The law of contracts

((onteil Haw $rlpial Htbrarij

Cornell University Library
KF 801.P27 1883
v.1

The law of contracts.

3 1924 018 824 353

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the Cornell University Library.

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THE

LAW OF CONTRACTS.

BY

THEOPHILUS PARSONS, LL.D.,

AUTHOR OP TREATISES ON THE ELEMENTS OP MERCANTILE LAW, ON THE LAW OP SHIPPING AND
ADMIRALTY, ON MARINE INSURANOE, ON PARTNERSHIP, ON NOTES AND BILLS,
AND ON THE LAVS OF BUSINESS POE BUSINESS MEN.

Volume I.

SEVENTH EDITION.

WITH ADDITIONS BY

WILLIAM V. KELLEN.

BOSTON:
LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY.

1883.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1853, by
Theophilus Parsons,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts.
Copyright renewed 1881, by Theophilus Parsons.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1855, by

Theophilus Paksons,

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts.

Copyright renewed 1883, by Catharine A. Parsons.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1857, by

Theophilus Parsons,

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1860, by

Theophilus Parsons,

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1864, by

Theophilus Parsons,

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1873, by

Theophilus Parsons,
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1883, by

David L. Webster, Francis A. Dewson, and Charles M. Keed, Trustees.

In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.

KF

University Press:
John Wilson and Son, Cambridge.

TO

WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT, ESQ.,

THE HISTORIAN OF SPAIN, MEXICO, AND PERU.

I might, perhaps, find some excuse for dedicating this work to
you, in the natural desire of connecting my own labors with those
which have won for you and for our country so much renown.
And even more in the friendship, which began so long ago we can-
not remember its beginning ; and in the long years, that through
childhood, youth, and manhood, have brought us upon the con-
fines of age, if not beyond them, has never for a moment been
broken.

But neither of these is my principal motive. That, I must
confess to be, a strong and irrepressible desire to speak of your
father ; to express, however imperfectly, my gratitude to him ; and
to execute, even in this slight degree, the purpose I have long had,
of putting on record my testimony to the excellence of one who
stood for many years at the head of his profession, who was my
master during my apprenticeship to the law, and ever after my
revered instructor and invaluable friend.

It was in 1815 that I entered his office as a student. I had been
accustomed all my life to see him often, and hear him often spoken
of, for our families were intimate, and he was among my father's
most valued friends; and I had always heard him mentioned with
a kind and degree of respect that seemed to be paid to him alone.
I knew that he had held the highest place in his profession for
some years ; but the regard and reverence generally accorded to
him were more than any mere professional success could win.
When I entered his office, he had already given up a large part of

IV DEDICATION.

his business. He did not go often into court ; but I heard him in
some important cases, and was a constant observer of the relations
■between him and his numerous clients. And it was not long
before I learned the grounds of his high social and professional
position.

In the first place, let me speak of his judgment and sagacity. 1
«annot conceive of any person possessing, in greater perfection,
that admirable thing we call good sense. I doubt whether, in his
long and active life, he ever made any one mistake of importance.
Whoever employed him in any business, soon saw that the wisest
thing that could be done in his case, and at every step of it, was
always the very thing that was done. Hence a confidence without
limit was reposed in his opinion ; and his advice was accepted and
followed by all who received it, as if it made further inquiry or
consideration wholly unnecessary.

The next quality I would mention, was a kindred and connected
one ; I mean his perfect truthfulness. It seemed as if he could
not deceive ; and if he had the faculty originally he must have lost
it by non-user. It made no difference on which side of a question
the party propounding it to him stood ; for his answer was to the
question, and not to the man. Whether he dealt with a client, an
adverse party, a witness, the jury, or the court, he dealt with them
all honestly. He had, what I am sorry to call the rare quality, of
loving truth so well, that his view of it was not to be distorted or
obstructed, either by any interest or any feeling of his own or of
those whom he represented, or by any disturbing influences of cir-
cumstances or position.

I speak last of his learning, although this was perhaps more
frequently remarked upon than his moral qualities, however deeply
they were felt. He had passed many years in laborious and well-
directed study ; for he was led to this, both by his sense of duty
to his clients, and by his sagacity, which told him that here he
must find the means of sound judgment and usefulness and suc-
cess ; and also by the love of his profession and of the law as a
science. For many years after he had withdrawn from the pro-

DEDICATION. V

fession, both as advocate and chamber-counsel, he still continued
his legal studies ; and often when I have called upon him and
stated some difficult question which had occurred in my practice,
he would — not for a fee — but in his kindness to me, and his love
of the law, enter upon the investigation with the zeal of earlier
days, and give me the whole benefit of his vast knowledge and his
unerring sagacity.

To these qualities I must add that of universal kindness and
unfailing courtesy. And certainly I have given good reasons why
he held so long the headship of a profession in which it is not easy
to climb to the high places, and very difficult to hold them ; and
also, why, outside of his profession and by society at large, he was
venerated during his long life as few men among us have ever
been. Let me add, that while he manifested, wherever in the con-
duct of his affairs it was needed, the firmness and fearlessness
that he inherited from a father who stood like a tower of strength
in command of the American forces at Bunker Hill, he was ever,
and remarkably, unassuming, retiring, and modest. It is difficult
to believe that he could not measure his own success, or that he
did not know his high position ; but no one ever heard a word or
a tone from him which indicated such knowledge.

He was not eloquent, and never, to my knowledge, attempted to
be ; and yet he was a most successful advocate. It was his pur-
pose and endeavor to do for every client, and in every case, all
that could be done by learning, sense, industry, and honesty ; this
he knew he could do, and did. And more than this he had no

desire to do. i0 ay

Such was William Peescott. When he died in 1844, at the
age of 82, 1 had known him intimately for twenty-nine years, and
had known of him many more. And I never yet heard a word
spoken, and I never heard of a word spoken, to his disparagement
or dispraise, during his long life or since its close, by any person
whomsoever; nor even have I heard the "but" or "if" with
which many indulge themselves in qualifying and clouding the
commendation they cannot but render. He has left behind him

VI DEDICATION.

no brilliant speeches to be remembered and quoted ; no books in
which the fruits of his learning and wisdom were gathered and
preserved ; and they who knew him are passing away, and already
his reputation is becoming traditional. And very glad shall I be,
if, by this slight memorial, I may, for a single moment, arrest the
waves of time, in their advancing flow over the sands in which are
written his name, and the names of many others of our best and
greatest.

THEOPHILUS PARSONS.
Cambridge, October, 1853.

ADVERTISEMENT TO THE SEVENTH EDITION.

The preparation of this edition of Parsons on Contracts was
begun by the editor under the supervision of the learned author.
The intention then was that such new matter as might be prepared
should be incorporated with the old, both in the text and the
notes, and that full responsibility for all changes should be borne
by the editor. After the death of Professor Parsons, however, it
was deemed advisable to present in this edition the text and notes
of the last edition, as revised by him, intact and unchanged, save
where subsequent statutory enactments made such changes im-
perative. The new matter which has been added appears in the
form of separate notes, which are indicated by numerals and ex-
tend across the page at the bottom. An attempt has been made
to give in the most compact form, consistent with clearness of
statement, the results of all the important cases decided since the
last edition was published. More than five thousand of such cases
have been digested from the original reports, and either cited or
the exact point decided presented briefly, in this edition. It is
hoped that the value of this standard work has been in some de-
gree increased, and that it will continue to give effective aid, as
the learned author intended it should, both to the student and

active practitioner.

W . V. K.

Boston, December, 1883.

CONTENTS.

PART I.

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS CONSIDERED IN REFERENCE TO THE
OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE PARTIES.

PRELIMINAEY CHAPTER.

Section I.

Page
Of the extent and scope of the law of contracts 3

Section II.
Definition of contracts 5

Section III.
Classification of contracts 7

BOOK I.

OF PARTIES TO A CONTRACT.
CHAPTER I.

Classification of Pahties

X CONTENTS.

CHAPTER II.

OF JOINT PARTIES.

Section I.
Whether parties are joint or several • 11

Section II.
Of some incidents of joinder • ■ 21

Section III.
Of contribution . ... 31

CHAPTER III.

AGENTS.

Section I.
Of agency in general ... . .... 38

Section II.
In what manner authority may be given to an agent . . . 46

Section III.
Subsequent confirmation . ... 48

Section IV.
Signature by an agent . .... 54

Section V
Duration and extent of authority . 59

Section VI.
The right of action under a contract . . .65

CONTENTS. x{

Section VII.
Liability of an agent 67

Section VIII.
Revocation of authority 73

Section IX.
How the principal is affected by the misconduct of his agent .... 78

Section X.
Of notice to an agent 80

Section XI.
Of shipmasters ... 84

Section XII.
Of an action against an agent to determine the right of a principal 85

Section XIII.
The rights and obligations of principal and agent as to each other . . 87

Section XIV.
Of public agents 98

CHAPTER IV.

FACTORS AND BROKERS.

Section I.

Who is a factor and who a broker 100

Section II.
Of factors under a commission ... 100

Section III.
Of the duties and the rights of factors and brokers 102

XU CONTENTS.

CHAPTER V.
Servants H2

CHAPTER VI.
Attorneys 122

CHAPTER VII.

TRUSTEES.

Section I.
Origin of trusts 133

Section II.
Classification of trusts 134

Section III.
Private trustees 135

Section IV.
Public trustees 138

CHAPTER VIII.

Executors and Administrators 141

CHAPTER IX.

GUARDIANS.

Section I.

Of the kinds of guardians 148

Section II.
Of the duty and power of a guardian 149

CONTENTS. Xlll

CHAPTER X.

Corporations 153

CHAPTER XI.
Joint-stock Companies 162

CHAPTER XII.

PARTNERSHIP.

Section I.
What constitutes a partnership ... . 165

Section II.
Of the real estate of a partnership 167

Section III.
Of the good-will .... 172

Section IV.
Of the delectus personarum 173

Section V.
How a partnership may be formed 174

Section VI.
Of the right of action between partners 184

-Section VII.
Of the sharing of losses 187

Section VIII.
Of secret and dormant partners 188

Xiv CONTENTS.

Section IX.
Of retiring partners

190

Section X.

1 Q3
Of nominal partners . . • • •

Section XI.
When a joint liability is incurred .... . 194

Section XII.
Of the authority of each partner . . ... ...... 196

Section XIII.
Power of a majority ... . . ..... 216

Section XIV.
Of dissolution ... . .... 218

Section XV.
Of the rights of creditors in respect to partnership funds .... . 231

Section XVI.
Limited partnership .... . . 240

CHAPTER XIII.

New Parties by Novation . . • 244

CHAPTER XIV.

NEW PARTIES BY ASSIGNMENT.

Section I.

Of assignments of choses in action 250

Section II.
Of the manner of assignment 256

CONTENTS.

XT

Section III.
Of the equitable defences 257

Section IV.
Covenants annexed to land 259

- CHAPTER XV.

GIFTS.

Section I.

Of gifts inter vivos 262

Section II.
Of gifts causa mortis 265

CHAPTER XVI.

INDORSEMENT.

Section I.

Of the nature and effect of indorsement 268

Section II.
Of the essentials of negotiable notes and bills 276

Section III.
Who may indorse 283

Section IV.
Of indorsement after maturity 288

Section V.
Of accommodation paper 293

XVI CONTENTS.

Section VI.
01 notes on demand 294

Section VII.
Of the transfer of bills and notes 297

Section VIII.
Of presentment for acceptance 302

Section IX.
Of presentment for payment 305

Section X.
Of whom, when, and where, the demand should be made 311

Section XI.
Of notice of non-payment 314

Section XII.
Of protest 325

Section XIII.
Of damages for non-payment of bills 327

Section XIV.
Bills of lading 328

Section XV.
Of property passing with possession 329

CONTENTS. XVii

CHAPTER XVII.

INFANTS.

Section I.

Incapacity of infants to contract 333

Section II.
Of the obligations of parents in respect to infant children 338

Section III.
Voidable contracts for necessaries 352

Section IV.
Of the torts of an infant 356

Section V.
Of the effect of an infant's avoidance of his contract 360

Section VI.
Of ratification 363

Section VII.
Who may take advantage of an infant's liability 369

Section VIII. 33-
Of the marriage settlements of an infant 371

Section IX.
Infant's liability with respect to fixed property acquired by his contract . 372

Section X.

Of illegitimate children 376

vol. 1. b

XV111 CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XVIII.

OF THE CONTRACTS OF MARRIED WOMEN.

Section I.

Of the general effect of marriage ... 378

Section II.
Of the contracts of a married woman made before marriage .... 380

Section III.
Of the contracts of a married woman made during her marriage . . 384

Section IV.
Of the disability of a wife to act as a single woman 405

Section V.
Of the separate estate of a married woman 408

CHAPTER XIX.

PERSONS OF INSUFFICIENT MIND TO CONTRACT.

Section I.

Non compotes mentis .... . 433

Section II.
Spendthrifts 439

Section III.
Seamen 440

Section IV.
Persons under duress 443

CONTENTS. XIX

CHAPTER XX.
Aliens 447

CHAPTER XXI.

Of Outlaws, Peesons attainted, and Persons excommunicated . 451

BOOK II.

CONSIDERATION AND ASSENT.

CHAPTER I.

CONSIDERATION.

Section I.
The necessity of a consideration 455

Section II.
Kinds of consideration 458

Section III.
Adequacy of consideration 465

Section IV.
Prevention of litigation 467

Section V.
Forbearance *7"

Section VI.
Assignment of debt *' 4

XX CONTENTS.

Section VII.

475
Work and service

Section VIII.
Trust and confidence .... 476

Section IX.
A promise for a promise 477

Section X.
Subscription and contribution 482

Section XI.
Of consideration void in part 485

Section XII.
Illegality of consideration 486

Section XIII.
Impossible considerations .... 489

Section XIV.
Failure of consideration 492

Section XV.
Mights of a stranger to the consideration 496

Section XVI.
The time of the consideration 498

CONTENTS. XXi

CHAPTER II.

ASSENT OF THE PARTIES.

Section I.
What the assent must be ^9° - . 505

Section II.
Contracts on time 510

BOOK III

THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF CONTRACTS.

CHAPTER I.
Preliminary Remarks 519

CHAPTER II.
Purchase and Sale op Real Property 522

CHAPTER III.

' e
HIEING OF REAL PROPERTY.

Section I.
Of the lease ^. . 530

Section II.
Of the general liabilities of the lessor 531

Section III.
Of the general liability and obligation of the tenant 533

XX11 CONTENTS.

Section IV.
Of surrender of leases by operation of law 543

Section V.
Of away-going crops 544

Section VI.
Of fixtures 545

Section VII.
Of notice to quit 547

Section VIII.
Of apportionment of rent . . . . 550

Section IX.
Of remedy for non-payment of rent 552

CHAPTER IV.

PURCHASE AND SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.

Section I.
Essentials of a sale 555

Section II.
Absolute sale of chattels 557

Section III.
Price, and agreement of parties 561

Section IV.
The effect of a sale 562

CONTENTS. XXlii

Section V.
Of possession and delivery 568

Section VI.

Conditional sales 577

safoj

Section VII.
Bought and sold notes 583

Section VIII.
Of sales to arrive 594

Section IX.
Mortgages of chattels 611

CHAPTER V.
Warranty 614

CHAPTER VI.
STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

Section I.

What the right of stoppage is, and who has it 639

■-'.sit:: .

Section II.
When and how the right may be exercised 645

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

[The references are to the bottom paging.]

A.

Page

Aaron v. Second Avenue R. R. Co. iii. 199

A. B.'s Estate i. 127

Abat v. Penny i. 224

Abbey v. Chase i. 65, 72

v. Dewey ii. 713

v. Devo i. 387

Abbot v. Bayley i. 372

v. Hermon i. 600

v. Massie ii. 680

Abbott v. Alsdorf i. 623

v. Broome ii. 513

v. Burbage iii. 442

v. Fisher i. 469

v. Goodwin i. 012

v. Hendricks i- 290

v. Hicks iii. 439, 462, 469

v. Keith ii. 848 ; iii. 79

v. Parfitt i. 143

v. Rogers i. 489

v. Rose ii. 861

v. Sebor ii. 511

v. Shawmut Ins. Co. ii. 557

v. Shepard i. 515

v. Stratten iii. 374

Abeel v. Radcliff i. 532 ; iii. 14, 19

Abell, Ex parte i- 238

o. Warren i. 337

Aberfoyle, The ii- 454

Abernethy v. Hutchinson ii. 332

Abington v. North Bridgewater ii. 708

Abitbol v. Bristow ii- 528

Abnev v. Kingsland i- 570

Abo, The ii- 519

Aborn v. Bosworth i. 332

Abraliam v. Plestoro iii- 409, 436

v. Reynolds Ji- 46

Abrahams v. Bunn iii. 125, 135

Abrahat v. Brandon ii- 837

Abrams a. Pomeroy ii- 685

Absolon v. Marks }■ 278

Acatos v. Burns ii- 456

Acebal v. Levy i. 562 ; iii. 14, 51, 53

Acey v. Fernie i- 42, 59 ; ii. 617

Acherley v. Vernon ii- 659, 660

Acheson v. Chase iii- 144

Acker v. Ledyard ii. 860; iii. 314

o. Phoenix i. 562

Acker v. Withrill i. 654

Ackerman v. Emott i. 137

Ackermann v. Ehrensperger iii. Ill

Ackerson v. Erie R. R. Co. iii. 186

Ackland v. Pearce iii. 127

Ackley v. Kellogg ii. 150, 151, 227, 230

v. Hoskins i. 56

Acome v. The Am. Itinera! Co. i. 504

Acorn, The ii. 437

A'Court v. Cross iii. 71, 76

Acraman v. Morrice iii. 434

Ada, The ii. 637

Adair v. Brimmer i. 146

v. Winchester i. 251

Adam, Ex parte iii. 414

Adams v. Adams i. 351 ; ii. 93

v. Blanhenstein ii. 196

v. Blethen i. 271

v. Blodgett iii. 402

u. Burks " ii. 321

v. Carroll i. 183

v. Claxton iii. 300, 421

v. Clem ii. 158

v. Coulliard ii. 894

v. Curtis i. 399

e. Edwards ii. 306

v. Frye ii- 857

v. Gay ii. 900, 905, 906

v. Hackett iii- 502

v. Hamell ii- 900

v. Hardy i. 274, 283

v. Haught ii- 418

v. Hayes i- 263

v. Hill ii- 635

v. Johnson i- 622

v. Jones ii- 4, 14

v. Kerr ii- 719

v. Lambert i. 524, 682

a. Lindsell i- 514

v. London & Blackwall Railway

Co. iii- 307

v. Mackay i- 409

v. Malkin iii- 416

v. M'Millan iii- 12, 14
v. New OrleanB Steam Tow-Boat

Co. ii- 182

v. O'Conner i- 580

*. O'Connor i- 578

XXVI

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Adams v. Otterbank i. 321, 669

v. Palmer iii. 499

v. Robinson i. 246

v. Rockingham Ins. Co. ii. 476, 576

v. •Saundars ii- 5.36

v. Scales iii- 11

v. Shelby ii. 923

v. Smith i. 292

v. Statliam ii. 826

v. Steer ii- 636

v. Storey iii- 385

v. Tapling ii. 823

v. The Sophia ii- 461

;;. Torbert i. 315

v. Townsend iii. 66

v. Warner ii. 639

v. Warren Ins. Co. ii- 483

v. Way iii- 113

v. Wlieeler i. 569

v. Williams ii. 6d3

v. Woonsocket Co. ii. 45

Adams Express Co. v. Darnell ii. 203

v. Egbert iii. 207

!■. Nock ii. 200

v. Reagan ii- 271

o. Wilson ii- 227
Adamson v. Jarvis i. 36, 87 ; ii. 927 ;

iii. 206

Aday v. Echols iii. 358

Adderley v. Dixon iii. 324

Addington v. Allen ii. 915

Addis v. Knight iii. 469

Addison v. Gandassequi i- 105

v. Gray ii. 827, 835

v. Kentucky Ins. Co. ii. 555

Adeline, The ' ii. 441

Adkins v. Baker ii. 392

v. Watson iii. 17

Adlard v. Booth i. 494

Admiral, The ii. 434

A. D. Patchin, The i. 442

Adventure, The ii. 440

iEtna Bank v. Winchester ii. 853

iEtna Ins. Co. u. Prance ii. 556, 598,

606

v. Olmstead ii. 543

v. Resh ii. 557

v. Tyler ii. 564, 574,583, 587; iii. 295

Aflalo v. Fourdrinier iii. 463

African Steamship Co. u. Swanzy ii. 454

Agar v. Biden iii. 366

v. Macklew ii. 845 ; iii. 332

Agawam Bank v. Strever ii. 24

Agawam Co. v. Jordan ii. 304

Agnew v. Bank of Gettysburg i. 321

v. Ins. Co. ii. 571

v. McElroy ii. 868, 871

v. Piatt ' iii. 392, 394, 437, 508

Agra, &c. Bank v. Leighton iii. 224

Agricola, The i. 117 ; ii. 469

Agricultural Bank u. Bissell iii. 139

v. Commercial Bank i. 326

v. The Jane ii. 404

Aguilar v. Rodgers ii. 478, 480

Aguire v. Parmelee i. 650

Ahearn v. Ayres ?' 5o2

Ahern v. Easterby .}.■ "'

Ah Thaie v. Quan Wan *}■ y.°

Aid, The '!• ?4°

Aigen v. Boston, &c. R. Co. '• ™»

Aiken v. Barkley };. ^Ji

v. Benton ln- 69

v. Dolan »■ 314

v. Manchester Print Works ii. 317,

320, 321

u. Sanford ii- 790, 875

v. Short i- 496

Ainslie v. Boynton i- 248, 258

v. Goff ii- 842

v. Medlycott i. 481 ; ii. 927

Ainsworth v. Partillo iii- 204

v. Walmsley ii. 367, 373, 375

Akerblom v. Price, &c. Co. ii. 440

Akerman v. Humphery i. 652 ; iii. 444,

445
Akhurst v. Jackson iii. 429, 435

Albany Exchange Bank v. Johnson

iii. 472

Albatross, The, n Wayne ii. 392

Albert v. Lindau i. 558 ; ii. 764

v. Winn i. 410

Albertson v. Halloway i. 495

Albin v. Presby ii. 166

Albion Bank ;;. Burns ii. 28

Albro v. Agawam Canal Co. ii. 46

Alchorne v. Gomme i- 540

Alcott v. Avery iii. 477

Alden v. Blague ii- 824

v. Clark ii. 6

v. Dewey ii. 305, 327

<■. Goddard ii. 810 ; iii. 102

t-. New York, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 236

i'. Pearson ii. 414

Alder v. Keighley iii. 187, 435

v. Saville ii. 832, 836

Alderman v. Eastern R. Co. i. 570, 579

Alderson v. Pope i. 188, 211

<■. Temple i. 654

Aldis v. Chapman i. 393

Aldrich v. Albee ii. 783, 784, 785

v. Chubb ii. 3

v. Grimes i. 368

v. Kinney ii. 740

v. Reynolds iii. 129

v. Simmons ii. 468

v. Warren i. 273

Aldridge v. Johnson i. 565

v. Turner ii. 6

Ale wy n, Ex parte iii. 464

v. Pryor i. 604, 606

Alexander, Ex parte iii. 420

u. Alexander i. 88, 89

v. Burnet iii. 103, 104

v. Comber iii. 59

v. Deneale i. 569

v. Dowie ii. 387

v. Dutton i. 635

v, Gardner i. 566, 574, 594

v. Germania Ins. Co. ii. 543, 546

v. Ghiselin iii. 308, 344

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

XXT11

Alexander v. Gibson
v. Greene
v. Heriot
v. Herr
v. Hickox
v. Hutcheson
v. McKenzie
v. Merry
v. Morgan
v. N. W. Univ.
v. Pierce
v. Polk
v. Pratt

f. Springfield Bank
v. Thomas
v. Wellington
v. Whipple

i. 62
ii. 181
i. 367
iii. 237
ii. 862
i. 363
ii. 333
iii. 12
i. 383

i. 94
i. 444
ii. 908
ii. 528
i. 292
i. 280
i. 256
iii. 103

Alexander, The ii. 385, 403, 404

Alexandre v. Sun Ins. Co. ii. 517

Alexandria Canal Co. v. Swann ii. 825
Alfred v. Fitzjames ii. 51

Alger v. Kennedy i. 542

o. Seoville iii. 24, 26

v. Thacker ii. 890, 891

Alida, The ii. 383

Aline, The ii. 403

Alivon v. Furnival ii. 738 ; iii. 429

Alkan v. New Hampshire Ins. Co. ii. 557,

575

Aikinson v. Horridge i. 635

Allaback v. Utt iii. 181

Allaire v. Hartshorne i. 292

v. Whitney iii. 235

Allaire Works r. Guion iii. 206

Allan v. Eldred i. 303

v. Gripper i. 648

Allard v. Greasert iii. 53

v. Lamirande ii. 909

Allegre v. Maryland Ins. Co. ii. 484, 524,

587, 667, 844

Allen v. Aldrich i. 393, 396

v. Allen ii. 730

v. Anderson i. 637; iii. 245

v. Bennett iii. 4, 9, 18

v. Blunt ii. 304; iii. 176

v. Brown ii. 28

v. Bryan i. 95

v. Burke iii. 309

v. Cameron i. 494

v. Centre Valley Co. i. 240

v. Chambers iii. 347

v. Charlestown Ins. Co. ii. 555,

560
v. Citizens, &c. Co. i. 155

v. Commercial Ins. Co. ii. 397, 505,
506, 507, 515
v. Culver i. 536

v. Davis i. 77, 167

v. Deming ii. 900, 905, 907

v. Duffle ii. 901

v. Dunn i. 233

v. Dykers ii. 124, 126

v. Edgerton ii. 815

v. Fosgate i. 11

v. Fourth Bank i. 800

Allen v. Hallet

ii. 459

v. Ham

iii. 267

</. Harrah

i. 312

v. Hay ward

i. 116, 120

v. Hearn

ii. 897

v. Hooker

i. 637

v. Hunter

ii. 317

v. Jackson

ii. 79

v. Jarvis

iii. 224

v. Kincaid

ii. 664

v. King

i. 307

v. Lenoir

i. 406

u. Mackay

ii. 429, 431, 433, 455

v. McKean

iii. 488

v. Merchants Bank i. 41 ; ii. 112,

674
v. Merchants Bank of N. Y. i. 67

v. Mille iii. 107

v. Minor i. 335, 353

v. Mutual Ins. Co. ii. 545, 547, 551,

562

v. New Gas Co. ii. 46

v. Pink i. 634

v. Polereczky i. 263

v. Rawson ii. 305

v . Rescous ii. 886

v. Rightmere ii. 31

o. Sewell ii. 181, 194

v. Sharpe ii. 753

v. Smith's Adm'r i. 307, 308

v. Sugrue ii. 507

v. Suydam i. 92 ; iii. 206

v. Thompson ii. 9 ; iii. 27

v. Watson ii. 847

„. Wells i. 232, 238

v. Williams i. 329 ; ii. 411

v. Woonsocket Co. i. 166, 224

Allen's Estate iii. 348

Aller v. Aller i. 457

Allerton v. Lang i. 264

Alleson v. Marsh ii. 459

Alletson v. Chichester ii. 610

Alley v. Deschamps iii. 305, 338, 339

Alliance Bank v. Kearsley i. 207

Alliance Ins. Co. v. La. State Ins. Co.

ii. 541, 567
Allibone v. Hager i. 161

Allies v. Probyn ii. 819

Allin v. Shadburne ii. 852

Ailing v. Boston, &c. R. Co. ii. 274

Allison v. Haydon ii. 60

Allkins v. Jupe i- 111

Allmand v. Russell iii. 382

Allnutt v. Ashenden ii. 24

Allore v. Jewell i. 435

Alloway v. Braine iii. 311

Allwood v. Haseldon i. 306

Alman v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 543

Almgren v. Dutilh ii. 420, 421

Almy v. Wilcox i. 393

v. Winslow i. 281

Alna v. Henckell ii. 512

v. Plummer iii. 12, 14, 248

Alner v. George ii- 749

Aloffi*. Scrimshaw ii. 850

XXV111

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Alonzo Pearce, Matter of iii. 477

Alsager, Ex parte iii. 427

v. St. Katherine's Dock Com-
pany ii. 413, 648
Alsop v. Coit ii. 526
v. Commercial Ins. Co. ii. 483, 489,

491

v. Price iii. 466

Alston v. Balls ii. 134

v. Herring ii. 417

v. Mechanics Ins. Co. ii. 524, 552

v. State Bank iii. 82

Altham's case ii. 689

Althorfe v. Wolfe i. 130

Alvanley v. Kinnaird iii. 370, 371

Alves v. Hodgson ii. 700

Alvord v. Smith i. 174

Alvord Carriage Co. v. Gleason i. 546

Amble v. Whipple i. 219

Ambler v. Bradley i. 180

Ambrose v. McDonald i. 130

Amelia, The ii. 390

Amer v. Longstretli i. 93 ; iii. 183,

186

Amer., &c. Co. v. Gurnee ii. 28

v. Wolf ii. 203

American Bank v. Doolittle i. 210

v. Jenness i. 290

American Express Co. v. Sands ii. 270

American Ins. Co. u. Bryan ii. 499

r. Center ii. 507, 510

v. Day ii. 586, 592

v. Francia ii. 506

p. Griswold ii. 484, 492, 493, 536

u. Henley ii. 614

v. Hutton ii. 488

v. Klink ii. 614, 615

v. Mahone ii. 543

u. Oakley i. 154

o. Ogden ii. 397, 506, 507, 530,

531

v. Robertshaw ii. 605

American Wine Co. v. Brasher ii. 922

Amery v. Rogers ii. 480

Ames v. Chew iii. 456

v. Colburn ii. 861

u. Dyer ii. 383

!>. Foster iii. 26

v. Gilman iii. 427

.'. Howard ii. 303, 307, 315

v. King ii. 373

v. Merriam i. 296

,,. Millvvard ii. 832

v. Quimby i. 561

Amethyst, The ii. 436, 437, 439, 441

Amherst Academy v. Cowls i. 484

Amiable Nancy iii. 186, 196

Amicable Society v. Bolland ii. 601,

610
Amidown v. Osgood i. 192

i". Woodman i. 322

Amies v. Stevens ii. 171, 172

Amis i: The Louisa ii. 384

Amor r. Fearon ii. 38, 39

Amory v. Broilerjck i. 572, 580

Amory i\ Francis
v. Gilman
v. Jones
e. Kannoffsky
v. McGregor
v. Melvin

iii. 468

ii. 489, 896

ii. 602

i. 41, 543

iii. 206

i. 534

Amoskeag, &c. Co. v. John Adams,

The i|- 435

v. Moore '• 315

Amoskeag Man. Co. v. Garner ii. 377

v. Spear ii. 352, 358, 370, 371, 373,

374, 375, 377

Amsinck i\ Bean i- 224; iii. 475

Amstel, The ii- 385

Ancher v. Bank of England J. 286

Ancrum v. Slone iih 114

Anderson v. Anderson ii- 92

v. Baker i-264

v. Bruner i- 02

v. Buckton iii. 239

u. Burnett ii. 915

v. Chenney i- 232

a. Chick ' hi. 12

„. Clark iii._278

u. Coonley i- 39

v. Davis ii. 8

v. Drake i- 311

„. Edie ii. 605

u. Ewing iii- 233

6-. Fitzgerald ii. 596, 598

v. Harold iii. 6

v. Hawkins ii- 753

< . Hodgson i. 573

v. Mannon ii. 28

u. Martindale i. 14, 17, 23, 31

v. Miller i. 255 ; iii. 435

v. Morice i. 601

i). New Jersey ii. 47

v. Nicholas i. 570

o. Pitcher ii. 670

o. Pope i. 193

v. Powell i. 175

v. Kobson i. 332

v. Scott iii. 46

u. Simpson iii. 39

r. Smith i. 541

t: Thornton ii. 481, 522, 525

v. Tomkins i. 200, 201, 207

v. Turnpike Co. i. 29

v. Van Alen i. 258

v. Wallace ii. 834

«'. Wheeler iii. 508

Andover, The ii. 412

Andover Savings Bank v. Adams ii. 709

Andree v. Fletcher ii. 481

Andrew v. Allen i. IW

v. Boughey ii. 751

v. Dieterich ii. 914

Andrewes v. Carstin i. 175

Andrews v. Belfield ii. 03

v. Bell iii. 339

o. Bond i. 253, 2K6

o. Boyd i. 308

v. Brown iii. 68, 359

v. Campbell i. 248

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

XXIX

Andrews v. Durant ii. 380, 650

v. Essex Insurance Company ii. 495,
496, 540
v. Estes i. 55; ii. 421

v. Franklin i. 280

v. Herriot ii. 719, 738, 740

v. His Creditors ii. 700

v. Hoxie i. 309

v. Jones i. 382

u. Kneeland i. 62, 628

v. Lyon ii. 944

v. Palmer iii. 427

v. Planters Bank i. 210

v. Pond ii. 700, 713, 714; iii. 110,
119, 145
v. Torry ii. 702

v. Wheaton i. 495

Andrus v. Foster ii. 51

Angel v. Hartford Ins. Co. ii. 543

v. McLellan i. 346, 349

Angell v. Duke iii. 38

v. Hartford Ins. Co. ii. 616

Angelo v. Angelo ii. 91

Angerstein v. Bell ii. 488

v. Handson i. 537

Angier v. Angier i. 401

v. Taunton Paper Manufactur-
ing Co. iii. 210
Angle v. North Western Ins. Co. ii. 861
Angus v. Kedford ii. 833, 834
Anketel v. Converse iii. 294
Anna Kimball, The ii. 413
Annandale v. Harris i. 377, 465
Ann C. Pratt, The ii. 403, 404
Ann Caroline, The ii. 432
Ann D. Richardson, The ii. 452
Annen v. Woodman ii. 480
Annie Lindsley, The ii. 431
Anonymous i. 12, 60, 140, 251, 261 ;
ii. 217, 460, 716, 765, 817, 840 ; iii. 35,
108, 117, 125, 136, 138, 141, 167, 289,
414,417,427,439,452
Ansell, Ex parte iii. 429
v. Robson iii. 447
Anstey v. Marden iii. 26
Anstruther v. Adair ii. 730
Antarctic, The ii. 383, 384
Anthony v. Stinson ii. 881
Antoni v. Belknap i. 546
Antonio v. Clissey iii. 28
Antram v. Chace i 481 ; ii. 838
Antrobus v. Smith i. 263; iii. 315
Apollo, The ii. 388
Apperson v. Cross ii. 28
Appleby v. Dodd i. 441 ; ii. 458
v. Johnson i. 505
Applegate v. Jacoby ii. 635
v. Moffitt i. 62
Appleton v. Binks i. 68 ; ii. 32
a. Chase i. 481
v. Donaldson ii. 127
v. Fullerton iii. 234
v. Parker ii. 756
Appleton Iron Co. v. Brit. Am. Ass.
Co. ii. 576

Appollon, The

iii. 175

Aquila, The

ii. 440

Araminta, The

ii. 467

Aranguren v. Scholfield

i. 331

Aranzamendi v. La. Ins. Co.

ii. 509

Arehard v. Hornor

ii. 37, 44

Archer v. Baynes

' iii. 5, 14

v. Dunn

ii. 878

v. English

ii. 722

v. Hudson

i. 161

v. Marsh

ii. 890

v. Merchants, &c. Ins. Co. ii. 545

v. Putnam iii. 117

v. Williams iii. 191

v. Williamson ii. 834

v. Zeh iii. 48

Archibald v. Merc. Ins. Co. ii. 497

v. Mutual Ins. Co. ii. 609

v. Thomas ii. 631

Arctic, &c. Ins. Co. v. Austin ii. 182

Arden v. Pullen i. 532, 533

n. Tucker i. 22

v. Watkins iii. 451

Ardesco Oil Co. v. Gilson ii. 46

v. Richardson i. 536

Arey v. Stevenson iii. 75

Argall v. Bryant iii. 99

!■. Smith i. 242

Argenbright v. Campbell iii. 318, 347,

352

Argus Co. v. Mayor, &c. of Albany iii. 15

Argyle v. Worthington ii. 392

Arkell v. Commerce Ins. Co. ii. 552

Armadillo, The ii. 403

Armel v. Inness ii. 535

Armfield v. Tate i. 367

Armiger v. Clarke iii. 366

Armington v. Barnet iii. 494, 498

Armistead v. Butler ii. 877

v. White ii. 147

!-. Wilde ii. 158

Armitage v. Insole i. 572

Armitt v. Breame ii. 798, 835

Armour v. McMichael i. 293

v. Mich., &c. R. Co. i. 59

v. Pecker i. 580

v. Transatlantic Fire Ins. Co. ii. 554

Armroyd !.•. Union Ins. Co. ii. 413, 418,

419

Arms v. Ashley i. 458

A. R. M. S. N. Co. v. Marzetti i. 154

Armstrong v. Baldock i. 530

v. Burrows ii. 687

v. Cristiani i. 322

v. Hussey i. 189

v. Lawson iii. 37

v. Lewis i. 175

v. McDonald i. 349

v. Percy iii. 176, 227, 229

v. Robinson i- 126

v. Stokes i- 65, 67

o. Toler i. Ill, 486 ; ii. 894

v. Wheeler iii- 424

Armstrong, &c. Co. v. Kosure ii. 814

v, Arnold ii. 869

XXX

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Arnold v. Brown i. 201, 202, 207, 224,

225

v. Crowder i. 546

v. Downing iii. 77, 82

v. Dresser i. S23

v. Halenbake ii. 181

v. Hudson River R. R. Co. iii. 496

i'. 111. Cent. R. Co. ii. 238, 270

!». Lyman i. 245, 497

••■ Maynard iii. 441, 442

v. Mayor of Poole ii. 763 ; iii. 367

v. Prout i. 574

v. Richmond Iron Works i. 369, 434;

ii. 713

v. Spurr i. 387

v. Wainwright i. 170

Arnot v. Biscoe i. 621

v. Erie R. Co. ii. 7

v. Woodbum i. 290

Arnott v. Hughes i. 62 1

v. Redfern iii. 113

Arnsby v. Woodward i. 539

Arques v. Wasson i. 613

Arrington v. Cary i. 109

v. Liscom iii. 109

Arrott v. Brown i. 921

Arthur v. Barton i. 84

u. Cole ii. 79

v. The Schooner Cassius ii. 414, 416,

456; iii. 206

Arton v. Booth i. 210; ii. 852

Ascough's case i. 541

Ash v. Putnam i. 653; ii. 914

v. Savage i. 612

Ashburner v. Balchen ii. 422, 423

Ashburnham v. Thompson i. 137

Ashby v. Ashby i. 143

v. James iii. 83

o. White iii. 233, 234

Ashcroft v. Morrin iii. 14

Ashford v. Hand iii. 202

Ashhurst v. Montour Iron Co. iii. 377,

378

Ashley v. Ashley ii. 609

o. Harrison iii. 193

v. Pratt ii. 534, 535

Aslilin v. White ii. 917

Ashmole v. Wainwright ii. 185

Ashmore v. Charles iii. 230

Ashworth v. Builders' Ins. Co. ii. 547

Aspdin v. Austin ii. 49

Aspinall v. Wake i. 146

Aspinwall v. Bartlet ii. 459

v. Torrance i. 70

Associated Firemen's Ins. Co. o.

Assum ii. 584

Astin v. Parkin iii. 237

Astley v. Reynolds i. 445 ; ii. 775;

iii. 290

v. Weldon iii. 170, 172

Aston v. Heavan ii. 180, 233

Astor v. Miller i. 260

v. Price iii. 119

v. Union Insurance Company ii. 523,

667

Asylum v. New Orleans _ iii- 499

Atchinson v. Baker ii- 68, 70

Atchison v. Gee ii- 897

Atchison, &c. R. Co. v. Flinn ii- 240

Athelstan v. Moon ii- 828

Atherton v. Brown ii- 518

v. Hitchings iii- 107

v. Newhall iii- 50

v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii- 575

v. Tilton i. 180

Athol Music Hall Co. v. Carey ^ i. 483

Atkin v. Acton ii- 38, 43

v. Barwick i- 563, 654

Atkins v . Boylston Fire and Marine

Ins. Co. ii. 798

v. Burrows ii. 464

v. Cobb iii. 219, 222

v. Curwood i. 387, 388

v. Equitable Ass. Soc. iii. 455

v. Hill i. 141

v. Howe i. 633

v. Johnson i. 36

v. Sleeper ii. 635

v. Tredgold iii. 87, 88

Atkinson, Ex parte iii. 416

c. Bayntun i. 470

v. Bell ii. 380

i-. Brindall iii. 442

v. Brooks i. 292

v. Brown ii. 666,- 794

v. Cotesworth ii. 454

v. Denby i. 446

v. Elliott iii. 469

v. Great Western In3. Co. ii. 500

v. Jordan iii. 382, 383

<■. Maline ii. 380, 395, 400; iii. 443

u. Manks i. 279

v. Ritchie i. 574, 606, 607 ; ii. 805

v. Settree i. 471

v. Teasdale ii. 883

v. The State Bank ii. 863

Atkyns v. Amber i. 107

v. Byrnes i. 552

v. Kinnier iii. 172

v. Pearce i. 344

Atlantic, The ii. 402, 403

Atlantic Bank v. Savery i. 83

Atlantic Ins. Co. u. Conard ii. 404

v. Storrow ii. 499

v. Wright ii. 587

Atlantic, &c. R. R. Co. v. Dunn iii. 184

Atlantic, &c. Tel. Co. v. Barnes ii. 31

Atlas, The ii. 401, 402

Atlee v. Backhouse i. 445, 469 ; ii. 823

Attenboro v. McKenzie i. 282

Attilla, The ii. 401

Att'y-Gen. v. Alford i. 136

v. Ansted i. 78

... Brooke i. 532

v. Case ii. 468

v. Clapham ii. 632, 696

«• Davy j, 160

"■ Day iii. 12, 346, 362

v. Dunn jj. 709

v. Norstedt ij. 398

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

XXXI

Att'y-Gen. v. North American Ins.

Co. ii. 615

t>. Plate Glass Co. ii. 686

v. Riddle i. 47

v. Sands i. 133

v. Shore ii. 696

v. Sibthorp ii. 689

</. Siddon i. 114

v. Sitwell iii. 354

Attwood, Ex parte iii. 422
v. Clark i. 581 ; ii. 666, 794

v. Munnings i. 41, 63

v. Small i. 78 ; ii. 924

v. Taylor ii. 769; iii. 112

v. iii. 316

Attwool v. Attvrool ii. 879

Atwater v. Clancy i. 629

v. Townsend ii. 719 ; iii. 391

v. Woodbridge iii. 498

Atwell v. Mayhew iii. 48

Atwill v. Ferritt ii. 336, 338

Atwood v. Cobb ii. 683, 794

i>. Emery ii. 629, 666

o. Gillett i. 224, 225

v. Partridge iii. 462

v. Sellar ii. 446

v. Vincent iii. 297

v. Weeden ii. 896

r. Whittlesey iii. 121

Aubert v. Maze ii. 835, 838

Aubery !-. Fiske i. Ill

Aubin v. Bradley i. 578

Auburn Bank v. Lewis iii. 124

Audenreid v. Randall i. 568, 651

Audenried v. Betteley ii. 937

Auer v. Penn iii. 39

Ault v. Goodrich iii. 96

Aultman v. Jett ii. 757

v. Lee ii. 745, 747

Aultman, &c. Co. v. Hetherington ii. 757 ;

iii. 219

Auriol v. Mills iii. 448, 449

v. Thomas iii. 143

Aurora, The ii. 404

Aurora Borealis, The, v. Dobbie ii. 392

Aurora City v. West ii. 870 ; iii. 113

Aurora Ins. Co. v. Eddy ii. 652

v. Kranich ii. 587

Austen v. Wilward i. 28

Austill v. Crawford iii. 204

Austin, Ex parte iii. 428

v. Bethnal Green Guardians i. 154

v. Bostwick iii. 88

v. Boyd i. 274-283

v. Burns i. 279, 280

v. Caverley iii. 491

v. Cbarlestown Female Seminary

i. 370

v. Drew ii. 567, 669

v. Hall i. 26

v. Holland i. 190

v. Johnson iii. 403

v. Lawar i. 151

v. Munro i. 145

v. Sawyer iii. 35

Austin v. The M. S. &L. Railway Co.

ii. 250, 204, 265, 268

v. Walker iii. 119

v. Wilson i. 326, 408 ; iii. 185

Australia Bank v. White ii. 113

Australian Royal Mail Steam Nav.

Co. v. Marzetti i. 154

Auworth r. Johnson i. 535

Averill v. Hedge i. 614

v. Irish ii. 129

v. Loucks i. 169 ; iii. 402

Averline v. Whisson i. 124

Avery i>. Baum ii. 939

v. Bowden ii. 425

v. Cheslyn i. 547

v. Hackley iii. 421

v. Lauve i. 165

v. Pitch iii. 202

v. Scott ii. 846

v. Stewart i. 321 ; ii. 783, 797,

799

v. Wilson i. 572

Aveson v. Kinnaird ii. 693

Awde v. Dixon i. 273, 285

Ayer v. Bartlett i. 678

v. Chase ii. 57

v. Hall ii. 377

v. Hawkins ii. 763 ; iii. 82

v. Hutchins i. 293, 295

v. New England Ins. Co. ii. 600

< . Spring iii. 239

v. Warren i. 407

Ayers v. Hewitt i. 369; ii. 924

Aylett v. Ashton iii. 357, 368

Ayliff v. Arclidale i. 353

v. Tracy ii. 77 ; iii. 33

Aymar v. Astor ii. 181, 428

v. Sheldon i. 314

Aynsworth, Ex parte iii. 171

Ayres v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. i. 467

v. Home Ins. Co. ii. 675

v. Western R. Co. ii. 262

Ayton v. Bolt iii. 71

B.

B. & E. R. Co. v. Collins

ii. 227

Babb v. Clemson

i. 568

Babcock v. Beman

i. 288

v. Case

ii. 814

v. Hawkins

ii. 818

v. Herbert

ii. 181

v. Montgomery

Ins. Co.

ii. 567, 569,
571

v. Orbison

i. 91

v. Smith

i. 400

v. Stone

i. 209

v. Thompson

ii. 896

v. Weston

iii. 394

v. Wilson

i. 481

Bach v. Longman

ii. 334

v. Owen

i. 572, 580

SXX11

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Bachelder v. Fiske

i. 30, 32

Bailey v. Smith

i. 562, 564

Bachelour v. Gage

iii. 449

v. Smock

i. 281

Bachurst v. Clinckard

i. 234

v. Taylor

ii. 344, 861

Backhouse v. Charlton

i. 227

v. The Mayor of New York iii. 483

o. Mohun

iii. 345, 365, 371

Baile'yville v. Lowell

i. 474

r. Sneed

ii. 171

Baillie v. Kell

ii. 43

Backman v. Jenks

i. 282

Bailly, Ex parte

iii. 414

v. Wright

i. 486

Baily v. Curling

ii. 833

Backus e. Coyne

i. 206 ; ii. 447

i: Merrell

ii. 920

v. Lebanon

iii. 486, 494, 498

v. Taylor

ii. 348, 349

o. Spaulding

i. 477

Bain v. Brown

i. 94

v. The Marengo

ii. 410

v. Clark

i. 104

Bacon, Ex parte

iii. 435

v. Fothergill

iii. 246

v. Brown

i. 622; ii. 765,922

Bainbridge r. Firmston

i. 477

i\ Charlton

ii. 733

v. Neilson

ii. 504, 512

v. Cranson

ii. 849

v. Pinhorn

iii. 472

v. Dubarry

ii. 8l"J

u. Wade

ii.8; iii. 16, 17

v. Dyer

i. 309, 310

v. Wilcox

iii. 159

<-. Eocles

iii. 15, 50

Baines v. Holland

ii. 520

v. Jones

ii. 325

v. Jevons

iii. 50

v. Rives

iii. 100

v. Woodfall

i. 506

v. Sondley

i. UU

Baird v. Folliver

iii. 168

Bacot v. Parnell

ii. 138

v. Mathews

i. 624

Badcock, Ex parte

iii. 418

Bakeman v. Pooler

ii. 776

Baddeley v. Mortlock

ii. 69, 70, 74

Baker, Ex parte

i. 324; ii. 468

Badeley r. Vigurs

ii. 702

v. Adams

i. 549

Badger, In re

ii. 340

v. Adm. of Backus

i. 161

v. Daenicke

ii. 766

v. Arnot

i. 62

v. Glens' Falls Ins.

Co. ii. 586

v. Baker

ii. 693

r. Ocean Ins. Co.

ii. 512, 513

v. Barney

i. 401 ; iii. 415

v. Phinney

358, 360, 361

v. Boston

iii. 510

u. Phosnix Ins. Co.

ii. 587

v. Briggs

i. 283

v. Titcomb

iii. 202

v. Brown

ii. 882

Badlam v. Tucker

ii. 129, 395, 400

v. Cartwright

ii. 71

Badnall v. Samuel

i. 323

v. City of New York

Steamship

Bage, Ex parte

iii. 422

ii. 435

Bagely v. Forder

i. 339

v. Cook

iii. 288

Bagg v. Jefferson

ii. 875

v. Corey

ii. 61, 458

Baglehole v. Walters

i. 634; ii. 394

c. Dessauer

ii. 156

Bagley v. Fiudlay

iii. 224

v. Dewey

ii. 851

v. Peddie

iii. 158, 173

v. Frellsen

i. 246

v. Smith

i. 219

r. Fuller

iii. 275

Bagott v. Mullen

i. 37

v. Gray

ii. 380, 394

Bags of Linseed

ii. 407

c. Higgins

ii. 650

Baikie v. Chandless

i. 126

r. Hoag

ii. 105

Baile v. St. Joseph Ins.

Co. iii. 32'J

»■. Jacob

i. 471

Bailey v. Adams

ii. 26, 2b

c. Jordan

iii. 34

v. Bailey

ii. 92

r. Keen

i. 339, 475

v. Bamberger

i. 360

r\ Ludlow

ii. 545

v. Bensley

i. 505

i ■ Manufacturers Ins

Co. ii. 428,

v. Bidwell

i. 273

497

v. Bussing

i. 136

i>. Newton

ii. 689

i/. Chapman

i. 109

r. N. Y. Cent. 1!. R. Co. ii. 240

v. Damon

ii. 407, 423

t . Scott

i. 283

v. Day

ii. 749

i: Stackpoole

ii. 765

v. Pinch

iii. 469

u. Stonebreaker

ii. 719

c Freeman

ii. 7; iii. 18

v. Taylor

ii. 333

v. Hastings

iii. 237

[•. Union Life Ins. Co.

ii. 606

v. Hudson K. Co.

i. 579

u. Wheaton iii. 394, 397, 409, 507

v. Mogg

ii. 60

v. White

ii. 79

v. Ogden

iii. 614

v. Wimpee

i. 239

v. Porter

i. 322

v. Woodruff

ii. 143

v. Quint

ii. 221

Baker's Appeal

i. 231

v. Shaw

iii. 269

Balch, Ex parte

ii. 864

u. Simonds

ii. 795

v. Smith

i. 256

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

XXX1U

Balcom v. Richards iii, 91

Baldey v. Parker i. 525, 571 ; iii. 46

Baldney v. Ritchie ii. 396

Baldwin v. Bank of La. i. 326 ; ii. 1 13

v. Bank of Newbury iii. 396

v. Burrows i. 174

v. Casella i. 82, 113

v. Chouteau Ins. Co. ii. 471

v. McCrae ii. 871

v. Munn iii. 245, 246, 217

v. N. Y. Ins. Co. ii. 601

c. Palmer iii. 6fi

i'. Potter i. 96

v. Society for Dif. of Useful

Knowledge iii. 330, 360

v. United States Tel. Co. ii. 279, 280,

282, 285, 287, 300

v. Williams iii. 57

Baldy r. Stratton ii. 73, 75

Baley r. Homestead Fire Ins. Co. ii. 576

Balfe v. West ii. 107, 112

Ball v. Bullnrd iii. 107

v. Coggs iii. 324, 366, 367

v. Consolidated, &c. Co. ii. 881

u. Dunsterville i. 122, 212, 485

v. Gilbert ii. 896, 897

v. Loomis i. 569

v. Newton i. 506

v. Stanley ii. 753, 779

v. Storie ii. 625

Ballard v. Burget i. 580

u. Burgett i. 557

o. Child i. 260

o. Merchants Ins. Co. ii. 484

v. Noaks ii. 818

v. Oddey iii. 125

v. Walker iii. 9

Ballinger v. Bourland iii. 144

v. Edwards iii. 130, 156

Ballou v. Farnum i. 117

v. Jones ii. 944

v. Talbot . i. 72

Ballston Spa Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. A.

ii. 552
Balmain v. Shore i. 169, 226

Balmanno v. Lumley iii. 357

Balme v. Hutton iii. 434, 441

Baltimore, The ii. 438

v. Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co. i. 151

v. Reynolds i. 98

Baltimore Turnpike v. Boone iii. 186

Baltimore & Susquehannah R. R. Co.

v. Nesbit iii. 506

Baltimore, &c. Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple

ii. 130
Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co. v. Blocker

iii. 184
v. Breining iii. 186

v. Campbell ii. 257

v. Rathbone ii- 270

v. State ii. 817

n. Wilkens i. 44

v. Wilkinson ii. 277

Bamber v. Savage iii- 9

Bamford v. Harris ii. 880

Bamford v. lies

ii. 18

v. Shuttleworth

i. 85

Bampton v. Paulin

iii. 31

Banbury, Ex parte

iii. 446

Bancroft v. Dumas

i. 489

„. Hall

i. 312

u. Merchants' Despatch Co. ii. 227
v. Snodgrass i. 194
Bandy v. Cartwright i. 531
Banglay, Ex parte. iii. 465
Bangor v. Goding ii. 221
v. Warren ii. 757
Bangor Bank ;-. Treat i. 12
Bangs v. Mosher ii. 27, 30
v. Strong ii. 28
Bank v. Carrollton R. Co. i. 220
u. Curry ii. 861
u. McChord ii. 861
o. Myers i. 323
v. Savery i. 298
v. Spicer ii. 755
v. Woods i. 327
Bank of America v. Senior i. 298
Bank of Augusta v. Earle ii. 698
Bank of Australasia v. Bank of Aus-
tralia i. 487
Bank of Beloit v. Beale i. 570
Bank of California u. West. Un. Tel.

Co. ii. 290

Bank of Cape Fear v. Sewell i. 322

Bank of Catskill if. Messenger i. 28

Bank of Chenango v. Osgood i. 28

v. Root i. 211

Bank of Chilicothe v. Dodge iii. 355

Bank of Columbia v. Fitzhugh ii. 669

v. Laurence i. 320

v. Patterson's Administrator i. 22,

154; ii. 61

Bank of Commerce v. Mechanics'

Bank Ass. ii. 853

v. Union Bank i. 300

Bank of England, Ex parte iii. 472

Bank of Galliopolis v. Trimble ii. 722

Bank of Georgia v. Lewin ii, 716

Bank of Ireland v. Beresford iii. 495

Bank of Lansingburg v. Crary iii. 35

Bank of Louisiana !\ Tournillon i. 320

Bank of Louisville v. Young iii. 123
Bank of Metropolis v. Guttschlick i. 52
v. N. E. Bank ii. 113; iii. 281

Bank of Middlebury v. Rut. & W.

R. R. Co. i. 22

Bank of Mobile v. King i. 65

Bank of Monro v. Strong iii. 130
Bank of Mutual Redemption v. Stur-

gis iii. 276

Bank of North America v. Bangs i. 300

v. Kirby i. 313

u. M'Call ii. 742

r. Wheeler ii. 738

Bank of Orleans v. Smith ii. 112

Bank of Pittsburg v. Neal i. 65

Bank of Rochester v. Jones i. 107, 108 ;

iii. 275

Bank of Salina v. Babcock i. 292

XXXIV

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Bank of Sandusky v. Scoville i. 292

Bank of South Carolina v. Myers i. 317
Bank of St. Albans v. F. & M. Bank

i. 300
v. Scott iii. 139

Bank of Tennessee v. Johnson i. 290

Bank of the Commonwealth v. Mudg-

ett i. 190

Bank of the State v. Bank of Cape

Fear i.. 309 ; iii. 486

Bank of United States v. Binney i. 204

v. Carneal i. 303

v. Dandridge i. 154

v. Davis i. 80, 83, 321

a. Donally ii. 700, 719, 721

v. Dunseth iii. 238

v. Halstead iii. 391

v. Leathers j. 326

u. Lyman i. 66

u. Owens iii. 116, 117, 132

v. Waggener iii. 116, 118

Bank of Utica v. Bender i. 316, 318

v. McKinster ii. 112

v. Phillips iii. 143

v. Smith i. 311; ii. 669

v. Wager iii. 123, 139, 143

Bank of Washington v. Neale ii. 113

v. Triplet ii. 669

Bank of Watertown v. Assessors of

Watertown iii. 498

Bank, First Nat, of Whitehall v. Lamb

iii. 124
Bankard <•■. Bait. & Ohio K. R. Co.

ii. 271

Banker v. Banker ii. 87

Banks v. Adams ii. 827

c. Gibson ii. 369

v. Haskie i. 532

u. Marshall i. 270

v. Martin i. 83

v. Mitchell i. 187

v. Pike ii. 878

v. Walker i. 448

«. Werts ii. 898

v. White i. 532

Bannister v. Read ii. 654

Bannon v. Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co.

ii. 178
Banorgee v. Hovey i. 46, 122

Banton v. Hoomes ii. 877

Baptist Church v. Brooklyn Fire Ins.

Co. ii. 470

Barber v. Andover iii. 494

i'. Barber iii. 96

v. Barnes i. 220

u. Brace ii. 448, 669

v. Briton i. 42

v. Brown i. 490; ii. 870

v. Butcher ii. 509

v. Fox i. 141, 471

v. Gingell i. 48

v. Hartford Bank i. 233

v. Pott ii. 748

v. Root ii. 736

Barbin v. Police Jury iii. 233

Barclay, Ex parte i-

322 ; iii. 468

v. Bailey

i. 303

v. Cousins

ii. 483

v. Kennedy

iii. 161

v. Lucas

ii. 20, 21

v. Stirling

ii. 483

v. Walmsley

iii. 146

Barcraft v. Snodgrass

i. 194

Barden v. Keverberg

i. 407

Bardwell v. Conway Ins. Co.

ii. 580

o. Lydall

ii. 4, 6

v. Perry

i. 231, 239

Barefoot, The

ii. 437

Barfield r. Nicholson

ii. 336

Barfoot v. Freswell

ii. 042

Barger v. Collins

i. 254

Bargett v. Orient Ins. Co.

ii. 478

Barhydt v. Ellis

ii. 31

Barickman r. Kuykendall

iii. 14

Baring r. Christie

ii. 644

v. Clark

i. 326

v. Corie i

107 ; ii. 938

v. Lyman

i. 187

Barker v. Baltimore, &c. R. Co. ii. 447

v. Binninger ii. 936

v. Blakes ii. 519, 520

v. Bradley ii. 11
v. Braliam i. 53; ii. 873, 874

v. Bucklin iii. 24, 28

v. Cassidy iii. 100

v. Oheriot ii. 413

v. Clarke i. 316

v. Dinsmore i. 556

l . Goodair i. 224, 258

v. Harrison i. 522

v. Hibbard i. 355

v. Hodgson ii. 425

i'. Lees ii. 848

i . Mar. Ins. Co. i. 93

c Parker ii. 21, 22
... Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 447, 517, 518,

519

v. Pittsburgh iii. 483

v. Richardson i. 26, 210 ; ii. 749

u. Roberts ii. 144

v. Seudder ii. 32

r. St. Quintin ii. 849

v. Sutton ii. 792

i>. Vansommer iii. 117

v. Windle ii. 422

Barkley v. Hanlan i. 470

v. Rensselaer i. 75

Barklie v. Scott i. 166, 213

Barksdale v. Brown i, 60

Barley v. Walford ii. 917

Barlow v. Bishop i. 285, 392

v. Leekie ii. 473

v. Ocean Ins. Co. i. 468

<■. Planters Bank i. 321

v. Scott i. 505

v. Wainwright i. 543

Barnard v. Adams ii. 444, 445, 446

v. Backhaus ii. 896

v. Bartholomew iii. 75, 111

v. Bridgeman i. 84

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

XXXV

Barnard v. Cushing

ii. 645

Barrett i>. Buxton

i. 435

v. Eaton

i. 612, 613

v. Charleston Bank

i. 317

v. Godscall

iii. 449

v. Deere

ii. 747, 774

v. Kellogg

i. 629

v. Dutton

ii. 425

o. Lee

iii. 340

v. French

ii. 636

v. Poor

iii. 176, 186

v. Goddard

i. 566, 648

v. Yates

i. 627

v. Hall i. 625 ;

ii. 307, 314, 315

v. Young

iii. 120

v. Jermy

ii. 547

Barnehurst v. Cabbot

i. 472

v. Lewis

ii. 764

Barnes, Ex parte

iii. 427

v. McKenzie

i. 232

v. Barnes

iii. 507

v. Pritchard

i. 578

v. Bartlett

iii. 217

v. Stockton, &c. Railway ii. 638

v. Boston, &c. R. Co.

iii. 349

v. Swann

i. 188, 204

v. Cole

ii. 247, 429

v. Thorndike

ii. 862

v. Gorham

i. 280

v. Union M. F. Ins. Co. i. 254 ; ii. 565,

v. Hedley

i. 460 ; iii. 128

584

v. Holcomb

i. 611

Barrick v. Buba

ii. 425

v. Marshall

ii. 220

Barringer v. King

ii. 743

v. Parker

ii. 836

v. Sneed

ii. 683

v. Perine

i. 482, 483, 484

Barron v. Paulding

ii. 930

v. Taylor

ii. 386

Barrow, Ex parte

iii. 414

v. Trenton Glass Co.

i. 83

o. Paxton

i. 611 ; ii. 121

v. Union Ins. Co.

ii. 576

v. Richard

iii. 331

v. Warlieh

iii. 141

Barrows v. Lane

i. 284

Barnesley v. Powell

iii. 414

v. Knight ii. 354, 355, 363, 371

Barnesville Bank v. West. Dn. Tel. Co.

Barry v. Anderson

i. 42

ii. 299

v. Boninger

i. 109; iii. 250

Barnet v. Gilson

ii. 829

v. La. Ins. Co.

ii. 500

v. National Bank

iii. 124

v. Nesham

i. 182

v. Smith

i. 304

v. Ransom

ii. 683

Barnett, Ex parte

iii. 420

Barry's case

i. 449

v. Goings

i. 409

Barstow v. Adams

iii. 426

v. Lambert

i. 59

v. Bennett

ii. 23

v. Stanton i.

631 ; ii. 918, 922

v. Gray

iii. 9

Barnewell v. Church

ii. 496, 529, 534

v. Hiriart

i. 322

Barney v. Bliss

ii. 780

Barter v. Wheeler

ii. 228

v. Brown

i. 571

Bartholomew v. Jackson i

.475; ii. 50, 61,

v. Coffin

i. 478

105

v. Currier

i. 211

v. Sawyer

ii. 305

v. Frowner

iii. 239

v. St. Louis, &c. R. R

. Co. ii. 210

v. Griffin

iii. 403

Bartlett v. Carnley

ii. 407

v. Maryland Ins. Co

ii. 504

i . Drake

i. 52

v. Patterson

ii. 865 ; iii. 12

o. Farrington

i. 532, 541

v. Prentiss

ii. 273

v. Hawley

i. 58, 319

v. Saunders

i. 136 ; iii. 422

v. Hoppock

i. 631, 632

v. Smith

i. 227

v. Knight

ii. 741

Barns v. Graham

ii. 781, 787

v. Mayor

ii. 708

Barnum v. Barnum

ii. 85

v. Pearson

i. 254

v. Childs

iii. 31

u. Pentland i. 87 ;

ii. 672, 675, 747

v. Vandusen

iii. 239

v. Robinson

i. 319

Baron v. Abeel

iii. 237

v. Van Zandt

i. 381

v. Husband

i. 248

v. Vinor

i. 488 ; ii. 887

Barough v. White

i. 295

v. West. Un. Tel. Co.

ii. 286

Barr v. Armstrong

i. 389

v. Williams

i. 569 ; iii. 145

i. 442

v. Hill

i. 460

v. Wyman

v. Lapsley
v. Marsh

iii. 331

Bartlette v. Crittenden

ii. 330, 332, 333

i. 316

Bartley v. Richtmyer

ii. 76

v. Myers i.

575 ; ii. 783, 784

v. Williams

i. 185

v. Sehroeder

i. 78

Bartley, The

ii. 440

Barratt v. Allen

i. 321

Barton v. Baker

i. 317

Barrell v. Trussell

iii. 27

v. Fitzgerald

ii. 633, 634, 640

Barrels of Oil

ii. 439, 440

v. Glover

iii. 172

i. 196

ii. 667, 672

iii. 401

Barret v. Hampton
Barrett v. Allen

ii. 896
ii. 783, 799

v. Hanson
v. McKelway

v. Barrett

ii. 874, 875, 884

v. Tower

XXXVI

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Barton v. Wolliford

ii. 174

Bartram v. Farebrother

i. 054

Barwis, Ex parte

iii. 414

Basch v. Humboldt Ins. Co.

ii. 5SG

Bash v. Bash

iii. 247

v. Hill

i. 109

Bashford v. Shaw

ii. 31

Bashore v. Whistler

i. 615

Baskerville v. Brown

ii. 881

Baskett v. Cunningham

ii. 348

Baskin v. Seechrist

i. 540

Bason v. Hughart

iii. 25

Bass v. Bass

iii. 96

v. Cliicago, &c.R. Co. ii. 246

; iii. 187

v. Clive

i. 300

v. Clivley

iii. 309

v. Smith

iii. 68

!•. White

i. 576

Basset v. Bassett

ii. 858

v. Collis

i. 635

v. Kerne

ii. 784

Bast v. Byrne

ii. 53

Basten v. Butter

ii. 879

Bastow v. Bennett

ii. 21

Batchelder, Re

iii. 273

v. Batchelder

ii. 736

v. Sanborn

ii 939

o. Sturgis

iii. 244

Bate v. Burr i. 66

iii. Ill

v. Cnrtwright

ii. 759

Bates, Ex parte

iii. 415

v. Bates

ii. 780

v. Cartwright

ii. 880

v. Chesebro

iii. 58

v. Churchill

ii. 7811

v. Coe

iii. 382

v. Cort i.

478, 490

v. Delavan

i. 520

v. Dandy

iii. 487

v. Enwright

i. 396

v. Hewitt

ii. 526

v. James

i. 235

v. Moore

iii. 44

v. Staunton ii. 152, 218

iii. 269

v. Todd

i. 410

v. Watson

i. 462

Bateson v. Gosling

i. 323

Bath, Ex parte

iii. 416

Batson v. Donovan ii. 217, 261, 203, 272,

Batteman <\ Morford

i. 515

Battersby v. Gale

ii. 385

Battin v. Bigelow

iii. 230

Battishill v. Heed

iii. 235

Battle v. Rochester City Bank

ii. 815

Battley v. Faulkner

iii. 99

Batty v. Hill

ii. 371

v. Lloyd

iii. 150

v. McCundie

i. 193

Baubie v. iEtna Ins. Co.

ii. 543

Bauchor r. Cilley

i. 177

Baudier, Ex parte

i. 237

Bauduy v. Union Ins. Co.

ii. 182

Bauendahl v. Horr

i. 579

Baugh v. Baugh

ii. 93

Baugher v. Nelson
Baughman v. Gould
Baum v. Dubois

v. Stevens
Bavington v. Clarke

iii. 506
ii. 916
i. 123
i. 633
i. 355

Baxendale v. Eastern C. Ry. Co.

i. 446; ii. 187

u. Great Western R. R. Co. i. 395,

446

v. Hart ii. 273

v. London R. Co. iii. 175

Baxter v. Baxter ii. 92

v. Bodkin i. 405

v. Bradbury ii. 933 ; iii. 240

v. Connolly iii. 323

v. Earl of Portsmouth i. 434, 430 ;

iii. 414

u. Lamont i. 61

v. Leland ii. 410, 416, 672

v. Little i. 290

v. New England Ins. Co. ii. 526

v. Nurse ii. 35

v. Penniman iii. 80, 92

u. People ii. 898

u. Pritchard iii. 441

v. Ryerss iii. 242

v. Wales i. 467

Bay v. Church i. 325

v. Coddington i. 285, 292

v. Cook i. 73, 140, 568

v. Gunn i. 333

Bayard v. Lathy i. 303

v. Shunk i. 302 ; ii. 754

Bayley r. Ashton iii. 84

v. Bradley ii. 940

v. Culverwell i. 563

c. Edwards i. 864; ii. 740

v. Gouldsmith i. 581

v. Homan ii. 819

v. Lawrence i. 536

v. Leominster iii. 323

v. Manchester i. 113

v. Merrill iii. 267

u. Rimmell ii. 35

v. Taylor ii. 336

Baylie v. Clare i. 446

Baylies r. Fettyplace ii. 425, 808

r. Sinex iii. 293

Bayliffe v. Butterworth i. 60, 87 ; ii. 670

Baylis r. Attorney-General ii. 681, 693

v. Baylis ii. 93

v. Dinely i. 335, 353, 363, 360

v. Usher ii. 215

Baylor v. Smithers i. 569

Bayly v. Garford i. 27

v. Grant ii. 459

v. Schofield i. 640

v. Taylor ii. 376

Bayne v. Morris ii. 834

Baynes v. Fry iii. 144

Baynham v. Guy's Hospital i. 532

Baynon v. Batley i. 400

Bay State, The ii. 433

Bazeley v. Forder i. 393

Bazin v. Richardson ii. 414

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

XXXV11

Beach v. Beach iii. 236

v. Berdell ii. 103

v. Branch i. 87

t\ Cooke ii. 836

v. First Methodist Church i. 483

v. Forsyth i. 103

v. Ilotchkiss i. 185

v. Native, The ii. 381, 382

v. Ranney iii. 189

v. State Bank i. 209, 303

Beachey v. Brown ii. 72

Beak v. Beak i. 205

Beal v. Alexander i. 299, 322

u. Chase ii. 893

v. Nason iii. 511

v. Park, &c. Ins. Co. ii. 543

v. Roberts i. 272

v. Wyman ii. 689

Beale v. Beale ii. 831

v. Coon ii. 884

v. Hayes iii. 173

v. Nind iii. 69

v. Paris i. 317

v. Sanders i. 537

v. Slaughter i. 282

v. Thompson ii. 426

Bealey v. Greenslade iii. 83

Beall v. Beall i. 376

v. White i. 543

Beals v. Cobb i. 392

v. Guernsey iii. 115

v. Home Ins. Co. ii. 573

a. Olmstead i. 623, 630

v. Peck i. 322

v. Terry iii. 220

Beaman v. Russell ii. 859 ; iii. 21

Bean v. Amsinck iii. 421

v. Atwater ii. 661

v. Burbank i. 457, 562

o. Green ii. 263, 273

v. Herrick i. 621

v. Newberry ii. 828

v. Simpson i. 258, 575 ; ii. 784

v. Smallwood ii. 307

v. Stupart ii. 473, 522

v. Sturtevant ii. 180, 194

Beane v. The Mazurka ii. 438

Bearce v. Barstow iii. 131

v. Bowker i. 48, 500

Beard v. Denniss ii. 893

v. Kirk i- 75

v. Linthicum iii. 309, 310, 347

v. Turner ii. 377

o. Webb i. 406

Beardesley v. Baldwin i. 280

Beardslee v. Morgner i. 253

v. Richardson ii. 114

Beardsley v. Duntley iii. 348

v. Southmayd ii. 722

v. Swann iii- 177

Beardsley Scythe Co. v. Foster iii. 308

Bears v. Ambler i- 537

Bearse v. Pigs of Copper }]■ 437

Beatson v. Haworth ii- 534

Beattie v. Lord Ebury i. 63

Beattie v. Robin

i. 569

Beatty v. Gilmore

ii. 250

o. Lycoming Ins. Co.

ii. 587

v. Randall

ii. 931

v. Wray

i. 228

Beaty v. Knowler

iii. 488

Beaubien v. Beaubien

iii. 308

Beauchamp v. Damory

iii. 243

Beaufort, Duke of, v. Neeld

i. 42

Beaumont, Ex parte

iii. 428

v. Fell

ii. 681, 694

v. Greathead

ii. 750

u. Meredith

i. 230

v. Reeve

i. 465

Beauregard v. Case

i. 176

Beavan v. Delahay

i. 544

Beaver v. Lewis

i. 220

Beaver Co. v. Armstrong

i. 330

Bechervaise v. Lewis

ii. 876

Bechtel v. Cone

iii. 352

Beck v. Allison

iii. 329

v. Evans

ii. 261, 263

v. Germania Ins. Co.

ii. 588

v. Rebow

i. 547

v. Robley

i. 297

Beck & Jackson, In re

ii. 844

Becker v. Hallgarten

i. 645

Beckett v. Arldyman

ii. 33

v. Taylor

ii. 826

Beckford v. Hill

i. 174

u. Hood

ii. 330

v. Wade

ii. 723

Beckham v. Drake i. 7, 65, 56, 66, 145 ;

iii. 172, 454

Beckley v. Munson i. 33

Beckman v. Sbouse ii. 134, 179, 256, 273,

275
Beckwith v. Angell i. 284

v. Brown iii. 382

v. Cheever i. 511, 514

v. Talbot iii. 15

Bedam v. Clerkson ii. 826, 829

Beddingfield v. Ashley iii. 150

Beddoe's Ex'rs v. Wadsworth i. 144

Bedel v. Powell iii. 188

Bedell v. Janney iii. 112

Bedell's case ii- 686

Bedford v. Brutton iii. 426

o. Hunt ii. 304, 309

c. Terhune i. 542

Bee, The ii. 437, 438

Beebe v. Dudley ii. 24, 32 ; iii. 23

v. Elliott " ii. 870

v. Robert i. 66, 628

Beecham v. Dodd i. 175, 213

Beecher v. Venn i- 59

Beecker v. Beecker i. 142, 248

Beed v. Blandford ii- 814

Beek v. Robley i. 289

Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenec-
tady R. R. Co. iii. 491, 494, 496
v. Wilson iii- 442

Beeler v. Young i. 336, 337, 338, 353

Beeman v. Buck i- 623

Beems v. C. & C. R. Co. iii. 209

XXXV111

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Beer v. Beer i. 22

Beer Co. v. Massachusetts iii. 510

Beers v. Bridgeport Spring Co. i. 158

v. Crowell iii- 57

v. Haughton iii. 391, 397

v. Horton iii. 503

v. Housatonic B. B. Co. ii. 184

v. Reynolds i. 243

v. Robinson i. 498

Beeston v. Collyer ii. 35

Beete v. Bidgood iii. 119

Beetem v- Burkholder ii. 814

Begbie v. Levi ii. 899, 907

v. Phosphate Sewage Co. i. 492;

ii. 886, 924

ii. 624

ii. 777

ii. 283

ii. 834

iii. 456

i. 628, 629

iii. 442

ii. 902, 903

iii. 429

iii. 435

iii. 439, 469

i. 536

iii. 441

iii. 421, 425

iii. 42 1 , 425, 428

iii. 333

ii. 085

ii. 880, 909

i. 84

ii. 77

ii. 853

ii. 10

i. 170

iii. 465

ii. 483, 486, 524, 086

ii. 5, 634, 713

i. 19

iii. 72

i. 49, 93 ; iii. 206

i. 272

ii. 306, 327

i. 103

i. 496

ii. 833

i. 320

iii. 43

ii. 882

i. 408 ; ii. 14

iii. 97

iii. 477

ii. 361

i. 173

ii. 487

ii. 20

72, 74, 78, 88, 89,

91

i. 641, 645, 651

i. 238

i. 41

ii. 700, 730

. Forbes
Behaly v. Hatch
Behm v. West. TJn. Tel. Co.
Behren v. Bremer
Beilby, Ex parte
Beirne v. Dord
Beisenthal, In re
Beitenman's Appeal
Belcher i». Burnett

v. Campbell

c. Lloyd

v. Mcintosh

v. Prittie
Belchier, Ex parte

i . Parsons

v. Reynolds
Belden v. Seymour
Belding v. Pitkin
Beldon v. Campbell
Belford t>. Crane
Belknap r. Bank of N. A

v. Bender

v. Wendell
Bell, Ex parte

v. Bell

v. Bruen

v. Chaplain

u. Crawford

u. Cunningham

v. Dagg

v. Daniels

v. Francis

v. Gardiner

i. Gipps

v. Hagerstown Bank

v. Hewitt

v. Horton

v. Kellar

o. Lamprey

v. Leggett

v. Lock

v. Locke

v. Marine Ins. Co.

u. Martin

v. Morrison

v. Moss
v. Newman
v. Offutt
v. Packard

Bell v. Palmer
v. Phynn
v. Quiu
v. Reed
v. Smith
v. Speight
v. Twilight

u. Walker

v. Ward
v. Welch

v. Whitehead
Bellairs v. Bellairs

r. Ebsworth
Bellemire v. Bank of U.
Bcllo Corrunnes
Belloni v. Freeborn
Bellows v. Lovell

v. Stone
Bellringer v. Blagrave
Beloit v. Morgan
Belote v. Wynne
Belshaw v. Bush
Belt v. Ferguson
Belton, Ex parte

v. Hodges
Belworth v. Hassell
Beman v. Tugnot
Bement v. Smith
Bemie v. Vandever
Bemis v. Leonard

v. Smith

v. Wilder
Benares, The
Bench v. Merrick

r. Sheldon
Bend v. Hoyt
Benden v. Manning
Bender v. Fromberger
Bendernagle v. Cocks
Bendetson v. French
Benedict v. Bachelder

r. Beebee

v. Caffee

v. Cowden

v. Daris

r. Field

v. Lynch

v. Montgomery

v. Morse

v. Smith
Benefactor, The
Benfield v. Solomons
Benford v. Schell
Benham v. Bishop

v. United Ins. Co.
Benjamin v. Benjamin

v. Groot

v. Sinclair

v. Tillman
Bennecke v. Ins. Co.
Benner v. Puffer
Benners v. Howard
Bennet, Ex parte

v. Abrams

v. Davis

iii. 206

i. 169

i. 489

ii. 527, 528

ii. 451, 907

i. 146

ii. 932

ii. 346

ii. 878

ii 8

ii. 341

ii. 79

ii. 20

ii. 113

ii. 442

ii. 5

ii. 24, 27

iii. 354

iii. 301

ii. 870

iii. 90

iii. 81

i. 410

iii. 472

i. 354; iii. 414

i. 583

i. 488

iii. 225

i. 229

ii. 796

iii. 439

i. 538

ii. 454

ii. 70

i. 620, 621

i. 85

ii. Ill

iii. 240, 242

iii. 202

ii. 160

ii. 905

iii. 36

i. 317

ii. 853

i. 196

i. 595

iii. 342

ii. 940

i. 549

i. 51

ii. 433

iii. 136, 465

i. 570

i. 363, 364

ii. 524

i. 386; ii. 215

iii. 104

ii. 410

i. 281

ii. 601

i. 578, 579

i. 572

iii. 468

iii. 329, 348

iii. 455, 456

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

XXXIX

Bennet v. Jenkins iii. 240, 242

u. Mellor ii. 160, 162

v. Paine i. 468, 469

o. Pixley ii. 633
Bennett, Ex parte i. 94, 95; iii. 472

u. Alcott iii. 240, 454

v. Austin ii. 702
v. Bean U. 68, 73, 75

v. Bennett ii. 91

v. Bittle i. 541

v. Brooks ii. 902

v. Cadwell i. 246

v. Cook iii. 97

v. Davis i. 335

v. Dutton ii. 241

v. Filyaw ii. 230

v. Francis ii. 772

u. Holmes ii. 869

«,. Hull iii. 60

v. Lockwood iii. 195

v. O'Brien ii. 117
v. P. & O. Steamboat Co. ii. 241, 243

v. Pratt iii. 17

v. Russell i. 187

v. Scott iii. 37

v. Shackford iii. 293

v. Sims i. 578

v. Smith iii. 305

v. Stickney i. 211

v. Stout i. 387

v. Womack i. 534
v. Woolf oik i. 184, 228 ; ii. 808

v. Young i. 318

Benners v. Clemens ii. 716

Benney v. Pegram i. 103

Bennington v. Dinsmore i. 282

Benson v. Blunt ii. 425

v. Cutler iii- 352

v. Drake ii- 903

v. Flower iii- 454

v. Heathorn ii- 398

v. Parry iii- 144

v. Remington i. 343, 348
v. The Mayor, &c. of New York

iii. 483, 490

Bent v. Hartshorn ii- 23

v. Manning i. 336, 338

v. Puller i. 571

Bentall v. Burn iii. 49, 444

Bentaloe v. Pratt ii. 478,532

Bentham v. Cooper iii- 17

Bentley v . Columbia Ins. Co. ii. 567

v. Doggett _i. 59

v. Mackay "• 928

Bently v. Griffin }■ 388

Benton «. Burgot ii- 740

v. Chamberlain i. 189

Benyon v. Nettlefold i- 486

Berans v. Farrell . i- 625

Beresford, Ex parte iii. 437

Bergen v. Bennett , . '• '6

Bergheim v. Blaenavon Iron Co. iii. 219

v. Great Eastern R. Co. , ii- 212

Bergstrom v. Mills JJ- 42b

Berkeley v. Watling i. 328, 661 ; n. 410

Berkley v. Hardy i. 122

Berkshire Bank v. Jones i. 315

Berkshire Woollen Co. v. Juillard i. 205

v. Proctor ii. 160, 162, 163, 164

Bermon v. Woodbridge ii. 479, 480

Bernal v. Pym iii. 270

Bernard v. Torrance i. 192

Berndtson v. Strang i. 650

Berolles v. Ramsay i. 339

Berredge, Ex parte iii. 4^7

Berridge v. Fitzgerald i. 319

Berrill v. Smith ii. 900

Berry v. Alderman i. 329

v. Bates ii. 850

v. Cox iii. 368

v. Da Costa ii. 75

v. Mutual Ins. Co. iii- 432

v. Pullen ii- 28

o. Robinson i. 290, 315

v. Scott "• 60

v. Vreeland iii- 187

v. "Whitney iii- 313

Berthold v. Goldsmith i. 41, 167

Bertholf v. Quinlan ii. 745, 747

Berthoud v. Atlantic Ins. Co. ii. 471,

541

Bertie v. Falkland iii. 107

Bertrand v. Barkman i. 292

Besch v. Frolich i. 224

Besford v. Saunders i. 364, 463, 464

Bessey v. Evans ii. 425

v. Windham ii. 924

Besshears v. Rowe ii- 10

Best v. Barber i- 463

v. Givens i- 364

v. Jolly _i- 485

v. Lawson ii- 874

v. Nokomis Bank i. 298

v. Osborne i- 635

v. Saunders ii- 453

v. Stow i. 522 ; iii. 312, 370, 371

Betesworth v. Dean and Chapter of

St. Paul's iii- 307

Bethel, &c. Co. v. Brown i. 567, 568

Betsey v. Rhoda ii- 459

Betsey, The ii- 403

Betterbee v. Davis ii- 775

Bettini v. Gye ii- 809

Betts v. Bagley iii- 394, 396

v. Gibbins i- 36, 87, 646

v. June i- 227

v. Lee . iii- 215

Bevan v. Lewis i- 203, 206

v. Waters iii- 266

v. Rees "• 775, 778

v. Sullivan }■ 184

Bever v. Brown ":.^5?

Beverley v. Beverley "• 77

Beverley's case |- 433

Beverleys v. Holmes }■ 457

Beverly v. Burke iii- 238

Beverly v. The Lincoln Gas Light and

Coke Co. i- 154, 581

Bevier v. Covell i"- 117, 138

v. Galloway i- 39»

xl

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Bevin v. Conn. Ins. Co.

ii.

600, 605,

Bingham v. Sessions

i. 444

607

v. Stewart

i. 58

Bevis v. Heflin

ii. 747

Binghampton Bridge, The

iii. 484

Bexwell v. Christie

i. 529

Bininger v. Wattles

ii. 353

Beyer v. Beyer

ii. 91, 02

Binks v. Lord Rokeby

iii. 357

Beymer v. Bonsall

i. 66

Binney v. Le Gal

i. 216

Beynon v. Godden

iii. 288

Binnington v. Wallis

i. 465

B. F. Bruce, The

ii. 458

Binns v. Waddill

i. 208

Bianehi v. Nash

i. 581

Birch, Ex parte iii. 416

470, 478

Biays v. Chesapeake Ins.

Co.

ii. 505

c. Depeyster

ii

666, 879

v. Union Lis. Co.

ii. 528

v. Earl of Liverpool

ii. 49; iii. 40,

Bibb v. Saunders

ii. 877

41

Bickerton v. Burreil

i. 70

v. Funk

i. 151

Bickford v. First, &c. Bank

i. 58, 296

v. Sharland

i. 463

v. Gibbs

ii. 8,

24, 31, 32

v. Tebbutt

ii. 704

v. Page

iii. 240

Birchett v. Boiling

iii

321, 320

Bicknell v. Todd

ii. 320

Bird v. Adams

iii. 92

Bidault v. Wales

ii

. 912, 915

c. Astcock

ii. 216

Biddell v. Dowse

i

. 479, 481

v. Bird

ii. 826

Biddlecombe v. Bond

i. 640 ; ii. 633

v. Blosse

ii. 7

7 ; iii. 32

Bidweli v. Madison

i. 182

v. Boulter i.

125;

ii. 11, 12

v. Northwestern Ins.

Co.

ii. 475,

v. Brown

i. 49, 53, 641

605

, 521, 577

r. Caritat

iii

407, 409

v. Rogers

iii. 76

u. Cromwell

ii. 173

Biffin v. Yorke

iii. 414

r. Gammon i. 245,

249;

tii. 25, 75

Bigelow v. Baldwin

ii. 818

i\ Hempstead

iii. 454

v. Benton

ii. 5

v. Jones

i. 394

v. Berkshire Ins. Co.

ii. 603

v. Le Blanc

i. 315

v. Davis

i. 498

c. Mayer

i. 630

v. Dennison

i. 49, 51

«.. Muhlenbrink

iii. 62

o. Elliott

i. 189

v. Munroe

iii. 10

d. Folger

iii. 439

v. Pierpoint

iii.

407, 409

v. Grannis

i. 304

Bird of Paradise, The

ii. 407

v. Heaton

ii

221, 413

Birdsall v. Heacock

ii. 5

u. Huntley

i. 578

Birdseye v. Flint

i. 408

v. Jones

iii. 242

v. Frost

i. 617

v. Kinney

i. 308

v. Kay

i. 235

v. Maynard

ii. 831

Birdsong v. Birdsong

i.

466, 622

v. State Life Ass.

ii. 015

Birdwell v. Cain

i. 137

v. Stilphen

ii. 861

Birge v. Gardener

ii. 248

i. Wilson i. 251,

256 ; ii.

796, 707

Birkenhead, Lancashire, & Cheshire

v. Woodward

ii. 941

Railway v. l'ilcher

i.

374, 376

Biggs v. Hansell

ii

828, 814

Birkettw. Willan

ii. 2, 612

r. Lawrence

ii

700, 894

Birkley v. I're.-^rave i.

34 ; ii.

445, 448

r. Wisking

ii. 651 ; iii. 4!i

Birks i'. French

i. 199

Bigler v. Flickinger

i. 622

c. Trippet

ii. 833

r. Hall

i. 568

Birley r. Gladstone

iii. 263

v. N. Y. Ins. Co.

ii. 583

Birney v. N. Y. & Wash.

Printing

Bilbie v. Lumley

i. 46"

; ii. 530

Tel. Co. ii. 279, 28:

I, 286,

287, 288

Bilborough r. Holmes

i. 240

Bischoff i: Wetherell

ii. 872

Biles v. Holmes

ii. 134

Bisel v. Hobbs

i. 198

Bill v. Bament

iii. 6, 46

Bishop r. Bishop

i. 547

v. Cureton

i. 411

v. Breckels

i. 220

v. Mason

ii. 488

f. Chambre

ii. 3G0

v. Porter

ii. 757

i. Clay Ins. Co.

ii. 575

Billings ii. Billings

ii. 92

v. Elliott

i. 547

v. Tolland Co. Ins. Co. ii.

524, 547,

v. Montague

i. 53

651

v. Sanford

iii. 69

Billingsly v. State

ii. 931

v. Shepherd

ii. 40

Billon v. Hyde

iii. 434

v. Smith

i. 617

Binford, In re

i. 579

v. Williamson

ii. 155

Bingham v. Allport

ii. 774

r. Wraith

i. 531

v. Bingham

iii. 354

Bishop of Chester v. John Free]

and

u. Maxcy

i. 015

i. 487
410, 412

v. Kogers

ii. 256,

259, 277

Bissel v. Price

ii.

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

xli

Bissell v. Bissell

v. Briggs

v. Edwards

v. Erwin

v. Hopkins

v. Lloyd

v. Morgan

v. The M. R. Co.
Bissig v. Britton
Bitner v. Brougli
Bitter v. Rathman

ii. 85, 797

ii. 740, 741, 742

ii. 744

iii. 242

i. 569, 613

i. 532

i. 329

i. 158

ii. 10

iii. 246

i. 166

Bitting & Waterman's Appeal ii. 937

Bixby v. Dunlap iii. 185

v. Franklin Ins. Co. ii. 386, 396, 447

v. Whitney i. 576 ; ii. 784

Bixler v. Ream i. 472

Bize v. Dickason iii. 439

v. Fletcher ii. 473, 534

Blachford v. Christian ii. 916

Black v. Baxendale iii. 207

v. Black ii. 91

v. Blazo iii. 411, 476

v. Bush i. 231

v. Cord iii. 310, 314

v. Homersham i. 159

v. Marine Ins. Co. ii. 501

v. Smith ii. 775

v. The Louisiana ii. 459, 464

v. Ward i. 279

v. Webb i. 561

Blackburn v. Gregson iii. 295

v. Mackey i. 341

v. Mann iii. 40

v. Scholes ii. 745

v. Smith ii. 815

Blackburne v. Thompson ii. 482

Blackett v. Royal Exch. Assur. Co.

ii. 478, 483, 639, 677

v. Weir i. 31

Blackhurst v. Clinkard i- 232

v. Cockell ii. 518, 521

Blackman v. Green i. 103

v. Leonard ii. 762

v. Nearing i. 322; ii. 797

v. Pierce i. 646

v. Tliomas i. 108

v. Wheaton ii. 928

Blackmore, Ex parte iii. 416

Blackstock „. N. Y..& E. R. R. Co.

ii. 198

Blackstone v. Alemania Ins. Co. ii. 494

v. Buttermore i. 78

Blackstone Bank v. Hill ii. 29, 768

Blackwell v. Justices of Lawrence

Co. iii. 242

v. Willard i. 78

Blad v. Bamfield ii. 931

Blades v. Free i- 394, 395, 404

Blagden, Ex parte iii. 439, 469

v. Bradbear iii. 12, 14, 347

Blagge v. N. Y. Ins. Co. ii- 519

Blagrave v. B. W. Co. ii. 840

Blague v. Gold i. 531
Blaine v. The Charles Carter ii. 401,

403

Blair v. Bank of Tenn.

v. Bromley

v. Drew

v. Snodgrass

v. Wilson
Blair, &c. Co. v. Walker
Blaisdell v. Pray
Blake v. Buchannan

v. Cole

u. Crowninshield

u. Dorgan

u. Ferris

v. Howe

v. Lanyon

v. McMillen

i. 282, 309

iii. 107

iii. 78, 95

iii. 6

ii. 755

iii. 40

i. 186

i. 255

i. 474; iii. 43

ii. 797

i. 221

i. 117

i. 540

ii. 52

i. 312

v. Midland Railway Co. ii. 247 ;

iii. 177

u. Parlin ii. 8

v. Peck i. 471

v. Pegram i. 151

v. Tucker ii. 932, 933

v. Williams ii. 718 ; iii. 408, 409, 436

Blakeley v. Bennecke i. 67

v. Blakeley i. 264, 434

Blakely v. Graham i. 49, 185

Blakeman v. Fonda iii. 76

Blakemore v. E. & B. R. R. Co. ii. 118,

248

v. Glamorganshire Can. Nav. ii. 638

Blakeney v. Dufaur i. 221

v. Goode iii. 41

Blakes, Es parte iii. 406, 409

Blakesley v. Smalhvood ii. 877

Blakey's Appeal iii. 381, 382

Blanchard v. Beers ii. 314

t\ Blanchard iii. 84

u. Brooks ii. 932

u. Bueknam ii. 460

v. Coolidge i. 180

v. Detroit, &c. R. Co. iii. 307

v. Eldridge ii. 318

v. Ely iii. 194, 196, 199, 246

u. Fearing ii. 400

v. Hill ii. 348, 376

v. Hilliard ii. 669

v. Isaacs ii. 190

v. Lilley ii. 834

v. Martha Washington, The ii. 386

u. Noyes ii. 749

v. Russell ii. 698, 718 ; iii. 385, 893,

394, 396, 397, 401, 409,

502, 507, 508

v. Sprague ii. 311

v. Stevens i. 292

v. Stone ii. 866

v. Waite ii. 471, 474, 539, 540

v. Wood ii. 32

Blanchard G. S. Man. Co. v. Warner

ii. 328
Blanchard Gun Stock Turning Co.

v. Jacobs ii. 321

Bland v. Collett ii. 759, 896

v. Haselrig iii. 68

Blane v. Proudfit i. 48

Blaney v. Hendrick iii. Ill, 112

xlii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Blantin v. Whitaker ii. 940

Blanton v. Knox iii. 44

Blasdale v. Babcock iii. 176, 229

Blasdel v. Fowle iii. 432

Blatchford r. Kirkpatrick iii. 334

v. Milliken i. 274

Blattmaker v. Saul ii. 72

Blaurett r. Woodworth iii. 293

Bleaden v. Hancock iii. 272

Bleeker v. Hyde ii. 4, 14

Blenden Hall, The ii. 439

Blenkinsop v. Clayton iii. 46, 68

Blennerhasset v. Monsell i. 380

Blighr. Brent i. 374; iii. 37

Blight v. Page i. 490

v. Rochester ii. 940

Blin r. Pierce i. 245, 255

Blinn v. Chester ii. 751, 823

Bliss, Ex parte iii. 418

r. Collins i. 550

i . Lawrence i. 253

v. Mclntire ii. 802

v. Robins ii. 840

v. Thompson ii. 925

Bliven v. N. E. Screw Co. ii. 077

v. Hudson R. R. R. Co. ii. 153, 173

Block v. Bell ii. 640

Blodget p. Jordan ii. 744

Blodgett r. Sleeper i. 208

Blofield v. Paine ii. 376

t». Payne ii. 372

Blood v. Enos ii. 43

u. Fairbanks i. 220

r. French i. 63

v. Goodrich i. 52, 123

v. Howard Ins. Co. ii. 552

v. Palmer i. 581

v. Shine ii. 831

Bloodgood v. Bruen iii. 75, 92

Bloom r. Helm i. 210

v. McGrath iii. 20

v. Richards ii. 898, 901

Bloomer ?>. Bernstein _ ii. 813 ; iii. 224

v. McQuewan ii. 319

v. Millingen ii. 319

v. Millinger ii. 321

v. Sherman ii. 837

Blore v. Sutton iii. 359

Bloss v. Bloomer i. 480

!•. Kittridge i. 021

Blossburg, &c. R. R. Co. v. Tioga R. R,

Co. iii. 105

Blossom v. Dodd ii. 200
Blot d. Boiceau i. 74, 108 ; iii. 204, 205,

Blount v. Hawkins ii. 11 ; iii. 27

v. Patten ii. 334, 344

Blow v. Russell ii. 775
Blower v. Great Western Railway ii. 174

Blowers v. Sturtevant i. 303, 304, 397

Bloxam v. Hubbard iii. 420

v. Sanders i. 563, 575, 042

Bloxham, Ex parte iii, 451, 408
Bloxsome v. Williams ii. 898, 899, 905,

007

Bluck v. Gompertz iii- 1

Bluett v. Osborne i- 632

Blum v. Robertson i- 60

Blumantle v. Fitchburg R. Co. ii. 274

Blumenthal v. Brainerd ii. 197, 212, 260
Bluraer v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 552

Blundell v. Brettargh ii. 845 ; iii. 332,

360

v. Gladstone ii. 689, 693

v. Winsor i. 216

Blunt v. Boyd i. 245, 249; iii. 28

v. Melcher ii. 56

Blydenburgh v. Welsh i. 620 ; ii. 918,

923 ; iii. 222

Blythe v. Bennett i. 550

(.. Dargin iii. 369

v. Pulteney iii. 293

v. Waterworks ii. 96

Boalt v. Brown ii. 856

Boardman v. Close i. 187

v. Cutter iii. 56

c. Gore i. 209; ii. 861

r. Keeler i. 189 ; iii. 247

v. Lake Shore, &c. R. Co. i. 225 ;

iii. 325

v. Meriden Britannia Co. ii. 353, 370,

371

u. Mostyn iii. 352

r. Page i. 33, 34, 35

v. Sill iii. 200, 285

v. Spooner iii. 14

Board of Commissioners v. Younger i. 130

Boatman's Institution t>. Holland i. 292

Bobbitt r. Shryer ii. 8

Bobo r. Hansell i. 364

Boddam r. Riley iii. 112

Bode's Heirs v. Stickney ii. 764

Bodenlmm c. Bennett ii. 261, 203, 272

i: Purchas ii. 20, 633, 758, 700

Bodger v. Arch iii. 80

Bodine r. Exchange Ins. Co. i. 90 ; ii. 614

?•. Glading iii. 332

Bodle v. Chenango Co. Ins. Co. ii. 577, 586

Bodley r. Goodrich iii. 403

v. Reynolds iii. 215

Bodwell '■. Bragg ii. 100

v. Swan iii. 179

Boenm p. Stirling i. 296

v. Wood iii. 336, 338, 341

Boelime r. Carr i. 322

Bogert v. Vermilya iii. 89

Boggs [-. Curtin i. 26, 35

v. Martin iii. 270

v. Teakle iii. 291, 404

Bogue's Appeal i. 232

Bohanan v. Bohanan iii. 352

Bohannon v. Pace iii. 04

Bohn v. Bogue ii. 341, 349

Bohtlingk v. lnglis i. 649

Boinest i\ Leignez i. 527

Boit i'. Maybin i. 515

Bolan v. Williamson ii. 155

Bold v. Molineux ii. 641, 644

v. Rayner i. 588

Bold Buccleugh, The ii. 434

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

xliii

Boldero v. East India Company ii. 678

Bolin v. Huffnagle i. 649

Bolland v. Nash iii. 439, 469

Bollande v. Disney ii. 602

Bolton v. Colder ii. 671

v. Hillersden i. 51

v. Lee i. 12

v. Madden i. 466

v. Prentice i. 389, 393

v. Puller i. 286 ; iii. 440

u. Richards ii. 755

u. Riddle i. 563, 572

v. Sowerby iii. 416

v. Street iii. 123

v. The Bishop of Carlisle ii. 802

Bomar v. Maxwell ii. 212, 275, 270

Bomeisler v. Dobson ii. 625

Bon v. Railway Passenger Ass. Co.

ii. 619

Bonaparte, The ii. 404, 405

Bonar v. Macdonald ii. 19

v. Mitchell i. 325

Bonbonus, Ex parte i. 203

Bond v. Bond i. 433

u. Clark i. 622

u. Cummings ii. 712

o. Farnham i. 308, 317

v. Gibson i. 205, 207, 208

v. Hays i. 186

v. Kent iii. 295

v. Loekwood i. 151

v. Moore i. 308

v. Nutt ii. 520, 521

v. Pittard i. 188

u. Seymour iii. 403 ; ii. 447

v. The Cora ii. 406, 438, 439, 533

v. The Superb ii. 447

Bondies v. Sherwood ii. 442

Bonham v. Badgley ii. 88, 726, 727

v. Iowa, &c. Ins. Co. ii. 559

Bonine v. Denniston ii. 7

Bonnell v. Allen i. 545

v. Jacobs i. 603

Bonner v. Liddell ii. 827

v. Welborn ii. 155

Bonney v. Bonney ii. 28

v. Foss i. 540

v. Seeley i. 33

Bonsey v. Amee ii. 380

Bonynge v. Field i. 130

Boody v. McKenny i. 362, 366, 367

Booker v. Kirkpatrick i. 226

Bool v. Mix i. 334, 362, 365

Boon v. Mtna. Ins. Co. ii. 571

v. Moss i. 172, 579

Boone v. Eyre ii. 658, 661, 662

v. Poindexter iii. 136

Boorman v. Am. Express Co. ii. 265

v. Brown iii. 235

v. Jenkins i. 628, 634

v. Nash iii. 220, 225, 429, 435, 462,

466

Boot v. Wilson iii. 448, 449

Booth v. Boston, &c. E. Co. ii. 45

v. Eighmie iii- 25

Booth v. Garelly

ii. 321

v. Garnett

ii. 835

v. Hartley

iii. 370

v. Hodgson

i. 313

v. Kennard

ii. 310

v. Powers

ii. 853

i'. Smith

ii. 757, 823, 824

v. Spuyten Duyvil Rolling Mill

Co. ii. 806

v. Storrs ii. 8

v. Terrell ii. 118, 137

v- Tyson ii. 785, 792

Boothby v. Scales i. 62

Bopp v. Fox i. 167

Boraston v. Green i. 544

Borchsenius v. Canutson ii. 877; iii. 27

Borden v. Borden ii. 810

v. Fitch ii. 740

u. Hingham Insurance Co. ii. 580

v. Houston ii. 16

v. Sumner iii. 409

Border State, &c. Assoc, v. McCarthy

iii. 117
Boreal v. The Golden Rose ii. 382

Borman v. Schober iii. 292

Boroughes's case ii. 645

Borradaile v. Brunton iii. 194

v. Hunter ii. 158, 603

Borrekins v. Bevan i. 624, 628, 03G

Borries v. Hutchinson iii. 223

v. Imperial Ottoman Bank ii. 882
Borrowman v. Drayton i. 697 ; ii. 674
v. Free i. 565

Borst v. Corey i. 440

Borthwick v. Carruthers i. 333

Borum v. Fouts i. 127

Bosanquet v. Dashwood iii. 137

v. Wray i. 186; ii. 764

Boscowitz i\ Adams Ex. Co. ii. 257

Bosler v. Kuhn iii. 478

Bosley v. Chesapeake Ins. Co. ii. 511, 512
Bosman v. Akeley ii. 32

Boson v. Sandford ii. 182, 183

Boss v. Lytton ii. 247

Bosseau v. O'Brien i. 51

Bostick v. Winton i. 615

Boston, The ii. 404, 433, 440, 443, 533
Boston v. Benson ii. 420, 856

v. Brazier ii. 826

Boston Bank o. Chamberlin i. 366

Boston Ice Co. v. Potter i. 246, 557

Boston India R. F. v. Hoit ii. 740

Boston Manuf. Co. v. Fiske iii. 176, 185
Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston

& Worcester R. R. Co. iii. 493,
494, 496
v. Gray ii. 838, 840

Boston & Lowell R. R. Co. v. Salem
& Lowell, B. & Me., and Lowell &
L. R. R. Cos. iii. 495

Boston & Maine R. R. Co. v. Babcock

iii. 309, 367
v. Bartlett i. 510; iii. 367

Boston & Sandwich Glass Co. v. Bos-
ton i. 496

xliv

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Boston & Worcester R. R. Corp. v.

Dana ii. 866

v. Sparhawk ii. 944

Bostwick v. Dodge i. 292

v. Leach iii. 36

Bosvil v. Brander iii. 437, 456

Boswell v. Green i. 199

v. Tunnell ii. 863

Botiller ;■. Newport i. 373

Bott v. McCoy i. 60

Bottomley v. Bovill ii. 535

v. Brooke ii. 884

r. Forbes ii. 076

Bottomly v. Nuttall i. 106

Bottsford v. Sandford iii. 129

Bouchaud v. Dias ii. 867

Bouchell v. Clary i. 353

Bouclier v. Lawson ii. 182, 454, 700, 739,

894

v. Vanbuskirk iii. 367

Boucicault v. Fox ii. 333, 338

c. Wood ii. 334

Bouck v. Wilber iii. 333

Boultbee i\ Stubbs i. 325

Boulter r, Peplow i. 31, 34

Boulton r. Bull ii. 309

v. Jones i. 557

v. Welsh i. 322

Bound v. Lathrop i. 211 ; iii. 88

Bourcier v. Lanusse ii. 730

Bourdillon v. Dalton iii. 424, 446

Bourke v. Lloyd ii. 831, 833

Bourne, Ex parte iii. 441

v. Cabot iii. 452

u. Diggles i. 92

u. Dodson iii. 428

v. Freeth i. 163

v. (iatliff ii. 675

v. Mason i. 496

v. Maybin i. 151)

Boussmaker, Ex parte iii. 4b5

Boutelleu. Smith ii. 888

Bouton v. Am. Ins. Co. ii. 600, 616

Bouttilier v. Thick ii. 840

Bovil v. Hammond i. 184, 185

Bovill c. Key worth ii. 310

Bowcher v. Noidstrom ii. 468

Bowdell i'. Parsons i. 572; ii. 800, 809

Bowdsn v. Gray i. 385

v. Moore ii. 152

p. Vaughan ii. 523, 524

Bowditch v. Winslow ii. 557

Bowdre r. Hampton iii. 88

Bowen v. Burke i. 563

r. Hope Ins. Co. ii. 483

v. Lake Erie Tel. Co. ii. 279, 290,

294, 301

v. Merchants Ins. Co. ii. 487

o. Newell i. 313

v. Stoddard ii. 076

v. Sullivan i. 562 ; ii. 106

Bower v Major i. 549

v. Peate i. 116

v. Swadlin i. 210

Bowerbank v. Monteiro i. 142 ; ii. 631

Bowers, Ex parte

p. Hurd

r. Jewell

v. Johnson

v. Parker
Bowes, Ex parte

v. Howe

o. Sliand

v. Tibbets
Bowie v. Napier

v. Stonestreet
Bowker v. Hoyt

v. Lowell
Bowles r. Round

v. Woodson
Bowling v. Harrison

iii. 416

ii. 0S5

ii. 856, 858

ii. 921

ii. 609

iii. 416

i. 306, 316

i. 024 ; ii. 624

ii. 50, 57

i. 102

iii. 858

ii. 655, 785, 791

i. 444

i. 520

iii. 306, 313

i. 300, 319

Bowling Green Bank i>. Todd i. 129

Bowman r. Bailey i. 184

r. Cecil Bank i. 212

v. Coffroth ii. 895

v. Curd ii. 32

r. Floyd ii. 378

v. Franklin ii. 557

r. Herring i. 5G9

v. Hilton ii. 220

v. Horsey ii. 667

v. Officer i. 93

v. Sanborn iii. 99

«.-. Teall ii. 173, 215 ; iii. 208

r. Woods ii. 58

Bowne v. Joy ii. 739, 863, 864

Bownell v. Briggs i. 66

Bowring v. Andrews i. 307

a. Shepherd ii. 668

Bowsall r. McKay iii. 184

Bowser v. Blits ii. 891

Bowyer v. Bright i. 526

lio.x of Bullion ii. 436

Boyce v, Anderson ii. 234, 238

r. California Stage Co. ii. 239

c. Douglas ii. 863

t. Edwards ii. 716

v. Ewart ii. 24

Boyd v. Anderson i. 492

v. Blanknian i. 147

v. Bopst i. 616

v. Brinckin i. 507 ; iii. 313

v. Brown iii. 188, 196

v. Browne ii. 321, 917

v. Cleaveland i. 815

v. Cowan iii. 236

v. Croydon R. R. Co. i. 153

v. Day ii. 881

v. Dubois ii. 496

i'. Graves ii. 940

v. Hitchcock ii. 751

u. Kennedy i. 330

v. Mangles iii. 439, 469

v. McAlpine ii. 321

v. Plumb i. 210

c. Siffkin i. 596

r. The Falcon ii. 392

v. Vanderkemp i. 80 ; iii. 466

v. Wilson i. 625, 628

Boydell v. Drummond iii. 5, 42, 65

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

xlv

Boyden v. Boyden

i. 367, 370

v. Moore

ii. 771

Boyers v. Elliott

i. 168

Boykin v. Dohlonde

iii. 2:!

Boyle, Ex parte

Hi. 409

v. Brandon

ii. 194

v. McLaughlin

ii. 198, 214

v. Peabody Heights Co. i. 032

v. Zacharie iii. 393, 394, 395, 396, 507

Boyle's Estate i. 411

Boynton ik Bodwell i. 548

v. Braley iii. 273

v. Clinton Ins. Co. ii. 475, 587

v. Dyer i. 136, 137 ; iii. 422

v. Hazleboom iii. 372

v. Hubbard ii. 925

v. Kellogg ii. 64, 70

v. Page ii. 901

v. Veazie iii. 49

Boys v. Ancell iii. 172

Boyson v. Coles i. 102

Bozon (i. Farlow iii. 323, 366, 374

Brabin v. Hyde iii. 20

Bracegirdle v. Heald ii. 49 ; iii. 40, 44

Bracey v. Carter i. 128

Bracken v. Miller i. 81

Bracket v. McNair iii. 207

Bfackett v. Blake i. 253

v. Bullard i. 613

v. Evans iii. 38

v. Hoyt i. 489

v. Mountfort ii. 858

v. Norton ii. 746

v. Rich ii. 3, 31

v. The Hercules ii. 461

Bradburn v. Great Western R. Co.

iii. 186, 196

Bradburne v. Botfield i. 17, 23

v. Bradburne i. 485

Bradbury v. 'Wright i. 533

Braden v. Gardner ii. 39

Bradfield v. Tupper iii. 83

Bradford v. Bush i. 62, 623

v. Cary iii. 483

v. Corey i. 317

v. Farrand iii. 396, 507

u. French i. 374

u. Greenway i. 409

v. Johnson i. 166

v. Manley i. 628, 634

v. Tappan i. 561

Bradhurst v. Col. Ins. Co. ii. 446, 449,

510

Bradish v. Henderson ii. 115

Bradlee v. Boston Glass Co. i. 56

v. Warren Savings Bank i. 64

Bradley v. Bolles ii. 385

v. Bradley ii. 613

v. Cary ii. 4

v. Chester Valley R. R. Co. iii. 378

v. Davis i. 322

v. Holdsworth i. 374

v. Hunt i. 266

v. Johnson iii. 369

v. Lowry ii. 709

Bradley v. Munton iii. 337
v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. ii. 602

v. Nashville Ins. Co. ii. 487

v. N. Y., &c. R. Co. ii. 46

v. Pratt i. 353

v. Rea ii. 903

v. Richardson i. 101

v. Toder ii. 804
v. Wash. A. & G. Steam Packet

Co. ii. 680

v. Waterhouse ii. 261

v. Wheeler i. 573

Bradlie i'. Am. Ins. Co. ii. 515

v. Maryland Ins. Co. " ii. 507

Bradsey v. Clyston ii. 826

Bradshaw v. Bennett i. 524

v. Buchanan iii. 181

u. Combs ii. 30

v. Heath ii. 736

v. Klein iii. 421, 441

v. Lancashire, &c. R. R. Co. i. 144

v. McLoughlin i. 459

v. Warner i. 578

Bradstreet v. Baldwin ii. 415

v. Clark iii. 103

v. Everson i. 90

u. Heron ii. 415

<.-. Neptune Ins. Co. ii. 399, 718

u. Supervisors of Oneida County

i. 448

Bradt v. Koon iii. 286

v. Towsley iii. 189

Brady r. Giles i. 119

o. Haines i. 569

u. Little Miami R. R. Co. i. 296

v. Mayor i. 127

v. Todd i. 62, 63

Bragdon v. Appleton Ins. Co. ii. 540

Bragg v. Anderson ii. 535

v. Cole ii. 792

v. Fessenden i. 123

</. Morrill i. 630

r. New England Ins. Co. ii. 576

Brahain v. Bustard ii. 353, 363

Brahn v. Jersey City, &c. Co. i. 548

Brainard v. Buck iii. 72

Braithwaite v. Coleman ii. 882

v. Skinner i. 141

o. Skofield i. 163

Bramah v. Roberts i. 163, 294

Bramhall v. Beckett _i. 292

Brammer v. Jones ii. 324

Bramwell v. Halcomb ii. 344, 348, 378

Branch v. Burnley ii. 746

v. Ewington ii. 56

v. Wiseman i. 232

Branch Bank v. Boykin i. 464

v. James i. 274

Brand v. Boulcott i. 20, 26, 34

v. Frumveller i. 532, 534

Brandao v. Barnett ii. 113

Brandas v. Barnett iii. 281

Brandon v. Brandon iii. 471

v. Curling ii. 481

v. Hibbert ii. 759

xlvi

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Brandon v. Hubbard

i. 26

v. Nesbitt

ii. 481

v. Newington

ii. 780

u. Old

i. 435

v. Pate

iii. 426, 454

v. Robinson

iii. 429, 449

Brandon Manuf. Co. v. Morse i. 570

Brandram r. Wharton iii. 87

Brandt r. Bowlhy i. 328; ii. 412; iii. 206

v. Lawrence ii. 790 ; iii. 223

Brannon v. Hursell iii. 113

Branston, The ii. 438

Brashear v. West iii. 382

Brashier v. Gratz iii. 340, 364

Brason v. Dean ii. 807

Brass v. Maitland ii. 417

v. Worth i. 53 ; ii. 120

Braswell v. Am. Ins. Co. i. 75 ; ii. 617, 745

Brather v. McEvoy ii. 87!'

Brawdy v. Brawdy iii. 349

Braxton v. Wood iii. 75

Bray r. Bates ii. 402

v. Gunn i. 88

i. Hadwen i. 321

v. Hartshorn ii. 308

v. Kettell ii. 421

v. Mayne ii. 131

v. The Atlanta ii. 466

v. Wheeler i. 349

Braynard v. Marsliall ii. 718 ; iii. 394, 395,

396, 397
Brazelton v. Colyar i. 99

Brazier ;;. Bryant ii. 762

Brazill v. Isham ii. 820

Brealey v. Andrew i. 473

v. Collins i. 522

Breary v. Kemp ii. 838

Breasted u. Farmers' Loan & Trust

Co. ii. 604

Breek v. Cole ii. 685

Breckenridge's Heirs v. Ormsby i. 335,

370

Breckinridge v. Shrieve i. 203

Brecknock Co. u. Pritchard i. 536 ;

ii. 199, 805

Bredin v. Dubarry i. 51

Bredin's Appeal ii. 886

Bree v. Sayler ii. 818

Breed v. Eaton ii. 533

v. Hillhouse i. 308; ii. 32

v. Hurd ii. 777

v. Judd i. 353

o. The Venus ii. 404, 453

Brees v. U. S. Tel. Co. ii. 279, 282, 285,

287
Brehm v. Great Western Ry. Co. ii. 239
Breinig v. Meitzler i. 393

Bremner v. Williams ii. 242, 243, 244

Brenchley, Ex parte iii. 471

Breneman, Ex parte iii. 402

Brennan v. Currint iii. 262

Brenner v. Duard iii. 478

v. Herr ii. 822

Brent v. Cook iii. 97

v. Green i. 510 ; iii. 12

I Brenton v. Davis i- 630

J Brereton v. Hull iii- 442

Breslauer v. Brown iii- 411

Breton v. Hull iii- -577

v. Woolven i- 384

Brett v. Brett ii. 732

v. Carter i- 013

v. Cumberland iii. 449

Brettel v. Williams iii. 18

Bretton v. Prat ii. 826, 835

Brenner v. Liverpool Ins. Co. ii. 669

Breverton's case i. 251

Brewer v. B. & W. R. R. Co. ii. 944

v. Dew

iii. 183, 454

v. Dyer

i. 498 ; ii. 941

v. Hardy

ii. 035

v. Herbert

iii. 313

('. Linnasus

ii. 708

!-. Norcross

ii. 878

i\ Salisbury

i. 564, 566, 570

v. Sparrow

i. 61, 52

Brewers v. Fleming

ii. 777

Brewerton r. Hnrris

ii. 874

Brewster v. Baker

i. 578 ; ii. 938

v. Burnett

ii. 814, 922

i'. De Fremery

i. 535

v. Edgerly

iii. 168, 173

v. Hammett

i. 231, 232

f. Hough

iii. 497, 498, 499

v, Kitchell

ii. 518, 807

v. McC'all's Devisees ii. 692

v. Silence

ii. 12, 604

v. Wakefield

iii. 113

Breyfogle v. Beckley

iii. Ill

Brice v. Bannister

i. 205

!•. Stokes

i. 29

Bricheno v. Thorp

i. 127

Brichta v. N. Y. Lafayette Company

ii. 477,

566, 574 ; iii. 436

Brickhouse v. Hunter

ii. 831

Bridge v. Hubbard i.

488; iii. 127, 129,

131

i. 497

t'. Niagara Ins. Co.

r. Sumner

ii. 871

r. The Grand Junction Co. ii. 250

v. Wain

iii. 195, 228

Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken iiil 607

Bridgeman's case

i. 517

Bridgeport Bank v. Dyer ii. 669, 675,

Bridger v. Rice

iii. 3..1

Bridges v. Berry

i. 306

v. Hawkesworth

ii. 106

v. Hitchcock

i. 532

v. Mitchell

iii. 96

v. North London, &c

. Co. ii. 251

Bridgewater Academy v

Gilbert i. 482

Bridgham i\ Henderson

iii. 394

Brien v. Harriman

i. 228

Brier's Appeal

i. 469

Brigg p. Washburne

ii. 895

Briggs v, A Light-Boat

ii. 384

<■•■ Boston, &e. R. R.

Co. ii. 231;

iii. 212

u. Briggs

ii. 734

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

xlvii

Briggs ii. Downing

v. Earl of Oxford

v. Georgia

v. Hall

-.. N. A. Ins. Co.

v. Partridge

v. Strange

v. Vanderbilt
Brigliam v. Clark

v. Home Life Ins. Co.

v. Peters

n. Smith
Bright v. Boyd

v. Carpenter

v. Cowper

v. Juilson

i: Mi-Knight

v. Paige

c. Rowland

v. Sneff
Brightman v. Hicks
Brigstocke v. Smith

ii. 7

iii. 831

i. 128

i. 542, 551

ii. 570

i. 65

ii. 304

i. 176

i. 183

iii. 441

i. 48, 51

i. 309

iii. 238

i. 274

ii. 406

i. 292; ii. 719

ii. 16

ii. 425

iii. 173

iii. 268

iii. 26

iii. 72

Brind v. Dale ii. 134, 168, 179, 188

Bringloe v. Morrice ii. 118

Brink v. Hanover Ins. Co. ii. 587

Brinker v. Brinker iii. 343, 362

Brinley v. Mann i. 155

v. National Ins. Co. ii. 579

u. Spring ii. 395

v. Whiting ii. 909

Brinsby v. Gold ii. 863

Brisban v. Boyd i. 514

Brisbane v. Stoughton iii. 378

Bristol v. R. & S. R. ft. ii. 199

v. Warner i. 282

Bristow v. Eastman ii. 748 ; iii. 425

v. Whitmore ii. 421, 454

Bristovve v. Fairclough iii- 201

o. Needham ii. 874

Brit. & Am. Tel. Co. v. Colson i. 515

Brit. No. Amer. Bank v. Merchants

Bank iii. 98

Britannia Co. v. Zingsen ii. 11

British Empire, The ii. 442

British Linen Co. v. Drummond ii. 719,

721
British Wagon Co. v. Lea i. 256

Brittan v. Barnaby ii. 413

Britten r. Hughes "z.477

Britton v. Angier ii 11

v. Bishop i. 290

v. Turner ii. 42, 655, 879

Brix v. Braham i- 463

Brizsee v. Maybee iii. 183, 215, 217, 218
Broad v. Jolyffe ii. 888, 891

». Thomas i. 109, 110

Broadwater v. Blot ii. 149

Broadway Bank v. Adams iii. 429

Broadwell v. Getman ii. 49; iii. 44

v. Howard j- 665

Brock v. Rice . '• 527

v. Thompson iii. 126, 156

Brockbank v. Anderson ii. 937

Brockelbank v. Sugrue . i- 47

Brockway v. Burnap i- 180

Brockway v. Clark

iii. 126

v. Lascala

ii. 36

Broddie v. Johnson

iii. 72

Brodie v. Howard

ii. 389, 396

c. St. Paul

iii. 18, 66

Broeder Trow, The

ii. 182

Broennenburgh i\ Haycock i. 635

Brogden v. Metropolitan R. Co. i. 507

v. Walker iii. 372

Bromage v. Lloyd i. 272, 285

v. Prosser iii. 177

Bronson v. Alexander i. 275

v. Cahill iii. 308

v. Gleason ii. 783

v. Green iii. 184

v. Kinzie iii. 505, 511

v. Newberry iii. 506

v. Newbury iii. 504

v. Stroud iii. 22

v. Wiman iii. 62

Brook i: Brook ii. 728

v. Hook i. 279

v. Smith ii. 739

Brooke v. Bridges iii. 237

a. Enderby i. 189 ; ii. 766

c. Evans i. 195, 199, 203

a. Gaily i. 364

v. Hewett iii. 429, 435, 454

v. La. St. Ins. Co. ii. 509

v. Mitchell ii. 837

v. Pickwick ii. 261, 273, 276

v. Washington i- 188

Brooker v. Scott i. 337

Brookes, Ex parte iii. 474

Brooklyn Bank v. De Grauw ii. 818

Brooklyn, The, White Lead Co. n.

Masury ii. 360, 371, 374

«. Mesury ii. 352

Brookman v. Metcalf i. 158 ; ii 945

Brooks w. Aston ii- 308

«. Ball i. 474

v. Bicknell ii. 308, 314, 315, 319, 324

v. Brooks i- 228

v. Byam ii. 318

v. Hargreaves i- 280

v. Harison iii. 181

i/. Harrison iii. 267

„. Hubbard iii. 232, 233

v. Marbury iii. 382

v. Minturn i. 57 ; ii. 415, 424, 425

v. Mitchell i- 295

v. Moody iii- 244

v. Oriental Ins. Co. ii. 446, 491, 507

v. Powers i- 569

u. State ii- 106

v. Stuart i. 27 ; ii. 851

v. Wheelock iii. 312, 347

v. White ii- 751, 823

Broom v. Batchelor ii. 635

v. Broom i- 168

v. Robinson iii- 448

Broome, Ex parte i. 229

Broomley v. Holland i- 74

Brothers v. Brothers i- 94

Brough v. Oddy iii- 318

xlviii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Brough v. Whitmore

ii.

483, 666

Broughton v. Brougliton

i. 93

v. Conway

ii. 634

v. Sillaway i

.527

; ii. 746

Brousseau v. The Hudson

ii. 41C

Brouwer v. Hill

i. 483

Brower v. Lewis

i. 628

Brown, Appeal of

i. 233

Ex parte iii. 416,

427,

463, 471

In re

i. 313

u. Ackroyd

i. 402

r. Adams

i. 457

v. Alden

i. 380

v. Allen

. 28, 228

v. Arrot

iii. 206

v. Bartee

iii.

378, 382

v. Bachelor

ii. 23

v. Bellows

i. 561

v. Bement

i. 611

v. Berry

ii. 781

v. Bigelow i

625

; iii. 427

v. Bigley

i. 129

v. Bowen

ii. 939

u. Bragg

i. 533

v. Bridges

iii. 77

v. Brine

i. 470

v. Brown i. 263, 266, 384, 409; ii. 11,

832 ; iii. 39

v. Buffalo & S. L. R. R.

Co.

ii. 247

v. Burns

ii. 763

t. Byrne

ii. 667

v. Chase

i. 152

v. Chicago, &c. R. Co.

iii. 187

v. Clark

i. 230

v. Clegg

ii. 182

u. Cole

i. 501

v. Collier

i. 403

v. Collins

iii. 398

v. Combs

i. 500

v. Coombs

i. 107

o . Cousens

ii

. 68, 107

u. Crump i.

502,

536, 537

v. Cuming

iii.

420, 439

v. Cummings

iii. 199

v. Curtiss i. 274

; ii.

7; iii. 28

v. Davies i.

288,

289, 293

u. Delano

ii. 425

v. Denison

ii. 150

v. Dewey

iii. 125

n. De Winton

i.

277, 278

u. Dickerson

iii. 212

i . Donnell

i. 155

v. Doyle

i. 12

v. Duchesne

ii. 325

v. Dudley

ii. 805

i'. Dunckel

ii. 757

v. Durham

i. 356

c. Dysinger i. 54C

; ii.

773, 779

v. Eastern R. R. Co.

ii. 273

v. Edes

iii. 72

v. Edgington

i. 630

v. Elkington

i. 635

v. Evans

ii. 827

c. Everhard

i. 455

v. Eergusoa i.

320,

323, 326

Brown

v. Eitch

i. 579

Foster

i. 564 ; ii. 63

Galloway

iii. 237

Gammon

ii. 789

Garland

ii. 877

George

iii. 28

Gibbins

i. 196

Gilman

iii. 293

Gil more

ii. 776

Girard

ii. 528

Hankerson

ii. 829

Harrison

iii. 143, 145

Hartford Ins. Co.

i. 79,200; ii. 492

Hatton

ii. 624

Heathcote

iii. 424, 443

Hiatts

iii. 98

Howard

iii. 99

Hummell

iii. 485

Hunt

ii. 424

Independence, The ii. 464

Joddrell

i. 434

Johnson

ii. 424, 799

Keller

i. 541

Kewley

ii. 755

Kimball

ii. 792

Lacy

iii. 129

Langford

i. 486

Leavitt

i. 292; ii. 848

Leeson

ii. 897

Leonard

i. 188

Litton

i. 97, 229

Lull i. 441

ii. 456, 458, 459

Maine Bank

i. 255

Marsh ,

i. 28

Maxwell

. 356 ; ii. 46, 248

McCormack

ii. 933

McCune

i. 357 ; ii. 942

McGran i.

74, 103, 104, 108

Miller

iii. 223

Morris

ii. 882 ; iii. 39

Mott

i. 293 ; iii. 451

Mullins

i. 151

Neal

ii. 772

Neilson

ii. 428, 498

Nevitt

iii. 116

Olmsted

ii. 756

Orland

ii. 624, 025

Orr

i. 392

Overton

ii. 463, 533

Batton

i. 394, 3110

People's Ins. Co.

ii. 473

Pforr

i. 70

Prophit

ii. 28

Quilter

ii. 589

Ralston

ii. 415, 425

Rawlings

iii. 66

Reed

ii. 862

Royal Ins. Co.

ii. 579

Saul

ii. 753

Savage

ii. 827, 837

Sax

iii. 215

Sayles

i. 631

Simms

i. 553

Slater

ii. 635

Sloan

i. 468

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

xlix

Brown r. Smith
v. Stapyleton
v. Sullivan
v. Swineford
v. Tapscott
v. Tarkington
v. Tayleur
v. Tiglie
v. Toell

v. Union Ins. Co
v. United States
v. Vawser
v. Vigne
v. Wade
o. Walli9
v. Ward
v. Warnock
v. Waters
v. Weber
v. Wilkinson
v. Williams
v. Witter
v. Wood
u. Wootton
v. Yaryan
Brown's Appeal
Browne v. Lee
v. Meverell
v. Robinson
Brownell v. Flagler

v. Hawkins
Browning v. Beston
v. Hart

v. Home Ins. Co.
v. Magill
u. Marvin
v. Morris

v. Provincial Ins. Co,
v. Eeame
v. Wright
Broxham v. Wagstaffe
Bruce v. Andrews

v. Bruce i. 298 ;

v. Hunter
v. Learned
v. Lytle
v. Pearson
v. Pettengill
v. Schuyler
v. Smith
v. Wait
Bruen v. Marquand
Brumby v. Smith
Brummel v. Stockton
Brundage v. Brundage
Brundige v. Poor
Brundred v. Muzzy
Brundrett, Ex parte
Brundridge v. Whitcomb
Brunswick Sav. Inst. v.

Ins. Co.
Brush v. Keeler
v. Scribner
Brutton v. Burton
Bryan v. Bradley

ii. 513
ii. 451
i. 147
hi. 182
i. 184; ii. 390
i. 273
ii. 487, 532
iii. 323
iii. 125
ii. 500, 520
i. 41!)
ii. 837
ii. 487, 488
ii. 818; iii. 46
i. 546
ii. 127
ii. 827, 831
iii. 116, 129
iii. 29
ii. 454
ii. 55-3
:i. 815
iii. 430
i. 12
ii. 51
i. 228
i. 31, 34
ii. 828
ii. 882
ii. 247, 248
iii. 122, 127, 401
ii. 639, 640, 641
iii. 402
ii. 546
i. 556
i. 224
iii. 137
i. 65
ii. 87 ; iii. 414
ii. 623, 634, 640
ii. 37, 44
iii. 277
ii. 701, 709, 823
hi. 159
iii. 216
i. 308, 316
i. 505, 506'
iii. 235
iii. 507
iii. 382
iii. 277, 279
i. 26, 210
ii. 140
i. 569
i. 158
iii. 310
i. 174
iii. 416
ii. 878
Commercial

ii. 470
ii. 897
i. 292
i. 122
ii. 635

Bryan v. Horseman

v. Jackson

v. Lewis

v. Stewart

v. Weatherhead
Bryant, Ex parte

v. Am. Tel. Co.

v. Booze

v. Christie

iii. 69, 70
i. 342
i. 500
i. 146
i. 530
iii. 470
ii. 288, 291, 301
i. 515
iii. 477

v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. ii. 418,
478, 505, 676

o. Craig

v. Eastman

v. Flight

v. Goodnow

v. Harabrick

v. Jackson

v. Kelton

v. Ocean Ins. Co.

v. Pottinger

v. Poughkeepsie Ins. Co,

v. Proctor

v. Sears

e. Whitcher

v. Young
Bryce v. Brooks
Bryden v. Taylor
Bryer v. Weston
Brymer v. Atkins
Bryson v. Browning

v. Rayner

v. Whitehead
Buchan v. Sumner
Buchanan v. Curry

v. Howland

v. Marshall

v. Ocean Ins. Co.

v. Rucker
Buchans v. Harwell
Buck v. Albee

v. Buck

v. Chesapeake Ins. Co.

v. Fisher

v. Hermance

v. Lane

v. McCaughtry

v. Mosley

i/. Rawlinson

v. Smiley

v. Smith

v. Winn
Buckbee v. U. S. Ins. Co.
Bucker v. Klerkgeter
Buekhause, Re
Buckingham v. Burgess
v. McLean

v. Smith
Buckland v. Butterfield
v. Conway
v. Hall
Buckle v. Mitchell
Buckley, Ex parte
v. Artcher
v. Barber
v. Bentley

i. 106

i. 274

ii. 69

i. 474, 483

iii. 238, 247

i. 434

i. 569

ii. 523, 524

i. 361

ii. 545

ii. 818

iii. 224

i. 556

iii. 403

i. 107

i. 325

i. 198

iii. 425

i. 263

ii. 130

ii. 889 ; iii. 323, 374

i. 168, 171

i. 210

ii. 325

i. 315

ii. 505

ii. 740, 872

ii. 941

i. 486

i. Ill

ii. 524

iii. Ill

ii. 307, 327

ii. 465

i. 526

i. 208

ii. 458

ii. 28

iii. 321

i. 168

ii. 614

ii. 466

iii. 475

i. 196

iii. 145

iii. 75

i. 546, 547

ii. 825, 833

iii. 364, 454

ii. 317

i. 136

ii. 915

i. 147, 227

i. 315

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Buckley v. Buckley
v. Cater
v. Furniss
r>. Guildbank
v. Wells

i. 168, 170

i. 230

i. 645, 649, 653

ii. 644; iii. 138

i. 387

Bucklin v. Thompson i. 612

v. Ward i. 254

Buckman v. Levi i. 574; iii. 193

Buckmaster i>. Harrop iii. 12, 66, 349

v. Smyth i. 578

Buckmyr v. Darnall ii. 4

Bucknam v. Barnum i. 176, 198

?■. Goddard i. 016

Buckner v. Finley i. 326

v. Smyth i. 383

Budd v. Busti iii. 297

v. Fairmaner i. 622

Buel v. Gordon iii. 464

Buell v. Buckingham i. 95

Bufe v. Turner ii. 558, 910

Buffalo v. Holloway i. 120

Buffalo Bank v. Fiske i. 651

Buffalo Steam Engine Works v. Sun

Ins. Co. ii. 475, 577

Buffam v. Merry ii. 143

Buffett v. Troy, &c. K. R. Co. ii. 237

Buffington v. Curtis i. 329; ii. 411

v. Quantin i. 636

Buffinton v. Ulen i. 568

Bufford v. Caldwell ii. 917, 927

v. McNeely i. 222

Buffum v. Buffum i. 168

u. Fayette Ins. Co. ii. 541

v. Green iii. 381, 382

Building, &c. Assoc, v. Dorsey iii. 117

Bulger v. Koche ii. 721

Bulkley v. Barber ii. 387

o. Dayton i. 20

v. Derby Fishing Co. i. 157; ii. 521

o. Honold ii. 393

v. Morgan ii. 923

Bull r. Bull ii. 82-1

v. Parker ii. 77'.)

r. Robison i. 573, 631

Bullard, Ex parte iii. 417

v. Roger Williams Ins. Co. ii. 5u6,

511, 529

v. Young ii. 212

Bullen i'. Denning ii. 039

v. Sharp i. 183

Buller !•. Fisher ii. 183, 434

v. Harrison i. 85, 80

Bullett v. Bank of Penn. i. 331, 332

Bullitt v. Musgrave ii. 843

Bullock r. Babcock i. 35 i

o. Boyd iii. 143, 157

v. Bullock ii. 92

v. Campbell iii. 98

v. Dommitt i. 536; ii. 805

v. Lamar, The ii. 431

v. Smith iii. 76

u. Taylor i. 279

v. Wilson iii. 237

Bulwer v. Horne ii. 772

Bumgardner w. Circuit Ct. iii. 506

Bunger v. Koop

Bunker v. Athearn
u. Miles

Bunn v. Guy
v. Ricker
v. Thomas

ii. 823

i. 279

i. 94

i. 459, ii. 889

ii. 761, 896, 897

ii. 644

v. Winthrop i. 377 ; iii. 315, 318

Bunney v. Poyntz i. 529, 645; iii. 263, 274

Buntin v. French iii. 294

Burbank r. Beach i. 319

c Rockingham Ins. Co. ii. 477, 577,

583

Burbridge r. Manners i. 318

Burcli v. Breckinridge i. 408

Burchard v. Tapscott ii. 394

Burchell v. Marsh ii. 840

Burchfield v. Moore ii. 854

Burcle r. Eekart i. 180

Burd v. Smith iii. 382, 383

Burdell v. Denig ii. 328

Burden v. Corning ii. 317

c. Ferrers i. 12

v. M'Elhenny iii. 69

Burdeno v. Amperse ii- 79

Burdett v. Willett iii. 438

v. Withers i. 536; iii. 249

Burdick v. Green ii. 757

o. Post iii. 403

Burgan v. Lyell i. 192

Burge v. Cedar Rapids, &c. R. Co. ii. 815

v. Coul i. 570

Burgess, Ex parte iii. 414

v. Atkins i. 234

r. Burgess ii. 372, 373

u. Clements ii. 158, 159

c. Equitable Ins. Co. ii. 532

v. Eve ii. 33

u. Gray i. 118, 120

v. Gun ii. 407

v. Hately ii. 377

r. Hills ii. 373, 375, 377

h. Pollock i. 433

v. Tucker ii. 875

v. Vreeland i. 318

v. Wheate iii. 295, 312

Burgliart v. Angerstein i. 336, 337, 353

v, Gardner i. 120, 128

v. Hall i. 336

Burgoyne v. Showier ii. 860

Burk v. Baxter i. 548

v. McClain iii. 409, 436

v. Serrill iii. 309

Burk '8 Appeal iii. 370

Burke v. Cruger ii. 28

r. Haley iii. 12, 14

v. McKay i. 325

</. Noble i. 27

j>. Norwich R. R. Co. ii. 46

v. Winkle i. 40T

Burkett v. Trowbridge i. 387

Burkhalter v. Second Bank ii. 757

Burkholder v. Plank i. 457

Burks v. Shain ii. 74

Burleigh v. Gebhard Ins. Co. ii. 552

v. Parton i. 208

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Burleigh v. Stott
Burlen r. Shannon
Burleson v. Burleson
Burley v. Russell
Burliner c Boyle

iii. 87, 88, 90

ii. 981

ii. 939

i. 357

iii. 411

Burlingame v. Brewster ii. 853

v. Burlingame i. 349 ; iii. 247

Burlingliame v. Robbing iii. "293
Burlington Mut. Loan Assoc, v. Hei-

der iii. 117

Bnrraester v. Barrow i. 316, 320

Burn r. Boulton iii. 83

u. Miller ii. 655

v. Morris i. 52

Burnaby's case ii. 874

Burnand v. Rodocanachi ii. 563

Burnby v. Bollett i. 632

Bumell b. Minot i. 34

Burness v. Pennel i. 48, 163, 193

Burnet v. Bisco i. 458

Burnett v. Chetwood ii. 337, 342, 347

v. Eufaula Ins. Co. ii. 576

v. Phalon ii. 353, 371, 376

v. Scribner ii. 940

v. Snyder i. 183

Burnhara v. Allen ii. 625

v. Dorr ii. 702

v. Gentrys iii. 118

v. Noyes iii. 441, 478

v. Tucker i. 290

v. Webster i. 290

v. Wood i. 290

Burns v. Bryant i. 549

v. Fletcher i 682

v. Pilsbury i. Ill

u. Poulson i. 113

v. Rowland i. 304

v. Thornburgh ii. 874

Burnside v. Merrick i. 170 ; iii. 426

Buron v. Denman i. 53, 549

Burpee v. Sparliawk iii. 411

Burr v. Cowperthwaite ii. 311

v. Duryea ii. 311

v. Foster ii. 524

u. Sim ii. 613

v. Stenton i. 531

v. Wilcox i. 474; iii. 23

v. Williams i. 566

Burrall v. Acker i. 234

v. Jacob i. 507

v. Rice iii. 396, 508

Burrell v. Jones i. 129 ; ii. 32

v. North ii. 194

Burridge v. Fortescue iii- 167

v. Row ii- 610

Burrill v. Stevens ii- 914

Burritt v. Belfy iii- 203

u. Saratoga Co. Ins. Co. ii. 523, 542.

553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 560

Burrough v. Moss i. 290 ; ii. 877

Burroughes v. Clarke ii- 59

Burroughs v. Hanegan }■ 308

v. Richmond _ __ '■ 435

Burrows v. Jemino ii- 700, 737

„, Pierce iii- 238, 242

Burrows v. Trieber ii. 156

v. Whitaker i. 564, 566

Burrus v. Kyle i. 108; iii. 275

v. Roulhac iii. 294

Burschalter v. Erie Bank i. 296

Burson v. Edwards iii. 180

v. Kincaid i. 210

Burt v. Dutcher i. 668

v. Sternburgh ii. 867

Burtis v. Thompson ii. 810

Burton, Ex parte i. 463

a. Blin ii. 670
v. Chinn ii. 877
„. G. N. R. Co. i. 479
o. Griffiths i. 140

b. Huglies ii. 103
v. Issit i. 211
b. Lockhert iii. 452
v. Philadelphia, &c. Railroad i. 154
o. Schermerhorn i. 495
v. Stewart ii. 922
v. Wilkinson ii- 152

Burton's case iii. 116, 125, 149

Burwell v. Mandeville's Ex'r i. 223, 220

v. Knight . ii. 871

Bury b. Bradford ii- 368

b. Philpot i. 377

Busby b. Clienault i- 228

o. North Amer.Jns. Co. . ii. 616

Busehman b. Wilson i. 536

Bush, Ex parte [iii. 287

b. Barnard i. 404

b. Canfield iii. 220

v. Clark i- 228

v. Davies i- 563

a. Dutcher iii- 212
u. Lathrop i- 255, 258
i: Livingston iii- 125, 127

b. Marshall ii- 933
b. Miller ii- 135
b. Pettibone i- 434
v. Shipman iii. 483
o. Steinman i. 120
v. Stevens iii- 31

Bushee v. Allen iii- 23

Bushell b. Beavan iii- 24

v. Wheeler iii- 54

Busk v. Davies i. 563, 560

v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co. ii. 527

Buskirk v. Purin iii. 269

Buson v. Dougherty i- 578, 579

Buss v. Gilbert _ iii. 470, 478

Bussard v. Levering i. 313, 318, 321

Bussfieid b. Bussfleld ii- 836

Bussman v. Ganster i- 537

Bustard's case iii- 243

Butcher v. Dresser i- 227

p. Easto iii- 441

v. Forman ii- 463

u. London & Southwestern Ry.

Co. "• 188, 203

b. Stewart ii. 694 ; iii. 25
Butcher's and Drover's Bank b.

Brown i- 271

Butler, Ex parte iii- *24

lii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Butler v. American Toy Co. i. 166

v. Arrow, The ii. 410

v. Basing ii. 194

v. Breck i. 337, 383

u. Buckingham i. 406

v. Carver i I i - 435

v. Chariton County Court iii. 481

v. Heane ii. 273

u. Hicks iii. 211

v. Hildreth iii. 441

v. Howe iii. 102

v. Hunter i. 116

v. Inneys ii. 875

v. Knight i. 130

v. Lee ii. 900, 905

v. Northumberland iii. 219

v. Paine i. 280

v. Palmer iii. 486, 611

v. Pennsylvania iii. 483

v. Powis iii. 309, 351

v. Rhodes iii. 477

v. Stocking i. 208

v. Thompson i. 583

v. Tufts i. 616

v. Wigge i. 487

v. Wildman ii. 497

v. Winters iii. 72

Butman v. Monmouth Ins. Co. ii. 573

Bntnam v. Abbot ii. 59

Butt v. Ellett iii. 302

v. Great Western R. R. Co. ii. 134

Butterfield v. Forrester ii. 250

v. Hartshorn i. 246, 248

v. Hemsley i. 210

o. Jacobs iii. 72, 76

v. Kidder iii. 121

Butterfill, Ex -parte iii. 470

Butters v. Haughwout i. 557

Butterworth r. McKinley i. 566

v. Robinson ii. 327, 345

Button v. Downham iii. 150

v. Great Western Cotton Co. ii. 45

Buttrick v Holden iii. 313

Butts v. Cuthbertson ii. 392

v. Dean ii. 756

v. Newton i. 387

Buxton, Ex parte iii. 422

v. Bouglian iii. 285

v. James ii. 348

v. Jones i. 76, 311

u. Lister iii. 321, 325, 328, 329

BuzzpII v. LaconiaMan. Co. ii. 45

Kyam v. Farr ii. 317

Byars v. Doores i. 69

Byassee v. Reese iii. 35

Byers v. Cliapin i 630

v. Pobey i. 12

v. Farmers Ins. Co. ii. 476, 554

v. Hussey ii. 28

v. McClanahan i. 37, 123

v. Van Deusen ii. 828

Byrne v. Doughty i. 51

Byrd v. Boyd ii. 37, 39

v. Fox j. ] 85

v. Odem ii. 908

Byrne v. Crowninshield ii. 722 ; iii. 103,

1 105

v. Fitzhugh i- 13, 19, 22

v. Jansen i- 617, 618

v. La. State Ins. Co. ii- 532

v. Van Tienhoven i. 515

Byrnes v. National Ins. Co. ii. 516

Byrnside v. Burdett i. 616

Byron v. N. Y. State Printing Tel.

Co. ii. 292

Bywater v. Richardson i. 633

C.

C. & X. & L. M. R. R. Co. v. Webb ii. 46

Cabarga v. Seeg ii. 686, 687

Cabeen v. Buckenridge i. 523

Cabell v. Vaughan i. 12

Cabellaro v. Slater i. 480

Cable v. Dakin iii. 218

<>. Ellis iii. 223

v. Rogers ii. 836, 837

Cabot r. Haskins i. 467, 498 ; iii. 8

v. Winsor i. 584, 589

Cadens v. Teasdale i. 248

Cadman v. Horner i. 522; iii. 371

v. Lubbock ii. 775

Cadmus, The ii. 467

». Matthews ii. 466, 467

Cadogan v. Kennett i. 569

Cadwallader v. Howell ii. 709, 710

v. Kroesen i. 216

Cady ti. Goodnow iii. 132

v. Shepherd i. 122

Cage v. Acton ii. 852

v. Phillips ii. 880

v. Wilkinson iii. 285

Cagger v. Lansing iii. 38

Cahen v. Piatt iii. 219

Cahill v. Bigelow ii. 11 ; iii. 64

Cahoon v. Ring ii. 304, 314, 317

Cailiffr. Danvers ii. 149

Cain v. Spann i. 290

Caine r. Horsefall ii. 633

Caines v. Smith ii. 69, 809

Cairnes v. Bleecker i. 52; ii. 827

Cairns v. Cairns ii. 93

Cairo Bank v. Crocker i. 574

Calahan v. Babcock i. 645

Calais Co. v. Van Pelt i. 80

Calbreath r. Graey ii. 519

Calcraft v. Harborough iii. 191

Caldecott v. Smytlnes i. 544

Calder v. Bull iii. 506

v. Dobell i. 66

v. Rutherford- i. 129

Caldwell v. Alton i. 160

v. Ball i. 594

v. Bartlett i. 657 ; iii. 290, 337

v. Brown iii. 177

v. Carrington's Heirs iii. 347

v. Cassidy i. 309

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

liii

Caldwell b. Drake i. 404

v. Murphy ji. 233

v. New Jersey Steamboat Co. ii. 186

v. Scott i. 208

v. Shepherd i. 128

v. St. Louis Ins. Co. ii. 497

v. Tutt iii. 266

v. Van Vliessingen ii. 324, 826

v. Wentworth ii. 763

v. West iii. 217

Calhoun v. Richardson ii. 936

v. Vechio i. 620

Caliot o. Walker iii. 141, 143, 159

Calisto, The ii. 384, 385

Calkins v. Chandler i. 472; ii. 7, 10 ;

iii. 27

v. Lockwood iii. 49

Call v. Calef ii. 907

v. Hagger iii. 511

v. Scott iii. 126

v. Ward i. 343

Callaghan v. Atlantic Ins. Co. ii. 521

v. Callaghan iii. 314, 316

v. Hallett i. 467 ; ii. 439

v. Myers i. 561

Callahan v. Caparata iii. 184

i; McAlexander ii. 830

o. Shaw iii. 190

Callen v. Thompson ii. 569

Callender b. Ins. Co. ii. 419

Callisher-B. BischofEsheim i. 468

Callo v. Brouncker ii. 38

Callow v. Lawrence i. 297

Calton v. Bragg iii. 112

Calvert v. Carter ii. 829

v. Gordon ii. 34

v. Hamilton Ins. Co. ii. 550, 557

Calvin's case i. 448

Calvo v. Davies i. 245; ii. 18, 28

Calye's case ii. 158, 159, 160, 166

Camarillo v. Fenlon i. 540

Cambell v. Galbreath i. 384

Cambioso v. Maffett ii. 894

Cambridge, The ii. 466

v. Anderton ii 505, 506

Cambridge Ins. for Savings v. Lit-

tlefield i. 463 ; ii. 936, 938

Cambridge University b. Bryer ii. 330

Camden v. McKoy i. 284

o. Vail iii. 294

Camden & Amboy Railroad Co. b.

Baldauf ii. 256, 259, 268, 273

v. Belknap ii. 192

v. Burke ii- 234

Cameron v. Baker i- 351

v. Boyle iii- 176

v. Francisco i- 228

v. Little j- 550

v. Montgomery iii- 382

v. Scudder iii- 382

v. Wynch iii- 216

Camidge v. Allenby i. 298, 306 ; iii. 263

Cammack v. Johnson i. 233, 235

Cammer v. Harrison i- 313

Camp b. Bates iii- 159

Camp b. Camp

i. 613

b. Grant

i. 228, 238

v. Hamlin

iii. 224

v. Meyer

iii. 440

b. Pulver

ii. 911

v. Scott

i. 296

e. Western Union Tel

Co. ii. 286,

287, 288

Camp's Appeal

i. 263

Canipanari v. Woodburn

i. 76

Camparree v. Brockway

i. 284

Campbell, Ex parte

iii. 471

v. Baker

ii. 28

v. Boggs

iii. 99

v. Bowen

i. 199

v. Butler

i. 274, 284

v. Butts

ii. 866

v. Colhoun

i. 167

r. Dearborn

iii. 432

b. Fleming

ii. 923

v. Galbreath

ii. 78

b. Gittings

ii. 663

v. Gullatt

ii. 85

v. Hall

i. 86

v. Hamilton i.

22; ii. 878, 884

v. Hicks

i. 41, 57

v. Innes

ii. 525

b. Jones

ii. 662

v. Knapp

i. 317 ; ii. 8

v. Leach

v. Lewis i. 259, 261

v. Mesier i. 32

v. Morris iii. 15

v. Morse ii. 172

u. New England Ins. Co. ii. 556, 592,

607

b. Parker ii. 122

v. Perkins iii. 466

v. Read iii. 127

v. Scott ii. 341

v. Shields iii. 126

b. Shipley i. 540

v. Smith i. 245

v. Stakes i. 356

v. Walker iii. 422

Campion v. Kille ii. 702

Camus v. Citizens Co. i. 117

Can v. Read ii. 748 ; iii. 425

Canaan b. Hartley iii. 447

Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany i. 298,

300, 301
v. Cox iii. 382

Canal Fund b. Perry i. 483

Candee u. Western Union Tel. Co.

ii. 278

Candler v. Fuller ii. 835

Candor's Appeal ii. 52

Candy, Ex parte iii. 419, 420

Cane v. Com. Ins. Co. ii. 580

Canfield v. Hard i. 223

o. Vaughan ii. 3

v. Watertown Ins. Co. ii. 588

Canfranque v. Burnell iii. 391

Canham v. Barry ii- 913

v. Jones ii. 362, 366, 372

liv

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Canizares v. The Santissima Trinidad

ii. 404
Cannan v. Denew iii. 416

v. Meaburn ii. 396, 454

Cannel v. Buckle ii. 852 ; iii. 307, 310

Cannell v. M'Clean iii. 247

Cannon v. Alsbury i. 370, 481

v. Mitcliell i. 524

Canover v. Cooper i. 349

Canter v. Amer. & Ocean Ins. Co. iii. 175
Cantrel r. Graham iii. 449

Cany v. PaLton i. 394, 395, 401

Cape Ann Bank v. Burns ii. 862

Cape Fear Bank v. Stinemetz i. 325

Cape Fear Steamboat Co. i . Conner

ii. 380

Capel v. Tliornton i. 529; ii. 745

Capen v. Alden ii. 766

v. Barrows i. 26, 184

v. Crovvell iii. 113

, . Glover iii. 498

v. Washington Ins. Co. ii. 530, 531

Capper r. Dando iii. 414

v. Spottiswoode iii. 295

Capron c. Johnson iii. 396, 508

Carbonel r. Uavies ii. 644

Card v. Hope ii. 388

Cardell v. Bridge ii. 873

Carden v. General Cemetery Co. i 164

Cardigan v. Armitage ii. 03 'J

Cardinell v. Bennett i. 567

Caitiffs v. Careless ii. 089, 692

Carew v. Northrup ii. 882

Carey v. Berkshire K. R. Co. i. 352 ; ii. 247

r. Brown iii. 258

Cargey v. Aitcheson ii. 831

Carhart v. Austin ii. 308

Cariss v. Tattersall ii. 860

Carle v. Hall i. 120

Carleton v. Leighton i. 560; iii. 431

v. Woods ii. 049

Carley o. Green i 397

v. Jenkins i. 200

v. Vance i. 309; ii. 773

v. Wilkins i. 623, 020

Carlisle v. Fleming iii. 302

Carliss i.'. McLaughlin iii. 110

Carl Johan, The ii. 4o4

Carlton v. Bailey i. 296, 486

u. Cummins i. 219

?'. Mays i. 228

Carman v. Beach i. 94

i'. Elledge ii 14

C'armichael v. Hughes i. 347

('armichel n. Latimer i. 172

Carnan v. Bowles ii. 336, 339, 341

Carne v. Brice iii 456

Carnegie c. Morrison i. 303, 497, 498 ;

iii. 429
Carnes v. Field ii. 043

Carnochan v. Christie ii. 833

v. Gould i. 627

Carolan v. Brabazon iii. 375

Carolina, The ii. 519

Carolus, The ii 4G8, 469

:enter v. American Ins.

Co. i. 80 ;

ii. 556

u. Butterfield

ii. 873, 882

v. Carpenter

i. 361

v. Dodge

i. 263, 460

v. Graham

i. 566

v. Lockhart

iii. 173

v. Marnell

iii. 435

v. Mutual Ins. Co. ii. 540 ; iii. 329, 330

v. Oaks i 283

c. Providence Ins. Co. ii. 493, 563,

564, 575, 577, 583

v. Schermerhorn ii. 933

v. Simmons ii. 934

v. State iii. 74

e. Stevens iii. 217

v. Stilwell ii. 939

v. Thompson i. 540 ; ii. 929

v. Washington Ins. Co. ii. 559

u. Woods i. 274

Carpentier v. Gardiner iii. 189

v. Mitchell iii. 68

Carprew v. Canavan ii. 882

Carpue u. L. & B. Railway Co. ii. 239,

244
Carr, Ex parte iii. 427

v. Bartlett i. 483

u. Burdiss iii. 441

v. Clough i. 334, 361, 362

v. Ellison i. 532 ; iii. 368

v. Ilinchlifl ii. 882, 884

r. Jackson i. 69, 71

i. King i. 404

u. London, &c. R. Co. ii. 934

r. Rice ii. 314

v Roberts i. 144

r. Rowland i. 284

v. Security Bank i. 303

v. The L. & Y. Railway Com-
pany ii. 250, 204, 268
< . Welch ii. 858
Carradine v. Collins i. 204
Carraway v. Odeneal i. 470
I Carrier v. Brannan ii. 896
Carrington, Ex parte iii. 415
v. Brents iii. 300
v. Cantillon i. 211
u. Ficklin ii 108
u. Manning iii. 75
v. Pratt ii. 403, 404
v. Roots iii. 37, 04
Carrol v. Blencow i. 407
Carroll v. Boston Ins. Co. ii. 574, 577
i'. New York &, N. H. R. R. Co. ii. 250
v, St. John's Society i. 66
.... Upton i. 320
v. Weld i. 274, 275, 284
v. Wiggins i. 579
Carruth v. Paige iii. 72
v. Walker i. 279
Carruthers v. Sheddon ii. 689
i'. Sydebotbam ii. 469
f. West i. 290, 293 ; iii. 461
Carshnre v. Huych iii. 92
Carsley v. White ii. 430, 431

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

lv

Carson v. Baillie
v. Blazer
v. Carson
v . Percy
Carstairs v. Stein
Carter v. Abbott
v. Boebra
v. Bradley
v. Brick
i'. Burley
v. Burris
v. Carter
v. Crick
v. Dean
u. Flower
u. Hamilton
v. Hobbs

i. 625
i. 544

iii. 499

iii. 373
iii. 119, 145, 469

iii. 426
ii. 481, 524, 598
i. 323
i. 621
i. 319, 326
i. 611
i. 3!i0
i. 629

iii. 416
i.307
ii. 596
ii. 163

v. John Hancock Ins. Co. ii. 618

v. Kungstead ii. 644, 045

v. Lewiston Bank i. 141

w. Rockett ii. 565

v. Bollard i. 347

v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co. ii. 533

u. Scargill ii. 809

v. Smith i. 309

u. Southall i. 211

v. Stennel i. 636

v. Talcott ii. 746

v. Toussaint i. 571 ; iii. 46

v. United Ins. Co. i. 251

v. Walker i. 637 ; ii. 922

v. Whalley i. 189

v. Willard iii. 444

v. Wormald ii. 819

Carteret v. Paschal i. 381

Carthrae v. Brown i. 26

Cartier v. Carlisle ii. 355, 357, 373, 376

Cartland v. Morrison i. 563

Cartwell v. The John Tyler ii. 461

Cartwright v. Cooke i. 478 ; ii. 819

v. Green ii. 719

v. Rowley ii. 1S5

Carvalho v. Burn iii. 435

Carver v. Braintree Man. Co. ii. 315

i). Hyde ii. 311

v. Jackson ii. 931

Carville v. Crane ii. 12 ; iii. 25

Carwiek v. Vickery i. 213

Cary v. Bancroft ii. 885

v. Crisp iii. 434

v. Curtis __ i. 85

v. Faden ii. 342

v. Gruman i. 636, 637 ; iii. 227

v. Hotailing ii. 914

v. Kearsley ii. 342, 344

v. Longman ii. 336, 344

v. Matthews i. 153

o. Whiting i. 538

Caryl v. Russell iii- 477

Casamajor v. Strode i- 525, 526

Casborne v. Dutton i- 280

Casco, The Brig ii. 171, 183, 423

Casco Bank v. Keen ii. 941

Case v. Arnett i- 546

v. Bank ii. 113 ; iii. 281

Case v. Barber ii. 818

v. Beauregard i. 240

u. Boughton i. 457

v. Brown ii. 327

v. Ferris ii. 831

v. Green ii. 787

v. Hart i. 183

v. Hartford Ins. Co. ii. 569, 571

v. Howard ii. 14

a. Mechanics Banking Associa-
tion i. 273
v. Northern, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 186
v. Winship i. 613
Casell, In re ii. 844
Casey v. Brush i. 185
v. Harrison ii. 863
v. Inloes ii. 939
Cash v. Gilles i. 638
v. Young iii 458
Cashaw v. North Western Ins. Co. ii. 494
Cason v. Cheely iii. 60, 62
Cassedy v. La. St. Ins. Co. ii. 511
Cassel v. Cassel iii. 348
v. Dowes i. 303
Cassiday v. McKenzie i. 76
Castalia, The ii. 466
Castellain v. Preston ii. 564
Castelli v. Boddington ii. 480, 879
Castello v. Bank of Albany ii. 129
Castle v. Candee i. 285
v. Sworder iii. 262
Castledon v. Turner ii. 093
Castleman v. Holmes ii. 20
Castling v. Aubert iii. 29, 30-
Caswell v. Coare i. 636; iii. 227
v. Davis ii. 353
v. Districh i. 183
v. Fellows i. 246
v. Ware i. 263
v. Wendell iii. 240
Catavvissa R. R. Co. v. Armstrong ii. 47
Cate i-. Cate iii. 219
Cater v. Startute ii. 834
Cates v. McKinney ii. 75
Cathcart v. Robinson iii. 371
Catherine, The ii. 396
v. Dickinso^ ii. 429, 430
Catherine, of Dover, The ii. 429
Catlett v. Pacific Ins. Co. ii. 513, 519,

567

Catley v. Wintringham ii. 204

Catlin v. Barnard i. 25

v. Bell i. 88, 89, 109 ; ii. 894

v. Hansen i- 329

v. Hills ii- 250

v. Martin '■ 386

v. Springfield Ins. Co. ii. 546, 554,

573, 586

v. Ware i. 406 ; iii. 239

Catling v. Skoulding iii. 69, 78, 79, 96

Catoir v. American Ins. Co. ii. 615, 616

Caton v. Rumney ii- 181

v. Shaw ii. 13 ; iii- 118

Cator v. Great Western Ins. Co. ii. 497

Catron v. Tenn. Ins. Co. ii. 491, 559

lvi

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Catskill Bank i>. Gray

i. 176

Chamberlin v. Collinson

i. 49

v. Messenger

i. 211

v. Griggs

iii. 477

Catt v. Howard

i. 215

0. Ingalls

iii. 28

Caudell v. Shaw

i. 406

v. Perkins

ii. 757

Caujolle v. Ferrie

i. S77

v. Shaw

iii. 210

Caul v. Gibson

i. 484

Chambers v. Crawford

i. 630

Caunt v. Ward

iii. 455

v. Davidson

iii. 273

Causten v. Burke

i. 184

v. Goldwin

iii. 159

Cavander r. Bulteel

i. 172

v. Griffiths

i. 525

Cave v. Coleman

i. 623

o. Jaynes

ii. 793

v. Hastings

iii. 18

v. Masterson

ii. 163

ii. 832

i. 227

v. Jliller

i. 496

Cavitt v. James

v. Minchin

i. 29

Cavode v. McKelvy

i. 468

v. Robinson

iii. 188

Cawley v. Furnell

iii. 72

v. Snooks

iii. 96

Cayme v. Watts

ii. 831

v. Winn

ii. 783

Cayuga, The

ii. 43.j

Champant v. Ranelagh

ii. 716

Cayuga Bank v. Hunt i.

303 ; iii. 145

Champenois r. Port

ii. 762

Cayuga County Bank r. Warden i. 322

Champion v. Bostick

i. 181 ; ii. 246

Cazc v. Baltimore Ins. Co.

ii. 413, 419

v. Brown

iii. 308, 313

v. Beilly

ii. 446

v. Griffith

i. 284

v. Richards

ii. 446

v. Plummer

iii. 14

Cazenove v. British Ass. Co.

ii. 592

i: Short

ii. 791

C. B. & Q. R. R. u. Payne

ii. 816

v. White

ii. 663

Cecil v. Mix

i. 274, 284

Champion, The, v. Jantzen

ii. 392

v. Blaistow

iii. 477

Champlin v. Butler

ii. 400

Celt, The

ii. 429, 434

v. Laytin

iii. 355

Center u. American Ins. Co.

ii. 505, 507,

r. Parish

iii. 10

508, 515

v. Rowley

ii. 655, 792

v. McQuesten

ii. 11

Champney ;-. Blanchard

i. 265

Central Bank v. Allen

i. 308, 313

Chancellor v. Poole

iii. 448

v. Lang

i. 278

v. Wiggins

i. 616

v. Pindar

ii. 815

Chandelor v. Lopus

i. 622, 625

v. Richards

i. 303

Chandler, Ex parte

iii. 417

v. Shine

ii. 16, 31

Re

iii. 416

Central, &c. Corp. c. Lowell

iii. 484

v. Belden

i. 328; ii. 413

Centurion, The

ii. 438

c. Brainard

i. 213

Chace v. Brooks

ii. 28

u. Coe

i. 56, 65

Chadbourn v. Watts iii.

127, 130, 135

v. Drew

i. 290

Chaddock v. Vanness

i. 275

v. Pulton

i. 640, 643

Cliadwick v. The Dublin S.

P. Co. ii. 432

v. Herrick

ii. 850

r. Maddon

i. 68

; . Sanger

i. 446

Chaffee v. Boston Belting Co

. ii. 319, 320,

o. Siddle

iii. 400

321

c: Sprague

ii. 411

v. Boston, &c. R. R. Co.

ii. 817

(•. Worcester Ins. Co.

ii. 495, 574

v. Jones

i. 32, 34, 36

Ohandos v. Talbot

iii. 437

r. Memphis /
Chaffraix v. Harper

i. 275

Channel v. Passitt

i. 174

i. 108

Channell v. Ditchburn

iii. 87, 90

Chalmers, Ex parte

ii. 813

Chanoine v. Fowler

i. 323

v. Lanior

i. 287, 289

Chanter v. Hopkins

i. 603, 631

Chamberlain v. Bagley

iii. 168

v. Lcese

i. 19, 23

c. Carlisle

ii. 866

Chapel v. Bull

iii. 245

v. Chamberlain

i. 157

v. Hickes

i. 494 ; ii. 655

v. Chandler

ii. 242

Chapin v. Clemitson

ii. 634

i: Cuyler

iii. 79

v. Dobson

ii. C84

v. Parr

i. 570

v. Lapham

i. 474

v. Harrod

ii. 475

v. Merrill

iii. 24

v. Mill. & Miss. R. R. C(

ii. 46

v. Thompson

iii. 127

v. N. H. Ins. Co.

ii. 586

v. Warden

iii. 75

v. Reed

ii. 452

Chaplin v. Hawes

ii. 250

v. Walker

i. 186

v. Rogers

iii. 46, 47

v. Ward

ii. 431

Chapline v. Moore

i. 383

p. Western Transp. Co.

ii. 186

Chapman v. Black iii. 127, 128, 129

v. Williamson

i. 145 ; ii 74

v. Chapman

iii. 297

Chamberlaine v. Turner

ii. 681

r. Collins

ii. 6

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

lvii

pman v. Crane

ii. 56

v. Dalton

ii. 637, 640, 800

v. Derby

iii. 439

v. Eames

i. 174

v. Erie R. Co.

ii. 46

v. Forsyth

iii. 478

v. Great Western E. Co. ii. 152

v. Ingram iii. 224

v. Keane i. 322

v. Koops iii. 298

v. Lampliire iii. 416

v. Lemon i. 407

v. Murch i. 023

u. Partridge iii. 12, 13

e. Robertson ii. 714, 715; iii. 123

v. Searle i. 645; iii. 263

v. Secomb ii. 633

v. Shepard i. 505

v. Speller i. 615

v. Sutton ii. 24; iii. 17

v. Thames Manuf. Co. iii. 234

v. Walton i. 91

Chappel v. Brockway ii. 891

v. Marvin i. 570 ; iii. 48

Chappell v. Purday ii. 349

Chappie v. Cooper i. 337

v. Durstor ii. 881 ; iii. 108

Chard v. Fox i. 322

Charles, Ex parte iii. 478

v. Andrews iii. 293

v. Branker ii. 772

v. Marsden i. 293 ; iii. 451

Charles River Bridge v. Warren

Bridge ii. 638 ; iii. 488, 490, 506

Charleston S. B. Co. v. Bason ii. 173

Charlestown v. Hubbard i. 500

Charleton v. Cotesworth ii. 453

Charlotte, The ii. 436

Charlton v. Lay i. 492

v. Wood i. 110

Charnley v. Winstanley i. 76 ; ii. 848
Charter v. Trevelyan i. 94 ; iii. 107

Chartered Bank v. Dickson i. 295

Chartered Mercantile Bank v. Nether-
lands, &c. Co. ii. 434
Charters v. Bayntun i. 338
Chase v. Bradley ii. 633
o. Debolt i. 69
v. Denny iii. 302
v. Dow iii. 716
v. Dwinal i. 446
v. Eagle Ins. Co. ii. 527, 528, 530,

534
v. Garvin i. 184, 186

v. Goble iii. 441

v. Hamilton Ins. Co. ii. 557

v. Ostrom i- 90

v. Phcenix Ins. Co. ii- 618

u. Stevens i. 182

u. Strain ii- 885

u. Walker ii- 319

v. Washburn ii. 143, 147

v. Wash. Ins. Co. ii. 169, 485, 526,

566
v. Westmore ii. 148 ; iii. 262, 266

Chase v. Wingate i. 546

Chase's Ex'r v. Burkholder i. 487

v. Washington Ins. Co. ii. 169

Chasemore i\ Turner iii. 76

Chastain v. Smith iii. 347

Chater v. Beckett i. 486 ; iii. 19

Chattahoochee Bank v. Schley ii. 99

Chattock v. Shawe ii. 598

Chatzel v. Bolton ii. 864

Chauneey v. Jackson ii. 392

Chaurand v. Augerstein ii. 666

Cheddick ». Marsh iii. 168, 173

Chedworth v. Edwards i. 96

Cheek v. Roper i. 302

Cheesman v. Excell ii. 156

v. Ramby ii. 889

Cheetham v. Hampson ii. 136

p. Ward ii. 852

Cheever v. Wilson ii. 737

Cheminant v. Thornton ii. 779

Cheney, In re iii. 425, 429

v. Arnold ii. 85

a. B. &M. R. R. Co. ii. 273

Clienot v. Lefevre iii. 106

Chenowith v. Dickinson ii. 149

Cheriot v. Foussat ii. 742

Cherry v. Boultbee iii. 429, 469

v. Clements i. 408

v. Heming i. 124; ii. 50; iii. 41

Chesapeake, The ii. 435

Chesapeake Co. v. Blair i. 330

Chesapeake Ins. Co. v. Allegre ii. 484

Chesapeake & Ohio Canal v. Knapp

ii. 61
Cheshire v. Barrett i. 361, 367

r. Taylor i. 315

Cheshire Bank v. Robinson ii. 828

Chessman r. Whittemore ii. 862

Chester v. Dickerson i. 167

Chester Glass Company v. Dewey i. 482 ;

ii. 941
Chesterfield v. Jansen iii. 116

Chesterfield Manuf. Co. v. Dehon iii. 439,

441
Chesterman i\ Lamb i. 636 ; iii. 227

Chestnut Hill Turnpike v. Rutter i. 154
Chevalier v. Lynch iii. 406

Chevallier v. Patton ii. 173

v. Straham ii. 169, 172, 177

Chew v. Morton ii. 939

Cheyney's case ii. 690

Chicago !'. Sheldon ii. 625

Chicago Bank v. Bayley i. 579

Chicago Marine Bank v. Wright i. 579
Chicago Packing Co. v. Tilton i. 030

Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R. R.

Co. v. Dewey ii- 250

Chicago, &c. Dock Co. u. Dunlap ii. 881
p."Kinzie iii- 65

Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Bensley ii. 203
v. Dana i- 511

u. Flagg iii- 186

v. Flexman ii- 244

v. Iowa ii- 184

v. Merrill ii- 188

Iviii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Montfort ii. 227

v. Nortliern Illinois, &c. Co. iii. 106

v. Ponclrom ii. 817

v. Sawyer ii. 203

i'. Schoeneman iii. 373

v. Shea ii. 213

v. Swett iii- 235

Chichester v. M'Intire iii- 333

Chick v. Fillsbury i. 318

Checkering v. Fowler ii. 205, 207, 208, 416

v. Globe Ins. Co. ii. 010

Chicopee Bank v. Chapin i. 292

v. Eager ii. 669

Chilcott v. Trinkle i. 344

Child c. Comber iii. 350

... Eureka Works i. 131

i". Godolphin iii. 346

v. Hardy man i. 394

v. Horden ii. 801

v. Morley i. 32

... Sun Mutual Ins. Co. ii. 531, 666,

672

Childe Harold, The ii. 462

Childers v. Deane iii. 139, 159, 161

Childs, In re iii. 440

t. Barnum iii. 18

i: Childs ii. 91

v. Monins i. 135, 142

v. Wyman i. 283

Chiles v. Drake iii. 184

v. Nelson i. 514

v. Smith ii. 486

Chilson v. Philips i. 349

Chilton v. Brarden iii. 294

China, The ii. 435

Chinn v. Hamilton iii. 113

Chion, Er parte iii. 435, 439

Chipman ;>. Poster i. 55

v. Morrill i. 32

Chippendale v. L. & Y. Railway Co. ii. 204

v. Thurston ii. 791; iii. 121, 149

v. Tomlinson iii. 454

Chisholm v. Gadsden ii. 918

C'liism v. Woods i. 010

Chiswell v. Gray i. 238

Chitty v. Naish ii. 7C2, 705

c. Selwyn ii. 532

Choen v. Sorter i. 408

Choice v. Moseley ii. 790

Cholmondeley v. Clinton i. 127; ii. 034;

iii. 354

Chomqua v. Mason iii. 104
Clioppin i: New Orleans, &c. R. R.

Co. iii. 184

b. Wilson i. 220
Chorley v. Bolcot ii. 60
Chouteau v. Allen i. 80

c. Leach i. 59; ii. 173
v. Merry i. 407
i\ Steamboat ii. 194

Choynski v. Cohen ii. 353

Chrisman v. Partee iii. 369

Christian v. Clark iii. 331

v. Coombe ii. 530

Christiana, The ii. 468

Christie v. Griggs ii. 234, 239, 242, 243

v. Lewis ii- 421

v. Sawyer i- 130

v. Simpson iii- 12

v. Trott ii. 423

Christman v. Moran ii. 844

Christoffersen v. Hansen i. 66, 68

Christophers v. Garr iii. 104

v. Sparke iii. 67

Christy v. Barnhart iii. 349

v. Douglas i. 128; iii. 285

v. Flemington iii. 72, 77, 92

v. Murphy ii. 361, 378

v. Row ii. 414

v. Smith ii. 155

Chrysler r. Renois i. 279

Chudleigh's case i. 133

Chumar o. Wood i. 569

Church v. Barlow i. 294, 321

u. Brown i. 538

c. Clark i. 303

(,. Feterow ii. 785

v. Hubbart ii. 496

v. Imperial Gas Co. i. 154

v. Knox i. 233, 234

c. Landers i. 386

v. Mar. Ins. Co. i. 93, 150

v. Roper ii. 834

v. Sparrow i. 205

Churchill v. Hulbert ii. 665

v. Hunt iii. 200

r. Palmer i. 62

v. Rosebeck ii. 250

v. Sutcr iii. 153

Churchwardens of St. Saviour i. 260 ;

ii. 632, 636, 638

Churton r. Douglas ii. 368, 369

Chusan, The ii. 385

Chute i'. Pattee ii 19

Cicero v. Clifford i. 330

Cincinnati <.. Marcus ii. 213

v. Rice ii. 901

v. Spratt ii. 226

Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Bakewell ii. 508

v. May ii. 527

Cincinnati, &c. R. R. Co. v. McCool

ii. 197

Citizens Bank ;;. Culver iii. 285

v. Howell i. 327

v. Nantucket Steamboat Co. ii. 181,

187, 190, 194

v. Payne i. 292

v. Richmond ii. 853

Citizens Ins. Co. c. Doll i. 176

Cilizens Security Co. v. Uhler iii. 117

City Bank v. Barrow i. 102

v. Cutter ii G69, 771, 776

v. First Bank ii. 853

v. Phelps ii. 27

City Bank of Brooklyn v. MeChes-

ney i. 191

City Council v. Benjamin ii. 905

City Discount Co. o. McLean ii. 766

City Fire Ins. Co. v. Corlies ii. 571

City Ius. Co. v. Bricker ii. 470

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

lix

City of Buffalo v. Holloway i. 120

City of Cincinnati v. Rice ii. 001

City of Edinburgh, The ii. 439

City of London v. Mitford iii. 323

v. Pugh iii. 328
City of Worcester v. Worcester Ins.

Co. ii. 553

Civilita and The Restless, The ii. 433

Clafflin v, Lenheim i. 75

Claflin r. Boston, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 197

v. Meyer ii. 134

v. Ostrom ii. 3

Clagett v. Kilbourne i. 167

v. Salmon i. 210, 325

Claghorn v. Cullen iii. 486

Clamorgan v. Lane i. 363, 366

Clancey v. Robertson ii. 37

Clancy v. Piggott iii. 16, 17

Clanrickard v. Sidney ii. 637

Clap, Re ii. 756

Clapham v. Cologan ii. 484, 518

v. Moyle ii. 642

v. Shillits iii. 370

Clapp v. Hale ii. 903

v. Rogers i. 230

v. Smith ii. 903

v. Thomas iii. 453

u. Young ii. 430

Clara, The ii. 430, 431

Clare v. Maynard iii. 227

Clarence v. Marshall ii. 870

Clarence Railway Co. v. Great North

of England Railway Co. ii. 664

Claridge v. Mackenzie i. 541 ; ii. 940

Clarion Bank v. Gruber iii. 124

Clarisse, The ii. 437, 440

Clark, Ex parte ii. 454

v. Allen ii. 609

v. Babcock i. 536

a. Badgley iii. 121, 132

v. Baker ii. 650, 676

v. Barlow iii. Ill
v. Barnwell ii. 172, 173, 183, 216, 407,
410, 412, 414

«. Bayer i. 407

v. Bigelow i. 316

v. Bowen i. 216 ; ii. 872

v. Boyd i. 272, 285

«. Bradshaw iii. 69

v. Burdett ii. 23

v. Burns ii. 188

v. Burt ii. 829

v. Bush ii. 16, 850

v. Chamberlin iii. 15

v. Caldwell iii. 373

«. Calvert iii. 427, 454

v. Clark ii. 357, 371, 372, 375,
736 ; iii. 500

v. Cox i- 386

v. Crabtree «• 423

v. Cushing i- 232
v. Dales i. 514; iii. 220

v. Depew i- 264

v. Des Moines i. 160

v. Dibble i- 186 I

ark v. Dignum

i. 89

v. Dinsmore

i. 29

v. Dutcher

iii. 75

B.Ely

i. 292

v. Farmers Man.

Co.

i. 331

v. Eaxton

ii. 179, 259

v. Flint

iii. 313

v. Foxcroft

ii. 5

v. Gamwell

i. 468

v. Garfield

i. 151

v. Gordon

i. 154

v. Graham

i. 12.'!

v. Guardians of Cuckfield Union

i. 151
v. Hamilton Ins. Co. ii. 558, 580

v. Hatch iii. 397

v. Hayward i, 579

v. Hougham i. 146 ; iii. 69, 70, 92
v. Houghton i. 207

u. Iselin iii. 421

v. Jones iii. 201

o. Keliher i. 548

v. King i. 279

v. Kingsley iii. 293

v. Lyman i. 231, 234

v. Man. Ins. Co. ii. 473, 524, 554, 557
v. Marsiglia ii. 919

v. Massachusetts F. & M. Ins.

Co. ii. 418, 510

v. Mauran i. 645

u. McDonald ii. 235

v. Meriam i. 284

v. Moody iii. 98

v. Morse — i. 569

v. Needles ii. 192

v. New Eng. Ins. Co. ii. 493, 575,
583, 586, 587
u. Nichols iii. 60

o. Ocean Ins. Co. ii. 490, 491

v. Parr iii. 240, 242

v. Pendleton iii. 32, 43, 188

v. Phcenix Ins. Co. ii. 588

v. Pinney ii. 632, 789 ; iii. 211, 212,
220, 231
v. Ralls i. 617

o. Reed i. 213

o. Roberts i. 87

v. Rochester, &c. R. R. Co. iii. 306
v. Rogers ii. 860

v. Russel i. 472 ; ii. 849

v. Schneider i- 282

o. Shee i. 329; iii. 137

v. Sickler ii- 28

v. Sigourney i. 272, 285 ; iii. 88

v. Small i. 458 ; ii. 6

v. Smith ii- 60, 745, 747

v. Spence ii. 134, 153, 277, 280

v. Swift i- 144

v. Tarbell ii- 702

v, United Ins. Co. ii. 487

v. Whitaker iii- 211

v. White iii. 381, 382

v. Woodruff ii- 647

v. Wright iii- 14

Clark's Ex'rs v. Van Riemsdyk i. 49

lx

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Clarke, Ex parte
v. Courtney
v. Dodge Healy, The
v. Fell
v. Gordon
v. Grant
i>. Henty
v. Hogeraan
v. Hutchins
v. Leslie

t>. Mayor of N. Y.
o. Minot
v. Morey
v. Perrier
v. Price
v. Remington

iii. 414-

i. 5o

ii. 437, 43.S

iii. 40!)

i. 304

iii. 354, 371

i. 323

i. 200

i. 574

i. 338

ii. 03

iii. 429, 458

i. 450

i 88

iii. 360

ii. 15, 795

Rochester, &c. R. R. Co. iii. 307,

v. Spence

v. Thompson
Clarkson v. De Peyster

u. Edes

i'. Garland

i'. Hanvvay

v. Parker

v. Phcenix Ins. Co.
Clason v. Bailey

v. Simmonds

i'. Smith
Clawson r. Clawson
Clay, Ex parte

v. Cottrell

!•. Crowe

v. Edgerton

o. Harrison

c. Huston

i!)

ii. 134, 64'J

i. 254

i. 137

ii. 423

iii. 116, 136

i. 458

iii. 454

ii. 447, 509

iii. 7, 9, 365

ii. 634, 535

ii. 523

ii. 78

i. 238

i. 20S, 290

i. 331

ii. 31

i. 0-12, 644

iii. 233

v. Rufford iii. 333, 345, 308

r. Smith iii. 394, 397, 508

v. Wood ii. 248, 250

Clay Ins. Co. <•. Beck ii. 559

r. Huron, &e. Co. ii. 556

Clayards v. Dethick ii. 250

Clayton v. Adams i. 407

v. Andrews iii. 59

v. Brown ii. 78

c. Gosling iii. 402

v. Gregson ii. 667, 672, 675

v. Harmony, The ii. 43,8

v. Hunt ii. 273

r. Kynaston i. 27

u. Lord Nugent ii. 680, 681

v. Phipps i. 316

v. Stone ii. 330, 334, 335

v. Wardell ii. 83, 85

Clayton's case ii. 7C6 ; iii. 150

Cleave v. Jones iii. 84

Cleaves v. Foss iii. 12

v. Stockwell i. 91

Cleem v. Brewer ii. 318

Clegg i». Levy ii. 700

Cleghorn v. Ins. Bank of Columbus

i. 238

o. N. Y., &e. P.. Co. i. 113

Clemens, In re iii. 410

Clement, The ii. 431, 432

Clement v. Clement I 248,

256; ii. 785

y. Durgin

ii.

827, 835

v. Henley

i. 22

v. Mad dicks

ii. 361

v. Mattison

i.

393, 396

v. Reid

i. 522

r. Repard

i. 290

Clement & Co. v. Meserole

iii. 219

Clementi v. Goulding

ii. 334

Clements v. Smith's Adm'rs

i. 638

t: Wells

i. 539

!■. Williams

i. 340

Clemontson v. Blessig

ii. 425

Clemson v. Davidson

ii

407, 417

Clendaniel v. Tuckerman

ii.

415, 425

Clenes v. Willoughby

i. 532

Clerk v . Blackstock

i. 11

v. Tailors of Exeter ii. 888

Clerment v. Tasburgh i. 522 ; iii. 371

Cleu v. McPherson i. 587, 602

Cleve !■. Mills iii. 406

Cleveland v. Covington i. 33

v. State Bank ii. 130

v. Union Ins. Co. ii. 485

v. Williams i. 76

Cleveland, Col. & C. R. R. Co. v.

Kearny ii. 46

Cleveland, &c. R. R. Co. v. Curran ii. 271

Clevenger v. Dunaway iii. 181, 183

Cleworth v. Pickford ii. 880

Clews !•. Bank of New York ii. 944

r. Traer ii. 922

Clifford v. Burton i. 391

c. Hunter ii. 527, 628

e. Laton i. 387, 394

v. Luhring iii. 29

v. Parker ii. 860

v. Reilly i. 539

v. Richardson iii. 199

*. Turrell ii. 685, 686 ; iii. 311, 344

Clift ti. Schwabe ii. 604

Clinan v. Cooke iii. 13, 18, 343, 350, 354,

359

Cline c. Myers iii. 219

r. Templeton i. 470

Clinen v. Cooke i. 46, 123

Clinton v. Eddy ii. 881

c Hope Ins. Co. ii. 502

r. York i. 349

Clinton Wire Cloth Co. v. Gardner i. 535

Clippinger v. Hepbaugh ii. 895

Clive ii. Beaumont iii. 334

Clodfelter v. Cox i. 258

Clopham v. Gallant iii. 424, 435

Clopper v. Poland ii. 11

v. Union Bank of Maryland i. 294 ;

ii. 850

Clopton v Cozart ii. 915

v. Hall ii. 7, 8

Close v. Close ii. 91

Clothier v. Webster i. 98

Cloud c. Hamilton i. 349

v. Whiting ii. 944

Clough v. Davis ii. 905

Clouser v. Clapper ii. 93

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

lxi

Clouston v. Barbiere

i. 284

Cloutman v. Tunison

ii. 466, 467

Clowes v. Brooke

i. 338

o. Clowes

ii. 90

v. Higginson

iii. 344

v. Van Antwerp

i. 150

Clubb v. Hutson

i. 273

Clugas i\ Penaluna

ii. 700

Clum v. Brewer

ii. 319

Clute f. Barron

i. 95

v. Carr

iii. 40

u. Robinson

ii. 790

v. Wiggins

ii. 106, 167

Coakley v. Weil

iii. 298

Coalter v. Coalter

iii. 95, 96

Coates v. Chaplin

iii. 54

v. Gealach

i. 410

v. Holbrook

ii. 357, 373, 375

v. Lewis

ii. 745, 938

v. Sangston

ii. 684

v. Stephens

i. 635

v. The Mayor, &c. of New York

ii. 510

v. Williams i. 174

v. Wilson i. 337

Coats v. Holbrook i. 449

Cobb, Ex parte iii. 452

v. Abbot ii. 246

v. Becke i. 90

v. Blanchard ii. 410

v. Doyle i. 292

v. Hall i. 47

v. Hatfield ii. 923

v. Haydock ii. 875

v. HI. Cent. R. Co. i. 579

v. Knapp i. 68

... New England Ins. Co. ii. 482, 486,

528, 847

v. Rice iii- 403

v. Selby ii- 665

v. Symonds iii. 416

v. Titus iii- 158

v. Wood ii- 843

Cobban v'. Downe ii- 190

Cobbett v. Hudson i. 386

Cobble v. Tomlinson i. 222

Cobden v. Bolton ii. 273

Cobhara, Ex parte i- 237

Coburn v. Pickering i. 569

v. Ware i- 495

v. Webb i. 65 ; ii. 853, 861

Cocheco Bank v. Haskell ii. 113

Cocheco Manuf. Co. v. Whittier ii. 638

Cochran v. Fisher ii- 520

v. Nebeker ii- 853

v. Perry i- 222

v. Retberg ii- 424, 666

Cock v. Bunn ii- 799

u. Goodfellow iii- 381, 382, 383

v. Honychurch ii- 818

Cockburn v. Alexander iii- 165

v. Ashland Lumber Co. iii- 199

Cocke v. Bank of Tennessee i- 212

v. Chaney «• lf»

Cockell v. Taylor i- 466

Cocker v. Franklin Hemp & Flax

Manuf. Co. i. 581 ; ii. 794

Cockerill v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. ii. 471

Cocking v. Fraser ii. 505, 509

v. Ward iii. 38

Cockle v. London, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 251

Cockran v. Irlam i. 89, 109

Cockroft v. N. Y., &c. R. Co. iii. 21!)

Cockshott v. Bennett ii. 477

Cockson v. Ogle ii. 828, 829

Cocrill v. Sparkes iii. 74

Coddington v. Davis i, 308, 315

v. Goddard ii. 683

v, Idell i. 187

Coder r. Huling i. 168

Codman v. Hall i. 534

v. Rogers iii. 95

Coe v. Clay i. 531

v. Smith ii. 36

v. Vogdes i. 532

Cofer v. Flanagan ii. 612

Coffee v. Ruffin ii- 815

Coffeen v. Brunton ii. 335, 370, 371, 373,

378

Coffin v. Coffin iii. 98

v. Dunham i. 403

v. Jenkins i. 196, 442 ; ii. 466, 407

v. Lunt i. 549

v. Newburyport Ins. Co. ii. 531, 532

v. Ogden ii. 304

v. Storer ii. 420, 424

Coffman v. Winslow ii. 10

Cofield v. Clark i. 508

Coggeshall v. Am. Ins. Co. ii. 487

Coggs v. Bernard i. 470 ; ii. 97, 98, 99, 109,

110, 120, 169, 171, 172, 237 ; iii. 253

Cogill v. H. & N. H. R. R. Co. i. 579

Cognac, The ii. 402

Cogswell, Ex parte iii- 419

v. Dolliver iii- 79

v. Ocean Ins. Co. ii. 497

Cohea v. Hunt i- 303

Cohen v. Dry Dock i. 113

o. Dupont i- 542

v. Frost ii- 180

v. Hume ii. 181

v. New York Ins. Co. ii- 601

v. New York Mutual Ins. Co. ii- 615

v. Wright i- 125

Coit v. Commercial Ins. Co. ii. 667

v. Houston ii. 773, 818

v. Smith "• 484

v. Starkweather ii- 690

v. Tracy iii- 88

Coit & al. v. Houston ii- 780

Coke v. Whorwood ii. 826 ; iii. 188

Colbeck r. Girdler's Co. i- 536

Colbourn v. Dawson ii- 684, 694

v. Duncomb 'i- 348

v. Morrill i- 541, 542

v. Simms i'- 349

Colby v. Colby ii- 877

v. Hunter "• 521

v. Norton "• 9«j

v. Reed »• 802

lxii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

i. 335, 353

i. 61(3

i. 406

ii. 634

iii. 230

iii. 382

i. 579

ii. 770

ii. 937

ii. 709

ii. 67, 08

i. 569

iii. 16

ii. 212, 253, 251, 255,

256, 258, 250, 203

ii. 030

ii. 634

ii. 861

i. 280; iii. 104, 105

iii. 324

i. 570

iii. 123, 143

i. 220

Colcock v. Ferguson

v. Goode
Colcord v. Swan
Coldham r. Showier
Coldren v. Miller
Cole v. Albers

t'. Berry

v. Blake

v. Bolaid

v. Cheshire

V. Cottingham

v. Davies

v. Dyer

v. Goodwin

v. Green
v. Hawes
«. . Hills
u. Jessup
v. Kernot
v. Kerr
v. Lockhart
v. Moxley

v. Northwestern Bank i. 102 ; ii. 133

v. O'Neill i. 409

u. Pennoyer i. 335

v. Robbins i- 435

v. Ross iii. 231, 232

v. Sackett ii. 757

a. Saxby i- 364

v. Taylor ii. 686

.,. Trull ii. 764

v. Turner i. 20

v. Tyng ii. 153

v. Wade i. 134

v. White iii. 349

Colegate v. Bacheler ii. 888

Coleman v. Carpenter i. 318

v. Chester iii. 39

v. Eyre iii. 39

v. Fobes iii. 88

c. Frazer i. 433

u. Garrigues iii. 11

v. Harriet, The ii. 402

v. Lansing ii. 760

v, Meade i. 109

v. Pearee i. 96

c. Riches i. 44; ii. 190, 409

v. Sherwin i. 12

v. Waltham ii. 333

Coles v. Bank of England ii. 942

v. Bowne iii. 10, 354

v. Coles i. 169, 207

v. Gurney i. 211

v. Hulme ii. 634

v. Marine Ins. Co. ii. 496, 532, 535

v. Robins iii. 458

u. Soulsby ii. 824

v. Trecothick i. 46, 93, 95, 123, 460,

522, 523 ; iii. 8, 12, 13, 316, 429

v. Turner ii. 658

v. Wight iii. 458

?>. Wright iii. 434

Colgin v. Henley i. 470

Colgrove v. N. Y. & H. R. R. Co. ii. 233

Colgrove v. Tallman
Collamer v. Day
Collard v. Groom

v. Sampson
Colledge v. Harty

v. Horn
Collen v. Wriglit
Collenburg, The
Collet v. Podwell
C'ollett n. Morrison

ii. 28

ii. 896

i. 526

iii. 335

ii. 520

iii. 09, 75

i. 69

ii. 418

ii. 834

ii. 475, 599

(.'oilier v. Baptist Educational Society

i. 483, 484

a. Jenkins iii. 357

w.NiMU iii. 125, 128

Collingburne v. Mantell ii. 819

Collinge v. Ileywood iii. 98

Collingridge v. Royal Exchange Ass.

Co. ii. 5Q2

Collingwood t. Pace i. 448

Collins, In re iii. 415

i\ U. & E. R. Ry. Co. ii. 226

v. Barrows i. 532, 633

v, Blantern i. 486; ii. 685

v. Bradbury i. 281

a. Bums ii. 151

<■. Butler i. 311

t. Canty i. 550

u. Cliamp i. 150
v. Charlestown Ins. Co. ii. 549, 556

v. Collins i. 397 ; ii. 92

v. Decker i. 167

l\ Denison ii. 917

v. Evans i. 71 ; ii. 016

v. Everett i. 274

v. Forlies ii. 144; iii. 435

v. Godefroy i. 467

v. Hathaway iii. 286

v. Lemastera i. 12

v. Locke ii. 893

v. Martin i. 103, 272, 286, 292

v. Merrill i. 486

v. Myers i. 613

v. Owens iii. 298

v. Pellerin i. 569

a. Powell ii. 838

v. Prentice ii. 664

v. Price ii. 44

v. Prosser i. 12, 210

v. Roberts iii. 129

v. Rudolph i. 408

v. Secreh iii. 118

v. Suau i. 49, 257

u. The A. & S. R. R. Co. iii. 188

v. Tillou ii. 940

v. Trist i. 275

v. Wallis ii. 870

v. Westbury i. 445

v. Wheeler ii. 462

v. Woodruff ii. 138

Collins Co , The, v. Brown ii. 357

<•. Cowen ii. 357

v. Walker ii. 377

Collinson v. Owens iii. 298

Collis v. Emett i. 283

v. Stack iii. 75

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

lxiii

Collman ». Collins

ii. 223

Collumer v. Foster

i. 185

Collund i>. Read

i. 169

Collyer v. Fallon

i. 253

Colman v. Upcot

iii. 9

Colonel Ledyard, The

ii. 416

Colpoys <-. Colpoys

ii. 691

Colson v. Bonzey

ii. 396

v. Thompson

iii. 309

v. Welsh

iii. 452

Colt v. C'lapp

i. 97

v. Mass. Arms Co!

ii. 314

v. McMechen

ii. 171

i'. Netterville

ii

. 56, 416

v. Partridge

ii.

863, 866

Col. Ins. Co. v. Ashby ii

446,

448, 450

v. Catlett

ii. 419

a. Lawrence ii. 556,

558,

559, 562,

565

573,

586, 587

v. Lynch

ii. 480

Columbia v. Patterson

ii. 57

Columbian Ins. Co. v. Bean

ii. 877

Columbo, The

ii. 412

Columbus v. Howard

ii.

131, 137

v. Jaques

i. 160

Columbus & Indiana Central R

R.

Co. v. Arnold

ii. 47

v. Farrell

ii. 251

Columbus, &c. R. R. Co. v. Troesch. ii. 46

i'. Watson

iii. 304

Colvil v. Besley

i. 402

Colvin v. Corwin

iii. 202

v. Holbrook

i. 70

v. Williams

iii. 57

Colwell r. Child

ii. 831

v. Lawrence

iii. 167

Colwill v. Reeves

iii. 214

Colyear v. Countess of Mulg

rave

iii. 308,

316

ii. 2b

Coman v. State

Combe i'. Greene

ii. 663

Combe's case

i

. 89, 156

Combes v. Chandler

i. 252

Combs v. Tarlton

iii. 245

Comegys v. Vasse

i. 253

Comer v. Cunningham

i. 580

Comfort v. Duncan

i. 544

v. Eisenbeis

iii. 464

Coming, Ex parte

iii. 297

Commander-in-chief

*i. 181

Commerce, The

ii. 433

Commercial Bank v. Bobo

ii. 757

v. Colt

i. 254

v. Cunningham i

.294

; ii. 768

v. Gorham

i. 12

v. Hamer

i. 303

v. Kortright

i. 59

v. Lum

ii. 800

v. Martin

ii. 119

v. Nolan i

479

iii. 145

a. Wilkins i.

231,

232, 234

Commercial Bank of Buffalo v. Kort-
right i. 154; iii. 220, 221

Com. Bank of Natchez v. The State
of Miss. "'■ 486

Commercial Bank of Pa. v. Union

Bank of N. Y. i. 89

Commercial Ins. Co. v. Union Ins.

Co. ii. 470

v. Whitney ii. 479

Commercial Steamship Co. v. Boul-

ton ii. 424

Commercial Union Ass. Co. v. Scam-

mon ii. 575

Commins v. Scott iii. 4

Commissioners v. Perry i. 482

Commonwealth v. Bacon iii. 483

r. Cheney ii. 865

u. Churchill ii. 865, 866

v. Collins i. 407

v. Cooper i. Ill

v. Courow ii. 55

v. Crevor iii. 112

v. Curtis i. 160

v. Dorchester Ins. Co. ii. 539

v. Emigrant, &c. Bank ii. 858

v. Frost iii. 134

o. Gamble i. 355

v. Green ii. 741

v. Hantz i. 355

v. Hemperly ii. 65

v. Hide & Leather Ins. Co. ii. 561

v. Holmes i. 47

v. Hunt ii. 724

r. Kendig ii. 900, 907

v. Knox ii. 901

!\ Lane ii. 92

v. Manley i. 285

v. Mann iii. 483

v. Munson ii. 85, 86

v. Murray i. 348, 355

v. Nesbit ii. 902

v. Pash ii. 897

v. Power ii. 241

v. Proprietors ii. 831

v. Ricketson ii. 468

v. Sessions of Norfolk iii. 187

v. Shepherd i. 377

v. Shuman ii. 938

v. Stamp ii- 85

v. Stone ii. 754

v. Wentz i- 377

v. Wolf ii. 905

v. Worcester T. Co. ii. 941
Commonwealth Bank v. Law i. 208, 210,

.. 283

v. Mechanics Bank ii. 762

v. Mudgett i. 319

Commonwealth Ins. Co. u. Chase ii. 508

i;. Globe Ins. Co. iii. 585

Comp v. Henchman i. 95

Compta, The iii- 207

Compton v. Bearcroft ii- 723

v. Bedford iii. 441

v. Martin iii- 44

Com stock, Ex parte iii. 407

Matter of iii- 471

v. Farnum i- 254

v. Grout iii- 465

v. Hannah i- 289

lxiv

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Comstock v. Howk

i. 482

c. Hutchinson i. 636,

iii. 227

v. Moore

ii. 364

v. Norton

iii. 23

v. Ray ford

i. 569

v. Smith

ii. 757

Comus, The

ii. 441

Comyns r. Boyer

i. 488

Conant, Matter of

iii. 428

v. Frary

i. 231

r. Raymond

ii. 57

v. Seneca County Bank

i. 258

Conard r. Atlantic Ins. Co. ii. 395, 40.

iii. 292, 443, 444

v. Pacific Ins. Co. iii. 185

Contlerman r. Smith i. 013

Cone !'. Baldwin i. 280

v. Niagara Ins. Co. ii. 501

Conger r. Ring i. 95

Congress Spring Co. v. High Rock

Spring Co. ii. 351

Congress and Empire Spring Co. v.
High Rock Congress Spring Co. ii. 351,

361
Congress, &c. Co. u. High Rock, &c.

Co. ii. 351

Congreve v. Evetts i. 560

Coningharn r. Plunkett iii. 315

Conkey e. Hopkins ii. 8

Conklin r. Barton i. 182

v. Underhill iii. 127

Conkling v. Carson iii. 403

Conlin v. Cantrell i. 409

Conn v. Coburn i. 338 ; ii. 4

v. Conn i. 408

v. Wilson ii. 75

Connecticut v. Jackson ii. 769 ; iii. 159,

101, 168

Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Groom ii. 603

i . N. Y. & N. Haven R. Co. ii. 608

v. Schwenk ii. 580

Conn. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer ii. 606

Connelly v. Cheever i. 227

Conner r. City of New York iii. 483

v. Coffin i. 545

v. Henderson i. 022

c. Robinson ii. 668, 076

v. Trawick i. 263

Connerat v. Goldsmith ii. 4

Conners r. Hennessey i. 116

Connersville r. Wadleigh ii. 915

Connolly v. Warren ii. 275

Connor r.Bellamont ii. 716

Connory v. Kendall i. 200, 297

Conollv r. Kettlewell ii. 12

v. Pardon ii. 681, 093

Conover v. Mass. Life Ins. Co. ii. 692

v. Mut. Ins. Co. ii. 575

v. Stillwell i. 459

Conro v. Pt. Henry I. Co. i. 230

Conroe r. Birdsall i. 353, 357, 369

Conroy v. Warren i. 273

Conroy v. Woods i. 232

Consolidated Ins. Co. v. Cashaw ii. 494

Const v. Harris i. 217

Constable v. Clobery i 12

v. Noble "• 475, 487

Constantia, The i- 640

Constantine o. Constantine ii. 645

Constitution, The, v. Woodworth ii. 392
Contee v. Dawson ii- 844

Continental Bank v. Commonwealth

Bank i. 279

!-. Townsend i. 292

Continental Ins. Co. v. Hulman ii. 476,

577
c. Palmer ii. 608

Converse p. Boston & Maine R. Co.

ii. 197
v. Bradley iii. 394

v. Citizens Ins. Co. ii. 562

v. Converse i. 438

v. McKee i. 237

v. Norwich, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 231

Converseville Co. c Chambersburg

Co. i. 558

Convoy's Wheat, The ii. 298

Conway, Ex parte iii. 381

v. Beazley ii. 723, 735, 730

r. Bush i. 575

c . Edwards i. 568

i\ Gray ii. 425

v. Kinsworthy iii. 311

Conway Tool Co. v. Hudson River

Ins. Co. ii. 583, 584

Conwell v. Sandridge i. 222

Conyers r. Ennis ii. 915

v. Kenans iii. 107

Cooch v. Goodman i. 485

Cook r. Bank of Louisiana i. 52

i\ Black ii. 610

r. Bradley i. 7, 351, 457, 462, 463,
464, 474
v. Caldecott iii. 441

c. Champlain Trans. Co. ii. 247, 218
v. Collingridge ii. 309

v. Comm. Ins. Co. ii. 500

v. Continental Ins. Co. ii. 546

\ r. Cook ii. 91

* c-. Creswell i. 548

r. Darling i. 313

c. Ellis iii. 185

r. Field ii. 605

v. Fiske i. 110

t\ Fowler iii. 112

v. Genesee Mut. Ins. Co. ii. 751

!■. Hartle ii. 773

v. Hill iii. 187

c. Husted ii. 50

i . Jennings ii. 419, 647

r. Johnson ii. 893

v. Litchfield i. 314, 322

v. Moffat iii. 390, 507

r. Moseley i. 623

v. Newman i. 145, 253

i . Pritchard iii. 381, 477

v. Satterlee i. 280

v. Southwick i. 274, 284

r. State Bank ii. 113

v. Stearns ii. 042

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Ixv

Cook v. "Warren

v. Y/elch

v. Wot ton
Cooke, Ex parte

r. Booth

r. Callaway

i\ Clayworth

c. Colehan

v. French

r. Millard

i . Nathan

t, Orne

c. Oxley

l: Tombs

v. Whorwood
Cooke's Appeal
Cooke's case
Cookendcrfer v. Preston
Cookes p. Mascall

i. 110
i. 18

iii. 440
i. 532
i. 311
i. 435; iii. 373
i. 280
i. 322
iii. 40
i. 285
ii. 16
i. 514
iii. 19

iii. 202
i. 150
i. 546
ii. 669, 075
ii. 77

Cooley e. Board of Wardens of the

Port of Philadelphia iii. 511

v. Broad i. 174

v. Cook iii. 460

v. Perrine i. 62

v. Rose ii. 769

i . Vansycle i. 147

v. Willard i. 41

Coolidge v. Bridgham i. 616 ; ii. 815 ;

iii. 227, 229

v. Gloucester Ins. Co. ii. 490, 506,

510

■,-. Gray ii. 487

r. Neat ii. 70, 72, 73

v. Payson i. 292, 303

v. Ruggles i. 254

v. Smith i. 387

v. Miles iii. 118

Coombs v. Emery i. 489

v. Gortlen i. 556

v. Scott i. 53

Coomer v. Bromley i. 209

Coon v. Plymouth Plank Road iii. 285

o. Syracuse & Utica R. R. ii. 46

Coope r. Bowles i. 201

v. Eyre i. 196

Cooper v. i. 582; ii. 832

v. Bigalow ii. 874

v. Blandy ii. 940

v. Bockett ii. 860

v. Burr i. 264

r. Chitty iii. 426, 434

v. Dedrick iii. 18

v. Hamilton Man. Co. ii. 47

v. Elston iii. 60

v . Johnson ii. 848

t: Martin i. 348, 460

v. Matthews ii- 324

a. Mullins ii. 47 ; iii. 178

v. Mass. Ins. Co. ii. 605

v. Newman i- 619

v. Parker ii. 750; iii. 72

v. Pena iii- 306

v. Phillips i. 339 ; ii. 44

w.Rankin ..i-46

v. Robinson ii. 879

Cooper v. Smith
v. South
v. Stevenson
v. Turner
v. Twibill
v. Willomatt
v. Wyatt

ii. 040 ; iii. 5
ii. 396
i. 126
iii. 67
i. 632
ii. 134
iii. 449

Co-operative Ass. v. Leflore ii. 550

Coopwood c. Wallace i. 128, 129; ii. 00

Coosa, The ii. 520

Cooth i: Jackson iii. 66, 333, 345, :550

Cope v. Albinson i. 506

v. Alden ii. 716

v. Burt ii. 89

v. Cope ii. 045

v. Cordova ii. 204, 207, 415

v. Dodd ii. 669, 672, 074

e. Joseph ii. 879

v. Rowlands i. 489 ; ii. 894

v. Smith ii. 24

Copeland, Ex parte iii. 420, 424

v. Copeland ii. 936, 9?.7

v. Mercantile Ins. Co. i. 51 ; ii. 474

c. New England Ins. Co. ii. 527, 529,

573

v. Stein . iii. 273, 458

v. Stephenson iii. 424

v. Stevens iii. 446

v. Watts i. -344

Copelin v. Ins. Co. ii. 512

Copeman v. Gallant iii. 435

Copis v. Middleton ii. 0

Copland, Ex parte i. 238

v. Bosquet i. 57'J

Copp v. McDugall i. 307

Copper v. Wells ii. 845

Copper, &c. Co. v. Spencer iii. 39

Coppin v. Braithwaite ii. 242 ; iii. 178,

180, 194

v. Coppin ii. 701

v. Craig i. 107, 497, 528 ; ii. 883

v. Walker ii. 883

Coppock !.-. Bower i. 469 ; ii. 895

Corbett v. Brown ii. 913, 914, 916

v. Schumacker i. 91

Corbin v. 'Am. Mills i. 114

Corcoran v. Allen i. 150

v. Harran iii. 177

Core's case ii. 043

Corey v. James ii. 875

v. Ripley iii. 476

Cork v. Baker ii. 08

Cork & Bandon Railway v. Caze-

nove i. 374, 375

Corlies v. dimming i. 104

v. Elemming iii. 90

Cornelius v. Vanarsdallen ii. 803

Cornell v. Andrews iii. 334

v. Green ii- 773

v. Jackson iii. 240, 243

v. Moulton ii. 797

r. Nebeker ii. 862

r. Todd ii- 035

Corney v. DaCosta i. 317

Cornfoot r. Fowke i. 64 ; ii. 522, 921

lxvi

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Corning v. Abbott

i. 199

i . Burden

ii. 311, 312

v. Lewis

i. 411

Cornish v. Abington

ii. 942

c. Stubbs

i. 548; ii. 6B5

v. Upton

ii. 344

Cornwall v. Haight

i. 503

v. Hoyt

i. 407

v. Wilson

i. 88, 104

Cornwell v. Voorhees

ii. 154

Cornwell's Appeal

iii. 426

Coromandel, The

ii. 437, 440

Corp v. MeComb

i. 313, 318

Corps r. Robinson

i. 211

Corrie r. Onslow

iii. 44'J

Corsbie r. Free

iii. 424

Corson r. Mulvany

iii. 311

Cort v. Ambergate, &o. Railway Com

pany ii. 809

Cortelyou r. Lansing ii. 121

Corwin v. Benham iii. 292

v. Daly ii. 352, 353, 354

c. Hood ii. 040

Corwith r. Colter i. 572

Cory v. Boylston Ins. Co. ii. 497

p. Bretton iii. 72

v. Burr ii. 501

v. Cory i. 435

r. Patton ii. 520

Coslake r. Till iii. 323, 340

Cosmopolite, The ii. 481

Cossens, Er parte iii. 473

Costa R. R. Co. v, Moss iii. 185

Coster /-. Murray iii. 95, 96

v. Thomason i. 212

v. Turner iii. 330

Costigan r. Newland i. 85
v. The Mohawk & Hudson Rail-
way Co. ii. 37, 38 ; iii. 208

Costley v. Wilkerson i. 228

Cotes v. Davis i. 392

Cothay r. Fennell i. 57, 65, GO

v. Murray iii. 402

i. Tute i. 574

Cother v. Merrick ii. 044
Cottage St. Church v. Kendall ' i. 483
Cottam v. Partridge iii. 79, 80, 94, 90

v. Smith i. 200

Cotteen v. Missing i. 263

Cotterel v. Harrington iii. 149

Cotterill, Ex parte iii. 435

v. Starkey ii. 247

Cottinfrtoii's case ii. 739

Cotton, In re iii. 415

v. Blane ii. 6

r. Goodwin ii. 779

v. Thomas ii. 37(1

a. Thurland ii. 759, 887

Cottrell, Er parte iii. 404

v. Conklin i. 274, 283, 284

Cottrill v. Van Duzen i. 178, 190, 198

Coty v. Barnes i. 011, 613

Cotzhausen v. Judd i. 208

Couch v. Mills i. 28

v. Watson Coal Co. ii. 40

Cougar v. Galena R. R. Co. ii. 174

Coughlin r. N. Y., &c. R. Co. ii. 908

Coulter v. Richmond i. 275

v. Robertson i. 486

Coulon v. Bowne ii. 524

Coulston v. Carr i. 485

Coulter's case iii. 238

Coulthart v. Clementson ii. 22
Council Bluff Works v. Cuppey i. 279;

ii. 786

Counden v. Clerke ii. 689

Countess of Durham, The ii. 434
Countess of Portsmouth v. Earl of

Portsmouth iii. 414

Countess of Rutland's case ii. 679

Couradt v. Sullivan ii. 10

Courcier v. Ritter i. 87

Coursen v. Hamlin i. 229

Courtis v. Cane iii. 210

Courtnay v. Miss. Ins. Co. ii. 471

Courtney v. N. Y. City Ins. Co. ii. 477,

575

Courtwright v. Stewart iii. 62

Couston v. Chapman i. 628

Coutourier v. Hastie i. 101, 559, 610 ;

ii. 13 ; iii. 29

Covas v. Bingham i. 495

Coventry v. Atherton iii. 102

Covill v. Hill iii. 270

Cowan, E.r parte iii. 425

!'. Braidwood ii. 738

v. Iowa Ins. Co. ii. 576

v. Milbourn ii. 337

Cowas-jee v. Thompson i. 650

Cowdin v. Gottgetreu iii. 26

Cowdrey v. Vandenburgh i. 252

Cowell v. Batterley iii. 286

v. Betteley ii. 838; iii. 280

v. Brothers, The ii. 439

v. Edwards i. 33, 34

v. Simpson i. 107; iii. 259, 263, 2G4,

» 27-3

v. Watts i. 143

Cowie v. Harris iii. 459

v. Remfry iii. 8

v. Stirling i. 282

Cowing v. Snow ii. 407

Cowles v. Harts i. 322

i'. Marble iii. 39

v. Whitman iii. 330

Cowling v. Beachum ii. 701

Cowsar v. Wade ii. 885

Cox, E r parte iii. 427

v. Adams ii. 37

v. Bodfish i. 240

v. Brain

ii. 771, 772

v. Buck

ii. 938

v. Cooper
v. Cox

ii. 882
ii. 92

v. Fay

v. Hickman

ii. 827
i. 174

v . Jagger
v. Kitchin

ii. 827
i. 407

o. McBurney

i. 168, 171

if. Midland Railway Co.

.48

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

lxvii

Cox v. Murray

ii. 385

u. Prentice

i. 185, 490

a. Russell

i. 2:32

v. Smith

iii. 113

t-. Sprigg

iii. 314

i'. Strode

iii. 240, 242

v. United States

ii. 713

Coxe v. Gent

ii. 831

v. Hale

iii. 420

v. Harden

i. 649; ii. 412

v. Lundy

ii. 831

v. State Bank

ii. 753, 874

Coxhead v. Mullis

ii. 65

Coxon v. Great Western Railway Co.

ii. 227, 232

Coxwell v. De Vaughn

ii. 762

Coye v. Leach

ii. 613

Coyle v. Fowler

i. 457, 459

Coysegame, Ex parte

iii. 455

Cozzins v. Whitaker

i. 616, 627, 636

Crabill v. Marsh

iii. 350

Crabton v. Kile

i. 636

Crabtree v. Clapham

i. 185

v. Clark

ii. 423

Craddock v. Aldridge

ii. 660

v. Riddlesbarger

i. 553

Craft v. Isham

ii. 15, 16, 795

v. McConoughy

ii. 888

Crafts v. Mott

iii. 463, 464

Cragg v. Bowman

i. 394

Craggin v. Bailey

iii. 464

Cragoe v. Jones

ii. 16

Craig v. Blow

ii. 917

v. Childress

ii. 177

v. Hawkins

ii. 842

v. Hewitt

iii. 116

v. Kittredge

i. 263

v. Leslie

i. 150

v. Miller

ii. 702

v. Murgatroyd

ii. 582, 607

o. Parkis

ii. 3, 31

v. U. S. Ins. Co.

ii. 529

v. Wells

ii. 635

Craighead v. The Bank

iii. 79

Crain v. Beech

iii. 201

v. Petrie

iii. 194

Craine v. Hubbel

iii. 125

Craker v. Railway Co.

iii. 187

Cram v. Aiken

ii. 448

v. Cadwell

i. 210

v. Hendricks i.

291 ; iii. 153, 156

Cramer v. Bachmann

i. 187

v. Bradshaw

i. 624

a. Lepper

iii. 132

Cramp v. Symons

ii. 840

Crane v. Conklin

i. 435

u. Dygert

iii. 112

o. French

i. 234, 236

v. Gough

iii. 63, 352

v. Pratt

ii. 753

v. Price

ii. 309, 312

v. Roberts

ii. 789

Cranley v. Hillary

ii. 770

Crans v. Hunter

i. 52

Cranson v. Gobs

ii. 904, 907

Cranston v. Clarke

v. Marshall

v. Phila. Ins. Co.
Crantz v. Gill

Cranwell v. Ship Fanny Fosdick
Cranz v. Kroger
Crapo v. Allen
Crauf urd v. Blackburn

v. Hunter
Craven v. Craven

o. Ryder
Crawford v. Chute

v. Clark

v. Forristall

v. Louisiana State Bank

i). Slade

v. Smith

v. Stirling

v. Willing

o. Wilson
Crawley v. Mullins

i. 534

ii. 408

ii. 474

i. 339

iii. 208

i. 263

ii. 463, 464

ii. 82

ii. 484, 489

ii. 833

i. 653

ii. 865

ii. 204

i. 508

i. 91

ii. 865

i. 564, 566

i. 210; ii. 879

iii. Ill

ii. 708, 709, 710

i. 548

Crawshay v. Collins i. 173, 219, 224, 227,

229, 230 ; ii. 369, 845

v. Eades i. 646

v. Maule i. 169, 174, 220, 221, 226,

229, 230 ; iii. 321

v. Thompson ii. 373, 374

Craythorne v. Swinburne i. 32, 36 ; ii. 6

Creamer v. Perry i. 317

Creed, In re ii. 612, 613

v. Hartman i. 117

v. Mallet ii. 459

v. Penn. R. Co. ii. 245

v. Stevens iii- 127

Creery c. Hollis ii. 443

Creigliton v. Ingersoll iii. 286

Cremer v. Higginson i. 210 ; ii. 14, 23

Cressinger v. Lessee of Welch i. 366,

368 ; ii. 900

Cresson v. Stout i. 547

Creswell v. Blank i- 228

Creuse v. Defiganiere iii- 74

Crill v. Doyle i. 562

Cripps v. Davis iii- 77, 92

v. Golding i- 485

Crisdee v. Bolton iii. 168, 172

Crisp v. Churchill i. 337

v. Gamel i. 485

Crist v. Brindle ii. 878

Crittenden v. Fiske ii- 14

v. Jones iii. 393

v. Phoenix Ins. Co. i. 262

v. Schermerhorn i. 393

Crocker v. Colwell j- 205

v. Crocker i- 557

v. Franklin H. & F. Man. Co. ii. 666

v. Higgins i- 498

v. Jackson ii- 439, 448

v. Lewis i|- 921

v. Orpen iii- 328

v. People's Ins. Co. ii. 524, 553

v. Whitney i- 254, 255, 258

Crockett v. Dodge ii- 450

Crockett v. Newton ii- 433

Crookford v. Winter i- 79

lxviii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Crofoot v. Bennett
Croft v. Alison

v. Day ii. 3(

Crofts v. Beale

!■. Marshall

v. Waterhouse
Croker r. Lauder

!■. Open
Crompton r. Pratt
Cromwell, Ex parte

i. Benjamin

v. Lovett

v. (J wings

v. Sac County
C'romnger v. Crocker
Crunise v. Clark

v. Cronise
Crook r. Jadis

v. Stephen

v. Williams
Crooke v. Slack
Crooker v. Crooker

Crookewit v. Fletcher
Crooks c. Crooks

!-. Moore
Crookshank v. Burrell
Croom v. Shaw
Oroome o. Lediard
Criipp b. Hambleton
CrosVie v. McDoual
Crosby r. Berger

v. Fitch

t. Grant

t . Jeroloman

i. Loop

v. Mason

v. Wadsworth

v. Wyatt
Crosley v. Arkwright
Cross c. Andrews

v. Bryant

v. Burlington Bank

v. Cross

17. DeVille

v. Hopkins

v. O'Donnell

v. Peters

v. Sackett

v, Shutliff
Crosse v. Androes

v. Gardner

r. Lawrence

e. Smith
Crossing r. Scudamore
Crosswcll v. Lehman

i. 566

i. 114

2, 366, 369, 372, 373

i. 292

ii. 496, 674

ii. 234, 236, 242

i. 648

iii. 312

ii. 760

iii. 411

i. 388

ii. 755

ii. 827

i. 289,330; iii. 113

i. 572, 573

i. 335

iii. 499

i. 289

ii. 852

i. 93

ii. 383

i. 192, 231

ii. 420

ii. 78

i. 575

iii. 01, 02

i. 62

iii. 312, 345, 361

ii. 773

iii. 314

ii. 730

ii. 181, 400

i. 289, 292

i. 11

i. 551

iii. 112

iii. 35, 04

ii. 29

i. 488

i. 433 ; ii. 158

iii. 382

i. 215

i. 377

i. 448

iii. 321

i. 642

ii. 915

ii. 921

ii. 534, 535

i. 355

i. 614

iii. 349

i. 310

ii. 637

i. 200

Crouch v. Credit Foncier of Eng. i. 27S,

330
v. Grea t Western Railway Co. ii. 232
c. Gridley iii. 471, 478

(-. Roemer ii. 309

c.The London, &c. Railway Co.

ii. 185, 187, 224, 259
Croucher v. Oakman ii. 463

Croufihton v. Forrest i. 208

Croukite v. Wells ii. 190

Crousillat v. Ball
Crout v. DeWolf
Crow v. Crow

v. Rogers
Crowder v. Austin
Crowdus v. Shelby
Crowe >'. Aikin

v. Clay
Crowell v. Beebe

v. Currier

v. Davis

c. Gleason
Crowfoot v. Gurney
Crowhurst v. Laverack
Crowie v. Hoover
Crowley v. Vitty
Crowly v. Cohens
Crowther v. Rowlandson
Croydon Gas Co. v. Dickinson

ii. 511

ii. 941

ii. 91

i. 496, 497

i. 526

i. 34

ii. 334, 338

ii. 757

ii. 939

i. 498

ii. 842

i. 444

i. 245

i. 407

i. 546

i. 543

ii. 485, 566

iii. 100

i. 315;

ii. 28

i. 275

ii. 774

i. 52

ii. 527

ii. 527, 528

i. 272

ii. 703
ii. 621
iii. 253

■>■«

Crozer v. Chambers

r. Pilling
Crozier I-. Carr
Cruder v. Penn. Ins. Co.

v. Phil. Ins. Co.
Cruger v. Armstrong

v. Jones
Cruickshanks v. Rose
Cruikshank v. Janson
Crumbacker v. Tucker
Crumless v. Sturgess i. Tin

Crump !>. U. S. Mining Co. i. 04

Crusader, The ii. 357, 369

Crusoe v. Bugby i. 538

Cruttwell ?>. Lye ii. 309

Cruzan v. Smith i. 40

Cry me v. Day i. 300

Cubberly v. Scott i. 387

Cud ». Rutter i. 522 ; iii. 325

Cuff v. Dorland iii. 372

o. Peim ii. 685

Culbertson v. Shaw ii. 431

Culbreath v. Culbreath iii. 354

Cullara v. Guillot i. 568

v. Valentine ii. 850

Cullen r. Butler ii. 497

v. Duke of Queensbury i. 139

Cullough v. Wainwright ii. 080

Culnes, Ex parte iii. 446

Culter t>. Reynolds i. 313

Culver 17. Ashley i. 51 ; ii. 827

Cumber v. Wane i. 249 ; ii. 749, 751

Cumberland, The ii. 4:-'9

Cumberland Bank 17. Hall ii. 859

17. Hann i. 290

Cumberland Coal and Iron Co. v.

Sherman i. 95

Cumberland, Inhab. of, v. Inhab. of

North Yarmouth ii. 847

Cumberland Valley Prot. Co. v.

Schell ii. 558, 580

Cumberland, &c. Co. <7. Andes Ins.

Co. i. 565; ii. 561

Cumberland, &c. Co. v. Douglas ii. 546
Cuming v. Hill ii. 54, 56

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

lxix

Cummer v. Milton
dimming v. Forrester

v. Roebuck
Cummings v. Arnold

v. Banks

v. Dennett

e. Griggs

v. Harris

v. Powell

i*. Spruance

v. Williams
Cummings' Appeal

ii. 712

ii. 879

i. 585; iii. 13

ii. 425

ii. 740

i. 458

i. 560

iii. 267, 268

i. 335, 360, 362

iii. 184, 196

ii. 877

i. 466

Cummins v. Agricultural Ins. Co. ii. 546

v. Wise iii. 126, 130

Cunard v. Hyde ii. 485

Cundell v. Dawson i. 489

Cunliffe o. Booth i. 289

v. Harrison iii. 151
Cunningham v. Ashbrook i. 561, 566 ;

iii. 46

v. Bragg i. 225

v. Dunn ii. 805

v. Freeborn iii. 383

v. Hall ii. 393

v. Holton i. 535

v. Irwin i. 396

e. Knight i. 355

v. Lamar i. 212

v. Morrell ii. 649, 660

<.-. Pattee i. 532

o. Reardon i. 393

v. Smitli ii. 913

Cupples r. Whelan . i- 47

Curley v. Harris ii. 852

Curling v. Chalklen ii- 16

v. Long ii. 407

Curran v. Holyoke Water Co. iii. 351

Currie v. Misa i. 292 ; ii. 756

Currier v. Barker i- 549

o. Continental Ins. Co. ii. 614, 752

v. Currier i. 576

u. Fellows i- 34

v. Hodgdon i. 254

v. Knapp i- 578

v. Rovve i. 186

v. Webster i. 180

Curry v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. ii. 523,

545, 558, 586

v. Larer iii- 173

v. Powers }■ 263

v. Rogers i- 483

v. White i- 225

Curtin v. Patton i. 364, 369

Curtis v. Aspinwall i- 627

v. Barcley ..."'• ^^?

v. Brown iii- 24, 2o

v. Bryan ii- 363, 364

v. Drinkwater ii- 242

v. Gibbs ii- ?40

v. Groat «'• 215

v. Hall ..}■ |35

v. Hannay m- 2^

v. Hubbard «■ ^5b

v. Hunton ">■ 409

v. Mohr »■ 292

Curtis v. Parks

i. 501

v. Pugh

iii. 51

v. R. & S. R. R. Co.

ii. 234

v. Sage

iii. 38

v. Vernon

i. 147

v. Ward

iii. 210

v. Williamson

i. 66

Curtis's Ex. v. Bank of Somerset i. 142

Curtiss v. Greenbanks ii. 787

v. Howell ii. 683

v. Lawrence iii. 176

v. Marten i. 315

Curts v. Cisna i. 93

Cushing v. Arnold iii. 459

v. Breed i. 565

v. Drew iii. 174

v. John Frazer, The ii. 429, 430, 431

o. Smith i. 193

v. Thompson ii. 564

Cushman v. Bailey i. 176

v. Blanchard iii. 242

v. Dement i. 284

v. Holyoke i. 566

v. North-western Ins. Co. ii. 580,

G48

v. United States Ins. Co. ii. 554, 593,

597

Cusic v. Douglas iii. 511

Cussons v. Skinner ii. 43

Cuthbert f . Cummings ii. 667, 676

v. Haley iii. 129

Cutler v. Ashland i. 55

u. Bonney ii- 157

v. Close i- 494

v. Everett ii- 1

v. Hinton ii- 12

v. How i. 466; iii. 126, 171

v. Johnson i- 466

v. Rand ii- 607

v. Rose ii- 861

v. Southern iii- 200

v. Thurlo ii- 400

v. Windsor i. 180; ii. 421, 422

Cutter v. Cochrane i- 473

u. Copeland i- 569

v. Davenport ii- 701

v. Evans "i- 471

v. Powell ii. 39, 458, 653, 669, 792

v. Reynolds _ }■ 458

Cutting v. Dana iii- 324

Cutts v. Perkins i-255

v. Salmon i- ^

Cuxon v. Chadley }• 246

Cuyler v. Cuyler i'- 849

v. Sanford iii- 14o

v. Stevens i- s21

Cynthia, The "• 4'>J

Cypress, The

ii. 458

D.

Dabney v. Stidger
Daby v. Ericson

i. 211, 212
i. 228

lxx

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Dadmun Man. Co. v. Worcester Ins.

Co. ii. 477, 562, 576

Dacosta v. Davis ii. 713

Da Costa v. Edmunds ii. 485

v. Firth ii. 484

v. Newnham ii. 447

Daegling v. Gilmore i. 115

Daglish r. Davidson ii. 452

Dalihnan v, Forster ii. 930

Dailey v. Coons i. 103

Dails i\ Lloyd i. 96, 406

Dain v. WycofE ii. 76

Dakin v. Williams ii. 663 ; iii. 174

Dalby v. Hirst i. 537

v. India Ass. Co. ii. 606

v. Pullen i. 526 ; iii. 337

Dale v. Cook ii. 877

v. Hall ii. 182, 428

i . Robinson i. 408

v. Smithson ii. 355, 364, 373

v. Sollet ii. 880

Dalgleish v. Brooke ii. 481

Dalglish v. Jarvie ii. 598

Dally v. Smith iii. 416

D'Almaine v. Boosey ii. 346

Dairy mple v. Dalrymple ii. 81, 88, 729

Dalton v. Irvin i. 109

v. Laudahu i. 552

Dalton City Co. v. Dalton Mfg. Co. i. 166

Daly i'. Duggan iii. 374

v. Palmer ii. 335

Dalyell i: Tyrer i. 119

Dalzell c. Crawford iii. 335

Dame v. Baldwin i. 556

v. Wingate ii. 869

Damon, In re iii. 400

p. Inhabitants of Granby i. 22

v. Osborne i. 566

Damont v. N. O. & Carollton E. R.

Co. ii. 248

Dana v. Coombs i. 368

v. Fiedler ii. 687 ; iii. Ill, 220

v. Hancock iii. 20

v. Lull i. 201, 222

v. Sawyer i. 303

Danaher v. Garlock i. 54

Danbury Band v. Bean i. 185

Dance v. Girdler ii. 21

Dand v. Kingscote ii. 604

Dandridge v. Harris ii. 783

Dane !'. Kirkwall i. 437

Danforth v. Adams ii. 937

v. Culver iii. 76

v. Scoharie Turnpike Co. i. 154

Dangerfleld v. Thomas iii. 435

Daniel v. Adams i. 41, 60

v. Ballard i. 33, 37

v. Bowles ii. 67, 69

v. Cartony iii. 125, 127

v. Frazer iii. 305

r. Mitchell i. 621

v. Swift i. 107; iii. 275

Daniell v. Griffin i. 51

Daniels, E.r parte iii. 465

c. Harris ii. 527

Daniels v. Hatch "• 823

v. Hudson River Ins. Co. n. 542, 5o4,

557

v. Newton "• 810

v. Pond i- 544, 547

v. Tearney ii- 943

D'Anjou v. Deagle ii- 194

Danley v. Rector ii. 239

Dann v. Do'lman i. 488

v. Spurrier i. 540 ; ii. 637, 939

Danolds v. State iii. 480

Dansey t'. Richardson ii. 155, 162, 164

Dante, The ii. 404

Dantzic, The ii. 43

DAquila v. Lambert i. 642

Darbj' v. Baines ii. 389

v. Boucher i. 338, 302

v. Mayer ii. 701

Darbyshire v. Parker i. 320

Darcy v. Askwith ii. 665

D'Arcy v. Ketchum ii. 742

Darden v. Lovelace i. 564

Dardier v. Chapman i. 382

Darling v. Boston, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 231

u. Lewis i. 78

v. March i. 210, 212

Darmstaetter v. Moynahan i. 116

Darrell v. Tibbitts ii. 563

Darrol v. Quimby i. 76

Darst v. Bates iii. 28

u. Gale i. 155

v. Roth i. 122

Dart i'. Dart ii. 933

Dartmouth College v. Woodward iii. 480,

481, 482, 483, 485, 486, 500, 501, 502

Dartnall v. Howard i. 91, 92, 476

Dashiell v. Attorney-General ii. 089

Daubignv v. Davallon i. 450

v. Duval i. 60, 102 ; iii. 290

Davenport v. Bishopp iii. 316

v. Gear i. 184

v. Karnes ii. 730

a. Mason iii. 66

c. Peoria Ins. Co. i. 42

o. Rackstrow i. 24

v. Woodbridge i. 258

Davenport Nat. Bank v. Homeyer i. 276

Davey v. Chamberlain ii. 131

v. Mason ii. 194

David v. Ransom ii. 897

David Howes, Matter of iii. 460

Davidson v. Bridgeport ii. 757

v. Cooper ii. 853, 858, 862

v. Delano iii. 82

v. Geoghagan ii. 874

r. Goodall ii. 70

v. Graham ii. 259

v. Little i. 466

v. Weems i. 228

v. Young ii. 944

Davie v. Briggs ii. 612

Davies v. Davies ii. 58

v. Edwards iii. 82

v. Games i. 167

v. Humphreys i. 32, 36, 500 ; iii. 98

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

1XX1

Davies i>. Mann
v. Penton

Davis r. Allen
v. Anderson
v. Bean
t . Bechstein
v. Boardman
v. Bradford
i. Bradley
u. Brown
v. Browslier
v. Caldwell
r. Carlisle
v. Child
v. Cilley
v. Clemson
v. Coburn
v. Connop
v. Cook
v. Davis

ii. 248, 250, 430
iii. 168

i. 192
iii. 302
ii. 880

i. 252
i. 65; ii. 474

i. 500
i. 579; ii. 938; iii. 280

ii. 84
iii. 281

i. 336
ii. 856
ii. 385
ii. 836
ii. 713

i. 256

i. 544

i. 208
ii. 871, 944

v. Detroit, &c. R. R. Co.

„. Dodd

v. Dudley

v. Duke of Marlborough

v. Emerson

v. Fish ii. !

w. Freeman

v. Garr

v. Garrett

v. Gillett

v. Goodenow

i'. Gowen

v. Grow

v. Hanly

v, Hardacre

v. Hedges

v. Higgins

r. Hill

v. Holbrook

v. Hone

v. Hubbard

v. Huggins

v. Hunt

u. Jacquin

v. Jenny

v. Jones

v. Kendall

v. Lane

v. Leslie

v. Lyman

v. Mason

v. Maxwell

v. McCurdy

o. Meeker

v. Moore

v. Morgan

v. Morris

v. M. S. & N. J. R. E. Co. ii. 276

v. Newton "i- 437

"■ Ney ,i- "^3

v. Noafes "• 823

v. Old Colony E. Co. i- 158

v. Oswell iii- 215

v. Palmer "■ 307, 314

v. Petway i- 526

ii. 48

i. 331

i. 367

i. 253

i. 33

ii. 898 ; iii. 190

iii. 169

iii. 104, 123

i. 92 ; ii. 406

iii. 167

ii.- 52

i. 204

iii. 218

i. 318

iii. 118

iii. 219

ii. 24

i. 666

ii. 897

iii. 306, 373

ii. 812

ii. 27

i. 615; ii. 863

i. 334

ii. 858

i. 547 ; ii. 685

ii. 353, 355, 371

i. 76, 223, 298

ii. 458

iii. 244

ii. 889

i. 86. 39, 650, 657

iii. 463

i. 622

iii. 40

i. 473

i. 538

Davis v. Quincy Ins.

Co.

ii. 564

o. Kowell

iii. 12

v. Russell

iii. 274

v. Sanders

ii. 937

v. Seneca, The

ii. 388

v. Sliapley

iii. 478

i'. Shields i, 583, 588 ; iii. 8, 220

v. Smith i. 364 ; iii. 79, 242

f. Smith Organ Co. i. 158, 4S'i

v. Steiner iii. 75

r. Symonds i. 522 ; iii. 337, 344, 045

v. Tallcot ii. 685, 794, 866 ; iii. 190

v. Thomas ii. 941

v. Wells ii. 14

v. West iii. 327

v. Willan ii. 273

v. Windsor Bank i. 76

Davis Sewing Machine Co. o. Mills ii. 31

Davis, &c. Co. v. Buckles ii. 762

v. Maginnis i. 570

Davison v. Seymour ii. 895

Davoll v. Brown ii. 315

Davoue v. Panning i. 94, 95, 150

Davy's case iii. 425

Dawes v. Boylston i. 255 ; iii. 409

o. Cope i. 568

v. Head iii. 409

</. Howard i. 343, 347, 348

v. Peck i. 574

v. Pinner iii. 159

Dawkes v. Lord De Loraine i. 280

Dawn, The ii. 398, 461, 464

Dawson v. Atty ii. 524

v. Chanuiey ii. 156, 157

o. Collis i- 037

v. Ewing ii- 774

v. Godfrey iii- 485

v. King iji- 75

v. Lawes •[• 25

v. Morrison i- 48

v. Real Estate Bank ii. 28

v. Wilson ii- 766

Day, Ex parte iii- 486

v. Bassett i- 578

v. Berkshire Woollen Co. ii. 170

v. Binning ii. 362, 372

v. Candee ii- 325

v. Charter Oak Ins. Co. ii. 557

v. Cloe iii- 26

v. Cummings iii- 130, 136

v. Elmore ii- 32 ; iii. 18

v. Lafferty ii- 776

v. Laflin iii- 426

v. Lockwood i- 229

d. Newman i. 523 ; iii. 316

j;. Noble »• 456

a. Pool ii»- 22:5

v. Raguet i;.628

v. Ridgway .,«■ 27

v. Trig ii- 680

v. Union Rubber Co. ii-. 319

v. Wamsley i- 80,

v. Woodworth iii- 176, 184

Dayton v. Monroe ii- 922

\. Wilkes ii- 361, 369

lxxii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Dayton Ins. Co. v. McGookey ii. 543

Deacon v. Gridley i. 474

Deal v. Bogue i. 236

v. Maxwell iii- 60

Dean v. Allalley i- 547

v. Allen ii. 873

v. Am. Ins. Co. .ii- 604

v. Anderson iii. 314

u. Emerson ii. 802

v. Hall i. 274

v. Hewitt iii. 89, 92

v. Hornby ii. 499

v. James ii. 775

v. Keate ii. 131

v. Mason i. 492, 018, 627, 633 ; ii. 328

v. M'Gliie ii. 400

v. Morey i. 635

v. Munroe iii. 101

v. Newhall i. 27, 28

v. Richmond ii. 93

v. Skiff ii. 71

u. Williams ii. 709

Dean & Chapter ofWindsorw. Gover i. 153

Deane v. Annis i. 342

Dearborn v. Bowman i. 501

o. Cross ii. 085

c. Dearborn i. 120

v. Turner i. 581

Dearie v. Barrett ii. 771, 772

Dease v. Jones iii. 103

Deason v. Boyd i. 301, 3(18

De Barante v. Gott ii. 730

De Barnales v. Fuller iii. 112

De Begnis v. Armistead i. 489 ; ii. 887

De Beil ». Thompson iii. 4, 32

Delienham v. Mellon i. 386

De Berdt v. Atkinson i. 307, 316

De Berkom v. Smith i. 213

Deblois v. Ocean Ins. Co. ii. 504, 607, 527,

529, 535
De Bolle" v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co. ii. 541,

507
Debolt v. The Ohio Life Ins. &

Trust Co. iii. 497, 498

De Boom v. Priestly ii. 02

De Bouchout v. Goldsmid i. 60, 102

De Bras v. Forbes i. 290

De Briar v. Minturn ii. 37

De Bussche v. Alt i. 97

Decamp v. Feay iii. 342, 356

De Camp v. Stevens ii. 41
Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank ii. 028

Decell v. Lewenthal i. 338

Dechapeaurouge, Ex parte iii. 419, 420

Dechanns v. Horwood i. 23

Deckard v. Case i. 2(H)

Decker v. Judson ii. 931

v. Livingston i. 26

v. Shaffer iii. 25

Deckert, Re iii. 500

De Cosse Brissac v. Kathbone ii. 872

De Costa v. Jones ii. 897

v. Mass. Mining Co. iii. 170
Decouche v. Savetier ii. 721, 730 ; iii. 393

Decreet v. Burt i. 35

Dederick v. Leman u- 749

Dedliam Bank v. Chickering i. 486

Dee v. Downs m- 21

Deeks v. Strutt i- 141

Deering v. Chapman i. 486

v. Winchelsea i. 36

Deer Isle v. Eaton i- 500

Deerly v. Mazarine i- 407

Deey , Ex parte iii. 4;>2

Deeze, Ex parte iii. 239, 269, 270, 272

Defenbaugh v. Weaver iii. 222

De Figaniere v. Young i. 129

Deford ». Reynolds i. 189

De Forest v. Fulton Ins. Co. ii. 474, 482,

541, 565, 660, 876

v. Oder ii. 876

v. The Fire Ins. Co. i. 103

De Forrest v. Bacon iii. 382

v. Hunt iii. 69

u. Leete iii. 244

k Strong iii. 145

v. Wright i. 116, 120

Defrance v. Austin ii. 52

Defreeze v. Trumper i. 616

De Gaillon v. L'Aigle i. 407

Degg v. M. Eigg Co. ii. 46

Deghetoft v. London Ass. Co. i. 251

De Gogorza t. Knickerbocker Life

Ins. Co. ii. 603

De Graff v. N. Y. Cent. B. Co. ii. 46

De Hahn v. Hartley ii. 473, 518, 526

De Havilland v. Bowerbank iii. 112

De La Chaumette u. Bank of Eng-
land i. 292
Delafleld v. Illinois i. 51, 60, 61, 331
Delahay v. Memphis Ins. Co. ii. 559
Delamatyr v. Milwaukee, &c. R. R.

Co. ii. 251

Delameter r. Miller i. 321

Delano v. Bartlett i. 282

u. Blake i. 308

c. Rood iii. 116, 117

r. Scott ii. 316

Delavan Bank r. Cotton iii. 91

De La Vega v. Vienna ii, 719

Delavergne i\ Norris iii. 244, 240

Delaware, The, v. The Ospray ii. 431

Del. Bank v. Jarvis i. 299

v. Smith ii. 110

Delaware Canal Co. u. Westchester

Bank i. 498

Delaware, &c. R. Co. !•. Napheys ii. 240
Delhasse, Ex parte i. 17(3

De Lisle v. Priestman ii. 129

Delmonico r. Guillaume i. K8

Deloach c. Turner iii. 72

Delondre v. Shaw ii. 357

Deloney r. Hutcheson i. 109

l)e Long v. Stanton ii. 828

De Longuemere v. N. Y. Fire Ins.

Co. ii. 487, 688

v. Tradesmen's Ins. Co. ii. 542, 554

Deloret v. Rothschild iii. 320

De Lovio v. Boit ii. 470

Delver v. Barnes ii. 840, 842

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

lxxiii

Demainbray v. Metealf iii. 256, 288, 291

Demarest r. Willard iii. 424

v. Wynkoop iii. 102, 103

De Medeiros v. Hill i. 574, 607

Demeritt v. Exchange Bank iii. 508

Demi v. Bossier i. 544

Deming v. Grand Trunk R. Co. iii. 207

v. Kemp iii. 206

Dcmmon r. Boylston Bank iii. 439

De Mott v, Lara way ii. 181, 197

v. MeMullen ' i. 411

Demott v. Swain i. 211

Dempsey v. Gardner i. 568; ii. 395

Demuth r. American Institute i. 505, 506

Den v. Ashmore i. 540

v. Demarest ii. 933

v. Farlee ii. 859

v. Hammel i. 95

d. University of North Carolina

r. Foy iii. 481

d. Wright 0. Wright ii. 856

Dendy v. Powell ii. 882

Denegre v. Hiriart i. 322

Denew v. Daverell i. 92, 110 ; ii. 879

Denison i\ Denison ii. 85

v. Lee iii. Ill

v. Seymour ii. 468

Denman v. Bloomer i. 59

Denmead v. Glass iii. 56

Denn v. Chubb iii. 236

o. Cornell ii. 940

d. Burne v. Rawlins i. 549
Dennett v. Atherton i. 531

e. Cutts i. 129; ii. 60; iii. 285
v. Dennett i. 433
v. Short ii. 789
v. Wyman i. 290

Dennie v. Elliott ii. 874, 875

v. Walker i. 300

Dennis v. Alexander i. 566

v. Barber iii. 212

v. Clark i. 343, 352

v. Ludlow ii. 473

v. Morrice i. 316

v. Sherman ii. 903

Dennison v. Thomaston Ins. Co. ii. 523

Denniston v. Cook ii- 897

v. Imbrie iii- Ml

v. Stewart i- 322

Dennistoun v. Lillie ii 524

Denny v. Cabot i. 180

v. Conway Ins. Co. ii. 542

v. Gilman ii- 914

v. Lincoln i- 612

v. Manhattan Co. i. 70 ; ii. 633

v. Merrifleld iii- 411

v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. iii- 194

v. Palmer i- 306, 317

v. Williams "i- 48

Denoon v. Home, &c. Ass. Co. ii. 483, 491

Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore i- 187

Denston v. Henderson i- 327

v. Perkins iii- 439, 441

Dent v. Turpin «■ 358

Denton v. East Anglian Railway l. 154

Denton v. Embury

ii. 98, 99

v. G. N. Ry. Co.

ii

260, 408

v. Noyes

i. 125

v. Stewart

iii. 359

Denver v. Roane

i. 228

Denys v. Shuckburgh

iii. 354

Depau v. Humphreys

ii

714, 716

v. Ocean Ins. Co.

ii.

508, 537

De Pau v. Jones

ii. 527

De Peau v. Russell

ii. 497

Depeyster v. Clarkson

i. 137

v. Col. Ins. Co.

ii. 506

o. Sun Ins. Co.

ii. 605,

509, 532

Depuy v. Swart

i.

463, 464

Deraughn o. Heath

iii. 183

Derby, In re

iii. 414

v. Jacques

ii. 870

v. Johnson

ii. 654

v. Phelps

ii. 68 ; iii. 41

v. Thrall

ii. 853

De Ridder v. McKnight

i. 507

v. Schermerhorn

i. 11

; ii. 664

De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti

iii. 360

Derocher v. Continental Mills i. 355

De Rothschild v. R. M. Steam Packet

Co. ii. 184, 499

De Rouge v. Elliott ii. 608

Derrickson v. Quimby i. 110

Derry c. Derry i. 460

De Rutte v. N. Y., Alb. & Buf. Tel.

Co. ii. 279, 280, 281, 285, 290, 293

Derwort v. Loomer ii. 233, 234, 236

Descadillas v. Harris ii. 756

Descharms, Ex parte iii. 464

Deschler v. Beers ii. 675

Desha v. Holland i. 188

v. Pope iii- 279

v. Sheppard i. 229

Deshon v. Merchants Ins. Co. ii. 527,

529, 684
Des Moines Univ. v. Livingston i. 483
De Sobry v. De Laistre ii. 700

Despatch Linet, Bellamy Man. Co. i. 52,

611
De Sylva v. Henry ii. 881

De Tasted, Ex parte iii. 419, 420, 468

De Tastet v. Baring i. 327

v. Sharpe iii. 466

De Tastett v. Crousillat i- 93

Detmold v. Reeves ii- 311

De Tollenere v. Fuller ii. 137

Detroit Bank v. Burkham i. 301

Detroit, &c. R. R. Co. v. Farmers

Bank ii. 231

o. McKenzie ii- 226

Detwiler ». Cox i. 552

Deuxu.Jefferies ii. 849, 850

Devaux v. I' Anson ii. 483, 497

De Vaux v. I' Anson ii- 483

De Vaux v. Salvador ii. 447, 499; iii. 192
Devaynes v. Noble i. 228; ii. 766

Devens v. Mechanics, &c. Co. ii. 587

Deverell v. Bolton iii- 334

Devereux v. Buckley iii- 207

Deveron, The ii- 439

lxxi

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Devin v. Harris

i. 230

Devine v. Edwards

i. 575

Devlin v. Clark

i. 331

v. Mayor, &e. of N. Y.

i. ^56

Devon i\ Pawlett

i. 145

Devonshire v. Eglin

iii

327, 352

Dewar r. Span

ii. 710

Dewiirt v. Clement

i. 670

Dewdney, Ex parte

iii. 407

Dewees /•. Morgan

i. 027

Dewey c. Alpena School Districl

ii. 805

v. Bell

ii. 042

r. Dewey

i. 168

t\ Field

ii

936, 939

i: Humphrey

ii

771, 776

v. Osborn

iii. 237

<-. School District

ii. 170

v. Watson

iii. 310

Devvint c. Wilste

iii. 24S

De Witt v. Morris

iii. 218

i-. Pierson

i. 542

c. The St. Lawrence

ii. 392

e. Walton

i. 288

Dewolf c. Pratt

iii. 337

De Wolf c. Archangel Ins. Co.

ii. 532

r. Johnson

iii.

123, 130

v. Murray

i. 322

v. N. Y. Ins. Co.

ii. 524

v. Strader

i. 127

D'Wolfc. Harris

ii. 395

Dexter v. Blanchard

iii. 31

r. The Richmond

ii. 439

Dey v. Dox

iii. 220

v. Dunham

iii. 15 1

!'. Poughkeepsie Ins. Co.

ii.

477, 575

Dezell v. Odell

ii.

936, 939

Diamond v. Harris

i. 537

I lias r. The Revenge

ii. 454

Dibbin v. Marquis of Anglesea

ii. 833

Dibble v. Brown

ii. 277

v. Rogers

ii. 939

Diblin v. Murphy

iii. 188

Dicheno v. N. Y. Cent. R. R.

Co.

ii. 247

Dickens v. Lee

ii. 346

v. Shepperd

iii. 243

Dickenson v. Conway

12

u. Hall

ii. 309

( . Lilwal

i. 585

v. Naule

i.

145, 528

Dickerman r. Miner

ii. 853

Dickerson r. Brown

ii. 84

v. Derickson

ii. 10

v. Selyee

ii. 410

Dickey v. Am. Ins. Co.

ii. 508

v Brown

iii. 144

v. Linscott

ij

. 41, 792

r. United Ins. Co.

ii. 488

Dickinson v. Boyle

iii.

195, 239

r. Follett

i. 035

t'. Gay

i. 628

v. Grand Junction Canal Co.

iii. 234

v. Hatfield

iii. 75

v. Legare

i. 201

v. Shee

ii. 77G

i. 163, 165, 215
ii. 161
iii. 408
ii. 725

i. 218
11, 632

i. 409
ii. 294

iii. 68

i. 634

i. 562,

Dickinson v. Valpy

v. Winchester
Dickson, E.e parte

v. Dickson

v. Indianapolis

v. Jordan

v. Miller

v. Reuter's Telegraph Co

v. Thompson

v. Zizinia

Didier v. Davison iii. 95, 96, 104

Diehl v. Adams County Ins. Co. ii. 551
Dietrich v. Penn. 11. Co. ii. 238, 273

Dietriclisen r. Cabburn iii. 307

Dietterich r. Heft i. 137, 151

Dietz v. Mound City Ins. Co. ii. 582

Differdorfer r. Jones i. 544

Digby v. Atkinson iii. 248

Diggle v. London & Blackwall R. R.

Co. i. 154

Dilk v. Keighley i. 353

Dill v. O'Ferrell ii. 814

v. South Carolina R. R. Co. ii. 212, 277

I Dillard r. Manhattan Ins. Co.
v. Moore

Dillaye r. N. Y. Central R. R. Co. ii. 245,

251
I Dilleber v. Knickerbocker Ins.
Diller v. Brubacker
Dillon r. Coppin

o. Union Pacific, &c. R. Co.
Dilworth r. Sinderling
| Dimmick v. Lockwood
Dimsdale v. Robertson
Dingle v. Hare
Dingley v. Buffum
Dinn v. Blake
Dinsman c. Bradley
Dinsmore v. Bradley
v. Dinsmore
v. Duncan
Diplock v. Blackburn

ii. 845

ii. 601
617

Co. ii. 617
ii. 120, 941
iii. 315, 318
ii. 45
iii. Ill
iii. 244
iii. 333
iii. 227
i. 545
ii. 841
iii. 398
iii. 508
75,88
i. 330
i. 93, 97

in.

, Survivors of Bolds & Rhodes i. 177

Directors B. & E. Ry. Co. v. Collins ii. 227
Disborough r. Xeilson ii. 791

Ditcham v. Worrall ii. 65

i Ditchburn v. Goldsmith ii. 897

Dittmar r. Norman i. 558

Ditts v. Lonsdale i. 200

Diversey r. Johnson i. 229 ; ii. 146

Diversy v. Kellogg i. 573

Divine r. McCormick
Divoll v. Leadbetter
Dix v. Cobb

v. Otis
Dixon, Ex parte

v. Bell

v. Broomfield

v. Buck

v. Clark

v. Cyrus, The

v. Dixon

v. Dunham

v. Green

v. Hammond

v. Hurrell

i. 032

ii. 941

i. 251, 254, 255

i. 165

ii. 882

ii. 52

iii. 10

i. 572

ii. 773, 774, 779, 780

ii. 461,466

ii. 757, 820

ii. 204, 209

ii. 939

ii. 218

i. 402

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

lxxv

Dixon v. Johnson i. 817

v. Moyer ii. 307, 314, 315

v. Myers i. 566

v. Olmstead ii. 887

v. Ramsay iii. 391

v. Ranken ii. 40

v. Sadler ii. 495, 527, 529

v. Sinclair ii. 871

v. Stansfield i. 107, 108

v. Yates i. 562, 563, 640, 64G, 651,

053

Dixon Crucible Co. u. Guggenheim

ii. 352, 358

Doak v. Snapp
Doake ;>. Dodsvvorth
Doane v. Eddy

«.'. Russell

v. Walker

v. "Willcutt
Dob v. Halsey
Dobell v . Hutchinson

v. Stevens
D'Obree, Ex parte
Dobree v. Schroder
Dobson v. Collis

v. Harris

w. Land

v. Lockhart

v. Pearce

v. Sotheby
Dockray v. Dockray

v. Dunn
Dod v. Herring
Dodd v. Acklom

v. Bishop

v. Seymour

v. Wakeman
Doddington v. Hallet
Dodge v. Adams

v. Bank of Kentucky

v. Brown

v. Burdell

v. Card

v. Emerson

v. Exchange Bank

v. Lean

v. Perkins

v. Tileston

v. Union Ins. Co.
Dodgson v. Bell
Dodsley v. Kinnersley

v. Varley
Dodson v. Harris

o. Kayes
Dodsworth v. Jones
Doe v. Abernathy

v. Acklom

v. Adams

v. Allen

v. Barnard

v. Barton

v. Baytup

v. Bevan

v. Beynon

v. Biggs

iii. 123

i. 172

iii. 428

iii. 253, 271

ii. 873

ii. 932

i. 23, 208

i. 525, 582; iii. 5

ii. 920

iii. 406, 460

ii. 454

iii. 43

ii. 906

ii. 564

ii. 880

ii. 741

ii. 547, 548, 551

iii. 382

i. 309, 470

iii. 427

i. 544 ; ii. 940

i. 193

iii. 309

i. 91

ii. 387, 391

i. 464

i. 318

i. 2'. in

i. 457; ii. 0

ii. 315

i. 280

i. 300

iii. 19

i. 97; iii. 110, 112

i. 110; iii. 206

ii. 317, 446, 464

i. 383

ii. 346

iii. 46

ii. 900

ii. 643

iii. 272

i. 366

ii. 940

ii. 636

ii. 689

iii. 117

i. 540, 541 ; ii. 940

ii. 940

iii. 449

ii. 692

ii. 644, 645

Doe v. Birch
v. Bliss
v. Bower
v. Brown
v. Burt
v. Carew
v. Carpenter
v. Carter
v. Catamore
v. Cawdor
v. Chamberlaine
v. Childress
v. Clark
v. Clarke
v. Cooper
v. Cox
v. Cranstoun
v. Crick
v. Cuthell
v. Davis
v. Dixon
v. Dodd
v. Dunbar
v. Eason
v. Edgar
v. Errington
v. Evans
u. Filliter
v. Fleming
v. Ford
v. Foster
v. Frowd
v. Galloway
o. Glenn
v. Goldsmith
v. Goldwin
v. Gooch
v. Grafton
v. Green
v. Groves
v. Grubb
u. Guy
r. Hamilton
v. Hare
v. Hawke
v. Heath
v. Hiscocks
v. Home
v. Howells
v. Hubbard
v. Huddart
v. Hughes
v. Hulrae
v. Jesson
I/. Johnston
v. Lambley
v. Laming
v. Lawder
v. Lock
v. Long
v. Lucas
v. Martin
v. Meyrick
v. Mills
v. Morgan

i. 539

i. 539

ii. 083

i. 541 ; iii. 116, 119

i. 530; ii. 680

ii. 689

ii. 682

i. 538; iii. 449

ii. 859, 860

i. 451

i. 549

iii. 471

iii. 432, 449

i. 538, 549

i. 541

i. 594

ii. 680

i. 549

i. 549

iii. 236

ii. 638

ii. 639, 044

i. 550

ii. 669

ii. 940

ii. 929

i. 540, 549

iii. 175, 183

ii. 645

ii. 932

ii. 940

i. 540, 549

i. 531; ii. 681, 682

i. 147

ii. 030

i. 49, 549

iii. 149

i. 549

i. 548

ii. 936

i. 549

i. 141

i. 22

iii. 238

i. 530

i. 545

ii. 681, 691, 691

ii. 932

ii. 933

ii. 687

iii. 239

"i. 549

i. 211, 542

ii. 618

i. 538

ii. 945
ii. 155, 549
i. 542
ii. 645
i. 540; ii. 620
i. 551
i. 79; ii. 694
ii. 630
ii. 949
ii. 687

lxsvi

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Doe iv Needs

ii. C89

v. Palmer

ii. 800

a. Parkin

ii. 682

v. Parry

ii. 081

r. Pasquali

i. 541, 549

v. Pierce

i. 549

c. Pitcher

i. 488

v. Pittman

i. 540

v. Pole

i. 543; ii. 941

v. Porter

i. 548

v. Powell

ii. 940

v. Quigley

i. 549

v. Rees

i. 539

v. Eichardson

ii. 831

v. Roberts

iii. 335

r. Robinson

i. 89, 90

p. Rollings

i. 549

v. Salkeld

ii. 635, 637, 080

v. Sayer

i. 549

v. Seaton

ii. 929

v. Smith i. 548; ii. 794; iii. 430, 448

iv Smythe i. 540 ; ii. 040

r. Sommersett i. 549

v. Stanion i. 541

v. Taniere i. 499

.v Thorp iii. 103

v. Vardill ii. 730, 731

v. Vickers ii. 940

r. Walters i. 549

v. Warren ii. 769; iii. 159, 161

i . Watkins i. 550

r. Watts i. 549

v. Webster ii. 680

v. Westlake ii. 690

c. Whittick i. 540

v. Wiggins ii. 940

v. Williams ii. 638

v. Wood i. 543 ; ii. 940

v. Woodbridge i. 539

Dogge iv North Western Ins. Co. ii. 477

Dogget v. Vowell i. 47-5

Doggett v, Emerson i. 621 ; ii. 927

Doig v. Barkley iii. 161

Dolan v. Scanlan i. 109

v. Thompson i. 109

Dold v. Geiger i. 382

Dole v. Gold i. 322

v. Lincoln i. 263, 205

c. Stimpson i. 571 ; iii. 46

v. Weeks i. 272, 298

Dollirer iv St. Joseph Ins. Co. ii. 559

Dolman iv Cook ii. 702

Doloret v. Rothschild iii. 320, 325

Dolph r. White i. 497

Dolubdass v. Ramloll i. 49

Domestic, &a. Co. r. Arthurhultz i. 579

Dominick v. Michael iii. 339

Dommett v. Bedford iii. 431, 449

Don v. Lippman ii. 719, 721, 740

Donahoe r. Emery iii. 244

Donahue iv Cromartie i. 504

Donaldson v. Beckett ii. 330

r. Benton ii. 753

v. Mississippi R. R. Co. ii. 47

Donallen v. Lennox i. 480

Donally v. Wilson _ ii. 768

Donath v. Broomhead i. 645, 647

v. N. A. Ins. Co. ii. 480

Donnee v. Dow iii. 222

Donnell v. Columbian Ins. Co. ii. 039, 773

v. Donnell i. 264

v. Jones iii. 183, 186, 197

Donellan v. Read ii. 50; iii. 37, 43

Donelly v. Corbett iii. 395, 396, 508

i'. Harris iii. 185

Donelson v. Colerain ii. 878

v. Posey ii. 229, 231

Doner i>. Staufler i. 234

Donnington v. Mitchell i. 380, 383

Donohoe r. Gamble ii. 129

Doolan, In re iii. 323

Dooley v. Gallagher i. 618

Doolittle r. Malcom ii. 831, 833

Doolubdass i: Ramloll i. 526; ii. 896, 897

Doorman v. Jenkins i. 91, 476; ii. 100,

101, 110, 168

Doran v. Smith i. 356

Dorchester v. Coventry iii. 239

v. Webb ii. 852

Dorchester & Milton Bank v: New

England Bank i. 327 ; ii. 113, 669, 672

Dore v. Sellers iii. 293

Doremus v. McCormick i. 209

Dorian ;;. Sammis ii. 925

Dorman r. Bigelow ii. 28

Dormer r. Williams ii. 90

r. Knight ii. 633

Dorothy Foster, The ii. 441
Dorr v. N. J. Steam Nav. Co. ii. 254, 256,

259, 207

v. Pacific Ins. Co. ii. 398

v. Swartwuut iii. 103, 106

Dorrs v. Morewood ii. 221

Dorsey v. Abrams ii. 113

!•. Dorsey ii. 736

r. Gassaway ii. 765

v. Gilbert i. 149

c. Goodenow i. 403

v. Jackman i. 616

v. Rockwood i. 479

f. Watson i. 308

v. Way man iii. 343

Dorwin v. Potter iii. 190

Dostal /•. JlcCaddon i. 545

Doty v. Brown ii. 868, 870

r. Miller i. 110

v. Mitchell i. 409

r. Wilder iii. 12

v. Wilson i. 501

Doub iv Mason ii. 941

Doubleday v. Muskett i. 163, 164

Dougal v. Cowles i. 207

Dougherty r. Stamps ii. 881

v Van Nostrand i. 173; ii. 369

v. Western Bank of Georgia i. 309

Doughty v. Doughty ii. 737

?v West ii. 324

Douglas, Ex parte iii. 256

iv Forrest iii. 104

iv McAllister iii. 220

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Ixxvii

Douglas v. Moody ii.

424, 447, 451, 456

v. Neil

i. 186

v. Oldham

ii. 71!)

v. Patrick

ii. 774, 775

v. Scougal

ii. 527

v. Vincent

ii. 77; iii. 33

Douglass v. Elkins

iii. 76

v. Howland ii

16, 31 : iii. 18. 31

v. Mayor of New York ii. 708

v. McChesney

iii. 116, 118

v. Reynolds

ii. 32

v. Spears

iii. 1)

v. White

ii. 751, 823

v. Winslow

i. 231, 232

Dounce v. Dow

i. 627, 631

Douville v. Sun Ins. Co.

ii. 490

Dove, The

ii. 442

Dow !». Drew

iii. 160

v. Eyster

i. 388

v. Greene

iii. 279

v. Humbert

iii. 235

v. Kansas, &c. E. Cc

ii. 47

v. Moore

i. 200

v. Sayward

i. 232, 236

v. Smith

ii. 527, 536

v. Tuttle

ii. 850

Dowd v. Faucett

ii. 879 ; iii. 238

Dowdall v. Lenox

iii. 116

Dowdle v. Camp

iii. 63

Dowell v. Dew

iii. 363, 365

v. Gen. S. N. Co.

ii. 429

Dowley v. Camp

ii. 31

Dowling v. Eggemann

iii. 285

v. Ford

iii. 90

v. McKenney

iii. 19, 46

Dowman, Ex parte

iii. 462

Down v. Hailing

i. 293, 200

v. Hatcher

ii. 74!)

v. Pinto

ii. 37

Downer v. Brackett

iii. 459, 461, 478

v. Garland

ii. 865

v. Rowell

ii. 144

v. Shaw

ii. 740

v. Sinclair

ii. 781

v. Smith

ii. 815

Downes v. Back

iii. 220

Downey v. Andrus

ii. 747

Downing v. Funk

i. 471

Downs v. Collins

iii. 321, 361, 369

v. Cooper

ii. 826, 936, 044

v. N. Y., &c. R. Co.

ii. 246

v. Planters Bank

i. 318

v. Ross

iii. 60

Dows v. Cobb i. 328, 651

ii. 198, 199, 410

o. Greene

i. 47

v. Griswold

iii. 461

Dowse v. Coxe

ii. 849

Dowset v. Sweet

ii. 681

Dowsland v. Thompson

ii. 873

Dowthwaite v. Tibbul

iii. 69. 70

Dowzelot v. Rawlings

i. 225

Dox v. Dey

iii. 113

Doyle v. Bailey

i. 174

v. Callow

iii. 336

v. Harris

iii. 332

Doyle f. Jessup

o. Kiser

v. Lord
Doyley v. Burton
Draco, The
Drain v. Doggett
Drais v. Hogan
Drake v. Baker

v. Beckham

v. Elwyn

v. Hill

u. Mayor of Exeter

v. Mayor of Exon

v. Mitchell

v. Ramey

v. Ramsey

v. Sear

v. Taylor

v. White
Drakely v. Deforest
Draper v. Charter-Oak Ins. Co,

ii. 76

ii. 277

i. 531

ii. 827

ii. 401, 402, 403, 404

ii. 747

i. 388

iii. 246

iii. 455

i. 175, 213

i. 248

iii. 435

iii. 454

ii. 852

i. 180

i. 177, 366

iii. 219

v. Com. Ins. Co.

v. Glassop

v. Pattina

v. Romeyn

v. Weld

v. Wood
Draughan v. Buntin
Draxel v. Man
Drayton v. Dale
Drennen v. House

u. Walker
Dresser v. Ainsworth

v. Brooks

v. Dresser
Dresser Manuf. Co. v. Waterston
Drew v. Drew

v. Nunn

v. Power

v. Towle i. 495

v. Woolcock
Drewe v. Corp

v. Hanson
Driesbach v. National Bank
Driggs v. Dwight
Drinan v. Nichols

iii. 440

ii. 791

iii. 30

ii. 542,

657

ii. 527

iii. 108

iii. 9

ii. 30

i. 283

ii. 853

iii. 25

iii. 237

i. 300 ; iii. 458

i. 178, 213

i. 51

i. 616

iii. 388, 461

i. 2C5

iii. 215

iii. 106

i. 76

iii. 116

ii. 875

ii. 833

iii. 357

i. 523

iii. 124

iii. 195, 246

ii. 745

Drinkwater v. Goodwin i. 107 ; ii. 745,
883; iii. 275, 276

v. Tebbetts

v. The Spartan
Driscol v. Passmore
Driscoll v. Bovil
Drover's Bank v. Brown
Drue v. Thome
Druid, The
Drummond v. Burrell

v. Hopper

v. Irish

v. Wood
Drumright v. Philpot
Drury v. Connor

v. Defontaine i.

v. Drury

v. Foster

i. 315

ii. 407

ii. 524, 532

ii. 533

i. 271

ii. 731

i. 114

iii. 41

i. 435

ii. 88

i. 103

i. 122

iii. 309, 310, 349

488 ; ii. 898, 899

i. 371

ii. 861

ii. 49 ;

lxxviii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Drury v. Hervey
t. Hooke
v. Macale
v. Molins
v. Shumway
v Smith

Dry v. Davy

i. 579
ii. 08
iii. 310
iii. 32H
iii. 242
i. 205
ii. 5, 21

Dryburg v. N. Y. & Wash Pr. Tel. Co.

ii. 289, 290
Dry Dock Bank r. Amer. Life Ins.

& Trust Co. iii. 117, 158

Drysdale v. Mace iii. 338, 371

Dublin v. Wicklow R. R. v. Black i. 305,

375

Dubois, Ex parte iii. 472

v. Baura iii. 311

v. Del. & Hud. Canal Co. ii. 62, 813

v. Hull iii. 2'JU

„. Kelly i. 545,547; iii. .'57

w. Mason i. 283

Dubois' Appeal i. 128

Dubose v. Wheddon i. 353

Dubuisson v. Folkes ii. 27, 30

Dubuque Bank v. Carpenter i. 210

Ducat v. Chicago i. 155

Duchess de Brabant, The ii. 454

Duchess of Kingston's case ii. 800

Duckett v. Williams ii. 590

Duckworth v. Alison ii. 870

Dudgeon v. Pembroke ii. 495, 498, 530

r. Teass ii. 138

Dudley v. Mallery ii. 820

v. Mayhew ii. 330

v. Nettlefold ii 830

v. Smith ii. 230, 242

v. Thomas ii. 831

v. Warde i. 547

Dufaur v. Professional Life Ass. Co. ii. 604

Duff v. Budd ii. 224, 201, 203, 272

v. Gardner i. 12

v. Lawrence ii. 425

v. Snider iii. 40

v. The East India Co. ii. 740

v. Wilson i. 541

Duffee v. Mason i. 021!

Duffell v. Wilson ii. 481

Duffle v. Hayes ii. 423

Duffield ». Brainerd i. 222

v. Creed iii. 07

Duffy v. Ins. Co. i. 410

v. Patten ii. 770 ; iii. 41

Dufolt v. Gorman ii. 221

Dufour v. Morse i. 317

Dugan v. Gittings iii. 102, 372

v. Nichols i. 567 ; iii. 441

Dugdale v. Lovering i. 36

Duguet v. Rhinelander ii. 479

Duhring v. Duhring i. 108

Duignan v. Walker ii. 890

Duke of Beaufort v. Neeld i. 41

Duke of Bedford, The ii. 403, 404

Duke of Manchester, The ii. 4f>8

Duke of Dorset r. Lord Hawarden ii. 681

Duke of Norfolk v. Worthy i. 65, 525,

582

Duke of Northumberland v. Erring-
ton ii- 033, 642
Duke of Queensbury v. Shebbeare ii. 330
Duke of St. Albans v. Shore ii. 662, 663
Duker o. Franz ii- 853
Dula v. Cowles ii- 051
Dulaney v. Payne ii- 769
v. The Peragio ii. 439
Dulany v. Rogers iii. 353
Dullaghan v. Fitch iii. 172
Dulles v. De Forest ii. 706
Dulty v. Brownfield i. 361, 370
Dumaresly v. Fishly ii. 720
Dumas v. Jones ii. 491
Dumont v. Ruepprecht i. 221
Dumper r. Symras i. 153
Dunbar r. Bonesteel ii. 917
v. Brown ii. 31
v. Garrity ii. 764
v. Glenn ii. 353
v. Marden ii. 809
v. McFall ii. 909
v. Tredennick i. 93
v. Tyler i. 308
v. Williams ii. 44
Duncan v. Benson ii. 404
v. Bloomstock ii. 874
v Cafe ii. 700, 761
v. Clark i. 207
i'. Course i. 325
v. Caiman ii. 713
v. Duncan ii. 829
17. Hodges ii. 861
v. Holcomb ii. 869
v. Kock ii. 512
v. Lewis i. 556
v. Maryland Savings Institution

iii. 139, 143

v. McCullough i. 308, 435 ; iii. 373

v. Railroad Co. ii. 137

v. Stone i. 578, 579

17. Sun Ins. Co. ii. 482, 517, 542, 547

e. Tombeckbee Bank i. 211

v. Topham i. 515, 516

Duncan's Appeal i. 410

Duncklee v. Locke i. 129 ; ii. 60, 875

Duncomb v. Tickridge i. 350

Duncuft v. Albrecht i. 522 ; iii. 56, 324,

325
Dundas v. Dundas ii. 701

v. Dutens

ii. 77

Dundee, The

ii. 454

Dunham v. Dodge

iii. 89

v. Gould

iii. 158

v. Pettee

ii. 663

v. Presby

i. 175

v. Rogers

i. 180

v. Greenfield Steam Mills Co. i. 265

Dunkley ;•. Farris i. 79

Dunlap v. Hales i. 364, 365

v. Hunting ii. 103, 786

v. International, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 275

v. Thompson i. 319

v. Watson i. 187, 228

Dunlevy v. Talmadge iii. 292

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

lxxix

Dunlop v. Gregory ii. 893

v. Grote iii. 22a

v. Higgins i. 514, 516; iii. 212, 221

v. Munroe ii. 154

v. Waugli i. G22

Dunman v. Strother ii. 896

Dunn v. Grand Trunk R. Co. ii. 245

v. Johnson iii. 198

v. Murray ii. 836

v. Sayles ii. 49

v. Slee i. 33

v. Smith i. 301

v. Snell i. 255, 257

v. Sparks iii. 463

v. Wade i. 35

v. West ii. 838 ; iii. 24

Dunnage v. Joliffe ii. 204

Dunne v. Deery i. 142

o. English i. 93, 187

v, Ferguson iii. 35

Dunnell v. Mason i. 101

Dunning v. Chamberlain iii. 104

v. Merrill iii. 129

v. Roberts ii. 298

Dunning's Appeal i. 243

Dunscomb v. Dunscomb i. 137

Dunseth v. Bank of United States iii. 239

Dunton v. Brown i. 361

Dupee v. Boston Water Power Co. i. 158

Dupeyre v. Western Ins. Co. ii. 496, 529

Duplanty v. Commercial Ins. Co. ii. 484

Dupont v. McLaran i. 220

Dupont de Nemours v. Vance ii. 442, 448

Duport v. Wildgoose ii. 829

Du Pratt v. Lick i. 115

Dupuy v. United Ins. Co. ii- 515

Durand v. Carrington ii. 866

v. Thouron ii. 567

Durant v. Essex Co. ii. 870

v. Mass. Hospital Ins. Co. iii- 429

v. Rogers i- 208

v. Titley i. 399

Durborrow's Appeal i. 232

Durell v. Wendell i. 28

Durfee v. Jones ii. 106

Durgy, &c. Co. v. O'Brien i. 640, 641, 645

Durham p. Arledge

v. Bischoff

v. Carbon Coal Co.

v. Manrow

v. Price

v. Wadlington
Durkee v. Vt. Central R. R.
Durnford v. Lane
Durrell v. Bederly

u. Evans
Durrum v. Hendrick
Duryea v. Burt
Duryeas v. Whitcomb
Dusar v. Murgatroyd
Dusenberry v. Ellis
Dustan v, M'Andrew
Dutcher v. Dutcher

v. Marine Bank

v. Wright

ii. 11

i. 248

i. 155

iii. 28

i. 308

i. 468

ii. 299

i. 481

ii. 524

i. 593

i. 307

i. 196

i. 176, 184

ii. 454

i. 69, 72

iii. 225

ii. 737

iii. 440

ii. 797; iii. 460

Dutchess Co. v. Davis

ii. 942

Dutton v. Dutton

i. 411

u. Gerrish

i. 633

o. Hutchinson

iii. 95

v. Marsh

i. 58

o. Morrison i. 224,

234, 237 ; iii. 441

v. Poole i

496,498; iii. 353

v. Solomonson

i. 573 ; iii. 226

v. Tilden

ii. 686

v. Willner

i. 97

Duvall v. Craig

i. 68

v. Farmers Bank i

308, 382 ; iii. 139

v. Farmers Bank of

Maryland ii. 674

Dwight v. Ames

iii. 411, 421

v. Appletons

ii. 335

v. Blackmar

i. 95

v. Brewster ii.

175, 179, 246, 275

v. Emerson

i. 290, 315

u. Newell

i. 272

v. Pease

i. 273

Dwyer v. Edie

ii. 605

Dye !'. Kerr

ii. 52

Dyer i\ Brannock

ii. 84

v. Burnham

i. 69

v. Cady

ii. 936

v. Clark

i. 168, 170, 223

v. Covington

i. 280

v. Dorsey

iii. 246

v. Gibson

ii. 28, iii. 26

v. Hargrave

iii. 356

v. Hunt

ii. 700

v. Lewis

ii. 394

a. Libby

i. 564, 567

v. Pearson

ii. 938

v. Rich

ii. 802

v. Shurtleff

i. 93

Dykers v. Allen

ii. 126, 128

Dykes v. Blake

i. 523, 525, 582

v. Leather M. Bank

i. 297

Dyott v. Letcher

iii. 96

Dyster, Ex parte

iii. 465

E.

Eaden v. Titchmarsh
Eades v. Booth
Eadie v. Ashbaugh
Eads v. H. D. Bacon, The

v. Williams
Eager v. Atlas Ins. Co.

v. The Commonwealth
Eagle ". Swayze

v. White
Eagle Bank v. Chapin

v. Smith i. 298,

Eagle Fire Co. a. Lent
Eagle, &c. Co. v. Shattuck
Eagleson v. Shotwell
Eaken v. Thorn
Eames, Ex parte

v. Godfrey '

v. Home Ins. Co.
Eardley v. Price

i. 12

i. 352

i. 62, 75

ii. 442

ii. 843

ii. 516

iii. 103

i. 533

ii. 196, 212

i. 321

301, ii. 753

i. 368

iii. 28

iii. 118

ii. 461

iii. 400

ii. 315

ii. 540, 543

ii. 44

lxxx

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Earl v. Peck i. 466

v. Shaw ii. 475, 479, 532

v. Stacker ii. 832

Earl of Bedford v. Bishop of Exeter

ii. 863

Earl of Bristol v. Wilsmore i. 664; ii. 914

Earl of Buckinghamshire v. Drury i. 371

Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen iii. 147, 150

Earl of Falmouth v. Thomas iii. 35, 30

Earl of Granard v. Dunkin ii. 336

Earl of Litchfield, In re iii. 421, 425

Earl of Mansfield v. Ogle iii. 149

Earl of Shrewsbury v. Gould ii. 640

Earle v. Dickson iii. 107

v. Harris ii. 520

o. Peale i. 338

v. Reed i. 353

v. Rowcroft ii. 500

v. Sawyer ii. 311, 315, 3'27

Early v. Elannery ii. 765

i'. Garrett i. 615, 635

Earnest v. Parke i. 463

East Carver Co. c. Manuf. Ins. Co. ii. 490

East St. Louis v. St. Louis Gas, &c.

Co. ii. 932

East Tennessee B. R. Co. v. Nelson ii. 185
Easterlin v. Rylander i. 561

Easterly v. Cole iii. 110, 111

Eastern Counties Bailway Co. v.

Broom i. 153

v. Philipson ii. 000

Eastern R. R. Co. v. Benedict iii. 48

v. Belief Ins. Co. ii. 687

Eastern Star, The ii. 459

Eastern Union R.R. Co. v. Cochrane ii. 18
East Haddam Bank v. Scovil i. 91, ii. 113
Eastham p. Anderson iii. 38

East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge

Company iii. 483

East India Co., Ex parte iii. 401

v. Henchman i. 95

v Hensley i. 41

v. Prince iii. 69

v. Pullen ii. 189

v. Vincent ii. 939

Eastman v. Clark i. 183

v. Coos Bank i. 120

v. Foster iii. 408

v. McAlpin iii. 382

!>. Rapids ii. 770

r. Wright i. 254, ii. 852

Easton Bank i>. Commonwealth iii. 498

v. Worthington i. 556

East River Bank i>. Kennedy i. 132

Eastwood v. Brown i. 570

v. Kenyon i. 460, 465, iii. 21, 23, 28

v. Suville iii. 84

Eaton v. Bell i. 136, iii. 141, 159

v. Benton ii. 52

v. Boissonnault iii. 13

v. Boston, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 248

v. Eaton ii. 737

v. Hill ■ i. 356

v. Jacques iii. 424

v. Lincoln ii. 751

Eaton v. Lyon

ii. 625

v. McKown

i. 297

u. Smith

ii. 624, 625

v. Whitaker

iii. 347

Ebenezer, The

ii. 440, 519

Eberman v. Beitzell

i. 489

Ebert's Executors v. Ebert's Admin-
istrators ii. 835
Eccleston v. Clipsham i. 14, 15
Echols v. Cheney i. 40
Ecker v. Bohn iii. 463
Eclectic Ins. Co. v. Fahrenkrg ii. 543
Eclipse Windmill Co. u. Thorson ii. 745,

747

Edan i\ Dudfield ii. 772

Eddie v. Davidson i. 234

Eddins v. Buck ii. 79

Eddowes v. Hopkins iii. 112

Eddy, The ii. 407

v. Badger iii. 144

v. Clement ii. 880

v. Herrin i. 444

v. Livingston . ii. 110

Edelen v. Gough iii. 17, 18, 31

Edelston v. Edelston ii. 376

Eden v. Parkinson ii. 519

Edens v. Williams i. 222

Edes v. Hamilton Ins. Co. ii. 575, 577

Edgar v. Boies ii. 660, iii. 231

v. Knapp i. 31, 34

Edgell v. Hart . i. 613

v. McLaughlin ii. 896

v. Stanford iii. 125

Edgerly !•. Emerson ii. 6

v. Farmers Ins. Co. ii. 586

v. Whalan i. 387

Edgerton v. Clark iii. 236

' v. N. Y., &c. R. E. Co. ii. 245

Edick v. Crim i. 616

Edie v. East India Co. i. 278, 286, ii. 674

Edinboro Acad. v. Dobinson i. 482

Edington v. Pickle ii. 879

Edis v. Bury ii. 640

Edleston v. Edleston ii. 355, 373

v. Vick ii. 364, 367, 369, 374

Edmands v. Mutual Ins. Co. ii. 575

Edmiston v. Wright iii. 206

Edmond v. Caldwell ii. 757

Edmonson v. Davis i. 209

v. Dyson i. 376

v. Stephenson ii. 48

Edmunds v. Bushell i. 41

v. Dowries iii. 77

Edson v. Fuller i. 304, 474

Edwards, Ex parte iii. 416, 419, 420

v. Aberayon Ins. Co. ii. 846

v. Baltimore Ins. Co. ii. 587

v. Barrow ii. 698

v. Baugh i. 472

v. Beaird iii. 292

v. Brewer i. 642, 645

v. Burt i. 466

v. Chapman ii. 815

u. Child ii. 458

v. Coleman iii. 426

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

lxxxi

Edwards v. Coombe
</. Cottrell
v. Davis
o. Etherington
i: Footner
v. Goldsmith

iii. 411

i. 557

i. 343, 361

i. 532, 633

i. 79 ; ii. 524

ii. 625, 684

v. Grand Junction R. Co. iii. 315
v. Great Western R. R. Co. ii. 185,

187

v. Harben i. 569

v. Hart ii. 783

v. Hodding i. 85; ii. 761

v. Kearzey iii. 506

v. Kelly iii. 31

v. Lord ii 236

v. Martin iii. 242

v. McCaddon iii. 511

v, McFall _ i. 189

v. McLeay iii. 371

c. Owen ii. 912

.,. Parkhurst ii. 909

a. Remington i. 185

o. R. F. Stockton, The ii. 434

r. Sherratt ii. 186, 217

v. Skirving iii. 129

v. St. Louis Ins. Co. ii. 400

v. State, &c. ii. 934

v. Temple ii. 882

v. Todd ii. 414

v. Towels i. 394

a. Varick ii. 932

v. Williams iii. 172

Edwin, The ii. 409

Eeles, In re iii. 417

Egan v. Mut. F. Ins. Co. ii. 542, 554, 557

Egbert v. Lippman ii. 306

Egberts v. Wood i. 201, 238

Egerton v. Furzeman ii. 897

v. Mathews iii. 9, 16

Eggleston v. Boardman i. 128

Egleston v. Knickerbacker ii. 686

Egremont v. Langdon ii. 940

Ehle r. Judson i- 464

v. Purdy _ i- H

Ehringhaus v. Ford iii- 118

E. I. Comp. v. Henchman i. 95

Eiuhelberger ». Barnitz i. 620; ii. 918

Eicke v. Nokes iii- 77

Eighth Bank v. Fitch i. 232

Eilenberger v. Protective Ins. Co. i. 79 ;

6 ii. 543

Eisdell v. Coningham

Ekins v. East India Co.

n. Marklish
Ela v. Card
Elam v. Carruth
Eland v. Karr
Elbers v. United Ins. Co.
Elbinger Co. v. Armstrong

v. Clave
Elcox v. Hill
Elder, Ex parte
o. Littler

v. True "'•

v. Warfield

in. ZSO

ii. 716

i. 103

i. 406

i. 52

ii. 882

ii. 479

iii. 223

i. 105

ii. 158

iii. 471

i. 147

242, 244

ii. 8

Elderkin v. Elderkin iii. 426

Elderton v. Emmens ii. 49, 801

Eldred v. Hawes i. 309

Eldridge v. Uenson i. 581

v. Long Island R. R. Co. ii. 236

v. Rowe ii. 37, 657

v. Wadleigh i. 616

Electra, The ii. 435

Elephanta, The ii. 404

Elfe v. Gadsden iii. 12

Elford v. Teed i. 303

Elgar, Ex parte iii. 462

o. Watson ii. 773

Eliason v. Henshaw i. 505, 514

Eliott v. Giese ii. 471

Eliver v. Beste iii. 409

Eli Whitney, The ii. 420

Elizabeth, The ii. 439

v. Rickers ii. 462

Elizabeth & Jane, The ii. 442

Eliza Jane, The ii. 383

Elkin v. Janson ii. 522, 525

v. Moore iii. Ill

Elkington v. Holland i. 126

Elkins v. Boston & Maine R. R. ii. 175,

184
v. Parkhurst i. 489 ; ii. 785, 789

Ellen v. Topp ii. 56

Ellershaw v. Magniac i. 650 ; ii. 411

Ellery i\ Cunningham iii. 112

v. New Eng. Ins. Co. ii. 497

Ellett-o. Tyler iii. 295
Ellicott v. Alliance Ins. Co. ii. 507, 508,

512

o. Martin i. 273

v. Nichols iii- 72

v. Peterson iii. 43

v. White iii- 357

Elliot v. Bradley i- 108

„. Collier i. 380

u. Cooper i. 279

v. Davis i. 122, 124

v. Hamilton InB. Co. ii. 545, 557

v. Wilson ii- 532

Elliott v. Bishop i- 545

u. Bradbury iii- 275

v. Cordell iii- 438

u. Giese "■ 7; iii. 17

v. Gurr ii. 87, 727

v. Horn i- 355

v. Minott iii- HI

v. Rossell ii- 181

u. Sleeper ii- 757

v. Smith i-_641

v, Swartwout i- 85

v. Thomas iii- 49

Ellis, Ex parte iii- 474
v. Am. Tel. Co. u. 280, 281, 282, 286,
287, 294

v. Brown i- 274, 284

v. Chinnock iii. 227

v. Commercial Bank i. 306, 311

v. Emmanuel ''• 6
v. Essex Merrimack Bridge i. 149
„. Hamlen i. 494; ii. 39, 655

VOL. I.

/

lxxxii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Ellis v. Higgins
p. Hunt
v. James
i>. M'Henry
v. Nimmo
p. Paige
p. Schmoeck
v. Secor

i. 575, 648
ii. 220
ii. 737
iii. 318
i. 549; ii. 794
i. 163
i. 265

v. Sheffield Gas Consumers Co. i. 116

v. Sisson i. 257

p. Thompson i. 581 ; ii. 666, 704

v. Turner i. 114; ii. 258

r. Warnes iii. 129

v. Wild i. 302

». Willard ii. 412, 418

Ellison v. Chapman i, 184

v. Collingridge i. 281

p. Ellison iii. 315

u. Elwin iii. 438

Ellsworth v. Lockwood ii. 6

v. Tartt i. 176

Elmendorf v. Harris ii. 843

Elmore v. Kingscote iii. 14

p. Naugatuck R. R. Co. ii. 231

p. Sands ii. 246

v. Stone i. 571 ; iii. 46, 47

Elphick !•. Barnes i. 581

Elsee v. Gatward ii. Ill

Elston p. Jasper i. 434

Eltham v. Kingsman i. 74; ii. 759

Elting p. Seott ii. 524

v. Vanderlyn i. 470

Elton, Ex parte i. 238

v. Brogden i. 635 ; ii. 500

v. Jordan i. 635

t*. Larkins ii. 912

Elwell v. Chamberlin i. 66

Grove, The ii. 440

Elwes v. Maw i. 546, 547

Ely p. Ely i. 537 ; ii. 589, 860

v. James ii. 756

v. McClung iii. 116

p. Webster ii. 894

Elysville Manuf. Co. «. Okisko Co.

i. 154 ; iii. 295

Emancipation, The ii. 402, 403

Emanuel p. Bird i. 238

Emblem, The ii. 440, 441

Emblin v. Dartnell i. 309

Embree v. Hanna ii. 738

Emdin p. Darley ii. 875

Emerick v Sanders iii. 25

Emerson v. Baj lies ii. 877

u. Brigliam i. 632

v. Davies ii. 334, 335, 336, 341, 342,

343

v. Harmon i. 205

p. Heelis i. 525

".Hogg ii. 314, 315

v. Ilowland ii. 38, 464

p. Knower i. 210

v. Partridge ii. 713

v. Slater ii. 685; iii. 29

Emery v. Chase i. 458

v.Emery i. 393; ii. 834

Emery v. Hersey
v. Hitchcock
v. Irving Bank
u. Kempton
v. Neighbour
v. O wings
v. Smitli
v. Wase
Ernes !>. Widowson
Emily, The
Emly r. Lye
Emma Johnson, The
Emmanuel, The
Emmens v. Elderton
Emmerson v. Helis
Emmett v. Norton

v. Tottenham
Emmons v. Littlefleld

v. Lord

v. Murray

r. Westfield Bank
Emmott v. Kearns
Emory v. Greenough

ii. 195, 225, 456

ii. 828

i. 578

i. 349

i 402

ii. 843

iii. 43

ii. 834; iii. 369

ii. 821

ii. 432

i. 194, 203

ii. 414

ii. 519

ii. 30

i. 125 ; iii. 12, 35

i. 43, 47, 393, 401,

402

i. 270

i. 458

ii. 44

i. 364

i. 177

i. 472

ii. 737 ; iii. 396,

397

Empire State, The ii. 435

Empire Trans. Co. v. Wamsutta Oil

Co. ii. 172, 270

Empson v. Soden i. 646, 547

Emulous, Schooner, and Cargo ii. 437

Ender v. Scott i. 623

Enderby v. Gilpin iii. 152

Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford

&, New Haven R. R. Co. iii. 490, 492,

494, 495

England v. Curling iii. 321

v. Davison ii. 831

r. Lewis iii. 292

English p. Blundell i. 11, 14, 23

v. Harvey i. 137

v. New Haven, &c. R. R. Co. iii. 484

Enicks v. Powell i. 36

Enlow v. Klein i. 578

Ennis v. Walker iii. 12

u. Williams i. 190

Eno v. Crooke i. 259

Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co. p. Troxell

ii. 353
Ensminger r. Marvin i. 204

Enterprise, The ii. 458

Enterprise Ins. Co. v. Parisot ii. 573

Entwistle v. Ellis ii. 474, 490

Entz v. Mills iii. 12

Enys v. Donnithorne i. 12, 15, 30

Episcopal Charitable Society v. Epis-
copal Church i. 154
Epler v. Funk i. 299
Epley v. Witherow ii. 939
Eppes v. Tucker ii. 446
Epps p. Hinds ii. 159
Equitable Ins. Co. p. Paterson ii. 598,

605
Erie Bank p. Gibson ii. 24

Erie, &c. Trans. Co. v. Dater ii 265

Erie Railway v. Union, &c. Co. i. 485

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

lxxxiii

Erie R. Co. v. Wilcox

ii. 257

Evans v. Tweedy

iii. 75

Ernst v. Bartle

i. 12

v. Underwood

i. 280

v. Steckman

i. 281

v. Walshe

iii. 323

Errington v. Aynesley

iii. 824

v. Wells

i. 56

Krskine v. Adeane

i. 632

Evansville, &c. R. R. Co. v. Baum i. 114

v. Plummer

iii. 35

v. Lowdermilk

iii. 191

Krwin i;. Bank of Kentucky

i. 569

v. Young

ii. 270

v. Blake i. 11

131 ; ii. 746

Eve v. Moseley

ii. 823

<.. Maxwell

i. 623

Evelyn v. Chichester

i. 374

v. Parhara

iii. 316

v. Radish

iii. 248

v. Saunders i

. 463 ; ii. 685

Everard v. Watson

i. 322

r. United States

iii. 434

Everett v. Collins

ii. 755

Ksilaile v. La Nauze

i. 42

v. Desborough i. 62

; ii.

597, 598,

Kslileman v. Harnish

iii. 26

912

Kskridge v. Glover

i. 506

a. Hall

i. 579

Esniay v. Fanning

ii. 137

v. London Ins. Co.

ii. 570

Esposito v. Bowden

ii. 425

v. Stone

iii. 380

Espy v. Cincinnati Bank

i. 301

Everhart v. Puckett

ii. 93

v. Jones

ii. 75

Everitt v. Chapman i. 175,

176

198, 213

Ess v. Truscott

i. 89

Everman v. Robb

iii. 302

Essex Co. v. Edwards i.

274, 275, 285

Evernghim v. Ensworth i

. 208 ; " :

Estep v. Estep

i. 532

Everson v. Carpenter

i. 364

Estes v. Power

i. 322

Everth v. Hannam

ii. 500

Estis v. Rawlins

iii. 104

Evertson v. Newport Bank

i. 330

Estwick v. Caillaud

iii. 382

o. Tappen

i. 136

Esty v. Aldrich

iii. 43

Ewart v. Nagel

i. 407

Eten v. Luyster

i. 538

v. Stark

ii. 162

Etheridge v. Binney

i. 204

v. Street

ii. 171

Etherington v. Parrot i.

387, 389, 394

Ewbank v. Nutting

ii. 466

Etherinton o. Prospect Park

, &c. R.

Ewen v. Terry

ii. 874

Co.

iii. 209

Ewer v. Coffin

ii. 743

Etting v. Schuylkill Bank

i. 306

v. Jones

i. 141

Eubanks v. Banks

ii. 699

v. Washington Ins. Co.

ii.

473, 475

v. Peak

i. 370

Ewers v. Hutton

i. 402

Eureka Co. v. Bailey

i. 155

Ewin, In re

ii. 701

Europa, The

ii. 433

Ewing r. Bailey

ii. 797

Evans v. Ashley

iii. 12

v. Blount

iii

210, 212

v. Atlantic R. Co.

ii. 47

v. Ewing

i. 460

v. Bell

ii. 3, 908

v. French

ii. 142

v. Bidwell

i. 540

!'. Howard

iii. 124

v. Birch

ii. 53

u. Osbaldiston

i. 175

v. Bremmer

i. 273

v. Tees

i. 46

v. Davies

iii. 83

Exall v. Partridge

i. 12, 500

v. Drummond

i. 189, 192

Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Royal

Ins.

Co.

v. Eaton ii. 307, 311, 315, 322 ;

i. 49

> 'i

471, 564

iii. 480

Exchange Bank v. Hartford

i. 330

i7. Evans

i. 68, 397

v. Rice

i

303, 497

v. Harris

i. 570

Exeter Bank v. Gordon

ii. 119

v. Hutton

ii. 415

v. Rogers

ii. 17

v. Jones

ii. 897

v. Sullivan

iii. 90

v. Keeland

ii. 9

Exeter, The

ii. 403

v. Lipscomb

i. 263

Exon v. Russell

i

309, 310

v. Llewellyn

i. 523

Exposito v. Bowden

ii. 806

v. Mann

iii. 426

Exton v. Scott

iii. 315

v. Marlett

ii. 410

Eyles v. Ellis

ii. 758

v. Montgomery

iii. 506

Eyre, Ex parte

iii. 462

v. Negley
v. Powis

iii. 116

v. Eyre

iii. 348

ii. 819

v. Glover

ii

480, 483

d. Pratt

ii. 666

v. Jackson

iii. 425

v. Prosser

ii. 882

v. Marine Ins. Co.

ii

488, 667

v. Roberts

iii. 35

Eabens v. Mercantile Bank

i. 74; ii. 113

v. Sanders

ii. 636

Faber v. Faber

ii

373, 375

v. Soule

ii. 258

Fackler v. Fackler

iii. 107

v. Spriggs

v. The Charles

iii. 397

FRgin v. Coggin

i. 355
i. 103

ii. 439

Fahnestock v. Bailey

lxxxiv

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Fahy v. North ii

Fair v. M'lver iii.

Fail-bank v. Leary ii.

Fairburn v. Eastwood iii.
Fairchild v. Cal. Stage Co.ii. 240; iii.

v. Fairchild i.

v. Holly ii.

v. Sloeum ii.

Fairclough v. Pavia i.

Fairfax v. Hunter i.

Fairlee v. Herring i.

Fairlie, Ex parte iii.

v. Christie ii.

v. Fenton i.
Fairmount R. R. Co. *. Stutler ii.

Fairtitle v. Gilbert ii.

Faithorne v. Blaquire i.

Fake v. Smith iii.

Falconer v. Montgomery ii.

Faler v. Jordan i.

Fales v. Russel i.

Falk, Ex parte i.

Falkenburg v. Lucy ii.

Falkland v. Cheney i.

Falkner v. Case iii.

Faller v. Faller ii

Falley v. Giles i.

Fallowes v. Taylor i
Fall River Iron Works v. Croade

iii. 409:

Fall River Union Bank Co. o. Stur-

tevant i
Fall River Wh. Co. v. Borden
Falls v. Gaither
Falmouth v. Roberts
Falton v. Hood
Falvey v. Northern Co.
Fannin v. Anderson
Fanning v. Chadwick

v Consequa

v. Dunham
Fanny, The
Fanny & Elmira, The

Fanton v. Fairfield Co. Bank i.

Farebrother v. Ansley i

v. Simmons ii

Fareira v. Gahell i. Ill; ii.

Fargo v. Ames j.

Farina t>. Hone ii

v. Silverlock ii. 357, 373,

Faris v. King iii.

v. Newburyport Ins. Co. ii.

Farish »•. Reigle ii. 234,

Farlow, Ex parte i.

Farmeloe v. Bain i. 639; iii.

Farmer v. Francis i

v. Legg

i. 505,

in.

184, 185,

ii. 713,

iii. 136,

ii.

ii.

v. Sewall
v. Stewart
v. Willard
Farmers Bank i

in.
473

153,

Bowie

u. Detroit, &c. R. R. Co. ii.

v. Duvall i. 306,

v. Ellis i.

v. Green i.

.41
469

888
448
178
167
766
226
273
448
304
462
474
107
245
931
407
158
842
200
332
641
352
217
288
i.91
532
456

436

216
167
514
857
915
233
106
186
716
157
383
396
258
.36
. 11
896
232
i."48
375
127
484
239
238
273
i. 62
496
156
843
i. 80
.322
216
318
158
191

Farmers Bank u. Gunnell i. 318

u. Maxwell i- 158

v. McKee iii. 215

v. Reynolds ii. 26, 28

v. Waples i. 315

v. Watson i. 158

Farmers,' &c. Bank v. Erie R. Co. i. 651
v. Logan i. 578

Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Cham-
plain Trans. Co. ii. 194, 200,
203, 228, 230, 231, 256, 259, 263

^'. Kercheval

v. Planters Bank

v. Rathbone

v. Smith

v. Wilson
Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Archer

v. Chase

v. Curry

v. Fogelman

c. Graybill

v. Ross

v. Snyder

v. Taylor
Farmers Loan Co. v. Walworth
Farmington Academy v. Allen

ii. 15, 20, 24, 31

iii. 95

i. 294

iii. 394, 397

iii. 92

Co.

Farnham v. Camden R. R

v. Farnham

r. Gilman
Farnsworth v. Boardman

v. Garrard

v. Shepard

v. Storrs
Farnum v. Perry
Farnworth v. Packwood
Farquhar, Ex parte
Farr v. Pearce

r. Sumner
Farrand v. Bouchell
Farrar v. Adams

a. Alston

(j. Beswick
Farrell v. French

v. Higley
Farrer v. Granard

v. Nightingal
Farrington v. Lee

v. Payne

t. Tennessee

c. Woodward
Farrow v. Respess

v. Turner
Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R
Co.

v. Mather

v. Rogers

v. Sully
Fash i'. Ross
Fassett v. Traher
Fatman v. Leet
Faugier v. Hallett
Faulder v. Silk
Faulkner v. Bailey

ii. 476
ii. 539
ii. 556
ii. 559
ii. 575

i. 183

ii. 542, 544

ii. 543

i. 51
i. 483 ;

ii. 50
ii. 270

ii. 93
iii. 464

i. 458

i. 494; ii. 879

i. 569

i. 452

i. 564

ii. 159

iii. 460

i. 173

i. 361, 362

iii. 187

ii. 173, 174, 216

ii. 913, 915

i. 177

ii. 464

ii. 936

i. 407

ii. 522, 559

iii. 94, 96

ii. 751;

iii. 426

iii. 480

i. 81

ii. 31

i. 498

R.

ii. 46

iii. 15

ii. 797

ii. 14

i. 68

iii. 382

i. 40

536

i. 438

90

n.

ui

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

lxxxv

Faulkner v. Delaware & Hudson Canal

Co. iii. 105

v. Hart ii. 210, 698

v. Hunt i. 173

v. Lowe ii. 807

v. Wright ii. 172

Faull y. Tinsman i. 254

Fauntleroy's Case i. 209

Favenc r. Bennett ii. 745

Faviell v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co.

i. 131 ; ii. 840

Favor v. Philbrick Co. ii. 196

Favorita, The ii. 435

Fawcett v. Bigley i. 79

u. Cash ii. 35

v. Osborn i. 176

v. Whitehouse i. 187

Fawcus v. Sarsfield ii. 531

Faxon v. Mansfield ii. 39

Fay b. Bradley ii. 769

v. Howe i. 137

v. Jones i. 258

v. Lovejoy iii. 123

v. Parker iii. 183

v. Richmond i. 62

v. Steamer New World ii. 238

v. Strawn ii. 677

Fayle v. Bird i. 309

Fear v. Dunlap i. 284

Fearn v. Lewis iii. 72

v. Mayers iii. 301

Featherstonaugh v. Fenwick i. 229

Feauhert v. Turst ii. 730

Feeter v. Heath i. 67, 73

Feigler v. Sponeberger i. 202

Feigley v. Whitaker i. 225

Feise v. Aguilar ii. 490, 491

v. Parkinson ii. 481, 524

v. Randall iii. 477

v. Wray i. 644, 645 ; iii. 262

Fejavary v. Broesch iii- 302

Felch v. Allen ii. 47

o. Bugbee iii- 396, 508

Felichy v. Hamilton i. 199

Felker v. Emerson i. 386

Fell v. Goslin i. 12

v. Knight ii. 161

Fellowes v. Gordon ii. 114, 116

v. Lord Gwyder iii. 308, 319

Fellows v. Fellows ii. 91, 736

w.Hartford ...i-75

v. Longyor iii. 116

v. Mitchell i. 29

v. Prentiss ii 24

v. Wyman i- 218

Fells v. Read iii- 329

Felt v. School District ii- 140

Feltham v. England ii- 47

Felthouse v. Bindley i- 515

Felton v. Dickinson i- 497

v. Fuller i- 563

v. Minot '"• 293

Fenby v. Pritchard '• 292

Fenelon v. Butts i»- 177

Fenly v. Stewart i- 56 ; iii. 10

Fenn v. Harrison i. 63, 68, 271

Fennell v. Ridler ii. 899, 907

Fenner v. Buffalo, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 197, 210

v. Duplock i. 508 ; ii. 940

v. Taylor i. 409

Fenno v. Sayre iii. 127

Fenton v. Browne i. 522

v. Clark ii. 41, 792

v. Dublin Steam Packet Co. i. 116

v. Emblers

iii. 42, 97

v. Holloway

i. 435

v. Reed

ii. 82, 83, 88

v. White

i. 353

Fentum v. Pocock

i. 294 ; iii. 451

Fenwick v. Sears

iii. 391

Ferax, The

ii. 383

Fereby v. Gordon

i. 621

Fereday v, Hordern

iii. 151, 152

Feret v. Hill

ii. 913

Ferguson v.

i. 535 ; ii. 136

v. Bell

i. 365

u. Brooks

i. 407

v. Cappeau

iii. 270

v. Carrington

ii. 914, 923

v. Davol Mills

ii. 352

v. Hosier

iii. 223

v. Lothrop

ii. 877

u. Mahon

ii. 738

u. Northern Bank

i. 565

v. Oliver

i. 636

v. Porter

i. 87; ii. 116

v. Thomas

i. 613

v. Tucker

ii. 57

Fergusson v. Fyffe

ii. 716

v. Norman

i. 489 ; iii. 261

Ferrall v. Shaen

iii. 125, 126

Ferrara v. Tallent, The

ii. 462

Ferree v. Oxford Ins. Co

ii. 575

Ferrell v. Maxwell

ii. 10

Ferris v. Comstock

iii. 228

v. Irving

i. 76

v. Saxton

i. 318

Ferry v. Ferry

ii. 769 ; iii. 161

Person v. Monroe

i. 231, 240

Fessler w. Low

iii 221

Fetridge v. Merchant

ii. 363

v. Wells ii.

352, 353, 363, 371

Fetrow v. Wiseman

i. 335

Fettrech v. Leamy

iii. 242

Fewell v. Kessler

i. 523

Fewings v. Tisdall

ii. 37, 44

Fidgeon v. Sharpe

iii. 441, 442

Fiedler v. New York Ins.

Co. ii. 505, 507,

510, 515

Field v. Boland

iii. 365, 366

v. Chase

ii. 424

v. Dickinson

iii. 106

v. Field

i. 160

v. Herrick

i. 531

v. Holland

ii. 765

v. Maghee

i. 252

v. Mayor, &c. of New York ii. 751

v. Mills

i. 53»

v. Nickerson

i. 290, 306

u. Runk

iii. 49

lxxxvi

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Field o. Schieffelin

i. 149

Fish v. Kempton

ii. 882

v. Simco

i. 669

v. Thomas

ii. 400

Fielden v. Lahens

i. 208 ; ii. 16

Fisher v. Beasley

iii. 132

v. Starkin

i. 606

v. Clisbee

ii. 181

Fielding v. Kymer

i. 102

v. Cochran

ii. 520

v. Mills

iii. 264, 271

v. Currier

iii. 478

Fields v. Mallett

i. 311

v. Cutter

ii. 5, 11

Fifield r. Elmer

i. 578, 579

v. Dynes

i. 110

Fifth National Bank of Chicago v.

v. Ellis

i. 4b4

Bayley

i. 570

v. Evans

i. 311

Figes p. Cutler

i. 175, 176

v. Hildreth

ii. 759

Figgins v. Ward

i. 211

v. Johnson

iii. 296

Filby v. Lawford

iii. 462

v. Kay

iii. 246

Fildes v. Hooker

iii. 334, 357, 363

v. Kuhn

iii. 15

Filer v. Peebles

ii. 53

v. Lackey

iii. 504

Files v. McLeod

iii. 29

v. Lane

ii. 718

Filkins v. Blackman

ii. 368

v. Leland

i. 290

Fillebrown v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co.

v. May

i. 468

ii. 160

v. Miller

iii. 278,

v. Hoar

iii. 178

v. Morris Canal & B.

Co. i. 331

Filley v. Fassett

ii. 352, 370

u. Mowbray

i. 353

v. Phelps

i. 231

i. Murray

i. 201

Fillieul v. Armstrong

ii. 38

v. Price

i. 315

Fillmer v. Delber

i. 131 ; ii. 825

v. Prince

iii. 220

o. Gott

i. 458

v. Pyne

i. 503

Fillyan v. Laverty

i. 228

v. Salmon

i. 290; ii. 16

Filsom v. Himes

i. 486

c Seltzer

i. 510

Finch v. Boning

ii. 773

v. Shattuek

i. 444, 446

v. Brook

ii. 776, 777

t: Tayler

i. 203

v. Brown iii. 196

v. Finch i. 343, 347

Findlay v. Smith i. 137

Findon, Ex parte iii. 46 i

v. Parker ii. 907

Fink v. Hake ii. 877

Finley v. Quirk ii. 901

Finn v. Donahue ii- 904

v. Western R. Co. i. 574

Finney v. Apgar iii. 48

c. Bedford Comm. Ins Co. i. 56, 57

.'. Fairhaven Ins. Co. i. 49; ii. 474,480

v. Warren Ins. Co. ii. 473, 485, 525

Finnucane o. Small ii. 134

Fire Ins. Co. v. Loomis i. 527

Fireman's Ins. Co. », Crandall ii. 587

i\ Holt ii. 493

v. Powell ii. 489

Firemen's Ins. Co., In re iii. 421

v. Congregation, &c. ii. 569

v. Ely iii. 123

v. Sturges iii. 123

Firman ». Blood i. 284

First Bank v. Carpenter ii. 3

v. Fourth Bank ii. 755

v. Goodscll i. 289

v. Leach ii. 755

v. Marshall ii. 850

v. Whitman i. 300, 303

First Mass. Turnpike Corp. v. Field

iii. 107

First National Bank v. Bennett ii. 10

v. Pettit i. 565

Fischel v. Scott i. 699

Fish v. Chapman ii. 170, 171, 178, 254, 259

</. Dodge i. 120 ; iii. 176

o. Val De Travers Asphalte Co.

iii. 175
v. Waltham ii. 896

Fishli v. Fishli ii. 91

Fishmonger's Company v. Robert-
son i. 479, 499 ; ii. 663
Fisk v. Comm. Ins. Co. ii. 496
v. Copeland i. 211
v. Cushman i. 410
v. Gray iii. 169
u. Herrick i. 233
u. Masterman ii. 480
v. Newton ii. 196, 198, 416
v. Tank i. 630
Fiske v. Eldridge i. 282
v. Foster iii. 397
Fitch v. Burk i. 566
v. Hamlin iii. 121
v. Jones i. 273, 329 ; ii. 857
v. Livingston ii. 431 ; iii. 196
v. Newbury ii. 222, 223; iii. 268, 269
i>. Pacific R. R. Co. ii. 249
v. Peckham ii. 51
v. Reading i. 282, 307
v. Sutton i. 249; ii. 749
Fitchburg Ins. Co. v. Davis i. 315
Fitchburg Sav. Bank u. Amazon

Ins. Co. ii. 476

Fits v. Cook ii. 940

Fitt v. Cassanet ii. 812, 815

Fitts v. Hall i. 357, 360

Fitzgerald v. Lord Portarlington iii. 314
v. Reed i. 434

v. Vicars iii. 309

Fitzherbert v. Mather i. 62, 78, 80;

ii. 625

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

lxxxvii

Fitzherbert v. Shaw i. 647

Fitzhugh v. Wilcox i. 437

Fitzpatrick v. Apperson iii. 129

v. School Coram. i. 301

Fitzroy v. Gwillim ii. 887 ; iii. 137, 290
Fitzsimmons v. Joslin i. 04, 78, 039 ;

ii. 920, 921
Fivaz v. Nichols
Flad Oyen, The
Flagg r. Dryden

K.Ely

v. Mann

v. Millbury

v. Stowe
Flanagan v. Meyer
Flanagin v. Hambleton
Flanders v. Barstow

v. Clarke

v. Crolius

v. Maynard

v. Sherman
Flanigan v. Lampman
Flanigen v. Turner

v. Wash. Ins. Co.
Flannagan v. Kilcome
Flarty v. Odium

it. 8SB

ii. 399

ii. 783

i. 136

i. 661

ii. 901

i. 176

ii. 903

i. 248

i. 611

i. 146

ii. 12

i. 564

i. 132

i. 252

ii. 936

ii. 527

i. 468

i. 253

Flavel v. Harrison ii. 363, 364, 372, 377

Fleckner v. V. S. Bank i. 49; iii. 127,

143

Fleeee, The ii. 439

Fleet v. Murton i. 58 ; ii. 668

Fleetwood v. Green iii. 334

v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y. i. 446

Fleming v. Beck iii. 199

Flemming v. Gilbert ii. 685

v. Gooding i. 540; ii. 940

v. Hayne i. 463, 464

v. Potter ii. 785

v. Sloeura ii. 918

v. Smith ii. 506

Flemington v. Smithers iii. 177

Flemyng v. Hector i. 41, 47, 63

Fletcher v. Bowsher i. 034 ; ii. 394

v. Braddick ii. 422, 430

v. Button ii. 790; iii. 245, 246, 247

v. Cole i. 572

v. Commonwealth Ins. Co ii. 555,

556, 559, 561, 565, 919

v. Daingerfield i. 125

v. Davis iii. 476

v. Dyche ii. 876 ; iii. 168, 174

v. Fletcher iii. 315

v. Grover i. 32, 34

v. Gushee i. 288

v. Harcot ii. 886

v. Herring i. 545

v. Howard i. 568

v. Inglis ii. 497

v. Jackson i. 33, 34, 35

v. Morey iii. 424

v. Peck iii. 481,502

v. Pynsett ii. 804

v. Reed i. 219

v. Rutland, &c. R. R. iii- 481

v. Webster ii. 830

Flewellin v. Rave ii. 119
Flight v. Bolland iii. 9, 364
v. Booth i. 582
v. Leman ii. 907
v. McLean i. 277
Flindt v. Waters ii. 481
Flinn v. Headlam ii. 523, 524
v. Philadelphia R. R. ii. 238, 246
Flint v. Brandon iii. 306, 319, 326
v. Clark iii. 236
v. Day i. 274, 284
v. Flemyng ii. 483
v. Lyon i. 587
v. Norwich Transportation Co. ii. 246
v. Ohio Ins. Co. ii. 471, 541
v. Pattee i. 266
v. Rogers i. 303
v. Steadman iii. 242
v. Woodin i. 526
Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Rob-
erts ii. 392
Flintum, Ex parte i. 238
Flood v. Finlay iii. 429, 435, 454
Flook v. Jones iii. 442
Florence, The ii. 438, 440
Flory v. Denny i. 611 ; ii. 128
Flower, Ex parte iii. 424
u. Young ii. 395
Floyd v. Calvert ii. 85
v. Miller i. 225
Floyer v. Edwards iii. 116, 126, 135, 142,

171

v. Sherard i. 466; iii. 149

Fluck v. Tollemache i. 340

Flureau v. Thornhill iii. 245, 246

Flynn v. Allen i. 257

(.-. No. American Ins. Co. i. 498

v. Williams ii. 923

Foard v. Womack i. 307

Fobes v. Cantfield iii. 189

Foden t>. Sharp i. 309 ; ii. 716

Fogerty v. Jordan ii. 909

Fogg v. Johnston i. 230

v. Middlesex Ins. Co. ii. 475, 476

v. Sawyer i. 302; ii. 754

Foggart v. Blackweller i. 623

Foland v. Bovd i. 323

Foley v. Addenbrooke i. 14, 16, 23

v. Cowgill ii. 920

v. Mason i. 563; ii. 677, 777

v. Moline ii. 525

v. Robards i. 168, 174, 204

Folk v. Russell i- 225

Follansbee v. Adams iii. 224

Foil's Appeal iii- 374

Folsom v. Belknap Co. Ins. Co. ii. 475

v. Marsh ii. 336, 341, 344, 345, 349

v. Merchants Ins. Co. ii. 485, 632

Foltz v. Mey iii. 127

Fonda v. Van Home i. 335

Fonner v. Duplock i- 541

Fontaine v. Col. Ins. Co. ii. 404, 456

v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 397, 507, 527

Fooks v. Waples ij- 917

Foorde v. Hoskins i- 133

lxxxviii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Foot, In re iii. 421

v. N. H. & Northampton Co. iii. 87

v. Tewksbury i. 435 ; iii. 280

Foote v. Blanchard iii. Ill

v. Burnet i. 144; iii. 242, 244

v. Emerson ii. 887 ; iii. 41

v. Hartford Ins. Co. ii. 575

v. Sabin i. 210

v. Silsby ii. 304, 307, 311

v. Storrs ii. 134, 149, 153

Foquet v. Moore i. 486

Forbes v. Appleton i. 496

v. Aspinall ii. 480, 491

v. Boston, &c. R. Co. iii. 206

v. Church ii. 479

v. Davison i. 198

v. Foot iii. 106

i: Hannah, The ii. 401

v. Manuf. Ins. Co. ii. 502, 508, 509

v. Parker i. 612, 013

v. Parsons ii. 465

v. Phipps iii. 437

v. Rice ii. 419

r. Skelton iii. 95

Forbush v. Bradford ii. 325

Force v. Dutcher i. 62

v. Elizabeth i. 330

Ford v. Adams i. 247, 254

v. Bronaugh i. 13

v. Chambers i. 566

v. Cotesworth ii. 805

v. Ford ii. 730

v. Jones ii. 844

v. Mitchell ii. 194

v. Monroe i. 352

v. Phillips i. 363, 364, 365

v. Rehman i. 470

v. Stuart i. 257 ; iii. 308, 316

v. Tiley ii. 800, 809

v. Williams iii. 381, 382

v. Yates ii. 675

Forde v. Herron i. 172

Fordley's Case ii. 776

Foreign Merchants v. British, &c.

Ins. Co. ii. 531

Foreman v. Hardwick ii. 897

Fores v. Johnes ii. 337

Forkner v. Stuart i. 202

Forman v Marsh i. 150

v. Walker i. 41

Fornshill v. Murray ii. 726

Forrer v. Forrer i. 187

Forrest, The ii. 463

v. Elwes iii. 120

i: Warrington iii. 437

Forrestier v. Boardman i. 87, 103

Forsaith v. Clogston ii. 869

Forshaw v. Chabert ii. 474, 527

Forster v. Fuller i. 68, 142, 152, 282, 459

«. Hale iii. 66, 343

v. Macreth i. 204

v. Surtees iii. 466

!». Taylor i. 12

v. Wilson iii. 439, 469

Forsyth v. Day i. 64; ii. 942

Forsyth v. Milne
Forsythe v. Ellis
Fort v. Coker

v. Cortes
Fortescue v. Barnett

v. Hannah
Forth v. Simpson
Fortitude, The
Forward v. Dehoney

i. 342

i. 615

i. 49

i. 307

ii. 610 ; iii. 315

iii. 362, 473

ii. 148, 221

i. 78; ii. 404,453

i. 255

v. Pittard ii. 150, 169, 170, 172

Forwood I'. No. Wales Ins. Co. ii. 504

Fosdick v. Car Co. i. 57!)

v. Van Husen ii. 753

Foshay v. Ferguson i. 445

Foss v. Crisp i. 448
Foster, Ex parte, i. 251 ; iii. 292, 410, 431

In re iii. 463

v. Bates i. 49, 146

v. Boston i. 82

v. Caldwell i. 623

v. Charles ii. 916

v. Dawber iii. 80

v. Drew ii. 779

v. Elliott iii. 233

v. Equitable Ins. Co. ii. 475, 577
v. Essex Bank i. 114, 155 ; ii. 99, 134

v. Frampton i. 648

v. Gile ii. 608

v. Hale iii. 18

v. Hall iii. 297

v. Hilliard i. 150

v. Hodgson iii. 96

v. Hooper i. 29

u. Hudson iii. 431

v. Jack iii. 101

u. Jackson ii. 874

v. Jolly ii. 685

v. Julien i. 308

v. McDivit ii. 870

v. McGraw ii. 765

v. McO'Blenis iii. 43

i'. Mentor Life Ins. Co. ii. 611

v, Minnesota, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 46

v. Miranda, The ii. 431

v. Moore ii. 314, 317, 324, 325

v. Paulk i. 296, 297

u. Pettibone ii. 143

o. Peyser i. 633

o. Pugh i. 570

v. Remick iii. 472

v. Ropes i. 563, 564, 567

v. Saco Manuf. Co. iii. 382

v. Sampson ii. 462

v. Schoffleld ii. 75

v. Sineath i. 319

v. Stewart ii. 56

u. Swasey i. 626

v. Trull ii. 821

v. U. S. Ins. Co. ii. 389, 473, 474
480, 567

v. Warner i. 678

v. Wilcox i. 406

v. Wilmer ii. 533

Fothergill v. Fotliergill iii. 329

v. Walton ii. 663

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

lxxxix

Foubert v. Turst iii. 809

Fouch v, Wilson i. 52

Follicles v. Willoughby ii. 136

Foulkes v. Sellway ii. 70

Fountain v. Grymes iii. 149

Fournier v. Faggott iii. 176

Fourth Bank, &c. v. Henselien i. 225
Fourth School District in Rumfbrdu.

Wood i. 154

Fowke v. Bowie ii. 763, 764

Fowle v. Freeman iii. 9

o. Harrington i. 218

v. Spear ii. 363
v. Springfield Ins. Co. ii. 559, 561

Fowler v. iEtna Ins. Co. ii. 544

u. Bott i. 536, 537

v. Brooks ii. 20

v. Down iii. 424, 446

o. Garlike ii. 689

v. Garret iii. 130

v. Gilman iii. 210

v. Hollenbeck ii. 54

v. Hunt iii. 103

v. Kymer i. 650

v. Lock ii. 45, 135

v. Ludwig ii. 757

v. Morrill iii. 286

v. Poling i. 260

v. Richardson i. 219

v. Shearer i. 406 ; ii. 933

u. Stuart i. 460

v. Trebein ii. 79
Fowles </. Great Western Railway

Co. ii. 231

Fox v. Abel ii. 905

v. Adams iii. 409, 436

v. Clifton i. 63, 162, 213

v. Davis i. 399

v. Fisk iii. 95

v. Glastenbury ii. 248, 250

v. Han bury i. 224, 225, 234

a. Harding iii. 198

v. Mackreth i. 95, 631 ; iii. 422

v. McGregor ii. 167, 221 ; iii. 253,

266

v, Mensch ii. 900

». Smith ii. 827, 831, 835, 836

v. Southack i. 448

v. Wilcocks i. 137

v. Woodruff iii. 478

Foxcroft i'. Devonshire iii. 276

Foxcroft Academy v. Favor i. 482

Fraley v. Bispham i. 624

Frame v. Dawson iii. 66, 348, 349, 350

Frances, The ii- 519

Franchot v. Leach iii. 248

Francis, The ;;• 519

v. Dodsworth ii- 881

v. Felmit i- 355

4j. Francis iii- 287

v. Kerker i- 49

v. Ocean Ins. Co. ii- 525, 587

v. Wigzell iii- 368, 369

Franco v. Bolton iii. 465

Frank v. Edwards ii- 18

Frank v. Wessels

i. 279

Frankland v. Nicholson

ii. 89

Franklin, The

i. 226

v. Beatty

i. 463, 465

v. Ezell

i. 59, 62, 80

v. Lord Brownlow

iii. 364

v. Miller i. 493; ii. 663, 813

v. Neate i. 253 ; ii. 127

v. Osgood iii. 378

v. Vanderpool ii. 755

Franklin Bank v. Cooper ii. 9

v. Hooper ii. 762
Franklin Ins. Co. v. Chicago Ins. Co.

ii. 551
v. Coates ii. 556, 566, 587
v. Hazzard ii. 609
... Hewitt ii. 471
v. Lord ii. 404
v. Martin ii. 547
v. Sefton ii. 609
v. Taylor ii. 471
Franklin Savings Institution v. Cen-
tral Ins. Co. ii. 577
Franklyn v. Laniond i. 68, 527
v. Tuton iii. 331
Franks, Ex parte i. 407, 409, 415
v. Weaver ii. 370, 371, 372
Frary v. Booth i. 392
v. Frary ii. 732, 736
Fraser v. Berkeley iii. 191
v. Hopkins ii. 396
v. Pendleberry i. 446
a. Pigott ii. 633
v. Wyckoff i. 109
Frasher v. State iii. 499
Fraternal Ins. Co. v. Applegate ii. 608
Fray v. Voules i. 130
Frazer v. Boss ii. 756
v. Bunn ii. 764
v. Gervais ii. 918
v. Ililliard i. 648
v. Marsh ii. 195
v. Ross i. 558
Frazier v. Dick i. 32-3
v. Rowan i. 354
Freake v. Cranefeldt iii. 75
Freakeley v. Fox ii. 852
Frear v. Evertson ii. 577
v. Hardenbergh i. 462, 475 ; iii. 36
Fredd v. Eves i. 393, 394
Frederick v. Coxwell iii. 361, 369
Fredericks v. Fasnacht i. 506
Free v. Hawkins i. 315
Freeborn ». Denman ii. 847, 849
Freely v. Barnhast iii. 334
Freeman v. Baker i. 635; ii. 408,
463, 466, 916
v. Baldwin i- 611
v. Baspoule ii. 828, 831
v. Bass ii- 870
v Boynton i- 467
v. Brittin iii- 127, 156
v. Buckingham ii. 409
v. Oasliart i- 212
v. Chute i- 637

xc

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Freeman v. Clute

iii

196, 227

Fromont v. Coupland i.

184, 185, 186j

v. Cooke

ii.

936, 938

ii.

220, 24B

v. East India Co.

ii. 466

Frontier Bank v. Morse

i. 30i

; ii. 754

v. Fenton

i. 463

Frontin v. Small

:

. 65, 156

e. Freeman ii

736

; iii. 314

Frost v. Bengough

iii. 69, 75

v. Holmes

i. 388

v. Brisbin

ii. 710

v. Hyett

ii. 873

v. Carter

iii. 464

r. Nichols

i.

568, 580

v. Hill

iii. 12

v. Perry

i. 254

!■. Johnson

ii. 818

v. Robinson

i. 460

i . Kellogg

i. 183

v. Kosher

i. 51

r. Knight

ii.

809, 810

t>. Taylor

ii. 406

v. Koon

ii. 941

Freeman's Bank v. Rollins

i. 323; ii. 28

v. Lowry

ii. 922

Freemoult v. Dedire ii

730

; iii. 299

t\ Saratoga Ins. Co.

ii. 553

Freer v. Hesse

iii. 335

v. Tarr

iii. 41

Freese v. Brownell

ii. 714

i'. Vought

ii. 66

v. Tripp

iii. 184

r. Willis

i.

391, 401

Freestone v. Butcher

i. 388

Frothingham v. Ererton

i. 74,

92, 108 ;

Freeth v. Burr

iii. 224

iii. 204,

205, 235

Freiberg v. Branigan

i. 387

v. Haley

ii. 827

Freleigh r. The State

iii. 511

v. Jenkins

ii. 413

Freme v. Wright

iii. 334

i . Seymour

ii. 791

French v. Andrade

iii. 409

Frow, &c. Co.'s Appeal

iii. 440

i. Backhouse

ii

389, 473

Fry v. Evans

ii. 877

v. Carr iii.

429,

431, 430

r. Hill

i. 302

v. Chase

i. 233

v. Rousseau

i. 280

r. French

i

245, 247

Fryatt v. The Sullivan Co.

ii

138, 145

v. Grindle

iii

153, 156

Frye v. Barker

ii

. 88, 125

v. Kennedy

ii. 769

!>. Shepler

iii. 348

v. Macale iii.

304,

305. 328

Fryer v. Roe

iii. 97

i . Marsh

ii. 32

Fulham v. Down

i. 496

c Merrill

iii. 426

Fullam !•. Valentine

ii. 30

v. New

ii. 837

v. West Brookfield

i. 135

r. Price

ii. 387

Fuller, Ex parte

iii.

424, 430

it. Reed

ii. 108

v. Abbott

i. 488

v. Rogers

ii. 312

v. Abrahams

i. 527

r. Styring

i. 18G

v. Bennett

i. 81, 82

v. Teschemaker

i. 161

< . Boston Ins. Co.

ii. 580

Frentress v. Markle

ii. 818

i . Bradley

ii. 220

Freto v. Brown

i.

348, 349

v. Brown

ii. 4i .-.'2

Fretz v. Stover

i. 78

!■. Crittenden

ii. 686

Freund v. Importers and

Traders

r. Dame

ii. 895

Bank

i. 297

i\ Dingman

i. 310

Freundschaft, The

i. 220

v. Fenwick

ii. 840

Frey v. Kirk

iii. 394

v. Hodgdon

ii. 913

Freyman ?'. Knecht

iii. 223

* . Jocelyn

i. 77

Frichette v. State Ins. Co.

ii. 497

v. Kennebec Ins. Co.

ii. 506

Frick v. Trustees of Schools

ii. 941

r. Little

ii. 776

Fricker r. Thomlinson

iii. 6

v. McDonald

i. 315

Fridge t: The State

i. 335

v. M'Call

ii 511

Fridley i>. Bowen

ii. 707

i'. Milford

ii. 28

Friedly r. Scheetz

i. 015

r. Naugatuck Railroad Co. ii

233, 234

Friend v. Woods

ii.

169, 172

< . Ruby

i. 532

Friends, The

ii. 433

c. Russell

ii. 486

Frink v. King

ii. iT.i'2

v. Smith

i. 298

<-. Potter

ii. 234

v. Wilson i.

64,80

; ii. 921

r. Tatman

iii. 221

v. Wright

ii. 878

Frisbie v. Fayette Ins. Co.

ii. 524

Fuller's Case

iii. 149

!'. Larned

ii. 757

Fullerton v. Sturges

i. 272

r. McCarty

i. 400

Fulmer v. Seitz

ii. 19

Frissel v. Haile

iii. 287

Fulton v. Fulton

ii. 91

Fritchey v. Bosley

i. 130

Fulton's Case

ii. 861

Frith c. Barker

ii.

409, 414

Fulton Bank v. Beach

iii. 136

v. Sprague

i. 32

v. N. Y. & S. Canal Co

i. S3

Frizzle c. Veach

ii. 909

v. Phoenix Bank

i. 290

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

XC1

Funk's Lessee v. Kincaid

i. 540

Furber v. Carter

i. 178

Furillio v. Crowther

i. 351

Furlong v. Hysora

i. 3S7

v. Polleys

iii. 188

Furman v. Elmore

iii. 242

v. Haskin

i. 295

Ftirneaux r. Bradley

ii. 489

Furnes v. Smith

i. 358

Furnis v. Hallon

ii. 831, 834

Furniss r. Gilchrist

i. 288

v. Magoun, The

ii. 403

Furnival v. Crew

i. 532 ; iii. 323

v. Prowd

ii. 834

v. Weston

i. 210 ; ii. 852

Furtado ;-. Rogers

ii. 481

Furze v. Sherwood

i. 322

Fussel v. Daniel

iii. 143

Fusselman v. Worthington

i. 540

Fussil v. Brookes

iii. 126

Futrell v. Vann

ii. 55

Fyson v. Kitton

iii. 5

G.

Gaar v. Louisville Bank

i. 279

Gabarron v. Kreeft

i. 574

Gabay v. Lloyd

ii. 672, 675

Gabriel v. Dresser

ii. 815

Gaby r. Griver

i. 527

Gadd v. Houghton

i. 55, 58, 590

Gaddis v. Leesnn

iii. 58

Gaff v. Sims

ii. 31

Gaffield v. Hapgood

i. 547

Gaffney v. Hayden

i. 355

Gage r. Gage

i. 123

o. Lewis

ii. 31

v. Mechanics' Bank

ii. 31, 32

v. Stimson

i. 65

v. Tirrell

ii. 427

Gahn v. Niemcewicz

i. 323

Gaillard v. Le Seigneur

iii. 127

Gaillon r. L'Aigle

i. 105

Gail3 v. The Osceola

i. 247

Gaines v. Dorsett

i. 281

v. McKinley

i. 62

v. Union Trans. Co.

ii. 257

Gainsford r. Carroll

iii. 220

v. Grammar

iii. 69

Gairdner v. Sen house

ii. 535

Gaither v. Farmers &

Mechanics

Bank

iii. 125, 127

v. My rick

ii. 535

Galbraith v. Gedge

i. 168

v. Neville

ii. 739, 740

Galbreath r. Galbreath

iii. 349

Gale v. Capern

iii. 92

u, Eastman

iii. 123

v. Halfknight

iii. 416

v. Kemper's Heirs

i. 310

v. Laurie

ii. 454, 483

v. Leckie

i. 184

u. Lindo

ii. 78

v. Mottram

ii. 826

Gale v. Nixon iii. 4

v. Parrott i. 349

v. Keed ii. 889

v. Walsh i. 325

0. Ward i. 547

u. Wells i. 151
Galena & Chicago Union R. Co. 0.

Yarwood ii. 248

Gall v. Comber i. 101

Gallagher 1;. Fayette Co. R. R. iii. 307

v. Nichols iii. 23

v. Waring i. 626, 628

Gallaher v. Thompson ii. 60

Gallego v. Gallego i. 382; iii. 437

Gallin v. London, &c. R. Co. ii. 238

Gallini v. Laborie ii. 887

Gallison, Re iii. 471

Galloway >;. Garland iii. 348

u. Hughes ii. 416

v. Webb ii. 834

Galpin v. Hard i. 306

Galsworthy v. Strutt iii. 170, 172

Gait's Ex'rs v. Swain i. 482

Galusha v. Cobleigh iii. 106

Galvin v. Thompson ii. S27

Galway v. Matthew i. 202

Gambart v. Sumner ii. 342

Gamble v. Grimes i. 486

Gambling v. Read i. 578

Gambril v. Rose iii. 126

Gambs ;•. Covenant Life Ins. Co. ii. 606

Game v. Harvie ii. 109

Games v. Manning i. 309 ; ii. 785, 787

Gammel r. Skinner iii. Ill

Gammell v. Parramore ii. 32

Gammon v. Chandler i. 129 ; it 60 ; iii. 288

v. Freeman ii. 685

v. Howe iii. 174

Gamwell v. Merch. Ins. Co. ii. 556

Gandell v. Pontigny ii. 37, 44

Gandy v. Adelaide Ins. Co. ii. 526

Ganguere's Estate, In re i. 437 ; ii. 902

Ganly v. Ledwidge i. 556

Gannard v. Eslava i. 264

Gansevoort v. Williams i. 208

Garbutt v. Watson iii. 60, 61

Garcelon v. Hampden Ins. Co. ii. 522

Gardiner v. Childs i. 196

e. Davis ii. 745

v. Gray i. 626

v. Hopkins ii- 812

v. Shannon iii- 466

Gardner, Ex parte iii. 471

v. Adams i- 253

v. Allen ii- 883

i.-. Baillie i. 42

u. Bibbins ii. 465, 466

v. Boston, &c. R. Co. i- 48

Buckbee

v. Col. Ins. Co.
v. Flagg
v. Gardner
v. Grout
v. Hazelton
v. Heartt

ii. 860

ii. 487, 491, 512

iii. 125, 135

i. 124, 388, 409

iii. 49

iii. 15

i. 120

XC11

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Gardner v. Rowland

i. 594; ii. 395

Gatehill's ease

i. 161

v. Joy

iii. 60, 61

Gatehouse v. Gatehouse

ii. 92

r. Lane

i. 5(54

Gates o. Beecher

i. 224, 225

i'. McCutcheon

i. Ill

u. Madeley

i. 382

v. M'Mahon

iii. 70, 77

f. Madison Ins. Co. ii.

542, 540, 553,

v. New Jersey, The

ii. 401

056, 558

559, 560, 573

v. Nolen

ii. 897

Gathings v. Williams

ii. 727

v. Rowe

iii. 435

Gatliffe v. Bourne

ii. 208

v. Salvador

ii. 506

Gauger v. Pautz

i. 185

v. Walsh

ii. 804

Gaulden v. McPhaul

iii. 184

v. Watson

ii. 29

Gault v. Brown

iii. 40

Gardom, Ex parte

i. 209; iii. 15

Gaunt v. Hill

i. 509

Garfield v. Paris

iii. 49

Gauntlet, The

ii. 404

Gariss v. Gariss

iii. 372

Gauss v. Hobbs

i. 193

Garland, Ex parte

i. 226

Gaussen v. Morton

i. 74, 77

v. Chambers

i. 570

Gavigan v. Evans

ii. 685

v. Jacomb

i. 204

Gawtry r. Doane

i. 319

v. Noble

ii. 828

Gay v. Lander

i. 278

v. Pamplin

i. 408

v. Parpart

ii. 76

Garlick ;;. Ward

ii. 895

u. Rainey

ii. 716

Garlinghouse v. Whitvvell

ii. 944

v. Union Ins. Co.

ii. 603

Garment v. Barrs

i. 635

v. Waltman

i. 206

Garner v. Garner

i. 129

Gayford v. Nicholls

i. 116

Garnett v. Garnett

ii. 93

Gayler v. Wilder

ii. 304, 318

v. Macon ii. 849 ; iii. 335, 330, 340
u. Willan ii. 261, 203, 272
v. Woodcock i. 303
Garnham v. Finney i. 539
Gamier v. Poydras ii. 731
Garrard v. Frankol ii. 928
v. Grinling iii. 344
v. Haddan ii. 862
o, Hartley i. 162
v. Zachariah ii. 787
Garrells c Kensington ii. 520
Garret v. Malone i. 478
v. Taylor ii. 748
Garretson v. Selby i. 574
Garrett o. Foot iii. 120, 147
v. Handley i. 65
v. Malone iii. 36
v. Muller i. 189
Garrigues v. Coxe ii. 428, 486
Garrison v. Memphis Ins. Co. ii- 427
Garron v. Galbraith ii. 536
Garrow v. Carpenter ii. 881
Garside i. Trent & Mersey Naviga-
tion ii. 100, 227, 230
Gartoni'. Bristol & Exeter R. K. Co. i 440
Garvin c. Williams i. 263
Garwood v. Garwood ii. 868
Gascoyne r. Smith i. 295
Gashwiler v. Willis i. 107
Gaskartli v. Lowther iii. 366
Gaskell v. King i. 488
v. Morris iii. 220
Gaskill v. Dudley i. 161
Gaslight Co. a. Turner ii. 886
Gasque v. Small i. 466
Gass v. New York, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 231
v. Stinson ii. 766
Gassett v. Godfrey i. 573 ; ii. 700
v. Grout iii. 437
Gaston r. Am. Exchange Bank i. 329
v. Frank urn iii. 334, 369

Gaylord Man. Co. v. Allen i. 624, 620, 628
Gaylord v. Gaylord ii. 832

Garner v. Wilkinson iii. 437

Gaynorw. Old Colony, &c. R.R. Co. ii. 251
Gazelle, The ii. 431, 458

Gazinsky et ux. u. Colburn i. 20

Gazley v. Price ii. 663, 790

Gazrara v. Ohio Ins. Co. ii. 532

Geach v. Ingall ii. 695

Geary v. Physic iii. 9

Geddes v. Pennington ii. 911

Gee v. Cheshire Ins. Co. ii. 493, 583

c. Pearse iii. 339, 342

!■. Pritchard ii. 330, 335, 336

Geer v. Archer i. 464

v. Putnam ii. 900

Geiger v. Eighth, &c. Assoc. iii. 117

v. Green iii. 367

Geill i>. Jeremy i. 320

Geiser v. Kershner ii. 749

Gelley v. Clerk ii. 165

Gelston v. Hoyt ii. 931

Gem, Ex parte iii. 416

Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sherwood

ii. 499 • iii. 192

General Smith, The ii. 381,'382, 385

Gen. Steam Nav. v. Gillon ii. 434

Gen. Steam Nav. Co. t . Mann ii. 429

i.'. Rolt ii. 19

f. Tonkin ii. 429

General Trust Co. v. Chapman i. 129

General Worth, The v. Hopkins ii. 392

Gennings v. Lake i. 520

Gentleman, The ii. 423

George, The ii. 463

v. Clagett i. 66 ; ii. 883, 884, 938

t. Elliott ii. 138

v. Gillespie ii. 867

v. Harris i. 482, 484

v. Johnson ii. 918

v. Norris i. 569

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

XC111

George v. Sandel i. 47

v. Skeates ii. 392

v. Skivington iii. 219

v. Tate i. 205 ; ii. 875

v. Van Horn ii. 76

George Dean, The ii. 441

George Home, The i. 442

Geralopulo v. Wieler i. 326

Gerhard v. Bates ii. 921

Gerhauser v. No. Brit. Ins. Co. ii. 592

Germain v. The Indiana ii. 392

Germaine v. Burton i. 636

German Lutheran Trustees v. Heise ii. 766

Germnn Mining Co., In re
Germania Ins. Co. v. McICee

v. Sherlock
Gerrish v. Glines
Gerst v. Jones
Gervais v. Edwards
Getchell v. Clark

v. Heald
Gether v. Capper
Getty v. Rountree

v. Shearer
Gettys v. Gettys
Gheen v. Johnson

v. Osborn
Gibbens v. Buisson
Gibbes v. Mitchell
Gibbins v. Phillips
Gibbon v. Baddall

v. Paynton
Gibbons v. Hoag
Gibbs v. Benjamin

v. Bryant

v. Chisholm

v. Fremont

u. Gray

v. Guild

v. Merrill

v. Potter

v. Smith
Gibert v. Fetcher
Gibson v. Bell

v. Boyd

v. Bruce

«., Carruthers

i. 229

ii. 543

ii. 573

ii. 853

i. 627, 631

iii. 360, 366

iii. 286

iii. 88

i. 508

i. 631

ii. 861

ii. 737

i. 91

i. 551

ii. 424

ii. 873

iii. 442

iii. 295

ii. 274

iii. 338

i. 564

iii. Ill

iii. 161

i. 314; iii. 113

ii. 417, 418

iii. 107

i. 369

ii. 454

ii. 886

iii. 295

iii. 439, 469

ii. 119

iii. 477

i. 639, 642 ; iii. 426

v. Colt

v. Connor

v. Cook

v. Cooke

v. Courthorpe

i7. Cranage

v. Culver

o. Dickie

v. East India Co.

v. Erie R. Co.

v. Gibson

v. Goldsmid

v. Ingo

v. King

v. Livesey

v. Love

v. Lupton

429, 435

i. 62

i. 292

ii. 319

i. 245, 248, 249

iii. 447

ii. 63

ii. 196, 199, 203

ii. 79

i. 154

ii. 46

ii. 850

iii. 306

ii. 454

iii. 416

iii. 143

i. 570

I 12, 212

Gibson v. Minet

v. Moore

v. Norway Bank

v. Overbury

v. Powell

v. Small

u. Spurrier

u. Stearns

v. Stevens

v. Stone

v. Van Dresar

v. Wells

v. Winter
Giddens v. Byers Heirs
Giddings v. Coleman
Giese v. Schultz
Giffert v. West
Gifford, Ex parte

v. Allen

v. Carvill

v. Kolsch

v. Thompson

v. Whitaker
Gihon v. Fryatt
Gilbach's Appeal
Gilbert v. Danforth

v. Dennis

v. Guptill

u. Hohnes

v. Lynes

v. McEachen

v. N. Amer. Ins. Co.

v. Schwencle

v. Sykes

o. Whidden

v. Wiman
Gilbertson v. Richardson
Gilby v. Singleton
Gilchrist v. Donwell

u. Leonard

o. McGee

v. Williams
Gildart v. Gladstone
Gildersleeve v. U. S. Tel.

Giles v. Ackles

v. Cynthia, The

v. Eagle Ins. Co.

v. Grover

v. Hart

v. O'Toole

;;. Perkins
Gilfert v. Hallet
Gilham v. Locke
Gilhooley v. Washington
Gilkyson v. Larue
Gill v. Cole

v. Cubitt

u. Kuhn

v. Kymer

v. McAttee

v. Shelley

v. Wells

v. Woods
Gillespie ti. Battle

.26;

.74;

i. 248 ; ii. 627

i. 185, 186

i. 48

ii. 610

ii. 8H2

ii. 527, 531

i. 525

iii. 129, 138

i. 235 ; iii. 49

i. 178

ii. 325

i. 535

ii. 748

i. 55

i. 246

iii. 193

i. 272

i. 36, 325

ii. 29

i. 622

ii. 467

i. 159

ii. 819

ii. 875

i. 355

ii. 784

i. 308, 322

i. 151

i. 75

i. 351

i. 151

ii. 586

i. 152

ii. 897 ; iii. 43

•i. 198

ii. 200

iii. 195

i. 211

i. 319

ii. 873

ii. 939

ii. 881

ii. 638

Co. ii. 286, 288,

301

i. 470

ii. 460

ii. 447

ii. 103

ii. 771, 772

iii. 195, 196

i. 571 ; iii. 451

ii. 534

iii. 465

i. 541

iii. 72

iii. 236

i. 288, 289

i. 178

iii. 258

iii. 309

ii. 633

fii. 335

i. 380

iii. 38

XC1V

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Gillespie v. Carpenter

ii. 944

v. Cresswell

iii. 98

i: Edmonston

i. 514

i>. Forsyth

ii

527, 628

v. Hamilton

i. 226

v. Hannahan

i. 311

o. Moon

iii. 354

v. Thompson

ii. 416

Gillet, Ex parte

iii. 435

v. Averill

i. 307

Gillett v. Bowman

ii. 802

;;. Fairchild

i. 250

p. Ellis ii. 216

448,

451, 456

i'. Hill

i. 566

(.. Mawman

ii. 140

i. Phelps

ii. 913

v. Rippon

i. 33

Gilligan v. Boardman

ii.

7; iii. 17

Gillingliam r. Gillingham

ii. 72, 92

v. Waskett

ii. 879

Gillis v. Bailey

i. 53, 90

v. Hall

iii. 309

Gillott v. Esterbrook ii.

353,

355, 357,

371

372,

376, 378

v. Kettle

ii. 375

Gilman v. Brown

iii.

203, 2H7

u. Cutts

iii. 106

u. Eastern R. R. Co.

ii. 46

u. Hall

ii. 43, 703

v. Hunnewell ii

353

362, 370

n. Kibler

i. 470; iii. 17

v. Moore

ii. 785

v. Peck

i. 302 ; i ■ ,

Gilmore v. Black

i. 173

u. Bussey

ii. 757

v. Carman

ii. 172

<■. Holt

ii.

777, 780

v. Spies

i

311, 312

Gilpin r. Enderby

i. 188

v. Temple i

175,

178, 198

Gilpins v. Consequa i. 490

574

; ii. 806 ;
iii. 220

Gilreath v. Allen

iii. 184

Gilson v. Bingham

i. 638

v. Gwinn

iii. 258

v. Spc'in-

i. 356

Ginesi «. Cooper

i. 175

; ii. 893

Girard t>. Taggart i

674

; iii. 224

Girard Ins. Co. v. Marr

ii. 127

Giraud v. Richmond

iii. 41

Gisbourn v. Hurst

ii. 175

Gist v. Lybrand

i. 30S

Gittings v. Mahew

i. 482

v. Nelson

i.

560, 613

Givens v. Calder

iii.

346, 347

Gladding v. Constant

ii. 457

Glade v. Germania Ins. Co.

ii. 654

Gladwell v. Turner

i. 318

Glahohn n. Hays

ii.

408, 657

Glaholme v. Rowntree

iii. 260

Glaister v. Hewer

ii. 875

Glascock v. Glascock

iii.

298, 299

Glasfurd v. Laing

iii. 138

Glasgow, The

ii. 396

v. Sands

i. 380

Glass v. Glass
Glasscock v. Nelson

v. Smith
Glasscott v. Day
Glassington v. Rawlins
Glazebrook v. Woodrow
Gleason v. Dodd

v. Dyke

v. Gleason

v. Goodrich Trans. Co.

>'. Sykes
Gleim v. Belmont, The
Glen v. Hope Ins. Co.

v. Lewis

v. Whitaker
Glen Cove Mut. Ins. Co. v.

ii. 88

iii. 372

i. 218

ii. 776, 778

ii. 797

iii. 217

ii. 7-12

i. 501

ii. 92

ii. 212, 213

i. 667

ii. 384

ii. 494

ii. 548

i. 573

Harrold

i. 458
Glendale Woollen Co v. Protection

Ins. Co. ii. 521, 546, 553

Glendenning, Ex parte i. 325

Glenn v. Gill i. 231

v. McCullough iii. 69

v. Thompson i. 548

Glenny v. Smith ii. 372

Glezen v. Rood iii. 235

Globe Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Ins. Co.

iii. 442
Glory, The ii. 439

Glossop v. Colman i. 24

Gloucester Bank v. Salem Bank i. 301 ;

ii. 754

Gloucester Ins. Co. v. Younger ii. 508

Glover v. Austin " ii. 380, 387

v. Barrie ii. 834

v. Dowagic Universalist Parish ii. 791

u. Glover i. 151

v. Ott i. 338

v. Proprietors of Drury Lane i. 385

v. Robbins ii. 853

Glyn v. East & West India Dock Co.

iii. 274

Glvn Mills & Co. o. East, &c. Dock

Co.

ii. 411

Glynn v. Baker

i. 330

Goate v. Goate

iii. 77

Goblet v. Beechey

ii. 686

Godard v. Benjamin

ii. 749

v. Gray

ii. 738

Godchaux v. Mulford

iii. 49

Goddard v. Binney i.

563, 564 ; iii. 60

... Cox

ii. 762, 764

v. Hodges

i. 184; ii. 764

(,'. Ingram

iii. 90

u. Merchants Bank

i. 300

v. O'Brien

ii. 82 1

v. Pratt

i. 189

v. Sawyer

ii. 702

v. Tangier, The

ii. 416

v. Vanderheyden

iii. 461

Godefroy v. Dalton

i. 126

Godfrey v. Forrest

ii. 883

v. Eurzo

i. 573; iii. 438

Godillot i'. Harris

ii. 352

Godin v. Lond. Ass. Co. i

107; iii. 260,276

v. Royal Ass. Co.

ii. 493

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

XCV

Godwin v. Francis

iii. 14

Goede Hoope, The

ii. 481

Godts v. Rose

i. 589 ; iii. 49

Goesele v. Brimeler

i. 165

Goetz v. Foos

ii. 11 ; iii. 23

Goffc. Clinkard

ii. 182

v. Rehoboth i;

. 773; iii. Ill

Goicoeoliea v. La. State Ins.

Co. ii. 518,

648

Goings v. Mills

ii. 749

Goit v. National Ins. Co.

ii. 575

Goix v. Knox

ii. 495, 497

v. Low ii

495, 648, 739

v. National Ins. Co.

ii. 477

Goldbeck v. Goldbeck

ii. 85

Golden v. Manning

ii. 196, 415

v. Prince

iii. 391, 502

Golder v. Ogden

i. 586

Gold Hunter, The

ii. 407

Golding, Davis, & Co., Ex parte i. 645

Goldman v. Davis i. 315
Gold Mining Co. u. National Bank

i. 51
Goldney, Ex parte iii. 431
Goldsborough v. Orr ii. 660
Goldsbury v. May i. 569
Gold-Separating Co. v. U. S. Disin-
tegrating Ore Co. ii. 313
Goldshede v. Swan ii. 694; iii. 17
Goldsmith v. Guild iii. 340
Goldstone v. Osbom ii. 844
Golightly v. Jellicoe ii. 836
Gomez v. Garr ii. 827
Gompertz v. Bartlett i. 298
v. Denton i. 637
Gondolier, The ii. 458
Gonzales v. Broad i. 110
v. Minor ii. 458
v. Sladen i. 105
Gooch v. Bryant ii. 859
v. Sullivan iii. 66
Good, Ex parte i. 2]0
v. Cheeseman ii. 819
v. Elliott ii. 896
v. Good ii. 885
v. Martin ii. 8
v. Mylin iii. 176
Goodall, Ex parte iii. 435
v. Marshall iii. 409
v. New England Ins. Co. ii. 565, 584
v. Polhill i. 326
v. Richardson ii. 119
v. Thurman ii. 74, 75
Goodall's case ii. 646
Goodburn v. Stevens i. 168, 170
Goode v. Harrison i. 354
v. Jones i. 274
v. M'Cartney i. 180
v. Waters ii. 833
Goodenow v. Buttrick ii. 874
v. Dunn i. 612
v. Tyler i. 104, 105
Gooding v. Morgan ii- 757
Goodinge v. Goodinge ii. 692
Goodisson v. Nunn iii. 247

Goodlead v. Blewith
Goodloe v. Clay

v. Rogers
Goodman, Ex parte

In re

v. Chase

a. Griffin

o. Hannibal

v. Harvey

v. Kennell

r. Pocock

v. White
Goodnow v. Parsons

v. Smith

v. Warren
Goodrich ;;. City, &c.

o. Downs

v. Gordon

r. Jones

v. Lafflin

v. Norris

v. Reynolds

u. Rogers

v. Willard
Goodridge v. Lord

v. Ross

ii. 773

iii. Ill

iii. 198

iii. 468

iii. 415

iii. 25

ii. 26

i. 545

i. 289 ; ii. 97

i. 114

ii. 38, 44, 634

i. 207

ii. 675, 823

i. 210

i. 316

ii. 867

iii. 403

i. 303

i. 545

ii. 812

ii. 410

i. 161

iii. 152

iii. 267

ii. 422

.365

Goodright d. Hall v. Richardson i. 540
d. Walter v. Davids i. 539

Goodsall v. Boldero ii. 606, 607

v. Webb ii. 609

Goodsell v. Benson ii. 712

v. Myers i. 363

Goodson v. Brooke i. 59

Goodspeed v. East Haddam Bank i. 164

Goodtitle v. Bailey ii. 635, 931

o. North iii. 237, 465

v. Southern i. 531 ; ii. 680, 681

v. Toombs iii. 237

v. Woodward i. 211

Goodwin v. Blackburne ii. 109

v. Clark i. 487

v. Cremer ii. 749, 750

v. Cunningham i. 258

v. Davenport i. 305

v. Hardy i. 158

„. Holbrook i. 575, 786, 810

p. Jones iii. 407, 409

' v. Lightbody iii. 366, 429, 435

v. Mass. Life Ins. Co. ii. 606, 618
v. Richardson i. 168

v. Robarts i. 276, 330; ii. 936

v, Willoughby i. 471

Goodyear v. Bishop ii. 327, 328

v. Day ii 304, 325

v. Housinger ii. 3*^4

v. Mullee ii. 324

v. N. J. Cent. R. R. ii. 324

v. Providence Rubber Co. ii. 316
„. Railroads ii. 312, 316

v. Wait ". 312

v. Watson "■ 6

Gookin v. Graham i. 616

v. N. E. Ins. Co. ii- 488

Goold v. Chapin ii. 211, 213, 232

Goom v. Aflalo i. 585, 586; iii. 13

XCV1

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court iii. 497

v. Baltimore iii. 498

v. Bankard i. 194
v. Bowne ii. 428, 498, 505, 879

v. Brewster iii- 187

v. Buchanan i. 88; ii. 181, 183

v. Bulkeley i. 46

v. Cannon iii. 440

v. Church ii. 882

v. Dalby i. 459

v. East India Co. ii. 380

v. Freeman i. 221

v. Gordon iii. 36

v. Grand St. R. R. Co. ii. 238

v. Haywood i. 406

v. Hutchinson ii. 179

v. Jenney iii. 217

v. Jones iii. 184

v. Mass. Ins. Co. ii. 476, 505, 506

v. Norris iii. 219, 224

v. Parker iii. 233

v. Potter i. 344, 351

v. Price i. 326

v. Rimmington ii. 498, 571

v. Rolt i. 114

v. Strange ii. 753

v. Torrey iii. 293

v. Tucker ii. 827, 832, 835

Gore v. Brazier iii. 239, 242
v. Gibson i. 434, 436; iii. 373, 414

v. White ii. 915

v. Wright ii. 941

Gorgier v. Mieville i. 329, 330

Gorham v. Stearns iii. 441, 442
Gorrison v. Perrin i. 599, 603, 604, 606,

673

Gorst v. Lowndes ii. 797

Gorton v. Dyson i. 141

Gosbell v. Archer iii. 8

Goslin v. Hodson ii. 58

Gosling v. Birnie ii. 152

v. Higgins ii. 215, 415

Gosman v. Cruger i. 408

Goss v. Lord Nugent ii. 425, 685

v. Turner ii. 789

v. Whitney ii. 905

Goswiler's Estate ii. 797

Gott v. Gandy i. 532

Gottsman v. Ins. Co. ii. 557

Goudy v. Gebhart ii. 924

v. Gillam iii. 88

Gough, In re iii. 448

v. Crane iii. 354

v. Farr ii. 74

v. Findon i. 265

v. Howard i. 537

v. Staats ii. 755

Gould v . Armstrong i. 470

v. Banks ii. 776

v. Emerson ii. 608

v. Gould i. 35, 177, 229

v. Hill ii. 253, 254, 255, 256

v. Oliver ii. 448

v. Parlin ii. 874

v. Stanton ii. 388, 389, 391

Gould v. Webb «• 663, 738

Gouldsworth v. Knights i. 541 ; ii. 940

Goupy v. Harden }■ 299

Gourdine v. Graham iii. 102

Gourdon v. Ins. Co. ii. 475, 476

Gourlay v. Duke of Somerset ii. 845;
iii. 310, 360

Gouthwaite v. Duckworth i. 195-198

Gove v. Wining i. 315

Gover v. Christie }• 251

Governeur v. United Ins. Co. ii. 533

Governor, The v. Gordon iii. 99
Governor & Company of the Cast

Plate Manufacturers v. Meredith iii. 493
Governor, &c. of Copper Mines v.

Fox i. 158, 479

Governor, &c. v. Petch i. 506

Govett v. Richmond ii. 826

Govier v. Hancock i. 395

Gowan r. Jackson i. 212

v. Jeffries i. 224

v. Forster iii. 80

Gower v. Capper i. 478

u. Mainwaring i. 134

v. Moore i. 306, 307

v. Saltmarsh iii. 173

Gowing v. Knowles i. 505

Grabenhorst v. Nicodemus i. 542

Grable v. Margrave iii. 184

Grabtree v. May i. 354

Grace v. American Ins. Co. i. 54

v. Denison iii. 344

v. Hale i. 336, 338

v. Morgan iii. 175

v. Smith i. 178

Graddon v. Price ii. 804

Grady v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co. i. 90

Graeff v. Hitchman i. 194, 203, 206

Graff v. Bloomer ii. 197

v. Foster i. 629

Grafton, The ii. 209, 407

Graham v. Ackroyd i. 101

v. Barras ii. 521

v. Bickham iii. 174

v. Brettle i. 404

v. Chapman iii. 441

v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. ii. 220

v. Dyster iii. 258, 278

v. Fireman's Ins. Co. ii. 555

v. Gracie i. 254, 474

v. Graham ii. 843

v. Halloway ii. 811

v. Hendren iii. 371

v. Hope i. 75, 192

v. Hoskins ii. 459

v. Hunt i. 463, 464

v. Jackson iii. 225

v. Kinder i. 256

o. Martin ii. 65

v. Mayer i. 209

u. Musson i. 123; iii. 10, 14

v. O'Neil ii. 8, 12

t>. Pacific R. Co. iii. 181

v. Pierson iii. 478

v. Robertson i. 25, 34

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

XCV11

Graham v. Sangston i. 322, 826

v. Thompson ii. 760

v. West. Un. Tel. Co. ii. 280, 282, 288

v. Whicholo i. 543

Gram v. Cadwell i. 26

v. Seton i. 122, 212

Grammar School v. Burt iii. 486

Granby v. Amherst i. 149 ; ii. 709

Grandy v. McCleese ii. 810

Grand Bank v. Blanchard i. 318

Grandin v. Le Boy i. 292

Grand Turk, The ii. 454

Granger, Ex parte iii. 471

v. Collins i. 502, 536

v. George iii. 99

v. Howard Ins. Co. ii. 574

Grangiac v. Arden i. 460

Granite Railway Co. v. Bacon ii. 857

Grant, Ex parte 418

In re i. 345; iii. 456, 468

v. Cole i. 82

v. Da Costa i. 281

v. Ellicott i. 293, 294 ; iii. 451

v. Fletcher iii. 13 ; i. 583, 585, 586

v. Green i. 390

v. Hamilton ii. 896

v. Healey i. 328

v. Howard Ins. Co. ii. 545, 551, 556

v. Johnson ii. 661, 663

v. King ii. 144

v. Law ii. 813

v. Maddox ii. 667, 677

v. M'Lachlin ii. 398

v. Mills iii. 424

v. Nat. Bank iii. 421

v. Naylor ii. 4

v. Norway i. 44 ; ii. 190, 409

e. Paxton ii. 484

v. Raymond ii. 303, 315, 322

v. Ridsdale ii. 23

v. Royal Exchange Company ii. 877,

879

v. Smith ii. 16, 18

</. Thompson i. 434, 438

v. Vaughan i. 272, 330

Grantham v. Hawley i. 558, 560

Grasselli v. Lowden ii. 891

Gratitudine, The i. 78 ; ii. 404, 405, 456

Gratz v. Bayard i. 226

v. Gratz ii. 829

v. Redd iii. 354

Gravenor v. Woodhouse i. 540

Graves v. Bemis iii. 293

v. Berdan i. 537

v. Boston Mar. Ins. Co. i. 56 ; ii. 475,

478, 479

v. Dale ii. 863

v. Dash i. 327

v. Hartford, &c. Co. ii- 210

v. Harwood ii. 686

v. Legg ii- 663

v. Merry i- 191

v. Sawcer ii- 387

v. Tucker ii- 9

v. Weeks iii- 104

Graves v. Woodbury

ii. 874

Gravett v. Mugge

i. 564

Gray v. Agnew

i. 102

v. Bartlett

ii. 939

v. Belden

iii. 116

v. Bell

i. 317

v. Bennett

iii. 426

429, 437

v. Bompas

i. 542

v. Brackenridge

i. 128

v. Briscoe

iii

241, 243

v. Brown

ii. 28; iii. 12, 132

0. Clark

ii

633, 644

v. Coffin

i. 161

v. Cox

i. 632

v. Crosby

iii. 170

v. Davis

iii. 48

v. Donahoe

i. 280

v. Fowler

iii. 125

v. Gardner

ii. 488

v. Gutteridge

ii. 761

v. Handkinson

i.457

v. Holdship

i. 547

v. James

ii. 315

v. Mendez

iii. 102

u. Munroe

iii. 504

v. Portland Bank

iii.

212, 220

v. Russell ii

336, 337,

344, 346

v. Sims

ii. 496

v. Thomas

i. 255

v. Wain

ii. 419, 44

v. Wass

ii. 746

u. Waterman

iii. 196

v. White

ii. 756

v. Wilson

ii. 844

Gray De Wilton v. Saxon iii. 328

Gray's Ex'rs v. Brown ii. 28

Graysbrook v. Fox i. 147

Greathead v. Walton ii. 907

Great Northern R. Co. v. Shepherd ii. 275,

277
v. Witham i. 479

Great Western R. R. Co. v. McComas

ii. 217

Greaves v. Ashlin i. 564 ; ii. 666

v . Key ii. 936

Grebill's Appeal i. 382

Greeley v. Stilson iii. 37

Greely v. Bartlett i. 60

v. Dow i. 324 ; ii. 28

u. Hunt i. 315

u. Smith ii. 871

v. Tremont Ins. Co. ii. 444, 447, 506

v. Waterhouse ii. 402, 404

Green, Ex parte i. 347

In re ii. 896

v. Armstrong iii. 35

v. Barrett i. 229

v. Beatty ii. 749

v. Beesley ii. 246

v. Bicknell iii. 462, 465

v. Biddle iii. 238, 502, 505

u. Bradfleld iii. 381

v. Briggs ii. 387

v. Brown ii. 498

v. Button iii. 194

XCV111

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Green v. Clark ii. 866, 871

v. Clarke iii. 207

v. Cope i. 67

v. Cresswell iii. 24

v. Disbrow iii- 93

v. Eales iii. 249

v. Farley i. 319, 320

v. Farmer iii. 210, 215, 272

v. Fouley i. 319

v. Fox iii. 293

v. Goings i. 309

v. Gonzales i. 80

v. Gosden ii. 912

v. Green ii. 035

v. Hatch i. 258

i'. Hinkley i. 47

v. Homestead Ins. Co. ii. 552

v. Home i. 65

v. Hulett ii. 38

v. Kemp iii. 132

v. Kopka i. 105

v. Lowell ii. 746

i-. Mann ii. 191, 199, 249

v. Milwaukee, &c. E. Co. ii. 188

v. Pole ii. 847

v. Price ii. 890

v. Rivett iii. 70

v. Sargeant i. 05

v. Sarmiento iii. 301, 398

v. Shurtliff ii. 772

v. Sperry i. 350, 385

v. State iii. 499

v. Stuart ii. 814

v. Tanner i. 69, 194, 206

v. VanBuskirk ii. 699

v. Winter i. 136, 150

v. Young ii. 501, 581

Greenaway v. Adams i. 538; iii. 359
Green Bay Bank v. Dearborn i. 565, 568,

570

Greenby e. Wilcocks i. 144, 200

Greene v. Bateman i 505; iii. 224

v. Bishop ii. 335, 336, 341, 344, 349

v. Brooking ii. 11; iii. 21, 56

v. Darling i. 254

v. Dingley ii. 794

v. Dodge ii. 32

v. First Parish in Maiden i. 547

v. Greene i. 108, 170

v. Harris iii. 41

v. Lycoming Ins. Co. ii. 616

Greenfield Bank v. Leavitt iii. 210

Greenfield Savings Bank v. Stowell ii. 862

Greenhow's Adm's v. Harris iii. 117

Greening, Ex parte iii. 427, 452

v. Wilkinson ii. 212, 220

Greenland v. Chaplin ii. 250; iii. 192

Gree.nlaw v. Greenlaw ii. 730

Greenleaf v. Kellogg ii. 709

v. Quiney iii. 88

Greeno v. Munson i. 540

Greenough v. Rolfe ii. 840

r. Smead i. 274, 284

v. Wigginton i. 409

Greenslade v. Dower i. 203

Greentree v. Rosenstock _ i. 81

Greenup v. Vernon i. 552

Greenville R. R. Co. v. Partlow iii. 184 "

Greenwald v. Ins. Co. ii- 572

v. Raster i- 210

Greenway, Ex parte i. 331

w. Fisher iii. 478

Greenwood, In re ii. 844

v. Bishop of London i. 488

v. Brodhead i. 240

v. Curtis ii. 726, 727

v. Freight Co. iii. 486, 491

o. Lidbetter ii. 823

Gregg v. George i. 296

v. James ii. 746

v. Wells ii. 936, 938

v. Wyman ii. 902, 904

Gregg's case iii. 167

Gregory v. Christie ii. 532, 534

v. Frazer i. 435

v. Harm an i. 141

v. Hurrill iii. 103

v. King ii. 897

v. McDowell iii. 222

v. Mighill iii. 310, 349, 352, 360

v. Morris iii. 273

a. Pierce i. 407

v. Piper i. 114, 115

v. Siryker ii. 141

v. Tliomas i. 612

v. Wendell i. 569; ii. 886

v. AVest Midland R. Co. ii. 272

u. Wilson iii. 363

Gregson v. Ruck i. 586; iii. 13

Greignier, Ex parte iii. 418, 419

Gremere v. Le Clerk Bois Valon i. 488

Grendell v. Godmond i. 392

Greneaux v. Wheeler i. 289, 292

Grenfell r. Dean and Canons of

Windsor i. 253

I-. Girdlestone iii. 92

Grew v. Burditt ii. 877

Grey, Ex parte iii. 420

v. Cooper i. 370

v. Frier ii. 603

Grice r. Richardson i. 575

Griclley v. Dole i. 184

Grieff v. Bondousquie i. 178

Grier r. Grier ii. 831

v. Hood i. 216

Grierson i'. Eyre ii. 349

Griffin v. Banks i. 397

v. Doe i. 175

v. Eyles iii. 286

v. Had ley ii. 827

v. Kemp i. 296

v. Macaulay i. 29

v. McKenzie iii. 511

v. Ransdell i. 387

Griffith v. Buffum i. 176

v. Burden i. 330

v. Cave ii. 181

v. Griffith iii. 300

w. Ins. Co. of N. A. ii. 519

v. Wells i. 489

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

XC1X

Griffiths v. Owen ii. 819, 820 ; iii. 81

v. Puleston i. 644

Griggs v. State ii. 100

Grill v. Iron Screw Steamer Co. ii. 428

Grim v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 669, 573

Grimaldi v. White i. 638

Grimes v. Hamilton Co. iii. 15

v. Reese ii. 876

Grimman v. Legge i. 643 ; ii. 792, 940

Grimshaw v. Bender i. 327

v. Walker iii. 403

Grindell u. Godmond i. 403

Grinnan v. Baton Rouge Mills Co.

i. 191

Grinnell v. Cook ii. 156, 164, 165, 167

v. West. Un. Tel. Co. ii. 287

Grinoldby v. Wells i. 628

Grisby v. Nance i. 186

Grissell v. Robinson i. 500

Griswold v. McMillan iii. 424

v. N. Y. Ins. Co. ii. 418, 510, 513

v. Pratt iii. 401, 434

v. Sabin iii. 224

v. Sheldon i. 560

v. Waddington i. 173, 219, 223, 224,

226, 316

Groat v. Gile i. 564

Grocer's Bank v. Kingman ii. 20

v. Penfield i. 292

Groffu. Belche i. 565

Grome, Ex parte iii. 462

Groning v. Mendham i. 638

Groom v. Mealey iii. 469

v. Thomas iii. 414

v. West iii. 439, 469

Gross v. Criss ii. 668

v. Kierski i. 016

Grosvenor v. Atl. F. Ins. Co. ii. 475,

577
v. Flax & Hemp Manuf. Co. iii. 117,

118
v. Henry i. 548

v. Lloyd i. 189

v. N. Y. &c. R. R. Co. ii. 190

Grote v. The C. & H. R. Co. ii. 243, 245
Groton v. Dalheim i. 306

Groton Co. v. Gardner i. 552

Grove v. Bastard iii. 334, 335

v. Brien ii. 0

v, Dubois i. 100

Grover v. Wakeman iii. 382

Grover, &c. Co. v. Clinton iii. 433

Grover & Baker S. M. Co. v. Wil-
liams ii. 324
Groves v. Buck iii. 62
v Graves iii. 126
v. Perkins i. 523
v. Smith i. 176
Grow v. Seligman ii. 370
Grubb v. Suit ii. 74
Grugeon v. Smith i. 322
Grymes v. Boweren i. 547
Grysiel v. Whiehcott iii. 141
Guaranty Co. u. Board of Liquida-
tion iii- 506

Guard v. Whiteside ii. 850
Guardian Ins. Co. v. Hogan ii. 606, 609
Guardians of the Poor u. Isathans ii. 85

Guardians, &e. v. Franklin i. 153

Guerlain v. Col. Ins. Co. ii. 473

Guernsey v. Carver iii. 202

v. Cook i. 68

Guerreiro v. Peile i. 60, 102, 529

Guerry v. Perryman i. 254

Guest v. Smythe i. 93

Guggenheimer v. Geiszler iii. 123

Guichard v. Superveile iii. 96

Guidon v. Robson 1. 22

Guier v. O'Daniel ii. 712

Guier's case ii. 644

Guild v. Belcher i. 215
u. Butler i. 324 ; ii. 6; iii. 411

v. Guild ii. 51

v. Rogers i. 554

Guille v. Swan iii. 195

Guillod v. Nock ii. 772
Gulick v. Gulick i. 185, 186; ii. 71

v. Grover i. 46, 411

Gulledge v. Howard ii. 99

Gullett v. Lamberton i. 370

v. Lewis ii. 746

Gulliver v. Drinkwater iii. 466

Gully v. Bishop of Exeter i. 460

v. Gully ii. 645

Gunderson ;\ Richardson ii. 904

Gunn v. Barry iii. 505
v. Bolckow i. 639; iii. 274

Gunnis v. Erhart i. 524

Gunter v. Astor ii. 52

v. Halsey iii. 66

Gunther v. Atwill i. 628
Gurley v. Hiteshue iii. 314, 330, 371

Gurney v. Atlantic R. Co. iii. 222

i'. Behrend i. 052

v. Crockett ii. 385

v. Sharp iii. 276

v. Womersley i. 272, 298

Gurnsey v. Gardner i. 257

Gustavia, The ii. 385

Guth v. Guth i. 397

Guthrie v . Jones i. 546

v. Murphy i. 350

v. Pugsley iii. 243

Gutteridge v. Munyard iii. 249

Guy v. Butler i. 254

o. Sharp ii. 691

v. Tams iii. 75

Gwathney v. Cason iii. 10, 15

Gwilliam v. Daniel ii. 422

u. Stone iii. 359
Gwin v. Whitaker ii. 765; iii. Ill

Gwinnell v. Herbert i. 299

Gwynn, Ex parte iii. 143, 274

i/. McCauley iii. 314

v. Lee i- 288

Gwynne, Ex parte i. 643

v. Heaton i. 523
Gylbert v. Fletcher i. 354 ; ii. 54

Gyles v. Wilcox ii. 345

Gynes v. Kemsley ii. 681

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

H.

Haak v. Lindermann

i. 568

Haas v. Flint

iii. 143

Hacker v. Johnson

i. 232

v. Storer

i. 144

Hacket v. Glorer

i. 531

v. Tilley

1.487

Eackett v. B. C. & M. Rd. Co. ii. 188

u. King i. 444

v. Martin i. 254 ; ii. 188, 577

v. McNamara iii. 312, 323, 367

Hackitt v. Reynolds iii. 297

Hackley v. Headley i. 443

v. Hoskins ii. 52

v. Sprague iii. 127, 128

Hackwood v. Lyall ii. 396, 400

Hadd v. U. S., &c. Co. ii. 227

Hadden v. Knickerbocker i. 552

Haddock v. Bury i. 308

v. Murray i. 318

v. Woods i. 279

Haddon v. Chambers iii. 464

Hadduck v. Wilmarth ii. 909

Hadfield v. Mayor, &c. New York iii. 484

Hadley v. Baxendale ii. 198 ; iii. 196

v. Clarke ii. 198, 415, 425, 808

v. N. H. Ins. Co. ii. 543

v. Prather i. 618

Haffey v. Birchetts iii. 242

Hafford v. New Bedford i. 118

Hafner v. Irwin iii. 382

Hagard v. Raymond iii. 464

Hagedorn v. Bell ii. 482

v. Oliverson i. 49 ; ii. 389, 474, 480

Hagar v. Hagar iii. 352

Hager v. Nolan ii. 58

Hagebush v. Ragland ii. 117

Hagey v. Hill i. 323

Haggartu. Morgan ii. 844

Haggertston v. Hanbury ii. 635

Haggerty v. Palmer i. 579

v. Porter i. 242

Habn v. Doolittle i. 621

u. Fredericks i. 565

v. Horstman iii. 172

Haigh v. Brooks i. 473; ii. 694 ; iii. 17

v. De La Cour ii. 491, 536

Haight v. Badgeley ii. 52

Hailey v. Franks ii. 944

Haille v. Smith ii. 411 ; iii. 278

Haine v. Tarrant i. 338

Haines t'. Busk i. Ill

u. Corliss i. 383

v. Dubois i. 271

v. East Tennessee R. R. Co. ii. 47

v. Haines i. 459 ; iii. 314, 316

v. Pearce ii. 756

a. Tucker ii. 810 ; iii. 224

Hains v. Jeffel i. 377

Hair v. Bell ii. 41, 792

Hairston v. Hairston ii. 709

Hakes v. Hotchkiss i. 471 ; ii. 679

Haldane v. Johnson i. 534 ; ii. 770

Haldeman v. Michael iii. 442

Hale, Ex parte iii. 469

v. Baldwin iii- 508

v. City of London, &c. Co. i. 631

v. Gerrish i. 364, 365

v. Hale iii. 161

v. Henderson i. 489

v. Huse ii- 828

v. James iii. 239

v. Lawrence ii. 722
v. Mechanics Ins. Co. ii. 475, 493, 577,

583

v. Mercantile Ins. Co. ii. 535

c. Milwaukee Dock Co. i. 328

v. Morse iii. 81

v. N. J. Steam NaT. Co. ii. 172

v. Omaha Bank i. 552

v. Rawson i. 605

v. Rice i. 463

v. Small iii. 416

v. Smith i. 616

v. Washington Ins. Co. ii. 499

Hale's Exec. v. Ard's Exec. iii. 101

Haley v. Dorchester Ins. Co. ii. 580

v. Manuf. Ins. Co. ii. 562

Half hed v. Jenning ii. 845

Half hide v. Fenning ii. 845

Halford v. Kymer ii. 606

Halhead v. Young ii. 483

Haliday, Ex parte iii. 420

Halifax v. Chambers i. 537

Halifax Union v. Wheelwright ii. 861

Hall, Ex parte iii 427, 452

v. Ashhurst i. 129 ; ii. 32

v. Barrows ii. 355, 360, 367, 368

v, Barnard iii. 450

v. Belknap iii. 219

v. Bird ii. 305

v. Boardman iii. 439

v. Brinkloy iii. 287

v. Buffalo, The ii. 431

v. Campbell ii. 698

i-. Cannon ii. 58

v. Cazenove ii. 685

v. Clagett i. 231 ; iii. 354

v. Conn. River Steam Co. ii. 234

v. Cook ii. 885

v. Crowley iii. 174

v. Cushing iii. 127

v. Daggett iii. 143

v . Dean iii. 244

v. De Cuir ii. 242

v. Denison iii. 382

v. Dewey i. 540

(>. Dyson i. 486

(,-. Farmer ii. 12

v. Fisher ii. 939

v. Flockton ii. 325

v. Franklin Ins. Co. ii. 397, 398,

508, 532

v. Fuller i. 300

v. Gardner i. 256

v. Gaylor i. 574

v. Hale i. 289

a. Hall i. 221, 238, 395 ; iii. 347

u. Hardy iii. 310, 369

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CI

Hall v. Hill

ii. 684

Halwerson v. Cole

ii. 216

v. Ilinks

i. 557

Haly v. Lane

i. 287

v. Hoxsie

ii. 6

Ham v. Goodrich

iii. 38

v. Huffam

i. 30

v. Ham

ii. 932

v. Janson

ti. 447, 677

v. Hamburgh, The

ii. 392

v. Lanning

i. 206

v. Van Orden

i. 263

u. Law

iii. 99

Hamaker v. Blanchard

ii. 106

u. Leigh

i. 24

v. Eberley i. 470, 471 ; ii. 849

v. Little

iii. 104

Hamar v. Medsker

i. 406

v. Marston

i. 248, 497

Hambidge v. De la Croute

i. 216

v. May hew
v. McDuff

ii. 634

Hambleton v. Veere

iii. 201

iii. 297

Hamer v. Dipple

i. 335

v. Mollineaux

ii. 484

Hamil v. Stokes

i. 229

v. North Eastern E. Co.

ii. 238

Hamill v. Purvis

i. 210

v. Ocean Ins. Co.

ii. 483, 507

Hamilton v. Benbury

ii. 762

v. Odber

ii. 740, 743

v. Cunningham

i. 91, 92

v. Ody

ii. 874, 875

v. Denny

iii. 299

v. Parker

ii. 903

v, Hamilton

ii. 939

v. People's Ins. Co.

ii. 472, 560

«.•. Hooper

ii. 18

v. Potter

ii. 80

v. Lycoming Mutual Ins. Cc

. i. 514;

v. Power

ii. 246

ii

. 470, 540

v. Reed

iii. 355

v. Marsden

i. 540

v. Renfro

i. 126 ; ii. 174

v. McDonald

i. 252

v. Richardson

ii. 197

v. McPherson

iii

. 199, 209

v. Robinson i.

250, 253, 563

v. Mendes

ii. 504

v. Rupley

ii. 654

v. Mutual Ins. Co.

ii. 601

v. Savage

i. 406

v. Pearson

i. 300

v. Seabright

ii. 818

v. Phoenix Ins. Co.

ii. 389

v. Smallwood

ii. 824

v. Royse

i. 89

v. Smith

i. 11; ii. 819

v. Russell

i. 569

v. Snowhill

i. 612

v. Seaman

i. 219

v. Southmayd

i. 552

». Sheddon

ii. 532

v. Surtees

ii. 940

v. Summers

i. 204

v. Timmons

i. 358

v. Terry

i. 505

v. Tuttle

iii. 265

v. Watson

ii. 9

v. Warren

iii. 305, 414

Hamilton College v. Stewart

i. 482

v. Whittier ii

783 ; iii. 332

Hamlin, Ex parte

iii. 411

v. Wiles

ii. 308, 327

v. Stevenson

i. 334

v. Williams

ii. 740

Hammat v. Emerson i

495;

v. Wilson i. 271, 288; ii. 71

Hammer v. McEldowney

iii. 310

v. Wisconsin

iii. 483

Hammersley v. De Beil

iii. 32

v. Wright

ii. 71

v. Knowlys

ii. 765

Hall and Hinds, In re

ii. 97

Hammett v. Linneman

i. 580

Hallen v. Runder

i. 545; iii. 36

v. Yea

iii

116, 143

Haller v. Williamowitz

i. 186, 187

Hammon v. Roll

i. 210

Hallett v. Dowdall

i. 216

Hammond, Ex parte

iii. 416

Halley v. Troester

i. 437

v. Allen

ii. 486

v. Wigram

ii. 447

u. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co

ii. 616.

Halliday v, McDougall

i. 326

799

v. St. Louis, &c. R. Co.

ii. 227

v. Anderson

i.

564, 646 ;

v. Ward

iii. 92

iii. 49, 273

Hallock v. Ins. Co.

ii. 567

v. Chamberlin

i. 274

Halloway v. Davis

ii. 663

o. Douglas i. 173,

229; ii

Hallowell v. Curry

i. 311

v. Essex Ins. Co.

ii. 513

v. Fawcett

i. 108

v. Hopping

iii.

121, 130

v. Howard

ii. 779

v. Hussey

i. 476

v. Saco

ii. 709

v. McClures

ii.

217, 414

Hallowell Bank v. Howard

ii. 879

v. Messenger

i.

251, 252

Halsey v. Brown

ii. 669

u. Reid

ii. 535

v. Grant

iii. 357, 358

v. Rogers

ii. 468

v. Norton

i. 224

v. Roll

i. 471

v. Whitney i

210; iii. 382

v. Smith

iii.

125, 126

v. Woodruff

i. 28

v. Toulmin

iii.

462, 466

Halstead v. Seamen

ii. 843

Hammonds v. Barkley

iii.

275, 288

v. Shepard

i. 201, 208

Hamond v. Holiday

i.

109, 110

Cll

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Hampden v. Walsh ii. 760

Hamper, Ex parte i. 176, 180

Hampshire v. Peirce ii. 695

Hampstead v. Plaistow ii. 88

Hampton v. M'Connell ii. 740, 741

Hamson v. Harrison iii. 410

Hamrick v. Hogg ii. 918

Hanauer v. Bartels i. 5Uo

v. Doane i. 486

Hanbury v. Hanbury ii. 01

Hanchet v. Whitney i. 548

Hancock v. American Ins. Co. ii. 612

v. Caffyn iii. 426, 454

v. Entwisle iii. 462

v. Fairfield i. 55, G8

v. Hodgson i. 69 ; iii. 116

v. New York Ins. Co. ii. 001

v. Reede ii. 833

b. Wilhoite iii. 100

Hancock's Appeal ii. 925

Hancox v. Dunning ii. 383

v. Fishing Ins. Co. ii. 489

Hand v. Armstrong iii. 113

v. Baynes ii. 196, 199, 400

v. Elvira, The ii. 430, 439

Handford v. Palmer ii. 136

!'. Rogers ii. 685

Handley v. Chambers iii. 246

Hands v. London, &e. R. R. Co. ii. 249

b. Slaney i. 337
Handy v. Foley i. 407
Hanford v. Robertson ii. 767

v. Rogers iii. 18

Hanliam v. Sherman i. 543

Hankey v. Becht i. 170

r. Garratt i. 234

v. Jones iii. 416

Hankins v. Shoup i. 290

Hankinson v. Hankinson ii. 92

v. Sandilaus i. 12

Hanks v. Deal i. 353, 356

v. McKee i. 620

v. Naglee ii. 72

v. Palling i. 581

Hanna v. Flint i. 182

I/. Barter iii. 221

u. Mills iii. 226

c. Phelps iii. 221, 270
v. Wilson iii. 313

Hannah v. Carrington iii. 376, 378

v. Fife ii. 886

Hannan v. Hannan i. 458

v. Johnson i. 207

Hannay v. Eve ii. 894

Hannibal R. R. Co. v. Swift ii. 213

Hanover v. Turner ii. 736

Hansard v. Robinson i. 331

Hansbrough v. Baylor iii. 153, 154

v. Gray i. 294

Hansell v. Erickson ii. 40, 657

Hansen v. Rounsavell ii. 767

Hanson, Ex parte iii. 424

v. Armitage iii. 51, 53, 55

v. Buckner i. 264; iii. 242

v. Crawley ii. 853

Hanson v. Meyer i. 564, 575, 645 ; iii. 273

v. Roberdeau i- 527

v. Bowe i- 124; iii. 10

v. Rowell ii- 466

v. Stetson i- 482

v. Stevenson iii. 447

Hantz v. The York Bank iii. Ill

Hapgood, Re iii. 421

Harbeck v. Southwell iii. 293

Harbert's case i. 31 ; iii. 379

Harbin v. Levi ii. 877

Harbold v. Kuntz iii. 75

Harcourt v. Ramsbottom iii. 333

Hard v, Seeley ii. 816

v. Vt. & Canada R. R. Co. ii. 46

Hardcastle v. Netherwood ii. 879

Hardell v. McClure iii. 62

Harden, Ex parte iii. 467

v. Gordon i. 441 ; ii. 463

v. Harden ii. 831

Hardenburg v. Hardenburg ii. S2

Harder v. Harder iii. 362

Hardesty v. Richardson iii. 352

Hardey v. Coe ii. 823

Hardie v. Grant i. 394, 395

Hardin v. Forsyth i. 540

v. Ho-yo-po-Nubby's Lessee i. 125

Harding, Ex parte i. 205

u. Alden ii. 732, 736

v. Ambler ii. 931

v. Commercial Loan Co. ii. 753

v. Davies ii. 773, 777

v. Foxcroft i. 176, 184 ; ii. 387

v. Souther ii. 421

„. Tifft ii. 702, 767

v. Wilson i. 631

Hardman v. Bellhouse ii. 822

v. Hardman ii. 645

v. Wilcock ii. 218

Hardtmann v. Tegart i. 396

Hardwicke v. Vernon i. 96

Hardy v. Carolina R. Co. ii. 46

o. Coe ii. 823

17. Corlis ii. 882

17. Innes ii. 516, 832

v. Jandon ii. 126

v. Mitchell iii. 440

17. Nelson iii. 175, 242

v. Ryle ii. 797

v. Union Ins. Co. ii. 493, 557, 583

v. Waltham iii. 499

Hare v. Henty i. 306

t7. Horton ii. 646, 647

v. Travis ii. 531, 533

Harford v. Morris ii. 729

Harger v. M'Mains iii. 212

Hargous v. Ablon iii. 194

i>. Stone i. 603, 628

Hargrave v. Dusenbury ii. 753

17. Hargrave iii. 364

v. Smee ii. 626, 641

Hargreaves v. Hutchinson iii. 118, 137

!7. Parsons iii. 23, 24, 28

v. Rothwell i. 81

Hargroves v. Cooke ii. 762; iii. 17

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

cm

Harker v. Dement ii. 127
Harkins v. Standard Sugar Refinery

ii. 47

Harlan v. Harlan i. 466

Harland's case ii. 137

Harless v. Petty iii. 832, 352

Harley v. King iii. 424

v. State i. 448

Harlow v. Curtis i. 605

v. Putnam ii. 320

u. Thomas iii. 244

Harman v. Anderson i. 648 ; ii. 152 ;

iii. 48, 444

v. Fisher i. 654; iii. 441

v. Gandolph ii. 425

v. Goodrich iii. 218

v. Johnson i. 203

v. Kingston ii. 484

v. Reeve iii. 19

t*. Vanhatton ii. 403

Harmer v. Bell ii. 434

v. Killing i. 364

Harmony v. Bingham i. 446 ; ii. 198,

805, 806

Ham v. Kiehl ii. 822

Harnett v. Yielding iii. 305, 309, 361

Harney v. Owen i. 355, 360

Harnor v. Groves ii. 679

Harper i\ Albany Ins. Co. ii. 545, 648

v. Calhoun ii. 879

v. Dotson i. 616

v. Fairley iii. 86

v. Gilbert i. 355; ii. 54

v. Hampton ii. 824

v. Little i. 72

v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 602

Harratt v. Wise ii. 520

Harrell v. Kelly iii. 107

v. Owens ii. 198

Harrencourt v. Merritt iii. 82

Harriman v. Harriman ii. 823

v. Queen Ins. Co. i. 83; ii. 587

Harrington v. Brown i. 95

v. Hingham i. 216

v. Kloprogee ii. 632

v. Long ii. 907

v. Lyles ii. 182

v. McShane ii- 225

v. Snyder ii. 131, 134, 137, 138

v. Stratton i. 495

v. Victoria Graving Dock Co. ii. 886

Harriot, The ii. 441

Harris's case ii. 540

Harris v. Boston iii. 143, 144

v. Campbell i. 12

v. Carraody i. 446

v. Carter ii. 467

v. Clark i. 312

v. Clarke i. 266, 312, 321

v. Costar ii. 234

v. Curnow ii- 832

v. Delamar ii- 921

v. Eagle Ins. Co. ii. 473, 578

«. Farwell i;. 192

v. Fawcett ii- 33

Harris v. Great Western R. Co. ii. 267

v. Harris i. 409; ii. 91

v. Hillegasa i. 176

v. Huntbach ii. 4

v. Jones iii. 240

v. Knickerbocker , iii. 309

v. Lee i. 392

v. McGovern iii. 102

v. Mills iii. 108

v. Mitchell ii. 844

v. Moody ii. 448

v. Morris i. 393, 395

v. Mott iii. 369

v. Mullins i. 622

v. Murray i. 243

v. Newell ii. 24, 31

v. Nickerson i. 510, 527

v. Ohio Ins. Co. ii. 582

v. Osbourn iii. 101
v. Packwood ii. 187, 261, 272

v. Palmer ii. 875

v. Porter iii. 41

v. Rand ii. 215

v. Reynolds ii. 819, 844

v. Roof ii. 895

v. Royal Ins. Co. ii. 549

v. Runnells i. 488

t>. Scaramanga ii. 537

v. Simmerman ii. 745, 747

v. Venables i. 466

v. Waite i. 627
v. Wall i. 363, 364, 365

v. Warner i. 35, 37
v. Watson i. 467 ; ii. 467

v. White ii. 758
v. Wilson i. 198 ; ii. 828

v. Woodruff iii. 266

v. Young ii. 11

Harris Manuf. Co. v. Marsh iii. 224
Harrison, Ex parte ii. 387, 391 ; iii. 462

v. Bainbridge ii. 875

v. Berkley iii. 193
v. Cage ii. 65, 68, 69, 71

v. Central R. R. Co. ii. 249

v. Clifton i. 333

v. Close i. 27, 211

v, Colton ii. 905

v. Crowder i. 303

v. Fane i. 336, 338

v. Gardner i. 173

v. Hall i. 402

v. Harnel iii. 132

k. Harrison iii. 212, 220

i>. Heathorn i. 162, 163

v. Jackson i. 122

v. Knight |. 474

v. Lemon i- 485

v. London, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 271

v. Lord North i. 537

v. McClelland i. 58

v. McConkey ii. 610

v. McHenry i- 94

v. Murrell ii- 138

v. Roscoe i- 66

v. Roy ii- 178

CIV

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Harrison v. Shanks

i. 62

Harvey, Ex parte ii. 20 ;

iii. 416, 432

u. Sterry i. 200;

in. 391, 408,

v. Aruhbold ii.

716; iii. 122

409

o. Ashley

iii. 308

v. Taylor

ii. 355

v. Brydges

i. 550

v. Young

iii. 490

v. Childs

i. 183

i. 43, 70, 75

v. Connecticut, &c. R. Co

iii. 196

Harrod v. McDaniels

i. 49

v. Crickett

i. 225, 226

Han-old v. Whitaker

i. 25

v. Epes

ii. 137

Harrop v. Fisher

i. 64, 288

v. Farnie

ii. 734

Harsh v. Klepper

ii. 853

v. Gibbons

i. 492

v. Morgan

ii. 293

v. Harris

i. 562

Harshberger v. Alger

ii. 61

v. Harvey

i. 547

Harshraan v. Lowe

iii. 382

v. Richards

ii. 701, 867

Harson v. Pike

i. 509

v. Smith

ii. 862

Hart v. Aldridge

ii. 52

v. Snow

iii. 236

v. Crane

iii. 403

v. Troupe

i. 308

v. Davis

ii. 885

v. Turner

iii. 206

v. Deamer

i. 438

v. Varney

i. 190

v. Direct, &c. Cable Co.

ii. 284

Harvie v. Oswel

i. 539

o. Dorman

ii. 769

Harwood v. Bartlett

iii. 434

v. Granger

ii. 864

v. Bland

i. 525

v. Hammett

i. 024

„. G. N. R. R.

ii. 308

v. Hart's Adm'x

i. 351

v. Heffer

i. 393

v. Hayden

iii. 131

Hashrook v. Paddock

ii. 691

v. Nash

iii. 80

v. Palmer

i. 280

v. Otis

ii. 466

Hasbrouck v. Vandervoort

ii. 126

v. Prater

i. 338

Hascall v. Whitmore

i. 287, 289

v. Prendergast

iii. 72, 74

Haselington v. Gill

iii. 455

u. R. & S. R. R. Co.

ii. 232

Haskell r. Adams

i. 184

v. Sattley

iii. 53, 54

v. Boardman

i. 315

v. Stephens

i. 381, 382

v. Hilton

i. 251

v. Tallmadge

ii. 916

v. Hunter

iii. 224

v. Ten Eyck i. 96 ; ii. 129

v. Windsor i. 532, 533, 537, 633

v. Woods iii. 12

v. Wright i. 631, 632

Harteau v. Harteau ii. 732, 736

Harten v. Gibson i. 377

Harter v. Moore ii. 26

Hartfleld v. Roper i. 356; ii. 248

Hartford Bank v. Stedman i. 311, 318

Hartford Ins. Co. v. Davenport ii. 610

y. Farrish ii. 471

v. Olcott ii. 586

v. Ross ii. 478

Hartland v. Chace i. 242

Hartley, Ex parte iii. 427

v. Buggin ii. 531, 532

v. Case i. 322

v. Cummings ii. 37, 890

v. Harman ii. 37, 44

v. Herring iii. 189

v. Rice ii. 69, 79, 897

v. Wharton i. 333, 363

Hartley's Appeal i. 78

Hartman v. Dowdel i. 381

v. Keystone Ins. Co. ii. 596, 605

Hartop v. Hoare ii. 103 ; iii. 270

Hartnell v. Hill ii. 833

Hartshorn v. S. & L. Dealers Ins. Co.

ii. 490

v. Shoe, &c. Ins. Co. ii. 490

Hartshorn v. Slodden iii. 442

Hartwig v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. ii. 251

Harvard College v. Gore ii. 709

v. Rice i. 564

Hasket v. Wootan ii. 896, 897

Haskins v. Burr i. 174

v. Hamilton Ins. Co. ii. 560, 680

v. Lombard ii. 863, 866

v. Kelly ii. 120

u. Patterson ii. 122

v. Warren i. 563

Haslet v. Haslet iii. 348

v. Street i. 211

Hassam v. St. Louis Perpet. Ins. Co.

ii. 446

ILissard v. Rowe i. 151

Hassel v. Simpson iii. 441, 442

Hassell c. Long ii. 34

Hassinger v. Diver ii. 59

Hastelow v. Jackson ii. 769

Hastie v. Couturier i. 559

v. De Peyster ii. 494

Hastings v. Bangor House i. 51

v. Dolarhide i. 368

v. Johnson iii. 231

v. Lovering i. 624

v. Pepper ii. 174, 181, 414

v. Westchester Ins. Co. ii. 686

v. Whitley ii. 890

i/. Wilson iii. 447

v. Wiswall ii. 769 ; iii. 159, 161

Hatch v. Bates i. 457

v. Bayley i. 671 ; ii. 926

v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. i. 155

v. Cobb iii. 342, 360

v. Coddington i. 61, 75

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CV

Hatch v. Dennis

v. Douglas ii.

p. Hobbs

v. Lincoln

v. Mut. Ins. Co.

v. Purcell

w. Searles

p. Smith

v. Stamper

v. Taylor

p. Trayes
Hatchell v. Odom
Hatcher p. Hatcher

v. McMorine
Hatchett v. Gibson
Hathaway p. Brady

p. National Ins. Co.

p. Payne

p. Trenton Ins. Co.

ii. 577

i; iii. 123, 159

ii. 23

i. 571

ii. 601, mi

i. 500

i. 272

iii. 381, 382

i. 538

i. 40, 50

i. 281

i. 464

iii. 348

i. 314

ii. 149

i. 132

ii. 603

ii. 932

ii. 600

Hatsall v. Griffith i. 11, 22, 24 ; ii. 748

Hattin p. Chapman ii. 75

Hatton v. Bragg iii. 262

v. Gray iii. 9

v. Kean ii. 338

Hatzfield v. Gulden ii. 895

Hauberger p. Boot iii. 356

Hauenstein p. Lynham i. 448

Haughey p. Strickler i. 198

Haughton p. Bayley i. 21

p. Ewbank i. 47, 48

Haughwout p. Murphy iii. 313

Haule p. Hemying ii. 803, 804

Hausman p. Nye iii. 53

Havana, The ii. 458

Havelock p. Geddes ii. 422, 663

p. Bockwood ii. 399

Haven p. Grand Junction E. Co. i. 330

v. Low i. 569

v. Bichardson iii. 382

v. Wakefield iii. 197

Havens, Ex parte iii. 419

p. Bush ii. 660

p. Hussey i. 201

Haverley p. Leighton ii. 804

Haviland v. Haviland ii. 72

Havre, The ii. 435

Hawcroft p. Great Northern Eailway

Co. ii. 186

Hawes p. Armstrong iii. 17

p.Foster i. 685, 588; iii. 13

p. Humble i. 596, 602

p. Knowles i. 113 ; iii. 185

p. Lawrence i. 596, 601

v. Marchant ii. 936, 937

p. Tillinghast i. 183

Hawke p. Bidgeway iii- 184

Hawkes v. Eastern By. Co. iii. 306, 309,

363, 374

p. Phillips i- 283

p. Salter i- 321

p. Saunders >• 463

Hawkeye, &c. Assoc, v. Blackburn

iii. 117

Hawkins, Ex parte iii. 419, 420

v. Appleby i- 209

Hawkins p. Barney

iii. 502

p. Berry

i. 623

o. Cardy

i.

297, 298

v. Chace

iii. 10

p. Colclough

ii. 829

v. Cooper

ii. 247

u. Craig

i. 385

u. Great Western Co

ii. 271

v. Gilbert

ii. 39

v. Hoffman

ii. 274, 27

v. Holmes

iii. 6

p. Kemp

iii. 245

v. Moffit

i. 264

p. Pemberton

i. 617,

618, 625

p. Providence, &c. E.

Co.

i. 385

p. Pythian

ii. 131

p. Butt

ii. 753

Hawks v. Hinchcliff

ii. 128

Hawkyns v. Obyn

iii. 437

Hawley v. Beverley

iii. 477

p. Farrar

i. 462

v. Foote

ii.

757, 820

v. Hodge

ii. 848

v. James

i. 150

p. Smith

i. 77

; ii. 166

Hawralty p. Warren

iii. 308

Hawtayne p. Bourne

i. 42, 60

Hawthorn v. Hammond

ii. 161

Hawthorne p. Calef

iii. 507

Haxall p. Shippen

ii. 477

Haxtun v. Bishop

i. 309

i/. Corse

iii. 388

Hay, Re

iii. 452

v. Ayling

i. 488

p. Bloomer, Brig

ii. 458

v. Cohoes Co., The

iii. 178

p. Fairbairn

ii. 395

Haycraft v. Creasy

ii. 916

Hayden p. Cabot

iii. 199

v. Demets

i. 568

; iii. 224

p. Johnson

iii. 72

p. Madison i. 500 ; ii. 39, 655

Haydon, Ex parte i. 238

v. Williams i. 382 ; iii. 72, 77, 92

Hayes p. Bement i. 243

p. Heyer i. 201, 243

v. Kershaw iii- 318

p. Matthews i. 58

p. Nash iii. 478

p. Biddle ii. 128 ; iii. 216, 254

v. Warren i. 475

Hayford v. Cunningham ii. 384

Hayman p. Molton ii. 397

Hayner p. Smith i. 542

Haynes v. Birks i. 321

p. Carter i. 190

p. Covington ii- 28

v. Holliday ii. 667

u. Knowles i- 232

v. Nice ii- 764

v. Bowe ii. 482

Hays p. Borders ii- 52

p. Carr iii. 332

v. Kennedy ii. 170, 233

„. Mouille i. 640, 645, 648

CV1

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Hays v. Stone

v. Sulzor
Hay ward v. Barker

v. Cuthburt

v. Hayward

v. Leonard

v. Middleton

v. National Ins. Co.

v. Seougall

i. 51, 87

ii. 809, 327

i. 465

iii. 238

i. 382 ; iii. 437

ii. (155

ii. 220, 672

ii. 543

i. 547, 607

v. The Pilgrim Society i. 155

v. Young ii. 889

Haywood v. Rodgers ii. 698

Hazard v. Day ii. 902 ; iii. 14

v. Franklin Ins. Co. ii. 576

v. Hazard i. 188

v. Irwin ii. 925

v. New Eng. Mar. Ins. Co. i. 505 ;

ii. 428, 478, 611, 529, 530

v. Smith iii. 129

v. Treadwell i. 75

Hazeltine v. Weld ii. 153

Hazel ton r. Balehelder i. 53; ii. 941

Hazen v. Addis ii. 829

v. Union Bank of Tennessee iii. 483

Hazlebaker v. Reeves iii. 75

Hazlett v. Gill i. 131

Head v. Goodwin i. 560

Hendley v. Kirby i. 265

Headriek v. Brattain i. 613

Heald v. Builder's Ins. Co. i. 545

v. Kenworthy i. 66

Healey v. Gray ii. 161

v. Spence ii. 824

Health v. Hall i. 475

Heane v. Rogers ii. 936, 937 ; iii. 416

Heaney v. Heeney iii. 191

Heanny v. Birch iii. 416

Heaphy r. Hill iii. 372

Heapy v. Parris i. 77

Heard v. Bowers iii. 170, 173

v. Eldredge i. 159

v. Rogers ii. 457

o. Stamford i. 380, 383

Hearle v. Greenbank i. 122

Hearne v. Chadbourne iii. 40

Hearsey v. Pruyn i. 85

Hearshy v. Ilickox i. 107

Heartt v. Chipmaa i. 129

Heath, In re iii. 474

„. Chilton i. 143

v. Derry Bank ii. 911

v. Franklin Ins. Co. ii. 586, 013

v. Hall i. 257

v. Heath iii. 41

v. Sansom i. 222

v. Waters i. 187

v. West i. 361

Heathcoate v. Crookshanks i. 219

v. Hulme i. 229

Heatheock v. Pennington ii. 133

Heatherly v. Record ii. 684

Heaton v. Angier i. 245

Heavilow v. Heavilow i. 184

Hebb's case i. 514

Hebbard v. Haughian i. 458

Hebden v. Rutter
Hebdon v. West
Heck v . Shener
Heckers v. Fowler
Heckliard v. Sayre
Hecksher v. McCrea
Hector, The
Hedderley, Exparte
Hedger v. Steavenson

i. 477 ; ii. 65

ii. 606
ii. 879
ii. 827
iii. 339
ii. 423 ; iii. 208
ii. 440
iii. 468
i. 322

Hedges o. Hudson K. R. R. Co. ii. 210

v. Riker i. 149

v. Sealy i. 254

t>. Strong iii. 40

Hedgley v. Holt i. 338, 352; ii. 45

Hedwig, The ii. 439

Heebner v. Eagle Ins. Co. ii. 505, 511,

515

Heermance v. Vernoy i. 616

Heermans v. Ellsworth i. 258

Heffer v. Heffer ii. 89

Hefferman v. Benkard i. 116

Heffner v. Lewis i. 546

Hefner v. Vandolah i. 279

Hegeman v. W. R. R. Co. ii. 233, 234,

283

Hegleru. Eddv i. 579
Heilbutt v. Hickson i. 628, 629; iii. 219

Heimstreet i>. Howland i. 182

Heine v. Appletons ii. 338

Heinecke v Earle i. 653

Heinlin v. Castro iii. 85

Heinrichs v. Kerchner ii. 76

Ileintz ;>. Cahn ii. 762

Helena, The ii. 398

Hellaby v. Weaver ii. 179, 231

Hellawell v. Eastwood i. 547

Helm v. Bryant ii. 678

v. Wilson ii. 655

Helme «. Smith ii. 387, 390

Helms i". Kearns i. 497

Helmsley v. Loader i. 125

Helps v. Hereford ii. 933

i>. Winterbottom iii. 97

Helsby v. Mears ii. 226

Ilelsey v. Fairbanks i- 26

Heltzell b. Hynes iii. 293

Helyear v. Hawke i. 59, 63

Hemans v. Picciotto ii. 658

Hemenway, Ex parte i. 545

Hemingway v. Hamilton ii. 913

Hemmenway v. Stone i. 11

Hemp i'. Garland iii. 100

Hemphill v. Chenie ii. 199, 203, 206

Henbach v. llollman i. 101

Henchman v. Offley ii. 484

Henck v. Todhunter i. 125

Henderson, Exparte iii. 414
v. Australian Royal Mail Steam

Nav. Co. i. 154

v. Barnewall i. 89, 588; iii. 11

v. Blanchard iii. Ill

v. Buckley ii. 837

v. Clarke i. 333

v. Henderson ii. 737; iii. 244

v. Hicks iii. 311

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CVll

Henderson v. Hudson

v. Johnson

v. Lauck

v. Lewis

v. Mayhew

v. McDuffee

v. Moore

v. Stevenson

v. Stringer

i\ Western Ins. Co.
Hendren v. Colgin
Hendrick v. Whittemore
Hendricks t>. Franklin

v. Judah

v. Mount

v. Robinson

i. 175

iii. 17

i. 563

ii. 878

ii. 391

i. 34

ii. 749

ii. 257

i. 396

ii. 573

i. 380

ii. 10

i. 327

i. 295; iii. 478

iii. 381

iii. 382

Hendrickson v. Hendrickson ii. 922

v. Kingsburg iii. 184

Henen v. Munro ii. 447

Henfree v. Bromley ii. 837, 855
Hening v. United States Ins. Co. ii. 471

Henisler v. Freedman ii. 284
Henkel v. Pape i. 515 ; ii. 299
Henkle v. Royal Exch. Ins. Co. ii. 47o

Henley v. Bank ii. 940

v. Soper ii. 825

Henman v. Dickinson ii. 860

Hennell v. Fairlamb ii. 885

Hennequin v. Clews iii. 434

Henniker v. Wigg ii. 706

Henning's case ii. 803

Henop v. Tucker ii. 464

Henrickson v. Margetson ii. 511
Henry, The ii. 397, 410, 442,

443, 533

v. Butler ii. 876

v. Goldney i. 33 ; ii. 863

v. Lee i. 312

v. Means iii. 102

v. Root i. 366

v. Sargeant ii- 722

v. Staniforth ii. 481

Henry Ewbank, The ii. 438, 439, 440, 441

Hensel v. Noble iii. 271

Henshaw v. Hunting ii. 865

o. Robins i. 624, 625

Henslee v. Cannefax i. 208

Hensly v. Baker i- 615

Henson, Ex parte iii. 143, 465

v. Blackwell ii. 607

Hentig v. Staniforth ii. 481

Hepburn v. Auld i. 525

v. Dunlop iii. 355

v. Sewell iii. 211

Heran v. Hall i. 167

Herbert, Ex parte iii. 416

v. Cook ii. 740

v. Hallett ii. 418, 510

v. Herbert ii. 726

<.-. Pigott ii. 852

v. Turball i- 334

Hercules, The }}■ 467

Hercy v. Birch ">• 321

Herdman v. Pace . i- 405

Herefordshire Co., In re iii- HI

Hergman v. Dettlebach

i. 235

Heridia v. Ay res

ii. 469

Herkenrath v. Atner. Ins. Co.

ii. 585

Herlakenden's case

i. 646

Herlihy v. Smith

i. 113

Hern v. Nichols

i. 79

Hernaman v. Bawden

ii. 460

Heroine, The

ii. 435

Herrick v. Borst

ii. 24, 25

v. Carman

i. 284, 290

v. Dean

iii. 137

v. Herrick

ii. 837

!>. Moore

iii. 244

v. Randolph

iii. 498

v. Wolverton

i. 295

Herries v. Jamieson

ii. 769

Herrin v. Butters ii. 50 ; iii. 42

v. Libbey ii. 923

Herring v. Boston Iron Co. ii. 678

v. Hoppock i. 578

v. Hottendorf i. 61

v. Pollard iii. 238

v. Wickham ii. 76

Herrison v. Guthrie iii. 469

Herrman v. Adriatic Ins. Co. ii. 546

v. Merchants Ins. Co. ii. 632

Hersey v. Merrimack Co. Ins. Co. ii. 491

Hersfield v. Adams ii. 178

Hersom v. Henderson i. 634

Ilervey v. Hervey ii. 82

Heseltine v. Siggers iii. 56

Hesketh v. Blanchard i. 176, 178

v. Fawcett ii. 780

Hess v. Werts i. 241

Hesse v. Stevenson ii. 634 ; iii. 435

Hessian v. Edward Howard, The ii. 490

Heth's Ex'r v. Wooldridge's Ex'r iii. 347

Heudebourck v. Langton i. 140

Ileugh v. London, &c. Co. ii. 108

Hewes v. Hansom ii. 758

v. Rand iii. 411

Hewett v. Buck ii. 389

He win v. Libbey ii. 925

Hewins v. Cargill ii. 853

Hewison v. Guthrie iii. 262, 439

Hewit v. Flexney ii- 530

v. Mantell iii- 426

Hewitt v. Anderson i- 513

v. Charier U- 60

o. Rankin i- 172

v. Watertown Ins. Co. ii- 628

v. Wilcox ii- 60

Hey v. Moorhouse i- 469

Heydon v. Heydon i. 233 ; iii. 298

v. Williams iii. 431

Heydon's case i- 28

Heydon & Smith's case iii- 216

Heyhoe v. Burge i- 180

Heyliger v. N. Y. Ins. Co. ii. 447, 448

Hey man v. Neale i. 584, 586 ; iii. 13

Heytle v. Logan iii- 116

Heywood v. Hildreth iii- 459

v. Perrin ii- 633

o. Pickering i. 296, 312

o. Watson i- 292

cvm

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Heywood v. Wingate i. 287

Heywood's case ii- 640

Hiatt v. Gilmer ii. 54

v. Williams iii. 352

Hibbard v. N. Y. & E. R. M. Co. ii. 246

v. West. Un. Tel. Co. ii. 286 ; iii. 235

Hibbert v. Shee i. 525

Hibblewhite v. McMorine i. 123, 331, 560,

598 ; ii. 861

Hibernia, The ii. 454, 404

Hibernia Ins. Co. v. Meyer ii. 586

i'. O'Connor ii. 587

Hibsliman v. Dulleban ii. 807

Hickerson v. Benson ii. 897

Hickey v. Burt i. 254; ii. 749

Hickley v. F. & M. Bank iii. 382

Hickman v. Cox i- 174

v. Haynes iii. 57

v. Thomas iii. 266

Hickok v. Buck ii. 135, 137 ; iii. 216

v. Hickok iii. 98

Hicks v. Branton iii. 293

v. Brown iii. 397

t>. Cram ii. 936, 938

v. Gleason ii. 865

r. Hankins i. 42; iii. 12

u. Hannibal, &c. R. Co. ii. 273

v. Hinde i. 288

v. Hotchkiss iii. 393, 507, 508

v. Palington ii. 444

v. Stone ii. 928

v. Walker ii. 458

Hidden v. Slater Ins. Co. ii. 561

Hide v. Petit ii. 826

Hier v. Abrahams ii. 352

Higden v. Williamson iii. 427, 431

Higert v. Trustees, &c. Univ. i. 482

Higgins v. Aguilar ii. 487

v. Breen ii. 50

v. Emmons ii. 103, 785

v. Kusterer iii. 35

v. Livingstone i. 139

v. Moore i. 103

v. Morrison i. 326

e. Murray i. 564, 574 ; iii. 60

t>. Scott iii. 108

v. Senior i. 56, 57, 65, 66, 67

v. Turner i. 540

v. Watson i. 274

Higginson v. Clowes iii. 354, 371

v. Dall ii. 473, 485, 491

v. Kelly iii. 449

r. Pomeroy ii. 496

v. Weld " i. 605

Highland, &c. Co. v. Matthews i. 572

Highlander, The ii. 457, 459

Highmore v. Molloy iii. 416

Hight v. Bacon i. 630, 631

v. Ripley iii. 60

Hightstown Banlc v. Christopher i. 83

Higinbolham v. Holme iii. 449, 472

Hilarity, The ii. 403

Hildebrand v. Fogle ii. 691

Hildreth v. Pinkerton Academy i. 459

Hill, Ex parte iii. 428, 457, 462, 472

Hill v. Anderson

i. 362

u. Andrus

ii. 454

i). Barclay

iii. 327

v. Barner

i. 130

v. Bellows

iii. 104

v. Buckley

iii.

337, 356

v. Buckminster

i. 290

; ii. 685

v. Calvin

ii

14, 858

v. Chapman

i. 266

v. Corcoran

ii. 904

o. DeRochemont

i. 545

v. Dobie

iii. 447

v. Dunham

ii. 905

v. Dunlap

ii. 866

v. Ely

i. 290

v. Featherstonhaugh i. 110, 128

v. Golden Gate, The ii. 386, 420

v. Gomme iii. 308, 314, 374

v. Grange ii. 639

v. Gray i. 620, 621

v. Green ii. 43, 812

v. Heap i- 316

v. Henry iii. 98

v. Hobart i. 581 ; ii. 666, 790, 794 ;

iii. 245

v. Hooper iii. 41

v. Humphreys ii. 197

v. Idle ii- 425

v. Kendall iii. 72, 76, 92

v. Lafayette Ins. Co. ii. 558

v. Manchester & S. W. Co. ii. 931

v. Meeker iii. 160

v. Miller ii. 647

v. More ii- 844

v. Patten ii. 484

v. Robbins ii. 763, 766

v, Robinson i. 543

v. Smith i. 489; iii. 426, 435, 438, 452

u. Southwick iii. 224

v. Thompson ii. 309, 324

r. Thorn ii. 827

v. Tucker i. 11, 23

c. Voorhies i. 188

u. West i. 466 ; ii. 933

v. Wiggin i. 230

Hill Manufacturing Co. v. Boston, &c.

R. R. Co. ii. 186

v. Morris iii. 429

Hillebrant v. Brewer i. 264

I-Iiller v. English ii. 808, 905

Hilliard v. Greenleaf iii. 391

Hilliard v. Noyes ii. 749

z>. Richardson i. 117

Hillier v. Alleghany Co. Ins. Co. ii. 571

Hilliker v. Francisco i. 208

Hillman v. Wilcox i. 623

Hills v. Bannister i. 636

u. Barnes i. 130 ; ii. 860

</. Croll iii. 364, 366

!>. Lynch i. 573

v. Miller ii. 635

v. Place i. 309

v. Snell i. 556, 562

v. Street i. 496

v. Univ. of Oxford ii. 348

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

C1X

Hillyard v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins.

Co. ii. 615

Hilly er v. Bennett i. 361

Hilton v. Burley ii. 765

v. Dinsmore ii. 10

v. Eckersley i. 487 ; ii. 890, 893

v. Houghton ii. 900, 905

v. Shepherd i. 320

Hime v. Dale ii. 834, 337, 347

Himely v. S. Car. Ins. Co. ii. 525, 532

v. Stewart ii. 495

Himes v. Barnitz ii. 881

Himrod Furnace Co. ■/. Cleveland,

&c. B. Co. iii. 15

Hinchcliffe v. Barwick iii. 223

v. Earl of Kinnoul ii. 664

Hinckley v. Arey ii. 749, 823; iii. 13

v. Kreitz ii. 0

v. Southgate ii. 49; iii. 41

Hind v. Holdship i. 497

Hinde v. Gray ii. 890

v. Liddell iii. 223

v. Whitehouse i. 510, 563, 577, 584 ;

iii. 12, 49

Hindle v. O'Brien iii. 136

Hindley v. Westmeath i. 394, 396, 396,

399

Bondman v. Dill iii. 403

v. Langford iii. 27

v. Shaw ii. 461

Hindman's Appeal ii. 708

Hine v. Allely i. 311

v. Lart ii. 358, 366, 370

Hinely v. Margaritz i. 335, 364, 369

Hines v. Butler i. 475

Hinesburgh v. Sumner i. 481

Hingston v. Wendt ii. 442; iii. 288

Hinkle v. Wanzer i. 251

Hinkley v. Fowler i. 497, 498

v. Marean ii. 719; iii. 391, 607

Hinman v. Hapgood ii. 59

v. Hartford Ins. Co. ii. 557, 559

v. Judson i. 611

v. Moulton i. 473

Hinsdale v. Bank of Orange i- 331

Hinsdell v. Weed ii. 414

Hinton, Ex parte iii. 449

v. Acraman iii. 462

v. Citizens Ins. Co. i- 80

v. Dibbin ii. 268

v. Locke ii. 670, 675, 677

Hirbour v. Eeeding i. 167

Him v. The State of Ohio iii. 510

Hirsch v. Patterson iii. 231

Hirschfeld v. London, &c. E. Co. ii. 915

Hirschman v. Budd ii. 853

Hirschorn v. Canney i. 580

Hiscock v. Phelps i. 167, 172

Hitch v. Davis i. 263

Hitchin v. Groom ii. 624, 691

Hitchcock v. Aicken ii. 741

v. Buchanan i- 282

„.Coker i. 465 ; ii. 369, 890

v. Huat i.-.636

v. Humphrey ii- 24

Hitchcock v. St. John

i. 201

Hitchings v. Ellis

i. 177

Hitner's Appeal

i. 397

Hixon v. Hetherington

i. 246

v. Hixon

iii. 233

Hoadley v. Bliss

i. 315

v. M'Laine

iii. 14

Hoadly v. Northern Trans.

Co. ii. 265

v. Watson

iii. 181

Hoag v. McGinnia

iii. 169, 170

Hoagland v. Moore

ii. 654

v. Segur

iii. 168

Hoard v. Garner

iii. 206

Hoare v. Dresser

i. 64

v. Graham

i. 7

Hobart v. Drogan

ii. 439, 468

v. Littlefield

i. 574

v. Norton

ii. 533

Hobbs v. Francais

ii. 355, 363

v. Hull

i. 401

v. London, &c. E. Co.

iii. 193

v. Memphis Ins. Co.

ii. 475

v. Norton

ii. 939

Hobby v. Dana

ii. 545

Hoblins v. Kimble

iii. 176

Eobson v. Watson

i. 129 ; ii. 60

Hoby v. Eoebuck

iii. 37

Hochster d. De La Tour ii. 38, 800, 809,

810

Hockenbury v. Myers ii. 7

Hockett v. Jones i. 463

Hodgdon v. Hodgdon iii. Ill

v. New York, &c. R. Co. ii. 415

Hodge v. Coombs i. 46

v. Fillis i- 308

v. Hudson River E. E. Co. ii. 319, 324

v. Manley iii. 79, 82

Hodgedon v. Hubbard ii. 928

Hodges v. Dawes i. 180

v. Eastman i. 248, 254

v. Hodges i. 393

v. Horsfall iii. 343

v. King iii. 168

v. Lovatt iii. 132

v. Richmond Mfg. Co. iii. 40

v. Saunders i- 467

v. Smiles i. 280, 331

v. Welch ii. 342

Hodgkins v. Bond iii. 10

Hodgkinson v. Fernie, ii. 422, 430-

v. Fletcher i. 401, 402

Hodgman v. Smith i. 180

Hodgson, Ex parte i. 238; iii. 420, 449

v. Anderson i. 74, 245

v. Barrett i. 568 ; ii. 755

a. Bell iii- 200

v. Davies ii. 668, 811

o. Dexter i- 138

v. Glover ii- 492

v. Hodgson 'j;.695

v. Johnson iii- 38

v. Le Bret "ii- 46

v. Loy i. 642, 645

v. Marine Ins. Co. ii- 490

v. Millward iii. 183

ex

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Hodgson v. Richardson

ii. 622

v. Shaw

ii. 6

v. Temple

ii. 894

Hodnett v. Tatum

i. 51

Hodsden v. Harridge

ii. 801

Hodson, In re

ii. 841

v. Terrill

ii. 759

Hoey v. Eurman

ii. 870

Hoffman v. ^Etna Ins. Co. ii. 470, 478, 570

v. Bechtel ii. 25

v. Brown ii. 850

v. Carrow i. 556

v. Coombs ii. 28

v. John Hancock Ins. Co. ii. 616

v. Noble iii. 270

v. Pitt i. 569

v. Western Ins. Co. ii. 578

Hoffnung, The ii. 426

Hog v. Gouldney ii. 536

Hogaboom v. Herrick ii. 26

Hogan v. Del. Ins. Co. ii. 475

v. Reynolds i. 204

Hogarth v. Latham i. 200

Hogarth v. Wherley ii. 747

Hoge t>. Hoge i. 468

Hogg v. Emerson ii. 328

v. Horner ii. 535

v. Kirby ii. 336, 337, 349, 361

v. Orgill i. l'J8, 242

v. Snaith i. 42

Hoggart v. Scott iii. 336

Hoggins v. Gordon ii. 59, 836

Hogins v. Plympton i. 624, 634

Hogsett v. Ellis iii. 26

Hogshead v. Williams ii. 28

Hogue v. Davis i. 35

Hoit v. Hodge ii. 806

v. Underhill i. 364

Hoitt v. Holcomb ii. 025

Holabird v. Atlantic Ins. Co. ii. 598

Holbird v. Anderson iii. 382

Holbrook v. Allen i. 305

v. Amer. Ins. Co. ii. 575, 585

u. Armstrong iii. 38, 44

... Baker i. 612

v. Bullard ii. 50

v. Burt ii. 811

v. Camp i. 275

v. Chamberlin i. 52, 212, 546

v. Debo ii. 932

v. Foss iii. 403

v. Lackey ii. 878

v. St. Paul Ins. Co. ii. 561

v. Utica & Schen. Co. ii. 240, 817

v. Waters iii. 437

v. Wight i. 107 ; iii. 281

Holbrook & Co., Re iii. 468

Holcomb v. Stimpson ii. 818

Holcombe v. Hewson i. 632

Holcroft v. Barber ii. 35

v. Dickenson ii. 64, 65

Holdemen v. Baker i. 53, 98

Holden v. Cosgrbve i. 273

v. Dakin i. 618, 622, 627

v. Eitchburg R. Co. ii. 45

Holden v. Taylor i- 531

Holder v. Borden ii. 438

v. Dickeson "• 76

Holderness v. Shackels ii. 391 ; iii. 297, 298

Holding v. Pigott i. 544; ii. 669

Holdridge v. Gillespie i. 150

v. Utica, &c. R. R. ii. 251

Holeman v. P. H. White, The ii. 392

Holford v. Blatchford iii. 143, 145, 153

v. Hatch i. 259 ; iii. 424

Holker v. Parker i. 131 ; ii. 825

Holl v. Griffin ii. 152

v. Hadley iii. 103

Holladay i>. Davis i. 93

Holland, Ex parte iii. 432

u. Hodgson i. 546

v. Holland ii. S2

v. Martin iii. 471

v. Pelham ii. 605; iii. 149

v. Turner i. 306, 317

Holliday v. St. Leonard i. 98

Hollingworth v. Tooke i. 107

Hollingsworth v. Napier i. 648, 652 ;

iii. 444

v. Svvedenborg i. 348

Hollis v. Claridge iii. 287

v. Morris ii. 924

v. Pool i. 549

v. Staley i. 240

Hollister v. Hollister ii. 736

v. Nowlen ii. 212, 234, 258, 259, 273

Holloman i\ Life Ins. Co. ii. 593

Holloway v. Griffith ii. 810

v. Hampton iii. 43

v. Holloway ii. 364, 370, 372

v. Lowe ii. 908

Holly v. Rathbono i. 248

Holman v. Johnson ii. 700, 886, 894

v. Loynes , i. 93

Holme v. Brunskill ii. 19

v. Hammond i. 183

Holmer v. Viner iii. 477

Holmes, In the matter of iii. 401

v. Blogg i. 360, 367, 374

u. Buckley i. 261

u. Charlestown Ins. Co. ii. 541, 556,

580
v. German Sec. Bank i. 565

v. Goring ii. 664

v. Higgins i. 164, 184

v. Holmes ii. 85 ; iii. 500

o. Hoskins iii. 46

v. Kerrison i. 302; iii. 97

v. Knights iii. 21

<-. Mather i. 113

v. McGray i. 167

v. Misroon iii. 114

v. N. E. R. Co. ii. 46

v. Onion i. 114

v. Porter i. 182

v. Remsen ii. 701, 738 ; iii. 405, 407,
408, 409
u. Rhodes iii. 200

v. Robinson ii. 874

v. Sinnickson iii. 242

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CXI

Holmes v. Smythe
i). Tremper
v. Trumper
u. United Ins. Co.
v. Weed
v. West
v. Williams
!>. Williamson'

Holsapple v. Rome, &c. R. Co. ii. 270

Hoist c Pownal i. 041

Holt v. Bodey ii. 27

v. Brien i. 387

v. Holt i. 579; iii. 308

v. Ward Clarencieux i. 370, 481 ;

ii. 06
Holten v. Arthur ii. 366

Holtgreve v. Wintker i. 190

Holtliam v. Ryland ii. 806

Holtzman v. Millandon i. 505

Holy land v. De Mendez i. 190; iii. 449
Holyoke v. Haskins ii. 712

Homan v. Brooklyn Ins. Co. i. 54

v. Earle ii. 66

Home Bank v. Carpenter iii. 411

Home Ins Co. v. Augusta iii. 480

o. Baltimore Warehouse Co. ii. 565,

583

v. Curtis ii. 616

v. Green i. 327

v. Hauslein ii. 575

v. Heck i. 565

v. Pierce ii. 617

v. Western Trans. Co. ii. 564

Home, &c. Assoc, v. Thursby iii. 117

Homer v, Ashford i. 467 ; ii. 890

v. Dorr ii. 480

v. Guardian Ins. Co. ii. 610

v. Homer i. 167

v. Thwing i. 356 ; ii. 137

v. Wood i. 208

Homes v. Crane i. 569, 612 ; ii. 122, 401

v. Dana i. 474, 483

v. Smith i. 321

v. Smyth i. 292

Hone v. Mutual Safety Ins. Co. ii. 478,

671

Honeyman v. Marryatt i. 507; iii. 312

Honner v. 111. Central R. R. Co. ii. 46

v. Morton iii. 438

Honnett v. Honnett ii. 88

Honnick «>. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 478

Honore v. Lamar Ins. Co. ii. 504

Honyman v. Campbell ii. 67

Hood v. Adams i. 527

v, Farnstock i. 81

v. Hood ii. 737

u. Manhattan Ins. Co. ii. 478, 483, 537

v. New York & New Haven

R. R. Co. i. 158 ; ii. 231

v. Riley ii. 878

v. State ii. 737

Hood's Estate ii. 708

Hoodly v. McLaine i- 562

Hooe v. Groverman ii. 421

v. Oxley i- 49

iii. 117 Hook v. Hook ii. 940

i. 547 i'. Kinnear iii. 308

ii. 853, 802 r. Moreton ii. 459

ii. 480 v. Pratt i. 465

i. 32 v. Stone i. 201

i. 200 v. White ii. 881

iii. 153, 154 Hooker v. De Palos i. 487

i. 31, -')4 !■. Vandewater ii. 887

Hoop, The ii. 447
Hooper, Ex parte iii. 66, 349, 403

v. Brundage iii. 288

v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 232

v. Edwards ii. 901

v. Goodwin i. 263

u. Keay ii. 766

v. Perley ii. 400

v. Pierce ii. 837

v. Smith iii. 441

v. Stephens iii. 80

v. Tuckerman iii. 403

v. Wells ii. 263
r. Williams i. 277, 278
Hoover v. Pierce i. 486 ; ii. 924

v. Wise i. 81
Hopcraft v. Hickman ii. 829, 834; iii. 309

v. Keys ii. 940

Hope, The ii. 438

Hope, Ex parte iii. 463

v. Booth iii. 462

v. Cust i. 209

r. Dido, The ii. 439

v. Hayley i. 612

v. Liddell iii. 287

Hope Ins. Co. v. Brolaskey ii. 559

Hopewell v. De Pinna ii. 612

Hopkins v. Appleby i. 638

< . A. & St. L. R. R. Co. ii. 240

v. Beebe i. 276

!'. Crittenden iii. 113
v. Forsyth ii. 387, 464

v. Grazebrook iii. 246

if. Grey iii. 381

a. Hopkins ii. 93

u. Lacouture i. 66

v. Lee iii. 245
v. Logan i. 479, 502, 503

v. Megguire ii. 879

v. Mehafly i. 69, 72

v. Richardson ii. 12

v. Roberts iii. 351

v. Sanford iii. 196

e. Smith i. 213

v. Tanqueray i. 621

v. Thompson i. 611

v. Westcott ii. 277
Hopkinson v. Lee i. 14, 16, 17, 18, 22

Hopkirk v. Page i. 310

Hopley v. Dufresne i- 308

Hopper v. Childs iii. 293

v. Hopper iii. 362

v. Sisk ii. 917

Hopping v. Quin i. 128

Hopjon c. Boyd i. 438

v. Trevor iii. 310

Horbach v. Elder i. 32

CX11

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Horder v. Horder

i. 410 ; ii. 78

Houghton v. Houghton

ii. 838

Hore v. Whitmore

ii. 518, 521

v. Manuf. Ins. Co. ii.

524, 520, 553,

Horn v. Buck

i. 617 ; iii. 2iy

555, 556, 557

r. Horn

ii. 874

v. Matthews i. 101; iii

274, 276, 277

i . Ivy

i. 153

v. Maynard

iii. 398, 508

y. Nason

iii. 464

v. Page ii

700; iii. 123

i'. Roberts

ii. 847

Houlditch v. Cauty

i. 322

Hornbuckle r. Hornbury

i. 402

v. Donegal

ii. 740

Hornby c. Lacy

i. 497 ; ii. 745

v. Milne

iii. 27

Horncastle v. Farran

i. 045

Houliston v. Smyth

i. 393

p. IJaworth

ii. 480

Hountz v. Holthouse

i. 246

Horne r. Midland R. Co.

iii. 207

Housatonio Bank v. Laflin

i. 319, 322

v. Kouquette

i. 314

House v. Fort i

617, 622, 623

Horner v. Fish

iii. 107

v. Palmer

ii. 639

v. Flintoff

iii. 172

v. Schooner Lexington

ii. 208

v. Graves

ii. 890

Househill Co. v. Neilson

ii. 310

!•. Leeds

ii. 940

Household Ins. Co. v. Grant

i. 615

v. Marsliall

i. 434

Houseman v. Girard Ass.

i. 80

Horneyer r. Lushington

ii. 480

Houser it. Lamont

iii. 344

Hornsby r. Lee

iii. 437

v. Planters' Bank

iii. 124

Horrel v. M'Alexander

ii. 832

c. Reynolds

i. 363, 306

Horsburgh v. Orme

ii. 749

Houston v. LafEee

iii. 39

Horsefall r. Mather

i. 535; ii. 136

v. Pollard

ii. 829

Horsfall r. Fauntleroy

ii. 745

v. Robertson

ii. 876

v. Handly

i. 85

Houston, &c. R. Co. v. Oram

ii 46

i: Mather

i. 535 ; ii. 136

Hovonden v. Annesley

ii. 940

Horsford v. Wright

iii. 242

Hovey v. American Ins. Co.

ii. 553

Horsley r. Bell

i. 139

v. Blanchard

i. 51, 82

v. Rush

ii. 421

v. Chase

i. 433

Horst v. Wagner

ii. 853

v. Hobson

i. 435

Hort v. Norton i

476 ; ii. 51, 61

v. Hovey

i. 433, 435

Horton v. Benson

ii. 833

v. Sebring

i. 298

v. Champlin

iii. 286

r. Stevens ii.

307, 315, 321

v. Green

i. 617

Hovil v. Pack

i. 51

v. Home

iii. 722

How v. Abbott

ii. 314

v. Mabon

ii. 308

v. Camp

iii. 382

v. Manning

i. 298

v. Kemball ii. 7, 8; iii. 17

v. Stanley

ii. 844

v. Weldon

i. 523

Horton's Appeal

i. 222

v. Whitebanck

i. 90

Hosack v. Weaver

i. 556

v. Whitefield

i. 90

Hosea v. McCrory

ii. 194

Howard i\ Ames i.

289; iii. 253

v. Rowley

ii. 28

v. Babcock

ii. 117

Hosford v. Nichols

ii. 701, 716

r. Baillie

i. 42

Hoskins i: Duperoy

iii. 461

c. Burgen

iii. 43

v. Jliller

i. 385

v. Cadwalader

ii. 922

u. Paul

i. 553

v. Chapman

ii. 747

v. Pickersgill

ii. 483

v. Cobb

ii. 408

Hosmer c. Beebe

i. 104

i\ Continental Ins. Co.

ii. 014

Hostler's case

ii. 148

v. Cooper

ii. 828

Hotchkiss i'. Artisan's Bank ii. 190

v. Crompton

iii. 438

v. Greenwood

ii. 307

u. Crowther

iii. 453

Hotel Co. v. Wade

i. 158

v. Daly

i. 515

Hotham r. East India Co.

ii. 625

v. Doolittle

i. 532

Houdlette v. Tallman

i. 566

v. Edgell ii.

826; iii. 316

Hougli v. Edwards

iii. 286

v. Ellis

iii. 313, 328

v. Evans

ii. 918

r. Emerson

i. 632

v. May

ii. 755

f. Grover

ii. 58

v. People's Ins. Co.

ii. 583

v. Henriques ii.

354, 360, 363

v. Richardson

i. 621

v. Hildreth

iii. 109

v. Warr

ii. 34

v. Hoey

i. 631

Houghtaling v. Ball

ii. 700

v. Holbrook

iii. 18

v. Houghtaling

iii. 37

v. Hopkyns

iii. 310

v, Marvin

i. 77

v. Howard

i. 59

Houghton, Ex parte

iii. 464

v. Hudson

ii. 936, 943

v. Adams

ii. 754

r. Ives

i. 318

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CX1I1

Howard v. Jemmett iii. 424, 439
u. Kentucky & Louisville M. Ins.

Co. iii. 607

v. Macondray ii. 425

v. Miner i. 575 ; ii. 784

v. Mississippi Bank i. 300

v. Odell- ii. 396, 400

v. Priest i. 170

v. Rogers iii. 345

v. Sexton ii. 825

v. Shepherd i. 328

v. Smith i. 108
r. Tucker ii. 943; iii. 206

v. Whetstone i. 393

v. Williams i. 569

v. Wissman ii. 410

Howard's case ii. 486

Howard Bank, Ex parte iii. 469

Howard College v. Pace i. 248

Howden v. Haigh iii. 477

v. Simpson i. 486

Howe v. Abbott ii. 307, 312

o. Batchelder iii. 36

... Bradley i. 306 ; ii. 769

t-. Handley i. 12 ; iii. 218

v. Hayward iii. 58

v. Howe Machine Co. ii. 378

v. Howe Man. Co. ii. 372

v. Huntington ii. 666, 795

v. Merrill i. 300

v. Morton ii. 314

v. Newmarch i. 115

o. Nickels ii. 14, 15, 16

v. O'Mally i. 478

v. Ould i. 271

v. Palmer iii. 47, 51

a. Searing ii. 369, 378

v. Sheppard ii. 877

v. Synge i. 488

v. Thompson iii. 92

v. Underwood ii. 304

v. Ward i. 35
Howe Machine Co. v. Ballmeg ii. 745

v. Reber iii. 224

v. Willie ii. 814

Howell v. Burnet iii. 103

v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. ii. 556

v. Coupland i. 491; ii. 805

v. Edgar in\ 382

v. Gordon i. 78

u. Harding ii. 875

v. Harvey i. 219

v. Jackson ii- 161

v. Knickerbocker Ins. Co. ii. 617

v. Mclvers i- 475

v. Morlan ii- 153

v. Selving i- 147

v. Sevier ii- 28

v. Young iii- 99

Howells v. Landore Steel Co. ii. 47

Howes, In re »i- 460

v. Barker »■ 458

v. Bigelow i- 383, 385

Howie v. Ray iii- 219

Howland, Ex parte i"- 415

Howland v. Carson i. 303

v. Comm. Ins. Co. ii. 480, 648

v. Continental Ins. Co. ii. 016

v. Greenway ii. 415

u. Harris i. 594

i . Lounds i. 513

v. Mar. Ins. Co. ii. 512

Howlet v. Strickland ii. 873, 879

Ilowley v. Whipple ii. 2!>8

Howson v. Hancock ii. 760, 887

Howton v. Frearson ii. 664

Howze v. Patterson i. 200

Hoxie v. Carr i. 168, 169, 171, 172

i'. Home Ins. Co. ii. 410

v. Pacific Ins. Co. ii. 531

Hoy v. Holt i. 537

!■. Rogers i. 383

Hoyle v. Stowe i. 363, 366, 368, 370

Hoyt v. Bridgewater Co. iii. 143

v. Byrnes ii. 753, 774

v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. ii. 203

v. French ii. 28

u. McKenzie ii. 336

v. N. Y. Ins. Co ii. 606

v. Shipherd i. 92

v. Sprague i. 150 ; ii. 045

v. Wildfire ii. 38, 461

Hubbard v. Callahan iii. 113

v. Charlestown Branch R. R.

Co. iii. Ill

v. Coolidge i. 466, 509

v. Cummings i. 361, 367, 368

-o. Glover ii. 523

u. Hartford Ins. Co. ii. 559, 583

v. Jackson i. 297

». Matthews i. 226

v. Morgan i. 242

v. Norton iii. 244

v. Shaw i. 537

Hubbell v. Carpenter ii. 29

v. Cramp iii. 478

v. Great Western Ins. Co. ii. 400

Hubbersty i\ Ward i. 44 ; ii. 190, 409

Hubbert v. Borden i. 57

Huber v. Steiner ii. 721

Hubert v. Moreau iii- 6

v. Turner iii. 6, 11

Hubgh v. New Orleans R. R. ii. 46

Hubon v. Park iii. 23

Huck v. Globe Ins. Co. ii- 569

Huckle v. Money iii. 183, 187, 188

Huckman v. Fernie i. 47, 62, 79 ; ii. 597,

599
Hucks v. Thornton ii. 486, 527

Huddersfield Canal Co. v. Buckley

ii. 873

Huddlestone's case i- "6

Hudnal v. Wilder i. 264, 569

Hudnall v. Scott ii- 881

Hudson v. Baxendale ii. 224, 410, 416

v. Bennett ii- 3'7

v. Bilton ij- 521

L-. Clementson ii- 688

v. Granger i. 107; ii- 883

v. Guestier «• 399

cxiv

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Hudson r. Harrison
v. Hudson
v. Johnson
v. Bevett
v. Robinson
v. Tenny
v. Worden

ii. 512

i. 140

ii. 746

i. 123

i. 12

iii. 112

ii. 57

Huelsenkampf v. Citizen's E. E. Co. ii. 240

Huey v. Pinney ii. 24

Haft' i'. McCauley iii. 36

v. Nickerson i. 500 ; ii. 042

v. Wright i. 411

Huffman i-rHulbert ii. 24, 25

Hugg v. Augusta Ins. Co. ii. 409, 418,

503, 505, 509, MO

Huggeford r. Ford iii. 218

Hughes, Ex parte i. 95; iii. 420

v. Hughes i. 048

v. Humphreys ii. 55

v. Kerney " iii. 294, 205

?>. Kiddell i. 298

c. Large i. 290

c. Lenny iii. 272

i'. Morris iii. 046

v. Stanley i. 558

v. Stubbs iii. 315

v. AVashington i. 93

v. Wheeler ii. 757 ; iii. 125

v. Young iii. 364

Hughes's Appeal i. 151

Huguenin !•. Basely i. 93

v. TCayley ii. 598, 912

Hulett v. Craig ii. 806

v. Hugg ii. 882

r. Smith ii. 156, 157

Hull v. Augustine i. 282

r. Blake ii. 738

... Caldwell iii. 113

i.Clark iii. 211

v. Connolly i. 350

v. Cooper ii. 532

v. Hull ii. 736, 938

v. Northwestern Ins. Co. ii. 018

v. Peer iii. 333

v. Piekersgill i. 49, 50, 53

Hull Dock Co. v. Browne ii. 487

Hull of a New Ship ii. 126, 129

Hulle v. Heightman ii. 44

Hulme v. Muggleston iii. 439, 469

Hultz v. Gibbs i. 393

Humble v. Hunter i. 55, 56

v. Mitchell iii. 50

Hume v. Bolland i. 209

k. Hord i. 409

p. Peploe ii. 771

Humes r. Scruggs iii. 455

Humplirey v. Arabin ii. 607

v. Dale i. 590, 591; ii. 667

v. Douglass i. 356

i: Phinney iii. 239

Humphreys v. Comline i. 023, 632

0. Gardner ii. 826

v. Ouillow ii. 860

v. Jones iii. 76

v. Lundy iii, 08

Humphreys v. Union Ins. Co. ii. 605, 508
Humphries v. Blight's Assignees

iii. 424, 439

v. Chastain

v. Harrison
Hundley v. Webb
Hunsaker v. Sturgis
Hunsden v. Cheyney
Hunt, Ex parte

v. Adams

v. Bate

v. Bell

i. 218

i. 381

i. 569

ii. 120

ii. 77

i. 351

ii. 7, 857

i. 475, 503

ii. 897

t: Bridgham ii. 26, 28 ; iii. 88

k Carlisle ii. 468

v. Chicago, &c. E. E. Co. ii. 48

v. Cleveland, The ii. 414

v. DeBlaquire i. 393, 401, 402

v. Pish i. 321

v. Frost ii. 685

v. Hall ii. 716
v. Haskell ii. 215, 220, 221, 419 ;
iii. 210, 252, 269

i: Hecht iii. 52

v. Hort ii. 693

v. Hunt ii. 92, 737

v. Johnson i. 384 ; ii. 78

v. Jones ii. 700

v. Maybee i. 316

u. Moore ii. 921

i'. Nevers iii. Ill

u. Nugent i. 320

v. Otis Company ii. 37, 39, 879

v. Peake i. 370, 481 ; ii. 66

v. Eousmanier i. 74, 76 ; iii. 355

v. Eoyal Ex. Ass. Co. i. 211 ; ii. 794

v. Saekett i. 616

... Silk ii. 813, 814

v. Thompson i. 343

v. United States ii. 26, 28

v. Wimbledon Local Board i. 154

Hunt's Appeal ii. 85

Hunter v. Agnew i. 335, 3o3

?'. Bennison ii. 834

v. Boucher i. 394, 395

v. Daniel iii. 338

v. Fry ii. J22
v. General Mut. Ins. Co. N. Y. ii. 648

v. Hatfield ii. 73

v. Hudson River, &c. Co. i. 79

f. Hunt i. 31

v. Hunter i. 263

v. Jameson i. 62

v. Leathley ii. 484, 534

v. Le Conte i. 534

o. Miller i. 55

v. Osterhondt i. 550

v. Parker i. 52, 85, 122

v. Potts ii. 428 ; iii. 406
u. Prinsep ii. 398, 413, 418, 484 ;
iii. 210

v. Rice i. 571

v. Robinson iii. 101

v. Wetsell iii. 58

». Wright ii. 481

Hunter, The ii. 402, 403

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

cxv

Huntgate v. Mease ii. 837

Huntington v. American Bank ii. 772

v. Finch ii. 857

v. Gilmore i. 263, 205

v. Hall i. 610

v. Knox i. 56, 66

Huntley v. Bacon iii. 183

v. Bulwer i. 128

v. Sanderson iii. 98

Huntly v. Waddell _ i. 615

Huntress v. Patten iii. 132

Huntress, The ii. 416

Huntzinger v. Brock iii. 507

Hurd v. Brydges iii. 416

u. Cook i. 567

v. Fogg i ii. 875

v. Little i. 324

v. West ii. 142, 144

Hurdle v. Waring i. 515

Hurff v. Hires i. 665, 566

Hurlburt v. Pacific Ins. Co. ii. 885

Hurley v. Brown ii. 631

v. Milward ii. 448

Huron, The, v. Simmons ii. 302

Hurry v. Hurry ii. 401, 421

o. John & Alice, The ii. 401

v. Mangles i. 048

o. Royal Exch. Ass. Co. ii. 488

Hursh v. Byers ii. 102

v. Sheets i. 129

Hurst v. Bambridge ii. 829
v. Gwennap iii. 426, 458

v. Hill i. 219

v. Holding i. 110

v. Usborne ii. 422

Hurt v. Clarke i. 208

v. Southern R. R. Co. ii. 238

Hurtin v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 523, 524

v. Union Ins. Co. ii- 419

Husband v. Davis ii. 748

Husbands v. Smith's Adm'r i. 140

Huscombe v. Standing i. 446

Huse v. Hamblin i. 279

v. MeDaniel ii. 756

Hussey v. Christie i>- 454

v. Criekett ii. 896

v. Freeman i. 318

v. Horn-Payne iii- 17

v. Jewett i. 370
a. Roundtree i. 338; ii. 52

v. Thornton i. 564

v. Whitely ii. 324

Hustler, Ex parte iii. 282

Huston v. Cantril i- 460

v. Moorhead iii. 152

Hutcheson r. Blakeman i. 505, 516

Hutchins v. Adams iii- 176

v. Bank of Tenn. i- 109

i». Brackett ii- 1°*

r. Gilchrist i- 570
v. Hebbard i. 74 ; ii. 938

c. Hudson i- 191

u. Kimmell ii- 84, 86

o. King »i- 35

o. Olcutt »■ 645

Hutchins v. Riddle

v. Scott

v. Turner
Hutchinson v. Bowker

v. Coombs

v. Gascoigne

v. Hosmer

v. Howard

v. Moody

v. Morley

v. Pettes

v. Reid

v. Smith

v. Sturges

v. Tatham

v. Watkins

ii. 874

ii. 855

i. 209

i. 508

ii. 464

iii. 416

iii. 143, 149

iii. 286

ii. 28

ii. 020

iii. 280

. 879; iii. 226

i. 205, 238

ii. 873

i. 58 ; ii. 668

i. 557

v. York, Newcastle, & Berwick
Ry. Co. ii. 46

Hutchison v. Bowker, i. 505 ; ii. 471, 624,

628, 666

v. Mitchell
Huthacher v. Harris
Hutson v. Merrifield
Huttmann r: Boulnois
Hutton v. Bragg

v. Bulloch

v. Eyre

v. Mansell

v. Moore

v. Padgett

v. Warren i. 537, 544; ii.

i. 27

ii. 78

i. 562

ii. 608

ii. 35

ii. 421

i. 67, 105

ii. 850

ii. 66

i. 561

iii. 17

, 670, 678

ii. 10

i. 206

iii. 178, 187

i. 603, 624, 626

i. 227

ii. 143, 145

ii. 729

Huyler v. Atwood
Hyat t\ Hare
Hyatt v. Adams

v. Boyls
Hyde v. Brashear
v. Cookson
v. Hyde

v. Johnson iii. 85

v. Louisiana Ins. Co. ii. 507

v. Paige i- 66

v. Stone i. 385; iii. 115

v. Trent & Mersey Navigation ii. 150,
196, 204, 205, 415, 669
v. Wolf i- 66

v. Woods iii- 431

Hydraulic Engineering Co. v. McHaf-

fie ii. 629; iii. 196,197

Hyleing v. Hastings iii- 68

Hylton v. Brown iii. 238

Hynds v. Schenectady Co. Ins. Co.

ii. 547, 573
Hyne v. Dewdney (• 280

Hynes v. Stewart i- 230

Hysinger v. Baltzells iii- 103

Hyslop v. Clarke iij- 382

v. Jones i' 319

I.

Icard v. Goold
Ide v. Gray

v. Pass. Riv. R. R. Co.

v. Stanton

ii. 460

ii. 913

i. 331

iii. 14, 18

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Idle v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co. ii. 396, 397,

510

r. Thornton i. 597

Ilett e. Collins iii. 294

Iley !•. Frankenstein i. 681

Illidge v. Goodwin ii. 247

Illinois, The ii. 435, 483

111. Central R. R. Co. a. Cox ii. 46

v. Frankenberg ii. 227

v. Mitchell ii. 232

v. Patterson iii. 311

111., &e. R. R. Co. u. Johnson ii. 227

, . Rend ii. 238, 270

c. Whittemore ii. 240

Illinois Ins. Co. v. Andes Ins. Co. ii. 494

Illinois, &c. Soe. v. Winthrop ii. 593

Illslev v. Jewett ii. 756; iii. 80

Inchoff v. Chicago R. R. Co. ii. 250

Imlay v. Elleften ii. 719 ; iii. 391

r. Huntington i. 409

t-. N. & W. R. R. Co. ii. 315

v. Wikoff ii. 831

Imperial Gas Light & Coke Co. v.

London Gas Light Co. iii. 107

Imperial Ins. Co. i>. Murray ii. 565

Imperial Marine Ins. Co. v. Fire Ins.

Corporation ii. 484

Importers' Ins. Co. c. Christie i. 539

Inee, In re ii. 284

Independent Ins. Co., Re iii. 401

Independent Ins. Co. v. Agnew ii. 571

Indiana, The ii. 431

Indiana Ins. Co. v. Coquillard ii. 539

Indiana, &c. R. R. Co. v. Beaver ii. 245

r. Mundy ii. 238

Indianapolis, &c. R. R. Co. v. Allen ii. 271

( . Horst ii. 245

r. Maguire i. 565

v. Paramore ii. 24'J

Indianapolis Ins. Co. v. Brown iii. 125

Industry, The ii. 439

Infanta, The ii. 458

Ingalls v. Bills ii. 180, 236, 243

v. Cole ii. 628

v. Herrick i. 569

r. Lee i. 291; iii. 153, 150

v Lord iii. 210

IngalUbv v. Wood ii. 104

I. & C. R. R. Co. o. Rutherford ii. 817

Ingate v. Christie ii. 179

Inge v. Bond i. 616

Ingersol v. Jones ii. 70

v. Van Rookkelin iii. 210

Ingersoll u. Baker ii. 7

r. Ingersoll ii. 91

r. Martin i. 403

Ingle r. Hartman i. 94

Ingledew v. Douglas i. 352

Inglis v. Haigh iii. 93, 94, 96

!•. Vaux ii. 487

Ingraham v. Albee ii. 466

( . Geyer iii. 407, 409

v. Gilbert i. 462

v. Grigg iii. 403

r. Hall ii. 751

Ingraham v. South Carolina Ins. Co. ii. 526

v. Wheeler »• 395

v. Whitmore i-. 102

Ingram v. Ingram i- 89

v. Jordan iii- 224

v. Lawson iii. 197

v. Webb ii- 834

Inkster v. Marshall Bank _ ii. 25

Inman v. Foster iii- 179

Inman Steamship Co. v. Bisehoff ii. 498

Innel v. Newman ii. 749

Innes v. Stephenson ii. 747

Ins. Co. v. Bruce ii. 943

v. Colt ii. 471

v. Davis i. 78

v. Dunham ii. 470

v. Dutcher ii. 615

v. Eggleston ii. 617

u. Express Co. ii. 570

u. Foley ii. 597

v. Haven ii. 559

v. Jarvis ii. 539, 615

v. McCain i. 75 ; ii. 745

v. Railroad Co. ii. 228

t>. Southard ii. 542, 554, 556

v. Stinson ii. 561

v. Thompson ii. 501

v. Updegraff ii. 561, 504

v. Webster ii. 544

v. "Weides ii. 587, 588

Ins. Co. of Penn. v. Smith ii. 472

Ionic, The ii. 275

Ionides v. Pacific Ins. Co. ii. 483, 484,

522, 525
i. Pender ii. 526

v. Universal, &c. Ins. Co. ii. 498

Ipswich Manufacturing Company r.

Story ii. 852

Irby v. Wilson ii. 732

Ireland v. Kip i. 306

v. Livingston i. 61, 572, 597 ; ii. 674

Ireland's case iii. 167

Irish v. Cutter i. 263, 275, 283

v. Nutting i. 203

Irons v. Kentner i. 565; ii. 149

v. Smallpieee i. 203

Irvine v. Crockett i. 370

a. Irvine i. 303

v. Kirkpatrick i. 620 ; ii. 918. 924

i'. Stone i. 486 ; iii. 19

v. Watson i. 65, 67 ; ii. 745

v. Withers i. 309

Irving v. Greenwood ii. 70, 76

v. Manning ii. 491, 506, 507

v. Motley i. 79

u. Thomas i. 619 ; ii. 920

v. Veitch iii. 77, 80, 97

Irwin v. Bidwell i. 174

Isaac v. Clark ii. 105

Isa'acs v. Cooper ii. 324

Isabella Jacobina, The ii. 420

Isbell v. Norvell ii. 136

Isberg v. Bowden ii. 873, 883, 885

Island City, The ii. 435, 437, 439, 442

Isle Royale Mining Co. v. Hertin iii. 214

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CXV11

Isler w. Baker

i. 223

Jackson v. Lever

iii. 429

Israel v. Clark

ii. 242

v. Ligon

iii. 356

Itinerant, The

ii. 428

v. Lodge

ii. 870

Ivans v. Draper

i. 19'

v. Lomas

iii. 477

Ives v. Jones

i. 37, 87

v. Loomis

iii. 238

v. Sterling

i. 484

v. Lowe

iii. 4

Ives's case

ii. 646

v. Lunn

i. 448

Iveson i>. Conington

i. 129

v. Malin

ii. 856

Ivey v. McQueen

iii. 183

v. Mass. Ins. Co. ii.

493,

562, 575,

Izon v. Gorton

i. 532

582, 583

v. Mayo i

364,

370, 497

v. Murray

ii. 933

J.

v. Packard
v. Parker

iii. 129
i. 309

Jaccard v. Anderson

i. 315

v. Parks

i. 399

Jack, In re

iii. 316

a. Parkhurst

ii.

680, 931

v. McKee

iii. 247

v. Pierce

iii. 66

Jack Park, The

ii. 459

v. Ransom

ii. 687

Jacks v. Bell

iii. 185

v. Reeves

ii. 638

v. Moore

ii. 881

v. Richards

i. 313

v. Nichols

iii. 123

v. Robinson i. 176, 183; ii. 387

Jacobs, Ex parte

i. 324

v. Rogers

ii. 185

Jackson, Ex parte

i. 214

; iii. 418

v. Schoonmaker

ii. 479

v. Alexander

i. 189

a. Sedgwick

i. 229

v. Ambler

ii. 828

v. Sill

ii. 680

v. Baker

i. 104

; iii. 173

v. Stackhouse ii

634,

849, 851

v. Bartlett

ii. 746

v. Stevens

ii.

634, 933

v. Blodgett

ii. 635,

638, 640

v. Stewart

i. 125

v. Bowen

iii. 130

v. Tufner

iii. 242

v. Bryan

i. 548

u. Union Bank

ii. 113

v. Bull

ii. 933

v. Van Dalfsen

i. 95

v. Burchin

i.

365, 368

v. Vanderhayden

i. 4oe

; ii. 933

v. Carpenter

i.

365, 368

v. Walker

i. 489

v. Catlin

iii. 12

v. Walsh

i. 95

v. Charnock

ii. 446

o. Wetherill

i. 623

v. Cobbin

i. 502,

503, 536

v. Wheat

iii. 103

v. Cocker

iii. 309

v. Wilcox

ii. 919

v. Cornell

i. 238

v. Winslow

ii. 933

v. Covert

iii. 60

v. Wood

iii. 237

v. Craig

ii. 689

v. Yabsley

ii. 833

v. Cummings

iii. 267

v. York & Cumberland R. R. Co. i. 330

v. Davis

ii. 940

ii. 178

v. Delong

ii. 829

Jackson Ins. Co. v. Partee

i. 78

; iii. 440

v. Duchaire

ii. 8, 78

; iii. 477

Jacky v. Butler

i. 233

v. Dunsbagh

ii. 635

Jacob, The

ii. 403

v. Eddy

i. 542

Jacob v. Kirk

iii. 14

v. Evans

iii. 39

Jacobs v. Adams

iii. Ill

v. Farmers Ins. Co.

ii. 493

v. Featherstone

i. 407

v. Fitzsimmons

i. 448

v Latour

iii. 260

v. Galloway

i. 506

v. Locke

iii. 337

d. Gibbs v. Osborn

ii. 860

Jacobson v. Le Grange

ii. 58

v. Green

i. 448

v. Williams

iii.

431, 433

v. Henry

iii. 130

Jacomb v. Harwood

i. 26

v. Hubble

ii. 932

Jaffray v. Crane

ii. 28

v. Hudson i

326; ii.

639, 643

Jagger Iron Co. v. Walker

ii. 756

v. Ireland

ii. 645

Jaggers v. Binnings

ii. 391

v. Irvin

iii. 418

Jalie v. Cardinal

ii. 163

v. Jackson ii.

732, 736

; iii. 352

James Adgar

ii. 433

v. Jacob

ii. 745

James v. Attwood

ii. 844

v. Jacoby

ii. 860

v. Bixby

ii. 50

v. Johnson

ii. 766

; iii. 102

v. Campbell

iii. 178

v. Jones

iii. 129

v. Catherwood

ii. 700

v. King

iii. 414

v. Chalmers

i. 329

v. Lamphlre

iii.

488, 511

v. Cotton

ii. 812

v. Lawrence

ii. 639

v. David

ii. 819

cxvm

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

James v. Dowell

ii. 863

v. Emery
v. Fulerod

i. 14, 16, 16, 17

i. 478

u. Griffin

i. 644

v. Jones

ii. 195

v. Le Roy

v. Lycoming Ins. Co.

ii. 67
ii. 551

v. McCredie

i. 60

v. Morey
v. Morgan
v. Muir

iii. 190
i. 466
i. 561

v. O'Driscoll

ii. 58

v. Patten

iii. »

v. Pawnee, The

ii. 392

v. Raggett
v. Shore

ii. 875
i. 525

v. Stratton

i. 232

c. Stull

iii. 511

v. Williams i. 478; iii. 16, 17, 81

James Church v. Moore i. 278

Jameson a. Brick & Stone Co. iii. 440

v. Gregory i. 581

v. Royal Ins. Co. ii. 573

v. Swinton i. 320, 323

Jamey v. Columbia Ins. Co. ii. 398

Jamieson, In re ii. 844

Jamison v. Brady ii. 877

v. Cosby ii. 18

Jane, The ii. 402, 404

Jane & Matilda, The ii. 459

Janes v. Whitbread i. 174

Janet Mitchell, The ii. 438

Jaques v. Marquand i. 204, 205

c. Methodist Church i. 400

v. Todd i. 39

v. Withy ii. 874

Jarmain v. Algar iii. 24

Jarman v. Woolloton iii. 455

Jarrald v. Houlston ii. 336, 341, 343, 349

Jarvis v. Brooks i. 169, 239

v. Chappie ii. 882, 883

v. Davis i. 569

v. Peck i. 488; ii. 891

v. Rogers ii. 127. 129

v. Wilkins iii. 17

Jay v. Almy ii. 465

Jebsen v. East & West India Dock Co.

iii. 186, 190
Jee r. Thurlow i. 398, 399, 400

Jeffcott v. No. Brit. Oil Co. i. 585

Jefferson v. Adams iii. 184, 185

v. Washington ii. 710

Jefferson Co. Bank v. Chapman ii. 882
Jefferson Ins. Co. v Cothral ii. 542, 545,

554
Jeffersonville R. R. Co. v. Cleveland

ii. 203

v. Hendrick ii. 250

v. White ii. 151

Jpffery v. Walton ii. 084, 685

Jefferys v. Boosey ii. 330, 338

v. Gurr i. 500

c. Jefferys iii. 318

Jefford v. Ringgold i. 370

Jeffrey v. Bigelow i. 79

Jeffreys v. Baldwin

ii.-348

Jeffries v. G. W. R. R. Co.

ii. 816

v. Ins. Co.

ii. 656

v. Jeffries

iii. 335

v. Wiester

i. 94

Jefts v. York

i. 72

Jelliet v. Broade

ii. 888

Jemison r. Blowers

iii. 478

Jenckes v. Cook

i. 540

Jencks v. Coleman

ii. 241

Jendwine v. Slade

i. 622

Jenkins r. Bacon

i. 476

ii. 108

v. Blizard

i. 191

u. Brewster

i. 258

v. Eldridge

iii. 32

v. Gillespie

i. 131

ii. 825

v. Heycock

ii. 531

v. Hooker

i. 253

«. Hopkins

iii. 245

v. Hutchinson

i. 72

v. Jarrett

i. 563

v. Nicholson Pavement Co. ii. 319

v. Pickett ii. 194

v. Quincy Ins. Co. ii. 555

v. Reynolds iii. 16, 17, 18

v. Robertson ii. 807

Jenks v. Lewis ii. 465

Jenkyns r. Brown i 650

v. Usborne i. 328, 645, 651, 652 ;

ii. 409 ; iii. 444, 445

Jenness v. Bean i. 292

v. Carleton i. 225

v. Emerson i. 349

v. Wendell ii. 814 ; iii. 49

Jenney r. Aldon i. 349

v. Lesdemier i. 131

Jennings v. Broughton iii. 370

u. Brown i. 460, 465

v. Camp ii. 39, 655

v. Chenango Co. Ins. Co. ii. 522, 542,

553, 560

v. Estes i. 198

v. Gage i 557

v. Gratz i. 624

u. Ins. Co. ii. 402

v. Johnson iii. 218

!-. Maddock iii. 184

v. Merrill i. 102

!•. Newman i. 143

v. Pitman i. 354 ; ii. 54

v. Roberts i. 322, 323

i: Rundall i. 356

r. Thomas i. 284

Jennison v. Parker ii. 120

v. Stafford i. 470

Jenys r, Pawler i. 300

Jeremy v. Goochman i. 475

Jerome v. Bigelow i. 487

v. Scudder iii. 338

v. Whitney i. 279

Jersey City, &c. R. R. Co. v. Jersey

City, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 270

Jersey Glass Co. iii. 417

Jerusalem, The ii. 381,403

Jervis v. Berridge iii. 16, 18

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CX1X

Jervoise v. Silk i. 347

Jesse v. Roy i. 441 ; ii. 458

Jessel v. Williamsburgh Ins. Co. i. 254

Jeune !'. Ward i. 882

Jewell v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. ii. 240

v. Grand Trunk R. Co. ii. 199

v. ii. 031

Jewett' v. Carter i. 79

i>. Cornforth i. 35

v. Dockray i. 255

ir. Dringer ii. 145; iii. 213

v. Miller i. 95; ii. 935

v. Preston iii. 434

o. Ricker iii. 38

v. Stevens i. 198

v. Warren i. 474 ; iii. 47, 49

Jewitt v. Wadleigh i. 131

Jewry v. Busk ii. 69

Tewson v. Moulson i. 381 ; iii. 437

Tilson v. Gilbert iii. 41

Todderell v. Cowell iii. 449

Jodrell v. Jodrell iii. 374

Joel v. Morrison ii. 247

Johan & Siegnmnd, The ii. 388

Johann Friedrich, The ii. 434

Johannes, The ii. 439

Johannes Christoph, The ii. 454

John Hancock Ins. Co. v. Daly ii. 597

v. Moore ii. 603

John Owen, The, v. Johnson ii. 413

John Perkins, The ii. 437

John r. Bacon ii. 251

Johns u. Bailey ii. 903

v. Dodsworth i. 28

v. Johns ii. 88, 91 ; iii. 66

v. Simons i- 84

v. Stevens ii. 840

Johnson, Ex parte i. 217, 306

v. Arnold iii. 195

v. Arrigoni i. 307

v. Bank of N. America i. 296

v. Barry i. 199, 200

v. Berlizheimer i. 227

v. Berkshire Ins. Co. ii. 574

v. Blasdale i. 73, 88, 272

v. Blenkensop ii. 37

v. Bloodgood i. 258

v. Boone ii- 766

v. Boston ii. 47

v. Buck iii- 11, 15, 18

v. Campbell i. 107 ; iii. 276

a. Clark i- 167

v. Clay ii. 771, 772

v. Collins . i- 27

v. Cope i. 618

v. Courts iii- 240

v. Craig __ i- &

v. Cranage !

v. Credit Lyonnais Co.

v. Cunningham

a. Cuttle

v. Day

v. Dodgson

v. Dorsey

v. Evans

102
ii. 746
iii. 53
ii. 898
iii. 6
i. 466
i. 236

Johnson v. Parnum

iii. 273

v. Pitzhugh

iii. 471

v. Poster

i. 49S

v. Gilbert

iii. 27

v. Greaves

ii. 405

v. Hartshorne

i. 228

v. Helmstaedter

iii. 441

v. Henderson

i. 279

v. Hersey

i. 208

v. Hill

ii. 167

v. Holdsworth

ii. 749

v. Hopkins

iii. 08

v. Huckins

ii. 463

v. Hudson

ii. 894

v. Hudson River R. Co.

ii. 248

f. Hunt ii. 380 ; iii. 409, 436

v. Jackson ii. 815

v. Johnson i. 32, 381, 526 ; ii. 648, 651,
712; iii. 125, 356
v. Kennion i. 297, 298

v. Knapp ii. 11

v. Lancashire R. Co. i. 564

o. Lancaster ii. 771, 772

v. Latham ii. 830

v. Lines i. 336, 350

v. Marlborough ii. 860

v. Marriott i. 127

v. Martinus i. 290

v. McDonald i. 595, 596

v. Medlicott i. 435

v. Meeker i. 301

v. Midland Railway ii. 185, 187

v. Miln ii. 422

v. Morse ii. 869

v. Municipality i. 154

v. Nyoe iii- 243

v. Ogilby i. 67

v. O'Hara i. 104

v. Peck ii. 914

v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 586

v. Pie i. 357

v. Planters Bank ii. 24

r. Reynolds ii. 163

v. Root ii. 304, 309, 315, 317

v. Sandusky, The ii. 383

ii. Schooner McDonough ii. 154

v. Shrewsbury & B. Ry. Co. iii. 322,
330, 374
v. Sims i. 442 ; ii. 458

v. Smith i. 51, 55 ; iii. 49

v. Somers iii. 14

v. Somerville iii- 312

v. Stone ii. 275, 277

v. Sumner iii. 211

v. Thayer i. 246

v. Totten i. 192

v. Trinity Church iii- 8

v. Union Ins. Co. ii- 578

v. Watson iii- 44

v. Way i. 289

v. White ii- 871

v. Whitwell iii- 381, 3X2

». Wilson i. 25 ; ii. 835

v. Winona R. R. Co. ii- 236

Johnson's Appeal i- 151

cxx

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Johnson & Stowers, Re

iii. 421

Jones v. Harris

i. 78

Johnston, Ex parte

i. 306

v. Herbert

i. 210 ; ii. 852

v. Bower

ii. 863

o. Hibbert

iii. 451

v. Brown

i. 42 ; ii. 143

v. Hoar

ii. 772

v. Browne

i. 558, 565

v. Hoey

ii. 674

v. Caulkins

ii. 809

v. Hook

ii. 719

v. Commonwealth

ii. 900, 901

v. Hoyt

ii. 413

v. Cope

i. 627

u. Ins. Co.

ii. 531

v. Dutton

i. 217

v. Johnson

ii. 853

v. Fessler

i. 506

v. Jones i.

646; ii. 91, 853

u. Glancy ii

. 66, 349, 358

v. Judd

ii. 63, 792

v. Huddleston

ii. 798

v. Kilgore

ii. 7G5

v. Nicholls

ii. 24

v. Lees

ii. 893

v. Orr Ewing

ii. 370

v. Lewis

iii. 101

(/-. Searcy

ii. 28

v. Littledale

i. 68, 527

v. South Western Railroad Bank i. 79

v. Lock

i. 266

v. Thompson

ii. 26

v . Lusk

i. 231

v. Wabash College

i. 482

v. Marcy

iii. 41

v. Wilcox

i. 78

v. Marsh

i. 550 ; iii. 225

Johnstone v. Huddlestone

i. 544, 648 ;

v. Marshall

iii. 177

ii. 940

v. Mechanics Ins. Co

ii. 586

Joliet Iron Co. u. Scioto Brick Co. ii. 128

u. Merchants Bank

ii. 128

Jolland, v.

i. 97

v. Moore

iii. 92

Jollett v. Deponthieu

iii. 406

v. Morrisett, The

ii. 392

Jollie v. Jacques

ii. 348

v. Nanney

i. 527

Jolly v. Baltimore Equitable So-

v. Neptune Ins. Co.

ii. 484

ciety

ii. 551

o. Newman

ii. 689

Jonasshon v. G. N. Ry. Co.

ii. 663

a. Nicholson

ii. 497, 500

Jones, Ex parte

iii. 143, 465

v. Noy

i. 76, 223

v. Ashburnham i.

470, 472, 473

v. O'Brfe'n

i. 308

v. Ashford

ii. 5

v. Pearce

ii. 313

v. Barcley

ii. 659

v. Perkins

i. 435

v. Belt

iii. 337

v. Peterman

iii. 66

v. Bennett

ii. 836

v. Pitcher

ii. 396

v. Blanchard

iii. 409

v. Powell

iii. 467

v. Blum

ii. 391

v. Provincial Ins. Co.

ii. 593

v. Boston Mill Corporation i. 467 ;

v. Randall

ii. 896

ii. 832,

840; iii. 333

v. Reed

i. 535

v. Boyce

ii. 180, 236

v. Richardson

i. 612

v. Bradner

i. 639

i'. Robinson i.

19, 23, 496, 497

v. Brandon

iii. 505

o. Roe

i. 560

u. Brewer

i. 151

v. Ryde

i. 298

u. Bright

i. 630

v. Saw kins

ii. 822

v. Bullitt

ii. 751

v. Selby

i. 265, 267

v. Clarke

ii. 673

v. Shaddock

i. 137

v. Clifton

i. 384, 410

v. Shorter

iii. 24

o. Commerce, The

ii. 392

v. Sims

i. 573

v. Cooper

iii. 22

e. Smith

ii. 97, 122, 804

o. Dareh

i. 370

v. Starkey

ii. 113

v. Dexter

i. 256

v. Tanner

i. 141

v. Dowman

i. 67

v. Thurloe

ii. 148, 167

v. Dunn

ii. 051

v. Todd

i. 360

v. Dyke

i. 527

v. Tyler

ii. 166

i>. Edney

i. 524

v. United States

ii. 776

v. Fales

ii. 669

v. Victoria Graving Dock Co. iii. 18

v. Flint

iii. 34, 35

v. Voorhees

ii. 179, 253, 276

v. Foxall i.

136; iii. 422

v. Waite

i. 399, 485, 488

v. Gibbons

iii. 427

v. Ward

ii. 769

v. Gilman

iii. 193

v. Wasson

i. 629

v. Gilreath

ii. 878

v. Williams

i. 509

v. Glass

ii. 134

v. Witter

i. 257, 258

v. Goodwin

i. 275

v. Woodbury

ii. 63

v. Grand Trunk R. Co.

iii. 207

v, Yates

i. 229 : ii. 924

v. Gwynn

iii. 177

Jones Manuf. Co. v. Manuf . Ins. Co. ii. 524,

v. Harmovan

iii. 234

545. 653

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CSX1

Jonge Andries, The ii. 439

Bastiaan, The ii. 438, 439

Jordan v. Black i. 411

v. Dobbins ii. 533

v. Fall River R. R. Co. ii. 275

v. Gillen i. 253

v. James i. 109, 594, 042

v. Lewis iii. 170

v. Meredith ii. 670

c. Neilson ii. 861

a. Norton i. 41, 508

a. Trumbo iii. 136

v. Warren Ins. Co. ii. 409, 417, 510

v. Williams ii. 466

Joseph v. Bigelow ii. 685

Joseph E. Coffee, The ii. 383

Joseph Cunard, The ii. 385

Joseph Harvey, The ii. 468

Joseph, The ii. 520

Josephine, The ii. 519

Josephs v. Pebber • i- 111

v. Pebrer i. 162

Joshua Barker, The ii. 414, 456

Joslyn v. Grand Trunk R. Co. ii. 197

v. Smith ii. 26, 28 ; iii. 88

Jourdain v. Wilson i. 261

Jowers v. Blandy i. 579

Joy v. Campbell iii. 435

v. Hopkin9 iii. 221

v. Sears ii. 395 ; iii. 433

Joyce v . Adams i- 566

v. Maine Ins. Co. ii- 552

v. Realm Ins. Co. ii- 484

Joynes v. Statham iii. 312

Jubber v. Jubber ii- 08S

Judah v. Harris i. 280

v. Randall ii- 509

Judd v. Day i. 511

v. Fulton ii- 797

v. Ives iij- 400

v. Lawrence i- 449

Judge v. Wilkins i- 406

Judkins v. Walker i. 355 ; ii. 40

Judovine v. Goodrich ii. 941

Judson v. Cope ii. 309, 314, 315, 322

v. Etheridge iii- 266

Judy v. Gilbert iii- 349

v. Holmes i- 272

u. Sturges i- 1°3

v. Wass i. 524 ; ii. 790

v. Western R. R. Co. ii. 233

Juhel v. Church ii. 481

Julia M. Hallock, The ii. 468

Julia, The ii- 520

Juliana, The i. 441 ; ii. 457, 458, 460

Jumel v. Marine Ins. Co. ii. 447, 602, 517

Jung v . Second Ward Bank ii- 752

Juniata Bank v. Hale }■ 306

Junkins v. Simpson ii- 815

Juno, The «• 481

Jupe v. Pratt «■ 810

Jupiter, The «• 432, 43o

Jurgenson v. Alexander u. 375

v. Catharina Maria ii. 461

Juzan v. Toulmin ii- 91 <

K.

Kainu.Old i. 589,634; ii. 679

Kaines v. Knightly ii. 475

Kallenbach v. Dickinson iii. 87
Kallman v. United States Express

Co. ii. 270

Kaltenbach b. Mackenzie ii. 512

Kane v. Bloodgood iii. 107

v. Columbia Ins. Co. ii. 535

v. Gott i. 150

v. Hood ii. 626, 661, 663

v. Paul i. 143

Kane, In re i. 347

Kansas, &c. R. Co. v. Little ii. 181

Kansas City Bank v. Mills i. 93

Karr v. Karr i. 136

Karthaus v. Ferrer i. 216 ; ii. 828

Kase v. John i. 637

Kasson, In re iii. 450

v. Broeker i. 212

Kathman ». Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. ii. 483

Kautzman v. Weirick ii. 31

Kavanagh v. Day ii. 716

Kay v. Allen ii. 14

v. Curd iii. 14

v. Duchess De Pienne i. 407

v. Marshall ii. 312

v. Wheeler ii. 428

Kaye v. Brett i. 48

v, Dutton i. 462, 502, 503

v. Waghorne ii- 824

Kayser v. Disher i- 142

Kead v. Rann ii- 673

Keane v. Boycott i. 335 ; ii. 52

Kearney v. Holmes ii- 39

Kearsarge, The ii. 383, 384

Kearsey v. Carstairs iii- 448

Kearslake v. Morgan ii- 820

Keasley v. Codd i- 164

v. Cole i- 325

Keate v. Temple iii- 22

Keates v. Cadogan i. 513, 621, 630

Keating v. Central R. R. Co. ii. 817

v. Price ii- 685

v. Spink ii- 392

Keeble v. Hickeringall iii- 195

Keech v. B. & W. R. R. Co. ii. 248

Keegan v. Cox i. 354

v. Geraghty ii- 701

Keeler v. Field i- 579

v. Fireman's Ins. Co. ii- 409

v. Goodwin i- 565, 639

v. Neal ii- 823

v. Niagara Ins. Co. u. 478

v. Salisbury ii- 824

Keeley v. Boston, &c. R. Co. ii- 273

Keen v. Coleman ii. 942

v. M'Laughlin iii- 180

v. Vaughan ||- 751

Keenan v. Brown ii- 663

v. Southworth «• 153

Keene v. Beard ..'■ %<!'

v. Dilke «"■ 1?*

v. Keene m- H3

cxxn

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Keene v. Kimball ii. 332, 333, 334

o. Thompson ii. 763

u. Wheatley ii. 333, 334, 338, 34b

Keener v. Bank of United States ii. 077

v. Harrod i. 68

Keenholts v. Becker iii. 170

Keightley v. Watson i. 14, 17, 23 ; ii. 023

Kein v. Tupper i. 504, 505

Keine v. Home, &c. Ins. Co. ii. 558

Keir v. Leeman i. 469

Keith v. Chirk iii. 480

v. Goodwin i. 35, 37

v. Jones i. 280

Keithsburg v. Frick i. 160

Kekewich v. Manning iii. 315

Kelby v. Steel i. 26, 34, 35

Kelhim i'. MeKinstry i. 563

Kell v. Nainby i. 24; ii. 937

Keller v. Phillips i. 391

?'. Ybarru i. 505

Kelley v. Davis i. 339

r. Hemingway i. 281

v. Hurlburt i. 188, 189

u. Riley ii. 71, 75

i . Sanborn iii. 90

v. Solari ii. 536

v. Webster iii. 38

Kellner v. Le Mesurier ii. 481

Kellogg v. Barnard i. 029

o. Brennan ii. 392

v. Denslow i. 636, 638

v. Gilbert ii. 740

v. Hickock iii. 100

v. Lovely iii. 273

v. Norris ii. 746

v. Richards ii. 751

v. Schuyler iii. 466, 478

v. Slawson iii. 403

v. Smith ii. 939

u. Winnebago ii. 709

v. Wood ii. 933

Kelly i'. Commonwealth Ins. Co. ii. 471

v. Cunningham ii. 431

v. Dutch Church of Schenectady

iii. 242, 248

u. Garrett ii. 882

u. Holdship iii. 426

v. Hooper ii. 349

v. Low iii. 244

v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y. i. 117

v. Morris ii. 334, 336, 344

v. Powlet ii. 691

v, Renfro ii. 71

v. Scott iii. 440

v. Smith i. 562; ii. 536; iii. 200

v. Solari i. 496

v. Whitney i. 280

v. Worcester, &c. Ins. Co. ii. 578

Kelsea r. Haines i. 567

Kelsey v. Crawford Bank i. 51

Kember v. Southern Express Co. ii. 260

Kemble v. Farren iii. 170, 172, 173

v. Kean i. 221 ; iii. 322

Kemeys v. Proctor iii. 312, 343

Kemleys v. Richards i. 215

Kemp r. Andrews

i. 30

v. Balls

i. 29£

; ii. 749

v. Burt

i. 126

v. Canavan

i. 651

v. Carnley

i. 200

v. Coffin

i. 219

£•• Coughtry

ii. 181,

225, 456

i: Falk

i. 052

v. Finden

i. 31, 33

v. Pryor

i. 88, 104

v. Westbrook

iii.

289, 291

Kempe v. Fitchie

iii. 327

Kendal v. Symonds

ii. 830

v. Fitts

i. 569

u. Hamilton

i. 12

v. Kendall

ii. 861

v. Kingsley

ii. 796

v. Stone

iii. 179,

183, 104

u. United States

i. 252

v. Winsor

ii.

305, 321

Kendig v. Marble

iii. 130

Kendrick v. Campbell

i. 303

v. Delafield

ii. 500

v. Lomax

ii. 820

i\ McCrary

ii. 76

v. Turbell

ii. 835

Kennard v. Burton

ii. 250,

251, 430

!'. Cass. Co.

i. 330

Kennaway v. Treleaven i. 480; iii. 17
Kennebec Co. v. Augusta Ins. Co. ii. 474,

475, 487

Kennedy v. Baltimore Ins. Co. i. 154

«-. Barnwell iii. 110

u. Bohannon i. 191

u. Dunckles ii. 874

v. Gad ii. 897

v. Green ii. 804

v. Kennedy ii. 91 ; iii. 299

t: Lee i. 173, 614 ; iii. 344

v. McFaden i. 184

v. Ross i. 509

v. Shea ii. 76

t\ St. Lawrence Co. Ins. Co. ii. 473,

542, 553, 554, 555, 557, 560

v. Strong iii. 209, 211

v. Ware iii. 318

r. Whitwell iii. 115, 209, 211, 221

Kennersly Castle, The ii. 404

Kennett v. Chambers i. 486

v. Milbank iii. 77

Kenney v. Alvater i. 200

v. Ingalls iii. 441

Kennison v. Taylor iii. 242

Kenniston v. Mer. Co. Ins. Co. ii. 569

Kennon v. Dickens iii. 161

Kenny r. Udall i. 381

Kenny's Patent Button-Holeing Co.

v. Somerville ii. 368

Kenrig ;;. Eggleston ii. 216, 274

Kensington, Ex parte i. 238

v. Dollond iii. 465

v. Inglis ii. 545

Kent v. Burgess ii. 729

v. Dawson Bank i. 90

v. Elstob ii. 840

INDEY TO CASES CITED.

CXX111

Kent v. Ginger
v. Humphreys
v. Huskinson
v. Kent

v. London Ins. Co.
v. Manuf. Ins. Co.
v. Midland R. Co.
v. Phelps
v. Shuckard
v. Somervell

iii. 221

ii. 793

iii. 6, 50

ii. 49; iii. 41

ii. 549

ii. 493

ii. 188

iii. 143, 145

ii. 160

i. 142

Kentucky, The, v. Brooks ii. 392

Kentucky Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jenks ii. 540,

611

Kentucky, &c. R. R. Co. t>. Dills iii 186

Kentyen v. Parks i. 329

Kenworthy v. Schofield i. 510 ; iii. 12

Kenyon v. Berthon ii. 518, 521, 522

v. Farris i. 392

v. Nichols ii. 685

v. "Welty iii. 355

Keplinger v. De Young ii. 321

Kepner v. Keefer ii. 898, 900

Ker v. Dungannon i. 93

v. Mountain ii. 242

v Snead i. 137

Kercheval v. Triplett ii. 932

Kermeyer v. Newby ii. 756

Kerns v. Piper i. 42

v, Sehoonmaker iii. 99

Kerr r. Bell i. 361

v. Chess ii. 870

u. Laird i. 137

v. Moon ii. 700

v. Willan ii. 273

Kerrigan v. Rantigan i. 263

Kerrison v. Cole i. 487, 488

Kershaw v. Matthews i. 226

Kerslake v. White i. 530

Kerwhaker v. Cleveland C. & C. R. R.

Co. ii- 248
Kesee v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co.

ii. 817

Ketchell v. Burns ii- 4

Ketchum v. Barber iii- 158

v. Durfee i- 203

v. Durkee i. 199, 231

a. Evertson ii- 39

v. Stout iii- 358

Kettell v. Alliance Ins. Co. ii. 505

v. Wiggin ii. 527, 531, 532

Kettle i'. Harvey ii- 655, 660

Ketsey's case i. 373

Kettleby v. Atwood iii- 329

Keutgen v. Parks i- 329

Keve v. Paxton i- 546

Kewley v. Ryan ii. 484, 533

Key v. Bradshaw ii- 64

v. Cotesworth i. 642, 650

v. Vattier ii- 908

v. Wilson ii.-.882

Keyes v. Keyes ,«• 88

Keys v. Harwood ii- 813

v. Williams i- 251

Keyser v. Hanbeek i. 557 ; ii. 407

Keystone Lumber, &c. Co. v. Dole ii. 806

Kid v. Mitchell

iii. 212

Kidd v. Rawlinson

i. 569

Kiddell v. Burnard

i. 035

Kidder v. Hunt

iii. 66

v, Norris

ii. 764

Kidney v. Stoddard

ii. 919

Kieran v. Sandars

ii. 152

Kierlighett, The

ii. 399

Kiester v. Miller

i. 478

Kiggil v. Player

iii. 426

Kilborn v. Field

ii. 93

Kilburn v. Kilburn

ii. 828, 833

Kilby i>. Wilson

i. 209

Kilgore v. Bulkley

ii. 669

v. Dempsey

ii. 714

v. Powers

iii. 113

Kilgour v. Finlyson

i. 48

v. Miles

ii. 799

Kilkelly v. Martin

ii. 853

Kill v. Hollister

ii. 844

Killcrease v. Killcrease

i. 380

Killick, Ex parte

iii. 455

Killips v. Putnam Ins. Co.

ii. 586

Killmore v. Howlett

iii. 37

Kilmorey i\ Thackeray

iii. 324

Kilvington v. Stevenson

ii. 876

Kimball, The

ii. 407

v. Blaisdell

ii. 933

v. Brown

iii. 79

v. Cunningham

ii. 922, 923

v. Hamilton Ins. Co.

i. 201

v. Howard Ins. Co.

ii. 583, 584

v. Keyes

i. 402

v. Leland

i. 263

v. Morris

iii. 474

v. Proprietors of Boston Athe-
naeum iii. 126
v. Rutland & B. R. R. Co. ii. 178, 256,

259

v. Thompson iii. 403

v. Tucker ii. 422

Kimball Manuf. Co. v. "Vroman iii. 223

Kimberley r. Jennings iii. 373

Kimberly v. Ely iii. 507

Kimbro v. Hamilton i. 563

Kimmey v. Commonwealth ii. 726

Kimpton v. Eve i. 646; iii. 328

Kinahan v Bolton ii. 355

Kincade v. Conley i- 146

Kincaid v. Brunswick ii- 773

Kinder v. Howarth iii- 428

v. Shaw i- 102

Kine v. Balfe iii- 349

King, Ex parte iii. 451, 462, 466

v. Baldwin ii- 26

v. Bardeau i- 624 ; iii. 358

v. Barrett i- 127

v. Batterson "• 14

v. Bickley .}• 322

v. Bowen ii- 828

t: Bradley ii- 880

v. Bremond m- 230

v. Brown "'• 247

v. Chase ii. 868, 870, 871

v. Diehl i»- I11

CXX1V

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

King

v. Doolittle

. Dowdall

. Drury

. Eagle Mills

. Faber

. Fleece

. Fleming

. Flintan

. Fox well

. Gillett

. Gilson

. Green

. Hamilton

. Hartford Ins. Co

. Hoare

. Hobbs

. Humphreys

. Hutehins

. Johnson

. Jones

. Kerr

. Kersey

. Lane

. Lenox

, Lowry

. Mashiter

. Milsom

. Moon

. Paddock

. Perry

. Phillips

. Pyle

. Richards

i. 292 ; ill. 354, 355

ii. 7'J'J

iii. 149

i. 570

i. 203

i. 298

ii. 805

i. 395

ii. 709

ii. 425

iii. 242

ii. 130

iii. 305

ii. 487

i. 11, 12

i. 471

ii. 143

ii. 813

iii. 153

i

in
ii. 103, 218

v. Root

i'. Sears

v. Shepherd ii.

v. Smith

v. Sow

v. State Ins. Co. ii. 489.

u. Talbot

v. Thorn i.

v. Trice

v. Upton i.

v. Wilcomb

v. Wilson

v. Withers

o. Zimmerman
King's Heirs v. Thompson iii.
Kingdom v. Nottle i.

Kingham v. Robins
Kinghom v. Montreal Tel. Co.

Kingman v. Spurr

King Philip Mills v. Slater

Kingsbury v. Smith

v. Westfall
Kingsford « Merrj- i. 557 ;

Kingsland v. Braisted
Kingsley, Ex parte

v. Balcombe

v. Holbrooke

v. Lake Shore, &c. R. Co.

v. Wallis ii. 666,

Kingsman v. Kingsman

144
iii. 242
ii. 75
iii. 104
ii. 104
ii. 389
ii. 631

ii. 928
iii. 415
ii. 404
i. 570
. 242, 243
223, 224 ;
iii. 209
iii. 183
i. 485
. 180, 183
ii. 746
ii. 52
562, 504
i. 136
142, 143
iii. 382
470, 472
i. 170
iii. 339
iii. 317
i. 331
309, 314
144, 21 if)
ii. 772
ii. 299,
301
i. 174
ii. 815
iii. 170
. 543

290
i. 186
iii 467
iii. 24
iii. 36
ii 212
794, 811
i. 335

Kingst. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clark _ii. 16

Kingston v. Girard "• 532

v. Kincaid i. 41, 87, 91 ; ii. 831

a. Knibbs ii- 073

v. Phelps i- 479, 481

v. Preston ii. 659, 660

r. Wilson i. 87

Kington v. Kington ii. 752

Kinley v. Fitzpatrick i. 623

Kinlock v. Craig i. 644 ; iii. 276

Kinlyside v. Thornton i. 546, 547

Kinnard r. Daniel i. 410

Kinnerley v. Hossack ii. 878, 880

Kinnersley v. Orpe i. 538

Kinney v. Central R. Co. ii. 238

c. Ensign ii. 852

v. Lee i. '280

v. Watts iii. 242, 248

Kinscy v. Minnick i. 543

v. Stewart iii. 285

Kinsley r. Ames i. 549

r. Robinson i. 307

Kinsman v. Kershaw ii. 745

r. Loomis ii. 932

r. Parkhurst ii. 318, 893

Kintzing v. McElrath i. 620 ; ii. 918

Kintzinger, Estate of i. 380

Kinzey v. Leggett i 578

Kipling v. Turner ii. 21

Kirby, Ex parte iii. 474

c. Bannister i. 140

v. Duke of Marlborough ii. 707

v. Ingersoll i. 201, 207

v. Schoonmaker i. 231

v. Sisson i. 331

v. Smith ii. 526

Kirk v. Blurton i. 125

v. Bromley Union iii. 343

v. Dodge Ins. Co. i. 280

v. Glover ii. 746

v. Hamilton ii. 938

o. Hodgson i. 202, 217

v Nice i. 631

Kirkham v. Boston iii. 294

!-. Marter iii. 31

Kirkman v. Newstead i. 24

r. Shawcross ii. 161 ; iii. 256

Kirkpatrick r. Alexander i. 573

v. Bonsall ii. 896

v. Houston iii. 132

('. Howk ii. 19

v. McCullock i. 315

v. Muirhead i. 292

v. Smith ii. 686

r. Stainer i. 106

Kirney v. Smith iii. 416

Kirrigan v. Kirrigan ii. 737

Kirsclmer v. Conklin i. 294

Kirtland v. Wanzer i. 326

Kirton v. Braithwaite ii. 773, 774

v. Elliott i. 337

Kirwan p. Kirwan i. 214, 466

Kisler ;•. Tinder ii, 881

Kissam i\ Albert, The ii. 430

Kisten v Hildebrand ii. 160

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CXXV

Kistner v. Sindlinger
Kitchen v. Bartsch

v. Bedford

v. Lee
Kitchin v. Buckley

v. Campbell

v. Compton
Kitner v. Whitlock
Kitson v. Julian
Kittredge v. Brown

v. Holt

v. Woods
Kittridge v. McLaughlin
Klauber v. BiggerstafE
Kleeman v. Collins

i. 232

iii. 451

ii. 78

i. 368

i. 21

iii. 426, 434

i. 21

i. 205

ii. 16, 18

iii. 75

ii. 868

i. 545

iii. 459

i. 279

iii. 15

Kleimwort v. Cassa Marittima ii. 404

Klein, In re iii. 388

v. Currier i. 284 ; ii. 8

v. Seibold i. 556

Kleine o. Catara ii. 423, 828, 840, 841

Kleinhaus v. Generous ii. 28

Klewin v. Bauman iii. 181

Kline v. Beebe i. 335, 366

v. Central R. R. Co. ii. 245

o. L'Amoureux i. 350

v. Raymond ii. 14

Klingman v. Holmes iii. 181

Klock v. Robinson iii. Ill

Klopp & Stump v. Lebanon Valley

Bank i. 291

Knaggs v. Greene ii. 4

Knapp, In re iii. 285

v. Alvord i. 76

v. Curtis ii. 149

v. Hanford i. 142

v. Harden ii. 684

v. Maltby iii. 174

v. MeBride i. 223, 226

v. Parker i. 284

v. Wallace i. 110

Knave v. Ternott i. 93

Knears v. Schuylkill Bank ii. 309, 323,

327
Knecht v. Mitchell i. 548

Kneeland v. Ensley ii. 730

Knew v. Hoffman i. 185

Knibs v. Jones iii. 219

Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Gould ii. 587
v. Peters ii. 603

Knickerbocker, &c. Ins. Co. v. Weitz

ii. 608
Knight v. Attila, The ii- 401

v. Barber iii. 56

v. Bennett i. 544

v. Burton ii. 834, 836

v. Cambridge ii. 499

v. Clements ii. 860

v. Cole ii. 633

o. Crockford iii. 7

v. Eureka, &c. Ins. Co. ii. 389

v. Faith ii. 489, 506, 517

v. Fox i. 116

v. Hughes i- 33

v. Hunt iii- 477

v. Knotts ii- 684

Knight v. Lord Plimouth

iii. 421

v. Luce

i. 59

v. Mann

iii. 50

v. Nepean

ii. 613

v. N. E. Worsted Co.

ii. 663

v. Nichols

i. 611

v. Ogden

i. 170

v. Parsons

ii. 463

v. Peachy

iii. 448

v. Portland, &c. R. R. Co.

ii. 231

v. Pror., &c. R. Co.

ii. 226

Knights v. Putnam

iii. 128

v . Quarles

i. 145

Knill v. Hooper ii. 527, 528

Knobb v. Linsay

i. 448

Knoll v. Harvey

iii. 231

Knott v. Cottee

i. 137

v. Hogan

i. 265

v. Knott

i. 167

v. Morgan i. 173 ; ii. 360, 363

Knoup v. The Piqua Bank iii. 482, 483,

486, 498

Knowles v. A. & St. L. R. R. Co. ii. 102

v. Maynard ii. 940

v. McCamly iii. 368

v. Michel iii. 35

Knowlman v. Bluett iii. 41, 43

Knowlton v. Boss ii. 466

v. Vickies ii. 843

Knox v. Clifford ii. 907

v. Flack i. 335

i>. King iii. 12

v. Lee ii. 770

v. Ninetta, The ii. 406, 410, 414, 677

v. Simonds ii. 842

v. Waldoborough ii. 871

Knox Co. Com. v. Aspinwall i. 330

Knoxville Bank v. Clark ii. 862

Koch v. Briggs iii. 378

!'. Godshaw iii. 219

Kockill v. Witherell ii. 834

Koehler v. Black Co. i. 153, 156

v. Iron Co. i. 156, 157

Koenig v. Mueller iii. 293

Kohler v. Smith iii. 113

Kohlman v. Ludwig i. 288

Kolb v. O'Brien iii. 181, 184

Kohn v. Packard i. 207, 218, 416

v. Schooner Renaisance ii. 894

Kohne v. Ins. Co. ii 540

Kollock v. Parcher ii. 628

Konig v. Bayard i. 326

Konigmacher v. Kimmel i. 151

Koons v. Miller iii. 110

Kooystra v. Lucas i. 531

Kopitoff v. Wilson ii. 406

Kornegay v. White i. 635

Kortright v Buffalo Com. Bank iii. 212

Koster v. Keed ii. 498

Kountz v. Holthouse i. 215

u. Kennedy ii. 853

v. Kirkpatrick iii. 219

Kowing v. Manly ii. 108

Kramer v. Sanford i. 308, 317

Kratzer v. Lyon ii. 826

CXXT1

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Kraus v. Arnold

ii. 776

Krause v. Meyer

ii. 853

Kreis v. Gorton

iii. 440

Kreiss v. Seligman

i. 487

Kribbs v. Downing

iii. 356

Krider v. Lafferty

ii. G87

Krolin v. Sweeney

ii. 156, 160

Krom v. Schoonmaker

iii. 178

Kronheim v. Johnson

iii. 46

Krueger, Re

iii. 416

Kruger v. Wilcox

iii. 275

Krulder v. Ellison

i. 505

Krumbhaar v. Birch

i. 615

Krutz v. Stewart

iii. 29

Kuhn v. Newman

i. 176

Kunckle v. Kunckle

ii. 831

Kunzler v. Kohaus

iii. 831, 832

Kurtz v. Adams

ii. 8

v. Frank

ii. 72

Kyle v. E. R. R. Co.

ii. 232

v. Green

i. 315

v. Kavanagh

i. 562

o. Wells

iii. 72, 92

Kymer v. Larkin

iii 435, 454

v. Suwercropp

i. 66, 67, 643

Kynaston v. Crouch iii.

381, 434, 457, 458

Kynter's case

ii. 394

La Amistad de Rues

iii. 196

Labaree r. Carleton

i. 457

Labouchere v. Dawson

i

172

; ii. 893

L. A. C. Assoc, v. Fairhurst

i. 384

Lacaussade v. White

ii. 887

Lackey r. Stouder

i. 010

Lackington v. Atherton

iii. 49

Laclouch v. Towle

ii. 217

Lacon v. Briggs

iii. 68

v. Higgins

ii. 720

v. Mertins

iii.

295, 349

La Constantia

ii. 405

Lackawanna R. R. Co. v

Chenewith

Lackman v. Wood

ii. _ i * '
ii. 945

Lacoste v. Flotard

i. 492

Lacy, Ex parte i. 94 ;

iii.

418,

421, 422

1-. Dubuque Lumber Co.

i. 55

v. Kynaston

i. 27

; ii. 850

v. Lear

i. 550

v. Osbaldiston

ii. 39

Ladd i'. Ohotard

ii. 195

v. Hildebrandt

iii. 368

v. Kenney

i. 308

v. Lord

ii.

836

; iii. 227

v. Lynn

i. 403

Lady Arundell v. Phips

i. 569

Lady Belknap's case

i. 407

Lady Cox's case

iii. 467

Lady Durham, The

ii.

460, 461

Lady Ormond v. Hutchinson

i. 96

La Farge v. Herter

ii. 27

v. Kneeland

i. 85

Lafferty v. Jelley

Laflin v. Willard

Lafollett v. Kyle

Lafonde v. Ruddock

Laforge v. Jayne

Lafou v. Chinn

Laliy v. Holland

Laidlaw v. Organ

Laidler ;;. Burlinson ii.

v. Elliott
Laing v. Chatham

v. Colder ii. 235,

v. Fidgeon

u. Lee
Laing & Todd, In re
Lainson v. Tremere
Laird v. Allen

v. Pirn iii.

v. Robertson
La Jeune Eugenie
Lake Erie R. R. Co. i>. Eckler
Lake Hill v. Rose Hill Cemetery
Lake Shore, &c. R. Co. v. Pierce
Lallande v. Ball
Lalor v. C. B., &c. R. R. Co.

v. Wattles
Lamar a. Minter
Lamatt v. Hudson River Ins. Co.
Lamb v. Briard

v. Crafts i. 624, 63

v. Durant ii. 395

v. Lathrop

v. Lindsay

v. Paine

!■. Parkman
Lambard v. Pike
Lambert, Ex parte

v. Bessey

v. Liddard
Lambert's case
Lambeth v. Western Ins. Co.
Lambreth r. Clarke
Lamburn v. Cruden
Lamego v. Gould
Lamerson v. Marvin
Lamond i\ Davall
L'Amoreux v. Gould i. 467,

t>. Van Rennsselaer
Lamourieux v. Plewett
Lampen v. Kedgewin
Lampet's case
Lamphier v. Phipos
Lamphire v. Cowan
Lampon v. Corke ii.

Lamprey v. Lamprey
Lamson v. Clarkson

r. Westcott
Lancashire v. JIason
Lancaster v. Harrison
Lancaster Bank v. Moore i.

v. Wordward
Lancaster Canal Co., Ex parts
Lance r. Cowan
Lancey v. Maine Central R. Co.
Lanchester v. Tricker

i. 97

iii. 235

iii. 352

iii. 104

iii. 72

i. 182

i. 25

i. 620

380, 649

i. 126

ii. 8S1

259, 207

i. 630

iii. 17

ii. 826

ii. 931

iii. 352

225, 248

ii. 474

ii. 700

i. 96

iii. 510

ii. 246

ii. 881

ii. 48

iii. 388

iii. 237

ii. 473

ii. 403

3 ; iii. 62

; iii. 443

ii. 787

iii. 135

ii. 18

ii. 410

ii. 221

iii. 421

iii. 178

ii. 535

i. 206

ii. 482

i. 82

ii. 43

iii. 151

ii. 923

i. 579

480, 482

i. 409

ii. 3

ii. 871

i. 250

i. 92

ii. 826

634, 929

iii. 314

i. 541

ii. 463

i. 641

i. 28, 29

435, 436

i. 290

iii. 402

i. 656

iii. 78

i. 31

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CXXV11

Lanckton v. Wolcott iii. 468

Land v. Jefferies i. 669

Land Credit Co., In re i. 200

Lander v. Clark ii. 423

Landers v. Watertown Ins. Co. ii. 683
Landry v. Stansbury i. 307

Landsberger v. Magnetic Tel. Co. ii. 200,

301
Landsdale v. Cox i. 32

Lane, Ex parte iii. 428

In re iii. 421

v. Burghart iii. 25, 463

o. Chandler ii. 884

v. Cook iii. 202

v. Cotton ii. 99, 161, 185, 187 ; iii. 207
v. Drinkwater i. 13, 15, 20, 22, 23

v. Goodwin

v. Harrison

v. Ironmonger

v. Maine Ins. Co.

v. McKeen

v. Montreal Tel. Co.

v. Old Colony R. Co.

v. Owings

v. Pearce

v. Penniman

v. Steward

v. Taylor

o. Thomas

v. Tyler

ii. 00

ii. 871

i. 388

ii. 574

i. 387

ii. 290

iii. 270

i. 28

ii. 875

ii. 413, 454

i. 315 ; iii. 153, 156

i. 150

i. 175

i. 184

Lane, Praser and Boylston, oase of i. 178

Lane & Co., Re
La Neuville v. Nourse
Lanfear v. Sumner
Lang, Ex parte

In re

v. Anderdon

i'. Brevard

v. Smith

v. Waring

v. Webber

v. Whidden
Langan v. Hewett
Langdale, Ex parte
Langdon v. Buel

v. De Groot

v. Doud

v. Hughes

v. Litchfield

v. Minn. Ins. Co.

v. Paul

v. Richardson
Lange v. Kennedy
Langer v. Felton
Langford v. Frey
Langfort v. Tiler i.

Langhorn v. Allnutt

v. Collogan
Langhton v. Higgins
Langley v. B. & M. R. R. Co

v. Berry

v. Palmer
Langloie v. Brant

iii. 470, 472

i. 627

i. 594, 654

iii. 411

iii. 460

ii. 521

ii. 26

i. 330

i. 168

ii. 875

i. 434

i. 210

i. 176

i. 611

ii. 309, 315

ii. 944; iii. 103

iii. 23

iii. 498

ii. 575

ii. 857

iii. 22

i. 225

ii. 929

i. 335

563,564, 572,642;

iii. 225

ii. 535

ii. 474, 481

i. 565

ii. 232

i. 246

i. 310

ii. 488

Langridge v. Levy

ii. 921 ; iii. 195

Langston, Ex parte iii. 297

v. Bates iii. 352

Langton v. Higgins i. 561

v. Horton i. 560, 613 ; ii. 126, 129,

394

v. Hughes ii. 887, 894

Lanier v. McCabe i. 215

Lankton v. Stewart iii. 351

Lann v. Church iii. 286

Lano v. Neale ii. 394

Lansdale v. Brashear iii. 79, 95, 96

Lansdowne v. Lansdowne iii. 354

Lansing v. Gaine i. 191

v. Lansing i. 143 ; ii. 897

v. McKillup i. 211

v. Montgomery ii. 929

v. Prendergast iii. 464

Lantry v. Parka ii. 39, 40, 44

Lantz v. Frey ii. 52

Lanyon v. Blanchard iii. 283

v. Toogood i. 572

Lapham v. Atlas Ins. Co. ii. 487

v. Whipple iii. 41

Lapsley v. McKinstry i. 99

v. Pleasants ii. 602

Larch, The ii. 390, 454

Larkin v. McMullin ii. 78

Larrabee v. Talbot iii. 397

Lary v. Young i. 315

Lasher v. St. Joseph, &c. Ins. Co. ii. 559

Lassell v. Reed i. 545, 547

Latham v. Latham ii. 91

v. Morrow i. 526

v. Sumner i. 578

Lathrop v. Amherst Bank ii. 908

u. Atwood iii. 200

v. Kneeland i. 161

v. Morris i. 292

Latimer v. Batson i. 569

Latourette v. Williams i. 381

Latt v. Booth i. 335, 353

Latta v. Shawk ii. 307

Lattimore v. Garrard ii. 503

Laubach v. Laubach iii. 224

Laughan r. Bewett i. 406

Laugher v. Pointer i. 20, 118, 119

Laughlin v. Ferguson i. 569

v. Fream i. 406

v. Lorentz i. 227

Laughter's case ii. 641

Laughton v. Taylor ii. 863

Laurent v. Chatham Ins. Co. ii. 565, 578,

579

Lavabre v. Wilson ii. 535

Laval v. Myers ii. 897

Lavassar v. Washburne i. 387

Lavender, Ex parte iii. 416

Laveroni v. Drury ii. 184, 428

Lavery v. Crooke iii. 181

Laverty v. Burr i. 210

v. Hall iii. 311

v. Moore iii. 337

La Vie v. Phillips iii. 415

Lavinia, Ship, v. Barclay i- 84

Law v. Hollingsworth ii. 627

CXXV111

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Law v. Jackson ii. 773

p. London Life Policy Co. ii. 006

v. Sutherland iii. 104

v. Wilkin i. 339, 341, 475, 499

Lawler v. Keaquick i. 91, 103

Lawley v. Hooper iii. 116, 149

Lawrence v. Aberdein ii. 484

c. Brown ii. 936

v. Clark i. 184

v. Cowles iii. 1-0

v. Dana ii. 338, 341, 342, 344, 346,

347, 349

v. Davis iii. 382

v. Dole ii. 789, 790

v. Dorsey iii. 306

v. Fox i. 498

v. Gebhard i. 287

v. Hand ii. 921

v. Heister i. 406

v. Holyoke Ins. Co. ii. 575

v. Kemp i. 547

v. Kidder ii. 893

v. McArter i. 334

u. McCalmont ii. 5, 24, 634

u. M'Gregor ii. 672

u. Miller ii. 770

v. Minturn ii. 448

v. Ocean Ins. Co. ii. 533

v. Smith ii. 337

v. Staigg ii. 770

v. Stonington Bank i. 285; ii. 113

u. Sydebotham ii. 533

v. Taylor i. 169, 207 ; iii. 14

v. Van Home ii. 517

v. Wardwell iii. 195, 197, 198

v. Warrall iii. 69

v. Wright i. 146

Lawrence County v. Dunkle iii. 85

Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Lowell Mills ii. 352

Lawrenson v. Butler iii. 9, 305

Laws v. Purser ii. 940

Lawson r. Dickinson iii. 2*7

u. Dumlin ii. 409

u. Farmers Bank i. 318, 321, 323

v. Higgins ii. 384

v. Lawson i. 205

v. Lovejoy i. 335, 361, 367, 374

v. Townas ii. 14

v. Weston i. 272, 289

Lawton v. Lawton i. 547

v. Salmon i. 547

Lay v. Neville ii. 941 ; iii. 49

Layer v. Nelson i. 31

Layet r. Gano i. 04

Layfield's case i. 202

Layson o. Kowan iii. 382

Laythoarp v. Bryant iii. 9, 64

Layton, .Ear parte iii. 414

». Butler iii. 238

v. Pearce ii. 790

Lazard v. Wheeler i. 253

Lazarus v. Com. Ins. Co. ii. 430, 476, 477,

562

v. Waithman iii. 434

Lazear v. Union Bank iii. 124

Lazell v. Pinnick

i. 434

Lea v. Alexander, The

ii. 439

v. Barber

iii. 19, 20

v. Guire

i. 189

v. Lea

ii. 931

v. Whitaker

iii. 172

Leabo v. Goode

i. 246

Leach r. Fobes

iii. 319

v. French

ii. 132

v. Hewitt

i. 307

v. Mullett

i. 525, 582

v. Republic Fire Ins. Co.

ii. 588

v. Thomas

i. 546

Leadbetter v. iEtna Ins. Co.

ii. 586

Leader t>. Barry i

. 333 ; ii. 82

Leads v. Wright

i. 647

Leaf o. Coles

i. 223

League v. Waring

ii. 756

Leake ;>. Young

ii. 820

Lean v. Shutz

i. 407

Leaper v. Tatton

iii. 69, 70

Lear v. Yarnel

iii. 121

Learned v. Bellows

ii. 851

Leary v. Miller i. 308

Leask v. Scntt i. 051
Leather Cloth Co., The, v. Hirsch-

field ii. 376
o. The American Leather Cloth

Co. ii. 353, 363, 364, 366, 367, 368

Leatherdale v. Sweepstone ii. 776, 777

Leathers v. Farmers Ins. Co. ii. 667

Leathly v. Hunter ii. 534

Leavenworth v. Delafield ii. 451, 510

Leavitt v. Cutler ii. 73, 75

v. De Launy iii. 145

v. Palmer i. 487

v. Peck i. 202

v. Putnam i. 269

v. Savage ii. 26, 28

i". Simes i. 306

Leballister r. Nash ii. 780

Lebeau v. General Steam Navigation

Co. ii. 412

Le Blanche v London, &c. R. Co. ii. 260

Le Breton v. Miles ii. 713, 730

v. Nouchet ii. 730

Le Cheminant v. Pearson ii. 517

Lechmere v. Brasier iii. 336

v. Carlisle iii. 467

u. Fletcher iii. 75

v. Hawkins ii. 882

Leek v. Maestaer ii. 149

Leckey v. McDermott iii. 269

Leckie v. Sears ii. 415

Le Couteulx r. Buffalo i. 157

Ledlow v. Becton iii. 31

Ledoux v. Goza i. 90

Ledwich v. McKim ii. 861

Ledyard v. Hibbard ii. 678

Lee, Ex parte iii. 287, 451

v. Atkinson ii. 136

o. Boardman ii. 501

v. Coleshill i. 487

v. Davis i. 187

v. Dick ii. 14

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CXX1X

Lee ». Early ii. 762

v. Elkins ii. 831, 835

v. Gaskill iii. 36

v. Gray ii. 533

v. Grinnell ii. 444, 447, 449, 450, 451

v. Hodges ii. 76

u. Howard Ins. Co. ii. 473, 544, 555,

557

v. Kilburn i. 640

v. Kimball i. 594

v. Kirkpatrick ii. 939

v. Lashbrooke i. 229

v. Lee ii. 52, 873, 876

v. Mass. Ins. Co. ii. 493

v. Muggeridge i. 461, 462

v. Pain ii. 681

t>. Perry iii. 69

v. Starbird ii. 859

v. Vernon i. 532

v. Wood ii. 850

v. Woolsey iii. 191

Leech v. Baldwin ii. 173

Leeds, Ex parte iii. 417

v. Clieetlmm ii. 589

v. Dunn ii. 7

v. Metropolitan Gas Light Co. iii. 234

v. Vail i. 380

Leeds Banking Co., In re i. 321

Leeds and Liverpool Canal Co. v.

Hustler ii. 638
Leeds and Thirsk Railway v. Fearn-

ley i. 372, 374
Leeke, Ex parte iii. 474
Leeming v. Snaith ii. 422
Leer v. Yates ii. 425
Lees v. Nuttall i. 93, 94
v. Whitcomb i. 478
Leese v. Martin iii. 281
Leeson v. Holt ii. 258
Lefever ;;. Lefever ii. 941
v. Underwood i. 187
Lefferson v. Dallas iii. 63
Leffingwell v. Elliott iii. 176, 240, 244
v. Warren iii. 109
Leffler v. Armstrong iii. 378
v. Rice i. 200
Leflore v. Justice i. 631
Leftwitch v. St. Louis Ins. Co. ii. 497
Legal v. Miller iii. 309
Legg v. Benion i. 549
v. Evans iii. 260
v. Legg i. 254, 380, 384
v. Willard iii. 261
Leggat v. Reed i. 388
Leggate v. Clark i. 405
Legge v. Croker iii. 371
Leggett v. Perkins i. 409
v. Steele iii. 239
Leggott v. Gt. Northern R. R. Co. i. 144
Legh v. Hewitt i. 537 ; ii. 668
v. Legh i. 26, 210, 254
Legrand v. Hampden Sydney Col-
lege i- 154
Legro v. Staples i. 246
Le Guen v. Gouverneur ii. 26

Lehain v. Phillpott i. 552

Lehigh Coal Co. v. Mohr 1. 78

Lehigh Valley Co. v. McFarlan iii. 480

Lehman v. Jones i. 308

Lehnbeuter v. Holthaus ii. 306

Leicester v. Rose iii. 477

Leidig v. Coover i. 351

Leigh v. Hind ii. 890

v. Leigh ii. 749

i). Mobile i. 564, 567

v. Paterson ii. 809 ; iii. 220

v. Smith ii. 190

v. Taylor i. 140

Leighton, Ex parte i. 152

v. Atkins iii. 463

v. Sargent i. 92

v. Stevens i. 579

v. Wales ii. 890

Leitch v. Hollister iii. 382

v. Wells ii. 865

Lekeux v. Nash iii. 448

Leland, In re i. 224

v. Creyon ii. 12

v. Hayden i. 159

v. Medora, The ii. 402, 403

v. Stone iii. 187

Le Loir v. Bristow ii. 45, 880

Le Louis ii. 698

Leman, Ex parte iii. 420

Lemar v. Miles i. 548

Le Mesurier v. Vaughan ii. 484

Lemoine v. Bank of No. America i. 210,

297

Lemon v. Temple i. 329

Lemont v. Lord ii. 418

Lemott v. Skerrett i. 637

Lempriere v. Pasley iii. 427

Lenfers v. Henke iii. 36

Lengsfield v. Jones ii. 423

Leonard v. Robinson i. 68

Lennig v. Ralston ii. 713

Lennon v. Napper iii. 308, 332, 373

Lennox r. Roberts i. 318

Lenox v. United Ins. Co. ii. 216, 448, 537

!•. Winnissimet Co. ii. 431

Leominster v. Fitchburg R. R. Co. ii. 827

Leonard v. Adm'r of Villars ii. 769

v. Bates i. 457; ii. 661, 663

v. Fowler i. 628

v. Hendrickson ii. 182

v. Huntington ii. 386, 396

v. Leonard i. 437

v. Nye i. 256 ; iii. 434

v. N. Y., Alb., & B. Tel. Co. ii. 279,

280, 282, 283, 285, 290, 300

v. N. Y., &c. Tel. Co. i. 515

v. Pitney iii- 107

v. Vredenburgh ii. 78; iii. 18

v. Wildes i. 283

Leopold v. Salkey ii. 4

v. Van Kirk i. 627, 630

Le Page v. McCrea ii. 758

Lepard v. Vernon i. 76

Lerned v. Johns i- 56

Leroux v. Brown ii. 722 ; iii. 63

VOL. I.

cxxx

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Le Roy v. Beard ii. 719
u. Crowninshield ii. 721 ; iii. 390,397
v. Johnson i. 203
v. Tatham ii. 307, 311, 312, 321
Le Sage v. Coussmaker ii. 62
Lesley v. Rosson iii. 39
Leslie v. Baillie iii. 355
v. Guthrie iii. 424
v. Thompson iii. 356
v. Wiley i. 189
Lessee v. Kincaid i. 540
Lessee of Lazarus v. Bryson i. 95
Lester v. East i. 563, 564, 567
c. Garland ii. 796, 797
v. Jewett i. 479 ; ii. 663
v. McDowell i. 560
L'Estrange v. L'Estrange i. 245
Le Sueur v. Le Sueur ii. 734
Letcher v. Bank of the Common-
wealth ii. 20
v. Norton i. 612
Lethbridge r. Mytton iii. 200, 245
v. Phillips ii. 104
Letorey v. Korstall i. 183
Lett v. Melville iii- 416
Letton v. Young iii. 188
Leuekhart v. Cooper iii. 256, 283, 2S5
Lever v. Fletcher ii. 496
Leverick v. Meigs i. 87, 100
Levering v. Levering ii. 91
v. Union Transportation Co. ii. 270
Levezey u. Gorgas ii. 834
Levi v. Kanrick i. 230
v. Lynn, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 180
v. WaterUouse ii. 261
Levois v. Gale ii. 417
Levy, In re iii. 428, 457, 470
v. Baillie ii. 588
v. Bank of U. S. i. 300
v. Brown i. 130
v. Cohen i. 514
v. Drew i. 290
v. McCartee i. 448
v. Merrill ii. 501
v. "Walker i. 172
Levystein v. Whitman ii. 762
Lewin v. Dille i. 51
v. Guest i. 525
Lewis, Ex parte ii. 154, 403 ; iii. 284,

416, 422

In re iii. 416

v. Ames ii. 84

v. Anderson i. 172

v. Atlas Ins. Co. i. 76

v. Atlas Mut. Ins. Co. iii. 203

v. Brass ii. 772

u. Brelime i. 101

v. Browning i. 515

v. Burgess ii. 836

v. Burr i. 321

v. Campbell iii. 248

v. Chapman ii. 348

v. Cleveland, The ii. 392

v. Clifton ii. 937

v. Covilland i. 563

Lewis v. Culbertson ii. 878

v. Eagle Ins. Co. ii. 522, 523, 554

v. Elizabeth & Jane, The ii. 461

v. Fullarton ii. 336, 342, 343

v. Gamage i. 131; ii. 746

v. Gompentz i. 322

a. Hancock ii. 454

u. Harvey i. 274, 283, 284

v. Houston iii. 107

v. Jones i. 325, 537, 515 ; ii. 751, 915
v. Kramer i. 303, 304

v. Langdon i. 173 ; ii. 369

v. Lee i. 407 ; ii. 94

v. Lewis iii. 507

v. Littlefield i. 356 ; ii. 896

c. London, &c. R. Co. ii. 251

a. Lyman i. 515

o. Lyster ii. b20

v. Marshall ii. 672, 674

v. McAfee ii. 137

v. Nicholson i. 70, 72

v. Owen iii. 397

v. l'ayn ii. 856

v. Pead i. 438

v. Peake i. 635; iii. 176,229

v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 606, 609, 615, 017
v. Rucker ii. 490

v. Springfield Ins. Co. ii. 560, 571
v. The Western Railroad Co. ii. 199,
212, 214
r. Trickey i. 475

v. United States iii. 478

v. Webber iii. 440

v. Welch i. 489

< . Weldon ii. 663

r. White ii. 815

v. Williams i. 276 ; ii. 447, 452

Lexington v. Clarke i. 486 ; iii. 19, 20
Lexington & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Ap-

plegate iii. 494

Lexington, &c. R. R. Co. o. Elwell ii. 941
Leycester v. Logan ii. 454

Libbey v. Pierce ii. 941

v. Tolford i. 533, 535

Libby v. Hopkins iii. 470

Liber v. Parsons iii. 242

Liberty Hall Association i>. Housa-

tonic Ins. Co. ii. 472, 542, 549

Libhart v. Wood ii. 38

Lichty v. Hugus iii. 101

Lickbarrow v. Mason i. 290, 328, 330,

651,652; ii. 409, 410,443,444

Liddard v. Kain i. 618

v. Lopes ii. 419

Liddell r. Sims ii. 793

Liddlow v. Wilmot i. 401, 402

Lidgett v. Secretan ii. 517

v. Williams ii. 421

Liebig's Extract of Meat v. Hanbury

ii. 353
Liedemann v. Schultz ii. 667

Liford's case i. 546, 547 ; ii. 664, 665

Ligbtbody v. North American Ins.

Co. ii. 540

o. Ontario Bank ii. 754

INDEX TO OASES CITED.

CXXX1

Lightbum v. Cooper

i. 637

Lightfoot v. Heron

iii. 373

v. Tenant

ii. 894

Lightly v. Clouston

ii. 56

Ligonia v. Buxton

ii. 87

Like v. Beresford

i. 382

v. Thompson

ii. 760

Lill v. Egan

i. 204

Lillard v. Whitaker

iii. 211

Lilley v. Elwin ii.

35, 38, 39, 44

LiUie ». Hoyt

iii. 98

Lilly v. Hays

i. 457, 497

v. Hodges

i. 12

Limerick Academy v. Davis

i. 482

Lime Rock Bank v. Mallett

ii. 28, SO

v. Phetteplace

i. 167

Lincoln v. Battelle

ii. 721

v. Claflin

ii. 928

v. Emerson

i. 76

v. Erie Preserving Co.

i. 505

v. Hapgood

ii. 709

v. Hope Ins Co.

ii. 508

v. S. & S R, E. Co.

iii. 176, 194

v. Whittenton Mills

ii. 830

v. Wilbur

iii. 413

v. Wilder

ii. 638

v. Wright
Lincoln & Kennebec Bank

ii. 669

Lindauer v. Delaware Ins. Co. ii. 540

Lindenau v. Desborough ii. 558, 592, 597,

698, 912, 019

Linder v. Monroe iii. 189

Lindgren v. Lindgren ii. 681

Lindley v. Union Ins. Co. ii. 493

Lindo v. Unsworth i. 321

Lindon v. Hooper iii. 210

Lindsay v. Amesley iii. 168

a. Limbert iii. 447

v. Lynch iii. 65, 309

v. Springer ii. 939

Lindsey v. Gordon ii. 793

Lindus c. Bradwell i. 392

Line v. Stephenson i. 531 ; ii. 647

Lineker v. Ayeshford i. 328

Lines v. Smith i. 282, 616

Linforth, In re i. 558

Lingen v. Simpson iii. 325

Lingham v. Eggleston i. 564, 567

Lingwood v. Eade ii. 834

Link ii. Clemmens ii. 799, 901

Linker v. Long i. 523

Linn v. Crossing i' 12

v. Hamilton iii. 476

v. Sigsbee ii. 893

Linn Boyd Co. v. Terrill iii- 15

Linseott v. Mclntire iii- 38, 41

Linsell v. Bonsor iii- 82

Linsenbigler v. Gourley >■ 266

Linsey v. Ashton ii- 834

Linsley v. Bushnell iii- 176, 183

v. Lovely «- 677

Linton v. Porter i. 615

Lion, The «■ 430, 431

Liotard v. Graves i. 103; in. Ill

Lipe v. Eisenlerd
Lipford v. Railroad Co.
Lippincott v. Barker
Lipscombe v. Holmes
Lipson v. Harrison
Liscom v. Boston Ins. Co.

ii. 76 ; iii. 183

ii. 171

iii. 381

ii. 60

ii. 436

ii. 584, 588

Lishman u. Northern Maritime Ins.

Co. ii. 526

Lister v. Baxter i. 84

v. Lister iii. 422

Litchfield, In re iii. 418, 421, 425

v. Cudworth i. 95

Litowitch v. Litowitch ii. 737

Litt i>. Cowley i. 641, 642

Littell v. Hord iii. 128

r. Marshall i. 293

Little, Ex parte iii. 413

v. Blunt iii. 92, 98, 104

v. Boston, &c. R. Co. ii. 270

v. Clark i. 191

v. Dawson ii. 52

v. Dodge i. 406

v. Gould ii. 337, 338

v. Hall ii. 330

v. Rogers iii. 288

v. Willetts i. 262

Littledale v. Dixon ii. 5i5

Littlefield v. Littlefield iii. 98, 332

v. Shee i. 461, 462, 465

v. Smith ii. 827

v. Winslow ii. 631

Littlejohn, Ex parte iii. 463

v. Jones ii. 181

Little Miami R. R. Co. v. Stevens ii. 46

Litton v. Baldwin i. 409

Lively, The Schooner iii. 196

Liver Alkali Co. v. Johnson ii. 180

Livermore v. Merscliell ii. 868

v. Rand ii. 763, 766; iii. 79, 111
Liverpool A. L. A. u. Fairhurst i. 384

Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Verdier ii. 583

Liverpool, &c. Ins. Co. u. McGuire ii. 546

Livie i». Janson ii. 517

Living, Ex parte iii. 427

Livingston v. Bird iii. 138

v. Dugan i. 469

v. Indianapolis Ins. Co. iii. 132

v. Jones ii. 325, 327

v. Livingston i. 410

v. Maryland Ins. Co. ii. 519, 522, 526

v. Miller ii. 784

v. Roosevelt i. 201, 213

v. Woodworth ii- 328

v. Wootan ii. 7U0

Livingstone v. Ralli ii. 846

Lizardi v. Cohen i. 314

Llewellyn, Ex parte iii. 474

v. Earl of Jersey ii- 680

Lloyd, Ex parte iii. 473

v. Archbold i. 25, 189

v. Brewster ii. 914, 923

v. Crispe i. 491

v. Freshfield i. 205

v. Fulton ii- 77

v. Goodwin iii. 216, 218

cxxxu

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Lloyd v. Howard

i. 285, 286

v. Johnson

i. 337

v. Keaeh

iii. 127, 153

v. Leisenring

ii. 897

v. Lloyd

ii. 79

a. Maund ii. 624, 625 ; iii. 69, 70, 74, 75

v. Oliver i. 276, 281

v. Scott iii. 116, 127, 149

v. Thomas i. 225

v. Walkey ii- 773

v. West Branch Bank i. 59

v. "Williams iii. 133, 134, 135, 142

Load v. Green ii. 914

Lobdell v. Baker i. 59 ; ii. 943

v. Hopkins i. 575 ; ii. 783

Lock v. Furze iii. 165

v. Miller ii. 881

Lock Company v. W.&N. R.R. ii. 228

Locke v. Lewis i. 208

v. McVean ii. 20

v. North Am. Ins. Co. ii. 562

v. Swan ii. 424

«/. United States ii. 26, 29

v. Williamson i. 627

Lockett v. Merch. Ins. Co. ii. 532

Lockhart v. Barnard i. 22

Lockridge v. Foster ii. 917, 927

Lockwood v. Barnes iii. 41, 44

v. Bostwick ii. 358, 370

v. Crawford i. 295

v. Cullen i. 384

v. Ewer ii. 129

v. Laskell ii. 249

v. Salter i. 383

v. Thomas i. 402

Lockyer v. Offley ii. 499, 612

v. Savage iii. 472

Loder v. Chesleyn i. 474

Lodge v. Phelps ii. 719; iii. 319

Lodwicks v. Ohio Ins. Co. ii. 673

Loehner v. Home Ins. Co. ii. 559

Loeschman v. Machin ii. 134

v. Williams i. 647

Lofield's case ii. 639

Logan v. Austin ii. 823

v. Birkett i. 398

v. Bond i. 204, 206

v. Hall i. 537

v. Mason ii. 763, 766

v. Mathews ii. 134, 901

e. McGinnis iii. 3(32

t\ Simmons i. 411

v. Wienholt iii. 310, 362

Logs of Mahogany ii. 407, 413, 421, 863

Lohnes v. Ins. Co. ii. 543

Loker i>. Damon iii. 190

Lolley's case ii. 734

Lombard Bank v. Thorp iii. 429

London Chartered Bank of Australia

v. White iii. 281

London Gas Light Co. v. Nichols i. 12
London S. F. Society v. Hagerstown

Savings Bank i. 280

London & B. Railway Co. v. Fairclougli

i. 263

London & Bir. Railway Co. v. Winter

iii. 345, 363
London & Prov. Law Ass. Co. u. Lon-
don & Prov. Joint-Stock Ins. Co. ii. 375
London & South Western Bank v.

Wentworth i. 298

Londonderry i,\ Chester ii. 83, 87 ; iii. 501

Lonergan v. Stewart i. 558, 565

Long, In re i. 240

I?. Allen ii. 669

i. Battle Creek i. 505

v. Bonner i. 552

v. Brown iii. 369

v. Colburn i. 55, 56, 72

v. Hicks i. 617

v. Majestre i. 187

o. Millar i. 67 ; iii. 18

v. Preston i. 654

v. Ryan ii. 708

v. Storie iii. 126

v. Story i. 219

v. Younge i. 230

Long & Wharton's case iii 150

Longcope r. Bruce i. 232

Longley v. Griggs i. 35

Longman v. Winchester ii. 336

Longridge v. Dorville i. 468, 471 ; ii. 823

Longworth r. Mitchell i. 512 ; ii. 770

Lonsdale v. Brown i. 326, 471

v. Littledale i. 114

Loomis v. Barker i. 208

v. Bedel ii. 240, 242

v. Cline i. 352

u. Eagle Ins. Co. ii. 605, 606, 607

«•. Green ii. 868

v. Marshall i. 180

v. Newhall i. 351,462; iii. 19

v. Pierson i. 211

v. Shaw ii. 511

Loop r. Loop i. 358

Loosemore r. Radford iii. 200

Loraine v. Cartwright i. 87

Lord v, Baldwin i. 233

v. Belknap ii. 600

(.-. Bigelow i. 540

v. Brig Watchman iii. 382, 436

c- Dall ii. 489, 606

v. Ferguson ii. 396

v. Goddard ii. 917

v. Grow i. 625

v. Jones iii. 261, 267

v. Midland R. R. Co. ii. 260

v. Neptune Ins. Co. ii. 409, 417, 502,

510

v. Ocean Bank i. 293

v Stephens iii. 364

«>. Wheeler ii. 655, 805

Lord Brooke v. Rounthwaite iii. 356

Lord Camoys v. Scurr ii. 118

Lord Cochrane, The ii. 402, 405

Lord Cranstown v. Johnston iii. 333

Lord Darcy v. Askwith ii. 665

Lord Dormer v. Knight ii. 633

Lord Nelson, The ii. 441

Lord Ward o. Lumley ii. 862

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CXXX1U

Lorent v. Kentring

ii. 215

Lorillard v. Palmer

ii. 415

v. So. Car. Ins. Co.

ii. 486

Loring v. Brackett

ii. 852

o. Cooke

ii. 778

v. Gurney

ii. 675

v. Manuf'. Ins. Co.

ii. 577

v. Neptune Ins. Co.

ii. 537

v. Proctor

ii. 471, 474

v. Steinman

ii. 612

v. Thorndike

ii. 729

Lorymer v. Smith

i. 560

Los Angeles Assoc, v. Phillips iii. 810

Losee v. Dunkin i. 295

Losh v. Hague ii. 307

Lothrop v. Foster ii. 36 ; iii. 36

■u. Greenfield Ins. Co. ii. 543

Lotty, The ii. 468, 469

Loud v. Citizens Ins. Co. ii. 524

v. Loud ii. 737

v. Pierce iii. 388

Loudon v. Taxing District iii. 230

v. Tiffany ii. 882

Loughor Coal & Ey. Co. v. Williams

ii. 628
Loughran v. Ross i. 545

Louis v. Brown iii. 168

Louisa, The ii. 426

Louisa Bertha, The ii. 403

Louisiana v. New Orleans iii. 506

Louisiana Bank v. Citizens Bank i. 301
v. Kenner's Succession i. 226

Louisiana State Bank v. Seneca i. 83

Louisiana, The, v. Fisher ii. 431

Louisville Ins. Co v. Bland ii. 507

Louisville Manuf. v. Welsh ii. 31

Louisville & Charleston B. R. Co. v.

Letson i. 153

Louisville & Frankfort R. R. Co. v.

Ballard ii. 246

Louisville, &c. R. R. Co. v. Collins ii. 47

v. Filbern ii 48

Lounsbury v. Protection Ins. Co. ii. 547,

551

Lovatt v. Field i. 595

v. Hamilton i. 597

Love v. Cobb iii. 362

v. Hackett iii. 75

v. Hinckley ii. 439

v. Pares ii. 639

v. Sierra Nevada Co. i. 125

v. Wells ii. 903

Lovegrove v. White i. 130

Lovejoy v. Augusta Ins. Co. ii. 557

v. Spafford i. 191

v. Whipple ii. 900, 905

Lovel v. Whitridge ii. 878

Lovelace's case iii- 425

Loveland v. Shepard ii. 32

Lovell v. Briggs i- 180

v. Howell ii. 46

e. Williams i. 65 ; ii. 756

Lovelock v. Franklyn ii. 800, 809

o. King ii. 61, 147

Lover v. Davidson ii. 336

Lovett v. Hobbs ii. 179, ]86

Lovewell v. Westchester Ins. Co. ii. 628

Lovie's case i, 145

Lovrein v. Thompson ii. 467

Low v. Allen iii. 109

v. Archer iii. 199

i'. Barchard i. 466

v. Blodgett ii. 6

v. Davy ii. 488

v. Elwell i. 548

v. Hart ii. 370

v. Howard i. 308

v. Pew i. 560

Lowber v . Connit iii. 15

v. Le Roy ii. 633

Lowe v. Beckwith ii. 14

v. Bliss i. 280

v. Griffiths i. 337

v. Martin iii. 285

v. Moss ii. 172, 173, 198, 215

v. Peers ii. 04, 79 ; iii. 174

v. Waller iii. 117, 127

v . Weatherly i. 470

Lowell v. Boston & Lowell R. Co. i. 117,

120

v. Daniels ii. 942

v. Gage i. 274

v. Johnson iii. 129

u. Lewis ii. 307, 309, 315, 327
v. Middlesex Ins. Co. ii. 555 ; iii. 295
Lowell Manuf. Co. v. Safeguard Ins.

Co. ii. 582, 687

Lowell Wire Fence Co. v. Sargent ii. 227

Lower v. Winters iii. 36, 41

Lowerre, Matter of iii. 457

Lowery v. Gear iii. 85

v. Scott i. 311

Lowes v. Mazzareddo iii. 127

Loweth v. Fothergill iii. 69

Lowfield v. Bancroft i. 28

Lowman's Appeal ii. 877

Lowndes v. Lane i. 522

Lowrey v. Murrell i. 302; ii. 754

Lowry v. Adams ii. 4, 16

0. Bourdieu ii. 481

v. Dufferin iii. 350

v. Francis iii. 481

v. Guilford i. 126

v. Hall iii. 409

u. Houston i. 380

v. Mehaffy ii. 660 .

v. Steamboat Portland ii. 249 ;j

D.Thornton i. 381 j\

Lowther v. Lowther i. 94, 95 ; iii. 329

Loy i>. Ins. Co. ii. 575

Loyd v. Hicks iii. 189

v. Lee i. 460, 465, 471

v. Mansell iii- 286

Lubbock v. Inglis ii. 152

v. Potts ii. 887

Lucas r. Bank of Darien i. 192

v. Beach i- 164

v. Beale i. 22

v. Bristow ii- 670

v. Brooks i- 540

CXXX1V

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Lucas v. Chamberlain

v. Cole

v. Comerford

v. De La Cour

v. Dorrien

v. Godwin

v. Groning

v. James

v. Jefferson Ins. Co.

v. Laws

v. Milwaukee R. Co.

v. Novosilieski

r. Steamboat Swann

v. Worswick
Lucena v. Craufurd

iii. 24

i. 174

iii. 320

i. 65

i. 330

i. 494 ; ii. 50, 793

i. 101, 103

iii. 372

i. 32 ; ii. 582

i. 236

ii. 245

ii. 53

ii. 429

i. 502

i. 48 ; ii. 460, 473,

561, 565

Lucesco Oil Co. v. Brewer ii. 048

Luckett v. Townsend ii. 129

r. Williamson iii. 335, 337, 347

Lucy, Ex parte i. 468

v. Ingram i. 117

v. Levington i. 144

Ludington v. Bell i. 192

Ludlam v. Ludlam i. 447

Ludlow v. Cooper i. 168

v. Gill ii. 914

!'. McCrea i. 12

v. Van Ransselaer ii. 700, 894

Ludlow, Mayor of, v. Charlton i. 154

Ludwick v. Huntzinger iii. 113

Luey v. Bundy ii. 815

Lufburrow v. Henderson ii. 880

Luff v. Pope i. 304

Luffkiti v. Curtis i. 405

Luke v. Lyde ii. 418, 419, 420, 017

Lukem's Appeal i. 136

Lumbermen's Bank v. Pratt i. 225

Lumley v. Gye ii. 52

v. Wagner iii. 304, 328, 330, 364, 367

Lumpkin r. Wilson i. 61

Lundie v, Robertson i. 308

Luney v. Vantyne i. 351

Lunn v. Thornton i. 561, 012

Lunt v. Adams i. 303

v. Stewart i. 27, 211

v. Whitaker iii. 205

Lupton v. White i. 06, 110

Lush v. Druse iii. Ill

v. Russell ii. 43

Lusk v. Smith i. 210

Lutz v. Linthicum ii. 831, 842

Luxmore v. Robson iii. 249, 424

Lyde v. Mynn iii. 324, 463

I. y decker v. Palisade Land Co. iii. 506

Lyell v. Sanbourn i. 47

Lygo v. Newbold ii. 237

Lyle v. Barker iii. 216

v. Murray iii. 98

v. Rodgers ii. 827, 830

Lylly's case ii. 54

Lyman !>. Babcock iii. 172

v. Brown ii. 864, 871

v. Cessford ii. 926

v. Clark ii. 634, 851

v. Lyman i. 229, 230

Lyman v. United Ins. Co. ii. 475

Lynch i>. Baldwin i. 552

v, Bragg ii. 878

v. Clemence ii. 826, 827

v. Commonwealth i. 125, 126

v. Crowder ii. 458

v. Dalzell ii. 574, 577

v. Fallon i. 94

v. Hamilton ii. 524

v. Livingston ii. 636

v. Nurdin
u. O'Donnell
v. Smith
Lynde v. Budd
v. McGregor

ii. 247, 248; iii. 195
i. 565

ii. 817
i. 368

ii. 913

Lyndeborough Glass Co. v. Mass.

Glass Co. i. 49, 158

Lyndon v. Gorham i. 232, 233, 234

v. Lyndon ii. 88

Lynn v. Bruce i. 29

v. Burgoyne ii. 480

Lynx v. King ii. 172, 173

Lyon v. Armstrong ii. 908

v. Commercial Ins. Co. ii. 558, 919

o. Culbertson ii. 896

i-. Johnston i. 230

v. King iii. 43

v. Knott ii. 730

v. Lamb iii. 16

i. Marshall iii. 477

u. Mells ii. 258, 267

v. Pollock i. 62

v. Reed i. 543; ii. 941

v . Richmond iii. 355

v. Smith ii. 155

v. State Bank iii. 139

v. Strong ii. 900

f. Sundius i. 304

Lyons v. Barnes i. 581

i'. Martin i. 114

Lyons Bank v. Ocean Bank ii. 98

Lysaft v. Bryant i. 323

Lysaght v. Walker iii. 17

Lysatt !■. Bryant i. 323

Lysney v. Sclby i. 621

Lyte v. Perry i. 263

Lytle v. Pope i. 36

Lytton v. Lytton i. 372

M.

Maanss v. Henderson i. 42 ;

Mabbett v. White
Maber v. Maber

v. Massias
Maberley v. Sheppard iii

Maberly r. Turton
Macally's case
Macarthur r. Campbell
Macbeth v. Haldiman
Macclesfield v. Davis
Maccord i>. Osborne
MacDonald v. Law Union Ins. Co.

ii.

938

i.

200

iii. 85

iii.

259

46, 55

i.

347

ii.

898

ii.

837

i.

138

iii.

329

i.

363

ii. 592

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CXXXV

Macdowall v. Fraser
Mace v. Wells
Maofarlane v. Taylor
MacGliee o. Morgan
Machir v. Moore
Machou v. Railway Co.
Mack v. Jones

v. Patchin
Mackaness v. Long
Mackay, In re

v. Bloodgood

v. Holland
Mackenzie v. Pooley
Mackersy v. Ramsays
Mackie v. Cairns
Mackinley v. McGregor
Mackintosh v. Barber

v. Mitcbeson

ii. 523

iii. 463, 464

i. 631

i. 466; iii. 310

ii. 807

ii. 187

iii. 499

i. 531

i. 668

ii. 827

i. 122

i. 289

ii. 396

i. 46

iii. 381, 382

i. 386

i. 95

i. 84

v. The M. C. Railway Company ii. 664
v. Whitworth ii. 494

Macklin v. Richardson ii. 330, 334

Mackrell v. Simond ii. 424

Mackreth v. Syramons iii. 293, 294

Maclay v. Harvey i. 505, 512, 515

Maclean v. Dunn i. 46, 5S7, 592, 636 ;

iii. 11

Macloon v. Smith i. 313

MacMahon v. Jacobs iii. 411

Macomber v. Cambridge Ins. Co. ii. 563

v. Durham iii. 113, 121

v. Howard Ins. Co. ii. 544, 545, 555,

557

i,-. Parker i. 564, 566; ii. 420

v. Thompson ii. 365

Macon «. Crump ii. 826, 831

v. Sheppard i. 483

Macrory v. Scott iii. 4

Macrow v. Great Western R. R. Co. ii. 213

Mactier v. Frith i. 514; ii. 296, 540

Macy v. De Wolf ii. 391

v. Mut. Ins. Co. ii. 531

v. Whaling Ins. Co. ii. 478, 511, 667,

672
v. Wheeler ii. 400

Mad River, &c. R. R. Co. v. Fulton

ii. 275, 277

Maddeford v. Austwick i. 187 ; ii. 920

Madden v. Kempster iii. 277, 301

Maddock v. Hammett iii. 133

Maddux v. Bevan i. 51

Madeira v. Hopkins iii. 343

Madeley v. Booth iii. 357

Madigan v. Walsh iii. 36

Madison Bank v. Davis iii- 124

Madonna D'Idra, The ii. 403, 461

Maester v. Atkins i»- 276

Magalhaens v. Busher if- 408

Magee, Ex parte iii. 413

v. Atkinson '• 68

v. Badger '• 289

v. Lavell »'• 172

v. Young

Maggs v. Ames

Maghee v. Morgan

Maghee v. O'Neil

ii. 4

i. 4

iii. 84

Magill v. Hinsdale

v. Merrie
Magnay v. Edwards
Magniac v. Thompson
Magnin v. Dinsmore
Magnus v. Buttemer
Magoffin v. Holt
Magrath v. Church
Magruder v. Gage

v. Union Bank
Maguire v. Card

i. 55

i. 191

i. 22

i. 410, 460

ii. 270, 274

ii. 497

iii. 339

ii. 451, 502

i. 574

i. 306

ii. 384

v. Maguire ii. 732, 730 ; iii. 501

Mahan v. Waters i. 309

Mahana v. Blunt iii. 347

Maher y. Hibernia Ins. Co. ii. 586, 588

Mahier v. Keays i. 280

Mahoney v. Porter iii. 456

Mahony v. Ashlin i. 325

v. Metropolitan R. R. ii. 817

v. Young iii. 239

Mahurin i>. Bickford ii. 744

v. Pearson ii. 878

Maigley v. Haner i. 458

Maillard v. The Duke of Argyle iii. 81

Main v. Melbourne iii. 349

Maine Bank i>. Butts iii. 123, 138, 142

Maine Central Institute v. Haskell i. 483

Mainwaring v. Baxter iii. 309

u. Brandon i. 92

v. Leslie i. 394

v. Newman i. 186

v. Sands i. 394

Mainzinger v. Mohr « iii. 90

Mair v. Glennie i. 176; iii. 443

Mairs v. Taylor ii. 130

Maisonnaire v. Keating ii. 447

Maitland v. Martin i. 87

Majestic, The ii. 415

Major v. Haukes i. 225

v. Tardos iii. 160

Majors v. Everton i. 410; ii. 78

Makarell v. Bachelor i. 337

Makepeace v. Coutes i. 26; ii. 874

v. Harvard College ii. 634

Makin v. Watkinson ii. 802

Making v. v. Welstrop ii. 836

Makins, Ex parte iii. 429

Malbon v. Southard i. 272, 274, 283

Malcom v. Loveridge i. 551

Maiden v. Fyson iii. 245, 361

Male v. Roberts ii. 704

Maleverer v. Redshaw i. 487

Maley v. Shattuck ii. 931

Malin v. Malin ii. 916

Malins v. Brown iii. 350

v. Freeman ii. 371, 373, 812

Mallam v. Ardan i. 540

Mallan v. May ii. 800

Mallett v. Foxcroft ii. 869

Mallory v. Bird iii. 133

v. Vanderheyden i. 383

v. Willis ii- 143

Mallough v. Barber i. 93

Malone v. Boston, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 260

v. Hathaway ii. 47

CX XXVI

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Maloney v. Stephens
Malory v. Gillett
Maltby, Ex parte

v. Harwood
Man, Ex parte

v. Sliiffner
Manahan v. Noyes
Manby v. Long

i. 78 ; ii. 745

iii. 29

iii. 473

ii. 52, 54

iii. 429

i. 93; iii. 260

ii. 813

i. 153

v. Scott i. 337, 388, 394, 396

Manchester v. Hough i. 400

v. Milne ii. 410

Manchester Bank v. Fellows i. 126, 316,

319

v. White i. 320

Manchester Iron Co. u. Sweeting ii. 26

Mandel r. Steel ii. 879

Manderston v. Robertson iii. 87, 88

Mandeville v. Reynolds i. 130

v. Welch i. 245, 247, 249 ; iii. 297

v. Wilson iii. 96

Maneelly v. McGee ii. 756

Manella v. Barry i. 87

Maney v. Killough i. 569

Mangles v. Dixon i. 254

Manhattan Co. v. Osgood iii. 143

Manhattan Ins. Co. v. Barker ii. 559

v. La Pert i. 46

v. 8 tein ii. 575

v. Warwick i. 78 ; ii. 601

Manley v. Geagan iii. 23

j\ Ins. Co. ii. 576

Manly v. Howlett iii. 314

v. United Ins. Co. ii. 485

Mann v. Evertson i. 027

v. Forrester iii. 283

v. Huston iii. 401

v. Sliiffner i. 102

v. White River Log, &c. Co. ii. 175

Manning v. Albee i. 570; ii. 810

v. Cox ii. 749

u. Manning i. 136

t. McClure i. 292

v. Purcell ii. 759

v. Wells ii. 156, 102

Manrow v. Durham ii. 12 ; iii. 18

Mansell v. Burredge i. 12

Manser v. Heaver ii. 834

Mansfield v. Cole ii. 131

v. Mclntyre ii. 730

v. Ogle iii. 116

v. Trigg ii. 650, 814

Manson v. Felton i. 430

Manton c. Parker ii. 309

Mantz v. Goring i. 536

Manufacturers Bank v. Barnes i. 301

!•. Follett ii. 853

v. Hazard ii. 945

v. Schofield ii. 944

Manufacturing Co. c. Corbin ii. 308

Manville v. Cleveland & Toledo R. R.

Co. ii. 46

r. West. Union Tel. Co. ii. 300

Many v. Beekman Iron Co. ii. 632

v. Jagger ii. 307, 309, 314, 322

v. Sizer ii. 307, 309, 324

Maple v. Kussart «• 945

Maples v. Wightman i- 335

Marble v. Moore i- 564, 567

Marburg v. Brooks iii- 382

v. Marburg iii. 166

Marcardier v. Chesapeake Ins. Co. ii. 421,

500

March v. Berrier i. 150

v. Hammond ii. 930

v. Pigott ii. 486

v. Putney ii. 31

Marchant v. Dodgin iii. 131

Marchesseau v. Chaffee iii. 220

Marcus v. St. Louis Ins. Co. ii. 610, 617

Marcy v. Marcy iii. 38

v. Sun Ins. Co. ii. 497, 528

Mardall !>. Thelusson ii. 877

Marden v. Babcock i. 569

Mardis v. Tyler i. 464

Mare, Ex parte ii. 462

v. Charles i. 57, 288

Marengo, The ii. 388

Marfield v. Goodhue i. 77, 104, 108 ; iii. 205

Margaret, The ii. 442

Margaret Podger's case i. 50

Margetson v. Wright i. 617

Maria, The i. 117 ; ii. 436, 439, 464, 469,

520
Marietta i\ Flearing iii. 483

Marine Bank v. Wright ii. 410

Marine Dock & Mutual Ins. Co. v.

Goodman ii. 507, 508

Marine Ins. Co. u. Stras ii. 534

v. Tucker ii. 480, 533

v. U. S. Ins. Co. ii. 419

Marine & F. Ins. Bank v. Jauncy i. 276

Mariners v. Washington, The ii. 462

Marion Commissioners v. Clark i. 330

Marion, The ii. 382

Markham v. Brown ii. 161

v. Gonaston ii. 853

v. Jones i. 196

Markle v. Hatfield i. 301 ; ii. 753

Marks v. Barker iii. 439

c Hamilton ii. 561

c. Morris iii. 136

Marley v. Noblett iii. 40

Mario w v. Pitfield i. 338, 392

Marmon v. Marmon i. 438

Marquand v. Hipper iii. 17

v. N.V.Man. Co. i. 174, 220,222, 224

Marquette Bank v. Stewart ii. 195

Marquette Man. Co. v. Jeffery i. 578

Marquette R. Co. u. Kirkwood ii. 220

Marquis of Huntley ii. 441

Marr v. Johnson i. 294

Marrett v. Brackett ii. 755

Marriott v. Shaw i. 234

v. Stanley ii. 250

Marryatt v. Broderick i. 74 ; ii. 759

Marryatts v. White ii. 767

Marsdon v. Reid ii. 535

Marseilles o. Kenton iii. 95

Marsh, Ex parte iii. 474

v. Billings ii. 360

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CXXXVH

Marsh v. Blythe

ii. 432, 434

v. Puller

i. 264

v. Griffin

ii. 19, 85.3

v. Home

ii. 261, 272

o. Hutchinson

i. 407

v. Hyde

iii. 57

v. Keating

i. 49

v. Low

iii. 223

v. Marsh

i. 411

v. Martindale iii. 116, 129, 138, 141

v. Minnie, The ii. 886

v. Packer ii. 837, 847

v. Putrnan iii. 398

v. Rouse i. 563

v. Rulesson ii. 39

v. Russell i. 76, 175

v. Titus i. 558

v. Ward i. 11

v. Webber i. 621 ; iii. 195, 219

v. Wood ii. 848 ; iii. 427

Marsh's Appeal i. 230

Marshall, Ex parte iii. 462

v. Am. Express Co. ii. 196, 198

v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. i. 469 ;
ii. 895

v. Betner iii. 176
v. Broadhurst i. 143, 145, 146 ; ii. 664

v. Duke i. 616

u.Pall i. 647

v. Perguson iii. 35

v. Garner ii. 446, 450

v. Green iii. 37, 50

v. Hutchison iii. 382

v. Lynn iii. 16

o. Marshall i. 221

v. Mitchell i. 308, 315

v. Nashville Ins. Co. ii. 499

v. New York, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 187

v. Pierce ii. 939

v. Rutton i. 399, 406

v. Smith i. 13

v. Stevens i. 409

v. York, N. & B. Co. ii. 238

Marson, Ex parte iii. 470

Marsteller v. M'Clean iii. 102

Marston v. Allen i. 286

v. Hobbs i. 260 ; iii. 240

Martendale v. Pollet ii. 858

Martha, The ii. 414, 426

Martha Washington, The ii. 386

Martin, Ex parte iii. 439

v. Atkinson iii. 238, 242, 245

v. Baker i- 144

u. Barton Iron Works i. 457

v. Berens i. 538

v. Black's Ex'rs i- 470

v. Boyd i. 274, 283

v. Brecknell ii. 767 ; iii. 463

v. Broach iii- 75

v. Chauntry i- 289

v. Clarke •>• 908

v. Cotter i- 624

v. Crokatt «■ 511

v. Delaware Ins. Co. ii. 532, 672

v. Dwelly iii- 368

Martin v. Pishing Ins. Co. ii. 518, 531

o. Franklin Ins. Co. ii. 477

c G. N. Ry. Co. ii. 234

v. Harrington iii. 286

v. Hawks ii. 875 ; iii. 286

v. Hayes i. 297

v. Heathcote iii. 96

v. Hewson ii. 759, 760

v. Hill ii. 722

v. Hurlbut i. 556

v. Long iii. 240

v. Martin i. 399

v. Mathiot i. 519

v. Mayo i. 364, 370

v. Mayor, &c. of Brooklyn ii. 154

v. McCormick iii. 355

v. Merritt iii. 332

v. Mitchell iii. 9, 366, 368, 369

v. Morgan i. 496

v. Nicolls ii. 740

v. Nutkin iii. 331

v. Porter iii. 215

v. Pycroft iii. 343, 345

v. Roberts ii. 922

v. Salem Ins. Co. ii. 428

v. Silliman i. 110

v. Sitwell ii. 479

v. Striblin ii. 9

v. Temperley i. 116, 117

v. Thornton ii. 836

v. Thrasher i. 206

v. Voeder ii. 908

u. Wade ii. 895

v. Wharton iii. 39

v. Williams ii. 826, 827

v. Winslow i. 306

v. Wright ii. 24, 52, 344

Martin's Heirs v. Martin ii. 88

Martindale v. Booth iii. 264

v. Smith i. 643

Martine v. International Ins. Co. i. 222 ;

ii. 601, 615

Martineau v. Kitching i. 566, 576

Martini v. Coles i. 102

Marvin, Ex parte iii. 417

v. Bates iii. 107

v. Titsworth iii. 378

v. Trumbull i. 172

v. Wallis iii. 46

Marvine v. Hymers iii. 138, 141, 143

Marwick, In re i. 238

Mary, The ii. 399, 401, 403, 439, 447, 448,

462,718; iii. 147

Mary Ann, The ii. 403, 466

Mary Caroline, The ii. 454

Mary Hale, The ii. 438

Mary Paulina, The ii. 462

Mary Pleasants, The ii. 441

Maryland v. Bank of Md. iii. 382

Maryland Ins. Co. v. Le Roy ii. 531

v. Ruden ii. 523

Marx v. National Ins. Co. ii. 471

Marzetti v. Williams i. 87, 92

Mascal's case i. 260; iii. 235

Mason v. Armitage iii. 325

CXXXV111

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Mason v. Bauman i. 92

v. Blair iii. 347

v. Blaireau, The ii. 437, 438, 440, 441,

442

v. Chambers i. 531 ; ii. 659, 060

v. Citizens Ins. Co. ii. 587, 015

u. Connel i. 171, 189, 2 20

v. Crosby ii. 927

v. Denison iii. 415

v. Dennison i. 3611

v. Farnell i. 141

v. Felton i. 439

v. Franklin Ins. Co. ii. 483, 538

... Fuller ii. 730

o. Haile iii. 393, 503

v. Harvey ii. 586

v. Homer ii. 730

v. Knowlson ii. 874

t. Jordan ii. 942

v. Joseph i. 89, 90

v. Lickbarrow i. 94, 575

v. Martin iii. 273

v. Mason ii. 013

v. Pritchard ii. 641

v. Robinson ii. 089

v. Thompson ii. 156, 162, 164, 106

v. Whitbeck Co. iii. 51

v. White ii. 680

v. Whithorne i. 136

v. Wright i. 337

Mass. Gen. Hospital v. Fairbanks i. 433

Massasoit, The ii. 461

Massey v. Davies i. 97, 111

v. Building Assoc. iii. 117

Massie v. Sebastian ii. 933

v. Watts iii. 333

Massiter v. Cooper ii. 212

Masson r. Bovet ii. 814, 923

Mast v. Pearce i. 033

Master v. Miller i. 253 ; ii. 854, 855, 857,

907

Masterman v. Cowrie ii. 119, 143

Masters, In re ii. 907

v. Baretto i. 309

v. Madison Co. Ins. Co. ii. 555, 575

v. Masters ii. OSfi

v. Warren iii. 178

Masterton v. Mayor of Brooklyn iii. 198,

201, 200

Matasce v. Hughes ii. 756

Matchin r. Matchin ii. 93

Mateer r. Brown ii. 156, 157

Matern v. Gibbs ii. 437

Mather v. American Express Co. ii. 253

v. Bush iii. 391, 393

v. Maidstone i. 300

v. Ney ii. 89

Matheson v. Equitable Ins. Co. ii. 517

Mathews v. Aiken ii. 6

u. Davis iii. 238

u. Howard Ins. Co. ii. 573

v. Hunter i. 107

v. Lewis iii. 151

v. Menedger iii. 277

Matliewson v. Clarke i. 173, 174

Mathewson i>. Johnson

v. Stockdale
Mathewson's case
Matlock v. Gibson

v. Matlock

v. Todd
Matsell c. Flanagan ii.

i. 334, 362

ii. 336, 344

i. 12

i. 457

i. 169

iii. 107

. 361, 370, 375

Matson v. Farm Building Ins. Co. ii. 551

v. Wharam iii. 22

Matteson v. Holt iii. 223

v. Nathanson i. 225

Matthews, Ex parte ii. 395, 400

v. Allen i. 317

v. Baxter i. 435

v. Bliss i. 621

v. Coalter ii. 861

v. Coe iii. 144

v. Cribbett ii. 75

v. Felch i. 182

u. Fuller i. 91

v. Houghton ii. 577

v. Howard Ins. Co. ii. 499; iii. 192

v. McStea i. 226

v. Milton ii. 12

v. Offley ii. 464

v. Parker . i. 635

v. Poythresg i. 289

Matthie v. Potts ii. 488

Matthiessen Co. v. McMahon i. 434 ;

iii. 58

Mattison v. Marks i. 281

v. Westcott ii. 781

Mattocks v. Chadwick iii. 77

Mattoon v. Pearce iii. 217

Mattox v. Craig iii 231, 232

Mauck r. Melton iii. 66

Maud r. Waterhouse i. 472

Maudslav ;•. Le Blano i. 163

Maul v. Rider i. 523

Maule v. Murray ii. 738, 739

Maundrell, Ex parte iii. 448

Mauney v. Coit i. 225

v. Ingram iii. 267

Maunsell v. White iii. 33

ilnury v. Talmadge ii. 234, 236

Maving ». Todd ii, 154, 192, 257, 258
Mavor v. Pyne ii. 649, 792 ; iii. 44, 108

Mawdesley v. Parke iii. 409

Mawe «. Samuel ii. 837

Alawuian v. Tegg ii. 341, 312, 344, 348,

349

Mawson v. Blane i. 303

Maxey v. Strong i. 225

Maxim r. Morse i. 463

Maxwell v. Day ii. 756

v. Deare ii. 757

v. Goodrum i. 280

u. Hogg ii. 361, 363

v. Jameson i. 247

v. Mcllvoy ii. 155

v. Robinson ii. 535

May v. Babcock ii. 410, 686

v. Breed iii. 395, 404, 409, 508

v. Calder i. 150

v. Campbell iii. 153, 156

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CXXX1X

May v. Christie

ii. 536

v. Coffin

i. 467

v. Gamble

ii. 757

v. Harvey

iii. 478

v. May

i. 20

v. Princeton

ii. 248

v. Skey

i. 392

v. Woodward

i. 12, 30

May Queen, The

ii. 459

M&yall v. Mitford

ii. 548

Mayberry v. Willoughby

i. 225

Maybin v. Coulon

ii. 832

v. Railroad Co.

ii. 190

Maydew v. Forester

i. 32

Mayell v. Potter

ii. 416

Mayer v. Mayer

ii. 92

v. Mutual Ins. Co.

ii. 543, 617

Mayfield v. Wadsley

i. 486; ii. 649;

iii. 19, 35, 36

Mayham v. Coombs

iii. 294

Mayhew v. Boyee

ii. 250

v. Boyd

ii. 19

v. Criekett

i. 36, 210

v. Eames

i. 83

v. Mayhew

ii. 89

v. Terry

ii. 457

Maynard v. Brown

iii. 365

v. Hunt

ii. 776

v. Morse

ii. 16

v. Rhodes

ii. 599, 912

v. Wright

ii. 629

Mayne v. Griswold

iii. 107

Maynell v. Surtees

iii. 352

Mayo v. Archer

iii. 416

v. Maine

ii. 491

v. Marine Ins. Co.

ii. 491

v. Snow

ii. 421

Mayor v. Humphries

ii. 244

v. Johnson

i. 331

v. Lefferman

i. 446

u. Steward

iii. 44'J

v. Williams

i. 466

Mayor of Berwick-upon-Tweed v.

Oswald ii. 18, 824

Mayor of Cambridge v. Dennie ii. 18

Mayor of Ludlow v. Charlton i. 154

Mayor of New York v. Bailey i. 117,

120
v. Colgate iii. 108

v. Hamilton Ins. Co. ii. 588

Mayor of Norwich v. Norfolk Railway

Co. ii. 660

Mayor of Thetford's case i. 153

Mayor, &c. of Alexandria v. Patten

ii. 762
Mayor, &c. of Kidderminster v. Hard-
wick i. 154
Mays v. Cannel ii. 833
v. Manufacturer's Bank iii. 438, 446
Mayson v. Beazeley i. 230
Maze v. Miller ii. 822
Mazozon v. Foot iii. 104
McAUester v. Sprague i. 27
McAllister v. Gallaher ii. 761
v. Hoffman ii. 761, 897

McAllister v. New England Mut. Ins.

Co. ii, 615

v. Reab ii. 879

McAlpine v. Wingard i. 290

McAndrew v. Bassett ii. 354, 355, 363

McAndrews v. Electric Tel. Co. ii. 279,

286, 287

McArthur v. Sears ii. 170, 171, 181, 183

v. Slauson i. 109

McAuley v. Billinger i. 484

McAvoy v. Medina ii. 106

McBride v. Gray iii. 75

v. Hagan ' i. 210 ; ii. 827

v. McBride i. 349

v. McClelland i. 569

v. M'Laughlin iii. 178, 183

McCaffrey v. Woodin i. 552 ; iii. 302

McCall v. Clayton i. 55

v. Flowers ii. 134

v. Hinckley iii. 382, 403

McCall 's case i. 137

McCallen v. Adams i. 401

MeCan v. Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 232

McCandlish o. Newman i 561

McCann v. South Nashville Street

R. Co. iii. 322

McCardel v. Peck ii. 361, 378

McCargo v. Merchants Ins. Co. ii. 487

v. N. O. Ins. Co. ii. 499

McCartee v. Camel ii. 612, 613

v. Teller i. 371

McCarthy i: Goold i. 253

v. Pope iii. 39

McCartney v. Gambart ii. 370

McCarty v. Emlen i. 234

v. Blevins i. 560

v. Murray i. 335

McCaskill v. Ballard i. 329

McCawley v. Furness R. Co. ii. 238

McClain v. Davis i. 436

McClane v. Fitch i. 318

McClartey v. Gokey i. 573

McClintick v. Cummins i. 446

McClintock v. Lary ii. 406

McCluer v. Girard Ins. Co. ii. 549

McClung i: Kelley i. 564, 627

v. McClung ii. 91

McClure v. McClure iii. 314, 362

v. Richardson ii. 177

v. Williams iii. 130, 219

McClures v. Hammond ii. 177

McClurg v. Kingsland ii. 305, 321

v. Terry ii. 87

McClurg's Appeal ii. 893

McCluskey v. Providence Ins. Co. ii. 475

McColl v. Oliver i. 186

McComb v. Wright i. 123 ; iii. 12

McConicke c. N. Y. & E. R. R. Co.

i. 565
McConihe v. McMann i. 486

McConnell v. Dunlap iii. 246

v. Gibson i. 95

v. Hampton iii. 188

v. Hector i. 226

c. Hughes i. 561

cxl

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

McConochie v. Sun Ins. Co.

ii. 511

McCormick r. Barnum

ii. 'XV.)

v. Connoly

ii. 02

v. Demary

ii. 07

v. Drummett

iii. 41

v. DunviLLe

iii. 21U

p. Hadden

i. 570

v. Littler

i. 434

v. Manny

ii. 315

v. Seymour ii.

305, 308, 328

v. Sullivant

ii. 701

v. Talcott

ii. 314

v. Trotter

i. 280

McCoy v. Artcher

i. 61G

r. Hock

iii. 267

v. Huffman

i. 355

v. It & D. M. R. Co.

ii. 174

v. Metropolitan Ins. Co. ii. 592

McCracken v. Haywood iii. 505, 511

v. West ii. 021

McCrea v. Purmort iii. 0

McCready r. Freedly i. 12

v. Goldsmith ii. 431, 432, 433

v. Thorn ii. 380

McCreary v. Van Hook ii. 10

McCreery r. Green ii. 805

MoCreight r. Aiken i. 434, 438

McCrillis v. Bartlett i. 436, 438 ; iii. 414

v. Carlton ii. 815

v. How i. 353

McCulloch r. Dashiell i. 238

v. Eagle Ins Co. i. 514, 515; ii. 540

v. Judd iii. 05

v. McKee i. 51

McCullough v. Cox ii. 663

v. Henderson iii. 82

u. Myers ii. 827

u. Somerville i. 207 ; iii. 382

r. Wainwright ii. 080

McCullum r. Gourley ii. 700

McCune i\ Belt i. 204

McCurry ;.'. Hooper i. 438

McCutchen u. McGahay i. 387, 393, 304,

.305, 390

McDaniel v. Cornvvell i. 407

v. King ii. 710

McDaniell v. Bell ii. 827

McDaniels v. Barnum iii. 130

v. Flower Brook Manuf. Co. ii. 6

u. Lapham ii. 823

v. Robinson ii. 157, 166

MeDavid v. Adams i. 384

McDermot ». Laurence i. 172

McDoal v. Yeomans

McDole v. Purdy

McDonald v. Bacon ii. 830

v. Bennett iii. 266, 207

v. Black ii. 565

v. Edgerton ii. 160, 162, 105

v. Eggleston i. 122

v. Hewett i. 566

v. Hodge iii. 231

i'. Law, &c. Ins. Co. ii. 550

v. Magruder i. 35, 204

v. Morton i. 437

ii. 3,
iii. 295, 2fr '

McDonald r. Napier iii. 285

u. Red Wing iii- 496

v. Richardson ii. 369

v. Smith iii. 137

v. Western R. R. Co. ii. 212

McDonnell v. Pope i. 543

McDougal v. Paton iii. 464

McDougall v. Maguire ii. 881

McDowall v. Wood i. 407

McDowell v. Chambers iii. 9

v. Lucas iii. 352

v. Rissell ii. 146

u. Simms i. 526

v. The Blackstone Canal Co. ii. 765

McDowle'e case ii. 54

McDuffee v. Portland, &c. R. Co. ii. 187

McElfatrick v. Hicks iii. 138

McElroy ». Buck iii. 15

v. Nashua & Lowell R R. Corp. ii. 244

McElvey v. Lewis i. 219

McElwee v. Collins iii. 156

McEntire v. McEntire i. 621

McEvers v. Mason i. 303

McEwen v. Montgomery Ins. Co. ii. 584

v. Morey i. 561

v. Smith i. 639

McFarland r. Newman i. 623

McFee v. S. Car. Ins. Co. ii. 534

McGahay v. Williams i. 396

McGan v. Marshall i. 335

McGee v. Mathis iii. 481

v. Metcalf ii. 29

McGill v. Dowdle i. 176

,.. McGill i. 165

v. Rowand ii. 186, 276, 277

r. Ware iii. 123, 127, 143

McGilvery p. Capen ii. 422

McGinley v. U. S. Ins. Co. ii. 597

McGinn v. Pontiac, The ii. 438, 440

v. Shaeffer i. 370

McGivnev ;■. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 562

McGoon "v. Ankeny i. 563 ; ii. 105, 909

McGowan r. Dyer i. 79

v. St. Louis, &c. R. Co. ii. 47

McGowin r. Remington iii. 330

McGrath v. ( 'lark ii. 853

v. Robertson i. 407

McGregor r, Comstock i. 129

v. Gardner i. 77

v. Penn i. 623

v. Rhodes i. 275

McGregory r. McGregory i. 331

McGrew v. Browder i. 550

McGruder ?•. Bank of Washington i. 311

McGuire v. Bosworth i. 274, 283

(/. Newkirk ii. 15

v. Ramsey i. 171

McHenry v. Duffleld i. 72

v. Railway Co. ii. 196

McHose v. Fulmer iii. 223

r. Wheeler i. 161

McHugh t-. Wells iii. 332

Mcllvaine p. Harris iii. 35

p. Wilkins iii. Ill

Mclneffe v. Wheelock ii. 774

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

cxli

Mclntire v. Carver iii. 270

v. Patton ii. 940

Mclntyre v. Agricultural Bank iii. 377

v. Browne ii. 195

v. Parks i, 662

v. Williamson ii. 634

Mclver v. Humble i. 21 3

v. Richardson i. 509 ; ii. 13

McJilton v. Love i. 254 ; ii. 864

McKanna v. Merry i. 337

McKay u. Bryson ii. 52

u. Carrington iii. 334, 340

v. Green iii. 298

McKeage v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. i. 546

MeKecknie t>. Ward ii. 28

McKee v. Barley iii. 312

v. Hamilton i. 209

McKeen v. Allen ii. 829

v. Gammon iii. 248

v. Oliphant ii. 832

MuKelvey v. Jarvis ii. 764

McKelvy's Appeal i. 224

McKenna v. George i. 32, 34

McKenzie v, Durant i. 309, 322

u. Hancock i. 636

v. McLeod i. 538

v. Stevens i. 342

v. Sykes ii. 625

McKeon v. Caherty ii. 897 ; iii. 426

v. Citizens R. R. Co. iii. 186

v. Mclvor ii. 197

McKesson v. Stanbury i. 329

McKibbin v. Brown iii. 310

McKinlay v. Morrish ii. 410

McKinley v. Watkins i. 470, 479

McKinney v. Alvis i. 247

o. Bradlee i. 581

v. Crawford i. 290

v. Fort i- 618

v. Jewett ii- 253

v. Neil ii. 234, 239, 244

v. Page ii. 843

v. Pinckard i. 523

v. Snyder iii. 92

McKinnon v. McEwan iii. 196

McKinsey v. Anderson ii. 863

McKissick v. Millowners' Ins. Co. ii. 575

McKnight v. Devlin i. 616 ; iii. 219,

224

v. Dunlop ii- 649, 655, 792 ;

iii. 57

v. Hogg i- 351

v. Ratcliff i. 243; iii. 199

McLane v. Sliarpe ij- 250

McLaren v. Watson ii. 3, 4

McLauchlin v. Lomas ii. 134, 137

McLaughlin v. Hill iii- 202

v. Piatti in- 310

v, Waite ii- 108

McLean v. Burbank ii. 180

v. Dunn i- 574

v. Republic Ins. Co. ii- 802

v. Richardson iii- 224

McLearn v. McLellan iii- 293

McLellan v.. Cumberland Bank i. 28

McLemore v. Powell

i. 323

McLeod, The

ii. 459

ii. Burroughs

iii. 490

McLoughlin v. Bishop

i. 530

McLure v. Ashby

iii. 107

o. Rush

ii. 660

v. Wilson

i. 483

McMahan v. Franklin

i. 97

McMahon v. Field

iii. 193

v. McClernan

i. 187, 219

v. Portsmouth Ins. Co.

ii. 541, 584

v. Sloan

ii. 104

McManus v. Crickett

i. 114

o. L. & Y. Ry. Co.

ii. 266

McMaster v. Ins. Co. of N. A. ii. 580

McMasters v. Westchester Co. Ins.

Co. ii. 587

McMicken v. Beauchamp ii. 860

McMillan v. Bull's Head Bank ii. 3, 31

,-. McNeil iii. 392, 390

v. Michigan South. R. R. Co. ii- 265

v. Peacock ii. 78

v. Vanderlip ii- 39

McMillen v. Lee _ i. 347

McMinn v. Richmonds i. 335, 353

McMullen v. Rafferty iii. 98

McMurry v. The State ii. 783

McNair v. Gilbert i. 332

McNairy v. Bell i. 30'1

v. Thompson ii. 633

McNamara v. King iii. 184

McNaught v. McClaughry ii. 8

McNaughter v. Casally iii. 224, 226,

354

McNaughton v. Conkling ii- 4

v. Partridge iii- 354

McNear v. Bailey ii- 828

McNeil v. Colquhoon iii. 409

v. Knott i- 299

v. Magee iii- 310

v. Reed i. 478, 492; iii. 197

u. Tenth Bank i- 252

v. Williams ii. 348

McNeill it. McDonald i. 290

McNeille v. Acton i- 227

McNeilly v. Patchin i- 35

v. Reid .i- 175

McNorton v. Akers ii- 928

McPherson v. Cox i. 129, 443 ; ii. 668 ;

iii. 40, 285

v. Gale ■ ii- I47

v. Rathbone i- llJ7

v. Rees i- 462

v. Walters ij- 939

McQueen v. Farquhar j- 526

McQuewans v. Hamlin i- 209

McRae v. Creditors iii- 293

McRaven v. Crisler ii- 853

McRea v. Central Bank i- 545

McRoberts i'. Washburne jii- 484

McShane v. Hazlehurst iii- 372

McSherry v. Brooks i- 18>>

McSparran v. Neeley i. 436 ; ii- 862

McStea v. Matthews i- 226

McVey v. Cantrell i- 408

cxlii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

McWhortor v. McMahan iii. 14

Me Williams v. Hopkins ii. 875

M'Allister v. Reab iii. 110

M' Arthur v. Seaforth iii. 212, 220

M'Bride v. Marine Ins. Co. ii. 425, 447,

513

M'Cabe v. Morehead iii. 217, 218

M'Carty v. Colvin ii. 758

v. Decaix ii. 734

M'CIarin v. Nesbit ii. 753

M'Collum v. Gushing ii. 13

M'Comb b. Wright iii. 12

M'Combie w. Davics i. 93, 102; iii. 270

M'Connel v. Hall ii. 781, 787

M'Cormick v. Fitzmorris ii. 858

M'Coy v. M'Coy ii. 91

M'Crnney r. Alden iii. 125

M'Crea v. Purmort ii. <j;-i2

M'Culloch v. M'Culloch ii. 720

v. Royal Excli. Ass. Co. ii. 470

M'Daniel v. Hughes ii. 738

M'Dermid v. Red path iii. 219

M'Dermott p. S. G. Owens, The ii. 385

v. U. S. Ins. Co. ii. 833

M'Donald v. Carr ii. 617

u. Rainor ii. 871

u, Scaife iii. 218

i'. Trafton ii. 913

M'Donnell v. Branch Bank iii. 08

M'Donough r. Dannery ii. 437

M'Dowell v. Tyson ii. 877

M'Elmoyle v. Cohen ii. 721

M'Ewan v. Smith i. 652 ; iii. 444

M'Fadden v. Jenkyns iii. 315

M'Gaw t>. Ocean Ins. Co. ii. 409, 414, 417,

510
M'Gillivray v. Simson ii. 882 ; iii. 259
M'Gregor v. Ins. Co. of Penn. ii. 478, 609,

677

M'Guire v. Warder iii. 123

MTIai-d u. Whetcroft ii. 77G

MTntyre v. Carver ii. 148

v. Parks ii. 700

o. Scott ii. 400

M'lver v. Humble ii. 390

M'Kenzie v. Hancock iii. 227

v. Xevins ii. 766 ; iii. 2.^3

M'Kesson v. M'Dowell iii. 143, 145

M'Kinstry v. Solomons ii. 828

M'Lanahan v. Universal Ins. Co. ii. 523,

525, 528

M'Leles v. Hale iii. 43

M'Lelhm v. Maine Ins. Co. ii. 520, 537

M'Mechen's Lessee v. Grundy iii. 442

M'Menomy !•. Ferrers iii. 382, 42H

M'Millan v. M'Neil iii. 5H7

v. Union Ins. Co. ii. 469, 527

M'Nitt v. Clark ii. 790

M'Queen v. Burns iii. 123

M'Quirk v. Penelope, The ii. 460

Meach v. Meach i. 265

Mead v. Cliase iii. 45

u. Davidson ii. 486 ; iii. 329

v. Degolyer ii. 655, 792

v. Small i. 308

Mead v. Thompson

i. 551

v. Wheeler

iii. 170

v. Young

i. 285

Meade v. Brothers

i. 61

Meader v. Scott

ii. 878

Meador v. Hughes

i. 215

Meadows v. Meadows

iii. 12

v. Tanner

iii. 370

Meaghan, In re

iii. 449

Meaher v. Cox i. 215, 221 ; iii. 429

Meany v. Head iii. 250

Mears v. Humboldt Ins. Co. ii. 547

v. Swomestedt i. 68

Meason v. Cline iii. 321

v. Kaine i. 185

v. Philips iii. 231, 232

Mechanics Bank v. Bank of Colum-
bia i. 54

u. Earp ii. 112, 113

v. Edwards iii. 132

v. Griswold i. 308

v. Merchants Bank i. 91, 313 ;

ii. 112

v. New York, &c. R. R. Co. i. 43, 44,
45, 331
Mechanics Bank of Alexa. v. Seton

iii. 325, 330, 331
Mechanics & Farmers Bank v. Capron

iii. 464
Mechanics & Traders Bank v. Debolt

iii. 486, 498

!•. Gordon ii. 115, 193

Mechanics, &c. Bank v. Farmers, &c.

Bank i. 556

Mechelen e. Wallace i. 485

v. Williams iii. 19

Medbury v. Hopkins ii. 700, 721

v. Watrous i. 355, 360; ii. 40

Metldlemore v. Goodale i. 259

Medeiros r. Hill ii. 520

Jledill i'. Collier i. 161

Medina v. Stoughton i. 614

Medley r Hughes ii. 416

Medlin i'. Piatt County ii. 856

Medora, The ii. 404

Medway f. Needham ii. 723, 724, 729

Meech !'. Robinson ii. 445

o. Smith i. 72 ; iii. 110

Meek v. Atkinson i. 444

r. Kettlewell iii. 315

Meeker v. Jackson i. 332

Meert v. Moessard i. 245

Megginson r. Harper iii. 92

Meggs v. Binns i. 126

Megrath r. Gray i. 324 ; iii. 411

r. Robertson iii. 415

Mehan v. Thompson ii. 756

Meidel v. Anthis iii. 184

Meigs v. Mut. Ins. Co. ii. 488

Meincke v. Falk iii. 60

Meist r. Penn. K. Co. ii. 242

Meister v. Moore ii. 86

Melan v. Fitz James ii. 719; iii. 391

Melancon «. Robichaux i. 627

Melchert v. American Un. Tel. Co. ii. 896

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

cxliii

Meldrum v. Snow i. 581

Melhado v. Porto Alegre, &c. R. Co. i. 155

Melledge v. Boston Iron Co. ii. 756

Mellen v. Boarman ii. 877

v. Hamilton Ins. Co. ii. 477, 493, 588

v. Moore i. 58

Mellerish r. Rippin i. 322

Melley v. Casey i. 411

Mi'llish i\ Andrews ii. 535

v. Motteux i. 634 ; ii. 394

r. Simeon i. 327

Mellona, The ii. 434

Mellor v. Spateman iii. 233, 234

v. Watkins i. 543, 548 ; ii. 665

Melius v. Silsbee ii. 305

Melody v. Chandler i. 613

Melville v. Brown iii. 201

v. De Wolf ii. 43

v. Hayden ii. 640

Melvin u. Proprietors, &c. on Mer.

River ii. 638

Memphis, &c. R. R. Co. u. Blakeney

ii. 817

Menagh v. Whitwell i. 240

Menard o. Scudder ii. 13, 16

Mendel, Ex parte iii. 420

Menetone v. Athawes ii. 140

Menham v. Edmonson iii. 425

Mentor, The ii. 460

Mentz v. Renter i. 383

Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Chase ii. 254

v. Holthaus ii. 586

v. State Ins. Co. ii. 478, 491

Mercein v. Smith ii. 876

Mercer v. Irving iii. 168

v . Jones iii. 209, 210

v. Selden iii. 103

v. Whall ii. 43

Merchant, The ii. 441

Merchant Shipping Co. v. Armitage

ii. 415

Merchants Bank v. Bangs i. 579

v. Easley i. 307

v. N. Jersey Steam Nav. Co. ii. 255

v. Spalding iii. 355

v. Spicer ii. 765

v. State Bank ii. 113

v. Trenholm i. 102

Merchants Dispatch Co. v. Hallock ii. 203

v. Smith ii. 172

Merchants Ins. Co. v. Clapp ii. 480

v. Morrison ii. 531

v. Shillito ii. 485

Merchants Trans. Co. v. Bolles ii. 257

Merchants, &c. v. Grant i. 364

Merchants, &c. Co. v. Bolles ii. 187

v. Goodrich ii. 897

v. Story ii. 151

Meredith v. Gilpin ii. 870

v. Hinsdale "■ 719

v. Meigh iii. 54

Merele v. Wells _«■ 23

Meres v. Ansell ji. 679

Merest v. Harvey iii- 183

Merethew v. Andrews iii. 347

Meretony v. Dunlope
Merewether v. Shaw
Merithew v. Sampson
Meriwether r. Bird
Merkle v. Wehrheim
Merle v. Andrews
Merrell v. Tice
Merriam v. Bayley

v. Cunningham

v. Field

v. Granite Bank

ii. 489

ii. 77

ii. 445, 446

ii. 872, 873

iii. 311

i. 448

ii. 332

i. 463

i. 338

i. 626, 627

i. 289

v. Hartford, &c. Railroad Co. ii. 188,

193

v. Wilkins i. 305

Merrick v. Avery ii. 392

e. Gordon i. 176

e. Santvord i. 161

Merrick's case iii. 436

Merrick's Estate iii. 409, 427

Merril v. Frame ii. 647

Merrill v. Bartlett ii. 391

v. Boylston Ins. Co. ii. 534

t: Gore ii. 633

v. Grinnell ii. 239

v. Merrill iii. 174

v. Smith i. 385

Merrills v. Law iii. 121, 125

Merrimac Man. Co., The, v. Garner

ii. 372, 373, 374, 378

Merrimack, The ii. 519

Merrimack Co. Bank v. Brown ii. 20, 768

Merrimack Manuf. Co. v. Quintard iii. 210

Merriman r. Col. Butts, The ii. 302

v. Moore i. 245

Merritt v. Benson iii. 145

v. Brown iii. 338, 339

v. Claghorn ii. 156, 157

v. Clason i. 583 ; iii. 7, 9

c. Day i. 225 ; iii. 90

v. Earle ii. 171

v. Johnson ii. 141, 380

?.. Old Colony R. R. Co. ii. 197

v. Pollys i. 219, 230

t>. Seaman i- 146

u. Todd i. 295

Merry v. Prince ii- 474

Merrywether v. Nixan i. 36, 37

Mers v. Franklin Ins. Co. ii. 559

Merse ». Seymour iii. 307

Mershon r. Hobensack ii. 169, 171, 175, 434

v. National Ins. Co. ii. 545

Mertens i\ Adcock i. 574

c. Winnington i. 326

Merwin v. Butler ii. 179, 196

t>. Playford i. 177

Mesner i>. Suffolk Bank ii. 438

Messenger v. Clarke i. 385

r. Penn. R. Co. ii- 187

v. Southey i- 322

Messer v. Woodman i. 566

Messerole v. Tynberg ii. 354, 355, 36_3,

Messier v. Amery _ i. 105

Messmore v. New Tork Shot Co. i. 627 ;

iii. 199

cxliv

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Mestaer v. Gillespie

iii. 357

Metcalf v. Bruin

ii. 21

». Cooke

i. 409

c. Hess

ii. 157

v. Ives

ii. 828

v. Pilcher

iii. 153, 1 50

v. Scholey

iii. 441

v. Taylor

ii. 063

Metcalfe i: Britannia Iron Works ii. 418,

419
v. Parry ii. 534

v. Pulvertoft iii. 317

u. Richardson i. 322

v. Shaw i. 388

Methodist Episcopal Church v. Gar-

vey i. 484

Metropolitan Wash. Mach. Co. v.

Earle ii. 321

Mettler v. Moore iii. 233

Metzer, Ex parte. iii. 421

Meux v. Humphries i. 211 ; ii. 894

Mews v. Carr iii. 13

Mexborough v. Bower ii. 845

Mey i-. So. Car. Ins. Co. ii. 487, 532

Meyer, Ex parte iii. 421

c Atkins i. 225

«. Everth i. 589

c. Hanchett i. 94

v. Haworth i. 465

v. Hehner i. 75 ; ii. 745

v. Hibsher i. 307

v. Isaac ii. 639, 640

a. Johnston i. 613

o. Lemcke ii. 188

r. Peek ii. 410

Meyerhoff v. Eroehlich iii. 76

Meyerstein r. Barber iii. 274

Meymot, Er parte iii. 416, 472

Meynell v. Surtees i. 506

Meyrick v. Anderson i. 147

Miaghan v. Hartford Ins. Co. i. 83

Michael v. Mills iii. 245

». Tredwin ii. 531

Michaell v. Stockworth i. 27

Michaels v. N. Y. R. R. Co. ii. 172

Michelen v. Wallace iii. 36

Michell v. Burlington iii. 433, 481

Mich. Cent. R. Co. v. Dolan ii. 46

Michigan Central R. R. v. Hale ii. 203,

208

v. Ward ii. 203, 208

Michigan Life Ins. Co. v. Bowes ii. 010,

618

Michigan State Bank v. Gardner i. 102

v. Hastings iii. 480

Michigan, &c. R. Co. v. Carrow ii. 274

i . Caster iii. 207

r. Coleman ii. 240

v. Heaton ii. 270, 271

i: McDonough ii. 174

u. Mineral Springs Manuf. Co. ii. 232

v. Oehm ii. 213

r. Phillips i. 557, 568, 574

Michoud v, Girod i. 95

Mickey v. Burlington Ins. Co. ii. 562, 573

Mickle v. Peet i. 185

Mickles v. Colvin i. 292

Micklewaite v. Winter ii. 129

Middlebrook v. Corwin i. 545, 547

Aliddlebury College v. Chandler i. 337

Middlesex, The ii. 208, 415, 427

Middleton r. Bryan iii. 218

v. Findler i. 110

v. Hill ii. 875

u. Hoge i. 361

u. Janverin ii. 723

v. Weeks ii. 836

v. Welles i. 93

Middleton Bank v. Jerome i. 273

Middlewood e. Blakes ii. 532

Midgley v. Lovelace i. 22, 261

Midland Ry. Co. v. Bromley ii. 190

Mihills Manuf. Co. v. Day iii. 186

Milan & R. Plank R. Co. v. Husted

iii. 498

Milbourn v. Ewart ii. 852

Milburn v. Beach iii. 184

v. Belloni i. 637

v. Codd i. 184

v. Gayther i. 196

Mildmay v. Folgham ii. 477

Miles v. Cattle ii. 168

i'. Conn. Ins. Co. ii. 592

v. Durnford i. 143

v. Edelen i. 570

v. Gorton i. 046, 653 ; iii. 262, 274

v. Ogden ii. 765

v. Williams iii. 437

Miletus, The ii. 428

Milford !'. Worcester ii. 87

Milks v. Rich iii. 27

Mill Dam Foundry v. Hovey ii. 603

Millar v. Hall iii. 397

v. Taylor ii. 329, 330, 336, 342

Millard r. Eamsdell i. 229

Millaudon v. Atlantic Ins. Co. ii. 566

v. K. O. Ins. Co. ii. 570

v. Western Ins. Co. ii. 578, 582

Miller v. Adsit ii. 104

u. Austen i. 279

v. Baker i. 548

v. Ball iii. 348

v. Ballard i. 484

v. Bartlet i. 180

v. Berkey ii. 24

v. Brigham i. 220

v. Chetwood i. 522

v. Cook iii. 17

r. Covert ii. 751

c . Drake i. 459, 478, 498, 578

u. Eagle Life Ins. Co. ii. 005, 607

v. Gaither ii. 880

v. Gaston ii. 3

v. Gilleland ii. 853

v. Goddard ii. 39, 657_

v. Hackley i. 325

v. Hannibal, &c. R. Co. ii- 647

v. Hayes ii- 73

v. Henlan iii. 372

v. Hines i. 207

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

cxlv

Miller v. Howell

ii. 917

v. Hull

iii. 130

v. Johnson

ii. 871

o. Kelley

ii. 407

o. Kendig

i. 505

v. Kennedy

ii. 843

v. Kreiter

i. 258

v. Lea

ii. 882

v. Levi

i. 548

v. Lynch

ii. 901

v. Manice

i. 205

r. Mariner's Church

iii. 190

v. Marston

iii. 266

v. lit Brier

i. 540

i: Me Gain

ii. 787

v. MeElroy

ii. 348

v. Miller i. 265, 266 ; ii. 834 ; iii. 91, 97

v. Mut. Ben. Ins. Co. ii. 543, 591

v. Pelletier iii. 10

v. Pittsburg & Cleveland R. Co. ii. 664

v. Piatt ii. 939

v. Price i. 176 ; iii. 290

v. Race i. 272, 289, 329, 330

v. Reed ii. 861

v. Rosier ii. 73

v. Sawyer i. 34

v. Shields i. 535

r. Sims i. 354

v. Smith i. 654

v. State iii. 102

v. Steam Nav. Co. ii. 172, 197, 211

y. Stem ii. 28, 29

v. Stewart ii. 16, 18

v. Tassell i. 615

v. Thompson ii. 640

r. Travers ' i. 531 ; ii. 681, 693, 695

r. Whittfer i. 251

v. Young i. 622

Millerd v. Thorn ii. 756

Millett v. Parker ii. 10

!•. Snowden ii. 242

Milligan v. Cooke iii. 337, 357, 358

v. The B. F. Bruce ii. 458

r. Wedge i. 116

Milliken v. Brown i. 27 ; ii. 750

v. Dehon i. 108 ; ii. 129

v. Loring i. 230

v. Milliken iii. 364, 366

v. Pratt ii. 700, 730

v. Thorndike i. 531

Millikin v. Brandon iii. 416

Milliman v. N. Y. Cent., &c. R. Co. ii. 251

Millington v. Fox ii. 362, 373, 377

Millon v. Salisbury ii. 131

Millot v. Lovett ii. 458

Mills, Ex parte iii. 420

v. Alderbury Union i. 496

v. Ball i. 647

v. Bank of U. S. i. 91, 322; ii 669,

676
v. Barber i. 200, 201, 207

v. Bay ley i- 257 ; ii 658

v. Bell 'ii- 242

v. Catlin ii. 634, 638

v. Dennis i- 149

VOL. I.

Mills v. Duryee ii. 740, 741, 742

v. Farmers Ins. Co. ii. 576

v. Fellows i. 187

v. Fowkes ii. 763 ; iii. 79, 82

v. Graham i. 358

v. Graves ii. 939

•>. Hunt i. 527 ; iii. 49

!'• Hyde i. 34

v. Jefferson iii. 113

r. Ladbroke i. 16, 25

v. Lee i. 468, 469

v. Mills ii. 895

v. Oddy i. 525

v. Shult ii. 408

v. United States Bank i. 313

v. Voorhees iii. 337

v. Williams iii. 483

v. Wright ii. 645

u. Wyman i. 351, 462

Millward v. Littlewood ii. 69, 71

Miln v. Spinola ii. 391, 400

Milne v. Duncan i. 496

v. Gratrix ii. 847

v. Huber i. 489
v. Moreton ii. 701 ; iii. 407, 409, 436

Milner v. Harewood i. 371

o. Milnes i. 383

v. Tucker i. 638

Milnes v. Cowley i. 466

u. Duncan i. 496

r. Gery ii. 845 ; iii. 332, 360

v. Milnes iii. 407

Miltenberger v. Beacom ii. 562, 567

Milton v. Mosher i. 123, 611

v. Rowland i. 036

Milward v. Hibbert ii. 4^5

Milwaukee, &c. R. Co. v. Arms iii. 186

Mims c. Mitchell ii. 134

Minard v. Mead i. 56, 392

Minden v. Cox i. 348

Miner v. Bradley ii. 651

v. Gaw i. 208

v. Harbeck ii. 463

»■ Hoyt i. 290

v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 543

v. Tagert ii. 490
Miners Bank v. United States iii. 486, 490

Minerva, The ii. 437, 457, 466

Minet, Ex parte iii. 15, 462, 464

Minett v. Forrester i. 76

Mingus !'. Pritchett ii. 784
Minn. Oil Co. v. Collier Lead Co. i. 51-3 ;

ii. 296

Minnit v. Whinery i. 188, 202

Minns v. Morse iii. 63

Minock v. Shortbridge i. 354

Minor r. Michie ii. 783

v. Walter ii. 881

Minot v. Joy i. 538

v. Paine i. 159

v. Tappan iii. 426, 431

v. Thayer iii. 476

Minter v. Pacific R. Co. i. 41

Minturn v. Col. Ins. Co. ii. 491

v. Fisher i. 315

cxlvi

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Minturn v. Marmfact. Ins. Co. ii. 475

v. Seymour i. 52-2

v. Warren Ins. Co. ii. 483

Mirabita r. Imperial Bank i. 579

Miranda v. City Bank of N. Orleans i. 91

Misner v. Granger i. 031

Missouri, The ii. 392

t\ Iowa ii. 039

Missouri's Cargo, The ii. 436

Missouri Ins. Co. v. Kittle iii. 117

Missouri, &c. Co. u. Hannibal, &c.

R. R. Co. ii. 190
Missroon v. Waldo i- 027
Mitchell r. Beal i. 569
v. Billingsley iii. 183
v. Burton ii. 19
!■. Chambers ii. 389
v. Cotten ii. 28
v. Cragg ii. 823
v. Cross i. 318
r. Ball i. 188; ii. 763, 768
v. Darthez ii. 647
r. Degrand i. 318
<■. Edie i. 650 ; ii. 504
v. Fuller i. 287
v. Gile i. 558
v. Griffin iii. 27
v. Harris ii. 844
v. Hazen iii. 240
v. Holmes i. 380
v. Homfray i. 203
v. Hughes iii. 426, 433, 437
v. Kingman i. 434 ; ii. 685
v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Rail-
way ii. 210
v. Lapage i. 588
v. M'Lemore iii. 98
v. M'Millan iii. 409
v. Merrill ii. 786
v. Mims i. 79; ii. 134
v. Newhall ii. 670
v. Cldfield ii. 875
i'. Penn. R. R. Co. ii. 46
z>. Reed i. 187
v. Reynolds ii. 880, 891
v. Roulstone i. 198
v. Sellman iii. 72, 76
v. Smith i. 489
v. St. Andrew's Bay Land Co. i. 52
v. Steinmetz iii. 334
v. Taylor ii. 380
v. Union Ins. Co. ii. 605, 606
v. Warner i. 144, 260
r. Wheaton ii. 751
v. Williamson i. 458
v. Wilson iii. 340
r. Wjnslow iii. 424, 441
v. Worden ii. 015
Mitcheson v. Oliver ii. 396
Mitford v, Mitford i. 381 ; iii. 424, 437
<-. Walcot i. 326
Mix !\ Bloomington Bank i. 293
v. Shattuck i. 225; iii. 87
v. Singleton ii. 5
Mixer v. Coburn i. 495, 618

Mixer v. Howarth
Mizen v. Pick
Moak v. Johnson
Moale v. Buchanan
Moar v. Wright

iii. 60, 61, 62

i. 401

iii. 248

iii. 343, 354

i. 254

Mobile, &c. R. R. Co. c. Jarboe ii. 270

Mobley v. Clark i. 307

v. Lombat i. 233

Mock v. Kelley ii. 60

Mockbee v. Gardner i. 616

Mockman v. Shepherdson ii. 43

Moddewell v. Keever i. 173, 201

Moderwell i;. Mullison i. 168

Moehring v. Mitchell ii. 613

Moens v. Heyworth ii. 912, 913

Moc-t r. Couston ii. 376

Moffat r. M'Dowell iii. 382

i\ Parsons i. 46; ii. 747, 774

v. Smith i. 532

v. Strong i. 541

v. Ward ii. 487

Moggridge, Ex parte iii. 465

r. Davis iii. 470

v. Jones i. 495

Mohawk Bank v. Broderick i. 296

v. Burrows ii. 875

Mohawk Bank Bridge Co. v. Utica &

Sch. R. R. Co. ii. 6.39

Mohr !•. Boston, &c. R. Co. i. 647

v. C, &c. R. Co. ii. 210

Moies v. Bird i. 275, 283

Moir v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co. ii. 521

Moist's Appeal ii. 51

Moley v. Brine . i. 354

Molineux, Ex parte iii. 420

Moller i>. Young ii. 413

Mollet v. Brayne ii. 940

Mollett v. Whackerbarth ii. 855, 856

Molloy v. Egan iii. 309, 341, 372

Molony v. Kernan i. 95

Molson v. Hawley i. 293 ; iii. 451

Molton v. Camroux i. 437 ; iii. 414

Molwo, &c. Co. t>. Court of Wards i. 183
Molyn's case ii. 636, 638

Monadnock R. Co. v. Manufacturers

Ins. Co. ii. 561

Moncrief v. Ely i. 351

Moncrieff v. Goldsborough iii. 310

Moncure ;-. Dermott iii. 153

Mondel v. Steel i. 494

Monitor Ins. Co. o. Buffura i. 49

v. Young i. 96

Monk ?•. Clayton i. 41, 43

Monmouth Ins. Co. v. Lowell ii. 639

Monnell v. Burns ii- 44

Monnett v. Sturges iii. 113

Monro v. De Chemant i. 75

Monroe »>. Conner i. 203

v. Douglas ii. 742

Montacute v. Maxwell ii. 77 ; iii. 14, 32,

352

Montague v. Benedict i. 388, 390

v. Espinnasse i. 387

v. Perkins i. 272

v. Sewell iii. 117

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

cxlvii

Montague v. Smith

ii. 837

Moore v. Hart

ii. 77

Montany o. Rock

i. Oil

v. Hendrick

iii. 101

Monte Allegre, The

i. 02, 038

v. Hershey

i. 436

Montefiori v. Montefiori

ii

73; iii. 471

v. Hill

i. 247

Montelius v. Charles

i. 302

v. Hitchcock

iii. 270

Montesquieu v. Sandys

i. 93

v. Hylton

iii. 126

Montgomery v. Dillingham

ii. 28

v. Hyman

iii. 75

v. Hughes

ii. 5

v. Inhabitants of Abbot ii. 250

v. Kellogg

ii. 16

o. Jones

iii. 420

v. Kirksey

iii. 40:!

v. Kendall

ii. 907

v. Lampton

i. 403

v. Lowrey

i. 252

v. Middleton

i. 5yo

c. Magrath

ii. 634

v. Robinson

i. 513

v. McKinlay

i. 587, 6U3

o. The T. P. Leathers

ii. 437, 4:58,

v. Meagher

iii. 189

442

v. Moore

i. 95

v. Walker

i. 294

v. Mountcastle

iii. 15

Montgomery Co. v. American Emi-

o. Murdock

ii. 901

grant Co.

ii. 814

v. Platte Co.

iii. 173

Montgomery County Bank

v. Al-

v. Randolph

iii. 374

bany City Bank i.

303,

305 ; ii. 112

t\ Ross

iii. 38

Montgomery, &e. R. R

Co.

v. Ed-

v. Sample

i. 235

monds

ii. 270

v. Small

iii. 348

Montova v. London Ass.

Co.

ii. 428, 497

v. Stone

i. 75

Montreal, The

ii. 469

v. Taylor

ii. 487

Montreal Bank v. Page

i. 225

v. Turbeville

ii. 915

Montriou v. Jefferies

iii. 206

v. Vance

iii. 118, 157

Monys v. Leake

i. 488

v. Viele

i. 464

Mooar v. Harvey

ii. 709

v. Voughton

iii. 112, 159

Moody, Ex parte

iii. 472

(.. AVeber

i. 531

u. Baker

iii. 194

c. Woolsey

ii. 610

v. Blake

i. 556

Moorehead v. Gilmore

i. 200

v. Brown i.

566;

ii. 380, 650

v. Wriston

i. 215

u. Fiske

ii. 307, 314

Moorhouse v. Crangle

iii. 21

v. Mahurin

ii. 753, 779

Mooring v. Mobile M. D.

& M. I. Co.

v. Payne

i. 235

ii. 757

i: Threlkeld

i. 280

Moors v. Albro

iii. 414, 4:2

v. "Webster

iii. 284

Moorson r. Greaves

ii. 420

Moon v. Durden

ii. 896, 897

Moran v. Baudin

ii. 458, 406

v. Guardians of Whitney

Union

v. Miami Corns.

ii. 943

1.90; ii. 670

v. Prather

i. 210

Mooney v. Lloyd

i. 128

Morancy v. Quarles

ii. 852

u. Musser

i. 108

Moravia v. Levy

i. 185

Moor v. Veazie

i. 251

Morcure v. Dermott

iii. 129

v. Wilson

i. 73, 89

Mordaunt v. Moncreiffe

ii. 93

Moore, Ex parte

iii. 416

Mordy v. Jones

ii. 510

v. Abernathy

i. 367

More v. Howland

iii. 144, 158

v. Adam

iii. 194

v. Mayhew

i. 80

v. American Transportation Co.

Morean v. U. S. Ins. Co.

ii. 509

ii. 427, 455

Moreau v. Edwards

i. 172

v. Barthop

i. 571

v. Sarlarans

i. 168

v. Blake

iii. 372

Morehouse v. Comstock

i. 603, 026

v. Campbell

i.

508 ; ii. 667

Moreland v. Lawrence

iii. 113

u. Clementson

ii. 745, 938

Mores v. Conham

ii. 120 ; iii. 253

v. Coffield

i. 308, 317

o. Mead

i. 618

v. Collins

iii. 382

v. Missouri, The

ii. 392

v. Cornell

i. 405

Moreton v. Hardern

i. 209

v. Crofton

iii. 316, 318

Morewood v. Pollock

ii. 209, 427

v. Dalton

i. 265

Morford v. Bliss

ii. 939

v. Davis

i. 176

Morgan, Ex parte

iii. 422

v. Edwards

iii. 347

v. Bain

ii. 813; iii. 224

v. Evans

ii. 256

v. Biddle

ii. 380, 395

v. Fitzwater

i. 468

v. Bliss

ii. 913

v, Foley

iii. 323

v. Blitzenberger

iii. 38

v. Fox

iii. 42

v. Brundett

iii. 442

v. Gano

i. 187

v. Campbell

i. 552

cxlviii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Morgan v. Congdon

ii. 148

Morris v. Jones

iii. 149

i'. Davis

i. 648

v. Joseph

i. 137

v. Elford

i. 110

v. Langdale

iii. 194

v. Fenclier

i. 615

v. Lee

i. 280

v. Gregg

iii. 212

v. Lowell Manuf. Co. ii. 324

r. Griffith

iii. 38

v. Martin

i. 394

v. Graff

ii. 700

v. Miller

ii. 82

r. Helier

iii. 198

v. Moore

ii. 936. 939

v. Ins. Co. of N. A.

ii. 415

v. Morris

i. 149, 238

r. Malleson

i. 200

v. Norfolk

i. .>3

r. Mather ii

. 842; iii. 159

v. Phelps

iii. 243

v. McUhee

ii. 720

v. Redfield

ii. 58

v. Milman iii.

309, 350, 300

i'. Robinson

ii. 398, 456

v. Kunes

i. 185

v. Shryoek

i. 615

v. Pebrer

ii. 896

u. Silter

ii. 061

V. l'C'L't

i. 325

v. Stacey

iii. 15

v. Kainsford iii.

314, 317, 363

u. Summerl

i. 93

i. Eeintzel

i. 331

v. Tillson

i. 536

c. Richards

ii. 890, 900

v. Thompson

i. 616, 618

v. Richardson

i. 216

v. Vanderen

ii. 860

u. Rowlands

iii. by

v. Way

iii. 377

v. Schermerhorn

iii. 117, 136

Morris Run Coal Co. v.

Barclay Coal

o. Spangler

ii. 941

Co.

ii. 888

f. Stearns

i. 170

Morrison v. Blodgett i

232, 235, 200, 237

i'. Stell

i. 75

v. Bowman

i. 46

v. Taylor

i. 568

v. Buchanans

ii. 836

v. Tener

i. 90

v. Davis

iii. 194

v. Thames Bank

i. 385

v. Deaderick

i. 252, 253

v. Thomas

i. 140

v. Dingley

i. 664, 505

v. Vale of Neath Co.

ii. 47

v. Galloway

ii. 063

(.-. Walton

iii. 72, 92

v. Kurtz

i. 289

v. Woodworth

i. 328

v. Moreland

ii. 882

r. Yarborough

ii. 64, 65, 70

v. Morrison

ii. 91

Mori arty v. Bailey

i. 208

v. Muspratt

ii. 597, 598

Morison v. Thompson

i. 92

u. Peay

iii. 316, 348

Morisone v. Arbuthnot

ii. 78

u. Salmon

ii. 8(12

Moritz v. Hoffman

ii. 78

v. Smith

ii. 750

v. Melhorn

ii. 65

v. Tenn. Ins. Co.

ii. 561, 564, 574

Morluy v. Attenborough

i. 614, 615

v. Woodley

i. 505

v. Inglis

ii. b79

Morriss v. Harvey

i. 248

v. Polhill

i. 144

Morriset r. King

iii. 151

Morly !'. Boothby

i. 456; ii. 8

Morrow v. Delaney

i. 564

Morning Light, The

ii. 431

(.-. Reed

i. 504

Morphett v. Jones

iii. 66, 348

u. Starke

ii. 746

Morphy v. Blanchin

ii. 810

v. Waltz

i. 509

Morrell v. Fisher

ii. 681, 082

Morse, A'.r parte

iii. 420

v. Frith ii. 624, 625 ;

iii. 72, 74, 75

v. Auburn

iii. 177

v. Irving Ins. Co.

ii. 572

v. Bellows

i. 210, 254; ii. 746

v. Trenton Ins. Co.

ii. 605

v. Brainard

ii. 220

Morrill v. Aden

i. 338, 350

v. Buffalo Ins. Co.

ii. 547

v. Colehour

iii. 39

u. Crawford

i. 434 ; iii. 178

u. Nightingale

iii. 219

v. Earl

i. 383

v. Wallace

i. 023

i: Faulkner

ii. 933

Morris, Ex parte

iii. 420

v. Goddard

ii. 940

In re

iii. 409

v. Gould

iii. 506

v. Abat

iii. 242

v. Hovey

iii. 464

v. Ashbee

ii. 336, 344

v. Lowell

iii. 478

i . Bowen

i. 62

v. Massachusetts Bank i. 301 ; ii. 113

i. Clay

i. 434

v. Merest

iii. 332, 338

r. Cleasby i.

100, 101, 497

v. Royal

i. 94

n. Cornell

ii. 405, 400

t. Sherman

i. 663

v. Edgington

i. 531

c. Slue

ii. 175, 182, 274

v. Eves

iii. 301

v. St. Paul Ins. Co.

ii. 544

v. Grier

i. 131

v. Welton

i. 349

v. Husson

i. 310, 320

v. Wilson

i. 178; iii. 152

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

cxlix

Morss v. Elmendorf

v. Gleason
Mortimer v. Capper
v. Orchard
u. McCallan
v. Mortimer
Mortimore v. Wright
Mortin t: Burge
Mortlock v. Buller

iii. 358, 359

i. 220

iii. 429

iii. 309

i. 500

i. 397

i. 340, 351, 475

ii. 831, 833

i. 466, 523; iii. 13,

305, 357, 361

Morton v. Dean iii. 12, 14

v. Fenn ii, 72

v. Lamb i. 578

v. N. Y. Eye & Ear Infirmary ii. 303,

311
v. Thurber iii. 123

v. Tibbett iii. 51, 53

v. Webb ii. 860

v. Weir i. 539

v. Westcott i. 320

Morville v. Am. Tract Soc. i. 158

v. The Great Northern Railway

Co. ii. 264, 268

Mosby v. Wall ii. 871

Mosdell v. Middleton i. 487

Moseby v. Partee iii. 308

Moseley v. Boush i. 251, 252

v. Lord ii. 456

v. Shattuck i. 579

v. Virgin iii. 309, 326

Moses v. Boston & Maine R. R. ii. 192,

259

v. Col. Ins. Co. ii. 502, 509

v. Fogartie i. 388

v. Macferlan i. 492, 522

u. McDivitt iii. 130

o. Mead i. 628, 632

v. Norris ii. 177

v. Norton iii. 23

v. Pratt ii. 480

v. Stevens i. 355 ; ii. 40

v. San Ins. Co. ii. 497, 527, 529

Mosher v. Smith i. 508

v. Southern Express Co. ii. 226

Moshier v. Kitehell iii. 26

v. Shear ii. 842

Moss v. Adams ii. 765

a. Atkinson iii. 15

v. Bainbrigge ii. 632

v. Charnock iii. 443

v. Hall i. 324 ; ii. 28

v. Jerome i. 175

v. Livingston i. 55

v. Rossie Lead Mining Co. i. 49

v. Smith ii. 506

o. Sweet i. 581

v. Townsend ii. 148 ; iii. 250

Mosteller v. Bosh i. 290

Moston v. Burn i. 470

Mote v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 251

Moth v. Frome iii- 431

Motley v. Downman ii. 355, 359, 378

v. Manuf. Ins. Co. ii. 563

v. Motley i- 96

Mott v. Comstock i- 401

Mott v. Consumer's Ice Co. i. 113

v. Mott ii. 893; iii. 174

Motte v. Dorrell iii. 121

Motteux v. London Ass. Co. i. 24 ; ii. 4s0,

532

Mottram v. Heyder i. 641, 647

Motz v. Mitchell i. 446

Mouflet v. Cole ii. 888

Mouldsdale v. Birchall i. 474

Moule, Ex parte iii. 414

Moulor v. Am. Ins. Co. ii. 556, 592

Moulten v. Posten ii. 28

Moulton v. Bowker i. 130

v. Greene iii. 270

v. Trask ii. 40, 654

Mounce v. Byars iii. 297
Mound City Ins. Co. v. Twining ii. 618

Mount v. Larkins ii. 532

Mountaineer, The ii. 438

Mountford v. Gibson i. 147

v. Willes iii. 112

Mountfort v. Scott i. 81

Mountney v. Collier i. 540

Mountstephen v. Brooke i. 210 ; ii. 749 ;

iii. 70, 92

v. Lakeman iii. 20

Mount Wollaston Bank v. Porter iii. 478

Mouse's case ii. 216

Mouton v. Noble i. 457, 458, 483

Mowatt v. Howland i. 91

Mowbray, Ex parte iii. 427

Mowers «. Fethers ii. 161

Mowrey v. Walsh iii. 270, 290

Mowry v. Bishop iii. 141, 159, 160, 161

v. Bradley i. 170

o. Home Ins. Co. ii. 597, 614

v. Sliumway iii. 123

v. Todd i. 254, 258

Moxey, The ii. 430

Moxhay c Inderwick iii. 363

Moxley v. Moxley's Adm'r i. 612

Moxon v. Atkins ii. 487, 524, 673

Moynahan v. Hanaford i. 210, 275

Moyses v. Little iii. 435, 454

Mozley v. Tinkler i. 480, 509 ; ii. 12

Mudd v. Harper i. 296

v. Reeves ii. 753

Mudge v. Wilmot iii. 411

Mugford v. Richardson i. 542

Muggridge, In re iii. 424

v. Eveleth ii. 420

Muhler v. Bohlens i. 101

Muilman v. D'Equino i. 302

Muir v. United Ins. Co. ii. 512

Muirhead v. Kirkpatrick i. 469, 470 ;

ii. 885

Muldon v. Whitlock ii. 390

Mulgrave, The ii. 442

Mulhern v. McDavitt j. 349

Mulherrin v. Hannum i. 309

Mulholland v. Bartlett i. 470

Mullasky v. Cedar Falls i. 160

Mullen !>. Ensley ii- 137

v. Gilkinson ii- 41

v. Russell iii- 130

cl

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Muller v. Pondir i. 107, 645 ; iii. 277

Mullett v. Mason iii. 195, 219

Mullick v. Radakissen i. 302

Mullikin v. Aughinbaugh iii. 109

Mulliner v. Florence ii. 167 ; iii. 265

Mulloy i: Backer ii. 419

Mulrey v. Barrow iii. 293

Mulry v. Mohawk Valley Ins. Co. ii. 560

Mulvehall t\ Millward ii. 75

Mumford, Ex parte iii. 464

v. Bowen i. 536

r. t'omm. Ins. Co. ii. 517

v. Hallett ii. 478, 483

v. McPherson i. 633 ; ii. 679

o. Nicholl ii. 387

o. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 501

v. Whitney iii. 37

Munday v. Railway iii. 506

Mundorff v. Kilbourn iii. 347, 362, 374

v. Wickersham i. 51

Mundy v. Culver iii. 168

c. Joliffe iii. 310, 351

Munet v. Gibson i. 283

Munger v. Tonawanda R. Co. ii. 248

Munn, In re iii. 417

v. Baker ii. 27:!, 640

v. Commission Co. i. 69; iii. 128, 153

Munro v. Alaire ii. 828, N32

v. De Chemant i. 75, 404

u. Saunders ii. 726

Munroe v. Connor i. 203

v. Cooper i. 273

v. Hamilton i. 220

v. Holmes ii. 390

v. Leach ii. 250

v. Merchant i. 448

v. Perkins ii. 085

•>. Pritchett ii. 917, 927

Munsey v. Goodwin ii. 57

Mureh v. Concord R. R. Corp. ii. 248

v. Wright i. 580

Murden v. S. Car. Ins. Co. ii. 532

Murdock v. Boston, &c. R. Co. ii. 904 ;

iii. 187

v. Chenango Co. Ins. Co. ii. 473,
542, 552, 554, 555, 557

v. Harris i. 547

Murphy, In re iii. 449

v. Abrarns i. 167

v. Boese iii. 11

v. Commissioners, &c. i. 118

v. Hanrahan i. 248

v. N. Y., &c. R. Co. iii. 209

r. O'Shea i. 95

v. Renkert ii. 10; iii. 22

v. Simpson ii. 900

u. Smith ii. 47

('. Union Railway ii. 247

v. Webber ii. 764

v. Welch i. 58, 155

Murray v. Alsop ii. 526

v. Baker iii. 106

v. Barlee i. 388

o. Benbow ii. 337

u. Blatchford i. 22, 26

Murray v. Bogert

i. 34, 174,

183, 184

o. Bogue

ii

342, 349

v. Brooks

i. 02

v. Burtis

iii. 128

v. Carret

i. 492

v. Charlestown

iii. 480

v. Col. Ins. Co.

ii. 479,

484, 491

v. De Rottenham

iii. 301

v. East India Co.

i. 42

v. Elliston

ii. 333

a. Gouveneur

iii. 238

v. Harding

iii. 149

v. Harway

i. 539

v. Hatch

ii. 503,

505, 511

v. House

i. 126

v. Jennings

iii. 219

v. Johnston

i. 228

p. Judah

i. 294

c. Lylburn

i. 254

i/. Mann

ii. 916

v. Mechanics Bank iii. 75

v. Mumford i. 222, 227, 229

r. Murray i. 238

v. Parker ii. 928

v. Riggs iii. 382, 439

v. United Ins. Co. ii. 479, 519, 525

Murrill ••. Neill i. 231, 237, 238

Murrin, In re iii. 455

Murry v. Smith i. 581 ; ii. 666, 794

Muscan Hair Man. Co. v. Amer. H.

M. Co. ii. 324

Muschamp v. L. & P. June. Railway

Co. ii. 227, 230, 231, 232

Muse v. Donelson iii. 90

v. Lettermann ii. 939

v. Swayne iii. 168

Muser v. Holland ii. 253

Musgrove v. Gibbs iii. 163

Music Hall Ass. v. Cory i. 568

Musier v. Trumpbour i. 185

Mussen v. Price iii. 226

Musser v. P. & A. Street Ry. Co. ii. 273

Mussey c. Atlas Ins. Co. ii. 493

a. Beecher i. 45

v. Rayner ii. 14

Musson v. Fales ii. 382

Mutford v. Waleot i. 326

Mutual Ass. Co. v. Mahon ii. 555

Mutual Benefit Ass. v. Hoyt ii. 607

Mutual Ben. Ins. Co. v. Brown i. 124

v. Tisdale ii. 613

c. Wise ii. 592

Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Noyes i. 338

Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cargo ii. 446, 451

r. Coatesville ii- 552

i\ Cohen ii. 506

v. French ii. 615

v. Hone i. 32 ; ii. 682

v. Hunt i. 436

v. Munro ii. 491, 503, 536

v. Newton ii. 586

v. Ruse ii. 017, 618

u. Schmidt ii. 613

v. Swift ' ii. 479

Myatt v. Myatt ii. 87

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Cli

Myatts v. Bell i, 227
Myers, Ex parte iii. 402
»• Edge ii. 4, 21
v . First Bank ii. 28
v. Girard Ins. Co. ii. 527, 528, 529
v. Harriet, The ii. 440
v. James ii. 78
v. Keystone Ins. Co, ii. 471
v. Mayfield i. 552
v. McIIugh i. 120
v. Meinrath ii. 904
'■• Nell ii. 853
v. Perry ii. 433
v. Sanders i. 362
v. Silljacks iii. 323
v. Smith i. 230
v. United Guarantee, &e. Com-
pany i. 258
v. Watson iii. 30G, 371
v. Willis ii. 396, 400
Myler 1: Fitzpatrick ii. 217
Mynard 0. Syracuse, &c. E. Co. ii. 270
Mynn v. Joliffe ii. 746

N.

Nailor v. Bowie

i. 308, 311

Naisl), In re

iii. 149

Naftzinger v. Roth

iii. 351

Nagle v. Baylor

iii. 373

v. Mailison

iii. 185

Naglee v. Ingersoll

ii. 877

v. Lyman

i. 303

Najac v. Boston, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 226

Nance's Lessee v. Thompson ii. 838

Nanson v. Gordon iii. 440, 475

Napier v. McLeod i. 26

v. Schneider i. 327

Napoleon, The, v. Etter ii. 392

Narragansett, The iii. 196

Nash, Ex parte iii. 420

v. Drew i. 61

v. Harrington i. 318

». Hodgson ii. 763; iii. 82, 85

v. Lull ii. 320

v. Nash iii. 437

v. Russell i. 464

v. Skinner i. 283

v. Towne iii. 221

v. Tupper ii. 719, 721 ; iii. 301

Nashua Ins. Co. v. Moore ii. 539

Nashville R. R. Co. u. Elliot i. 336; ii. 47,

249

v. Messino ii. 233, 245

Nason v. Dinsmore ii. 900, 005

Nathan v. Giles iii. 443

Nathaniel Hooper, The ii. 413, 419, 426,

439, 451, 452

National Bank v. Graham ii. 07, 98

v. Hall i. 505

v. Hartford Ins. Co. ii. 552

v. Insurance Co. ii. 113, 557

v. Merchants Bank ii- 412

v. Norton ' i. 83, 191

National Bank v. Fassett i. 65

National Bank of Greenfield v. M.

& C. R. K. Co. ii. 213

National Exchange Co. v. Drew i. 80

National Fire Ins. Co. v. Loomis i. 526;

iii. 10

National Ins. Co. v. Allen i. 56, 65

v. Minch i. 79

v. Webster ii. 573

National Mahaiwe Bank v. Peck ii. 767

National Park Bank v. Ninth Nat.

Bank i. 300

Naugatuck R. R. Co. v. Waterbury

Co. ii. 231

Nautilus, The ii. 420

Nave v. Home Ins. Co. ii. 569

Navone v. Haddon ii. 505, 516

Navulshaw v. Brownrigg i. 60, 102

Nay v. Mograin iii. 66

Naylor v. Dennie i. 640, 653

v. Fall River Iron Works ii. 36

v. Mangles iii. 256

v. Moody ii. 20, 28

v. Palmer ii. 499

v. Taylor ii. 520

Nazareth v. Lowe iii. 296

N. C. R. Co. 0. Bastian i. 154

Neal v. Bellamy ii. 10

v. Clark " iii. 433

v. Gilmore ii. 61

v. Saunderson ii. 170

v. Sheffield ii. 824

v. Wilmington, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 203
Neale v. Clantice i. 553

v. Ledger ii. 844

v. Mackenzie iii. 364, 365

v. Turton i. 164, 186

v. Wyllie i. 537

Neate v. Ball i. 581

Neave a. Moos ii. 929

Nebraska City v. Campbell iii. 199

Nedriffe v. Hogan ii. 875

Nedrow v. Farmers Ins. Co. ii. 615

Neel v. Deens i. 493

Neelson !■. Sanborne ii. 7

NefF>. Horner ii. 853

Negley v. Jeffers iii. 38

Negus, Ex parte iii. 200

Neidlet v. Wales i. 537

Neil v. Cheves ii. 685

v. Cottingham iii. 406

Neill v. Morley iii. 414

Neilson v. Col. Ins. Co. ii. 509

v. Harford ii. 310, 311, 624

y. Morgan iii. 184

v. Thompson ii. 324

Neirinckx, Ex parte iii. 416

Neldon v. Smith i. 595

Nellie D., The ii. 435

Nellis v, Clark i. 522 ; ii. 924

Nelson, The ii. 402, 404

v. Belmont ii. 447, 449, 450, 452

v. Boynton ii. 11 ; iii. 26, 30

v. Bridges iii. 323

o. Brown i. 565

clii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Nelson v. Carland

iii. 388

c. Carringtou

iii. 243

e. Cartwell

iii. Ill

v. Cowing

i. (32

<•. Eaton

i. 370

«. Fehler

iii. Ill

v. Garey

ii. IJUG

v. Hopkins

ii. OH)

v. Iverson

ii. 103

u. Leland

ii. 431

v. Lloyd

i. 108

r. Macintosh

ii. 115

v. Matthews

iii. 243

c. Morgan

iii. 184

t. Neely

i. 205

v. Powell

i. 00

v. Salvador

ii. 520

v. Surle

i. 472, 473

v. Stephenson

ii. 409

u. Suddarth

i. 443, 445

c. Suffolk Ins. Co.

ii. 495, 499

v. Woodruff

ii. 400

Nelthorpe v. Holgate

iii. 308, 357

Neponset Bank v. Leland

iii. 282

Neptune, The ii. 381, 437, 460, 461, 408
Neptune Ins. Co. v. Robinson ii. 523

Neptunus, The ii. 520

Nereide, The ii. 520

Neret v. Burnard i. 210

Nerot v. Wallace i. 459, 489, 402

Nesbit v. Burry i. 666

Nesbitt v. Digby iii. 403

v. Lushington ii. 499, 501

v. Meyer iii. 321

Nesmith c. Calvert ii. 318

v. Dyeing i. 107, 108

Nestor, The ii. 381, 384

Netherland S. Co. v. Styles ii. 433

Netherly v. Ripley iii. 347

Nettles v. Railroad Co. ii. 196

Nettleton r. Billings ii. 044

v. Sikes iii. 34

Nevada, The ii. 431

Neve v. Hollands iii. 86

Neves r. Scott i. 409

Neville v. Merchants Ins. Co. ii. 4S9,

540

v. Wilkinson ii. 78, 026

Nevins r. Rockingham Ins. Co. ii. 577

v. Townsend i. 206

Nevison v. Wliitley iii. 138

Nevitt v. Clarke ii. 463

New v. Swain i. 563; iii. 202

Nevvall v. Elliott ii. 306

v Hussey ii. 757

Newark, The ii. 184

New Bedford Turnpike v. Adams i. 483
Newbeggin v. Pillans i. 407

Newbert v. Cunningham i. 129; iii. 100
Newbery i\ Wall iii. 15

New Brunswick S. & T. Co. v.

Tiers ii. 172

Newburgh Bank v. Smith ii. 762

Newbury v. Armstrong i. 480 ; iii. 17

v. Brunswick ii. 729

Newbury's case ii. 345

Newby (>. Paynter iii. 358

c. Vestal • i. 552

Newcastle Ins. Co. v. Macmorran ii. 518,

544

Newcomb v. Boston, &c R. Co. i. 568, 570

v. Brackett i. 580

a. Cabell i. 568

v. Clark i. 57

v. Hale ii. 25

v. Mutual Ins. Co. ii. 008

v. Ramer iii. 35

!'. Wallace iii. 233

New Draper, The ii. 388

Newel u. Keith ii. 50

Newell v. Hamer ii- 28

v. Hill i. 5)0

v. Newton ii. 8i4

v. Smith ii. 19S

v. Turner ii. 022

N. E. Bank c. Lewis ii 871

N. E. Fire Ins. Co. v. Schettler ii. 543, 5-2

N. E. Ins. Co. r. Robinson ii. 541

v. Wetmore ii. 477

N. E. Marine Ins. Co. v. De Wolf i. 51 ;

ii. 421
v. Sarah Ann, The ii. 396, 397, 398
N. E. Mutual Ins. Co. o. Butler ii. 530, 800
Newhall, Ex parte iii. 424, 420

v. Buckingham i. 236

v. Paige ii. 106

v. Vargas i. 641, 043, 645, 649, 65ff
v. Wright ii. 635

Newham v. May iii. 359

New Hamps. Ins. Co. e. Rand ii. 539, 579
New Hamps. Savings Bank v. Col-
cord i. 470 ; ii. 27
New Haven County Bank v. Mitch-
ell ii. 14, 20
New Haven S. B. Co. a. Vanderbilt ii. 430
Hew Haven, &c. Co. c. Campbell iii. 270
New Hope, &c. Co. v. Perry i. 309
v. The Phoenix Bank i. 83
New Jersey, The ii. 435
v. Wilson iii. 502
N. J. Ins. Co. v. Baker ii' 591
New Jersey Railroad Co. v. Kennard ii. 244
New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Mer-
chants Bank ii. 264, 259, 267, 427
Newlan r. Dunham i. 501
Newhn v. Freeman i. 410
r. Ins. Co. ii. 4S9
Newman v. Alvord ii. 352, 354, 359, 363,

371
v. Bagley i. 232

v. Bean i. 236

v. British i. 59

t-. Cazalet ii. 536

v. Chapman iii. 299

v. l)e Lorimer iii- 68

v. Edwards ii. 943

v. Jackson iii. 378

v. Labeaume ii. 837

i'. MeComas i. 225

v. Meek ii. 765

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

cliii

Newman v. Morris

i. 166

v. Newman

i. 488

i'. Rogers

hi. 340

v. Springfield Ins. Co.

ii. 559

v. Walters

ii. 438

v. Washington

i. 129 ; ii. 59

Newmarch v. Clay

ii. 763

Newnham v. Stevenson

iii. 441

New Orleans v. Gauthreaux i. 232

New Orleans Bank v. Matthews i. 226

New Orleans R. R. Co. u. Allbritton i. 117
v. Bailey iii. 185

v. Mills 1. 308

v. Moore iii. 209

a. Moye iii. 39

New Phoenix, The ii. 45

Newport v. Cook i. 347

Newry & Enniskillen R. R. v. Coombe

i. 373, 374, 376

Newsom v. Thornton i. 328, 640, 651 ;

ii. 127

Newsome v. Coles i. 213

v. Graham ii. 870

Newton v. Bronson i. 53

v. Chantler iii. 441, 442

u. Foster ii. 880

v. Galbraith ii. 780, 787

o. Harland i. 550

v. Kennerly iii. 113

v. Luldiard ii. 937

v. Lucas ii. 680, 683

v. Mut. Ben. Ins. Co. ii. 603

v. Newton i. 146

v. Swazey iii. 347

v. Trigg iii. 265, 416

v. Wilson iii. 113

New York, The, v. Rea ii. 431, 434

New York Belting Co. v. Washing-
ton Ins. Co. ii. 470

New York Bowery Ins. Co. v. N. Y.
Ins. Co. ii. 494, 558, 686, 919

New York Central Ins. Co. o. Na-
tional Prot. Ins. Co. i. 81

New York Cent. R. Co., In re ii. 5

N. Y. Cent., &e. R. Co. v. Standard
Oil Co. ii. 253

New York Fire Ins. Co. v. Bennett

i. 210

New York Fireman Ins. Co. v. Ely

iii. 123, 139, 141
v. Milne iii- 511

New York Firemen's Ins. Co. o. Stur-
(rgs iii. 12o

New York Ins. Co. v. Clopton ii. 601

v. Delavan ii. 580

v. Hendren ii. 601

v, Langdon ii. 544, 547

v. Lawrence ii- 533

v. Protection Ins. Co. ii- 494, 585
v. Roberts ii. 480, 484, 490

v. Robinson ii- 511

v. Statbam "■ 601

v. Thomas ii. 473

New York Iron Mine v. Citizens Bank

i. 41

New York Life Ins. Co. v. Flaek ii. 594,

609, 610
New York R. R. Co. v. Schuyler i. 155
New York & Bait. Trans. Co. v. Phil.

&c. Steam Nav. Co. ii. 432

New York & E. R. v. Skinner ii. 248

New York & H. R. Co. v. Story iii. 198
New York & N. Haven R. R. Co. v.

Pixley i. 478

New York & Va. Steamship Co. v.

Calderwood ii. 431

New York & Wash. Tel. Co. v. Dry-
burg ii. 279, 280, 284, 294
New York, &c. v. Hamilton Ins. Co.

ii. 470

New York, &o. Co. v. De Wolf i. 484

Niagara, The, v. Cordes ii. 452

Niagara Bank v. Rosevelt ii. 765

Nias v. Adamson iii. 424

Niblo v. North American Ins. Co. ii. 559,

565, 578, 579

Niboyet v. Niboyet ii. 734

Nichol v. Bate i. 292, 316

o. Godts i. 629

v. Martyn ii. 52

Nicholas v. Chamberlain i. 546

v. Chapman ii. 837

v. Clent iii. 277

Nicholas ». N. Y., &c. R. Co. ii. 270

Niohole v. Allen i. 342, 475

Nicholls v. Stretton ii. 890

v. Poulson ii. 60

v. Wilson iii. 101

Nichols, The ii. 435

v. Bellows iii. 454

u. Bucknam i. 500

o. Chalie ii. 844

v. Coolahan ii. 37, 44

v. Cosset iii. 123

v. Diamond i. 288

v. Eaton iii. 429, 431

a. Fayette Ins. Co. ii. 555, 561, 580

v. Fearson iii. 125, 127, 152

v. Freeman iii. 247

v. Haywood i. 27

v. Johnson ii. 475, 856; iii. 14, 19

v. Lee iii. 125

v. Luce ii. 664

o. McDowell ii. 25

v. Nichols ii- 93

v. Norris i. 325

v. Patten ii- 924

v. Pool i. 309

v. Raynbred i. 477, 479

v. Rensselaer Mut. Ins. Co. ii. 831

v. Rogers ii- 722

v. Ruggles ii. 342

v. Whiting ii. 787

Nicholson v. Chapman ii. 105

v. Leavitt i. 204 ; iii. 403

v. May i- 473

v. Paget ii. 640, 641

v. Revill i. 210, 325

v. Sykes ii- 833

v. Willan ii. 253, 261

cliv

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Nickells v. Atlierstone
Nickerson v. Bridgeport
Co.

v. Easton

c Mason

v. Soesman

v. Tyson
Nieklaus v. Dalm
Niekolson v. Knowles
Kickson c. Brolian
Nieloson v. Wordsworth
Nicol r. Carr
Nicolai v. Lyon
Nicoll v. Amer. Ins. Co.

r. Burke

r. Mumford
Niell i: Morley
Nightingale v. Chafee

v. Scaimell

n. Withington
Nightingall r. Smith
Niles r. Sprague
Nimmiek v. Holmes
Nimrod, The
Nims r. Bigelow

i'. Vaughn
Kind ( . Marshall
Niolon v. Douglass
Niphon, The
Nisbet v. Nash

v. Patton
Niven v. Belknap
Niver v. Bossman
Nix v. Bradley

v. Olive
Nixon, Ex parte

v. Brown

v. Bullock

u. Carco

v. Downey

v. English
Noakes, Ex parte

v. Morey
Noble v. Gookins

v. Howard

u. Kennoway

c. Kersey

v. Peebles

r. Smith

r. Tliompson Oil Co.

v. United States

v. Ward
Nobles v. Bates
Nobley v. Clark
Nodine v. Doherty
Noe >■. Hodges I
Noice v. Brown
Noke v. Awder
Noke's case
Nokes v. Kilmorey
Noland v. Clark
Nolin !•. Blackwell
Nolte, E.r parte
Noonan v. Illsley

v. Lee

i. 543; ii. 041
Hydraulic

iii. Iil3

i. 'jo-j

ii. 408

iii. 100

ii. 450

i. -228

ii. 218

i. 41, 59

iii. 334

iii. 334

i. 87

ii. 554

i. 56

ii. 391

i. 436, 437

ii. 756, 757

iii. 186

i. 348, 301, 370

ii. 082

ii. 82

ii. 444, 448, 450

ii. 464, 405

i. 185

iii. 304

ii. 034

iii. 382

ii. 460, 401

i. 220

i. 209

ii. 938, 939

iii. 173

i. 409

i. 647

iii. 448

i. 550

ii. 787

ii. 959

i. 08

i. 290

iii. 421

iii. 58

i. 523

ii. 874

ii. 672, 673

iii. 426

ii. 828

i. 263, 460

i. 258

i. 08

iii. 57

ii. 800

i. 300

ii. 904

ii. 753

ii. 72

i. 261

i. 631 ; ii. 047

iii. 342

ii. 119

iii. 101

i. 210

u. 881 ; iii. 221

Noonan t. Orton

Norcross v. Ins. Co.

Norman i: Cole
v. Molett
r. Morrell
v. Phillips

Norris v. Blair
i'. Despard
v. Graham
v. Hall
v. Harrison
c. Langley
v. Le Neve
c. Mumford
Spencer

iii. 842

ii. 501

ii. 895

iii. 4

ii. 086

iii. 51, 65

iii. 15

i. 308

iii. 22

i. 248

ii. 477

i 301

i. 93

iii. 409

iii. 23

ii. 694

t'. Trustees of Abingdon Acad-
emy iii. 486
v. Vernon i. 200
v. Wait i. 358
v. Wilkinson iii. 297
North i', Forrest iii. 57
t'. Kershaw ii. 324
v. Phillips ii. 896
v. Wakefield i. 29, 45, 83
N. A. Coal Co. v. Dyett i. 388
N. A. Fire Ins. Co. v. Graham iii. 477
N. A. Ins. Co. r. Throop ii. 543
North Bennington Bank v. Tabor i. 330
i: Wood i. 319
North British Ins. Co. v. Lloyd ii. 9
v. Moffatt ii. 476
North Church v. Jevne iii. 293
North Penn. Coal Co.'s Appeal i. 169
North Penn. B,. B. Co. v. Adams iii. Ill
North Biver Bank r. Aymar i. 45
North Biver Meadow Co. v. Shrews-
bury Church ii. 861
North" Star, The ii. 429
North Western Ins. Co. u. Bonner ii. 015,

618
v. Little ii. 618

North Western By. v. McMichael i. 373,
374, 375, 376
r. Whinray ii. 18

North of England, &c. Co. v. Arch-
angel Ins. Co. ii. 476
Northampton Bank v. Mass., &c. Co. i- 616
v. Pepoon i. 65
Northampton Gas Light Co. c. Par-

nell ii. 658, 660

Northampton Ins. Co. u. Tuttle i. 515

Northcote v. Doughty ii. 65

Northern v. Williams ii. 208, 416

Northern Indiana, The ii. 433

Northern B. B. v. Concord & Clare-

mont B. E. iii. 494

Northern B. B. Co. v. Fitchburg B. B.

Co. ii. 232

Northern, &c. E. Co. v. Canton Co. i. 545
Northey r. Field i. 641, 647

Northfield v. Vershire ii. 82

Northington, Ex parte i. 433

Northrup ?•. Cook iii. 221

v. Foot ii. 900

v. Graves iii. 354

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

civ

Northrup v. Mississippi Valley Ins.

Co. ii. 471

v. Northrup ii. 603

v. Phillips ii. 14(1
v. Railway Passenger Ins. Co. ii. 619

Norton, Ex parte iii. 446

«. Acklane iii. 449

v. Babeock iii. 242, 244

v. Cook iii. 397, 507

v. Coons i. 36, 37

v. Eastman ii. 14

v. Ellam iii. 98

v. Fazan i. 395, 390

v. Gale iii. 19

v. Masoall iii. 310, 365

v. Pickering i. 316

v. Preston iii. 66

u. Rensselaer Ins. Co. ii. 586

v. Rose i. 254

v. Seymour i. 125

v. Shepard iii. 77

v. Simmes i. 487

v. Waite i. 292

v. Webb ii. 790

v. Woodruff ii. 143

v. Young ii. 814
Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Me.

R. R. ii. 184, 202, 203

Norwich v. Norwich ii. 826

Norwich Univ. v. Denny i. 90

Norwood v. Stevenson i. 404, 405

Nostra Senora del Carmine, The ii. 405

Nostrand v. Atwood iii. 382

Notara v. Henderson ii. 173, 417

Notman v. Anchor Ass. Co. ii. 601

Nott v. Downing i 212

Nourse v. Barns iii. 246

v. Henshaw i. 408

v. Prime iii. 143

Novelli v. Rossi ii. 738

Novello v . Ludlow ii. 333

Nowell v. Pratt i. 102

v, Roake iii. 237

Nowlan, Ex parte iii. 474

v. Ablett ii. 85, 37

Nowlin v. Pyne iii. 167

Noyes v. Blakeman •■ 409

v. Butler ii. 740

</. Cushman i- 165

v. Jenkins i- 560

v. Marsh iii. 319, 374

v. N. H., N. L., & S. R. R. Co. i. 210

v. Phillips !»■ 187

v. R. & B. R. R. Co. ii- 232

v. Ward iii-. 176

Noyes' Ex'rs v. Humphreys i. 486 ;_ iii. 26

Nudd v. Burrows iii- 277

u. Hamblin iii- 99

Nugent v. Smith ii- 170, 195

Nune v. Modigliani ii- 874, 875

Nunn v. Wilsmore i- 401 ; iii. 382

Nuova Loanese, The ii- 404, 453

Nurse v. Craig ,.i- 401

v. Seymour "J- ■*"

Nussbaumer v. Becker i- 191

Nutbrown v. Thornton i. 522

Nutt i>. Bourdieu ii. 600

Nutter v. De Rochemont iii. 103

i'. Stover i. 289
Nutting c. Conn. River R. R. Co. ii. 231

v. Dickinson iii. 39

Nye v. Merriam iii. 183

o.

Oades v. Woodward i. 77

Oakes v. Munroe ii. 940

Oakey v. Bennett iii. 409

Oakley v. Aspinwall i. 176

o. Morton ii. 655, 805

Oakman ;;. Rogers iii. 14

Oaks v. Weller ii. 16

Oastler v. Henderson i. 541, 543

Oates v. Bromell ii. 837

v. Hudson i. 445, 446

v. National Bank i. 291

Oatman v. Bond iii. 507

v. Walker iii. 248

Obermyer v. Nichols ii. 663

Obrian v. Ram i. 380

O'Brien v. Boston, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 245

v. Currie i. 354 ; iii. 414

v. Gilchrist ii. 410, 686

v. Smith i. 296

Ocean Bank v. Olcott iii. 476

Ocean Ins. Co. u. Carrington ii. 471, 540

v. Fields ii. 491

;;. Rider i. 129; ii. 60

Ocean Queen, The ii. 435

Ockenden, Ex parte iii. 288

O'Conner v. Forster iii. 207

O'Connor v. Adams ii. 45

v. Arnold ii. 746

v. Beckwith ii. 51

v. Roberts ii. 47

Odell i: B. & M. R. Co. i. 565

v. Montross iii. 39

v. Wake iii. 448

Odin v. Greenleaf i. 33

Odiorne r. Maxey i. 42, 102

v. Sargent ii. 634

v. Winkley ii. 314

Odlin v. Ins. Co. of Penn. ii. 425, 501

O'Donnell v. Brehen iii. 35

v. Sweeney ii. 900

Odour v. Odour ii. 92

Oehlricks v. Ford i. 65, 67 ; ii. 672

Oertel v. Schroeder i. 291

O'Ferrall, Ex parte iii. 429

Offley v. Clay ii._746

Offley and Johnson's case i. 31

Offly v. Ward i. 498

Offut v. Stout i- 321

Offutt v. Scott i- 167

Ogden v. Astor iii- 96

v. Barker ii- 425

^.Cowley i. 306, 311

v. General Ins. Co. ii. 409, 510

clvi

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Ogden v. Jackson

iii. 381

u. Jennings

i. 531

v. Marshall

i. 98

v. New York Ins, Co.

ii. 480, 501

v. Ogden

iii. 32, 33

v. Raymond

i. 72

Saunders iii. 385, 392, 394, 396, 397

409, 437, 449, 602, 507, 609, 510

p. Stone iii. 381

Ogg v. Shuter i. 567, 579

Ogilvie v. Foljambe i. 524; iii. 7

v. Hull ' i. 541

Oglander t\ Boston iii. 437

Ogle v. Atkinson ii. 152

<.-. Ege ii. 324

v. Wrangham ii. 389

O'Hara v. Carpenter ii. 886

Ohde v. Northwestern Ins. Co. ii. 618

Ohio R. R. Co. v. McPherson ii. 941

v. Muhling ii. 238

Ohio & Miss. R. R. Co. v. Tindall ii. 46

O. &M. R. Co. v. Yohe ii. 173

Ohio, &c. College i\ Love i. 4S2

Ohio, &.c. R. Co. v. Selby ii. 238, 270,271

i: Swarthout ii. 273

Ohl v. Eagle Ins. Co. ii. 387

Oinson i). Heritage i. 396

O'Keeffe v. Kellogg i. 503

Okell v. Smith ii. 811

O'Keson v. Barclay i. 468

Olcott v. Tioga Railroad Co. i. 161 ;

iii. 105

Oldaker v. Lavender i. 229

Oldershaw v. King ii. 6

Oldfield v. Wilmers ii. 826, 831

Oldham v. James ii. 375

!'. Litchford iii. 353

v. Turner iii. 153

Oldknow, Ex parte i. 237

Oliphant v. Mathews i. 204

Oliver, Ex parte iii. 474

v. Bank ofTenn. i. 307

v. Com. Ins. Co. ii. 471, 474, 475

v. Court i. 95

v. Gray iii. 92

c. Greene ii. 485, 525

v. Houdlet i. 370

v. Moore i. 108 ; iii. 275

v. Munday i. 300

v. Oliver i. 397 ; ii. 336

v. Woodroffe i. 335, 352

Olivera v. Union Ins. Co. ii. 601

Oliverson v. Briglitman ii. 487

Olivier v. Townes iii. 409

Ollivant v. Bayley i. 030, 637

Ollive v. Booker i. 602 ; ii 408

Olmstead v. Beale ii. 36, 39, 42, 43, 655,

057, 792

v. McNall ii. 392

o. Miller iii. 189

Olmsted v. Hotailing i. 78

Olney v. Howe i. 667

Olyphnnt v. Baker i. 666

!'. McNair i. 61

O'Mara v. Hudson R. R. Co. iii. 209

Omoa, &c. Co. v. Huntley i. 118

Oneida Manuf. Co. v. Lawrence i. 623,

628
O'Neil v. Buffalo Ins. Co. ii. 546, 547,

551, 687

r. New York Mining Co. iii. 45

Ongley o. Chambers i. 530

Onion v. Robinson ii. 832

Onondaga County Bank v. Bates i. 325

v. De Pay i. 205

Onslow v. iii. 328

u. Corrie iii. 424, 418

v. Eames i. 635

v. Orchard i. 28

Ontario Bank v. Lightbody i. 302

v. Mumford i. 251, 252 ; iii. 424

v. Root iii. 346

v. Schermerhorn iii. 145

v. Worthington i. 292

Ooades v. Woodward i. 77

Oom v. Bruce ii. 481

Oppenheim v. Russell i. 648 ; iii. 257,

268

v. White Lion Hotel Co. ii. 159

Oppenbeimer v. U. S. Ex. Co. ii. 260

v. Edney ii. 277

Orange Co. Bank v. Brown ii. 263, 275

Orbona, The ii. 439

Oi-cutt v. Nelson i. 573; ii. 713

Ord v. Fenwick i. 146

v. Noel iii. 361

Ordinary v. Wherry i. 863

Orear v. McDonald i. 304, 306, 307

Oregon, The, c. Rocca ii. 433

O'Reilly v. Royal Exch. Ass. ii. 533

v. Guardian Ins. Co. ii. 580, 613

v. Morse ii. 305, 308, 309, 310

Orelia, The ii. 403, 404

Organ u. Stewart iii. 58

Oriental, The ii. 404

Oriole, The ii. 386

Orleans, The, v. Phoebus ii. 388

Ormerod v. Tate ii. 838 ; iii. 286

Ormond v. Anderson iii. 309, 365

v. Holland ii. 45

v. Hutchinson i. 96

Ormrod v. Huth i. 629; ii. 916

Orms v. Ashley i. 458

Ormsbee v. Machir i. 564

Ormston v. i. 311

Orndorifu. Adams Ex. Co. ii. 270

Orne, In re iii. 428, 457

v. Townsend ii. 464

O'Rourke v. O'Rourke ii. 902

r. Percival iii. 372

Orr v. Churchill iii. 170

v. Hodgson i. 448

v. Littlefield ii. 324, 325

v. Tanner ii. 908

v. Union Bank of Scotland i. 300

... Ward i. 75

v. Williams ii. 785

Orrell v. Hampden Ins. Co. ii. 476, 477,

576
Orrick v. Colston i. 275

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

clvii

Orrok v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. ii. 447,

606, 507, 508, 515

Ortucan v. Dickson i. 456

Orvis r. Kimball i. 304

Ory !•. Winter iii. 397

Osacar v. La. St. Ins. Co. ii. 488

Osborn v. Adams iii. 396, 409

v. Brennan i. 196

v. Crosbern i. 29

v. Etheridge ii. 879

v. Gantz i. 580

v. Governors of Guy's Hospital ii. 52

v. Harper i. 20, 22, 35

v. Hawley i. 279

v. Humphrey iii. 498

v. Rogers i. 503

v. United States Bank i. 125, 126

v. Wise ii, 689

Osborne v. Bremar i. 525

v. Knox, &c. R. Co. ii. 41}

Osceola, The ii. 457

Osgood v. De Groot ii. 878

v. Franklin i. 466, 522, 523

v. Hutchins ii. 644

v. Lewis i. 623, 624

v. Nichols ii. 940

v. Strode iii. 314

Osmarili, The ii. 405

Osmond p. Fitzroy i. 438

Osprey, The ii. 433

Ossulston v. Yarmouth iii. 159, 160

Ostell v. Lepage ii. 864

Osterhout v. Shoemaker ii. 940

Osterman v. Baldwin i. 448

Ostrander v. Brown ii. 196, 198, 206, 207,

416
Oswald n. Gray ii. 843

i). Mayor, &c. of Berwick-upon-
Tweed ii. 18
Oswego Falls Bridge v. Fish iii. 490
Oswego Starch Factory v. Lendrum

i. 569 ; ii. 914

Otis v. Gazlin i. 463

v. Hussey i. 308

v. Lindsey iii. 160

v. Raymond ii. 918

v. Sill i. 612

v. Thorn ii. 392

Otread v. Round iii. 369

Otsego Co. Bank v. Warren i. 308

Ottawa, The ii. 431

Ottawa Bank v. Dudgeon ii. 6

Otts v. Alderson i. 619, 623

Ottumwa Woollen Co. v. Hawley i. 546

Ougier v. Jennings ii. 478, 532, 669,

676
Ouimit v. Henshaw ii. 276

Oulds v. Harrison i. 290

Outcall v. Darling iii. 260

Outcalt v. Van Winkle ii. 437

' Outhwaite v. Porter i. 292

Outram v. Morewood ii. 867, 869

Outwater v. Dodge i. 566 ; iii. 51

v. Nelson ii. 666

Overbay v. Lighty i. 622

Overend, &c. Co. v. Oriental Corpora-
tion ji, 28
Overholt v. Ellswell i. 404
Overholt's Appeal i. i(j8
Overseers of St. Martin v. Warren iii. 465
Overton v. Freeman i. 116
Owen, Ex parte i. 174
o. Bartholomew ii. 929
v. Bowen i. 248
v. Burnett ii, 268
v. Cawley i, 337
v. Foulkes iii. 422
v. Gooch i, 08
v. Homan j, 32.3
v. Johnson ji. 413

"• Long i. 335

v. Owen ii. 02

v. Thomas ii. 680 ; iii. 19

d. Union Match Co. iii. 20 j
v. Van Uster j. 305
v. White i. 344
v. Wolley iii. 68

Owens v. Claytor iii. 2-34

l-. Collins i. 108

i. Dickenson i. 388

r. Lewis iii. 35

v. Roberts j. 80

e. Weedman j. 533
Owensboro Bank v. Western Bank i. 49,

87

Owings v. Baldwin iii. 335, 349

v. Hull i. 51

v. Low i. 254

v. Speed iii. 480

Owings' case i. 434; iii. 316

Owsley v. Cobin iii. 433

Owston v. Ogle i. 25; ii. 387, 389

Oxendale v. Wetherell ii. 654, 655, 785,

791, 792

Oxford v. Peter i. 113

Oxford Bank v. Haynes ii. 31

v. Lewis ii. 29

Oyster v. Longnecker iii. 132, 134

Ozeas v. Johnston i. 185

Ozley v. Ikelheimer i. 408

Pacific Ins. Co. v. Guse

ii. 539

Pacific R. Co. v. Maguire

iii. 480

Packard v. Dunsmore

i. 570

v. Getman

ii. 193

v. Hill

ii. 628

v. Nye

i. 136

v. Richardson

i. 6; iii. 16

Packer v. Gillies

iii. 290

v. Hinckley

i. 75

v. Hinckley Locomotive

Works

ii. 745

v. Willson

iii. 17

Packet, The ii. 404, 447, 454, 456

Packet Co. v. Sickles ii

869; iii. 43

Paddelford v. Thacher

ii. 750

clviii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Paddock v. Com. Ins. Co. ii. 499

v. Franklin Ins. Co. ii. 484, 486, 528,

529, 530

v. Robinson ii. "'-

v. Strowbridge i. G21

Padelford v. Boardman ii. 446, 447

Padwick v. Turner i. 313

Page, Ex parte i. 238

v. Arnim ii. 939

t-. Bauer iii. 427

v. Broom iii. 358

v. Bussel iii- 464

u. Carpenter i. 232, 236, 237

v. Estes iii. 437

v. Esty i. 532

v. Ferry ii. 309, 315, 327

r. Foster ii. 828

v. Godden iii. 447

v. Hill ii. 940

... Parr i. 541

r. Sheffield ii. 458

v. "Way iii. 424

Paget i'. Perchard i. 569

Pahlman v. Graves i. 240

v. Taylor i. 193

Paiee v. Walker i. 58

Paige r. McMillan i. 581

v. Ott ii. 655, 792

v. Smith ii. 184

v. Stone i. 64, 60

Pain v. Packard ii. 25, 26

v. Smith iii. 2117

Paine v. Cave i. 527

v. Fulton iii. 58

!'. Howells ii. 668

o. Jones ii. 18

v. Ringgold ii. 625

v. Voorhees ii. 757

Painter v. James ii. 413

v. Newby iii. 358

Paley's case ii. 333

Palin v. Gathercole ii. 336

Palliser r. Ord i. 89

Palm v. Medina Ins. Co. ii. 640

Palmer v. Andrews ii. 70

v. Baker iii. 143

v. Blackburn ii. 675

v. Cheney i. 45

a. City of New York ii. 900

v. Davis ii. 833

v. DeWitt ii. 331

u. Dodge i. 219

v. Edwards i. 269

</. Eliot ii. 756

o, Foley ii. 5

v. Goodwin iii. 397

v. Gracie ii. 421

v. Green ii. 877

v. Hand iii 274

v. Harris ii. 370

v. Hatch i. 62

a. Largent ii. 853

u. Lorillard ii. 413, 417, 425

v. Marquette, &c. Mill Co. iii. 14

v. Marshall ii. 532

Palmer v. Merrill i. 254, 257 ; ii. 610, 751

v. Myers i. 209

v. Naylor ii. 499

o. Xeave ii. 78

v. Oakley i. 152

< . Pratt i. 280 ; ii. 480

v. Reynolds iii. 176

v. Richards i. 285

v. Scott iii. 365

r. Sparshott i. 23

v. Stebbins ii. 890

v. Stephens i. 72

v. "Warren Ins. Co. ii. 522, 639

a. Whitney i. 319

v. ii. 833, 837

Palmerton v. Huxford ii. 823

Palo Alto, The i. 515

Pancoast !,•. Addison iii. 106

v. Travellers Ins. Co. iii. 123

Papayanni v. Hocquard ii. 533

Pape v. Lister ii. 73

Pappa v. Rose i. 91 ; ii. 833

Paradine r. Jane i. 536, 598 ; ii. 199, 806

Paradise r. Gerson i. 215

i'. Sun Ins. Co. ii. 483, 500

Parage i\ Dale ii. 507

Paragon, The ii. 448, 069, 072

Paramour r. Yardly i. 141 ; ii. 645

Pardee v. Drew ii. 274

r. Fish i. 295

Pardington v. S. W. Ry. Co. ii. 260

Parliam v. Green i. 34

o. McGravy iii. 107

v. Randolph i. 526 ; ii. 917, 927

Parham, &c. Co. v. Brock ii. 756

Paris !•. Strong iii. 41

r. Stroud i. 337

Parish v. Crawford ii. 195

v. Sevon iii. 405

c. Stone i. 266, 485 ; ii. GS5

r. Wheeler iii. 216

Park v. Bates iii. 242

v. Hamond i. 93

v. Thomas i. 2!H5

Park Bank r. Ninth Bank i. 300

Parke v. Eliason i. 571

Parken v. Whitby iii. 374

Parker v. Adams ii. 248

o. Atwood iii. 476

v. Baker i. 370

v. Bamber ii. 327

r. Barker i. 212, 213; ii. 8

v. Brancker i. 74, 108; iii. 206, 253

v. Bridgeport Ins. Co. ii. 556, 557

v. Bristol, &c. Ry. Co. i. 86 ; ii. 1*5,

ISO

v. Brown iii. 240

*•. Carter i. 402

v. Colcord ii. 86ii

u. Cousins i. 219 ; iii- 123

u. Crole iii. 400

v. Davis ii. 770

o, Donaldson ii. 883

v. Eagle Ins. Co. ii. 580

v. Eggleston ii. 830

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

clix

Parker v. Ellis

i. 341

Parks ». Hall i. 639 ,

iii. 273, 291

v. Fergus

i. 182

v. Ingram

i. 282, 294

v. Flagg

ii. 172, 181

v. Morris

iii. 219

v. Flint

ii. 165

Parmalee v. Hoffman

ii. 546

v. Gordon

i. 303

Parmelee u. Fisher

ii. 276

v. Gossage

ii. 033

Parmeter v. Cousins

ii. 486

v. Great Western Railway Co. ii. 185,

v. Todhunter

ii. 511

187, 639

Parmiter v. Coupland

ii. 625

v. Greele

i. 303

Parnell v. Price

ii. 29

v. Gregg

i. 22

Parr, Ex parte

iii. 468

v. Haworth

ii. 314

v. Eliason

iii. 125, 127

v. Heaton

iii. 25

Parrill v. McKinley

iii. 343

v. Hulme ii. 304,

811,

318, 327, 328

Parris v. Roberts

i. 578

v . Jackson

i. 228

Parrish v. Koons

iii. 309, 343

v. Jones

ii. 496, 497

Parrott ». Kumpf

iii. 487

v. Kelly

i. 255

Parry, Ex parte
v. Ashley

ii. 391

v. Kendall

ii. 882

ii. 477

v. Lawrence

i. 27

v. House

i. 540

v. Leggett

ii. 869

v. Spikes

ii. 13

v. Manning

iii. 426

Parshall v. Shirts

i. 523

v. Nichols

ii. 635

Parslowe v. Dearlove

iii. 461

v. Norton

iii. 465, 466

Parson v. Sexton

i. 637

v. Parker

iii. 4, 343

Parsonage Fund v. Osgood

iii. 83

v. Parmele

ii. 663, 790

Parsons v. Aldrich

ii. 828

v. Patrick

iii. 290

v. Armor

i. 48

v. Fistor

i. 234

v. Briddock

ii. 6

v. Potts

ii. 527, 529

v. Camp

i. 545

.v. Pringle

i. 636

v. Carey

iii. 82

v. Ramsbottom i.

190

; iii. 116, 119,

v. Crosby

ii. 937

125

v. Redfield iii. 498

v. Rochester ii. 887

v. Rolls i. 126

v. Russell ii. 810 ; iii. 201

a. Sears ii. 324

v. Simonds iii. 218

v. Smith i. 76

v. South Eastern R. Co. ii. 257

v. Staniland iii. 35

v. Stiles ii. 304, 308, 315

v. Tainter iii. 15

v. Wallis iii. 46

«. Way i. 377

v. Webb iii. 424

v. Wells iii. 416

Parkersburg, The ii. 435

Parkhouse v. Foster ii. 155

Parkhurst v. Dickerson i. 304

v. Foster ii. 155

v. Kinsman i. 222 ; ii. 304

v. Smith ii. 626

v. Sumner ii. 871

v. Vail ii. 7, 8

v. Van Cortlandt ii. 939; iii. 14, 18,

343, 352

Parkin v. Carruthers i- 76, 192

v. Thorold iii. 312, 339, 341

Parkinson v. Lee i. 618, 629

v. Scoville _ iii. 395

Parkist v. Alexander i. 88, 93

Parks v. Alta California Tel. Co. ii. 279,

280, 292, 391

v. Barrowman iii. 369

v. Boston iii. 209, 214

v. General Interest Ass. Co. ii. 566

v. Hardy ii. 172, 181, 198, 215, 419

v. Hill i. 370

v. Loucks iii. 45

v. Lyman i. 135

v. Martin i. Ill ; iii. 212

v. Mass. Ins. Co. ii. 487

v. Monteath ii. 172, 254, 255, 259, 268

u. Parsons ii. 681 ; iii. 437

v. Woodward i. 255

Partin v. Luderlow i. 208

Partlow v. Cooke ii. 52

Parton v. Hervey ii. 86, 87, 89

Partridge r. Colby ii. 274

v. Dartm. Coll. iii. 271

v. Davis ii. 4

v. Dearborn iii. 421, 470

t\ Dorsey's Lessee iii. 313

ii. Hannum iii. 426

v. Menck ii. 358, 363, 372

v. Wooding i. 563

Paschal, In re i. 129

v. Terry ii. 842

Paschall v. Passmore ii. 642

Passenger R. Co. v. Stutlen i. 348

Passmore v. West. Hn. Tel. Co. ii. 288

Pastorious v. Fisher iii. 234

Patapsco Ins. Co. v. Coulter ii. 483, 492,

500, 573

v. Smith ii. 472

v. Southgate ii. 396, 606, 511

Patch n. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 615

Patchett v. Holgate i. 377

Patehin v. Swift i. 458

Pate v. Henry ii. 186

v. Wright ii- 902

Patee v. Pelton i- 616

clx

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Paterson v. Wallace ii. 45

Pateshall v. Tranter i. 636

Patience v. Townley i. 308

Patman u. Vaughan iii. 416

Patmor v. Haggard iii- 17

Paton v. Brebner iii. 357

v. Duncan i. 621

v. Rogers iii. 336, 3.37

Patrick, Ex parte iii. 143

v. Coram. Ins. Co. ii. 511

v. Green way iii. 234

v. Leach i. 617

v. Littell i. 408

v. Ludlow ii. 486

v. Marshall iii. 246

v. Patrick ii. 77

Patron v. Silva ii. 425

Pattee v. Greeley ii. 900, 903

Patten v. Browne iii. 416

v. Ellingwood i. 463

v. Merchants Ins. Co. ii. 55T

v. Moses i. 161

v. Rea i. 119

v. Thompson i. 108

Patterson v. Atherton i. 254

v. Black ii. 498, 613

v. Brown iii. 95, 96

v. Chalmers ii. 386

v. Gage ii. 43

u. Gaines i. 377

v. Gandasequi i. 66, 105

v. Grimes i. 377

v. Hardacre i. 272

v. Lytle ii. 930

v. Patterson ii. 58

v. Stewart iii. 245

v. Tash i. GO, 102

v. Todd i. 284. 290

Pattison v. Blanchard i. 176

v. Hall ii. 765

v. Syracuse National Bank ii. 98

Patton v. M'Clure iii. 347

v. Randolph, The i. 84

v. Smith i. 569

v. State Bank i. 331

Paul v. Dowling iii. 416

v. Frazier ii. 64, 74

v. Hardwick i. 635

v. Joel i. 322

v. Jones iii. 464

v. Perry i. 37

v. Reed i. 578, 580

v. Slason ' iii. 235

v. Young iii. 370

Pauli r. Simes i. 588

Paulsen v. Dallett i. 110

Pawling v. Bird ii. 736

v. Pawling iii. 161

v. Wilson ii. 732

Pawson i'. Barnevelt ii. 473

v. Watson ii. 518, 522, 523, 524, 526

Paxton v. Newton iii. 327

Payler v. Homersham ii. 633, 851

Payne v. Allen ii. 465

u. Baldwin iii. 487

Payne v. Banner
v. Bettisworth
v. Cave

v. Commercial Bank
b. Cutler
v. Preer
v. Graves
v. Haine
v. Hutchinson
v. Matthews
v. Newcomb

iii. 338

ii. 663

i. 510

ii. 28

i. 292

iii. 152

iii. 358

i. 536

ii. 487

i. 238

iii. 144, 145

v. New South Wales Co. i. 479

„. Rodden i. 616

v. Rogers ii. 749

v. Shadbolt k i. 564 ; iii. 274

v. Trezevant iii. 127

v. Waterston i. 110

Paynter v. Walker ii. 877

v. Williams i. 501

Payson v. Whitcomb i. 309

Peabody v. Proceeds of 28 Bags of

Cotton ii. 437

o. Speyers iii. 15, 57

Peace, The ii. 441

Peachey v. Rowland i. 116

Peacock v. Cummings i. 217

v. Dickerson ii. 779

v. Evans iii. 316

v. Jeffery ii. 874

v. Monk i. 458

v. N. Y. Ins. Co. ii. 592

v. Peacock i. 177, 219, 220, 227; ii. 50

v. Pembroke i. 382

v. Penson iii. 361

v. Purcell ii. 757

v. Rhodes i. 272

Peak v. Bull ii. 866

Peake, Ex parte iii. 429

Pearce, Ex parte iii. 469

In re iii. 477

v. Atwood ii. 901

v, Blackwell i. 620

v. Blagrave iii. 24

v. Chamberlain i. 226

v. Hennessy iii. 113

v. Hitchcock i. 23

v. Patton iii. 511

u. Piper i. 230

v. Wilkins i. 204

Pearl r. Harris iii. 319

v. Walls ii. 850

Pearl St. Cong. Soc. v. Imlay ii. 5

Pearsall v. Dwight ii. 700, 719, 721

Pearse v. Green i. 96

Pearson v. Archbold ii. 831, 833

v. Commercial Ass. Co. ii. 550

v. Davis iii. 242

v. Duane iii. 209

v. Duckham i. 33

v. Graham i. 76; iii. 434, 454, 458

v. Henry i. 143

v. Humes i. 487

v. Keedy i. 231

v. Lemaitre iii. 179

u. Mason i. 110; iii. 224

IXDEX TO CASES CITED.

clxi

Pearson v. M'Gowran

v. Parker

v. Pearson

v. Rockhill

v. Skelton
Pease, Ex parte

v. Dwight

v. Hirst

v. Mead

v. Sabin

v. Smith

n. Turner
Peasle v. Breed

iii. 133

i. 21, 35

i. 460

iii. 382

i. 35, 37, 184

iii. 261

i. 273

21 ; ii. 22 ; iii. 87

i. 145

i. 631

i. 556

i. 299

i. 30, 35

Peate v. Dicken i. 475; ii. 899; iii. 17

Peay v. Pickett i. 279

Pebbles ». Stephens i. 457

Pechner v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 543

Peck v. Barney ii. 16

v. Briggs ii. 897

v. Burr ii. 887

v. Davia ii. 829

v. Fisher i. 170

v. Halsey ii. 088

v. Hozier ii. 719

v. Hubbard ii. 784

v. Lusk i. 193

c. Mayo ii. 714

v. Neal ii. 244

v. N. Y. Cent., &o. R. Co. ii. 246

v. Peck ii. 82

v. Ritchie i- 51

v. Wakely ii. 829

Pecker v. Hoit ii. 937

v. Kennison ii. 719

Peckham v. Balch iii. 349

v. Faria iii. 22

v. N. Parish in Haverhill i. 12, 20

Pedder v. Watt ii. 758

Pederson v. Lotinga i. 66

Pedrick v. Bailey i- 160

Peek v. North S. Railway Co. ii. 271

Peel, Ex parte i. 207, 214

v. Price ii- 408

v. Shepherd ii. 746

i>. Thomas i- 163

Peele v. Merchants Ins. Co. ii. 504, 506, 507,

608, 611, 512, 513, 615

v. Northcote i- 101

v. Suffolk Ins. Co. }}■ 508

Peers v. Lambert iii- 356

Peet v. Chicago «■ 227

v. McGraw ii- 164

Peeters v. Opie i. 578 ; ii. 660

Peifer v. Landis iii- 348

Peigne v. Sutcliffe }■ 356

Peirce v. Boston ii- 879

v. Butler ii- 669

v. Corf iii- 12

u. Ocean Ins. Co. ii. 397, 398, 511

v. Rowe »»• 1@1

v. Somersworth i»- 494

Peisch v. Dickson »• 6°°

Peixotti v. McLaughlin «• 180

Pellecat v. Angell »■ 894

Pellew v. Wonford "• 797

Pelly v. Wathen iii. 287

Peltier v. Collins i. 608, 586, 589; iii. 13

Pemberton v. King i. 548

v. Oakes ii. 21

v. Vaughan ii. 890

Pemberton Bank v. Lougee i. 275

v. Porter i. 298

Pembroke v. Thorpe iii. 326, 343, 350

Pembroke Iron Co. v. Parsons ii. 422

Pena v. Vance iii. 58

Pence v. Duvall iii. 242

Pendar v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co. ii. 493, 583,

584

Pender v. Fobes i. 634

Pendergrast v. Foley iii. 102

Pendleton v. Dyett i. 541

Pendrell v. Pendrell i. 377

Penfold v. Universal Ins. Co. ii. 602

Penley v. Record iii. 174

v. Watts i. 537 ; iii. 229

Penn v. Bennet i. 464

v. Lord Baltimore i. 467 ; iii. 333

Penn's Adm'r v. Watson iii. 96

Pennell v. Alexander i. 590

v. Hinman ii. 936, 943

Penniman v. Hartshorn iii. 7, 9

v. Norton iii. 477

v. Patchin ii. 827

v. Rodman iii. 333

v. Tucker ii. 479

Penniman's case iii. 503

Pennington v. Baehr i. 270

v. Gittings i. 263 ; iii. 318

v. Taniere ii. 940

Pennock v. Freeman iii. 107

v. Dialogue ii. 305

v. Tilford i. 623

Pennock's Appeal i. 526

Penn. Co. v. Roy ii- 2:J7

Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lynch ii. 46

o. McCloskey ii. 268

c. Miller ii. 212

t. Titusville iii. ly6

Pennsylvania & Ohio Canal v.

Graham iii. 178

Penn., &c. R. R. Co. v. Books ii. 270;

iii. 186

v. Delaware, &c. Co. iii. 304

v. Henderson ii. 270

v. Kerr ii- 249

v. Schwartzenberger ii. 227

Penny v. N. Y. Ins. Co. ii. 447

v. Parham i. 274, 283

Pennypacker v. Umberger ii. 702

Pennypacker's Appeal i. 137, 151

Penobscot, &c. R. R. Co. v. Bartlett ii. 713

Penoyer v. Hallett ii. 424

v. Watson ii- 21

Penrose v. Curren i- 356

Penshoer, The ii.,434

Pensonmeau v. Bleakley i- 95

Penton v. Robart i- 548

Pentz v. Receivers of iEtna Fire Ins.

Co. «■ 571

People v. Baker ii- 737

clxii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

People r. Bartlett ii. 810

v. Chicago, &c. E. Co. ji. 203

v. Commissioners, &c. iii. 484

u. Conklin i. 448

v. Gaslierie iii. 112

v. Harvey i. 126

v. Jansen ii. 25, 20

a. Johnson i. 263

v. Jurlges ii. 875

v. Kendall i. 356

v. Manhattan Co. iii. 486

i: MeHatton ii. 29

i>. Moores i. 355

v. Morris iii. 483

r. New York Common Pleas ii. 875

v. Otis iii. 480

v. Overseers i. 377

c Pettit i. 890

v. Shall i. 458

v. Slack ii. 87

v. St. Francisco ii. 928

v. White ii. 28

People's Bank v. Bogart i. 620

v. Gridley i. 568

u. Keech i. 318

People's Ferry Co. v. Beers ii. 380

People's Savings Bank v. Collins ii. 932

Pepper v. Aiken ii. 823

i: Haight ii. 663, 887

Pequawket Bridge v. Mathes ii. 856

Percival v. Blake i. 638 ; iii. 50

u. Frampton i. 292

i'. Maine Ins. Co. ii. 556

v. Phipps ii. 336, 347

Percy, In it i. 126

v. Millaudon ii. 115

v. Percy ii. 713

Perham v. Raynal iii. 87

Perine v. Dunn ii. 908

Perkins v. Augusta Ins. Co. ii. 511, 533,

635

v. Boothby i. 51

v. Burbank iii. 70

v. Cady i. 66

v. Catlin i. 284

v. Challis i. 291

t . Clay ii. 888

v. Cummings i. 480

v. Dana i. 535

v. Douglass i. 581

v. Eastern & B. & M. R. R. Cos.

ii. 248

c. Eaton ii. 760, 761

i: Franklin Bank i. 312

v. Gilman ii. 30, 850

v. Hart ii. 61, 649

v. Hersey ii. 74 ; iii. 188

v. Littlefield iii. 24

o. Lyman ii. 890 ; iii. 174

u. New Eng. Ins. Co. ii. 497

v. N. Y. Cent. E, E. Co. ii. 238

u. Parker i. 256

r. Perkins i. 129

v. Prout ii. 928

v. Thompson i. 95

Perkins v. Washington Ins. Co. ii. 471,

540 ; iii. 329

v. Whelan i. 616; iii. 99

v. Wright iii. 306

Perley v. Balch i. 495 ; ii. 815, 922

Perren v. Monmouthshire E. Co. ii. 773

Perrin v. Noyes i. 329

v. Protection Ins. Co. ii. 495, 497, 573

Perrine v. Cheeseman i. 458

v. Fireman's Ins. Co. ii. 27

Perring v. Hone i. 164

Perry, Ex parte iii. 414

v. Barrett i. 283

v. Green i. 308, 317

v. Jackson iii. 102

v. Jones iii. 431

c. Mays i. 290

c. Osborn ii. 420

v. Randolph i. 188

v. Roberts i. 254

v. Smith iii. 232

v. Thompson ii. 260

v. Truefltt ii. 362, 363, 372

u. Worcester ii. 943

Perry Co. Ins. Co. v. Stuart ii. 545, 561,

576

Perry Manuf. Co. v. Brown iii. 397

Perryclear v. Jacobs i. 382

Perryer, E.r parte iii. 420

Persch v. Quiggle ii. 106

Persia, The ii. 439

Person v. Chase i. 350

j>. Warren i. 434

Persons v. Jones iii. 107

Perth Amboy Man. Co. v. Condit ii. 624

Peru v. Turner i. 511

Petchell v. Hopkins iii. 106

Peter v. Beverly i. 150; ii. 757 ; iii. 378

v. Compton iii. 42

v. Craig ii. 848

r. Rich i. 34

v. Steel ii. 50

Peterborough Bank v. Childs iii. 124

Peters v. Anderson ii. 762

v. Ballistier i. 61 ; ii. 456; iii. 48

r. Brown iii. 92

(.-. Delaware Ins. Co. ii. 492, 582

v. Fleming i. 336, 337

v. Gooch ii. 815

v. Hobbs i. 312

v. Lord i. 355 ; ii. 52, 54, 56

v. McKeon iii. 245

c,-. Newkirk ii. 842, 843 ; iii. 464

v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 507, 530

v. Ryland iii. 1S4

v. Warren Ins. Co. ii. 447, 448, 499,

931 ; iii. 192

v. Westborough ii. 49 ; iii. 42, 43

Peterson v. Ayre ii. 843 ; iii. 320

v. Humphrey ii. 361

Petkin v. Tompson i. 383

Peto v. Blades i. 615

v. Hague i. 79

v. Reynolds i. 308

Petrie v. Bury i. 14, 22

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

clxiii

Petrie v. Clark

i. 292

Pettee v. Tenn. Manuf. Co.

ii. 879

Pettegrew v. Pringle

ii. 521

Pettengill v. Elkins

i. 508

v. Hinks

ii. 587

Pettibone v. Roberts

i. 492

Pettingill v. McGregor

i. 130

Pettis v. Kellogg

i. 012

v. Ray

ii. 818

Pettit, Ex parte

iii. 427

v. Braden

iii. 20

Pettitt v. Johnson

iii

377, 378

Petty i'. Anderson

i. 391

v. Cooke

ii. 19

Pettyt v. Janeson

i. 229

Pevey e. Skinner

i. 531

Peyroux v. Howard

ii

382, 384

Pey toe's case

ii

788, 818

Peyton v. Bladwell

ii. 78

Peytona, The ii

209,

415, 416

Pezant v. National Ins. Co.

ii.

507, 515

Pfau v. Reynolds

ii. 817

Pfeffer v. Steiner

i. 228

Pfeiffer v. Maltby

i. 175

Phalen r. Virginia

iii. 510

Phalen's ease

iii. 510

Pliares v. Barbour

ii. 6

Phebe, The

ii.

420, 454

Phelan v. Currency Bank

i. 289

a. Douglass

ii. 796

v. Moss

i. 289

v. Phelan

ii. 92

Phelps v. Auldjo

ii. 533

v. Bellows

iii. 117

v. Comstock

ii. 319

v. Hubbard

i. 668; 11

v. McDonald

iii. 434

v. Paris

ii. 880

v. Pierson

iii. 136

v. Riley

iii. 233

u. Townsend

i. 479

v. Viseher

i. 275

v. Williamson

iii. 72

v. Worcester i.

336,

338, 350

Phetteplace v. Steere

i. 476

Philadelphia v. Lockhardt

i. 255

v. Maryland

iii. 498

Philadelphia, &c. R. Co. ii. 634
Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. u. Amer.

Life Ins. Co. ii. 611

Philadelphia R. R. Co. v. Havre de

Grace Steamboat Co. ii. 907

Philadelphia, W. & B. R. R. Co. v.

Howard ii. 943

Philadelphia & Read. R. R. Co. e.

Derby i. 114; ii. 237

Philadelphia, &c. R. Co. a. Larkin ii. 246 ;

iii. 181, 187

Philbrick v. Preble ii. 827

Philbrook v. Belknap ii. 792 ; iii. 63

a. Delano iii- 297

v. New England Mut. Fire Ins.

Co. ii- 631

Philips v. Bank of Lewiston i. 258

o. Biggs i. 37

Philips v. Bury

iii. 482

' v. Hunter ii, 738

739- iii. 406

v. Knightley

ii. 826, 834

v. Morrison

ii. 794

v. Williams

iii. Ill

Phillimore v. Barry

iii. 4

Phillips v. Allan

iii. 397

v. Barber

ii. 497

v. Bateman

i. 466 ; ii. 4

v. Berger

iii. 319, 331

v. Berick

ii. 751

v. Bistolli

iii. 46, 50

v. Bonsall

i. 12

v. Bridge

i. 232

v. Broadley

iii. 101

v. Bullard

ii. 755

v. Clagett

ii. 749

v. Cockayne

iii. 125

v. Condon

ii. 117

v. Cook

i. 235

v. Crammond

i. 171

v. Duke of Bucks, The

iii. 308

v. Earle

ii. 190

v. Foxal

ii. 30, 33

v. Germon

iii. 286

v. Green

i. 366

v. Headlam

ii. 627

v. Higgins

ii. 833

v. Howell

i. 73

v. Innes

ii. 901

v. Ives

ii. 897

w. Jones

ii. 50, 58

v. Knox Co. Ins. Co.

ii. 555, 561

v. Lawrence

iii. 183

v. London, &c. R. Co.

ii. 241

v. Merrimac Ins. Co.

ii. 580

v. Moore

i. 448, 578

v. Moses

ii. 763

v. Ocmulgee Mills

i. 565

v. Page

ii. 308

v. Phillips

i. 168

v. Purington i.

198 ; ii. 387

v. Rounds

ii. 28

v. Smith

iii. 242

v. Stanch iii. 370

v. Stevens i. 536

v. Sun, &e. Co. i. 538

t-. Thomas Scattergood, The ii. 459

u. Thompson iii. 66, 347, 358

v. Wright ii. 383

Phillipson v. Hayter i. 388

Phillpott v. Jones ii. 765

Phillpotts v. Evans ii. 809 ; iii. 225

Philpot v. Bryant i. 323

v. Hoare iii. 448

v. Wallet ii. 68

Philpott v. Elliott iii. 354

Phipps, Ex parte iii. 416

v. Anglesea ii. 716

v. Chase i. 316

v. Jones i. 482

Phcenix v. Assig. of Ingraham iii. 381,

442

Phoenix Bank v. Hussey i. 326

Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Badger ii. 588

clxiv

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Phoenix Ins. Co. o. Cochran ii. 495

v. Doster ii. 802

v. Dunham ii. 608

v. McLoon ii. 491

u. Michigan, &e. R. Co. ii. 583

Phosphate Co. r. Green i. 53

P. H. White, The, v. Levy ii. 302

Phyfe v. Eimer i. 538

v. Wardell iii. 319

Pliyn v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co. ii. 499

Physick's Estate ii. 85

Pianciani v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co. ii. 266

Piatt r. Eads i. 306

v. Oliver i. 168

Pickard v. Low i. 613

.-. Sears ii. 936, 944

v. Valentine i. 311

Pickas r. Guile ii. 109

Pickering v, Appleby iii. 50

v. Banks iii. 129

v. Barkley ii. 174

u. Bishop of Ely iii. 323, 365

„.. Busk i. 42, 47, 59, 63, 109; ii. 938

v. Cease ii. 896

v. Dowson i. 589, 634; ii. 679

v. Fisk ii. 719

v. Holt ii. 421

v. Pickering i. 142, 386

Picket v. Crook iii. 1K4

Pickett v. King iii. 82

v. Memphis Bank i. 130 ; ii. 703

v. State iii. 68

Pickford v. Grand Junction Railway

Co. ii. 184, 185, 187, 190

Pickman v. Woods ii. 407, 413

Pickrel v. Rose i. 507

Pickup v. Thames Ins. Co. ii. 528

Picquet v. Cormick ii. 881

v. Curtis i. 309

v. Swan i. 410

Pidcock v. Bishop ii. 8, 919

Bidding v. How ii. 363, 378
Piddington v. South Eastern R. R.

Co. i. 446

Pidge v. Pidge ii. ill

Pidgin v. Cram i. 343, 345

Piedmont Ins. Co. v. Ewing ii. 540

Piehl v. Balchen ' ii. 457, 462

Pier £'. Carr i. 541, 543

Pierce, In re i. 384

u. Andrews ii. 936, 943

v. Benjamin iii. 211

v. Boston Savings Bank i. 265

v. Boston, &c. Bank iii. 113

v. Brown ii. 940

v. Bryant i. 242

v. Burnham ii. 94

v. Butler ii. 669

v. Cameron i. 495

v. Fuller ii. 890

v. Gilkey i. 304

v. Jackson i. 209, 231, 232

c Johnson i. 66

i: Kennedy i. 284

u. Kittredge i. 304

Pierce v. Knight ii. 766, 767

v. Milwaukee, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 187

v. Minturn i. 540

v. Nashua Ins. Co. ii. 478, 576

v. O'Keefe i. 116

v. Parker ii. 850

v. Pendar i. 319

v. Schenck ii. 143, 144

v- Selleck ii. 664

v. Seymour iii. 76

v. State, The ii 625

v. Struthers i. 320

v. Thornely iii. 424, 437

v. Tobey iii. 91

v. Travellers Ins. Co. ii. 602

a. Trigg i. 168, 170

... Whitney i. 316

v. Wood ii. 923

v. Woodward ii. 890

Pierce, Clark, & Co. v. Knight ii. 762

Pierpont v. Fowle ii. 339, 349

v. Graham i. 201, 207, 220; iii. 382

Piers v. Piers ii. 83

Pierson v. Dunlop iii. 2b'0

u. Eagle Screw Co. ii. 321, 327 ;

iii. 176

v. Hooker i. 26, 201, 210

v. Hutchinson i. 331

v. McCahill i. 468

Pigeon v. Osborn ii. 883

Pigott, v. ii. 185

v. Bagley i. 226

v. Thompson i. 497

Pigott's case ii. 853, 854, 855, 850

Pike v. Balch ii. 398

v. Gage ii. 830

u. Galvin ii. 933

v. Irwin ii. 8

v. King ii. 901

v. McDonald iii. 463

v. Munroe ii. 638

v. Nicholas ii. 340, 349

v. Vaughn i. 564

v. Warren iii. 88

Pilcher v. Arden i. 129

Pilford's case iii. 236

Pilkington v. Scott ii. 37, 49, 890

Pillans v. Van Mierop i. 7, 303, 457, 459

Pilmore v. Hood ii. 921

Pirn v. Curell i. 531

v. Downing i. 151

v. Reid ii. 558

Pinckney v. Hagadorn i. 55

Pincombe v. Rudge iii. 241

Pindall i>. The North Western Bank ii. 753,

754

Pinder r. Morris iii. 286

Pine v. Smith i. 292

Pingree v. Comstock iii. 383

Pinhorn v. Tuckington iii. 159

Pinkerton ;■. Caslon ii. 828

v. Marshall i. 272

v. Woodward ii. 160, 164

Pinkham v. Macy i. 322

v. Mattox, iii. 51

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

clxv

Pinkston v. Brewster

ii. 940

v. Huie

iii. 246

Pinnel's case i

249; ii.

749, 751

Pinney v. Barnes

ii. 868

; iii. 202

v. Gleason

iii. 232

Pinnock v. Harrison

iii. 251

Pintard v. Tackington

i. 332

Pinto v. Santos

i. 96

Pipe c. Bateman

i. 240

Piper v. Manny

ii.

156, 166

v. Smith

i. 228

Pipon v. Cope

ii. 500

v. Pipon

iii. 406

Piqua Bank v. Knoup

iii. 498

Pirie v. Anderson

ii. 395

Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hamp-
shire Bridge iii. 490, 493, 494, 497, 498
Pitcairn v. Ogbourne ii. 78

Pitcher v. Bailey i. 36

</. Barrows i. 169

v. Livingston iii. 175, 240, 242

v. Tovey iii. 424, 448

v. Wilson ii. 49 ; iii. 41

Pitchford v. Davis i. 163

Pitkin v. Brainerd ii. 420

v. Flanagan i. 35

v. Pitkin i. 226

o. The Long Island E. R. Com-
pany iii. 41
v. Thompson iii. 397
Pitman v. Hooper ii. 459, 460
Pitney v. Glen's Falls Ins. Co. ii. 543, 582
Pits v. Wordal ii. 826
Pitsinowsky v. Beardsley i. 62
Pitt v. Albrithow ii. 152
v. Berkshire Ins. Co. ii. 615
v. Petway i. 95
v. Purssord i. 32, 501
v. Smith i. 435; iii. 414
v. Yaldan i. 126
Pittam v. Foster i. 441
Pitts v. Beckett i. 586; iii. 10, 13
v. Congdon i. 324
v. Hall ii. 305, 327, 328
v. Mangum i. 460
v. Waugh i. 188
v. Wemble ii. 307
v. Wemple ii. 315
Pittsburgh, &c. E. Co. v. Alleghany i. 158
v. Hazen ii. 198
v. Heck iii. 224
v. Hollowell ii. 198
v. MeClurg ii. 817
v. Shaeffer ii. 29
Pixley v. Boynton ii. 896
Place v. Delegal i. 24; ii. 21
v. Sweetzer i. 236
Plahto v. Merchants Ins. Co. ii. 490
Plaisted v. B. & K. Steam Navigation

Co. ii. 171, 183, 435

Planche" v. Colburn ii. 654, 813

v. Fletcher ii. 534, 700, 894

Plank Road v. Griffin i- 483

Plant, Ex parte iii- 424

v. Condit i- 636

Planters Bank v. Markham ii. 669

u. Merritt i. 296

v. Sellman i. 323

v. Sharp iii. 482, 486, 507

u. Snodgrass iii. 139

v. St. John i. 226

v. Stockman ii. 765

v. Wilmington Bank i. 327

Planters Ins. Co. v. Deford ii. 543, 586

v. Myers ii. 543

Plate v. Central K. R. Co. ii. 931

Plath v. Minn., &c. Ins. Co. ii. 557, 576

Piatt v. Button ii. 348

v. Drake i. 322

v. Hibbard ii. 134, 149, 151, 153, 192

o. New South Wales ii. 708

v. Squire ii. 941

Playford v. United K. Tel. Co. ii. 280,

281, 282, 295

Pleasants ;>. Pendleton i. 577

Plevins v. Downing iii. 57

Plimmer v. Sells i. 47

Plimpton v. Curtiss iii. 41

Plitt, Ex parte iii. 286

Plomer v. Long ii. 765, 767

Plowman v. McLane ii. 785

Pluckwell v. Wilson ii. 250

Plumer v. Gregory i. 203

Plumleigh v. Dawson iii. 234

Plummer v. Jarman i. 381

v. Keppler iii. 373

i>. Lyman i. 304 ; iii. 28

u. McKean iii. 170

v. Wildman ii. 447

Plunkett v. Methodist Epise. Society

iii. 310
Poe v. Luck iii. 395, 396, 508

Poillon v. Secor i. 193

Poindexton v. Blackburn iii. 437

Point Street Iron Works v. Simmons

iii. 353

Polak v. Everett ii. 19, 937

Poland v. Glyn iii. 442

Pole v. Ford i. 323

Polglass v. Oliver ii. 753

Polhemus v. Heiman i. 617

Polhill v. Walter i. 71, 72; ii. 916

Polk v. Oliver i. 191

Pollard, Ex parte iii. 461, 469

v. Baylor iii. 125, 126

v. Baylors iii. 125, 126

v. Gibbs i. 52

v. Scholy iii. 116, 125

v. Shaaffer i. 536, 537

v. Somerset Ins. Co. ii. 475, 577

v. Stanton i. 188

Pollen v. Le Roy iii. 225

Pollfexen v. Moore iii. 293

Pollock v. Babcock ii- 4!)6

v. Donaldson ii- 480

v. Hall ii- 847

v. Landis ii. 162 ; iii. 267

v. Maison iii- 109

v. Pratt iii- 464

v. Stables i. 60, 87; ii. 669

clxvi

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Pollock v. Stacy
Polly v. McCall
Polydore v. Prince
Pomeroy v. Burnett

v. Donaldson

v. Smith

ii. 635
iii. 68
ii. 731
iii. 244
ii. 181
ii. 129

Pomfret v. Ricroft i. 535 ; ii. 136, 664

Pond v. Lockwood i. 292

v. Underwood i. 86

v. Williams i. 27 ; ii. 763; iii. 83

Ponder v. Carter i. 36 ; iii. 98

v. Graham iii. 500

Pondrom v. Ch. & A. R. R. Co. ii. 817

Pool v. Pratt i. 370 ; ii. 06

v. Welsh ii. 464

Poole v. Hill i. 24

v. Palmer ii. 937

v. Protection Ins. Co. ii. 509

v. Rice ii. 75G

v. Tumbridge ii. 770, 771

Poole's case i. 546, 548

Pooley v. Budd iii. 319, 330

v. Driver i. ISO

v. Harradine i. 294

Poor v. Hazleton i. 382

v. Humboldt ii. 546

i. Oakman ii. 665

Poorman v. Mills i. 279

Pope v. Albion Bank ii. 113

f. Brett ii. 827, 835

e. Carl ii. 330, 336

a. Chaffe ii. 858

v. Duncannon iii. 333

v. Harkins ii. 940

v. Jackson i. 546

v. Linn ii. 901, 904

v. Nance i. 301

v. Nickerson ii. 396, 397, 403, 405,

454, 456

v. Onslow iii. 424, 427

v. Randolph i. 186, 264

v. R. B. Forbes ii. 435

v. Risley i. 230

v. Tunstall ii. 819

Popham o. Eyre iii. 308, 342, 340

Poplewell v. Wilson i. 282

Poppenhausen u. N. Y. G. P. C. Co.

ii. 309, 328

v. Falke ii. 313

Pordage i: Cole ii. 658, 600

Port v. Jackson iii. 200

<-. Port ii. 82, 84

v. Turton iii. 416

Port Carbon Co. v. Groves i. 631

Porter v. Androscoggin & Ken. R. R.

Co. i. 156

v. -Ballard i. 257

v. Bank of Rutland i. 83

v. Barry i. 200

v. Blood ii. 794 ; iii. 253

v. Briggs i. 388

v. Bussey ii. 470

v. Dougherty iii. 306

v. Hldebrand ii. 275

v. Judson i. 316

Porter v. Kemball

i. 315

v. Lane

ii. 875

v. Langhorn

ii. 12

v. McCollum

i. 272

u. Morris

ii. 884

v. Munger

iii. Ill

v. Pettengill

i. 578

v. Providence Ins. Co.

ii. 444

v. Sawyer

ii. 897

v. Stewart

ii. 79.3

v. Taylor

ii. 746

v. Vorley iii. 426, 452, 454

v. White i. 200

v. Wilson i. 198

Porterfield v. Augusta ii. 712

Porthouse t'. Parker i. 211, 321

Portis v. Cummings ii. 941

Portland Bank, Ex parte i. 205

v. Apthorp iii. 498

v. Brown ii. 765, 768

v. Hyde i. 186

v. Stacey ii. 380, 395

o. Stubbs ii. 395, 400, 410, 418 ;

iii. 443

Portwood v. Outton iii. 432

Post v. Jones ii. 397, 440, 442, 456

v. Kimberly "i. 183, 195, 198

v. Phcenix Ins. Co. ii. 533

u. Post i. 549

v. U. S. i. 627

Postlethwait v. Garrett iii. 121, 130

i\ Parkes ii. 75

Postmaster-General v. Furber ii. 766

v. Norvell ii. 768

v, Reeder ii. 19

Pothonier v. Dawson iii. 253

Pott u. Clegg iii. 77

v. Eyton i. 182

v. Todhunter ii. 686

r. Turner iii. 416

Potter v. Brown ii. 731 ; iii. 406

c. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. iii. 235

v. Deboos ii. 67

v. Holland ii. 307, 308, 315, 318

r. Irish ii. 386

v. Kerr iii. 395

v. Marine Ins. Co. ii. 492

v. Mayo i. 129 ; ii. 60 ; iii. 286

u. McCoy . i. 212

u. Merchants Bank i. 75

u. Morland ii. 668

v. Muller ii. 324

v. Ocean Ins. Co. ii. 447, 615

v. Ontario & Livingston Mut. Ins.

Co. ii. 584, 630

v. Parsons i. 130

v. Providence Ins. Co. ii. 502, 517
r. Sanders i. 514

v. Spilman iii. 455

v. Suffolk Ins. Co. ii. 497

v. Taggart ii. 770

v. Thompson ii. 129 ; iii. 253

v. Tyler i. 289

v. Whitney ii. 324

v. Yale College iii. 121

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

clxvii

Pottinger v. Wightman ii. 712
Potts v. Aechternacht i. 110
v. Henderson i. 08
v. New York, &c. R. Co. iii. 270
v. Whitehead i. 515
Poucher v. Holley ii. 874
v. Norman ii. 60
Pougett v. Tompkins ii. 89
Poughkeepsie Bank v. Phelps iii. 17, 98
Poulter v. Killingbeek iii. 35
Pounsett v. Fuller iii. 223
Pourie v. Fraser i. 48
Poussard v. Spiers ii. 809
Poutz v. La. Ins. Co. ii. 481
Powder Co. v. Burkhardt i. 558
Powell, Ex parte iii. 419
v. Biddle ii. 681, 692
v. Bradlee ii. 915
v. Brown i. 459
v. Conant iii. 335
r. Divett ii. 854, 855
o. Edmunds i. 524
v. Graham i. 113
v. Hinsdale ii. 216
v. Horton ii. 667
v. Hyde ii. 501
v. Little ii. 746
v. Lyles i. 615
v. Manson Manuf. Co. i. 406
v. Myers ii. 213
v. M. & B. Manuf. Co. iii. 237, 239
v. Newburgh iii. 206
v. Salisbury iii. 195
v. Smith iii. 200
v. Thomas i. 283
v. Tuttle i. 89
v. Waters iii. 129, 153
Power v. Barham i. 622
v. Finnie i. 286
v. Kent iii. 286
v. Whitmore ii. 447, 537, 609
Powers v. Bellinger i. 564
v. Fowler iii. 16
v. Hale iii. 316, 371
v. Nash i. 32
v. North Eastern Ass. ii. 592
v. Russell i- 386
v. Ware ii. 858
Powhattan Steamboat Co. v. Appo-
mattox R. R. Co. ii. 190, 907
Powis v. Smith i- 22
Powles v. Hider i- 114
v. Innes ii. 476
v. Page i- 83
Powley v. Walker i- 537
Pownal v. Ferrand i- 500
Praeger v. Bristol, &c. R. Co. ii. 251
Prankard, Ex parte *'.':. *^
Prather v. "Vineyard "i- 28
Pratt v. Adams iii. 116, 118, 123
v. Bates iii- 23
v. Beaupre i- 58
v. Bryant ii. H6 ; iii. 213
v. Chase iii- 49, 411
v. Curtis iii- 441

Pratt v. Elgin Baptist Soc. i. 483

v. Flamer i. 377

v. Foote ii. 757

v. Hackett ii. 827, 837

v. Hubbard ii. 722

v. Huggins iii. 108

v. Humphrey iii. 24

v. Hutchinson i- 162

v. Landon i. 177

v. Law iii. 358

v. Maynard i. 664

v. Paine ii. 646

o. Parkman i. 594, 595 ; ii. 395

v. Railway Co. ii. 227

v. Reed ii. 381, 382, 453

v. Richards, &c. Co. i. 543

v. Russell i. 463

v. Willey iii. 117

Pratt's case iii. 417, 474

Pray v. Clark i. 532 ; iii. 309

v. Gorham i. 348

v. Maine i. 297 ; ii. 6

v. Mitchell iii. 56

Prebble v. Boghurst i. 466 ; iii. 373

Preble v. Baldwin iii. 24, 38

Precious v. Abel i. 59

Prentice v. Achorn i. 435 ; iii. 373

v. Reed ii. 840

v. Zane i. 292

Prentiss v. Danielson i. 308

v. Graves ' i. 273

v. Russ ii. 918

v. Savage ii. 713

v. Sinclair i. 191

v. Stevens iii. 77

Presbrey v. Williams ii. 797

Presbury v. Morris i. 627

Presb. Church v. City of New York

ii. 807

Presb. Congr. v. Williams ii. 941

Presbyterian Soc. v. Beach i. 483

Prescot, Ex parte iii- 439

t7. ii. 644

Preseott, Ex parte iii. 424, 468

v. Brinsley i- 285

v. Brown i. 385

v. Elms i- 548

v. Flinn i. 47

<>. Holmes i- 615

v. Hull i- 257

v. Locke i. 564, 567

v. Norris i- 338

w.Parker iii. Ill

v. Perkins i- 35

v. Trueman iii- 244

President, The Brig ii- 381

President, &c. v. Ogle ii- 884

Preslar v. Stallworth iii- 109

Presley v. Davis i- 347

Preston v. Boston _i- 496

v. Christmas ii- 823

u. Dayson _j- 316

v. Greenwood ii- 487

v. Jackson iii- 129

v. Merceau ii- 679

clxyiii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Preston v. Preston

iii. 311

Prior v. Hembrow

i.145; ii. 848

v. Tubbin

iii. 200

Priscilla, The

ii. 405

v. Walker

iii. 160

Pritchard i\ Brown

ii. 932

v. Whitney

i. 578, 579

v. Howell

iii. 72

Prestwick v. Marshall

i. 47, 302

v. Martin

ii. 43

Prettyman v. Unland

i. 552

o. Merchants Ass. Soc.

ii. 618

Prevost v. Gratz

ii. 860

v. Norton

ii. 712

Prevot v. Lawrence

i. 540

v. Ovey iii. 323,

324, 329, 338

Prewett v. Carruthers

i. 460

o. Schooner Lady Horatia i 1

Prewitt v. Wilson

i. 460; ii. 76

Pritchett v. Ins. Co.

ii. 484

Price v. Alexander

i. 122

Probart v. Knouth

i. 338

v. Asheton

iii. 364

Proctor v. Jones

iii. 47

v. Barker

i. 325

v. Keith

i. 536

v. Benington

i. 437

v. Moore iii.

394, 397, 409

v. Corporation of Penzance iii. 309

v. Nicholson

ii. 161, 167

v. Dyer

iii. 371

v. Sargent

ii. 890

v. Easton

i. 406

Profllet v. Hall

ii. 160

v. Green

iii. 169, 170

Propert r. Parker

iii. 6

v. Griffith

iii. 309, 337

Proprietors of Canal Bridge v. Gor-

v. Hartshorn

ii. 200

don

i. 154

v. Harwood

ii. 941

Proprietors of Ken. Purchase v. La-

v. Hewett

i. 357

fa oree

iii. 511

u. Hicks

i. 167

Proprietors of Trent Navigation v.

v. Hopkins

iii. 511

Wood ii.

169, 170, 180

v. Justrobe

iii. 231

Proprietors, &c. Credit Co

. «. Ar-

v. Lavender

i. 274

duin

i. 508

v. Lea

iii. 40

Prosser u. Edmonds

i. 251, 253

v. Macauley

iii. 370

v. Hooper

1.638; ii. 811

v. Neale

i. 300

Protection Ins. Co. u. Hall

ii. 491

v. Page

ii. 688, 095

v. Montefiore

ii. 297, 525

u. Powell

ii. 208, 416

v. Wilson

iii. 482, 490

v. Ralston

iii. 439

Prouty v. Roberts

i. 204

v. Richardson

iii. 17

v. Ruggles

ii. 315

v. Seaman

i. 474

Providence, The

ii. 458

v. Severn

iii. 188

Providence Bank v. Billings

iii. 486, 488,

v. Trusdell

ii. 6, 11

498, 502

v . Tyson

ii. 849

v. Frost

iii. 123

v. TJpshaw

iii. 95

Providence Life Ins. Co. v. Martin ii. 619

Prickett v. Badger

i. 97

Providence, &c. Co. ^. Phoenix Ins.

Pride v. Earl of Bath

ii. 88

Co.

ii. 490

Prideaux v. Burnett

i. 631

Providence, &c. R. Co. v.

Yonkers

Pridgen r. Andrew

iii. 113

Ins. Co.

ii. 549

v. Hill

iii. 96

Providentia, The

ii. 519

Prieger v. Exchange Ins.

Co. ii. 552

Provincial Ins. Co. v. Leduc

i. 65

Priest v. Citizens Ins. Co

ii. 587

Provost v. Wilcox

ii. 392

v. Cone

i. 408

Prugnell v. Gosse

ii. 888

Priestley v. Foulds

ii. 639

Pruman v. Hardin

i 579

v. Fowler

ii. 45, 40

Pruyn v. Milwaukee

iii. 113

Priestley's case

ii. 337

Pryke v. Waddingham

iii. 335

Prime v. Cobb

i. 556

Puckett t>. Reed

i. 668

o. Koehler

ii. 10, 11; iii. 27

v. Smith

iii. 201

Primrose v. Bromley

iii. 421

v. United States

i. 638

Primus, The

ii. 519

Pudor v. B. & M. R. R. Co.

ii. 277

Prince !-. Clark

i. 88

Pugh v. Bussell iii.

391, 395, 508

v. Fuller

ii. 878

v. Chesseldine

ii. 789

v. Ocean Ins. Co.

ii. 397, 506

v. Currie

i. 168, 170

Prince Albert v. Strange

ii. 330, 332, 342

v. Duke of Leeds ii. 486

635, 795, 797

Prince Edward v. Trevellick ii. 466

v. Durfee

i. 202

Prince George, The

ii 450

v. Good

iii. 348

Prince Regent, The

ii. 405

Pulbrook v. Lawes

iii. 38

Princessa, The

ii. 520

Pulcifer v. Page

ii. 145

Princeton v. Gulick

i. 192

l'ullen v. Shaw

ii. 859

Pringle v. Dunn

i. 81

Pullian v. Pensonneau

ii. 840

v. M'Clenachan

ii. 838

Pulling !•. Great Eastern R.

Co. i. 144

v. Phillips

i. 289

v. Tucker

iii. 442

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

clxix

Pullman Palace Car Co.

v. Smith ii. 156

v. Taylor

ii. 237

Pulsifer v. Hotchkiss

i. 495

Pulte v. Derby

ii. 838

Pulteney v. Shelton

iii. 328

Pultney v. Keyiner

i. 102

; iii. 293

Pulver, In re

iii.

428, 457

Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft

iii. 317

Pupkey v. Resolute, &c. Ins. Co.

ii. 477

Pureeli v. Miner

iii. 347

Pureliell v. Salter

ii.

882, 938

Purdew v. Jackson

iii. 437

Purdy v. Delavan

ii. 831,

832, 834

v. Philipa

iii. Ill

Purser v. Brain

ii. 371

Pursley v. Hays

i. 367

Purvianee v. Sutherland

i. 212

Purvis v. Rayer

ii. 334

Pusey v. Clemson

ii. 852

v. Pusey

iii. 329

Putnam v. Dutch

ii. 395

v. Farnham

ii. 10

v. French

ii. 745

v. Home Ins. Co.

i. 59

; ii. 471

v. Putnam

ii. 724

a. Ritchie

iii. 238

v. Story i.

253, 474

, iii. 431

v. Sullivan

i. 308

v. Tennyson

i. 384

v. Tillotson

ii.

409, 668

v. Wise

i.

174, 183

v. Wood

ii.

422, 423

Pye, Ex parte

iii. 315

v. Daubuz

iii. 427

Pyke v. Thomas

ii. 890

Pyle, &c. o. Cravens

i. 334

Q.

iii. 605

i. 183

iii. 68, 108

iii. 126

ii. 801

i. 458

i. 118, 119, 120

ii. 576

Quackenbush v. Danks

v. Sawyer
Quantock v. England
Quarles v. Brannon

v. George

v. Quarles
Quarman v. Burnett
Quarrier v. Ins. Co.
Quebec Ins. Co. v. St. Louis ii. 564

Queen v. Inhabitants of Stoke-upon-

Trent ii. 668

v. L. & S. Railway Co. ii. 938

v. Nevill ii. 634

Queiroz v. Trueman i. 102; iii. 258, 278
Quelin v. Moisson
Quick v. Ludborrow
Quigley v. De Haas

v. Thompson
Quimby v. Hazen

v. Putnam

v. Cook
Quince v. Callender
Quincey v. Quincey

v. Sharpe
Quincy, Ex parte

iii. 406

ii. 664, 852

i. 69; ii. 648

ii. 909

iii. 254
iii. 91

iii. 161
ii. 715
ii. 693
iii. 76
i. 547

Quincy v. Hall iii. 105

v. Quincy i. 895

v. Tilton i. 654 ; ii. 812

Quincy Bank v. Ricker i. 300

Quinebaug Bank v. Tarbox ii. 866

Quinn v. Davis i. 556

v. Fuller i. 211

K.

Raba v. Ryland iii. 290

Rabaud v. De Wolf ii. 78

Rabone v. Williams ii. 883, 884

Racehorse, The ii. 426

Raekham v. Marriott iii. 75

Rackstraw v. Imber i. 185

Radford v. Smith i. 572, 680

Radley v. Manning iii. 124, 135

Rae v. Grand Trunk R. Co. ii. 184
Rafferty v. New Brun. Ins. Co. ii. 546, 547

Raffin, Ex parte iii. 298

Ragan v. Kennedy i. 569

Ragg v. King ii. 459

Ragsdale v. Memphis R. Co. ii. 47

Rahilly «. Wilson i. 558
Rahway Sav. Inst. v. Irving St.

Church i. 546

Raiguel v. Ayliff i. 280

Raikes v. Todd iii. 16, 17

Railroad Co. v. Aspell ii. 248

v. Barrow ii. 236

v. Campbell ii. 232

v. Finney iii. 187

v. Georgia iii. 487

v. Hecht iii. 506

v. Lockwood ii. 270

v. Manuf. Co. ii. 257

v. National Bank i. 291

R. R. Co. v. Trimble ii. 319

Railton v. Hodgson i. 66

v. Mathews ii. 9, 918

Railway Co. v. Vallely ii. 246

Rainbolt v. Eddy ii. 853

Rainey v. Capps . ii. 900

Rainsford v. Fenwick i. 337

v. Smith ii. 931, 932

Rainwater v. Durham i. 338

Raisin v. Clark i. 94

Raitt v. Mitchell ii 669; iii. 264, 271

Rake v. Pope iii. 44

Raleigh v. Atkinson i. 74

Ralli v. Janson ii. 489

Ralph v. Brown ii. 866

Ralston v. Smith ii. 308

v. The State Rights ii. 434 ; iii. 185

v. Union Ins. Co. ii. 507

Ramaley v. Leland ii. 160

Ram Coomar Coondoo v. Chunder

Canto Mookerjee ii. 908

Ramdulollday v . Darieux i. 307

Ramires v. Kent i. 448

Rammelsberg v. Mitchell i. 172

Ramsay v. George i- 383

v. Joyce i. 411

clxx

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Ramsbotham v. Cator

i. 280

Rapier v. Holland

ii. 877

Ramsbottorn v. Gosden

iii. 312

Rapp, Ex parte

iii. 420

Ramsdale v. Horton

ii. 753

v. Latham

i. 209

Ramsdell v. Maxwell

i. 541

v. Palmer

ii. 672

z>. Morgan

iii. 137

v. Rapp

ii. 624

v. Sigerson

iii. 382, 403

Rashleigh, Ex parte

iii. 470

Ramsden v. Hylton

ii. 034

Ratcliffe v. Allison

iii. 343

Ramsour v. Thomas

ii. 705

v. Planters Bank

i. 308

Ranay v. Alexander

i. 580

Rateau v. Bernard

i. 570

Rand t; Hubbard

i. 271

Rathbone v. Orr

ii. 318

v. Hubbell

i. 159

Rathbun r. Payne ii

247,248,431

v. Mather

i. 486 ; iii. 20

Rattary v. Cook

i. 663

v. The Barge

ii. 392

Rattoon v. Overacker

i. 146

Randall v. Harvey

i. 471

Ratzer v. Ratzer

i. 174

v. Howard

ii. 914

Raubitschek v. Blank

iii. 18

v. Kehlor

i. 62

Raux v. Brand

iii. 78

v. Kelsey

iii. 23

Ravee v. Farmer

ii. 836

v. Lynch

ii. 425

Raw v. Cutten

iii. 421, 428

v. Moon

ii. 750

Rawley v. Rawley

ii. 882

v. Morgan

ii. 76 ; iii. 33

Rawlings v. Bell

ii. 916

v. Newson

i. 630 ; iii. 219

Rawlins r. Goldfrap

i. 352

v. Randall

i. 390 ; ii. 92

v. Jenkins

ii. 633

v. Raper

iii. 227

v. Van Dyke i.

347, 393, 401

v. Rhodes

i. 633

Rawlinson v. Oriet

ii. 863

i'. Snyder

i. 58

v. Pearson

iii. 416

v. Sweet

i. 338

v. Shaw

ii. 852

v. Van Vechten i.

52, 72, 122, 155

v. Stone

i. 271

f. Wilkins

iii. 103

Rawson v. Johnson

i. 577, 578

v. Willis

iii. 362

v. Spencer

iii. 483

Randel v. Chesapeake &

Delaware

v. Walker

iii. 426

Canal Co.

ii. 844

Rawstorne v. Gandell

ii. 749

Randle e. Harris

ii. 11; iii. 27

Ray, Ex parte

iii. 467

v. Fuller

ii. 875

v. Bank of Kentucky

iii. 354

Randleson, Ex parte

i. 7G3

v. Catlett

ii. 900

v. Murray

i. 120

v. Sherwood

ii. 727

Rangely v. Spring

ii. 940

a. Wiyht

iii. 471

Ranger v. Carey

i. 290, 290

Raymond v. Bearnard

ii. 773

Ranken v. Reeve

ii. 535

v. Fitch

i. 144

Rankin v. Am. Ins. Co.

ii. 478, 497

v. Loyd i.

337, 344, 348

i; Blackwell

ii. BOO

i\ Pritchard

iii. 368

v. Huskisson

iii. 331

v. Proprietors of Crown & Eagle

v. Lodor

iii. 382

Mills

i. 68

v. Matthews

i. 524

c. Roberts

ii. 634

v. Potter

ii. 505

r. Tyson

ii. 413

v. Scott

iii. 254

Rayne v. Orton

i. 29

v. Simpson

iii. 343

Rayner v. Grote

i. 70

v. Woodworth

iii. 100

v. Mitchell

i. 113

Ranking v. Barnard

iii. 429

v. Stone

iii 327

Rann v. Home Ins. Co.

ii. 551

Raynes v. Bennett

i. 387

v. Hughes

i. 7, 457

Raynor v. Linthorne

iii. 11

Ranney v. Edwards

ii. 843

v. Nims

iii. 181

Rannie r. Irvine

ii. 890

Rea v. Cutler

ii. 445

Ransom v. Mayor of N. Y.

ii. 315, 327

i . Durkee

i. 394, 396

Ransome !'. Bentall

ii. 355

i>. Gibbons

ii. 837

Ranson p. Mack

i. 321

Reab v. Moor

ii. 36, 39

v. Sherwood

i. 284

Read, Ex parte

iii. 421

Rapelye v. Anderson i. 291 ; iii. 153, 156

v. Bonham

ii. 511

k. Bailey

ii. 23

v. Cutts

ii. 32

?■■ Mackie

i. 566

v. D upper

ii. 875

Raphael v. Bank of Eng.

i. 289

v. Earle

i. 387

v. Birdwood

iii. 409

v. Goldring

ii. 773, 777

v. Boehm

i. 137

v. Granberry

ii. 667

v. Pickford

ii. 196

o. Hull of a New Brig

ii. 384

v. Thames Valley R.

Co. iii. 307

r. Legard

i. 390

Rapid, The

ii. 443

v. Long

iii. 316

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

clxxi

Read v. Nash

v. Passer

v. Power

v. Rann

v. Spaulding

v. Taft

v. Teakle
Reade v. Com. Ins. Co.

v. Lacy

v. Lamb

i). Livingston
Reading v. Blackwell
Ready v. Noakes
Reakert v. Sanford
Real Estate Co. v. Keech

iii. 26

ii.82

iii. 337

i. 110; ii. 654

ii. 172

i. 486

i. 391

ii. 533

ii. 342, 343

iii. 64

i. 410

i. 150

iii. 316

i. 392

iii. 124

Real Estate Ins. Co. v. Roessle ii. 470, 540

Ream v. Rank iii. 240

Reaney v. Culbertson i. 41

Reay v. White ii. 770

Rebecca, The ii. 183, 407, 432, 454

Reddick i\ Jones i. 292

Redding v. Hall i. 537 ; ii. 136, 138

v. Wilkes iii. 350

Redfield v. Holland ii. 561

v. Middleton ii. 348

Redhead v. Cator ii. 32

Redman v. Hartford Ins. Co. ii. 552

v. Redman ii. 78

v. Wilson ii. 495, 529

Redmon v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 554

Redmond v, Liverpool, &c. Steamship

Co. ii. 208

Red Oak Bank v. Orvis i. 312

Redpath v. West. Un. Tel. Co. ii. 287

Red Rover, The ii. 442

Reece v. Allen iii. 378

Reech v. Kennegal iii. 353

v. Kennigate iii. 353

Reed v. Ashburnham R. Co. i. 48

v. Bartlett ii. 823

u, Boardman ii- 763

v. Bostick iii. 285

v. Canfield ii. 463

v. Chambers iii. 338

v. Clark ii. 73

v. Cole ii. 476, 494

v. Cutter ii. 304, 308

v. Evans iii. 17

u. Fullum ii. 17 ; iii. 15

v. Garvin ii. 4

v. Hodges iii. 332

v. Holcomb iii. 22

v. Howard i. 235

v. Jewett i. 569, 611

v. Kilburn Co-operative Society

ii. 790
v. Latham i. 75

v. Marsh i. 303

v. Merchants' Ins. Co. ii- 550

u. Moore i- 393

v. Murphy i- 268

v. Noe i- 525

v. Pacific Ins. Co. ii- 74

v. Rann »• 654

v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co. ii. 606

Reed i>. Shaw

ii.

849

v. Shepardson

i.

231,

234

v. Smith

iii.

129

v. Taylor

iii

400

v. Upton

ii.

756

v. White

ii.

390

v. Williamsburg Ins. Co.

ii.

561

v. Wilmott

i.

569

u. Wilson

i.

313

v. Wood

i.

589,

633

Reeder v. Craig

ii

933

v. Purdy

iii.

188

v. Sayre

i.

548

Reedie v. Lond. & North Western Rail-

way Co.

i.

116,

120

'.'. Seixas

i.

322

Rees v. Lines

ii. 60

v. Overbaugh

ii.

856

Reese v. Bradford

i.

231

Reeside, Schooner ii. 183,

427,

671,

677

v. Knox

i.

280

Reeve v. Bird

i.

543,

544

v. Parkins

i.

230

Reeves v. Capper ii. 125,

128,

101;

iii.

254,

288

v. Hearne

ii.

819

t\ Reeves

ii. 88

r. The Ship Constitution

ii.

131,

428

Regina v. Ambergate, &c. R.

Co.

ii.

943

v. Basingstoke

ii.

938

v. Millis

ii. 84, 85

v. Smith

ii. 44, 54

v. Welch

ii. 49

v. Wheeler

i

547

Relioboth v. Hunt

iii.

481

Reid v. Barber

i.

616

v. Darby

ii

398

v. Fairbanks

ii

380

r. Harvey

ii

522

v. Hollinshead' i. 166,

176

; iii

289

v. Hoskins

ii

425,

808

v. McNaughton

iii. 89

v. Morrison

i

311

u. Rensselaer Glass Factory

iii.

110,
111

Reif v. Page

ii

802

Reilly v. Jones

iii

172

174

v. Smith i.

230

; iii

370

Reiman v. Hamilton

i

387

Reimers v. Ridner

i

597

Reinheimer v. Hemmingway

i

236

Reinicker v. Smith i.

43E

; iii

373

Reish v. Thompson

ii. 66

Reitz v. People

iii

463

Relf v. Ship Maria i. 442 ; ii.

464, 46 ■

466

Reliance, The

ii

461

Relle v. W. U. Tel. Co.

ii

294

Remelee v. Hall

iii

203

Remer v. Downer

i

318

Remick r. O'Kyle

i

309

v. Sanford i. 685;

iii. 50, 51

Remington v. Harrington

i

318

v. Palmer

ill. 38

Remington Sewing Machine Co. o.

Kezertee

ii. 8

clxxii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Remnants in Court
Remon v. Hayward
Renard v. Sampson
Renaux v. Teakle
Renew v. Butler
Reniger v. Fogossa
Rennell v. Kimball

ii. 384

ii. 686

ii. 420, 678

i. 388, 389

i. 137

i. 6 ; ii. 665

ii. 390, 453

Renner v. Bank of Columbia i. 313; ii. 669

Rennick v. Ficklin i. 396

Rennie r. Robinson ii. 940

Reno v. Hogan ii. 256, 267

Renoud v. Daskam i. 532

Renteria c. Ruding i. 328

Renton v. Chaplin i. 221

Renwick v. Williams i. 293; iii. 451

Reppert v. Colvin iii. 91

Repplier v. Orrich iii. 382

Rerick v. Hearn iii. 314

Reserve Ins. Co. a, Kane ii. 606

Resh v. Bank ii. 113

Resor v. Johnson ii. 52

Resultatet, The ii. 442

Reusse v. Meyers ii. 396

Reutcli v. Long iii. 39

Reuter v. Electric Tel. Co. ii. 291

v. Sala i. 572 ; ii. 790

Rerens r. Lewis ii. 389, 454

Revenue Cutter, The ii. 384

Rew v. Pettet i. 136

Rex r. Adderley ii. 797

v. Allen iii. 125

v. Bellringer i. 160

i7. Birdbrooke ii. 37

r. Bower i. 160

r. Brampton ii. 39, 729

v. Brotherton ii. 898

v. Butterton ii. 939

v. Carlile ii. 930

v. Christ's Parish ii. 36

v. Cole i. 354

v. Collector of the Customs ii. 387

v. Cording iii. 253

v. Cumberland ii. 797

v. De Hales Owen ii. 55

v. Friend i. 347

v. Girdwood ii. 625

(.. Great Borden ii. 36

... Great Wigston i. 354

v. Gutch i. 114

v. Hanger ii. 129

v. Harborne ii. 613

p. Hay ii. 613

v. Hertford ii. 99

v. Humphery ii. 154 ; iii. 284

d. Ivens ii. 161

v. Laindon ii. 687

v. Lolley ii. 736

c. Loudonthorpe i. 547

v. Mainwaring ii. 633

v. Manning i. 234

v. Mary Mead i. 398

v. Miller i. 160

v. Munden i. 351

!■. Nutt i. 114

v. Pedley i. 120

Rex v. Robinson ,_ iii 449

o. Scammonden ii- 685, H87

v. Sedgley ii- 616

v. Shatton i. Ill

v. Stevens ii- 797

v, St. Mary's ii- 644

v. Twyning ' ii. 612

b. Varlo i. 160
v. Webb i. 162
i'. Westwood i. 160
v. Whitnash ii. 899

Reyman v. Mosher iii- 66

Reynell v. Lewis i. 48, 163

Reyner t\ Hall ii. 5:;6

Reynolds, Ex parte iii. 420, 422, 428

v. Commerce Ins. Co. ii. 544

v. Douglass i. 326 ; ii. 16

v. Doyle iii. 98

u. Fenton ii. 738

c. Lounsburg ii. 936
v. Magness ii. 687
v. McCurry i. 363
v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. iii. 436
v. Nelson iii. 341
v. Ocean Ins. Co. ii. 445, 508, 537
v. Pinhowe ii. 823
v. Railroad i. 642
v. Robinson i. 385
v. Rowley i. 42
v. Ruckman i. 172
v. Shuler i. 548, 553
c. Stevenson ii. 901
v. Sweetzer i. 346
v. Toppan i. 181 ; ii. 194, 195
». Waller i. 435

Rhea v. Rhenner i. 407

Rhine r. Ellen ii. 934

Rhinelander v. Ins. Co. of Penn. ii. 501

Rhines v. Phelps i. 612

Rhoades v. Castnet iii. 18

Rhode?, Ex parte ii. 875

r. Amsinck i. 206

v. Forwood i. 75

v. Ibbetson iii. 371

.-. Lindly i. 279

v. Rhodes iii. 348, 350

i. Thuaites i. 566

Rice, Ex parte iii. 418

v. Austin i. 108, 232

r. Barnard i. 168, 231 ; ii. 745

v. Barrett i. 193

v. Bixlee i. 468

*, Churchill ii. 783

v. Courtis ii. 719

v. Dwight Man. Co. ii- 39

v. Forsyth i. 616

v. Gist ii. 896

r. Gordon i. 523

v. Groffman i. 59

v. Hart ii. 210

v. Homer ii. 505

v. King iii. 201

v. Mather iii. 153

v. Maxwell iii. 477

v. MoMartin i. 231

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

clxxiii

Rice v. New England Ins. Co. ii. 523, 524

v. Peet i. 434

v. Richards i. 227

v. Sims i. 478

v. Stearns i. 299

v. Tavernier i. 131

v. Tower ii. 489, 676

v. Welling iii. 125

v. Wood i. 94

Rich v. Aldred ii. 103

v. Basterfield i. 120
v. Jackson i. 524; iii. 312, 354

v. Kneeland ii. 180

v. Lambert ii. 184, 407

v. Lippincott ii. 314, 315

v. Lord ii. 634, 851

v. Parker ii. 518

v. Smith i. 538

v. Topping iii. 118

Richard Busted, The ii. 381, 383, 385

Richards v. Brockenbrough ii. 826, 827

v. Brown iii. 116, 149

v. Clark ii. 797

v. Drinker ii. 828

v. Hazzard iii. 382

v. Hudson iii. 409

v. James ii. 882
v. London, &c. Railway ii. 189, 202,

212

v. Maryland Ins. Co. iii. 427

v. Merriam iii. 427

v. Porter iii. 5, 6

v. Richards ii. 91

Richardson, Ex parte iii. 474

In re iii. 460

v. Boright i. 367, 368

v. Brown i- 622

v. Clark ii. 394

v. Duncan i. 443, 444

v. Farmer i- 189

v. Feu iii. 69, 70

v. French i. 205

v. Goddard ii. 200, 208, 416
v. Goss i. 647, 654; iii. 257, 271, 283

v. Hogg }■ 242

v. Jackson ii. 779

v. Johnson i- 617

v. Langridge i- 548

v. Lester i- 200

v. Lincoln i. 299
v. Maine Ins. Co. ii. 425, 496, 501, 531

v. Martyr i. 281

v. Mellish i. 469

v. Moies i- 48
v. New York Central R. R. Co. ii. 249

v. Nourse ii. 840

v. Pierce iii- 43

v. Rardin i- 568

v. Richardson i. 266 ; iii. 106

v. Rickman ii- 820

v. Ridgley iii- 293, 295

v. Robbins iii- 29

v. Scott River Co. i- 153, 156

v. Stodder i- 411

v. Strong i. 436 ; iii. 414

Richardson v. Watson

ii. 690

v. Whiting

ii. 454

v. Williamson

i. 69

o. Wil. & Man. R. R. Co.

ii. 248

v. Wyatt

i. 170

Riches v. Brigges ii. 108, 109

Richmond v. Dubuque, &c. R. Co. iii. 319

v. Roberts ii. 66

v. Smith ii. 156, 157, 159

v. Union Steamboat Co. ii. 207

Richmond Manuf. Co. v. Stark i. 52

Richmond R. R. Co. v. The Louisa

R. R. Co. iii. 490, 493, 494

Richmond Trading, &c. Co. ca Farquar

i. 624
Richmondville Seminary v. McDonald

i. 161
Richmondville Union Seminary v.

Hamilton Ins. Co. ii. 557, 582

Richter v. Poppenhusen i. 227

Rickard v. Kohl ii. 881

Ricker v. Cross ii. 395

Rickert v. Snyder iii. 240, 243, 244

Rickets v. Dickens i. 615

Ricketson v. Compton i. 132

Ricketts v. Bell iii. 371

v. Pendleton i. 312

v. Weaver i. 144

Rickford v. Ridge ii. 755

Rickman v. Carstairs ii. 484

Ricks r. Dillahunty i. 615, 616, 623

Ricord v. Bettenham ii. 447

Riddell v. Sutton i. 143

Riddle v. Backus iii- 41

v. Bowman i. 32

v. Brown iii- 37

v. Littlefield i. 530

■,. Rosenfeld ii. 764

v. Varnum i. 566

v. Welden i- 553

Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co. ii. 588

Riddlesden v. Wogan ii. 88

Rider v. Ocean Ins. Co. ii. 876 ; iii. 288

v. Pond ii. 661

Rider and Fisher, In re ii. 829

Ridgeley v. Crandall i. 335

Ridgeway v. Day i. 316

v. Kennedy i. 579

Ridgway v. English ii. 52

v, Hungerford Market Co. ii. 36, 43

v. Ingram iii- 4, 15

v. Philip i. 193

u. Wharton iii. 18, 343

Ridgway's Appeal i- 175

Ridley v. Gyde iii- 442

v. McNairy iii- 347

Ridout v. Brough iii- 439, 469

Rigby v. Hewitt ii. 250 ; iii. 192

Rigden v. Martin ii. 842, 843

v. Wolcott iii. 180

Riggs v. Dooley iii- 102

v. Murray iii- 383

v. Price i- 280

v. Waldo i. 275, 284

Right v. Bawden i. 549

clxxiv

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Eight v. Bueknell

ii. 932

u. Cuthell

i. 49

v. Darby

i. 548

v. Proctor

ii. 931

Rigs v. Cage

i. 76

Eiley v. Carter

ii. 885

v. Cuthell

i. 50

v. Farnsworth

iii. 12, 15

v. Gerrish

i. 275

v. Home

ii. 261, 273

v. Mallory

i. 361

v. Wiiliam9

iii. 15

Riley's Adm'rs v. Vanhouten ii. 632

Rinehart r. Olwine iii. 226

King r. Franklin ii. 396

Ringgold v. Ringgold ii. 150

Bipka >: Pope i. 309

v. Sergeant iii. 234

Ripley v. Chipman ii. 39, 792

v. Colby i. 1(35

v. Davis iii. 211

v. Etna Ins. Co. ii. 470, 522

v. Kingsbury i. 194, 204

v. McClure ii. 809

v. N. J., &c. R. Co. ii. 246

v. Scaife ii. 422

v. Waterworth i. 109

v. "Woods iii. 437

Rippey v. Miller iii. 186

Bisdale v. Newnham ii. 521

Rising v. Granger iii. 292

Rising Sun, The ii. 441

Risley, Succession of ii. 610

o. Plienix Bank i. 256

v. Eisley i. 25a

Rison v. Wilkerson ii. 608

Riston v. Cobb ii. 681

Ritchie v. Atkinson i. 493 ; ii. 414, 658

v. Smith ii, 894

v. U. S. Ins. Co. ii. 508

v. Williams ii. 852

Ritson v. Dodge iii. 311

Rittenhouse v. Leigh i. 193

Ritter v. Cushman ii. 127

v. Phillips iii. 113

v. The Jamestown ii. 392

Eittinhouse v. Ind. Line of Tel. ii. 290, 301

Eitts v. Hall ii. 318

Eivers v. Walker ii. 842

Rix v. Adams i. 472

v. Strong ii. 787

Eixford v. Nye ii. 827, 835

v. Smith ii. 173

Eoach v. Chapman ii. 381

v. Garvan ii. 739

v. Perry i. 229

v. Quick i. 337, 383

v. Thompson i. 33

Eobalina v. Armstrong i. 377

Bollards >: Hutson i. 407

Eohb v. Halsey iii. 123

r. Montgomery ii. 660, 663

Bobbins v. Alexander ii. 749

v. Bacon i. 245, 249, 257

v. Cooper i. 232

Bobbins v. Eaton i. 363, 364, 367, 368, 374

o. Farley iii. 75

v. Fennel i. 90

v. Fuller i. 218

v. Hayward i. 137

v. Luce ii. 781

v. Mount i. 356, 5S2

Bobert c. Garnie ii. 763, 765

v. West i. 409

Eobert Fulton, Ship ii. 385, 863
Robert Morris, The, u. Williamson ii. 392
Boberts v. Barker i. 545; ii. 669, 677
v. Beatty ii. 783, 784, 785, 787, 794

v. Berry iii. 339, 341

v. Chenango Co. ii. 473, 553

v. Cocke ii. 587

v. Connelly ii. 76

o. Continental Ins. Co ii. 543

v. Eberhardt 221, 230

v. Eden i. 285

v. Fisher ii. 756

v. Fitler i. 184

v. Goff iii. 136

v. Hammon iii. 82
v. Havelock i. 493 ; ii. 652, 653

v. Hughes i. 618

v. Jenkins i. 635

r. Kelley i. 387
v. Kelsey i. 222 ; iii. 322

v. Mackoul ii. 875

v. Mariett ii. 836

v. Marston i. 500

v. Mason i. 316

v. Morgan i. 623

u. Myers ii. 333, 338

i-. Ogilby ii. 218

<•. Peake i. 280

v. Eiley ii. 256

v. Bockbottom Co. ii. 49; iii. 43

r. Smith ii. 47

v. Spicer iii. 456

v. Taft i. 319

v. Thompson ii. 120

v. Tremoille iii. 149
r. Trenayne iii. 121, 125, 147
v. Tucker ii. 50 ; iii. 14, 43

v. Turner ii. 149, 191

v. Ward ii. 307, 309

v. Wyatt ii. 128, 137

Bobertshaw v. Hanway i. 170

Bobertson v. Baker ' i. 168

f. Breedlove i. 290

u. Clarke ii. 668

v. Col. Ins. Co. ii. 481

v. Deatherage i. 37

v. Ewell i. 569
v. French ii. 478, 626, 033, 647

v. Jackson ii. 667, 672

v. Kennedy ii. 175, 179

i'. Kensington i. 286

v. Ketchum i. 41

v. Liddell iii- 441

v. Livingston i. 60

v. March i. 483
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, ii. 617

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

clxxv

Robertson v. Money

v. Smith

v. St. John

v. Struth

v. United Ins. Co.

v. Vaughan

v. Western Ins. Co.
Robeson v. French
Robinet v. Cobb
Robinson v. Abell

v. Alexander

v. Anderton

v. Ashton

v. Baker

v. Bakewell

v. Bank of Attica

v. Batchelder

ii. 668

i. 12, 28, 211

j. 532

ii. 872

ii. 480

Iii. 45, 62

ii. 478

ii. 902

ii. 837

i. 274, 284

iii. 96

i. 615

i. 170

ii. 223 ; iii. 268

iii.. 176

iii. 443

ii. 685, 781, 782

v. Bland ii. 700, 701, 713, 714, 719,
887; iii. 112, 165

v. Blen i. 306

v. Campbell iii. 237
v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. ii. 396, 505,

509

v. Cone ii. 248, 250

v. Cook ii. 775
v. Crowder i. 200, 201 ; iii. 409

v. Davison ii. 805

v. Day i. 308

v. Doolittle ii. 70-3

v. Dunmore ii. 176, 189

v. Elliott i. 613

v. Fiske ii. 631

v. Frost ii. 129

v. Gardner ii. 104

v. Garth iii. 12

v. Georges Ins. Co. ii. 844

v. Gleadow i. 66

v. Green ii. 019

v. Greinold i. 386

v. Harman ii. 165, 246

v. Harvey i. 617

v. Hawkesford i. 296

v. Hindman ii. 35

v. Hofman i. 211

v. Jones ii. 520, 931

v. Kettletas iii. 352

v. Knights ii. 415

v. Larrabee iii. 254

v. Lotus, The ii. 392

v. Lyall i.'84

v. Lyle i. 38

v. Lyman i. 290

v. Mansfield iii. 291

v. Manuf. Ins. Co. ii. 491

v. Marine Ins. Co. ii. 419, 420

v. McDonnel i- 558

v. Mollett i|- 672

v. Moore i'- 827
o. Musgrove i. 524, 525, 582
v. Nahon i. 394, 395, 404

i\ New York Ins. Co. ii- 58

v. Noble iii. 208, 233

v. Norris •■ Hi

v. Offutt ii- 27

v. Page iii- 371

Robinson i>. Perry

ii. 876

v. Prescott

ii. 740, 744

v. Price

ii. 447

v. Rapelye

iii. 382

v. Red Jacket,

The

ii. 392

u. Reed

ii. 18

v. Reynolds

i. 300, 407

c. Rice

i. 616

v. Robinson i. 137, 406 ; ii. 877 ;
iii. 200, 316

v. Skipworth i. 556

v. Snyder ii. 640

v. Taylor iii. 455

v. Thompson i. 217
v. Threadgill i. 477 ; ii. 110, 112

u. Tobin ii. 474

o. Turpin ii. 204

v. Vale iii. 470

v. Walker i. 12

v. Walter ii. 167

v. Ward i. 126

e. Webb i. 116

v. Weeks i. 362

v. Wilkins ii. 348

v. Wilkinson i. 189

v. Yarrow i. 47

Robinson Machine Works v. Vorse i. 87
Robinson Works v. Chandler i. 515, 618,

030

Robison v. Gosnold i. 395

v. Lyle i. 37

Robson v. iii. 427

v. Bennet i. 312; ii. 755

v. Collins iii. 344

u. Curlewis i. 322

v. North Eastern R. Co. ii. 251

Rocco v. Hackett ii. 743

Rochester Bank v. Harris i. 296

Rockford Bank v. Gayiord ii. 31

Rockwell v. Adams ii. 939

i: Hobby iii. 297, 432

v. Hubbell iii. 506

v. Lawrence iii. 358

Rodes v. Blythe iii. 161

Rodger v. Comptoir D'Escompte i. 651

Rodgers ;>. Jones iii. 50

v. Niles i. 630

u. Nowill ii. 373, 376

v. Smith i. 615

». Torrant ii. 319

Rodman v. Hedden iii. 200

v. Zilley i._ 522

Rodney v. Strode i. 28

Rodocanachi v. Buttrick i. 283

v. Elliott ii. 470, 501

Rodrigues v. Habersham i. 633

v. Melhuish _ ii. 469

Rodriguez v. Hefferman i. 60, 102

Rodwell v. Phillips iii- 35

Roe, The ii- 438, 439

v. Archbishops ii- 940

u.Harrison i. 639; ii. 20

v. Hayley i- 261

v. Prideaux i- 88, 549

v. Tranmarr ii. 635, 636, 637

clxxvi

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Roe d. Durant v. Doe i. 548
Roehner v. Knickerbocker Ins. Co. i. 281 ;

ii. 797

Roelandts v. Harrison ii. 521

Roffey, Ex parte iii. 467

Roger Williams Ins. Co. o. Carring-

ton ii. 471

Rogers v. Allen iii. 409

v. Atkinson ii. 679

v. Bachelor i. 208

v. Boehm i. 97

o. Bradshaw iii. 494

v. Bumpass i. 380

v. Clifton ii. 48; iii. 177

v. Coleman ii. 740

u. Colt ii. 624

v. Currier ii. 383

v. Eagle Fire Ins. Co. ii. 635

v. Fales iii. 176

v. Hackett i. 325

v. Hanson iii. 223

v. Hurd i. 335, 363

v. Kneeland i. 49; iii. 17

v. Langford i. 298

v. Ludlow i. 409

v. March i. 55

v. Maylor ii. 536

v. Mechanics Ins. Co. ii. 451, 484, 485,

660, 672, 674

v. Miller i. 332

v. Novvill ii. 370, 373, 376

v. Painter i. 172

v. Palmer i. 81

v. Parrey ii. 888

v. Pitcher ii. 940

u. Rathbun iii. 130

v. Rogers i. 150 ; ii. 93

v. Rutter ii. 780

v. Saunders iii. 342

v. Smith i. 408

u. Snow i. 539

v. Spence iii. 215, 453

v. St. Charles, The ii. 429, 431, 433

v. Stephens i. 463

v. Taintor ii. 369

v. Traders Ins. Co. i. 252; ii. 482

o, Thomas i. 639, 641, 643

v. Weir ii. 153

v. Western Union Tel. Co. ii. 903

v. Wheeler ii. 184

Rogers, &e. Works v. Lewis i. 579

Rogerson v. Ladbroke ii. 882

Rollback v. Pacific R. R. Co. ii. 47

Rohl k. Parr ii. 428

liohr v. Kindt iii. 247

Rohrback v. Germania ii. 561

Roland v. Gundy i. 556

Rolfe v. Abbot i. 340

v. Rolfe iii. 323, 330, 331

Roller v. Woodridge i. 130

Rolleston v. Hibbert iii. 443

v. Smith iii. 443

Rollins n. Columbian Ins. Co. ii. 574

v. Marsh i. 152, 473

v. Moody i. 642

Rollins v. Mooers

iii. 403

v. Stevens

i. 210

Rolls, Ex parte

iii. 420

v. Yate

i. 15, 31

Rolt v. Watson

i. 331

Romaine v. Allen

iii. 212

Roman ;>. Serna

ii. 3

Romig v. Romig

iii. 210

Rommel v. Wingate

i. 515, 565

Romp, The

ii. 400

Ronaldson v. Tabor

i. 540

Rondeau v. Wyatt

iii. 59, 60, 62

Rood o. Jones

i. 470

v. Winslow

i. 444

Roff e. Stafford

i. 334

Rooke v. Midland Railway Co. ii. 212

Roosevelt v. Hopkins i. 539

v. Kellogg ii. 710

v. Mark iii. 75, 463, 464

Root v. Ball ii 933

<.-. Crock ii. 933

v. Godard i. 301

v. Great Western R. Co. ii. 227

v. Lord i. 578

v. Lowndes iii. 179

u. Renwick ii. 840

v. Taylor ii. 876

Rooth v. North Eastern R. R. Co. ii. 270

... Quinn i. 202

Taylor ii. 870

v. Wilson ii. 100

Roots v. Lord Dormer i. 525

Roper v. Johnson ii. 810 ; iii. 223

v. Stone i. 458

v. Williams iii. 331

Rosa v. Brotherson i. 292

Roscorla v. Thomas i. 475, 502, 621

Rose, The ii. 431

v. Beatie i. 027, 628

i: Bowler i. 143

v. Clarke i. 251

!•. Cunynghame iii. 14

v. Daniel i. 370

u. Dickson iii. 117

u. Hart iii. 439, 469

v. Haycock iii. 441

v. Izard i. 167 ; iii. 440

v. Poulton i. 21, 180

v. Sims iii. 439, 469

v. Spark ii. 835

v. Story i. 579

v. U. S. Tel. Co. ii. 295

v. Williams ii. 28

Rosetto i'. Gurney ii. 418, 495, 510

Rosevelt v. Fulton ii. 925

v. Hopkins i. 539

Ross, Ex parte iii. 469

v. Active, The ii. 446, 456

v. Bradshaw ii. 593

v. City of Madison i. 154

v. Cornell i. 185

v. Green ii. 896

u. Henderson i. 167

v. Hill ii. 169

v. Howell i. 206

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

clxxvii

Eoss v. Johnson

ii. 154

v. Knight

ii. 878

v. Parkyns

i. 174

v. Ross

ii. 701 ; iii. 72

v. Sadgbeer

ii. 891

v. Thwaite

ii. 484

v. Turner

i. 260

v. Welch

iii. 35

Ross's Ex'r v. McLauchlan's Ad. i. 467

Rosse v. Bramsteed ii. 167

Rossiter u. Chester ii. 215,419

v. Miller iii. 14

v. Rossiter i. 64, 69

v. Trafalgar Life A. i. 90

Roswell v. Vaughan i. 615

Rotch !>. Edie ii. 501

v. Hawes ii. 137

Rotoh's Wharf Co. v. Dudd i. 155

Roth v. Buffalo, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 212

17. Colvin i. 289

Rothery v. Munnings iii. 101

Rothschild v. Corney i. 296

v. Currie i. 313, 314

v. Michigan, &o. R. Co. ii. 203

Rothwell v. Humphreys i. 203

Rouch v. The Great Western Co. iii. 434,

454, 458

Rouquette v. Overmann i. 308, 313

Rourke v. White Moss Colliery Co. ii. 46

Rouse v, Ins. Co. ii. 531

Rousset v. Ins. Co. ii. 476

Routh v. Thompson i. 49 ; ii. 389, 474,

479, 480, 482

Routledge v. Burrell ii. 473, 521

v. Grant i. 527, 562

i). Ramsay ii. 471 ; iii. 72

Roux v. Salvador ii. 503, 506, 512

Rovena, The ii. 467

Rover, The, v. Stiles ii. 392

Row v. Dawson i. 251 ; iii. 300

u. Pulver ii. 24, 26

Rowan v. Kirkpatrick i. 136 ; iii. 422

Rowan's Appeal iii. 362

Rowe v. Bellaseys iii. 149

„. Brig ii. 437, 440

v. Galliers iii 449

v. Hamilton i. 406

v. Pickford i. 647

v. Stevens i. 94

v. Tipper i. 323

v. Ware i- 46

v. Young i. 309 ; ii. 770

Rowena, The ii- 216

Rowland v. Bull's Ex'rs iii. 143

v. State i. 130

Rowlandson, Ex parte i. 180

Rowley v. Ball i. 331

v. Bigelow i. 328, 643, 650 ; ii. 409,

937
v. Empire Ins. Co. ii- 543

v. Gibbs iii- H5, 217

... Houghton . ii- 370

v. Stoddard i- 27, 28

Rowning v. Goodchild ii- 155

Roworth v. Wilkes «• 342

VOL. i.

Rowton, Ex parte iii. 427, 438, 452

o. Willink iii. 357
Royal Bank of Scotland v. Cuth-

bert iii. 406

Royal Stewart, The ii. 404

Royal, &e. Co. v. Braham i. 153
Royalton v. The R. & W. Turnpike

Co. iii. 201

Royce v. Barnes ii. 883

Royster v. Johnson i. 228

Ruan v. Gardner ii. 483

Rubber Company v. Goodyear ii. 312, 321

Rucher v. Conyngham iii. 147

Ruchizky v. De Haven i. 362

Rucker v. Allnut ii. 535

u. Cammed er iii. 12, 13

(/. Donovan i. 642

v. Hannay iii. 69

ii. London Ass. Co. ii. 488

Ruckman v. Bergliolz i. 94

v. Bryan ii. 897

v. Cowell iii. 477

a. Merchant Ins. Co. ii. 397, 505, 507,

508

v. Mott ii. 420

v. Pitcher ii. 760

Rudd v. Planters Bank iii. 129

Rudder v. Price iii. 165

Rudderow v. Huntington ii. 373

Rudge v. Birch ii. 884

Ruding v. Smith ii. 698, 702, 729

Rudolph v. Wagner ii. 777

Rudston v. Yates ii. 829

Ruff ii. Bull iii. 102

Ruffin, Ex parte i. 227, 228, 240

Rufford, Ex parte iii. 468

Ruggles v. Bucknor ii. 423

ii. General Ins. Co. ii. 524, 525

v. Keeler ii. 721 ; iii. 104

v. Patten i. 309

Rugh v. Ottenheimer iii. 499

Rumball v. Metropolitan Bank ii. 936

Rumney v. Keyes i. 342, 394, 401

Rumsey v. Berry ii. 896

Rundale v. La Fleur ii. 829

Rundel ». Keeler i. 353

Rundell v. Murray ii. 339, 348

Rundle, Ex parte iii. 467

v. Moore i. 87, 353

Runquist ti. Ditchell i. 59; ii. 408

Runyan v. Caldwell ii. 134

v. Nichols i. 128

Runyon v. Montford i. 316, 320

Rupart v. Dunn i- 627

Rusby v. Scarlett i. 47, 48, 52

Ruse v. Mutual Ins. Co. ii. 607, 614

Rush v. Baker iii- 426

Rushforth v. Hadfield ii. 129, 672, 675

Rushton v. Crawley ii- 309

Rusk ii. Fenton i- 437

Russel v. Asa R. Swift, The ii. 385 i

v. Field ii- 864

u. Russel iii- 297

ii. Union Ins. Co. ii- 525

Russell v. Allard i. 549

I

clxxviii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Russell r. Babeock

ii. 7

v. Bell

iii. 439, 469

v. Branham

ii. 915

v. Brooks

i. 385

v. Buck

i. 474

i.. Carrington i. 564, 565, 567 ; ii. 146

v. Clark ii- 917

v. Coffin ii- 635

!>. Cowles ii- 66

v. De Grand i. 489 ; ii. 479, 481, 886

v. Doty iii- 464

v. Failor i. 32

v. Fillmore i. 612

v. Hankey i. 91

v. Langstafle i. 272, 306

v. Livingston ii. 178

v. Miller ii. 876

c. Nichols i. 595

u. Nicoll i. 566, 603, 604, 606, 780

v. O'Brien i. 568; ii. 395

v. Ormsbee ii. 784, 795

v. Palmer i. 529 ; iii. 204

< . Pellegrini ii. 845, 847

,-. Perkins ii- 520

v. Phillips i- 304

v. Pyland ii. 897

r. Skipwith i- 450

v. Slade iii. 41

v. AViggin i. 303; ii. 485

v. Woodward iii- 382

Rust v. Gott ii. 897

v. Larue i. 128 ; ii. 908

v. Nottidge ii. 49

Ruston v. Dun woody ii. 847

Rutenberg r. MaiD iii- 11

Rutgers v. Hunter i- 523

v. Lucet ii. 51, 110

Ruth, Er parte iii. 452

Rutherford v. Ruff i. 435 ; iii. 373

Rutland Bank v. Buck i. 292

Rutland Railroad v. Cole i. 65

Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. v.

Crocker ii. 635

Rutter r. Blake i. 636

Ryall v. Rolle ii. 128, 401, 443 ; iii. 427

Ryan t>. Cumb. Valley R. R. Co. ii. 46

v. Dorr iii. 3

v. Goodwin ii. 306, 307, 316

v. Hall ii. 683

v. Martin i. 132 ; iii. 169

v. Rand ii. 686

v. Sans i. 47, 404

v. Tondinson iii. 64

u. Trustees ii. 5

a. Ward iii. 749

v. Wilson i. 536

Eyberg v. Snell i. 328, 652 ; iii. 444

Ryder, In re i. 345, 347, 348

v. Hathaway iii. 213

v. Hulse i. 383

v. Mansell i. 541

v. Thayer iii. 205

r. Wombwell i. 337

Ryerson v. Eldred i. 540

Ryerss v. Farwell ii. 940

Ryland v. Smith
Ryle v. Brown
Ryram v. Hunter

iii. 437

iii. 316

i. 308

S.

Sabel v. Slingluff
Saccura v. Norton
Sackett v. Andross

c. Johnson
Saco v. Casanueva
Saeo Bank v. Sanborn

i. 381

ii. 848

iii. 385, 388

ii. 56

ii. 934

i. 319

Saddington v. Kinsman i. 381 ; iii. 437

Sadler v. Evans i. 85, 86

v. Henlock i- 113, 114

v. Hobbs i. 29

v. Leigh iii. 460

o. Nixon i. 31, 34, 184

p. Robins ii. 738

Sadlers' Ins. Co. u. Badcock ii. 476, 574

Sadlier v. Biggs i. 532

Safford v. McUonough iii. 50

v. Stevens ii. 836

Sage v. Brooklyn ii. 832

c. M'Guire ui. 348

v. Sleutz i. 579

v. Strong ii. 18

v. Wilcox i. 6, 471 ; ii. 7 ; iii. 17

Sageman v. Brandywine, The ii. 459

Sager o. Portsmouth, &c. R. R. Co.

ii. 174, 256, 259, 266

Sainsbury v. Jones i. 522; iii. 359

v. Matthews iii. 34

v. Parkinson i. 271

Saint v. Pilley i. 545

St. Alban Steamboat Co. v. Wilkins ii. 39,

792

St. Albans Bank i: Wood iii. 137

St. George v. Wake i. 411

St. Jago de Cuba ii. 381, 382, 459

St. John r. Am. Ins. Co. ii. 572, 573, 606

v. Benedict iii. 374

v. Diffendorf iii. 285

v. Garrow iii. 92

c. Purdy ii. 757

v Quitzlow i. 541

v. St. John i. 397

v. Van Santvoord ii. 230

St. John's Parish v. Bronson i. 388

St. Lawrence, The ii. 384

St. Louis Ins. Co. u. Glasgow ii. 573

St. Louis, &c. Co. v. Parker i. 59

St. Louis, &c. R. Co. v. Lamed ii. 227

St. Mary's Church, case of i. 160

St. Saviour's Churchwardens v.

Smith i. 260

Sainter v. Ferguson ii. 890; iii. 168, 174,

307
Salem Bank v. Gloucester Bank i. 42 ;

ii. 112

v. Thomas i. 203

Sales v. Western Stage Co. ii. 236

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

clxxix

Salisbury, In re

v. Hatcher

v. Howe

v. Marshall

v. Renick

v Stainer
Salkeld, Ex parte
Sallery v. Prindle
Salley Magee, The
Sallinger v. Simmons
Salmon v. Davis

v. Smith

v. Wooton

i. 149

iii. 386, 366

ii. 919

i. 632, 633

i. 317

i. 628

iii. 416

i. 304

i. 103; ii. 411

ii. 231

i. 210

i. 541

ii. 864

Salmon Falls Manuf. Co. v. Goddard

iii. 15

v. Tangier ii. 208, 415, 416, 427

Salomon v. Hathaway i. 580

Saloucci v. Johnson ii. 519

Salte v. Field i. 75, 653, 654

Salter v. Burt 1. 313, 321 ; ii. 783, 799

v. Ham i. 166

v. Kidley ii. 932

Saltmarsh v. Planters & Merchants

Bank iii. 153

v. Tuthill i. 289 ; ii. 900

Saltourn v. Houstoun ii. 642

Salt Springs Bank v. Burton i. 311

Saltus v. Everett ' i. 328 ; ii. 223

v. Ocean Ins. Co. ii. 418, 505, 510

Salvador v. Hopkins ii. 532

Samms v. Stewart ii. 178

Samon's case ii. 829, 830

Sampayo v. Salter ii. 413, 419

Sampson v. Clark iii- 478

v. Easterby ii. 642

v. 01) Iyer i. 130

v. Pattison iii. 378

v. Security Ins. Co. ii. 560

v. Smith ii. 465

Sams v. Stockton i- 337

Sam Slick, The ii. 384

Samson v. Thornton i. 274

Samuel, The ii. 437, 439, 443

o. Berger ii. 359, 363

v. Eoyal Ex. Ass. Co. ii. 488

Samuel Book, In re i. 354

San Antonio v. Lane i. 330

San Bernardo, The ii. 439

Sanborn v. Benedict i. 560

v. Fireman's Ins. Co. ii. 470, 544

v. Flagler iii- 9

v. French i. 466

v. Little i. 254, 258

v. Murphy ii. 838

Sander v. Hoffman ii. 893

v. Sander iii. 414

Sanders ». Branch Bank ii. 751

v. Etcherson ii. 16

v. Filley i. 498

v. Keber i. 579, 580

v. Knox ii- 762

v. Logan ii. 305, 325, 328

v. Pope iii- 327

v. Spencer ii- 160

v. Stuart iii- 193

Sanderson v. Aston
u. Bell
v. Bowes
u. Bradford
v. Busher

ii. 33

ii. 747 ; iii. 266

i. 309

iii. 409

ii. 408

v. Cockermouth & W. Ey. Co. iii. 309,

327

v. Graves iii. 38

v. M'Cullom ii. 474

v. Milton Stage Co. i. 219

v. Simonds ii. 474

Sandford v. Sandford ii. 91

Sandham, Ex parte i. 215

Sandiland, Ex parte i. 398

Sandilands v. Marsh i. 207, 215

Sandiman v. Breach ii. 634, 899

Sands v. Church iii. 132

v. Lyon ii. 783, 797, 799

v. Matthews i. 276

v. N. Y. Ins. Co. i. 78 ; ii. 601, 615

v. Sanders ii. 539

v. Taylor i. 574 ; iii. 225

Sanford v. Bulkley ii. 779

v. Dodd i. 492

v. Eighth Av. R. R. Co. ii. 246

u. Handy ii. 919

v. Hayes iii. 83

v. Mechanics Ins. Co. ii. 541, 546

v. Mickles i. 295, 296

v. Norton i. 284, 289

v. Raikes ii. 680

v. Trust Fire Ins. Co. ii. 540

Sanger v. Dun i. 90

v. Eastwood i. 612

San Jose Indiano, The i. 226

San6ee v. Wilson i. 572

Sansom v. Ball ii. 447

v. Rhodes ii. 794

Sappho, The ii. 428

Sapsford v. Fletcher ii. 873

Sarah, The ii. 440

Sarah Ann, The i. 78; ii. 397, 398

Sarah Starr, The ii. 382

Saratoga, The ii. 464

Saratoga R. R. o. Row ii. 923

Sard v. Rhodes ii. 819

Sargeant v. Butts ii. 898

Sargent v. Chubbuck ii. 78

v. Currier i. 616

v. Franklin Ins. Co. iii. 113, 209, 212,

220

v. Gile i. 578, 579

u. Graham ii. 776

v. Howe iii- 376

v. Lamed ii- 316

v. Seagrave ii. 305, 324

v. Southgate i- 290

Sari v, Bourdillon iii. 8

Sarratt v. Austin iii. 439

Sasportas v. Jennings i. 445

Sasscer v. Farmers Bank i. 320

Sasseen v. Clark ii. 161

Satterlee v. Frazer ii- 908

v. Groat ii- 178

v. Matherson iii- 506

clxxx

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Satterthwaite v. Mut. Ben. Ins. Ass.

ii. 558

Sauer v. Schulenberg ii. 75

Sauerwein v. Brunner iii. 1-7

Saul v. His Creditors ii. 698, 704, 706

Saulsbury v. Blandys iii. 329

Saunders v. Bartlett i. 108, 232 ; iii. 275

v. Frost ii. 776

u. Graham ii. 775

v. Hatternian ii. 915

v. Johnson i. 22

v. Smith ii. 337, 341, 348

v. Topp iii. 50

v. Wakefield i. 6 ; iii. 16, 18

v. Williams iii. 407, 409, 437

Saunderson v. Gregg iii. 458

v. Griffiths i. 49

v. Jackson i. 586 ; iii. 4, 7, 8, 18

v. Judge i. 310

t,. Marr i. 335, 337

v. Piper i. 281 ; ii. 693

v. Rowles iii. 416

Saurez v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co. ii. 506, 508

Savage v. Aldren i. 286

v. Carroll iii. 309, 348

v. Everman ii. 824

v. Howard Ins. Co. ii. 575

v. King i. 285

v. Rix i. 39, 56, 68, 73

Savage Man. Co. v. Armstrong i. 575

Savannah, &c. R. Co. v. Callahan iii. 172

Savary v. Clements ii. 466

v. Goe ii. 783

Saveland v. Green i. 51

Saville v. Robertson i. 195, 198

Savings Bank v. Bates i. 313

v. Ela ii. 29

Savory v. Stocking iii. 478

Savoury v. Chapman ii. 746

Saward v. Austey ii. 634

Savvin v. Guild ii. 316

Sawrey v. Rumney ii. 682

Sawtell v. Sawtell ii. 732

Sawyer, In re iii. 411

v. Coasters Ins. Co. ii. 518, 523, 525,

526

v. Cutting ii. 221

u. Dodge County Ins. Co. ii. 549

v. Fisher i. 557, 579

v. Gerrish iii. 267

v. Hammatt ii. 635, 666

v. Hoovey i. 290

v. Joslin i. 646

v. Maine Ins. Co. ii. 399

u. Mayhew i. 92

v. Mclntyre iii. 248

v. Patterson ii. 28

v. Tappan ii. 764

v. Turpin iii. 415, 421

o. Twiss i. 547

v. Wagstaff ii. 820

Say v. Barwick iii. 373

Sayer i>. Bennet i. 76, 223

//. Chaytor i. 11

Sayles v. Wellman ii. 905

Sayre v. Flournoy

i. 380

v. Frick

i. 312

v. Moore

ii.

334, 344

Sayward v. Stevens

ii.

413, 414

Scale v. Fothergill

ii. 834

Scales v. Anderson

i. 552

v. Universal Ins. Co.

ii. 597

Scampellini v. Atcheson

i. 382

Scanlan v. Geddes

iii. 15

v. Wright

ii. 692

Scaramanga v. Stamp

ii. 533

Scarborough v. Lyrus

ii. 401

v. Reynolds

i. 131

; ii. 825

Scarfe v. Morgan ii. 899, 907 ; iii. 261,

266
Scarman v. Castell ii. 44

Sceales v. Scanlan i. 617

Schank v. Schank ii. 91

Scheifflin v. Stevens i. 191

Schenck v. Schenck i. 136

Schenkl v. Dana i. 228

Schenley's Appeal i. 552

Schermerhorn v. Schermerhorn ii. 874,

875

v. Vanderheyden i. 458

Schieffelin v. Carpenter ii. 941; iii. 249

v. N. Y. Ins. Co. ii. 418, 517

v. Stewart i. 136, 137 ; iii. 422

Schilling v. Holmes i. 542

Schimmelpennich v. Bayard i. 4S

Schlesinger v. Stratton i. 581

Schley v. Lyon iii. 212, 2i6

Schlizzi r. Derry ii. 425

Schlosser's Appeal i. 245

Schmaling, Ex parte iii. 465

Schmalz v. Avery i. 69

Schmidlapp v. Currie i. 240

Schmidt i: Blood ii. 134, 153

i. Livingston i. 522

Schmitz v. Langhaar ii. 32

Schneider v. Cochrane i. 326

f. Foster i. 575

v. Heath i. 63, 634 ; ii. 3a4

v. Norris i. 586 ; iii. 8, 9

v. Provident Life Ins. Co. ii. 817

v. Schifiman i. 274, 275, 283, 876

Schnewind v. Hacket ii. 853

Schnitzer v. Oriental Works i. 628

Schnuckle v. Bierman i. 396

Schoch v. Garrett ii. 51

Schofield v. Corbett ii. 876

Scholefield v. Eichelberger i. 223, 226, 316

Scholes v. Murray, &c. Co. ii. 712

Scholey v. Goodman i. 399

Schollenberger v. Nehf i. 284

Schomer v. Hekla Ins. Co. ii. 543

Schomp t>, Schenck ii. 908

Schondler v. Wace iii. 435

School Dist. o. Bragdon i. 356

Schoole v. Noble ii- 875

Schoonover v. Rowe iii- 180

Schopn.an v. B. & W. R. R. Co. ii. 184,

232
Schotsmans v. Lancashire R. R. Co. i. 679,

642, 650

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

clxxxi

Schreger v. Carden

ii. 773

Scott v. Rivers

ii. 874

Schroeder v. Harvey

i. 301, 558

v. Scholey

iii. 441

v. Johns

iii. 100

v. Scott

i. 616 ; ii. 7

Schroepel v. Hopper

iii. 338

v. Seymour

ii. 718

Schroeppel v. Corning

iii. 137

v. Shepherd

iii. 195

Schroyer v. Lynch

ii. 154, 155

v. Simons

i. 542

Schuehardt !>. Aliens

i. 62, 563

o. Stanford

ii. 336, 342, 344

Schultz v. Pacific R. R.

Co.

ii. 47

v. Surman

iii. 301, 424, 438

Schumitsch v. American Ins. Co. ii. 555

Schurmeier v. St. Paul, &c. R. R. Co.

iii. 484

Schuyler v. Hoyle i. 381

v. Russ i. 617, 634

v. Van Der Veer ii. 829

Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Moore ii. 633

Schwabacker v. Ri Idle i. 209

Schwartz v. Germania Ins. Co. ii. 014

v. Gilmore i. 115

v. U. S. Ins. Co. ii. 481

a. Yearly i. 110

Schwartzel v. Holenshade ii. 328

v. Holenshall ii. 327

Scioto, The ii. 428, 429, 430

Scofield v. Day ii. 715

v. Tompkins iii. 172

Scorell v. Boxall iii. 35

Scotia, The ii- 435

Scotland, The ii. 435, 455

Scott, In re iii. 411

v. Alexander i. 318

v. Avery ii. 845, 846

a. Barnes ii. 827

v. Bevan i- 328

v. Billgerry iii. 304

v. Bourdillion ii. 667

v. Buchanan i. 335, 366, 367

v. Bush iii- 38

v. Caruth i. 185

v. Chester Valley Bank ii. 99

o. Colmesnil i. 189, 191

v. Corporation of Liverpool ii. 431

u. Crane ii. 103

v. Fisher ii- 763

v. Franklin iii- 281

v. Godwin i- 14, 23

v. Haddock iii. 102, 103

v. Harmon "• 908

v. Irving ii- 672, 67o

v. James '• 380

v. Jester iii- 285

v. Kittanning Coal Co. ii- 648

v. Lewis «>■ W®

v. Libbey "• 415, 425

v. Lifford '■ 319

v. Littledale "• 92°

v. Lloyd iii- H6. 149

v. Miller "• 453

v. Nesbit ii. 887 ; iii. 136

a. Nichols iii- 98

v. Pettit '• 648

v. Pilkington "• 872

v. Plymouth, The «• 392

v. Porcher i. 248; iii. 301

«■ ^y .!!■ 764

v. Rayment ni. i^

v. The Eastern Counties Rail-
way Co. iii. 49
v. Thompson ii. 533
v. Trent ii. 746
v. White iii. 29
Scotthorn v. South Staffordshire R. R.

Co. ii. 214, 231, 232

Scottin v. Stanley ii. 391

Scottish Mar. Ins. Co. v. Turner ii. 507,

610

Scouton v. Eislord i. 463, 464

Scoville v. Griffith ii. 198

v. Tolland ii. 335

Scrace v. Whittington i. 129

Scranton, The ii. 435

v. Baxter ii. 118

v. Clark i. 616

Screws v. Roach i. 560

Scribner v. Collar i. 94

v. Fisher iii. 508

Scrimshire v Alderton iii. 439

o. Scrimshire ii. 726, 729

Scripps v. Reilly iii. 183

Scripture v. Lowell Ins. Co. ii. 569, 571

Scruggs v. Gass i. 302 ; ii. 754

Scrugham v. Carter i. 234; iii. 218

Scudder v. Andrews i. 495

v. Balkam ii. 383

v. Bradbury i. 568

v. Bradford ii. 444, 449, 450

v. Union Bank ii. 712

Scull v. Briddle ii. 398

Scully v. Kirkpatrick iii. 400

v. Scully iii. 362

Scurry v. Freeman iii. 134

Seaborne v. Blackston ii. 746

v. Maddy i. 340

Seabury v. Hungerford i. 274

Seacord v. Burling i. 280

v. Miller i. 317

Seago v. Martin « i. 51

Seagood v. Meale ii. 77 ; iii. 14, 32

Seagraves v. City of Alton i. 154 , ,

Sea Ins. Co. v. Fowler ii- 484

Sea Lark, The "• 382

Seaman, Ex parte }]}■ 467

v. Aschermann iii- 323

v. Fonereau i. 78 ; ii. 524

v. Vawdrey ijj- 358

Seamans v. Loring ii- 532

Seamore v. Harlan iii- 240

Sea Reuter, The }}■ 388

Searle v. Adams iii- 1">

a. Keeves iii- 48, 444

v. Laverick ii- 149

v. Scovell »• 418

Sears v. Bags of Linseed ii- 407

clxxxii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Sears v. Brink iii. 17

v. Giddey i. 393

v. Lyons iii. 183

v. The City of Boston ii. 709, 710, 711 ;

iii. 301

v. Vincent ii. 820

v. "Wills ii. 407, 413

v. Wingate ii. 410

Searsburgh T. Co. v. Cutler ii. 942

Seaton v. Benedict i. 387, 388, 390 ; ii. 772

o. Booth i. 26, 525

v. Henson i. 27

v. Mapp iii. 338

v. Scoville i. 279

v. The Second Municipality iii. 198

Seaver v. Coburn i. 68

v Morse ii. 39, 41, 43

v. Phelps i. 434

Seawell v. Henry ii. 753

Seccomb v. Provincial Ins. Co. ii 534

Seckel v. Scott i. 564

Secomb v. Nutt i. 640

Secombe v. Edwards ii. 629

Security Bank v. Bank of Republic i. 301

v. Cushman i. 83

u. McDonald i. 210

Security Ins. Co. u. Gober ii. 615

Seddon v. Senate ii. 026

Sedgworth v. Overend ii. 748

Seed v. Higgins ii. 310

v. Lord i. 580

Seeger v. Pettit i. 545

Seeley v. Bishee i. 308

o. Bishop ii. 665

r. Engell i. 329

v. Fisher ii. 337

Seers v. Fowler ii. 660

v. Turner ii. 863

Segar v. Edwards i. 88

Segars v. Segars iii. 38

Segura v. Keed ii. 416

Seidenbender v. Charles i. 489

Seignior and Wolnier's case i. 63

Seigworth v. Leffel iii. 219

Seixas v. Woods i. 618, 622, 625

Seizo v. Provezende ii. 355, 370, 371, 375

Selby v. Eden i. 309

v. Hutchinson ii. 654

v. Selby iii. 6, 293

Selden v. Cushman iii. 187

v. Hendrickson ii. 403, 404

Seldon v. Tutop ii. 836

Selfridge v. Gill iii. 464

Selkrig v. Davies i. 169 ; iii. 406

Selleck v. French iii. 110, 111

v. Tallman iii. 332

Sellen v. Norman ii. 44, 53

Seller v. Work ii. 108

Sellers v. Dugan ii. 901

Sellick v. Addams ii. 837

Selser v. Brock ii. 9

Selway v. Fogg ii. 161, 922

v. Holloway ii. 193

Selwood v. Mildmay ii. 681, 682

Selwyn's case ii. 613

Seminary v. McDonald i. 161

Semmes v. City Ins. Co. ji. 601

Semple v. Cornewall iii- 115

Seneca County Bank v. Neass i. 319, 320

v. Schermerhorn iii. 116

Senior v. Armytage i. 537, 544 ; ii. 669,

678

Sentance <\ Poole i. 436

Sergeson v. Sealey i. 438

Servante v. James i. 13

Sessions v. Moseley i. 266

v. Richmond iii. 143, 170

Seton v. Del. Ins. Co. ii. 509

v. Low ii. 522

v. Slade iii. 9, 312, 365

Settle v. St. Louis Ins. Co. ii. 533

Seventh Bank v. Cook i. 300

Seventh Ward Bank y. Hanrick i. 318

Severance v. Kimball i. 443

Severn v. Clerks ii. 642

Sewall v. Allen ii. 187

v. Fitch iii. 62

v. Henry ii. 035

v. Hull, The, of a New Ship ii. 383

v. Sewall ii. 93, 737

v. Sparrow ii. 849

u. V. S. Ins. Co. ii. 508, 512

Seward v. L'Estrange i. 225

v. Mitchell i. 478 ; iii. 39

Sewer v. Bradfield i. 12

Sexton v. Graham i. 565 ; ii. 146

v. Montgomery Ins. Co. ii. 542, 554,

555, 557, 560, 584, 586, 587

o. Pike i. 129 ; ii. 60

v. Wheaton i. 264, 410

Seybel v. Currency Bank i. 289

Seyds v. Hay iii. 284

Scyfert v. Bean i. 552

Seymour v. Brown ii. 142, 143, 145

v. Darrow ii. 757

v. Davis iii 49

v. Delancey i. 522; iii. 306, 316

v. Delaney i. 435

v. Fellows ii. 78

v. Gartside ii. 65

v. Marvin iii. 143

v. McCormick ii. 327

v. Minturn ii. 749

v. O'Keefe i. 568

v. Osborne ii. 304, 315, 317

i. Sexton ii. 765

v. Strong iii. 116

Shackel v. Rosier i. 485, 488

Shackelford v. Handley ii. 927

v. Morris iii. 153, 154

Shackleton v. Sutcliffe iii. 356

Shaddle v. Disborough iii. 372

Shaeffer v. Lee iii. 201

v. Sheppard i. 385

v. Sleade ii. 920

Shafer v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 543

Shaffer v. McKanna i. 248

v. Sawyer i. 579

Shaffer's Appeal i. 147

Shafher v. The State ii. 87

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

clxxxiii

Shakeshaft, Ex parte iii. 474

Shaler v. Trowbridge i. 187

Shamburg v. Ruggles i. 215

Shank v. Northern R. R. Co. ii. 47

Shannon v. Comstock ii. 423 ; iii. 208,

248
Shapley h. Bellows ii. 874, 875
v. Tappan ii. 487
Sharington v. Stratton i. 456
Sharke v. Roahde iii. 429
Sharkey v. Mansfield ii. 881
Sharman v. Brandt i. 94, 107; iii. 11
Sharp v. Brice iii. 187, 188
v. Conkling i. 25
v. Gibbs ii. 521
v. Grey ii. 242, 243
v. New York i. 79
v. Nowell ii. 834
v. Parks i. 556
v. Rhiel iii. 40
i'. Tavlor ii. 700; iii. 374
v. Teese i. 489
v. Thompson ii. 646
v. "Wright iii. 311
Sharpe v. Kelley ii. 940
v. Roahde iii. 435
Sharpley v, Hurrel ii. 402 ; iii. 147
Sharrod v. Lond. & N. Western Rail-
way Co. i. 114
Shattuck v. Lawson i. 184
Shaughnessy v. Fogg i. 127
Shaw, Ex parte iii. 419, 420
v. iEtna Ins. Co. ii. 561
v. Allen iii. 75
v. Arden i. 110, 128
v. Badger ii. 792
v. Batley iii. 458
v. Berry i. 146; ii. 156
v. Boyd i. 360
v. Cooper ii. 305, 306
a. Farnsworth i. 538
v. Finney iii- 13
v, Fisher i. 522 ; iii. 325
v. Gookin ii. 877
v. Hoffman i. 548
v. Holland iii. 220
v. Jakeman iii. 471
v. Kay i. 537
v. Knox i- 275
v. Leavitt ii- 685, 686
v. Loud i- 32
v. M'Combs ii- 898
v. McGregory i. 200, 215, 245
v. Mitchell iii- 438, 456
v. Nudd i. 46, 123 ; iii. 220
< v. Picton ii- 763
v.Pratt i. 27, 210; ii. 765
v. Railroad Co. i- 331
v. Reed >• 306
a. Rep. Ins. Co. "• 614
v. Robberds ii. 547, 548, 573
v. Robbins iii- 393, 394
v. Shaw iii- 63
v. Sherwood i- 31
v. Spencer i- 329

Shaw v. Stone

i. 104

v. Thackray

iii. 373

v. Thompson

i. 390

v. Turnpike Co.

ii. 813

v. White

iii. 239

v. Wilkins

iii. 242

p. York & N. M. Ry.

Co.

ii. 268

Shawe v. Felton

ii. 488

Shawhan v. Van Nest

i. 664;

iii. 224,
225

Sheahan v. Barry

ii

73, 810

Sheahy v. Adarene

iii. 43

Shearer v. Handy

ii.

827, 828

v. Shearer

i.

168, 227

Shearman v. AkinB

i. 441

Shed v. Brett

i.

311, 322

v. Pierce

i. 28

Shedd v. Wilson

i. 237

Shee v. Hale

i. 538

iii. 449

Sheehan v. Davis

i. 125

Sheehy v. Mandeville

i. 12

; ii. 757

Sheerman v. Thompson

i. 485

Sheffield v. Page

ii. 464

She f tall v. Clay

iii. 69

Shelby v. Guy

ii. 723

iii. 106

Shelden v. Bennett

ii. 762

v. Robinson

ii. 179

Sheldon v. Benham

i. 321

; ii. 687

v. Capron

i. 525

v. Conn. Ins. Co.

ii. 616

u. Cox

i. 558

v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. ii. 542, 553

v. Haxtun iii. 123, 128

. Kendall i. 55 ; ii. 884

v. Newton i. 356

Sheldon Co. v. Eickmeyer Co. ii. 941

Shellenbarger v. Blake ii. 71

Shelley v. Wright ii. 931

Shelling v. Farmer ii. 836

Shelton v. Gill iii. 136

v. Homer i. 95

v. Livius i- 524

v. Pendleton i. 388, 402, 403

v. Sherfey i. 329

v. Springett i. 341, 344, 351

v. Tiffin ii. 709

v. Tutt ii- 167

v. Walker iii. 419

Shepard, Ex parte iii. 467

v. Hawley i. 211, 312, 321

v. Milwaukie Gas. Co. iii- 199

v. Ward ii. 746

v. Watrous i- 444

Shepherd, Ex parte iii. 468

v. Bevin iii. 314, 316, 318

v. Chamberlin i- 311

v. Chewter ii- 536

v. Conquest ii- 338

v. Hampton iii- 220

v. Harrison i- 579; ii. 412

v. Johnson iii- 212, 220

v. Kain i. 624, 635 ; ii. 394

v. Kottgen ii- 444

v. Mackoul i. 402, 403

v. Percy i- 93

olxxxiv

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Shepherd v. Pybus
v. Sawyer

i. 630

; ii. 393
ii. 890

o. Taylor

ii. 412

v. Temple

v. Union Ins. Co.

i. 623
ii. 575

Shepley v. Davis
v. Waterhouse

i. 566
iii. 88

Sheppard v. Boggs
v. Doolan

iii.

i. 172
323, 335

v. Stites

ii. 829

Sheppards ;■. Turpin
Sherburne v. Shaw

iii. 382
iii. 14

Sheridan v. Brooklyn R. R. Co. ii. 240

<.. Carpenter ii. 853

v. The New Quay Co. ii. 218

Sheriff;;. Potts ii. 534

Sherman v. Ballou ii. 873

v. Barnard i. 486

v. Buffalo Bayou R. R. Co. iii. 107

v. Champlain Trans. Co. i. 617 ;

ii. 37, 38, 43 ; iii. 43

v. Clark i. 320

v. Dutch i. 553

v. Fair ii. 577

v. Hudson River R. Co. ii. 196, 210

v. Rochester & Syracuse R. R. ii. 46

v. Rugee i. 646

v. Wakemari iii. 72

v. Williams i. 531

v. Withers iii. 95

Sherratt v. Bentley ii. 645

Sherrill v. Hopkins iii. 397, 404

Sherrod v. Langdon i. 178

Shersby v. Hibbert ii. 468

Sherwood v. Agricultural Ins. Co. ii. 577

v. Gen. Mut. Ius. Co. ii. 499

v. Marwick i. 209

v. Robins i. 582

v. Sutton iii. 107

Shields v. Fuller i. 227

v. Ohio iii. 487

u. Pettee i. 595, 597, 600, 636;

iii. 222

v. Wash. & N. O. Tel. Co. ii. 279, 301

r. Yonge ii. 46

Shiells v. Blackburne ii. 114, 115

Shift v. La. State Ins. Co. ii. 637

Shiffner v. Gordon ii. 880

Shileock v. Passman i. 126

Shillibeer ». Glyn i. 477 ; ii. 110

Shilling v. Accidental Death Ins. Co.

ii. 606

Shimer v. Jones ii. 27

Shindler v. Houston iii. 46, 49

Shipherd v. Underwood i. 85

Ship Lavinia v. Barclay i. 84

Shipman v. Horton i. 334, 362

Shippey v. Derrison iii. 4

v. Eastwood ii. 900, 905

v. Henderson i. 463

Shipton v. Casson ii. 655, 792

v. Thornton ii. 417, 418, 510

Sliirland v. Monitor Iron Works Co. i. 94

Shirley v. Shirley iii. 9, 295

v. Stratton iii. 370

Shirtz v. Shirtz
Shisler v. Vandike
Shitler v, Bremer
Shitz v. Dieffenbach
Shober v. Hauser

iii. 239

i. 301

iii. 75

iii. 432

iii. 116, 127

Shoe & Leather Bank v. Dix i. 58

Shoecraf t v. Bailey it 162

Shoemaker v. Benedict iii. 89

i. Hinze ii. 99

v. Keeley iii. 454, 465

Shoemaker, &e. Co. v. Bernard i. 215

Shoenfleld v. Fleisher i. 103

Shook v. State ii. 27, 30

Shore r. Bentall ii. 495

o. Lucas i. 640

v. Wilson ii. 632, 686, 691, 696

Shorey v. Rennell '*. 465, 466

Short v. Home Ins. Co. ii. 544

v. McCarthy iii. 99

v. New Orleans i. 247

«. Skip with i. 93, 97

a. Stone ii. 69, 71, 799, 800, 809

v. Stotts ii. 64, 68

Shorter v. Smith iii. 490, 494

Shortrede v. Cheek iii. 17

Shotwell v. Miller i. 211

u. Murray iii. 355

v. Wendover iii. 215

Shreeves v. Allen i. 289

Shreve v. Brereton iii. 169

v. Joyce i. 146

Shreves v. Leonard iii. 99

Shrewsbury v. Blount ii. 917

Shrewsbury & B. Ry. Co. v. Lon. &

N. W. Ry. Co. iii. 374

Shrimpton v. Laight ii. 375

Shroyer v. Richmond ii. 934

Shubrick ?\ Salmond i. 456

Shucardt v. Aliens i. 563

Shuck v. Wight iii. 126

Shuey r. United States i. 513

Shufeldt v. Pease i. 557

Shuler v. Millsaps ii. 74

Shultz v. Elliott i. 640

v. Ohio Ins. Co. ii. 517

Shumway v. Reed ii. 757

v. Stillman ii. 740

Shurlds v. Tilson i. 191

Shurtleff v. Millard i. 355, 361

Shute r. Dorr iii. 41

v. Taylor iii. 168, 173

Shutt'ord c. Borough iii. 97

Shuttleworth v. Bruce i. 257

Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co. i. 109

v. Hill ii. 523, 526

Sibley v. Aldrich ii. 160

v. Fisher ii. 860

v. Hayward iii. 273

v. Holden ii. 634

v. Lumbert iii. 84

v. McAllaster i. 32

v. Tie i. 563

Sibly v. Tutt i. 327

Siboni v. Kirkman i. 145, 146; ii. 664

Sibree v. Tripp i. 249 ; ii. 761

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

clxxxv

Sice v. Cunningham

i. 306

Simons ». G. W. Ry. Co.

ii. 257

Sicklemore v. Thistleton

ii. 633

u. Johnson

ii.

634, 851

Sickles v. Borden

ii. 311, 328

Simpson, Ex yarte

iii. 462

o. Carson

ii. 88, 98

v. Bloss

ii. 886

u. Gloucester Man. Co.

ii. 315, 325

v. Charleston Ins. Co.

ii. 501

u. Mather

iii. 79

v. Clayton

i. 25

u. Mitchell

ii. 325

v. Crippin ii

660

; iii. 223

v. Pattison ii

. 39, 649, 653

v. Fogo

ii. 872

v. The Falls Co.

ii. 311

v. Fullen wider

iii. 129

v. Youngs

ii. 324

v. Hand

ii. 429

Sidaways v. Todd

ii. 153

v. Hanley

ii. 874

Siddall v. Rawcliff

ii. 752

u. Hart

ii. 874

Sidwell v. Evans

i. 471, 472

u. Hawkins

i. 526

v. Mason

iii. 75

a. Henderson

ii

683, 691

Siebert v. Spooner

iii. 441

v. Henning

iii. 411

Siebert's case

ii. 338

i'. Ingham

ii

764, 766

Sievewright v. Archibald

i. 585, 586,

v. Leech

i. 170

591

v. London, &c. R. Co.

iii. 197

Siewert v. Hamel

iii. 123

v. Nicholls

ii. 906

Siffken v. Wray

i. 644

v. Pacific Ins. Co.

i. 296

Siffkin r. Walker

i. 194

v. Potts

i. 635

Sigerson v. Matthews

i. 325

o. Robertson

i. 339

Sigourney i». Drury

iii. 88, 90

u. Sadd

iii. 334

v. Lloyd

i. 286

u. Simpson

ii. 91

v. Munn

i. 168, 229

u. Stackhouse

ii. 860

Sikes v. Johnson

i. 356

i/. Turney

i. 323

Sill v. Worsvvick

iii. 406

v. Vaughn

i. 30

Sillem v. Thornton ii.

542, 545, 548

v. Warren

iii. 133

Sillick v. Booth

ii. 613

v. Wilson

ii. 321

Silliman v. Fredericksburg, &c. R. Co.

Simpson College v. Bryan

i. 483

i.01

Sims v. Bond i. 66

; a

883, 938

Silsbee v. Ingalls

iii. 21

v. Brittain

ii. 389

Silsbury v. McCoon ii.

145 ; iii. 215

v. Brutton

i

203, 215

Silsby v. Foote

ii. 308, 322

v. Chance

ii. 134

Silva v. Low

ii. 527, 533

u. Clarke

ii.

753, 754

Silver Lake Bank v. Harding ii. 744

v. Everhardt

ii. 945

Silverman v. Chase

i. 245

v. Gondelock

iii. 98

Silvernail v. Cole

i. 467, 471

v. Gurney ii. 444,

445,

448, 449

Silveus v. Porter

i. 166

v. Howard

ii. 415

Silvey v. Sumner

i. 541

v. Hutchins

iii. 63

Silvis v. Ely

i. 470

o. Rickets

ii. 78

Simerson v. Branch Bank

i. 570

v. Sims

i. 263

Slmmonds v. Swaine

ii. 831, 835

v. Willing i.

195

196, 198

Simmons v. Almy i

129; iii. 285

Simson v. Cooke

ii. 21, 766

u. Cincinnati Sav. Soc.

i. 263

v. Jones

i. 481

„. Clark

ii. 818

Sinard v. Patterson

ii. 822

o. Law

ii. 232

Sinclair, In re

ii. 455

v. Simmons

ii. 77

v. Bank of S. Car.

iii. 99

v. South Eastern R. R. Co.

v. Bowles

ii.

653, 655

v. Swift

i. 562

v. Jackson

ii. 929

Simms v. Marryatt i

615 ; iii. 331

v. Pearson

. 114; :. l ■

v. Norris

i. 550

v. Richardson

ii. 12

Simon v. Barber

i. 347

v. Tarbox

iii. 183

c. Lloyd

ii. 820

Singer v. Kelly

i. 243

u. Miller

ii. 166

v. McCormick

ii. 39

v. Motivos

iii 12, 59

v. Walmsley ' ii. 304,

308,

315, 317

Simond v. Boydell

ii. 480

Singleton v. Bolton

ii.

362, 365

v. Braddon

i. 608

v. Hilliard

ii. 672

Simonds v. Catlin

iii. 12

v. Kennedy

iii. 186

v. Clapp

i. 62

u. Lewis

iii. 161

v. Hodgson

ii. 402, 403

v. St. Louis Ins. Co.

ii.

606, 609

v. Strong

i. 192

Sinnot v. Davenport

ii.

386, 399

v. Union Ins. Co.

ii. 510

Siordet v. Hall

ii. 173

v. Walter

iii. Ill

Sipperly v. Stewart

ii. 114

v. White ii.

444, 451, 452

Sir Wollaston Dixie's case

iii. 135

clxxxvi

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Sissons v. Reynolds

ii. 909

Sloop Mary, The

iii. 147

Sistare v. Cushing

i. 219

Sloper v. Fish

iii. 435

Siter v. Morrs

ii. 565

Slossom v. DufE

iii. 118

Sivewright v. Archibald i

508 ; iii. 13

Slubey v. Heyward

.564, 646; in !■'>

v. Richardson

i. 92

Sluby v. Champlin

iii. 69

Skaggs v. Emerson

i. 542

Slutz v. Desenberg

i. 558

Skeate i\ Beale

i.

445, 4G5

Slumway v. Cooper

i. 150

Skeels v. Chickering

ii. 831

Sly v. Edgley

i. 114

Skelton v. Brewster

ii. 11

Slyhoof v. Flitcraft

ii. 863

v. Dustin

i. 303

Small c. Atwood

i. 621

Skidmore v. Desdoity

ii.

495, 497

v. Browder

i. 258

Skillen v. Waterworks

i. 536

v. Currie

ii. 19

Skillings v. Coolidge

ii. 835

v. Gibson

ii. 528, 531

Skingly, In re

i. 536

v. Moates

i

651; ii. 417

Skinner v. Dayton

i

122, 220

u. Oudley

iii. 382, 383

b. Gunn

i. 62

u. Owings

iii.

310, 346, 347

c. Hall

ii. 227

v. Robinson

iii. 258

v. London, Brighton, &

South-

v. Quincy

ii. 790

coast Ry. Co.

ii.

135, 239

v. Small

ii. 91

v. M'Douall

iii. 345

v. Stagg

iii. 273

v. Somes

i.

254, 255

Smalley v. Greene

ii. 893

v. Stocks

i. 65

r. Smalley

iii. 181

v. Upshaw

ii. 220

Smallpiece v. Dawes

i. 391

v. Western Ins. Co.

ii. 509

Smart v. Batehelder

i. 564

Skinner's Appeal

i. 3b2

v. Harding

iii. 37

Skip, Ex parte

iii

136, 465

v. Sandars

i. 74

77, 104, 108

Skipp v. Eastern Counties R.

Co

ii. 46

Smedburg v. More

iii. 342

Skrine v. Hope, The

ii. 388

Smedes v. Bank of Utica

i. 91; ii. 112

Slack v. Brown

ii. 772

Smedley v. Felt

ii. 610

Slackhouse v. O'Hara

i. 131

Smethurst v. Mitchell

i. 60

Slade r. Arnold

ii. 900

i'. Woolston

iii. 211,220

Slater, Ex parte

i. 211

Smilax, The

ii. 403

v. Irwin i. 83;

iii.

260, 293

Smiley v. Bell

i. 251

v. Lawson

iii 87

Smillie r. Quinn

ii. 609

v. Magraw

11

; ii. U04

Smith, Ex parte i. 126,

224,

551; iii. 421,

u. Sherman

iii. 188

468, 471

Slater Ins. Co. v. Barstow

ii. 5:19

In re i

235

iii. 434, 506

Slatterie v. Pooley

ii. 938

Re

iii. 416

Slaughter v. Green

ii. 142

r. JEtna Ins. Co.

ii. 592

v. McRae

iii. 227

v. Algar

i. 470, 472

Slaymaker v. Irwin

i 608

v. Allen

i. 411, ••'<■■: ii ;m

Sleat v. Flagg

ii.

261, 273

v. Appleton

iii. 484

Sleath v. Wilson

ii. 247

o. Arnold

iii. 14

Sleech v. Thorington

i. 382

v. Atlantic M. F. Ins. Co

ii. 863, 864,

Sleeper v. Paige

iii. 106

866

Sleight v. Hartshorne

ii. 666

v. Ayer

i. 83

Slim v. Northern Railway Co

ii. 256

r. Babeock

ii. 927

Slingerland v. Morse ii. 103,

786, 788 ;

v. Barker

i. 232

iii. 27

v. Barrow

i. 184, 185

Slingsby's case i. 13, 14, 15, !

v. Bartholomew

i

. 467 ; ii. 823

Slipper v. Stidstone

iii. 469

v. Bates

ii. 635

Sloan v. Gibson

i. 458

c. Bean

ii. 906

v. R. F. & M. Co.

ii. 941

„. Bell

ii. 515

a. Sommers

iii. 125

i'. Berry

i.

254 ; iii. 220

Sloane r. Cadogan

iii. .315

v. Bickmore

ii. 759, 887

v. Moore

i. 221

v. Birmingham Gas

Co.

i. 153, 154

Slocomb v. Lizardi

i. 222

v. Bishop

iii. 107

Sloconibe v. Glubb

i. 372

v. Bond's Heirs

iii. 105

Slocum v. Despard

ii. 663

v. Boston, &c. R. R.

Co.

ii. 275

v. Fsiirchild

ii. 268

r. Bouek

iii. 56

v. Hooker

i. 370

;>. Bourier

ii. 896

v. Seymour

iii. 36

o. Bowditch Ins. Co

ii. 541, 555

Sloeumb v. Holmes

iii. 95

o. Bowles

i. 645

Sloman v. Walter

iii. 174

c. Braine

i. 273, 286

Sloo v. Law

i. 131

c. Brotherline

i. 127

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

clxxxvii

Smith

th v. Brown ii.

686, 751, 823, 824 ;

iii. 391, 404

v. Bruning

ii. 80

v. Brush

iii. 119

v. Bryan

iii. 34

v. Buchanan

iii. 397, 406

v. Burnham

i. 174, 188

v. Campbell

iii. 382

v. Cedar Falls, &c

R. Co. i. 73

v. Chester

i. 300

v. Clark

i. 287 ; ii. 143

v. Cleveland

iii. 486

v. Coe

iii. 293

t.-. Coffin

iii. 426, 433, 435

v. Columbia Ins. Co. ii. 505, 655, 564

f. Collins

i. 200, 209

v. Condry i.

93: ii. 434; iii. 196

v. Cong. Meet. House in Lowell

ii. 655

v. Cook

ii. 149

v. Cragen

i. 195

v. Creole, The

ii. 468, 469

v. Crooker

ii. 857, 861

v. Dallas

i. 563; iii. 15

v. Dann

ii. 16

v. Davenport

i. 84; ii. 415, 456

v. Dawson

iii. 79, 95

v. Dearlove

ii. 164, 168

v. Demarest

ii. 828

v. De Silva

ii. 390

v. De Witt

i. 292

v. Dickenson

iii. 168

v. Dixon

i. 131

v. Downing

ii. 311, 312, 317

v. Dunlap

iii. 220, 233

v. Easton

ii. 298

v. Edwards

i. 213, 231

v. Ely

ii. 311

a. Empire Ins. Co

ii. 660

v. Estate of Steel

ii. 27

v. Evans

i. 200, 360, 361

v. Eield

i. 653

v. Finch

i. 284

v. Fisher

i. 318

v. Forty

iii. 83

v. Foster

i. 578

v. Fox

iii. 99

v. Frederick

ii. 636

v. Frost

ii. 149

v. Gibson

i. 338

v. Glens Falls Ins.

Co. ii. 587

v. Godfrey

i. 486 ; ii. 698, 700

v. Gordon iii

. 423, 424, 427, 446

v. Goss

i. 653; iii. 260

v. Gould

ii. 403

v. Green

iii. 219, 227

v. Greenlee

i. 527

v. Griffith

iii. 208, 222

v. Gugerty

ii. 793

v. Guild

ii. 940

v. Hathorn

iii. 119

v. Haverhill Ins. Co.

a. Haynes

ii. 789

v. Hay ward

ii. 37, 44

u. Healy

ii. 719 ; iii. 391

Smith v. Henry

i. 569

v. Hibbard

iii. 293

v. Higgins

ii. 314

v. Hill

iii. 102

v. Hiscock

i. 287, 289

v. Hodson

iii. 439, 478

v. Home

ii. 261

v. Hubbs

ii. 924

v. Hughes

i. 620

v. Hunt

i. 26

v. Hyde

ii. 60

v. Ins. Co.

ii. 563

u. Jackson

i. 169

u. Jameson

ii. 748 ; iii. 425

v. JefEryes

ii. 690

v. Johnson

i. 63 ; ii. 334, 828, 836 ;

iii. 361

v. Jones

ii. 761 ; iii. 12

v. Kelley

i. 368

v. Kingsford

ii. 44

v. Kittridge

i. 266

v. Knowlton

ii. 612, 613

v. Knox

i. 293 ; iii. 451

v. Lamberts

i. 131

r. Lascelles

i. 91, 93, 574

v, Lawrence

iii. 340

v. Lay

ii. 389

v. Lewis

ii. 737, 814

v. Little

i. 318, 322

v. Littlefield

i. 548

v. Lloyd

ii. 765

v. Lock

ii. 934

v. Loomis

ii. 781, 787 ; iii. 29

v. London, &c

R. R. Co. ii. 249

v. Love

i. 627, 628

v. Lowden

ii. 874

v. Lynes i. 557, 578, 579
v. Manufacturers Ins. Co. ii. 504, 506

v, Marrable i. 633

v. Marsack i. 300

v. Mawhood i. 489 ; ii. 894

v. Mayer iii. 219

u. Mayo i. 364, 370

v. McClure i. 311

v. McClusky ii. 872

v. McGowan ii. 856, 862

v. Mead ii. 700

v. Mec. & Traders Bank i. 289
v. Mercer i. 298, 300 ; ii. 308

v. Miller i. 296, 306

v. Milles iii. 426, 454

v. Mitchell ii. 916

v. Montgomery ii. 4

v. Moore i- 612

v. Morse i. 58, 506

v. Mullett i. 320

u. Myers i. 558, 597

v. Nashua & Lowell R. R. Co.

v. New York Cent. R. R. Co.
v. N. Y. & Harlem B. R. Co.
v. N. Y., &c. R. R. Co.
v. Nichols
v. Nicolls
v. Niles

.202,

214

ii. 256

ii. 268

ii. 232

ii. 737

ii. 737, 740, 743

ii. 144, 145

clxxxviii

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Smith v. Odlin ii. 470

v. Overby iii. 178

v. Oxford Iron Co. ii. 45, 47

u. Pacldmrst ii. 035

v. Parsons iii. 394, 507

v. Pekin, The ii. 459

v. Pettee i. 597 ; iii. 224

v. Philadelphia Bank i. 280

v. Philbrick i. 312

a. Phillips iii. 313

v. Pickering iii. 427, 452

v. Pierce ii. 182

v. Pittsburg Bank iii. 132

v. Plomer i. 385

l\ Plummer ii. 454

v. Pocklington i. ]2

v. Proprietors, &c. i. 154

v. Raleigh i. 542, 551

v. Ramsay iii. 476

v. Readfield i. 446

... Rice i. 627

c. Richardson iii. 207

v. Robertson ii. 512

v. Robinson iii. 123

v. Ryan iii. 80

v. Sanborn ii. 790
i'. Saratoga Co. Ins. Co. ii. 575, 577

u. Schroeder ii. 936, 937

v. Scott iii. 416

v. Seward ii. 181

v. Shaw i. 328

v. Shelden ii. 28

c. Sheldon i. 225

v. Shepherd ii. 171

o. Sherman ii. 74

!•. Simms iii. 82

v. Simonds i. 1 14

v. Sleap i. 86

v. Sloan i. 204
v. Smith i. 170, 265, 397, 460, 469 ;
ii. 51, 87, 736, 757, 784, 915, 937 ;
iii. 174, 349, 394, 397, 409
v. Sparrow
v. Spinolla
Spooner

l. 588; ii. 899, 905

ii. 719; iii. 391

i. 436, 439, 440

iii. 244

ii. 76, 852

ii. 578

ii. 46

i. 210

iii. 240

i

Sprague
. Stafford
. State Ins. Co.

Steele

Stone
. Strong
. Sullivan

Surman i. 571 ; iii. 6, 34, 35, 61, 60

. Swift
. Talcott

Tarlton
. Thompson
. Thorn
. Tracy
. Turner
. Underdunck

Van Loan
. Ware

Watson
, Weaver

ii. 468

i. 21

i. 171, 174

i. 128

iii. 72

i. 62, 78 ; ii. 60

iii. 335, 511

iii. 349

i. 292

i. 462

i. 166, 176

i. 512

Smith v. Weed

v. Westmoreland

v. Whiting

v. Wigley

v. Wilcox

v. Williams

i-. Wilmington

e. Wilson

v. Winter

v. Wolf

v. Wood

v. Woodflne

v. Wooding

v. Woodruff

v. Wright i. 176;

v. Wyckoff
Smith's Heirs v. Dickson
Smith Paper Co. v. Servin
Smitherman v. Smith
Smithson v. Garth
Smithurst v. Edmunds'
Smoot v. Rea
Smout v. Ilhery
Smuller v. Union Canal Co.
Smyley v. Head

r. Reese
Smyrl v. Niolon
Smyth, Ex parte

u. Craig

v. M'Mastera

v. Tankersley

v. Ward
Snaitli v. Gale
Snead v. Watkins
Sneathen v. Grubbs
Snedeker v. Warring
Snee v. Prescot
Sneed v. Ewing

v. Weister

v. Wiggins
Sneider v. Geiss
Snell !'. D wight

c. Foussat

v. Mitchell

v. Moses

v. Rich

b. The Independence
Snellgrove v. Bailey

v. Hunt
Snelling v. Lord Huntingfield

i. 473

iii. 82

i. 146, 322

ii. 766

ii. 900

i. 634

i. 145

ii. 424, 670, 678

i. 219; ii. 27

iii. 144

i. 228

i. 552

ii. 363

ii. 216, 447, 672

i. 272

i. 131

i. 546

ii. 821

i. 28

ii. 130

iii. 307

i. 70, 76

ii. 762

ii. 9

i. 393

ii. 172

ii. 652

i. 76

ii. 897

i. 183

i. 565

iii. 464

ii. 167

i. 565

i. 546

i. 642

ii. 726

ii. 766

ii. 793

ii. 159, 277

i. 175

ii. 742

iii. 335

i. 627

ii. 468

ii. 45

i. 266

iii. 426

ii. 49;

iii. 40

ii. 529

i. 463

iii. 48

iii. 104

i. 231

iii. 283

ii. 649

Snethen v. Memphis Ins. Co.

Snevily v. Read

Snider v. Thrall

Snoddy v. Cage

Snodgrass's Appeal

Snook v. Davidson
v. Fries
v. Hellyer ii. 826, 827, 848; iii. 427

Snow, In re iii. 466

u. Conant ii. 877

c. Eastern R. R. Co. ii. 277

v. Franklin ii. 824

v. Orleans i. 69

v. Perkins i. 322

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

clxxxix

Snow i>. Perry

ii.

753, 779

v. Ware

ii. 63, 655

?>. Warner

iii. 56

v. Wope

ii.

465, 466

Snowden v. Noah

ii

361, 378

v. Phoenix Ins.

Co.

ii. 520

t>. Warder

ii. 671

Snowdon v. Davis

i. 86, 496

Snowhill v. Snowliill

iii. 437

Snowman v. Harford

iii. 339

Snyder v. Farmers Ins.

Co.

ii.

541, 554

t>. Findley

ii.

917, 927

u. Reno

i. 272

v. Riley

i. 290

v. Sponable

i. 80

v. Vaux

iii. 215

!>. Wise

ii. 744

Soames v. Spencer

i. 592

Soares v. Rahn

ii. 404

Soblomsten, The

i. 129

Society in Troy v.

Goddard

i. 484

v. Perry

i.

482, 484

Society, &c. v. New

Haven

iii. 485

i). Wheeler i. 462 ; ii. 482, 511

Sogers v. Hackett i. 308

Sohier v. Easterbrook ii. 828

v. Loring i. 325

v. Norwich Ins. Co. ii. 569

Solarte v. Palmer i. 322

Soles v. Hickman iii. 309

Sollers, Ex pdrte iii. 438

Solly v. Forbes i. 27, 29, 210 ; ii. 851, 852

v. Rathbone i. 89, 102, 109

v. Whitmore ii. 535

Solomon v. Fitzgerald i. 167

o. Gregory ii. 27

v. Kimmel i. 457

Solomons v. Bank of England i. 272,

287 ; iii. 290

v. Jones iii. 127

v. M'Kinstry ii. 826, 836

v. Ross iii. 406

Soltau v. De Held iii. 331

Somerby v. Buntin iii. 56, 321, 343

Somers v. Pumphrey i. 433

Somerville v. Somerville ii. 701

v. Williams i. 313

Somes v. Brewer ii. 925

v. British Empire Shipping Co. ii. 382

v. Skinner ii- 925

v. Sugiue ii. 396, 397

Sommer v. Wilt iii- 183

Soome v. Gleen iii- 147

Sooy v. State i- 80

Soper v. Fry i. 206, 335

v. Soper "• 91

Sophie, The ii- 385

Sorbe v. Merchants Ins. Co. "• 484

Sorrelle v. Sorrelle ii- 877

Sorsbie v. Park i- 15, 16, 17, 23

Sortwell v. Hughes }_■ 486

Sottomayor v. De Barros ii- 726

Souch v. Strawbridge iii. 38, 43, 44, 63

Soulden v. Van Rensselaer iii- 92

South, Ex parte i- 246

Southampton v. Brown i. 498

Southard v. Porter i. 290

o. Rexford ii. 67, 71, 73

v. Steele i. 216

South Carolina Society v. Johnson ii. 18

Southcomb v. Bishop of Exeter iii. 342

Southcombe v. Merriman ii. 597

Southeote c. Hoare i. 15, 22

v. Stanley ii. 164

Southcote's case ii. 98, 121

South Eastern Railway Co. v. Knott

iii. 365

Souther, Re iii. 471

Southern v. How i. 617 ; ii. 351, 375

Southern Express Co. v. Moon ii. 270

c/. Newby ii. 265

u. Purcell ii. 260

v. Shea ii. 227

Southern Ins. Co. v. Booker ii. 616

v. Gray i. 65

v. Lewis ii. 559

v. McCain ii. 643, 617

Southern Life Ins. & Tr. Co. v. Cole iii. 57

Southern R. R. Co. u. Kendrick ii. 250

Southerne v. Howe i. 617

Southey v. Sherwood ii. 337, 347

Southorn v. Reynolds ii. 373

South Sea Co. v. Bumbstead ii. 842

v. Duncomb iii. 289

South Wales, In re i. 175

South Wales Railway Co. v. Wythes

iii. 327, 330, 360

Southwell v. Beezley i. 565 ; iii. 40

v. Bowditch i. 107

Southwestern Co. c. Stanard i. 564

South Western Freight Co. v. Plant i. 568,

578

Southwick v. Atlantic Ins. Co. ii. 559

v. Estes i. 114

v. The Clyde ii. 392

Southworth v. Smith ii. 777, 780

Southworth Bank u. Gross ii. 858

Soward v. Palmer ii. 770

Spafford v. Dodge ii. 426, 447, 451

Spain v. Arnott ii. 35, 38

v. Hamilton i. 257

Spalding v. Adams ii. 128

v. Dixon iii. 461

v. People iii. 478

v. Rosa ii. 805

v. Ruding i. 652

v. Vandercook i. 495 ; ii. 773

Spann v. Baltzell i. 319, 322

v. Mercer i. 387

Sparhawk v. Allen i. 150

v. Buell i. 334

v. Russell i- 239

v. Wills ii- 769

Sparkes v. Marshall ii. 476, 477

Sparkling v. Smith iii- 68

Sparkman v. Higgins ji- 305

Sparks ». Garrigues ii- 769

v. Kittredge ii- 446

v. Purdy "i- 210

Sparling v. Marks i. 617 ; iii. 223

cxc

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Sparr v. Wellraan ii. 277

Sparrow v. Caruthers ii. 488

Sparry's case ii. 863, 864

Spaulding v. Alford ii. 60

e. Bank of Muskingum iii. 116

v. Lord iii. 11:1

v. Preston i. 480

Spear v. Gardner i. 76

v. Hart iii. 18

v. Hartley iii. 256, 284

v. Hooper ii. 835

v. Newell ii. 670

v. Orendorf iii. 348

Spears r. Hartley iii. 108

Specht v. Commonwealth ii. 905

Speed v. Philips i. 406

Speer i\ Bishop i. 193

Speights v. Peters i. 221

Spelman v. Aldrieh ii. 78

r. Fisher Iron Co. ii. 48

Spence v. Chadwick i. 536, 607; ii. 215,

415

c. White ii. 875

Spencer v. Barnett iii. 293

u. Billing i. 213

v. Cone iii. 02

v. Daggett ii. 181

v. Durant i. 14, 2;i

v. Eustis ii. 466, 467

v. Field i. 56, 69

v. Harding i. 527

v. Harvev i. 308

v. Milwaukee, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 817

v. Tissue ii. 746

v. Wilson i. 7o

Spencer's case i- 261

Spensley v. Lancashire Ins. Co. ii. 669

Sperry, In re i. 238

v. Fanning i. 152

v. Horr i. 279

Spicer v. Cooper ii. 667

v. Earl i. 355

v. Norton ii. 12

Spiers v. Brown ii. 342, 343, 349

Spies v. Gilmore i. 284

i'. Joel iii. 382

v. Newberry i. 322

Spikes v. English iii. 184, 180

Spildt v. Bowles iii. 435, 454

v. Heath i. 600

Spiller, Ex parte iii. 420

j;. Scribner ii. 941

Spindler v. Greillet i. 300

Spinetti v. Atlas Steamship Co. ii. 183

Spires v. Hamot ii. 709

Spitzer v. St. Marks Ins. Co. ii. 471

Spong v. Wright iii. 75

Spooner v. Holmes i. 557

Spoor v. Holland iii. 216

Spotswood v. Barrow ii. 43

Spottiswoode r. Clarke ii. 348, 361, 378

Sprague v. Baker i. 260

v. Craig ii. 69, 70, 71

v. Hazenwinkle ii. 766

v. Quinn i. 548

Spreadbury v. Chapman i. 387

Sprigwell v. Allen i. 615

Spring v. Chase iii. 240

v. Coffin i. 492

v. Gray iii. 70, 94, 95, 96

v. Haskell ii. 455

v. So. Car. Ins. Co. ii. 475, 476 ;

iii. 382

Springer v. Foster iii. 394, 395

v. Hutchinson ii. 3

v. Springer i. 31

Springfield Bank v. Merrick i. 489 ;

ii. 886, 887

Sproatt v. Donnell ii. 448

Sprott v. Powell i. 140

Sproul v. Hemmingway i. 117

Sproule v. Ford iii. 211

Spruill v. N. Car. Ins. Co. ii. 602

Sprye v. Porter ii. 908

Spurrier v. Hancock iii. 340

Squier v. Hunt i. 572

v. Mayer i. 547

Squire v. Campbell iii. 331, 343, 345

v. Grevell ii. 834, 837

v. Tod i. 522

v. West. Un. Tel. Co. ii. 285, 300

v. Whipple ii. 49 ; iii. 41

Squires v. Whiskan ii. 897

Srodes v. Caren ii. 129

StaatH i'. Bristow i. 231

v. Howlett i. 206 ; ii. 21 ; iii. 17

v. Ten Eyck iii. 175, 240, 241, 242,

246

Stables v. Eley i. 192; ii. 247

Stacey v. Decy ii. 938

v. Franklin Ins. Co. ii. 493, 582, 583

Stache v. St. Paul Ins. Co. ii. 587

Stackpole v. Arnold i. 7, 56

v. Simon ii. 691

v. Symonds ii. 905

Stackwood v. Dunn ii. 938

Stacy v. Kemp ii. 903

v. Ross i. 506

Stadt v. Lill iii. 16

Stafford, In re i. 137

v. Bartholomew iii. 362

z>. Bryan iii. 75

v. Clark ii. 772

v. Newsom ii. 913

a. Richardson iii. 98

v. Roof i. 3t',J

Stagg, Ej- parte iii. 42! I

v. Eureka Co. i. 54' i

Stainback ;>. Bank of Virginia i. 4-

v. Rae ii. 42'.i

v. Read i. 42

Stainbank /■. Fenning i. 84; ii. 402, 403

Staines v. Plank iii. 462

v. Shore i. 526

Stainland v. Hopkins ii. 644

Stalker v. McDonald i. 292

Stamford Bank v. Benedict ii. 765

Stammers r. Macomb i. 38S

Stanard v. Eldridge iii. 2-14

Standen u. Chrinnas i. 530

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CXC1

Standish v. Ross

». Wliitwell
Standridge v. Standridge
Stanifortli v. Fellowes
Staniland v. Hopkins
Stanley v. Charaberlin

v. Gaylord

v. Jones

v, Kempton

it, Robinson

v. Stanley

v. Towgood
Stanley's Appeal
Stanly v. Duhurst

v. Hendricks
Stannus v. Stannus
Stansbury v. Fringer
Stansell v. Roberts
Stansfleld v. Johnson
Stanton v. Allen

v. Bell

v. Blossom

i. 496

ii. 302

ii. 734

iii. 469

ii. 644

i. 81

ii. 137

ii. 908

iii. 131

iii. 372

iii. 487

iii. 249

i. 150, 151

iii. 454

ii. 11 ; iii. 25

i. 293

iii. 333

iii. 298

iii. 12

i. 487

ii. 114

i. 32:;

v. Eager i. 328,653; ii. 411

v. Hall iii. 438

v. Henry ii. 837

v. Small i. 560, 561 ; iii. 224. 226

v. Wilson i. 336, 343, 347

Stanwood v. Rich ii. 627

Stapilton v. Stapilton i. 467; iii. 365

Staples v. Anderson i. 532

v. Emery i. 545, 547

Stapleton v. Conway ii. 716

v. Nowell ii. 772

Star Glass Co. v. Morey iii. 219

Starbuck v. New England Ins. Co. ii. 530

Stark v. Parker ii. 36, 39, 792

Stark Co. Ins Co. v. Hurd ii. 583

Starkweather v. Cleveland Ins. Co. ii. 576

u. Loring ii. 744

Starr v. Bennett ii. 915

v. Goodwin ii. 394

v. Pease iii. 236

v. Peck ii. 83, 85

v. Robinson iii. 504

v. Taylor i. 406, 407

i'. Torrey i. 290

v. Winegar ii. 146 ; iii. 213

Startup v. Cortazzi iii. 220

v. Macdonald i. 573, 580 ; ii. 783, 787

State v. Atherton i. 61

v. Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co. iii. 209

v. Bell Telephone Co. ii. 278

v. Campbell ii. 245

v. Clarke i- 334

v. Cook i. 343

v. Davis ii. 88

v. Dean _ ii. 106

v. Dunnavant ii. 628

v. Evans i. 569

v. Gaillard i. 457, 62T

v, Hallett ii- 709

v. Hawthorne iii- 611

v. Heyward iii- 486

v. Kreider ii- 863

v. Litchfield ii. 284

State v. Mathews

ii. 155

v. Miller

ii. 85

v. Neal

i. 209

v. Patterson

ii. 726

v. Phalcn

iii. 511

v. Reynolds

ii. 24, 26

v. Richmond

i. 336; iii. 415

v. Rosenfeld

i. 570

v. Spartanburg

i. 62

v. Sterling

iii. 611

v. Suheer

ii. 900

i\ Torinus

i. 99

State Bank v. Bank of the Capitol i. 63

v. Cowan iii. 139

u. Fox i. 161

u. Hastings i. 253

u. Hunter iii. 143

!>. Littlejohn ii. 822

v. Seawell iii. 103, 104

v. Slaughter i. 321

e. Welles ii. 754

u. Wilborn iii. 388

u. Woody iii. 82, 83

State Ins. Co. v Maackens ii. 577

v. Roberts ii. 475, 577

v. Todd ii. 587

State of New York v. Mayor ii. 274

State Treasurer v. Cross i. 482

Staton o. Kew iii. 369

Stavely v. Parsons iii. 449

Stavers ;>. Curling ii. 663

Stead i'. Davvber ii. 799

v. Nelson iii. 369

v. Salt i. 216

Steadman v. Duhamel ii. 942

Steamboat Co. v. Whillden ii. 434; iii. 184,

196

Steamboat New World v. King ii. 96, 238

Steam Nav. Co. v. Dandridge ii. 182

Stearnes v. Nevvson iii. 372

Stearns v. Barrett ii. 890, 892

v. Dean iii. 268

v. Doe ii. 456

,,. Felker ii. 908

v. Frearman i. 369

v. Haven i. 178, 212

v. Marsh ii. 129 ; iii. 216

v. Sampson ii 542

v. Swift iii. 239

Stebbins v. Globe Ins. Co. ii. 542, 553, 554

u. Edmunds i. 161

v. Leowolf ii. 783

v. Palmer i. 145 ; ii. 74

v. Sherman i. 463

v. Smith i. 473 ; iii. 21

Steckel i\ Bank ii. 113

Stedman v. Eveleth i. 161

v. Gooch i. 301

v. Western Transportation Co. ii. 270

Steel, Ex pane iii. 420, 422

v. Frick i. 531

v. Hoe iii- 17

v. Jennings i. 205

v. Lacy ii- 626

v. Smelting Co. ii. 938

cxcn

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Steel v. Steel ii. 52

v. Whipple iii. 129

Steele v. Harmer i. 163

v. Ins. Co. ii. 169, 566

v. Putney ii. 937, 943

u. Thatcher ii. 466

v, Townsend ii. 233

Steen v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. ii. 587

Steene v. Aylesworth iii. 441

Steers v. Lashley i. 293

Stegall v. Stegall i. 377

Steiglitz v. Egginton i. 52

Stein v. La Dow i. 201

Stein's case iii. 406

Steinback v. Ehinelander ii. 474, 480

Steiner v. Heald ii. 308

Steinhauer v. Witman ii. 929

Steinman v. Magnus ii. 751 ; iii. 477

v. Wilkins ii. 153

Steinweg v. Erie K. R. Co. ii. 186

Steman i>. Harrison i. 282, 498

Stemmer's Appeal i. 220

Stenburg v. Callanan i. 215

Stephens v. Australasian Ins. Co. ii. 484

v. Badcock i. 96

v. Baird ii. 938

u. Bales of Cotton ii. 4C6

v. Beal i. 380

v. Be Medina iii. 414

v. El wall iu. 434, 458

v. Farrar i. 129

v. Felt ii. 327

v. Olive i. 401

v. Peel ii. 372

v. Sole iii. 427

v. Squire iii. 25

v. Wilkinson i. 642

Stephenson ». Cady ii. 813

v. Dickson i. 318

v. Hall i. 351

v. Hardy i. 392

o. Hart ii. 224

v. Little iii. 214

v. Primrose i. 308, 317

v. Weeks i. 138

Steptoe's Adm'rs v. Harvey's Ex'rs.

iii. 116

Sterling v. Sinnickson ii. 79

Sterry v. Arden i. 460
Stetson v. Mass. Ins. Co. ii. 485, 489, 545,

561, 562

v. Patton i. 52, 72, 122

Stevens, Ex parte iii. 416

v. Adams i. 129 ; ii. 59

v. Armstrong i. 117, 119

v. Austin ii. 922

v. Bell iii. 382

o. Benton ii. 934

n. Blanchard ii. 292

v. Briggs ii. 749

v. Cushing ii. 815

v. Davis iii. 119, 145

v. De Conte ii. 361

v. Eno i. 566
v. Fuller i. 623 ; ii. 918

Stevens v. Gaylord

v. Gladding

v. Hartwell

v. Hauser

c. Hoy

v. Head

v. Jackson

v. Judson

v. Lincoln

v. Lyford

u. Park

v. Phoenix Ins. Co.

;;. Reeves

v. Robins

v. Robinson

t>. Stevens

v. Stewart

r. Strange

u. Warren

v. Webb

... Wilson
Stevenson v. Agry

v. Blakelock

v. Hart

v. Heyland

a. Kleppinger

v. Lambard

u. McLean

v. Montreal Tel. Co.

v. State

v. Watson
Steward v. Blakeway

o. Harding

u. Lee

v. Lombe

v. Winters
Stewart, Ex parte

v. Aberdeen

v. Alliston

v. Ball
Bell

ii. 852
ii. 330
iii. 194
iii. 428
i. 61
ii. 318
iii. 414
ii. 925
iii. 134
iii. 188
ii. 756

i. 155
ii. 672, 675

i. 107
ii. 915

iii. 37

iii. 49

i. 283

ii. 609

ii. 791, 806

i. 102
iii. 382
iii. 285
ii. 224

i. 292
ii. 660

i. 540
i. 514, 515
ii. 285, 301

i. 557
ii. 833

i. 183

i. 549
ii. 748

i. 569

iii. 328

iii. 416

ii. 669, 670, 675

i. 525
iii. 416
ii. 488, 524

v. Brooklyn, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 244

v. Brown ii. 774

u. Caldwell i. 203

v. Campbell ii. 11 ; iii. 26

v. Cass ii. 825

v. Donelly ii. 785

v. Dougherty i. 622

v. Drake iii. 242

r. Dunlop ii. 525

v. Edtlowes ii. 680 ; iii. 15

v. Greenock Marine Co. ii. 507

v. Harvard College ii- 47

v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. i. 95

v. Lehigh, &c. E. Co. ii. 187

v. Loring i. 493

v. Maddox iii. 184

v. Mather i. 109

i . McKean ii- 19

u. Moody iii. 441

i/. Morison ii- 622

v. Noble iii. 245

v. Parsons ii. 160

n. Sloper iii. 416

v. Smithson ii. 364

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CXC111

vart v. Spedden

iii. 102

v. Spenser

iii. 382, 403

v. Steele

ii. 517

v. Stewart

iii. 315, 354

v. Stimp8on

ii. 57

t>. Tenn. Ins. Co.

ii. 532

v. The State

i. 522

v. Trustees of Hamilton College i. 484

v. U. S. Ins. Co. ii. 882

v. Walker ii. 38

v. West India, &c. Co. ii. 450

v. Woodward ii. 882

Stickles v. Arnold ii. 833

Stickney v. Allen iii. 212

v. Jordan ii. 714

Stidham v. Matthews iii. 368

Stief v. Hart ii. 129

Stikeman v. Dawson i. 358

Stiles i\ Cbwper i. 254 ; ii. 939

v. Farrar i. 254

v. Granville i. 349

v. White ii. 916

Stilk v. Myrick i. 467

Still v. Hall ii. 879

v. Hoste ii. 695

Stilley v. Folger i. 408

Stillwell v. Craig i. 281

v. Staples ii. 474, 665

Stimpson ». B. & S. R. R. Co. ii. 315

v. The Railroads ii. 327, 328; iii. 176,

_ 185

Stinemets v. Ainslie iii. 464

Stinson v. Clark i. 570

v. Wyman ii. 454

Stirling v. Peet iii. 242

v. Vaughan ii. 489

Stitt v. Wardell ii. 534

Stoallings v. Baker i. 177

Stobie v. Dills i. 643

Stock v. Inglis ii. 489

v. Mawson iii. 477

Stockdale v. Dunlop i. 595, 601 ; ii. 561

v. Onwhyn ii- 337

v. Young iii. 237

Stocken v. Collen i. 514

Stocker v. Brockelbank i. 180

v. Harris ii. 534

Stocking v. Hunt iii- 507

v. Sage iii. 30, 206

Stockley v. Stockley i. 435; iii. 351, 373

Stocks v. Dobson j- 258

v. Van Leonard iii- 107

Stockton v. Frey ii. 234, 239, 246, 823

v. Turner ii- 645

Stockton R. Co. v. Barrett ii. 487

Stockwell v. Dillingham i- 197

Stoddard v. Hart iii- 346

v. Kimball i. 285, 286

v. Long Island Railroad Co. ii. 254,

255, 256, 259, 267

v. Martin "'-8«I

v. Mcllwain . ■■ "2

v. Mix >■ 468

v. Penniman i- 283 ; ii. 853

v. TreadweU "• 63

Stoddard's case i. 52

Stoddard Woollen Manuf. Co. v. Hunt-
ley iii. 264
Stoddart ». Smith i. 525
Stodden v. Harvey ii. 794
Stoddert v. Bowie's Ex'r iii. 309
v. Vestry of Port Tobacco Parish

i. 157

Stoever v. Whitman ii. 671, 909

Stokely v. Thompson iii. 159

Stokes v. Cox ii. 624

v. Landgraff ii. 352, 360, 371, 375

v. Mason iii. 467

u. Moore iii. 7

b. Saltonstall ii. 234, 235, 236, 239, 244

Stollenwerck v. Thacher i. 103, 568, 570,

651

Stonard v. Dunkin ii. 152

Stone, Ex parte i. 205

v. Blanchard ii. 311

v. Boston & Maine Railroad iii. 453,

455
v. Browning iii- 51

o. Carlan ii. 360

v. Carr i. 348

v. Charlestown iii. 483

v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. ii. 273

v. Codman i. 117, 120

v. Compton ii. 9

v. Dennis ii. 844

v. Dennison i. 353 ; iii. 44, 64

v. Denny ii. 917

v. Fouse i. 184 •

v. Fowle ii. 790

v. Gilliam i. 676

v. King i. 572

v. Lidderdale i. 253

v. Marsh i. 209; ii. 747

i'. McNair i. 392

v. Matthews i. 553

r. Miller ii. 822

v. Mississippi iii. 510

v. National Ins. Co. ii. 409

«. Peacock i- 566

v. Pointer i. 015

!>. Rockefeller ii. 3

v. Seymour ii. 763, 765

v. Swift i. 328

t;. Vance ii. 686

v. Waitt ii. 199, 224, 465

t>. Ware iii- 136

v. Whiting i. 543

v. Wilson ii- 861

v. Withipool i- 356

v. Wood _ i- 68, 69

Stonehewer v. Farrar ii. 830, 833

Stonehouse v. Gent i- 84

Stoneman !>. Pyle i- 279

Stoney b. Araer. Life Ins. Co. iii. 132

v. Beaubien _i- 283

Stoolfoos v. Jenkins i- 357

Stoonevart Maatschappy Nederland,

The, b. Peninsular, &c. Co. ii. 429

Storer v. Gordon ii- 603

v. Great Western Railway Co. iii. 327

cxciv

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Storer v. Hunter

i. 569

!•. Logan

i. 303

Storke v. De Smeth

ii. 835

Storm v. Green

iii. 181

v. Smith

i. 616

v. Stirling

i. 280

Storr v. Crowley ii.

196,

197, 214

Storrs v. Barker ii

939

; iii. 355

v. City Bank of Utiea

i. 117

Story v. Elliot

ii. 898

v. Finnis

ii. 773

v. Flournoy

iii. 262

v. Holcomoe ii. 336,

341,

342, 344,
345, 349

v. Johnson

i. 366

v. Livingston

ii. 769

r. Lord Windsor

i. 80

u. Patten

ii. 874

v. Richardson

i. 20, 26

Stotts v. Byers

i. 292

Stouffer v. Coleman

iii. 324

v. Latshaw

i. 443

Stoughton v. Lynch

. 187

; iii. 161

v. Rappalo

ii. 415

Stoughton's Appeal

i. 150

Stourbridge Can. Co. v. Wheeley

ii. 638

Stout v. Folger

iii. 200

v. Jackson

iii. 242

Stoveld, Ex parte

iii. 418

u. Brewin

ii. 772

v. Hughes

i.

647, 653

Stover v. Herrington

iii.

381, 382

Stow v. Russell

iii. 340

v. Stevens

ii. 790

Stowe v. Meserve

i. 612

v. Thomas ii.

330,

341, 342

v. Wyse

ii. 931

Stowell v. Robinson

iii. 341

v. Roch

i. 374

Stowell's Adm'r v. Drake

i. 31

Stracey v. Deey

ii. 882

Stracy v. Bank of England

i. 469

Strader v. Lambeth

ii. 687

Strafford Bank v. Crosby

ii. 29

Straker v. Kidd

ii. 424

Strang v. Hirst

ii. 756

Strangborough v. Warner

i. 478

Strange v. Brennan

iii. 374

v. Price

i. 322

Stratbmore v. Bowes

i. 411

Strathnaver, The

ii. 436

Straton v. Enstall

ii. 686

Stratton v. Allen

i. 157

v. Hale

iii. 472

v. Pettit ii.

627,

637, 643

v. Stratton i

.460

; iii. 370

Straus v. Minzesheimer

i. 564

v. Wessel

i. 579

Strauss v. Kois

i. 564

Stray v. Russell

ii. 806

Streaper v. Williams

iii. 169

Streatfleld v. Ilalliday

i. 12

Street v. Blay

i. 637

v. Rigby ii

.845

; iii. 172

Streeter v. Horlock

ii. 68

Stretch v. Parker

v. Sehenk
Stretton v. Busnach
Stribblehill v. Brett

ii. 65

iii. 311

i. 407

ii. 80

Stribling v. Bank of the Valley iii. 118,

143

Strickland v. Coker i. 372

v. Hudson i. 54

u. Maxwell i. 544; ii. 634

v. Turner i. 558

Striekler v. Burkholder ii. 27

Strithrost v. Graeme iii. 104

Strode v. Russel ii. 695

Stroh v. Uhrich ii. 881

Strohn v. Detroit R. R. Co. ii. 265

v. Hartford Ins. Co. ii. 540

Strong v. Barnes ii. 634

t;. Blake ii. 777

v. Campbell ii. 155

v. Clawson iii. 424

v. Foote i. 336

v. Foster i. 294; ii. 627

v. Hart iii. 261

u. Harvey ii. 775

„. Manuf. Ins. Co. ii. 659, 562, 575

v. Martin ii. 500

v. Natally ii. 212, 488

v. N. Y. Ins. Co. ii. 537

v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 494

v Place i. 177

u. Smith i. 382

v. Stewart 'i. 109

v. Strong ii. 749; iii. 216

v. Wilkin i. 410

v. Willey ii. 825

Stronghill v. Buck ii. 931

Strother v. Lovejoy ii. 392

u. Lucas ii. 713

Stroud v. Marshall i. 433

Strowd v. Willis ii. 931

Stuart v. Commonwealth ii. 877

v. L. & X. W. Railway Co. iii. 306

v. Stimpson ii. 57

v. Wilkins i. 618

Stubbs v. Lund i. 649, 650

v. Page iii. 240

Stucky v. Clyburn i. 618

Studabaker v. Marquardt iii. 132

Stukeley v. Butler ii. 645

Stull v. Hanse ii. 5

Stults v. Silva i. 281

Stultz v. Dickey i. 544

Stump v. Henry iii. 80

Stupetski v. Transatlantic Ins. Co. ii. 546

Sturdevant v. Pike i. 94

Sturge v. Sturge i. 523

Sturges v. Crowninshield i. 5; iii. 385,

390, 391, 392, 397, 400, 449, 502,

503, 507, 509, 511

a. Keith iii. 211, 220

v. Murphy ii. 430

Sturgess v. Cary ii. 444, 445

Sturgis v. Clough ii. 430

v. Galindo iii. 322

v. Slocum iii. 277

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

cxcv

Sturm v. Atlantic Ins. Co. ii. 661, 683
Sturt v. Mellish iii. 95

Sturtevant v. Ballard i. 570

0. Randall ii. 870

Stuyvesant v. Mayor of New York

iii. 327
v. Woodruff ii. 664

Styan, In re ii. 610

Styles v. Wardle ii. 798

Success, The ii. 519

Succession of Dulhonde i. 292

Suckley v. Delafield ii. 526

i\ Furse ii. 545

Sucklinge v. Coney ii. 776

Suffell v. Bank of England ii. 853

Suffield Society v. Loomis iii. 113

Suffolk Bank «. The Worcester

Bank ii. 771, 773

Suffolk Ins. Co. v. Boyden ii. 564

Sugden v. Lolley ii. 735

Sugg !•. Tillman iii. 403

Suit v. Woodhall i. 81

Sullivan v. Jacob iii. 373

c'. Ferguson iii. 294

v. Mitchell i. 311

v. Sullivan i. 397; ii. 88

v. Tuck iii. 320

Summerhays v Kansas, &c. It. Co. ii. 47

Sum merit 0. Elder i. 645

Summers v. Ball i. 399

Summersett v. Jarvis iii. 416

Sumner u. Bowen i. 320

u. Ferryman i. 445

v. Ford i. 309

v. Hamlet ii. 380

v. Jones ii. 907

v. Powell i. 228

v. Williams i. 143 ; ii. 32, 631 ; iii. 175

Sumter v. Lehie iii. 237

Sunbolt v. Alford ii. 167 ; iii. 265

Sunderland Ins. Co. v. Kearney di. 482

Sun Ins. Co. e. Wright ii. 490

Supervisors v. Otis ii. 28

Supervisors of Albany Co. v. Dorr ii. 154

Supple v. Iowa State Ins. Co. ii. 543

Surcome v. Pinniger iii. 32, 353

Surplice v. Farnsworth i. 533, 537

Surtees, Ex parte iii. 419, 420

v. Hubbard i. 248

Surtell v. Brailsford i. 407

Susan, The ii. 439, 440

Suse f. Pompe i. 327

Susquehanna Ins. Co. v. Perrine ii. 541

Susquehanna, &c. Co. v. Finney i. 571

Sussex Bank v. Baldwin i. 308, 311, 316,

318

Sutcliffe v Dohrman i- 231

Suter v. Sheeler iii- 75

Sutherland, In re iii- 435

I?. Briggs iii- 337

i<. Pratt ii- 486

Sutphen v. Fowler iii- 333

Sutphin v. Crozer ii- 760

Sutton i'. Ballou i- 568

0. Buck ii- 103

Sutton u. Chetwynd

v. Crain

v. Hawkins

v. Horn

v. Irwine

v. Kettell

v. Kowley

v . Tatham

v. Temple

v. Tyrell

v. Warren
Suttons v. Tyrrell
Suydam v. Bartle

v. Broadnax

iii 316

i. 142

ii. 779

ii. 841

i. 210

ii. 410

iii. 360

i. 87; ii. 670

i. 533, 633 ; ii. 135

ii. 39

ii. 88, 724, 726, 727

ii. 847, 848

iii. 143

iii. 396, 397

v. Clark i. 508, 583, 586 ; iii. 444

v. Columbus Ins. Co. ii. 540

v. Day ii. 318

v. Jenkins iii. 115, 210, 211, 212, 215,

217, 218, 220, 221

v. Vance ii. 27

v. Westfall iii. 143

Swain v. Howland ii. 467

v. Seamans ii. 939

v. Senet iii. 286

v. Tyler i. 342

Swallow v. Emery i. 578

Swampscot Machine Co. v. Partridge

ii. 539, 57!)

Swan, The ii. 441

0. Broome ii. 898

v. Nesmith i. 101

f. Snow ii. 608

v. Stedman i. 212

v. Tappan iii. 189

Swanson v. Swanson i. 376

.'. White iii. 117

Swanton w. Reed ii. 420

Swanzey e. Moore ii. 40, 657

Swartwout v. Payne iii. 121, 125

Swasey v. Antram i. 166

v. Vanderheyden i. 353

Sweany v Hunter i. 467

Sweat ;;. Hall i. 399

Sweatland v. 111. & Miss. Tel. Co. ii. 280,

283, 286, 287, 288, 289

Sweeney v. Franklin Ins. Co. ii. 561

t,-. Owsley i. 563

Sweeny v. Easter iii. 276

Sweet v. Bartlett iii. 286

v. Benning ii. 337, 344, 340

v. Cater ii. 348

v. Franklin iii. 74

v. Harding ii. 783

0. Jenkins ii. 677

v. Lee iii. 9, 16, 41

v. Maugham ii. 337, 348

v. Pym i. 644; iii. 271

Sweeting v. Darthez ii. 424

v. Turner i. 562

Sweetland u. Illinois, &c. Telegraph

Co. i. 79; ii. 287

Sweetzer v. French i. 209, 210

Swcezey v. Thayer i. 150

Sweigart v. Berk i. 23

Swete v. Fairlie ii. 592, 599

CXCV1

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Swetland v. Creigh i. 280

Swett v. Colgate i. 616, 622, 625

v. Patrick i. 25; iii. 175, 242

v. Southworth i. 90 ; ii. 745

Swick ». Home Ins. Co. ii. 597, 609

v. Sears ii. 939

Swift v. Barnes iii. 218, 220

v. Barnett i. 338

v. Clark i. 442 ; ii. 458

u. Dey ii. 374, 375

v. Hawkins i. 457

v. Kelly ii. 726

v. Pierce iii. 23

v. Railway, &c. Ass. ii. 610

v. Stevens i. 332

v. Tyson i. 291, 292

v. Vt. Ins. Co. ii. 561

i>. Williams ii. 39

v. Whesen ii. 304

Swigert v. Graham ii. 132

Swindall v. Swindall i. 137

Swindler v. Hilliard ii. 256, 268

Swiney v. Barry ii. 856

Swinfen v. Chelmsford i. 126, 130

v. Swinfen i. 131

Swinford v. Burn ii. 59

Swire v. Redman ii. 3, 28, 756

Swires v. Parsons ii. 52

Swisher v. Williams ii. 901

Switzer ». Gardner iii. 323

v. Skiles i. 527

v. Smith i. 256

Sword v. Keith iii. 41

Swoyer's Appeal i. 382

Sydebotham, Ex parte i. 354; iii. 415

Sydney Cove, The ii. 404

Sydnor v. Hurd i. 55, 68

Syers v. Bridge ii. 674

v. Jonas ii. 668, 678

v. Syers i. 176

Sykes v. Dixon i. 478 ; ii. 48, 52

v. Giles i. 41, 87, 528, 520 ; ii. 740, 747

v. Halsted i. 391 ; ii. 91

i>. Sykes ii. 364, 372, 373, 375

Sylvester v. Crapo i. 296

v. Downer i. 274, 283, 284

Symes, Ex parte iii. 473

v. Hughes ii. 886

Symington v. McLin i. 60

Symonds v. Coekerill iii. 116, 149

i/. Northwestern Ins. Co. ii. 618

Symons i>. James i. 524

Sypher v. McHenry i. 137

Syracuse, &c. R. Co. v. Collins ii. 755

Taber v. Cannon ii. 390, 391

v. Penett ii. 112

Tabor v. Michigan Life Ins. Co. ii. 616

Taffe v. Warnick i. 647

Taft v. Buffum i. 222

v. Larkin ii. 878

v. Montague ii. 655

Taft v. Sergeant i- 364

Taft & Co. v. Pike i. 361

Tagart v. The State of Indiana iii. 104

Tagg v. Tennessee Bank i. 81

Taggard v. Loring ii. 386, 420, 500

Taggart v. Buckmore ii. 383

Taintor v. Prendergast i. 68, 106

Tait v. Levi ii. 480, 527

ii. N. Y. Ins. Co. ii. 601

Taitt, Ex parte i. 238

Talbot v. Commonwealth Bank i. 309

v. Gray ii. 81, 795

v. M'Gee i. 131 ; ii. 825

v. Seamen, The ii. 441

v. Wilkins i. 209

Talcot v. Marine Ins. Co. ii. 534

Talcott !■. Goodwin iii. 426

v. Henderson ii. 914

Tallcott v. Dudley iii. 424

Talley v. Great Western R. Co. ii. 212

Talliaferro's Ex'rs v. King's Adm'rs

iii. 161
Talmadge v. The Rensselaer & Sara-
toga R. R. Co. iii. 44
Talver v. West iii. 49
Tameret u. Edwards i. 569
Tamplin v. Diggins iii. 439, 469
Tarns r. Way i. 290
Tamvaco v. Simpson i. 446
Tandy ». Tandy ii. 834
Tanner, Ex parte iii. 422
v. Christian i. 68
v. Livingston iii. 240
v. Moore ii. 24
v. Scovell i. 645, 646
v. Smart iii. 71, 72, 74, 76, 78, 79
Tansley v. Turner i. 566
Tapley v. Butterfield i. 200, 201, 207
v. Martens ii. 755
Tappan v. Blaisdell i. 231, 232
v. Kimball iii. 90
v. Nat. Bank-note Co. ii. 324
Tappenden v. Burgess iii. 441
Tapscott ». Williams i. 23
Tarbox v. Eastern Steamboat Co. ii. 410
Tardy v. Boyd i. 307
Tarleton v. Backhouse iii. 159
v. Baker ii. 897
v. M'Gawley iii- 195
v. Tarleton ii. 740
Tarling v. Baxter i. 563, 566
o. O'Riordan i. 505
Tarpley v. Hamer iii. 506
Tarquair v. Redinger ii. 833
Tarr i>. Williams i. 409
Tarrant v. Webb ii. 46
Tartar, The ii. 404
Tasker v. Kenton Ins. Co. ii. 588
Tassell v. Lewis i. 321
Tatara v. Williams iii 96
Tate v. Citizens Ins. Co. ii. 476, 574, 578
v. Clements i. 199, 225
v. Greenlee iii- 12
v. Wellings iii. 116, 119, 125
v. Wymond ii. 29

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CXCVU

Tatham v. Le Roy

v. Lowber

v. Piatt
Tatlock v. Harris
Tattersall v. Groote
Tatton v. Wade
Tatum t'. Bonner
Taunton v. Costar

U. 317, 321

ii. 325

iii. 309

i. 245

i. 229; ii. 846

ii. 915

ii. 6

i. 650

Taunton Bank v. Richardson i. 315

Taunton Copper Co. v. Merch. Ins.

Co. ii. 485

Taussig v. Hart i. 94

Tawney w. Crowther iii. 4, 18

Tayler v. Marling ii. 848

Tayloe v. Merchants Fire Ins. Co. i. 515 ;
ii. 540, 587; iii. 329
v. Sandiford ii. 763; iii. 168

Taylor v. ./Etna Ins. Co. ii. 601, 613

v. Agricultural, &c. Assoc. iii. 353
v. Ashton i. 71; ii. 917

v. Atwood i. 435

v. Backhouse ii. 844

v. Baldwin ii. 687

v. Bank of Illinois i. 326

v. Blacklow i. 126

v. Blanchard ii. 893

v. Bowers ii. 886

v. Brewer ii. 59

u. Briggs ii. 666, 672

v. Bryden i. 318

v. Bullen i. 635; ii. 394

v. Carpenter i. 449 ; ii. 356, 357, 358,
372, 375, 376, 377 ; iii. 185
v. Cato, The ii. 438, 461

v. Chapman i. 543

v. Chicago, &e. R. Co. i. 48

v. Clay ii. 425

v. Coryell i. 216

v. Croker i. 370

v. Curry i. 281

v. Diplock ii. 613

v. Dobbins i. 279

v. Field i. 234, 236 ; iii. 298

v. Fleet i. 626; ii. 911

v. French i. 315, 317

v. Gallup ii. 784

v. Geary iii. 409

v. Germania Ins. Co. ii. 471, 616

v. Gilman ii. 908

v. Green i. 78

v. Henderson i. 197

v. Henry i. 263

v. Horde ii. 634

v. Hutchinson i. 226

v. Jones i. 308, 475, 515

v. Kymer i. 330; ii. 766, 938

v. Laird ii. 37

v. Liverpool & Great Western

Steam Co. .ii. 183

v. Longworth iii- 338

v. Lowell ii. 472, 480, 529

v. Maguire iii- 196

v. Merrill iii- H

„. Mills iii- 200, 464

u. Mortindale i- 523

Taylor v. Moseley

ii. 860

o. Neville

iii. 329

v. Nicolson

ii. 827

v. Phoenix Ins. Co.

ii. 544

v. Patrick

i

435, 468

v. Plumer

iii

300, 439

v. Popham

ii. 875

v. Pratt

ii. 13

v. Pugh

ii. 71

v. Robinson

iii. 277

v. Ross

iii. 17

v. Salmon

i. 93, 94

v. Savage

i. 37

v. Shelton

i. 68

v. Shum

iii.

424, 448

v. Snyder

i. 312

v. Spear

iii. 98

v. Stibbert

iii. 313

v. Taylor

ii. 371

v. Terme

i. 180

v. Thomas

i. 271

v. Trueman

i. 330

v. Wakefield

iii. 46

v. Waters

ii. 874

v. Weld

ii. 924

v. Wells

ii. 225

v. Wetmore

ii. 14

v. Wheeler

iii. 427,

431, 432

v. Whitehead

ii. 136

v. Whitthorn

iii. 442

v. Wilson

ii.

483, 525

v. Young i

192 ; iii.

463, 466

v. Zepp

ii. 940

Taymon v. Mitchell

i. 626

Teaff v. Hewitt

i. 547

Teague v. Hubbard

i. 186

Teal v. Auty

iii. 35

«-•. Felton

ii. 155

v. Sears

ii. 191

Teasdale i'. Charleston Ins. Co. ii. 612

Tebbets, In re iii. 478

ii. Haskins ii. 62

Tebbetts v. Hamilton Ins. Co. ii. 542

Tebbitts v. Hamilton Ins. Co. ii. 557

Tebbs v. Carpenter i. 137

Tebbutt v. Bristol R. Co. i. 153

Teed v. Ellworthy i. 23

Teesdale v. Anderson i. 624

Teese v. Huntington ii. 328

Tegetmeyer v. Lumley ii. 876
Tempest v. Fitzgerald i. 671 ; iii. 46

v. Kilner iii. 220, 221

Templar v. McLachlan i. 128

Temple, Ex parte iii. 427

v. Haw ley i. 372

v. Seaver i. 218

v. Turner ii. 459

Templeman v. Biddle i- 544

v. Case ii. 104

Tenant v. Elliott ii- 887

Ten Broeck v. De Witt iii. 287

v. Livingston iii. 334

Tench v. Cheese ii. 642

Ten Eyck v. Brown ii- 4

v. Wing iii. 72

CXCV1U

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Tennant, Ex parte i. 174, 183

v. Strachan iii. 426, 451

Tennessee v. Sneed iii- 506

Tennessee Bank v. Ebbert i. 613

Tenn. Ins. Co. v. Scott ii. 478

Tenney v. Foote i. 208

Tenny i: Prince i. 274, 283 ; ii. 7

Terhune v. Mayor, &c. of New York

ii. 745

Terrell v. Goddard i. 221

Terrett v. Taylor iii. 481, 483, 485

Terrill v. Richards i. 175, 198, 213

Tcrritt v. Bartlett i. 486, 480

Terry v. Belcher i. 569

v. Bissell ii. 936

v. Carter i. 187

v. Duntze ii. 660

v. Fargo i. 42

v. Parker i. 307, 310

v. Wacher i. 96

Tetley v. Easton ii. 308

r. Taylor iii. 402

Tewksbury v. Bennett i. 617, 621

l: O'Connell ii. 809

b. Spruance i. 94

Thacher v. Dinsmore i. 7, 154 ; ii. 756

Thackaray v. The Farmer ii. 459

Thacker v. Hardy ii. 896

v. Shepherd i. 24

Thaekoorseydass v. Dhondmull ii. 896

Thallhimer r. Brinckerlioff ii. 908

Thames v. Barbour ii. 6

Thames Iron Co. u. Patent Derrick

Co. ii. 148; iii. 253

Tharsis Sulphur Co. v. Loft us ii. 833

Thatcher v. Bank of New York i. 48

v. Gammon iii. 130

Thaxton v. Edwards ii. 783

Thayer v. Brackett i. 290 ; ii. 778

v. Clemence i. 260

v. Daniels i. 258; iii. 98

t7. King i. 332

v. Luce iii. 15

v. Middlesex Ins. Co. ii. 541

v. Mowry ii. 866

v. Rock iii. 19, 36

v. St. Louis, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 233,236

v. Torrey i. 406

v. Turner ii. 922

o. Viles iii. 38

v. Wadsworth ii. 36, 39

v. Wendell i. 143

v. White i. 342

Thelusson v. Fergusson ii. 520, 533

v. Fletcher ii. 513

Theobald u. Colby ii. 885

Thetford v. Hubbard ii. 775, 780

Thetis, The ii. 440

Thibault v. Gibson iii. 115

Thibodeau v. Levasseur ii. 721

Thicknesse v. Bromilow i. 204

Thickstun v. Howard ii. 156, 164

Thiis i'. Byers ii. 424

Thimbleby v. Barron ii. 850

Thimblethorp v. Hardesty i. 23

Thing v. Libbey i. 365

Thinue v. Rigby ii. 829

Thorn v. Bigland ii. 916

Thomas v. Afflick ii. 797

v. Allen iii. 200

v. Atherton i. 206

v. Atkinson i. 66

c. Bishop i. 135

u. Boston & Providence R. R.

Co. ii. 151, 184, 201, 212

v. Cadwallader ii. 663

v. Catheral iii. 119

v. Clarke ii. 422, 423

v. Cleaves iii. 132
v. Cook i. 37, 643, 544 ; ii. 941 ;
iii. 24

v. Courtnay iii. 477

v. Crosswell iii. 179

v. Davis ii. 31, 795

v. Day ii. 152

v. Dering iii. 358

u. Desanges iii. 460

v. Dickinson iii. 38

v. Dike i. 355 ; ii. 40

v. Dingley i. 631

i>. Dow ii. 28

v. Edwards i. 66, 69

v. Evans ii. 776

v. Freelon ii. 863

u. Graves ii. 676

v. Hammond iii. 40

v. Hayden i. 535

i'. Heathorn ii. 749, 751

v. Hewes i. 69

v. Hopper ii. 877

o. Jones iii. 328

v. Kelsoe iii. 437

v. Lane ii. 465

v. Lewis ii. 389

v. Lincoln i. 110

v. Mason iii. 136

v. McCann ii. 917, 927

u. Miles ii. 892

v. Molier ii. 829

i7. Newton i. 287, 289

v. O'ilara ii. 076

v. Osborn ii. 404, 421

v. Pemberton iii. 447

v. Pennrich i. 208

o. R. R. Co. i. 167

u. Rawlings i. 126

u. Rideing iii. 426

v. Roossa I. 279; ii. 785

v. Rhymney Railway Co. ii. 236

v. Roberts i. 335

v. Shillibeer i. 247

v. Sorrell ii. 642

v. Stetson ii. 20
v. Thomas i. 457, 497 ; ii. 93, 680, 694

v. Todd ii. 753
•>. Vonkapff ii. 565 ; iii. 361

i: Weeks ii. 305
u. Williams i. 486 ; ii. 43; iii. 19, 20, 31

v. i. 20

Thomas Martin, The ii. 433

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CXC1X

Thomason v. Frere

. 224, 272 ; iii. 426,

458

Thomasson v. Boyd

i. 368

Thombleson v. Black

iii. 331

Thomond v. Earl of Suffolk i. 383

Thompson, Ex parte

iii. 462, 465

In re

ii. 710

v. Alger

iii. 224, 225, 388

v. Andrews

i. 226

v. Bell

i. 47

v. Berry

iii. 130

v. Blanchard

i. 458, 569 ; ii. 938

v. Botts

i. 618, 636

v. Brown

ii. 765

v. Charnock

ii. 844

v. Cohen

iii. 324

v. Davenport

i. 66, 68 ; ii. 391

v. Dawson

iii. 294

v. Dominey

i. 328, 651 ; ii. 410

v. Emery

i. 254, 257

v. Fargo

i. 96

v. Finden

ii. 390

v. Gardiner

i. 583,585; iii. 13

v. Gillespy

ii. 521

v. Glover

ii. 14

o. Guthrie

iii. 245

v. Hale

i. 293, 296

v. Harding

i. 147

v. Havelock

i. 93, 111

v. Hervey

i.-402

v. Hewitt

iii. 471, 478

v. Hopper

ii. 495, 631

v. Inglis

ii. 423

v. Ins. Co.

ii. 617

v. James

i. 515

o. Jones

iii. 126

v. Ketcham

ii. 683, 713

v. Lacy

ii. 155, 167

v. Lay

i. 364

v. Lindsay

i. 627

v. Lovrein

i. 405

v. Lyon

i. 356

v. Marrow

iii. 239

v. MoCullough

i. 298

v. McFarland

ii. 939

v. N. Y. & Harlem R. E. Co. iii. 490

v. Page

i. 483

v. Patrick

ii. 120

■v. Percival

i. 192, 245

v. Perkins

i. 100, 101

v. Powles

iii. 122

v. Reynolds

ii. 499, 909

v. Ross

ii. 76

v. Royal Exch. Ass

Co. ii. 505

v. Shattuck

iii. 199, 249

v. Shepherd i.

273, 293 ; iii. 452

v. Sickles

iii. 101

v. Small

ii. 407

v. Stanhope

ii. 336

v. Thompson

i. 640 ; ii. 92

v. Tiles

i. 571

v. Tod

iii. 347

v. Towle

i. 616

v. Trail

j. 649 ; ii. 407

v. Williams

ii. 906

Thompson v. Williamson

i. 177

v. Woodbridge

iii. 135

Thorns v. Dingley

iii. 193

Thomson v. Bank of S. C.

ii. 112

v. Brit. No. Am. Bank

ii. 755

v. Buchanan

ii. 524

v. Davenport i. 105

106, 107, 590

t>. Dougherty

i. 264, 410

u. Harrison

ii. 78

v . Hopper

iii. 95

v. Picket

iii. 113

v. Redman

ii. 879

v. Royal Ex. Ass. Co.

ii. 403

v. Winchester

ii. 362

Thomyris, The

ii. 519

Thoreau v. Pallies

ii. 828

Thorley, Ex parte

iii. 420

v. Lord Kerry

iii. 185

Thorn v. Wilson

iii. 295

Thornborow v. Whiteacre

i. 466

Thornbury v. Bevill iii.

344, 360, 374

Thorndike v. Bath

i. 564, 568

u. Boardman

ii. 534

v. Burrage

i. 536

v. City of Boston ii.

708, 710, 711

v. De Wolf i. 176, 184 ; ii, 38,

v. Norris

ii. 933

v. Stone ii

404 ; iii. 147

Thorne v. Deas

ii. 112

v. Kathan

i. 396

v. Watkins

ii. 701

v. White

ii. 464, 465

Thornett v. Haines i

526 ; iii. 370

Thornton v. Appleton

ii. 858

v. Bank of Washington

iii. 143

v. Carson ii.

826, 831, 835

v. Charles

i. 686 ; iii. 13

v. Davenport

i. 569

v. Dixon

i. 168

v. Exchange Bank

i. 405

<•. Fairlie

i. 469

v. Illingworth i. 365,

369 ; iii. 415

v. Kelly

iii. 15

v. Kempster i

. 587 ; iii. 13

v. Meux i

. 586; iii. 13

v. Place i

494 ; ii. 655

u. Thompson

iii. 227

v. V. S. Ins. Co.

ii. 447, 537

v. Wynn

i. 325, 637

Thorogood v. Bryan

ii. 250

v. Marsh

ii. 172

Thorold v. Smith

i. 51 ; ii. 747

Thorp v. Thorp ii. 660, 661, 728

Thorpe v. Booth

i. 302

v. Cooper

ii. 836

v. Fowler

i. 579

v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co.

ii. 237

v. Sliapleigh

i. 387, 393

u. Thorpe i. 473 ; ii

91 ; iii. 452

v. White

ii. 39

Thouvenin v. Lea

iii. 39, 43

Thrall v. Hill

i. 545, 560

v. Newell

ii. 637

v. Wright

i. 338

Thrasher v. Everhart

ii. 719

cc

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Thrasher v. Haynes ii. 827

v. Tuttle ii. 746

Threfall v. Borwick ii. 167

Threlkeld v. Fitzhugh iii. 242

Throckmorton v. Tracey ii. 638, 640

Thropp v. Field i. 531

Thropp's Appeal i. 545

Thrupp v. Fielder i. 363, 364

Thrustout r. Crafter ii. 875

Thurber v. Anderson i- 41

v. Blackburne ii. 740

Thurlow i\ Massachusetts iii. 511

Tliurman v. Wells i. 253

Thnrn v. Alta Cal. Tel. Co. ii. 285

Thursby ». Plant iii. 449

Thurston v. Blanchard ii. 756

v. Col. Ins. Co. ii. 500

v. Cornell iii. 144

v. Fisher iii. 106

ii, Koch ii. 582

v. Maddocks iii. 96

v. Martin iii. 170

n. McKown i. 273, 295

v. Percival
v. Thornton
v. Wolfborough

Thurstout v. Grey

Thweatt v. Jones

Thwing !;. Wash. Ins. Co.

i. 128 ; ii

i. 509
iii. 98
iii. 237
i. 36, 37
ii. 418, 510,
511,512
Tibbetts v. Towle i. 578

v. Moore iii. 293

Tibbits v. George i. 245, 254, 257 ; ii. 610
Tice v. Gallop i. 59

Tichburne v. White ii. 217, 274

Tickel v. Short i. 01

Ticonic Bank v. Johnson iii. 143

Tidd v. Lister iii. 438

v. Iiines i. 55

Tidewater Canal Co. v. Archer i. 9.3

Tidmarsh v. Washington Ins. Co. ii. 525,

528, 529
Tidswell v. Angerstein ii. 605

Tier u. Lampson i. 75

Tierman t>. Beam iii. 294

Tiernan v. Napier ii. 783, 787

v. Poor iii. 310

Tifft i>. Culver iii. 183

v. Tifft i. 351

Tilden v. Barnard i. 58

Tileston v. Nettleton ii. 11

f. Newell ii. 663

Tiley i\ Courtier ii. 753

Tilford r. Ramsey iii. 189

Tilghman p. Proctor ii. 310

Tilley v. County of Cook ii. 680

v. Hudson R. R. Co. iii. 209

v. Tilley ii. 613

Tillier v. Whitehead i. 211

Tillinghast v. Nourse iii. 88

v. Wlieaton i. 266

Tillock ii. Webb ii. 902, 904

Tillotson v. Boyd i. 260

v. Cheetham iii. 183

v. Gesner iii. 335

Tillotson v. McCrillis i. 349

ii. Tillotson i. 260 ; ii. 716
Tillou v. Britton ii. 776; iii. 381, 382
ii. Clinton Mut. Fire Ins. Co. ii. 860

v. Kingston Ins. Co. ii. 552, 562

Tilton v. Hamilton Ins. Co. ii. 571

v. Russell i. 348

v. Tilton iii. 309

Tilton Safe Co. v. Tisdale i. 631

Tilton, The Sch. ii. 398

Timberman v. Craddock i. 109

Timbers v. Katz i. 381
Timmins v. Gibbins i. 302; ii. 754

Timmis o. Piatt i. 145

Timrod v. Shoolbred i. 627

Tindal, Ex parte iii. 462

</. Bright i. 186

</. Brown i. 322
v. Taylor i. 328 ; ii. 407, 410, 417

Tindall v. Touchberry ii. 11

Tingle v. Tucker ii. 466
Tingley v. Cutler i. 458 ; iii. 174

Tingrey v. Brown i. 146

Tinker v. McCauley ii. 4

Tinkler v. Prentice i. 488

Tinney v. Ashley ii. 790

Tinsley r. Beall i. 290

v. Lacy ii. 346

Tipper v. Bicknell i. 475

Tippet v. Hawkey i. 26

Tippets v. Heane iii. 81

y. Walker i. 68 ; iii. 37

Tipping v. Smith ii. 829

Tirrell v. Gage ii. 413

Tisdale v. Conn. Ins. Co. ii. 612

v. Harris iii. 56

v. Mitchell iii. 97

v. Mut. Ben. Ins. Co. ii. 586

Tisloe v. Graeter ii. 686

Titcomb ». Wood i. 557

Titman u. Titman ii. 51

Tittemore v. Vt. Ins. Co. ii. 576

Titus y. Carkins iii. 181

</. Glens Falls Ins. Co. ii. 687
v. Hobart ii. 719; iii. 391

v. Perkins ii. 829

Tobago, The ii. 401

Tobey v. County of Bristol ii. 845

v. Ellis i. 323

v. Lennig i. 322

v. Robinson i. 487

v. Wood i. 354

Tobias v. Francis i. 547

Tobin v. Crawford i. 42

o. Post iii. 220

Tod v. Baylor iii. 239

v. Benedict i. 61

Todd v. Clapp i. 166, 354

v. Emly i. 41
v. Gee i. 522 ; iii. 359

v. Lorah i. 208

e. Old Colony R. R. Co. ii. 817

v. Parker ii. 774

v. Stokes i. 401

v. Summers ii. 663

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CC1

Todd v. Todd iii. 79

Toland v. Sprague iii. 95

Tolbert v. Harrison ii. 874
Toledo Bank v. Bond iii. 482, 483, 486,

498

Toledo Works v. Bernheimer iii. 293

Toledo, &c. R. Co. v. Hamilton ii. 174

w. Hammond ii. 275

Tolen v. Tolen ii. 732, 736

Tollcy v. Greene iii. 43

Tome v. Doelger ii. 807

v. Dubois i. 559, 562

Tomlin v. Mayor, &c. of Fordwich ii. 834

Tomlinson v. Gill iii. 21

n. Hammond ii, 835

v. Savage i. 526

Tompkins v. Bernet iii. 137

v. Brown iii. 76, 89

v. Corwin ii. 644

v. Elliot ii. 660, 663

v. Haile ii. 426

v. Weeks i. 147

o. Wheeler iii. 381, 382

Tonnawanda R. K. Co. a. Munger ii. 248

Tonson v. Walker ii. 341, 346

Toof v. Martin iii. 415

Took v. Tuck iii. 477

Tooke v. Hollingworth i. 575; iii. 434, 438

Tooker v. Bennett i. 211

v. Sloan i. 49

Tooley v, Windham i. 471

Toomer v. Dawson i. 583 ; iii. 4, 18

Tope v. Hoekin iii. 434, 458

Topham v. Braddick i. 96 ; iii. 98

v. Chapman iii. 409

Toppan v. Atkinson ii. 479

Torrey v. Baxter i. 218

v. Fisk i. 272

v. Grant iii. 129

Torriano v. Young i. 535

Toulmin v. Copland ii. 766

Toulson v. Grout iii. 429

Touro v, Cassin ii. 700

Tourville v. Naish i. 80

Touson v. Walker ii. 330

Toussaint v. Hartop ii. 848

v. Martinnant i. 31 ; iii. 463

Touteng v. Hubbard ii. 425

Tovey v. Lindsey ii. 734

i\ Pitcher iii. 448

Tow Boat Co. v. The Delphos ii. 441

Towell v. Gatewood i. 621, 623, 624

Tower v. Richardson i. 270

v. The Utioa, &c. Railroad Co. ii. 189

Towers v. Barrett ii. 812

v. Moore i. 30

v. Osborne iii. 59, 61

Towle v. Dresser i. 361

v. Kettell ii- 424

u. Larrabee ii- 900

,.. Leavitt i. 60, 526

v. Marrett "• 00

v. Raymond iii. 266

Town v. Stetson ii. 353

Town of Pawlett i;. Clark iii. 483

Towne v. Fiske

i. 546

v. Rice

i. 58, 281

a. Smith

iii. 397, 409

v. Wason

i. 298

v. Wiley

i. 356

Townend v. Drakeford

i. 586; iii. 13

Townes v. Mead

iii. 106

Townly v. Crump i. 648, 652 ; iii. 274,

444

Townsend v. Bush iii. 127

v. Carpenter i. 252

v. Crowdy i. 496

v. Devaynes i. 169

v. Hargraves i. 563; iii. 63

v. Houston iii. 350

v. Inglis i. 48; ii. 747

v. Jennison ii. 722

v. Long ii. 9

v. Loraiue Bank i. 322

v. Neale i. 22

v. Newell iii. 260, 270

v. Nickerson i. 542

v. Riddle i. 211 ; ii. 24, 28

v. Riley ii. 769

v. Townsend iii. 393

i). Wells ii. 784, 785

Townshend, Ex parte iii. 419, 420

v. Stangroom iii. 344

Townsley v. Sumrall i. 325, 459

v. Tickell iii. 430

Towsley v. Moore iii. 38

Towson v. Havre-de-Grace Bank ii. 162,

165, 779

Tracey v. Albany Exchange Co. i. 532

v. Jenks ii. 905

v. McArlton i. 404

.-. Strong ii. 772, 775, 776

e. Suydam i. 228

Tracy v. Reed ii. 863

v. Torry ii. 325

v. Wood ii. 101

Traders Ins. Co. v. Robert ii. 562

Tradesmen's Bank v. Third Bank i. 300

Trafton, Ex parte iii. 411

Train v. Holland Ins. Co. ii. 616

Trainer v. The Superior ii. 459

Trail v. Trail ii. 91

Trammell v. Harrell ii. 878

Transportation Co. v. Downer ii. 817

Traphagen v. Traphagen iii. 348

Trapnall v. Burton ii. 939; iii. 102

v. Merrick i. 530

Trask v. Patterson ii. 604

Traver v. i. 474

Travis v. Bishop i. 612

Treadway v. Smith iii. 41

Tread well v. Aydlett i- 645

v. Bladen ii. 307

v. Brown iii. 440

v. Marden iii. 464

v. Moore ii. 768

<-. Union Ins. Co. ii. 418, 527

ii, Williams i. 174

Treasurer, The ii- 416

v. Commercial, &c. Co. iii. 31SJ

ecu

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

i. 12

i

803
492

ii.

771

. 59, 03

ii. 89

iii.
i.

137

538

ii.

700

ii.

398

iii.
i.

427
228

Treasurers ». Bates

Treat v. Orono

Trebilcock v. Wilson

Tredwen v. Bourne

Tree r. Quin

Tregoning v. Attenborough

Treloar v. Bigge

Tremain v. Liming

Tremont, The

Tremont Bank, Ex parte

Tremper v. Conklin

Trench v. Chenango Ins. Co. ii. 542, 500

Trenehard v. Hoskins ii. 633

Trent Navigation Co. v. Harley ii. 25

Trenton Bank v. Gay i. 01, 279

e. Wallace ii. 804, 860
Trenton Banking Co. v. Duncan ii. 944

Trenton Ins. Co. v. Johnson ii. 599, 605,

607

Trescott v. Davis ii. 936

Treuttell v. Barandon i. 103

Trevor v. Wood ii. 296 ; iii. 14

i: Woods ii. 299

Tribune, The Sch. ii. 421

Trickett v. Tomlinson i. 41

Trident, The ii. 403

Trieber v. Commercial Bank ii. 907

Trigg v. Faris i. 616

Triggs v. Newnham iii. 69

Trimbey v. Vignier ii. 700, 719

Trimble v. Hill ii. 760

v. Rateliffe i. 264

v. Strother i. 248

Trinity House v. Clark ii. 422

Tripp v. Armitage iii. 458

v. Curtenius i. 279

Trippee v. Frazier ii. 088

Trist v. Child ii. 895

Triton v. Foote iii. 323

Triumph, The ii. 438

Troewert v. Decker ii. 904

Tronson v. Dent ii. 418

Trott v. Wood ii. 669, 672

Trotter v. Curtis iii. 143

v. Evans iii. 296

Troubadour, The ii. 400

Troup v. Smith iii. 99, 107

Trousdale v. Darnell i. 548

Troutman v. Gowing iii. 338
Trow v. Vermont C. R. R. Co. ii. 248, 250

Trowbridge v. Cushman i. 232

v. Welherbee iii. 39

Trowel v. Castle ii. 859

Troy Academy v. Nelson i. 482, 483
Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Corning

ii. 079

Troy, &o. R. Co. v. Boston, &c. R.

Co. i. 158

True v. Fuller ii. 3

u. International Tel. Co. ii. 286

.... Plumley ii. 898

v. Ranney ii. 87, 88, 727

True Blue, The ii. 442

Trueman v. Fenton iii. (if)

v. Hurst i. 352

Truesdale v. Hazard ii. 392

Truett v. Chaplin i.468, 471

v. Wainwright ii. 858

Truitt v. Baird i. 185

Trullinger v. Kofoed ii. 762

Trull v. Roxbury Ins. Co. ii. 579, 588

Truman v. Loder i. 56, 591, 670 ; iii. 11
Trumbull v. Portage Co. Ins. Co. ii. 575
v. Tilton i. 463

Trundy v. Farrar i. 154

Truscott v. Davis ii 941

Trusler v. Murray ii. 336, 344

Trustees of Howard College r. Pace i. 248
Trustees of Iowa College i>. Hill i. 292
Trustees of Schools v. Tatman iii. 482
Trustees, &c. v. Kendrick ii. 757

Trustees, &c. of Vincennes Univer-
sity v. Indiana iii. 485
Tryon v. Whitmarsh ii. 917
Tubb i: Harrison i. 348
Tuck v. Fyson iii. 449
Tuckahoe Canal Co.
R. R. Co.

Tucker v. Andrews

i. Buffington

a. Clarke

v. Humphrey

v. Justices

!>. Magee

v. Moreland

c Oxley

u. Ruston

u. Taylor

v. Tucker

?•. Wilamouicz

v. Wilson

i*. Woods
Tuckerman v. French

v. Hinkley

v. Home Ins. Co.

v. Newhall

v. Stevens, &c.
Co.

Tuckwell v. Lambert
Tudor v. New Eng. Ins. Co

v. Terrel
Tudway o. Bourn
Tuel v. Weston
Tuffnell v. Constable
Tufts v. Adams

v. McClure

v. Tufts
Tuggle v. Gilbert
Tulk v. Moxhay
Tuller v. Talbot
Tullett v. Armstrong
Tullidge v. Wade
Tunison v. Chamblin

v. Cramer
Tunnell v. Pettijohn
Tunno r. Bird

o. Lague

r. Trezevant
Tupper v. Cadvvell

i\ Hay thorn

Tuckahoe

iii.

i.

ii. 395,

617, 652

i. 331

490

411

400

iii. 337

iii. 444

i. 138

ii 55

i. 366, 368

iii. 439

iii. 48, 444

iii. 254

ii. 884

ii. 127

ii. 129

i. 506

ii. 14

ii. 903

ii. 502

i. 26 ; ii.
Transportation

ii. 503,
ii.

850

227

913

509

681

iii. 429

i. 113

i. 490

iii. 244

i. 572

iii. 17

i. 147

iii. 307

ii. 245

iii. 455

ii. 75; iii. 183

i. 363

ii. 16

ii. 187

ii. 844

i. 309

i. 238

336, 337, 338

iii. 296

i. 309;

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CC111

Tupper v. Powell
Turberville v. Whitehouse
Turley v. Bates

v. North Amer. Ins. Co.

v. Thomas
Turnbull v. Gadsden

v. Strohecker

v. Turnbull
Turner, Ex parte

v. Bissel

v. Browne

v. Burrows

v. Calvert

v. Cameron

v. Clirisman

v. Coffin

v. Coolidge

a. Davies

v. Diaper

u. Hawkeye Tel. Co.

v. Hubbell

v. Hulme

v. Jay cox

v. Langdon

v. Leech

v. Lewis

v. Maddox

v. Mason

u. Meyers

a. Meymott

v. Protection Ins. Co.

v. Richardson

v. Robinson

iii. 136

i. 353

i. 506

ii. 586

ii. 250

ii. 916

ii. 881

ii. 93

iii. 428

i. 181

ii. 824

ii. 389, 478, 482

iii. 127

i. 545

i. 464

ii. 944

ii. 395

i. 37

ii. 880

ii. 282

iii. 31

iii. 131

i. 240

i. 563

ii. 392
ii. 849
ii. 38
iii. 414
i. 550
ii. 532
iii. 424, 446
i. 110; ii. 36,43, 330,
332
v. Rookes i. 402

v. Rusk i. 434

v. Samson i. 294

v. Satterlee ii. 874

v. Stetts ii. 565

v. Swainson ii. 826, 832

v. Thomas ii. 882, 938

o. Trisby i. 337

(i. Trustees of Liverpool Docks i. 649,

650

v. Turner ii. 833

v. Vaughan iii. 434

Turner's case ii. 450, 465

Turney v. Dodwell iii- 80

a. Williams i- 136

o. Wilson ii. 177, 181, 183

Turnpike Co. v. Commonwealth ii. 815

o. Phillips iii- 486

v. State iii- 484

Turpin, Ex parte

v. Povall ii

Turquand v. Vanderplank
Turrell v. Morgan
Turrill v. Boynton
v. Crawley
v. Mich., &c. R. R.
Turtle v. Muncy

v. Worsley
Turton v. Benson

v. Turton
Tuscumbia R. R. Co. v. Rhodes

123, 136

iii. 458

iii. 6

ii. 28

ii. 167

ii. 315

i. 385

i.407

ii. 78

i. 381

i. 290

Tutela, The
Tuthill v. Davis
Tutor v. Patton
Tutt v. Land
Tuttle v. Bartholomew

v. Brown

o. Chirk

i'. Cooper

v. Love

i. Swett

v. Tuttle
Twiggs v. Chambers
Twiss v. George

v. Massey
Two Catherines, The
Two Friends, The
Twopenny v. Young i
Twycross v. Dreyfus
Tye v. G Wynne
Tyler v. iEtna Ins. Co.

v. Binney

v. Bland

v. Carlton

v. Currier

c/. Pickett

u. Gould

v. Home

v. Jones

v. McCardle

v. West. Un. Tel. Co.

Tyly v. Morrice
Tynes v. Grimstead
Tyre v. Causey
Tyrell v Hope
Tyrer v. King
Tyrie v. Fletcher
Tyrrell v. Washburn
Tyson v. Cox

u. Gurney

v. Prior

v. Rickard

v. Robinson

v. Watts

ii. 425

iii. 12U

i. 289

i. 187

ii. 84

i. 623

iii. 163

i. 198

i. 505, 506

ii. 49; iii. 41

ii. 823

i. 129

iii. 352

i. 463

ii. 461

ii. 438

29 ; ii. 852, 853

i. 99

i. 405

ii. 559, 561

ii. 3

ii. 780

i. 458

ii. 383

ii. 680

i. 303

ii. 481

ii. 848

ii. 793

ii. 287, 289, 292,

300

ii. 274

i. 93

i. 623

iii. 456

iii. 246

ii. 472, 486

i. 36

ii. 27

ii. 519

ii. 437, 440

iii. 116, 119

ii. 847

iii. 367

u.-

Udell v. Atherton
Uhde i'. Walters
Uhl v. Harvey

v. Robinson
Ulary v. Washington, The

Ullman v. Kent
Ullock v. Reddelein
Ulmer v. Cunningham
Ulrich v. Berger

v. McCormick
Underhill v. Asrawam Ins. Co. ii. 524, 586

i. 474
ii 660
ii. 840
i. 531
ii. 613

i. 79

ii. 668

i. 191

i. 568

ii. 466, 467,

902

i. 574

i. 573

i. 26

ii. 881

i. 75; ii. 745

v. Gibson

v. Saratoga & W. R. R. Co.

. Van Cortlandt
Underwood v. Birchard
v. Wing

CC1V

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Unger v. Boas ii. 897

Union, The ii. 464

v. Jansen ii. 466, 467

Union Bank v. Commerce Bank Hi 440

v. Costar's Ex'rs ii. 16

v. Eaton i. 206

v. Edwards iii. 312

v. Geary i. 469

v. Hyde i. 315, 320

v. Kindrick ii. 769

v. Oceana County Bank i. 303

v. Ridgely ii- 17

o. Willis i. 274, 283, 312, 321

Union Bank of Georgetown v. Geary

i. 131

Union Bank of La. v. Bowman ii. 15

Union Bank of Md. v. Ridgely i. 154

Union Bank of Tenn. v. Gowen i. 320

Union College Trustees p. AVheeler i. 255

Union Ex. Co. c. Graliam ii. 270

Union Ins. Co. v. Chipp ii. 543

v. Comm. Ins. Co. ii. 470, 494

v. Grant ii. 616

v. Lenox ii. 413, 419, 510

v. Mowry ii. 617

o. Pottker ii. 617

v. Eeif ii. 597

v. T.vsen ii. 488

v. Wilkinson ii. 543

Un. Man. Co. <>. Lounsbury ii. 304, 324

Union Sav. Inst. v. Boston iii. 113

Union Steamship Co. v. N. Y. S. Co. ii. 432

Union Sugar Refinery v. Mathieson ii. 314

Union Towboat Co. r. Delphos, The ii. 441

Union Trust Co. v. Bigdon ii. 128

Union Turnpike Co. o. Jenkins i. 7

United States v. Alden ii. 465, 466

v. Ames i. 60; ii. 825

v. Arredondo iii. 488

t*. Bainbridge i. 335, 355, 375

v. Bank of U. S. iii. 381

v. Barker i. 318 i

v. Bartlett iii. 355

v. Blakeney i 355 I

v. Borden ii. 465 i

v. Bostwick , i. 535

v. Boyd ii. 16

u. Bradbury ii. 766

u. Buchanan ii. 672

v. Buford i. 251

v. Coffin ii. 465

v. Collins ii. 465

v. Crosby ii. 701

v. Curry i. 131

v. Cutler ii. 465

v. Freeman ii. 465

v. Great Falls iii. 484

u. Grush ii. 465

v. Hatcli ii. 463

v. Herron iii. 478

v. Hillegas ii. 19

v. Hudson i. 60

v. Hunt ii. 465

v. Ins. Cos. i. 153

v. Jarvis i. 74

United States v. King

iii. 382

v. Kirkpatrick

ii. 766

u. Le Baron

ii. 479

u. Lunt

ii. 465

r. Matthews

ii. 466

v. McLemore

ii. 769

v. Netcher

ii. 465

v. Parmelee

i. 50

v. Paul Shearman, The

ii. 534

i'. Robeson

iii. 391

y. Ruggles

ii. 405

v. Small

ii. 465

v. Steffens

ii. 350

u. Tillotson

ii. 19

u. Wardwell

ii. 766

v. Wilder

ii. 451, 459

v. Winn

ii. 465

v. Wyngall

i. 59

? . Yates

i. 131

U. S. Bank v. Bank of Ga. i

301 ; ii. 753

v. Binney

i. 188

c. Carneal

i. 322

v. Chapin

iii. 113

r. Smith

i. 309

U. S. Ex. Co. v. Backman

ii. 175, 270

v. Bedbury

i. 187

U. S. F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Kimberley ii. 649
U. S. Ins. Co. o. Scott ii. 456

U. S. Life Ins. Co. v. Advance Co. ii. 543
U. S. Tel. Co. v. Gildersleeve ii. 287

v. Wenger ii. 290, 292

». Western Union Tel. Co. ii. 291
Unity Assurance Ass. v. Dugan iii. 455
University v. People iii. 499

University of Cambridge v. Bryer ii. 334
University of Oxford !-. Richardson ii. 349
University of Vt. o. Buell i. 482, 483

Unwin ?•. Heath

ii. 314, 317

r. Woolsley i

138; ii. 631

Updegraff v. Bennett

ii. 76

Updyke v. Doyle

i. 215

r. Ten Broeck

iii. 43

Upham v. Lefavour

i. 108

v. Prince

i. 299; ii. 3

Upnor, The

ii. 437

Upshaw v. McBride

ii. 940

Upson v. Austin

iii. 132

Upton i'. Gray

i. 66

o. Salem Ins. Co.

ii. 487

u. Sturbridge Mills

i. 577, 580

Ure v. C oilman

ii. 431

Urquhart u. Barnard

ii. 534

v. Melver

i. 102

Urruston v. Newcomen

i. 339

Usher v. De Wolfe

i. 254, 250

Uthwatt v. Elkins

i. 140

Utica Ins. Co. v. Bloodgood

ii. 887 ;

iii. 143

v. Cad well

ii. 887

v. Kip

ii. 887

v. Scott

ii. 887

v. Tillman

iii. 139

Utley v. Donaldson

i. 505

r. Union Tool Co.

i. 161

Utterson v. Vernon

iii. 462, 466

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CCV

Vaccaro v. Toof

i. 191

Vail v. Durant

i. 107

v. Heastis

iii. 118

v. Rice

ii. 667, 674

v. Strong

i. 558

Valo v. Bayle

i. 573

Valejo v. Wheeler

ii. 195

Valentine v. Foster

i. 463

v. Valentine

ii. 825

v. Vaughan

iii. 416

Valk a. Gaillard

i, 323

v. State Bank

i. 323

Vallance v. Dewar

ii. 524, 532, 669

Vallee v. Dumergue

ii. 737

Vallette v. Mason

i. 292

Valley Bank v. Stribling iii. 117

Valliant v. Dodemede iii. 424, 448, 449

Vallier v. Ditson ii. 756

Valpy v. Gibson i. 650

v. Oakeley iii. 429, 435

v. Sandars iii. 435

Valton v. National Ins. Co. ii. 591, 605

Van Aernam v. Van Aernam i. 377

Van Alen v. Rogers iii. 236

v. Vanderpool i. 60

Van Allen v. Humphrey i. 410

Van Alstyne i>. Van Slyck i. 11

Van Amringe v. Peabody i. 102

Van Antwerp v. Stewart ii. 848

Van Arsdale v. Howard ii. 917, 918

Van Atta v. McKinney i. 129 ; ii. 60

Van Baggen v. Baines ii. 521

Van Benschooter v. Lawson ii. 769

Van Bracklin v. Fonda i. 632

Van Buskirk v. Hart. Fire Ins. Co. i. 215

v. Purinton ii. 223

v. Roberts ii. 41

Van Casteel v. Booker i. 61, 649, 650

Van Derveer v. Wright ii. 32

Van Deusen v. Charter Oak Ins. Co. ii. 575

Van Doren v. Everitt i. 544

u. Robinson iii. 372

v. Tjader i. 274

Van Duyne v. Van Duyne ii. 941

Van Duzor v. Allen i. 580

Van Dyck v. Howitt ii. 481

v. Van Beuren i- 487

Van Dyke o. Davis i. 468

Van Epps v. Dillaye • ii- 757

v. Schenectady i. 525

o. Van Deusen iii. 437

Van Hagen v. Van Rensselaer ii. 635

Van Hook v. Pendleton ii. 325

Van Horn v. Hann i. 436

Van Horn & Clark, Adm'rs, v. Bell ii. 856

Van Home v. Crain i- 260

Van Hoven v. Irish ii- 905

Van Keuren v. Central Railroad i. 546

e. Parmelee iii. 88, 89, 90, 91

Van Master v. Babcock ii- 893

Van Natta v. Mutual Ins. Co. ii- 566

Van Ness v. Forrest i- 185

v. Packard ii- 668

Van Orden v. Van Orden i. 142

Van Ostrand v. Reed i. 589, 633 ; ii. 757

Van Patton v. Beats i. 435

Van Raugh v. Van Arsdale iii. 397, 409

Van Reimsdyke v. Kane i. 198 ; ii. 700,

719, 721 ; iii. 507

Van Rensselaer v. Gallup i. 260, 551

v. Jewett i. 535; iii. Ill

v. Jones iii. Ill

v. Read iii. 507

Van Rhyn v. Vincent iii. 96

Van Sandau v. Crosbie iii. 463

Van Santvoord v. St. John ii. 230, 231

Van Shaick v. Hudson River R. R.

Co. ii. 817

Van Storch v. Griffin ii. 69, 73

Van Syckell v. Ewing, The ii. 184

Van Vacther v. Flack i. 280

Van Valen v. Russell i. 233

Van Valkenburg v. Bradley i. 227

v. Roun ii. 685

Van Valkinburg v. Watson i. 343, 345

Van Vetchen v. Pruyn i. 319

Van Vleet v. Adair iii. 233

Van Voorhis v. Brintnall ii. 728

Van Wart v. Smith i. 91

v. Wooley i. 91 ; ii. 112 ; iii. 206

Van Winkle v. Keteham i. 358

Van Woertu. Albany, &c. R. Co. iii. 40, 49

Van Wyck v. Allen iii. 219

v. Brasher i. 435

Van Zandt v. New York iii. 311

u. Mut. Ben. Ins. Co. ii. 603

Vanada v. Hopkins i. 88

Vance v. Blair i. 184

v. Bloomer ii. 783

v. Campbell ii. 309, 315

v. Lowther ii. 853

v. McLaughlin i. 382

v. Monroe ii. 765

v. Tourne iii. 220

v. Vance ii. 92

v. Ward i. 303

v. Wells i. 465

Vancouver v. Bliss iii. 335

Vandenanker v. Desbrough iii. 454, 456

Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co. ii. 509,

518

Vanderbilt, The ii. 433

v. Adams iii. 510

v. Richmond Turnpike Co. i- 114

Vanderburgh v. Hull i. 181

v. Truax iii. 195

Vanderheyden v. Mallory i. 409

Vanderpoel v. Van Allen i. 547

Vanderslice v. Newton iii. 188

v. Steam Towboat Superior ii. 182

Vandervoort v. Smith ii. 679

Vandeuzer v. McMillan i. 230

Vane v. Cobbold ii. 912

Vanhooser v. Logan ii. 785

Vanlandingham v. Huston iii. 106

Vanmeter v. McFadden iii. 432

Vann v. Hussey i- 236

Vanquelin v. Boward ii. 872

CCT1

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Vansandau v. Browne

iii. 101

Vanvivee v. Vanvivee

ii. 836

Vardy, Ex parte

iii. 446

Varick r. Crane

iii. 125, 126

Varley v. Coppard

i. 539

Varner v. Nobleborough

ii. 756

Varney v. Brewster

ii. 828

u. Grows

iii. 106

v. Hickman

ii. 760

v. Young

i. 344, 349

Varnum v. Bellamy

i. 292

v. Martin

i. 126

Vassar v. Camp

i. 508, 514

Vasse v. Ball

ii. 521

o. Smith

i. 356, 300

Vaughan v. Aldridge

ii. 76

v. Davies

ii. 875

v. Fuller

i. 308

r. Hancock

iii. 19, 36

l: Taff Vale Ry. Co.

ii. 218

Vaughn v. Hankinson

iii. 81

Vaupell v. AVoodward

iii. 56

Vaux i\ Draper

i. 21

v. Sheffer

ii. 429

Vawter v. Griffin

iii. 56, 57

Veacock r. McCall

i. 458

Veazie v. Parker

i. 109

c. Somerby

ii. 386 ; iii. 217

r. Williams i. 51,

78, 526 ; ii. 924

Veazy r. Harmony

ii. 780

Vedder v. Vedder

ii. 821

Venable v. Curd

i. 58

Venables v. Smith

i. 113

v. Thompson

ii. 687

Vennum v. Gregory

iii. 165

Vent v. Osgood i

335,355; ii. 40

Ventris v. Shaw

iii. 72

v. Smith

i. 556

Venus, The

iii. 175

Vere v. Smith

i. 102

Vermilye e. Adams Ex. Co. i. 330
Vermont Central R. R. Co. v. Estate

of Hills ii. 079

Vernard v. Hudson ii. 412

Vernede v. Weber i. 609

Vernon, The ii. 434

o. Alsop ii. 015

v. Hankey iii. 458, 469

v. Hanson

iii. 426

v. Keys

ii. 913

v. Manhattan Company

i. 191

v. Morton

iii. 382

v. Smith

ii. 565

v. Vernon

iii.

308, 314

Vertue v. Jewell

i.

640, 645

Very v. McHenry

ii. 718

Vibbard v. Johnson

i. 616

Vicars r. Wilcocks

iii. 194

Vice v. Fleming

i. 202

Vickers v. Viekers

i.

561

; iii. 319

Vickery v. Welch

ii. 890

Victoria, The

ii.

429, 431

Victors v. Davies

i. 603

Vidal v. Thompson

ii. 700

Viele r. Germania Ins

Co.

ii. 645

Viele i'. Hoag
Vielie (-. Osgood
Vigers v. Pike
Viliers v. Beaumont
Vinal v. Richardson
Vincennes, The
Vincent v. Chicago

v. Germond

v. Horlock
Viner v. Cadell
Vining v. Gilbreth
Vinton v. Middlesex R. R. Co

v. Peck
Violett v. Paton i. 6,

v. Powell
Virany v. Warne
Virgil, The
Virgin, The

v. Gaithcr
Vischer v. Yates
Vivian v. Campion
Vivior v. Wilde
Vlierboom v. Chapman
Vogel c. People's Ins. Co.

v. Ripper
Voguel, Ex parte
Volant, The
Voltz v. Blackmar

v. Harris
Volunteer, The
Von Hemert v. Porter
Von Hoffman

Von Lindenau v. Desborough
Voorhees v. Dorr

v. Earl i. 636, 637 ;

v. Wait
Voorhies v. Atlee
Voorhis v. Olmstead
Vore v. Hurst
Vos v. Robinson

v. United Ins. Co.
Vose v. Allen

i: Eagle Ins. Co.

v. Handy

o. L. & Y. Ry. Co.

r. Morton

v. Philbrook
Voyle v. Hughes
Vreede r. Scholyts, The
Vreeland v. Hyde

i'. Ryno
Vroom v. Van Home
Vrow Elizabeth, The
Vulliamy v. Noble
Vynior's case
Vyse v. Wakefield

W.

Wabash & R. Co. v. Rector
Wabash, &c. Co. v. Beers

v. Toledo National Bank
Wack v. Sorber
Waddell, In re

ii. 29

iii. 8

iii. 370

ii. 686

i. 473

ii. 388

ii. 203

iii. 46

i. 270

iii. 439

i. 570

ii. 247

ii. 903

272; iii. 17

i. 57, 66

ii. 59

ii. 429, 431

ii. 403, 404

i. 266

ii. 897

i. 260

ii. 848

ii. 419, 456

ii. 556

ii. 858

i. 237

ii. 454

iii. 181

ii. 32

ii. 413, 421

iii. 161

iii. 481

ii. 605

ii. 908

iii. 194, 227

i. 370

i. 315

i. 639

i. 284

ii. 587

ii. 495

ii. 415

ii. 594

i. 257

ii. 46

ii. 453

ii. 878

iii. 315

ii. 519

i. 317

i. 3b5

i. 147

ii. 619

i. 22_

ii. 847

ii. 802

iii. 186
iii. 502

i. 580
iii. 348

ii. 284

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CCV11

Waddell v. Col. Ins. Co. ii. 509

v. Cook i. 235

Waddington v. Bristow iii. 35

v. Oliver ii. 39, 792

v. United Ins. Co. ii. 479

Wade v. Dowling ii. 837, 844

e. Grimes i. 380

v. Hamilton iii. 277

v. Haycock ii. 653

t. Kalbfleish ii. 74

i . Lindsay ii. 933

v. Newbera iii. 6

v. Powell i. 131

v. Simeon i. 470, 471

v. Taylor i. 113

v. Thayer iii. 181

v. Wilson iii. 134, 135

Wade's case ii. 775, 779

Wadham v. Marlowe iii. 406, 449

Wadleigh v. Elines ii. 033

v. Jordan iii. 101

v. Pillsbury ii. 866

v. Veasie ii. 863, 865

Wadley v. Jones i. 185

Wadling v. Oliphant iii. 435

Wadlington v. Gary ii. 29

Wadsworth v. Alcot ii. 143

v. Manning Hi. 306

v. Pacific Ins. Co. ii. 488

v. Sherman i. 437

Wagenseller v. Simmers ii. 66, 68

Wagman v. Hoag ii. 28, 29

Wagner v. Holbrunner iii. 180

v. Simmons i- 200

v. White .i- 537

Wagonseller v. Snyder ii. 897

Wailing v. Toll i. 350

Wain v. Bailey i. 331

v. Warlters i. 6 ; ii. 7; iii. 15, 16, 17

Wainewright v. Bland _ ii. 606

Wainman v. Kyman iii. 82, 83

Wainwright v. Crawford ii. 403

v. Webster i. 302 ; ii. 754

Waistell v. Atkinson ii- 773

Wait, In re i- 234

v. Baker , i. 650; ii. 411

v. Brewster ''• 755

v. Green j- 580

v. Morris ,j- 464

v. Pomeroy ji- 853

Waite v. Barry ii- 829

v. Delesdernier «• 746

v. Foster i- 2"

v. The Hundred of Stoke ii. 898

Waithman v. Miles i- 549

Waitman, Ex parte i- 211

v. Wakefield i- 387

Wake v. Tinkler ii- -884

Wakefield v. Governor, The }]■ 435

v. Lithgow ii- 752

v. Martin "• *;&

v. Orient Ins. Co. "• 649

v. Smart m- 1(®

v. So. Boston, &c. R. Co. i- 48

Wakefield & Bingley v. Brown i- 20

Wakeman v. Gowdy

ii. 128

v. Grover

iii. 381

v. Hoyt

iii. 416, 441

Waland v. Elkins

ii. 226, 246

Walbridge v. Harroon

i. 463, 464

Walburn r. Ingilby

i. 216

Walcot v. Walker" i. 569; ii. 347, 348

Walcott v. Keith i. 569
Waldeck v. Springfield F. & M. Ins.

Co. ii. 586

Walden v. Bolton i. 130

v. Chamberlain ii. 404

r. Le Roy ii. 447

v. Louisiana Ins. Co. ii. 524, 558, 919

. v. Murdock i. 570

v. N. Y. Ins. Co. ii. 527

r. Phoenix Ins. Co. ii. 513

v. Sherburne i. 207; iii. Ill

Waldo, The ii. 224, 454, 456

v. Belcher i. 566

v. Long iii. 175, 245

Waldo Bank v. Lumbert i. 205

Waldron v. Chase i. 566

v. Harring ii. 3

v. Romain i. 566

Wales v. Webb iii. 129

Walkenshaw v, Perzell i. 243

Walker v. Bank of Augusta i. 320

v. Bank of Mont. Co. i. 323

v. Bank of the State of New

York i. 72, 304

v. Bank of Washington iii. 129
v. Birch ii. 129 ; iii. 259, 275

v. Boiling ii. 47

v. Boston Ins. Co. ii. 455

v. Burnell iii. 435

v. Butterick i. 558

v. Campbell iii. 75

v. Carrington i. 94, 387

v. Collier i. 569

v. Constable iii. 12

v. Davis i. 288, 356, 360

v. Derby i. 94

v. Ellis iii. 190

v. Eyth i. 239

v. Fitts i. 183

v. Forbes ii. 14

v. Geiss i. 292

v. Graham i. 316

v. Hatton i. 537

v. Hill iii. 22, 29, 409

v. Hitchcock iii. 236

v. Hoisington i. 635

v. House i- 229
v. Jeffreys iii. 339, 340, 341, 342

v. Johnson iii- 40

v. Leighton ii. 877, 878

v. Lide i- 304

v. Maitland ii- 495

v. May i- 147

v. McCulloch i. 27, 210

v. McDonald i- 269

v. Merrill ii- 827

v. Metropolitan Ins. Co. ii- 472

v. Moore iii. 245, 246

CCV111

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Walker v. Newton ii- 745

Wallis v. Day

v. Nussey iii- 58

v. Mease

v. Perkins i- 465

v. Truesdell

v. Protection Ins. Co. ii- 503

v. Wallis i

o. Reeves iii- 448

v. Wheelock

r. Sargeant i. 129; ii. 60; iii. 285

Walls v. Atcheson

v. Schuyler iii- 239

Wallwyn v. Coutts

v. Scott i- 131

Walmesley v. Cooper

v. Sherman 546, 547

Walpole v. Bridges

v. Shoemaker i. 532

v. Cholmondeley

v. Simpson i. 338, 392, 394

v. Ewer

v. Smith i. 60; iii. 185, 187

Walrond v. Hawkins

v. Stetson i. 303, 319

Walsh v. Adams

v. Supple iii- 56

v. Bailie

v. V. S. Ins. Co. ii. 444, 445

v. Bishop

v. Wait i. 222

v. Chicago, &c. R. Co.

v. Walker i. 51, 411, 457 ; ii. 838

v. Durkin

v. Wilson iii. 183

v. Etna Ins. Co.

v. Witter ii. 739

v. Farrand

v. Woollen i. 281

v. Gilmor

v. York & North Midland Rail-

v. Homer

way Co. ii. 231, 256

v. Medley

Wall v. Bry i. 315

v. Nourse

a. Charlick i. 409

v. Peet Valve Co.

v. East River Ins. Co. ii. 553, 560

v. Philadelphia Fire Ass

v. Howard Ins. Co. ii. 542, 560

v. Sexton

v. Lakin iii. 381

v. Washington Ins. Co.

v. London Real Property Co. iii. 247

v. W'nitcomb

v. Williamson ii. 724, 728

Walter v. Brewer

Wallace v. Agry ii. 757

v. Dewey

v. Breeds i. 566

v. Harvey

v. Clark iii. 218

v. Haynes

v. De Pau ii. 528

v. Kirk i.

v. Fielden ii. 404

v. Ross i.

v. Fouche ii. 676

v. Smith

v. Hardacre iii. 427, 450

Walters v. Munroe

v. Ins. Co. ii. 578, 648

v. Short

v. Jewell i. 11 ; ii. 853

Walton v. Bethune

v. Kensall i. 26

v. Crowley ii.

v. Lewis i. 367

v. Dickerson

v. McConnell i. 309

v. Dodson

v. McLaren i. 22

v. Hanbury

v. Miner ii. 932

v. Mandeville

v. Morss i. 357

v. Neptune, The

v. Patterson i. 234 ; iii. 409

v. Potter

o. Rappleye i. 465; iii. 374

Walworth v. Pool

v. Rippon i. 407

Walwyn r. St. Quintin

v. Talbot iii. 242

Walz v. Alback

v. Vigus ii. l'-i6

Wangler v. Swift

v. Woodgate iii. 254

Wankford v. Fotherley

v. Wren iii. 227

v. Wankford

Waller v. Cralle i. 444

Wanless v. McCandless

o. Drakeford ii. 941, 943 ; iii. 426,

Wann v. West. Un. Tel. Co.

452

Wansbrough v. Maton

v. Hendon iii. 14

Wape v. Hemenway

v. King ii. 832

Waples v. Eames

v. Lacy ii. 765, 768 ; iii. 75

v. Hastings

v. Parker i. 571

Warbasse v. Sussex Ins. Co.

v. Smith iii. 253

Warburton v. Aken

Walley v. Montgomery ii. 411

v. Lytton

Wallingsford v. Wallingsford iii. 374

v. Storr

Wallis v. Bardwell i. 162, 337

Ward, Ex parte

v. Bastard ii. 873

v. Allen

v. Carpenter iii. 167

v. Ames

v. Cook ii. 413

v. Blunt

ii. 36, 890

iii. 188

ii. 936, 937

. 458 ; ii. 635

i. 175

i. 544

iii. 316

ii. 852

ii. 170

ii. 623

ii. 637

i. 639

i.235

ii. 16

i. 28

ii. 904

ii. 864, 865

ii. 601

iii. 394, 507

ii. 829

ii. 533

i. 569

iii. 404

ii. 45

. ii. 559, 561

i. 266

ii. 629

i. 74, 77

ii. 194

i. 634

i. 301

ii. 753

. 322 ; iii. 444

. 328, 594, 652

iii. 289, 291

i. 317

ii. 860

ii. 518

. 358, 367, 371

i. 129; ii. 60

ii. 4

i. 36

iii. 28

ii. 463

ii. 305

iii. 208

i. 316, 323

i. 275

ii. 802

ii. 77; iii. 32

ii. 852

i. 61

ii. 286, 288

i. 547

ii. 457

ii. 488

i. 335

ii. 475

ii. 924

i. 372

ii. 847

iii. 465

i. 304

ii. 466

ii. 618

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CC1X

Ward v. Bodeman

i. 183

v. Buckingham

iii. 328

v. Byrne

ii. 890

u. Dalton

iii. 434

v. Evans

ii. 747

v. Fryer

i. 474

v. Fuller

iii. 430

u. Green

ii. 421

v. Hobbs

i. 632

v. Hunter

i. 441

v. Jenkins

iii. 426, 429

v . Johnson i. 12, 13, 28, 211 ; ii. 850

i: Kilpatrick i. 546

v. Lambert ii. 925

v. Morris iii. 409
v. New York Central B. Co. ii. 196

v. Peck ii. 506

v. Perrin i. 312

u. Ruckman ii. 388

u. Shaw i. 564, 566

v. Stahl ii. 5

v. Stout ii. 27
v. Tingley ii. 402 ; iii. 402

v. Turner i. 265

v. Tyler i. 225

v. Uncorn ii. 836

v. Ward ii. 605

v. Wardsworth iii. 286

v. Warren i. 81

f. Weeks iii. 194

u. Whitney ii. 410

v. Wilson ii. 392

v. Wood ii. 474, 500

Ward's case i. 547

Wardell v. Mourillyan ii. 196, 206

v. Railroad Co. i. 157

Warden v. Eichbaum i. 51

v. Greer ii. 173, 410
Wardens, &c. of St. James Church

v. Moore i. 278

Wardens, &c. of St. L. o. Kerwan ii. 813

Wardens, &c. of St. Saviour v. Bostock ii. 16

Warder v. Baker ii. 943

v. Horton ii. 493

v. Tucker i. 467

Wardwell v. Haight i. 75, 191

Ware v. Adams ii. 8

v. Gay ii. 135, 239

v. Hylton i. 449

v. Miller iii. 503

Wareham Bank v. Burt ii. 171

Warfield v. Campbell i. 129

Warfield's Adm'rs v. Boswell iii. 118

Waring v. Ayres iii- 311

v. Clarke ii. 430

v. Cunliffe iii. 159, 161

v. Favenck i. 67 ; ii. 883

v. Knight iii. 407, 409

o. Mason i. 589, 628, 636

v. Smith ii. 856, 862

b. Waring i. 434

Wark v. Willard ii- 933

Warlow b. Harrison i- 526

Warmstrey v. Tanfield i- 251

Warn v. Bickford ii- 879

Warner v. Beckett i. 253

v. Booge i. 474

v. Cunningham i. 226

v. Daniels i. 621 ; ii. 921, 926, 027
b. Heiden i. 388, 402

v. Hitchins i. '537

b. Martin i. 103

v. McKay i. 66

u. People iii. 483

v. Vallily iii. 210

v. Van Alstine iii. 296

v. Warner ii. 93

Warnick v. Grosshobz iii. 29

Warnock v. Davis i. 253; ii. 609

Warren, In re i. 175, 238 ; iii. 416

v. AUnutt i. 310

b. Batchelder i. 247

v. Buckminster i. 566

v. Crabtree iii. 122, 129

b. Flagg ii. 744

b. Green ii. 827

b. Hodge i. 470

b. Leland iii. 35

b. Lyons City ii. 496

v. Mains ii. 753, 779, 793

b. Manuf. Ins. Co. ii. 527

b. Merrifield ii. 633

b. Middlesex Ass. Co. ii. 555

o. Milliken ii. 146

b. Ocean Ins. Co. ii. 474

b. Philadelphia Coal Co. i. 617, 619
v. Richardson iii. 334

b. Saxby ii. 660

b. Skinner ii. 823

v. Stearns i. 483

b. Tenth Nat. Bank iii. 421

b. Thunder iii. 345, 372

». Wells ii. 877, 878

v. Wheeler i. 254; ii. 683; iii. 247
v. Whitney i. 463, 464

Warren Bank v. Sufiolk Bank ii. 113

Warrender v. Warrender i. 397 ; ii. 701,

712, 727
Warrick b. Bruce i. 353, 370, 481 ; iii. 35
b. Scott ii. 473

i\ Warrick i. 81

Warring v. Layton ii. 860

Warters i\ Herring ii. 810

Warwicke v. Noakes ii. 752

Washburn v. Bank of Bellows Falls i. 231,

232, 234
b. Fletcher i. 515

b. Goodman i. 219, 223, 227

v. Gould ii. 304, 324, 633

„. Hale i- 385

v. Jones ii. 162

v. Ramsdell i. 290

Washburn, &c. Co. u. Providence, &c.

R. Co. ii- 227

Washington Bank v. Brown iii. 237

v. Lewis iii- 282

v. Shurtleff iii- HI

Washington Bridge Co. b. State iii. 487
Washington Co. Ins. Co. v. Colton ii. 931
Washington Co. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller i. 281

ccx

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Washington Ins. Co. v. Kelley ii. 559

v. Merchants Ins. Co. ii. 545

Washington & Baltimore Turnpike Co.

v. Baltimore & Ohio R. E. Co. iii. 490
Washington & N. 0. Tel. Co. v. Hob-
son ii. 290, 301
Wason v. Rowe i. 624 ; ii. 624
Watchman, The iii. 409
Water's Appeal ii. 944
Waterbury v. Graham iii. 17
v. Sinclair i. 284
Waterer v. Freeman iii. 233
Waterhouse v. Skinner i. 577
r. Waite iii. 459
Waterman v. Barratt i. 291, 473
v. Clark ii. 880
v. Gilson ii. 50
v. Hunt i. 240
c. Johnson ii. 680, 689
«•- Meigs iii. 14, 62
c. Robinson ii. 103
Waters v. Allen ii. 480
v. Bean i. 465
v. Bridges ii. 827
v. Brogden i. 41
v. Comly iii. 382
( . Earl of Thanet iii. 98, 99
v. Grace i. 129
v. Howard ii. 76 ; iii. 305, 306
v. Merchants Ins. Co. ii. 489, 495,

560

v. Monarch Ins. Co. ii. 474, 482

r. Riley i. 30, 32

v. Simpson ii. 29

v. Taylor i. 76, 223

v. Tomkins iii. 82, 84

r. Towers iii. 197

v. Travis i. 525 ; iii. 358

Waterston v. Getchell iii. 265

Watertown v. White i. 255

Watertown Ins. Co. v. Grover ii. 580

Water Witch, The ii. 410

Wathen v. Sandys i. 12

Watkins v. Atkinson ii. 392

v. Baird i. 443

t-. Birch i. 569

v. Bowers i- 271

a. Crouch i. 309

v. Purand ii. 567

v. Eames i. 483

v. Halstead i. 464, 465

v. Hill ii. 756

v. Holman ii. 940 ; iii. 333

v. Maule i. 271 ; iii. 329, 427, 452

r. Peck ii. 936, 939

v. Perkins iii. 23

v. Stevens iii. 75, 92

v. Vince i. 47, 125

Watkinson v. Bank of Penn. i. 191

r. Inglesby ii. 749, 751, 818

r. Laughton iii. 206, 207

Watriss v. Cambridge Bank i. 545

Watrous v. Chalker i. 406

Watson, Ex parte i. 180; iii. 415, 474

v. Alcock ii. 6

Watson v. Ambergate ii- 231
v. A. N. & B. Railway Co. ii. 229 ;
iii. 195

v. Bennett i. 153

v. Bladen ii. 305, 313
v. Bourne iii. 394, 397, 409, 507

v. Brightwell iii. 13

v. Clark ii. 529

v. Cross ii. 167

v. Denton i. 635

v. Hensel ii. 878

o. Hetherington ii. 774

v. Hurt i. 284

v. Ins. Co. of N. A. ii. 511

v. King i. 76, 77

v. Lyle iii. 95, 96

v. Mainwaring ii. 593

a. Marine Ins. Co. ii- 502

v. Marston iii. 305, 373

v. McLaren ii. 3 ; iii. 18

v. Mercer iii. 506

v. Moore iii. 180

v. Murray i. 175

v. Murrell i. 129
u. Pittsburg & Cleveland R. R.

Co. iii. 240

v. Poulson ii. 916

v. Randall i. 470

v. Reid iii. 372

v. Sherman i- 122

v. Spratlev iii. 37

v, Thelkeld i. 394, 395, 404

v. Watson ii. 829 ; iii. 238

Watt, The ii. 437, 439

v. Hoch ii. 763 ; iii. 110

v. Morris ii. 527

v. Potter ii. 456 ; iii. 211

Watters v. Smith i. 468

Watts r. Everett iii. 506

v. Fraser iii. 191

v. Friend iii. 62

r. Hendry i. 564

v. Kavanagh i. 74

v. Rees ii. 876

u. Van Ness ii. 900

v. Waddle iii. 333

Wattson v. Marks ii. 455

Waugh v. Carver i. 188

v. Cope iii. 82

v. Riley i. 448

Waul v. Kirkman iii. 14

Wave, The, r. Hyer ii. 439

Waverley, The, v. Clements ii. 392

Way v. Howe iii. 411, 476

v. Peck ii. 78

v. Sperry i. 463, 464

Wayde v. Carr ii. 250

Waydell v. Luer ii. 757

Wayland v. Mosely ii. 410, 686

Waymire v. Jetmore ii. 87

Wayne v. Holmes ii. 315, 327

». The Gen. Pike ii. 392

Weatherall v. Geering iii. 435

Weatherbee r. Weatherbee ii. 737

Weathered v. Mays ii. 875

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CCX1

Weatherford v. Fishback ii. 916, 921

Weatherhead v. Boyers iii. 118

Weatherhead's Lessee v. Baskerville

ii. 689

Weatherstone v. Hawkins ii. 48; iii. 177

Weave v. Gove i. 98

Weaver v. Baehert ii. 67, 74

v. Childress ii. 661

v. Jones i. 552

v. Lynch ii. 941

v. Sessions ii. 813

v. S. G. Owens, The ii. 386

v. Ward iii. 414

Webb, In re ii. 151, 610

v. Daggett iii. 381, 402

v. Direct Lond. & Port. Railway

Co. iii. 306, 309, 332, 374

v. Duckingfield i. 442 ; ii. 458

v. Fairnianer ii. 797

v. Fox ii. 103 ; iii. 424, 446

v. Ingram ii. 836

v. Odell i. 662

v. Pierce ii. 421

v. Plummer i. 544 ; ii. 669, 677

v. Portland Manuf. Co. iii. 233, 234
u. Powers ii. 336, 341, 342, 344, 346,

349

v. Protection Ins. Co. ii. 571

v. Rose ii. 330

v. Steele i. 255

Webb's case ii. 688

Webber v. Davis i- 562

v. Ives ii. 842

v. Tivill iii- 94

Webster v. Bray i. 229

„. Cobb i. 274, 284

v. Coffin i. 580

v. De Tastet i. 93 ; ii. 460

v. Ela iii- 14

v. Enfield ii- 654

v. French }■ 526

v. Granger i- 574

v. McGinnis }■ 386

v. Seekamp ii- 453

v. Spencer i- 146

v. Withey "i- 403

v. Woodford }■ 434

v. Wvser "• 824

v. Zellly "i- 1°' 39

Wedderburn r. Bell ii- 527

v. Wedderburn ."• 94°

Wedge r. Newlyn }}}■ Wl

Wedgwood v. Adams ul- 30g

Wedlake v. Hurley i;.2f°

Weed v. Clark .."■ \2n

v Ellis "• °"

v. Panama R. R. Co. ii. 236, 454

v. Schenect. & Sar. R. R. Co. h. 227,

230, 231, 275

v. Van Houten \- 309

Weed, &c. Co. a. Emerson .i- 405

Weeks v. Burton »• ^

ii. 797

Weeks v. Tybald

v. Wead
Weger v. Penn. R. R. Co,
Wehrum v. Kuln
Weiberg v. The St. Oloff
Weigel, Succession of
Weiger v. Gould
Weiler v. I-Ioch
Weimer p. Clement
Weir v. Aberdeen

v. Weir
Weisser v. Denison

v. Maitland
Weiting v. Nissley
Weitzel, In re
Welborn ;'. Sechrist
Welch v. Goodwin

v. Hicks

v. Knott

v. Mandeville

v. Marvin

v. Myers

v. Ware

v. Whittemore

v. Wordsworth
Welchman v. Sturgis
Weld v. Cutler

v. Hadley

v. Lancaster

v. Walker
Weldon v. Buck
Welford v. Beazley

v. Liddel

v. Hull

v. Leighton

v. Propert

i. 355, 360 ; ii. 39
i. 69

i. 506
i. 669
ii. 47
i. 468

ii. 458
i. 131
i. 627
ii. 27
i. 621

ii. 527
ii. 51
i. 301

ii. 047

iii. 240

iii. 416

iii. 362

i. 300

ii. 215, 418

ii. 375
i. 254
iii. 22

iii. 447

iii. 183
i. 613

iii. 506
i. 146
i. 564

ii. 787
ii. 895
i. 393
i. 327

iii. 4, 8
iii. 96

Welland Canal Co. u. Hathaway ii. 936,

942, 944

Weiler v. Baker iii- 235

v. London, &c. R. Co. ii. 251

Welles v. Boston Ins. Co. ii- 572

u. Cowles hi- 37

v. Gray ii- 447

v. March i. 197, 201

Wellesley v. Wellesley iii- 324

Wellington v. Downer iii- 219

v. Jackson i- 279, 301

v. Mackintosh ii- 844, 845

Wellman v. Southard iii- 77

Wells, Ex parte }}}■ 417

v. Abernethy iii- 220

v. Archer ii- 610

v. Banister i- 500

v. Cooke ii- 844

v. Girling i»- 477

i). Hatch i- 129

v. Horton ii. 49 ; m 43

v. Jackson i- 284

v. Jewett «• 917

v. Kingston-upon-Hull i- 154

v. Mace "'• 463

v. Meldrum "• 464

v. New York Cent. R. R. Co. ii. 238

v. Padgett ii- 65, 75

v. Phila. Ins. Co. ii- 485

v. Pierce »■ 943

v. Porter i. 560; in. 127

v. Ragland iii- 102

CCX11

INDES TO CASES CITED.

Wells v. Robinson
v. Smith

v. Steam Nav. Co.
v. Tregusan
v. Watiing
v. Williams
Wright

iii. 137

iii. 338

ii. 182

ii. 645

iii. 235

i. 450; ii. 482

ii. 645

Welsh r. German American Bank i. 300

v. Hole iii. 286

!>. Lawrence ii. 247

v. Speakman i. 198

r. Usher iii. 297, 432

v. Welsh iii. 464

Welts v. Conn. Ins. Co. ii. 601

Wence !•. Wykoff ii. 51

Wendell v. Van Rensselaer ii. 939

Wennall v. Adney i. 460, 462

Wennan v. The Mohawk Ins. Co. iii. 98

Wentworth v. Bullen i. 478 ; ii. 819

v. Clark i. 406

v. Cock i. 145

v. Day ii. 105 ; iii. 255

v. Dows iii. 219

v. Outhwaite i. 642, 646

v. Realm ii. 412

Werner v. Humphreys i. 145

Wernse v. Hall ii. 721

Wertheimer r. Penn. R. Co. ii. 253

West v. Ashdown ii. 27

c. Cairns i. 460

v. Citizens Ins. Co. ii. 576

v. Cunningham i. 618, 627

v. Cutting i. 637

i -. Emmons i. 578

«. Foreman i. 280

v. Francis ii. 342

v. Lady Franklin, The ii. 392

v. Moore i. 356

v. Newton i. 572

v. O'Hara iii. 22

v. Pritchard iii. 220

v. Pryce iii. 469

v. Raymond i. 132

c. Skip i. 168, 234

r. Tilghman ii. 939

v. Wentworth iii. 211, 212, 220

v. Wheeler i. 392

West Bank v. Shawnee Bank ii. 113

West Boston Bank v. Thompson i. 83,

297
West Branch Bank v. Morehead ii. 763
West Feliciana R. R. Co. v. Stockett

iii. 511
West Hickory Ass. v. Reed i. 107

West India, &c. Co. v. Home, &c. Ins.

Co. ii. 497

West Mass. Ins. Co. v. Duffey ii. 471

West of England Bank, In re i. 210

West River Bank v. Taylor i. 320

West River Bridge Co. v. Dix iii. 483,
490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 496
West St. Louis Co. Bank v. Shawnee

Co. Bank i. 297

West T. & Coal Co. v. Kilderhouse

ii. 714, 762

Westbrook Manuf. Co. v. Grant iii. 460
Westbury v. Aberdein ii. 912

Westchester Ins. Co. v. Earle ii. 471

v. Foster ii. 585

Westerlo v. Evertson i. 185

Westerman v. Means ii. 793

Western v. Genessee Mut. Fire Ins.

Co. ii. 713

v. Russell iii. 18, 316, 337, 365

Western R. R. v. Babcock iii. 367, 371
Western Stage Co. v. Walker i. 109, 217
Western Trans. Co. o. Barber iii. 268

West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Am. U. Tel. Co.

ii. 278
v. Buchanan ii. 286, 288

v. Carew ii. 280, 282, 283, 285, 286,

288

v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. iii. 15

a. Fenton ii. 286

u. Fontaine ii. 279, 286

v. Meyer ii. 291

Western, &c. Co. r. Lansing i. 532

Western, &c. R. Co. v. McElwee i. 51

Westfall v. Parsons i. 35; iii. 24

Westlake v. St. Lawrence Ins. Co. ii. 582,

587

Westley r. Clarke i. 29

Westmeath v. Salisbury i. 399

v. Westmeath i. 397

Westminster College v. Gamble i. 484

Weston v. Alley i. 61

». Barton ii. 20, 21

v. Chamberlain i. 35

v. Davis i. 500

v. Ernes ii. 473

a. Penniman ii. 386, 396

v. Wright i. 84

Westwick v. Theodor ii. 55

Westwood v. Bell ii. 883 ; iii. 283

Westzinthus, In re i. 652, 653

Wetherbee v. Green iii. 1'14

Wetherell v. Jones ii. 886

v. Langston i. 23

Wetherill v. Neilson i. 627, 629

Wethey v. Andrews i. 296

Wetmore v. Baker ii. 246

v. Brien iii. 153

u. Neuberger iii. 37

v. Pattison ii. 639; iii. 199

v. Scovill ii. 336

v. Wells ii. 05

Wetzel v. Sponsler's Ex'rs ii. 26

Weyland v. Elkins ii. 226

Weybosset Bank v. Borden City

Mills iii. 414

Weymouth v. Boyer iii. 302

Wiser v. Lockwood ii. 88

Whallon v. Kauffman ii. 034

Wharton v. King ii. 831, 833, 835

v. McKenzie i. 337

v. O'Hara i. 492

v. Walker i. 247, 248

o. Williamson i. 324

Wheat, The Convoy's ii. 298

Wheatcroft v. Hickman i. 174

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CCX111

Wheatley v. Low

i. 477 ; ii. 109

Whitaker, The

v. Purr

iii. 315

v. Bond

v. Strobe

i. 281

v. Brown

v. Williams

iii. 97

v. Cone

Wheaton v. East

i. 335, 366, 367

v. Eastwick

v. Hibbard

ii. 887 ; iii. 137

v. Rice

v. Peters

ii. 330, 331, 337

v. Sumner

v. Wilmarth

i. 322

v. Whitaker

Wheeler n. Borman

iii. 424

v. Williams

v. Bowen

i. 382; iii. 437

Whitbeck v. Whitbeck

v. Bramah

iii. 446, 447

Whitbread v. Brockhurst

f. Collier

i. 526 ; iii. 14

Whitcher v. Morey

v. Constantine

ii. 731

Whitchurch v. Bevis iii

v. Eastern State, The ii. 432

Whitcomb v. Converse

v. Field

i. 308, 311

v. Jacob

v. Guild

i. 273

v. Preston

v. Knaggs

ii. 753, 777, 779

v. Williams

v. Moore

i. 382

v. Whitcomb

v. Nevins

i. 52

v. Whiting

v. Newbold

iii. 253

v. Whitney

v. Raymond

ii. 739, 884

White, Ex parte

v. Rice

i. 215

v. Allen

v. Russel

i. 489, 886, 887

v. Bailey ,

v. Spencer

ii. 761, 897

v. Banks

v. San Francisco, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 226

v. Baxter

v. Stone

i. 276

v. Bluett

v. Sumner

ii. 380, 395

v. Boulton

v. Thompson

ii. 459

v. Bradshaw

v. Train

i. 569

v. Branch

v. Van Wart

i. 219

v. Brockway

v. Warner

i. 295; iii. 98

v. Brown

i7. Washburn

ii. 28

v. Canfield

u. Webster

iii. 106

v. Chapman i

v. Wheeler i. 263 ; ii. 91, 92, 749

v. Commonwealth

Wheeler, &c. Co. v. Teetzlaff ii. 802

v. Crew

Wheeling Ins. Co. v. Morrison ii. 562

v. Cuddon

Wheelock v. Doolittle

iii. 88

u. Cushing

v. Freeman

ii. 858

v. Daedalus, The

v. Lee

iii. 426

v. Damon

v. Tanner

i. 571 ; ii. 779

v. Demilt

v. Wheelwright

ii. 137

v. Dingley

Wheelwright v. Beers

iii. 207

v. Dougherty

u. Depeyster

i. 556 ; ii. 399

v. East Saginaw

v. Moore

ii. 7

o. Fox

Whelan v. Lynch

i. 96

v. Franklin Bank

v. Reilly

i. 47

v. Gainer

v. Whelan

i. 460

v. Geroch

Wheldale i>. Partridge

i. 150

v. Gifford

Whelpdale v. Cookson

iii. 422

v. G. W. Ry. Co.

Whetstone v. Davis

i. 548

v. Griffing

Whichcote v. Lawrence

i. 94 ; iii. 422

v. Hale

Wellington v. Polk

iii. 484

v. Hancock

Whincup v. Hughes

ii. 814

v. Holford

Whipple v. Blackington

iii. 80

v. Humphrey

v. Chamberlain Man

Co. iii. 234

v. Jordan

v. Cumberland Man.

Co. iii. 176

v. Lady Lincoln

v. Dow

i. 343

v. Lowe

v. Giles

i. 388

v. Mann

v. Parker

iii. 41

v. Maynard

v. Stevens

iii. 79, 90

u.Miller i. 630 ; ii. 932 ;

v. Walpole

iii. 183, 186

a, Mitchell

v. Whitman

i. 130

v. Moseley

Whisler v. Hicks

iii. 244

v. Murphy

Whiston v. Stodder

ii. 700, 713, 717

v. Mutual Ins. Co.

Whitacre v. Culver

ii. 941

v. Nelis

ii. 442
iii. 370
i. 204, 205
ii. 909
i. 616, 618
iii. 85
i. 611
i. 380
ii. 938
i. 473
iii. 350
iii. 40
. 346, 347, 350
i. 176
iii. 301
ii. 829
ii. 756
i. 564 ; ii. 737
iii. 87, 88, 90
i. 566, 571
i. 558
ii. 304
iii. 103
iii. 382
i. 459
i. 462, 469
ii. 234
ii. 681
i. 361
iii. 219
ii. 564, 651
iii. 391
.110; iii. 206
i. 146
iii. 12
iii. 356, 361
i. 464
ii. 402
iii. 305
i. 478, 481
ii. 849, 850
i. 645
ii. 16
ii. 859
ii. 886, 887
iii. 261
ii. 333, 334
i. 76
ii. 266
iii. 446
iii. 88
ii. 645
ii. 837
ii. 151
ii. 823
i. 96, 110
ii. 84
ii. 806
iii. 37
iii. 110, 196
i. 645
iii. 199, 239
i. 191
ii. 546, 560
ii. 76

CCX1V

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

White v. Oliver
v. Palmer
v. Parker
v. Patten
v. Perley
u. Proctor
u. Reed

ii. 63, 655

i. 437

i. 150, 151

ii. 933

ii. 784, 785

i. 125; iii. 12

ii. 24

v. Republic, &c. Ins. Co. ii. 571

v. Skinner i. 68, 72

v. Smith i. 281 ; iii. 271

v. Solomonsky iii. 25

f. Springfield Bank i. 292

v. Stoddard i. 307

v. Trotter i. 95

v. "Walker ii. 850, 941

v. Webb iii. 216

a. "Westport Cotton Man. Co. i. 42
v. White ii. 730; iii. 333, 501,

500

v. Whitman ii. 865, 866

v. Whitney iii. 242, 244

v. Williams iii. 295

v. Winnisimmet Co. ii. 181, 190, 248

v. Wright iii. 120, 121, 149

White's Bank v. Smith ii. 380

White's case ii. 161

White River Turnpike v. Vermont

Central R. R. Co. iii. 490, 494

Whitebread, Ex parte iii. 297

Whuecross, &c. Co. v. Savill ii. 450

Whited r. Germania Ins. Co. ii. 543

Whitefield v. Longfellow i. 444

v, McLeod i. 522, 027

Whitehead v. Anderson i. 641

v. Cade ii. 876

v. Greetham i. 476; ii. 110

v. Lord iii. 101

v. Price ii. 548

v. Reddick i. 55

■,-. Tuckett i. 39, 42, 59

v. Vaughan iii. 282

v. Walker i. 200, 327 ; iii. 100

Whitehouse v. Bickford ii. 939

v. Frost i. 653

v. Hanson ii. 10

Whitehurst v. Boyd ii. 635

v. Fayetteville Ins. Co. ii. 551, 571

Whiteley v. Swayne ii. 304

Whitesell v. Crane ii. 277

v. Heiney iii. 23

Whiteside v. Jennings iii. 247

Whitesides ;>. Dorris i. 382

v. Lafferty i. 229

v. Thurlkill ii. 171, 183

Whitestown v. Stone i. 484

Whitfield v. Collingwood ii. 860

o, Le Despencer ii. 154, 1 55

v. Levy iii. 108

Whitford v. Panama R. R. Co. ii. 247

Whiting, Ex parte iii. 469

u. Barrett i. 263

v. Brastow i. 547

v. Earle i. 349, 350

v. Independent Ins. Co. ii 492

v. Mass. Ins. Co. ii. 614, 618

Whiting v. Stacey ii. 25

Whitley i'. Lof tus i. 354 ; ii. 54

v. Piedmont Ins. Co. ii. 614

Whitlock v. Duffield i. 532 ; iii. 323

Whitlocke v. Walton iii. 107

Whitman, Ex parte iii. 423

u. Bryant iii. 22

v. Freese i. 624

v. Leonard i. 223

Whitmarsh v. Charter Oak Ins. Co. ii. 545

v. Hall ii. 40

v. Walker i. 355; iii. 33,37

Whitmore v. Adams i. 208

v. Coats ii. 666 ; iii. 224

a. Gilmour i. 65

v. Shiverick i. 167

v. Steamboat Caroline ii. 194

Whitney v. Allaire ii. 923

v. Bigelow iii. 92

v. Black River Ins. Co. ii. 546

v. Boardman i. 634 ; iii. 224

c. Brattleboro Bank ii. 99

v. Cochran iii. 03

v. Dutch i. 304

v. Eaton i. 580

v. Emmett ii. 306, 307, 309, 312

u. Ferris i. 198

u. Groot ii. 24

v. Haven ii. 523, 533

v. Hitchcock iii. 185

v. Lee ii. 114

v. Meyers i. 543

v. N. Y. Fire Ins. Co. ii. 418

u. Ocean Ins. Co. ii. 527

u. Potsdam Bank i. 272

v. Robinson ii. 941

v. Spencer ii. 810

f. Stearns i. 458

v, Sutton i. 023

v. Whiting iii. 398

Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow i. 158

Whitney & Munson, Re iii. 422

Whiton r. Mears ii. 31

v. Spring ii. 745

Whitridge v. Dill ii. 431, 432

Whittaker v. Manchester, &c. R. R.

Co. ii. 251

v. Mason ii. 668

Whitteniore v. Adams ii. 719

u. Cutter ii. 307, 311, 313, 323, 328 ;

iii. 189

v. Gibb9 iii. 57

Whitten v. Fuller iii. 220

v. Peacock i. 261

Whittier v. Dana iii. 57

o. Groffam i. 306

Whittingham v. Hill i. 353

u. Thornburgh ii. 523

v. Wooler ii. 341, 349

Whittingham's case i. 370

Whittington, Ex parte iii. 448

v. Farmer's Bank ii. 879

Whittle v. Skinner i. 257, 466, 474

Whittlesey v. Dean i. 318

Whitton v. Commerce, The ii. 464

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CCXV

Whitton v. Smith

i. 201,

207, 220

v. Wass

iii. 104

Whitwell v. Harrison

ii. 488

v. Johnson

i

318, 319

Whitworth v. Adams

iii. 154

a. Davis

iii. 435

v. Erie R. Co.

ii. 228

u. Ferguson

iii. 102

v. Harris

i. 220

Whoregood v. Whoregood i. 400

Whywall i: Champion i. 303
Wibert v. N. Y. & Erie E. R. Co. ii. 198;

iii. 198

Wick v. Samuel Strong, The ii. 392

Wickens v. Evans ii. 890

Wicker v. Norris ii. 797

Wickes v. Caulk ii. 862

Wicknam v. Hawker ii. 642

Wicks v. Gogerley iii. 128

v. Lippman i. 185

Widgery v. Haskell iii. 381, 382

Widoe v. Webb i. 486

Wieland v. White i. 130

Wieler v. Schilizzi i. 620

Wigg b. Shuttleworth i. 488

v. Wigg i. 80

Wiggin, Ex parte iii. 413

b. Coffin iii. 177, 188

v. Peters ii. 797

v. Suffolk Ins. Co. ii. 492

u. Tudor i. 26, 210

o. Wiggin i. 541

Wiggins v. Hammond i. 20(3

v. Hathaway ii. 154, 155

Wiggle b. Thompson i. 322

Wigglesworth v. Dallison i. 537, 544 ;

ii. 608, 678

v. Steers i. 435 ; iii. 373

Wight ». Geer ii. 900

b. Shuck iii. 126

Wightman v. Chartman i. 12

v. Coates ii. 64, 66

b. Wightman ii. 88, 726

Wigmore v. Jay ii. 46

Wigmore and Wells' case i. 12

Wilbert o. New York & Erie Railroad

Co. iii- 197

Wilborn v. Whitfield i- 540

Wilbour v. Turner i. 272, 298

Wilbur v. Beecher ii. 309, 327

v. Crane i- 469

v. Jernegan ii. 756, 757

v. Tobey i-_448

Wilburn v. Larkin i- 55

Wilby r. Phinney i- 186

v. W. C. R. Co. ii. 226, 232

Wilcocks v. Union Ins. Co. ii- 499

Wilcox v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. i. 47

b. Draper •'• 14

v. Hall i- 627

b. Howland i. 444 ; iii. 159, 160

v. Hunt ii. 700, 719

Wilcus v. Kling !»• 172

"• ^e "■ 8S„

u. Parmelee ii- 2t,0

Wilcus v. Plummer

iii. 99

v. Roath

i. 304

v. Singletary

i. 210

o. Wilcox

ii. 833

v. Wood

ii. 009

Wild b. Harris

ii. 71

v. Williams

ii. 749

Wilde v. Armsby

ii. 860

v. Gibson

iii. 371

v. Vinor

ii. 848

v. Waters

i. 547

Wilder b. Keeler

i. 238

b. Winne

iii. 382

Wildes b. Savage

i. 303 ; ii. 14

Wildman, Ex parte

iii. 408

Wilds b. Hudson River R. R. Co. ii. 248

Wilelmina Eleanora, The ii. 426

Wiley b. Bradley iii. 39

v. Brattleboro Bank ii. 99

b. Griswold i. 208

b. Knight iii. 403

v. Moor ii. 861

v. Shoemak ii. 785

Wilhelm v. Schmidt ii. 764

Wilkes b. Ferris iii. 48, 382

v. Jacks i. 307

v. Lion iii. 237

v. Wilkes i. 397

Wilkie b. Geddes ii. 527

b. Roosevelt iii. 127

Wilkins v. Aiken ii. 335, 341, 342, 343,

348

v. Bromhead iii. 435

b. Carmichael ii. 454 ; iii. 286

v. Casey iii. 301, 451

v. Davis i. 224 ; iii. 440

v. Fry iii. 424, 448

v. Germania Fire Ins. Co. ii. 552

v. Pearce i. 202, 217

v. Reed i. 69

v. Taliaferro i. 552

v. Tobacco Ins. Co. ii. 552

Wilkins School District v. Milligan iii. 66

Wilkinson, Ex parte iii. 421, 425

v. Adain ii. 633

v. Byers i. 469 ; ii. 823

v. Candlish i. 203

v. Conn. Ins. Co. ii. 598

b. Coverdale ii. 108

u. Gaston ii. 797

v. Godefroy ii. 761

v. Hall i. 25

v. Holiday i. 564, 567

v. Henderson i- 228

u. Hunter i- 143

v. Leland iii. 481

v. Lindo i- 26

b. Lloyd ii- 806

v. Scott i. 458 ; ii. 932

v. Torkington iii- 323

v. Verity iii- 99

v. Wilkinson i. 377 ; iii. 449

v. Wilson ii- 404

v. Wright i- 409

Wilks v. Black i. 55, 124

CCXV1

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Wilks v. Davis ii. 845 ; iii. 332

v. Smith ii. 660

Will's case i. 515

Willamette Co. v. Eemick iii. 293

Willan t ■. Willan i. 532

Willard «>. Bridge ii. 152

v. Dorr ii. 454

v. Fox ii. 875

v. Hewlett i. 304

v. Perkins i. 573

v. Reeder iii. 121

v. Rice iii. 213

v. Sperry ii. 751

r. Stevens i. 622

o. Stone i. 370, 481 ; ii. 66

u. Tayloe iii. 305

v. Twitchell iii. 240

Willats v. Kennedy i. 459, 470

Willcocks, Ex parte i. 160

Willes, Ex parte iii. 416

v. Glover i. 80 ; ii. 524

Willet v. Atterton iii. 70

v. Blanford i. 228

p. Chambers i. 208

Willets v. Green ii. 43

Willetts v. Buffalo & Rochester R, R.

Co. ii. 248

Willey v. Beach i. 388

v. Connor i. 544

William, The ii. 102, 469

William Beckford, The ii. 440

William F. Burden, The ii. 435

William Hannington, The ii. 440

William Lushington, The ii. 442

William & Emmeline ii. 403, 404

Williams, Ex parte i. 224, 226, 228 ;

iii. 446

In re ii. 827; iii. 414

v. Alexander i. 473

v. Archer iii. 221

v. Avery ii. 77

v. Bacon iii. 11

v. Bank of Michigan i. 240

v. Bank of U. S. i. 311

v. Bartholomew iii. 355

v. Barton i. 102 ; iii. 192

v. Branson ii. 172

v. Brown iii. 382

v. Bruffy iii. 480

v. Butler i. 126

v. Carpenter ii. 753
v. Chester & Holyhead Railway

i. 154

v. Commercial Exch. Co. i. 407

</. Crary . ii. 882

v. Currie iii. 187

v. Dakin iii. 170, 173

v. Delafield ii. 525

v. Donaldson i. 409

v. Dormer ii. 732

v. Durst iii. 101

v. Dyde . i. 463

v. Everett i. 248

v. Field iii. 248

v. Eowler i. 403

Williams v. Gilchrist

ii. 881

v. Gillies

i. 107, 212

u. Gilman

ii. 668, 676

o. Given

i. 557

v. Grant

ii. 172, 183

v. Gridley

iii. 84

v. Griffith ii. 763;

iii. 72, 75, 79

v. Hance

iii. 145

v. Harrison

i. 355

v. Hart

iii. 312

o. Healey

ii. 663

v. Henshaw

i. ]84, 185

v. Hide

ii. 805

v. Hill

iii. 189

v. Holcombe

ii. 138

v. Hollingsworth

ii. 73, 75

v. Houghtaling

ii. 769

v. Hutchinson

i. 348

v. Ingersoll ii

838 ; iii. 300

v. Jenny Lind, The

ii. 442

v. Johnson

ii. 355, 371

v. Jones i. 165 ; ii. 721 ; iii. 108, 381
v. Kennebec Ins. Co. ii. 505, 509

u. Landman iii. 349

v. Leper ia. 27, 30, 31

v. Little i. 292

v. Littlefield i. 107

v. Lloyd ii. 805

v. London Ass. Co. ii. 452

v. London Com. Ex. Co. ii. 821

u. Marshall i. 95

v. May bee i. 366

v. Mayor of Annapolis iii. 310

v. Millington i. 528

o. Moor i. 353

u. Moore i. 336

u. Morris ii. 665; iii. 15

v. Mostym iii. 233

v. N. E. Ins. Co. ii. 473, 522, 524,

542, 547, 554, 555, 557
v. Nichols ii. 224, 456

v. North China Ins. Co. i. 49

v. Oates ii. 724, 728

<.'. Ocean Ins. Co. ii. 8b5

v. Paul ii. 900

u. Pendleton i. 4b0

v. Planter's Bank iii. 4SS7

v. Prince i. 396

v. Rawlinson ii. 766, 768

v. Robbins i. 58

v. Roberts iii. 294

o. Roger Williams Ins, Co. ii. 559,

563
v. Roser i. 611

u. Shee ii. 532, 535

v. Sherman iii. Ill

v. Sims i. 2b0

v. Smith ii. 419, 605, 507 ; iii. 102
v. Spafford i. 628

u. Spence ii. 370

a. Storrs iii. 112

v. Stratton iii. 432

v. Suffolk Ins. Co. ii. 449, 495, 501
<.-. Taylor ii. 235, 238

v. Thorp ii. 610

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CCXV11

Williams v. Vanderbilt
v. Vermeule
v. Vreeland
v. Walsby
v. Waring

ii. 228; iii. 209
iii. 424
iii. 353

ii. 748 ; iii. 425
i. 310

v. Wash. Life Ins. Co. ii. 606

v. Whiting ii. 709

v. Williams i. 537 ; ii. 85, 92, 421,

834 ; iii. 116, 373

v. Wilson i. 173; ii. 369, 830

v. Winans i. 303

v. Woods i. 89

v. Young i. 563

Williams Bros. v. Davis i. 558

Williams College v. Danforth i. 485

Williamsburg Ins Co. v. Cary ii. 549, 587

Williamson v. Alphonso, The ii. 441

v. Barrett ' ii. 434 ; iii. 196

v. Dickens iii. 465

v. Henley ii. 907

v. Missouri, The ii. 392

v. N. J. S. E. Co. i. 546; ii. 914

v. Taylor ii. 49

v. Wilson i. 224

v. Woodman ii. 941

Willing v. Peters i. 463

Willingham v. Joyce iii. 429, 454

Willings v. Blight ii. 388

v. Consequa i. 629 ; ii. 700

Willion v. Berkley i. 448 ; ii. 638

Willis, In re iii. 463

o. Bank of England i. 82

v. De Castro ii. 851

v. Dyson i. 202

v. Evans iii. 309

v. Freeman iii. 450, 451

v. Gammell i. 470

v. Green i. 321

v. Hall i. 204

v. Long Island E. E. Co. ii. 234, 246,

250

v. Newham iii. 84, 85

v. Peckham i. 467

v. Poole ii. 593, 594

v. Twambly i. 258, 361

v. Willis i. 564, 577

Willison v. Watkins i. 540

Williston v. Williston iii. 338, 348

Willoughby v. Backhouse ii- 215

v. Comstock iii- 118

v. Horridge ii. 181, 248

v. Moulton i. 279

Wills v. Brown iii. 26, 27

v. Cowper ii. 701

v. Boss ii- 14

v. Stradling iii- 349

Will's case i- 515

Wilmer v. Smilax, The ii- 401

Wilmhurst ». Bowker i. 642, 650

Wilmot v. Charter Oak Ins. Co. ii. 618

v. Hurd i- 621 ; ii. 879

v. Smith ii. 61, 747, 774

Wilson, Ex parte iii. 416, 427

In re "?• 406

v. Alexander u- '«d

Wilson v. Anderton ii. 218

v. Appleton iii. 104

v. Backhouse i. 024
v. Balfour iii. 259, 290
v. Baptist Educational Society i. 482

v. Barker i. 53

v. Beddard iii. 10

v. Borstel ii. 463

v. Bowden i. 200

ti. Breeding i. 380
v. Brett i. 92; ii. 102, 116

v. Broom iii. 225
v. Burr i. 129, 403; ii. 59

„ v. Butler ii. 913

* v. Calvert iii. 79

v. City Bank iii. 421

v. Clements i. 303

v. Codman ii. 883

v. Coffin i. 126

v. Conine i- 235

v. Curzon i. 164

v. Day iii- 441

v. Dickson ii. 454

v. Ducket ii. 523

v. Edmonds _ i- 77

v. Ferguson i. 618

. v. Finch Hatton i. 532
v. Foote i. 274 ; ii. 30

v. Forbes iii- 242

v. Gen. Ins. Co. ii. 500

v. Genessee Ins. Co. ii- 584

v. George iii- 232

v. Greenwood i. 219, 224
v. Guyton ii. 105; iii. 255

a. Hamilton ii. 181

v. Hardesty iii. 136, 506

v. Hart _ i- 66

v. Hatton i- 633

v. Henderson ii- 860

v. Hentges i- 492
v. Herkimer Co. Ins. Co. ii. 553, 560

v. Hicks ii- 423
v. Hill ii. 476, 563, 574

v. Hirst ii- 766

v. Hodson i. 147

v. Holmes i- 286

v. Hooper i- 569

v. Hudson i- 147

o. King iii- 224

v. Knott "■ 140

v. Lazier •• 329
v. Little ii. 123, 126; iii. 220, 221

v. Lutwidge }■ 300

v. Marsh •• 63J
v. Martin ii. 489 ; iii. 41

v. Mary, The . «• 465

v. Merry "• 46, 47

v. Milner „„'■„„£

v. Mushett i- S98, 399

v. Northern Pac. E. Co. }}■ 240

v. Oatman »;■ 239

v. Ohio, The «■ \%

v. Paulsen 1-.568

v. Poulter .}• 51

v. Powers u- ^

CCXVlil INDEX TO C

Wilson v. Ray

iii. 477

o. Robertson

ii. 080

v. Rousseau

ii. 319

v. Russell

iii. 37b

v. Simpson

ii. 320

u. Smyth

i. 401

v. Soper

i. 201

v. Spencer

iii. 240

v. Stolley

ii. 320

v. Sugg

i. 131

v. Swabey

i. 323

v. Trumbull Ins. Co.

ii. b'A'J

v. Tumman

i. 40, 53

v. United Ins. Co.

ii. 501

v. Wadleigh

ii. 740

v. Wilson i. 126, 613

ii. 920 '.' :

iii. 374

v. Y. & M. Railroad Co.

ii. 07

v. York, Newcastle, &

Berwick

Railway Co. ii.

231

; iii. 196

v. Young i

.131

; ii. 825

Wilt v. Franklin

iii. 381

v. Vickers

iii. 17G

Wilton v. Falmouth

ii. 709

v. Harwood ii

939

; iii. 347

v. Railroads

ii. 322

Wiltse v. Barnes

ii. 188

Wiltshire v. Cottrell

i. 547

v. Sims

i. 60, 91

Winans v. Allemainia Ins. Co.

ii. 543

v. Denmead

ii.

307, 314

v. Huston

ii. S50

Winberry v. Koonce

iii. 89

Winch v. Fenn

iii.

143, 405

u. Keeley i. 254, 255

; iii.

424, 435

o. Sanders

ii. 835

v. Winchester

iii.

312, 354

Winchester, Ex parte

iii.

402, 471

v. Patterson

ii. 413

v. Union Bank

i. 146

Windham v. Doles

i. 240

v. Windham

i. 531

Windham's case

i. U

; ii. 037

Windham Bank v. Norton

i. 309

Windle v. Andrews

i. 326

Windsor, Dean and Chapter of, v.

Gover

i. 153

Winfield v. Dodge

ii. 005

Wing v. Angrave

ii. 013

v. Chapman

iii. 219

v. Clark

i. 577

v. Dunn

iii. 128

v. Harvey

ii. 599

v. Hurlburt

i. 703

v, Hill

i. 501

v. Schramm

i. 405

Wingate v. Dail

iii. 363

v. Foster

ii. 550

v. Smith

iii. 213

Win go v. McDowell

i. 270

Winks v. Hassall

iii. 434

Winn v. Albert

iii. 346

v. Bowles

i. 251

o. Bull

iii. 14

v. Col. Ins. Co.

ii. 507

CASES CITED.

Winn i«. Southgate ii- 39

v. Thomas iii. 477

Winne v- Reynolds iii. 334

Winnesheik Ins. Co. v. Schueller ii. 587

Winship o. Bank of U. S. i. 205, 206

v. Bass ii. 852

c. Winship ii. 737

Winslow v. Croker i. 385

v. Dawson iii. 126

v. Merchants Ins. Co. i. 546, 612

v. Patten ii. 638

v. Tarbox i. 611; ii. 400

v. Vermont, &c. R. R. Co. ii. 197

Winson v. McLellan i. 612

Winsor i: Dillaway ii. 675

v . Griggs i. 08

v. Lombard i. 61'8, 624, 032

v. McLellan ii. 305

Winsted Bank v. Spencer ii. 932

Winston v. Ewing i. 234

v. Westfeldt i. 288

Winstone v. Linn ii. 55

Winter v. Branch Bank ii. 26

v. Delaware Ins. Co. ii. 533

v. Garlick ii. 834

v. Iowa iii. 416

c. Jones ii. 502; iii. 482

v, Kretchman iii. 426

v. Munton ii. 828

c. Perratt ii. 688

v. Richards i. 233

v. White ii. 828

Wintermute v. Clarke ii. 156, 165

v. Redington ii. 311, 315

Winterstoke Hundred's case i. 19

Winthrop v. Carlton ii. 716, 865

v. Union Ins. Co. ii. 532, 535, 674

Wintle v. Crowther i. 88

Wintringham v. Lafoy iii. 382

Wirth v. Austin i. 297

Wisconsin Bank v. Morley i. 53

Wise v. G. W. Ry. Co. ii. 261

v. Metcalfe i. 536

v. St. Louis Mar. Ins. Co. ii. 478

>: Wilson ii. 39, 55

Wiseman i'. Chiapella i. 303

r. Roper ' i. 467

r. Vandeput i. 642

Wiser v. Lockwood ii. 88

Wiswall !•. Brinson i. 117

Wiswould, Ex parte iii. 416

Witbeek v. Holland ii. 203

Witcher t: Brewer i. 208

Witherell v. Maine Ins. Co ii. 671

Witherow v. Witherow ii. 655

Withers v. Atkinson ii. 802

o. Bircham i. 15, 25

v. Lyss i. 563; iii. 48, 444

v. Reynolds ii. 649, 653

r. Weaver i. 203

Witherspoon t'. Anderson iii. 242

v. Dubose i. 383

Withington v. Herring i. 41, 59

Withy e. Cottle iii. 311, 319, 323

Witt v. Mayor, &c. of New York i. 535

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CCX1X

Witt v. Welsh i. 356

v. Derby Fishing Co. i. 157

Wittersheim v. Lady Carlisle iii. 97

Wittkovvsky v. Wasson i. 661

Witty v. Matthews i. 530

Wodell v. Coggeshall i. 349

Wodrop v. Ward i. 238

Woert v. Jenkins iii. 183

Wohlenberg v. Lageman ii. 840
Wolcott v. Eagle Ins. Co. ii. 483, 484, 485,

490, 491

v. Heath ii. 896

v. Mount i. 617, 631 ; iii. 196, 198, 219

v. Van Santvoord i. 300

Wolf v. Dozer iii. 41

v. Stix iii. 462

v. Summers iii. 265

v. Trochelman i. 131

v. Western Union Tel. Co. ii. 286, 287

Wolfe v. Frost iii. 37

v. Goulard ii. 353, 372, 378

o. Myers ii. 410

v. Whiteman iii. 97

Wolfenberger v. Young iii. 74

Wolfersberger v. Bucher ii. 877

Wolff v. Koppel i. 101

Wollenwebber v. Ketterlinus i. 307

Wolton v. Gavin ii. 899

Wolverton v. Lacey ii. 457, 459

Wonder v. Baltimore ii. 47

Wood v. Adcock ii. 826

v. Akers ii. 877

v. A. R. R. Co. i. 52

v. Ashe i. 618, 621

v. Beard i. 648

a. Bell ii. 380, 394, 650

v. Benson i. 486 ; iii. 19

v. Bodwell ii. 756

v. Brown i. 146

v. Corl i. 313

v. Crocker ii. 210

v. Curling ii. 149

v. Davis iii. 15

v. Day ii. 931

v. Dodgson iii. 463

v. Dudley i. 611

v. Earl ii. 831

v. Goodridge i. 124

v. Griffith ii. 832 ; iii. 310, 332, 357,

361, 373

v. Grimwood iii. 135, 136

v. Hartford Ins. Co. ii. 542, 544

v. Hitchcock ii. 778

v. Hubbell i. 537

v. Jones i. 645

v. Leadbitter ii. 642

v. Lee ii. 691

v. Lincoln Ins. Co. ii. 506, 508, 511

v. Manley ii. 665

v. McCann ii. 895

v. Mich. South. R. R. ii. 319

v. Milwaukee, &c. R. Co. ii. 210

v. Morewood iii. 215

v. Mytton i. 277, 278

v. N. E. Ins. Co. ii. 488, 497

Wood v. Nimrod
v. O'Kelley
v. Partridge
v. Patterson
v. Pennell
v. Perry
v. Pierson
v. Pugh
v. Roach
v. Robbins
c. Savage
v. Smith
v. Steele
v. Tunnicliff
v. Watkinson
v. Warren
v. Wellington
v. Wood
v. Wylds
o. Yeatman

ii. 458

i. 189

i. 254, 256

iii. 354

i. 193

i. 254; ii. 086

iii. 255

i. 326

i. 645

iii. 112

iii. 32

i. 623

ii. 856, 858

ii. 7

ii. 719

i. 290

i. 158

ii. 91, 672

iii. 82, 83

iii. 290

Wood and Foster's case i. 558

Wood, &c. R. Co. v. Brooke i. 579

Woodard v. Herbert iii. 462

Woodbridge v. Allen iii. 75, 397

v. Wright ii. 719

Woodburn v. Mosher iii. 403

Woodbury v. Blair i. 69

Woodcock i: Bennet i. 522; iii. 358, 359

i'. Nuth i. 644

v. Oxford & Worcester R. R. Co. ii. 27

r. Parker ii. 304

Woodend v. Paulsbury ii. 712

Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States iii. 214

Wooderman v. Baldock i. 569

Woodes v. Dennett i. 73

Woodfin v. Hooper iii. 504

Woodfolk !>. Blount iii. 300

Woodford v. McClenahan i. 62

Woodger v. Great Western R. R. Co.

iii. 209

Woodham v. Hubbard ii. 904

Woodhouse v. Meredith i. 93

v. Shepley ii. 64, 68

Woodhull v. Wagner iii. 894, 395, 397

Woodin v. Burford i. 41, 62, 79

v. Foster i. 322

Woodland, The ii. 454

Woodleife v. Curties ii. 169

Woodlife's case ii. 169

Woodman v. Boothby i. 275

v. Chapman i. 383

v. Eastman i. 308, 317

v. Stimpson ii. 304

v. Thurston i. 315

v. Woodman i- 380

Woodrop-Sims, The ii. 428, 429

Woodruff v. Col. Ins. Co. ii- 471

v. Dobbins ii. 818

v. Hinman i- 486

v. King i- 207

ii. Logan i. 354 ; ii. 54

v. M'Gehee i- 66

v. Plant _.i- 296

v. Richardson iii- 187

v. Robb !"• 376

ccxx

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Woodruff v. Trapnall iii. 502

v.. Woodruff ii. 92

Woods v. Anders i. 129

v. Ayres i- 7

v. Blodgett i. 130

v. Carlisle "• 877

v. Dennett ii- 890

v. Devin ii. 192, 276

v. Farmare iii. 348

v. Masterman ii. 588

v. North i. 279

i'. Pickett ii. 389

v. Ridley i. 142, 278

v. Russell ii. 380, 394, 649

i: Wilder i. 226

Woodstock Bank v. Downer ii. 31

Woodward v. Barnes i. 384

i\ Cowing i. 492

v. Darcy ii. 852

v. Lazar ii. 359, 361

v. Seeley ii. 642 ; iii. 37

v. Thacher i. 636; iii. 227

v. Towne iii. 434

Woodworth v. Curtis ii. 320

v. Downer i. 218

v. Rogers ii. 314, 325

?■. Sherman ii. 318

Wooland i\ Crowther iii. 437

Wooldridge v. Wilkins i. 168, 170; iii. 239

Wooley r. Batte i. 37

v. Cliamberlin ii. 936

i.'. Clements i. 322

Woolf r. Beard ii. 247

r. Claggett ii. 527, 533

Woolfe r. Home i- 527

Woollam v. Hearn iii. 309, 345, 354

v. Ratcliff ii. 371

Woolley v. Alexander iii. 132

Woolsey v. Crawford i. 327

v. Hogan iii. 411

v. Judd ii. 330, 336

Woolston's Appeal ii. 77

Wooster v. Sage ii. 813

Wooten v. Miller i. 480

v. Read ii. 655

Wope v. Hemenway ii. 465

Worcester v. Green ii. 92!)

Worcester Bank v. Hill ii. 7

Worcester Corn Exch. Co. i. 210

Worcester M. I. u. HardiDg ii. 942

Word v. Cavin i. 617

v. Vance i. 356

v. Word ii. 91

Wordell v. Smith i. 569

Worden v. Sharp iii. 38

Wordsworth r. Willan ii. 250

Work v. Cowhick iii. 15

Works v. Hershey ii. 822

World Ins. Co. v. Schultz ii. 556,592, 594,

598

Wormack v. Rogers i. 466

Wormley v. Lowry i. 292

Worms v. Storey ii. 423

Worral v. Akworth ii. 834

Worrall v. Gheen ii. 856

Worrall v. Harford iii 301
v. Munn i. 52; iii. 10, 14, 338

Worrell's Appeal i. 137, 150, 151

Worsley v. De Mattos iii. 441
v. Scarborough i. 81 ; iii. 299
v. Wood i. 491 ; ii. 473, 586

Worth v. Case i. 271

v. Worth iii. 352

Worthington v. Charter Oak Life Ins.

Co. ii. 601, 615

v. Cowles i. 67

v. Curtis ii. 610

v. Grimsditch iii. 83

u. Warrington iii. 245

u. Wigley ii. 823

v. Young iii. 238

Worthy v. Jones iii. 43

v. Patterson iii. 227

Wotton v. Cooke i. 24

v. Shirt i. 551

Wray v. Milestone i. 185

Wren r. Kirton i. 94, 96

v. Pearce iii. 17

Wrexham v. Huddleston i. 226

Wright v. Bigg i. 512

v. Brosseau i. 246

v. Burroughes i. 550
v. Butler ii. 752 ; iii. 100

v. Campbell iii. 444

v. Cobleigh ii. 874

v. Crookes i. 51

v. Daily i. 131

v. Dame iii. 297

v. Dannah iii. 11

v. De Groff iii. 39

a. Deklyne ii. 867

... Fairfield iii. 426, 454

v. Gihon ii. 56

v. Goddard ii. 772

v. Hart i. 603

v. Hartford Ins. Co. ii. 5S6

v. Hazen ii. 929

v. Herrick i. 189

v. Hooker i. 204

v. Howard iii. 336, 357

v. Howell i. 636

t>. Hunter ii. 387
v. Laing ii. 763 ; iii. 134

v. Lawes i. 647

v. Lawton ii. 756

v. London, &c. R. Co. ii. 46

v. McAlexander iii. 116

v. Morley ii. 6 ; iii. 437
v. Morse i. 285 ; ii. 684

v. Nutt ii. 6

v. Orient Ins. Co. ii. 529

a. Post i. 21
v. Proud i. 93
o. Reed ii. 753
v. Remington i. 443
v. Rider ii. 893

b. Russell ii. 5, 21
v. Shawcross i. 321
v. Shiffner ii. 521
v. Simpson ii. 6

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

CCXX1

Wright v. Smith
v. Smyth
v. Steele
v. Tallis
v. Walker
v. Ward
v. Wheeler
v. Wilcox

ii. 831, 836

ii. 879

i. 364, 365

ii. 337

i. 93

ii. 28

iii. 130

i. 114

v. Wright i. 129, 136, 251, 831,

407,460; ii. 62, 737, 828

Wrightup v. Chamberlain iii. 229

Wrigley, In re ii. 710

Wrotesley v. Adams i. 531 ; ii. 682

Wroth v. Johnson ii. 897

Wyat ". Bulmer i. 293

o. Hodson iii. 87, 90

Wyatt v. Barnard ii. 342

Wyburd v. Stanton i. Ill

Wycoff v. Longhead iii. 153

Wyckoff v. Anthony ii. 776

Wyeth v. Stone ii. 306, 308, 311, 314, 324

Wyke v. Rogers ii. 29

Wyld v. Pickford ii. 263

Wylie v. Marine Bank i. 109

v. Smitherman iii. 183, 187

Wyllis v. Ault iii. 144

Wylly v. Collins i. 409

Wyman v. Ballard iii. 244

v. Gray iii. 17

v. Goodrich ii. 11

v. Hallowell & Augusta Bank i. 42

v. People's Ins. Co. ii. 555, 588

v. Smith iii. 28,- 30

v. Winslow ii. 780

Wyndham, Ex parte iii. 416

v. Way i. 646

Wynn u. Alien i. 322

v. Allard ii. 247, 248

v. Cox ii. 679

Wynne v. Jackson ii. 700

v. Price i. 522 ; iii. 325

v. Raikes i. 304

Wyoming Co. v. Price i. 540

X.

Xenos v. Wickham

Y.

Yager v. Merkle
Yalden, Ex parte
Yale, Ex parte

v. Dederer i.

v. Edgerton
Yallop v. Ebers
Yancey v. Brown
Yandes v. Lefavour
Yarborough v. Bank of England
Yard ;;. Eland
Yarnell v. Anderson
Yate v. Roules

i>. Willan

ii. 471

i. 405
i. 129
i. 126
403, 408
iii. 25

iii. 462
ii. 31

ii. 746
i. 154
i. 480
i. 192
i. 22

ii. 772

Yates v. Boen

v. Bond

v. Brown

v. Carnsew

v.Vutt

v. Donaldson

v. Foot

v. Freckleton

v. Hoppe

v. Nash

v. Pym

v. Sherrington

v. Van Rensselaer
Yea v. Eouraker
Yeager v. Farwell

v. Wallace
Yealey v. Pink
Yeamans v. Yeamans
Yeatman v. Savings Inst,

v. Woods
Yeaton v. Berney
Yokom v. McBride
Yong v. Reynoll

i. 4:14

i. 615

i. 117; ii. 468, 469

iii. 420

ii. 408

i. 02

ii. 897

ii. 746

i. 74

i. 282

i. 624 ; ii. 677

iii. 439, 469

ii. 874

iii. 68

i. 307

i. 202

i. 98

ii. 825

iii. 421

i. 109

i. 309

iii. 246

ii. 6

Yonkers, &c. Ins. Co. v. Hoffman, &c.

Ins. Co. ii. 494

Yopst v. Yopst i. 384

York v. Grindstone ii. 164, 165

v. Landis ii. 6

York Buildings v. Mackenzie i. 95

York Co. v. Central R. R. Co. ii. 233

Yorke v. Grenaugh ii. 164, 165 ; iii. 268
Yorks v. Peck i. 11, 29, 30

Yorkshire Banking Co. v. Beatson i. 204
Yorton v. Milwaukee R. Co. ii. 246

Yost v. American Ins. Co. ii. 614

Youde v. Jones ii. 645

Young, Ex parte ii. 387, 390, 391 ; iii. 449,

463, 464
v. Adams i. 300; ii. 753

v. Axtell i. 190

v. Bank of Bengal iii. 439, 469

v. Berkley iii. 127

v. Black ii. 868

v. Bradley i. 557

v. Bryan i. 325

v. Conant Mfg. Co. ii- 050

v. Corell ii. 917

v. Dearborn iii- 286

v. Duhme i. 146

v. Durgin i. 320

v. Eagle Ins. Co. ii. 476, 576

v. French iii- 27

v. Frier i. 239

v. Frost iii' 371

v. Hall ii- 915, 916

^.Harris i- 314; ii. 700

v. Hockley !"■ 4M

v. Hunter i- 194

v. Keighley i. 234

v. Mackall ij|- 102

v. MacRae «• 353

v. Matthews i- 666

v. McClure i- 569

v. Miller >"• n2

v. Paul !"• o7°

CCXX11

INDEX TO CASES CITED.

Young v. Rathbone

iii. 334

v. Reuben

ii. 820

v. Seott

iii. 136

c. Smith ii

197, 220

a. Stevens

i. 436

v. Taylor

iii. 463

v. Timmins

ii. 890

v. Turner

iii. 176

v. Virginia, The

ii. 392

v. Ward

i. 272

v. Washington Co. Ins. Co. h

. 550, 551

v. West. Un. Tel. Co.

ii. 285

v. Wood

iii. 295

v. Wright

iii. 127

Young, &e. Co. v. Wakefield

ii. 814

Young Mechanic, The ii.

381, 401

Young Sam, The

ii. 383

Youngblood v. Loury

i. 553

Younger v. Givens iii.

221, 222

Youngs v. Lee i. 291,

292, 322

Youqua v. Nixon i.

490, 574

Yoxtheimer v. Keyser

i. 463

Yulee v. Canora

i. 99

Yundt v. Hartrunft

iii. 178

Zacharias v. Zacharias
Zacharie v. Orleans Ins. Co.

iii. 75
ii. 488

Zachrison v. Ahman i. 109

Zachrisson v. Poppe i. 586

Zagury v. Furnell i. 566

Zaleskiu. Clark i. 564; ii. 63

Zane u. Brig President, The ii. 381,

384

v. Zane ■ 468, 471

Zarega, In re iii. 404

Zell v. German Sav. Inst. iii. 281

Zeigler v. Day

ii. 47

Zenobia, The

ii. 454

Zent v. Heart

iii. 88

Zephyr, The ii

402, 403, 442

Zephyru9, The

ii. 440

Zerbee v. Miller

ii. 52

Zerega v. Poppe

ii. 410

Ziegenfuss, Ex parte

iii. 400, 401

Ziegler v. Bank

ii. 113

Zimmerman v. Rote

ii. 862

v. Zimmerman

ii. 941

Zimmermann v Marchland

i. 541

Zimpleman v. Veeder

ii. 128

Zinck v. Walker

i. 571

Zinn v. Rowley

ii. 787

Zipcey v. Thompson

ii. 699

Zodiac, The

ii. 433

Zollar v. Janvrin

i. 191

Zouch v. Parsons

i. 334

Zuchtmann v. Roberts

i. 578

Zwinger v. Samuda

i. 330

PART I.

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

CONSIDERED IN REFERENCE TO

THE OBLIGATIONS

ASSUMED BY

THE PARTIES.

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

PRELIMINARY CHAPTER.
SECTION I.

OP THE EXTENT AND SCOPE OF THE LAW OF CONTKACTS.

The Law of Contracts, in its widest extent, may be regarded
as including nearly all the law which regulates the relations of
human life. Indeed, it may be looked upon as the basis of
human society. All social life presumes it, and rests upon it ;
for out of contracts, express or implied, declared or understood,
grow all rights, all duties, all obligations, and all law. Almost
the whole procedure of human life implies, or, rather, is, the con-
tinual fulfilment of contracts.

Even those duties, or those acts of kindness and affection,
which may seem most remote from contract or compulsion of any
kind, are nevertheless within the scope of the obligation of con-
tracts. The parental love which provides for the infant when, in
the beginning of its life, it can do nothing for itself, nor care for
itself, would seem to be so pure an offering of affection, that the
idea of a contract could in no way belong to it. But even here,
although these duties are generally discharged from a feeling
which borrows no strength from a sense of obligation, there is
still such an obligation. It is implied by the cares of the past,
which have perpetuated society from generation to generation ;
by that absolute necessity which makes * the performance of * 4
these duties the condition of the preservation of human life ;
and by the implied obligation on the part of the unconscious
objects of this care, that when, by its means, they shall have grown
into strength, and age has brought weakness upon those to whom
they are thus indebted, they will acknowledge and repay the debt.

3

* 5 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

Indeed, the law recognizes and enforces this obligation, to a
certain degree, on both sides, as will be shown hereafter.

It would be easy to go further, and show that in all the rela-
tions of social life, its good order and prosperity depend upon the
due fulfilment of the contracts which bind all to all. Sometimes
these contracts are deliberately expressed with all the precision of
law, and are armed with all its sanctions. More frequently they
are, though still expressed, simpler in form and more general in
language, and leave more to the intelligence, the justice, and hon-
esty of the parties. Far more frequently they are not expressed
at all ; and for their definition and extent we must look to the com-
mon principles which all are supposed to understand and acknowl-
edge. In this sense, contract is co-ordinate and commensurate with
duty ; and it is a familiar principle of the law, of which we shall
have much to say hereafter, and which has a wide, though far
from a universal application, that whatsoever it is certain that a
man ought to do, that the law supposes him to have promised to
do. "Implied contracts," says Blackstone (vol. ii. p. 443), "are
such as reason and justice dictate, and which, therefore, the law
presumes that every man undertakes to perform." These con-
tracts form the warp and woof of actual life. If they were wholly
disregarded, the movement of society would be arrested. And
in so far as they are disregarded, that movement is impeded or
disordered.

If all contracts, express or implied, were carried into full effect,
the law would have no office but that of instructor or adviser. It
is because they are not all carried into effect, and it is that they
may be carried into effect, that the law exercises a compulsory
power.

Hence is the necessity of law; and the well-being of society
depends upon, and may be measured by, the degree in which
5 * the law construes and interprets all contracts wisely ; elimi-
nates from them whatever is of fraud or error, or otherwise
wrongful ; and carries them out into their full and proper effect
and execution. These, then, are the results which the law seeks.
And it seeks these results by means of principles ; that is, by
means of truths, ascertained, defined, and so expressed as to be
practical and operative. There are many of the rules of law
which do not come within this definition of principles. They
are formal or technical ; but they are in force because they are
4

*

PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. * 6

believed to be subsidiary to, and needed or useful for the compre-
hension, application, and enforcement of principles ; and these for-
mal rules derive their whole power and value from the principles
which they explain or enforce and carry into effect.

It is said that the law seeks these results by means of princi-
ples ; and these again, in their most general form, may be said to
be, first, those rules of construction and interpretation which have
for their object to find in a contract a meaning which is honest,
sensible, and just, without doing violence to the expressions of the
parties, or making a new contract for them ; and, secondly, those
which discharge from a contract whatever would bring upon it the
fatal taint of fraud, or is founded upon error or accident, or would
work an injury. And if these elements of wrong are so far vital
to any contract, that when they are removed it perishes, then the
law annuls or refuses to enforce that contract, unless a still greater
mischief would thereby be done.

Subsidiary to these are the rules and processes of the law, by
means whereof a contract, which in itself is good, and has been
properly construed, and is free from all removable elements of
wrong, is enforced, or carried into execution.

* SECTION II. *6

DEFINITION OP CONTRACTS.

A contract, in legal contemplation, is an agreement between
two or more parties, for the doing or the not doing of some par-
ticular thing, (a)

la) "A contract is an agreement in eration and the promise and the sale,

wh ch a party undertakes to do, or not ought to meet together, for a contract is

to do a particular thing." Marshall,C, J., derived from con and trahere, which is a

Sturges « Crowninsh"e!d; 4 Wheat. 197. drawing together, so as in contracts every

_" I contract is an agreement, upon thing which is requisite ought to concur

sufficient consideration, to do or not to do and meet together ; namely the consid-

aTaTcuUr thing." 2 Bl. Com. 446.- eration, of the one side, and the sale or

LPs!denham and Worlington's case, 2 the promise on the other side. But to

Leon 224, 225, which was an assumpsit, maintain an action upon an ^"^'n r

founded upon an executed consideration, same is not requisite, for it is sufficient if

Per?«Tj conceived that the action did there be a moving cause, or considera-

we?l He and The said there was a great tion precedent, for which cause or cons.d-

diff erence between contracts and that case : eration the promise was made.
" For in contracts upon sale, the consid-

* 7 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

It has been said that the word agreement is derived from the
phrase " aggregatio mentium." (5) This is at least doubtful, and
was probably suggested by the wish to illustrate that principle of
the law of contracts which makes an agreement of the minds of
the parties or the consent and harmony of their intentions, essen-
tial. We shall presently see that they must propose and mean
the same thing, and in the same sense.

The word "contract" is of comparatively recent use, as a law
term. Formerly, courts and lawyers spoke only of " obliga-
tions," (c) — meaning thereby " bonds," in which the word
" oblige " is commonly used as one of the technical and formal
terms, — " covenants," and " agreements," which last word was
used as we now use the word " contract." The word " promise "
is often used in instruments, and sometimes in legal proceedings.
"Agreement" is seldom applied to specialties; "contract" is
generally confined to simple contracts ; and " promise " re-

* 7 fers to the engagement of a party * without reference to the

reasons or considerations for it, or the duties of other parties.
In the above definition of a contract, no mention is made of the
consideration. The Statute of Frauds requires, in many cases,
and for many purposes, that the " agreement " shall be in writing,
and some note or memorandum thereof be signed by the party
sought to be charged. Under this provision, it has been much
controverted whether the word "agreement" so far implies a
" consideration," that this also must be in writing. This question
will be considered in a subsequent part of this work, (i) We
have not included the consideration in the definition of the
contract, because we do not regard it as, of itself, an essential
part thereof. But for practical purposes it is made so by some
important and very influential rules, and we shall treat of the
consideration as one of the elements of a legal contract.

(6) Per Pollard, Serjeant, arguendo in v. Warlters, 6 East, 16; Saunders t>.

Reniger v. Fogossa, Plowd. 17. Wakefield, 4 B. & Aid. 595 ; Violett v.

(c) See the Abridgments of Brooke, Patton, 6 Cranch, 142 ; Packard v. Rich-

Rolle, Bacon, &c. ardson, 17 Mass. 122: Sage v. Wilcox, 6

(rf) Vol. III.* 14-* 16. And see Wain Conn. 81.

6

PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. * 8

SECTION III.

CLASSIFICATION OF CONTRACTS.

The most general division of contracts is into contracts by spe-
cialty, and simple contracts.1

Contracts by specialty are those which are reduced to writing
and attested by a seal — or, to use the common phrase, contracts
under seal ; and contracts of record. These last are judgments,
recognizances, and statutes staple. But the term " contracts by
specialty " is sometimes confined to contracts under seal.

Simple contracts are all those which are not contracts by spe-
cialty. It is not accurate in point of language to distinguish be-
tween verbal contracts and written contracts ; for whether the
words are written or spoken, the contracts are equally verbal, or
expressed in words. Nor is it accurate in point of law to
* distinguish between written and parol contracts, (e) For * 8
whether they be written or only spoken, they are, in law, if
not sealed, equally and only parol contracts. For some pur-
poses, and especially by the requirements of the Statute of Frauds,
the evidence of the contract must be in writing ; and when it is
in writing, some peculiar rules of law apply to it. (/) But it is
a mistake to rest upon this a legal distinction between written
and oral contracts ; and from this mistake some confusion has
arisen, (c/)

(e) " The law makes no distinction clared to exist by a higher sort. In

in contracts, except between contracts this sense it is unquestionably true, as

which are, and contracts which are not, Lord Ellenborough said in Hoare v. Gra-

under seal. I recollect one of the most ham, 3 Camp. 57, that to incorporate

learned judges who ever sat upon this with a written contract an incongruous

or any other bench, being very angry parol condition, is contrary to first prin-

when a distinction was attempted to be ciples.

taken between parol and written con- '' (g) Wilmot, J., Pillans v. Van Mierop,

tracts, and saying, ' They are all parol, 3 Burr. 1670-1, and Parker, J., Stack-

unless under seal.'" Lord Abinger, C. pole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. 27, 30, recog-

B., in Beckham v. Drake, 9 M. & W. nize three classes of contracts, but are

92. not sustained by the authorities. See

(J) And independently of the statute, Rann v. Hughes, 7 T. R. 350, n. ;

a familiar rule of judicial procedure Thacher «. Dinsmore, 5 Mass. 299, 301 ;

forbids the contradiction, by one sort Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57; Union

of evidence, of a state of things de- Turnpike Co. v. Jenkins, 1 Caines, 386.

1 As to express, implied, and constructive contracts, see "Woods v. Ayres, 39
Mich. 346.

7

* 8 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

The essentials of a legal contract, of which we shall now pro-
ceed to treat, are, first, the Parties, for we cannot conceive of a
contract which has no parties ; secondly, the Consideration, for
this is, in legal contemplation, the cause of the contract ; thirdly,
the Assent of the Parties, without which there is in law no con-
tract ; and, fourthly, the Subject-Matter of the Contract, or what
the parties to it propose as its effect.

*BOOK I.

OF PAETIES TO A CONTKACT.

CHAPTER I.

CLASSIFICATION OP PARTIES.

Parties may act independently and severally, or jointly, or
jointly and severally.

They may act as representative of others, as

Agents,

Factors or Brokers,

Servants,

Attorneys,

Trustees,

Executors or Administrators,

Guardians.
They may act in a collective capacity, as

Corporations,

Joint^Stock Companies,

Partnerships.
They may be New Parties,

By Novation,

By Assignment,

By Indorsement.
They may be Parties disabled in whole or in part, as

Infants,

Married Women,
* Non Compotes Mentis, * 10

Drunkards,

Spendthrifts,

Seamen,

9

10 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

Persons under Duress,
Aliens,
Outlaws,
Attainted,
Excommunicated;
These subjects we will proceed to consider separately.
10

CH- n-J OP JOINT PARTIES.

11

* CHAPTER II. *11

OP JOINT PARTIES.

Sect. I. — Whether Parties are Joint or Several.

Wherever an obligation is undertaken by two or more, or a
right given to two or more, it is the general presumption of law
that it is a joint obligation or right.1 Words of express joinder
are not necessary for this purpose ; but on the other hand, there
should be words of severance, in order to produce a several respon-
sibility or a several right, (a)

Whether the liability incurred is joint, or several, or such that
it is either joint or several at the election of the other contracting
party, depends (the rule above stated being kept in view) upon the
terms of the contract, if they are express ; and where they are
not express, upon the intention of the parties as gathered from

(a) Hill v. Tucker, 1 Taunt. 7 ; Hat- But, in Slater v. Magraw, 12 G. & J.
sail v. Griffith, 4 Tyr. 487 ; King v. 265, where (on the sale of a negro) the
Hoare, 13 M. & W. 499, per Parke, B. ; form of the covenant was, " I do here-
English v. Blundell, 8 C. & P. 332; by obligate to give the said William
Yorks v. Peck, 14 Barb. 644. — With re- Slater a good title for said boy when
spect to instruments under seal, it is said called on. W. M. F. Magraw (seal).
in Shep. Touch. 375 : " H two, three, or Security : George H. Dutton (seal),"
more bind themselves in an obligation, — a demurrer to a count declaring on
thus, obligamus nos, and say no more, the this as a joint and several covenant,
obligation is, and shall be taken to be, joint was sustained, and the court held that
only, and not several." And see Ehle v. the covenant to convey the title was
Purdy, 6 Wend. 629. — If an instrument, the covenant of Magraw alone ; that the
worded in the singular, is executed by covenant of Dutton was a several cov-
several, the obligation is a joint and enant as surety that Magraw would
several one ; and those who thus execute make the title when called on for that
it may be sued either separately or to- purpose ; and that therefore an action
gether. Hemmenway v. Stone, 7 Mass. on the covenant to convey could not be
58 ; Van Alstyne v. Van Slyck, 10 Barb, maintained against them jointly. See,
383; Powell, J., Sayerv. Chaytor, 1 Lutw. also, De Ridder v. Schermerhorn, 10
695, 697; Marsh v. Ward, Peake, Cas. Barb. 638; Allen u. Fosgate, 11 How.
130; Clerk v. Blackstock, Holt, 474; Pr. 218.
and see Hall v. Smith, 1 B. & C. 407.

1 Thus, a promissory note in the form : " I promise," &c, signed by several per-
sons, is joint as well as several. Wallace v. Jewell, 21 0. St. 163. See also Crosby
v. Jeroloman, 37 Ind. 264, 274, citing the text with approval.

11

'12

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[book I.

* 12 all the circumstances of the case. (J) 1 It may * be doubted,

however, whether any thing less than express words can

raise a liability which shall be at once a joint and a several

liability.

Where the obligation is joint and several, an ancient and famil-
iar rule of law forbids it to be treated as several as to some of the
obligors, and joint as to the rest. The obligee has the right of
choice between the two methods of proceeding ; but he must re-
sort to one or the other exclusively, and cannot combine both ;
that is, he must proceed either severally against each, or jointly
against all. (c) 2

of agreement (conveniunt) being in the
plural, and not being repeated in the
singular, so as to express a distinct sev-
eral promise. Bolton v. Lee, 2 Lev. 56;
Sewer v. Bradfield, Cro. E. 422 ; May v.
Woodward, Freera. 248; Enys v. Don-
nithorne, 2 Burr. 1190 ; Mansell v. Bur-
redge, 7 T. R. 352 ; Bangor Bank v.
Treat, 6 Greenl. 207.

(c) Streatfleld v. Halliday, 3 T. R.
782 ; Cabell v. Vaughan, 1 Wms. Saund.
291, f, n. 4; Bangor Bank v. Treat, 6
Greenl. 207. In the case of a joint and
several debt, judgment (without satisfac-
tion) recovered against one of the debt-
ors, is no bar to an action against
another. Per Popham, C. J., Brown v,
Wootton, Cro. J. 74, cited by Parke, B.,
in King v. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 504. —
But a judgment, though unsatisfied, re-
covered against one of two joint debtors,
is a bar to an action against the other,
or to an action against both. 3 Kent's
Com. 30; "Ward v. Johnson, 13 Mass.
148 ; King v. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 494. —
In Robertson v. Smith, 18 Johns. 484,
which was the case of a solvent dormant
partner, discovered after judgment ob-
tained against the insolvent ostensible j
partner, Spencer, J., while holding the ;
plaintiff's action to be barred, suggested
that the court, on application, might be
induced to vacate the former judgment. —
But Collins v. Lemasters, 1 Bail. 346;
Treasurers v. Bates, 2 Bail. 362, and
Sheehy v. Mandeville, 6 Cranch, 253, are
contra. In King v. Hoare, 13 M. & W.
494, Sheehy v. Mandeville was cited, but
Parke, B., giving the judgment of the
court, observed : " During the argument,

(b) Wilde, J., in Peekham v. North
Parish in Haverhill, 16 Pick. 274, 283.
In the following cases the liability was
held to be joint : Wigmore and Wells'
case, 3 Leon. 206 ; Wightman v. Chart-
man, Gould, 83;- Anonymous, Moore,
260 ; Coleman v. Sherwin, 1 Salk. 137,
1 Show. 79; Byers v. Dobey, 1 H. Bl.
236; Exall v. Partridge, 8 T. R. 308;
Wathen v. Sandys, 2 Camp. 640; For-
ster v. Taylor, 3 id. 49 ; Eaden v. Titch-
marsh, 1 A. & E. 691 ; London Gas
Light Co. v. Nicholls, 2 C. & P. 365;
Phillips v. Bonsall, 2 Binn. 138. In the
following cases the liability was held to
be several: 39 H. 6, 9, pi. 15; Bro.
Abr. Covenant, pi. 27 ; 9. c. Viner Abr.
Covenant (M. a), pi. 1, 2 ; s. c. Mathew-
son's case, 5 Rep. 22 ; Brown v Doyle,
3 Camp. 51, n. ; Gibson v. Lupton, 9
Bing. 303; Collins v. Prosser, 1 B. & C.
682 ; Hudson v. Robinson, 4 M. & Sel.
475; Smith v. Pocklington, 1 Cr. & J.
445 ; Fell v. Goslin, 7 Exch. 185 ; Harris
v. Campbell, 4 Dana, 586; M'Cready v.
Freedly, 3 Rawle, 231 ; Ernst v. Bartle,
1 Johns. Cas. 319; Ludlow v. McCrea,
1 Wend. 228; Howe v. Handley, 25 Me.
116. In the following cases the liability
was held to be joint and several: Constable
v. Clobery, Pop. 161 ; Burden v. Ferrers,
1 Sid. 189; Hankinson v. Sandilaus, Cro.
J. 322 ; Linn v. Crossing, 2 Roll. Abr.
148, Obligation (G) ; Lilly v. Hodges,
1 Stra. 553, 8 Mod. 106; Robinson v.
Walker, 1 Salk. 3'.)3, 7 Mod. 163. The
words there were, conveniunt pro se et qvo-
libet eorum. But Holt, C. J., dissenting
from the majority, thought this might be
considered joint by reason of the word

1 Where the principal obligor is bound in a certain sura, and A,B, and C, " each
as surety respectively " in a third of that sum, the liability of each surety is several.
Commercial Bank v. Gorham, 11 R. I. 102.

- Kendall v. Hamilton, 4 App. Cas. 604, follows and approves. King v. Hoare,
supra.

12

CH. II. J

OP JOINT PARTIES.

•18

* The question whether the eight under a contract is joint * 13
or otherwise, enters more intimately into the nature of the
contract, and therefore is of more importance ; and it is at the
same time of greater difficulty.

As a contract with several persons, for the payment to them of
a sum of money, is a joint contract with all, and all the payees
have therein a joint interest, so that no one can sue alone for his
proportion ; so, the designating of the share of each will not create
such a severance of interest as to sustain a several action ; but all
must join in an action for the whole. (<2) But if the contract
contains distinct grants, or promises of distinct sums to distinct
payees, they would then have several interests, and certainly
may, perhaps must, bring separate actions, (e)

Where there are three or more obligees or promisees, the con-
tract, if treated as joint by any, must be treated as joint by all.
In no case can two sue together, leaving the other to seek his
remedy upon the same contract, by himself. (/)

a decision of the Chief Justice Marshall,
in the Supreme Court of the United
States, was cited as being contrary to the
conclusion this court has come to ; the
case is that of Sheehy v. Mandeville. We
need not say we have the greatest re-
spect for every decision of that eminent
judge ; but the reasoning attributed to
him by that report is not satisfactory to
us ; and we have since been furnished
with a report of a subsequent case, in
which that authority was cited and con-
sidered, and in which the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts decided
that, in an action against two on a joint
note, a judgment against one was a bar.
Ward v. Johnson, 13 Tyng, 148." —
Where one contracts in writing with
three persons to give a bill of sale of
two-thirds of a vessel to two of them, and
of one-third to the other, and, in pursu-
ance of the contract, does convey two-
thirds ; this is not a severance of the
cause of action, and a suit may be
maintained for the price against the
whole. Marshall v. Smith, 15 Me. 17.

(rf) Lane v. Drinkwater, 5 Tyr. 40, 1
C, M. & E. 599 ; Byrne v. Fitzhugh, 5
Tyr. 54, 1 C, M. & R. 613.

}e) The master of a vessel covenanted
with the several part-owners and their
several and respective executors, adminis-
trators, and assigns, to pay certain mon-
eys to them and to their several and re-
spective executors, &c, at a certain
banker's, and in such parts and propor-

tions as were set against their respective
names. Upon this covenant an action
was brought by the covenantees jointly.
Held, on "demurrer to the declaration,
that the covenant was several, because
otherwise no effect would be given to
the words " several and respective exe-
cutors," &c.,and because the money was
to be paid to the banker, not as an entire
sum for him to make distributions, but
in several proportions to the separate
account of each part-owner, thus making
the interest of the covenantees several.
Servante v. James, 10 B. & C. 410. See
also Ford v. Bronaugh, 11 B. Mon. 14.

(/) Contra, Bro. Abr. Covenant, 49.
A man covenanted with twenty, and
with each of them, to make certain sea-
banks ; and by his not doing it the land
of two was overflowed to their injury.
Held by the court, that these two could
have their action of covenant without
the others. " Qucere," adds Brooke,
"for it seems that each should bring
an action by himself." The criticism of
Brooke is undoubtedly well founded.
It may be questioned, moreover, whether
this case is authority even to give such
a covenant the legitimate attributes of a
sereral covenant. The case was cited m
Slingsby's case (according to the report
of the latter in 2 Leon. 47 ). There, A, B,
and C, being parties respectively to an
indenture tripartite, wherein A cove-
nanted with B and C, et quokbet eorum,
that the land which he had conveyed to

13

* 14 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

If a contract which is expressly, and in its very terms, joint
and several, be made with divers persons, but for the pay-

* 14 ment * of a sum or the accruing of some other benefit to

one of them only, all must join in a suit upon that con-
tract ; O) because but one thing is to be done, and all have a
legal interest in the performance of that thing, although but one
party has a beneficial interest. So if there be in one instrument
a covenant with A, and another separate and distinct covenant
with B, and both are for the payment of a sum of money to A, A
cannot sue alone for this sum, but B must join, because other-
wise the payer might be subjected to suits by both parties. (K)
In general, all contracts, whether express, or implied and result-
ing from the operation or construction of law, are joint, where the
interest in them of the parties for whose benefit they are created,
is joint, and separate where that interest is separate. But the
interest which is thus important as a criterion, is an interest in
the contract, and not in any sum of money, or other benefit, to
be received from it. It is a strictly legal and technical interest
created by the contract, and does not depend upon the condition
or state of the parties aside from the contract. (J) 2

A covenant which is single in its nature, or which is for one and
the same cause, and so, in strict propriety, may be called one cov-
enant and not a cluster of covenants, can never be joint and sev-
eral in respect to the covenantees. In other words, this class of
covenants does not exist with respect to the parties plaintiff in an
action for covenant broken ; it never lies in the option of the cove-
nantees to say whether they shall sue for the breach, jointly or
severally. They must sue jointly if they can. (j) The circum-

B was discharged of all incumbrances, B Spencer v. Durant, Comb. 115; Eccles-

brought a several action of covenant ; ton v. Clipsham, 1 Wms. Saund. 153 ;

and the court held, notwithstanding the Petrie v. Bury, 3 B. & C. 353; Scott v.

case from Brooke, that C ought to have Godwin, 1 B. & P. 67, 71 ; Gibbs, C. J.,

been joined. James v. Emery, 5 Price, 533 ; Foley v.

(g) Anderson v. Martindale, 1 East, Addenbrooke, 4 Q. B. 197 ; Pollock, C. B.,

497. Parke, B., and Rolfs, B„ Keightley v.

(A) Id. AVatson, 3 Exch. 721, 723, 726^— Possi-

(i) Anderson v. Martindale, 1 East, bly, an exception to this rule is to be

497 ; English v. Blundell, 8 C. & P. 332; found in the case where the words of the

Lord Detiman, Hopkinson v. Lee, 6 Q. B. covenant are joint and several as to the

971, 972. covenantees, while their interest is sev-

(j ) Slingsby's case, 5 Rep. 19 a ; eral. In such a case the law, perhaps,

1 As where one enters into a business contract under seal, and afterwards takes a
partner in his business, the latter cannot sue upon the contract. Duff v. Gardner,
7 Lansing, 165.

14

CH. II. J OP JOINT PARTIES. * 15

stances of each case, and the situation * and relation of the * 15

allows the covenantees, who, upon any
principle of construction, clearly may
sue separately, the liberty to sue jointly.
See Eccleston v. Clipsham, 1 Wms.
Saund. 153 ; Withers v. Bircham, 3 B.
& C. 250 ; Slingsby's case, 5 Rep. 19 a ;
Rolls v. Yates, Yelv. (Metcalf's ed.), 177,
n. — On the supposition that this ex-
ception exists, both rule and exception
might be expressed by stating the prop-
osition thus : It is not possible, by any
mere words of joinder and severance, to
give the covenantees the election to
sue separately or together.

By what principles it is to be deter-
mined whether a given contract is joint,
or joint and several, or several, is a mat-
ter in regard to which the authorities are
in a state of some confusion. A doubt,
suggested by Mr. Preston in his edition
of the Touchstone, and taken up by the
Court of Exchequer, has at once shaken
the received opinion, and occasioned at
least apparent conflict between that court
and the Queen's Bench. It is evident
that a covenant may be considered with
reference either to the covenantors or
covenantees. If A, B, and C covenant
with X, Y, and Z, two distinct questions
arise. Shall X, Y, and Z join, or not,
as plaintiffs'! Shall A, B, and C be
joined, or not, as defendants t There
appears no reason for doubting that the
words of joinder or severalty determine
the answer of the second of these ques-
tions. The covenant, with respect to
the covenantors, may belong to either
one of the three classes of joint, several,
and joint and several, just as the par-
ties have chosen to say in the covenant
that it shall. The language of severalty
or joinder, and not the interest, is then
the test of the quality of the covenant
quoad the covenantors. Enys u. Donni-
thorne, 2 Burr. 1190. As regards the
joinder of the covenantees there is nothing
a priori to prevent the existence of the
same three classes to choose amongst;
namely, the class where they must sue
jointly, that where they must sue sepa-
rately, and that where it is at their
option to sue either jointly or severally.
But the proposition stated above, if true,
obviously removes the third alternative.
The covenantees either must join or must
sever. Thus the inquiry is narrowed to
this, By what means is it to be deter-
mined in a given case whether they
must or must not sue jointly ? And
this is the point, and, as it would seem,
the only point upon which there is a

real conflict of authorities. A series of
cases, received without question by the
text-writers, went upon the principle
that the interest which the covenantees
take by the covenant, quite irrespective of
words of severalty or joinder, is in all cases
the decisive test. James v. Emery, 5
Price, 529, 8 Taunt. 245; Withers v.
Bircham, 3 B. & C. 254; Servante v. James,
10 B. & C. 410 ; Lane v. Drinkwater, 5
Tyr. 40, s. c. 1 C, M. & R. 599. But
Mr. Preston denies the correctness of
the rule as stated. " On the subject of
joint and several covenants, that emi-
nent lawyer, Sir Vicary Gihbs, assumed
that covenants must necessarily be joint
or several according to the interest. The
language was, ' Wherever the interest
of parties is separate, the action may be
several, notwithstanding the terms of
the covenant on which it is founded may
be joint ; and where the interest is joint,
the action must he joint, although the
covenant in language purport to be joint
and several.' James v. Emery, 5 Price,
533. With great deference, however, the
correct rule is, that, by express words
clearly indicative of the intention, a cove-
nant may be joint, or joint and several,
to or with the covenantors or covenan-
tees, notwithstanding the interests are
several. Salk. 393; 2 Roll. Abr. 419;
[possibly should be 149; see 6 Q. B. 971,
n.]. So they may be several, although
the interests are joint. But the implica-
tion or construction of law, when the
words are ambiguous, or are left to
the interpretation of law, will be, that the
words have an import corresponding to
the interest, so as to be joint when the
interest is joint, and several when the
interest is several ; notwithstanding lan-
guage which, under different circum-
stances, would give to the covenant a
different effect. Slingsby's case, 5 Rep.
19 ; 3 Chanc. 126 ; 5 T. R. 522 ; South-
cote v. Hoare, 3 Taunt. 89; 1 Wood,
537; 2 Burr. 1190." Shep. Touch, by
Preston, 166. In Sorsbie v. Park, 12 M.
& W. 146, Lord Abinger said : " I think
the rule is plain and certain, and re-
quires no authority ; it is correctly stated
by Mr. Preston in the passage in Shep.
Touch. 166, which Mr. Temple cited.
Where the words of a covenant are in
their nature ambiguous, so that they
may be construed either way, then the
deed in which they are inserted supplies
the mode of their construction. If it ex-
hibit a several interest in the parties,
you may construe it as a several cov-
enant, and rice versa. But there is no

15

16

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

16 parties, and the nature of the consideration, * are all to be

rule to say that words, which are ex-
pressly a joint covenant by [to] several
persons, shall be construed as a several
covenant, unless there is something to
lead to that construction." In this view
Parke, B., concurred (p. 158). " The
rule is, that a covenant will be construed
to be joint or several according to the
interest of the parties appearing upon
the face of the deed, if the words are
capable of that construction ; not that it
will be construed to be several by rea-
son of several interests, if it be expressly
joint." — In Foley v. Addenbrooke, 4 Q.
B. 197 (which was decided a little before
Sorsbie v. Park, but was not referred to
in that case), the doubt suggested by
Preston was not agitated. Mills v. Lad-
broke, 7 Man. & G., 218 [1844], was an
action brought by a single plaintiff. It
was contended that the covenant on
which the action was founded, although
several in terms, ought to be treated as
joint by reason of the interest of the
covenantees, who were engaged in a
partnership transaction. Tindat, C. J., in
overruling the objection, thus adverted to
the doctrine of the Court of Exchequer :
" The covenant, therefore, entered into
by the defendant, as representing Kings-
cote, with the shareholders, is, in point
of form, not a covenant with all the
covenantees jointly, but a several cove-
nant with each. And we think this is
so clearly the case, that if the general
rule as laid down by Sir Vicary Gibbs, in
James v. Emery, is qualified according
to the suggestion of Mr. Preston, in a
note to Sheppard's Touchstone, p. 166,
which was adopted by the Court of Ex-
chequer in the case of Sorsbie v. Park,
all reference to the nature of the plain-
tiffs interest would be unnecessary.
But, assuming on the authority of the
several cases referred to in the argu-
ment, that the unqualified rule of law is,
that the action shall follow the nature
of the interest of the covenantees, with-
out regard to the precise form of the
covenant, so that the action must be
joint where the interest in the subject-
matter of the covenant is joint, and sev-
eral where the interest of each covenantee
is a several interest, we think, upon
reference to the deed itself, the plaintiff
has such several interest in the subject-
matter as will enable him to sue alone
on this several covenant." [His lordship
then proceeds to examine the language
of the deed.] It was not long before
Hopkinson v. Lee, 6 Q. B. 964 [1845],
afforded an opportunity for the expres-

16

sion of the opinion of the Court of
Queen's Bench. This was an action by
a trustee upon articles of agreement un-
der seal, to which the defendant and T
were parties, of the one part, and the
plaintiff and his cestui que trust, parties of
the other part. The agreement recited
a loan by the plaintiff to E of money in
the hands of the plaintiff, belonging to
the cestui que trust; in consideration of
which defendant and T covenanted sev-
erally and respectively " with and to
[the plaintiff] his executors, administra-
tors, and assigns, and also as a distinct
covenant with and to [the cestui que trust]
her executors, administrators, and as-
signs," that they, the covenantors, would
pay, or cause to be paid, interest at five
per cent per annum on the money lent to
E. It was held that the cestui que trust
ought to have been joined as a plaintiff.
Lord Denman, in the opinion, referred
with approbation to the rule that wordB
of severalty do not prevent a covenant
from being joint where the interest is
joint, and said that Mr. Preston's excep-
tion was not grounded on any judicial
authority. His Lordship added (p. 971),
" We think there is no ground for Mr.
Preston's apprehension that words per-
fectly plain and unambiguous, confining
the contract expressly to one person, and
excluding all others from its operation,
will be strained by the law so as to com-
prehend those whom it took pains to ex-
clude. The true explanation of the rule
is rather this : that the whole covenant,
taken together, binds to both covenantees,
and not to either of them alone, though
separately named in some of its words,
by reason of the joint interest in the sub-
ject-matter, of the action appearing on
the face of the deed itself. Such being
the state of the authorities, a special case
was reserved from the assizes for the
Court of Exchequer, where certain per-
sons, with whom a covenant had been
made, sued the covenantors upon it.
The deed, being fully set out, was found
to make a covenant with the plaintiffs for
themselves and others ; and in Michaelmas
Term, 1843, the court held, in strict con-
formity with all the cases, that a non-
suit ought to be entered, because those
others had not been joined as plaintiffs
in bringing the action, though the cove-
nant declared on was, in its terms, made
with them alone. But the plaintiff here
places his whole reliance on some dicta
which fell from the late Chief Baron and
from Parke, B., applicable, not to that
case, but only to the converse of it,

CH. II.] OF JOINT PARTIES. * 17

looked into, to ascertain who is really interested, * and who * 17

which were represented as at variance
with the old law. Unluckily, no refer-
ence was made to Anderson v. Martin-
dale, as the court, justly thinking the
general rule too clear for argument,
stopped the learned counsel who sup-
ported it. Lord Abinger thought the
rule plain and certain, and that it re-
quired no authority : ' it is correctly
stated by Mr. Preston ; ' he then cites
the rule with the exception. Parke, B.,
also thinks the correct rule is laid down
by Gibbs, C. J., in James v. Emery (5
Price, 533), with the qualification stated
by Mr. Preston. These learned judges
could not intend to overrule Anderson v.
Martindale (1 East, 497), which was
not brought before them ; nor, if they
did, could we agree to be bound by their
extrajudicially declaring such an inten-
tion where their decision itself pursued
the doctrine of that case." — In Brad-
burne v. Botfleld, 14 M. & W. 559, 572
[1840], the matter was thus left by
Baron Parke : " There is no occasion
to refer to the cases relating to the rule
of construction, as to covenants being
joint or several, according to the inter-
est of the parties, which is perfectly well
established. In the ease of Sorsbie v.
Parke (12 M. & W. 146), Lord Abinger
and myself, on referring to the estab-
lished rule, as laid down by Lord Chief
Justice Gibbs, in the case of James v.
Emery (2 Moore, 195), approved of Mr.
Preston's qualification and explanation
of it in his edition of the Touchstone,
166, namely, that, if the language of the
covenant was capable of being so construed,
it was to be taken to be joint or several,
according to the interest of the parties
to it. Mr. Preston adds, that the gen-
eral rule proposed by Sir Vicary Gibbs,
and to be found in several books, would
establish that there was a rule of law too
powerful to be controlled by any inten-
tion, however express, and I consider such
qualification to be perfectly correct, and
at variance with no decided case, as it
is surely as competent for a person, by
express joint words, strong enough to
make a joint covenant, to do one thing
for the benefit of one of the covenantees,
and another for the benefit of another,
as it is to make a joint demise where it
is for the benefit of one. I mention this,
because the Court of Queen's Bench,
in the case of Hopkinson v. Lee (14
Law J. (n. b.) Q. B. 104), have supposed
that Lord Abinger and myself had sanc-
tioned some doctrine at variance with
the case of Anderson v. Martindale, and

Slingsby's case, which it was far from
my intention, and I have no doubt from
Lord Abinger's, to do ; it being fully es-
tablished, I conceive, by those cases,
that one and the same covenant cannot
be made both joint and several with the
covenantees. It may be fit to observe,
that a part of Mr. Preston's explanation,
that by express words a covenant may
be joint and several with the covenant-
ors or covenantees, notwithstanding the
interests are several, is inaccurately ex-
pressed; it is true only of covenantors,
and the case cited from Salkeld, p. 393,
relates to them; probably Mr. Preston
intended no more, and I never meant to
assent to the doctrine that the same cov-
enant might be made, by any words,
however strong, joint and several, where
the interest was joint ; and it is this part,
I apprehend, of Mr. Preston's doctrine,
to which the Court of Queen's Bench
objects. I think it right to give this
explanation, that it may not be supposed
that there is any difference on this point
with the Court of Queen's Bench." —
Afterwards [1849] came the case of
Keightley v. Watson, 3 Exch. 716. That
was an action of covenant by one plain-
tiff on a deed executed by one Dobbs
of the first part, the plaintiff of the
second part, and the defendants of the
third part. The deed, after reciting that
Dobbs had agreed to purchase certain
land of the plaintiff, which same land
Dobbs had agreed to sell to the defend-
ants, stated that it was thereby cove-
nanted by each party thereto, that Dobbs
should sell, and the defendants should
purchase, the said land, at £7,335, £900
to be paid upon the execution of the
deed, and £6,435 on the 27th of Novem-
ber, 1851. The deed then contained the
following covenant : " And the defend-
ants for themselves, their heirs, &e.,
hereby covenant, with the said plain-
tiff, his executors, &c, and, as a sepa-
rate covenant with the said Dobbs, his
executors, &c, that they the said de-
fendants, and their heirs, &c, shall, on
performance of the covenant and agree-
ment, hereinbefore contained, on the
part of the said Dobbs, pay to the said
plaintiff, his executors, &c, or to the said
Dobbs, his executors, &c, in case the
said plaintiff, his executors, &c, shall
then have been paid his or their pur-
chase-money, payable, &c, the sum of
£6,435, being the remainder of the said
purchase-money, on or before the 27th
November, 1851. And further, that the
said defendants, their heirs, &c, shall in

17

18

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[book I.

* 18 has sustained the damage arising from a breach of * the con-
tract, and whether such damage was joint or several. (&)

the mean time, and until the whole
of the said sum of .£(J;43o shall be paid
off, pay to the said plaintiff, his execu-
tors, &c, interest on so much of the
purchase-money as shall from time to
time remain unpaid, at the rate of £o
per cent per annum, from the date of
these presents," &c. Held, that plain-
tiff might probably sue alone for interest
on the unpaid portion of the purchase-
money, the covenant being several.
Pollock, C. B., said : " I am of opinion
that in this case trie plaintiff is entitled
to the judgment of the court. I con-
sider that the inquiry really is as to the
true meaning of the covenant, at the
same time bearing in mind the rule, —
a rule which I am by no means willing
to break in upon, — that the same cove-
nant cannot be treated as joint or sev-
eral at the option of the covenantee. If
a covenant be so constructed as to be
ambiguous, that is, so as to serve either
the one view or the other, then it will
be joint, if the interest be joint, and it
will be several, if the interest be sev-
eral. On the other hand, if it be in its
terms unmistakably joint, then, although
the interest be several, all the parties
must be joined in the action. So, if the
covenant be made clearly several, the
action must be several, although the in-
terest be joint. It is a question of con-
struction. What then, in this case, did
the parties mean *? The words of the cove-
nant are, ' And the said R. Watson, H.
Watson, and J. Smith, for themselves,
their heirs, executors, and administrators,
thereby covenant with the said W. T.
Keightley, his executors, administrators,
and assigns, and as a separate covenant
with the said A. A. Dobbs, his executors,
administrators, and assigns, that they
will do so and so. If I am to put a con-

struction upon that, I should say that it
is intended to be a several or separate
covenant. In the case of Hopkinson v.
Lee, it seems to have been understood at
one time by this court, that there were
joint words. There are certainly none.
But the nature of the interest, upon look-
ing into that particular case, may possi-
bly justify that decision. The words of
this instrument are several, and its terms
disclose a several interest ; the covenant,
therefore, must be construed according
to the words as a several covenant ; and
it appears to me that the words used by
the parties were intended to create such
a covenant. I think, therefore, that the
plaintiff is entitled to sue alone." Parke,
B., in the course of an opinion of consid-
erable length, said : " The rule that cove-
nants are to be construed according to
the interests of the parties, is a rule of
construction merely, and it cannot be
supposed that such a rule was ever laid
down as could prevent parties, whatever
words they might use, from covenanting
in a different manner. It is impossi-
ble to say that parties may not, if they
please, use joint words, so as to express
a joint covenant, and thereby to exclude
a several covenant, and that, because a
covenant may relate to several interests,
it is therefore necessarily not to be con-
strued as a jaint covenant. If there be
words capable of two constructions, we must
look to the interests of the parties which
they intended to protect, and construe
the words according to that interest. I
apprehend that no case can be found at
variance with that rule, unless Hopkin-
son v. Lee may he thought to have a
contrary aspect. During the course of
the argument in Bradburne v. Botfleld, I
certainly was under the impression, from
reading the case of Hopkinson v. Lee,

(k) In Windham's case, 5 Rep. 7, it
is stated that joint words in a grant are
sometimes taken severally. 1. In respect
of the several interests of the grantors ;
as if two tenants in common, or several
tenants, join in a grant of a rent-charge,
yet in law this grant shall be several, al-
though the words are joint. 2. In respect
of the several interests of the grantees,
&c. 19 H. 0, 63, 64. A warranty made
to two of certain lands shall enure as
several warranties, in respect that they
are severally seized, the one of part of
the lands, and the other of the residue in

18

severalty. 6 E. 2 ; Covenant, Br. 49.
[But this case does not seem to be law.
See note (m) supra } A joint covenant
taken severally in respect of the several
interests of the covenantees. Vide 16
Eliz. Dyer, 337, 338 [infra, note (c)], be-
tween Sir Anthony Cook and Watton, a
good case. 3. In respect that the grant
cannot take effect but at several times.
4. In respect of the incapacity and im-
possibility of the grantees to take jointly.
6. In respect of the cause of the grant, or
ratione subjected material. 6. Nc res destruatur
et ut evitetur absurdum.

CH. II.]

OF JOINT PARTIES.

•19
•19

^ * The nature, and especially the entireness (0 of the con-
sideration, is of great importance in determining whether
the promise be joint or several ; for if it moves from many persons
jointly, the promise of repayment is joint ; (m) but if from many
persons, but from each severally, there it is several, (w) Where
the payment is in the first place of one sum in solido, and this
is afterwards to be divided among the payees, there, generally,

that there were in that case words capa-
ble of such a construction as to make the
covenant a joint covenant. If that had
been so, then the words subsequently in-
troduced would not have made it several,
unless there had also been an interest in
respect of which it could he several, ac-
cording to the rule referred to by the
Lord Chief Baron, as laid down in Slings-
by's case, that it is not competent to the
court to hold the same covenant joint or
several at the option of the covenantee."
Rolfe, B., gave the following opinion,
which is cited at length as containing
within a small compass a clear and able
review of the whole subject: "I am of
the same opinion. It seems to me that
the question turns entirely upon the rule,
as stated by my Brother Parke, which
was distinctly laid down by this court in
the cases cited, and in which I fully con-
cur. It appears to me that Mr. Preston's
suggestion was perfectly well founded,
that the rule in Slingsby's case was not a
rule of law, but a mere rule of construc-
tion. Prom that case it appears, that, if
a covenant be cum quolibet et qualibet eortim,
that may be either a joint or several cove-
nant, and it will depend upon the context
whether it is to be taken as a joint or
several ; but it cannot be both. The rule
given in Slingsby's case is not very satis-
factory to my mind ; namely, with regard
to the difficulty which arises as to the
proper person to recover damages. If a
party choose to enter into a covenant
which creates such a difficulty, I do not
see what the court has to do with it. It
is clear that parties can so contract by
separate deeds ; why, then, should they
not be able equally to do so by separate
covenants in the same deed ? If they so
word one covenant as to make it a joint
and separate covenant, had it not been
otherwise decided, I confess I should
have seen nothing extraordinary in hold-
ing that if they choose so to contract as
to impose upon themselves that burden,
and state it to be both joint and several,
the court ought so to construe it. But
Slingsby's case has laid down the oppo-
site rule. I take it, that from that time,

the rule has always been, — whether dis-
tinctly expressed or not, it is not neces-
sary to consider, — but the rule has been
that you are to look and see from the
context what the parties meant. Apply-
ing that rule here, I see no doubt about
the question. They have said, in terms,
that it is to be a separate covenant. Ac-
cording to the other construction, if
Dobbs had satisfied Keightley, and Dobbs
had died, Keightley might have to sue
for the money coming to Dobbs, and nice
versa ; or, suppose Dobbs had not satisfied
Keightley, and Keightley had died, Dobbs
would have had to sue for the money
coming to Keightley's representatives.
The parties have expressed themselves in
words showing it was to be a separate
covenant with each, and I think we
should so hold it ; consequently the plain-
tiff is entitled to our judgment." Plait,
B., concurred in the judgment. — Prom
the whole we may gather that the Court
of Exchequer maintain the general prin-
ciple that it is competent for the parties
to make the contract, by express words,
what they please, as well with respect
to the joinder of parties as with respect
to any other legal quality of the con-
tract. The rule, carried to its extent,
would permit the making of a covenant
joint, or several, or joint and several, as to
the covenantors ; and joint, or several, or
joint and sevtral, as to the covenantees.
But the Court of Exchequer add that the
rule is to be taken with this qualification,
namely, that one of the six cases above
enumerated is excluded by the doctrine
(settled, perhaps, on authority rather than
principle), that no covenant can be joint
and several as to the covenantees. Of course
it is not to be doubted that in this respect
all contracts, whether under seal or not,
are governed by the same principles.

{1) Chanter v. Leese, 5 M. & W. 698,
701 ; 1 Roll. Abr. 31, pi. 9.

(m) Ivans v. Draper, 1 Roll. Abr. 31,
pi. 9 ; Winterstoke Hundred's case, Dyer,
370, a. But see Jones o. Robinson, 1
Exch. 454, infra, note (c).

(n) Bell v. Chaplain, Hardres, 321.

19

* 20 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

* 20 the * interest of the payees is joint ; (o) but where the firtst

payment is in several sums among the several payees, there,
generally, their interest is several, (p) So if a sum in solido is
advanced to one by many persons, the promise of repayment is a
promise to all jointly ; (q) but if several sums are advanced sepa-
rately by each, there the promise is to each severally, (r) And
if the several persons raise the sum by separate and distinct con-
tribution ; but, when raised, it is put together and advanced as
one sum, there the promise of repayment is to all jointly, (s)

Both a joint obligation or right, and a several obligation or
right may coexist ; for there may arise from the same contract,
one joint duty to all, and also several duties to each of the
parties. (£)

In analogy with the rule in the case of contracts, it is well es-
tablished, that there can be no joint action for an injury, unless
that injury be a joint injury to the plaintiffs. Therefore husband
and wife cannot sue jointly for assault and battery of them, or for
slander of them, (w)

Whatever rule be adopted as the leading principle of construc-
tion, the question whether the right created by a contract is joint
or several, must be left in any particular instance so much to
mere authority, that we close the subject with a reference to the
decisions collected in the note, (w)

(o) Lane v. Drinkwater, 5 Tyr. 40 ; action was held properly brought ; where

Byrne v. Fitzhugh, id. 54. it was held that a several action should

(p) Thomas and , Styles, 461. have been joint ; where a several action

(q) May v. May, 1 C. & P. 44. Money was held properly brought ; where it was

advanced on the joint credit of two par- held that a joint action should have been

ties may be recovered by them in a joint several : —

action against the person for whose ben- 1. Where a joint action was held properly

efit it was paid. Osborne v. Harper, 5 broui/ht.

East, 225. Wakefield & Bingley v. Brown,

(r) Brand v. Boulcott, 3 B. & P. 235. 9 Q. B. 209. Covenant. Bingley, being

(s) May v. May, 1 0. & P. 44. owner of a term of sixty-one years,

(() Story v. Richardson, 6 Bing. N. C. granted an annuity to Samuel W., and

123 ; Peckham v. North Parish in Haver- for securing payment, assigned the terra

hill, 16 Pick. 274. (wanting one day) to Robert W. By

(u) 9 Ed. 4, 51 ; Cole ». Turner, 6 indenture, reciting these facts, Robert

Mod. 149. The husband should sue alone W., at the request of Samuel W. and

for the injury to him, and the husband of Bingley, demised, and Bingley de-

and wife should sue jointly for the injury mised and confirmed the premises to

to her. Gazinsky et ux. v. Colburn, 11 Sophia B., at a rent payable to Samuel

Cush. 10. W., while the premises remained sub-

(v) It is attempted in this note to col- ject to the annuity, and afterwards to

lect at least the most important cases in Bingley. Sophia B. covenanted to and

which the question of the propriety of with Samuel W. and Robert W., and

the joinder of plaintiffs has been passed their respective executors, &c, and also

upon. These cases fall, it is evident, with and to Bingley, his executors, &c,

within one of four classes : Where a joint to pay the rent, while the premises were

20

CH. II.]

OP JOINT PARTIES.

21

•SECTION II.

21

OP SOME INCIDENTS OP JOINDEE.

Parties are not said to be joint in law, merely because they
are connected together in some obligation or some interest

eubject to the annuity, to Robert [sic]
W., and afterwards to Bingley, and also
to make certain repairs. The action
was upon the covenant to repair. Held,
on demurrer, that Samuel W., being
dead, Robert W. and Bingley could sue
jointly. — Rose b. Poulton, 2 B. and
Ad. 822. Covenant. Demurrer. The
covenant declared upon was, in terms,
with the plaintiffs and G., jointly and
severally. G. was also one of the cove-
nantors, but was dead at the time of the
bringing of the action. The court held,
that whether or not one of the cove-
nantees could, if he had chosen, have
sued separately, the action, as brought,
was well maintainable. — Pease v.
Hiest, 10 B. & C. 122. A, wishing to
obtain credit with his bankers, in 1817,
prevailed upon three persons to join
him in a promissory note, whereby
they jointly and severally promised to
pay the bankers or order £300. Upon
two of the partners retiring from the
banking-house, a balance was struck
between the old and new firm, and the
promissory note was delivered to the
new firm, but not indorsed to them.
Held, that the action was well brought
in the name of the surviving members
of the old firm. — Kitchin v. Buckley,
T. Raym. 80 ; 1 Lev. 109 ; s. o. 1 Sid.
157; nom. Kitchin v. Compton. Cove-
nant for repairs against lessee for years.
One Randall demised the tenement to
the defendant, and afterwards granted
a moiety of the reversion to Kitchin,
and afterwards the other moiety to
Knight. Kitchin and Knight brought
this action jointly. After verdict for
the plaintiffs, it was moved in arrest of
judgment, that the plaintiffs, being ten-
ants in common, ought not to join. But
the court held that the action was prop-
erly brought, and said : " This is a per-
sonal action merely, in which tenants
in common may join." — Vaux v. Dra-
per, Styles, 156, 203 ; 1 Roll. Abr. 31, pi.
9. Assumpsit. The several cattle of the
two plain iffs having been distrained,
defendant, in consideration of £10 paid

to him by the plaintiffs, promised to pro-
cure the cattle to be redelivered to them.
Held, on motion in arrest of judgment,
that the joint action was good. Rolle,
C. J., said : " The consideration given is
entire, and cannot be divided, and there
is no inconvenience in joining the action
in this case ; but if one had brought the
action alone, it might have been question-
able." Jerman, J., dissented, and thought
several promises should be intended.

American Cases. — Smith v. Tall-
cott, 21 Wend. 202. In an agreement
under seal for the sale of lands, hus-
band, wife, and trustee of the wife,
were parties of the first part. The
trustee did not execute the deed —
though by an indorsement on the back
(under seal) he bound himself to do
what should be necessary on his part
to carry the contract into effect. Held,
that an action against the parties of the
second part was properly brought in
the joint names of husband, wife, and
trustee. — Pearson v. Parker, 3 N. H.
366. Plaintiffs, being sureties for de-
fendant, discharged the debt, in part,
with money raised upon the joint note
of the plaintiffs, and in part with their
joint note given directly for the resi-
due. Held, that their action against the
principal debtor was well brought joint
ly. — Wright v. Post, 3 Conn. 142. ,
Twenty persons, desirous to support a
public right of fishery, entered into an
agreement to defend such right through
a trial at law, each promising to pay his
proportion of the expense to such of
them as should be sued for occupying
the fishery. Three of them were sued
jointly, and, after an unsuccessful de-
fence, each paid from his private funds
one-third part of the execution. Held,
that these three could maintain a joint
action against a fourth, to recover his
twentieth part of the expense incurred ;
the joint liability of the plaintiffs, coupled
with defendant's promise, and not the pay-
ment of the money, being the cause of
action. — Haughton v. Bayley, 9 Ired.
L. 337. The two plaintiffs, each out of
21

22

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

22 * which is common to them both. They must be so con-
nected as to be in some measure identified. They have not

his own stock, delivered goods to defend-
ant, to be peddled, and took a bond, pay-
able to themselves jointly, for the faithful
accounting therefor. Held, that they
could maintain a joint action upon
the bond, notwithstanding their several
interests. See also Doe d. Campbell,
r. Hamilton, 13 Q. B. 077; Beer v.
Beer, 9 E. L. & E. 468 ; JIagnay v. Ed-
wards, 20 id. 264; Arden v. Tucker, 4

B. & Ail. 815; Powis i\ Smith, 5 B. &
Aid. 800; Wallace v. McLaren, 1 Man.
& li. 510; Townsend v. Neale, 2 Camp.
100; Osborne v. Harper, 5 East, 225;
Miilgley v. Lovelace, Carth. 289; Yate
v. Routes, 1 Bulst. 25 ; Clement r. Hen-
ley, 2 Roll. Abr. 22 (F), pi. 2; Parker
i'. Greg!,', 3 Foster (N. H.), 416; Saun-
ders u. Johnson. Skin. 401.

2. /;/ the following cases it was held that
a screed 'iclio/i should have been joint.

Lucas p. Beale, 20 Law jour. (n. 8.)

C. P. 134, 4 E. L. & E. 358. Assump-
sit. The plaintiff, acting on behalf of
the members of an orchestra, to which
he himself belonged, signed a proposal,
" on behalf of the members of the or-
chestra," to continue their services, pro-
vided the defendant would guarantee
certain salary then due to them. The
defendant accepted this proposition, but
failed to pay the salary due. The plain-
tiff alone brought an action for the
whole money due to himself and the
rest, and stated the contract to be with
himself and the rest. The jury found
that he acted on behalf of himself as
well as the rest, field, that the con-
tract was joint, and that he could not
recover. — Lockiiart ". Barxard, 14
M. & W. 074. Assumpsit. A hand-bill,
relating to a stolen parcel, offered a
reward to " whoever should give such
information as should lead to the early
apprehension of the guilty parties." The
informal ion was communicated first by
plaintiff to C. in conversation, after-
wards to a constable by plaintiff and C.
jointly. _ Held, that C. ought to have
joined in the action for the reward. —
Hopkinson r. Lee, (! Q. B. 904 [For
an abstract of this case, and for the com-
ments made upon it by the Court of
Exchequer, see note (/) sujira.] — Byrne
v. Fitziiugii, 5 Tyr. 54 ; s. c. 1 C , M. & R.
013. Before Puttesou, J., and Gurnet/,
li. The agreement of defendant was
that, in consideration of plaintiff and B.
using their endeavors to charter ships
and procure passengers on board of

22

them, and not engaging with any other
emigrant broker, they, the defendants,
undertook to pay plaintiff and B. a com-
mission of £5 per cent on the amount
of the net passage-money made by the
ships, one-half to be paid to plaintiff,
and the other half to B. ; Lane v. Drink-
water, being cited, held, that plaintiff,
suing without B., should be non-suited.
— Hatsall v. Griffith, 4 Tyr. 487.
A broker was employed to sell a ship
belonging to three part-owners, two of
whom communicated with him. To
them he paid their shares of the pro-
ceeds of the sale; but, after admitting
the third part-owner's share to be in his
hands, refused to pay it to him without
the consent of the other two. An ac-
tion of assumpsit having been brought
by the third part-owner for the share,
held, that he was not entitled to recov-
er. — Petrie v. Bury, 3 B. & C. 353.
Covenant. Demurrer. The covenant
declared upon was with the plaintiff
and two others, for the use of a third
party. The declaration averred that
the two other covenantees had never
sealed the deed. /Lid, notwithstand-
ing, that as all might sue, all must sue,
and that the declaration was bad. —
Soutiicote v. Hoare, 3 Taunt. 87.
Covenant upon an indenture of three
parts. Held, on demurrer, that a cove-
nant with A and B, and with every of
them, is joint, though A is party of the
first part, and B party of the second
part, to the deed. — Guidon v. Rob-
son, 2 Camp. 302. Action by the draw-
er and payee of a bill of exchange
against the acceptor. The bill sued
upon was drawn payable to Guidon &
Hughes, under which firm the plaintiff
traded. There was no one associated
with him as partner ; but he had a clerk
named Hughes, and Lord Ellenhorough
held that such clerk should have been
joined. — Slint.sby's Cask, 5 Rep. 18
b. ; s. c. 3 Leon. 160 ; s. o. 2 Leon. 47 ;
s. c. Jenk. Cent. 262. R. B. by deed cov-
enanted with four persons and their as-
signs, et ad it rum quolibet eorum, that he
was lawfully and solely seized of a rec-
tory. Two of the covenantees brought
covenant against 1). B. and held ill, be-
cause it was a joint covenant, and the
others ought to have joined. The court
said : " When it appears by the decla-
ration that every of the covenantees
hath, or is to have, a several interest or
estate, there, when the covenant is

CH. II. J

OF JOINT PARTIES.

23

Several and * respective shares, which being united make * 23
a whole ; but these together constitute one whole, which,

made with the covenantees, et cum quo-
libet eorum, these words, cum quolilet
eorum make the covenant several in
respect of their several interests. As
if a man by indenture demises to A
black acre, to B white acre, to C green
acre, and covenants with them, and
quolibet eorum, that he is lawful owner
of all the said acres, &c, in that case in
respect of the said several interests, by
the said words et cum quolibet eorum, the
covenant is made several ; but if he de-
mises to them the acres jointly, then
these words, cum quolibet eorum, are void,
for a man by his covenant (unless in
respect of several interests), cannot
make it first joint and then make it sev-
eral by the same or the like words, cum
quolibet eorum ; for, although sundry per-
sons may bind themselves et quemlibet
eorum, and so the obligation shall be
joint or several at the election of the
obligee, yet a man cannot bind himself
to three, and to each of them, to make
it joint or several at the election of sev-
eral persons for one and the same cause,
for the court would be in doubt for
which of them to give judgment, which
the law would not suffer, as it is held in
3 H. 6, 44 b." See also Bradburne v.
Botfield, 14 M. & W. 559 ; Sorsbie v. Park,
12 M. & W. 146 ; Lane v. Drinkwater, 5
Tyr. 40, 1 C, M. & R. 599; English v.
Blundell, 8 C. & P. 332; Decharms b.
Horwood, 10 Bing. 526 ; Hill v. Tucker,
1 Taunt. 7 ; Anderson !'. Martindale, 1
East, 497 ; Spencer v. Durant, Comb.
115; Thimblethorp v. Hardesty, 7 Mod.
116; Chanter v. Leese, 4 M. & W. 200;
Wetherell v. Langston, 1 Exch. 634 ; Foley
v. Addenbrooke, 4 Q. B. 197 ; Teed v. Ell-
worthy, 14 East, 210 ; Scott v. Godwin,
1 B. & P. 67.

American Cases. — Sweigakt i\ Berk,
8 S. & R. 308. Seven of ten joint obli-
gees brought an action (living the other
obligees) against the obligor. Held that
it could not be maintained. Semble, an
action could not have been maintained
by one, although brought m respect ot
separate interests. — Doe ». Halsey, lo
Johns. 34. Assumpsit by T). & D., part-
ners, against H. M. being shown to be a
member of the firm, held, that he ought
to have been joined as plaintiff.— bras
v. Harris, 8 B. Mon. 55. Debt on a penal
bond. The bond was executed by the
defendant in favor of the plaintiff and
several others, as joint obligees. Ihe
plaintiff brought the action alone to re-

cover the penalty. Held, that the action
was not well brought. Aliter, if the ac-
tion had been covenant on the bond ; for
in that case, so far as each of the obli-
gees in the bond has a separate interest
in the performance of its stipulations,
the cause of action is several, and not
joint. See Pearce v. Hitchcock, 2 Comst.
388. — Tapscott v. Williams, 10 Ohio,
442. Where lands descended to copar-
ceners, with warranty, and they were
evicted before severance, it was held that
one of them could not sue alone on the
warranty for his share of the damages.

3. In the following cases a several action
was held to be properly brought.

Keigi-itley v. Watson, 3 Exch. 716.
[For an abstract of this ease see note (/)
supra.] — Jones v. Robinson, 1 Exch.
454. The declaration stated that the
plaintiff and A B carried on business in
copartnership ; and in consideration that
they would sell defendant their business,
and become trustees for him in respect
of all debts, &c, due to plaintiff and
A B in respect thereof, defendant prom-
ised plaintiff to pay him all the money
he had advanced in respect of the co-
partnership, and for which it was ac-
countable to plaintiff, and also promised
plaintiff and A B that he would dis-
charge all the debts due from the plain-
tiff and A B as such copartners, and all
liabilities to which they are subject.
The declaration then averred that plain-
tiff and A B did sell the business to
defendant and became trustees for him
in respect of all debts, &c, due to plain-
tiff and A B in respect thereof, and that,
at the time of the promise, plaintiff had
advanced a certain sum, for the non-pay-
ment of which the action was brought.
On motion in arrest of judgment, the
defendant contended that the considera-
tion moved from tlie plaintiff and A B
jointly, and therefore (as the considera-
tion is the essential part of a contract,
without which the promise is nothing),
A B should have been joined as co-plain-
tiff ; but the court held that the separate
interest of the plaintiff in the partner-
ship fund was the consideration upon
which the promise sued upon in this
case was founded ; and, therefore, the
rule for which the defendant contended
did not apply. — Palmer v. Sparshott,
4 Man. & G. 137. By an agreement, not
under seal, between defendant of the
one part, and plaintiff and F. of the other
part — reciting that plaintiff and F.
23

24

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I

* 24 whether it be an interest * or an obligation, belongs to alL
Hence arises an implied authority to act for each other,

had assigned certain property to defen-
dant for .£150 apiece, and that it had
been agreed that defendant should re-
tain £50 out of each £150 — the defen-
dant, in consideration of the two several
sums of £50 and £50 so retained, agreed
with plaintiff and F., their executors,
&c, to indemnify plaintiff and F., and
each of them, their heirs, executors, etc.,
and their, and eacli and every of their,
estates and effects, from the costs of
a certain action. Held, that plaintiff
might maintain assumpsit upon this agree-
ment without joining F. — Poole v.
Hill, 6 M. & W. 835. Covenant. By
articles of agreement, reciting that the
defendant had contracted with J., as the
agent of the plaintiff and the other
owners of the property, for the purchase
6f the lands therein mentioned, the de-
fendant covenanted with the plaintiff,
and the several other parties beneficially
interested, to perform such contract by
paying the purchase-money on a certain
day, &c. I/eld, that this covenant was
several, and that the plaintiff might sue
alone for the non-payment of his share
of the purchase-money, without joining
the other parties beneficially interested.
■ — Place v. Delegal, 4 Bing. N. C. 426.
Assumpsit. One Evans, as attorney for
plaintiffs, executors of Miers, having
sold an estate, to a share of the proceeds
of which W. was entitled as legatee, and
defendant claiming W.'s share of such
proceeds, under an agreement with W.
plaintiffs paid the amount to defendant,
on receiving from him a guaranty in
these terms : " Mr. John Evans, and also
Messrs. Place & Meahry [the plaintiffs],
as the executors of the will of the late
Mr. John Miers : In consideration of
your having paid, &c, I hereby undertake
to indemnify and save you and each of
you harmless, &c. C. Delegal." Held,
that plaintiffs might sue on this guar-
anty without joining Evans. — Thicker
v. Shepherd, 2 Chitt. 052. The plaintiff
and one It., being insurance brokers
and partners, effected n policy of in-
surance on the defendant's ship. The
premium was not paid to the underwri-
ter till after R. had become bankrupt,
when it was paid by the plaintiff alone
out of his private property. The plain-
tiff brought this action alone to recover
the amount of the premium thus paid.
Held, that the action was well brought.
— Glossop v. Colman, 1 Stark. 25. As-
sumpsit. Plaintiff had held out his son

24

as his partner, and had made out bills
and signed receipts in their joint names ;
but held by the court of K. B. that he
was not precluded from maintaining his
action by showing that his son was not in
fact his partner. — Davenport v. Rack-
strow, 1 C. & P. 89. Halloc/c, B., S. P.
— Kell v. Nainisy, 10 B. & C. 20 S. P.
" A party with whom the contract is
actually made may sue without joining
others with whom it is apparently made."
Parte, J. — Garret !». Taylor, 1 Esp.
Nisi Prius, 117. " Three persons had
employed the defendant to sell some
timber for them, in which they were
jointly concerned. Two of them he had
paid their exact proportion, and they had
given him a receipt in full of all demands.
The third now brought his action for
the remainder, being his share ; and
it was objected, that as this was a joint
employment by three, one alone could
not bring his action. But it was ruled
by Lord Mansfield, that where there had
been a severance as above stated, that one
alone might sue. 4 G. 3 MS." — Kirk-
man v. Newstead, 1 Esp. Nisi Prius, 117.
" Action for the use and occupation of a
house. It appeared that the house was
the property of six tenants in common,
to all of whom, except the plaintiff, the
defendant had paid his rent ; and this
action was for his share of the rent. It
was objected that one tenant in common
alone could not bring this action, but
that all ought to join ; but Lord Mans-
field overruled the objection, and the
plaintiff^ recovered. Sin. Westm. M.
177ii, MS." [The above two cases from
Espinasse's Nisi Prius are of doubtful
authority. See note to Hatsall v. Grif-
fith, 4 Tyr. 488, and Walford on Parties,
460.]— Wotton r. Cooke, Dyer, 337 b.
Covenant. Three purchased lands jointly
in foe and covenanted each with the others
and their heirs, it eorum utrique, to convey
to the heirs of those who happened to
die first, their respective third parts.
Two of the three having died, the heir
of one of them brought this action
against the survivor, alleging that he had
not conveyed to him according to his
covenant. It was moved, in arrest of
judgment, that the covenant was joint,
and not several, for the word " utrique "
in Latin is conjunctim , and not separatim ;
sed von allocatur, and judgment was given
for the plaintiff.

American Cases. — Hall v. Leigh, 8
Cranch, 60. Plaintiff and P. consigned

CH. II.]

OP JOINT PAETIES.

*25

which is in some cases carried * very far. Thus, if several * 25
plaintiffs sue for a joint demand, and the defendant pleads

to defendant a quantity of cotton, of
which they were joint owners. They
gave defendant separate and different
instructions for the disposition of their
respective moieties, each distinctly con-
fining his instructions to his own moiety.
Held, reversing judgment of circuit court,
that plaintiff could maintain an action
for the violation of his instructions, with-
out joining P. — Swett b. Patrick, 2
Fairf. 179. Defendant conveyed land
with warranty to A, B, and C. Held, on
demurrer, that a several action on. the
warranty was well brought by A. —
Sharp v. Conkling, 16 Vt. 354. Cove-
nant. By indenture between the plaintiff
and others, of the first part, and the de-
fendant of the other part, the defendant
covenanted with the parties of the first
part that he would turn from its natural
channel a certain stream of water which
flowed over the land of the covenantees ;
and whereas, the water, when diverted,
would pass over the land of the plain-
tiff, that he- would so convey it as not
to injure said land. The plaintiff brought
the action without joining the other cove-
nantees, and alleged breaches of both
covenants. Held, that he might recover
on the second covenant, but not on the
first. Redjuld, J., said the court were will-
ing to abide by the rule that, where the
interest in the subject-matter secured
by the covenant is several, although
the terms of the covenant will more
naturally bear a joint interpretation,
yet, if they do not exclude the infer-
ence of being intended to be several,
they shall have a several construction
put upon them. See also Catlin i\ Barn-
ard, 1 Aik. 9 ; Harrold v. Whitaker, 10
Jur. 1004; Mills v. Ladbrooke, 7 Man.
& G. 218; Simpson o. Clayton, 4 Bmg.
N. C. 758 ; Withers v. Bircham, 3 B. & C.
254; Johnson v. Wilson, Willes, 248;
Lloyd v. Archbold, 2 Taunt. 324; Story
o. Richardson, 6 Bing. N. C. 123; Owston
v. Ogle, 13 East, 538 ; Lahy v. Holland,
8 Gill, 445.

4. In the following cases it was held that
a joint action should have been several.

Seaton u. Booth, 4 A. & E. 528.
Assumpsit. A, B, & C, being interested
in certain lands, but having no common
legal interest in any portion of them,
agreed together, according to their re-
spective interests, to put them up for
sale, and the lands were so put up, under
the direction of their agents, in lots.
Each lot was described in a separate

paper, containing the conditions of sale,
in which it was stipulated, among other
things, that if the purchaser should he
let into the premises before payment of
the purchase-money, he should be consid-
ered tenant at will to the vendors, and
pay interest at the rate of four per cent
on the amount of purchase-money, as
and for rent. Defendant bought four of
the lots, and was let into possession, and
held for several years without paying the
purchase-money ; whereupon the vendors
brought their joint action against him,
to recover rent. Their declaration con-
tained two counts : one upon the contract
between the plaintiffs and defendant for
the sale of the property; the other for
use and occupation. Held, that the ac-
tion could not be sustained on eitheF
count ; not on the first, because no joint
contract with all the plaintiffs was
proved; not on the second, because no
joint ownership in the plaintiffs, and
occupation under them was proved. —
Wilkinson v. Hall, 1 Bing. N. C. 713.
Action of debt against lessee for double
value, under stat. 4 Geo. II c. 28, for
holding over. Held, that tenants in com-
mon could not maintain such action
jointly where there had been no joint
demise. " If there be no joint demise,
there must be several actions for rent, for
a joint action is not maintainable except
upon a joint demise." Tindal, C. J. —
Servante v. James, 10 B. & C. 410. Cove-
nant. The defendant, who was master
of a vessel, covenanted with the plain-
tiff and others, part-owners, and their
several and respective executors, adminis-
trators, and assigns, to pay certain moneys
to them and to their and every of their
several and respective executors, adminis-
trators, and assigns, at a certain banker's,
and in such parts and proportions as were
set against their several and respective
names. The action was brought by all
the covenantees jointly. Held, that the
covenant was several, and so the action
not well brought, but each covenantee
should have brought a separate action.
— Graham v. Robertson, 2 T. E. 282.
Plaintiffs, together with A & B, being
owners of one ship, and the defendant of
another, a prize was taken, condemned,
and shared by agreement between them ;
afterwards the sentence of condemnation
was reversed, and restitution awarded,
with costs, which was paid solely by the
plaintiffs, A and B having in the mean
time become bankrupts. An action could

25

26

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

* 26 in bar an accord and satisfaction with * one of the plaintiffs,

but without any allegation that the other plaintiffs had
authorized the accord and satisfaction, the plea is nevertheless
good. (?c) For a release of a debt, or of a claim to damages,
by one of many who hold this debt or claim jointly, is a full dis-
charge of it, and this whether they hold this debt or claim in their
own right, or as executors or administrators, (x) This has been
extended to the case where the release is given by one of joint
plaintiffs, who, although a party to the record, is not a party in

interest, but whose name the actual parties in interest were

* 27 obliged to use with their own in bringing the * action. (?/)

Nevertheless, if in such a case the party taking the release,
and pleading it in bar, is aware that the party giving it had no
interest in the claim released, the court would disregard the
release ; (z) and upon such facts as these the court have ordered
the release to be given up and cancelled, (a)

If two or more are jointly bound, or jointly and severally

not be brought by the plaintiffs alone for
a moiety of the restitution money and
costs, because it was either a partnership
transaction, when A and B ought to be
joined ; or not, when separate actions
should be brought by each of the persons
paying. See also Smith v. Hunt, 2 Chitt.
142 ; Brandon !\ Hubbard, 2 Br. & B. 11 ;
Tippet v. Hawkey, 3 Mod. 3>3 ; Make-
peace v. Coutes, 8 Mass. 451, overruled in
Capen v. Barrows, 1 Gray, 370 ; Brand v.
Boulcott, 3 B. & P. 235 ; Kelby v. Steel,
6 Esp. 194.

American Cuscs, — Bor.GS y. Curtin,
10 S. & R. 211. Two firms, C. & B. and
J. & D., having become sureties for A.,
gave their joint and several note for the
debt of A. Held, that the two firms, on
payment by them of the note, could not
maintain a joint action against A., it not
appearing that the payment was made
out of a joint fund of the two firms.
" The action of assumpsit must be joint
or several, accordingly as the promise
on which it is founded is joint or sev-
eral. Where the promise is express, there
can be little difficulty in determining
to which class it belongs, as its nature
necessarily appears on the face of the
contract itself; and if it be joint, all to
whom it is made must, or at least may
sue on it jointly . . . But an imjjliid
promise, being altogether ideal, and
raised out of the consideration only by in-
tendment of law, follows the nature of
the consideration ; and as that is joint or

26

several, so will the promise be." Gibson,
J. — Carthrae v. Brown, 3 Leigh, 98.
C. covenanted with B. & J. that he
would pay B. and J. $300, namely, to
each of them one moiety thereof. Held,
a several covenant, so that B., as the
survivor of the two, could not maintain
an action to recover the whole sura.
— Uljier v. Cunningham, 2 Greenl. 117.
Assumpsit for money had and received.
Goods, belonging to some and not to all,
of sundry joint debtors, were taken in ex-
ecution and wasted. Held, that all the
debtors could not maintain a joint action
against the sheriff, and that those only
ought to have sued whose property was
actually wasted.

(w) Wallace ». Kensall, 7 M. & W.
264.

(x) Bac. Abr. Release, D. K. ; Jacomb
i'. Harwood, 2 Ves. Sen. 265 ; Murray
v. Blatchford, 1 Wend. 583 ; Napier v.
McLeod, 9 Wend. 1211 ; Decker ?\ Living-
ston, 15 Johns. 470 ; Pierson v. Hooker, 3
Johns. 68; Austin v. Hall, 13 Johns. 286;
Bulkley v. Dayton, 14 Johns. 387 ; Bruen
!'. Marquand, 17 Johns. 58 ; Helsey ».
Fairbanks, 4 Mason, 206 ; Tuckerman
i'. Newhall, 17 Mass. 581 ; Wiggin v,
Tudor, 23 Pick. 444.

(»/) Wilkinson v. Lindo, 7 M. & W.
81 ; Gibson ». Winter, 5 B. & Ad. 96.

(e) Gram o. Cadwell, 5 Cowen, 489;
Legh v. Legh, 1 B. & P. 447.

(a) Barker i\ Richardson, 1 Y. & J.
362.

CH. II.] OF JOINT PARTIES. * 28

bound, and the obligee releases to one of them, all are dis-
charged. (6) Formerly a very strict and technical rule was
applied to these cases ; thus, where an action was brought against
one of three who were bound jointly and severally, a plea in bar
that the seal of one of the others was torn off was held good.
And where three were bound jointly and severally, and the seals
of two were eaten off by rats, the court inclined to think the
obligation void against all. (c) But if the seals had remained on
until issue were joined, their removal afterwards would not have
avoided the bond, (d)

Where a technical release, that is, a release under seal, is given
to one of two joint debtors, and the other being sued, pleads the
joint indebtedness and the release, it is no answer to say that the
release was made at the defendant's request, and in consideration
that he thereupon promised to remain liable for the debt, and
unaffected by the release ; (e) for this would be a parol exception
to a sealed instrument; or rather a parol renewal in part, of
a sealed instrument which was wholly discharged. This being
the reason, it should follow that only a release under seal should
have the effect of excluding this answer ; and the weight of
authority is certainly and very greatly in favor of this limita-
tion. (/) It has, however, been held in this country, that
a release which is not under seal, to * one of many joint * 28
debtors, of his share or proportion of the debt, operates in
law as a full discharge of all. (#) But though the word release
be used, even under seal, yet if the parties, the instrument being
considered as a whole and in connection with all the circum-
stances of the case and the relations of the parties, cannot
reasonably be supposed to have intended a release, it will be
construed as only an agreement not to charge the person or party
to whom the release is given, and will not be permitted to have
the effect of a technical release ; (A) for a general covenant not to

(6) Co. Lit. 232 a ; Bac. Abr. Release, (e) Brooks v. Stuart, 9 A. & E. 854;

G • Vin Abr. Release, G. a ; Dean v. Parker v. Lawrence, Hob. 70.
Newhall, 8 T. R. 168 ; Hutton v. Eyre, 6 (/) Shaw v. Pratt 22 Pick. 305;

Taunt 289 ; Lacy v. Kynaston, 1 Ld. Walker v. McCulloch, 4 Greenl. 421 ;

Raym 690 ■ s. c. 12 Mod. 551 ; Clayton Lunt v. Stevens, 24 Me. 534 ; Harrison v.

v Kynaston Salk. 574 ; Milliken v. Close, 2 Johns. 448 ; Rowley v. Stoddard

Brown, 1 Rawle, 391 ; Johnson v. Collins, 7 Johns. 210 ; McAUester v. Sprague, 34

20 Ala 435 Me- 296 i Pond "■ Williams> 1 Gray- 6S0-

(c) Bayly v. Garford, March, 125 ; (.?) Milliken v. Brown, 1 Rawle, 391.

Seiton , Henson, 2 Show. 29. [h ) Solly v. Forbes 2 Br. 4 B^ 46 ;

Id) Nichols v. Haywood, Dyer, 59 pi. McAUester v. Sprague, 34 Me. 296 ; Burke

12 13 • Michaell v. Stockworth, Owen, 8. v. Noble, 48 Penn. St. 168.
' ' 27

* 29 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

sue is not itself a release of the covenantee, but is so construed
by the law, to avoid circuity of action ; and a covenant not to sue
one of many, who are jointly indebted, does not discharge one who
is a joint debtor with the covenantee, nor in any way affect his
obligation, (i)

It may be added, though not strictly within the law of con-
tracts, that the effect of a release of damages to one of two
wrong-doers is the same as a release of debt ; it is in its opera-
tion a satisfaction of the whole claim arising out of the tort,
and discharges all the parties. (/) And in actions against two or
more defendants for a joint tort, it has been said that damages
should be assessed against all jointly for the largest amount
which either ought to pay. (F) The true rule, however, must be,
that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for all the injury he
has received, and for this there should be judgment against all
who joined in doing the wrong. Several damages should not
be assessed ; but if they are, the plaintiff may elect which sum
he. will, and remitting the others, enter judgment for this sum

against all. (7)
* 29 * No release by the party injured, or claimant, has the

effect of discharging all, although given but to one, unless it
be a voluntary release ; for if one of two who owe jointly, either
a debt or compensation for a wrong, be discharged by operation
of law, without the concurrence or consent of the party to whom
the debt or compensation is due, he does not hereby lose his right
to enforce this claim against those not discharged, (m) But it is
said, that if the discharge by operation of law is at the instance
of the plaintiff, or be caused by him, it then operates as a dis-
charge of the other debtors, (n)

The legal operation of a release to one of two or more joint
debtors may be restrained by an express provision in the instru-
ment, that it shall not operate as to the other. For if a release

(i) Lane v. Owings, 3 Bibb, 247; croft, 2 Str. 910; Onslow v. Orchard, 1

Shed v. Pierce, 17 Mass. 628 ; Couch v. Str. 422 ; Brown v. Allen 4 Esp 158 ■

Mills, 21 Wend. 424 ; Rowley v. Stoddard, Austen v. Willward, Cro. E. 860 • Smith-

7 Johns. 209 ; McLellan v. Cumberland son p. Garth, 3 Lev. 324.
Bank, 24 Me. 566 ; Bank of Catskill v. (I) Johns v. Dodsworth, Cro. C. 192 ■

Messenger, 9 Cowen, 37 ; Durell v. Wen- Walsh v. Bishop, Cro. C. 243 ; Heydon's

dell, 8 N. H. 369 ; Bank of Chenango v. Case, 11 Eep. 5 ; Halsey v. Woodruff 9

Osgood, 4 Wend. 607 ; Lancaster v. Har- Pick. 555 ; Rodney v. Strode, Carth. 19.
rison, 6 Bing. 731 ; s. c. 4 Mo. & P. 561 ; (m) Ward v. Johnson, 13 Mass. 152.

Dean v. Newhall, 8 T. R. 168. „) Roberston v. Smith, 18 Johns.

(?) Brown v. Marsh, 7 Vt. 320. 459

(h) Bull. N. P. 15 ; Lowfleld v. Ban-

28

CH. II. J OP JOINT PARTIES. * 30

containing such a proviso be pleaded by the other in bar to an
action against both, a replication that the action is brought against
both, only to recover of the other, is good. (0)

If an action be brought against many, and to this an accord
and satisfaction by one be pleaded in bar, it must be complete,
covering the whole ground, and fully executed. It is not enough
if it be in effect only a settlement with one of the defendants for
his share of the damages ; nor would it be enough if it were only
this in fact, although in form an accord and satisfaction of the
whole claim, (p)

Joint trustees are not necessarily liable for each other, or
bound by each other's acts. Each is liable for the acts of others,
only so far as he concurred in them, or connived at them, actively
or negligently. Each is, in general, responsible only for money
which he has himself received ; and if he signs a receipt with the
others, because the receipt would have no force without his signa-
ture, he may, at least in equity (unless he is himself in default),
show that he did not receive the money, and thus remove or
limit his liability ; but if this be not shown, the joint receipt
is evidence against all. (9/) A trustee may thus * explain * 30
his receipt, because he is obliged to join with the others in
giving one ; but a co-executor not being under this necessity, it
is said that he is bound by the receipt he signs, (r) And, in gen-
eral, any co-executor or co-trustee who does jointly with the others
any act which it is not necessary for him to do, is bound thereby
to any party who shall suffer therefrom, (s)

If two or more persons are bound jointly to pay a sum of
money, and one of them dies, at common law his death not only
severs the joinder, but terminates the liability which belonged to
him, so that it cannot be enforced against his representatives ; (0
but if they were bound jointly and severally, the death of one has

(0) Twopenny v. Young, 3 B. & C. Eden, 360 ; Griffin v. Macaulay, 7 Gratt.

211 ; s. c. 5 Dow. & R. 261 ; Lancaster v. 476

Harrison, 4 Mo. & P. 561 ; s. c. 6 Bing (r) Sadler v. Hobbs 2 Br . Ch. 114 ,

726 ; Solly v. Forbes, 2 Br. & B. 38 ; North Chambers v. Minclun, 7 Ves. 198

- ™f^ 13 Q- B. 536. See Post, J^^^S^^^

f BruteTH W* * ' ^ S^S^ * B ^' ^
^Fellows .Mitchell, 1 P. Wm, 83, Hooper 2 Mass. 572 ; Yorks v. Peck, 14
and Cox's note; Westly v. Clarke, 1 Barb. 644.

* 31 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

not this effect, (u) If bound jointly, the whole debt becomes the
debt of the survivors alone, and if they pay the whole, they can
have at law no contribution against the representatives of the
deceased, because this would be an indirect revival of a liability
which death has wholly terminated, (v) But where the debt was
made joint by fraud or error, equity will relieve by granting con-
tribution ; as it will if the debt were for money lent to both and
received by both, so that both actually participate in the bene-
fit, (w) If the last survivor dies, leaving the debt unpaid, his rep-
resentatives alone are chargeable, and have no contribution against
the representatives of the other deceased obligor.

Such were the rules of the common law ; but in most of the
United States these rules are changed by statute. The represen-
tatives of the deceased continue to be bound by his obligation.
If the debtors were jointly bound, the creditor could bring but one
action when all were alive, and that against all ; and then obtain-
ing judgment and taking out execution against all, he might levy
it on all or either as he chose, leaving them to adjust their

* 31 proportion by contribution. After the death of a * joint

debtor, the creditor cannot join the survivors and the repre-
sentatives of the deceased in one action, even if the statute gives
the creditor, where one of many joint debtors dies, the same
remedy by action as if the contract were joint and several ; inas-
much as an executor cannot be joined with the survivors in an
action upon a contract which was originally joint and several,
because one would be charged de bonis teslatoris, and the other de
bonis propriis, which cannot be ; (x) but the creditor may elect
which to sue. (j/) He may sue either, or both, in distinct actions,
and may levy his executions upon either or both. But he can
get, in the whole, only the amount of his debt ; and the survivors
and the representatives of the deceased, or the representatives of
all the debtors, if all are deceased, have against each other a claim
for contribution, if either pay more than a due proportion. (2)

If one or more of several joint obligees die, the right of action
is solely in the survivors, and if all die, the action must be brought

(«) Towers v. Moore, 2 Vern. 99 ; (x) Kemp v. Andrews, Carth. 171 ;

May v. Woodward, Freem. 248. Hall v. Huffam, 2 Lev. 228.

(w) See note (c), p. 32, post. (y) May !'. Woodward, Freem. 218;

(w) Waters v. Riley, 2 Har. & G. 313 ; Enys v. Donnithorne, 2 Bur. 1190.
Simpson ><. Vaughan, 2 Atk. 33 ; Yorks v. (z) Peaslee ». Breed, 10 N. H. 489 ;

Peck, 14 Barb. 044. Baehelder v. Fiske, 17 Mass. 464.

30

CH. II.]

OF JOINT PARTIES.

32

by the representatives of the last survivor, (a) But if the right
under the contract be several, the representatives of the deceased
party may sue, although the other obligees are living. (6)

SECTION III.

OF CONTRIBUTION.

Where two or more persons are jointly, or jointly and severally,
bound to pay a sum of money, and one or more of them pay the
whole, or more than his or their share, and thereby relieve the
others so far from their liability, those paying may recover from
those not paying, the aliquot proportion which they ought
to pay. (e) Some things have been said about this * right to * 32
contribution, in the preceding section ; we add that the per-
sons not paying, but being relieved from a positive liability by the
payment of others who were bound with them, are held by the law
as under an implied promise to contribute each his share to make
up the whole sum paid, (d) And this rule applies equally to

(a) Rolls v. Tate, Yelv. 177 ; Ander-
son v. Martindale, 1 East, 497 ; Stowell's
Admr. v. Drake, 3 Zabr. 310.

(b) Shaw 7i. Sherwood, Cro. E. 729.

(c) Harbert's Case, 13 Rep. 13 a, 15 b ;
Layer v. Nelson, 1 Vern. 456 ; Toussaint
v. Martinnant, 2 T. R. 104 ; Kemp v. Fin-
den, 12 M. & W. 421 ; Browne i<- Lee, 6
B. & C. 689 ; Sadler v. Nixon, 5 B. & Ad.
936; Holmes v. Williamson, 6 M. & Sel.
159 ; Blackett v. Weir, 5 B. & C. 387 ;
Lanchester v. Tricker, 1 Bing. 201 ; Boul-
ter v. Peplow, 9 C. B. 193. In Offley and
Johnson's case, 2 Leon. 166 [1584], the
Court of King's Bench held that one
surety had no right at common law to
recover contribution from a co-surety.
" The first case of the kind in which the
plaintiff succeeded was before Gould, J.,
at Dorchester." Buller, J., 2 T. R. 105. —
The action for money paid to recover
contribution is founded upon the old writ
de contributione faciendd. Tindnl, C. J.,
Edger v. Knapp, 5 Man. & G. 758, citing
Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium, 878, in
the edition of 1794, p. 162. From the
passage in Fitzherbert, as the English
version is amended by the learned repor-
ter of Edger v. Knapp, 5 Man. & G. 758,
759, it seems that a parcener distrained

upon is entitled to contribution without
any express agreement on the part of her
coparceners, while to entitle a. joint feoffee
to contribution, under similar circum-
stances, the other feoffees must have
agreed to contribute. In analogy to the
case of feoffees, one partner, in order to
entitle himself to recover contribution of
his copartner, is bound to show a contract
independent of the relation of partner :
Tindal, C. J., 5 Man. & G. 759. It is not
sufficient for him to show that the pay-
ment made on account of his copartners
was made by compulsion of law. Sadler v.
Nixon, b B. & Ad. 936. — In Hunter v.
Hunt, 1 C. B. 300, plaintiff and defend-
ant respectively were under-lessees, at
distinct rents, of separate portions of
premises, the whole of which were held
under one original lease, at an entire
rent. Plaintiff, having paid the whole
under a threat of distress, brought an
action against defendant to recover the
proportion of rent due from him, as for
money paid to his use : Held, that the
action was not maintainable. See Sprin-
ger v. Springer, 43 Penn. St. R. 518.

(d) Contribution was at first enforced
only in equity, and Lord Eldon regretted
(not without reason, in the opinion of

31 •

33

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[book I.

those who are bound as original co-contractors, and to those who
are bound to pay the debt of another or answer for his default, as

co-sureties, (e)
* 33 * The payment, to establish a claim for contribution, must

be compulsory. Hence, if one of many who must pay a cer-
tain debt, might show if sued that he was bound to pay only a cer-
tain proportion and could defend himself against a further claim,
his payment of more than his share gives him no claim for con-
tribution, (f) But this does not mean that there must be a suit,
but only a fixed and positive obligation. (^) The law requires no
one to wait for a suit, if he has no defence ; and not always, even
if he has a defence. (A) And if he resists a suit in which he has

Baron Parke, 6 M. & W. 168), that courts
of law ever assumed jurisdiction of the
subject. It is universally admitted that
the duty of contribution originates in the
equitable consideration that those who
have assumed a common burden ought to
bear it equally ; from this equitable obli-
gation the law implies a contract, since
all who have become jointly liable may
reasonably be considered as mutually
contracting among themselves with ref-
erence to the duty in conscience. Lord
Eldon, Craythorne r. Swinburne, 14 Ves.
ICO, 169 (adopting the view taken by
Romilly arguendo) ; Campbell v. Mcsier, 4
Johns. Ch. 334; Lansdale v. Cox, 7 Monr.
401 ; Fletcher v. Grover, 11 N. H. 308 ;
Johnson v. Johnson, 11 Mass. 359 ; Chaf-
fee v. Jones, 19 Pick. 264; Horbach v.
Elder, 18 Penn. 33 ; Powers v. Nash, 37
Me. 322 ; Holmes v. Weed, 19 Barb. 128 ;
Yates v. Donaldson, 5 Md. 389. — As-
sumpsit for money paid is the usual ac-
tion for enforcing contribution, and its
propriety, before taken for granted, was
confirmed in Kemp v. Finden, 12 M. & W.
421.

(e) The payee of a note, given by
the defendant's testator as principal,
neglected to present it to the executor
within two years after the original grant
of administration, and was by statute
barred of his action against him. The
plaintiff who signed the note as surety
was held not to be discharged by the
creditor's neglect to present his claim,
and having paid the note was entitled
to recover the amount of the executor.
Sibley v. McAllaster, 8 N. H. 389. See
also Chipman v. Morrill, 20 Cal. 130.
Bachelder v. Fiske, 17 Mass. 464, was
perhaps the earliest case where the ex-
ecutor of a deceased co-debtor was held
liable at law for contribution. The court
there met the technical objections that

32

were raised, with the maxim, Ubi jus ibi
remedium. And see McKenna i'. George,
2 Rich. Eq. 15 ; Riddle v. Bowman, 7
Foster (N. H.), 236.

The surviving surety on a joint ad-
ministration bond, on account of which
he was compelled to make large pay-
ments, sought to recover contribution
from the representatives of a deceased
co-surety : it was held, that in the case of
a joint bond, the remedy at law survives
against the surviving obligor, and is lost
against the representatives of him who
dies first; that where all the obligors are
principals, equity will enforce contribu-
tion though the remedy at law is gone,
but in case of a surety it will not inter-
fere to charge him beyond his legal lia-
bility in the absence of fraud, accident,
or mistake ; that although a surety who
has paid the debt may compel his living
co-surety to contribute, he has no such
right either at law or in equity, against the
estate of a deceased co-surety, because
the liability of the creditor was termi-
nated by his death and cannot be indi-
rectly revived. Waters v. Riley, 2 Har.
& G. 305. But see the able dissenting
opinion of Archer, J.

(f) Lucas v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 6 Cow.
635. See also Mutual Safety Ins. Co. r.
Hone, 2 Comst. 235.

(.7) Pitt u. Purssord, 8 M. & W. 538;
Maydew v. Forrester, 5 Taunt. 615;
Davies v. Humphreys, 6 M. & W. 153 ;
Lord Kenyan, Child o. Morley, 8 T. R.
614; Frith i\ Sprague, 14 Mass. 455;
Russell v. Failer, 1 O. St. 327.

(h) It has been held that a surety pay-
ing when he had a good defence, which
defence, however, was not available to
the principal if he had been sued by the
creditor, may recover of the principal.
Shaw v. Loud, 12 Mass. 461.

CH. II.]

OF JOINT PARTIES.

*34

no sufficient defence, lie cannot, generally, recover from the party
for whom he pays, the costs of this suit, (i) And where a
contract is broken, the surety may * pay without suit and * 34
hold the principal, and a co-surety may pay and hold the co-
sureties to contribution. (/) And the right to contribution arises
although the co-surety paid the debt after giving a bond for it
without the knowledge of the co-sureties. (&)

(i) Whether contribution can be re-
covered for the costs of a suit sustained
in resisting payment, is left in doubt by
the authorities. Lord Tenterden ruled
against contribution for costs in Roach v.
Thompson, Mo. & M. 489 ; Gillet v. Rip-
pon, id. 406; Knight v. Hughes, id. 247 ;
in the latter case intimating that there
might be a distinction between a case be-
tween two sureties (the case before him)
and a case of surety against principal.
But in Kemp v. Finden, 12 M. & W. 421,
where the plaintiff and defendant had ex-
ecuted as sureties a warrant of attorney,
given as collateral security for a sum of
money advanced on mortgage to the prin-
cipals, and, on default being made by the
principals, judgment was entered up on
the warrant of attorney, and execution
issued against the plaintiff, it was held
that he was entitled to recover from the
defendant as his co-surety a moiety of
the costs of such execution. Parke, B.,
said : " They were costs incurred in a pro-
ceeding to recover a debt for which, on
default of the principals, both the sure-
ties were jointly liable ; and the plaintiff
having paid the whole costs, I see no rea-
son why the defendant should not pay
his proportion." — A surety to a note was
subjected to costs in consequence of its
non-payment by the principal; there was
an agreement in writing to save him
harmless ; held, that he was entitled to
recover the costs so paid by him in an
action against the principal. Bonney v.
Seely, 2 Wend. 481. In Cleveland v.
Covington, 3 Strob. L. 184, it was held
that as a general rule a principal was
liable for costs incurred by the surety,
and was therefore incompetent as a wit-
ness in an action against him. Where a
judgment, recovered against an insolvent
principal, and his two sureties, was paid
by one of them, held, that he could recover
of his co-surety one half of the costs.
Davis !'. Emerson, 17 Me. 64. And in
Fletcher ». Jackson, 23 Vt. 593, the right
of a co-surety to recover costs and ex-
penses is said to depend altogether upon
the question -whether the defence was
made under such circumstances as to be
regarded as hopeful and prudent ; if so,

VOL. I.

the expenses of defence may always be
recovered. — But not if the surety be
notified that there is no defence. Beck-
ley v. Munson, 22 Conn. 299. — In Board-
man v. Page, 11 N. H. 431, where an
action was commenced by the holder of a
note against all the co-signers, and judg-
ment was recovered against one only, it
was held that upon payment of damages
and costs of the judgment, the party
against whom the judgment was recov-
ered was not entitled to contribution from
the other co-signers in respect to the
costs — the same not being a burden
common to all the co-signers of the
note. — It would seem not unreasonable
to conclude, notwithstanding the nisi
prius decisions of Lord Tenterden, that
where the party from whom contribu-
tion is sought was at the time of the
former action directly liable for the debt
to the creditor, so that if the latter had
chosen he might have been sued by him,
contribution may be recovered for the
costs of the judgment, though not per-
haps for costs incurred in resisting pay-
ment of the judgment. Yet in the late
case of Henry v. Goldney, 15 M. & W.
494, 496, an action ex contractu being
brought against A, and he pleading in
abatement the pendency of another ac-
tion for the same cause against B, it was
contended that the plea ought to be sus-
tained, to prevent A from being twice
vexed for the same cause ; but Alderson,
B., observed : " How is A vexed by an
action being brought against B t B can-
not recover against A his proportion of the
costs."

(j) It has been held in Kentucky
that the principal must be insolvent to
render a co-surety liable to contribute to
another who has paid the debt. Pearson
v. Duckham, 3 Litt. 386 ; Daniel v. Bal-
lard, 2 Dana, 296. But this is opposed
to the prevailing doctrine. Cowell v.
Edwards, 2 B. & P. 268 ; Odin v. Green-
leaf, 3 N. H. 270.

(/!) Dunn v. Slee, Holt, 399; where
it was also held by Parke, J., that time
given to one surety is no bar to an action
afterwards by that surety against a co-
surety. M

t 33

* 35 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

If a plaintiff in an action ex contractu recovers judgment and
takes out an execution, a defendant upon satisfying the execution
makes out a claim for contribution against other parties, by show-
ing either that such parties were co-defendants in the action, or
that they were jointly liable in fact for the debt which was

* 35 made a cause of action against him alone. (I) But * in

the latter case the joint liability must not be a liability as
copartners, (m)

At law a surety can recover from his co-surety only that co-
surety's aliquot part, calculated upon the whole number, without
reference to the insolvency of others of the co-sureties ; (n) but in
equity it is otherwise, (o)

If one co-surety takes security from the principal for his pro-
portion of the burden, or for the whole, the other co-surety shall
share in the benefit of it. (j?)

The contract of contribution is a several contract. (q~) And
hence a surety may release one of his co-sureties without barring
his right of action against the rest ; for a release of one surety
discharges the others only from such a proportion of the debt as
they would be entitled to have recourse to the discharged party
for, upon their payment of the whole debt, (r) But if two co-sure-

(!) In Murray v. Bogert, 14 Johns. Cowell v. Edwards, 2 B. & P. 268. — Shaw,
318, it was luiil that where A who claims C. J., Chaffee v. Jones, 19 Pick. 2(1.3 ; Cur-
contribution of B & C, on the ground of rier v. Fellows, 7 Foster (N. H. ), 366.
having paid a judgment, shows neither (o) Peter v. Rich, 1 Chanc. 34; Cow-
that B & C were parties to the judgment, ell v. Edwards, 2 B & P. 268. — And in
nor that the debt was a joint one, not aris- Vermont the rule of equity has been held
ing out of a partnership transaction, he to be the rule of law also. Mills v. Hyde,
must be nonsuited. The reporter's ab- 10 Vt. 50. So also, Henderson v. McDuf-
stract seems incorrect, in so far as it rep- fee, 5 N. H. 38, but there the decision
resents the court as holding that the mere went, partly at least, on the necessity of
absence of proof that the defendants were the case, there being no court to adminis-
parties to the judgment was fatal to the ter equitable relief. It has been decided in
claim of contribution. Such a doctrine South Carolina, that co-sureties who are
would lie directly in the face of Holmes not within the jurisdiction, as well as in-
v. Williamson, 6 M. & Sel. 158 ; Burnell solvent co-sureties, are to be excluded in
v. Minot, 4 Moore, 340; Boardman v. the calculation of the proportion to be
Paige, 11 N. II. 431. contributed by those against whom pay-

(m) Sadler c. Nixon, 5 B. & Ad. 936; ment can be enforced. McKenna v.

Edgar r. Kiiapp, 5 Man. & G. 708 ; Mur- George, 2 Rich. Eq. 15.
ray r. Bogert, 14 Johns. 318 ; Pearson v. (p) Miller !•. Sawyer, 30 Vt. 412;

Skelton, 1 M. & W. 504, where the former Parliam v. Green, 64 N. C. 436.
action was ex delicto. But where the ('/) Kelby !•. Steel, 5 Esp. 194; Gra-

joint contractors were, together with ham v. Robertson, 2 T. R. 282; Brand v.

many others, partners in a joint-stock Boulcott, 3 B. & P. 235 ; Birkley v. Pres-

company, of which they were the con- grave, 1 East, 220 ; Parker v. Ellis, 2

tract committee men, contribution was Sandf. 223.

enforced between them on account of the (r) Crowdus v. Shelby, 6 J. J. Marsh,

joint liability incurred by them as such 61 ; Fletcher v. Grover, 11 N. H. 368 ;

committee. Boulter v. Peplow, 0 C.B. 493. Fletcher v. Jackson, 23 Vt. 581.

(n) Browne v. Lee, 6 B. & C. 689;

U

CH- IL] OP JOINT PARTIES. * QQ

ties pay the debt out of a joint fund, their right of action against
the principal, and as it would seem against other co-sureties is
joint, (s)

_ The contract on which the assumpsit is founded dates from the
time when the relation of co-surety or co-obligor is entered into; al-
though the cause of action does not arise till the payment.
* Hence the discharge of one of the joint debtors (by what- * 36
ever cause) from his direct liability to the creditor, does not
relieve him in law, any more than in equity, from his obligation to
indemnify such of the remaining joint debtors as have borne
more than their original proportion of the debt, (t)

The undertaking which is to serve as the foundation of a claim
of contribution must be joint, not separate and successive, (ft)
Thus, the second indorser of a promissory note is not liable to the
first, though neither be indorser for value ; (w) unless there is
an agreement between the indorsers that, as between themselves
there shall be co-sureties ; (y~) and this is true even if they are
indorsers of accommodation paper, (w) And a guarantor cannot
be compelled to contribute in aid of a surety, (x)

Directors of an association who have authority to contract debts
on the credit of members of the corporation, those debts being
reasonable and necessary for carrying on the business, may have
a bill in equity against the members for contribution towards the
payment of these debts ; but not for costs and expenses of suits
instituted against them by creditors of the association ; unless a

(s) Osborne v. Harper, 5 East, 225; (v) Weston v. Chamberlain, 7 Cush.

Boggs v. Curtin, 10 S. & R. 211 ; Pearson 404 ; Hogue v. Davis, 8 Gratt. 4. See

v. Parker, 3 N. H. 366; Jewett v. Corn- also Westf all v. Parsons, 16 Barb. 645;

forth, 3 Greenl. 107 ; Fletcher v. Jackson, Pitkin v. Flanagan, 23 Vt. 160.
23 Vt. 593; Contra, Gould v. Gould, 8 (w) McNelly v. Patchin, 23 Mo. 40;

Cowen, 168. But Kelby v. Steel, 5 Esp. Dunn v. Wade, id. 207.
194, on the authority of which this case (x) Longley v. Griggs, 10 Pick. 121.

seems to have been decided, is quite dis- In Harris v. Warner, 13 Wend. 400, it

tinguishable from Osborne v. Harper. was held that the defendant, who was the

(t) Accordingly where the liability of last of four sureties for H. in a joint

one joint maker of a promissory note was promissory note, was not bound to make

continued by partial payments within six contribution to the plaintiff who was the

years, but the remedy of the holder against first surety and had paid the debt, the

the other was barred by the statute of defendant having qualified his undertak-

limitations, the debtor who continued lia- ing by adding to his signature the words

ble could notwithstanding recover contri- " surety for the above names." In Keith

bution from the other after paying the v. Goodwin, 81 "Vt. 268, it was held that

debt. Peaslee v. Breed, 10 N. H. 489 ; the guarantor of a note on which sureties

Boardman v. Paige, 11 N. H. 431 ; Howe had already signed, stood in relation to

v. Ward, 4 Greenl. 195. those who had signed before him as

(U) Prescott v. Perkins, 16 N. H. 805. surety for them jointly, not jointly with

(u) McDonald v. Magruder, 3 Pet. them.

470 ; Decreet v. Burt, 7 Cush. 651.

35

* 37 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

due regard to the interests of the association required a defence
against those suits, (xx)

The right of contribution exists against all who are sureties for
the same debt, although their primary liability depends upon dif-
ferent instruments. Where two bonds, for example, are given for
the performance of the same duty, and A and B sign as sureties in
one, and C and D in the other, A, if he pay the debt, may in equity
recover one fourth of the whole from each of the rest, (jf)

A party acquires a right to contribution as soon as he pays
more than his share, but not until then ; (2) and conse-
* 37 quently * the statute of limitations does not begin to run
until then, (a)

The law does not, generally at least, raise any such implied
promise, or right to contribution, among wrong-doers, or where
the transaction was unlawful. Qb) l If money be recovered in an
action grounded upon a tort it gives no ground for contribu-
tion, (c) Still, however, contribution is sometimes enforced where
he who is to be benefited by it did not know his act to be illegal,
or where it was of doubtful character, (i)

(xx) Tyrrell v. Washburn, 6 Allen, having sold ten casks of goods and sent

466. them to the plaintiffs to deliver to buyer,

(y) Deering v. Winchelsea, 2 B. & P. subsequently ordered the plaintiffs to de-

270 ; Mayhew v. Criekett, 2 Swanst. liver a portion of them to another per-

184 ; Craythorne v. Swinburne, 14 Ves. son, which order they obeyed. It was

160. Semb'e, the same principle may be held, that a promise to indemnify the

applied at law ; Branson, C. J., Norton v. plaintiffs might be implied from the facts

Coons, 3 Denio, 130, 132 ; Chaffee v. on which they could recover for the

Jones, 19 Pick. 260, 264 ; Enicks o. Pow- injury sustained in consequence of ful-

ell 2 Strob. Eq. 106. filling the order, although they had no

,JZK V, "■ HumPhreys, 6 M. & W. right to detain the goods or change their

153 ; Lord Eldon, Ex parte Gifford, 6 Ves. destination — the general rule that be-

808; Lytlei'. Pope, 11 B. Mon. 297. tween wrong-doers there is neither in-

(n) Davies v Humphreys, 6 M. & W. demnity nor contribution not applying

A^ndr "■ Ca^er! 12 I,red' L- 242' where the act js not clearly illegal in
(6) Pitcher o. Bailey, 8 East, 171; itself, and is done bona fide. — In Adam-
Booth v. Hodgson, 6 1. E. 405. But in son v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66 72 Bent C J
Bailey -v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455, it is said said : "It was certainly decided iiiMerrv-
that this rule has so many exceptions weather v. Nixan, that one wrongdoer
that it can hardly with propriety be could not sue another for contribution ;
caled a general rule. See Atkins u. Lord Kenyan, however, said, 'that the
Johnson, 43 Vt. 78. decision would not affect cases of indem-
(c) Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T. R. nit,/, where one man employed another to
I ,o ; ™brother.,»' Ansley, 1 Camp, do acts, not unlawful in themselves, for
■AH; Wilson v. Milner 2 Camp. 452; the purpose of asserting B right.' This
Ihweatt v Jones 1 Rand. 328. is the only decided cas? on the subject

nt { K HS l\ GlS?]ns' 2 A' & E' 67' 4 that is "rtelllgMe. There is a case of
iNev. & M. 64. There the defendants Walton u. Hanbury and others (2 Vern.

1 When acts, which are not apparently illegal, are done by one person at the
request of another, a promise to indemnify may be inferred. Dugdale v. Lovering,
1j> lx, iU O) Jr. Uo.

36

CH. II.]

OP JOINT PAETIES.

*38

The implied promise and the right to contribution resting upon
it, may be controlled by circumstances or evidence showing a
different understanding between the parties ; thus, a surety
cannot exact contribution of one who became co-surety at his
request, (e)1

* The commercial law of Prance, and of continental Eu- * 38
rope generally, admits the right to contribution, and regu-
lates it much as the law of England and this country. (/) The
civil law wholly rejects it. (<?) But by a decree of the Emperor
Hadrian, a co-surety being sued, might require the plaintiff to pro-
ceed against all liable jointly with him. He could not therefore
be compelled to pay the whole unless through his own neglect. (Ji)

692), but it is so imperfectly stated, that
it is impossible to get at the principle of
the judgment. The case of Philips v.
Biggs (Hardres, 164), was never de-
cided ; but the Court of Chancery seemed
to consider the case of two sheriffs of
Middlesex, where one had paid the dam-
ages in an action for an escape, and sued
the other for contribution, as like the case of
two joint obligors. From the inclination
of the court in this last case, and from
the concluding part of Lord Kenyan's
judgment in Merry weather v. Nixan, and
from reason, justice, and sound policy,
the rule that wrong-doers cannot have
redress or contribution against each
other, is confined to cases where the per-
son seeking redress must be presumed to
have known that he was doing an unlaw-
ful act."— Wooley v. Batte, 2 C. & P.
417 ; a party having recovered damages
in case against one of two joint coach
proprietors for an injury sustained by
the negligence of their servants ; held,
that such proprietor (he proving that he
was not personally present when the
accident happened) might maintain an
action against his co-proprietor for con-

i Contra, Bagott v. Mullen, 32 Lid. 332. Paul v. Berry, 78 111. 158, and Robertson
v. Deatherage, 82 111. 511, are to the effect that sureties may by agreement terminate
the right to contribution.

o I

tribution. See also Ives v. Jones, 3 Ired.
Xi. 538. But there can be no recovery in
such case if the two proprietors are part-
ners. Pearson v. Skelton, 1 M. & W.
504. See Thweatt v. Jones, 1 Band.
328.

(e) Turner v. Davies, 2 Esp. 478 ;
Bycrs o. McClanahan, 6 G. & J. 256;
Daniel v. Ballard, 2 Dana, 296 ; Taylor
v. Savage, 12 Mass. 98, 103. And see
Thomas r. Cook, 8 B. & C. 728; Harris
v. Warner, 13 Wend. 400; Bobison v.
Lyle, 10 Barb. 612 ; Keith v. Goodwin,
31 Vt. 268. But such an agreement
cannot be shown by parol evidence when
the guaranteed obligation is in writing.
Norton t\ Coons, 2 Seld. 33.

(f) Code Civ. Art. 2033 ; 1 Pothier on
Obligations, by Evans, 291.

(g) Dig. 46, 1, 39.

(h) Inst. 3, 21, 4. If the surety, on
paying the debt, took the precaution to
obtain a subrogation, he might exercise
the actions of the creditor against his
co-sureties; 1 Pothier on Obligations,
by Evans, 291; Cod. 8, 41, 11; Dig.
46, 1, 39.

i 39 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK

*39 *CHAPTEE III.

AGENTS.

Sect. \. — Of Agency in General.

The law of agency is now of very great importance. Such is
the complexity of human affairs in civilized society, that very few
persons are able to transact all their business, supply all their
wants, and accomplish all their purposes, without sometimes
employing another person to represent them, and act for them,
and in their stead. Such person becomes their agent, and the
person employing an agent is his principal.

There are two principles in relation to the law of agency, on
one of which it is founded, while the other measures the responsi-
bility of the principal for the acts of an agent. The first of these
is, that the agent is but the instrument of the principal, who acts
by him ; and a principal assumes the relations, acquires the
rights, and incurs the obligations which are the proper results of
his acts, equally, whether he does these mediately, or directly ;
whether he uses an unconscious and material instrument, or a
living and intelligent, instrument ; whether he signs his name by
a pen which he takes from the table, or by a man whom he
requests to sign his name for him. In either case, the thing done
is the act of the principal ; and, to a considerable extent, the law
identifies the agent with the principal, although for some purposes,
and in some respects, the agent incurs his own share of responsi-
bility, or acquires his own rights, by the act which he performs as
the act of another. The second of these principles is, that, as
between the principal and a third party who has supposed himself
to deal with a principal by means of one purporting to be
* 40 his agent, the principal is responsible * for and is bound by
the acts of his agent on either of two grounds, which may
co-exist, and may not. One of these is, that he has actually
created this agency ; the other is, that he has, by words or acts,
38

CH- m-J AGENTS.

41

fully authorized the third party to believe the person to be his
agent. If he has justified the belief of the third party, that this
person had from him sufficient authority to do, as his agent, that
precise thing, it is no answer, on his part, to say that the agent
had no authority, or one which did not reach so far, and that it
was a mistake on the part of the third party. It may have been
his mistake, but the question then is, whether the principal led
this third party into the mistake. And in deciding this question,
all the circumstances of the transaction, and especially the
customary usages in relation to such transactions, come into
consideration.

^ This principle applies to, and may indeed be said to create, the
distinction between a general agent and a particular agent, (a)
A general agent is one authorized to transact all his principal's
business, or all his business of some particular kind. A par-
ticular agent is one authorized to do one or two special things.
But it is not always easy to find a precise rule which determines
with certainty between these two kinds of agency. A manufac-
turing corporation may authorize A to purchase all their cotton,
and he is then their general agent for this special purpose,
or to purchase all the cotton they may * have occasion to * 41
buy in New Orleans, and then he may be called their
general agent for this special purpose in that place. Or to
purchase the cargoes that shall come from such a plantation, or
shall arrive in such a ship or ships, or five hundred bales of
, cotton, and then he should rather be regarded as their particular
agent for this particular transaction.

(a) See Jacques v. Todd, 3 Wend. 83; except for those. In the case of a par-
Anderson v. Coonley, 21 Wend. 279 ; ticular agent, the scope of authority is
Savage v. Rix, 9 N. H. 263 ; Whitehead measured by the express directions he
v. Tuckett, 15 East, 400. The term has received ; in the case of a general
Agency seems to imply two quite distinct agent the law permits usage to enter in
things, namely, a contract between prin- and enlarge the liability of the principal,
cipal and agent, and the legal means by This usage, however, is not a uniform,
which the principal is made, without his unvarying rule ; in other words there is
direct participation, a party to a contract no common scope of authority predicable
with a third person. No advantage, but of every general agent. To say of a
only confusion, seems to result from certain one that he is a general agent is
blending these two things. If, in con- not enough to describe his powers, or to
sidering agency in the latter aspect, the determine the extent of his principal's
domestic contract between principal and liability ; it is next to be ascertained for
agent could be excluded from the mind, what particular business he is thus gen-
and reserved for separate observation, it eral agent'. This done, the agency is
might conveniently be laid down as the brought within a class, and the qualities
rule of law that the principal is in all attach to it which the law, using the
cases bound for acts of the agent done light of mercantile custom, affixes to the
within the scope of his authority, and never class at large.

39

41

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK

But there is a material distinction between authority, and
instructions uncommunicated, and not intended to be com-
municated to the third party dealing with the agent. Such in-
structions qualify the liability of the principal neither in the case
of a general agency nor of a particular agency, (aa) x

(aa) The sound rule of law issetforth
by Parker, C. J., giving the judgment of
the court in Hatch v. Taylor- 10 N. H.
538: "It is, we think, apparent enough,
that all which may be said to a special
agent, about the mode in which his
agency is to be executed, even if said at
the time that the authority is conferred
or the agency constituted, cannot be
regarded as part of the authority it-
self, or as a qualification or limitation
upon it. There may be, at all times,
upon the constitution of a special agency,
and there often is, not only an authority
given to the agent, in virtue of which he
is to do the act proposed, but also cer-
tain communications, addressed to the
private ear of the agent, although they
relate to the manner in which the author-
ity is to be executed, and are intended as
a guide to direct its execution. These
communications may, to a certain extent,
be intended to limit the action of the
agent ; that is, the principal intends and
expects that they shall be regarded and
adhered to, in the execution of the
agency ; and should the agent depart
from them, he would violate the instruc-
tions given him by the principal at the
time when he was constituted agent, and
execute the act he was expected to per-
form in a case in which the principal did
not intend that it should be done. And
yet, in such case he may have acted en-
tirely within the scope of the authority
given him, and the principal be bound by
his acts. This could not be so, if those
communications were limitations upon
the authority of the agent. It is only
because they are not to be regarded as
part of the authority given, or a limita-
tion upon that authority, that the act of
the agent is valid, although done in vio-
lation of them ; and the matter depends
upon the character of the communica-
tions thus made by the principal, and
disregarded by the agent. Thus, where
one person employs another to sell a
horse, and instructs him to sell him for
$100, if no more can be obtained, but to
get the best price he can, and not to
sell him for less than that sum, and not
to state how low he is authorized to sell,

because that will prevent him from ob-
taining more. Such a private instruction
can with no propriety be deemed a limi-
tation upon his authority to sell, because
it is a secret matter between the princi-
pal and agent, which any person pro-
posing to purchase is not to know, at
least until the bargain is completed.
And if no special injunction of secrecy
was made, the result would be the same ;
for from the nature of the case, such an
instruction, so far as regards the mini-
mum price, must be intended as a private
matter between the principal and agent,
not to be communicated to the persons
to whom he proposed to make a sale,
from its obvious tendency to defeat the
attempt to obtain a greater sum, which
was the special duty of the agent. It
will not do to say that the agent was not
authorized to sell, unless he could obtain
that price. That is the very question,
whether such a private instruction limits
the authority to sell." pp. 545-547
" No man is at liberty to send another
into the market to buy or sell for him as
his agent, with secret instructions as to
the manner in which he shall execute
his agency, which are not to be commu-
nicated to those with whom he is to deal ;
and then, when his agent has deviated
from those instructions, to say that he
was a special agent, — that the instruc-
tions were limitations upon his authority,
— and that those with whom he dealt, in
the matter of his agency, acted at their
peril, because they were bound to in-
quire, where inquiry would have been
fruitless, and to ascertain that of which
they were not to have knowledge. It
would render dealing with a special agent
a matter of great hazard. If the princi-
pal deemed the bargain a good one, the
secret orders would continue sealed ;
but if his opinion was otherwise, the in-
junction of secrecy would be removed,
and the transaction avoided, leaving the
party to such remedy as he might enforce
against the agent. Prom this reasoning,
we deduce the general principle, that
where private instructions are given to a
special agent, respecting the mode and
manner of executing his agency, intended

1 See Fatman v. Leet, 41 Ind. 133 ; Crazan v. Smith, ib. 288.
40

CH. III.]

AGENTS.

42

The importance of the distinction between a general agent and
a special or particular agent, lies in the rule, that if a particular
agent exceed his authority, the principal is not bound ; (6)
but if a general agent exceed his authority the * principal * 42
is bound, (e) * provided the agent acted within the ordinary
and usual scope of the business he was authorized to transact, and
the party dealing with the agent did not know that he exceeded
his authority, (d) 2

Any specific authority must be strictly pursued ; as, for
example, one known to be an agent to settle claims, and with
specific authority to this effect, cannot be supposed to have
authority to commute them, (e) 3 Nor can the agency be enlarged

to be kept secret, and not communicated
to those with whom he may deal, such
instructions are not to be regarded as
limitations upon his authority ; and not-
withstanding he disregards them, his act,
if otherwise within the scope of bis
agency, will be valid, and bind his em-
ployer." pp. 548, 549. See also Berth-
old v. Goldsmith, 24 How. 536, where
one who had been employed as a special
agent for a particular purpose in refer-
ence to sales of property, in the profits
of which he was to share, was declared
in regard to other transactions of his
own relating to the disposal of the same
property, not to be a partner as to third
parties, and neither a general nor special
agent. Trickett o. Tomlinson, 13 C. B.
(n. s.) 663; Edmunds v. Bushell, Law
Kep. 1 Q. B. 97.

lb) Flemyng v. Hector, 2 M. & W.
178; Todd v. Emly, 7 M. & W. 427; 8
id. 505 ; East India Co. v. Hensley, 1 Esp.
Ill ; Woodin v. Burford, 2 Cr. & M. 391 ;
Jordan v. Norton, 4 M. & W. 155 ; Sykes
v, Giles, 5 M. & W. 645 ; Waters v. Brog-
den, 1 Y. & J. 457 ; Daniel v. Adams,
Ambl. 495. And see Reaney v. Culbert-
eon, 21 Penn. St 507.

(c) Duke of Beaufort v. Neeld, 12 CI.
& F. 248, 273; Nickson v. Brohan, 10
Mod. 109 ; Monk ». Clayton, Molloy, B.
2, ch. 10, § 27.

(d) Forman v. Walker, 4 La. An. 409 ;
Campbell v. Hicks, 4 H. &N. (Exch.) 851.

(e) Kingston i.-. Kincaid, 1 Wash. C.
C. 454. That the authority given to the
agent must in all cases be strictly pur-
sued, see Robertson i\ Ketchum, 11 Barb.
652, and Cooley v. Willard, 34 111. 69.
The exception, extending the principal's
liability in favor of third parties, is only
made where such third parties are igno-
rant that restrictions have been imposed
upon the agent. In Attwood v. Munnings,
7 B. & C. 283, Bayley, J., said : " This
was an action upon an acceptance im-
porting to he by procuration, and, there-
fore, any person taking the bill would
know that he had not the security of the
acceptor's signature, but of the party pro-
fessing to act in pursuance of an author-
ity from him. A person taking such a
bill, ought to exercise due caution, for he
must take it upon the credit of the party
who assumes the authority to accept, and
it would be only reasonable prudence to
require the production of that authority."
The authority in that case was contained
in two powers of attorney, and it was
decided that, taking the proper construc-
tion of them, the agent had exceeded his
authority, and so the principal was not
bound. This case is confirmed by Well-
ington v. Herring, 5 Bing. 442. Goods
were shipped on board of plaintiff's ship,

i Thus where a general agent gave, without authority, a lease under seal in his
principal's name, and received rent thereunder, its surrender to hini_ » agoodde fence
to the principal's action for further rent. Amory v. Kannoffsky, 11 / Mass. 351. bee

Th? Thyistutahhough Kent was expressly forbidden to do the act in question,
Bell v Offutt 10 Bush, 632 ; Minterw. Pacific R. Co. 41 Mo. 503

• Nor does an agent's authority to draw bills of exchange on time or s,gh , mdude
the drawhig of pof t-dated bills. New Tork Iron Mine v. Citizens' Bank, 44 Mich.

^ 41

43

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[book I.

so as to hold any principal but the one employing the agent;

thus, the agent of a partnership is not the agent of the
* 43 members severally, (ee) The * rule is, as to the public, that

the authority of a general agent may be regarded by them
as measured by the usual extent of his general employment. (/)
The obvious reason for this is, that the public may not be
deceived to its injury by previous acts which the agent was fully-
authorized to do. By such authority the principal does, as it were,
proclaim and publicly declare him to be his agent, and must abide
the responsibility of so doing. It would not be right for the prin-
cipal to say to one who dealt with his general agent : " you knew
that he was my general agent, for I authorized you and everybody
else to believe this, but in this particular instance I had revoked or
limited the authority, and the revocation or limitation shall affect
you although you did not know it." But a principal may well
say to one who dealt with an agent for a particular purpose, it
was your business first to ascertain that he was my agent, and
then to ascertain for yourself the character and extent of his
agency. (/)

We think the distinction between a general agency and a spe-
cial agent useful, and sufficiently definite for practical purposes,

and by the bills of lading, which were in-
dorsed to the defendants, were to be deliv-
ered on payment of freight. The bills were
indorsed by the defendants to their fact-
ors, to whom the goods were delivered,
and the freight charged. Assumpsit was
brought against the defendants on the
bankruptcy of the factors, but was not
sustained on the ground that authority
to receive the goods was given only on
immediate payment of the freight. Tobin
v. Crawford, 5 M. & W. 235. And see
Hogg ... Snaith, 1 Taunt. 347 ; Acey i:
Ferine, 7 M. & W. 157; Esdaile v. La
Nauze, 1 Y. & Coll. 394 ; Maanss v. Hen-
derson, 1 East, 335 ; Murray v. East India
Co., 5 B. & Aid. 204; Gardner v. Baillie,
6 T. R. 591 ; with which compare Howard
?•. Baillie, 2 H. Bl. 618 ; Stainback t>. Bank
of Virginia, 11 Gratt. 260; Same v. Read,
id. 281. The ruling of Heath, J., in Hicks
v. Hankins, 4 Esp. 114, seems to admit of
question. For instance, where the au-
thority of a general agent has been cir-
cumscribed, see Odiorne <■. Maxcy, 13
Moss. 178; White v. Westport Cotton
Man. Co. 1 Pick. 215; Salem Bank a.
Gloucester Bank, 17 Mass. 1 ; Wyman v.
Ilallowell & Augusta Bank, 14 Mass. 58;
Kerns v. Piper, 4 Watts, 222 ; Terry o.

42

Fargo, 10 Johns. 114 ; Reynolds v. Row-
ley, 4 La. An. 409. Except the master of
a vessel and an acceptor for honor, no
agent can borrow money on his principal's
account without special authority. Haw-
tavne v. Bourne, 7 M. & W. 595. See
post, pp. * 81 & * 82.

(ee) Johnston v. Brown, 18 La. An.
330.

(/•) Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38;
Whitehead v. Tuckett, 15 East, 400. But
if an injury is to result to one man from
the omission or neglect of an agent of
another, the principal must be held liable.
And when the defendants sent their agent
to employ the plaintiff, who was a physi-
cian, to visit a boy who had been injured
while in their service, directing the agent
to tell the plaintiff that they would pay
him for his first visit, and the agent
neglected so to do, and employed the
plaintiff generally to attend the boy so
long as he might need medical aid, and
the plaintiff attended upon the boy on
the credit of defendants, held, that de-
fendants were liable to the plaintiff for
his services in attending the boy. Barber
u. Briton & Hall, 26 Vt. 112.

(ff) Barry v. Anderson, 22 Ind. 36;
Davenport v. Peoria Ins. Co. 17 la. 276.

CH- In-J AGENTS. # 44

although it may have been pressed too far, and relied upon too
much in determining the responsibility of a principal for the acts
of an agent. It may indeed be said, that every agency is, under
one aspect, special, and under another, general. No agent has
authority to be in all respects and for all purposes an » alter
ego " of his principal, binding him by whatever the * agent * 44
may do in reference to any subject whatever ; and therefore
the agency must be special so far as it is limited by place, or time,
or the extent or character of the work to be done. On the other
hand every agency must be so far general, that it must cover
not merely the precise thing to be done, but whatever usually and
rationally belongs to the doing of it.

Of late years, courts seem more disposed to regard this distinc-
tion and the rules founded upon it, as altogether subordinate to
that principle which may be called the foundation of the law of
agency > namely, that a principal is responsible, either, when he
has given to an agent sufficient authority, or, when he justifies a
party dealing with his agent in believing that he has given to this
agent this authority. (#)

Where the agency is implied from general employment, it may
survive this employment, and will be still implied in favor of
those who knew this general employment, but have not had notice
of the cessation of the employment, and cannot be supposed to
have knowledge thereof. (K) Hence the common and very proper
practice of giving notice by public advertisement when such an
agency is revoked.

In order to judge correctly of the extent of an agent's author-
ity, the distinction must be noticed between those acts which are
within his authority, and those which are only within an appear-
ance of authority, for which the principal is not responsible ; for
a principal is responsible only for that appearance 'of authority
which is caused by himself, and not for that appearance of con-
formity to the authority which is caused only by the agent. An
agent's authority is that which is given by the declared terms of

(g) In Mechanics Bank v. N. Y. &c. quite insufficient to Solve a great variety

E. Co. 3 Kernan, 632, it is said by Com- of cases. It is unprofitable to dwell upon

stock, J., in giving the decision of the that distinction."

court of appeals, " There are in the books, (h) v. Harrison, 12 Mod. 346 ;

many loose expressions concerning the Monk v. Clayton, Molloy, B. 2, ch. 10, §

distinction between a general and a spe- 27, cited per curiam, 10 Mod. 110; Emmett

cial agency. The distinction itself is v. Norton, 8 C. & P. 506.
highly unsatisfactory, and will be found

43

* 45 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

his appointment, notwithstanding secret instructions ; or that with

which he is clothed by the character in which he is held out to the

world, although not within the words of his commission.

* 45 Whatever is done under an authority * thus manifested, is

actually within the authority, and the principal is bound for
that reason ; for he is bound equally by the authority which he
actually gives, and by that which, by his own acts, he appears to
give. But it is obvious that an agent may clothe his act with all
the indicia of authority, and yet the act itself may not be within
either the real or apparent authority. The appearance of the
authority is one thing ; and for that the principal is responsible
only so far as he has caused that appearance. The appearance of
the act is another ; and for that it seems the agent alone is
responsible. It is a fundamental proposition, that one man can
be bound only by the authorized acts of another. He cannot be
charged because another ho^ds a commission from him, and
falsely asserts that his acts are within it. (i) This distinction
has been well illustrated by recent adjudications. Thus a master
of a ship is the general agent of the owners to perform all things
relating to the usual employment of his ship, and, among other
things, to sign bills of lading for goods put on board, and ac-
knowledge the nature, quality, and condition of the goods. But
if he signs a bill of lading for goods which have never been
shipped, he exceeds his authority ; and although the act, judged
by its appearance and the representation of the agent, is strictly
within the authority, yet the principal is not bound. (&) x So, if
the master signs a bill of lading for a greater quantity of goods
than those on board, the same principle applies. (7) And where
the servant of a wharfinger fraudulently signed a receipt, purport-
ing to be an acknowledgment that certain wheat had been deliv-
ered at his employer's wharf, no such wheat having in fact been
delivered, and thereby wilfully induced one C to pay the price
thereof to the pretended vendor ; it was held that the wharfinger
was not liable, the servant having authority only to give receipts
for goods which had in fact been delivered at the wharf, (to)
Again, where a railroad corporation appointed an agent to issue

(i) Per Comstock, J., in Mechanics Bank (I) Hubbersty v. Ward, 8 Exch. 330.

v. N. Y. &c. R. Co. 3 Kernan, 599. (m) Coleman v. Riches, 16 C. B. 104.

(£) Grant v. Norway, 10 C. B. 665.

1 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Wilkens, 44 Md. 11.
44

CH. III.] AGENTS. * 46

certificates for stock, upon a transfer on the company's books by
a previous owner, and a surrender of that owner's certificate ;
and the agent fraudulently issued * certificates for his own * 46
benefit, without a compliance with either of the above condi-
tions, his acts were held to be beyond the scope of his authority,
and his principals not bound, (n) And where an agent author-
ized in writing to purchase goods to a certain amount, had ex-
ceeded the amount, but assured a seller that he had not, and the
seller sold the goods on this assurance, it was held by a majority
of the court (Wilde, J., dissenting), that the principal was not
held, (o) 1 We have some doubts of the last decision ; and, cer-
tainly, care must be taken not to extend this principle too far.
Thus, an agent may be authorized to give notes for his principal
in order to raise money to be used in the business of the latter.
A third person may inspect the power, advance the money in good
faith, and the agent appropriate it to his own use ; and this the
agent may have intended at the time. In such a case, the prin-
cipal would be responsible, not because the act of the agent ap-
peared to be within the authority, but because the power actually
included the transaction. A power given to an agent to borrow
money, upon notes or otherwise, implies that the money may be
paid to him, and so the whole transaction is strictly and literally
authorized. The misappropriation of the proceeds by the agent
is a mere breach of trust, relating to money in his hands, and
upon the principles of trust, his intention to misappropriate would
not affect an innocent party. But suppose the power to give the
note is on its face conditional. It then has no existence until
the condition has been actually fulfilled. And if one advances
money to the agent on his declaration that the conditions
have been fulfilled, and it turns out that the conditions had
not occurred on which the exercise of the power depended, then
he was trusting to the representation of the agent, and must look
to him alone. As the principal never authorized the transac-
tion at all, he is bound neither by the contract nor by the
representation, (j?)

in) Mechanics Bank „. N. Y. &c. R. Bank v. N. Y. &c R. Co. 3 Kernan, 599.

Co. 3 KerTan? 699. ^ R1 , fee North River Bank „. Aymar, 3 Hill,

to) Mussey v. Beecher, 3 Cush. 611. AbA.
(p) Per Comslock, J., in Mechanics

i In Palmer v. Cheney, 35 la. 281, the principal was declared liable in such a case.

45 *

* 47 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

It has been held that " a general and special agent to

* 47 transact * all manner of business," though created by a

power of attorney under seal, does not necessarily include
therein authority to sell. Such a power is regarded as a vague
and indefinite instrument, under which a prudent man would not
accept a title to property, (q)

For the power of the agent to submit questions in which his
principal is interested, to arbitration, see the section on Arbitra-
tion in the second volume.

SECTION II.

IN WHAT MANNER AUTHORITY MAY BE GIVEN TO AN AGENT.

The facts being undisputed, the question whether the alleged
agent had sufficient authority, is a question of law. (qq) An
agent, generally, may be appointed by parol, and so authorized to
do any thing which does not require him to execute a deed for his
principal, (r) 1 The rule of the common law, that an agent can-
not affix a seal for his principal, unless his authority to do this is
under seal, is still generally recognized as in force, (rr) He may
be authorized by parol to make and sign contracts in writing, and
it seems to be now settled that he may be authorized without
writing, to make even those contracts which are not binding upon
his principal unless in writing signed by him. (s) And even a
parol ratification is equivalent to an orignal authority, (f)

(q) Hodge v. Coombs, 1 Black, 102. under seal, could not be admitted in

(77) Gulick v. Grover, 4 Vroom, 403. evidence in an action of assumpsit against

(r) 2 Kent, Com. 612. The receipt of the principal. But see contra, Cooper v.

an authorized agent is the receipt of the Rankin, 5 Binn. 613, and page * 52, infra,

principal. Mackersy v. Ramsays, 9 CI. notes (m), (0).

& F. 818, 850. — A tender made to an au- (s) Shaw v. Nudd, 8 Pick. 9 ; Ewing

thorized agent is as if made to his prin- v. Tees, 1 Binn. 450 ; Clinen v. Cooke, 1

cipal. Moffat v. Parsons, 5 Taunt. 307. Sch. & L. 22 ; Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves.

{rr) Rowe v. Ware, 30 Ga. 27'8 ; Echols 234, 250. — But by an express provision

v. Cheney, 28 Cal. 157. See also Morri- of the Statute of Frauds, an agent, to

son v. Bowman, 29 Cal. 337 ; Gordon v. grant or assign a term for more than

Bulkeley, 14 S. & R. 331. And in Ban- three years, or an estate of freehold,

orgee v. Hovey, 5 Mass. 11, it was held must be authorized thereto in writing.

(Sewell, J., dissenting), that a sealed in- 29 Car. IX c. 3, § 3.
strument executed in the name of the (t) Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722.

principal by an agent, not authorized

1 Manhattan Ins. Co. v. La Pert, 52 Tex. 604.
46

CH. III.] AGENTS. * 48

An authority is presumed or raised by implication of law, on
the ground that the principal has justified the belief that he has
given such authority, in cases where he has employed a person in
his regular employment ; («) 1 as where one sends goods
*to an auctioneer, or to a common repository room for *48
sale, the bailee has an implied authority to sell, (v~) And
such presumptions frequently arise in the case of a wife ; (w) or
of a domestic servant ; (x) or of a son who has been permitted
for a considerable time to transact a particular business for the
father, (y) 2 as to sign bills, &c. ; or where one has been repeat-
edly employed to sign policies of insurance for another. (z) So
the acceptance of the agency by the agent may be inferred from
his acting under it ; and this has been held even where he writes
to his principal refusing the agency, (zz)

It must be remembered, however, that an agent employed for a
special purpose, derives from this no general authority from his

(«) Dows v. Greene, 16 Barb. 72 ; (z) Brockelbank v. Sugrue, 5 C. & P.

Lyell v. Sanbourn, 2 Mich. 109 ; Thomp- 21 ; Haughton >•. Ewbank, 4 Camp. 88,

son v. Bell, 10 Exch. 10. where it was held sufficient proof of an

(v) Lord Ellenborough, Pickering v. agent's authority to subscribe a policy of

Busk, 15 East, 38. insurance for an insurer, that the insurer

(w) Prestwick v. Marshall, 7 Bing. was in the habit of paying iosses upon
565 ; Huckman v. Fernie, 3 M. & W. 505 ; policies so subscribed by* him, without
Att'y-Gen. o. Riddle, 2 Cr. & J. 493 ; producing the power of attorney under
Plimmer o. Sells, 3 Nev. & M. 422. — which the agent testified that he acted. —
After separation, the wife is still her An authority to draw is not an authority
husband's agent for the procurement of to indorse ; Robinson v. Yarrow, 7 Taunt,
such things as are reasonable and neces- 455 ; yet the fact that a confidential
sary for herself. Emmett v. Norton, 8 clerk had been accustomed to draw,
C. & P. 506. So where the person co- taken in connection with the fact that
habited with is only a mistress, and his master had in one instance author-
known to be in fact only a mistress, if ized him to indorse, and on two other
she is allowed to pass ostensibly as wife, occasions had received money obtained
Ryan v. Sans, 12 Q. B. 460. by his indorsement, is evidence from

(x) A master is not responsible for a which a jury may infer a general author-
contract entered into by a servant to ity to indorse. Prescott v. Flynn, 9
whom he had always given cash for Bing. 19. As to what will amount to
making purchases. Rusby v. Scarlett, 5 proof of an implied authority to a clerk
Esp. 75. So with any particular agent in a mercantile house to sign shipping
who obtains on credit goods which the papers in the names of his principals,
principal gave him money to purchase, see Dows v. Greene, 32 Barb. 490.
Lord Abinger, C. B., Flemyng v. Hector, (zz) George v. Sandel, 18 La. An.
2 M. & W.' 181. 635.

(y) Watkins v. Vince, 2 Stark. 368.

1 But not if the former employment was without the principal's knowledge,
Cobb v. Hall, 49 la. 366 ; nor if a mere temporary employment, nearly a year before,
Green v. Hinkley, 52 la. 633 ; nor to sell from the fact that a purchasing clerk was
employed fifteen months before to make a single sale. Cupples v. Whelan, 61 Mo.
583. See Wilcox v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 24 Minn. 269 ; Whelan v. Reilly, 61 Mo. 565.

2 A sale of intoxicating liquors by a son, as clerk, in a public house kept by his
father, will warrant the conviction of the latter for an illegal sale. Commonwealth
t;. Holmes, 119 Mass. 195.

47

* 49 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

principal. («) J Where the belief of the authority of an agent
arises only from previous action on his part as an agent, the
persons so treating with him must, on their own responsibil-
ity, ascertain the nature and extent of his previous employ-
ment. (7>) This may be such as to estop the principal from
*49 * denying his authority in the particular transaction; but
if not, then they have no remedy, unless against the agent
himself who misled them, (c)

SECTION III.

SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION.

As agency may be presumed from repeated acts of the agent,
adopted and confirmed by the principal previously to the contract
in which the question is raised, (cf) so agency may be confirmed
and established by a subsequent ratification ; the common law
having adopted the civil law maxim, uomnris ratihabitio retrotrahi-
tur el mandato cequiparatur.,\e~) 2 The rule may be stated thus :

(a) Reynelly. Lewis, 15 M. & W. 517 ; agreed with the holder of the note of a

Dawson ». Morrison, 16 L. J. C. P. 240 ; firm, that it should be renewed upon part

Cox v. Midland Railway Co. 3 Exch. 2G8; payment at maturity and a new note

Rusby v. Scarlett, 5 Esp. 75; Burness v. given for the balance, such agreement

l'ennel, 2 H. L. Cas. 619 ; Kaye v. Brett, will be an authority to one of the part-

5 K.xch. 269; Thatcher o. Bank of New ners, after the dissolution, to give a new

York, 5 Sardf. 121. note in the firm name in renewal, and

(A) Schiminelpennich v. Bayard, 1 the termination of the partnership is not
Pet. "201 ; Parsons v. Armor, 8 id. 413 ; a revocation of such authority.
Blane v. Proudfit, 3 Call, 207 ; Kilgour (c) Pourie v. Eraser, 2 Bay, 200.
ti. Fiulyson, 1 H. Bl. 155, where a power (d) Townsend v. Inglis, Holt, 278;
given, on the dissolution of a partner- Haughton v. Ewbank, 4 Camp. 88; Bar-
ship, to one of the partners to receive all ber v. Gingell, 3 Esp. 60. There the
debts owing to, and to discharge all apparent acceptor of a bill of exchange,
claims against the late partnership, was setting up as a defence that his signa-
lield not to authorize him to indorse a ture had been forged, it was held a good
bill of exchange in the partnership name, answer that the defendant had paid other
though drawn by him in that name, and bills of the drawer under similar circum-
accepted by a debtor of the partnership stances. And see Brigham v. Peters, 1
after the dissolution. In Richardson v. Gray, 147.

Moies, 31 Mo. 430, it is said that when (e) 18 Vin. Abr. Ratihabilh; Lucena

the partners had, prior to the dissolution, v. Craufurd, 1 Taunt. 325 ; Clark's Ex-

1 Thus a horse-car conductor cannot agree to give a free passage, Wakefield v. So.
Boston R. Co. 117 Mass. 544; nor an engineer contract for a railroad, Gardner v.
Boston, &c. R. Co. 70 Me. 181 ; nor a passenger agent make freight contracts, Tay-
lor v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 74 111. 80. See Reed v. Ashburnham R. Co. 120 Mass. 43.

2 Ratification maybe inferred from a principal's acts, Bearce v. Bowker, 115
Mass. 121); Gibson v. Norway Bank, 09 Me. 579; as where an agent to sign notes in

48

CH. III. J

AGENTS.

49

where any one contracts as agent, — but not unless he contracts
as agent, (/) — without naming a principal, his acts enure to the
benefit of the party, although at the time uncertain or unknown,
for whom it shall turn out that he intended to act, provided
the party thus entitled to be principal ratify the contract, (g) 1

ecuto'rs v. Van Riemsdyk, 9 Cranch, 158;
Fleckner v. United States Bank, 8 Wheat.
363 ; Bell v. Cunningham, 3 Pet. 81 ; Hooe
v. Oxley.l Wash. (Va.) 19; Moss t>. Ros-
sie Lead Mining Co. 5 Hill (N. Y.), 137 ;
Rogers v. Kneeland, 10 Wend. 218 ; Marsh
v. Keating, 1 Bing. N. C. 198 ; Bigelow v.
Dennison, 23 Vt. 505. — If any stranger,
in the name of the mortgagor "or his heir
(without his consent or privity), tender
the money, and the mortgagee aceepteth
it [which, however, he is not bound to do],
this is a good satisfaction, and the mort-
gagor or his heir, agreeing thereunto,
may re-enter into the land. Co. Lit.
206 b.

(/) Collins v. Suau, 7 Rob. 623.

(jr) Wilson v. Tumman, 6 Man. & G.
242. " Ratum quis habere von potest quod
ipsius nomine non est qestum." See also
Saunderson v. Griffith's, 5 B. & C. 909;
and Routh v. Thompson. 13 East, 274 ;
Foster i>. Bates, 12 M. & W. 226 ; Hull i>.
Pickersgill, 1 Br. & B. 282. This doc-
trine has frequent application in cases
of marine insurance. See Hagedorn v.
Oliverson, 2 M. & Sel. 485; Finney v.
Fairhaven Ins. Co. 5 Met. 192. — A notice to
quit, given by an unauthorized agent, can-
not be made good by an adoption of it by
the principal after the proper time for giv-
ing it, the agent having acted in his own
name in giving the notice, nor it seems, if
he acted in the name of the principal.
Doe v. Goldwin, 2 Q. B. 143 ; Right v.
Cuthell, 5 East, 491. — In Bird r. Brown,
4 Exch. 786, a very important distinction
was taken by the Court of Exchequer.

A, a merchant at Liverpool, sent orders
to B, at New York, to purchase certain
goods, which were shipped accordingly in
five ships and consigned to A, who, after
the receipt of the goods by one of them,
stopped payment on the 7th of April,
1846. B, pursuant to directions from A,
had drawn bills for the goods partly on A,
and partly on C, with whom A had deal-
ings. I), a merchant at Liverpool, and
who also had a house of business at New
York, purchased there several of the bills,
which were drawn at sixty days' sight,
and dated some on the 28th, and others on
the 30th of March, 1846. On ihe 8th of
May, a fiat in bankruptcy issued against
A, and his assignees were appointed.
The other four vessels arrived respect-
ively on the 4th, 5th, 7th, and 10th of that
month, and immediately on the arrival
of each, and while the transitus of the
goods on board continued, D, on behalf
of B, but not being his agent, and with-
out any authority from him, gave notice
to the masters and consignees, claiming
to stop the goods in transitu. On the 11th
of May the assignees made a formal de-
mand of the goods still on board and
undelivered, from the master and consign-
ees of each of the four ships, at the same
time tendering the freight; but they
refused to deliver them, and on the same
day delivered the whole to D. On the
next day the assignees made a formal
demand of the goods from him, but he
refused to deliver them up. On the 28th
of April, B heard at New York that A
had stopped payment, and on the next

his principal's absence so signs after the latter's return as an indorser, and the prin-
cipal with knowledge receives a dividend thereon from the bankrupt maker, and
agrees to hold him harmless, Harrod v. McDanicls, 126 Mass. 413; as by acceptance
of a policy, of an agent's execution of a premium note, Monitor Ins. Co. v. Buffum,
115 Mass. 343 ; as by their appearance as witnesses of the parties to an arbitration,
of the submission signed by attorney, Blakely v. Graham, 111 Mass. 8; as the failure
to object by the only stockholder not previously informed, of the corporation super-
intendent's purchase of goods, Lyndeborough Glass Co. v. Mass. Glass Co. Ill Mass.
315; as by acceptance of the consideration with knowledge, of an agent's release of
a mortgage, Tooker v. Sloan, 3 Stewart, 394 ; or as by acceptance of rents there-
under, of an unauthorized lease of a mining right, Chamberlin v. Collinson, 45 la.
429. An insured's ratification, after a loss, of unauthorized insurance is sufficient.
Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 7 Lansing, 138. See Fort v. Coker, 11 Heiskell,
579, as to a conditional ratification; Owensboro Bank v. Western Bank, 13 Bush,
526! as to ratifying an agent's taking of insufficient security.

i Williams v. North China Ins. Co. 1 C. P. D. 757 ; Francis v. Kerker, 85 111. 190.
vol. i. 4 49

51

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

50

•61

And, on the other * hand, if the principal accept, receive,
and hold the proceeds or beneficial results of such a contract,
he will be estopped from * denying an original authority, or

day he executed a power of attorney to
E, of Liverpool, authorizing him to stop
the goods in transitu. This was received
by E on the 13th of May, who on that
day adopted and confirmed the previous
stoppage by D. B afterwards adopted
and ratified all which had been done both
by E and D. Held, that the title of A to
the goods was not devested by the above
stoppages m(ransi'(K, andeonsequently that
trover for them was maintainable by the
assignees against B. Pollock, C. B., deliv-
ering the judgment, said : " The doctrine
' omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et ntandato
cequiparatur' is one intelligible in principle,
and easy in its application when applied to
cases of contract. If A. B., unauthorized
by me, makes a contract on my behalf
with J. S., which I afterwards recognize
and adopt, there is no difficulty in dealing
with it as having been originally made by
my authority. J. S. entered into the con-
tract on the understanding that he was
dealing with me, and when I afterwards
agree to admit that such was the case,
J. S. is precisely in the condition in which
he meant to be ; and if he did not believe
A. B. to be acting for me, his condition
is not altered by my adoption of the
agency, for he may sue A. B. as princi-
pal at his option, and has the same equi-
ties against me if I sue, that he would
have had against A. B. In cases of tort
there is more difficulty. If A. B. pro-
fessing to act by my authority, does that
which /irima facie amounts to a trespass,
and I afterwards assent to and adopt his
act, there he is treated as having from
the beginning acted by my authority, and
I become a trespasser, unless I can justify
the act which is to be deemed as having
been done by my previous sanction. So
far there is no difficulty in applying the
doctrine of ratification even in cases of
tort — the party ratifying becomes as it
were a trespasser by estoppel — he cannot
complain that he is deemed to have au-
thorized that which he admits himself to
have authorized. The authorities, how-
ever, go much further, and show that in
some cases where an act, which if unau-
thorized would amount to a trespass, has
been done in the name and on behalf of
another, and without previous authority,
there a subsequent ratification may enable
the party on whose behalf the act was
done, to take advantage of it, and to
treat it as having been done by bis direc-

50

tion. But this doctrine must be taken
with the qualification that the act of rati-
fication must take place at a time, and
under circumstances, when the ratifying
party might have himself lawfully done
the act which he ratifies. Thus in Lord
Audley's case, a fine with proclamations
was levied of certain land, and a stranger
within five years afterwards, in the name
of him who had right, entered to avoid
the fine ; after the five years, and not
before, the party who had the right to
the land ratified and confirmed the act of
the stranger ; this was held to be inopera-
tive, though such ratification within the
five years would probably have been
good. Now the principle of this case,
which is reported in many books, Cro. E.
561; Moore, 457, pi. 630; Poph. 108, pi. 2,
and is cited with approbation by Lord
Coke in Margaret Podger's case (9 Eep.
106 a), appears to us to govern the pres-
ent. There the entry to be good must
have been made within the five years ; it
was made within that time, but till rati-
fied it was merely the act of a stranger,
and so had no operation against the
fine ; by the ratification it became the
act of the party in whose name it was
made, but that was not until after the
five years — he could not be deemed to
have made an entry till he ratified the
previous entry — and he did not ratify
until it was too late to do so. In the
present case the stoppage could only be
made during the transitus ; during that
period, the defendants, without authority
from Illins, made the stoppage. After
the transitus was ended, but not before,
Illins ratified what the defendants had
done ; from that time the stoppage was
the act of Illins. But it was then too
late for him to stop ; the goods had
already become the property of the plain-
tiffs, free from all right of stoppage.
We are therefore of opinion that there
must be judgment for the plaintiffs." —
It is somewhat remarkable, in view of
the present state of the law, that it was
at one time strenuously contended that
the doctrine of ratification reached less
broadly in contract than in tort; and that
although a principal unknown at the time
could afterwards adopt the act of the
agent in the latter case, he could not in
the former. See Hagedorn i\ Oliverson,
2 M. & Sel. 485, and per Parke, J., in
Hull v. Pickersgill, 1 Br. & B. 287.

CH- m-] AGENTS.

52

a ratification. (K) 1 And if a party does not disavow the acts
of his agent as soon as he can after they come to his knowl-
edge, he makes these acts his own. (»') 2 Nor will the delay of
a third party to assert his rights against the principal for the
acts of the agent, discharge the former from his liability, if the
relative position of principal and agent have not in the mean
time been altered. But the failure of the principal to notify the
agent of his dissent, does not, as between them, ratify the act ; (/fc)
for the agent knew his own want of authority. An adoption of
the agency in part, adopts it in the whole, because a principal is
not permitted to accept and confirm so much of a contract
made by one * purporting to be- his agent, as he shall think * 52
beneficial to himself, and reject the remainder. (I) 3

(A) Holt, C. J., in Bolton v. Hillers- &c. Co. v. Dandridge, 8 G. & J. 248, 323 ;
den, 1 Ld. Raym. 224, 225; Thorold v. Hays v. Stone, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 128; Cope-
Smith, 11 Mod. 72; Byrne v. Doughty, land v. Mercantile Ins. Co. 6 Pick. 198.—
13 Ga. 46; Johnson o. Smith, 21 Conn. Conduct which would be sufficient to
627. The principal, when he has once charge an individual as principal, may
affirmed a contract made by the agent not amount to ratification in the case of
without authority, and even fraudulently, a State. Delafield v. Illinois, 26 Wend,
cannot afterwards disaffirm it ; bringing 102 ; Warden v. Eichbaum, 3 Grant, 42 ;
assumpsit against the third party is an Drennen r. Walker, 21 Ark. 539.
affirmance. Smith o. Hodson, 4 T. R. (i) Bredin v. Dubarry, 14 S. & R. 27 ;
211,217. Yet if the party, alleged to be Veazie v. Williams, 8 How. 134; Bene-
principal, after denying that the agent diet v. Smith, 10 Paige, 126 ; McCulloch
had authority from him to purchase v. McKee, 16 Penn. 289 ; Brigham v. Pe-
goods, receive them from the agent in ters, 1 Gray, 139.
payment of a debt due from the latter, (k) Lewin v. Dille, 17 Mo. 64.
the original seller (whatever other rem- (/) Wilson v. Poulter, 2 Stra. 859;
edy he may have) cannot hold such sup- Smith v. Hodson, 4 T. R. 211 ; Hovil v.
posed principal liable as having ratified Pack, 7 East, 164 ; Brewer v. Sparrow,
the purchase made by the agent. Hast- 7 B. & C. 310 ; Wright v. Crookes, 1
ings v. Bangor House, 18 Me. 436. — The Scott, N. R. 685 ; Hovey v. Blanchard,
ratification of an act of an agent, in 13 N. H. 145 ; Farmers Loan Co. v.
order to bind the principal, must be with Walworth, 1 Comst. 447 ; N. E. Marine
a full knowledge of all the material Ins. Co. u. De Wolf, 8 Pick. 56 ; Culver
facts. Freeman v. Rosher, 13 Q. B. v. Ashley, 19 id. 300 ; Bigelow v. Den-
780 ; Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 607 ; Penn., nison, 23 Vt. 565 ; Hodnet e. Tatum,

1 Perkins v. Boothby, 71 Me. 91.

2 If a principal receives money borrowed on notes given in his name by his agent
without authority and fails to disavow the same within a reasonable time after
demand, he will be held to have ratified the act and to be bound by the notes. Gold
Mining Co. v. National Bank, 96 U. S. 640. So where an attorney without authority
received a bond in settlement of a debt due his principal, and the latter's silence
would tend to mislead him. Maddux v. Bevan, 39 Md. 485. Bosseau v. O'Brien,
4 Bissell, 395, decided that a principal's failure to answer his agent's letters or in-
quiries as to a sale is not a ratification. A principal must disavow within a "reas-
onable time " or " promptly," Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431 ; Daniell v. Griffin, 46
Ala. 520; or ns soon as he can, Kelsey v. Crawford Bank, 69 Penn. St. 426; Peck v.
Ritchey, 66 Mo. 114; otherwise he will be bound, Western, &c. R. Co. v. MeElwee,
6 Heiskell, 208; Walker v. Walker, 7 Baxter, 260.

8 Mundorff v. Wickersham, 63 Penn. St. 87 ; Seago v. Martin, 6 Heiskell, 308,
in which latter case the cash proceeds of certain sales of corn save one were
accepted.

51

52

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

A ratification is too late if it defeats the intervening rights of
a third party. (ZZ)

Where the party who undertakes to act as agent has affixed a
seal to an instrument which did not need a seal, a parol ratifica-
tion will make the instrument obligatory upon the principal as a
simple contract, (m) l And where one acting as agent has,
without authority, entered into a contract in writing required by
the Statute of Frauds to be in writing, the principal is bound by
an oral ratification. (n~) But it has been held, that a parol ratifi-
cation cannot make that the deed of the principal which origi-
nally did not bind him from the agent's want of an authority
under seal, (o) 2

It may be stated as a general rule, that no act operates a
ratification, unless, with a full knowledge of the circumstances, it
was intended so to operate, or unless it was such an act as

9 Geo. 70 ; Elam v. Carruth, 2 La. An.
375 ; Cook v. Bank of Louisiana, id.
324. It seems the delivery of money
to the agent for payment hy him to a
person with whom the agent had con-
tracted without authority, is such a
ratification (though the delivery of the
money be not made known to the other
contracting party), that if the agent
embezzle the money, the principal is
still bound by the contract. Lord El-
lenboroiir/h, in Rusby v. Scarlet, 5 Esji.
77. — In Burn v. Morris, 4 Tyr. 4*5,
trover was maintained against the finder
of a bank-note for £20 by the owner.
The defendant got the note changed at
the Bank of England, and afterwards,
being taken before the Lord Mayor, £7
(being part of the proceeds of the note)
were found upon her and were restored
to the plaintiff. It was contended that
this receipt of the £7 was a ratification
of the defendant's act, and precluded the
plaintiff from treating it as a conversion ;
and Brewer v. Sparrow, 7 B. & C 310,
was cited. But Lord Lt/nd/iurst, C. 15.,
said: " In that case the whole proceeds
of the sale were taken ; this is an adop-
tion of the act : here the receipt of the
£7 does not ratify the act of the parties,

it only goes in diminution of damages."
— If the principal, upon being informed
of what has been done, by one acting as
his agent, does not give notice of dissent
in a reasonable time, his assent shall be
presumed. Cairnes c. Bleecker, 12 Johns.
300 ; Richmond Manuf. Co. v. Stark, 4
Mason, 296; Crans v. Hunter, 28 N. Y.
389.

(//) Stoddart's case, 4 Court of Claims,
511.

(m) Hunter v. Parker, 7 M. & W.
322 ; Despatch Line v. Bellamy Manuf.
Co. 12 N H. 205; Worrall v. Munn, 1
Sold. 229; Randall v. Van Vechten, 19
Johns. 61 ; Bank of Metropolis v. Gutt-
schlick, 14 Pet. 29 ; Mitchell a. St. An-
drew's, &c. Co. 4 Fla. 200 ; Wood v. A. R.
It. R. Co. 4 Seld. 100 ; Crozier i: Carr, 11
Tex. 376. But see Wheeler o. Nevins, 34
Me. 54.

(n) Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722.

(o) Steiglitz v. Egginton, Holt, 141,
per Gibbs, C. J. ; Stetson v. Patton, 2
Greenl. 358 ; Despatch Line v. Bellamy
Manuf. Co. 12 N. H. 205; Parke, B.,
Hunter v. Parker, 7 M. & W. 343.—
In Blood v. Goodrich, 9 Wend. 77, Sav-
age, C. J., advanced the opinion that a
ratification in writing might suffice.

1 State v. Spartanburg, &c R. Co. 8 S. C. 129.

s The unauthorized execution of a deed, whether of an individual or a partner-
ship, may be ratified by parol. Holbrook v. Chamherlin, 116 Mass. 155. See also
Bartlett v. Drake, 100 Mass. 174. So the taking possession of land ratifies a mort-
gage executed without authority by an agent. Pouch v. Wilson, 59 Ind. 93. But
Pollard i: Gibbs, 55 Ga. 45, was to the effect that an unauthorized execution under
seal of a crop lien must be ratified under seal.

52

CH. III. J

AGENTS.

52

justifies third parties who are interested in the question, in be-
lieving that it was a ratification, (oo) 1 And the ignorance of the
principal, although it arose from his own negligence, will invali-
date the ratification, (op) The evidence of ratification should be
as clear as that required for an original authority, (oq)

The ratification of the tort of an agent does not, in general,
relieve the agent from liability ; although by such ratification in
tort as well as in contract, a liability is incurred by the princi-
pal, (p )

(oo) Gillie v. Bailey, 17 N. H. 18;
Dickenson v. Conway, 12 Allen, 487 ;
Hazelton v. Batchelder, 44 N. H. 40;
Coombs v. Scott, 12 Allen, 493 ; Holde-
men v. Baker, 44 N. H. 414; Brass v.
Worth, 40 Barb. 648 ; Johnson v. Craig,
21 Ark. 539.

(op) Coombs v. Scott, 12 Allen, 493.

(oq) Wisconsin Bank v. Morlev, 19
Wis. 62.

(p) It appears indeed to be said in 2
Greenl. Evid. § 68, that a man cannot
become a trespasser by ratification. " If
the act of the agent was in itself unlaw-
ful, and directly injurious to another, no
subsequent ratification will operate to
make the principal a trespasser; for an
authority to commit a trespass does not
result by mere implication of law. The
master is liable in trespass for the act of
his servant, only in consequence of his
previous express command." But, as it
seems, the cases recognize no greater
difficulty in becoming a trespasser by
ratifying the trespass of the agent, than
in becoming liable ex contractu by ratify-
ing the agent's contract. In neither case
can the principal be made liable, unless
the agent, at the time of the tort or the
contract, undertook to act for him; but
if the agent, though without any pre-
cedent authority, did undertake to act
for the principal, and he subsequently
ratify, " in that case," in the language of
Tindal, C. J., Wilson v. Tumman, 6 Man.
& G. 242, " the principal is bound by the
act, whether it be for his detriment or
his advantage, and whether it be founded
on a tort or a contract, to the same extent,
as, by, and with all the consequences
which follow from, the same act done by
his previous authority. Wilson v. Tum-
man was an action of trespass against
T., who had ratified the trespass of
agents ; but they in committing the tres-
pass had not acted for T., but for an-

other person ; and on this account it was
held that T. was not liable. In Barker
v. Brahara, 3 Wils. 376, De Grey, C. J.,
said explicitly, "one assenting to a tres-
pass after it is done is a trespasser." In
Co. Lit. 180 b, it is stated, that "if A
disseize one to the use of B, who knowetli
not of it, and B assent to it, in this case,
till the agreement, A was tenant of the
land, and after the agreement, B is ten-
ant of the land, but both of them be dis-
seizors; for Oram's ratihabitio retrotrahitur it
mandato a quiparatur." And where a bailiff
seized a beast for a heriot where none
was due, and the lord agreed to the seiz-
ure and took the beast, the whole court
agreed that the lord was liable in tres-
pass, and the only question made was,
whether the plaintiff might elect to bring
trover instead. Bishop v. Montague, Cro.
E. 824. See also Wilson v. Barker, 4 B.
& Ad. 614, 616, where 4 Inst. 317, is
cited by Parke, J. ; Hull v. Pickersgill,
1 Br. & B. 282, 286 ; Pollock, C. B., Bird
t\ Brown, 4Exch. 786, cited supra, p. *49,
note g. This matter of trespass by rati-
fication was very thoroughly discussed,
and the law respecting it settled substan-
tially as it has ever since remained, so
early as 38 Ed. 3, 18; Lib. Ass. 223, pi.
9, s. u. ; and see the resolution of the
court stated Bro. Abr. Ejectione Custodie,
pi. 5, 8, Trespass, pi. 113, 256. — As to
trespass with battery, or a trespass consti-
tuting a statutory offence, see Bishop r.
Montague, Cro. E. 824 ; Hawk. P. C, B.
2, Ch. 29, § 4 ; but with this last compare
Gould, 42 ; Moore, 53, pi. 155 ; and Co.
Lit. 180 b, note 4.

An interesting and important question
arose in Buron v. Denman, 2 Exch. 167.
The defendant, a naval commander, sta-
tioned on the coast of Africa, with in-
structions for the suppression of the
slave trade, went beyond his instructions
in firing the baracoons of the plaintiff, a

1 See Phosphate Co. v. Green, L. K. 7 C. P. 43.

53

* 53 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

* 53 * An agent who has the power to appoint a sub-agent, may

ratify his act, and thereby make it binding on the agent's
principal, (g) *

*54 "SECTION IV.

SIGNATURE BY AN AGENT.

The manner in which an agent should sign an instrument for
his principal has given rise to some controversy. There has
been a tendency to discriminate in this respect ; to say, for in-
stance, that if A signs " A for B," this is the signature of A, and
ho is the contracting party, although he makes the contract at the
instance and for the benefit of B. But if he signs " B by A,"
then it is the contract of B made by him through his instrument
A. In the first case A is the principal ; in the second, B is the
principal and A his agent. But the recent cases, and the best
reasons, are, for determining in each instance and with whatever
technical inaccuracy the signature is made, from the facts and
the evidence, that a party is an agent or a principal, in accordance
with the intention of the parties to the contract ; if the words are
sufficient to bear the construction, (V) 2 But it is still requisite

Spanish subject, and carrying off certain dinary case of ratification by subsequent

slaves of which he was there lawfully authority between private individuals,

possessed. The Lords of the Admiralty If an individual ratifies an act done on

and the Secretaries of State for the for- his behalf, the nature of the act remains

eign and colonial departments, respec- unchanged, it is still a mere trespass, and

tivcly, by letter, adopted and ratified the party injured has his option to sue

what the defendant had done. Held, by cither ; if the crown ratifies an act, the

Alderson, Piatt, and Rolfr, BB., that such character of the act becomes altered, for

ratification was equivalent to a prior the ratification does not give the party

command, and rendered what otherwise injured the double option of bringing

would have been a trespass on the part his action against the agent who com-

of the defendant, an act of state for mitted the trespass or the principal who

which the crown was alone responsible, ratified it, but a remedy against the

Parke, B., doubted : " I do not say that crown only (such as it is), and actually

I dissent ; but I express my concurrence exempts from all liability the person who

with some doubt, because, on reflection, commits the trespass."
there appears to me a considerable dis- (q) Newton v. Bronson, 3 Kern. 587.

tinction between the present and the or- (r) See Mechanics Bank v. Bank of

1 The ratification of an unauthorized sub-agent's acts binds the principal equally
as if authorized, as in the collection of money, Strickland u. Hudson, 55 Miss. 235;
but such ratification docs not render the principal liable to pay for the sub-agent's
services, Homan v. Brooklyn Ins. Co. 7 Mo. App. 22. See also Grace v. American Ins.
Co. 16 Blatchford, 433 ; Danahcr p. Garlock, 33 Mich. 295, as to sub-agents.

2 Thus a draft headed by the name of an insurance company and designating in

54

CH. III.] AGENTS. * 55

that the name of the principal appear as such in the signature of
a deed, (s) It has been regarded as an established principle,
that no person is held to be the agent of another in making a
written contract, unless his agency is stated in the instrument
itself, and he therein stipulates for his principal by name. (t) 1
In Stackpole v. Arnold, (u) * Chief Justice Parker considers * 55
this rule as applicable to every written contract. But the
rule is qualified, if not contradicted by authorities of much weight,
and we do not regard it as of great force except in cases of
sealed instruments, (v) Indeed, Chief Justice Parker, in the
later case of New England Marine Ins. Co. v. De Wolf, (w) seems
to confine it to these cases. The rule stated by Mr. Smith
(2 Leading Cases, note to Thompson v. Davenport), is this : parol
evidence may always be admitted to charge an unnamed principal ;
but not to discharge the actual signer. Good reasons may be
given for this rule ; but it is not sustained by all the authorities.

Columbia, 6 Wheat. 326, 337; Long v. Courtney, 5 Pet. 319, 350. See Beck-
Colburn, 11 Mass. 97 ; Abbey v. Chase, ham v. Drake, 9 M. & W. 79.
6Cush. 54; Sheldon v. Kendall, 7 Cush. (t) Long v. Colburn, 11 Mass. 97;
217 ; Wilks v. Black, 2 East, 142 ; Wil- Magill v. Hinsdale, 6 Conn. 464 ; Han-
burn v. Larkin, 3 Blackf. 55 ; Hunter v. cock v. Fairfield, 30 Me. 299.
Miller, 6 B. Mon. 612; Whitehead v. (h) 11 Mass. 27.
Reddick, 12 Ired. L. 95; Mc Call v. Clay- (i>) Evans v. Wells, 22 Wend. 324;
ton, 1 Busb. L. 422 ; Sydnor v. Hurd, 8 Pinckney v. Hagadorn, 1 Duer, 89 ; An-
Tex. 98 ; Giddens v. Byers' Heirs, 12 id. drews v. Estes, 2 Pair!'. 267. The undis-
75; Johnson v. Smith, 21 Conn. 627; closed principal, however, can never
Rogers v. March, 33 Me. 106 ; Southern come in and take advantage of a written
Ins. Co. v. Gray, 3 Flor. 262 ; Hicks v. contract entered into by his agent in a
Hinde, 9 Barb. 528. But see Moss v. Liv- case where the latter has distinctly de-
ingston, 4 Comst. 208 ; Lennard v. Rob- scribed himself in the writing as principal.
inson, 5 El. & Bl. 125. In Pinckney Lucas v. De La Cour, 1 M. & Sel. 249;
v. Hagadorn, 1 Duer, 89, an auctioneer 2 Greenl. Evid. § 281. In Humble v
had signed his own name to a receipt for Hunter, 12 Q. B. 310, which was an ac-
the deposit made upon the purchase of tlon of assumpsit on a charter-party exe-
real estate sold to the plaintiff at auction ecuted, not by the plaintiff, but by a
" for which a good and sufficient title is third person who in the contract de-
to be given by J. H. and others ; " it was scribed himself as the " owner " of the
held, that this was a sufficient signing by ship, it was held, that evidence was not
J. H. within the Statute of Frauds, although admissible to show that such person was
his signature did not appear in the the plaintiff's agent,
subscription. (">) 8 Pick. 56 ; Northampton Bank v.
(s) Bac Abr. Leases, I. 10; Clarke v. Pepoon, 11 Mass. 288, 292.

print in the margin the signers as its general agents, drawn upon the company in
payment of a claim, is the draft of the company and not of the agents although
signed by them in their own names. Chipman v. Foster, 119 Mass. 189. We have
this day sold to you, on account of M. & Co, 2,000 cases of oranges signed B ..&
Co." without more, does not bind " H. & Co." personally. Gadd v Houghton, 1 Ex.
D. 357. See Cutler v. Ashland, 121 Mass. 588. Lacy v. Dubuque Lumber Co. id la.
510, held a principal bound, although the agent's name and designation appeared

° ^ Aydeed ^ianed "A. B. by C. D. his attorney in fact," is a sufficient execution
without reciting the fact in the body of the deed. Tidd v. Rines, 26 Minn. 201.

55

56 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

We give in our note the cases on this subject, (x) l As be-
: 56 tween an undischarged principal and a third * party, a letter

(x) In favor of this rule may be cited
Humble v. Hunter, 12 Q. B. 310 ; Hig-
gins v. Senior, 8 M. & W. 834 ; Trueman
v. Loder, 11 A. & E. 594.— In Beckham
t>. Drake, 9 M. & W. 79, where it was de-
cided that a partner might be held liable
upon a written contract, signed by his
copartners, but in which his name did
not appear, Lord Abimjer, C. B., and
Parke, B., took occasion to consider the
case upon the principles of Agency.
They admitted that in the case of a bill
of exchange or promissory note, none but
the parties named in the instrument by
their name or firm, can be made liable
to an action upon it, but were of opinion
that all other written contracts, not un-
der seal, stand upon the same 'footing
with regard to the parties who may be
sued upon them, as contracts not written.
The weight of American authority is as
yet opposed to the admission of parol
evidence to charge an unnamed party.
Many of the cases in which this broad
doctrine was laid down by our courts,
were cases of mercantile paper, yet the
decisions evidently were not rested upon
the peculiar character of this class of
instruments. Whether American courts
will be inclined hereafter to follow the
English judges, and draw a line of dis-
tinction which shall leave ordinary writ-
ten contracts open to the admission of
new parties, remains to be seen. It is
certain, however, that considerations
deserving great attention may be urged
against the admissibility of parol evi-
dence to charge with liability upon a
written contract a party not referred to
be in it. See Long e. Colburn, 11 Mass.
97; Lerned v. Johns, 9 Allen, 419;
Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. 27 ; Brad-
lee o. Boston Glass Co. 16 Pick. 350 ;
Savage v. Rix, 9 N. H. 263 ; Minard v.
Mead, 7 Wend. 68 ; Spencer p. Field,
10 Wend. 87 ; United States v. Parmele,
Paine, C. C. 252 ; Fenly v. Stewart,
5 Sandf. 101. In Finney v. Bedford Com-
mercial Ins. Co. 8 Met. 348, it was held,
that when a part-owner of a vessel or

its outfits effects insurance thereon in
his own name only, and nothing in the
policy shows that the interest of any
other person is secured thereby, an ac-
tion on the policy cannot be maintained
in the names of all the owners, upon pa-
rol evidence that such part-owner was
their agent for procuring insurance and
that his agency and their ownership
were known to the underwriters, and
that the underwriters agreed to insure
for them all, and that it was the inten-
tion of all the parties, in making the
policy, to cover the interest of all the
owners. And with this recent case
agrees the decision of the Supreme
Court in Graves v. Boston Mar. Ins.
Co. 2 Cranch, 419, 439. But in Hunt-
ington c. Knox, 7 Cush. 371, which was
an action by the plaintiff to recover the
price of certain bark sold and delivered
to the defendant under a contract in
writing, by which one Geo. H. Hunting-
ton acknowleged to have received of the
defendant a partial payment of $25, and
in consideration thereof, agreed to deliver
to the defendant the bark in question, it
was decided that the plaintiff, Mehitabel
Huntington, might show by parol evi-
dence that the contract was made by
Geo. H. Huntington on her account, and
that the bark delivered was her property,
and that she was entitled to recover on
the contract. Shaw, C. J., relies upon the
case of Higgins v. Senior, and states
the principle broadly thus : " Where a
contract is made for the benefit of one
not named, though in writing, the latter
may sue on the contract jointly with
others or alone, according to the interest.
The rights and liabilities of a principal
upon a written instrument executed by
his agent do not depend upon the fact of
the agency appearing on the instrument
itself, but upon the facts, first, that the
act is done in the exercise, and second,
within the limits of the powers delegated ;
and these are necessarily inquirable into
by evidence." Considerable stress is
however laid upon the fact that this

1 Chandler ». Coe, 54 N. H. 561, decided that such evidence was admissible to
charge an unknown but not a known principal, but inadmissible to discharge the
agent, whether the principal was known or unknown. A principal may sue in his
own name on a non-negotiable promissory note made in his behalf and for his bene-
fit, although in terms payable to the agent. National Ins. Co. v. Allen, 116 Mass.
398. Under an unsealed lease signed by an agent in his own name as " agent as
landlord," the landlord may sue for rent in his own name. Nicoll v. Burke, 78
N. Y. 680.

56

CH. III.]

AGENTS.

57

of the agent informing the principal of his action with the reply
of the latter approving thereof, will be evidence of the agent's
authority ; even though the terms stated in the * letter be * 57
not precisely those of the transaction, if the latter be not
unreasonable nor unusual and in substance the same. (*/)

The case of an attorney for a corporation executing a deed of
their land, under his own name and seal, is considered in the
chapter on Corporations, (yy)

The case sometimes occurs where a person holding some office,
signs his name, adding to it the name of his office, for the pur-
pose of representing himself as an official agent, and preventing
his personal liability. But this mere addition seldom has this
effect, being usually regarded only as a word of description, (z)

action was not brought upon the writ-
ten contract itself, but for the price of
goods sold by the agent, from which
the promise to pay implied by law, al-
though prima facie to the agent, might
be controlled by parol evidence that the
contract was for the sale of property
belonging to the principal, and sold by
her through her agent. Upon this dis-
tinction this case may be reconciled with
Finney v. Bedford Commercial Ins. Co.,
which was not, however, alluded to in
the case. Newcomb v. Clark, 1 Denio,
226, was an action by C. upon an agree-
ment in writing with P., who, it was in
proof, was C.'s agent. Held, that an ac-
tion upon an express contract (not being
a negotiable instrument), must be brought
in the name of the party with whom it
was made ; and it is not competent to
show by parol that the promisee was the
agent of another person for the purpose
of enabling such person to maintain an
action. And in Fenly v. Stewart, 5
Sandf. 101, which was an action of as-
sumpsit to charge the defendants as
principals upon a contract with A. W.
Otis & Co., to deliver 25,000 bushels of
oats to the plaintiffs, and in which the
Messrs. Otis were introduced and testi-
fied that at the time they signed the
written agreement for the sale and deliv-
ery of the oats in their own name, they
were the agents of the defendants ; it
was decided that the plaintiffs could not
recover, and the court denying the dictum
of Baron Parke, in the case of Higgins v.
Senior, that it is competent by parol
proof to charge a party upon a contract
in writing made by another person in his
own name, stated the rule to be, " that
where a contract is reduced to writing,
whether in compliance with the requi-

sitions of the Statute of Frauds or not,
and it is necessary to sue upon the
writing itself, there you cannot go out
of the writing, or contradict or alter it
by parol proof, and consequently can-
not recover against a party not named
in tiie writing ; but where the contract
of sale has been executed so that an
action may be maintained for the price
of the goods irrespective of the writ-
ing, there the party who has had the
benefit of the sale may be held liable,
unless the vendor, knowing who the
principal is, has elected to consider the
agent his debtor." The true principle
upon which this seeming contrariety of
opinion may be reconciled, would appear
to be that laid down in the case of Fenly
v. Stewart, and may be stated thus :
where a contract is reduced to writing,
and an action is brought upon the writ-
ing itself, no other persons can be made
parties than those named in the instru-
ment, but when a right of action exists
independent of the writing, which is
merely offered as evidence tending among
other things, to establish that right, then
the party having the legal interest or li-
ability, and for whom the contract was
actually made, may sue or be sued, al-
though not named in the writing. But
Hubbert v. Borden, 6 Whart. 79 ; Violett
v. Powell, 10 B. Mon. 347; Brooks v.
Minturn, 1 Cal. 481 ; and Cothay v. Fen-
nell, 10 B. & C. 671, are authorities to
show that an unnamed principal may
come in to take the benefit of a written
contract with an agent, who acted in his
own name.

(y) Campbell o. Hicks, 4 H. & N.
(Ex'ch.), 851.

lyy) See post, p. * 140 and note.

Mare v. Charles, 5 E. & B. 978. See

57

* 57 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

So if he adds only the word " trustee," or even " agent," it has
been said that he is held personally ; but this is sometimes de-
nied, (zz) 1 If the plaintiff knew that the agent acted only in the
official capacity which he designates, and accepted the contract as
such, the agent would not be held personally, (zd) A general
rule may be drawn from the cases to this effect ; one signing as
" agent," without giving the name of his principal, is himself
bound. But if he gives the name of his principal, he is himself
bound only as agent, (zb*)

See further as to the form of the signature, chapter sixth, on
Attorneys.

post, p. *122. Venable & Co. v. Curd & 111. 238; Bingham v. Stewart, 13 Minn.

White, 2 Ik>ad, 582. In this last case it 106 ; Pratt v. Beaupre, 13 Stewart, 187.

was held that the acts of officers de facto Held, that he may sign the name of his

are valid when they concern the public or principal first, and add his own as agent

the rights of third persons who have an thus : " A, by B, agent," in Smith v.

interest in the act done. But a different Morse, 9 Wall. 76.
rule prevails where the act is for the (za) Randal v. Snyder, 1 Laws. 163.

benefit of the officer, because he cannot (zb) See Williams v. Robbins, 16 Gray,

be allowed to take advantage of his own 77, and compare Means v. Swomestedt,

wrong. 32 Ind. 87, with Dutton v. Marsh, L. R. 6

(=) Bickford v. First, &c. Bank, 42 Q. B. 361.

1 An instrument in the form of a note beginning, " We as trustees but not indi-
vidually promise to pay," and signed " A. B. and C., trustees," secured by a mort-
gage given by A. B. and C. as trustees, does not bind them personally. Shoe &
Leather Bank v. Dix, 123 Mass. 148. A mortgage assignment from a loan associa-
tion, concluding, " In witness whereof the said association, by J. S., its president,
duly authorized for this purpose, has hereunto set its seal, and the said J. S.,
president as aforesaid, has hereunto set his hand," signed "J. S., president of"
(giving the association name), and sealed, is in form executed by the association.
Murphy v. Welch, 128 Mass. 489. But a charter-party signed by A. & B. as " agents
to merchants," binds them personally for failure, under a trade usage, to disclose
their principal within a reasonable time. Hutchinson v. Tatham, L. R. 8 C. P. 482.
See Fleet v. Murton, L. R. 7 Q. B. 126. A note signed by "A., agent," Bartlett v.
Hawley, 120 Mass. 92; by "A., receiver," Towne v. Rice, 122 Mass. 67; by "A.,
treasurer," Mellen v. Moore, 68 Me. 390; by "A., administratrix," Harrison v.
McClelland, 57 Ga. 531 ; by "A. & B., school trustees," Cahokia Trustees v. Rauten-
berg, 88 111. 219 ; by " A. & B., trustees of the, &c. Church," Hayes v. Matthews, 63
Ind. 412; or by "A., vestryman, Grace Church," Tilden v. Barnard, 43 Mich. 376,
binds the signer personally. A person, who describes himself in the body of a con-
tract "as agent," and signs his name without more, is liable personally. Paice v.
Walker, L. R. 5 Ex. 173; but not if he there describes himself as contracting "on
account of." Gadd v. Houghton, 1 Ex. D. 357.

58

CH. III.] AGENTS. * 58

SECTION V.

DURATION AND EXTENT OP AUTHORITY.

Where there is an authority expressly given or implied by law,
it is important to determine its extent, scope, and duration.
Where a principal has held one out as his general agent, or
authorized parties so to regard him by continued acquiescence
and confirmation, we have said that the principal cannot limit or
qualify his own liability by instructions, or limitations, given by
him to his agent, and not made known in any way to parties act-
ing with such agent, (a) And where an agent is employed to
transact some specific business, and only that, yet he binds his
principal by such subordinate acts as are necessary to, or are usu-
ally and properly done in connection with the principal act,
or to carry the same into effect. (6) * And he has a * rea- * 58

(a) Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38; 461: Lord Elhnborouqh, Helyear v.
Whitehead v. Tuckett, 16 East, 400; Hawke, 5 Esp. 75; Withington v. Her-
Commercial Bank v. Kortright, 22 Wend, ring, 5 Bing. 442 ; Goodson v. Brooke, 4
348 ; Munn v. Commission Co. 15 Johns. Camp. 163 ; Barnett v. Lambert, 15 M. &
44 ; Hatch v. Taylor, 10 N. H. 538 ; Lob- W. 489 ; Denman v. Bloomer, 11 111. 177 ;
dell v. Baker, 1 Met. 193 ; Nickson v. Eranklin v. Ezell, 1 Sneed, 497. So where
Brohan, 10 Mod. 109 ; Runquist v. Ditch- the government is the principal and a
ell, 3 Esp. 64 ; Precious v. Abel, 1 Esp. statute the letter of authority. United
350; Howard v. Howard, 11 How.Pr. 80; States v. Wyngall, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 16.—
Lloyd v. West Branch Bank, 15 Penn. If a party authorizes a broker to buy
St. 172 ; Chouteaux v. Leach, 18 Penn. St. shares for him in a particular market,
224. — E converso, it would seem that a where the usage is, that when a pur-
third party dealing with an agent cannot chaser does not pay for his shares within
have the benefit against the principal of a given time, the vendor, giving the pur-
a private arrangement between the lat- chaser notice, may resell and charge him
ter and the agent, of which such third with the difference; and the broker,
party neither knew nor was entitled to acting under the authority, buys at such
know. See Acey v. Fernie, 7 M. & W. market in his own name ; such broker, if
j52 ' compelled to pay a difference on the

(6) Tredwen o. Bourne, 6 M. & W. shares through neglect of his principal

» Thus a mercantile firm is liable for the necessary horse-hire of an agent selling
bv sample although the latter was furnished with money for that purpose and was
forbidden to pledge the firm's credit, Bentley v. Doggett, 51 Wis. 224; a person
held out as manager of a hotel binds the hotel-keeper by his purchases of necessary
supplies on credit, Beecher v. Venn, 35 Mich., 466; an oral contrac of insurance
made bv a local agent binds the company, Putnam v. Home Ins. Co 123 Mass. 324,
a railroad agent, authorized to issue bills of lading, binds the railroad by issuing one
on a forged warehouse receipt, no goods being in fact received, Armour v. Mich &c.
R. Co. 65 N. Y. Ill ; and an agent for the sale of a horse for a fixed sum without
further restriction binds the owner by a warranty, Tice v. Gallop, 5 Inomp. & C. 01.
To the same effect see Newman v. British, &c. Co. 113 Mass. 362; Knight v. Luce,
U6 Mass 586 ■ St Lo^is, &c. Co. .. Parker, 59 Ul. 23 ; Rice „. Groffmann, 56 Mo. 434.

59

*59

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

sonable discretion as to the execution of his authority. Thus,
an agent employed by government to collect debts, may, in
the exercise of this discretion, give the debtor reasonable in-
dulgence as to the time of payment, (c) But no officer of the
United States can enter into a submission to arbitration which
shall bind them, unless authorized by an act of Congress. (<f)
But an agent is not at liberty to exercise this discretion in the
choice of a mode of performing the duty imposed upon him, if
some one mode, and that only, is fixed either by usage or by the
orders of his principal, if he is a general agent ; or if he is a par-
ticular agent, by his principal's orders alone ; for then he must
adopt that very mode and no other, (e) An authority to sell
does not carry with it authority to sell on credit, unless such be
the usage of the trade ; but if there be such usage, then the agent
may sell on credit unless specially instructed and required to sell
only for cash. (#) And if he sells for credit, having no authority
to do so, he becomes personally responsible to his principal
* 59 for the whole debt, (/i) So is he also if * he blends the

to supply funds, may sue the principal
for money paid to his use. Pollock v.
Stables, 12 Q. B. 765 ; Bayliffe v. Butter-
worth, 1 Exch. 425. See, on the limita-
tion of general powers, Blum v. Robert-
son, 24 Oal. 127.

(c) United States v. Hudson, 3 Mc-
Lean, 156.

(d) United States v. Ames, 1 Woodb.
& M. 76, 89.

(e) Daniel v. Adams, Ambl. 495. And
the incidental means the agent resorts to
in carrying out his authority must be
those which usually attend an agency of
that kind : if an extraordinary exigence
occur he has no right to have recourse
to extraordinary means to meet it. Haw-
tayne v. Bourne, 7 M. & W. 595.

(<7) Holt, 0. J., Anon. 12 Mod. 514;
Lord Ellenhorongh, Wiltshire v. Sims, 1
Camp. 258; Van Allen v. Vanderpool,
6 Johns. 60; Robertson v. Livingston, 6
Cowen, 473; James v. McCredie, 1 liav,
291 ; Uelafield v. Illinois, 26 Wend. 223 ;
Stoddard v. Mcllwain, 7 Rich. L. 525;
Mellen, J., in Greely v. Bartlett, 1 Greenl.
172, 179, stated the rule of the law mer-
chant to be that a factor may sell the
goods of his principal on a reasonable
credit unless restrained by instructions or
a special usage.

(h) Barksdale v. Brown, 1 Nott &
McC. 517; Walker v. Smith, 4 Dallas,
389. And the principal may also main-

60

tain trover against the vendee. Holt,
C. J., Anon. 12 Mod. 514 ; and see Wilt-
shire v. Sims, 1 Camp. 258. — An agent
to sell has no power to barter, and if he
undertake to do so, the principal may
recover the goods, although the party
receiving them was ignorant that the
agent was not the owner. Guerreiro v.
Peile, 3 B. & Aid. 616. — A simple au-
thority to sell will not authorize a sale
at auction. Towle i>. Leavitt, 3 Foster
(N. H.), 360. — And it seems an au-
thority to sell at auction will not support
a private sale, although more is thus
obtained than the agent was limited to
in case of an auction sale. Daniel v.
Adams, Ambl. 495. — At common law
an agent cannot pledge the goods of his
principal without special authority. Pat-
erson v. Tash, 2 Stra. 1178 ; Daubigny v.
Duval, 5 T. R. 604; De Bouchout o.
Goldsmid, 5 Ves. 211 ; Rodriguez v. Heff-
ernman, 5 Johns. Ch. 417 ; Bott v. McCoy,
20 Ala. 578. This has been modified in
England by various statutes (4 Geo. IV.
c. 83 ; 6 Geo. III. c. 94 ; 5 & 6 Vict. c.
39). See Navulshaw v. Brownrigg, 2
De G., M. & G. 441. And in several
States of this Union statutory enactments
have been made providing that any con-
signee, agent, or factor, having possession
of merchandise with authority to sell
the same, or having possession of any
bill of lading, permit, certificate, or order

CH. III.] AGENTS.

59

accounts of his principal with his own, or takes a note payable
to himself, ({) If an agent to whom goods are intrusted for a
particular purpose, sell the same to a person, or in a manner not
within the scope of his authority, the principal may disaffirm the
sale and recover the goods of the vendee, if he have not justified
the vendee in believing that the agent had such authority. (7c)
Even a general agent, appointed and authorized to transact busi-
ness in the most general terms, cannot bind his principal in any
matter which does not fairly fall within the business, (kit) x So
an authority to buy a certain lot of land or other special thing,
does not authorize the agent to sell or exchange it, (kl) 2 or buy
more or less, (km)

If the power of an agent be given by a written instrument,
which instrument is known to the party contracting with him,
such instrument must be followed strictly, and the power given
by it cannot be varied or enlarged by evidence of usage ; (V) 8

for the delivery of merchandise with the vided the pledgee make the advances

like authority, shall be deemed the true in good faith believing that the agent

owner thereof so as to give validity to had authority to enter into the contract,

the sale, disposition, or pledge of such — If the merchandise was pledged to

merchandise as security for any ad- secure antecedent advances, the pledgee

vances, negotiable paper, or other obli- acquires no other right or interest in the

gation given on faith thereof. Maine pledge than was possessed or could have

R. S. (1841), ch. 43, sect. 2; Mass. been enforced by the agent or factor at

Sup. to R. S. ch. 216, § 3, Pub. Laws the time of making the pledge. Me. R.

of R. I. (1844), p. 280, sect. 2 ; N. Y. S. (1841), ch. 43, sect. 3; Mass. Sup. to

R. S. (1846), vol. ii. part 2, ch. 4, tit. R. S. ch. 216, sect. 4; Pub. Laws of R. I.

v. § 1-3; Laws of Penn. (1846), ch. (1844), p. 280, sect. 3; N. Y. R. S. (1846)

ccccxvii. 3. — By the statutes of some vol. ii. part 2, ch. 4, tit. 5, §4; Laws of

of the States the pledgee cannot retain Penn. (1846), ch. ccccxvii. 4.
the merchandise if he had notice that (i) Symington v. McLin, 1 Dev. & B.

the factor was not the true owner before 291. See post, p. *95, n. (w).
he made the advances, for which the (k) Peters ». Ballistier, 3 Pick. 495;

merchandise was pledged as security. Nash v. Drew, 5 Cush. 422.
But the statute of Massachusetts pro- (kk) Weston v. Alley, 49 Maine, 94.

vides that the pledgee shall hold good, But see State v. Atherton, 16 N. H. 203;

" notwithstanding the person making Stevenson v. Hoy, 43 Penn. St. 191.
such advances upon the faith of such (kl) Tod v. Benedict, 15 la., 591.

deposit or pledge may have had notice (km) Olyphant v. McNair, 41 Barb,

that the person with whom he made 446; Rice v. Tavernier, 8 Minn. 248.
such contract was only an agent," pro- (/) Delafield v. Illinois, 26 Wend. 192.

1 An agent authorized to give a note for borrowed money, cannot embody therein
an agreement to pay an attorney's fee if not paid at maturity. Trenton Bank v.
Gay, 63 Mo. 33. That a general agent to borrow money and purchase supplies may
give the ordinary securities, see Hatch v. Coddington, 95 U. S. 48.

2 So one employed to sell land, cannot exchange it, Lumpkin v. Wilson, 5 Heiskell,
655; nor an agent to collect, release debts, Herring v. Hottendorf, 74 N. C. 688. bee
also Silliman v. Fredericksburg, &c. R. Co. 27 Gratt. 119; Wanless v McCandless,
38 la. 20 ; Baxter v. Lamont, 60 111. 237 ; Meade v. Brothers, 28 Wis. 689.

3 Where a principal sends a written order capable of two interpretations, and the
agent bona fide acts upon one of them, the principal cannot be released from his con-
tract on the ground that he intended it to bear the other. Ireland v. Livingston,
L. R. 5 H. L. 395.

61

* 60 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

because the effect of usage is properly limited to the manner in
which the power is to be exercised ; and even in this respect it
cannot control the language of the instrument, although it may
aid in construing its words, or in supplying some that are needed.
But an agent authorized to make a certain contract, may bind his
principal by one which while it differs in its precise terms is of
the same legal effect ; especially if it secures additional benefits
to his principal. (11}

An agent employed to answer particular questions, and with-
holding some facts material to the contract, about which

* 60 * no questions are asked, does not thereby vitiate the con-

tract;^) it would be otherwise if such agent were em-
ployed to make the contract, (n) A mere power to sell land
gives the agent no power to convey, (nri) x

It has been held that a power to sell carries with it a power to
warrant ; (o) 2 but we think it the better rule, that an agent em-
ployed to sell, without express power to warrant, cannot give a
warranty which shall bind the principal, unless the sale is one
which is usually attended with warranty, in which case he
may ; (p ) 3 thus an auctioneer has, in general, no implied author-

[II) Simonds v. Clapp, 16 N. H. 222. sell goods at wholesale is an authority to

(m) Huckman v. Fernie, 3 M. & ff. sell by sample. Andrews u. Kneeland,

505. 6 Cowen, 334. An agent to sell a horse

(n) Everett v. Desborough, 5 Bing. may warrant his soundness. Alexander

503 ; Fitzherbert v. Mather, 1 T. R. 12. v. Gibson, 2 Camp. 555 ; Bradford v.

(nn) Force v. Dutcher, 3 Green, 401. Bush, 10 Ala. 386. See Brady v. Todd,

(o) Nelson r. Cowing, 6 Hill (X. Y.), 9 C. B. (n. s.) 592. In Alabama, an

336; Woodford u. McClenahan, 4 Gil- authority to sell a slave has been held to

man, 85 ; Hunter v. Jameson, 6 Ired. L. imply an authority to warrant. Skinner

252; Franklin !>. Ezell, 1 Sneed, 497; v. Gunn, 9 Port. (Ala.) 305; Gaines v.

Schuchai-dt c. Aliens, l'Wall. 359. MeKinley, 1 Ala. 446. But an agent to

(p) Gibson v. Colt, 7 Johns. 390; Hel- deliver has no authority to warrant.

year .'. Hawke, 5 Esp. 72; Croom v. Woodin v. Burford, 2 Cr. & M. 291, 4

Shaw, 1 Flor. 211; Smith i\ Tracy, 36 Tyr. 264. In -judicial sales there is no

N. Y. 79. A sale by sample is a war- warranty express or implied. The Monte

ranty that the bulk shall correspond with Allegre, 9 Wheat. 616.

the sample ; and a general authority to

i Lyon v. Pollock, 99 U. S. 668.

2 See Randall v. Kehlor, 60 Me. 37, as to the authority of a commission merchant
to warrant the condition of flour.

3 A special agent to sell a horse is not thereby authorized to warrant its quality,
Cooley v. Perrine, 12 Vroom, 322; s. c. 13 Vroom, 623. But a general agent for the
sale of reapers may warrant them, Murray v. Brooks, 41 la. 45. See Pitsinowsky v.
Beardsley, 37 la. 9. Where one adopts a sale made by another as his agent, he
cannot repudiate a warranty which is an essential part of the contract. Churchill
v. Palmer, 115 Mass. 310 ; Eadie v. Ashbaugh, 44 la. 619. See generally, Anderson
v. Bruner, 112 Mass. 14; Boothbv v. Scales, 27 Wis. 626; Morris v. Bowen, 52
N. H. 416; Palmer v. Hatch, 46 Mo. 585 ; Fay v. Richmond, 43 Vt. 25; Applegate
«\ Moffitt, 60 Ind. 104 ; Baker v. Amot, 67 N. Y. 448 ; Harrison v. Shanks, 13 Bush,
620.

62

CH. III.] AGENTS. * 61

ity to sell with warranty of the quality of what he sells, (q)
But even where usage would permit a warranty, if the principal
gives his agent express instructions not to warrant, and the agent
does warrant, although it has been said that such warranty is not
binding on the principal, on the general ground that no princi-
pal is bound by the acts of his agent if such acts transcend his
authority, (r) yet the better opinion is that the principal is bound
by such warranty, where the buyer was justified by the nature of
the case in believing that this authority was given, and had no
means of knowing the limitation of the authority of the agent, (s)

An agent for collection of negotiable paper is a holder for pur-
poses of protest, and is held to the obligations of a holder. («s) x

* The usage of the trade or business is of great import- * 61
ance in determining all these questions ; but this important
distinction seems to be taken between the case of a written
authority and that of an oral authority, namely, — where the
authority is oral and is known to the party dealing with the
agent, usage may enlarge and affect the authority, or the con-
tract ; but, as has been already stated, usage has not this power
where the whole authority is in writing, and this is known to the
party dealing with the agent. (£)

If a principal sells goods by an agent, and the agent makes a
material misrepresentation which he believes to be true, and his
principal knows to be false, this is the falsehood of the principal
and avoids the sale, (u) 2

(q) Blood v. French, 9 Gray, 197 ; a stranger to a fair with express direc-

Brady v. Todd, 9 C. B. (n. s.) 692. tions Dot to warrant the horse, and the

(r) Lord Kem/on, Fenn v. Harrison, 3 latter acted contrary to the orders, the

T. R. 760 ; Dodderidge, C. J., Seignior purchaser could only have recourse to

and Wolmer's case, G'odb. 361. the person who actually sold the horse,

(s) Ashhurst, J., Fenn v. Harrison, 3 and the owner would not be liable on the
T. R. 760, who said : " I take the dis- warranty, because the servant was not
tinction to be that if a person keeping acting within the scope of his employ-
livery stables, and having a horse to sell, ment." So per Bayley, J., Pickering v.
directed his servant not to warrant him, Busk, 15 East, 45.

and the servant did nevertheless warrant (ss) State Bank u. Bank of the Cap-

him, still the master would be liable on itol, 41 Barb. 343.

the warranty, because the servant was (t) Attwood v. Munnings, 7 «._ & ex-
acting within the general scope of his 278; s. c. 1 Man & R. 66; Schimniel-
authority, and the public cannot be sup- penmch v. Bayard, 11 et. 2b4.
posed to be cognizant of any private con- (u) Schneider v Heath 3. Camp. oUo.
versation between the master and servant; And this is true although the represen.
but if the owner of a horse were to send tations are of such a character that the

i But an agent to collect a note, cannot sell it. Smith v. Johnson, 71 Mo. 382.
2 The representation must be in a matter of fact, and not in point , oi law.
Beattie v. Lord Ebury, L. R. 7 Ch. 777. See Upton v. Tnbikock, 91 U. S. 45, to the

*62

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

*62 *An agent's acts in making or transferring negotiable
paper (especially if by indorsement), are much restrained.
It seems that they can be authorized only by express and direct au-
thority, or by some express power which necessarily implies these
acts, because the power cannot be executed without them, (v) l
But, to this extent, the principal will be held. Thus, if a prin-
cipal supply an agent with his acceptances in blank, as to date,
amount, time, and place of payment, but payable to the order

principal is not bound by them ; for, as
was said by Lord Abinqer in Cornfoot v.
Fowke, 6 M. & W. 386 : " It does not
follow that because he is not bound by
the representation of an agent without
authority, he is therefore entitled to
bind another man to a contract obtained
by the false representation of that agent.
It is one thing to say that he may avoid
a contract if his agent, without his au-
thority, has inserted a warranty in the
contract ; and another to say that he
may enforce a contract obtained by
means of a false representation made
by his agent, because the agent had no
authority." Cornfoot v. Fowke, 6 M. &
W. 358, was an assumpsit for the non-
performance of an agreement to take a
ready-furnished house. The plaintiff had
employed C. to let the house in question,
and the defendant being in treaty with
C. for taking it, was informed by him
that there was no objection to the house ;
but after entering into the agreement,
discovered that the adjoining house
was a brothel, and on that account de-
clined to fulfil the contract. It appeared
that the plaintiff knew of the existence
of the brothel before, but C, the agent,
did not. The majority of the court held,
contrary to the opinion of Lord Abingar,
C. B., that these facts furnished no
ground of defence to the action. This
case has been very much questioned
from the first, and was overruled in
Fuller v. Wilson, 3 Q. B. f>R. The
judgment in the latter case was indeed
reversed in the Exchequer Chamber, 3
Q. B. 03, but not on this point : Lord
Abinger there saying, 3 Q. B. 76: "The
judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench
on the motion to enter a verdict was not
given upon the facts now before us. We
shall not reverse that if we give judg-

ment now for the plaintiff in error." In
this country, Cornfoot a. Fowke was
denied to be law by the court in Fitz-
simmons u. Joslin, 21 Vt. 129. And in
Crump v. U. S. Mining Co. 7 Gratt. 362,
where the plaintiffs authorized their
agent to procure subscriptions to a pro-
spectus in the form of a subscription
paper for the sale of stock in their gold
mining company upon the terms pre-
scribed in such prospectus, representing
the mines to be in full and successful oper-
ation, with several particulars of descrip-
tion and recommendation, and referring
to the last report of the directors of the
company for a full description of the
mines, buildings, and machinery, which
paper was signed by the defendants ; it
was held that they might, in an action
upon the contract, prove that the agent
at the time of procuring their subscrip-
tions, made representations in addition
to those contained in the prospectus and
reports of the company, upon the faith
of which the defendants became subscrib-
ers, but which representations were false
and fraudulent ; although it was insisted
by the plaintiffs that the authority of
their agent was limited and defined by
the prospectus and report.

(v) Paige v. Stone, 10 Met. 160; Ros-
siter v. Rossiter, 8 Wend. 494. An assur-
ance by an agent that bills will be
accepted by his principal, though acted
upon by the party assured, is not as
between the latter and the principal to be
treated as equivalent to an acceptance of
the bills, so as to vest in the principal
legal rights from the time such assurance
is given. Hoare v. Dresser, 7 H. L. Cas.
290; Harrow v. Fisher, 10 C. B. n. s. 196.
But see Layet n. Gano, 17 Ohio, 466;
Forsyth'v. Day, 46 Maine, 176.

effect that one, induced to subscribe for stock by an agent's fraudulent misrepre-
sentations, must repudiate the transaction seasonably.

1 The treasurer of a savings bank has no authority to indorse its name on a
promissory note ; and a vote of the corporation to sell notes held by it does not con-
fer such authority. Bradlee v. Warren Savings Bank, 127 Mass. 107.

64

CH- m0 AGENTS. * 62

of that correspondent, though part of these acceptances may
bear upon their face that they are the second of exchange, yet
if the correspondent fraudulently negotiate those marked second,
the acceptor will be liable to an innocent holder for value for the
amount which they represent. (») i An express power to indorse
does not imply a power to receive notice of dishonor, (x) It may
be stated as a general rule that retaining money procured by an
indorsement will be regarded as a ratification of the authority to
indorse, (xx)

SECTION VI.

THE RIGHT OP ACTION UNDER A CONTRACT MADE BY AN AGENT.

In contracts by deed no party can have a right of action under
them but the party whose name is to them ; (#) but in the case of
a simple contract an undisclosed principal may show that the
apparent party was his agent, and may put himself in the place
of his agent, (z) 2 but not so as to affect injuriously the rights of

(m>) Bank of Pittsburg v. Neal, 22 The Duke of Norfolk v. Worthy, 1 Camp.

How. 96. 337 ; Garrett v. Handley, 4 B."& C. 664 ;

(x) Bank of Mobile v. King, 9 Ala. Davis v. Boardman, 12 Mass. 80; Rutland

279. Railroad v. Cole, 24 Vt. 33 ; Higgins

(xx) National Bank v. Fassett, 42 Vt. v. Senior, 8 M. & W. 834 ; Whitmore i>.

432. Gilmour, 12 M. & W. 808, where a bank-

(y) Green v. Home, 1 Salk. 197 ; rupt, under the circumstances of the

Frontin v. Small, 2 Ld. Raym. 1418. case, was considered agent for his as-

(z) Skinner v. Stocks, 4 B. & Aid. signees. See Oelricks v. Ford, 20 Md.

437; Cothay v. Fennell, 10 B. & 0. 671; 489.

1 See Coburn v. Webb, 56 Ind. 96.

2 As in the case of a claim against a decedent's estate, although proved by his
agent in his own name and attached after collection as the latter's property, Gage v.
Stimson, 26 Minn. 64. A principal may sue on a non-negotiable note made for his
benefit but payable to his agent, National Ins. Co. v. Allen, 116 Mass. 398; but not
on a negotiable instrument, Chandler v. Coe, 54 N. H. 561. One, not mentioned in
an insurance policy procured for him by a broker in his own name, may bring suit
upon it, Browning v. Provincial Ins. Co. L. R. 5 P. C. 263; as well as the agent,
Provincial Ins. Co. v. Leduc, L. R. 6 P. C. 224. A wife is liable as undisclosed prin-
cipal for goods bought for her by her husband, although his note was taken in pay-
ment. Lovell v. Williams, 125 Mass. 439. See Armstrong v. Stokes, L. R. 7 Q. B.
698; Irvine v. Watson, 5 Q. B. D. 102. But an undisclosed principal is not liable
for breach of an agreement under seal to purchase real estate, Briggs v. Partridge,
64 N. Y. 357 ; nor on the stipulations of an instrument under seal made by an agent
in his own name without mention of the principal, although the other party knew of
the latter's interest and had received part payment from him. Pickering's Claim,
L. R. 6 Ch. 525. Where, however, a lease is signed by agents of a corporation, but

vol. i. 5 (35

* 63 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

the other party, (a) Thus a purchaser for an unknown principal,
whom he does not disclose, is himself liable for the price, (aa)
Nor can the unknown principal adopt a contract as made by his
agent, in part only and for so much as benefits him ; he must

adopt it as a whole if at all. (ab) How far this rule
*63 *is affected by the Statute of Frauds will be considered

hereafter. (5) By parity of reasoning, an undisclosed prin-
cipal, subsequently discovered, may be made liable on such con-
tract; (c) x but in general, subject to the qualification that the
state of the account between the principal and agent is not
altered to the detriment of the principal, (d) 2 It might be sup-
posed that the party dealing with an agent whose agency is
concealed, does not lose his election to have recourse either to
the agent, or to his discovered principal, if the principal has pre-
maturely settled with his agent, even without fraud ; as where the
agent bought on one month's credit and the principal paid him

(a) George v. Clagett, 7 T. R. 359; La. 64; Hyde v. Wolf, 4 La. 234 ; Bacon
Sims v. Bond, 5 B. & Ad. 389; Warner v. v. Sondley, 3 Strob. L. 542; Bownelt v.
McKay, 1 M. & W. 591 ; Huntington v. Briggs, 45 Barb. 470. — The party deal-
Knox, 7 Cush. 371 ; Violett v. Powell, ing with the agent may, when he discov-
10 B. Mon. 349. And see Harrison v. ers the principal, charge either at his
Roscoe 15 M. & W. 231 ; Woodruff u. election. Thompson v. Davenport, 9 B.
M'Uehee, 30 Ga. 158. & C. 78 ; Wilson v. Hart, 7 Taunt. 295 ;

(aa) Fierce v. Johnson, 34 Conn. 274. Kailton v. Hodgson, 4 Taunt. 576, n. (n) ;

(nb) Elwell v. Chamberlin, 31 N. Y. Kobinson c. Gleadow, 2 Bing. N. C. 161;

671. Sue ante, p. * 52. Patterson t;. Gandasequi, 15 East, 62; Hig-

(b) And see p. * 54, note (r), supra. See gins v. Senior, 8 M. & W. 834. But where
also Bank of United States v. Lyman, 20 a vendor takes the note of the agent,
Vt. 666, 673, 674, where the doctrine of which shows him to rely upon the agent,
Lord Aliini/er and Baron Parke in Beck- he cannot afterwards sue the principal,
ham v. Drake, 9 M. & W. 79, was recog- Patterson v. Gandasequi, 15 East, 62 ;
nized by Prentiss, J. Hyde v. Paige, 9 Barb. 150 ; Bate v. Burr,

(c) Thompson v. Davenport, 9B. & C. 4 Ilarring. 130.

78; Cothay v. Fennell, 10 B. & C. 071 ; (d) Thompson v. Davenport, 9 B. & C.

Thomas o. Edwards, 2 M. & W. 216 ; 78 ; Lord Ellenborough, Kymer v. Suwer-

Beebe v. Robert, 12 Wend. 413; Upton cropp, 1 Camp. 109; Smethurst v. Mitch-

v. Gray, 2 Greenl. 373 ; Nelson v. P.. well, ell, 1 E. & E. 622.
3 Doug. 410; Hopkins v. Lacouture, 4

with nothing in the lease to show that fact, and the corporation enters under it and
occupies the premises, it is bound by the lease. Carroll v. St. John's Society, 125
Mass. 605. As to charter-parties, see Christoffersen v. Hansen, L. R. 7 Q. B. 509;
Pederson v. Lotinga, 28 L. T. 267.

1 See preceding note. The mere filing of a proof of claim against the estate of
an insolvent agent of an undisclosed principal, after the latter's discovery, is not a
conclusive election to treat the agent as the debtor. Curtis v. Williamson, L. R. 10
Q. B. 57. But taking the agent's note in payment, intending to give him exclusive
credit, is such election. Perkins v. Cady, 111 Mass. 318. The agent or principal,
however, cannot compel an election. Beymer u. Bonsall, 79 Penn. St. 298. See
Calder v. Dobell, L. R. 6 C. P. 486.

2 Thomas v. Atkinson, 38 Ind. 248, 258, follows and cites the text with ap-
proval.

66

CH- In-] AGENTS. * 64

before the credit had expired. <» i But it may be open to ques-
tion whether such settlement by the principal, although prema-
ture, if perfectly bond fide, in the course of business, and free
from all suspicion that it had been hastened for the purpose of
interfering with the seller, would not discharge the principal
We think it would.

Where the name of the principal is disclosed at the time the
contract is made by the agent, the former is the proper party to
sue upon the contract. This is so whether he be a citizen of
another State than that where his agent resided and made the
contract or not. This doctrine is contrary to the rule laid down
in Story's Agency as to contracts made for residents in a foreign
State, and which was supposed to be the doctrine of the
English cases at that time. But the doctrine has more * re- * 64
cently been explained by the English courts, and Judge
Story's rule rejected. The doctrine never was generally received
in this country, and in a recent case in the Supreme Court of the
United States it was directly disavowed. (#)

SECTION VII.

LIABILITY OF AN AGENT.

An agent is not personally liable, unless he transcends his
agency, or departs from its provisions, (K) 2 or unless he expressly

(e) Kymer u. Suwercropp, 1 Camp. Johnson v. Ogilby, 3 P. Wms. 279 ; Jones

109; Waring v. Favenek, 1 Camp. 85; K.Downman, 4 Q. B. 235, n. (a). The de-

Healdc. Ken worthy, 10 Exch. 739. cision of the Queen's Bench in this case

(g) Oelricks v. Ford, 23 How. 49. See was afterwards reversed in the Exchequer
also 2 Kent Com. 630, 631, n. ; Allen v. Chamber on a special ground, but the
Merchants Bank of N. Y., 22 Wend. 224 ; doctrine of law does not seem to be inl-
and Green v. Cope. pugned. — But the departure from au-

(h) Feeter v. Heath, 11 Wend. 477; thority, to charge the agent, must not be

1 Where an agent in buying goods discloses that he has a principal but does not
give his name, the seller may resort to the principal though he has bond fide paid
the agent, unless the seller's conduct is such, as by delay, &c, to justify the conclu-
sion that he looks only to the agent, Irvine v. Watson, 5 Q. B. D. 102, 414 ; but not
if the principal has bond fide paid the agent at a time when the seller still gave credit
to the agent and knew of no one else as principal. Armstrong v. Stokes, L. R. 7
Q. B. 598; see Hutton v. Bulloch, L. R. 8 Q. B. 331 ; affirmed in L. R. 9 Q. B. 572.

2 An agent will be liable unless the party dealing with him understood, or as a
reasonable man ought to have understood, that he was dealing with him as agent.
Worthington v. Cowles, 112 Mass. 30.

67

*65

THE LAW OP CONTEACTS.

[BOOK I.

pledges his own liability, (z) J in which case he is liable although
he describes himself as agent, (&) or unless he conceals his char-
acter of agent, (7) 2 or unless he so conducts as to render
* 65 * his principal inaccessible or irresponsible, (m) or unless
he acts in bad faith. If a sealed instrument is executed by
an agent, and it contain covenants which expressly purport to be
those of the principal, and the agent in executing it calls himself

known to the other contracting party.
Story on Agency, § 265, recognized by
Lord Lhnman, in Jones v. Downman, 4
Q. B. 239.

(i) If an agent, executing a contract in
writing, use language whose legal effect
is to charge him personally, it is not com-
petent for him to exonerate himself by
showing that he acted for a principal, and
that the other contracting party knew
this fact at the time when the agreement
was made and signed. Magee v. Atkin-
son, 2 M. & W. 440; Jones v, Littledale,
B A. & E. 486 ; Higgins v. Senior, 8 M. &
V: 834; Appleton v. Binks, 5 East, 148,
which was the case of a contract under
seal; Chadwick v. Maddon, 12 E. L. & E.
180; Tanner v. Christian, 4 E. & B. 591 ;
Hancock v. Fairfield, 30 Me. 299. See
also Duvnll r. Craig, 2 Wheat 56 ; Tip-
pets u. Walker, 4 Mass. 595; Forster r.
Fuller, 6 Mass. 58 ; White v. Skinner, 13
Johns. 307 ; Stone v. Wood, 7 Cowen,
453; Andrew v. Allen, 4 Harring. 45'J;
Potts a. Henderson, 2 Cart. (Ind.) 327;
Fash v. Ross, 2 Hill (S. C), 294.

(fc) Seaver v. Col.urn, 10 Cush. 324;
Tanner v. Christian, 4 E. & B. 591 ; Len-
nard v. Robinson, 5 E. & B. 125 ; Taylor
v. Shelton, 30 Conn. 122.

(I) Franklyn i\ Lamond, 4 C. B. 637,
where it was held that the fact of selling
as auctioneers was not such an indication
of agency as to absolve the defendants
from personal responsibility. — In an ac-
tion for use and occupation of lands by
the sufferance and permission of the
plaintiffs, it appeared that the lands were
let by auction by the plaintiffs, E. & T.,
who were auctioneers, to the defendant,
under conditions which stated the letting
to be " By E. & T., auctioneers." One of

the conditions was, " The rent is to be
paid into the hands of E. or T., auction-
eers, or to their order, at two payments,"
&c. At the foot of the document was
written, " approved by me, David Jones."
Jones was the tenant at the time of the
sale. Nothing else appeared in the con-
ditions to show on whose behalf the let-
ting was. The plaintiffs gave evidence
to show that Jones, being indebted to
them, had authorized them to let the
lands as above, pay the rent due to
Jones's landlord, and retain any surplus
in satisfaction of their own debt. Evi-
dence to a contrary effect was given by
the defendant. The judge in summing
up left it to the jury whether the plain-
tiffs had let the lands on their own behalf
and as creditors of Jones, or merely as
his agents. The jury found a letting by
the plaintiffs on their own behalf. Held,
that the conditions imported a letting by
Jones, E. and T. acting as his agents ; and
that the document ought to have been so
explained to the jury. And a new trial
was granted. Evans v. Evans, 3 A. & E.
132. — The agent is, perhaps, in like
maimer liable (at the option of the party
contracting with him) if he do not state
the name of the principal, and notwith-
standing the other contracting party have
the means of knowing the principal.
Thompson v. Davenport, 9 B. & C. 78;
Owen v. Gooch, 2 Esp. 507 ; Raymond v.
Proprietors of Crown and Eagle Mills,
2 Met. 319; Winsor r. Griggs, 5 Cush.
210 ; Taintor v. Prendergast, 3 Hill (N.
Y.). 72

(m) Ashhurst, J., Fenn v. Harrison, 3
T. R. 761 ; Ravage v. Rix, 9 N. H. 263;
Syilnor v. Hurd, 8 Tex. 98; Keener v.
Harrod, 2 Md. 63.

1 Thus an agent, as party to a charter-party, is liable for delay in loading, where
he stipulated that his liability was to "cease" as soon as he had shipped" a cargo,
Christoffersen i\ Hansen, L. R. 7 Q. B. 509; or a real estate agent, by contracting
to sell land and signing a receipt in his own name for a deposit, and the owner after-
wards declines to complete the purchase. Long „. Millar, 4 C. P. D. 450. See
Guernsey v. Cook, 117 Mass. 548.

2 An agent must disclose his agency, to render his principal liable. Nixon v.
Downey, 49 la. 166. It is not enough that the party with whom he deals has the
means of ascertaining the principal. Cobb v. Knapp, 71 N. Y. 621.

68

CH. III.] AGENTS.

65

an agent, he is not liable on those covenants ; (ri) but if they are
not expressly the principal's covenants, the agent is liable on
them. 0) 1 If a person dealing with an agent, knows his agency,
his rights and obligations will be the same as if the agent disclosed
it, Qp) unless the agent purposely represents himself as a principal
and assumes the responsibility of one. And if the agent's act be
open to two constructions, one of which binds him, and the other
binds the principal, it is said that the law prefers the latter, (q)

If a party dealing with an agent as agent, and knowing that
the principal is bound, takes the agent's note, it is held that the
principal is discharged, (f)

If one describes himself as agent for some unnamed princi-
pal, he is of course liable if proved to be the real principal, (s)
So he is if he signs as agent of a company which has no ex-
istence, or has no power to make the contract, (ss) 2 And one
acting as agent is liable personally, if it be shown that he
acts without authority. (£) 3 But it seems to be law, that an

(n) Hopkins v. Mehaffy, 11 S. & R. B to be agent for C in the matter, enter

126. with him into a contract which is illegal

(o) Hancock v. Hodgson, 4 Bing. 269 ; if the contract of C, but is not illegal if

Stone v. Wood, 7 Cowen, 453; Spencer B's personal contract, and it turn out

o. Field, 10 Wend. 87. that B acted without authority, the ille-

(p) Chase v. Debolt, 2 Gilman, 371. gality of the supposed contract is no bar

(q) Dyer v. Burnham, 25 Me. 13. to an action by A against B ; for the

(r) Paige v. Stone, 10 Met. 160; Wil- contract actually made contained no ille-

kins v. Reed, 6 Greenl. 220; Green v. gality. Parke, B., Thomas v. Edwards,

Tanner, 8 Met. 411. 2 M. & W. 217. — It is perhaps doubtful

(s) Schmalz v. Avery, 16 Q. B. 655 ; whether or not a party contracting, with-

Carr v. Jackson, 7 Exch. 382. out authority, as agent for another, and

(ss) Woodbury v. Blair, 18 la. 572. giving the name of the principal, can

(t) Dusenberry v. Ellis, 3 Johns. Cas. afterwards himself enforce the contract

70; Byars v. Doores, 20 Mo. 284; Bayley, as principal. Strictly, it would seem, he

B., Thomas v. Hewes, 2 Cr. & M. 530, n. cannot. Even admitting that the agent

(a) ; Collen v. Wright, 7 E. & B. 301, af- thus acting without authority, might be

firmed in 8 E. & B. 647. And a sub- held liable upon the contract as principal,

sequent ratification it seems will not because he acted in his own wrong, yet

(always at least) excuse him. Rossiter it does not follow that he himself should

v. Rossiter, 8 Wend. 494; Palmer v. Ste- be allowed to take advantage of the

phens, 1 Denio, 471. — If A, supposing wrong. And this appears to have been

1 Where one, purporting to act for an academy, makes a deed containing per-
sonal covenants of warranty, in which he is so described as grantor, but signs and
seals in his own name, it is his deed, Snow v. Orleans, 126 Mass. 453; so where
agents contracted for a company under their own names and seals. Quigley v. lie
Haas, 82 Penn. St. 267. , „T , , „, . .

2 Or is irresponsible, as " Captain of Co. I. 49th Reg't Mo. Vols. Blakely v.
Bennecke, 59 Mo. 193. ....

3 " Persons who induce others to act on the supposition that they have autnority
to enter into a binding contract on behalf of third persons, on it turning out that
they have no such authority, may be sued for damages for the breach of an ™Pliea
warranty of authority." Cockburn, C. J., in Richardson v. Williamson, L. K. b y. a.
276. See also Weeks v. Propert, L. R. 8 C. P. 427.

69

* 66 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

* 66 * agent is not responsible to third parties for mere neglect

or omission in the discharge of his duty, for they must
look to the principal, (w)

Whether an agent makes himself liable who transcends his
authority, or acts without authority, but believes in good faith
that he has such authority, may not be absolutely settled. It
must depend upon the question whether he is regarded as always
impliedly warranting his possession of authority. Where an
agent fraudulently misrepresents his authority, with the purpose of
deception, there it is as clear that he is liable legally as it is that
he is liable morally. But where he verily believes himself to
possess the authority under which he acts, but is mistaken on this
point, then a deciding test of his liability may perhaps be found
in his means of knowledge. . If he could have known the truth,
and did not through his own fault, then he is ignorant by his
own wrong. And if an injury is to result from this ignorance,
either to a third party or to him, and the third party is wholly
innocent, it ought to fall on him who so represented himself as
agent, because he was not therein wholly innocent. He was not

guilty of intentional deception, but he was guilty of decep-

* 67 tion in fact, and if this was caused * by his want of care or

want of diligence, or by his negligence in any way, he
must bear the burden of it. And this is what we should infer
from some of the cases in which it is said that an agent who
states that which he does not know to be true, places himself
under the same liability as one who states what he knows to be
not true. We think this principle just, only if it be meant that

the view of Lord EUenbormigh, C. J., and himself principal in the transaction, and
Altlmit, J., in Bickerton v. Burrell, 5 M. & not agent for J. & T.) brought an action
Sel. SiSJ ; though the decision in that in his own name against the buyers for
case'was put on the narrower, and some- refusing to accept the remainder. At
what unsatisfactory ground, that the nisi priiis the jury were instructed that if
plaintiff had not notified the defendant, the defendants received the first portion
previous to bringing the action, of his of goods, with knowledge that the plain-
claim to the character of principal. — If tiff was the real seller, and all parties
the other party, after knowledge of the then treated the contract as one made
true state of the matter, elect to act un- with the plaintiff as principal in the
dor the contract, it is clear that he has transaction, the plaintiff was entitled to
waived his right to object that it was recover, and upon this instruction a ver-
not made originally with the plaintiff as diet having been rendered for the plain-
principal. In Rayner o. Grote, 15 M. & tiff, the court held that the case was
VV. 359, the plaintiff made a written con- properly left to the jury, and refused to
tract for the sale of goods, in which he disturb the verdict.

described himself as the agent of J. & T. ; («) Colvin v. Holbrook, 2 Comst. 126;

the buyers accepted part of the goods, Denny v. Manhattan Co. 2 Denio, 118.
and the plaintiff (who in reality was

70

CH. III.]

AGENTS.

67

he is thus liable, who states what he does not know to be true,
and by proper diligence and care might have known to be not
true. But the question still remains, whether the agent is liable
where he himself has been deceived wholly without his fault,—
as by a forged letter which he could not detect. The case must
be very rare in fact, where one acting as an agent is wholly
without the means of ascertaining his own agency. But we
incline to the opinion, as resting on the better reason, that he
would still be held. If he and the third party with whom he
deals, are both perfectly innocent, and a loss occurs, and a loss
results from his want of authority, this loss must fall somewhere ;
and it seems just that it should rest on him who has assumed,
innocently but yet falsely, that he possessed this authority. («)
But a party cannot hold him liable, if the agent acted in good
faith, and the contract and all the facts were known to that
party. (yv~)

(v) In Polhill v. Walter, 3 B. & Ad.
114, the right of action is held to be
grounded on an affirmation of authority
which the affirmer knew to be false; and
if he acted under an authority which was
forged, but which he believed genuine,
he would not be responsible. Story
(Agency, § 263, n. 2), says, " the distinc-
tion of Lord Tenterden (in the above
case) is entirely overthrown by Smout v.
Ilbery, 10 M. & W. 7." We do not so
understand this case. There the family
of Mr. Ilbery was supplied with provi-
sions by Smout. Ilbery was lost in a
voyage to India, in October, 1839; the
provisions were supplied both before and
after his death ; and the action was
brought against the widow. A principal
question was, whether she was liable for
the provisions supplied after the death of
Ilbery, and before it was known. Alder-
son, B., in giving the opinion of the court,
says, "There is no ground for saying,
that in representing her authority as con-
tinuing, she did any wrong whatever.
There was no mala fides on her part —
no want of due diligence in acquiring
knowledge of the revocation — no omis-
sion to state any fact within her knowl-
edge relating to it, and the revocation
itself was by the act of God." On this
ground she was held not liable. But he
says previously, "that where a party
making the contract as agent, bond fide
believes that such authority is vested in
him, but has in fact no such authority,
he is still personally liable. In these
cases, it is true, the agent is not actuated

by any fraudulent motives, nor has he
made any statement which he knows to
be untrue. But still his liability depends
on the same principles as before. It is a
wrong differing only in degree, but not
in its essence, from the former case, to
state as true what the individual making
such statement does not know to be true,
even though he does not know it to be
false, but believes without sufficient
grounds, that the statement will ulti-
mately turn out to be correct." It can-
not be doubted, however, that the court
intend to confine the liability of the sup-
posed agent to the case where he not
only had no authority, but might have
known that lie had none. This may not
only be inferred from the decision, but
the court say afterwards, " If, then, the
true principle derivable from the cases
is, that there must be some wrong or
omission of right on the part of the
agent, in order to make him personally
liable on a contract made in the name of
his principal, it will follow that the agent
is not responsible in such a case as the
present. And to this conclusion we have
come." We doubt, however, the law of
this case, and prefer the view stated in
the text; the widow had received the
provisions, and when she paid for them
there would be no loss anywhere. See
Taylor v. Ashton, 11 M. & W. 401 ; Col-
lins v. Evans, 5 Q. B. 820 ; Lewis i\ Nich-
olson, 18 Q. B. 503; Carr v. Jackson,
7 Exch. 382.

(vv) Aspinwall v. Torrance, 1 Lansing,
381.

71

68

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

* 68 * The question then occurs, whether in such a case the

agent can be held on the contract, and in some cases it has

* 69 been so decided, (w) * But we think it the better opinion

{w) This question has been very re-
cently discussed in the Queen's Bench,
in the case of Jenkins v. Hutchinson, 13
Q. B. 744. That was an action of as-
sumpsit on a charter-party, which pur-
ported to be made between the plaintiff
on the one part, and one T. A. Barnes of
the other part, and was signed " Ralph
Hutchinson, for T. A. Barnes." It ap-
peared that Hutchinson had no author-
ity to enter into the charter-party for
Barnes, and it was therefore contended
that he was personally liable as principal
in this action, but the court held other-
wise. Lord JJeuman said : "It is not pre-
tended that the defendant had any
interest as principal ; he signed as agent,
intending to bind a principal, and in no
other character. That he may be liable
to the plaintiff in another form of action,
forany damage sustained by his represent-
ing himself to be agent, when he was not,
is very possible ; but the question is here,
whether he can be sued on the charter-
party itself, as a party to it. No reported
case has decided that a party so circum-
stanced can be sued on the instrument
itself. Mr. Justice Sloii/, in his book on
the Law of Agency, states, that the deci-
sions in the American courts are conflict-
ing on this point, and that ' in England it
is held, that the suit must be by a special
action on the case ; ' citing Polhill v.
Walter, 3 B. & Ad. 114. That case does
not, perhaps, establish the broad proposi-
tion ; for the contract was a bill of ex-
change — an instrument differing in many
respects from ordinary contracts. In the
absence of any direct authority, we think
that a party who executes an instrument
in the name of another, whose name he
puts to the instrument, and adds his own
name only as agent for that other, can-
not be treated as a party to that instru-
ment, and be sued upon it, unless it be
shown that he was the real principal."
See also Lewis v. Nicholson, 18 Q. B.
603. — The law is so held in Massachu-
setts. Long v. Colburn, 11 Mass. 97;
Ballou p. Talbot, 10 Mass. 461 ; Jefts v.
York, 4 Cush. 371. And in Abbey v.
Chase, 6 Cush. 56, the view taken in the
text is confirmed. The court say : " It
does not necessarily follow that a con-
tract made by an authorized agent,
which does not bind the principal, be-
comes the agent's contract, and makes
him answerable if it is not performed.
This depends upon the legal effect of the

72

terms of the contract. If the agent em-
ploys such terms as legally import an
undertaking by the principal only, the
contract is the principal's, and he alone
is bound by it. But if the terms of the
contract legally import a personal under-
taking of the agent, and not of the prin-
cipal, then it is the contract of the agent,
and he alone is answerable for a breach
of it. So when one who has no authority
to act as another's agent, assumes so to
act, and makes either a deed or a simple
contract in the name of the other, he is
not personally liable on the covenants in
the deed, or on the promise in the simple
contract, unless it contain apt words to
bind him personally. The only remedy
against him in this commonwealth, is an
action on the case for falsely assuming
authority to act as agent." In Maine,
Harper v. Little, 2 Greenl. 14 ; Stetson
v. Patton, id. 358. In Connecticut, Ogden
v. Raymond, 22 Conn. 385. In Indiana,
McHenry r. Duffield, 7 Blackf. 41. And
in Pennsylvania, Hopkins v. Mehaffy, 11
S. & R. 126. In this case, Gibson, J.,
says : " No decision can be found in sup-
port of the position, that what appears
on the face of the deed to be the proper
covenant of the principal, but entered
into through the agency of an attorney,
shall be taken to be the proper covenant
of the attorney, whenever he had no
authority to execute the deed. How
could he be declared against ? If in the
usual and proper manner of pleading it
were alleged that the agent had cove-
nanted, it would appear by the produc-
tion of the instrument that he had not,
but that his principal had covenanted
through his means; which, on non est
factum being pleaded, would be fatal."
But in New York the courts have held
the agent personally liable on the eon-
tract in such cases. Dusenburv v. Ellis,
3 Johns. Cas. 70 ; White v. Skinner, 13
Johns. 307 ; Randall v Van Vechten, 19
id. 60; Meech v. Smith, 7 Wend. 315;
Palmer r. Stephens, 1 Demo, 471. But
see Walker v. Bank of the State of New
York, 13 Barb. 639, contra. The agent
is held liable on the contract in New
Jersey; Bay v. Cook, 2 N. J. 343. In
New Hampshire the court seem to have
taken a middle course. It is there held
that if a person, having no authority to
act as agent, undertakes so to act in
making a contract, and the contract
which he makes, rejecting what he was

CH- In0 AGENTS. * 70

that the contract is wholly void. It is not the contract of the
principal because he gave no authority to the supposed agent
It is not the contract of the agent, for he professed to act for the
principal. So, if one forges a signature to a note, and obtains
money on that note, he cannot be held on it as on his promise to
pay. But m all such cases the supposed agent may be reached in
assumpsit if money be paid to him or work and labor done for
him under such supposed contract, or in trespass for special dam-
ages for so undertaking to act for another without authority,
or in some other appropriate action; but not on the contract
itself.

An agent who exceeds his authority renders himself liable to
the whole extent of the contract, although a part of it was within
his authority, (x) It may, however, be said, that where an agent
exceeds his authority, what he does within it is valid, if that part
be distinctly severable from the remainder.

SECTION VIII.

REVOCATION OP AUTHORITY.

It is a general principle, that an authority is always revocable ;
the principal may at any time put an end to the relation between
himself and his agent by withdrawing the authority, unless
the authority is coupled with an interest, or given for a * val- * 70
uable consideration. (#) 1 Notice of revocation is not neces-

not authorized to put to it, contains apt blank note exceed his authority, and the
words to charge himself, he is personally third party receive the note with knowl-
liable. Woodes v. Dennett, 9 N. H. 55 ; edge that the authority has been trans-
Savage v. Rix, id. 263; Moor v. Wilson, cended, the note will not be void in toto,
6 Foster (N. H.), 332. but only for the excess beyond the sum

(x) Feeter v. Heath, 11 "Wend. 477. which was authorized.
— But in Johnson v. Blasdale, 1 Sm. & (y) It is to be noticed, that many

M. 1, the Court of Appeals of Missis- cases which in England might be under-

sippi held that if an agent in filling up a stood as examples of an authority irrevo-

1 Thus the agency of one, intrusted, without consideration, with money to settle
a lawsuit, can be revoked at any time before the settlement is completed. Phillips v.
Howell, 60 Ga. 411. One intrusting money to another to be paid to a creditor, may
revoke before the creditor assents ; and such assent may be presumed from the lat-
ter's knowledge. Simonton v. Minneapolis Bank, 24 Minn. 216. The authority of
a person to procure donations for a railroad extension, a portion of which was to be
allowed him for his services, is revocable at pleasure. Smith v. Cedar Falls, &c. R.
Co. 30 la. 244.

73

♦71

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

sary, where the agent had only a special authority to do a special
act, and this authority is exhausted, (yy) But where third parties
have dealt with an agent clothed with general powers, whose acts
have therefore bound his principal, and the principal revokes the
authority he gave his agent, such principal will continue
* 71 to be * bound by the further acts of his agent, unless the

cable at the pleasure of the principal,
because coupled with an interest, would
not in this country be classed under that
head, owing to the general adoption here
of the definition of a " power coupled
with an interest," given in Hunt v. Rous-
manier, 8 Wheat. 201 [see post, note
(d )]. All such cases, it seems, can be
considered instances where the authority
cannot be revoked because of the valuable
consideration moving from the agent ; as
where the agent had begun to act under
the authority, and would be damnified by
its recall, or where the authority is part
of a security. Walsh v. Whitcomb, 2
Esp. 505 ; Gaussen v. Morton, 10 B. & C.
731 ; Hodgson v. Anderson, 3 B. & C.
842; Broomley v. Holland, 7 Ves. 28;
Marryat u. Broderick, 2 M. & W. 371;
Eltliam v. Kingsman, 1 B. & Aid. 684 ;
Yates v. Hoppe, 9 C. B. 541 ; Ware, J.,
United States v. Jarvis, 2 Ware, 278.
And see Brown v. McGran, 14 Pet. 479,
495 ; Story on Agency, §§ 466, 467, 468,
where the opinions of the civilians are
cited ; but compare 2 Kent Com. 644.
Eabens v. The Mercantile Bank, 23 Pick.
330, seems to be the ease of a power ir-
revocable by the principal, both because
given for consideration and because
coupled with an interest in the- sense
of Chief Justice Marshall. Whether
after advances made by a factor, his
authority to sell the goods of the prin-
cipal to the extent of those advances, is
revocable at the pleasure of the principal,
is a question upon which the authorities
are not agreed. In Brown v. McGran,
14 Pet. 479, it was held that the authority
to sell is not revocable in such a case.
The decisions in the State courts, so far
as they go, appear to be in substantial
agreement with Brown v. McGran. If
the original authority, on consideration
of which the advances were made, was
an authority to sell at a limited price, it
seems plain that the fact of the advances
does not alter that authority. It continues
an authority to sell on certain terms, and
as such, on the doctrine of the Supreme
Court, may be held irrevocable to the
extent of the consideration given for it,
that is, to the amount of the advances.
Some of the State courts have gone a

74

step further in this direction, and held
that an authority to sell at a limited
price may be converted into a general
authority to sell, by the fact of advances
in conjunction with the fact of the ne-
glect of the consignor, after reasonable
notice, to repay the advances. Parker v.
Brancker, 22 Pick. 40; Frothingham v.
Ever ton, 12 N. H. 239. See also Blot
v. Boiceau, 3 Comst. 78. This subject
has recently come before the Court of
Common Bench in England in Smart v.
Sandars, 5 C. B. 895, where it was de-
cided that a factor's authority to sell is
revocable at the will of the consignor,
notwithstanding advances to the full
value, and a request of repayment un-
complied with. Brown v. McGran had
been cited in the argument ; Wilde, C.
J., delivering the judgment of the court,
said (p. 918) : " In the present case the
goods are consigned to a factor for sale.
That confers an implied authority to sell.
Afterwards the factor makes advances.
This is not an authority coupled with an
interest but an independent authority,
and an interest subsequently arising.
The making of such an advance may
be a good consideration for an agreement
that the authority to sell shall be no
longer revocable ; but such an effect will
not, we think, arise independently of
agreement. There is no authority or
principle, in our law, that we are aware
of, which leads us to think it will. If
such be the law, where is it to be found ?
It was said in argument, that it was the
common practice of factors to sell, in
order to repay advances. If it be true
that there is a well-understood practice
witli factors to sell, that practice might
furnish a ground for inferring that the
advances were made upon the footing of
an agreement that the factor should have
an irrevocable authority to sell, in case
the principal made default. Such an in-
ference might be a very reasonable and
proper one ; but it would be an infer-
ence of fact, and not a conclusion of
law." See also Raleigh v. Atkinson, 6
M. & W. 670 ; Hutchins v. Hebbard, 34
N. Y. 24.

(yy) Watts v. Kavanagh, 35 Vt. 34.

CH. III.] AGENTS. * 71

third parties have knowledge of tho revocation, or unless he does
what he can to make the revocation as notorious and generally
known to the world as was the fact of the agency. (2) 1 This is
usually done by advertising, and usage will have great effect in
determining whether such principal did all that was incumbent on
him to make his revocation notorious. And third parties who
never dealt with such agent before such revocation, if they, as a
part of the community were justified in believing such agency to
have existed, and had no knowledge and no sufficient means of
knowledge of the revocation, may hold the principal liable for the
acts of the agent after revocation ; (a) as in the case of a partner-
ship, where the dissolution or change of parties was not properly
made known. (J)

A revocation of authority may be • made either expressly or by
any action in relation to the subject-matter, vhich is manifestly
irreconcilable with a continuance of the authority, (bb) 2 And it

(z) Hazard v. Treadwell, Stra. 506 ; thority implied from cohabitation, joined

„. Harrison, 12 Mod. 346 ; Buller, with the previous sanction of acts of

J Saite v. Field, 6 T. E. 215 ; Spencer agency performed by the person held
v. Wilson, 4 Munf. 130 ; Morgan v. Stell, forth as wife. That the tradesman fur-
5 Binn. 305. — Where an agency consti- nishing the goods in such a case has
tuted by writing is revoked, but the writ- knowledge that the woman is only a
ten authority is left in the hands of the mistress, does not affect his right to
agent and he subsequently exhibits it to notice of separation. Ryan v. Sams, 12
a third person who deals witli him as Q. B. 460, where Munro v. De Chemant,
ao-ent on the faith of it without any no- 4 Camp. 215, was commented on. lier
tice of the revocation, the act of the agent, v. Lampson, 35 Vt. 179.
within the scope of the authority, will (a) See last note,
bind the principal. Beard o. Kirk, 11 (6 Graham v. Hone 1 Peake, 154;
NH 397 This necessity for actual Parkin v. Carruthers, 3 Esp. 248 ; Ward-
notice of revocation, or a general noto- well v. Haight, 2 Barb. 549.
rkty equivalent to notice, has been held (bb) Potter u. Merchants Bank, 28
to exist in full force in the case of an au- N. X. o41.

i Pavment to an agent before such notice releases the debt. Packer v. Hinckley
Works 7122 Mass ?84g; Ins. Co. „. McCain, 96 TJ S. 84; Meyer v Hehner 96 HI
400 Ulrich v. McCorrnick, 66 Ind. 243; Braswell o. Am. Ins. Co 75 N C. 8. bo a
businei^gent continues to *^ *££*?££%$?££* S£rf£

Sffik A^gh, SVffi lU^d^tt: M Barkley ,

*rtX'tVrt^\^% «* *W* SS%^tomthrdetary,Tan
before the agent has acted Gilbert v. Holmes 64 ^1 L 54 !. So .the del. y, y

72

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

has been held that a principal revoking an authority may compel
the former agent to deliver up the paper conferring authority, (be)
A mere appointment of another agent to do the same thing is not
of itself a revocation of the first appointment, (bd)

The death of the principal operates per se, as a revocation of

the agency, (c) 1 But not if the agency is coupled with an

*72 * interest vested in the agent, (d) Then it survives, and

(be) Spear v. Gardner, 16 La. An. 383.

(bd) Darrol v. Quimby, 11 Allen, 208.

(c) Co. Litt. § 66 ; Hunt v. Rousma-
nier, 8 Wheat. 201 ; Watson v. King, 4
Camp. 272 ; Lepard i\ Vernon, 2 Ves.
& B. 51 ; Smout ». Ilbery, 10 M. & W. 1 ;
Buxton v. Jones, 1 Man. & G. 84 ; Cam-
panari v. Woodburn, 15 C. B. 4; Rigs v.
Cage, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 350; Ferris v.
Irving, 28 Cal. 645. In Cassiday v. Mc-
Kenzie, 4 W. & S. 282, it was held, in
opposition to the current of authority,
that a payment made by an agent, after
the death of his principal, he being ig-
norant thereof, was valid as an act of
agency. Lunacy of the principal revokes,
but the better opinion (according to Ch.
Kent, 2 Com. 645) is, that the fact of the
existence of lunacy must have been pre-
viously established by inquisition before
it could control the operation of the pow-
er; and see Bell, Com. on the Laws of
Scotland, § 413. — In Davis v. Lane, 10
N. II. 156, it was held, that the authority
of an agent, where the agency is revo-
cable, ceases, or is suspended, by the in-
sanity of the principal, or his incapacity
to exercise any volition upon the subject-
matter of the agency, in consequence of
an entire loss of mental power ; but that
if the principal has enabled the agent to
hold himself out as having authority, by
a written letter of attorney, or by a pre-
vious employment, and the incapacity of
the principal is not known to those who
deal with the agent within the scope of
the authority he appears to possess, the
principal and those who claim under

him, may be precluded from setting up
the insanity as a revocation. The court
in this case also held, that the principle,
that insanity operates as a revocation,
cannot apply where the power is coupled
with an interest, so that it can be exer-
cised in the name of the agent. Whether
it is applicable to the case of a power
which is part of a security, or executed
for a valuable consideration, was left
undecided. See Jones v. Noy, 2 Mvl. &
K. 125 ; Waters o. Taylor, 2 Ves. & B.
301 ; Huddlestone's case, 2 Ves. Sen. 34,
1 Swanst. 614, n.; Sayer v. Bennett, 1
Cox'a Cas. 107. — Bankruptcy of the prin-
cipal revokes the authority. Parker v.
Smith, 16 East, 382; Minett v. Forres-
ter, 4 Taunt. 541. Defendant being in
the employment of J. in his trade, sold,
bond fide, some goods belonging to J.,
after J. had committed an act of bank-
ruptcy, of which defendant was ignorant.
The sale was more than two months be-
fore the commission issued. Defendant
acted under a general authority. The
assignee brought trover. Held, on a plea
of not guilty, that defendant, having sold
under a general authority only, had been
guilty of a conversion. Pearson r. Gra-
ham, 6 A. & E. 809. — Marrimjt of feme
sole principal revokes. White v. Gifford,
1 Rol. Abr. Authoritie E. pi. 4; Charnley
v. Winstanley, 5 East, 266.

(d) See ante, p. *70, a. (y). Hunt
v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 201 ; Bergen
v. Bennett, 1 Caines' Cas 1 ; Smvth i>.
Craig, 3 W. & S 14 ; Cassiday v. McKen-
zie, 4 W. & S. 282 ; Knapp v. Alvord, 10

737, contra, Lewis o. Atlas Ins. Co. 61 Mo. 534 ; unless there is an agreement to pay
the agent a certain sum if he lost his place, Ex parte Logan, L. R. 9 Eq. 149. Nor is
a broker who was to find a purchaser of land within a month, and whose agency is
revoked before the end of the month, entitled to his commission, though he found the
purchaser within the month. Brown v. Pforr, 38 Cal. 550.

1 As an agency to occupy land, Lincoln v. Emerson, 108 Mass. 87; to receive a
deposit of money, Davis r. Windsor Bank, 46 Vt. 728 ; and to measure and deliver
corn, Cleveland v. Williams, 29 Tex. 204. A person who lias given his wife authority
to deal with a tradesman and to pledge his credit, is liable to the tradesman for
goods supplied to the wife during his subsequent insanity, the tradesman having no
knowledge of his insanity. Drew r. Nunn, 4 Q. B. D. 661. Per Brett and Bramwell,
L. JJ., that insanity revokes an agent's authority, ib.

76

CH. III.] AGENTS.

73

the agent may do all that is necessary to realize his interest and
make it beneficial to himself. Such an agency is not revocable
at the pleasure of the principal in his lifetime, (e) and if the
agent dies the agency passes over to his representatives. (/) To
determine whether the agency be thus irrevocable, it is an impor-
tant if not a decisive question, whether the act authorized could
be performed by the agent in his own name, or only by him as an
agent, and in the name of the principal. In the first case, if an
interest were coupled with the agency, the authority would sur-
vive the death of the principal, and the agent might perform
* the act in the same manner after the death as before. In * 73
the latter case, as he could no longer use the name of the
principal, for the obvious reason that one who is dead can no
longer act, it would seem that his right must be limited to that of
requiring the representatives of the deceased to perform the act
necessary for his protection.

Unless the authority is thus coupled with an interest, it would
seem the word " irrevocable " does not take away the power of
revocation. Qf )

The revocation is not prevented by any interest in the money
to come from the exercise of the authority ; 1 but the inter-
Paige, 205. The important question is of Lord Ellmboroucjh , in Watson v. King,
what constitutes an authority coupled with 4 Camp. 272, that death revokes even a
an interest ; and here there is some di- power coupled with an interest. See
versity in judicial definition. In Hunt ante, note (y). A warrant of attorney to
r. Eousmanier, 8 Wheat. 201, it was held confess judgment is not revocable ; and
(Marshall, C. J., giving the opinion of though determinable by death, yet, at
the court), that the interest which can common law, as a judgment entered up
protect a power, after the death of the during any term, or the subsequent va-
person who creates it, must be an inter- cation, related to the first day of such
est in the thing itself on which the power term, a warrant of attorney might be
is to be exercised, and not an interest in made available after the death of the
that which is produced by the exercise principal, by entering up judgment with-
of the power. — In Smart v. Sandars, 5 in the term and vacation in which the
C. B. 895, 917, Wilde, C. J., said that, death occurred. Lord Holt, Oades v.
" Where an agreement is entered into on Woodward, 1 Salk. 87 ; Fuller c. Joce-
a sufficient consideration, whereby an lyn, 2 Stra. 882 ; Heapy v. Parris, 6 T. R.
authority is given for the purpose of 368.

securing some benefit to the donee of the (e) Gaussen v. Morton, 10 B. & C.

authority, such an authority is irrevoca- 731 ; Walsh v. Whitcomb, 2 Esp. 565 ;
ble. This is what is usually meant by Allen v. Davis, 8 Eng. (Ark.) 2y. See
an authority coupled with an interest:" also Marfield v. Goodhue, 3 Comst. 02;
— that is, irrevocable except by the death Houghtaling v. Marvin, 7 Barb. 412; Wil-
of the principal ; for the dictum, as the son v. Edmonds, 4 Foster (N. H.), 517.
whole case shows, is to be taken in con- (f) 2 Kent Com. 643.

nection with the doctrine, understood still (ff) McGregor v. Gardner, 14 la. 326.

to prevail in England, on the authority

1 As by way of a commission, in the surplus proceeds of land to be sold. Haw-
ley v. Smith, 45 Ind. 183.

77

*73

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK

est must be in the property on which the power is to be ex-
ercised. (fg~)

The authority is revoked by the death of the agent.1 Hence, if
a firm be the agent, and one of them dies, his estate cannot be
charged for the subsequent misuse of the authority by the sur-
viving partner. (fh~)

SECTION IX.

HOW THE PRINCIPAL IS AFFECTED BY THE MISCONDUCT OF HIS

AGENT.

A principal is liable for the fraud or misconduct of his agent, so
far, that, on the one hand, he cannot take any benefit from any
misrepresentation fraudulently made by his agent, although the
principal was ignorant and innocent of the fraud ; (#) and on
the other hand, if the party dealing with the agent suffer from
such fraud, the principal is bound to make him compensation

(fa) Hartley's Appeal, 63 Perm. St.
202'; Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 600;
Blackstone v. Buttermore, 63 Perm. St.
286.

(/A) Johnson v. Wilcox, 25 Ind. 182.

(<j) Attorney-General v. Ansted, 12
M. & W. 520; Fitzherbert v. Mather, 1
T. R. 12 ; Seaman v. Fonereau, 2 Stra.
1183 ; Fitzsimmons v. Joslin, 21 Vt. 129.
"I have no doubt that if an agent of a
party, say of Mr. Attwood in this case,
without his knowledge, made a wilfully
false representation to the British Iron
Company, upon which representation
they acted, ' adhihentes Jidem' and on
that confidence bad formed n contract ;
— I have no hesitation whatever in say-
ing, that against that contract, equity
would relieve just as much as if there
was the scienter of the principal proved ;

because it is not a question of criminal
responsibility which is here raised by the
facts. The agent could not commit the
principal to any criminal purpose, if the
principal did not know it, and had not
either given him an authority or adopted
his act when he did know it. But as to
the civil effect of vitiating the contract
made upon that false representation, I
have no doubt whatever that it would
vacate it just as much, with the igno-
rance of the principal, as if he were
charged with knowing it, and as if the
agent had been an agent for this pur-
pose." Lord Brougham in Attwood c.
Small, 6 CI. & F. 448. See also Tay-
lor v. Green, 8 C. & P. 316 ; Olmsted v.
Hotailing, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 317; Veazie
v. Williams, 8 How. 134, s. c. 3 Story,
611 ; Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y. 79.

1 The death of an agent with the power of substitution, revokes the authority of
a substitute, whose presentation of the principal's certificates of loan thereafter will
not justify a corporation in making a transfer. Lehigh Coal Co. v. Mohr, 83 Penn.
St. 228. See Jackson Ins. Co. v. Partee, 9 Heiskell, 296. That war revokes an
agency, see Howell v. Gordon, 40 Ga. 302 ; Blackwell t'. Willard, 65 N. C. 555 ; contra,
Jones v. Harris, 10 Heiskell, 98; Darling v. Lewis, 11 Heiskell, 125; Maloney v.
Stephens, 11 Heiskell, 738. That the tender of an insurance premium during the
rebellion to a former agent resident in Virginia does not bind an insurance company,
see Ins. Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S. 425; contra, Sands v. N. Y. Ins. Co. 50 X Y. 626 ; Man-
hattan Ins. Co. u. Warwick, 20 Gratt. 614. See Fretz v. Stover, 22 Wall. 198.

78

CH. III.]

AGENTS.

*74

for the injury so sustained ; (T) 1 and this although the
* principal be innocent, (i) 2 provided the agent acted in * 74
the matter as his agent, and distinctly within the line of the
business intrusted to him. (&)3 And though there be no actual
fraud on the part of the agent, yet if he makes a false representa-
tion as to matter peculiarly within his own knowledge or that of
his principal, and thereby gets a better bargain for his principal,

(h) Holt, C. J., in Hern v. Nichols, 1
Salk. 289, and Ellenborough, C. J., in
Crockford v. Winter, 1 Camp. 124, lay
down the broad doctrine that a principal
is answerable civiliter, though not crimi-
naliter, for the fraud of his agent. Jef-
frey v. Bigelow, 13 Wend. 618, illustrates
the general doctrine. There the defend-
ants had been in partnership with one
Hunt, for speculation in sheep, they con-
tributing funds, and he time and services.
Hunt purchased some sheep diseased
with the scab, knowing the fact, and
mixed them with a larger number be-
longing to the partnership. Subsequently
Hunt assigned his interest to defendants,
who employed S. to sell the sheep. The
flock was purchased from S. by the
plaintiff, and mixed with the sheep he
before owned. The scab broke out
among them and destroyed many sheep,
of his old stock as well as of those pur-
chased from S. ; and considerable ex-
pense was incurred in the attempt to
arrest the disease. S. was aware of the
infected condition of the flock, but no
actual knowledge was proved upon the
defendants. Held, that the plaintiff was
entitled to maintain his action, and could
recover damages for the loss both of the
sheep purchased and of the other sheep
receiving the infection, and all other
damages necessarily and naturally flow-
ing from the act of the defendants'
agent. Semble, the liability of the de-
fendants would have been the same if
S. had been ignorant of the state of the

1 If insurance agent cheats the insured into signing the preliminary papers and
paying the premium, and the policy is issued on the agent's false statements, the
company is bound. Eilenberger v. Protective Ins. Co. 89 Penn. St. 464. But if an
insurance agent fraudulently settles a loss by fire with a member of a firm the firm
must restore, or offer so to do, the amount received before bringing suit on the policy.
Brown v. Hartford Ins. Co. 117 Mass. 479. .

2 Where a husband as his wife's agent fraudulently procured insurance on her
life, the company can recover the money paid to her administrator, although she was
innocent of the fraud. National Ins. Co. v. Minch, 5 Thomp. & C. 545.

a A principal is bound by the representations of an agent, made, while so acting,
as true of his own knowledge, but which prove to be false although not known by
him to be so, and although the principal neither authorized or knew that he was to
make them. Jewett v. Carter, 132 Mass. 335. See McGowan v. Dyer, L. K. 8 «. a.

79

flock ; the knowledge of Hunt when he
bought the diseased sheep being con-
structively the knowledge of his partners,
and his assignment of his interests to the
defendants, before the sale to the plain-
tiff, making no difference, as to their re-
sponsibility. See also Johnston v. South-
Western Railroad Bank, 3 Strob. Eq.
263 ; Mitchell e. Mims, 8 Tex. 6 ; TJdell
v. Atherton, 7 H. & N. 172 ; Sweetland
v. 111. &e. Tel. Co. 27 la. 433 ; Fawcett v.
Bigley, 59 Penn. St. 411.

(i) Irving v. Motley, 7 Bing. 543; Doe
v. Martin, 4 T. R. 39, 66; Edwards v.
Pootner, 1 Camp. 530. Where an attor-
ney's clerk had simulated the court seal
upon a writ, by taking an impression
from the seal upon another writ, the
writ and all proceedings thereon were
set aside, and the attorney, although per-
sonally blameless, was compelled to pay
the costs. Dunkley v. Fan-is, 11 C. B.
457, 285 ; Hunter v. Hudson River, &c.
Co. 20 Barb. 493.

(k) Peto v. Hague, 5 Esp. 135 ; Huck-
man v. Femie, 3 M. & W. 605. — In
Woodin v. Burford, 2 Cr. & M. 392,
Baylei), B., said : " What is said by a
servant is not. evidence against the mas-
ter, unless he has some authority given him to
make the representation." It is not meant,
as the case shows, that there must be an
express authority to make that particu-
lar representation ; but the authority may
be implied as incident to a general author-
ity. Sharp v. New York, 40 Barb. 256.

* 75 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

such principal, although innocent, cannot take the benefit of the
transaction. But the third party may rescind the contract, and
recover back any money he may have paid the principal, by reason
of his confidence in such misrepresentation. (7) And it has been
held, that if an agent, permitted by his principal to hold himself
out as owner of land, sells it for the agent's own interest, the sale
binds the principal. (IT) The declarations of an agent are not
admitted as evidence against his principal, unless they are a part
of the res gestae. (Im)

SECTION X.

OP NOTICE TO AN AGENT.

A principal is affected by notice to his agent, respecting any
matter distinctly within the scope of his agency, when the notice

is given before the transaction begins, or before it is so
* 75 far * completed as to render the notice nugatory, (m) 1

The notice to the agent may be implied as well as express.

(I) Willes v. Glover, 4 B. & P. 14 ; lands to himself and wife, of a prior un-

Ashhurst, J., Fitzherbert v. Mather, 1 T. registered mortgage, it was held not to

E. 16 ; Franklin v. Ezell, 1 Sneed, 497 ; operate as notice to the wife, so as to

National Exchange Co. e. Brew, 2 Macq. give the mortgage a preference in respect

1 1 103 ; Carpenter r. Amer. Ins. Co. 1 Story, to her title ; especially as she had paid

57. And it seems the purchaser, without the consideration for the conveyance out

rescinding the contract, may maintain of her separate estate. Snyder r\ Spon-

case for deceit against the principal, able, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 567; s. c. affirmed in

Fuller v. Wilson, 3 Q. B. 58. error, 7 Hill, 427. It seems a principal

(//) Calais Co. v. Van Pelt, 2 Black, is chargeable with notice of what is

372. known to a sub-agevt, how many degrees

(Im) Green v. Gonzales, 2 Daly, 412. soever removed, such sub-agent being

(m) Bank of U. S. r. Davis, 2 Hill appointed by his authority. See Boyd

(N. Y.), 451. Notice to one of several v. Vanderkemp, 1 Barb. Ch. 287. As to

joint purchasers, whatever be the nat- the time when notice may be given, see

ure of the estate they take, is not in Tourville v. Naish, 3 P. Wms. 307 ; Story

general notice to the rest, unless he who ;•. Lord Windsor, 2 Atk. 630; More v.

receives the notice be their agent; and Mayhew, 1 Chanc. Cas. 34; Wigg u.

where notice was given to a husband, Wigg, 1 Atk. 384.

at the time of taking a conveyance of

1 Thus notice to an agent for that purpose of the day chosen to fix the price of
wheat sold to his principal, Owens v. Poberts, 36 Wis. 258 ; or to a buyer's agent
of the non-payment of a check for the price of land, Farmer v. Willard, 7-1 N. C. 284 ;
but not notice to an auctioneer of an action against his principal respecting the prop-
erty for sale, Hinton v. Citizens' Ins. Co. 63 Ala. 488. See Sooy v. State, 12 Vroom,
394 ; Houseman v. Girard Ass. 81 Penn. St. 256 ; Day <>. Wamsley, 33 Ind. 145 ;
Chouteau v. Allen, 70 Mo. 290.

80

CH. III.] AGENTS. * 76

Knowledge obtained by the agent in the course of that very trans-
action is notice ; 1 and it has been said, that knowledge obtained
in another transaction, but so short a time -previous that the
agent must be presumed to recollect it, is also notice affecting
the principal ; (n) but this is questionable, (o) This matter has
been most discussed in cases where, in consequence of the em-
ployment of solicitors or counsel in the purchase of real estate,
the question has arisen how far the clients are affected with
notice of incumbrances, or defects of title, which, by a more or
less strong presumption, must be taken to have come to the
knowledge of their agents. Two propositions seem to be well
settled : the first, that the notice to the solicitor, to bind the
client, must be notice in the same transaction in which the client
employs him, or at least, during the time of the solicitor's
employment in that transaction ; (p) the other, that where
a * purchaser employs the same solicitor as the vendor, he * 76
is affected with notice of whatever that solicitor had notice
of, in his capacity of solicitor for either vendor or purchaser, in
the transaction in which he is so employed. (§■) The first, it is

(n) Lord Langdale, M. R., Hargreaves a subsequent purchaser in an indepen-

v. Rothwell, 1 Keen, 159. And see Mount- dent and unconnected transaction, his

ford v. Scott, 3 Madd. 34. previous knowledge is not notice to such

(o) N. Y. Cent. Ins. Co. v. National other person for whom he acts. " The

Ins. Co. 20 Barb. 468. reason is [per Sergeant, J., delivering the

(p) Wigram, V. C, Fuller v. Bennett, opinion of the court], that no man can

2 Hare, 402, 403. And Lord Hardwicke, be supposed always to carry in his mind

in declaring the same doctrine, in Wors- the recollection of former occurrences ;

ley v. Scarborough, 3 Atk. 392, said it and moreover, in the case of the attor-

would be very mischievous if it were ney or counsel, it might be contrary to

otherwise, for the man of most practice his duty to reveal the confidential com-

and greatest eminence would then be munieations of his client. To visit the

the most dangerous to employ. And see principal with constructive notice, it is

Warrick v. Warrick, 3 Atk. 294. In necessary that the knowledge of the

Hood v. Fahnestoek, 8 Watts, 489, it was agent or attorney should be gained, in

held that if one in the course of his busi- the course of the same transaction in

ness as agent, attorney, or counsel for which he is employed by his client." s.

another, obtain knowledge from which P. Bracken v. Miller, 4 W. & S. 102.

a trust would arise, and afterwards be- (?) Wigram, V. C., Fuller v. Bennett,

comes the agent, attorney, or counsel of 2 Hare, 402.

1 Knowledge of a managing tenant in common affects his co-tenants, Ward v.
Warren, 82 N. Y. 265 ; and of an attorney of the intention of an insolvent to com-
mit a fraud under the bankrupt law is imputable to his client, Rogers v. Palmer, 102
U. S. 263 ; but a wife is not affected by her husband's knowledge of incumbrances on
land purchased by her, Pringle v. Dunn, 37 Wis. 449. So a buyer's intention, known
to a seller's agent, to evade a liquor law, affects the seller, Suit v. Woodhall, 113 Mass.
391 ; but contra, Stanley v. Chamberlin, 10 Vroom, 565, affirmed in 11 Vroom, 379,
to the effect that a principal, without actual knowledge of the proposed illegal use
of property could disown the agent's act and recover for such use. See further,
Hoover v. Wise, 91 U. S. 308 ; Greentree v. Rosenstock, 61 N. Y. 583 ; Farrington v.
Woodward, 82 Penn. St. 259; Tagg v. Tennessee Bank, 9 Heiskell, 479.

VOL. I. 6 81

* 77 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

evident, is so far qualified by the second, that where the circum-
stance of the solicitor's being employed for two parties is in the
case, a purchaser, in the language of Sir J. Wigram, may be
affected with notice of what the solicitor knew as solicitor for
the vendor, although as solicitor for the vendor he may have
acquired his knowledge before he was retained by the purchaser
— whatever the solicitor, during the time of his retainer, knows
as solicitor for either party, may possibly in some cases affect
both, without reference to the time when his knowledge was first
acquired. Any other qualification of the principal limiting the
client's liability to notice acquired in the same transaction, the
distinguished judge referred to does not acknowledge, (r) If,
however, one assume to act as agent of another, and cause an act
to be done for him of which the latter afterwards takes the
benefit, he must take it charged with notice of such matters as
appear to have been at the time within the knowledge and recol-
lection of the agent, (s)

Notice to a servant of the principal, or one employed by the
principal, affects the principal, only when given about the very
thing that servant is employed to do.1 Thus, notice to a general
clerk in a mercantile house, not to furnish goods, does not bind
the house. (£) 2

On the other hand, knowledge possessed by a principal affects
a transaction, although the transaction took place through an
agent to whom the knowledge was not communicated. It cer-
tainly has this effect if the knowledge of the principal could have
been and should have been communicated to the agent. But it
may not be certain that the knowledge of the principal is the
knowledge of the agent the moment the principal acquires it,
without any reference to the duty or the possibility of the
principal's imparting that knowledge to the agent, in

* 77 season * for him to be influenced by it. (u) In some cases

(r) See Fuller v. Bennett, 2 Hare, 402, (I) Grant v. Cole, 8 Ala. 519.

where the cases are reviewed and much (u) In Willis v. Bank of England, 4

discussed. A. & E. 21, 39, the doctrine of notice was

(s) Hovey v. Blanchard, 13 N. H. 145. thus stated by Lord Denman: " The gen-

1 Thus a servant's knowledge of the disposition of a vicious dog in his charge is
acknowledge of the master. Baldwin v. Casella, L. R. 7 Ex. 325.

2 Nor is the knowledge by a janitor of a city school-house of a defect in the high-
way in front of the same, notice to the city. Foster v. Boston, 127 Mass. 290; nor
is notice to a station agent, notice to a railroad company of the assignment of a chose
in action. Lambreth v. Clarke, 10 Heiskell, 32.

82

CH. III.] AGENTS.

77

the rights of the principal are certainly to be determined by his
own knowledge only ; as, if a principal knew of defences to a
promissory note available only against a purchaser with knowl-
edge, and this principal bought the note by an agent, who had no
knowledge of these defences, they might still be enforced against
the principal.

Much question has arisen as to the effect on a corporation, of
notice to one who is a member or officer of it. By some it is held
that the notice must be made formally to the corporation, 0) and
it has been contended on the other hand, that the notice is
enough if given to any director, or any member of a board which
manages the affairs of the corporation, (w) We consider these
views extreme and inaccurate ; and should state as the rule of
law that a notice to a corporation binds it, only when made to an
officer, whether president, director, trustee, committee-man, or
otherwise, whose situation and relation to the corporation imply
that he has authority to act for the corporation in the particular
matter in regard to which the notice is given, (x) 1

eral rule of law is that notice to the rule. Certainly, Mayhew v. Eames, 3 B.

principal is notice to all his agents. & C. 601, cited by the learned chief jus-

Mayhew v. Eames ; at any rate if there tice, is very far from establishing the

be reasonable time, as there was here, for naked doctrine that notice to the prinei-

the principal to communicate that notice to pal is notice eo instanti to the agent.
his agents, before the event which raises the (v) Louisiana Bank v. Senecal, 13 La.

question happens. . . We have been 525.

pressed with the inconvenience of requir- (»■) Bank of U. S. v. Davis, 2 Hill

ing every trading company to communi- (N. Y.), 451 ; North Eiver Bank v. Ay-

cate to their agents everywhere whatever mar, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 262.
notices they may receive ; hut the ar- (x) See Bowles v. Bage, 3 C. B. 16 ;

gument ab inconvenienti is seldom enti- Borter v. Bank of Rutland, 19 Vt. 410,

tied to much weight in deciding legal 425; Fulton Bank v. N. Y. &c. Co. 4

questions ; and, if it were, other incon- Baige, 127 ; National Bank v. Norton, 1

veniences of a more serious nature would Hill (N. Y.),575; New Hope, &e. Co. v.

obviously grow out of a different deci- The Phoenix Bank, 3 Comst. 156, 166;

sion." It may be considered worth in- Banks v. Martin, 1 Met. 308 ; Story on

quiry whether the clause we have put Agency, §§ 140 a, 140 d.
in italics is not an essential part of the

1 Thus if a director of a. bank, who acts for the bank in discounting a note,
knows that the note was procured by fraud, the bank is affected with his knowledge,
Security Bank v. Cushman, 121 Mass. 490 ; but a director who offers a note, which
he owns, to his bank for sale or discount, if he does not act with the board in
making the discount, is regarded as a stranger in so doing, and does not affect the
hank with his knowledge of a defect in its consideration. Hightstown Bank t>.
Christopher, 11 Vroom, 435; Atlantic Bank v. Savery, 82 N. Y. 291. See Smith v.
Ayer, 101 U. S. 320 ; West Boston Sav. Bank w. Thompson, 124 Mass. 506; Barnes
v. Trenton Gas Co. 12 C. E. Green, 33. The knowledge of an insurance agent who
issues the policy, of incumbrances on the property omitted from the application,
will not prevent a recovery. Harriman i: Queen Ins. Co. 49 Wis. 71. Likewise an
insurance agent's failure to state the nature of an applicant's interest. Miaghan v.
Hartford Ins. Co. 24 Hun, 59. See further as to corporation agents, Slater v. Irwin,
38 la. 261.

83

78 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

SECTION XI.

OP SHIPMASTERS.

A master of a ship has, by the policy of the law-merchant, some
authority not usually implied in other cases of general
* 78 * agency, (jf) Thus, he may borrow money, if the exigen-
cies and necessities of his position require it, and make his
owner liable, and pledge the ship (by bottomry for the most part)
for the repayment. (2) But this authority does not usually
extend to cases where the principal can personally act, as in the
home port, (a) or in a port where the owner has a specific agent
for this purpose, (5)1 and by parity of reason not in a port so
near the owner's home that he may be consulted, without incon-
venience and injurious delay, (c) So, too, under such circum-
stances, he may, without any special authority, sell the property
intrusted- to him, in a case of extreme necessity, and in the
exercise of a sound discretion. Nor need this necessity be actual,
in order to justify the master and make the sale valid. If the
ship was in a peril, which, as estimated from all the facts then
within his means of knowledge, was imminent, and made it the
only prudent course to sell the ship as she was, without further
endeavors to get her out of her dangerous position, this is enough,
and the sale is justified and valid, although the purchasers
succeed in saving her, and events prove that this might have been
done by the master. But it must be a case where a sudden and

(y) Whether an action maybe main- (a) Lister v. Baxter, Stra. 695; Pat-

tained against an owner, which is ton v. The Randolph, Gilp. 457 ; Ship

grounded on the exercise of this pecu- Lavinia v. Barclay, 1 Wash. C. C. 49 ;

liar and extraordinary authority by one Lord Abinijn; Arthur u. Barton, 6 M. &

who was not the master on the register, W. 138.

but by appointment of the owner had (b) Pritchard v. Schooner Lady Hora-

virtually acted as master, qumn: see tia, Bee, Ad. 167.

Stonehouse u. Gent, 2 Q. B. 431, u. ; (c) Johns v. Simons, 2 Q. B. 425;

Smith v. Davenport, 34 Me. 520. Arthur v. Barton, 6 M. & W. 138 ; Mac-

(z) Barnard p. Bridgeman, Moore, 918; kintosh i\ Mitcheson, 4 Exch. 175; Bel-

Weston v. Wright, 7 M. & W. 396 ; Ar- don v. Campbell, 6 Exch. 886, where

thur v. Barton, 6 M. & W. 138; The Robinson v. Lyall, 7 Price, 592, was ques-

Gratitudine, 3 Rob. Ad. 240 ; Stainhank tioned.
v. Fenning, 11 C. B. 51 ; 13 C. B. n. s.
418 ; The Fortitude, 3 Sumner, 228.

1 Gunn v. Roberts, L. R. 9 C. P. 331.

84

CH. III.] AGENTS.

79

entire change of wind or weather, or some other favorable cir-
cumstance which no one at the time could have rationally
expected, became the means of her safety ; for although the
powers and duty of the master should not depend on mat-
ters which are alike beyond control and foresight, (d) * it * 79
is still certain that the sale of a ship by the master can be '
justified and made valid only by a strict necessity.

The general rights and duties of ship-masters are more fully
considered in our chapter on the Law of Shipping

SECTION XII.

OP AN ACTION AGAINST AN AGENT TO DETERMINE THE RIGHT OF

A PRINCIPAL.

It is a rule of law in respect to all agencies, that where money
is paid to one as agent, to which another as principal has color of
right, the right of the principal cannot be tried in an action
brought by the party paying the money against the agent as for
money had and received to the use of such party ; but such
action should be brought against the principal, (e) * * For * 80

(d) The Brig Sarah Ann, 2 Sumner, the principal, or done something equiva-
206 ; Hunter v. Parker, 7 M. & W. 322. lent to it ; and the mere entering the

(e) Bamford v. Shuttleworth, 11 A. amount to the credit of the principal,
& E. 926 ; Sadler v. Evans, 4 Burr. 1984 ; or making a rest, is not equivalent
Horsfall v. Handley, 8 Taunt. 136 ; Cos- to payment over. Buller v. Harrison,
tigan v. Newland, 12 Barb. 456. Yet if Cowp. 565 ; Cox v. Prentice, 3 M. & Sel.
notice not to pay over has been given, 344. But upon these cases Mr. Smith
then the agent may be sued. Lord comments as follows : " It will be ob-
Mansfield, Sadler v. Evans, 4 Burr. 1986 ; served that in neither of these cases
Edwards v. Hodding, 5 Taunt. 815 ; could the principal himself ever by pos-
Hearsey v. Pruyn, 7 Johns. 179 ; Elliott sibility have claimed to retain the money
v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137 ; Bend v. Hoyt, for a single instant, had it reached his
13 id. 263; La Earge v. Kneeland, 7 hands, the payment having been made
Cowen, 456. See, however, as to the by the plaintiff under pure mistake of
liability of collectors of the customs, facts, and being void ab initio, as soon as
Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236. — And in that mistake was discovered, so that the
some cases it has been held that even agent would not have been estopped
without notice, the agent may be held from denying his principal's title to the
liable for money had and received, if he money, any more than the factor of J.
have not actually paid over the money to S. of Jamaica, who has received money

1 But Shipherd v. Underwood, 55 HI. 475, decided that if a seller of real estate
intended to palm off a defective title on a purchaser, the latter might sue the seller's
agent to recover back the deposit money before it was paid over to the seller,
although the purchaser knew the agent's capacity.

85

80

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

a party who deals with an agent (acting as such, and within
the scope of his authority) has, in general, no right to separate
him from his principal, and hold him liable in his personal capa-
city. The agent owes an account of his actions to his principal,
and that he may be able to render that account, the law, except
under special circumstances, refuses to impose upon him a duty
to any third party.

We here close all that was proposed to be said of agents as
parties to contracts entered into by them in their representative
capacity. The relation between agent and principal constitutes
itself a distinct contract, and the considerations growing out of it
might, in a strictly accurate division, find a place in that part of
this work which treats of the Subject-Matter of contracts. But it
has been deemed expedient in this instance, as in some others, to

paid to him under the supposition of his
employer being J. S. of Trinidad, would
be estopped from retaining that money
against his employer, in order to return
it to the person who paid it to him. Be-
sides which, in Buller v. Harrison, had
the agent paid the money he received
from the underwriter in discharge of the
foul loss, over to his principal, he would
have rendered himself an instrument of
fraud, which no agent can be obliged to
do. Except in such cases as these, the
maxim, respondeat superior, has been ap-
plied, and the agent held responsible to
no one but his principal." Merc Law,
B. 1, c. 5, § 7. In Snowdon v. Davis, 1
Taunt. 359, a sheriff had issued a warrant
on mesne process, to distrain the goods
of A ; the bailiff levied the debt upon
the goods of B, and paid it over. Held,
that money had and received would lie
against the bailiff. Mnnsjield, C. J.,
said : " The bailiff pays the money over
to the sheriff, and the sheriff to the ex-
chequer, and it is objected, that as it has
been paid over, the action for money had
and received does not lie against the
bailiff; and this is compared to the case
of an agent, and the authorities are cited
of Sadler v. Evans ; Campbell v. Hall, 1
Cowp. 204 ; Buller v. Harrison, 2 id. 565,
and several others. In the case of Sad-
ler y. Evans, the money was paid to the
agent of Lady Windsor, for Lady Wind-
sor's use ; in that of Buller v. Harrison,
the money was paid to the broker, ex-
pressly for the benefit of the assured. In
Pond !\ Underwood, the money was paid
for the use of the administrator. Can it
in this case be said with any propriety,
that the money was paid to the bailiff for

86

the purpose of paying it to the sheriff, or
to the intent that the sheriff might pay it
into the exchequer ? The plaintiff pays
it under the terror of process, to redeem
his goods, not with an intent that it
should be delivered over to any one in
particular." But this case has been re-
garded by high authority as establishing
a stronger doctrine than that on which
Sir James Mansfield appears to have
placed it. In Smith v. Sleap, 12 M. &
W. 588, Parke, B., referring to Snowdon
v. Davis, said : " It was there held that
a party who had received money wrong-
fully could not set up as a defence that
he had received it for, and paid it over
to, a third person." In the same case
a dictum of the Court of Exchequer is
reported, to the effect that a payment to
A, expressly as the agent of B, for the
purpose of redeeming goods wrongfully
detained by B, and a receipt by A ex-
pressly for B, would make a case upon
which an action against A for money
had and received, could be maintained.
And in the case of Parker i>. Bristol and
Exeter Railway, 6 Exch. 702, where the
defendants had refused to deliver the
plaintiff's goods until he paid an excess
over the proper amount due for freight
money, it was held that he might main-
tain an action to recover this excess from
the defendants, although they received a
portion of it only as agents for the Great
Western Railway Company ; the princi-
ple being " that an action for money had
and received lies to recover back money
which has been obtained through compul-
sion even although it has been received
by an agent who acted for the princi-
pal."

CH- IIL] AGENTS.

•81

sacrifice logical order to the convenience of the reader ; and such
observations as seem to be required by the contract of Agency,
properly so called, are subjoined in the following section.

SECTION XIII.

THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT AS TO

EACH OTHER.

An agent with instructions is bound to regard them in every
point ; nor can he depart from them, without making him-
self * responsible for the consequences. (#) 1 If he have no * 81
instructions, or indistinct or partial instructions, his duty
will depend upon the intention and understanding of the parties.
This may be gathered from the circumstances of the case, and es-
pecially, from the general custom and usage in relation to that
kind of business. (K) But he cannot defend himself by showing
a conformity to usage, if he has disobeyed positive instructions.

(g) Leverick v. Meigs, 1 Cowen, 645 ; a severe application of the general rule,

Marshall, C. J., Manella v. Barry, 3 see Hays v. Stone, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 128.

Cranch, 415, 439; Kingston v. Kincaid, (h) Marzetti v. Williams, 1 B. & Ad.

1 AVnsh. C. C. 454; Rundle v. Moore, 415; Sutton v. Tatham, 10 A. & E. 27;

3 Johns. Cas. 30 ; Loraine v. Cartwright, Sykes v. Giles, 5 M. & W. 645 ; Kingston

3 Wash. C. C. 151 ; Ferguson v. Porter, 3 v. Wilson, 4 Wash. C. C. 315. — And if

Fla. 27. — "And no motive connected the agent is employed to act in some

with the interest of the principal, how- particular business or trade he may bind

ever honestly entertained, or however his principal by following the usages of

wisely adopted, can excuse a breach of that trade, whether the principal is

the instructions." Washington, J., in aware of them or not. Pollock v. Sta-

Courcier v. Ritter, 4 Wash.' C. C. 549, bles, 12 Q. B. 765 ; Bayliffe v. Butter-

551 ; but compare Forrestier v. Board- worth, 1 Exch. 425 ; there Parke, B.,

man, 1 Story, 43. — If in obedience to distinguishing the case of Bartlett v.

the instructions, the agent do an act Pentland, 10 B. & C. 760, said : " That

which is illegal in fact, though not however is a different question from the

clearly in itself a breach of law, nor present, which is one of contract. In

known by the agent to be so, he is enti- the case of a contract which a person or-

tled to be indemnified by the principal ders another to make for him, he is bound

for the consequences. Betts v. Gibbins, by that contract if it is made in the usual

2 A. & E. 57 ; Adamson v. Jarvis. 4 Bing. way."

66, 72 ; Ives v. Jones, 3 Ired. L. 538. For

1 Thus where the security of payment was to be " unquestionably good," and the
purchaser's notes were worthless, Robinson Machine Works v. Vorse, 52 la. 207 ;
Clark v. Roberts, 26 Mich. 506 ; or the agent takes insufficient or worthless security,
Owensboro' Bank v. Western Bank, 13 Bush, 526. See Nicolai v. Lyon, 8 Oreg 56.
— On the other hand, a principal must make good an agent's losses in fulfilling his
instructions, as by a sale of worthless bonds. Maitland v. Martin, 86 Penn. St. 120;
or where the agent was obliged to allow for the defective packing of cotton, Beach
v. Branch, 57 Ga. 362.

87

* 82 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

If loss ensue from his disregard to his instructions, he must
sustain it ; if profit, he cannot retain it, but it belongs to his
principal, (i)

A principal discharges his agent from responsibility for devia-
tion from his instructions, when he accepts the benefit of his
act. (yfc) l He may reject the transaction altogether ; (I) and

* 82 * if he advanced money on goods which his agent purchased

in violation of his authority, he is not bound to return the
goods to the agent when he repudiates the sale, but has his lien on
them, and may hold them as the property of the agent, (m) But
he must reject the transaction at once, and decisively, as soon as
fully acquainted with it. For if he delays doing this, that he may
have his chance of making a profit, or if he performs acts of own-
ership over the property, he accepts it, and confirms the doings of
the agent, (w)

The question has arisen, whether a principal is bound by the
act of an agent, who executes his commission in part only ; as if
being directed and authorized to buy two houses, he buys one
only ; or to buy fifty shares of stock, he buys twenty-five ; or to
buy one hundred bales of cotton, he buys fifty. It has been said
that the principal is bound by the partial execution of the agent's
authority, (o) But it is plain that cases which present this ques-
tion may differ essentially. If one is made agent to purchase a
lot of woodland and a saw-mill, and purchases either alone, it
would be a hardship upon the principal to be compelled to take
that, when it might be nearly valueless to him without the other.
But if the authority which he gave his agent to buy both, was in
such a form that the seller of one, after due inquiry, was perfectly

(i) Catlin i>. Bell, 4 Camp. 184 ; Park- Arabl. 740; Vanada v. Hopkins, 1 J.

ist v. Alexander, Uohns. Ch. 394; Segar J. Marsh. 285, 294; Sugden on Powers,

v. Edwards, 11 Leigh, 213. ch. 9, § 8. — And in some cases it has

(k) Clarke v. Perrier, 2 Freem. 48 ; been held at law that an agent transcend-

Prince v. Clark, 1 B. & C. 186. ing his authority in part, binds his prin-

(/) Roe v. Prideaux, 10 East, 158. — cipal for the part which was performed

If, however, an agent has done more than in accordance with the authority. Gor-

he was authorized to do, the execution, don ;;. Buchanan, 5 Yerg. 71 ; Johnson v.

though void as to the excess, may be Blasdale, 1 Sm. & M. 17. — See Wintle v.

held good for the rest, at least in equity. Crowther, 1 Cr. & J. 316.
But it is necessary in such a case that [m) Lord Hardwicke, Cornwall v. Wil-

the boundaries between the excess and son, 1 Ves. Sen. 510 ; Lord Eldon, Kemp

the execution of the power should be v. Pryor, 7 Ves. 240, 247.
clearly distinguishable. Sir Thomas (n) Prince v. Clark, 1 B. & C. 186;

Clarke, V. C, Alexander v. Alexander, Cornwall v. Wilson, 1 Ves. Sen. 509.
2 Ves. Sen. 644 ; Campbell v. Leach, (o) Gordon v. Buchanan, 5 Yerg. 81.

1 Or ratifies the same, Bray v. Gunn, 53 Ga. 144.

CH. III.J AGENTS. * 83

justified in believing the agent authorized to buy either separately,
the principal should bo held. Wo should say, that the principal
might generally be held ; but would not be, where he could show
that the things embraced within the authority he gave were united
in that authority, and in his intention, and that it would be a detri-
ment to him to take a part only.

Some conflict appears to exist as to the right of an agent to
delegate his authority. On the one hand, the general principle,
that delegatus non potest delegare, is certain, (j?) An agent
can * do for his principal only that which his principal au- * 83
thorizes ; and if the principal appoint an agent to act for him
as his representative in any particular business, this agent has not
thereby a right to make another person the representative of his
principal. The employment and trust are personal ; they may
rest on some ground of personal preference and confidence, and
on the knowledge which the principal has of his agent's ability,
and the belief he has of his integrity. But if the agent, merely
by virtue of his agency, may substitute one person in his stead, he
may another, or any other, and thus compel the principal to be
represented by one whom he does not know, or be bound by obli-
gations cast upon him by one he does know, and because he knows
him would refuse to employ. But, on the other hand, the princi-
pal may, if he chooses, give this very power to his agent, (q) In

(p) Combe's Case, 9 Rep. 75 b, 76 a. — Ess v. Truscott, 2 M. & W. 385. — A bro-
Tbis maxim has frequent application ker cannot delegate his authority. Ben-
in cases of powers. Ingram v. Ingram, derson v. Barnewall, 1 Y. & J. 387 ;
2 Atk. 88 ; Alexander v. Alexander, 2 Cockran v. Warn, 2 M. & Sel. 301, n. —
Ves. Sen. 643 ; Hamilton v. Royse, 2 Nor can a factor. Solly v. Rathbone, 2
Seh. & L. 330. A notice to quit given by M. & Sel. 298 ; Catlin v. Bell, 4 Camp.
an agent of an agent, is not sufficient 183. — A distinction, however, is to be
without a recognition by the principal, taken between the employment of a ser-
Doe v. Robinson, 3 Bing. N. C. 677. — vant and the delegation of the authority.
An attachment for non-payment of costs An agent, like another person, may act
cannot be supported by a demand of the by the hand of a servant as well as by
costs by a third person, authorized by his own hand, in cases where the act is
the attorney to receive them. Clark v. merely physical, or where mind enters
Dignum, 3 M. & W. 319. — In an action into it so little that it would be absurd to
on an agreement for the sale of goods, at say that the difference between one mind
a valuation to be made by A, the issue and another could be of any moment.
was, whether a valuation was made by Lord Ellenbarough, Mason v. Joseph, 1
A. It appeared that the goods were in Smith, 406. See also Powell v. Tuttle, 3
fact valued by B, A's clerk. Held, that Comst. 396 ; Moor v. Wilson, 6 Foster
the defendant was not bound by it, unless (N. H.), 332; Comm. Bank of Penn. v.
it were shown that it was agreed between Union Bank of N. Y., 1 Kern. 203. See
the parties that B's valuation should be also Williams v. Woods, 16 Md. 220.
taken as A's; and that the fact of the (q) Palliser v. Ord, Bunb. 166. — A.
defendant's seeing B valuing, and making power coupled with an interest, given to A
no objection until B told him the amount, and his assigns, passes with the interest to
was not evidence of such agreement. A's devisee, to the executor of that de-

89

* 84 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

the common printed forms of letters of attorney, we usually find
the phrase, " with power of substitution," and after this a promise
to ratify whatever the attorney, " or his substitute," may lawfully
do in the premises. That the agent has this power, when it is
given to him in this way, cannot be doubted. But it must be as
certain that the principal may confer the same power other-

* 84 wise ; and not only by other * language, but without any

express words whatever, (r) And there are many acts
which an agent must necessarily do through the agency of other
persons, and which are valid when so done, (s) If a principal
constitutes an agent to do a business which obviously and from its
very nature cannot be done by the agent otherwise than through
a substitute, or if there exists in relation to that business a known
and established usage of substitution, in either case the principal
would be held to have expected and have authorized such substi-
tution, (f) 1 So too, where an agent without authority appoints a
substitute, the principal may, either by words or acts, so confirm
and ratify such substitution, as to give to it the same force and
effect as if it had been originally authorized, (w)

A substitute of an agent who had no authority to appoint him,
cannot be held as the agent of the original principal, but is only
the agent of the agent who employs him, (u) 2 and who is accord-
ingly his principal ; and the person so employed is bound only to

visee, and to the assignee of the devisee, quantities, which work was to be paid

&c. ; for the word assigns includes both for by the successful competitor for the

assignees in law and in fact. How a. building contract ; the jury found a usage

Whitefield, 1 Vent. 30H, 339 ; s. c. as for architects to have their quantities

How i». Whitebanck, 1 Freem. 476. made out by surveyors : it was held that

(/•) Moon t'. Guardians of Whitney the plaintiff was entitled to recover com-

TJnion, 3. Bing. N. C. 814 ; Gillis v. Bailey, pensation from the defendants. Moon v.

1 Foster (N. H.), 149. Guardians of Whitney Union, 3 Bing. N.

(s) Rossiter v. Trafalgar Life A. A., C. 814 ; Ledoux v. Goza, 4 La. An. 100.
27 Beav. 377. («) Tindal, C. J., Doe v. Robinson, 3

(() An architect employed by defend- Bing. N. C. 677, 679 ; Mason u. Joseph,

ants to draw a specification for a build- 1 Smith, 406.

ing proposed to be erected, himself (v) Cobb v. Becke, 6 Q. B. 930; Rob-
employed the plaintiff to make out the bins v. Fennell, 11 id. 248.

1 An insurance agent may authorize his clerk to do various acts, as sign and
issue policies and receive premiums. Bodine v. Exchange Ins. Co. 51 N. Y. 117;
Grady v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co. CO Mo. 116. See also Norwich Univ. v. Denny, 47 Vt.
13 ; Chase v. Ostrom, 50 Wis. 640.

2 In such a case the agent is responsible for the sub-agent's acts: as where a col-
lection agency's attorney lost a note sent to him for collection, Swett r. Southworth,
125 Mass. 417 ; Morgan v. Tener, 83 Penn. St. 305 ; or failed to pay over collections,
Bradstreet r. Everson, 72 Penn. St. 124 ; see Sanger v. Dun, 47 Wis. 015 ; or a bank
sent a draft for collection to a banker who received payment and failed before mak-
ing a remittance. Kent v. Dawson Bank, 13 Blatchford, 237.

90

CH. HI.] AGENTS. * 85

his immediate employer, and can look only to him for compensa-
tion, (w) ! But a substitute appointed by an agent, who h^s this
power of substitution, becomes the agent of the original principal,
and may bind him by his acts, and is responsible to him as his
agent, and may look to him for compensation.

An agent is bound to great diligence and care for his princi-
pal ; not the utmost possible, but all that a reasonable man under
similar circumstances, would take of his own affairs, (x) 2 And
where the instructions are not specific, or do not cover the
* whole case, there, as we have already stated, he is to con- * 85
form to established usage, as that which was expected from
him. («/) This usage may be generally proved by ordinary means ;
but in some instances, as in relation to negotiable bills and notes,
it is required and defined by the law ; and here it must be followed
precisely, (z) And an agent is bound to possess and exert the

(w) Cleaves v. Stockwell, 33 Me. bility may be limited by the particular

341. understanding of the parties ; as for in-

(x) Co. Litt. 89 a ; Chapman v. Wal- stance, where an agent dealing with

ton, 10 Bing. 57; Lawler v. Keaquiek, negotiable paper, has been accustomed to

1 Johns. Cas. 174 ; Kingston v. Kincaid, do business in a certain way different

1 Wash. C. C. 454 ; Babcock u. Orbi- from that which the law would otherwise

son, 25 Ind. 75. — Less than ordinary require, and the principal employing him

diligence is required of one who acts as may fronj, the circumstances be supposed

agent gratuitously; unless indeed he to know this; Mills v. Bank of U. S. 11

hold himself out as a person exercising Wheat. 431 ; Allen v. Merchants Bank,

one of certain privileged professions or 22 Wend. 215 ; East Haddam Bank v.

trades, as that of an attorney. Door- Scovil, 12 Conn. 303. And an agent in-

man v. Jenkins, 4 Nev. & M. 170, s. c. 2 trusted with a negotiable instrument,

A. & E. 256 ; Dartnall v. Howard, 4 B. & and failing to fulfil his duty with respect

C. 345. See infra, n. (a). to it, is only liable like other agents to

(y) Ante, p. * 81, note (h) ; Wiltshire the extent of the loss he has caused, and

v. Sims, 1 Camp. 258. — And the usage does not have to assume the responsibil-

if followed (in the case where there are ities which the law-merchant imposes

no express instructions), is a defence to upon a negligent party to the bill,

the charge of negligence. Russell v. Marshall, C. J., Hamilton v. Cunning-

Hankey, 6 T. R. 12. As to the fac- ham, 2 Brock. 367. And see Van Wart

tor's duty to insure, see Smith v. Las- v. Woolley, 3 B. & C. 439, and Van Wart
celles, 2 T. R. 189; Tickel v. Short, 2 ■ v. Smith, 1 Wend. 219. An agent, acting

Ves. Sen. 239. with ordinary diligence, is not liable for

(z) Crawford v. Louisiana State Bank, injuries caused by his mistake in a doubt-

1 Mart. n. s. 214; Miranda v. City Bank ful matter of law. Mechanics Bank v.

of New Orleans, 6 La. 740 ; Smedes u. Merchants Bank, 6 Mel. 13.
Utica Bank, 20 Johns. 372. Yet this lia-

1 Thus the individual members of a band whose leader contracted to play at a fair
must look to the leader alone for their pay. Corbett v. Schumacker, 83 111. 403.

2 On this principle, a broker to sell raisins, which were to be of "fair average
quality in opinion of selling broker," is not liable if they turn out to be not of the
requisite quality, Pappa v. Rose, L. R. 7 C. P. 32, 525 ; nor are stockbrokers liable
for failure to take security for the return of a deposit. Gheen v. Johnson, 90 Penn.

St. 38. Where a principal expresses a wish for " registered " bonds, but leaves the

broker to purchase " as your own good sense dictates," the broker is not liable, if he
acts in good faith, for a loss on unregistered bonds purchased by him. Matthews v.
Fuller, 123 Mass. 446.

91

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

skill and knowledge necessary for the proper performance of the
duties which he undertakes, (a)

The responsibility of an agent, whether for positive misconduct,
or for deviation from instructions, is not measured by the extent

of his commission or compensation, but by the loss or
* 86 * injury which he may cause to his principal. (J) * And in

general, a verdict against a principal for the act of his ser-
vant, is the measure of the damages which the former may
recover against the latter, (c) And the agent is responsible if
the loss could not have happened but for his previous misconduct,
although it was not immediately caused by it. (i) But the

(a) One who undertakes to act in a
professional or other clearly defined ca-
pacity, as that of carpenter, blacksmith,
or the like, is bound to exercise the skill
appropriate to such trade or profession ;
and this, it seems, although the under-
taking be gratuitous. Dartnall v. How-
ard, 4 B. & C. 345 ; Sliiells o. Blackburne,
1 H. Bl. 161 ; Bourne v. Biggies, 2 C'hitt,
811 ; Tindat, C. J., Lamphier v. Phipos,
8 C. & P. 479 ; Denew v. Daverell, 3
Camp. 451 ; Leighton u. Sargent, 7 Fos-
ter (N. II.), 400. In Wilson v. Brett, 11
M. & W. 113, it was held that a person
who rides a horse gratuitously at the
owner's request, for the purpose of show-
ing him for sale, is bound, in doing so, to
use such skill as he actually possesses ;
and if proved to be a person conversant
with and skilled in horses, he is equally
liable with a borrower for injury done to
the horse while ridden by him. Rolfe, B.,
said : " The distinction I intended to make
was, that a gratuitous bailee is only
bound to exercise such skill as he pos-
sesses, whereas a hirer or borrower may
reasonably be taken to represent to the
part)' who lets, or from whom he bor-
rows, that he is a person of competent
skill. If a person more skilled knows
that to be dangerous which another not

so skilled as he, does not, surely that
makes a difference in the liability. I
said I could see no difference between
negligence and gross negligence — that it
was the same thing, with the addition of
a vituperative epithet ; and I intended
to leave it to the jury to say whether
the defendant, being, as appeared by the
evidence, a person accustomed to the
management of horses, was guilty of cul-
pable negligence." But Parke, B., only
went so far as to say that, " In the case
of a gratuitous bailee, where his profession
or situation is such as to imply the possession
of competent skill, he is equally liable for
the neglect to use it." See post, chapter
on Bailments, section II.

(h) Sivewright v. Richardson, 19 Law
Times, 10; Hamilton v. Cunningham, 2
Brock. 350 ; Arrott v. Brown, 6 Whart. 9 ;
Frothingham v. Everton, 12 N. H. 239;
Allen v. Suydam, 20 Wend. 321. Yet the
principal may maintain an action against
the agent for a breach of the contract be-
tween them, and recover nominal dam-
ages, although there be no actual loss.
Marzetti u. Williams, 1 B. & Ad. 415;
Frothingham v. Everton, 12 N. H. 239.

(c) Mainwaring v. Brandon, 8 Taunt.
202 ; a. c. 2 Moore, 125.

(d) Davis v. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716;

1 Thus an agent cannot recover compensation for an act done in violation of his
duty, In re Owens, Ir. R. 7 Eq. 236, 424 ; nor contrary to instructions in the absence of
ratification. Hoyt v. Shipherd, 70 111. 309. An agent procuring insurance, in his
own name, contrary to his principal's orders, thereby invalidating it, is liable for
actual damages. Sawyer v. Mayhew, 51 Me. 398. But it has been held that if a
broker employed to buy as cheap as possible accepts, without the knowledge or
sanction of his principal, a commission from the seller's broker under an arrange-
ment but for which the price would have been less, he is liable to his principal for
such commission, Morison v. Thompson, L. R. 9 Q. B. 480; and that an agent to
sell a note and mortgage who does not disclose an offer received by him, but subse-
quently buys them himself for a sum less than the offer, must account to his princi-
pal for the difference. Mason v. Bauman, 62 111. 76.

92

CH. III.] AGENTS.

*87

loss must be capable of being ascertained with reasonable cer-
tainty, (e)

An agent may not dispute the title of his principal. This is
well established as a general rule ; but it has been held that the
agent may do this, if the principal has obtained the property by
fraud, (ee)

It may be regarded as a prevailing principle of the law, that
an agent must not put himself, during his agency, in a position
which is adverse to that of his principal. (/) 1 For even if the
honesty of the agent is unquestioned, and if his impartiality be-
tween his own interest and his principal's might be relied upon,
yet the principal has in fact bargained for the exercise of all the
skill, ability, and industry of the agent, and he is entitled to
demand the exertion of all this in his own favor. (#) This prin-
ciple is recognized to some extent at law ; (A) but most cases of
this kind come before courts of equity. Thus, an attorney may
not take a gift from his client, although there be not the least
suspicion of fraud, (i) 2 But the rule is applied not so much
to those who act as servants, or instruments for some
* particular thing, as to persons whose employment is *87

Short v. Skipwith, 1 Brock. 103 ; Mai- Myl. & C. 134 ; Huguenin v. Baseley, 14

lough v. Barber, 4 Camp. 150; Park v. Ves. 273; Woodhouse v. Meredith, 1 Jac.

Hamond, id. 344; s. c. 6 Taunt. 495; & W. 24; Barker v. Marine Ins. Co. 2

Smith v. Lascelles, 2 T. R. 187 ; Bell v. Mason, 369 ; Church v. Marine Ins. Co. 1

Cunningham, 3 Pet. 84, 85; De Tastett id. 344; Parkistv. Alexander, 1 Johns. Ch.

v. Crousillat, 2 Wash. C. C. 132 ; Morris 394 ; Shepherd v. Percy, 4 Martin (n. s.),

v. Summerl, id. 203. 207 ; Crook v. Williams, 20 Penn. St. 342 ;

(e) Webster v. De Tastet, 7 T. if. 157 ; Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234.
The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 560; (g) Thompson v. Havelock, 1 Camp.

Smith i). Condry, 1 How. 28 ; Tidewater 527 ; Diplock v. Blackburn, 3 id. 43.
Canal Co. v. Archer, 9 G. & J. 479. (h) See infra, note (o).

(ee) Hardman v. Wilcox, 9 Bing. 382, (i) Lord Erskine, C, Wright v. Proud,

n. (a). 1.3 Ves. 138 ; Montesquieu v. Sandys, 18

(/) Lees v. Nuttall, 2 Myl. & K. 819 ; id. 308 ; see Iter v. Dungannon, 1 Dru.

Knave v. Ternot, 16 La. An. 132 ; Lees & War. 542 ; Middleton v. Welles, 4 Bro.

v. Nuttall, 1 Russ. & M. 53 ; Dunbar v. P. C. 245. See also Cutts v. Salmon, 12

Tredennick, 2 Ball & B. 319; Norris o. E. L. & E. 316: Holman v. Loynes, 27 id.

Le Neve, 3 Atk. 38 ; Taylor v. Salmon, 4 168 ; Broughton v. Broughton, 31 id. 587.

1 Thus the agreement of a railroad agent whose duty it is to select a route, to
choose, for a consideration paid to himself, a particular route, is void. Holladay v.
Davis, 5 Oreg. 40 ; and an agent in charge of land cannot, when it is sold for taxes,
gain by its purchase a valid tax title. Bowman v. Officer, 53 la. 640; Curts v. Cisna,
7 Bissell, 260. See Dunne v. English, L. R. 18 Eq. 524; Hughes v. Washington, 72
111. 84; Tynes o. Grimstead, 1 Tenn. Ch. 508; Kansas City Bank v. Mills, 24 Kan.
604.

2 Nor can an attorney, at the sale of his client's land, under a power-of-sale mort-
gage, buy it either for himself or another, Dyer v. Shurtleff, 112 Mass. 165; nor can
he buy his client's land at a tax sale. Wright v. Walker, 30 Ark. 44. But see Guest
v. Smythe, L. R. 6 Ch. 551.

93

* 87 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

rather a trust than a mere service. Thus, one holding property
for another, which it is his duty to sell, cannot himself purchase
it ; (Jc) l or if he be employed to buy, he cannot sell. (J) 2 A
technical reason given for this is, that the same person cannot
both buy and sell.3 But if employed to sell, where he would
not himself convey or transfer the property as agent, because the
principal would do this himself, still the agent cannot bind the
principal to make the transfer to him or for his benefit, by any
contract which he makes as his agent. As agent to sell, it is his
duty to get the highest fair price ; and this duty is incompatible
with his wish to buy ; and so, vice versa, if he is an agent to pur-
chase. At one time it was understood to be necessary to show
that a trustee. had taken undue advantage of his position, in
order to set aside a purchase by him of that which he was a
trustee to sell, (rn) But this is not so now. (n) At present, the
rule in equity appears to be, that any act by an agent with respect
to the subject-matter of the agency injurious to his principal, may
be avoided by the principal. If an agent to sell become the pur-
chaser, or if an agent to buy be himself the seller, a court of
chancery, upon the timely application of the principal, will pre-
sume that the transaction was injurious, and will not permit the
agent to contradict this presumption ; — unless, indeed, he can

{k) Lowther v. Lowther, 13 Ves. 103; (n) Ex parte Lacy, 6 Ves. 627; Ex

"Wren v. Kirton, 8 id. 502 ; Morse v. Royal, parte Bennett, 10 Ves. 385 ; Davoue v.

12 id. 355; Charter v. Trevelyan, 11 CI. Panning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252; Brothers

& F- ^14. u. Brothers, 7 Ired. Eq. 150 ; Harrison

(/) Lees v. Nuttall, 2 Myl. & K. 819; v. McHenry, 9 Ga. 161; Sturdevant v.
Taylor v. Salmon, 4 Myl. & C. 139; Pike, 1 Cart. (Ind.) 277; Mason v. Mar-
Bunker v. Miles, 30 Me. 431. tin, 4Md. 124.

(m) Lord Loughborough, Whichcote v.
Lawrence, 3 Ves. 750.

1 Bain ». Brown, 56 N. Y. 285 ; Jeffries v. Wiester, 2 Sawyer, 135. Not even if
the price be stipulated, Ruckman v. Bergholz, 8 Vroom, 437 ; unless the principal
assents after full information in regard to it, Ingle r. Hartman, 37 la. 274. But a
real estate agent after the termination of his agency may purchase the property sold
by him as agent. Walker v. Derby, 5 Bissell, 134 ; Walker u. Carrington, 74 111.
446. s

2 Not even in good faith and for the market price. Sharman v. Brandt, L. R.
6 Q. B. 720; Taussig „, Hart, 58 N. Y. 425; Tewksbury v. Spruance, 75 111.
187.

3 A broker acting for both parties to a sale or exchange can recover compensa-
tion from neither, unless each knows hie employment and agrees to pay, Rice v.
Wood, 113 Mass. 133; Rowe v. Stevens, 53 N. Y. 621; Alexander v. N. W. Univ.
57 Ind. 466; Meyer v. Hanchett, 39 Wis. 419; 43 Wis. 246; notwithstanding his
good faith, Scribner v. Collar, 40 Mich. 375; nor if in accordance with a custom or
usage. Raisin o. Clark, 41 Md. 158. See generally, Carman o. Beach, 63 N. Y.
97; Shirland «. Monitor Iron Works Co. 41 Wis. 162; Lynch v. Fallon, 11 R. I.

Oil.

94

CH. III.]

AGENTS.

show that the principal, when furnished with all the knowledge he
himself possessed, gave him previous authority to be such buyer
or seller, or afterwards assented to such purchase or sale, (o)
And even where the sale is a judicial sale, under a title
superior to that of the trustee or the cestui que * trust, one * 88
standing as trustee in respect to such property in his pos-
session is not, it seems, permitted to purchase and hold for his
own benefit, (p) l

Among the obvious and certain duties of an agent, is that of
keeping a correct account of all money transactions, and render-
ing the same to the principal with proper frequency, or whenever

(o) Lord Eldon, Coles v. Trecotlrick,
9 Ves. 234, 247 ; Lord Ersh'ne, Lowther
v. Lowther, 13 id. 103 ; Ex parte Hughes,
6 id. 617 ; Murphy v. O'Shea, 2 Jones
Law, 422 ; E. I. Comp. v. Henchman, 1
Ves. Jr. 289 ; Ex parte Bennett, 10 Ves.
385; Oliver v. Court, 8 Price, 127 ; Fox
v. Mackreth, 2 Bro. Ch. 400; The York
Buildings Co. v. Mackenzie, 8 Bro. P. C.
42; Molony v. Kernan, 2 Dru. & War.
31 ; Davoue u. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch.
252 ; McConnell v. Gibson, 12 111. 128 ;
Pensonneau v. Bleakley, 14 id. 16 ;
Dwight v. Blackmar, 2 Mich. 330 ; Clute
v. Barron, id. 192 ; Allen v. Bryan, 7
Ired. Eq. 276 ; Moore v. Moore, 1 Seld.
256 ; Conger v. Eing, 11 Barb. 356 ;
White v. Trotter, 14 Sm. & M. 30; Mi-
choud v. Girod, 4 How. 503 ; Green v.
Sargeant, 23 Vt. 466 ; Cumberland Coal
and Iron Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553;
Buell v. Buckingham, 16 la. 284. Unless
the principal object, the transaction
stands good; and » third party cannot
open it. Jackson v. Van Dalfsen, 5
Johns. 43 ; Jackson v. Walsh, 14 id. 407 ;
Williams's Ex'rs v. Marshall, 4 G. & J.
376 ; Litchfield v. Cudworth, 15 Pick. 31 ;
Pitt u. Petway, 12 Ired. L. 69. How
far a court of law, at the instance of the
principal, will go in avoiding such sales
or purchases by the agent for his own
benefit is not quite clear. Probably in
no jurisdiction where chancery powers
have existed from the beginning, and
where courts of law have not been com-
pelled to act, in order to prevent parties
from being without remedy, would it be
held that a sale by an agent to himself

is avoided at law by the mere dissent of
the principal, without proof of fraud, or
breach of a positive instruction to make
sale to some third party. From the lan-
guage of the court in Jackson v. Walsh,
14 Johns. 414, 415, it may be inferred
that if A, as executor, sell land to B, and
B on the same day reconvey to A, the
legal title is vested in A, in the absence
of actual fraud. And there is a strong
intimation in Williams v. Marshall, '4 G.
& J. 37fi, 380, that even if it be a chattel
interest that is sold, the principal, desir-
ing to set aside the sale merely on the
ground that the agent was himself the
purchaser, must resort to equity. And
so it seems to be held in Massachusetts :
Harrington v. Brown, 5 Pick. 521, per
curiam; Shelton v. Homer, 5 Met. 467.
In Perkins v. Thompson, 3 N. H. 144, it
was decided that a deputy-sheriff, who on
selling goods seized upon an execution,
was himself the purchaser, thereby be-
came guilty of a conversion, and was lia-
ble in trover; but the amount paid for
the goods was allowed to be given in ev-
idence in mitigation of damages. At
that time, however, the New Hampshire
courts possessed no equitable jurisdic-
tion. And see Lessee of Lazarus v.
Bryson, 3 Binn. 54. In New Jersey, the
court, in order to give relief at law, held
that a sale to himself by an executor,
administrator, or trustee, intrusted with
the sale of real estate, must be consid-
ered absolutely void by common law.
Den v. Hammel, 3 Harrison, 74, 81. See
Mackintosh i\ Barber, 1 Bing. 60.
(p) Jewett v. Miller, 6 Seld. 402.

1 An express contract between the director of a corporation and his cestui que trust
is not void, but voidable at the option of the cestui que trust if exercised within a
reasonable time ; but it will not be enforced at law or equity against the latter's
resistance. Stewart v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 9 Vroom, 505.

95

* 89 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

called on. (q) x The court has compelled the rendering of such
account after twenty years had elapsed. But, in general, after
a considerable time has elapsed, and there are no circumstan-
ces to repel the presumption of an account rendered,

* 89 * accepted, and settled, the jury are instructed to make that

presumption, (r) The agent of an agent is generally ac-
countable only to his own principal, and not to the principal of
the party for whom he acts ; that is, only his immediate employer
can call him to account, (s) And a sub-contractor cannot pass
by his immediate employer and sue the principal or proprietor of
the work. (£)

If an agent, without necessity, has mixed the property of his
principal, with his own, in such a way that he cannot render an
account precisely discriminating between the two, the whole of
what is so undistinguishable is held to belong to the princi-
pal ; (u) for it was the duty of the agent to keep the property and

(q) Topham v. Braddick, 1 Taunt. (r) Tophara v. Braddick, 1 Taunt. 571.
672 i Lord Chedworth v. Edwards, 8 (s) Stephens v. Badcock, 3 B. & Ad.
Ves. 49; White v. Lady Lincoln, 8 354, where it was held that mone3r had
Ves. 363 ; Lord Hardwicke v. Vernon, and received could not be maintained
14 Ves. 510 ; Lady Ormond e. Hutchin- against an attorney's clerk, who, in the
son, 13 Ves. 47; Lupton v. White, 15 absence of his master, and authorized by
Ves. 436 ; Pearse v. Green, 1 Jac. & W. him, received certain money due to the
135; Motley v. Motley, 7 Ired. Eq. 211. plaintiff which the attorney had been
See as to the classes of persons whom employed by the plaintiff to collect ;
equity will compel to account, Terry r. although the absence of the attorney
Wacher, 15 Sim. 448. — It seems that (who proved to be in a state of insol-
where the agent has made a mistake in vency) continued, and the defendant had
the account he will not be bound by the not paid over the money to him or his
account as given, although his principal estate. The agent when he received the
has acted upon the presumption of its money had given a receipt signed " for
correctness in his dealings with third par- Mr. S. J. [the attorney], J. B." [the de-
ties — provided there was ground from fendant]. See also Pinto v. Santos, 5
which the principal might reasonably Taunt. 447 ; Myler v. Fitzpatrick, Mad.
have inferred the existence of the error. & G. 360.

In the case adjudged, the principal, like (t) Lake Erie R. Co. v. Eckler, 13

the agent, was a broker, and the mistake Ind. 67.

in the accountwas one which a knowledge (n) Lupton v. White, 15 Ves. 436,

of the usage of the stock market might 440; Chedworth v. Edwards, 8 Ves. 46;

have enabled him to detect. Dails w.. Wren c Kirton, 11 Ves. 377 ; Hart v.

Lloyd, 12 Q. B. 531. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. 62, 108.

1 Even for the proceeds of certain sales which as between the principal and the
purchaser are illegal and void. Baldwin r. Potter, 46 Vt. 402. A selling agent who
refuses to account for or to sell goods when directed, and unlawfully retains
possession, is guilty of a conversion, Coleman v. Pearce, 26 Minn. 123; and is
liable for their market value at the time the order to sell was received. Whelan
v. Lynch, 60 N. Y. 469. See Monitor Ins. Co. <;. Young, 111 Mass. 537. If an
agent, pursuant to instructions, delivers to a common carrier moneys of, consigned
to, and to be transported to, his principal, he ceases thereafter to have any title or
interest therein, and cannot sue the carrier therefor. Thompson v. Fargo, 63 N. Y.
479.

CH- IIL] AGENTS. * 90

the accounts separate, and he must bear the responsibility and
the consequences of not doing so.

As the principal is entitled to receive from the agent property
intrusted to him, with its natural increase, 0) 1 he may charge
the agent with interest for balances in his hands, unless the
nature of the transaction, or evidence, direct or circumstantial,
shows that the intention of the parties was otherwise, (vi) This
may be inferred, for instance, where there has been a long accu-
mulation, and the money has lain useless in the agent's hands, •
and the principal has known this, and made no objection, (x)

It is a general rule, that all profits or advantages made by an
agent in the business of his agency, beyond his due compensation,
belong to his principal, (xx) 2

If an agent employed for any special purpose, discharges
his * duty and does all he was required to do, he is entitled * 90
to full compensation, although the principal declines or
refuses to take advantage of the agent's act, or even to adopt it.
Thus, if an agent employed to sell land, succeeds in finding, for
his principal, a buyer on the stipulated terms ; but the principal
refuses to make the sale and rescinds the authority, the agent
may have his action for his services ; and the measure of dam-
ages (which would be a matter of law), would, generally, be his
regular commission on the sale. («/)

It has been held to be the duty of an agent appointed to collect
money, to give immediate notice when any is collected, (s)

(v) Brown v. Litton, 1. P. Wms. 141 ; (x) Lord Kenyan, seems to have been

Massey v. Davies, 2 Ves. Jr. 317 ; Dip- of opinion in Eogers v. Boehm, 2 Esp.

lock v. Blackburn, 3 Camp. 43 ; Short v. 704, that neither at law nor in equity, if

Skipwith, 1 Brock. 103. money had been remitted to an agent,

(w) Dodge v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 368, and he suffered it to remain dead in hia

388. " Upon the principles of the com- hands, could he be made liable for inter-

mon law, we think it clear that interest est ; though he should be chargeable

is to be allowed, where the law by impli- with interest if he mixed the money

cation makes it the duty of the party to with his own, or made any use of it.

pay over the money to the owner, with- (xx) Lafferty v. Jelley", 22 Ind. 471.

out any previous demand on his part." \y) Prickett v. Badger, 1 C. B. (n. s.)

Putnam, 3. As to receivers, see v. 296.

Jolland, 8 Ves. 72. (z) McMahan v. Franklin, 38 Mo. 548.

1 One of several heirs who agrees to purchase stock on joint account, each to
contribute his proportion of the purchase-money, is liable, on his refusal to account
and adjust the matter, to each for his share of the dividends. Colt u. Clapp, 127
Mass. 476.

2 Thus an agent to whom a ship was consigned for sale, and who bought her him-
self at the price fixed, and resold her for double the money, must account for the
difference. De Bussche v. Alt, 8 Ch. D. 286. See Dutton v. Willner, 62 N. Y. 312 ;
Dodd v. Wakeman, 11 C. E. Green, 484.

vol. i. 7 97

90

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

SECTION XIV.

OP PUBLIC AGENTS.

A public agent,1 as, for example, a collector, has been held
liable for the acts of his deputy in exacting illegal compensation,
notwithstanding he believed the compensation authorized by law
and accounted for it to the treasury, (a)

If he gives a promissory note purporting to bind a public
body, as a school district, which he has no authority to bind, he
is liable on it himself. (5)

He cannot act for the body whom he represents in lending
money to himself, (c)

Public agents are not liable for injury sustained by an innocent
but mistaken exercise of their discretion, unless it amounts to
their own personal negligence, (d) Nor for the negligence of
workmen properly employed by them, (e) But a public body,
although acting gratuitously for the public, is responsible for
their own personal negligence, and for wanton or malicious in-
jury. (/) Although a private agent, acting within the scope of
a general authority, but violating private instructions, unknown
to the party with whom he acts, binds his principal, the rule is
held otherwise as to a public agent ; because his authority is
matter of record in the books of a corporation, or of some public
record, and may be inquired into and ascertained. (# ) And
municipal corporations are to be regarded rather as agents than
as principals, and as responsible to their constituents. (K)

A public agent acting for the government is not personally
responsible ; and this has been held, although the contract was

(a) Ogdeu v. Marshall, 3 Blatchford, (e) Holliday v. St. Leonard, 11 C. B.

319. (n. s.) 192.

(5) Weave v. Gove, 44 N. H. 196. ( f) Clothier v. Webster, 12 C. B

(c) Holdernesa o. Baker, 44 N. H. (n. s.) 790.

414. (g) Baltimore W.Reynolds, 20 Md. 1.

(d) Yealy v. Fink, 43 Penn. 212. (A) Idem.

1 The government is not bound by the act or declaration of its agent, unless it
manifestly appears that he acted within the scope of his authority, or was employed
in his capacity as a public agent to do the act or make the declaration for the gov-
ernment. Clifford, J., in Whiteside v. United States, 93 U. S. 247, 257. A pur-
chasing agent cannot bind the government before actual delivery of the goods.
Noble v. United States, 11 Ct. of CI. 608.

98

CH. III.] AGENTS. * 90

under his seal. But if the credit given him were not within the
line of his duty, and covered by his authority, he is personally
liable, (i) x And the presumption derived from his office or em-
ployment, may be overcome by evidence of the intention of the
parties to make the contract on his personal responsibility. (/)

Public agents, where they stand in the relation of trustees, are
treated of in the subsequent chapter on Trustees.

(t) Yulee v. Canora, 11 Ha. 9. ( j) Lapsley v. McKinstry, 38 Mo. 245.

1 An agent of a foreign government is not liable personally, nor can a creditor
indirectly sue such a government by bringing an action against the agent, Twy-
cross v. Dreyfus, 5 Ch. D. 605 ; nor will a promise by a public agent to pay a debt
when he receives money from his principal make him personally liable. Brazelton
v. Colyar, 2 Baxter, 234. A State may, however, by statute ratify an agent's act in
selling its property in excess of his authority and receiving a note in payment, and
may then enforce payment the same as an individual. State v. Torinus, 26 Minn. 1.

99

* 91 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK

•91 * CHAPTER IV.

FACTORS AND BROKERS.

Sect. I. — Who is a Factor, and who a Broker.

Factors and Brokers are both and equally agents ; but with this
difference : the Factor is intrusted with the property, which is
the subject-matter of the agency ; the Broker is only employed to
make a bargain in relation to it. The compensation to both is
usually a commission; and when the agent guarantees the pay-
ment of the price for which he has sold the goods of his principal,
then the commission is larger, as it includes a compensation for
this risk. In this case he is said in the books to act under a
del credere commission. But this phrase is seldom used in this
country, nor indeed is the word factor often employed by mercan-
tile men. The business of factors is usually done by commission
merchants, who are generally called by that name, and who do or
do not charge a guaranty commission as may be agreed upon by
the parties. But the charge of a guaranty commission gives the
factor no increased authority over the property, (a)

SECTION n.

OF FACTORS UNDER A COMMISSION.

Whether a factor who sells under a del credere or guaranty
commission becomes thereby a principal debtor to his prin-

92 cipal, * or only a surety, has been somewhat doubted ; (J) if
he be a principal debtor, his employer may demand the price

*

(a) Morris v. Cleasby, 4 M. & Sel. (b) Grove v. Dubois, 1 T. R. 112;

666; Thompson v. Perkins, 3 Mason, Leverick v. Meigs, 1 Cowen. 645, 663,
232. 664.

100

CH. IV.] FACTORS AND BROKERS. * 93

of him without looking to the buyer. If he be only a surety, he
is bound to pay only if the buyer does not. It appears to be now
settled that he is still only a surety, and that recourse must be
had first to the principal debtor, on whose default only the factor
is liable ; (c) 1 not that the employer must sue the buyer before he
sues the factor, but that he can sue the factor only because the
buyer neglects or refuses to pay, and when he so neglects or re-
fuses. It seems, however, to be still held, that the promise of the
factor to guarantee the debt is not within the Statute of Frauds,
as a promise to pay the debt of another, (d) If he takes a note
from the purchaser of the goods, this note belongs to his principal.
But if he takes depreciated paper he must make it good, (e) If
money be paid him, and he remits it, he does not guarantee its
safe arrival, but is bound only to use proper means and proper
care in sending it ; (/) unless it is agreed that he shall guarantee
the remittance, and may charge therefor a commission ; in which
case he is liable although he does not charge the commis-
sion. (#) He has the same claim on * his principal for * 93
advances as if he did not charge a commission. (A)

(c) Hougton v. Matthews, 3 B. & P. also purchased another bill of one Im-
485 ; Morris v. Cleasby, 4 M. & Sel. 666 ; bert, which they also remitted to the
Gall v. Comber, 7 Taunt. 558 ; Peele v. plaintiff, in part payment for sales of his
Northcote, 7 Taunt. 478 ; Couturier v. goods. Walters and Imbert failed, and
Hastie, 8 Exch. 40 ; Bradley v. Richard- the bills were protested ; and this action
son, 23 Vt. 720 ; Thompson v. Perkins, was brought to recover the amount on
3 Mason, 232 ; Wolff v. Koppell, 5 Hill the defendants' guaranty. Washington,
(N. Y.), 458. See Wolff v. Koppell, 2 J. :" The guaranty of the defendants ex-
Denio, 368, where conflicting opinions tended no further than to the sales and
are given on this question by Porter and receipts of the money arising from them.
Hand, Senators. As to Imbert's bill, therefore, there is no

(d) Swan v. Nesmith, 7 Pick. 220 ; pretence for charging the defendants
Wolff v. Koppell, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 458; s. c. with that, as it was a bill purchased
2 Denio, 368 ; Couturier v. Hastie, 8 by the defendants from a man in good
Exch. 40 ; Bradley v. Richardson, 23 credit, and it was purchased for the pur-
Vt. 720. pose of a remittance, as the defendants

(e) Dunnell v. Mason, 1 Story, 543. had been directed. But the guaranty
(,/') Lucas v. Groning, 7 Taunt. 164; extends to Walters' bill which was not

in Muhler v. Bohlens, 2 Wash. C. C. purchased with the proceeds of the plain-
378, the defendants received consign- tiff's goods, but was given by the pur-
ments from the plaintiff, and engaged chaser of those goods instead of money.
to sell them on a del credere commission, If the defendants were bound to guaran-
and to guarantee the debts. They sold tee the payment of this debt when con-
to one Walters part of the goods, and tracted, the guaranty continues, because a
when the money for which the goods bill which is dishonored is no payment."
were sold became due, they took Wal- (g) Henbach v. Mollman, 2 Duer,
ters' bill of exchange for the amount and 227.
remitted the same to the plaintiff. They (h) Graham v. Ackroyd, 10 Hare, 192.

1 Contra, Lewis v. Brehme, 33 Md. 412, 429.

101

* 93 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

SECTION III.

OP THE DUTIES AND THE EIGHTS OP FACTORS AND BROKERS.

A broker or factor is bound to ordinary care, and is liable for
any negligence, error, or default, incompatible with the care and
skill properly belonging to the business that he undertakes. (J)
It is his business to sell; but the power to sell does not necessarily
include the power to pledge. This rule was formerly applied with
great severity ; (/) but it seems to be now the law, aided by some
statutes both of England and of this country, (¥) that he may
pledge the goods for advances made in good faith for his principal,
and perhaps otherwise if distinctly for the use and benefit of the
principal, (0 l or for advances made to himself to the extent of
his lien ; (to) or, perhaps, if the owner has clothed the factor
with all the indicia of ownership so as to enable him to mislead
others, and the pledgee had no notice or knowledge that he was
not owner, (n) 2 But this has been denied in this country, (ww)

(i) Vere v. Smith, 1 Vent. 121. which regulate the power of the factor

(;') The factor cannot pledge the to pledge the goods of his principal. For

goods of his principal as security for interpretations of these acts see Stevens

his own debt. Paterson i>. Tash, 2 Str. v. "Wilson, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 512; s. i;. 3

1178. The principal may recover goods Denio, 472 ; Zachrison v. Ahman, 2

pledged by the factor, by tendering to Sandf. 68 ; Jennings ;>. Merrill, 211 Wend,

him the sum due to him, without any ten- 1 ; Navulshaw v. Brownrigg, 2 De G., M.

der to the pawnee. Daubignyw. Duval, 5 & G. 441.

T. K, 604 ; M'Combie v. Davies, 7 East, (?) Mann v. Shiffner, 2 East, 523 ;

5; Solly v. Rathbone, 2 M. & Sel. 298. M'Combie v. Davies, 7 East, 6; Solly v.

See also De Bouchout v. Goldsmid, 5 Rathbone, 2 M. & Sel. 298 ; Pultney v.

Ves. 211 ; Martini ?>. Coles, 1 M. & Sel. Keymer, 3 Esp. 182. " A factor may

140 ; Fielding v, Kymer, 2 Br. & B. deliver the possession of goods on which

639 ; Queiroz v . Trueman, 3 B. & C. he has a lien to a third person, with

312; Kinder e. Shaw, 2 Mass. 398; notice of the lien and with a declaration

Odiorne v. Maxcy, 13 Mass. 178 ; Bowie that the transfer is to such person as

v. Napier, 1 McCord, 1 ; Van Amringe v. agent of the factor, and for his benefit."

Peabody, 1 Mason, 440 ; Whitaker on Kent, C. J., Urquhart v. Mclver, 4 Johns.

Lien, 123, 136; Rodriguez i>. Heffernan, 103, 116.
5 Johns. Ch. 429; Nowell v. Pratt, 5 (m) Id.

Cush. 111. He cannot barter the goods (n) Boyson v. Coles, 6 M. & Sel. 14;

of his principal, but must sell them out- Williams v. Barton, 3 Bing. 139.
right, Guerreiro v. Peile, 3 B. & Aid. 616. (nn) Michigan State Bank v. Gardner,

(k) See ante, p.* 58, n. (h), for statutes 15 Gray, 362.

1 But a factor has no authority to pledge the goods of his principal as a security
for his own debt, even though the creditor has no notice of his character as a factor,
and the goods were invoiced to him as a purchaser. Gray v. Agnew, 95 111. 315.
Nor will the pledge be good for the amount of the factor's charges against his prin-
cipal at the time. Merchants' Bank ><, Trenholm, 12 Heiskell, 520. See Cole v.
Northwestern Bank, L. R. 9 C. P. 470 ; City Bank v. Barrow, 5 App. Cas. 664.

2 See Johnson v. Credit Lyonnais Co. 3 C. P. D. 32.

102

CH. IV.] FACTORS AND BROKERS.

94

The power of a factor to pledge for his own benefit the goods of
a consignor cannot be considered as settled in this country.
But it seems that *he may pledge negotiable paper intrusted * 94
to him by his principal, to a party who has no notice or
knowledge of his want of title, (o)

A broker employed to sell has no authority to receive pay-
ment ; a and in a case in New York it was not permitted to over-
come this rule by proof of usage. (00)

A principal does not, in general, lose his property in his goods
by any act of the factor, as long as he can trace and identify them,
either in the factor's hands, or into the hands of any representa-
tive of the factor, who holds them only in the factor's right, and
not in his own independent right, as purchaser, pledgee, &c. (p)

He is bound to obey positive instructions precisely, but not
mere wishes or inclinations ; (q~) and will be justified in departing
from precise instructions if an unforeseen emergency arises, and
he acts in good faith and for the obvious and certain advantage
of his principal. (r)

If a factor buys goods at a price exceeding the limit set by his
principal, or otherwise in disregard of his instructions, and the
principal repudiates the contract, the goods become the property
of the factor, and the principal is not liable for them, (rr)

Factors or brokers must conform to the usages of the business ;
and they have the power such usages would give them, and can
bind the principal only to a usual obligation. A factor need not
advise insurance, still less make insurance ; but having possession
of the goods he may insure them for the owner, (s) 2 A factor

(0) Collins v. Martin, 1 B. & P. 648 ; Ekins v. Marklish, Ambl. 184 ; Lucas v.

Treuttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100. Groning, 7 Taunt. 164.

(oo) Higgins v. Moore, 34 N. Y. 417. (r) Judson v. Sturges, 5 Day, 556 ;

(p) "Warner v. Martin, 11 How. 209; Drummond u. "Wood, 2 Caines, 310;
Beach <>. Forsyth, 14 Barb. 499 ; Black- Liotard i: Graves, 3 Caines, 226 ; Law-
man v. Green, 24 Vt. 17 ; Benny v. Pe- ler v. Keaquick, 1 Johns. Cas. 174 ; For-
gram, 18 Mo. 191. See Fahnestock v. restier v. Bordman, 1 Story, 43.
Bailey, 3 Met. (Ky.) 48, which is a strong (rr) The Sally Magee, 3 Wall. 451.
case upon this point. (s) De Forest v. The Fire Insurance

(q) Brown v. McGran, 14 Pet. 479 ; Co. 1 Hall, 84.

1 Nor to submit to arbitration so as to bind his principal, Ingraham v. Whitmore,
75 111. 24 ; nor to deliver a bill of lading without the payment of an accompanying
bill of exchange, when authorized so to do only upon such payment. Stollenwerck
v. Thacher, 115 Mass. 224.

2 If a factor promises to insure, or if so ordered or if usage imposes that duty
upon him he fails to do so, he is liable himself as insurer, and, in the event of a loss,
is entitled to credit for premiums that he should have paid. Shoenfeld v. Fleisher,
73 111. 404.

103

* 95 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

has discretionary power in regard to the time, mode, and circum-
stances of a sale ; but he must exercise this discretion in good
faith, and if he hastens a sale improperly, and without good rea-
son, it is void. (£)

If he has any instructions how to dispose of the goods, and
has made no advances on them, he is certainly bound by these
instructions, (w)

A factor for commission must account to him from whom he
received the goods, until an adverse claimant establishes his right
to them, (uu)

* 95 * A factor is a general agent from the nature of his

employment; and if he be known as a general commission
merchant or factor, he binds the principal who employs him,
although for the first time, by any acts fairly within the scope
of his employment, even if they transcend the limits of his
instructions ; if the party dealing with him had no knowledge
of those limits.

If he sends goods to his principal, contrary to order or to his
duty, the principal may refuse to receive them, and may return
them, or if the nature of the goods or other circumstances make
it obviously for the interest of the factor that they should be sold,
the principal may sell them as his agent, (u)

If he has no del credere commission, he may still be personally
liable to his principal ; as where he makes himself liable by ne-
glect or default ; or if he sells the goods of several principals to
one purchaser, on credit, taking a note to himself, and getting
the same discounted. (m>) Or if he sells on credit, and when that
expires takes a note to himself, (.x) But if he sell on credit and
at the time takes a negotiable note which is not paid, the loss
falls on the principal ; and the factor is not bound to pay it, if

(0 " But it seems, if the sale be hur- (a) Marfield v. Goodhue, 3 Comst.

ried in order to enable the factor to 62; Brown i\ McGran, 14 Pet. 479;

realize his advances, and it is not made Smart v. Sandars, 5 M. G. & S. 805.
in due course of business, it will be luu) Bain v. Clark, 39 Mo. 352.

void." . . . The agents, "were bound (») Kemp v. Pryor, 7 Ves. Jr. 237,

as factors to sell at reasonable and fair 240, 247; Cornwall v. Wilson, 1 Ves.

prices ; and it would be contrary to Sen. 509.

their duty, and a fraudulent proceeding (w) Jackson v. Baker, 1 Wash. C. C.

on their part to sell the goods at a 394; s. c. 445; Johnson v. O'Hara, 5

greatly reduced price, or in common Leigh, 456. But not necessarily so.

parlance, to sacrifice them, in order the Goodenow v. Tyler, 7 Mass. 36 ; Cor-

more hastily to realize the proceeds." lies v. Cumming, 6 Cowen, 181.
Shaw, C. J., Shaw v. Stone, 1 Cusli. Ix) Hosmer v. Beebe, 2 Martin (n. s.)

228, 248. 368.

104

CH. IV.] FACTORS AND BROKERS. * 96

he has no guaranty commission, although the note be made pay-
able to the factor. (?/)

A foreign factor is one who acts for a principal in another
country; a domestic factor acts in the same country with his
principal. A foreign factor is, as to third parties, under ordinary
circumstances, a principal.1 And though his principal may sue
such third parties, they cannot sue his principal, for they act with
the factor only, and on the factor's credit. But it seems to be
otherwise with the domestic factor. A third party dealing with
him may have a claim on his principal, unless it can be shown
that credit was given to the factor exclusively. (2) That
is, in the case of a foreign factor the presumption * of law * 96
is, that credit was given to him exclusively ; in the case of
a domestic factor, that credit is given to his principal ; but the
presumption may be said to exist only in the absence of evidence ;
for the intention of the parties, to be drawn from the terms of
the contract and from circumstances, will determine whether the
party dealing with the factor dealt with him as agent or as prin-
cipal, (a) It seems very nearly and perhaps quite settled, that
for the purpose of this rule, our States are not foreign countries
to each other, (5) although for most purposes of the law-mer-
chant they are so.

(1/) Messier v. Amery, 1 Yeates, 540 ; Scotland, but did not mention their

Goodenow v. Tyler, 7 Mass. 36. names. The seller did not inquire who

(z) Paterson v. Gandasequi, 15 East, they were, and debited the party pur-

62 ; Addison v. Gandasequi, 4 Taunt, chasing ; and it was held that he might

574. The following authorities distin- afterwards sue the principal for the

guish the foreign and domestic factors : price. Lord Tenterden, C. J., said :

Gonzales v. Sladen, Bull. N. P. 130; De " There may be another case, and that

Gaillon v. L'Aigle, 1 B. & P. 368; is where a British merchant is buying

Thomson v. Davenport, 9 B. & C. 78; for a foreigner. According to the univer-

Kirkpatrick v. Stainer, 22 Wend. 244. sal understanding of merchants, and of all

(a) Green H. Kopka, 2 Jur. (n. s.) 1049. persons in trade, the credit is then con-
In this case it is declared that " there is sidered to be given to the British buyer,
no rule of law that a person contracting and not to the foreigner. In this case,
in England as agent of a foreign prin- the buyers lived at Dumfries ; and a
cipal Is personally liable on the contract, question might have been raised for the
In all cases, whether the principal or consideration of the jury, whether, in
agent is liable is a question of inten- consequence of their living at Dumfries,
tion, to be ascertained by the terms of it may not have been understood among
the contract and the surrounding circum- all persons at Liverpool, where there
stances." are great dealings with Scotch houses,

(b) In Thomson v. Davenport, 9 B. that the plaintiffs had given credit to
& C. 78, a purchaser in Liverpool rep- M'Kune only, and not to a person living,
resented that he bought for persons in though not in a foreign country, yet, m

1 Thus in England, by usage of trade, credit is given to the factor, and his foreign
principal can neither enforce nor is bound by the contract. Elbinger Co. v. Claye,
L. R. 8 Q. B. 313 ; Hutton v. Bulloch, L. R. 8 Q. B. 331.

105

*9T

*97

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

* The factor and the principal may sometimes have con-
flicting claims against a purchaser ; as the factor for his lien

that part of the king's dominions which
rendered him not amenable to any pro-
cess of our courts. But instead of direct-
ing the attention of the Recorder to any
matter of that nature, the point insisted
upon by the learned counsel at the trial
was, that it ought to have been part of
the direction to the jury, that if they
were satisfied the plaintiffs, at the time
of the order being given, knew that
AfKune was buying goods for another,
even though his principal might not be
made known to them, they, by afterwards
debiting M'Kune, had elected him for
their debtor. The point made by the
defendant's counsel, therefore, was, that
if the plaintiffs knew that II' Kane was
dealing with them as agent, though they
did know the name of the principal
they could not turn round on him.
The Recorder thought otherwise : he
thought that though they did know that
M'Kune was buying as agent, yet if they
did not know who his principal really
was so as to be able to write him down
as their debtor, the defendant was lia-
ble, and so he left the question to the
jury, and I think he did right in so doing.
The judgment of the court below must
therefore be affirmed." — In Kirkpatrick
v. Stainer, 22 Wend. 244, an agent of
a foreign mercantile house who induced a
merchant here to make a shipment of
goods to bis principals, to be sold on
commission, and engaged that insurance
should be effected either here or in Eu-
rope on the property shipped, had been
held by the Supreme Court not to be
prrsonalhj liable for a breach of the
agreement to insure; the action, if
maintainable, lay only against the prin-
cipals. Tliis decision of the Supreme
Court was confirmed by tin? Court of
Errors, Chancellor Walworth, with some
other members of the court, dissenting
for reasons which certainly seem to have
much weight, although they did not suf-
fice to convince a majority of the Court
of Errors. On the precise question be-
fore us, the Chancellor says : " Upon a
careful examination of the law on this
subject, I have arrived at the conclusion
that there is a well-settled distinction be-
tween the personal liability of an agent,
who contracts for the benefit of a do-
mestic principal, and one who contracts
for a principal who is domiciled in a
foreign country. I do not think that by
our commercial usage it is applicable to
the case of a principal who is domiciled

106

in another State of the Union ; as the in-
terests of trade do not seem to require it.
Besides, it does not appear to have been
applied in England to the case of a prin-
cipal residing in Scotland; although in
the case of Thomson v. Davenport, be-
fore referred to, Lord Tenterden supposed
it might have been a proper subject of
inquiry for the jury, whether there was
not a usage of trade at Liverpool to give
the credit to the agent where the prin-
cipal resided in Scotland. So far as the
law is settled on the subject, however, it
only applies to a principal domiciled in a
foreign country ; or, in the language of
the common law, ' beyond the seas.' "
Senator Verplanck gave the only other
opinion. He thought the Supreme Court
right, and the majority of the Court of
Errors agreed witli him. But he rests
his opinion on the ground, that the Eng-
lish rule, that the factor of a foreign
principal is himself liable to the exclu-
sion of the principal, rests entirely upon
the custom of trade in England, and is no
part of the common law, nor of the law-
merchant generally; and is not the law
of this country, unless a particular cus-
tom could be proved which should give
that effect to the contract. And there-
fore, in the absence of such evidence of
custom, the principal is liable as in any
other cases of contracts by an agent for a
principal. Such would seem to be the
authority of this case ; but we neverthe-
less hold the rule to be as stated in our
text. In Taintor v. Prendergast, 3 Hill
(N. Y.), 72, t'ntivn, J., says, "This suit
was brought to recover a sum of money
advanced to the defendant, a citizen of
this State, in part payment for a quan-
tity of wool which he agreed to deliver to
the plaintiff's agent. The contract was
made by the latter without disclosing the
name of his principal, who was a mer-
chant residing at Hartford, Connecticut.
The agent was a resident of this State.
The wool was not delivered as agreed,
and the question is, whether an action
can be maintained by the principal. It
may be admitted, as was urged in the
argument that whether the principal be
considered a foreigner or not, his agent
omitting to disclose his name, would be
personally liable to an action. Even in
case of a foreign principal, however, I
apprehend it would be too strong to say,
that when discovered he would not be
liable for the price of the commodity
purchased by his agent. This may in-

CH. IV.] FACTORS AND BROKERS. * 98

for advances, &c, and the principal for his price. In general 'it
may be said that a purchaser who pays to either, will be protected
against the other, if he has no notice or knowledge of any valid
claim or right belonging to the other, (c) But, excepting when
such rights exist in the factor, the principal has a higher right
than he, and may enforce a contract with a third party for his
own benefit.

*A factor may buy and sell, sue and be sued, collect *98
money, receive payments, give receipts, &c, in his own
name ; but a broker, only in the name of his principal, (d) 1 A
factor has a lien on the property in his hands, for his commis-
sions, advances, and expenses ; (e) 2 but whether the possession
of a bill of lading duly indorsed, gives the factor a right to take

deed be said, when a clear intent is credit was given exclusively to the agent,
shown to give an exclusive credit to the and this we think the true rule,
agent. I admit that such intent may be (c) Drinkwater v. Goodwin, Cowper,
inferred from the custom of trade, where 251 ; Atkyns v. Amber, 3 Esp. 493 ; Cop-
the purchaser is known to live in a for- pin v. Craig, 7 Taunt. 243; Hudson v.
eign country. No custom was shown or Granger, 5 B. & Aid. 27.
pretended in the case at bar; and where (</) Baring v. Corie, 2 B. & Aid. 143;
the parties reside in different States Hearshy v. Hichox, 7 Eng. (Ark.) 125.
under the same confederation, this has (e) Williams v. Littlefield, 12 Wend,
been held essential to exonerate the prin- 362 ; Holbrooke v. Wight, 24 Wend. 169.
cipal. Thomson v. Davenport, 9 B. & C. The factor has a general lien, to secure
78. It will be seen by this case and all advances and liabilities, upon all goods
others referred to by it, that the usual which come to his hands as factor. God-
and decisive indication of an exclusive in v. London Ass. Co. 1 Burr. 494 ; Hol-
credit is, where the creditor knows there lingworth v. Tooke, 2 H. Bl. 501 ; Cowel
is a foreign principal, but makes his v. Simpson, 16 Ves. 270 ; Stevens v. Rob-
charge in account against the agent. If ins, 12 Mass. 180 ; Bryce v. Brooks, 26
the seller be kept in ignorance that he is Wend. 367 ; The Frances, 8 Cranch, 419;
selling to an agent or factor, I am not Dixon v. Stansfield, 10 C. B. 398. And
aware of a case which denies a concur- the factor obtains an interest sufficient
rent remedy." We understand the court to support his lien, upon accepting a draft
to mean, that where the principal pur- drawn upon the faith of the goods. Ne-
chaser is known, and is known to live in smith v. Dyeing, &c. Co. 1 Curtis, 130;
a foreign country, there the existing cus- Bank of Rochester v. Jones, 4 Comst.
torn of trade leads to the inference that 497 ; Vail v. Durant, 7 Allen, 408^

1 A broker cannot sue in his own name upon contracts made by him as a broker,
Fairlie v. Eenton, L. R. 5 Ex. 169 ; nor, although signing a contract note as selling
as broker for an undisclosed principal, can he sue as principal in the contract.
Sharman v. Brandt, L. R. 6 Q. B. 720. Likewise a broker, signing a contract note in
terms, " I have this day sold by your order and for your account to my principals,'
is not, in the absence of usage, personally liable on the contract. Southwell v. Bow-
ditch, 1 C. P. D. 374.

2 Commission merchants making advances on goods insured by them which are
burned without their fault, have the same lien on the insurance money when col-
lected as they had on the goods. Johnson v. Campbell, 120 Mass. 449. Also where
an agent has advanced money or incurred liability for a principal, and the latter be-
comes insolvent while the agent has in his possession or within reach the proceeds
or fruit of the advances, he has a lien upon them before they come into the princi-
pal's actual possession. Muller v. Pondir, 55 N. V. 325. See Brown v. Coombs, 63
N. Y. 598 ; Daniel v. Swift, 54 Ga. 113.

107

* 99 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

possession of the goods and hold them by his lien, is uncertain.
We should doubt whether the bill of lading, alone, would give
him such a right. (/) 1 But a factor who accepts a bill drawn on
goods, which goods are in the hands of a third person to be de-
livered to the factor, acquires undoubtedly a lien on the goods as
against an attaching creditor. (#) The consignor may always
transfer the goods to a third person free from any lien or claim
of the factor on them to seeure his debt, if he transfers them
before they come into the hands of the factor. (K) Nor has a
factor any lien on goods in his hands, unless they came to him as
factor, (i)

It may be doubted, whether, in England, a factor can sell the
goods, against the orders of the principal, even if the principal
expressly refuses to pay or secure his debt to the factor, (j)
Here, the factor certainly may sell enough to cover his balances,
if the principal, after proper demand, refuses to pay or secure
them ; but the factor must protect the principal's interest, as to
the time and manner of the sale. (&) 2 And the Supreme Court
of the United States denies that a consignor, having received

* 99 advances, has any right, by any orders, to suspend or * con-

trol the factor's right of sale, except as to the surplus of the
goods beyond the factor's advances or liabilities. (I) 3 But instruc-
tions or an agreement as to this right of sale will be enforced. (ll~)
Nor need a factor make a sale ; but after reasonable delay and
endeavors to sell, be may maintain an action against his principal
for his commissions or charges, (to) 4 As to the measure of dam-

(/) See, however, Rice v. Austin, 17 239; Parker v. Brancker, 22 Pick. 40;

Mass. 197 ; Patten v. Thompson, 6 M. & Marfield v. Goodhue, 3 Comst. 62 ; Blot

Sel. 350. v. Boiceau, 1 Sandf . 1 11 , and 3 Comst. 78 ;

[g) Nesmithv. Dyeing Co. 1 Curtis, 130. Blackmar v. Thomas, 28 N. Y. 67. See

(A) Bank of Rochester v. Jones, 4 ante, p. * 70, u. (</).
Comst. 497. (/) Brown v. McGran, 14 Pet. 479.

(i) Elliot v. Bradley, 23 Vt. 217; (//) Milliken v. Dehon, 27 N. Y. 364.

Dixon v. Stansfield, 10 C. B. 398. __ (m) Prothingham v. Everton, 12 N.

( i ) See Smart v. Sandars, supra,
(k) Prothingham v. Everton, 12 N. H.

( j ) See Smart v. Sandars, supra. H. 239 ; Upham v. Lefavour, 11 Met. 174.

(k)~ ■ ■

1 The mere possession of bills of lading of cotton confers no lien on the factors
to whom it was shipped as against an attachment. Saunders v. Bartlett, 12 Heiskell,
316 ; Oliver r. Moore, 12 ib. 482 ; Chaffraix v. Harper, 26 La. An. 22. But delivery
of cotton to a factor's agent and the placing it on the factor's drays gives such a lien
as against an attachment put on the cotton while still on the drays. Burrus v. Kyle,
66 Ga. 24.

4 But before selling to repay himself, the consignee must give the consignor
reasonable notice to repay him. Hallowell r. Fawcett, 30 la. 491.

3 Mooney v. Musser, 45 Ind. 115 ; Howard v. Smith, 56 Mo. 314, to the same point.

1 A factor who has made large advances to his principal on account of goods not

108

CH- IV-] FACTORS AND BROKERS. * 99

ages in actions against factors for wrongful sales, see second
volume.

Possession is necessary to give a lien, and a broker has there-
fore no lien. («) 1 In the transactions of business these relations
are sometimes confounded, and it is not always easy to distinguish
between the factor and the broker. The best test, however, is
in the fact of possession ; but even one who has possession may
sometimes be held to be a broker, (o) Neither can delegate his
authority, (p) The broker may certainly be the agent of both
parties, and often is so ; but it would seem from the nature of his
employment, that the factor can be, generally at least, the agent
only of the party who employs him. The whole subject of the
lien of a factor and the rules and principles applicable to it, are
considered in our chapter on Liens ; and the distinction between
a factor and broker, in respect to the Statute of Frauds, is stated
in the section on Bought and Sold Notes.

Neither has a right to his commissions, as a general rule, until
the whole service, for which these commissions are to compensate,
is performed, (j)2 But where the service is begun, and an im-

(n) See Jordan v. James, 6 Ham. 99, (p) Catlin v. Bell, 4 Camp. 183;

where the several classes of liens are dis- Solly v. Rathbone, and Cockran v. Irlam,

cussed, and the cases cited. But it is of 2 M. & Sel. 298, n. (a),
the very essence of a lien that possession (q) Harnond v. Holiday, 1 C. & P.

accompanies it. 384; Dalton v. Irving, 4 C. & P. 289;

(0) Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38. Broad v. Thomas, 7 Bing. 99.

sold, which have been on hand for several months, may sue him for such advances
without waiting until all the goods are sold, although it was agreed that, if upon
settlement, after all the goods were sold, any balance was found due the factor, the
principal was to pay it. Dolan v. Thompson, 126 Mass. 183. But to recover from
his principal any deficit arising from the sale of goods for less than his advances and
charges, a factor must show that he faithfully followed his principal's orders. Strong
v. Stewart, 9 Heiskell, 137.

1 But a broker may have a lien upon the proceeds in his hands of a sale of a
cargo of sugar, for his commissions arising from that sale, although he cannot
retain the amount of his entire claim against the owners. Barry v. Boninger, 46
Md. 59.

2 Nor for unsuccessful efforts, unless the failure is due to the principal. Sibbald
v. Bethlehem Iron Co. 83 N. Y. 378. But a real estate broker is entitled to his com-
missions if he procures a purchaser, although his principal concludes the sale him-
self, Timberman v. Craddock, 70 Mo. 638; Arrington v. Cary, 6 Baxter, 609; Dolan
v. Scanlan, 57 Cal. 261 ; but such purchaser must be ready to carry out the terms
agreed on between his principal and himself, Fraser v. Wyckoff, 63 N. Y. 445;
McArthur v. Slauson, 53 Wis. 41 ; or be acceptable to him, Coleman v. Meade, 13
Bush, 358 ; nor can the principal, by changing such terms, prevent the recovery of
such commissions, Bash i>. Hill, 62 111. 216; Stewart v. Mather, 32 Wis. 344; or by a
refusal to ratify a sale, Bailey v. Chapman, 41 Mo. 536. If, however, a broker
breaks off negotiations, his principal can afterwards renew and complete them with-
out entitling the broker to a commission. Wylie t>. Marine Bank,-61 N. Y. 415. —
A broker to sell is also entitled to compensation when he finds one who makes a
written contract for the property, Veazie v. Parker, 72 Me. 443 ; though never carried

109

* 100 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

portant part performed, and the factor or broker is prevented
by some irresistible obstacle from completing it, and is himself
without fault, there it would seem that he may demand a pro-
portionate compensation, (r) * So a broker, employed to sell land
and making a proper bargain, has been held entitled to his com-
mission although the purchaser refused to take the land from a
defect in the title, (rr) 2 And if he makes a contract for the pur-
chase of goods to arrive, he may recover his commissions although
the goods do not arrive, (rs) Neither factor nor broker can have
any valid claim for his commissions or other compensation if
he has not discharged all the duties of the employment

* 100 which he has undertaken, with proper care and * skill, and

entire fidelity, (s) 3 And for his injurious default, he not
only loses his claim, but the principal has a claim for damages. (£)
He must account for all the profits made from contracts entered
into on behalf of his principal, (tf) And if he has stipulated to
give his whole time to his employer, he will not be permitted to

(r) Ilamond v. Holiday, 1 C. & P. Pick. 328. See also Shaw v. Arden, 9

384 ; Broad v. Thomas, 7 Bing. 99 ; Read Bing. 287 ; Hill v. Featherstonhaugh, 7

o. Rann, 10 B. & C. 438. Bing. 569. As to his duty to keep ac-

(rr) Doty t: Miller, 43 Barb. 529; counts, see White v. Lady Lincoln, 8 Ves.

Middleton v. Findler, 25 Cal. 76 ; Knapp 363. He must not confound the princi-

v. Wallace, 4 N. Y. 477 ; Schwartze v. pal's property with his own. Lupton u.

Yearly, 31 Md. 270. See as to the rights White, 15 Ves. 432. He cannot recover

of a ship-broker, Cook v. Fiske, 12 Gray, his compensation if he has embezzled the

491, and Cook v. Welch, 9 Allen, 350. principal's funds, although it exceeds the

(rs) Paulsen v. Dallett, 2 Daly, 40. amount embezzled. Turner v. Robinson,

(s) Denew v. Daverell, 3 Camp. 451 ; 6 C. & P. 16, n. (g).

Hamond v. Holiday, 1 C. & P. 384 ; White (t) See note (6), p. * 86.

i'. Chapman, 1 Stark. 113; Hurst v. Hold- (tt) Payne v. Waterston, 16 La. An.

ing, 3 Taunt. 32; Dodge v. Tileston, 12 239.

out. Pearson v. Mason, 120 Mass. 53. — A broker, leaving copies of a. written
authority to procure a loan with several persons, one of whom without the broker's
knowledge lends the money, is entitled to his commissions. Derrickson v. Quimby,
14 Vroom, 373. But where the broker's advertisement attracted a purchaser to
whom the principal made a sale, the broker was held to recover not even his out-
lays, in Charlton v. Wood, 11 Heiskell, 19. — A broker to sell a colliery, who was to
receive as a commission all he could get above a certain sum, was held entitled to
6uch excess, although very largely above such sum. Morgan i: Elford, 4 Ch. D.
352. — A broker, in the absence of agreement, is entitled to the customary rate of
commissions. Potts v. Aechternacht, 93 Penn. St. 138.

1 Or if he opens a negotiation, and his principal completes the sale, he can
recover the proper proportion of the commission. Martin o, Silliman, 53 N. Y. 615.
See Thomas v. Lincoln, 71 Ind. 41, to the effect that a broker can receive a com-
mission only on the actual completion of a sale of personal property.

2 Gonzales v. Broad, 57 Cal. 224 ; contra, Rockwell v. Newton, 44 Conn. 333.

3 As in Fisher v. Dynes, 62 Ind. 348, where a broker negotiating an exchange of
land, negligently omitted, until the time limited for the exchange had expired, to
inform one party that the other refused to take one lot because the taxes were not
paid.

110

CH. IV.] FACTORS AND BROKERS. * 100

derive any compensation for services rendered elsewhere, (u)
Neither the factor nor broker can acquire any claim by services
which are in themselves illegal or immoral, or against public
policy, (v) 1

A factor to whom goods were sent for sale, cannot be sued
until after demand or instructions to remit, (w)

A broker to whom a certificate of shares has been intrusted
with special instructions, can make no disposition of them which
these instructions do not permit ; nor can evidence of a contrary
usage be received ; 2 and if he does this, he is liable for what was
the market price of the shares on the day when he violated his
instructions, (nw)

A commission merchant cannot detain proceeds of a sale from
his principal, in favor of claims or equities between a third party
and the principal, in which the commission merchant has no
interest, (yx)

If a factor with power to sell, has made advances to his princi-
pal, it may not be quite certain whether these advances take from
the principal the power of revocation. From the cases it would
seem that the prevailing if not the settled rule in this country is
against the power of the principal to revoke an authority which
has thus become coupled with an interest. But in England it
seems to be otherwise, (w)

(«) Thompson v. Havelock, 1 Camp. (vv) Bums v. Pilsbury; 10 Gray, 362.

527, and cases cited in note; Massey v. (vw) Parsons v. Martin, 11 Gray, 111.

Davies, 2 Ves. Jr. 317 ; Gardner v. (vx) Aubery v. Fiske, 36 N. Y. 47.

M'Cutcheon, 4 Beav. 534. (a») See note (y), p. * 70, in which the

(») Haines v. Busk, 5 Taunt. 521 ; cases on this question are given in con-
Josephs v. Pebber, 3 B. & C. 639 ; Wyburd nection with the more general subject of
v. Stanton, 4 Esp. 179 ; Buck v. Buck, 1 a revocation of an authority coupled with
Camp. 547 ; and Rex v. Shatton, in note ; an interest.
Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258.

1 Thus a broker cannot recover premiums paid for illegal insurance, Allkins v.
Jupe 2 C. P. D. 375 ; nor money advanced to cover losses in stock-gambling, nor his
commissions therein. Fareira v. Gabell, 89 Penn. St. 89. But a broker carrying
stocks on a margin, is entitled to his expenditures, especially where he informs his
principal frequently of the state of his accounts, and the latter, knowing the custom,
makes no objection until called upon to pay. Eobinson v. Norris, 51 How. Pr. 442.

2 A usage of brokers that one, on receipt of an order to buy stocks on a margin,
assumes the contract himself, instead of making it with a third person, is illegal.
Commonwealth o. Cooper, 130 Mass. 285.

Ill

101 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

•101 * CHAPTER V.

SERVANTS.

In England the relation of master and servant is in many re-
spects regulated by statutory provisions, and upon some points
is materially affected by the existing distinction of ranks, and by
rules which have come down from periods when this distinction
was more marked and more operative than at present. In this
country we have nothing of this kind. With us, a contract for
service is construed and governed only by the general principles
of the law of contracts.

The word servant seems to have in law two meanings. One is
that which it has in common use, when it indicates a person hired
by another for wages, to work for him as he may direct.

We may call such a person a servant in fact; but the word
is also used in many cases to indicate a servant by construc-
tion of law ; it is sometimes applied to any. person employed by
another, and is scarcely to be discriminated in these instances
from the word agent. This looseness in the use of the word
is the more to be regretted, because it seems to have given rise
to some legal difficulties and questions which might have been
avoided.

There are important consequences flowing from the relation
of master and servant, and it is therefore an important question,
where this relation exists, and how far it extends. Thus, if one
wishes to build or repair a house, and contracts with another to
do this, and the contractor with another, and this other with still
a third, for perhaps a part of the work, or the supply of materials,
and the servant of the third by his negligence injures some per-
son, has the injured party his right of action against the owner of
the land or of the house ? Undoubtedly, if all employed about
the house were his servants, but not otherwise. So if an
* 102 owner of coaches lets one with the horses * and the coach-
man for a definite time or a definite journey, and while the
112

CH. V.] SERVANTS. * 102

hirer is using the coach the coachman by his negligence injures a
person ; has the injured party now an action against the owner ?
Yes, if the coachman were at the time of the wrongful act Ms ser-
vant, and not otherwise. Hence, when a master gives general
directions to his servant, trusting to his discretion, the master
may be liable for the servant's misuse of his discretion ; but if he
gives specific directions, and the servant transcends them, the
master is not liable, (a) Again, if one employs a person to drive
home for him cattle which he has bought, and gives the cattle up
to the driver, going elsewhere himself, and the driver, or a person
employed by the driver, by his negligence, injures any one, the
injured person has, we think, as in the other instances, an action
against the original party, if the party who did the wrong were at
the time his servant, and not otherwise. So one was held respon-
sible, who employed a day laborer to clean out a drain, in doing
which he broke up the highway, whereby the plaintiff was in-
jured. (6) The general principle is, that a master is responsible
for the tortious acts of his servant, which were done in his service.1
It is certain and obvious that a master is not responsible for all
the torts of his servant ; for those, for instance, of which the ser-
vant is guilty, when they are entirely aside from his service, and

(o) Oxford v. Peter, 28 111. 434. (6) Sadler v. Henloek, 4 E. & B. 570.

1 This is so although the servant is reckless, lacks judgment, or yields to passion,
causing an unjustifiable injury, Cohen v. Dry Dock, &e. B. Co. 69 N. Y. 170; or acts
wantonly or even wilfully. Mott v. Consumers' Ice Co. 73 N. Y. 643. — The owner
of a cab, the driver of which on his way back to the stables drives furiously and
runs over a person, is liable for the driver's negligence, Venables v. Smith, 2 Q. B. D.
279 ; and equally so a stevedore, whose foreman was to superintend the shipping of -
rails after a carman had unloaded them, and who, being dissatisfied with the latter's
unloading, so unloaded some as to injure a passer-by. Burns v. Poulson, L. E. 8
C. P. 563. In Bayley v. Manchester, &c. R. Co. L. R. 7 C. P. 415, affirmed in L. R.
8 C. P. 148, a railway company was declared responsible for the act of a porter in
violently pulling a passenger out of a railway carriage, under an erroneous impres-
sion that the passenger was in a wrong carriage, as being an act done in the course
of his duty, a part of which was to prevent people from travelling in wrong car-
riages.— But a master is not liable in exemplary damages unless the servant was
wantonly negligent. Hawes v. Knowles, 114 Mass. 518; Cleghorn v. N. Y. &c. R.
Co. 56 N. Y. 44 ; Wade v. Thayer, 40 Cal. 578. — If a person is injured by the com-
bined negligence of master and servant, a fortiori the master is liable. Tuel v.
Weston, 47 Vt. 634. — The owner is not liable for damage caused by his runaway
horse, if the driver was not careless, Holmes v. Mather, L. R. 10 Ex. 261 ; nor while
in use by a borrower in other than the owner's business. Herlihy r. Smith, 116
Mass. 265. — A carman whose duty is to deliver beer with a horse and cart and col-
lect the empty casks, and who uses the horse and cart on an errand of his own, does
not by reason of picking up some casks on his return so re-enter his master's em-
ployment as to render the latter liable for an accident then occurring. Bayner v.
Mitchell, 2 C. P. D. 357. — The knowledge of a servant put in charge of a dog of his
ferocious character, is the knowledge of the master. Baldwin v. Casella, L. E. 7 Ex.
325.

vol. i. 8 113

102

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

have no connection with his duties, or with the command or the
wish of his master ; (65) as if he should leave his master's house
at_ night and commit a felony. There must, then, be some prin-
ciple which limits and defines the rule, respondeat superior. And
we think it may be clearly seen and stated. It is this : the re-
sponsibility of the master grows out of, is measured by, and begins
and ends with, his control of the servant, (c) It is true that the

(lb) Evansville, &c. R. Co. v. Baum,
26 Ind. 70.

(c) On this ground rests the distinc-
tion now well established, between the
negligence of the servant, and his wilful
and malicious trespass ; the act in either
case being done in the course of his em-
ploy. For the former the master must
answer ; for the latter he is held not
liable, unless the trespass is proved to
have been authorized or ratified by him.
McManus r. Crickett, 1 East, 106 ; Croft
t>. Alison, 4 B. & Aid. 590; Lyons v. Mar-
tin, 8 A. & E. 512 ; Goodman v. Kennell,
1 Mo. & P. 241, s. c. 3 C. & P. 167 ; Sad-
ler v. Hcnlock, 4 El. & Bl. 570 ; Foster
v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479; "Wright v.
Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343; Vanderbilt v.
Richmond Turnpike Co. 2 Comst. 479;
Corbin v. American Mills, 27 Conn. 274.
But it seems that where the duty of the
master to the party whose property is in-
jured, is not merely that which every
man owes to his neighbor, but a peculiar
duty arising from a special relation, there
that special relation may occasion a
liability even for the wilful tort of the
servant. As where the relation is one of
bailment. In Sinclair v. Pearson, 7 N. II.
227, Parker, J., giving the judgment,
said: "It is evident, therefore, that the
liability of a bailee, for a loss occasioned
by the act of a servant, cannot be made
to depend upon the question whether the
act was wilful or otherwise ; or whether
the servant, in committing it, was doing,
or forbearing what his master had direct-
ed ; for if that were the criterion, the
bailee would never be liable for the act
or neglect of his servant, unless done by
his command, either expressed, or in fact
to be inferred ; but it must depend upon
the question whether the degree of care
and diligence required about the preserva-
tion, safe-keeping &c.,of the tiling bailed,
has been exercised bv master and ser-
vant." And Ellis v. Turner, 8 T. R. 531,
was referred to, where a loss of part of
a cargo having occurred in consequence
of the misconduct of the master of the
vessel, and an action having been brought
by the owner of the goods against the

114

owners of the vessel, Lord Kenyon said:
" Though the loss happened in con-
sequence of the misconduct of the de-
fendants' servant, the superiors (the
defendants) are answerable for it in this
action. The defendants are responsible
for the acts of their servant in those
things that respect his duty under
them, though they are not answerable
for his misconduct in those things that
do not respect his duty to them : as
if he were to commit an assault upon a
third person in the course of his voyage."
— The rule established in McManus v.
Crickett, is criticised by Reeve, Dom.
Rel. 357 ; and in the case of The Druid,
1 Wm. Rob. 485, Dr. Lushington com-
mented in forcible terms upon the hard-
ship of the rule, and expressed regret at
its adoption. — If a master give general
directions which naturally occasion the
commission of a tort by the servant
executing them, the master is liable, not-
withstanding he never commanded that
particular act. Rex v. Nutt, Fitzg. 47 ;
Lord Tenterden, Rex t>. Gutch, Mo. & M.
437, 438; Attorney-General o. Siddon, 1
Tvr. 49; Gregory v. Piper, 9 B. & C.
591 ; Lord Lonsdale v. Littledale, 2 H. Bl.
267, 299 ; Sly v. Edgley, 6 Esp.6 ; Holmes
v. Onion, 2 C. B. (n. s.) 790. In Powles
v. Hider, 6 E. & B. 208, the owner of a
cab, plying in London, was held liable for
goods lost by the negligence of the cab-
driver, although the driver paid the owner
every day a certain sum for the use of
the cab and horses. And where the ser-
vant is in the employ of the master, and
the acts complained of are done in the
course of the employment, the master
is responsible, although the acts were
done in a way directly contrary to
his instructions. Philadelphia, &c. R.
Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468 ; Southwick
v. Estes, 7 Cush. 385. — But in cases
where the master is held liable on the
ground of an implied authority to the
servant to do the particular act for him,
if the tort is a trespass on the part of the
servant, the master must not be sued in
trespass, but case. Gordon v. Rolt, 4
Exch. 365 ; Sharrod v. London, &c. R. Co.

CH. V.] SERVANTS. * 103

policy of holding a master to a * reasonable care and dis- * 103
cretion in the choice of a servant may cause a liberal con-
struction of the rule in respect to an injured party, and
may therefore be satisfied in some instances with a * slight * 104
degree of actual control ; but of the soundness and general
applicability of the principle itself, we do not doubt ; nor do we
see any greater difficulty in the application of the principle than
may always be apprehended from the variety and complexity of
the facts to which this and other legal principles may be applied.
The master is responsible for what is done by one who is his
servant in fact, for the reason that he has such servant under
his constant control, and may direct him from time to time as he
sees fit ; and therefore the acts of the servant are the acts of the
master, because the servant is at all times only an instrument ;
and one is not liable for a person who is a servant only by con-
struction, excepting so far as this essential element of control
and direction exists between them. We should therefore say
that, in the instances we have before supposed, the owner of the
land or the house was not responsible for the tort of the servant
of the sub-contractor, nor would he have been for the tort of the
sub-contractor or of the first contractor. They were not Ms ser-
vants in any sense whatever ; they were to do a job, and when
this was done he was to pay the party whom he had promised to
pay ; and this was all ; for if, although a contractor be employed,
by the terms of the contract control is left with the owner, he
is still liable, (cc) Nor is the contractor held if he properly
executes the plan and follows the direction of an architect em-
ployed to direct him, and injury occurs through the fault of the
plan, (ci) In accordance with this rule it is declared that where
the negligent party exercises a distinct and independent calling,

4 Exch. 580 ; where a railway train, driven ing the servant to drive at such a rate as

at the rate of forty miles an hour, accord- to interfere with the right of the sheep to

ing to the general directions of the com- be on the railway. It was observed in

pany to the driver, ran over and killed the judgment, that, notwithstanding the

some sheep which had strayed upon the order to the driver to proceed at a great

line in consequence of the defective fences speed, it did not follow as a necessary

of the company. It appeared that if the consequence that the ; engine would m-

driver (running the engine at the speed fringe on the plaintiff's cattle ; and the

directed) had seen the sheep, he could case was distinguished from Gregory r.

not have stopped the train in time to Piper, 9 B. & C. 591, on this ground bee

prevent the collision. Held, that the Howe v. Newmarch, 12 Allen, 4y; Uu

company were not liable in trespass for Pratt v. Lick, 38 Cal. 691.
the injury ; but that the action should (cc) Schwartz v. Gilmore, 4o 111. 45&.

have been case, either for permitting the (cd) Daegling v. Gilmore, 49 111. ZV5.

fences to be out of repair, or for direct

115

* 105 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

his employer is not liable, (cf) and if the negligence be committed
in the performance of a piece of work undertaken in consequence
of a special contract, in such case the contractor is solely respon-
sible, (e) 1 Nor does it make any difference if the contractor be,
in matters beside the contract, the servant of the other con-
tracting party. (/) And the party with whom the contractor
engages is not liable, although acts are done by the contractor or
his servants amounting to a public nuisance, so long as the act
contracted for is not in itself a nuisance. (#) But if an employer
interferes with the contractor and gives special directions, and
the mischief is done while the contractor is obeying them, the
employer would be liable. (_gg) If the act to be done be itself
an unlawful one, or necessarily involves in its performance the
commission of a public nuisance, the employer is not

* 105 discharged from liability on the ground that the * party

employed was a contractor, because in such case he has
sufficient control, and expressly commands" the act to be done, (h) 2

(d) Milligan v. Wedge, 12 A. & E. contractor's servant. Where a company,

737 ; Martin v. Temperley, 4 Q. B. 298 ; empowered by act of parliament to con-

De Forrest ;>. Wright, 2 Mich. 368 ; Pierce struct a railway contracted with certain

». O'Keefe, 11 Wis. 180 ; Butler v. Hunter, persons to make a portion of the line,

7 H. & N. 826. and by the contract reserved to them-

(c) Allen o. Hayward, 7 Q. B. 960; selves the power of dismissing any of

Gayford v. Nicholls, 9 Exch. 702. the contractor's workmen for incompe-

(/) Knight v. Fox, 5 Exch. 72. tence ; and the workmen, in constructing

(g) Overton v. Freeman, 3 Car. & K. 49. a bridge over a public highway, negli-

(gg) Hefferman v. Benkard, 1 Rob. 432. gently caused the death of a person

(A) Peacliey v. Rowland, 13 C. B. 182 ; passing beneath the highway by allowing

Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Co. 2 El. & Bl. 767. a stone to fall upon him: Held, in an

— It is a consequence from the principles action against the company, upon stat.

stated in the text, that if a contractor 9 & 10 Vict. o. 93, by the administratrix

himself employ a servant, he and not the of the deceased, that they were not liable :

original employer is liable for the con- and that the terms of the contract in

duct of that servant. And the general question did not make any difference.

employer does not become liable even if Rcedie !•. London, &c. R. Co. 4 Exch. 244.

lie have a degree of control over the ser- Yet a man is none the less liable for

vant, and the power of removal, provided the negligence of his own servants be-

this authority is not so extensive as in cause they were not directly employed

effect to render the servant no longer the by him, but mediately, through the inter-

1 Thus the owner of a house, employing a carpenter to raise it and put another
story under it complete, is not liable for an injury to an adjoining house during the
work, unless the carpenter is unskilful or unsuitable, or tin- work creates a nuisance.
Connors v. Hennessey, 112 Mass. 9(1 See Iiobinson v. Webb, 11 Bush, 464. But
Bower v. Peate, 1 Q B. D. 321, decided' that if a house-owner employs a contractor
to pull the house down, excavate the foundations, and rebuild it, he is liable for an
injury thereby caused to an adjoining house, on the ground that the owner was
bound to see to it that no accident happened, although the contractor undertook to
support the adjoining house as far as might be necessary.

2 Thus by employing a person to fill an ice-house by the cord, the employer can-
not escape liability for injuries caused by an obstruction of the street in so doing.
Darrastaetter v. Moynahan, 27 Mich. 188.

116

CH. V.]

SERVANTS.

106

A contractor to build houses, employing a sub-contractor has
been held liable for injury caused by the sub-contractor's negli-
gence. (M) Some exceptions seem to be made on the ground of
public policy, although the case could hardly come within the
law or reason of nuisance ; as where railroads have their work
done by contract, and are yet held liable, (i) And a railroad
company has been held liable for an injury caused by the wilful
misconduct of its engineer, (m) And mortgagees of a railroad
who are in possession and who manage the road, are liable for
the negligence of their servants. (#) So, too, a distinction seems
to be taken between an injury caused by the manner of doing
a work, and one caused by the work itself. As, for exam-
ple, a * municipal corporation building a sewer, would not * 106
be liable for the negligent act of a workman employed by
the contractor ; but would be liable for an accident caused by
the sewer being left open at night, and improperly lighted and
guarded, (j) So commissioners of emigration are not responsible

vention of another, whom he has author-
ized to appoint servants for him. And
Littledale, J., in the able opinion so much
cited, instances several cases where the
liability exists, although the master has
neither the direct appointment nor the
superintendence of the servants; as the
liability of a shipowner for the crew
selected and governed by the master ; of
the owner of a farm, who conducts its
operations through a bailiff, for the in-
ferior working men hired by the bailiff;
and of the owner of a mine for the work-
men employed by his steward, and paid
by him on behalf of the master. To
which may be added the liability of the
owner of a chartered ship for the neg-
ligence of the crew while under the
immediate direction of the charterer.
See Fenton v. Dublin Steam Packet Co.
8 A. & E. 835. The following conven-
ient tests for ascertaining in a particular
case whether a certain person was the
master of the servants in question, are
suggested by Coleridge, J., 7 Jur. 152 :
Had he the power of selecting them'?—
was he the party to pay them 1 — were
they doing his work ? — were they doing
that work under his control in the or-
dinary way ? — Where the other elements
of liability exist, it is no defence that
the master, voluntarily performing part
of his work by means of servants, was
obliged by law to take those servants
from a prescribed class. Whether he

would be liable where the law absolutely
forbade him to do that part of his busi-
ness himself, and still allowed him to
select out of a class more or less nu-
merous, is perhaps unsettled, but the prob-
ability is he would still be held. Where
there is this personal prohibition, and
also an obligation by law to take a par-
ticular individual, and thus no liberty of
choice whatever is permitted, it seems
the master's liability ceases. See Martin
v. Temperley, 4 Q. B. 298 ; The Agricola,
2 Wm. Rob. 10 ; The Maria, 1 Wm. Rob.
95; Lucy r. Ingram, 6 M. & W. 302;
Yates v. Brown, 8 Pick. 23; Stone v.
Codman, 15 Pick. 297 ; Lowell v. Boston,
&c. B. Co. 23 Pick. 24 ; Sproul v. Heming-
way, 14 Pick. 1 ; Ruffin, C. J., in Wiswall
v. Brinson, 10 Ired. L. 563 ; Blake v.
Ferris, 1 Seld. 48 ; Stevens v. Armstrong,
2 id. 435 ; Kelley i/. Mayor, &c. of New
York, 1 Kern. 432.

(hh) Creed v. Hartman, 29 N. Y. 591,
and 8 Bosw. 123.

(/) See some of the cases cited in
preceding note, and Mayor, &c. of New
York v Bailey, 2 Demo, 445 ; Hilliard v.
Richardson, 3 Gray, 352. See also Camus
v. Citizens Co. 40 Barb. 380.

(ii) New Orleans R. Co. v. Allbritton,
38 Miss. 242.

(ij) Ballou v. Farnum, 9 Allen, 47.

(j) Storrs v. City of Utica, 17 N. Y.
104. This case throws some doubt on
Blake v. Ferris, 1 Seld. 48.

117

*106

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

for the good conduct of persons whom they lawfully license, (jj)
And the city of New Bedford was not liable for injury caused
by negligence of firemen appointed and paid under a statute ; it
was held that the action would not lie. (jk) If the contracting
party employs persons to do the work, not on a contract, but on
day's wages, he would still retain the power of directing them
from day to day in their work ; and this might render him liable.
But we should still hold that if the work done at day wages were
such as to carry with it no implication or probability of actual
supervision or control, and none such were proved in fact, the
employer would not be liable. For the same reason we should
say that the owner and letter of a coach, horses, and coachman,
was or was not responsible to one injured by the negligence of
the coachman, as the terms of the hiring and the circumstances
of the case led to the conclusion that the coachman was or was
not at the time of the negligence the servant of the owner or
of the hirer of the coach. (Je) * The owner might doubtless

( jj) Murphy v. Commissioners, &c.
28 N. Y. 134.

(jk) Hafford o. New Bedford, 16
Gray, 207.

(k) A party who is not the general
master of a servant may make him his
servant in a particular transaction, by
specially directing him thereto, or by a
subsequent adoption of what he lias
done ; and in this way a special liability
may be incurred. And in Quarnian v.
Burnett, (j M. & W. 508, the owners of
the carriage having provided the driver
with a livery which he left at their house
at the end of each drive, and the injury
in question being occasioned by his leav-
ing the horses, while so depositing the
livery in their house, the court acknowl-
edged that if it had appeared that the
coachman went into the house to leave
his livery on that occasion under a spe-
cial order of the owners, or under a gen-
eral order to do so at all times, without
leaving any one at the horses' heads, a
liability would have been incurred. In
the course of the judgment, Baron Parke
observed : " It is undoubtedly true that
there may be special circumstances
which may render the hirer of job-horses
and servants responsible for the neglect

of a servant, though not liable by virtue
of the general relation of master and ser-
vant. He may become so by his own eon-
duct, as by taking the actual management
of the horses, or ordering the servant to
drive in a particular manner, which occa-
sions the damage complained of, or to
absent himself at one particular moment,
and the like." See also Burgess v. Gray,
1 C. B. 578. — Where question is not
made of the fact of service, but simply
whether it is a service of that party whom
it is attempted to charge — there can be
no doubt that the servant cannot have,
with respect to the same act of service,
two unconnected masters. Two persons
may be joint masters, and thereby sub-
ject to a joint liability ; and such joint
liability may be converted into a several
one by the election of the plaintiff to
sue one separately — which the law al-
lows to be done in actions of tort ; but
" two persons cannot be made separately
liable at the election of the party suing,
unless in cases where they would be
jointly liable." LittWlnle, J., Laugher v.
Pointer, 5 B. & C. 559. This principle
serves as a test in that difficult class of
cases where the negligent servant seems
to be in some respects in the employment

1 In Omoa, &c. Co. v. Huntley, 2 C. P. D. 464, it was decided that an owner who
charters a vessel for certain specified objects, but who engages and pays the master
and crew, is liable for the loss of the cargo through their negligence.

118

CH. V.] SERVANTS. * 107

be held responsible * to the hirer, if the injured party com- * 107
pelled him to make compensation, and it could be shown
that the owner had knowingly employed an insufficient and dan-
gerous servant, for this would be only to hold him responsible for
his own negligence. The rule we have given would not require
the tort to be committed in the master's presence in order to hold
him responsible. It is enough if, when the tort was committed, the
wrong-doer was in the service of the master, and was then acting
as his servant. And this question has been held to be a question
of fact for the jury. (J) If, however, the servant, when doing the
wrong, was employed in the service of the master, it is no defence
for the master, that he was also, and in some degree, acting in
his own business, (m)

There seems to be some extension of the responsibility of the
master, when the work, in the doing of which the injurious negli-
gence occurred, related to real estate ; on the ground that the
owner of such property is bound to be careful how his use of it,
or acts in relation to it, affect third parties or the public ; but
the limits of this extension are not well settled. If it have any
foundation whatever, it must rest upon the maxim sic utere tuo ut
alienum non Icedas, which, while it imposes a certain restriction
upon the use of all property, may be held perhaps to apply more
especially to lands ; and whoever permits anything to be
done upon his ground, to the positive damage *of another, * 108
may be responsible for the nuisance. Thus it has been

of one party, and in some respects in that yant among many. " If the driver be
of another. In such a case, as soon as it the servant of the job-master, we do not
is ascertained that, as to the transaction think he ceases to be so by reason of the
in question, he is the servant of either owner of the carriage preferring to be
one, it follows immediately that he can- driven by that particular servant, where
not be regarded as the servant of the there is a choice amongst more, any
other, who therefore is not liable for his more than a hack post-boy ceases to be
negligence. Hence in the great case of the servant of an innkeeper, where a
Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547, it was traveller has a particular preference of
held by Abbott, C. J., and Littledale, J. one over the rest, on account of his sobri-
(whose opinion has since been authorita- ety and carefulness. If, indeed, the de-
tively approved), in opposition to the fendants had insisted upon the horses
view of Bayky and Holroyd, JJ., that being driven, not by one of the regular
where the owner of a carriage hired of a servants, but by a stranger to the job-
stable-keeper a pair of horses to draw it master, appointed by themselves, it would
for a day, and the owner of the horses have made all the difference. bee also
provided a driver, through whose negli- Quarman e. Burnett, 6 M. & W. W»;
gent driving an injury was done to a Stevens v. Armstrong, 2 held. 460 ; JJai-
horse belonging to a third person, the yell v. Tyrer, El., Bl. & El. 899.
owner of thi carriage was not liable to (I) Per Lord Abmger.i at « pnus,
be sued for such injury. And the case is Brady v. Giles, 1 Mo. & R. 494.
not affected though the owners of the (m) Patten v. Bea, 2G.&H. oUo.
carriage asked for that particular ser-

119

* 109 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

decided that one who has directed his servant to remove snow
and ice from the roof of his house, is responsible for an injury
received by a passer, whether the negligence was that of the ser-
vant or of a stranger employed by the latter or of one who volun-
teered to assist him. (w) This duty, however, cannot extend so
far as to oblige the owner of land to see to it in all cases that a
nuisance is not erected thereon. The measure of his responsi-
bility must be his reasonable power of control, and therefore it
should be sufficient for his exculpation, that he never, either ex-
pressly, or impliedly, sanctioned the nuisance. But if he let his
land with a nuisance upon it, he would, on the same principle, be
liable for its continuance, as well as for its erection, although he
had reserved to himself no right to enter upon the land and abate
the nuisance. And so if he let land for a particular use which
must result in a nuisance, he should be liable therefor, (o) But
the general doctrine, that the owner of fixed property was liable
for injury caused by mismanagement thereof by any one, in a
manner quite distinct from that in which the owner of a chattel
would be held, although once in much favor, (p) is now quite

often disregarded. (#)
* 109 * Of the general principles of the law of contracts, appli-

(n) Althorfe v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355. care to prevent the doing of acts which

(o) See Rich v. Basterfield, 4 C. B. 783 ; it was his duty to prevent, whether done

Rex v. Pedley, 1 A. & E. 822, 3 Nev. & M. by his servants or others. If, for in-

627 ; Fish v. Dodge, 4 Denio, 311 ; Carle stance, a person occupying a, house or a

v. Hall, 2 Met. 353. And this doctrine field should permit another to carry on

may enter into the decision in Burgess v. there a noxious trade, so as to be a nui-

Gray, 1 C. B. 678, above referred to. sance to liis neighbors, it may be that he

(p) Lilthdale, J., Laugher v. Pointer, 5 would be responsible, though the acts

B. & C. 560; Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. complained of were neither his acts nor

& W. 510. the acts of his servants. He would have

(q) See Allen v. Hayward, 7 Q. B. violated the rule of law, ' Sic ntere tuo ut

960; and in Reedie v. London, &c. R. Co. alienum non Icedas.' " Bush v. Steinman,

4 Exch. 244, this doctrine was expressly 1 B. & P. 404 ; Randleson v. Murray, 8

overruled. There Rolfe, B., giving the A. & E. 109, and other cases of that class,

judgment, said : "On full consideration, must be regarded as substantially over-

we have come to the conclusion, that ruled ; and such American decisions as

there is no such distinction, unless per- were made before the recent investiga-

haps the act complained of is such as to tions, in deference to those cases, will

amount to a nuisance. ... It is not ne- not, it is presumed, be adhered to. De

cessary to decide whether in any case the Forrest v. Wright, 2 Mich. 368. See,

owner of real property, such as land or however, Mayor, &c. of New York v.

houses, may be responsible for nuisances Bailey, 2 Denio, 433 ; and Buffalo ». Hol-

occasioned by the mode in which his loway, 14 Barb. 101 ; cases which it

property is used by others not standing seems difficult to reconcile with the cur-

in the relation of servants to him, or part rent of recent English decisions. See

of his family. It may be that in some also Lowell v. Boston, &c. R. Co. 23 Pick,

case he is so responsible. But then, 24; Gardner ». Heartt, 2 Barb. 165;

his liability must be founded on the Stone v. Codman, 15 Pick. 297.
principle that he has not taken due

120

CH. V.] SERVANTS. * 109

cable to the contract of service, we have already considered
some under the head of Agency ; and we shall defer the consider-
ation of others, and of the questions which they present, to the
third Book of this Part, which relates to the subject-matter of
contracts, and to the chapter upon the topic of the Hiring of
Personal Service.

121

110

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

110

* CHAPTER VI.

OP ATTORNEYS.

Attorneys are made so by a letter or power of attorney, (a) or
they are Attorneys of Record.

It is a general rule, that one acting under a power of attorney,
cannot execute for his principal a sealed instrument, unless the
power of attorney be sealed. (&) 1 And where a statute prescribes

(a) "Few persons are disabled to be
private attorneys to deliver seizin ; for
monks, infants, femes covert, persons
attainted, outlawed, excommunicated,
villains, aliens, &c, may be attorneys.
A feme may be an attorney to deliver
seizin to her husband, and the husband
to the wife." Co. Lit. 52 a. An infant
cannot execute a power coupled with an
interest. Hearle v. Greenbank, 3 Atk. 695,
714.

(b) Harrison ;;. Jackson, 7 T. R. 209 ;
Elliot v. Davis, 2 B. & P. 338 ; Berkelev
v. Hardy, 5 B. & C. 355; Stetson v. Pat-
ton, 2 Greenl. 358. — If a partner seal for
himself and copartner, in the presence of
the copartner, it is sufficient, though his
authority be only by parol. Ball v. Dun-
sterville, 4 T. R. 313. —In Brutton ».
Burton, 1 Chitt. 707, it was held that a
warrant of attorney under seal, executed
by one person for himself and partner in
the absence of the latter, but with his
consent, was a sufficient authority for
signing judgment against both ; on the
ground that a warrant of attorney to
confess judgment need not be under seal.
— And Hunter v. Parker, 7 M. & W. 322,
contains another application of the same
equitable and reasonable principle. Com-
pare Banorgee v. Hovey, 5 Mas9. 11, 24.
— An instrument to which the agent of a
corporation has affixed his seal, may be
evidence of the contract in an action of
assumpsit against the corporation ; for the
seal of the agent of a corporation, unlike
that of the agent of a natural person,

never can be the seal of his principal.
Randall o. Van Vechten, 19 Johns. 60 ;
Damon r. Inhabitants of Granby, 2 Pick.
345 ; Bank of Columbia v. Patterson's
Admr. 7 Cranch, 299. But see Bank of
Middlebury v. Rut. & W. R. R. 30 Vt. 159.
— There is a class of Partnership cases, in
which it has been held that any express
ratification though parol, by a partner of
a contract under seal entered into for the
firm by his copartner, makes the instru-
ment the deed of the firm. Darst v. Roth,
4 Wash. C. C. 471 ; Mackay v. Bloodgood,
9 Johns. 285 ; Drumright v. Philpot, 16
Ga. 424. — The dicta of several judges
have extended this exception to include
an original parol authority. See Skinner
v. Dayton, 19 Johns. 513, where the
decision seems to be too broadly stated
in the reporter's note. Some decisions
also go to this extent, as Gram v. Seton,

1 Hall, 262.- In Cady v. Shepherd, 11
Pick. 400, the cases are reviewed, and
among others Brutton v. Burton, 1 Chitt.
707 (see supra), the decision in which it is
stated nakedly, without the addition of
the reason by which the Court of Queen's
Bench appear to have been governed, and
which goes to reconcile it with the author-
ities. McDonald & Mills v. Eggleston,
Barker & Co., 26 Vt. 156, is also to the
same effect. And see Hunter v. Parker, 7
M. & W. 331, 332, 344 ; Price v. Alexander,

2 Greene (la.), 427; Cady v. Shepherd and
McDonald & Mills v. Eggleston, Barker
& Co., however, must be taken to decide
the law for Massachusetts and Vermont

1 A power not under seal may he sufficient to authorize the sale of land, but not
to make a conveyance. Watson v. Sherman, 84 111. 263.

122

CH- VI-J OF ATTORNEYS.

Ill

* certain formalities, and makes them requisite for the * 111
execution of an instrument, a power to make that instru-
ment, must, in general, be itself executed with similar formali-
ties, (c) But as oral or written powers are equally parol, one
by oral authority may sign the name of his principal with-
out a seal thereto ; and so he may be authorized orally to bind
his principal by written contracts, where the Statute of Frauds
requires a writing signed by the parties sought to be charged,
as the foundation of an action, (cT)

The effect of a written authority in limiting the power of an
attorney precisely within what is written, may be illustrated by
the execution of a deed by one person for another. If a grantor
requests a person in his presence to sign for him his (the gran-
tor's) name to a deed, and the person thus requested writes the
name of the grantor without writing his own, or adding any
words to indicate that the grantor acted by attorney, this would
seem to be nevertheless the signature of the grantor, and the
deed would be valid. But if the grantor has given to A a
power of attorney in the ordinary form, authorizing him to exe-
cute a deed for him as his attorney, and this person writes
the * name of the grantor in his absence, without saying * 112

to be, that a partner may bind his co- & W. 215, citing Hudson v. Eevett, 5 Bing.

partner by a contract under seal, made 368 ; Blood v. Goodrich, 12 Wend. 525,

in the name and for the use of the firm, 9 Wend. 68 ; Bragg v. Fessenden, 11 111.

in the course of the partnership business, 544. And besides, on the doctrine of

provided the copartner assents to the estoppel, a principal, by admitting that to

contract previously to its execution, or be his deed which was executed by his

afterwards ratifies and adopts it ; and agent, might be held to have disabled

this assent or adoption may be by parol, himself to say that the agent was not

Whether the doctrine of these cases is duly authorized. As -yet, however, the

to be extended to other than partnership law must certainly be taken to be that

cases, is open to doubt; the probability is even a parol ratification does not make

that it will not. It is worthy of notice, in an instrument under seal, executed by an

the absence of clear and consistent ad- agent who had not an authority under

judication, that parol ratification, though seal, the deed of the principal. Where,

frequently confounded in the cases with however, a partner makes a mortgage of

an original parol authority, stands on quite personal property in the name of the firm

a different footing and may be defended and seals it, the seal being unnecessary,

by reasons which do not apply to the the mortgage binds the firm. Milton v.

other. It is delivery that completes the Mosher, 7 Met. 244 ; see also ante, p.

deed, and a subsequent parol assent, *62, note (m).

or contemporaneous parol assent, may (c) Gage v. Gage, 10 Foster (N. H.),

amount to delivery, though a previous 420 ; Clark v. Graham, 6 Wheat. 577.

assent, by the nature of things, as well (d) Shaw v. Nudd, 8 Pick. 9; Coles v.

as by common law, never can. The deed Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234 ; Clinen v. Cooke,

must exist before it can be delivered ; and 1 Sch. & L. 22 ; McComb v. Wright, 4

it may be delivered at anv time after it Johns. Ch. 659 ; Graham v. Musson, 5

once does exist in a complete form! See Bing. N. C. 607. See Baum v. Dubois,

Byers v. McClanahan, 6 G. & J. 250 ; 43 Penn. St. 260.
Parke, B., Hibblewhite v. McMorine, 6 M.

123

*112

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

" by A, his attorney," or writing his own name ; this would not
seem to be a sufficient execution of the deed. Because A had
no other power to act for the grantor than that which the letter
of attorney gave him ; and that did not give him any other power
than to act as the grantor's attorney ; that is, to sign the deed
himself, declaring that the grantor signed it by him. In the first
case, evidence is admissible to show the authority under which
the signature was made ; and when this exhibits the grantor as
present, and as authorizing the signature made in that way, then
it becomes the signature of the grantor made by another hand
than his own.1 But in executing a deed by attorney, the power
being delegated to the attorney is with him, and the deed takes
effect from his act ; and therefore the instrument which gives the
power is to be strictly examined and construed, (a) It is how-

(e) This point, upon which there
seems to be no express decision, arose
in the case of Wood v. Goodridge, 6
Cush. 117. This was the case of a
mortgage deed and note made under a
power of attorney under seal, by sim-
ply signing the name of the principal
opposite to a seal, in the case of the
deed, and in the case of the note, by
simply writing the principal's name at
the foot. It was not necessary to de-
cide the point, the court being of opin-
ion that the power though very general
in its terms, did not confer authority to
mortgage, nor to borrow money and
bind the principal by a promissory
note. But the question of the manner
of execution was much considered, and
the court, per Fletcher, J., signified an
inclination to hold, that where an at-
torney signs the name of his principal
to an instrument which contains noth-
ing to indicate that it is executed by
attorney, and without adding his own
signature as such, it is not a valid exe-
cution. — A deed was signed in the
presence and by the direction of P. G.
(and in the presence of an attesting
witness), thus: "P. G. by M. G. G."
It was objected that M. G. G., signing in
that manner for the principal, should
have had a power under seal; but the
deed was held valid. Gardner v. Gar-
ner, 5 Cush. 483. In delivering the
judgment in this case, Shaw, C. J.,
said : " The name being written by
another hand, in the presence of the
grantor, and at her request, is her act.

The disposing capacity, the act of
mind, which are the essential and effi-
cient ingredients of the deed, are hers ;
and she merely uses the hand of another,
through incapacity or weakness, instead
of her own, to do the physical act of
making a written sign. Whereas, in
executing a deed by attorney, the dispos-
ing power, though delegated, is with the
attorney, and the deed takes effect from
his act ; and therefore the power is to
be strictly examined and construed." —
Perhaps it will still be regarded as an
open question whether the simple signing
of the principal's name, without evidence
on the face of the instrument that the
execution is by an agent, may not be
sufficient. From a passage in Dixon on
Title Deeds, vol. ii. p. 533, it may be in-
ferred that the author's view is similar
to that now taken by the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts. On the other hand
the books contain numerous intimations
that it has not generally been supposed,
heretofore, that any other form is neces-
sary to the valid execution of a deed
by attorney than is requisite when the
principal makes a deed in his proper
person. See 1 Prest. Abstr. 2d ed.
293, 294; Smith, Mer. Law, B. I. ch.
5, § 4 ; Wilks v. Back, 2 East, 142,
145; Elliot v. Davis, 2 B. & P. 338;
Bac. Abr. Leases, J. § 10 ; also, Han-
son v. Eowe, 6 Foster (N. H.), 327. It
seems the better opinion that, even since
the Statute of Frauds, a signing is not es-
sential to a deed. Aveline o. Whisson,
4 Man. & G. 801; Cherry v. Homing,

1 See Mutual Ben. Ins. Co. o. Brown, 3 Stewart, 193, and reporter's note.

124

CH. VI.]

OP ATTORNEYS.

113

ever held, that a deed which is inoperative at law from a defective
execution by an attorney, is nevertheless valid in equity if the
attorney had authority to make the deed, (ee) And also that if
the seal of a corporation be affixed to its deed, it will be held
valid without signature ; and a presumption of authority to affix
the seal will arise from the seal itself. (<?/)

* An attorney of record, more commonly called an attor- * 113
ney at law, is one who has been duly admitted by compe-
tent authority to practise in the courts. An attorney at law, by
his admission as such, acquires rights of which he cannot be
deprived at the mere discretion of a court. (/) Such an attorney
need not prove his authority to appear for any party in court,
and act for him there, unless his authority be denied, and some
evidence be offered tending to show that he has no such
authority. (#) But * a person who is not an attorney at * 114

4 Exch. 631 ; Shep. Touch, by Preston,
56, n. If this be so, it may be considered
going very far to hold that the addition
of the name of the principal, by the
hand of an authorized attorney, invali-
dates an instrument which would have
been perfectly good without any signa-
ture at all. In some States the Statutes
of Conveyance modify the common law in
this particular, and require signing as
well as the affixing of a seal. With re-
spect to instruments not under seal, the
opinion seems equally to have prevailed
that an authority to sign for a principal
is well executed by the mere subscription
of the principal's name. Chitty on Bills,
9th ed., 33; Byles on Bills, 6th ed., 26. —
An auctioneer or auctioneer's clerk per-
forms his implied authority by simply
writing the purchaser's name in the mem-
orandum of sale. Bird v. Boulter, 4 B.
& Ad. 443. This indeed is of no great
weight in itself, since that case might be
viewed as falling within the class ex-
pressly distinguished by the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, namely, where
the signature is made in the presence of
the principal, and by his immediate di-
rection : yet there is a case of White v. ■
Proctor, 4 Taunt. 209, where the ob-
jection was expressly taken that the
name of the auctioneer ought to appear
as well as that of the purchaser. There
Best, Serjeant, referring to Emerson v.
Helis, 2 Taunt. 38, said that in that
case the auctioneer wrote his own name
in the heading of the paper, and that the
decision was given on that ground. But
Mansfield, C. J., replied : " In that case

there was no argument upon the circum-
stance that the auctioneer had signed,
nor was the case at all decided upon that
ground : his saying ' gold by John Wright,'
did not make him agent for the buyer ;
the only question was whether his sign-
ing thf purchaser's name was done by him
as agent for the purchaser." The power
of one partner to bind the firm by a
note or bill has been referred to prin-
ciples of agency ; and it is well estab-
lished that the signature of the firm
name without more is a complete exe-
cution. See Norton v. Seymour, 3 C.
B. 792 ; Kirk v. Blurton, 9 M. & W.
284. — Watkins v. Vince, 2 Stark. 368,
though meagrely reported, seems to be
a case where Lord Ellenborough enter-
tained no doubt that the signing of
the principal's name, by an agent hav-
ing authority to contract in his behalf,
was a sufficient signature. And see
Helmsley v. Loader, 2 Camp. 450, which
is somewhat more explicit.

(ee) Love v. Sierra Nevada, &c. Co.
32 Cal. 639.

(rf) Sheehan v. Davis, 17 O. St. 571.

(/) Fletcher v. Daingerfield, 20 Cal.
427 ; Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 203 ; Ex
parte. Yale, 24 Cal. 241.

(g) Osborn v. IT. S. Bank, 9 Wheat.
738, 830 ; where this rule of evidence
was applied in the case of an attorney
assuming to act in behalf of a corpora-
tion. See also Jackson o. Stewart, 6
Johns. 34; Denton v. Noyes, id. 296;
Hardin v. Hoyoponubby's Lessee, 27 Miss.
567; Henck r. Todhunter, 7 Har. & J.
275; Huston, J., Lynch v. Commonwealth,

125

* 114 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

law, and who offers to appear for another in court, by special
authority, must prove such authority if requested. (K)

The power of the court to disbar an attorney is not unfre-
quently exercised. And it is said that the court is bound to
prefer charges against an attorney, whenever satisfied that
the ends of justice require this. (JiK) But an attorney should
not be disbarred, unless a case of malpractice is proved with
certainty, (hi) And where a statute declares the causes for
which an attorney may be disbarred, it is said that he may not
be for a cause not declared in the statute. (hj~)

An attorney who places his client's money in the hands of his
own banker, on his own private account, though he does this
bond fide, and has money of his own in the hands of the same
banker, is liable for the loss thereof by the bankruptcy of the
banker, (i) But it seems that he is not liable if he deposits the
money as the property of the owner, and opens a special account
specifying whose it is. (,/) His implied duty to use reasonable
skill, care, &c, is the same as that of other persons to whose care
and skill any thing is intrusted ; which will be spoken of here-
after, (/c) He is not responsible for mistake in a doubtful point
of law, (?) or of practice, (m) nor for the fault of counsel retained
by him. (w) But the estate of an attorney was held liable after

18 S. &R. .369; Woodhwy, J., Eastman v. (1c) Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060;
Coos Bank, 1 N. H. 23; Manchester Baikie v, Chandless, 3 Camp. 17, 19;
Bank «. Fellows, 8 Foster (N. H.), 302; Shileock v. Passman, 7 C. & P. 289;
Williams v. Butler, 35 111. 544. — The Godefroy v. Dalton, 6 Bing. 460 ; Meggs
authority from the client need not in gen- v. Binns, 2 Bing. N. C. 025; Lynch v.
eral be in writing; yet an oral authority Commonwealth, 16 S. & R. 368; Dear-
to appear in a cause is not sufficient to born v. Dearborn, 15 Mass. 316; Var-
enable the attorney to release the inter- num v. Martin, 15 Pick. 440 ; Wilson v.
est of a witness. Murray v. House, 11 Coffin, 2 Cush. 316; Cooper v. Stephen-
Johns. 464. As to the evidence required son, 12 E. L. & E. 403; Parker v. Rolls,
to support a claim for services rendered 28 id. 424. See ante, p. *84, note (.r). See
by an attorney to his client, see Burghart for a full discussion of duties of counsel,
v. Gardner, 3 Barb. 04; Wilson u. Wil- Swinfen o. Lord Chelmsford, 5 H. & N.
son, 1 Jac. & W. 457. — Solicitor is the 890.

legal designation of one who fills the (/) Kemp v. Burt, 4 B. & Ad. 424;

place in a court of equity corresponding s. o'. 1 iSTev. & M. 262 ; Elkington v. Hol-

to that of an attorney in a court of law. land, 9 M. & W. 659; Pitt u. Yalden, 4

Maughan, c. 1, § 1. Burr. 2060.

(A) Marshall, C. J., Osborn v. IT. S. (m) Laidler v. Elliott, 3 B. & C. 738.

Bank, 9 Wheat. 829. [„) Lowry r. Guilford, 5 C. & P. 234.

(hh) In re Percy, 36 N. Y. 651. —Yet an attorney cannot by consulting

(hi) People v. Harvey, 41 111. 277. his counsel, shift from himself the re-

(kj) Ex parte Smith, 28 Ind. 47 ; Red- sponsibility of a matter presumed by the

man v. State, ib. 205. law to lie within his own knowledge.

(0 Robinson v. Ward, 2 C. & P. 59. Tindal, C. J., Godefroy ». Dalton, 4 Mo.

(j) Abbott, C. J., Robinson v. Ward, 2 & P. 149; s. c. 6 Bing. 460.
C. & P. 60.

126

CH. VI.]

OP ATTORNEYS.

115

his death, for erroneous advice given to a client in ignorance
of a recent change of the law. (nn~) He is liable for disclos-
ing privileged communications, (o) If discharged by one
party, * he may act for an opposite party, provided he *115
makes no improper use of knowledge obtained by him
while acting for the first party. (/>) But it seems that he may
not act for an opposite party if discharged by his first client for
misconduct. (<?) If, being employed about a purchase of land,
he buys an adverse or outstanding title, he is held to buy it for
his client, if his client so elects, (qq)

The law implies a contract on the part of the client, to pay
his attorney the legal fees, or statute rate of compensation, (r)
And if the client asserts that the services were to be rendered
for a less compensation, the burden rests on him to prove this

(nn) A. B.'s estate, 1 Tuck. 247.

(o) And his liability is not removed
by the fact that he was previously re-
tained for the party to whom the disclos-
ures were made, and that his employer
knew of that former retainer. Taylor v.
Blacklow, 3 Bing. N. C. 235. In Thomas
v. Rawlings, 27 Beav. 140, a solicitor de-
clined answering on the ground that
he had obtained his information while
acting as the solicitor of his co-defend-
ant. — Held, that he had not brought
himself within the rule as to profes-
sional privilege. His reply that he had
obtained his information " either as a
creditor or as the solicitor" of his client
was taken most strangely against the
solicitor ; and he was held bound to
give the discovery. In Hall v. Renfro,
3 Met. (Ky.) 51," it is held that an at-
torney is a competent witness for or
against his client in all cases except con-
cerning any communication made to him
by his client in that relation, or his ad-
vice thereon ; and in this with the client's
consent. Such communications to be
privileged must have been addressed to
the attorney in his professional character
with a view to legal advice which, as an
attorney, it was his duty to give. Borum
v. Fouts et al. 15 Ind. 50. See also
Shaugnessy v. Fogg, 15 La. An. 330.
But in King v. Barrett, 11 0. St. 261, it
was held that if a party to a suit offers
himself as a witness and gives evidence
generally in a case, he thereby loses the
privilege, and under the code of civil pro-
cedure consents to the examination of his
attorney touching such admissions as are
pertinent to the issue. In De Wolf v.
Strader, 26 111. 225, it is said that a re-

tainer or fee paid is necessary to consti-
tute the relation of attorney and client,
and that an attorney who is requested to
prepare a deed or mortgage, no legal ad-
vice being required, is not privileged.

(p) Bricheno v. Thorp, 1 Jac. 300. —
It is not clear, however, if it be distinctly
shown that confidential disclosures have
been made to the attorney or solicitor,
which if communicated to the other
party must be directly prejudicial to the
former client, that a court of equity
would not forbid the acceptance of the
second retainer, although the attorney
was dismissed for no misconduct. Lord
Eldon, Bricheno v. Thorp, 1 Jac. 303.
304; Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 19 Ves.
261, 275. In the latter case Lord Eldon
said : " My opinion is that he [the attor-
ney] ought not, if he knows anything
that may be prejudicial to the former
client, to accept the new brief, though
that client refuse to retain him." — In
Johnson v. Marriott, 4 Tyr. 78, where
the court refused to restrain an attorney,
who (without his misconduct) had been
dismissed from the employment of the
plaintiffs, from acting for the defendant,
the judges rested their decision on the
ground that there was no affidavit by the
plaintiffs that the attorney, while in
their employment, had obtained a confi-
dential knowledge of particular facts,
which it would be prejudicial to their
case to communicate to the defendant.

(q) Lord Eldon, Cholmondeley v.
Clinton, 19 Ves. 261 ; Gurnet/, B., John-
son v. Marriott, 4 Tyr. 78.

(qq) Smith v. Brotherline, 62 Penn. St.
461.

*(r) Brady v. Mayor, &c. 1 Sandf. 569.

127

* 116 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

bargain, (s) If a bargain be proved, the attorney cannot recover
more by showing that his services were worth more. (£) And
even if he shows that the case was deemed, with good reason,
a desperate one, this will not sustain his cjaim for an excessive
compensation ; as half the sum recovered, (u) If, during the suit,
an attorney make a contract with his client, which is void for
champerty, he may still recover a proper compensation for ser-
vices rendered before the illegal bargain, (v)

An attorney cannot maintain an action for compensation for

services, merely by proof that the services were rendered ; but

must go farther and show that they were requested, or, in- other

words, that he was retained as attorney or counsel, (w) l And

his own pocket or office docket book, in which he has

* 116 entered * the name of the suit and the parties in question,

is not of itself evidence that the services were either
requested or rendered, (x)

An attorney cannot recover his bill against his client, if his
client has received no benefit whatever from his services by rea-
son of his want of care and skill, (y) But if the client has
received any benefit, he must in England pay the bill, and may
then have an action for damages, (z) It has been there held,
however, that a jury may discriminate between the several items
in an account, and reject those for work entirely useless ; (a)
and it may be supposed, that in America the client might reduce
the attorney's claim, by showing the little value of the benefit
received, by the fault of the attorney, as in actions for other
services.

An attorney has a lien on the judgment he recovers, and on
the papers of the case, for his costs and fees ; (7>) and it will pre-

(«) Id- 111 ; Bracey v. Carter, 12 A. & E. S7S;

(t) Coopwood v. Wallace, 12 Ala. 790. Hill v. Featherstonhaugh, 7 Bing. 569 ;

(u) Christy v. Douglas, Wright. 485. Hopping „. Quinn, 12 Wend. 517. See

(w) Thurston v. Percival, 1 Pick. 415; Runyan v. Nichols, 11 Johns. 547.
Rust v. Larue, 4 Litt. 417 ; Caldwell v. (s) Templar „. McLachlan, 2 B. & P.

Shepherd, 6 Monr. 392 ; Smith v. Thomp- 136.
son, 7 B. Mon. 305. (o) Shaw v. Arden, 9 Bing. 289.

(w) Burghart v. Gardner, 3 Barb. 64. (6) Mooney i: Lloyd, 5 S. & R. 412 ;

M Briggs v. Georgia, 15 Vt. 61. Dubois' Appeal, 38 Penn. St. 231 ; Gray

(;/) Huntley v. Bulwer, 6 Bing. N. C. «. Brackenridge, 2 Penn. 75,2 Greenl. Ev.

1 In fixing the value of an attorney's services, his professional skill and standing,
his experience, the nature of the controversy, both in regard to the amount involved
and the nature of the questions raised, as well as the result, must all be taken into
consideration. Eggleston u. Boardman, 37 Mich. 14.

128

CH- V*-] OF ATTORNEYS. * l]Q

vail against a set-off acquired by the judgment-debtor after the ren-
dition of the judgment ; (55) but it seems to be settled that a set-
off in ordinary course prevails over the lien ; (5c) and he has no
lien on a claim for unliquidated damages in tort, until after a
judgment, (bd) In most of our States this rule applies to bar-
risters, counsellors, attorneys, and proctors in admiralty (5e)
equally. But it has been said that an attorney's lien covers
only his costs and expenses, and his fees as attorney, but not
his fees as counsellor, nor incidental expenses not taxable, (c) 1
We think this is not law. The lien of an attorney, its extent
and its limitations, are considered more fully in our chapter on
Liens.

An attorney is, in general, personally liable on an agreement
made by him in his own name, although only professionally con-
cerned in the matter, (d)

§ 144, n. 4 ; McGregor v. Comstock, 28 for his fees and disbursements. Dunklee

N. Y. 237 ; Newbert v. Cunningham, 50 v. Locke, 13 Mass. 525 ; Potter v. Mayo,

Me. 281 ; Myers v. McHugh, 16 la. 335 ; 3 Greenl. 34 ; Gammon i>. Chandler, 30

Waters v. Grace, 23 Ark. 118 ; Hursh v. Me. 152 ; Ocean Ins. Co. v. Rider, 22

Sheets, 21 la. 501. Pick. 210 ; Hobson v. Watson, 34 Me. 20.

(66) Warfield ?>. Campbell, 38 Ala. 527. And even without statute provisions.

(6c) DaFiganiereu. Young, 2 Rob. 670. Sexton v. Pike, 8 Eng. (Ark.) 193. A

(6c?) Wood v. Anders, 6 Bush, 641. counsel, who, with his client's consent,

(be) The Soblomsten, L. R. 1 Adm. & withdraws from a case after having

Eccl. 293. tendered beneficial services, does not

(c) Heartt v. Chipman, 2 Aik. 162. thereby lose his right to compensation

The subject of the attorney's lien lias for the services rendered, unless at the

been much discussed in this country, time of his withdrawal he waives or

Wilson v. Burr, 25 Wend. 386 ; Stevens abandons his claim to compensation.

v. Adams, 23 id. 57; Newman v. Wash- Coopwood o. Wallace, 12 Ala. 790;

ington, Mart. & Y. 79 ; Wells v. Hatch, Stephens v. Farrar, 4 Bush, 13.

43 N. H. 246. And see Van Atta v. Mc- (d) Hall v Ashurst, 1 Cr. & M. 714;

Kinney, 1 Harr. 235. An attorney has, Iveson v. Conington, 1 B. & C. 160;

in some States, a lien upon his client's Burrell v. Jones, 3 B. & Aid. 47 ; Scrace

papers left with him, for any general bal- c. Whittington, 2 B. & C. 11; Watson

anceduehim. Dennett v. Cutts, 11 N. H. v. Murrell, 1 C. & P. 307. — In New

163; Walker it. Sargeant, 14 Vt. 247; Hampshire, it is held that where a plain-

aliler in Pennsylvania. Walton v. Dick- tiff resides within that State, and employs

erson, 7 Barr, 376. So by statute in many an attorney in his behalf to commence

States he has a lien upon a judgment an action for him, such attorney is

actually recovered in favor of his client, authorized by the employment to place

1 The attorney's lien for costs and charges attaches to deeds or papers or upon
moneys received by him on his client's behalf in the course of his employment, In
re Paschal, 10 Wall. 483 ; McPherson v. Cox, 96 U. S. 404 ; Bowling Green Bank v.
Todd, 52 N. Y. 489, on the ground that they are the fruits of his own labor or
expense. Ex parte Yalden, 4 Ch. D. 129. See Pilcher v. Arden, 7 Ch. D. 318; Gen.
Trust Co. v. Chapman, 1 C. P. D. 771. He may also have a lien on his client's
real estate. Perkins v. Perkins, 9 Heiskell, 95; Brown v. Bigley, 3 Tenn. (Ch.)
618. Contra, Garner v. Garner, 1 Lea, 29. See Twiggs v. Chambers, 56 Ga. 279.
But an attorney has no such lien before judgment as will prevent his client from
making a settlement. Simmons u. Almy, 103 Mass. 33; Wright v. Wright, 70
N. Y. 96.

vol. x. 9 129

* 117 THE LAW OF CONTBACTS. [BOOK I.

If his client's papers are stolen from him without his fault, he
is not liable for the loss, (dd)

* 117 * How far an attorney at law may bind his clients by his

arrangements in a case, without special instructions or au-
thority, may not be quite certain. We take the practice to be,
however, that his entries on the docket, his agreements about con-
tinuances, about evidence, or the conduct of the trial, or, perhaps,
about costs and the like, would, in general, bind the client, (de) 1

According to most American authorities, an attorney employed
in the usual way to conduct a suit, has, in general, no authority
to enter into a compromise without the sanction of his client, ex-
press or implied ; 3 but it is said that a compromise so made will
not be set aside, unless for reasons arising from the character or
circumstances of the compromise, (c?/") An attorney cannot sell
or assign his client's claim. (dg~) The liability of counsel has
recently been adjudicated in an important case before the English
Court of Exchequer, where it was held that no action lies against
a counsel who, being employed to conduct a cause, enters into a
compromise of the matter at issue, even though contrary to his
client's instructions, provided it is done bond fide, (e) He cannot

the name of the plaintiff upon the writ (dd) Hill v. Barner, 18 N. H. 607.

as indorser, and to bind him as such ; (de) Sampson v. Ohleyer, 22 Cal. 200.

and in such case, if the indorsement be For a case strongly asserting the right of

thus : "A, plaintiff, by his attorney, B," an attorney to manage a case, see Board

the plaintiff is regarded as the indorser, of Commissioners v. Younger, 29 Cal.

and the attorney is not personally bound ; 147.

but if the plaintiff reside out of the State, (df) Potter v. Parsons, 14 la. 286;

the attorney having no authority to bind Christie v. Sawyer, 44 N. H. 298.

the plaintiff, is himself personally bound (<(y) Rowland o. State, 58 Penn. St.

by such indorsement, and the writ accord- 196.

ingly is properly and sufficiently in- (e) Swinfen v. Lord Chelmsford, 5

dorsed. Pettingill «. McGregor, 12 N. H. H. & N. 590. See Fray ■,. Voules, 1 Ell.

179; Woods v. Blodgett, 15 N. H. 509. & E. 839.

1 An attorney has no implied authority after judgment in favor of his client to
enter into an agreement on his behalf to postpone execution. Lovegrove v. White,
L. R. 0 C. P. 440. But an attorney to prosecute a suit to evict a tenant has author-
ity by his retainer to bind his client, the landlord, by an agreement with the tenant's
attorney that, if the larter will submit to a default, execution shall not issue for a
week afterwards, or if issued, not to be served within that time. Wieland i\ White,
109 Mass. 3'.I2. — An attorney has authority, by virtue of his employment as such, to
release, before judgment, an attachment of real estate. Moulton c. Bowker, 115
Mass. 36. But an attorney for a party, in the absence of a special agreement, is not
liable for a stenographer's services in an action, Bonynge ><. Field, 81 N. Y. 159.

" Whipple ?-. Whitman, 13 R. I. 512; Mandeville v. Reynolds, G8 N. Y. 528;
Ambrose v. McDonald, 53 Cal. 28 ; Fritchey v. Bosley, 56 Md. 94; Levy v. Brown, 56
Miss. 83; Walrlen v. Bolton, 55 Mo. 405; Pickett v. Memphis Bank, 32 Ark. 346;
Roller v. Wooldridge, 46 Tex. 485. That in England and Massachusetts an attorney
may in good faith compromise a claim, see Butler v. Knight, L. R. 2 Ex. 109; Wie-
land v. White, 109 Mass. 392.

130

CH- V*-] OP ATTOENETa.

118

release an interested witness without special authority from his
client, (ee)

If an attorney cannot by virtue of his general authority bind
his clients by bargains, as, for compromise or settlement of a case,
still less can he enter into agreements quite independent of any
action. (f) He cannot indorse for his client a note left with him
for collection. (/) Nor can he receive anything but money for a
debt left with him for collection. (/#)

It is said, in many cases, that an attorney has the right to sub-
mit his client's case to arbitration. (J) i But in other cases this
power, for what seem to us good reasons, is confined to suits
actually commenced. (Ji)

The right of a party to change his attorney in an action has of
late passed under adjudication in some cases. The lien of the at-
torney on the papers for past services must of course be preserved.
But otherwise, the right of the client to change his attorney is
sometimes asserted very strongly. (hh~) The weight of authority
would seem, however, in favor of the rule that the consent
of the court must be obtained, and will not be given but for
reason, (hi)

There are many English statutes relating to the powers, duties,
and responsibilities of attorneys, which have no force in
* this country. Most of our courts have their own rules of * 118
practice bearing somewhat on this subject ; (z) but these

(ee) Succession of Weigel, 18 La. Ann. 31. And see Scarborough v. Reynolds,

49. 12 Ala. 252, and Wade <--. Powell, 31

(/) This subject is fully considered Ga. 1.
in a recent English case. Swinfen v. (Iik) Hazlett v. Gill, 5 Rob. 611.

Swinfen, 1 C. B. (n. s.) 364. See also (hi) Wolf v. Trochelman, 5 Rob. 611;

Smith's Heirs v. Dixon, 3 Met. (Ky.) 438, Sloo v. Law, 4 Blatch. C. C. 268 ; Walton

for the discussion of the extent of an u. Sugg, Fhill. L. 98.
attorney's power to bind his client under (i) The nature and scope of the au-

his general authority, and independent of thority of attorneys at law in this

any special authority conferred by the country are considered in Holker v.

client. Parker, 7 Cranch, 436; Erwin v. Blake,

(ff) Child v. Eureka Works, 44 N. H. 8 Pet. 18; Union Bank of Georgetown

354. v. Geary, 5 id. 99 ; United States v. Curry,

(fff) Wright v. Daily, 26 Tex. 730. 6 How. 100 ; United States v. Yates, id.

(g) Filmer v. Delber, 3 Taunt. 486; 605; Smith v. Lamberts, 7 Gratt. 138;

Fariel v. Eastern Co. R. Co. 2 Exch. Lewis v. Gamage, 1 Pick. 347 ; Jenney

344 ; Wilson v. Young, 9 Barr, 101 ; Hoi- ;>. Delesdernier, 20 Me. 183 ; Jewitt v.

ker v. Parker, 7 Cranch, 436 ; Talbot v. Wadleigh, 32 id. 110 ; Slackhouse v.

M'Gee, 4 Monr. 375. O'Hara, 14 Penn. 88 ; Walker v. Scott, 8

(h) Jenkins v. Gillespie, 10 Sin. & M. Eng. (Ark.) 644; Smith „. Dixon, 3 Met.

i Morris v. Grier, 76 N. C. 410 ; Lee v. Grimes, 4 Col. 185.

131

* 118 THE LAW OP CONTBACTS. [BOOK I.

have no binding force in other courts. The rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States are, however, binding on the Circuit
and District Courts of the United States, so far as they are
applicable to them.

(Ky.) 438; West v. Raymond, 21 Ind. 643; Flanders v. Sherman, 18 Wis. 575;
305 ; Ricketson v. Compton, 23 Cal. 636 ; Hathaway v. Brady, 26 Cal. 581 ; Ryan v.
East River Bank v. Kennedy, 9 Bosw. Martin, 18 Wis. 672.

132

CH. Vn.] TBUSTEES. * 119

♦CHAPTER Vn. *119

TRUSTEES.

Sect. I. — The Origin of Trusts.

It can hardly be denied that Trusts in the English law had a
fraudulent origin. It was sought, by the intervention of a trus-
tee, to evade the feudal law of tenures, and the prohibitions of
the statutes of Mortmain, and to place property where a creditor
cduld not reach it. The practice became common ; and as such
trustee was not accountable at common law, the Chancellor, in
the reign of Richard II., applied the writ of subpoena to call him
before the Court of Chancery, where he might be compelled to
do what equity and justice required. " A trust," said Sir Robert
Atkins, (a) " had for its parents fraud and fear, and for its nurse
a court of conscience." The obvious utility of trusts has made
them very common : but almost the whole jurisdiction over trus-
tees has always remained in the Courts of Equity. (J) So far
as they come under the supervision and control of the common
law, trustees are treated in most respects as agents, and most of
the principles and rules of law in relation to them have been
anticipated and stated under that head.

(a) Attorney-General v. Sands, Har- only a confidence and trust, for which
dres, 491, arguendo, "A trust is altogether he hath no remedy by the common law,
the same that a use was before 27 Hen. but his remedy was only by subpoena in
VIII., and they have the same parents, chancery. If the feoffees would not
fraud and fear; and the same nurse, a perform the order of the chancery,
court of conscience. By statute law, a then their persons for the breach of
use, trust, or confidence, are all one and the confidence were to be imprisoned
the same thing. What a use is, vide PI. till they did perform it." — Foorde v.
Com. 352, and 1 Rep. in Chudleigh's Hoskins, 2 Bulst. 337. Per Coke. C. J. :
case ; and they are collateral to the land ; " If cestui que use desires the feoffees to
a cestui que trust has neither jus ad rem nor make the estate over, and they so to do
,-„ re » refuse, for this refusal an action upon

(b) Co. Lit. 272 b; Chudleigh's case, the case lieth not, because for this he
1 Rep. 121. " So that, he who hath a use hath his proper remedy by a subpoena in
hath not jus, neque in re, neque ad rem, but the chancery."

133

* 120 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

•120 * SECTION n.

CLASSIFICATION OF TRUSTS.

Trusts are simple when property is vested in one person upon
trust for another, without any particular directions or provisions ;
and then the nature and operation of the trust are determined
by legal construction. They are special, where the purposes of
the trust, and the manner in which they are to be accomplished
are especially pointed out and prescribed ; and then these express
provisions must be the rule and measure of the trustee's rights
and duties.

They may be merely ministerial, as where one receives money
only to pay the debt of the giver, or an estate is vested in him
merely that he may convey it to another. Or they may be dis-
cretionary, where much is left to the prudence and judgment of
the trustee. But in all cases, the trustee, by accepting the trust,
engages that he possesses, and that he will exert, that degree of
knowledge, intelligence, and care, reasonably requisite for the
proper discharge of the duties which he undertakes to perform.

A trust, with a power annexed, is distinguished from a mixture
of trust and power, (c) In the former case, as where lands are
vested in trust, with a power in the trustees to make leases of a
certain kind, or length, the trustee may or may not exercise this
power, and will not be compelled to do so, unless his neglect to
exercise it be fraudulent and wrongful. But in the latter case,
as where lands or funds are vested in trust for certain persons,
to be " distributed among them according to the best judgment
of the trustee," here the distribution is of the essence of the
trust, and must be made ; although in the manner of distribution,
the courts will not interfere unless to prevent fraud or other

wrong.
*121 * Trustees are also private or public. The former hold
property for the benefit of an individual (the cestui que
trust) or more than one, but who are distinctly pointed out, per-
sonally, or by other sufficient description. Public trustees are
those who hold for the benefit of the whole public, or for a cer-
(c) Gower v. Mainwaring, 2 Ves. Sen. 89; Cole v. Wade 16 Ves. Jr 43.

134

CH. VII.] TRUSTEES. » 122

tain large part of the public, as a town or a parish ; and they are
usually treated as official persons, with official rights and respon-
sibilities.

SECTION in.

PRIVATE TRUSTEES.

A private trustee is, as we have seen, one to whom property,
either real or personal, has been given to be held in trust for the
benefit of others; and the most common instances are trustees
of property for the benefit of children, or other* devisees or
legatees, or for married women, or for the payment of the debts
of an insolvent, or for the management and winding up of some
business and the like.

Where property is devised to executors in trust, their relation
to the estate as trustees is as distinct from their relation to it as
executors as if they were not executors, (ee)

The legal estate is in the trustee, and the equitable estate is in
the cestui que trust; but as the trustee holds the estate, although
only with the power and for the purpose of managing it, he is
bound personally by the contracts he makes as trustee, although
designating himself as such ; and nothing will discharge him but
an express provision, showing clearly that both parties agreed
to act upon the responsibility of the funds alone, or of some
other responsibility, exclusive of that of the trustee ; or some
other circumstance clearly indicating another party who is bound
by the contract, and upon whose credit alone it is made. The
mere use by the promisor of the name of Trustee, or of any other
name of office or employment, will not discharge him. Some one
must be bound by the contract, and if he does not bind
some other, he binds himself, (cT) * and the official name is * 122
then regarded only as describing and designating him. (d d)

Ice) Parsons v. Lyman, 5 Blatchford, cepted by him generally, though it was

170 drawn on account of the company.

Id) Thomas v. Bishop, Cas. Temp. Childs v. Monins, 2 Br. & B. 460. A

Hardw. 9, 2 Str. 955. In this case a promissory note, by which the makers,

cashier was held liable on a bill ac- as executors, jointly and severally promise

Idd) Fullam v. West Brookfield, 9 Allen, 1.

135

*122 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

A trustee is held not only to careful management of the trust
property, so that it shall not be wasted or diminished, but he is
bound to secure its reasonable productiveness and increase. If
one of joint trustees permit by his want of due care another trus-
tee to waste the fund, he will be responsible for the loss, (de)
If a trustee mingles the trust money with his own, as by deposit-
ing it in a bank in his own name, he will be liable for any depre-
ciation. (iT/1) It has been said that a trustee, by reason of the
confidence reposed in him, is bound to take more care of the
trust property than of his own, for he may speculate with his
own, but must not with what he holds in trust. (%) He is
bound not to make use of the trust property for his own bene-
fit. (dK) If »it lie idle in his hands, without cause, he will be
charged interest, (e) In some instances he is charged compound
interest ; but there is some discrepancy in the cases in which
the question of compounding interest occurs. On the whole, we
think the rule may be stated thus : Interest will be compounded,
or computed with annual rests, where the trustee is guilty of
gross delinquency, or mingles the trust property with his own
for his own benefit, or employs it in trade, or otherwise so uses
the trust funds as to justify the belief that he has actually earned
interest upon the interest ; and the reason for charging com-
pound interest is much stronger, when the trustee refuses to
exhibit the accounts, which would show, precisely, what loss or
advantage he has derived from the trust funds. (/) But he

to pay on demand with interest, renders (df) Mason v. Whithome, 2 Cow. 242.

them personally liable. — Baton r. Bell, (iiij) King v. Talbot, 50 Barb. 453.

5 B. & Aid. 34. Commissioners of a (dk) Flagg v. Ely, 1 Edm. 206.

private inclosure act, are personally (e) Green v. Winter, 1 Johns. Ch. 26;

liable on drafts drawn on bankers, re- Manning ». Manning, 1 Johns. Ch. 527;

questing them to pay the sums therein Schieffelin a. Stewart, 1 Johns. Ch. 620.

mentioned on account of public drain- In Attorney-General v. Alford, 4 De G.,

age, and to place the same to their M. & G. 843, the rule upon this point is

account, as commissioners. — Rew v. laid down thus: The measure by which

Pettet, 1 A. & E. 196, 8 Nev. & M. the court ought to charge a trustee inter-

456. The makers of a note who sign est is, to ascertain what interest he has

it "as church-wardens and overseers," received, or ought to have received, or

are personally liable, although the loan that he is estopped from saying he did

was for the use of the parish. — Ex not receive.

parte Buckley, 14 M. & W. 469. It was (f) Jones v. Foxall, 15 Beav. 392;

held, in this case, that there was no sep- Schieffelin o. Stewart, 1 Johns. Ch. 620 ;

arate right of action against " R. M." a Evertson v. Tappen, 5 Johns. Ch. 497;

partner who signed a promissory note for Luken's Appeal, 7 W. & S. 48; Boynton

himself and his copartners thus: "For v. Dyer, 18 Pick. 1 ; Turney v. Williams,

J. C, R. M., J. P., and T. S.," " R. M." 7 Yerg. 172 ; Wright v. Wright, 2 McCord,

See Packard i\ Nye, 2 Met. 47 ; ante, p. * 55. Ch. 200; Bryant v. Craig, 12 Ala. 354;

(dp) Schenck o. Schenck, 1 C. E. Karr's Adm'r v. Knrr, 6 Dana, 3 ; Rowan

Green, 174. „. Kirkpatrick, 14 111. 1 ; Barney v. Saun-

186

CH. TIL]

TRUSTEES.

123

*will not be charged even with simple interest until a *123
reasonable time for investment has elapsed ; and this has
been held, in some cases, six months, a year, or even two
years. (#)

A trustee must not himself purchase the property which it is
his duty as trustee to sell ; nor sell the property which, as trustee,
he purchases. This rule applies, in its whole extent, to all
agents, and the reasons, limitations, and authorities for it, were
presented in treating of that subject, (gg)

A purchaser from a trustee with knowledge that a trust
attaches to the property, holds it subject to the trust. (j)K)

ders, 16 How. 535. See also Raphael v.
Boehm, 11 Ves. 92; s. c. 13 Ves. 407,
690 ; Ashburnham v. Thompson, 13 Ves.
402 ; Tebbs v. Carpenter, 1 Madd. 299 ;
Swindall v. Swindall, 3 Ired. Eq. 285.—
But mere neglect to invest the money, or
an improper investment, without gross
delinquency, Knott v. Cottee, 16 Beav.
77 ; Robinson i). Robinson, 1 De G., M.
& G. 147 ; Schieffelin v. Stewart, 1 Johns.
Ch. 620; McCall's case, 1 Ashm. 357;
English v. Harvey, 2 Rawle, 305 ; Har-
land's case, 5 Eawle, 323; Findlav v.
Smith, 7 S. & R. 264 ; Dietterich v. Heft,
5 Barr, 87, or merely mingling the trust
funds with his own, is not sufficient to
charge him with compound interest.
Clarkson v. De Peyster, 1 Hopk. Ch.
424 ; s c. nom. De Peyster v. Clarkson,
2 Wend. 77 ; Stafford, In re, 11 Barb.
353 ; Ker v. Snead, Circuit Court of Vir-
ginia (Oct. 1847) ; Scarbwgh, J., 11
Law Rep. 217. In the case of Fay u.
Howe, 1 Pick. 527, and Robbins v. Hay-
ward, cited in a note to this case, where
large sums of money had come into the
hands of a guardian of infants, there
being rents of real estate and income
from public stocks periodically received,
and no account having been settled for
many years, it was ordered that an ac-
count should be settled with a rest for
every year, and the balance thus struck
should be carried forward, to be again
on interest, whenever the sum should be
so large that a trustee acting faithfully
and discreetly would have put it into a pro-
ductive state. And five hundred dollars
was the sum which the court thought
should subject the guardian to this
charge. But for cases in which it ap-
pears to be doubted whether compound
interest should be charged to a trustee,
see McCall's case, 1 Ashm. 357; Eng-

lish v. Harvey, 2 Rawle, 305 ; Harland's
case, 5 Rawle, 323; Findlay o. Smith,
7 S. & R. 264; Ackerman v. Emott, 4
Barb. 626. And see Dietterich v. Heft,
5 Barr, 87 ; Kerr v. Laird, 27 Miss.
544. See Pennypacker's App. 41 Penn.
St. 494, where it is held that the prin-
ciple of rests does not apply to guard-
ians, executors, or administrators, who
admit or neglect to put trust-funds out
at interest.

(g) In Karr v. Karr, 6 Dana, 3, two
years were allowed for periodical rests,
at the end of which periods the interest
should be made principal. In Dunscomb
v. Dunscomb, 1 Johns. Ch. 508, six months
after receipt of the moneys was thought
a reasonable time, after which interest
should be charged. In Merrick's Estate,
1 Ashm. 304, six months was allowed. And
see Worrell's App., 23 Penn. St. 44. In
De Peyster v. Clarkson, 2 Wend. 77, six
months was allowed. In Fox v. Wil-
cocks, 1 Binn. 194, the administrator
was held chargeable with interest after
twelve months had elapsed from the
death of the intestate. In Boynton v.
Dyer, 18 Pick. 8, one year was consid-
ered the proper period. In Schieffelin
v. Stewart, 1 Johns. Ch. 620, the plain-
tiff was administrator, and was allowed
from the 8th September, 1803, when
administration was granted, to the 6th
July, 1805, when the last debt of any
magnitude was paid to the estate ; then
interest began, and the account was
computed afterwards with annual rests.

(gg) See also Morris v. Joseph, 1 W.
Va. 256 ; Renew v. Butler, 30 Ga. 954 ;
Sypher v. Mcllenry, 18 la. 232. But see
contra, Birdwell v. Cain, 1 Cold. 301.

(gh) Jones's Adm'r o. Shaddock, 41
Ala'. 262.

137

124 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

SECTION rv.

PUBLIC TRUSTEES.

There is an important difference between these trustees and
private trustees, in respect to their personal responsibility for
their contracts. Where one acts distinctly for the public, and

in an official or quasi official capacity, although he engages
* 124 that * certain things should be done, he is nevertheless

not liable on this engagement, unless there be something
in the contract, or some admissible evidence respecting it, which
shows that the -parties understood and intended the promisor to
make his promise personally, and to be bound himself, instead
of the State, or in addition to the State, for the due performance
of the promise. (K)

But trustees and other officers are sometimes held personally
upon their contracts, as for payment of wages, materials, supplied,
&c, where they have charge of public works, and have funds
which they may use for these purposes, and especially where the
nature of the transaction shows that the party dealing with them
may well have supposed that he was dealing with them on their
own account, or that they intended, although acting for the pub-
lic, to be responsible for the materials they bought or the labor

(A) Macbeath v. Haldimand, 1 T. R. part of the government. It would be
172. This was an action on promises detrimental to the king's service, for no
against a defendant (who was Governor private person would accept of any com-
of Quebec), for work, labor, &c. Duller, raand on such terms. The case of Mac-
J., said : " It is true that he (the de- bcath v. Haldimand seems to govern the
fendant) gave the orders to Sinclair, present. It was there determined that a
and that every thing which the plain- commander was not answerable for con-
tiff did was pursuant to directions from tracts entered into by him on behalf of
the latter, whom he was instructed to government. And whether the contract
obey ; but these orders did not flow be by parol or by deed, it makes no differ-
from the defendant in his own personal ence as to the construction to be put on
character, but as governor and agent it. That indeed was a stronger case than
for the public ; and so the plaintiff him- the present ; because there it was left
self considered it. And in any case open to evidence, from whence it was
where a man acts as agent for the pub- to be inferred that the contract was made
lie, and treats in that capacity, there is by the defendant as the agent of the gov-
no pretence to say that he is personally ernment, but here it appears in express
liable." Unwin v. Wolseley, 1 T. R. terms that the defendant entered into
674. Ashliurst, J., said : " It would be this contract on the behalf of govern-
extremely dangerous to hold that gov- ment." See also Hodgson v. Dexter,
ernors and commanders in chief should 1 Cranch, 345 ; Tucker v. Justices, 13
make themselves personally liable by Ired. L. 434 ; Stephenson v. Weeks, 2
contracts which they enter into on the Foster (N. H.), 257.

138

CH. VII.] TRUSTEES. * 125

they hired, (i) Such trustees * know the state of the means * 125
in their hands, and how far they may rely upon a public
provision of funds, and may contract accordingly, while those
who deal with them cannot know this at all, or certainly not so
well. (/)

The true principle which runs through all of these cases, and
applies alike to private and public trustees, is this. To whom did
the promisee give credit, and to whom did the promisor under-
stand him to give credit? If the promisee gave credit to the
promisor personally, and was justified in so understanding the
case, and the promisor as a rational person knew or should have
known that the promisee trusted to him personally, and he did
not guard the promisee from so trusting him, then he cannot
afterwards turn him over to those whom he represents, because
he must abide his responsibility. On the other hand, if the
promisor supposed the promisee to trust only to those for whose
benefit he acted, or rather to the funds and means possessed by
him as trustee, and if he had a right to suppose so, and the prom-
isee did not demand and receive the assurance of his personal
liability, then no such liability exists, and he is bound only to act
faithfully as a trustee in fflie discharge of his promise.

An agent who exceeds his authority and fails to bind his prin-
cipal, becomes liable himself. On this familiar principle public
trustees or officers, as town or parish officers, who enter into con-
tracts in their official capacity, and on behalf of the corporations
which they represent, if they so deviate from or exceed their

(t) Horsley v. Bell and others, Ambl. take care to be provided. That the work-

769. An act of parliament was passed men who engaged to do the work could

to make a certain brook navigable, not know the state of the fund, nor was it

The defendants, with many other per- their business to inquire ; they gave credit

sons, were named commissioners to put to the commissioners." Cullen v. Duke,

the act in execution. Certain tolls were of Queensberry, 1 Bro. Ch. 101, and notes,
to be paid by vessels which should navi- (j) Higgins v. Livingstone, 4 Dow,

gate the brook, and the commissioners 341, 355. Lord Eldon, in this case, said :

were empowered to borrow money on " As to the general liability of parliamen-

these tolls. The commissioners employed tary trustees, if I were to give an opinion, I

the plaintiff to do different parts of the would say that when persons act under a

works, and such of the commissioners parliamentary trust, and state themselves

as were present at the several meetings, as so acting, they are not to be held per-

made orders relative thereto. Every one sonally liable. But this also, I think,

of them was present at some of the meet- rests on strong principle, that as the

ings, but no one was present at all the trustees must know whether there are

meetings. The fund proving deficient, it funds to answer the purpose, they, when

was held that all the acting commission- they contract with others, who do not

era were personally liable to the plain- know, act as if representing that they

tiff. The Lord Chancellor and the judges had a fund applicable to the object, and

agreed in opinion. " The commissoners are then personally bound^ to provide

had power to borrow money, and ought to funds to pay the contractors.''

139

126

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

authority as not to bind these corporations, are themselves
*126 liable. (1c) But whether they are liable on the contract, * or

in case, must depend on the character and circumstances
of the transaction. (T)

(k) Sprott v. Powell, 3 Bing. 478;
Leigh v. Taylor, 7 B. & C. 491 ; Heude-
bourek v, Langton, 3 C. & P. 571 ; Kirby
v. Bannister, 5 B. & Ad. 1069 ; s. c. 3
Nev. & M. 119; Burton v. Griffiths, 11 M.
& W. 817; Bay v. Cook, 2 N. J. 343;
Husbands v. Smith's Adm'r, 14 B. Mon.
211. — Uthwatt v. Elkins, IS M. & W.
772. Church-wardens and overseers of a
parish having taken a lease of land in
their official capacity, which they were
not authorized, by the statute 59 Geo.

140

III., c. 12, to hold in the nature of a corpo-
ration, it was held to be a personal un-
dertaking of their own, on which they
were individually responsible for the
payment of rent. — "If an overseer of
the poor contract with tradesmen upon
account of the poor, and upon his own
credit, as soon as he receives so much of
the poor's money, it becomes his own
debt." Holt, C. J., Anon. 12 Mod. 659.
(/) See ante, p. * 68, note (w).

CH. VIII.] OP EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

s127

* CHAPTER VIII.

127

OP EXECDTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

They act as the personal representatives of the deceased, hav-
ing in their hands his means, for the purpose of discharging his
liabilities or executing his contracts, and of carrying into effect
his will, if he have left one ; and in general, they are liable only
so far as these means, or assets in their hands, are applicable to
such purpose. x But they may become personally liable ; and a
clause in the Statute of Frauds, hereafter to be spoken of, refers
to this subject. In England it is regarded as the peculiar province
of a court of equity to administer justice in cases of legacies, (a)

(a) Deeks v. Strutt, 6 T. R. 690, and
see Jones v. Tanner, 7 B. & C. 542. But
it seems Deeks v. Strutt is to be under-
stood as only deciding that an action for
a legacy cannot be maintained upon an
assent of the executor merely implied
from his possession of sufficient assets ;
leaving it open to say that an action may
lie upon an express promise by him in
consideration of assets, or upon an ex-
press admission by him that he has
money in his hands for the payment of
such legacy. Barber v. Fox, 2 Wms.
Saund. 137 c. n. (a), citing Atkins v. Hill,
Cowp. 284, and Gorton o. Dyson, 1 Br. &
B. 219. It has been held that where an
account of the residuary estate of a tes-
tator has been made out by the executors,
and signed by the parties interested,
under which account all of them have
been paid except one, such one may re-
cover his proportion, with interest, in
assumpsit against the executors. Greg-
ory v. Harman, 3 C. & P. 205. Upon
the assent of the executor to a bequest of
a specific chattel, whether personal or
real, the interest in it vests in the legatee,

and he may recover it by an action at
law. Doe r. Guy, 3 East, 120. And see
Paramour «. Yardly, Plowd. 639. Whether
an executor has assented to a bequest
is a question of fact for the jury, and
not a matter of law to be determined by
the court. Mason v. Farnell, 12 M. & W.
647. Lord Holt is reported to have said
in Ewer v. Jones, 2 Salk. 415, that a dev-
isee may maintain an action at common
law against a terre-tenant, for a legacy
devised out of land ; for where a statute,
as the Statute of Wills, gives a right,
the party by consequence shall have an
action of law to recover it. In Braith-
waite o. Skinner, 5 M. & W. 313, this
dictum was much discussed, and the
learned Barons were of opinion, that
it was to be taken with a material
qualification, which is thus stated by
Parke, B. : " The Statute of Wills en-
ables a party to dispose by will of the
property which he might have disposed
of during his lifetime at his free-will and
pleasure. I think the meaning of Lord
Molt is this, that if a person gives an in-
terest which could be enforced by an

l An executor may pledge the personal property of his testator for the general
purposes of the will, but if the person receiving such a pledge from an executor has
at the time knowledge or notice that the executor intends to misapply the money, or
is in the very transaction applying it to his own private use, the pledge is not valid.
Carter v. Lewiston Bank, 71 Me. 448.

141

128

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

The law and practice on this subject varies somewhat in different

States in this country.
* 128 * It is said that the promise of an executor to pay a debt,

" whenever sufficient effects are received from the estate
of the deceased," must be construed to mean sufficient effects
received in the ordinary course of administration, according to
law. (5) If an executor or administrator receives, as such, a
promissory note or bill of the deceased, and indorses the same, he
is liable upon it personally, (c) If he makes a note or bill, signing
it "as executor," he is personally liable, unless he expressly limits
his promise to pay, by the words, "out of the assets of my testa-
tor," or " if the assets be sufficient," or in some equivalent way ; (cT) l

action at law, the statute would give an
action for it. Thus, if a person devised
by will a right of common, the devisee
would have a right of action for it ; so if
he devised a rent which was not a free-
hold rent (which could not be the subject
of an action at law), an action would
lie for it. So if he devised a right of
way, it could be enforced by action , or
if he left a term, the right to it might be
enforced by ejectment. So if the testa-
tor clearly meant to impose a duty upon
another person, obliging him to pay a leg-
acy, an action of debt would lie for it
against the person on whom the duty of
paying the money was imposed : as if
the testator left an estate in fee to A, di-
recting him to pay a sum of money to B,
1 am not prepared to say that an action
of iU-l)t might not lie after A had accepted
the estate, founded upon the duty cre-
ated by the testator of paying that sum.
But h is going too far to say that the
statute would give a right of action for
those things which are merely equitable
interests ; as, for example, if a testator
had created a trust in favor of a person,
it would be absurd to say that person
could enforce the trust by an action at
law." In this case the testator devised
lands in fee, after the determination of
certain life-estates, to A, B, and C, as ten-
ants in common, subject to and charged
witli the payment of £200, which he
thereby bequeathed to, and to be equally
divided among, the children of his niece :
A and B, during the life of one of the
tenants for life, granted their reversion
in two undivided third parts of the land
to mortgagees for five hundred years.
It was held that an action of debt could

not be maintained against the termors
for a share of £200 so bequeathed, on
the ground that, admitting Lord Holt's
dictum to be correct, that where the testa-
tor merely intended to create a duty
from one person to another, the law
would give a remedy, — in this case no
duty was imposed upon the defendants
towards the plaintiff, which could be en-
forced by an action of debt. Semble, no
action at law could be maintained, but the
proper remedy was in equity. And see
on this point Beecker v. Beecker, 7 Johns.
99 ; Van Orden v. Van Orden, 10 Johns.
30. — In Connecticut and New Hamp-
shire, it has been held that an action at
law will lie against an executor upon a
promise implied from the possession of
assets. Knapp v. Hanford, 6 Conn. 170 ;
Pickering v. Pickering, 6 N. H. 120. But
it is believed that in jurisdictions where
courts of chancery have existed, the doc-
trine of the English cases has been fol-
lowed. See Kent ?•. Somervell, 7 G. & J.
265 ; Sutton v. Crain, 10 G. & J. 458. —
An action at law by a legatee for a leg-
acy on an executor's promise, must be
brought against the executor in his per-
sonal, not in his representative capacity.
Kayser v. Disher, 9 Leigh, 357.

(b) Bowerbank v. Monteiro, 4 Taunt.
844.

(c) Buller, J., King i>. Thorn, 1 T. R.
489 ; Curtis v. Bank of Somerset, 7 Har.
& J. 25,

id) Childs o. Monins, 2 Br. & B. 460 ;
King r. Thorn, 1 T. E. 489 ; Woods c.
Ridley, 27 Miss. 119 ; Forster v. Fuller,
6 Mass. 58, where the principle was ap-
plied to the case of a guardian. — As to
covenants by executors or administrators,

142

1 Dunne v. Deery, 40 la. 251.

CH. VIII.] OP EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. * 129

but a note or bill so qualified would not be negotiable, be-
cause on condition. If an executor or administrator *sub- *129
mits a disputed question to arbitration, in general terms,
and without an express limitation of his liability, and the arbi-
trators award that he shall pay a certain sum, he is liable to pay
it whether he has assets or not. («) But if the award be merely
that a certain sum is due from the estate of the deceased, without
saying that the executor or administrator is to pay it, he is not
precluded from denying that he has assets. (/)

When there is a contract with an executor or administrator,
by virtue of which money has become due, and the money if
recovered will be assets in his hands, he may, in general, sue
for it in his representative capacity. (#) * And so he may be
sued as executor for money paid for his use in that capacity. (K)

Executors should pay the utmost respect to the directions in
the will of their testator, but have nevertheless a certain discre-
tion ; thus where a will required the executor to invest certain
funds in real estate securities, it was held that he might, in the
exercise of a sound discretion, deposit the funds in a savings
bank. (hK)

An administrator appointed to settle an estate which a former
administrator or executor has left unsettled, is called an admin-
istrator de bonis non, and if there be a will it is annexed to his
appointment as administrator. Among his duties is that of
requiring and enforcing a transfer to himself from his prede-
cessor of choses in action belonging to the estate ; and for a loss
caused by negligence in this respect, he is liable, {hi)

"With respect to covenants relating to the freehold, the rule of
law is, that for the breach of a covenant collateral or in gross,

made professedly in their capacity as But he is only liable personally in an ac-

suoh, see Sumner v. Williams, 8 Mass. tion for money lent to him as executor,

162 ; Thayer v. Wendell, 1 Gallis. 37. or had and received by him as executor.

(e) Riddel v. Sutton, 5 Bing. 200. Rose v. Bowler, 1 H. Bl. 108 ; Powell v.

(/) Pearson v. Henry, 5 T. R. 6. Graham, 7 Taunt. 686; Jennings v. New-

(9) Cowell i\ Watts, 6 East, 405; King man, 4 T. R. 317 ; and see observations

v. Thorn 1 T. R. 487 ; Marshall v. Broad- of the judges in Ashby v. Ashby, 7 B. &

hurst 1 Tyr. 348, 1 Cr. & J. 403 ; Heath C. 444 ; Miles v. Durnford, 2 De G., M. &

v. Chilton, 12 M. & W. 632; Kane v. G. 641.

Paul 14 Pet 33. (AA) Lansing ». Lansing, 45 Barb. jim.

(A) Ashby v. Ashby, 7 B. & C. 444. — (hi) Wilkinson v. Hunter, 37 Ala. 268.

1 Thus the executors of a deceased baker continuing the business under direc-
tions in the will, may recover in their representative capacity for bread and flour
supplied to a customer. Abbott v. Parfitt, L. R. 6 Q. B. 346.

143

*130

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

whether such breach occur before or after the death of the cove-
nantee, the personal representative must sue and not the heir ; (i)
for the breach of a covenant which runs with the land, the heir
must sue if the breach occur after the covenantee's death, the
personal representative if it occur before. (/) The doctrine of a
continuing breach, for which the heir or assignee may recover if
the ultimate and substantial damage is suffered by him, was estab-
lished in England by the case of Kingdon v. Nottle, (k~) but
* 130 it has not been adopted in this country. (V) * In general,
every right ex contractu, which the deceased possessed at
the time of his death, passes to his executor or administra-
tor; (to)1 and so strong is this rule, that it prevails against

(£) Lord Abinqer, C. B., Raymond ».
Fitch, 2 C, M. &'R. 588, 599, 5 Tyr. 985;
Lucy ?\ Levington, 2 Lev. 26, 1 Ventr.
175 ; Bacon's Abr. Executors and Adminis-
trators, N.

(j) Com. Dig. Covenant, B. 1, Admin-
istration, B. 13 ; Morley u. Polhill, 2
Ventr. 56, 3 Salt. 109; Smith v. Si-
mons, Comb. 64.

(k) 1 M. & Sel. 355; 4 M. & Sel. 53;
King v. Jones, 5 Taunt. 418. Along with
the authority of this case seems to fall
also the doctrine on which it was
founded, and of which so much is made
in the books (see Williams on Executors,
1st ed. 519 ; 1 Lomax on Executors, 292),
that an action can in no case be main-
tained in the name of the executor, un-
less an injury to the personal estate
appears. In England the Court of Ex-
chequer have gone as far as they can
without quite overthrowing Kingdon v.
Nottle. See the opinion of Lord A binder
in Raymond p. Fitch, 2 C, M. & 11. 596,
600, and the still later case of Ricketts v.
Weaver, 12 M. & W. 718, where Parke,
B., said : " The question, therefore, is re-
duced to this, whether an executor can sue
for the breach of a covenant to repair in
the lifetime of the lessor, who was tenant
for life, without averring special damage.
On that point Raymond v. Fitch, in which
all the cases were considered, is an author-
ity directly in point, and ought not to be
shaken. The result of that case is, that
unless it be a covenant in which the heir

alone can sue (according to Kingdon v.
Nottle and King v. Jones) for a breach of
the covenant in the lifetime of the lessor,
the executor can sue, unless it be a mere
personal contract, in which the rule ap-
plies that actio personalis moritur cum per-
sona. The breach of covenant is the
damage ; if the executor be not the
proper person to sue, the action cannot
be brought by any one." In this country,
where the courts are free from the
shackles which the authority of Kingdon
v. Nottle and kindred cases imposes, it is
reasonable to believe that the later doc-
trine (which is also the older doctrine) as
to actions by executors, will be carried to
its full extent. See Clark „. Swift, 3
Met. 390.

(/) Greenby v. Wilcocks, 2 Johns. 1 ;
Mitchell v. Warner, fi Conn. 497 ; Beddoe
v. Wadsworth, 21 Wend. 120; Clark r.
Swift, 3 Met. 390; Hacker v. Storer, 8
Greenl. 228, 232 ; 4 Kent, Com. 472 —
The case of Kingdon v. Nottle has, how-
ever, been substantially followed in Ohio
and Indiana. Foote r. Burnett, 10 Ohio,
317 ; Martin v. Baker, 5 Blackf. 232.

(m) Comyns's Digest, Administration,
B. 13 ; Bacon's Abridgment, Executors
and Administrators, N. ; Morley v. Polhill,
2 Ventr. 56, 3 Salk. 109; Smith v.
Simons, Comb. 64 ; Lucv «. Levington,
1 Ventr. 176, 2 Lev. 2<i; Raymond v.
Fitch, 2 C, M. & R. 588 ; Ricketts v.
Weaver, 12 M. & W. 718; Carry. Rob-
erts, 5 B. & Ad. 84, per Parke, J.

1 The executrix of a railway passenger who, after an interval, dies in consequence
of an accident, may recover, in an action for breach of contract against the railway
company, the damage to his personal estate arising in his lifetime from medical
expenses and loss occasioned by his inability to attend to business, Bradshaw v,
Lancashire, &c. R. Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 189 ; but not in an action of tort. Pulling
>: Gt. Eastern R. Co., 9 Q. B. D. 110. See Leggott v. Gt. Northern R. Co., 1 Q.
B. D. 599.

144

CH. VIII.] OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. * 131

special words of limitation in the contract itself, (ri) But con-
tracts may be extinguished and absolutely determined by the
death of the party with whom they are made, (o) If money be
payable by a bond to such person as the obligee may appoint
by will, and the testator makes no appointment by his will, the
debt dies, as the executor is not considered his appointee for that
purpose, (p) Nor could an administrator, where there was no
will, claim the money.

The law raises no implied promise to the personal representative,
in respect to a promissory note held by the deceased, (q)

* Where the contract with the deceased is of an execu- * 131
tory nature, and the personal representative can fairly and
sufficiently execute all that the deceased could have done, he
may do so, and enforce the contract. (V) 1 But where an execu-
tory contract is of a strictly personal nature — as, for example,
with an author for a specified work, the death of the writer before
his book is completed, absolutely determines the contract, unless
what remains to be done — as, for example, the preparing of an

(n) Devon r. Pawlett, 11 Vin. Abr. an action upon such note, must declare

133, pi. 27. Somewhat analogous to this upon the promise to the testator ; unless

is the point stated in Leonard Lovies' an express promise to the executor can he

case, 10 Rep. 87 b, that a chattel interest shown. Timmis v. Piatt, 2 M. & W. 720.
in land cannot be entailed. (r) Marshall v. Broadhurst, 1 Tyr.

(o) For example, the right to recover 348, 1 Cr. & J. 403. See Werner v.
for the breach of a promise to marry Humphreys, 3 Scott, N. R. 226. — E con-
does not pass to the executor. Chamber- verso, the personal representative is bound
lain v. Williamson, 2 M. & Sel. 408; Steb- to complete such a contract, and, if he
bins v. Palmer, 1 Pick. 71. .And so in does not, maybe made to pay damages
other cases where the injury is personal, out of the assets. Wentworth v. Cock,
though accompanying a breach of con- 10 A. & E. 42 ; Sihoni ». Kirkman, 1 M.
tract. Parke, B., Beckham v. Drake, 8 & W. 418, 423. — Where several persons
M. & W. 854; Lord EHenborough, C. J., jointly contract for a chattel, to be made
Chamberlain v. Williamson, 2 M. & Sel. or procured for the common benefit of
415, 416; Cook v. Newman, 8 How. Pr. all, ?nd the executors of any party dying
523. But see Knights v. Quarles, 2 Br. are, by agreement, to stand in the place
& B. 104. of such party dying, although the legal

(p) Pease v. Mead. Hob. 9. And the remedy of the party employed would be

reason given is that the payee in that solely against the survivors, yet the law

case is evidently to take for his own use, will imply a contract on the part of the

for the word pay "carryeth property deceased contractor, that his executors

with it; " whereas the executor, when he shall pay his proportion of the price of

recovers as assignee in law of the testa- the article to be furnished. Prior v.

tor, takes for the use of the. testator. Hembrow, 8 M. & W. 873, 889.

( q) Therefore the executor in bringing

1 In such a case, if losses are sustained in the performance of the intestate's con-
tract by his personal representative, the latter must bear them ; if profits are realized,
they belong to the estate, Smith v. Wilmington, &c. Co., 83 HI. 498. But the per-
sonal representative may not bind the estate by an executory contract, Austin v.
Munro, 47 N. Y. 36.

vol. i. io 145

* 132 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

Index, or Table of Contents, &c, can certainly be done, to the
same purpose by another, (s)

One of joint executors is not generally liable for the wrong-
doing of the other, without negligence or other default on his
own part, (ss) J

If executors or administrators pay away money of the deceased
by mistake, or enter into contracts for carrying on his business
for the benefit of his personal estate, and to wind up his affairs,
they may sue either in their individual or their representative ca-
pacities ; (t) but they should sue in the latter capacity, in order
to avoid a set-off against them of their individual debts. («)

The title of an administrator does not exist until the grant
of administration, and then reverts back to the death of the
deceased ; but only in order to protect the estate, and not for
any other purpose. (z>) And if an agent sells goods of the
deceased, after his death, and in ignorance of his decease, the
administrator may adopt the contract and sue upon it. (jv~)

On the death of one of several executors, either before or
* 132 * after probate, the entire right of representation survives
to the others, (x) But if an administrator dies, (xx) or a
sole executor dies intestate, no interest and no right of represen-
tation is transmitted to his personal representative, (y)

Executors and administrators are regarded as Trustees, and
are bound by the rules of the law of Trust, and of Agency, so
far as the same are applicable to them. Thus, neither can buy

(s) Lord Lyndhurst, C. B., and Bm/l>i/, <■. Overackcr, 8 Johns. 126; Winchester
B., Marshall v. Broadliurst, 1 Tyr. 349. v. Union Bank, 2 G. & J. 79, 80 ; Welch-
See Siboni r. Kirkman, 1 M. & XV. -123. man v. Sturgis, 13 Q. B. 552 ; Bell v.
See also White «. Commonwealth, 39 Speight, 11 Humph. 451.
Penn. St. 167. (,e) Foster v. Bates, 12 M. & W. 226.

(ss) Wood v. Brown, 34 N. Y. 337. (x) Flanders v. Chirk, 3 Atk. 509. So

[l) Clark v. Hougham, 2 B, & C. 149; in the case of the death of one of two ad-

Aspinwall u. Wake, 10 Bing. 61; Web- tuinistrators, the administration survives

ster v. Spencer, 3 B. & Aid. 360 ; Ord v. to the other. Hudson v. Hudson, Cas.

Fenwick, 3 East, 104 ; Merritt v. Seaman, Temp. Talb. 127. — That joint executors

2 Seld. 168. are one person in law, Shaw v. Berry, 35

(u) Per Bai/hy, Ilolroi/d, and Best, JJ., Me. 279. But see Smith v. Whiting, 9

Clark v. Hougham, 2 B. & C. 155, 156, Mass. 334.
I57- (rx) Young n. Duhme, 4 Met. (Ky.)

(v) Morgan v. Thomas, 8 Exch. 302 ; 239.
Foster v. Bates, 12 M. & W. 22; Law- (y) Com. Dig. Administrator, B. 6;

rence v. Wright, 23 Pick. 128 ; Rattoon Tingrey u. Brown, 1 B. & P. 310.

1 Unless they give a joint bond, Newton v. Newton, 53 N. H. 537. See further as
to the liability of one executor for the acts of his co-executor, Adair i: Brimmer,
74 N. Y. 539; Bryan v. Stewart, 83 N. Y. 270; Shreve v. Joyce, 7 Vroom, 44;
Kineade v. Conley, 74 N. C. 387.

146

CH. Vni.] OP EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. * 132

what he sells ; Q/y) and either is held responsible for loss to the
estate, caused by his negligence or default ; as of a debt which
might have been collected with due diligence. Qyz)

An executor de son tort is one who without right disposes of
or interferes with the assets of the deceased, or otherwise assumes
to act as executor. He is liable for the property taken by him,
and for all damage caused by his acts, and not only to an action
by the rightful executor or administrator, but may be sued by
a creditor of the deceased, (z) But mere acts of kindness and
charity touching the property of one deceased, as taking care of
it, providing for the family and the like, do not make one execu-
tor de son tort, (zz) It is held in England, that an executor de
son tort of a rightful executor is liable in the same manner as a
rightful executor of the original testator, for his debts, (a) 1 But
the rightful executor or administrator cannot be prejudiced by
an act or contract of an executor de son tort. (b) And it would
seem, that if an executor de son tort be afterwards made admin-
istrator, he is not bound by a contract made by himself as execu-
tor before the grant of administration, (c)

(yy) Howell v. Selving, 1 McCarter, pressly promised to pay the plaintiff as
84 ; Boyd r. Blankman, 29 Cal. 19. soon as the bill was made out. Probate
{yz) Cooley v. Vansyole, 1 McCarter, was afterwards granted to B, the real
496; Shaffer's Appeal, 46 Penn. St. 131; executrix, who gave notice to the defend-
Tuggle v. Gilbert, 1 Duvall, 340 ; Tomp- ant to pay the price to her. Held, that
kins v. Weeks, 26 Cal. 50. the plaintiff could not maintain an action
(z) Curtis v. Vernon, 3 T. R. 587 ; against the defendant for the price. —
Elder v. Littler, 15 la. 65. But where the act of the executor de son
(zz) Brown v. Sullivan, 22 Ind. 264. tort was done in the due course of ad-
fa) Meyrick v. Anderson, 14 Q. B. 719. ministration, and is one which the right-
(A) Buckley v. Barber, 6 Exch. 164; ful executor would have been compellable
Mountford o. Gibson, 4 East, 441 ; Dick- to do, such act shall stand good. Grays-
enson v. Naule, 1 Nev. & M. 721 ; where brook v. Fox, 1 Plowd. 282 ; Thompson
A having proved a will, in which she v. Harding, 20 E. L. & E. 145.
supposed herself to be appointed execu- (c) Doe v. Glenn, 1 A. & E. 49; s. c.
trix, employed the plaintiff, an auctioneer, 3 Nev. & M. 837 ; Wilson v. Hudson, 4
to sell the goods of the testator; and Harring. 169. But see contra, Walworth,
they were sold to the defendant, who, as C, Vroom v. Van Home, 10 Paige, 558 ;
an inducement to the plaintiff to let him Walker v. May, 2 Hill, Ch. (S. C.) 23.
remove the goods without payment, ex-

1 But the executor of an executrix de son tort is not liable for a breach of contract
committed by the person with whose property the executrix de son tort has intermed-
dled. Wilson v. Hodson, L. E. 7 Ex. 84.

147

133 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

*133 * CHAPTER IX.

GUARDIANS.

Sect. I. — Of the kinds of Q-uardians.

Guardianship at common law has fallen into comparative
disuse in this country, although many of the principles which
determined the rights and duties of that relation are adopted,
with various qualifications, in the guardianships by testamentary
appointment of the father, or by the appointment of courts of
probate or chancery, which prevail with us. We have also by
statute provisions, guardians of the insane, and of spendthrifts.
All of these rest upon the general principle, that it is the duty of
society to provide adequate care and protection for the person
and property of those who are wholly unable to take care of
themselves.

So far as relates to contracts to which guardians are parties,
we can do little more than refer to the statutes of the several
States, in which the obligations and duties of guardians, their
powers, and the manner in which their powers may be exercised,
■are set forth, usually with much minuteness and precision.

One principle, however, should be stated ; which is, that guar-
dians of all descriptions are treated by courts as trustees ; and,
in almost all cases, they are required to give security for the
faithful discharge of their duty, unless the guardian be appointed
by will, and the testator has exercised the power given him by
statute, of requiring that the guardian shall not be called upon
to give bonds. But even in this case, such testamentary pro-
vision is wholly personal ; and if the individual dies, refuses the
appointment, or resigns it, or is removed from it, and a substitute
is appointed by court, this substitute must give bonds.

It may be added, that it is better for a guardian who proposes
to make any sale or contract not certainly within his general
148

CH. IX.]

GUARDIANS.

134

power, to go to the proper court, by petition, for authority or
direction. And, generally, it is only when the ward has no other
means for his support and education, that the court will authorize
the sale of his lands. The statutes regulating this matter some-
times provide expressly for this, (z)

SECTION II.

•134

OP THE DUTY AND POWER OP A GUARDIAN.

The guardian is held in this country to have only a naked
authority, not coupled with an interest, (a) His possession of
the property of his ward is not such as gives him a personal
interest, being only for the purpose of agency. But for the bene-
fit of his ward, he has a very general power over it. He manages
and disposes of the personal property at his own discretion, (6)
although, as we have already intimated, it is safer for him to
obtain the authority of the court for any important measure ; he
may lease the real estate (the lease not to continue beyond the

(2) Morris v. Morris, 2 McCarter,
239.

(a) Granby v. Amherst, 7 Mass. 1, 6.

(6) " I apprehend that no doubt can
be entertained as to the competency of
the guardian's power over the disposition
of the personal estate, including the
choses in action, as between him and the
bond fide purchaser. The guardian in
socage of the real estate may lease it in
his own name, and dispose of it during
the guardianship (and the chancery
guardian has equal authority), though
he cannot convey it absolutely without
the special authority of this court, be-
cause the nature of the trust does not
require it." Kent, C, Field v. Schieffelin,
7 Johns. Ch. 154. This case decides that
the purchaser of the ward's personal
estate is not responsible for the faithful
application of the purchase-money by
the guardian, unless he knew or had
sufficient information at the time that
the guardian contemplated a breach of
trust, and intended to misapply the
money; or was in fact by the very
transaction applying it to his own
private purpose. — The guardian of a
non compos mentis can sell her personal

estate at his discretion, and her real
estate with license from the court. " It
is true the guardian ought not to sell the
personal estate, unless the proceeds are
wanted for the due execution of his
trust, or unless he can by the sale pro-
duce some advantage to the estate, but
having the power without obtaining any
special license or authority, a title under
him acquired bond fide by the purchaser
will be good, for he cannot know whether
the power has been executed with dis-
cretion or not." Parker, C. J., Ellis v.
Essex Merrimac Bridge, 2 Pick. 243. —
The Court of Chancery may authorize a
sale of the ward's real estate. Dorsey
v. Gilbert, 11 G. & J. 87. — Also, In re
Salisbury, 3 Johns. Ch. 347; Hedges v.
Riker, 5 id. 163. — " The court may
change the estate of infants from real
into personal, and from personal into
real, whenever it deems such a proceed-
ing most beneficial to the infant. The
proper inquiry in such cases will be,
whether a sale of the whole, or only of a
part, and what part of the premises will
be most beneficial." Kent, C, Mills v.
Dennis, 3 Johns. Ch. 367.

149

* 135 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

ward's majority), if appointed by will or by the court, but the
guardian by nature cannot ; (c) : he cannot however sell it with-
out leave of the proper court. Nor should he, in general, convert
the personal estate into real, without such leave, (d) And

* 135 where a court of * equity authorizes a conversion of real

estate into personal, or vice versa, it will, if justice requires
it, provide that the acquired property shall retain the character
and legal incidents of the original fund, (e)

But where a fictitious character is thus impressed upon the
property of a ward, it ceases, as a general rule, and the property
resumes its true character, on the majority of the ward. (/)

As trustee, a guardian is held to a strictly honest discharge
of his duty, and cannot act in relation to the subject of his trust
for his own personal benefit, in any contract whatever. And
if a benefit arises thereby, as in the settlement of a debt due
from the ward, this benefit belongs wholly to the ward. (</) 2
And it has been held that if a guardian makes use of his own
money to erect buildings on the land of his ward, without hav-
ing an order of the court therefor, he cannot charge the same in

(c) May v. Calder, 2 Mass. 56. A Sweezy v. Thayer, 1 Duer, 286 ; March
lease of an infant's land by his father as v. Berrier, 6 Ired. Eq. 524. The above
natural guardian, is void. cases illustrate the general principles of

(d) The cases cited (3 Johns. Ch. 348, equitable conversion, although all of
370, 5 id. 163), affirm the power of a them are not applicable exclusively to
court to order the minor's real estate to conversions by a guardian with license
be converted into personal, or his personal from court.

into real, but do not expressly deny the (/) Forman v. Marsh, 1 Kern. 544.

guardian's authority to do the latter. ig) Green v. Winter, 1 Johns. Ch. 26 ;

See supra, note (b). Stanley's Appeal, 8 Church v. The Marine Insurance Co. 1

Barr, 431; Cooke's Appeal, 9 id. 508; Mason, 345; Holdridge v. Gillespie, 2

Worrell's Appeal, 23 Penn. St. 44. Johns. Ch. 30 ; Davoue v. Fanning, 2

(e) Foster v. Hilliard, 1 Story, 88 ; Johns. Ch. 252 ; White v. Parker, 8 Barb.
Wheldale v. Partridge, 5 Ves. Jr. 396; 48; Ringgold v. Ringgold, 1 Har. & G.
Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. 563, 577 ; Peter 11 ; Rogers v. Rogers, 1 Hopk. Ch. 515;
v. Beverly, 10 Pet. 532 ; Hawley v. Lovell v. Briggs, 2 N. H. 218 ; Sparhawk
James, 5 Paige, 318, 489 ; Kane v. Gott, v. Allen, 1 Foster (N. H.), 9. — The
24 Wend. 660 ; Reading v. Blackwelt, 1 guardian is not entitled to compensation
Baldw. 166; Collins o. Champ, 15 B. for services rendered before his appoint-
Mon. 118; Slumway v. Cooper, 15 Barb. ment. Clowes v. Van Antwerp, 4 Barb.
656; Forman v. Marsh, 1 Kern. 644; 416.

1 A guardian cannot lease his ward's oil or mineral lands for working and conse-
quent impoverishment. Stoughton's Appeal, 88 Penn. St. 198. Neither can a guard-
ian sell or improve the ward's property for his own benefit, Lane v. Taylor, 40 Ind.
495 ; nor charge his ward's land with the whole removal of an encumbrance, when
he has himself an interest in the land. Bourne !•. Maybin, 3 Woods, 724.

2 If, however, a guardian continues the ward's business successfully, the ward by
accepting the benefits after coming of age, cannot object. Hoyt <;. Sprague, 103
U. S. 613. But a guardian cannot charge a ward's business with losses incurred in
his unauthorized continuation of it. Corcoran v. Allen, 11 R. I. 567.

150

CH. IX.] GUAKDIAN8. * 136

account with his ward, or recover the amount from the ward. (A)
But we believe a rule so severe would not be applied unless for
special reasons. He must not only neither make nor suffer any-
waste of the inheritance, but is held very strictly to a careful
management of all personal property, (i) He is respon-
sible * not only for any misuse of the ward's money or * 136
stock, but for letting it lie idle ; and if he does so without
sufficient cause, he must allow the ward interest or compound
interest in his account ; (/) x and if he lends it without security,
and without the approval of the court, he is liable for its loss. ( jj)
This subject is more fully presented in treating of the responsi-
bility of Trustees. (¥)

To secure the proper execution of his trust, he is not only
liable to an action by the ward, after the guardianship termi-
nates, (7) but during its pendency the ward may call him to
account by his next friend, or by a guardian, ad litem. And the
courts have gone so far as to set aside transactions which took
place soon after the ward came of age, and which were beneficial
only to the former guardian, on the presumption that undue
influence was used, and on the ground of public utility and
policy, (m)

(h) Hassard v. Rowe, 11 Barb. 24. own name. Stanley's App. 8 Penn. St.

See also White v. Parker, 8 Barb. 48; 431. — He was held liable for the ward's

Austin v. Lawar, 23 Miss. 189, and money invested in the stock of a naviga-

Brown v. Mulling, 24 Miss. 204. tion company, in good credit at the time,

(i) Dietterich v. Heft, 5 Barr, 87. If and paying large dividends for a long

he lends money on the mere personal time afterwards. Worrell's App. 9 Penn.

security of one whose circumstances are St. 508. See also Clark v. Garfield, 8

equivocal, he is responsible for the Allen, 427 ; Gilbert ;•. M'Eachen, 38 Miss,

money lent. — Stem's App. 6 Whart. 469; Bond v. Lockwood, 33 III. 212.
472. " Whenever the guardian has the (j) In Pennsylvania it is held that

fund and disposes of it to another, he there is a distinction as to funds in the

must do it with strict and proper caution, hands of guardians as to making rests

and is seldom safe unless he takes from the rule in case of other trustees

security." Sergeant, J., Konigmacher v. who neglect to invest. Pennypacker's

Kimmel, 1 Penn. 207 ; Pim v. Downing, Appeal, 41 Penn. St. 4P4. See Hughes

1 1 S. & R. 66 ; Smith v. Smith, 4 Johns. Appeal, 53 Penn. St. 500.
Oh. 281. — But he is bound in general (jj) Gilbert v. Guptill, 34 111. 112.

only to the exercise of common prudence (k) See ante, p. * 122, note (/).

and skill. Johnson's Appeal, 12 S. & R. (I) See Birch v. Furtk, 2 Met. (Ky.)

317 ; Konigmacher v. Kimmel, 1 Penn. 544, as to the effect of lapse of time in

207. He is liable for any negligence, barring a petition in equity by wards

Glover v. Glover, 1 McMul. Ch. 153. — against their guardians.
Although expressly authorized to invest (m) Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav. 551 ;

the ward's money in bank-stock, he is Gale v. Wells, 12 Barb. 84.
personally liable if he invests it in his

1 A guardian who refuses to disclose what use he has made of a large surplus of
his ward's income, for which he charges himself with interest, is not entitled to his
commissions. Blake v. Pegram, 109 Mass. 541.

151

* 137 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

A guardian cannot, by his own contract, bind the person or
estate of his ward ; (n) l but if he promise on a sufficient consid-
eration to pay the debt of his ward, he is personally bound by his
promise, although he expressly promises as guardian, (o) 2 And
it is a sufficient consideration if such promise discharge the debt
of the ward. And a guardian who thus discharges the debt of
his ward may lawfully indemnify himself out of the ward's estate,
or if he be discharged from his guardianship, he may have an
action against the ward for money paid for his use. (p) An
action will not lie against a guardian on a contract made by the
ward, but must be brought against the ward and may be defended
by the guardian. (<?)

* 137 * The guardianship is a trust so strictly personal, or

attached to the individual, that it cannot be transferred
from him, either by his own assignment or devise, or by inheri-
tance or succession.

A married woman cannot become a guardian without the con-
sent of her husband ; but with that she may. (r) It would seem,
but not certainly, that a single woman who is a guardian, loses
her guardianship by marriage ; but she may be reappointed, (s)
In some States she loses it by statute ; in others, not.

If there be two guardians, and one has possession of the ward,
and the other takes the ward out of his possession against his
will, it is said in England that the guardian losing the possession
may have his action against the other, (i)

(n) Thacher v. Dinsmore, 5 Mass. 299; Timelier v. Dinsmore, 5 Mass. 299; Ex

Jones v. Brewer, 1 Pick. 314. parte Leighton, 14 Mass. 207.

(o) Forster v. Fuller, 6 Mass. 58. ' (r) Palmer v. Oakley, 1 Doug. (Mich.)

(p) Thacher v. Dinsmore, 5 Mass. 299 ; 433.
Forster v. Fuller, 6 Mass. 58. Is) 2 Kent, Com. 225, a. (b).

(q) Brown v. Chase, 4 Mass. 436; (t) Gilbert v. Schevencle, 14 M. & W.

488.

1 As for repairs to the ward's dwelling-house, even after the guardian's death,
Wallis v. Bardwell, 126 Mass. 366, or for the support and care of his ward, Rollins
v. Marsh, 128 Mass. 116.

2 Unless the creditor agrees that the guardian's liability is to be limited to the
ward's assets in his hands, Sperry v. Fanning, 80 111. 371.

152

CH- x-] CORPORATIONS.

138

* CHAPTER X. *138

CORPORATIONS.

A corporation aggregate is, in law, a person ; (a) l and it
was an established principle of the common law, that corpora-
tions aggregate could act only under their common seal ; (5) but
to this principle there were always many exceptions. These
exceptions arose at first from necessity, and were limited by
necessity. As where cattle were to be distrained damage feasant,
and they might escape before the seal could be affixed, (c) But
it was held that the appointment of a bailiff to seize for the
use of a corporation, goods forfeited to the corporation, must
be by deed, (cf) A corporation is liable for the tortious acts of
its agent, though he were not appointed under seal, (e) 2 The

(a) See the great case of the Louis- seal. The Mayor of Thetford's case, 1

ville, &c. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, Salk. 192 ; Koehler v. Black Co. 2 Black

where it was decided by the Supreme (U. S.), 715; Richardson v. Scott River

Court that a corporation created by a Co. 22 Cal. 150.

State and doing business within the ter- (r) Manby v. Long, 3 Lev. 107 ; Bro.
ritory of such State, though it have Abr. Corporations, pi. 2, 47 ; Dean and
members who are citizens of other Chapter of Windsor v. Gover, 2 Wms.
States, is to be treated in the United Saund. 305, Plowd. 91. And so it seems
States courts as a citizen of that State, the appointment of a bailiff to distrain
— By an act incorporating a railway for rent need not be by deed. Cary v.
company, no action was to be brought Matthews, 1 Salk. 191 ; Taunton, J., Smith
against any person for any thing done in v. Birmingham Gas Co. 1 A. & E. 530. —
pursuance of the act, without twenty But a corporation cannot, except by
days' notice given to the intended de- their seal, empower one to enter on their
fendant : Held, that the word person in- behalf for condition broken ; and this
eluded the company, and that they were though the estate be only for years,
entitled to notice upon being sued for Dumper v. Symms, 1 Rol. Abr. Corpora-
obstructing a way in carrying the act in- tions, (K).

to effect. Boyd v. Croydon R. Co. 4 (d) Horn v. Ivy, 1 Vent. 47, 1 Mod.

Bing. N. C. 669. 18, 2 Keb. 567.

(6) 1 Bl. Com. 475. — Yet a corpora- (e) Eastern Co. R. Co. v. Broom,

tion might do an act upon record without 6 Exeh. 314 ; Watson v. Bennett, 12

1 As within the meaning of a statute permitting only " persons " who did not aid
the rebellion, to bring suit, U. S. v. Ins. Cos. 22 Wall. 99 ; but not for the purpose of
suing, as a common informer, for a penalty recoverable by the " person " informing,
Guardians, &c. o. Franklin, 3 C. P. D. 377. See Royal, &c. Co. v. Braham, 2 App.
Cas. 381.

2 Even to a mere licensee on its premises, who is injured by the wrongful act
of its servant in the course of his employment. Tebbutt u. Bristol R. Co., L. R. 6
Q. B. 73.

153

*139

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

* 139 * exception was afterwards extended to all matters of daily
or frequent exigency or convenience, and of no special
importance. (/) 1 In this country, the old rule has almost, if
not entirely disappeared, (g) But in England it seems to remain
in some force, (/i) 2 A contract of a corporation, as of an indi-
vidual, may be implied from the acts of the corporation, or of
their authorized agents, (i) In general, if a person not duly
authorized make a contract on behalf of a corporation, and the
corporation take and hold the benefit derived from such con-
tract, it is estopped from denying the authority of the agent, (j) 3
All duties imposed upon a corporation by law, raise an implied

Barb. 196; Burton v. Philadelphia, &c.
Railroad, 4 Harring. 252 ; Johnson v. Mu-
nicipality, 5 La. Ann. 100; Goodspeed v.
East Haddam Bank, 22 Conn. 530. Es-
pecially if the act done was an ordinary
service, such as would not be held under
other circumstances to require an author-
ity under seal. Smith v. Birmingham
Gas Co. 1 A. & E. 52(1. 3 Nev. & M. 771 ;
Yarborough v. Bank of England, 16
East, 6. — And a corporation, like any
other principal, is liable for acts of its
agent incidental to an authority duly
delegated. Kennedy v. Baltimore Ins.
Co. 3 Har. & J. 307.

( /) Gibson n. East India Co. 5 Bing.
N. C. 262, 270; Lord Denrnan, C. J.,
Church v. Imperial Gas Co. 6 A. & E.
846. See Bro. Abr. Corporations, pi. 49.

(g) The Bank of Columbia v. Patter-
son,'7 Cranch, 299; Bank of the United
States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64 ; Dan-
forth v. Schoharie Turnpike Co. 12
Johns. 227 ; Commercial Bank of Buffalo
v. Kortright, 22 Wend. 348 ; American
Ins. Co. «. Oakley, 9 Paige, 49G ; Parker,
C. J., Fourth School District in Rumford
v. Wood, 13 Mass. 199 ; Proprietors of
Canal Bridge v. Gordon, 1 Pick. 297 ;
dies' nut Hill Turnpike ». Butter, 4 S. &
R. 16 ; Union Bank of Maryland v.
Ridgely, 1 liar. & G. 324 ; Legrand v.
Hampden Sydney College, 5 Munf . 324 ;
Elysville Manuf. Co. v. Okisko, 6 Md.
153.

(h) Rolfe, B., Mayor of Ludlow o.
Charlton, 6 M. & W. 823 ; Gibson v. East
India Company, 5 Bing. N. C. 275 ; Lord
Denman, C. J., Church v. Imperial Gas
Co. 6 A. & E. 861 ; Williams v. Chester,
&c. R. Co. 5 E. L. & E. 497 ; Diggle v.
London, &c. R. Co. 5 Exch. 442; Clark v.
Guardians, &c. 11 E. L. & E. 442. But see
Denton v. East Anglian R. Co. 3 Car. & K.
17 ; Henderson v. Australian, &c. Co. 5 El.
& Bl. 409 ; A. R. M. S. N. Co. u. Marzetti,
11 Exch. 228.

(i) Smith a. Proprietors, &c. 8 Pick.
178 ; Kennedy i>. Baltimore Ins. Co. 3
Har. & J. 367 ; Trundy v. Farrar, 32 Me.
225; Ross v. Madison, 1 Cart. (Ind.) 281;
N. C. R. Co. v. Bastian, 15 Md. 494 ; Sea-
graves v. City of Alton, 13 111. 366.—
Beverly v. Lincoln Gas Co. 6 A. & E.
829 ; where the judgment of the Court of
Queen's Bench was delivered by Patteson,
J., in an elaborate opinion. And in
Church v. Imperial Gas Co. 6 A. & E.
845, the same court held that a corpora-
tion, created for the purpose of supplying
gas might maintain assumpsit for the
breach of a contract by the defendant to
accept gas from year to year, at a certain
price per annum, the consideration being
alleged to be the promise of the corpora-
tion to furnish it at that price — such
promise by the corporation, though not
under seal, being valid, and a good con-
sideration.

(j) Episcopal Charitable Society v.

1 As in letting a graving-dock, owned by a municipal corporation, to ships need-
ing repairs. Wells v. Kingston-upon-Hull, L. R. 10 C. P. 402.

2 Thus a sale of tolls by a municipal corporation, not under its common seal nor
signed on its behalf by any one authorized under seal so to do, does not bind the
purchaser. Mayor, &c. of Kidderminster v. Hardwick, L. R. 9 Ex. 13. See also
Austin v. Bethnal Green Guardians, L. R. 9 C. P. 91 ; Hunt v. Wimbledon Local
Board, 4 C. P. D. 48.

8 As where an agent leased land in his own name, but the corporation occupied
it, Clark v. Gordon, 121 Mass. 330; or the secretary of an insurance company

154

CH. X.] CORPORATIONS. * 140

promise of performance. (#) A corporation is a citizen of the
State which creates it, as to its right to sue or be sued in
the courts of the United States, (jk) But it has no status as
a citizen in any other State, and if it goes there to do busi-
ness, the State into which it goes may lawfully discriminate
against it as between it and domestic corporations of that
State ; even so far as to compel it to cease business in that
State. 07)

The question of execution appears to stand upon somewhat
different ground from that of authority ; for while a corporation
is generally estopped from denying that a contract or an instru-
ment was made by its authority, if it receive and hold the bene-
ficial result of the contract or the instrument, as the price for
property sold, or the like, it may, or its creditors may, deny
that the instrument was legally executed, even if the * au- * 140
thority were certainly possessed.1 Thus, if a conveyance
purporting to be the conveyance of a corporation, made by one
authorized to make it for them, be in fact executed by the attor-
ney as his own deed, it is not the deed of the corporation, although
it was intended to be so, and the attorney had full authority to
make it so. And if the deed be written throughout as the deed
of the corporation, and the attorney when executing it declares
that he executes it on behalf of the company, but says, "in
witness whereof I set my hand and seal" this is, in law, his deed
only, and does not pass the land of the corporation. (&) 2 And

Episcopal Church, 1 Pick. 372; Hay- (jk) Ducat v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 48

ward v. The Pilgrim Society, 21 Pick. 111. 172.

270; Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns. (jl) Hatch v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 8

60. And see Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Blatchford, 105 ; Stevens v. Phoenix Ins.

Mass. 479 ; Brown v. Donnell, 49 Me. Co. 41 N. Y. 149.

421 ; Allen v. Citizens, &c. Co. 22 Cal. 28. (k) Brinley v. Mann, 2 Cush. 337.

( if) New York R. Co. u. Schuyler, 34 The material parts of the deed in this

N. Y. 30. case were as follows : " Know all men,

pledged its bonds with the directors' knowledge and acquiescence, Darst v. Gale,
83 111. 136 ; Durham v. Carbon Coal Co., 22 Kan. 232.

' A deed to a corporation after the granting of its charter, but before organiza-
tion, and duly recorded, will be presumed to have been accepted as soon as the cor-
poration was capable of contracting.- Rotch's Wharf Co. v. Judd, 108 Mass. 224.
A corporation cannot, however, ratify an act made for its benefit before it had an
existence as such. Melhado v. Porto Alegre, &c. R. Co., L. R. 9 C. P. 503.

2 The assignment of a mortgage purporting on its face to be the deed ot tfle
corporation, signed and sealed by its president, duly authorized for that Purpose,
and acknowledged to be its free act and deed, is duly executed by the corporation
Murohv v. Welch, 128 Mass. 489. And a corporation contract, sealed with a private
seal Van officer instead of the corporate seal, is binding if he had authority so to
do, or his act is ratified. Eureka Co. v. Bailey Co., 11 Wall. 488.

155

141

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

* 141 a corporation must execute its deed under its * corporate
seal, otherwise the deed is void. (7) If, however, it was
only a simple contract which was executed in this way, it might
be inferred from the general principles of the law of agency, that
it would be valid as the contract of the corporation ; for it would

&c, that the New England Silk Com-
pany, a corporation legally established,
by 6. C. their treasurer, in consideration,
&c, do hereby give, grant, &c." " In
witness whereof, I, the said C. C, in be-
half of said Company and as their treas-
urer, have hereunto set my hand and
seal." The certificate of acknowledg-
ment stated that " C. C, treasurer, &c.,
acknowledged the above instrument to
be his free act and deed." The court held
that this was not the deed of the corpo-
ration. See also Combe's case, 9 Rep.
76 b ; Frontin !'. Small, 2 Stra. 705. No
abler exposition of the doctrine of deeds
by attorney is to be found in the books
than that of Lord Chief Baron Gilbert,
Bac. Abr. Leases, J. 10 : " If one hath
power, by virtue of a letter of attorney,
to make leases for years generally by in-
denture, the attorney ought to make
them in the name and style of his
master, and not in his own name: for
the letter of attorney gives him no inter-
est or estate in the lands, but only an
authority to supply the absence of his
master by standing in his stead, which
he can no otherwise do than by using his
name, and making them just in the same
manner and style as his master would do
if he were present : for if he should
make them in his own name, though he
added also, by virtue of the letter of at-
torney to him made for that purpose, yet
such leases seem to be void, because the
indenture being made in his name must
pass the interest and lease from him, or
it can pass it from nobody : it cannot
pass it from the master immediately, be-
cause he is no party ; and it cannot pass
it from the attorney at all, because he
has nothing in the lands ; and then his
adding by virtue of the letter of attorney will
not help it, because that letter of attor-
ney made over no estate or interest in
the land to him, and consequently, he
cannot, by virtue thereof, convey over
any to another. Neither can such inter-
est pass from the master immediately, or
through the attorney ; for then the same
indenture must have this strange effect
at one and the same instant to draw out
the interest from the master to the attor-
ney, and from the attorney to the lessee,
which certainly it cannot do ; and there-
fore all such leases made in that manner

156

seem to be absolutely void, and not good,
even by estoppel, against the attorney,
because they pretend to be made not in
his own name absolutely, but in the
name of another, by virtue of an author-
ity which is not pursued. This case,
therefore, of making leases by a letter of
attorney seems to differ from that of a
surrender of a copyhold, or of livery of
seizin of a freehold, by letter of attor-
ney ; for in those cases when they say,
We A and B as attorneys of C, or by virtue
of a letter of attorney from C, of such a date,
Src., do surrender, frc, or deliver to you seizin
of such lands ; these are good in this man-
ner, because they are only ministerial
ceremonies or transitory acts in pais, the
one to be done by holding the court rod,
and the other by delivering a turf or
twig; and when they do them as attor-
neys, or by virtue of a letter of attorney
from their master, the law pronounces
thereupon as if they were actually
done by the master himself, and carries
the possession accordingly ; but in a
lease for years it is quite otherwise, for
the indenture, or deed, alone conveys the
interest, and are the very essence of the
lease, both as to the passing it out of
the lessor at first, and its subsistence in
the lessee afterwards ; the very inden-
ture, or deed itself is the conveyance,
without any subsequent construction, or
operation of law thereupon; and there-
fore it must be made in the name and
style of him who has such interest to
convey, and not in the name of the at-
torney, who has nothing therein. But in
the conclusion of such lease, it is proper
to say, In witness whereof A B, of such a
place, fyc, in pursuance of a letter of attor-
ney hereunto annexed, bearing date suck a
day, hath put the hand and seal of the master,
and so write the master's name, and de-
liver it as the act and deed of the master,
in which last ceremony of delivering it
in the name of the master by such attor-
ney, this exactly agrees with the cere-
mony of surrendering by the rod, or
making livery by a turf or twig, by the
attorney, in the name or as attorney of
his master." And see Porter v. Andro-
scoggin, &c. R. Co. 37 Me. 349 ; Richard-
son n. Scott River Co. 22 Cal. 150.

(/) Koehler v. Iron Co. 2 Black, 715.

CH. X.] CORPORATIONS. * 141

be a contract made by one as the agent of another, and containing
the express declaration that it was so made.

It must be remembered that a corporation, as a legal person,
is entirely distinct from the individuals who compose it, and
therefore a resolution adopted by them is not a corporate act,
nor is a deed by trustees of the members the deed of the
corporation. (7Z)

Corporations to hold property are generally limited as to the
amount they may hold. It has been held in New York, that they
could not take in excess of their charter, (Im) reversing the
decision of the Supreme Court that they could take and hold
until the State interfered with them.

A corporation may employ one of its members as its agent, and
the same person, while such agent, may also be an agent for
the other contracting party, and sign for him the memorandum
required by the Statute of Frauds, (m) And the officers and
directors of a corporate body are trustees of the stockholders and
cannot without fraud secure to themselves advantages not com-
mon to the latter, (n) 2 But a director may make a contract with
a corporation, and then, as to his contract, stands as a stranger
to it. (nn)

A corporation is the creature of the law, and is only what the
act of incorporation has made it, and derives all its powers from
that act. (no) Nevertheless, corporations authorized by their
charter to act in a prescribed manner may to some extent by
practice and usage make themselves liable on contracts entered
into in a different way. (o) But it has been decided that corpo-
rations cannot exceed the powers given in their charters and
make contracts not incidental or ancillary to the exercise of those
powers, and that they are not estopped from setting up their own

(») Gashwiler v. Willis, 33 Cal. 11. (no) Baltimore v. Baltimore, &c. R.

(Im) Chamberlain o. Chamberlain, 43 Co. 21 Md. 50.
U Y 424 (°) Witte v. Derby Fishing Company,

' Im) Stoddert v. Vestry of Port To- 2 Conn. 260; Bulkley v Derby Fishing

bacco Parish, 2 G. & J. 227. Company, 2 id. 252; Le Couteulx v. Buf-

(n) Koehler v. Iron Co. 2 Black, 715. falo, 33 N. Y. 333.

(nn) Stratton v. Allen, 1 Green, 229.

i Thus the directors of a railroad cannot secure, at its expense, undue advantages
to themselves, by the formation of a new company as an auxiliary to the original
one, with an understanding that they, or some of them, shall take stock in it ana
then that valuable contracts shall be given to it by the railroad, in the profits ot
which they are to share as stockholders of the new company. Wardell v. Railroad
Co., 103 U. S. 651.

157

* 142 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

want of authority to make such contracts by the fact that they
have been in the habit of entering into and fulfilling similar
engagements, for a long period, (p)1 This question may be
regarded, however, as not yet fully determined. The plea of
ultra vires as defined by Comstock, J., imports, not that the cor-
poration could not, and did not in fact, make the author-

* 142 ized contract, but that it ought not * to have been made.

The acquiescence of the shareholders in the abuse will
prevent the interposition of such a plea. (c[) 2

A corporation expressly authorized to transact business in
which it is customary to use negotiable paper, or receiving or
using negotiable paper in the proper transaction of business of
any kind, has, as a general rule, power to make, indorse, or
otherwise dispose of negotiable paper in any way not in itself
objectionable. (qq~)

No stockholder has any claim to a dividend until it be declared.
And when the distribution is ordered, it would seem that it should
be distributed among those who were stockholders at the time of
the order, (gr) 3 It is very common to create by will or otherwise

( p) Governor, &c. of Miners v. Fox, 16 (qq) Farmers Bank v. Maxwell, 32 N. T.

Q. B. 229 ; Hood v. New York, &c. R. Co. 679 ; Same v. Ellis, id. 583 ; Same v. Wat-

22 Conn. 502. son, id. 583 ; Wood v. Wellington, 30 N. Y.

{q) Bissell v. The M. R. Co. 22 N. Y. 218 ; Brookman v. Metcalf, 32 N. Y. 591.
258. {qr) Goodwin v. Hardy, 57 Me. 143.

1 A railroad corporation, authorized to build between certain points and pay
interest on instalments on stock until its completion, cannot, on the extension of the
road to other points, continue to pay such interest until the extension is completed,
Pittsburg, &o. R. Co. v. Allegheny, 63 Penn. St. 126 ; equally a lease by a railroad of
its road, rolling-stock, and franchises, for which no authority is given in its charter,
is ultra vires and void, Thomas v. Railroad Co. 101 U. S. 71 ; Troy, &c. R. Co. v.
Boston, &c. R. Co. 86 N. Y. 107. On the same principle, neither a railroad corpora-
tion, nor one to make and sell musical instruments, can guarantee the expenses of a
musical festival in expectation of an increase of traffic or business, Davis v. Old
Colony R. Co. 131 Mass. 258; Davis v. Smith Organ Co. 131 Mass. 258; but a glass
manufacturing corporation may contract to buy glassware for its trade while re-
pairing its works, Lyndeborough Glass Co. .•. Mass. Glass Co. Ill Mass. 310; a
water-power company, after the extinguishment of its water-power, may sell and
agree to regrade its land, Dupee v. Boston Water Power Co., 114 Mass. 37 ; and
a tract society with the chartered right to hold property for investment, may receive
money on lawful conditions securing it the income, failing the performance of which
it must return it, Morville v. Am. Tract Soc. 123 Mass. 129. In New York a distinc-
tion is made between an executory and an executed contract of a corporation ultra
vires, the latter of which only will be enforced. Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63
N. Y. 62.

2 It is equally true that where the shareholders authorize the lending of money
to the corporation by its directors, the corporation will be estopped to deny the
validity of the act. Hotel Co. v. Wade, 97 U. S. 13.

3 And such distribution should be made within a reasonable time after the divi-
dend is declared. Beers v, Bridgeport Spring Co. 42 Conn. 17. See Brundage
v. Brundage, 60 N. Y. 644. A purchaser of shares at auction, by the terms of sale

158

CH. X.] CORPORATIONS. * 142

a trust, whereby the income and dividends of certain stock is pay-
able to a person during his life, the principal going elsewhere at
his death. If extra dividends are earned and declared, the gen-
eral rule must be that they belong to the party entitled to the
dividends, (^s) But it has been held in Massachusetts, that if
instead of paying out earnings as dividends in money, additional
stock is created, absorbing those earnings, the shares thereof dis-
tributed to the trustee under such a trust, must be held by him as
additions to the capital, and not paid over to the party entitled
to the dividends. (<?i) 1 The question is not without its difficulty.
Municipal corporations created by acts of incorporation, are gov-
erned and limited by those acts quite as much as private corpo-
rations. In the older States there are towns which rest upon
prescription ; and in all our States there are general laws appli-
cable to all municipal corporations. The questions which have
arisen under the acts of incorporation, or the general laws relating
to this subject, are, mainly, questions concerning the right or
power of the town or city to make certain by-laws or enter into
certain agreements ; and the constitutional power of the legisla-
ture to confer certain powers upon these corporations. These
questions are iudefinitely diversified ; but the principle which
runs through all the cases may be stated thus. A town or city
has not only the power of making by-laws or contracts expressly
permitted by law, but all such as can be reasonably considered
incident to the powers expressly given, or as necessary for the
proper exercise of those powers ; and in determining what powers
are thus necessary much regard is paid to the nature of these cor-
porations and the purposes for which they exist ; and a liberal
though not a lax construction is given to provisions intended to
promote the interests of the public.

(qs) Woodruff's Estate, 1 Tuck. 68. See, as somewhat modifying the law of
The authorities are fully examined in this case, Leland v. Hayden, 102 Mass.

tlllS CclSG- 04Z.

(qt) Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101.

of which a deposit was to be made at once, and the remainder of the purchase-money
paid at a future time, is entitled to a dividend meanwhile declared. Black v. Hom-
ersham, 4 Ex. I). 24. . . .

1 Rand ». Hubbell, 115 Mass. 461. It is equally true that compensation for land
of a corporation taken by eminent domain, if distributed as a dividend among the
shareholders, goes to the capital, and not the income of such a trust fund Heard v.
Eldredge, 109 Mass. 258 ; or if the entire property of a corporation be sold and dis-
tributed, Clifford v. Thompson, 115 Mass. 478.

159

* 142 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

By way of illustration of this, it may be said, that in Illinois it
is held that the legislature may authorize municipal bodies to take
stock in railroads, without a vote of the inhabitants, (gw) In
Massachusetts, an ordinance of a city prohibiting projecting awn-
ings was sustained ; (qv~) and another prohibiting any person from
permitting swine under his care to go upon a sidewalk. (qw~) In
Georgia, it is held that a city cannot obstruct the streets by the
erection of any building, however necessary, (qx) In Illinois, a
city council having by charter a power to establish and regulate
markets, has no authority to prohibit the sale of vegetables out-
side the market limits. (c[y~) In Iowa, a city may construct a
bridge across a stream dividing streets, and issue its bonds to pay
for the same, (qz) but has no power to erect a toll-bridge, (ga)

In the absence of special provisions in the charter, or of by-
laws lawfully made, the corporate acts of a corporation are the
acts of a majority at a regular meeting, whether those present
were or were not a majority of the members of the corporation, (r)
And these corporate acts are binding upon all the members, (s)
It does not seem to have been positively decided whether this must
be a majority of all the members present, or may be only a major-
ity of all present and voting. But we hold that it may be the
latter. Otherwise, persons not voting would be counted as voting
against the measure. As a majority of all present binds all the
members, because all the members might be present, and perhaps
because it is their duty to be present, so a majority of those pres-
ent and voting should have the same force, because it is within
the right and power and perhaps the duty of all present to vote,
and so to express their dissent from any measure which they do

(qn) Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 111. 405. v Bellringer, 4 T. R. 810; Rex v. Miller,
(qv) Pedriek v. Bailey, 12 Gray, 161. 6 id. 208; Rex v. Bower 1 B. & C. 492-
(qw) Commonwealth v. Curtis, 0 Al- Ex parte Willcocks, 7 Cowen, 402. — The
len, -0° rule is perhaps the same where the act is
(qx\ Columbus v. Jaques, 30 Ga. 506. to be done by the corporation, when that
(qy) Caldwell v. Alton, 33 111. 416. consists of a definite number. Lord
(qz) Mullasky v. Cedar Falls, 19 la. Kenyan, Rex r. Bellringer, 4 T. R. 822.
, . _, At common law, the corporation may
(qa) Clark v. Des Moines, 19 la. 199. delegate to a select body in itself, its
(r) Attorney-General u. Davy, 2 Atk. power of electing members or officers.
/ id ^t , ^ Rex w. Westwood, 7 Bing. 1. — In a cor-
r- \SJ ow "'i o ?' CowP-248; Keldw. poration composed of different classes,
ineld, y VVend. 394. — But where the act a majority of each class must consent
is to be done by a body within the cor- before the charter can be altered, if
poration, and consisting of a definite there be no provision in the charter re-
number, a majority of that body must specting alterations. Case of St. Mary's
attend, and then a majority of those Church, 7 S. & R. 517.
thus assembled will bind the rest. Rex

160

CH. X.] CORPORATIONS. * 143

not approve. The individuality of members is merged in that of
the corporation, and therefore at common law no member is liable
personally for the debt of the corporation. But in some States
the private property of any member of a city or town or school
district, or a territorial (not a poll) parish, may be taken on exe-
cution against the corporation and he has Ms remedy over against
the corporation ; (£) and in many of our States it is now provided
by law that members of Banking Corporations, of Manufacturing
Corporations, and, in a few instances, of some other corpo-
rations, are responsible for the debts of the corporations
in * whole or in part, (tf) The various statutory pro- * 143
visions on this subject are usually precise and definite.
It has been held that as this personal liability depends wholly on
the provisions of positive law, it is to be construed strictly, (u)
and where the certificate of the officers of a corporation in due
form was sworn to and recorded as the law required, it exempted
the stockholders from personal liability without reference to the
truth of the statements in the certificate. (v~) And in a later
case, it was held that the officers of a manufacturing company
were not made liable by their false statement that the capital stock
was paid in, unless the statement was wilfully false. (w~)

Negotiable paper may be made, indorsed, or otherwise disposed
of by corporations generally, by the presidents or cashiers writing
their names with their titles of office ; especially if making or
dealing with such paper is within the scope of the proper business
of the corporation, (x)

(t) Gatehill's case, 5 Dane, Abr. 158; v. Santvord, 34 N. Y. 208. A corporation

Parsons, C. J., in 7 Mass. 187 ; Gaskill o. carrying on a prohibited business, cannot

Dudley' 6 Met. 546. interpose their corporate privileges to

(tt) The following cases relate to this prevent the liabilities of stockholders,

subiect • Utley v. Union Tool Co. 11 Richmondville Seminary v. McDonald,

Gray, 139 ; Medill v. Collier, 16 Ohio, 34 N. Y. 379.

599 ; McHose v. Wheeler, 45 Penn. St. M Gray v. Coffin, 9 Cush. 199.

32 • French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 518 ; (v) Stedman v. Eveleth, 6 Met. 114.

Allibone v. Hager, 46 Penn. St. 48; {w) Stebbins v. Edmunds, 12 Gray, 203.

Baker v. Backus, 32 111. 79. As to who (x) State Bank v. Fox, 3 Blatch-

is a stockholder, see Lathrop v. Kneeland, ford, 431 ; Patten v. Moses, 49 Me. 255;

46 Barb 432. That stockholders are not Olcott v. Tioga B. Co. 27 N. Y. 546;

liable in another jurisdiction, unless by s. c. 40 Barb. 179; Goodrich v. Reynolds,

force of some positive law, see Merrick 31 111. 490.

VOL. i. 11 161

* 144 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

*144 * CHAPTER XL

JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES.

In England the statute of 7 & 8 Victoria, ch. 110, has the effect
of making joint^stock companies, formed and registered in a cer-
tain way, quasi-corporations. In this country, wherever there are
no similar statutory provisions, joint-stock companies are rather
to be regarded as partnerships. The English statute above re-
ferred to defines a joint-stock company as " a partnership where-
of the capital is divided or agreed to be divided into shares, and
so as to be transferable without the express consent of all the
copartners." (ft) And this definition may be considered as appli-
cable to such companies in this country. Although a joint-stock
company is certainly not a corporation, yet it differs in some
respects from a common partnership. A member of a partner-
ship may assign his interest in the property of the firm ; but the
assignee does not become a partner unless the other copartners
choose to admit him ; and the interest so assigned being subject
to all the debts of the partnership, it may be withheld by the part-
ners for the purpose of settling the affairs of the firm, and until
it is certain that there is a balance belonging to the partners, and
until the share belonging to the assigning partner may, in whole
or in part be paid over to his assignee without injury to the cred-
itors of the firm. (6) But in a joint-stock company pro-
* 145 vision is made beforehand for such transfer, * and this is
a principal object and effect of the division into shares.

(a) 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, § 2. The same Act (6 Geo. I. c. 18), made during the
section proceeds to include also within excitement produced by the South Sea
the term Joint-Stock Company, all Life, Company, having been repealed by the
Fire and Marine Insurance Companies, statute 6 Geo. IV. c. 91, it was held in
and every partnership consisting of more Garrard v. Hardey, 5 Man. & G. 471, that
than twenty-five members. the formation of a company, the stock

(b) See Pratt v. Hutchinson, 15 East, in which should be transferable, was not
611; Rex v. Webb, 14 East, 406 ; Josephs an offence at common law. And the
v. Pebrer, 3 B. & C. 639; Fox v. Clifton, doctrine was reaffirmed in Harrison v.
9 Bing. 115; s. c. 6 id. 776. The Bubble Heathorn, 6 Man. & G. 81.

162

CH. XI.] JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES. * 146

In other respects the differences between the law of joint-stock
companies and that of partnerships (which is our next topic), are
not very many nor very important, (c)

Some question has arisen as to the power of a managing com-
mittee to pledge the credit of the members of a society ; and it is
held that this must depend upon the rules and by-laws of the
society, (d) Such a case is not likened to that of a partnership,
but is governed by the law of principal and agent, (e) Nor has a
member of a joint-stock company any implied authority to accept
bills in the name of the directors or of the company. (/) The
effect of becoming a subscriber to an intended company, in regard
to the creation of a partnership between the members as well
among themselves as in reference to the public, has been before
the courts ; and it has been held that an application for shares
and payment of the first deposit did not suffice to constitute one a
partner, where he had not otherwise interfered in the concern ; (#)
and that the insertion of his name by the secretary of the com-
pany in a book containing a list of the members was not a holding
of himself out to the public as a partner. (A) And this on the
ground that such person does not thereby acquire a right to share
in the profits.

But though there be some want of the necessary formalities or
acts of a party to make himself legally a member, yet if he inter-
pose and act as a member or director, (i) attend meetings, accept
office, or otherwise give himself out to the public as such, either
expressly, or by sufficient implication, then he will make him-
self liable as a partner. (/) And this even if the com- i
pany * originated in fraud, to which he is not a party, nor * 146
privy ; (Jc) or if a deed expressly required by the printed
prospectus to make him a partner has not been signed by him ; (J)

(c) See the remarks of Lord Campbell, (?) Lord Denman, Bell v. Francis, 9 C.
in Burness t>. Pennell, 2 H. L. Cas. 497. & P. 66. I

(d) Flemyng v. Hector, 2 M. & W. (j) Doubleday v. Muskett, 7 Bing.
172. And see Reynell v. Lewis, 15 M. & 110 ; Tredwen v. Bourne, 6 M. & W.
t${_ 5i7_ 461 ; Maudslay v. Le Blanc, 2 C. & P.

ie) ja 409, note; Braithwaite v. Skofield, 9 B.

(/) Bramah „. Roberts, 3 Bing. N. C. & C. 401 ; Peel v. Thomas, 15 C. B. 714. ,

963- Dickinson v. Valpy, 10 B. & C. 128; And see Harrison v. Heathorn, 6 Scott,

Steele v. Harmer, 14 M. & W. 831. N. R. 735.

(a) Pitchford v. Davis, 5 M. & W. 2 ; (k) Ellis v. Schmoeck, 5 Bing. 5^1 ;

Fox v. Clifton, 4 Mo. & P. 676, 6 Bing. s. c. 3 Mo. & P. 220

776. Same case sent down for a third {I) Maudslay v. Le Blanc, U, S f.

trial 9 Bing 115. And see Bourne v. 409, n. And see Ellis v. Schmoeck, 5

Freeth, 9 B. & C. 632. Bing. 521.

(A) Fox v. Clifton, 4 Mo. & P. 676.

163

*146

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

or even if the company has never been regularly and finally
formed ; (m) or has been abandoned ; (w) or is insolvent, (o)

It seems that a member of such a company may sue the com-
pany for work and labor done, and money expended by him in
their behalf, (p)

(m) Abbott, C. J., Keasley v. Codd, 2 C.
& P. 408, n.

(n) Doubleday v. Muskett, 7 Bing. 110.

(o) Keasley v. Codd, 2 C. & P. 408.

(p) Garden v. General Cemetery Co.
5 Bing. N. G. 253. But it is to be observed
that this was so held with reference to
an incorporated joint-stock company ; and
some stress was laid in the decision upon
the particular provisions of the act of
incorporation. And see Perring ti. Hone,
4 Bing. 28. — A member of a. joint-stock

164

company, like a member of an ordinary
partnership, may recover compensation
for service rendered to the company
previous to his having become a member
of it. Lucas v. Beach, 1 Man. & G. 417.
In general, however, an action cannot be
maintained by a member against the
company, or by the company against a
member, on a contract between him and
the company. Neale v. Turton, 4 Bing.
149; Wilson v. Curzon, 15 M. & W. 532;
Holmes v. Higgins, 1 B. & C. 74.

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP. * 147

* CHAPTER XII. *147

PARTNERSHIP.

Sect. 1. — What constitutes a Partnership.

A partnership exists when two or more persons combine their
property, labor, and skill, or one or more of them, in the transac-
tion of business, for their common profit, (a) A copartnership
is not a corporation, nor a joint-tenancy, nor a co-tenancy. Some
of its qualities and characteristics are similar to those of these
other modes of joint-interest. But it has its own system of rules
and principles of law which must govern all the questions arising
under it ; and mistakes have arisen from attempting to bring
rules from these other modes of joint-interest, to control ques-
tions of partnership.

A partnership is presumed to be general when there are no
stipulations, or no evidence from the course of business, to the
contrary. (b~) But it may be created for a specific purpose, or
be confined by the parties to a particular line of business, or even
a single transaction. When the partnership is formed by written
articles, it is considered as beginning at the date of the articles,
unless they contain a stipulation to the contrary, (c)

(a) Noyes v. Cushman, 25 Vt. 890. partnership in his business a person who
For a discussion of the principles of law had not then been admitted as attorney,
applicable to partnerships between at- and therefore could not be lawfully re-
torneys at law, and the ■ responsibilities ceived. No time being expressly fixed
growing out of them, and as to the for the commencement of the partnership,
effect of the dissolution of the firm by the court held that it was an agreement
the death of one of its members, see for a present partnership, aDd that parol
McGill v. McGill, 2 Met. (Ky.) 258. evidence was not admissible to show

(b) There is nothing in the law to that it was a conditional agreement,
prevent its being a universal partnership, which was not to take effect till the
however rare and difficult such cases person to be received was admitted as an
must be in fact. See Goesele v. Bimeler, attorney, and that it was therefore void.
14 How. 589. On the other hand a part- See Dix v. Otis, 5 Pick. 38. — But parties
nership may be limited to one particular may agree to form a partnership at some
subject. Eipley v. Colby, 3 Foster (N. future time, and until it arrives they will
H.), 438. not be liable as partners, unless they

(c) Williams v. Jones, 5 B & C. 108. have held themselves out as such. Dick-
An attorney entered into a written con- inson v. Valpy, 10 B. & C. 128; Avery v.
tract, whereby he agreed to take into Lauve, 1 La. Ann. 457.

165

* 148 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

In general, persons competent to transact business on their
own account may enter into partnership ; the disabilities of cover-
ture, infancy, and the like, applying equally in both cases. 1 But
interesting questions have been raised as to the rights and

* 148 * liabilities of those who represent infants. The personal

liability of such a party would seem to depend upon the
question whether he has claimed and exercised the right of with-
drawing any part of the capital, or of receiving a share of the
profits. Perhaps if he had by agreement the right to do this,
and more certainly if he had actually withdrawn capital or pro-
fits, he would be held personally responsible for the debts of
the partnership. (<i) It is often said that whether persons who
engage in joint transactions are partners, depends upon their
intentions ; but it must be remembered that by this is meant
their intentions as legally expressed or ascertained. (dd~)

Usually, the partners own together both the property and the
profits ; but there may be a partnership in the profits only. For
as between themselves the property may belong wholly to one
member of the partnership, although it is bound to third parties
for the debts of the firm ; as when it is bought wholly by funds
of one partner, and the other is to use only his skill and labor
in disposing of it, for a share of the profits, (e)

(</) Barklie v. Scott, 1 Hud. & B. 83. or profits as trustee for his son, nor in

A invested a sum of money for his in- fact drawn any.
fant son in a partnership on its forma- (dd) Salter v. Ham, 31 N. Y. 321.

tion, and it was stipulated, in a letter (e) So where a broker, employed by a

written by the other partners of the merchant to purchase goods, with the

house, that they should correctly account funds of the merchant, was to be one

with A, as the trustee of his son, for one third interested in them, and not to

third profit of his son's capital, or any charge commissions, and the correspond-

loss that might accrue, and be governed ence between him and the merchant

and directed by his advice in all matters described the transaction as a joint

relative to the business. Held, that this concern, the broker was held to be

letter did not constitute A a partner, interested as a partner in the goods, and

the jury having found that the money could pledge the whole of them. Eeid

was not invested by A for his own benefit, v. Hollinshead, 4 B. & C. 867. Abbott,

and that he had not reserved to himself C. J. : " Such a partnership may well

the power of drawing out the principal exist, although the whole price is in the

1 A married woman cannot enter into a partnership not in relation to her separate
property, but in so doing, even with her husband's consent, the latter is regarded its
the partner. Swasey v. Antram, 24 Ohio St. 87. See Todd v. Clapp, 118 Mass. 495;
Silvcus v. Porter, 74 Penn. St. 448; Newman v. Morris, 62 Miss. 239; Bradford v.
Johnson, 44 Tex. 381. If however she acts under a secret trust for her husband, she
may sue for a dissolution and an accounting. Bitter v. Bathman, 61 N. Y. 512.
As to corporations forming a partnership, see Allen v. Woonsocket Co. 11 R. I.
288; Butler v. American Toy Co. 46 Conn. 136; Dalton City Co. «. Dalton Mf'g
Co. 33 Ga. 243 ; Aigen v. Boston, &e. B. Co. 132 Mass. 423.

166

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP. * 149

SECTION II.

OP THE REAL ESTATE OP A PARTNERSHIP.

All kinds of property may be held in partnership ; and there
may be a partnership to trade in land, (/) ] or to cultivate
land * for the common profit ; (#) but real estate is still * 149
subject, to a certain extent, to the rules which govern that
kind of property.2 There has been much conflict and uncertainty
as to some of the rights and remedies of partners and creditors
in respect to real property belonging to the partnership, both
in England and in this country. But we consider the established
and the just rule to be, that when real estate is purchased with
partnership funds, for partnership purposes, it will be treated as
partnership property, and held like personal property, chargeable
with the debts of the firm, and with any balance which may be
due from one partner to the other, upon the winding up of the

first instance advanced by one partner, and the other labor, mutual interest in
the other contributing his time and skill the profits alone will not render the
and security in the selection and purchase latter liable to the former for contribu-
of the commodities." But where the tion for any loss of capital in the ad-
broker merely acts as agent, and in lieu venture. Heran v. Hall, 1 B. Mon. 159.
of commissions is to receive a certain See also Berthold v. Goldsmith, 24 How.
proportion of the profits arising from the 636.

sale, and bear a certain proportion of (f) Campbell v. Colhoun, 1 Penn.

the losses, the property in the subject of 140 ; Fall River Wharf Co. v. Borden, 10

the sale does not vest in him as a partner, Cush. 458 ; Clagett v. Kilbourne, 1 Black,

although he may be liable as such to third 346.

persons. Smith v. Watson, 2 B. & C. 401. (?) Allen v. Davis, 13 Ark. 28.

So where one partner furnishes capital,

1 Such a partnership may be created orally, Chester v. Dickerson, 54 N. T. 1 ;
Holmes v. McCray, 51 Ind. 358; Hirbour v. Reeding, 3 Montana, 15. See Williams
v. Gillies, 75 N. Y. 197.

2 If purchased by partnership funds for partnership purposes, such real estate is
firm property, whether one or all the partners hold the legal title, Davies v. Games,
12 Ch. D. 813; Offutt v. Scott, 47 Ala. 104; Bopp v. Fox, 63 111. 54; Johnson v.
Clark, 18 Kan. 157; Whitmore v. Shiverick, 3 Nev. 288 ; Collins ». Decker, 70 Me.
23; Ross v. Henderson, 77 N. C. 170; Knott v. Knott, 6 Oreg. 112; West Hickory
Ass. v. Reed, 80 Penn. St. 38; Lime Rock Bank p. Phetteplace, 8 R. I. 56; Fairchild
v. Fairchild, 64 N. Y. 471 ; if not so purchased, it belongs to the partners individu-
ally, Homer v. Homer, 107 Mass. 82 ; Price v. Hicks, 14 Fla. 565 ; Morgan v. Olvey,
53 Ind. 6. Such real estate must satisfy firm in preference to individual creditors.
Hiscock v. Phelps, 49 N. Y. 97 ; Rose v. Izard, 7 S. C. 442. A surviving partner
can sell the firm real estate, and equity will compel the heir holding the legal
title to convey it, Murphy v. Abrams, 50 Ala. 293; Mathews v. Hunter, 67 Mo.
293; whether necessary to pay debts or not, Soloman v. Fitzgerald, 7 Heiskell,
552.

167

*150

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

affairs of the firm. (K) But it seems to be the prevailing
* 150 rule in this country, * that as between the personal repre-
sentative and the heirs of a deceased partner, his share
of the surplus of the real estate of the partnership, after all
its debts are paid, and the equitable claims of its members are
adjusted, will be considered and treated as real estate, (i) It

(A) Goodburn v. Stevens, 6 Gill, 1;
Buchan v. Sumner, 2 Barb. Ch. 165, 197-
207, where several leading cases are re-
viewed; Buckley" v. Buckley, 11 Barb.
44 ; Piatt v. Oliver, 3 McLean, 27 ; Rice
v. Barnard, 20 Vt. 479 ; Overholt's Ap-
peal, 12 Penn. St. 222 ; Moderwell v.
Mullison, 21 id. 257 ; Buck v. Winn, 11
B. Mon. 322 ; Owens v. Collins, 23 Ala.
837 ; Cox i\ McBurney, 2 Sandf. 561 ;
Bufltum v. Buffum, 49 Me. 108; Dewey
i>, Dewey, 35 Vt. 555 ; Robertson v.
Baker, 11 Fla. 192 ; Shearer v. Shearer,
98 Mass. 107. " So far as the partners
and their creditors are concerned, real
estate belonging to the partnership is
treated in equity as personal property,
and subjected to the same general rules."
Assistant V. O, Delmonico v. Guillaume,
2 Sandf. Ch. 306. And where the real
estate is purchased for partnership pur-
poses on partnership account, it is im-
material whether the purchase is made
in the name of one partner or of all,
or of a stranger. Boyers v. Elliott, 7
Humph. 204; Hoxie o. Carr, 1 Sumner,
182. In this last case, Story, J., says:
"A question often arises, whether real
estate, purchased for a partnership, is to
be deemed for all purposes personal es-
tate like other effects. That it is so, as
to the payment of the partnership debts,
and adjustment of partnership rights,
and winding up the partnership concerns,
is clear, at least in the view of a court of
equity. But, whether it becomes personal
estate as between the executor or ad-
ministrator of a deceased partner and
his heir or devisee, is quite a different
question, upon which learned judges have
entertained opposite opinions. The whole
doctrine as between such claimants, must
turn upon the presumed intention of the
deceased partner; whether by leaving it
in the state of being real property he
meant, as between his personal represent-
atives and his heirs and devisees, that it
should retain its true and original charac-
ter; or whether having appropriated it
as partnership property, it should assume
the artificial character belonging to the
other personal funds of the firm." See
Sigourney v. Munn, 7 Conn. 11. — In
Buchan v. Sumner, already cited, Chan-

168

cellor Walworth, states it to be the
English rule, " That real estate belong-
ing to the firm, unless there is something
in the partnership articles to give it a
different direction, is to be considered, in
equity, as personal property; and that
it goes to the personal representative of
the deceased partner, who was beneficially
interested therein." — Wooldridge v. Wil-
kins, 3 How. (Miss.) 372. After reviewing
Greene v. Greene, 1 Hamm. 244, and
Thornton v. Dixon, 3 Bro. Ch. 199, the
court say : " The result of these cases
we take to be, that lands purchased by
partners, under an agreement that they
shall be sold for the benefit of the part-
nership, will be regarded as joint stock,
and will be likewise so considered, though
there be no agreement, if there be such
an application or use of them to the pur-
poses of the concern, as evidences an
original understanding of the parties
that they are to be treated as such, and
not as an estate in common." See Dyer
v. Clark, 5 Met. 562 — See West v. Skip,
1 Ves. Sen. 242; Phillips v. Phillips, 1
Myl. & K. 663. Sir John hack, M. R.,
in tliis last case said, that notwithstanding
older authorities, he considered it to be
settled that all property, whatever might
be its nature, purchased with partnership
capital for the purposes of the partnership
trade, continued to be partnership capital,
and to have to every intent the quality
of personal estate. And this is confirmed
in Broom i>. Broom, 3 Myl. & K. 443.
See Pugh v. Currie, 5 Ala. (s. s.) 446.
— In Pierce v. Trigg, 10 Leigh, 427,
'Dicker, P., after reviewing the Virginia
cases, adds : " Upon the whole I am of
opinion that the late English cases pro-
pound the true rule, and that real
estate, purchased with partnership funds
and for partnership purposes, must be
regarded as partnership stock, and treat-
ed as personalty." See also Ludlow v.
Cooper, 4 Ohio (n. s.), 1 ; Duhring r. Dull-
ring, 20 Mo. 174 ; Moreau v. Saffarans,
3 Kneed, 595; Galbraith v. Gedge, 16
B. Mon. 031 ; Coder v. Huling, 27 Penn.
St. 84.

(i) Goodwin v. Richardson, 11 Mass.
469. In this case an estate was mort-
gaged to two partners, who acquired an

CH,

XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

151

has been held, that the real estate of a partnership does not
acquire the incidents or liabilities of personal estate, unless there
be an agreement of the partners to that effect ; and that then
this change in the legal nature of the property results from
this agreement ; (,/) but we doubt the * accuracy of this * 151
ruling ; unless it is admitted that such agreement may be
inferred from the purchase of the property by partnership funds,
and the use of it for partnership purposes. It seems that
improvements made with partnership funds on real estate belong-
ing to one of the partners, will be treated as the personal prop-
erty of the partnership. (&)

absolute title by foreclosure, and the
court held that it thereby vested in them
as tenants in common, and on the deatli
of one partner was, as to his moiety, to
be treated as his separate estate. See
Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sumner, 185, where
Story, J., says that this decision " turns
upon a mere point of local law, under
a local statute, and does not dispose of
the equities between the parties resulting
from general principles." In Yeatman
v. Woods, 6 Yerg. 20, it was held that
real estate held by partners, for partner-
ship purposes, descends and vests in the
heir at law of a deceased partner, as real
estate in other cases. In Deloney v.
Hutcheson, 2 Rand. 183, it is said that
" The surviving partner, if he be a
creditor, can have no other remedy
against the real estate than any other
creditor can have." In Lawrence v.
Taylor, 5 Hill (N. Y.), Ill, it is said:
" Out of the Court of Chancery, real
estate, though belonging to partners and
employed in the partnership business —
the title standing in their joint names —
is deemed to be holden by them as
tenants in common, or joint-tenants for
all purposes." See also Lang v. Waring,
25 Ala. 625; Matlock v. Matlock, 5 Ind.
403.

(/) In Coles v. Coles, 15 Johns. 159;
Thornton v. Dixon, 3 Bro. Ch. 199 ; Bell
v. Phynn, 7 Ves. 453 ; Balmain v. Shore,
9 id. 500, language is used which might
have this interpretation. In Smith v.
Jackson, 2 Edw. Ch. 28, the Vice-Chan-
cellor said : " If at the time of forming
the partnership, the parties agree to in-
vest a part of their capital in the pur-
chase of real estate for partnership
purposes, or should at any time after-
wards find it expedient to do so, and
agree between themselves that, upon the
dissolution, the real as well as personal
estate shall be sold and turned into

money for the purpose of paying the
partnership debts and closing their joint
concerns, there the Court of Chancery,
acting upon the agreement, aud consider-
ing that as done which was agreed to be
executed, is warranted in regarding the
whole as personalty either in reference
to the claims of creditors, or the rights
of the heir or next of kin of a deceased
partner. . . But if a purchase be made,
and a conveyance taken to partners, as
tenants in common, without any agree-
ment to consider it as stock, although it
be paid for out of their joint fund, and
to be used for partnership purposes, I am
of opinion it must still be deemed real
estate." But see Collund v. Read, 24 N.
Y. (10 Smith) 505. Ripley v. Water-
worth, 7 Ves. 425. (1802.) Lord Eldon in
this case held to the effect that if an in-
tention to convert the real property of
the partnership can be gathered from the
general tenor of the partnership deed,
coupled with the nature of the partner-
ship dealings, that intention must prevail
to the full extent of converting the real
property, as between the real and per-
sonal representatives of the deceased
partner ; although the property might
not have been purchased with partner-
ship funds, and no conversion might be
necessary for the payment of the part-
nership debts. Collyer, Part. § 142;
Selkrig v. Davies, 2 Dow, 212. (1814.)
Lord Eldon: "My own individual opin-
ion is, that all property involved in a
partnership concern ought to be consid-
ered as personal." See also the judg-
ment of Lord Eldon in Crawsliay v.
Maule, 1 Swanst. 521, and Townsend v.
Devaynes, 1 Montague on Partnership,
App. n. (2 A). And see upon this point
the case of Jarvis v. Brooks, 7 Foster
(N. H.), 37 ; North Penn. Coal Co.'s Ap-
peal, 45 Penn. St. 181.

(k) Averill v. Loucks, 6 Barb. 28;

169

152

THE LAW OP CONTEACTS.

[book

The widow has her dower in the estate after the debts are paid,
but not until then. (7) J Although the legal title is protected,
the party having such title is held, if necessary, as trustee for
partnership purposes, or for the surviving partner. And if a

partner buys land out of partnership funds, and takes
* 152 title * to himself, he may be held as trustee for the

partnership, (w) It is to be remembered, however, as

Buckley v. Buckley, 11 Barb. 43 ; King
v. Wilcomb, 7 Barb. 263.

{I) Goodburn v. Stevens, 5 Gill, 1 ;
Greene v. Greene, 1 Hamra. 244 ; Rich-
ardson u. Wyatt, 2 Desaus. 471; Wool-
dridge v. Wilkins, 3 How. (Miss.) 360,
371 ; Burnside v. Merrick, 4 Met. 541 ;
Dyer v. Clark, 5 Met. 562. In this last
case, the liabilities of partnership prop-
erty to partnership creditors were elabor-
ately considered in the decision of the
court, the purport of which is given in
the head note as follows : " When real
estate is purchased by partners, with the
partnership funds, for partnership use and
convenience, although it is conveyed to
them in such a manner as to make them
tenants in common, yet in the absence of
an express agreement, or of circum-
stances showing an intent that such es-
tate shall be held for their separate use, it
will be considered and treated, in equity,
as vesting in them, in their partnership
capacity, clothed with an implied trust
that they shall hold it, until the purposes
for which it was so purchased shall be
accomplished, and that it shall be ap-
plied, if necessary, to the payment of
the partnership debts." Upon the disso-
lution of the partnership, by the death
of one of the partners, the survivor has
an equitable lien on such real estate for
his indemnity against the debts of the
firm, and for securing the balance that
may be due to him from the deceased
partner, on settlement of the partnership
accounts between them ; and the widow
and heirs of such deceased partner hare
no beneficial interest in such real estate,
nor in the rent received therefrom after
his death, until the surviving partner is
so indemnified. See Howard v. Priest, 5
Met. 5X2 ; Peck v. Fisher, 7 Cush. 386 ;
Arnold v. Wainwright, 6 Minn. 358 ;
Smith v. Smith, 5 Ves. 189. The es-

tates in this case were held subject to
dower, having been purchased with the
partnership fund, but conveyed to one
partner under a specific agreement that
they should be his, and he should be
debtor for the money. Lord Chancellor
Loughborough said : " If these estates had
only been conveyed to one partner, hav-
ing been purchased with partnership
funds, they would have been part of the
partnership property. But that was not
the nature of the transaction. The dis-
tinction is, the agreement as to the pur-
chase of these houses was specific. Upon
that they never could be specifically di-
vided, as if they were part of the part-
nership stock ; but when they came to
settle, the houses were Robert Smith's,
and he was debtor for so much money."
(m) Pierce v. Trigg, 10 Leigh, 406,
Tucker, P. (with whom Cabell, J., agreed),
after a review of the English cases said :
" I think, then, the doctrine laid down in
Gow on Partnership, 51, and 3 Kent,
Com. 37, may now be taken as settled in
England; namely, that real estate pur-
chased for partnership purposes with
partnership funds, and used as a part
of the stock in trade, is to be considered
to every intent as personal property, not
only as between the members of the part-
nership respectively, and their creditors,
but also as between the surviving partner
and the representatives of the deceased.
The legal title may, indeed, be in the
heir, but let the legal title he in whom it
may, it is in equity deemed partnership
property, and the partners are deemed
crsttiis que trust thereof, while the holder
of the legal title is but a trustee for the
partnership." In Pugli u. Currie, 5 Ala.
(n. s.) 446, the court say : " It can make
no difference whatever that the land was
entered in the name of the deceased part-
ner — the heirs will, in a court of equity,

1 So of a right to a homestead exemption. Robertshaw v. Hanway, 52 Miss. 713.
But a conveyance of partnership real estate for a firm debt bars dower. Simpson
v. Leech, 86 111. 286. Mowry v. Bradley, 11 R. I. 370, was to the effect that the
wife of a partner whose interest in the firm real estate was simply equitable could
claim dower in the surplus proceeds of its sale after payment of firm debts.

170

CH. XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

153

before stated, that this rule extends only so far as may be made
necessary by the business or debts of the partnership, and as
soon as this necessity ceases, any remaining real estate has
all the incidents of real property, as to conveyance,
inheritance, and dower. And where the land * purchased * 153
with the partnership funds is afterwards sold by the part-
ner who has the legal title to the whole, or to a part as tenant
in common, neither the firm nor its creditors have any lien on
the land for partnership purposes, against a purchaser without
notice or knowledge, where the deed to the partners did not
describe them as members of a firm, or partners, or otherwise
indicate the fact that the land was purchased as partnership
property, (ji) But a purchaser with actual or constructive notice

be considered as trustees of the surviving
partner." In the case of Burnside v.
Merrick, 4 Met. 541, Shaw, C. J., having
stated the question to be, whether real
estate, purchased by partners, for part-
nership business, and with partnership
funds, but conveyed to them bij such a deed
as, in case of other parties, would make them
tenants in common, would be considered as
partnership stock, said : " Though there
has been much diversity of judicial opin-
ion upon the subject, we think the pre-
vailing opinion now is, that real estate,
so acquired, is to be considered at law as
the several property of the partners, as
tenants in common : yet that it is so held,
subject to a trust, arising by implication
of law, by which it is liable to be sold,
and the proceeds brought into the part-
nership fund, as far as is necessary to
pay the debts of the firm, and to pay any
balance which may be due to the other
partners, on a final settlement ; and can-
not be held by the separate owner, except
to the extent of his interest in such final
balance. And it follows as a necessary
consequence, that when the firm is insol-
vent, the whole of the property, so held,
must be brought into the partnership
fund, in order to satisfy the partnership
creditors, as far as it will go for that pur-
pose." See Buchan v. Sumner, 2 Barb.
Ch. 165 ; Smith o. Tarlton, 2 Barb. Ch.
236"; McGuire v. Eamsey, 4 Eng. (Ark.)
618; Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sumner, 182. In
the case of Phillips v. Crammond, 2
Wash. C. C. 445, Washington, J., in de-
livering his opinion, said: "The general
principle is, that if a receiver, executor,
factor, or trustee, lay out the money
which he holds in his fiduciary char-
acter, in the purchase of real property,

and take the conveyance to himself, he
who is entitled to the money, which has
been thus invested, may follow the same,
and consider the purchase as made for
his use, and the purchaser a trustee for
him. Upon the same principle, I con-
ceive that a resulting trust would arise
to a partnership concern in lands pur-
chased by one of the partners, and paid
for out of the joint funds. . . . But this
species of resulting trust is open to cer-
tain qualifications, amongst which it is
proper to notice the following, namely,
that the person whose money was in-
vested in the purchase, is not obliged to
take the land, and to consider the pur-
chaser as his trustee, but may elect to
treat him as his debtor, and to claim the
money instead of the property. As a
consequence of this, and because the
claim to a resulting trust is merely that
of an equity, founded upon the presump-
tive intention of the parties, that equity
may be rebutted, even by parol evidence,
and circumstances to defeat it. If, for
instance, the person for whose benefit the
trust would otherwise be created, declares
that the purchase was not made for him,
or if both parties treat it as a purchase
for the use of him to whom the convey-
ance was made, no resulting trust will
arise." But the partner has no interest
in the estate purchased in his copartner's
name, unless it was intended or used for
partnership purposes. Cox v. McBurney,
2 Sandf. 561.

(n) It has been held that real estate,
used by the partners for partnership pur-
poses, but conveyed to them in fee as ten-
ants in common, and afterwards mortgaged
by one partner without notice to the .
mortgagee of existing partnership debts,

171

* 153 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

that the land is substantially, although not formally, partnership
property, holds it chargeable with the debts of the partnership ;
and this is the case even if he had no knowledge what those debts
were, or even of their existence. (0) *

section m.

OF THE GOOD-WILL.

The good-will of an establishment is considered, at least for
some purposes, as partnership property.2 Indeed, in case of
insolvency, or for other sufficient reasons, a court will take cog-
nizance of it, as a valuable property, and order it to be sold,

is to be considered real estate as between See also Forde v. Herron, 4 Munf. 321.
the mortgagee and the partnership cred- In this case, Roane, J., in delivering the
itors, and liable in the first instance to judgment of the court, said: " The court
the mortgagee. McDermont v. Laurence, is of opinion that, although real property,
7 S. & R. 438. Tdghman, C. J., said : purchased with the effects and used for
" Land, except for the purpose of erect the purposes of a mercantile firm or co-
ing necessary buildings, is not naturally partnery, may, in equity, be liable to dis-
an object of trade or commerce. Yet charge the balance due from the company
there is no doubt, that by the agreement to any partner, in preference to the pri-
of the partners, it may be brought into vate and individual debt of any other
the stock, and considered as personal prop- partner, it is nevertheless competent to
erty so far as concerns themselves and the members of such co-partnery to ac-
their heirs and personal representatives, quire such property jointly, as individu-
But if a conveyance of land is taken to als, or to lose the lien aforesaid (gene-
partners as tenants in common, without rally existing upon the social property),
mention of any agreement to consider it by acts tending to mislead or deceive
as stock, and afterwards a stranger pur- creditors or purchasers in this particu-
chases from one of the partners, it would lar." See also Marvin v. Trumbull,
be unjust if without notice he should Wright, 386.
be affected by any private agreement." (o) Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sumner, 182.

1 So with regard to mortgagees. Cavander v. Bulteel, L. E. 9 Ch. 70 ; Hiscock v.
Phelps, 1') N. Y. 07; Hewitt v. Rankin, 41 la. 30; Lewis u. Anderson, 20 Ohio St.
281. See Reynolds v. Ruckman, 35 Mich. 80.

2 The value of the good-will is the advantage secured in succeeding to the busi-
ness without reference to excluding any other person from the same business,
Mcllvaine, J., in Rammelsbcrg t. Mitchell, 29 Ohio St. 22, 54. The good-will is
considered a part of the partnership property, and will be included in its sale.
Boon w. Moss, 70 N. Y. 465 ; Shcppard <>. Boggs, 0 Neb. 257. Where a retiring
partner has sold his share of the business and good-will, he may carry on the same
business in the same place, but must not solicit the customers of the old business for
orders ; Labouchere v. Dawson, L. R. 13 Eq. 322 ; Moreau v. Edwards, 2 Tenn. Ch.
347; or even deal with them, Ginesi r. Cooper, 14 Ch. D. 596. The assignment of
the good-will carries the exclusive right to use the name of the old firm. Levy v.
Walker, 10 Ch. D. 430 ; Rogers v. Painter, 97 Mass. 291 ; Carmichel v. Latimer, 11
R. I. 395 ; Doake v. Dodsworth, 4 Kan. 159.

172

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP. * 154

* and restrain partners from pursuing a course which would * 154
destroy its value, (p)

In one English case, a distinction was taken between profes-
sional partnerships, in which the pecuniary value of the good-will
was recognized, and commercial partnerships, in which it was
intimated that the rule might be otherwise. ( q) But we doubt
the value of the distinction.

If the good-will could not be attached, it might still be assigned
for the benefit of the creditors. Perhaps it would pass to the
assignees of a bankrupt or insolvent, by operation of law ; but
not so as to carry with it any obligation of further labor or
responsibility on the part of the insolvent, to make the good-will
available. (Y)

SECTION rv.

OP THE DELECTUS PERSONARUM.

The partnership must be voluntary ; and therefore no partner
and no majority of partners can introduce a new member without
the consent of the others. The delectus personarum is always
preserved ; and if one partner sells out his interest in the firm,
this works a dissolution of the partnership, which can only be
renewed by the agreement of all. But such transfer may be made
by a partner, and will give to a bond fide purchaser all the right
of the partner selling out, to his share of the surplus upon
a settlement, (s) * And he may have a suit in equity for * 155
his share of the profits. (£)

(p) Williams v. Wilson, 4 Sandf. Ch. Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Meriv. 452 ; Knott v.

379. Morgan, 2 Keen, 213 ; Bell v. Locke, 8

(9) Farr v. Pearce, 3 Madd. 70. Paige, 75. As to the proper meaning of

(r) Dougherty v. Van Nostrand, Hoff. the term " Good-will," as used in trade,

Ch. 68. It has been held that the good- and the nature and extent of the rights

will of a partnership is not partnership which pass by an assignment of the

stock, and survives. Hammond v. Doug- " Good-will " of a business, see Harrison

las, 5 Ves. 539. This was doubted in v. Gardner, 2 Madd. 198.
Crawshay v. Collins, 15 Ves. 227. But (s) Gilmore v. Black, 2 Fairf. 488;

Hammond v Douglas was sustained in Griswold v. Waddington, 15 Johns. 82 ;

Lewis v. Langdon, 7 Sim. 421. The Moddewell v. Keever, 8 W. & S. 63

good-will of an establishment is recog- The assignment of shares in the stock of

nized as a valuable interest in equity, an unincorporated company, the certifi-

(t) Mathewson v. Clarke, 6 How. 122, 141.

173

* 155 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

An assignment to trustees for the benefit of the creditors, does
not make the creditors partners, and though the assignment pro-
poses that the business shall be carried on by the assignees to
make the profits for the benefit of the creditors, if they exercise
no control or direction in tbe management of the business, it
seems by the latest decisions that they will not be regarded as
partners therein, as to third parties ; the proper test in such a case
being whether the person by whom the business is actually carried
on, acts only in the capacity of agent for those to whose benefit
the profits are to accrue, (w)

SECTION V.

HOW A PARTNERSHIP MAT BE FORMED.

A partnership may be formed by deed, or by parol ; and with
or without a written agreement, (u) 1 And whatever be the

cates of which contained a provision that nel, 1 Whart. 381 ; Putnam v. "Wise, 1

they should not be assigned without the Hill (N. Y.), 234. See also Channel v.

consent of the directors and treasurer, Fassitt, 16 Ohio, 166; Crawshay ;>. Maule,

being made without their assent, does 1 Swanst. 508; Treadwell u. Williams, 9

not make the assignee a partner, or Bosw. 649.

enable him to bring a bill in equity to (h) Janes r. Whitbread, 11 C. B. 406;
compel the partners to account. King- Coates v. Williams, 7 Exch. 205. Wheat-
man v. Spurr, 7 Tick. 235. Parker, C. J., croft v. Hickman, Cox v. Hickman, 8 H.
said : " It is a settled principle, that a L. C'as. 268, in which cases it was held
company or co-partnership cannot be that a deed of assignment to trustees of a
compelled to receive a stranger into their debtor's property for the purpose of car-
league. These associations are founded rying on his business, and after paying
in personal confidence and delectus person- all costs and charges thereof, of dividing
arum. It is even held, that an executor the residue of the net profits among his
or heir of one of the members does not creditors in payment of their debts, made
become a member, unless by consent or the creditors who executed the deed,
by the terms of the compact." Compare partners in the business as to third
this case with Alvord v. Smith, 5 Pick, parties. Hickman v. Cox, 18 C. B. 617;
232. See Murray v. Bogert, 14 Johns. Brundred v. Muzzy, 1 Dutcher, 208.
318; Marquand v. N. Y. Man. Co. 17 (w) Owen, Ex parte, 4 De G. & S. 351;
Johns. 535. That no partner can be in- Smith v. Tarlton, 2 Barb. Ch. 336. —
troduced by mere sale and transfer to Although ordinary partnerships may be
him of a partner's interest, see Mathew- formed without any written contract,
son v. Clarke, 6 How. 122 ; Mason v. Con- and the acts and words of the parties are

1 As to whether a partnership is created, depends upon the meaning of the parties
as expressed in the agreement. Ross v. Parkyns, L. R. 20 Eq. 331 ; Ex parte. Tennant,
6 Ch. D. 303 ; Ratzer v. Ratzer, 1 Stewart, 136 ; Chapman v. Eames, 67 Me. 452.
An executory agreement to form does not create a partnership. Doyle v. Bailey,
75 III. 418; Lucas v. Cole, 57 Mo. 143; Haskins v. Burr, 106 Mass. 48; Irwin v.
Bidwell, 72 Penn. St. 244 ; Baldwin ». Burrows, 47 N. Y. 199. See Beckford v. Hill,
124 Mas3. 588 ; Cooley v. Broad, 29 La. An. 345.

174

CH. XII.]

PAETNEESHIP.

156

arrangement between the parties, one who holds himself out,
or permits himself to be held out as a partner, is liable as
such. (to)

The law will * not give effect to an agreement to form a * 156
partnership for illegal transactions or purposes, (w) 1 An
action cannot be maintained for the breach of an agreement to
become a partner, unless the terms of the intended partnership
were specific and are clearly proved, (x) But where a partner in
an existing firm agreed that a certain person should be received
as a partner in that firm, it was held that an action might be
maintained for a breach of that agreement, and some uncertainty
in the terms of the agreement was not a sufficient defence, (y)

ordinarily sufficient for that purpose, yet
if the object of the company be to specu-
late in the purchase and sale of land, the
positive rules of law and the Statute of
Frauds require the partnership agreement
to be in writing, and a court of equity will
not enforce a parol contract for such a
purpose. Smith u. Burnham, 3 Sumner,
435 ; Henderson v. Hudson, 1 Munf . 510 ;
Ridgway's App. 15 Penn. 177. But this
is said in a late case to apply only to the
contract between the parties, and that as
to third persons the partnership may be
proved like any other. In re Warren,
Da vies, 320. — If articles of partnership
exist, a creditor of the firm may still
prove the partnership by parol. Griffin
v. Doe, 12 Ala. 783. But the evidence of
a partnership must be submitted to the
jury. Drake v. Elwyn, 1 Caines, 134.
For the existence of a partnership or
joint connection is a question of fact.
Beecham v. Dodd, 3 Harring. 485.
"Whether the terms of the agreement
and the facts as found by the jury con-
stitute a partnership, is a question of
law. Id. ; Everitt v. Chapman, 6 Conn.
347 ; Terrill v. Richards, 1 Nott & McC.
20 ; Gilpin v. Temple, 4 Harring. 190.

{vv) Moss v. Jerome, 10 Bosw. 220.

(w) Armstrong v. Lewis, 2 Cr. & M.
274; Ewing v. Osbaldiston, 2 Myl. & C.

53. But where two persons carried on
the business of pawnbrokers under a
deed of partnership ; and the business
was conducted solely in the name of one,
and he only was licensed : Semble, that
although the parties might have made
themselves liable to penalties imposed
by the statute 39 & 40 Geo. III., c. 99,
yet, that it being no part of the con-
tract to carry on the partnership in
such a manner as to contravene the
law, the contract was not void. If,
however, a collateral agreement so to
conduct the partnership had been proved,
its illegality would have prevented either
party from acquiring any right under
the partnership.

(x) Figes v. Cutler, 3 Stark. 139. In
an action for breach of agreement to
enter into a partnership, a plea of dis-
honest conduct by the plaintiff in his
previous partnership relations, is no de-
fence. Andrewes v. Carstin, 100 Eng.
C. L. 444.

(y) McNeill v. Reid, 9 Bing. 68. Tin-
dal, C. J., said : " The other point for
our consideration under this head of
objection is, that the contract is too
vague, too uncertain, as to the term of
partnership, amount of capital to be con-
tributed, and the like, to be the sub-
ject of estimate by a jury. But is that

1 A partner in an unlawful business is without remedy as against his co-partners,
Snell v. Dwieht, 120 Mass. 9; Dunham v. Presby, ib. 285; Lane v. Thomas, 37 Tex.
157- Watson v. Murray, 8 C. E. Green, 257; In re South Wales, &c. Co. 2 Ch. D.
763 • although an account may be had of that portion of a firm's business that may
be legal, Anderson v. Powell, 44 la. 20. The fact that a firm sold articles to the
Confederate States was held, in Pfeiffer v. Maltby, 38 Tex. 523. not to prevent an
accounting. Marsh v. Russell, 66 N. Y. 288, decided that a partnership formed to
furnish recruits during the civil war, with an agreement that its members should not
compete with each other or furnish recruits for less than a fixed price was lawful ;
and Wallis v. Wheelock, 26 La. An. 246, held a partnership for blockade-running
during the civil war not to be illegal.

s 175

* 157 THE LAW OP CONTEACTS. [BOOK I.

A partnership, in general, is constituted between individuals,

by an agreement to enter together into a general or a particular

business, and share the profits and the losses thereof, (z) J

* 157 But * the mere sharing of profits, without any connection

whatever in the business, is not enough to constitute a
partnership, (a) Thus, if one firm agrees with another, that each
shall continue and carry on its own business independently, but
that the profits and losses of each firm shall be divided between
the two, the two firms do not enter into partnership, nor do the
members of one of the firms become partners with the members
of the other. (5) There need not, however, be a community of
interest in the property, if there be in the profits, and some con-
nection in the business. (<?) 2 But the setting apart of a portion

a correct statement of the evidence? Cushman v. Bailey, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 526;
It is plain that the plaintiff considered, Belknap n. Wendell, 1 Foster (N. H.),
and that the defendant led him to con- 175 ; Catskill Bank v. Gray, 14 Barb,
sider, that he was contracting for a fourth 474. — A participation in the uncertain
part of the defendant's business, in the profits of trade, renders one a copart-
room of Muspratt, who had quitted it; ner in respect to the liabilities of the
and that both the defendant and his concern to third persons. Oakley v.
agent, Carstairs, knew the precise extent Aspinwall, 2 Sandf. 7. See Bucknam
and value of such an interest. That v. Barnum, 15 Conn. 67 ; Cushman v.
being so, the case is clear of the diffi- Bailey, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 526. See also,
culty which arose in Figes v. Cutler, on this subject, Mair v. Glennie, 4 M.
where the evidence was too indistinct & Sel. 240; Smith v. Watson, 2 B. & C.
to enable the jury to come to any con- 401; Hesketh v. Blanchard, 4 East, 144;
elusion. It is unnecessary to advert to Reid v. Hollinshead, 4 B. & C. 867 ;
the cases in equity, because this is not Everitt v. Chapman, 6 Conn. 347 ; Hard-
it proceeding to enforce performance of ing v. Foxcroft, 6 Greenl. 76 ; Thorn-
a contract, but to obtain damages for the dike v. De Wolf, 6 Pick. 124 ; Jackson
breach of it. v. Robinson, 3 Mason, 138; Griffith v.
(=) Langdale, ex parte, 18 Ves. 300. Buffum, 22 Vt. 181; Duryeas v. Whit-
In this case, the Lord Chancellor (El- comb, 31 Vt. 395.

don), said: "The criterion of a part- (a) Merrick v. Gordon, 20 N. Y. (6

nership is, whether the parties are to Smith) 93 ; Fawcett v. Osborn, 32 111.

participate in profit. That has been 411 ; Morgan v. Stearns, 41 Vt. 397.
the question ever since the case of (b) Smith p. Wright, 5 Sandf. 113.

Groves v. Smith." If the actual con- And see Pattison v. Blanchard, 1 Seld.

tract give a claim upon the profits, or 186.

the application of them, that is partner- (c) Briggs v. Vanderbilt, 19 Barb,

ship. See Ex parte Hamper, 17 Ves. 222; Ellsworth v. Tartt, 26 Ala. 133;

403, Sumner's ed. and note, p. *404; Miller ». Price, 20 Wis. 117.

1 A partnership always arises where a community of profit and loss is agreed
on, McGill b. Dowdle, 33 Ark. 311; Harris v. Hillegass, 54 Cal. 463; Marsh v.
Russell, 66 N. Y. 288; Falkner v. Hunt, 73 N. C. 571 ; Kuhn v. Newman, 49 la. 424;
Beauregard v, Case, 91 U. S. 134 ; although the parties expressly agree that there
shall be no partnership, Ex parte Delhasse, 7 Ch. D. 511; Moore o. Davis, 11
Ch. D. 261.

2 In the absence of agreement the presumption is that there is community of
interest in both property and profit and loss. Robinson v. Ashton, L. R. 20 Eq. 25 ;
Whitcomb r. Converse, 119 Mass. 3H ; Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Doll, 35 Md. 89 ; Flagg
v. Stowe, 85 111. 154 ; Knight v. Ogden, 2 Term. Ch. 473; Hankey v. Becht, 25 Minn.
212. See Syers v. Syers, 1 App. Cas. 174.

176

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP. , * 158

of the profits to pay the debt of a third person, does not make
him a partner, (d) So too, a joint purchase, but for the purpose
of distinct and separate sales by each party on his own account,
does not constitute the purchasers partners, (e) And this, how-
ever unequal the shares may be, and even if one of the parties
has no direct interest or property in the capital of the firm. If
one party furnishes material at a certain price, and another man-
ufactures it at a certain price and has charge of the selling of the
articles, the two dividing the profits, this does not make them
partners, as between themselves, (ee) The cases are quite numer-
ous which turn upon the question what facts suffice to create a
liability as a partner. They are determined by the special cir-
cumstances of each case, and it is difficult to draw general rules
from them, (ef) In the absence of specific stipulations or con-
trolling evidence, the presumption of law is, that the partners
share the profits equally. (/)

The articles may provide or omit a period for the continuance
of the partnership. But if such a period be provided and the
time expires, and then the partnership is renewed by agreement,
it has been held that the new partnership is founded upon
the same terms as the old one, in the absence of opposing
testimony. (#)

* It is certain that persons may be copartners as to third * 158

(d) Drake v. Eamsay, 3 Rich. L. 37. the connection, transmitted to the com-

(e) Bauchor v. Cilley, 38 Me. 653; plainant in London, where he resided,
Stoallings v. Baker, 15 Mo. 481. the articles of copartnership, with an in-

(ee) Hitchings v. Ellis, 12 Gray, 449. dorsement of a renewal of them for an-

\ef) The following are recent inter- other term of seven years, to commence

esting cases on this question: Pratt v. from the expiration of the former one.

Landon, 12 Allen, 544; Emmons v. The complainant, in answer to this com-

Westfield Bank, 97 Mass. 230; Merwin munication, said he would agree to the

v. Playford, 3 Rob. 702; Strong v. Place, proposition, on the happening of a certain

4 Rob. 385. contingency. It did not distinctly appear

(/) Peacock v. Peacock, 16 Ves. 49; whether the contingency happened or not.

Parrar v. Beswick, 1 Mo. & R. 527 ; But it did appear that the complainant

Gould v. Gould, 6 Wend. 263. But see continued to discharge his duties as a

Thompson v. Williamson, 7 Bligh, 432. partner in the same manner as formerly.

See Story, Part. § 24 ad Jin. note. On this evidence the defendants con-

(g) Dickinson v. Survivors of Bolds tended tliat the partnership was not
& Rhodes, 3 Desaus. 501. This was a renewed for seven years, but was deter-
bill in equity for an account of the minable at the pleasure of either party,
profits of a copartnership. The only But the court held that the complain-
question in the case was as to how ant's continuing to discharge his former
long the partnership continued. It duties on the original terms, was a sub-
appeared by the original articles that stantial acceptance of the defendant's
it commenced in 1787, under an agree- proposition, and so the partnership was
ment to continue seven years. After renewed for another term of seven
the expiration of that period the _de- years,
fendants, being desirous of renewing

VOL. i.

12 177

* 159 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

parties, and brought within all the liabilities of partnership as
to them, who are not partners between themselves. (Ji) For
whether tbey are partners as between themselves is determined
chiefly by reference to their own intention ; but whether they are
partners in respect to third parties is determined by a considera-
tion of this intention, and also of that actual participation of
profits which is held to require of them to participate in the
losses, because it diminishes the fund from which the losses are
to be paid ; (?) and also of the way and degree in which the per-
son sought to be charged as partner has been held out to the
world as such, so that the person seeking to charge him had good
reason to believe a debt of the partnership carried with it his
responsibility. (/)

If one lends money to be used by the borrower in his business,
the lender to receive interest, and in addition thereto a share of
the profits of the business, a question may arise whether he is a
lender on usury or a partner. He would seem indeed to be both ;
only a usurer as between the lender and borrower, but a partner
as to third persons ; and it may depend upon the manner in which
the question is presented, whether the character of a usurer is to
be fixed upon him. If he sues the borrower for repayment

* 159 of the money, it seems to be competent * for the borrower

to allege in his defence the usurious character of the
loan. (¥) But if a third party who is a creditor of the borrower,
upon a debt which has arisen in the business in which the money
was lent to be used, sues the lender as a partner, on the ground
that he took away profits to which the creditor might look for his
debt, the lender will be held as such partner, and it is not com-
petent for him to set up his contract as usurious, for he may not
rest his defence upon his own wrong. (J)

(A) If parties are so associated in busi- (i) As to what participation of profits

ness as to make them partners with re- makes one a partner, see infra, n. (m).
spect to third persons, but expressly agree (j) Cottrill v. Vanduzen, 22 Vt.

that a partnership shall not exist, they oil; Gilpin v. Temple, 4 Marring. 90;
are not partners as between themselves. ' Furber v. Carter, 11 Humph. 271 ;

Gill v. Kuhn, (i S. & R. 333; Heskith r. Grieff v. Bondousquie, 18 La. Ann. 631;

Blanchard, 4 East, 144. If, however, Sherrod v. Langdon, 21 la. 518.
parties by their conduct, have treated (k) Morse v. Wilson, 4 T. R. 363.

their contract as a partnership, and have See also Gilpin v. Enderbey, 5 B. & Aid.

so held themselves out to the world, it is 954 ; s. c. 5 Moore, 671.
unnecessary to put a construction upon yl) Grace v. Smith, 2 W. Bl. 998;

the written contract, as between them- Morse v. Wilson, 4 T. 1i. 353 ; Case of

selves and others. Stearns v. Haven, Lane, Fraser & Boylston, cited in 17

14 Vt. 540. See also Drennen u. House, Vesey, 405, Sumner's edition. See Gib-

41 Penn. St. 30. son v. Stone, 43 Barb. 285.

178

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP. * 160

A question has frequently arisen where a clerk, agent, or
salesman has been taken into partnership, to render in fact the
same services as before, or a person received to render such
services who had not been previously employed, upon an agree-
ment that the services shall be compensated not by a salary, but
by a share of the profits.1 Is such person a partner as to third
parties ? It will appear, by the cases cited in the notes, that
there has been some uncertainty upon this point. Prom many
of the cases it would seem that a rule of this kind was adopted ;
namely, that where the bargain was that A should receive for
his services one tenth of the profits this made him a partner ;
but if he was to receive a salary, equal in amount to the one
tenth part of the profits, this did not make him a partner. This
rule is somewhat technical, but not altogether so ; and would
doubtless be applied to such a contract now, if the words used
were not accompanied by other language, or by facts which
required, or at least justified a different interpretation. Whether
a person were a partner with others, should be determined in this
as in other cases by a consideration of their intention, and of
the way in which the alleged partner was held forth to the public,
and the interest and power he had in or over the fund to which
the creditors of the partnership could look for their security.
Where A employs B, and agrees to give him, in lieu of wages,
or by way of wages, a certain proportion of A's profits, this need
not give B any right to control the business or interfere
therein in any way. They are not * then necessarily * 160
partners, because there is no reciprocity between them :
unless some other sufficient reason exists for so treating them.
But the reason usually alleged as that for which he who shares
in the profits is held liable as a partner for the debts, namely,
that he has diminished the fund from which the debts are to be

1 The mere lending of money for a share of the profits does not constitute a part-
nership, Ex parte Tennant, 6 Ch. D. 303 ; Mollvvo, &c. Co. v. Court of Wards, L. R.
4 P. C. 419 ; Smith v. Knight, 71 111. 148 ; Harvey v. Childs, 28 Ohio St. 319 ; Rich-
ardson v. Hughitt, 76 N. Y. 55; Eager ti. Crawford, ib. 97; contra, Parker v. Canfleld,
37 Conn. 250, although there was an express stipulation that the lender should be
regarded as a creditor ; nor membership in a defunct corporation, Central Bank v.
Walker, 66 N. Y. 424 ; nor in an incipient corporation, although doing business before
the capital is paid in, Salem Bank v. Almy, 117 Mass. 476; Blanchard v. Kaull, 44
Cal. 440; not even between themselves, Ward v. Brigham, 127 Mass. 24; nor cor-
poration creditors in charge, Beeson v. Lang, 85 Penn. St. 197 ; nor farming on shares,
Holloway v. Brinkley, 42 Ga. 226; Jeter v. Penn, 28 La. An. 230; Gregory v.
Brooks, 1 Hun, 404 ; Robinson v. Haas, 40 Cal. 474 ; but see Autrey v. Frieze, 59 Ala.
687 ; nor fishing on shares, Holden v. French, 68 Me. 241.

179

* 160 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

paid, seems to be regarded as not applicable to one who takes
wages, though they may be measured by the profits ; and if this
is the bargain in fact the manner of its expression would seem
not to be material. It is certain that while the salesman took
a thousand dollars a year as wages for his services, this did
not make him a partner. The fund to pay debts grew up in
some measure from his services, and he was entitled to be paid
out of it for them ; and if he now has, instead of a fixed salary,
a share of the profits, it might still be clear from the contract
and circumstances, that the arrangement was intended not to
pay him more than his services were worth, but only to make
his wages dependent in some degree upon his services, and so
to stimulate him to make the profits, or the general fund to
which the creditors must look, as large as possible. Lord
Eldon's reason for the rule seems to be, "that where the sales-
man has an amount of money equal to one tenth of the profits,
this gives him no action of account, and therefore he is not a
partner ; but where he is to receive one tenth of the profits, this
gives him an action of account, and therefore makes him a part-
ner ; " but this seems open to the objection that the question of
partnership is prior, and shftuld determine the right of account ;
whereas this reason would regard the right of account as prior,
and determining the question of partnership, («i) Lord Eldon

(m) It seems to be well settled, that a Sanrlf. 311 ; Newman v. Bean, 1 Foster
contract to pay one employed in certain (N. 11.), 03; Recti v. Murpliy, 2 Greene
business a salary, equal in amount to a (Town), 074 ; Goode v. M'Cartney, 10
certain proportion of the profits, will not Tex. 103; Glenn i\ Gill, 2 Md. 1 ; Drake
make such a person a partner. The v. l'.amcv, 3 Rich. L. 37 ; Bartlett v.
question of profits is of importance only Jones, 2 Strob. 471 ; Hodges v. Pawes, 6
in determining the amount of salary. Ala. 215; "Wilkinson v. Jett, 7 Leigh,
Neither will a certain salary, together 115. But see Heyhoe v. Rurge, 9 C. B.
with a commission of a certain per cent 431; Taylor r. Tcrme, 3 Har. & J. 505;
upon the profits, make the receiver a Evcritt v. Chapman, (> Conn. 351. — In
partner. Miller v. Bartlet, 15 S. & R. Bradley ». White, 10 Met. 303, it was held
137; Stocker ». Brockelbank, 5 E. L. & that an agreement between D. and W., by
E. 07; Dunham p. Rogers, 1 Barr, 255; which D. was to furnish goods for a
Denny v. Cabot, 0 Met. 82 ; Hodgman v. store, and pay all the expenses, and W.
Smith, 13 Barb. 302; Brockway v. Bur- was to transact the business of the store
nap, 16 id. 300; Atherton .'. Tilton, 44 and receive half of the profits, as a corn-
's. II. 452. And the better opinion seems pensationfor his sernces, did not constitute
now to be, that an agreement by which a W. a partner, and that in action against
person is to receive a certain -portion of the D. and W. for goods sold and delivered to
profits for his satary, does not constitute D., W. was not liable. See also Ambler
a partnership, such person having no v. Bradley, 0 Yt. 110; Blanchard v.
specific interest in the profits themselves, Coolidge, 22 Pick. 151. This question
as profits. See Loomis v. Marshall, 12 also underwent much discussion in Denny
Conn. 69; Burcle v. Eekart, 1 Denio, ... Cabot, 6 Met. 82. The court there
337; s. c. 3 Comst. 132 ; Vanderburgh v. said: "On this point the distinction
Hull, 20 Wend. 70; Ogden v. Astor, 4 appears to us to be well established,

180

CH. XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

161

says, " the cases * have gone to this nicety," and speaks
of the rule above mentioned as settled ; but we have not

161

that a party who participates in the
profits of a trade or business, and has
an interest in the profits, as profits, is
chargeable as a partner with respect to
third persons ; but if he is only entitled
to receive a certain sum of money in
proportion to a given quantum of the
profits, as a compensation for his labor
and services, he is not thereby liable
to be charged as a partner. It is true
that Lord Eldon has expressed a doubt
of the soundness of this distinction. In
Ex parte Hamper, 17 Ves. 404, he says,
' The cases have gone to this nicety
(upon a distinction so thin, that I cannot
6tate it as established upon due consid-
eration), that if a trader agrees to pay
another person, for his labor in the con-
cern, a sum of money, even in proportion
to the profits, equal to a certain share
that will not make him a partner ; but if
he has a specific interest in the profits
themselves, as profits, he is a partner.' He
admits, however, that the law of partner-
ship is thus settled. Ex parte Watson, 19
Ves. 459 ; Ex parte Eowlandson, 1 Rose,
92. And this distinction has been con-
firmed by numerous subsequent decisions.
In Cutler v. Windsor, 6 Pick. 335, it was
decided, that an agreement between the
owner and master of a vessel to divide
the earnings of the vessel between them,
after deducting certain fixed charges, did
not render them liable to third persons as
partners. In that ease the deduction was
from the gross earnings. And the agree-
ment is substantially the same in the
present case. For although, in terms,
the agreement was to pay Cooper one
third of the net earnings, yet that is ex-
plained by the words immediately follow-
ing, by which it appears that Cooper was
entitled to one third of the gross profits,
after deducting certain specified charges;
and that in no event was he to be liable
for any losses. So the agreement in
this case is precisely similar to that in
Loomis v. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69. In that
case, French and Hubbell agreed with
Marshall to manufacture his wool into
cloth, and he agreed to give them for
their services, and the materials they
should furnish, a certain proportion of
' the net proceeds of all the cloths, after
deducting incidental and necessary ex-
penses of transporting and other proper
charges of sale.' It was not expressed
in terms to be for such compensation,
but such the court held was the legal

meaning of the agreement. This case
was very ably discussed by the learned
judge who delivered the opinion of the
court, and, as it seems to us. the decision
is fully sustained by well established
principles. So in Reynolds v. Toppan,
15 Mass. 370, it was agreed between
the master and owner of a vessel, that
the latter was to receive two fifths of the
net earnings of the vessel ; and it was
held that this did not render him liable
as a partner. So in Vanderburgh v. Hull,
20 Wend. 70, where a person was employ-
ed as an agent in conducting the business
of a foundry, at a salary of §300 ; and in
addition thereto he was to receive one
third of the profits of the foundry, if
any were made; and he had nothing to
do with the losses; it was held, that the
agent was not, either as to his employers
or third persons, a partner. So in Turner
v. Bissell, 14 Pick. 192, it was agreed that
Bissell was to furnish wool to he worked
into satinets by Root, who was to find
and pay for warps for the same, and
Bissell was to pay Root for working the
wool, finding the warps, &c, 40 per cent
on the sales of the satinets. It was held
that the defendants were not partners
inter se, nor as to third persons." — And
in further exposition of this principle, it
is said: "If a person stipulate for a
share in the profits, so as to entitle him
to an account, and to give him a specific
lien, or a preference in payment, over all
creditors, and giving him the full benefit
of the profits of the business, without
any corresponding risk in case of loss ;
justice to the other creditors would seem
to require that lie should be holden to
be liable to third persons as a partner.
But where a party is to receive a com-
pensation for his labor, in proportion to
the profits of the business, without hav-
ing any specific lien upon such profits, to
the exclusion of other creditors, there
seems to be no reason for holding him
liable as a partner, even to third persons.
This distinction is supported by Cary, in
his treatise on Partnership, and Chancel-
lor Walworth considers it as a sound
one, in Champion v. Bostick, 18 Wend.
184. And it is adopted with approbation
by Chancellor Kent, in his Commenta-
ries, 3 Kent, Com. (4th ed.) 25, n. The
remarks of Judge Story on these dis-
tinctions are very forcible, and seem to
us to be founded on sound principles."
" The question in all this class of cases,"

181

*162

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

* 162 succeeded in finding in the * English reports, previous
cases or authorities which can be regarded as establishing
this rule. And we regard it as now an established rule that if a
party is paid for his services as an employee of the firm, whether
-by a salary or a share in the profits, he is not a partner. And
if a partner has a right to elect a salary for his services instead
of a share of the profits, and in good faith elects a salary, he
ceases to be a partner, (mm)

In a. recent English case it is said that the test to determine
the liability of one sought to be charged as a partner, is whether
the trade is carried on in his behalf, and the participation of
profits such as to establish the relation of principal and agent,
between the person taking the profits and those who carry on

he says, " is first to arrive at the inten-
tion of the parties inter sese ; and secondly,
if between themselves there is no inten-
tion to create a partnership, whether
there is any stubborn rule of law, which
will nevertheless, as to third persons
make a mere participation in the profits
conclusive that there is a partnership."
" It is said, ' every man who has » share
in the profits of a trade ought also to
bear his share in the loss, as a partner.'
In a just sense this language is sufficient-
ly expressive of the general rule of law ;
but it is assuming the very point in con-
troversy to assert that it is universally
true, or that there are no qualifications,
or limitations, or exceptions to it. On
the contrary, the very cases alluded to
by Lord Eldon, in the clearest terms
established that such qualifications, limi-
tations, and exceptions do exist." Story
on Part. § 36. "Admitting, however,
that a participation in the profits will
ordinarily establish the existence of a
partnership between the parties, in favor
of third persons, in the absence of all
other opposing circumstances ; the ques-
tion is, whether the circumstances, under
which the participation exists, may not
qualify the presumption, and satisfac-
torily prove that the portion of the
profits is taken, not in the character of
a partner, but in the character of an
agent, as a mere compensation for labor
and services. If the latter be the true
predicament of the party, and the whole
transaction admits, nay requires, that
very interpretation, where is the rule
of law which forces upon the transac-
tion the opposite interpretation, and re-

182

quires the court to pronounce an agency
to be a partnership, contrary to the truth
of the facts, and the intention of the
parties '? Now it is precisely upon this
very ground, that no such absolute rule
exists, and that it is a mere presumption
of law, which prevails in the absence of
controlling circumstances, but is control-
led by them, that the doctrine in the
authorities alluded to is founded ; " " and
there is no hardship upon third persons,
since the party does not hold himself out
as more than an agent. This qualifica-
tion of the rule (the rule itself being
built upon an artificial foundation), is
in truth but carrying into effect the real
intention of the parties, and would seem
far more consonant to justice and equity
than to enforce an opposite doctrine,
which must always carry in its train seri-
ous mischiefs or ruinous results, never
contemplated by the parties." § 38.
Where a broker bought wheat for B.
& H. with their funds, and an agreement
is made between the three that the
broker shall dispose of the wheat, and
that the profits shall be equally divided,
the broker is neither partner nor joint
owner of the wheat. Hanna v. Flint, 14
Cal. 73. See also Holmes v. Porter, 39
Me. 157; Chase v. Stevens, 19 N. H. 465;
Matthews v. Felch, 25 Vt. 536; Pott v.
Eyton, 3 M. G. & S. 32, and Heimstreet
v. Howland, 5 Denio, 68. See also Lafou
u. Chinn, 6 B. Mon. 305; Barry v. Nesh-
am, 3 M. G. & S. 641 ; Conklin v. Barton,
43 Barb. 435.

(mm) Bidwell v. Madison, 10 Minn.
13; Parker v. Fergus, 43 111. 437.

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP. * 163

the business, (mn) 1 But if two or more persons carry on a
business, sharing the profits, and one who is the most active
partner, as salesman or the like, calls, in the articles, his share
of the profits a salary, he is nevertheless a partner as to third
persons ; the rule as to wages or salary applying only to those
who are strictly only employed by the firm, (mo)

It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between partnership
and tenancy in common ; and this question is often important,
as determining between the adverse rights of the creditors of
the individual owners, and those of persons who claim as partner-
ship creditors. In general, if the property owned jointly
is so * owned for the purpose of a joint business, and is so * 163
used, and the profits resulting form a common fund, it is
partnership property ; otherwise not. (n) a

(mn) Bullen v. Sharp, L. R. 1 C. P. their account in the like proportions for

86. a voyage, and consigned the same to the

(mo) Brigham i>. Clark, 100 Mass. master for sale and returns ; it was held

430. that they were tenants in common of

(n) Post v. Kimberly, 9 Johns. 470; the cargo, and not partners. Story, J.:
Murray v. Bogert, 14 id. 318 ; Hawes " It does not by any means follow be-
v. Tillinghast, 1 Gray, 289. Where cause the purchase was made for the
the owners of land let it, agreeing with account of all, or the shipment was
the occupiers to receive one half of the made in the names of all, that this eon-
grain, &c, in consideration of the occu- stituted them partners in the sense of a
pancy, the owners and occupiers, to- joint interest. They might authorize a
gether with other persons whom the common agent to purchase or ship goods
occupiers admitted to a share in the for them according to their several and
grain in consideration of their doing a separate interests, without involving
portion of the farm work, were held to themselves in a joint partnership re-
be tenants in common of the grain. Put sponsibility. In my judgment there was
nam v. Wise, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 234; Caswell no community of interest in the cargo, as
v. Districh, 15 Wend. 379; Walker v. partners. It appears from the admis-
Fitts, 24 Pick. 191 ; Frost v. Kellogg, 23 sions of the parties, as well as the proofs,
Vt. 308 ; Case v. Hart, 11 Ohio, 364 ; that they never were, nor designed to be
Smyth ij. Tankersly, 20 Ala. 212 ; Jack- partners ; and that they held their titles
son v. Robinson, 3 Mason, 138. A and B to undivided portions of the cargo, not as
were tenants in common with C and D of a common, but as a separate interest.
a ship in certain proportions, and pur- They were, therefore, tenants in common
chased a cargo, by an agreement, on of the cargo, having no general commu-

1 It being stated that participation in profits is merely cogent evidence of part-
nership, Holme v. Hammond, L. R. 7 Ex. 218 ; Mollwo, &c. Co. v. Court of Wards,
L R 4 P C 419 • Ex parte Tennant, 6 Ch. D. 303 ; Harvey v. Childs, 28 Ohio St.
319; Eastman v. Clark, 63 N. H. 276; Pooley v. Driver, 5 Ch. D. 458. — A contract
between one of two or more partners and a third person, with the knowledge and
assent of the other partners, by which the third person is to share in the profits and
losses, in the firm business, of the partner with whom he contracts, does not consti-
tute such a participation in the profits as will make the third person a partner, or
liable for the partnership debts. Burnett v. Snyder, 81 N. Y. 550.

2 See as to a joint ownership of land, Letorey v. Korstall, 27 La. An. Brf;
Steward v. Blakeway, L. R. 6 Eq. 479; L. R. 4 Ch. fi03 ; as to a joint ownership of
a steamboat, Adams v. Carroll, 85 Penn. St. 209; Ward v. Bodeman, 1 Mo. App
272. See also Quaekenbush v. Sawyer, 64 Cal. 439 ; Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Ross, M
Ohio St. 429.

183

• 164

THE LAW OF CONTEACTS.

[book I.

SECTION VI.

OP THE EIGHT OP ACTION BETWEEN PAETNEES.

It is generally true that one partner cannot sue a copartner
at law in respect to any matter growing out of the transactions
of the partnership, and involving the examination of the partner-
ship accounts ; (0) because courts of law cannot do effec-
* 16-1 tual * justice to such questions and interests, and resort
must be had to courts of equity. Qp~) But it is clear that

nity of the profit and loss, but only a pro-
portion according to their separate inter-
ests. If either had died, his share would
not have survived to the others." Hard-
ing 0. Foxcroft, 6 Greenl. 76. In this
case it was held that the joint owners of
a vessel, who agreed to send her on a
foreign voyage for their mutual benefit
— a part of the cargo being purchased
by each separately, and a part by both
jointly — were tenants in common of the
property, and not partners, and that
therefore a creditor of both owners, for
cordage of the vessel, was not entitled to
priority in payment, out of the vessel
and cargo, against the separate creditors
of either. Mellen, C. J., said : " It is true
some parts of the cargo were purchased
by the owners severally, and put on
board, and some parts were purchased on
joint account ; but to constitute a part-
nership, persons must not only be jointly
concerned in the purchase, but jointly
concerned in the future sale." See
Thorndike a, De Wolf, 6 Pick. 124.
Where one party furnishes a boat and
the other sails it, an agreement to divide
the gross earnings does not constitute a
partnership. Bowman v. Bailey, 10 Vt.
170 ; Duryeas c. Whitcomb, 31 Vt. 395.

(0) Bovill v. Hammond, 6 B. & C.
149 ; Brown v. Tapscott, 6 M. & W. 110 ;
Lawrence v. Clark, 9 Dana, 257 ; Stone
v. Fouse, 3 Cal. 292 ; Bennett v. Wool-
folk, 15 'Geo. 213. This question is con-
sidered in Lane v. Tyler, 49 Me. 252, and
in Shattuck v. Law son, 10 Gray, 405. It
is held otherwise under the code of In-
diana, in Heavilow o. Heavilow, 29 Ind.
509.

(p) It is clear that one partner has no
right of action against a copartner for
money or labor expended for the benefit
of the concern. See Goddard v. Hodges,

184

1 Cr. & M. 37 ; Holmes v. Higgins, 1 B.
& C. 74; Milburn v. Codd, 7 id. 419;
Fremont v. Coupland, 2 Bing. 170;
Saddler v. Nixon, 5 B. & Ad. 936 ; Pear-
son v. Skelton, 1 M. & W. 504; Bevans v.
Sullivan, i Gill, 383. But one partner
may maintain an action for money had
and received against the other partner,
for money received to the separate use
of the former, and wrongfully carried to
the partnership account. Smith v. Bar-
row, 2 T. Ii. 476. And one partner may
have an action against his copartner for
not contributing his proportion toward
the common stock. Thus, where A
agrees to supply B with a manuscript
work, to be printed by B, the profits of
which are to be equally divided, B may
maintain an action against A for refusing
to supply the manuscript. This is not an
action for partnership profits, but for
refusing to contribute the labor of the
defendant, towards the attainment of
profits. Gale v. Leckie, 2 Stark. 107.
The same principle was adopted in
Ellison o. Chapman, 7 Blackf. 224. See
also Vance v. Blair, 18 Ohio, 532. — The
American courts fully recognize the doc-
trine that during the existence of a part-
nership, or even after its dissolution, but
before the business is wound up, and the
final balance ascertained, no action at
law will lie between partners. Haskell
v. Adams, 7 Pick. 59; Williams v. Hen-
shavv, 12 id. 378 ; Fanning v. Chadwick,
3 id. 420 ; Capen v. Barrows, 1 Gray, 376;
Causten v. Burke, 2 Harr. & G. 295;
Chase v. Garvin, 19 Me. 211 ; Kennedy v.
McFaden, 3 Harr. & J. 194 ; Murray v.
Bogert, 14 Johns. 318; Davenport o. Gear,

2 Seam. 495 ; Roberts v. Fitler, 13 Penn.
St. 265 ; Gridley v. Dole, 4 Comst. 486.
After such final balance is determined,
and a promise by one partner to pay

CH. XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

164

a partner may sue a copartner on an express agreement, and per-
haps on an implied agreement, to do any act not involving a con-
sideration of ihe partnership accounts ; (<?) * or on an express

over, the other partner may sustain an
action at law. Gulick v. Gulick, 2 Green
(N. J.), 678; Byrd v. Fox, 8 Mo. 574.
The promise may be only implied.
"Wray v. Milestone, 5 M. & W. 21 ; Nims
v. Bigelow, 44 N. H. 376.

(</) Van Ness v. Forrest, 8 Cranch,
80; Gibson v. Moore, 6 N. H. 547. In
this case Parker, J., thus states the prin-
ciples applicable to this point : " As-
sumpsit may be maintained by one
partner against another to recover a
final balance upon the settlement of the
partnership account, where there is an
express promise to pay. Casey v. Brush,
2 Caines, 293 ; Fromont v. Coupland, 2
Bing. 170. In Massachusetts, the court
have held that where the partnership ac-
counts are closed, and the balance struck,
the law raises an implied promise. Fan-
ning o. Chadwick, 3 Pick. 423. The
same doctrine is found in Rackstraw v.
Imber, Holt, 368. So where the judg-
ment will be an entire termination of the
partnership transactions, although there
has been no settlement of the accounts
by the partners, nor an express' promise
to pay, an action may be sustained.
And if the partners by an express agree-
ment separate a distinct matter from the
partnership dealing, and one party ex-
pressly agrees to pay the other a specific
sum for that matter at a given time, an
action of assumpsit will lie on that con-
tract, though the matter arose from the
partnership dealing. Collumer v. Foster,
26 Vt. 754; Williams v. Henshaw, 11
Pick. 82. Probably an action may be
maintained by one partner against the
other, for a balance due him out of the

partnership transactions, if there be but
a single item to liquidate. Musier v.
Trumpbour, 5 Wend. 274, 1 Stark. 78 ;
but see Bovill v. Hammond, 6 B. & C.
149. The proposition that no action can
be maintained at law, by one partner
against the other, except to recover a
final balance, must be taken witli refer-
ence to the facts and questions arising in
those cases in which such language is
u»ed. In Smith c. Barrow, 2 T. R, 478,
Mr. Justice Bulla- says : ' One partner
cannot recover a sum of money received
by the other, unless on a balance struck,
that sum is found due to him alone.'
Similar language is found in Ozeas v.
Johnston, 1 Binn. 191 ; Beach v. Hotch-
kiss, 2 Conn. 426 ; Murray v. Bogert, 14
Johns. 318; Westerlo v. Evertson, 1
Wend. 532. So in Moravia v. Levy, 2
T. R. 483, n., an action was sustained for
the amount of a balance struck, which
the defendant had promised to pay. The
articles contained a covenant to account
at certain times, and it does not appear
whether it was a final balance which was
recovered. It is undoubtedly true, as a
general rule, that so long as the partner-
ship continues, and the concerns of it re-
main unadjusted, the law will raise no
implied promise by one to pay the other
upon it partnership transaction. The
reason is, that such transactions create
no debt or duty to pay. The act of one
party is the act of the other — the pay-
ment or receipt of money by one is a
payment or receipt by the other — and
no cause of action can arise. In the
present case there has been no balance
struck. The settlement of the partner-

1 A partner may sue his copartner for contribution where a firm is formed for a
single transaction, Meason v. Kaine, 63 Penn. St. 335 ; or on a negotiable instrument
given for a balance ascertained on dissolution, McSherry v. Brooks, 46 Md. 103;
or on a preliminary contract, Truitt v. Baird, 12 Kan. 420 ; Morgan v. Nunes, 54 Miss.
308 ; or for unpaid profits where the conduct of the business is given over to one
partner, Wadley v. Jones, 55 Ga. 329 ; or on an award on a firm submission, Blakely
v. Graham, 111 Mass. 8; or on a balance ascertained on a settlement, Ross v. Cornell,
45 Cal. 133; Mickle v. Peet, 43 Conn. 65; Scott v. Caruth, 50 Mo. 120; Knew v.
Hoffman, 65 Penn. St. 126 ; Wicks v. Lippman, 13 Nev. 499 ; or on an express prom-
ise to repay advances made on firm account, Ganger v. Pautz, 45 Wis. 440. — Ordi-
narily, replevin or trover will not lie by one partner against another, Crabtree v.
Clapham, 67 Me. 326 ; Bartley v. Williams, 66 Penn. St. 329 ; see Danbury Band v.
Bean, 54 N. H. 524. — Where each partner agreed with the rest to pay a proportion
of a firm debt and save the rest harmless, it was held that if any partner neglected
so to do within a reasonable time after due, any other partner might, without await-
ing an action, pay the same, and the whole amount apportioned being paid, might re-
cover of the delinquent partner his proportion. Edwards v. Remington, 51 Wis. 336.

185

165

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

promise made before the partnership began, in relation to ad-
vances to constitute the capital of the firm ; (qq) or on his part-
ner's note for advances made to him ; (jr) or for damage done
to his private property which was used by the firm, (qs)
* 165 And if partners finally balance all * their accounts, or a
distinct part thereof is entirely severed by them from the
rest, a suit at law is maintainable for the balance, (r)

If one of a partnership who are plaintiffs be also one of a part-
nership who are defendants, the action cannot be maintained;
for the same party cannot be plaintiff and defendant of record,
in the same action, (s) l The rule may be different in those

ship concerns, generally, still remains to
be made. But by agreement between
the parties, in relation to a specific por-
tion of the partnership transactions, a
final adjustment has been made. If this
accounting by means of the reference
had only been for the purpose of ascer-
taining an item, in order to carry it into
the partnership account between them,
no doubt the general rule would apply.
That was the case in Fromont v. Coup-
land, 2 Bing. 170. But such is not the
fact here." See also Clark v. Dibble, 16
Wend. 601 ; Grisby v. Nance, 3 Ala. 347.
— And after a dissolution, an action will
lie between partners to recover a balance
due, on an implied promise. Wilby o.
Phinney, 15 Mass. 116 ; Pope v. Ran-
dolph, 13 Ala. 214. — So to recover back
money paid by mistake on an adjustment
of the partnership concerns. Bond v.
Hays, 12 Mass. 34 ; Chase v. Garvin, 19
Me. 211.

(qq) Currier v. Webster, 45 N. H. 220;
Currier v. Rowe, 46 N. H. 72.

(qr) Chamberlain v. Walker, 10 Allen,
429.

(qs) Haller v. Williamowitz, 23 Ark.
566.

(r) Clark v. Dibble, 16 Wend. 601;
Gibson v. Moore, 6 N. H. 547 ; McColl v.
Oliver, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 510; Panning v.
Chadwick, 3 Pick. 420; Gulick v. Gu-
lick, 2 Green (N. J.), 578; French v. Sty-
ring, 2 C. B. (». s.) 357.

(s) Portland Bank v. Hyde, 2 Fairf.
196 ; Tindal v. Bright, Minor (Ala.), 103 ;
Mainwaring v. Newman, 2 B. & P. 120 ;
Neale v. Turton, 4 Bing. 149 ; Teague v.
Hubbard, 8 B. & C. 345; Bosanquet v.
Wray, 6 Taunt. 597. — But see Rose

v. Poulton, 2 B. & Ad. 822, where the
facts were as follows : By an indenture
between A, B and his wife, and C, of one
part, and D, K, and the same C, of another
part, it was recited that F, also party to
the deed, had requested to have a certain
farm given up to him, in which B's wife
was interested, he ( F) giving sureties,
namely, the said D, E, and C, for pay-
ment of an annuity to B's wife ; and it
was thereupon witnessed that in consid-
eration of the covenants thereinafter en-
tered into by A, B and his wife, and C,
and of 10s , the said D, E, and C, and
each and every of them, covenanted with
A, B and his wife, and C, to pay the
annuity. There followed covenants by
A, B and his wife, and C, severally, for
quiet enjoyment, and for- executing an
assignment to F when required. The
deed was signed and sealed bj' D, E, and
C, and by F, but not by A or B. In an ac-
tion brought by A and B, after the death
of C, for breach of the covenant to pay
the annuity : — Held, First, that the omis-
sion of A and B to execute the deed did
not disable them from suing upon it; that
sueli omission did not amount to a total
failure of consideration for the covenant
sued upon (supposing such total failure
to be an answer to the action), and that
the covenant to pay the annuity, and
those for quiet enjoyment and for assign-
ing, were not mutual and dependent.
Secondly, that at least after C's death,
A and B might sue D's executors (D and
E being also dead), for non-payment of
the annuity, though the covenan for
such payment was entered into both by
and to C. — And where one who is a
member of two firms makes a note in

1 Blaisdell v. Pray, 68 Me. 269. But firms with a common partner can sue each
other where legal and equitable remedies are alike, Douglas v. Neil, 37 Tex. 628 ;
Kingsland i>. Braisted, 2 Lansing, 17.

186

CH. XII. J PARTNERSHIP. * 166

States where by .statute, a copartnership may be sued by their
firm name, and a garnishee may be proceeded against in the same
way. (ss^

One partner cannot without express agreement, charge the
firm for the extra value or amount of his services, (si) *

* Partners are bound, each to all the others, to act with *166
entire good faith, and apply themselves with due diligence
to the business of the concern, and in general to do nothing for
their own advantage which shall sacrifice the interests of the
partnership. (£) 2 And an action in equity, or in some cases,
at law, is maintainable by the injured partners for any loss sus-
tained by a breach of this obligation, (u)

SECTION VII.

OF THE SHARING OP LOSSES.

Though partnerships are usually formed by a participation of
both profits and losses, it may be agreed that a partner shall have
his share of the profits and not be liable for losses, and this agree-
ment is valid as between the parties. And this agreement will
be equally efficacious whether stated in articles, or proved by cir-

the name of one of the firms, payable (() Long v. Majestre, 1 Johns. Ch.
to a member of the other firm, the payee 305 ; Stoughton v. Lynch, id. 470 ; Faw-
may sue and recover upon such note, cett v. Whitehouse, 1 Rus. & M. 132.
Moore v. Gano, 12 Ohio, 300. See Baring See Lefever v. Underwood, 41 Penn. St.
v. Lyman, 1 Story, 396 ; Banks v. Mitch- 605, as to duty of partner to keep part-
ell, 8 Yerg. 111. See post, p. *253. nership funds unmixed with his own, and

(ss) United States Express Co. o. Bed- within the reach of all the partners.

bury, 34 111. 459. (a) Maddeford v. Austwiek, I Sim. 89 ;

(s«) Bennett v. Russell, 34 Miss. 524 ; Terry v. Carter, 25 Miss. 168.
Haller v. Williamowitz, 23 Ark. 666.

1 Boardman v. Close, 44 la. 428 ; Coddington v. Idell, 2 Stewart, 204 ; Forrer v.
Forrer, 29 Gratt. 134 ; Mills v. Fellows, 30 La. An. 824 ; Heath v. Waters, 40 Mich.
457 ; Lee v. Davis, 70 Ind. 464. Neither can a partner sue for services rendered before
the partnership of which the firm takes advantage, Dunlap v. "Watson, 124 Mass. 305.
See Cramer v. Bachmann, 68 Mo. 310, to the effect that the parties' intention governs,
an express agreement being unnecessary. — A partner is not entitled on settlement
to the natural depreciation of goods and fixtures, being the capital stock contributed
by him. Tutt v. Land, 50 Ga. 339.

2 Thus a partner cannot secretly stipulate for his private advantage. Dunne v.
English, L. R. 18 Eq. 524 ; Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore, 64 Penn. St. 43 ; McMahon
v. McClernan, 10 W. Va. 419. — And a partner secretly renewing a firm lease in his
own name holds it as a trustee for the firm, Mitchell v. Reed, 61 N. Y. 123 ; as well as
real estate and life insurance policies bought with firm funds, Shaler v. Trowbridge,
1 Stewart, 595.

18T

THE LAW OP CONTEACTS.

[BOOK I.

* 167

cumstances or otherwise. For the partners inter se, may make

what bargain they will. But no such agreement will prevent
such partner from being liable for the debts of the partnership,

unless the creditor knew of this bargain between the partners,

and with this knowledge gave the credit to the other partners
only. (V)

*167

SECTION VIII.

OF SECRET AND DORMANT PARTNERS.

A secret partner is one not openly and generally declared to be
a partner, (w) and a dormant partner is strictly one who takes no
share in the transaction or control of the partnership business ;
but it is often held to mean one whose name is not publicly men-
tioned ; and the phrases secret partner and dormant partner are
sometimes, but inaccurately, used as synonymous, (as) A dor-

(v) See Gilpin v. Enderbey, 5 B. &
Aid. 954 ; Bond p. Pittard, 3 M. & W.
357. In this case, A and B carried on
business together as solicitors in partner-
ship, and held themselves out as such ;
and the defendant employed them in
that capacity. By the agreement under
which A and B entered into business to-
gether, B was to receive annually out of
the profits the sum of .£300, but he was
not to be in any manner liable for the
losses of the business, and was to have a
lien on the profits for any losses he might
sustain by reason of his liability as a
partner : Held, that A and B were prop-
erly joined as plaintiffs in an action for
work and labor, as the money, when re-
covered, would be the joint property of
both until the accounts were ascertained
and the division took place. In this case
Holland, B., said : " It has been fully
established by numerous cases both at
law and in equity, that third parties are
not affected by the secret contracts, inter
se, of persons holding themselves out and
contracting as partners. That doctrine
is fully gone into in the case of Waugh t>.
Carver, 2 II. Bl. 210, by Lord Chief
Justice (Eyre) De Grey, and is there
distinctly laid down." See Perry v.
Randolph, 0 Sm. & M. 385 ; Hazard u.
Hazard, 1 Story, 37-1; Barrett v. Swan,
17 Me. 180; Pollard v. Stanton, 7 Ala.
761 ; Alderson v. Pope, 1 Camp. 404, n. ;

188

Minnit v. Whinery, 5 Bro. P. C. 489.
See also Brown «. Leonard, 2 Chitt.
120.

(w) In United States Bank r. Binney,
5 Mason, ISO, the following definition of
a secret partnership is given : " I under-
stand the common meaning of secret part-
nership to be a partnership where the
existence of certain persons as partners
is not avowed or made known to the
public by any of the partners. Where
all the partners are publicly made
known, whether it be by one or all the
partners, it is no longer a secret partner-
ship." See s. c. 5 Pet. 520.

(x) In Mitchell v. Dall, 2 Harr. & G.
159, it is said that in the legal accepta-
tion of the term dormant, as applied to
partners in trade, every partner is con-
sidered dormant unless his name is men-
tioned in the firm, or embraced under
general terms in the name of the firm or
company. See to the same effect Kelley
v. Hurlhurt, 5 Cowen, 534 ; Desha !•. Hol-
land, 12 Ala. 513; Hill v. Voorhies, 22
Penn. St. 08. — The law relative to dor-
mant partners seems to be confined to
trade and commerce, and does not ex-
tend to speculations in the sale and pur-
chase of land. Pitts v. Waugh, 4 Mass.
424 ; Smith v. Burnham, 3 Sumner, 470.
But see Brooke v. Washington, 8 Gratt.
248, contra.

CH. XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

168

mant partner is liable when discovered. («/) But not for a debt
contracted after he has retired, provided the creditor never knew
that he was a partner, or did know that he had retired before
credit was given to the partnership. (2)

If there be a dormant and unknown partner, and credit is given
to the ostensible partner in the business of the firm and for
their benefit, all the partners whether known or unknown, are
liable, (zz)

* It is said that a dormant partner cannot join as plain- * 168
tiff in an action, because there is no sufficient privity of
contract between him and the party who contracted with the
firm, (a) But he may be sued and joined as defendant. (b~) x

(y) Robinson r. Wilkinson, 3 Price,
638. In this case Wilkinson had been a
dormant partner in a ship with one Cay,
but had retired. Robinson, the plaintiff,
supplied the ship and the captain with
stores and cash on account of the ship, to
the amount of £1,000 and upwards. The
amount of the debt at the time of Wil-
kinson's retirement was £401 16s. Id.
Cay having become insolvent, the Court
of Exchequer held that Robinson was
clearly entitled to recover against Wil-
kinson the total sum of £401 16s. Id.
(with a trifling deduction on a particular
account), although, when the goods were
supplied, Robinson had no knowledge
that Wilkinson was a partner. " A
party," said Graham, B., "has always
a right against a concealed partner of
whom he has previously had no knowl-
edge, as soon as he discovers him, unless
that ignorance were his own fault ; as, if
he had not used due diligence in finding
him." See also Lea v. Guire, 13 Sin. &
M. 656 ; Bigelow v. Elliott, 1 Clifford, 28.
— The liability of a dormant partner to
creditors may be avoided, however, by
proof of fraud in the formation of the
partnership, if such dormant partner has
received no share of the funds. Mason
u. Connell, 1 Whart. 381.

(z) Grosvenor v. Lloyd, 1 Met. 19. In
this case, Shaw, C. J., observed, " A dor-
mant partner is liable for debts contracted
while he is a partner, not because credit
is given to him, but because he is in fact
a contracting party, taking part of the
profits of such contracts. But when he
ceases to be in fact a partner, the reason
ceases, and he is no longer liable. He is
not liable as a contracting party, because

the partnership name, under which the
remaining partners continue to transact
business, no longer includes him, though
that name may remain the same ; and he
is not liable as holding out a false credit
for the firm, because the case supposes
that he is not known as a partner, and
therefore the firm derives no credit whilst
he remains a secret or a dormant partner.
No customer, therefore, or other person
dealing with the firm can be disappointed
in any just expectations, if he silently
withdraws from the firm. A very differ-
ent rule would apply where one had been
a known or ostensible partner, and held
himself out as such." See also Krlley v.
Hurlburt, 5 Cowen, 534; Evans a. Drum-
mond, 4 Esp. 89; Armstrong v. Hussey,
12 S. & R. 315; Scott v. Colmesnil, 7 J.
J. Marsh. 416; Benton v. Chamberlain,
23 Vt. 711 ; Edwards v. McFall, 5 La.
Ann. 167 ; Brooke r. Enderby, 2 Br. & B.
71 ; Carter v. Whalley, 1 B. & Ad. 11. —
It is a question for the jury whether a
person was a dormant partner, and his
interest not in fact generally known, so
as to excuse notice of his retirement
from the firm. Shaw, C. J., in Goddard
v. Pratt, 16 Pick. 429. See as to dormant
partners Deford v. Reynolds, 36 Penn.
St. 325, where also the doctrine is laid
down that one who is a member of a firm
known as R. M. & Co. does not become a
dormant partner by reason of the credit-
or's ignorance of the name of R. M.'s co-
partner.

{zz) Richardson v. Farmer, 36 Mo. 35.

(a) Wood v. O'Kelley, 8 Cush. 406;
Jackson v. Alexander, 8 Tex. 109.

(fc) Boardman v. Keeler, 2 Vt. 65;
Lloyd v. Archbowle, 2 Taunt. 324.

1 That a dormant partner need not he joined as a plaintiff, see Garrett, v. Muller, 37
Tex. 589 ; Leslie v. Wiley, 47 N. Y. 648. See Wright v. Herrick, 125 Mass. 154.

189

* 169 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

A secret partner, who conceals his interest in the firm to pro-
tect it from attachment, may have his bill in equity for an account
against partners privy to the concealment, (bb)

SECTION IX.

OF RETIRING PARTNERS.

A retiring partner who receives thereafter a share of the profits
is still liable ; but not if he receives an annuity or definite sum
noways dependent on the profits. Though the remaining part-
ners may look to the partnership fund or to their expected
profits as the means of paying such annuity, it is still only their
debt to him, and does not involve him in their responsibility to

others, (c)
* 169 * When a partner retires from a firm, notice is usually

given by public advertisement, or by letters to the custom-
ers of the firm, or both ; and generally, in the case of a retiring
partner as in that of a dissolution, actual notice should be given
to all customers of the firm, (cc) 2 and also customary notice by

(66) Harvey v. Varney, 98 Mass. 118. of a partner retiring and leaving his

(c) See Young i'. Axtell, 2 H. Bl. 242 ; capital in the firm, it will be necessarily

Holyland v. De Mendez, 3 Meriv. 184. unsafe to reserve a usurious rate of in-

Tliere it was agreed on the dissolution of terest for the capital left in the firm ;

a partnership, that the continuing partner though this observation, perhaps, only

should, in consideration of an assignment applies to a usurious agreement in the

to him of the partnership property, in- deed of dissolution itself. For where by

eluding a lease of the premises on which a deed of dissolution between A, B, and

the business was carried on, secure to the C, A and B covenanted to replace C's

retiring partner the payment of an anivu- share of the capital by instalments, and

ity, " or in case he should at any time afterwards a new agreement was entered

after the expiration of the then existing into by parol, which secured a usurious

lease be dispossessed of and compelled to rate of interest to C, it was held that the

quit the premises, without an3' collusion, effect of considering the latter agreement

contrivance, act, or default of his own." void, was, not to invalidate, but to set up

The continuing partner obtained a re- the original agreement and make that

newal of the lease, and afterwards be- binding on the parties, for that the sec-

came bankrupt, and the renewed lease ond agreement was not a performance

passed under the assignment of his of, but a substitution for the former

estate. It was held, that this was not transaction. See Parker o. Ramsbottom,

such an eviction or dispossession as was 3 B. & C. 257.

contemplated by the agreement, in the (rr) Bank of the Commonwealth v.

event of which the annuity was to cease. Mudgett, 45 Barb. 603, affirmed in 44 N.

Under the same circumstances, namely, Y. 614 ; Ennis ;;. Williams, 30 Ga. 691.

1 Austin v. Holland, 69 N. Y. 571; Holtgreve r. Wintker, 85 III. 470; Haynes v.
Carter, 12 Heiskell, 7. — A retiring partner must give actual notice to existing dealers

190

CH. XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

*169

advertisement ; (cd~) but sufficient lapse of time may supply the
want of notice, as in one case where eleven years had passed
since the retirement, (ce) A party having such notice cannot
hold the retiring partner to a responsibility for a credit given to
the firm after such retirement and notice. (<f) 1 It also seems

(cd) This question is much considered
in Sclieifflin t>. Stevens, 1 Wins. 106. See
also Zollar v. Janvrin, 47 N. H. 8-!4.

(ce.) Farmers' Bank o. Green, 1
Vroom, 316.

(d) Notice of the withrawal of a dor-
mant partner is not necessary. Magill v.
Merrie, 5 B. Mon. 168 ; Kennedy <>. Bo-
hannon, 11 B. Mon. 120 ; Scott v. Colraes-
nil, 7 J. J. Marsh. 416 ; Little v. Clarke,
36 Penn. St. 114. — But it is otherwise as
to ostensible partners. To affect a cred-
itor who has formerly traded with the
firm, the notice of the retirement of an
ostensible partner must be proved to
have been actual. Prentiss v. Sinclair, 5
Vt. 149 ; Simons v. Strong, 24 Vt. 642 ;
Wardwell v. Haight, 2 Barb. 549 ; Clapp
v. Rogers, 2 Kern. 283 ; Hutchins v. Hud-
son, 8 Hump. 426 ; Graves v. Merry, 6
Cowen, 705 ; Vernon v. Manhattan Com-
pany, 17 Wend. 527. In Pitcher v. Bar-
rows, 17 Pick. 365, Shaw, C. J., said, " It
has sometimes been held that those who
have been dealers and customers of a
firm shall have actual notice of a dissolu-
tion ; but," he adds, " that may be thought
too strict. But it has always been held,
that in default of actual and personal
notice to a party, public notice in some
newspaper shall be deemed necessary."
" The doctrine," says Mr. Chancellor
Kent, " seems to be that merely taking a
newspaper in which a notice is contained
is not sufficient to charge a party, for it
is not to be intended that he reads the
contents of all the notices in the news-
papers which he may chance to take.
The inference of constructive notice
from sucli a source was strongly ex-
ploded in some of the above cases."
(3 Kent, 4th ed. 67, n.) Watkinson v.
Bank of Pennsylvania, 4 Whart. 482.
But see Jenkins v. Blizard, 1 Stark. 418.

A newspaper notice accidentally reach-
ing a bank director is not equivalent to
actual notice to the bank ; but it seems it
would be, if the notice was actually
served on him, with directions to com-
municate it to the board. National Bank
v. Norton, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 672. — Publish-
ment of the dissolution in a newspaper
will not per se be sufficient, although it
may with other circumstances go to the
jury as evidence of actual notice. See
Graham o. Hope, 1 Peake, Cas. 154 ;
White v. Murphy, 3 Rich. L. 369 ; Hut-
chins a. Bank of Tennessee, 8 Humph.
418 ; Shurlds v. Tilson, 2 McLean, 458 ;
Grinnan v. Baton Rouge Mills Co. 7 La.
Ann. 638. As to all persons who have
had no dealings, and given no credit to
the firm, publishment of the dissolution
is sufficient. Lansing v. Gaine, 2 Johns.
300; Prentiss v. Sinclair, 5 Vt. 149;
Shurlds !'. Tilson, 2 McLean, 458 ; Wat-
kinson n. Bank of Pennsylvania, 4 Whart.
482. In Mowatt v. Howland, 3 Day, 353,
two partners of a firm resided in New
York, and the third in Norwich in Con-
necticut, their usual place of doing
business. Upon dissolution, notice was
given, for several weeks successively, in
two newspapers, one printed at Norwich,
and the other at New London, in the vi-
cinity of Norwich. One of the New
York partners afterwards indorsed a hill
of exchange in New York with the com-
pany name, but whether the indorsee had
or had not actual notice of the dissolu-
tion, did not appear, nor did it appear
that he had ever been a correspondent of
the company. It was held, that these
facts constituted reasonable notice to
him, and to every person not a corre-
soondent of the company. See also City
Bank of Brooklyn v. McChesney, 20 N.
Y. (o Smith) 240.

with the firm, and public notice to the world, to entirely escape liability. Polk v.
Oliver 56 Miss. 566. — Anv means of fairly publishing the fact of dissolution as
widely as possible, as by advertisement, public notice in the manner usual in the
community, or by a withdrawal of the exterior indications of the partnership, are to
be considered on the question of notice. Lovejoy v. Spafford, 93 U. S. 430. — As to
notice generally, see Uhl v. Harvey, 21 Am. L. Reg. n. s. and the elaborate note
appended thereto. ., , , , , , .

i A dormant partner on retiring need notify only those who knew ot his
connection with the firm. Nussbaumer v. Becker, 87 111. 281 ; Vaccaro *. Toof,
9 Heiskell, 194.

191

* 170 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

* 170 to be settled that * such retiring partner is not held to

a creditor who has no knowledge of such retirement,
provided the retirement was actual and in good faith, and the
retiring partner did all that was usual or proper to give the pub-
lic and customers notice of his retirement. But if the retiring
partner gives no such notice, then a customer of the firm accus-
tomed to trade with the firm on the responsibility of all the part-
ners, including him who has retired, and not knowing of his
retirement, may hold him for a debt contracted with the firm
after his retirement, (e) Whether a new customer can so hold
him is not so certain. Generally, he cannot ; but if the new cus-
tomer was brought to the firm by the responsibility of this part-
ner, which responsibility he knew to have existed, and had a right
to suppose existed still, which right grew out of the laches of the
retiring partner, and no negligence or want of diligence was im-
putable to the creditor, it would seem on general principles that
the creditor had a right to hold him responsible as a partner. It
would be difficult to distinguish on principle such a case from that
of a former customer creating a new debt.

If a creditor of a firm, knowing of the retirement of a partner,
receives for his debt the negotiable paper of the remaining part-
ner or partners, the presumption is that he intends to discharge
the retiring partner. (/) 1

For the liability of an incoming partner, see post, Sect. XII.

(e) Parkin ". Carruthers, 3 Esp. 2-18 ; which this responsibility proceeds, is the
Graham «. Hope, 1 Peake, Cas. 154 ; negligence of the partners in leaving the
Bernard v. Torrance, 5 G. & J. 383 ; Lu- world in ignorance of the fact of dissolu-
cas v. Bank of Darien, 2 Stew. (Ala.) tion, and leaving strangers to conclude
280 ; Stables v. Eley, 1 C. & P. 614 ; that the partnership is continued, and to
Taylor v. Young, 3 Watts, 339; Ami- bestow faith and confidence on the part-
down v. Osgood, 24 Vt. 278 ; Simonds v. nership name in consequence of that be-
Strong, 24 Vt. 042; Burgan v. Lyell, 2 lief. See 3 Kent, Com. 60; Princeton r.
Mich. 102; Johnson v. Tottcn, 3 Cal. Gulick, 1 Harrison, 161. See post, note
343 And a partner whose name is not (y), p. * 204,

used in a firm, is still liable for debts (/) Thompson ?•. Percival, 3 Nev, &

contracted subsequently to his retire- M. 167; Evans v. Drummond, 4 Esp. 89;

ment, with persons who knew of his Harris v. Farnell, 15 E. L. & E. 70, o. c.

previous connection, but who had no 15 Beav. 81; Yarnell v. Anderson, 14

notice of his retirement. Davis v. Al- Mo. 019; Crooker „. Crooker, 52 Me.

len, 3 Comst. 108. The principle upon 267.

1 The giving of his individual promissory note, by one partner, after dissolution,
for a part of a firm debt, is a good consideration for an agreement by the creditor to
release him from all liability for the debt. Ludington v. Bell, 77 N. Y. 138.
192

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP. * 171

♦SECTION X. *171

OF NOMINAL PARTNERS.

A nominal partner, or one held out to the world as such with-
out actual participation of profit and loss, is of course held, gen-
erally, as responsible for the debts of the partnership.1 But one
who not being a partner, holds himself out to certain persons as
a partner, is liable as such only to those who give credit to the
firm in the belief that he is a partner ; and it is said that this
belief may be inferred as to any one dealing with the firm, from
the general notoriety of his alleged partnership. (ff~) It has been
determined that where two or more persons appear to the public
as partners, and there is a stipulation between them, that one of
them shall not have any share of the profits, nor pay any portion
of the losses, he is not liable to the creditor of the firm who
before giving credit knew of this stipulation ; because such cred-
itor has no right to fix upon him a responsibility against his bar-
gain and intention, which bargain and intention were known to
the creditor. (g~) An admission by a person that he is a partner
in a firm is not conclusive against him, though made to the cred-
itor, if made after the debt for which it is sought to make him
liable, was contracted ; otherwise, if made before the credit is
given. (A)

(ff) Wood v. Pennell, 61 Me. 62. answerable for more than their subscrip-

(g) Anderson ?>. Pope, 1 Camp. 404, tion ; and such partner be also aware,

n., and Lord Ellenborough in that case that a particular individual is to be sole

held that notice to one member of a firm, nominal proprietor ; the firm of which

of such a stipulation, was notice to the such a partner is a member (although he

whole partnership. It was also held in has not taken any share in the paper),

Batty v. McCundie, 3 C. & P. 202, that cannot sue the subscribers who have taken

if one of several partners be concerned shares, for the price of goods furnished

in preparing the prospectus of a pro- for the paper. See also Burnes v. Pen-

jected newspaper, which prospectus states nell, 2 House of L. Cas. 497.
that he and others will act as treasurers (h) Eidgway u. Philip, 1 C. M. & R-

and managers, and also that the subscri- 415. In this case the plaintiff contracted

bers are not to be partners, nor to be with one Brown, the patentee of a draining

1 One who, by representing himself to be a partner, induces another to give credit
to the supposed partnership, is liable to him as a partner, whether actually a partner
or not Rice v. Barrett, 116 Mass. 312. — As to nominal partners generally, see fur-
ther Pahlman v. Taylor, 75 111. 629; Peck v. Lusk, 38 la. 93; Dailey v. Coons, 64
Ind.'545; Dodd v. Bishop, 30 La. An. 1178; Rittenhouse v. Leigh, 57 Miss. 697;
Gauss tf.Hobbs, 18 Kan. 600; Speer v. Bishop, 24 Ohio St. 598; Cushing v. Smith,
43 Tex. 261 ; Poillon v. Secor, 61 N. Y. 456.

TOL. I. 13 193

172

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

172

* SECTION XI.

WHEN A JOINT LIABILITY IS INCURRED.

Where there is no joint purchase or joint incurring of debt,
but a purchase by one to whom alone credit is given, a subsequent
joint interest in the property purchased, and in the business
and profits depending upon it, carries no liability for the origi-
nal debt, (i) And where many persons join in an adventure,

machine, for the erection of one of those
machines on the plaintiff's lands in Cam-
bridgeshire. The draft of the agreement
being drawn up in the name of Brown &
Co., the plaintiff asked Brown what other
persons beside himself composed the firm,
upon which Brnwn wrote on the back of
the draft, " John Broadlmrst, Esq., and Dr.
Wilson Philip." The contract being bro-
ken, the plaintiff brought his action against
Philip and Broadlmrst ; but previously to
the action, his son called on the defend-
ant Broadlmrst, and asked him whether
Brown was correct in making the indorse-
ment upon the draft of the agreement, to
which Broadlmrst replied in the affirma-
tive, and stated that he had bought his
original interest from the other defend-
ant, Dr. Philip. Evidence was also given
at the trial, that while the engine was in
progress, he attended very frequently at
the manufactory to inquire how it was
going on, and that lie gave advice and
made suggestions with regard to its con-
struction. In answer to this, an agree-
ment or license from Brown and the
•other parties interested in the patent to
Broadlmrst, was given in evidence on the
ipart of the latter, authorizing Broad
buret to use the patent for the erection
of engines in certain parts of Cornwall
•only, and it was contended that the ad-
missions of Broadlmrst were to be taken
with reference to the interest which he
thus possessed in the invention, and not
to any participation either in the patent
generally, or in the particular transaction
in question. Gaselee, J., who tried the
action, left it to the jury to say whether
Broadlmrst, at the time he made the
admission, was under a mistake; and
whether the acts he was proved to have
done did or did not afford a sufficient
ground for supposing it to be a mistake ;
and with regard to those acts he left it to
the jury to say whether they were refer-

194

able to a partnership in the patent in
general, or in this particular transaction.
The jury found a verdict for the defend-
ants on the ground that Broadlmrst
was not a partner, and the Court of Ex-
chequer refused to grant a new trial.
See Gordon v. Bankard, 37 111. 147 ; Bar-
croft v. Snodgrass, 1 Cold. 430.

(<) Persons are not to be held jointly
liable upon a contract as partners, unless
they have a joint interest existing at
the time of the formation of the contract.
The case of Young v. Hunter, 4 Taunt.
582, well illustrates this principle. In an
action for goods sold and delivered, two
of the defendants, Hunter and Rayney,
suffered judgment to go by default ; the
other defendants, Hoffham & Co., pleaded
the general issue. On trial it appeared
that Hunter and Rayney had bought
goods of the plaintiffs and others, which
they intended to ship for the Baltic, and
the defendants, Hoffham & Co. (not oth-
erwise partners of Hunter & Co.), were
afterwards allowed to join in the adven-
ture, and to have a fifth share upon the
goods being puton board. The plaintiffs
knew nothing of Hoffham & Co., but
sold the goods to Hunter & Co. only.
The question was whether this was a
case of common sleeping partners. Mnns-
Jifld, C. J., directed the jury to find for
defendant, with liberty for plaintiff to
move for a new trial ; a rule nisi was ob-
tained, on the ground that Hoffham &
Co. having had the benefit of the goods,
were liable to pay for them, though they
were originally furnished to Hunter &
Co. only. On a new trial, Manafdrl, C.
J., continued of the same opinion.
IJeath, J. : " The proposition of the plain-
tiffs, counsel, that if it be shown that at
any one period of the transaction there
was a partnership subsisting, it was
therefore to be inferred that there had
been a partnership in the particular or-

CH. XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

173

* each to contribute his share, each is liable alone for his * 173
share to the person from whom he bought it. No part-
nership arises until the several shares are brought together and
mixed up in one common adventure, (/) But if the bargain was
for a joint purchase and joint adventure, there is at once a joint
liability for the original purchase, although it was made by one
of the partners alone, and he alone was known to be interested,
and credit was given to him alone. (&) And the same rule is

iginal purchase, is wholly unfounded."
Chambre, J., was of the same opinion.
Gibbs, J. : " The only possible ground for
a new trial would be, if the plaintiffs
could show that at the time of the pur-
chase of the goods from the plaintiffs,
Hoffham & Co. and Hunter & Eayney
were concerned in that purchase in their
joint account. It only appears that they
were so interested at the time of ship-
ment. It is not to be inferred from the
fact that Hoffham & Co. were interested
at the time of shipment, that they were
interested at the time of the purchase.
It is for the plaintiffs to make it out by
evidence. If parties agree among them-
selves that one house shall buy goods,
and let the other into an interest in them,
that other being unknown to the vendor ;
in such a case the vendor could not re-
cover against him, though such other
persons would have the benefit of the
goods. On this and other reasons, I think
the present verdict ought not to be dis-
turbed."— This principle is further illus-
trated by many cases showing that where
one, on his individual credit alone, bor-
rows money for the use of the firm, the
firm will not be liable merely because the
money came to their use. See Siffkin v.
"Walker, 2 Camp. 308; Graeff o. Hitch-
man, 5 Watts, 454 ; Emly v. Lye, 15 East,
7 ; Green v. Tanner, 8 Met. 411 ; Ripley
v. Kingsbury, 1 Day, 150, n.

[j ) This principle is fully established
by the case of Saville v. Robertson, 4 T.
R. 720. See also Gouthwaite v. Duck-
worth, 12 East, 421, where Saville v.
Robertson is distinguished. Lord Ellen-
borough, in Gouthwaite v. Duckworth,
says: "The ease of Saville v. Robertson
does indeed approach very near to this ;
but the distinction is, that there each
party brought his separate parcel of
goods, which were afterwards to be
mixed in the common adventure, on
hoard the ship ; and till that admixture
the partnership in the goods did not
rise. But here the goods in question
were purchased in pursuance of^ the
agreement for the adventure, of which it

had been before settled that Duckworth
was to have a moiety.'' And Mr. Jus-
tice Baijleij observed, that, " In Saville v.
Robertson, after the purchase of the goods
made by the several adventurers, there
was a still further act to be done, which
was the putting them on board the ship
in which they had a common concern,
for the joint adventure; and until that
further act was done, the goods pur-
chased by each remained the separate
property of each. But here, as soon as
the goods were purchased, the interest of
the three 'attached in them at the same
instant, by virtue of the previous agree-
ment." See also Post v. Kimberly, 9
Johns. 470, in which it was held, that
there was no partnership between A and
B, and C and D, in the outward cargo,
except, perhaps, so far as related to the
transport and selling of it ; for that, al-
though the whole cargo was shipped on
board the same vessel, yet it was clear
that each house purchased and put on
board its aliquot part, without the con-
cern or responsibility of the other.
Brooke r. Evans, 5 Watts, 196 ; Sims
v. Willing, 8 S. & R. 103.

(h) Thus, where three persons were
engaged in a joint speculation, for the
purchase and importation of corn, but
no partnership fund was raised for the
speculation, and the parties met the ex-
penses in thirds, and two only of the
three had the management of the specu-
lation, one of these two being the con-
signee and the other the salesman of the
corn ; it was nevertheless very truly
said, that, if there had been a claim in
that ease by the seller of the corn, no
doubt he would have been entitled to
proceed against all the parties, and
might have called on them all for pay-
ment. Smith v. Cragen, 1 Cr. & J. 500.
Upon the same principles, where A and
others agreed to become partners in the
purchase of fifteen shares of a copper
adventure, and in pursuance of the
agreement, A alone, and in his own
name, contracted for the purchase of
the shares, and paid a deposit, to which

195

* 174 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

* 174 * applied, where the creditor of a foreign firm, aware of

the persons composing the firm, and that the goods are
to be shipped for the firm, in dealing with a resident member,
makes out the invoices to him individually, and draws upon him
alone. (7) Because the liability of a partner springs either from
his holding himself out to the world as a partner, or from his
participation in the business and its profit or loss. If these two
causes meet, as is usually the case, they strengthen each other ;
but either of them alone is, in general, sufficient to create this
liability, (rri) Nor is it necessary that there should be an express
stipulation, if in fact they share the business and the profits as
partners, (mm) And there is no liability as a partner where
there is neither a participation of profits, nor any such use of
the defendant's name permitted by him as justifies the plaintiff
iD selling to others on his credit, although there may be in some
other way or measure a community of interest, (n)

SECTION XII.

OP THE AUTHORITY OF EACH PARTNER.

It is a general rule, both throughout Europe and in this coun-
try, that the whole firm and all the members of a copartnership
are bound by the acts and contracts of one partner with reference

the others contributed ; it was held that ished, the jury were to find for the plain-

the others, as well as A, were bound by tiffs. The jury did so find, and the

this contract, and that, upon an action Court of King's Bench refused to grant a

and verdict against A for the non-per- new trial. Gardiner v. Cliilds, 8 ( '. & P.

formance of it, the others were bound to H45. — See Coope o. Eyre, 1 H. Bl. 37;

contribute their proportion of the dam- Barton v. Hanson, 2 Taunt. 49; Sims v.

ages and costs. Browne v. Gibbins, 5 Willing, 8 S. & R. 103.

Bro. P. C. 401. So, where A and B, pub- (I) Bottomly i: Nuttall, 94 Eng. C. L.

lishers, ordered certain stationers to 122; s. e. 5 C. B (n. s.) 122.

supply paper to C and D, printers, (/«) See Buckingham v. Burgess, 3

for the purpose of printing certain McLean, :;04 ; Markham v. .Tones, 7 B.

specified works, and, upon the bank- Mon.451;; Benedict r. Davis, 2 .McLean,

ruptcy of A and B, the stationers (lis- ."M7 ; CoUrillr. Vanduzen, 22 Vt. fill,

covered that („' and D were partners with (mm) Din-yen, v. Burt, 2S Cnl fit ;*. t.

A and B in the publication of those (n) See Osborne v. Brennan, 2 Nott &

works, and thereupon brought an action McC. 417; Milburn v. Guy i her, 8 Gill,

against C and 1), to recover the value of 92. — And a lay or share in the proceeds

the paper, Lord Denman, C. J., told the of a whaling voyage, does not create a

jury that if they thought, that, at the partnership in the profits of the voyage,

time when the goods were furnished, but is in the nature of seamen's wages,

the defendants were partners in the con- anil governed by the same rules. Coffin

cern for whose benefit they were furn- v. Jenkins, 3 Story, lud.

196

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP. * I75

to the partnership business and affairs (nri) — such act or con-
tract being in law the act or contract of all. This power of each
partner to represent and to bind the rest, and to dispose of the
partnership property, is sometimes regarded as arising
from * the agency which all confer on each ; and some- * 175
times from the community of interest whereby no partner
owns any part of the partnership property exclusively of the rest,
but each partner owns the whole, in common with all the others.
We think it rests upon both of these foundations together. It
is true that there may be a copartnership where one or more of
the partners has no interest in the capital stock by agreement
among themselves. But even then all own together the profits,
and so much of the funds or capital of the firm as consists of
profits. Partners are undoubtedly, in some way, agents of each
other. But the principle of agency alone will not explain the
whole law of their mutual responsibility. Out of the combination
of this principle with those which grow out of the community
of property and of interest, the law of partnership is formed.
And this law may often be illustrated by a reference to the prin-
ciples of agency ; but must still be regarded as consisting of a
distinct system of rules and principles peculiar to itself.

So also, partnership is sometimes spoken of as like joint-
tenancy, with important modifications, or like tenancy in com-
mon, with such modifications. In truth it is a distinct and
independent relation ; and though it has some of the attributes
of joint tenancy, and some of tenancy in common, it is neither
of these. Nor can it be much better illustrated by a reference
to either of these modes of joint-ownership, than they would be
by a reference to partnership.

If an action is brought against sundry persons as copartners,
and the fact of copartnership is admitted, or otherwise proved,
then the admission of one of the partners as to any matter
between the firm and another party affects, as evidence, all the
partners. But where the existence of the copartnership, or of
the joint interest of liability, is in dispute, the admission of one
person that he is copartner with the others, affects him alone,
and is not evidence of the existence of the copartnership so
as to bind the others, (o) And if two firms are partners in

(nn) Stockwell v. Dillingham, 60 Me. (o) Taylor v. Henderson, 17 S. & B.

442' "Welles v March 30 N. Y. 344. 453; McPherson v. Rathbone, 7 Wend.

197

176

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[book I.

*176 * any transaction, the acknowledgment by one affects both.
The effect of an acknowledgment by a partner, where a
promise is barred by the Statute of Limitations, will be con-
sidered when we treat of that statute.

Where a joint business transaction consists in or refers to the
purchase of goods, it is generally the rule that the partnership
liability begins when the goods are ordered. But this may de-
pend upon the question whether the person giving the order was,
at that time, the agent of all who are sought to be charged. For
if he was not, then they are not liable ; and in that case a
subsequent naked acknowledgment of the contract will not
suffice to render them liable as partners, (p) For parties are

216; Jewett v. Stevens, 6 N. H. 82;
Mitchell c. Roulstone, 2 Hall, 351 ; Nel-
son r. Lloyd, 9 Watts, 22 ; Cottrill v. Van-
duzen, 22 Vt. 511 ; Gilpin v. Temple, 4
Hairing. 190; Van Reimsdyk v. Kane, 1
Gallis. t>30 ; Tuttle v. Cooper, 5 Pick.
414; Whitney v. Ferris, 10 Johns. 66;
Bucknam r. Barnum, 15 Conn. 68; Phillips
v. Purington, 15 Me. 425; Jennings v.
Estes, 16 id. 323; Welsh v. Speakman,
8 W. & S. 257 ; Haughey v. Strickler, 2
id. 411 ; Porter v. Wilson, 13 Perm. 641.
— But the existence of a partnership may
be proved by the separate admissions of
all who are sued, or by the acts, decla-
rations, and conduct of the parties, the
act of one, the declarations of another,
and the acknowledgment or conduct of
a third. Welsh v. Speakman, 8 W. & 8.
257. See also Haughey v. Strickler, 2
W. & S. 411. And where proof of the
admissions of an alleged partner are
offered at the trial, it is the province of
the judge and not of the jury to pass
upon the fact whether such person was
a partner or not. Harris v. Wilson, 7
Wend. 57. — And where the terms of
the agreement and the facts are admit-
ted, it is a question of law, whether there
was a partnership or not. Everitt v.
Chapman, 6 Conn. 347; Terrell v. Rich-
ards, 1 Nott & McC. 20. — The fact that
the defendants do business as partners is
prima facie evidence of their copartner-
ship, and no written articles need be
shown. Bryer v. Weston, 16 Me. 261 ;
Gilbert v. Whidden, 20 id. 367; Forbes
v. Davidson, 11 Vt. 660. And the ad-
verse party's acknowledgment that the
plaintiffs were partners is sufficient.
Bisel r. Hobbs, 6 Blaekf. 479. In Hogg
v. Orgill, 34 Penn. St. 344, it is held that
the admission of one partner that an-
other was a member of the firm, made

198

after dissolution, binds no one but him-
self.

(p) Gouthwaite !•. Duckworth, 12 East,
421; Saville v. Robertson, 4 T. R. 720.
In Sims v. Willing, 8 S & R. 103, A, by
order of B, chartered a vessel to take a
cargo of flour and Indian corn on freight
from Philadelphia to Lisbon. Part of
the flour belonged to A, part to B, and
the remainder to C ; and the share of
each was paid for out of his separate
funds. A effected a separate insurance
on his own interest in the flour. The
whole shipment was consigned to C, in
Lisbon, and the whole appeared as his
property for the purpose of protecting
it from British cruisers. Had the vessel
arrived at Lisbon the whole of the flour
was to have been sold by the consignee,
and the net proceeds of A's interest re-
mitted, on his account, to his correspond-
ent in London. Held, that A, B, and C
were partners, and individually liable for
the whole amount of a general average
due upon the flour. — The ease of Post v.
Kimberly, 9 Johns. 470, is a leading case
on this subject. In that case, A. and M.,
partners, owned three-fourths of a vessel,
and B. and K., partners, owned the one-
fourth; they agreed to fit her out on a
voyage from New York to Laguira. A.
and M. purchased three-fourths of the
cargo, and chiefly, if not wholly, with
notes lent and advanced to them by P.
& IS., commission merchants. B. and K.
purchased the other fourth of the cargo,
for which they paid their own money,
and shipped the same on board the ves-
sel ; but it was not distinguished from
the rest of the cargo by any particular
marks ; and the whole cargo was to be
sold at Laguira, for the joint account
and the joint benefit of the owners, A.
and M., and B. and K. M. went out as the

CH. XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

177

* not jointly liable as partners upon any contract, unless * 177
they had a joint interest preceding or contemporary with
the formation of the contract. But where two or more agree
together to purchase goods, and agree also that one shall purchase
them for the rest, here there is a partnership preceding the pur-
chase, and he that buys is by the agreement of the others their
agent, and all are liable as partners. (5)

We have seen that each partner is for many purposes the agent
of all the rest, by force of law, without any express authority. (»•) 1

supercargo and agent ; and having sold
the cargo at Laguira, he invested the
proceeds in a return cargo, with which
the vessel set sail for New York, but was
obliged by stress of weather to put into
Norfolk, where M. sold the return cargo,
except a small parcel of coffee, and for
the avails received bills of exchange,
which he indorsed and remitted, with the
parcel of coffee, to P. and R., to whom
A. and M. were jointly indebted, and
M. on his private account, to a greater
amount, for advances made at the time
of the purchase of the outward cargo.
P. and R. collected the bills and sold the
coffee so remitted, and applied the same
to the payment of the debts so due to
them from A. and M. P. and R. had
notice, if not at the time of the shipment
of the outward cargo, certainly before
the bills remitted by M. were collected,
and the coffee sold and converted into
money, that B. and K. were interested
in and owned one-fourth of the cargo so
sold by M. ; and B. and K. demanded of
P. and R. their proportion of the proceeds
so remitted by M., after deducting com-
missions, &c., but P. and R. refused to
pay or deliver the same, alleging their
right to retain the same, for the payment
of the debt due to them from A. and M.
It was held, that there was no partnership
existing between A. and M. and B. and
K., so as to render the disposition of the
return cargo, by M. binding, as the act
of a partner on B. and K. ; that there was
no agreement constituting a partnership
in the purchase of the outward cargo, or
to share jointly in the ultimate profit and
loss of the adventure ; and though there
might be a partnership so far as respect-
ed the transportation and selling of the
outward cargo, for the joint profit and
loss of the owners ; yet it terminated in
the sale of the outward cargo ; and their

interest in the return cargo was separate
and distinct, each being entitled to his
respective proportion of it without any
concern in the profit and loss which
might ultimately arise ; and that P. and
R., not having received the bills in the
course of trade, and knowing of the
interest of B. and K. before the bills
were paid, had no right to retain their
share, for the payment of the debt of A.
and M., but must account to B. and K.,
for their proportion ; and that a bill for
a discovery and account by them, against
P. and R., was sustainable in the Court of
Chancery ; that court having a concur-
rent jurisdiction with the courts of law
in all matters of account. — In Coope o.
Eyre, 1 H. Bl. 37, A, B, C, and D, agreed
to buy jointly all the oil they could get,
as their joint purchase, but A alone was
to buy, and B, C, and D were to share
equally in the oil he bought. A buys of
E on credit. The oil falls in value, and
A fails. E sues B, C, and D, as his part-
ners. They were held not to be his
partners, because it appeared that A
was not to sell for the rest ; but when
he had bought, B, C, and D were to re-
ceive from him each one-fourth ; and
there was no community in the dispo-
sition of the oil. — A firm cannot be
charged with a debt contracted by one
of the partners before the partnership
was constituted, although the subject-
matter which was the consideration of
the debt, has been carried into the part-
nership as stock. Brooke v. Evans, 6
Watts, 190 ; Ketchum v. Durkee, 1 Hoff.
Ch. 538.

(q) Felichy v. Hamilton, 1 Wash. C.
C. 491.

()•) Boswell v. Green, 1 Dutcher, 390 ;
Western Stage Company v. Walker, 2
la. 604.

i Thus one partner may buy and sell, Tate v. Clements, 16 Fla. 339 ; Birks i».
French, 21 Kan. 238 ; Corning v. Abbott, 54 N. H. 469 ; Johnson „ Barry 95 111. 483 ;
notwithstanding notice to withhold credit from him, Campbell v. Bowen, 49 Ga. 417 ,

199

* 178 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

Loans, purchases, sales, assignments, pledges, or mortgages,
effected by one partner on the partnership account,

* 178 * and with good faith on the part of the creditor or other

third party, are binding on all the firm. And this agency,
as it generally springs from a community of interest, so it is gen-
erally limited by this community.

A partner may transfer all his interest in the partnership, and
it has even been held, contrary as we think to the prevailing rule,
that such assignment by a partner to his individual creditors, was
valid against the partnership creditors, (s) 1

Among the questions which have arisen as to the limitations
to the general power of a partner over the partnership property,
one, not yet perhaps perfectly settled, is as to the power of one
partner to make an assignment of the whole property, to pay
the partnership debts, (t) We think the weight of authority

(s) Wilson v. Bowden, 8 Rich. L. 9, it, as I conceive, affect the power, that

and Norris v. Vernon, id. 13. these goods were conveyed to trustees

(() Anderson v. Tompkins, 1 Brock, to be suld by them. The mode of sale
456. It was held in this case that the must, I think, depend on circumstances,
right of one partner to hind another by Should goods be delivered to trustees,
such assignment results from his general for sale without necessity, the transae-
power to dispose of the partnership pro- tion would he examined with scrutinizing
perty, and if made bona fide is valid, eyes, and might, under some circumstan-
Marshall, C. J., said : " Had this, then, ces, be impeached. But if the necessity
been a sale for money, or on credit, no be apparent, if the act be justified by its
person, I think, could have doubted its motives, if the mode of sale be such as
obligation. I can perceive no distinction the circumstances require, I cannot say
in law, in reason, or in justice, between that the partner has exceeded his power."
such a sale and the transaction which The assignment was also held valid in
has taken place. A merchant may right- Harrison t: Sterry, 5 Cranch, 300, al-
fully sell to his creditor, as well as for though under seal. Robinson r. Crow-
money. He may give goods in payment der, 4 McCord, 519. And see to the
for a debt. If he may thus pay a small same effect Mills v. Barber, 4 Day, 42 J ;
creditor, he may thus pay a large one. Deckard v. Case, 5 Watts, 22 ; Tapley
The quantum of debt, or of goods sold, v. Butterfield, 1 Met. 515 ; Mabbett v.
cannot alter the right. Neither does White, 2 Kern. 442 ; Kemp u. Carnley,

or accept delivery, Kenney v. Altvater, 77 Penn. St. 34 ; Crosswell v, Lehman, 54
Ala. 363; or hire servants, Carley v. Jenkins, 46 Vt. 721 ; or assign a firm chose in
action, Clarke v. Hogeman, 13 W. Va. 718; or receive security for money lent, In re
Land Credit Co., L. R. 8 Ch. 831 ; or mortgage firm goods for a firm debt, Richard-
son v. Lester, 83 111. 55; or settle an insurance loss, Brown v. Hartford Ins. Co., 117
Mass. 479 ; or borrow money, Howze v. Patterson, 63 Ala. 205 ; Leffler r. Rice, 44
Ind. 103; Smith i\ Collins, 115 Mass. 388; or indorse negotiable paper, Porter v.
White, 39 Md. 613 ; Moorehead v. Gilmore, 77 Penn. St. 118 ; Cottam v. Smith, 27 La.
An. 128; or sign the firm name to notes, Wagner v. Simmons, 61 Ala. 143; Johnson
v. Barry, 95 III. 483; Porter v. Barry, 39 Md. 613; Faler v. Jordan, 44 Miss 2S3 ;
Ditts ii. Lonsdale, 49 Ind. 521 ; Shaw v. McGregory, 105 Mass. 96; Dow v. Moore,
47 N. H. 419 ; but a partner cannot accept a bill drawn "to our order," Hogarth r.
Latham, 3 Q. B. D. 643.

_ 1 A partner may mortgage his interest, and the mortgagee may sell it, subject to
his copartners' right first to apply the joint property to the payment of firm debts
and of any balance due themselves. Smith v. Evans, 37 Ind. 626.

200

CH. XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

*179

*179

and of * reason is in favor of this power, and that such
assignment, being entirely in good faith, would be held
valid ; especially if one of the partners had absconded, and the
other made the arrangement. (t€) He may sell the whole stock
in trade by a single contract, (m) Nor is the sale avoided by

3 Duer, 1. In Egberts v. Wood, 3 Paige,
617, Chancellor Walworth considered such
assignments valid when not against the
known wishes of a copartner. The con-
trary was held in Dickinson v. Legare,
1 Desaus. 557 (overruled by Robinson v.
Crowder, supra ) ; Dana v. Lull, 17 Vt.
390, per Redfield, J., and Bennett. J. See
Moddewell v. Keever, 8 W. & S. 63. Ir.
Havens v. Hussey, 5 Paige, 30, the power
of one partner to make such an assign-
ment against the known wishes of a,
copartner, or without his consent, was
held invalid. Chancellor Walworth, re-
ferring to Egberts v. Wood, supra, said :
"As it was not necessary for the decision
of that case, I did not express any
opinion as to the validity of an assign-
ment of the partnership effects by one
partner, against the known wishes of
his copartner, to a trustee, for the benefit
of the favorite creditors of the assignor ;
in fraud of the rights of his copartner
to participate in the distribution of the
partnership effects among the creditors,
or in the decision of the question as to
which of the creditors, if- any, should
have a preference in payment out of the
effects of an insolvent concern. . . . One
member of the firm, without any express
authority from the other, may discharge
a partnership debt, either by the pay-
ment of money, or by the transfer to the
creditor of any other of the copartnership
effects ; although there may not be suf-
ficient left to pay an equal amount to
the other creditors of the firm. But it is
no part of the ordinary business of a
copartnership to appoint a trustee of all
the partnership effects, for the purpose
of selling and distributing the proceeds
among the creditors in unequal propor-
tions. And no such authority as that
can be implied. On the contrary, such
an exercise of power by one of the firm,
without the consent of the other, is in
most cases a virtual dissolution of the
copartnership ; as it renders it impossible
for the firm to continue its business." —
In Hitchcock v. St. John, 1 Hoff. Ch. 511,
It was held, that one partner cannot on
the eve of insolvency assign all the part-
nership property to a trustee, for the
purpose of paying the debts of the firm
with preferences. In Kirby v. IngersoU,

1 Doug. (Mich.) 477, the reasons for and
against the validity of such assignments
to trustees were elaborately considered
by Fetch, J., delivering the opinion of the
court, and Whipple, J., dissenting; and it
was hold that the implied authority ari-
sing from the ordinary contract of copart-
nership does not authorize one of the
partners, without the assent of his co-
partners, and in the absence of special
circumstances, as their absence in a
foreign country, to make a general as-
signment of the partnership effects, to a
trustee, for the benefit of creditors, giv-
ing preferences to some over others. The
power of one partner to make such an
assignment to trustees as would termin-
ate the partnership, was left undecided
in Hayes v. Heyer, 4 Sandf. Ch. 4b5, and
Pierpoint !■. Graham, 4 Wash. C. C. 232.
In the latter case Judge Washington evid-
ently inclined to the opinion that it does
not exist, although he did not find it
necessary to express himself decidedly
upon the question. This power is de-
nied in Kimball v. Hamilton Ins. Co. 8
Bosw. 495, and Hook u. Stone, 34 Mis.
329; Welles v. March, 30 N. Y. 344;
Coope v. Bowles, 42 Barb. 87. See Col-
Iyer on Part. § 395; Story on Part. §§
101, 310; 3 Kent, Com. 44, n. (7th ed.).
But the assignment of real property to
trustees will not bind the partners who
do not join in it. Anderson v. Tompkins,
1 Brock. 463 ; Collyer on Part. (3d Am.
ed.) § 394. See also Wilson v. Soper, 13

B. Mon. 411, and Fisher v. Murray, 1 E.
D. Smith, 341.

(tt) Palmer v Myers, 43 Barb. 509.
See also Stein v. La Dow, 13 Minn. 412.

(«) Arnold v. Brown, 24 Pick. 89;
Tapley v. Butterfield, 1 Met. 518; Ander-
son v. Tompkins, 1 Brock, 456 ; Pierson
r. Hooker, 3 Johns. 70; Livingston v.
Roosevelt, 4 Johns. 277 ; Mills v. Barber,
4 Day, 430 ; Pierpoint r. Graham, 4 Wash.

C. C. 234 ; Kirby v. IngersoU, 1 Harring.
Ch. (Mich.) 172; Halstead v. Shepard,
23 Ala. 558. In Whitton v. Smith, 1
Freeman, Ch. (Miss.) 238, Buclmer, C. J.,
says : " One of the undisputed canons
of the law of partnership is the right of
each partner to sell the whole partner-
ship property, if the sale be free from
fraud on the part of the purchaser, and

201

180

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

the fact that the partner making the sale applies the
* 180 * proceeds fraudulently to the payment of his private

debt, («) if the purchaser was wholly innocent of the fraud.
It seems to be settled that a partner may dissent from a future
or incomplete contract, and that a third party having notice of
such dissent could not hold the dissenting partner, without evi-
dence of his subsequent assent or ratification, (w) And the

such a sale terminates the partnership
relation." Arnold v. Brown, 24 Pick. 92,
Mortun, J. : " The sale was made by one
of two partners. And the first objection
is, that one, in the absence of the other,
had no authority to make this sale. It is
said, that, although he might sell the
whole partnership stock by retail, yet
that it was not according to the ordinary
course of business, and so not within the
scope of his authority, to sell the whole
at once by a single contract. We have
no evidence of the terms of association
between these partners ; but there is no
reason to suppose that either member of
the firm had any different authority than
what was derived from the relation sub-
sisting between them. Doubtless the or-
dinary business of the company was to
purchase goods by the large quantity,
and to sell them in small quantities.
But this cannot restrain the general
power to buy and sell. The validity
of a purchase or a sale cannot be made
to depend upon the amount bought and
Bold. The authority will expand or con-
tract, according to the emergencies which
may arise in the course of their proper
business. One of their principal objects
was to sell, and it would be absurd to
Bay that either partner might sell all the
goods by retail as fast as possible, but if
a favorable opportunity occurred, to sell
a great part or the whole at once, he
would have no power to do it. That an
exigency had arisen in the affairs of
the partnership, which rendered a sale
necessary, and which made it highly
expedient and beneficial to sell in this
mode, is very apparent. And we have
no doubt that the one partner was au-
thorized to make this sale in the name
of the firm." See also Forkner v. Stuart,
6 Gratt. 197.

(v) Arnold v. Brown, 24 Pick. 93.
Morion, J. : " It was immaterial to the
purchaser how or to whom he paid the
price. If a portion went to pay a private
debt of one of the firm, it would not
invalidate the sale and defeat the trans-
fer of the goods. "Whether it would be
deemed a legal payment pro tanto, as

202

against the creditors of the firm, is a
question with which we have nothing
to do. So if the partnership stock had
been taken in satisfaction of a private
debt due from one of the partners to the
purchaser, it might have been deemed
fraudulent as to the creditors of the
company. But sucli was not this case."
(w) In Willis v. Dyson, 1 Stark. 164,
the dissent was by one partner, who sent
a circular containing these words : " I am
sorry that the conduct of my partner
compels me to send the annexed circular.
I recommend it to you to be in possession
of my individual signature before you
send any more goods ; " and it was held
to be sufficient. Lord Ellenborouyh held,
" That although no dissolution had taken
place till a late period, yet that after
notice by one partner not to supply any
more goods on the partnership account,
it would be necessary for the partner
sending goods after such notice to prove
some act of adoption by the partner who
gave the notice, or that he had derived
some benefit from the goods." Feigley
v. Sponeberger, 5 W. & S. 504 ; Vice v.
Fleming, 1 Y. & Jer. 227 ; 3 Kent, Com.
45; Lay field's case, 1 Salk. 292; Minnit
v. Whinery, 5 Bro. P. C. 489 ; Kooth v.
Quinn, 7 Price, 193 ; Yeager v. Wallace,
67 Penn. St. 365. — The implied author-
ity of one partner to draw bills and
notes for the partnership is revoked by
notice to the person who afterwards re-
ceives them that it does not exist. Galway
v. Matthew, 1 Camp. 403 ; s. c. 10 East,
264 ; Rooth t>. Quinn, 7 Price, 193. The
refusal of a partner to give a joint note
does not of itself amount to a revocation
of the implied authority, but the ques-
tion is to be submitted as one of fact for
the jury. Leavitt v. Peck, 3 Conn. 124;
Vice v. Fleming, 1 Y. & Jer. 227. — This
dissent may not, perhaps, relieve a part-
ner from liability, where the partnership
consists of more than two, unless the ma-
jority dissent. 3 Kent, Com. 45 ; Story on
Part. § 123 ; Coll. on Part. § 389, n. ;
Rooth v. Quinn, 7 Price, 193 ; Kirk v.
Hodgson, 3 Johns. Ch. 400. And it has
been held that each partner may bind his

CH. XII.] PAETNERSHIP. * 181

mere fact that the goods purchased by the contract came into
the possession of the firm is not sufficient evidence of such assent
or ratification, without some evidence of a benefit received by
the dissenting partner, from the delivery of the goods to the
firm, (x)

* Money lent to one partner for his own expenses, in- * 181
curred by him in prosecuting the business of the partner-
ship, has been held to be a partnership debt, (y) But if a partner
who has given his own security for money borrowed by himself,
apply that money to partnership purposes, this' does not make it
a partnership debt. The partnership owes the borrowing partner,
and he alone owes the lender. (2) 1 And a person lending money
to one partner, that he may contribute it to increase the capital
of the concern, cannot hold the other partners liable, without
some evidence of their assent or authority, (a) And one attor-
ney, a member of a firm, has no general authority resulting from
the nature of their business to borrow money on the credit of the
firm. (6) 2 Nor can he bind his copartner by an indorsement of

copartners by any contract within the goods coming to the use of the firm, and
scope of the partnership business, not- a benefit derived to the dissenting part-
withstanding they object to the transac- ner from their delivery to the firm.'
tion. Wilkins v. Pearce, 6 Denio, 641. The bargain may have proved to be a
" By the act of entering into a copartner- very losing one, and this may have been
ship, each of its members becomes foreseen by the dissenting partner and
clothed with full power to make any have been the very cause of the notice ;
and every contract within the scope and and why should he be held to pay, per-
limits of the copartnership business. All haps from his private property, for
such contracts will therefore be abso- goods, the purchase and sale of which
lutely binding upon the several members, may have absorbed the whole partner-
This, however, is incident to the copart- ship stock, when he had provided against
nership relation, and must exist in deft- such a calamity by expressing his dissent
ance of expostulations and objections, from the contract before it was consum-
while the relation endures." s. c. 2 mated 1 "

Comst. 469. A firm cannot be charged (y) Both well v. Humphreys, 1 Esp.

with a debt contracted by one partner, 406. And see Ex parte Bonbonus, 8 Ves.

before the partnership was constituted, 540.

although the subject-matter which was (z) Graeff v. Hitchman, 5 Watts, 454 ;

the consideration of the debt has been Bevan v. Lewis, 1 Sim. 376 ; Emly 0.

carried into the partnership as stock. Lye, 15 East, 6.

Nor can the firm be charged with rent (a) Fisher v. Taylor, 2 Hare, 218.

which accrued upon a lease to one of the And see Greenslade ?;. Dower, 7 B. & C.

partners. Brooke v. Evans, 5 Watts, 635 ; Stewart v. Caldwell, 9 La. Ann. 419 ;

196 ; Ketchum v. Durfee, 1 Hoff. Ch. King v. Faber, 22 Penn. St. 21.
528 ; Le Roy v. Johnson, 2 Pet. 198. (6) Breckenridge v. Shrieve, 4 Dana,

{x) Monroe v. Conner, 15 Me. 178. 378. See also Sims v. Brutton, 5 Exch.

Shepley, J. : " It is quite obvious that 802 ; Wilkinson v. Candlish, 5 Exch. 91 ;

there may be a difference between the Harman v. Johnson, 3 Car. & K. 272.

1 Salem Bank v. Thomas, 47 N. Y. 15.

2 Plumer v. Gregory, L. E. 18 Eq. 621. Neither can a partner in a law firm bind
his copartner by giving a note in the firm name, even for a partnership debt, unless
he has special authority, or it was necessary for carrying on the business, Smith v.

203

* 182 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

a writ in his own name, (c) A lender of money to a partner can-
not, in general, recover of the firm, without showing that the
money was applied to the use of the firm. For the presumption
would lie that it was borrowed by the partner on his own account,
and not lent to the firm. But although it be proved that the
money was not applied to the use of the firm, yet the firm will be
liable for it, if it were borrowed in their name by a partner whom
they had apparently clothed with authority to borrow it

* 182 for them. (cT) 1 If the partnership * be carried on in the

name of an individual, the presumption of law is that a
note signed by him is his own note, and the contrary must be
shown, (e) 2 If, however, a partner of a firm having other names,
or the word company in its partnership style, sign a bill or note
with his own name, and without the proper partnership style, or
in other words to indicate that it is on partnership account, for
money borrowed, he alone is answerable, although the money was
borrowed for and applied to a partnership purpose. (/) 3 Ques-

(r) Davis !'. Gowen, 17 Me. 387. note was given in a matter not relating

{d) In Etheridge v. Binney, 9 Pick, to the partnership business, and that also

272, it was held that in case of a limited with the knowledge of the payee. See

and dormant partnership carried on by Thieknesse i. Bromilow, 2 Cr. & J. 425;

one of the partners in his individual Barratt v. Swann, 17 Me 180 ; Ensmiu-

name. if he borrow money representing it ger v. Marvin, 5 Blackf. 210; Bank of

to be for the use of the partnership, the dor- the United States v. Binney, 5 Mason,

mant partners will be liable, without 170; Wright v. Hooker, 6 Selden, 51.
proof by the creditor that the money (ej See cases in former note, and Oli-

went to the use of the partnership. But pliant t>. Mathews, 1(3 Barb. 008.
it was held otherwise, if there were no ( f) Ripley r. Kingsbury, 1 Day, 150,

such representations. — See Whitaker n. ; Foley v. Robards, 3 Ired L. 179;

v. Brown, 10 Wend. 505, where it was Jaques i\ Marquand, 0 Cowen, 407 ; Willis

held that a note, given by one partner in v. Hall, 2 Dev. & B. 231 ; Logan v. Bond,

the name of the firm, is of itself presump- 13 Ga. 192 ; Hogan v. Reynolds, 8 Ala.

tive evidence of the existence of a part- 6'.t. Otherwise, if the paper be signed

nership debt, and if the other partners with the partnership clause. Pearce v.

seek to avoid the payment, the burden Wilkins, 2 Cornst. 409; Hamilton o. Sum-

of proof lies upon them to show that the mers, 12 B. Mon. 11.

Sloan, 37 Wis. 285 ; nor bind his firm by a post-dated check drawn in the name of the
firm, Forster «. Maekreth, L. R. 2 Ex. 103. See Garland v. Jacomb, L. R. 8 Ex. 216.

1 But Lill ». Egan, 89 111. 609, decided that if money is lent to one partner, neither
the signing a note for it by his copartners, nor the application of most of it to firm
debts would make it a partnership transaction.

2 Yorkshire Banking Co. u. Beatson, 4 C. P. D. 204, decided that if the name of
a firm is identical with that of an individual member of it, proof that such name
was signed to a bill of exchange by the authority and for the purposes of the firm
is necessary to make the firm liable ; but it was said in the same case, on appeal, in
6 C. P. D. 109, affirming the judgment in the particular case, that the presumption in
such a case is that the bill was given for the firm, and is binding upon it, at least
where the individual carries on no business separate from the business of the firm,
which presumption may be rebutted by proof that the bill was signed not in the
name of the partnership, but of the individual for his private purposes.

8 But a joint obligation under seal executed by all the members of «. firm in its

204

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP.

183

tions of this kind can be decided in many cases only by the special
circumstances attending the transaction. For it is certain that if
money has been actually borrowed by one partner on the credit of
the firm, and in the course of the business of the firm, the other
partners are liable for it, although the money was misapplied by
him who borrowed it. (#) And if the money be borrowed by one
partner, not expressly on his individual credit, and it was in part
borrowed for and used by the firm, the copartners are
liable. (A) * And where the money of a third person is * 183
in the hands of a copartner as trustee, and he applies it
to the use of the firm, with the knowledge and consent of the
copartners, they are certainly bound, (i) And it has been de-
cided, upon strong reasons, that they are so held without their
knowledge and consent. (/) Still if a partner borrows money T

(g) Emerson v. Harmon, 14 Me. 271 ; 119 : " Where a third person lends money
Church v. Sparrow, 5 Wend. 223; Onon- to one of the copartners upon the check
daga County Bank v. De Buy, 17 id. 47 ; or notes of the firm, he has a right to
Waldo Bank v. Lumbert, 16 Me. 416; presume it is for the use of the firm ■
Winship v. Bank of United States, 5 Pet. unless there is something to create a
529 ; Steel v. Jennings, Cheves, 183. — suspicion that the money is not borrow-
But see Lloyd v. Freshfield, 2 C. & P. 325, ed for the firm, and that the borrower is
where Bayley, J., is reported to have said : committing a fraud upon his copartners.
"In point of law, one of several partners And where money is thus borrowed upon
may pledge the partnership name for the note or check of the firm, the mem-
money bond fide lent, the lender suppos- bers of the firm or those of them to
ing that one partner has the authority of whom the credit was given by the lend-
the house to borrow, and that he is bor- er, are bound to show, not only that the
rowing for the purposes of the house, money was not applied to their use, but
But if there be gross negligence, and the also that the lender had reasons to believe
transaction be out of the ordinary course it was not intended to be so applied at
of business, the lenders cannot recover of the time it was lent. Bond v. Gibson, 1
the other partners, if the money be mis- Camp. 185; Whitaker v. Brown, 16 Wend,
applied." 605." See further Jaques v. Marquand, 0

(A) Church v. Sparrow, 5 Wend. 223 ; Cowen, 497.
Whitaker v. Brown, 16 id. 605 ; Miller v. (i) Hutchinson v. Smith, 7 Paige, 26 ;

Manice, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 114. Whether the Jaques v. Marquand, 6 Cowen, 497 ; Nich-

money was so borrowed and appropriated olson v. Leavitt, 4 Sandf. 309.
is a question for the jury. Church v. Spar- ( /-) Richardson i: French, 4 Met. 577.

row, supra. — In Miller v. Manice, supra, In this case it was determined that where

Walworth,C\\., is reported to have said at p. an administrator, who is a member of a

business, and for its benefit, will be regarded as a copartnership obligation, and pay-
able out of the firm assets, although the firm name is not mentioned therein, and it
appears upon its face to be simply the obligation of the copartners contracted in
their individual names, Berkshire Woollen Co. v. Juillard, 75 N. Y. 535 ; see Ex
parte Stone, L. R. 8 Ch. 914 ; Ex parte Portland Bank, 70 Me. 369 ; and where the
signing of a firm name as "M. & G. by G." to an instrument shows that it was
intended to be the act of all the partners, although but one partner, " G," is named
in the instrument, George v. Tate, 102 U. S. 564; and it is equally true that where
all firm checks are drawn in one partner's name, a check so drawn binds the firm.
Crocker v. Colwell, 46 N. Y. 212. — A letter beginning "We hereby guarantee,"
signed by the firm name and each of the partners, is both joint and several. Er parte
Harding, 12 Ch. D. 557. — If there is no firm style, one partner may sign his co-partners'
names to a note given in the course of the partnership business, and bind them.
Nelson v. Neely, 63 Ind. 194; Kitner v. Whitlock, 88 111. 513.

205

183

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[book I.

on his own individual credit, and subsequently applies it to the
benefit of the firm, this does not make the firm liable to the origi-
nal lender, (/c)

A partner cannot bind his copartners by a submission of a part-
nership question to a reference, (hk) 1

It was decided many years ago, in one case, that a purchase
by one partner bound the others ; and in another case, that a
sale by one partner bound the others ; (I) and these rules are

partnership, applies to the partnership
concerns money belonging to his intes-
tate's estate, and afterwards gives the
note of the firm to a creditor of the
intestate, to whom such money was due,
in discharge of such creditor's claim on
the estate, the firm is bound to pay the
note, although the money was not in the
hands of the firm when the note was
given. And Hubbard, J., in giving the
opinion of the court, said: " The defence
relied upon in this case is, that the
money of the plaintiff never came to the
use of the firm of 1J. Blodgett & Co., and
consequently that the note declared on
was without consideration ; that if the
money in the hands of P. Blodgett, as
one of the administrators of George
Blodgett, and belonging to that estate,
was used by the firm of P. Blodgett &
Co., the firm were not the debtors to the
several creditors of the estate, between
whom and them there was no privity,
but to the administrators of the estate ;
and that the remedy of the creditors, of
whom the plaintiff was one, was on the
bond of the administrators. Without
controverting this proposition, we think
the plaintiff's case can be distinguished
from it. The firm of P. Blodgett & Co.
have the use of the money of the estate
which they have borrowed from the
administrators. If, then, the plaintiff,
knowing this, is willing to discharge her
claim against the estate, and take, in lieu
thereof, the note of the firm, it seems to
us that the transaction is a valid one,
and that the note is given on a good con-
sideration. Supposing the transaction to
appear in the books of the firm, the
administrators on the estate of George
Blodgett will be charged with the amount
of the note given to the plaintiff ; and

the note will be entered in the account
of notes payable, and the receipt of the
plaintiff, and her order for her dividend
upon the estate, will be a good voucher
for the defendants to sustain their charge
for so much money returned to the
administrators. And we are further of
opinion that it was not necessary, as was
ruled by the Court of Common Pleas,
that the money should have been sub-
stantially in hand, at the time of giving
the note, to enable the plaintiff to recover
upon it against the firm. It was sufficient
for that purpose if the money, to which
the plaintiff had an equitable claim, had
in fact been used by the firm, to author-
ize the giving of the note so as to bind
them ; it being the substitution of one
creditor of the firm for another for a
good consideration, by consent of the
different parties concerned. For whether
the defendant, French, was ignorant or
not of the giving of the note, at the time,
the act of his copartner in this respect
is equally binding upon him, the firm
having had the money."

{*•) Green v. Tanner, 8 Met. 411 ; Be-
van i'. Lewis, 1 Sim. 376 ; Graeff !'. Hitch-
man, 5 Watts, 454; Logan u. Bond, 13
Ga. 192; Wiggins v. Hammond, 1 Mo.
121. If the note be signed A B, for A B
& Co., the firm will be liable. Staats v.
Howlett, 4 Denio, 559. If a partner bor-
row money on his own note for the use
of the firm, lie may afterwards substitute
the note of the firm for his own, and it
will be no fraud, and the firm will be
bound. Union Bank ;;. Eaton, 5 Humph.
499. See owo, p. * 180.

(kk) Martin i: Thrasher, 40 Vt. 460.

(/) Lambert's case, Godb. 24 1 ; Hyatt
v. Hare, Comb. 383. And see Winship r.
Bank of United States, 5 Pet. 561 ;

1 Backus v. Coyne, 35 Mich. 5 ; contra in Pennsylvania, Gay v. Waltman, 89 Penn.
St. 453; see Thomas v. Atherton, 10 Ch. D. 18.3. Neither can one partner confess
judgment to bind his copartners, Soper !>. Pry, 37 Mich. 236; Rhodes v. Amsinck,
38 Md. 346: contra, Ross v. Howell, 84 Penn. St. 129. As to whether a partner,
before or after dissolution, can cause the appearance of another partner to be
entered to a suit against the firm, see Hall v. Lanning, 91 U. S. 160.

206

CH. XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

184

* the basis of a partnership liability now. And the seller * 184
or the purchaser will not be affected by the fraudulent in-
tention of the partner in the transaction, unless there has been
collusion, or want of good faith, or gross negligence, on his
part, (rn) But the power of one partner to dispose of partnership
property is confined strictly to personal effects, (n)

A mortgage of firm property by a partner in his own name,
conveys no title, (nn) 1

The act of each partner is considered as the act of the whole
partnership, or of all the partners, only so far as that act was
within the scope of the business of the firm ; (o) 2 but one copart-
ner may bind the firm in matters out of their usual course of
business, if they arose out of and were connected with their usual
business, (jj) Or if they receive the express sanction and con-
firmation of the firm, (g) And if a firm owe a debt, it is held

"Walden v. Sherburne, 15 Johns. 422 ;
Mills v. Barber, 4 Day, 430; Dougal a.
Cowles, 6 Day, 515.

(m) Bond v. Gibson, 1 Camp. 185.
Assumpsit, for goods sold and deliv-
ered. It appeared that while the de-
fendants were carrying on the trade of
harness-makers together, Jephson bought
of the plaintiff a great number of bits to
be made up into bridles, which he carried
away himself ; but that instead of bring-
ing them to the shop of himself and his
copartner, he immediately pawned them
to raise money for his own use. Guzclee,
for the defendant Gibson, contended that
this could not be considered a partner-
ship debt, as the goods had not been
bought on the partnership account, and
the credit appeared to have been given
to Jephson only. He allowed the case
would have been different had the goods
once been mixed with the partnership
stock, or if proof had been given of
former dealings upon credit between the
plaintiff and the defendants. Lord Ellen-
borough: "Unless the seller is guilty of
collusion, a sale to one partner is a sale
to the partnership, with whatever view
the goods may be bought, and to what-
ever purposes they may be applied. I

will take it that Jephson here meant to
cheat his copartner ; still the seller is not
on that account to suffer. He is innO'
cent ; and he had a right to suppose that
the individual acted for the partnership.'"
Verdict for the plaintiff. — See McCul
lough v. Somerville, 8 Leigh, 415 ; Arn
old v. Brown, 24 Pick. 89; Tapley
Butterfield, 1 Met. 518 ; Anderson
Tompkins, 1 Brock. 4o<> ; Pierpont v. Gra
ham, 4 Wash. C. C. 234 ; Kirby *•. Inger-
soil, 1 Harr. Ch. (Midi.) 172 ; Whitton v.
Smith, Freem. Ch. (Miss.) 231; Duncan
v. Clark, 2 Rich. 587.

(n) Anderson a. Tompkins, 1 Brock.
450; Shaw, C. J., in Tapley v. Butter-
field, 1 Met. 519; Coles v. Coles, 15
Johns. 159. — Nor can one partner with-
out special authority, bind the firm by
a contract for the sale of real estate
employed in the business of the firm.
Lawrence v. Taylor, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 107.

(nn) Clark v. Houghton, 12 Gray, 38.

(o) Hannan v. Johnson, 18 E. L. &
E. 400; s. c. 2 E. & B. 61 ; Goodman v.
White, 2 Miss. 163; Miller v. Hines, 15
Ga. 197.

(p) Sandilands v. Marsh, 2 B. & Aid.
673.

(?) Ex parte Peele, 6 Ves. 602.

1 But Woodruff v. King, 47 Wis. 261, decided that one partner may execute a
chattel mortgage of the firm property to secure a partnership debt without his part-
ner's consent, and the attachment by him of a seal thereto, which was unnecessary,
will not affect its validity.

2 Thus there is no implication of law from the mere existence of a trade partner-
ship that one partner has authority to bind the firm by opening a banking account
on its behalf in his own name. Alliance Bank v. Kearsley, L. K. 6 C. P. 433.

207

* 185 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

that a partner binds the firm by their note for that debt, given by
him against the wishes of his partners, (qq) Where any creditor
of one member of a firm takes from his own debtor, either in pay-
ment or as security for his debt, the paper of the firm, the pre-
sumption of law is, that he took it in fraud of the firm ; and
without proof of their interest, or their assent and authority
(which may be circumstantial), the firm will not be

* 185 held, (r) 1 And if a partner * applies partnership funds to

the payment of his own debts, this act is void, although
the creditor did not know that the funds belonged to the partner-
ship, (s) 2 And a purchaser who buys partnership property from
a partner, knowing that the transaction was a fraud on the firm,
may be held a trustee for the firm. (£)

Partners may be made liable for the torts of a copartner if con-
nected with contract, and done apparently in due course of the
business of the firm, and the existence of the copartnership
and its business is that which gives the opportunity for the
wrong and injury inflicted upon the innocent party, (w) 3 It has

(qq) Partin v. Luderloh, 6 Jones, Eq. him v. Ensworth, 7 Wend. 326 ; Hal-

341. stead u. Shepard, 23 Ala. 558 ; Buck v.

(r) Gansevoort v. Williams, 14 Wend. Mosley, 24 Miss. 170 ; Filden t>. Lahens,

33 ; Minor v. Gaw, 11 8m. & M. 322 ; 9 Bosvv. 436 ; Whitmore v. Adams, 17 la.

Clay v. Cottrell, 18 Penn. 408; Homer v. 567 ; Burleigh r. Parton, 21 Texas, 585.
Wood, 11 Cush. 02; Butter v. Stocking, (t) Croughton v. Forrest, 17 Mo. 131.

4 Seld. 408. («) Willet v. Chamhers, Cowp. 814.

(s) Rogers v. Batchelor, 12 Pet. 220; So where one partner purchases such

Dob v. Halsey, 16 Johns. 34 ; Everng- articles as might be of use in the part-

1 Commonwealth Bank v. Law, 127 Mass. 72; Blodgett v. Sleeper, 67 Me. 499.

2 The creditor will hold such funds as trustee, Johnson v. Hersey, 70 Me. 74 ; and
the assignee of a firm may recover them from the party receiving them, Thomas v.
Pennrich, 28 Ohio St. 55. Locke v. Lewis, 121 Mass. 1, decided that a sale by a
partner, in payment of his own debt, of goods which are in fact goods of the partner-
ship, but which the partnership has so intrusted to him as to enable him to deal with
as his own, and to induce the public to believe to be his, and which the creditor
receives in good faith and without notice that they are the goods of the partnership,
is valid against the partnership and its creditors. Gray, C. J., elaborately discusses
Rogers v. Batchelor, 12 Pet. 221, supra, and the cases therein cited, and says :
"Upon a careful examination of the cases referred to in Rogers <\ Batchclor.'we
cannot find the slightest intimation of an opinion that the title in the property or
security would not pass to the private creditor, if he did not know it to belong to
the partnership ; but, on the contrary, we do find pointed suggestions that it would."
See Ililliker v. Francisco, 05 Mo. iV.M ; Blodgett e Sleeper, 07 Me. 499 ; Hurt >-.
Clarke, 50 Ala. 19 ; Todd v. Lorah, 75 Penn. St. 155 ; Cotzhausen v. Judd, 43 Wis.
213 ; Caldwell >: Scott, 54 N. H. 414 ; Binns r. Waddill, 32 Gratt. 588; Moriarty v.
Bailey, 46 Conn. 592 ; Davis v. Cook, 14 Key. 205.

3 A firm is not liable for such torts, unless done in the course of the firm business,
Tenney v. Foote, 95 111. 99; Witcher p. Brewer, 49 Ala. 119; or with the copartners'
knowledge and assent, Loomis v. Barker, 69 III. 360 ; or unless it receives the benefit
of the transaction, Durant v. Rogers, 87 111. 508. — A partner's misrepresentation also
in any firm transaction binds it, Wiley v. Griswold,41 la. 376; Henslee v. Cannefax,

208

CH. XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

186

* been held that one partner might bind the firm by a * 186
guaranty or letter of credit given in their name ; (v) but
it seems to be now settled that there must be a special authority
for that purpose ; (w) but this may be implied from the common

nership business, and instantly converts
them to his own separate use, the part-
nership is liable. Bond v. Gibson, 1
Camp. 185. A employed B and G, who
were partners as wine and spirit mer-
chants, to purchase wine and sell the
same on commission. C, the managing
partner, represented that he had made
the purchases, and that he had sold a
part of the wines so purchased at a
profit ; the proceeds of such supposed
sales he paid to A, and rendered ac-
counts, in which he stated the purchases
to have been made at a certain rate per
pipe. In fact, C had neither bought nor
sold any wine. The transactions were
wholly fictitious, but B was wholly ig-
norant of that. Upon the whole account
a larger sum had been repaid to A, as
the proceeds of that part of the wine al-
leged to be resold, than he had advanced ;
but the other part of the wine, which C
represented as having been purchased
was unaccounted for. Held, that B was
liable for the false representations of his
partner ; and that A was entitled to re-
tain the money that had been paid to
him upon these fictitious transactions, as
if they were real. Rapp v. Latham, 2 B.
& Aid. 795. See Stone v. Marsh, 6 B. &
C. 551 (Fauntleroy's case) ; Hume v. Bol-
land, Ry. & M. 371 ; Kilby «. Wilson,
Ry. & M. 178 ; Edmonson v. Davis, 4
Esp. 14; Moreton v. Hardern, 4 B. & C.
223 ; Babcock o. Stone, 3 McLean, 172.—
The conversion by one partner of prop-
erty which came into the possession of
the firm on partnership account is the
conversion of all. Nisbet v. Patton, 4
Rawle, 120. The partnership is liable to
the innocent indorsee of a promissory
note signed by one of the members in the
name of the firm, without the knowledge
or consent of his partner ; although the
note was given for a debt unconnected
with the business of the partnership.
Boardman v. Gore, 15 Mass. 331. So the
partnership is liable for the fraudulent
representations of a partner relative to
matters in the course of its business,
although without the knowledge of his

copartners. Doremus v. McCormick, 7
Gill, 49 ; Beach v. State Bank, 2 Cart.
(Ind.) 489; Hawkins v. Appleby, 2
Sandf. 421. Sand/orrl, J.: "It has long
been established that a partner is liable
in assumpsit for the consequences of
frauds practised by his copartner in the
transaction of the business, of which he
was entirely ignorant, and although he
derived no benefit from the fraud. This
is upon the ground that, by forming the
connection, partners publish to the world
their confidence in each other's integrity
and good faith, and impliedly agree to be
responsible for what they shall respec-
tively do within the scope of their part-
nership business; and if, by the wrongful
act of one a loss must fall upon a
stranger, or upon the other partner, who
is equally innocent, the latter, having
been the cause or occasion of the confi-
dence reposed in his delinquent associate,
must suffer the loss." It is held that the
implied authoritj' of a partner does not
extend to illegal contracts, as the bor-
rowing of money at usurious interest,
and will not bind his copartners without
their knowledge or consent. Hutchins v.
Turner, 8 Humph. 415. The court in
this case said : " The liability of a part-
ner, arising out of this implied assent,
and undertaking to be responsible for the
acts of his copartner on behalf of the
firm, in the ordinary business and trans-
actions thereof, cannot be held to extend
to illegal contracts. This would be ab-
surd. An agency or authority to a part-
ner to violate the provisions of a public
statute cannot be implied ; nor can it be
implied that such illegal act is within the
scope of the partnership, which could
only exist for lawful purposes.1' See
Pierce v. Jackson, 6 Mass. 245 ; Sherwood
v. Marwick, 5 Greenl. 295 ; Coomer v.
Bromley, 12 E. L. & E. 307; State v.
Neal, 7 Foster (N. H.), 131; Graham
u. Meyer, 4 Blatch. 129.

(v) Hope v. Cust, cited in 1 East, 48 ;
Ex parte Gardom, 15 Ves. 286.

(w) Sweetser v. French, 2 Cush. 309;
McQuewans v. Hamlin, 35 Penn St. 517.

49 Mo. 295 ; Smith v. Collins, 115 Mass. 388 ; McKee v. Hamilton, 33 Ohio St. 7 ;
Talbot v. Wilkins, 31 Ark. 411 ; but not if made while selling the several interests of
his copartners, unless approved by them or he acts as their agent, Schwabacker v.
Riddle, 84 111. 517.

vol. i. 14 209

187

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

course of business or previous transactions between the parties,
or from subsequent adoption by the firm, (x) a And if the word
" surety " be added to the signature of the firm, this casts upon
the holder the burden of proving the assent of the firm. («/) And
if the signature or indorsement be in the usual form, but the
party receiving it knows that it is given by way of suretyship, he
must prove by direct evidence or equivalent circumstances the
assent of the partners, (z) 2

A release by one partner is a release by all, both in law and in

equity, (a) And a release to one partner is a release to
* 187 all. (b) 8 * But any fraud or collusion destroys the effect

of such release. And the release to discharge absolutely
all the copartners, must be a technical release under seal, (c)

{x) Crawford ;.-. Sterling, 4 Esp. 207 ;
Sutton i'. Irwine, 12 S. & R. 13; Ex
parte Nolte, 2 Glyn & J. 295; Hamill v.
Purvis, 2 Penn. 177 ; Cremer v. Higgin-
son, 1 Mason, 323 ; Foote r. Sabin, 19
Johns. 154; Laverty v. Burr, 1 Wend.
631 ; N. Y. Fire Insurance Co. v. Bennett,

6 Conn. 571; Andrews c. Planters Bank,

7 Sm. & M. 192; Langan o. Hewett, 13
Sm. & M. 122; Sweetser v. French, 2
■.Cush. 30!).

(y) Boyd v. Plumb, 7 Wend. 309 ; Rol-
lins' v. Stevens, 31 Me. 454; Butterfield
l. Hemsley, 12 Gray, 226.

(z) Darling v. March, 22 Me. 188.

(a) Pierson v. Hooker, 3 Johns. 68 ;
Bruen a. Marquand, 17 Johns. 58 ; Sal-
mon v. Davis, 4 Binn. 375 ; Morse i\
Bellows, 7 N. H. 567; Halsey v. Whit-
ney, 4 Mason, 206 ; Smith v. Stone, 4 G.
&j. -810; McBride e. Hagan, 1 Wend.
326; Xnyes v. N. Haven, N. London &
Ktonington R. R. Co. 30 Conn. 1. The
ffule of law and equity is the same, and
<only eollusion for fraudulent purposes
between the partners and a debtor de-
■Btroys the effect of such release. Barker
tu Richardson, 1 Y. & Jer. 362; Cram v.
•Cadwc-U, 5 Cowen, 481). — And the fraud
•must be clearly established. Arton v.
Booth, 4 Moore, 192 ; Furnival r. Wes-
iton, 7 Moore, 356. And see Legh t>.
Legh, 1 B. & P. 447 ; Jones v. Herbert, 7
Taunt. 421; Mountstephen v. Brooke, 1

Chitt. 391. — Where one partner signed a
general release to a debtor of the firm,
and it did not appear whether it was
intended to apply to separate or to part
nership demands, or whether the subscrib-
ing partner had on his separate account
any demand against the debtor, the re-
lease was held a discharge from debts
due the partnership. The release was a
part of an indenture of assignment, in
trust for creditors. Emerson v. Knower,
8 Pick. 63. — Where such release is for
all demands, parol proof that a particular
debt was not intended to be released is
not admissible. Pierson v. Hooker, 3
Johns. 68.

(6) Hammon v. Roll, March, 202;
Bower v. Swadlin, 1 Atk. 294 ; Collins o.
Prosser, 1 B. & C. 682 ; American Bank
v. Doolittle, 14 Pick. 126; Coodnow v.
Smith, 18 Pick. 416 : Claggett r. Salmon,
5 G. & J 314; Burson r. Kincaid, 3
Penn. 67. — So a discharge of one surety
of his ichole liability is a discharge to the
others. Nicholson v. Revill, 4 A. & E.
675; Mayhew v. Crickett, 2 Swanst. 192.
— But a release to one partner may, by
means of recitals and provisos, be limited
in its operations to the partner to whom
it is given. Solly v. Forbes, 4 Moore,
448 ; 2 Br. & B. 38. See Wiggin v. Tudor,
23 Pick. 444.

{<■) Shaw v. Pratt, 22 Pick. 305;
Walker v. McCulloch, 4 Greenl. 421 ;

i See In re West of England Bank, 14 Ch. D. 317 ; Moran v. Prather, 23 Wall. 492 ;
Dubuque Bank v. Carpenter, 34 la. 433 ; s. c. 41 la. 518.

2 Commonwealth Bank o. Law, 127 Mass. 72 ; Security Bank v. McDonald, 127
Mass. 82; Lemoine v. Bank of No. America, 3 Dillon, 44; Moynahan u. Hanaford,
42 Mich. 32',) ; Bloom v. Helm, 53 Miss. 21.

3 But not if manifestly for his benefit alone. Ex parte Good, 5 Ch. D. 46; Green-
wald v. Raster, 86 Penn. St. 45.

210

CH. XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

188

And a discharge of one of several joint debtors by operation of
law, without the consent or co-operation of the creditor, takes from
him no remedy against the other debtor, (d)

The signature or acknowledgment of one partner, in matters
relating to the partnership, in general, binds the nrm;(» as
notice in legal proceedings, or abandonment to insurers by one
who has effected insurance for himself and others. (/) And if
one of several joint lessors, partners in trade, sign a notice to
quit, this will be valid for all ; (g) but not if they are not part-
ners in trade. (K) And in general a notice to one partner is
binding upon all ; (i) as of a prior unrecorded deed, the knowl-
edge of which, by one partner, will avoid a subsequent
deed to * all the partners. (/) And notice of a want of * 188
consideration of a promissory note, received by one partner,
affects all. (&)

Where a bill accepted by a firm is dishonored by one partner,
notice of the dishonor need not be given to the other partners ; (7)

Harrison v. Close, 2 Johns. 449 ; Catskill
Bank v. Messenuer, 9 Cowen, 37 ; Lunt
t>. Stevens, 25 Me. 534; ShotweU v. Mil-
ler, Coxe, 81. — It has been held that
a composition deed, given by the joint
creditors of a partnership upon its disso-
lution, to that partner who winds up the
affairs of the firm, is in the nature of a
release, and will discharge the other part-
ner from his liability. Ex parte Slater, G
Ves. 146. — But a covenant not to sue
one of several partners will not have the
same effect. Coll. on Part. § 608, and
cases cited.

(tf ) Ward v. Johnson, 13 Mass. 152 ;
Robertson v. Smith, 18 Johns. 459; Took-
er !'. Bennett, 3 Caines, 4; Townend v.
Riddle, 2 N. H. 449.

(e) See Corps v. Robinson, 2 Wash. C.
C. 388; Bound v. Lathrop, 4 Conn. 336;
Fisk v. Copeland, 1 Overt. 383. — During
the partnership one may enter an ap-
pearance in an action to bind the whole.
Bennett v. Stickney, 17 Vt, 531. See
contra, Haslet v. Street, 2 McCord, 311;
Loomis v. Pierson, Harper, L. 470. But
after dissolution one cannot acknowledge
service for the firm. Demott v. Svvaim,
5 Stew. & P. 293. And service of pro-
cess upon one partner, after dissolution,
will not authorize a judgment against
the firm. Duncan v. Tombeckbee Bank,

4 Port. (Ala.) 181.

( f) Hunt v. Royal Ex. Assurance Co.

5 M. & Sel. 47. So if one partner, for
himself and partner, sign a note for the

weekly payment under the Lords' act,
such note would bind the firm. Meux
v. Humphry, 8 T. R. 25 ; Burton u. Issit,
5 B. & Aid. 267.

(a) Doe v. Hulme, 2 Man.'fi R. 483.

(h) Goodtitle v. Woodward, 3 B. &
Aid. 689. But one joint-tenant may ap-
point a bailiff to distrain for rent due all
the joint-tenants. Robinson v. Hofman,
4 Bing. 562. And one partner may au-
thorize a clerk to draw or accept notes
or bills, in the name of the company.
Tillier v. Whitehead, 1 Dallas, 269.

(i) Alderson v. Pope, 1 Camp. 401;
Ex parte Waitman, 1 Mont. & A. 364;
Figgins v. Ward, 2 Cr. & M. 424; Carter
v. Southall, 3 M. & W. 128.

(j ) Barney v. Currier, 1 Chipman
(Vt.), 315; Gilby u. Singleton, 3 Litt.
250.

(!c) Quinn v. Puller, 7 Cush. 224. — So,
in equity, service of a subpoena upon one
partner may, upon notice, be made good
service upon his copartner abroad. Car-
rington v. Cantillon, Bunb. 107; Coles
v. Gurney, 1 Madd. 187. And see Lans-
ing v. McKillup, 7 Cowen, 416.

(V) Porthouse v. Parker, 1 Camp. 82.
See Dabney v. Stidger, 4 Sm. & M.749.
But it is otherwise in case of mere joint
indorsers, who are not partners ; notice
in such case must be given to both.
Shepard v. Hawley, 1 Conn. 368. Even,
it seems, to hold either. Bank, &c. v.
Root, 4 Cowen, 126.

211

* 188 THE LAW OP CONTKACTS. [BOOK I.

and where a bill or note is indorsed by a firm, which is dissolved
before the note is due, notice to one of the partners by a holder
not having knowledge of the dissolution, is sufficient, (m) And
where the drawer of a bill is a partner of the house on which it is
drawn, he is chargeable without notice to him of the dishonor of
the bill, (n) A partner cannot, merely by the authority given by
the partnership, and without the authority of the partners, bind
his copartner by his indorsement of negotiable paper not belong-
ing to the partnership, (jiri)

Generally, a partner cannot bind his copartners by deed, with-
out express authority. But it has been held that if he annex a
seal for himself and his copartner, in the presence of his copart-
ner, that will bind them both, (o) l

In some cases very slight circumstances appear to be sufficient
to affect a party with the liabilities of partnership. ( /;) But the
mere fact of persons giving a joint order for goods will not
make them liable as partners, if it appear otherwise that the
seller trusted to them severally, (q) Nor is a person made

(m) Coster v. Thomason, ID Ala. 717; themselves out to others, whether their

Nott v. Douming, 6 La. 684. And in such contract woulrl make tliem so or not.

case it lias been said, that one partner Stearnes v. Haven, 14 Vt. 504. See notes

may, after dissolution, waive demand (q), (r), and (0, post.
and notice for the other partners as well (q) Gibson ?•. Lupton, 9 Bing. 297. In

six for himself. Darling a. March, 22 Me. this case the two defendants, who were

184. But this may be doubted. not general partners, gave a joint order

(n) Gowan v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 176. to the plaintiff's agent for the purchase

Notice of the dishonor of a note given of some wheat The order contained

to the surviving partner of a firm fixes these words, " Payment for the same to

the liability of a partnership, and binds be drawn upon e.uch of us in the usual

the representatives of the deceased part- manner." In reply to this order, the

ner. IJabney v. Stidgvr, 4 Sin. & M. 749 ; plaintiffs wrote to the defendants : " We

Cocke ». Bank of Tennessee, 6 Humph. 51. have made a purchase for your joint

(mi) Bowman v. Cecil Bank, 3 Grant, account." At the same time they drew

33. a bill upon each defendant for one third

(o) Ball r. Dunsterville, 4 T. R. 313 ; of the price, each bill being for one

Swan v. Steadman, 4 Met. 548. See Pot- moiety of the third. They afterwards,

ter v. McCoy, 26 Penn. St. 458; Freeman on the wheat being shipped, drew like

v. Carhart, 17 Ga. 348. In Gram u. bills for the remainder of the price, hav-

Seton, 1 Hall, 2G2, the court seem inclined ing previously written: "Wo hold you

to maintain the general power of a part- both harmless for the advance up to the

ner to affix a seal for the firm in the period of lading and invoice " The bill

partnership business. See also Purvi- of lading, on coming into the possession

ance v. Sutherland, 2 Ohio (n. s ), 478. of the defendants, was indorsed by each

(;>) Parker r. Barker, 1 Br. & B. 9, 3 of them. Under these circumstances, the
Moore, 226. — Persons are to be treated Court of Common Pleas held that the (le-
as partners if they so conduct and hold fendants were only severally liable on the

1 But an express or implied verbal or written authority or ratification, not under
seal, makes the deed that of the firm. Holbrook i>. Chamberlhi, 116 Mass. 155. See
Williams v. Gillies, 75 N. Y. 197 ; Cunningham v. Lamar, 61 Ga. 574 ; Kasson v.
Broeker, 47 Wis. 79.

212

CH. XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

189

* a partner by a stipulation that a firm will be governed by * 189
his advice, (r)

If the terms of the contract, and all the facts necessary for its
construction, are ascertained, the question whether there is a part-
nership, is a question of law. (a)

No particular mode of holding oneself out as a partner is neces-
sary to make one liable as such ; but it must be a voluntary act ;
for otherwise a party might be charged with a ruinous responsi-
bility without his knowledge, intention, or assent, and without
fault on his part, and through the fraud or wrongful acts of oth-
ers. («) Where a person is received as a new member

* into an old firm, and the new firm recognizes, by pay- * 190
ment of interest a debt of the old firm, this is, in general

contract, each being responsible for the
purchase of a moiety only of the cargo.
See also Hopkins v. Smith, 11 Johns. 161 ;
Livingston v. Roosevelt, 4 id. 266 ; Mclver
v. Humble, 16 East, 169. — So where in
an action of assumpsit, C was charged
as a partner with A, on the authority of
B, who informed the plaintiff before he
furnished the goods, that they were in
partnership, and, at the trial, B's clerk
proved that B had been in the habit of
discounting bills for A, and that in dis-
counting a bill at one time for A, he bad
introduced C to him as his partner, but
that the only connection in trade between
B and the defendants was in discounting
bills ; Lord Kent/on said that this evidence
was not sufficient to charge C as A's
partner ; that the introduction of C to B
should be taken secundum suhjectam mat-
eriam, that is, as applying to a transac-
tion in which A was concerned with B,
the discounting of bills, to which trans-
action only it should be confined. De
Berkom v. Smith, 1 Esp. 29; see also
Livingston v. Roosevelt, 4 Johns. 266.

(r) Barklie v. Scott, 1 Hud. & B. 83.
Because it does not hold him out to the
world as a partner, nor give him any
share in the profits, nor empower him to
dissolve, alter, or affect the partnership.
— So the fact that several persons as-
sociated together to run a line of stage-
coaches, that they had a general meeting,
and that debts were contracted on account
of the company, do not prove a partner-
ship as between themselves. Chandler
v. Brainard, 14 Pick. 285; Clark v. Reed,
11 id. 446. — And the fact that two per-
sons sign a note jointly was held not
evidence of a partnership between them.
Hopkins v. Smith, 11 Johns. 161. But
see Carwick v. Vickery, Dougl. 653 ; De

Berkom v. Smith, 1 Esp. 29; 3 Kent (5th
ed.), 30, n. See further as to what facts
will constitute a partnership, Smith «.-.
Edwards, 2 Har. & G. 411.

(s) See Everitt v. Chapman, 6 Conn.
347 ; Terrill v. Richards, 1 Nott & McC.
20; Drake i: Klwin, 1 Caines, 184; Beech-
am v. Dodd, 3 Har. 485 ; Drennen v. House,
41 Penn St. 30.

(() Such circumstances as, according
to the custom of merchants, usually in-
dicate a partnership, may he given in
evidence against one whom it is sought
to charge as a partner ; such as the use
of his name in printed invoices, bills of
parcels, and advertisements, or on the
printed signs attached to the place of
business ; and these may afford strong
presumptive evidence of his acquiescence
in the name and character of partner.
In general, if he so acts as to justify
others in believing him a partner, he will
be liable as such. Spencer t. Billing, 3
Camp, 310 ; Parker v. Barker, 1 Br. & B.
9, 3 Moore, 226. Nevertheless, this evi-
dence may be rebutted by showing either
that he was entirely ignorant of these
transactions, or that he took the proper
means of disowning them and denying
his authority. One is not liable as a
nominal partner because others use his
name as that of a member of a firm,
without his consent, although he pre-
viously belonged to the firm ; provided
he has taken the proper steps to notify
the public of his retirement. Newsome
v. Coles, 2 Camp. 617. And the plaintiff
should be prepared to show that the acts
of the defendant, which he relies on as
acts of partnership, were done by the
defendant, with full knowledge and de-
liberation on his part. See Fox v. Clifton,
6 Bing. 776, 4 Mo. & P. 713.

213

•191

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

evidence of an adoption of the debt by the new firm, including the
new partner, which will make him liable ; (m) but it has not
always nor necessarily this effect. Some knowledge of and as-
sent to this payment must be brought home to the new partner, by
direct testimony, or by showing such oversight of or such share in
the actual business of' the firm as would imply such knowledge ;

and perhaps there should be some evidence of assent by
* 191 the * creditor to the transfer of the debt from the old to

the new firm, (w)

(u) Ex parte Jackson, 1 Ves. 131. The
general rule, as well as the exceptions to
it which may possibly occur, are well
illustrated by the case of Ex parte Peel,
6 Ves. 602. There Kirk, a warehouse-
man, carrying on business under the firm
of Kirk and Company, being indebted to
Sir Robert Pud for goods sold, after that
debt was contracted had entered into
a treaty with Ford, a breeches-maker,
for forming a partnership. About four
months afterwards a commission of bank-
ruptcy issued against them. No articles
having been executed, Ford disputed the
point of partnership, which was tried at
law, and the partnership was established
upon the evidence of acts done. A peti-
tion was presented by Sir Robert Peel to
prove his debt as a joint debt. In sup-
port of the petition the affidavit of one
Copeland stated, that it was agreed that
the separate debts of Kirk should be
assumed by the partnership ; that entries
were made in the books with the knowl-
edge of Ford ; and particularly, that
the goods furnished by the petitioner
were entered at a reduced price. This
was opposed by the affidavit of Ford,
denying the agreement, or even knowl-
edge of these circumstances. Lord
Etdon: "I agree it is settled that if
a man gives a partnership engagement
in the partnership name, with regard to
a transaction not in its nature a partner-
ship transaction, he who seeks the benefit
of that engagement must be able to say
that, although in its nature not a part-
nership transaction, yet there was some
authority beyond the mere circumstance
of partnership to enter into that contract
so as to bind the partnership, and then it
depends upon the degree of evidence.
Slight circumstances might be sufficient
where in the original transaction the
party to be bound was not a partner but
at the subsequent time had acquired all
the benefit, as if he had been a partner
in the original transaction ; and it would
not be unwholesome for a jury to infer

214

largely that that obligation, clearly ac-
cording to conscience, had been given
upon an implied authority. So here, if
this was a case in which it was found
upon the trial that this man was a part-
ner upon a long-existing partnership,
with a regular series of transactions,
books, &c, a knowledge of what his
partner had been doing might be in-
ferred against him; that which in com-
mon prudence he ought to have known.
But that is not the case of this partner-
ship : it was a treaty. It is not even yet
agreed how the stock and partnership
were to be formed. In the course of
that treaty, Ford, ignorant of law, per-
mits acts to be done which the law holds
to be partnership acts. It is a very dif-
ferent consideration whether this man,
so trepanned into a partnership, had
got regular books, &c. ; and it is difficult
to say, not only that knowing this he had
agreed to it, but that he knew it; in
which case I am afraid he must be
bound. That fact has not been sufficient-
ly inquired into." The order, therefore,
directed a reference to the commissioners
to inquire whether, at the commence-
ment of the partnership, any debts due
from Kirk, for his stock in trade, were
assumed, and any debts to him carried
into the partnership, with the knowledge
and assent of Ford.

(;■) Kirwan v. Kirwan, 2 Cr. & M. 617.
In this case it appeared that A kept an
account in the nature of a banking ac-
count with the firm of B. & Co., and
annual accounts were rendered to him.
During the time that A dealt with the
firm, all the partners retired except C,
who formed a new partnership with K.
On the accession of K a large capital
was brought into the concern. A's ac-
count was then transferred from the
books of the old to those of the new
partnership, and the balance was struck
annually as before ; and A, until his
death, which happened about three years
afterwards, received sums on account,

CH. XII.] PARTNEKSHIP. * 191

The liability of an incoming partner for old debts is not to be
presumed, (w) 1 but may be proved by circumstances indicating
his willingness and intention to assume the old debts, (ww)

If persons who succeed to the interest of a retiring partner
continue to transact the business in conjunction with the remain-
ing partners as before, they become members of the firm as
under the original articles in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, (wx)

The authority of a partner to bind his firm rests indeed upon a
necessity ; for mercantile business could not be carried on by a
partnership otherwise, without great inconvenience. And it is
bounded and measured by this necessity, so that the partnership
is not bound by the acts or contracts of any partner, not within
the legitimate scope of the partnership business, (x) An illustra-
tion of this may be found in the rule which is held by authorities
of great weight, that one partner cannot bind his firm by a sub-
mission to arbitration, without specific authority from his copart-
ners ; nor has a partner, as such, authority to consent to a

and interest on his balance from the new And although the account was trans-
firm, in the same manner as before, ferred from the old to the new firm, the
Upon the death of A, his administrators learned judge conceived that there might
brought an action against the quondam be many ways in which interest might be
partners and C to recover the balance, paid without K being aware of it ; and
and in that action the quondam partners the manner of keeping the accounts led
contended that their responsibility had to the supposition that lie was not aware
shifted to C and K, and it was argued in of it. See also Ex parte Sandham, 4
their behalf that the transfer of the ac- Deac. & C. 812; Stenburg v. Callanan,
count into the books of the new firm, 14 la. 251.

and the payments of money to A, (w) See Catt v. Howard, 3 Stark. 5.

amounted to evidence against K that (ww) Updyke v. Doyle, 7 R. I. 446.

he intended to take the debt upon him. (wx) Mealier v. Cox, 37 Ala. 201.

But . the Court of Exchequer were of \x) Dickinson v. "Valpy, 10 B. & C.

opinion that no inference of that sort 128 ; Sandilands v. Marsh, 2 B. & Aid.

could be drawn, in the absence of any 673 ; Sims v. Brutton, 1 E. L. & E. 446.

proof of A's assent to the substitution of One partner cannot bind the firm or

K as his debtor, for the original partners ; transfer its property for his private debt :

and Bolland, B., observed further, that Kemeys v. Richards, 11 Barb. 312; Lan-

there was nothing to show that K under- ier v. McCabe, 2 Fla. 32 ; unless the

took to answer for the debts of the old other partners authorize or ratify the

firm, and the probabilities were that he act. Wheeler v. Rice, 8 Cush. 205.
would not incur further responsibilities.

1 The presumption is against the assumption by an incoming partner of pre-exist-
ing debts, Kountz v. Holthouse, 85 Penn. St. 235; Paradise v. Gerson, 32 La. An.
532 • but to become so liable, he must expressly agree with the creditor to assume,
Shamburg v. Ruggles, 83 Penn. St. 148 ; Meador v. Hughes, 14 Bush, 652 ; Morehead v.
Wristow, 73 N. C. 398. The new partner's assent to assume, and the creditor's consent
to accept him, are both equally necessary, Shoemaker, &c. Co. v. Bernard, 2 Lea 358 ;
but very slight evidence of such assumption being sufficient, Cross v. Burlington Bank,
17 Kan. 336 ; Shaw v. McGregory, 105 Mass. 96. See Guild v. Belcher, 119 Mass.
257, that in 'the absence of fraud, that portion of a firm note covering an after-
incurred debt may be recovered.

215

* 192 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

judgment in an action against him and his copartners ; (?/) the
reason given for these rules being, that a partner has no implied
authority, except so far as is necessary to carry on the busi-
ness of the firm. (2) Another reason is also given, that

* 192 * such implied authority might deprive the other partners

of their legal rights or remedies.

So if a partner disposes of the partnership property in any man-
ner for his personal and exclusive benefit, as by a sale on terms
beneficial to himself alone, this is not valid as to the other partner
without proof of his assent, (zz)

It is a familiar principle, that partners may limit or enlarge
the power of each other, as between themselves, at their own
pleasure ; and it is certain that third persons are not affected by
any such limitations or stipulations, unless they have notice or
knowledge of them, (a) But whether they are bound by limita-
tions of which they have notice, and therefore cannot hold the
firm on the contract of a partner who, as they know, has exceeded
the power given to him by his firm, may not be quite settled ;
but we think the better reason and authority lead to the conclu-
sion that third parties are affected by such stipulations when
made known to them. (6)

section xin.

POWER OP A MAJORITY.

Whether the majority of the partners of a firm can hind the
minority, is not yet quite determined by authority. Some cases
show a disposition to admit this power, but to confine its exercise

(y) Hambidge v. De la Croute, 3 M. Armstrong v. Robinson, 5 G. & J. 412 ;

G. & S. 742 ; Morgan v. Richardson, 16 Tavlor p. Coryell, 12 S. & R. 243.
Mo. 409 ; Binney r. Le Gal, 19 Barb. 692. "(zz) Cadwallader v. Kroesen, 22 Md.

See also Grier v. Hood, 25 Penn. St. 430 ; 200.
Clark v. Bowen, 22 How. 270. (a) Blundell v. Windsor, 8 Sim. 601;

(z) Stead v. Salt, 3 Bing. 101 ; Kart- Walburn v. Ingilby, 1 Mvl. & K. 61.
haus v. Ferrer, 1 Pet. 228; Buchanan v. (b) See Ha'llet r. Dowdall, 9 E. L. &

Curry, 19 Johns. 137; Harrington v. E. 347; s. 0. 18 Q. B. 2 ; Worcester Corn

Higham, 13 Barb. 660; 8. c. 15 id. 524. Ex. Co. 19 E. L. & E. 627 ; In re Lea, F.

But see Wilcox v. Singletary, Wright, & L. Ins. Co. 23 E. L. & E. 422 ; Fall

420; Southard v. Steele, 3 Monr. 435; River Union Bank v. Sturtevant, 12 Cush.

372.

216

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP. * 193

to the internal concerns of the firm, (5J) or to those which are of
little importance. The authorities on this subject will be found
in our notes, (c) We think a distinction might be drawn
*on principle, between partnerships made by articles, and * 193
by their provisions not determinable by either party at
pleasure, and those which may be dissolved by mutual consent
and terminated at once by either party, at his own will and
pleasure. In the former case, it might be said that the majority
should not be permitted to govern, because the minority have no
refuge, no escape by dissolution ; and if controlled absolutely by
the majority, they might be made to incur unreasonable danger.
But where any dissenting partner may dissolve the partnership at
pleasure, then the majority should govern. Because that is but
saying to the minority, choose either to go on with us in the
transaction we propose and approve, or leave us to go on by our-
selves, as you prefer. Where the copartnership is determinable
at the will of any partner, the rule that the minority may gov-
ern only terminates a partnership between disagreeing partners.
Where the partnership is not determinable at pleasure, it may
be said that the rule that a minority may arrest or prohibit a
transaction which they do not approve, gives them in fact a power
to terminate a copartnership at pleasure, because if they can
arrest one transaction, they may all. This is possible ; but the
inconveniences resulting from it seem to be less than those which
might come from permitting a bare majority to retain the capital
of copartners, and employ it in transactions which they disap-
prove, and expose it to hazards they are unwilling to encounter.

{bb) As the appointment of a publisher Turn. & R. 525. Lord Eldon's opinion

of a newspaper owned by a partnership, was in favor of the power of a majority

Peacock v. Cummings, 46 Penn. St. 434. to bind the minority, provided their con-

(c) It has been laid down by a learned duct was bona fide. His lordship said:
writer (Chitty's Laws of Commerce, vol. "I call that the act of all which is the
3, p. 236), that in the absence of any ex- act of the majority, provided all are con-
press stipulation a majority must decide suited, and the majority act bona fide."
as to the disposition of the partnership The majority of partners do not represent
property. But this opinion is given with the whole body, except when the voice of
considerable caution, and it may perhaps the minority has been called for. In such
be more safe to say, that the power of the case the court will take the opinion of the
majority to bind the minority is confined minority to have been fairly overruled,
to the ordinary transactions of the part- See also Kirk v. Hodgson, 3 Johns. Ch.
nership. See 6 Ves. 777 ; 5 Bro. P. C. 400 ; Wilkins v. Pearce, 5 Denio, 541 ;
489. It is true that in one case it has Robinson v. Thompson, '1 Vern. 465; Ex
been held that in all sea adventures the parte Johnson, 31 E. L. & E. 430; 3 Kent,
acts of the majority shall bind the whole; Com. 45, n. ; Story on Part. § 123, n. ;
but in that case provision to that effect Johnston v. Dutton, 27 Ala. 245 ; West-
was made by deed. Falkland v. Cheney, ern St. Co. u. Walker, 2 la. 504.
6 Bro. P. C. 476. So in Const t>. Harris,

217

* 194 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

Moreover, the opposite rule — that the majority might govern —
would give to them the power of dissolving the partnership at
pleasure ; because, if they wished for a dissolution, they could
always propose transactions so adverse to the views or interests
of the minority as to compel them to assent to a dissolution as
their only escape.

It must be regarded as certain that a majority cannot compel a

minority to extend the business of the partnership to transactions

beyond their original intention, or otherwise make a ma-

* 194 terial * change in the business, not contemplated in the

formation of the partnership, nor sanctioned by all the
partners.

SECTION xrv.

OP DISSOLUTION.

The dissolution of a partnership does not affect the liability
of the partners for former debts,1 but in general, prevents the
incurring of a new joint liability.

However it takes place, dissolution terminates altogether the
power of a partner to carry on the business concerns of the part-
nership, in a way to bind former partners by any contract what-
ever. The former partners are partners no longer, but tenants in
common ; and where there is no agreement to the contrary, each
partner, after dissolution, possesses the same authority to adjust
the affairs of the firm, by collecting its debts, and disposing of its
property, as before the dissolution ; but they can no longer bind
each other, even to the extent of varying the form of existing obli-
gations, (d) No partner can indorse a note of the firm, even to
pay a prior debt of the firm, (e) It is said in England, that a
retired partner may authorize, even by parol, a remaining partner

(d) Torrey v. Baxter, 13 Vt. 452; Glasscock v. Smith, 25 Ala. 474 ; Fellows
Woodworth v. Downer, id. 522 ; Robbing v. Wyman, 33 N. H. 351. Perhaps some
v. Fuller, 24 N. Y. (10 Smith) 570. See doubt is thrown on this conclusion, by
post, p. * 200. Fowle v. Harrington, 1 Cush. 146, and

(e) Humphries v. Chastain, 5 Ga. 166 ; Temple v. Seaver, 11 Cush. 314.

1 Nor will a dissolution, not caused by the death of a partner, prevent the carry-
ing out of a firm contract only partially performed. Dickson v. Indianapolis, &c.
Co., 63 Ind. 9. *

218

CH. XII.] PAETNEESHIP. * 195

to indorse bills in the name of the firm, which will hold him.; (/)
hut then, in fact, he is scarcely a retired partner. We should
say, that a general authority to a partner, to settle the affairs of
the firm, whether it be an express authority, or the authority
given by law to a surviving partner, would not give any power of
this kind. (#)

It is important to know what makes a dissolution. If the part-
nership be for a time certain, one partner may maintain
an * action at law against another for a breach of the * 195
articles in dissolving before the period therein limited;
and the action may be brought before the expiration of the time
for which the partnership was limited. The damages would be
the profits which would have accrued to the plaintiff from the
continuation of the partnership business. (A) Where a partner-
ship is not to endure for a time certain by the articles of copart-
nership, or where that time has expired, it may undoubtedly be
dissolved at the pleasure of any partner, (i) 1 But the dissolution
should be made with due notice to the other partner or partners,
and at such time and in such manner as would not cause unneces-
sary injury to them; nor would the law sanction fraud in this

(/) Smith v. Winter, 4 M. & W. 454. injury would be inflicted, or fraud indi-

(g) Long v. Story, 10 Mo. 63G ; Parker cated. Howell v. Harvey, 5 Ark. 280. —
v. Cousins, 2 Gratt. 372; Lusk v. Smith, The duration may be gathered from the
8 Barb. 570 ; Hurst v. Hill, 8 Md. 399 ; terms of the articles, although not ex-
Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio fN. s.) 21; Ham- pressly provided for. Wheeler v. Van
ilton v. Seaman, 1 Cart, find.) 185 ; Fow- Wart, 2 Jur. 252. See also Crawshay v.
ler v. Richardson, 3 Sneed, 508 ; Merritt Collins, 15 Ves. 227 ; Wilson a. Green-
v. Pollys, 16 B. Mon. 355. But see Kemp wood, 1 Swanst. 480 ; Washburn v. Good-
v. Coffin, 3 Greene (la.), 190. man, 17 Pick. 519. — In the case of

(A) Bagley v. Smith, ION. Y. (6Seld.) Sanderson v. The Milton Stage Co. 18

489. Vt. 107, it was held, — where one partner

0') Griswold v. Waddington, 15 Johns, gave the other notice that the copartner-
82. — But notice should be given to the ship was dissolved, but this was not as-
other partner. Nerot v. Bernand, 4 Russ. sented to by the other, and the parties
260; Peacock v. Peacock, 16 Ves. 50.— did not afterwards act upon it, — that it
This should be a reasonable notice where did not operate as a dissolution of the
the articles are totally silent upon the firm,
subject, and where, without such notice,

1 " A partnership for an indefinite period is in law ». partnership at the will
of the partners, and either partner may withdraw when he pleases, and dissolve
the partnership, if he acts without any fraudulent purpose," Morton, J., in
Fletcher v. Reed, 131 Mass. 312 ; although one partner paid a bonus for a good-will
established by the other, McElvey v. Lewis, 76 N. Y. 373 ; Sistare v. Cushing, 4
Hun, 503 ; Carlton v. Cummins, 51 Ind. 478. But a partner cannot treat the part-
nership as at an end because of his partner's dishonesty or bad character, and absorb
all the joint benefits and property, when he knew of such characteristics at the
formation of the partnership. Amble v. Whipple, 20 Wall. 546 ; see McMahon v.
McClernan, 10 W. Va. 419.

219

* 195 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

matter. («') Whither, when the partnership is by articles which
stipulate its continuance for a specified period, one partner may
dissolve it within that period, is not, perhaps, quite certain. J By
the civil law, such dissolution is permitted, on the ground that it
would be useless and mischievous to hold reluctant partners
together. (/) In England the weight of authority is decidedly
opposed to such dissolution, as a breach of contract ; (ft) still it is
difficult to deny that one may assign his interest, and this would
operate a dissolution ; 2 or he might contract a debt, and let his
interest be taken in execution. 3 A court of equity might interfere
to prevent such assignment ; but would not, in case of debt, un-
less there was collusion, or the creditor's interest could not other-
wise be secured. (0 And even if the partnership by the articles

(ii) See Stemmer's Appeal, 58 Penn. v. Connell, 1 Whart. 388 ; Whitton u.

g^ 163, Smith, 1 Freem. Ch. (Miss ) 231 ; Beaver

'(;') Vinnius in Ins. 3, 26, 4 ; Ferriere v. Lewis, 14 Ark. 138. In Bishop v.

in Id. tome V. 156; Dig. 17, 2, 14; Breckles, 1 Hoffm. Ch. 534, the question

Domat, b. 1, tit. 8, § 5, art. 1-8, by was considered doubtful, but the rule of

Strahan. the civil law deemed more reasonable,

(k) Peacock v. Peacock, 16 Ves. 56 ; and the refusal of one partner to proceed

Orawshay v. Maule, 1 Swanst. 495 See properly in the business of the partner-

Pearpoint v. Graham, 4 Wash. C. C. 234, ship, was held sufficient cause for a de-

where Washington, J., distinctly affirms the cree of dissolution. Per Vice-Chancellor :

rule indicated' by the English authorities. "The law of the court, then, requires

(I) Marquand v. N. Y. Man. Co. 17 something more than the mere will of one
Johns. 525. In this case, the assignment party to justify a dissolution. But it
by one partner of all his interest in the seems to me that but little should be de-
partnership was held to dissolve it, al- manded. The principle of the civil law
though by the articles it was to continue is the most wise. Why should this court
till two partners should demand its disso- compel the continuance of a union when
lution. In Skinner u. Dayton, 19 Johns, dissension has marred all prospects of the
638, it was held that the partnership is advantages contemplated by its forma-
dissoluble at the pleasure of any partner, tion ? By refusing to dissolve it, the
although he has entered into a covenant power of binding each other, and of deal-
for its continuance for seven years — the ing with the partnership property, re-
only consequence being that lie thereby mains, when all confidence and all com-
eubjects himself to a claim for damages bination of effort is at an end. The
for a breach of his covenant. See Mason object of the contract is defeated."

1 Cole v. Moxley, 12 W. Va. 730, decided that one partner could not dissolve
a, partnership for a fixed period, but must account for profits up to the time of
expiration.

'2 Such an assignment dissolves the firm, and the assignee is only entitled to his
share after the payment of debts, Bank v. Carrollton R. Co. 11 Wall. 024 ; Morss u.
Gleason, 64 N. Y. 204; and the remaining partner may hold possession until the
firm affairs are wound up. Miller v. Brigham, 50 Cal. 615 When the assignee
does take possession, the copartner's remedy is in equity. Blood v. Fairbanks, 48
Cal. 171.

8 But a mortgage to a copartner of his interest in a crop does not operate as a
dissolution, Munroe v. Hamilton, 60 Ala. 226 ; nor of his partnership interest in
personal property to a third person, Dupont v. McLaran, 61 Mo. 502; nor a sale
of his interest in mining firm to a third person, Nisbet v. Nash, 52 Cal. 540; nor
a seizure by a third person of one partner's interest on execution, Choppin v. Wilson,
27 La. An. 444; nor seizing firm property to pay firm debts, the business being
afterwards discontinued, Barber v. Barnes, 62 Cal. 650.

220

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP. * 196

be dissoluble at pleasure, equity will decree specific performance
of them if this be necessary to give the plaintiff his rights. (II)
And when it decrees a dissolution it may determine at what day
the partnership shall be considered as at an end. (lm)

* It has been questioned whether a court would infer an * 196
agreement for a continuance of the partnership for a defi-
nite period, from circumstances ; as the taking of a lease of an
estate to be used as partnership property, or the like. But it
may well be doubted, whether such an inference would be drawn
merely from circumstances, unless they made the agreement quite
certain, (m)

A court of equity would always decree a dissolution at the
prayer of one or more copartners, if it were shown that the
other partner or partners were guilty of fraud, or gross miscon-
duct in the affairs of the partnership ; or it may restrain a part-
ner from injurious action, (n) But it will not interfere for slight
causes ; and perhaps for nothing less than unquestionable fraud,
or an amotion of the complaining partner from his share in the
business, or such conduct as renders the carrying on of the busi-
ness of the firm substantially impossible, (o)

If the bill seeks to correct in some way the proceedings of a
firm, but not to dissolve it, it is not usual to appoint a
receiver, * although this might be done. But if the prayer * 197
is to dissolve the partnership, it is usual to appoint a
receiver, (p)

Any assignment of a copartner's interest in the partnership
funds operates, ipso facto, a dissolution ; this would certainly be
true of the assignment of the whole of a copartner's interest,

(11.) Whitworth v. Harris, 40 Miss. 483. years, must hold that if the partners pur-

(/7ft) Dumont v. Ruepprecht, 33 Ala. chase a fee-simple, there shall be a part-

175 nership for ever." See Marshall v.

(m) Crawshay o. Maule, 1 Swanst. Marshall, cited 2 Bell, Com. 641, n. 3, and

495,508,521. Lord Eldun: "Without 643, n. 1.

doubt, in the absence of an express, there (n) Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 3.M;
may be an implied contract, as to the du- Mealier r. Cox, 37 Ala. 201.
ration of a partnership. But I must (o) Blakeney «. Dufaur 15 E. L. & E.
contradict all" authority, if I say, that 76; 8. c. 15 Beav. 40; Blake v Dorgan,
wherever there is a partnership, the pur- 1 Greene (la.) 537 ; Terrell v. God-
chase of a leasehold interest of longer or dard, 18 Ga. 664; Renton v. Chaplain,
shorter duration is a circumstance from 1 Stock. 62.

which it is to be inferred that the part- (p) Hall o Hall 3 E. L. & E. 191 ,

nership shall continue as long as the S. c. 3 Mac. & G. 79; Roberts v Eher-

Tease. On that argument, the court hold- hardt, 23 EL. & F. 24o ; s. o. 1 Kay

ing that a lease of seven years is proof of 148; Speights «. Peters, 9 Gil 472 ,

partnership for seven years, and a lease Sloane v. Moore, 61 I'enn. bt. 4L1.
of fourteen of a partnership for fourteen

221

* 198

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

and perhaps of the assignment of any portion of his interest
which required a closing of the partnership business and accounts
to determine the value of the portion assigned ; and although the
assignment was made only to give a collateral security, (q) And
an assignment by one partner of his share of the future
* 198 profits to another partner is a dissolution of the * partner-
ship, because the essence of that is a participation of the
profits, (r)

As death operates of itself a dissolution, (s) 1 so in England civil

(q) Horton's Appeal, 13 Perm. St. 67 ;
Parkhurst v. Kinsman, 1 Blatch. 488 ;
Marquand v. New York Manuf. Co. 17
Johns. 52-3. — In Whitton v. Smith, 1
Freem. Ch. (Miss.) 2:51, it was held that
a sale or assignment by one partner of all
his interest in the partnership property,
operates as a dissolution, ipso facto, al-
though the partnership articles provide
for a continuance of the partnership for
a definite period. — See Conwell v. San-
didge, 5 Dana, 213 ; Cochran v. Perry, 8
W. & S. 202. — But the true principle
seems to be stated in Taft v. Buff um, 14
Pick. 322. In this case, one of four mem-
bers of a firm assigned the whole of his
interest in all the personal and real es-
tate of the firm to one of his copartners,
but still continued, to transact the busi-
ness of the firm in the same manner as
before, until the failure of the company ;
a suit was commenced against the re-
maining three members of the firm ; they
pleaded in abatement the non-joinder of
the party who had so assigned his share,
and the court held that a conveyance by
a partner of all his interest in all the real
and personal estate of the firm to one of
his copartners, does not ipso facto dissolve
the copartnership; it is only evidence
tending to show a dissolution. In this
case the court say that a person may still
be a partner, though he ceases to have
any property in the stock of a partner-
ship, on the principle that two persons
may become partners, one furnishing
money or goods, and the other skill or
labor; or after persons have entered into
a partnership, and each has furnished
capital, one may, with the consent of his
associates, and for good consideration, as

of great skill or labor, withdraw his funds
or share in the stock, and still continue
to be a member of the firm. Putnam, J.,
remarked: " We think that such an ar-
rangement would not necessarily operate
as a dissolution of the connection." He
adds : " A majority of the court are of
opinion that it [the fact of the sale by one
partner] was evidence in the case, which
might or might not prove a dissolution,
as other facts might be proved in the
case, all of which should have been left
to the jury, to determine the fact whether
the partnership had been dissolved or not.
For example, if, after a sale, the partner
assigning his interest had ceased to have
any concern in the establishment, had en-
tered into other business on his own sep-
arate account, or, as it might be, had
removed to a foreign country or place,
and there carried on business for him-
self, or lived upon his own funds or
otherwise ; upon such evidence we should
all think that the jury ought to find that
the copartnership was dissolved. On the
other hand, if (as in the present ease it is
found) the partner so assigning, after the
conveyance, continued to act as a part-
ner, making himself liable as such by
drafts and other partnership business,
just as he had done before the convey-
ance ; then it would seem to a majority
of the court that the jury ought to find
that the partnership was not dissolved."
Coll. on Part. § 110. — See Buford v. Mc-
Neeley, 2 Dev. Eq. 481 ; Dana . . Lull, 17
Vt. 390.

(r) Heath v. Sansom, 4 B. & Ad. 175;
Edens v. Williams, 311 111. 252.

(s) Vulliamy v. Noble, 3 Meriv. 593 ;
Murray w. Mumford, 6 Cowen, 441 ; Can-

1 Cobble v. Tomlinson, 50 Ind. 550 ; Martine v. International Ins. Roc. 53 N. Y.
339 ; Slocomb v. Lizardi, 21 La. An. 355; unless the partnership articles specifically
provide for its continuance, Roberts v. Kelsey, 38 Mich. 602. Whether death wiil
work a dissolution in a partnership or voluntary association composed of many mem-
bers depends upon the intention as gathered from the terms and character of the
organization. Walker v. Wait, 50 Vt. 068. See Duffield v. Brainerd, 45 Conn. 424.

222

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP. * 199

death has the same effect ; as outlawry, or attainder for treason or
felony. We have not this civil death in this country ; and impris-
onment for a term of years, or even for life, would probably have
only the effect of other incapacity ; and so would absconding for
debt or crime. (£) That is, it would not be a dissolution of the
partnership, nor cause a dissolution at once, proprio vigore, but
it would be good ground for applying to any court, having
authority, to grant a dissolution. When either partner becomes
disabled to act, or when the business becomes wholly impractica-
ble, a court of equity would dissolve the partnership, or treat it
as dissolved, as the justice of the case might require, (u) The
contract of partnership is mutual ; and it would be obviously
unjust to hold one party to his contract, when it had become
impossible for the other to fulfil his part. If the party so dis-
abled from active aid, was, by the terms of the contract, only
a silent or dormant partner, only contributing capital, and sharing
with his partner the profit and loss arising from the use made of
the capital by the active partner, the above reason would seem
not applicable, because his capital might remain as before. But
in this case, if an application comes from the active partner, he
certainly should be permitted to renounce the benefit of the capi-
tal under such circumstances, if he wished to do so. And if the
application comes from the party owning the capital, or his repre-
sentatives, they as certainly ought to be permitted to withdraw
the capital from hazards which the owner could no longer esti-
mate nor provide for, nor advise in relation to. And we think
with Mr. Justice Story and Mr. Chief Justice Parker, that it may
well be doubted whether the rule of law should not be that
absolute insanity * or any equivalent disability, operates at * 199
once, and ipso facto, a dissolution, (v) But it is said that a

field v. Hard, 6 Conn. 184 ; Burwell v. 6 Humph. 85, it was held, that an inqui-
Mandeville, 2 How. 560; Knapp v. Mc- sition of lunacy, found against a member
Bride 7 Ala. 10. — In such case the dis- of a partnership, ipso facto, dissolves the
solution takes effect from the time of the partnership. See also Griswold v. Wad-
death however numerous the association, dington, 15 Johns. 57 ; Davis r. Lane, 10
and this not only as to the deceased part- N. H. 161, where Parker, C. J., is reported
ner but also as to all of the survivors, to have said : " It has been held, in fcng-
Dyer v. Clark, 5 Met. 575 ; Scholefield v. land, that the insanity of one partner
Eichelberger, 7 Pet. 586. And the same does not operate as a dissolution of the
rule applies 'to a silent partner. Wash- partnership, hut that object must be at-
bum v. Goodman, 17 Pick. 520. tained through a court of equity, bayer
(() Whitman v. Leonard, 3 Pick. 177. v. Bennet, cited 2 Ves. & B. oOo. Gow
u) Leaf v. Coles, 12 E. L. & E. 117. on Part. 272. But the soundness of
(v) Story on Part. § 295; Jones v. the principle may perhaps be doubted.
Nov 2 Myl. & K. 125. In Isler v. Baker, Waters v. Taylor, 2 Ves & B. 303; Gns-

223

199

THE LAW OF CONTEACTS.

[BOOK I.

decree of dissolution for the cause of insanity, has no retrospec-
tive action ; not even to the time when the bill was filed. (w~)

Nothing is more common than for a firm to go on without
change of name, or of business, or even new books of account,
when a member leaves it, or a new member is added. Yet,
strictly speaking, the old partnership was dissolved and a new
one formed by any change among its members. Thus a mort-
gage to a firm to cover advances, was held not applicable to the
firm after a new member was added, (mw)

Bankruptcy of the firm, or of one partner, operates an imme-
diate dissolution, (x) l Insolvency under the statutes would have
the same effect ; («/) but not the mere insolvency which is only

wold r. Waddington, 15 Johns. 57, 82,
cited supra. It certainly could not have
been applied here prior to 1832, as we
had before that time no court through
whose decree in equity a dissolution could
have been effected. Admitting it to be
correct in its fullest extent, however, it
would not affect this case, for each part-
ner has an interest by the partnership
contract, and the interest of one partner
would not be terminated by the insanity
of another. In making a sale, or contract,
he does not act as agent, but in his own
right ; and the partnership name may be
used by one, without any supposition
that another acts, individually, or has
any knowledge or volition in relation to
the matter. But so long as the partner-
ship continues, the act of one binds the
others ; and as it is, in its effect, the act
of all the partners, it may deserve great
consideration whether the insanity of one,
in the absence of any stipulation to the
contrary, does not operate ipso facto, as a
dissolution of the partnership itself."

(w) Besch v, Frolich, 1 Phil. Ch. 172.

(ww) Abat v. Penny, 19 La. An. 289.

(.r) Fox i>. Hanbury, Cowp. 448.
Lord Mansfield : " An act of bankruptcy
by one partner is to many purposes a dis-
solution of the partnership, by virtue of
the relation in the statutes, which avoid
all the acts of a bankrupt from the day

of his bankruptcy; and from the neces-
sity of the thing, all his property being
vested in the assignees, who cannot carry
on a trade." See Wilson v. Greenwood,
1 Swanst. 482 ; Ex jiarle Smith, 5 Ves.
295; Ex parte Williams, 11 Ves. 5;
Crawshay v. Collins, 15 Ves. 218; Dut-
ton v. Morrison, 17 Ves. 193; Griswold v.
Waddington, 15 Johns. 82 ; s. c. 16 Johns.
491; Marquand ,-. N. Y. Manuf. Co. 17
id. 535; Arnold r. Brown, 24 Pick. 89;
Atwood v. Gillett. 2 Doug. (Mich.) 206 ;
Coll. on Part. B. 1, uh. 2, § 3 ; Story on
Part. § 313. But " an act of bankruptcy,
however, does not dissolve the partner-
ship instanter. It must be followed by a
fiat and adjudication. ' The adjudication
that he is a bankrupt,' said Lord Lough-
borough, ' is what severs the partnership.' "
Coll. on Part. § 111; Ex parte Smith, 5
Ves. 295; Story on Part. § 314. The
English law gives effect to the dissolu-
tion from the declaration of bankruptcy
under a commission ; but this relates back
to the act of bankruptcy, and vests the
property in the assignees from that period
by operation of law. Fox u. Hanbury,
siiftra ; Ex parte Smith, 5 Ves. 29b ;
Barker v. Goodair, 11 Ves. 83 ; Thomason
v. Frere, 10 East, 418 ; 3 Kent, Com. 59.
(«) Williamson v. Wilson, 1 Bland,
418 ; Gowan i\ Jeffries, 2 Ashm. 305, and
cases cited supra.

1 The bankruptcy of one partner operates a dissolution, Gates v. Beecher,
60 N. Y. 618; Allen v. Woonsocket Co. 11 R. I. 288; Wilkins v. Davis, 2 Lowell,
611 ; In re Leland, 6 Benedict, 168 ; and his assignee becomes a tenant in common with
the solvent partners, Halsey v. Norton. 45 Miss. 703; Wilkins v. Davis, 2 Lowell,
611; but the assignee cannot maintain a firm suit, Amsinck w. Bean, 22 Wall 395;
without joining the solvent partners, Browning v. Marvin, 22 Hun, 547 ; Halsey v.
Norton, 45 Miss. 703. — So an assignment by an insolvent firm in trust for creditors
works a dissolution if no provision is made for a continuance. McKelvy's Appeal, 72
Penn. St. 409.

224

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP. * 200

an inability to pay debts, until a refusal to pay ; (z) and proba-
bly not until interference with the firm by attachment or other
legal process, by a creditor of the firm, or of an indebted
* partner. In the last case, it would seem to operate * 200
as a transfer of the partner's interest. And bankruptcy
destroys the right of a partner to bind the firm by his acknowl-
edgment of debt, (a) But either of the solvent and compe-
tent partners may collect, adjust, and receipt for partnership
accounts. (6)

After a dissolution from any cause, we hold that no partner
can bind his former partners by any new contract, not even if
it relates to a previous transaction ; thus it is held that he cannot
make a promissory note binding the firm for a partnership debt
contracted before the dissolution, (55) x nor renew a note given
before the dissolution, (be") 2 But the authorities are not in agree-
ment on this question. (bd~)

Whether a partnership is absolutely dissolved or only sus-

(z) The insolvency of a partnership ever the one or the other operates to
does not per se dissolve it. Arnold v. vest the bankrupt's or insolvent's prop-
Brown, 24 Pick. 93. Morton, J. : " It is erty in assignees, or other ministers of
further contended for the plaintiffs that the law, it would produce that effect."
the partnership was dissolved. There is (a) Atwood v. Gillett, 2 Doug. (Mich.)
no pretence that the partners intended to 206.

dissolve the partnership. If it was done (6) Fox v. Hamburg, Cowp. 445; Har-

at all by them it was the effect of their vey v. Crickett, 5 M. & Sel. 336 ; Gordon

acts against their intentions. The in- v. Freeman, 11 111. 14 ; Major v. Hawkes,

solvency of one or both the partners, we 12 111. 298.

think, would not produce this effect. (bb) Cunningham v. Bragg, 37 Ala. 436.

The insolvency of one might furnish to (be) Lumberman's Bank v. Pratt, 51

the other sufficient ground for declaring Me. 563.

a dissolution. But, in this State the ina- (bd) Thus it is said that notes given

bility to pay the company or the private by a partner in settlement of the busi-

debts of the partners would not, per se, ness after dissolution, bind the other

operate as a dissolution. In England, partners, in Ward v. Tyler, 52 Penn. St.

bankruptcy, and in some of our States 393. And that they do not, in Lange v.

where insolvent laws exist, legal insolv- Kennedy, 20 Wis. 279.
ency may produce a dissolution. Wher-

1 Without express authority, Matteson v. Nathanson, 38 Mich. 377 ; nor can he by
part payment or acknowledgment remove the bar of the Statute of Limitations, New-
man v. McComas, 43 Md, 70 ; Mayberry v. Willoughby, 5 Neb. 368 ; Tate v. Clem-
ents, 16 Fla. 339 ; Maxey v. Strong, 53 Miss. 280 ; Dowzelot v. Rawlings, 58 Mo. 75 ;
Crumless v. Sturgess, 6 Heiskell, 190 ; Folk v. Kussell, 7 Baxter, 691; contra, Merritt
v. Day, 9 Vroom, 32; Mix v, Shattuck, 50 Vt. 421; Feigley o. Whitaker, 22 Ohio
St. 606.

2 Curry v. White, 51 Cal. 530 ; Montreal Bank v. Page, 98 111. 109 ; Seward v.
L'Estrange, 36 Tex. 295; Meyer v. Atkins, 29 La. An. 586; Maxey v. Strong, 53
Miss. 280; Floyd v. Miller, 61 Ind. 224; Jenness v. Carleton, 40 Mich. 343; though
authorized to wind up affairs, Smith v. Shelden, 35 Mich. 42 ; Mauney v. Coit, 80
N. C. 200 ; contra, Lloyd o. Thomas, 79 Penn. St. 68. —But a demand by or on a
former partner, after dissolution, on a firm note will charge an indorser. Gates v.
Beecher 60 N. Y. 618 ; Fourth Bank, &c. v. Henschen, 52 Mo. 207.

vol.. i. 15 225

*200

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

pended, where the partners are domiciled in different countries,
by the breaking out of a war between the countries, may not
be positively settled, but the weight of authority is in favor of
the dissolution, (c) a

Although the death of a partner operates a dissolution of the
partnership, the articles of copartnership may provide for its con-
tinuance, by an agreement that the executors, administrators,
heirs, or other designated person, shall take the place of a de-
ceased partner. (d~) But where executors, in execution of a will,

(c) Griswold v. Waddington, 15 Johns.
57 ; 16 id. 438. In this case, the author-
ities and principles governing contracts
with persons domiciled in an enemy's
country, were fully reviewed by Chan-
cellor Knit, in the Court of Errors.
McConnell v. Hector, 3 B. & P. 113;
Scholefield v. Eichelberger, 7 Pet. 586.
The partnership in such cases will be
illegal, notwithstanding one or more
partners are resident in a neutral coun-
try. The San Jose Indiano, 2 Gallis.
268; The Franklin, 6 Rob. Adm. 127.
And the property of a house of trade
established in an enemy's country is eon-
demnable as prize, whatever may be the
domicile of the partners. The Freund-
schaf t, 4 Wheat. 105 ; Story on Part. § 316.

(d) Wrexham >\ Huddleston, 1 Swanst.
514, n. ; Crawshay v. Maule, 1 Swanst.
520; Pearce v. Chamberlain, 2 Ves. Sen.
33; Balmain v. Shore, 9 Ves. 500; War-
ner v. Cunningham, 3 Dow, 76 ; Gratz v.
Bayard, 11 S. & R. 41 ; Knapp v. McBride,
7 Ala. 28. And such express agreement
for the continuance of the partnership
after the death of one partner is neces-
sary, although the partnership is for a
term of years. Gillespie v. Hamilton, 3
Madd. 251 ; Scholefield v. Eichelberger,
7 Pet. 580; Pigott v. Bagley, McCle'l. &
Y. 575. It is not a settled question
whether stipulations in the articles of
partnership, providing for its continu-
ance after the death of a partner for the
benefit of the heirs, is binding on them.
Louisiana Bank u. Kenner's Succession,
1 La. 384. But according to Chancellor
Kent, "the better opinion is, that they
are not anywhere absolutely binding.

It is at the option of the representatives,
and if they do not consent, the death of
the party puts an end to the partner-
ship." 3 Kent, Com. 57, u. ; Pigott u.
Bagley, McClel. & Y. 56'.) ; Kershaw v.
Matthews, 2 Russ. 62. — A partner, too,
may by his will provide that the partner-
ship shall continue notwithstanding his
death ; and if it is consented to by the
surviving partner, it becomes obligatory ;
but, in that case, that part of his prop-
erty only will be liable, in case of bank-
ruptcy, which he has directed to be
embarked in the trade. Ex pane Gar-
land, 10 Ves. 110; Thompson r. Andrews,
1 Myl. & K. 110 ; Pitkin v. Pitkin, 7 Conn.
307 ; Burwell v. Mandeville's Ex'r, 2
How. 560, 576. The court in this case
said : " By the general rule of law every
partnership is dissolved by the death of
one of the partners. It is true that it is
competent for the partners to provide by
agreement for the continuance of the
partnership after such death; but then it
takes place in virtue of such agreement
only, as the act of the parties, and not
by mere operation of law. A partner,
too, may by his will provide that the
partnership shall continue notwithstand-
ing his death ; and if it is consented to
by the surviving partner, it becomes
obligatory, just as it would if the test-
ator, being a sole trader, had provided
for the continuance of his trade by his
executor, after his death. But then in
each case the agreement or authority
must be clearly made out ; and third
persons, having notice of the death, are
bound to inquire how far the agreement
or authority to continue it extends, and

' Woods v. Wilder, 43 N. Y. 164 ; New Orleans Bank v. Matthews, 49 N. Y. 12 ;
Hubbard v. Matthews, 54 N. Y. 43 ; Taylor <•. Hutchinson, 25 Gratt. 536 ; Booker
v. Kirkpatrick, 26 Gratt. 145 ; Planters' Bank v. St. John, 1 Woods, 585. See Mc-
Stea v. Matthews, 50 N. Y. 166 ; Matthews r. McStea, 91 U. S. 7. — Where a firm is
dissolved by war, notice of dishonor of a firm note given to a partner remaining
where its place of business was, binds all, including a partner in the hostile terri-
tory. Hubbard v. Matthews, 54 N. Y. 43.

226

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP. * 201

* carry on the business of a partnership for the benefit of * 201
the heir, the whole property is liable, and not merely the
capital in the business, (e) And if, without such requirement in
the will, executors put or leave the funds of the deceased in the
partnership, voluntarily, they would be liable personally as part-
ners, (ee)

When a partner dies, the partnership property goes to the sur-
vivors for the purpose of settlement, and they have all the power
necessary for this purpose, and no more. (/) 1 Thus they may
apply the funds of the firm to discharge incumbrances on the real
estate, or to execute a contract for purchase of real estate, (ff)
But they cannot renew a promissory note and bind their partners
to the new note, although they will be themselves bound by it,
nor can a partner do this who is authorized by the partners, on
a dissolution, to wind up the business. (fg~) It is said that the
survivors can charge nothing for their trouble or labor in settling

what funds it binds, and if they trust the 5 M. & Sel. 336 ; Butchart v. Dresser, 31

surviving party beyond the reach of such E. L. & E. 121 ; Barney i'. Smith, 4 Har.

agreement, or authority, or fund, it is & J. 495; Murray v. Mumford, 6 Cowen,

their own fault, and they have no right 441 ; Washburn v. Goodman, 17 Pick,

to complain that the law does not afford 519; Rice v. Richards, 1 Busb. Eq. (N.

them any satisfactory redress. A test- C.), 277; Shields v. Fuller, 4 Wis. 102;

ator, too, directing the continuance of a Van Valkenburg v. Bradley, 14 la. 108.

partnership, may, if he so choose, bind But in Buckley v. Barber, 1 E. L. & E.

his general assets for all the debts of the 506, Baron Parke doubts whether sur-

partnership contracted after his death, viving partners have a power to sell

But he may also limit his responsibility, and give a good legal title to the share

either to the funds already embarked in of the partnership property belonging to

the trade, or to any specific amount to the executors of the deceased, even when

be invested therein for that purpose ; and they sell in order to pay the debts of the

then the creditors can resort to that fund deceased and of themselves, and decides

or amount only, and not to the general that at all events the survivors have no

assets of the testator's estate, although power to dispose of it otherwise than to

the partner or executor, or other person pay such debt, certainly not to mortgage

carrying on the trade, may be person- it together with their own as a security

ally responsible for all the debts con- for a debt principally due from them,

tracted." and in part only from the deceased. In

(e) McNeillie v. Acton, 21 E. L. & E. Louisiana the rule of the French law

3 ; Lauglilin v.. Lorentz, 48 Penn. St. 275. prevails, and the surviving partner has

(ee) Richter u Poppenhusen, 39 How- no power to sue for the partnership debts

ard (N. Y.), 82. without the authority of the court. Con-

(/) Ex -parte Ruffm, 6 Ves. 119, 126; nelly v. Cheever, 16 La. 30; Hyde o.

Ex parte Williams, 11 Ves. 5; Crawshay Brashear, 19 La. 402.
v. Collins, 15 Ves. 218; Peacock v. Pea- (ff) Shearer v. Shearer, 98 Mass. 107.

cock, 16 Ves. 49, 57 ; Harvey v. Crickett, (fg) Myatts v. Bell, 41 Ala. 222.

1 Thus a surviving partner, where a firm has an account at a banker's, has a right
to draw checks upon the partnership account, Backhouse v. Charlton, 8 Ch. D. 444 ;
or indorse a note payable to the firm, Johnson v. Berlizheimer, 84 111. 54 ; contra,
Cavitt v. James, 39 Tex. 189; or give notice of intention to renew a lease before
its expiration, where the lease to the firm gave the privilege, Betts v. June, 51
N. Y. 274.

227

* 202 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

the concern. ((/) 1 Nor is a partner entitled to compensa-

* 202 tion for extra services in the absence of an express * con-

tract, and it is said that there is no principle of the law
which authorizes an inquiry into the inequality of the services
of partners, unless there be an express stipulation to that
effect, (/t)

They are tenants in common with the representatives of the
deceased, as to the choses in possession. And they have a lien
on them to settle the affairs of the concern, and pay its debts, (i)2
And if a surviving partner has paid more than his proportion
of the firm's debts, he may claim repayment from the estate of
the deceased. But after his lien on the partnership funds is
exhausted, he can claim only in common and equally with the
separate creditors of the deceased. (/)

Whether a creditor of the firm may proceed against the estate
of the deceased partner without first exhausting his remedies
against the partnership funds, is not certain ; but the prevailing
rule in this country is that he must first look to the partnership
funds. (7c)

If the survivors carry on the concern, and enter into new trans-
actions with the partnership funds, they do so at their peril ; and

(g) Beatty v. Wray, 19 Penn. St. 516. go at once to the estate of the deceased

See Willett v. Blanford, 1 Hare, 253, for partner ; Devaynes v. Noble, 1 Meriv.

the discretion of the court as to shares 529 ; Sumner v. Powell, 2 Meriv. 37 ;

of partners. ' Wilkinson !•. Henderson, 1 Myl. & K.

(/i) Piper v. Smith, 1 Head, 93; Mur- 582. And this doctrine seems to he sup-
ray r. Johnston, id. 353. ported in Fillyan i>. Laverty, 3 Fla. 72,

(i) Ex parte Ruffta, 6 Ves. 119; Ex and Camp v. Grant, 21 Conn. 41. But

parte Williams, 11 Ves. 5. see Bennett u. Woolfolk, 15 Ga. 213,

(j) Busby v. Chenault, 13 B. Mon. and Parker v. Jackson, 16 Barb. 33;

554. Tracy r. Suydam, 30 Barb. 110; Cres-

(h) In England it seems that he may well v. Blank, 3 Grant, 320.

1 Dunlap v. Watson, 124 Mass. 305; Johnson v. Hartshorne, 52 N. T. 173;
Brown's Appeal, 89 Penn. St. 139; Denver v. ltoane, 99 U. S 355; rontra, Royster
v. Johnson, 73 N. C. 474 ; nor if appointed receiver on his own application, Brien v.
Harriman, 1 Tenn. Ch. 467. But a partner who, at his own risk, continues the busi-
ness in order to preserve the good-will and to sell the property and business to
advantage, may be allowed a reasonable compensation, Cameron v. Francisco, 26
Ohio St. 190 ; and if a surviving partner, with the assent of the administrator of
the deceased partner, employs extra labor to finish existing contracts, enters upon
new contracts, employing the machinery, patents, and property of the firm therein,
then, to the extent of his personal services devoted to such extra work, he is entitled
to compensation, Schenkl v. Dana, 118 Mass. 236.

2 Tremper v. Conklin, 44 N. Y. 58 ; Carlton v. Mays, 8 W. Va. 245 ; see Smith v.
Wood, 31 Md. 293 ; Pfeffer >-. Kteiner,27 Mich. 537 ; Bush v. Clark, 127 Mass. 111. But
choses in action and other demands belong to the surviving partner, Daby v. Erics-
son, 45 N. Y. 786; Davidson v. Weems, 58 Ala. 187 ; Isicklaus v. Dahn, 63 Ind. 87 ;
Brown t>. Allen, 35 la. 306 ; and after the survivor's death his representative succeeds to
such rights, Costley v. Wilkerson, 49 Ala. 210; Brooks v. Brooks, 12 Heiskell, 12.

228

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP. * 203

the representatives of the deceased may elect to call on them for
the capital with a share of the profits, or with interest. (I) l

After allowing a reasonable time for a settlement, a court of
equity will enjoin a survivor from further prosecution of the
business, and will appoint a receiver, and direct an account to
be taken, (m)

A court of equity will interfere and decree a dissolution,
upon * a case distinctly made out, of positive and injurious * 203
wrong, done by one or more of the partners, against the
interest of the firm ; (n) and when called upon to settle the affairs
of a partnership, it will respect any stipulations between the part-
ners as to the mode of settlement. In the absence of such stipu-
lations it will be governed by the last settled account, both as to
its result and its method, unless the account be set aside for
fraud, actual or constructive, or be open to objection as oppressive
and unreasonable, (o) Nor will a partner be allowed compensa-
tion for services to the firm, or any peculiar advantage, without
express stipulation, or circumstances of equivalent force, (p)
The presumption of law is that the losses are to be equally borne,
and the profits equally divided, even if the money or the labor are
provided in different proportions. (#)

While it is a general rule that every partner is bound to exer-
cise due skill and diligence in promoting the interests of the firm,
without reward or compensation, unless it be otherwise agreed

(/) Brown v. Lytton, 1 P. Wms. 140; v. Barrett, 1 Sim. 45; Jones u. Yates, 9

Hammond v. Douglas, 5 Ves. 539; B. &C.632. croQT„,t

Featherstonaugh i- . Fenwiek, 17 Ves. o Jackson ». Sedgwick, 1 Swanst.

298; Heathcote v. Hulrae, 1 Jac. & W. 460, 469; Pettyt v. Janeson 6 Madd

122 Sigourney v. Munn, 7 Conn. 11; 146; Oldaker „. Lavender 6 Sim. 2.9

Crawshay v. Collins, 2 Russ. 345; 8. c. Desha v. Sheppard, 20 Ala. 747, Story

15 Ves. 218; 3 Kent, Com. 64; Millard on Part. §§ 206, 349.

v. Ramsdell, 1 Harring. Ch. (Mich.) 373; (p) Lee v Lashbrooke 8 Dana 214

Bemie „. Vandever, 16 Ark. 616. But a Coursen r. Hamlin, 2 Duer, 513 Day v.

partner appointed receiver is not held as Lockwood 24 Conn. 185 But if some

partner to account for profits for pari, of those who are partners really ; lct as

nership money invested in trade. White- trustees for the company, they may have

sides v. Lafferty, 3 Humph. 150. a right to repayment of their adv ances.

(m) Murray v. Mumford, 6 Cowen, See Inre German Mining Co. 27 E. L. &

441; Walker v. House, 4 Md. Ch. 39; E. 158. „

Oldaker v. Lavender, 6 Sim. 239 ; Green O. O. 11.

i A survivor mixing firm property with his own is liable ten^l^M**'
. unless he can distinguish each from the other. D.versey v. Johnson 93 111. 547.

* 204 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

between the parties, (qq) J such agreement may be implied from
the course of business pursued between the partners, as disclosed
by the evidence ; and when a partner renders services which
neither the law nor the agreement of the parties imposes upon
him, it is said that an agreement that he shall be paid is
implied, (r)

A dissolution will be decreed, if the court are satisfied that the

whole scheme and purpose of the partnership were absurd and

impracticable ; (s) or that the original agreement between the

parties was tainted with fraud. (t~) In such cases, all the

* 204 * partners must be made parties to the bill, (w) Even

after a dissolution, and while the affairs are in settlement,
the court will interfere, by injunction or a receiver, if necessary to
prevent waste or wrong, (v)

When a court of equity winds up a partnership concern, it is
done by a sale of the partnership effects ; (w) and either partner
may, it is said, insist upon a sale. (»)

Proper notice should be given of a dissolution ; for a firm may
be bound, by a contract made after dissolution, or retirement of
one or more, by a former partner, in the usual course of business,
with a person who had no notice or knowledge of the dissolu-
tion. (?/) The requirement of notice in case of dissolution is
quite similar to that stated in a previous section in relation to
a retiring partner.

(qq) An attorney at law, who was a E. 245 ; s. c. 1 Kay, 148 ; Mayson v.

partner in a mercantile firm, was not al- Beazley, 27 Miss. 185; Milliken v. Lov-

lowed to charge commissions for collect- ing, 37 Mc. 408.

ing the debts of the firm, in Vanduzer v. («•) Crawshay v. Maule, 1 Swanst. 495;

McMillan, 87 Ga. 299. See also Drew b. Crawshay v. Collins, 15 Ves. 218.

Person, 22 Wis. 05L (x) Lyman v. Lyman, 2 Paine, C. C.

(r) Levi v. Kanrick, 13 la. 344. 11. '

(s) Beaumont i-. Meredith, 3 Ves. & B. (y) Merritt v. Pollys, 16 B. Mon. 355;

180; Buckley n. Cater, 17 Ves. 15; Pearce Clapp v. Rogers, 2 Kern. 283; Devins

v. Piper, 17 Ves. 1; Reeve ...Parkins, 2 v. Harris, 3 Greene (la.), 186; Pope r.

Jac. & VV. 3110. Risley, 23 Mo. 185; Brown v. Clark, 14

(t) Hynes v. Stewart, 10 B. Mon. 429; Penn. St. 469; Conro c. Port Henry Iron

Fogg v. Johnston, 27 Ala. 432. Co. 12 Barb. 27; Lyon v. Johnston, 28

(u) Long b. Yonge, 2 Sim. 369. Conn. 1 ; Myers v. Smith, 15 la. 181 ;

(») Roberts v. Eberhardt, 23 E. L. & Reilly v. Smith, 16 La. An. 31.

1 Each partner must work to the extent of his ability for the firm, failing to do
which he is chargeable on a settlement of accounts for the value of his services.
Marsh's Appeal, 69 Penn. St. 30.

230

CH. XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

205

SECTION XV.

OP THE EIGHTS OP CREDITORS IN RESPECT TO PARTNERSHIP FUNDS.

The property of a partnership is bound to the payment of the
partnership debts, and the right of a private creditor of one
copartner to that partner's interest in the property of the firm,
is postponed to the right of the partnership creditor. (2) 1
But it * is said that if the contract between the partners * 205
prevents them from having any lien on the partnership
effects for the payment of the partnership debts, the partnership
creditors have no preference over individual creditors. («)

Difficult questions sometimes arise where the private creditor
seeks to attach, or levy upon the partnership property, or the in-
terest of the indebted partner therein. Where attachment by
mesne process exists, such attachment is allowed ; but it is gen-
erally made subject to the paramount rights of the partnership

(2) Murrill v. Neill, 8 How. 414 ; Pierce
v. Jackson, 6 Mass. 243 ; Tappan ». Blais-
dell, 5 N. H. 190 ; Brewster v. Hammett,
4 Conn. 540 ; Commercial Bank v. Wil-
kins, 9 Greenl. 28 ; Douglas v. Winslow,
20 Me. 89; Donelson v. Posey, 13 Ala.
(n. s.) 752; Filley v. Phelps, 18 Conn.
294 ; Pearson o. Keedy, 6 B. Mon. 128 ;
Black v. Bush, 7 id. 210 ; Glenn v. Gill,
2 Md. 1 ; Sutcliffe v. Dohrman, 18 Ohio,
181 ; Baker's Appeal, 21 Penn. St. 76.
And if the partners sell the partnership
property for the purpose of paying the
private debt of one partner, such sale is
'null and void as to the creditors of the
firm. Ferson v. Monroe, 1 Poster (N.
H.), 462. — If the individual partners
have no lien on the partnership funds for
the payment of partnership liabilities,
the creditors of the partnership are en-
titled to no preference over the creditors
of the individual partners in attaching
its property. Rice o. Barnard, 20 Vt.
479; Feyson v. Monroe, 1 Foster (N. H.),
462. And this preference is denied to
the creditors of the partnership, where
there has been a bona fide sale of the
partnership effects without the reserva-

tion of a lien. Ketchum v. Durkee, 1
Barb. Ch. 480; Reese u. Bradford, 13
Ala. 387. See Smith v. Edwards, 7
Humph. 106. An assignment by part-
ners of their joint and separate property
for the payment of their debts, with pref-
erence to certain partnership creditors
and certain individual creditors, has been
held valid. Kirby v. Schoonmaker, 3
Barb. Ch. 46, 50. — In Vermont, the cred-
itors of the partnership, in attaching
partnership property, are at law entitled
to no preference to creditors of an indi-
vidual partner. Reed v. Shepardson, 2
Vt. 120; Clark v. Lyman, 8 Vt. 290.
But in equity the partnership effects are
pledged to each partner until he is re-
leased from all his partnership obliga-
tions, and are first chargeable with the
claims of the partnership creditors, not-
withstanding prior attachments of the
separate creditors. Washburn v. Bank
of Bellows Falls, 19 Vt. 278; Bardwell
v. Perry, 19 id. 292 ; Crooker v. Crooker,
46 Me. 250.

(a) Rice v. Barnard, 20 Vt. 479; Snod-
grass' Appeal, 13 Penn. St. 471 ; Jones v.
Lusk, 2 Met. (Ky.) 356.

1 It is equally true that no partner has a right to share in the firm property
except after payment of its liabilities. Staats v. Bristow, 73 N. Y. 264 ; Rice v.
McMartin, 39 Conn. 573 ; Hall v. Clagett, 48 Md. 223 ; Conant v. Frary, 49 Ind. 530.

231

206

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

creditors. (5) 1 And such attachment is defeated by the
* 206 mere * insolvency of the firm, although the partnership

creditors have commenced no action for the recovery of
their debts, (c) But where one partner is dormant, the creditor

(b) Pierce v. Jackson, 6 Mass. 242. In
this case an attachment of partnership
property for a partnership debt was held
to prevail over a prior attachment of the
same property for the separate debt of
one of the partners. Parsons, C. J. : "At
common law a partnership stock belongs
to the partnership, and one partner has
no interest in it but his share of what is
remaining after all the partnership debts
are paid, he also accounting for what he
may owe to the firm. Consequently, all
the debts due from the joint fund must
first be discharged, before any partner
can appropriate any part of it to his own
use, or pay any of his private debts ; and
a creditor to one of the partners cannot
claim any interest but what belongs to
his debtor, whether his claim be founded
on any contract made with his debtor, or
on a seizing of the goods on execution."
Phillips c. Bridge, 11 id. 248 ; Newman v.
Bagley, 16 Pick. 672 ; Allen v. Wells, 22
id. 450 ; Trowbridge v. Cushman, 24 id.
310 ; Commercial Bank v. Wilkins, 9
CJreenl. 28; Smith r. Barker, 1 Fairf.
458; Douglas r. Winslow, 20 Me. 89.
Weston, C. J. : " The interest of each
partner is in his portion of the residuum
after all the debts and liabilities of the
firm are liquidated and discharged.
Equity will not aid the separate creditor,
until the partnership claims are first ad-
justed. And they will interpose to aid
the creditors of the firm, when a separate
creditor attempts to withdraw funds, in
regard to which they have a priority.
In this State, and in Massachusetts, a
separate creditor may attach the goods
of a firm, so far as his debtor has an in-
terest in them, subject to the paramount
claims of the creditors of the firm." —
Tappan v. Blaisdell, 5 N H. 190. Bich-
ardson, C. J. : "According to the old cases
in the courts of law, the separate credi-
tor took the goods of the partners, and
sold the share of his debtor, without in-

quiring what were the rights of the other
partners, or what was the real share of
each. Blackhurst v. Clinkard, 1 Show.
169, 1 Salk. 392, 1 Corny ns, 277. But the
true nature of a partnership seems to
have been better understood in more
modern times, and it is now settled that
each partner has a lien on the partner-
ship property, in respect to the balance
due to him, and the liabilities he may
have incurred on account of the partner-
ship." Morrison v. Blodgett, 8 N. H. 238 ;
Page v. Carpenter, 10 id. 77 ; Dow v.
Sayward, 12 id. 276 ; Brewster u. Ham-
mett, 4 Conn. 540 ; Washburn v. The
Bank of Bellows Falls, 19 Vt. 278 ; In
the matter of Smith, 16 Johns. 102;
Bobbins v. Cooper, 6 Johns. Ch. 186. But
where a partnership was dissolved, and a
creditor of the partnership afterwards
took the joint and several note of the
individual partners, held, that he could
not be regarded as a creditor of the part-
nership, nor entitled to preference as
such. Page v. Carpenter, 10 N. H. 77.
In Conroy v. AVoods, 13 Cal. 626, it is
held that when one partner buys out his
copartners, agreeing to pay the debts of
the firm, the partnership property re-
mains bound for firm debts, just as before
the sale. The lien of firm creditors at-
taching, must be preferred to the lien of
an individual creditor of the remaining
partner, attaching first. See James v.
Stratton, 32 111. 202.

(c) Pierce v. Jackson, 6 Mass. 242 ; Fisk
v. Herrick, 6 id 271. In the latter case
the court said: "Before either partner
can rightfully claim to his own use, or
for the payment of his own debts, any of
the partnership effects, the partnership
must be solvent, and he must not be a
debtor to it." — Riceu. Austin, 17 id. 206;
Commercial Bank v. Wilkins, 9 Greenl.
28 ; Lyndon v. Gorham, 1 Gallis. 368.
" The general rule undoubtedly is, that
the interest of each partner in the part-

1 That firm property may be taken on mesne process or execution for a partner's
separate debt, see Branch v. Wiseman, 51 Ind. 1; Clark r. dishing, 52 Cal. 617;
Saunders o. Bartlett, 12 Heiskell, 316; Longcopc v. Bruce, 44 Tex. 434; Barrett v.
McKenzie, 24 Minn. 20; Hacker v. Johnson, 66 Me. 21 ; contra, Haynes v. Knowles,
38 Mich. 407; New Orleans u. Gauthreaux, 32 La. An. 1126; Durborrow's Appeal'
84 Penn. St. 404; Anderson v. Chenney, 51 Ga. 372. An attachment of firm goods
in a suit against one partner is not valid against a subsequent attachment by a firm
creditor. Kistner v. Sindlinger; Boguc's Appeal, 83 Penn. St. 101 ; Eighth Bank
v. Fitch, 49 N. Y. 539 ; Fargo v. Ames, 45 la. 491 ; Cox ;;. Russell, 44 la. 556.

232

CH. XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

207

of the other is not then postponed in his attachment of the stock
in trade, to a creditor of the same firm who had discovered the
dormant partner, and makes him defendant, (d) But such post-
ponement would he made, where the first attaching creditor's debt
did not arise from the partnership business, and the debt of
the second creditor did arise therefrom, (e) The same rule is
applied to attachments by trustee process, and to direct attach-
ments. (/)

* Formerly, both in England and in this country, the * 207
principle of moieties prevailed. That is, the private cred-
itor took the proportion of the partnership stock which belonged
by numerical division to his debtor. (#) But now, both there

nership funds is only what remains after
the partnership accounts are taken ;
and unless, upon such an account, the
partner be a creditor of the fund, he
is entitled to nothing. And if the part-
nersliip be insolvent, the same effect fol-
lows."

(d) The reason of this exception to
the general doctrine is, that the public
rely on the personal credit of the osten-
sible owner, and not on that of the dor-
mant partners. Lord v. Baldwin, 6 Pick.
348, 351. " The case before us is that of
a dormant partnership, which is neces-
sarily, from its very character, unknown
at the time the liability is incurred. All
the creditors sold their goods or made
their contract with the ostensible, visible
partner ; they trusted to him personally,
and to the goods upon which he was
trading, as his. The dormant partner is
brought to light by ex post facto investi-
gation ; and he is made responsible, not
because he was trusted, but because he
secretly enjoyed the profits of the busi-
ness. Now, in such case, the reason for
giving preference to such creditors as
may first discover his liability, so that
stock ostensibly belonging to the visible
partner shall first be applied to the satis-
faction of their debts, does not exist." . . .
" The question now is, whether, when all
the creditors have trusted the man of
business and apparent owner of the goods,
any one of them, who is behind the rest
in his attachment, shall supplant them
and gain priority because he has discov-
ered this concealed liability. At the time
the debt was created, he stood upon the
same footing with the rest; he trusted
John Brown and the goods in his posses-
sion ; so did they. They have taken pos-
session first of the fund which was held
out to the public as the means of credit ;

and it might be, and probably was in this
very case, that the goods attached are
the identical goods which they sold to
the party sued. There would be then no
pretence of equity, and we think not of
law, in allowing a preference founded
upon no meritorious distinction of cir-
cumstances." French v. Chase, 6 Greenl.
166. The authority of the two preced-
ing cases is fully affirmed in Cammack v.
Johnson, 1 Green, Ch. 163. See also Van
Valen v. Russell, 13 Barb. 590 ; Brown's
Appeal, 17 Penn. St. 480.

(«) Winter v. Richards, 10 Conn. 37.
This case determines that a first attach-
ing creditor, who has dealt with a partner
in the course of the business of the partnership,
but at the same time in ignorance of its
existence, shall not be postponed to sub-
sequent attaching creditors, to whom the
dormant partners were known when the
business transactions took place, or sub-
sequently disclosed before their attach-
ments, but that he shall be postponed if
his claims did not arise from a partner-
ship transaction, while that of the subse-
quent attaching creditor did. The court
distinguished Lord v. Baldwin from the
case before them, and remark : " The re-
sult in that case is perfectly compatible
with the decision in this ; and it is ap-
parent that the court meant only to de-
cide the case before them ; for they say,
' Whether a private creditor of his could
seize property so situated, and hold it
against the ostensible owner, is a question
of a very different nature.' " See Allen
v. Dunn, 15 Me. 292.

(/) Fisk v. Herrick, 6 Mass. 271 ;
Church v. Knox, 2 Conn. 514 ; Barber v.
Hartford Bank, 9 id. 407 ; Lyndon v. Gor-
ham, 1 Gallis. 367 ; Mobley v. Lombat, 7
How. (Miss.) 318.

(g) Heydon v. Heydon, 1 Salk. 392.

233

208

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

and here, the rule is well settled that if partnership effects can
be taken either by attachment or on execution to secure or satisfy
the debts of one of the partners, this can be done only to the
extent of that partner's interest, and subject to the settlement of
all partnership accounts. (A) The levy of execution does

* 208 not give the creditor * a separate possession of the goods.

The indebted partner had no such possession himself ; and
the levy gives to his creditor only that which the debtor had ; and
that is a right to call for an account, and then a right to the bal-
ance which may be found to belong to him upon a settlement.
And it must still be regarded as unsettled, whether a sheriff levy-
ing an execution of a separate creditor on a partner's interest,

can take any, and if any what, actual possession of the

* 209 partnership property, (i) * Considering the great diver-

" Coleman and Heydon were copartners,
and a judgment was against Coleman,
and all the goods both of Coleman and
Heydon were taken in execution, and it
was held by Holt, C. J., and the court,
that the sheriff must seize all, because the
moieties are undivided ; for if he seize
but a moiety, and sell that, the other will
have a right to a moiety of that moiety.
But he must seize the whole, and sell a
moiety thereof undivided, and the ven-
dee will be tenant in common witli the
other partner." Jacky v. Butler, 2 Ld.
Raym. 871. " Two joint partners are in
trade. Judgment was entered against
one of them ; and, upon a fieri facias, all
the goods, being undivided, were seized in
execution ; and upon application to the
King's Bench by him against whom the
judgment was not, the court held that
the sheriff could not sell more than a
moiety, for the property of the other
moiety was not affected by the judg-
ment, nor by the execution." Baehurst
v. Clinkard, 1 Show. 173 ; Marriott v.
Shaw, 1 Comyns, 277; Rex v. Manning,
2 id. 616. " If A, B, and C are partners,
and judgment and execution is sued
against A, only his share of the goods
can be sold. It is true, the sheriff may
seize the whole, because the share of each
being undivided, cannot be known ; and
if he seize more than a third part, he can
only sell a third of what is seized, for B
and C have an equal interest with A in
the goods seized ; but the sheriff can only
sell the part of him against whom the
judgment and execution was sued." See
Eddie v. Davidson, Dougl. 650 ; Parker
v. Pistor, 3 B. & P. 288 ; Wallace v. Pat-
terson, 2 Har. & McH. 463; Lyndon v.

234

Gorham, 1 Gallis. 367 ; MeCarty *. Em-
lin, 2 Dallas, 278; Church o. Knox, 2
Conn. 514. Tne same rule is recognized
as law in Vermont, but not in equity.
Eeed v. Shepardson, 2 Vt. 120; Clark v.
Lyman, 8 id. 21)0 ; Washburn v. Bank of
Bellows Falls, 19 id. 278.

(It) Fox v. Hanbury, Cowp. 445;
Eddie v. Davidson, Dougl. 650 ; West v.
Skip, 1 Ves. Sen. 239 ; Hankey v. Garratt,
1 Ves. Jr. 236; Taylor v. Fields, 4 id.
396 ; Young v. Keighley, 15 Ves. 557 ; In
re Wait, 1 Jac. & VV. 608, Lord Eldon ;
Dutton o. Morrison, 17 Ves. 193 ; Com-
mercial Bank v. Wilkins, 9 Greenl. 33 ;
Doner v. Stauffer, 1 Penn. St. 198 ; Win-
ston r. Ewing, 1 Ala. (n. s.) 129; Story
on Part. § 261 ; Coll. on Part. § 822, n. ;
ante, note (A) ; Crane v. French, 1 Wend.
311; Tappan v. Blaisdell, 5 N. H. 190;
Burgess v. Atkins, 6 Blackf. 337, 338.
Dewey, 3. : " The general rule of law is,
that in levying an execution against one
partner for his separate debt, the officer
may take possession of all the joint
property of the firm, in order to inven-
tory and appraise it. He has no author-
ity to divide it; he can only sell the joint
interest of the debtor, whatever it may
be, and the purchaser will stand in the
place of the debtor, and hold the same
interest in the joint concern which he
held."

(i) In Scrugham v. Carter, 12 Wend.
131, it was held that replevin does not
lie against a sheriff in such a case for
taking the property and removing it to a
place of safe custody, and the remedy of
the other partners is to obtain an order
staying proceedings until an account be
taken in equity. In Burrall v. Acker,

CH. XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

'209

sity of authority, as shown by our note, and consequent uncer-
tainty, as to this power of the sheriff, the question seems to

23 id. 606, he was held authorized to take
joint possession, with the other partners,
of the partnership property, after the
levy and before the sale, but whether lie
was entitled to exclusive possession, was
not decided. The subject was fully dis-
cussed by Mr. Justice Cowen, in Phillips
v. Cook, 24 Wend. 389,' and it was de-
cided that, on an execution at law
against one of two partners, the sheriff
might lawfully seize, not merely the
moiety, but the corpus of the joint es-
tate, or the whole, or as much of the
entire partnership effects as might be
necessary to satisfy the execution, and
deliver the property sold to the pur-
chaser ; and if he purchases with notice
of the partnership, he takes subject to an
account between the partners, and to the
equitable claims of the partnership cred-
itors. Bates v. James, 3 Duer, 45. It
has since been held that he is equally
subject to an account whether he had
such notice or not. Walsh v. Adams, 3
Denio, 125. The same cases affirm his
power to deliver all the goods of the
partnership to the purchaser. Birdseye
v. Ray, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 158, affirms Phillips
v. Cook, so far as it relates to the seizure
of the whole of the joint estate by the
sheriff on an execution against one part-
ner for his separate debt. But the sheriff
subjects himself to an action if he sells
the entire property in the goods of the
copartnership, or any thing more than
the debtor partner's interest in them.
Waddell v. Cook, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 47,
n. ; Walsh v. Adams, 3 Denio, 125. In
New York, it is held that neither a court
of law nor of equity will stay execution
at law against the joint estate for a sep-
arate debt until an account be taken.
Moody v. Payne, 2 Johns. Ch. 548 ; In re
Smith, 16 Johns. 106, n.; Phillips v.
Cook, 24 Wend. 389 ; Hergman v. Det-
tlebach, 11 How. Pr. 46. See Reed v.
Howard, 2 Met. 36. But the rule has
been disapproved. Cammack v. Johnson,
1 Green, Ch. 168. In Alabama, the sher-
iff is held justified in taking exclusive
possession of the goods of the firm until
the aid of a court of equity is successfully
invoked. Moore v. Sample, 3 Ala. (n.
B.) 319. In New Hampshire, the right of
a sheriff to take possession of partner-
ship property, levied on for the private
debt of a partner, has been denied after
an elaborate examination of the question.
Gibson v. Stevens, 7 N. H. 352, 357.
Parker, J. : " The specific property of a

partnership cannot be lawfully taken and
sold to satisfy the private debt of one of
the partners. His creditor can have no
greater right than the debtor himself has
individually, which is a right to a share of
the surplus. This is the necessary result
of the doctrine, that the partnership prop-
erty is a fund in the first place for the
payment of the partnership debts, and
that the interest of an individual partner
is only his share of the surplus. 5 N. H.
192, 193, 250; 9 Conn. 410. There are
difficulties in selling the interest of one
partner upon an execution. Courts of
equity first direct an account which
courts of law cannot do ; and if the
interest of one partner may be sold upon
an execution at law, it must be left to an
account afterwards. Gow on Part. 246-
254. And a question may arise in such
case, whether the sale operates as a disso-
lution of the partnership before the time
limited by the articles of copartnership,
or whether the other partners are author-
ized to carry on the trade, and account
at the expiration of the term. If the
sheriff can sell only the interest of the
partner, and not the goods, lie must be
liable if he make actual seizure of the
specific property, either to the partner-
ship or the other partners. Wilson v.
Conine, 2 Johns. 280. Especially if he
sell the whole as in this case. 1 Gallis.
370; 15 Mass. 82." Morrison v. Blod-
gett, 8 N. H. 238. Parker, J.: "If the
sheriff cannot sell an interest in specified
portions of the goods of the partnership,
there seems to be no reason why he should
levy upon those goods, and deliver them
to the vendee, or why he should in fact
reduce them into possession. If ' in truth
the sale does not transfer any part of the
joint property so as to entitle him' (the
vendee) 'to take it from the other part-
ner ' (1 Story, Eq. 626), on what principle
is the sheriff authorized to seize and
hold to the exclusion of the other part-
ners, what his vendee after a sale of the
interest of the debtor is perfected, cannot
take from them % If the sheriff sells
' only the interest of sucli partner, and
not the effects themselves' (1 Wight,
50, cited 2 Johns. Ch. 549), upon what
grounds shall he seize the effects which
he is not to sell ? If ' the creditors of
the partnership have a preference to be
paid their debts out of the partnership
funds before the private creditors of
either of the partners,' and this ' is
worked out through the equity of the

235

* 210 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

call for statutory provisions; but in the absence of such pro-
visions, and on general principles, it would seem that the sheriff
cannot take or give, by sale, specific possession of the partnership
property. He takes and can sell only the right and interest of
the indebted partner to and in the whole fund.

Different rules and modes of practice prevail in different

* 210 parts * of this country. But wherever it can be done, the

better and safer way would probably be for the writ to be
a trustee process, or in the nature of a foreign attachment, and
this should be served on the other partners as alleged trustees,
and a return made by the sheriff that he had attached all the
right and interest of the partner defendant in the stock and prop-
erty of the partnership. And the other partners being summoned
as trustees, would be obliged to disclose in their answer the
state of the concern, which will show the interest of the partner
defendant.

After sale on execution, the sheriff should convey to the pur-
chaser all the right and interest of the indebted partner in the
stock and property of the partnership. And the purchaser would
then have the right to demand an account, and a transfer to him
of whatever balance or property would, upon such account, have
belonged to his debtor, and would have, perhaps, the same right
of possession. (_j~)

partners over the whole funds ' (1 Story, partnership effects, is sustained, there-
Eq. 625), that equity should prevent them fore, not only by the reason of the thing,
from being deprived of the means of after the adoption of the general pre-
payment by reason of such seizure by the ciple before stated, but by express au-
sheriff, who can neither sell the goods, thority." The doctrine of these cases is
nor pay the creditors, and against whom affirmed in Page v. Carpenter, 10 N. H.
they cannot proceed, so long as he may 77 ; Dow v. Say ward, 12 id. 271, 14 id. 9.
lawfully hold the goods." . . "In See Taylor c. Field, 4 Ves. 396 ; Johnson v.
Smith's case, 16 Johns. 106, the court, Evans, 7 Man. & G. 240. 240, 250, Tindal,
after saying that the separate creditor C. J. ; Coll. on Part. B. iii. ch. vi. § 10. — In
takes the share of his debtor in the Newman v. Bean, 1 Foster (N. H), 03, it
same manner as the debtor himself had was held that an action might be main-
it, and subject to the rights of the other tained against a third person who seizes
partner, add: 'The sheriff therefore does goods on execution belonging to a part-
not seize the partnership effects them- nership, for the debt of an individual
selves, for the other partner has a right partner, and excludes the other partners
to retain them for the payment of the part- from the possession of them. See on this
nership debts.' And in Crane v. French, subject 26 Am. Jur., art. 3. See also
1 Wend. 313, Chief Justice Savage, after Place v. Sweetzer, 16 Ohio, 142 ; Newhall
considering the subject, says : 'The sher- v. Buckingham, 14 111. 405; Hill v. Wiggin,
iff therefore sells the mere right and title 1 Foster (N. H.), 292; Vann v. Hussey, 1
to the partnership property, but docs not Jones, 381 ; Deal v. Bogue, 20 Penn. St.
deliver possession.' See also 5 N. H. 228 ; Lucas v. Laws, 27 Penn. St. 211 ;
193; 2 Conn. 516, 517. The conclusion Reinheimer v. Hemmingway, 35 Penn.
that the sheriff, upon an execution St. 432.

against one partner, is not to deliver (;') Morrison v. Blodgett, 8 N. H. 254.

to his vendee, and is not to seize the Parker, J. : " Whether, under our present

236

CH. XII.]

PARTNERSHIP.

211

* That the private creditors of one of the partners can- * 211
not reach the partnership funds until the claims of the
partnership creditors are satisfied, is now the universal rule both
in courts of law and of equity, (/c) But whether the private prop-
erty of a partner is equally preserved for his private creditors, is
not perhaps certain. At law, no such rule seems to be well estab-
lished. But where the partnership has failed, and the partner-
ship property is held as a fund for the partnership creditors, the
justice of holding the private property of individual partners for
the exclusive benefit of their private creditors, is obvious. Then
each fund would be held separate ; the partnership assets for the

laws, the creditor can do more than re-
turn a genera] attachment of the interest
of his debtor in the partnership, and
summon the other partners as his trust-
ees ; and what are the effects of such a
service upon the rights and duties of the
other partners, and, of course, upon the
action of the debtor himself ? Whether
it can suspend his right to interfere with
the partnership property, so long as the
attachment exists, or whether he may
proceed to act as partner until judgment
and sale upon execution? And whether,
after an attachment, the creditor of any
of the partners may maintain a bill in
equity for an account before a seizure
and sale of the interest of the debtor on
the execution > are questions which may
arise, but upon which this case does not
call for an opinion." — Dow v. Say ward,
12 N. H. 276. Upham, J. : " In the case
of Morrison v. Blodgett, is a very elabor-
ate examination of this question by Mr.
Chief Justice Parker, and the opinion of
the court is strongly intimated that a
general attachment of the interest of a
partner in p, firm may be made, though
it is suggested that, in order to make the
attachment available, by obtaining a true
knowledge of the extent of the partner-
ship interest, it might be expedient or
necessary to summon the other parties
as trustees. We are unable now to see
any better course than was there sug-
gested. There seems to be a good reason
for giving up the process of attachment
at law in such cases, as it would probably
in this mode be rendered equally as effec-
tual and prompt as any other means of
securing the interest of the debtor that
might be devised. If a process in chan-
cery should be deemed more effectual,
still it might be desirable al9o to retain
a right of attachment at law." See also
Page i. Carpenter, 10 N. H. 77; s. c. 14

N. H. 9, 12. Parker, C. J. : " Neither will
the fact that the interest of a partner is
of a nature that is incapable of actual
seizure, and of a reduction into posses-
sion, exempt it from a seizure and sale
upon execution. Equities of redemption
and other interests are of that char-
acter, but are nevertheless subject to an
execution at law. It follows, then, that
the interest of the defendant in the pro-
perty of the stage company was liable to
attachment. Whatever may be the sub-
ject of the levy and sale, may be the
subject of attachment. It is true that
there is difficulty in securing the interest
of one partner by attachment, so that he
or his partners, through their right to
hold the property, may not impair the
security. This subject was adverted to
in Morrison v. Blodgett, before cited.
Perhaps it cannot be done without some
further legislation, unless it be through
the aid of chancery by means of an in-
junction. But the difficulty of effectually
securing the interest of one partner by an
attachment, so that the other partners,
or the debtor himself, cannot through
the rights of the other partners to retain
possession of the property, impair the
security, by no means proves that such
interest is not attachable. It may, not-
withstanding, be attached, and the credit-
or will thereby gain a prior right to have
it applied in satisfaction of his judg-
ment. And should the debtor or his
partners attempt to avoid the effect of
the attachment, the creditor may, per-
haps, on application to this court, obtain
an injunction to restrain them from any
acts inconsistent with his right to have
the interest of his debtor sold upon the
execution." pp. 12, 13.

(£) Murrill v. Neill, 8 How. 414;
Shedd v. Wilson, 1 Williams, 478 ; Con-
verse v. McKce, 14 Tex. 20.
237

211

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

partnership creditors, and the assets of each partner for his own
creditors, and only the balance of each fund, after the special
claims upon it were discharged, would be applicable to the claims
of the other class. But it will be seen from our note that this
cannot now be asserted, on authority, to be a settled rule, even in
equity. (7)

(T) In the time of Lord Bardtmcke
joint creditors were allowed, in bank-
ruptcy, to prove their debts under a
separate commission against one partner,
or under separate commissions against
all the partners, but only for the purpose
of assenting to or dissenting from the
certificate, and were considered to have
an equitable right to the surplus of the
separate estate, after payment of the
separate creditors. Ex parte Baudier, 1
Alk. 98 ; Ex parte Vognel, id. 132 ; Ex
parte Oldknow, Co. B. L. ch. 6, § 15 ;
Ex parte foblmm, id. See Dutton v.
Morrison, 17 Ves. 207 ; Ex parte Farlow,

1 Rose, 4'J2. Lord Thurlow broke in
upon this rule, allowing joint creditors
to prove and take dividends under a
separate commission, and holding that
a commission of bankruptcy was an ex-
ecution for all the creditors, and that no
distinction ought to be made between
joint and separate debts, but that they
ought to be paid ratably out of the
bankrupt's property. Ex parte Haydon,
Co. B. L. ch. 6, § 15; s. c. 1 Bro. Ch.
453 ; Ex parte Copland, Co. B. L. ch. 6, §
15; s.c. 1 Cox, 429; Ex parte Hodgson,

2 Bro. Ch. 5; Ex parte Page, id. 119; Ex
parte Flintum, id. 120. Lord Rosli/n re-
stored the principle of Lord Ilardwicke's
rule (Ex parte Elton, 3 Ves. 233; Ex
parte Abell, 4 id. 837), which was adopted
by Lord Eldon less out of regard to the
reason of the rule itself than for the
sake of establishing a uniform practice.
Ex parte Clay, 0 Ves. 813; Ex parte Ken-
sington, 14 id. 447; Ex pint!: Taitt, 16 id.
193. See his remarks in Chiswell v.
Gray, 9 Ves. 126; Barker v. G.mdair, 11
id. 86, and such is the English law. Gow
on Part. 312. There are, however, three
exceptions to this rule : " 1st, where a
joint creditor is the petitioning creditor
under a separate fiat; 2d, where there
is no joint estate, and no solvent partner ;
3d, where there are no separate debts.
In the first case the petitioning creditor,
and in the second, all the joint creditors
may prove against the separate estate
pari passu with the separate creditors.
In the last case, as there are no separate
creditors, the joint creditors will be ad-
mitted pari passu with each other upon

238

the separate estate." Coll. on Part. §
923 ; Story on Part. §§ 37S-3S2. But see
Emanuel v. Bird, 19 Ala. 596, and Cleg-
horn v. Ins. Bank of Columbus, 9 Ga.
319. The history of the English rule
was reviewed in Murray v. Murray, 5
Johns. Ch. 60. It has been adopted
by some American courts. Woddrop r.
Ward, 3 Desaus. 203 ; Tunno «. Treze-
vant, 2 id. 270; Hall ><. Hall, 2 McCord,
Ch. 302 ; McCuiloch v. Dashiel, 1 Har.
& G. 90 ; Murrill v. Neill, 8 How. 414.
See In re Marwick, Davics, 229; In re
Warren, id. 320 ; Morris <•. Morris, 4
Gratt. 293. In Jackson r. Cornell, 1
Sandf. Ch. 348, the Assistant VUv-Chan-
cellor said : " It is not denied that the
rule of equity is uniform and stringent,
that the partnership property of a firm
shall all be applied to the partnership
debts, to the exclusion of the creditors
of the individual members of the firm ;
and that the creditors of the latter are
to be first paid out of the separate effects
of their debtor, before the partnership
creditors can claim any thing. See Wil-
der v. Keeler, 3 Paige, 167; Egberts i*.
Wood, id. 517; Payne v Matthews, 6
id. 19 ; Hutchinson v. Smith, 7 id. 'M ; 1
Story, Eq. §§ 025, 075." And it was held
in Jackson v. Cornell that a general as-
signment of his separate property made
by an insolvent copartner, which prefers
the creditors of the firm to the exclusion
of his own, is fraudulent and void as to
the latter. The English rule has been
discarded in Pennsylvania. Bell i>. New-
man, 5 S. & R. 78 ; In re Sperry, 1 Ashm.
347. And Lord Tluirloir's ruie prevails
in Connecticut, although the surviving
partner be solvent and within the juris-
diction of the court. Camp v. Grant, 21
Conn. 41. It has been held in Massachu-
setts that whatever may be the rule in a
court of equity, an attachment of the
separate property of a partner for a
partnership debt is not defeated at law
by a subsequent attachment of the same
property for his separate debt. — Allen
o. Wells, 22 Pick. 450. Dewey, J. : " It is
urged, however, on the part of the de-
fendant, that as this court, as a court of
law, have long since recognized the prin-
ciple that an attachment of the goods of

en. xii.]

PARTNERSHIP.

212

The rights of partnership creditors to a preference in
the distribution * of the partnership property must not be * 212
taken to extend so far as to affect a bona fide transmutation
of partnership into private property made prior to or upon a dis-
solution. While the partnership remains and its business is going
on, whether it be in fact solvent or not, any honest distribution
of the partnership effects among the members of the firm
cannot * be disturbed by any equities of creditors of the * 213

a partnership, by a creditor of one of
the partners, is not valid, as against an
after attachment by a partnership cred-
itor, it should also adopt the converse of
the proposition, giving a like preference
to separate creditors in respect to the
separate property. But we think there
is a manifest distinction in the two cases.
The restriction upon separate creditors,
as to partnership property, arises not
merely from the nature of the debt
attempted to be secured, but also from
the situation of the property proposed
to be attached. In such a case, a distinct
moiety or other proportion, in certain
specific articles of the partnership pro-
perty, cannot be taken and sold, as one
partner has no distinct separate property
in the partnership effects. His interest
embraces only what remains upon the final
adjustment of the partnership concerns.
But, on the other hand, a debt due from
the copartnership is the debt of each
member of the firm, and every individ-
ual member is liable to pay the whole
amount of the same to the creditor of
the firm. In the case of the copartner-
ship, the interest of the debtor is not the
right to any specific property, but to a
residuum which is uncertain and contin-
gent, while the interest of one partner
in his individual property is that of a
present absolute interest in the specific
property. Each separate member of the
copartnership being thus liable for all
debts due from the copartnership, and
no objection arising from any interfer-
ence with the rights of others as joint
owners, it seems necessarily to follow,
that his separate property may be well
adjudged to be liable to be attached
and held to secure a debt due from the
copartnership." And in the distribution
of the estates of deceased insolvent debt-
ors, partnership debts are paid ratably
with the private claims. Sparhawk v.
Russell, 10 Met. 305. But in New
Hampshire the English rule has been
adopted in the law, to its fullest extent,
and where real estate of one partner
was set off on execution for a debt due

from the partnership, and afterwards the
same land was set off for a separate debt
of the same partner, the last levy was
held to prevail over the first and to give
the legal title. Jarvis v. Brooks, 3 Fos-
ter (N. H.), IMG. — The conclusion of the
Supreme Court of Vermont on this ques-
tion is as follows : " That a partnership
contract imposes precisely the same ob-
ligation upon each separate partner that
a sole and separate contract does, and
that it is not true that, in joint contracts,
the creditor looks to the credit of the
joint estate, and the separate creditor to
that of the separate estate; and that
there is no express or implied contract
resulting from the law of partnership,
that the separate estate shall go to pay
separate debts exclusively ; but that, as
the partnership creditors in equity have
a prior lien on the partnership funds,
chancery will compel them to exhaust
that remedy before resorting to the sep-
arate estate ; but that beyond this, both
sets of creditors stand precisely equal,
both at law and in equity." Per Rrdfirld,
J., Bardwell v. Perry, 19 Vt. 2!>1>,'303.
Mr. Justice Story says of the English
rule: "It now stands as much, if not
more, upon the general ground of author-
ity, and the maxim stare decisis, than
upon the ground of any equitable reason-
ing." Story on Part. § 377. And he says
further : " It is not, perhaps, too much to
say, that it rests on a foundation as ques-
tionable and as unsatisfactory as any
rule in the whole system of our jurispru-
dence ; " but " should be left undisturbed
as it may not be easy to substitute any
other rule which would uniformly work
with perfect equality and equity." § 382.
Chancellor Kent, on the other hand re-
marks : " For my part, I am free to con-
fess that I feel no hostility to the rule,
and think that it is, upon the whole,
reasonable and just." 3 Kent, Com. G5, n.
See also Walker v. Eyth, 25 Penn. St.
216; Morrison v. Kurtz, 15 111. 193;
Baker v. Wimpee, 19 Ga. 87 ; Young v.
Frier, 1 Stock. 465.

239

* 214 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

partnership, (to) * In a recent case in Illinois, in which this
subject is much considered, the rule in equity is stated to be
this : the assets of a deceased and of insolvent partners, if there
be partnership and separate property, will be distributed by pay-
ing the firm debts out of the joint estate, and the individual debts
out of the separate estate ; that the joint and individual debts
should be kept distinct, and the assets of the two estates mar-
shalled accordingly ; that joint creditors must first resort to the
joint fund, and the creditors of the individual partners to their
separate property ; that upon the inadequacy of either of these,
then the joint or separate estate may be applied according to the
exigency of the case ; that if there is no joint fund nor any sol-
vent partner, joint creditors may participate equally with a private
creditor in the estate of a deceased partner, and if there should
be a surplus of the joint fund, the creditor of an individual

* 214 partner may resort * to that, (n) Nor have the joint cred-

itors such a lien on the partnership funds, as to avoid a
transfer in good faith and for value to a purchaser, by partners,
before judgment and execution, (o)

A note signed by all the partners, but not by the partnership
name, would not create a partnership debt, unless it was given as
a partnership note, in the partnership business ; if given for a
matter outside the partnership business, it would be only a joint
note, (oo)

SECTION XVI.

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP.

This species of partnership has been but recently introduced
into this country, but has already been adopted in very many of
our States, and promises to be of great utility, (p) We have

(m) Ex parte Ruffin, 6 Ves. 119; Allen Allen v. Center Valley Co. 21 Conn. 130.

v. Center Valley Co. 21 Conn. 130. See however Ferson v. Munroe, 1 Foster

(n) Pahlman v. Graves, 26 111. 405. (N. H.), 462.

(o) Greenwood v. Brodhead, 8 Barb. (oo) Turner v. Jaycox, 40 N. Y 470.

593; Waterman v. Hunt, 2 R. I. 298; (p) New York, Massachusetts, Rhode

1 Hollis v. Staley, 3 Baxter, 167 ; Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S.119; In re Long
7 Benedict, 141 ; Schmidlapp v. Carrie, 55 Miss. 597. See Menagh v. Whitwell, 62
N. Y. 146, that the firm must be solvent.

240

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP. * 215

borrowed it from the continent of Europe, as it was formerly
unknown in English practice, and is not recognized by the com-
mon law of England. Limited partnership is now permitted
in England, but it is not the same thing there that it is in this
country.

With us, a limited partnership, or, as it is sometimes called, a
special partnership, arises wholly from statute, and is defined and
determined by statutory provisions. The purpose of it is to
enable a party to put into the stock of a firm a definite sum of
money, and abide a responsibility and share a profit which shall
be in proportion to the money thus contributed, and no more.
By the common law of partnership, he who had any interest in
the stock, and received any proportion of the profits, is a partner,
and as such, liable in solido for the whole debts of the firm. And
mere joint-stock companies, without incorporation, are, as to all
purposes of liability, like common partnerships, (q) Capitalists
were therefore unwilling to place their capital in the stock of a
trading company, unless advantages were offered them
equivalent to this great risk. Men of * business capacity, * 215
who had only their skill, industry, and integrity, could not
always borrow adequate capital, because they could not give abso-
lute security ; and they could not pay as a premium for the risk
more than legal interest, because the usury laws prohibited this.
But they may now enter into an arrangement with a capitalist, by
which they receive from him adequate means for carrying on their
business profitably, paying him a fair share of the profits earned
by the combination of his capital and their labor, while he runs
the risk of losing the capital which is thus earning him a profit,
but knows that he can lose no more.

i Partnerships of this kind being, as has been stated, wholly un-
known to the common law, are authorized and regulated only by
statute. And these statutes differ considerably in the several
States. But the provisions are generally to the following effect.
First, there must be one or more who are general partners, and
one or more who are special partners ; secondly, the names of the
special partners do not appear in the firm, nor have they all the

Island, Connecticut, Vermont, New Jer- (?) Co y Bodfish 85 Me .302^ £

Mississippi, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, v. Werts, 4 S. & B. 356.
Kentucky, Virginia.

* 216 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

powers and duties of active members ; thirdly, the sum proposed
to be contributed by the special partners must be actually paid
in ; fourthly, the arrangement must be in writing, specifying the
names of the partners, the amount paid in, &c, which is to be
acknowledged before a magistrate, and then recorded and adver-
tised, in such way as shall give the public distinct knowledge of
what it is, and who they arc, that persons dealing with the firm
give credit to. Besides these general provisions, others of a more
particular nature are sometimes introduced. Thus in some States,
no special partnership may carry on the business of insurance or
banking. And there are often special provisions to give greater
security to the public and persons dealing with such firms. But
for these we must refer the reader to the statutes of the several
States.

A special partner, complying with the requirements of the law,

cannot be held as personally liable for the debts of the firm;

although, of course, the whole amount which he contributes

goes into the fund to which the creditors of the firm may

look.

* 216 * It seems to be quite well settled, that the special part-

ner must, at his own peril, comply precisely with the
requirements of the statutes, (qq) Any disregard of them, or
want of conformity, although it be accidental and entirely inno-
cent on his part, or any material mistake by another, as by the
printer who prints the advertisement, deprives him of the benefit
of the statute. He is then a partner at common law, and, as such,
liable in solido for the whole debts of the firm. (V)

(qq) Haggerty v. Porter, 103 Mass. 17 ; calling the contribution $5,000, when it

Pierce v. Bryant, 5 Allen, 1)1 ; Richardson was but $2,000, if it had called it §2,000,

v. Hogg, 38 Penn. St. 153 ; Hartland v. when it was in fact §5,000, it might have

Cliace, 39 Barb. 283. been well urged, in the absence of all ill-

(r) Hubbard i. Morgan, TJ. S. D. C. design or personal fault on the part of
for N. Y., May, 1839, cited in 3 Kent, the special partner, that this error could
Com. 36 ; Argall v. Smith, 3 Denio, 435. not mislead the public, or any dealer
In this case, which was decided by the with the firm to his injury, as it made the
Court of Errors of New York unani- grounds of credit less than their actual
mously, it was held, that the publication value, instead of, as in the case at bar,
of the amount contributed by the special making them more. But even then the
partner as $5,000, whereas it was $2,000, necessity of a strict compliance with the
left upon him all the liabilities of a gen- provisions of the statute might be suffi-
eral partner. The argument of Spencer, cient to hold the special partner as a gen-
Senator, who alone gives the reasons of eral one. See Hogg v. Orgill, 34 Penn.
the decision, turns upon the necessity of St. 344, as to payment in checks of third
a true advertisement ; he regards an erro- persons, by special partner, being equiva-
neous advertisement as no advertisement lent to an actual cash payment, as required
at all. But suppose the error had been by the New York statute,
the reverse of what it was. Instead of

242

CH. XII.] PARTNERSHIP. * 216

If a special partner sells out his interest to the general partner
for a sum exceeding his invested capital, it has been held that this
was such a withdrawal of his capital as the statute prohibits, and
that it made him liable, (s) But it seems that the special partner
may make loans to the partnership, (ss)

If the special partner of one firm is the general partner of
another firm, the second firm may claim as creditor of the first
firm. (0

(s) Beers v. Reynolds, 12 Barb. 288; cial partners are considered under various

8. c. 1 Kern. 97. points of view, in Singer v. Kelly, 44

(ss) Walkensham v. Perzell, 4 Eob. Penn. St. 145; Running's Appeal, 44

426. Penn. St. 150; McKnight v. Katcliff,

(«) Hayes v. Bement, 3 Sandf. 394. 44 Penn. St. 156; Harris a. Murray, 28

See also Hayes v. Heyer, 35 N. Y. 826. N. Y. 574.

The rights, duties, and liabilities of spe-

243

217 THE LAW OP CONTEACTS. [BOOK I.

*217 * CHAPTER XIII.

NEW PARTIES BY NOVATION.

The term novation has not been much used in English or
American law, but may be found in some late English cases ;
and the thing itself, or this form of contract, may be found in
many cases, both in England and in this country. The word is
borrowed from the civil law, where it forms an important topic ;
and we may find a clear statement of its principles in Pothier's
work on Contracts, (a) It is denned thus : a transaction whereby
a debtor is discharged from his liability to his original creditor,
by contracting a new obligation in favor of a new creditor, by
the order of his original creditor. Thus, A owes B one thousand
dollars ; B owes C the same sum, and, at the request of C, orders
A to pay that sum, when it shall fall due, to C. To this A con-
sents, and B discharges A from all obligation to him. A thus
contracts a new obligation to C, and his original obligation to B
is at an end. By the civil law, any new contract entered into
for the purpose and with the effect of dissolving an existing con-
tract was regarded as a novation, and in the above case the civil
law would recognize two sorts of contracts of novation ; the con-
tract by which A is discharged from his liability to B by contract-
ing a new obligation to C, and the novation by which B would
be discharged from his obligation to C by procuring A as a new
debtor. This distinction has not been preserved in the common
law, and the rights and obligations of the parties in both cases
! are governed by the same rule.

A leading English case on this subject is Tatlock v. Harris. (6)

(a) Part 3, ch. 2, art. 4. second indorser, a bona fide holder for va-

(b) 3 T. R. 174. In this case it was de- luable consideration might recover the
termined that where a bill of exchange was amount of it in an action against the ac-
drawn by the defendant and others on the ceptor for money paid or money had and
defendant alone, in favor of a fictitious received; and Butler, J., puts this case:
person (which was known to all parties " Suppose A owes B £100, and B owes
concerned in drawing the bill), and the de- C £100, and the three meet, and it is agreed
fendant received the value of it from the between them that A shall pay C the ilOO,

244

CH. XIII.]

NOVATION.

218

It will be seen, from the statement of the cases in the
* note, that the principle deducible from them is, that if * 218
A owes B, and B owes C, and it is agreed by these three
parties that A shall pay this debt to C, and A is by this agree-
ment discharged from his debt to B, and B is also discharged
from his debt to C, then there is an obligation created from A to
C, and C may bring an action against A in his own name, (e) 1

B's debt is extinguished, and C may re-
cover that sum against A." — So in Wil-
son v. Coupland, 5 B. & Aid. 228, where
the plaintiffs were creditors and the de-
fendants were debtors to the firm of " T. &
Co./' and by consent of all parties an ar-
rangement was made that the defendants
should pay to the plaintiff's the debt due
from them to " T. & Co.," it was held, that
as the demand of " T. & Co." on the de-
fendants was for money had and received,
the plaintiffs might recover against the de-
fendants on a count for money had and re-
ceived, Best, J., saying, " A chose in action
is not assignable without the consent of all
parties. But here all parties have assented,
and from the moment of the assent of the
defendants it seems to me that ttie sum due
from the defendants to ' T. & Co.' became
money had and received to the use of the
plaintiffs." The case of Heaton v. Angier,
7 N. H. 397, furnishes an excellent illus-
tration of this principle. That was an ac-
tion of assumpsit for a wagon sold and de-
livered. The defendant having bought the
wagon of the plaintiff at auction, sold it
immediately afterwards on the same day to
one John Chase. Chase and the defendant
then went to the plaintiff, and Chase agreed
to pay the price of the wagon to the plaintiff
for the defendant, and the plaintiff agreed to
take^Chase as paymaster. Held, that the
debt due from the defendant to the plaintiff
was extinguished. Green, J., having cited
the case put by Buller, J., in Tatlock v. Har-
ris, said : " The case put by Boiler is the
very case now before us. Heaton, Angier,
and Chase being together, it was agreed be-
tween them that the plaintiff should take
Chase as his debtor for the sum due from
the defendant. The debt due to the plain-
tiff from the defendant was thus extin-
guished. It was an accord executed. And

Chase, by assuming the debt due to the
plaintiff, must be considered as having paid
that amount to the defendant, as part of
the price he was to pay the defendant for
the wagon." See also Thompson v. Per-
cival, 5 B. & Ad. 925, 3 Nev. & M. 171. - -
And in such case the defendant's under-
taking is not to pay the debt of a third per-
son within the meaning of the Statute of
Frauds. Bird v. Gammon, 3 Bing. N. C.
883; Meert v. Moessurd, 1 Mo. & P. 8;
Arnold v. Lyman, 17 Mass. 400 ; French v.
French, 2 Man. & G. 644, 3 Scott, N. R.
125 ; Blunt r. Boyd, 3 Barb. 209.

(c) So if in such case the promise of A
to pay C is conditional, as to pay whatever
may hereafter be found due from A to B,
and after such amount is ascertained, but
before it is paid, B becomes bankrupt, still
C may sue A for the amount of A's debt
to B. Crowfoot v. Gurney, 9 Bing. 372.
See also Hodgson v. Anderson, 3 B. & C.
842. — It is to be borne in mind that in
order to constitute an assignment of a debt
or a novation, so as to enable the transfer-
ree to bring an action in his own name in
a court o) 'law, the assent of the debtor to
the agreed transfer is absolutely essential,
and there must be a promise founded on
sufficient consideration to pay it to the
transferee. In equity, however, it is other-
wise, and there need be no promise by the
debtor to the assignee in order to entitle
him to sue in his own name. Lord Eldon
in Ex parte South, 3 Swanst. 392 ; Tibbits
v. George, 5 A. & E. 115, 116; Bobbins v.
Bacon, 3 Greenl. (2d ed.) 346, n. ; Blin v..
Pierce, 20 Vt. 25 ; L'Estrange v. L'Estrange,
1 E. L. & E. 153, n. ; Van Buskirk v. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co. 14 Conn. 141 ; Mande-
ville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277; Gibson v.
Cooke, 20 Pick. 15. See also Schlosser's
Appeal, 58 Penn. St. 493.

i Thus where a mortgagor conveys the mortgaged premises, and his grantee
agrees to assume and pay the mortgage debt, and the mortgagee accepts ;ta .as his
debtor, a novation results, Campbell v Smith, 71 N. Y. 26 ; < Calvo v I) avies, 73 N. Y.
211 ; Merriman v. Moore, 90 Penn. St. 78; or where a new firm takes upon itself the
liabilities of the old, and'a creditor, with knowledge of that ft ict, , *grees to accept
the new firm as debtor, and releases the old firm, Shaw v. McGregory, 105 Mass
96 ; Silverman v. Chase, 90 111. 37. Such a release may be inferred from the

245

* 219 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

This would certainly seem to be in contradiction or exception

to the ancient rule, that a personal contract cannot be assigned

so as to give the assignee a right of action in his own name.

But it is not so much an exception as a different thing. It is

the case of a new contract formed and a former contract

* 219 dissolved. * And the general principles in relation to con-

sideration attach to the whole transaction, (d) Thus, to
give to the transaction its full legal efficacy, the original liabilities
must be extinguished. For if the debt from A to B be not dis-
charged by A's promise to pay it to C, then there is no considera-
tion for this promise, and no action can be maintained upon

* 220 it ; 0) : but, * if this liability be discharged, then it is a

(d) For example, in order that an as- purchase-money to pay the plaintiff and
signment of a chose in action should be other creditors their demands against the
valid against the creditors of the assignor, estate, which the defendant promised the
it must be bona fide and upon adequate executor to pay. This action was brought
consideration. Langley v. Berry, 14 N. H. to recover the amount of the plaintiff's de-
82 ; Giddings v. Coleman, 12 N. H. 153. mand. Held, that he could not recover.
The assignment, however, need not, al- Upham, J., " The principal question in this
though in writing, express to be for value case is, whether the plaintiff can avail him-
received. Johnson v. Thayer, 17 Me. 401 ; self of the promise made by the defendant
Legro v. Staples, 16 Me. 252; Adams v. to the executor — he never having agreed
Robinson, 1 Pick. 461. It is sufficient if to accept the defendant as his debtor, nor
it be so in point of fact; and this must be having made any demand of him for the
proved aliunde than from the face of the money prior to the commencement of this
paper. Langley v. Berry, supra. See post, suit. ... In cases of this kind, a contract,
Chapter on Assignment. in order to be binding, must be mutual to

(e) Cuxon a. Chadley, 3 B. & C. 591 ; all concerned; and until it is completed by
Butterfield v. Hartshorn, 7 N. H. 345. the assent of all interested it is liable to be
This was an action of assumpsit for money defeated, and the money deposited counter-
had and received. The plaintiff held a claim manded. It seems, also, to be clear, that
against the estate of a person deceased, no contract of the kind here attempted to
The executor of the estate sold a farm be- be entered into can be made without an
longing thereto to the defendant, and left entire change of the original rights and lia-
in the defendant's hands a portion of the bilities of the parties to it. There is to be

acceptance of interest, the receiving of new notes, or the proving a claim in bank-
ruptcy, Bilborough v. Holmes, 5 Ch. D. 255; Wright v. Brosseau, 73 111. 381 ; but
the mere acceptance of the note of an individual partner after dissolution is not
enough without an express agreement, Leabo v. Goode, 67 Mo. 120 ; otherwise, of
a bond given for a simple contract debt, Bennett v. Cadwell, 70 Penn. St. 253. See
Hountz v. Holthouse, 85 Penn. St. 235, as to the assumption of firm debts by an
incoming partner. — A compromise between the creditor and debtor, by which the
amount, the terms and mode of payment of the debt, the rate of interest and nature
of the securities are changed, is not a novation, unless the intention of the parties
so to do is particularly expressed. Baker v. Frellsen, 32 La. An. 822. — The debtor
also must assent to the new arrangement, to give it validity ; as where an ice com-
pany, with which a customer from dissatisfaction had ceased to deal, bought out the
company with which the customer had subsequently contracted for ice, and continued
to deliver ice to him without notifying him of the purchase until after the consump-
tion of the ice, it was held, that no recovery could be had for the ice so delivered.
Boston Ice Co. c. Potter, 123 Mass. 28.

1 There must be an absolute extinguishment of the original debt. Caswell v.
Fellows, 110 Mass. 52. As to extension of the time of payment being a sufficient con-
sideration, see Windham v. Doles, 59 Ga. 265; Hixon v Hetherington, 57 Ala. 165.
246

CH. XIII.]

NOVATION.

220

sufficient consideration; and if at the same time C gives up
his claim on B as the ground on which B orders A to pay C,
then the consideration for which A promises to pay C may be
considered as moving from C. An order addressed by a creditor
to his debtor, directing him to pay the debt to some one to whom
the creditor is indebted, operates as a substitution of the new debt
for the old one, when it is presented to the debtor, and assented
to by him, and not before; and also provided this third party
gives up his original claim against the first creditor, and not
otherwise. (/) The mutual assent of all the three parties seems
to be necessary to make it an effectual novation, or substitution ;

a deposit of money for the payment of a
prior debt, an agreement to hold the money
for this purpose, and an agreement on the
part of a third person to accept it in com-
pliance with this arrangement. It is made
through the agency of three individuals,
for the purpose of payment; and it can
have no other effect than to extinguish the
original debt, and create a new liability of
debtor and creditor between the person
holding the money and the individual who
is to receive it. On any other supposition
there would be a duplicate liability for the
same debt; and the deposit, instead of be-
ing a payment, would be a mere collateral
security, which is totally different from the
avowed object of the parties. To entitle
the plaintiff to recover, there must be an
extinguishment of the original debt ; and
it is questionable whether, in cases of this
kind, anything can operate as an extin-
guishment of the original debt, but payment,
or an express agreement of the creditor to
take another person as his debtor in dis-
charge of the original claim." See also
Warren v. Batchelder, 15 N. H. 129.—
Wharton v. Walker, 4 B. & C. 163. In
this case A being indebted to B, gave him
an order upon C, who was A's tenant, to
pay B the amount that should be due from
C to A, from the next rent. B sent the
order to the tenant C, but had not any
direct communication with him upon the
subject. At the next rent-day C produced
the order to A, and promised him to pay
the amount to B, and upon receiving the
difference between the amount of the order
and the whole rent then due, A gave C a
receipt for the whole. B afterwards sued
C to recover the amount of the order, in
an action for money had and received, and
upon an account stated. It was held by
the whole Court of King's Bench, that he
could not recover on either count, because
the debt from A to B was not extinguished,
Bayley, J., saying: "If, by an agreement

between the three parties, the plaintiff had
undertaken to look to the defendant, and
not to his original debtor, that would have
been binding, and the plaintiff might have
maintained an action on such agreement;
but in order to give him that right of ac-
tion there must be an extinguishment of
the intermediate debt. No such bargain
was made betweeen the parties in this case.
Upon the defendant's refusing to pay the
plaintiff, the latter might still sue A, and
this brings the case within Cuxon v. Chad-
ley, 3 B. & C. 591." See also French v.
French, 2 Man. & G. 644, 3 Scott, N. R.
125 ; Thomas v. Shillibeer, I M. & W. 1 24 ;
Moore v. Hill, 2 Peake, 10; Maxwell v.
Jameson, 2 B. & Aid. 55 ; Short v. City of
New Orleans, 4 La. An. 281 ; McKinney v.
Alvis, 14 111. 34.

(/) Where a declaration alleged that
one J. S., being indebted to the plaintiff,
made and delivered to him his order in
writing, directed to the defendant, to de-
liver to the plaintiff or bearer a certain
quantity of wood ; and that the defendant,
being indebted to J. S., in consideration
thereof accepted the said order, and prom-
ised to deliver the wood, according to the
tenor and effect of such order and the ac-
ceptance thereof ; Held, on demurrer, that
the defendant's acceptance of the order, and
his promise to deliver the wood, were with-
out any consideration, and therefore void ;
and that the plaintiff could not maintain
an action against him thereon. Perhaps
it might be questioned in such a case as
this, whether the order of J. S. on the de-
fendant, together with the acceptance of it
by J. S. did not discharge the defendant's
debt to J. S., and so raise a consideration
for his promise to pay the plaintiff. The
defendant would undoubtedly have been
liable under the rules of the civil law.
Ford v. Adams, 2 Barb. 349. See also
Gails v. Sch. Osceola, 14 La. An. 54.

247

* 221 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

for so long as the debtor has made no promise, or come under
no obligation to the party in whose favor the order is given, it
is a mere mandate which the creditor may revoke at his pleas-
ure, (j) 1 And if the person in whose favor the order is

* 221 drawn has in consideration * thereof discharged the debt

due to him, and so may hold this order as against the
creditor giving it, still it is not a novation. He must sue in the
name of the party drawing the order, unless the person on whom
it is made has agreed with him in whose favor it is made to
comply with the order. (A) And if the action is brought in the
name of the original creditor, it is subject to the equitable de-
fences which may exist between him and the debtor. But after
such assent or agreement is given, then the order is irrevocable,
and neither party can recede from the agreement. 0') The old
debt is entirely discharged.

It will be seen, therefore, that in such case the debtor does not
undertake to pay the debt of another, but contracts an entirely

(q) Owen v. Bowen, 4 C. & P. 93. In And the creditor must also consent to take

this' case A gave a sum of money into the the new debtor as his sole security, and to

hands of B, to pay to C, but B had not extinguish his claim against his former

paid it over. It was held, that if C had debtor. Butterfield v. Hartshorn, 7 N. H.

not consented to receive this sum of B, A 345.

might countermand the authority and re- (i) See Ainslie v. Boynton, 2 Barb. 258;

cover it back from B. See also Gibson v. Hodges v. Eastman, 12 Vt. 358; Surtecs v.

Minet, 1 C. & P. 247. Hubbard, 4 Esp. 203. In this case Lord

(A) The agreement of all parties seems Ellenboroutjh observed: "Choses in action
to be absolutely essential to complete this generally are not assignable. Where a
contract, and unless there is a promise by party entitled to money assigns over his
the debtor to pay the new substituted crcd- interest to another, the mere act of assign-
itor the amount for which he was originally ment does not entitle the assignee to main-
liable to his own creditor, there is no priv- tain an action for it. The debtor may re-
ity of contract, and an action at law will fuse his assent; he may have an account
not lie by the transferee in his own name, again-st the assignor, and wish to have his
Williams v. Everett, 14 East, 582 ; Mande- set-off; but if there is anything like an as-
ville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277; Trustees of sent on the part of the holder of the money,
Howard College t>. Pace, 15 Ga. 486 ; Gib- in that case I think that this [assumpsit for
son v. Cooke, 20 Pick. 18. See Wharton money had and received], which is an eqni-
v. Walker, 4 B. & C. 163 ; Scott v. Porcher, table action, is maintainable." Beecker v.
3 Meriv. 652 ; Wedlake v. Hurley, 1 Cr. & Beecker, 7 Johns. 103 ; Hollv r. Rathbone,
J. 83; Baron v. Husband, 4 B. & Ad. 614. 8 id. 149; Norris a. Hall,' 18 Me. 332;
But see Hall u. Marston, 17 Mass. 575. — Clement v. Clement, 8 N. H. 472.

1 All three parties must concur in the same agreement, Murphy t>. Hanrahan, 50
Wis. 485, 489 ; which the original and substituted debtor may rescind at any time
before the latter has notice that the creditor accepts him, Trimble v. Strother, 25
Ohio St. 378 ; Durham v. Bischoff , 47 Ind. 211. The acceptance of the new for the
original contract discharges the old debt, whether the new contract is ever performed
or not. Morriss v. Harvey, 75 Va. 726. By accepting a third person in substitution
for the original debtor, the creditor assumes the risk of such person's insolvency.
Cadens i>. Tcasdale, 53 Vt. 469. See also Andrews v. Campbell, 36 Ohio St. 361 ;
Elanagin v. Hambleton, 54 Md. 222 ; Drake <,. Hill, 53 la. 37 ; Shaffer v. McKanna,
24 Kan. 22.

248

CH. XIII.] NOVATION. * 222

new debt of his own, the consideration of which is the absolute
discharge of the old debt. Consequently, this new promise is
not within the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, relating to
a promise to pay the debt of another. (/)

There is one point upon which some uncertainty exists as to
the principles of the civil law concerning novation, but upon
which the rule of the common law is clear. If the order be for
less than the whole debt due from him on whom it is made to
the maker, it seems not to be entirely agreed upon by civilians
whether such an order, assented to and complied with,
would * or would not discharge the whole of the original * 222
debt. But there can be no doubt that by the common law
it would be a discharge only pro tanto, unless there were a dis-
tinct agreement and a valid promise that it should be taken for
the whole. (k~)

(j) Bird v. Gammon, 3 Bing. N. C. 883 ; of a debt due from the drawee to the drawer,

Blunt v. Boyd, 3 Barb. 209. And see ante, without the consent of the drawee, amount

note (b), p. *217. to an assignment of any portion of the debt

(k) Heathcote v. Crookshanks, 2 T. B. or liability, and does not authorize the in-

27; Fitch v. Sutton, 5 East, 230; Pinnel's stitution of a suit in the name of the assignee

case, 5 Rep. 117 ; Cumber v. Wane, 1 Strn. for the whole or any part of the sum due

426. See also Sibree D.Tripp, 15 M. & W. from the debtor. Gibson v. Cooke, 20 Pick.

23, where the case of Cumber v. Wane was 15 ; Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277 ;

much discussed, and somewhat qualified. — Bobbins v. Bacon, 3 Greenl. 346 (2d ed.), n.
Neither will an order or draft for part only

249

223

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

223

* CHAPTER XIV.

NEW PARTIES BY ASSIGNMENT.

Sect. I. — Of Assignments of Choses in Action.

Any right under a contract, either express or implied, which
has not been reduced to possession, is a chose in action ; (a) and
is so called because it can be enforced against an adverse party
only by an action at law. At common law, the transfer of such
chose in action was entirely forbidden. The reason was said to
be this. A chose in action, by its yery nature and definition, is a
right which cannot be enforced against a reluctant party, except
by an action, or suit at law. And if this be transferred, the only
thing which passes is a right to go to law ; and so much did the
ancient law abhor litigation, that such transfers were wholly
* 224 prohibited. (6) But we apprehend that the * stronger and

(a) 2 Bl. Com. 396, 397 ; 1 Dane, Abr.
92. Choses in action are not limited, how-
ever, to rights arising under contracts.
" Blackstone seems to have entertained
the opinion, that the term chose, or thing
in action, only included debts due, or
damages recoverable for the breach of a
contract, express or implied. But this
definition is too limited. The term chose
in action is used in contradistinction to
chose in possession. It includes all rights
to personal property not in possession
which may be enforced by action ; and it
makes no difference whether the owner
has been deprived of his property by the
tortious act of another, or by his breach
of a contract, express or implied. In both
cases-, the debt or damages of the owner
is a ' thing in action.' " Per Bronson, C.
J., Gillet v. Fairchild, 4 Denio, 80. It
was accordingly held in that case that a
receiver of an insolvent corporation, who
was empowered by law to sue for and re-
cover " all the estate, debts, and things in
action," belonging to the corporation,
might maintain trover for the conversion
of the personal property of the corpora-
tion before the plaintiff was appointed

250

receiver. See also Hall v. Robinson, 2
Comst. 293.

(6) "It is to be observed, that by the
ancient maxim of the common law, a
right of entry or a chose in action cannot
be granted or transferred to a stranger,
and thereby is avoided great oppression,
injury, and injustice." Co. Lit. 266 a.
So again in Lampet's case, 10 Rep. 48,
Lord Coke says : " The great wisdom and
policy of the sages and founders of our
law have provided, that no possibility,
right, title, nor thing in action, shall be
granted or assigned to strangers, for that
would be the occasion of multiplying of
contentions and suits, of great oppression
of the people, and chiefly of terre-tenants,
'and the subversion of the due and equal
execution of justice." At what time this
doctrine, which, it is said, had relation
originally only to landed estates, was first
adjudged to be equally applicable to the
assignment of a mere personal chattel not hi
possession, it is not easy to decide ; it
seems, however, to have been so settled
at a very early period of our history, as
the works of our oldest text-writers, and
the reports contain numberless observa-

CH. XIV.]

ASSIGNMENT.

224

better reason was, that no debtor shall have a new creditor sub-
stituted for the original one, without his consent; for he may
have substantial reasons for choosing whom he should owe.

Courts of equity have, for a long time, disregarded this rule ; (c)
and, as a general rule, they permit the assignee of a chose in
action to sustain an action in his own name, if he can go into
equity at all ; but when such a case comes before them, they
apply such equitable rules, as would prevent the debtor from
being oppressed or injured, (d) Such an assignment is regarded

tions and cases on the subject. Chitty &
Hulme on Bills, p. 6. — But it is to be ob-
served that the king was always an ex-
ception to this rule, for he might always
either grant or receive a possibility or
chose in action by assignment. Brever-
ton's case, Dyer, 30 b ; Co. Lit. 232 b, u.
(1). And it seems that in this country
the same exception exists in respect to
the government of the United States.
United States i>. Buford, 3 Pet. 30.

(c) Anon. Freem. Ch. (Miss.) 145;
Wright v. Wright, 1 Ves. Sen. 409;
Warmstrey ». Tanfield, 1 Chanc. 29 ;
Row v. Dawson, 1 Ves. Sen. 331 ; Prosser
v. Edmonds, 1 Y. & Coll. 481 ; Hinkle v.
Wanzer, 17 How 3.33 ; Bigelow v. Willson,
1 Pick. 485, 493 ; Dix v. Cobb, 4 Mass.
508, 511 ; Haskell v. Hilton, 30 Me. 419 ;
Miller o. Whittier, 32 id. 203 ; Moor v.
Veazie, id. 342 ; Ex parte Foster, 2 Story,
133.

(d) It is not to be understood that the
assignee of a chose in action may always
enforce his claim in a court of equity ;
but simply that he may proceed in equity
in his own name, whenever he is entitled
to go into a court of equity at all. It
seems to be well settled, however, that
the mere fact of one's being the assignee
of a chose in action will not entitle him to
go into a court of equity at all. His
remedy is generally complete at law by a
suit in the name of the assignor, and to
that he will be left. It is only when the
legal remedy is in some manner obstructed
or rendered insufficient that a court of
equity will interpose. The law was thus
laid down by Lord Hardwicke, in Motteux
v. The London Assurance Co. 1 Atk. 545,
547 ; by Lord King, in Dhegetof t v. The
London Assurance Co. Mosely, 83 ; and
by Sir Lancelot Shadwell, in Hammond v.
Messenger, 9 Sim. 327, 332. In this last
case the learned Vice-Chancellor said :
" If this case were stripped of all special
circumstances, it would be, simply, a bill
filed by a plaintiff who had obtained from
certain persons to whom a debt was due

a right to sue in their names for the debt.
It is quite new to me that, in such a sim-
ple case as that, this court allows, in the
first instance, a bill to be filed against the
debtor, by the person who has become
the assignee of the debt. I admit that,
if special circumstances are stated, and
it is represented that notwithstanding the
right which the party has obtained to sue
in the name of the creditor, the creditor
will interfere and prevent the exercise of
that right, this court will interpose for
the purpose of preventing that species of
wrong being done; and, if the creditor
will not allow the matter to be tried at
law in his name, this court has a juris-
diction, in the first instance, to compel
the debtor to pay the debt to the plain-
tiff; especially in a case where the act
done by the creditor is done in collusion
with the debtor. If bills of this kind were
allowable, it is obvious that they would
be pretty frequent ; but I never remem-
ber any instance of such a bill as this
being filed, unaccompanied by special
circumstances." See also Keys v. Wil-
liams, 3 Y. & Col. 462, 466, and Rose v.
Clarke, 1 Y. & Col. Ch. 534, 548. The
doctrine has been distinctly held also in
New York : Carter v. United Ins. Co. 1
Johns. Ch. 463 ; Ontario Bank v. Mum-
ford, 2 Barb. Ch. 596. And in Maryland :
Gover v. Christie, 2 Har. & J. 67 ; Adair
v. Winchester, 7 G. & J. 114. And in
Tennessee : Smiley v. Bell, Mart. & Y.
378. And in Virginia: Moseley v. Boush,
4 Rand. 392. There is no conflict between
the case of Moseley v. Boush and the
case of Winn ;;. Bowles, 6 Munf. 23, an
earlier Virginia case. The latter case
simply decided that the statute of Vir-
ginia, authorizing the assignee of a chose
in action to sue in his own name, did not
take from the Court of Chancery the
jurisdiction which it formerly had.
There seems to have been sufficient in
this case to give a court of equity juris-
diction consistently with the rule that
we have laid down. Mr. Justice Story,

251

*225

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[book I.

* 225 * in equity as a declaration of trust, and an authorization
to the assignee to reduce the interest to possession, (e)
But if the assignee be a mere nominal holder, without interest
in the thing assigned, then the suit should be brought, even in
equity, in the name of the party in interest. (/)

The fraudulent intent of the assignor will, generally, defeat
the assignment, although the assignee is innocent, (ff)1

indeed, in his Commentaries on Equity
Jurisprudence, expresses a somewhat dif-
ferent view upon this subject. After
stating the law as laid down in Ham-
mond v. Messenger, cited above, he says,
§ 1057 a : " This doctrine is apparently
new, at least iu the broad extent in
which it is laid down ; and does not seem
to have been generally adopted in Amer-
ica. On the contrary, the more general
principle established in this country
seems to be, that, wherever an assignee
lias an equitable right or interest in a
debt, or other property (as the assignee
of a debt certainly has), there a court of
equity is the proper forum to enforce it ;
and he is not to be driven to any circuity
by instituting a suit at law in the name
of the person who is possessed of the le-
gal title." He cites no case, however,
which appears to conflict with Hammond
v. Messenger, except the case of Towns-
end v. Carpenter, 11 Ohio, 21. That case
does not indeed decide that the mere fact
of one's being an assignee of a chose in
action will entitle him to enforce his
claim in equity. The learned judge,
however, does not cite any case in sup-
port of his position, and he appears not
to have been aware of the weight of
authority against him ; for he says he
knows of no case except Moseley v.
Boush, cited above, " where it has been
held that a court of law, having once de-
clined jurisdiction of a particular subject-
matter, and afterwards in an indirect
manner entertained it, that a Court of
Chancery, to which it appropriately and
originally belonged, is therefore deprived
of it." The case of the Ontario Bank v.

Mumford, cited above, which was decided
since Story's Equity was published, con-
tains a thorough discussion of this sub-
ject. The counsel for the plaintiff relied
upon Story's Equity, but Chancellor Wal-
worth, having cited with approbation the
case of Hammond v. Messenger and sev-
eral of the other cases referred to in this
note, reaffirmed to its full extent the doc-
trine which they contain. " As a general
rule," says he, "this court will not enter-
tain u. suit brought by the assignee of a
debt, or of a chose in action, which is a
mere legal demand ; but will leave him
to his remedy at law by a suit in the
name of the assignor. Where, however,
special circumstances render it necessary
for the assignee to come into a court of
equity for relief, to prevent a failure of
justice, he will be allowed to bring a suit
here upon a mere legal demand." Such
must undoubtedly be considered the true
rule upon the subject. In California, by
statute, " the assignee of a non-negotiable
note has a right of action not only against
his immediate assignor, but also against
previous assignors, in short, against every
person from whom the note has passed
by assignment." Hamilton r. McDonald,
18 Cal. 128. See also Kendall v. United
States, 7 Wallace, 113; Moore v. Lowrey,
25 la. 330.

(e) Co. Lit. 232 b, n. (1) ; Morrison v.
Deaderick, 10 Humph. 342.

(/) Field v. Maghee, 5 Paige, 539;
Rogers v. Traders' Insurance Co. 6 Paige,
583.

(ff) Flanigan v. Lampman, 12 Mich.
58.

i Combes v. Chandler, .33 Ohio St. 178, decided that if the real owner of a note has
conferred the apparent absolute ownership upon the assignor, the assignee, pur-
chasing upon the faith of such ownership, will obtain a valid title against the real
owner, although his assignor obtained the note from such owner by fraud. See
McNeil v. lenth Bank, 46 N. Y. 325. But the assignment of a mortgage, executed
simply for use as collateral security for a loan bv the mortgagee, on his failure to
procure the loan, conveys no title, and is void. 'Davis v. Bechstein 69 N Y 440.
That the assignee of a non-negotiable certificate, indorsed in blank by the owner,
may write an absolute assignment over the indorsement, and by a sale of it for value,
cut off the rights of the owner, see Cowdrey v. Vandenburgh 101 U S 572

252

CH. XIV.] ASSIGNMENT. * 22Q

There are assignments of choses in action which will not be sus-
tamed either m equity or at law, as being against public policy i
As by an officer in the army or navy, of his pay, (g) or

his commission, (h) or the salaries of judges, (t) or of a * 226
mere right to file a bill inequity for a fraud, (j) or a right
of action for an injury to the person, an action for which dies
with the person, (*) But a judgment in such action may be
assigned, and claims for torts to property. (Ich) But after the
conversion of a chattel, the owner may sell it so as to give the
purchaser a right to claim it of the wrong-doer. (I)

A mere right of entry for condition broken has been held not
assignable. (II)

Courts of law also permit and protect assignments of choses
in action, to a certain extent, (m) 2 E the debtor assent to the

iff) Stone o. Lidderdale, 2 Anst. 533; signment. Story, J., Comegys v Vasse
McCarthy v. Goold, 1 Ball & B. 387; 1 Pet. 193, 213; Lazard .Wheeler, 22
Davis v. Duke of Marlborough, 1 Swanst. Cal. 173.

74 ; Flarty v. Odium, 3 T. R. 681 ; Gren- tick) Jordan v. Gillen, 44 N. H. 424

tell v. Dean and Canons of Windsor, 2 (/) Hall v. Robinson, 2 Comst. 293

±Seav. 544 ; Jenkins v. Hooker, 19 Barb, overruling Gardner v. Adams, so far as

,,. _ „ _, „ the latter conflicts with what is stated in
A) Collyer v. Fallon, Turn. & R. 459. the text. It will be perceived that this
m t' aa Kenyon, Flarty v. Odium, 3 case furnishes no exception to the rule
-T. R 681. But it seems a city officer that a right of action for a tort cannot
may lawfully make an assignment of his be assigned. It merely decides that the
salary yet to grow due, so as to prevent owner of a chattel may sell it and con-
its attachment upon a trustee process, vey a good title to it, notwithstanding it
Brackett v. Blake, 7 Met. 335. And has been wrongfully converted, and then
see State Bank v. Hastings, 15 Wis. the vendee may demand it in his own
75. right ; and, upon a refusal to deliver it,

(/) Prosser v. Edmonds, 1 Y. & Col. bring his action, not for the conversion

481 ; Morrison v. Deaderick, 10 Humph, done to the vendor, but for the conversion

342. done to himself by such refusal. And

(k) Gardner v. Adams, 12 Wend. 297 ; see Andrews v. Bond, 16 Barb. 633;

Thurman v. Wells, 18 Barb. 500; Cook Franklin u.Neate, 13 M. & W. 481.
v. Newman, 8 How. Pr. 523. " In gen- (11) Warner v. Beckett, 3 Conn. 468.

eral, it may be affirmed that mere per- (m) Buller, J., Master v. Miller, 4 T.

sonal torts, which die with the party, and R. 320, 340 : " It is true that formerly

do not survive to his personal representa- the courts of law did not take notice of

tive, are not capable of passing by as- an equity or trust ; for trusts are within

signment ; and that vested rights ad rem the original jurisdiction of a court of

and in re, possibilities coupled with an equity ; but of late years it has been

interest, and claims growing out of and found productive of great expense to

adhering to property, may pass by as- send the parties to the other side of the

1 The general principle that a public officer cannot assign the future salary of his
office, as against public policy, is laid down in Bliss v. Lawrence, 58 N. Y. 442, which
was the case of a clerk in the United States Treasury Department in the city of New
York. — The assignment of a life insurance policy to a person having no insurable
interest in the life insured, was held invalid in Warnock v. Davis, 104 IT. S. 775.

2 A voluntary assignment of a chose in action not affecting creditors, made in
good faith, is good as against a subsequent assignee for value. Putnam v. Story,
132 Mass. 205. — But a creditor cannot assign a part of his claim without the debtor's
consent. Beardslee v. Morgner, 73 Mo. 22.

253

*227

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK

assignment, and promise to pay the assignee, an action may be
brought by the assignee in his own name, (n) but other-
* 227 wise he * must bring it in the name of the assignor ; (o)
and this rule applies to an assignment of a negotiable bill
or note, unless it be indorsed by the assignor, (p) And the
action brought in the name of the assignor for the benefit of the
assignee is open to all equitable defences ; but only to those
which are equitable. That is, the debtor may make all defences
which he might have made if the suit were for the benefit of the
assignor as well as in his name, provided these defences rest
upon honest transactions which took place between the debtor
and the assignor before the assignment, or after the assignment
and before the debtor had notice or knowledge of it. (q) The
same rule holds as to the equities existing between an assignor

Hall ; wherever this court have seen that
the justice of the case has been clearly
with the plaintiff, they have not turned
him round upon this objection. Then if
this court will take notice of a trust,
why should they not of an equity ? It is
certainly true that a chose in action cannot
strictly be assigned ; but this court will
take notice of a trust, and consider who
is beneficially interested." Ashhurst, J.,
Winch v. Keeley, 1 T. R. 619; Dix v.
Cobb, 4 Mass. 508 ; Welch v. Mandeville,
1 Wheat. 233 ; Legh v. Legh, 1 B. & P.
447; Eastman v. Wright, 6 Pick. 316,
322 ; Owings v. Low, 5 G. & J. 134, 145 ;
Hickey v. Burt, 7 Taunt. 48 ; Graham v.
Gracie, 13 Q. B/548.

(n) Crocker v. Whitney, 10 Mass.
316 ; Mowry v. Todd, 12 id. 281 ; Bar-
rett v. Union M. F. Ins. Co. 7 Cush. 175 ;
Currier v. Hodgdon, 3 N. H. 82 ; Morse
v. Bellows, 7 id. 549, 565; Moar o.
Wright, 1 Vt. 67 ; Bucklin v. Ward, 7
id. 195 ; Hodges v. Eastman, 12 id. 358 ;
Stiles v. Farrar, 18 id. 444 ; Smith v.
Berry, 18 Me. 122 ; Warren o. Wheeler,
21 id. 484 ; Barger u. Collins, 7 Harr. &
J. 213, 219 ; Clarke v. Thompson, 2 R. I.
146. Such seems to be the general ruling
on this subject. But such a transaction
would seem to fall within the law of no-
vation ; and the question would be as to
the consideration on which the promise
of the original debtor to the assignee is
founded. Probably it would be held
that if A holds the note of B, payable
to A, and assigns this for value to»C, and
B assents and promises to pay C, B is by
such transfer released from his promise
to A, and this is a sufficient consideration

254

to sustain his promise to C. See Ford
v. Adams, 2 Barb. 349. In Tibbits v.
George, 5 A. & E. 115, Lord Denman
said: "None of the authorities which
have been cited show that it is necessary
that the assignment should be in writing
in order to pass an equitable interest,
although in very many of the cases there
was a writing ; and as to express assent,
it is undoubtedly held that, in order to
give an action at law, the debtor must
consent to the agreed transfer of the
debt, and that there must be some consid-
eration for his promise to pay it to the
transferee."

(o) Jessel v. Williamsburgh Ins. Co.
3 Hill (N. Y.), 88; Usher v. De Wolfe,
13 Mass. 290 ; Coolidge v. Ruggles, 15 id.
387 ; Skinner v. Somes, 14 id. 107 ; Pal-
mer v. Merrill, 6 Cush. 282. See also
supra, note (m).

(p) Freeman a. Perry, 22 Conn. 617.
See also Hedges v. Scaly, 9 Barb. 214.

(?) Mangles v. Dixon, 18 E. L. & E.
82 ; Bartlett v. Pearson, 29 Me. 9, 15 ;
Guerry v. Perryman, 6 Ga. 119; Wood
p. Perry, 1 Barb. 114, 131 ; Commercial
Bank v. Colt, 15 id. 506 ; Sanborn v. Lit-
tle, 3 N. H. 539 ; Norton o. Rose, 2 Wash.
( Va.) 233; Murray v. Lylburn, 2 Johns.
Ch. 441 ; Hacket v. Martin, 8 Greenl. 77 ;
Greene v. Darling, 5 Mason, 201, 214 ;
Comstock v. Farnum, 2 Mass. 96 ; Wood
v. Partridge, 11 id. 488; McJilton v.
Love, 13 111. 486 ; Thompson v. Emery,
7 Foster (N. H.), 269; Faull v. Tinsman,
36 Penn, St. 108. See Patterson v. Ath-
erton, 3 McLean, 147, in which a different
doctrine seems to be held, but on very in-
sufficient grounds.

CH. XIV.] ASSIGNMENT. * 228

and his assignee in respect to a chose in action held for value
and without notice, by a subsequent assignee. The latter takes
the exact position of his vendor, f>) The assignee of a non-
negotiable obligation can take no rights which his assignor did
not possess, and, generally, make no defences he could not
make, (rr~) 1 The assignment of a note to which a lien is
attached by way of security, carries with it, in general, the
lien, (>s) 2

The death of the assignor will not defeat the assignment, but
the assignee may bring the action in the name of the executor
or administrator of the deceased, (s) If the assignment be in
good faith and for valuable consideration, although the action be
brought in the name of the assignor, neither his release nor his
bankruptcy will defeat it. (£) A debt due for goods sold and
delivered, and resting for evidence on a book account, may
* be so assigned, (w) or an unliquidated balance of ac- * 228
counts, (w) or a contingent debt, (w) 3 or a judgment, (x)
or a bond ; but an action on a bond must be in the name of the
obligee, although it be made payable expressly to " assigns." («/)
And it has been held that a grant of a franchise to a town, as the
right of fishery, may be the subject of a legal assignment or
release, and the assignee or releasee may maintain an action
respecting it . in his own name, (z) But a servant bound by
indenture cannot be transferred or assigned by the master to

lr) Bush v. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. (8 586 ; Parker v. Kelley, 10 id. 184 ; Winch

Smith) 535 » Keely. 1 T. R. 619; Blin v. Pierce, 20

Irr) Gray v. Thomas, 18 La. An. 412. Vt. 25; Blake v. Buchanan, 22 Vt. 648;

(rs) Forwood v. Dehoney, 6 Bush, Parsons v. Woodward, 2 N. J. 196 ; Jew-

174 • Guy v. Butler, 6 Bush, 508; Perry ett v. Dockray, 34 Me. 45.
v. Roberts, 30 Ind. 244. M Dix v. Cobb 4 Mass. 508.

(s) Dawes v. Boylston, 9 Mass. 337, (b) Crocker v. Whitney, 10 Mass. dlo.

346 ; Cutts v. Perkins, 12 id. 206, 210. (u>) Cutts v. Perkins, 12 Mass i 206.

(0 Dix v Cobb, 4 Mass. 508, 511; (x) Brown v. Maine Bank, 11 Mass.

Brown v. Maine Bank, 11 id. 153 ; Webb 153 ; Dunn v. Snell, 15 id. 481.
v. Steele, 13 N. H. 230, 236 ; Duncklee v. (y) Skinner v. Somes, 14 Mass. 107.

Greenfield Steam Mill Co. 3 Foster (N. fz) Watertown v. White, 13 Mass.

H.), 245 ; Anderson v. Miller, 7 Sm. & M. 477.

i For a learned discussion of the rights of assignees of non-negotiable chases^ in action,
see the oninion of Dwight, C, in Union College Trustees v. Wheeler, 61 N.X.SB.

» So an assignment by a stockholder of his shares of stock carries his proportionate
share of the assets, including all undeclared dividends. Boardmanv. Lake Shore, &e.
R'3CAn84in^nt7'of money to become due is valid, and if the person from whom
the money is to become due, after notice of the assignment advances such money to
the assignor, the assignee may recover it of him. Bnce v. Bannister, 3 Q. B. U. 569.
See also Philadelphia v. Lockhardt, 73 Penn. St 211.

255

* 229 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

another, because the master has only a personal trust, (a) 1 The
right of a mortgagor to redeem his equity of redemption after the
same has been taken and sold on execution, is assignable both at
law and in equity. (6) The respective interests of a crew of a
privateer in a prize cannot be assigned, because, by the statute of
the United' States, they have no right in or control over the prop-
erty until it has been libelled, condemned, and sold by the mar-
shal, and the proceeds, after all legal deductions, paid over to the
prize agents, (c) a

SECTION II.

OF THE MANNER OP ASSIGNMENT.

It was once held that the assignment of an instrument must be
of as high a nature as the instrument assigned, (d) But this rule
has been very much relaxed, if not overthrown ; and indeed it has

been determined that the equitable interest in a chose in
* 229 action may be assigned for a valuable consideration * by a

mere delivery of the evidence of the contract ; and that it
is not necessary that the assignment should be in writing, (e) 3

(a) Hall v. Gardner, 1 Mass. 172; case, Parker, C. J., said : " It is uniformly
Davis v. Coburn, 8 id. 299 ; Clement v. holden, that an assignment of an instru-
Clement, 8 N. H. 472 ; Graham v. Kinder, ment under seal must be by deed; in
11 B. Mon. 60. So the powers and du- other words, that the instrument of trans-
ties of the testamentary guardian of an fer must be of as high a nature as the in-
infant are a personal trust, which cannot strument transferred."

be assigned. Balch v. Smith, 12 N. II. 437. (e) " There are cases in the old books

(b) Bigelow v. Willson, 1 Pick. 485. which show that debts and even deeds

(c) Usher v. De Wolfe, 13 Mass. 290; may be assigned by parol; and we are
Alexander u. Wellington, 2 Russ. & M. 35. satisfied that there is no sensible ground

(d) Perkins v. Parker, 1 Mass. 117; upon which a writing shall be held ne-
Wood v. Partridge, 11 id. 488. In this cessary to prove an assignment of a con-

1 A contract to keep wagons let to a railway company in repair is not an agreement
for personal performance, such that it cannot be assigned and the repair of the wagons
by the assignee be a sufficient performance of the contract, British Wagon Co. v. Lea,
5 Q. B. D. 149; and equally so of a contract for street-cleaning, Devlin v. Mayor, &c.
of New York, 63 N. Y. 8.

2 But a right in a sum awarded to the owner of property by his own government by
way of compensation for its destruction by the act of a foreign government, either out
of reprisals made by the former upon the latter, or out of a fund set apart by the former
for the purpose, in accordance with a treaty by which it has renounced all claims of its
citizens upon the latter, is an interest legally capable of being assigned by such owner,
even before his own government has taken any steps toward securing to him an indem-
nity for his loss. _ Leonard v. Nye, 125 Mass. 455 ; Jones v. Dexter, 125 Mass. 469.

8 An oral assignment of an account, or a portion of it, for a valid consideration, is
good, and vests in the assignee the right to collect the debt in his own name. Risley v.
Phenix Bank, 82 N. Y. 318. See also Switzer v. Smith, 35 la. 269.

256

0 ,

CH. XIV.J ASSIGNMENT. * 229

So the equitable interest in a judgment may be assigned by a
delivery of the execution. (/) But a mere agreement to assign
without any delivery, actual or symbolical, of the writing evi-
dencing the debt ; or an indorsement upon the instrument direct-
ing the debtor to pay a portion of the amount due, to a third
person, such indorsement being notified to the debtor, but the
writing remaining in the hands of the creditor, does not constitute
a sufficient assignment. (#)

We may, however, say, that now the assignment of a debt may
be by parol, and may be inferred from the conduct and acts of the
party. Q/g)

An order or draft upon a particular fund, purporting to appro-
priate that fund to its payment, or directly implying this, is, after
notice, an equitable assignment of the fund, and needs no accept-
ance to have this effect, (gh)

The cause of action which a buyer of land has against the seller
for his misrepresentation, is personal, and does not pass by an
assignment of the contract, (gi) A holder of a debt or claim,
assigning it for valuable consideration, warrants its genuineness
and legal force, unless he communicates all the facts bearing upon
the case, when the buyer takes the risk. ($?')

SECTION III.

OF THE EQUITABLE DEFENCES.

We have seen that an assignee of a chose in action takes it sub-
ject to all the equities of defence which exist between the assignor
and the debtor, (li) 1 The assignee does not take a legal interest,

tract, which assignment has been executed v. George, 5 A. & E. 107 ; Heath v. Hall,

by delivery, any more than in the assign- 4 Taunt. 326.

ment of a personal chattel." Per Parker, (/) Dunn v. Snell, 15 Mass. 481.

C. J., Jones v. Witter, 13 Mass. 304. See fa) Whittle v. Skinner, 23 Vt. 531 ;

also Dunn v. Snell, 15 Mass. 481 ; Palmer Palmer v. Merrill, 6 Cush. 282.

». Merrill, 6 Cush. 292 ; Vose v. Handy, (<j<j) Gurnsey v. Gardner, 49 Me. 167.

2 Greenl. 322, 334 ; Robbins v. Bacon, 3 id. (qh) Shuttleworth v. Bruce, 7 Kob. 160.

346 ; Porter v. Ballard, 26 Me. 448 ; Pres- fat) Collins v. Suau, 7 Rob. 623.

cott v. Hull, 17 Johns. 284, 292 ; Ford v. fa/) Flynn v. Allen, 57 Penn. St. 482.

Stuart, 19 Johns. 342; Thompson v. (h) See supra, note fa), p.* 227. And see

Emery, 7 Foster (N. H.), 269; Tibbits Spain v. Hamilton, 1 Wallace, 604.

1 As to equities under the assignment of a mortgage, pendente lite, see Ellis v. Sisson,
96 111.105.

vol. i. 1' ^o<

* 230 THE LAW OF CONTEACTS. [BOOK I.

nor hold what he takes by a legal title ; but he holds by an
equitable title an equitable interest; and this interest courts of
law will protect only so far as the equities of the case permit ;
and any subsequent assignee is subject to the same equities as his
assignor, (i) But these equities must be those subsisting at the
time when the debtor receives notice of the assignment ; for the
assignment, with notice, imposes upon the debtor an equitable
and moral obligation to pay the money to the assignee, (j) J

* 230 Moreover, the assignee ought, especially if * required, to

exhibit the assignment, or satisfactory evidence of it, to
the debtor, to make his right certain ; although it is enough, if
the debtor be in good faith informed of it, and has no reason to
doubt it. (/c) And if after the assignment, and previous to such
a notice of it, the debtor pays the debt to the assignor, he shall be
discharged, because he shall not suffer by the negligence or fault
of the assignee. (J) 2

If, after the assignment and notice, the debtor pays the debt to
the assignor, and is discharged by him, and the assignee recovers
judgment against the assignor for the consideration paid him for
the assignment, the assignee may still recover of the debtor the
debt assigned, deducting what he actually recovers from the
assignor, (m) Nor can the debtor set off any demand against
the assignor which accrues to him after such assignment and
notice, («) but he may any which existed at or before the assign-
ment and notice, (o)

(i) Willis v. Twambly, 13 Mass. 204; 17; Bean <>. Simpson, 16 Me. 49; John-
Stocks v. Dobson, 19 E. L. & E. 96 ; Bush son !>. Bloodgood, 1 Johns. Cas. 51 ; An-
v. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. (8 Smith) 535. derson w. Van Alen, 12 Johns. 343.

(j) Crocker «. Whitney, 10 Mass. 316, (l) Jones v. Witter, 13 Mass. 304;

319; Mowrv v. Todd, 12 id. 281 ; Jones Stocks v. Dobson, 19 E. L. & E. 96.

v. Witter, 13 id. 304; Fay v. Jones, 18 (m) Jones i.\ Witter, 13 Mass. 304.

Barb. 340; Risley i\ Risley, 11 Rob. (La.) (n) Goodwin v. Cunningham, 12 Mass.

298; Small v. Browder, 11 B. Mon. 212; 193; Green v. Hatch, id. 195; Jenkins v.

Clodfelter v. Cox, 1 Sneed, 330; Myers Brewster, 14 id. 291 ; Phillips w. Bank of

v. The United Guarantee, &c. Co. 31 E. L. Lewiston, 18 Penn. St. 394 ; Conant ».

& E. 538 ; Fanton o. Fairfield County Seneca County Bank, 1 Ohio. St. 298.

Bank, 23 Conn. 485. See also supra, note (o) Ainslie >'. Boynton, 1 Barb. 258;

(?), p * 227. Sanborn v. Little, 3 N. H. 539.

(k) Davenport v. Woodbridge, 8 Greenl.

1 Notice, not the assignment, fixes the rights of the parties. Miller w. Kreiter, 76
Penn. St. 78. — As to third persons, the assignment of a chose in action is valid without
notice to the.jlebtor. Thayer v. Daniels, 113 Mass. 129.

2 Notice iS equally necessary to protect the assignee against such payment by the debtor
to the assignor. Heermansv. Ellsworth, 64 N.Y. 159. — "The assignee ofa judgment takes
it subject to equities between the original parties and to any payments by the judgment
debtor before notice of the assignment. Noble v. Thompson Oil Co., 79 Penn. St. 354.

258

CH. XIV.] ASSIGNMENT. * 231

In New York and in some other States, the assignee of a. chose
in action, may now bring an action upon it in his own name, by
statutory provision. But this change is only in the form of the
action, and not in its effect. The assignee is still subject to the
same equities of defence as before. That is, if the defendant can
show that he, in good faith, paid the debt, or a part of the debt,
to the assignor, before the assignment, or before he had any
knowledge of the assignment, the defence is as effectual as if the
action were in the name of the assignor.

It has been held in New York that an assignment of a thing in
action is presumed to have been upon sufficient consideration,
unless the contrary appear, and in such case no trust results
therefrom for the benefit of the assignor, (p)

♦SECTION IV. *231

COVENANTS ANNEXED TO LAND.

A covenant affecting real property, made with a covenantee
who possesses a transferable interest therein, is annexed to the
estate, and is transferable at law, passing with the interest in the
realty to which it is annexed ; (q) and it is often called a " cove-
nant running with the land." If such covenants be made by the
owner of land who conveys his entire interest to the covenantee,
they are annexed to the estate, and the assignee of that estate
may bring his action on the covenants in his own name, (r) But
the assignee must take the estate which the covenantee has in
the land, and no other ; nor can he sue upon the covenants if he
takes a different estate, (s) But it is said that the assignee can-

(p) Eno u. Crooke, 10 N. Y. (6 Seld.) covenant, and on refusal, may maintain

60. an action against him by the common

(?) "A covenant is real when it doth law. Meddlemore v. Goodale, 1 Rol.

run in the realty so with the land that he Abr. 521. See also Campbell v. Lewis, 3

that hath the one, hath or is subject to B. & Aid. 392.

the other, and so a warranty is called a (s) He is not in fact an assignee of the

real covenant." Shep. Touch. 161. covenantee unless he takes the same

(r) Thus if A, seized of land in fee, estate ; for an assignment, by the very

conveys it by deed to B, and covenants definition of the word, is " a transfer, or

with B, his heirs, and assigns, for further making over to another, of one's whole in-

assurance, and then B conveys to C, and terest, whatever that interest may be ; and

C to D, D may require A to make fur- an assignment for his life or years differs

ther assurance to him according to the from a lease only in this, that by a lease

259

*232

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

not sue upon the covenants unless the estate passes to him ; and
therefore cannot sue upon the covenants that the grantor
* 232 is lawfully seized of the land, and has a good * right to
convey ; for if these be broken, no estate passes to the as-
signee, and being broken before the assignment, they have become
personal choses in action and so not assignable, (f)

The right to sue for existing breaches does not pass to the
assignee, — being mere personal choses in action, (u) — unless
they be continuing breaches. As if there be a covenant to repair,
which is broken, and the need of repair remains, and the assignee
takes the property in that condition, he may sue on the cove-
nant, (d) But if there be arrearages of rent, the breaches of the
covenant to pay are each entire, giving a distinct right of action,

one grants an interest less than his own,
reserving to himself a reversion ; in as-
signments he parts with his whole prop-
erty, and the assignee consequently stands
in the place of the assignor." 1 Steph.
Com. 485. There is a difference, how-
ever, in this respect, between the estate
or interest in the land and the land itself ;
for there may be an assignment of a part
of the land, and the assignee may have
his action. This distinction is taken by
Lord Coke. " It is to be observed," says
he, " that an assignee of part of the land
shall vouch as assignee. As if a man
makes a feoffment in fee of two acres to
one, with warranty to him, his heirs and
assigns, if he make a feoffment of one
acre, that feoffee shall vouch as assignee ;
for there is a diversity bi-tween the whole
estate in part, and part of the estate in the
whole, or of any part. As if a man hath
a warranty to him, his heirs and assigns,
and he makes a lease for life, or a gift in
tail, the lessee or donee shall not vouch
as assignee, because he hath not the es-
tate in fee-simple whereunto the warranty
5s annexed." Co. Litt. 385 a. See also
Holford v. Hatch, Dougl. 183 ; Palmer v.
Edwards, id. 187, n. ; Van Rensselaer v.
Gallup, 5 Denio, 454; Astor i-. Miller, 2
Paige, 68, 78; Van Home v. Crain, 1
Paige, 455.

(() This is the established doctrine in
this country, and it would seem to be in
accordance with the older authorities in
England. Shep. Touch. 170; Greenby v.
Wilcoeks, 2 Johns. 1 ; Mitchell v. War-
ner, 5 Conn. 497 ; Marston v. Hobbs, 2
Mass. 439; Rossi'. Turner, 2 Eng. (Ark.)
132 ; Fowler v. Poling, 2 Barb. 300 ; Bal-
lard v. Child, 34 Me. 355; Thayer v.
Clemence, 22 Pick. 490. Per Shaw, C. J.
Chancellor Kent says : " The covenants

260

of seizin, and of a right to convey, and
that the land is free from incumbrances,
are personal covenants, not running with
the land, or passing to the assignee ; for,
if not true, there is a breach of them as
soon as the deed is executed, and they
become choses in action, which are not
technically assignable. But the covenant
of warranty, and the covenant for quiet
enjoyment, are prospective, and an actual
ouster or eviction is necessary to consti-
tute a breach of them. They are, there-
fore, in the nature of real covenants, and
they run with the land conveyed, and
descend to heirs, and vest in assignees or
the purchaser. The distinction taken in
the American cases is supported by the
general current of English authorities,
which assume the principle that covenant
does not lie by an assignee for a breach
done before his time. On the other hand
it was decided by the K. B., in Kingdom
.-. Nottle, 1 M. & Sel. 355, 4 id. 53, that a
covenant of seizin did run with the land,
and the assignee might sue on the ground
that want of seizin is a continual breach.
The reason assigned for this last decision
is too refined to be sound. The breach
is single, entire, and perfect in the first
instance." 4 Kent, Com. 471. The case
of Kingdom v. Nottle was severely criti-
cised and condemned by the Supreme
Court of Connecticut, in Mitchell v.
Warner, 5 Conn. 497, and it cannot be
considered as law in this country.

(«) St. Saviour's Churchwardens v.
Smith, 3 Burr. 1271 ; Tillotson ,,. Bovd,
4 Sandf. 516.

(r) Mascal'8 Case, Moore, 242, 1 Leon.
62 ; Vivian «. Campion, 1 Salk. 141, Lord
Rayra. 1125; Sprague v. Baker, 17 Mass.
586.

CH. XIV.] ASSIGNMENT. 233

and on the death of the landlord these arrearages go to the per-
sonal representative and not to the heir, (w)

Covenants between landlord and tenant, lessee and reversioner,
run with the land. If one who owns in fee conveys to another a
less estate, such as a term of years, and enters into covenants
with the grantee, which relate to the use and value of the prop-
erty granted, the right of action for a breach of these covenants
which the grantee has, passes to his assignee, so long as this less
estate continues,, (x) Such are covenants to repair, to grant
estovers for repair or for firewood, to keep watercourses
* in good order, (y) or to supply with water ; (2) also * 233
covenants for renewal, (a) for quiet enjoyment, (J) and
the usual warranties for quiet possession, (c) But if one having
no estate in the land grants with covenants of warranty, as no
estate passes, and nothing except by estoppel, the assignee can-
not sue on these covenants, for a lessee by estoppel cannot pass
any thing over, (d)

(w) Anon. Skin. 367 ; Midgley v. Love- (a) Roe v. Hayley, 12 East, 464.

lace, Carth. 289, 12 Mod. 46. 4) Noke v. Awder, Cro. E. 436.

(x) Spencer's Case, 6 Rep. 17 b. (c) Campbell v. Lewis, 3 B. & Aid 392.

y) Holmes v. Buckley, Prec. Ch. 39, 1 (d) Noke v. Awder, Cro. E. 436 ; Whit-

Eq Ca. Abr. 27, pi. 4. ten v. Peacock, 2 Bing. N. C. 411.

(z) Jourdain v. Wilson, 4 B. & Aid.
266.

261

234 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

*234 * CHAPTER XV.

OP GIFTS ; OK VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENTS OP CHATTELS.

The word " gift " is often introduced into deeds of land ; but
by gifts are usually meant transfers of chattels, which are wholly
voluntary, or without any pecuniary or good consideration. They
are usually distinguished into gifts inter vivos, and gifts causd
mortis.

SECTION I.

OP GIFTS INTER VIVOS.

Any person competent to transact ordinary business, may give
whatever he or she owns, to any other person. The usual inca-
pacities for legal action apply here. A gift by a minor, a married
woman, an insane person, or a person under guardianship, or
under duress, would be void or voidable according to the circum-
stances of the case.

Gifts by persons competent to give, of property which they had
a right to give, to persons competent to receive, and which are
completed by transfer of possession, however voluntary they may
have been, are regarded by the law as executed contracts, founded
upon mutual consent. It is essential, however, that there should
be such a change of possession as to put it out of the power of
the giver to repossess himself of the thing given, (j/) J And gifts

(y) Little v. Willetts, 55 Barb. 125, 37 Howard (N. Y.), 481.

1 A gift of an insurance policy, to be exchanged with the donor's assent for one in
accordance with the donee's wishes, is sufficiently consummated when the policy is given
to the donee and then returned, to be forwarded, by the donor's order, to the insurance
company, and is subsequently exchanged accordingly without any intervening objec-
tion by the donor. Crittenden v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 41 Mich. 442. The delivery of a sav-
ings-bank book also with an order for the payment of the whole deposit for the purpose
of transferring the money to the donee forms a complete gift, although the book and
262

CH. XV.] GIFTS. * 235

to persons holding somewhat of a fiduciary relation, as to attorney
from client, to parent from child, to guardian from ward, to trus-
tee from cestui que trust, are scrutinized by courts of law as
well as equity with great care, even if not held presumptively
void, (z) 1

It is essential to a gift, that it goes into effect at once, and com-
pletely. If it regards the future, it is but a promise ; and being
a promise without consideration, it cannot be enforced, and has no
legal validity. Hence delivery is essential to the validity
of every gift ; (a) for not even a court of equity will * in- * 235
terfere to enforce a merely intended or promised gift. (6)
There is, it is true, some authority for supposing that a gift inter
vivos may be valid without delivery, if there be a distinct accept-
ance, (c) But this is not the law. Nor will transfer by writing
alone satisfy the requirement of delivery. (cZ) The delivery may

(2) Garvin i>. Williams, 44 Mo. 465. (c) Comyns, in his Digest, Biens, D. 2,

(a) Bryson v. Brownrigg, 9 Ves. 1 ; under " Property of goods, how vested,"

Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Ves. 39; Irons v. says that " if a man grant all his goods, the

Smallpiece, 2 B. & Aid. 551 ; Noble v. property vests in the grantee, and the grant

Smith, 2 Johns. 52 ; Hooper v. Goodwin, may be without deed." This is asserted in

1 Swanst. 485 ; Adams v. Hayes, 2 Ired. L. London & B. Railway Co v. Fairelough, 2

366 ; Sims v. Sims, 2 Ala. 117 ; Allen v. Man. & G. 691, n. (a), and the distinction

Polereczky, 31 Me. 338 ; Withers v. Weaver, made, on this point, between gifts inter vivos

10 Barr, 391 ; Dole v. Lincoln, 31 Me. 422 ; and gifts causa mortis.

Carpenter v. Dodge, 20 Vt. 595 ; Hunting- (d) Cotteenr. Missing, 1 Madd. Ch. 176 ;

ton v. Gilmore, 14 Barb. 243; Hunter v. Caswell v. Ware, 30 Ga. 267; Evans p.

Hunter, 19 Barb. 631; Brown v. Brown, Lipscomb, 31 Ga. 71. And so long as

23 Barb. 565 ; Hitch v. Davis, 3 Md. Ch. money delivered by A to B for C, as a

266 ; People v. Johnson, 14 111. 342 ; Craig voluntary gift from A to C, is in the hands

v. Kittredge, 46 N. H. 57 ; Irish v. Nutting, of B, A may revoke the gift, and reclaim

47 Barb 37. tQe money ?rom B. See Lyte v. Perry,

(6) Pennington v. Gittings, 2 G. & J. Dyer, 49 a, and Connor v. Trawick, 37 Ala.

208. See Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Ves. 39. 289. But in Cranz v. Kroger, 22 111. 74,

order are not presented to the bank until after the donor's death, Kimball i> Leland,

110 Mass 325 ■ Davis v. Key, 125 Mass. 590 ; so of a mere delivery of the book alone,

Tamil's AnDeal 36 Conn. 88; and of a deposit in a savings bank in the donor's name

as trustee for a!, with the intention to make a present or future gift, Minor v. Rogers, 40

Conn 512 ■ Kerriean v. Rantigan, 43 Conn. 17 ; the purchase of a horse by a husband,

with the intention of making an immediate gift to his wife, and the keeping it in his

with the 1°ten™n. "' ^livery t0 her, Wheeler v. Wheeler, 43 Conn. 503. But the

delivery of a cfck on a sav^s bank payable four days after'the donor's death does not
delivery oi a cnaxra e e ■ f N y _ D h ,j operate as a rev0.

sry^dS^sa & <* »*», . ^ of ** &* « « , ..

before the donor rTokes^he "same, although it was not present or """^^
see Whiting .. Barrett, 7 Lansing, 106 As to delivery generally, see Davis i. *ejr,
125 Mass. 590; Curry v. Powers, 70 N. Y. 212; Ham «. Van Orden, 84 N. I. 257,

^Bu^giftVa pltnfto her physician, which the donor elects to abide by after
the relatio/ceases, cannot be impeached after her death. Mitchell v. Homfray, 8 Q. B.

263

* 236 THE LAW OF CONTEACTS. [BOOK I.

be constructive ; for it may be any such delivery as the nature of
the thing and its actual position require ; as a delivery of a part
for the whole, or of a key, (dd) or of a cumbrous mass by taking
the donee near it, and pointing it out, with words of gift, or by
an order on a bailee. But in this last instance, we should say
that the gift did not become complete until the order was pre-
sented and accepted, or performed, (e)

A gift, by a competent party, made perfect by delivery and
acceptance, is then irrevocable by the donor. But if it be preju-
dicial to existing creditors, it is, as a transfer without considera-
tion, void as to them. It is not, however, void as to subsequent
creditors, unless made under actual or expected insolvency, or
with a fraudulent purpose as to future creditors. In either of
these cases, gifts, or voluntary transfers or settlements of any
kind (all of which are regarded by the law as gifts), are
void. (/)

* 236 * From the established principles in regard to promises

without consideration, and the necessity of delivery and
acceptance, it may be inferred, that if a gift, inter vivos, be made
by a note or promise, not under seal, it may be avoided by the
donor, for it is not a present gift, but a promise without consid-
eration. If it be by a check, or order, or draft, then it can be
revoked, and payment or acceptance stopped. But if it is paid in
good faith and before revocation, it becomes a completed and
irrevocable gift. So it would be if it were accepted in such a way
as to bind the acceptor. On the other hand, if any consideration
which the law acknowledges, enters into a transaction which is
called a gift, it changes it at once into a sale or barter, if deliv-
ery be made, and otherwise into an executory and enforceable
contract.

it was said that if the gift be evidenced by Brewer, 6 Tex. 45 ; Anderson v. Baker, 1

writing, it cannot be resumed. Held, also, Ga. 595 ; Donnell v. Donnell, 1 Head, 267.
in same case, that a parent may resume a ( f) For American cases in which this

gift made to a child, without the consent of question is considered, see Thomson v.

'Dec}1;111- Dougherty, 12 S. & R. 448; Hanson ».

(dd) Marsh v. Fuller, 18 N. H. 360. A Buckner, 4 Dana, 251 ; Hudnal ... Wilder,

gift of a pocket was held to carry its con- 4 McCord, 294 ; Sexton v. Wheaton, 8

tents, in Allerton v. Lang, 10 Bosw. 362 ; Wheat. 229 ; Gannard v. Eslava, 20 Ala.

Cooper v. Burr, 45 Barb 9. 732 ; Clark v. Depew, 25 Penn. St. 509 ;

(e) Carradine v. Collins, 7 Sm. & M. Trimble v. Ratcliffe, 9 B. Mon. 511 ; Haw-

428 ; Blakey v. Blakey, 9 Ala. 391 ; Pope kins v. Moffit, 10 B. Mon. 81.
v. Randolph, 13 Ala. 214; Hillebrant v.

264

CH. XV.] GIFTS. * 237

SECTION II.

OP GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS.

These gifts can be made only by a person by whom death is
believed, on reasonable grounds, to be very .near, and who makes
the gift in view of, and because of, his approaching death, (ff)

Much that was said of gifts inter vivos, applies equally to gifts
causd mortis. There must be delivery to the donee ; and while
it need not be strictly actual, it must be as near an actual delivery
to the donee, as the circumstances of the case and the nature
and actual position of the thing given, will permit, (g) i And it
is said that no mere possession, whether it be subsequent or pre-
vious and continued, will supply the want of delivery ; (h)
but we should doubt whether this can be regarded * as a * 237
universal rule. The law watches, however, this kind of
transfer jealously, and is unwilling that it should take the place
of wills, and make them unnecessary ; because, while it is much
less troublesome, it is open to those objections of uncertainty
which the law seeks to avoid, in reference to wills, by its precau-
tions and provisions as to their execution. Hence it is the pre-
vailing rule, that the donor's own note, or his own check or draft
not accepted or paid before his death, does not pass by gift causd
mortis? Delivery by a dying husband of the book of a savings

iff) Knott v. Hogan, 4 Met. (Ky.) 99; Vt. 591 ; Dresser r. Dresser, 46 Me. 48.

Champney v. Blanchard, 39 N. Y. 1 1 1 . But see Headley v. Kirby, 18 Perm. St. 326.

(g) Jones v. Selby, Prec. Ch. 300; Drury (h) Dole v. Lincoln, 31 Me. 422; Hun-

v. Smith, 1 P. Wms. 404; Snellgrove v. tington v. Gilmore, 14 Barb. 243. In Eng-

Bailey, 3 Atk. 214 ; Lawson !>. Lawson, 1 land, the law seems not to be settled on this

P. Wms. 441 ; Miller v. Miller, 3 P. Wms. point. Moore v. Dalton, 7 E. L. & E. 134,

356; Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. 431. There differs from the cases first cited; while

seems to be no limit in law to the extent of Gough v. Findon, 7 Exch. 48, 8 E. L. &

a donatio causd mortis. Meach v. Meach, 24 E. 507, confirms them.

1 A savings-bant deposit may be a gift causd mortis, provable by delivery of book, though
unaccompanied by assignment. Pierce v. Boston Savings Bank, 129 Mass. 425. In
Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich 185, it appeared that a woman, living alone, was found dead,
with the following writing signed by her on a slate at her bedside : " I wish A. to
take possession of all, personal, real, and mixed. I am so sick, I believe I shall die.
Look in valise." In the valise was found an envelope containing securities, and another
envelope containing a memorandum of her wishes. It also appeared that the deceased
was under obligation to A. for services and kindnesses. Held, as valid a gift causd mortis
as if there had been manual delivery of securities.

2 Smith v. Smith, 3 Stewart, 564 ; although accompanied by a delivery of hU
bankers' pass-book, Beak v. Beak, L. li. 13 Eq. 489.

265

* 237 THE LAW OF CONTEACTS. [BOOK I.

bank showing deposits by a deceased wife, with a verbal gift
thereof passed to the donee the moneys so deposited. QiK) And
bank-notes, certainly, (i) and perhaps the notes, bonds, and other
written promises of others than the donor, may be the subject of
a valid donatio causd mortis, although the rule on this subject can
hardly be considered as completely settled. (/)

It is held in New York, rightly we think, that a valid gift,
causd mortis, of corporate stocks, may be made by simple delivery
of the certificates with intent to transfer the stock, although the
certificates contain a restriction on the method of transfer. (Jj~)

In a recent English case, a father put a check into the hands
of his son of nine months old, and said, I give this to baby for
himself. Afterwards he said it was his purpose to give the
amount of the check to his child. But at his death it was found
among his papers, and it was held that there had been neither
a gift nor a valid declaration of trust. (Jk) In another case a
voluntary deed of gift of all her personal property was made by
one who soon after died. Then the donee died. Among his
effects were promissory notes which had belonged to the donor,
but were not indorsed, and there was no evidence of their delivery
to him. But it was held that the deed of gift was a complete
declaration of trust and carried all her personal property to the
donee. (j7) There have been some cases arising from gifts made
by soldiers before joining the army, in the late war. Where the
gift was made to take effect " if he did not come back," it was
held not valid, because not a present absolute gift, {jm) But in
another case, where the same contingency existed, it was held
valid, (jri)

The donor, during his life, may at any time revoke any dona-

(hh) Tillinghast v. Wheaton, 8 R. I. 536. of a third person may be a valid donatio

(0 Hill v. Chapman, 2 Bro. Ch. 612. causa mortis, although not made transfer-

This has not been recently doubted. able by delivery bv blank indorsement ; and

0) See Miller v. Miller, 3 P. Wins, in that case the executor or administrator

356, and Bradley v. Hunt, 5 G. & J. 54. of the deceased must indorse it. Brown v.

These cases seem to hold that, if the notes Brown, 18 Conn. 410. See also Sessions

were payable to bearer, the donation would v. Moseley, 4 Cush. 87, and Smith v. Kit-

be valid, thus putting such a note on the tredge, 21 Vt. 238.

footing of bank-bills. This distinction may (jj) Walsh v. Sexton, 55 Barb. 251.

perhaps be sustained, but it should be ex- ( jk) Jones v. Lock, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 25.

tended to all notes indorsed in blank, for (jl) Richardson v. Richardson Law Rep.

they are just as much transferable by deliv- 3 Eq. 686. See Morgan v. Malleson L. R.

evy to bearer. See Parish v. Stone, 14 Pick. 10 Eq. 475.

207, which asserts the law as stated in the (jm) Linsenbigler v. Gourley, 66 Penn.

text. See also Harris v. Clark, 2 Barb. 56, St. 166.

94, and 3 Comst. 93; Flint v. Pattee, 33 (jn) Virgin v. Gaither, 42 111 39.

N. H. 520. But it also seems that the note

266

CH. XT.] GIFT3. * 237

tion eausd mortis, even if it be completed by delivery and accep-
tance. Such a gift is as revocable as a will. The authorities
agree that he may do this if he recovers, because the death, which
has not taken place, was the cause of the gift. (&)

Gifts causd mortis are wholly void as against existing credi-
tors. (I) A court of equity will sometimes compel a party to
complete and execute a gift which, at law, would be wholly in the
power of the donor, (m)

(k) In Jones o. Selby, Prec. Ch. 300, * decided about one hundred and fifty years

donatio causd mortis was put on the same ago, but the rule has never been shaken,
footing as a will, in this respect, — that it (/) See cases cited in note ( f), p. *235.

could, as certainly, be revoked by the donor, (m) See post, Chap, on Specific Herform-

at any time during his life. This case was ance, sect. 2.

267

238 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

*238 * CHAPTER XVI.

NEW PARTIES BY INDORSEMENT, OR OF NEGOTIABLE BILLS AND NOTES.

Sect. I. — Of the Nature and Effect of Indorsement.

By the ancient rules of law we have seen that the transfer of
simple contracts was entirely forbidden. It is usually expressed
by the phrase, that a chose in action is not assignable. But bills
of exchange and promissory notes, made payable to order, are
called negotiable paper ; and they may be transferred by indorse-
ment, and the holder can sue in his own name, and the equita-
ble defences which might have existed between the promisor and
the original promisee are cut off.

It is generally said that the law of bills and notes is excep-
tional ; that they are choses in action, which, by the policy of the
law merchant, and to satisfy the necessities of trade and business,
are permitted to be assigned as other choses in action cannot be.
This is undoubtedly true ; but the law of negotiable paper may
be considered as resting on other grounds also. If A owes B
one hundred dollars, and gives him a promissory note wherein
he promises to pay that sum to him (without any words extend-
ing the promise to another), this note is not negotiable ; and if
it be assigned, it is so under the general rule of law, and is sub-
ject in the hands of the assignee to all equitable defences. But
if A in his note promises to pay B or his order, then the origi-
nal promise is in the alternative, and it is this which makes the
note negotiable, (a) The promise is to pay either B or some
one else to whom B shall direct the payment to be made. And
when B orders the payment to be made to C, then C may demand

it under the original promise. He may say that the prom-
* 239 ise was made to B, but it was a promise * to pay C as soon

as he should come within the condition ; that is, as soon

(a) Reed v. Murphy, 1 Ga. 236.
268

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS. * 240

as he should become the payee by order of B. And then the law
merchant extends this somewhat, by saying that the original
promise was in fact to pay either to B, or to C if B shall order
payment made to him, or to any person to whom C shall order
payment made, after B has ordered the payment made to C. For
B has the right of not merely ordering payment to be made to C,
but to C or his order ; and C has then the same right, and by the
continued exercise of this right the transfer may be made to any
number of assignees successively, and the last party to whom the
note is thus transferred, or the final holder, becomes the person
to whom A promised B to pay the money, and such holder may
sue in his own name upon this promise. And not only are words
" or order " unnecessary in the indorsement, but it is held that
if the indorsement be expressly restrictive, as if made to A only,
its negotiability remains unaffected. (6) It is said, however, that
this does not apply to notes indorsed after maturity, (c)

We may find the reasons of the law of negotiable bills and
notes in their origin and purpose. By interchange of property,
men supply each other's wants and their own at the same time.
In the beginning of society this could be done only by actual bar-
ter, as it is now among the rudest savages. But very early money
was invented as the representative of all property, and as there-
fore greatly facilitating the exchange of all property, and as
measuring its convertible value. The utility of this means en-
larged, as the wants of commerce, which grew with civilization,
were developed. But at length more was needed; it became
expedient to take a further step ; and negotiable paper, first bills
of exchange and then promissory notes, were introduced into mer-
cantile use, as the representative of the representative of property,
— that is, as the representative of money. It was possible to
make exchanges of large quantities of bulky articles, by the use
of money, without much inconvenience ; and it was possible for
him who wished to part with what he had, to acquire in its
stead by selling it for money, an article * in which the * 240
value of all that he parted with was securely vested, until
he had such opportunity as he might wish to place this value in
other property, which he did by buying. But still coin was itself
a substantial article, not easily moved to great distances in large

(6) Walker v. Macdonald, 2 Exoh. 527. (c) Leavitt v. Putnam, 1 Sandf. 199.

269

* 240 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

quantities ; and while it adequately represented all property, it
failed to represent credit. And this new invention was made,
and negotiable paper introduced, to extend this representation
another degree. It does not represent property directly, but
money. And as in one form it represents the money into which
it is convertible at the pleasure of the holder, so in another form
it represents a future payment of money, and then it represents
credit. And as names in any number may be written on one
instrument, that instrument represents and embodies the credit
of one man or the aggregated credit of many. Thus, by this in-
vention, vast amounts of value may change ownership at any dis-
tance, and be transmitted as easily as a single coin could be sent.
And by the same invention, while property is used in commercial
intercourse, the credit which springs from and is due to the pos-
session of that property may also be used at the same time, and
in the same way. And all this is possible because negotiable
paper is the adequate representative of money, and of actual
credit, in the transaction of business. And it is possible there-
fore only while this paper is such representative, and no longer ;
and the whole system of the law of negotiable paper has for its
object to make this paper in fact such representative, and to
secure its prompt and available convertibility, and to provide for
the safety of those who use this implement, either by making it
or receiving it, in good faith. Hence, if a note be made payable
absolutely, no evidence can be received of an oral agreement
made when the note was made, that it should be given up when
a certain event occurred, and that this event has occurred, (cc)

If a note be surrendered to the maker from a mistaken belief
that it has been paid, he is still liable for the balance due upon
it. (O

By the practice of merchants, the transfer of negotiable paper
is made by indorsements. The payee writes his name (c?) on

(cc) Tower v. Richardson, 6 Allen,, indorser of the bill. Lord EUenborough

3°1- , said: " I am clearly of opinion that this

erf) Banks v. Marshall, 23 Cal. 223. is not an indorsement by the defendant.

_ (d) There _ can be no indorsement For such a purpose the name of the party

without a signing of the name. Vincent must appear written with intent to indorse.

v. Horlock. 1 Camp. 442. In this case A, We see these words, ' pay the contents to

the drawer and payee of a bill of ex- such a one,' written over a blank indorse-

change, indorsed the bill in blank to B, ment every day, without any thought of

who wrote over A's signature, " pay the contracting an obligation ; and no obliga-

contents to C," and then delivered it to tion is thereby contracted. When a bill

C. Held, that B was not liable to C as an is indorsed by the payee in blank a power

270

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS. * 241

*the back of the bill or note, or, as it has been held, * 241
something which is the equivalent of his name and is
intended as a substitute for it, (?) and delivers the paper to
the purchaser, (/) ] and is then called an indorser ; and it has
been held that if a payee writes his name on any part of the
paper with intent to indorse it, this is an indorsement, (ff) The
purchaser of the note may then write over this indorsement an
order to pay the contents of the note to him or to his order, if
the payee has not already written this. The purchaser thus
becomes an indorsee. When the name only is written it is called
an indorsement in blank, and the holder may transfer it by
delivery, and it may thus pass through many hands, the final
holder who demands payment writing over the name indorsed
an order to pay to him. Whenever this order is written by an
indorser, whether a first or later indorser, it is an indorsement
in full, and the indorsee cannot transfer the note except by his
indorsement, which again may be in full or in blank. It is now
quite settled that the executor or administrator of a deceased
payee may indorse the note of his testator, (g~) but he has no

is given to the indorsee of specially ap- the payee or holder must not only write

pointing the payment to be made to a his name on the hack, but must deliver

particular individual, and what he does in the bill to the indorsee. Emmett v. Tot-

the exercise of this power is only exprcssio tenham, 20 E. L. & E. 348 ; Sainsbury v.

eorum gum tacite insunt. This is a sufficient Parkinson, id. 361. See also Hall v. Wil-

indorsement to the plaintiffs, but not by the son, 16 Barb. 648.

defendants." So Buller, J., in Fenn v. Har- Iff) Haines v. Dubois, 1 Vroom, 259.

rison, 3 T. R. 761, says: "In the case of \g) This question was ably discussed

a bill of exchange, we know precisely in the ease of Rawlinson v. Stone, 3

what remedy the holder has, if the bill be Wils. 1. This was an action upon a

not paid; his security appears wholly on promissory note, payable to A, or order,

the face of the bill itself, — the acceptor, and indorsed by the administratrix of A.

the drawer, and the indorsers, are all lia- It was objected that the indorsement was

ble in their turns ; but they are only liable not valid so as to give the indorsee an ac-

because they have written their names on the tion in his own name. But the objection

bilt." was overruled ; and this case has been

(e) The figures 128 were held sufficient considered ever since as having settled

in Butchers and Drovers Bank v. Brown, the law upon this point. See Watkins v.

6 Hill (N. Y.), 443. Maule, 2 Jac. & W. 237, 243; Shaw, C.

(/) In order to a valid indorsement, J., Rand v. Hubbard, 4 Met. 252, 258 ;

1 In Adams v. Blethen, 66 Me. 19, the indorsement was in terms: "I this day
sold and delivered " to A. the within note, signed by the payee. A constructive delivery
is sufficient, as by an order on the bank where the note is held as collateral security,
Howe v. Ould. 28 Graft. 1. A note may be delivered on condition that it shall not
take effect until something is done, as the acceptance of an insurance policy for which
it is given, Watkins v. Bowers, 119 Mass. 383; and if placed in the hands of a
third person, takes effect on the performance of the condition, without further de-
livery, Taylor v. Thomas, 13 Kan. 217. The delivery of an envelope containing a
note, on condition that it should not be opened during the maker's life, and be returned
if desired, is, after the maker's death without return, a good delivery, and the note is
valid. Worth v. Case, 42 N. Y. 362.

271

* 242 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

right to deliver to the indorsee a note which was indorsed by the
deceased, but never delivered by him. (Ji) The same rule holds
also in the case of an assignee of an insolvent payee. (€)

The indorsement of a blank note binds the indorser to any

terms as to amount and time of payment which the party to

whom he intrusts the paper inserts, (j) , If the note be

* 242 originally *made payable to "bearer," it is negotiated

or transferred by delivery only, and needs no indorse-
ment, (Jc) any person bearing or presenting the note becoming
in that case the- party to whom the maker of the note promises
to pay it.

If a note, whether indorsed in blank or made payable to bearer,
be transferred by delivery, the transferrer is not liable as an
indorser, nor as a guarantor, nor is he, in general, liable in any
way. 1 But if the paper be wholly worthless, as by the forgery
of the principal names, or for any similar reasons, the transferrer
may be held to repay the money paid him for it, on the ground
of failure of consideration. (V)

The holder of negotiable paper, indorsed in blank or made
payable to bearer, is presumed to be the owner for consideration.
If circumstances cast suspicion on his ownership, as if it came
to him from or through one who had stolen it, then he must
prove that he gave value for it ; and on such proof will be entitled
to it, unless it is shown that he was cognizant of the want of
title, or had such notice or means of knowledge as made his neg-
ligence equivalent to fraud, (m) If one signs a note on condi-

Malbon ». Southard, 36 Me. 147; Dwight (k) Wilbour v. Turner, 5 Pick. 526;

v. Newell, 15 111. 3:33. Dole v. Weeks, 4 Mass. 451. And this is

(A) Bromage v. Lloyd, 1 Exch. 31 ; so although it be under seal. Porter v.

Clark v. Sigourney, 17 Conn. 511; Clark McCollum, 15 Ga. 528.
v. Boyd, 2 Hamm. 279. (M Gurney v. Womersley, 4 E. & B.

(0 Pinkerton v. Marshall, 2 H. Bl. 133.
334; Thomason v, Frere, 10 East, 418. (m) Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452; Grant

(./) Montague v. Perkins, 22 E. L. & v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1510; Peacock v.

E. 516 ; Russel v. Langstaffe, Dougl. 514 ; Rhodes, Dougl. 633 ; Collins v. Martin, 1

Violett v. Patton, 5 Cranch, 142, 151; B. & P. 648; Lawson v. Weston 4 Esp.

Johnson i>. Blasrlale, ISm.&M.l; Tor- 50; King v. Milsom, 2 Camp. 5; Solo-

rey v. Fisk, 10 Sm. & M. 690; Smith v. mons v. Bank of England, 13 East, 135,

Wyekoff, 3 Sandf.Ch. 77, 90; Fullerton n. ; Paterson v. Hardacre, 4 Taunt. 114;

ivSturges, 4 Ohio St. 629; Young v. Hatch v. Searles, 31 E. L. & E. 219 ; Jud-

Ward, 21 111. 223. son „. Holmes, 9 La. An. 20; Cruger ».

a But such a transferrer impliedly warrants the genuineness of the instrument, and
that he has a right to transfer it hv delivery, Whitney v. Potsdam Bank, 45 N. Y. 303 ;
Giffert v. West, 37 Wis. 115 ; Snyder ;>. Reno, 38 la. 329; but not if the transferrer
expressly refuses to so warrant, Bell v. Dagg, 60 N. Y. 528; or if the transferee agrees
to take his chances, Beal v. Roberts, 113 Mass. 525.

CH. XVI.] * NOTES AND BILLS'. * 243

tion that a certain other person sign it also, and that other person
does not sign it, it is said that the signer is not liable to an indor-
see ; but this must not be extended to an innocent indorsee for
value, (n)

* A distinction of this kind has been made. If an indor- * 243
ser shows that the paper was issued for an illegal consid-
eration, it may be no defence against an innocent holder, who
must, however, prove value paid ; but if he only shows that the
consideration was void, the presumption of value is in favor of
the indorsee, and the defendant must prove that the plaintiff
holds it not for value. (o~) A note given in renewal of a note
made for an illegal consideration, is open to the same defence as
the original note. (00)

All the payees must join in the indorsement, (p) and strictly
speaking, only a payee, or one made payee by a subsequent indorse-
ment, can become himself an indorser. It is not enough that a
name is written on the back of a note or bill, for although this is,
literally speaking, an indorsement, whether it be so or not by law
and the usage of merchants must depend upon the character of
the signer. The effect of a simple signature, without any other
words, on the back of a note, by one not the payee, has been much
considered and* variously decided. From the authorities which we
deem entitled to most respect upon this question, and from gen-
eral principles, we come to these conclusions : If any one not the
payee of a negotiable note, or in the case of a note not negotia-
ble, if any party, writes his name on the back of the note at or
sufficiently near the time it is made, his signature binds him

Armstrong, 3 Johns. Cas. 6 ; Conroy v. see by delivery only, without any fresh

Warren, 3 Johns. Cas. 259 ; Thurston v. indorsement, the transferee takes, as

McKown, 6 Mass. 428; Munroe v. Cooper, against the acceptor, any title which the

5 Pick. 412 ; Wheeler v. Guild, 20 Pick, intermediate indorsee possessed. Fair-

645 ; Aldrich v. Warren, 16 Me. 465. It clough v. Pavia, 25 E L. & E. 533.

is now well settled, overruling the earlier (n) Awde v. Dixon, 5 E. L. & E. 512 ;

cases, that if the defendant prove a note s. o. 6 Exch. 869; Evans v. Bremmer, 35

fraudulent or illegal in its inception, this E. L. & E. 397 ; Prentiss v. Graves, 33

throws the burden on the plaintiff of Barb. 621.

proving that he paid value. Smith v. (o) Fitch v. Jones, 5 E. & B. 238. See,

Braine, 3 E. L. & E. 379 ; Bailey v. Bid- for effect of illegality of consideration,

well, 13 M. & W. 73 ; Case v. Mechanics Brown v. Tarkington, 3 Wallace, 377,

Banking Association, 4 Comst. 166. It is and Clubb v. Hutson, 18 C. B. (n. s.) 414.

otherwise if the defendant merely show {oo) Holden v. Cosgrove, 12 Gray, 216.

a want of consideration when the note (p) Dwight v. Pease, 3 McLean, 94.

was given. Middleton Bank v. Jerome, But see, for a disregard of this rule in

18 Conn. 443; Ellicott v. Martin, 6 Md. reference to a payee whose name was

509; Thompson v. Shepherd, 12 Met. left in the note by mistake, Pease v.

311. Where a bill or note is indorsed in Dwight, 6 How. 190.
blank, and is transferred by the indor-

vol. i. 18 273

* 244 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

in the same way as if it was on the face of the note and below

that of the maker, that is to say, he is held as a joint maker,

or as a joint and several maker according to the form of the

note, (g) 1 If the signature be at a distinctly later period,

* 244 * after the making and delivery of the note, the signer, as

to the payee, is not a maker but a guarantor, (r) His
promise is void if without consideration, but the consideration
may be the original consideration for the note, if the note was
received at his request and upon his promise to guarantee the
same, or perhaps, if the note was made at his request alone,
without the promise, and more certainly if the note was given
for his benefit; or the consideration for the guaranty may be
a new one moving in some way from the holder. In the last
case, if the note is not negotiable, the party indorsing can be
held only as maker or as guarantor, but if the note be negotia-
ble, the question might arise whether, although the party sign-
ing is only a guarantor as to the payee or party receiving the
note from him, he may not be liable to subsequent parties as
indorser. For if he be only a guarantor he may make the
defence of a want of consideration against any holder, but if
an indorser, only against his immediate indorsee. This ques-
tion we should answer by saying, that if the payee writes his
name over the name of the other, thus making him to all
appearances a second indorser, he might be held as such by any
subsequent ignorant holder for value, because he has enabled
the payee to give his signature this appearance and therefore this

(?) Campbell v. Butler, 14 Johns. 349 ; lins ?•. Everett, 4 Ga. 266 ; Robinson

Dean r. Hall, 17 Wend. 'Hi ; Sampson u. v. Abell, 17 Ohio, 36; Webster i\ Cobb,

Thornton, 3 Met. 275; Union Bank v. 17 111. 459; Goode v. Jones, 9 Mo. 876;

Willis, 8 id. 504; Austin r. Boyd, 24 Lewis v. Harvey, 18 Mo. 74; Wilson v.

Pick. 64; Bryant v. Eastman, 7 Cush. Foot, 11 Met. 285; Lowell v. Gage, 38

111 ; Adams v. Hardy, H'J Me. 339 ; Mar- Me. 35 ; Carpenter •: Oakes, 10 Rich. L.

tin v. Boyd, 11 N. H. 385; Flint v. Day, 17 ; Higgins v. Watson, 1 Mann. (Mich.)

9 Vt. 345; Bright v. Carpenter, 9 Hamin. 428; Cecil v. Mix, 6 Port. (Ind.) 478;

139; Carroll v. Weld, 13 111. 682. See Cook „. Southwick,.9 Tex. 615 ; Branch

also Ellis v. Brown, 6 Barb. 282 ; Malbon Bank v. James, 9 Ala. 949 ; Essex Com-

t>. Southard, 36 Me. 147; Partridge i>. pany v. Edwards, 12 Mass. 273. For

Colby, 19 Barb. 258; Schneider?-. Schifl- eases in which such signer is held only

man, 20 Mo. 571 ; Greenough v. Smead, as guarantor or indorser, see Blatchford

3 Ohio St. 415; Seabury r. Hungerford, v. Milliken, 35 111. 434; Van Doren v.

2 Hill (N. Y.), 84; Cottrell v. Conklin, 4 Tjader, 1 Nev. 380; Price v. Lavender,

Duer, 46 ; Brown i>. Curtiss, 2 Comst. 38 Ala. 389.

225 ; Sylvester v. Downer, 20 Vt. 355 ; (r) Id. ; Tenney v. Prince, 4 Pick.

McGuire v. Bosworth, 1 La. An. 248; 385; Sampson t>. Thornton, 3 Met. 276;

Penny v. Parham, 1 La. An. 274 ; Col- Hammond v. Chamberlain, 26 Vt. 406.

1 Gorman v. Ketchum, 33 Wis. 427.

274

CH. XVI. J NOTES AND BILLS. * 245

effect. And we should go further and consider that he would
be liable to any holder even with full notice, because he wrote his
name for the purpose of giving the payee his credit, and there-
fore impliedly authorized the payee to give his suretyship any
character perfectly compatible with the manner and place of his
signature, so that unless there was a special agreement between
the parties that this should not be done, which was also known
to the holder, the payee might transfer the note, making the
signer a second indorser, and liable as such, (s) It has been
held in England, that one sued as indorser, cannot plead in
defence that the note was not indorsed to him. (£)

It is held in many States that one who indorses * a note * 245
in blank at any time before it is indorsed by the payee may
be held as an original promisor, («) 1 And it has been held that
this is a conclusive presumption of law, and cannot be rebutted
by evidence showing a different agreement, (ti) In Louisiana,
it is held that a person who is not a party, putting his name to
a note, is presumed to be a surety, (to)

Whether two persons who indorse a bill or note at the same
time are joint indorsers, or first and second indorsers, is open
to evidence as between the two ; and one who indorses at the
request of another and for the same purpose is not a joint indor-
ser with him. (»mi) It is indeed a general rule, that as between

(s) Crozer v. Chambers, 1 Spencer, Schiffman, 20 Mo. 571 ; Orrick i\ Colston,

256 ; Riley v. Gerrish, 9 Cush. 106 ; 7 Gratt. 189 ; Carroll v. Weld, 13 111. 682 ;

Moies v. Bird, 11 Mass. 440. See post, Riggs v. Waldo, 2 Cal. 485. See ante, p.

Sect. III. p. * 250. * 243, note (5).

(() McGregor v. Rhodes, 6 E. & B. (») Essex Company u. Edmands, 12

266. Gray, 273.

(«) Irish v. Cutter, 31 Me. 536; Riley (re) Collins v. Trist, 20 La. An. 348.

v. Gerrish, 9 Cush. 104; Schneider v. (w) Shaw v. Knox, 98 Mass. 214.

1 In New York, when a person other than the payee indorses a note in blank, the
payee not having indorsed it, in the absence of proof that he signed as surety, he is
impliedly liable as a subsequent indorser, and is not liable to any one with notice unless
the payee has first assumed the liabilities of a first indorser, Phelps v. Vischer, SO
N. Y. 69 ; but if he indorses to become security for the maker, the payee may maintain
an action against him on the note, or indorse without recourse, Coulter v. Richmond,
59 N. Y. 478. In some States, such a person is held liable as a joint promisor and surety
of the maker, Pemberton Bank v. Lougee, 108 Mass. 371 ; Woodman v. Boothby, 66
Me. 389; Walz v. Alback, 37 Md. 404; ChnfFe v. Memphis, &c. R. Co., 64 Mo. 193;
Moynahan v. Hanaford, 42 Mich. 329; in Indiana, as an indorser simply, Bronson v.
Alexander, 48 Ind. 244 ; in New Jersey, if signing at the making of the note as surety,
he is liable as a joint promisor ; if signing afterwards as surety, he is liable as a
guarantor, Chaddock v. Vanness, 6 Vroom, 517; in Connecticut, such an indorsement
is a guaranty of the collectibility of the note by due diligence, Holbrook v. Camp, 38
Conn. 23 ; in California, it imposes the same liability as a regular indorsement, Jones
0. Goodwin, 39 Cal. 493.

275

* 245 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

drawer, acceptor, and indorsers, their relation and responsibility
may be explained by evidence, (_vx)

Notes and bills are usually considered together ; the law re-
specting them being in most respects the same. The maker of
a note being liable, generally, in the same way as the acceptor
of a bill. And if an instrument be so far ambiguous, that it may
be doubted whether it is a bill or a note, it seems that the holder
may treat it as either, at his election, (w)

Among the points of difference, it has sometimes been supposed
that a bill drawn on the credit of goods operates as a bill of sale
of the goods, and passes the property in them to one who dis-
counts or buys the bill. This is not quite so. A bill drawn by
a consignor or a consignee of goods, may stand on the credit of
those goods, and those goods may be given as security for the bill
to one who discounts it ; but it seems settled that the mere draw-
ing of the bill, and selling it or offering it for discount, has not
the effect of transferring the goods, (a;) But "where the bill of
lading was attached to the bill of exchange, and the bill dis-
counted by a bank on the credit of the bill of lading, and the
consignee on whom the bill was drawn, refused acceptance,
it was held that the bank took the goods by discounting the
bill, (xx)

SECTION II.

OP THE ESSENTIALS OP NEGOTIABLE NOTES AND BILLS.

Promissory notes were made negotiable in England by the stat-
ute of III. & IV. Anne ; but it has been doubted there whether
a note, payable to the maker's own order, was a negotiable
note. (j/) 1 In this country it is so undoubtedly. In New York

(vx) Lewis !>. Williams, 4 Bush, 678. (>/) Written securities, in the form of

(w) Lloyd i\ Oliver, 12 E. L. & E. promissory notes, made payable to the

424 ; s. c. 18 Q. B. 471. maker or his order, and by him indorsed,

(x) Marine F. & Ins. Bank v. Jauncey, are an irregular kind of instrument,

3 Sandf. 257 ; Wheeler v. Stone, 4 Gill, which has grown into use among mer-

38 ; Hopkins v. Beehe, 26 Perm. St. 85 ; chants, since the statute of Anne, and is

Sands v. Matthews, 27 Ala. 30!). now extremely common in this country

(xx) The Davenport Nat. Bank v. Ho- and in England. At what precise time

meyer, 45 Mo. 145. they first came into use, and what was

1 See Goodwin v. Robarts, L. R. 10 Ex. 337, for a history of negotiable securities, in
the judgment of Cockburn, C. J.

276

CH. XTI.J

NOTES AND BILLS.

246

* it is provided by statute, that a promissory note,
payable to the order of the maker thereof, or

" made
to the

*246

the occasion which gave rise to them, it
is impossible to say. Baron Parke, in
Hooper 'v. Williams, 2 Exch. 21, charac-
terizes them as securities, in an informal,
not to say absurd, form, probably intro-
duced long after the statute of Anne —
for what good reason no one can tell —
and become of late years exceedingly
common. So Chief Justice Wilde, in
Brown o. De Winton, 6 C. B. 342, said
that notes in this form, according to his
experience, which extended over a period
exceeding forty years, were very far
from uncommon. They seem not to
have attracted the attention of courts
until a recent date. It has always been
the received opinion in this country that
instruments in this form were negotiable
within the statute of Anne, and that they
differed in no material particular from
notes in the ordinary form. Such also, ac-
cording to the observation of eminent
counsel, in Brown v. De Winton, was the
received opinion in England, until the
case of Flight v. Maclean, 16 M. & W.
51. Since that case, the nature and con-
struction of instruments of this kind
have been very learnedly and elabor-
ately discussed by the three principal
common-law courts in Westminster
Hall. The case of Flight v. Maclean
came up in the Court of Exchequer, in
1846. The declaration stated that the
defendant made his promissory note in
writing, and thereby promised to pay to
the order of the defendant .£500 two
months after date, and that the defendant
then indorsed the same to the plaintiff.
To this there was a special demurrer, as-
signing for cause, that it was uncertain
whether the plaintiff meant to charge the
defendant as maker or as indorser of the
note, and that a note payable to a man's
own order was not a legal instrument,
and could not be negotiated. The court
sustained the demurrer without much
discussion, " on the ground that the in-
strument in question, made payable to
the maker's order, was not a promissory
note within the statute of Anne, which
requires that a promissory note, to be as-
signable, shall be made payable by the
party making it to some ' other person/ or
his order, or unto bearer." During the
argument, however, Parke, B:, put to
the counsel this question : " Though by
the law-merchant the note cannot be
indorsed, could not the defendant make
this a promissory note by indorsing it
to another person ? " This case was fol-

lowed the next year in the Queen's
Bench by the case of Wood v. Mytton,
10 Q. B. 805, in which precisely the same
question was presented as in Flight v.
Maclean, except that in the latter it
arose on a motion in arrest of judgment,
whereas in the former it arose on a special
demurrer. The question was argued at
considerable length, and Lord Uenman,
after a very minute examination of the
statute of Anne, held that the instrument
declared on was a promissory note within
the terms of the statute, and judgment
was given for the plaintiff. It is to be
observed, however, that Palteson, J., dur-
ing the argument of this case, put to the
counsel a question similar to that put
by Baron Parke, in Flight v. Maclean.
" Whatever," said he, " maj' be the
case with respect to a note like this
before indorsement, may it not, as soon
as it is indorsed, come within the statute,
either as a note payable to bearer, if it is
indorsed in blank, or as a note payable
to the person designated, if it is indorsed
in full ? " In 1818 the question came up
again in the Court of Exchequer, in the
case of Hooper c. Williams, 2 Exch. 13.
The instrument declared on in this case was
similar to those in the two former cases,
being made payable to the defendant's
own order, and by him indorsed in blank.
The pleader, however, adopting the sug-
gestion of Mr. Baron Par/a- and Mr. Jus-
tice Patteson, declared as upon a note
payable to bearer. At the trial the de-
fendant objected that there was a vari-
ance between the note and the declaration,
and the case coining before the court in
banc upon this objection, Parke, B., in
delivering the opinion of the court, said:
" It appears to us, that the instrument in
this case was, when it first became a
binding promissory note, a note payable
to bearer, and consequently was properly
described in the declaration. This view
of the case reconciles the decision of
this court in Flight v. Maclean, with that
of the Queen's Bench in Wood v. Mytton ;
but not the reasons given for those decis-
ions. In the case in this court the dec-
laration was bad on special demurrer,
as it did not set out the legal effect of the
instrument. In that in the Queen's
Bench, the motion being for arrest of
judgment, the declaration was, in sub-
stance, good ; for it set out an inartificial
contract, which had the legal effect of a
valid note payable, as stated on the
record, to the plaintiff. The difference

277

247

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[book I.

* 247 order of a fictitious * person, shall, if negotiated by the
maker, have the same effect, and be of the same validity,
as against the maker, and all persons having knowledge of the
facts, as if payable to bearer." (2)

In some of our States there are statutory provisions permitting
negotiable paper to be under seal.1

In Virginia every promissory note or check payable at a par-
ticular bank or banking-office, and every inland bill payable in

between the two courts in the construc-
tion of the statute is of no practical conse-
quence, as, in our view of the case,
securities in this informal, not to say
absurd form, are still not invalid ; and it
might be of much inconvenience if they
were, for there is no doubt that this form
of note, probably introduced long after
the statute of Anne, and for what good
reason no one can tell, has become of
late years exceedingly common ; and it
is obvious that, until they are indorsed,
they must always remain in the hands of
the maker himself, and so he can never
be liable upon them." Shortly after the
decision in this case, the same question
came up in the Common Bench, in tlie
case of Brown v. l)e Winton and Gay v.
Lander, 6 C. B. 336. In Brown ,. De
Winton the question camp up in the same
shape as in Wood v. Mytton, and Collmnn,
J., in giving the judgmentof the court, de-
livered a very able and elaborate opinion,
in which lie agreed entirely with the view
taken by the Court of Exchequer. In
Gay !'. Lander, the question was pre-
sented in a little different light. It is a
familiar principle in the law of negotia-
ble paper, that when a note is made pay-
able to A or hs order, the words " his
Older " impart to the note a permanently
assignable quality into whose hands so-
ever it may come ; so that, though A
indorse the note to B specially, without
using the words "or his order," yet B may
indorse it in turn to whomsoever he
pleases. The point raised in Gay v. Lan-
der was, whether the indorsement should
receive the same construction in the case
of a note payable to the order of the
maker and by him indorsed, and the
court held that it should. Gollman, J., in
delivering the opinion, said : " We think
that the principle on which the case of
Brown v. De Winton was decided, will
extend to this case. The principle on
which that case was decided is, that the

note, before it was indorsed, was in the na-
ture of a promise to pay to the person to
whom the maker should afterwards, by
indorsement, order the amount to be paid ;
and that, after the note is indorsed and
circulated, it must be taken as against
the party so making and indorsing the
note, that he intended that his indorse-
ment should have the same effect as the
indorsement by the payee of a note pay-
able to the order of a person other than
the maker would have had. Now, it is
well established that, if a note be made
payable to J. S. or order, and J. S., in
such case, indorses the note specially to
Smith & Co., without adding ' or order,
Smith & Co. may convey a good title to
any other person by indorsement." It
might, perhaps, be inferred from what
fell from Baron Parke in Hooper r. Wil-
liams, that he entertained a different
opinion on this last point, but the point
did not arise in that case, and probably
his attention was not particularly directed
to it. In Absolon v. Marks, 11 Q. B. 19,
the defendant and four others made a
joint and several note payable to their
own order, and all indorsed it in blank;
and upon an action in which the decla-
ration stated that the defendant made
his promissory note payable to his own
order, and indorsed the same to the plain-
tiff and promised to pay him the same
according to its tenor and effect, Lord
Dertmim decided that the note having
been indorsed was thereby made certain
and a good promissory note under the
statute. See also Edie ;'. East India Co.
2 Burr. 1216; Woods v. Ridley, 11
Humph, 194 ; Wardens, &c. of St.
James Church v. Moore, 1 Cart. (Ind.)
289.

(z) 1 N. Y. R. S 768, § 5. For a case
illustrative of this rule, see Central
Bank of Brooklyn v. Lang, 1 Bosw.
(N. Y.) 202.

1 In general, however, a note under seal is not negotiable.
Fonder of England, L. R. 8 Q. B. 374.

278

See Crouch v. Credit

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS. * 248

the State, is negotiable by statute. In Kentucky the words
* " or order " are not necessary, (a) In Ohio a power of * 248
attorney to confess judgment may be inserted in a nego-
tiable note, (b) x And a certificate of deposit in a bank has
been held negotiable by our highest authority, (c) 2 The word
" negotiable," however, has been held not to make a note negotia-
ble, though it may show an intention that it should be so. (d)

It is sufficient in law if the maker's name appears in the note ;
as, " I, A., promise," <fec. But signature at the bottom is so
usual, that the want of it would taint the note with suspicion, (e)
Signature of a note, as of other instruments, is often made by a
mark, which is properly attested. But it is held that a signature
by a mark not attested is valid, and evidence may establish it as
a signature, (ee) 3

As the negotiable bill or note is intended to represent and take
the place of money, it must be payable in money, and not in
goods ; (/) 4 and although it has been held in this country that

(a) Maxwell v. Goodrum.'lO B. Mon. (ee) Willoughby v. Moulton, 47 N. H.

286. 205.

(6) Osborn v. Hawley, 19 Ohio, 130. (/) Jerome v. Whitney, 7 Johns. S21 ;

(c) Miller v. Austen, 13 How. 218. Thomas ;;. Roosa, 7 Johns. 461 ; Peay v.
See also Poorman v. Mills, 35 Cal. 118. Pickett, 1 Nott & McC. 254 ; Rhodes v.

(d) Carruth v. Walker, 8 Cal. 252. Lindley, 3 Hamm. 51 ; Atkinson v. Manks,

(e) Taylor v. Dobbins, 1 Stra. 399 ; 1 Cowen, 691, 707 ; Clark v. King, 2 Mass.
Elliot v. Cooper, 2 Ld. Raym. 1376; 3 524; Bunker v. Athearn, 35 Me. 364;
Kent. Com. 78. Wingo v. McDowell, 8 Rich. L. 446. So

1 An agreement in a note to pay attorney's fees does not destroy its negotiability,
Stoneman v. Pyle, 35 Ind. 103 ; Sperry v. Horr, 32 la. 184; Seaton v. Scovill, 18 Kan.
433 ; Gaar v. Louisville Bank. Co., 11 Bush, 180. Contra, Woods v. North, 84 Penn. St.
407 ; in Trenton Bank v. Gay, 63 Mo. 33, as rendering it uncertain, and in Bullock v.
Taylor, 39 Mich. 137, as being a stipulation for a penalty.

2 A certificate of deposit promising payment to order of a certain number of dollars
"in currency" is negotiable, Klauber v, Biggerstaff, 47 Wis. 551; but not if payable
"in current funds," Johnson o. Henderson, 76 N. C. 227. A certificate of deposit,
payable on return thereof " properly indorsed," is in legal effect a promissory note
payable on demand, and the principles applicable to such notes should be applied to
these certificates. Cooky, C. J., in Tripp v. Curtenius, 36 Mich. 494. So if payable
"on return of this receipt." Prank v. Wessels, 64 N. Y. 155.

3 The signature to a note may be made with a printed facsimile. Pennington v.
Baehr, 48 Cal. 565. In Brook v. Hook, L. R. 6 Ex. 89, it was declared, by a divided
court, that a forged signature cannot be ratified. Contra in Wellington v. Jackson, 121
Mass. 157; Hefner v. Vandolah, 62 III. 483. One inducing another, by admitting his
signature, to take a bill of exchange, cannot show it to be a forgery. Continental Bank
v. Commonwealth Bank, 50 N. Y. 575.

4 A bill of exchange drawn in Canada and payable in New York in " gold dollars "
is negotiable. Chrysler v. Renois, 43 N. Y. 209. So Black v. Ward, 27 Mich. 191,
decided that a note made and indorsed in Michigan and payable in Canada, "in Canada
currency," is payable in money and negotiable. So too in Iowa, under a statute, in
Council Bluffs Works v. Cuppey, 41 la. 104, an instrument to pay a certain sum in
" railroad ties " " without defalcation " was declared, by a divided court, to be negotiable.
But a note payable in "currency" is not negotiable, fluse v. Hamblin, 29 la. 501 ; nor
vrima facie if payable in " current funds," Haddock v. Woods, 46 la. 433.

279

*249

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

it might be made payable in bank-bills which were at the time
the note was made universally current as cash, (g) the weight of
authority and reason is against this, and in favor of the English
rule, which requires them to be payable in money. (A)
* 249 The * payment must not rest upon any contingency or un-
certain event. (/) Hence a draft on a public officer, as
such, is not negotiable, because it is presumably drawn against a
contingent public fund, (j) But if the event must happen, an
uncertainty as to the time of its happening does not prevent
the bill or note from being negotiable. (&) 1 And if the bill

the bill or note, in order to be negotiable,
must contain a promise for the payment
of money only, and not for the payment
of money and the performance of some
other act. Austin v. Burns, 16 Barb.
643. Therefore, where a note contained
a promise to deliver up horses and a
wharf, and also to pay money at a par-
ticular day, it was held not to be within
the statute. Martin v. Chauntry, 2 Stra.
1271. A note, however, need not con-
tain the words "promise to pay," in order
to come within the statute ; it is sufficient
if it contain words which, upon a rea-
sonable construction, import a promise to
pay. Therefore, where a note contained
a promise by the maker to be accountable
to A or order for .£100, it was held to be
within the statute. Morris v. Lee, 2 Ld.
Raym. 1:196, 8 Mod. 362, 1 Stra. 629.
And so where the note set forth in the
declaration was, " I acknowledge myself
to be indebted to A in £ — , to be paid on
demand, for value received;" on demur-
rer to the declaration, the court, after
solemn argument, held that this was a
good note within the statute, the words
" to be paid," amounting to a promise to
pay; observing, that the same words in a
lease would amount to a covenant to pay
rent. Casborne v. Dutton, Schv. N. P.
395. See also Hyne v. Dewdney, 11 E.
L. & E. 400, ii,; 2 Foster (N. II.), 188.

(</) Keith i'. Jones, 9 Johns. 120; Judah
v. Harris, 19 Johns. 144; Swetland v.
Oreigh, 15 Ohio, 118; Williams v. Sims,
22 Ala. 612; Barnes i\ Gorman, 9 Rich.
L. 297; Butler v. Paine, 8 Minn. 324.
In Iowa, a, note payable in articles of

personal property is negotiable by sta-
tute. See Riggs v. Price, 3 Greene (la.),
334.

(h) McCormick v. Trotter, 10 S. & R.
94 ; Gray v. Donahoe, 4 Watts, 400 ;
Hasbrook u. Palmer, 2 McLean, 10 ; Fry
v. Rousseau, 3 McLean, 106 ; Smith v.
Philadelphia Bank, 14 Penn. St. 525 ;
Lowe v. Bliss, 34 111. 168 ; 3 Kent, Com.
75. But an instrument promising to pay
a sum of money, to one or order, with
interest, as- per interest warrants at-
tached, or upon its surrender before
due, to issue stock in exchange there-
for, has been held to be a negotiable
note. Hodges v. Shules, 22 N. Y. (8
Smith) 114. See also London S. F.
Society v. Hagerstown Savings Bank,
36 Penn. St. 489, where a certificate of
deposit, payable in currency, was held
not to be negotiable.

(/) Alexander v. Thomas, 2 E. L. &
E. 286 ; Storm i: Stirling, 28 E. L. & E.
108; Austin v. Burns, 16 Barb. 643;
Dawkes v. Lord Lorane, 3 Wils. 207;
Beardesley v. Baldwin, 2 Stra. 1151 ;
Roberts v. Peake, 1 Burr. 323; Cook
l-. Satterlee, 6 Cowen, 108; Van Vacter
i'. Flack, 1 Sm. & M. 3>J3 ; Palmer v.
Pratt, 9 J. B. Moore, 358 ; Dodge v. Em-
erson, 34 Me. 96.

(j) Reeside v. Knox, 2 Whart. 233;
Pier i\ Covington, 19 Penn. St. 200;
Raigauel v. Ayliff, 16 Ark. 594; West
v. Foreman. 21 Ala. 400; Kinney v. Lee,
10 Tex. 155.

(k) Cooke v. Colehan, 2 Stra. 1217;
Andrews v. Franklin, 1 Stra. 24 ; Evans v.
Underwood, 1 Wils. 262; Dawkes v. Lord

1 A note payable at the death of the maker is negotiable, Mahier t-. Keays, 28 La. An.
246 ; but not if payable by instalments to cease at the payee's death, Brooks v. Hargreaves,
21 Mich. 254. — The negotiability of a premium note is not affected by a memorandum
therein that if the note is not paid at maturity the premium shall be considered as earned
and the policy be void so long as the note remains unpaid. Kirk v. Dodge Co. Ins. Co.,
39 Wis. 138. Nor does a recital in a note that additional interest will be paid " after due,"
and that the maker has deposited collateral security to be sold on certain terms on its

280

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS. * 250

direct the drawee to credit the payee with so much cash, it is a
good bill. (I)

"While it is essential to a bill of exchange that it be an order
or positive direction to the drawee to make the payment, it is
sufficient if it be substantially so; and the use of the word
"please," or any equivalent expression, does not alter the char-
acter of the instrument, (m) 1

If the amount is expressed in the usual way, by figures in the
corner or at the bottom, and is also written in words in the body
of the note, the written words not only prevail over the written
figures, but are said to do this so conclusively, that evidence is
not admissible to show that the figures were right, and that the
words were omitted by mistake from the body of the note, (n)

Usually bills and notes express the consideration by saying
" for value received ; " but where this is not expressed, it is im-
plied by law, both as to the makers and the acceptors or indorsers
of negotiable bills and notes, and this presumption must be •
rebutted by evidence if the defence rests on want of * con- * 250
sideration. (o) 2 And the presumption is so far rebutted

Lorane, 3 Wils. 207, 213 ; Washington An. 563, it was held that a note payable
County Mutual Insurance Company v. " one day after the trety of peas," ma-
Miller, 26 Vt. 77. In Seacord v. Burling, tured upon the termination of the war.
5 Denio, 444, it was held that an agree- (i) Ellison v. Collingridge, 9 C. B.
ment in writing by which the subscriber 570 : Lloyd v. Oliver, 12 B. L. & E. 424 ;
to it promised to pay another a sum of s. c. 18 Q. B. 471.
money on demand with interest, and ad- (m) Wheatley v. Strobe, 12 Cal. 92.
ded but no demand is to be made as long us («) Saunderson v. Piper, 4 Bing. N.
the interest is paid, was not a promissory C. 425.

note. And see Richardson v. Martyr, 30 (o) Hatch v. Trayes, 11 A. & E. 702;

E. L. & E. 365 ; Kelley v. Hemmingway, Grant v. Da Costa, 3 M. & Sel. 351 ;

13 111. 604. In Gaines i>. Dorsett, 18 La. Benjamin v. Tillman, 2 McLean, 213 ;

non-payment, affect its negotiability. Towne v. Rice, 122 Mass. 67. — Mattison v.
Marks, 31 Mich. 421, held that a note payable "on or before" a day named, was payable
at a time sufficiently certain, the maker having an option merely to pay in advance
of his legal liability. Contra, Stults v. Silva, 119 Mass. 137. A note payable at a
certain time, " or before," if made out of the profits of a certain machine, is negotiable.
Ernst v. Steckman, 74 Penn. St. 13 ; Walker v. Woollen, 54 Ind. 164. And a written
promise to pay money to a corporation or order, in instalments as required by its
directors, is a good note on demand by the payee or its directors. White v. Smith, 77
111. 351 ; Stillwell v. Craig;, 58 Mo. 24. But a promissory note, with the words " Given
as collateral security with agreement" in the margin, is not negotiable. Costelo v.
Crowell, 127 Mass. 293. — A promissory note made payable a specified number of
months after date, without grace, falls due on the same day of the month as that of its
date. Roehner v. Knickerbocker Ins. Co., 63 N. Y. 160.

1 Thus " On demand, with interest, please pay J. S. or order, fifty-five dollars," is
a promissory note. Almy v. Winslow, 126 Mass. .'j42.

2 A reference to the consideration in a note does not affect its negotiability. Taylor
v. Curry, 109 Mass. 36 ; Collins v. Bradbury, 64 Me. 37. In Missouri, by statute, the
words "for value received" must be inserted, to make a note negotiable. Bailey v.
Smock, 61 Mo. 213.

281

* 250 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

as to cast the burden of proof on the holder, by evidence making
the consideration doubtful, (p) The defence of illegal considera-
tion is not generally valid if it be not illegal in the State where
the note is payable and the action brought, (pp) But as to the
question of usury, the note is governed by the laws of the State
where it was made. (j»<?)

To a note there need be but two original parties, a maker and
a payee ; and these must be sufficiently certain. Thus, no action
can be maintained on a note payable " to the heirs, executors,
or assigns of A." (q~) To a bill there are three parties, drawer,
drawee, and payee. The drawee is not bound until acceptance ;
and then having become the acceptor, he is regarded as prima-
rily the promisor, and the drawer only collaterally ; (r) and the
drawer is therefore liable in very much the same way as the
indorser of a note. And as with a note so with a bill of ex-
change, the payee must be sufficiently certain, that is, a per-
son capable of being ascertained at the time the instrument is
drawn, (s)

So too the payer should be certain ; and generally if one who
is guardian or trustee or the holder of some office, signs with his
name, adding thereto the name of his function or office, with
intent to make himself liable only in that capacity, such addition
will generally be held only as words of description, and he will
be personally liable on the note, (ss) 1 This question has been
considered in the chapter on Agents, and the section on the
Signature of an Agent.

If the payee be a fictitious person, an innocent indorsee may
sue the drawer or maker ; but as to the acceptor it has been held

Bristol !>. Warner, 19 Conn. 7; Poplewell E. L. & E. 562; Blair v. Bank of Ten-

v. Wilson, 1 Stra. 264 ; Lines v. Smith, 4 nessee, 11 Humph. 84. But a drawee

Fla. 47 ; Clark v. Schneider, 17 Mo. 295. who is only an accommodation acceptor,

(p) Delano v. Bartlett, 6 Cush. 364. is but a surety for the drawer for most

But see Fitch v. Redding, 4 Sandf. 130. purposes. Parks v. Ingram, 2 Foster (N.

(pp) Baukman v. Jenks, 55 Barb. 468. II.), 283; Sternan o. Harrison, 42 Penn.

(pq) Hull i;. Augustine, 23 Wis. 383. St. 49.

(</) Bennington v. Dinsmore, 2 Gill, (s) Yates v. Nash, 98 Eng. C. L. 581 ;

348. See also as to necessary certainty 1 Parsons, Notes and Bills, 61.
of the payee, Cowie v. Stirling, 6 E. & (ss) Foster v. Fuller, 6 Mass. 68 ; Fiske

B. 333. v. Eldridge, 12 Gray, 474.

(r) Attenborough v. Mackenzie, 36

1 A bill of exchange headed " Office of B. Co.," and concluding "charge same to
account of B. Co.," and signed "A., Prcs't, C, Sec'y," does not bind the signers
personally. Hitchcock v. Buchanan, 105 U. S. 416.

282

CH. XVI.J NOTES AND BILLS. * 250

that he is answerable only if he knew that the payee was ficti-
tiousi But we should have some doubts of this, (i)

Where instruments are not negotiable, third parties may be-
come interested ; but, if they are to be regarded as new parties
at all, it is only with much qualification.

SECTION III.

WHO MAY INDORSE.

Only negotiable paper can be indorsed, in the technical and
legal sense of this word ; and an indorsement can be made only
by the original payee or by some one who is made payee by
indorsement to him. But not unfrequently a stranger to the note
writes his name on the back, and then the question arises what
is his relation to the note. On this point we have already stated
that there is a singular diversity in the decisions of different
States. In some he is held as a joint promisor or surety, (tt) 1

(t) Collis v. Emett, 1 H. Bl. 313; v. Tliomas, 7 Mo. 440 ; Lewis v. Harvey,

Munet v. Gibson, 3 T. R. 481. See 18 id. 74; Perry v. Barret, id. 140;

Stevens e. Strang, 2 Sandf. 138. Schneider v. Scliiffman, 20 id. 571.

(It) In Massachusetts, Baker v. Briggs, South Carolina, Stoney v. Beaubien, 2

8 Pick. 122, 130; Tenny v. Prince, 4 id. McMullen, 313; Baker v. Scott, 5 Rich.

385 ; Austin v. Boyd, 24 id 64 ; Hawkes 305 ; Carpenter v. Oaks, 10 id. 17. In

v. Phillips, 7 Gray, 284 ; Draper v. Weld, Louisiana, such party is regarded as a

13 id. 580; Union Bank v. Willis, 8 Met. surety. McGuire v. Bosworth, 1 La. An.

504. In this last case the previous cases 248 ; Penny v. Parham, id. 274. The

on this subject in Massachusetts are principle upon which one not the payee

carefully reviewed. Maine. Irish v. Cut- signing negotiable paper in blank upon

ter, 31 Maine, 536 ; Leonard v. Wildes, 36 the back of it is charged as a promisor,

id. 265 ; Malbon v. Southard, id. 147 ; if he does this at the time the note is

Childs v. Wyinan, 44 id. 433; Adam3 o. made, is stated by Mr. Justice Parker,

Hardy, 32 id. 339. Vermont, Nash v. in Moies v. Bird, 11 Mass. 436, 440. In

Skinner, 12 Vt. 219 ; Sylvester v. Dow- Lewis v. Harvey, 18 Mo. 74, Gamble,

ner, 20 id. 355. New Hampshire, Martin J., delivering the opinion of the court,

v. Boyd, 11 N. H. 385. Missouri, Powell said : " We think the strength of argu-

1 But the rule of Union Bank v. Willis, supra, does not apply where the note is
payable to the maker's own order, and there can be only a promise to pay such per-
son, as the maker himself makes the bearer or indorsee, Stoddard v. Penniman, 108
Mass. 366, 370; or if when negotiated the maker's name appears first on the back of the
note, Dubois v. Mason, 127 Mass. 37. But in Massachusetts, by a late statute, one in-
dorsing a note above the name of the payee is liable only on the failure of the maker to
pay, and not absolutely. Commonwealth Bank v. Law, 127 Mass. 72. If a stranger,
for a sufficient consideration, places his name on the back of a note after it is due,
changes the rate of interest on the face of the note, pays the interest then due, and sub-
sequently pays an instalment of interest at the changed rate, he is liable as an original
promisor. Kodocanachi v. Buttrick, 125 Mass. 134.

283

250

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

in others as a guarantor, (tu~) in others as an indorser. (tv~) In
most of the States the effect of such indorsement depends on the
intention of the parties, which may be shown by evidence ; (tw~)

ment is decidedly opposed to the conclu-
Bion that the party who puts his name
upon the hack of a note to which he is
not a party, whether it be negotiable or
not, is to be held only as an indorser.
We think that he is to be taken to have
assumed the obligation arising from the
act of putting his name upon paper as it
then was, and upon which he could not
then be an indorser. Shall he, then, be
held to be a guarantor or a maker ? In
the absence of all extrinsic evidence, it is
but giving effect to his signature to allow
the holder to treat him as a maker, for
that is the effect most beneficial to the
holder, and is entirely consistent with the
meaning of his signature."

((«) As in Illinois, Webster v. Cobb, 17
111. 459 ; Klein v. Currier, 14 id. 237 ; Car-
roll c. Weld, 13 id. 682 ; Camden v. Mc-
Koy, 3 Scam. 437 ; Cushman v. Dement,
id. 497; Smith u. Finch, 2 id. 321. In
Ohio, Robinson v. Abell, 17 Ohio, 36;
Greenough v. Smead, 3 Ohio St. 415. In
Kansas, Firman v. Blood, 2 Kansas, 496. In
Texas, Can- r. Rowland, 14 Texas, 275;
Cook r. Southwick, 9 id. 615. In Vir-
ginia, Watson v. Hurt, 6 Gratt. 633. In
Connecticut, Clark v. Merriam, 25 Conn.
576 ; Beckwith ;>. Angell, 6 id. 315 ; Per-
kins c. Catlin, 11 id. 213; Ranson v. Sher-
wood, 26 id. 437. These cases in Con-
necticut hold that such indorsement in
blank prima facie implies a contract on
the part of the indorser that the note is
due and payable according to its tenor,
that the maker shall be of ability to pay
it when it comes to maturity, and that it
is collectible by the use of due diligence.
In Pennsylvania, it is held, that, where a
negotiable note is indorsed by one not a
party to it, the presumption from the pa-
per is, that he indorsed as second indorser
for the accommodation of the prior
parties, and no liability would attach to
him so long as the note remains in the
hands of the payee ; but when made at
the request of the payee, who acts upon
the faith of it, it imparts a guaranty.
Sehollenberger v. Nehf, 28 Penn. St. 189.
The rule adopted in Ohio differs from
that which prevails in Massachusetts in
this, that in the former State a stranger
indorsing in blank is presumed to be a
guarantor; in the latter State he is pre-
sumed to be an original promisor. But
in Ohio such person may be charged as
maker upon proof that his indorsement
was made at the time of execution by

284

the other party, or if afterward, that it
was in pursuance of an agreement or in-
tention that he should become responsi-
ble from the date of the execution. In
Massachusetts, the indorsement is pre-
sumed to have been made at the time of
the execution of the note ; so that the
difference in fact is only one as to the
presumption of the time of the indorse-
ment, though it has not been so stated in
the Ohio decision. See Greenough c.
Smead, supra.

(Ir) As in New York, Spies r. Gilmore,
1 Comst. 321; Ellis v. Brown, 6 Barb.
282 ; Waterbury v. Sinclair, 26 id 405 ;
Cottrell v. Conklin, 4 T)ucr, 45. These
decisions overrule the earlier ones in this
State, holding such indorser liable as an
original promisor. See Herrick v. Car-
man, 12 Johns. 159 ; Campbell v. Butler ;
14 id. 349. In Indiana. Wells v. Jackson,
6 Blackf. 40 ; Cecil r. Mix, 6 Ind. 478 ;
Vore v. Hurst, 13 id. 551. In Tennessee,
Camparree v. Brockway, 11 Humph. 355;
Clouston v. Barbiere, 4 Sneed, 336. In
Iowa, Fear p. Dunlap, 1 Greene, 331. In
California, sucli party is called a guar-
antor, but his liability is the same as that
of an indorser. Riggs v. Waldo, 2 Cal.
485 ; Pierce r. Kennedy, 5 id. 138. Mis-
sissippi, Jennings v. Thomas, 13 S. & M.
617, 5 id. 627.

(tw) Clark v. Merriam, 26 Conn. 576;
Sehollenberger ?•. Nehf, 28 Penn. St. 189 ;
Carroll v. Weld, 13 111. 682; Cottrell v.
Conklin, 4 Duer, 45; Lewis v. Harvey, 18
Mo. 74; Barrows r. Lane, 5 Vt. 161;
Knapp v. Parker, 6 id. 642 ; Sandford v.
Norton, 14 id. 228; Flint v. Day, 9 id.
345 ; Sylvester v. Downer, 20 id. 355 ;
Beckwith v. Angell, 6 Conn. 315; Perkins
v. Catlin, 11 id. 213; Champion r. Grif-
fith, 13 Ohio, 228; Robinson r. Abell, 17
id. 36 ; Greenough r. Smead, 3 Ohio St.
415 ; Jennings v. Thomas, 13 S. & M. 617,
5 id. 627 ; Fear v. Dunlap, 1 Greene,
Iowa, 331 ; Patterson ,-. Todd, 18 Penn.
St. 426. This question is discussed at
length in Perkins v. Catlin, 11 Conn. 213,
by Huntington, J., who said : " The in-
dorsement is not controlled by the oral
testimony, but completed according to
the manifest intention of the parties.
The evidence is offered in conformity
with the familiar rule, that the law does
not imply a contract where an express
one has been made." Thus, where a
party guaranteed a note " good," it may
be shown that the plaintiff took the note

CH. XVI.]

NOTES AND BILLS.

251

but in Massachusetts the presumption that he intended to be an
original promisor seems to be conclusive, (tx)

The indorsement of a bill or note passes no property, unless
the indorser had at the time a legal property in the
note, (u) * And therefore a married woman cannot at * 251
common law, indorse a note made payable to her before or
during her coverture, unless by force of some statutory provi-
sion, (v) Nor does the property in a note pass by indorsement,
if the indorsee knew at the time he received it that the indorser
had no right to make the transfer, (w) A party receiving a bill
or note as agent, or for any particular purpose, and exceed-
ing bis authority or violating his duty, may nevertheless pass
the property in the note to a bond fide holder, (x) But no

under an express agreement that tho
plaintiff should run his own risk as to
the solvency of the maker, the plaintiff
saying, previous to the signing of the
guaranty, that it was only a guaranty,
that the note was not paid, or that it was
genuine, though knowing at the time that
it was of different legal effect, and that
the defendant was ignorant of the legal
effect of it, and relied upon the plaintiff's
representation. Cooke v. Nathan, 16
Barb. 343. See in this connection, the
remarks of Watte, J., in Castle v. Can-
dee, 16 Conn. 223.

{tx) In Wright v. Morse, 9 Gray, 337,
the defendant, whose name was on the
back of the note, and who was not the
payee, offered to show that at the time
he signed the note it was agreed by the
plaintiff, the payee of the note, and the
defendant, that if the maker of the note
should arrive safely in California, the
defendant was to be released, and the
plaintiff was not to look to the defendant
for the payment of the note, and that the
defendant was only a guarantor, that, if
the maker should arrive safely at Califor-
nia, then the plaintiff was to get his money
from the maker. Held inadmissible. See
also Essex Co. v. Edmands, 12 Gray, 273.

(u) Mead v. Young, 4 T. R. 28. In this
case it was held that in an action by the
indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of
exchange, drawn payable to " A, or or-
der," it is competent for the defendant to
give in evidence that the person who in-
dorsed to the plaintiff was not the real
payee, though he be of the same name,
and though there be no addition to the
name of the payee on the bill. The in-
dorsement and delivery must both be
made by the person then having the legal
interest in the note ; and if a note is in-

dorsed by the payee, and retained in his
possession, and after his death is deliv-
ered by his executor to the person to
whom it was indorsed, the title to the
note is not thus transferred. Bromage v.
Lloyd, 1 Exch. 31 ; Lloyd v. Howard, 1
E. L. & E. 227, n.; Awde v. Dixon, 5 E.
L. & E. 512 ; s. c. 6 Exch. 869 ; Prescott
v. Brinsley, 6 Cush. 233 ; Clark v. Boyd,
2 Hamm. 56; Clark p. Sigourney, 17
Conn. 611. See also Bay v. Coddington,
5 Johns. Ch. 54; Lawrence v. Stonington
Bank, (i Conn. 521.

('■) Savage v. King, 17 Me. 301. See
Barlow v. Bishop, 1 East, 432 ; Common-
wealth u. Manley, 12 Pick. 173.

(w) See Roberts v. Eden, 1 B. & P.
398; Stoddard r. Kimball, 6 Cush. 470.

(x) Thus where the drawer of a bill
of exchange which had been accepted,
wrote his name across the back of it, and
delivered it to A to get it discounted, and
A, while the bill was yet running, de-
posited it with B, as security for money
advanced to himself, but without any
fraud in B, this was held to be a valid in-
dorsement from the drawer to B. Palmer
v. Richards, 1 E. L. & E. 529. In this
case, Parke, Baron, said : " I think this
was a perfectly good indorsement from
Edwards to Tingey. If the allegation in
the declaration were that there had been
an indorsement of this bill from Edwards
to Brown, it would be a question of fact
whether the writing of Edwards's name
on the back of the instrument, accom-
panied by a delivery of it to Brown,
meant to transfer the property in the
bill to him, so as to enable him to in-
dorse it as his own, or merely to hand it
over to another party. As to the case
which has been cited, of Lloyd c. How-
ard, I think the decision there was per-

285

*252

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

* 252 assignee, even for * good consideration, can hold the bill
or note, if he knew or had direct and sufficient means of
knowing that the transfer of the same to him was wrongful or
unauthorized. The assignor may have held the bill or note by
indorsement to him; and as an indorsement may always be
restricted or conditioned at the pleasure of the indorser, the
assignor was bound to obey such restriction ; and an assignee
by indorsement, who knows that the indorsement to him was
made in disregard of such restriction, has no property in the bill
or note. («/) If a negotiable bill or note be indorsed for consid-
eration, so that the whole property passes to the indorsee, its
negotiable quality passes with it ; and it may be doubted whether
this negotiability can be restrained by the indorsement, (z) But
where the indorsement is without consideration, and is intended
merely to give the indorsee authority to receive money for the
indorser, there the restriction operates ; and if such indorsee again
indorses it over, the second indorsee cannot hold it, because the
first indorsement gave him notice that the first indorsee had no
power to transfer the note, (a)

If a note is once indorsed in blank it is thereafter transferable

fectly right, and an authority for saying
that there was no indorsement from Ed-
wards to Brown ; for the mere writing of
a man's name on the back of an instru-
ment is not enough for that purpose ; it
is only one act towards it ; and Lloyd v.
Howard shows that the writing the name
and handing the instrument to a third
person, without any intention to pass the
property in it to that person, is insuffi-
cient to constitute an indorsement to
that person. But if a man writes his
name on the back of a bill of exchange
in order that it may be negotiated, and
any person afterwards receives it for
value, it does not lie in the indorser's
mouth to say that the bill was not in-
dorsed to that person ; and it has been
the established rule ever since the case of
Collins v. Martin, 1 15. & P. 648, that any
person who thus takes a bill for value is
the indorsee of it. I think that Edwards,
by putting his name on the back of this
bill, and putting it into the hands of his
agent, with authority to represent him,
who hands it over to a third party, ought
not to be permitted to say that he did
not indorse it to any person who took it
for value from his agent, The question,
therefore, here is, whether, there being
no proof of any fraud in Tingey, he may

286

not be considered a holder of the bill,
and Edwards, as having indorsed it to
him. The case is distinguishable from
Lloyd r. Howard in this, that if this bill
were indorsed to Brown solely with the
view to enable him to pass it away, and
not to treat him as owner of the bill him-
self, no property passed from Edwards
to him ; and if such property had been
alleged, the case of Lloyd v. Howard
would apply. But that decision does not
hold with respect to a third person who
received it from the agent whom Ed-
wards intrusted with it, and who has
paid value for it." See also Mars ton v.
Allen, 8 M. & W. 494; Andrews v. Bond,
16 Barb. 633 ; Smith v. Braine, 3 E. L. &
E. 379; Moody v. Threlkeld, 13 Ga. 555;
Stoddard b. Kimball, 6 Cush. 469.

(y) Ancheru. Bank of England, Dougl.
037'; Sieourneyt'. Llovd, 8 B. & C. 622;
8. o. 3 Mo. & P. 229, 5 Bins 525 ; Robert-
son v. Kensington, 4 Taunt. 30. See also
Bolton v. Puller, 1 B. & P. 539; Rams-
bottom v. Cator, 1 Stark. 228 ; Savage v.
Aldren, 2 Stark. 232.

(z) See ante, p. * 239.

(a) Edie >: East India Co. 2 Burr.
1216, per Wilmot, J.; Wilson v. Holmes,
5 Mass. 543 ; Power v. Finnie, 4 Call, 411,
per lloane, J.

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS. * 253

by mere delivery so long as the indorsement continues blank, and
its negotiability cannot be restricted by subsequent special in-
dorsements, but the holder may strike them all out and recover
under the blank indorsement, by filling that so as to make the
note payable to himself. (6) Where one has acquired a bill by
indorsement, bond fide, he may hold it and recover upon it, al-
though earlier parties knew that it was transferred wrongfully
or without authority, (c)

* If a negotiable bill or note which is open to any defence * 253
that can be made only against a holder with knowledge or
notice, pass by indorsement, for consideration, to a holder without
knowledge or notice, against whom the defence cannot be made,
and this holder indorse it over for consideration to a party who
has knowledge or notice of the defence, such indorsee may never-
theless recover on the note, because he stands on the right of his
indorser. The party bound to pay it to the holder without notice
is not injured by being bound to pay it to his indorsee ; and the
innocent holder has not only the right of enforcing payment,
but of transferring the note by indorsement ; and with it all his
rights, (d)

No party can be at once plaintiff and defendant ; hence a firm
which is promisee of a note, cannot sue a firm that is promisor, if
any person is a member of both firms ; and a note signed by sev-
eral makers and payable to one of them, cannot be sued by him.
But if any such note passes by indorsement into the hands of a
third party, he may sue all the parties to the note, (e)

Any person may accept or indorse a bill, or sign or indorse a
note, as agent for another ; and the principal is held and not the
agent, if there was sufficient authority for the act, and the act
itself was properly done. A general authority to transact busi-
ness, however wide in its terms, is seldom construed to include
the power of making or indorsing negotiable paper. (ee~) But an

(b) Smith v. Clarke, 1 Esp. 180, Peake gave money for it, it is a good note as to
Cas. 225, per Lord Kenyan; Mitchell o. him, unless there should be some fraud or
Fuller, 15 Penn. St. 268. equity against him appearing in the case."

(c) And this although his indorser (d) Hascall v. Whitmore, 19 Me. 102 ;
acquired the bill or note by fraud. Salt- Thomas v. Newton, 2 C. & P. 606; Solo-
marsh v. Tuthill, 13 Ala. 390. See also mons v. Bank of England, 13 East, 135;
Haly v. Lane, 2 Atk. 181, where Lord Smith v. Hiscock, 14 Me. 449 ; Chalmers
Hardwkke is reported to have said: v. Lanion, 1 Camp. 383.

" Where there is a negotiable note, and (e) Heywood ». Wingate, 14 N. H. 73.

it comes into the hands of a third or See ante, p * 165.

fourth indorsee, though some of the (ee) Lawrence v. Gebhard, 41 Barb,

former indorsees might not pay a valu- 575, is an interesting case on this

able consideration, yet if the last indorsee question.

287

* 25-1 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

authority from a payee to indorse a note payable to his order, is
not to be inferred from the mere act of delivery. (/) And when
authorized the agent should show unequivocally that he acts only
as agent, if he intends not to bind himself ; and he seems to be
held to this obligation more strictly in England, (#) than in this
country. (K)

*254 * SECTION IV.

OF INDORSEMENT AFTER MATURITY.

Notes and bills are usually transferred by indorsement before
they are due. But they may be so transferred after they are due,
and before they are paid. There is, however, a very important
difference between the effect of the transfer of a bill or note
before its maturity, and that of such transfer when the bill or
note is overdue. The bond fide holder of a note by indorsement
before maturity takes it subject to no equities existing between
his assignor and the promisor which are not indicated on the face
of the note, (J) and to none which do not exist at the time of the
transfer. (/) It was once much questioned whether he who re-
ceived a note under circumstances of suspicion was not bound to
ascertain for himself, and at his own peril, that the note came
rightfully into his hands ; and therefore a promisor might defend
against the note, by showing that he had lost it, or that it was
stolen from him, or by any other similar defence, showing also
that this might have been ascertained by the holder before receiv-
ing the note. (¥) But the weight of recent authority is in favor

(/) Harrop v. Fisher, 100 Eng. C. L. not to apply to negotiable notes. Wins-

196 ; s. c. 10 J. Scott, 196. ton v. Westfeldt, 22 Ala. 760.

(g) Nicholls v. Diamond, 24 E. L. & E. ( /) Furniss v. Gilchrist, 1 Sandf .

403; Mare v. Charles, 34 E. L. & E. 138; 53.

s. c. 5 E. & B. 978. (k) In Gill v. Cubitt, 3 B. & C. 466,

(h) Hicks v. Hinde, 9 Barb. 628; where a bill of exchange was stolen dur-

Babcock v. BemaD, 1 Kern. 200 ; De Witt ing the night, and taken to the office of a

u. Walton, 5 Seld. 571. See ante, p. *52. discount broker early in the following

(i) Brown r. Davies, 3 T. R. 82, per morning by a person whose features were
Buller, J. ; Hall v. Wilson, 16 Barb. 548 ; known, but whose name was unknown to
Fletcher v. Gushee, 32 Me. 587 ; Walker the broker, and the latter, being satisfied
v. Davis, 33 id. 516 ; Gwynn r. Lee, 9 with the name of the acceptor, discounted
Gill, 138 ; Kohlman v. Ludwig, 5 La. the bill, according to his usual practice,
An. 33. And the doctrine of lis pendens without making any inquiry of the per-
is that whoever purchases property which son who brought it ; it was held that, in
is at that time in litigation, takes it sub- an action on the bill by the broker against
ject to any decree or judgment made in the acceptor, the jury were properly di-
respect to it in the pending suit, is held rected to find a verdict for the defendant,

288

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS. * 255

of the rule that such holder is entitled to the benefit of the
note, unless * he is a wilful party to the wrong by which it * 255
comes into his hands, or, perhaps, has been guilty of such
negligence as amounts to constructive fraud ; (7) 1 for even gross
negligence alone would not deprive him of his right, (m) 2 But
the authorities on this subject are not, as our note will show, in
entire agreement. The law is certainly otherwise, however, if
the bill or note were transferred to him when overdue, (n) It
comes to him then discredited ; he is put upon his guard ; and,
although he pays a full consideration for it, he receives nothing
but the title and rights of his assignor. Such a bill or note can
no longer represent a distinct and definite credit, or money to be
paid at a certain period ; and as it no longer answers the purpose
or performs the functions of negotiable paper, it no longer shares
the privileges of such instruments. And it is therefore said that
any defence which might be made against the assignor may be
made available against the assignee ; (o) and where a note was

if they* thought that the plaintiff had J., says : " I never could understand what
taken the bill under circumstances which is meant by a party's taking a bill under
ought to have excited the suspicion of a circumstances which ought to have ex-
prudent and careful man ; and they hav- cited the suspicion of a prudent man."
ing found for the defendant, the court re- But the authority of these cases is de-
fused to disturb the verdict. Down v. nied in Pringle o. Phillips, 5 Sandf. 157,
Hailing, 4 B. & C. 330 ; Smith v. Mec. & and an opposite doctrine strongly main-
Tran. Bk. 6 La. An. 610. tained and decided. So also in Roth &

(/) Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452; Law- Co. v. Colvin, Allen & Co. 32 Vt. 125,

son v. Weston, 4 Esp. 56 ; Goodman v. where the law is fully examined by

Harvey, 6 Nev. & M. 372 ; Cone v. Bald- Poland, J., and the doctrine of Gill v.

win, 12 Pick. 545 ; Matthews v. Poythress, Cubitt reaffirmed, and the case of Pringle

4 Ga. 287 ; Raphael v. Bank of England, v. Phillips fully approved. And see Mer-

33 E. L. & E. 276, 17 C. B. 161 ; Magee riam v. Granite Bank, 8 Gray, 264 ; and

v. Badger 30 Barb. 246. See contra, Nut- Crosby v. Grant, 36 N. H. 273 ; Hall v.

ter v Stover 48 Me. 163. Hale, 8 Conn. 336 ; Sandford v. Norton,

(m) "Gross negligence may be evi- 14 Vt. 228 ; Tutor v. Patton, 13 La. 213;

dence of mala fides, but is not the same Greneaux v. Wheeler, 6 Tex. 515.

thing. We have shaken off the last (n) Chalmers v. Lamon, 1 Camp 383 ;

remnant of the contrary doctrine." Per Thomas v. Newton, 2 C. * P. 606; Smith

Lord Denman, Goodman v. Harvey, 4 A. v. Hiscock 14 Me. 449 ; Hascall v. Whit-

& E. 870, 6 Nev. & M. 372. It is a ques- more 19 id. 102.

tion for the jury whether the party taking o) Brown ». Davies, 3 T. E. 80 per
the bill was guilty of bad faith. See Buller J.; Beek v Robley ,1 H Bl. 89, n.
Cunliffe o. Booth, 3 Bing. N. C. 821. In Id) ; Howard v Ames 3 Met 308 ; Mac-
Crook ,. Jadis, 5 B. & Ad. 909, Patteson, kay v. Holland, 4 id. 69 ; Potter v. Tyler,

i Johnson v. Way, 27 Ohio St. 374. .

2 One who purchases negotiable paper before due for a valuable consideration, in
good faith and without actual knowledge or notice of any defect of title, although guilty
of gross negligence, holds it by a title valid as against every other person, oeyoel
v. Currency* Bank,' 54 N. Y. 288; First Bank wGoodsell, 107 Mass. 149; Phelau
». Moss 67Penn. St. 59; Comstock v. Hannah, 76 III. 530; Shreeves y. Allen, 79
111 553 — A purchaser for value, of unmatured commercial paper, with in terest_ over-
due is not from that fact alone, affected with notice of prior equities or infirmities m
the title. Cromwell v. Sac County, 96 U. S. 51; Kelley v. Whitney, 45 Wis. 110.

19 289

256

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

sold and delivered before maturity but not indorsed until
* 256 after maturity, it was * held open to the same defences as
if it had been transferred after dishonor. (j>) This rule
has, however, this important qualification. It is said by high
authorities, and on good reason, that the defence must arise from
the note itself, or the transaction in which the note originated,
and not from any collateral matter, {q)

Although paper negotiated when overdue is subject to equitable
defences, yet a demand must be made on the acceptor or maker
within reasonable time, and reasonable notice must be given to an
indorser, or he will be discharged, (r)

As between the original parties to negotiable paper the consid-
eration may always be inquired into ; and so it may as between
indorser and indorsee, (s) But an action by an indorsee against
the maker cannot be defeated by showing that no consideration

2 id. 58; McNeil v. McDonald, 1 Hill
(S. C), 1; Mosteller r. Bosh, 7 Ired. Eq.
39; Connery v. Kendall, 5 La. An. 515;
Sawyer t\ Hoovey, id. 153; Lancaster
Bank v. Woodward, 18 Penn. Si. 857 ;
Clay r. Cottrell, id. 408. — The burden of
proving, however, that the note was in-
dorsed after it was overdue, in order to
let in his equities, is on the defendant;
for the presumption is that the indorse-
ment was made at or soon after the date
of the note, or at least before its matur-
ity. Burnham v. Wood, 8 N. 11. 334;
Burnham v. Webster, 10 Me. 232 ; Ranger
r. Carey, 1 Met. 369; Cain r\ Spann, 1
McMull. 258 ; Washburn r. Ramsdell, 17
Vt. 299. — And this burden is not dis-
charged by proof that the note was
transferred and delivered to the plain-
tiff before it was dishonored, but was
not indorsed until afterwards. Ranger
v. Carey, 1 Met. 369. — Suspicious cir-
cumstances, however, may rebut this
presumption. Snyder v. Riley, 6 Barr,
165 ; Tarns v. Way, 13 Penn. St. 222.
. (p) Southard v. Porter, 43 N. H. 239.
(q) Burrougli v. Moss, 10 B. & C. 558;
Whitehead v. Walker, 10 M. & W. 69(3 ;
Carruthers v. West, UQ.B. 143; Hughes
v. Large, 2 Barr, 103; Cumberland Bank
v. Hann, 3 Harrison, 223; Chandler v.
Drew, 6 N. H. 469; Robinson !'. Lyman,
10 Conn. 31; Britton v. Bishop, 11 Vt.
70; Robertson v. Breedlove, 7 Port. (Ala.)
541 ; Tuscumbia R, R. Co. >•. Rhodes, 8
Ala. 206; Tinsley t>. Beall, 2 (ia. 134;
Hankins v. Shoup, 2 Cart. (Ind.) 342;
McAIpin v. Wingard, 2 Rich. L. 547 ;
Oulds v. Harrison, 28 E. L. & E. 524, 10

290

Exch. 572; Arnot v. Woodburn, 35 Mo.
99. In Massachusetts and South Caro-
lina all set-offs between the original par-
ties existing at the time of the transfer
of the title are allowed. Sargent v.
Southgate, 5 Pick. 312 ; Nixon v. Eng-
lish, 3 McCord, 549; Perry v. Mays, 2
Bailey, 354 ; Cain o. Spann, 1 McMull,
258. So in Maine : Burnham u. Tucker,
18 Me. 179 ; Wood v. Warren, 19 id. 23.
In New York the point was considered
doubtful in Miner o. Hoyt, 4 Hill, 193,
197. — In Massachusetts, however, equi-
ties arising between the original parties
after the transfer of title, but before
notice to the maker, cannot be set off as
against the indorsee. Ranger v. Carey,
1 Met. 369 ; Baxter v. Little, 6 id. 7.

(r) McKinney v. Crawford, 8 S. & R.
351; D wight v. Emerson, 2 N. H. 159;
Patterson v. Todd, 18 Penn. St. 426;
Levy !•. Drew, 14 Ark. 334 ; Thayer v.
Brackett, 12 Mass. 465 ; Field e. Nicker-
son, 13 Mass. 138 ; Berry v. Robinson, 9
Johns. 121.

(s) De Bras v. Forbes, 1 Esp. 117;
Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 71, per
Ashliunt, J.; Abbot v. Hendricks, 1 Man.
& G. 791; Herrick v. Carman, 10 Johns.
224 ; Hill v. Ely, 5 S. & R. 363 ; Clement
v. Reppard, 15 Penn. St. Ill; Johnson v.
Martinus, 4 Halst. 144 ; Hill v. Buck-
minster, 5 Pick. 391 ; Fisher v. Salmon,

1 Cal. 413; Fisher v. Leland, 4 Cush.
456; Bank of Tennessee v. Johnson, 1
Swan, 217. It is held in Starr v. Torrey,

2 N. J. 190, that failure of consideration
known to indorsee, is a defence in a suit
by him against maker.

CH. XVI. J NOTES AND BILLS. * 257

passed to the maker from the payee and indorser, (t) or between
any remote parties.

A distinction of this kind is sometimes made. An in-
dorsee * who buys a note for less than its face, can recover * 257
from his indorser only what he paid, with interest ; but
may recover from the maker, the whole amount of the note. This
has been held in some cases in New York. (2) See on this sub-
ject the chapter on Usury.

On the ground that negotiable paper is intended only for busi-
ness purposes, and has its peculiar privileges only that it may
more perfectly perform this function, it has been held that one
who takes a negotiable note, even before its maturity, but only in
payment of or as security for an antecedent debt, without giving
for it any new consideration, does not take it in the way of busi-
ness, and is not a bond fide holder ; and that he therefore holds
the note subject to all equitable defences. This doctrine rests
upon adjudications and opinions of great weight ; but it is also
denied by very high authorities, indeed by the highest in this
country, the Supreme Court of the United States, who have de-
cided that a pre-existing debt of itself, and without any strength-
ening circumstances, is of itself a sufficient consideration. But it
has nevertheless been held since that decision, by courts entitled
to great respect, that the doctrine of the Supreme Court is erro-
neous and untenable. It must be admitted that the law on this
subject is in a very unsettled state ; but it may be supposed that
in this country the authority of the Supreme Court will generally
prevail, (a) 1

(() Perkins v. Challis, 1 N. H. 254; changed the common law. Oertel v.
Waterman v. Barratt, 4 Harring. (Del.) Schroeder, 48 111. 183.
311. See Klopp & Stump o. Lebanon (z) Ingalls v. Lee, 9 Barb. 647 ; Cram
Valley Bank, 39 Penn. St. 489, as to v. Hendricks, 7 Wend. 569; Rapelye v.
incompetency of indorser as a witness Anderson, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 472; Youngs
to impair the legal effect of the note u. Lee, 18 Barb. 187.
in the hands of a holder to whom it (a) In Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 19, the
was regularly negotiated. The Supreme court say, " We have no hesitation in
Court of Illinois holds that a statute of saying that pre-existing debt does con-
that State permitting the defence of stitute a valuable consideration in the
want or failure of consideration, has sense of the general rule already stated,

1 In Railroad Co. v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14, affirming Swift v. Tyson, supra,
and Oates v. National Bank, 100 TJ. S. 239, Harlan, J., declared that "Our conclusion,
therefore, is that the transfer, before maturity, of negotiable paper, as security for an
antecedent debt merely, without other circumstances, if the paper be so indorsed that
the holder becomes a party to the instrument, although the transfer is without express
agreement by the creditor for indulgence, is not an improper use of such paper, and is
as much in the usual course of commercial business as its transfer in payment of such
debt. In either case, the bond fide holder is unaffected by equities or defences between

291

258

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

* 258 * It has been held that a note indorsed and negotiated
on the last day of grace, is subject to the same defences as
if indorsed after dishonor. (6)

aa applicable to negotiable instruments."
So held in Succession of Dulhonde, 21
La. An. 3. This question has not yet
received a distinct adjudication in Eng-
land, and the following cases, in which
it has incidentally arisen, leave in doubt
what the inclination of judicial opinion
is. Bramah v. Roberts, 1 Bing. N. C.
469 ; Percival v. Frampton, 2 C. M. & R.
180; Crofts t>. Beal, 5 E. L. & E. 408.
The cases of Collins v. Marten, 1 B. & P.
650; Hey wood v. Watson, 4 Bing. 496;
De la Chaumette v. Bank of England,
9 B. & C. 209 ; Smith v. De Witt, 6 Dow.

6 R. 20, have some bearing on the ques-
tion. The decisions in this country have
turned chiefly upon the question whether
the transfer is for a valid consideration.
The weight of authority is, that the
transfer of a negotiable instrument, in
payment of a debt already due, or where
upon the faith of such transfer other
security is relinquished or indulgence
given, is for a valid consideration, and
entitles the holder to protection. Smith
v. Van Loan, 16 Wend. 659 ; Bank of
Salina v. Bahcock, 21 Wend. 499 ; Bank
of Sandusky v. Scoville, 24 Wend. 115 ;
Marshall, C. J., Coolidge v. Payson, 2
Wheat. 60, 73 ; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet.
15 ; Walker w. Geiss, 4 Whart. 252, 258 ;
Homes v. Smyth, 16 Me. 177 ; Norton v.
Waite, 20 Me. 175 ; Adams v. Smith, 35
Me. 324; Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn.
388; Bostwick v. Dodge, 1 Dougl. (Mich.)
413; Reddick v. Jones, 6 Ircd. L. 107;
Nichol v. Bate, 10 Yerg. 429 ; Wormley v.
Lowry, 1 Humph. 470; Cobb v. Doyle,

7 R. I. 550 ; Brown v. Leavitt, 31 N. Y.
113 ; Stotts v. Byers, 17 la. 303 ; Curtis
v. Mohr, 18 Wis. 61 ; Boatman's Institu-
tion v. Holland, 38 Mo. 49; Mailing
v. McClure, 30 111. 490; Stevenson v.
Heyland, 11 Minn. 198; Citizens Bank
v. Payne, 18 La. 222. Contra, Rosa v.
Brotherson, 10 Wend. 85 ; Bright v. Jud-
son, 47 Barb. 29. But see Smith v. Van
Loan, supra ; Ontario Bank u, Worthing-
ton, 12 Wend. 593; Payne v. Cutler, 13
Wend. 605. In the following cases, it is
held that, where the transfer is merely for

the sake of collateral security, there is no
valid consideration, and the holder is not
entitled to protection against the equities.
Bay v. Coddington, 6 Johns. Ch. 54; s.
c. 20 Johns. 637 ; Stalker v. McDonald,
6 Hill (N. Y.), 93 ; Clark v. Ely, 2 Sand.
Ch. 166; Mickles v. Colvin, 4 Barb. 304;
Fenby v. Pritchard, 2 Sandf. 151 ; Youngs
v. Lee, 18 Barb. 187, 2 Kern. 561; Kirk-
patrick c. Muirhead, 16 Penn. St. 123;
Petrie v. Clark, 11 S. & R. 377 ; Bertrand
v. Barkman, 8 Eng. (Ark.) 150; Jenness
v. Bean, 10 N. H. 266 ; Williams r. Little,
11 N. H. 66; Prentice v. Zane, 2 Gratt.
262 ; Gibson v. Conner, 3 Ga. 47 ; Allaire
v. Hartshorne, 1 N. J. 665 ; Bramhall v.
Beckett, 31 Me. 205 ; Alexander v. Spring-
field Bank, 2 Met. (Ky ) 534. Contra,
Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 15; Chicopee
Bnnk v. Chapin, 8 Met. 40; Stevens v.
Blanchard, 3 Cush. 168 ; Valette v. Mason,
1 Smith (Ind.), 89; s. c. 1 Cart. 288;
Pugh ». Durfee, 1 Blatch. 412; Atkinson
i'. Brooks, 26 Vt. 569; Greneaux o.
Wheeler, 6 Texas, 515. See further on
the suffieience of the consideration af-
forded by a pre-existent debt, Rutland
Bank v. Buck, 5 Wend. 60; Grandin v.
Le Roy, 2 Paige, 509 ; White v. Spring-
field Bank, 3 Sandf. 222; Lathrop v.
Morris, 5 Sandf. 7 ; N. Y. M. I. W. r.
Smith, 4 Duer, 362; Blanchard v. Stevens,
3 Cush. 162 ; Pond i>. Lockwood, 8 Ala.
669; Varnum v. Bellamy, 4 McLean, 87;
King i'. Doolittle, 1 Head, 77. In Trus-
tees of Iowa College v. Hill, 12 la. 426, it
was held that if one took a note as col-
lateral security for an antecedent debt,
he is nevertheless prima facie, though not
conclusively, to be considered as holder
for value, and it is on the defendant to
show that he is not such a holder ; that
if it was taken as collateral security
only, the plaintiff parting with nothing,
giving no time, relinquishing no right,
nor suffering damages or injury as the
consideration, or in consequence of re-
ceiving it, he would not be such holder.
See Outhwite v. Porter, 45 N. H. 470.

(b) Pine v. Smith, 11 Gray, 38; Crosby
v. Grant, 36 N. H. 273.

prior parties, of which he had no notice. This conclusion is abundantly sustained by
authority. A different determination, by this court, would, we apprehend, greatly
surprise both the legal profession and the commercial world." So in New York in the
case of unrestricted accommodation paper, but not if fraudulently diverted from its
original purpose. Grocers' Bank v. Penfield, 69 N. Y. 502 ; Continental Bank v.
Townsend, 87 N. Y. 8. Currie v. Misa, L. R. 10 Ex. 153, decided that the "title of a
creditor to a negotiable security given to him on account of a pre-existing debt, and

292

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILIJ3. * 259

SECTION V.

OF ACCOMMODATION PAPER.

A party may be willing to lend his credit to another, when he
cannot or does not wish to lend him money. He does this by
signing or indorsing a note or bill without consideration. Such
notes or bills are known as accommodation paper.

It has been sometimes said that the defence of want of consid-
eration is valid against the indorsee when the indorsee took the
paper with notice of the want of consideration, or of any circum-
stances which would have avoided the note in the hands of the
indorser. (w) But the case of an accommodation note,
* whether made or indorsed for the benefit of the party to * 259
whom the maker or indorser intends to lend his credit, is
an exception to this rule. If A makes a note to B or his order,
intending to lend B his credit, and gives it to B to raise money
on, B cannot sue A on that note ; but if he indorses it to C, who
discounts the note in good faith, knowing it however to be an
accommodation note and without valuable consideration, 0 can
nevertheless recover the note from A. The maker may therefore
have a defence against the payee which he cannot have against
an indorsee who has knowledge of that defence. (t>) 1 But this
is true only where the consideration paid by the indorsee may

(«) Steers v. Lashley, 6 T. R. 61 ; Mott, 7 Johns. 361 ; Grant v. Ellicott, 7

Wyat v. Bulmer, 2 Esp. 538 ; Perkins v. Wend. 227 ; Molson v. Hawley, 1 Blatch.

Challis, 1 N. H. 254 ; Brown v. Dayies, 3 409 ; Lord v. The Ocean Bank, 20 Penn.

T. R. 80; Down v. Hailing, 4 B.&C. 330; St. 384; Kemp v. Balls, 10 Exch. 605.

Ayer v. Hutchins, 4 Mass. 370 ; Thomp- And this is so, even if the indorsee took

son v. Hale, 6 Pick. 259 ; Littell v. Mar- the bill after it became due. Charles v.

shall, 1 Rob. (La.) 51. Marsden, 1 Taunt. 224; Carruthers v.

(v) Thompson v. Shepherd, 12 Met. West, 11 Q. B. 143; Ren wick v. Williams,

311 ; Smith v. Knox, 3 Esp. 46 ; Brown v. 2 Md. 356.

received by him oonafide, and without notice of any infirmity of title on the part of the
debtor, is indefeasible, whether that security be payable at a future time or on demand;"
Lord Coleridge, C. J., dissenting on the ground that the security in question was a
check not entitling the holder to this protection. Contra, Armour v. McMichael, 7
Vroom, 92; Mix v. Bloomington Bank, 91 111. 20.

1 An accommodation note transferred after due, though subject to equities between
the original parties, is not to set-off, though existing at the time the note was negotiated.
Stannus v. Stannus, 30 la. 448.

293

* 259 THE LAW OF CONTKACTS. [BOOK I.

be regarded as going to the maker in the same manner as it
would if the payee had been promisor, and the maker had signed
the note as his surety. The successive indorsers of accommoda-
tion paper are not however so far sureties as have a claim of con-
tribution against each other; for each indorsee has the same
claim against earlier indorsers that he would have if it was not
accommodation paper, unless it can be shown that there was an
agreement between the indorsers that they should be considered,
as between themselves, as joint indorsers and sureties, (w) ] It
has been held in England that where A signs with B for B's
accommodation, and C takes the note agreeing, when he takes it,
to hold A only as surety, and C gives time to B to the injury of
A ; a plea by A, stating these facts in defence, was good, (x) In
general, accommodation notes or bills are now governed by the
same rules as negotiable paper for consideration, (j/) 2

SECTION VI.

NOTES ON DEMAND.

Notes and bills payable on demand are in one sense always
overdue ; they are not, however, so treated until payment has
been demanded and refused ; then they become like bills on time
which have been dishonored ; and to bring them within this rule
there should be evidence of such demand and refusal. But there

(w) Aiken v. Barkley, 2 Speers, 747. 430. But see Hansbrough v. Gray, 3

In this case the authorities are fully con- Gratt. 350.

sidered, and it is shown that the rule is (y) Fenton v. Pocock, 5 Taunt. 192

held as stated in the text, in Massachu- Bank of Montgomery v. Walker, 9 S. &

setts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, R. 220 ; Murray v. Judah, 6 Cowen, 484

Maryland, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Clopper v. Union Bank of Maryland, 7

Connecticut, and otherwise only in Ohio Har. & J. 02 ; Church v. Barlow, 9 Pick,

and North Carolina. The Supreme Court 547 ; Grant v. Ellicott, 7 Wend. 227

of the U. S. have held that there was no Marr v. Johnson, 9 Yerg. 1 ; per Wilde

distinction in this respect between in- J., Com. Bank v. Cunningham, 24 Pick

dorsers for value and indorsees for ac- 274; Far. & M. Bank v. Eathbone, 26 Vt

commodation, in McDonald v. McGruder, 19; Strong v. Foster, 33 E. L. & E. 282

3 Pet. 470. And it is so held in Missouri, s. c. 17 C. B. 201 ; Prouty v. Roberts, 6

in McCunet). Belt, 45 Mo. 174. Cush. 19. See also Parks v. Ingram, 2

(x) Pooley v. Harradine, 7 E. & B. Foster (N. H.), 283.

1 Where the intention of all parties to an accommodation bill was that it should be
met by the last indorser, the previous indorsers cannot be sued unless they have had
notice of dishonor. Turner v. Samson, 2 Q. B. D. 23.

'* Kirschner v. Conklin, 40 Conn. 77.

294

CII. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS. * 260

is this difference between a note on time and a note on demand ;
a note on time, after that time has passed, is certainly dishonored,
and an indorsee must know it, But there is no time when a note
on demand must have been dishonored, and none therefore when
an indorsee could not have received it without that knowl-
edge. Nevertheless it seems reasonable to * say that if a * 260
note which was payable at any day, has not been paid for
very many days, it may fairly be presumed to have been dis-
honored, and an indorsee after this lapse of time, may be held to
have had a sufficient notice of its dishonor ; and many American
authorities hold this view, (c) 1 But it is still true, that the law
does not presume that they were made with the intention of im-
mediate demand and payment. And if it provides for interest,
this strengthens the probability that the maker was to have a
credit of some extent, and the indorser or guarantor will be held
liable accordingly, (i) In such cases the note may be regarded
as a continuing security, and the indorser would remain liable
until an actual demand. Nor would the holder be chargeable
with neglect for omitting to make such demand within any par-
ticular time, (e) 2 A note payable generally, but not specifying

(c) If not negotiated until a long time months before it was indorsed, a length
after it is made, it is subject to all the of time sufficient to induce suspicions
equities in the hands of an indorsee, as it that the promisors would not pay it, and
would be in the possession of the payee, to cause some inquiry to be made,
Furman o. Haskin, 2 Caines, 369 ; Hen- whether it had in fact been dishonored,
dricks v. Judah, 1 Johns. 319; and two or why payment had not been made. If
months and a half after a note was dated there was no other circumstance, this
was held sufficient to let in the equities would be a good reason to let the defend-
of the maker against the payee, in an ac- ants into any defence which could legally
tion by the indorsee. Losee v. Dunkin, be made by them, if Page [the payee and
7 Johns. 70. Under different circum- indorser] were the plaintiff." In England
stances, a period of five months after a the principle that a note payable on de-
note was dated was held not sufficient for mand may become discredited by mere
this purpose. Sandford v. Mickles, 4 lapse of time is not adopted. Brooks v.
Johns. 324. So seven days has been held Mitchell, 9 M. & W. 15 ; Barough v.
not to be sufficient. Thurston i>. Mo- White, 4 B. & C. 355 ; Gascoyne v. Smith,
Kown, 6 Mass. 428; Ayer v. Hutchins, 4 1 McClel. & Y. 348. See Herrick v. Wol-
Mass. 370. In this case the rule concern- verton, 41 N. Y. 581.
ing notes payable on demand was thus (d) Lockwood </. Crawford, 18 Conn,
laid down by Parsons, C. J.: "A note 361.

payable on demand is due presently. In (c) Merritt v. Todd, 23 N. Y. 28; 1

this case the note has been due eight Pars. Notes & Bills, 263.

1 In Chartered Bank v. Dickson, L. It. 3 P. C. 574, it was decided that a note on
demand must be presented for payment within a reasonable time under the circum-
stances, or the indorsers would be discharged.

2 Pardee v. Fish, 60 N. Y. 265, 271, to the same effect. See Herrick v. Wool verton,
41 N. Y. 581. But Wheeler o. Warner, 47 N. Y. 519, held that a promissory note,
payable on demand, whether with or without interest, is due forthwith, and an action
thereon against the maker is barred by the Statute of Limitations, if not brought within
six years after its date and distinguished, Merritt u. Todd, 23 N. Y. 28, supra, as deciding

295

» 261 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

any time of payment, is due immediately ; and a provision that
interest is to accrue after a specified contingency, as the decision
of a certain suit, does not affect this rule. (/ )

Where a note on demand is indorsed within a reasonable time
after its date, the indorsee has all the rights of an indorsee of a
negotiable note on time where the indorsement was made before
maturity ; but what this reasonable time shall be must depend
upon the facts of the case. It is not determined by any positive
rule. (#) Nor is there a positive rule as to the present-
* 261 ment of bank-checks ; but * the rule as to overdue notes
is applied with more strictness to them. (A) 1 But still,
one who takes a check that is overdue is said not to take it subject
to all infirmities of title, if he exercises a reasonable caution in
taking it ; of which a jury is to judge, (i) And the drawer of
a check is not discharged by any delay in presenting it which has
not been actually injurious to him. (j) 2 In a recent case in
New York it was held that a presentment of a check for payment
on the day after receiving it, would be sufficient to charge the
maker. (jj~) 3 It may be remarked that priority in the drawing

(/) Holmes v. West, 17 Cal. 623. (N. H.), 230; Ames v. Merriam, 98 Mass.

(y) The question of reasonable time, 294 ; Biekford v. First, &c. Bank, 42 111.

within which a note due on demand must 238.

be indorsed after it is made, in order to (h) Boehm v. Sterling, 7 T. E. 423 ;

shut out any equities between the maker Down e. Hailing, 4 B. & C. 330; Roth-

and indorser, is purely a question of law. schild v. Corney, 9 B. & C. 388 ; Brady v.

Per Shaw, C. J., Sylvester v. Crapo, 15 Little Miami R. R. Co. 34 Barb. 249;

Pick. 93; Camp v. Scott, 14 Vt. 887.— O'Brien v. Smith, 1 Black, 99. But in

Two days and even five months have this country the principle is not consid-

been held to be within the limit. Dennett ered applicable to bank-notes or bank

v. Wyman, 13 Vt. 485; Sandford v. post notes. The Fulton Bank v. The

Mickles, 4 Johns. 224. So one month. Phoenix Bank, 1 Hall, 502, 577.
Ranger v. Carey, 1 Met. 369. On the (;') Rothschild v. Corney, 1 Dan. & L.

other hand, under different circum- 325; Foster v. Paulk, S. J. Ct. of Me.

htances, eight months, and two months, 1857, 20 Law Rep. 222 ; Mohawk Bank v.

have been considered beyond it. Ameri- Broderick, 13 Wend. 133.
can Bank v. Jenness, 2 Met. 288; Nevins (j) Robinson v. Hawksford, 9 A. &

v. Townshend, 6 Conn. 5; Camp ». Scott, E. (n. s.) 52 ; Park v. Thomas, 13 Sm. &

14 Vt. 387. See f urther, Wethey v. M. 11 ; Foster v. Paulk, supra.
Andrews, 3 Hill (>J. Y,), 582; Thompson ( jj) Johnson v. Bank of N. America,

v. Hale, 6 Pick. 259 ; Mudd v. Harper, 1 5 Rob. 554.
Md. 110; Carleton v. Bailey, 7 Foster

that as between a holder and indorser such a note was not due until demand made.
Peckham, J., said : " There is no divided opinion here or in England that upon such a
note, with or without interest, an action may be maintained against the maker without
any demand because it is due."

1 A bank check is to be presented within a reasonable time, which will depend on the
circumstances of the case. Woodruff v. Plant, 41 Conn. 344. See Rochester Bank u.
Harris, 108 Mass. 514 ; Smich v. Miller, 43 N. Y. 171.

2 Heywood v. Pickering, L. R. 9 Q. B. 42S; Griffin v. Kemp, 46 Ind. 172; Planters'
Bank v. Merritt, 7 Heiskell, 177 ; Gregg v. George, 16 Kan. 546.

3 Burachalter v. Erie Bank, 42 N. Y. 538 ; Simpson e. Pacific Ins. Co., 44 Cal. 139.

296

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS. * 262

of a check gives the holder no preference of payment over checks
subsequently drawn, (/c) If a check be drawn on a bank where
there are no funds, it need not be presented to maintain an
action. (7) * A check on a broker payable to bearer is a nego-
tiable instrument, and may pass by indorsement so as to entitle
the holder to sue the indorser as in the case of a bill of ex-
change, (m) 2

SECTION vn.

OP THE TRANSFER OP BILLS AND NOTES.

A bill once paid by the acceptor can no longer be negotiated ;
but until paid by him it is capable of indefinite negotia-
tion, (n) 3 * If paid in part it may be indorsed as to the * 262
residue. But while wholly due it cannot be indorsed in
part ; (o) and if it be indorsed in part, and is afterwards indorsed

(k) Dykes v. The Leather M. Bank, has paid the hill, it seems that he may

11 Paige, 612. sue the acceptor upon the bill; and if,

(/) Foster v. Paulk, supra. instead of suing the acceptor, he put it

(m) Keene v. Beard, 98 Eng. C.L. 372. into circulation upon his own indorse-

See also Pars. Notes & Bills, 68. ment only, it does not prejudice any of

(re) Connery v. Kendall, 5 La. An. 515; the other parties who have indorsed the

Pray v. Maine, 7 Cush. 253 ; Eaton v. Mc- bill that the holder should be at liberty

Kown, 34 Me. 510. Per Lord Ellenborough, to sue the acceptor. The case would be

Callow v. Lawrence, 3 M. & Sel. 97 ; Beck different if the circulation of the bill

v. Robley, 1 H. Bl. 89, n. — But if a bill would have the effect of prejudicing any

is paid by the drawer, it may afterwards of the indorsers."

be reissued by the drawer, and the ae- (o) Hawkins v. Cardy, 1 Ld. Eaym.

ceptor will be still liable to pay it. Hub- 360. And although an indorser has paid

bard v. Jackson, 3 C. & P 134, 4 Bing. part of a bill to the indorsee, the latter

390, 1 Mo. & P. 11. — In Callow v. Law- may still recover the whole amount of

rence, supra, Lord Ellenborough said : " A the bill against the drawer. Johnson v.

bill of exchange is negotiable ad Infinitum, Kennion, 2 Wils. 262 ; Martin v. Hayes,

until it has been paid by or discharged 1 Bush. L. 423.
on behalf of the acceptor. If the drawer

1 See Wirth v. Austin, L. R. 10 C. P. 689.

2 So, too, a check payable to order may be transferred by the payee by parol, with
manual delivery, without indorsement. Freund v. Importers & Traders Bank, 76
N. Y. 352.

8 In West Boston Bank v. Thompson, 124 Mass. 506, 514, to the point that " when
the indorser of a note which has been in circulation takes it up, all indorsements on the
note subsequent to his are cancelled, and he cannot afterwards negotiate the note so as
to make the subsequent indorsers liable to any person with notice of the facts," Morton,
J., said that " the mere fact that a note, before its maturity, comes in the usual course of
business into the hands of the payee after having been once negotiated by him, does not
destroy its negotiability, nor defeat the right of a bona fide holder to recover against all
who are parties to the note at the time it is negotiated to him." See also West St.
Louis Bank v. Shawnee County Bank, 95 U. S. 557, and Lemoine v. Bank of North
America, 3 Dillon, 44.

29T

* 262 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

by the same indorser to the same indorsee for the remaining part,
this is not a good indorsement. (p~)

The holder of a bill or note payable to bearer, or of one payable
to some payee or order and indorsed in blank, may transfer the
same by mere delivery, ( q) 1 and is not liable upon it (r) But
where one obtains money on a bill or note by discount, and the
bill or note is forged, if he did not indorse it he is still liable to
refund the money to the party from whom he received it on the
ground of an implied warranty that the instrument is genuine ;
and also on the general principle, that one who pays money with-
out consideration may recover it back, (s) 2

If a note be made payable on its face or by indorsement to
a party or his order, that party can transfer the note in full
property only by his indorsement ; and when he indorses it he
makes himself liable to pay it if those who ought to have paid

(p) Hughes v. Kiddell, 2 Bay, 324. See also Rogers v. Langford, 1 Cr. & M.

This was an action against the indorser 637.

of a note. By one indorsement he had (s) Jones v. Ryde, 1 A. K. Marsh. 157,

assigned part of the sum mentioned in 6 Taunt. 489 ; Bruce o. Bruce, 1 A. K.

the note, and the residue by another in- Marsh. 165, 5 Taunt. 495 ; Gompertz v.

dorsement. The court held that the Bartlett, 24 E. L. & E. 156; Gurney u.

action could not be supported, on the Womersley, 28 E. L. & E. 256, and edi-

ground that an indorsement for part of a tor's note ; Eagle Bank v. Smith, 5 Conn,

note or bill is bad; and if so, then two 71; Canal Bank u. Bank of Albany, 1

vicious indorsements could never eonsti- Hill (N. Y.), 87; Thompson v. McCul-

tute a good one. See also Hawkins v, lough, 31 Mo. 224. Sed uliter, if the bill

Cardy, 1 Ld. liaym. 360, Carth. 466; or note is discounted by the banker of

Johnson u. Kennion, 2 Wils. 262, per the acceptor or maker, Smith v. Mercer,

Gould, J. 6 Taunt. 70. The ruling of Abbott, C. J.,

(?) Davis u. Lane, 8 N. H. 224; Wil- in Fuller v. Smith, Ry. & U. 49, is not

hour (i. Turner, 5 Pick. 526 ; Dole v. consistent with Smith v. Mercer, 6 Taun-

Weeks, 4 Mass. 451. ton, 76.

(r) Camidge v. Allenby, 6 B. & C. 373.

1 The possessor of a note payable to bearer or indorsed in blank may, with the
beneficial owner's consent, sue it, and then is regarded as the holder. Bank of America
v. Senior, 11 R. I. 376 ; Hovey v. Sebrin™, 24 Mich. 232. An indorsement for collection
transfers the legal title to the note, and the indorsee can sue in his own name. King v.
Fleece, 7 Heiskell, 273. Contra, Best v. Nokomis Bank, 76 III. 608. In Massachusetts
the holder of a negotiable promissory note, if with legal capacity to sue, may bring a
suit upon it, whether he have any title or interest, in law or in fact, in it whatever.
Pemberton Bank v. Porter, 125 Mass. 333 ; Atlas Bank v. Savery, 127 Mass. 75. But
it is a good defence to a promissory note, that the plaintiff, although in possession of
the note, has no interest in it, and is prosecuting the action, not for the benefit of the
person beneficially interested, but against his objection. Towne v. Wason, 128 Mass.
517. A person advancing money to buy a note for the indorser cannot sue him
thereupon, Dodge v. Brown, 113 Mass. 323; unless so agreed, Horton v. Manning, 37
Tex. 23.

2 When a bill is accepted in blank for the purpose of being negotiated, and is
afterwards filled in with the name and signature of a person as drawer and indorser, the
acceptor cannot, as against a bond fide indorsee, adduce evidence to show that either
the drawing or indorsement is a forgery. London & Southwestern Bank v. Wentworth,
5 Ex. D. 96.

298

CH. XVI.J NOTES AND BILLS. * 263

* it to him, had he continued to hold it, fail to pay it to the * 263
party to whom he orders it to be paid. His indorsement is

in itself only an order on them to pay the bill or note ; but the
law annexes to this order a promise on his part to pay the bill
or note if they do not. He may guard against this by indorsing
it with the words " without recourse," which mean, by usage, that
the holder is not to have, in any event, recourse to the indor-
ser. (£) While these words, or any words which convey clearly
the same meaning, protect the indorser from any demand on him,
they convey to the indorsee the paper itself, with all its negotia-
ble qualities, in the same way as an indorsement with no words
of restriction or exception could do. (w) The same purpose will
be answered if he uses any other words,, or others distinctly ex-
pressive of the same meaning. Without these the indorser is
liable for the whole amount, (y)

It is this peculiarity which gives their great value and utility
to bills and notes as instruments of commerce and business, and
this liability is strictly denned and very carefully watched and
protected. It is a conditional liability only. All the previous
parties must have the bill or note presented to them, and payment
demanded ; and notice of the demand and non-payment must be
given to all. And this requirement is very precise as to time,
and somewhat so as to form, as we shall presently see.

It has been said that every party so indorsing a bill or note
may be regarded as making a new bill or note ; (w) this, though
true in general, may not be precisely and exactly the rule of
law ; still important consequences sometimes flow from it.

* Thus an indorsement is said to imply that all previous * 264
parties could do validly what they did, and that the present
indorser has power to make a valid indorsement. (#) And an

(t) Rice v. Stearns, 3 Mass. 225 ; Up- and indorsing them to him without quali-

ham v. Prince, 12 Mass. 14 ; Waite v. fication, is liable to the principal on his

Foster, 33 Me. 424. indorsement, however small his commis-

(w) Epler v. Funk, 8 Barr, 468. Such sion.
an indorsement transfers the indorser's (w) Chitty & Hulme on Bills, p. 241,
whole interest therein, but taken with and cases cited. See also Pease y. Tur-
other circumstances, it is said to tend to ner, 3 How. (Miss.) 375. — In Gwinnel v.
show that the note was not indorsed for Herbert, 5 A. & E. 436, it is said that the
value, and therefore to open to the maker indorser of a promissory note does not
the same defences against the indorsee stand in the situation of maker relatively
which he could have made against the to his indorsee, and the latter cannot de-
payee. Richardson v. Lincoln, 5 Met. 201. clare against him as maker.

(») Goupy v. Harden, 7 Taunt. 159. In (z) McNeil v. Knott, 11 Ga. 142;

this case it was held, that an agent pur- Beal v. Alexander, 6 Tex. 531 ; Delaware

chasing foreign bills for his principal, Bank v. Jarvis, 20 N. Y. (6 Smith) 226.

299

* 264 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

acceptor is bound, although the name of the drawer is forged, and
an indorscr, although the maker's name is forged ; for by accept-
ance and by each indorsement, a new contract is formed. («/)
And the same rule would apply to a party who intervenes and
accepts or pays supra protest. (2) But a distinction has been
taken between a bill with the signature forged, and one of which
the whole body is forged, holding that the implied admission or
warranty of the acceptor does not apply in the latter case, (a)
And if a prior indorsement be forged, it has been held that the
second indorser cannot be charged as promisor or indorser. (aas)
A drawee is bound to know the signature of his drawer, and
if he pays the amount of the bill cannot recover it back ; but
this obligation does not go beyond the signature, and if the
amount of the bill is increased by a forgery, he has been per-
mitted to recover from the payee the original amount, and what-
ever more he paid, (ab) If an acceptor gives to a holder for
value a new bill in payment of a forged one, which he had ac-
cepted, not knowing it to be forged when he gives the new
bill, he is bound on the new bill. (6) So, if a bank pays a
forged check, it bears the loss, (e) 1 And a party cannot be

(v) Wilson v. Lutwidge, 1 Stra. 648 ; (:) Goddard v. Merchants Bank, 4

Jenys v. Fawler, 2 Stra. 946 ; Price v. Comst. 147.

Neal, 3 Burr, 1354; Smith v. Chester, 1 (<t) Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank,

T. R. 655, per Butler, J. ; Bass v. Clive, 3 Comst. 230. But see Hall v. Fuller, 6

4 M. & Sel. 15, per Dumpier, J. ; Smith v. B. & C. 750.

Mercer, 6 Taunt. 76; Robinson v. Rey- (aa) Howe v. Merrill, 5 Cush. 80.

nolds, 2 Q. B. 196 ; Canal Bank v. Bank (ab) National Park Bank v. Ninth Na-

of Albany, 1 Hill (N. Y), 287 ; Goddard tional Bank, 55 Barb. 87.

v. Merchants Bank, 4 Comst. 147 ; Ham- [b) Mather v. Maidstone, 37 E. L. & E.

ilton v. Pearson, 1 Cart. (Ind.) 540. So 335; s. u. 18 C. B. 273.

also the acceptor undertakes that the (c) Levy v. Bank of United States, 1

drawer has the capacity to draw and in- Binn. 27 ; Bank of St. Albans v. F. & M.

dorse. Drayton v. Dale, 2 B. & C. 299, Bank, 10 Vt. 141 ; Orr v. Union Bank of

3 Dow. & R. 534, per Bayley, J. ; Smith v. Scotland, 29 E. L. & E. 1.
Marsack, 6 C. B. 486; Mather v. Maid-
stone, 18 C. B. 273.

1 If there was no delay in giving notice after the discovery of the forgery. Welch v.
Goodwin, 123 Mass. 71 ; Allen v. Fourth Bank, 59 N. Y. 12. But not if the payee by
his own fault or negligence contributed to the success of the fraud, or to mislead the
drawee. Bank of Nonh America v. Bangs, 106 Mass. 441 ; Park Bank v. Ninth Bank,
46 N. Y. 77; Quincy Bank v. Ricker, 71 111. 439; Howard v. Mississippi Bank, 28 La.
An. 727. In Pennsylvania, by statute, recovery may be had when any party's signature
is forged, against a party previously holding or negotiating. Tradesmen's Bank o.
Third Bank, 66 Penn. St. 435. The drawer of a check made payable to the order of
the payee is not bound by a payment thereof by the bank, upon a forged indorsement of
the name of the payee, the bank being bound before payment to ascertain the
genuineness of the indorsement, Welsh v. German American Bank, 73 N. Y. 424 ;
Seventh Bank v. Cook, 73 Penn. St. 483 ; unless the drawer so directed or misled the
bank, Dodge v. Exchange Bank, 20 Ohio St. 234. See First Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S.
343. But an answer, " it is good," by a bank officer, supposing the iuquiry related only

300

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS. * 265

held liable upon paper on which his name is forged, merely be-
cause he has paid, without objection, other notes forged by the
same person, (d) * And if a bank receive payment of an amount
due to it in its own bills, which turn out to be forged, it is
bound, (e) But, in general, payment of a debt in forged bills,
both parties being innocent, is no payment, nor is a bank bound
by discounting a forged note ; (/) and it has been held that a
depositor owes the bank no duty which requires him to
examine his pass-book or vouchers, with * a view to the * 265
detection of forgeries of his name. (<?) 2 But the loser by
forged paper can recover it back only by showing proper diligence
in detecting the forgery and in giving notice to those who might
be affected by it. (A) 3

It has been held that a note made by a corporation in violation
of a statute, is void in the hands of an innocent holder, (i) And
this has been held also, where the signature of the promisor was
obtained by fraud. (/) But where one whose name was forged
took security for the note, it was held to be a ratification by
him. (F) And it is also held that mere illegality of consideration
— if the note be not declared void by statute — will not affect the
rights of one who holds it for value and in good faith. (7)

Whether payment of a debt in bills of an insolvent bank, both
parties being ignorant of the fact, is payment, seems not to be
quite settled. It must depend upon the question (which in each

id) Walters v. Harvey, 17 Md. 150. Mass. 38 ; Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany,

(e) United States Bank v. Bank of 1 Hill (N. Y.), 287 ; Pope v. Nance, 1
Georgia, 10 Wheat. 333. Minor (Ala.), 299.

( f) Stedman v. Gooch, 1 Esp. 5 ; Markle U) Root v. Godard, 3 McLean, 102.

v. Hatfield, 2 Johns. 465 ; Young v. Adams, ( /) Dunn v. Smith, 12 Sm. & M. 602.
6 Mass. 182 ; Eagle Bank v. Smith, 5 (it) Fitzpatrick o. S. Commissioners, 7

Conn. 71. Humph. 224.

(g) Weisser v. Denison, 10 N. Y. 68. (1) Norris v. Langley, 19 N. H. 423;
(A) Gloucester Bank v. Salem Bank, 17 Johnson v. Meeker, 1 Wis. 436.

to the drawer's signature and his account, does not bind the bank, Espy v. Cincinnati
Bank, 18 Wall. 604; nor the certification of a check previously materially altered,
Security Bank v. Bank of the Republic, 67 N. Y. 458. Contra, Louisiana Bank v.
Citizens Bank, 28 La. An. 189. See Morse v. Massachusetts Bank, 1 Holmes,_209.

1 But one who, knowing the signature to a promissory note to be forged, and intending
to be bound by it, acknowledges it as his own, assumes the note as his own, and is bound
by it just as if it had been originally signed by his authority. Wellington v. Jackson,
121 Mass. 157. But Shisler v. Vandike, 92 Penn. St. 447, declared that where a fraud
is of such a character as the forged indorsement of a note, its ratification by the person
whose name is forged is opposed to public policy, and cannot be permitted. — Detroit
Bank v. Burkham, 32 Mich. 328, was to the effect that a drawee cannot recover of the
payee where the security accompanying a bill proved to be fictitious.

2 Manufacturers Bank v. Barnes, 65 111. 69.

3 Schroeder v. Harvey, 75 111. 638.

301

* 266 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

case may be affected by its peculiar circumstances), whether the
payee takes the bills as absolute payment at his own risk, or takes
them only as conditional payment, he to be bound only to use
due diligence in collecting the bills, and if he fails, the payment
to be null. Perhaps the weight of authority, as well as of reason,
is in favor of this last view predominating where there is no
sufficient evidence of a contrary intention, (to) How far a bill or
note received by a creditor is considered in law as a payment of
the debt, will be treated hereafter, (n)

The liability of an indorser may be considered, first as depend-
ing on the demand of payment, and then as to notice of non-
payment, and the proceedings necessary thereon. But bills of
exchange must also, in some instances, be presented for

* 266 acceptance, * when they are made payable at a certain time

after sight, in order to fix the day of their maturity. If
payable in so many days after date this is not necessary. But the
holder may present any bill for acceptance at any time, even the
last day before it is due ; and if not accepted may sue the drawer
and indorser. It is prudent and usual to present a bill for accept-
ance soon after it is received, as the holder thereby acquires the
security of the acceptor, (o) 1

SECTION VIII.

OF PRESENTMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE.

Presentment for acceptance should be made by the holder or
his authorized agent to the drawee2 or his authorized agent, (p)

(m) Ellis v. Wild, 6 Mass. 321 ; Ontario to the drawee. It must be a reasonable

Bank r. Liglitbody, 11 Wend. 9, 13 Wend, time ; and that is a question for the jury

101 ; Wainwright v. Webster, 11 Vt. 570; to decide from the circumstances of each

Oilman v. Peck, id. 510 ; Fogg r. Sawyer, case. See also Fry u. Hill, 7 Taunt. 397 ;

9 N. H. 30o; Frontier Bank v. Morse, 22 Mullick v. Radakissen, 28 E. L. & E. 86.

Me. 88; Timmis o. Gibbins, 14 E. L. & —No cause of action arises upon a bill

E. 64, n. Contra, Lowrey v. Durrell, 2 payable at sight, until it is presented.

Port. (Ala.) 280; Scruggs o. Gass, 8 Holmes i\ Kerrison, 2 Taunt. 323; Thorpe

Yerg. 175 ; Bayard v. Shunk, 1 W. & S. ■.-. Booth, Ry. & M. 388.
92- (p) Cheek v. Roper, 6 Esp. 175. Itisnot

(n) Post, Chap, on Defences. sufficient to call at the residence of the

(o) Muilman v. D'Equino, 2 H. Bl. 565. drawee and present the bill to some per-

It was here held that there is no fixed son, who is unknown to the party calling,

time within which a bill payable at sight, Id.
or a certain time after, shall be presented

i See Montelius v. Charles, 76 111. 303.

2 The holder of a bill of exchange payable on a day certain is not bound to present

302

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS. * 267

during the usual hours of business. ( q) 1 And the drawee has
until the next day to determine whether he will accept, but may-
answer at once, (r)

A bill may be in some sort accepted before it is drawn, for a
written promise to accept a certain bill hereafter to be
made is * construed as an acceptance, if precisely that bill * 267
is drawn within a reasonable time after such promise, (s) 2
But a bill payable so many days after sight, cannot have its day
of payment fixed, except by presentment ; and it has therefore
been said, that an acceptance by previous promise does not apply
except to bills payable on demand, or at so many days after
date, (t) It does not seem quite clear, however, why the accept-
ance by such promise might not be held valid to bind the acceptor,

(?) Elford v. Teed, 1 M. & Sel. 28 ; See Wiseman v. Chiapella, 23 How. 368,
Church v. Clark, 21 Pick. 310 ; Bank of for a discussion of the cases on present-
United States >: Carneal, 2 Pet. 543 ; ment for acceptance.
Harrison u. Crowder, 6 Sm. & M. 464 ; (r) Montgomery County Bank u. Al-
Parker v. Gordon, 7 East, 385. — And bany City Bank, 8 Barb. 399.
presentment after banking hours, and an (s) Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1670;
authorized person then answering, has Coolidge v. Payson, 2 Wheat. 66; Wilson
been held sufficient. Garnett v. Wood-* v. Clements, 3 Mass. 1 ; Goodrich v. Gor-
cock, 1 Stark. 476. A presentment, how- don, 15 Johns. 6 ; Parker v. Greele, 2
ever, at eight o'clock in the evening, at Wend. 545 ; Kendrick v. Campbell, 1
the drawee's residence, has been held at Bailey, 522; Carnegie p. Morrison, 2
a reasonable hour. Barclay v. Bailey, 2 Met. 381 ; Storer a. Logan, 9 Mass. 55;
Camp. 537. — But eleven or twelve at MeEvers u. Mason, 10 Johns. 207 ; Schim-
night has been held otherwise. Dana v. melpennich v. Bayard, 1 Pet. 264 ; Boyce
Sawyer, 22 Me. 244. So of a demand at v. Edwards, 4 Pet 121 ; Williams v. Wi-
eight in the morning. Lunt v. Adams, 17 nans, 2 Green (N. J.), 339; Bayard v.
Me. 230. See Flint v. Rogers, 15 Me. 67 ; Lathy, 2 McLean, 462 ; Vance v. Ward,
Commercial Bank v. Hamer, 7 How. 2 Dana, 95; Reed v. Marsh, 5 B. Mon. 8;
(Miss.) 448; Cohea v. Hunt, 2 Sm. & M. Rowland v. Carson, 15 Penn. St. 453;
227. — The rule in all cases is that the Beach v. State Bank, 2 Cart. (Ind.) 488;
presentment should be at a reasonable Cassell v. Dows, 2 Blatch. 335; Lewis v.
time; and when the paper is due from or Kramer, 3 Md. 275 ; Naglee v. Lyman, 14
at a bank, it should, as we have already Cal. 450. See also Exchange Bank v.
said, as a general rule, be presented with- Rice, 98 Mass. 288.
in banking hours. But in other cases (i) Story on Bills of Exch. § 249,-
the period ranges through the whole day, Wildes v. Savage, 1 Story, 22 ; Russell v-
down to the time of going to bed. Cay- Wiggin, 2 Story, 213.
uga Bank „. Hunt, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 635.

the same for acceptance to the drawee; and a presentment for payment at the time and
place at which it is made payable is a sufficient presentment to charge the drawer and
indorsers. Walker v. Stetson, 19 Ohio St. 400. Unreasonable delay of the payee of a
draft to present it to the drawee, or to notify the drawer of its non-acceptance or
non-payment, or to return it to the drawer as refused by the drawee, makes the paper the
payee's own, and discharges the drawer. Allan v. Eldred, 50 Wis. 132. The payee o(
a check has no right against a bank or banker until its acceptance, First Bank v.
Whitman, 94 U S. 343 ; nor is a check an assignment of funds in bankers' hands, Carr
v. Security Bank, 107 Mass. 45 ; Tyler v. Gould, 48 N. X\ 682. Contra, Union Bank v.
Oceana County Bank, 80 111. 212.

1 Skelton v. Dustin, 92 111. 49, that any time within the day is sufficient, if not
payable at a bank.

2 So a promise in a telegram binds the sender to one who takes a bill on the faith of
the despatch. Central Bank u. Richards, 109 Mass. 413.

303

* 268 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

leaving the day of payment to be fixed by presentment. That is,
if a bill payable at sixty days after sight were presented and
acceptance refused, and the protest fixed the day of presentment
and therefore the day when it should be paid, it is not clear why
the acceptor might not be held on his promise to accept that very
bill when it should bo made and presented.

An acceptance must be absolute, and not differ in any respect
from the terms of the bill. If any other be given, the holder may
assent and so bind the acceptor, but must give notice, as in case
of non-acceptance, to other parties, in order to bind them ; (u)
and the acceptor is held only so far as he promises by his accept-
ance. (v) The usual way of accepting is by writing the word
" accepted " on the face of the bill, and signing the acceptor's
name ; but there is no precise formula or method which is neces-
sary to constitute a good acceptance. It seems to be enough if
it is substantially a distinct promise to pay the bill according to
its terms, whether it be in writing upon the bill or upon a separ-
ate paper, or by parol, (w)1 And a written promise to pay a
bill, operates as an acceptance of the bill when drawn ; but it
should be sufficiently precise to identify the bill as that

* 268 authorized, (ww) In many * of our States there are stat-

utes respecting acceptance of bills. (x~)

(u) Walker v. Bank of State of New have had the money, and they ought to

York, 13 Barb. 636 ; Lyon v. Sundius, 1 be paid, but I do not interfere in this

Camp. 423 ; Russell v. Phillips, 14 Q. B. business, you should see my partner."

891. And it was field that all this amounted to

(v) Sallery v. Prindle, 14 Barb. 186. a parol acceptance of the bills on which

See, however, Clarke v. Gordon, 3 Rich, the defendants were liable to an indorsee,

L. 311. between whom and A there was no priv-

(w) Edson v. Fuller, 2 Foster (N. H.), ity, and that the indorsee was not pre-
183; Barnet v. Smith, 10 Foster (N. H.), eluded from suing, by having made a
256 ; Wynne v. Raikes, 5 East, 514 ; protest in ignorance of this acceptance.
Fairlee v. Herring, 3 Bing. 025. In this — In Ward v. Allen, 2 Met. 53, a bill was
case, bills having been drawn on the de- read to the drawee, who said it was cor-
fendants by their agent, and with their rect and should be paid; and this was
authority, in respect to a mine which treated as a sufficient acceptance. See
they afterwards transferred to A, they Parklmrst v. Dickerson, 21 Pick. 307 ;
requested A to place funds in their hands Luff v. Pope, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 413 ; Walker
to meet the bills when due, saying, " it v. Lide, 1 Rich. L. 241) ; Walker v. Bank
would be unpleasant to have bills drawn of State of New York, 13 Barb. 636 ;
on them paid by another party." A Lewis v. Kramer, 3 Md. 265; Orear v.
placed funds accordingly ; but when the McDonald, 9 Gill, 350.
bills were left with the defendants for (ww) Plummer v. Lyman, 49 Me. 229 ;
acceptance, no acceptance was written Burns v. Rowland, 40 Barb. 368.
on them. A's agent having complained (x) In New York, Missouri, and Cali-
to one of the defendants on the subject, fornia, the acceptance must be in writ-
he said : " What, not accepted ? We ing ; and may be by promise before the

1 An oral acceptance of a bill is binding upon the acceptor. Pierce v. Kittredge, 115
Mass. 374.

304

CH. XVI. J NOTES AND BILLS. * 269

An acceptance can be made only by a drawee, or by one for
honor ; but an acceptance by one of many drawees binds the
acceptor. (j/~)

SECTION IX.

OF PRESENTMENT FOB PAYMENT.

A bill or note must be presented for payment at its maturity,
or the indorsers are not held. They guarantee its payment, not
by express words, but by operation of law. And for their protec-
tion the law annexes to their liability, as a condition, that reason-
able efforts shall be made to procure the payment from those
bound to pay before them, and also that they shall have reasona-
ble notice of a refusal to pay, that they may have an opportunity
to indemnify themselves. The justice of this is obvious. A
holder of a note, with a good indorser, might be very indifferent
as to the payment by the promisor or an earlier indorser, if he
knew that he could certainly collect the amount from the indor-
ser on whom he relied ; therefore the very liability of this . indor-
ser is made to rest upon the efforts of the holder to obtain
the money from the prior parties. Again ; each indorser
transfers by indorsement a debt due to * himself, and if by * 269
the guaranty which springs from his indorsement he has to
pay this debt to another, he is entitled to all such prompt knowl-
edge of the failure of the party whom he guarantees, and of his
own consequent liability, as will enable him to secure a payment
of this debt to himself, if that be possible. The rules, and the
exceptions to the rules, in relation to demand of payment and
notice of non-payment, will be found to rest upon these prin-
ciples.

Generally the question of reasonable time, reasonable diligence,
and reasonable notice, is open to the circumstances of every case,
and is determined by a reference to them, (z) But in regard to
bills and notes the law merchant has defined all of these with
great exactness.

bill is drawn. And a drawee holding and (y) Owen v. Van Uster, 1 E. L. & E.

refusing to return a bill to a holder for 396; 8. c. 10 C. B. 318.
twenty-four hours, is to be held as ac- (z) Goodwin v. Davenport, 47 Me. 112.
cepting it.

vol. I. 20 305

270

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

The general rule may be said to be, that the drawer and indor-
see of a bill and the indorsers of a note are discharged from
their liability, unless payment of the bill or note be demanded
from the party previously bound to pay it, on the day on which
it falls due. (a) And if the holder neglects to make such
demand, he not only loses the guaranty of subsequent parties,
but all right to recover for the consideration or debt for which

the bill or note was given. (J)
* 270 * Let us look at the exceptions to this rule requiring

such presentment of a bill or note. Bankruptcy or insol-
vency, however certain or however manifested, is not one. (V) *
Though the bank or shop be shut, presentment there or to the
parties personally must still be made, (<f) Nor will the death of

(a) Field u. Nickerson, 13 Mass. 131 ;
Martin v. Winslow, 2 Mason, "241 ; Sice v.
Cunningham, 1 Cowen, 397 ; Montgomery
County Bank v. Albany City Bank, 8
Barb. 396 ; Holbrook v. Allen, 4 Fla. 87 ;
Robinson !'. Blen, 20 Me. 10!>; Magruder
v. Union Bank, 3 Pet. 87 ; Jimiati Bank
v. Hale, 10 S. & R. 157. If the bill or
note is payable at a time certain, it must
be presented on the last day of grace;
and a demand either before or after that
day is insufficient to charge the indorser.
Id.; Howe i'. Bradley, 19 Me. 31; Leavitt
i'. Simes, 3 N. H. 14 ; Farmers Bank v.
Duvall, 7 G. & J. 78 ; Piatt v. Eads, 1
Blackf. 81 ; Etting v. Schuylkill Bank, 2
Barr, 355.

(6) Bridges t. Berry, 3 Taunt. 130;
•Camidge u. Allenby, 6 B. & C. 373.
This was an action for the price of
igoods. It appeared that the same were
>sold at York on Saturday, December
10th, 1825, and on the same day, at three
o'clock in the afternoon, the vendee de-
livered to the vendor, as, and for a pay-
'inent of the price, certain promissory
motes of the bank of D. & Co. at Hud-
fdersfleld, payable on demand to bearer.
D. & Co. stopped payment on the same
day at eleven o'clock in the morning, and
never afterwards resumed their pay-
ments ; but neither of the parties knew
of the stoppage, or of the insolvency of
1). & Co. The vendor never circulated
the notes, or presented them to the
bankers for payment ; but on Saturday,
the 17th, he required the vendee to take
back the notes, and to pay him the
amount, which the latter refused. Held,
under these circumstances, that the ven-

dor of the goods was guilty of laches,
and had thereby made the notes his own,
and, consequently, that they operated as
a satisfaction of the debt. In Hare v.
Henty, 100 Eng. C. L. 65, it is held that a
banker receiving a check upon another
banker, not resident in the same town, is
not bound to transmit it for presentment,
by the post of the day on which he re-
ceives it, but he has until post time of the
next day for so doing. See also 2 Pars.
Notes & Bills, 72.

(c) Russell v. Langstaffe, Dougl. 515;
Ex parte Johnston, 3 Deac. & C. 433 ;
Bowes v. Howe, 5 Taunt. 30 ; Gower v.
Moore, 25 Me. 16 ; Ireland v. Kip, Anthon,
142 ; Shaw v. Reed, 12 Pick. 132 ; Groten
v. Dalheim, 6 Greenl. 476 ; Holland v.
Turner, 10 Conn. 308; Orear c. McDon-
ald, 9 Gill, 350. And although the in-
dorsers, at the time of indorsement, had
reason to believe, and did believe, that
the maker would not pay, this does not
dispense with the necessity of due notice
to them of such maker's default. Denny
!». Palmer, 5 Ired. L. 610 ; Oliver v. Mun-
day, 2 Penning. 982 ; AUwood u. Hasel-
don, 2 Bailey, 457.

(d) Bowes v. Howe, 6 Taunt. 30, re-
versing the decision of the King's Bench
in the same case, 16 East, 112. And see
Camidge v. Allenby, 6 B. & C. 373. If
the maker is absent on a voyage at sea,
having a domicile within the State, pay-
ment must be demanded there. Whittier
v. Groffam, 3 Greenl. 82 ; Dennie u.
Walker, 7 N. H. 199. See Ogden v. Cow-
ley, 2 Johns. 274; Galpin v. Hard, 3 Mc-
Cord, 394 ; Ellis v. Commercial Bank, 7
How. (Miss.) 294.

306

1 Smith v. Miller, 52 N. Y. 545.

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS. * 271

the party prevent the necessity of demanding payment of his
personal representatives, if he have any, (e) and if not, at his
house ; nor will the death of the party who should give notice ;
for if no executor or administrator is appointed before the note
falls due, the executor or administrator may make sufficient
demand and give notice within a reasonable time after the
appointment. (/)

Delay or omission to demand payment does not, however, dis-
charge the drawer of a bill, if the drawee had in his hands
no effects of the drawer, at any time between the drawing of the
bill and its maturity, and had no right on other ground to expect
the payment of the bill, (#) for the drawer had then no right to
draw the bill, and therefore no right to demand or notice, because
he could not profit by it to get payment to himself of the debt
from the drawee, there being no such debt. So also if the
transaction between the drawer and the drawee was * ille- * 271
gal. (A) But such presentment should still be made in
all cases to hold the subsequent parties, (i) And it is held that
an accommodation drawer is entitled to demand and notice of dis-
honor, although he had no funds in the hands of the drawee, (ii)
The discharge from liability arising from such delay or omis-
sion may be waived, by an express promise to pay made after
such discharge, or by a payment in part, from which the law
infers an acknowledgment of liability ; but not by a mere promise
to pay made before such delay or omission. (/) 1 If the party

(e) Gower v. Moore, 25 Me. 16 ; Lan- it was the duty of the maker, and not of

dry v. Stansbury, 10 La. 484. the sureties, to provide for the payment.

( f) White v. Stoddard, 11 Gray, 258. Fort v. Cortes, 14 La. 180.

(</) De Berdt v. Atkinson, 2 H. Bl. (h) Copp v. McDugall, 9 Mass. 1.
336; Terry r. Parker, 6 A. & E. 502; Where the indorsee of a negotiable prom-
Kinsley e. Robinson, 21 Pick. 327 ; Foard issory note failed to recover against the
v. Womaek, 2 Ala. 368 ; Wollenweber v. promisor, because the original contract
Ketterlinus, 17 Penn. St. 389; Allen e. was usurious, the indorser, who was the
Smith's Adm'r, 4 Harring. (Del.) 234; original payee, was held liable, without
Oliver v. Bank of Tenn. 11 Humph. 74 ; notice, for the amount due by the note,
Orear v. McDonald, 9 Gill, 350. See also but not for the costs of the indorsee's
Fitch v. Redding, 4 Sandf . 130 ; Allen v. action against the promisor.
King, 4 McLean, 128; Durrum v. Hen- (i) Wilkes v. Jacks, Peake Cas. 202;
drick, 4 Tex. 492 ; Bowring v. Andrews, Leach v. Hewitt, 4 Taunt. 730 ; Ramdu-
3 McLean, 576; Gillettu. Averill, 5Denio, lollday v. Darieux, 4 Wash. C. C. 61 ;
85 ; Mobley v. Clark, 28 Barb, 390. But Carter v. Flower, 16 M. & W. 743.
where a note is signed by one person as a (u) Merchants Bank v. Easley, 44 Mo.
principal, and others as sureties, it is not 286.

a sufficient excuse to show that the sureties ( j) That payment of part is a waiver

had no funds in the place of payment ; for of non-demand on the maker, see Vaughan

1 That a promise to pay after neglect of presentment and notice, or both with knowl-
edge, is a waiver, see Yeager v. Farwell, 13 Wall. 6; Meyer v. Hibsher, 47 N. Y. 265;
Tardy v. Boyd, 26 Gratt. 631 ; Johnson v. Arrigoni, 5 Orcg. 485. If an indorser also

307

272

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

who should pay the note has absconded, or has no domicile or
regular place of business, and cannot be found by reasonable
endeavors, payment need not be demanded of him, because it

would be of no utility to a subsequent party ; (k) still,
* 272 notice of these facts * should be given. And it has been

held that where demand of payment was delayed by politi-
cal disturbances, or by any invincible obstacle, it was enough if
the demand was made as soon as possible after the obstruction
ceased. (I) l

v. Fuller, Stra. 124(5; Taylor v. Jones,
2 Camp. 106; Lundie a. Robertson, 7
East, 231 ; Haddock v. Bury, id. 236, n. ;
Hodge v. Fillis, 3 Camp. 464 ; Hopley v.
Dufresne, 15 East, 275 ; Ryram o. Hun-
ter, 36 Me. 217 ; Low v. Howard, 11
Cush. 268 ; Dorsey u. Watson, 14 Mo.
59; Harvey o. Troupe, 23 Miss. 538.—
That a new promise to pay, after notice
of the neglect to demand of the maker,
is a waiver, see Sussex Bank v. Baldwin,
2 Harrison. 487 ; Seeley v. Bisbee, 2 Vt.
105; Ladd ». Kenney, 2 N. H. 340;
Sogers v. Hackett, 1 Foster (N. H.), 100;
Breed v. Hillhouse, 7 Conn. 523 ; Jones v.
O'Brien, 26 E. L. & E. 283 ; Peto v. Rey-
nolds, id. 404. — It has been decided that
it must be shown affirmatively, however,
that the indorser, when he made the
promise, knew that no demand had been
made on the maker. Otis v. Hussey, 3
N. H. 346 ; New Orleans Railroad Co. r.
Mills, 2 La. An. 824 ; Robinson v. Day, 7
La. An. 201. But it is said in Bruce v.
Lytle, 13 Barb. 163, that where there is
an express promise, demand and notice
will be presumed unless the contrary be
shown. — So if an indorser take full se-
curity from the maker to secure him
against his liability to pay the note, this
excuses a demand on the maker, and no-
tice thereof to the indorser. Durham u.
Price, 5 Yerg. 300 ; Duvall v. Farmers
Bank, 2 G. & J. 31 ; Mead v. Small, 2
Greenl. 207 ; Marshall v. Mitchell, 34 Me.
227 ; Marshall v. Mitchell, 35 Me. 223 ;
Prentiss v. Danielson, 5 Conn. 175; Perry
v. Green, 4 Harrison, 61 ; Mechanics
Bank v. Griswold, 7 Wend. 165; Cod-
dington v. Davies, 3 Denio, 16 ; Bond v.
Farnham, 5 Mass. 170 ; Stephenson v.
Primrose, 8 Port. (Ala.) 155. — Aider, of
only part security. Spencer v. Harvey,

17 Wend. 489; Bruce v. Lytle, 13 Barb.
103 ; Burroughs v. Hannegan, 1 McLean,
309 ; Kyle r. Green, 24 Ohio, 495 ; Wood-
man v. Eastman, 10 N. H. 359 ; Andrews
v. Boyd, 8 Met. 434 ; Otsego Co. Bank v.
Warren, 18 Barb. 290. — And the whole
doctrine itself is subject to many quali-
fications ; and in Kramer v. Sandford, 4
W. & S. 328, where the American author-
ities are fully reviewed, Gibson, C. J., ob-
served that this doctrine of waiver in
consideration of security had no footing
in Westminster Hall.

(k) Putnam o. Sullivan, '4 Mass. 45;
Gilbert v. Dennis, 3 Met. 495, 499; per
Shaw, C. J. ; Duncan u. McCullough. 4
S. & R. 480 ; Lehman o. Jones, 1 W. &
S. 126; Wheeler v. Field, 6 Met. 290;
Gist v. Lybrand, 3 Ohio, 307; Central
Bank v. Allen, 16 Me. 41 ; Bruce v. Lytle,
13 Barb. 163; Nailor v. Bowie, 3 Md.
251 ; Ratcliff v. Planters Bank, 5 Sneed,
425. — So when the maker of the note
was a seafaring man, having no resi-
dence or place of business in the State,
and was at sea when payment was due,
no demand was held requisite. Moore
v. Coffield, 1 Dev. 247. So where the
maker of a promissory note removes
from the State subsequently to making,
and continues to reside abroad until its
maturity. Foster v. Julien, 24 N. Y. 28.
— But where the holder was told, at the
time of the indorsement, that the maker
was a transient person, and his residence
unknown, an effort should be made, not-
withstanding, to find him. Otis u. Hus-
sey, 3 N. H. 346.

(/) Patience v. Townley, 2 Smith,
King's Bench, 223. And so the preva-
lence of a contagious malignant fever
in the place of residence of the parties,
which occasioned a stoppage of all busi-

indorses a renewal note, void for usury, given in substitution of the original note, it is
a waiver of presentment and notice of the non-payment of the original note. Leary v.
Miller, 61 N. Y. 488.

1 Sec Ronquette v. Overmann, L. R. 10 Q. B. 525 ; Bond v. Moore, 93 U. S. 593 ;
Dunbar v. Tyler, 44 Miss. 1 ; Norris v. Despard, 38 Md. 487.

308

CH. XVI.]

NOTES AND BILLS.

273

Where the bill or note is made payable at a particular place
specified in the body of it, it seems to be the rule in England that
it must be presented for that purpose at that place, for the place
is part of the contract ; (m) but " payable at," &c, out of the
body of the note, either at the bottom, or in the margin, is but a
memorandum, which binds nobody, (n) And in this country,
neither a bill or note drawn payable at a place certain, nor a bill
drawn payable generally, but accepted payable at a specified
place, need be presented at that place, (o) 1 in order to
* sustain an action against the maker or acceptor; but *273
he may show by way of defence, that he was ready there
with funds, and thus escape all damages and interest; (p) and
if he can show positive loss from the want of such presentment

ness, has been held a sufficient excuse
for a delay of two months in giving no-
tice of a non-payment. Tunno v. Lague,
2 Johns. Cas. 1. If the holder deposits
the note in the post-office in season to
reach the place of payment at the prop-
er time, to be there presented by his
agent, but through the mistake of the
postmaster it is misdirected and delayed,
these facts have been held to excuse the
delay. Windham Bank v. Norton, 22
Conn. 213.

(m) Rowe v. Young, 2 Br. & B. 165 ;
Sanderson v. Bowes, 14 East, 500 ; Spind-
ler v. Grellett, 1 Exch. 384; Emblin v.
Dartnell, 12 M. & W. 830. These de-
cisions, however, led to the enactment of
1 & 2 Geo. IV. c. 78, which provides that
an acceptance at a particular place is a
general acceptance, unless expressed to
be payable there only, and not otherwise
or elsewhere. On the construction of
this statute, see Selby o. Eden, 8 Bing.
611 ; Eayle v. Bird, 6 B. & C. 531.

(n) Masters v. Barretto, 8 M. G. & S.
433; Exon v. Russell, 4 M. & Sel. 505;
Bowling v. Harrison, 6 How. 259.

(o) United States Bank o. Smith, 11
Wheat. 171 ; Eoden v. Sharp, 4 Johns.
183; Wolcott u.Van Santvoord, 17 Johns.
248; Caldwell v. Cassidy, 8 Cowen, 271;
Haxtun v. Bishop, 3 Wend. 15 ; Wallace
v. McConnell, 13 Pet. 136; Carley v.
Vance, 17 Mass. 389; Watkins v.
Crouch, 5 Leigh, 522 ; Ruggles v. Pat-
ten, 8 Mass. 480; Allen v. Smith's
Adm'r, 4 Harring. (Del.) 234; Dough-
erty v. Western Bank of Georgia, 13 Ga.

288; Ripka v. Pope, 5 La. An 61; Blair
v. Bank of Tenn. 11 Humph. 84 ; Weed v,
Van Houten, 4 Halst. 189; McNairy v.
Bell, 1 Yerg. 502 ; Mulherrin v. Hannum,
2 id. 81; Bacon „•. Dyer, 3 Fairf. 19;
Remick v. O'Kyle, id. 340 ; Doekray v.
Dunn, 37 Me. 442; Nichols v. Pool, 2
Jones (N. C), 23; Irvine v. Withers, 1
Stew. (Ala.) 234; Eldred v. Hawes, 4
Conn. 465 ; Waite, J., in Jackson v. Park-
er, 13 id. 358; Payson o. Whitcomb, 15
Pick. 212; Sumner v. Ford, 3 Ark. 389;
Green n. Goings, 7 Barb. 652 ; Brigham
ii. Smith, 16 N. H. 274. Contra, per Story,
J., Picquet ». Curtis, 1 Sumner, 478.
See also New Hope D. B. Co. o. Perry,
11 111. 467 ; Ganes v. Manning, 2 Green
(la.), 251 ; Andrews v. Hoxie, 5 Tex. 171 ;
Carter v. Smith, 9 Cush. 321 ; McKenzie
<;. Durant, 9 Rich. L. 61 ; Bank of State
v. Bank of C. F. 13 Ired. L. 75. — If the
bill or note be payable at a particular
place, on demand, then, according to
Savuye, C. J., in Caldwell v. Cassidy, 8
Cowen, 271, demand is necessary. This
is denied in Dougherty v. Western Bank
of Georgia, 13 Ga. 287 ; but it is there
decided that bank-notes are exceptions
to the general rule, on the ground of
public policy, and demand upon them
must be made. This may, however, be
doubted.

(p) Wolcott v. Van Santvoord, 17
Johns. 248; Wallace v. McConnell, 13
Pet. 136; Savage, C. J., in Haxtum o.
Bishop, 3 Wend. 21 ; Wilde, J., in Carley
v. Vance, 17 Mass. 392 ; Caldwell v. Cas-
sidy, 8 Cowen, 271.

1 See, to the same effect, Hills v. Place, 48 N. Y. 520 ; Yeaton v. Berney, 62 HI. 61 ;
Mahan v. Waters, 60 Mo. 167. If a note specifies no place of payment, a presentment
at the maker's former place of business, with no inquiry as to his residence, will not
charge an indorser. Talbot v. Commonwealth Bank, 129 Mass. 67.

309

* 274 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

(as the subsequent failure of a bank where he had placed funds to
meet the bill), he will be discharged from his liability on the bill
to the amount of such loss. Such seems to be the prevailing,
though not the only view, taken of this subject by the American
authorities ; for some of much weight hold, that where the accept-
ance is thus qualified, the holder may refuse it, and protest as for
non-acceptance ; but if he receives and assents to it he is bound
by it, and can demand payment nowhere else. The drawers and
indorsers are certainly discharged by a neglect to demand pay-
ment at such specified place. ( q) 1 If the place be designated
only in a memorandum not in the body of the bill or note, pre-
sentment may be made at such place, but may also be made where
it might have been without such memorandum, (v) If the note
be payable at any of several different places, presentment at any
one of them will be sufficient. («) It has been held that where a
note was made payable at a certain house, and the occupant

* 274 * of the house was himself the holder of the note at its ma-

turity, it was demand enough if he examined his accounts,
and refusal enough if he had no balance in his hands belonging to
the party bound to pay. (£)

(<?) See 3 Kent. Com. 97, 99; Picquet cordingly, and contended that the mem-

v. Curtis, 1 Sumner, 478 ; Gale v. Kem- orandum was as much parcel of the

per's Heirs, 10 La. 305 ; Warren v. Allnut, contract as if it had been in the body of

12 La. 454 ; Bacon v. Dyer, 12 Me. 19. the instrument, and that therefore pre-

(r) Williams v. Waring, 10 B. & C. 2. sentment at the house where the note was
This was an action of assumpsit on a made payable should have been averred
promissory note by the indorsee against and proved. Lord Tenterden, C. J. : "In
the maker. The note was in the follow- point of practice, the distinction between
ing form: "31st January, 1827. Two mentioning a particular place for pay-
months after date I promise to pay to ment of a note, in the body and in the
A. B. £25, value received. J. Waring, margin of the instrument, has been fre-
At Messrs. B. & Co.'s, Bankers, London." quently acted on. In the latter case it
The note was in the handwriting of the has been treated as a memorandum only,
defendant, the maker, and the memoran- and not as a part of the contract ; and
dum was written at the time the note I do not see any sufficient reason for
was made. For the defendant it was departing from that course." Bayley, J.,
contended that the note should have cited the case of Exon !•. Runell, 4 M. &
been described in the declaration as Sel. 505, as being sufficient to decide this
payable at Messrs. B. & Co 's, and that case in favor of the plaintiff. See also
evidence of presentment there should Morris v. Husson, 4 Sandf. 93.
have been given. The judge overruled (s) Langley v. Palmer, 30 Me. 467.
the objection, but gave leave to move (t) Sanderson v. Judge, 2 H. Bl. 509.
to enter » nonsuit. It was moved ac-

1 Contra, in Iowa, Fuller v. Dingman, 41 la. 506.
310

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS. * 275

SECTION X.

OF WHOM, WHEN, AND WHERE THE DEMAND OR PRESENTMENT FOR
PAYMENT SHOULD BE MADE.

Demand of payment should be made by the holder, or his
authorized agent, of the party bound to pay, or his authorized
agent ; («) and at his usual place of residence, or usual place of
business ; if the former, within such hours as may be reasonably
so employed, and if the latter, in business hours ; but a demand
at a bank where a note is payable, made after business hours, but
while the bank is still open and the officers are there, has been
held sufficient. (y~) x If the holder finds the dwelling-house or
place of business of the payor closed, so that he cannot enter the
same, and after due inquiry cannot find the payor, the prevalent
doctrine in this country is, that he may treat the bill or note as
dishonored. (w~) If the payor has changed his residence to some
other place within the same State, the holder must endeavor to
find it and make demand there ; but if he have removed out of the
State, subsequent to making the note, the demand may be
made at his former residence, (x) The presumption * is * 275
that the maker lives where he dates the note, and demand
must be made there, unless when the note falls due the payor
resides elsewhere within the State, and the holder knows it, and
then the holder must make the demand there, (y)

(«) Lord Kenyon, in Cooke v. Calla- Bank of United States, 2 Pet. 96 ; Ogden

way, 1 Esp. 115. — And a person in v. Cowley, 2 Johns. 274 ; Fields v. Mallett,

possession of a bill, payable to his own 3 Hawks, 465 ; Buxton v. Jones, 1 Man.

order, is a holder for this purpose. & G. 83. — But in such case some inquiry

Smith v. McClure, 5 East, 476, 2 J. P. or effort ought to be made to find the

Smith, 43 ; v. Ormston, 10 Mod. 286. maker. Ellis v. Commercial Bank, 7

A demand by a notary is sufficient. How. (Miss.) 294; Sullivan v. Mitchell,

Hartford Bank v. Stedman, 3 Conn. 489; 1 Car. L. Rep. 482; Collins v. Butler,

Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 2 Harrison, 487 ; Stra. 1087.

Bank of Utica v. Smith, 18 Johns. 230. (x) Anderson v. Drake, 14 Johns. 114 ;

— Parol authority to an agent to demand McGruder v. Bank of Washington, 9

payment is sufficient. Shedd v. Brett, 1 Wheat. 598 ; Gillespie v. Hannahan, 4

Pick 401 McCord, 503 ; Reid v. Morrison, 2 W. &

Iv) Shepherd v. Chamberlain, 8 Gray, S. 401; Wheeler v. Field, 6 Met. 290;

225. See Hallowell v. Curry, 41 Penn. Nailor v. Bowie, 3 Md. 251. See Gilmore

gt 322 "• Spies, 1 Barb. 158.

(w) Hine v. Allely, 4 B. & Ad. 624; (y) Fisher v. Evans, 5 Binn. 541 ;

Shedd v. Brett, 1 Pick. 413; Williams v. Nailor v. Bowie, 3 Md. 251 ; Lowery v.

i Salt Springs Bank v. Burton, 58 N. Y. 430.

311

275

THE LAW OP CONTEACTS.

[BOOK I.

Presentment for payment, or demand, is sufficient, if made on
one member of a partnership. If there be joint makers who are
not partners, we hold it should be made on all. («/?/) 1 But it is
not always so held, (yz) 2 It has been held that the holder of
negotiable paper may assume that a party resides where he
resided when he put his name on the paper, unless he has notice
or knowledge of a change of residence. («/a)

The whole law in respect of demand and notice is very much
influenced by the usage of particular places, where such usage is
so well established and so well known that persons may be sup-
posed to contract with reference to it. Of this the English rule
in relation to checks on bankers affords an instance, (2) 3 and
also the usage of the banks of our different cities as to notes dis-
counted by them, or left with them for collection. In this coun-
try the practice is not uniform ; but, in general, a demand is
made some days before the maturity of a note, by a notice post-

Scott, 24 Wend. 358 ; Smith v. Philbrick,
10 Gray, 252. See also on this subject,
Taylor v. Snyder, 3 Denio, 145. A note
specifying no place of payment, was
dated, made, and indorsed in the State
of New York, but the maker and in-
dorser resided in Mexico, and continued
to reside there when the note fell due,
their place of residence being known
to the payee and holder, both when the
note was given and when it matured;
and it was held that a demand of pay-
ment on the maker and a notice to the
indorser were necessary to charge the
indorser. Gilmore v. Spies, 1 Barb. 158 ;
affirmed on appeal, 1 Comst. 321. But
it is said in Ricketts e, Pendleton, 14
Md. 320, that where the maker does not
reside, and has 'no place of business in
the State where the note is payable, no
demand upon him is necessary to charge
the indorser.

(yy) Blake v. McMillen, 22 la. 358;
Union Bank v. Willis, 8 Met. 504. So
held as to joint indorsers, in Savre v.
Frick, 7 Watts & S. 383, and Shep'ard v.
Iiawley, 1 Conn. 307.

(yz) A demand on one of three joint
promisors held sufficient in Harris v.
Clark, 10 Ohio, 5.

(i/m) Ward v. Perrin, 54 Barb. 89. But
see Peters v. Hobbs, 25 Ark. 67.

(?) Robson u. Bennett, 2 Taunt. 388.

By the practice of the London bankers,
if one banker who holds a check drawn
on another banker presents it after four
o'clock, it is not then paid, but a mark is
put on it to show that the drawer has
assets, and that it will be paid ; and
checks so marked have a priority, and
are exchanged or paid next day at noon,
at the clearing-house ; held, that a check
presented after four, and so marked, and
carried to the clearing-house next day,
but not paid, no clerk from the drawee's
house attending, need not be presented
for payment at the banking-house of the
drawee. Such a marking, under this
practice, amounts to an acceptance, pay-
able next day at the clearing-house. It
is not necessary to present for payment
a check payable on demand till the day
following the day on which it is given.
A person receiving a check on a banker
is equally authorized in lodging it with
his own banker to obtain payment, as he
would be in paying it away in the course
of trade. Although in consequence there-
of the notice of its dishonor is postponed
a day, one day being allowed for notice
from the payee to the drawer, after the
day on which notice is given by the
bankers to the payee. See Bancroft v.
Hall, Holt, 476; Henry u. Lee, 2 Chitt.
124.

1 Red Oak Bank >-. Orvis, 40 la. 332; Gates v. Beecher, 60 N. T. 518, 523.

2 Allen v. Harrah, 30 la. 363, to the same effect, with regard to an Ohio note,
following Harris v. Clark, supra,

8 See Heywood v. Pickering, L. R. 9 Q. B. 428.

312

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS. * 276

dated on the day of maturity, omitting the days of grace.
But it is usual also, if the note be not paid on the last day
of grace, to make a formal demand on that day, after business
hours. Bills and notes sometimes express days of grace, but gen-
erally not. Usually, and in some States by statutory provi-
sions, all bills and notes on time, when grace is not expressly
excluded, are entitled to grace, (a) 1 And it has been
* held that a bank post-note dated, which had across one * 276
end the words " due on " a certain day which excluded all
the days of grace, which words the bank cashiers of Boston,
where the note was issued, testified were placed there to indicate
that the note was due and payable on that day without graee,
was still entitled to grace. (&) But notes payable on demand
are not entitled to grace, (c) nor are checks on banks, though
payable on time, (d) 2

It sometimes happens that when a bill is drawn in one country,
and made payable in another, the laws in relation to presentment
and demand differ in those countries ; and then the question
arises, which law shall prevail. It would seem that in England
the law of the place in which it is payable prevails ; (e) 3 but in

(a) Corp v. McComb, 1 Johns. Cas. 11 id. 431 ; Cook v. Darling, 2 E. I. 385.—
328 ; Jackson c. Richards, 2 Caines, 343. The days of grace on negotiable notes
In the absence of proof to the contrary, constitute a part of the original contract,
the legal presumption is, that in every Savings Bank v. Bates, 8 Conn. 505, but
State in the Union three days of grace the notes may be declared on according
are allowed by law on bills of exchange to their terms without adding the days of
and promissory notes. Wood v. Corl, 4 grace. Padwick v. Turner, 11 Q. B. 124.
Met. 203. In this case, Shaw, C. J., said : — Whenever the maker of a note is en-
" We consider it well settled, that by the titled to grace, the indorser has the same
general law-merchant, which is part of privilege. Packard v. Valentine, 13 Me.
the common law, as prevailing through- 412; Central Bank v. Allen, 16 Me. 41.
out the United States, in the absence of (6) Perkins v. Franklin Bank, 21 Pick,
all proof of particular contract or special 483, confirmed in Mechanics Bank v.
custom, three days of grace are allowed Merchants Bank, 6 Met. 13.
on bills of exchange and promissory (c) In re Brown, 2 Story, 503 ; Salter
notes ; and when it is relied upon that by v. Burt, 20 Wend. 205 ; Somerville v.
special custom no grace is allowed, or Williams, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 484; Cammer a
any other term of grace than three days, Harrison, 2 McCord, 246.
it is an exception to the general rule, and Id) Bowen v. Newell, 5 Sandf. 326.
the proof lies on the party taking it." (e) Rothschild v. Currie, 1 Q. B. 43.
See also Bussard v. Levering, 6 Wheat. This was an action by an indorsee against
102 ; Renner v. Bank of Columbia, 9 the payee and indorser of a bill of ex-
Wheat. 581 ; Mills v. United States Bank, change drawn in England on, and accept-

1 See Reed v. Wilson, 12 Vroom, 29. On mere instalments of interest, however, no
days of grace are allowed. Macloon v. Smith, 49 Wis. 200 ; Bank of N. A. u. Kirby,
108 Mass. 497, 501.

2 Contra, Culter v. Reynolds, 64 111. 321.

8 Rouquette v. Overmann, L. R. 10 Q. B. 525, decided that the liability of an
indorser of a bill of exchange is measured, like that of the acceptor, whose surety he is,
by the law of the place of performance ; and that where the time of payment and protest

313

* 277 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

this country it has been decided that the law of the country in
which the bill is indorsed shall govern exclusively as to the lia-
bilities and duties of the indorsers, on the ground that every
indorsement is substantially a new contract. (/) Hence,

* 277 a bill drawn in one place and payable in * another, and

there accepted, must be governed, as to the acceptor, by
the laws of the place in which it is accepted. (#) And as no
indorsement becomes effectual until actual transfer, the place
of the actual transfer is the place of the contract of indorse-
ment. (A)

SECTION XI.

OP NOTICE OP NON-PAYMENT.

Where a bill is not accepted, or a bill or note is not paid at
maturity, by the party bound then to pay it, all subsequent parties
must have immediate notice of this fact. 1 The contract of an

cd by, a French house, both plaintiff and not present the bill for payment after protest
defendant being domiciled in England ; for non-acceptance, notwithstanding that
held, that due notice of the dishonor of by the French code de commerce the holder
the bill by the acceptor was parcel of the is not excused from the protest for non-
contract ; that the bill being made pay- payment by the protest for non-accept-
able by the acceptor abroad was a foreign ance ; and loses all claim against the
bill, and the lex loci contractus must there- indorser, if the bill be not presented for
fore prevail ; and that it was sufficient protest for non-payment. In such a case
for the plaintiff to show that he had the payee of the bill is bound to conform
given the defendant such notice of the to the French law in respect to bills of
dishonor and protest as was required by exchange, to enforce his remedies against
the law of France. In Gibbs v. Fremont, the drawers, but not so the indorsee ; he
20 E. L. & E. 555, the case of Rothschild is only required to comply with the law-
o. Currie is, however, referred to by merchant prevailing here, the indorse-
Alderson, B., as of questionable authority, ment having been made in the city of
(/) Aymer v. Sheldon, 12 Wend. 439. New York ; and according to which his
In this ease it was held, that the indorsee right of action is perfect, after protest
of a bill of exchange, payable a certain for non-acceptance. See also Hatcher v.
number of days after sight, drawn in a McMorine, 4 Dev. L. 122.
French West India Island, on a mercantile (g) Lizardi v. Cohen, 3 Gill, 430.
house in Bordeaux, and transferred in (A) Cook v. Litchfield, 5 Sandf. 330;
the city of New York by the payee, need Young v. Harris, 14 B. Mon. 556.

of a bill of exchange, drawn and indorsed in England and made payable and accepted
in France, was enlarged by the government of France to a certain time, dne notice of
presentment and dishonor, made thereafter in accordance with the law of France, was
sufficient to bind the indorser. — A bill of exchange drawn in England and payable in
Spain was indorsed in England by the defendant to the plaintiff, who indorsed it to M ,
residing in Spain. Acceptance having been refused, a delay of twelve days occurred
before M. wrote to inform the plaintiff of the dishonor. On receipt from M. of the notice
of dishonor, the plaintiff gave immediate notice to the defendant. No notice of dishonor
by non-acceptance is required by the law of Spain. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled
to recover the amount of the bill. Home v. Rouquette, 3 Q. B. D. 514.

1 Omission to give notice of default in the payment of previous instalments of a note

314

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS. * 278

indorser is a written contract ; his liability is conditional and
depends upon due demand and notice, and cannot be made abso-
lute by parol evidence of statements made before or at the time
of the indorsement. (M) Thus a verbal agreement of the parties
to waive notice may not render it unnecessary ; (i) but it is some-
times waived in writing, and this usually on the note ; as by the
words, " I waive demand and notice ; " and such waiver is suffi-
cient, (j) A waiver of demand alone should operate as a waiver
of notice ; for if demand of payment is not made because unneces-
sary, a notice can hardly be necessary or useful ; but a waiver of
notice alone is not a waiver of demand, for though the party
waiving may not wish for notice of the non-payment, he
may still claim that * payment should be demanded. (k) J * 278
A waiver of protest has been construed variously ; that
it is a waiver of demand but not of notice, (I) that after waiver
of protest, demand must still be made, (11) and that such waiver
is a waiver of demand and notice. (Im)

There may be a constructive waiver of demand and notice ;
as, by an act of the indorser or drawer which puts the holder off
his guard, or which prevents the holder from treating the note
as he otherwise would. There are many cases showing how this
waiver may be effected. (In) 2 An indorser consenting to an

(hh) Goldman v. Davis, 23 Cal. 256. (j) Woodman v. Thurston, 8 Cush.

(t) It is so intimated in some English 159.

cases. Free v. Hawkins, Holt, 550, 8 (fc) Drinkwater a. Tebbetts, 17 Me.

Taunt. 92. But see Drinkwater v. Teb- 16 ; Lane v. Steward, 20 Me. 98 ; Berk-

betts, 17 Me. 16; Boyd v. Cleaveland, 4 shire Bank v. Jones, 6 Mass. 524; Bu-

Pick. 525 ; Taunton Bank v. Richardson, chanan v. Marshall, 22 Vt. 561. See also

6 Pick. 437 ; Fuller o. McDonald, 8 Union Bank v. Hyde, 6 Wheat. 572 ; Cod-

Greenl. 213 ; Marshall v. Mitchell, 35 Me. dington v. Davis, 3 Denio, 16 ; Bird v. Le

221 ; Farmers Bank v. Waples, 4 Harring. Blanc, 6 La. An. 470.

(Del.) 429; Hoadley v. Bliss, 9 Ga. 303; 11) Wall v. Bry 1 La. An. 312

Lary v Young, 8 Eng. (Ark.) 402.— (U) Buckley v. Bentley, 42 Barb. 646.

Although a bill or note has been indorsed (Im) Fisher v. Price, 37 Ala. 407 ; Jac-

long after it is overdue, there must still card v. Anderson, 37 Mo. 91 ; Porter v.

be a demand and notice of default in Kemball, 53 Barb. 467.

order to charge the indorser, because a (In) Gove ,. Wmmg 7 Met 212

bill or note, although overdue, does not Taylor v. French, 4 ED. Smith 458

cease to be neeotiable. Dwight v. Emer- Mintun v. Fisher, 7 Cal. 573; Kyle v.

cease to be negotmuie ^ w „ Gre 14 Ohio, 490 ; Amoskeag v. Moore,

Johns 121 Greelyw Hunt, 21 Me. 455; 37 N. H. 539; Curtiss v. Martin 20 111.
Erkpatrik, McCuliock,3'Humph.l7i; 557 But see Haskell v. Boardman, 8
Adams v. Torbert, 6 Ala. 865. Allen, 38.

so payable does not discharge the indorser as to later instalments. VMh^S ^s- Co.

v. Davis, 121 Mass, 121. See Croydon Gas Co. * D.ckinson^ 2 C. P. D 46

i A waiver of " notice " will not excuse due presentment Voormes v. Atlee, 29 la 49
2 An admission of liability, promise to pay, and arrangement for delay ot

Proceto]ngas u^onThe note by In indorser, with full knowledge of the facts, amount to

a waiver of demand and notice. Cheshire v. Taylor, 29 la. 492.

* 27£ THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

extension of time between maker and payee, thereby waives
demand and notice at the original maturity of the note. (7o)

No waiver affects any party but him who makes it. It was for-
merly held that a neglect to give notice would not support a
defence to a bill, unless injury could be proved ; but is now well
settled that the law presumes injury, (m)

The omission to give such notice may, however, be excused by
circumstances which rendered it impossible, or nearly so. The
maker's letter, before maturity, stating inability to pay, and
requesting delay, does not excuse want of demand or of no-
tice, (n) But a request of the indorser for delay, or an agree-
ment with him for delay, would excuse or waive demand and
notice, (o) The absconding or absence beyond reach of the party
to be notified, (p) 1 or ignorance of his residence, (j) or the death
or sufficient illness of the party bound to give notice, or any suffi-
cient accident or obstruction, will excuse the want of notice. But
nothing of this kind is a sufficient excuse, provided the notice
could have been given by great diligence and earnest

* 279 endeavor, for so much is required by the law. (r) * Nor

(lo) Walker v. Graham, 21 La. An. war between one country and the country

209. where the note is payable excuses imme-

(m) Dennis v. Morrice, 3 Esp. 158; dvite notice; but notice should be given

Norton o. Pickering, 8 B. & C. 610; Hill within reasonable time after peace. Hop-

v. Heap, Dow. & Ii. 59; De Berdt v. At- kirk r. Page, 2 Brock. 20 ; Griswold v.

kinson, 2 H. Bl. 336. — But in Terry v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438; Scholefield

Parker, 6 A. & E. 502, it was held, that c. Eichelberger, 7 Pet. 586.
if a drawer of a bill of exchange have no (<?) Hunt v. Maybee, 3 Seld. 266; Por-

effects in the hands of the drawee at the ter v. Judson, 1 Gray, 175.
time of the drawing of the bill, and of (r) A party is bound to use reasonable,

its maturity, and have no ground to ex- but not excessive, diligence. Sussex Bank

pcct that it will be paid, it is not neces- v. Baldwin, 2 Harrison, 487 ; Bank of

sary to present the bill at maturity ; and Utica e. Bender, 21 Wend. 643 ; Clark v.

if it be presented two days afterwards, Bigelow, 16 Me. 246 ; Roberts v. Mason,

and payment be refused, the drawer is 1 Ala. (N. s.) 373; Preston v. Daysson, 7

liable, and the case of De Berdt v. Atkin- La. 7 ; Runyon v. Montford, 1 Busb. L.

son is denied to be correct. And see ante, 371 ; Manchester Bank v. Fellows, 8

page * 271, note (.;). Foster (N. H.), 302. — If due diligence

(n) Pierce v. Whitney, 29 Me. 188. be used it will be sufficient, although

(o) Ridgeway v. Day, 13 Penn. St. notice should be sent to the wrong place.

208; Clayton v. Phipps, 14 Mo. 399. Burmester v. Barron, 9 E. L & E. 402;

(p) Walwyn v. St.Quintin,2 Esp. 516, Nichol v. Bate, 7 Yerg. 305; Barr v.

IB. & P. 652; Bowes v. Howe, 5 Taunt. Marsh, 9 id. 253; Phipps v. Chase, 6

30. And see Crosse v. Smith, 1 M. & Sel. Met. 491 ; Barker v. Clarke, 20 Me. 156.

145; Bruce v. Lytle, 13 Barb. 163. — So And where a party is ignorant of the

1 Notice to the person named in a will as executor of the non-payment of a promissory-
note indorsed by his testator, which became payable after the will was offered for probate
and letters testamentary applied for, and before the executor named declined to accept
the trust, is sufficient to charge the estate ; but such notice, if the note matured after the
executor had renounced the trust, and a special administrator had been appointed,
ij not sufficient, although no public notice of the Uuter's appointment had been or-
dered or given. Goodnow v. Warren, 122 Mass. 79.

316

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS. * 279

will the holder's inability to learn the proper place for giving
notice, though an excuse for him, be available to another indorser
who possesses the necessary information, (s)

A conveyance of all the property of the maker to the indorser,
and an acceptance by him, would be regarded as waiving his right
to notice, (t) It might, however, be questioned whether it would
have this effect, if made after the maturity of the note, and with-
out mention of it. (w)

It may not be certain, whether the giving of full security to the
indorser by the maker, would necessarily operate as a waiver.
We should say it would not, because the maker might intend
only to secure the indorser, if he be legally held, (w)

It is a well settled rule, that where there has been no demand
or notice, the party entitled to it waives this defence, by a prom-
ise to pay, made with a full knowledge of the circumstances and
of his defence, (to) And such a promise, made with full knowl-
edge of the absence of demand or notice, operated as a waiver,
although the promisor did not know that demand of the note was
necessary to hold him. (to)

No mere probability that the note or bill will not be paid
excuses demand, and it is even held that the certainty of non-pay-
ment does not. (w) And if an indorser adds to his name the
word " surety," this is said only to give him the right of a surety
in addition to that of an indorser. (x) But a party having colla-
teral security for the whole of his liability on the note, is not
entitled to demand and notice. («/)

address of the person liable upon a bill merous and obscure. 3 Kent, Com. 113,

or note, it is sufficient if he use reason- and Story, Prom. Notes, § 357, and on

able diligence to ascertain it, and after Bills, § 374, would seem to hold the tak-

having ascertained it, sends a notice ing of security a waiver of the notice,

forthwith. Dixon u. Johnson, 29 E. L. But it is held otherwise in Creamer v.

& E. 504. Perry, 17 Pick. 332 ; Woodman v. East-

(s) Beale v. Paris, 20 N. Y. (6 Smith) man, 10 N. H. 359 ; Holland v. Turner,

407. 10 Conn. 308 ; Taylor v. French, 4 E. D.

(/) This seems, upon the whole, to be Smith, 458 ; Kramer o. Sandford, 4 Watts

settled by authority. See Corney v. Da & S. 328 ; Seacord v. Miller, 3 Kern. 55 ;

Costa, 1 Esp. 302; Barton v. Baker, 1 S. Moore v. Coffield, 1 Dev. 247; Denny v.

& R. 334 ; Kramer v. Sandford, 4 Watts Palmer, 610 ; Dufour v. Morse, 9 La. 333.

& S. 328 ; Bond v. Farnham, 5 Mass. The subject of this and the two preced-

170 ; Bank of South Carolina v. Myers, ing notes is fully considered and the

Bailey, 412 ; Barrett v. Charleston Bank, authorities examined in 1 Pars. Notes &

2 McMuilan, 191 ; Stephenson v. Prim- Bills, 560-575.

rose, 8 Port. Ala. 155; Perry v. Green, 4 (vv) Salisbury v. Renick, 44 Mo. 554.

Harr. 61 ; Vreeland v. Hyde, 2 Hale, 429 ; (vw) Matthews v. Allen, 16 Gray, 694.

Seacord v. Miller, 3 Kern. 55; Benedict (w) Gray r. Bell, 2 Rich. L. 67.

v. Caffee, 5 Duer, 226. (a:) Bradford v. Corey, 5 Barb. 461 ;

(«) Walters v. Munroe, 17 Md. 154. Campbell v. Knapp, 15 Penn. St. 27.

(y) The cases on this subject are nu- (y) 3 Kent, Com. 113.

317

* 280 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

If there be joint indorsers (not partners) notice should be given
to each ; and it is held that neglect to give notice to either one
discharges all. (yy~)

In general, the notice must be given within a reasonable time ;

and what this time is, is a question of law for the court, (z)

and each case will be judged by its circumstances.

* 280 * It is so important that the rights and duties of all per-

sons interested in negotiable paper should be as exactly
defined and as certainly known as possible, that there is now a
positive rule of law on the subject ; and this, as gathered from the
usage in commercial places, and the weight of authorities is, that
notice of non-payment may be given to parties liable to pay, on
the same day on which payment has been refused ; (a) either
personally or by mail, as may be proper under the circumstances ;
and that notice should be given as soon as on the day following
that on which payment has been refused ; (6) J or by the mail of
the same day, or by the next mail afterwards, provided no con-
venient or usual means intervene. Where there is but one mail
departing upon the day succeeding the default, notice must be
sent thereby unless it depart before ordinary business hours on
that day. (c) 2 But if there be more than one mail it is consid-
ered that it is sufficient if the notice be deposited in time to go

(yij) People's Bank v. Keech, 26 Md. Fitch, 4 B. Mon. 599; Coleman v. Car-

521. penter, 9 Barr, 178.

(z) Hussey v. Freeman, 10 Mass. 84; (h) If the parties reside in the same

Nash r. Harrington, 2 Aik. 9 ; Haddock town, notice given at any time on the

v. Murray, 1 N. H. 140; Sussex Bank v. next day after the default is sufficient.

Baldwin, 2 Harrison, 488; Bank of Utica Grand Bank ti. Blanchard, 23 Pick. 305

v. Bender, 21 Wend. 043 ; Remer n. Dow- Remington v. Harrington, 8 Ohio, 507

ner, 23 id. 020; Bennett >;. Young, 18 Whittlesey v. Dean, 2 Aik. 263.
Penn. St. 201 ; Smith v. Fisher, 24 Penn. (c) Lennox v. Roberts, 2 Wheat. 373

St. 222. — It seems to be in some respects Seventh Ward Bank v. Hanrick, 2 Story

partly a question of law and partly of 416; Davis v. Hanly, 7 Eng. (Ark.) 647

fact. See Taylor v. Bryden, 8 Johns. Lawson v. Farmers Bank, 1 Ohio St,

173; Ferris v. Saxton, 1 Southard, 1; 207 ; Hartford Bank <>. Stedman, 3 Conn

Scott v. Alexander, 1 Wash. (Va.) 335 ; 489; Howard v. Ives, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 263

Dodge v. Bank of Kentucky, 2 A. K. Whitwell v. Johnson, 17 Mass. 449

Marsh. 610. Mitchell v. Degrand, 1 Mason, 176

(a) Burbridge v. Manners, 3 Camp. United States v. Barker, 4 Wash. C. C
193; Bussard v. Levering, 6 Wheat. 102; 465; Chick v. Pillsbury, 24 Me. 458
Corp v. McComb, 1 Johns. Cas. 328; Downs r. Planters Bank, 1 Sm. & M^
Farmers Bank v. Duvall, 7 G. & J. 79 ; 261 ; Mitchell e. Cross, 2 R. I. 437 ; Bur-
Smith v. Little, 10 N. H. 626; McCIane v. gess v. Vreeland, 4 N. J. 71 ; Stephenson

v. Dickson, 24 Penn. St. 148.

1 If mail communication is stopped by war, posting a notice is insufficient. Farmers
Bank v. Gunnell, 26 Gratt. 131.

2 See Gladwell c. Turner, L. R. 5 Ex. 59.

318

CH. XVI. J NOTES AND BILLS. * 281

by any mail of that day. (d) In London it may be sent by penny-
post to parties residing there.

The notice should be properly addressed. Where an indorser
added to his indorsement his street and number, it was held that
the notice should be so addressed. (dd~)

If the parties live in the same town or city, the notice should
be personal, or left at the residence or place of business of the
party, and if sent through the mail, it is sufficient only if in
fact received in due season, (e) By " parties " in this rule, is
meant the party to be notified, and the party who is to give the
notice, and this last is the bank or notary holding the
* paper as agent, and not the owner. (/) In general, a * 281
personal notice is good, if given anywhere, (g) 1 unless
the reception of notice is an official act, requiring an official
place. (A)

If the parties do not live in the some town, then it may be sent
to the post-office nearest to the residence of the party to be
notified, (£) 2 or it may be sent to the post-office where the party

(d) Whitwell v. Johnson, 17 Mass. (h) Seneca Bank v. Neass, 5 Denio,
449; Housatonie Bank v. Laflin, 5 Cush. 329.

650 ; Story on Prom. Notes, § 824 ; Car- (i) Scott v. Lifford, 9 East, 347 ; Dun-

ter v. Burley, 9 N H. 558. Jap v. Thompson, 5 Ycrg. 67; Spann v.

(del) Bartlett v. Robinson, 9 Bosw. Baltzell, 1 Fla. 302. — But in Pierce

305, 39 N. Y. 187. v. Pendar, 5 Met. 852, it was held, that

(e) Bowling v. Harrison, 6 How. 248 ; when both parties resided in the same
Hyslop v. Jones, 3 McLean, 96 ; Foster town, notice could not be given through
v. Sineath, 2 Rich. L. 338; Van Veehten the post-office, and Shaw, C. J., thus
v. l'ruyn, 3 Kern, 549. But by statute it remarked upon this point : " The only re-
is sufficient, in New York, if the notice niaining question then is, whether notice
be put in the mail. See, as interesting by the post-office was sufficient. The
cases on the requisites of notice, Walker general rule certainly is, that when the
v. Stetson, 14 Ohio (U. S ), 89, and Palmer indorser resides in the same place with
v. Whitney, 21 Ind. 58. the party who is to give the notice, the

(f) Bowling v. Harrison, 6 How. 248 ; notice must be given to the party per-
Bnrbank v. Beach, 15 Barb. 326; Green sonally, or at his domicile or place of
v. Fouley, 20 Ala. 322 ; Manchester Bank business. Perhaps a different rule may
v. Fellows, 8 Foster (N. H.), 302. prevail in London, where a penny-post is

(g) Hyslop v. Jones, 3 McLean, 96. established and regulated by law, by

1 See Bartlett v. Hawley, 120 Mass. 92.

2 If there are several post-offices in the same town, the notice may he sent to either,
Saco Bank v. Sanborn, 63 Me. 340, unless the party usually receives his mail at one
alone, when it should be sent there, Roberts v. Tai't, 120 Mass. 169. Notice sent on the
day of default to E., where the indorser had formerly resided, but whence he had
removed to C. without the holder's knowledge, and thence forwarded to C. on the next
day, where the indorser received it, is seasonable. North Bennington Bank v. Wood,
51 Vt. 471. — A notice left at the desk of a custom-house officer is prima facie sufficient,
Commonwealth Bank v. Mudgett, 44 N. Y. 514; or if addressed to the director of a
corporation who indorsed its bill as surety, at its place of business, it is sufficient,
Berndge v. Fitzgerald, L. R. 4 Q. B. 639. — If an indorsees residence is unknown, in-
formation may be sought from the other parties to the note. Gilchrist v. Donwell, 53
Mo. 591. See Gawtry v. Doane, 51 N. Y. 84, 92.

319

282

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

usually receives his letters, although not his actual place of resi-
dence ; (/) or to the post-office at the place of the party's resi-
dence, though he usually receives his letters at a nearer office in
another town ; (&) or to the place of his actual residence at the
time, although the party has his domicile elsewhere, (Jck*) If the
sender knows that the other party usually receives his letters at
another office, he may send notice there. (Z) And if the Endor-
ser has changed his residence, and the change is unknown to the
party sending notice, he may send the notice to his former resi-
dence, (m) So he may send it to any place designated by
* 282 the indorser on the note, (n) * Where notice may be pro-
perly given through the post-office, it is sufficient if the
notice be deposited in the office in season, although it is never
received by the indorser. (o)

Where an indorser receives notice, and is bound to give notice
to other parties as the condition of making them liable to him,
he comes under similar rules, and each successive indorser has
until the next day to give such notice. ( p) But no party bound
to give notice can profit by the days to which other parties are

whom letters are to be delivered to the
party addressed, or at his place of dom-
icile or business, on the same day they
are deposited. And perhaps the same
rule might not apply, where the party to
whom notice is to be given lives in the
same town, if it be at a distinct village
or settlement where a town is large, and
there are several post-offices in different
parts of it. But of this we give no
opinion. In the present case the de-
fendant had his residence and place of
business in the city of Bangor, and the
only notice given him was by a letter,
addressed to him at Bangor, and de-
posited in the post-office at that place.
And we are of opinion that this was
insufficient to charge him as indorser."
In Green i>. Farley, 20 Ala. 322, where
both indorser and holder resided in Mont-
gomery, but the acceptor resided in
Mobile, and the note was there pro-
tested, it was held that notice to the
indorser sent by the notary through the
post-office was sufficient. And see Bell
v. Hagerstown Bank, 7 Gill, 216; Morton
v. Westcott, 8 Cush. 425.

(/) Morris v. Husson, 4 Sandf. 94;
Bank of Louisiana v. Tournillon, 9 La.
An. 132.

(k) Seneca Bank v. Neass, 6 Denio,
329; Morton v. Westcott, 8 Cush. 425;
Manchester Bank v. White, 10 Foster
(N. H.), 450.

320

(kk) Young ;;. Durgin, 15 Gray, 264.

(I) Walker v. Bank of Augusta, 3 Ga.
486 ; Sherman v. Clark, 3 McLean, 91 ;
Mont. Co. B. v. Marsh, 3 Seld. 481.
Thompson, J., in Bank of Columbia v.
Lawrence, 1 Pet. 678.

(m) Union Bank of T. v. Gowen, 10
Sm. & M. 333; Hunt v. Fish, 4 Barb.
324 ; Hunt v. Nugent, 4 Barb. 641.

(n) Burmeister v. Barron, 9 E. L. & E.
402 ; s. c. 17 Q. B. 828 ; Morris v. Husson,
4 Sandf. 93. But the mere dating of the
note does not dispense with proper in-
quiry as to residence. Carroll v. Upton,
3 Comst. 272 ; Pierce a. Struthers, 27
Penn. St. 249 ; Runyon v. Montfort, 1
Busb. L. 371.

(o) Bell v. Hagerstown Bank, 7 Gill,
216; Sasscer v. Farmers Bank, 4 Md.
409.

(p) Darbyshire v. Parker, 6 East, 3;
Smith v. Mullett, 2 Camp. 208 ; Jame-
son v . Swinton, 2 Camp. 374 ; Brown v.
Ferguson, 4 Leigh, 37. This rule is so
well settled that, although the party re-
ceiving notice may easily have forwarded
it the same day, yet he is not under obli-
gation to send it until the next post after
the day of its reception. Geill v. Jeremy,
Mo. & M. 61. See Hilton v. Shepherd, 6
East, 14, n. ; West River Bank v. Taylor,
34 N. Y. 128.

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS.

283

entitled. Thus, if a note has six indorsers, and the holder noti-
fies the last, and the last notifies the fifth, and so on until all are
notified, the first indorser will not receive notice until six days
have elapsed, and will still be held to all parties. But if the
holder gives no notice until the fourth day, and then notifies the
first and second indorsers, no indorser will be held.

If a bill is sent to an agent for collection, he is treated as a
holder of the note for the purpose of giving notice, and his
principal has the same time for notifying his indorsers after
receiving notice from the agent, as if himself an indorser receiv-
ing notice from an indorsee. (?) It has however recently been
held in England, that the allowance of a day in each step in pre-
sentation and notice applies only as between the parties to a bill,
and not as between a distant holder of his agent, (qq)

Whether joint indorsers, who are not partners, are entitled to
separate notice, may not be certain ; but we think that they have
this right, on reason as well as authority, (r)

If Sunday or any other day intervene, which, by law, or by es-
tablished usage, is not a day of business, then it is not counted,
and the obligation as to notice is the same as if it fell on the
succeeding day. (s) If a note or bill payable without * grace *283
falls due on such a day, it is not payable until the next day.
But if the last day of grace falls upon such a day, then it is pay-
able on the day before ; for the days of grace are regarded as mat-
ters of favor, and are abridged instead of being lengthened by the
intervention of such a day. (£) An action brought on the last day

(q) Bank of U. S. v. Davis, 2 Hill (() Where days of grace are allowed,

(N. Y.), 451 ; Church v. Barlow, 9 Pick, and the last of them falls on Sunday, the

647 ; Lawson v. Farmers Bank, 1 Ohio fourth of July, or other public holiday,

St. 206. the bill or note is payable the day before.

('/(/) Tn re Leeds Banking Co. Law Ransom v. Mack, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 688;

Rep. 1 Eq. 1. Cuyler v. Stevens, 4 Wend. S66; Sheldon

(r) It would seem that notice to one is v. Benham, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 129; Homes v.

enough, from Porthouse v. Parker, 1 Smith, 20 Me. 264; Tassell v. Lewis, 1

Camp. 82, and Harris v. Clark, 10 Ohio, Lrl. Raym. 743 ; Haynes v. Birks, 3 B. &

6. That notice must be given to each, is P. 599; Bussard v. Levering, 6 Wheat,

held in Shepard v. Hawley, 1 Conn. 367; 102; Adams v. Otterback, 15 How. 639;

Willis v. Green, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 232; Lewis v. Burr, 2 Caines Cas. 195; Barlow

Union Bank v. Willis, 8 Met. 504; State v. Planters Bank, 7 How. (Miss.) 129;

Bank n. Slaughter, 7 Blackf. 133. Offut v. Stout, 4 J. J. Marsh. 332. But if

(s) Eagle Bank v. Chapin, 3 Pick. 180 ; no grace is allowed, and the day on which

Agnew v. Bank of Gettysburg, 2 Har. & the bill or note by its terms falls due is a

G. 479 ; Hawkes v. Salter, 4 Bing. 715 ; holiday, it is not payable until the day

Wright v. Shawcross, 2 B. & Aid. 601, n. ; after. Salter v. Burt, 20 Wend. 205;

Bray v. Iladwen, 5 M. & Sel. 68. So of Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69; Delamater

public holidays. Cuyler v. Stevens, 4 v. Miller, 1 Cowen, 76; Barratt v. Allen,

Wend. 566 ; Lindo v. Unsworth, 2 Camp. 10 Ohio, 426. — If, however, the nominal

602. day of payment in an instrument, which

vol. i. 21 321

284

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

of grace, has been held to have been brought too soon ; (m) but
this is not settled. (i>) 1

The purpose of notice is, that the party receiving it may obtain
security from the party liable to him, for the sum for which he is
liable to other parties. No precise form is necessary ; but it must
be consonant with the facts, and state distinctly the dishonor of
the bill, and either expressly or by an equivalent implication, that

the party to whom the notice is sent is looked to for the
* 284 payment, (w) And it is held by the * best authority, that

this implication arises from the actual notice of dishonor, (x)
Nor will a slight mistake in the name or description of the note or
party vitiate the notice, unless the party receiving it is misled
thereby ; (#) nor need the notice state who owns or who protests
the note, (z) Any party may give notice, and it will enure to the
benefit of every other party, (a) provided the party giving the
notice be himself the holder or an indorser already fixed by

is entitled to grace, happens to fall on
Sunday or on a holiday, the days of grace
are the same as in other cases, and pay-
ment is not due until the third day after.
Wooley v. Clements, 11 Ala. 220.

(u) Wiggle v. Thomason, 11 Sm. & M.
452 ; Walter v. Kirk, 14 III. 65.

(v) See McKenzie v. Durant, 9 Rich.
L. 61 ; Ammidown v. Woodman, 21 Me.
580.

(w) Hartley v. Case, 4 B. & C. 339 ;
Solarte v. Palmer, 7 Bing. 530 ; Boulton
p. Welsh, 3 Bing. N. C. 688, remarked
upon in Houlditch v. Cauty, 4 id. 411 ;
Grugeon v. Smith, 6 A. & E. 499; Strange
v. Price, 10 id. 125; Cooke v. French, id.
131; Furze v. Sharwood, 2 Q. B. 388;
King v. Bickley, id. 419 ; Rohson v. Cur-
lewis, id. 421 ; Hedger v. Steavenson, 2
M. & W. 709; Lewis v. Gompertz, 6 id.
399 ; Bailey v. Porter, 14 id. 44 ; Messen-
ger v. Southey, 1 Man. & G. 76; Arm-
strong v. Christiani, 5 C. B. 687 ; Everard
v. Watson, 18 E. L. & E. 194 ; Barstow
v. Hiriart, 6 La. An. 98 ; Denegre v. Hiri-
art, id. 100 ; Cook v. Litchfield, 5 Sandf.
330; Beals v. Peck, 12 Barb. 245; Spann
v. Baltzell, 1 Fla. 302 ; Reedy v. Seixas,
2 Johns. Cas. 337; United States Bankz>.
Carneal, 2 Pet. 543; Mills v. Bank of
United States, 11 Wheat. 431 ; Shed v.
Brett, 1 Pick. 401 ; Gilbert ». Dennis, 3
Met. 495 ; Pinkham v. Macy, 9 id. 174 ;
Dole v. Gold, 5 Barb. 490 ; De Wolf v.
Murray, 2 Sandf. 166 ; Youngs u. Lee, 2

Kern. 551 ; Smith v. Little, 10 N. H. 526;
Cowles v. Harts, 3 Conn. 516 ; Wheaton
v. Wilmarth, 13 Met. 423 ; Cayuga Coun-
ty Bank v. Warden, 1 Comst. 413 ; Piatt
v. Drake, 1 Dougl. (Mich.) 296; Spies v.
Newberry, 2 id. 425 ; Bank of Cape Fear
v. Sewell, 2 Hawks, 500. See also 1 Am.
Lead. Cas. 231-237 ; Boehme v. Carr, 3
Md. 202 ; Farmers Bank v. Bowie, 4 id.
290; Woodin v. Foster, 16 Barb. 146;
Wynn v. Alden, 4 Denio, 163 ; Townsend
v. Lorain Bank, 2 Ohio (n. s.j, 345; Paul
u. Joel, 4 H. & N. 355. And if a party to
a note gives positive notice of dishonor,
which afterwards turns out to be true, it
is immaterial whether he had knowledge
of the fact at the time when he gave the
notice or not. Jennings v. Roberts, 29 E.
L. & E. 118.

(x) Chard ... Fox, 14 Q. B. 200; Gra-
ham v. Sangston, 1 Md. 60 ; Mills v. Bank
of United States, 11 "Wheat. 431 ; Met-
calfe v. Richardson, 20 E. L. & E. 301.

(?/) Mellersh v. Rippen, 11 E. L. & E.
499 ; Smith v. Whiting, 12 Mass. 6 ; To-
bey v. Lenning, 14 Penn. St. 483 ; Cayuga
County Bank v. Warden, 2 Seld. 19;
Snow v. Perkins, 2 Mich. 239 ; Housa-
tonic Bank v. Laflin, 5 Cush. 546; Den-
nistoun v. Stewart, 17 How. 606.

(-) Bradley v. Davis, 26 Me. 45.

(a) Chapman v. Keene, 3 A. & E. 193 ;
overruling Tindal v. Brown, 1 T. R. 167,
2 id. 186, n., and Ex parte Barclay, 7 Ves.
697 ; Beal's Adm'r v. Alexander, 6 Tex.

1 See Blackman v. Nearing, 43 Conn. 56. An action may bo brought on the last day
of grace if a demand be first made, otherwise not; see Estes v. Power, 102 Mass. 65.

322

CH. XVI.] NOTES AND BILLS. * 285

notice, (5) and gives the notice to the party sought to be charged
within one day after the dishonor, or after receiving notice him-
self, (c) The holder may leave without notice whom he will, and
hold by due notice those whom he will ; and the indorser having
due notice, must himself notify prior parties to whom he would
look, (cf) But if a holder prevents an indorser from having re-
course to a prior party, by discharging that prior party, he cannot
look to the indorser whom he notifies. And notice given to one
party does not hold another; thus if a second indorser having
notice, and thereby being bound, neglects to give notice to the first
indorser, the latter would not be liable, (e) Nor does authority to
an agent to indorse a note imply authority to receive notice of
dishonor. (/) And if one partner makes a note which another
indorses, regular notice of the dishonor must be given to the
indorser. (</) If the paper be in fact dishonored, a notice may
be good, although the party giving it had no certain knowledge of
the fact. (A)

The party giving the notice must have with him the note or
bill, unless there are special circumstances accounting for and
excusing its absence, (hh)

* After the holder of a dishonored bill or note has given * 285
due notice to indorsers, he may indulge the acceptor or
maker with forbearance or delay, without losing his claim on the
indorsers, provided he retains the power of enforcing payment
at any moment, (i) 1 But if he makes a bargain for delay, prom-
ising it on a consideration which makes the promise binding, or
under his seal, this destroys his claim against the indorser. (/)

531. But the notice must be given by a (c) Morgan v. Woodworth, 3 Johns,

party to the bill. If given by a stranger Cas. 90.

it will not suffice. Jameson v. Swinton, ( /) Valk v. Gaillard, 4 Strob. L. 99.
2 Camp. 373; Chanoine v. Fowler, 3 (q) Foland v. Boyd, 23 Penn. St. 476.
Wend. 173; Wilson v. Swabey, 1 Stark. (A) Jennings v. Roberts, 4 E. & B. 615.
34. So in case of non-acceptance, notice (AA) Arnold v. Dresser, 8 Allen, 435.
to the drawer by the drawee will not (i) Pole v. Ford, 2 Chitt. 125 ; Philpot
avail, for the latter is not a party. Stan- v. Bryant, 4 Bing. 717 ; Badnall u. Sam-
ton v. Blossom, 14 Mass. 116. uel, 3 Price, 521 ; Walwyn v. St. Quintin,

(b) Lysaft v. Bryant, 9 C. B. 46. 1 B. & P. 652; McLemore v. Powell, 12

(c) Brown v. Ferguson, 4 Leigh, 37; Wheat. 554; Bank v. Myers, 1 Bailey,
Simpson v. Turney, 5 Humph. 419. See 412 ; Planters Bank v. Sellman, 2 G. & J
also Turner v. Leech, 4 B. & Aid. 451 ; 230 ; Gahn v. Niemcewicz, 11 Wend. 312
Eowe v. Tipper, 20 E. L. & E. 220, n. Frazier v. Dick, 5 Rob. (La.) 249 ; Walk

(d) Valk v. Bank of State, 1 McMull. er v. Bank of Mont. Co. 12 S. & R. 382
Eq. 414 ; Carter v. Bradley, 19 Me. 62 ; Freemans Bank v. Rollins, 13 Me. 202.
Lawson v. Farmers Bank, 1 Ohio St. 206. (/) Clark v. Henty, 3 5T. & Col. 187

l Bateson v. Gosling, L. R. 7 C. P. 9 ; Tobey v. Ellis, 114 Mass. 120 ; Hagey v. Hill,
75 Penn. St. 108.

323

* 286 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

The reason is, that he ought not to claim payment of the indors-
ers, unless, on payment, he could transfer to them the bill or note,
with a full right to enforce payment at once from the acceptor or
maker. But he could give them no such right if he had, for good
consideration, given to the acceptor or maker his promise that
they should not be sued.

It has been a subject of some discussion whether the above rule
applies in cases of assignments in insolvency.1 Bankrupt and in-
solvent laws usually provide that the discharge of the bankrupt or
insolvent shall not discharge his indorsers or sureties ; and it is
sometimes attempted to effect the same result in voluntary as-
signments in insolvency. The indentures contain a provision
that the creditors who become parties to them shall discharge the
insolvent ; but they also contain a further provision that the in-
dorsers or sureties shall not be discharged. And the question has
been whether the indorsers or sureties are discharged notwith-
standing this provision. But we think the reason of the rule
which discharges them, does not hold in this case. For where
the debtor himself stipulates that his discharge shall not prevent
his creditors from having recourse to his indorsers or sureties, it
must be understood that he binds himself not to oppose such dis-
charge to a suit against himself by the indorsers or sureties

* 286 if they are held liable to his creditors * by reason of a pro-

vision which he himself expressly makes. The reason,
therefore, fails, which generally makes his discharge their dis-
charge. And, it may be added, that it is for their benefit that
this provision should be carried into effect. For if his discharge
necessarily operated their discharge, creditors would naturally pre-
fer a claim against them to the dividend of an insolvent, and would
*therefore take nothing from him, but all from them. Whereas,
if this clause permits them to get what they can from the insol-
vent, and look to the indorsers or sureties only for the balance,

Greely v. Dow, 2 Met. 176 ; Wharton v. charged, though the party for whom he

Williamson, 13 Penn. St. 273. See also is bound take security of the acceptor

Moss w. Hall, 5 Exch. 46. Unlike, how- and then release it without his consent,

ever, the case of a surety, a party liable Hurd v. Little, 12 Maes. 603; Pitts v.

on a bill as indorser will not be dis- Congdon, 2 Comst. 352.

1 An indorser or surety is not discharged by the creditor's voting to accept 8
composition in bankruptcy from the maker, Ex parte Jacobs, L. R. 10 Ch. 211 ;
Megrath v. Gray, L. K. 9 C. P. 216; Guild v. Butler, 122 Mass. 498; and notice must
be sent to an indorser, although a bankrupt, and his assignee has been appointed. Ex
parte Baker, 4 Ch. D. 795.

324

CH. XVI.] N0TE8 AND BILLS. * 287

they would always do so, and the sureties would have the benefit
of whatever was paid by way of dividend, (/fc)

If an indorser who is released from his liability by the laches
of the holder, thereafter promises to pay the note with knowledge
of the facts which constitute the laches, he cannot set up as a
defence against the note the want of demand and notice. (M)
And he is thus liable although when he made the promise he did
not know that the want of notice released him, as he must be pre-
sumed to know the law. (kl)

SECTION XIL

OP PROTEST.

If a foreign bill be not accepted, or not paid at maturity, it
must be protested at once ; and this should be done by a notary
public, to whose official acts under his seal, full faith is given in
all countries. (£) Inland bills are generally, and promissory notes
very often protested in like manner, but this is not required by
the law-merchant, (to) It is held, on the weight of authority,
that our States are so far foreign to each other, that a bill drawn
in one of them, upon a drawee resident in another, re-
quires protest, (n) The notary's certificate * of protest * 287
would not be evidence of dishonor, where the protest was

(£) Parke, B., Kearsley v. Cole, 16 M. v. Bates, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 52 ; Cole v. Jes-

& W. 135; Ex parte Gifford, 6 Ves. 805; aup, 9 Barb. 393.

Boultbee v. Stubbs, 18 Ves. 20 ; Ex parte (m) Windle v. Andrews, 2 B. & Aid.

Glendinning, Buck, Cases in Bankruptcy, 696 ; Bonar v. Mitchell, 5 Exch. 415 ;

517 ; Nicholson v. Revill, 4 A. & E. 675; Young ». Bryan, 6 Wheat. 146; Burke v.

Lewis p. Jones, 4 B. & C. 506, n. ; Nichols McCay, 2 How. 66.

v. Norris, 3 B. & Ad. 41; Clagett v. Sal- (n) Whether a bill drawn in one of
mon, 5 G. & J. 314; Owen v. Homan, 3 the United States upon persons resident
E. L. & E. 112 ; Price v. Barker, 30 E. L. in another is a foreign bill so as to re-
ft E. 157 ; Sohier v. Loring, 6 Cush. 537. quire a protest in case of non-acceptance
See ante, p. *29. or non-payment, is a question concerning

(kk) See ante, p. * 271, and note ; and which there has been a difference of ju-

also Sigerson v. Matthews, 20 How. 496 ; dicial opinion. It has been held in New

Rogers v. Hackett, 1 Foster, 100 ; Rey- York and Connecticut that such bills are

nolds v. Douglas, 12 Pet. 497 ; Thornton not foreign. Miller v. Hackley, 5 Johns.

v. Wynn, 12 Wheat. 183. 375 ; Bay v. Church, 15 Conn. 15. But

(kl) Morgan v. Peet, 32 HI. 281. See the case in New York has been since

ante as to waiver, p. *279. overruled in the same jurisdiction; and

(I) Gale v. Walsh, 6 T. R. 239 ; Bry- in the other States where the question

den v. Taylor, 2 Har. & J. 396; Townsley has arisen, and in the Supreme Court of

v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 170. And the duty of the United States, a contrary opinion has

the notary cannot be performed by an been held. Duncan v. Course, 1 S. Car.

agent or clerk. Onondaga County Bank Const. 100 ; Cape Fear Bank v. Stine-

325

* 288 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

not required by law, (o) even if the notes were payable in a for-
eign country. (p~) If the bill be protested for non-acceptance by
the drawee, any third person may intervene, and accept or pay
the bill, for the honor of the drawer or of any indorser ; and such
acceptance supra protest has the same effect as if the bill had
been drawn on him. He is liable in the same way, and he has
his remedy against the person for whom he accepts, and all prior
parties with notice ; and if he pays the bill for an indorser he
stands in the position of an indorsee for value. (<?) And this is
true although the acceptance is at the request and for the honor
of the drawee after his refusal, (r) The holder is not bound to
receive an acceptance supra protest, (s) but must receive payment
if tendered to him supra protest. But after a general acceptance by
the drawee there can be no acceptance supra protest, and a third
party can only add his credit to the bill by a collateral guaranty, (t)
If the bill designates a third party to whom recourse is to be had on
non-acceptance, it is said that this direction must be obeyed, (m)

The notarial protest is generally admissible, but not conclusive
evidence of the facts therein stated, which properly belong to the
act of protest, (v)

* 288 * Banks which receive bills and notes for collection,

generally, perhaps always, employ agents to collect, and
notaries to demand and protest. And it has been held that such
a bank is liable only for due discretion in choosing its agent, and
not for the agent's negligence, (w) And if any act is to be done
at a distance from the bank, the assent of the holder of the note

metz, 1 Hill (S. C), 44; Lonsdale v. 156; Baring v. Clark, 19 Pick. 220. The

Brown, 4 Wash. C. C. 148 ; Phceuix Bank payer supra protest for the honor of the

v. Hussey, 1'2 Pick. 483 ; Brown v. Fer- indorser cannot hold such indorser liable

guson, 4 Leigh, 37; Halliday v. McDou- if he have already been discharged by

gall, 20 Wend. 81 ; Carter v. Burley, 9 N. reason of want of notice of the non-ac-

H. 658 ; Buckner v. Finley, 2 Pet. 586 ; ceptanee. When a party has once been

Schneider v. Cochrane, 9 La. An. 235. exonerated, his liability cannot he revived

This is in accordance with the doctrine without his assent. Higgins v. Morrison,

of Mahoney v. Aslilin, 2 B. & Ad. 478, 4 Dana, 100.

where a bill drawn in Ireland upon a per- (?) Konig v. Bayard, 1 Pet. 250.

son resident in England was held to be a (s) Mitford v. Walcot, 12 Mod. 410.

foreign bill. (() Jackson v. Hudson, 2 Camp. 447.

(o) Union Bank u. Hyde, 6 Wheat. («) Story on Bills of Exch. §§ 65, 219.

674; Taylor v. Bank of Illinois, 7 Monr. (v) So by statute in New Hampshire,

580; Bank of U. S. v. Leathers, 10 B. Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Alabama,

Mon. 64 ; Carter v. Burley, 9 N. H. 558. and California. See also Gordon v.

(p) Kirtland v. Wanzer, 2 Duer, 278. Price, 10 Ired. L. 385; Graham v. Sangs-

(q) Holt, C. J., in Mutford 0. Walcot, ton, 1 Md. 59; Sumner i\ Bowen, 2 Wis.

1 Ld. Raym. 574 ; Mortens v. Winning- 524 ; Austin v. Wilson, 24 Vt. 630.
ton, 1 Esp. 112; Goodhall v. Polhill, 1 (u>) Agricultural Bank v. Commercial

C. B. 233 ; Geralopulo v. Wieler, 3 E. L. Bank, 7 Sm. & W. 592.
& E. 515; Wood v. Pugh, 7 Ohio, Part 2,

326

CH. XVI.J NOTES AND BILLS.

289

to the employment of a sub-agent will be presumed. O) i But
where a bank assumes to act directly by its own servants or
agents, the general principles of agency would apply, and make
the bank responsible for the acts of its agents.

As to the form and particular statements of the protest, the
true rule is, that notice of protest should inform the party, with
reasonable certainty, what note or bill it is on which he is to be
charged, (xx)

section xni.

ON DAMAGES FOR NON-PAYMENT OF BILLS.

If a bill of exchange be not paid at maturity, the holder may at
once redraw on the drawer or indorser, not only for the face of
the bill, but for so much more as shall indemnify him ; and there-
fore for so much as shall cover the necessary costs of protest,
notice, commissions, and whatever further loss he sustains by the
current rate of exchange on the place where the drawer or in-
dorser resided, (y) This is the rule of the law-merchant ; but in
this country, instead of re-exchange, or damages to be ascertained
by a reference to the above items of loss, established rates of
damage are fixed by statute or by usage. (z) These rates are
larger in proportion to the distance of the place where the
drawee resides from the place where the bill is drawn. * For * 289
the amount, or percentage of damage, at different dis-
tances, we can only refer to the laws of the several States. They
differ considerably ; and it may be regretted that more uniformity
does not prevail among the several States in relation to this mat-

(x) Dorchester Bank v. N. K. Bank, 1 drawer or indorser, and recover all the

Cush. 177 ; Baldwin o. Bank of Louis- customary damages. Welden v. Buck, 4

iana, 1 La. An. 13; Citizens Bank v. Johns. 144; Whitehead v. Walker, 9 M.

Howell, 8 Md. 630. & W. 506. But the acceptor is not liable

(xx) Bank v. Woods, 28 N. Y. 546 ; for re-exchange. Woolsey v. Crawford,

Home Ins. Co. v. Green, 19 N. Y. 118. 2 Camp. 445; Napier v. Schneider, 12

(y) Mellish v. Simeon, 2 H. Bl. 378; East, 420; Sibely v. Tut, 1 McMull. Eq.

De Tastet v. Baring, 11 East, 265 ; Graves 320 ; Suse v. Pompe, 98 Eng. C. L. 638.

v. Dash, 12 Johns. 17 (overruling Hen- See on this topic, Pars. Notes & Bills,

dricks v. Franklin, 4 Johns. 119) ; Den- 652, 661.

ston v. Henderson, 13 id. 322. The holder (z) Hendricks v. Franklin, 4 Johns,

may also, upon protest for non-acceptance, 119, per Spencer, J.; Parsons, C. J, in

without waiting for protest upon non- Grimshaw v. Bender, 6 Mass. 157.
payment, maintain an action against the

1 Planters Bank v. Wilmington Bank, 75 N. C. 534.

327

* 290 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

ter. It seems to be settled by the weight of authority, that, in
determining the amount of re-exchange, the actual or mercantile
par or valuation of money should be regarded, and not the mere
legal or nominal rate, which, as between this country and Eng-
land, differs very widely from the true value, (a)

SECTION XIV.

BILLS OP LADING.

These documents are also by the law-merchant now treated as
negotiable instruments to a certain extent, (aa) The master, by
signing such bill, promises to deliver the goods to A " or his
assigns." If A indorses the bill to any person, or in blank, de-
livering it to any person, that constitutes such person his assignee,
and vests in him a property in the goods, and he may claim the
goods of the captain or owners in the place of the person putting
them on board, and with the same rights. (6) But a bill of lading
is rather quasi negotiable than actually so, the effect of the in-
dorsement being only to transfer the property in the goods and
not the right upon the contract itself, and the indorsee cannot
maintain an action on the bill itself in his own name, nor an
action on the case for the non-delivery of the goods, (e) x
* 290 And a mere memorandum of shipment would not * have the
force nor the negotiability of a bill of lading, (J) nor will the
property in goods, for which a bill of lading has been given, pass
by a mere delivery of the bill without indorsement, (e) or by in-

(a) Scott v. Bevan, 2 B. & Ad. 78; men t," and assignable by such indorse-
Smith v. Shaw, 2 Wash. C. C. 167 ; Grant ment.

v. Healey, 3 Sumner, 623. (c) Thompson v. Dominey, 14 M. &

(aa) These are also made so in Eng- W. 403 ; Howard v. Shepherd, 9 C. B.

land by 18 & 19 Vict. ch. 111. 297 ; Dows v. Cobb, 12 Barb. 310; Line-

(b) Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63 ; leer v. Ayeshford, 1 Cal. 75. See also
Newsom v. Thornton, 6 East, 41 ; Berk- Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. 314 ; Stanton
ley v. VVatling, 7 A. & E. 39, 2 Nev. & v. Eager, 16 Pick. 474; Tindal v. Taylor,
P. 178 ; Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. 208; 4 E. & B. 219.

Chandler v. Belden, 18 Johns. 157; Ry- (d) See Jenkyns v. Usborne, 13 Law

berg u. Snell, 2 Wash. C. C. 294. In J. (n. s.) C. P. 196; Brandt u. Bowlby, 2

Renteria v. Ruding, 1 Mo. & M. 511, Lord B. & Ad. 932.

Tenterden said that a bill of lading, in (e) Stone o. Swift, 4 Pick. 389. But

which the word " assigns " did not appear, see Walter v. Ross, 2 Wash. C. C. 283.
was nevertheless "an indorsable instru-

1 A warehouse receipt is negotiable only to the same extent and for the same
purposes as a bill of lading or carrier's receipt ; its indorsement or delivery does not
transfer the contract itself, but. only the property represented by it, and becomes mere
evidence of title. Hale v. Milwaukee Dock Co. 29 Wis. 482.

328

CH. XVI.J BILLS. * 291

dorseiuent without delivery. (/) For a further statement of the
law of Bills of Lading, see the chapter on the Law of Shipping.

Certificates are sometimes used as if they were negotiable ; but
in an interesting case in Massachusetts, it was decided that they
were not, and that the word " trustee " added to the name of the
person in whose name they stood notified the person to whom
they were delivered as security, and he could not make a valid
transfer of them. Qf ) J

SECTION XV.

OP PROPERTY PASSING WITH POSSESSION.

By the common law, one who has no title to a chattel can give
no title, except by a sale in market overt, which is not known in
this country. An exception exists in the case of negotiable notes
made payable to bearer, or payable to order and indorsed in blank,
so as to be transferable by delivery. (#) We consider that this
exception extends to all negotiable instruments which are trans-
ferable by mere delivery by any party holding them ; and that
by delivery thereof, a good title passes " to any person honestly
acquiring them ; " (A) because the property passes with the pos-
session. Only, as has been said, when suspicion is cast upon his
ownership, as by showing that the paper got into circulation by
force or fraud, need he account for it, even by showing that he
had paid a good consideration for it. (i) It becomes, then, im-
portant to determine what are negotiable instruments. If,
for example, the bond of a railroad * company, payable to * 291

(f) Buffington v. Curtis, 15 Mass. 528; Chalmers, 2 Seld. 209; Seeley v. Engell,

Allen v. Williams, 12 Pick. 297. 17 Barb. 530 ; Lemon v. Temple, 7 Ind.

iff) Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382. 556; Shelton v. Sherfey, 3 Greene (la.),

(</) Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452. 108 ; Wilson v. Lazier, 11 Gratt. 477. But

(A) So said by Abbott, C. J., in Gorgier he must be a lawful holder, and is not if

f. Mieville, 3 B. & C. 45. In Clark v. he took it usuriously from an agent. He

Shee, Cowper, 197, Lord Mansfield puts cannot retain it against an insolvent prin-

notes and money on precisely the same cipal. Keutgen v. Parks, 2 Sandf. 60.
footing. " When," says he, " money or (i) Berry v. Alderman, 24 E. L. & E.

notes are paid bond fide, and upon a val- 318; s. c. 14 C. B. 95; Fitch v. Jones, 32

uable consideration, they never shall be E. L. & E. 134 ; s. c. 5 E. & B. 238 ; Mc-

brought back by the true owner; but Kesson v. Stanberry, 3 Ohio (n. 8.), 156;

where they come maid fide into a person's Catlin v. Hansen, 1 Duer, 309 ; McCaskill

hands, they are in the nature of specific v. Ballard, 8 Rich. L. 470 ; Perrin v.

property ; and if their identity can be Noyes, 39 Me. 384 ; Bissell v. Morgan, 11

traced and ascertained, the party has a Cush. 198. See p. * 241, ante.
right to recover." See also James v.

1 See also Gaston v. Am. Exchange Bank, 2 Stewart, 98.

329

* 292 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. ^ [BOOK I.

bearer, is a negotiable instrument, then a purchaser in good
faith holds it not only free from the equitable defences which
the company might have made against the first holder, but
also against the claims of an owner who may have lost it, or from
whom it was stolen. We regard both the English and American
authorities as making all instruments negotiable which are pay-
able to bearer, and also those which are by custom transferable
by delivery, within which definition the common bonds of rail-
road companies would fall. Of the coupons attached, which have
no seal, this would seem to be the rule. But usage must have
great influence in determining this question. Our note will show
the state of the authorities on this subject. (/) x

If the owner of a note or bill not negotiable, or if ne-

* 292 gotiable * specially indorsed to him, lose it, he may, on suf-

(j) See Gorgier v. Mieville, 3 B. & C. bility of Buch instruments Knox Co.

45, and compare it with Glyn v. Baker, Com. v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539 ; Beaver

13 East, 509. See also Wookey v. Pole, Co. v. Armstrong, 44 Penn. St. 63. See

4B.&Ald. 1; Grant v Vaughan, 3 Burr, also Redfield on Railways, 595, § 239,

1516, where a draft by a merchant on and 2 Am. Law Reg. (n. e.) 748. See

his banker was held negotiable. This Liekbarrow v. Dason, 5 T. R. 683, respect

case distinctly confirms the case of ing bills of lading, before cited. Zwinger

Miller v. Race. In Jackson v. Y. & C. R. v. Samuda, 7 Taunt. 265; Lucas v. Dor-

R. Co. 48 Me. 147, it was held that unless rien, 7 Taunt. 278; Lang v. Smith, 7

there was some statutory provision to Bing. 284 ; in which case it was held that

that effect an action could not be mam- certain bordereaux and coupons, entitling

tained upon interest coupons, not con- the bearer to certain portions of the pub-

taining negotiable words, by an assignee, lie debt of Naples, were not negotiable,

Goodenow, J., delivered a dissenting opin- the jury finding that they did not usually

ion, citing and supporting the text above, pass from hand to hand like money.

Since that time the same question has Taylor v. Kymer, 3 B. & Ad. 321, and

been passed upon by the Supreme Courts Taylor w Trueman, 1 Mo. & M. 403, were

of the United States and of Pennsylvania, decided on the construction of Stat. 6

both of which fully sustain the negotia- Geo. IV. c. 94. But an instrument for

1 The scrip of a foreign government, issued by it on negotiating a loan, and for
which a bond is to be given after all instalments have been duly paid, is, by the custom
of all the stock-markets of Europe, a negotiable instrument, and passes by mere delivery
to a bond fide holder for value. English law follows this custom. Goodwin v. Robarts,
1 App. Cas. 476. — Boyd v. Kennedy, 9 Vroom, 146, decided that corporation coupon
bonds lawfully issued, containing words of negotiability, are negotiable like commercial
paper. To the same effect are Vermilye u. Adams Ex. Co., 21 Wall. 138 ; Marion
Commissioners v. Clark, 94 U. S. 278 ; Cromwell v. Sac County, 96 U. S. 51 ; Force v.
Elizabeth, 1 Stewart, 403 ; Exchange Bank v. Hartford, &c. R. Co., 8 R. I. 375 ;
Dmsmore v. Duncan, 57 N. Y. 573; Chesapeake Co. v. Blair, 45 Md. 102, 110; Griffith
v. Burden, 35 la. 138, 142; San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Tex. 405. See Crouch v. Credit
Foncier of England, L. R. 8 Q B. 374. — An interest coupon detached from a
mortgage bond of a railroad is negotiable by delivery, and may be enforced against
the corporation by a bond fide holder who has no interest in and cannot produce
the bond. Haven v. Grand Junction R. Co., 109 Mass. 88. To the same effect are
Evertson v. Newport Bank, 66 N. Y. 14 ; Cicero v. Clifford, 53 Ind. 191 ; Kennard v.
Cass Co., 3 Dillon, 147. " Interest coupons detached from bonds, payable to bearer
at a specified time and place, are negotiable promises for the payment of money, and
therefore subject to the same rules as bank-notes or other negotiable instruments. They
are, in effect, promissory notes by the law merchant, and possess all the attributes of ne-
gotiable paper." Eoyce, J., in North Bennington Bunk v. Tabor, 52 Vt. 87, 93.
— That days of grace are allowed on coupons, see Evertson v. Newport Bank, 66 N. Y. 14.

330

CH. XVI.] BONDS. * 292

ficient proof of its tenor and of his loss, sustain an action at
law, because no finder can give good title to any holder by a
bond fide sale of such paper to him. (fc) 1 But if the paper be ne-
gotiable and indorsed in blank, or if it be payable to bearer, then
the promisor or indorser may be held liable to an innocent holder
for consideration. It follows, therefore, that the promisor or in-
dorser should not be liable to the loser without sufficient indemnity
to him against the possible demand of such innocent purchaser. (7)
But courts of law find it difficult to require such indemnity, or to
judge of its sufficiency ; and therefore, generally at least, they
turn the loser over to courts of equity, -in which the defendant
may be properly secured by adequate indemnity ; and there the
action will be maintained. Qm) Hence if a note or bill, transfer-
able by delivery, be lost to the owner at the time of its maturity,
this loss is, in general, a defence against a suit at law. (n) But
in some of our States, statutes permit recovery (o) if the plaintiff

the payment of money under seal is not with delivery are negotiable, but that

negotiable, although it appear to be so certificates of stock in a corporation are

upon its face ; at least where any writing not. See Hodges v. Shuler, 22 N. Y. (8

is necessary in order to transfer it. Clark Smith) 114.

v. Farmers Man. Co. 15 Wend. 256; (k) Wain v. Bailey, 10 A. & E. 616.
Parke, Baron, in Hibblewhite v. Mc- (/) Pierson v. Hutchinson, 2 Camp.
Morine, 6 M. & W. 200. In Fisher v. 211; Hansard v. Robinson, 7 B. & C. 90;
The Morris Canal and Banking Com- Clay v. Crowe, 18 E. L. & E. 514 ; Davis
pany, decided in the Supreme Court of v. Dodd, 4 Taunt. 602 ; Poole v. Smith, 1
New Jersey in 1856, it was held that rail- Holt, 144 ; Rowley v. Ball, 3 Cowen, 303;
road bonds are negotiable, and this case Kirby v. Sisson, 2 Wend. 550 ; Devlin v.
was fully concurred in by the Court of Clark, 31 Mo. 22. But evidence is ad-
Appeals. Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Hill (N. missible to show that the note has been
Y.), 159, is generally regarded as having actually destroyed, or that it cannot come to
settled the same point in New York, in the hands of a bona fide holder. Bolt v.
reference to State bonds. But the Court Watson, 4 Bing. 273 ; Rowley v. Ball,
of Appeals in the Schuyler case, held supra. The case where a bank-bill is cut
that certificates of stock in a corporation in halves and one of them is lost, and
are not negotiable ; or at least, that he payment sought for the other, would
who takes an assignment of a certificate, seem to stand upon the same grounds as
without any transfer in the corporation's that of a lost negotiable instrument,
books, acquires only the title of assignor. Mayor v. Johnson, 3 Camp. 324. But see
Mechanics Bank v. New York and New Bullet v. Bank of Pennsylvania, 2 Wash.
Haven Railroad Co. 3 Kern. 599. So in C. C. 172 ; Patton v. State Bank, 2 Nott
Ide v. Conn. & Pass. Riv. R. R. Co. 32 Vt. & MeC. 464 ; Hindsdale v. Bank of Or-
297, it was held that a railway bond pay- ange, 6 Wend. 378.
able to bearer is a negotiable instrument (m) Pierson v. Hutchinson, 2 Camp,
and may be declared upon and described 211 ; Lord Eldon, in Ex parte Greenway,
in an action of assumpsit as a " bond." 6 Ves. 812.

The result would seem to be that all cor- (n) Aranguren v. Scholfield, 38 E. L. &

poration bonds and government stocks E. 424 ; Morgan v. Reintzel, 7 Cranch, 273.
which pass by delivery or indorsement (o) New York, Alabama, Mississippi.

1 McGregory ». McGregory, 107 Mass. 543; Tuckerv. Tucker, 119 Mass. 79. SeeKing
v. Zimmerman, L. R. 6 C. P. 466. But the owner of a note may sue it without possession
of it, if in the hands of the adverse party. Wright v. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437, 441. — The
rule that a bond fide purchaser of a lost or stolen bill or note, indorsed in blank or
payable to bearer is not bound to look beyond the instrument has no application to
the case of a lost or stolen bill of lading. Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 557.

331

292

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

gives indemnity, and in others, the court so direct, (p) But, if it
is physically destroyed, it may be recovered at law, — where, if
only lost, courts would have denied relief, (q)

(p) Meeker u. Jackson, 3 Yeates,
442 ; Anderson v. Eobson, 2 Bay, 495 ;
Tales v. Russell, 16 Pick. 315 ; Bullet v.
Bank of Penn. 2 Wash. C. C. 172 ; Swift
v. Stevens, 8 Conn. 431 ; Thayer v. King,
15 Ohio, 242.

(q) Aborn v. Bosworth, 1 E. I. 401;
Swift v. Stevens, 8 Conn. 431 ; Rogers v.
Miller, 4 Scam. 334 ; McNair v. Gilbert,
3 Wend. 344; Pintard v. Tackington, 10
Johns. 104.

332

CH. XVII.] INFANTS. * 293

•CHAPTER XVn. *293

INFANTS.

In general, all persons may enter into contracts ; and when a
contract is made the law presumes the competency of the parties.
If, therefore, a party rests his action or his defence upon the in-
competency or incapacity of himself or of the other party, this
must be proved, (a) This incompetency may he absolute and en-
tire, or limited and partial ; in some cases a contract is void as to
both parties, and in others only as to one ; in some cases void, and
in others voidable. We shall consider these questions as we proceed.

As the essence of a contract is an assent or agreement of the
minds of both parties, where such assent is impossible, from the
want, immaturity, or incapacity of mind, there can be no perfect
contract. On this ground rests, originally, the disability of infants.
We will first consider this class of disabled persons.

SECTION I.

INCAPACITY OF INFANTS TO CONTRACT.

All persons are denominated infants, by the common law, until
the age of twenty-one. But in some parts of this country
* females reach majority, at least for some purposes, at * 294

(a) Jenne v. Ward, 2 Stark. 326 ; Leader was commenced), and the defendant must
v. Barry, 1 Esp. 353 ; Henderson v. Clark, prove that he was still a minor at the time
27 Miss. 436. Not only is a defendant, who of such ratification. Bay v. Gunn, 1 Denio,
sets up his infancy as a defence to his con- 108 ; Borthwick v. Carruthers, 1 T. R. 648 ;
tract, bound in the first instance to prove Hartley v. Wharton, 11 A. & E. 934. — If
his non-age affirmatively, but if to such a the infant leave the point in doubt, the de-
plea the plaintiff reply a new promise, after fence is not sustained. Harrison v. Clifton,
the defendant became of age, he may show a 17 Law Jour. Ex. 283.
new promise at any time (before the suit

333

* 295 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

eighteen, as in Vermont, (J) in Maryland, (c) in Ohio, (cf) in
Maine, (e) in Missouri, (/) in Texas, (g) and, perhaps, in some
others of our States. A person is of full age at the beginning of
the last day of his twenty-first year, or the day before his twenty-
first birthday. This rule is founded upon an ancient authority, and
upon the principle that the law recognizes no parts of a day, and
therefore when the last day of the last year begins, it is considered
as ending. (A) A similar rule as to infancy prevailed in the Roman
civil law. (i) An infant, using the word in its common meaning,
that of a child who has not left its mother's arms, cannot make a
contract in fact ; but most children who are a few years old are
capable of making a contract. And when the law says that they
are not capable until the age of twenty-one, it is for their sake,
and by way of protection to them. If we keep this principle dis-
tinctly in mind, it will guide us through the intricacies of the law
in relation to this subject.

Thus as a general rule, the contract of an infant is said to be not
void, but voidable. That is, he may, either during his minority, or
within a reasonable time after he becomes of age, (/) avoid the
contract if he will ; or when he reaches the age of twenty-one, if
he sees it to be for his benefit, and chooses so to do, he may con-
firm and enforce the contract. It has been said that whatever
contract the court can see and declare to be to his prejudice, that
will be pronounced void ; and whatever contracts are not

* 295 clearly to his prejudice, but may be useful, * these will be

held voidable. And in reliance on this principle as a safe
and sufficient rule, an infant's warrant of attorney authorizing a
conveyance of his land, (&) a confession of a judgment against

(b) Sparhawk v. Buell, 9 Vt. 42, 79. 597, and in State v. Clarke, 3 Harring.

(c) Davis v. Jacquin, 5 Har. & J. 100. (Del.) 557.

(d) Ohio Statutes, eh. 59. (,•) Savigny, Dr. Rom. 182, 383, 384.

(e) Maine, Acts of 1852, ch. 291. (j) It was settled by the case of Zouch
(/) Laws of Missouri, 1849, p. 67. v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794, that an infant
(q) Hartley's Dig. of Texas Laws, art. cannot avoid his conveyances of land until

242/°i\ mi. ne oecome3 of age- In" Roof ". Stafford, 7

(h) There seems to have been but one Cowen, 179, it was held that the same rule

case, on this question, in England, reported, applied to a sale of chattels; but in the

under the name of Herbert v. Turball, in same case, on error, 9 Cowen, 626, the dis-

1 Keb. 589, and in Sid. 162, and without tinction was maintained, that while he could

names in 1 Salk. 44, and referred to as good not avoid a conveyance of lands until he

law in 2 Salk. 625, in Ld. Raym. 480, and was of age, he might a sale of chattels. So

m Com. Dig. Enfant, A; and the rule is also in Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. 119, and in

repeated in all the text-books. The reason Shipman v. Horton, 17 Conn. 481. See

is analogous to that which made the old also Matthewson v. Johnson, 1 Hoff. Ch.

law writers speak of a year and a day, when 560 ; Carr v. Clough, 6 Foster (N. H), 280.
they mean a whole year. The same rule (k) Lawrence v. McArter, 10 Ohio, 37 ;

is asserted in Hamlin v. Stevenson, 4 Dana, Pyle v. Cravens, 4 Litt. 17.

334

CH. XVII.] INFANTS. * 295

him, (O1 and his cognovit for the same purpose, although the
action was wholly for necessaries, (m) or his appointment of an
agent of any kind, (w) his bond with a penalty, or for the payment
of interest, (o) a release by a female infant to her guardian, ( p)
an infant's contract of suretyship, (q) 2 his release of his legacy or
distributive share in an estate, (r) and a mortgage by an infant
wife of her reversionary interest, for the purpose of securing the
debts of a partnership in which her husband was a partner, («) 3
have each been declared to be absolutely void. (t).

The better opinion, however, as may be gathered from the
later cases, cited in our notes, seems to be that an infant's con-
tracts are, none of them, or nearly none, absolutely void, that is,
so far void that he cannot ratify them after he arrives at the age
of legal majority. Such, at least, is the strong tendency of
modern decisions, (w) 4

(l) Saunderson v. Marr, 1 H. Bl. 75 ; 477, 481 ; Latt v. Booth, 3 Car. & K. 292;

Bennett v. Davis, 6 Cowen, 393 ; Waples Vent v. Osgood, 19 Pick. 572 ; Lawson v.

v. Hastings, 3 Barring. (Del.) 403; Knox Lovejoy, 8 Greenl. 405; Rogers v. Hurd, 4

v. Flack, 22 Penn. St. 337. Day, 57 ; McGan v. Marshall, 7 Humph.

(m) Oliver v. Woodroffe, 4 M. & W. 650. 121 ; Fridge v. The State, 3 G. & J. 104 ;

(n) Doe d. Thomas v. Roberts, 16 M. Ridgely v. Crandall, 4 Md. 435 ; Wheaton

& W. 778. v. East, 5 Yerg. 41 ; McMinn v. Richmonds,

(o) Baylis u. Dinely, 3 M. & Sel. 477 ; 6 id. 9 ; Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn. 494 ; United

Hunter v. Agnew, 1 Fox & S. 15; Colcock States v. Bainbridge, 1 Mason, 71, 82, and

v. Ferguson, 3 Desaus. 482. many other cases. But it may be ques-

Ip) Fridge v. The State, 3 G. & J. 104. tioned whether it is a sufficiently clear, cer-

(q) Wheaton v. East, 5 Yerg. 41, 61 ; tain, and practical rule. The more recent

Allen v. Minor, 2 Call, 70. But see contra authorities incline to hold all (or all with

Hinely v. Margaritz, 3 Penn. St. 428. a single exception) an infant's contracts to

(r) Langford v. Frey, 8 Humph. 443. be voidable merely, not void, and that it is

(s) Cronise v. Clark, 4 Md. Ch. 403. the privilege and right of the infant only

See also McCarty v. Murray, 3 Gray, 578. (not that of the court) to declare his con-

(() In Connecticut some contracts of an tracts void. And the rule itself as alluded

infant are made void by statute. Rogers to in the text, and sustained by the older

v. Hurd, 4 Day, 57 ; Maples v. Wightman, authorities, has been declared unsatisfac-

4 Conn. 376. tory, liable to many exceptions, and diffi-

(«) The rule that an infant's contracts cult of safe application. See Fonda v. Van

are void or voidable according as they may Home, 15 Wend. 631 , 635 ; Brecken bridge's

he pronounced to be prejudicial or useful, Heirs v. Ormsby, 1 J. J. Marsh. 236, 241 ;

has been laid down, and recognized by many Scott v. Buchanan, 2 Humph. 468 ; Cole v.

courts and judges. See Keane v. Boycott, Pennoyer, 14 111. 158; Cummings v. Pow-

2 H. Bl. 515 ; Baylis v. Dinely, 3 M. & Sel. ell, 8 Tex. 80. And see a just criticism by

1 So, too a judgment confessed by an infant's partner, Soper v. Fry, 37 Mich. 236.

2 Contra, Fetrow v. Wiseman, 40 Ind. 148, as voidable only. But an infant's con-
tract in signing a promissory note as surety is not necessarily void if it may be benefi-
cial to him, and becomes binding if, after coming of age, with knowledge that his in-
fancy is a defence, he promises to pay the note. Owen v. Long, 112 Mass. 403.

3 Likewise an agreement by infant husband, made shortly before marriage, and in
consideration of it, to assign all of the wife's property to a trustee for her sole and sep-
arate use, is void. Kingsman v. Kingsman, 6 Q. B. D. 122.

4 That all of an infant's contracts not illegal, or appointing an agent, are voidable,
see Hamer v. Dipple, 31 Ohio St. 72 ; Fetrow v. Wiseman, 40 Ind. 148.

335

* 296 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

* 296 * But the contract of an infant for necessaries is neither
void nor voidable. It is permitted for his own sake that
he may make a valid contract for these things, as otherwise, what-
ever his need, he might not be able to obtain food, shelter, or rai-
ment. And the principles which govern this rule show plainly
that it is intended only for his benefit, and is regarded and treated
as an exception to a general rule.

The word necessaries, in relation to an infant, is not used in
a strict sense ; but the social position of the infant, bis means,
and those of his parents, are taken into consideration. Necessa-
ries for him mean such things as he ought properly to have, and
not merely that which is indispensable to his life or his bodily
comfort.1 It is difficult to lay down any positive rule which
shall determine what are and what are not necessaries. Indeed
there is no such rule. It may be said, however, that whether
articles of a certain kind, or certain subjects of expenditure, are
or are not such necessaries as an infant may contract for, is a
matter of law, and for instruction by the court ; but the question
whether any particular things come under these classes, and the
question also as to quantity, are, generally, matters of fact for the
jury to determine, (y) The cases cited in the notes will show
the views taken of this question by various courts in England
and in this country.

It seems to be certain that food, clothing, lodging, and needful
medicine, are such necessaries ; and the infant may contract
for them on credit, although he has ready funds in his posses-
sion. O) So, proper instruction, (x) Necessaries for an infant's

Mr. Justice Bell upon the vague and in- Caldwell, 12 Cush. 512. This is to be un-
deflnite use of the words " void " and " void- derstood with some limitation, however, for
able," in State!). Richmond, 6 Foster (N.H.), the quantity of poods supplied may be ex-
232; Pm-lce, B , in Williams v. Moore, 11 cessive, in 'which case, if the jurv give the
M. & W. 256; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 103, 104 plaintiff his whole bill, their verdict may
And see Nashville R. R. Co. v. Elliot, 1 be set aside. Johnson v. Lines, 6 VV. & S.
Cow. 611; and post, note (6), * 329. 80. So if ihev find a verdict for the plain-
to) Bent v. Manning, 10 Vt. 225, 230 ; tiff, contrary to the opinion of the court, a
Beeler v. Young, 1 Bibb, 519, 521; Grace new trial will be granted. Harrison v. Fane,
v. Hale, 2 Humph 27, 29 ; Stanton v. WW- 1 Man. & G. 550.

son, 3 Day, 37 ; Phelps v. Worcester, 11 («i) Burghart v. Hall, 4 M. & W. 727.

N. H. 51 ; Harrison v. Fane, 1 Man. & G. (x) And for some, the term " proper in-

550; Peters o. Fleming, 6 M. & W. 42 ; struction" might include a knowledge of

Burghart ». Angerstein, 6 C. & P. 690; the languages, while for others a Tnere

Tuppcr v. Cadwell, 12 Met. 559; Davis v. knowledge of reading and writing may be

1 Necessaries are not "limited to that which is requisite to sustain life, but include
whatever is proper and suitable in tbe case of each individual, having reference to his
circumstances and condition in life." Pardee, J., in Strong v. Foote, 42 Conn. 203,
a case in which dentistry was declared necessary.

336

CH. XVII.]

INFANTS.

297

* wife may be validly contracted for by him ; but not, it is * 297
said, if they are necessaries provided in view of marriage,
though his wife afterwards use them. O) And it seems that, as
an incident to a marriage, which an infant may contract, he is
liable during coverture for the antenuptial debts of his wife,
which she was legally liable to pay, at her marriage, (z) He is
also liable to the same extent as an adult would be for neces-
saries supplied to his lawful children, (a) In some cases, such
things as horses, regimentals, watches, or even jewelry, are
regarded as necessaries, (ft) J An infant cannot borrow
money, so as to * render himself liable to an action for * 298
money lent, although borrowed and expended for neces-
saries ; because the law does not, for his own sake, trust him with

sufficient. Alderson, B., in Peters v. Flem-
ing, 6 M. & W. 48. But a regular colle-
giate education for one in the ordinary sta-
tion and circumstances in life, has been held
in this country not within the term " neces-
saries." Middlebury College v. Chandler,
16 Vt. 683. But a good " common-school "
education would be, for every one ; such an
education is essential to the intelligent dis-
charge of civil, political, and religious du-
ties. Roi/ce, J., in Middlebury College v.
Chandler, 16 Vt. 686. Instruction in read-
ing and writing was held necessary, in
Manby v. Scott, 1 Sid. 112; and the reason
given was, that it was for the benefit of the
realm that learning should be advanced.
In Raymond v. Loyl, 10 Barb. 489, Hand, J.,
says : " It was said on the argument that
'schooling' is not a necessary. And Mr.
Chitty says, it seems a parent is not legally
bound to educate his child. Chit, on Cont.
140. A parent is almost the sole judge of
what is necessary. But if a parent is liable
to a third person, I hope it will never be
decided that sending to a common school,
at a suitable season, and to a reasonable
extent, is not necessary in this country."

(y) Turner v. Trisby, 1 Stra. 168. See
Rainsford v. Fenwick, Carter, 215; Ahell
v. Warren, 4 Vt 149, 152; Beeler v.
Young, 1 Bibb, 519, 520. And see Sams v.
Stockton, 14 B. Mon. 232. And an infant
widow is personally bound by her contract
for the funeral expenses of her deceased
husband, who died leaving no assets. Chap-
pie v. Cooper, 13 M. & W. 252.

(s) Paris v. Stroud, Barnes's notes, 95 ;

Roach v. Quick, 9 Wend. 238 ; Butler v.
Breck, 7 Met. 164.

(a) Dicta in Abell v. Warren, 4 Vt. 152 ;
Beeler v. Young, 1 Bibb, 520.

(b) To be necessaries the articles must
be bond Jide purchased for use, and not for
mere ornament ; they need not be such as
a person could not do without, but should
be in quality and quantity suitable for his
real wants, and his condition and circum-
stances in life. The term includes his food,
but not dinners, confectionery, fruit, &c.,
supplied to his friend. Brooker v. Scott,
1 M. & W. 67 ; Wharton c. McKcnzie, 5
Q. B. 606. Also lodging and house-rent,
Kirton v. Elliott, 2 Bulst. 69 ; Crisp v.
Churchill, cited in Lloyd v. Johnson, 1 B.
& P. 340 ; but not repairs upon his house,
although beneficial in themselves, and ne-
cessary to save the building from decay.
Tupper v. Cadwell, 12 Met. 559. Nor food
for his horses. Mason v. Wright, 13 Met.
306. Nor the rent of a building for carry-
ing on a trade or manual occupation. Lowe
v. Griffith, 1 Scott, 458. Suitable clothing
also comes within the class of necessaries,
but not suits of satin and velvet with gold
lace. Makarell v. Bachelor, Cro. E. 583.
Nor racing jackets. Burghart v. Anger-
stein, 6 C. & P. 690. Nor cockades for an
infant captain's soldiers. Hands v. Slaney,
8 T. R. 578 ; although regimentals for a
volunteer, and livery for such captain's ser-
vant have been held to be necessaries. Id. ;
Coates v. Wilson, 5 Esp 152. The follow-
ing are examples of articles not generally
" necessaries " : Horses, saddles, bridles,

1 A pair of jewelled solitaires worth £25, and an antique silver goblet worth £15
15s., intended for a present, are not necessaries, Ryder v. Wombwell, L. R. 3 Ex. 90;
L. R. 4 Ex. 32 , nor dwelling-house repairs, Wallis v. Bardwell, 126 Mass. 366 ; nor travel-
ling expenses, McKanna v. Merry, 61 111. 177.

vol. i. 22 337

* 299 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

the expenditure, (c) Nor is he liable on a contract for repairs
made upon his house, although the house must have fallen into
decay without them, (d) Nor can he bind himself for the insur-
ance of his property, (e) nor for the board of horses which he uses
in his business. (/) : And it is said that an action cannot be main-
tained against an infant for the falsehood of his warranty, or for a
breach of it. (#)

It is said that a lawsuit may or may not be a necessary for an
infant, according to circumstances, (gg)

SECTION II.

OP THE OBLIGATIONS OP PARENTS IN RESPECT TO INFANT CHILDREN.

The obligation of the father to maintain the child is and always
has been recognized, in some way and in some degree,

* 299 * in all civilized countries. The infant cannot support him-
self ; others must therefore supply him with the means of

subsistence, and the only question is, whether the public (that is,

liquors, pistols, powder, whips, and fiddles. 7 W. & S. 83, 88 ; Bent v. Manning, 10

Beeler v. Youny, 1 Bibb, 519; Glover c. Vt. 225, 230. It is otherwise in equity.

Ott, 1 McCord, 572 ; Rainwater v. Durham, Marlow v. Pitfield, 1 P. Wms. 558. But

2 Nott & McC. 524 ; Grace- v. Hale, 2 money advanced to an officer, to procure

Humph. 27; Clowes v. Brooke, 2 Stra. the liberation of an infant from an arrest

1101 ; Harrison v. Ean^, 1 Man. & G. 550. on a debt for necessaries, may be recovered,

A stanhope. Charters v. Bayntun, 7 C. & it not being, strictly speaking, money lent.

P. 52. Coaeh hire. Hedgley v. Holt, 4 C. Clarke v. Leslie, 5 Esp. 28. So an infant

& P. 104. A chronometer for a lieutenant is liable for money paid at his request to

in the navy, not then in commission. Ber- satisfy a debt which he had contracted for

olles v. Ramsay, Holt, 77. Balls and ser- necessaries. Randall v. Sweet, 1 Denio, 460.

enades. Carter, 216. Counsel fees and So if the infant gives his note for the neees-

expenses of a lawsuit. Phelps v. Worces- saries, and another signs as surety, and sub-

ter, 1 1 N. H. 51. But as each case is gov- sequently pays the note, he may recover the

erned by its own peculiar circumstances, amount of the infant. Conn v. Coburn, 7

the examples here given can serve only as N. H. 368 ; Haine v. Tarrant, 2 Hill (S. C),

illustrations, and under different circum- 400.

stances would not necessarily be binding (rf) Tupper v. Cadwell, 12 Met. 559.

precedents. Thus, as we have just seen, (e) Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Noyes, 32 N. H.

horses are not generally necessary, but when 345.

an infant had been advised to ride on horse- (/) Merriam v. Cunningham, 11 Cush.

back for his health, a different rule was ap- 40. See also, on the point of his binding

plied. Hart i>. Prater, 1 Jur. 623. himself by contract, Swift u. Barnett, 10

(c) Smith v. Gibson, Peake, Ad. Oas. Cush. 436, and Hussey i\ Roundtree, Busb.

52; Darby v. Boucher, 1 Salk. 279; Pro- L. 110.

bart v. Knouth, 2 Esp. 472, n. ; Beeler v. (g) Morrill v. Aden, 19 Vt. 505; Pres.

Young, 1 Bibb, 519, 521 ; Earle v. Peale, 1 cott v. Norris, 32 N. H. 101.
Salk. 387, 10 Mod. 67 ; Walker v. Simpson, (gg) Thrall v. Wright, 38 Vt. 494.

1 Nor for supplies, as tobacco, bagging, ties, and cash furnished nn infant encaged
in planting on his own account ; nor for provisions, if boarding with his father. Decell
v. Lewenthal, 57 Miss. 331.

338

CH. XVII.]

INFANTS.

300

the State) shall do this, or his parent. And justice, equally with
the best affections of our nature, answers that it is the duty of the
parent. But it is a very difficult question how far this duty is
made a legal obligation by the common law.1

In England, after much questioning, and perhaps a tendency to
hold the father liable for necessaries supplied to the child on the
ground of moral obligation and duty, (K) it seems to be on the
whole, settled, that this moral obligation is not a legal one ; and
indeed it has been recently peremptorily decided that no
* such legal obligation exists in the case of contracts made * 300
by the child for necessaries, (i) The father's liability is

(h) In Simpson v. Robertson, 1 Esp. 17
(1793), which is the earliest case on this
point, Lord Kenyon said he had ruled be-
fore, that if a tradesman colludes with a
young man, and furnishes him with clothes
to an extravagant degree, though the father
might have been liable hud they been to a rea-
sonable extent, the tradesman who gives
credit to such an extravagant degree shall
not, at law, be allowed to recover. Crantz
v. Gill, 2 Esp. 471 (1796), decided that if
the father gives the son a reasonable allow-
ance for his expenses, he is not liable even
for necessaries furnished to the son. The
presumption of liability was rebutted bjr the
allowance. But this case seems to imply
that sucli liability exists in the absence of
rebutting circumstances. — In Urmston v.
Newcomen, 4 A. & E. 899, 6 Nev. & M. 454
(1836), it was considered as a doubtful
question whether a parent was, at common
law, liable to pay a third person who fur-
nishes necessaries for his deserted child.
Sir John Campbell, Attorney-General, argu-
endo, says, p. 903 : " Then the question is
whether a father, if he desert his legitimate
child, be not liable in assumpsit to any
one who provides food and clothing for it.
There is no express decision on the point."
Alexander, contra : " The supposed founda-
tion of the defendant's liability does not ex-
ist. It is not true that, by the common law,
a father is bound to maintain his child."
Lord Denman, C. J., says :." The genera

derstood as my opinion at present), that
the general liability is as contended by the
Attorney-General." — In Law v. Wilkin, 6
A. & E. 718 (1837), the defendant's son
was from home at school, and appeared to
be in want of clothes which the plaintiff
supplied him. When the boy went home,
he took the clothes with him but did not
wear them. There was no evidence that
the father ever saw the clothes, or that he
had any communication with the plaintiff
before or after they were furnished. The
judge at nisi prius nonsuited the plaintiff,
thinking there was not sufficient evidence
to go to the jury to charge the defendant.
The Court of King's Bench set aside the
nonsuit on the ground that there was some
evidence to that effect; and Lord Denman,
C. J., who with his brethren the year before
had carefully andjilmost anxiously avoided
the question, in TJumston v. Newcomen,
now said : " A father is properly liable for
any necessary provision made for his infant
son." Littleddle,Fattesbn,&ntl Coleridge, J J.,
made no objection to this dictum, although
the decision of the case did not require it. —
In Cooper v. Phillips, 4 C. & P. 581 (1831 ),
Taunton, J., 6ays : " If the father of a fam-
ily lives at a distance from the place at
which his children are, and puts them un-
der the protection of servants, I am of opin-
ion that if any accident occurs to one of the
children, even from the carelessness of the
servant, the father of the family is bound

question is important ; but the facts do not to pay_ for the medical attendance .on such

raise it." And afterwards :" The general child."

question, therefore, which.' we should ap- (t') In Bakeru. Keen, 2 Stark. 501 (1819),

proach with much anxiety, does not arise." Abbott, C. J., said : " A father would not

Litl/edah, J. : " The general question does be bound by the contract of his son, unless

not arise." Patteson, J. ;• " I agree that either an actual authority were proved, or

the general question does not arise." Cole- circumstances appeared from which such

ridge, -J. : " It is best to say nothing on the an authority might be implied. _ Were it

general question. For the purpose of this otherwise, a father, who had an imprudent

case, I will assume (what is not to he un- son, might be prejudiced to an indefinite

i See judgment of Cockburn, C. J., in Bageley t>. Forder, L. B. 3 Q. B. 559 ; Kelley
o. Davis, 49 N. H. 187.

339

301

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

* 301 nevertheless * admitted in many English cases, but is now
put on the ground of agency ; and the authority of the infant

extent; it was therefore necessary that some
proof should be given that the order of the
son was made by the authority of his father.
The question, therefore, for the considera-
tion of the jury, was, whether, under the
circumstances of the particular case, there
was sufficient to convince them that the
defendant had invested his son with such
authority. He had placed his son at the
military college at Hatlow, and had paid
his expenses while he remained there. The
son, it appeared, then obtained a commis-
sion in the army, and, having found his
way to London, at a considerable distance
from his father's residence, had ordered
regimentals and other articles suitable to
his equipment for the East Indies. If it
had appeared in evidence that the defend-
ant had supplied his son with money for
this purpose, or that he had ordered these
articles to be furnished elsewhere, the cir-
cumstance might have rebutted the pre-
sumption of any authority from the de-
fendant to order them from the plaintiff.
Nothing however of this nature had been
proved ; and since the articles themselves
were necessary for the son, and suitable to
that situation in which the. defendant had
placed him, it was for the jury to say,
whether they were not satisfied that an au-
thority had been given by the defendant."
— This was soon followed bv Fluck v. Tol-
lemache, 1 C. & P. 5 (1823), before Bur-
rough, Justice of the Kind's Bench. The
defendant's son was a cadet at Woolwich
the father living at Uxbridge. Upon being
written to to pay the plaintiff's bill, which
was the first knowledge the defendant had
of the transaction, he said he had ordered
no goods of the plaintiff, and would not
pay for any supplied to his son. The lat-
ter was fifteen years old. Bunough, J., told
the jury, that " an action can only be main-
tained against a person for clothes supplied
to his son, either when he has ordered such
clothes, and contracted to pay for them, or
when they have been at first furnished with-
out his knowledge, and he has adopted the
contract afterwards; such adoption may
be inferred from his seeing his son wear the
clothes, and not returning them, or making,
at or soon after the time when he knows of
their being supplied, some objection. Here
the only knowledge that it appeared the
defendant had of the transaction was being
asked for the money; he then repudiated
the contract altogether. It would be rather
too much that parents should be compell-
able to pay for goods that any tradesman
may, without their knowledge improvidently
trust their sons with." — Iu Blackburn v.

340

Mackey, 1 C. & P. 1 (1823), before Abbott,
Chief Justice of the King's Bench, the de-
fendant's son was a minor living away from
his father, as a clerk in London, receiving
a guinea a week as wages. The father did
not supply the son with any clothes, and it
was proved that he was, at the time of the
supply by the plaintiff, in great want of
them. The defendant did not know the
plaintiff, and when informed of the supply
of clothes to his son, he repudiated the con-
tract altogether. Abbott, C. J., told the
jury, that a father was not bound to pay
for articles ordered by his son, unless he had
given some authority, express or implied.
— In Rolfe v. Abbott, 6 C. & P. 286 (1833),
the defendant's son, a young man of nine-
teen years of age, and having a situation
worth .£90 a year, went with a friend who
introduced him to the plaintiff, a tailor, and
the latter supplied him with clothes, and
soon after sent his bill, debiting them to the
son, and not to the father. The friend of the
minor had no authority from the father to
introduce his son to the plaintiff, and there
was no evidence that the father knew of
the transaction. In summing up to the
jury, Gurney, B., said : " The question in
this case is, whether these clothes were sup-
plied to the son of the defendant by the as-
sent of the defendant. For, to charge him,
it is essential that the goods should have
been supplied with his assent or by his au-
thority. Indeed, if the law were not so,
any one of you who had an imprudent son
might have bills to a large amount at the
tailor's, the hatter's, the shoemaker's, and
the hosier's, and you know nothing at all
about it." — Clements u. Williams, 8 C. &
P. 58 (If 37), was an action by a school-
master against a guardian for clothes sup-
plied to his ward who had been placed in
the plaintiff's school, but who had not been
provided by his guardian with clothes for
upwards of a year. The schoolmaster sup-
plied his wants, and charged them to the
guardian, with his bill for tuition. Wil-
liams, J., told the jury, that he was not
aware of any authority which a school-
master had to cause his pupil to be sup-
plied with articles of wearing apparel with-
out the sanction, express or implied, of the
parent or guardian ; and that it was the
duty of the schoolmaster, if he observed his
pupil to he in want of such articles, to com-
municate that fact to the boy's friends, and
not to furnish him with such things with-
out their authority. — Seaborne v. Maddy,
9 C. & P. 497 (1840), is also a very strong
case against the parent's liability. This
was au action of assumpsit for the board

CH. XVII.]

INFANTS.

302

to bind the father by * contracts for necessaries is inferred, * 302
both in England and in this country, from very slight evi-
dence. (J) If we take the case * of necessaries supplied * 303

and lodging of the defendant's illegitimate
child. The child had been placed with the
plaintiff by the defendant in the year 1831,
at 2s. a week, and the amount had been
paid down to the month of April, 1838.
The child remained with the plaintiff down
to April, 1839, and evidence was given of
a conversation in the month of May follow-
ing, in which it was alleged that the defend-
ant had promised payment of the amount
claimed. The defendant gave evidence,
that, at the time of settlement in 1838, he
said the plaintiff was to give up the child
either to Mr. Parkes or the Union, for he
would pay no longer. Evidence was also
given, that on several occasions when asked
for payment the defendant refused to pay
any thing, and there was also contradictory
evidence as to the conversation in May,
1839. Parke, B., said: "No one is bound
to pay another for maintaining his children,
either legitimate or illegitimate, except he
has entered into some contract to do so.
Every man is to maintain his own children
as he himself shall think proper, and it re-
quires a contract to enable another person
to do so, and charge him for it in an action.
In the present case there had been a con-
tract in 1831, which was put an end to in
1838. However, on the part of the plain-
tiff, it is contended that a new contract is
to be inferred from the conversation with
the defendant in the year 1839. This is
for you to consider. But you must also
bear in mind that the defendant has on
several occasions distinctly refused to pay
any thing, and that as to one of the con-
versations, the evidence is contradictory."
The case of Mortimore v. Wright, 6 M. &
W. 482 (1840), seems to be decisive on this
point. Lord Abinqer, C. B., said : " I am
clearly of opinion that there was no evi-
dence for the jury in this case, and that
the plaintiff ought to have been nonsuited.
The learned judge was anxious, as judges
have always been in modern times, not to
withdraw any scintilla of evidence from the
jury; but he now agrees with the rest of
the court that there ought to have been a
nonsuit. In the present instance I am the
more desirous to make the rule absolute to
that extent, in order that there may be no
uncertainty as to the law upon this subject.
In point of law, a father who gives no au-
thority, and enters into no contract, is no
more liable for goods supplied to his son
than a brother, or an uncle, or a mere
stranger would be. From the moral obli-
gation a parent is under to provide for his

children, a jury are, not unnaturally, dis-
posed to infer against him an admission of
a liability in respect of claims upon his son,
on grounds which warrant no such infer-
ence in point of law. . . . With regard to
the case in the Court of King's Bench, of
Law o. Wilkin, if the decision is to be
taken as it is reported, I can only say that
I am sorry for it, and cannot assent to it
It may have been influenced by facts which
do not appear in the report ; but, as tl e
case stands, it appears to sanction the idea
that a father, as regards his liability for
debts incurred by his son, is in a different
situation from any other relative ; which is
a doctrine I must altogether dissent from.
If a father does any specific act, from which
it may reasonably be inferred that he has
authorized his son to contract a debt, he
may be liable in respect of the debt so con-
tracted ; but the mere moral obligation on
the father to maintain his child affords no
inference of a legal promise to pay his debts;
and we ought not to put upon his acts an
interpretation which abstractedly, and with-
out reference to that moral obligation, they
will not reasonably warrant. In order to
bind a father, in point of law, for a debt
incurred by his son, you must prove that
he has contracted to be bound, just in the
same manner as you would prove such a
contract against any other person ; and it
would bring the law into great uncertainty
if it were permitted to juries to impose a
liability in each particular case, according
to their own feelings or prejudices." Parke,
B., added: "It is a clear principle of law
that a father is not under any legal obliga-
tion to pay his son's debts." — And in Shel-
ton v. Springett, 20 E. L & E. 281, the
same principles are reiterated ; and the law
declared to be well settled, that without
some contract, express or implied, the father
is not liable for necessaries supplied to the
son. Jercis, C. J., says : "If a father turns
his son upon the world, the son's only re-
source, in the absence of any thing to show
a contract on the father's part, is to apply
to the parish, and then the proper steps
will be taken to enforce the performance of
the parent's legal duty."

(j) This may be inferred from some of
the cases we have already cited ; but it was
doubted in Mortimore i\ Wright, whether
Law v. Wilkin, and Blackburn o. Mackey,
were law. And in Shelton v. Springett,
where the father had given his son £5 and
sent him to London to look out for a ship,
telling him to put up at a particular hotel,

341

303

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK

to an infant actually incapacitated by want of age, or by disease
of mind or body, from making any contract, or acting in any
way as the agent of any person, the father cannot be made lia-
ble except on the ground of his parental obligation ; and there
are cases, or rather dicta in some cases which might indicate,
perhaps, that the question would be decided in England in favor
* this liability on his part, if it were necessary. It will be

it the son put up at another, upon which
vidence the jury had found a verdict against
he father for the son's board, the verdict
was set aside and a nonsuit ordered on the
ground that there was no evidence to war-
rant a jury in holding the father liable. In
Forsyth v. Milne (1808), cited in McPher-
son on Infants, p. 511, the defendant's wife,
in his absence and without his knowledge,
contracted with a third person for the board
of their minor daughter. The defendant
paid the bid, but expressed some disappro-
bation of it. The mother removed the
daughter to another situation ; it was held
that the first payment so far acknowledged
the discretionary power of the wife to con-
tract, as to make the father liable to the
plaintiff upon the second contract. — In
Bryan v. Jackson, 4 Conn. 288 (1822),
where the defendant's minor son had taken
up goods of the plaintiff, which the defend-
ant paid for, without objection, or giving
notice not to trust his son any further, and
the son afterwards took up other goods of
a similar nature ; it was held that the pay-
ment so made by the defendant was equiva-
lent to a recognition of his son's authority,
and rendered the defendant liable for the
goods subsequently taken up, although he
had (but without the plaintiffs knowledge)
given positive orders to his son to contract
no more debts, and had placed him under
the care of a friend, with instructions to
furnish him with every thing necessary and
suitable for him. See also McKcnzie v.
Stevens, 19 Ala. 691. — It was held in
Nichole v. Allen, 3 C. & P. 36 (1827), that
if a parent knew that a third person was
maintaining his minor child, although ille-
gitimate, and expressed no dissent, he is
liable, unless he show that the child is there
against his consent ; but this case was after-
wards denied in Mortiniore v. Wright. —
In Eumney v. Keyes, 7 N. H. 571 (1835),
it was held, that if a husband, living in a
state of separation from his wife, suffers his
children to reside with the mother, he is
liable for necessaries furnished them, and
she is considered as his agent to contract
for this purpose. And see Rawlyns v. Van-
dyke, 3 Esp. 250 (1800). In Deane v. An-
nis, 14 Me. 26 (1836), the defendant's minor
son left his father's home against his will,

342

and refused to return to it upon his father's
commands. Being afterwards taken sick,
however, he did return, and remained until
his death. During his sickness his father
went with him to the plaintiff's house to
obtain medical advice, and the plaintiff
afterwards visited the boy professionally at
his father's house. No express promise
was proved to pay the plaintiff, nor did the
father notify him that he did not expect to
pay him. The father was held liable for
the plaintiff's services. — And in Swain v.
Tyler, 26 Vt. 1, where the father had given
his minor son leave to act for himself, and
had made publication of the fact, and that
he would not thereafter pay any debts of
his son. The son returned to his father's
house, sick, and the plaintiff's charges were
for necessary medical services rendered the
son, upon the credit of the father, and in
good faith charged to him at the time, and
the father knew of the services being ren-
dered and did not object, it was held that
the law implies a promise to pay, though
the father did not assent to the services
being done on his credit, either expressly
or impliedly, in fact. — The case of Thayer
v. White, 12 Met. 343 (1847), has an im-
portant bearing upon the point of implied
liability. It does not appear in that case
that the defendant's son was a minor, nor
were the goods bought by the son necessa-
ries, but the facts were that a son, who had
several times, with his father's express con-
sent, bought goods of T. in the name and
on the credit of his father, again bought
goods of T. in the name of his father, on
six months' credit ; T. charged the goods
to the father, and immediately wrote a let-
ter to him, informing him thereof, and
stating that he supposed it was correct, but
thought proper to give him notice. The
father made no reply to this letter. Held,
in a suit by T. against the father, for the
price of the goods, that the jury were war-
ranted in inferring, from the father's silence,
his consent to the transaction thus notified
to him. Hdd, also, that such consent was
proof either of an original authority to the
son, or of a subsequent affirmance by the
father, which bound him to pay for the
goods.

OH. XVII.]

INFANTS.

304

noticed, that where it is most distinctly denied that this moral
obligation of the parent constitutes a legal obligation, the denial
is confined to a liability for the contracts of the child. The rea-
son is said to be, the danger of permitting a father to be bound in
this way, and it is variously illustrated in the cases ; but this rea-
son fails where the infant can make no contracts, and must be
supplied or suffer.

In this country, the rule of law varies in the different States.
In most of them in which the question has come before the courts,
the legal liability of the parent for necessaries furnished to the
infant, is asserted, unless they are supplied by the father ; and it
is put on the ground that the moral obligation is also a legal one,
and some of our courts have declared this quite strongly. (&)
In other States the present English rule has been * declared * 304
to be law, and agency and authority are held to be the only
ground of such liability. (7)

(fc) See Stanton v. Wilson, 3 Day, 37
(1808). In this case the father had been
divorced from the plaintiff, his former wife,
and two of her children were ordered into
her custody as guardian. A third remain-
ed with his father (the defendant), for a
few years, when through fear of personal
violence and abuse from his father he fled,
and went to live with his mother and her
second husband, who furnished him with
support and education. The action was
brought to recover for the support of the
three children. "It was agreed that the
whole of the charges accrued without arty
request from the father, and that he never
made any express promise to pay them."
The court (two judges dissenting), held
the father liable for the whole bill, saying :
"parents are bound by law to maintain,
protect, and educate their legitimate chil-
dren during their infancy. This duty rests
on the father. But because the father has
abandoned his duty and trust, by putting
the child out of his protection, he cannot
thereby exonerate himself from its main-
tenance, education, and support. The
duty remains, and the law will enforce its
performance, or there must be a failure
of justice. The infant cast on the world
must seek protection and safety where it
can be found ; and where with more pro-
priety can it apply than to the next friend,
nearest relative, and such as are most in-
terested in its safety and happiness ? The
father having forced his child abroad to
seek a sustenance under such circumstances,
sends a credit along with him, and shall
not be permitted to say it was furnished

without his consent, or against his will."
But see Finch v. Finch, 22 Conn. 411, post,
note (o). In the case of Edwards v. Davis,
16 Johns. 284, it was decided that there
was no common-law obligation requiring a
child to support a parent ; but Spencer. J.,
in delivering the opinion of the court, said :
" The duty of a parent to maintain his
offspring, until they attain the age of ma-
turity, is a perfect common-law duty." In
the matter of Ryder, 11 Paige, 187, Wal-
worth, C, says: "A parent who has the
means is undoubtedly bound to support his
or her minor child." For recent New York
decisions, see close of next note. See also
Benson v. Remington, 2 Mass. 113; Whip-
ple v. Dow, id. 415 ; Dawes v. Howard,
4 id. 97 ; Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, 13
Johns. 480 ; Pidgin v. Cram, 8 N. H. 350,
2 Kent, Com. 193; Call v. Ward, 4 W. &
S. 118; Dennis v. Clark, 2 Cush. 353;
State v. Cook, 12 Ired. L. 67.

(I) In Hunt v. Thompson, 3 Scam. 180
(1841), Wilson, C. J., said: "That a par-
ent is under an obligation to provide for
the maintenance of his infant children is a
principle of natural law ; and it is upon
this natural obligation alone that the duty
of a parent to provide his infant children
with the necessaries of life rests ; for there
is no rule of municipal law enforcing this
duty. The claim of the wife upon the hus-
band, for necessaries suitable to his rank
and fortune, is recognized by the principles
of the common law, and by statute. A
like claim to some extent may be enforced
in favor of indigent and infirm parents,
and other relatives, against children, Sic.,

343

305

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

* 305 * The law can hardly be considered as positively settled
either in England or in this country. But, resting not so
much on direct and specific authorities, as on the general charac-
ter of American jurisprudence on this subject, we would state, as
strongly prevailing rules here, that where goods are supplied to
an infant which are not necessaries, the father's authority must
be proved to make him liable ; where they are necessaries, the
father's authority is presumed, unless he supplies them himself,
or was ready to supply them ; where the infant lives with the
father, or under his control, his judgment as to what are necessa-
ries will be so far respected, that he will be held liable only for

in many cases ; but, as a general rule, the
obligation of a parent to provide tor his
offspring is left to the natural and inextin-
guishable affection which Providence has
implanted in the breast of every parent.
This natural obligation, however, is not
only a sufficient consideration, for an ex-
press promise by a father to pay for neces-
saries furnished his child, but when taken
in connection with various circumstances
has been held to be sufficient to raise an
implied promise to that effect. But either
an express promise, or circumstances from
which a promise by the father can be in-
ferred, are indispensably necessary to bind
the parent for necessaries furnished his in-
fant child by a third person." — Owen v.
White, 5 Port. (Ala.) 435 (1837), seems to
deny the legal obligation of the father, ex-
cept on a contract, express or implied ; but
admits that such " contract is implied where
the father fails in his duty to support the
child, or drives him from home. Then the
father is liable for a suitable maintenance."
In Varney v. Young, 11 Vt. 258 (1839),
the court appear to deny altogether that
the moral obligation of the father consti-
tutes any legal obligation. Bennett, J.,
says : " There must be proof of a contract,
express or implied, a prior authority, or a
subsequent recognition of the claim." — Per-
haps the strongest case in the American
reports, against the liability of the father,
is Gordon u. Potter, 17 Vt. 350 (1845).
There the defendant told his minor son in
the spring to go out to work, and in the fall
lie would get him some winter clothes. The
son went to service at monthly wages. In
Jane following, the plaintiff famished him
with cloth and trimmings for a suit of
clothes. The father knew of this purchase
by the son, and furnished him money to paij
for making them up ; he also permitted him
to wear out the clothes. It did not clearly
appear whether the plaintiff furnished the
goods upon the son's or the father's credit.

344

And this might have been a sufficient
ground for the decision itself; but Redjield,
J., went much further, and said : " But
there is one defect in the case, which we
think must clearly and indisputably pre-
clude any recovery against the father. It
does not appear that the father ever gave
the son any authority, either expressly or
by implication, to pledge his credit for the
articles ; but the contrary. And unless the
father can be made liable for necessaries
for his infant child, against his own will,
then, in this case, the plaintiff must lail to
recover. I know there are some cases, and
dicta of judges, or of elementary writers,
which seem to justify the conclusion that
the parent may be made liable for necessa-
ries for his child, even against his own will.
But an examination of all the cases upon
this subject will not justify any such con-
clusion." After critically examining the
American and English authorities, he con-
cluded : " It is obvious that the law makes
no provision for strangers to furnish chil-
dren with necessaries, against the will of
parents, even in extreme cases. For if it
can be done in extreme cases it can be done
in every case where the necessity exists ;
and the right of a parent to control his
own child will depend altogether upon his
furnishing necessaries, suitable to the vary-
ing taste of the times There is no stop-
ping-place short of this, if any interference
whatever is allowed. If the parent aban-
dons the child to destitution, the public au-
thorities may interfere, and, in the mode
pointed out by the statute, compel a proper
maintenance. But this, according to the
English common law, which prevails in this
State, is not the right of every intermed-
dling stranger." See also Raymond v.
Loyl, 10 Barb. 483 ; Chilcott v. Trimble,
13 Barb. 502 ; Shelton v. Springett, 20 E.
L. & E. 281 ; 8. o. 11 C. B. 462; Atkyns
v. Pearce, 2 C. B. (n. s.) 763.

CH. XVII.] INFANTS. * 306

things furnished to the infant to relieve him from absolute want ;
where the infant does not live with the father, but has voluntarily
left him, the authority of the father must be strictly proved, un-
less, perhaps, in cases of absolute necessity ; and where he has
been deserted by the father, or driven away from him, either by
command or by cruel treatment, there the infant carries with him
the credit and authority of the father for necessaries. And
wherever the question is how far the father is liable for necessa-
ries supplied to the child, this word " necessaries " will not gen-
erally be understood in the very liberal sense given to it when the
question is as to the capacity of the infant to contract, but will be
interpreted according to the circumstances of the case. And if
the child be of sufficient age and strength to earn by proper exer-
tions the whole or a part of his subsistence, it will not be deemed
" necessary " that the aid should be rendered to him which
it would be ': necessary " to * give to an infant incapaci- * 306
tated by tender years, or by debility of mind or body, from
contributing to his own support.

So far as the duty of support certainly belongs to the parent as
a legal obligation, and is neglected, any other person may perform
it, and will be regarded as performing it for him ; and, on general
principles, the law will raise a promise on the part of the parent,
to compensate the party who thus did for him what he was bound
by law to do. (m) But this rule is carried no further than its
reason extends ; and is guarded by many restrictions from becom-
ing the means of. injury to the parent. Thus, we have seen, that
if the child be living with the parent, or, as it is said in some
cases, if he be sub potentate parentis, the law will not presume
that the parent neglects the child, but will presume a due care of
him, until the contrary is shown ; and of the propriety and suffi-
ciency of the clothing, &c, the parents must judge; and if a
stranger under such circumstances supplies the child even with
necessaries he certainly cannot hold the parent upon the contract
implied by his duty, without proving a clear and unquestionable
abandonment and neglect of that duty.

If the supplier seeks to make the parent responsible, on the

(m) In the matter of Ryder, 11 Paige, omission of duty, on the part of the parent,
185 Wal^th, Ch., says/ "A stranger in supplying the child with necessaries
may furnish necessaries "for the child, and Equally strong are Van Valkinburg.Wa^
"cover of the parent compensation there- son, 13 Johns. 480, and Pidgin v. Cram, 8
for, where there is a clear and palpable N. H. 350.

345

* 307 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

ground that his authority was given to the child, then, if the goods
supplied were necessaries, it would seem from the cases, as we
have said, that slight evidence is sufficient to prove such authority ;
as that the father saw the son wear the clothes, or knew that he
had received them, and made no objection. But if the things sup-
plied are strict and absolute necessaries, needful for the child's
subsistence, or if the child is living away from the parent, under
circumstances which indicate a desertion by the parent, or that
the child has been expelled from his house, or caused to leave it
by the wrongful acts of the parents, then the authorities and
dicta to which we have referred lead to the conclusion that
whoever supplies the wants of the child may recover from the
parent, (w)

* 307 * It has been held in England that a father was under

no legal obligation to educate his child, and could not be
made liable for the expenses of his instruction, where the wife,
being cruelly treated at the husband's house, left it, taking the
children with her. This precise question has not occurred in this
country, but the weight and tendency of authorities would not re-
quire us to believe that the decision would be the same here as in
England. It has been held in Massachusetts that where a wife
leaves a husband from his cruelty, taking her child, he is liable
not only for her maintenance, but for that of the child, if he
makes no effort to reclaim it ; and this liability is not discharged
by her return to his house, (nn) If the wife be divorced, with
alimony, and the care of the children be given to her, the father
has been held liable not only to her for the expenses she incurs
in their support and education, but also to a stranger whom she

(n) We are unable to discriminate these or, in other words, that the things supplied

cases, on principle, from any which may were strict and absolute necessaries. We

occur, in wliich compensation is sought have some doubts, therefore whether even

from a father for things supplied to an in- this exception would always be allowed,

fant, which were absolutely needed for his Indeed, we are disposed to regard the rule

subsistence, and which the child would not of law, in this country generally, if not

have had unless they were supplied by a universally, as imposing a liability on the

stranger. Where the infant has unneces- father for all supplies to an infant, which

sanly and in his own wrong left his parent were so absolutely needed that he must

and renounced the filial rclation.it seems have them or perish. The liability may be

to be held that the liability of the parent put on different grounds in different courts,

ceases. But in the principal case in which — in some on the ground of contract and

this is directly decided (Angel v. McLellan, of implied authority, and in others on the

16 Mass. 28), the child had absconded to legal obligation growing out of tie moral

avoid arrest for felony; and although the obligation, — but on some ground or other

case finds that " he was in distress in a for- we think it would generally be enforced,

eign country," it does not appear that he (nn) Reynolds v. Sweetser, 15 (5ray, 78.
might not have supported himself by labor,

346

CH. XVII.] INFANTS. * 308

marries, and who continues to support the children ; but the
authority of this case has been, to say the least, weakened, (o)
And where the father and mother separate, and the father permits
the mother to take the children with her, then the father consti-
tutes the mother his agent to provide for his children, and is
bound by her contract for necessaries for them, (jo) J There
is, indeed, authority in England and in this country, for holding
that if a parent of sufficient ability to provide suitably for his
children neglect to do so he is guilty of an indictable offence, (g)

It becomes a different question when the child has an inde-
pendent property sufficient for his own maintenance ; what then is
the father's obligation? It would seem that the rule of
law * formerly was, that if the parent had abundant means * 308
himself, he was bound to provide for his children, even if
they had independent property, (r) And this rule is enforced
even now in some instances, (s) It is, however, in- general, re-
laxed ; and courts go far in appropriating the means of the child
to his own support, although the father may also be entirely
able to maintain him. (f) And where the father is without means
to educate and support his children in a manner which is ren-
dered suitable by their position and expectations, courts of equity
will not only make an allowance out of the estate of the children,
but will, if necessary, take from the principal of a vested legacy
for the proper maintenance and education of the legatee, (m)
Such decrees are usually made for the future maintenance of the
child ; but it cannot be said that there is a positive rule prevent-
ing retrospective allowances. (t>) But a court will not, unless
for very strong and special reasons, make an allowance to the
father, out of the infant's estate, for the past maintenance of his
child, (w)

(o) Stanton v. Willson, 3 Day, 37. This («) In the matter of Kane, 2 Barb. Ch.
case was commented upon and denied in 375. rnnr,0. rh "W ■

Finch v. Finch. 22 Conn. 411, and it was (t) Jervoise v. Si k, Cooper, Ch .52

decided by a majority of the court that a Maberly v Turton, 14 Ves. 499, Simon
divorced wife could not maintain an action v. Barber, 1 lamlyn, it.
against her former husband to recover for (u) Newport v. Cook^2 Ashm. 332 , A,

the support of their infant children, the parte Green, 1 Jac. & W. .2oS. See also
custody of whom was awarded to her. Two Carter, ». Bollard ,11 Humph. .*».
of the five judges, however, adhered to the (v) In the matter of Kane, 2. Harb.

decision of Stanton v. Willson. Ch. 375. »-. v 10fi.

(p) Rawly ns „. Vandyke, 3 Esp. 251 . (w) Presley v. Davis 7 Rich. I )q. 105

\g) Rex I Friend, Russ. & R. 20. See and see Carnuchael v. Hughes, 6 E. L. &
also, in the matter of Ryder, 11 Paige, 185. E. 71.
(r) Dawes v. Howard, 4 Mass. 97.

i McMillen v. Lee, 78 HI. 443.

347

* 309 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

Whether the mother is under an equal obligation with the

father to maintain the child, the father being dead, seems not

to be quite certain ; but the weight of authority, both in England

and in this country, might justify the conclusion that she is not

under a legal obligation, (x) 1 or that it is very greatly

* 309 qualified in important particulars. Thus, if the * child

has property, the mother is not bound for the child's main-
tenance where the father would be. (y) And a court of equity
has refused to compel a mother to furnish the means of educating
a child, even where she was entirely able to do so ; and it is even
said that the court has no power to do this, (z) A husband is
not responsible for the child of his wife by a former husband,
unless he takes him into his house ; but if he does, he assumes
the responsibility for his maintenance, so long as he retains him
as one of his family, (a) But, on the other hand, the relation
which he in this case sustains to the child rebuts any presump-
tion which might otherwise exist, of a promise or obligation to
pay the child for his services, (b) as it does in the case of his own
children, (c)

Where the parent is thus obliged to provide for the child a
home, and a sufficient maintenance, so, on the other hand, he has
a right to the custody of the child during his minority, and is

(x) The chancery cases which assert in this respect. See, against the mother's

this obligation, appear to do so, on the obligation, Tilton v. Russell, 11 Ala. 497 ;

ground of the ability of the mother and Raymond v. Loyl, 10 Barb. 483; Pray v.

the need of the children. See Hughes v. Gorham, 31 Me. 241 ; Commonwealth v.

Hughes, 1 Bro. Ch. 387. In Benson v. Murray, 4 Binn. 487 ; Passenger R. Co.

Remington, 2 Mass. 113, the court say: r. Stutlen, 54 Penn. St. 375.
"The law is very well settled that parents (y) In Dawes v. Howard, 4 Mass. 97,

are under obligations to support their it is said, that where minor children have

children, and that they are entitled to property of their own, the father is, not-

their earnings." In Nightingale v. With- withstanding, bound to support them, if

iugton, 15 Mass. 274, Parker, C. J., says : of ability ; but it is otherwise with the

" Generally the father, and in case of his mother.

death the mother, is entitled to the earn- (z) In the matter of Ryder, 11 Paige,

ings of their minor children. This right 185.

must be founded upon the obligation of (a) Stone v. Carr, 3 Esp. 1 ; Cooper v.

the parents to nurture and support their Martin, 4 East, 82 ; Tubb t>. Harrison, 4

children." But it is only a dictum in T. R. 118; Freto v. Brown, 4 Mass. 635;

either case; and in neither do the court Minden v. Cox, 7 Cowen, 235.
refer to any authority whatever for this (6) "Williams v. Hutchinson, 5 Barb,

rule ; nor are we aware of any direct ad- 122 ; s. c. 3 Comst. 312.
judication, in which it is determined as (c) See post, Book III., Ch. IX., Sect

the point of the case, that the mother 1.
and the father stand on the same footing

1 A mother is entitled to the wages of a minor child after the father's death only so
long as it remains in her family and is provided for by her. Hollingsworth v. Sweden-
borg, 49 Ind. 378.

348

CH. XVII.] INFANTS. * 310

entitled to all his earnings, (d) And a husband taking the
children of his wife by a former marriage into his family, has,
primd facie, a right to their custody and their earnings. (cW) On
this ground it lias been held that the father might recover the
wages of the son, even for services which it was a violation of
law to render, if the father did not know of this violation, (e)
For these two things, this obligation and this right, go together.
Thus, if the father separates from the mother, and permits the
child to leave him and go with her, he is no longer entitled to
the earnings of the child, and has no power to avoid his reason-
able contracts ; (/) and therefore the son may in such case make
a special contract with his employer, which is valid against the
father's will. And if the parent be himself an insane person and
a pauper, and therefore under no obligation to maintain the child,
he is not entitled to the child's earnings, nor is the town which
supports the parent entitled to receive the child's wages, so long
as the child himself is not a pauper. (g~) And it has been
said that * wherever the son is not living with the father, * 310
the son may of necessity be entitled to receive the wages
of his labor, and that the father's consent to the son's receipt and
appropriation of them would be inferred in such case from very
slight circumstances. (A)

It is certain that a father may, by an agreement with his minor
child, relinquish to the child the right which he would otherwise
have to his services, and may authorize those who employ him to
pay him his wages, and will then have no right to demand those
wages, either from the employer or from the child. («') And such
an agreement may be inferred from circumstances ; as where a
father left his child to manage his own affairs, and make and
execute his own contracts for a considerable time, (j ) Or even
if the father knew that the son had made such a contract for him-

(d) See note (x), supra, and State v. Morse v. Welton, 6 Conn. 547 ; Whiting
Baird 3 Green, 196; McBride v. McBride, v. Earle, 3 Pick. 201 ; Varney v. Young,
1 Bush 15. 11 Vt. 258 ; Burlingame v. Burlingame, 7

(dd) Mulhern ». McDavitt, 16 Gray, Cowen, 92 ; Bray v. Wheeler, 3 Williams,

404 514. In Tillotson v. McCrillis, 11 Vt.

(e) Emery v. Kempton, 2 Gray, 257. 477, it is held that a father may give to
See in this connection, Jenness v. Emer- his minor son a part as well as the whole
son, 15 N. H. 486. of his time.

(f) Wodell v. Coggeshall, 2 Met. 89; ( /) Canover v. Cooper, 3 Barb. 115;
Chilson v Philips 1 Vt. 41. Clinton v. York, 26 Me. 167 ; Stiles v.

in) Jenness v. Emerson, 15 N. H. 486. Granville, 6 Cush. 458 ; Wodell v. Copges-
(h) Gale v. Parrott, 1 N. H. 28. hall, 2 Met. 91; Cloud o. Hamilton, 11

(i) Jenny „. Alden, 12 Mass. 375; Humph. 104.

349

* 311 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

self, and interposed no objection, (/c) And it has been held that
an infant whose father is dead, and whose mother is married
again, is entitled to his own earnings. (7)

It is very common in this country to see in the newspapers an
advertisement signed by a father, stating that he has given to his
minor son " his time," and that he will make no future claim on
his services or for his wages, and will pay no debts of his con-
tracting. Such a notice would undoubtedly have its full force in
reference to any party to whom a knowledge of it was brought
home. And if a stranger, not knowing this arrangement, should
employ the son, he might still interpose it as a defence, if the
father claimed the son's wages. But if a stranger supplied a son,
at a distance from his home, with suitable necessaries, in igno-
rance of such arrangement, there is no sufficient reason for
holding that it would bar his claim against the father. And we
think that he might recover from the father for strict

* 311 necessaries, even if he knew this arrangement. * On what

ground could the father discharge himself from his lia-
bility by such a contract ? Even if the father had paid the son a
consideration for the release of all further obligation, it would be
a contract with an infant, and void or voidable, because certainly
not for necessaries. And the whole policy and reason of the law
of infancy would seem to be opposed to permitting a father to cast
his son in this way upon the public, and relieve himself from the
obligation of maintenance.

It may be added, that while an infant remains under the care
and control of his father, and is in fact supported by him, the
infant is not liable, even on his express contract, to a stranger
for necessaries furnished for him. One reason given for this, is,
that it would interfere with his father's right of judging how he
should be supported, (w) Where services are rendered at the
parent's request, it will be presumed that credit is given to him
alone, and in that case the infant cannot be liable even for neces-
saries, (o) And it is held that the emancipation of an infant by
his father does not enlarge his capacity to contract. (00)

(k) Whiting v. Earle, 3 Pick. 201; 4 Watts, 80; Simms v. Norris, 5 Ala. 42 ;

Armstrong v. McDonald, 10 Barb. 300. Johnson v. Lines, 6 W. & S. 80 ; Phelps v.

(/) Freto v. Brown, 4 Mass. 675. Worcester, 11 N. H. 51.

(n) Angel v. McLellan, 16 Mass. 28; (o) Duncomb v. Tickridge, Aleyn, 94 ;

Wailing y. Toll, 9 Johns. 141 ; Hull v. Phelps v. Worcester, 11 N. H. 51 ; Simms

Connolly, 3 McCorrl, 6 ; Kline v. L'Am- v. Norris, 5 Ala. 42.
oureux, 2 Paige, 419 ; Guthrie v. Murphy, (oo) Person u. Chase, 37 Vt. 647.

350

CH. XVII.] INFANTS. * 312

The common-law liability of a parent to support his child
ceases altogether when the infant becomes of full age ; and then
a parent would not be bound even by his express promise to pay
for necessaries previously furnished to the child, not at the request
of the parent. Qs>) If they were furnished at his request it would
be otherwise. (c[)

If a son or daughter remains with the parent after coming of
age, rendering services, it is held that neither he nor she can
recover wages, without a contract for them, (jjq) Because if
a child after becoming adult continues to live with his or her
parent, the law implies no promise of wages on the part of the
parent. (<?»•) But the jury will judge from all ■ the evidence,
whether there was such a contract. (5s)

By statute of 43 Eliz. c. 2, the father, " being of ability," is
liable to contribute to his child's support even after he becomes
of age. And in some of our States similar provision is made, (r)
But such a liability is wholly statutory, and does not accrue until
proceedings are had pursuant to the statute, (s) So at common
law a son is not liable for the support of an infirm
* and indigent parent, (t) Nor is a father liable at common *312
law for the support of his illegitimate child. The only
remedy is under the statute, procuring an order of filiation, and
the like, (w)

It should be added, that a father is not liable for the wilful tort
of his infant child, (w) And it is said that he has no right, re-
sulting from the parental relation, to maintain an action for in-
jury to his child, unless there be some injury to the father ; (w)
but it is enough if the father be put to any expense for the care or

(p) Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207. See (s) Loorais ». Newhall, 15 Pick. 169

also Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57. Mortimore v. Wright, 6 M. & W. 488

(7) Loomis B. Newhall, 15 Pick. 159. Gordon v. Potter, 17 Vt. 348 ; Shelton ».

(qq) Leidig v. Coover's Ex'ors, 47 Springett, 20 E. L. & E. 281 ; a. c. 11 C

Penn. St. 534 ; Adams v. Adams' Adm. B. 462.

23 Ind. 50. (') Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. 281 ;

Iqr) Liiney v. Vantyne, 40 Vt. 501. Rex v. Munden, 1 Stra. 190. But see

(as) Hart v. Hart's Adm'x, 41 Mo. Gilbert v. Lynes, 2 Root, 168 ; Ex parte

441. Hunt, 5 Cowen, 284.

(r) The provision in the Rev. Stat, of (u) Furillio v. Crowther, 7 Dow. & R.

Massachusetts, ch. 46, § 5, is very broad : 612 ; Cameron v. Baker, 1 C. & P. 268 ;

" The kindred of any such poor person, Moncrief a. Ely, 19 Wend. 405.

if any he shall have, in the line or degree (v) As for setting the father's dog

of father or grandfather, mother or upon the hog of the plaintiff. TrfEt v.

grandmother, children or grandchildren, Tifft, 4 Denio, 175. 000

by consanguinity, living within this State, {w) Stephenson v. Hall, 14 Barb. ZU.
and of sufficient ability, shall be bound
to support such pauper, in proportion to
their respective ability.

351

* 313 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

cure of the child, (x) Neither can he give a valid release for an
assault on his minor child, (j/)

It seems to be held that a father cannot maintain an action, for
loss of service, against a railroad company by whose negligence
/the child was killed. (2) If this be law, it may perhaps be
regretted that the action "per quod servitium amisit" does not
extend to such a case.

A father may devise away all his property, leaving nothing
whatever to his infant children, or for their support, if he men-
tions them in the will so as to show that he intends this, (a)

SECTION in.

VOIDABLE CONTRACTS FOR NECESSARIES.

As an infant is not permitted to enter into general contracts,
because his immature judgment would expose him to injury, and
as he is nevertheless permitted to contract for necessaries, be-
cause otherwise he might suffer for the want of them, so
* 313 this * exceptional permission is qualified in an important
particular, for the same purpose of protecting him from
wrong. He cannot contract to pay even for necessaries, in such
wise as to bar an inquiry into the price and value. The law
permits persons to supply him with necessaries, and have a valid
claim against him therefor for their fair worth ; but it does not
permit them to make a bargain with him as to the price, which
shall bind him absolutely, because it does not permit him to de-
termine this price for himself, by reason of his presumed inability
to take proper care of his own interests ; but the value and the
price may be determined by a jury. And a seal to the instrument
would give it no additional force in this respect, but the infant
would still be bound only for a fair value. For the same reason an
infant cannot be bound for the amount in an account stated ; (6)
nor for the sum mentioned in his note, although given for neces-

(x) Dennis v. Clark, 2 Cush. 347. (a) See Lord AlvanJey's remarks on

(y) Loomis v. Cline, 4 Barb. 453 ; this power of the father, in Rawlins v.

Eades v. Booth, 8 A. & E. (n. s.) 718. Goldfrap, 5 Ves. 444.

(z) Carey v. Berkshire R. R. Co. 1 (6) Ingledew v. Douglas, 2 Stark. 36;

Cush. 475. See, however, Ford v. Mon- Trueman v. Hurst, 1 T. R ,40; Hedgeley

roe, 20 Wend. 210. c Holt, 4 C. & P. 104; Oliver „. Wood-

352

CH. XVII.]

INFANTS.

*314

saries ; (c) nor for the amount due on his hond, for the ancient
distinction which held him on a bond without a penalty, but not
on a bond with penalty, would probably be now disregarded, (d)
If, however, an infant gives his note, his bond, or any other in-
strument, for necessaries, he may be sued upon the instrument,
but the plaintiff shall recover only the value of the necessaries, (e)

Neither can an infant enter into contracts of business
and * trade ; for this is not necessary, and might expose * 314
him to the misfortune of entering upon adult life with the
burden of bankruptcy resting upon him. (/) But if he uses, as
necessaries for himself or his family, the goods furnished to him
for the purposes of trade, he is so far liable. (#) This liability to
pay even for necessaries seems to be founded only on his actual
necessities, and if he had already supplied himself with sufficient
clothing, it was held that he was not bound to pay for similar
articles subsequently purchased, although they might be suitable
in themselves, and although he had avoided payment for the first
purchase on the ground of his infancy. (A) As he cannot trade,
neither can he subject himself to the incidents of trade, as bank-

roffe, 4 M. & W. 050 ; Williams v. Moor,
11 id. 256 ; Beeler v. Young, 1 Bibb, 519.

(c) McCrillis v. How, 3 N. H. 348;
Bouchell v. Clary, 3 Brevard, 194 ; Swa-
sey v. Vanderheyden, 10 Johns. 83 ; Fen-
ton v. White, 1 Southard, 100; McMinn
v. Richmonds, 6 Yerg. 9 ; Hanks v. Deal,
3 McCord, 257. Some of these cases
declare an infant's note, though given
for necessaries, void, but it is conceived
they mean voidable only, and not that
such note is not susceptible of ratifica-
tion.

(d) The older cases hold that an in-
fant's bond, at least if given with a pen-
alty, is absolutely void, not voidable
merely, although given for necessaries,
Ayliff v. Archdale, Cro. E. 920 ; Fisher v

form of an infant's contract for neces-
saries is such that the consideration is
open to inquiry, he may be sued upon the
contract itself. And in Bradley v. Pratt,
23 Vt. 378, interest was allowed on a
promissory note given by an infant, and
it is declared that there is no general rule
exempting infants from a liability to pay
interest on their just debts.

(/) Whittingham v. Hill, Cro. J. 494 ;
Why wall v. Champion, 2 Stra. 1083; Dilk
v. Keighlev, 2 Esp. 480 ; Latt v. Booth,
3 Car. & K. 202. But if with his guard-
ian's consent he is carrying on a certain
business, it has been held that he might
bind himself to pay for articles suitable
and necessary for that business. Rundell

Keeler, 7 Watts, 237. Sed quaere. Al-

Mowbray, 8 East, 300 ; Baylis v. Dinely, though an infant cannot trade, and would

' not be bound to execute any contract of
trade he may have entered into, yet if he
has in part executed such contract him-
self he may sue the adult for non-per-
formance on his part, and this while he is
yet an infant. Warwick v. Bruce, 2 M.
& Sel. 205. As to bankruptcy of an in-
fant see post, Chapter on Bankruptcy and
Insolvency in Third Volume.

(,?) Turberville v. Whitehouse, 1 C. &
P. 94; s. c. 12 Price, 692.

(h) Burghart t>. Angerstein, 6 C. & P.
690.

M. & Sel. 447 ; Hunter v. Agnew, 1
Fox & S. 15 ; Allen v. Minor, 2 Call, 70 ;
Colcock v. Ferguson, 3 Desaus. 482. — It
is conceived, however, that in this coun-
try, bonds, like other contracts, are only
voidable, and may be ratified. Conroe v.
Birdsall, 1 Johns. Cas. 127. The mar-
ginal note to this case erroneously uses
the word void, in relation to such bond ;
the court said it was only voidable.

(c) Earle v. Reed, 10 Met. 387 ; Dubose
v. Wheddon, 4 McCord, 221. See also
Stone v. Dennison, 13 Pick. 1 ; Breed v.
Judd, 1 Gray, 455, that wherever the

23

353

315

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

ruptcy or insolvency, (i) nor is he liable as a partner of a

mercantile firm, (j) 1 Nor can he be sued on his cove-

* 315 nant as an * apprentice, (/c) Nor is his contract for labor

(i) For no man can be a bankrupt, for
debts which he is not obliged to pay.
Eex v. Cole, 1 Ld. Raym. 443, per Holt,
C. J. ; Ex parte Sydebotham, 1 Atk.
146. — And a commission of bankruptcy
against an infant is void, and not merely
voidable. Belton v. Hodges, 9 Bing. 305 ;
O'Brien v. Currie, 3 C. & P. 283. This is
the English rule ; but in this country it
has been held that an infant is entitled
to the benefit of the bankrupt law of the
United States of 1841, and that the pro-
ceedings might be in his own name. In
re Samuel Book, 3 McLean, 317.

(j) If, however, an infant engages in
a partnership, he must, at or within a
reasonable time after the period of his
coming of age, notify his disaffirmance
thereof ; otherwise he will be deemed to
have confirmed it, and will be bound by
subsequent contracts made on the credit
of the partnership. Goode v. Harrison, 5
B. & Aid. 147. Bai/ky, J., in this case,
said : " It is clear that an infant may be
in partnership. It is true that he is not
liable for contracts entered into during
Ids infancy ; but still, he may be a part-
ner. If he is in point of fact a partner
during his infancy, he may, when he
■comes of age, elect if he will continue
that partnership or not. If he continues
the partnership, he will then be liable as
a partner ; if he dissolves the partnership,
and if, when of age, he takes the proper
means to let the world know that the
partnership i6 dissolved, then he will
cease to be a partner. But the founda-
tion of my opinion is the negligence of
Bennion at the time he became of age.
Suppose an infant is not really a partner,
and that, during his infancy, he never in
fact enters into any joint purchase, but
ithat he holds out to different people, ' I
ana a partner with A,' and then comes of
age. Suppose also that the person to
whom he made the representation fur-
nishes A with goods, A representing him-
self to be a partner with the infant, and

the latter having done nothing to correct
the mistake and apprehension in the
mind of the seller of those goods, I
should think, in such a case as that, the
infant, the person who, when he was an
infant, had represented himself as being
a partner with A, would, by suffering
that delusion to continue when he be-
came of age, and neglecting to set the
matter right, be liable to all those per-
sons upon whom the delusion operated.
That is the justice, and as it seems to me,
the law, of the case." So in Miller v.
Sims, 2 Hill (S. C), 479, it was held that
an infant partner, who afterwards con-
firmed the contract of partnership, by
transacting the business and receiving
the profits, became thereby liable on all
the previous liabilities of the firm, even
such as were not known to him. But as
to the last point see contra, Grabtree v.
May, 1 B. Mon. 289.

(k) It is clear that an infant cannot be
sued on his covenants of indenture. See
Gylbert v. Fletcher, Cro. C. 179 ; Jennins
v. Pitman, Hutton, 03; Lvlly's case, 7
Mod. 15; Whitley v. Loftus, 8 Mod. 190;
Frazier v. Rowan, 2 Brevard, 47 ; Mc-
Kniglit o. Hogg, 3 Brevard, 44. — But if
the infant is a party to the indenture, or
his consent is expressed in it, many cases
have held that the contract of apprentice-
ship is binding absolutely upon him, and
that he cannot dissolve the relation thus
created. See Rex v. Great Wigston, 3 B.
& C. 484. — And a right of action neces-
sarily results to the injured party for a
breach thereof. Woodruff v. Logan, 1
Eng. (Ark.) 276. — And this, because it
was said that such contracts must be for
the infant's benefit, and therefore he
should not avoid them. But analogy and
principle would seem to require that, in-
dependent of any statutory provisions
regulating this matter, this contract, like
all others, should be voidable at his
election. See the cases cited in the next
note. Where a statute allows a parent

1 But if an infant actually enters into a partnership, has the benefit of it while it
lasts, and draws out the greater part of his contribution, he must, on its dissolution
with assets insufficient to pay the claims of all the partners, bear his equal and propor-
tionate share of the loss of capital. Moley v. Brine, 120 Mass. 324. The fact that two
infant mortgagors, after one of them became of age, received a part of the consideration
and made a part payment on the mortgage, will justify the inference of a ratification.
Keegan t>. Cox, 116 Mass. 289. For facts held insufficient to justifv a jury in finding
that there was a ratification of firm matters by an infant partner on becoming of age,
see Minock v. Shortbridge, 21 Mich. 304; Todd o. Clapp, 118 Mass. 495; Tobey v.
Wood, 123 Mass. 88.

354

CH. XVII.]

INFANTS.

316

and service generally binding. (7) * But enlistments in the navy,
though made without the consent of the parent or guardian, are
binding, and the infant cannot avoid them ; (m) and it is the same
as to the army, (w) Neither can he avoid a contract whereby he
undertakes to do what he is under a legal obligation to do ; as a
bond executed under a statute, to indemnify a town for the sup-
port of an illegitimate child ; for which an order of filiation has
been made upon him. (o) 2 He is not responsible as an
innkeeper for * losses sustained by his guests. (p~) Nor *316
will joining her husband in a conveyance bar an infant
feme covert of her right of dower. (^)

to bind his son as an apprentice, un-
doubtedly an indenture executed in pur-
suance of such statute would bind all the
parties to it ; and the infant could not
dissolve the relation thus created, but it
would not necessarily follow that the
remedy of the adult, for the desertion of
the apprentice, would be an action against
him on his covenants. See also Harper v.
Gilbert, 5 Cush. 417.

(I) Vent v. Osgood, 19 Pick. 572;
Moses v. Stevens, 2 Pick. 332 ; Nickerson
is. Easton, 12 Pick. 110 ; Francis v. Fel-
rnit, 4 Dev. & B. 498 ; Thomas v. Dike,
11 Vt. 273 ; Peters i>. Lord, 18 Conn. 337.
And if an infant avoids such contract
when part performed, he may recover on
a quantum meruit for the labor actually
performed under it. Vent v. Osgood, 19
Pick. 572 ; Judkins v. Walker, 17 Me. 38 ;
Medbury v. Watrous, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 110
(overruling the contrary cases of McCoy
v. Huffman, 8 Cowen, 84 ; Weeks v. Leigh-
ton, 5 N. H. 343 ; Harney v. Owen, 4
Blackf. 337). Deducting, it seems, any
injury the adult may have sustained by
such avoidance. Thomas v. Dike, 11 Vt.
278 ; Moses v. Stevens, 2 Pick. 332 ; Jud-
kins v. Walker, 17 Me. 38. But see
Whitmarsh v. Hall, 3 Denio, 375, contra,
as to deducting for injury to the adult.

(m) Commonwealth v. Gamble, 11 S.
& R. 93; Commonwealth v. Murray, 4
Binn. 487 ; United States v. Bainbridge,

1 Mason, 71 ; United States v. Blakeney,
3 Gratt. 405.

(n) The statutes of the United States
provide that the enlistment of a minor
without the consent of his parent or
guardian cannot be avoided. But no
person under the age of eighteen shall be
mustered into the United States service,
and the oath of enlistment taken by the
recruit shall be conclusive as to his age.
12 Stat, at Large, 339.

(o) People r. Moores, 4 Denio, 518.
So where a father entered on land in the
name of his minor son, for the purpose of
defrauding his creditors, and afterwards
sold the land, which his son by his direc-
tion conveyed by his own deed, during his
infancy, to the purchaser, it was held
that such deed was one which the law
would have compelled him to make, and
therefore could not be avoided by him on
arriving at full age. Elliot o. Horn, 10
Ala. 348. In like manner equal partition
of lands binds an infant. Bavington v.
Clark, 2 Penn. St. 115; Commonwealth
v. Hantz, id. 333. The binding effect of
proceedings in partition in Pennsylvania,
where a purpart is accepted by the guar-
dian, depends upon statutes. Gilbach's
Appeal, 8 S & P. 205.

(p) Holt, C. J , Williams v. Harrison,
Carth. 161 ; Crosse v. Androes, 1 Roll.
Abr. 2, D. pi. 3.

(q) Cunningham v. Knight, 1 Barb. 399.

i Thus an infant may sue on a quantum meruit on an avoided, partially executed
labor contract. Gaffney v. Hayden, 108 Mass. 137 ; Deroeheru. Continental Mills, 58
Me, 217. See Shurtleff v. Millard, 12 R. I. 272. An infant is however, bound by an
executed contract for his services, even though not exclusively for necessaries, it it was
apparently fair and reasonable, and the other party did not know of his infancj. Opicer

"' 2 "a '''recognizance" given by an infant to appear in a higher court is binding upon
him. Fagin v. Goggin, 12 R. I. 398. An infant is also liable for the services of an attor-
ney in defending him in a bastardy proceeding. Barker v. Hibbard, 54 N. H. 539.

* 317 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

It may be added, that an infant may be an attorney or agent to
execute a new power, or, indeed, to perform any act which he has
physical and mental capacity to perform, (r)

SECTION IV.

OF THE TORTS OF AN INFANT.

An infant is protected against his contracts, but not against his
frauds or other torts, (s) But only for those committed by him-
self, and not for those of persons representing him, as he cannot
have an agent, in the legal sense of the word, (ss) His promis-
sory note given as a compensation for his torts is not binding. (0
If such tort or fraud consists in the breach of his contract, then
he is not liable therefor in an action sounding in tort, because
this would make him liable for his contract merely by a change
in the form of the action, which the law does not permit, (m) *
But where the tort, though connected by circumstances with the
contract, is still distinguishable from it, there he is liable. As if
he hires a horse for an unnecessary ride he is not liable for the

hire, but if in the course of the ride he wilfully abuses and
* 317 injures the * horse, he is liable for the tort. (_v) 2 And if

he should sell the horse, trover would lie, nor would his

(r) Sheldon v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. Morrill v. Aden, 19 Vt. 505, that infancy

494 ; Thompson v. Lyon, 20 Mo. 155. is a bar to an action founded on a false

(s) See Stone v. Withipool, Latch, 21; and fraudulent warranty. But contra,

Bullock v. Babcock, 3 Wend. 391 ; Hanks Word ». Vance, 1 Nott & McC. 197 ;

v. Deal, 3 McCord, 257 ; Green v. Sperry, Peigne v. Sutcliffe, 4 McCord, 387 ; The

16 Vt. 390; Lewis v. Littlefield, 15 Me. People v. Kendall, 25 Wend. 399; Jen-

238 ; Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615, nings » Rundall, 8 T. R. 337 ; Gilson v.

020; Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Hill (N. Y.), Spear, 38 Vt. 311.

592, 594 ; Homer v. Thwing, 3 Pick. 4!>2 ; (v) Campbell v. Stakes, 2 Wend. 137.
School Dist. /■. Bragdon,3 Foster (N. H.), And so he will be liable in trover if he
516 ; Walker v. Davis, 1 Gray, 506. He drive the horse further, or on a different
is even liable for his own torts, though route from that for which he has en-
he act by his father's command, Humph- gaged him. Homer v. Thwing, 3 Pick,
rey v. Douglass, 10 Vt. 71 ; or through 492. Approved in Green v. Sperry, 16
the agency of a third person, Sikes v. Vt. 390; Towne v. Wiley, 23 Vt. 353.
Johnson, 16 Mass. 389. And see Vasse v. Smith, 6 Cranch, 226.

(ss) Robbins a. Mount, 4 Rob. 553. But see Witt v. Welsh, 6 Watts 9; Pen-

m Hanks v. Deal, 3 McCord, 257. rose v. Curren, 3 Rawle, 351 ; 1 Am. Lead.

(«) See West v. Moore, 14 Vt. 447; Cas. 118, 119 (1st ed.) ; 10 Am. Jur. 98;

Brown v. Durham, 1 Root, 273 ; and 11 id. 69 ; 20 id. 264.

1 That infancy is a bar to an action for false and fraudulent representations by a
vendor or pledger as to his ownership of property sold or pledged, see Doran v. Smith,
49 Vt. 353, and 17 Am. Law Reg. n. s. 42, and the elaborate note of E. H. Bennett
in the latter, at p. 44.

2 But not for a failure to drive the horse skilfully. Eaton v. Hill, 50 N. H. 235

35G

CH. XVII.]

INFANTS.

*317

infancy be a good defence. Nor need this tort or fraud be subse-
quent to the contract. Thus, in the case of a bond given by an
infant and received by the obligee in reliance upon his false and
fraudulent representations of his being of full age, the bond
cannot be enforced against him. (w) But as soon as the infant
makes and delivers it, he is guilty of a fraud, for which an ac-
tion may at once be maintained for any loss sustained, (x)

(w) Conroe v. Birdsall, 1 Johns. Cas.
127; Brown v. McCune, 6 Sandf. 224.
Neither will his warrant of attorney to
confess judgment bind him, and the court
cannot make it good, although there be
fraud in the infant. Saunderson v. Marr,
1 H. Bl. 75. See also Burley v. Russell,
10 N. H. 184; Stoolfoos v. Jenkins, 12
S. & R. 399.

(x) Fitts v. Hall, 9 N. H. 441 (over-
ruling Johnson ». Pie, 1 Ley. 169). Com.
Dig. Action on the Case for Deceit, A. 10 ; 2
Kent, Com. 241, n. (c) ; Reeves' Dom.
Rel. 269. — And in Wallace v. Morss, 5
Hill (N. Y.), 391, an infant who had
fraudulently obtained goods upon credit,
not intending to pay for them, was held
liable in an action for the tort. But see
contra, Brown v. McCune, 6 Sandf. 224 ;
Price v. Hewett, 18 E. L. & E. 522 ; s. c.
8 Exch. 146. The case of Pitts v. Hall,
supra, is decidedly condemned in 1 Am.
Lead. Cas. pp. 117,118, where the learned
editors say : " This decision, which di-
rectly overrules Johnson v. Pie, 1 Lev.
169, is clearly unsound ; the representa-
tion by itself was not actionable, for it
was not an injury ; and the avoidance of
the contract, which alone made it so, was
the exercise of a perfect legal right on
the part of the infant. The contract,
in such a case as Pitts v. Hall, forms an
essential part of the right of action, and
no liability growing out of contract can
be asserted against an infant. The test
of an action against an infant is, whether
a liability can be made out without
taking notice of the contract. It is ad-
mitted, in the same court, that such an
affirmation as in Fitts v. Hall does not
estop the infant so as to render him liable
on the contract ; which implies that the
avoidance of a contract induced by such
a representation is not a fraud." In the
case referred to, Parker, C. J., says:
"But Johnson v. Pie, 1 Lev. 169, was
' case, for that the defendant being an in-
fant, affirmed himself to be of full age,
and by means thereof the plaintiff lent
him £100, and so he had cheated the
plaintiff by this false affirmation.' After
verdict for the plaintiff, it was moved m
arrest of judgment that the action would

not lie for this false affirmation, but the
plaintiff ought to have informed himself
by others. ' Kelynge and Wyndham held
that the action did not lie, because the
affirmation being by an infant, was void ;
and it is not like to trespass, felony, &c,
for there is a fact done. Twysden doubt-
ed, for that infants are chargeable for
trespasses, Dyer, 105; and so, if he
cheat with false dice, &c.' The report in
Levinz states that the case was ad-
journed ; but in a note, referring to 1
Keb. 905, 913, it is stated that judgment
was arrested. If this case be sound, the
present action cannot be sustained on the
first count. From a reference in the
margin, it seems that the same case is
reported, 1 Sid. 258. Chief Baron Comyns,
however, who is himself regarded as high
authority, seems to have taken no notice
of this case in his Digest, 'Action on the
case for Deceit,' but lays down the rule
that 'if a man affirms himself of full
age when he is an infant, and thereby
procures money, to be lent to him upon
mortgage,' he is liable for the deceit ; for
which he cites 1 Sid. 183; Com. Dig.
Action, &c. A. 10. We are of opinion
that this is the true principle. If infancy
is not permitted to protect fraudulent
acts, and infants are liable in actions ex
delicto, whether founded on positive
wrongs, or constructive torts, or frauds
(2 Kent, Com. 197), as for slander (Hods-
man v. Grissel, Noy, 129), and goods con-
verted (auth. ante), there is no sound
reason that occurs to us why an infant
should not be chargeable in damages for
a fraudulent misrepresentation whereby
another has received damage." But it is
believed that the true ground of the de-
cision in Fitts v. Hall was mistaken in
the Am. Lead. Cases, the learned authors
being misled perhaps by the marginal
note, in which it is said that " An infant
is answerable for a fraudulent represen-
tation and deceit, which is not connected
with the subject-matter of a contract, but
by which the other party is induced to
enter into one with him, if he afterwards
avoids the contract by reason of his infancy.
Such may have been the case before the
court; but the principle to be deduced
357

* 318 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

* 318 As long as the bond runs, * it is not clear that he will not

pay it; and this uncertainty should perhaps reduce the
damages to a nominal amount. But when he refuses to pay,
and avoids the bond, by this refusal he gives no new cause of
action, but now in the action grounded upon the original tort, full
damages may be given. It might be held, however, that before
any action could be maintained for the fraud in making such a
bond, either he must have refused payment, or else the bond
should be returned to him ; and then the plaintiff would be enti-
tled to recover the full amount of the bond. And if goods were
sold to an infant in reliance upon his fraudulent representations
that he was of full age, the seller may reclaim them, certainly on
his refusal to pay, if not before, on the ground that he had never
parted with his property. O) If he allows a person to buy his
property, in good faith on the part of the purchaser, and with-
out informing the purchaser that he is an infant, it has been
intimated, that he cannot recover his property from the purcha-
ser, (s) The reasons for this view are not satisfactory, and the

doctrine is denied in another case in the same State, (a)
* 319 * When goods not necessaries are sold to an infant,

without fraudulent representations by him, with a knowl-
edge by the seller of his infancy, and the infant refuses to pay
for them, and also refuses to return the goods, although they are
within his possession and control, some question exists as to the
rights of the seller. Some authorities support the doctrine that
he is remediless, regarding the incapacity of the infant as his
privilege and his defence. But it seems unreasonable and unjust
to say that the infant may refuse to pay for the goods, without

from the decision is, that a fraudulent the mere silence of the infant as to his

misrepresentation, whereby money or age, knowing that the other party be-

goods are obtained by an infant, is itself lieved him an adult, would be a sufficient

an actionable injury. It is stated in Bac. ground to enable the other party to re-

Abr. Infancy if Age (I.), 3: "If an infant claim the goods so parted with. See 20

without any contract, wilfully takes away Am. Jur. 265. But in Stikeman v. Daw-

the goods of another, trover lies against son, 1 De Gex & S. 90, it was held that in

him. Also it is said, that if he take the the absence of any positive misrepresen-

goods under pretence that he is of full tation, the mere omission of the infant to

age, trover lies, because it is a wilful and disclose his minority was not a sufficient

fraudulent trespass." So an infant is fraud to invalidate the contract. So his

liable for a fraudulent execution of a note is voidable, although the payee did

trust confided to him. Loop v. Loop, 1 not know of his infancy and although he

Vt. 177. was carrying on trade as an adult. Van

(y) Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. 359 ; Winkle v. Ketcham, 3 Caines, 323.
Mills v. Graham, i B. & P. 140, per Mans- (z) Hall v. Timmons, 2 Rich. Eq. 120.

frld, C. J. ; Fumes v. Smith, 1 Roll. Abr. (a) Norris v. Wait, 2 Rich. Eq. 148.

530, C. pi. 3. It has been suggested that

358

CH. XVII.]

INFANTS.

320

affecting the validity of the sale to him. It should seem enough
if the infant has the power of rescinding the sale. This is an
adequate protection ; and if the goods are out of his possession
when the sale is rescinded, the seller may be wholly without
remedy. But when the sale is rescinded, the property in the goods
should revest in the seller, so far, at least, that if he finds them
in the possession of the infant, he may peaceably retake them as
his own. And if he demands them, the refusal of the infant to
deliver them would seem to be a tort wholly independent of the
contract, on which trover might be maintained. And there
are authorities which sustain this view. (J) * At all events, * 320

(6) Judge Reeve states similar views
in his work on the Domestic Relations,
p. 244. He says : "But it seems to have
been an opinion among the elementary
writers, that if a contract be performed
by the adult to the infant, and then the
infant refuse to perform his part, and
this contract be rescinded ; that, in such
cases, the adult has no remedy to recover
the consideration paid to the minor. So
that if a minor should contract to pay an
adult §50 for a horse, sold to him by the
adult, and then the minor should rescind
the contract, that the adult must lose his
horse. Or if a minor should buy a horse,
and pay for him, that he might rescind
the contract, and recover back the
money, and yet retain the horse ; it being
a presumption of law, as they say, that
the consideration paid or delivered by
the adult was intended as a present to
the minor. This doctrine appears to me
to be wholly destitute of principle, and
not supported by the authorities. That
the minor has a right to rescind his con-
tract at pleasure is not controverted ; but
when rescinded I should suppose that the
contract was as if it had never been, and
that the minor could never retain when
he had rescinded. I apprehend it to be
a sound maxim, and which is founded
in the highest reason, that an infant, al-
though he may always use his privilege,
as a shield to defend himself against his
own contracts, yet he shall never make
use of it as an offensive weapon to injure
others. It is enough that an infant shall
have full power to set afloat his contract.
In doing this he is in the proper use of his
privilege ; but to obtain, by that means,
property from others, is a fraud, and is
turning his privilege into an offensive
weapon, which the law will not indulge.
It is true that the lawful exercise of this
privilege will produce the effect of de-
frauding others, in many cases. As where

an infant has bought a horse, and given
his note for the value, and then avoids
his note by a plea of infancy ; and has
sold the horse, spent the money received,
and is unable to pay the value of the
horse ; in this case the adult may be de-
frauded, but it is because the minor is
unable to pay, or make him satisfaction.
But how, in point of principle and good
sense, would the case be, if the infant
were in possession of the horse at the
time he avoided the note ? Would not the
whole contract be utterly void,' and as
much blotted out of existence as if it had
never been ? and would not the horse
then be the property of the adult, the
infant having received the full benefit of
his privilege ; that is, the privilege of
not being bound by his contract ? And if
the property of the horse were in the
adult, he might retake him in a peaceable
manner prescribed by law, and might de-
mand him of the infant ; and in the case
of refusal might bring an action of trover
against the minor, for converting the
horse to his own use." Judge Meicalf, in
his very valuable articles on the Law of
Contracts, in the American Jurist, says,
vol. xx. p. 260 : " But where the infant
refuses to pay for articles sold to him,
the other party cannot retake the articles ;
and where he has received money for
property which he engaged to deliver to
the purchaser, and afterwards refuses to
deliver, his privilege (as it is termed) is
his defence. This is manifestly inequit-
able, and Judge Reeve therefore zealously
contends that such is not the law. But
the principles of the law of infancy seem
to lead to this result, and the authorities
to be too stubborn to be resisted." We
confess that we think the views of Judge
Reeve more consonant with the principles
of law, as well as of equity. The infant
is not bound by his promise; but this
must mean that the promise was void, or

359

321

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

it seems to be admitted that if the infant has received the goods
and paid for them, he cannot avoid the contract and recover the
money paid, without redelivering the goods, (c)

*321

* SECTION V.

OF THE EFFECT OF AN INFANT'S AVOIDANCE OF HIS CONTRACT.

Every executory contract may be avoided by an infant, and
then the adult dealing with him is relieved from his part of the
contract ; as if the contract were for the sale of a horse, by the
infant, and the infant refuses to deliver the horse, the adult of
course may refuse to pay the price. But if it be executed on the
part of the adult, — as, for instance, by the payment in advance
for the horse, — and the infant then annuls the contract, and re-
fuses to deliver the horse, the rights of the other party are not so
certain. (d~) If, previous to the contract, the infant fraudulently
represented himself as of age, we have seen, that for this fraud
he may be answerable. But, if there were no such representa-

may be made void, and when void it is as
if it had not been; and therefore when
the infant has defeated the claim of the
seller for the price by avoiding his prom-
ise, there is an end of the contract. We
see no sufficient reason for connecting his
subsequent wrong-doing, in refusing to
redeliver the property with the contract,
so as to say the owner now sues substan-
tially for a breach of the contract, al-
though formally, in tort. He demands,
in fact as well as in form, damages for
the wrongful detention of property which
is his, because it was his, and has never
passed out of him but by a contract
which the infant has exercised his right
of rescinding. We think the case of
Vasse v. Smith, 6 Cranch, 226, rests upon
similar principles. There the defendant
received goods as supercargo, but dis-
posed of them in disobedience to the
orders of the owner, who brought trover.
The defendant pleaded and proved in-
fancy, and the court below held it to be
a sufficient defence. Marshall, C. J., in
delivering the opinion of the Supreme
Court, said: "This court is of opinion
that infancy is no complete bar to an
action of trover, although the goods
converted be in his possession, in virtue

360

of a previous contract. The conversion
is still in its nature a tort ; it is not an
act of omission, but of commission, and
is within that class of offences for which
infancy cannot afford protection. . . .
This instruction of the court (below)
must have been founded on the opinion
that infancy is a bar to an action of
trover for goods committed to the infant
under a contract. . . This court has
already stated its opinion to be, that an
infant is chargeable with a conversion,
although it be of goods which came law-
fully to his possession." And see Walker
v. Davis, 1 Gray, 606. We think that
Badger v. Phiuney, 15 Mass. 359, and
Fitts v. Hall, 9 N. H. 441, imply similar
principles.

(c) Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508;
Bailey o. Bamberger, 11 B. Mon. 113 ;
Smith v. Evans, 6 Humph. 70 ; Cummings
v. Powell, 8 Tex. 80. And see Harney v.
Owen, 4 Blackf . 337 ; Weeks v. Leighton,
5 N. H. 343 ; Medbury v. Watrous, 7 Hill
(N. Y.), 110.

(rf) See Shaw v. Boyd, 5 S. & R. 309 ;
Crymes v. Day, 1 Bailev, 320 ; Jones
v. Todd, 2 J. J. Marsh. 361, 20 Am. Jur.
260.

CH. XVII.] INFANTS. * 322

tions, it is not certain that the adult party has any remedy. He
cannot bring trover for the horse, for it was never his ; nor case,
unless he can found his action upon a wrong independent of the
contract ; we should say, however, he can now recover the money
on the ground that the entire avoidance of the sale has left the
infant in possession of money that belongs only to the adult. If
the infant disaffirms a sale that he has made, and reclaims the
property he sold, it seems now quite well settled that he must
return the purchase-money, (e) 1

If, during infancy, he has destroyed or parted with the property
he purchased before a demand was made upon him for it subse-
quently to his disaffirmance, the seller, as we have said, may
be remediless ; unless he does this in such a way, or * under * 322
such circumstances, as to amount to a tort ; but if he de-
stroys or disposes of the property after coming of age, this must
be regarded as a confirmation of the contract. (/) And it has
been held that an infant can rescind his purchase and recover the
price he paid, only when he is ready to return the thing purchased ;
nor do we think the rule would be unjust to the infant if it did
not permit him to rescind his purchase, unless he was both willing
and able to return the thing purchased in substantially as good
a condition as when he purchased it. (ff*)

If an infant advances money on a voidable contract which he
afterwards rescinds, he cannot recover this money back, because
it is lost to him by his own act, and the privilege of infancy does
not extend so far as to restore this money unless it was obtained
from him by fraud.2 Whether an infant who has engaged to labor

I A TSndo-er v Phinnev 15 Mass. 363; dorsement, because he cannot restore
Hulled rCumm^TlGreenl. 13 \ the maker of the bill or note , to he
Smith „. Evans, 5 Humph. 70; Farr ». same condi tion as before to Du Ity

if an adult files his bill to set aside a con- 241 ; Deason v. Boyd, 1 Dana, 45 , Law

veyance made when under age, he must «on ■* Lovejoy .* £™g* i0£ Com. 20l.
offer to restore the purchase-money, (#) . Riley v. mi lory *

see Hillyer v. Bennett, 3 Edw Ch. 222. See also .Bryan "^ffi uml^

So if the indorsee of an infant payee is 473; Kerr v. ne 11 it mo. i* ,

paid, the infant cannot avoid his in- ton v. Hoge, 6 Bush, 478.

i That he may recover personalty, without retaking the money «rg».*
Dl^S;;WiS'A2L 272, is at variance with the text. Potter, J„ says,

ool

* 322 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

for a certain period, and, after some part of the work is performed,
rescinds the contract, can recover for the work he has done, has
been differently decided. (#) The principle upon which the rule
is founded that forbids the infant's recovery of money advanced
by him on a contract which he has rescinded, would appear to
lead to the conclusion that he could not recover for the work he
had done ; but the weight of authority seems to be the other way.
As to the time of an infant's disaffirmance of his contract, it may
be said, in general, that he cannot avoid a sale of lands, conclu-
sively, until of full age, (A) although he may enter while under
age, and take and hold the profits, (i) The disaffirmance may be
by any appropriate legal process, or by any act on his part show-
ing conclusively his purpose of annulling the sale. Contracts
which relate only to the person or to personal property may be
avoided at any time, and by any act clearly manifesting this pur-
pose. (/) Thus he may avoid a sale, and his guardian may bring
trover for the chattel sold. (&) And this right may be exer-
cised against all equities of purchasers from the grantee, or other
persons. (7)

An infant stands on the same footing as an adult, in respect to
his rights to reclaim money on a failure of consideration, or because
obtained by fraud, or to rescind contracts for good cause.

((/) See note (I), supra, p. * 315. turn to the contrary, see Boody v. Mc-

(/<) Stafford v. Roof, 9 Cowen, 626; Kenney, 23 Me. 517. See also Farr o.

Bool i\ Mix, 17 Wend. 120 ; Matthewson Sumner, 12 Vt. 28.

v. Johnson, 1 Hoff. Ch. 560; Shipman v. (Ic) See cases supra, and Shipman v.

Horton, 17 Conn. 481 ; Cummings v. Horton, 17 Conn. 481 ; Carr v. Cloueh 6

Powell, 8 Tex. 80. See also ante, p. * 294, Foster (N. H.), 280. See also Cummings

note (j). v. Powell, 8 Tex. 80.

li) Stafford v. Roof, 9 Cowen, 626. (/) Mvers v. Sanders, 7 Dana, 506;

{]) See supra, note (h). For a die- Hill v. Anderson, 5 Sm. & M. 216.

" The weight of authority, and we think, of reason, is, that it is no defence that the
minor voluntarily paid the money ; and when he has received no benefit from the
contract, he has a right to recover it back;" citing and reiving on Robinson v.
Weeks, 06 Me. 102, 104. — An infant may recover back at any time deposits made by
him with brokers by way of margins in stock transactions, and lost. Ruchizky v De
Haven, 97 Penn. St. 202. In that case, Gordon, J., said, " The doctrine, that where an
infant has executed a contract and has enjoyed the benefit of it, and afterwards on
coming of age, seeks to avoid it, he must first restore the consideration which' he
received; that he cannot have the benefit of the one side without restoring the
equivalent on the other, — this rule may, and certainly does, apply in certain cases but
as a general rule it is unsound," and " foreign to the case in hand."
362

CH. XVII.] INFANTS.

323

* SECTION VI. * 323

OP RATIFICATION.

As the liability of the infant is defeated by the law, for his
protection, therefore, as we have already seen, when he is of full
age, he may, if he pleases, confirm and ratify a contract entered
into by him during infancy, and this he may do by parol, (m) *
But, for this ratification, a mere acknowledgment that the debt
existed, or that the contract was made, is not enough, (w) By a
well-recognized distinction, while the deed of an infant cannot be
avoided except by some act of equal force with the deed, acts
insufficient to avoid a deed may suffice to affirm or ratify it. (nn) 2
It need not be a precise and formal promise ; but it must be a
direct and express confirmation, and substantially (though it need
not be in form} a promise to pay the debt or fulfil the con-
tract, (o) It must be made with the deliberate * purpose * 324

(m) In England, by stat. 9 Geo. IV. the case out of the said statute; and per

c. 14, § 5, it is now necessary that the Plait, B., and Martin, B., that it was a

new promise or ratification should be in sufficient ratification. A similar statute

writing, and signed by the party to be exists in Maine. — In Baylis v. Dinely, M.

charged thereby. And any written in- & Sel. 477, it seems to have been held

strument signed by the party, which in that an instrument under seal, executed

an adult would be an adoption or rati- while the maker was an infant, could

fication of an act done by one acting as not be affirmed by parol. But this is be-

agent, is sufficient. Harris v. Wall, 1 lieved to be inconsistent with true prin-

Exch. 122 ; Hartley v. Wharton, 11 A. & ciple and analogous cases. See Hoyle v.

E. 934. But see Mawson v. Blane, 26 E. Stowe, 2 Dev. & B. 320; Wheaton v.

L. & E. 560. The defendant, having East, 5 Yerg. 41 ; Houser v. Reynolds, 1

while an infant, accepted a bill of ex- Hayw. (N. C.) 143. But see Clamorgan

change, was applied to, after he became v. Lane, 9 Mo. 446

of age, on behalf of the holder, and then (n) Bobbins v. Eaton, 10 N. H. 561 ;
wrote to him as follows : " Your brother Thrupp v. Fielder, 2 Esp 628 ; Ordi-
tells me you are very uneasy about the nary v. Wherry, 1 Bailey, 28; Benham
£500 bill drawn by Mr. P. on me. Pray v. Bishop, 9 Conn. 330 ; Alexander y.
make yourself easy about it, as I will Hutcheson, 2 Hawks, 535 ; Eord v. Phil-
take care that it is paid, and Sir Henry lips, 1 Pick. 203.
P. comes to England in June." Held, [nn] Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wall. 617.
per Parke, B., and Alderson, B., that this (o) See Goodsell v. Myers, 3 Wend,
was not a sufficient ratification to take 479 ; Rogers v. Hurd, 4 Day, 57 ; Wilcox

1 A promise, when of age, to pay a debt contracted in infancy " as a debt of honor,"
when of ability, is not a sufficient ratification to take the case out of 9 Geo. IV, c. 14, § 5.
Maccord v. Osborne, 1 C. P. D. 568.

2 An infant's deed is voidable, not requiring ratification after majority to give it
validity, but for its avoidance requiring some clear and unmistakable act, as a suit to
regain possession, to cancel the deed, and the like. Tunison v. Chamblin, 88 111.378.
But on rescinding a conveyance of land he is bound to restore the consideration if he
still has it, otherwise not. Reynolds v. McCurrv, 100 111. 356.

363

*324

THE LAW OF CONTEACTS.

[BOOK I.

of assuming a liability from which he knows that he is dis-
charged by law, and under no compulsion; (^>) and to the party
himself or his agent. (<?) It may be conditional, and in that case
the party relying upon it must show that the condition has
been fulfilled, (r) But it seems to be now settled that a rati-

v. Roath, 12 Conn. 550 ; Hale v. Gerrish,
8 N. H. 374 ; Bigelow v. Grannis, 2 Hill
(N. Y.), 120; Willard v. Hewlett, 19
Wend. 301 ; Emmons v. Murray, 16 N.
H. 385, The cases are well collected in
Bingham on Infancy (Am. ed.), p. 69,
n. : " No particular words seem necessary
to a ratification, and provided they im-
port a recognition and confirmation of
his promise, they need not be a direct
promise to pay. Whitney v. Dutch, 14
Mass. 460, Parker, C. J. ; Hale v. Gerrish,
8 N. H. 376; as 'I have not the money
now, but when I return from my voyage

1 will settle with you ; ' and ' I owe you,
and will pay you when I return,' have
been held a sufficient ratification. Mar-
tin v. Mayo, 10 Mass. 137 ; also these
words, 'I will pay it (the note) as soon
as I can make it, but not this year. I
understand the holder is about to sue it,
but she had better not.' Bobo i>. Hansel,

2 Bailey, 114. So a promise to endeavor
to procure the money and send it to the
creditor is sufficient. Whitney v. Dutch,
15 Mass. 457; and where a minor after
coming of age wrote to the plaintiff, ' I
am sorry to give you so much trouble in
calling, but I am not prepared for you,
but will without neglect remit you in a
short time,' this was held a sufficient
ratification. Hartley v. Wharton, 11 A.
& E. 934. See also Harris v. Wall, 1
Exch. 128, where it is said, that any
written instrument signed by the infant,
which in the case of adults would have
amounted to the adoption of the act of
a party acting as agent, will, in the case
of an infant who has attained his ma-
jority, amount to a ratification. A de-
claration of an intention to pay a note,
and authorizing an agent to take it up,
has been held a good ratification, al-
though the agent had done nothing about
it. Orvis v. Kimball, 3 N. H. 314; see
further, Best v. Givens, 3 B. Mon. 72;
Taft v. Sergeant, 18 Barb. 320. On the
other hand, an admission by an infant
that he owed the debt, and tliat the adult
would get his pay, but at the same time
refusing to give his note, was considered
no ratification of the original promise.
Hale v. Gerrish, 8 N. H. 374; and so
these words, ' I owe the plaintiff, but am
unable to pay him, but will endeavor to
get my brother bound with me.' Ford

364

v. Phillips, 1 Pick. 202; likewise the
language, ' I consider your claim as
worthy my attention, but not my first
attention,' adding he would soon give it
the attention due it. Wilcox u. Roath,
12 Conn. 550. And see Dunlap v. Hales,
2 Jones (N. C), 381 ; and where a minor
gave his note, a part of which he sub-
sequently paid, and in his will made
after attaining majority, directed the
payment of his just debts, this was held
no ratification as to the residue of the
note. Smith v. Mayo, 9 Mass. 62 ; but
see Wright v. Steele, 2 N. H. 51 ; 20 Am.
Jur. 269; Merchants v. Grant, 2 Edw.
Ch. 544. And where a minor received
money, which he promised in writing to
pay to another when requested, and on
being applied to, said it was not conven-
ient to pay then, but expressed an inten-
tion to do so on his arrival at Honduras ;
this was held no ratification of his promise
to repay, however otherwise he might
have been liable. Jackson v. Mayo, 11
Mass. 147. Neither is a submission to
arbitration, whether he is liable or not,
on his note, a ratification. Benham v.
Bishop, 9 Conn. 330 ; nor is a partial
payment any ratification of the remain-
der. Thrupp v. Fielder, 2 Esp. 628;
Robbins o. Eaton, 10 N. H. 561; Hinley
o. Margaritz, 3 Barr, 428. If the rati-
fication is conditional, as, to pay when
able, the plaintiff must show the hap-
pening of the contingency, but not that
the defendant could pay without incon-
venience. Thompson v. Lay, 4 Pick. 48 ;
Cole u. Saxby, 3 Esp. 159. See also
Davis v. Smith, 4 Esp. 36 ; Besford v.
Saunders, 2 H. Bl. 116 ; Martin ». Mayo,
10 Mass. 141 n. (c) ; Everson v. Carpen-
ter, 17 Wend. 419."

(p) Ford v. Phillips, 1 Pick. 202 ;
Smith v. Mayo, 9 Mass. 64; Curtin
v. Patton, 11 S. & R. 307 ; Harmer v.
Killing, 5 Esp. 102; Brooke v. Gaily, 2
Atk. 34 ; Hinely v. Margaritz, 3 Barr,
428.

(?) Goodsell v. Myers, 3 Wend. 479;
Bigelow v. Grannis, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 120;
Hoit v. Underhill, 9 N. H. 439.

(r) Thompson v. Lay, 4 Pick. 48 ; Cole
v. Saxby, 3 Esp. 159. See also Davis v.
Smith, 4 Esp. 36 ; Besford v. Saunders,
2 H. Bl. 116 ; Everson v. Carpenter, 17
Wend. 419.

CH. XVII.]

INFANTS.

•325

fication will not maintain an action brought before such ratifica-
tion. (»)

The mere fact that an infant does not disaffirm a contract after
he is of full age, is not, necessarily, of itself a confirma-
tion, (t) * but this fact may be made significant by circum- * 325
stances ; thus, if coupled with a continued possession and
use of the property, or a refusal to redeliver the same, and an
assertion of ownership, it may frequently raise, by implication of
law, such confirmation, and a promise to pay for the property,
especially if either this intention and promise to pay must be pre-
sumed, or else a fraud. Indeed any act of ownership, after full
age, should have this effect ; but it must be unequivocal.

The purchases of an infant may be far more easily ratified than
his conveyances of real estate. To affirm the latter some positive
act seems to be necessary, and mere acquiescence, or failure to
disaffirm, although continued beyond a reasonable time, has been
adjudged not sufficient to bind the minor, (m) But it is held in

(s) Thornton v. Illingworth, 2 B. &
C. 824 ; Ford v. Phillips, 1 Pick. 202 ;
Thing v. Libbey, 16 Me. 55; Merriam v.
Wilkins, 6 N. H. 432 (overruling the
earlier case of Wright v. Steele, 2 N. H.
61) ; Hale v. Gerrish, 8 N. H. 374; Good-
ridge v. Boss, 6 Met. 487.

(() Bennett's note to Dublin & Wick-
low Railway Co. v. Black, 16 E. L. & E.
558. But see post, notes (u) and (y). As
to the necessity for a positive act of con-
firmation, see Ferguson v. Bell, 17 Mo.
347 ; Dunlap v. Hales, 2 Jones (N. C),
381. Also Harris v. Wall, 1 Exch. 122.

(«) In Jackson v. Carpenter, 11 Johns.
539, an infant conveyed land to A, in fee
in the military tract, in 1784. Afterwards
in 1796, and ten years after he became of
age, he conveyed the same premises to B.
A claimed that the first deed was only
voidable, and not void, and that there
had been an acquiescence for so long a
time after the infant arrived at full age,
that it amounted to a confirmation of the
first conveyance, before the second was
executed. But the court said, in giving
their opinion : " The cases cited by the
defendant's counsel, to this point, do not
support it to the extent contended for. In
all of them it appears that some act of
the infant, after he is twenty-one years of
age, is required to evince his assent ; they
are only instances of purchases made, or
leases given, rendering a rent by which
either the continuance in possession or
receipt of the rent reserved shows his
assent afterwards. In the present case,

no act of the infant appears since he
arrived at full age, by which this assent
could be inferred, except mere omission.
He has possessed no property, nor has he
received rent. The confirmation of this
sale, consequently, can, in no point of
view, turn out to his advantage, nor can
his neglect to do anything from 1784 till
1796 destroy his title. It would be con-
trary to the benign principles of the law,
by which the imbecility and indiscretion
of infants are protected from injury to
their property, that a mere acquiescence,
without any intermediate or continued
benefit, showing his assent, should oper-
ate as an extinguishment of his title."
So in Jackson v. Burchin, 14 Johns. 124,
an infant in 1784, and while between
nineteen and twenty years of age, con-
veyed wild and unoccupied land in fee,
and in 1795 executed another conveyance
of the same premises, not having in the
mean time after his arrival at full age
made any entry on the premises. It was
also proved that the infant, after he came
of age, had stated to others that he had
sold his land to [the first grantee]. The
defendant also offered to prove that the
infant, after he became of full age, de-
clined to sell the premises on one occa-
sion, because he had previously sold it, but
this was overruled. Spencer, J., in deliv-
ering the opinion, observed : " I perceive
no evidence of the affirmance of the first
deed by the infant after he came of age."
These cases were commented upon in
Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. 120. and the court
365

*326

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[book I.

New York that a continuance of possession and acts of ownership
after coming of age, ratify the contract, (uii) It has been
* 326 held in England that an infant's bond * could not be ratified
but by an instrument of equal solemnity. But this has been
doubted for strong and we think sufficient reasons, (v) Whether
his verbal declarations can, in any event, ratify his instrument
under seal, may not be certain ; but it is quite certain that if, in
an instrument under seal, a person recites or refers to a former
instrument also under seal, made while he was a minor, this is a
ratification of the first, (w) Thus, the grant of lands received
during infancy, by way of exchange for other lands, has been held
to be a confirmation of the original conveyance, (x) And if a

incline to the same general doctrine. So
in Tuaker v. Moreland, 10 Pet. 68, Mr.
Justice Story observed : " To assume, as
a matter of law, that a voluntary and de-
liberate recognition by a person, after his
arrival at age, of an actual conveyance of
his right, during his non-age, amounts to
a confirmation of such conveyance; or to
assume that a mere acquiescence in the
same conveyance, without objection, for
several months after his arrival at age, is
also a confirmation of it, are not maintain-
able. The mere recognition of the fact
that a conveyance has been made, is not,
per se, proof of a confirmation of it." In
Lessee of Drake v. Ramsay, 5 Hamm.
251, the court remarked : " In our opin-
ion lapse of time may frequently furnish
evidence of acquiescence, and thus confirm
the title [of the first purchaser] ; but of
itself it does not take away the right to
avoid until the Statute of Limitations takes
effect" The same doctrine was afterwards
affirmed in Cresinger v. Lessee of Welch,
15 Ohio, la". In the very able case of Doe
v. Abernatliy, 7 Blaekf. 442, it appeared
that a female infant, residing in Pennsyl-
vania, executed there a deed of bargain
and sale for land situate in that State.
She afterwards married, but whether
before or after her majority did not
appear, nor did it appear where, after the
execution of the deed, she and her hus-
band had resided, nor that her husband
had acquiesced in the deed after he knew
of it. Held, that the lapse of about five
years after the wife's majority, without
any attempt to disaffirm the conveyance,
did not, under the circumstances, prevent
the husband and wife from disaffirming it.
In Boody v. McKenney, 23 Me. 623, Shep-
ley, J., thus lays down the law on this
subject : " When a person has made a

366

conveyance of real estate during his in-
fancy, and would affirm or disaffirm it
after he becomes of age, in such case the
mere acquiescence for years to disaffirm
it affords no proof of a ratification. There
must be some positive and clear act per-
formed for that purpose. The reason is,
that by his silent acquiescence lie occa-
sions no injury to other persons, and se-
cures no benefits or new rights to himself.
There is nothing to urge him as a duty
towards others to act speedily. Language
appropriate in other cases, requiring him
to act within a reasonable time, would
become inappropriate here. He may,
therefore, after years of acquiescence, by
an entry, or by a conveyance of the estate
to another person, disaffirm and avoid the
conveyance made during his infancy."
This point was discussed in Hoyle v.
Stowe, 2 Dev. & B. ."20, where it was held
that some act of affirmance was clearly
necessary, and that if declarations were
sufficient they must be clear and unequiv-
ocal, and made with a view to ratification.
In Houser v. Reynolds, 1 Hayw. 143, such
declarations were held sufficient. See,
however, Clamorgan ». Lane, 0 Mo. 446,
and note [y) below.

(««) Henry v. Root, 33 N. Y. 526.

(v) Parol ratification was claimed in
Baylis c. Dinely, 3 II. & Sel. 477. But see,
contra, Hoyle v. Stowe, 2 Dev. & B. 320 ;
Wheaton i\ East, 5 Yerg. 41 ; Houser v.
Reynolds, 1 Hayw. 143 ; Scott v. Buchan-
an, 2 Humph. 468. But see Clamorgan v.
Lane, 9 Mo. 446.

(w) See Story v. Johnson, 2 Y. & Col.
586 ; Boston Bank u. Chamberlin, 15
Mass. 220 ; Phillips v. Green, 5 Monr.
344.

(x) Williams v. Mabee, 3 Halst. Ch.
500.

CH. XVII.]

INFANTS.

326

minor receives and retains the proceeds of a sale of real estate,
he is estopped from denying the validity of the sale, (xx)

In some cases it has been urged, that even a silent acquiescence
for a considerable time by an infant, after arriving at full age, is
itself a ratification of his conveyance. («/) 1

{xx) Pursley v. Hays, 17 Iowa, 3ll.

(y) In Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn. 494,
where an infant, having executed a deed
of conveyance in 1791, at the age of
eighteen years, held the note given for
the consideration four years, and then
married; her husband held it until her
death in 1815, and continued to hold it
eleven years afterwards ; and, during the
whole period, there was no act or expres-
sion of disaffirmance, and the grantee was
permitted to remain in the undisturbed
occupation of the land, it was held that
there was both an implied and a tacit af-
firmance. Ilosmer, C. J., said : " The
deed in question has been ratified by
every implied mode of affirmance. The
consideration note was held by P. Bolles
a year after her arrival at full age, and
before her marriage, and by the plaintiff
has been held ever since. During all
this period, until the commencement of
the plaintiff's action, a profound silence
was observed relative to the disaffirm-
ance of the contract ; and the defendant
was permitted to remain in the unques-
tioned occupation of the land. These
acts imply an affirmance of the deed, not
unlike the holding possession of land
leased or exchanged, and authorized the
same inference. Besides, the omission to
disaffirm alone, for eleven years, a period
almost sufficient to give title by posses-
sion, is an acquiescence in the convey-
ance amounting to a tacit affirmance."
This case was cited with approbation in
Richardson v. Boright, 9 Vt. 368, where
Redfield, J., said : " In the case of every
act of an infant merely voidable, he must
disaffirm it on coming of full age, or he
will be bound by it." See also Holmes
o. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 35, Dallas, J. ; 2 Kent,
Com. 238. — The case of Wallace v. Lewis,
4 Harring. (Del ) 75, is a strong case
against the right of disaffirmance. There
a minor, when wanting only four months
of his majority, conveyed his land in fee
by deed in proper form, and the purcha-
ser went into immediate possession, and
greatly improved the premises. The in-
fant, four years after, brought his action

of ejectment against his own grantee, to
recover the same premises. It was held
that his silence for four years after he
became of age was a waiver of his right
to disaffirm, and that he could not re-
cover. And see also Scott v. Buchanan,
11 Humph. 468. But see Moore v. Aber-
nathy, 7 Blackf. 442. So in Wheaton v.
East, 5 Yerg. 41, it was held that any act
of a minor, from which his assent to a
deed executed during his minority may
be inferred, will operate as a confirma-
tion, and prevent him thereafter from
electing to disaffirm it. Therefore where
the minor had done no act from which a
dissent or disaffirmance might be inferred,
for three or four years after he arrived at
twenty-one, but where he admitted he
had sold the land, said he was satisfied,
offered to exchange other lands for it,
and saw the bargainee putting on im-
provements without objection, it was held
that these were sufficient acts from which
to infer a confirmation. We have thus
fully referred to the authorities on the
subject of the ratification of conveyances,
because there is, as will be seen by a ref-
erence to the foregoing cases, not a little
conflict between them. On the other
hand, as to purchases, the law is well set-
tled; and if an infant retains property
purchased, whether real or personal, and
gives no notice of an intention to disaf-
firm, for an unreasonable length of time
after he arrives at full age, and especially
if he uses the property, sells it, or mort-
gages it, or exercises any unequivocal
act of ownership over it, without any no-
tice to the other party of an intention to
disaffirm, this is clearly sufficient evi-
dence of a ratification. Some of the
leading cases on this subject are Boyden
o. Boyden, 9 Met. 519 ; Boody v. McKen-
ny, 23 Me. 517 ; Hubbard v. Cummings,
1 Greenl. 11, where this doctrine is ap-

£lied to the purchase of real estate. Co.
it. 51 b; Robbins «. Eaton, 10 N. H.
561 ; Cheshire v. Barrett, 4 McCord, 241 ;
Lawson v. Lovejoy, 8 Greenl. 405 (Ben-
nett's ed. n.) ; Alexander v. Heriot, Bai-
ley, Ch. 223; Armfield v. Tate, 7 Ired. L.

1 Delay by an infant, with neglect, after becoming of age, with the knowledge that
his erantee is intending to and does make valuable improvements to make known his
h\tenT?on to avoid his deed in season to prevent the same, is a ratification of his deed.
Davis v. Dudley, 70 Me. 236.

*327

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[book I.

* 327 * If any act of disaffirmance is necessary to enable an

infant after attaining his majority to avoid his conveyance

* 328 made while * a minor, it is now well settled that the exe-

cution of a second deed, which is inconsistent with the
former deed, is itself a disaffirmance of the former deed, although
the infant had not previously manifested any intention to avoid it
and had made no entry upon the premises conveyed. The old
rule, requiring such entry before the infant could make another
conveyance, has long since been done away. (2) In some of our
States, however, a sale of lands can be made only by one in pos-
session ; and in that case the infant should enter before making
his conveyance.

A question has been raised in relation to ratification by an
infant, whether, if the contract be one of those which is declared
to be not voidable, but void, any ratification could restore it.

258; Kitchen v. Lee, 11 Paige, 107; Rea-
son v. Boyd, 1 Dana, 45. — And where an
infant, a few days before he became
twenty-one, purchased a note and drew
an order on a third person for the pay-
ment, but which was not paid, of which
he had notice, it was held in a suit on
such order several years afterwards, that
his failure to return the note and disaf-
firm the contract, after he became of age,
warranted the inference that he intended
to abide by it, and was a sufficient an-
swer to the defence of infancy. Thom-
asson v. Boyd, 13 Ala. 419. In Delano
v. Blake, 11 Wend. 85, where an infant
took the note of a third person in pay-
ment for work done, and retained it for
eight months after he came of age, and then
offered to return it, and demanded pay-
ment for his work, it was held, in an
action for the work and labor performed
by him, that the retaining of the note for
such a length of time was a ratification
of the contract made during infancy,
especially when, in the mean time, the
maker of the note had become insolvent,
the debt lost, and the offer to return made
on the heel of that event. In Aldrich >•.
Grimes, 10 N. H. 194, an infant bought
personal property, with a right of return
if it was not liked. He kept it two
months after he was of full age, and after
he had been requested to return it if he
did not like it. It was held a confirma-
tion. In the case of Smith o. Kelly, 13
Met. 309, an infant bought goods that
were not necessaries, and the sellers, three
days before he came of age, brought an
action against him for the price, and at-

368

tached the goods on their writ. The
goods remained in the hands of the at-
taching officer at the time of the trial of
the action, and the defendant gave no
notice to the plaintiffs, after he came of
age, of his intention not to be bound by
the contract of sale. Held, that there
was no ratification of the contract of sale
by the defendant, and that the action
could not be maintained. If an infant
purchase land, and at the same time mort-
gage it for the purchase-money, so that
the whole is but one transaction, the retain-
ing of possession of the land beyond a
reasonable time is a confirmation of the
mortgage, and any act that ratifies the
mortgage affirms the deed. Bigelow v.
Kinney, 3 Vt. 853 ; Richardson o. Bo-
right, 9 id. 36S; Kobbins v. Eaton, 10 X.
H. 662 ; Dana v. Coombs, 6 Greenl. 89 ;
Hubbard v. Cummings, 1 id. 11; Lynde
v. Budd, 2 Paige, 191. — Upon the whole
it may be said, that an infant's convey-
ances are not ratified by a bare recogni-
tion of the existence of, or a silent
acquiescence in his deed, for any period
less than the period of statutory limita-
tion. See the cases already cited. Has-
tings r. Delarhide, 24 Cal. 195.

(z) Cresinger v. Welch, 15 Ohio, 156 ;
Hoyle v. Stowe, 2 Dev. & B. 320 ; Tucker
v. Moreland, 10 Pet. 58 ; Jackson v. Car-
penter, 11 Johns. 539 ; Jackson r. Bur-
chin, 14 id. 124. But to constitute a
disaffirmance, the second deed must be
so inconsistent with the first, that both
cannot consistently stand. Eagle Fire
Company v. Lent, 6 Paige, 635 ; Bingham
on Infancy (Bennett's ed.), p. 60, n.

CH. XVII.] INFANTS. * 329

And contracts by an infant for purposes of trade have been de-
clared absolutely void. But the exact distinction between the
void and the voidable contracts of an infant is rather obscure ;
and the better opinion, as well as the stronger reason, seems
to be, as we have already stated, that in reference to its
* ratification, no contract is void ; or, in the language of * 329
Parke, B., in Williams v. Moore, (a) " the promise of an
infant is not void in any case, unless the infant chooses to plead
his infancy." (5)

The rules of the common law concerning infancy are varied
in many of our States by statutory provisions. In some of them
the ratification must be in writing ; but a note or memorandum
expressing the intention of ratification is sufficient. (bb~)

SECTION VII.

WHO MAY TAKE ADVANTAGE OP AN INFANT'S LIABILITY.

It is a general rule that the disability of infancy is the personal
privilege of the infant himself, and no one but himself or his

(a) II M. & W. 256. Illingworth, 2 B. & C. 824, speaking of an
(6) The words " void " and " voidable " infant's contract of trade, calls it void, but
have often been very vaguely used when the case clearly shows that if the ratifi-
applied to contracts, and the word void cation which was shown in the case had
has been frequently used to denote merely been before the action was commenced,
that the contract was not binding, and as instead of after, the infant would have
expressing no opinion whether such con- been bound, a conclusion impossible had
tract might or might not be ratified, the contract been really void. So an in-
Thus, in Conroe v. Birdsall, 1 Johns. Cas. fant's acceptance of a bill of exchange
127, the marginal note indicates that the has been called " void," but it is only void-
court held the contract " void," and the able, and is susceptible of a ratification,
case is so cited in Mason v. Denison, 15 Gibbs v. Merrill, 3 Taunt. 307. Another
Wend. 71 ; and in 2 Kent, Com. 241 ; but instance occurs in the application of the
the language of the court was: "The word "void" to fraudulent contracts, but
bond is voidable, only at the election of they are only voidable, and if the person
the infant." So in Curtin v. Patton, 11 defrauded choose to ratify he may do so,
S. & R. 311, Mr. Justice Duncan, speaking and hold the other party. Ayers v. Hew-
of an infant's contract of suretyship, calls ett, 19 Me. 281. These instances are suf-
it in one place " absolutely void," but in ficient to illustrate the vague and inde-
the very next line he makes use of such finite use of the word void, and may
expressions as " confirming," " distinct acts perhaps serve to reconcile the conflicting
of confirmation," &c, plainly showing that, language of some cases, and to account
while calling the contract void, he did not for the application of the word " void " to
mean to deny that it was susceptible of any of an infant's contracts. See also
ratification, and if so, that it was not " ab- Arnold v. Richmond Iron Works, 1 Gray,
solutely void," but only voidable, as it 434, and ante, p. *295, note («).
has often been held by the same court. (6ft) Stern v. Freeman, 4 Met. (Ky.)
Hinely v. Margaritz, 3 Barr, 428. In a 309.
similar manner, Bayley, J., in Thornton v.

vol.1. 24 369

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[book I.

* 330 legal representatives can take advantage of it. (c) * There-
fore other parties who contract with an infant are bound
by it, although it be voidable by him. Were it otherwise this
disability might be of no advantage to him, but the reverse, (d)
Thus, an infant may sue an adult for a breach of promise of
marriage, although no action can be brought against an infant
for that cause, (e) And an infant may bring an action on a mer-
cantile contract, though none can be brought against him. (/)
So in contracts of apprenticeship, or in cases of hiring and ser-
vice. (J) In none of these cases can the adult discharge himself
by alleging that there was no consideration for his promise, on
the ground that the promise of the infant did not bind him.
The mutuality or reciprocity of the contract or obligation is not
complete, but it is sufficient to bind the party of adult age to his

(c) Parker i>. Baker, Clarke, Ch. 136; all the potatoes then growing on three
Gullett ». Lumberton, 1 Eng. (Ark.) 109; acres of land, at so much per acre, to be
Rose v. Daniel, 3 Brevard, 438 ; Voorhees dug up and carried away by the plaintiff ;
v. Wait, 3 Green (N. J.), 343. This priv- and the plaintiff paid £40 to the defend-
ilege extends to the infant's personal rep- ant under the agreement, and dug a part.,
resentatives. Smith v. Mayo, 0 Mass. 62 ;
Jefford u. Ringgold, 6 Ala. 544; Martin
v. Mayo, 10 Mass. 137 ; Hussey v. Jewett,
9 Mass. 100; Jackson v. Mayo, 11 Mass.
147; Parsons v. Hill, 8 Mo. 135; Slocum
v. Hooker, 13 Barb. 536, and to his privies
in blood, Bac. Abr. Infancy (I.), 6; Aus-
tin v. Charlestown Female Seminary, 8
Met, 196; Nelson v. Eaton, 1 Redfield,
498. But not to his assignees, or privies
in estate only. Id. ; Whittingham's case,
8 Rep. 43 ; Breckenridge's Heirs v. Orms-
by, 1 J. J. Marsh. 236 ; Hoyle v. Stowe, 9.
Dev. & B. 323. Nor to a guardian. Oli-
ver v. Houdlet, 13 Mass. 237 ; Irving v.
Crockett, 4 Bibb, 437. It is on this ground,
connected with others, that parties to ne-
gotiable paper cannot take advantage of
.the infancy of any prior party. Jones ».
.Dareh, 4 Price, 300 ; Grey v. Cooper, 3
Dougl. 65; Nightingale v. Withington, 15
Mass. 272; Taylor v. Croker, 4 Esp. 187;
Dulty v. Brownfield, 1 Barr, 497.

(d) Boyden v. Boyden, 9 Met. 519, 521,
Sknw, C. J. ; McGinn v. Shaeffer, 7 Watts,
412, 414.

(e) Hunt v. Peake, 5 Cowen, 475 ; Pool
v. Pratt, 1 D. Chip. ( Vt.) 252 ; Willard v.
Stone, 7 Cowen, 22 ; Holt v. Ward Claren-
cieux, 2 Stra. 937. And the infant may
sue for a breach of such promise without
averring consent of his or her parent or
guardian. Cannon «. Alsbury, 1 A. K.
Marsh. 76.

(/) In Warwick v. Bruce, 2 M. & Sel.
205, the defendant on the 12th of Octo-
ber, agreed to sell to the plaintiff, a minor,

370

and carried away a part of those dug, but
was prevented by the defendant from dig-
ging and carrying away the residue. It
was held that the infant was entitled to
recover for this breach of the agreement.
Lord Elle.nboromjh, C. J. ; " It occurred to
me at the trial, on the first view of the
case, that as an infant could not trade,
and as this was an executory contract,
he could not maintain an action for the
breach of it ; but if I had adverted to the
circumstance of its being in part executed
by the infant, for he had paid £40, and
therefore it was most immediately for his
benefit that he should be enabled to sue
upon it, otherwise he might lose the ben-
efit of such payment, I should probably
have held otherwise. And I certainly
was under a mistake in not adverting to
the distinction between the case of an
infant plaintiff or defendant. If the de-
fendant had been the infant, what I ruled
would have been correct ; but here the
plaintiff is the infant, and sues upon a
contract partly executed by him, which
it is clear that he may do. It is certainly
for the benefit of infants, where they have
given the fair value for any article of
produce, that they should have the thing
contracted for. And it is not necessary
that they should wait until they come of
age in order to bring the action. A hun-
dred actions have been brought by infants
for breaches of promise of marriage, and
I am not aware that this objection has
ever been taken since the case in Strange."
(tj) Eubanks v. Peak, 2 Bailey, 497.

CH. XVII.] INFANTS. * 331

part of the contract. But if a person of adult age marry one
who is under the age of consent (in males fourteen, and females
twelve years), such marriage is binding upon neither party; and
it is by the rules of the common law in the power of either
to disagree when the infant * comes to the age of consent, * 331
though not before. (K) But we shall speak of this more
fully when treating of the Contract of Marriage.

SECTION VIII.

OP THE MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS OP AN INFANT.

The power of an infant in respect to marriage settlements has
been much discussed. It seems to be determined, that a marriage
settlement upon a female infant, and her release of dower in con-
sideration of such settlement, are valid, (i) But whether she can
bind herself by a settlement of her own estate in contemplation
of marriage, seems still to be regarded as an open question, (y)
It is certain that a female infant may marry ; and therefore it
might be supposed that a prudent settlement of her property, in
view of marriage, would come within the reason of the rule which
makes valid the contracts of an infant for necessaries. Of course
such a settlement would be within the power of chancery, for cor-
rection or avoidance, on the ground of fraud, mistake, or undue
influence, and any injurious effect would be prevented. And the
court would always pay due regard to the youth and immature
judgment of the infant wife. But to say that a young woman
may marry, but, because she is an infant, cannot use valid pre-
cautions to secure her property against waste, and for her own
benefit, would give an effect to her legal incapacity entirely
opposed to the principle that the disability of an infant is a privi-
lege allowed as a shield and a protection, not as a burden and an
injury. It has therefore been held that sifch settlement is, at all

(h) Bac. Abr. Infancy and Age (A.). to be in favor of her having such power.

/) Drury v. Drury, 2 Eden 39; Earl See Atherley, Treatise on Marriage Set-

of Buckinghamshire^. Drury, 2 Eden, tlements, pp. 18-45. But m that case

60 ; Wilmogt .Opinion., p. 177 f McCartee Lord Eldon held that she was not so bound

v Teller '» Paige 511 by such conveyance or agreement to con-

' ( /) Previous to Milner v. Harewood, vey as that she might not avoid it on

18 Ves 259, the weight of authority seemed coming of age.

371

* 332 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

events, only voidable, and that no one but herself can avoid it,
and she need not ; but may affirm or avoid it when of full

* 332 age. The * question then occurs, whether she can so dis-

affirm it after majority, if still married ; and it has been
said that the preponderance of opinion is that she cannot. (&)
So whether a male infant may bind himself irrevocably by a mar-
riage settlement of his own estate is not quite certain. (7) It is
not, however, easy to find any very good reason which would
draw a distinction between the sexes in this particular, and make
such settlement by a male infant absolutely binding, and leave
that by a female voidable by her at her majority. But we con-
sider this whole subject open for further adjudication.

SECTION IX.

infant's liability with respect to fixed property acquired by

his contract.

It is of importance to know how the ordinary principles govern-
ing the contracts of infants are applied to the case where an
interest in property, of a fixed and permanent nature, is vested in
an infant by means of his contract. Are the duties attendant
upon the occupation of fixed property separated therefrom when
the occupier is within the privilege of minority ? Where the
interest devolves by direct operation of law (as \rpon marriage or
by descent), it is clear that the duty is received along with it —
transit terra cum onere. (rn) This fundamental maxim, thus un-
dergoes no general relaxation in favor of infants ; its operation
is only affected, if at all, when that other maxim, that an infant's
contract shall never be his burden, comes in conflict with it. The

question arising here is undoubtedly one of no little diffi-
* 333 culty ; but it has been so determined as to reconcile * the

two principles without impairing either of them. It is held

(k) Temple v. Hawley, 1 Sandf. Ch. female infants can settle their personal

153. estate before marriage, definitively, See

(?) In Slocomb v. Glubb, 2 Bro. Cb. 545, Strickland v. Coker, 2 Ch. Gas. 21 1 ; and

it seems to be the doctrine that a male Warburton r. Lytton, cited in Lytton v.

infant may bar himself by covenants be- Lytton, 4 Bro. Ch. 441.

fore marriage of his estate by curtesy, (m) Leeds & Thirsk Railway Co. v.

and of all right in or to his wife's per- Fearnley, 4 Exch. 20.
sonal property. And that both male and

372

CH. XVII.J INFANTS. * 334

that if one under age take a lease, and enter, and continue in
possession after claim of the rent, he, like any other person (and
by the same process as any other person), (n) may be compelled
to pay the rent he has contracted to pay. (0) Yet he may, if he
choose, disclaim at any time, and thereby exonerate himself ; (p)
or at least he may disclaim at any time before the rent day comes,
and have relief from liability for the past occupation. ( q) No
necessity obliges him to put off his disclaimer until his majority ;
for it is common learning that an infant may void matters in fait,
either within age or at full age, (r) but matters of record (for the
reason that when such come in question, his nonage is to be
ascertained by inspection of the court, and not by the country)
must be avoided during his minority, and not afterwards. Yet
when it is said he may avoid during minority, what is to be under-
stood is rather a suspension than an avoidance, — an avoidance,
as it were, only de bene esse. Upon arriving at full age he may
disaffirm that disaffirmance, and revive the original contract, (s)
In this case the debt incurred by his former occupation under the
lease, and the recovery of which he had prevented by disavow-
ing, also revives. Where an interest vests in the infant (as it
appears it does in all cases where he accepts a lease or other
conveyance of land, or an assignment of a share in permanent
stock), no express ratification on coming of age is requisite.
The interest, being vested, continues until divested by
repudiation, * which may be by parol ; and his, acquiescence * 334
after majority will be taken, after a reasonable time, as a
waiver of his right to disclaim, and an adoption at mature age,
of the act of his infancy, (t) It seems (though the point is still

(n) Per Parke, B., Newry & Ennig- compare Newry & Enniskillen Railway

killen Railway Co. v. Coombe, 3 Exch. Co. v. Coombe, 3 Exch. 672, 575, 578.

5g9_ In the former case the law is thus sum-

(0) Newton, C. J., Bottiller v. Newport, marily stated in the judgment of the

21 H. 6, 31 B., cited and approved by court : " It seems to us to be the sounder

Parke B. in Northwestern Railway Co. principle, that as the estate vests as it

v. McMichael, 5 Exch. 126 ; Ketsey's certainly does, the burden upon it must

case Brownl. 120 ; s. c, under various continue to be obligatory until a waiver

names, Cro. J. 320, 2 Bulst. 69, Roll. Abr. or disagreement by the infant takes

Enfanis K place, which, if made after full age,

(p) Northwestern Railway Co. «. Mc- avoids the estate altogether, and revests

Michael, 5 Exch. 125. it in the party from whom the infant

lq) Ketsey's case, Cro. J. 320 ; 1 Piatt purchased ; if made within age, suspends

on Leases, 528, 629. it only, because such disagreement may

(r) Co. Lit. 380 b; Bac. Abr. Infancy be again recalled when the infant attains

aJ Age (!.),!. - his majority." - See Bool «. Mix, 17

(s) Northwestern Railway Co. v. Mc- Wend. 119, 132, per Brownson, J.
Michael, 5 Exch. 114, 127; with which (i) Bac. Abr. Infancy and Age (I.), b,

373

*335 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

unsettled), that the fact that the rent reserved upon a lease made
to an infant is greater than the land is worth, in no respect alters
the case ; although the contract is now manifestly an injurious
one. (w)

Even if shares in a railway corporation, or other public com-
pany holding land, are personal property, (y) the holders of such
shares, since they acquire a vested interest of a permanent nature,
fill a position analogous in this respect to that of occupiers of
real estate ; and the infant purchaser of a share in such a corpora-
tion incurs a liability similar to that of an infant lessee, (w)
Thus the simple plea of infancy is no defence to an action for
calls, (x) What limits are to be set to the analogy is undeter-
mined. It cannot be said that the cases which have as yet been
adjudicated are authority for extending it to other than stock based,
like railroad stock, in some measure upon the possession of land.
There is no principle of law (though such has sometimes been
supposed to exist), placing infants on the same footing as other
persons whenever they enter into contracts which owe their valid-
ity, and the means of their enforcement, to statutes. In all stat-
utes containing general words, there is an implied or virtual
exception in favor of persons whose disability the common law
recognizes. («/) Thus where a company is incorporated by stat-
ute, and by a general clause all shareholders are subjected
* 335 * to certain liabilities, and enjoined certain duties ; here
the same abatement of the rigor of the provision is to be
made with regard to infants, lunatics, and femes covert, which
the common law would make in applying a common-law rule. (3) l

Com. Dig. Enfants (C.), 6; Evelyn a. who enjoys the land demised would apply

Chichester, 3 Burr. 1717; Lawson o. Love- here, because this liability rests entirely

joy, 8 Greenl. 405 ; Robbins ». Eaton, 10 in contract, and there is no possession of

N. H. 562 ; Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 39, any thing ; all that the party gets is a

40, per Dallas, J. right to a portion of the profits of the un-

(u) Northwestern Railway Co. u. Mc- dertaking." But see Leeds & Thirsk

Michael, 5 Exch. 114. Railway Co. u. Fearnley, 4 Exch. 26 and

(») Bligli v. Brent, 2T.4 Col. 268; especially the judgment of the court as

Bradley v. Holdsworth, 3M.4W. 422, given by Baron Parke, in Northwestern

424. Railway Co. r. McMichael, 5 Exch. 123.

(w) In Newry & Enniskillen Railway (x) Birkenhead, Lancashire, & Che-
Co. v, Coombe, 3 Exch. 577, where the shire Railway Co. v. Pilcher, 5 Exch. 121.
point was discussed, /'olfe, B., indeed, (y) Stowell v. Roch, Plowd. 364.
said : " I must say I doubt whether the (z) In the Cork & Bandon Railway
doctrine as to a lease granted to an infant Co. v. Cazenove, 10 Q. B. 935, two of the

1 Bradford v. French, 1 10 Mass. 365, was a decision that an infant mortgagee misrht
make the "demand" necessary under a statute, providing that a mortgagee might
demand of a creditor or an officer attaehintr mortgaged personalty the amount d'ue, failure
to pay which would dissolve the attachment.

374

CH. XVII.]

INFANTS.

336

The case of an infant whose interest in his land or stock is ac-
quired by marriage or descent is (as we have seen) quite differ-
ent ; for his liability is cast upon him by direct operation of law. (a)
So where a minor is held to service in the navy by force of a
statute ; (J) it is not the contract of enlistment which binds him,
but the statutory duty. In all cases, " the only criterion is whether
the liability is derived from contract." (e) If it be derived from
contract the common-law exceptions apply to it ; otherwise, not.

Respecting the manner of pleading the defence of infancy in
cases where a liability is charged on account of the occupation of
land, or the possession of stock, and of replying to that defence,
the following conclusions may be drawn from recent decisions in
England. First. Where a prima facie liability appears in
consequence of such holding of land or stock, the * simple * 336
plea of infancy is not sufficient ; the defendant must also
aver that the interest on account of which he is charged came to
him by contract and that he has disaffirmed that contract, (d)
and if the disaffirmance be after he arrived at age he must aver
that it was within a reasonable time after becoming of age. (<?)

judges, Lord Denman and Patteson, J., ex-
pressed the opinion that since, by the
statute, a shareholder was liable to the
company for calls In his character of
shareholder, the fact of infancy made no
difference. The Court of Exchequer,
which had previously refused assent to
this doctrine (see Newry Railway Co. v.
Coombe, 3 Exch. 665, and Leeds Railway
Co. v. Fearnley, 4 Exch. 26, 32), thus ob-
served upon it in the Northwestern Rail-
way Co. v. McMichael, 5 Exch. 124:
" We cannot say that we concur in the
opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench,
as reported in 11 Jur. 802, and 10 Q. B.
935, if it goes to the full extent that all
shareholders, including infants, are by the
operation of the Railway Acts made ab-
solutely liable to pay calls. No doubt
the statute not only gave a more easy
remedy against the holder of shares by
original contract with the company, for
calls, and also attached the liability to
pay calls to the shares, so as to bind all
subsequent holders ; but we consider, as
we have before said, that there are im-
plied exceptions in favor of infants and
lunatics in statutes containing general
words (Stowel v. Lord Zouch, Plowd.
364), though that depends, of course, on
the intent of the legislature in each case
(see Wilmot's Notes of Opinions and
Judgments, p. 194, The Earl of Bucking-

hamshire v. Drury), and that this statute
did not mean, by general words, to de-
prive infants of the protection which the
law gave them against improvident bar-
gains. Under this statute, therefore, our
opinion is, that an infant is not absolutely
bound, but is in the same situation as an
infant acquiring real estate or any other
permanent interest : he is not deprived of
the right which the law gives every in-
fant, of waiving and disagreeing to a
purchase which he has made; and if he
waives it, the estate acquired by the pur-
chase is at an end, and with it his liability
to pay calls, though the avoidance may
not have taken place till the call was
due."

(a) Parke, B., Newry & Enniskillen
Railway Co. v. Coombe, 3 Exch. 574;
Leeds & Thirsk Railway Co. v. Eearnley,
4 Exch. 26.

(6) See United States v. Bainbridge, 1
Mason, 71.

(c) Parke, B., Newry & Enniskillen
Railway Co. v. Coombe, 3 Exch. 569.

(d) Leeds & Thirsk Railway Co. v.
Eearnley, 4 Exch. 26; Cork & Bandon
Railway Co. v. Cazenove, 10 Q. B. 935 ;
s. c. 11 Jur. 802.

(e.) Dublin & Wicklow Railway Co.
v. Black, 16 E. L. & E. 656 ; s. c. 8 Exch.
181.

375

* 337 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

Second. If upon the simple plea of infancy being put in, the
plaintiff take issue thereon, and the defendant obtain a verdict,
the plaintiff is entitled to judgment non obstante veredicto. (/)
Third. Where infancy, the contract, and the disaffirmance, are
all pleaded, it is a good bar ; and if the defendant has, upon com-
ing of age, reaffirmed the contract, it is for the plaintiff to allege
this fact in his replication. (#) Fourth. Supposing the law to
be (which, however, it seems it is not) that an infant occupying
under a lease, wherein exorbitant rent is reserved, may defend
against the recovery of such rent, without giving up possession, his
plea, in addition to the other requisites, must distinctly show that
at the time of pleading it he is still a minor, (h)

SECTION X.

OP ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN.

All persons are illegitimate who are both begotten and born
out of lawful wedlock. If begotten before wedlock, and born an
hour after, they are legitimate at common law. By the statutes
of many of our States, (i) following the doctrine of the Roman
civil law, and of most of the nations of Europe, a
* 337 * subsequent marriage of the parents legitimates such
children. (J)

In England the common law conclusively presumed every child
to be legitimate, if the parents were married and within the realm,
when the child might have been begotten, and the husband not
proved to be impotent. (A) Now, however, there as well as here,
it is a question for the jury ; but the presumption in favor of legi-

</> Birkenhead, Lancashire, & Che- to be construed favorably, Swanson v.

shire Railway Co. v. Pilcher, 5 Exch. 121. Swanson, 2 Swan, 446. But see Ed-

(g) Newry & Enniskillen Railway Co. mondson v. Dyson, 7 Ga. 512.
v. Coonibe 3 Exch. 565. {j) Code Civil> No 331 . 2 Domat

(A) Northwestern Railway Co. *. Mc- 361; 1 Ersk. Inst. 116; Butler's note
Michael 6 Exch. 128. (181,, to Co. Lit. It was in reply to an

(i) inis is so in Maine. Vermont, attempt of the English Bishops to intro-

Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, duce this rule of the civil (and canon)

Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Mis- law into England, that the Lords made

souri, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, their famous answer, " Nolumus ieqes

Louisiana, Kentucky, and perhaps some Anglim mutiiri"

other States. Statutes of legitimation Ik) 1 Roll. Abr. 358 ; Co. Lit. 244 a.
are valid, Beall v. Beall, 8 Ga. 210; and

376

CH. XVII.] INFANTS. * 333

timacy can be overthrown only by clear proof. (I) It has been
held in England that the evidence of the husband is not admis-
sible to prove his access to his wife ; (m) and in this country,
that the evidence of the wife is not admissible to prove his non-
access, (w) At common law bastards have no inheritable blood ;
but in some of our States they inherit from their mothers, and
their mothers inherit from them, under various qualifications. (0)
In England, and generally in this country, the putative father is
chargeable, by statute provisions (and by them only), for the
support of his illegitimate child.

In England, Courts of Equity have, in some cases, been very
much disposed to favor bastards, in the consideration of settle-
ments or devises in relation to them ; (p) and in other cases
have been extremely severe, (j) In this country, the courts have
generally been liberal towards them, (f) But while a devise in
favor of an expected (and then begotten) illegitimate child has
been held valid, (s) a settlement in favor of future illegiti-
mate children was held void, (t) * It has been held in * 338
England that bastards cannot marry within the prohibited
degrees, (u)

The rights of the mother to the custody of the child have been
maintained against the putative father. (y~)

(l) Pendrell v. Pendrell, Stra. 925 ; diana, Illinois, Virginia, Kentucky, Mis-
Cross v. Cross, 3 Paige, 139 ; Common- souri, Tennessee, North Carolina, Ala-
wealth v. Wentz, 1 Ashm. 269 ; Com- bama, Georgia.

monwealth v. Shepherd, 6 Binn. 286; (p) Annandale v. Harris, 2 P. Wms.

Stegall v. Stegall, 2 Brock. 256 ; Bury v. 432.

Phillpot, 2 Myl. & K. 349; Patterson v. (q) Prec. Ch. 475; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr.

Gaines, 6 How. 550, 589. The presump- 123 ; Gilb. Eq. 139.
tion of law seems to be less in Van Aer- (r) Bunn v. Winthrop, 1 Johns. Ch.

nam v. Van Aernam, 1 Barb. Ch. 375. 338 ; Harten v. Gibson, 4 Desaus. 139.
But see Caujolle v. Eerrie", 23 N. Y. (9 (s) Pratt v. Flamer, 4 Har. & J. 10.
Smith) 90. \t) Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, N. Y.

(m) Patchett v. Holgate, 3 E. L. & E. Leg. Obs. 191.
100. (u) Haines v. Jeffell, 1 Ld. Eaym. 68.

(n) People v. The Overseers, 15 Barb. (v) Kobalina 1;. Armstrong, 15 Barb.

286 ; Parker v. Way, 15 N. H. 45. 247.

(0) Vermont, Connecticut, Ohio, In-

377

* 339 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

* 339 * CHAPTER XVIII.

OP THE CONTRACTS OP MARRIED WOMEN.

Sect. I. — Of the General affect of Marriage on the Mights of

the Parties.

At common law the disability of a married woman is almost
entire. Her personal existence is merged for most purposes in
that of her husband. This was not so among the Anglo-Saxons,
nor with the earlier Teutonic races ; and must be explained as
one of the effects of the feudal system. It was a principal object
of that system to make the whole strength of the State available
as a military force ; and to this purpose was sacrificed much of
the consideration and respect which had been formerly paid by
the German tribes to woman and her rights of property, and which
had distinguished these tribes from the nations of Rome, Greece,
and the East. As a married woman could not be a soldier, she
was permitted to have but imperfect and qualified rights of prop-
erty, because property was then bound to the State, and made the
means of supplying it with an armed force. It is possible that
the Teutonic respect for woman was intensified into the extrava-
gance of chivalry, as a kind of compensation. All was done for
her that could be done, in manners and in social usages ; because
in law, and in reference to rights of property, so little was allowed.
Dower was carefully secured to her ; but the exercise of her own
free will over her property was forbidden. But the influence of
the feudal system is broken, very much in England, and far more
here. And among the effects of this decay of a system in which
many of the principles and forms of our law originated, we count
the changes which have been made and are now making

* 340 in the law which defines the position and the rights * of

the married woman. This law is in fact, at this moment,
in a transition state in this country. It seems to be everywhere
378

CH. XVIII.] MARRIED WOMEN. * 340

conceded that the old rules were oppressive and unjust, and cer-
tainly not in conformity with the existing temper or condition of
society. Almost everywhere changes are made, or attempted ;
and the necessity of change is not denied. But in some parts of
our country the slow and gradual progress of these changes indi-
cates a belief that there is much need of caution, in order to im-
prove and liberalize the marital relation, without inflicting upon
it great injury. We know that in those States in which the
greatest changes have been made, and still greater are desired by
some persons, there are those who think mischief has already
been caused, and that a brief experience will prove the inconven-
ience and danger of permitting husband and wife to possess in-
terests and properties and powers, altogether, or in a great degree,
independent and equal. The tendency of this would seem to be,
necessarily, to make them bargainers with each other ; and as
watchful against each other, as careful for good security, as strict
in making terms and compelling an exact performance of prom-
ises or conditions, and as prompt to seek in litigation a remedy
for supposed wrongs, as seller and buyer, lender and borrower,
usually are ; and as these parties may be, more properly and
safely , than husband and wife.

We place in a note at the end of this chapter, a synopsis of the
statutory provisions of the several States affecting the law of
husband and wife ; but shall present in the text what may still be
regarded as common law on this subject, and in force, where not
changed as stated in the synopsis, {aa)

We will first consider the effect of marriage upon the contracts
made by the woman before her marriage, and then her contracts
made after marriage.

(aa) The English Statute of 1870, ch. woman shall be her own, and that her

93, changes the law of that country ma- husband is not, and her property is, liable

terially, providing, with much detail, that for her ante-nuptial debts.
the property and earnings of a married

379

* 341 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

*341 * SECTION II.

OF THE CONTRACTS OP A MARRIED WOMAN MADE BEFORE
MARRIAGE.

The contract of a married woman made before her marriage
inures to the benefit of her husband ; but does not vest in him
absolutely. It is a chose in action, which he may reduce to his
own possession during her life. If he does not so reduce it to
his possession, and dies, she surviving him, it becomes again
absolutely hers, (a) 1 If she dies before he has reduced it to
possession, he surviving, he may enforce the contract as her
administrator, for his own benefit. (5) And it has been said that
if he gets possession of her choses in action after her death, with-
out suit, they are his, by a title as perfect as if he had received
letters of administration, (c) 2 And if administration be neces-
sary, and the husband dies before taking out letters of ad-
ministration, the right to take them goes to his personal
representatives ; and if another party becomes administrator, he
will be regarded as a trustee for the husband or his personal
representatives, (d) He may reduce such chose in action to his
possession by receiving the money or other benefit due from it, or
by a new contract with the debtor in substitution for the wife's

(a) Co. Lit. 351b; Obrian v. Ram, 3 Wras. 409; Cas. -Temp. Talb. 173; 2

Mod. 186; Estate of Kintzinger, 2 Ashm. Kent, Com. 135; Blennerhassett v. Mon-

455 ; Legg v. Legg, 8 Mass. 99 ; Glasgow sell, 19 Law Times, 36.

v. Sands, 3 G. & J. 96 ; Stephens v. Beale, (c) Whitaker v. Whitaker, 6 Johns.

4 Ga. 319 ; Killcrease v. Killcrease, 7 How. 112. We cannot but entertain some

(Miss.) 311 ; Rogers v. Bumpass, 4 Ired. doubts of this. But see Lowry v. Hous-

Eq. 385; Sayrey. Flournoy, 3 Kelly (Ga.), ton, 3 How. (Miss.) 394; Scott v. James,

511. 3 id. 307 ; Wade u. Grimes, 7 id. 425.

(6) 1 Roll. Abr. 910 ; Elliot v. Collier, (d) And so if her husband, having been
3 Atk. 526, 1 Ves. Sen. 15, 1 Wils. 168 ; appointed administrator, die before the es-
Donnington v. Mitchell, 1 Green, Ch. 243 ; tate is all administered, his executor or ad-
Brown t\ Alden, 14 B. Mon. 144. He holds ministrator is entitled to be administrator
the proceeds, however, as assets for the de bonis non, in preference to her next of
payment of her debts contracted before kin. Donnington v. Mitchell, 1 Green, Ch.
marriage. — Heard v. Stamford, 3 P. 243 ; Hendren v. Colgin, 4 Munf. 231.

i See Mitchell v. Holmes, L. R. 8 Ex. 119.

2 But see Gill v. Woods, 81 111. 64 ; Woodman i*. Woodman, 54 N. H. 226 ; Wilson
v. Breeding, 50 la. 629.

380

CH. XVIII.] MARRIED WOMEN. * 342

chose in action, or by recovering a judgment on the con-
tract, (e) 1 * But the husband's pledging the wife's note, * 342
and afterwards redeeming it, is not a reduction by him. (/)

If the wife's choses in action are assigned by the husband, and
not otherwise reduced to his possession, the question arises,
whether this is of itself a reduction to possession. And if not'
has the assignee acquired a right to reduce them to his own posses-
sion ? And if so, and the assignee fails to do this during the life
of the husband, and the wife survives the husband, is the right of
reduction to possession by the assignee gone, and do the choses
in action become the wife's absolute property ?

The weight of authority is in favor of the latter view. The
doctrine to be drawn from the cases may be stated thus : If the
husband appoints an agent with authority to reduce to possession
these choses in action, the agent may go on and do this, while the
husband lives. But the death of the husband revokes the agency,
and if the wife is living, the choses in action become absolutely
hers, because they are unreduced by the husband. And if the
husband assign them, but not for value, this assignment has only
the effect of a naked authority to the assignee to reduce them
to possession. But if the husband assign them for value, the
assignment is now in itself a reduction to possession by the hus-
band, and the choses in action do not, on the husband's death,
return to the wife, although there was no further reduction during
his life. (#)

(e) It seems that any act on the part of session by the husband. Timbers v. Katz,

the husband, which clearly shows an in- 6 W. & S. 290.

tention to make the wife's chose in action (/) Bartlett v. Van Zandt, 4 Sandf.

his own, as mortgaging, releasing, taking Ch. 396 ; Latourette v. Williams, 1 Barb,

a new security, procuring a judgment on 9. See as to reduction by agents, Turton

it, appointing another as agent to collect v. Turton, 6 Md. 375.
the money who actually collects it, &c, {g) Schuyler v. Hoyle, 5 Johns. Ch.

is a sufficient reduction to possession, 196 ; Cartaret v. Paschal, 3 P. Wins. 197 ;

and bars the wife's right of survivorship. Jewson v. Moulton, 2 Atk. 417 ; Mitford

But mere receipt of interest on the wife's v. Mitford, 9 Ves. 87 ; Kenny v. Udall, 5

chose in action is not a reduction to pos- Johns. Ch. 464 ; Lowry v. Thornton, 3

session. Hart v. Stephens, 6 Q. B. 937. How. (Miss.) 394. That the assignment

Nor is the mere fact that he joined with must be for value, see Saddington v.

her, in giving a receipt for the principal, Kinsman, 1 Bro. Ch. 44 ; Johnson v.

sufficient evidence of a reduction to pos- Johnson, 1 Jac. & W. 472 ; Hartman v.

Dowdel, 1 Rawle, 279.

1 Payment to a husband of the cash proceeds of a sale of her real estate makes them his
absolutely, Plummer v. Jarman, 44 Md. 632 ; or of the proceeds of a note for the pur-
chase-money, Humphries v. Harrison, 30 Ark. 79; unless at the time he received them
he promised her to make repayment, and obtained possession only upon the faith of
such promise, Sabel v. SlinglufF, 52 Md. 132. The receipt by the joint agent of the hus-
band and wife of money of an estate of which she is administratrix, and of which a dis-

381

* 343 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

The effect of an assignment in Bankruptcy and Insolvency
is considered in the chapter on these subjects in the Third
Volume.

* 343 * Whether a creditor of the husband can acquire by at-

tachment in a suit against the husband, the wife's choses in
action, has been much disputed. The adjudications of this coun-
try seem to be in favor of his right to do so ; (K) not however
without high authority and strong reasons for the doctrine, that
the husband's right to reduce these choses to possession is strictly
marital, which he may perhaps himself transfer, but which cannot
be taken from him in invitum. (i)

It seems now to be settled, that any court having equity powers,
when an assignee of a wife's chose in action requires the aid of
those powers to reduce them to his possession, will compel an
adequate provision out of them, for the wife ; reference being had
not merely to this chose, but to all the property of the wife which
passes to the husband.

But the court will not interfere where the assignee may acquire
complete possession without its aid. (j) Whether, in this country,
a court of law possessing equity powers, would use them for the
protection of the wife, if an assignee of her choses in action
sought its aid to reduce them to possession by an action at law,
is not positively settled by adjudication. On general principles
we should hope that it would do so.

Generally, in all cases where the right of action would survive
to the wife, the husband and wife must join in an action there-

(h) Dold v. Geiger, 2 Gratt. 98, holds yet received. See, however, Swoyer's

that a husband cannot protect these Appeal, id. 377. A note given to the

choses in action from his creditors by wife during coverture is only a chose in

settling them- on his wife. Andrews v. action to which these rules apply, as it

Jones, 10 Ala. 400, qualifies, if it does not does not become the husband's unless he

deny this. Wheeler !■. Bowen, 20 Pick, reduces it to possession Gates v. Madely

563 ; Hay ward v. Hayward, id. 528, and 6 M. & W. 428 ; Hart v. Stephens 6 Q B.

Strong v. Smith, 1 Met. 470, assert that 937 ; Scarpellini v. Atcheson, 7 Q B. 875.

creditors have this power. Vance v. Mo- (i) Wheeler v. Moore 13 N H 478-

Laughlin. 8 Gratt 2SD, admits the validity Poor v. Hazleton, 15 N. II. 564. See also

of the attachment, but holds that it is Gallego v. Gallego, 2 Brock. 287 and

avoided by the death of the husband Peacock v. Pembroke, 4 Md. 280 '

while the suit is pending. Skinner's Ap- ( /) Duvall v. Farmers Bank 4 G &

peal, 5 Penn. St. 262, holds that a general J. 282 ; Whitesides v. Dorris 7 Dana

assignment by the husband of all his 101 ; Perryclear v. Jacobs, 2 Hill (S C )'

property for his creditors does not pass Cli. 504 ; Like v. Beresford, 3 Ves 506 •

to them his wife's interest in a legacy not Slcech v. Thorington, 2 Ves.' Sen. 562. '

tributive share belongs to her, reduces it to the huband's possession. Dardier v.
Chapman, 11 Ch. D. 442; but where a husband never claimed his wife's money as his
own, a disposition of it by his will, will not make it a part of his estate, Grebill's
Appeal, 87 Penn. St. 105.

382

CH. XVIII.] MARRIED WOMEN. * 344

for. (&) As all her beneficial contracts made before mar-
riage inure to * the benefit of the husband, so, on the other * 344
hand, if she is liable for any debts when he marries her,
this liability is cast on him jointly with her, by the marriage ; (7) l
even if he were an infant at the time of marriage. Qm) And this
is true also, although the debts did not mature and become pay-
able until after the marriage, (n) and although he received nothing
with her. This, however, is only his personal liability, and does
not survive him. If, therefore, he dies before a debt is paid, his
estate is not liable for it, unless the debt was put in suit and re-
duced to a judgment in his lifetime, (o) even if that estate con-
tains or consists wholly of what has been her personal property.
But her separate liability revives by his death, (p) although her
marriage may have taken from her and given to him or his repre-
sentatives, all her means. So if she dies before the debt is paid
or reduced to judgment, his liability also ceases, (q) But if she
leaves choses in action unreduced to possession by the husband,
and after her death he or his representative as her administrator,
reduces them to possession, as above stated, the proceeds of these
choses in action must be applied, in the first place, to any unpaid
debts of hers, and only the balance can be held by the husband or
his estate, (r)

A discharge of the husband in insolvency or bankruptcy bars
a suit against husband and wife for her debt. And it has been
held that such discharge extinguished her debt ; (s) in which
case it could not revive at her husband's death. But in equity a
satisfaction of the debt would still be decreed from any separate
estate held by her. (t)

(k) Morse v. Earl, 13 Wend. 271 ; 1 Bailey, Eq. 166 ; Howes v. Bigelow, 13

Ramsey v. George, 1 M. & Sel. 176 ; Hoy Mass. 384 ; Chapline v. Moore, 7 Monr.

v. Rogers, 4 Monr. 225 ; Milner v. Milnes, 179 ; Buckner i>. Smyth, 4 Desaus. 371 ;

3 T. R. 631. Mentz v. Reuter, 1 Watts, 229.

('/) Morris v. Norfolk, 1 Taunt. 212; (p) Woodman u. Chapman, 1 Camp.

Howes v. Bigelow, 13 Mass. 384 ; Petkin 189.

v. Thompson, 13 Pick. 64 ; Haines v. Cor- (?) See cases above cited,
liss, 4 Mass. 659 ; Dodgson v. Bell, 3 E. (r) Heard v. Stamford, 3 P. Wms.

L. & E. 542 ; s. c. 5 Exch. 967. 409, Cas. Temp. Talb. 173 ; Donmngton

(m) Butler v. Breck, 7 Met. 164; v. Mitchell, 1 Green, Ch. 243; Ryder v.

Roach v. Quick, 9 Wend. 238. Hulse, 24 N. Y. 372.

(n) Heard v. Stamford, Cas. Temp. (s) Lockwood v. Salter, 2 Ney. & M.

Talb. 173; s. c. 3 P. Wms. 409; Tho- 255.
mond v. Earl of Suffolk, 1 P. Wms. 469. (t) Mallory v. Vanderheyden, cited m

(o) Roll. Abr. 351 ; Heard v. Stamford, 2 Kent, Com. 138, n. (a).
3 P. Wms. 409 ; Witherspoon v. Dubose,

1 Alexander v. Morgan, 31 Ohio St. 546.

383

* 345 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

Although a husband cannot contract with his wife, (u)

* 345 he * may make her a valid gift of a chattel or of a chose in

action.1 But a delivery of the chattel, or of the evidence
of the chose in action, is indispensable. (i>) 2

SECTION III.

OF THE CONTRACTS OP A MARRIED WOMAN MADE DURING HER

MARRIAGE.

By the rules of the common law, a married woman has no
power to bind herself by contract, or to acquire to herself and
for her exclusive benefit any right, by a contract made with her.3
And as she can make no valid contract, the husband cannot be
bound by any contract which she may attempt to make. He is
responsible for her torts of every kind ; but if the tort is essen-
tially connected with a contract, as by borrowing money on false
and fraudulent pretences, it is held that the husband is not liable
for the tort, (w) * If she receives money or property by gift to
herself or in payment for her services, and lends it, her husband
and not she has the right to recover it ; and so if she sell any
thing, her husband has the right to recover the price. He may
claim the earnings of her personal labor, and only where she
alone is the meritorious cause of the debt due can she be joined
in an action for it. In general, whatever she earns, she earns as
his servant, and for him ; for in law, her time and her labor, as
well as her money, are his property, (x) 5

(u) See post, p.* 359. (w) L. A. L. Assoc, v. Fairhurst, 9

ft;) Brown v. Brown, 23 Barb. 665 ; Exch. 422.
Lockwood v. Cullen, 4 Rob. 129. (x) See Legg v. Legg, 8 Mass. 99 ;

1 And his reservation of a power of revocation or appointment to other uses does not
impair the validity of the gift. Jones ;■. Clifton, 101 U. S. 225. A conveyance of real
estate by deed from a husband to his wife, intended as a Rift in prossenti, though void at
law, may be sustained and enforced in equity. Hunt v. Johnson, 44 N. Y. 27.

2 As, for instance, against creditors in a gift of extravagant furniture in the common
dwelling. In re Pierce, 7 Bissell, 426. — Letters alone from a husband to his wife,
making a gift to his wife, will not effectuate it. Breton v. Woolven, 17 Ch. D. 416.

8 A married woman's void contract cannot be enforced after her divorce, although
she then renews her promise. Putnam v. Tennyson, 50 Ind. 456.

4 As her false representations for necessaries. Woodward v. Barnes, 46 Vt. 332.

6 Cambell v. Galbreath, 12 Bush, 459; McDavid v. Adams, 77 111. 155; Yopst v.
Yopst, 51 Ind. 61. The proceeds of their joint labor also belong to the husband,
384

CH. XVIII.]

MARRIED WOMEN.

!346

* If A enters into a contract with the wife of B, not * 346
knowing her marriage, and she having no authority to bind
B, and not professing to act for him, the wife is not bound, neither
is B liable upon such contract. («/) But whether B, who may cer-

Howes v. Bigelow, 13 Mass. 384; Wins-
low v. Croker, 17 Me. 29; Hoskins v.
Miller, 2 Dev. 360; Hyde v. Stone, 9
Cowen, 230; Morgan v. Thames Bank,
14 Conn. 99 ; Matter of Grant, 2 Story,
312; Hawkins v. Craig, 6 Monr. 257;
Merrill v. Smith, 37 Me. 394. And not-
withstanding the husband lives apart
from his wife, and in a state of continued
adultery, his right to her personal prop-
erty is still the same, so long as the re-
lation of husband and wife continues.
Russell v. Brooke, 7 Pick. U5 ; Turtle v.
Muncy, 2 J. J. Marsh. 82 ; including her
earnings both before and after marriage.
Glover v. Proprietors of Drury Lane, 2
Chitt. 117 ; Washburn v. Hale, 10 Pick.
429 ; Prescott v. Brown, 23 Me. 305. In
Messenger v. Clark, 5 Exch. 388, it was
held that a husband is entitled to the
money which his wife saves out of a
weekly allowance given by him for her
support, they living separate by agree-
ment. It should be noted, however, that
Molfe, B., puts the case on the ground that
the wife had invested her savings in stock
(which stock she afterwards sold and gave
away the proceeds), and he held that al-
though the money might have been hers
to dispose of as she pleased, yet when she
bought a specific chattel with a part of it,
that chattel became the husband's.

(y) In Smith v. Plomer, 15 East, 607,
it was held that a tradesman supplying a
married woman living apart from her hus-
band with furniture upon hire, does not
thereby divest himself of the present right
of property in such goods, inasmuch as
the married woman was incapable of ac-
quiring it by any contract ; and therefore
if the sheriff take such goods in execution,
at the suit of the husband's creditor, trover
lies by the tradesman. But if the contract
had been valid, the goods being let to hire
generally, without any time limited, no-
tice to determine the contract given to the
sheriff's officer, and not to the other con-
tracting party, would not be sufficient to
determine the contract. Lord Elimbor-
ough, C. J. : " This case has been pre-
sented during parts of the argument in

different points of view from what it ap-
peared in at the trial. In order to main-
tain trover, the plaintiff must have a
present right of property in the goods ;
the first question therefore, is, whether
the plaintiff had put the right of prop-
erty out of him by a valid contract for
the hire of the goods with Mrs. East "i If
the contract were for a year it would put
the property out of him for that time ; or
if, according to Mrs. East's evidence, the
hiring were only general, without deter-
mining either price or time, it would
operate as a contract, for a reasonable
price, so long as both parties pleased ;
and still the property would be out of
him for the time, if it were a valid con-
tract. That brings it to the question
whether Mrs. East, being a married wo-
man, could make a valid contract for the
hire of the plaintiff's goods. Now a con-
tract to be valid must hind both parties ;
but she being married, it could not bind
her. It is said, however, that it would
bind her husband, being for necessaries
for her use ; but I know of no case where
a husband has been held liable upon a
contract of this sort made by his wife
living apart from him, as for necessaries ;
and no such case was made before the
jury. Then has he confirmed the con-
tract? There is no such evidence. The
case, therefore, stands upon her own con-
tract unconfirmed, which is liable to the
infirmity of her being a married woman.
It was argued on the other hand, that
supposing the contract was good, the no-
tice given by the plaintiff to the sheriff's
officer would have determined it ; but to
that I cannot accede ; for to determine a
contract which is determinable upon no-
tice, the notice should be brought home
to the other contracting party ; and it is
not enough that it should be given to one
acting adversely under some supposed
derivative title in the law from that
party. The notice, therefore, which was
given to the sheriff's officer, would not
alter the case. The conclusion is, that
this action lies, because the plaintiff had
the present right of property in him at

Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 N. Y. 589 ; SbaefFer v. Sheppard, 54 Ala. 244 ; Bowden v.
Gray, 49 Miss. 547 ; including her personal apparel purchased with the same, Hawkins
v. Providence, &c. R. Co., 119 Mass. 596. Even if he is living apart in adultery, she
cannot bequeath a legacy not received by her in her lifetime, nor reduced by him to
possession. Vreeland v. Ryno, 11 C. E. Green, 160.

vol. I. 25 385

* 347 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

tainly repudiate the contract, can elect to adopt it, and enforce it
as his own against A, may well be doubted. Upon principle we
should say he could not, because there is a total want of reciprocity
or mutuality. We may add that such a case would perhaps fall
within the rule, that no act is capable of ratification by the prin-
cipal which was not performed by the agent as agent, and in behalf
of the principal, (z)

The wife may be the agent of the husband, and in that

* 347 * character may make contracts which bind him ; and this

agency need not be expressed, but is raised by law from a
variety of circumstances. Thus, the purpose and comfort of mar-
ried and domestic life would be defeated or obstructed if the wife
had not a general authority to hire servants, or to purchase such
articles as are necessary for the use of the family ; l and the
necessity is not to be a strict one, but includes whatever things
are unquestionably proper to be used in the family ; and suited to
the manner of life which the husband authorizes ; and this even
after her adultery, if they have not separated, (a) And therefore
the law clothes her with this authority. (J) So, whatever she

the time, inasmuch as the married wo- to do. Church r. Landers, 10 Wend. 79.

man, to whom he sent the goods, was not But whether the husband is at home or

capable of contracting with liim for the abroad, the wife is not presumed to be

hire, so as to take the property out of his agent generally, or to be intrusted

him." with any other authority than it is usual

(z) See "Agents,'' ante, p. *49, note and customary to confer upon the wife.

(g)- Benjamin v. Benjamin, 15 Conn. 347;

(a) Robinson v. Greinold, 1 Salk. 119 ; Sawyer v. Cutting, 23 Vt. 480 : Leeds v.
is. c. 6 Mod. 171 ; Bac. Abr. Baron #• Vail, 15 Penn. St. 184. And an innkeep-
Feme (H.). er's wife has no authority during her

(b) The wife is prima facie the hus- husband's absence to board or lodge
band's agent in managing the affairs of his guests at less than the usual rates,
his household. Pickering e. Pickering, Webster i\ McGinnis, 5 Binn. 235. And
'6 N. H. 124; Mackinley v. McGregor, the wife cannot appear and manage a
3 Whart. 369 ; Felker v. Emerson, 16 Vt. cause at nisi prius for her husband, al-
fi53. But not to lend his property, Green though he is at the time in custody and
r. Sperry, 10 Vt. 390, although where the cannot appear himself. Cobbett v. Hud-
husband was absent from home, and she son, 10 E. L. & E. 318; 8. c. 15 Q. B.
let her husband's horses out for hire, it 988.

•was presumed that she had authority so

1 Thus a married woman purchasing goods for ordinary family use of one, know-
ing her to be such, and as living with husband, is not, in absence of express agree-
ment, individually liable therefor. Powers D.Russell, 26 Mich. 179. But a husband
who is able and willing to supply his wife with necessaries, and who has forbidden her
to pleilgc his credit, cannot be held liable for necessaries bought by her; and a
tradesman, without notice of the husband's prohibition, and without having had
previous dealings with the wife with his assent, cannot maintain an action against him
for the price of articles of female attire suitable to her station in life, and supplied to her
upon his credit, but without his knowledge or assent. Debenham v. Mellon, 5 Q. B. D.
394, affirmed in 6 App. Cas. 24 ; Clark v. Cox, 32 Mich. 204. — But the wife's p:\rent
cannot recover for necessaries supplied her, if the husband whom she has lelt was
willing to support her. Catlin v. Martin, 69 N. Y. 393. But see, contra, Burkett v.
386

CH. XVIII.] MAEEIED WOMEN. * 347

purchases for herself, the husband is liable for, provided it be such
in quality, and no more in quantity, than is suitable for the station
and means of the husband, and the manner in which he permits
her to live. But beyond this she has no 'such authority, and her
contracts for other things are wholly void. Thus, an agreement
by a wife for the sale of her real estate, with the assent of her hus-
band, and for a valuable consideration, is said to be void in law ;
and equity has refused to enforce it. (c)

As the wife may be the agent of the husband, so the husband
may be the agent of the wife, in transacting such business as
recent statutes enable her to do on her own account ; a and it is
held in New York, the Chief Justice dissenting, that she may
manage her separate property through the agency of the husband
without subjecting it to the claims of his creditors, (cc) But the
case shows, and it must be certain, that if she permits him to
assume as to his creditors the aspect of owner of her property so
that it would amount to actual fraud if it were withheld from
them, this could not be permitted. If she holds him out as her
agent she is certainly bound by his acts, (cd) 2

In every case it is a question for the jury, under the instruc-
tion of the court, whether articles supplied to the wife, and for
which it is sought to make the husband liable on his implied
authority to her, are or are not necessaries in this sense ; (cT) 3

(c) Lane v. McKeen, 15 Me. 304. Clifford v. Laton, 3 C. & P. 15 ; Holt v.

(cc) Buckley v. Wells, 33 N. Y. 518 ; Brien, 4 B. & Aid. 252 ; Seaton v. Bene-

Abbey v. Deyo, 44 Barb. 374. diet, 5 Bing. 28 ; Montague v. Espinasse,

(erf) Read v. Earle, 12 Gray, 423. 1 C. & P. 356 ; Spreadbury v. Chapman,

See also Owen v. Cawley, 36 N. Y. 600. 8 id. 371 ; Atkins v. Curwood, 7 id. 766;

(rf) Etherington v. Parrot, Salk. 118; Waithman v. Wakefield, 1 Camp. 120;

McCutchen v. McGahay, 11 Johns. 281; Furlong v. Hyson, 35 Me. 333.

Trowbridge, 61 Me. 251, where the husband carried her to and left her at the parent's
house. — A wife left without support is not justified in parting with her husband's fur-
niture in pnvment of necessaries. Edgerly v. Whalan, 106 Mass. 307. See Butts v.
Newton, 29 Wis. 632. But see Ahern v. Easterby, 42 Conn. 546, allowing sale of a stove
to pay for necessaries. If some things furnished are necessaries and others not, recovery
may still be had for the former. Roberts v. Kelley, 51 Vt. 97. See Thorpe v. Shapleigh,
67 Me. 235.

1 As such he may collect rents, Walker v. Carrington, 74 111. 446 ; purchase real
estate, Coolidge ;•. Smith, 129 Mass. 554; sell it, Lavassaru. Washburne, 50 Wis. 200;
sell her personal property, Griffin v. Ransdell, 71 Incl. 440; give valid notes, Freiberg
v. Branigan, 18 Hun, 344; act as her clerk and assistant in her business, Cubberly v.
Scott, 98 111. 37 ; and carry on her farm, Bennett v. Stout, 98 111. 47.

2 Whether she has by her acts so held him out is a question for the jury. Arnold v.
Spurr, 130 Mass. 347. — If a husband and wife own a vessel of which he is master, they
are jointly liable on his contracts for its employment within the scope of a master's
authority. Reiman v. Hamilton, 111 Mass. 245.

3 Among necessaries have been held to be medical services, Spaun v. Mercer, 8 Neb.
357; a gold watch and other jewelry, Raynes v. Bennett, 114 Mass. 424; a sewing-

387

* 348 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

*348 *and the husband may show that the articles are not
necessaries by proof that the wife had previously suffi-
ciently supplied herself elsewhere, (e)

An important fact may be, the possession by the wife of a
separate income or other distinct means of her own ; and it may
be necessary to ascertain whether the tradesman supplying her
dealt with her on her own account, making charges to her alone,
and receiving payment from time to time from her alone ; for
such facts would go far to show that he dealt with the wife on
her own credit, and not on her husband's. (/)

But if the articles be more or better than are necessary for the
wife, still the husband may be held, not upon his authority as
implied by the law, but upon sufficient evidence of his express
authority or assent ; and for this purpose comparatively slight
evidence is sufficient ; and the mere fact that he saw and knew
that she possessed and used the property, or even that she had
ordered it, and he made no objection, may be enough for this
purpose. (#) For so long as the husband lives with his wife, he
is liable to any extent for goods which he distinctly permits

(e) Reneaux v. Teakle, 8 Exch. 680. ings, with tradesmen, are understood by

(/) It is always a question of fact both parties to be upon the credit of her

for the jury whether the tradesman gives separate funds for maintenance. 2 Story,

credit to the wife for articles delivered Eq. § 1401. See also Owens v. Diekin-

to her, and if the credit is once given to son, 1 Craig & P. 48 ; Murray v Barlee,

her, the husband will not he liable, al- 0 Myl. & K. 209 ; N. A. Coal Co. v. Dyett,

though the articles may be necessary, 7 Paige, 9 ; Gardner v. Gardner, id. 112;

and although the wife lives with him, Smith o. Sullivan, 11 How. Pr. 3(38 ;

and he sees her wear them without ob- Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41 Barb. 558.
jection. Bentley h. Griffin, 5 Taunt. 356 ; (g) Waithman v. Wakefield, 1 Camp:

Metcalf r. Shaw, 3 Camp. 22 ; Stammers 120.' The mere fact that the husband

v. Macomb, 2 Wend. 454 ; Moses v. Fog- sees the wife wearing the goods does

artie, 2 Hill (S. C.), 335 ; Sheldon v. not vary the case, if it be shown that he

Pendleton, 18 Conn. 417 ; for the law disapproved of the conduct of the wife

does not allow a person who has once in ordering them. Atkins v. Curwood,

given credit to A, knowing all the facts, 7 C. & P. 756. And where no express

afterwards to shift his chiim and charge authority is shown, the extravagant na-

B. Leggat v. Reed, 1 C. & P. 16. And ture of the wife's order is always proper

wherever a married woman lives apart to be taken into consideration by the

from her husband, having a separate jury, as showing that the wife had no

estate and maintenance secured to her, such authority. Lane r. Ironmonger, 13

there may be good ground to hold that M. & W. 368 ; Freestone ;'. Butcher, 9 C.

all her debts contracted for such main- & P. 647 ; Montague v. Benedict. 3 B.

tenance, and in the course of her deal- & C. 631 ; Seaton v. Benedict, 5 Bing. 28.

machine, Willey v. Beach, 115 Mass. 559 ; reasonable legal expenses in the prosecution of
the wife by the husband, Warner v. Heiden, 28 Wis. 517; and in divorce proceedings,
Porter v. Briggs, 38 la. 166 (contra, Drais v. Hogan, 50 Cal. 121 ; Dow v. Eyster, 79 111.
254 ; Whipple v. Giles, 55 N. H. 139) ; dentistry and false teeth, Freeman v. Holmes, 62
Ga. 556. Among non-neces-aries, "religious instruction" or rent of pew, St. John's
Parish v. Bronson, 40 Conn. 75 ; and a gold pencil-case, a cigar-case, a glove-box, a
scent-bottle, a guitar, music, and a purse valued at .£20, where the husband's income
as clerk was £400 a year, Phillipson v. Hayter, L. R. 6 C. P. 38.

388

CH. XVIII.] MARRIED WOMEN. * 349

her to purchase. That the husband may withhold his authority,
and is always saved from liability by express notice1
* and prohibition, is perhaps more clear by the earlier au- * 349
thorities than by the later. It was long since decided that
if the wife lives with the husband, and he prohibits a tradesman
from supplying her with articles of dress, he cannot be made
liable for them, because, in the language of Lord Hale, " it shall
not be left to a jury to dress my wife in what apparel they think
proper." (K) And this doctrine is maintained by many cases,
and the rule to be gathered from them would seem to be, that
the implied authority of the husband may always be rebutted by
proof of express prohibition. We cannot but think it certain,
however, that this rule would be greatly modified, at least in this
country, under circumstances which distinctly required such mod-
ification. As, for instance, suppose the husband to be rich and
penurious, and that he gave his wife garments enough to prevent
her suffering from cold, but only of such coarse fabric or mate-
rials that she could not wear them in the street ; or that from bad
temper or cruelty he gave her no clothing, so that for decency's
sake she was obliged to remain always in her chamber, and even
there suffered from cold, — we cannot doubt that the husband
would be held liable in such cases, the law resting his liability,
if necessary, upon an absolute presumption of his authority ; as
has been held in the case of his turning her out of doors without
her fault. And the reason and justice of the rule would be fully
satisfied if the husband, living with his wife, were held answer-
able for necessaries supplied to her, with or without notice of pro-
hibition ; but where there was express prohibition, then the jury
should be instructed that the word " necessaries " should be con-
strued very strictly. It is said : " The law will not presume so
much ill as that a husband should not provide for his wife's neces-
sities." 0') This should not be presumed ; but when it is proved,
the law should not do, nor permit, so much ill as to leave
her without necessaries. The later authorities seem indeed to
change, and, as we think, materially for the better, the ground

(h) Manby v. Scott, 1 Sid. 122; Bac. Bolton v. Prentice, Stra. 1214; Keneaux
Abr. Baron &■ Feme (H.); Etherington v. Teakle, 8 Exch. 680.
v. Parrot, 2 Ld. Eaym, 1006, 1 Salk. 118; (i) Lord Hale, in Manby v. Scott, 1

Sid. 109.

i To bind the husband after notice, the seller must show that the husband failed to
make an adequate supply, as well as that the articles are necessaries. Barr v. Armstrong,
56 Mo. 577.

389

* 350 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

* 350 upon which the liability * of the husband for necessaries

furnished to the wife has hitherto rested. Generally, at
least, it has been put upon her agency and his authority. Un-
doubtedly this has been stretched very far, and authority to con-
tract for the husband sometimes implied from circumstances
which not only suggest no rational probability of any such au-
thority, but seem to be strongly opposed to this supposition ; it
sometimes appears to be a legal supposition, not only without
fact, but opposed to fact. It seems, indeed, absurd to say, that a
man who has driven his wife from his house and his presence,
and manifested by extreme cruelty his utter hatred of her, was all
the time constituting her his agent, and investing her with author-
ity to bind him and his property. And if we suppose the case,
where a wife perfectly incapacitated by infirmity of body or mind
from making any contract at all, is supplied with necessaries by
one who finds her driven from home and ready to perish, and who
now comes to her husband for indemnity, we cannot doubt that
he would recover. But the proposition would seem too absurd
even to take its place among the fictions of the law, that the wife,
when she received this aid, promised in the husband's name that
he would pay for it, and that he had given her a sufficient author-
ity to make this promise for him. For these and other reasons
courts now show a tendency to rest the responsibility of the hus-
band for necessaries supplied to the wife, on the duty which grows
out of the marital relation. He is her husband ; he is the stronger,
she the weaker ; all that she has is his ; the act of marriage
destroys her capacity to pay for a loaf with her own money ; and as
all she then possesses, and all she may afterwards acquire, are his
during life and marriage, upon him must rest, with equal fulness,
if the law would not be the absolute opposite of justice, the duty
of maintaining her, and supplying all her wants according to his
ability.1 And we think this plain rule of common sense and com-
mon morality is becoming a rule of the common law. (j)

(j ) In Read v. Legard, 6 Exeh. 636, had supplied the wife with necessaries.
the husband was a lunatic, confined in Hill, of counsel, says, arguendo: "Not
an asylum as dangerous, and the plaintiff only has it never been decided judicially

1 A wife's services, and the comfort of her society, are due in return for the
husband's support, Randall o. Randall, 37 Mich. 563; and any contract by her for a
compensation to cave for her husband is void, Grant v. Green, 41 la. 88. — A husband
who offers to support his wife and children in his father's house, having no house or
means of his own, and she refuses because of the father's intemperance and abuse, is not
liable for neglecting to support her. People v. Pettic, 74 N. Y. 320.

390

CH. XVIII.]

MARRIED WOMEN.

351

* If a married woman carries on trade, and her husband * 351
lives with her and receives the profits, or they are applied
to the maintenance of the family, the law presumes that she
was his agent in this trade, and had his authority to make the
necessary purchases, (/c) So an authority may be presumed from

band is responsible for it." See also
Montague v. Benedict, 3 B. & C. 631,
and Seaton v. Benedict, 5 Bing. 28. (In
these very interesting cases on the liabil-
ity of the husband for goods furnished
to the wife, Mr. Smith, in his work on
Contracts, p. 286, says the. name of the
defendant is fictitious, and borrowed
from Shakspeare's Much Ado about
Nothing, the defendant being actually "a
highly respectable professional gentle-
man," whose name is not given.) A
similar doctrine was laid down in Shaw
v. Thompson, 16 Pick. 198 (1834). Slum;
C. J., in that case says : " By law a hus-
band is entitled to all the personal prop-
erty of the wife, to all her earnings and
acquisitions, and to the income of her
real estate ; it also throws on him the
obligation to support and maintain her."
And in Sykes v. Halstead, 1 Sandf. 483,
it was held, that where a husband turns
his wife away, or compels her to go by
ill-treatment, and refuses to provide for
her, he gives her a credit with the whole
community, although it be expressly for-
bidden by him ; and she has a right to
be supported by him. But in an action
for goods supplied to the wife on her
order alone, the question is (in the ab-
sence of such evidence of necessity as
may show an agency in law) whether
there was any agency, or authority in
fact, and not whether the goods were
necessary. Head v. Teakle, 24 E. L. &
E. 332 ; s. c. 8 Exch. 680. See also Kel-
ler v. Phillips, 39 N. Y. 351.

(k) Petty u. Anderson, 2 C. & P. 38;
Clifford v. Burton, 1 Bing. 199 — But in
Smallpiece v. Dawes, 7 C. & P. 40, where
A, who kept a fruit shop in London,
became a bankrupt in 1824, but did not
surrender to his commission, and from
that time to 1833 the business was car-
ried on by his wife, to whom fruit was
supplied, between 1828 and 1832, to an
amount exceeding .£266, and evidence
was given to show that A was seen m
London a few times between 1824 and
1833 and was arrested at the shop in
1833, and that he attended the mar-
riage of his two daughters at Mary-le-
bone church ; it was held that proof of
these facts was not sufficient to go to the
jury to show that A's wife acted as his
agent, so as to charge him with the price
of the fruit.

391

that by the mere fact of marriage a man
confers on his wife an irrevocable au-
thority to bind his credit, but everything
tends to show that her right so to do is
derived from some act, real or supposed,
of the husband, done after the marriage,
and which he must be in a condition to
persist in or revoke." Pollock, C. B.,
said : " This rule must be discharged.
The question raised by it is, whether
an action can be maintained against a
defendant, who has been a lunatic, for
things supplied for the necessary support
of his wife during the lunacy. It ap-
pears to me that the defendant is liable
in such an action. The action is founded
on this, that the defendant has taken on
him a duty — having contracted marriage
with the person sustained by the plain-
tiff, he has thereby become in point of
law liable for her maintenance, and if
he fails to provide for that maintenance,
except under certain circumstances which
justify him in withholding it, she has au-
thority to pledge his credit to procure it.
It may be true, as stated by Mr. Hill,
that no case has yet arisen in which this
precise point was brought before any
court ; but, on the other hand, none of
the dicta that occur in any of the cases
cited furnish a clew to decide the
present one adversely to the plaintiff."
Alderson, B., in the course of the trial,
had said : " It is a monstrous proposition,
that a man who drives a woman out of
doors, who hates, who abominates her,
actually gives her authority to make
contracts for him." He and Piatt, and
Martin, BB., agreed with Pollock, C. B.
Martin, B., said: "My brother Alderson
has stated the real truth respecting the
obligation of the defendant and the prin-
ciple of his liability ; namely, that by
contracting the relation of marriage, a
husband" takes on him the duty of sup-
plying his wife with necessaries ; and if
he does not perform that duty, either
through his own fault, or in consequence
of a misfortune of this kind, the wife
has in consequence of that relation a
right to provide herself with them, and
the husband is responsible for them.
And although in the declaration the
debt sued on is alleged to be the debt
of the defendant contracted at his re-
quest, the truth is that it is the wife
who contracts the debt, while the bus-

* 352 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [COOK I.

* 352 habitual * acts of agency, or from confirmation, which may-

be express or implied ; as where a wife was in the habit
of drawing, indorsing, accepting, or paying bills and notes for
her husband, and this he knew and sanctioned, his authority to
her will be presumed. (I) Or if such bills and notes are usually
a part of a certain business which is intrusted to the wife by the
husband, he would undoubtedly be held liable for them. Whether
a married woman can borrow money, even for necessaries, and
her husband be held liable on his implied authority, seems not to
be settled, (m) x If the lender can show that the money was
used by the husband, then he can hold him. It has been held in
California that a promissory note made by husband and wife
jointly does not bind the wife, (mm) The mortgage of a married
woman to secure her own promissory note which she had power
by law to make, is valid, (mn)

When the cohabitation with the husband ceases, and they live
separately, then a new state of things arises, and with it new
rules of law- The wife separates from her husband, either by
his fault, or by her own, or by mutual consent and agreement.
In the first case she carries with her all her rights to neces-

(l) Cotes v. Davis, 1 Camp. 485 ; Bar- money lent to the wife, unless his request
low i>. Bishop, 1 East, 432 ; Prestwick v. be averred and proved. Stone v. Mac-
Marshall, 7 Bing. 565. His authority to nair, 7 Taunt. 432 ; Stephenson o. Hardy,
her to make notes in his name cannot, 3 Wils. 388 ; Walker v. Simpson, 7 W. &
however, be inferred from the mere fact S. 83; Grendell v. Godmond, 5 A. & E.
that he knew she was carrying on busi- 755 ; Earle v. Peale, 1 Salk. 387 ; Darby
ness, and that she gave the note in the v. Boucher, id. 279. In equity, however,
course of such business ; and on a note the lender will be allowed to stand in
so given the husband is not liable even place of the tradesmen, and to have sat-
to a bond fide indorsee. Reakert v. Sand- isfaction as far as they could, had they
ford, 5 W. & S. 164. — Whenever the been plaintiffs. Harris v. Lee, 1 P. Wms.
husband authorizes the wife to execute 482, Prec. Ch. 502 ; Walker v. Simpson,
notes in his name, they must purport on supra; Marlow e. Pitfleld, 1 P. Wms. 558.
their face to be made in his behalf, or See May v. Skey, 16 Sim. 588, 18 Law
by her as agent, or he will not be bound. Jour. 308. And where money was ad-
Minard v. Mead, 7 Wend. 68. — But in vanced to the wife living with her hus-
the case of Lindus v. Bradwell, 5 C. B. band, and he, after the wife's decease,
582, where a bill of exchange addressed promised to repay the same, " when con-
to " William B." was accepted by his venient," but said he was not privy to the
wife, by writing her own name, " Mary loan, it was held that there was evidence
B." upon the back, which was presented to go to the jury that the wife had bor-
to the husband after it became due, who rowed the money with the sanction of
said he knew all about it, that it was for her husband, or that he ratified the act,
a milliner's bill, and that he would pay it and the plaintiff had a verdict. West v.
shortly, he was held liable as acceptor, Wheeler, 2 Car. & K. 714.
although he had not expressly author- (m?n) Brown v. Orr, 29 Cal. 120.
ized his wife so to accept the bill. (mn) Beals i>. Cobb, 51 Me. 348;

(m) At law, a husband is not liable for Frary v. Booth, 37 Vt. 78.

1 A bill in equity may he brought to recover money lent to a wife deserted by her
husband for the purchase of necessaries. Kenyon o. Farris, 47 Conn. 510.

392

CH. XVIII.J MARRIED WOMEN. * 353

saries, and he who supplies them to her may hold her husband
liable for their price ; (n) 1 and, as it has lately been held, for the
expenses of her burial. (nn~) a And we deem it to be the
*same thing in law, as well as in reason, whether he *353
actually expels her from his house without her fault, or
compels her to leave his house by cruelty to her, or by his mis-
conduct in it, as by introducing a prostitute into it. (0) 3 The
dictum of Lord Eldon, that " where a man turns his wife out of
doors he sends with her credit for her reasonable expenses," is
undoubtedly law. O) And we should say that he turned her out
of doors, in this sense, when he obliged her to fly by that degree
of ill-treatment which would induce and authorize a court of com-
petent jurisdiction to grant her a divorce. Indeed we should say
that a less degree of cruelty would authorize her to escape from
him and his house, aud " carry his credit " with her.

(») Bolton v. Prentice, 2 Stra. 1214; (nn) Cunningham v. Reardon, 98 Mass.

Harris v. Morris, 4 Esp. 41 ; Rawlyns v. 638.

Vandyke, 3 Esp. 251 ; Hodges v. Hodges, (0) In the case of Harwood v. Heffer,

1 id. 441 ; Aldis v. Chapman, 1 Selw. 3 Taunt. 421, where the evidence was

N. P. 281 ; McCutchen c. McGahay, 11 that the husband treated the wife with

Johns. 281; Houliston v. Smyth, 3 Bing. great cruelty, and confined her in her

127 ; Howard v. Whetstone, 10 Ohio, 365; chamber under pretence of insanity, and

Emmett v. Norton, 8 C. & P. 506 ; Clem- had taken another woman into his house,

ent v. Mattison, 3 Rich. 93; Predd v. with whom he cohabited, and on this

Eres, 4 Harring. (Del.) 385; Allen v. the wife escaped ; the Court of Common

Aldrich, 9 Poster (N. H.), 63. And if a Pleas, in 1811, apparently overlooking

wife is justified in leaving her husband, the fact of the husband's cruelty, did not

a request on his part that she will return think that the mere introduction of a

will not determine his liability for neces- prostitute into the family was sufficient

saries supplied to her during the separa- to justify the wife's leaving, and taking

tion. Emery v. Emery, 1 Y. & J. 501. up necessaries on her husband's account.

Where, however, the person supplying But this doctrine has since been decidedly

the wife with necessaries relies upon her condemned, and we think it unsound,

husband's ill-treatment as good cause for See Houliston v. Smyth, 10 Moore, 482 ;

her leaving him, he must show affirma- s. c. 3 Bing. 127 ; Hunt v. DeBlaquiere,

tively that the separation took place in 6 Bing. 562 ; Predd v. Eves, 4 Harring.

consequence of the husband's misconduct. (Del.) 385. It is said by Bronson, C. J.,

It is not enough to prove that there were in Blowers v. Sturtevant, 4 Denio, 46,

quarrels and personal conflicts between that the doctrine contained in Harwood

them, unless it be shown that the hus- v. Heffer cannot be law in a Christian

band was the offending party. Blowers country.

v. Sturtevant, 4 Denio, 46. And see Reed (p) Rawlyns v. Vandyke, 3 Esp. 250.

v. Moore, 6 C. & P. 200. And see Breinig v. Meitzler, 23 Penn. St.

157.

1 If the wife has left him for good and sufficient cause, Thorpe v. Shapleigh, 67 Me.
235 ; Hultz v. Gibbs, 66 Penn. St. 360 ; but if a husband whose wife left him without
her fault makes sufficient provision for her, or which she accepts, he is not then liable,
Crittenden v. Schermerhorn, 39 Mich. 661 ; Smyley v. Reese, 53 Ala. 89.

2 Whether he is her legatee or not, Sears v. Giddey, 41 Mich. 590 ; and may remove
her remains from one burial-place to another, if he has not freely consented to their in-
terment in the former place, Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 423.

s Bazeley v. Forder, L. R. 3 Q. B. 559 ; Hultz v. Gibbs, 66 Penn. St. 360. But if a
wife leaves her husband because of his cruelty, one receiving her for illicit purposes can-
not recover for her support. Almy v. Wilcox, 110 Mass. 443.

393

•>4

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK

Where husband and wife live together, there is a presumption
of law arising from cohabitation, that the husband assents to con-
tracts made by the wife for the supply of articles suitable to their
station, means, and way of life, (<?) But when this cohab-

* 354 itation * ceases, then, by the English authorities, the

presumption of law is against his assent ; and the husband
is not liable unless such presumption be rebutted by showing his
authority from the nature and circumstances of the separation, or
the conduct of the husband, or the condition of the wife, and the
nature of the articles supplied to her. (r) And where the husband
and wife live separate, there the party supplying her may be re-
garded, in the words of Lord Mansfield, as standing in her place.
And it is for him to make strict inquiry into the terms, cause,
and character of the separation ; for he trusts her at his peril. If
the separation has taken place by the husband's act, and against
the wife's will, still, if it be for her adultery, it was so far a justifi-
able act that the husband is no longer bound even for strict

* 355 necessaries supplied to his wife, (s) Whether * this rule

(<]) Etherington v. Parrot, 1 Salk. 118;
MeCutchen e. McGahay, 11 Johns. 281 ;
Fredd n. Eves, 4 Hairing. (Del.) 385.
Cohabitation is so strong evidence of as-
sent and authority by the husband, that
lie will be liable for necessaries furnished
the wife, although they were not legally
married, and although the tradesman
knew it. Watson v. Threlkeld, 2 Esp.
637 ; Robinson v. Nahon, 1 Camp. 215 ;
Blades v. Free, 9 B. & C. 167. But co-
habitation is not conclusive evidence of an
authority to purchase even necessaries ;
and it maj' be rebutted, as by showing
that the husband supplied her sufficiently
himself, or that he gave her sufficient
ready money to make the purchases.
Manby v. Scott, 1 Sid. 109; Besolution
iii. 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. (3d ed.) 264. Of
course, the proof of such facts lies on the
husband. Clifford v Laton. 3 C. & P.
15; Ilea v. Durkee, 25 111. 503.

(r) The English authorities are uni-
form that if the husband and wife live
separate and apart, the presumption of
law is against the husband's liability,
even for the wife's necessaries, and that
the burden of proof is on the tradesman
to show that the separation took place
under such circumstances as to continue
the husband's liability. Clifford v. Laton,
3 C. & P. 15 ; Mainwaring v. Leslie, 2 id.
507; Bird v. Jones, 3 Man. & R. 121-
Edwards v. Towels, 5 Man. & G. 624;
Hindley v. Westmeath, 6 B. & C. 200-

394

Blowerst). Sturtevant, 4 Denio, 46; Walk-
er v. Simpson, 7 W. & S. 83 ; Cany v.
Patton, 2 Ashm 140. But in Rumney v.
Keyes, 7 N. H. 571, where the question as
to the burden of proof and the presump-
tions of law in such case were much
discussed, the rule is adopted that the
burden of proof is on the husband to show
that the separation was not through his
fault, and prima facie, his liability still
continues for his wife's necessaries. See
also Frost v. Willis, 13 Vt. 202 ; Clancy
on Husband and Wife, 28; Rea v. Dur-
kee, 25 111. 503.

(s) Hardie o. Grant, 8 C. & P. 512;
Hunter p. Boucher, 3 Pick. 280 ; Child v.
Hardyman, 2 Stra. 875; Mainwaring v.
Sands, 1 id. 706; Morris u. Martin, id.
647. And in such case no notice to the
tradesman of the wife's adultery and sep-
aration is necessary in order to discharge
the husband from his liability. Morris
v. Martin, 1 Stra. 647 ; Mainwaring v.
Sands, id. 706 — Or if any notice is neces-
sary, general notoriety is sufficient. Par-
ker, C. J., in Hunter v. Boucher, 3 Pick.
289. And in like manner if the husband
and wife live apart by consent, he paying
her a sufficient maintenance, he is not
liable for her necessaries, she having
been guilty of adultery after the separa-
tion. Cragg v. Bowman, 6 Mod. 147.
And the same rule applies where the wife
voluntarily, and without any fault of the
husband, elopes from him, but lias not

CH. XVIII.] MARRIED WOMEN. * 355

of law would be modified by the power given in our States to
the husband, to obtain a divorce a vinculo from the wife for
her adultery, may be doubted. We see no good reason why it
should be, and our cases which touch upon this question seem to
adopt the English view. (£) But more question may exist as to
another part of the English law on this subject ; for it has been
there distinctly decided, that if the husband commits adultery,
and brings his adulteress into his house, and treats his wife with
great cruelty, and then turns her out into the streets, and she
afterwards commits adultery, and then being repentant, offers to
return to him, and is wholly without means of subsistence, never-
theless no action for furnishing her with necessaries is maintain-
able, (u) But this is certainly very severe law, and our courts
would be very reluctant to apply it. If the husband rests his
defence upon the wife's adultery, it must be very strictly proved,
and a verdict in an action for criminal conversation is not admis-
sible as evidence to prove it. (v) If after such adultery the
husband receives her back into his house, he must maintain her
as before ; and cannot discharge himself of his liability for neces-
saries supplied to her if she leaves him afterwards, or even if he
sends her away, but by proof of a new act of adultery ; so it has
been held, (w)

been guilty of actual adultery ; in such before seen, any man living with any
case the husband cannot be made liable woman, as man and wife, is liable lor ner
for necessaries furnished the wife by support, although they were never mar-
third persons, although they had no ried, and the tradesman knew it Watson
knowledge of the elopement. Brown* v. Threlkeld, 2 Esp 637; Robinson v.
Patton 3 Humph. 135; McCutchen e. Nahon, 1 Camp. 245; Blades v. Free, 9
McGahay, 11 Johns. 281 ; Hindley v. B. & C 167

Marquis of Westmeath, 6 B. & C. 200; (0 See Hunter i >. Bouche -3 Pick. 291.
Cany v. Patton, 2 Ashm. 140. However, («) Govier v. Hancock, 6 _1.K. oOo
although the wife be actually guilty of And it has likewise been held m England
adultery, yet if cohabitation continue, the that a husband is not liable to the penalty
husband is still liable for her necessaries, of stat. 5 Geo. IV. c. 83, § 3, for neglect-
Norton v. Fazan, 1 B. & P. 226 ; Harris v. ing and refusing to maintain his wile,
Morris 4 Esp. 41. Let a woman be ever who has left him and committed adultery,
so vicious, yet while she cohabits with although he ha?. '""fl/Tame crime"
her husband he is bound to provide neces- parture been guilty of the same crime,
saries for her, and is liable to the actions King v. llmtan, lB.&Ad. IM.
of such persons as furnish her with them; (v) Hardie *\ Giant 8U if- W*
for his bargain was to take her for better Because it is res ,n(er alias paries
or for worse. Per Holt, C. J., in Robi- (w) Harris „ Mom . 4 : Iwp. 4L 1 £.
son v. Gosnold, 6 Mod. 171. For contin- was an action rf«7P»'toSLh
ued cohabitation after knowledge of her necessaries furnished to *e delen* .n .
adultery is a condonation of her offence, wife It appeared that the wife had ton

S'no .knowledge of her adultery, yet if i^J>™^^^*£fc

h^ZS^^i^r^^ufbe ^^un|rthe.^umstanceshe
li.H»f™ her necessaries: for, as we have was liable. Lord Kenyan said .

* 356 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

If the wife leaves the husband without just cause, and

* 356 refuses * to cohabit with him, then it is certain that she

loses all right to a maintenance from him. 1 For the
opposite rule would encourage a wilful breach of the marriage
vow and duty, and weaken the wholesome influences which keep
together those who have solemnly agreed to live together, (x) By
the civil law also, if a wife leave her husband without his fault,
he is not obliged ei cequaliter subministrare. (?/) But if after
deserting him she offers to return, we think his obligation to re-
ceive or maintain her must depend upon the circumstances of her
separation, its length, and her conduct during the separation ;
thus, if she commit adultery, before or after her elopement, he is
under no obligation whatever to receive her. If no sufficient ob-
jection arises from these circumstances, then he is bound to
receive her ; otherwise not. (z) 2 And if she leaves him invol-
untarily, even by compulsion of law, as by imprisonment for non-
payment of a fine and costs, it would seem that the husband is not
discharged from his liability to maintain her. (a) We repeat,
therefore, that if the wife lives separate from her husband, it is
obvious, from the many questions which may be raised, that it is

respect to her having been formerly to receive her, his liability for her future

guilty of adultery, and having been in the necessaries is thereby revived. McCutchen

Magdalen Asylum, though an adulterous v. McGahay, 11 Johns. 281 ; Clement v.

elopement will prevent the husband from Mattison, 3 Rich. L. 93; Cunningham v.

being liable for articles furnished to the Irwin, 7 S. & R. 247. — And if such appli-

wife during the term of her elopement, cation is made to the husband by some

that is no answer now. The husband has third person on behalf of the wife, and he

taken her back, and she was from that without questioning such third person's au-

time entitled to dower ; she was sponte thority, puts his refusal on some other

retracta, and of course entitled to mainte- ground, it will be equivalent to a personal

nance during coverture, if her husband application by the wife herself. McGahay

turned her out of doors." And where the v. Williams, 12 Johns, 293. So if husband

husband left his wife who had been guilty and wife separate by consent, and provi-

of adultery, still living in his house with sion is made by him for her maintenance, if

two children bearing his name, he was the wife, during such separation, purchase

held liable for necessaries supplied her, necessaries, and the parties subsequently

by one who did not know the circum- cohabit together, the husband will be liable

stances. Norton v. Fazan, 1 B. & P. 226. for them. Rennick v. Ficklin 3 B. Mon.

(z) Manby v. Scott, 1 Sid 129 ; Brown 166; Rea v. Durkee, 25 111. 503.
v Patton, 3 Humph. 135; McCutchen v. [,/) Dig. Lib. 23, Tit. 3.
McGahay, 11 Johns 281 ; Hindlev v. Mar- ('*) In Henderson v. Stringer 2 Dana

quis of Westmeath, 6 B. & C. 200; Wil- 293, it is said: "If she offers to return,

hams v. Prince, 3 Strob. L. 490 ; Allen v. and he, without sufficient cause, refuses to

Aldnch, 9 Foster ( N. H), 63. — If, how- receive her, his liability is revived."
ever, she offers to return, not having been (a) Bates v. Enright, Sup. Ct.of Me. 21

guilty of adultery, and the husband refuses Law Rep. 53.

1 For late cases, see Thome v. Kathan, 51 Vt. 520; Bevier v. Galloway, 71 111. 517;
Schnuckle v Bierman, 89 111. 454 ; Harttmann ;>. Tcgart, 12 Kan. 177.

2 If, however, she returns, and he receives her, he does not become liable for her
necessary support during the separation. Oinson v. Heritage, 45 Ind. 73

396

CH. XVIII.] MARRIED WOMEN.

357

incumbent on one who would supply her with necessaries on the
husband's credit, but without his express authority, to look cau-
tiously into all the facts and circumstances. (J)

When the separation takes place by the consent and agreement
of both parties, something of uncertainty arises, from the
* conflict between the unwillingness of the law to permit * 357
and sanction such violation of marriage obligation and
duty, on the one hand, (M) and on the other its disposition to
allow such a separation under circumstances which give it a
color of reason, and to hold all parties to their contracts made
in relation to it, so far as may be done without placing the power
of a dissolution of marriage too much in the hands of the married
parties, (be) Thus, it is said by Sir William Scott, that the obli-
gations of the marriage contract are not to be relaxed at the
pleasure of one party, or at the pleasure of both, (c) And it is
well settled that they cannot by any contract destroy each other's
rights. Let the covenant of separation be never so formal or sol-
emn, either party may at any time insist upon a restoration
of all the rights which belong to the relation of marriage, (d)
But if after such a deed, and a separation consequent upon it,

(i) See Blowers v. Sturtevant, 4 Denio, live together, ' till death them do part,'

46. and on which the solemnities both of chil

(bb) See a strong case to this effect, society and of religion have stamped a

Collins v. Collins, Phill. (N. C.) Eq. 163. binding authority, from which the parties

(be) For recent cases arising under arti- cannot release themselves by any private

cles of separation, see Griffin v. Banks, 37 act of their own, or for causes which the

N. Y. 621 ; Hitner's appeal, 54 Penn. St. law itself has not pronounced to be suffi-

110 ; Carley v. Green, 12 Allen, 104. cient, and sufficiently proved." See also

(c) See Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg. Cons. .Sullivan v. Sullivan, 2 Adams. Eccl. 303;
118; Oliver v. Oliver, id. 364. Smith?;. Smith, 2 Hasrg. Eccl. (supp.) n.

(d) Mortimer v. Mortimer, 2 Hagg. (a). —Although a deed of separation
Cons. 318. In this case, Sir William Scott, upon mutual agreement, on account of
in commenting upon a plea in bar to a suit unhappy differences, contain a covenant
for the restitution of conjugal rights, ob- not to bring a suit for restitution of con-
served : " The seventh and eighth articles jugal rights, yet it is no bar to such a suit,
plead the circumstance which led to the Westmeath v. Westmeath, 2 Hagg. Eccl.'
deed of separation, and the deed is exhibi- (supp.) 115. — That deeds of separation
ted. The objection taken against these between husband and wife amount to
articles is, that deeds of separation are not nothing more than a mere permission to
pleadable in the ecclesiastical court, and one party to live separate from the other,
most certainly they are not, if pleaded as and confer no release of the marriage con-
st bar to its further proceedings ; for this tract on either party, and that neither can
court considers a private separation as an violate them, see Warrender v. Warren-
illegal contract, implying a renunciation der, 2 CI. & E. 561 ; Lord St. John v.
of stipulated duties — a dereliction of Lady St. John, 11 Ves. 526, 532 ; Wilkes
those mutual offices which the parties are v. Wilkes, 2 Dickens, 791 ; Marquis of
not at liberty to desert — an assumption Westmeath v. Marchioness of Westmeath,
of a false character in both parties con- IDow&C. 519; Guth v. Guth, 3Bro. Ch.
trary to the real status personce, and to the 614, seems contra, but this case is not of
obligations which both of them have con- good authority.

tracted in the sight of God and man, to

397

*358

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

the husband institutes proceedings to recover the society of his
wife, the deed, though no bar, may still be evidence as to the
character of the separation, and if this be shown to have arisen
from his misconduct, either by the deed itself or otherwise, he

cannot succeed, (e) Nevertheless, where such separation
* 358 is made by an * instrument to which a third person is a

party, and is a trustee for the wife, and the husband agrees
with this trustee to give him a sufficient sum for her mainten-
ance, such trustee may maintain an action on the agreement. (/)

(e) Rex v. Mary Mead, 1 Burr. 542.
This case was a writ of habeas corpus, at
the instance of a husband to bring up the
body of his wife, who had separated from
him, and who was then living with her
mother. The mother brought her daugh-
ter into court, and the substance of the
return on the writ of habeas corpus was
" that her husband having used her very
ill, in consideration of a great sum which
she gave him out of her separate estate,
consented to her living alone, executed
articles of separation, and covenanted ( under
a large penalty) 'never to disturb her or
any person with whom she should live;'
that she lived with her mother at her own
earnest desire ; and that this writ of habeas
corpus was taken out with a view of seiz-
ing her by force, or some other bad pur-
pose." The court held this agreement to
be a formal renunciation by the husband of
his marital right to seize her, or force her
back to live with him. And they said
that am/ attempt of the husband to seize
her by force and violence would be a
breach of the peace. They also declared,
that any attempt made by the husband to
molest her, in her present, return from West-
minster Hall, would be a contempt of court.
And they told the lady she was at full lib-
erty to go where and to whom she pleased.
And where the wife voluntarily lived
apart from her husband, without coercion
on the part of any one, it was held that
the writ of habeas corpus should not be
granted to her husband, but that the rem-
edy, if there was no good cause for her
remaining apart, was solely in the Eccle-
siastical Courts. Ex parte Sandiland, 12
E. L. & E. 463.

(/) Jce v. Thurlow, 2 B. & C. 547; 8
c. 4 Dow. & R. 11 ; Wilson v. Mushett, 3
B. & Ad. 743. In this case the defendant
gave a bond to A and B, conditioned for
the payment of an annuity to his wife,
unless she should at any time molest him
on account of her debts, or for living
apart from her. By indenture of the
same date between the above parlies and
the wife, reciting that defendant and his

398

wife had agreed to live separate during
their lives, and that, for the wife's main-
tenance, defendant had agreed to as-
sign certain premises, &c, to A and B,
and had given them an annuity bond as
above mentioned; it was witnessed that
defendant assigned the premises, &c, to
them, in trust for the wife, and lie cove-
nanted with A and B to live separate
from her, and not molest her or interfere
with her property ; and power was given
her to dispose of the same by will, and to
sell the assigned premises, &c, and buy
estates or annuities with the proceeds.
The wife covenanted with the defendant
to maintain herself during her life out of
the above property, unless she and the
defendant should afterwards agree to
live together again ; and that he should
be indemnified from her debts. The in-
denture (except as to the assignment),
and also the bond, were to become void
if the wife should sue the defendant for
alimony, or to enforce cohabitation. And
it was provided that if the defendant and
his wife should thereof er agree to live together
again, such cohabitation should in no loan alter
the trusts created by the indenture. There
was no express covenant on the part of
the trustees. The defendant and his wife
separated, and afterwards lived together
again for a time, and this fact was
pleaded to an action by the trustees
upon the annuity bond, as avoiding that
security. Held, on demurrer to the plea,
that the reconciliation was no bar to an
action on this bond, since it did not ap-
pear that the bond, and the indenture of
even date with it, were not really exe-
cuted with a view to immediate separa-
tion ; and although there might be parts
of the indenture which a court of equity
would not enforce under the circum-
stances, yet there was nothing, on a
view of the whole instrument, to prevent
this court from giving effect to the clause
which provided for a continuance of the
trusts notwithstanding a reconciliation.
See also Logan o. Birkett, 1 Myl. & K.

CH. XVIII.] MARRIED WOMEN. * 359

And if the trustee agrees to hold the husband harmless on his
liability for his wife, and indemnify him against any further
expenditure for her, the husband may maintain an action on such
agreement, (g) Without the intervention of such third
party, the * husband and wife cannot contract together, * 359
being but one person in the view of the law. (h) a But
such agreement must be absolute and unconditional, and not de-
pendent upon the contingency of a future separation, nor upon
the wife's future consent to live separate, for then it is regarded
as an inducement to separation, and is therefore wholly void, (i) 2
And if the covenant be in general to pay an annuity to the wife,
the consideration for it being the separation, and in the nature
of a continuing consideration, a subsequent reconciliation and
cohabitation discharges the husband from his obligation, (j)
But the agreement may be expressly to pay to her or for her
use such annuity during her life, and then it is not affected by a
subsequent cohabitation. (&) And it would seem, that if the

(g) Summers w. Ball, 8 M. & W. 596, promissory notes, made by the defend-
where a deed of separation between hus- ant's testator to the plaintiff, his wife,
band and wife contained a covenant by during coverture. The consideration of
the wife and her trustees, that she, her the notes was certain property which the
executors or administrators, or the trus- plaintiff held in her own right, which
tees, or some or one of them, should passed to her husband. The court held
and would at all times save, defend, and that the action could not be sustained,
keep harmless and indemnified the hus- In Sweat v. Hall, b Vt. 187, the same
band from and against the debt or debts, doctrine has been established,
sum or sums of money, which she the (<) Westmeath v. Salisbury, 5 Bligh
wife had then, at the time of the making (n. 8.), 393; Durant v. Titley, 7 Price,
of the indenture, contracted, or which 677 ; Hindley v. Westmeath, 6 B. & C.
she should, at any time thereafter during 200; Jee v. Thurlow, 2 B. & C. 647;
the separation, contract. Held, that this Jones v. Waite, 9 CI. & F. 101.
covenant included debts previously con- (,;') Scholey v. Goodman, 1 C. & P. 36.
tracted by the wife for necessaries while (k) Wilson r. Mushett, 3 B. & Ad.
living with the husband. 743. In this case Lord Tenterden, C. J.,

(A) Co. Lit. 112 a ; Reeve, Dom. Rel. said : " I think it is impossible for us,
89, 90 ; Marshall v. Rutton, 8 T. R. 545 ; sitting in a court of law, to say that this
Carter o. Carter, 14 Sm. & M. 59. He deed, and the bond on which the action
cannot convey property directly to her. is brought, were avoided by the reconcil-
Martin r. Maftin, 1 Greenl. 394. — There iation alleged in the plea. The argument
is a recent case upon this point, decided for the defendant must be, that if the
by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, husband and wife had agreed to live to-
by the name of Jackson v. Parks, 10 gether again, even for a few hours, and
Cush. 550. It was assumpsit on two afterwards separated, all the provisions

l In New York, a married woman may, by statute, sue her husband to enforce
any right affecting her separate property, many form of action, in the same manner that
she might sue any stranger. Wright v. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437. Adam j v. Curtis, 4
Lansing 164, held that a married woman, carrying on no separate business, who performed
labor and services, at her husband's request, for the firm of which he was a member,
mio-ht sue the members of the firm, including her husband, for her services.

° An indenture in which a husband agrees to pay to a trustee money for the sup-
port of his wife, made in contemplation of an immediate separation, which takes place,
is not void as against public policy. .Fox v. Davis, 113 Mass. 255.

399

360

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[book I.

* 360 annuity is * expressly to be paid during the continuance of
a separation by mutual consent, and the husband forfeits
his marital rights by his own misconduct, he can no longer put an
end to the separation, nor to his obligation to pay the annuity. (I)
And if such an agreement to pay an annuity do not expressly
except adultery on her part, neither that nor a divorce because of
it would discharge his obligation, (m) Such is the doctrine of
the English courts ; and in Massachusetts, it was held where real
estate was secured, the income to be paid to the wife during her
life, and to her husband during his life, if he survived her, and
she was divorced from him for his adultery, and afterwards died,
he was still entitled to the income during his life, (mm) But it
must be remembered that such divorce in England would have
formerly been only (unless by act of Parliament) a mensd et
thoro ; whereas in this country it would be a vinculo, and thus
might perhaps put an end to such obligation. There is now,
however, in England, a court having full power to decree divorces
a vinculo ; and the rules of law hitherto applied in that court are
similar to those in force in this country.

of the deed were put an end to by condo-
nation. I think that upon this deed we
cannot come to such a conclusion.
Whether a court of equity would en-
force all the trusts or not is a question
■with which we have nothing to do. One
proviso of the deed is, that if the defend-
ant and his wife shall thereafter agree to
cohabit again, such cohabitation shall in
no way alter the trusts thereby created,
but they shall stand valid, and of as full
effect to all intents and purposes, as well
during such cohabitation as in case they
again live separate ; and it is said that
this is inconsistent with other parts of
the instrument of separation. But I do
not see the objection. The settlement
made on the wife may have been in-
tended to continue at all events as an al-
lowance in the nature of pin-money. At
least, I cannot say that a deed like this
becomes altogether void on a reconcilia-
tion. It would be contrary to the ex-
press provision of the deed, inserted,
perhaps, in contemplation that the wife
might, under some circumstances, choose
rather to live with her husband again,
enjoying the annuity settled upon her,
than to continue separate."

(/) Whoregood v. Whoregood, 1 Ch.
Cas. 250.

(m) Baynon v. Batley, 8 Bing. 256,
Jee v. Thurlow, 2 B. & C. 547. By deed
of three parts, between husband, wife,

400

and trustee, reciting that differences ex-
isted, and that the husband and wife had
agreed to live separate, the husband cove-
nanted to pay an annuity to the wife,
during so much of her life as he should
live, and the trustee covenanted to indem-
nify the husband against the wife's debts,
and that she should release all claim of
jointure, dower, and thirds. Held, that
this deed was legal and binding, and that
a plea by the husband that the wife sued
in the Ecclesiastical Court for restitution
of conjugal rights, and that he put in
an allegation and exhibits, charging her
with adultery, and that a decree of di-
vorce a mensd et thoro was in that cause
pronounced, was not a sufficient answer
to an action by the trustee for arrears of
the annuity. Abbott, C. J. : " The only
question is upon the sufficiency of the
pU-a. It has been decided that a plea
stating the commission of adultery by
the wife, is not sufficient, upon this
ground, that if the husband, when exe-
cuting such a deed as this, thinks proper
to enter into an unqualified covenant he
must be bound by it. Had he wished to
make the non-commission of adultery a
condition of paying the annuity to his
wife, he should have covenanted to pay
it quam diu casta vixerit."

(mm) Babcock v. John Smith, 22 Pick.
61.

CH. XVIII.]

MARRIED WOMEN.

361

If, upon such separation, property has been settled on the wife
and children for their support, it would be upheld against subse-
quent creditors, unless the settlement were shown to be in fraud
of them, or otherwise not in good faith, (n)

If there be separation by consent, and a specific sum settled
upon the wife, which is reasonably sufficient for her necessi-
ties, then the husband is not liable for necessaries supplied to
her. (o) Nor is he so liable even if the party so furnish-
ing * goods did not know of the provision made for the * 361
wife ; unless this party had supplied her before, and the
separation was recent and not notorious ; (p) the fact of separa-
tion, if he knew it, was enough to put him upon inquiry. But the
party supplying necessaries to a separated wife is not bound to
show that no provision is made for her ; if the husband would
otherwise be bound, and undertakes to relieve himself from his
liability by the fact of such provision, the burden of proving it
lies on him ; (<?) and if it be inadequate or not duly paid, he is

(n) Hobbs v. Hull, 1 Cox, 445 ; Ste-
phens v. Olive, 2 Bro. Ch. 91 ; Nunn v.
Wilsmor, 8 T. R. 521.

(o) Angier v. Angier, Gilb. Eq. 152;
Stephens v. Olive, 2 Bro. Ch. SO ; Todd v.
Stokes, 1 Salk. 116, 1 Ld. Raym. 444.
This allowance must be reasonably suffi-
cient for the wife to the satisfaction of a
jury ; and the mere acquiescence on the
part of the wife in the sum paid will not
necessarily exonerate the husband. Hodg-
kinson v. Fletcher, 4 Camp. 70 ; Liddlow r.
Wilmot, 2 Stark. 87 ; Emmett v. Norton,
8 C. & P. 506. The sum stipulated by
the husband must have been actually paid,
or the husband is not discharged, and the
wife is not driven to her remedy on the
instrument of separation, but may bind
her husband on her contracts. Nurse v.
Craig, 5 B. & P. 148 ; Hunt v. De Bla-
quiere, 5 Bing. 550.

(p) In Rawlins v. Van Dyke, 3 Esp.
250, Lord Eldon is reported to have held,
that in cases of separation between man
and wife, if the tradesman's demand is
for necessaries it is incumbent on the
husband, in order to discharge himself, to
show that the tradesman had notice of
the separation. But this doctrine was
directly repudiated in the late case of
Mizen v. Pick, 3 M. & W. 481, and Alder-
son, B., there said: "I do not see how
notice to the tradesman can be material.
The question in all these cases is one of
authority. If a wife, living separate from
her husband, is supplied by him with
sufficient funds to support herself — with

every thing proper for her maintenance
and support — then she is not his agent
to pledge his credit, and he is not liable."
It has likewise been held in this country
that if the tradesman was not accustomed
to trust the wife before separation,
neither express notice nor general noto-
riety of the fact of separation is neces-
sary to discharge the husband. Cany v.
Patton, 2 Ashm. 140 ; and see Baker v.
Barney, 8 Johns. 72 ; Mott v. Comstock,
8 Wend. 644; Wilson v. Smvth, 1 B. &
Ad. 801.

(?) See Frost v. Willis, 13 Vt. 202;
Rumney v. Keyes, 7 N. H. 571 ; Clancy on
Husband & Wife, 28. But in Mott v.
Comstock, 8 Wend. 544, it was held, that
if a husband professes to provide for Ids
wife, who lives apart from him, it is in-
cumbent upon a party who has been ex-
pressly forbidden to give her crt-dit to show
clearly and affirmatively that the hus-
band did not supply her with necessaries
suitable to her condition, before he can
charge him for supplies furnished her ;
and this seems to be the better law. But
in McClallen v. Adams, 19 Pick. 333,
where the wife of the defendant, being
afflicted with a, dangerous disease,'' was
carried by him to a distance from his
residence, and left under the care of the
plaintiff as a surgeon, and after the lapse
of some weeks, the plaintiff performed
an operation on her for the cure of the
disease, soon after which she died, it was
held, in an action by the plaintiff against
the defendant, to recover compensation
26 401

362

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

liable, (r) But he is not liable, even if the separation were not
by deed, and there is no written agreement between them

* 362 as * to the allowance, if it be in fact paid to her. (s) And

he is also under no liability if sufficient necessaries be pro-
vided for her by another person and none by him. (f)

The rule of law is, that if a wife be separated from her hus-
band, with her consent, he is liable for necessaries supplied to her
only where in fact she has no other means of obtaining them.
But under any circumstances of separation, the husband may be
held to answer to articles of the peace against him, if occasioned
by his violent conduct towards her, (m) and even held liable to

pay the bill of the attorney whom she employs for that

* 363 purpose, (y)1 But he has been held not liable to pay *the

for his services, that the performance of
the operation was within the scope of the
plaintiff's authority, if in his judgment
it was necessary or expedient, and that
it was not incumbent on him to prove
that it was necessary or proper under the
circumstances, or that before he per-
formed it he gave notice to the defendant,
or that it would have been dangerous to
the wife to wait until notice could be
given to the defendant.

(c) Hodgkinson v. Fletcher, 4 Camp.
70 ; Liddlow v. Wilmot, 2 Stark. 87 ;
Emmett v, Norton, 8 C. & P. 500; Hunt
v. De Blaquiere, 5 Bing. 550. — It has
been held that notwithstanding the hus-
band pay the wife a sufficient allowance,
yet if he expressly promise to pay the
debts she has contracted during such sep-
aration, he is bound by such promise.
Harrison v. Hall, 1 Mood. & R. 185;
Hornbuckle v. Hornbury, 2 Stark. 177.
But these cases seem certainly very
anomalous, and difficult to be supported,
since if the allowance was duly paid, and
was adequate, the husband's promise
would be nundum pactum.

(s) No deed of separation is actually
necessary ; it is sufficient if a separation
actually took place. Hodgkinson v.
Fletcher, 4 Camp. 70 ; Emery v. Neigh-
bour, 2 Halst. 142 ; Lookwood v. Thomas,
12 Johns. 248; Kimball r. Keyes, 11
Wend. o.j. But if the separate main-
tenance be secured by deed, it is held
that the deed is void unless executed by
a trustee on the part of the wife. Ewers
v. Hutton, 3 Esp. 255.

(t) It is immaterial from what source the

wife's provision comes, provided it be suffi-
cient and permanent. Liddlow v. Wil-
mot, 2 Stark. 86 ; and see Dixon v. Hurrell,
8 C. & P. 717. The case of Thompson
v. Hervey, 4 Burr. 2177, sometimes cited
as deciding that the provision must be
derived from the husband in order to dis-
charge him, seems to have proceeded
rather on the ground that the provision
was purely voluntary, and during the
pleasure of the grantor, and therefore
that creditors could not be supposed to
rely upon it.

(u) Turner *. Rookes, 10 A. & E. 47.
This was an action of assumpsit to re-
cover for services rendered by the plain-
tiff, as solicitor, to the defendant's wife, in
exhibiting articles of the peace against
the defendant. It appeared that the de-
fendant and his wife had been separated
for seven years, she living upon.a main-
tenance of £112 per annum, which the
defendant had secured to her by deed.
The cause of separation did not appear.
It further appeared that the defendant
had used such threats and violence
against his wife as authorized her to ex-
hibit articles of the peace against him.
It was held that the plaintiff was entitled
to recover.

()') Shepherd v. Mackoul, 3 Camp. 326.
But this was on the ground that in that
particular case the step was actually ne-
cessary on the part of the wife. See
Brown v. Ackroyd, 5 E. & B. 819; and
also preceding note. In Shelton v. Pendle-
ton, 18 Conn. 417, where A, the wife of

B, without his assent in fact, employed

C, an attorney and counsellor at law, to

1 So a husband unsuccessfully prosecuting his wife, to compel her to find sureties to
keep the peace, is liable for the reasonable fees of her attorneys, as necessaries. Warner
u. Heiden, 28 Wis. 517.

402

CH. XVIII.]

MARRIED WOMEN.

363

bill of an attorney whom she employs to procure an indictment of
him. (w)

In this country if questions of this kind come before the court
on a petition by the wife for a divorce, it is not uncommon for
the court if satisfied of the wife's destitution, and in view of all
the circumstances they deem it just and expedient, to require the
husband to provide for the expenses of the proceedings against
him.

A liability, very similar to that which falls upon one who is le-
gally a husband, rests also upon him who lives with a woman as
his wife, who is not so. If he holds her out to the public as his
wife, then he promises the public that he will be as responsible

prosecute, on A's behalf, a petition to the
superior court against B, for a divorce
from him, for a legal and sufficient cause,
with a prayer for alimony, and the cus-
tody of the minor children, and C per-
formed services and made disbursements,
in the prosecution of such petition, which
was fully granted, and thereupon brought
his action against B for a reasonable
remuneration ; it was held, 1st, that the
facts in the case showed that C looked
for payment and gave credit to A alone ;
2d, that the services and disbursements
in question were not necessaries, for
which B as the husband of A was liable ;
3d, that C's claim derived no strength
from the fact that to the petition for a
divorce was appended a prayer for ali-
mony and the custody of the minor chil-
dren ; 4th, that consequently 0 was not
entitled to recover. Church, C. J., com-
menting on the case of Shepherd t.
Mackoul, said : " The common law defines
necessaries to consist only of necessary
food, drink, clothing, washing, physic,
instruction, and a competent place of
residence. And we know of no case
which has professed to extend the cata-
logue of necessaries, unless it be Shepherd
v. Mackoul, 3 Camp. 326. That was an
action by an attorney to recover of a
husband a bill for assisting his wife to
exhibit articles of the peace against him.
And Lord Ellenborough said, that the de-
fendant's liability would depend upon
the necessity of the measure ; and if that
existed, she might charge her husband
for the necessary expense as much as for
necessary food or raiment. It is manifest
that the court considered that case as
falling literally within the established
doctrine of the common law on this sub-
ject— the necessity of preserving the
life and health of the wife. The duty of

providing necessaries for the wife is
strictly marital, and is' imposed by the
common law, in reference only to a state
of coverture, and not of i.ivorce. By
that law, a valid contract of marriage
was and is indissoluble, and therefore by
it the husband could never have been
placed under obligation to provide for
the expenses of its dissolution. Such an
event was a legal impossibility. Neces-
saries are to be provided by a husband
for his wife, to sustain her as Ms wife,
and not to provide for her future con-
dition as a single woman, or perhaps as
the wife of another man. It was on this
principle that the aforesaid case of Shep-
herd v. Mackoul was decided ; and the
latter case of Ladd v. Lynn, 2 M. & W.
265, in which it was holden that a hus-
band was not liable for expenses incurred
by the wife in procuring a deed of separa-
tion, proceeded upon the same principle."
(w) Because that is not necessary.
Grindell v. Godmond, 5 A. & E. 755. Nor
for the counterpart of the deed of separ-
ation, procured by the wife's trustee,
unless he expressly promise to pay. Ladd
v. Lynn, 2 M. & W. 265 ; Coffin v. Dun-
ham, 8 Cush. 404. Nor is a husband
liable to an attorney for professional
services rendered to the wife in defending
against his petition for a divorce for her
fault, nor on her petition against him for
his. Wing v. Hurlburt, 15 Vt. 607 ; Dor-
sey v. Goodenow, Wright, 120. See supra,
p. *348, note 3. And see Shelton v. Pen-
dleton, cited in the preceding note. Nor
is the woman herself liable, unless she
expressly promise to pay them, after the
divorce. Wilson v. Burr, 25 Wend. 386.
If there is evidence of an express agree-
ment to pay such bills, the husband may
then be liable. Williams v. Fowler, 1
McClel. & Y. 269.

403

364

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

for her as if she were so. (x) Hence he is liable, as for his
wife, to a tradesman who knew that they were not married. (jj)
The ground of his liability is not that he deceived persons into
an erroneous belief that she was his wife, but that after volun-
tarily treating her as such, and so inducing persons to believe that
he would continue to treat her as such, he cannot recede from
the liabilities which he thus assumes. But this liability ceases
with cohabitation ; he is not responsible for necessaries supplied
to her afterwards, even where they had lived together a long

time, and she had left him because of his ill conduct. (2)
* 364 * Proof of cohabitation seems to be sufficient primd facie

evidence in an action against husband and wife for her debt
before marriage, (a)

(1) Watson v. Trelkeld, 2 Esp. 637;
Robinson v. Nahon, 1 Camp. 245; Blades
v. Free, 9 B. & C. 167 ; Munro v. De Che-
mant, 4 Camp. 215 ; Carr v. King, 12
Mod. 372; Graham v. Brettle, 18 Law
Times, 185.

(y) Watson v. Trelkeld, 2 Esp. 637;
Robinson v. Nahon, 1 Camp. 245; Ryan
v. Sams, 12 Q. B. 460.

(z) Munro v. De Chemant, 4 Camp.
215. But in Ryan v. Sams, 12 Q. B. 460,
the facts were that the defendant and a
Mrs. S., his mistress, lived together as
husband and wife four years, and occu-
pied three residences successively. At
each time of their coming into a house,
plaintiff was employed to do work and
furnish materials for the fitting up. Mrs.
S. as well as the defendant gave direc-
tions ; and the defendant sanctioned her
orders and paid the bills. The plaintiff
knew that she was only his mistress.
While residing in the third house they
separated; but Mrs. S., without defend-
ant's sanction, sent for plaintiff to that
house, which she had not yet left, and
ordered fittings up for a new house of
her own. The plaintiff did the work,
and had not, in the mean time, an}r notice
of the separation. Held, in an action for
the last-mentioned work and goods, that
it was a proper question for the jury
whether or not the defendant had given
the plaintiff reason to believe that Mrs.
S., at the time of the orders, continued to
he the defendant's agent; and that, on
their finding in the affirmative, the de-
fendant was liable. Lord Denman, C. J. :
"In Munro v. I)e Chemant, 4 Camp. 215,
it may be presumed that the parties had
lived long separate ; and it is consistent
with the statement there that Lord Ellen-
borough may have noticed that circum-
stance as important if the parties were

404

not married, but told the jury, 'If you
think they are proved to have been man
and wife the case will be different.' And
the order there seems to have commenced
a new account. Here the defendant
sanctions orders to the plaintiff in the
name of Stanley, while the person in
question is living with him under that
name, and she afterwards gives orders to
the plaintiff in the same name, circum-
stances apparently continuing unaltered.
It would be unreasonable to expect more
evidence in such a case." And in Blades
!'. Free, 9 B. & C. 167, where a man who
had for some years cohabited with a
woman that passed for his wife, went
abroad, leaving her and her family at his
residence in this country, and died abroad,
it was held, that the woman might have
the same authority to bind him by her
contracts for necessaries as if she had
been his wife ; but that his executor was
not bound to pay for any goods supplied
to her after his death, although before
information of his death had been re-
ceived.

(a) Tracey v. McArlton, 7 Dowl. P. C.
532. And see Norwood v. Stevenson,
Andrews, 227. But to be liable for the
wife's torts committed before coverture, a
marriage de facto is not sufficient ; and a
man with whom a woman already mar-
ried contracts matrimony, her first and
lawful husband still living, is not respon-
sible for her torts committed before cov-
erture. Overholt v. Elsvvell, 1 Ashm.
200. And the same reasoning would seem
to apply to her debts contracted before
coverture. And a husband is not liable
for the debts of his wife dum sola, unless
the wife herself was liable for them at
the time of her marriage. Caldwell v.
Drake, 4 J. J. Marsh. 247.

CH. XVIII.] MARRIED WOMEN.

f365

In England, it has been decided, that if a marriage has taken
place de facto, the husband cannot defend against an action
brought on promises made by the wife before coverture, by show-
ing that the marriage was illegal, and therefore void, because only
the spiritual courts can take cognizance of such questions. (5)
But in this country, as we have no such courts, the defence could
not be objected to on these grounds.

•SECTION IV. «365

OP THE DISABILITY OF A WIFE TO ACT AS A SINGLE WOMAN.

This disability is almost entire at common law. The usages of
this country, recognized more or less distinctly by the courts,
have lessened this somewhat, and the recent legislation of most
of the States, has modified it very materially ; as may be seen in
the synopsis at the close of this chapter, (c)

Even at common law there were some exceptions. Thus, a
wife might purchase land in fee, and the grant would not be void.
But it would be voidable by the husband by any act distinctly
expressing his dissent; and voidable also by the wife after her
husband's death, (d) Her conveyance of her real estate was
absolutely void at common law. But the usages of this country,
from the earliest colonial times, have so modified this rule, that
a conveyance by her and her husband, jointly, of her land, is
valid ; but not by separate deeds. Qdd) x In some of the States

(5) Norwood v. Stevenson, Andrews, law of New York. It seems that it does

227. not, unless she distinctly consent that the

(c) See Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265 ; debt should be created on the credit of

s. c. 22 N. Y. 450 ; 68 N. Y. 329, for an that estate, and should bind it.
examination of the question how far and (d) Co. Lit. 352 a ; 2 Bl. Com. 292.
when the note of a married woman binds (dd) Baxter v. Bodkin, 25 Ind. 172.
her separate estate under the existing

1 So a subsequent assent of the husband renders her deed valid, if the wife has not
meanwhile repudiated the conveyance, Wing v. Schramm, 79 N. Y. 619 ; or where a
deed is expressed as the wife's, but the husband signs and acknowledges it with her,
Thompson v. Lovrein, 82 Penn. St. 432. But if a husband is insane, the wife's deed is
void. Leggate v. Clark, 1 1 1 Mass. 308. — A wife's mortgage, without husband's joinder,
is also void, Weed, &c. Co. v. Emerson, 115 Mass. 554; Herdman v. Pace, 85 111. 345 ;
Yager v. Merkle, 26 Minn. 429 ; as well as her assignment of a mortgage, Moore v.
Cornell, 68 Penn.. St. 320. — Where a husband and wife are both named "parties of
the first part," and then such parties as "grantors," it is a good deed, and binds them
both. Thornton v. Exchange Bank, 71 Mo. 221.

405

* 366 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

precautions are taken by statute to secure her actual consent, by
requiring that she should be examined concerning this matter
by a magistrate, without her husband being present, (e) 1

She may relinquish her dower, by executing with her husband
his deed of the land ; provided that apt words, to indicate her
purpose of release, are in the deed ; for these are necessary to
make the release effectual. (/) Generally, she cannot release
her dower by her own separate deed ; but in a very few of the
States it is said that she may. (#)

The agreement of a wife for a sale of her real estate,

* 366 though * made with the assent of the husband, is said to

be wholly void at law and in equity. (A) 2 Nor will she be
held after her husband's death on any of her covenants of war-
ranty, unless so far as they may operate upon her by way of
estoppel, (i) 3

In England, a married woman, trading independently of her
husband within the city of London, may, by the " custom of Lon-
don," sue and be sued as a feme sole, with reference to such
dealings of trade, (j) But even there the husband should be
made a party to the suit, (&) though she will be treated as the
substantial party. Elsewhere in England she can act as a single
woman only when the legal existence of her husband may be
considered as extinguished, wholly or for a definite period ; as in
case of outlawry, abjuration of the realm, or transportation for
life, or for a limited term. (I) In this country, however, in part

!>',

2 Kent, Com. 152. v. Vanderheyden, 17 Johns. 167. See as

_ ) Catlinw. Ware, 9 Mass. 218; Luff- to estoppel, Hill v. West, 8 Ohio, 225,

kin v. Curtis, 13 Mass. 223. opposing Jackson v. Vanderheyden, and

(<-/) Ela v. Card, 2 N. H. 175; Gordon agreeing with the Massachusetts cases,
t;. Haywood, id. 405; Fowler v. Shearer, ( /) Bac. Abr. Baron <$• Feme (M).

7 Mass. 14 ; Rowe v. Hamilton, 3 Greenl. (k) Caudell o. Shaw, 4 T. R. 361 ;

63. But see Powell v. Monson Man. Co. Beard v. Webb, 2 B. & P. 93 ; Starr v.

3 Mason, 347, and Hall i'. Savage, 4 Ma- Taylor, 4 McCord, 413; La'ughan v.

son, 273 ; Lawrence v. Heister, 3 Har. & Bewett, Cro. C. 68.
J. 371; Manchester v. Hough, 5 Mason, (/) Marshall v. Rutton, 8 T. R. 545.

67 ; 2 Kent, Com. 153. And a married woman cannot there be

(/i) Butler i). Buckingham, 5 Day, 492; sued on her contracts, although she live

Watrous v. Chalker, 7 Conn. 224. apart from her husband in a state of

(;) Fowler v. Shearer, 7 Mass. 21 ; adultery, and there exist a valid divorce

Colcord v. Swan, 7 Mass. 291 ; Jackson a mensa el thoro, and she contract during

1 A wife's deed is void, unless the statute formalities are fully complied with,
Wentworth v. Clark, 33 Ark. 432 ; but a substantial compliance with the statute is
sufficient, Thayer v. Torrey, 8 Vroom, 339; Hamar v. Medsker, 60 Ind. 413 ; Laughlin
v. Fream, 14 W. Va. 322; Allen v, Lenoir, 53 Miss. 321 : Little v. Dodge, 32 Ark. 453.

2 Nor can she bind herself to buy land. Robinson v. Robinson, II Bush, 174.

3 Nor are her heirs and devisees answerable on her covenants. Foster v Wilcox 10
R. I. 443.

406

CH. XVIII.]

MAKEIBD WOMEN.

867

by statute, as in Pennsylvania and South Carolina, (m) and as an
effect of the powers and privileges now given to the wife in many
States, and to some extent by the decisions of the courts, the law,
as we have already intimated, is much more reasonable,
*and a married woman may act as if unmarried, under *367
many circumstances; as for continued abandonment, (n)
alienage, and non-residence, or the privity and acquiescence of the
husband, although not expressed by deed, (o)

It may be added, that the husband is, in general, held for the
torts, or frauds of the wife, committed during coverture. If
committed by his order, he is alone liable. If while she is in his
company the law presumes his order ; but this presumption may
be overcome by evidence.1 Where both are liable, and must be

such separation in the assumed character
of a single woman. Lewis v. Lee, 3 B. &
C. 291, 6 Dow. & R. 98; Faithorne v.
Blaquire, 6 M. & Sel. 73; Turtle v. Wors-
ley, 3 Dougl. 290. But see Cox v.
Kitchin, 1 B. & P. 338. Neither is her
personal representative liable under such
circumstances, although he have abun-
dant assets. Clayton v. Adams, 6 T. B.
604. But if the legal existence of the
husband is considered as extinguished,
the wife may contract as a feme sole.
Lady Belknap's case, Year Book, 1 Hen.
4, 1 a; Lean v. Shutz, 2 W. Bl. 1195;
Marsh !>. Hutchinson, 1 B. & P. 231 ; Ex
parte Franks, 7 Bing. 762, 1 M. & Scott,
1 ; Carrol v. Blencow, 4 Esp. 27 ; Stretton
v. Busnach, 1 Bing. N. C. 140.

(hi) In Pennsylvania and South Caro-
lina a wife may become a sole trader, and
become liable as such, in imitation of the
custom of London. Starr v. Taylor, 4
McCord, 413 ; Newbiggin v. Pillans, 2
Eay, 162 ; McDowall v. Wood, 2 Nott &
McC. 242 ; Burke v. Winkle, 2 S. & R.
189; Jacobs v. Featherstone, 6 W. & S.
346. She must, however, in order to
have the privilege of contracting as a,
feme sole, be technically a trader. Mc-
Daniel v. Cornwell, 1 Hill (S. C), 428.
The privilege does not extend to a woman
who is a common carrier. Ewart v.
Nagel, 1 McMull. 60. Nor to one who
was separated from her husband, and
supported herself by her daily labor.
Robards v. Hutson, 3 McCord, 475.
Keeping a shop as a milliner brings her
within the privilege. Surtell v. Brails-
ford, 2 Bay, 333. But her privilege to
contract as a feme sole extends no further
than to such contracts as are connected

with her trade. McDowall v. Wood, 2
Nott & McC. 242. And see Wallace v.
Rippon, 2 Bay, 112.

(n) If the husband is banished, then,
as we have seen, by the laws of England
and of this country, a wife may contract
as a feme sole. Wright r. Wright, 2 De-
saus. 244. And the law is the same
whether he is banished for his crimes, or
has voluntarily abandoned his wife. Rhea
v. Rhenner, 1 Pet. 105; Chapman v.
Lemon, 11 How. Pr. 235. The voluntary
absence of the husband, however, must
be more than temporary in order to have
this effect. Robinson v. Reynolds, 1 Aik.
174; Gregory v. Pierce, 4 Met. 478; Com-
monwealth v. Collins, 1 Mass. 116; Chou-
teau v. Merry, 3 Mo. 254. If it amount
to absolute and complete desertion, then
it may be sufficient. Cases supra, and
likewise Ayer v. Warren, 47 Me. 217.
Whether the imprisonment of the hus-
band for life, or a term of years, in our
State prisons, will have the same effect,
is more doubtful. See 21 Am. Jur. 8;
1 Swift, Dig. 36; Cornwall v. Hoyt, 7
Conn. 427. If the husband is an alien,
and never resided in this country, the
wife may sue and be sued as a feme sole.
Kay v. Duchess de Pienne, 3 Camp. 123 ;
Deerly v. Mazarine, 1 Salk. 116; Robin-
son v. Reynolds, 1 Aik. 174; De Gaillon
v. L'Aigle, 1 B. & P. 356, compared with
Farrer v. Granard, 4 B. & P. 80. But
this rule is qualified in Barden v. Kever-
berg, 2 M. & W. 61, in which it is held
that she is responsible only if 6he repre-
sents herself as a. feme sole, or the plaintiff
has knowledge of the facts.

(o) McGrath v. Robertson, 1 Desaus.
445.

1 Her defence of coercion should be set up in the pleadings. Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio
St 299. See Handy v. Foley, 121 Mass. 259; Ferguson v. Brooks, 67 Me. 251. A

407

* 368 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

sued jointly, the remedy, by imprisonment or execution, must
be sought of the husband alone, (p) But if the tort of the wife
alone be punishable by imprisonment, this punishment falls on
her alone. If the wife be sued jointly with her husband, for her
libel (and perhaps for other torts), the damages shall be the
same as if she were unmarried. (9) If the husband assumes to
be the agent of the wife, and in that capacity commits a fraud, it
is said that she cannot be made liable, because she has no power
to make her husband her agent, (r) But this we think may be
doubted.

*368 * SECTION V.

OP THE SEPARATE ESTATE OP A MARRIED WOMAN, AND OP
SETTLEMENTS IN HER FAVOR.

If the wife has a separate estate, this is usually reached in
equity. Thus, if she join with her husband in making a promis-
sory note, this separate estate is chargeable with it. (s) l Perhaps,
however, it must be shown that the promise was made with spe-
cial reference to, or was received on the credit of her separate
estate. (£) Our courts now protect with great care any separate
estate of the wife, and any reasonable agreement in her favor, (w)
Nor will they interfere to vary or discharge it but for strong
cause and on certain evidence, (w) Nor will the wife herself be
permitted to waive such an agreement if it were made after mar-

(p) 3B1. Com. 414. Ikelheimer, 26 Ala. 332; Collins v. Bu-

(q) Austin v. Wilson, 4 Cush. 273. dolph, 19 Ala. 616.

(r) Birdseye v. Flint, 3 Barb. 500. (f) Conn v. Conn, 1 Md. Ch. 212 ;

(s) Yale ii. Dederer, 21 Barb. 286 ; s. c. Cherry v Clements, 10 Humph. 552 ;

18 N. Y. 265 ; 22 N. Y. 450 ; 68 N. Y. 329 ; Burch v. Breckenridge, 16 B. Mon. 482.
Bell v. Kellar, 18 B. Mon. 381 ; Ozley v. («) See Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio, 649.

(v) Rogers v. Smith, 4 Barr, 93.

husband is liable in replevin for his wife's unlawful detention of chattels under a claim
of title in herself. Choen v. Porter, 66 Ind. 194.

1 Contracts by a married woman for necessaries or her separate estate's benefit are
enforceable against it, Priest v. Cone, 51 Vt. 495 ; as for money borrowed for the avowed
purpose of benefiting her estate, and her note is received in reliance upon her statement,
although the money was in fact otherwise applied, McVey v. Cantrell, 70 N. Y. 295 ;
see Dale v. Robinson, 51 Vt. 20; or for services rendered in borrowing money to
lift a mortgage from her separate estate, Patrick v. Lit toll, 36 Ohio St. 79 ; or a bond
for part of the purchase-money of her estate, Garland ?>. Pamplin, 32 Gratt. 305 ; but
not for money lent to her on an agreement that it should be applied to the use of her
husband or his firm, Nourse v. Henshaw, 123 Mass. 96. — She is not liable as surety on a
guardian's bond without expressing an intention to bind her separate estate. Gos-
man ». Cruger, 69 N. Y. 87.

408

CH. XVIII.] MARRIED WOMEN. * 369

riage, and obviously intended to benefit her children, (w) And
if the wife's debts are contracted before marriage, the remedy
against her separate estate is suspended during her marriage, (x)
But if contracted after marriage, they are primd facie, chargeable
on her separate estate, (t/) 1 It will be seen in the synopsis at
the close of the chapter, that the statutes of many States contain
provisions for the security of the wife's separate estate.

Whether a wife, acting with her husband, may dispose of land
conveyed to trustees for her separate use, when no power of dis-
position is given her, is not certain. The better rule seems to be,
that she may, if the trust instrument is silent, but not if it con-
tain express prohibitions or restrictions, (z) After some
* fluctuation it seems that the English courts incline to * 369
permit a wife, with the consent of the trustees and the
husband, to alienate funds or modify a trust created for her
benefit. But it would also seem, that in this country the wife is
protected against her own acts, and that such a trust cannot be
discharged or changed unless by order of court, (a) And if lands
so held in trust are sold by the husband under an agreement to
purchase with the proceeds other lands to be held under the same
trust, the lands so purchased by him are protected from his cred-
itors. (6) But where, by such a trust, the wife may dispose of
the fund, for ever, but dies without disposal, it goes to her hus-
band, (e) Nor can a second husband interfere with a trust created
by a first husband. (cT) It has however been held, on grounds

(w) Tenner v. Taylor, 1 Sim. 169. is held in Connecticut, Imlay v. Hunting-

tx) Vanderheyden v. Mallory, 1 ton, 20 Conn. 146, 175. In Alabama,

Comst. 452. See Dickson v. Miller, 11 Bradford ». Greenway, 17 Ala. 797. In

Sm & M 594 North Carolina, Harris v. Hams, 7 Ired.

(V) Greenough v. Wigginton, 2 Greene Eq. Ill, and in Virginia, Hume v. Hord,

(la.), 435 ; Gardner v. Gardner, 7 Paige, 5Gratt374.
^12 («) Leggett v. Perkins, 2 Comst. 297;

(z) So held in New York, in Jaques v. L'Amoureux v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Barb.

Methodist Episcopal Church, 17 Johns. Ch. 34; Rogers v. Ludlow, 3 Sandf. Ch.

648. In Maryland, in 5 Md. 219 ; Tarr 104; Noyes v. Blakeman, 2 Seld. 567,

v. Williams, 4 Md. Ch. 68; Williams v. Cruger v. Jones, 18 Barb 467. Inebu-

Donaldson id. 414. In Tennessee, in preme Court of the United States hare

Marshall v. Stephens, 8 Humph. 159; held that a court of equity should pro-

Litton v. Baldwin, id. 209. In South tect such a trust .for the collateral refc-

Carolina, Nix v. Bradley, 6 Rich. Eq. 53 ; tives, rf "tended for their benefit. Neves

Adams v. Mackey, id. 75. In Georgia, v. Scotn9How. 196. .. „R4

Wylly v. Collins, 9 Ga. 228. In Missis- (6) Barnett v. Goings, 8 Blackf. 284
Bippi, Doty „. Mitchell, 9 Sm. & M. 435. (a) Brown v Brown 6 Humph 127,

And in Rhode Island, Metcalf v. Cooke, 2 Wilkinson ,. Wright 6 B. Mon. 576.
R.I. 355. That she cannot make such <<*) Cole v. ^ O'Neill, 3 Md. Ch. 174,

disposition unless the power be given her, Robert v. West, 15 Ga. IAS.

i Conlin v. Cantrell, 64 N. Y. 217.

409

* 370 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

which seem to us doubtful, that where a wife has power to dis-
pose of lands under a trust, and executes that power by selling
them, and with the proceeds buys other lands, these other lands
do not come under the original trust, and become subject to the
original power, (e) If she has the power to sell, she may make
a valid contract to sell. (/)

A married woman may contract with her husband, for a settle-
ment for her benefit, in good faith, and for a valuable considera-
tion, and courts of equity will sustain it, and even do what may
be necessary to complete such a contract, if interrupted by death
or accident, (g) If made in good faith in pursuance of an ante-
nuptial agreement, it seems that this is valid, without other consid-
eration than the marriage, that being a good and sufficient
*370 one. (A) But if wholly voluntary, it is *void against
existing creditors, although made in good faith, but not
against subsequent creditors, (i) 1

To any contract of a third person for the benefit of a wife,
there must be a distinct assent of the husband ; but this may be
proved by implication, as by depositing money to her credit in a
bank, and giving the deposit-book to her with the knowledge of
the husband. (/)

In New York, the statute requirements as to making a will, are
held not to determine the age at which a married woman, with
power to make a will, may exercise that power. (&) And the
same rule would probably be adopted elsewhere.

Formerly, the rights which the husband acquired over the
property of his wife by his marriage, were not only carefully
protected, but any disposition of her property by the wife, made
before marriage, in derogation of his rights, was held to be void

(<?) Newlin u. Freeman, 4 Ired. Eq. bert v. Winn, 5 Md. 66. See also, in re-

312. lation to post-nuptial settlements, Kinnard

( f) Van Allen v. Humphrey, 15 Barb. v. Daniel, 13 B. Mon. 496 ; Thomson e,

655.' Dougherty, 12 S. & R. 448 ; Magniac v.

(</) Livingston v. Livingston, 2 Johns. Thompson, 1 Baldw. 344 ; Duffy v. Ins.

Ch.'537; Coates v Gealach, 44 Penn. Co. 8 W. & S. 413; Sexton v. Wheaton, 8

St. 43. Wheat. 229 ; Picquet v. Swan, 4 Mason,

(A) Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 443.
481. ( /) Fisk v. Cushman, 6 Cush. 20.

(»') Borst v. Corey, 16 Barb. 136 ; Al- (k) Strong v. Wilkin, 1 Barb. Ch. 9.

1 But a voluntary settlement by a husband upon his wife directly, without
impairing the claims of existing creditors, is valid, although reserving a power of
revocation, or appointment to other uses, Jones v. Clifton, 101 TJ. S. 225 ; and a deed
of land, which is but a reasonable provision for her, by a husband to bis wife, in con-
sideration of love and affection, is valid as against an heir, Majors v. Everton, 89 111.
56 ; Horder v. Horder, 23 Kan. 391.

410

CH. XVI1I.J MARRIED WOMEN. * 370

on the ground that it was a fraud upon him. Doubtless there
may now be such disposition of property by the wife, in actual
fraud of the husband. (kk~) But, in this country, nothing less
than such a fraud, certainly proved, would be permitted by our
courts to invalidate the acts of an unmarried woman, in favor of
a husband subsequently married. We give in the note some
authorities on this subject. (I)

Again we must refer to the synopsis of the statutes concerning
married women, which follows immediately. The reader will also
find the cases cited in this note bearing on this question. (II)
The law on this interesting subject must be regarded however
as still in a transition condition, and changes in it are quite
frequent.

(klc) Duncan's Appeal, 43 Penn. St. (II) Huff v. Wright, 39 Ga. 41 ; Rich-

67 ; Belt v. Ferguson, 3 Grant, 289. ardson v. Stodder, 100 Mass. 528 ; Marsh

(I) St. George v. Wake, 1 Myl. & K. v. Marsh, 43 Ala. 677 ; Corning v. Lewis,

610 ; Bill v. Cureton, 2 Myl. & K. 603 ; 54 Barb. 51 ; Demott v. McMullen, 8 Abb.

Strathmore v. Bowes, 2 Bro. 345; 6. c. 1 Pr. (u. s.) 335; Smith v. Allen, 1 Lans.

Ves. Jun. 22 ; Tucker v, Andrews, 13 Me. 101 ; Boyles' Estate, 1 Tuck. 4 ; Walker

124 ; Jordan v. Black, Meigs, 142 ; Ram- v. Walker, 9 Wall. 743 ; Melley v. Casey,

say v. Joyce, 1 McMull. Eq. 236 • Logan 99 Mass. 241 ; Gulick v. Grover, 4 Vroom,

i». Simmons, 3 lred. Eq. 487. 463 ; Dutton v. Dutton, 30 Ind. 452.

411

371 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

SYNOPSIS

Of (he Statutes in the different States and Territories and the District of Columbia
concerning the Rights and Powers of Married Women, and of the Husband in
relation to her Property.

In Alabama, the wife's separate estate is alone liable for antenuptial debts,
Code 1876, §2704. All her property held before, or acquired after, marriage
is secured to her separate use, free from the husband's debts, § 2705. The
husband is her trustee, and entitled to the profits, § 2706. Husband and wife
may jointly sell and convey her estate in an instrument attested by two wit-
nesses, § 2707, or acknowledged in the usual manner, § 2708. The proceeds of
such a sale are her separate estate, which the husband may use for her benefit.
They cannot contract with each other to sell any property, § 2709. He may
receive property coming to her, §2710. Her estate is liable for necessaries for
the family, § 2711. If a suit therefor is brought against a husband, and exe-
cution is not satisfied, her separate estate may be sold by order of court, § 2712.
She may dispose of her property by will, §2713. If the husband is unfit to
manage her estate (or his estate, or abandons her, or has no property except
what is exempt from execution), she may be vested with the powers of a feme
sole, §§ 2719, 2728, 2729. If the husband is insane, she may convey her real
estate as if unmarried, the deed to be attested by two disinterested witnesses,
Acts of 1869-70, p. 187. Her estate is liable for reasonable attorney's fees
for its benefit, Acts of 1880-81, p. 36. $2,000 worth of real estate, including
the homestead, and $1,000 worth of personal estate, are exempted from exe-
cution, § 2820.

In Arizona, all of a married woman's property owned before marriage and
acquired thereafter by gift, devise, bequest, or descent, is her separate prop-
erty, Compiled Laws of 1877, p. 328, § 1, of which, if of the age of twenty-one
years, she has the sole control, and may convey without the husband's join-
der, as fully as if unmarried, p. 332, § 1. All after-acquired property, except
as above, is common property, p. 328, § 2. Such separate estate must be in-
ventoried and recorded to exempt it from the husband's debts, p. 328, §§3, 4,
5. During the wife's nonage the husband shall control her separate property,
but may not convey it except by a writing signed by her with certain formalities,
p. 328, § 6. If she sells for his benefit or he uses the proceeds with her written
consent, it is a gift to him, p. 328, § 7. If the husband mismanages, a trustee
may be appointed, p. 328, § 8. The husband has sole charge of the common
property, which includes the profits of her estate, unless otherwise provided by
the terms of the gift to her, p. 329, § 9. She takes no dower, p. 329, § 10.
One half of the common property at death goes to the survivor, and the other
half to the other's issue, subject to debts ; if no issue, the whole to the sur-
vivor so subject, p. 329, § 11. On divorce, the common property is equally
divided, except for adultery and extreme cruelty, in which cases the court has
a discretion towards the guilty party, p. 329, § 12. Her separate property con-
tinues liable for her debts after marriage, p. 329, § 13. Married women may
carry on business on complying with certain regulations, pp. 330, 331, §§ 24,
25, 26, in doing which she must be responsible for her children's maintenance,
p. 331, § 27; and her husband, unless he consents in writing, will not be re-
sponsible for her trade debts, p. 331, § 29. She may insure her husband's
life, free from his debts, unless the premium exceeds $300, payable to herself,
p. 332, § 32, or payable to her children or guardian, § 33.
412

CH. XVIII. J MARRIED WOMEN. _ * 371

In Arkansas, the before or after acquired real or personal property of a
married woman is her separate estate, free from her husband's debts, and she
may convey or dispose of it by will as if unmarried, Const, of 1874, Art. 9,
§ 7. But her property is liable for his debts contracted by him as her agent
for the support of herself and children, Laws of 1873, p. 382, §2. She may
contract with reference to her property, do business and perform any services
on her sole account, and her earnings are her own, and she alone may sue or
be sued with reference thereto, § 3. Her husband is not liable on any of her
contracts, § 4. The husband caunot bind a child to service, dispose of it, or
appoint a testamentary guardian therefor, without the mother's consent, if
living, §7. She may sue and be sued as if unmarried, §9. She must have
her real estate recorded in her name in her county, § 10. Contracts of service
for more than a month must be in writing and approved by the husband, Laws
of 1875, p. 230, § 2.

In California, a married woman, either personally or by agent, independ-
ently of her husband, may transfer her shares of stock, receive the dividends
and grant proxies thereon, as if unmarried, Code of 1872, § 325. She may
hold shares in homestead, and loan and savings corporations, bought withher
own earnings and those of her children, or with property bequeathed or given
to her by others than her husband, §§ 561, 575. Her conveyance of her real
estate and her power of attorney given for that purpose are ineffective unless
acknowledged by her, apart from her husband, to have been made and given
freely, when they have the same effect as if she were unmarried, §§ 1093, 1094,
1186, 1187. She may dispose of her property by will as if unmarried, § 1273.
She may sue or be sued alone concerning her estate or homestead, when the
action is between herself and husband, or when living apart from her husband
by reason of his desertion or their mutual agreement in writing, Code of Civil
Procedure of 1872, § 370. If the husband and wife are sued together, she may
defend in her own right and for him also if he neglect so to do, § 371. She
may become a sole trader on due notice and petition to the court, §§ 1811,
1812, 1813. She may invest therein of the community or her husband's
separate property not exceeding $500, § 1S14. On leave of court she may
carry on the business specified in her own name, and the investments and
profits belong to her, free from the husband's debts, and she has the same
rights and liabilities as if unmarried, §1819. She is also liable, as such
trader, for the maintenance of her minor children, and her husband is not
liable for her debts unless he so consents in writing, §§ 1820, 1821.

In Colorado, all of a married woman's property at the marriage, with its
profits, and all received from any source save her husband, including however
ornaments, money, and apparel from him, is her separate property, tree trom
his debts or disposal, General Laws of 1877, § 1747. She may dispose of per-
sonal estate as if unmarried, § 1748. She may sue or be sued alone touching
her person, property, or reputation, § 1749. She may dispose by will of one
half of her property only away from her husband, unless he consents in writ-
insr § 1750. She may trade or labor on her sole account, and her earnings
and profits are her own to use or invest ; she may sue or be sued touching the
same, and the same are liable to execution, § 1752. Marriage contracts are
valid §1753. The husband is liable for her antenuptial debts only to the
extent of property, or its proceeds, derived from her, her death not freeing
hfm from sucfi liability, §§1754, 1755. When a woman, in debt and owning
land, marries, a ioint judgment for the same against husband and wite is to be
evfe'd on such land alone, § 1756 The husband's sole deed can convey no
part of the wife's land, § 1757. She may give any w»*^n in»ti^ent to pay
money, and if for her estate's benefit she may be sued thereon, the judgment
be a lien on her land, which may be levied on therefor, § I'f-®™™* ^
and convey her property, sue and be sued, and contract m eveiy way on nei
sole liability, as Ff unmaVried, §§ 1759, 1761. The covenants of a deed d not
bind her § 183. She may be a special partner with her husband oi another,
and may so contract as if unmarried, anti in relation to partnership matters

413

* 372 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

may be a witness for or against the husband, § 1993. She may with her
husband adopt a child, § 2. Her husband must join or be joined in suits,
unless relating to her separate estate or between themselves, Code of (Jivil
Procedure of 1877, § 6. If sued together she may defend herself, § 7.

In Connecticut, a married woman's real estate, the result of her labor,
and the proceeds of its sale, if invested in her name or that of her trustee, is
her separate property ; and she may convey it, as if unmarried, by leave of
court, if abandoned for three years by her husband, Gen. Sts. of Conn, of
1875, Tit. 14, c. 2, §§ 1, 2. All the before and after acquired personal property
of a woman, married since June 22, 1849, and the proceeds of its sale, are held
in trust by the husband to enjoy the income subject to her and the minor
children's support, to apply such part of the principal as may be necessary for
her support, or otherwise with her written consent ; on his death the rest to
be transferred to her, if living, otherwise to her legatees or representatives.
A portion of such trust property, equivalent to any of her antenuptial debts
paid by him, is to vest in him absolutely, §3. The husband cannot sell her
property, unless she, if living, or her representatives or the guardians of the
minor children, conseut in writing, and all reinvestments must be in bis name
as trustee, § 4. As trustee he is accountable to the probate court, § 5. If aban-
doned her property vests in her ; and she may, during the abandonment, sue
and be sued, and do business as if unmarried, § 6. She may insure her hus-
band for the benefit of herself and children, up to $300 premium. Payment to
her of money lent or deposited by her or for personal services, is as valid as if
she were unmarried, § 8. If the husband is insane, she may, by leave of the
probate court, convey her land as if unmarried, Tit. 4, c. 5, § 17. Her convey-
ance of real estate, to be effectual, must be executed jointly with the husband,
and duly acknowledged and recorded, and his conveyance of the same alone is
invalid, Tit. 18, c. 6, § 10. On her death, intestate, the husband, if without
curtesy, has a lien on her real estate for improvements made by him with her
assent, or for the mutual benefit, Tit. 18, c. 7, § 15. She may be sued as if
unmarried upon any antenuptial cause of action, and upon any postnuptial
contract made on her personal credit for the benefit of herself, her family, or
her estate, and for any tort, unless coerced by the husband, and her property
attached and levied upon, Tit. 19, c. 5, § 9 ; and in like manner, on a joint
contract with the husband, for the benefit of her or the joint estate, § 10.
Likewise she may sue, if doing business, upon any right accruing therefrom,
§ 11. In a civil action by or against her, the husband may be joined, but
judgment is to be entered only in favor of or against the one for or against
whom a cause of action is found, and costs taxed for or against that one only,
§ 12. In all marriages contracted after March 1G, 1877, neither husband nor
wife acquires any rights in any before or after acquired property of the other
except as survivor. She has her earnings, may contract with third persons,
and convey her property, real and personal, as if unmarried. Her property is
liable for her debts, but not for the husband's, Acts of 1877, u. 114, § 1. All
purchases of either husband or wife are presumed, in the absence of notice, to
be on his or her private account; but both are liable if for the family support,
the joint benefit, her reasonable apparel, or support while abandoned by him.
She shall be indemnified by him for what she may have expended for the
family support if he has property, §2. If married before March 16, 1877,
any husband and wife may agree in writing to abandon all existing and mu-
tual rights in each other's property, and when recorded, this act shall apply
to such marriage as well, §5. A married woman, so long as a conservator
is over her husband, may exercise every right touching her estate as if un-
married, Acts of 1881, c. 149. The conservator of a married woman whose
husband is capable of taking care of her has charge ouly of her separate
estate, not of her person or other estate ; but if the husband has aban-
doned her, of her person and estate also as if she were unmarried, Acts of
1882, c. 6, § 1.

In Dakota, a married woman must support her husband out of her separ-
414

CH. XVIII.] MARRIED WOMEN.

373

ate estate, when he has none, has not deserted her, and is too infirm to
support himself, Code of 1877, § 77. She may contract with her husband or
a .third person, as if unmarried, subject in transactions with her husband to
the rules of trusts, § 79. She may hold property with her husband, jointly or
in common may convey her property without his consent, and may record an
inventory of the same duly acknowledged, § 82. She is not answerable for
his acts, and has no dower. Her earnings and other accumulations and her
minor children's earnings, while apart from her husband, are her separate
property, which is alone liable for her debts, contracted before or after mar-
riage, fe 83. She is not liable for necessaries, if he neglects, unless she
abandons him, but on an agreement of separation she is liable for her support
unless expressly stipulated, §§ 84, 85. If of age, she may execute a power
without her husband's concurrence, unless its terms prevent; but it must be
acknowledged, §§ 315, 316. A general power to dispose, without his concur-
rence, of a present or future estate in land given her in fee, is valid, § 335,
and so of a special power to so dispose of any less estate, § 342. She may
dispose by will of all her property, § 684. If she sues or is sued, the action
proceeds in all respects as if she were unmarried, § 77; and judgment is
entered and enforced in like manner against her property alone, § 292. Any
instrument may be executed and acknowledged by a married woman as if
unmarried, Laws of 1881, c. 2, § 2.

In Delaware, a married woman , her husband joining, may convey her land,
but must acknowledge the same apart from her husband, Code of 1874, pp.
478, 501, §§ 1469, 1614. Her real estate, mortgages, stocks, and silver plate
owned before and acquired after marriage remain her separate property
subject to her antenuptial debts, but not subject to her husband's disposition,
or his debts or contracts. She may not convey her separate property, nor
dispose of the profits without her husband's consent under seal. The husband
is entitled to curtesy, p. 478. She may reinvest, with his consent, a mortgage
debt paid to her, or the proceeds of property so sold in other real estate or
stocks or mortgages, the same to remain her separate property, p. 478. If the
husband fails to support her while living apart from him, she is entitled to her
property, if distinguishable from his, free of his debts, and she may sue and be
sued and contract about it. If living apart without his default, he is not, but
otherwise is, liable for her debts ; when they again cohabit, he becomes liable
for all her debts contracted during the separation, p. 479. A judgment for
antenuptial debts may be recovered against her alone, p. 479, § 2. She may
receive her wages for labor not for her family, sue therefor in her own name,
hold against all. including the husband, and deposit subject to her sole right to
withdraw without the husband's consent, § 3. She may sue or be sued touch-
ing her separate property, as if unmarried; but he cannot sue alone respecting
it, although she may join him in her suits. She may make contracts and sue
and be sued thereon as if unmarried, § 4. She may, if twenty-one years of
age, dispose of her property by will; but if intestate it goes to her heirs
subject to curtesy. Ante-marriage settlements may be made to define mar-
riage rights and in case of descent. If she dies without issue the husband
has a life estate in one-half of her real estate after payment of her debts, § 5
as amended, Acts of 1875, c. 165. She may release to the husband the control
of her property and the income for the mutual benefit, and in writing revoke
it, pp. 479, 480, Act of 1873. All before and after acquired property other
than from her husband is her separate property, and the profits thereof are
subject to neither his disposal, nor debts, Laws of 1875, p. 289, § 1. A married
woman may, as if unmarried, buy real estate and secure the purchase-money
by any appropriate instrument with a warrant of attorney, upon which the
husband is not liable unless » party thereto, § 3.

In Florida, all the property of a married woman owned before or ac-
quired after marriage is her separate estate, and not liable for the husband's
debts, McClellan's Digest, c. 150, § 1. The rights of husband and wife, de-
rived under the Spanish law, when in force, remain the same, subject to for-

415

* 373 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

malities of conveyance, § 2. Her separate estate, both that owned before and
acquired after marriage, is the husband's, §§ 3, 4. She cannot sue him for the
profits, nor can he charge for his care, § 5. Her property can only be conveyed
jointly with the husband with due formalities, § G. Her estate is alone liable
for her antenuptial debts, § 7. Her estate must be inventoried and recorded
to be free from liability for his debts, — any omission will, however, confer no
rights upon the husband, § 8. A married woman may convey her real estate
as if unmarried if the husband joins, if due formalities are observed, and if she
privily acknowledges that her act is free, § 9. All former conveyances by a
married woman with husband's joinder, made valid, § 10. She may con-
vey her estate or release dower by attorney, if the power be executed in the
presence of two witnesses, duly acknowledged and recorded, and the husband
joins, § 11. A married woman may, after due proceedings had, be licensed
by the court to become a free dealer and to manage her own estate, sue and be
sued, and contract in all respects as if unmarried, §§ 13, 14, 15. A married
woman may dispose of her property by will as if unmarried, § 16.

In Georgia, all the property of the wife, at the marriage or after acquired,
remains her separate property, liable for her debts only, Code of 1882, §§ 1753,
1754. When separate from her husband, her own and her children's acquisi-
tions vest in her; and if she dies intestate they go to her children, failing which,
to her next of kin, § 1756. The husband is liable for necessaries, unless she
leaves him without provocation, when notice relieves him, § 1757. She may
with her husband's consent become a public trader, and may contract, sue and
be sued, as if unmarried, and the profits are her own, § 1760. When the hus-
band or wife dies without issue, the survivor is the sole heir; but if she dies
intestate leaving children, the children and the husband share alike, §§ 1761,
1762. She may deposit of her own or her children's earnings up to $2000, in
any savings bank of the State subject to her control as if unmarried, § 1772.
Her paraphernalia, consisting of her own and her children's apparel, her
watch, suitable ornaments and useful personal articles, is not subject to her
husband's debts or contracts, § 1773. She may sue and be sued alone when
the action concerns her separate property, is between her husband and herself,
and when she is separated from him, § 1774. The wife as to her separate
estate may act as if unmarried, but must comply with every restriction of the
marriage contract. She cannot bind it by suretyship or by assuming her hus-
band's debts; and any sale of it to her husband's creditor to extinguish his
debt is void, § 1783. Her contract of sale of her separate estate with her hus-
band or trustee is invalid unless by leave of county court, § 1783. A loan may
be made to her with the consent of the husband, who is liable for, but has no
control over it, to be used strictly for the proposed purpose, on penalty of con-
version, §§ 2134, 2135. She may make a will, where power so to do is reserved
in the creation of her estate or by marriage contract, where, with an estate
absolute or in expectancy, the husband consents thereto, where in execution of
a vested power, and where, if abandoned or divorced, she controls her earnings
as if unmarried, § 2410. Prescription does not run against her, § 2686, nor the
Statute of Limitations, § 2926, unless attaching before marriage, § 2927.

In Idaho, all the property of a wife, owned before or acquired after mar-
riage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, is her separate property, Revised
Laws of 1874 and 1875, p. 03 1, § 1. All other acquired property is common,
§ 2. Her separate estate must be inventoried and recorded, upon which it
will be free of his debts, §§ 3, 4, 5. The husband shall manage it, but no
conveyance or lien is effective unless in writing, signed by both, and acknowl-
edged by her apart from him, § 6. Any sale by her for the husband's benefit
or his use of such proceeds with her written consent, is an irrevocable gift to
him, § 7. If he mismanages, a trustee may be appointed by and subject to the
court to pay over the profits as directed, § 8. The husband controls the com-
mon property, including profits of her property, unless the latter by express
provision are to be applied to her use, when they are not liable for his debts,
§ 9. Neither curtesy nor dower is allowed, § 10. On divorce, except for adul-
416

CH. XVIII.] MARRIED WOMEN. * 374

tery or some cruelty, the common property is to be equally divided, otherwise
the guilty party will have what the court allows, § 12. Her property alone is
liable tor antenuptial debts, § 13. In all marriages subsequent to January 6
187o, and in prior marriages, as regards acquisitions subsequent thereto, mu-
tual rights are governed by this act, unless in conflict with marriage contracts,

* 1 j Wlfe dle3' the common property is the husband's, if he has

not abandoned her, otherwise she may dispose of one half by will, failing
which it goes to her other heirs. When the husband dies, one half of the
same goes to her, and the other half may be disposed of by his will, failing
which, to his descendants, if any, subject to his debts, family allowance, and
expenses, Laws of 1879, p. 50. She may sue or be sued about her property or
homestead, or if deserted, or having agreed in writing to live apart from her
husband, General Laws of 1880-81, p. 35, § 185. When sued together, she may
defend in her right and for him, if he neglect, § 186. All her property and its
profits, with her personal earnings, are exempt from execution against her
husband, p. 98, § 439. A married woman may become a sole trader by leave
of court, on due proceedings had, p. 200, §§ 885-891. She must make oath
of her purpose to support herself and dependants, and not to defraud creditors,
and that no more than $500 of her capital came from the husband, § 892; she
may then carry on business as if unmarried, is liable for her minor children's
maintenance, and her husband, unless giving written assent, is not liable for
her business debts, §§ 893-95.

In Illinois, a married woman may sue and be sued alone as if unmarried,
Revised Statutes of 1880, c. 68, § 1. She may contract as if unmarried, but
without her husband's consent she may not become a co-partner, unless he has
deserted her, is insane, or in the penitentiary, § 9. She may use and sue for
her earnings as if unmarried, § 7. A married woman may own, in her individ-
ual right, property obtained by descent, gift, or purchase, and manage, sell,
and convey the same as the husband can his property; but if living together, a
transfer to him, to be valid against third persons, must be in writing and ac-
knowledged and recorded like chattel mortgages, § 9. She is equally liable
with her husband for family expenses and the children's education, and may
be sued therefor singly or jointly, § 15. If when eighteen years old she joins
her husband in the conveyance of her real estate, she is bound as if unmarried,
c. 30, § 18; and her acknowledgment may be taken as if unmarried, § l£r! If
she dies intestate without issue, the husband is entitled to one half of the real
estate and the whole of the personal estate absolutely; if she leaves issue, to
one third of the personal property absolutely ; if no issue or kindred, to the
whole of her estate, c. 39, § 1. A homestead to the value of $1,000 is exempt
from attachment for debt, and so continues while occupied by the survivor or
the children until the youngest is twenty-one years of age, or if the husband
or wife deserts the family, in favor of the occupier, c. 52, §§1,2. She may
cause the life of her husband to be insured for her own use, or that of her chil-
dren, if she dies before it accrues; but if the premium is paid in fraud of his
creditors, an amount equal to the sum so paid with interest shall inure to
their benefit, c. 73, § 54. Her separate property is chargeable with the support
of poor relatives, c. 109, § 2.

In Indiana, a married woman may sue alone touching her separate prop-
erty and when the suit is between herself and husband, Revised Statutes of
1881, c. 2, § 254. The wife of a person who has absented himself from home
for five years has the same rights and powers as if unmarried to make con-
tracts, deeds, and acquittances during the absence, c. 6, § 2234. If she die,
testate or intestate, one third of her real estate descends to her husband sub-
ject to its proportion of her antenuptial debts, c. 7, § 2485. A wife's per-
sonal property at the marriage or acquired afterwards by descent, devise, or
gift, remains her own like her real estate. If the husband dies first, it goes to
her; if she dies first, it is distributed like her real estate, § 2488. If she dies
intestate without issue but leaving parents, three fourths of her property go
to her husband and one fourth to the parents or the survivor, but if only $1,000
vol. 1. 27 417

* 375 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

in all, the whole goes to the husband. If she leaves no issue nor parents, the
whole goes to the husband, §§ 2489, 2490. A married woman may dispose of
her property by will, e. 9, § 2.357. A married woman's lands and the profits
are her separate property as fully as if unmarried, free of her husband's debts,
but she cannot convey or incumber them unless he joins in a deed, c. 71 , § 5116.
A married woman may acquire property by conveyance, gift, devise, or descent,
or by purchase with her own money, and control the same and the profits, as
if unmarried. She may likewise contract about and dispose of her personal
property, but not the real, unless the husband joins, § 5117. Her covenants
for title and official bonds bind her as if unmarried, § 5118. But her contract
of suretyship is void, § 5119. The husband is not liable for her business debts
on her sole account, or if in partnership other than with himself, nor for im-
provements on her property by her authority, § 5122. She alone is liable for
such improvements, made by his order with her consent in writing, § 5123. She
has the same exemption of property from seizure and sale for debt as household-
ers, § 5124. The husband is liable for her antenuptial debts to the extent only
of personalty received through her or derived from the sale or profits of her
land, § 5125. Judgment for such debts may be rendered against them jointly,
to be levied on her land only, § 5127. The husband can convey no interest
in her land by his separate deed, § 5128. Suits about such land are to be
brought against them jointly, or if living apart, against her alone, § 5129.
She may do business and labor on her separate account, the profits of which,
other than for her husband or family, are her separate property, § 5130. She
may sue as if unmarried for damages to her person or character, such to be
her separate property, § 5131. If it shall appear to be beneficial to her, a
married woman may, by leave of court, convey or incumber her real estate
without the husband's joinder, § 5137.

In Iowa, a married woman may convey and contract about her real estate
like other persons, Revised Code of 1880, Tit. 13, c. 5, § 1935. The convey-
ance of husband and wife together passes the estate of either, unless the con-
trary appears ; but in such a couveyance of her property, he is not bound by
the covenants unless so expressed, §§ 1936, 1937. A married woman may own
property acquired by descent, gift, or purchase, and dispose of the same and
devise it by will precisely as the husband, Tit. 15, c. 2, § 2202. Her property
canrfot be the subject of contract with her husband, nor liable for his debts,
§ 2203. If the husband gains possession of her property before or after mar-
riage, she may sue for or about it as if unmarried, § 2204. Her conveyance,
transfer, or lien to the husband is as valid as between other persons, § 2206.
If the husband or wife abandons the other, and is absent from the State for a
year, or imprisoned, the other, by leave of court, may use his or her property
to support the family or pay debts ; and all acts so done bind both and the
property of both, §§ 2207, 2208. The husband and wife may each appoint the
other an attorney in fact, revocable at pleasure, to dispose of each other's prop-
erty for the mutual benefit, § 2210. The wife may receive, hold, and sue for
personal wages, and may sue and be sued touching her rights and property
as if unmarried, § 2211. The husband and wife or their property or incomes
are not liable for the other's antenuptial debts, nor for the other's separate
debts, § 2212. She may contract and sue and be sued respecting the same as
if unmarried, § 2213. The family expenses and children's education are charge-
able upon the property of both or either, and joint or separate suit may be
brought, § 2214. Neither husband nor wife can remove the other or the
children from the homestead without mutual consent; and if he deserts her,
6he may have custody of minor children, unless the court directs otherwise,
§ 2215. The homestead, consisting of half an acre in a town plat, or four
acres without, up to $500 in value, is exempt from judicial sale, except in
certain cases, and the surviving husband or wife may continue to occupy, Tit.
13, c. 8, §§ 1988-2010.

In Kansas, all the property of a woman at the marriage, and its profits, and
subsequently acquired by descent, devise, and bequest, or by gift other than

418

CH. XVIII.] MARRIED WOMEN. * 375—376

from her husband, is her separate property, free from his disposal or debts
Dassler's Compiled Laws of 1879, c. 02, § 3136. A married woman may dis-
pose of her property and contract about it the same as a married man with his
own, § 3137. She may sue and be sued, as if unmarried, § 3138. She may
trade or labor, and her profits and earnings are her own, and may be used and
invested in her own name, § 3139. If married without the State, and the hus-
band moves within, she continues to enjoy prior property rights, § 3140.
Marriage contracts or settlements remain valid, § 3141. A homestead of one
hundred and sixty acres without a town or city, or of one acre within, is
exempt from forced sale, except with their joint consent, for taxes, purchase-
money, and improvements, c. 38, § 2497.

In Kentucky, the husband has only the use of the before or after acquired
property of the wife, with power to rent the realty for not more than three years,
and to receive the rent. If she dies during such term, the rent goes to him. if
living, subject to her debts; if he dies, to her or representatives, like subject,
General Statutes of 1873, p. 518, § 1. Such realty or rent is not liable for his,
but is for her, ante and post nuptial debts, for her and family necessaries, in-
cluding the husband's, procured by a writing signed by her, remedy for which
may be against her alone, or both. His inchoate curtesy and right to use or
rent her realty is free of his separate debts during her life, § 2. They may
jointly convey her land, § 3. The husband is not liable for her antenuptial
debts, except to the value of what he may receive by her other than realty, but
is liable for necessaries, § 4. If he deserts, does not suitably provide for her,
or is in penitentiary for more than a year, she may, by leave of court, act as if
unmarried, even to conveying her property, § 5. She may, by leave of court,
do business as if unmarried, and dispose of her property and profits by will or
deed, if no intent to defraud his creditors appears, §§ 6, 7. If her real estate
is taken for a public use, the compensation may be appropriated by the court
for her benefit, p. 522, § 9. A married woman whose husband resides with-
out the State may acquire property, contract, and sue and be sued as if un-
married, but the husband on petition may be restored to his marital rights,
§ 10. Her conveyance of her property may be by a joint or separate deed,
but by the latter only when the husband first conveys. She must acknowl-
edge the same apart from her husband, p. 258, §§ 20, 21. If shares of bank
stock are taken for or transferred to a married woman for her use, the hus-
band takes no interest or dividends. If she dies, it goes to her heirs; but she
may dispose of it by will with his consent, or, if instrument creating the trust
so provides, she may receive, but not anticipate, the dividends, p. 532, § 1 5. She
may make deposits, and her checks or receipts are as valid as if she were un-
married, § 16. A separate or trust estate conveyed or devised to her may be
sold and conveyed, if the instrument conveying or creating does not forbid,
and the husband and trustee join, her interest in the proceeds remaining the
same, § 17. A married woman's earnings may be paid to her directly, free of
the debts or control of the husband, p. 533, note. She may by will dispose of
an estate, secured to her separate use by deed or devise, or in the exercise of a
written power to make a will, p. 832, § 4.

In Louisiana, a married woman, even if separate in estate from her husband,
cannot alienate, grant, mortgage, or acquire, by gratuitous or incumbered title,
unless he concurs or gives his written consent, Revised Code of 1870, Art.
122. Her separation from him divides property and dissolves the community
of acquets and gains, making his authorization unnecessary, Art. 123, She
may contract by leave of court, if the husband refuses, Art. 125. If twenty-
one years of age, she may, by the husband's authority and leave of court,
borrow or contract for her separate benefit, and to secure the same give secu-
rity affecting her separate paraphernal or dotal estate. In so doing it must
appear to the court that the monev is to be borrowed or the debt contracted
solely for her separate advantage, Arts. 126, 127, 128. If of the age of twenty-
one vears, a married woman may, with the husband's consent after examina-
tion "apart from him, renounce in favor of a third person her matrimonial,

419

* 377 THE LAW OF CONTEACTS. [BOOK I.

paraphernal, dotal, and other rights, Art. 129. She may, if a public merchant,
without the husband's authority, bind herself respecting her trade, and the
husband also, if a community of property exists between them. She is a pub-
lic merchant if she carries on a separate trade, but not if she simply retails the
merchandise of her husband's commerce, Art. 131. If the husband is inter-
dicted or absent, she may, by leave of court, sue and be sued, or contract, Art.
132. Every general authority, though stipulated in the marriage contract, is
void, except respecting the administration of her property, Art. 133. The wife
may make her last will without his authority, Art. 135. The husband or wife
may, either by marriage contract or during the marriage, give to the other in
full property, all that he or she might give to a stranger, Art. 1746. But all
such donations during marriage, though termed inter vivos, are always revo-
cable, Art. 1749. They may, by marriage contract, determine the rights of
proppity; but cannot change the legal order of descents (this restriction not
affecting donations inter vivos or such mortis causa, or donation by the marriage
contract according to the rules for donations), nor derogate from the husband's
rights over the person of his wife and children, or as head of the family, nor
with respect to children, if he survive the wife, nor from the prohibitory dis-
pensations of the Code, Arts. 2325-2327, 2336. The property of married
persons is divided into " separate " and "common;" and the separate prop-
erty of the wife into " dotal " and " extra-dotal, " or "paraphernal." The
" dotal " is that which the wife brings to the husband to assist him in bearing
the expenses of the marriage establishment, Arts. 2334, 2335, 2337. The wife
has a legal mortgage on her husband's immovables (which he may release by
giving a special mortgage to the satisfaction of a family meeting, &c, or in
accordance with stipulations in the marriage contract.) : but it shall not be
lawful to stipulate that no mortgage shall exist, Arts. 2378-2380; and a privi-
lege on his immovables for the restitution of her dowry, &c, Arts. 2376-2380,
2390. A partnership, or community, of acquets or gains exists by operation
of law in all cases But the parties may modify or limit it, or agree that it
shall not exist; in which case there are provisions, preserving to the wife the
administration and enjoyment of her property and the power of alienating it
as if paraphernal, with reference to the expenses of the marriage and liability
of the husband, Arts. 2332, 2399, 2401, 2424. This community consists
of the profits of all the effects of which the husband has the administration and
enjoyment, either of right or in fact; of the produce of the reciprocal industry
and labor of both husband and wife; and of the estates which they may
acquire during marriage, either by donations made jointly to them both, or by
purchase, or in any similar way, even though the purchase be in the name of
one and not of both. Debts contracted daring marriage enter into this part-
nership, and must be acquitted out of the common fund; but those contracted
before marriage, out of individual effects, Arts. 2102, 2403 The husband is
the head and master of the community; administers its effects, disposes of the
revenue, and may alienate by an unincumbered title, without the wife's con-
sent. He cannot convey inter vivos the immovables gratuitously, the commu-
nity, nor any portion of the movables, except to establish the children ; but he
may the movables. If he disposes of the common estate by fraud to injure the
wife, she may sue his heirs for one-half, Art. 2373. If decreed separate in
property, she must contribute proportionately to the household expenses and
the children's education, and must do both alone if he has nothing, Art. 2435.
When separate by contract or judgment in person or property, she has the free
administration of her estate, and may dispose of movables, but not immov-
ables, without the husband's consent, or on refusal by leave of court, Art. 2436.
She may, with the husband's consent, give her dotal effects to establish their
children or her children by a former marriage, Arts. 2358, 2359.

In Maine, a married woman may own property acquired by descent, gift, or

purchase, and may manage, sell, and convey it, and devise it by will, without

the husband's joinder or assent; but real estate from or paid for by him or

from his relatives she cannot convey without such joinder, unless held as secu-

420

CH. XVIII.] MARRIED WOMEN. * 378

rity or in payment of a bona fide debt from the husband. Her property paid
for out of his property, or conveyed by him without consideration, is liable for
his prior debts, ltevised Statutes of 1871, c. o'l, § 1. A wife married since
March 22, 1844, loses no right by the Act of that date, nor does a husband ac-
quire any right to her property thereby, nor are his prior rights affected by this
Act. She may release to her husband the right, revocable in writing, to con-
trol the whole or any part of her property, and dispose of the income for the
mutual benefit, § 2. She may receive her personal wages other than for her
family, sue for in her own name, and hold against him or third persons, § 3.
A husband, married since April 26, 1852, is not liable for her antenuptial
debts, nor for those contracted after in her own name. She is liable for both,
may be sued therefor singly or jointly with him, and her property attached and
levied on, as if unmarried, § 4. She may sue aud be sued alone, or jointly
with the husband, touching her property and personal rights, as if unmarried;
and the husband may not settle such suits without her written consent, § 5 as
amended by Statute of 1870, c. 112. If she dies intestate, her property goes
to her heirs, but by an antenuptial settlement they may arrange marriage
rights and bar all rights not so secured, § 6. If he abandons her or is impris-
oned, leaving her no maintenance, she may, by leave of court, make contracts,
and receive for disposal her personal property from the holder and give a valid
discharge. Her husband and herself are bound by such contracts, and she
may, during such absence, sue and be sued, and execution be enforced on all
her acts, as if unmarried. He may be made a party on his return, §§ 7, 8. If
her real estate is taken for a public use, the compensation is to be so invested
as to secure her equal benefit, § 9. If she enters or remains in the State with-
out living with her husband, she may contract, dispose of her property, and
sue and be sued as if unmarried. AVhen he claims his marital rights, her
contracts and suits are affected as if they were then first married, § 10. Her
estate is liable for the expenses of her last sickness, § 11.

In Maryland, a married woman's property, real and personal, at the mar-
riage, or after acquired by purchase, gift, grant, devise, bequest,_or inheritance,
is free of her husband's debts; but no transfer to a wife from him is valid if in
fraud of creditors, Revised Code of 1S78, Art. 51, § 19. _ She holds her prop-
erty for her separate use, and may devise it as if unmarried, or convey it by a
joint deed; but if he is insane, by a separate deed or mortgage. If she dies
intestate with issue, the husband has a life estate in all her property ; if with-
out issue, a life estate in the real, and the personal absolutely. On a joint con-
tract she may be sued jointly and the judgment be collected as if they were un-
married, § 20. She may, but need not, have a trustee appointed; if without,
she may sue to protect her property, as if unmarried, §§ 21, 22, Acts of 1882,
c. 265, § 7. She may insure her husband's life, payable to herself free of all
claims, or if she die first, to her children, descendants, their guardian or legal
representatives, §§ 24, 25. Her receipt for deposits by her are valid, but if the
deposit is in fraud of creditors the latter may attach, § 27. If she makes a
lease with covenants, she may be distrained upon for rent or suffer a re-entry,
§ 28. In all deeds to her, she may bind herself and assigns by covenants, as
if unmarried, § 29. A married woman may convey or mortgage her property,
the husband joining, and execute and acknowledge the same or a bill of sale
like other grantors, without a private examination, and may release dower by a
joint or separate deed, § 30. Her property, and not her husband, is liable tor
her antenuptial debts, Acts of 1880, c. 253, § 31. Suits for such debts may
be brought against her as if unmarried, joining her husband; but judgment
shall pass against her and her estate only; and she may appoint an attorney at
law to act for her, §§ 32, 33. She is entitled to her earnings, and may dispose
of the same, as if unmarried, the same to be liable for any debts incurred in so
earning them, for which she may be sued as if unmarried, and the husband
defend in her name ; but no judgment can be entered " without proof, unless
they jointly consent in writing, Acts of 1882, ... 265, § 7 If a lease vests, by
deed, will, or operation of law, in a married woman, she is liable on all its

421

* 378-379 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

covenants running with the land, as if unmarried, Acts of 1882, c. 385, § 1.
If she dies intestate, without issue, her personal property, including choses in
action, devolves on the husband absolutely, without administration, unless she
leaves debts; but if with issue, the same devolves on her administrator, the
surplus to be distributed to the husband for life only, thence to her descend-
ants per stirpes, the estate to be invested by and subject to the order of the
court, Acts of 1882, e. 477, § 32.

In Massachusetts, all of a woman's property at her marriage remains her
separate property, and a married woman may receive, receipt for, hold, man-
age, and dispose of property, as if unmarried; but without her husband's
written consent she cannot impair his curtesy, Public Statutes of 1882,
c. 147, § 1. She may make contracts as if unmarried, but not with her hus-
band, § 2. A husband and wife cannot transfer property to each other,
except that he may give her wearing apparel, and articles of personal use and
ornament up to ¥-',000, if not in fraud of creditors, § 3. Her labor for other
than her husband and children, unless expressly agreed otherwise, is pre-
sumed to be on her separate account, § 4. She may be an executrix, ad-
ministratrix, guardian, or trustee, and may bind herself and the estate she
represents without his act or assent, § 5. A married woman may make a
will as if unmarried, but may not, without the husband's written consent, de-
prive him of curtesy or of more than one half of her personal estate. § 6. She
may sue and be sued as if unmarried, but no suits can be had between hus-
band and wife, § 7. She is not liable for her husband's debts, nor her prop-
erty on an execution against him unless she fails to record a certificate that
she is doing business on separate account, §§8, 11. The husband is not
liable for an antenuptial or postnuptial debt, except when such a certificate
is not recorded, § 9. Her contracts touching her property, trade, business, la-
bor, or services do not bind him or his property, except on failure to record such
a certificate, but bind her and her property as if unmarried, § 10. When she
does or proposes to do business on her separate account, a certificate giving
their names, its nature and the place with street and number, must be re-
corded, failure to do which renders the property employed liable for the hus-
band's debts and the husband liable on all contracts as if made by himself,
§ 11. She may have a trustee appointed to take charge of her property, § 13.
If her real estate is taken by eminent domain, the compensation therefor may
be invested so as to secure her the same benefit as from the property taken,
§ 14. If she comes into the State without her husband, she may act as if un-
married, § 29. \Vhen husband and wife come into the State and reside as
such, she retains all her property, and subsequent rights accrue as if the time
of their coming was the time of their marriage, § 30. If he deserts her or is
in the state-prison, not leaving a maintenance, she may, by leave of court, dis-
pose of her property or of any undisposed personal property coming to him by
reason of the marriage, as if unmarried, during such absence or imprison-
ment, § 31. Her personal wages are not liable to trustee process in a suit
against the husband, c. 183, § 29. If she dies intestate, without issue living,
he takes of her real estate in fee up to !$5 000, and curtesy in the remainder ;
if she dies without kindred, the whole in fee, c. 124, § 1. If a married
woman dies leaving issue and personal estate undisposed of by will, one half
of the same goes to the husband, Stat, of 1882, c. 141.

In Michigan, a, married woman's property at the marriage and afterwards
acquired in any way is her estate free of her husband's debts, and may be
contracted about, sold, transferred, mortgaged, conveyed, devised, and be-
queathed as if she were unmarried, Compiled Laws of 1871, vol. ii. § 4083.
Any trustee of hers may convey to her all or a part of the property or the
income for her separate use, § 4804. She may sue and be sued touching her
sole property, as if unmarried ; and where the husband's property cannot be
sold or encumbered without her consent in due form or is exempt from judicial
process, she may sue in her own name, § 4S0.5. Her husband is not liable
on her property contracts, but she may be sued on her contracts where he is
422

CII. XVIII.] MARRIED WOMEN. * 380

not liable or refuses to perform, § 4806. If he deserts her or is in the state-
prison without providing for '

ceive such personal estate as is due the husband in her right, and give a valid
discharge, S, 4777. All such proceeds she may use as if her own !nd unmar-
ried, and while deserted, she may contract in her own name, sue and be sued,
make and execute instruments in her own name, all of which shall be as bind-
ing as if the marriage took place thereafter, §§ 4778-47S8. When her real
estate is taken by eminent domain, the compensation may be so invested as to
attord the same benefit as the undamaged estate would have, § 4793 If she
comes from another State without her husband, she may act in all respects as
it unmarried ; and when her husband comes, the effect is as if the marriage
took place at his arrival, §§ 4795-4797. She may insure his life for her bene-
fit up to |300 premium, and may make such insurance payable, if she dies
before him, to her children or dispose of it by will, §§ 4808, 4809. She may
execute a power, if of age, by grant or devise, without the husband's concur-
rence, unless m terms prohibited, § 4178. If entitled to an estate in fee and
empowered to dispose of it during the marriage, she may create any estate, as
if unmarried, § 4197. If she dies intestate, one third of her personal estate
goes to the husband, and the remainder to her children ; but if one child only,
one half to him ; if no children or issue, nor parents, nor brothers or sisters or
issue, the whole goes to him. A homestead of forty acres without, or a lot in,
a town, city, or village, up to $1,500, is exempt from judicial sale, § 6137. Her
acknowledgment to a deed or other instrument affecting real property, and
those taken since Aug. 4, 1875, may be taken as if she were unmarried
Stat, of 1877, p. 50.

In Minnesota, all of a married woman's property, owned before or after
marriage, continues her separate property, and she may receive, take, hold,
use, and enjoy it and its profits and all avails of her contracts and industry
free from her husband's control and debts, as if unmarried, General Statutes
of 1878, c. 69, § 1. She is bound by her contracts and responsible for her
torts, and her property is liable therefor, as if she were unmarried. She may
contract, as if unmarried, but not to sell or convey real estate other than by
a mortgage to secure purchase money or a lease for three years or less, unless
the husband joins, and no curtesy attaches against such a mortgage, § 2.
She is not liable for his debts, nor is he for hers other than for necessaries,
§ 3. The husband and wife may not contract with each other touching real
estate, but may in respect to all other matters, as if they were not married.
But where rights of creditors and bona fide purchasers come in question, they
are held to have notice of each other's debts and contracts, § 4. If she is
deserted by him for a year or is entitled to a divorce, she may, by decree of
court, bar his curtesy and have power to dispose of her lands, as if unmarried,
§ 5. Antenuptial settlements are unaffected, and the husband is not ex-
empted from liability for her torts, § 6. If a married woman deposits in a
savings bank, the trustees may repay her, and her receipt shall be a discharge
as against third persons, c. 33, § 62. She may sue and be sued alone, as if un-
married, where the husband would not be a necessary party aside from the
marriage relation, c. 66, § 29. A homestead of eighty acres without, or a lot
within, a town of over 5,000 inhabitants, or half an acre in a lesser town, is
exempt from judicial sale, c. 68, § 1. The surviving husband or wife is enti-
tled to the homestead of the deceased for life, free of debts, c. 46, § 2. A married
woman may dispose of her property by will, as if unmarried, c. 47, § 1. If the
wife dies intestate leaving issue, the husband is entitled absolutely to an undi-
vided third of all her real estate, free of any disposition of the same to which he
did not assent, but subject proportionally to her debts; if without kindred, to
the whole of such real estate, § 3. All undisposed-of personal estate is admin-
istered as intestate estate, c. 47, § 4.
In Mississippi, a married woman has the same capacity to acquire, hold,

423

* 381 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

manage, control, use, enjoy, and dispose of all property, contract about it,
bind herself personally, sue and be sued, with all the rights and liabilities
thereof, as if unmarried, Revised Code of 1880, c. 42, § 1107. Husband and wiie
may sue each other, § 1108. She may dispose of her estate by will, as if
unmarried, § 1109. Dower and curtesy are abolished, § 1170. If she dies
with issue, leaving estate undisposed of, it descends to her husband and
descendants in equal parts; if without issue, the husband inherits the whole,
§ 1171. If she fails to make satisfactory provision for her husband in her will,
he may renounce the same and become entitled to the same share as if she had
died intestate, except that, if she leaves no issue, he shall be entitled to only
one half of her estate, § 1172. If her will contains no provision for him, he
has the same share as in the case of an unsatisfactory provision, § 1173. Her
provision by will for him is in bar of any share of her estate, unless otherwise
expressed, §1174. If the husband has separate property at the death of the
wife, testate, equal to his share of her estate, he cannot renounce; but if less,
he may have the difference made up to him ; or if only one fifth, the whole,
§ 1175. If the husband appropriates her property or its income, he shall be
her debtor for a year ; but if she permits him to use the income, or her estate
for family support, he is not chargeable, § 1176. They cannot contract with
each other for compensation for services rendered, nor can he rent or carry on
business with his wife's plantation, houses, cattle, or tools, or with any of her
means, but all business so done is on her account by him as agent as to
persons without notice, unless written contract to the contrary is executed
by them, acknowledged and recorded, § 1177. No transfer of goods or lands
between them is valid against third persons unless in writing, acknowledged
and recorded, possession of property not being equivalent to record, § 1178.

In Missouri, a married woman, deserted or whom her husband fails to sup-
port, may, by leave of court, sell and convey her real estate or any undisposed-
of personal estate, which he has in her right, or receive any such personal
property from the holder and give a valid discharge therefor, and her earn-
ings and those of her minor children, fred of his debts, and use the proceeds
of such sales, personal property and earnings, to support herself and family.
Revised .Statutes of 1879, c. 51, §§ 3284-3288. When her real estate is taken
by eminent domain, the compensation therefor may be invested so as to se-
cure her the same benefits as such real estate, § 3289. The wife of a man
under guardianship may, by leave of court, join with the guardian in convey-
ing her real estate, and release dower in so doing, § 3290. While the hus-
band is in the penitentiary, she may do business and sue and be sued, as if
unmarried, as well as be entitled to 'the rights of an abandoned wife, § 3291.
A married woman, living apart from her husband by reason of ill-usage, may,
by leave of court, have the sole use and enjoyment of her real estate, §§ 3292-
3294. Her real estate, its income and the proceeds of its sale and her hus-
band's interest in that owned by her at the marriage and afterwards acquired
by gift, grant, devise, or inheritance, are free of his debts and cannot be con-
veyed by him without her joinder; but the annual products are liable for family
necessaries, for labor and materials thereon, and for improvements, § 3295.
Her personal property at marriage and acquired after by gift, bequest, or in-
heritance, or by purchase with separate money, or personal wages or compen-
sation for personal injuries, with the profits thereof, remains her separate
property, free from his debts, except what he has become possessed of with
her express assent in writing, but is subject to her antenuptial debts and
for his debts for family necessaries, § 3296. The husband's property, except
such as he may have acquired from the wife, is exempt from all her antenup-
tial debts, Laws of 1881, p. 161.

In Montana, a married woman may sue alone concerning her separate prop-
erty or homestead ; when the action is between her husband and herself, or
when living apart from him, she may sue and be sued alone. If sued with him,
she may defend for herself and for him, if he neglect, Revised Statutes of
1879, p. 42, §§ 7, 8. She may dispose of her property by will without her
424

CH. XVIII.J MARRIED WOMEN. * 3gl

husband's consent, p 271, § 435. If she dies intestate, leaving a child or its
issue, the husband takes an equal share of her property; if more than tone
* -o7 he„t7aukes one third; if no issue or kindred, he takes the whole, p. 282
V \- sheudles, the entire community property goes to him, except that

she may dispose by will of the portion for her support, p. 285, 6 550 She
may convey her real estate with her husband, being examined privily as to the
same p 441 §(,196-199. All her before and after acquired property is free of
her husband s debts, except for family necessaries, such property to be thus
exempt to be recorded, p. 588, § 86(5. She may do business on her own ac-
count, p. o89, § 867, on filing a declaration to become individually responsible
for her business debts, § 868. She may then do business in her own name, all
the property therein belongs to her free of his debts, and she may sue and be
sued concerning it, § 869. She is then responsible for her children's mainte-
nance, § 870. She may not invest more than $10,000, unless her declarations
state under oath that the surplus is not from the husband's funds, § 871
Neither he nor his property is liable for her business debts unless he consents
m writing, § 872. A homestead of one hundred and sixty acres without a
town, city, or village, or one fourth of an awe within, up to $2,500, is exempt
from judicial process, p. 101, § 311.

In Nebraska, all a married woman's property at the marriage and its profits,
and that coming to her by descent, devise, or the gift of other than her hus-
band, or acquired by purchase, remains her separate property, as if unmarried,
aud free from his debts or disposal, Compiled Statutes of 1881, c. 53, §1.
She toay bargain, sell, and convey, and contract concerning her property as
fully as a married man, § 2. She may sue and be sued, as if unmarried, § 3.
She may do business and service on sole account, and her earnings therefrom
are her sole property, and may be used and invested in her own name, § 4. A
woman married without, if her husband comes to reside in this State, enjoys
rights there acquired, § 5. The husband's property is not liable for her ante-
nuptial debts, § 7. She may dispose of her property by will, as if unmarried,
c. 23, § 123. She may likewise manage, control, lease, or convey her real estate
by deed or will, c. 73, § 42. A homestead up to $2,000, and one hundred
and sixty acres without, or two lots within, an incorporated city or village,
are exempt from execution, c. 36, § 1.

In Nevada, all the property of a married woman at the marriage or after
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, with its profits, is her separate
property, which, with the exception of money, must be inventoried, acknowl-
edged, and recorded from time to time as acquired, Compiled Laws of 1873,
§§ 151-155. The husband has the control and absolute disposition of the
community property, with certain exceptions, § 156. Curtesy and dower are
abolished, § 157. She may, without the husband's consent, dispose of her
property in any manner, § 158. Her earnings, as to his debts, and if living
apart from her husband, those of herself and minor children, are her own
absolutely, § 164. If he allows her to use her earnings, it is a gift, and with
the profits, they belong to her, § 165. Her separate property is alone liable
for her debts, §§ 166, 167. They may contract with each other, as if unmar-
ried, like persons occupying a confidential position towards each other, § 169.
She must support the husband if not able to support himself, § 174. If living
apart from him, she may sue alone, § 175. She may dispose of her property
by deed and by will, § 184. She may, by leave of court, become a sole trader,
and may sue and be sued in matters pertaining to the business, while the hus-
band is'not liable for her contracts unless made with his written assent. She
is then liable for her children's maintenance, § 223.

In New Hampshire, a married woman holds to her own use, free of her
husband's control, all before or after acquired property, if not the result of a

Eayment or pledge of his property, General Laws of 1878, c. 183, § 1. While
er husband is insane, during his abandonment of her without leaving a suit-
able maintenance, or when a cause of divorce exists by his act, she may hold
and use the earnings of her minor children, and use such property as he may

425

* 382 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

leave, for the family maintenance, §§ 2, 3. If the wife of an alien or citizen
of another State resides apart from him in the State for six mouths, she may
hold property, as if unmarried, and have the care of and expend the earnings
of her minor children; and when he comes into the State, the effect is of a
marriage of that date, §§ 4, 5. The wife of a man under guardianship may
join his guardian in conveying her real estate, § 9. If of age, she may join
her husband in any conveyance of real estate; and in release of dower, if
not of full age, § 10. She may, if of full age, dispose of her property by will,
but not to the impairment of the husband's rights, § 11. As to third persons,
she lias the same rights, may make contracts, and sue and be sued, as if un-
married, but no undertaking on her husband's behalf is binding except her
release of dower and homestead in a mortgage, § 12, as amended by the Laws
of 1879, c. 57, § 27. She may have a trustee appointed to manage her prop-
erty, § 14. While he is insane, or the member of a religious society believing
marriage unlawful, or is in a state-prison, or a cause of divorce exists by his
act, she may, by leave of court, have a just share of his estate set off to her,
and may convey it so as to bar dower, homestead, and curtesy, §§ 15-17. He
is not liable for her antenuptial debts, § 18. A homestead to the value of
$500 is exempt from execution, c. 138, § 1. The husband is entitled to cur-
tesy; and if she dies without issue intestate, or testate with no provision for
him in her will, or if he waives provision, to one third of her personal prop-
erty; or if without issue, to one half of the same; but neither to curtesy nor
share if he deserted her or failed to maintain her within three years of her
death, c. 202, § 15, as amended by the laws of 1879, c. 37. If she dies with
issue by him, the husband may waive provision for him in her will and release
curtesy, and become entitled to one-third part of her real estate in fee; if
without issue by him, to a life-interest in one third of her real estate; if with-
out issue, to one half of her real estate in fee, c. 202, § 16. Any antenuptial
settlement in his favor bars his claims upon her estate, § 17. Mutual devises
and bequests are in lieu of rights in each other's estate, unless otherwise
expressed, § 18.

In New Jersey, the property of any woman married since July 4, 1852, at
the marriage continues her separate property, as if unmarried, Revision of
1877, p. 636, § 1. All the property of any woman "now married" is her
separate property, as if unmarried, except the liability for the husband's debts
contracted before July 4, 1852, § 2. All the property and profits acquired by
a married woman after July 4, 1852, in any way, is her sole property, as if
unmarried, § 3. Her future earnings and their investments are to be her sole
property, as if unmarried, § 4. She may contract and enforce the same, as if
unmarried, except as accommodation indorser, guarantor, or surety, or to
answer for the debt or default of a third person, § 5. She is bound by the
covenants in her deed of land, § 7. She may, without the concurrence of her
husband, receive and receipt for property, as if unmarried, § 8. She may, if
of the age of twenty-one years, dispose of her property by will, as if unmar-
ried, without impairing the husband's interest in her real property, § 9. She,
and not the husband, is with her property liable, and may be sued, as if un-
married, for her ante and post nuptial debts, § 10. . She may sue alone, touch-
ing her separate property, as if unmarried, § 11. She cannot convey her real
estate without her husband, except when specially provided, nor impair his
curtesy, nor can they contract with or sue each other, § 14. Her property is
not subject to his disposal or debts, § 15. She may make deposits in a savings
bank free of the husband's control, p. 1069, § 66. If living separate from
her husband, she may, without his consent, sell and convey any contingent
interests any real property, other than what came from her husband, as if
unmarried, Laws of 1880, c. 62. Any conveyance in pursuance of a power of
attorney executed by a married woman with the husband is as effectual as if
she were unmarried, Laws of 1882, c. 68.

In New Mexico, persons of either sex, not otherwise prohibited by law,
may make a will, General Laws of 1880, p. 26, § 1. Married persons, having
426

CH. XVIII.] MARRIED WOMEN. * 382

no direct heir, may constitute each other, mutually, as heirs, § 10. One half
of the wife's property, testate or intestate, after deducting the common debts
of the marriage and her private debts, belongs to the husband, p. 32, §§ 4, 5.
When her property amounts to $5,000, and the heirs be not descendants, or in
the absence of these it exceeds this sum, after certain deductions are made,
the husband is entitled to one fourth, if without this aid he would remain
poor; § 7. When the husband or wife dies without legitimate children, the
survivor takes all the acquired property of the marriage community, p. 36.

In New York, the property of a married woman at the marriage and its
income remains her separate property, free from the disposal or debts of her
husband, as if she were unmarried, Revised Statutes of 1882, vol. iii.
p. 233b'. A married woman may take by descent, gift, grant, devise, or be-
quest from other than her husband, and hold to her separate use, and convey
and devise, property and its income, free from her husband's disposal and
debts, as if she were unmarried, ib. A trustee of her property, on her
written request and by leave of court, may convey to her all or a part of such
property or its income for her sole use and benefit, ib. Marriage contracts
are valid, ib. A married woman's property, coming to her by descent,
will, or gift, by business or labor on her sole account, owned at the marriage,
and its income, remains her property, may be used, collected, and invested in
her own name, free from her husband's control or debts, except such latter as
were contracted for family necessaries, p. 2338. She may dispose of her per-
sonal property, carry on business and perform labor on her separate account,
and her earnings are her property, and may be used or invested in her own name,
ib. She may sell, convey, and contract about her real estate in all respects
as if unmarried, and may covenant so as to bind her separate property, ib.
Neither her contracts touching her separate estate or business bind her hus-
band, ib. A joint action may be brought against them for her antenuptial debt,
but the judgment binds her separate estate only, or her husband only to the
extent of her property acquired by him, p. 2337. She may insure his life for
her sole use up to $500 premium, p. 2335. She may, if without issue, dispose
of such insurance by will, ib. She may hold any patent received by her and its
proceeds, and may use and dispose of it as if unmarried, ib. If of age, she may
give and execute a power of attorney as if unmarried, p. 2339; may assign
or surrender, with his assent, a policy on his life for her benefit, vol. li.
p. 1515; and may acknowledge instruments, or proof of execution be taken,
as if unmarried, vol. iii. p. 2233; she may sue and defend as if single, and
the husband should not be joined in a suit affecting her separate estate, vol.
iv. p. 90; Code of Civil Procedure, § 450.

In North Carolina, a married woman is alone liable for her antenuptial
contracts, Revised Statutes of 1873, p. 590, §§ 13, 14. The husband must be
joined in a suit against her, but judgment will not issue against him for her an-
tenuptial debts or postnuptial contracts, § 15. But he may be liable for costs
for misconduct in such a suit, or discharged from the defence, § 16. She cannot
contract to bind her property without the husband's written consent, ex-
cept for necessary personal expenses, for family support, or for discharging
antenuptial debts, unless she is a free trader, § 17. She may by an ante-
nuptial contract, or by the husband's written consent, acknowledged and
recorded, become such a trader, and contract as if unmarried, §§ l°-20.
She may, after due notice, cease to be a trader, and return to her disability,
except as to incurred liablity or subsequent fraud, § 22. She must be joined
by her husband in a conveyance of her real estate, except in a lease up to
three years, § 26. She may contract with her husband, but may not, with-
out leave of court, thereby charge her real estate longer than three years,
SS 27, 28. Her separate income, if saved, is her separate property; but it he
receives it without objection, he is liable to account for it but a year, § JJ.
She may dispose of her property by will as if unmarried, but not to impair
curtesy $ 31. If she dies intestate, in whole or in part, he holds her per-
sonal estate, subject to her debts. If he then dies before administering, it

427

* 382 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

passes into his estate, still so subject, § 32. She may insure his life up to
$300 premium out of his estate, and dispose of her interest therein by will,
§ 34 In executing an instrument for registry, she must acknowledge after a
separate examination by the proper officer, Laws of 1876, 1877, p. 320.

In Ohio, a married woman's real estate, at the marriage or after acquired,
■with its income, remains her separate property and under her control. She
may in her own name contract for its improvement, or lease it for not more
than three years. It is subject to curtesy, but not during her life to her hus-
band's debts or control, Revised Statutes of 1880, § 3108. Her personal
property at the marriage, or after acquired in any way, remains her separate
property and under her sole control, free of husband's debts, except such as
he has reduced to possession with her express assent to dispose of for his own
use and benefit, § 3109. Her property is liable in a joint action against hus-
band and wife for an antenuptial cause against her, for her tort during the
marriage, or for her contract for the improvement of her real estate, § 3110.
If the husband deserts her, or neglects to provide for his family, she may con-
tract for her own and minor children's labor, and collect the earnings, and, by
leave of court, act as an unmarried woman in acquiring and disposing of prop-
erty, in making contracts, and in suing and being sued, after which he ceases
to be liable upon her contracts, § 3111. If the husband joins a sect not be-
lieving in marriage, she may have a just part of his property, and may have
the care of a minor child and its proportion of his property; and all his dispo-
sitions of his property tending to deprive his wife and children of support are
void, and may be recovered, §§ ull3-3117. She must, in disposing of her
real estate, join with her husband, and acknowledge the same after a separate
examination touching the same, §§ 4107-1109. A married woman may sue
and be sued alone only concerning her separate property, upon her written
obligation, her firm business, to set aside a deed or will, to collect a legacy,
or if the suit is between her husband and herself, § 4996. Judgment may
be enforced against her and her property as if unmarried ; but she is entitled
to the benefit of all exemptions to heads of families, § 5319. She may
insure her husband's life for her benefit; and insurance on the life of any
person may be transferred to her and inure to her separate use, and in case
she die before due, to her children, or if no children, on her death revert to
the party insured or his transferee. She may sell or assign such insurance
with the concurrence of the party insured, § 3629. If a married woman
dies intestate, without children or their legal representatives or kindred, all
her property belongs to the husband, §§ 4158-4160, 41G3. She may make
a will, § 5914.

In Oregon, a married woman's property at the marriage or after acquired
by gift, devise, or descent, is free of her husband's debts and contracts, and is
to be registered, Revised Statutes of 1872, p. 95, § 5. She can sue and be
sued alone only touching her separate estate, or when the action is between
herself and husband, p. 110. She must be joined by her husband in con-
veying her real estate, but in so doing is not bound by the covenants, p. 515,
§ 2. She may make a will subject to curtesy, p. 788, § 3. Her property
and earnings are free from his control, p. 663, § 4. If deserted, she may,
by leave of court, act as if unmarried, even to the sale and conveyance of her
property, § 5.

In Pennsylvania, a married woman's property at the marriage and after-
terwards acquired of every kind remains her separate property, free from her
husband's debts or disposal without her written consent duly acknowledged.
He is not liable for her antenuptial debts, Brightly's Purdon Digest of 1872,
p. 1005, § 13. She may dispose of her property by will, § 14. She is liable
with her husband for family necessaries, § 15. She must join him in her
suits, § 20. She may have a trustee, § 19. She may lend him money and
take a mortgage therefor in her trustee's name, § 21. If deserted or
unprovided for by him, she may act as an unmarried trader, and have exclu-
sive charge of her children, §§ 24-26. The husband, by desertion or neglect
428

CH. XVIII. J MARRIED WOMEN. * 382

for a year, loses his curtesy and all intestate rights to her estate, and to ap-
point a guardian for the children by will, §§ 27, 28. She may buy a sewing-
machine for her own use, § 37. Her personal earnings, after leave of
court, are her property, §§ 38, 39. She may, at the discretion of the trus-
tees, receive payment of her deposits in a bank, or interest thereon, without
the assent, and free from the debts, of the husband, Brightly 's Purdon
Digest, 1873-1878, p. 1827. She may transfer her personal property with due
acknowledgment, p. 1899. She may sell and transfer stocks as if unmar-
ried, p. 2037. She may hold stock in savings fund, building or loan associa-
tions, with full privileges, may alone sell, assign, transfer, or withdraw it, may
borrow money of such associations, and secure it by transfer of the stock, by
other securities, or by a bond and mortgage on her estate, if the husband joins
in the latter. All dues may be collected of her, and the stock is free from
her husband's debts, Acts of 1879, p. 17, § 7.

In Rhode Island, a married woman's property before marriage, or be-
coming hers thereafter, or acquired by her own industry, and its income,
remains her separate property, free of her husband's debts, Public Statutes
of 1882, c. 166, § 1. The proceeds of its sale may be invested in her name
■with the same effect as if unsold, § 2. The husband's receipt for her income
is sufficient, unless she has given notice otherwise, when her receipt alone is
sufficient, as it is in all cases for the payment to her of her property, § 3. She
may, by joining her husband, convey by deed her real property, furniture,
plate, jewels, shares of stock, savings deposits, and mortgage debts due her;
and the husband cannot alone convey such property of hers, §§ 4, 5. She
may sell, convey, and contract with reference to the rest of her property as if
unmarried; but may not transact business as a trader, § 6. If of age, the
husband and wife may convey her property by joint or separate deeds, which,
to be effective, must be acknowledged by her on an examination apart from
her husband, §§ 7-9. If of the age of twenty-one years, she may dispose of
her real estate, and if of the age of eighteen years, of her personal property by
will; but not to impair curtesy or her husband's right to administer without
accounting upon her undisposed-of personal estate, §§ 13, 14. Her property
is liable for her antenuptial debts and upon her authorized contracts, as if she
•were unmarried, § 15. Upon authorized contracts she can sue and be sued
alone; in all other matters, if without a trustee, the husband must be joined,
§ 16. Judgments recovered upon such suits become her property, § 17. She
may have a trustee appointed over her property, § 18. The rights of husbands
accruing before the digest of 1844 went into operation remain the same, § 20.
Life insurance up to $10,000 on any life for her benefit inures to her separate
use, may be sued for by her, and she may have a trustee appointed to hold the
proceeds. §§ 21, 22. If she is of age, and is deserted, or not provided for by
him (if able) for six months, she may, by leave of court, sell and convey her
property, have her minor children's earnings, and sue and be sued as if un-
married, § 23. She may control, transfer, and withdraw her deposits in savings
banks and the interest thereon, c. 153, § 58. If she die intestate without
issue or kindred, her property goes to her husband, c. 187, § 4.

In South Carolina, a married woman's property, at the marriage or alter
acquired in any way, is her separate property free of her husband's debts,
General Statutes of 1882, § 2035. She may devise, bequeath or convey it as
if unmarried; if she dies intestate, with issue, the husband takes one-third ot
her estate; if without issue, one half; if without issue, parents, brothers, sis-
ters or issue, or lineal ancestor, two-thirds; if without issue or kindred, the
whole of her estate; and she may execute all legal instruments as it un-
married, «« 2036, 1845. She can purchase, take conveyances, and contract
with reference to her property, as if unmarried, and her husband is not liable
for her debts except when contracted for her necessary support, § MSI. sue
may sue and be sued alone touching her separate property, or when the action
is between her husband and herself, judgment to be enforced as if she weie
unmarried, Code of 1882, § 135.

429

* 382 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

In Tennessee, life insurance, effected by a married woman upon her hus-
band's life, inures to her benefit and that of her children free of his debts,
Compiled Statutes of 1871, § 2479. The proceeds of her property cannot be
paid to any person except by her consent on privy examination, or by their
joint deed or power of attorney, § 2483. She may dispose of her separate
estate by will, §§ 2108, 2484. If deserted by him, or leaving him for ill-treat-
ment, after-acquired property by her is free of his debts or disposal during
the separation, § 2485. If of the age of twenty-one years, she may dispose of
her interest in real estate by will, deed, or otherwise, as if unmarried, § 2486 a.
She may dispose of her real estate in any manner without his consent or con-
currence after privy examination thereto before the proper official, § 2486 b.
Unless in case of a settled estate upon her, the power is withheld, § 2486 c.
Her property is liable for debts for necessaries for herself and children, as if
she were unmarried, § 2 ISO d. Her property must be scheduled and registered,
§ 2 186 e. Her separate property is liable for her antenuptial debts, Acts of
1877, p. 104. Her property is not subject to her husband's debts or contracts
except by her consent in writing, Acts of 1879, p. 182, u. 141.

In Texas, all a married woman's property before marriage and acquired
after by gift, devise, or descent, and the increase of land acquired, is her sep-
arate property, but is under the husband's sole management, Revised Statutes
of 1879, Art. 2851. All her other after-acquired property is common, and may
be disposed of by the husband alone, Art. 2852. At the dissolution of the
marriage all their effects are regarded as common, unless proved otherwise,
Art. 2853. She may contract debts for family necessaries and for the benefit
of her separate property, for which they may be jointly sued, Arts. 1205, 2854;
and execution levied on her separate or the common property at the discretion
of the plaintiff, Art. 2855. If the husband fails to support her or to educate
the children from the proceeds of her property, she may, by decree of court,
have so much as may be necessary, Art. 2856. If the husband fails to sue
alone or jointly with her for her property, she may, by leave of court, sue for
it alone, Art. 1201. She may dispose of her property by will, Art. 4857. If
she die intestate with issue, the husband is entitled to one third of the per-
sonal estate, and an estate for life in one third of her land ; if without issue,
to the whole of the personal estate and one half of the land absolutely; if
without issue, or parents, brothers, or sisters or issue, to the whole of her prop-
erty, Art. 1046. A homestead of two hundred acres without, or lots up to
$5,000 within, a town or city, are exempt from a forced sale, Art. 2336.

In Utah, a married woman's property at the marriage and afterwards ac-
quired by gift, devise, or descent, and its income, is her separate property, and
may be managed and disposed of as if unmarried, Compiled Laws of" 1876,
p. 342, § 1020. She may sue and be sued, § 1021. No dower exists, § 1022.
She may dispose of all her estate by will, p. 271, § 689.

In Vermont, a married woman doing business in her own name may sue
and be sued in all matters connected therewith, as if unmarried, and execution
issue against her separate estate, Revised Laws of 1880, § 2321. Personalty
acquired by descent is held to her sole use, § 2322. Stocks and bonds given
her by a parent, and the income, are hers, free from the husband's debts', ex-
cept for family necessaries and the improvement of her real estate, and may
be disposed of by her as if unmarried, § 2323. The annual products of her
realty, the proceeds of its sale, and her husband's interest therein are free of
his debts, except that such annual products are liable for family necessaries
and for labor and materials on her real estate after November 20, 1861. Her
husband, without her joinder, cannot dispose of such annual products or his
interest, § 2325. When her realty is taken for a public use, the compensation
may be so invested as to yield the same benefit that such undamaged realty
would have afforded, § 2326. If deserted or unprovided for, she may contract
for and be entitled to the earnings of herself and minor children ; may, by
leave of court, hold and dispose of property, contract, and sue and be sued in
her own name, but he will not be liable on such contracts, or rights vested
430

CH. XVIII.] MARRIED WOMEN. * 882

prior to January 1, 1871 ; she may also sell her realty and undisposed-of per-
sonalty coming to him through her, and receive personalty due him, all the
proceeds of which she may use, during his absence, for the family support,
§§ 2327-2330. If forced to live apart from him by his ill-treatment, she
may, by leave of court, have the sole benefit of her real estate, §§ 2331-2333.
While he is in State prison, she may do business, sue and be sued, and have
the same privileges as when deserted, § 2334. She may insure' his life up to
$300 premium free of his debts, § 2340. She may dispose of her property by
will, § 2039. If she dies intestate and without issue, the husband, if he does
not elect to take curtesy, takes all her property if not over $2,000, if more
than that, he takes $2,000 and half of the remainder; if without issue or kin-
dred, he takes the whole, § 2230. Her earnings deposited in a savings bank
are exempt from trustee process, § 3577.

In Virginia, a married woman's property at the marriage, and its profits
and income, and that acquired by her as a sole trader, is her separate property,
free of her husband's disposal and debts ; and she may contract with reference
thereto and dispose of it, and sue and be sued, as if unmarried, if he contracts
with her touching her property other than that acquired by her in trade, and
is joined in suits affecting her, Acts of 1876-1877, p. 333, § 1. A married
woman's property, acquired by gift, grant, purchase, descent, or devise, is her
separate estate, subject to the provisions of the above Act of 1877, free of her
husband's debts; and she may dispose of it by will, but not to the impairment
of curtesy ; and if a minor, her guardian is not to turn her estate over to her
until she reaches the age of twenty-one years, Acts of 1877-1878, p. 247. If
she dies intestate, the whole of her personal property goes to the husband; if
intestate, without issue or kindred, the whole of her real estate goes to her
husband, Code of 1873, c. 119, §§ 1, 10.

In Washington Territory a married woman may acquire, hold, and dis-
pose of property, and sue and be sued, as if unmarried, Code of 1681, § 2396.
She has no more of disability in civil matters than the husband, and may
equally in her own name appeal to the courts, § 2398. She has equal right
to earnings and estate of children, § 2399. Her property at the marriage, and
after acquired by gift, devise, or inheritance, and its income and profits, is free
of her husband's debts and contracts, and she may manage, lease, sell, convey,
encumber, and dispose of it by will precisely as her husband can, § 2400. If
he gets control of it, she may sue for it as if unmarried, § 2401. She may con-
stitute him her attorney in fact, as if unmarried, § 2403. She may receive
and sue for her personal earnings, and may sue and be sued for the protection
of her rights, as if unmarried, § 2404. Neither she, nor the rent or income
of her property, are liable for his antenuptial debts, nor for his separate debts,
§ 2405. She may contract and enforce and be held by them as if unmarried,
§ 2406. Her property is jointly or separately liable for family expenses and
children's education, § 2407. Property acquired by her other than by gift,
devise, or inheritance, is community property, which personalty the husband
manages and disposes of, but not more than one half by will, § 2409. He can-
not dispose of community realty unless she joins, § 2410. On her death, one
half of the community property goes to him. the other half being subject to
her disposal by will, § 2411. If without issue, the whole goes to him, § 2412.
If separate from him, her earnings and accumulations, and those of minor
children with her, are her separate property, § 2413. Dower and curtesy are
abolished, § 2414. If she dies intestate with one child, he takes one halt ot
her property; with more than one child, he takes one third; if without issue
but parents, he takes one half; if without issue or parents, or brother or sister,
he takes the whole, § 3302. .

In West Virginia, a married woman's property at the marriage, ana con-
veyed to her other than by her husband, and its profits, is her sole property, as
if unmarried, free from her husband's control and debts, Kelly's Revised
Statutes, vol. ii. c. 122, §§ 1, 2. She may take property by gift, grant devise,
or descent from other than her husband, and hold, convey, and devise it and its

431

* 382 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

profits as if unmarried, free from his debts and disposal; but unless apart
from him he must join in her deed of conveyance, § 3. Her trustee on her
written request may, by leave of court, convey her property to her, § 4. She
may insure hpr husband's life up to $150 premium free of his debts, § 5. She
may hold, enjoy, and dispose of a patent free of her husband's debts, § 7.
She may receive and receipt for her deposits in a bank, § 8. She may be sued
jointly with him for her antenuptial debt, but the judgment will bind hpr
property alone, § 10. The husband is liable for her antenuptial debts only to
the extent of her separate property acquired by him, § 11. She may sue and
be sued alone concerning her separate property, when between her husband
and herself, and when living apart from him, § 12. If living apart from him,
she may do business in her own name, and the property used, the profits and
earnings realized, will be her separate property, free from the debts and con-
trol of her husband, § 13.

In Wisconsin, a married woman's property at the marriage, including
realty held jointly with her husband, is her separate property, with its profits,
free of his debts and disposal, Revised Statutes of 1878, c. 108, §§ 2340,
2341. She may receive property by inheritance, gift, grant, devise, or bequest
other than from her husband, and hold, convey, and devise it and its profits as
if unmarried, free from his debts and disposal, § 2342. Her personal earnings,
except those from her husband, are her own, free of his debts and control,
§ 2343. If deserted or unprovided for, she may do business in her own name,
and collect the profits and her and her minor children's earnings, and apply
them to the family support, free from his debts or control, § 2344. She may
sue and be sued touching her property or personal earnings, and judgment
enforced against her property, as if she were unmarried, § 2345. She is liable,
as if unmarried, for antenuptial debts contracted after April 3, 1872, § 2346.
She may insure her husband or another person for her benefit up to $150 pre-
mium, § 2347. She may, if of age, convey her real estate, as if unmarried,
c. 100, § 2221. She may, if eighteen years of age, dispose of all her real and
personal estate by will, c. 103, §§ 2277, 2281. Her deposits in a savings bank
and profits are her own solely, payable to her, and her receipt therefor is a
discharge, c. 94, § 2020. If she dies intestate, without issue, her real and per-
sonal property goes to her husband, c. 101, § 2270; c. 169, § 3935.

In Wyoming, a married woman's property at the marriage, and afterwards
acquired in any way other than from her husband, is her separate property,
and may be enjoyed by her as if unmarried, free from the debts and contr-ol of
her husband, Compiled Laws of 1876, u. 82, § 1. She may contract about, sell,
and convey her personalty as if unmarried, § 2. She may sue and be sued
touching her property, person, and reputation as if unmarried, § 3. She may
make a will as if unmarried, § 4. She may do business and perform services,
and the earnings and profits are her own, and may be used by her, and do all
acts relating to the same, as if unmarried, § 5. Her husband is not liable for
her antenuptial debts unless he assumes them in writing, § 6. If she dies
intestate with issue, one half of her property goes to him ; if without issue, three
fourths; but if no more than $10,000, the whole, c. 42, § 1.

In the District of Columbia, a married woman's property at the mar-
riage, or acquired during marriage in any other way than by gift or conveyance
from her husband, is her own as absolutely as if she were unmarried, free from
her husband's disposal and debts, Revised Statutes of 1873-1874, § 727. She
may convey, devise, and bequeath her property as if unmarried, § 728.
She may contract and sue and be sued in her own name in all matters relating
to her separate property as if unmarried, § 729. Her husband and his prop-
erty are not liable upon her contract or suit, but a judgment may be enforced
against her separate property as if she were unmarried, § 730.

432

EH. XIX.] PERSONS OF INSUFFICIENT MIND. * 383

* CHAPTER XIX. *383

PERSONS OF INSUFFICIENT MIND TO CONTRACT.

Sect. I. — Non Compotes Mentis.

They who have no mind, " cannot agree in mind " with
another ; and as this is the essence of a contract, they cannot
enter into a contract. But there is more difficulty when we con-
sider the case of those who are of unsound mind, partially and
temporarily ; and inquire how the question may be affected by
the cause of this unsoundness.

Mere mental weakness, or inferiority of intellect, will not in-
capacitate a person from making a valid contract ; nor is it easy
to define the state of mind which will have this effect. There
must be such a condition of insanity or idiocy, as, from its char-
acter or intensity, disables him from understanding the nature
and effect of his acts, and therefore disqualifies him from trans-
acting business and managing his property, (aa) 1 And an adult
person although of unsound mind can become liable on an, implied
contract for necessaries. (a5) 2

It was once held that no man could discharge himself from his
liability under a contract by proof that when he made it he was
not of sound mind ; on the ground that no man should be per-
mitted to stultify himself, (a) This is not now the law, either

(aa) Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N. H. 531 ; (ab) Ex parte Nothington, 1 Ala. (S.

Bond v. Bond, 7 Allen, 1 ; Hovey v. Chase, C.) 400. •

62 Me. 304; Somers v. Pumphrey, 24 Ind. (a) Litt. §§-405, 406; Beverley's case,

231 ; Hovey v. Hovey, 55 Me. 256 ; Cole- 4 Eep. 126 ; Stroud v. Marshall, Cro. E.

man v. Prazer, 3 Bush, 300. 398 ; Cross v. Andrews, id. 622. But this

1 Por this reason a monomaniac's deed cannot be set aside when his monomania
had no reference to the transaction of which the conveyance was the result and does
not affect his business judgment. Burgess v. Pollock, 53 la. 2'3.

2 But an insane person is not liable on an implied contract for expenses at an
asylum, into which she was received at the request and on the express agreement of
another to pay for her board and other expenses. Mass. Gen. Hospital v. Pairbanks,
129 Mass. 78.

vol. i. 28 433

384

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

in England or this country. If one enters into a contract while

deprived of reason, and afterwards recovers his reason, he may
repudiate that contract. (5) 1 It is said that an insane

* 384 person * may be arrested at common law, in a civil ac-
tion, (c) We have much doubt of this as a rule, at least

in this country.

The deed of an insane person is not void, but it is voidable. 2

was contrary to the most ancient author-
ities. See 2 Bl. Com. 291. — In Waring
v. Waring, 12 Jur. 947 (1848), the nature
and the degrees of insanity are very fully
considered. It is difficult to define insan-
ity, or to discriminate it precisely from
mere weakness of mind, or disturbed
imagination. Absolute sanity of mind
may or may not be predicated of any
person, accordingly as we include therein
more or less perfect power of thought
and accuracy of judgment. In Waring
v. Waring, Lord Brougham holds that no
mind which is insane upon any one point
can be wholly sound on any subject. If
by this any thing more is meant than that
an unsound mind is not a sound one, the
proposition is opposed to the general, if
not universal opinion of mankind. And
perhaps all experience demonstrates that
a mind may be, in relation to some one
point, what would be called insane by all
persons, and yet on others be judged to
be sane, if tried by any of the tests usu-
ally applied to this question.

(b) In Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. 623,
the action was assumpsit by the indorsee
against the indorser of a bill of exchange.
The defendant pleaded that when he in-
dorsed the bill he was so intoxicated as
to be unable to comprehend the meaning,
nature, or effect of the indorsement; of
which the plaintiff at the time of the in-
dorsement had notice. Held, to be a
good answer to the action. Parke, B. :
" Where the party, when he enters into
the contract, is in such a state of drunk-
enness as not to know what he is doing,
and particularly when it appears that this
is known to the other party, the contract
is void altogether, and he cannot be com-
pelled to perform it. A person who takes
an obligation from another under such
circumstances is guilty of actual fraud.

The modern decisions have qualified the
old doctrine, that a man shall not be al-
lowed to allege his own lunacy or intoxi-
cation, and total drunkenness is now held
to be a defence." See Mitchell v. King-
man, 5 Pick. 431 ; Webster v. Woodford,
3 Day, 90 ; Grant v. Thompson, 4 Conn.
203; Lang v. Whidden, 2 N. II. 435;
Sea-ver v. Phelps, 11 Pick. 304 ; Arnold
v. Richmond Iron Works, 1 Gray, 434 ;
McCreight v. Aiken, 1 Rice, 56; Yates w.
Boen, 2 Stra. 1104; Baxter v. Earl of
Portsmouth, 5 B. & C. 170; Rice v. Peet,
15 Johns. 503; Owing's case, 1 Bland,
377; Horner v. Marshall, 5 Munf. 466;
Fitzgerald v. Reed, 9 Sm. & M. 94. And
an administrator may avoid a contract
by showing the insanity of the testator at
the time of making it. Lazell v. Pinnick,
1 Tyler, 247. — So insanity is a good
defence to an action of slander, and
evidence that the defendant was a
weak-minded man, and at times, both
before and after the speaking of the
words, totally deranged, is competent
evidence in ascertaining whether he was
insane at the time of speaking them.
Bryant v. Jackson, 6 Humph. 199. —
And it is no answer that the same party
when contracting was not apprised of the
other's insanity, and did not suspect it,
and did not overreach such insane per-
son, or practise any fraud and unfairness
upon him. Seaver v. Phelps, 11 Pick.
304. And the dictum of Lord Tenterden,
in Brown v. Joddrell, 1 Mood. & M. 105,
to the contrary, is inconsistent with mod-
ern decisions. The modern rule seems to
be somewhat qualified in Morris v. Clay,
8 Jones, L. 216. — Insanity is no defence
to an action of trover. Morse v. Craw-
ford, 17 Vt. 499.

(c) Person v. Warren, 14 Barb. 488 ;
Bush v. Pettibone, 4 Comst. 300.

1 The burden of proving the restoration to reason is upon him who seeks to enforce
a contract against the one alleging insanity. Elston v. Jasper, 45 Tex. 409. See
Turner v. Rusk, 53 Md. 65. — An insane person's contract made during a lucid
interval is binding, McCormick v. Littler, 85 HI. 62 ; as well as a contract ratified
during a lucid interval, although entered into when insane, Blakeley v. Blakeley, 6
Stewart, 502, and reporter's note.

2 Matthiesson, &c. Co. ;>. McMahon, 9 Vroom, 5.36, decided the general rule to
be that contracts with lunatics and insane persons are invalid, subject to the quaiifica-

434

CH. SIX.] PERSONS OP INSUFFICIENT MIND. * 385

His heirs may avoid as to the grantee or subsequent purchasers,
although the deed was not obtained by fraud, nor for an inade-
quate consideration, (cc) l

He may repudiate a contract made by him when insane,
although his temporary insanity was produced by his own act, as
by intoxication. (<J)2 But he must not make use of his intoxica-
tion as a means of cheating others. If he made himself
drunk * with the intention of avoiding a contract entered * 385
into by him while in that state, it may well be doubted
whether he would be permitted to carry this fraud into effect.
And if he bought goods while drunk, but keeps them when sober,

(cc) Hovey v. Hobson, 63 Me. 451. Wigglesworth v. Steers, 1 Hen. & M. 70.

(d) In Pitt v. Smith, 3 Camp. 33, Lord It seems to be held in equity that intoxi-
Ellenborouyh held that an agreement cation does not avoid a contract, unless
signed by an intoxicated man is void, on the intoxication was produced by the
the ground that such a person "has no other party or unless fraud had been
agreeing mind." And he reasserted this practised upon him. Cory v. Cory, 1
rule in Fenton v. Holloway, 1 Stark. 126. Ves. Sen. 19 ; Johnson v. Medlicott, 3 P.
See Cooke v. Clayworth, 18 Ves. 15; Wms. 130, n. ; Stockley v. Stockley, 1
Cole v. Bobbins, Bull. N. P. 172 ; Barrett Ves. & B. 23 ; Cooke v. Clayworth, 18
v. Buxton, 2 Aik. 167; Burroughs v. Ves. 12; Crane v. Conklin, Saxton, 346.
Richmond, 1 Green (N. J.), 233; Foot v. Dealing with persons non compotes raises
Tewksbury, 2 Vt. 97 ; Reynolds v. Wal- a presumption of fraud ; but it may be
ler, 1 Wash. (Va ) 164; Reinicker v. rebutted; and if the evidence of good
Smith, 2 Har. & J. 421 ; Curtis v. Hall, 1 faith and of benefit to the unsound per-
Southard, 361 ; Rutherford v. Ruff, 4 son is clear, equity will not interfere.
Desaus. 364; Seymour v. Delaney, 3 Jones v. Perkins, 5 B. Mon. 225. — As to
Cowen, 445; Duncan v McCullough, 4 frauds on drunkards, see Gregory v.
S &. R. 484 ; Taylor v. Patrick, 1 Bibb, Frazer, 3 Camp. 454 ; Brandon v. Old, 3
168; Prentice v. Achorn, 2 Paige, 30; C. & P. 440. Some of the above author-
Harrison v. Lemon, 3 Blaekf. 51 ; Drum- ities certainly seem to be inconsistent
mond v. Hopper, 4 Harring. (Del.) 327. with the principle, that a person in a
And the legal representatives of a party state of intoxication has no agreeing
contracting while intoxicated have the mind, and therefore there never was a
same right as the party himself to avoid contract between the parties. We think
such contract, although the drunkenness this principle, however, the true one.
was not procured by the sober party.

tion that a contract made in good faith with a lunatic for a full consideration which
has been executed without knowledge of the insanity, or such information as would
lead a prudent person to the belief of the incapacity, will be sustained, as in Lan-
caster Bank v. Moore, 78 Penn. St. 407, where the insanity of the maker of a note,
discounted for him by a bank without notice of his insanity, was held no defence. But
Van Patton v. Beals, 46 la. 62, decided that a person of unsound mind signing as
surety a note for an antecedent debt is not liable, though person taking the note did
not know of his mental unsoundness.

1 Great weakness of mind, also, together with a grossly inadequate consideration, will
afford ground for the setting aside a conveyance upon seasonable application. Allore
v. Jewell, 94 TJ. S. 506. See Taylor ». Atwood, 47 Conn. 498.

2 The contract of a man too drunk to know what he is about is capable of ratifi-
cation by him when he becomes sober, as in Matthews v. Baxter, L. R. 8 Ex. 134,
where martin, B., said : " I think that a drunken man when he recovers his senses
might insist on the fulfilment of his bargain, and therefore that he can ratify it so as
to bind himself to a performance of it." An habitual drunkard is simply in-
competent to execute a deed upon proof that at the time his understanding was
clouded or his reason dethroned bv actual intoxication, or of general unsoundness of
mind. Van Wyck v. Brasher, 81 N. Y. 260.

435

* 386 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

his drunkenness is no answer to an action for the purchase-
money, (e) 1 A distinction has been taken between express con-
tracts and those implied by law, as for money paid, goods sold,
<fec. And it is said that these last contracts, especially where the
things furnished were necessaries, cannot be defeated by showing
the drunkenness of the defendant. (/)

If the condition of lunacy be established by proper evidence
under proper process, the representatives and guardians of the
lunatic may avoid a contract entered into by him at a time when
he is thus found to have been a lunatic, although he seemed to
have his senses, and the party dealing with him did not know him
to be of unsound mind. (#) But this rule has one important quali-
fication, quite analogous to that which prevails in the case of an
infant, and resting undoubtedly on a similar regard for the inter-
ests of the lunatic. This is, that his contract cannot be avoided,
if made bond fide on the part of the other party, and for the

* 386 procurement of necessaries, (A) 2 which, * as in the case of

(e) See Aldtrson, B., in Gore v. Gibson, Earl of Portsmouth, 5 B. & C. 170, 2 C. &
13 M. & W. 623. From Sentance v. Poole, P. 178, a tradesman supplied a person
3 C. & P. 1, it might be inferred that an with goods suited to his station, and after-
indorsement, made in a state of complete wards, by an inquisition taken under a
intoxication, could not be enforced commission of lunacy, that person was
against the drunkard by a bond fide found to have been lunatic before and at
holder without knowledge of the circum- the time when the goods were ordered
stances. Such a rule must rest on the and supplied. It was hid, that this was
assumption that the act was a nullity ; but not a sufficient defence to an action for
it is difficult to see how one could indorse the price of the yuods, the tradesman, at
a bill or note in such a way that its ap- the time when lie received the orders
pearance would excite no suspicion, and and supplied the articles, not having any
yet be 60 drunk as to know nothing of reason to suppose that the defendant
what he was doing; and unless the in- was a lunatic. Abbot, C. J.: "I was of
dorser were utterly incapacitated, it opinion at the trial that the evidence
should seem that a third party, taking given on the part of the defendant was
the note innocently and for value, ought not sufficient to defeat the plaintiff's ac-
to hold it against him. tion. It was brought to recover their

(/) Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. 023. charges for things suited to the state and

(g) McCrillis v. Bartlett, 8 N. H. 569. degree of the defendant, actually ordered

See Smith v. Spooncr, 3 Pick. 229; Man- and enjoyed by him. At the time when

son v. Felton, 13 Pick. 206. the orders were given and executed, Lord

(k) Richardson v. Strong, 13 Ired. L. Portsmouth was living with his family,

106; Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. 623; and there was no reason to suppose that

Niell v. Morley, 9 Ves. 478 ; McCrillis r. the plaintiffs knew of his insanity. I

Bartlett, 8 N. H. 569. In Baxter v. The thought the case very distinguishable

1 Nor can the maker's drunkenness he set up against the innocent indorsee of a
negotiable note. McSparran v. Neeley, 91 Perm. St. 17. See, however, as to a maker's
insanity, McClain h. Davis, 77 Ind. 419, contra. But in a suit by a bond fide indorsee of
a note against a lunatic, the consideration may he inquired into. Moore u. Hershey,
90 Perm. St. 196.

2 A lunatic, and after his death his personal representative, is liable for necessaries.
Van Horn v. Hann, 10 Vroom, 207 ; and for money borrowed to pay his debts, Lan-
caster Co. Bank v. Moore, 78 Penn. St. 407 ; or of which has had the benefit.
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 79 N. Y. 541. See Young v. Stevens, 48 N. H. 133.

436

CH. XIX.]

PERSONS OF INSUFFICIENT MIND.

*386

infants, would not be restricted to absolute necessaries, but
would include such things as are useful to him, and proper
for his means and station. And it has been recently held, that
a bond fide contract made with a lunatic, who was apparently
sane, cannot be rescinded by him or his representatives, unless
the parties can be placed in statu quo. (i) 1

The statutes of the different States provide that idiots, lunatics,
drunkards, and all persons of unsound mind, may be put under
guardianship. And the finding by a competent court of the fact
of lunacy, and the appointment of a guardian, are held to be
conclusive proof of such lunacy, and all subsequent contracts
are void. (/) In England, an inquisition is only presumptive

from an attempt to enforce a contract
not executed, or one made under cir-
cumstances which might hare induced
a reasonable person to suppose the de-
fendant was of unsound mind. The
latter would be cases of imposition ; and
I desired that my judgment might not
be taken to be that such contracts would
bind, although I was not prepared to say-
that they would not."

(0 Molton r. Camroux, '12 Jur. 800
(1848); s. c. 2 Exch. 487; in error, 4
Exch. 17. See also Niell v. Morley, 9
Ves. 478 ; Price v. Berrington, 7 E. L. &
E. 254; Fitzhugh v. Wilcox, 12 Barb.
235. In Dane v. Kirkwall, 8 C. & P.
679, it was held, that to constitute a
defence to an action for use and occu-
pation of a house, taken by the defend-
ant under a written agreement, at a
stipulated sum per annum, it is not
enough to show that the defendant is
a lunatic, and that the house was un-
necessary for her; but it must also be
shown that the plaintiff knew this, and
took advantage of the defendant's situa-
tion ; and if that be shown, the jury
should find for the defendant ; and they
cannot, on these facts, find a verdict for
the plaintiff for any smaller sum than
that specified in the agreement

(/) Fitzhugh v. Wilcox, 12 Barb. 235 ;
Wadsworth v. Sherman, 14 Barb. 169.
Contra in Pennsylvania, In re Gangwere's
Estate, 14 Penn. St. 417. In Leonard v.
Leonard, 14 Pick. 280, the court said :
" It is suggested, on the part of the de-
fendant, that an inquisition of lunacy
in England is not conclusive on the
question of sanity ; but it is a sufficient

answer, that such an inquisition is very
different from the proceedings in a court
of probate under our statute. The plain-
tiff insists that the guardianship is con-
clusive of the disability of the ward, in
relation to all subjects on which the
guardian can act, and that J the only
mode of preventing this operation is by
procuring the guardianship to be set
aside. And there can be no question
but that the judge of probate has power
to reconsider the subject, and if it shall
appear that the cause for the appointment
of a guardian has ceased, or that the
guardian is an improper person for the
office, the letter of guardianship may be
revoked. McDonald v. Morton. 1 Mass.
543. In the case of White v. Palmer, 4
Mass. 147, it was held, that the letter of
guardianship was competent evidence of
the insanity of the ward, and the reason-
ing tends to show that it is conclusive ;
but this was not the question then before
the court. If this were not the general
principle of the law, the situation of the
guardian would be extremely unpleasant,
and it would be almost impossible to
execute the trust. In every action he
might be obliged to go before the jury
upon the question of sanity, and one
jury might find one way, and another
another. We are of opinion, that as to
most subjects, the decree of the probate
court, so long as the guardianship con-
tinues, is conclusive evidence of the
disability of the ward ; but that it is
not conclusive in regard to all. For ex-
ample, the ward, if in fact of sufficient
capacity, may make a will, for this is an
act which the guardian cannot do for

1 Rusk v. Fenton, 14 Bush, 490. But an exchange by one whose mental incapacity
is apparent to any one of ordinary observation is void, and his guardian, subsequently
appointed, may recover his property without tender of that received by him. Halley
v. Troester, 72 Mo. 73.

4o7

* 387 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

* 387 * evidence as to other parties. (&) But it has been held,

that even where the statute expressly declares all the con-
tracts of a lunatic under guardianship void, or disables him from
entering into contracts, it is not the purpose nor effect of such
provisions to annul his contract for necessaries, if made in good
faith by the other party, and under circumstances which justify
the contract. (J) If a lunatic be sued, or a claim is made upon
him, perhaps any person, though not expressly authorized, may
in his case, as in that of an infant, make, in good faith, a legal
tender for him, which shall inure for his benefit.

Courts of law, as well as equity, afford protection to those
who are of unsound mind. They endeavor to draw a line be-
tween sanity and insanity, but cannot so well distinguish between
degrees of intelligence. Against the consequence of mere impru-
dence, folly, or that deficiency of intellect which makes mistake
easy, but does not amount to unsound or disordered intellect,
even equity gives no relief, unless the other party has made use
of this want of intelligence to do a certainly wrongful act. (m) 1
It may be said that a lower degree of intellect suffices ordinarily
to make a will than is required to make a valid contract. («)

In this country, where provision is made by statute that persons
of unsound mind may be put under guardianship, this may be
done upon a representation and request, either of the authorities
of the town in which he resides, or of his friends or relatives ;
and after proper inquiry into the facts, and into the evidence
and character of the insanity. The guardian so appointed gives
bonds for the due management and care of the estate and person
of the insane. He then is put into possession of the estate of

him. But the transaction now in ques- of witnesses not medical men, relative to

tion falls within the general rule." So, the sanity of a party, arc not admissible,

proceedings in a court of equity, estab- yet their opinions, in connection with the

lishing the lunacy of a party, are ad- facts upon which they are founded, may

missible to prove the lunacy in an be. Grant v. Thompson, 4 Conn. 203

action at law, against third persons not McCurry v. Hooper, 12 Ala. 823.
a party to the proceedings in equity. (k) Sergeson v. Sealey, 2 Atk. 412

McCreight o. Aiken, 1 Rice, 56. And Faulder v. Silk, 3 Camp. 126. And the

creditors of an obligor to a bond, if not same rule was recognized in Hart v,

interested in the result, are competent Deamer, 6 Wend. 407. See also Hop

■witnesses to prove the obligor's lunacy, son v. Boyd, 6 B. Mon. 296.
Hart v. Deamer, 6 Wend. 497. And to (/) McCrillis v. Bartlett, 8 N. H. 569.

prove a party's lunacy at the time of (m) Osmond v. Fitzroy, 3 P. Wnis.

making a contract, evidence of the state 129; 1 Fonbl. Eq. (6th ed.) 66; Lewis

of his mind before, at, and after such v. Pead, 1 Ves. Jr. 19.
time is admissible. Grant v. Thompson, (n) Converse v. Converse, 21 Vt. 168.

4 Conn. 203. Although the mere opinion

1 See Marmon v. Marmon, 47 la. 121.

438

CH. XIX.] PERSONS OP INSUFFICIENT MIND. * 388

his ward, and has the general disposition * and control of * 388
it. For their powers and duties, see the preceding chap-
ters on Guardians and on Trustees.

Similar provisions are often made with respect to persons men-
tioned in the next section.

SECTION II.

SPENDTHRIFTS.

In regard to these persons, the appointment of a guardian, and
the depriving them of all power over their own property, is gen-
erally put on the ground of a danger that they may become
chargeable to the town or other body corporate who will be
bound to support them if they become paupers. The application
must come, therefore, from the authorities of such town ; and set
forth that the party, by drinking, gaming, or other debauchery,
is so spending and wasting his means as to be in danger of becom-
ing chargeable. Here also there is to be a judicial inquiry into
the facts, after due notice to the alleged spendthrift ; and upon
a finding of the facts in accordance with the petition, a guardian
is appointed as before, and after such appointment all contracts
of the spendthrift, except for necessaries, are void. Where a
provision is made for recording such complaint and petition in
a public registry, no valid contract, except for necessaries, can
be made by the spendthrift, after such record, provided a guar-
dian be subsequently appointed on the petition, (o) And it has
been held that the acknowledgment or new promise of a spend-
thrift under guardianship is not sufficient to take a former prom-
ise out of the Statute of Limitations. (p~)

(o) It was held in Smith v. Spooner, 3 (p) In Mason v. Felton, 13 Pick. 206,
Pick. 229, that the Massachusetts statute Shaw, C. J., said : " The question, then,
of 1818, c. 60, which, in case a guardian is, whether a spendthrift, under guardian-
shall be appointed to a spendthrift, ship is competent to make a valid con-
avoids "every gift, bargain, sale, or tract for the payment of money. The
transfer of any real or personal estate," plaintiff relies upon Smith «. Spooner,
made by the spendthrift after the com- 3 Pick. 229, as decisive. But we think
plaint of the selectmen to the judge of that that case turns upon a very differ-
probate, and the order of notice there- ent principle. That action was brought
on shall have been filed in the registry upon a note executed after a complaint
of deeds, does not apply to promissory made by the selectmen and before the
notes. But this case is explained by actual appointment of a guardian. It
Shaw, C. J., in Mason v. Felton, 13 Pick, depended, therefore, wholly upon the
208 as depending wholly upon the con- construction of the statute of 1818, pro-
Btruotion of the statute of 1818. riding, that after such complaint made,

439

389 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

*389 * SECTION III.

SEAMEN.

The reckless and improvident habits of seamen, and their ina-
bility to protect themselves against the various parties with whom
they deal, have induced courts both of law and equity to extend
to them a certain kind of disability for their protection ; that is,
certain contracts with seamen, taking away their rights, or laying
them under wrongful obligations, are annulled. A number of
statutes have been enacted both in England and in this country
in relation to the shipping articles, as they are termed, or the
contracts by which seamen engage their services for a voyage.
The Act by which this subject is principally governed at this time

is that of 1813, c. 2. And it has been very distinctly de-
* 390 cided, that any stipulations in shipping articles * which

derogate from the general rights and privileges of seamen,
will be held void in admiralty, and to a certain extent at com-
mon law, unless it shall be made apparent by proof on the part
of the owner, that the nature and effect of such stipulations were
explained to and understood by the seamen, and an additional
compensation allowed him, fully adequate to all that he lost by

and a copy filed with the register of thrift and those dependent on him. These

deeds, every gift, bargain, sale, or trans- considerations form a marked distinction

fer of real or personal estate, shall he between the case of an actual adjudica-

void. It was decided on the ground tion, conclusively fixing the disability

that before the actual appointment of contemplated by the statute, and ap-

a guardian there was no disability to pointing a guardian to act in place of

make contracts, except the specific dis- the person disabled, and the limited and

ability created by the statute ; that such temporary restraint established by the

a disability ought not to be extended by statute of 1818, on the construction of

construction, being in derogation of a which the case of Smith r. Spooner, was

general right and power of persons over decided. But there are several expres-

their own property ; and that the mak- sions, in the opinion of the court, in

ing of a promissory note was not a gift, that case, implying a distinction in their

sale, or transfer of property within the minds between the case of a person ac-

meaning of the act. It is to be re- tually under guardianship, and that of

marked, that the disability created by a person in relation to whom the in-

this act is to take effect upon a mere cipient measures have been taken to es-

complaint, before any adjudication, or tablish such a guardianship. The court

even inquiry into the truth of the facts speak of the note, made after complaint

charged, and before the appointment filed, but before the appointment of a

of a responsible officer competent and guardian, as a note made 'on the eve of

bound to take charge of the property, a disability to contract.' And the clos-

and provide for the wants of the spend- ing remarks, in the opinion of the chief

440

CH. XIX.]

PERSONS OF INSUFFICIENT MIND.

;391

the stipulation, (q) In the case of The Juliana, referred
* to by Judge Story in Harden v. Gordon, the true doc- * 391
trine on this subject is set forth by Lord Stowell with great
clearness and force. The general principle in all these decisions

justice, strongly implied the same conclu-
sion." Shearman v. Akins, 4 Pick. 283;
and see Pittam v. Poster, 1 B. & C. 248 ;
Ward o. Hunter, 6 Taunt. 210.

(?) Brown v. Lull, 2 Sumner, 443;
Harden v. Gordon, 2 Mason, 541 ; 3 Kent,
Com. 193 ; The Juliana, 2 Dodson, 504.
In Brown o. Lull, supra, Story, J., speak-
ing of the effect of a stipulation in the
shipping articles, which in that case was
relied upon as controlling the right of
the seaman to wages, said : " It is well
known that the shipping articles, in their
common form, are in perfect coincidence
with the general principles of the mari-
time law as to seamen's wages. It is
equally well known that courts of admi-
ralty are in the habit of watching with
scrupulous jealousy every deviation from
these principles in the articles as injuri-
ous to the rights of seamen, and founded
in an unconscionable inequality of bene-
fits between the parties. Seamen are a
class of persons remarkable for their rash-
ness, thoughtlessness, and improvidence.
They are generally necessitous, ignorant
of the nature and extent of their own
rights and privileges, and for the most
part incapable of duly appreciating their
value. They combine, in a singular man-
ner, the apparent anomalies of gallantry,
extravagance, profusion in expenditure,
indifference to the future, credulity,
which is easily won, and confidence,
which is readily surprised. Hence it is
that bargains between them and ship-
owners, the latter being persons of great
intelligence and shrewdness in business,
are deemed open to much observation
and scrutiny ; for they involve great in-
equality of knowledge, of forecast, of
power, and of condition. Courts of ad-
miralty on this account are accustomed to
consider seamen as peculiarly entitled to
their protection ; so that they have been,
by a somewhat bold figure, often said to
be favorites of courts of admiralty. In
a just sense they are so, so far as the
maintenance of their rights and the pro-
tection of their interests against the ef-
fects of the superior skill and shrewdness
of masters and owners of ships are con-
cerned. Courts of admiralty are not by
their constitution and jurisdiction con-
fined to the mere dry and positive rules of
the common law. But they act upon the
enlarged and liberal jurisprudence of

courts of equity, and in short, so far as
their powers extend, they act as courts
of equity. Whenever, therefore, any
stipulation is found in the shipping arti-
cles which derogates from the general
rights and privileges of seamen, courts
of admiralty hold it void, as founded
upon imposition, or an undue advantage
taken of their necessities and ignorance
and improvidence, unless two things con-
cur : first, that the nature and operation
of the clause is fully and fairly explained
to the seamen; and secondly, that an
additional compensation is allowed, en-
tirely adequate to the new restrictions
and risks imposed upon them thereby.
This doctrine was fully expounded by
Lord Stowell, in his admirable judgment
in the case of the Juliana (2 Dodson,
604) ; and it was much considered by
this court in the case of Harden v. Gor-
don (2 Mason, 541, 556, 657) ; and it has
received the high sanction of Mr. Chan-
cellor Kent in his Commentaries (iii. § 40,
p. 193). I know not, indeed, that this
doctrine has ever been broken in upon in
courts of admiralty or in courts of equity.
The latter courts are accustomed to apply
it to classes of cases, far more extensive
in their reach and operation ; to cases
of young heirs selling their expectancies ;
to cases of reversioners and remainder-
men dealing with their estates ; and to
cases of wards dealing with their guar-
dians ; and above all, cases of seamen
dealing with their prize-money, and other
interests. If courts of law have felt
themselves bound down to a more lim-
ited exercise of jurisdiction, as it seems
from the cases of Appleby v. Dodd (8
East, 300), and Jesse v, Roy (1 C. M. &
R. 316, 329, 339), that they are, it is not
that they are insensible of the justice
and importance of these considerations,
but because they are restrained from
applying them by "the more strict rules
of the jurisprudence of the common law,
which they are called upon to admin-
ister." In the case of The Betsy &
Rhoda, in the District Court of Maine, 3
N. Y. Leg. Obs. 215, it was held that a
negotiable note taken by a seam-in for
wages, will not extinguish his claim for
wages, nor his lien on the ship, unless he
be informed of this effect, and have ad-
ditional security given him by way of
compensation.

441

*391

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

is, that where a man has made a promise to one who has taken
a wrongful advantage of his circumstances or his necessities, he
shall not be bound by such promise. And the same principle has
been enforced against seamen ; as where in the course of a voyage
they compelled the master to make a new contract with them for
higher wages, by threats of desertion, (r) And contracts made
with pilots or salvors, under circumstances of necessity, for exor-
bitant or unjust compensation, have been set aside on the same
principle. But, in general, contracts respecting the wages of
seamen will be construed liberally in their favor, in all cases
where there may be room for such construction. As where by
the usual clause no seaman was entitled to his wages, or any part
thereof, until the arrival of the ship at the port of discharge, the
words italicized are not construed as a condition precedent to the
earning of wages, but only as determining the time and place of
payment, (s)

(r) Bartlett v. Wyman, 14 Johns. 261.
In this case the court said, that the new
contract made by the master was not
binding on him, because made "in con-
travention of the policy of the Act of
Congress of the 20th July, 1790. This
statute requires, under a penalty, every
master of a ship or vessel, bound from a
port in the United States to any foreign
port, before he proceeds on the voyage,
to make an agreement in writing or print
with every seaman or mariner on board,
with the exception of apprentices or ser-
vants, declaring the voyage and term of
time for which the 6eaman or mariner
shall be shipped. In the present case
this was done, and the rate of wages
.fixed at seventeen dollars per month lor
.the whole voyage. To allow the sea-
man, at any intermediate port, to exact
higher wages, under the threat of desert-
ing the ship, and to sanction this exaction
by holding the contract, thus extorted,
binding on the master of the ship, would
be not only against the plain intention of
the statute, but would be holding out
encouragement to a violation of duty, as
well as of contract. The statute protects
the mariner, and guards his rights in all
essential points ; and to put the master
at the mercy of the crew takes away all
reciprocity."

(s) Swift v. Clark, 15 Mass. 173;
Johnson v. Sims, 1 Pet. Ad. 215 ; Flan-
ders' Marit. Law, § 404 ; The Schooner
Emulous & Cargo, 1 Sumner, 207 ; The
A. D. Patchin, 1 Blatch. C. C. 414. And

442

in the George Home, 1 Hagg. Ad. 370,
on an engagement to go "from London
to Batavia, the East India seas or else-
where, and until the final arrival at any
port or ports in Europe." It was held,
that upon the arrival of the ship at
Cowes for orders (as previously agreed
between the owners and masters), the sea-
men were not bound to proceed on a fur-
ther voyage to Rotterdam. But in Webb
i . Duckingfield, 13 Johns. 391, where a
seaman who had signed shipping articles,
by which he engaged not to absent him-
self from the vessel without leave, " un-
til the voyage was ended, and the vessel
was discharged of her cargo," on the
vessel's arriving at her last port of dis-
charge, and being there safely moored,
refused to remain and assist in dischar-
ging the cargo, but absented himself
without leave ; it was held, that by such
desertion he had forfeited his wages. —
So mutinous and rebellious conduct of
the mariner, if persisted in, forfeits their
right to wages. Eelf v. Ship Maria, 1
Pet. Ad. 186. — So does desertion ; and
the statute of the United States, declar-
ing any unauthorized absence of a sea-
man from his ship for forty-eight hours
to be desertion, applies to all cases where
the seaman does not return within such
time, although he may have been pre-
vented by the sailing of the ship. For
the ship is not bound to wait for him,
but he is bound to rejoin the ship within
that period, suo periculo. Coffin v. Jen-
kins; 3 Story, 108.

CH. XIX.] PERSONS OP INSUFFICIENT MIND. * 392

♦SECTION IV. 392

PERSONS UNDER DURESS.

A contract made by a party under compulsion is void ; because
consent is of the essence of a contract, and where there is com-
pulsion there is no consent, for this must be voluntary. (£) Such
a contract is void for another reason. It is founded on wrong.
The violence was itself an injury to the party suffering it ; the
party using the violence had no right to do so, and cannot estab-
lish a right on his own wrong-doing.

It is not, however, all compulsion which has this effect ; it must
amount to durities, or duress. But this duress may be either
actual violence, or threat. (?*) x And actual violence, if not so
slight as to be quite unimportant, is sufficient to annul a contract
made under its influence. Imprisonment in a common jail or
elsewhere, is duress of this kind ; but to have this effect it must
either be unlawful in itself, or, if lawful, then it must be accom-
panied with such circumstances of unnecessary pain, privation,
or danger, that the party is induced by them to make the
contract, (w)

(t) 1 Roll. Abr. 688. by imprisonment, either the imprison-
(u) 1 Bl. Com. 131. ment or the duress after must be tortious
(v) Watkins v. Baird, 6 Mass. 511; and unlawful. If, therefore, a man, sup-
Richardson v. Duncan, 3 N. H. 508 ; posing that he has cause of action a-
Stouffer «. Latshaw, 2 Watts, 167 ; Nel- gainst another, by lawful process cause
son v. Suddarth, 1 Hen. & M. 350. — An him to be arrested and imprisoned,
arrest, though for a just cause, and un- and the defendant voluntarily executed
der lawful authority, yet if it be for an a deed for his deliverance, he cannot
unlawful purpose, is duress of imprison- avoid such deed by duress of imprison-
ment. Severance v. Kimball, 8 N. H. ment, although, in fact, the plaintiff had
386. — In Watkins v. Baird, supra, Par- no cause of action. And although the
sons, C. J., observed: "It is a general imprisonment be lawful, yet unless the
rule, that imprisonment by order of law deed be made freely and voluntarily, it
is not duress ; but to constitute duress may be avoided by duress. And if the

1 In McPherson v. Cox, 86 N. Y. 472, it was fe/rfthat the refusal, under the circum-
stances, by a person who could alone get clearance for a vessel at the custom-house, to
clear her until the master had signed a bill of lading and a certain agreement, where-
upon the master signed, constituted duress. — A threat, however, made by a husband
to his wife that he would poison himself unless she signed a promissory note, is not duress
such as will avoid the note as to her, Wright r. Remington, 12 Vroom, 48 ; affirmed
in 14 Vroom, 451 ; nor is the refusal to pay a claim in full, thereby compelling a
creditor, by reason of a pecuniary strait, to receipt in full for a part payment, duress,
if the debtor is not the cause of the creditor's embarrassment. Hackley v. Headley,
45 Mich. 569.

443

*393

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I,

* 393 * Duress by threats does not exist wherever a party has

entered into a contract under the influence of a threat, but
only where such a threat excites a fear of some grievous wrong ;
as of death, or great bodily injury, or unlawful imprisonment.
It is a rule of law, which is applied to many cases, that where the
threat is of an injury for which full and entirely adequate com-
pensation may be expected from the law, such duress will

* 394 not, * of itself, avoid a contract, for the threatened person

ought to have sufficient resolution to resist the threat and
rely upon the law ; as where the threat is of an injury to property,

imprisonment be originally lawful, yet if
the party obtaining the deed detain the
prisoner in prison unlawfully by covin
with the jailer, this is a duress which
will avoid the deed. But when the im-
prisonment is unlawful, although by
color of legal process, yet a deed ob-
tained from a prisoner for his deliver-
ance, by him who is a party to the un-
lawful imprisonment, may be avoided
by duress of imprisonment. In Allen, 92,
debt was sued on a bond, and duress of
imprisonment pleaded in bar. The plain-
tiff had, on charging the defendant with
felony in stealing a horse, procured a
warrant from a justice, on which the
defendant was arrested and imprisoned,
and sealed the bond to the plaintiff to
obtain his discharge, which was done,
the horse appearing to be his own horse.
Rolle, J., directed the jury, that the pro-
ceedings being had to cover the deceit,
the bond was obtained by duress. And,
in our opinion, it is a sound and correct
principle of law, when a man shall
falsely, maliciously, and without prob-
able cause, sue out a process, in form
regular and legal, to arrest and imprison
another, and shall obtain a deed from a
party thus arrested, to procure his deliv-
erance, such deed may be avoided by
duress of imprisonment. For such im-
prisonment is tortious and unlawful, as
to the party procuring it ; and he is an-
swerable in damages for the tort, in an
action for a false and malicious prosecu-
tion ; the suing of legal process being
an abuse of the law, and a proceeding
to cover the fraud. And although Bridg-
man, in Lev. 68, 60, is made to say, that
imprisonment in custody of law by
the king's writ, will not be duress to
avoid a deed, when the arrest is without
cause of action, because the party has
his remedy by action of the case, yet
this must be a mistake, as there is no
remedy by action for suing a groundless
suit, unless the suit be without probable

444

cause and malicious. And if it be, cer-
tainly the imprisonment is wrongful, as
to the party who maliciously procured
it.'' — In Richardson <*. Duncan, 3 N. H.
508, it was held, that where there is an
arrest for improper purposes, without
just cause, or an arrest for just cause,
but without lawful authority, or an ar-
rest for a just cause, and under lawful
authority, for an improper purpose, and
the person arrested pays money for his
enlargement, he may be considered as
having paid the money by duress of im-
prisonment, and may recover it back in
an action for money had and received.
— But an agreement by a prisoner to
pay a just debt, made while under legal
imprisonment, cannot be avoided on the
ground of duress. Shephard v. Watrous,
SCaines, 160 ; Crowell v. Gleason, 1 Fairf.
325 ; Meek v. Atkinson, 1 Bailey, 84. —
But a bond given for the maintenance of
a bastard child, as required by some stat-
ute, is void for duress, if the warrant
and other proceedings before the magis-
trate are not according to the statute.
Fisher v. Shattuck, 17 Pick. 252. — So a
bond executed through fear of unlawful
imprisonment may be avoided on ac-
count of duress. Whitefield v. Longfel-
low, 13 Me. 146. — But contra, as to a
mortgage given as security for payment
of a sum to the county, as the con-
dition of a pardon. Rood v. Winslow, 2
Dougl. (Mich.) 68. — A threat by a judg-
ment creditor to levy his execution, is
not such duress as to make void an a-
greement to pay the sum due. Wilcox
v. Rowland, 23 Pick. 107 ; Waller r.
Cralle, 8 B. Mon. 11. — Nor a threat of
lawful imprisonment. Eddy o. Herrin,
17 Me. 338; Alexander v. Pierce, 10 N.
H. 497. — And a note given to obtain the
release of property from an illegal levy of
an execution, is not void. Bingham v.
Sessions, 6 Sm. & M. 13. See Bowker v.
Lowell, 49 Me. 429 ; Hackett v. King, 6
Allen, 68.

CH. XIX.]

PERSONS OP INSUFFICIENT MIND.

395

or of a slight injury to the person. (w) But no verdict could
compensate adequately for loss of limb, or for great per-
sonal violence, * and no man shall be held bound to incur * 395
such a danger. These distinctions, however, would not
now probably have a controlling power in this country ; but where
the threat, whether of mischief to the person or the property, or
to the good name, was of sufficient importance to destroy the

(w) Atlee v. Backhouse, 3 M. & W.
642; Sumner v. Ferryman, 11 Mod. 201 ;
Astley v. Reynolds, Stra. 715. It is on
this ground, perhaps, that in England
duress of one's property is not sufficient to
avoid a contract. Atlee v. Backhouse, 3
M. & W. 650 ; where Parke, B., said :
" There is no doubt of the proposition
laid down by Mr. Erie, that if goods are
wrongfully taken, and a sum of money is
paid, simply for the purpose of obtaining
possession of those goods again, without
any agreement at all, especially if it be
paid under protest, that money can be
recovered back ; not on the ground of
duress, because I think that the law is
clear, although there is some case in
Viner's Abridgment, Duress (B.), 3, to
the contrary, that in order to avoid a
contract by reason of duress, it must be
duress of a man's person, not of his
goods ; and it is so laid down in Shep.
Touch, (p. 61); but the ground is, that
it is not a voluntary payment. If my
goods have been wrongfully detained,
and I pay money simply to obtain them
again, that being paid under a species of
duress or constraint may be recovered
back ; but if, while my goods are in pos-
session of another person, I make a bind-
ing agreement to pay a certain sum of
money and to receive them back, that
cannot be avoided on the ground of du-
ress." Skeate v. Beale, 11 A. & E. 983.
In this case Lord Dmman, C. J., said :
" We consider the law to be clear, and
founded on good reason, that an agree-
ment is not void because made under
duress of goods. There is no distinc-
tion in this respect between a deed and
an agreement not under seal ; and, with
regard to the former, the law is laid
down in 2 Inst. 483, and Shep. Touch. 61,
and the distinction pointed out between
duress of or menace to the person, and
duress of goods. The former is a con-
straining force, which not only takes
away the free agency, but may leave no
room for appeal to the law for remedy ;
a man, therefore, is not bound by the
agreement which he enters into under
such circumstances ; but the fear that
goods may be taken or injured does not

deprive any one of his free agency who
possesses that ordinary degree of firm-
ness which the law requires all to exert."
In this country, however, it has been held,
that duress of goods would under some
circumstances avoid a man's note or
bond. Sasportas v. Jennings, 1 Bay,
470; Collins v. Westbury, 2 id. 211. In
this last case the law was thus laid down
by the court: "So cautiously does the
law watch over all contracts, that it will
not permit any to be binding but such as
are made by persons perfectly free, and
at full liberty to make or refuse such con-
tracts, and that not only with respect to
their persons, but in regard to their goods
and chattels uko. Contracts to be binding
must not be made under any restraint or
fear of their persons, otherwise they are
void. . . . So, in like manner, duress of
goods will avoid a contract, where an
unjust and unreasonable advantage is
taken of a man's necessities, by getting
his goods into his possession, and there
is no other speedy means left of getting
them back again but by giving a note or
a bond, or where a man's necessities may
be so great as not to admit of the ordi-
nary process of law, to afford him relief,
as was determined in this court after
solemn agreement, in the case of Sas-
portas v. Jennings, 1 Bay, 470 ; also in
the case of Astley v. Reynolds, Stra.
915." See also Nelson v. Suddarth, 1 Hen.
& M. 350 ; Eoshay v. Ferguson, 5 Hill (N.
Y.), 158, where Bronson, J., said: "I en-
tertain no doubt that a contract procured
by threats and the fear of battery, or the
destruction of property, may be avoided
on the ground of duress. There is noth-
ing but the form of a contract in such a
case, without the substance. It wants
the voluntary assent of the party to be
bound by it. And why should the
wrong-doer derive an advantage from
his tortious act ? No good reason can
be assigned for upholding such a trans-
action." Although in England a contract
may not be avoided for duress of goods,
yet money paid under such duress may
be recovered back. See Oates v. Hud-
son, 5 E. L. & E. 469 ; s. c. 6 Exch. 346.

445

395

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK I.

threatened party's freedom, the law would not enforce any con-
tract which he might be induced by such means to make. And
where there has been no actual contract, but money has been
extorted by duress, under circumstances which give to the trans-
action the character of a payment by compulsion, it may be
recovered back, (x) 1

A contract made under duress is not, however, strictly speak-
ing, void, but only voidable ; because it may be ratified and af-
firmed by the party upon whom the duress was practised. (#) 2

{x) Chase u. Dwinal, 7 Greenl. 134;
Oatts v. Hudson, 5 E. L. & E. 469; s. c.
6 Exch. 340. But where a person has
paid the amount of taxes assessed upon
him, he cannot recover it back, upon the
ground that the assessment was illegally
made, if there be no proof that he was
compelled to pay any portion thereof by
duress of his person or seizure of his
property, or that any part was paid
under protest, and to avoid such arrest
or seizure. The mere fact that the taxes
were paid to collectors, who had warrants
for the collection, affords no satisfactory
proof of payment by duress. Smith v.
Readfield, 27 lie. 145. See, as to pay-
ments under legal duress, Fleetwood v.
New York, 2 Sandf. 475 ; Harmony v.
Bingham, 1 Duer, 229 ; Mayor v. Leffer-
man, 4 Gill, 425.

(y) Shep. Touch. 62, 288. The privi-
lege of avoiding a contract for reason of
duress is personal, and none can take
advantage of it but the party himself.
Huscombe v. Standing, Cro. J. 187 ; Bay-
lie v. Clare, 2 Brownl. 276 ; McClintick
v. Cummins, 3 McLean, 158. Perhaps,

however, this privilege extends to sure-
ties. It was so held in Fisher v. Shattuck,
17 Pick. 252. But the contrary was ex-
pressly adjudged in Huscombe v. Stand-
ing, Cro. J. 187. See also McClintick v.
Cummins, 3 McLean, 158. In this case
it is said that the father and son may
each avoid his obligation by duress of
the other ; and so a husband by duress of
his wife. Sec also Bac. Abr. Dunss (B.).
For other cases illustrating the law of
duress, compulsion, and oppression, see
Baxendale v. Eastern Counties R. R. Co.
27 L. J. C. 137; Baxendale v. Great
Western R. R. Co. 32 L. J. C. 225, 33 ib.
197 ; Tamvaco r. Simpson, 3 L. J. C. 268 ;
Fraser v. Pendleberry, 31 L. J. C. 1 ; At-
kinson v. Benby, 30 L. J. Exch. 361 ; Pid-
dington v. South-Eastern R. R. Co. 27 L.
J. C. 295 ; Garton v. Bristol & Exeter R.
R. Co. 28 L. J. Exch. 169. In these last
cases the plaintiffs recovered excessive
charges which they had paid to railroad
companies who had refused to carry
goods, or to deliver goods carried, unless
these payments were made.

1 If one, knowing he has no just claim against another, arrests him or attaches his
goods, a payment by the latter to release himself or goods, is a payment under duress,
and can be recovered back in an action for money had and received. Chandler v.
Sanger, 114 Mass. 364. So if A. obtains possession of a deed and uses it to extort
money from B., as price of its preservation for defence of his title and threatens,
expressly or impliedly, to withhold or destroy it unless B. complies with his demands,
a payment by B. is to be deemed involuntary and may be recovered back. Motz v.
Mitchell, 91 Penn. St. 114.

2 A father may avoid a mortgage which he was induced to sign by threats of the
prosecution and imprisonment of Ms son. Harris v. Carmody, 131 Mass. 51.

446

CH. XX. J ALIENS. * 396

* CHAPTER XX. *396

ALIENS.

An alien, by the definition of the common law, is a person born
out of the jurisdiction and allegiance of this country, excepting
only the children of public ministers abroad, whose wives are
American women. But the statute of 29th January, 1795, de-
clared that, " the children of citizens of the United States, born
out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, shall be
considered as citizens of the United States." The statute of the
14th April, 1802, is more obscure on this subject, and is regarded
by high authority (a) as leaving this question in some doubt.
We do not believe that the courts of this country would apply to
this question those principles of the common law of England
which oppose the provision of the statute of 1795. This cannot,
however, be regarded as certain, until it is settled by competent
adjudication or statutory provision.

It is said that a foreign born child of a citizen of the United
States, is subject to a double allegiance ; but on reaching maturity
he has the right to elect one and repudiate the other, and such
election is conclusive upon him. (aa) And it has been held that

(a) Chancellor Kent says, 2 Com. 52 : 29th, 1795, was not so ; for it declared

" It [this statute] applied only to the generally ' that the children of citizens of

children of persons who then were or had the United States, born out of the limits

been citizens ; and consequently the bene- and jurisdiction of the United States,

fit of this provision narrows rapidly by shall be considered as citizens of the

the lapse of time ; and the period will United States.' And when we consider

soon arrive when there will be no statu- the universal propensity to travel, the

tory regulation for the benefit of children liberal intercourse between nations, the

born abroad, of American parents, and extent of commercial enterprise, and the

they will be obliged to resort for aid to genius and spirit of our municipal insti-

the dormant and doubtful principles of tutions, it is quite surprising that the

the English common law. . . . But the rights of the children of American citi-

whole statute provision is remarkably zens, born abroad, should, by the existing

loose and vague in its terms, and it is act of 1802, be left so precarious, and so

lamentably defective, in being confined far inferior in the security which had

to the case of children of parents who been given in like circumstances by the

were citizens in 1802, or had been so pre- English statutes."

viously. The former act of January (aa) Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N. Y. 356.

447

* 397 THE LAW OP CONTBACTS. [BOOK I.

a child of aliens born in this country, is primd facie a citizen
thereof, although his mother was here only for the purpose of
being confined. (a5)

At common law an alien cannot acquire title to real property

by descent, nor by grant, nor by operation of law. Nor can he

give good title by grant ; nor can he transmit good title

* 397 * to his heir. (6) If an alien take land by purchase, he

may hold it until office found, and may bring an action for
the recovery of possession ; (c) but if he die, the land passes at
once to the State, without any inquest of office, (d) His title can-
not be called in question in a collateral proceeding between indi-
viduals ; (d<P) for an alien may take and hold by deed or devise
as against all but the sovereign ; (c£e) and the rule that an alien
may take land by purchase is valid in equity as well as law. (df)
But the severity of these rules has been very much mitigated in
this country, somewhat by adjudication, but more by the various
statutes of the States, in many of which, and in the constitutions
of some, there are provisions modifying the principles of the
common law relative to aliens, (e) 1

In respect to personal property, and the various contracts in
relation to it, and the obligations which these contracts impose

(ab) Munro v. Merchant, 28 N. Y. 9. Ramires v. Kent, 2 Cal. 558, that an

{b) Calvin's case, 7 Rep. 25 a ; Col- alien could not be deprived of land or of

lingwood c. Pace, 1 Vent. 417 ; Jackson any rights incident to its ownership, by

». Lunn, 3 Johns. Cas. 109 ; Levy v. Mc- proof of alienage in any proceeding but

Cartee, 6 Pet. 102 ; Jackson v. Green, 7 in an inquest of office.

AVend. 333; Jackson o. Fitzsimmons, 10 (d) Co. Lit. 2 b; Willion v. Berkley,

Wend. 1 ; Cross v. De Valle, 1 Wallace, Plowd. 229 b, 230 a ; Fox «, Southack,

5. 12 Mass. 143; Fairfax v. Hunter, 7

(c) Waugh v. Riley, 8 Met. 295.— Cranch,619; Orr v. Hodgson, 4 Wheat.

Savarje, C. J., in Bradstreet v. Supervisors 453. See also Wilbur v. Tobey, 10 Pick.

of Oneida County, 13 Wend. 548, decided 179 ; Foss v. Crisp, 20 id. 124 ; People v.

that notwithstanding the ancient rigor of Conklin, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 67; Banks v.

the common law, such an action might Walker, 3 Barb. Ch. 438.

be maintained. "If it is the property of (dd) Harley v. State, 40 Ala. 689.

the alien against everybody but the gov- (de) Osterman u. Baldwin, 6 Wallace,

eminent, he has the right to use it ; and 116.

if necessary to prosecute for it, surely the (df) Cross i: De Valle, 1 Clifford, 282.

right to prosecute is necessarily conse- (e'j This subject is very fully consid-

quent upon his right to its enjoyment." ered, and presented with great clearness,

— In Texas an alien cannot hold prop- and an abundant illustration, in 2 Kent,

erty except in particular cases. Merle Com. lect. xxv.

v. Andrews, 4 Tex. 200. It was held in

1 A sale of lands in Texas, before her separation from Mexico, by a citizen to a non-
resident alien, passed the title to the latter, who thereby acquired a defeasible estate
in them, which he could hold until deprived thereof by the supreme authority, upon
the official ascertainment of the fact of his non-residence and alienage, or upon the
denouncement of a private citizen. Phillips v. Moore, 100 U. S. 208. See also Hauen-
stein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483.

448

CH. XX.]

ALIENS.

398

upon him, and the remedies to which he may resort for breach of
them, the alien stands very much upon the same footing as the
citizen. An alien resident within a State was entitled to the
benefit of the insolvent laws. (/) The bankrupt law now in
force by section 19th permits any person to become a bankrupt
" residing within the jurisdiction of the United States, and owing
debts provable under this Act." And he may be made a bank-
rupt under the provisions respecting involuntary bankruptcy.

The recent statute concerning trade-marks, as will be seen
in our chapter on that subject, admits aliens to its advantages.
And before the statute in some interesting cases respecting trade-
marks, it was determined that he was entitled to the same
protection as our citizens. (#) The right * to confiscate * 398
the debts and property of alien enemies is declared to exist
in Congress, by the highest judicial authority ; (A) but the exer-
cise of this right, it may well be hoped, will never be attempted. (*')
But even alien enemies residing in this country may sue and be
sued as in time of peace, on the ground that their residence is

(f) Judd c. Lawrence, 1 Cush. 531.
" The insolvent laws extend in terms to
all insolvent debtors residing within this
Commonwealth ; and this language un-
questionably embraces aliens as well as
native or naturalized citizens, unless it
can be shown that such was not the in-
tention of the legislature. It has been
argued that this appears by the author-
ity given to the commissioner to assign
all the debtor's estate, real and personal,
whereas an alien cannot hold or effectu-
ally assign real estate. But if this were
so, there seems to be no reason why the
personal estate of an alien insolvent
debtor should not be distributed among
his creditors under the insolvent laws as
well as the personal estate of native citi-
zens who have no real estate. But it is
not true that aliens cannot hold and as-
sign real estate. It is true an alien can-
not take by descent, but he may take by
purchase or devise, and can hold against
all except the Commonwealth, and can
be divested only by office found, and,
until office found, can convey. And
whatever title the insolvent debtor could
convey by deed may be assigned by
statute."

(g) Coats v. Holbrook, 2 Sandf. Ch.
586; Taylor v. Carpenter, id. 603; 3
Story, 458 ; 11 Paige, 292 ; 2 Woodb. &
M. 1. Woodbury, J., in a long opinion
reviewing the authorities both English

vol. i. 2tt

and American, sustains the doctrine of
the text, and reprehends in the strongest
terms any attempt to place aliens in our
courts upon a footing different from our
citizens, contending that the want of
reciprocity of rights to our citizens in
foreign courts might be a good reason
for legislation by Congress, but would
not be for this court to deny to aliens
rights guaranteed to them by the Consti-
tution, and which a court could not deny
without an exercise of judicial legisla-
tion. " The cannibal of the Fejees may
sue here in a personal action, though
having no courts at home for us to resort
to." "An alien is not now regarded as
' the outside barbarian ' he is considered
in China." " In the courts of the United
States they are entitled, being alien
friends, to the same protection of their
rights as citizens." Story, J., 3 Story,
434. —Barry's case, 2 How. 65; 5 id. 103.
An alien was allowed, as to regaining
the custody of his child from his wife
and her connections, the same remedies
and principles as are granted to the
citizens.

( A) Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch,
110; The Adventure, id. 228, 229; Ware
v. Hylton, 3 Dallas, 199.

( i) A very powerful argument against
the right itself was made by Alexander
Hamilton, in his letters signed Camillus,
published in 1795.

449

* 398 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

lawful until they are ordered away by competent authority, and
this residence gives them a right to protection. (/) During this
residence, the alien is equally hound with the citizen to obey all
the laws of the country, which do not apply specifically and
exclusively to citizens.

(j) Wells v. Williams, 1 Ld. Raym. Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69 ; Russell p.
282 ; Daubigny v. Davallon, 2 Anst. 462; Skip with, 6 Binn. 241.

450

CH. XXI.] OUTLAWS, ETC. * 422

* CHAPTER XXI. *422

OP OUTLAWS, PEESONS ATTAINTED, AND PERSONS EXCOMMUNICATED.

The process of Outlawry was common in England under the
Saxon kings. By it a person was placed wholly out of the pro-
tection of the law, so that he was incapable of bringing any action
for redress of injury ; and it also worked a forfeiture of all goods
and chattels to the king. Until some time after the Conquest
it was confined to cases of felony ; but then it was extended by
statute to all actions for trespass vi et armis. By later statutes it
has been extended to other civil actions. An outlaw might be
arrested by the writ of capias utlagatum, and committed until
the outlawry was reversed. But this reversal was granted on any
plausible ground, if the party came into court himself or by attor-
ney ; the process being used in modern times merely to compel
appearance, (a) In some of our older States process of outlawry
was permitted and regulated by statute ; but it never had much
practical existence in this country, and is now wholly disused. (J)

Attainder, by the common law, was the inseparable conse-
quence of every sentence of death. Attainder for treason worked
a forfeiture of all estates to the king, and such " corruption of
blood " that he could neither inherit, nor could any one inherit
from him ; he was utterly deprived of all rights, and wholly inca-
pacitated from acting under the protection of the law, either for
himself or for another. In the words of Blackstone, "the law
sets a note of infamy upon him, puts him out of its protection, and
takes no further care of him than to see him executed ; "
and " by an anticipation of his punishment he * is already * 423
dead in law." (c) During the conflicts in England between
different claimants of the throne, and between the sovereign and

3 Bl. Com. 284. (e) 4 Bl. Com. 380.

See 7 Dane, Abr. 318.

451

* 423 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK I.

the people, this tremendous engine of oppression was unsparingly
used, and sometimes under circumstances which gave to it the
character of extremest cruelty. It may well be believed that
such a process would not find favor among us, either when we
were colonies, or after we had become States ; and it has no
existence here.

Excommunication expels a person from the Church of England,
and as the civil law comes in aid of the ecclesiastical power of that
country, it has been of great moment there ; and as it worked a
disability almost entire, it was an instrument of great power in
the hands of the ecclesiastical authorities. But in this sense ex-
communication can have no existence in this country, as we have
no national church, recognized and armed by the civil law. We
have, however, churches, which, with us, are only voluntary asso-
ciations organized for religious purposes. As such they are recog-
nized and protected by the law. They must have the right to
determine as to their own membership, and to provide for this by
forms and by-laws, which, if they contradict no principles or pro-
visions of law, and interfere with no personal rights, would doubt-
less be regarded by the courts. (cT) But all questions which come
up in relation to the rights or contracts of a person severed from
such society, by an act of " excommunication," would be governed
by the general principles of the law of property, or of the law of
contracts.

(<f) Farnsworth v. Storrs, 6 Cush. 412.

452

BOOK II.

CONSIDERATION AND ASSENT.

*BOOK II. *427

CONSIDERATION AND ASSENT.

CHAPTER I.

CONSIDERATION.

Sect. I. — The Necessity of a Consideration.

A promise for which there is no consideration cannot be en-
forced at law. This has been a principle of the common law from
the earliest times, (a) 1 It is said to have been borrowed from the
Roman law. The phrase " nudum pactum " — commonly used to
indicate a promise without consideration — certainly was taken
from that law ; but it does not mean with us precisely what the
Roman jurists understood by it. By the civil law gratuitous prom-
ises could be enforced only where they were made with due for-
mality, and in prescribed language and manner ; then such
agreement was a "pactum verbis prescriptis vestitum," and where
such promise was not so made it was called a " nudum pac-
tum," (5) that is, nudum because not vestitum. But an agree-
ment thus formally ratified, or " vestitum," was enforced without
reference to its consideration ; whereas a " nudum pactum," or
promise not formally ratified, was left to the good faith of the
promisor, the law refusing to aid in its enforcement, unless the

(a) 17 Ed. IV. ch. 4, pi. 4; 3 Hen. VI. Kegister for 1854, in which the cases on
c. 36, pi. 33 ; Bro. Abr. Action sur le Case, the whole topic are ably collected.
40. — See on the subject of Consideration (b) Vin. Com. de Inst. Mb. 3, tit. 14, p.

articles by "E. L. P." in the March, May, 659 (ed. 1755) ; Id. lib. 3, De Verborum
and July numbers of the American Law Obligationibus, tit. 16, p. 677 ; Cod. lib.

7, tit. 52 (6th ed.), Gothofred.

1 An oral agreement in substitution for a written agreement, not within the Statute
of Frauds, needs no new consideration. Brown v. Everhard, 52 Wis. 205.

455

* 428 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

promisee could prove a distinct consideration. The principle
of this is, obviously, that if a contract be not founded
*428 *upon a consideration, it shall not be enforced, unless
ratified in such a way as may show that it was deliberate,
intentional, and distinctly understood by both parties. The rule
was intended to protect parties from mistake, inadvertence, or
fraud. A similar rule or practice, grounded on a similar purpose,
prevails on the continent of Europe ; where contracts which are
properly ratified and confirmed, before a public notary or similar
magistrate, are valid without inquiry into their consideration;
while a private contract can be enforced only on proof of a con-
sideration. And, indeed, it can only be the same principle which
makes reasonable an ancient and well-established distinction in
the common law, by virtue whereof a contract under seal is in
general valid without reference to the consideration ; not by way
of exception to the rule that no promise can be enforced which
was not made for a consideration, but because, as it is said, the
seal implies a consideration. The only real meaning of this must
be, that the act of sealing is a deliberate and solemn act, implying
that caution and fulness of assent which the rule of the civil law
was intended to secure, (c) Whether this inference from

* 429 the use of a seal can now be made with sufficient * force

to sustain the very great difference made by the law be-
tween sealed instruments and those which have no seal, might
be doubted. The distinction rests now, perhaps, more on the
difficulty of disturbing a rule established by long use and of very
extended operation. (d) And in some of the States by usage,

(c) That this is the real distinction be- cause or consideration they were made,
tween contracts under seal and contracts As if I, by deed, promise to give you
not under seal, see Plowden, arguendo, .£20, here you shall have an action of
in Sharrington v. Stratton, Plowd. 308. debt upon this deed, and the considera-
" Words," says he, " pass from man to tion for my promise is not examinable ;
man lightly and inconsiderately; but it is sufficient to say it was the will of
where the agreement is by deed there the party who made the deed." See 2
is more time for deliberation ; for when Smith, Lead. Cas. 456. See also Morley
a man passes a thing by deed, first, there i>. Boothby, 3 Bing. Ill ; Fallowes v. Tay-
is the determination of the mind to do it; lor, 7 T. R. 477; Shubrick v. Salmond, 3
and upon that he causes it to be written, Burr. 1639; Fonbl. Eq. vol. i. p. 344, n.
which is one part of deliberation, and (a). — Some writers on contracts have
afterwards he puts his seal to it, which said that specialties do not require a con-
is another part of deliberation ; and last- sideration to render them obligatory at
ly, he delivers the writing as his deed, law; but this seems to be somewhat in-
which is the consummation of his reso- accurate. The existence of a consideration
lution ; so that there is great deliberation seems to be as essential in the case of
used in the making of deeds, for which deeds as in simple contracts, but that
reason they are received as a lien final existence is conclusively presumed from
to the party, and are adjudged to bind the nature of the contract,
the party, without examining upon what (d) Iu Ortucan v. Dickson, 13 Cal. 33,

456

CH- !•] CONSIDERATION. * 429

and in others by statutory provisions, the want or failure of
consideration may be a good defence to an action on a. sealed
contract, (dd} 1

By the general rule only a creditor of the grantor can avail
himself of the fact that a deed was without consideration, (de)
because as between the parties to a deed there is no need of a
consideration. (<£/)

By the civil law, and the modern continental law, the consid-
eration is the cause of the contract. This principle is quoted and
apparently adopted by Plow den ; and it has been recently ac-
knowledged by high judicial authority, and the cause distinctly
discriminated from the motive, (e)

Doubts have been expressed whether a contract reduced to
writing was not in this respect the same as oue under seal. (/)
But this question is now abundantly settled; and both in this
country and in England a consideration must be proved, where
the contract is in writing but not under seal, as much as if the
contract were oral only. (#) The exception to this rule in the
case of mercantile negotiable paper is considered elsewhere.

it is said that the difference between sideration with motive. Motive is not

sealed and unsealed instruments is now the same thing with consideration. Con-

a mere unmeaning and arbitrary distinc- sideration means something which is of

tion, made by technical law, and not sus- some value in the eye of the law, moving

tained by reason. from the plaintiff; it may be some benefit

(dd ) See Gray v. Handkinson, 1 Bay, to the defendant, or some detriment to the

278; State o. Gaillard, 2 id. 11; Swift v. plaintiff; but at all events it must be

Hawkins, 1 Dallas, 17; Solomon v. Kim- moving from the plaintiff. Now that

mel, 5 Binn. 232; Case v. Boughton, 11 which is suggested as the consideration

Wend. 106; Leonard v. Bates, 1 Blackf. here, a pious respect for the wishes of

173; Coyle v. Fowler, 3 J. J. Marsh. 473; the testator, does not in any way move

Pebbles i'. Stephens, i Bibb, 500; Walker from the plaintiff; it moves from the

v. Walker, 13 Ired. L. 335; Matlock v. testator; therefore, legally speaking, it

Gibson, 8 Rich. L. 437 ; Martin v. Bar- forms no part of the consideration." See

ton Iron Works, 35 Ga. 320. also Lilly «. Hays, 5 A. & E. 548; Smith,

Ide) Hatch v. Bates, 54 Me. 136. Cont. p. 88, n. — In Mouton v. Noble, 1

hlf) Laberee v. Carleton, 53 Me. 211. La. An. 192, Eustis, C. J., said: "Civil-

(e) Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Q. B. 851. ians use the word cause in relation to

In this case the defendant contended, obligations in the same sense as the word

tnat the motive with which an agree- consideration is used in the jurisprudence

ment had been made, was a part of the of England and the United States."
legal consideration, and that the decla- (/) Rann v. Hughes, 3 T. R. 350, n.

ration ought to have set out the same (a), 7 Bro. P. C. 550; Pillans o. Van

with the other considerations, but Pat- Mierop, 3 Burr. 1670.
teson, J., said "It would be giving to (g) Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57;

'causa' too large a, construction if we Dodge v. Burdell, 13 Conn. 170; Bean

were to adopt the view urged for the v. Burbank, 16 Me. 458; Beverleys v.

defendant; it would be confounding con- Holmes, 4 Munf. 95; Brown v. Adams,

1 But in those States such a, defence is not good upon a voluntary promise in
writing, under seal, to pay a sum of money, for value received, where the parties
intended there should be no consideration. Aller v. Aller, 11 Vroom, 446. See
further as to sealed instruments, Burkholder v. Plank, 69 Penn. St. 225.

457

*430 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

It has been held, quite generally, that where the considera-
tion is expressed in a written contract no other can be
* 430 proved, (A) * unless there are words which indicate other
considerations ; (i) because this would be an alteration of
the contract by evidence aliunde. The same rule is said to be
applied in equity, unless relief is sought against the instrument
on the ground of fraud or mistake ; (/) but many decisions of
weight allow the maker of a written promise, or of a deed, to
prove other and additional considerations besides those expressed
in the contract. (&) 1 Where the consideration is not expressed it
may be proved. (7) And where the contract declares that it was
made for a valuable consideration, this is primd facie evidence of
such consideration, (m)

SECTION II.

KINDS OP CONSIDERATION.

The civil law division of all considerations into four species,
very clearly stated by Blackstone, is logically exact and exhaus-
tive ; (w) but it has never been so far introduced into the
* 431 common * law as to be of much practical utility in deter-
mining questions of law.

1 Stew. (Ala.) 51; Burnet a. Bisco, 4 Reynolds, 8 B. Mon. 596; Mitchell v.

Johns. 235; People o. Shall, 9 Cowen, Williamson, 6 Md. 210.
778; Roper v. Stone, Cooke, 499; Clark (i) Maigley v. Hauer, 7 Johns. 341.

v. Small, 6 Yerg. 418; Perrine v. Cheese- {j) Clarkson v. Hanway, 2 P. Wms.

man, 6 Halst. 174. — The consideration, 203; Peacock v. Monk, 1 Ves. Sen. 127

however, need not be expressed in the Eilmer v. Gott, 7 Bro. P. C. 70.
writing. It may be proved aliunde. Ting- (k) Emmons v. Littlefield, 13 Me. 233 ,

ley v. Cutler, 7 Conn. 291; Arms v. Ash- Tyler v. Carlton, 7 Greenl. 175; Wallis

ley, 4 Pick. 71 ; Cummings v. Dennett, 26 ». Wallis, 4 Mass. 135, Parsons, C. J.;

Me. 397; Mouton v. Noble, 1 La. An. Quarles v. Quarles, id. 680; Wilkinson

192; Thompson a. Blanchard, Conist. o. Scott, 17 id. 249.

335; Patchin v. Swift, 21 Vt. 292. The (/) Orms v. Ashley, 4 Pick. 71; Ting-
admission of a consideration in the writ- ley v. Cutler, 7 Conn. 291.
ing, is of course primd facie evidence of (m) Whitney v. Stearns, 16 Me. 394.
its existence. Whitney «,, Stearns, 16 See Sloan v. Gibson, 4 Mo. 33. Contra,
Me. 394. Glen Cove Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrold, 20

(A) Schermerhorn a. Vanderheyden, 1 Barb. 298.
Johns. 139; Veacock o. McCall, Gilpin, (n) " These valuable considerations are

329 ; Emery v. Chase, 5 Greenl. 232 ; divided by the civilians into four species •

Howes v. Barker, 3 Johns. 506; Cutter v. 1. Do, ut des ; as when I give money or

1 That oral evidence is admissible to show the real consideration of a written contract,
see Farnsworth v. Boardman, 131 Mass. 115, as in a suit to foreclose a mortgage to'
show that no debt ever existed between the parties, Hannan v. Hannan, 123 Mass.
441 ; or of an assignment of letters-patent, Hebbard v, Haughian, 70 N. Y. 54
458

CH. I.] CONSIDERATION.

431

The fundamental distinction in the common law is between
those cases where the consideration is a benefit to him who makes
the promise, and those in which it is an injury to him who re-
ceives the promise. For it is a perfectly well-settled rule, that if
a benefit accrues to him who makes the promise, or if any loss or
disadvantage accrues to him to whom it is made, and accrues at
the request or on the motion of the promisor, although without
benefit to the promisor, in either case the consideration is sufficient
to sustain assumpsit, (o) J

Considerations at common law may be good, or valuable. The
definition of Blackstone is this : " A good consideration is such
as that of blood, or of natural love and affection, when a man
grants an estate to a near relation ; being founded on motives of
generosity, prudence, and natural duty. A valuable consideration
is such as money, marriage, or the like, which the law esteems
an equivalent given for the grant ; and is therefore founded in
motives of justice." (p) A valuable consideration is usually in

goods, on a contract, that I shall be re- vant hires himself to his master for cer-
paid money or goods for them again. Of tain wages, or an agreed sum of money,
this kind are all loans of money upon here the servant contracts to do his mas-
bond or promise of repayment ; and all ter's service, in order to earn that specific
sales of goods in which there is either an sum. Otherwise, if he be hired generally ;
express contract to pay so much for them, for then he is under an implied contract
or else the law implies a contract to pay to perform this service for what it shall
so much as they are worth. 2. The sec- be reasonably worth. 4. The fourth
ond species is, Facio, ut facias, as when I species is, Do, ut facias ; which is the di-
agree with a man to do his work for rect counterpart of the preceding. As
him, if he will do mine for me ; or if when I agree with a servant to give him
two persons agree to marry together, or such wages upon his performing such
to do any other positive acts on both work ; which is nothing else but the last
sides. Or it may be to forbear on one species inverted ; for servus facit, ut herus
side in consideration of something done del, and herus dot, ut servus facial." 2 Bl.
on the other, as, that in consideration Com. 444.

A, the tenant, will repair his house, (o) Com. Dig. Action upon the Case upon

B, the landlord, will not sue him for Assumpsit (B.) 1 ; Pillans v. Van Mierop,
waste. Or it may be for mutual forbear- 3 Burr. 1670; Nerot v. Wallace, 3 T. R.
ance on both sides ; as, that in considers 24 ; Bunn v. Guy, 4 East, 194 ; Willats v.
tion that A will not trade to Lisbon, B Kennedy, 8 Bing. 5 ; Miller v. Drake, 1
will not trade to Marseilles ; so as to Caines, 45 ; Powell v. Brown, 3 Johns,
avoid interfering with each other. 3. The 100 ; Forster v. Puller, 6 Mass. 58 ;
third species of consideration is, Facio, ut Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 182; Bul-
ges, when a man agrees to perform any- dreth v. Pinkerton Academy, 9 Foster
thing for a price, either specifically men- (N. H.), 227; Haines v. Haines, 6 Md.
tioned, or left to the' determination of the 435.

law to set a value to it. And when a ser- (p) 2 Bl. Com. 297. In Coyle v. Fow-

1 Thus where a broker, relying upon a promise of his principal to indemnify him
against loss, resists a call for a " margin," in accordance with the rules of the " Board
of Stock Brokers," of which he is a member, and is in consequence suspended, the
injury so caused is a good consideration for the promise, "White v. Baxter, 71 N. Y.
254 ; or a mortgagee waives his security in consideration of an agreement to put the
mortgaged property up at auction and divide the proceeds in a certain way, Bradshaw
v. McLoughlin, 39 Mich. 480. See also Conover v. Stillwell, 5 Vroom, 56 ; Gordon v.
Dalby, 30 la. 223.

459

* 432 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

some way pecuniary, or convertible into money ; marriage, which
it is now settled is a valuable consideration, (j) * is the principal
exception to this.

An equitable consideration is sufficient as between the parties,
although it be not valuable ; but only a valuable consider-

* 432 ation * is valid as against a third party, as a subsequent

purchaser, (r) whose debt existed when the contract was
made ; an attaching creditor, or the like. It is at least true that
an equitable consideration is sufficient in all conveyances by deed,
and in transfers not by deed, but accompanied by immediate pos-
session, (s) But where there is a promise, performable of course
in future, and the consideration is only moral, there it might
have been said formerly that the law was not positively settled.
But the late cases settle the question definitively. Mr. Baron
Parke has said, " a mere moral consideration is nothing." (£) 2

ler, 3 J. J. Marsh. 473, it is said : " A plea Cord, 504 ; Ewing v. Ewing, 2 Leigh,

that a note was executed without any 337 ; Carpenter v. Dodge, 20 v t. 595. In

'good' consideration would not be a bar Smith v. Smith, 7 C. & P. 401, it was held

to a suit on the note, because it is imma- that a gift from a father to a son of a

terial whether there was a 'flood' consid- watch, chain, and seals, was valid upon

eration or not, provided there was a delivery, and the father could not after-

' valuable ' consideration ; and there not wards revoke the gift,

only might be a 'valuable' consideration (() Jennings v. Brown, 9 M. & W..501.

in the absence of a 'good' consideration, This subject was examined at length in

but the two considerations are seldom the case of Eastwood r. Kenyon, 11 A. &

united. When there is a 'good' consid- E. 438, where it was held that a pecuniary

eration there is not generally also a benefit, voluntarily conferred by the plain-

' valuable ' consideration, and e converso. tiff and accepted by the defendant, is not

There may be a ' valuable ' consideration, such a consideration as will support an

which is not valid in law." action of assumpsit on a subsequent ex-

(?) Whelan v. Whelan, 3 Cowen, 537 ; press promise by the defendant to reim-

Sterry v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 261 ; Barr v. burse the plaintiff. Therefore, where the

Hill, Addison, 276 ; Hustin v. Cantril, 11 declaration in assumpsit stated, that the

Leigh, 136 ; Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Pet. plaintiff was executor of the father of the

348 ; Smith v. Allen, 5 Allen, 454. defendant's wife, who died intestate as to

(r) Lord Tenterden, C. J., in Gully v. his land, leaving the defendant's wife, an

Bishop of Exeter, 10 B. & C. 606 ; Chitty infant, his only child and heir ; that the

on Cont. 28. ^ plaintiff acted as her guardian and agent

(s) Noble v. Smith, 2 Johns. 52 ; during infancy, and in that capacity ex-

Grangiac v. Arden, 10 Johns. 293; Pitts pended money on her maintenance and

v. Mangum, 2 Bailey, 588 ; Pearson v. education, in' the management and im-

Pearson, 7 Johns. 26 ; Frisbie v. McCarty, provement of the land, and in paying the

1 Stew. & P. 56 ; Fowler v. Stuart, 1 Mc- interest of a mortgage on it ; that the

1 A woman being regarded as a purchaser for value of all property accruing to her
by virtue of the marriage or an ante-nuptial agreement. Derry v. Derry, 74 Ind. 560.
Thus a promise to marry, subsequently performed, is a valid consideration for a
promissory note, Wright v. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437 ; or for a conveyance of lands to
the wife, however fraudulent, if she had no knowledge of the fraud, Prewit v. Wilson,
103 U. S. 22 ; and equally for a promise of the wife to allow her intended husband the
use of her land, on which he proceeds to make improvements, Stratton v. Stratton.
58 N. H. 473.

_ _2 Freeman v. Robinson, 9 Vroom, 383. A testator's desire to equalize the pro-
visions of his will is an insufficient consideration to. support a note given for that
purpose only. West v. Cairns, 74 Ind. 265.

460

CH. I.J

CONSIDERATION.

433

Neither the rule which so distinctly postpones * moral *433
considerations to those which are pecuniary, nor that

estate was benefited thereby to the full
amount of such expenditure ; that the
plaintiff, being unable to repay himself
out of the personal assets, borrowed
money of A on his promissory note ;
that the defendant's wife, when of age
and before marriage, assented to the loan
and the note, and requested the plaintiff
to give up the management of the prop-
erty to her, and promised to pay the note,
and did in fact pay one year's interest on
it; that the plaintiff thereupon gave up
the management accordingly; that the
defendant, after his marriage, assented to
the plaintiff's accounts, and upon such ac-
counting, a certain sum was found due to
the plaintiff for moneys so spent and bor-
rowed ; that the defendant, in right of his
wife, received all the benefit of the plain-
tiff's said services and expenditure, and
thereupon, in consideration of the prem-
ises, promised the plaintiff to pay and dis-
charge the note. Held, on motion in ar-
rest of judgment, that the declaration was
bad, as not disclosing a sufficient consid-
eration for the defendant's promise. And
Lord Denman said, in giving judgment:
" Most of the older cases on this subject
are collected in a learned note to the case
of Wennall u. Adney, 3 B. & P. 249, and
the conclusion there arrived at seems to
be correct in general, 'that an express
promise can only revive a precedent good
consideration, which might have been en-
forced at law through the medium of an
implied promise, had it not been sus-
pended by some positive rule of law ; but
can give no original cause of action, if the
obligation, on which it is founded, never
could have been enforced at law, though
not barred by any legal maxim or statute
provision.' Instances are given of void-
able contracts, as those of infants, ratified
by an express promise after age, and dis-
tinguished from void contracts, as of mar-
ried women, not capable of ratification by
them when widows; Lloyd v. Lee, 1
Stra. 94 ; debts of bankrupts revived by
subsequent promise after certificate, and
similar cases. Since that time, some
cases have occurred upon this subject
which require to be more particularly
examined. Barnes v. Hedley, 2 Taunt.
184, decided that a promise to repay a
sum of money, with legal interest, which
sum had originally been lent on usurious
terms, but in taking the, account of which
all usurious items had been by agreement
struck out, was binding. Lee v. Mugger-
idge, 5 Taunt. 36, upheld an assumpsit by
a widow, that her executors should pay a

bond given by her while a feme covert to
secure money then advanced to a third
person at her request. On the latter oc-
casion the language of Mansfield, C. J.,
and of the whole Court of Common Pleas,
is very large, and hardly susceptible of
any limitation. It is conformable to the
expressions used by the judges of this
court in Cooper v. Martin, 4 East, 76,
where a step-father was permitted to re-
cover from the son of his wife, after he
had attained his full age, upon a declara-
tion for necessaries furnished to him while
an infant, for which, after his full age, he
promised to pay. It is remarkable that
in none of these was there any allusion
made to the learned note above referred
to, which has been very generally thought
to contain a correct statement of the law.
The case of Barnes v. Hedley is fully con-
sistent with the doctrine in that note laid
down. Cooper v. Martin also, when fully
examined, will be found not to be incon-
sistent with it. This last case appears to
have occupied the attention of the court
much more in respect of the supposed
statutory liability of a step-father, which
was denied by the court, and in respect of
what a court of equity would hold as to a
step-father's liability, and rather to have
assumed the point before us. It should,
however, be observed, that Lord Ellenhor-
ovgh, in giving his judgment, says : _ ' The
plaintiff having done an act beneficial for
the defendant in his infancy, it is a good
consideration for the defendant's promise
after he came of age. In such a case the
law will imply a request, and the fact of
the promise lias been found by the jury ; '
and undoubtedly the action would have
lain against the defendant whilst an in-
fant, inasmuch as it was for necessaries
furnished at his request in regard _ to
which the law raises an implied promise.
The case Of Lee i'. Muggeridge must,
however, be allowed to be decidedly at
variance with the doctrine in the note
alluded to, and is a decision of great
authority. It should, however, be ob-
served, that in that case there was _ an
actual request of the defendant during
coverture, though not one binding in law ;
but the ground of decision there taken
was also equally applicable to Littlefield
e. Shee, 2 B. & Ad. 811, tried by Gasdee,
J. at N. P., when the learned judge held,
notwithstanding, that ' the defendant hav-
ing been a married woman when the goods
were supplied, her husband was originaUy
liable, and there was no consideration for
the promises declared upon.' After time
461

*434

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK II.

which seems to embrace marriage within the same cate-
* 434 gory as * money, appears at first sight very creditable to

the common law. There is, however, one reason which
doubtless had much influence in establishing this rule ; and that
is, the extreme difficulty of deciding between considerations bear-
ing a moral aspect, which were and which were not sufficient to
sustain an action at law. And the rule may now be stated as
follows : a moral obligation to pay money or to perform a duty
is a good consideration for a promise to do so, where there was
originally an obligation to pay the money or to do the duty, which

taken for deliberation, this court refused
even a rule to show cause why the nonsuit
should not he set aside. Lee v. Mugger-
idge was cited on the motion, and was
sought to be distinguished by Lord Ten-
terden, because there the circumstances
raising the consideration were set out
truly on the record, but in Littlefield v.
Shee the declaration stated the considera-
tion to be, that the plaintiff had supplied
the defendant with goods at her request,
which the plaintiff failed in proving, inas-
much as it appeared that the goods were
in point of law supplied to the defendant's
husband, and not to her. But Lord Ten-
terden added, that the doctrine that a moral
obligation is a sufficient consideration for
a subsequent promise, is one which should
be received with some limitation. This
sentence, in truth, amounts to a dissent
from the authority of Lee v. Muggeridge,
where the doctrine is wholly unqualified.
The eminent counsel who argued for the
plaintiff in Lee v. Muggeridge, spoke of
Lord Mansfield as having considered the
rule of nudum pactum as too narrow, and
maintained that all promises deliberately
made ought to be held binding. I do not
find this language ascribed to him by any
reporter, and do not know whether we
are to receive it as a traditional report, or
as a deduction from what he does appear
to have laid down. If the latter, the note
to Wennall v. Adney shows the deduction
to be erroneous. If the former, Lord Ten-
terden and this court declared that they
could not adopt it in Littlefield v. Shee.
Indeed the doctrine would annihilate the
necessity for any consideration at all, inas-
much as the mere fact of giving a promise
creates a moral obligation to perform it."
The 6ame doctrine was supported by the
later case of Kaye v. Dutton, 7 Man. & G.
807. — The case of Lee v. Muggeridge is
clearly wrong, and inconsistent with many
subsequent cases in England and this
country, where the doctrine is now almost
universally recognized, whatever it may

462

have been in some earlier cases, that a
mere moral obligation is not sufficient to
support an express promise. Thus, where
a son, who was of full age, and had ceased
to be a member of his father's family, was
suddenly taken sick among strangers, and,
being poor and in distress, was relieved by
the plaintiff; and afterwards the father
wrote to the plaintiff, promising to pay
the expense incurred, it was held that such
a promise would not sustain an action.
Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207 ; White v.
Bluett, 24 E. L. & E. 434. So where the
plaintiff had furnished necessaries to a
person, indigent and in need of relief, and
his son, who was of sufficient ability,
signed and delivered this writing to the
plaintiff, namely : " This may certify that
the debt now due from my father to A [the
plaintiff] , I acknowledge to be for neces-
saries of life, and of such a nature that I
consider myself hereby obligated to pay
A $60 towards said debt, now due, pro-
vided my father does not settle with A in
his lifetime ; " it was held that this contract
was void, for want of consideration. Cook
r. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57. See also Loomis
v. Newhall, 15 Pick. 159, similar to Mills
v. Wyman ; Hawley v. Farrar, 1 Vt. 420 ;
Ingraham v. Gilbert, 20 Barb. 152; Bates
v. \Vatson, 1 Sneed, 376 ; Parker v. Car-
ter, 4 Muuf. 273, where a promise by a
son to pay a debt for his father was held
void for want of consideration. McPher-
son v. Pees, 2 Penr. & W. 521 ; Smith v.
Ware, 13 Johns. 257, where a lot of land
was sold, described in the deed as supposed
to contain ninety-three acres, but was
found to be five or six acres short, the
promise of the seller to pay for deficiency
was held to be without consideration.
Prear v. Hardenbergh, 5 Johns. 272,
where a promise to pay for labor of the
plaintiff on land recovered from him by
the defendant in a suit at law, was held
void for want of consideration. This case
was cited with approbation in Society v.
Wheeler, 2 Gallis. 143.

CH. I.]

CONSIDERATION.

434

was enforceable at law but for the interference of some rule of
law. Thus a promise to pay a debt contracted during infancy,
or barred by the Statute of Limitations or bankruptcy, is good,
without other consideration than the previous legal obligation, (w) 1
It must, however, be distinct and specific ; (uii) and it has been
held that the payment of interest, or even payment of part of the
principal and its indorsement on the note by the debtor himself,
is not sufficient to warrant a jury in finding a new promise to pay
the whole debt. (mi>) Where such promise is made, it does not
seem to be necessary to declare upon it as the foundation of a
suit, but an action may be brought upon the old promise, and the
new promise will have the effect of doing away the obstruction
otherwise interposed by the bankruptcy and discharge. (uw~) But
if the promise is conditional, then the party seeking to enforce it

(«) Earnest v. Parke, 4 Eawle, 452 ;
Rogers v. Stephens, 2 T. R. 713; Hawkes
v. Saunders, Cowp. 290; Cooke v. Brad-
ley, 7 Conn. 57; Prewett v. Caruthers,
12 Sm. & M. 491 ; Walbridge v. Harroon,
18 Vt. 448; Patten v. Ellingwood, 32 Me.
163; Franklin v. Beatty, 27 Miss. 347;
Otis v. Gazlin, 31 Me. 567; Scouton v.
Eislord, 7 Johns. 36 ; Fleming v. Hayne,
1 Stark. 370 ; Freeman v. Fenton, 1 Cowp.
544; Twiss v. Massey, 1 Atk. 67; Ex parte
Burton, id. 255 ; Birch v. Sharland, 1 T.
R. 715; Besford v. Saunders, 2 H. Bl.
116; Brix v. Braham, 8 J. B. Moore, 261,
1 Bing. 281 ; Erwin v. Saunders, 1 Cowen,
249 ; Shippey v. Henderson, 14 Johns. 178;
Maxim v. Morse, 8 Mass. 127 ; "Way v.
Sperry, 6 Cush. 238; Best v. Barber, 3
Dougl. 188; Trumbull v. Tilton, 1 Foster
(N. H.), 128. The promise should be
made after the decree in bankruptcy dis-
charging the debt — a promise made after
the petition in bankruptcy was filed mere-
ly, but before the decree, is not sufficient.
Stebbins v. Sherman, 1 Sandf. 510. In
England, however, by statute 6 Geo. IV.
c. 16, a promise by a bankrupt must be
in writing, and signed by the bankrupt, or
by some person thereto by him lawfully
authorized. — A promise by a debtor to
pay a debt which has been voluntarily re-
leased by the creditor is not binding, for
want of consideration. Warren v. Whit-
ney, 24 Me. 561 ; Snevily v. Read, 9
Watts, 396; Montgomery v. Lampton, 3
Met. (Ky.) 519, where the distinction is

broadly taken between a discharge by
force of positive law and a voluntary dis-
charge. And this although the release
was given without consideration, and
merely to enable the debtor to testify
in a suit against the creditor, in which
he could not have otherwise testified
because of a legal interest. Valentine
v. Foster, 1 Met. 520. But see Willing
v. Peters, 12 S. & R. 177.

(uu) It must be an absolute and uncon-
ditional promise to pay the debt. Brown
v. Collier, 8 Humph. 510. The words,
" I have always said, and still say, that
she shall have her pay," spoken to an
agent of the creditor, may be construed
by the jury as an express promise to pay.
Pratt v. Russell, 7 Cush. 462. — Mere
statements to third persons that he had
promised to pay the debt are not in
themselves sufficient. They afford some
ground to raise the presumption of a
promise, but are not such in themselves.
Prewitt v. Caruthers, 12 S. & M. 491;
Yoxtheimer !>. Keyser, 11 Penn. St. 365.

(uv) Merriam v. Bayley, 1 Cush. 77;
Cambridge Institution for Savings v. Lit-
tlefield, 6 Cush. 210.

(uw) Williams v. Dyde, Peake, Cas.
68 ; Maxim v. Morse, 8 Mass. 127 ; Ship-
pey v. Henderson, 14 Johns. 178; Depuy
v. Swart, 3 Wend. 135. — If the old debt
was due by note or specialty, a parol pro-
mise merely will not sustain an action on
the note or specialty itself. Graham a.
Hunt, 8 B. Mon. 7.

1 In. Ingersoll v. Martin, 58 Md. 67, the rule is stated to be that while a pre-existing
debt released by operation of law, will support a new promise to pay a, debt volun-
tarily released by the creditor, is insufficient. To the same effect, see Hale v. Rice, 124
Mass. 292 : Hockett v. Jones, 70 Ind. 227.

463

* 435 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

must show that the condition has been satisfied ; as if the debtor
promised to pay when he was able, then the creditor must prove
his ability, (ux) In such case, and perhaps in all, it would be
safer to rely upon the new promise as the ground of the action,
and upon the old promise only as the consideration for the new
one, («y) as in many cases it has been held that the new promise
does not revive the negotiability of a bill or note, but binds the
insolvent only to the person to whom the contract was made, (wz)
The contrary has however been held, (tta)

The morality of the promise, however certain, or however

urgent the duty, does not of itself suffice for a consideration. In

fact, the rule amounts at present to little more than permission

to a party to waive certain positive rules of law which

* 435 * would protect him from a plaintiff claiming a just and

legal debt. (v~)
Perhaps an illustration of the rule, that a moral obligation does
not form a valid consideration for a promise, unless the moral
duty were once a legal one, may be found in the case of a widow,
who promises to pay for money expended at her request or lent
to her during her marriage. It has been held in England, in a
. case examined in a former note, (w) that this promise was bind-
ing, and there are many dicta to that effect in this country ; (x)

(ux) Besford v. Saunders, 2 H. Bl. Adams, 19 Pick. 429, Ehle v. Judson,
116; Fleming v. Hayne, 1 Stark. 370; 24 Wend. 97; Warren v. Whitney, 24
Branch Bank v. Boykin, 9 Ala. 320; Me. 561; Geer o. Archer, 2 Barb. 420.
Scouton o. Eislord, 7 Johns. 36 ; Bush u. In this last case it was held that an ex-
Barnard, 8 id. 407.— So in promises by press promise can only revive a prece-
an adult to pay " when he is able " a debt dent good consideration, which might
contracted during infancy, the defendant's have been enforced through the me-
ability to pay must be shown. Penn v. dium of an implied promise, had it not
Bennett, 4 Camp. 203 ; Cole u. Saxby, 3 been suspended by some positive rule of
Esp. 160, Davies ;>. Smith, 4 id. 36; law, but can give no original right of
Thompson v. Lay, 4 Pick. 48; Everson action, if the obligation on which it is
v. Carpenter, 17 Wend. 419 So of a founded never could have been enforced
promise to pay a debt barred by the at law, though not barred by any legal
Statute of Limitations. Tanner ». Smart, maxim or statute provision. But it is
6 B. & C. 603; Haydon v. Williams, 7 not necessary that the moral obligation,
Bing. 163; Gould v. Shirley, 2 Mo. & P. in order to be a good foundation "for an
581 ; Tompkins u. Brown, 1 Uenio, 247 ; express promise, should be such that,
Laforge v. Jayne, 9 Penn. St. 410. without the express promise, an action

[ufi) Penn v. Bennett, 4 Camp, 205; could once hai-e been sustained upon it. But,

Fleming v. Hayne, 1 Stark. 371 ; Wait v. if it could have been made available in a

Morris, 6 Wend. 394. defence, it is equally within the rule.

(uz) Depuy v. Swart, 3 Wend. 135; See also Nash o. Russell, 5 Barb. 556;

Moore v. Viele, 4 id. 420; Walbridge v. Mardis v. Tyler, 10 B. Mon. 382; Wat-

Harroon, 18 Vt. 448, White n. Cushing, kins v. Halstead, 2 Sandf. 311, and page

30 Me. 267; Graham v. Hunt, 8 B. *381,a«/e.
Mon. 7. (u,) See note (t), ante.

(ua) Way v. Sperry, 6 Cush. 238. (x) Cook r. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57 ;

(») Way v. Sperry, 6 Cush. 238 , Tur- Hatchell v. Od..ni, 2 Dev. & B. 302;

ner v. Chrisman, 20 Ohio, 332 ; Dodge v. Ehle „. Judson, 24 Wend. 97 ; Geer v
464

CH. I.] CONSIDERATION. * 43g

but the current of recent decision in England is in favor of the
view, that the promise of a married woman has not, when given,
any legal force, and therefore is not voidable, but void ; and can-
not be ratified by a subsequent promise after the coverture has
ceased, nor be regarded as a sufficient consideration for a new
promise ; and we have therefore expressed our belief, in that note,
that the case of Lee v. Muggeridge is not law. («/) » And a late
case in New York takes the same ground very decidedly, (z) It
has, however, been held that the promise of a widow to pay for
goods furnished during her coverture, on the faith of her separate
estate, was binding, (a)

It seems to have been held in England, formerly, that while a
promise in consideration of future illicit cohabitation was cer-
tainly void, a promise in consideration of past cohabitation, es-
pecially if grounded upon seduction by the promisor, was
* sufficient. It appears to be now held, that the considera- * 436
tion is equally insufficient in either case, (b) 2

section in.

ADEQUACY OP CONSIDERATION.

If the consideration is valuable it need not be adequate ; that
is, the court will not inquire into the exact proportion between
the value of the consideration and that of the thing to be done
for it. (c) 3 But it must have some real value ; and if this be very

Archer, 2 BaTb. 420. This was express- (6) It appears to be so determined by

ly held in Franklin v. Beatty, 27 Miss. Beaumont v. Reeve, 8 A. & E. (n. s.)

347. 483, although the court had some diffi-

(y) Littlefield v. Shee, 2 B. & Ad. 811 ; culty in coming to this conclusion. See

Meyer v. Haworth, 8 A. & E. 467 ; East- also on this point Binnington v. Wallis,

wood v. Kenyon, 11 id. 438. See also 4 B. & Aid. 650; Jennings v. Brown, 9

Lloyd v. Lee, 1 Stra. 94, and note (0, M. & W. 496 ; Annandale v. Harris, 2 P.

ante. Wms. 432 ; Walker v. Perkins, 1 W. Bl.

(z) Watkins ». Halstead, 2 Sandf. 517; Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 A. & E.

311 ; and see "Waters v. Bean, 15 Ga. 438.

358. (c) Skeate v. Beale, 11 A. & E. 983;

(a) Vance v. Wells, 8 Ala. 399. Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 id. 438, 456 ; Hub-

1 See Hayward v. Barker, 52 Vt. 429.

2 It was said in Wallace u. Rappleye, 103 111. 229, that an agreement in consider-
ation of past illicit cohabitation, if valid at all, must be under seal. — An undertaking by
the putative father to support his illegitimate child is upon a sufficient consideration,
Hook v, Pratt, 78 N. Y. 371 ; but to make such a child his heir requires a valuable
consideration, Wallace v. Rappleye, 103 111. 229.

8 " The adequacy of the consideration is for the parties to consider at the time of

vol. i. 30 465

*437

THE LAW OF CONTKACTS.

[BOOK II.

small, this circumstance may, even by itself, and still more when
connected with other indications, imply or sustain a charge of

fraud, (d) The courts, both of law and of equity, refuse
*437 *to disturb contracts on questions of mere adequacy,

whether the consideration is of benefit to the promisor, or
of injury to the promisee.1 Nevertheless, if an agreement be
unreasonable or unconscionable, but not in such a way or to such
a degree as to imply fraud, courts of equity will not decree a
specific performance, (e) and though courts of law will not de-
clare the contract void, they will give only reasonable damages
to the plaintiff who seeks compensation for a breach of it. (/)

bard v. Coolidge, 1 Met. 84; "Whittle v.
Skinner, 23 Vt. 532 ; Sanborn v. French,
2 Foster (X. H.), 246; Phillipps v. Bate-
man, 16 East, 372 ; Kirwan v. Kirwan, 2
Cr. & M. 623 ; Cole v. Trecothick, 9 Ves.
246; Floyer r. Sherard, Ambl. 18; Mac-
Ghee v. Morgan, 2 Sch. & L. 395, n. (</) ;
Low v. Barchard, 8 Ves. 133 ; Speed v.
Phillips, 3 Anst. 732 ; Harlan v. Harlan,
20 Penn. St. 303 ; Davidson v. Little, 22
id. 245.

(d) Cockell v. Taylor, 15 E. L. & E,
101 ; s. c. 15 Beav. 103 ; Edwards v. Burt,
id. 435 ; s. c. 2 DeG. M. &. G. 55 ; John-
son v. Dorsey, 7 Gill, 269 ; Wormack v.
Rogers, 9 Ga. 60; Judge v. Wilkins, 19
Ala. 765 ; Milnes v. Cowley, 8 Price, 620 ;
Preble v. Bog hurt, 1 Swan'st. 329; Mayor
v. Williams, 6 Md. 235. Mere folly or
weakness or want of judgment, will not
defeat a contract. This is well illustrated
by the case of James v. Morgan, 1 Lev.
Ill; s. c. 1 Keb. 569. An action was
brought in special assumpsit, on an agree-
ment to pay for a horse a barley-corn
a nail, for every nail in the horse's
shoes, and double every nail, which came,
there being thirty-two nails, to five hun-
dred quarters of barley ; and on a trial
before Hyde, J., the jury under his di-
rection, gave the full value of the horse,
£8, as damages ; and it is to be collected
that the contract was considered valid ;
for the report states, that there was after-
wards a motion to the court in arrest of
judgment, for a small fault in the declara-
tion, which was overruled, and the plain-
itiff had judgment. See Chitty, Cont. 32.
.And where in an action of assumpsit it
was alleged, that in consideration of 2s.
6d. paid, and £4 17s. 6rf. to be paid, the

defendant promised to deliver two rye-
corns on the next Monday, and double
in geometrical progression every succeed-
ing Monday (or every other Monday), for
a year, which would have required the
delivery of more rye than was grown in
the whole year, the court on demurrer
seemed to consider the contract good;
and Powell, J., said, that although the
contract was a foolish one, yet it would
hold good in law, and that the defendant
ought to pay something for his folly ; but
no judgment was given, the case being
compromised. Thornborrow v. AVhiteacre,
2 Ld. Bayrn. 1164. See Chitty, Cont. 32;
Birdsong v. Birdsong, 2 Head, 289.

(e) Osgood u. Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch.
23; Morfiock v. Buller, 10 Ves. 292;
Gasque i>. Small, 2 Strob. Eq. 72.

(/) Thus, where an execution creditor
proposed to discharge the execution, with-
out putting it into an officer's hands, if the
debtor would give his note for the debt
and costs, and also the sum which an offi-
cer might charge for collecting the execu-
tion, and such note was given, payable in
oats, at a very low price per bushel ; the
court held, that though the note was not
usurious, yet it was unconscionable, and
they deducted the sum included in the
note as officer's fees from the amount of
the verdict on the note. Cutler r. How, 8
Mass. 257. See Cutler v. Johnson, id. 266.
— So, where the defendant hired a cow
and calf of the plaintiff, and agreed to
return them in one year, with six dollars
for the use of them, and, if not then de-
livered, six dollars annually until deliv-
ered, it was held that the plaintiff was en-
titled to recover the value of the cattle,
with six dollars for the use of them for

making the agreement, not for the court when it is sought to be enforced." Per Black-
burn, J., in Bolton v. Madden, L. R. 9 Q. B. 55. — A single consideration is sufficient to
support all the promises of a contract. Harris v. V enables, L. R. 7 Ex. 235.

1 Mere inadequacy is insufficient except as bearing upon the question of fraud or
undue influence. Earl v. Peck, 64 N. Y. 596 ; Cumming's Appeal, 67 Penn. St. 404.

466

CH. I.] CONSIDERATION. * 433

When adequacy of consideration becomes material, whether it
exists is a question for the court. (</)

As the consideration must have some value and reality the
assumption of a supposed danger or liability, which has no foun-
dation in law or in fact, is not a valuable or sufficient consider-
ation, (h) nor is the performance of that which the party was
under a previous valid legal obligation to do;^')1 and where
one through mistake of the law acknowledges himself under an
obligation which the law does not impose, he is not bound by
such promise ; (/) although, in general, ignorance of the law is
no excuse or defence, for if it were, a " premium would be held
out to ignorance." (&)

♦SECTION IV. *438

PREVENTION OP LITIGATION.

The prevention of litigation is a valid and sufficient considera-
tion ; for the law favors the settlement of disputes. (J) Thus,
a mutual submission of demands and claims to arbitration is
binding so far as this, that the mutual promises are a considera-
tion each for the other, (jii) But the submission must be mutu-

one year only, and interest on that sum into for the purpose of ascertaining and

from the expiration of the year until the settling the boundaries of two provinces

cattle were delivered. Baxter v. Wales, of America, and providing for mutual

12 Mass. 365. conveyances, &c. It was objected amongst

(g) Best, C. J., in Homer v. Ashford, 3 other things, that the agreement was mere-

Bing. 327. ly voluntary, and that equity never de-

(7i) Cabot v. Haskins, 3 Pick. 83. crees specifically without a consideration.

\i) Harris v. Watson, Peake, Cas. 72; Upon which the Chancellor (Lord Hard-

Stilk v. Myrick, 2 Camp. 317 ; Callaghan wicke) observed, that it was true that the

v. Hallett, 1 Caines, 104 ; Willis v. Peck- court never decrees specifically without

ham, 1 Br. & B. 515 ; Collins v. Godefroy, consideration ; but that the agreement in

1 B. & Ad. 950; Sweany v. Hunter, 1 question was not without consideration;

Murphey, 181 ; Smith v. Bartholomew, 1 for though nothing valuable was given on

Met. 276; Crowhurst v. Laverack, 16 E. the face of the articles as a consideration,

L. & E. 497 ; s. c. 8 Exch. 208 ; L'Amo- the settling boundaries, and peace and

reux v. Gould, 3 Seld. 349. quiet, formed a mutual consideration on

()') Warder v. Tucker, 7 Mass. 449; each side; and in all cases make a eonsid-

Preeman v. Boynton, id. 483 ; May v. Cof- eration to support a suit in chancery, for

fin, 4 id. 347 ; Silvernail v. Cole, 12 Barb, performance of the agreement for set-

685 ; Ross v. McLauchlan, 7 Gratt. 86. tling the boundaries, bee also Wiseman

(k) Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East, 469. v. Roper, 1 Chanc. 158; Stapilton v. bta-

tl) Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sen. pilton, 1 Atk. 3.
444. In this case a bill was filed in chan- (m) Hodges v. Saunders, 17 Pick. 470;

eery to enforce specific performance of Jones v. Boston Mill Corp. 4 id. 507 ; Wil-

articles of agreement under seal, entered liams u. The Commercial Exchange to.

1 As the completing a contract, already partially performed, to build a railroad, in
consideration of additional compensation. Ayres v. Chicago, &c. R. Co., 52 la. 478.

467

*439

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[book II.

ally binding ; that is, equally obligatory on both parties, or the
consideration fails. On the same ground a mutual compromise is
sustained, (n) With the courts of this country, the prevention
of litigation is not only a sufficient, but a highly favored
* 439 consideration ; (o) and no investigation * into the character
or value of the different claims submitted will be entered
into for the purpose of setting aside a compromise, it being suffi-
cient if the parties entering into the compromise thought at the
time that there was a question between them, (p) l

So giving up a suit or any equivalent proceedings, instituted
to try a question of which the legal result is doubtful, is a good
consideration for a promise to pay a sum of money for an aban-
donment thereof. (5) 2 And in these cases inequality of consid-

29 E. L. & E. 429; s. c. 10 Exch. 569;
Com. Dig. Action upon the Case on As-
sumpsit (A. 1), (B. 2).

(ii ) Durham v. Wadlington, 2 Strob.
Eq. 258 ; Van Dyke v. Davis, 2 Mich. 145 ;
H"ge v. Hoge, 1 Watts, 216. In this case
G/bxm, C. J., held that a compromise of a
doubtful title was binding upon the par-
ties, although ignorant of their rights, un-
less vitiated by fraud sufficient to avoid
any other contract. In Cavode r. McKel-
vey, Addison, 56, where conflicting titles
of lands were settled by one claimant pur-
chasing the title of the other, it was held
that the settlement was a good considera-
tion to support such purchase, although
the title was bad. In O'Keson r. Barclay,
2 Penn. St. 5.31, an action for slander was
compromised by the defendant agreeing
to give the plaintiff a certain sum. Held,
by the Supreme Court, reversing the judg-
ment of the court below, that there was a
sufficient consideration for the promise,
although the words laid iu the declaration
were not actionable.

(o) See in addition to the cases in the
last note, Zane v. Zaue, 6 Munf. 406 ; Tay-
loru. Patrick, 1 Bibb, 168 ; Fisher r. Mav, 2
id. 448; Truett v. Chaplin, 4 Hawks, 178;
Brown i>. Sloan, 6 Watts, 321 ; Stoddard
v. Mix, 14 Conn. 12 ; Rice v. Bixler, 1 W.
& S. 456 ; Barlow v. Ocean Ins. Co. 4 Met.
270.

(p) Fj parte Lucy, 21 E. L. & E. 199;
Mills v. Lee, 6 Monr. 91 ; Moore r. Fitz-
water, 2 Rand. (Va.) 442; Bennet r.
Paine, 5 Watts, 259; Pierson v. McCahill,
21 Cal. 122.

(q) In Longridge r. Dorville, 5 B. &
Aid. 117, it was held that the giving np a
suit, instituted to try a question respecting
which the law is doubtful, is a good con-
sideration for a promise to pay a stipulated
sum ; and therefore where a ship, having
on board a pilot required by law, ran foul
of another vessel, and proceedings were
instituted by the owners of the latter to
compel the owners of the former to make
good the damage, and the former vessel
was detained until bail was given, and
pending such proceedings, the agent of
the owners of the vessel detained agreed,
on the owners of the damaged vessel re-
nouncing all claims on the other vessel,
and on their proving the amount of the
damage done, to indemnify them, and to
pay a stipulated sum by way of damages ;
it was held that there being contradictory
decisions as to the point whether ship-
owners were liable for an injury done
while their ship was under the control of
the pilot required by law, there was a suf-
ficient consideration to sustain the promise
made by the agents of the owners of the
detained vessel to pay the stipulated dam-
ages.—But in Watters c. Smith, 2 B. &
Ad. 889, where this case was relied upon,
the case was that B & C being jointly in-
debted to A, the latter sued B alone. He
remonstrated upon the hardship of the
case, alluded to circumstances which would
probably reduce the plaintiff's demand if
he gained a verdict, and proposed to put
an end to the action by paying part of the
debt, and the costs of the "suit. This was
agreed to, and a receipt given for the sum

1 Clark v. Gamwell, 125 Mass. 428 ; Plannagan i: Kilcome, 58 N. H. 443. A com-
promise in good faith of a disputed claim is binding, although it turns out that the
claim was wholly unfounded. Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449 ■ Wehruni
a. Kuhn, 61 N. Y. 623.

2 If the assignee of a bankrupt desists from proceedings against a co-assignee who

468

CH. I.]

CONSIDERATION.

440

eration does not constitute a valid objection ; it is enough if
there be an actual controversy, of which the issue may fairly be
considered by both parties as doubtful. But a promise by a son
not to complain of his father's distribution of his estate, is
*no consideration for the father's promise not to sue a *440
note given by the son. (r) It has been said that equity
regards the termination of family controversies as a sufficient
consideration for an agreement, even if the controversies had no
good foundation. (rr) 1

A promise to pay money, in consideration that the promisee
would abandon proceedings in which the public are interested, is
not sustainable, because such consideration is void on grounds of
public policy, (s) 2 So obtaining the passage of a law by corrupt
means is no valid consideration. (£)

paid, which was stated to be for debt and
costs in that action. A having afterwards
sued C, it was held, that the composition
above mentioned did not operate as a dis-
charge of the whole debt, but only to re-
lieve B, and therefore it was no defence
for C. — In Wilkinson v. Byers, 1 A. & E.
106, the Court of King's Bench held, that
where an action has been commenced for
an unliquidated demand, payment by the
defendant of an agreed sum in discharge
of such demand, is a good consideration
for a promise by the plaintiff to stay pro-
ceedings and pay his own costs. And, per
Littledale, J., even in the case of a liqui-
dated demand, the same promise made in
consideration of the payment of such de-
mand, may be enforced in an action of as-
sumpsit, when the agreement has been
such that the court would stay proceedings
if the plaintiff attempted to go on. See
Wilbur v. Crane, 13 Pick. 284 ; Mills o.
Lee, 6 Monr. 97 ; Union Bank v. Geary, 5
Pet. 114; Bennet v. Paine, 5 Watts, 259;
Muirhead v. Kirkpatrick, 21 Penn. St.
237; Livingston v. Dugan, 20 Mo. 102;
Hey v. Moorhouse, 6 Bing. N. C. 52;
Stracy v. Bank of England, 6 Bing. 754 ;
Atlee v. Backhouse, 3 M. & W. 648 ; Rich-
ardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229 ; Thornton
v. Fairlie, 2 Moore, 397, 408, 409.

(r) White v. Bluett, 24 E. L. & E. 434.

(rr) Smith v. Smith, 36 Ga. 184.

(s) In Coppock v. Bower, 4 M. & W.
361, a petition having been presented to
the House of Commons against the return

of a member, on the ground of bribery, the
petitioner entered into an agreement, in
consideration of a sum of money, and upon
other terms, to proceed no further with
the petition. Lord Abinger said : " Then
the next question is, whether this is an
unlawful agreement; and I think that
though it may not be so by any statute,
yet it is unlawful by the common law.
Here was a petition presented on a charge
of bribery. Now this is a proceeding in-
stituted not for the benefit of the individ-
uals, but of the public; and the only
interest in it which the law recognizes is
that of the public. I agree that if the
person who prefers that petition finds, in
the progress of the inquiry, that he has
no chance of success, he is at liberty to
abandon it at any time. But I do not
agree that he may take money for so
doing, as a means and with the effect of
depriving the public of the benefit which
would result from the investigation. It
seems to me as unlawful to do so as it
would be to take money to stop a prosecu-
tion for a crime. In either case the pros-
ecutor might say that he is not bound, at
his own expense, to continue an inquiry in
which the public alone are interested ; but
such a reason does not amount to an ex-
cuse, where he receives money for discon-
tinuing the proceedings." Keir v. Leeman,
9 A. & E. (n. s.) 371 ; Wall v. Charlick,
N. Y. Leg. Obs. July, 1850, 230.

(t) Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.
Co. 16 How. 314.

has misused money of the estate, on receiving a note towards the payment of the
amount, the note is upon a good consideration. Abbott v. Fisher, 124 Mass. 414

i A family compromise made in good faith and full knowledge will be sustained on
Blighter ground than one between strangers. Bierer s Appeal, 92 Penn. bt 2b5.

2 Or an aereement in consideration of withholding suit upon a bond not to expose

469

441

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK II.

SECTION V.

FORBEARANCE.

An agreement to forbear for a time, proceedings at law or in
equity, to enforce a well-founded claim, is a valid consideration
for a promise, (w) 1 But this consideration fails if it be
* 441 shown * that the claim is wholly and certainly unsustain-
able at law or in equity ; (w) 2 but mere proof that it is

(u) See 1 Boll. Abr. 24, pi. 33; Com.
Dig. Action upon the Case upon Assump-
sit (B. 1); 3 Chitty, Com. L. 66, 67. — In
Atkinson v. Bayntum, 1 Bing. N. C. 444,
one M. being in custody pursuant to a
warrant of attorney, by which he had
agreed that execution should issue from
time to time for certain instalments of a
mortgage debt, the defendant, in consider-
ation that the plaintiff would discharge M.
out of custody, undertook that he should,
if necessary, be forthcoming for a second
execution; it was held, that the defend-
ant's contract was valid. — As to the mode
of declaring in such case, see Willats v.
Kennedy, 8 Bing. 5 ; Moston o. Burn, 7 A.
& E. 19. In this country the same gen-
eral principles are recognized. Thus, if
one promise to pay the debt of another,
in consideration that the creditor will
"forbear and give further time for the
payment " of the debt ; this is a sufficient
consideration, though no particular time
of forbearance be stipulated ; the creditor
averring that he did thereupon forbear,
from such a day till such a day. King v.
Upton, 4 Greenl. 387. See also Elting v.
Vanderlyn, 4 Johns. 237 ; Muirhead v.
Kirkpatrick, 21 Penn. St. 237. — So an
agreement by a surety to forbear a suit
against his principal, after he shall have paid
the debt of the principal, is a good consid-
eration to support a promise, although at

the time of the agreement the surety had
no cause of action against the principal.
Hamaker r. Eberley, 2 Binn. 506. — So a
promise to forbear, for six months, to sue
a third person, on a just cause of action,
is a valid and sufficient consideration for a
promissory note. And in a suit on such
note by the payee against the maker, the
burden of proof is not on the payee, to
show that he has forborne according to
his promise, but on the maker, to show
that he has not. Jennison v. Stafford, 1
Cush. 168. See also Giles v. Ackles, 9
Barr, 147 ; Silvis i: Ely, 3 W. & S. 420;
"Watson !-. Randall, 20 Wend. 201 ; Ford
v. Rehman, Wright, 434; Gilman v. Kib-
ler, 5 Humph. 19; Colgin c. Henley, 6
Leigh, 85 ; Rood v. Jones, 1 Dougl. (Mich.)
188 ; Martin v. Black's Ex'rs, 20 Ala. 309 ;
McKinley v. Watkins, 13 111. 140.

(v) Gould r. Armstrong, 2 Hall, 266;
Lowe o. Weatherhy, 4 Dev. & B. 212 ;
Jones v. Ashburnham, 4 East, 455 ; Smith
v. Algar, 1 B. & Ad. 604 ; Martin v. Black's
Ex'rs, 20 Ala. 309 ; New Hampshire Sav-
ings Bank v. Culcord, 15 N. H. 119. The
case of Wade v. Simeon, 2 C. B. 548, well
illustrates this principle. In that case the
declaration stated that the plaintiff had
brought an action against the defendant
in the Exchequer to recover certain mon-
eys ; that the defendant pleaded various
pleas, on which issues in fact had been

and make public the commission of the crime of adultery by the obligee with the
obligor's wife. Brown v. Brine, 1 Ex. D. 5.

1 But payment of part of a debt due and payable is not a valid consideration for
an agreement to forbear to sue, Warren v. Ilodge, 121 Mass. 106 ; Carraway v.
Odeneal, 56 Miss. 223 ; as the payment of the principal of a note in consideration of
a promise to release the interest due thereon, Willis v. Gammill, 67 Mo. 730.

2 Thus an agreement to forbear to prosecute a suit by a woman for her seduction,
is no consideration for a promise. Cline v. Templeton, 78 Ky. 550. A written promise
to pay a firm draft, accepted by the promisor as a partner to avoid the vexation of a
suit when he expressly disclaims being a partner, and such is the fact, is without
consideration. Mulholland v. Bartlett, 74 111. 58. See Barkley v. Hanlan 55 Miss.
606.

470

CH. I.]

CONSIDERATION.

442

;442

doubtful will not invalidate * the consideration, (w) Nor
is it necessary that the forbearance should extend to an
entire discharge ; any delay, which is real and not merely color-
able, is enough, (x) Nor is it material whether the proceedings
to be forborne have been commenced or not. (j/) Nor need the
agreement to a delay be for a time certain ; for it may be for a
reasonable time only, and yet be a sufficient consideration for
a promise, (z) l But in declaring on a promise made on such a

joined, which were about to be tried ; and
that, in consideration that the plaintiff
would forbear proceeding in that action
until a, certain day, the defendant prom-
ised on that day to pay the amount, but
that he made default, &c. Plea, that the
plaintiff never had any cause of action
against the defendant in respect to the
subject-matter of the action in the Ex-
chequer, which he, the plaintiff, at the
time of the commencement of the said ac-
tion, and thence until and at the time of
the making of the promise well knew. To
this plea there was a general demurrer.
Tyndal, C. J., said : " By demurring to
the plea, the plaintiff admits that he had
no cause of action against the defendant
in the action therein mentioned, and that
he knew it. It appears to me, therefore,
that he is estopped from saying that there
was any valid consideration for the de-
fendant's promise. It is almost contra
bonos mores, and certainly contrary to all
the principles of natural justice, that a
man should institute proceedings against
another, when he is conscious that he has
no good cause of action, in order to con-
stitute a binding promise, the plaintiff
must show a good consideration, some-
thing beneficial to the defendant, or detri-
mental to the plaintiff. Detrimental to
the plaintiff it cannot be if he has no
cause of action ; and beneficial to the de-
fendant it cannot be ; for in contempla-
tion of law, the defence upon such an ad-
mitted state of facts must be successful,
and the defendant will recover costs, which
must be assumed to be a full compensation
for all the legal damage he may sustain.
The consideration, therefore, altogether
fails. On the part of the plaintiff it has
been urged, that the cases cited for the
defendant were not cases where actions
had already been brought, but only cases
of promises to forbear commencing pro-
ceedings. I must, however, confess that,
if it were so, I do not see that it would
make any substantial difference. The
older cases, and some of the modern ones,

too, do not afford any countenance to that
distinction. In Tooley v. Windham, Cro.
E. 206 (more fully reported 2 Leon. 105),
it is stated that the plaintiff had purchased
a writ out of Chancery against the defend-
ant, to the intent to exhibit a bill against
him, upon the return of the writ, which
was for the profits of certain lands, which
the father of the defendant had taken in
his lifetime, the defendant, in considera-
tion he would surcease his suit, promised
to Mm that if he could prove that his fa-
ther had taken the profits or had posses-
sion of the laud under the title of the fa-
ther of the plaintiff, he would pay him for
the profits of the land ; and the court held
that the promise was without consideration
and void. There the suit was in existence
at the time of the making of the prom-
ise. So, in Atkinson v. Settree, Willes,
482, an action had been commenced at
the time the promise was made. These
cases seem to me to establish the principle
upon which our present judgment rests,
and I am not aware that it is at all op-
posed by Longridge v. Dorville." See also
Barber v. Fox, 1 Vent. 159, 2 Wms. Saund.
134; Randall v. Harvey, Palm. 394; At-
kinson v. Settree, Willes, 482 ; King v.
Hobbs, Yelv. 26 ; Hammond v. Roll, March,
202 ; Lloyd v. Lee, 1 Stra. 94 ; Goodwin v.
Willoughby, Latch, 141, Poph. 177; Sil-
vernail v. Cole, 12 Barb. 685.

(w) Longridge v. Dorville, 5 B. & Aid.
117 ; Zane v. Zane, 6 Munf. 406 ; Blake v.
Peek, 11 Vt. 483, Truett v. Chaplain, 4
Hawks, 178.

(x) Sage v. Wilcox, 6 Conn. 81. Here
the delay was one year. Baker v. Jacob,
1 Bulst. 41. Here the delay was a fort-
night, or thereabouts. See also ante, note

(")•

(y) Wade v. Simeon, ante, note (r),
Hamaker v. Eberley, 2 Binn. 506.

(z) Lonsdale v. Brown, 4 Wash. C. C.
148; Sidwell v. Evans, 1 Penn. St. 385;
Downing v. Funk, 5 Rawle, 69 ; Hakes v.
Hotchkiss, 23 Vt. 235. See also ante,
note (u).

i On an agreement to extend time of payment and forbear to sue, if no definite

471

* 443 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

consideration, the plaintiff must allege and prove the actual time
of forbearance, and if this be judged by the court to be reason-
able, the action will be sustained ; (c<) but where the stay of action
is wholly uncertain, or such as can be of no benefit to the debtor
or detriment to the creditor, it is not enough, (b)

It is not enough to allege in the declaration that disputes and
controversies existed concerning a certain debt, and that the
promise on which the action is brought was made in considera-
tion that the plaintiff promised not to sue for that debt ; for this
is no allegation that a debt actually existed, and there must be
such an allegation; but with it there may be an allegation of
disputes and controversies concerning its amount, (c) It

* 443 seems * to be settled, that a general agreement to forbear

all suits is to be construed as a perpetual forbearance ; (d)
and a promise resting on the consideration of such forbearance
is no longer binding, when a suit, which was to be forborne, is
commenced.

It is not material that the party who makes the promise, in con-
sideration of such forbearance, should have a direct interest in
the suit to be forborne, or be directly benefited by the delay, (e)

(a) Kingii. Upton,4 Greenl.387 ; Barne- bound to prove at the trial the existence

hurst (>. Cabbot, Hardr. 5. of a debt to some amount ; he might not,

(6) Jones v. Ashburnham, 4 East, 455 ; indeed, be bound to prove the full amount,

Nelson v. Serle, 4 M. & W. 795 ; Bixler v. but simply to show such a claim as to lay

Keam, 3 Penn. St. 282. See also, llix v. a reasonable ground for the defendant's

Adams, 9 Vt. 233. making the promise : whereas, in the pres-

(c) Edwards v. Baugh, 11 M. & W. ent case, he would not have to prove any-

641. Lord Abingcr, C. B. : "The declara- thing beyond the fact that there had been

tion only alleges that certain disputis and a dispute between himself and the defend-

controversies were pending between the ant as to the existence of a debt. A man

plaintiff and the defendant, whether the may threaten to bring an action against

defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in any stranger he may happen to meet in

a certain sum of money. There is lioth- the street. Where an action is depending,

ing in the use of the word 'controversy' the forbearing to prosecute it is a sufficient

to render this a good allegation of consid- consideration for a promise to pay a cer-

e™tl0n: .^J16 controversy merely is, that tain sum of money ; for, besides other ad-

the plaintiff claims the debt, and the other vantages, the party promising would save

denies it. The case might have been dif- the extra costs which he would have to

ferent, if the declaration had said, ' Where- pay, even if he were successful."
as the defendant was indebted to the plain- (d) Clark v. Russell, 3 Watts 213-

tiff in divers sums of money, for money Sidwell v. Evans, 1 Perm. St. 385 '
lent, and also on an account stated, that a (e) Smith (. Al"ar IB & Ad 603

dispute arose as to the amount of the debt See Emmott r. Reams,' 5 Bing. N. C. 559]

so due; and in order to put an end to all In Maud v. Waterhouse, 2 C. & P 579 it

controversies respecting it, it was agreed was held that if a person, employed by the

that the plaintiff, m consideration of re- administrator of a deceased debtor to wind

ceivmg £100, should not sue the defend- up the concerns of the deceased's business

ant m respect to his original claim.' In give an undertaking to a creditor of the

that case the plaintiff would have been deceased, to furnish money to meet an ac-

time is agreed on, a reasonable time will be presumed. Calkins v. Chandler 36
Mich. 320. '

472

CH. I.J

CONSIDERATION. * 444

It is enough that he requests such forbearance ; for the benefit to
the defendant will be supposed to extend to him, and it would
also be enough to make the consideration valid, that the creditor
is injured by the delay. But there must have been some party
who could have been sued. (/) And in cases in which the person
to be forborne is not mentioned, but the forbearance may be un-
derstood to be forbearance of whoever might be sued, the
promise founded on such consideration is * binding, if *444
there be any person liable to suit, though the defendant
himself is not liable. (#)

In general, a waiver of any legal right, at the request of an-
other party, is a sufficient consideration for a promise ; (h) 1 or a
waiver of any equitable right ; (1) and so it is, although it be a
waiver of an action for a tort, by committing which the person
doing the wrong gained a benefit, although the other party suf-
fered no real injury from it. (j) Forbearance to eject a tenant
at will is a sufficient consideration for a guaranty of past and
future rent, (jj) So is forbearance by a collector to enforce the

ceptance which such creditor has given, in W. died intestate, and that at the time of
furtherance of an accommodation arrange- the making and delivery of the note no
ment for delaying payment, in the hope administration had heen granted of his
that funds may be forthcoming, he is lia- effects, nor was there any executor or ex-
ble on such undertaking, though he was ecutors of his estate, nor any person liable
merely a clerk, and had no interest in the for the debt so remaining due to the plain-
goods sold by the creditor, and had not tiff as aforesaid ; and the defendant averred
received any funds which he could apply that there neier was any consideration for
to the discharge of the debt. the said note except as aforesaid. Held,
(/) Jones v. Ashburnham, 4 East, 455 ; that the plea was a good answer to the
Nelson v. Serle, 4 M. & W. 795. In this declaration.

case, to a declaration in debt on a promis- (g) See Jones v. Ashburnham, 4 East,

sory note for £24, dated January 3d, 1837, 455.

made by the defendant, payable twelve (A) Stebbins v. Smith, 4 Pick. 97;

months after date to the plaintiff, the de- Smith v. Weed, 20 Wend. 184; Haigh v.

fendant pleaded that one J. W., before Brooks, 10 A. & E. 309 ; s. c. 2 Per. &

and at his death, was indebted to the D.477; 3 id. 452; Farmer v. Stewart, 2

plaintiff in £24 for goods sold, which sum N. H. 97 ; Nicholson v. May, Wright, 660 ;

was due to the plaintiff at the time of the Hinman v. Moulton, 14 Johns. 466 ; Wil-

making of the promissory note in the dec- liams v. Alexander, 4 Ired. Eq. 207 ; Wa-

laration mentioned; that the plaintiff, terman v. Barratt, 4 Harring. (Del.) 311.
after the death of J. W., applied to the (i) Whitbeck n. Whitbeck, 9 Cowen,

defendant for payment; whereupon, in 266; Thorpe v. Thorpe, 1 Salk. 171 ; s. o.

compliance with his request, the defend- 12 Mod. 455.

ant, after the death of J. W., for and in (j) Davis v. Morgan, 4 B. & C. 8;

respect of the debt so remaining due to Brealey v. Andrew, 2 Nev. & P. 114; s. o.

the plaintiff as aforesaid, and for no other 7 A. & E. 108.

consideration whatever, made and deliv- (_;)') Vinal v. Richardson, 13 Allen,

ered the note to the plaintiff, and that J. 521.

1 The release of a party from the performance of a contract forms a sufficient con-
sideration to account for money paid him under the contract, Cutter v. Cochrane,
116 Mass. 408; as well as the rescission of a subsisting contract, which one of the
parties refuses to fulfil, for a new agreement between the same parties, Bollins v.
Marsh, 128 Mass. 16.

473

* 445 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

collection of taxes by a sale of the land a good consideration for
the owner's promise to pay the tax. (jk)

And a promise to pay one if he would prove a debt against a
deceased husband, (A) or to pay a debt denied to be due, if the
party creditor would swear to it, rests upon a sufficient consider-
ation. And in an action upon such promise, it has been held
that the defendant cannot show that the plaintiff was mistaken or
swore falsely. (7)

The incurring of a liability in consequence of the promise of
another, is held to be a good consideration ; (m) and a subsisting
legal obligation to do a thing is a good consideration for a promise
to do that thing, (w)

* 445 * SECTION VI.

ASSIGNMENT OF DEBT.

An assignment of a debt or a right is a good consideration for
a promise by the assignee, (o) 2 Such assignment may not be
good at law, but it is valid in equity ; and courts of law, for many
purposes, and to a certain extent, recognize the validity of the
transfer, if the assignee obtains a benefit which the law con-
siders a sufficient and a proper consideration to found a promise
upon. (^>) But if the transaction amounts to maintenance, which
is illegal, the consideration fails, and the promise is void.

( jh) Burr v. Wilcox, 13 Allen, 269. Buck, 11 Vt. 166, it was held that a prom-

Ik) • Traver v. , 1 Sid. 57. ise by one already legally liable for a debt,

ll) Brooks r. Ball, 18 Johns. 337. in consideration of such liability to pay, if

(m) Underbill v. Gibson, 2 N. H. 352; waited on a, certain time, creates no new

Homes v. Dana, 12 Mass. 190; Bryant v. liability; and that a promise to pay the

Goodnow, 5 Pick. 228. See also Chapin debt of another, if waited on a certain

v. Lapham, 20 id. 467 ; Blake v. Cole, 22 time, leaving the debt to be enforced dur-

id. 97 ; Ward v. Fryer, 19 Wend. 494. In ing that time against the debtor, is not

Baileyville n, Lowell, 20 Me. 178, it was binding. And see, to the same effect,

determined, that an agreement by the Deacon v. Gridley, 28 E. L. & E. 345;

owner of an execution against the inhabi- r>. c. 15 C. B. 295.

tants of a town, that if they would at once (o) Loder v. Chesleyn, 1 Sid. 212;

assess the amount required, and collect the Moulsdale p. Birchall, 2 W. Bl. 820 ;

same, he would make a certain discount, is Price v. Seaman, 4 B. & C. 525; s. c. 7

founded on sufficient consideration, and Dow. & B. 14; Graham v. Gracie, 13 Q.

will be enforced. B. 548; Whittle v. Skinner, 23 Vt. 532;

(n) Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57 ; War- Harrison v. Knight, 7 Tex. 47 ; Edson v.

ner v. Booge, 15 Johns. 233; Jewett u. Fuller, 2 Poster (N. H), 185.
Warren, 12 Mass. 300. In Bussell v. (p) Price v. Seaman, 4 B. & C. 525, 7

1 A pre-existing debt is a good consideration for an assignment of a chose in action.
Putnam v. Story, 132 Mass. 205.

474

CH* I*] CONSIDEEATION. * 44g

SECTION VII.

WOEK AND SERVICE.

Work and service are a very common consideration for a prom-
ise, and always sufficient, if rendered at the request of the party
promising, (q) This request may often be implied ; it is so,
generally, from the fact that the party making the promise ac-
cepts and holds the benefit resulting from the work or ser-
vice. O) And it is an equally sufficient consideration for
a * promise, if the work or service be rendered to a third * 446
party at the request of the promisor ; (s) and such request
will often be implied from very slight circumstances ; as in the
case of clothing supplied to a child, where the mere knowledge
and silence of the father are enough, (t)

If the work and service rendered are merely gratuitous, and
performed for the defendant without his request or privity, how-
ever meritorious or beneficial they may be, they afford no cause
of action, (w) and perhaps no consideration for a subsequent

Dow. & R. 14, 10 Moore, 34, 2 Bing. 437 ; ficient consideration for the defendant's

Reate v. Dicken, 1 C. M. & R. 430 ; a. c. 5 promise. And see Lewis v. Trickey, 20

Tyr. 116. And an assignment of a chose Barb. 387.

in action need not be by deed. Howell v. (s) See cases cited supra, note (?).

Mclvers, 4 T. R. 690; Health v. Hall, 4 (<) Law v. Wilkins, 6 A. & E. 718;

Taunt. 326. Nichole v. Allen, 3 C. & P. 36. See, how-

(q) Hunt v. Bate, Dyer, 272, n. ; 1 ever, Mortimore v. Wright, 6 M. & W.

Boll. Abr. Hi pi. 2, 3. In Taylor v. Jones, 485, where Lord Abinger denies these cases

1 Ld. Raym. 312, it was held that giving a to be sound law. It is a question for the

soldier leave of absence at the instance of jury whether the circumstances are suffi-

a third person is a good consideration for cient in any particular case. Baker v.

a promise from him to the captain to bring Keen, 2 Stark. 501. See further, as to

him back in ten days, or pay a sum of this point, ante, p. *299, note (A), et seq.

money. (w) Hunt v. Bate, Dyer, 272 a; 1 Roll.

(r) 1 Wins. Saund. 264, n. (1) ; Tipper Abr. 11 pi. 1 ; Hayes v. Warren, 2 Stra.

v. Bicknell, 3 Bing. N. C. 710. In that 933; Roscorla v. Thomas, 3 Q. B. 234;

case the declaration stated that the de- Jeremy v. Goochman, Cro. E. 442 ; Dog-

fendants being in possession of certain get v. Vowell, Moore, 643 ; Hines v. But-

mortgage deeds, of which H. R. was de- ler, 3 Ired. Eq. 307. See also ante, p.

sirous to obtain an assignment by the * 432, note (t). — So, in Frear v. Harden-

payment of £500, the plaintiff consented bergh, 5 Johns. 273, where A entered on

at H. R.'s request to accept bills to that land belonging to B, and without his

amount drawn by H. R., upon H. R.'s pro- knowledge or authority cleared it, made

curing the defendants to deliver the mort- improvements, and erected buildings, and

gage deeds to the plaintiff as security ; that B afterwards promised to pay him for the

the defendants, in consideration of the improvements he had made, it was held,

plaintiff accepting the bills, undertook to that the work having been done, and the

deliver the deeds to him upon his paying improvements made without the request

them the amount of the bills. Held] a suf- of B, the promise was a nudum pactum, on

475

* 447 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

promise, although, as we have seen, a precedent request may in
law be presumed from the promisor's acceptance of the service.
So if a workman employed and directed to do a particular thing
choose to do some other thing, without the direction or assent
of the employer, the implied promise of the employer to pay for
his labor will not extend to the new work ; (y) but if the work is
accepted by the employer, it would be a sufficient consideration
for a promise to pay for it, and such acceptance might imply
such promise.

* 447 * SECTION VIII.

TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.

Trust and confidence in another often form a sufficient consid-
eration to hold that other to his undertaking. As if one intrusts
money, goods, or property of any kind, to any person, on the
faith of that person's promise to act in a certain way in reference
to those goods, or that money or property, such person, having
accepted the trust, will be held to his promise, because the trust
is itself a sufficient consideration for a promise to discharge and
execute the trust faithfully, (w) x For if a person makes a mere

which no action could be maintained. — without the privity or request of B, he

But perhaps the strongest case to be found was not entitled to recover for it.
in the American reports in illustration of (v) Hort v. Norton, 1 McCord, 22.

this principle, is that of Bartholomew r. See also Phetteplace r. Steere, 2 Johns.

Jackson, 20 Johns. 28. A owned a wheat 442.

stubble-field, in which B had a stack of (io) Doctor & Stud. Dial. 2, c. 24 ; Holt,

wheat, which he had promised to remove C. J., in Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Baym.

in due season for preparing the ground for 919. Thus, where it coffee-house keeper

a fall crop. The time tor its removal accepted a large sum of money from the

having arrived, A sent a message to B, plaintiff, aud promised to take proper

requesting the immediate removal of the care of it for a certain period, it was

stack of wheat, as he wished, on the next held that an action would lie on this

day, to burn the stubble on the field. B promise for gross neglect and want of

having agreed to remove the stack by ten caution, whereby the money was lost,

o'clock the next morning, A waited till Doorman v. Jenkins, 2 A. & E. 256. So

that time, and then set fire to the stubble where the plaintiff delivered the sum of

in a remote part of the field. The fire X700 to the defendant, to be laid out by

spreading rapidly, and B not appearing to him in the purchase of an annuity, and

remove the stack, A removed it for him. the defendant promised to get the au-

Held, that as A performed the service nuity well and properly secured, but was

1 As in Hammond v. Hussey, 51 N. H. 40, where a teacher undertook to examine
pupils for admission to a high school at the request of the school committee, and was
held liable for a false report that the plaintiff was not qualified. See Jenkins !'. Bacon,
111 Mass. 373, which was to the effect, that a person gratuitously undertaking to buy and
keep a government bond for another is responsible for its loss to the extent of its
value, irrespective of his negligence ; Morton, J., dissenting on the ground that it was
for the jury to decide whether he was liable or not by reason of negligence.

476

CH' L] CONSIDEBATION. * 443

gratuitous promise, and then enters upon the * perforin- * 448
ance of it, he is held to a full execution of all he has
undertaken. Questions involving this principle seldom arise ex-
cept in the case of bailments, and will be considered hereafter
when we treat of that subject. Here we will only sav, that
in general, an agent without remuneration cannot be required
to undertake an employment or trust, or held liable for not doing
so; but if he undertake and begin it, he is liable for the conse-
quences of neglect or omission in completing his work

SECTION IX.

A PROMISE FOR A PROMISE.

A promise is a good consideration for a promise, (x) 1 And it
is so previous to performance and without performance. As if

guilty of gross neglect and want of care, eration. See also the case of Wheatley
whereby both the money and the annuity v. Law, Cro. J. 668, where a similar
were lost, it was held that the plaintiff declaration was held good, if the case is
was entitled to maintain an action against correctly reported. Where the defend-
the defendant, to recover compensation ant received certain notes from the plain-
to1 tbe injury he had sustained, although tiff to collect or return, it was held that
the defendant was to receive no reward the delivery of the notes constituted a
for his services. Whitehead v. Greetham, consideration for the defendant's agree-
10 ;Moore, 182, 2 Bing. 464, McClel. ment, and that if he neglected to use
& 1 . 205. In the absence of an express ordinary diligence in endeavoring to col-
undertaking to procure good security, the lect them, he was liable therefor to
party would only be bound to use reason- the plaintiff. Robinson p. Threadgill, 13
able care and caution. Dartnall v. How- Ired. L. 39. And where the plaintiff in-
ard, 6 Dow. & R. 443 ; s. c. 4 B. & C. trusted " clivers boilers of great value " to
345. In Shillibeer v. Glyn, 2 M. & W. the defendant, to be weighed, and the de-
143, the declaration stated that the plain- fendant promised to return them in the
tiff being about to proceed to Northamp- same state and condition that they were
ton, paid money to the defendants in Lon- in at the time he received them, hut sent
don, that they might cause it to be paid them back in detached pieces and unfit
to him at Northampton on a certain day ; for use, it was held that the plaintiff was
that the defendants received the money entitled to maintain an action on the
for that purpose from the plaintiff, and promise, to recover compensation for the
that thereupon afterwards, in consider- injury he had sustained. Bainbridge v.
ation of the premises, the defendants Firmstone, 8 A. & E. 743 ; s. c. 1 Per. &
promised to cause the money to be paid D. 3 ; and see Smith, Lead. Cas. vol. i. p.
to the plaintiff at Northampton. The 96 (ed. 1841).

court were inclined to hold that the \x) Nichols v. Raynbred, Hob. 88;

declaration disclosed a sufficient consid- Hebden u. Rutter, 1 Sid. 180; Strang-

1 In Backus v. Spaulding, 116 Mass. 418, where the plaintiff in consideration of a sum
of money lent to him by the defendant's testator, and of a note made to him by the
latter for the payment of an additional sum in four months, made and delivered to
him a note for the amount of both sums, payable in six years, together with an
assignment, as collateral security for the_ payment thereof, of a contract relating to
certain real estate, it was held, that the promise of the plaintiff to pay his note at

477

448

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[book II.

one promises to become a partner in a firm, and another promises
to receive him into the firm, both of these promises are binding,
each being a sufficient consideration for the other, (y) So a
promise by a seller to refund in case of deficiency in the thing
sold is a good consideration for a promise to pay for any excess
therein. (?/«/) If one promises to teach a certain trade, this is a
consideration for a promise to remain with the party a certain
length of time to learn, and serve him during that time ; but, with-
out such promise to teach, the promise to remain and serve,
though it be made in expectation of instruction, is void, (a)

borough v. Warner, 4 Leon. 3 ; Gower ?>.
Capper, Cro. E. 543 ; Parke, J., in Went-
worth v. Bullen, 9 B. & C. 840; Cart-
wright v. Cook, 3 B. & Ad. 703 ; Miller
v. Drake, 1 Caines, 45 ; Rice v. Sims, 8
Rich. L. 416; Garret v. Malone, id. 335;
James v. Eulcrod, 5 Tex. 512; Dockray
v. Dunn, 37 Me. 442; The New York
and New Haven Railroad Co. v. Pixley,
19 Barb. 428; Kiester v. Miller, 25 Penn.
St. 481. So in White v. Demilt, 2 Hall,
405, it was held, that in an action for the
breach of the defendant's contract to sell
and deliver certain goods to the plaintiff,
the promise of the latter to accept the
goods and pay for them is a good con-
sideration for the defendant's promise to
delicer them. So in Howe v. O'Mally, 1
Murphey, 287, A conveyed to B a tract of
land containing 221 acres more or less.
Some years afterwards it was mutually
agreed to have the land surveyed, and if
it were found to contain more than 221
acres, the defendant should pay the plain-
tiff ten dollars per acre for the excess ;
if it fell short, the plaintiff was to refund
to the defendant at the same rate. Here
are mutual promises, and one is a good
consideration to support the other.

(y) .McNeill v. Reed, 2 M. & Scott, 89 ;
8. C. 9 Bing. 68.

(i/y) Seward i: Mitchell, 1 Cold. 87.

(z) Thus where the defendant had
signed a written agreement to the fol-
lowing effect : " I hereby agree to remaiu
with Mrs. Lees, of 302 Regent Street,
Portland Place, for two years from the
date hereof, for the purpose of learning
the business of a dressmaker, &c. As
witness my hand this 5th day of June,
1826," it was held, that as the agreement
was all on one side, nothing being con-
tracted to be done or performed by Mrs.
Lees as a, consideration or inducement

for the defendant's remaining two years
in her service, it was a nudum pactum;
and that no action consequently could be
brought upon it against the defendant,
for leaving her mistress, and commenc-
ing business on her own account before
the expiration of the two years. Lees o,
Whitcomb, 2 Mo. & P. 86 ; s. c. 5 Bing.
34. So, where the written agreement was
in the following terms : " Memorandum of
an agreement made the 17th of August,
1833, by which I, William Bradley of
Sheffield, do agree that I will work for
and with John Sykes, of Sheffield afore-
said, manufacturer of powder-flasks and
other articles, at and in such work as
he shall order and direct, and no other
person whatsoever, from this day hence-
forth, during and until the expiration of
twelve months, and so on from twelve
months' end to twelve months' end, until
I shall give the said John Sykes twelve
months' notice in writing that I shall quit
his service," it was held, that as this en-
gagement was entirely unilateral, and
nothing was to be given or done by John'
Sykes as a, consideration for Bradley's
promise to work for him by the year, and
no one else, the agreement was a nudum
pactum, and could not be enforced. Svkes
v. Dixon, 9 A. & E. 693 ; s. c. 1 Per. & D.
463. See also Bates t>. Cort, 3 Dow. &
R. 676. So where the defendant signed
the following instrument : " Mr. James

■, as you have a claim on my brother

for .£5 17s. 9<i, for boots and shoes, I
hereby undertake to pay the amount
within six weeks from this date, 14th
January, 1833," it was held, that the
promise being without consideration, was
a nudum pactum, and gave no cause of
action. James v. Williams, 5 B. & Ad.
1109.

maturity, and the delivery of the collateral security for the performance of that
promise, constituted a sufficient consideration for the promise, contained in the note
received by him, to pay the sum therein expressed at an earlier date.

478

CH. I.]

CONSIDERATION.

449

The reason of * this is, that a promise is not a good con- * 449
sideration for a promise unless there is an absolute mutual-
ity of engagement, so that each party has the right at once to
hold the other to a positive agreement, (a) 1

*This has been doubted, from the seeming want of *450
mutuality in many cases of contract. As where one prom-
ises to see another paid, if he will sell goods to a third person ;

promise, the corporation could not sue
upon the contract. And semble, that the
doctrine cannot be supported, that a cor-
poration may sue as plaintiff upon a simple
contract, upon the ground that by so do-
ing they are estopped from objecting that
the contract was uot binding upon them.
At all events such an estoppel could only
support an action of covenant, as upon a
contract under seal. See also Payne v.
New South Wales Co. 28 E. L. & E. 579 ;
B. c. 10 Exch. 283. — If, however, a con-
tract like the above, although not origi-
nally binding upon one party, by reason
of some defect or informality in the exe-
cution, or for any other cause, and there-
fore not originally binding upon the other
party, nevertheless be executed by the party
not originally liable, the other party can-
not refuse performance on the ground
that the contract was not originally bind-
ing. Fishmonger's Company v. Robert-
son, 5 Man. & G. 131. In like manner in
Phelps v. Townsend, 8 Pick. 392 (1829),
where the defendant, by an agreement
signed only by himself, had placed his
son as an apprentice to the plaintiffs to
learn the art of printing, therein prom-
ising that his son should stay with them
until he was twenty-one, &c. ; which the
son failed to perform. On the trial the
defendant objected that the contract was
void for want of mutuality, it not being
signed by the plaintiffs, and that there
was no obligation on the plaintiffs to do
anything which might form a consider-
ation for the defendant's promise. But
the court said, " that the acceptance of
the contract by the plaintiffs, and the
execution of it in part by receiving the
apprentice, created an obligation on their
part to maintain and instruct the defend-
ant's son." See also Commercial Bank v.
Nolan, 7 How. (Miss.) 508.

(a) McKinley v. Watkins, 13 111. 140;
Lester v. Jewett, 12 Barb. 502; Nichols
v. Eaynbred, Hob. 88 ; Kingston v. Phelps,
Peake, 227 ; Biddell v. Dowse, 6 B. & C.
255 ; Hopkins v. Logan, 5 M. & W. 241 ;
Burton v. G. N. R. Co. 9 Exch. 507 ; Dor-
sey v. Rockwood, 12 How. 126. This
necessity for the mutuality of the obli-
gation, in order to render either party
bound, is well illustrated by the later case
of the Governor & Copper Miners v. Fox,
16 Q. B. 239. In that case a corpora-
tion brought an action on an executory
contract, seeking to recover damages
for its non-performance. The declara-
tion stated that in consideration that
the plaintiffs would sell to the defend-
ants iron rails, the defendants agreed to
furnish to the plaintiffs sections of the
said railways, averring mutual promises,
and alleging as a breach the non-delivery
of the sections by the defendants. It ap-
peared that the plaintiffs were incorpo-
rated by a charter, for the purpose of
carrying on the business of copper miners,
and that the contract in question, which
was not under seal, had been made by an
agent on behalf of the plaintiffs with the
defendants. Held, that the action could
not be maintained by the corporation, as
the contract was not under seal, and did
not fall within any of the exceptions to
the general rule, that a corporation can
only bind itself by deed ; that the contract
was not incidental or ancillary to carry-
ing on the business of copper miners, and
was therefore not binding on the corpora-
tion; that no other charter authorizing
the company to deal in iron coul'd be
presumed to exist, the charter which was
given in evidence not supporting such an
authority; and that, as the corporation
could not be sued upon this contract, and
as the alleged promise by them formed
the consideration for the defendant's

1 But where a dealer, in response to an advertisement, sent in a tender to supply
stores to a railway for a period named for certain prices, " in such quantities as the
railway's store-keeper might order from time to time," and the railway accepted
his tender, it was held, in an action against the dealer on his refusal to deliver goods
ordered by the railway, that there was sufficient consideration for the dealer's promise
to supply the goods, although there was no binding contract on the part of the railway
to order "any. Great Northern Railway v. Witham, L. R. 9 C. P. 16.

479

* 451 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

or promises to give a certain sum if another will deliver up
certain documents or securities, or if he will forbear a demand,
or suspend legal proceedings or the like. (6) Here it is said that
the party making the promise is bound, while the other party is
at liberty to do anything or nothing. But this is a mistake.
The party making the promise is bound to nothing until the
promisee within a reasonable time engages to do, or else does or
begins to do, the thing which is the condition of the first

* 451 promise. * Until such engagement or such doing, the

promisor may withdraw his promise, because there is no
mutuality, and therefore no consideration for it. But after an
engagement on the part of the promisee which is sufficient to
bind him, then the promisor is bound also, because there is now
a promise for a promise, with entire mutuality of obligation. So,
if the promisee begins to do the thing, in a way which binds him
to complete it, here also is a mutuality of obligation. But if
without any promise whatever, the promisee does the thing re-
quired, then the promisor is bound on another ground. The thing
done is itself a sufficient and a completed consideration ; and the
original promise to do something, if the other party would do
something, is a continuing promise until that other party does
the thing required of him.

(b) In Kennaway v. Treleavan, 5 M. performed rests with one of the contract-
& W. 501, Parke, B., is reported to have ing parties. A guaranty falls under that
said, while discussing the sufficiency of class, when a party says, ' In case you
the consideration for a guaranty, which choose to employ this man as your agent
was in these terms : " Truro, July 12th, for a week, I will be responsible for all
1838. Messrs. Kennaway & Co. Gentle- such sums as he shaU receive during that
men — I hereby guarantee to you, Messrs. time, and neglect to pay over to you,' the
Kennaway & Co., the sum of .€250, in party indemnified is not therefore bound
case Mr. Paddon, of, &c, should default in to employ the person designated by the
his capacity of agent and traveller to you. guaranty; but if he do employ him, then
William S. Treleavan." " There is a case the guaranty attaches and becomes bind-
in the books of Newbury v. Armstrong, ing on the party who gave it. It is there-
6 Bing. 201, which strongly resembles the fore no objection in the present ease to
present. There the guaranty was in say that the plaintiffs were not obliged
these terms: 'I agree to be security to to take Paddon into their service; they
you for T. C. for whatever, while in your might do so or not, as they pleased ; but
employ, you may trust him with, and in having once done so, the guarantee at-
case of default to make the same good ; ' taches and the defendant becomes respon-
and the contract was held to be good, on silile for the default." See also Yard c.
the ground that the future employment Eland, 1 Ld. llaym. 368; Caballero r.
of the party was a sufficient considera- Slater, 25 E. L. & E. 285 ; s. c. 24 C. B.
tion. It is said, and truly, that in the 300; LAmoreux r. Gould, 3 Meld. 349.
present case there was no binding con- The binding obligation of contracts or
tract on the plaintiffs, and that, notwith- promises to do some thing, provided, or
standing the guaranty, they were not on condition, or when the other party
bound to employ Paddon. But a great shall do some other thing, is also recog-
number of the cases are of contracts not nized in Mozley v. Tinkler, 1 C. M. & K.
binding on both sides at the time when 692.
made, and in which the whole duty to be

480

CH- *•] CONSIDERATION. * 452

A very large proportion of our most common contracts rests
upon this principle. Thus, in the contract of sale, the proposed
buyer says, I will give you so much for these goods ; and he may
withdraw this offer before it is accepted, and if his withdrawal
reaches the seller before the seller has accepted, the obligation of
the buyer is extinguished ; but if not withdrawn, it remains as a
continuing offer for a reasonable time, and, if accepted within
this time, both parties are now bound as by a promise for a
promise ; there is an entire mutuality of obligation. The buyer
may tender the price and demand the goods, and the seller may
tender the goods and demand the price, (c) This subject, how-
ever, belongs rather to the topic " Assent."

A written agreement to submit disputes and claims to arbitra^
tion must be signed by all parties, or it is obligatory upon none.
For no party can hold another to the award, without showing
that he himself would have been equally bound by it. (<f)

It should be added, that the common law makes an ex-
ception * to this requirement of mutuality, in the case of * 452
contracts between infants and persons of full age ; follow-
ing in this respect the civil law, and the law prevailing on the
continent of Europe. The infant is not bound, while the adult is ;
the infant may avoid his contract, but the adult cannot, (e)
This rule has been applied to the contract of future marriage, as
well as to other contracts. Where a man of full age enters into
such contract with a woman who is a minor, if he breaks the
contract she has her remedy by action. (/) If she breaks it he
has no action. But a woman under age may perhaps be bound
by a marriage contract properly securing her interests, and delib-
erately entered into, with the approbation of her parents or guar-
dians. (#)

(c) Thus, in White v. Demilt, 2 Hall, (e) See ante, n. *329.

405, the plaintiff brought an action for (/) Holt v. Ward Clarencieux, 2 Stra.

the non-delivery of certain goods sold him 937 ; Hunt v. Peake, 5 Cowen, 475 ; Wil-

by the defendant. One ground of defence lard v. Stone, 7 Cowen, 22 ; Cannon v.

was want of consideration for the defend- Alsbury, 1 A. K. Marsh. 78. — So an in-

ant's promise. But the court said, that fant may maintain an action on a mer-

the promise of the plaintiff to accept and cantile contract, although he would not

pay for the goods was a good considera- be bound himself. Warwick v. Bruce, 2

tion for the defendant's promise to deliver M. & Sel. 205.

them. See also Babcock v. Wilson, 17 (g) Anslie v. Medlycott, 9 Ves. 14;

Me. 372; Appleton v. Chase, 19 Me. 74. Simson v. Jones, 2 Russ. & M. 365;

(d) Kingston v. Phelps, Peake, Cas. Durnford v. Lane, 1 Bro. Ch. Ill; Pon-
227; Biddell v. Dowse, 6 B. & C. 255; blanque, Eq. 74; and see ante, p. * 330.

s. c. 9 Dow. & E. 404 ; Antram v. Chace,
15 East, 212.

vol. i. 31 481

*453

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK II.

SECTION X.

SUBSCRIPTION AND CONTRIBUTION.

Where several promise to contribute to a common object,
desired by all, the promise of each may be a good consideration

for the promise of the others. (A) 1 If there be a chartered
* 453 * company or corporation, one who subscribes agreeably to

the statute and by-laws acquires a right to his shares ; and
as the company is under an obligation to give him the shares, this
would be a consideration for the promise, and would make his
subscription obligatory on him. (i) 2

(h) Society in Troy v. Perry, 6 N. H.
164; George v. Harris, 4 id. 533; Hanson
v. Stetson, 5 Pick. 506 ; State Treasurer
v. Cross, 9 Vt. 289; University of Ver-
mont v. Buell, 2 Vt. 48 ; Commissioners
v. Perry, 5 Hamm. 58 ; Ohio, &c. College
v. Love, 16 Ohio, 20; Comstock ». Howk,
15 Mich. 237. — It is on this ground that
subscriptions to charitable or benevolent
objects have often been held binding,
when there was no other consideration
for each subscriber's promise than the
promise of other subscribers. It must be
confessed, however, that there are many
authorities which seem to hold it neces-
sary in such cases that there shall be
some promise or engagement by the com-
mittee corporation, or other person to
whom the subscription paper runs, or that
something should be done on their part,
as the erection of the building, providing
materials or the like, in order to render
the subscription binding. The cases of
Limerick Academy v. Davis, 11 Mass.
114; Bridgewater Academy v. Gilbert, 2
Pick. 579; Troy Academy v. Nelson, 24
Vt. 189; Gittings v. Mayhew, 6 Md.
113; Phipps v. Jones, 20 Penn. St. 2G0
Barnes v. Perine, 9 Barb. 202 ; Wilson v
Baptist Education Soc. 10 Barb. 309
Gait's Ex'rs o. Swain, 9 Gratt. 633 ,
I/Amoreux v. Gould, 3 Seld. 349 ; and
others favor this view. See also No. 42
Am. Jur. 281-283; Foxcroft Academy u.

Favor, 4 Greenl. 382, n. (Bennett's ed.).
This point was very fully discussed in the
case of Hamilton College v. Stewart, 2
Denio, 403; s. c. 1 Const. 581. It was
there held, that the endowment of a liter-
ary institution is not a sufficient consider-
ation to uphold a subscription to a fund
designed for that object. And although
there is annexed to the subscription a
condition that the subscribers are not to
be bound unless a given amount shall be
raised, no request can be implied there-
from against the subscribers that the in-
stitution shall perform the services and
incur the expenses necessary to fill up the
subscription. Accordingly, where the de-
fendant subscribed $800 to a fund for the
payment of the salaries of the officers of
Hamilton College, and a condition was
annexed that the subscribers were not to
be bound unless the aggregate amount of
subscriptions and contributions should be
$50,000; it was held, that there was no
consideration for the undertaking, and
that no action would lie upon it, al-
though there was evidence tending to
show that the whole amount had been
subscribed or contributed according to
the terms of the condition. But see
Barnes v. Perine, 9 Barb. 202; Johnston
v. Wabash College, 2 Cart. (Ind.) 555;
Edinboro' Academy v. Dobinson, 37 Penn.
St. 210.

(i) Chester Glass Company v. Dewey,

1 Thus Higert v. Trustees, &c. Univ. 53 Ind. 326, held that the mutual promises of
certain subscribers towards the erection of a college building constituted a sufficient
consideration for the promise of each.

2 Upon a contract in writing by which the subscribers agree "to and with each
other " to associate themselves into a corporation for a specified purpose, the name of
which was to be determined by the members thereof, and to " pay to the treasurer of

482

CH. I.]

CONSIDERATION. * 453

On the important question, how far voluntary subscriptions
for charitable purposes, as for alms, education, religion, or other
public uses, are binding, the law has in this country passed
through some fluctuation, and cannot now be regarded as on all
points settled. Where advances have been made, or expenses or
liabilities incurred by others in consequence of such subscriptions,
before any notice of withdrawal, this should, on general princi-
ples, be deemed sufficient to make them obligatory, provided the
advances were authorized by a fair and reasonable dependence on
the subscriptions ; and this rule seems to be well established. (/) x
And the expenses or liabilities need not have been incurred by

16 Mass. 94. In this case, certain indi- v. March, 3 Scam. 198; Macon v. Shep-
viduals having associated in writing for pard, 2 Humph. 335 ; University of Ver-
the purpose of carrying on a particular mont v, Buell, 2 Vt. 48 ; Canal Fund v.
manufacture, and being afterwards incor- Perry, 5 Hamm. 58 ; Barnes v Perine, 9
porated for the same purpose, one who Barb. 202; Homes v. Dana, 12 Mass. 190.
subscribed the writing after the incorpo- In this last case sundry persons agreed to
ration, became thereby a member of the lend to the editors of the Boston Patriot
corporation, and was held to pay the sum the sums set against their names, which
he had subscribed. But where one sub- was to be paid to one of their number as
scribed an agreement to take shares in a agent. This agent therefore made ad-
corporation after the passage of the act of vances to the editors, and it was held,
incorporation, but before any meeting of that he had an action against each sub-
the persons incorporated and their associ- scriber. The court said the only question
ates, it was held, that such agreement which could arise in the case was, whether
could furnish no evidence of a contract Larkin was induced to advance his money
with the corporation. New Bedford Turn- by the subscription. See also Thompson
pike v. Adams, 8 Mass. 138. And there v. Page, 1 Met. 570, and Farmington
is no privitv of contract between a party Academy v. Allen, 14 Mass. 172; Collier
signing and a committee appointed by his v. B. E. Society, 8 B. Mon. 68; Mouton
co-signers at a meeting which he did not v. Noble, 1 La. An. 192 ; Brouwer v. Hill,
attend; although the committee pro- 1 Saudf. C20; Plank Road u. Griffin, 21
ceeded and expended money. Currv v. Barb. 454 ; Troy Academy v. Nelson, 24
Rogers, 1 Foster (N. H), 247. Vt. 189; Watkins v. Eames, 9 Cush. 537;

( /) Bryant 1*. Goodnow, 5 Pick. 228 ; McLure v. Wilson, 43 111. 356.
Warren v. Stearns, 19 id. 73; Robertson

said corporation " the amount set against their respective names, an action may be
maintained in the name of the corporation, after it is organized, against a subscriber,
upon the allotment to him of the shares subscribed for. Athol Music Hall Co.
v. Carey, 116 Mass. 471. See also Davis o. Smith American Organ Co. 117 Mass.
456. . .

1 A gratuitous subscription, to promote the objects for which a corporation is
established, cannot be enforced unless the promisee has, in reliance on the promise
sued on, done something, or incurred or assumed some liability or obligation ; and it
is not sufficient that others were led to subscribe by the subscription sought to be en-
forced. Cottage Street Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528. In Maine Central Insti-
tute v, Haskell, 73 Me. 140, it was declared that when a subscription is accepted and
money expended for the contemplated purpose, " it becomes a completed contract
binding on both parties ; the promise to pay and at least the implied promise to
execute, each being a consideration for the other." See to the same point Presby-
terian Society v. Beach, 74 N. Y. 72; Carr v. Bartlett, 72 Me. 120; Simpson College
v. Bryan, 50 la. 294; Des Moines Univ. 11. Livingston. 57 la. 307. — But the death ot
a subscriber before his promise is acted upon by the spending of moneyor the in-
curring of any liability revokes his subscription. Pratt v. Elgin Baptist Society, 93
111. 475; Beach v. First Methodist Church, 96 111. 177; Helfenstein's Estate, 77 Penn.
St. 328.'

483

* 454 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

the plaintiff if others of the subscribers incurred them on the
faith of the defendant's subscription, (jj) Further than

* 454 this it is not easy to go, unless such * subscriptions are

held to be binding merely on grounds of public policy. To
say that they are obligatory, because they are all promises, and
the promise of each subscriber is a valid consideration for the
promise of every other, seems to be reasoning in a vicious circle.
The very question is, are the promises binding ; for if not, then
they are no consideration for each other. To say that they are
binding because they are such considerations, is only to say that
they are binding because they are binding ; it assumes the very
thing in question. (&)

Where subscriptions are made upon the condition that they are
not valid unless a certain sum be raised, all of the subscribers
must be equally liable, and if some subscribe only to make up the
sum or to induce others, they themselves not to be called on, no
subscription is binding, (kfc) The sum to be raised need not have
been paid in, but is raised when the subscriptions of solvent and
responsible persons are received to the full amount. (JcT)

It is now common to put a seal to such a subscription book or
paper. Sometimes a seal is put to each name. Sometimes one

[jj) Miller o. Ballard, 46 111. 377. held, that where several persons subscribe

(it) That such subscriptions are valid for an object in which all are interested,

where no expenses or liabilities are in- as the support of institutions of religion or

curred because of them, and on the ground learning, in the community where they

of mutuality of promise, seems at least to reside, the promise of each subscriber is

be implied in some cases. See George v. the consideration of the promise of each

Harris, 4 N. H. 5.33. From this case it other. But the Court of Appeals does not

would appear, that such a subscription appear to adopt this view. It was held,

may at all events be treated as an agree- however, in both courts, that if the trus-

ment of the subscribers by and with each tees agreed to endearor to raise a certain

other, upon the failure to perform which sum in consideration of the subscription,

by any one of them, the others can join in this would make it binding. There are

an action of assumpsit against him to re- cases so obscurely stated that it is not easy

cover the amount of his subscription See to see whether the court intend to say that

also Society in Troy v. Perry, 6 N. II. such subscriptions are binding without the

164; Same >• Goddard, 7 id. 435 ; Fisher proof of expense or liability actually in-

v. Ellis, 3 Pick. 323; Amherst Academy curred in consequence of them. See Caul

v. Cowls, 6 id. 427. In the last two cases v. Gibson, 3 Barr, 416 ; Collier v. Baptist

a promissory note was given in discharge Educational Society, 8 B. Mon. 68 ; Barnes

of the subscription. But it is not easy to v. Ferine, 9 Barb. 202 ; s. c. 2 Kern. 18

see how that strengthened the obligation. In Methodist Episcopal Church r. Garvey,

In Ives j'. Sterling, 6 Met. 310, the court 53 111 401, a subscriber was held liable for

notice the conflict of opinion, without at- his subscription because the trustees had

tempting to reconcile it. In New York borrowed money on the faith thereof,
the authorities are in similar conflict. See (Ick) New York, &c. Co. t>. De Wolf,

Whitestown v. Stone, 7 Johns. 112; Mc- 31 N. Y. 273

Auley v. Billinger, 20 id. 89. In Stewart (kt) Westminster College a. Gamble,

v. Trustees of Hamilton College, 1 Comst. 42 Mo. 411.
581 ; s. c. 2 Denio, 403, Walworth, C, had

484

CH. I.] CONSIDERATION. * 455

seal, with a declaration in the heading, or in the in testimonium,
that each subscriber adopts and uses it as his seal. In any such
case it would seem, on general principles, that the objection of
want of consideration could not be brought against an action on
the subscription, (kni)

In general, subscriptions on certain conditions in favor
of * the party subscribing are binding when the acts stipu- * 455
lated as conditions are performed. (J)

SECTION XI.

OP CONSIDERATION VOID IN PART.

It sometimes happens that a consideration is void in part ; and
the question arises whether this fact makes the whole considera-
tion invalid, and the promise itself of no obligation. If one or
more of several considerations, which are recited as the ground
of a promise, be only frivolous and insufficient, but not illegal, and
others are good and sufficient, then undoubtedly the consideration
may be severed, and those which are void disregarded, while those
which are valid will sustain the promise, (m) 1 But where the
consideration is entire and incapable of severance, then it must
be wholly good or wholly bad. If the promise be entire, and not
in writing, and a part of it relate to a matter which by the statute
of frauds should be promised in writing, such part being
void, avoids the whole contract, (n) but if it be *such in *456

(km) Ball v. Dunsterville, 4 T. R. 313 ; plaintiff to hire of her a house, and furni-

Cooch v. Goodman, 2 Q. B. 580, 598. ture for the same, at the rent of &c and

(l) Williams College v. Danforth, 12 thereupon, in consideration that the plain-

Pick 541 tiff would take possession of the said house

tm) Parish v. Stone, 14 Pick. 198; partly furnished, and would, if complete

Kine v Sears 2 CM. & R. 48 ; Jones v. furniture were sent into the said house by

Wale 5 bSt N C 341 ; Sheerman v. the defendant in a reasonable time become

Thompson HgA & E. 1027 ; Best v. Jolly, tenant to the defendant of the saic house

lWffl™ "• Golding, 1 Roll. Abi: with all the said furniture, at the aforesaid

30 ActL suTcase,VL 2;gBradburne v. rent, and pay the same, quarter ly. from a

SK#ei' 2 ""* N c- 64! per feff --rt^SS

(n) Mechelen v. Wallace, 7 A. & E. 49 ; ture necessary, &c Held that ;tte ^ de
s c 2 Nev & P. 224. Here the declara- fendant's agreement to send in ^niture
tion ftated that the defendant wished the was an inseparable part of a contract for

i Erie Railway v. Union, &c. Co. 6 Vroom, 240.

485

* 456 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

its nature that it may be divided, and the part not required to be
in -writing by the statute may be enforced without injustice to the
promisor, that portion of the agreement will be binding, (o)

SECTION XII.

ILLEGALITY OF CONSIDERATION.

In general, if any part of the entire consideration for a promise,
or any part of an entire promise, be illegal, whether by statute or
at common law, the whole contract is void, (p) 2 Indeed the
courts go far in refusing to found any rights, upon wrong-doing.
Thus, no action can be maintained for property held for an illegal
purpose, as for making counterfeit coin. (</) 2

No contract to violate a law of a State, — as, for example, to
sell liquors contrary to a statute, — can be enforced within that
State. (/•) There must, however, be an illegal intent of some

an interest in lands, and therefore came & M. 18 ; Gamble v. Grimes, 2 Cart. (Ind.)

within Stat. 29 Car. II., which, in such 392; Carleton v. Bailey, 7 Foster (N. H.),

case, requires the agreement, or a memo- 230; Hoover e. Pierce, 27 Miss. 13. See

randum thereof, to be in writing. See also Howden v. Simpson, 10 A. & E. 815;

also Chater v. Beckett, 7 T. R. 203 ; Lord Hall v. Dyson, 10 E. L. & E. 424 ; s. c. 17

Lexington v. Clarke, 2 Vent. 223 ; Thomas Q. B. 785 ; Sherman o. Barnard, 19 Barb.

!■. Williams, 10 B. & C. 664; Wood v. 291.

Benson, 2 Tyr. 93 ; Mayfield e. Wadsley, (g) Discs of German silver were seized

2 B. & C. 357 ; Foquet v. Moore, 16 E. L. on their way to a place in which the ap-

& E. 466; s. c. 7 Exch. 870; Irvine ?>. pearance of Mexican silver dollars was to

Stone, 6 Cush. 508 ; Noyes's Ex'r v. Hum- have been given them, and no action could

phrevs, 11 Gratt. 636; Collins ;;. Merrell. be maintained for their recovery. Spald-

2 Met. (Ky.) 163. ing v. Preston, 21 Vt. 1. See also Bloss

(o) Irvine v. Stone, 6 Cush. 508; Wood v. Bloomer, 23 Barb. 604, where a promise

v. Benson, 2 Tyr. 93; Rand v. Mather, 11 to make and sell forged trade-marks was

Cush. 1. held void.

(p) Collins r. Blantern, 2 Wils. 347; (r) Territt v. Bartlett, 21 Vt. 184. See

Benyon t. Nettlefold, 2 E. L. & E. 113; also Wooton v. Miller, 7 Sm. & 31. 380.

Donallen v. Lennox, 6 Dana, 91 ; Brown See, however, as qualifying the rule, when

v. Langford, 3 Bibb, 500; Hinesburg r. the contract is not made within that State.

Sumner, 9 Vt. 23 ; Armstrong v. Toler, 1 1 McConihe v. McMann, 1 Williams, 95

Wheat. 238; Woodruff n. Hinman, 11 Vt. Backman v. Wright, 1 Williams, 187

592; Buck c. Albee, 26 Vt. 184; Deering Smith v. Godfrey, 8 Foster (N. H.j, 379

v. Chapman, 22 Me. 488; Filson v. Himes, Sortwell v. Hughes, 1 Curtis, C. C. 244 ,

5 Barr, 452 ; Dedham Bank e. Chickering, Read v. Taft, 3 R. I. 175. See also Ken-

4 Rick. 314 ; Perkins ;;. Cummings, 2 nett r. Chambers, 14 How. 38, as to illegal

Gray, 258; Coulter v. Robertson, 14 Sm. contracts.

1 Widoe v. Webb, 20 Ohio St. 431. Although a note given without knowledge of
the illegality for a turnpike assessment, void for a failure to include all the land liable,
is without consideration, the maker, with such knowledge, may, for the purpose of
completing the road, give a further note for that purpose, against which that defence
will not avail. Williams v. Pendleton, &c. Turnpike, 76 Ind. 87.

2 Nor for the price of goods sold in aid of the Rebellion, Hanauer v. Doane,
12 Wall. 342. An agreement by a physician that another may practise medicine

486

CH- !■] CONSIDEBATION. « 457

kind ; mere knowledge that an illegal use may, or even will, be
made of the thing, seems not to be enough, (s)

Agreements to raise prices, or fares for freight or passage on
boats, have been held void, as a kind of conspiracy, and as against
public policy, (t)

* A distinction must be taken between the cases in which * 457
the consideration is illegal in part, and those in which the
promise founded on the consideration is illegal in part. If any
part of a consideration is illegal, the whole consideration is void ;
because public policy will not permit a party to enforce a promise
which he has obtained by an illegal act or an illegal promise,
although he may have connected with this act or promise another
which is legal. But if one gives a good and valid consideration,
and thereupon another promises to do two things, one legal and
the other illegal, he shall be held to do that which is legal, («) 1
unless the two are so mingled and bound together that they
cannot be separated ; in which case the whole promise is void.

A distinction has been taken between the partial illegality of
a consideration when against a statute, and when against common
law. There are cases which sustain this distinction, (t>) but we
think it rests upon no sound principle ; and it has been held, on
good grounds, that the violation of a merely local or municipal

(s) Kreiss v. Seligman, 8 Barb. 439. ' contract contains distinct undertakings,
(t) Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 434, and some of which are legal and some illegal,
Hooker ;;. Vandewater, 4 id. 349. See the former will be in certain cases upheld!
also Hilton v. Eckersley, 32 E. L. & E. though the latter are void." And the
198; s. c. 6 E. & B. 47. principle was fully recognized in Bank of
(u) Thus, in the Bishop of Chester v. Australasia v Bank of Australia, 6 E. E.
John Freland, Ley, 79, Mutton, J., lays Moore, 152. See also Chase's Ex'r v.
down the rule that when a good thing and Burkholder, 18 Penn. St. 50.
a void thing are put together in the same (v) Norton v. Simmes, Hob. 14; Ma-
grant, the common law makes such con- leverer v. Redshaw, 1 Mod. 35. Twisden,
struction that the grant shall be good for J.; Com. Dig. Covenant (F.); Bac. Abr.
that which is good and void for that which Conditions ( K. ) ; Hacket v. Tilly, 1 1
is void. This principle is also distinctly Mod. 93 ; Butler v. Wigge, 1 wins.
recognized in Kerrison v. Cole, 8 East, Saund. 66 a, n. (1); 1 Pow. on Cont. 199;
236. See also Norton v. Simmes, Hob. 14. Lee v. Coleshill, Cro. E. 529 ; Pearson v.
And in the case of Leavitt v. Palmer, 3 Humes, Carter, 230 ; Mosdell v. Middleton,
Comst. 37, Bronson, J., said: "It is un- 1 Vent. 237; Van Dyck v. Van Beuren, 1
doubtedly true that where a deed or other Johns. 362.

in his name, personate him when applied to by patients for medical treatment, and
prescribe for them in his name, is against public policy and will not be enforced.
Jerome v. Bigelow, 66 HI. 452.

1 As if two classes of items, one legal and the other illegal, are embraced in the
same account, recovery may be had upon the lawful items. Goodwin r. Clark, 65
Me. 280. But where shares of stock were surrendered for new shares, a part of
which were to be used in bribing certain persons and the rest returned to the person
surrendering, the agreement to return the remainder was held void, as well as the por-
tion relating to bribery. Tobey v. Kobinson, 99 111. 222.

487

* 458 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

law, avoids a contract as effectually as if the law were of univer-
sal application, (w) A statute has no more power in avoiding a
contract partially opposed to it than the common law, (a;)
*458 unless it contain an express provision that all * such agree-
ments shall be wholly void, (j/) and then the contract is
entirely void ; as for example, a promissory note even in the
hands of an innocent indorsee, (z) But, while the law is suffi-
ciently distinct where the whole consideration or the whole prom-
ise is illegal, questions still remain, where the illegality is but
partial, which can only be determined by further adjudication.

Where the consideration is altogether illegal, it is insufficient
to sustain a promise, and the agreement is wholly void. This
is so ecpially, whether the law which is violated be statute law or
common law. It has been held in England, (a) that where a
statute provided a penalty for an act, without prohibiting the act
in express terms, there the penalty was the only legal consequence
of a violation of the law, and a contract which implied or required
such violation was nevertheless valid. But Lord Holt (5) denied
the doctrine ; and Sir James Mansfield established a better rule of
law, (c) holding that where a statute provides a penalty for an
act, this is a prohibition of the act. We apprehend that this has
always been the prevailing, if not the uncontradicted rule of law,

(w) Beman v. Tugnot, 5 Sandf. 153; 119, so far as it may be considered as hav-

Harris v. Runnels, 12 How. 80. ing recognized any distinction of this

ix) The merit of exploding this vener- kind, is not in our opinion sound law.
able error of supposing a distinction be- (y) Thus, where the statute declares a

tween contracts void by statute and certain contract to be " void to all intents

contracts void by common law, belongs to and purposes whatever," it has been held,

the Hon. Theron Metca/f, of Massachu- that if such a contract also contain stipu-

setts, who, with his well-known acuteness lations not within the intent of the statute,

and accuracy, has pointed out the origin the latter will be considered void by force

of the error, and shown its fallacy. 23 of the statute. See Crosley v. Arkwright,

Am. Jur. 2. And it may now be consid- 2 T. It. 603 ; Dann v. Dollman, 5 id. Ml.
ered as fully established that, although a (z) Bridge v. Hubbard, 15 Mass. 96,

contract contain some provisions or prom- Hay v. Ayling, 3 El. & E. 416, n. ; s. c. 16

ises which are void by statute, yet, if it Q. B. 423.

also embrace other agreements which (a) Comyns u. Boyer, Cro E 485;

would be valid, if standing alone, they and see Gremare v. Le Clerk Bois Valonj

may still be enforced. See Monys v. 2 Camp. 144.

Leake, 8 T. R. 411 ; Kerrison v. Cole, 8 (6) Bartlett v. Vinor, Carth. 252 ; s. o

East, 231 ; Doe v. Pitcher, 6 Taunt 359 ; Skin. 322. Holt, C. J., here said : " Every

Greenwood p. Bishop of London, 5 Taunt, contract made for or about any matter or

727 ; Newman v. Newman, 4 M. & Sel. 66 ; thing which is prohibited or made ivnlaw-

Wigg v. Shuttleworth, 13 East, 87 ; Gas- ful by any statute, is a void contract,

kell v. King, 1 1 East, 165 ; Howe v. Synge, though the" statute itself does not mention

15 id. 440; Tinckler v. Prentice, 4 Taunt, that it shall be so, but only inflicts a pen-

549 ; Fuller i>. Abbott, 4 id. 105 ; Shackel alty on the offender, because a penalty im-

v. Rosier, 2 Bing. N. C. 646 ; Jones u. plies a prohibition, though there are no

Waite, 5 id. 841. The case of Jarvis ». prohibitory words in the statute."
Peck, 1 Hoff. Ch. 479; s. c. 10 Paige, Ch. (c) Drury v. Eefontaine, 1 Taunt. 136.

488

CH. I.]

CONSIDERATION.

*459

on this subject, in this country. (<2) This rule is said not
to apply, however, where the * penalty is for some other *459
purpose than to make the act illegal, as to raise a revenue,
&c. We think this distinction very difficult, (e)

SECTION XIII.

IMPOSSIBLE CONSIDERATIONS.

Impossible considerations are wholly bad and insufficient. We
have seen that a consideration which one cannot perform with-
out a breach of the law is bad, and so is one which cannot
be performed at all. (/) The reason is obvious from such

{d) This principle is sustained by nu-
merous adjudged cases. Wheeler v. Rus-
sell, 17 Mass. 258; Coombs u. Emery, 14
Me. 404 ; Springfield Bank v. Merrick, 14
Mass. 322 ; Russell v. De Grand, 15 Mass.
39; Seidenbender v. Charles, 4 S. & R.
159; Mitchell v. Smith, 1 Binn. 118 ;
Sharp v. Teese, 4 Halst. 352 ; De Begnis
v. Armistead, 10 Binn. 107 ; s. c. 3 M. &
Scott, 516, Cope v. Rowlands, 2 M. & W.
149 ; Fergusson ». Norman, 5 Bing. N. C.
86; Territt v. Bartlett, 21 Vt. 184, Ban-
croft v. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456 ; Bell v Quin,
2 Sandf. 146 , Eberman v. ReiUell, 1 W.
& S. 181 , Hale v. Henderson, 4 Humph,
199; Elkins v. Parkhurst, 17 Vt. 105;
Brackett v. Hovt, 9 Foster (N. H.), 264;
Griffith v. Wells, 3 Denio, 226. — And the
repeal of a prohibitory act will not per se
render valid a contract made during the
existence of the act, contrary to its pro-
visions. But the legislature may give a
remedy by express enactment. Milne v.
Huber, 3 McLean, 212. A recent appli-
cation of the general principle of the text
was made in Jackson v. Walker, 5 Hill
(N. Y.), 27. By the laws of New York
every contribution of money intended to
promote the election of any person or
ticket is prohibited by the statute (1 R. S.
136, § 6), except for defraying the ex-
penses of printing, and the circulation of
votes, handbills, and other papers, pre-
vious to such election; and this, whether
the immediate purpose for which the
money is designed be in itself corrupt or
not. Accordingly, where the defendant
agreed to pay the plaintiff $1,000, in con-
sideration that the latter, who had built
a log cabin, would keep it open for the

accommodation of political meetings to
further the success of certain persons
nominated for members of Congress, &c,
it was held that the agreement was illegal,
and could not be enforced. See also the
recent case of Cundell v. Dawson, 4 C. B.
376.

(e) In Cundell v Dawson, 4 C. B. 376,
Wilde, C, J., intimated, that statutes en-
acted simply for the security of the rev-
enue, did not come within the principle.
And in Smith v. Mawhood, 14 M. & W.
452, it was held that the excise act, re-
quiring certain things of dealers in to-
bacco, did not avoid a contract of sale of
tobacco by one not complying with these
requisitions, as their effect is only to im-
pose a penalty. But where it appears to
be the intention of the legislature to pro-
hibit a contract as well as to impose a
penalty for making it, such contract is il-
legal and void, although the prohibition be
intended only for purposes of revenue.
And see Abbot v. Rogers, 30 E. L. & E.
446, s. c. 16 C. B. 277, and Lewis v.
Welch, 14 N. H. 294 ; Ellis v. Higgins, 32
Me. 34, and Hill v. Smith, Morris (la.), 70.

(/) 5 Vin. Abr. 110, 111, Condition
(C.) a, (D.) a; 1 Roll. Abr. 419; Co. Lit.
206 a; 2 Bl. Com. 341 ; Shep. Touch. 164.
See 22 Am. Jur. 20-22. In Nerot v.
Wallace, 3 T. R. 17, a promise was made
by the defendant to the assignees_ of a
bankrupt, when the latter was on his last
examination, that in consideration that
the assignees would forbear to have the
bankrupt examined, and that the commis-
sioners would desist from taking such ex-
amination touching moneys alleged to have
been received by the bankrupt, aud not ac-

489

460

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK II.

* 460 * consideration no possible benefit or advantage could be
derived to the one party, and no detriment to the other ;
and if that which is offered or provided as a consideration cannot
happen, the mere words alone are a nullity. It is undoubtedly
possible, that one may make a promise which is utterly impossi-
ble to perform, and nevertheless the promisee may derive a posi-
tive advantage from the mere fact that the promise is made. In
such a case, supposing the transaction free from all taint of fraud,
this advantage would be a good consideration, but not the promr
ise by itself.

But a promise is not void, merely because it is difficult, or even
improbable. And it seems, that if the impossibility applies to
the promisor personally, there being neither natural impossi-
bility in the thing, nor illegality nor immorality, then he is
bound by his undertaking, and it is a good consideration for

counted for, he, the defendant, would pay-
such money to the assignees. This prom-
ise was held by the court to be illegal, as
being against the policy of the bankrupt
laws. And Lord Kenyan observed : " I do
not say that this is nudum pactum ; but the
ground on which I found my judgment is
this ; that every person, who in considera-
tion of some advantage, either to himself
or to another, promises a benefit, must
have the power of conferring that benefit up
to the extent to which that benefit professes to
go, and that not onli/ in fact, but in law.
Now the promise made to the assignees in
this case, which was the consideration of
the defendant's promise, was not in their
power to perform, because the commis-
sioners had nevertheless a right to exam-
ine the bankrupt. And no collusion of the
assignees could deprive the creditors of
the right of examination which the com-
missioners would procure them. The as-
signees did not stipulate only for their own
acts, but also that the commissioners should
forbear to examine the bankrupt; but
clearly they had no right to tie up the
hands of the commissioners by any such
agreement." And Ashhurst, J., observed:
" In order to found a consideration for
a promise, it is necessary that the party
by whom the promise is made should
have the power of carrying it into effect,
and secondly, that the thing to be done
should in itself be legal. Now it seems
to me that the consideration for this
promise is void, on both these grounds.
The assignees have no right to control the
discretion of the commissioners; and it
would be criminal in them to enter into
such an agreement, because it is their

490

duty to examine the bankrupt fully, and
the creditors may call on them to perform
it. And for the same reason «the thing to
be done is also illegal." — And so in Bates
v. Cort, 2 B. & C. 474, which may perhaps
be regarded as an extreme case, the dec-
laration stated, that by agreement between
the plaintiff and G. G., the plaintiff agreed
to sell and deliver to G. G., a lace machine
for £220, to be paid thus : .£40 on delivery,
and the residue by weekly payments of
one pound, which were to be paid to the
defendant as trustee for the plaintiff, and
in case of any default the plaintiff was to
have back the machine, and in considera-
tion of the premises, and of the weekly
payments, the plaintiff, at the request of
the defendant, promised to take the ma-
chine and pay the balance should there be
any default in G. G. in the weekly pay-
ments. It was held that this promise was
a nudum pactum, and void. And by the
court • " The declaration affects to show
the legal operation of the agreement.
Now that states that the agreement bound
the defendant to take the machine, not the
plaintiff to deliver it. The declaration
does not even show that it was in the
plaintiff's power to deliver the machine,
for it is not stated that he had ever got it
back from the original vendee. There
certainly is an allegation of willingness to
let the defendant take the machine, but
that does not appear to have been in pur-
suance of any pre-existing agreement, nor
does the whole import any obligation on
the plaintiff to let the defendant take it.
The declaration is therefore bad, no suffi-
cient consideration for the defendant's
promise being shown."

CH- *•] CONSIDERATION. * 4gJ

* the promise of another, (<?) i The reason of this appears * 461
to be, that if a party binds himself to such an undertaking,
he may either procure the thing to be done by those who can do
it, or else pay damages for not doing it. The party receiving
such a promise may know that the promisor himself cannot do
the thing he undertakes, but may not know that he has not
already made, or has it not in his power to make, such arrange-
ment with him who can do it as will secure its being done. He
has a right, therefore, to expect that it will be done, and to pay
for such promise or undertaking, either by his own promise or
otherwise. But if the thing undertaken is in its own nature and
obviously impossible, he cannot expect it will be done ; and to
enter into any transaction based upon such undertaking, is a
fraud or a folly which the law will not sanction. Hence, it would
seem that an engagement by one, entered into with a second
party, that a third party shall do something which the first
cannot do, is a good consideration for a promise by the second
party. (Ji) The cases which seem to oppose this rule are, gener-
al See Co. Lit. 206 a,n. 1 ; Piatt on the bank and to the proper officers, and
Cov. 569; 3 Chitty on Com. Law, 101; that it is impossible to make the invest-
Blight v. Page, 3 B. & P. 296, n. ; Wors- ment with their consent. I should say
ley v. Wood, 6 T. R. 718, Kenyan, C. J. then that no sufficient answer was given,
And see Tuffnell v. Constable, 7 A. & E. the law not forbidding the thing to be
798, arguendo. In this case there was a done, and there being no breach of moral
covenant to invest a sum in bank annui- duty involved in it, and the defendants
ties, or other government stock, in the cor- being under covenant to perform it. But
porate names of the archdeacon of C, the if an actual impossibility were shown, the
vicar of W., and the churchwardens of W., parties might go to a court of equity to
the dividends to be held and received by the restrain proceedings in an action on the
archdeacon, vicar, and churchwardens, for covenant, they showing that they had
the time being, in trust for the support of done all in their power to fulfil it. The
a parish school for poor children, and in testator in this case must be taken to have
further trust for the disposition of coals, known, when he covenanted, whether the
&c, among poor persons of the parish, law would permit a fulfilment of the cove-
Held, on general demurrer to a declara- nant or not ; or, perhaps it should rather
tion, that an action lay upon such cove- be said, whether the course of practice
nant, no impossibility of performance would or would not allow it to be carried
appearing, inasmuch as the investment into effect." — So it will be no excuse for
might at any rate be lawfully made in the the non-performance of an agreement to
corporate names of the present archdeacon, deliver goods of a certain quantity or
vicar, and churchwardens. And Littledale, quality, that they could not be obtained at
J., said, in giving judgment : " The de- the particular season when the contract
fendants allege that they cannot invest was to be executed. Gilpins v. Consequa,
this stock, because the parties named in 1 Pet. C. C. 91 ; Youqua v. Nixon, id. 221.
the bequest are not corporations for that (A) Thus a promise to procure the con-

purpose, and the investment could not be sent of a landlord to the assignment of a
effected at the bank. But the answer is, lease is binding. Lloyd v. Crispe, 5 Taunt,
let them show that they have applied at 249. And where one of several partners

1 But "if from the nature of things the thing to be delivered is liable to perish,
then there is an implied condition that, if the delivery becomes impossible owing to
the thing perishing without default of the seller, he is excused." Blackburn, J., in
Uowell v. Coupland, L. li. 9 Q. B. 462, 466.

491

* 462 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

* 462 ally, at least, * cases in which the consideration was open

to the objection of illegality, (i)
By the Code Napoleon, B. 3, tit. 3, c. 4, s. 1, it appears, that
while a promise to do an impossible thing is null, a promise not
to do an impossible thing is a sufficient foundation for an obliga-
tion which rests upon it. We have no such distinction in the
common law.

SECTION xrv.

FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION.

When the consideration appears to be valuable and sufficient,
but turns out to be wholly false or a mere nullity, or where it
may have been actually good, but before any part of the contract
has been performed by either party, and before any benefit has
been derived from it to the party paying or depositing money for
such consideration, the consideration wholly fails, there a prom-
ise resting on this consideration is no longer obligatory, and
the party paying or depositing money upon it can recover it
back. (/) 1 But where the consideration fails only in part, prin-

in a firm agreed to introduce the plaintiff charge a debt due to his master. Al-
fa stranger) into it, it was decided that though this decision is sometimes cited as
the agreement was valid, although the showing that a contract is void if the con-
other partners were ignorant of its exist- sideration is impossible, yet it may be
ence, and their assent was of course essen- rested more properly on the ground that
tial to the admission of the plaintiff, the consideration was illegal. The same
McNeil v. Reed, 2 M. & Scott, 89 ; s. c. 9 may be said of Nerot v. Wallace, 3 T. R.
Bing. 68. 17, supra, note (/), p. *459.

(j) Thus in Harvey ». Gibbons, 2 Lev. (j) Woodward !>. Cowing, 13 Mass.
161, which was a writ of error on a judg- 216; Moses v. Macferlan, 3 Burr. 1012;
ment in Shrewsbury court, where the Spring v. Coffin, 10 Mass. 34 ; Lacoste v.
plaintiff declared that he being bailiff Plotard, 1 Rep. Const. Ct. 467 ; Wharton
to J. S., the defendant, in consideration v. O'Hara, 2 Nott & McC. 65 ; Pettibone
that he would discharge him of £20 due v. Roberts, 2 Root, 258 ; Boyd v. Ander-
to J. S., promised to expend £40 in re- son, 1 Overt. 438; Murray e. Carret, 3
pairing a barge of the plaintiffs, — verdict Call, 373; Treat v. Orono, 26 Me. 217;
and judgment for the plaintiff, upon non Sanford v. Dodd, 2 Day, 437 ; Colville o.
assumpsit, were reversed, the consideration Besley, 2 Denio, 139. The failure of con-
being illegal, for the plaintiff cannot dis- sideration must be total. Charlton v. Lay,

1 Where a person bought the exclusive right to use a certain patent in a place,
where he knew no such right could be obtained, ostensibly for the purpose of forming
a company to use the patent there, and of inducing persons to buy shares under a
belief that such exclusive right could be had, it was held that he could not recover
back the purchase-money on the ground of failure of consideration, having got what
he paid for. Begbie v. Phosphate Sewage Co. L. R. 10 Q. B. 491 ; affirmed in 1 Q. B. D.
679. — A license to sell a patented article is a good consideration for a note for the
price, unless the invention is so useless as to avoid the patent. Wilson o. Hentges, 26
Minn. 288.

492

CH. I.]

CONSIDERATION.

463

ciples analogous to those which govern an inquiry into the ade-
quacy of a consideration would be applied to it. If there
*were a substantial consideration left, although much *463
diminished, it would still suffice to sustain the contract.
But if the diminution or failure were such as in effect and reality
to take away all the value of the consideration, it would be re-
garded as one that had wholly failed. But if the consideration,
and the agreement founded upon it, both consisted of several
parts, and a part of the consideration failed, and the appropriate
part of the agreement could be apportioned to it, then they might
be treated as several contracts, and a recovery of money paid be
had accordingly. (&)

5 Humph. 496 ; Dean v. Mason, 4 Conn.
428. _ The measure of damages in such a
case is the sum paid ; no allowance is to
be made for the plaintiff's loss and disap-
pointment. Neel v. Deens, 1 Nott & McC.
210. No action lies on an agreement
promising to pay for tuition for a speci-
fied time, if, during the whole of that
time, the promisor was prevented by ill-
ness from attending and receiving the
tuition. Stewart v. Loring, 5 Allen, 306.
(£) Franklin v. Miller, 4 A. & E. 605,
Littledale, J. In this case the declaration
stated, that defendant, being indebted to
certain persons, agreed to repay the plain-
tiff the amount of aE accounts which he
should settle for the defendant ; and also
to pay the plaintiff .£40 a quarter on
stated days, till the said debts should be
fully settled ; and the plaintiff agreed to
advance to the defendant £1 per week,
and certain other sums, out of the sums of
£40 ; that, in consideration of the plain-
tiff's promise, the defendant agreed to per-
form the contract on his part ; that the
plaintiff paid debts for the defendant to di-
vers persons (naming them), to the amount
of .£281 ; that the whole amount of debts
was not yet settled ; and that several sums
of £40 had become due from the defend-
ant under the agreement, which had been
paid to the amount of £160 only, but the
rest were unpaid. Plea, as to two of the
sums of £40, that, before they became due,
the plaintiff had omitted to pay certain of
the debts due to creditors of the defendant
(naming them), other than the creditors
named m the declaration, which he might
have paid ; and had also omitted, after the
last payment of £40, to pay the defendant
£1 per week ; wherefore the defendant, in
a reasonable time, and before the two
sums in question were due, rescinded the
contract. Replication, that before and at
the time of the last payment of £40, the

defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in
the sum of £50 and more, in respect to
the moneys paid by the plaintiff for the
defendant as in the first count mentioned ;
and that the said £40 was insufficient to
discharge the amount in which the de-
fendant was so indebted to the plaintiff,
and for which the agreement was a secu-
rity. Held, that the plea was bad, as
showing, at most, only a partial failure of
performance by the plaintiff, which did
not authorize the defendant to rescind the
contract. — So in Ritchie v. Atkinson, 10
East, 295, where the master and the
freighter of a vessel of 400 tons mutually
agreed in writing, that the ship, being
every way fitted lor the voyage, should,
with all convenient speed, proceed to St.
Petersburg, and there load from the
freighter's factors a complete cargo of
hemp and iron, and proceed therewith to
London, and deliver the same on being paid
freight for hemp, £5 per ton, for iron, 5s a
ton, &c, one half to be paid on right de-
livery, the other at three months ; held,
that the delivery of a complete cargo was
not a condition precedent; but that the
master might recover freight for a short
cargo at the stipulated rates per ton ; the
freighter having his remedy in damages
for such short delivery. — Likewise in Rob-
erts v. Havelock, 3 B. & Ad. 404, a ship
outward bound with goods, being damaged
at sea, put into a harbor to receive some
repairs which had become necessary for
the continuance of the voyage, and a ship-
wright was engaged and undertook to put
her into thorough repair. Before this
was completed he required payment for
the work already done, without which he
refused to proceed ; and the vessel re-
mained in an unfit state for sailing. Held,
that the shipwright might maintain an
action for the work already done, though
the repair was incomplete, and the vessel

493

*464

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK II.

It is often difficult to say whether a consideration is divisible
and capable of apportionment, or so entire that it must stand or

fall together. (7) Perhaps no better rule can be given
*464 than *that if the thing to be done be in its own nature

separable and divisible, and there be no express stipulation
or necessary implication which makes it absolutely one thing,
and that part which fails may be regarded, to use the language of
the court in one case, " not as a condition going to the essence of
the contract," (m) in such case the failure does not destroy the

thereby kept from continuing her vo_yage,
at the time when the action was brought.

(/) Thus, in Adlard v. Booth, 7 C. &
P. 108, it was held, that where a printer
has been employed to print a work, of
which the impression is to be a certain
number of copies, if a fire break out and
consume the premises before the whole
number has been worked off, the printer
cannot recover anything, although a part
has actually been delivered. While in
Cutler v. Close, 5 C. & P. 337, where a
party contracted to supply and erect a
warm air apparatus, for a certain sum, it
was held, in an action for the price (the
defence to which was, that the apparatus
did not answer), that, if the jury thought
it was substantial in the main, though not
quite so complete as it might be under
the contract, and could be made good at
a reasonable rate, the proper course
would be to find a verdict for the plain-
tiff, deducting such sum as would enable
the defendant to do what was requisite.
This question frequently arises on special
contracts to do certain work, according to
certain plans, or certain specifications, and
the contract is not strictly complied with.
Here is a partial failure of consideration,
and the plaintiff/ in seeking to recover for
the labor and materials expended, will be
compelled to deduct for his partial failure,
and the defendant may rely upon this in
reduction of damages, and is not driven to
his cross action. Chapel w. Hickes, 2 Cr. &
M. 214. And in such case the plaintiff is
not entitled to the actual value of the
work, per se, but only the agreed price
minus such a sum as would complete the
work according to the contract. Thorn-
ton v. Place, 1 Man. & R. 218. In the
case of Ellis v. Hamlen, 3 Taunt. 53, it
was held, that if a builder undertakes a
work of specified dimensions and mate-
rials, and deviates from the specification,
he cannot recover, upon a quantum vale-
bant, for the work, labor, and materials.

(m) Lucas n. Godwin, 3 Bing. N. C.
746, Bosanquet, J. In that case the plain-
tiff contracted to build cottages by the
404

10th of October; they were not finished
till the 15th. Defendant having accepted
the cottages, it was held, that plaintiff
might recover the value of his work, on a
declaration for work, labor, and materials.
— The former practice of compelling a
party to pay the full sum for specified
labor, and then driving him to his cross
action if the work was not done according
to contract, was alluded to by Parke, H.,
in Mondel r. Steel, 8 M. & W. 870. In
that case, it was held, after mature consid-
eration, that in all actions for goods sold
and delivered with a warranty, or for work
and labor, as well as in actions for goods
agreed to be supplied according to a con-
tract, it is competent for the defendant to
show how much less the subject-matter of
the action was worth by reason of the
breacli of the contract; and to the extent
that he obtains, or is capable of obtaining,
an abatement of price on that account, he
must be considered as having received
satisfaction for the breach of contract ; and
he is precluded from recovering in another
action to that extent, but no more. See
also Chapel ,-. Hickes, 2 Cr. & M. 214.
So in Allen ?■. Cameron, 3 Tyr. 907, where
the plaintiff contracted to sell and plant
trees on the defendant's land, and also to
keep them in order for two years next
after the planting, it was held, that evi-
dence of non-performance by the plaintiff
of any part of his contract, by which the
trees had become of less value to the de-
fendant, was admissible to reduce the
damages in an action on the agreement
for their price, and for planting them.
Lord Ellrnborouqh seems to have laid down
the just rule on this subject in Parnsworth
r. Garrard, 1 Camp. 38. It was there
held, that where the plaintiff declares on
a quantum meruit for work and labor done
and materials found, the defendant may
reduce the damages, by showing that the
work was improperly done ; and may en-
title himself to a verdict by showing that
it was wholly inadequate to answer the
purpose for which it was undertaken to be
performed.

CH

!■]

CONSIDERATION.

465

rights growing out of the performance of the residue.

But the other * party may have his claim or action for *465

damages arising from such failure, (n)

In Vermont it seems to be the law, that the maker of a note
cannot avail himself of a partial failure of the consideration,
unless he has offered to rescind the contract, (o)

The bargain may, perhaps, be such as to preclude an inquiry
into failure of consideration. As if one buys a cargo of corn to
arrive, " the quantity to be taken from the bill of lading," and
that quantity is paid for, the buyer cannot recover back a part of
the price, because the cargo is short, nor could the seller demand
more if it went beyond the bill ; supposing good faith on both
sides. O) Here, however, if a few bags or bushels only, instead
of the cargo bargained for, should arrive, it would seem difficult
to hold the buyer for the whole price. Such contracts are like
those for the purchase of land, where the contents or dimensions
of the lot are stated with the addition of " more or less." The
intention being to prevent an unimportant variation
*from annulling the bargain, or raising new questions; *466
but not to prevent the effect of a failure of consideration,

(n) Although it was formerly held that
the only remedy was hy cross action, Tye
v. Gwynne, 2 Camp. 346; Moggridge v.
Jones, 3 id. 38, yet the party may now re-
sort to the cross action or not, at his elec-
tion. This subject was examined with
much ability and at great length, by
Dewey, J., in Harrington v. Stratton, 22
Pick. 510, where it was held, that in an
action by the payee against the maker of
a promissory note given for the price of a
chattel, it is competent for the maker to
prove, in reduction of damages, that the
sale was effected by means oi false repre-
sentations of the value of the chattel, on
the part of the payee, although the chattel
has not been returned or tendered to him.
And the learned judge, in the course of
his opinion, said : " The strong argument
for the admission of such evidence in re-
duction of damages in cases like the pres-
ent, is, that it will avoid circuity of action.
It is always desirable to prevent a cross
action where full and complete justice can
be done to the parties in a single suit ; and
it is upon this ground that the courts have
of late been disposed to extend to the
greatest length, compatible with the legal
rights of the parties, the principle of al-
lowing evidence in defence or in reduction
of damages to be introduced, rather than

to compel the defendant to resort to his
cross action. As it seems to us, the same
purpose will be further advanced, and with
no additional evils, by adopting a rule on
this subject equally broad in its applica-
tion to cases of actions on promissory
notes, between the original parties to the
same, as to actions on the original con-
tract of sale, and holding that, in either
case, evidence of false representations as
to the quality or character of the article
sold, may be given in evidence to reduce
the damages, although the article has not
been returned to the vendor." — See also
Mixer v. Coburn, 1 1 Met. 559 ; Perley v.
Balch, 23 Pick. 286; Hammat v. Emerson,
27 Me. 308 ; Coburn v. Ware, 30 Me. 202 ;
Spalding v. Vandercook, 2 Wend. 431 ;
Drew v. Towle, 7 Foster (N. H.), 412;
Albertson r. Halloway, 16 Ga. 377. The
cases of Scudder v. Andrews, 2 McLean,
564; Pierce r. Cameron, 7 Hich. L. 114;
Pulsifer v. Hotchkiss, 12 Conn. 234, and
some others seem, however, not in accord-
ance with this principle. See, however,
as to this last case, Andrews v. Wheaton,
23 Conn. 112.

(o) Burton u. Schermerhorn, 21 Vt.
289.

(p) Covas v. Bingham, 22 E. L. & E.
183; s. c. 2E. &B. 836.

495

* 467 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

which, though not absolutely complete, and, therefore, strictly
speaking, partial and not total, is still so large as to be substan-
tially total.

While it is true that a failure of consideration is a good ground
for the recovery of the money paid, it is a familiar and well-
settled principle of law, that where a person, with full knowledge
of all the circumstances pays money voluntarily, and without
compulsion or duress of persons or goods, he shall not afterwards
recover back the money so paid. (<?) But money paid by a mis-
take of fact which causes an unfounded belief of a liability to pay,
may generally be recovered back, (qq) even if the mistake arises
from negligence ; (gr) but not if the mistake affects only the mo-
tives of the party in paying the money, and not his obligation to
pay it. (qs)

SECTION XV.

RIGHTS OP A STRANGER TO THE CONSIDERATION.

In some cases, in which the consideration did not pass directly
from a plaintiff, and the promise was not made directly to him, it
has been made a question how far he might avail himself of it,
and bring an action in his own name, instead of the name of the
party from whom the consideration moved, and to whom the
promise was made. It seems to have been anciently held (r) as
a rule of law (though not universally so), (s) that no stranger
to the consideration of an agreement could have an action on
such agreement, although it were made expressly for his benefit ;
and this rule has been recognized and enforced in modern
* 467 times. (£) But it is certain that if the * actual promisee

(q) This rule is well considered in (qr) Kelly v. Solari, 9M.4W. 54, 58 ;

Forbes v. Appleton, 5 Cush. 117. For Bell v. Gardiner, 4 M. & G. 11 ; Townsend

illustrations of the kind of duress which o. Crowdy, 8 C. B (n. s.) 477.
avoids it, see Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick. (qs) Ai'ken r. Short, 25 L. J. Exch.

7, and Boston & Sandwich Glass Co. v. 321 ; Chambers v. Miller, 32 L. J. C. 30;

Boston, 4 Met. 181. Also Fulham v. Martin v. Morgan, 1 B. & B. 289.
Down, 6 Esp. 26, n.; Hills o. Street, 5 (r) Crow v. Rogers, 1 Stra. 592;

Bmg. 37 ; Snowdon v. Davis, 1 Taunt. 359. Bourne v. Mason, 1 Vent. 6 ; s. c. 2 Keb

(qq) Cox v. Prentice, 3 M. & S. 344 ; 457, Bull. N. P. 134. And in the late case

Dails v. Lloyd, 12 Q. B. 531 ; Townsend of Jones r. Robinson, 1 Exch. 456, Parke

v. Crowdy, 29 L. J. C. 300 ; Barber a. B., says : " It is true that no stranger to

Brown, 26 L. J. C. 41 ; Milnes v. Duncan, the consideration can sue."
6 B. & C. 671 ; Standish v. Ross, 3 Exch. (s) Dutton v. Poole, 1 Vent. 318 332 ;

527 ; Mills .,. Alderbury Union, 3 Exch. s. c. T. Jones, 103, 2 Lev. 210.

590,

496

(t) Price v. Easton, 4 B. & Ad. 433 ;

CH. I.]

CONSIDERATION,

468

is merely the agent of the party to be benefited, that party
may sue upon the promise, whether his relation to and interest
in the agreement were known or not. (m) This, however, rests
upon the ground that the consideration actually moves from such
party, and that he cannot be regarded as a stranger to it. But it
seems to be held in recent cases, that, while the rule itself is not
denied, it would generally be held inapplicable where the benefi-
ciary has any concern whatever in the transaction, (v) In some
cases, the actual promisee would be considered only the agent of
the beneficiary, and in others the beneficiary would be regarded
as the trustee of the party to whom the promise was directly
made, and, as such trustee, might maintain an action in his own
name. (mi) In this country, the right of a third party to bring an
action on a promise made to another for his benefit, seems
to be somewhat * more positively asserted ; (a;) 1 and we * 468

s. c. 1 Nev. & M. 303. In this case the
declaration stated, that W. P. owed the
plaintiff £13, and that in consideration
thereof, and that W. P., at the defendant's
request, had promised the defendant to
work for him at certain wages, and also,
in consideration of W. P. leaving the
amount which might be earned by him in
the defendant's hands, he, the defendant,
undertook and promised to pay the plain-
tiff the said sum of £13. Averment, that
W. P. performed his part of the agree-
ment. Judgment arrested, because the
plaintiff was a stranger to the considera-
tion. And Littledale, J., said : " This case
is precisely like Crow v. Rogers, and must
be governed by it."

(u) As in the familiar instance of prin-
cipals suing for goods sold by their factors,
who may be supposed perhaps to have
been the principals, and to whom alone
the promise was made. Hornby v. Lacy,
6 M. & Sel. 166; Coppin v. Craig, 7
Taunt. 243; Morris v. Cleasby, 1 M. &
Sel. 576.

(w) Thus, in the case of Lilly v. Hays,
1 Nev. & P. 26; s. c. 5 A. & E. 550, it
was held, that if A remits money to B to
pay C, and B promises C to pay it to him,
C can maintain an action against B for
money had and received. And Patteson,
J., there said : " The only question in this
case is, whether there is a consideration
moving from the plaintiff. It is said, that
such is the rule of law hitherto adhered
to ; and to that I agree. But in an action
for money had and received, there seldom

is a direct consideration moving from the
plaintiff. Here, the defendant, though not
the general agent, became the agent of
Wood, in this transaction ; therefore, the
consideration did move from the plaintiff,
through the instrumentality of Wood."
— See also Jones v. Robinson, 1 Exch.
454; Thomas r. Thomas, 2 Q. B. 85;
Hinkley v. Eowler, 1 5 Me. 285 ; Carnegie
i!. Morrison, 2 Met. 401 ; Dolph v. White,
2 Kern. 296.

(to) In Pigott v. Thompson, 3 B. & P.
149, Lord Atcanley is reported to have
said : " It is not necessary to discuss wheth-
er, if A let land to B, in consideration of
which the latter promises to pay the rent
to C, his executors and administrators, C
may maintain an action on that promise.
I have little doubt, however, that the ac-
tion might be maintained, and that the
consideration would be sufficient ; though
my brothers seem to think differently on
this point. It appears to me that C would
be only a trustee for A, who might for
some reason be desirous that the money
should be paid into the hands of C. In
case of marriage, it is often necessary to
make contracts in this manner, and the
personal action is given to the trustees for
the benefit of the feme covert."

(x) See 22 Am. Jur. 16-20; Hind v.
Holdship, 2 Watts, 104 ; Arnold v. Lyman,
17 Mass. 400; Bridge v. Niagara Ins. Co.
1 Hall, 247; Jackson v. Mayo, 11 Mass.
152, n. (a); Hinkley v. Fowler, 15 Me.
285; Hall v. Marston, 17 Mass. 575; Eel-
ton v. Dickinson, 10 id. 287 ; Delaware &

1 Helms v. Kearns, 40 Ind. 124. But see Exchange Bank v. Rice, 107 Mass. 37,
contra.

vol. i. 82 497

* 469 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

think it would be safe to consider this a prevailing rule with
us ; indeed it has been held that such promise is to be deemed
made to the third party if adopted by him, though he was not
cognizant of it when made, (j/)

But where the promise is made under seal, and the action
must be debt or covenant, then it must be brought in the name
of the party to the instrument ; and a third party for whose bene-
fit the promise is made cannot sue upon it. (s) :

SECTION XVI.

THE TIME OF THE CONSIDERATION.

Considerations may be of the past, of the present, or of the
future. When the consideration and the promise founded upon
it are simultaneous, then the consideration is of the present time ;
the whole agreement is completed at once, and the consideration
and the promise are concurrent. When the consideration is to do
a thing hereafter, it is of the future, and is said to be executory ;
when the promise to do this is accepted, and a promise in return
founded upon it, this latter promise rests on a sufficient founda-
tion, and is obligatory. When the consideration is wholly past,
it is said to be executed ; and in relation to considerations of this
kind, many nice questions have arisen.

It may be stated, as the general rule, that a past or ex-
* 469 ecuted * consideration is not sufficient to sustain a promise
founded upon it, unless there was a request for the consid-
eration previous to its being done or made. This request should
be alleged, in a declaration which sets forth an executed consid-

II. Canal Co. v. Westchester Co. Bank, 4 the three. Cahot r, Haskins, 3 Pick. 83.
Denio, 97 ; Beers v. Robinson, 9 Penn. St. See also Farrow r. Turner, 2 A. K. Marsh.
229. This question was fully examined 496 ; Crocker v. Higgins, 7 Conn. 347 ;
in the case of Carnegie v. Morrison, 2 Met. Miller v. Drake, 1 Caines, 45. See also
381, by Shaw, C. J., the old case of Dut- Bigelow v. Davis, 16 Barb. 561.
ton v. Poole, 1 Vent. 318, being adopted (y) Lawrence c. Pox, 20 N. Y. 268;
as good law, and in Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Steman v. Harrison, 42 Penn. St. 49.
Cuih, 337, the same doctrine is reaffirmed. (z) Lord Southampton v. Brown, 6 B.
— In like manner, the American courts & C. 718; Offly v. Ward, 1 Lev. 235 ; San-
have held, that a promise to three, upon a ders r. Filley, 12 Pick. 554 ; Johnson r.
consideration moving from them and a Poster, 12 Met. 167 ; Hinkley u. Fowler,
fourth person, will support an action by 15 Me. 285.

2 Flynn v. No. American Ins. Co. 115 Mass. 449; Crowell i>. Currier, 12 C. E.
Green, 152.

498

CH- LJ CONSIDERATION. * 4gg

eration, as that on which the promise is founded that is sought to
be enforced. Without such previous request a subsequent prom-
ise has no force; because the consideration being entirely com-
pleted and exhausted, it cannot be considered that it would not
have been made or given, but for a promise which is subsequent
and independent. A familiar illustration is afforded by the case of
a guarantor. If one lends money to another, and at a subsequent
time a third party, who did not request the loan, and is not benefited
by it, promises to see that it is repaid, such promise is void be-
cause no consideration passes from the promisee to the promisor
But if the promisor requests the loan, or if his promise is made
previous to the loan, or at the same time, then it will be supposed
that the loan is made because of the promise. It will also be
supposed, that the promisor is benefited by the loan because he
requests it, or, at least, that the lender parts with his money in
consequence of the promise, and this is a detriment to him, at the
instance of the promisor, which is equally good by way of a con-
sideration.

But this previous request need not always be express, or
proved, because it is often implied. As, in the first place, where
one accepts or retains the beneficial result of such voluntary ser-
vice. Here, the law generally implies both a previous request
and a subsequent promise of repayment. No one can compel
another to accept a gratuitous and unrequested service ; no one
can make himself the creditor of another, without his consent, or
against his will. But if that other chooses to accept such service,
or the service being rendered voluntarily, chooses to retain all
the benefit thereof to himself, this puts the service on the same
footing, in the law, as one rendered at request, and for which a
promise is made. The cases where goods are supplied to an
infant, and the father is held responsible, often fall within this
rule, (a)

(a) Thus, in Law v. Wilkin, 6 A. & E. assume that he concealed them. Mybroth-

718, which was an action against a father er Storks admits that, if the father had

for goods supplied to his minor son, who seen them, an implied authority would bo

was away at school. The only evidence shown." So in the Fishmonger's Co. r.

to charge the father was, that the boy, Robertson, 5 Man. &G. 192. Tindal,C3.,

when he went home for the holidays, took said, that if persons receive a benefit from a

the clothes with him, but was not wearing contract on which they would not be origi-

them ; and that he returned to school with nally bound, this would bind them, and ren-

them. Coleridge, J., said : " The defend- der them liable for the fulfilment of the

ant's son was sent to school in want of contract. Doe v. Taniere, 13 Jur. 119.

clothes. When they were supplied, and So where one built a school-house, under

he went home with them, we are not to a contract with persons assuming to act

499

470

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK II.

* 470 * And, in the second place, where one is compelled to do

for another what that other should do, and was compelhv

hie to do. Here also the law implies, not only a previous request

that the thing should be done, but also a promise to compensate

for the doing of it. (5) l As where one is surety for another, and

pays the debt which the other owes. Here the surety can

*471 recover *what he pays, without proving that the principal

debtor either requested him to pay the money, or promised

to repay him ; for the law implies all this. In receiving him as

surety, or in requesting him to become his surety, he will be

considered as having requested him to pay the debt ; and if such

request to pay the debt were express, the general principles of

as a district committee, but who had in
fact no authority, yet a district school was
afterwards kept in it by direction of the
authorized school agent, this was held to
be an acceptance of the house by the dis-
trict, and they were held liable to pay the
reasonable value of the building. Abbot
?-. Hermon, 7 Greenl. /(Bennett's ed.) 1 18, n.
See also Roberts v. Marston, 20 Me. 275 ;
Hayden r. Madison, 7 Greenl. 76 ; Weston
v. Davis, 24 Me. 374; Hatch v. Purcell, 1
Foster (N. H.), 544 ; Newell r. Hill, 2 Met.
180. So if a conveyance of an interest in
land be made in the common form of a
quit-claim deed, containing this stipula-
tion, " provided said grantee shall pay said
grantor or his assigns, twenty-two dollars
annually from this date on demand," un-
til the happening of a certain event ; and
the grantee holds under the deed, but fails
to make the annual payments when de-
manded, the grantor may sustain an ac-
tion of assumpsit against the grantee, to
recover the money. Huff v. Nickerson, 27
Me. 106. — But if one build a house for
his own convenience on the land of an-
other, by his permission, there is no im-
plied agreement on the part of the owner
of the land to pay the value of such house.
Wells v. Banister, 4 Mass. 514. Neither
can a school district be held liable for un-
authorized repairs upon their school-house,
from the fact that they afterwards used
the house; for this acceptance and hold-
ing of the repairs cannot be considered as
voluntary, because the house could not
well be used without making use of the
repairs. Davis v. Bradford, 24 Me. 349.
— So the law will not imply a promise on
the part of a pauper to pay from his estate
moneys expended by the town of his set-
tlement for his support. Charlestown v.

Hubbard, 9 N. H. 195 ; Deer Isle v. Eaton,
12 Mass. 328.

(6) Jeffreys v. Gurr, 2 B. & Ad. 833;
Pownal v. Perrand, 6 B. & (_'. 439. In this
case the indorser of a bill, being sued by
the holder, paid him part of the sum men-
tioned in the bill ; and it was held, that he
might recover the same from the acceptor
in an action for money paid to his use.
And Bayley, J., said : " The law is, that
a party, by voluntarily paying the debt of
another, does not acquire any right of ac-
tion against that other ; but if 1 pay your
debt because I am forced to do so, then I
may recover the same ; for the law raises
a promise on the part of the person whose
debt I pay, to reimburse me. That prin-
ciple was fully established in the case of
Exall >: Partridge, 8 T. R. 308." — Gris-
sell r. Robinson, 3 Bing. N. C. 10. In this
case the plaintiffs, having agreed with the
defendant to give him a lease of certain
premises, caused their attorney to prepare
the lease, and paid him for it; and after-
wards brought their action against the de-
fendant to recover the amount so paid,
and declared in assumpsit for money paid
by them for the defendant's use. It was
hfld, that they were entitled to recover,
the evidence showing that it was the cus-
tom for the landlord's attorney to draw
the lease, and for the lessee to pay for it.
Park, J., said: "As the plaintiffs were
liable to their own attorney in the first
instance, and all the evidence shows, that
according to the custom the defendant is
ultimately bound to pay for the lease, he
must be taken to have impliedly assented
to the payment made by the plaintiffs, and
the action lies for money paid to his use."
See also Davies v. Humphreys, 6 M. & W.
153.

1 As where a person, to save his own property from being sold on legal process,
pays a debt for which another is legally bound. Nichols v. Bucknam, 117 Mass. 488.

500

CH. I.J

CONSIDERATION.

*472

law would imply the promise of repayment. The compulsion in
this case must be a legal one ; or, in other words, there must be
an obligation which the law will enforce, (c)

And, in the third place, where one does voluntarily, and with-
out request, that which he is not compellable to do, for another
who is compellable to do it. As if one who is not surety, nor
bound in any way, pays a debt due from another. He has not the
same claim and right as if he had been compellable to pay this
debt. For now the law, if there be a subsequent promise to repay
the money, will indeed imply the previous request, as, if there
had been a previous request, it would have implied a subsequent
promise ; but it will not imply both the promise and the
request, as in the former case. (<f) * The reason * is, that * 472
the debtor shall not be obliged to accept another party as
his creditor without his consent. He owes some one; and he
may have partial defences, or other reasons for wishing to ar-

te) Pitt v. Purssord, 8 M. & W. 538.
In this case one of two persons, who, as
sureties for a third, signed together with
the principal a joint and several promis-
sory note, on the note becoming due, paid
the amount, though no demand had been
made or action brought against him by
the holder. It was Yield, that such pay-
ment could not be considered voluntary,
and that he might sue his co-surety for
contribution. And Alderson, B., said :
" This is not a voluntary payment, nor is
it like the case where one is liable as prin-
cipal and another as surety. Here the
sureties are not liable in default of the
principal ; they are all primarily liable,
and are all equally so. This was not a
payment made voluntarily, but was a pay-
ment in discharge of a debt due on an in-
strument on which the defendant was lia-
ble."

_ (d) Wing v. Mill, 1 B. & Aid. 104. In
this case a pauper residing in the parish
of A received during his illness a weekly
allowance from the parish of B, where he
was settled. Held, that an apothecary,
who attended the pauper, might maintain
an action for the amount of his bill
against the overseer of B, who expressly
promised to pay the same. — But without
such express promise, such action, it
seems, could not be maintained. Paynter
v. Williams, 1 Cr. & M. 819. In this case
a pauper, whose settlement was in the
parish of A, resided in the parish of B,
and whilst there received relief from tfie

parish of A, which relief was afterwards
discontinued, the overseers objecting to
pay any more unless the pauper moved
into his own parish. The pauper was
subsequently taken ill and attended by an
apothecary, who, after attending him nine
weeks, sent a letter to the overseers of A,
upon the receipt of which they directed
the allowance to be renewed, and it was
continued to the time of the pauper's
decease. Held, that the overseers of A
were liable to pay so much of the apothe-
cary's bill as was incurred after the letter
was received. And Bayley, B., said : " I
am of opinion that the parish is liable,
and that the plaintiff can maintain the
present action. The legal liability is not
alone sufficient to enable the party to
maintain the action, without a retainer or
adoption of the plaintiff on the part of
the parish. The legal liability of the
parish does -not give any one who chooses
to attend a pauper and supply him with
medicines a right to call on them for pay-
ment. It is their duty to see that a proper
person is employed, and they are to have
an option who the medical man shall be.
Wing v. Mill does not go the length of
saying that a mere legal liability is enough ;
there must be a retainer or adoption. In
that case the parish officers were aware of
the attendance, and sanctioned it, because
they applied to him to send in his bill."
See further, Doty v. Wilson, 14 Johns.
378; Gleason v. Dyke, 22 Pick. 393;
Dearborn r. Bowman, 3 Met. 155.

l Curtis v. Parks, 55 Cal. 106; Patillo v. Smith, 61 Ga. 265.

501

472

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK II.

range the debt with him to whom it is due, and not with another ;
and if another comes in without request or necessity and pays
the debt, the debtor is not obliged to substitute him in the place
of his original creditor unless he chooses to do it. But he may
do this if he so wishes ; and if, after the debt is paid by this third
party, the debtor choose to promise him repayment, he is held to
such promise, and the consideration, although executed, is suffi-
cient, for the law implies a previous request ; or, what is the same
thing, will not permit the debtor to deny the allegation of such
request in the declaration.

It is, however, to be observed, that where the law implies both
the previous request and also a subsequent promise, there no
other promise than that which is so implied can be enforced, if
the consideration for the promise be an executed one. («) In

(e) Kaye v. Button, 7 Man. & (',. 807.
This was an action of assumpsit upon an
agreement, whereby, after reciting that
one W. in his lifetime mortgaged certain
premises to I!, and B. to secure £3,500;
that B. and B. required YVr. to procure
the plaintiff to join him in a bond, as a
collateral security for that sum and inter-
est ; that the defendant had, since the
.death of W., taken upon himself the man-
agement of the estate of W., and had
paid to R. and B. .£3,370; that the plain-
tiff had been called upon as surety, and
had paid to E. and B. .£130; that the de-
fendant had repaid him .£-18, leaving .£82
due; that the defendant had agreed to
repay the plaintiff the £s,2 out of the
moneys which might arise from the sale
of the mortgaged premises, and in the
mean time to appropriate the rents towards
payment of the same, as the plaintiff had
a lien upon the premises for the same ;
that the defendant had requested the
plaintiff to release and convey all his es-
tate and interest in the premises to A. and
Tj., and that that lie had already done, reserv-
ing to himself a lien on the said property, —
it was witnessed that, in consideration of
the plaintiff's having paid the £130 to 1\.
and B. in part discharge of the mortgage,
and in consideration of his having released
and conveyed all his estate and interest in
the premises to A. and L., and in order to
secure to the plaintiff the repayment of
the .£82, the defendant undertook and
agreed with the plaintiff to pay him the
same, with interest, out of the proceeds of
the premises when sold, and, in the mean
time, to appropriate the rents in liquida-
tion of the same. The declaration then
stated, that, in consideration of the prem-

502

ises, the defendant promised the plaintiff
to perform the agreement ; and alleged for
breach, that, although the defendant had
received rents to a sufficient amount, he
had failed to pay. Held, that inasmuch
as the declaration did not show that the
plaintiff had any interest in the premises,
except that which he reserved, his release
and conveyance, though executed at the
defendant's request, formed no legal con-
sideration for the promise alleged to have
been made by the latter. And Tindnl,
C. J., in that case said : " Two objections
were made to the declaration, first, that it
did not show any consideration for the
promise by the defendant ; secondly, that
the promise was laid in respect of an exe-
cuted consideration, but was not such <<,
promise as would have been implied by
law from that consideration ; and that, in
point of law, an executed consideration
will support no promise, although express,
other than that which the law itself would
have implied. The cases cited by the de-
fendant, namely, Brown r. Crump, 1 Marsh.
5G7, G Taunt. 300; Granger i. Collins, 6
11. & \Y. 458 ; Hopkins v. Logan, 5 M. &
W. 2-tl ; Jackson r. Cobbin, 8 M. & W.
790 ; and Roscorla r. Thomas, 3 Q. B. 234 ;
s. c. 2 (iale & I). 508, certainly support
that proposition to this extent, that, where
the consideration is one from which a
promise is by law implied, there no ex-
press promise made in respect of that con-
sideration after it has been executed,
differing from that which by law would
be implied, can be enforced. But those
cases may have proceeded on the principle
that the consideration was exhausted by
the promise implied by law, from the very
execution of it; and, consequently, any

CH. I.]

CONSIDERATION.

473

* other words, no express promise made after a considera- * 473
tion has been wholly executed, and founded wholly upon

that consideration, can be enforced, if it differs from the promise
which the law implies. Otherwise, there would be two distinct
and perhaps antagonistic promises resting upon one consideration.
From what has been said, it will be seen that where the consid-
eration is wholly executed, the law implies in some cases a pre-
vious request, provided a promise be proved ; but will not imply
a request and thence imply a promise. On the other hand,
wherever the law implies a promise, there it will also

* imply a request ; and hence it may be said that express * 474
request is unnecessary where the law implies a promise. (/)

promise made afterwards must be nudum
pactum, there remaining no consideration
to support it. But the case may, perhaps,
be different where there is a consideration
from which no promise would be implied
by law ; that is, where the party suing has
sustained a detriment to himself, or con-
ferred a benefit on the defendant, at his
request, under circumstances which would
not raise any implied promise. In such
cases it appears to have been held, in
some instances, that the act done at the
request of the party charged, is a suffi-
cient consideration to render binding a
promise afterwards made by him in re-
spect of the act so done. Hunt v. Bate,
and several cases mentioned in the mar-
gin of the report of that case, seem to go
to that extent ; as also do some others
collected in Roll. Abr. Action sur Case
(Q.)." — So in Jackson v. Cobbin, 8 M. &
W. 790, a declaration in assumpsit stated,
in substance, that the defendant agreed to
let, and the plaintiff to take, a certain
messuage and premises on certain speci-
fied terms, and that afterwards, in con-
sideration of the premises, and that the
plaintiff, at the request of the defendant,
had promised the defendant to perform his
part of the agreement, the defendant
promised the plaintiff to perform his part
of the agreement, and that he then had
power to let the messuage and premises
to the plaintiff, without restriction as to the
purpose for which the same should be used
and occupied. Held, on special demurrer,
that such a promise could not be implied
from the relation of the parties, and that
the consideration alleged was insufficient
to sustain it. See also Hopkins v. Logan,
5 M. & W. 241 ; Lattimore v. Garrard, 1
Exch. 809. In Roscorla v. Thomas, 3 Q.
B. 235, the declaration stated, that in con-
sideration that the plaintiff, at the request
of the defendant, had bought a horse of

the defendant at a certain price, the de-
fendant promised that the horse was free
from vice ; but it was vicious. Held, bad,
on motion in arrest of judgment ; for that
the executed consideration, though laid
with a request, neither raised by implica-
tion of law the promise charged in the
declaration, nor would support such
promise, assuming it (as must be assumed
on motion in arrest of judgment) to be ex-
press. But we think this case goes too far
in saying, that a consideration which would
not raise an implied promise would not
sustain an express one. See the observa-
tions of Tindal, C. J., in Kaye r. Button,
cited above.

(/) It follows from what is stated in
the text, that in declaring on an executed
consideration, it is not necessary to allege
a precedent request where the law will
imply a promise without a request. See
Osborne v. Rogers, 1 Wins. Saund. 264, n.
(1), as corrected by the learned note of
Mr. Sergeant Manninq, appended to the
case of Fisher v. Pyne, 1 Man. & G. 265.
Accordingly, in Victors v. Davies, 12 M.
& W. 758, it was held, that in a declara-
tion for money lent, it is not necessary to
aver that the money was lent at the defend-
ant's request. Parke, B. : " There is a very
learned note of my brother Manning on this
subject, in which he goes into the whole
law with respect to alleging a request,
and points out the error into which Mr.
Sergeant Williams appears to have fallen
in his comment upon Osborne v. Rogers.
The note is thus : ' The consideration be-
ing executory, the statement of the re-
quest in the declaration, though men-
tioned in the undertaking, appears to
have been unnecessary. In Osborne v.
Rogers the consideration of a promise is
laid to be, that the said Robert, at the
special instance and request of the said
William, would serve the said "William,

503

*474

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK II.

and bestow his care and labor in and
about the business of the said William ;
and the declaration alleges, that Robert,
confiding in the said promise of William,
afterwards went into the service of Wil-
liam, and bestowed his care and labor in
and about,' &c. Here the consideration
is clearly executory, yet Mr. Sergeant
Williams, in a note to the words ' at the
special instance and request,' says, ' these
words are necessary to be laid in the dec-
laration, in order to support the action.
It is held, that a consideration executed
and past, — as in the present case, the ser-
vice performed by the plaintiff for the
testator in his lifetime, for several years
then past, — is not sufficient to maintain
an assumpsit, unless it was moved by a
precedent request, and so laid.' The
statement according to modern practice,
of the accrual of a debt for, or the mak-
ing of a promise for the payment of the
price of goods sold and delivered, or for
the repayment of money lent, as being in
consideration of goods sold and delivered,
or money lent to the defendant, at his re-
quest, is conceived to be an inartificial

mode of declaring. Even where the con-
sideration is entirely past, it appears to be
unnecessary to allege a request, if the act
stated as the consideration cannot, from
its nature, have been a gratuitous kind-
ness, but imports a consideration per se.
It being immaterial to the right of action
whether the bargain, if actually con-
cluded and executed, or the loan, if made,
and the moneys actually advanced, was
proposed and urged by the buyer or by
the seller, by the borrower or by the
lender. Vide Rastall's Entries, tit.
' Dette ; ' and Co. Ent. tit. ' Debt.' There
cannot be a claim for money lent unless
there be a loan, and a loan imports an
obligation to pay. If the money is ac-
cepted, it is immaterial whether or not it
was asked for. The same doctrine will
not apply to money paid : because no man
can be a debtor for money paid, unless it
was paid at his request. What my brother
Manning says, in the note to which I have
referred, is perfectly correct." And see
Acome v. The American Mineral Co. 11
How. Pr. 24.

504

CH- II.] ASSENT. * 475

* CHAPTER II. *475

ASSENT OP THE PARTIES.

Sect. I. — What the assent must be.

There is no contract, unless the parties thereto assent ; and
they must assent to the same thing, in the same sense, (a) 1 A
mere assent does not suffice to constitute a contract, for there
may be an assent in a matter of opinion, or in some fact which is
done and completed at the time, and therefore leaves no obliga-
tion behind it. But a contract requires the assent of the parties
to an agreement, and this agreement must be obligatory, and, as
we have seen, the obligation must, in general, be mutual. This
is sometimes briefly expressed, by saying, that there must be " a

(a) Hazard v. New England Marine it was held, that, unless both parties had

Ins. Co. 1 Sumner, 218. In Bruce t>. understanding^ assented to one of those

Pearson, 3 Johns. 534, it was held, that if views, there was no special contract as to

a person sends an order to a merchant to the price. Greene v. Bateman, 2 Woodb.

send him a particular quantity of goods & M. 359. See further, Tuttle v. Love, 7

on certain terms of credit, and the mer- Johns. 470: Eliason v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat,

chant sends a less quantity of goods, at a 225; Falls v. Gaither, 9 Port. (Ala.) 605;

shorter credit, and the goods sent are lost Keller r. Ybarru, 3 Cal. 147 ; Hutchison

by the way, the merchant must bear the v. Bowker, 5 M. & W. 535 ; Hamilton v.

loss, for there is no contract, express or Terry, 10 E. L. & E. 473; s. c. 11 C. B.

implied, between the parties. So where 954; Barlow v. Scott, 24 N. Y. (10 Smith)

shingles were sold and delivered at $3.25, 40 ; Hutcheson ;;. Blakeman, 3 Met. (Ky.)

but there was a dispute as to whether the 80; Holtzman v. Millandon, 18 La. An.

$3.25 was for a bunch or for a thousand ; 29. See post, * 494, note (j ).

1 A request to " telegraph how much corn you will sell, with lowest cash price,"
and the reply, " three thousand cases, one dollar five cents, open one week," to which
response was made, " sold corn, will see you to-morrow," do not constitute an agree-
ment, Lincoln v. Erie Preserving Co. 132 Mass. 129 ; nor an inquiry by a person as
to what a firm was " paying for stave bolts," with the answer that the firm " would
take all he could make and deliver at $2 per cord," Ahearn v. Ayres, 38 Mich. 692.
But an oral offer if a city " would build one half of a good bridge across the river, the
offeror would build the other half," is sufficiently definite, Long v. Battle Creek,
39 Mich. 323 ; as well as an agreement to account by a purchaser on a resale of land
for the proceeds above a " reasonable amount " in advance of the price paid by him,
Miller v. Kendig, 55 la. 174. See Appleby v. Johnson, L. R. 9 C. P. 158 ; Utley v.
Donaldson, 94 U. S. 29; National Bank v. Hall, 101 U. S. 43; Gowing v. Knowles,
118 Mass. 232 ; Harlow v. Curtis, 121 Mass. 320 ; Demuth v. American Institute, 75
N. Y. 502 ; Maclay v. Harvey, 90 111. 525.

505

* 476 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

request on the one side and an assent on the other." (I ) J A

mere affirmation, or proposition, is not enough. Nor is this any

more a contract if it be in writing than if spoken only, (c)2

* 476 * It becomes a contract only when the proposition is met

by an acceptance which corresponds with it entirely and
adequately. If an assent is obtained by fraud to a contract prom-
ising more than the assentor intended, the contract is not valid
for so much as he intended, but is wholly void. Thus, a note read
to a promisor as bearing less interest than that actually written,
and signed by him in that belief, was held void. (cc~)

An assent, however, may bind the party, although not express
or in writing, if it can be fairly inferred from his profiting by the
stipulations of the contract, (erf) 3

It may however happen, that there is some difference of under-
standing as to terms not directly referred to, either in the offer or
acceptance ; and it has been held that such a difference will not
prevent the accepted proposition from becoming a contract. (cT)

(&) Tindal, C. J., in Jackson v. Gallo- of the terms proposed by the company,

way, 5 Bine. N. C. 75. — In Eskridge r. Glover, 5 Stew. & F.

(c) Tucker c. Woods, 12 Johns. 190. 264, it was held, that an incomplete con-
See also Bruce v. Pearson, 3 Johns. 534; tract or agreement, which one of the
Tuttle i'. Love, 7 Johns. 470; Weeks r. parties has the option of completing at a
Tybald, Noy, 11 ; 1 Roll. Abr. 6 (M.), pi. particular day, raises a mutual right of
1. To render a proposed contract bind- rescission in the other party, at any time
ing there must be an accession to its before the ratification by the first. Thus,
terms by both parties, — a mere volun- where A proposed to exchange horses
tary compliance with its conditions by with I», and give B a specific amount, as
one who had not previously assented to it difference, which proposition B reserved
does not render the other liable on it. the privilege of determining upon by a
Johnston r. Fessler, 7 Watts, 48 ; Ball <•. certain day ; and before that day arrived,
Newton, 7 Gush. 599 ; and see Meynell A gave notice to B that he would not
v. Surtees, 31 E. L. & E. 475. In this confirm the offered contract, it was held,
case certain parties were desirous of con- that no action lay in favor of B to recover
structing a railway on the way-leave prin- the difference agreed to be paid by A.
ciple, and for that purpose entered into See also Cope r. Albinson, 16 E. L. &
negotiations with a land-owner, and pro- E. 470; s. c. 8 Exch. 185; Governor v.
posed terms which were discu.-scd by the Petch, 28 E. L. & E. 470; s. c. 10 Exch.
parties, but not agreed to. The company 610.

went forward, however, and constructed (cc) Stacv v. Ross, 27 Tex. 8.

their road. Held, that the acquiescence (cd) Smith v. Morse, 20 La. An. 220.

of the land-owner in the construction of (d) Baines v. Woodiall, 95 C. B. (n. s.)

the road did not amount to an acceptance 657.

1 It was decided in Demuth r. American Institute, 75 N. Y. 502, that the making
of an application on furnished blanks for space in an exhibition, and the payment of
an entrance fee, where by the conditions such payment was to precede approval, and
the right to reject was reserved, did not constitute a contract for the desired space.

2 But where the intention clearly is to form a written contract, the parties will not
be bound until the agreement has been reduced to writing and signed by them.
Fredericks v. Fasnacht, 30 La. An. 117.

8 An agreement to supply coal, reduced to writing as a draft merely, but not
formally executed, upon which one of the parties wrote " approved " and'his name,

506

CH. II.] ASSENT. * 477

But a letter accepting an offer, with a qualification that the terms
of a contract can afterwards be arranged between the parties, does
not constitute an absolute contract, upon which a bill for specific
performance will be entertained, (e)

■ When it is proposed by publication to do a certain thing on
certain terms, one who desires that thing to be done and if silent
as to the terms, will be supposed to assent to them ; thus, it has
been held at nisi prius, that if the publisher of a newspaper places
distinctly in the usual place of his paper, his terms of advertising,
one who orders advertising without any special bargains as to
terms, is to be regarded as assenting to the published terms.

Many cases turn upon the question whether this assent to the
proposition was entire and adequate. The principle may be stated
thus : The assent must comprehend the whole of the proposition ;
it must be exactly equal to its extent and provisions, and it must
not qualify them by any new matter. Thus, an offer to sell a
certain thing, on certain terms, may be met by the answer, " I
will take that thing on those terms," or by any answer which
means this, however it may be expressed ; and, if the proposition
be in the form of a question, as, " I will sell you so and so,
will you buy ? " the whole of this meaning may * be con- * 477
veyed by the word " Yes," or any other simply affirmative
answer. And thus a legal contract is completed.

But there are cases, where the answer, either in words or in
effect, departs from the proposition ; or varies the terms of the
offer, or substitutes for the contract tendered, one more satisfac-
tory to the respondent. In these cases there is no assent, and no
contract. The respondent is at liberty to accept wholly ; or to
reject wholly ; but one of these things he must do ; for if he
answers, not rejecting, but proposing to accept under some modi-
fications, this is a rejection of the offer. The party making the
offer may renew it ; but the party receiving it cannot reply,
accepting with modifications, and when these are rejected, again
reply, accepting generally, and upon his acceptance claim the
right of holding the other party to his first offer.

(e) Honeyman v. Marryatt, 6 H. L. Cas. 112.
constitutes, if acted upon by him, a, in sending coal in. the quantMes and at the

=X« r^v^t w^*?^ « bv ,

Brinckin, 55 Cal. 427.

478

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK II.

An answer or a compliance has been sometimes held insuffi-
cient to make a contract, where the difference of terms between

the parties did not seem to be very important. (/) a In
*478 *fact the court seldom inquires into the magnitude or

effect of this diversity ; if it clearly exist, that fact is
enough. But it is not material by which of the parties to an
agreement the words which make it one are spoken ; the intent

(/) Thus in Hutchinson v. Bowker, 5
M. & W. 535, the action was assumpsit
for the non-delivery of barley. It was
proved at the trial that the defendants
wrote to the plaintiffs, offering them a
certain quantity of " good " barley, upon
certain terms; to which the plaintiffs
answered, after quoting the defendants'
letter, as follows: "Of which offer we ac-
cept, expecting you will give us fine barley
and full weight." The defendants in reply,
stated that their letter contained no such
expression as fine barley, and declined
to ship the same. Evidence was given at
the trial that the terms " good " and " fine "
were terms well known in the trade ; and
the jury found that there was a distinc-
tion in the trade between " good " and
" fine " barley. Held, that although it
was a question for the jury what was the
meaning of those terms in a mercantile
sense, yet that, they having found what
that meaning was, it was for the court
to determine the meaning of the con-
tract ; and the court held that there was
not a sufficient acceptance. See also Slay-
maker /.'. Irwin, 4 Whart. 369 ; Gether v.
Capper, 26 E. L. & E. 275 ; s. c. 15 C. B.
39, 696. And in Vassar v. Camp, 1 Kern.
441, the defendants wrote to the plaintiffs,
offering them " 10,000 bushels of first
quality Jefferson county barley of this
year's growth." The plaintiffs replied,
sending a contract for the purpose of
having it signed by defendant, in which
the barley was described as first quality
Jefferson county tivo-rowed barley, of this
season's growth." Held, that this was
not an acceptance of the defendant's offer.
So where there is a material variance be-
tween the bought and sold notes delivered
by a broker to the vendor and vendee, there
is no sale. Peltier v. Collins, 3 Wend.
459; Suydam v. Clark, 2 Sandf. 133. See
the cases of Sivewright v. Archibald, 6 E.
L. & E. 286 ; s. c. 17 Q. B. 103 ; Moore v.
Campbell, 26 E. L. & E. 522; 6. c. 10

Exch. 323. So in Jordan v. Norton, 4
M. & W. 155, which was assumpsit for
a mare sold and delivered, to which the
defendant pleaded non-assumpsit. It ap-
peared that the defendant having seen
and ridden the mare, wrote to the plain-
tiff, " I will take the mare at twenty
guineas, of course wari anted ; and as she
lays out, turn her out my mare." The
plaintiff agreed to sell her for twenty
guineas. The defendant subsequently
wrote again to him : " My son will be at
the World's End (a public house) on
Monday, when he will take the mare and
pay you; send anybody with a receipt,
and the money shall be paid ; only say in
the receipt, sound and quiet in harness"
The plaintiff wrote in reply, " She is war-
ranted sound, and quiet in double harness ;
I never put her in single harness." The
mare was brought to the World's End on
the Monday, and the defendant's son took
her away without paying the price, and
without any receipt or warranty. The
defendant kept her two days and then
returned her as being unsound. The
learned judge stated to the jury that
the question was whether the defendant
had accepted the mare, and directed them
to find for the defendant if they thought
he had returned her within a reasonable
time; and desired them also to say
whether the son had authority to take
her without the warranty. The jury
found that the defendant did not accept
the mare, and that the son had no authority
to take her away. Held, on motion to enter
a verdict for the plaintiff, that there was
no complete contract in writing between
the parties, that, therefore, the direction
of the learned judge was right; that the
defendant was not bound by the act of
the son in bringing home the mare, in-
asmuch as he had thereby exceeded his
authority as agent; and consequently
that the plaintiff was not entitled to re-
cover.

1 Proprietors, &c. Credit Co. u. Arduin, L. R. 5 H- L. 64, was to the point that to
vary the terms of an offer, the party accepting must distinctly call the attention of
the offerer to his desire so to do.

508

CH. II. J

ASSENT.

'479

governs, and if this be clear, and expressed with sufficient
definiteness, it is enough. (<7)

This question frequently occurs in cases where a guaranty was
offered, and the party receiving it acted on the faith of such guar-
anty. But this is not enough, without a previous acceptance of
the guaranty. (A) Nor does this rest on a mere technical
* rule. Justice to the guarantor obviously requires that * 479
he should have notice of an intention to furnish goods or
money, or do any similar thing on the credit of his guaranty.
And this notice must be distinct, so that there can be no mistake
about it, and given in good season, so that the guarantor may, if
he chooses, take proper measures to secure himself. Such a case
must, however, be discriminated from one of absolute and com-
plete guaranty ; as where one writes, " I hereby guarantee you,
&c," and delivers the paper. This is not an offer, or proposition
to guarantee, but a declaration of the fact, and if made on good
consideration binds the party, without further action on the part
of him who receives it. (i) But where the guaranty is made only

(g) Putnam, J., in Hubbard v. Cool-
idge, 1 Met. 93. But where a conversa-
tion is relied upon as proof of an agree-
ment, it is for the jury to decide whether
such an assent of the minds of the parties
took place as to constitute a valid con-
tract, or whether what passed between
them was a loose conversation, not un-
derstood or intended as an agreement.
Thurston v. Thornton, 1 Cush. 89.

(A) Thus in Gaunt v. Hill, 1 Stark. 10,
which was assumpsit for non-payment
of £70, in consideration of forbearance.
The defendant's brother being indebted
to the plaintiff in the sum of £140, the
defendant offered by letter to pay the
plaintiff £70, provided he would give his
brother a full discharge ; and directed
him, in case he accepted his offer, to call
upon him the next morning. Held, that
the offer was not binding upon the de-
fendant, unless accepted within the time
appointed, and that at all events it must
be shown that the plaintiff had acceded to
the proposal in writing. — So in Mclver
v. Richardson, 1 M. & Sel. 557, a paper
writing was given by the defendant to A.
(to whose house the plaintiffs had declined
to furnish goods on their credit alone),
to this effect : " I understand A. & Co.
have given you an order for rigging, &c.
I can assure you, from what I know of
A's honor and probity, you will be per-
fectly safe in crediting them to that
amount ; indeed I have no objection to guar-

antee you against any loss from giving them
litis credit ; " which paper was handed over
by A. to the plaintiffs, together with a
guaranty from another house, which they
required in addition, and the , goods were
thereupon furnished. Held, that the paper
did not amount to a guaranty, there being
no notice given by the plaintiffs to the
defendant that they accepted it as such,
or any consent of the defendant that it
should be a conclusive guaranty. And
on the authority of that case the Court of
Exchequer afterwards, in Mozley v. Tink-
ler, 1 C. M. & It. 692, adopted the same
doctrine. In that case there was a guar-
anty in the following form : " P. informs
me that you are about publishing an arith-
metic for him. I have no objection to
being answerable as far as fifty pounds ;
for my reference apply to B." Signed,
" G. T." B. wrote this memorandum, and
added, "Witness to G. T.— J. B." It
was forwarded by B. to the plaintiffs,
who never communicated their accepts
ance of it to G. T. In an action against
the latter on the guaranty, held, that the
plaintiffs, not proving any notice of ac-
ceptance to the defendant, were not en-
titled to recover. See also Morrow v.
Waltz, 18 Penn. St. 118, and Harson v.
Pike, 16 Ind. 140.

(i) The distinction between a mere
offer to guarantee, and an actual guar-
anty, is well illustrated by the case of
Jones v. Williams, 7 M. &" W. 493. In

509

* 480 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

as an offer, or a proposition, there must be a distinct acceptance
of it. Of late, there are decisions, especially in New York, which
lead to the conclusion that an acceptance in part, of a guaranty,
that is, action on the faith of it by him to whom the guaranty is
given, holds the guarantor without any notice to him. This sub-
ject of guaranty we shall, however, consider specifically hereafter.
At a sale by auction, every bid of any one present is an offer
by him. It becomes a contract as soon as the hammer falls, or
the bid is otherwise accepted ; (/) but until it is accepted

* 480 it may * be withdrawn by the bidder, because until then it

is not obligatory on him, for want of the assent of the
owner of the property, by his agent the auctioneer. (Jc) l

SECTION II.

CONTRACTS ON TIME.

Propositions or offers on time involve questions of the assent

of parties, which are sometimes difficult. (7) Strictly speaking,

that case the defendant's undertaking was called locus patnitentirp. Every bidding is

contained in two letters, addressed to C. nothing more than an offer on one side,

J., the brother of the plaintiff's intestate, which is not binding on either side till it

R. J., in the first of which he pressed C. is assented to." See further Fisher r.

J. to join, and to induce his brothers to Seltzer, 23 Penn. St. 308. — As sales at

join, in a security for the repayment of auction are clearly within the statute of

money to be advanced to the defendant for frauds, Hiude r. Whitehouse, 7 East, 568 ;

carrying on a suit in chancery ; and in the Kenworthy v. Scofield, 2 B. & C. 945;

second he again urged that they should Brent r. Green, 6 Leigh, 16 ; the assent

lend their names for this purpose, and would not be binding unless in writing, if

added : " I should consider it a matter of the case came withm the terms of that

favor to myself if your brothers will join, statute.

and I will see that they come to no harm." (&) See post, pp. *539, *540, on the

field, that the letters amounted to an contract of sale by auctions.

actual r/nnranti/, on which the defendant (/) This subject was discussed in the

was liaiile to the plaintiff, and not merely case of Boston and Maine Railroad r.

to a representation with a view to the Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224. It was there held,

parties doing an act, against the conse- that a proposition in writing to sell land,

rmences of winch they should afterwards at a certain price, if taken within thirty

lie protected. days, is a continuing offer, which mav be

( j) Payne c Cave, 3 T. R. 148. The retracted at any time; but if not being

court there said : " The auctioneer is the retracted, it is accepted within the time,

agent of the vendor, and the assent of both such offer and acceptance constitute a

parties is necessary to make the contract valid contract, the specific performance of

binding; that is signified on the part of which may be enforced hv a bill in equity,

the seller, by knocking down the hammer, Fletcher, J., there observed : " In the pre's-

which was not done here till the defendant ent case, though the writing signed by the

had retracted. An auction is not unaptly defendants was but an offer, and an offer

1 An advertisement to sell at auction does not amount to a contract with any one
acting on it, or to a warranty that the sale will take place. Harris r. Nickerson L. R.
8 Q. B. 286.

510

CH. II.]

ASSENT.

481

all offers are on time. If one says, I will sell you this thing for
this money, and the other answers, I will buy that thing at that
price, all authorities agree that this is a contract. But the
* answer follows the offer ; it cannot be actually simulta- * 481
neous with it, although it is sometimes said to be so. But
the offer is regarded as continuing until the acceptance, if the
acceptance is made at once. Nor can it be necessary that the ac-
ceptance should follow the offer instantaneously. Though the
party addressed pauses a minute or two for consideration, still
his assent makes a contract, for the offer continues unless it is
expressly withdrawn. But how long will it continue ? The only
answer must be, in general a reasonable time ; (m) 1 and what this
is must be determined by the circumstance of the case. If the
party addressed goes away, and returns the next month or the
next week, and says he will accept the proposition, he is too late
unless the proposer assents in his turn. So it would be probably
if he came the next day, or the next hour ; or, perhaps, if he went
away at all and afterwards returned.

But the proposer may himself determine how long the offer

which might be revoked, yet while it re-
mained in force and unrevoked, it was a
continuing offer during the time limited
for acceptance ; and during the whole of
that time it was an offer every instant,
but as soon as it was accepted it ceased to
be an offer merely, and then ripened into
a contract. The counsel for the defend-
ants is most surely in the right, in saying,
that the writing when made was without
consideration, and did not therefore form
a contract. It was then but an offer to
contract ; and the parties making the offer
most undoubtedly might have withdrawn
it at any time before acceptance. But
when the offer was accepted, the minds of
the parties met, and the contract was com-
plete. There was then the meeting of
the minds of the parties, which constitutes
and is the definition of a contract. The
acceptance by the plaintiffs constituted a
sufficient legal consideration for the en-
gagement on the part of the defendants.
There was then nothing wanting in order
to perfect a valid contract on the part of
the defendants. It was precisely as if the
parties had met at the time of the accept-
ance, and the offer had then been made
and accepted, and the bargain completed

at once. A different doctrine, however,
prevails in France and Scotland and Hol-
land. It is there held, that whenever an
offer is made, granting to a party a cer-
tain time within which he is to be entitled
to decide whether he will accept it or not,
the party making such offer is not at lib-
erty to withdraw it before the lapse of the
appointed time. There are certainly very-
strong reasons in support of this doctrine.
Highly respectable authors regard it as
inconsistent with the plain principles of
equity, that a person, who has been in-
duced to rely on such an engagement,
should have no remedy in case of disap-
pointment. But, whether wisely and equi
tably or not, the common law unyield-
ingly insists upon a consideration, or a
paper with a seal attached. The authori-
ties, both English and American, in sup-
port of this view of the subject, are very-
numerous and decisive ; but it is not
deemed to be needful or expedient to refer
particularly to them, as they are collected
and commented on in several reports, as
well as in the text-books."

(m) Beckwith v. Cheever, 1 Foster
(N. H.), 41; Peru „ Turner, 1 Fairf.
185.

1 Where no time is limited, it must be accepted within a reasonable time, otherwise
jposer will not be bound. Chicago, &c. R. Co. v. Dana, 43 N. Y. 240 ; Judd ;». Day,

pro,

50 la. 247

511

* 482 THE LAW OP CONTEACTS. [BOOK II.

shall continue. He may say, I will give you an hour, or until
this time to-morrow, or next week, to make up your mind. Then
the party to whom the proposition is made knows how long the
offer is to continue. He may avail himself of the hour, the clay,
or the week given for inquiry or consideration, or making the
necessary arrangements ; and if within the prescribed time he
expresses his assent (supposing the proposition not in the mean
time withdrawn), he completes the contract as effectually as if
he had answered in the same way at the first moment after the
offer was made. (?i) 1

It seems irrational to say that the proposer is not bound by
receiving such delayed assent, although it is given within the
specified time, because no consideration had been paid him for
the delay, and for the continuance of the offer. If it were said
that where one makes an offer, and the other instantly accepts,
the offerer nevertheless is not bound, because there is no consid-
eration, then it might be said consistently that he is not bound
by an answer made within a time specified by him. But

* 482 no one * doubts that the offerer is bound by an instanta-

neous acceptance, although he received no consideration
for the offer. And what difference can it make as to the consid-
eration or the want of it, whether the acceptance follows the offer
in a second, or in a minute or two, or in a longer, but still rea-
sonable time, or in a still longer time limited and specified by
the proposer himself. All these cases stand on the same footing
in respect to consideration.

Undoubtedly, if the offerer gives a day for acceptance, without
consideration for the delay, he may at any time within that day,
before acceptance, recall his offer. So he may if he gives no
time. If he makes an offer, and instantly recalls it before
acceptance, although the other party was prepared to accept it
the next instant, the offer is effectually withdrawn. But accept-
ance before withdrawal binds the parties, if made while the offer
continues ; and the offer does continue in all cases, either a reason-
able time (and that only), or the time fixed by the party himself.2

(n) Wright v. Bigg, 21 E. L. & E. 591.

1 Longworth v. Mitchell, 26 Ohio St. 334. See also Smith v. "Weaver, 90 LI. 392. —
An offer by mail stating, in terms, " You will confer a favor by giving me your answer
by return mail," is released by a failure to answer by that mail. Maclay v. Harvey
90 111.525. • J

2 No contract arises under an offer of reward made by public proclamation until

512

CH. II.J ASSENT. * 483

It may be said, that whether the offer be made for a time
certain or not, the intention or understanding of the parties is to
govern. If the proposer fixes a time he expresses his intention,
and the other party knows precisely what it is. If no definite
time is stated, then the inquiry as to a reasonable time resolves
itself into an inquiry as to what time it is rational to suppose that
the parties contemplated ; and the law will decide this to be that
time which as rational men they ought to have understood each
other to have had in mind, (o)

We hold this to be the true principle, and to be capable of
universal application. Thus, where many subscribe for a common
result on a certain condition, the first question may be as to the
consideration; and this we have already discussed. And it
would be another question how long the parties are bound by the
promise contained in such subscription. If no time be agreed
on, and there be no express withdrawal, then the law must
choose between the period of legal presumption, which
* would generally be twenty years, and the principle of *483
reasonable time ; and the first alternative would be very
unreasonable, and might be very oppressive. The court will
look into all the circumstances of each case, and inquire what
the parties actually understood or intended, or, regarding them
as rational men, what they must be supposed to have intended.
And it seems difficult to reject this rule, without holding princi-
ples which would lead to the conclusion that one who offers goods
to another, and, receiving no answer, sells them to a third person
a year after, may still be held by him to whom the offer was first
made, if he shall then see fit to accept the offer ; a conclusion so
wholly unreasonable as to be impossible.

An analogous and closely connected question has arisen, where
the proposition and the reply are both made by letter. And as
we think, it must be governed by the same principles. It is un-
questionably true as a general proposition, that a contract cannot
bind the party proposing it, and indeed that there is no contract,

(o) Moxley v. Moxley's Adm'r,-2 Met. (Ky.) 309.

its terms are complied with, before which time it may be withdrawn in the same
manner, ignorance of which withdrawal by any subsequent claimant being immaterial.
Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. 73. Services entitling a person to a reward must be
rendered with a knowledge of its offer and for the purpose of its acquisition. How-
land v. Lounds, 51 N. Y. 604 ; Hewitt v. Anderson, 56 Cal. 476. See Montgomery u.
Robinson, 85 HI. 174.

vol. i. 33 513

*484

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK II.

until the acceptance of the offer by the party receiving it, is in
some way, actually or constructively communicated to the party
making the offer. (00) We consider that an offer by letter is a
continuing offer until the letter be received, and for a reasonable
time thereafter, during which the party to whom it is addressed
may accept the offer, and communicate the fact of his acceptance.
We hold also that this offer may be withdrawn by the maker at
any moment ; and that it is withdrawn as soon as a notice of such
withdrawal reaches the party to whom the offer is made,
and not before. (^Z)1 If, therefore, that party accepts
*484 *the offer before such withdrawal, the bargain is com-
pleted ; there is then a contract founded upon mutual
assent. And an acceptance having this effect is made, and is
communicated under the rule already stated, when the party re-

(00) The general principle is asserted
in Hebb's case, Law Rep. 4 Eq. 9.

(p) Notwithstanding the case of Mc-
Culloch v. Eagle Ins. Co. 1 Pick. 281, we
deem the rule of the text to be the law in
England, and in this country; although
further adjudication may be necessary to
define these rules and determine all their
consequences. It was first laid down in
England in Adams i>. Lindsell, 1 B. &
AM. 681, in 1818. The case of Cooke ».
Oxley, 3 T. R. 653, was there relied upon
by counsel, but the court said, " that if
that were so, no contract could ever be
completed by the post. For if the defend-
ants were not bound by their offer when
accepted by the plaintiffs, till the answer
was received, then the plaintiffs ought not
to be bound till after they had received
the notification that the defendants had
received their answer and assented to it.
And so it might go on ad infinitum. The
defendants must be considered in law as
making, during every instant of the time
their letter was travelling, the same iden-
tical offer to the plaintiffs, and then the
contract is completed by the acceptance
of it by the latter. Then as to the delay
in notifying the acceptance, that arises en-
tirely from the mistake of the defendants,
and it therefore must be taken as against
them, that the plaintiffs' answer was re-
ceived in course of post." See also Ken-
nedy v. Lee, 3 Meriv. 441. And in the
case of Potter v. Sanders, 6 Hare, 1, de-
cided in 1846, a purchaser offered a price
for an estate, and the vendor, bv a letter
sent by post, and received by the purchaser
the day after it was put into the post-

! A revocation of an offer is not effectual until communicated to the other party.
Stevenson i>. McLean, 5 Q. B. D. .346

514

office, accepted the offer. Held, that the
vendor was bound by the contract from
the time when he posted the letter, al-
though it was not received by the pur-
chaser until the following day. And this
rule was adopted by the House of Lords
in the still later case of Dunlop v. Hig-
gins, 1 H. L. Cas. 381. It was there laid
down, that a letter offering a contract
does not bind the party to whom it is ad-
dressed to return an answer by the very
next post after its delivery, or to lose the
benefit of the contract, but an answer,
posted on the day of receiving the offer, is
sufficient ; that the contract is accepted by
the posting of a letter declaring its accept-
ance ; that a person putting into the post
a letter declaring his acceptance of a con-
tract offered, has done all that is necessary
for him to do, and is not answerable for
casualties occurring at the post-office. See
also Stocken t>. Collen, 7 M. & W. 515.
With the exception of Tennessee (Gilles-
pie v. Edmonston, 11 Humph. 553), the
doctrine of Adams v. Lindsell is the estab-
lished law in this country. Beckwith v.
Cheever, 1 Foster (X. H), 41 ; Brisban r.
Boyd, 4 Paige, 17; Avcrill v. Hedge, 12
Conn. 436 ; Mactier i>. Frith, 6 Wend. 103 ;
Vassar r. Camp, 14 Barb. 341 ; s. c. 1
Kern. 441 ; Clark v. Dales, 20 Barb. 42 ;
Levy v. Cohen, 4 Ga. 1 ; Eliason ». Hen-
shaw, 4 Wheat. 228 ; Chiles v. Nelson, 7
Dana, 281 ; Falls v. Gaither, 9 Port. (Ala.)
605 ; Hamilton v. Lycoming Mutual Ins.
Co. 5 Penn. St. 339, where the case of
McCulloch v. Eagle Insurance Co. is ably
examined.

CH. II. J ASSENT. * 484

ceiving the offer puts into the mail his answer accepting it. ( pp) *
Thus, if A, in Boston, on the first day of January, writes to B, in
Baltimore, making an offer, and this letter reaches Baltimore on
the third, and B forthwith answers the letter, accepting the offer,
putting the letter into the mail that day ; and on the second of
January A writes withdrawing the offer, and his letter of with-
drawal reaches B on the fourth, there is nevertheless a contract
made between the parties. If the offer was to sell goods, B on
tendering the price, may claim the goods; if the offer was to
insure B's ship, B may tender the premium and demand the
policy, and hold A as an insurer of his ship. And so of any
other offer or proposition, (y)

Sometimes a man makes an offer, saying if there be no answer,
or none by a return mail, or by a certain time, he shall consider
the offer accepted. But he has no right to impose these condi-
tions, and silence is no acceptance of the offer, (qq) 2

(pp) The case of Tayloe v. Merchants' the Palo Alto, Davies, 344. In the case
Fire Ins. Co. 9 How. 390, is a strong case of Duncan v. Topham, 8 C. B. 225, the
on this subject. It was there held, that same principle was adopted, and the con-
where there was a correspondence relating tract was said to be closed by mailing the
to the insurance of a house against fire, letter of acceptance, although it never
the insurance company making known the reached its destination. All these cases
terms upon which they were willing to in- and some others are fully considered in 2
sure, the contract was complete when the Parsons, Marit. Law, p. 22, note 4.
insured placed a letter in the post-office (q) Hutcheson r, Blakeman, 3 Met.
accepting the terms ; and the house having (Ky.) 80.

been burned down while the letter of ac- (qq) Felthouse v. Bindley, 31 L. J. C.

ceptance was in progress by the mail, the 204.
company were held responsible. See also

1 After the mailing of a letter of acceptance by the offeree, the offerer is bound,
although it may not have reached him, Stevenson v. McLean, 5 Q. B. D. 346;
Byrne v. Van Tienhoven, 5 C. P. D. 344; Thompson v. James, 18 Dunlop, 1 ; but
the letter must be posted within the time limited, if any, or within a reasonable time,
and before a revocation is communicated, Potts v. Whitehead, 8 C. E. Green, 512 ;
Abbott o. Shepard, 48 N. H. 14 ; Stevenson v. McLean, 5 Q. B. D. 346 ; Maclay v.
Harvey 90 111. 525 ; the sending a letter being an overt act-showing assent, Howard
v Daly 61 N. Y. 362. Brit. & Am. Tel. Co. v. Colson, L. R. 6 Ex. 108, which held
that one to whom a letter of allotment of shares was mailed but never received is not a
shareholder, was overruled by Household Ins. Co. v. Grant, 4 Ex. D. 216.-A contract
may be made and proved by mutual telegrams equally as well as by letter, Leonard
» N Y &c Tel Co 41 N. Y. 544 ; Rommel v. Wingate, 103 Mass. 32/ ; Henkel v. Pape,
L R 6 Ex. 7; under the same rules as by letter, Robinson Machine Works r.
Chandler, 56 Ind. 575; Minn. Oil Co. v. Collier Lead Co. 4 Dillon 431 ; a ^tele-
graphic contract being complete when the acceptance is deposited at the telegraph
office for transmission, Minn. Oil Co. v. Collier Lead Co. 4 Dillon 431 ; Robinson
Machine Works v. Chandler, 56 Ind. 575. See further, Taylor v. Jones 1 C. B. 1).
87 Hurdle v. Waring, L. R. 9 C. P. 435 ; WiU's Case, L. R. 15 Eq. 18 ; Brtteman v.
Morford, 76 V Y. 622; Northampton Ins. Co. v. Tuttle 11 Vroom, 476 ; Washburn
v. Fletcher, 42 Wis. 152 ; Boit v. Maybin, 52 Ala. 252 ; Bryan r Booze ,55 Ga. 438.

2 But Lewis v. Browning, 130 Mass. 173, approving McCulloch v Eagle Ins. Co. 1
Pick 278 supra, decided that if an offer is made by letter in which the offerer requests
an answer by telegraph "yes" or "no," without which answer by a certam date he
"shall conclude '"'no/' the offer is made dependent on an actual receipt of the tele-
gram on or before that date.

v.

* 485 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK II.

We have supposed these letters to be properly addressed and
mailed, and to reach the proper party at a proper time. Cases
undoubtedly may occur where there is delay and hinderance, and
the cause of this may be the fault of the proposer, or of the

acceptor, or of neither. Such cases may form exceptions
*485 to the * principle above stated, and must be decided on

their own facts and merits, and by rules which are specially
adapted to them. But we should state as the general rule what
was lately declared to be law by the House of Lords ; that if the
party receiving an offer by letter, puts his answer of acceptance
into the mail, this completes the contract, for he has done all
that he could do, and is in no way responsible for the casualties
of the mail service. (r)

(r) See Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. L. Cas. 381, cited in note (p) sup.; Duncan v.
Topham, 8 C. B. 222.

516

BOOK III.

THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF CONTRACTS.

*BOOK III. *489

THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF CONTRACTS.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

The subject-matter of every contract is something which is to
be done, or which is to be omitted. No very precise or logical
division and classification of these various things is known to the
common law. The division stated and followed in the Pandects,
and referred to by Blackstone, (a) is exact and rational. It rec-
ognizes four species of contracts : Do ut Des ; Facio ut Facias ;
Facio ut Des ; Do ut Facias. But this division is not, in the civil
law, strictly followed. The whole subject of purchase and sale
(emptio et venditio) is treated of before this division is intro-
duced. (J) Blackstone says, " of this kind (Do ut Des) are all
sales of goods." But in fact it seems to be confined to giving
a thing (not money) to receive a thing in return.

It is impossible to make much use of this classification, in
exhibiting the rules of the common law in relation to contracts ;
and the arrangement of the subject-matters of contracts which we
have adopted, is the following. We shall treat of Contracts, —

1. For the Purchase and Sale of Real Estate.

2. For the Hiring of Real Estate.

3. For the Purchase and Sale of Chattels.

* 4. For the Purchase and Sale of Chattels with "War- * 490
ranty.

5. Of the Right of Stoppage in Transitu.

6. For the Hiring of Chattels.

7. Of Guaranty.

(a) 2 Bl. Com. 444. See ante, p. *430, (b) Emptio et Venditio. Pandects, lib.

note In). 18, tit. 18. Do ut des, etc. Pandecta, lib.

19, tit. 5, art. 1, § 4.

519

* 490 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

8. For the Hiring of persons.

9. For Service generally.

10. Of and in relation to Marriage.

11. Of Bailment,

12. Of Telegraphs.

13. Of Patents.

14. Of Copyrights.

15. Of Trade-marks.

16. Of Shipping.

17. Of Marine Insurance.

18. Of Fire Insurance.

19. Of Life Insurance.

Before, however, considering these topics severally, a few words
may be said of the remedy which the common law affords for
injury sustained by a breach of a contract to do a specific thing.

Where the thing to be done is the payment of money, there, in
general, the remedy is adequate and perfect. But where the
thing to be done is anything else than the payment of money,
there the common law can give only a remedy which may be
entirely inadequate ; for it can give only a money remedy. The
foundation of the common law of contracts may be said to be the
giving of damages for the breach of a contract. And even where
the contract is specifically for the payment of money, and for
nothing else, still the law does not, generally, in form, decree an
execution of the contract, but damages for the breach of it. If
an action be brought upon a promissory note, or a covenant, the
plaintiff sets forth the contract and the breach, and does not pray
for an execution of it ; but he sets forth also the damages he has
sustained, and claims them. The action of debt may, it is true,
be brought, not only on a bond, but upon many simple contracts ;
and in this action the payment of the money due is directly
demanded, and such is the judgment if the plaintiff recovers ; but
this action is not much used at the present time, in this country
at least, to enforce simple contracts. Where the contract is for
any other thing than the payment of money, the common law
knows no other than a money remedy ; for it has no power to
enforce the specific performance of a contract, with the exception
only of those money contracts for which debt will lie.

This inability of the common law was among the earlier and
520

CH. I.] PRELIMINARY REMARKS. * 491

most potent causes which gave rise to courts of equity ; for
* these courts have, both in England and in this country, * 491
a very complete jurisdiction over this class of cases. Per-
haps this apparent defect in the common law may be explained,
by supposing that, originally, the action of debt gave the power
of compelling performance in fact, in the great majority of cases
which required it, and that the comparative disuse of this action,
and the coming into notice of the great variety of other cases in
which this power was needed to do justice, occurred after the
forms of the common law had become fixed, and when there was
a great unwillingness in the courts to change or enlarge them ;
and when also another court had grown up which had full power
in all such cases. However this may be, this defect in the com-
mon law, which must be felt more and more sensibly as society
advances beyond the point at which it is willing to measure all
rights and wrongs by a money standard, is one cause, undoubt-
edly, of the disposition which is manifesting itself in this country
to bring together all common-law and all equity powers of prevent-
ing wrong and enforcing right ; as has been done, or attempted to
be done in New York, by their last Revised Code ; and as will, we
think, be done in other States of this Union, in some form and in
some measure. Indeed the recent legislation of England, by giv-
ing to the Common Law courts a kind of summary equity juris-
diction, seems to seek the same result.

521

492

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

492

* CHAPTER II.

PURCHASE AND SALE OF REAL PROPERTY.

Conyeyances of real property are made by deed ; but simple
contracts are often made for tbe purchase of real estate and
tbe specific performance of these contracts may be enforced in
equity, (a) or actions may be brought on them at common law. (5)
Neither equity nor law will enforce such contract, if it be founded
upon fraud, (c) or gross misrepresentation, (d) or upon an inten-
tional concealment of an important defect in or objection to an
estate ; (e) but a mere inadequacy of price — not gross, and not
attended by circumstances indicating fraud or oppression — is
not sufficient to avoid it. (/) And where the land is sold with

(a) That specific performance of con-
tracts for the sale or purchase of railway
shares will be enforced in equity, see
Duncuft b. Albrecht, 12 Sim. 189 ; Shaw
v. Fisher, 12 Jur.. 152; Wynne v. Price, 13
id. 295. — The idea formerly entertained,
that a court of equity might award com-
pensation for non-performance of a con-
tract of sale, is now exploded. Todd v.
Gee, 17 Ves. 273; Sainsbury v. Jones, 5
Myl. &C. 1.

(b) See Moses v. McFerlan, 2 Burr.
1011 ; Farrer v. Nightingal, 2 Esp. 639;
Squire i>. Tod, 1 Camp. 293. It seems,
that if the subject-matter of the contract
is such that both vendor and purchaser
would be reimbursed by damages, a court
of equity will decline to interfere, and will
leave a party to his remedy at law. This
is the case in ordinary agreements for the
sale of stock. Cud i>. Rutter, 1 P. Wms.
570; Nutbrown v. Thornton, 10 Ves. 159.
— It has been thought, however, that in
some cases a bill in equity for specific per-
formance ought to be maintained in such
contracts. See 2 Story, Eq. §§717, 724.

(c) See Davis v. Symonds, 1 Cox, 407 ;
Seymour v. Delancey, 6 Johns. Ch. 225 ;
Acker r. Phoenix, 4 Paige, 305 ; Nellis v.
Clark, 20 Wend. 24; Miller v. Chetwood,
1 Green, Ch. 199; Clement v. Reid, 9 Sm.
& M. 535.

522

(d) Cadman v. Horner, 18 Ves. 10. In
this case the purchaser was plaintiff, and
was the seller's agent, and specific per-
formance was refused, because he had rep-
resented to the seller that the houses had
been injured by a flood, and would re-
quire between .£40 and .£50 to repair them,
whereas 40s. would have repaired the dam-
ages. See also Lord Clerment o. Tas-
burgh, 1 Jac. & W. 112; Barker v. Harri-
son, 2 Collyer, 546 ; Best v. Stow, 2 Sandf.
Ch. 298 ; Schmidt v. Livingston, 3 Edw.
Ch. 213; Rodman v. Zilley, Saxton, 320;
Brealey v. Collins, Younge, 317.

(e) But general statements by a seller,
although not the whole truth, will not
amount to such misrepresentation as to
avoid the contract. See Fenton v. Browne,
14 Ves. 144 ; Lowndes v. Lane, 2 Cox, 363.

(/) Whitefield v. McLeod, 2 Bay, 380;
Stewart v. The State, 2 Har. & G. 114;
Knobb v. Lindsay, 5 Hamm. 472 ; Osgood
v. Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. I ; Coles v. Tre-
cothick, 9 Ves. (Sumner's ed.) 234 ; Wood-
cock v, Bennet, 1 Cowen, 733 ; Minturn v.
Seymour, 4 Johns. Ch. 500 ; Birdsong v.
Birdsong, 2 Head, 289, where inadequacy
of consideration is said to be only a badge
of fraud. But inadequacy of price if gross,
and attended by circumstances evincing
unconscientious advantage taken by the
purchaser of the improvidence and distress

CH. II.] PURCHASE AND SALE OP REAL PROPERTY. * 493

such words as " more or less," but with definite and distinct
boundaries, equity will not relieve against a considerable excess
or deficiency of land over the description, if there be neither
fraud nor gross mistake. (Jf )

It may be well to remark that a mere return of the deed to the
grantor, even with an indorsement, " I transfer the within deed
to (the grantor) again," will not reconvey a freehold estate which
has once vested in the grantee. (/#)

Delivery is requisite, and if a deed remains after execution, in
the possession and control of the grantor, it takes no effect. It
may be delivered as an escrow, to a third party to be delivered
to the grantee ; and if to be delivered only on certain .terms and
conditions, and the depositary delivers the deed in disregard and
violation of the conditions, and the grantee refuses or is unable
to perform them, the deed would be held void. (/A)

In all our States a record is required of conveyances of land,
and a recorded deed takes effect over a prior deed unrecorded,
of which the grantee had no knowledge or notice. But open and
visible possession by the former grantee may be notice to the
later grantee. (_/?) The record is said to be notice to all the
world ; but this means to all who are interested in the title ; and is
held not to affect strangers to the title who are put upon no in-
quiry in relation to it. (fj)

* Estates are frequently sold at auction; and in that *493
case, the plans and descriptions should be such as will give
true information to such persons as ordinarily attend such sales ;
for if they are deceptive or materially erroneous, the purchaser is
not bound to take the estate ; (#) and if these descriptions are

of the vendor, will avoid the contract in delivered up, or a sale rescinded (unless
equity, although the contract be executed, its grossness amounts to fraud), yet it may
MeKinney a. Pinckard, 2 Leigh, 149; Evans be sufficient for the court to refuse to en-
v. Llewellyn, 2 Bro. Ch. 150. See Groves force performance. Osgood v. Franklin,
v. Perkins, 6 Sim. 576 ; Sturge v. Sturge, 2 Johns. Ch. 23 ; Mortlock v. Buller, 10
14 Jur. 159. And if the inadequacy of Ves. 292 ; Day v. Newman, cited in Morfr-
price is so gross as to be itself sufficient lock v. Buller. See also, ante, p. *436.
evidence of fraud, then the contract will (ff) Noble v. Gookins, 99 Mass. 231.
be void. See Rice v. Gordon, 11 Beav. (fg) Linker v. Long, 64 N. C. 296;
265. But an inequality of price, in order Parshall v. Shirts, 54 Barb. 99.
to amount to a fraud, must be so strong (fh) Abbott v. Alsdorf, 19 Mich. 157.
and manifest as to shock the conscience In Fewell v. Kessler, 30 Ind. 195, the deed
and confound the judgment of any man was executed and acknowledged and left
of common sense. Osgood v. Franklin, 2 with the justice of the peace for the gran-
Johns. Ch. 23 ; and see How v. Weldon, 2 tee ; and it was held a valid delivery.
Ves. Sen. 516 ; Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Bro. {Ji) Cabeen v. Breckenridge, 48 111. 91.
Ch. 2; Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 246.— (//) Maul v. Rider, 59 Penn. St. 167.
Although inadequacy of price is not a (g) Dykes v. Blake, 4 Bing. N. C. 463.
ground for decreeing an agreement to be In this case, by the particulars of sale, lot

523

494

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

written or printed and circulated among the buyers, or conspicu-
ously posted in sight, then they cannot be controlled by ver-

* 494 bal declarations * made by the auctioneer at the time of
the sale. (A) And even if it be provided in the terms of

sale that any error or misstatement in the description shall not

avoid the sale, but be allowed for in the price, such provision will

13 was described as building ground, and
the adjoining lot 12 as a villa, subject to
liberty for the purchaser of lot 1 to come
on the premises to repair drains, &c, as
reserved in lot 7. The reservation in lot
7 referred to a lease, which gave the occu-
pier of that and the several adjoining lots,
composing a row of houses, a carriage-way
in common in front of the lots, and a foot-
way at the back, and also a footway over
lot 13. The particulars contained plans
which disclosed the carriage-way in front,
and the footway at the back of the houses,
but not the footway over lot 13. But they
stated that the lease of lot 7 might be seen
at the vendor's office, and would be pro-
duced at the sale. The plaintiff having
purchased lots 12 and 13, by one contract,
in ignorance of the footway over lot 13, it
was held, that the misdescription was such
as to entitle him to rescind the contract as
to both. See also Adams v. Lambert, 2
Jur. 1078; Robinson v. Musgrove, 8 C. &
P. 469 ; Taylor ». Mortindale, 1 Y. & Col.
Ch. 658 ; Symons v. James, id. 490 ; Mar-
tin v. Cotter, 3 Jones L. 506. " If the de-
scription be substantially true, and be de-
fective or inaccurate, in a slight degree
only, the purchaser will be required to
perform the contract, if the sale be fair
and the title good. Some care and dili-
gence must be exacted of the purchaser.
If every nice and critical objection be ad-
missible, and sufficient to defeat the sale,
it would greatly impair the efficacy and
value of public judicial sales ; and there-
fore, if the purchaser gets substantially
the thing for which he bargained, he may
generally be held to abide by the pur-
chase, with the allowance of some deduc-
tion from the price by way of compensa-
tion for any small deficiency in the value,
by reason of the variation. 2 Kent, Com.
437 ; King v. Bardeau, 6 Johns. 38. The
estate cannot be too minutely described
in the particulars ; for although it is im-
possible that all the particulars relative to
the quantity, the situation, &c, should be
so specifically laid down as not to call for
some allowance when the bargain comes
to be executed ; yet if a person, however
little conversant with the actual situation
of his estate, will give a description, he
must be bound by that whether conver-
sant of it or not. See Judson v. Wass, 11

524

Johns. 525, 3 Cranch, 270, 2 Bay, 11."
Dart, Vendors and Purchasers (Am. ed.),
p. 51, n. 2.

(A) Gunnis v. Erhart, 1 H. Bl. 289;
Bradshaw r. Bennett, 5 C. & P. 48 ; Can-
non v. Mitchell, 2 Desaus. 320 ; Shelton v.
Levius, 2 Cr. & J. 41 1 ; Powell v. Edmunds,
12 East, 6; Ogilvie v. Eoljambie, 3 Meriv.
53 ; Rich v. Jackson, 4 Bro. Ch. 514 ;
Wright v. Deckline, Pet. C. C. 199; Ran-
kin v. Matthews, 7 Ired. L. 286. And it
makes no difference that the question
arises on a sub-sale of the same premises
by the purchaser. Shelton u. Livius, 2
Cr. & J. 411. The rule applies in favor of
the seller as well as the purchaser. Powell
v. Edmunds, 12 East, 6. The case of Jones
v. Edney, 3 Camp. 285, is not at variance
with the rule stated in the text. That
was a case of a sale at auction of the lease
of a public-house. The house was de-
scribed in the conditions of sale as " a free
public-house ; " but the lease under which
it was held contained in fact a proviso that
the lessee and his assigns should take all
their beer from a particular brewery. At
the sale, the auctioneer read over the whole
lease in the hearing of the bidders, and
when he came to the proviso, being asked
how the house could be called "a free
public-house," he answered, " That clause
has been done away with. There has been
a trial upon it before Lord Ellenborough,
who has decided it to be bad. I warrant
it as a free public-house, and sell it as such."
The plaintiff bid off the house and paid a
deposit, but afterwards finding that the
clause might still be enforced, he brought
this action to recover the deposit back.
It was held, that he was entitled to recover.
Lord Ellenborough said : " In the condi-
tions of sale this is stated to be a 'free
public-house.' Had the auctioneer after-
wards verbally contradicted this, I should
have paid very little attention to what he
said from his pulpit. Men cannot tell
what contracts they enter into if the writ-
ten conditions of sale are to be controlled
by the babble of the auction-room. But
here the auctioneer at the time of the sale,
declared that he warranted and sold this
as a free public-house. Under these cir-
cumstances a bidder was not bound to at-
tend to the clauses of the lease, or to con-
sider their legal operation."

CH. II.] PURCHASE AND SALE OP REAL PROPERTY. * 495

not cover any misstatement of a substantial and important char-
acter ; but the purchaser may, on that ground, rescind the sale ; (i)
as, if an auctioneer sells lot A to one who, in good faith and with-
out fault supposes he is buying lot B, there is no sale, and no con-
tract between the parties for want of agreement of minds. (/)
And if the error be wholly unintentional, but such that the
amount of compensation to be allowed therefor cannot be exactly
calculated, the contract may be rescinded. (&) Wherever
* there is any material mistake, and no such provision re- * 495
specting it, the vendor cannot offer a pro tanto allowance,
and enforce the sale against the purchaser. And these principles
would hold in the case of a sale not at auction, so far as they
were applicable. (T)

If an estate be sold in separate lots, and one person buy many
lots, there is, by the later adjudications and the better reasons,
a distinct contract for each lot. (m) But where the contract is
written and signed for the purchase of several lots at one aggre-
gate price, it is one contract ; and this is so where this contract
was subsequent to a sale of the same lots severally and at several
prices to the same purchaser, (w) And if a vendor sell an estate
as one lot, and has title to a part, but not to the whole, he can-
not enforce the sale ; (o) but if he sells in several wholly inde-

(i) Duke of Norfolk v. Worthy, 1 Camp, named in the conditions for completing

337 ; Stewart v. Alliston, 1 Meriv. 26 ; the purchase, and before action brought

Eobinson v. Musgrove, 2 Mood. & R. 92 ; by the vendee, the vendor procured a lease

Leach v. Mullet, 3 C. & P. 115. of the yard for the term to the vendee,

\i

) Sheldon v. Capron, 3 R. I. 171. and offered it to him. See also Mills i

,..) Dobell v. Hutchinson, 3 A. & E. Oddv, 2 C. M. & R. 103.
355. This was a sale of a leasehold inter- (?) Hibbert v. Shee, 1 Camp. 113 ; Rob-

est of lands, described in the particulars inson v. Musgrove, 2 Mo. & Rob. 92.
as held for a term of twenty-three years, (m) This was expressly held in Emer-

at a rent of £55, and as comprising a yard, son v. Heelis, 2 Taunt. 38. See also James

One of the conditions was, that if any mis- v. Shore, 1 Stark. 426. The contracts

take should be made in the description of are separate, both in law and fact, Id.

the property, or any other error whatever Roots v. Lord Dormer, 4 B. & Ad. 77

should appear in the particulars of the Baldey v. Parker, 2 B. & C. 44, Best, J.

estate, such mistake or error should not Seaton v. Booth, 4 A. & E. 528 ; Gibson

annul or vitiate the sale, but a compensa- v. Spurrier, Peake Ad. Cas. 49 ; Dykes v.

tion should be made, to be settled by arbi- Blake, 4 Bing. N. C. 463. But see Van

tration. The yard was not, in fact, com- Eps v. Schenectady, 12 Johns. 436; Stod-

prehended in the property held for the dart v. Smith, 5 Binn. 355 ; Waters v. Tra-

term of £55, but was held by the vendor vis, 9 Johns. 450.

from year to year, at an additional rent. (n) Dykes v. Blake, 4 Bing. N. C. 463.

It was essential to the enjoyment of the See Chambers v. Griffiths, 1 Esp. 150;

property leased for the twenty-three years. Drewe v. Hanson, 6 Ves. 675 ; Hepburn v.

It did not appear that the vendor knew of Auld, 5 Cranch, 262 ; Osborne v. Bremar,

the defect. The court held that this de- 1 Desaus. 486 ; Cassamajor o. Strode, 2

feet avoided the sale, and was not a mis- Myl. & K. 706 ; Lewin v. Guest, 1 Russ.

take to be compensated for under the 325 ; Harwood v. Bland, Elan. & K. 540.
above condition ; although after the day (o) 2 Story, Eq. § 778 ; Reed v. Noe, 9

525

* 496 THE LAW CJF CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

pendent lots, it would seem reasonable that he should enforce
it as to those to which he could make title, as held by Lord
Brougham; (p) but we should not consider the lots as wholly
independent, if in point of fact the buying of them all was, for
any reason, a part of the inducement or motive of the buyer for
making the purchase.

There has been much question whether a sale at auction

might be avoided by the purchaser, because by-bidders or puffers

were employed by the owner or auctioneer. The proper

* 496 * way is undoubtedly to give notice of such a thing at the

sale ; but the weight of authority in this country, as well
as that of some cases in England, seems to be in favor of permits
ting an owner, without notice, to employ a person to bid for him,
if he does this with no other purpose than to prevent a sacrifice of
the property under a given price, (q) In a recent interesting
English case, it was held, that a sale at auction " without reserve,"
means, that there shall be no bid by or for the vendor at the auc-
tion, and that the property shall be sold to the highest bidder,
whether the sum offered be equivalent to its value or not. And
that the highest bond fide bidder may sue the auctioneer if he
knocks down the hammer at a subsequent and higher bidding of
or for the owner ; and this whether the auctioneer was or was
not privy to such bid. (V) It might be inferred from the lan-
guage by some of the judges in this case, that by-bidding was not

Yerg. 283 ; Dalby v. Pullen, 3 Sim. 29 ; Veazie v. Williams, 3 Story, 622 ; Thor-

Bates 7'. Delavan, 5 Paige, 300 ; Johnson nett v. Haines, 15 M. & W. 371 ; Wheeler

v. Johnson, 3 B. & P. 162; Parham v. v. Collier, Mood. & M. 123; Dart, Ven

Randolph, i How. (Miss.) 435. But if dors and Purchasers, p. 89. Contra

the part to which the seller has title was Towle v. Leavitt, 3 Foster (N. H.), 360

the purchaser's principal object, or equally Pennock's Appeal, 14 Penn. St. 446 .

his object with the other part, and is itself Staines v. Shore, 16 Penn. St. 200. In

an independent subject, and not likely to Veazie v. Williams, in 8 How. 134, the

be injured by being separated from the Supreme Court seems to hold, that if the

other part, equity will compel the pur- bids were intended to enhance the price,

chaser to take it at a proportionate price, and did so, the buyer should have relief in

See McQuin v. Farquhar, 11 Ves. 467; equity. See, as to bids by puffers, at auc-

Bowyer v. Bright, 13 Price, 698; Buck v. tion, McDowell v. Simms, 6 Ired. Eq.

McCaughtry, 5 Monr. 230 ; Simpson ,■. 278, and Tomlinson <-. Savage, id. 430 ;

Hawkins, 1 Dana, 305 ; Collard v. Groom, also, Doolubdass v. Eamloll, 3 E. L. & E.

2 J. J. Marsh. 488. 39, and Flint .-, Woodin, 13 E. L. & E.

(p) Cassamajor v. Strode, 2 Myl. & K. 278; », u. 9 Hare, 618. Where property

706. was advertised for sale "to the highest

(q) This right, provided there exists no bidder," a written proposal of "five hun-

actual intention to defraud, is recognized dred dollars more than the highest bid,"

by many recent authorities. See Latham without naming any sum, was not consid-

v. Morrow, 6 B. Mon. 630 ; National Fire ered valid. Webster <•. French, 11 111.

Ins. Co. t'. Loomis, 11 Paige, 431 ; Bowles 154. See Davis v. Petway, 3 Head, 667.
v. Round, 5 Ves. Jr. 508, n. (6) (Sumner's (r) Warlow v. Harrison, Exchequer

ed.) ; Crowder v. Austin, 3 Bing. 368 ; Chamber, 8 Am. Law Reg. 241.
526

CH. II.] PURCHASE AND SALE OF REAL PROPERTY. * 497

unlawful in cases of 'ordinary sale by auction, but would be made
so if such phrases in the advertisement as " without reserve," " to
the highest bidder," or any equivalent phrases, were used. It
must be often difficult, however, to draw the line between an hon-
est procedure of this sort and a fraudulent design. It is certain,
that any unfair conduct on the part of the purchaser in regard to
his purchase, prevents his acquiring any title to the goods. («) 1
But an agreement among many, that one should bid for all, will
not necessarily avoid the sale. (t~)

At an auction the contract of sale is not completed until
the * auctioneer knocks the property down to the pur- *497
chaser ; for he is the agent of the vendor, and this is his
assent to the offer of the purchaser, and until such assent be
given the offer may be withdrawn, (m) But an auctioneer has
no authority to rescind the sale, for either party, without specific
orders, although the purchase-money be not yet paid, (w) 2

If an auctioneer does not disclose the name of the owner of the
property which he sells, he is himself liable to an action by the
buyer for the completion of the contract. (w~) And it would be
so if he sold or warranted without authority, (x) If he has the
authority of the owner to warrant, and does so, disclosing the
name of the owner, he is himself exonerated from the warranty,
and the owner is liable upon it. («/) And he has such special

(s) Fuller v. Abrahams, 6 J. B. Moore, (to) Hanson v. Roberdeau, Peake, Cas.

316; s. c. 3 Br. & B. 116; Smith v. Green- 120; Franklyn v. Lamond, 4 C. B. 637;

lee, 2 Dev. L. 126. Mills v. Hunt, 20 Wend. 431 ; Jones c;.

(() Fire Ins. Co. v. Loomis, 11 Paige, Littledale, 6 A. & E. 486.
431; Switzer v. Skiles, 3 Gilman, 529. (x) Sugden, Law of Vendors (10th

(u) Paine v. Cave, 3 T R. 148; Rout- ed.), vol. 1, p. 70; Jones v. Dyke, id. vol.

ledge v. Grant, 4 Bing. 653. If the bid is 3, app. 8 ; Gaby v. Driver, 2 Y. & J.

retracted, the retraction must be loud 549.

enough to be heard by the auctioneer, (y) An auctioneer in such case is like

otherwise it amounts to nothing. Jones v. any other agent, and uuless he acts beyond

Nanney, McClel. 39; s. c. 13 Price, 103. his authority, binds his principal, but not

(») Boinest v, Leignez, 2 Rich. L. 464. himself.

1 That when a sale is to be " without reserve," the secret employment by the seller
of by-bidders renders the sale voidable by the buyer, see Curtis u. Aspinwall, 114
Mass. 187.

2 An auctioneer's advertisement to sell a certain article by auction does not amount
to a contract to put up the article with any one attending the sale ; and a withdrawal
of such article is not a breach of contract. Harris v. Mckerson, L. R. 8 Q. B. 286.
See Spencer v. Harding, L. R. 5 C. P. 561. An auctioneer cannot buy in for any one
property sold by him at auction. Hood v. Adams, 128 Mass. 207; Brock v. Rice, 27
Gratt. 812. If an auctioneer delivers goods to the wrong party, and his catalogue
and conditions of sale show that he contracted personally, he is liable. Woolfe
v. Home, 2 Q. B. D. 355. If the terms of sale require cash payment, an auctioneer
has no right to receive in payment a check on a bank where the buyer has no funds.
Bronghton v. Sillaway, 114 Mass. 71. An auctioneer can deduct his commissions and
expenses out of the proceeds of sale. Dowler's Succession, 29 La. An. 437.

527

498

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

property in the goods that he may bring an action for the price,
even if the goods be sold in the house of the owner, and were
known to be his. (z) But the buyer may set off a debt due to
him from the owner, (a) And if the auctioneer sell the property
of A as the property of B, and the buyer pay the price to B,
the auctioneer cannot recover it of the buyer. (6) It is said, that
after the sale is finished the auctioneer is no longer the agent of

the owner, and a payment to him of the price is not a pay-
* 498 ment to the owner, (c) But where the auctioneer, * by

usage, or on other evidence, can be shown to have authority

(2) Williams v. Millington, 1 H. Bl.
81 ; Coppin v. Walker, 7 Taunt. 237. But
where the person employing the auction-
eer to sell has no right so to do, the auc-
tioneer has no claim upon the property
against the rightful owner, and the pur-
chaser may refuse to pay the auctioneer.
Dickenson v. Naule, 1 Nev. & M. 721.
See ante, p. * 132.

(a) Coppin v. Craig, 7 Taunt. 243.

\b) Coppin v. Walker, 7 Taunt. 237.

(c) Sykes v. Giles, 5 M. & W. 645. In
this case the plaintiff- having employed an
auctioneer to sell certain timber growing
on his estate, the following, among other
conditions, were read at the sale, in the
presence of the defendant : " That each
purchaser should pay down a deposit of
£10 per cent in part of the purchase-
money, and pay the remainder on or he-
fore the 17th of August; but in case any
purchaser should prefer to pay the whole
amount of his purchase-money at an earlier
period, discount after the rate of £5 per
cent will be allowed." Also, " That each
purchaser shall enter into a proper agree-
ment and bond, if required, with such one,
two, or more sureties as shall be approved
by the vendor or his agent for the per-
formance of his agreement, pursuant to
the above conditions." The defendant
became the purchaser of one lot, and paid
the deposit. Some days after the sale,
which was on the 14th of February, the
defendant, at the auctioneer's request,
drew a bill of exchange for the residue of
the purchase-money, dated on the day of
the sale, on one J. M., payable six months
after date to his own order, and indorsed
it to the auctioneer, who, being in difficul-
ties, indorsed it to a third person, to whom
he was indebted, on his own account.
The bill became due on the 1 7th of Au-
gust, when the amount of it was duly
paid to the holder. It was never trans-
ferred to the plaintiff. Held, that under
these circumstances the delivery and pay-
ment of the bill of exchange was not a

528

valid payment of the residue of the pur-
chase-money for the timber purchased by
the defendant, the auctioneer having no
authority to receive payment of such res-
idue, or to take any security for the pay-
ment of it; but tliat, even if he were
authorized by the conditions to receive
payment, the payment required was a pay-
ment in cash, and he had no authority to
take a bill of exchange. Parke, B. :
" The question here is what authority the
auctioneer had. The extent of that au-
thority, in the absence of any proof of
general authority, must depend upon the
conditions of sale. The only authority
given to the auctioneer by these conditions
is to receive the deposit money ; the ven-
dor reserves to himself or his agent the
power to receive the remainder of the pur-
chase-money. As no agent is named for
that purpose, the payment must be to the
principal, or some general agent, which
the auctioneer certainly was not ; for the
word ' agent ' in the sixth condition clearly
docs not refer to him. By the third con-
dition the remainder of the money is to be
paid on or before the 17th of August, but
such payment is not to be to the auction-
eer but to the vendor. Then that part of
the condition which provides that the pur-
chaser may, if he shall prefer it, pay the
whole money at an earlier period, must
also be construed to mean that he shall
pay it to the same person, that is, the ven-
dor or his agent. But even if the auc-
tioneer had had authority to receive the
remainder of the purchase-money, he had
no authority to receive it in this way by
means of a bill of exchange. Cash pay-
ment was intended, and not a bill of ex-
change. My opinion, however, is, that
under the terms of the couditions of sale,
the vendor is to receive the purchase-
money, and not the auctioneer. The gen-
eral rule may be different, but the case
turns on this peculiar construction of the
conditions of the sale."

CH. II.] PURCHASE AND BALE OF REAL PROPERTY. * 498

to receive the money, such payment must discharge the buyer, (i)
It is the duty of the auctioneer to obtain the best price he fairly
can ; to comply with his instructions, unless they would operate
as a fraud ; to pursue the accustomed course of business, and to
possess a competent degree of skill ; and if he fail in either of
these particulars, and damage ensues to the owner, he is respon-
sible therefor, (e)

In the preceding remarks we have given the rules of law appli-
cable to auction sales of personal as well as of real property.
They are the same in both cases, except so far as they are neces-
sarily distinguished by the nature of the property sold.

(d) See Capel v. Thornton, 3 C. & P. (e) See Guerreiro v. Peile, 3 B. & Aid.

352 ; Bunney v. Payntz, 4 B. & Ad. 568. 616; Bexwell v. Christie, Cowp. 395;
The case of Sykes v. Giles, above cited, Russell v. Palmer, 2 Wils. 325.
does not impugn this rule, but turned
upon the special conditions of the sale.

vol. I. 34 529

* 499 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

*499 * CHAPTER III.

HIRING OP REAL PROPERTY.

Sect. I. — Of the Lease.

The hiring of real property is usually effected by means of a
lease, which is a contract, whereby one party — the tenant — has
the possession and profits of the land, and the other party — the
landlord — reserves a rent, which the tenant pays him by way of
compensation.

It is frequently a question whether an instrument is a lease at
once, or only an agreement to make a lease hereafter ; and, if it
be a lease, when by its terms it is to begin, and when to end ;
and whether the tenancy is for years, or from year to year, or at
will, or upon sufferance. But these questions are properly ques-
tions of construction, and so far as they come within the scope of
this work will be considered hereafter, when we treat of Construc-
tion, and of the Statute of Frauds, in our Second Volume.

If a party accepts a lease and occupies the premises, without
signing the lease, he is nevertheless liable for the rent. (<za)

Any general description will suffice to pass the demised prem-
ises, if it be capable of distinct ascertainment and identification.
And certain words, usually employed, as house, farm, land, and
the like, have, if necessary, a very wide meaning, (a) 1 And
where such general and comprehensive terms are employed, all
things usually comprehended within the meaning thereof will
pass, unless the circumstances of the case show very clearly that
the intention of the parties was otherwise, (b) 2 And inaccu-

(aa) Trapnall v. Merrick, 21 Ark. v. Wetherhead, Cro. C. 17 ; Gennings v.

503. Lake, id. 168 ; Kerslake v. White, 2 Stark,

(a) Shep. Touch. 90-92. 508 ; Ongley v. Chambers, 1 Bing. 483,

(6) Doe v. Burt, 1 T. R. 701 ; Bryan 496.

1 If the tract is shown with reasonable certainty, it will pass, though the description
is erroneous in some respects. McLoughlin v. Bishop, 6 Vroom, 512.

2 The grant of thing carries incident, Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N. H. 503 ; as the

530

CH- m-] HIRING OF EEAL PROPERTY.

500

racies as to qualities, names, amounts, Ac, will be rejected, if
there is enough. to make the purposes and intentions of the
* parties certain. (<?) So the granting for hire, of a thing *500
to be used, carries with it all proper appurtenances and
accompaniments which are needed for the proper use and enjoy-
ment of the thing, (d)

SECTION II.

OP THE GENERAL LIABILITIES OP THE LESSOR.

There is an implied covenant on the part of the lessor to put
the lessee into possession, l and that he shall quietly enjoy, (e) 2
But unless the demise be under seal there is no implied covenant
for good title, but only for quiet enjoyment. (/) And an inter-
ruption by a landlord of his tenant's occupation without evict-
ing him, has been held not to suspend the rent, in whole or in

(c) Miller u. Trayers, 1 M. & Scott, Hacket v. Glover, 10 Mod. 142; Shep.
312, 351; Blague v. Gold, Cro. C. 473; Touch. 165; Nokes' case, 4 Rep. 80 b.—
Mason v. Chambers, Cro. J. 31 ; Wrotes- Assumpsit lies against a landlord on his
ley v. Adams, Plowd. 187, 191 ; Windham implied promise to give possession. Coe
i'. Windham, Dyer, 376 b ; Goodtitle v. v. Clay, 3 Mo. & P. 57. And in the ab-
Southern, 1 M. & Sel. 299 ; Doe v. Gallo- sence of any proof to the contrary, the
way, 5 B. & Ad. 43 ; Pirn v. Currell, 6 tenancy under a written agreement be-
M. & W. 234, 269. gins from the day on which the agree-

(d) Shep. Touch. 89 ; Morris o. Edg- ment professes to have been executed,
ington, 3 Taunt. 24, 31 ; Kooystra v. Bishop v. Wraith, 26 E. L. & E. 568 ; Hale
Lucas, 5 B. & Aid. 830; Harding v. Wil- u. City of London, &c. Co. 2 B. & S. 737 ;
son, 2 B. & C. 96. Steel v. Frick, 56 Penn. St. 172.

(e) Line v. Stephenson, 4 Bing. N. C. ( f) Bandy v. Cartwright, 20 E. L. &
678, 5 id. 183 ; Holden v. Taylor, Hob. 12 ; E. 374 ; s. c. 8 Exch. 913.

lease of a ground floor carries the right to have windows overlooking the lessor's yard
unobstructed, Doyle v. Lord, 64 N. Y. 432 ; of a " building " includes land under the
eaves, if belonging to the lessor ; and the erection by him of a wall is an eviction,
Sherman v. Williams, 113 Mass. 481; of "machinery" includes a "blast" on leased
premises, Thropp o. Field, 11 C. E. Green, 82 ; but "adjoining buildings " will not
pass unless particularly described, Ogden v. Jennings, 62 N. Y. 526 ; nor will a lease
of a single room give the exclusive right to the outer wall, Pevey v. Skinner, 116
Mass. 129.

1 Where a former tenant held over without right it was held that a lessee with the
right of possession was not excused from rent in consequence of such holding over.
Field v. Herrick, 101 111. 110.

2 Mack v. Patchin, 42 N. Y. 167. See Milliken e. Thorndike, 103 Mass. 382.
Such an implied covenant means that the lessee shall not be disturbed rightfully in
his possession. Underwood v. Birchard, 47 Vt. 305. Where an express covenant was
for quiet enjoyment free from disturbance by_ the " lessor, his successors or assigns,"
no further covenant as to enjoyment will be implied. Burr r. Stenton, 42 N. Y. 462-
If the lessor's covenant applies to acts of " himself and his heirs and all others claim-
ing under him," the lessor will not be liable for a disturbance by the paramount
title. Dennett r. Atherton, L. R. 7 Q. B. 316. If ousted by a stranger, the tenant's
only remedy is against such stranger. Moore v. Weber, 71 Penn. St. 429.

531

* 501 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

part, (ff) 1 He is not bound to renew, without express cove-
nant, (#) nor are such covenants favored, if they tend to perpe-
tuity, (A)2 but where they are definite and reasonable the law sus-
tains them, (i) A covenant to " renew under the same covenants,"
is satisfied by a renewal which omits the covenant to renew, (j ) 3
But a covenant to renew implies a renewal for the same term and
rent, and, probably, on the same conditions as before, except only
the covenant to renew ; and if it be " to renew on such terms as
may be agreed upon," this is void for uncertainty. (k~) i If there be
a covenant to renew at the election of the lessee, he must make that
election before the lease terminates ; (k¥) and a mere continuance
in possession will not operate as an election to renew. (kl)

* 501 * A landlord is under no implied legal obligation to re-

pair, and it seems to be law on the weight of authority,
that the uninhabitableness of a house is not a good defence to an
action for rent. (I) 5 And if he expressly covenanted to repair, the
tenant cannot quit and discharge himself of the rent because the

Iff) Fuller v. Ruby, 10 Gray, 285. {I) Arden v. Pullen, 10 M. & W. 321;

(g) Lee v. Vernon, 7 Bro. P. C. 432; Hart v. Windsor, 12 id. 68; Izon v. Gor-

Eobertson v. St. John, 2 Bro. Ch. 140. ton, 6 Bing. X. C. 501 ; Gott .•. Gandy,

(A) Baynham v. Guy's Hospital, 3 22 E. L. & E. 173; Moffatt v. Smith, 4

Ves. 295 ; Attorney-General v. Brooke, Comst. 126 ; Banks v. White, 1 Sneed,

18 id. 319, 326. 613; Howard v. Doolittle, 3 Duer, 464 ;

(i) Furnival v. Crew, 3 Atk. 83; Clenes v. Willoughby, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 83;

Cooke o. Booth, Cowp. 819; Willan v. Estep v. Estep, 22 Ind. 114; Robbins v.

Willan, 16 Ves. 72, 84; Sadlier v. Biggs, Mount, 4 Rob. 553. But where a house

27 E. L. & E. 74. had been used as a house of ill-fame, and

(j) Carr v. Ellison, 20 Wend. 178. this was concealed by the lessor and un-

See also Abeel v. Radcliff, 13 Johns. 297. known to the lessee, it was held to be a

But see contra, Bridges v. Hitchcock, 1 defence or a counter-claim to an action

Bro. P. C. 522. for rent. Staples v. Anderson, 3 Rob.

(k) Rutgers v. Hunter, 6 Johns. Ch. 327. See post, ch. on Warranty, p. * 574,

215; Whitlock v. Duffield, 1 Hoff. Ch. n. (d). The cases contra, as" Collins v.

110; Tracy ». Albany Exch. Co. 3 Seld. Barrows, 1 Mo. & Rob. 112; Edwards v.

472. Etherington, 7 Dow. & R. 117 ; Salisbury

(kk) Renoud v. Daskavn, 34 Conn. 512. v. Marshall, 4 C. & P. 65, seemed to be

{kl) Falley v. Giles, 29 Ind. 114. overruled.

1 Bartlett v. Farrington, 120 Mass. 284; Walker v. Shoemaker, 4 Hun, 579.

2 Cunningham v. Pattee, 99 Mass. 248. "To renew and to continue to renew" is
a perpetual covenant, Page )'. Esty, 54 Me. 319; which equitv will enforce, Banks
t'! Haskie, 45 Md. 207. Wee Boyle v. Peabody Heights Co. 46 Md. 623.

8 Brand v. Frumveller, 32 Mich. 215.

4 Pray v. Clark, 113 Mass. 283; Western, &c. Co. v. Lansing, 49 N. Y. 499.

6 Coe v. Vogdes, 71 Penn. St. 383. Contra, Bissell v. Lloyd, 100 111. 214, where it
was held that an agreement by the lessor to keep in repair a particular room implied
that the lessor would repair the residue of the building ; and the lessee, having aban-
doned the premises because of non-repair, was excused from paying rent after such
abandonment. But in case of a furnished house, reasonable fitness for habitation is
an implied condition. Wilson v. Finch Hatton, 2 Ex. I). 336. Infra, i. *589, note (rf).
So in letting land there is no implied covenant that noxious plants will not grow in it.
Erskine v. Adeane, L. R. 8 Ch. 756.

532

CH. III. J HIRING OP REAL PROPERTY. * 502

repairs are not made, unless there is a provision to that effect, (to)
And if a landlord is bound by custom or by express agreement
to repair, this obligation, and the obligation of the tenant to
pay rent, are, it seems, independent of each other, so that the
refusal or neglect of the landlord to repair is no answer to a
demand for rent, (n) It would seem from the authorities above
cited, to be the law in England, that a tenant is justified in
avoiding his lease, only by a positive wrong on the part of his
landlord; as by erroneous or fraudulent misdescription of the
premises, or their being made uninhabitable by the landlord, (o)
It is there held, that if the lessor knows that his house is in a
ruinous condition, and that the lessee is ignorant of this, he is
not bound to declare its condition to the lessee". It is said, how-
ever, that he must do this if he knows that the lessee takes the
house because he believes it to be sound and habitable, or if the
concealment will amount to a deceit, (p ) But it would be diffi-
cult to suppose a case to which these exceptions, at least in their
substance, are not applicable. (q~)

It has been very properly decided in New York Court of
Common Pleas, that a landlord is liable in damages if he suffers
a chimney on the premises he has demised to remain in a ruinous
condition, and by its fall it injures his tenant's property, (qq)

* SECTION III. *502

OF THE GENERAL LIABILITY AND OBLIGATION OF THE TENANT.

The words "reserving," or "yielding," or "paying," a rent, or
any phraseology distinctly showing the intention of the parties
that rent should be paid, imply a covenant or a promise on the
part of the lessee to pay the same, although the words import no
promise. And he is liable for an action either for non-payment

(m) Surplice v. Farnsworth, 7 Man. & (p) Keates u. Earl Cadogan, 10 C. B.

G' fjf Bro Abr Dette pi. 18; 27 H. 6, ' (?) Libbey v. Telford, 48 Me. 316,

10 1 Dl 6 See also the reporter's note to held, that in a lease of a store here is

8u^.!a^ortOTan.*Q.678 no impUe d warranty that the bu] dmg.s

to) See Surplice v. Farnsworth, 7 safe, well-built, or fit for any particular

Man.& G. 576; Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. purpose

& W 68- Sutton v. Temple, id. 52; (qq) Eagle v. Swayze, 2 Daly, 200.
Arden v. Pullen, 10 id. 321.

* 503 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

of rent, or for refusing to take possession, (r) But a failure to
pay rent does not forfeit the lease, without express agreement to
that effect, (rr) l He is not bound to pay the taxes, unless he
agrees to ; but the agreement may be indirect and constructive ;
as if he agrees to pay the rent " free from all taxes, charges, or
impositions," (s) or even to pay a " net rent ; " (<) or any other
language is used, distinctly showing that this burden was to be
cast upon the tenant. And where a lessee of a part of a building
covenanted to pay taxes, he was held to pay his proportion of the
taxes assessed on the whole building, a usage to that effect being
shown to exist in that locality, (tt) 2

The time when the rent is due depends upon the terms of the
contract ; and, if this were silent, the time would depend upon
statutory provision, if any there were, and in the absence of such
provision, upon the usage of the country. Whenever it is due, if
no place of payment is fixed by the contract, and there is a clause
of re-entry and forfeiture in case of non-payment, a readiness to
pay upon the land would be necessary to prevent a forfeiture, and
as the law could not in such a case compel a tenant to seek the
landlord off the land to pay the rent, and at the same time be
ready upon the land with the money to prevent a forfeiture, it
would seem that a readiness to pay upon the land would also be
a good plea of tender in an action for the rent, (w) although the
tenant might, if he chose, make a personal tender which

* 503 would be good. (y~) But we hold, with the latest * English

authority, that if there be no clause of forfeiture in the
lease, the tenant must seek the landlord and tender the rent as in
other cases, in order to prevent the landlord from recovering the
costs of an action ; (w) although the American cases lead to a
different conclusion. (x~) And a tender of rent on the day it fell
due, although at a late hour in the evening, has been held

(r) See Piatt on Covenants, 50. The (t) Bennett v. Womack, 3 C. & P. 96 ;

learned author of this treatise maintains, 8. c. 7 B. & C. 627.

however, with great ability and learning, (tt) Codman v. Hall, 9 Allen, 335.

that an action of covenant will lie in such (?/) Haldane v. Johnson, 20 E. L. & E.

case only when the lease is made by in- 498 ; s. c. 8 Exch. 689.

denture executed by the lessee. (v) Hunter v. Le Conte, 6 Cowen, 728.

(rr) Brown v. Bragg, 22 Ind. 122. \w) Haldane ?•. Johnson, 20 E. L. & E.

(s) Bradbury c Wright, Dougl. 624. 498; s. c. 8 Exch. 689.

But see contra, Cranston v. Clarke, Sayer, (x) Hunter v. Le Conte, 6 Cowen, 728 ;

78. Walter v. Dewey, 16 Johns. 222.

1 Brand v. Frumveller, 32 Mich. 215. 2 Amory v. Melvin, 112 Mass. 83.

534

CH. III.] HIEING OP REAL PROPERTY. * 503

good. («/) Most leases now made in this country contain a
clause of forfeiture for non-payment, giving to the lessor the right
to re-enter thereupon, and to repossess himself absolutely of the
premises. This provision is expressed in various ways, but it is
substantially the same everywhere. It must be remembered,
however, that the law is exact, and indeed punctilious, as to the
exercise of this right of re-entry. It may be said, in general, that
a demand must be made for the rent due, and of the precise sum,
on the very day on which it becomes due, and at a convenient
time before sunset, and at the very place where it is payable, if
one be prescribed, and otherwise at the most conspicuous or noto-
rious place on the premises leased. (2)

A landlord who without demanding rent the day it is due, or
then entering, and without giving due notice, subsequently enters
upon land held by a tenant at will, is a trespasser, (zz)

A lessee for years holding over though only to remove his
goods, is held to become thereby a tenant from year to year, and
must give six months' notice to determine his tenancy, (za) 1

A tenant is not bound to make repairs without an express
agreement. Such is the general rule, sometimes asserted quite
strongly. (zb~) But, from the weight of authority, and the prevail-
ing usage, we should say that the tenant must make such repairs
as are made necessary by his use of the house, and are required
to keep the premises in tenantable condition. And even if an
accident occur without his having anything to do with it, as if a
window were broken, or slates cast from the roof, he must repair,
if serious injury will obviously result in case the accident be left
without repair, (a) 2 In general, an outgoing tenant must leave
the premises wind and water tight, but is not bound to any
ornamental repair, as painting, papering, &c, although so broad
a covenant on his part as "to leave the premises in good and

{y) Thomas v. Hayden, cited in Per- (zb) Brewster v. De Fremery, 33 Cal.

kins v. Dana, 19 Vt. 689. 341.

(z) Van Rensselaer v. Jewett, 2 Comst. (a) Ferguson v. , 2 Esp. 690 ;

135, 141 ; Jones v. Reed, 16 N. H. 68. In Gibson v. Wells, 4 B. & P. 290 ; Pomfret

the latter case it is said that the demand v. Ricroft, 1 Wms. Saund. 323 b, n. (7) ;

must be made in the afternoon. Horsefall v. Mather, Holt, 7 ; Auworth v.

[zz) Cunningham v. Holton, 55 Me. 33. Johnson, 6 C. & P. 239; Torriano v.

\za) Witt v. Mayor, &c. of New York, Young, 6 id. 8 ; Libbey v. Tolford, 48

6 Rob. 441. Me. 316.

1 A lessee from year to year holding over becomes a trespasser or continues to be a
tenant, as the landlord elects. Clinton Wire Cloth Co. v. Gardner, 99 111. 151.

2 U. S. v. Bostwick, 94 U. S. 53 ; Miller v. Shields, 55 Ind. 71.

535

* 504 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

sufficient repair, order, and condition," might cover these re-
pairs. (6) x But if he expressly agrees to keep the prem-

* 504 ises * in repair, and to deliver them up in good repair, he

is not justified in permitting them to remain out of repair
by the fact that they were so when he received them, (c) 2 If the
landlord is under no obligation to repair, and the tenant volun-
tarily makes them, the landlord is not bound to repay him the
expense ; (<T) 3 but there would be a sufficient consideration to
sustain a subsequent promise by the landlord. If there be an
express and unconditional agreement to repair, or to redeliver in
good order, or to keep in good repair, the tenant is bound to do
this, even though the premises are destroyed by fire, so that he is
in fact compelled to rebuild them, (e)4 but not if destroyed by the
act of God or the public enemies. (/) It is, therefore, now usual,
in well-drawn leases, to add to the covenant obliging the tenant
to repair and redeliver in good order, an exception, " unless the
premises are injured or destroyed by fire or inevitable accident."
It is held that where the lease stipulates that if the house be
burned down the rent shall cease, such a contingency determines
the lease, and the landlord may take possession, (ff) Where
the tenant contracts to repair, there is no implied promise to use
premises in a tenant-like manner, (<?) but such tenant is liable to
third parties for damages resulting from the ruinous state of the

(ft) Wise v. Metcalf, 10 B. & C. 312. See also Mantz v. Goring, 4 Bing. N. C.

But a declaration stating, that in consid- 451 ; Burdett v. Withers, 7 A. & E. 3C ;

eration that the defendant had become Belcher v. Mcintosh, 2 Man. & R. 186.

tenant to the plaintiff of a farm, the de- (d) Mumford v. Bowen, 6 Cowen, 475.

fendant undertook to make a certain (e) 40 Ed. 3, 6, pi. 11 ; Paradine v.

quantity of fallow, and to spend £00 Jane, Aleyn, 27 ; Bullock v. Dommitt,

worth of manure every year thereon, and 6 T. R. 050 ; Brecknock Canal Co. c.

to keep the buildings in repair, was held Pritchard, 6 T. R. 750 ; In re Skingley,

bad on general demurrer ; those obliga- 3 E. L. & E. 91 ; Allen v. Culver, 3 Denio,

tions not arising out of the bare relation 284; Spence v. Chadwick, 10 Q. B. 517,

of landlord and tenant. Brown v. Crump, 530; Phillips v. Stevens, 16 Mass. 23b;

1 Marsh. 567. See also Granger v. Col- Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63.

lins, 6 M. & W. 458; Jackson v. Cobbin, (/") Bayley v. Lawrence, 1 Bay, 409;

8 id- 790. Pollard v. Shaaffer, 1 Dallas, 210. See

(c) Payne v. Haine, 16 M. & W. 541. Proctor v. Keith, 12 B. Mon. 262.

But the age and character of the prem- (ff) Buschman «. Wilson, 29 Md.

ises must be considered in determining 553.

the proper extent of the repairs. Id. (g) Standen v. Christen, 10 Q. B. 35.

1 As to leaving rubbish on the premises, see Thorndike v. Burrage, 111 Mass. 531.

2 He must leave in as good condition as can be done without changing form or
material. Ardesco Oil Co. e. Richardson, 63 Penn. St. 162.

3 Witty v. Matthews, 52 N. Y. 512 ; Colbeck v. Girdlers Co. 1 Q. B. D. 234 ; as on
a hotel, Morris r. Tillson, 81 111. 607 ; water-works, Skillen v. Water-works, 49 Ind.
193; or salt-works, Clark v. Babeock, 23 Mich. 164.

4 Nor is it the landlord's duty to alter, for the convenience or safety of the tenant's
employees. Ryan v. Wilson, 87 N. Y. 471.

536

CH. HI.] HIRING OP REAL PROPERTY. * 505

premises ; and the landlord is not, if the premises were in good
order when leased. (/*) J But the tenant is not made liable by
this agreement forgets done before the execution of the inden-
ture, although its habendum states that the premises are to be
held from a day prior to the day of the execution, (i) And an
underlessee, with covenants to repair, is liable to his immediate
landlord only for such damages as result directly from the
breach of his * own contract ; and not for such as the owner * 505
may recover from the mesne landlord. (/) 2

The tenant of a farm is bound, without express covenants, to
manage and cultivate the same in such manner as may be required
by good husbandry and the usual course of management of such
farms in that vicinity. And if he fails to do so, assumpsit may
be maintained on the breach of the implied promise. (&) If he be
tenant for years, he may cut on the land a reasonable quantity of
wood for fires and repairs, (kk~)

It is no answer to a demand for rent that the premises are not
in a fit and proper state and condition for the purposes for which
they are hired. (Z) s If, therefore, the premises are burned down,
and the tenant is under no obligation to rebuild (not having
agreed to keep in repair), or are destroyed by the act of God or
the public enemies, yet he is bound to pay rent thereafter, (m)

(h) Bears v. Ambler, 9 Penn. St. 193. G. 576 ; Harrison v. Lord North, 1 Ch.

(i) Shaw v. Kay, 1 Exch. 412. Cas. 83.

0') Logan v. Hall, 4 C. B. 598; (m) Pollard v. Shaaffer, 1 Dallas, 210 ;

Walker v. Hatton, 10 M. & W. 249 ; Pen- Niedelet v. Wales, 16 Mo. 214 ; Fowler v.

ley v. Watts, 7 id. 601. But see contra, Bott, 6 Mass. 62 ; Lemott v. Skerrett, 1

Neale v. Wyllie, 3 B. & C. 533. Har. & J. 42 ; Wagner v. White, 4 Har.

(h) Powley v. Walker, 5 T. R. 373 ; & J. 546 ; Redding v. Hall, 1 Bibb, 536.

Beale v. Sanders, 3 Bing. N. C. 850; But see Wood v. Hubbell, 5 Barb. 601,

Brown v. Crump, 1 Marsh. 567. See also where the buildings were burned after

Wigglesworth v. Dallison, Dougl. 201 ; the lease was executed but before the

Legh v. Hewitt, 4 East, 154 ; Senior v. term began, or the lessee took possession ;

Armytage, Holt, 197 ; Gough v. Howard, and he was held not liable for rent. And

Peake, Ad. Cas. 197; Dalby v. Hirst, 1 in Warner v. Hitchins, 5 Barb. 66, where

Br. & B. 224, 3 Moore, 536 ; Angerstein the premises were burned down during

v. Hanson, 1 C. M. & R. 789 ; Hutton v. the term, it was held that the lessee was

Warren, 1 M. & W. 466 ; Halifax v. not bound to rebuild, because there was

Chambers, 4 id. 663; Lewis v. Jones, 17 no covenant to repair or rebuild, although

Penn. St. 262. there was a covenant to return the prem-

(kk) Hubbard v. Shaw, 12 Allen, 120. ises in the same condition as taken, and

(l) Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. & W. natural wear excepted. See Graves v.

68 ; Surplice v. Farnsworth, 7 Man. & Berden, 26 N. Y. 498.

1 Hoy v. Holt, 91 Penn. St. 88. As where a clause was to " keep in repair and leave
as found." Ely v. Elv, 80 111. 532

2 See Williams v. Williams, L. R. 9 C. P. 659.

8 A tenant is still liable on an express covenant, though the lessor has collected
insurance money and refuses to rebuild, Bussman ;■. Ganster, 72 Penn. St. 285 ; and
his guarantor is equally bound, Kingsbury v. Westfall, 61 N. Y. 356 ; and rent paid in
advance cannot be recovered back, Diamond v. Harris, 33 Tex. 634.

537

* 506 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

unless, as is now frequently done in this country, the lease con-
tains a provision, that the rent shall cease or proportionally abate
while the premises remain wholly or in part unfit for use. 1

In the absence of express agreement to repair, the lessee is
not bound to rebuild a house, which has been burned through the
negligence and folly of his own servants, (n)

A lessee may assign over the whole or a part of his term in

the premises.2 If he parts with the whole of his interest it is an

assignment ; if with less than the whole it is an underleasing,

leaving a reversion in the original lessee. An underlease

* 506 is not * a breach of a covenant " not to assign, transfer, or

set over " the premises, or the lease, or the interest or estate
of the lessee ; (o) 3 but if there be added to the covenant the
words " or any part thereof," it is equally a breach, to underlet
or to assign. The assignment must be of the whole term, to
make the assignee tenant of the lessor ; hence where the last day
of the term was reserved by the lessee, the assignee was liable to
him and not to the lessor. (00) By such breach the original lessee
becomes liable for damages ; but the lease is not terminated, or
the interest of the sub-lessee destroyed, unless the original lease
is made on condition that there shall be no assignment, nor un-
derleasing ; or provides that the original lessor may, upon any

(n) McKenzie v. McLeod, 10 Bing. ter, 8 T. R. 57. But it is otherwise if the

385. assignment is the voluntary act of the ten-

(o) Crusoe v. Bugby, 2 W. Bl. 766 ; ant. Doe v. Carter, 8 T.'R. 57, 300; Doe

8. c. 3 Wils. 234 ; Kinnersley v. Orpe, v. Hawke, 2 East, 481. It would seem,

Dougl. 56; Church v. Brown, 15 Ves. therefore, that taking the benefit of an

258,265. — But a covenant against imc?er- insolvent law would be a breach of the

letting will restrain the alienation by as- covenant. See Shee v. Hale, 13 Ves. 404.

signment. Greenway v. Adams, 12 Ves. And if the lease is made subject to a con-

395. — Letting lodgings is not a breach dition that the premises shall be actually

of covenant not to underlet. Doe v. occupied by the lessee, the lease will of

Laming, 4 Camp. 73. — And an assign- course determine whenever the condition

ment by operation of law is no breach of is broken, whether it be by the voluntary

a covenant not to assign ; as in a case of act of the party or by operation of law.

bankruptcy, or where the term is taken Doe v. Clarke, 8 East, 185.
on execution by a creditor. Doe v. Car- (oo) Davis v. Morris, 36 N. Y. 569.

1 A tenant should provide for suspension of rent during the time premises are unin-
habitable by fire or other casualty, Minot v. Joy, 118 Mass. 308 ; and it will apply to
rent paid in advance, Rich p. Smith, 121 Mass. 328; but not to gradual decay, Hatch
c. Stamper, 42 Conn. 28; unless the result of fire, Cary v. "Whiting, 118 Mass. 363.
An oral stipulation is insufficient. Martin v. Berens, 67 Penn. St. 459 ; but see JPhyfe
r. Eimer, 45 N. Y. 102. The bursting of boiler is such a casualty. Phillips v. Sun,
&c. Co. 10 R. I. 458.

2 If consent to assign is not to be arbitrarily withheld, an unreasonable refusal gives
the lessee such a right. Treloar i\ Bigge, L. R. 9 Ex. 151.

8 Eten a. Luyster, 60 N. Y. 252; Shaw v. Farnsworth, 108 Mass. 357. That a
covenant against underletting will not prevent an assignment, see Field v. Mills,
4 Vroom, 254 ; Bemis v. Wilder, 100 Mass. 446.

538

CH. III. J HIRING OF REAL PROPERTY. * 507

assignment or underleasing, enter and expel the lessee or his
assigns, and terminate the lease. If the lessees be a copartner-
ship, a change in the partners by withdrawal or addition is not
a breach of the covenant not to underlet, (op) 1 In a recent
English case the underlessee of a tenant who had covenanted not
to carry on a certain trade, was restrained from carrying on that
trade, (oq)

A distinction formerly prevailed between a proviso declaring
that the lease should be void on a specified event, and a proviso
enabling the lessor to determine it by re-entry ; and it was held,
that in the former case the lease became absolutely void on the
event named, and was incapable of being restored by acceptance
of rent, or other act of intended confirmation ; while in the latter,
some act, such as entry or claim, must have been performed by
the lessor to manifest his intention to end the demise, which was
voidable in the interval, and consequently confirmable. This dis-
tinction, however, is now exploded ; and it is held that the lease
is voidable only at the election of the lessor, but not of the lessee,
though the proviso expressly declare that it shall be void, (p)2
And any act will be a waiver of the forfeiture, which is a distinct
and voluntary recognition of the lease by the lessor, with a full
knowledge of the forfeiture ; as by taking rent, &c. (5) 3
Whether a mere demand of * subsequent rent is a waiver * 507
is not so certain, (r) A waiver of the forfeiture for one
breach does not prevent the lessor from insisting on the forfeit-
ure for another, (s) The sub-lessee is not liable to the original
lessor, there being no privity between them. But if the whole
term and interest be assigned by the termor, the assignee — who
is not a sub-lessee, as there is no reversion in the termor — is

(op) Roosevelt v. Hopkins, 33 N. Y. 81. v. Birch, 1M.&W. 402 ; Doe v. Rees, 4

(oq) Clements v. Wells, Law Rep. 1 Eq. Bing. N. C. 384 ; Arnsby v. Woodward, 6

403. B. & C. 509; Harvie v. Oswel, Cro. E.

(p) See Piatt on Leases, vol. ii. p. 327 ; 572 ; Goodright v. Davids, 2 Cowp. 803 ;

1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 19; and Taylor, Land- Garnham v. Finney, 40 Mo. 449. But see

lord and Tenant (7th ed.), § 492, where Importer's Ins Co. v. Christie, 5 Rob. 169.
this point is fully considered, and cases (r) Doe !'. Birch, 1 M. & W. 406.

cited. (s) Doe v. Bliss, 4 Taunt. 735 ; Doe v.

(q) Roe v. Harrison, 2 T. R. 425; Doe Woodbridge, 9 B. & C. 37G.

1 See Varley v. Coppard, L. R. 7 C. P. 505, to the effect that an express assign-
ment, on dissolution, by a partner to his copartner was a breach.

2 But where a lease is to terminate on a sale by the lessor,' it becomes absolutely
void thereby. Morton v. Weir, 70 N. Y. 247. See Rogers v. Snow, 118 Mass. 118.

3 Walrond v. Hawkins, L. R. 10 C. P. 342 ; Murray v. Harway, 56 N. Y. 337 ;
Clifford v. Reilly, Ir. R. 4 C. L. 218.

539

* 508 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

now liable to the original lessor for rent, by reason of his privity
of estate. (()

Where the letting is in the alternative, as for two, four, or
eight years, the tenant may determine the tenancy at either of
these perM^^By a proper notice, unless it be expressly agreed
otherwisj^\w)

A tenant may not dispute his landlord's title ; for he is es-
topped from changing, by his own act, the character and effect
of his tenure, (w) 1 And wherever a tenant disclaims his tenure,
or denies his landlord's title, or claims adversely to him, or
attorns to another as having title against him, he forfeits his
estate. But where the lease was obtained by the fraud of the
landlord, the tenant may now defend against an action brought
on the lease, by impeaching the landlord's title, (w) 2 It has
been held, however, that this fraud must be practised directly
against the tenant ; and is not enough that the landlord's title is
fraudulent as against other parties, against the creditors of the
actual owner, for example. The landlord may enter at once,
and bring ejectment for the forfeiture. But this is a

* 508 disclaimer * of the lease by the landlord, who cannot

thereafter take any advantage from the tenancy, (x) But a

{t) Stevenson v. Lambard, 2 East, 575. reporter ; Willison v. Watkins, 3 Pet. 43 ;

See also ante, p. * 231, and note (s). Doe v. Heath, 13 Ired. L. 498; Fussel-

(m) Dann v. Spurrier, 3 B. & P. 399; man v. Worthington, 14 111. 135; Pierce
Goodright v. Richardson, 3 T. R. 462. v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 470. But see Mount-
Where a house was leased at a certain ney v. Collier, 10 E. L. & E. 232 ; s. c. 1
rent, " to be paid quarterly, or half quar- E. & B. 030 ; Den >•. Ashmore, 2 N. J. 261 ;
terly if required," and the tenant entered Shultz v. Elliott, 11 Humph. 183; Funk's
and paid his rent quarterly for one year, Lessee e Kincaid, 5 Md. 404.
after which the landlord, without previ- (w) Hamilton v. Marsden, 6 Binn. 45;
ous demand or notice, distrained for half Baskini'. Seechrist,6Penn.St. 154; Brown
a quarter's rent, alleged to be then due, v. Dysingcr, 1 Rawle, 408 ; Miller v. Mc-
it was held, that he had no right so to Brier, 14 S. & R. 382.
do, but must give previous notice of his (?) Greeno v. Munson, 9 Vt. 37 ; Hall
election. Mallam v. Arden, 10 Bing. v. Dewey, 10 id. 593 ; Carpenter v. Thomp-
299. son, 3 N. H. 204; Blake v. Howe, 1 Aik.

(») Doe v. Barton, 11 A. & E. 307 ; 306; Lord v. Bigelow, 8 Vt. 445; Doe v.

Fleming v. Gooding, 10 Bing. 549 ; Doe Whittick, Gow, 195 ; Doe v. Frowd, 4

v. Smythe, 4 M. & Sel. 347 ; Alchorne v. Bing. 557 ; Doe v. Grubb, 10 B. & C. 810 ;

Gomme, 2 Bing. 54 ; Gravenor v. Wood- Doe v. Pittman, 2 Nev. & M. 673 ; Doe v.

house, 7 J. B. Moore, 289 ; Parry r. House, Long, 9 C. & P. 773 ; Doe v. Evans, 9 M.

Holt, 489, and the learned note by the & W. 48.

1 As hy buying in an outstanding title. Ryerson v. Eldred, 18 Mich. 12 ; Ronaldson
v. Tabor, 43 Ga. 230. So of a tenant holding over, Bonney r. Foss, 62 Me. 248 ; of a
tenant's assignee, Hardin e. Forsythe, 99 HI. 312 ; Stagg r. Eureka Co. 56 Mo. 317 ;
of an owner in fee, Campbell r. Shipley, 41 Md. 81 ; if iii possession, Lucas v. Brooks,
18 Wall. 436; Prevot v. Lawrence, 51 N. Y. 219.

2 Must be practised on the tenant, Wyoming Co. i\ Price, 81 Penn. St. 156;
Wilborn v. Whitfield, 44 Ga. 51 ; and deceive Mm, Camarillo r. Fenlon, 49 Cal. 202.
See Jenckes v. Cook, 9 R. I. 520 ; Evans v. Bidwell, 76 Penn. St. 497 ; Higgins v.
Turner, 61 Mo. 249.

540

CH> ni-] HIEING OF REAL PROPERTY. * 508

disclaimer by a tenant will work a forfeiture only when it
amounts to a renunciation of his character as a tenant, which
may be either by setting up a title in another or claiming title in
himself, (jf) A refusal to pay rent, together with a request for
further information as to the landlord's title, or a delay until
conflicting claims are settled, seem not to be sufficient to work a
forfeiture. (2) And while a tenant may not dispute his land-
lord's title, he may show that it has terminated ; (zz) J and evic-
tion under paramount title is a defence to the tenant, (zd) Nor
is a tenant estopped from denying his landlord's title after he has
surrendered his possession. (zJ) And he must make this surren-
der before he can assert rights against the landlord, acquired by
the tenant after his tenancy began, (ze)

The payment of rent admits, primd facie, a tenancy by impli-
cation; (a) but this inference may be prevented and the evi-
dence rebutted by showing that the payment was made under a
mistake. (6) 2

It was always admitted, that an actual expulsion of the tenant,
by the lessor, suspended the rent ; (<?) 3 but it was also held, that
no conduct of the lessor, however offensive, if it were less than
expulsion, affected the obligation of rent, (d) But this rule of
law has been essentially modified. It seems to be now settled, at
least in this country, that a lessor, by conduct of extreme outrage
and indecency, is barred from his action for rent, (e) And if the

(y) Doe v. Cooper, 1 Man. & G. 135. (b) Claridge v. Mackenzie, 4 Man. & G.

And see Elliott v. Smith, 23 Penn. St. 131. 143 ; Doe v. Barton, 11 A. & E. 307 ; Doe

(z) Doe v. Cawdor, 1 C. M. & R. 398; v. Brown, 7 A. & E. 447.
Doe v. Stanion, 1 M. & W. 695 ; Doe o. (c) Salmon v. Smith, 1 Wms. Saund.

Pasquali, Peake, Cas. 196. 202, 204, n. (2) ; Co. Litt. 148 b ; As-

(zz) 18 N. H. 222. cough's case, 9 Rep. 135 ; Pendleton c.

(za) Moffat v. Strong, 9 Bosw. 57. Dyett, 4 Cowen, 581; Bennett v. Bittle,

(zb) Zimmerman v. Marchland, 23 Ind. i Rawle, 339 ; Page v. Parr, Styles, 432.
474. (d) See the cases in the last note.

(zc) Brown v. Keller, 32 111. 151. (e) Ogilvie v. Hull, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 52;

(a) Gouldsworth v. Knights, 11 M. & Pendleton it. Dyett, 8 Cowen, 727, revers-

W. 337 ; Ponner v. Duplock, 2 Bing. 10. ing the same case in 4 Cowen, 581.

1 As by eviction or judicial sale, Duff v. Wilson, 69 Penn. St. 316; Lancashire v.
Mason, 75 N. C. 455; or by mortgage foreclosure, Ryder i>. Mansell, 66 Me. 167;
Ramsdell v. Maxwell, 32 Mich. 285 ; as then the lessor's right to sue him ceases, St.
John v. Quitzlow, 72 111. 334 ; Silvey v. Sumner, 61 Mo. 253 ; or if the lessor's wife,
in whose right he was seized, dies, Lamson v. Clarkson, 113 Mass. 348. A tenant
may also show that the purport and effect of the lease was entirely misapprehended.
Wiggin o. Wiggin, 58 N. H. 235.

2 Anderson v. Smith, 63 111. 126.

8 An entry without eviction is a mere trespass. Bartlett v. Farrington, 120 Mass.
284. So an entry to put up a, sign "to let. Oastler v. Henderson, 2 Q. B. Dt 575;
Pier v. Carr, 69 Penn. St. 326. See Colburn v. Morrill, 117 Mass. 262.

541

* 509 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

lessee proves an interference with his beneficial enjoyment of the
premises, which is material, and intentional, this would be a
defence against such an action. (/) * But the interference must
be deliberate and intentional, and only by the landlord himself,
and not by another tenant, or other person. (</)

* 509 * If a landlord oust his tenant from any part of the

demised premises, the tenant may surrender to him the
rest, and be no further liable for rent, (h) 2

As it is the duty of the tenant to surrender the premises to his
landlord when the tenancy expires, if a stranger intrude the
tenant should take legal means to recover possession, that he
may at the proper time surrender the premises. And until the
tenant restores full and complete possession to the landlord he is
liable for his rent. (hK) 3

It has been held in England that when on a regular notice to
quit, the tenant duly quitted the premises and removed his goods,
his accidental retaining of the key for a few days will not make
him liable for the rent of another quarter, (hi)

If a landlord has gained peaceable possession of a part of the
premises on the termination of the lease, he may use necessary
force for acquiring possession of the remainder. (A/) 4

To offer a surrender before the lease terminates, there must be
a mutual agreement between lessor and lessee ; but this agree-
ment need not be express, and may be inferred from the conduct
of the parties, (M)

(/) Cohen v. Dupont, 1 Sandf. 260; (hh) Schilling!). Holmes, 23 Cal. 227.

Gilliooley v. Washington, 4 Comst. 217; (/"') Gray r. Bompas, 11 C. B. (n. s.)

Jackson v. Eddy, 12 Mo. 209; Chris to- 520.
pher v. Austin, 1 Kern. 216. (A/) Mugford o. Richardson, 6 Allen,

(g) Gilliooley v. Washington, 4 Comst. 76.
217. (hk) Bedford v. Terhune, 3 N. Y.

(h) Smith v. Raleigh, 3 Camp. 613; 453.
Briggs v. Hall, 4 Leigh, 484.

i
■Ifa lessor's acts merely diminish the beneficial enjoyment, the tenant must aban-
don or continue to pay rent, De Witt v. Rierson, 112 Mass. 8 ; as where the lessdr of a
distillery refused to give the lessee a United States certificate, Grabenhorst v. Nico-
demus, 42 Md. 236 ; or the lessor's adjoining cellar was a nuisance, Alger v. Kennedy,
49 Vt. 109. See Scott v. Simons, 54 N. H. 426.

2 Rent is merely suspended until restoration of that part. Colburn v. Morrill, 117
Mass. 2G2 ; Hayner r. Smith, 63 111. 430 ; Skaggs v. Emerson, 50 Cal. 3. If the lessor
uses unreserved privileges he cannot collect rent therefor. Townsend v. Nickerson,
&c. Co. 117 Mass. 501.

3 Where a statutory notice of intention to quit is required, and the landlord refuses
to accept possession after the tenant's abandonment, the tenant continues to be liable
for rent until such notice is given. Rollins v. Moody, 72 Me. 135.

4 See Stearns v. Sampson, 59 Me. 568.

542

CH. HI.] HIEING OP REAL PROPERTY. * 509

SECTION IV.

OF SURRENDER OP LEASES BY OPERATION OF LAW.

Such surrender takes place when the lessee does something
incompatible with the lease, and the lessor assents or co-oper-
ates.1 As if the lessor gives and the lessee accepts a new valid
lease, (i) There is, perhaps, no better definition of the acts
which make a surrender in law, than to say, that they are such
acts, as in contemplation of law, are acts of notoriety ; as formal
and solemn as the execution of a deed, or livery, entry, and
acceptance of an estate, (j) The surrender may be by substitut-
ing a new lease between the same parties, as we have seen, or a
new lessee instead of the old one. (/c) But the mere agreement
for substitution is not enough ; there must be an actual change of
possession, and an actual reception by the lessor of the new
tenant in the stead of the old one ; (I) otherwise the new tenant is
but the assignee or sub-lessee of the old one. Or it may be a
surrender and abandonment of the premises to the landlord,
he accepting the same, and no new contract substituted, (m)

(i) Lyon v. Reed, 13 M. & W. 285 ; (I) Graham v. Whichelow, 1 Cr. & M.

Doe v. Pole, 11 Q. B. 713. 188 ; Taylor v. Chapman, Peake, Ad. Cas.

(?) Parke, B., Lyon v. Reed, 13 M. & 19. See also McDonnell v. Pope, 13 E.

W. 309 ; Co. Lit. 352 a. See also Crow- L. & E. 11 ; Barlow v. Wainwright, 22

ley v. Vitty, 9E. L. &E. 501; s. c. 7Exch. Vt. 88.

319. (?«) Reeve v. Bird, 1 C. M & R. 31.

(£) Stone v. Whiting, 2 Stark. 235; In Grimman v. Legge, 8 B. & C. 324, A.

Thomas v. Cook, 2 Stark. 408 ; s. c. 2 demised to B. the first and second floor

B. & Aid. 119 ; Lyon v. Reed, 13 M. & W. of a house for a year, at a rent payable

285 ; Doe v. Wood, 14 M. & W. 682 ; Nick- quarterly. During a current quarter,

ells v. Atherstone, 10 Q. B. 944; Whitney some dispute arising between the parties,

v. Meyers, 1 Direr, 266. B. told A. that she would quit immedi-

1 A written lease may be surrendered by abandonment with the landlord's assent
and reletting, Stobie v. Dills, 62 111. 432 ; so by an underletting and acceptance of
the sub-tenant by the landlord, and the collecting of rent from the latter, AmOry v.
Kannoffsky, 117 Mass. 357; so the receiving the key of the premises and the put-
ting another tenant in, Hanham v. Sherman, 114 Mass. 19; so where the tenant sur-
renders, and a sub-tenant, who had offered to surrender, quits the premises, Pratt
v. Richards, &c. Co. 69 Perm. St. 53. The delivery of the keys to, and negotiations
by the lessor with, a third party are evidence of surrender, Hill v. Robinson, 23
Mich. 244 ; but if the tenant abandons and hands the key to the landlord, who
puts up a notice " to let " and makes repairs, it is no surrender, Oastler v. Henderson,
2 Q. B. D. 575 ; Pier v. Carr, 69 Penn. St. 326. As to the liability of retiring part-
ner, see Beall v. White, 94 U. S. 382. In Kinsey v. Minnick, 43 Md. 112, held, that
after a change of partners, surrender at the term end is presumed. See Mellor v.
Watkins, L. B. 9 Q. B. 400, as to surrender affecting third persons. A surety for rent
is not discharged by a surrender. Kingsbury v. Westfall, 61 N. Y. 356.

543

* 510 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

* 510 An acceptance of rent, by the lessor from a third * party,

is primd facie only an acceptance of rent paid by the lessee
through an agent ; (w) but if this presumption be rebutted by
facts going to show that the landlord had given up the lessee, and
had nothing more to do with him, and treated the new occupant
as his lessee, this will amount to a surrender. For the landlord
cannot hold both as his lessees, (o)

SECTION V.

OP AWAY-GOING CROPS.

A tenant whose estate is terminated by an uncertain event
which he could neither foresee nor control, is entitled to the
annual crop which he sowed while his estate continued, by the
law of emblements. But a tenant for years knows when his lease
will expire. Nevertheless he has usually some right to the crop
he sowed, and to so much possession of the land as may be neces-
sary to getting in the crop ; but this right must depend either on
agreement or on usage. At common law he has no such right, (p) x
The local usages of this country, in this respect, vary very much,
and are not often distinctly defined or well established. Thus,
there is some uncertainty as to the property in the manure of a

ately. The latter answered, she might 201. See also Griffiths u. Puleston, 13 M.

go when she pleased. B. quitted, and A. & W. 358 ; Strickland p. Maxwell, 2 Cr.

accepted possession of the apartments : & M. 539 ; Boraston r. Green, 16 East, 71 ;

Held, that A. could neither recover the Davis v. Cannop, 1 Price, 53 ; Beavan c.

rent, which, by virtue of the original con- Delahav, 1 H. Bl. 5 ; Knight v. Banett, 3

tract, would have become due at the ex- Bing. 364; Hutton v. Warren, 1 M. & W.

piration of the current quarter ; nor rent 466 ; Senior v. Armytage, Holt, 107 ; Webb

pro rata for the actual occupation of the v. Plummer, 2 B. & Aid. 746 ; Holding v.

premises for any period short of the quar- Pigott, 7 Bing. 465. By the custom of

ter. See also Dodd v. Acklom, 6 Man. & Pennsylvania, the right of the tenant for

G. 672. a definite term to his away-going crops,

(n) Copeland v. Watts, 1 Stark. 95. seems to be well established. Diffedorffer

(o) Reeve v. Bird, 1 C. M. 4 R. 31 ; v. Jones, cited in Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn.

Walls v. Atcheson, 11 J. B. Moore, 379 ; 487, and in Stultz v. Dickey, 5 Binn. 289 ;

Woodcock v. Nuth, 8 Bing. 170 ; Thomas Comfort r. Duncan, 1 Miles, 229 ; Demi

v. Cooke, 2 B. & Aid. 119 ; Johnstone v. v. Bossier, 1 Penn. 224. Such is the case

Huddlestone, 4 B. & C. 922. also in New Jersey. Van Doren v. Ever-

(p) Caldecott v. Smythies, 7 C. & P. itt, 2 Southard, 460 ; Templeman o. Bid-

808; Wigglesworth v. Dallison, Dougl. die, 1 Harring. (Del.) 622.

1 Under a five years' lease, ending July 1 8, the tenant was allowed to take hay
maturing a week earlier, if good farming, though he had the hay ripening in first
year of Tease. Willey v. Connor, 44 Vt. 68.

544

CH. III.] HIEING OP EEAL PEOPEBTY. * 511

farm. Generally, in this country, the outgoing tenant cannot sell
or take away the manure, (?) 1 although it would seem that in
England he can. (r)

* SECTION VI. *511

OF FIXTURES.

The tenant may annex some things to the freehold, and yet
retain the right to remove them. These things are called Fix-
tures, (s) 2 There are no precise and certain rules, by which we
can always determine what are and what are not removable. The
method of affixing is a useful criterion, but not a certain one.
For doors, windows, blinds, and shutters, although capable of
removal without injury to the house, and in fact detached at the
time of transfer, nevertheless pass with the house ; while mirrors,
wardrobes, &c, although far more strongly fastened, would still

(q) Lassell v. Reed, 6 Greenl. 222 ; of it in the deed. Kittredge v. Woods, 3

Staples v. Emery, 7 Greenl. 201 ; Daniels N. H. 503 ; Conner v. Coffin, 2 Foster

v. Pond, 21 Pick. 367, 371 ; Lewis v. Ly- (N. H.), 539. See also Parsons v. Camp,

man, 22 Pick. 437, 442; Middlebrook v. 11 Conn. 625; Goodrich v. Jones, 2 Hill

Corwin, 15 Wend. 169; Lewis v. Jones, (N. Y.), 142.

17 Penn. St. 262. See also Kittredge v. (s) See Hallen v. Runder, 1 C. M. 4

Woods, 3 N. H. 503. R. 266, 276 ; Elliott v. Bishop, 28 E. L.

(r) See Roberts v. Barker, 1 Cr. & M. & E. 484; s. c. 10 Exch. 496; and Amos

808. In New Hampshire it has been held, and Ferrard on Fixtures, p. 2, for this def-

that where land is sold and conveyed, inition. But the word is, perhaps, quite

manure lying about a barn upon the land as often used to denote those things which,

will pass to the grantee, as an incident being added, cannot be removed,
to the land, unless there be a reservation

1 A covenant by a lessee not to carry away manure, &c, is a reservation to the lessor.
Heald v. Builders Ins. Co. Ill Mass. 38. If manure is a tenant's personal property,
he does not lose his title by leaving it on the farm when he quits. Fletcher v. Herring,
112 Mass. 382. If a dairy farm is also cultivated, the manure belongs to the lessor.
Bonn ell v. Allen, 53 Ind. 1 30. A tenant for two years cannot take manure under a provision
that he shall substitute dressing for hay removed. Hill v. De Rochemont, 48 N. H. 87.

2 The character of the thing attached, not the mode of annexation, determines
whether it is a fixture. Seeger v. Pettit, 77 Penn. St. 437. The premises must be left
in as good condition after removal as before. Turner v. Cameron, L. R. 5 Q. B. 306.
Fixtures must be removed before the end of term or possession, or they become the land-
lord's, even as against a judgment creditor with an incomplete levy, Thropp's Appeal, 70
Penn. St. 395 ; hut not against a purchaser of the same, Saint v. Pilley, L. R. 10 Ex. 137.
A tenant renewing must reserve right anew to remove fixtures or lose it. Watriss v.
Cambridge Bank, 124 Mass. 571 ; Loughran a. Ross, 45 N. Y. 792. So a tenant
holding over, Dingley v. Buffum, 57 Me. 381 ; unless the term is uncertain, Northern,
&c. R. Co. v. Canton Co. 30 Md. 347 ; or by fault of the landlord, Goodman v. Han-
nibal, &c. R. Co. 45 Mo. 33 ; Ex parte Hemenway, 2 Lowell, 496. Where fixtures are to
be the landlord's at the end of the lease, he may sell at any time. Thrall v. Hill, 110
Mass. 328. A tenant cannot, after his term ends, re-enter to remove fixtures as against
a purchaser without notice of his claim. Dostal v. McCaddon, 35 Iowa, 318. See,
generally, as to fixtures and requisites, McRea v. Central Bank, 66 N. Y. 489.

vol. I. 35 545

* 511 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

be chattels. (£) In modern times, this rule is construed much
more strongly in favor of the tenant, and against the landlord,
than formerly ; (w) and more so in respect to things put up for
purposes of trade or manufacture than for other things. As
between the seller and purchaser it is construed strongly against
the seller. Many things pass by a deed of a house, being put
there by the owner and' seller, which a tenant who had put them
there might have removed. In general, it may be said, that what
a tenant has added he may remove, if he can do so without any
injury to the premises, unless he has actually built it in, so as to
make it an integral part of what was there originally. (i>) 1

(() Winslow v. Merchants' Ins. Co. 4 and a sun-dial, Snedeker !;. Warring, 2
Met. 306, 314. Kern. 110; Carpenter's shop, Klwes r.
(u) Dubois v. Kelly, 10 Barb. 496. Maw, supra; Cart-house, id.; Chimney-
(v) We give below a statement of all piece, not ornamental, Leach v. Thomas,
the things which have been held remov- 7 C. & P. 327; Closets affixed to the
able, and of those which have been held house, Kimpton v. Eve, 2 Ves. & B. 349;
not removable. But it must be remem- Conduits, Nicholas v. Chamberlain, Cro.
bered, that each decision rested more or J. 121 ; Conservatory, substantially af-
less upon the peculiar circumstances of . fixed, Buckland v. Butterfield, 2 Br. & B.
the case, and may fail as authority when 54 ; Doors, Cooke's case, Moore, 177 ;
applied to another case which apparently Dressers, Kinlyside o. Thornton, suma,
resembles it. — 1. List of things held not Flowers, Littledale, J., in Empson v. Sod-
to be removable : Agricultural erections, en, supra; Fold-yard walls, Elwes v. Maw,
Elwes o. Maw, 3 East, 38; Contra, Du- supra; Fruit-trees, if tenant be not a nur-
bois v. Kelly, 10 Barb. 496 ; Ale-house sery-man by trade, Wyndham v. Way, 4
bar, Kinlyside o. Thornton, 2 W. Bl. Taunt. 316; Fuel-house, Elwes v. Maw,
1111 ; Barns fixed in the ground, Elwes supra ; Glass windows, Co. Lit. 53 a ;
v. Maw, supra ; Beast-house, id. : Benches Herlakenden's case, 4 Rep. 63; Hearths,
affixed to the house, Co. Lit. 53 a; Box- Poole's case, 1 Salk. 368; Hedges, Parke,
borders, not belonging to a gardener by J., in Empson v. Soden, supra ; Locks
trade, Empson v. Soden, 4 B. & Ad. 655 ; and keys, Liford's case, 11 Bep. 50;
Statue erected as an ornament to grounds, G'twrar, J., in Walker a. Sherman, 20
»

1 As between mortgagor and mortgagee the following are removable : Portable
furnace, resting by its own weight on the ground, and gas fixtures, Towne v. Fiske, 127
Mass. 125 ; Railway Sav. Inst. v. Irving St. Church, 9 Stewart, 61 ; gas fixtures screwed
on and mirrors on supports, McKeage v. Hanover Fire Ins Co. 81 N. Y. 38 ; rolling-stock
of railroad, Williamson v. X. J. S. R. Co. 2 Stewart, 311 ; certain machines, ICeve v.
Paxton, 11 (.'. E. Green, 107 ; Case r. Arnett, 11 C. E. Green, 459. As to mirrors in
niches for the purpose, see Ward u. Kilpatrick, 85 N. Y. 413. The following are not
removable : Looms affixed to the floor by nails which may be drawn without any
serious damage to the floor, Holland v. Hodgson, L. R. 7 C. P. 328 ; Ottumwa
Woollen Co. v. Hawlev, 44 la. 57 ; a factory bell in its tower, and a blower pipe for
taking air from a blower to a forge, Alvord Carriage Co. v. Gleason, 36 Conn. 86 ;
platform scales, for permanently weighing stock and grain, Arnold v. Crowder, 81 111.
56 ; an iron table weighing thirty-three tons, on brick foundations, and adapted only
for use in a glass factory, where placed, Smith Paper Co. v. Servin, 130 Mass. 511 ;
an embossing press, Pope v. Jackson, 65 Maine, 162 ; manure, Chase v. Wingate, 68
Maine, 204. A railroad track put down as a permanency is not removable as between
seller and buyer. Van Keuren v. Central Railroad, 9 Vroom, 165. Trade fixtures may
be removed, as steam engines and boilers, Holbrook v. Chamberlin, 116 Mass. 155;
an ice-house, Antoni ». Belknap, 102 Mass. 193 ; Crowie v. Hoover, 40 Ind. 49 ; counters
or counting-rooms nailed to the floor, Guthrie r. Jones, 108 Mass. 191 ; Brown v.
Wallis, 115 Mass. 156; heavy machinery, as a trip hammer, Heffner v. Lewis, 73
Penn. St. 302.

546

CH. III.]

HIRING OP REAL PROPERTY.

*512

•SECTION VII.

*512

OP NOTICE TO QUIT.

A tenant whose tenancy may be determined by the will of
the landlord, is entitled to notice of that determination, nor

Wend. 636, 639 ; Millstones, 14 H. 8, 25 b,
pi. 6, Liford's case, supra ; The Queen
v. Wheeler, 6 Mod. 187; Shep. Touch.
90; Looms substantially affixed to the
floor of a factory, Murdock v. Harris, 20
Barb. 407; Manure, Daniels v. Pond, 21
Pick. 367; Middlehrook v. Corwm, 15
Wend. 169; Lassell v. Reed, 6 Greenl.
222; Sawyer v. Twiss, 6 Foster (N. H.),
315. But see Staples o. Emery, 7 Greenl.
201 ; Partitions, Kinlyside v. Thornton,
supra ; Pigeon-house, Elwes v. Maw,
supra ; Pineries, substantially affixed,
Buckland u. Butterfield, supra; Pump-
house, Elwes v. Maw, supra ; Trees,
Empson v. Soden, supra; Wagon-house,
Elwes v. Maw, supra ; Poles used neces-
sarily in cultivating hops, which were
taken down for the purpose of gather-
ing the crop and piled in the yard, with
the intention of being replaced in the
season of hop raising, Bishop v. Bishop,
1 Kern. 123 ; Threshing-machines, fixed
by bolts and screws to posts let into the
ground, Wiltshear v. Cottrell, 18 E. L. &
E. 142; s. c. 1 E. & B. 674. —2. Things
held to be removable, though not coming
within the class of trade fixtures : Arras-
hanging, Bridgeman's case, 1 Rolle. 216 ;
Barns, resting by weight alone upon
foundations let into the ground, or upon
blocks, Wansborough v. Maton, 4 A. &
E. 884, Bui. N. P. 34 ; Granaries, resting
by weight alone, Wiltshear v. Cottrell, 18
E. L. & E. 142; s. c. 1 E. & B. 674;
Stables and outhouses, Dubois v. Kelly,
10 Barb. 496 ; Gas fixtures, Lawrence
v. Kemp, 1 Duer, 363; Beds fastened to
the ceiling, Ex parte Quincy, 1 Atk. 477;
Carding machines, Walker v. Sherman,
20 Wend. 636; Taffe v. Warnick, 3
Blackf. Ill ; Cresson v. Stout, 17 Johns.
116 ; Gale v. Ward, 14 Mass. 352 ; Tobias
v. Francis, 3 Vt. 425 ; Machinery, Van-
derpoel v. Van Allen, 10 Barb. 157;
Teaff v. Hewett, 1 Ohio St. 511, 541;
Cotton-spinning machines, screwed to
the floor, Hellawell o. Eastwood, 3 E. L.
& E. 562 ; s. (j. 6 Exch. 309 ; Ornamental
chimney-pieces, Tindal, C. J., in Grymes
u. Boweren, 6 Bing. 437; Bishop o.

Elliott, 30 E. L. & E. 595; s. c. 11 Exch.
113; Coffee-mills, Rex v. Londonthorpe,
6 T. R. 379 ; Ornamental cornices, Avery
v. Cheslyn, 3 A. & E. 75 ; Fire-frame,
Gaffield v. Hapgood, 17 Pick. 192 ; Fur-
naces, Squier v. Mayer, Freem. Ch. 249 ;
Gates (if removable without injury to
the premises), Tindal, C. J., in Grymes
c. Boweren, supra; Amos and Ferard on
Fixtures, p. 278 ; Iron backs to chimneys,
Harvey v. Harvey, Stra. 1141 ; Looking-
glasses, Beck v. Rebow, 1 P. Wms. 94 ;
Malt-mills, Lord Ke.nyon, in Rex v. Lon-
donthorpe, supra ; Movable boards, fitted
and used for putting up corn in bins,
Whiting v. Brastow, 4 Pick. 310; Mills
on posts, Ward's case, 4 Leon. 241; Or-
namental Fixtures, Amos and Ferard on
Fixtures, p. 67 ; Beck v. Rebow, supra ;
Padlock for a corn-house, Whiting v.
Brastow, supra; Pumps slightly attached,
Grymes v. Boweren, supj'a; Rails and
posts, Fitzherbert v. Shaw, 1 H. Bl. 258;
A ladder fixed to the ground and to a
beam above, and which was the only
means of access to a room above ; a
crane nailed at top and bottom to keep
it in its place, and a bench nailed to the
wall, Wilde v. Waters, 32 E. L. & E. 422 ;
s. c. 16 C. B. 637 ; Stables on rollers, id. ;
Stoves, •Smith, J., in Gray v. Holdship, 17
S. & R. 413 ; Tindal, C. J., in Grymes v.
Boweren, supra; Greene v. First Parish
in Maiden, 10 Pick. 500, 504 ; Tapestry,
Harvey v. Harvey, supra; Windmill on
posts, Rex r. Londonthorpe, supra; Win-
dow-blinds, Greene ». First Parish in
Maiden, supra. — 3. Trade fixtures held
to be removable : Brewing vessels, Law-
ton v. Lawton, 3 Atk. 13 ; Buildings
accessory to removable trade fixtures,
Dudley v. Warde, Ambl. 113; Cider-
mills, Lawton r. Lawton, supra ; Holmes
v.'Tremper, 20 Johns. 29; Colliery ma-
chines, Lawton v. Lawton, supra; Cop-
pers, Poole's case, 1 Salk. 368; Lawton
v. Lawton, supra; Dutch barns, Dean v.
Allalley, 3 Esp. 11 ; Engines, Lawton v.
Lawton, supra; Dudley v. Warde, supra;
Jibs, Davis v. Jones, 2 B. & Aid. 165;
Salt-pans, Lawton v. Salmon, 1 H. Bl.

547

* 513 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

* 513 can * he be dispossessed by process of law, without that

previous notice.1 In England, this notice, in the case of a
tenant from year to year, is one half of a year, which is distin-
guished from six months' notice, (w) 2 In this country there is
no uniform rule. In some of the States the English rule seems to
have been adopted, (x) In others it is regulated by statute, (y)

259, n. ; Shrubs planted for sale, Penton the defendant was tenant to the plaintiff,

v. Robart, 2 East, 88 ; Miller v. Baker, and that the rent was payable monthly,

1 Met. 27 ; Soap works, Poole's ease, but no evidence was offered to show on
supra; Steam-engine, Pemberton v. King, what day of the month it became due.

2 Dev. L. 376; Lemar v. Miles, 4 Watts, On the 21st day of September, 1848, the
330 ; Stills, Reynolds v. Shuler, 5 Cowen, plaintiff gave the defendant notice to
323; Burk v. Baxter, 3 Mo. 207; Trees quit the premises, and on the 26th day of
planted for sale, Penton v. Robart, supra ; October following brought his action to
Miller v. Baker, 1 Met. 27 ; Varnish recover them. The defendant requested
house, Penton v. Eobart, supra; Vats, the court to rule, that the notice was
Poole's case, supra. insufficient, because it ought to appear

(u>) Doe v. Smith, 5 A. & E. 350 ; that the notice covered an entire period
Johnstone v. Hudlestone, 4 B. & C. 922 intervening between the times of paying
See also Roe v. Doe, 6 Bing. 574; Doe v. rent; so that, if the rent was payable on
Green, 4 Esp. 198. the first day of each month, and notice
(x) Jackson v. Bryan, 1 Johns. 322; was given on the 21st of September, the
Hanchett v. Whitney, 1 Vt. 311 ; Trous- tenant was under no obligation to re-
dale v. Darnell, 6 Yerg. 431. move, and the plaintiff could not com-
fy) In Massachusetts, three months' mence his action until the first day of
notice is enough in all cases of tenancy November. The court declining so to
at will, and if the rent be payable at rule, the case was carried to the Supreme
shorter periods, then the notice need only Court, where the exception was sustained
equal one of those periods. R. S. eh. 60, on the ground that the R. S. had in this
§ 26. A question arose in the Supreme respect adopted the rule of the common
Court of Massachusetts, in the case of law. as to which see 13 H. 8, 15 b ;
Prescott v. Elms, 7 Cush. 346, as to the Right r. Darby, 1 T. R. 159 ; Doe v. Por-
construction of the last part of this pro- ter, 3 T. It. 13; Uichardson v. Langridge,
vision. It appeared in that case, that 4 Taunt. 128; Doe o. Johnston, MeClel.

1 A sub-lessee is entitled to a proper notice to quit, although the lessee voluntarily
surrenders. Mellor v. Watkins, L. R. 9 Q. B. 400. Notice by a lessor will enure to
the benefit of his assignee. Glenn v. Thompson, 75 Penn. St 389. Payment of reut
in advance does not dispense with notice. Sprague r. Quinn, 108 Mass. 553. If a
tenant holds over, no notice is necessary, Knecht r. Mitchell, 67 111. 86 ; unless so long
continued that the landlord's assent willbe presumed, Smith v. Littlefield, 51 N. Y. 539 ;
nor where a tenant is to remain only while in the landlord's employ, Grosvenor v. Henry,
27 la. 269 ; or on condition of running a saw-mill which he abandons, Crawley r.
Mullins, 48 Mo. 517 ; or his term is to end on notice of a sale, Miller v. Levi, 44 N. Y.
489 ; or "if he suited the landlord," AY hetstone r. Davis, 34 Ind. 510; or as long as the
tenant pays rent and the landlord can let, Wood i.\ Beard, 2 Ex. D. 30. But if the act or
condition is within the landlord's control, the tenant must have reasonable notice. Shaw
v. Hoffman, 25 Mich. 162. Notice by an unauthorized agent cannot be ratified after the
proper time has expired. Brahn c. Jersey City, &c. Co. 9 Vroom, 74. A notice from
one to whom lessor agrees to convey is not good. Reeder i\ S.iyre, 70 N. Y. 180. An error
in the address does not vitiate, if it is received by the one intended, Clark v. Keliher,
107 Mass. 406 ; as to a married woman as " ,1/r. C," Cook v. Creswell, 44 Md. 581.
Defects in a notice may be waived by the party receiving it. Boynton r. Bodwell,
113 Mass. 531. The owner of land, who forcibly enters thereon and ejects without
unnecessary force a tenant at sufferance, who has hart reasonable notice to quit, is
not liable to an action for an assault. Low v. Elwell, 121 Mass. 309, where Gray, C. J.,
elaborately reviews all the authorities.

2 In England, such a notice must run from one quarterly feast day to the next,
though more or less than six months, Morgan r. Davies, 3 C. P'D. 260 ; but the parties
may agree on any period, as one week, Cornish v. Stubbs, L. R. 5 C. P. 334.

548

CH. III.] HIRING OP REAL PROPERTY. * 514

*A notice to quit is necessary in all those cases in *514
which the implication of law creates a tenancy from year
to year, or one determinable by the landlord. (2) But a notice
to quit is not necessary where the relation of landlord and tenant
does not subsist, (a) or where the tenant distinctly disclaims the
title of his landlord. (5)

As the tenant is to act upon the notice when he receives it, it
should be such a notice as he may act upon safely ; and there-
fore it must be one which is binding upon all parties concerned
at the time it is given, and needs 110 recognition by any one of
them subsequently ; (c) nor will such recognition make it suffi-
cient. (<f) But a notice by one joint-tenant for himself and the
others is sufficient ; (e) and so is a notice by one copartner for
the firm. (/)

No particular form of the notice is necessary ; but there must
be a reasonable certainty in the description of the premises ; and
we think there should be a reasonably certain statement of the
time when the tenant must quit ; but this has been denied in New
York, (ff') It seems that the notice need state no reason for
terminating the tenancy, (fg) The notice may be oral, unless
there be an express agreement that it should be in writing. (g)

& T. 141. But the English rule applies Doe v. Quigley, 2 Camp. 505. So a
only where there is a yearly tenancy ex- member of a firm, occupying a house of
pressly or impliedly created, and there one of his copartners during the partner-
is no agreement between the parties in ship, is not entitled to notice at its close.
relation1 to the termination of tlie ten- Waithman v. Miles, 1 Stark. 181. So of
ancy ; but where the parties agree that a vendee in possession, who has not paid
the tenancy shall expire upon the giving the price, nor been recognized as a ten-
of a notice for a certain time, the notice ant. Doe v. Lawder, 1 Stark. 308 ; Doe
may be given at any time. Doe v. Graf- v. Sayer, 3 Camp. 8. See also Doe v.
ton, 11 E. L. & E. 488 ; s. o. 18 Q. B. 496. Chamberlaine, 5 M. & W. 14.
See, however, Baker v. Adams, 5 Cush. (6) Doe v. Evans, 9 M. & W. 48; Doe
89, and also Doe v. Cox, 11 Q. B. 122; v. Pasquali, Peake, Cas. 196; Bower v.
Post v. Post, 14 Barb. 253. In Massachu- Major, 1 Br. & B. 4 ; Doe v. Erowd, 4
setts a tenant at sufferance is not entitled Bing. 557 ; Doe v. Boilings, 4 C. B. 188 ;
to notice. Benedict v. Morse, 10 Met. 223 ; Doe v. Clarke, Peake, Ad. Cas. 239.
Kinsley v. Ames, 2 Met. 29 ; Hollis v. Pool, (c) Doe v. Cuthell, 5 East, 491 ; Doe
3 Met. 350. See also Ellis v. Paige, 1 v. Goldwin, 2 Q. B. 143. And see Currier
Pick. 43 ; Coffin v. Lunt, 2 Pick. 70. v. Barker, 2 Gray, 224; Steward v. Hard-
fa) Doe v. Watts, 2 Esp. 501 ; s. c. 7 ing, id. 335.
T. R. 83 ; Denn v. Rawlins, 10 East (d) Parke, B., in Buron v. Denman, 2
(Day's ed.), 261, n. 2. Exch. 167, 188; Doe v. Goldwin, supra;

(a) Right v. Bawden, 3 East, 260 ; Roe Doe v. Walters, 10 B. & C. 626.
v. Prideaux, 10 East, 158. Therefore, if (e) Doe v. Summersett, 1 B. & Ad.

a man gets into possession of a house to 135 ; Doe v. Hughes, 7 M. & W. 139.
be let, without the privity of the landlord, (/) Doe v. Hulme, 2 Man . & R. 483.

and they afterwards enter into a nego- (ff) Burns v. Bryant, 31 N. Y. 453.

tiation for a lease, but differ upon the (fg) Russell v. AUard, 18 N. H. 222.

terms, the landlord may maintain eject- (g) Doe v. Crick, 5 Esp. 196 ; Doe v.

ment to recover possession of the prem- Pierce, 2 Camp. 96 ; Legg v. Benion,

ises without giving any notice to quit. Willes, 43.

549

* 515 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

It should be served upon the tenant, personally, or by

* 515 leaving it with the tenant's wife, or servant, at * the usual

place of abode of the tenant ; (A) and if so left it is
sufficient, although it never reach the tenant. («') If there is
more than one tenant, the notice should be addressed to all, but
it may be served on either one. (,/)

A valid notice, properly served, vests the premises in the land-
lord, and absolutely terminates the tenant's right of possession at
the time stated, (k) * But this and all other effects of the notice
may be waived by the landlord, and is so waived by his receiving
subsequent rent f*om the tenant. (7)

section via.

OF APPORTIONMENT OF RENT.

The lessor holds only the reversion, the lessee having the land.
It is common to speak of the lessor who makes a sale of the
premises, as selling the land ; but in law, all he can sell is his
right to the land, and this means the reversion. If he sells the
whole of this to one buyer, the buyer takes his place, acquires
his rights, and is subject to all of his obligations which run with
the land, (m) But if he sells a part only of the reversion, or if
he sells the whole in parcels to different purchasers, this does
not extinguish the obligations of the lessee, nor does it transfer
them all to the purchaser. There must now be an apportionment
of the rent. And this may arise also if the lessor, retaining the
reversion, assigns a portion of the rent to one assignee and an-
other part to another person. («) The common-law doctrine of

(h) Jones u. Marsh, 2 T. R. 404; Doe may have his action against the landlord,

v. Lucas, 5 Esp. 183. seems to be doubtful. See Newton o.

(i) Doe v. Dunbar, Mood. & M. 10. Harland, 1 Man. & G. 644; Harvey v.

( /) Doe ». Watkins, 7 East, 551 ; Doe Brydges, 14 M. & W. 437 ; Wright v.

v. Crick, 5 Esp. 196. Burroughes, 3 C. B. 685.

(£) Turneru. Meymott, 1 Bing. 158 ; (/) Collins v. Canty, 6 Cush. 415;

Taunton v. Costar, 7 T. R. 431 ; Lacey v. Blythe v. Dennett, 6 E. L. & E. 424 ; s. c.

Lear, Peake, Ad. Cas. 210. Whether a 13 C. B. 178. ' See also Hunter v. Oster-

tenant in possession, who, after a good hondt, 11 Barb. 33.
notice has expired, has been assaulted (m) See ante, pp. *231, *232.

and forcibly expelled from the premises, (n) Bliss v. Collins, 6 B. & Aid. 876.

1 But if the tenancy is terminated between stated pay-days, no rent is recoverable
after the last preceding pay-day. Cameron v. Little, 62 Me. 550.

550

CH. III. J HIEING OP REAL PEOPEETY. * 516

entirety of contract forbade this apportionment. But it was long
ago permitted from obvious necessity.

* Where the transfer of the land or premises is by ali- * 516
quot parts, as half, or one-third, to one transferee, and the
residue to another, there is no difficulty in apportioning the rent
in the same way. But if the owner of a house under lease sells
so many rooms, or the owner of a farm sells so many fields, the
question will arise, in what manner the apportionment is to be
made ; that is, whether in the ratio of quantity, or in that of value.
And it is now settled, that it must be in proportion to value, and
not quantity ; and that this is a question of fact, for the jury to
settle upon the evidence offered them, (o)

If the owner and the buyer or buyers of the reversion agree
together as to the apportionment of rent, the lessee is bound by
this, because it is of no importance to him to whom he pays the
rent.

The rent must be apportioned also, if the reversion is divided
among many persons, by act of law ; as by descent, or sale on
execution, or by decree. (^>)

The lessor cannot himself apportion it by his own wrong. If
he enters on a part with the consent of the tenant, the rent is
proportionally abated ; but if he enters wrongfully and ousts the
lessee from a part of the premises, the whole rent is suspended
until the lessee is restored, (g)

There may also be an apportionment by time ; as if the lessor
dies in the middle of the term. At common law there could be
no apportionment of rent in this case, and the lessee is free from
the rent to the death of the lessor. But by statutes in England, (r)
and by similar statutory provisions or usage in this country, there
is always an apportionment in such case, the lessee being liable
to the representatives of the deceased for the rent until he died,
and to the heir afterwards, (s)

(o) Crosby v. Loop, 13 111. 625; Van (r) 11 Geo. II. ch. 19, § 15, and 4 Wm.

Kensselaer v. Gallup, 6 Denio, 454. IV. ch. 22.

Ip) 1 Roll. Abr. tit. Apportionment, D. (s) Gheen v. Osborn, 17 b. & H. 171 ;

pi. 3, 4, 5 ; Wotton v. Shirt, Cro. E. 742. Ex parte Smyth, 1 Swanst. 338; New

(q) Smith v. Raleigh, 3 Camp. 513; York Rey. Statutes.
Briggs v. Hall, 4 Leigh, 484.

551

517 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

*517 * SECTION IX.

OP REMEDY FOR NON-PAYMENT OF RENT.

We have already spoken of the right of re-entry, which only
prevents the accruing of further rent. For rents due and unpaid
the common law provided what Chancellor Kent calls the " sum-
mary and somewhat perilous authority of distress." This word is
derived through the secondary form " distrein," from the law-latin
verb " distringo." The power of distress, under the feudal law,
was simply the power to take all the personal property or chattels
of the tenant on the premises, and hold them as security for the
unpaid rent. What it was, in its exercise, may be inferred from
the fact, that this law word came, in course of time, to be used as
an expression of the extremest suffering. In Massachusetts and
the New England States generally, in New York since 1846, and
in many of the other States, the lessor has no power of distress,
and no other remedy for rent due, than the same actions of cov-
enant, debt, or assumpsit for use and occupation, (£) and the
same attachment he would have for other debts. In others of
the States, (m) 1 it is retained, but greatly and variously modified.

(f ) For cases on the action of assump- Long v. Bonner, 11 Ired. L. 27 ; Smith i>.

sit for rent, see Hall v. Southmayd, 15 Wooding, 20 Ala. 321; Weaver v. Jones,

Barb. 32; Scales v. Anderson, 26 Miss. 24 Ala. 420.

94; Greenup v. Vernon, 16 111. 26; (u) New Jersey, Delaware, Indiana,

Newby v. Vestal, 6 Port. (Ind.) 412; Illinois, Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky,

1 A landlord has a lien on the crop for rent and on the tenant's personal property,
the former of which he may follow into hands of a purchaser or attaching creditor,
Prettyman v. Unland, 77 111. 206 ; Mead v. Thompson, 78 111. 62 ; hut not the latter,
Hadden v. Knickerbocker, 70 111. 677 ; Morgan v. Campbell, 22 Wall. 381. — There can
be no distress unless the rent is fixed, or capable of being fixed, as by arbitration,
Myers a. Mayfield, 7 Bush, 212 ; or in proportionate profits of thing let, Wilkins v.
Taliaferro, 52 Ga. 208 ; or proportioned to lessor's improvements, Detwiler v. Cox,
75 Penn. St. 200. An undisclosed principal of an agent, letting in his own name, cannot
distrain. Seyfert v. Bean, 83 Penn. St. 450. The mere taking a note for rent will not
prevent distraining, unless so agreed. Atkyns v. Byrnes, 71 111. 326. A stipulation
in a lease giving landlord " lien " will prevail over a purchaser, attaching creditor,
assignee in bankruptcy, mechanic's lien, and follow goods though removed from the
premises. Hale o. Omaha Bank, 49 N. Y. 626 ; Groton Co. v. Gardner, 11 R. I. 626 ;
Dalton v. Laudahn, 27 Mich. 529 ; McCaffrey v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 459 ; Schenley's
Appeal, 70 Penn. St. 98. After distress and before sale, a landlord cannot sue for
rent. Lehain v. Philpott, L. R. 10 Ex. 242. In Illinois, a tenant may recover damages
resulting from the impairment in value of the use of the premises by the landlord's
act. Lynch v. Baldwin, 69 111. 210.

552

CH. III.] HIRING OP REAL PROPERTY. * 518

Nor would it be possible for us to give a detailed view of the vari-
ous provisions which exist in relation to this power, except by
reference to the State statutes. We will, however, endeavor to
exhibit such more general rules on the subject as seem to rest on
adjudication.

Originally, the lessor might enter upon the premises and dis-
train any chattels he might find there ; but now, and in
this * country generally, distress may be made only on the * 518
goods of the tenant, (v)

The distress must be reasonable in amount, and the property
distrained cannot be carried out of the county ; and the distress
must not be made at night. (m>)

Implements and beasts of husbandry, tools of trade, household
goods to a certain amount, and a great variety of things, deemed
by the several legislatures essential to the subsistence or comfort
of a family, are exempted from distress, or attachment, or levy,
by the several State statutes.

The goods may be replevied by the owner, at any time within
a certain number of days, and the question of indebtedness, or
any other which affects the right of distress may be tried ; but if
not replevied, they may be sold, and the proceeds applied to the
payment of the rent due.

The landlord is punishable for unlawful distress, by double
damages, or otherwise ; and the tenant, for unlawful rescue
of the goods or prevention of distress, by treble damages, or
otherwise.

The landlord's power of distress does not extend to goods
sold in good faith and for a valuable consideration before the
seizure ; (x) nor to goods in the custody of the law ; (?/) but
it has been held in New York, that goods mortgaged by the
tenant, even if taken possession of by the mortgagee, and re-
moved from the premises, may be followed by the landlord,
and be distrained upon, (z) And the distinction has been
taken, that while the goods of an assignee of the tenant are

Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina, (x) Craddock v. Riddlesbarger, 2

Pennsylvania, and perhaps some others. Dana, 205 ; Neale v. Clautice, 7 Har. &

(v) Hoskins v. Paul, 4 Halst. 110 ; J. 372.
Stone v. Matthews, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 429; (y) Craddock v. Eiddlesbarger, 2

Brown ». Sims, 17 S. & E. 138; Young- Dana, 205.

blood v. Lowry, 2 McCord, 39; Riddle v. (z) Reynolds t;. Shuler, 5 Cowen,

Welden, 5 Whart. 1. 323.

(w) Sherman v. Dutch, 16 111. 283.

553

* 518 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK IU.

liable to distress for rent, those of a mere under-tenant are not
so liable, (a) But the process of distress has been abolished
in New York. (5)

(a) Aclher v. Witherell, 4 Hill (N. Y.), been held to be constitutional. Guild v.
112. Eogers, 8 Barb. 602.

(6) Gen. St. p. 429. And this law has

554

CH. IV. J SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 519

* CHAPTER IV. *519

PURCHASE AND SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY.

Sect. I. — Essentials of a Sale.

All that is essential to the sale of a chattel, at common law,
is the agreement of the parties that the property in the subject-
matter should pass from the vendor to the vendee for a consid-
eration given, or promised to he given, by the vendee. Yet where
the parties have not explicitly manifested their meaning, the law
makes some important inferences. There is a presumption that
every sale is to be consummated at once ; that the chattel is to
be delivered, and the price paid, without delay. If, therefore,
nothing appears but an offer and an acceptance, and the vendee
goes his way without making payment, it is held to be a breach
of the contract (which is presumed to have contemplated payment
on the spot), and the vendor is not bound by the sale. But if
there was a delivery of the chattel, or the receipt of earnest, or of
part payment, either of these is evidence of an understanding that
something should remain to be performed in futuro ; and the
legal presumption is rebutted. Where the terms of the contract
expressly postpone delivery, or payment, or both, to a future day,
here also the sale is valid, and no legal presumption obstructs the
intention of the parties, but the property in the chattel sold
passes immediately. In this case no earnest is necessary
to bind the bargain, (a) The * effect of the Statute of * 520

(a) The law of sales, as it stands at be upon condition, and they can also be

this moment at the common law, is at perfect ; and yet no quid pro quo immedi-

least as old as the year-books. In 14 H. ately. And all this depends upon the

8, 17 b, 21 b, in the Common Pleas, the communication between,you and me ; as

law upon this subject is thus stated by that I shall have £20 for my horse, and

Pollard, J. : " Bargains and sales all de- I agree ; now if you do not pay the money

pend upon communication and words immediately, this is not a bargain; for

between the parties ; for all bargains my agreement is for the £20, and if you

can be to take effect instantly, or upon a do not pay the money straightway, you

thing to be done thereafter. They can do not act according to my agreement.

555

* 520 THE LAW OP CONTEACT3. [BOOK III.

Frauds, in modifying the principles of the common law in relation
to sales, will be considered hereafter.

It must be remembered, that no one can give what he has not
himself; and therefore no one can give good title who has no
good title.1 If a mere finder, and still more if a thief, sells what
he has found or stolen, to A, and A buys in good faith, and so
sells to B, and B to C, and C to D, <frc, the original owner may
reclaim his property wherever it may be, and take it without any
payment to the holder, any more than if that holder were the
thief himself. (6) 2 In England, a sale in market overt changes
the property and divests the owner of his rights ; but we have no
market overt in this country, (c) 3 It has even been held, that an
auctioneer selling stolen goods, and paying over the money to the
thief in good faith, is liable in trover to the true owner of the
goods ; (d) i but this is certainly very severe. It has also been
held that one who innocently buys a stolen horse, and sells him
for value, is liable to the owner for his value ; (dd) but this is

I ought, however, in this case, to wait for him, and I say that I am content;

convenient leisure, to wit, until you have still, if you do not pay the money now,

counted your money. But if you go to but depart from the place, this is no bar-

your house for the money, am I obliged gain, for I am only content that you

to wait? No, truly; for I would be in should have my horse for £10, and not-

no certainty of my money or of your withstanding you say you are content,

return; and therefore it is no contract the transaction is yet not perfect; for

unless this [delay] be agreed at the com- you do not pay the money, and so do not

munication. But if I sell my horse to perform the agreement." See also Shep.

you for so much as J. at S. shall say, this Touch, p. 224. And also Noy, Maxims,

is good if he does say, and if not, void ; p. 88. And see Duncan v. Lewis, 1 Du-

and thus a contract can be good or vail, 183; Martin v. Hurlbut, 9 Minn,

void, depending upon matter subsequent. 142.

Likewise if I sell my horse for £10 to be (b) McGrew !>. Browder, 14 Mart,

paid on a day, now this is good; and yet (La.) 17 ; Roland v. Gundy, 6 Ohio, 202;

there is no quid pro quo immediately." Browning r. Magill, 2 Har. & J. 808;

In the same case, Brudnel, C. J., said: Dame c. Baldwin, 8 Mass. 618; Wheel-

"As has been said, bargains and sales wrighti'. Depeyster, 1 Johns. 47!'; Hosack

are as is concluded and agreed among v. Weaver, 1 Veates, 478 ; Easton v.

the parties — as their intentions can be Worthington, 6 S. & It. 130; Lance v.

gathered. For if I sell my horse to you Cowan, 1 Dana, 195 ; Ventress v. Smith,

for £10, and we both are agreed, and I 10 Pet. 161.

accept a penny in earnest, this is a perfect (c) See the cases cited in the last

contract ; you shall have the horse, and note.

I shall have an action for the money. (rf) Hoffman v. Carrow, 22 Wend. 285.

But if I wish to sell my horse to you for (dd) Robinson v. Skipworth, 23 Ind.

£10, and you say that you will give £10 311 ; Sharp v. Parks, 48 111. 611.

1 Bearce v. Bowker, 115 Mass. 129; Moody r. Blake, 117 Mass. 23, 26; Prime r.
Cobb, 63 Me. 200; Bryant v. Whitcher, 52 N. H. 158, 161; Klein v. Seibold, 89 111.
540. See Nixon v. Brown, 57 N. H. 34 ; West. Un. R. Co. v. Wagner, 65 111. 197.

2 Nixon v. Brown, 57 N. H. 34; Coombs r. Gorden, 59 Me. Ill ; Barker v. Dins-
more, 72 Penn. St. 427 ; Quinn v, Davis, 78 Penn. St. 15 ; Mechanics', &c. Bank v.
Farmers', &c. Bank, 60 N. Y. 40.

3 But such a sale does not protect the seller. Ganly v. Ledwidge, Ir. R. 10 C. L. 33.

4 Hills v. Snell, 104 Mass. 173 ; Pease v. Smith, 61 N. Y. 477.

556

CH. IV.J SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 521

not, we think, in accordance with the authorities generally, (de)
If the owner has been deceived and defrauded into parting with
his property, so that he could claim it from the taker, yet if he
voluntarily parted with the property, he cannot reclaim it from
one who in good faith buys it of the fraudulent party ; and not
even if the fraud amounted to felony, (e) 1 And this rule has
been applied where it was not a buyer, but a creditor, who took
the goods in payment of a debt, (ee) But we think this may be
questioned. But it is said that a vendee with possession, and a
right to acquire title by a subsequent act, cannot, before that act,
give title against his vendor to a bond fide purchaser. (<?/)

* It should also be stated, that no one can be made to * 521
buy of another without his own assent. Thus, if A sends
an order to B for goods, and C sends the goods, he cannot sue for
the price, if A repudiates the sale, although C had bought B's
business. (/) 2

We will now proceed to treat of an absolute sale, and then of a
conditional sale of a chattel.

SECTION II.

ABSOLUTE SALE OF CHATTELS.

A sale of a chattel is an exchange thereof for money ; but a
sale is distinctly discriminated in many respects from an ex-
change in law ; an exchange being the giving of one thing and
the receiving of another thing ; while a sale is the giving of one
thing for that which is the representative of all values, (^r) 3

(de) See Spooner o. Holmes, 102 16 Wis. 659. So in England, Kingsfcrd

Mass. 56. v. Merry, 34 E. L. & E. 607; s. c. 11

(e) Malcom v. Loveridge, 13 Barb. Exch. 577. This is doubted, however, in

372 ; Hall v. Hinks, 21 Md. 406 ; Keyser Sawyer v. Fisher, 32 Me. 28.

v. Harbeck, 3 Duer, 373. See also Wil- (ee) Butters v. Haughwout, 42 111. 9.

liams v. Given, 6 Gratt. 268 ; Jennings v. (ef) Ballard v. Burgett, 47 Barb. 646.

Gage, 13 111. 610 ; Titcorab v. Wood, 38 (/) Boulton o. Jones, 2 Hurls. &

Me. 561 ; Caldwell v. Bartlett, 3 Duer, Norm. Exch. 564.

341 ; Smith v. Lynes, 1 Seld. 41 ; Crocker (g) The distinction between sales and

v. Crocker, 31 N. Y. 507 ; Hutchinson v. exchanges is well pointed out in an

Watkins, 17 Iowa, 475 ; Shufeldt v. Pease, anonymous case in 3 Salk. 157, where it

1 Mich., &c. R. Co. v. Phillips, 60 111. 190 ; Young v. Bradley, 68 HI. 553.

2 Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 12.3 Mass. 28.

3 For breach of agreement to exchange, the declaration should be special. Steven-
son v. State, 65 Ind. 409; Edwards v. Cottrell, 43 la. 194. When the same thing,

557 •

522

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

For a sale to be valid in law, there must be parties, a consid-
eration, and a thing to be sold. All persons may be par-
* 522 ties to * a sale, unless they labor under the disabilities or
restraints which have been spoken of in reference to con-
tracts generally.

Of the consideration we have spoken already.
The existence of the thing to be sold, or the subject-matter of
the contract, is essential to the validity of the contract, (h)1 If

is said : " Permutatio vicina est emptioni but
exchanges were the original and natural
way of commerce precedent to buying,
for there was no buying till money was
invented ; now, in exchanging, both par-
ties are buyers and sellers, and both
equally warrant; and this is a natural
rather than a civil contract, so by the civil
law, upon a bare agreement to exchange,
without a delivery on both sides, neither
of the parties could have an action upon
such agreement, as they may in cases of
selling; but if there was a delivery on
one side, and not of the other, in such
case the deliverer might have an action
to recover the thing which he delivered,
but he could have no action to enforce
the other to deliver what he had agreed
to deliver, and which the deliverer was
to have in lieu of that thing which he de-
livered to the other." — If goods have
been delivered by one party, and the
other party agrees to deliver other goods
of a similar quality on demand, the
transaction is not a sale, but an agree-
ment to exchange. Mitchell v. Gile, 12
N. H. 390. — ■ And proof of an exchange
will not support an averment of a sale of
goods. Vail v. Strong, 10 Vt. 457. — But
in Sheldon v. Cox, 3 B. & C. 420, where
A agreed to give a horse, warranted
sound, in exchange for a horse of B, and
a sum of money; and the horses were
exchanged, but B refused to pay the
money, pretending that A's horse was
unsound; it was held, that it might be
recovered on an indebitatus count for
horses sold and delivered.

(h) Wood & Foster's case, 1 Leon. 42 ;
Grantham v. Hawley, Hob. 132; Strick-
land v. Turner, 14 E. L. & E. 471 ; s. c. 7
Exch. 208 ; Robinson i\ Macdonnel, 5 M.
& Sel. 228, where it was held, that an as-
signment of the freight, earnings, and
profits of a ship, does not extend to the
profits not in existence, actual or poten-
tial, at the time of the assignment.
Therefore, where C. assigned by deed to
S. the freight, earnings, and profits of the
ship VV., which ship afterwards in a voy-
age to the South Seas, obtained a quan-
tity of oil, the produce of whales taken
in the said voyage; it was held, that this
oil did not pass to S. by the assignment;
for the assignor had no property, actual
or potential, in the oil, at the time of as-
signment, and the voyage was not then
contemplated. But where the plaintiffs
had shipped corn to London in a vessel
chartered by them, and sent the bill of
lading, together with the policy of in-
surance effected upon the property, to
the defendants, corn-factors in London,
who were to act under a del credere com-
mission, and the defendants on the 15th
of May sold the cargo to C, sending him
a bought note, stating that he had bought
of them 1180 quarters of Salonlca Indian
corn, of fair average quality when
shipped on board the Kezia Page from
Salonica, bill of lading dated February
22, at 27s. per quarter, free on board,
and including freight and insurance to a
safe port in the United Kingdom, the
vessel calling at Cork or Falmouth for
orders, payment to be upon handing

though changed in form, is to he returned, it is bailment; when another thing of
equal value may be returned, it is a sale. Lonergan v. Stewart, 55 111. 44 ; Rahilly
v. Wilson, 3 Dillon, 420 ; Schlesinger v. Stratton, 9 R. I. 578 ; Hughes v. Stanley, 45
la. 622 ; Marsh v. Titus, 3 Hun, 550 ; Frazer v. Boss, 66 Ind. 1 ; Dittmar v. Norman,
118 Mass. 319; Powder Co. v. Burkhardt, 97 U. S. 110. Johnston i>. Browne, 37 la.
200. Where one is to furnish another a certain line of goods and receive monthly
accounts of sales, it is consignment. Walker v. Butterick, 105 Mass. 237 ; Converse-
ville Co. v. Chambersburg Co. 14 Hun, 609; Williams Bros. v. Davis, 47 la. 363;
Albert v. Lindau, 46 Md. 334 ; Ex parte White, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 397 ; In re Linforth,
4 Sawyer, 370. As to sale with right to repurchase, see Slutz v. Desenberg, 28 Ohio
St. 371.

1 Smith v. Myers, L. R. 5 Q. B. 429 ; L. R. 7 Q. B. 139.

558

CH- IV-] BALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 523

a horse sold be dead before the sale, or merchandise be destroyed
by fire, both parties being ignorant thereof, the sale is wholly
void. If a substantial part of the thing sold be non-existent, it is
said, (i) that the buyer has his option to rescind the sale, or take
the remainder with a reasonable abatement of the price. But
where the parties are equally innocent, we think the meaning and
effect of this rule is, that the buyer should have only his choice
between enforcing or rescinding the contract ; and if he enforces
the contract and claims the remainder, he should pay for it the
price of the whole. For if the remainder is to be taken at a pro-
portionate reduction, or any reduction, from the whole original
price, it should be by a new bargain. Perhaps, however, he
may take the remainder, if he will pay for it the original
price, with an abatement which can be made exact by a
mere numerical proportion ; as where the goods were * all * 523
of one quality, and a certain part was wholly destroyed,
and the residue left wholly uninjured. But if a new price is
to be made for the remainder, by a new estimate of its value,
it must be certain that this can be done only by mutual con-
sent. (J)

The thing sold need not be in the possession of the vendor, and
if it has been tortiously converted, the owner may sell it, and give
title, and the purchaser may after demand and refusal maintain
trover for it. (jj")

A mere contingent possibility, not coupled with an interest,

shipping documents ; it was held ( Pollock, (j) See also Farrar v. Nightingal, 2
C. B., dissenting), that the meaning of Esp. 639, where Lord Kent/on said : " I
the contract was, that the purchaser have often ruled, that where a person
bought the cargo if it existed at the date sells an interest, and it appears that the
of the contract, but that if damaged or interest which he pretended to sell was
lost, he bought the benefit of the insur- not the true one ; as, for example, if it
ance, and therefore, although upon the was for a lesser number of years than he
voyage the corn had become fermented had contracted to sell, the buyer may
and so heated that it was unfit to be car- consider the contract as at an end, and
ried, and was sold on the 24th of April at bring an action for money had and re-
Tunis Bay, he was bound to pay the ceived, to recover back any sum of money
stipulated price in a reasonable time after he may have paid in part performance of
the delivery of the shipping documents, the agreement for the sale ; and though
and that, therefore, the defendants were it is said here, that upon the mistake be-
liable to the plaintiff, under their del ere- ing discovered in the number of years of
dere commission. Couturier v. Hastie, 8 which the defendant stated himself to be
Exch. 40; s. c. sub nom. Hastie v. Coutu- possessed, he offered to make an allow-
rier, reversed in 9 Exch. ; s. c. 6 H. ance pro tanto, that makes no difference
L. Cas. 673. in the case ; it is sufficient for the plain-
(i) 2 Kent, Com. 469. — The same rule tiff to say, that is not the interest which
exists in the French Law. Code Napo- I agreed to purchase."
leon, No. 1601. (jj) T°me v. Dubois, 6 Wall. 548.

559

524

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

is no subject of sale ; as all the wool one shall ever have ; (&) x or
the sheep which a lessee has covenanted to leave at the end of
an existing term. If rights are vested, or possibilities are dis-
tinctly connected with interest or property, they may be sold. (Z)2
But if one sells what he has not now, and has made no contract
for purchasing, and has no definite right to expect, as by con-
signment, but intends to go into the market and buy, it has
been held that he cannot enforce this contract ; (m) 3 and
* 524 * although this is questioned, such a contract if enforcea-
ble, as by the later authority and the better reason it seems
to be, must certainly be regarded as a contract for a future sale,
and not as a present contract of sale ; and therefore the property
in the thing when it is acquired by the proposed vendor, does not

(k) See Grantham v. Hawley, Hob. 132.
See Langton v. Horton, 1 Hare, 656. But
a valid sale may be made of the wine
that a vineyard is expected to produce ;
or the grain that a field is expected to
grow ; or the milk that a cow may yield
during the coming year, or the future
young born of a female animal then owned
by the vendor, McCarty v. Blevins, 5 Yerg.
195; Congreve <■. Evetts, 26 E. L. & E.
493 ; s. c. 10 Exch. 298, or the wool that
shall hereafter grow upon his sheep. But
see Screws v. Roach, 22 Ala. 675.

(I) See Jones v. Roe, 3 T. R. 88.—
But the expectancy of an heir presump-
tive, or apparent (the fee-simple being in
the ancestor), is not an interest or a pos-
sibility capable of being the subject of a
contract. Carleton v. Leighton, 3 Meriv.
667.

(m) Bryan v. Lewis, Ry. & M. 386.
And see Lorymer v. Smith, 1 B. & C. 1 ;
8. c. 2 Dow. & R. 23, AbbM, C. J. ; Head
v. Goodwin, 37 Me. 187 ; Stanton v. Small,
3 Sandf. 230. But this doctrine was di-
rectly overruled in the case of Ilibble-
whlte v. McMorine, 5 M. & W. 462, where
Parke, B., in delivering the judgment of
the court, is reported to have said :
"I have always entertained considerable
doubt and suspicion as to the correctness
of Lord Tentrrden's doctrine in Bryan v.
Lewis ; it excited a good deal of surprise
in my mind at the time ; and when ex-
amined I think it is untenable. I cannot
see what principle of law is at all affected
by a man's being allowed to contract for

the sale of goods, of which he has not
possession at the time of the bargain, and
has no reasonable expectation of receiv-
ing. Such a contract does not amount to
a wager, inasmuch as both the contract-
ing parties are not cognizant of the fact
that the goods are not in the vendor's
possession ; and even if it were a wager,
it is not illegal, because it has no neces-
sary tendency to injure third parties. The
dictum of Lord Tenterden certainly was
not a hasty observation thrown out by
him, because it appears from the case of
Lorymer v. Smith that he had entertained
and expressed similar notions four years
before. He did not, indeed, in that case,
say that such a contract was void, but
only that it was of a kind not to be
encouraged ; and the strong opinion he
afterwards expressed appears to have
gradually formed in his mind during the
interval, and was no doubt confirmed by
the effects of the unfortunate mercan-
tile speculations throughout the country
about that time. There is no indication
in any of the books of such a doctrine
having ever been promulgated from the
bench, until the case of Lorymer v. Smith,
in the year 1822 ; and there is no case
which has been since decided on that au-
thority. Not only, then, was the doubt
expressed by Bosanquet, J., in Wells v.
Porter, well founded, but the doctrine is
clearly contrary to law." See also Wells
v. Porter, 2 Bing. N. C. 722, Bosanquet, J. ;
Mortimer o. McCallan, 6 M. & W. 58;
Stanton <■. Small, 3 Sandf. 230.

1 So a sale of fish to be caught passes no title to the fish when caught. Low v.
Pew, 108 Mass. 347. As to corn growing in the field at stipulated price for future
delivery, see Sanborn v. Benedict, 78 111. 309. See also Gittings v. Nelson, 86 111. 591.

2 Thrall v. Hill, 110 Mass. 328.

3 Noyes v. Jenkius, 55 Ga. 586 ; Brown v. Combs, 63 N. Y. 598.

560

CH. IT.] SALE OF PERSONAL PEOPEETY. * 525

pass at once to the proposed vendee until the actual sale be
made, (n)

A sale may be good in part, and void as to the residue ; good as
between the parties, but void as to creditors ; good as to some of
the creditors, but void as to others, (o)

SECTION III.

PRICE, AND AGREEMENT OF PAETIES.

The price to be paid must be certain, or so referred to a defi-
nite standard that it may be made certain ; ( p) x as what
another * man has given ; or what another man shall say * 525
should be the price ; but if this third party refuse to fix the

(n) Black a. Webb, 20 Ohio, 304 ; modo secundum ejus cvstimationem et pretium
Stanton v. Small, 3 Sandf . 230 ; Lunn v. persolvatur, et res tradatur, et vendit.io ad ef-
Thornton, 1 C. B. 385; Langton v. Hig- fentum perducaiur.' So it is said in Ay-
gins; 4 H. & N. 402. liffe, Civ. Law, b. 4, tit. 4 : 'The price .

(o) Bradford v. Tappan, 11 Pick. 76, agreed on between the parties ought to

79. be certain ; wherefore a purchase is not

(p) Brown v. Bellows, 4 Pick. 189, valid if it depends on the will of the buyer
where the price was fixed by referees, and or seller ; though such price may be well
the court said in giving judgment : " It enough referred to the arbitration of a
is objected that the price should have third person to adjudge and determine
been fixed by the agreement, whereas it the value of the thing sold.' ' And thus
was to be ascertained by the referees ; the certainty of a price may be had, ei-
and we are referred to Inst. 3, 24, pr. ther by the determination of the contract-
where it is said: 'Pretium autem conslitui ing parties themselves, or else by relation
oportet, nam nulla emptio sine pretio esse po- had to some person or thing.' In the case
test.' But we apply another rule — id cer- at bar, the referees have fixed the price,
turn est, quod cerium reddi potest. It was, and according to these authorities, and
indeed, formerly doubted whether, when the reason of the thing, the sale should
a thing was to be sold, at whatever price be carried into effect, unless for some
Titius should value it, such contract would other objection which has been made by
be good ; but by Inst. 3, 24, 1, it is decid- the counsel for the defendant, it should
ed that it would be 'sect nostra decisio ita be differently determined." See also Flagg
i hoc constituit, ut quoties sic composita sit ven- v. Mann, 2 Sumner, 539; Cunningham v.
ditio, quanti Me oestimaverit, sub hac condi- Ashbrook, 20 Mo. 553 ; McCandlish a.
tione staret contractus, ut siquidem ille, qui Newman, 22 Penn. St. 460.
nominatus est, pretium definierit tunc omni-

1 If not fixed, a reasonable price is implied, James v. Muir, 33 Mich. 223, 227 ;
as the market price at the time and place of delivery, McEwen v. Morey, 60 111. 32.
See Callaghan v. Myers, 89 ID. 566. The price may_ be fixed by valuers, Newlan v.
Dunham, 60 111. 233 ; but if they refuse to act, there is no contract in the case of an
executory sale, Wittkowsky v. "VVasson, 71 N. C. 451. If by a referee, there is no sale
until he fixes the price. Hutton v. Moore, 26 Ark. 382 ; Vickers v. Vickers, L. R.
4 Eq. 529. See Brown v. Cole, 45 la. 601. Where the price of wheat was to be
fixed by the seller by a certain standard, and it was destroyed before so fixed, it was
held to be the buyer's loss. McConnell v. Hughes, 29 Wis. 537 ; Easterlin v. Rylander,
59 Ga. 292 ; Ames v. Quimby, 96 U. S. 324.

vol. I. 36 561

* 526 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

price, the sale is void. ( q) And the thing sold must be specific,
and capable of certain identification. There must be an agree-
ment of mind as to this ; and if there be an honest error as to the
price, or as to the substantial and essential qualities of the thing
sold (not as to its mere worth or condition), the sale may be
treated as null ; (r) 1 but this perhaps should be confined to cases
where the difference between the thing bought, and the thing
supposed to be bought, is sufficient to affect its identity. For
anything less than this the parties must be left to the law of
warranty, (s) This agreement of mind may be expressed orally
or by letter ; but we have already considered these questions fully,
when treating of assent ; and we would refer in this connection to
what we there said, (t) adding here, that where a proposal to
purchase goods is made by letter sent to another State, and is
there assented to, the contract of sale is made in that State, and
if it is valid by the laws of the latter State, it will be enforced in
the State whence the letter is sent, although it would have been
invalid if made there, (u)

SECTION IV.

THE EFFECT OF A SALE.

Upon a completed sale the property in the thing sold passes to
the purchaser ; one of these things implies the other ; if the
* 526 * property passes then it is a completed sale ; and if a com-
pleted sale then the property passes. (i>)2 And no bill

(q) Story on Sales, § 220. A sale may wood upon which some machinery was

be made of an article for what it is worth, mounted, subsequently discovered treas-

for that can be ascertained by experts, ure of considerable value, which had

See Hoodley v. McLaine, 10 Bing. 187 ; been concealed within the block by the

Acebal v. Levy, id. 382. See also Dick- intestate, and which was held not to pass

son v. Jordan, 12 Ired. L. 79, and 11 Ired. by the sale.
L. 166. (s) See post, p.* 540, and cli. v. on War-

(r) See Kelly v. Solari, 9 M. & W. 54 ; ranty.
Lucas v. Worswick, 1 Mo. & Rob. 2'J3. (t) See ante, -p.* 479, et seq. See also

As to the sale being controlled by the in- Routledge v. Grant, 4 Bing. 653 ; Bean v,

tention of the parties, see Huthacher v. Burbank, 16 Me. 458.
Harris's Adm'r, 38 Penn. St. 491. In this (u) Mclntyre v. Parks, 3 Met. 207.

case there was an administrator's sale at (v) Ba>/lei/, J., in Simmons v. Swift, 5

auction, and a purchaser of a block of B. & C. 862 ; Dixon v. Yates, 2 Nev. &

1 As where there is a mistake as to the identity of thing sold. Webb v. Odell, 49
N. Y. 583 ; Bowen v. Sullivan, 62 Ind. 281 ; Kyle v. Kavanagh, 103 Mass. 356 ; Harvey
v. Harris, 112 Mass. 32. See Hills v. Snell, 104 Mass. 173.

2 Webber v. Davis, 44 Me. 147 ; Bailey v. Smith, 43 N. H. 141 ; Tome v. Dubois,
6 Wallace, 548 ; Crill v. Doyle, 53 Cal. 713; Sweeting u. Turner, L. K. 7 Q. B. 310.

562

CH. IV.] SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 526

or memorandum subsequently sent in, can by its terms vary the
contract, (w) If it be sold for cash and the price be not paid,
or if it be sold on a credit, but by the terms of the bargain is to
remain in the hands of the vendor, the vendor has a lien on it
for the price ; (V) and only payment or tender gives the vendee
a right to possession. And if it be sold on credit, and the buyer
by the terms of the bargain has the right of immediate possession
without payment, but the thing sold actually remains in the pos-
session of the seller until the credit has expired, and the price is
still unpaid, it seems that the seller then has a lien for the
price, (x) If it be sold on credit, and there is no agreement in
respect to the delivery or possession of the goods, the prevailing,
but not quite universal rule, gives to the purchaser at once a com-
plete right not only of property but of possession, («/) subject
only to defeasance under the law of stoppage in transitu.

If the property passes, though not the right of possession, and
the thing sold perish, the loss falls on the purchaser, (z) l The

M. 202, Parke, J. ; Atkin v. Barwick, 1 ling v. Baxter, 6 B. & C. 362 ; Felton v.
Stra.167, where Fortesque, J., says: "Prop- Fuller, 9 Foster (N. H.), 121. — See, how-
erty by our law may be divested without ever, Baley v. Culverwell, 2 Mood. & R.
an actual delivery; as a horse in a sta- 6bti ; Langfort v. Tiler, 1 Salk. 113.
ble." It is exactly otherwise in the Roman (vv) Shucardt v. Aliens, 1 Wall.' 359.
civil law, and the laws of those nations \w) Bloxam v. Sanders, i B. & C. 948;
in Europe which adopt the civil law as Cornwall r. Haight, 8 Barb. 328 ; Bowen
the basis of their law. The property v. Burk, 13 Penn, St. 146. See also Dixon
(dominium) does not pass until delivery, v. Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313; Withers v.
Thus, if a seller retains the thing sold, to Lyss, 4 Camp. 237 ; Bush v. Davies, 2 M.
be delivered a week hence, and in the & Sel. 397; Langfort v. Tiler, 1 Salk. 113.
mean time becomes insolvent, the buyer And see Foley v. Mason, 6 Md. 37 ; Hen-
does not hold the thing, but it goes with derson v. Lauck, 21 Penn. St. 359; Swee-
his assets to the assignees. All the buyer uey v. Owsley, 14 B. Mon. 413.
holds is a claim against the seller for the (x) New v. Swain, Dan. & L. 193 ;
value of the thing, and for this debt of Lewis o. Covilland. 21 Cal. 178 ; Wil-
the seller the buyer takes only his divi- liams v. Young, 21 Cal. 227.
dend like other creditors ; for by a sale (y) Cartland v. Morison, 32 Me. 191 ;
only, without delivery, the buyer acquires Kimbro v. Hamilton, 2 Swan, 190 ; Hall
only a jus ad rem and not a jus in re. See v. Robinson, 2 Comst. 293. But Magoon
1 Bell, Com. 166, et seg. But for the com- v. Ankeny, 11 111. 558, and O'Keefe v.
mon-law rule, see the cases cited in the Kellogg, 15 111. 347, may be considered as
next note; also Noy, Maxims, p. 88; Hinde denying, or at least as qualifying this
v. Whitehouse, 7 East, 558, Lord Ellen- rule.
borough; Com. Dig. Agreement, B. 3; Tar- (z) Tarling <,. Baxter, 6 B. & C. 362.

See Morse v. Sherman, 106 Mass. 430; Foster v. Ropes, 111 Mass. 10; Haskins v.
Warren, 115 Mass. 514; Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325, 332; Lester v. East,
49 Ind. 588 ; Jenkins v. Jarrett, 70 N. C. 255 ; Hanauer v. Bartels, 2 Col. 514. _ If a
buyer agrees to remove the goods within a certain time, failure so to do may justify
the seller in repudiating the sale. Kellam v. McKinstry, 69 N. Y. 264 ; Bolton v.
Riddle, 35 Mich. 13. A sale is complete when the thing sold is so situated that the
buyer can take it at his pleasure. Turner v. Langdon, 112 Mass. 265 ; Marsh ». Rouse,
44 N. Y. 643; Rattary v. Cook, 50 Ala. 352; Partridge v. Wooding, 44 Conn. 277;
Sibley v. Tie, 88 111. 287.

1 Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450; Smith v. Dallas, 35 Ind. 255 ; Whitcomb v.

563

* 527 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

vendor's lien is destroyed by a delivery of the goods, or by a
delivery of a part, without intention to separate it from

* 527 the rest, but * with an intention thereby to give posses-

sion of the whole, (a) If sold for cash, and the money
be not paid within a reasonable time, the vendor may treat the
sale as null. (6) There may, however, be a delay in the payment
justified by the terms or the nature of the contract.

The property does not pass absolutely unless the sale be com-
pleted ; and it is not completed until the happening of any event
expressly provided for, or so long as anything remains to be done
to the thing sold, to put it into a condition for sale, or to identify
it, or discriminate it from other things, (e) 1 Thus if one buys one

See also Willis v. Willis, 6 Dana, 48; Mass. 1858, 11 Law Rep. 561. Of course

Macomber v. Parker, 13 Pick. 183; Far- if the vendee obtains possession by fraud,

num v. Perry, 4 Law Eep. 276 ; Crawford he can derive no rights, and the vendor

v. Smith, 7 Dana, 61. can lose none by such a delivery. Earl

(a) Mere delivery of part will not, of Bristol v. Willsmore, 1 B. & C. 514.

however, divest the vendor of his lien, as See also Hussey !•. Thornton, 4 Mass.

to the whole, if anything remains to be 405 ; Donahue v. Cromartie. 21 Cal. 80.
done by the vendor to the part undeliv- (ft) Anonymous, Dyer, 30 a. See also

ered. Simmons v. Swift, 5 B. & 0. 857. Langfort v. Tiler, 1 Salk. 113. But see

See on this subject Slubey r. Hcyward, 2 Greaves t: Ashlin, 3 Camp. 426, contra.

H. Bl. 504; Hammond v. Anderson, 4 B. Sec also Blackburn on Contract of Sale,

& P. 69 ; Hanson t: Meyer, 6 East, 614 ; p. 328, tt se<).

Ward v. Shaw, 7 Wend. 404; Payne v. (c) Bailey a. Smith, 43 K. H. 141;

Shadbolt, 1 Camp. 427 ; Brewer r. Salis- Gardner r. Lane, 9 Allen, 492 ; Strauss r.

bury, 9 Barb. 511; Weld v. Cutler, 2 Ross, 20 Ind. 300; Mc Clung i>. Kelley, 21

Gray, 195 ; Haskall v. Rice, S. J. Ct. Iowa, 608.

Whitney, 24 Mich. 486. — Where goods were purchased to be paid for when used or
disposed of, and a part was afterwards destroyed, it was held that the buyer must pay
for those destroyed. Powers v. Dellinger, 54 Wis. 389.

1 Where anything remains to be done, as weighing, measuring, or testing to deter-
mine the price, property does not pass although goods be ascertained and they are in
a state for acceptance. Johnson v. Lancashire R. Co. 3 C. P. D. 499; Foster v. Ropes,
111 Mass. 10; Gibbs v. Benjamin, 45 Vt. 124 ; Lingham v. Eggleston, 27 Mich. 324 ;
Dyer v. Libby, 61 Me. 45 ; Smart v. Batclielder, 57 X. II. 140 ; Southwestern Co. r.
Stanard, 44 Mo. 71 ; Ormsbee v. Machir, 20 Ohio St. 295 ; Lester v. East, 49 Ind. 588 ;
Morrison v. Dingley, 63 Me. 553 ; Leigh v. Mobile, &c. R. Co. 58 Ala. 165 ; Gravett v.
Mugge, 89 111. 218"; Burrows r. Whittaker, 71 ~S. Y. 291. — But the title to specific
goods passes before delivery, if such intent is expressed or implied, although the
seller has to do something more to the property, Marble v. Moore, 102 Mass. 443 ; as
to test or to count, Russell v. Carrington, 42 N. Y. 118; Watts v. Hendry, 13 Fla.
523; Wilkinson v. Holiday, 33 Mich. 386; Straus .■. Minzesheimer, 78 111. 492; Groat
v. Gile, 51 N. Y. 431 ; Morrow v. Reed, 30 Wis. 81 ; but if the intention is that some-
thing be done before completion, whether by the seller, buyer, or a third person, the
title does not pass, Foster v. Ropes, 1 1 1 Mass. 10 ; l'rcscott v. Locke, 51 K. H. 94 ; Pike
v. Vaughn, 39 Wis. 499 ; Darden v. Lovelace, 52 Ala. 289 ; Flanders c. Maynard, 58
Ga. 56 ; although placed in the buyer's hands, Kein v. Tupper, 52 N. Y. 550. To pass
title to an unfinished specific chattel, an express intent must appear, Thorndike v.
Bath, 114 Mass. 116 ; with express or implied acceptance, Brown r. Foster, 113 Mass.
136 ; Higgins i>. Murray, 73 N. Y. 252 ; Zaleski v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218. See Goddard
v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450; Pratt v. Maynard, 116 Mass. 388; Shawhan v. Van Nest,
25 Ohio St. 490; Seckel v. Scott, 66 111. 106. Morrow r. Delaney, 41 Wis. 149, de-
cided that under a contract declaring that the plaintiff " has this day sold " certain
specified logs lying in a certain place, " which are to be scaled where they now lie," the

564

CH. IV.J SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 527

hundred bushels of wheat out of two hundred, and is to send bags
or boxes for them which the seller is to fill ; and the buyer sends
bags enough for twenty bushels which the seller fills, and after-
wards the seller refuses to send any wheat whatever, it is held,
that the property in the twenty bushels put into the bags passes
to the buyer ; but not so of the other eighty. (<f) Where several
parties store grain in an elevator, in one mass, they are tenants
in common of the mass ; and if an order of the vendor on the
owners of the elevator, to deliver to a purchaser a certain quan-
tity, is accepted by the owners in their customary manner, that
quantity passes to the purchaser, (dd) 1 It has been held, that
where articles in process of manufacture under an agreement to
make and deliver to the vendee, he supplying certain specified
parts necessary to their completion, are lost by fire, while in pos-
session of the maker, their completion and delivery being delayed
solely by the neglect of the vendee to furnish the parts specified,
the loss must fall upon the maker, and not upon the vendee, (e)

(d) Aldridge v. Johnson, 7 E. & B. 885. (dd) Cushing v. Breed, 14 Allen, 37S.

See also Langhton u. Higgins, 4 H. & N. See post, vol. 2, p. * 137, note (66).
402, for a direct authority upon this (e) MeConike v. N. Y. & E, B. R. Co.

point. 20 N. Y. (6 Smith), 495. See post, chap-

ter on Liens.

title passed to the huyer and the logs were at his risk. See Hahn v. Fredericks, 30
Mich. 223, as to the title of hard wood mixed with soft in piles passing before separa-
tion. — The title to goods not specified will not pass until appropriation. Indianapolis
R. Co. v. Maguire, 62 Ind. 140 ; Smyth v. Ward, 46 la. 339. See Chapman u. Shep-
ard, 39 Conn. 413 ; Phillips v. Ocmulgee Mills, 55 Ga. 633 ; Morrison v. Dingley, 63
Me. 553 ; Cumberland, &c. Co. v. Andes Ins. Co. 64 Me. 466 ; Kein o. Tupper, 52
N. Y. 550 ; Hurff v. Hires, 11 Vroom, 581 ; Ferguson v. Northern Bank, 14 Bush, 555 ;
Southwell )'. Beezley, 5 Oreg. 143; Keeler v. Goodwin, 111 Mass. 490; Home Ins.
Co. v. Heck, 65 111. 111. As to election, see Lynch v. O'Donnell, 127 Mass. 311. A
delivery by the vendor to a carrier by the buyer's order is an appropriation, Krulder
v. Ellison, 47 N. Y. 36; Odell v. B."& M. R.'Co. 109 Mass. 50; Sneathen v. Grubbs,
88 Penn. St. 147; Green Bay Bank v. Dearborn, 115 Mass. 219; Groff v. Belche, 62
Mo. 400; as well as a discount of bill of lading is such of goods named therein,
Holmes v. German Sec. Bank, 87 Penn. St. 525 ; First National Bank v. Pettit, 9
Heiskell, 447. A vendor cannot send in excess of an order and make the buyer
select. Rommel v. Wingate, 103 Mass. 327; Borrowman v. Free, 4 Q. B. D. 500;
Tarling v. O'Riordan, 2 L. R. Ir. 82.

1 Subject, however, to the seller's lien until the delivery is absolute. Keeler v.
Goodwin, 111 Mass. 490. A contract acknowledging receipt of grain for storage,
with option to return grain of equal test and value, is of bailment, which becomes
sale when the bailee disposes of grain. Nelson v. Brown, 44 Iowa, 455. See Irons v.
Kentner, 51 la. 88 ; Sexton v. Graham, 53 la. 181. But when grain is deposited with
a warehouseman, and when the depositor desires to sell, the former will pay the high-
est market price or return like grain, it is a sale, not a bailment. Johnston v. Browne,
37 Iowa, 200. So where the price is to be fixed on any day decided on by depositor.
Lonergan v. Stewart, 55 111. 44. As to tenancy in common, see Ferguson v. Northern
Bank, 14 Bush, 555 ; Russell v. Carrington, 42 N. Y. 118; Morrison v. Woodley, 84
HI. 192. Usage makes the possession of warehouse receipts of grain equivalent to
its possession. Broadwell v. Howard, 77 111. 305. See Keeler v. Goodwin, 111 Mass.
490 ; Bailey v. Bensley, 87 111. 556.

565

*528

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

Nor is the sale completed while anything remains to be done to
determine its quantity, if the price depends on this ; unless this is

to be done by the buyer alone. (/) And even if earnest,
* 528 or a part * of the price be paid, the sale is not complete

under these circumstances, and if it finally fail, the money
paid may be recovered back. (#) But if on a sale of goods, any-
thing remains to be done by the buyer, and it nevertheless appears
by the terms of the contract that the parties intend that the prop-
erty should pass at once by the bargain from the seller to the
buyer, it will so pass. (gg~) 1 Upon a sale of goods in bond, the
property passes to the purchaser, upon delivery to a carrier
selected by him (although they remain subject to lien for duties,
and to the custody of the customs officers), during their overland
transit to the port of exportation and delay there until authority
to pass them is received ; and although the vendor volunteers to
take the necessary steps for obtaining the authority. (A)

{f) Tarling ti. Baxter, 6 B. & C. 360;
Gillet r. Hill, 2 Cr. & M. 535 ; Zagury v.
Furnell, 2 Camp. 240 ; Wallace v. Breeds,
13 East, 522 ; Busk r. Davis, 2 M. & Sel.
397 ; Shepley v. Davis, 5 Taunt. 617 ;
Rhodes v. Thuaites, 6 B. & C. 388; Al-
exander v. Gardner, 1 Bing. N. C. 676.
But where the thing to be done by the
vendor is but trifling, or is but a mathe-
matical computation, this rule will not
apply. Thus, where there was a sale of
certain trees, at a fixed price per cubic
foot, and all the trees had been marked,
and the cubical contents of each tree as-
certained, it was held, that the property
passed to the purchaser, although the
sum total of the cubical contents had not
been ascertained. Tansley v. Turner, 2
Bing. N. C. 151 ; s. c. 2 Scott, 238 ; and
see Cunningham r. Ashbrook, 20 Mo.
553. The general principle stated in the
text is recognized in the following Amer-
ican cases : Dixon r. Myers, 7 Gratt. 240 ;
Ward !■ Shaw, 7 Wend. 404 ; McDonald
v. Hewett, 15 Johns. 349; Barrett v. God-
dard, 3 Mason, 112; Rapelye v. Mackie,
6 Cowen, 250 ; Russell v. Nicoll, 3 Wend.
112; Outwater v. Dodge, 7 Cowen, 85;
Stevens v. Eno, 10 Barb. 95 ; Damon v.
Osborne, 1 Pick. 476 ; Macomber v. Par-
ker, 13 id. 175; Houdlette v. Tallman, 14
Me. 400; Cushman o. Holyoke, 34 id.

289 ; Stone v. Peacock, 35 id. 385 ; Golder
v. Ogden, 15 Penn. St. 528; Lester v.
McDowell, 18 Penn. St. 91; Nesbit v.
Burry, 25 Penn. St. 208; Riddle r. Var-
num, 20 Pick. 280 ; Davis v. Hill, 3 N. H.
382; Messer v. Woodman, 2 Foster (N.
H), 172 ; Warren v. Buckminster, 4
Foster (N. H.), 337; Crawford v. Smith,
7 Dana, 61. — But it is held, that if the
parties intended that the sale should
be complete before the article sold is
weighed or measured, the property will
pass before this is done. Riddle v. Var-
nuni, 20 Pick. 280. See also Butterworth
v. McKinly, 11 Humph. 206; Waldron v.
Chase, 37 Me. 414; Moody r. Brown, 34
id. 107 ; Olyphant v. Baker, 5 Denio, 379 ;
Dennis v. Alexander, 3 Barr, 50 ; Crofoot
v. Bennett, 2 Comst. 258 ; Brewer v. Sal-
isbury, 9 Barb. 511; Cushman p. Holy-
oke, id. 289. But see Waldo u. Belcher,
11 Ired. L. 609.

(q) Nesbit v. Burry, 25 Penn. St. 208;
Joyce v. Adams, 4 Seld. 291.

(qcj) Turley v. Bates, 2 Hurl. & Colt.
200; Ford v. Chambers, 28 Cal. 13;
Fitch v. Burk. 38 Vt. 683 ; Young v. Mat-
thews, L. R. 2 C. P. 127 ; Cummings v.
Griggs, 2 Duvall, 87 ; Burr v. Williams,
23 Ark. 244.

(h) Waldron v. Romain, 22 N. Y.
368.

1 Martineau v. Kitching, L. R. 7 Q. B. 436 ; Burrows v. Whitaker, 71 N. Y. 291 ;
Hurff v. Hires, 11 Vroom, 581 ; Carpenter v. Graham, 42 Mich. 191 ; or if something
is to be done by the vendor but at the vendee's direction and for his convenience.
Whitcomb v. Whitney, 24 Mich. 486.

* 5G6

CH. IV.] SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 529

An agreement to sell is a different thing from a sale, and there-
fore no mere promise to sell hereafter, amounts to a present sale ;
so, an acceptance of a specific order for certain chattels, is not itself
a sale of those chattels, either to the drawer or to the party in
whose favor the order is drawn, (i) And it is always a question
of fact for the jury, whether a sale has been completed or not. (/)
The frequent importance of this question arises from the rule,
which we repeat, that if a sale be complete, the property in the
thing sold passes to the buyer ; and if the sale is not complete, it
remains with the original owner.1

We are aware of no difference between the Roman civil
* and the common law, in regard to any part of ' the law * 529
of contracts, greater or more definite in principle and
theory than that which relates to this subject. But in practice
the result was not so different. By the Roman law, the sale
without delivery did not pass the property. It gave to the buyer
a jus ad rem, but not a jus in re until possession. Leaving the
property in the hands of the seller, it created two obligations, —
one on the part of the buyer to pay the price, and, for this debt,
the thing sold was a pignus in the hands of the seller ; the other
on the part of the seller to deliver the thing so pledged on pay-
ment of the debt. But if the pledge perished without the fault of
the seller, he could not be called on to return the pledge, but might
still call on the buyer to pay his debt, — that is, the price. (&)
In Louisiana, it is held, that if by the terms announced at a public
sale, the purchaser has a certain time to remove the goods, during
the whole of that time they are at the risk of the seller, {hie)

(i) Burrall v. Jacob, 1 Barb. 165. trated in Bell's Commentaries on the Law

(j) De Kidder v. McKnight, 13 Johns, of Scotland.
294. (kk) Gleason v. Sykes, 18 La. Ann.

(h) This whole subject is well illus- 627.

1 Lester v. East, 49 Ind. 588, 592 ; The Elgee Cotton Cases, 22 Wallace, 180; Leigh
v. Mobile, &c. B. Co. 58 Ala. 165 ; Cardinell v. Bennett, 52 Cal. 476 ; Olney v. Howe,
89 111. 556. Whether, upon an agreement to sell, the title passes, depends upon the
intention of the parties. Bethel, &c. Co. v. Brown, 57 Me. 9, 18 ; Prescott v. Locke,
51 N. H. 94, 101 ; Bussell v. Carrington, 42 N. Y. 118 ; Fitch v. Burk, 38 Vt. 683, 689 ;
Dugan v. Nichols, 125 Mass. 43; Hurd v. Cook, 75 N. Y. 454; Dyer v. Libby, 61 Me.
45 ; Lester v. East, 49 Ind. 588 ; Wilkinson v. Holiday, 33 Mich. 386 ; Ogg v. Shuter,
L. R. 10 C. P. 159, 162. As .to whether there is such intent is for jury, Marble v.
Moore, 102 Mass. 443 ; Kelsea v. Haines, 41 N. H. 246, 253 ; Dyer v. Libby, 61 Me. 45 ;
and such intent must be manifest when the bargain is made, Foster v. Ropes, 1 1 1 Mass.
10 ; Lingham v. Eggleston, 27 Mich. 324.

567

* 529 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

SECTION V.

OP POSSESSION AND DELIVERY.

While, as between the parties, the property passes by a sale
without delivery, if such is the intention, (kV) it is not valid, in
general, as against a third party without notice, without delivery.1
For if the same thing be sold by the vendor to two parties, by
conveyances equally valid, he who first gets possession will hold
it. (I) In general, where there is a completed sale, and no change
of possession, this retention of possession by the vendor is a
badge of fraud, and will avoid the sale in favor of a party who
subsequently acquires title to the property in good faith, either by

(H) Burt v. Dutcher, 34 N. Y. 493. 419; Fletcher v. Howard, 2 Aik. 115;

(/) 2 Kent, Com. 522 ; Dawes v . Cope, Bay !,'. Cook, 31 111. 336 ; Cullam v. Guil-
4 Binn. 258 ; Babb v. Clemson, 10 S. & R. lot, 18 La. Ann. 608.

1 A sale of a specific chattel passes property without delivery. Buffinton v. Ulen,
7 Bush, 231 ; Bigler v. Hall, 54 N. Y. 167. When nothing is said as to payment, the
presumption is that payment of price and delivery of possession are concurrent con-
ditions. Scudder v. Bradbury, 106 Mass. 422, 427 ; Phelps v. Hubbard, 51 Vt. 489 ;
Michigan, &c. R. Co. v. Phillips, 60 111. 190 ; S. W. Freight Co. v. Plant, 45 Mo. 517. A
delivery of possession by the vendor without insisting upon the payment of price waives
his right both to title and lien. Freeman v. Nichols, 116 Mass. 309 ; Mackaness v. Long,
85 Penn. St. 158. If a delivery is made in expectation of immediate payment, refusal
eo to do entitles the seller to reclaim the property. Hodgson r. Barrett, 33 Ohio St. 63 ;
Owens v. Weedman, 82 111. 409. — Of ponderous or intangible articles, a constructive
delivery is sufficient. Hayden r. Demets, 53 N. Y. 426 ; People's Bank v. Gridley,
91 111. 457 ; Audenreid v. Randall, 3 Cliff. 99 ; Xewcomb v. Cabell, 10 Bush, 460 ; Puck-
ett v. Reed, 31 Ark. 131. — A delivery by the owner of a carrier's receipt for goods is
a symbolical delivery. Green Bay Bank v. Dearborn, 115 Mass. 219. See Kewcomb
v. Boston, &c. R. Co. 115 Mass. 230; Stollenwerck v. Thacher, 115 Mass. 224. But a
sale without delivery, actual or constructive, is invalid against subsequent purchasers,
attaching creditors, aud those similarly situated. Haak v. Linderman, 64 Penn. St.
499 ; Mosher v. Smith, 67 Me. 172 ; Crawford v. Forristall, 58 N. H. 114 ; Seymour v.
O'Keefe, 44 Conn. 128 ; Richardson v. Rardin, 88 111. 124; Pettengill v. Elkius, 50 Vt.
431 ; Uhl v. Robinson, 8 Neb. 272 ; Wilson v. Paulsen, 57 Ga. 596 ; Sutton v. Ballou, 46
la. 517 ; Conway v. Edwards, 6 Nev. 190; Morgan v. Taylor, 32 Tex. 363. A bill of
sale of a horse, continued to be kept in the seller's stable, is insufficient against his
creditors, Dempsey v. Gardner, 127 Mass. 381. An accepted offer to buy a piano, when
finished, the making a bill of sale of it and payment of the price at a subsequent day,
is enough for a jury to find a delivery and passage of title against a subsequent pur-
chaser. Thorndike v. Bath, 114 Mass. 116. A written transfer and delivery of a stock
certificate to a bond fide purchaser is valid against the seller's attaching creditor. Bos-
ton Music Hall Ass. o. Cory, 129 Mass. 435. If the thing sold is in a third person's
hands, notice to him is a delivery against a subsequent attaching creditor. Dempsey
v. Gardner, 127 Mass. 381, 383 ; Russell v. O'Brien, 127 Mass. 349 ; Puckett v. Reed,
31 Ark. 131 ; Cofield r. Clark, 2 Col. 101. A survey of logs by a mutually agreed on
person, and putting on them the purchaser's mark, is sufficient delivery even against
subsequent purchasers, although the vendor was bound to deliver the logs farther down
the stream. Bethel, &c. Co. v. Brown, 57 Me. 9. See Thorndike v. Bath, 114 Mass. 116.

568

CH. IV.]

SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.

'580

transfer or by attachment, (11) and with no knowledge of the sale.
In the days of Mansfield and Butter, possession retained by the
seller or mortgagor of chattels, gave rise to an inference of law of
fraud. This severe doctrine has certainly been held in many
cases down to the present day, both in England and in this
country. But the rule has been much modified * in other * 530
cases. And there seems now to be a tendency to consider
the question of fraud in all such cases as a question of fact, in
relation to which the circumstance of possession is of great
weight, though not absolutely conclusive. The question is thus
taken from the court who should infer it from a single fact, and
is left to the jury, who may consider all the facts, and determine
how far the fact of possession is explained, and made consistent
with an honest purpose. («i) 1 And it is said that where the con-

(//) Tanneret v. Edwards, 18 La. Ann.
606 ; Walker v. Collier, 37 111. 362.

(m) Although few questions in the law
present a greater conflict of authorities
than this, we believe that reason, anal-
ogy, and the current of a modern au-
thority, both English and American, sup-
port the principle laid down in the text.
The subject is ably examined in 2 Kent,
Com. 515, et seq. ; and Smith, Lead. Cas.
(4th Am. ed.) vol. 1, p. 1, et seq. The fol-
lowing authorities adopt the views of the
text : Cadogan v. Kennett, Cowp. 432 ;
Eastwood v. Brown, Ry. & M. 312 ; Kidd
v. Rawlinson, 2 B. & P. 59 ; Cole v. Davies,
1 Ld. Raym. 724; Lady Arundell v.
Phipps, 10 Ves. 145; Watkins v. Birch, 4
Taunt. 823 ; Latimer v. Batson, 4 B. & C.
652 ; Steward v. Lombe, 1 Br. & B. 506;
Wooderman v. Baldock, 8 Taunt. 676 ;
Hoffman v. Pitt, 5 Esp. 22 ; Armstrong v.
Baldock, Gow, 33 ; Storer v. Hunter, 3 B.
& C. 368; Land v. Jeffries, 5 Rand. (Va.)
211; Terry ». Belcher, 1 Bailey, 568;
Howard v. Williams, id. 575 ; Smith v.
Henry, 2 id. 118; Callen v. Thompson, 3
Yerg. 475 ; Maney v. Killough, 7 id. 440 ;
Mitchell v. Beal, 8 id. 142; Baylor v.
Smithers, 1 Litt. 112 ; Goldsbury v. May,
id. 256 ; Hundley v. Webb, 3 J. J. Marsh.
643; Walsh v. Medley, 1 Dana, 269; Bis-
sell v. Hopkins, 3 Cowen, 166 ; Thompson
v. Blanchard, 4 Comst. 303 ; Griswold v.
Sheldon, id. 580; Brooks v. Powers, 15
Mass. 244 ; Bartlett v. Williams, 1 Pick.
288; Homes v. Crane, 2 id. 607; Wheeler
v. Train, 3 id. 255 ; Adams v. Wheeler,
10 id. 199 ; Marden v. Babcock, 2 Met.
99; Haven u. Low, 2 N. H. 13; Kendall

v. Fitts, 2 Foster (N. H), 1; Walcott v.
Keith, id. 198 ; Coburn v. Pickering, 3 id.
415; Clark v. Morse, 10 N. H. 239; Reed
v. Jewett, 5 Greenl. 96; Cutter v. Cope-
land, 18 Me. 127 ; Comstock v. Rayford,
12 Sm. & M. 369 ; Field v. Simco, 2 Eng.
(Ark.) 269; Erwin v. Bank of Kentucky,
5 La. Ann. 1 ; Collins v. Pellerin, id. 99 ;
Bryant v. Kelton, 1 Tex. 416. See Ball
v. Loomis, 29 N. Y. 412 ; State v. Evans,
38 Mo. 150; George v. Norris, 23 Ark.
121. — It must be confessed, however, that
there is a host of decisions in support of
the opposite principle, and that it still has
the sanction of very sound, respectable,
and learned courts. The doctrine was
first laid down in Twyne's case, 3 Rep.
87, and has since been recognized or
adopted in the following among other
cases : Edwards o. Harben, 2 T. R. 587 ;
Paget v. Perchard, 1 Esp. 205; Wordell
v. Smith, 1 Camp. 332 ; Reed o. Wilmot,
5 Mo. & P. 553 ; Hamilton v. Russell, 1
Cranch, 309 ; Alexander v. Deneale, 2
Munf. 341 ; Robertson v. Ewell, 3 id. 1 ;
Kennedy v. Ross, 2 Rep. Con. Ct. 125;
Hudnal v. Wilder, 4 McCord, 294 ; Ragan
v. Kennedy, 1 Overt. 91 ; Brummel v.
Stockton, 3 Dana, 134; Laughlin v. Fur-
guson, 6 id. 117 ; Jarvis v. Davis, 14 B.
Mon. 533; Young v. McClure, 2 W. & S.
147 ; Brady v. Haines, 18 Penn. St. 113 ;
Bowman v. Herring, 4 Harring. (Del.)
458; McBride v. McClellan, 6 W. & S.
94; Thornton v. Davenport, 1 Scam. 296;
Chumar v. Wood, 1 Halst. 155 ; Patten v.
Smith, 5 Conn. 196 ; Weeks v. Wead, 2
Aik. 64 ; Beattie v. Robin, 2 Vt. 181 ;
Farnsworth v. Shepard, 6 id. 521; Wil-

i Ingalls v. Herrick, 108 Mass. 351 ; Mead v. Gardiner, 13 R. I. 257.

569

* 531 THE LAW OP CONTBACTS. [BOOK III.

tract is bond fide and otherwise completed, slight acts suffice to
prove a delivery as against the claims of third parties, (mm) It
is held in California, that where cattle roaming with those of
other owners were sold, the purchaser will not be affected by
want of delivery, until he has had a reasonable time for selecting
and branding them, (mri) Goods are fraudulently purchased, if
the buyer intends not to pay for them, and the seller may recover
possession of them, from the purchaser or one who buys from him
with knowledge of the fraud, (mo) l If one resists the payment
of the price on the ground of fraud in the seller, he must prove
not only that the seller made false statements, but that he knew
them to be false, (mp) If a vendor proceeds to judgment for the
price after knowing the fraud, he loses his right to retake the
goods, (mq) But a mere demand of payment does not defeat the
vendor's right, (mr)

The delivery may be symbolical, or of a part for the
whole ; (n) 2 and a delivery of the key, the property being

* 531 * locked up, is so far a delivery of the goods, that it will

support an action of trespass against a subsequent pur-
chaser who gets possession of them, (o) If the goods are in
possession of another than the vendor, an order to him, with pay-
ment of the price by the buyer, completes the sale. (00) A sale

son 11. Hooper, 12 id. 653; Hutelrins v. (mo) King v. Phillips, 8 Bosw. 603;

Gilchrist, 23 id. 82 ; Gihson v. Love, 4 Fla. and see Rateau v. Bernard, 3 Blatch. C. C.

217 ; Sturtevant o. Ballard, 9 Johns. 337. 244, and Anderson v. Nicholas, 28 N. Y.

— But in those courts where the doctrine BOO.

of Twyne's case has been received with (mp) King v. Eagle Mills, 10 Allen,

favor, the rule has not been applied to 548.

sales on execution, which are in their nat- (mq) Bank of Beloit v. Beale, 24 N. Y.

ure public and notorious. Simerson i>. 473.

Branch Bank, 12 Ala. 205; Garland u. (mr) Mannings. Albee, 11 Allen, 520.

Chambers, 11 Srn. & M. 337; Foster v. (n) See Chamberlain v. Farr, 23 Vt.

Pugh, 12 id. 416; Abney v. Kingsland, 10 265; Brewer v. Salisbury, 9 Barb. 511 ;

Ala. 355. Evans v. Harris, 19 id. 416 ; Packard v.

(mm) Stinson v. Clark, 6 Allen, 340. Dunsmore, 11 Cush. 282 ; Vining </. Gil-
See also Burge v. Cone, 6 Allen, 412 ; breth, 39 Me. 496.

Dewartu. Clement, 48 Penn. St. 413; Miles (o) Chappel v. Marvine, 2 Aik. 79;

v. Edelen, 1 Duvall, 270 ; State v. Rosen- Benford v. Schell, 55 Penn. St. 393.

feld, 35 Mo. 472. (oo) M'Cormick «. Hadden, 37 111.

(mn) Walden v. Murdock, 23 Cal. 540. 370.

1 Oswego Starch Factory v. Lendrum, 57 la. 573.

2 As by a tender of warehouse receipts. Gregory v. Wendell, 39 Mich. 337 ; 40
Mich. 432. The delivery of a common carrier's receipt by an owner of goods, as
security for an advance of money, with the intention to transfer the property in
the goods, is a symbolical delivery of them, and vests in the person making the ad-
vance a special property in the goods sufficient to maintain replevin. Green Bay
Bank v. Dearborn, 115 Mass. 219 ; Stollenwerck i>. Thacher, id. 224 ; Fifth National
Bank of Chicago v. Bayley, id. 228 ; Newcomb v. Boston, &c. R. Co. id. 230 ; Alder-
man v. Eastern R. Co. id. 233.

570

CH- IV-] SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 531

of cotton may be evidenced by a delivery of the ginner's re-
ceipts, (op) The intent to deliver must accompany the act,
whatever that is, to give it the legal effect of delivery, (oq)
Marking timber on a wharf, or goods in a warehouse, operates as
a delivery ; goods bought in a shop, weighed or measured, and
separated, and left by the owner until called for, are sufficiently
delivered ; (p) 1 and horses bought at livery, and remaining at liv-
ery with the seller at his request, are said to be delivered to the
buyer, (q) This last case has been questioned, but it seems to
come under the general analogy, for the purchaser incurs at once
a liability for their keeping. It is true, however, that later cases
apply a stricter rule than formerly to constructive delivery ; and
the presumption of delivery is not to be favored, because it de-
prives the seller of his lien without payment, (r) But if goods
are sent, even under a contract of sale, to be applied by the re-
ceiver (who was to be the buyer) to a particular purpose (as to
take up certain bills of exchange) to which purpose they were not
and could not be applied, the sender does not lose his property in
them by the delivery, but may recover them back. («) And if
property be awarded to one by arbitrators, at a certain price, the
tender of the price does not pass the property, unless the other
party accept the price, (t)

(op) Waller v. Parker, 5 Cold. 476. horse by the vendee within the statute of

(og) Susquehanna, &c. Co. v. Finney, frauds. Although Elmore v. Stone has

68 Penn. St. 200. been much doubted, it seems not to have

(p) So selecting and marking sheep, been expressly overruled. See Smith u.

then in the possession of one who was re- Surman, 9 B. & C. 570, Bayley, J.
quested by the vendee to retain posses- (r) Dole v. Stimpson, 21 Pick. 384.

sion of them for him, is a sufficient de- See also Tempest v. Fitzgerald, 3 B. &

livery. Barney v. Brown, 2 Vt. 374. For Aid. 680 ; Baldey v. Parker, 2 B. & C. 37.

other instances of constructive delivery, But these cases arose under the statute of

see Hatch v. Bayley, 12 Cush. 27 ; and frauds, and turned upon what was a suf-

Hatch v. Lincoln, 12 Cush. 31. ficient acceptance within that act. But

(q) Elmore i'. Stone, 1 Taunt. 458. But there may be, perhaps, a delivery good at

see the subsequent case of Carter v. Tous- common law, which would not amount

saint, 5 B. & Aid. 855. In that case a to an acceptance within the statute of

horse was sold by verbal contract, but no frauds.

time was fixed for the payment of the (s) Moore v. Barthop, 1 B. & C. 5 ;

price. The horse was to remain with Thompson v. Tiles, 2 B. & C. 422 ; Giles

the vendors for twenty days without any v. Perkins, 9 East, 12; Bent v. Fuller, 5

charge to the vendee. At the expiration T. R. 294 ; Zinck v. Walker, 2 W. Bl.

of that time, the horse was sent to grass, 1154 ; Parke v. Eliason, 1 East, 544.
by the direction of the vendee, and by (t) Hunter v. Rice, 15 East, 100. And

his desire entered as the horse of one of Lord Ellenborough said : " There is a dif-

the vendors. Upon these facts the courts ference between property awarded to be

held that there was no acceptance of the transferred by the owner to another, and

1 That hauling certain lumber, after the buyer's inspector has passed it, to a wharf
ready for shipment " on rail of vessel," passes the title, see Whitcomb v. Whitney,
24 Mich. 486.

571

* 532 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK HL

Where goods to be delivered, in payment of a debt, are in readi-
ness for delivery, and the buyer requests the seller to keep them
for him this is a delivery which vests the property in the cred-
itor, (tt)

* 532 * It is sometimes a question of interest what is the duty

of the seller as to delivery of the articles sold, and as to
keeping them until delivery ; and also what is the duty of the
vendee as to receiving them. Usage determines this in a consid-
erable degree ; but from the general usage and the adjudications
some rules may be deduced.

If no time be appointed for delivery, or for payment, these acts
must be clone within a reasonable time ; and if neither party does
anything within that period, the contract is deemed to be dis-
solved. («) a If the goods are to be delivered when requested, the
purchaser may sue for non-delivery without proving a request,
provided the seller has incapacitated himself from delivering
them, as by resale or the like, (v) but in general a request must
be made before the seller can be sued for non-delivery, (w) And
if the vendee, either by the express terms of the contract or from
its nature, is to designate the manner or place of delivery, he
must do this before he can maintain his action, (x)

If a day be fixed either for delivery, or payment, the seller
has the whole of it ; and if any one of several days, the whole of

that which is actually transferred by the Sansee v. Wilson, 17 Iowa, 582; Stone v.

contract of the owner through the me- King, 7 R. I 358.

dium of his agent." (u) Bovvdell v. Parsons, 10 East, 359;

(«) Wheelock u. Tanner, 39 N. Y. Amory >\ Brodrick, 5 B. & Aid. 712.
481. (w) Bacli v. Owen, 5 T. R, 409. See

(u) Langfort v. Tiler, 1 Salk. 113; Radford u. Smith, 3 M. & W. 254; Ben-

and see Lanyon v. Toogood, 13 M. & W. ners i> Howard, 1 Taylor, 149. — As to a

27 ; Fletcher v. Cole, 23 Vt. ] 14. On the demand by a servant, see Squier v. Hunt,

subject of constructive or symbolic deliv- 3 Price, 08.

ery, see Dixon u. Buck, 42 Barb. 70; (x) See West v. Newton, 1 Duer, 277;

Armitage v. Insole, 14 Q. B. 728.

1 Bolton v. Riddle, 35 Mich. 13 ; Tufts v. McClure, 40 la. 317. If a note is given
in consideration of the delivery of flour on the day of its date, a failure so to deliver
is a failure of consideration. Corwith v. Colter, 82 111. 585. The seller must not tender
or deliver more or less than the exact quantity contracted for. Reuter v. Sala, 4 C. P.
D. 239 ; Croninger v. Crocker, 62 N. Y. 151 ; Highland, &c. Co. v. Matthews, 76 N. Y.
145. When goods are ordered from a correspondent who is agent for buying them, the
rule is less rigid. See Ireland v. Livingston, L. R. 2 Q. B. 99 ; L. R. 5 Q. B. 510 ; L. R. 5
H. L. 395. Where, as a general rule, no action lies on the part of a vendor upon a con-
tract for the sale and delivery of a specified quantity of goods until the whole
quantity is delivered, yet where the whole delivery is to be at one and the same
time, and the vendee elects to receive a portion and appropriates the same to his
own use, and by his acts evinces that he waives the condition precedent to a com-
plete delivery, the vendor may recover for the portion delivered. Avery v. Willson,
81 N. Y. 341.

572

CH. IV.J SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 533

all of them. It is said he must endeavor to do the needful act at
a convenient hour before midnight ; early enough, for instance, for
the buyer to count the money, or examine the goods, and give a
receipt ; but this very general rule does not seem anywhere de-
fined. If on a certain day, at a certain place, then it must be
done at a convenient time before sunset, because the presence of
the other party is necessary, and the law does not require him to
be there through the twenty-four hours. («/) 1

The seller is to keep the thing sold until the time for delivery,
with ordinary care, and is liable for the want of that care, or of
good faith ; but if he does so keep it, he is not liable for
its * loss, (z) unless it perish through a defect against * 533
which he has warranted. If the parties are distant from
each other, the seller must follow the directions of the buyer- as
to the way of sending the thing sold to him, and then a loss in
the transportation will fall on the buyer, (a) unless attributable to
the negligence of the seller ; if the seller disregards such orders, the
loss in transportation falls on him, though it does not happen
through his neglect. Delivery of the goods by the seller to a car-
rier in accordance with the specific request of the purchaser, is a
delivery to the purchaser, (aa) 2 If the directions be general, as

(y) See Startup v. McDonald, 6 Man. Sims, 6 Port. (Ala.) 138. In Godfrey w.

&G. 395. Furzo, 3 P. Wins. 186, and in Vale «.

(«) Where A bought of B three hun- Bayle, supra, Lord Chief Justice Eyre is

dred barrels of resin "to be delivered said to have held, " That though a trader in

■when called for within a week," and the country does not appoint a carrier, yet

paid for the same, and within a week B if the goods be embezzled he shall be li-

manufactured more than that quantity, able, because he leaves it in the breast

which he had ready for delivery, but of the person to whom he gives the order

did not set apart any specific quantity to send them by whom he pleases." The

for A, the resin being destroyed by fire carrier is generally considered the agent

after the end of the week, it was held of the buyer, and not of the seller. Dut-

that A was bound to call during the ton v. Solomonson, 3 B. & P. 584 ; An-

week ; that B was not bound to set apart derson v. Hodgson, 5 Price, 630. As soon,

for A any specific three hundred barrels, therefore, as the goods are in the due

and that A having failed to perform his and regular course of conveyance, they

part of the contract, could not recover are at the risk of the purchaser, and not

against B, either upon the contract before. Diversy v. Kellogg, 44 111. 114 ;

to deliver or for money had and re- Ullock v. Redelin, Dan. & L. 6 ; and see

ceived to recover the purchase-money Bull o. Robison, 28 E. L. & E. 686 ; s c.

paid. Willard v. Perkins, 1 Busb. L. 10 Exch. 342.

253. But see unte, p. * 529. (aa) Glen v. Whitaker, 51 Barb. 451.

(a) Vale v. Bayle, Cowp. 294 ; Gas- See Bradley v. Wheeler, 4 Rob. 18, and

sett v. Godfrey, 6 Foster (N. H.), 415; Hills v. Lynch, 3 Rob. 42.
Orcutt v. Nelson, 1 Gray, 536 ; Jones v.

1 Where A. was to deliver hogs during the " first half of August," to be weighed
at a certain place, he was given until noon of the 16th, till which time he was to
keep hogs at the scales. Kirkpatrick !>. Alexander, 60 Ind. 95. See Croninger v.
Crocker, 62 N. Y. 151 ; McClartey v. Gokey, 31 la. 505.

2 A carrier, in the eye of the law, is a bailee of the person to whom, not by

573

* 534 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

"by a carrier," without naming any one, usual and proper precau-
tions must be taken, and will protect the seller. (6) And it is a
part of his duty to give such notice of the sending them by ship or
otherwise as will enable the buyer to insure or take other pre-
cautions, (c)

If the contract be to deliver the thing ordered at the residence

or place of business of the buyer, the seller is liable, although

such delivery becomes impossible, unless it becomes so through

the act of the buyer. (tZ) If the seller refuse to deliver it

* 534 at a * time and place agreed on, and it perish afterwards

without his fault, he is liable for it. But if he be ready,
and the vendee wrongfully refuse or neglect to receive it, the
seller is not liable, unless the thing perishes through his gross
and wanton negligence. And if the vendee unreasonably neglect
or refuse to comply with conditions precedent to delivery, or to
receive the goods on delivery, the seller may, after due delay and
proper precautions, resell them, and hold the buyer responsible
for any deficit in the price, (e) ' It is common, and generally

(b) The vendor, in delivering goods was here held, that where a ship-owner,

to a carrier, must exercise clue care and knowing that a port is blockaded, enters

diligence, so as to provide the consignee into a contract with a merchant for the

with a remedy over against the carrier, delivery of a cargo there, if he after-

See Buckman v. Levi, 3 Camp. 414
Clarke v. Hutchins, 14 East, 475 ; Alex
ander v. Gardner, 1 Bing. N. C. 071
Dawes v. Peck, 8 T. R. 330.

(c) Cothay v. Tute, 3 Camp. 129

wards refuses to go, he is liable to an
action for the breach of the contract ;
but whether the damages are to be nom-
inal or otherwise must depend upon the
opinion of the jury, as to whether, if the

Brown on Sales, §526; 2 Kent, Com. vessel had gone to the place, she would
500. — If it lias been the usage between have been able to get in. — So it is no
the parties, in former dealings, for the defence to a breach of a contract to de-
vendor to insure, or if he receive specific liver certain goods at a certain time, that
instructions to insure in any particular such goods could not be had in the mar-
case, he is bound to insure. Id. ; Lon- ket at that time. Gilpins v. Consequa,
don Law Mag. vol. 4, p. 359. And see Pet. C. C. 85 ; Youqua v. Nixon, id. 221.
Smith v. Lascclles, 2 T. R. 189. (e) McLean o. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722;
(d) Hay ward v. Scougall, 2 Camp. 56, Mcrtens v. Adcock, 4 Esp. 251 ; Girard
n.; Atkinson v. Ritchie, 10 East, 530; v. Taggart, 5 S. & R. 19; Sands v. Tay-
De Medeiors v. Hill, 5 C. & P. 182. It lor, 5 Johns. 395.

whom, goods are sent. Higgins i'. Murray, 73 N. Y. 252 ; Cairo Bank ; . Crocker,

111 Mass. 163, 166 ; Arnold v. Prout, 51 N. H. 587 ; Hall v. Gaylor, 37 Conn. 550 ; Ma-
gruder v. Gage, 33 Md. 344. See Garretson v. Selby, 37 la. 629 Delivery on a vessel
for carriage, bill of lading being taken, is not a delivery to the buyer, but to the captain
as bailee for delivery to the person named in the bill of lading, for whom they are to
be carried. Gabarron v. Kreeft, L. R. 10 Ex. 274, 281. The delivery, however, to a
buyer of a delivery order on a carrier, together with a sample of the goods, passes
the title to him, whose loss they are if afterwards destroyed, and he is liable for the
price. Webster v. Granger, 78 111. 230. Hobart v. Littlefield, 13 R. I. 341, decided that
goods delivered at the wharf of a carrier with notice to him are prima facie at least
at the buyer's risk, though sold "free on board," and destroyed before actually put on
board. See Mich. Central R. Co. v. Phillips, 60 111. 190, and Finn v. Western R. Co.

112 Mass. 524.

1 The seller, after notifying the buyer to come and take the goods, need not give
him notice of resale. Ullman v. Kent, 60 111. 271.

574

CH. IT.] SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 535

advisable, to sell them at auction ; but this is not necessary. (/)
If the seller sell on credit, the goods are to be delivered without
payment ; but if the buyer becomes insolvent before the time of
delivery, the seller may demand security, and refuse to deliver

the goods without it. (#) 1 If goods are sold " on a credit of

months, or cash at discount," and the buyer after delivery of

the goods pays a part in cash, he will be held to have elected
cash and not credit, and may be sued for the balance, discount
off. (A)

If no place of delivery be specially expressed in the contract,
the store, shop, farm, or warehouse, where the article is sold,
made, grown, or deposited, is in general the place of deliv-
ery. (0 2 If expressly deliverable to the vendee, but no place is
named, it may be delivered to him where he is, or at his house,
or at his place of business, except so far as this option of the
seller is controlled by the nature of the article. For if the pur-
chaser bought a load of cotton to be worked in his mill, it
cannot, under an * agreement of delivery, be delivered at * 535
his distant dwelling-house ; nor should a load of hay for
his stable, or a cooking range for his kitchen, be delivered at his
store on the wharf.

Some cases distinguish between the duty of delivery arising
from a contract of sale, and a contract to deliver goods in pay-
ment of a precedent debt. In the first case the buyer must take
them where they are, and in the latter the owner must deliver
them at such place as shall be reasonable from the nature of the
case, or shall be pointed out by the party receiving them. Q")

(f) Crooks v. Moore, 1 Sandf. 279; kins, 5 Cowen, 516; Goodwin v. Hol-
Conway v. Bush, 4 Barb. 564. brook, 4 Wend. 380 ; Barr v. Myers, 3

(g) Tooke v. Hollingworth, 5 T. R. W. & S. 295. If, however, a particular
215 ; and see Bloxam v. Sanders, 4 B. & place be appointed by the contract, the
C. 948 ; Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East, 614. goods must be delivered there before an
And if the seller has despatched the action will lie for their price. Savage
goods to the buyer, and he becomes in- Man. Co. v. Armstrong, 19 Me. 147 ;
solvent, the seller has a right, by virtue Howard v. Miner, 20 id. 325.

of his original ownership, to stop the (j) Bean v. Simpson, 16 Me. 49. In

goods if yet in transitu. Mason v. Lick- this case it was held, that if no place be

barrow, 1 H. Bl. 357 ; Ellis v. Hunt, 3 T. appointed in the contract for the deliv-

R. 464. ery of specific articles, it is the duty of

(h) Schneider v. Foster, 2 Exch. 4. the debtor to ascertain from the creditor

(»') 2 Kent, Com. 505; Lobdell v. Hop- where he would receive the goods; and

1 Unless the buyer has come into actual possession of the goods sold, the seller
is not deprived of his right of lien as against the assignees of the buyer in the event
of his insolvency. Grice v. Richardson, 3 App. Cas. 319.

2 See Devine v. Edwards, 101 111. 138.

575

* 536 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

But in the latter case, if the contract be merely that the creditor
" may have them," with no words or acts implying that they were
to be carried to him, it should be enough if they are ready for
him when he comes for them. There seems to be also a distinc-
tion between the case of very cumbersome goods and those more
easily portable ; and the seller is held more strictly to the duty of
transporting the latter, and tendering them in specie. (&)

In general, if anything be ordered of a mechanic or manu-
facturer, the maker may deliver it where he makes it, unless he
have a shop or depository where his manufactured articles are
usually taken for sale or delivery, in which case such place may
be the place of delivery.

The vendee is bound to receive and pay for the thing sold

at the time and place expressed or implied in the contract of sale,

and to pay all reasonable charges for keeping it after sale and

before delivery. (I)1 And if he refuse so to take or pay for the

goods sold, he will be liable in an action for the price, or

* 536 in a * special action for damages, unless he can show inca-

pacity to contract, or sufficient error, duress, or fraud.
When payment of a debt is to be made by some specific article,
it is not quite settled where the article is to be delivered ; whether
by the payor at his own residence, to the payee who must come
for it, or to the payee at his residence or place of business,
whither the payor must carry it. It might seem from some state-
ments that local usages affect or decide this question in some

if this be not done, the mere fact that tiffs sold to the defendants the wool ly-

the debtor had the articles at his own ing unsacked in three rooms, to be paid

dwelling-house at that time is no defence, for upon delivery, the quantity to be as-

And see Bixby v. Whitney, 5 Greenl. certained by weighing, but without any

192. express contract as to who should be at

(k) Stone v. Gilliam, 1 Show. 149; the expense of sacking. The plaintiffs

Currier v. Currier, 2 N. H. 75; 2 Kent, sacked the wool in sacks furnished by

Com. 508. the defendants, and then caused it to be

(/) In Cole v. Kerr, 20 Vt. 21, it was weighed and shipped to the defendants ;

held, that there is no implied contract and it was held, that as the sacking pre-

upon the sale of personal property that ceded the delivery of the wool, the law

the vendee shall pay the vendor for any would not imply a contract on the part of

services, in relation to the property, ren- the defendants to pay the plaintiffs for

dered previous to the completion of the sacking,
sale by delivery. In this case the plain-

1 A buyer ought to pay the price when due without waiting for any demand, if
the goods are ready for delivery, and if he does not, he may be sued at once. Bran-
don Manuf . Co. u. Morse, 48 Vt. 322 ; Davis, &c. Co. v. McGinnis, 45 la. 638. The
buyer, if he has agreed to assume the risk of delivery on which the price is to be
payable, must pay the price if the goods are destroyed. Martineau v. Kitching, L. R.
7 Q. B. 436. When payment is to be made after demand or notice, the buyer must
be allowed a reasonable time to bring the money. Bass v. White, 65 N. Y. 665.

576

CH. IT.J SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 537

cases. And possibly the distinction between bulky and portable
articles might be carried so far as to lead to the conclusion that
one who has thus to deliver an article easily carried, as a watch
or a book, might be bound to take it to the payee. But we con-
sider the law in general to be, that it is enough if the payor deliv-
ers the article at his own residence or shop. And if he there
tenders it to the payee, and it be in all respects the article he
should have tendered, and the payee refuse or neglect to receive it,
with no valid objection grounded on the article itself, or on a stip-
ulation in the contract, then the payor is no further responsible for
what may happen to it. If it were, for instance, a carriage, and he
had tendered it as it stood in his barn or warehouse, he would have
no right — certainly none without sufficient notice to the payee — to
roll it out into the street, and there let it perish. For this would
be a wanton injury. But if it was in the street when he tendered
it, and he said, I offer it to you as your carriage, and I shall have
no more to do with it, he would not be bound to take any further
care of it.

But questions of this kind generally arise in the defence to
actions founded upon such contracts ; and we shall again consider
the subject of contracts for the delivery of specific articles, in our
third volume, under the head of Defences.

•SECTION VI. *537

CONDITIONAL SALES.

In every sale, unless otherwise expressed, there is an implied

condition that the price shall be paid, before the buyer has a right

1 to possession ; and this is a condition precedent, (m) l But it

(m) See Noy, Maxims, p. 88, where it paid before delivery is said to give the

i9 said : " If I sell my horse for money, I vendor a lien on the article sold until the

may keep him until I am paid." See payment. — But although the vendee

also Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East, 571 ; may not have a right of possession in the

Cornwall v. Haight, 8 Barb. 328. — This article bought until the price is paid, yet

implied condition that the price shall be the right of property passes by the bargain ;

1 A delivery, apparently unrestricted, of goods sold for cash is a waiver of the
condition that payment is to be made before the passing of the property in the
goods, although the seller has an undisclosed intention not to waive the condition.
Upton v. Sturbridge Mills, 111 Mass. 446. The title to personal property, sold on con-
dition that such title should remain in the vendor until the price is paid and the prop-
vol. i. 37 577

* 537 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

seems that in an action for non-delivery the buyer need only aver
that he was ready and willing to receive and pay for them, and that
the seller refused to deliver them, without averring an actual
tender, (n) But where the right to receive payment before de-
livery is waived by the seller, and immediate possession given to
the purchaser, and yet by express agreement the title is to remain
in the seller until the payment of the price upon a fixed day, such
payment is strictly a condition precedent, and until perform-
ance the right of property is not vested in the purchaser, (o) 1

and if the property is lost while yet in that he was, at the time, and always had
the possession of the vendor, without his been, ready to execute the mortgage and
fault, the loss will fall on the pur- bond, &c. It was held, that the cov-
chaser. Willis v. Willis, 6 Dana, 49; enants were mutual and dependent; that
Wing v. Clark, 24 Me. 36B ; Pleasants o. the averment of readiness to perform by
Pendleton, 6 Rand. (Va.) 473. See also the plaintiff was sufficient; and that,
ante, p. * 526, note (u), et seq. from the nature of the covenant, he was
(n) Waterhouse v. Skinner, 2 B & P. not bound to seal and tender the mort-
447; Rawson v. Johnson, I East, 203. gage before A had conveyed the land to
The case of Morton v. Lamb, 7 T. H. him, or had offered a conveyance. See
125, is not inconsistent with the doctrine also Miller ;-. Drake, 1 Caines, 45 ; Pee-
laid down in the text, as it is explained ters v. Opie, 2 Wms. Saund. 350, n. (3).
by the subsequent case of Rawson o. (o) Porter v. Pettengill, 12 N. H. 299;
Johnson, 1 East, 203. And there are Sargent v. Gile, 8 N. H. 325; Gambling
many cases where readiness to perform is v. Read, 1 Meigs, 281 ; Bigelow v. Hunt-
equivalent to performance. Thus in the ley, 8 Vt. 151 ; Barrett v. Pritchard, 2
case of West v. Emmons, 5 Johns. 179, A Pick. 512; Ayer v. Bartlett, 9 Pick. 156;
covenanted to convey by a good and suf- Tibbetts v. Towle, 3 Fairf. 341; Bennett
fieient deed a certain lot of land to B, on v. Sims, Rice, 421 ; Smith v. Lynes, 1
or before a certain day, and B cove- Seld. 41 ; Herring v. Hoppock, 3 Duer,
nanted to reconvey the same to A by 20 ; Brewster v. Baker, 20 Barb. 361 ;
a mortgage, at the same time, as se- Parris v. Roberts, 12 Ired. L. 208 ; Smith
curity, and also to execute a bond for v. Foster, 18 Vt. 182; Buckmaster v.
the consideration money; and B after- Smith, 22 id. 203; Root v. Lord, 23 id.
wards brought his action of covenant 568 ; Aubin v. Bradley, 24 id. 55 ; Bu-
against A, and in his declaration averred son u. Dougherty, 11 Humph. 50. la

erty delivered to the vendee, remains in the vendor even as against a bond fide purchaser
at a judicial sale. Bradshaw «. Warner, 54 Ind. 58. Where payment and delivery are
to be simultaneous, and the buyer, upon getting possession, omits or evades payment,
the seller may at once reclaim. Adams v. O'Connor, 100 Mass. 515; Paul v. Reed, 52
N. H. 136 ; Kinzey v. Leggett, 71 N. Y. 387. Where nothing is said, the sale is for cash
concurrent with delivery. S. W., &c Co. t>. Plant, 45 Mo. 517. See Phillips v. Moor, 71
Me. 78. The seller, if not guilty of laches, may reclaim, if the price be not paid, even
from the buyer's vendee or mortgagee in good faith. Benner v. Puffer, 114 Mass.
376; Enlow v. Klein, 79 Penn. St. 488 ; Duncan v. Stone, 45 Vt. 114 ; Fifield v. Elmer,
25 Mich. 48. See Zuchtinann i . Roberts, 109 Mass. 53. If a buyer sells and then
tenders the price to the seller, the title passes to his vendee. Day v. Bassett, 102 Mass.
445; Currier v. Knapp, 117 Mass. 324. As to a buyer's rights where the seller has
taken back goods, part of the price having been paid, see Preston v. Whitney, 23
Mich. 260; Latham v. Sumner, 89 111. 233; and where part is destroyed, part taken
back, and part paid for, see Swallow v. Emery, 111 Mass. 355.

1 Marquette Manuf. Co. v. Jeffery, 49 Mich. 283. But where the vendor allowed the
goods sold to be mingled with the vendee's goods of the same kind, he was estopped
to set up his title as against a subsequent purchaser of the vendee. Foster v. War-
ner, 49 Mich. 041. — A seller may retain a right over the goods, as by making the
bill of lading in his own or agent's name, to secure the price, to be transferred
on payment by indorsement ; and the propert}- will not pass until that is done.
Farmers', &c. Bank v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 568 ; Emery v. Irving Bank, 25 Ohio St. 360.

578

CH. IV.] SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 538

And generally, wherever in a contract of sale, it * is stated * 538
that some precise fact is to be done by either party, this

most of these cases, the question whether of the vendee, who may seize and hold

the property had passed, arose between the property upon execution. And at

the parties themselves or between the all events, if an additional bill of sale be

vendor and attaching creditors of the given, and the conditional vendee be thus

conditional vendee, and the weight of invested with all the indicia of ownership,

authority is as above. And in Sargent the vendor is estopped to set up the con-

v. Gile, 8 N. H. 325, such a conditional dition against a purchaser in good faith,

sale was held to leave the right of prop- for valuable consideration. Davis v.

erty in the vendor against subsequent Bradley, 24 Vt. 5o. And whenever a

bona fide purchasers from the conditional vendor in a conditional sale claims the

vendee, on the evident ground that the property against the creditors of the

vendee had no power to transfer any vendee, the burden of proof is upon him

right not his own. The same view ap- to show the condition, and that it has

pears to be taken by Washington, J., in not been complied with. Leighton v.

Copland o. Bosquet, 4 Wash. C. C. 594, Stevens, 19 Me. 164. — It has been de-

and more recently in Coggill v. H. & N. cided that such conditional sales are not

H. R. R. Co. 3 Gray, 545. See also La- in effect chattel mortgages, and there-

mond v. Davall, 9 Q. B. 1030. But Hag- fore void, because not recorded. Buson

gerty v. Palmer, 6 Johns. Ch. 437 ; Kee- v. Dougherty, 11 Humph. 50. And

ler v. Field, 1 Paige, 315 ; and Smith «. where upon a sale and delivery it was

Lynes, I Seld. 41, seem to have settled agreed that the vendor should retain a

it for New York law, that such bond fide lien upon the property until the price

purchaser without notice of the condi- was paid, it was held, that this agree-

tion sale, holds the property. And in ment of the parties created a valid lien

Martin v. Mathiot, 14 S. & R. 214 ; Rose in the vendor against the vendee, and

v. Story, 1 Barr, 190, it is decided, that purchasers from him, and that such lien

although under a conditional sale, the was not within the purview of the stat-

property does not pass to the vendee, as ute requiring mortgages of chattels to

between the parties, yet that such condi- be recorded. Sawyer v. Fisher, 32

tion is fraudulent and void as to creditors Me. 28.

See Mirabita ;>. Imperial Bank, 3 Ex. D. 164 ; Merchants' Bank i>. Bangs, 102 Mass.
291. In so doing, the seller does not reserve a lien only, in case the buyer fails to
pay the price, but reserves a right of disposing of the goods, so long at least as the
buyer continues in default. Ogg v. Shuter, 1 C. P. D. 47. That a bill of lading
deliverable to the seller's order is nearly conclusive of an intention to reserve the jus
disponendi to prevent the title passing to the buyer, see Shepherd v. Harrison, L. R. 5
H. L. 116. A seller may even reserve this right when the goods are placed on the
buyer's own ship free of freight on that account, Schotsmans !'. Lancashire, &c.
R. Co. 2 Ch. App. 332. Where a bill of exchange for the price is sent to a buyer for
acceptance with the bill of lading, to retain the latter he must accept the former,
and on refusing acceptance can acquire neither bill of lading nor the goods. Chicago
Marine Bank v. Wright, 48 N. Y. 1 ; Chicago Bank v. Bayley, 115 Mass. 228, 230;
Alderman v. Eastern R. Co. 115 Mass. 233; Cobb ». 111. Cent. R. Co. 88 111.394.

A bill of lading to shipper's order, or "to or order," indorsed to or making

goods deliverable to a consignee by name as security for antecedent advances vests
in him a property, absolute or special, at the time of their delivery on board. Bailey
v, Hudson R, Co. 49 N. Y. 70; Straus v. Wessel, 30 Ohio St. 211. And in the case
of animals the increase belongs to the vendor until the performance of the condition.
Clark v. Hayward, 51 Vt. 14. Where a sale is made under an agreement to give a
mortgage for the purchase-money, the title does not pass until the mortgage is given.
Thorpe v. Fowler, 57 la. 541; Bauendahl v. Horr, 7 Blatchf. 548; Benner v. Puffer,
114 Mass. 376; Ridgeway v. Kennedy, 52 Mo. 24; Drury v. Hervey, 126 Mass. 519;
Hegler v. Eddy, 53 Cal. 597; Carroll v. Wiggins, 30 Ark. 402; Brown v. Fitch, 43
Conn. 512 ; Jowers v. Blandy, 58 Ga. 379 ; Domestic, &c. Co. v. Arthurhultz, 63 Ind.
322; Moseley v. Shattuck, 43 la. 640; Boon v. Moss, 70 N. Y. 465; Sanders v. Keber,
28 Ohio St. 630; Holt v. Holt, 58 N. H. 270; Pruman v. Hardin, 5 Sawyer, 115;
lie Binford, 3 Hughes, 295 ; Rogers, &c. Works v. Lewis, 4 Dillon, 158 ; Fosdick v.
Car Co. 99 U. S. 256 ; Preston i>. Whitney, 23 Mich. 260 ; Fifield v. Elmer, 25 Mich.
48 ; Everett v. Hall, 67 Me. 497; Wood, &c. R. Co. v. Brooke, 2 Sawyer, 576 ; Dun-
can v. Stone, 45 Vt. 118 ; Sage v. Sleutz, 23 Ohio St. 1 ; Shaffer v. Sawyer, 123
Mass. 294 ; Cole v. Berry, 13 Vroom, 308.

579

* 539 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

may amount to a condition, though not so expressed. As where,
in a contract for sale of goods, the words are " to be delivered on
or before " a certain day, this is a condition precedent, and if they
are not delivered oh or before that day, (p) the purchaser is not
bound to take the goods. So if the goods are to be delivered " on
request," the buyer must allege and prove a request, this being
a condition precedent to his acquiring a complete right. (§■) But
if the seller has incapacitated himself from delivering by resell-
ing, or otherwise, no request is necessary, (r)

If goods are sold and delivered conditionally, the vendor re-
tains his right to them as against the vendee, but, in general, not
against a bond fide purchaser from the vendee. (rr~) 1 But it is
held in Massachusetts, that if the seller is to be paid in specified
promissory notes or bills of exchange, the sale is conditional, (rs) 2
and that if the buyer receives the goods, and before giving the
notes sells them to an honest vendee, no title passes to the
vendee, (ri)

* 539 * There is another class of sales on condition, often

called " contracts of sale or return." In these the prop-
erty in the goods passes to the purchaser, subject to an option in

(/>) Startup v. McDonald, 2 Man. & a request must be alleged and proved,

G. 395. And the delivery must have but not otherwise."

been made at a reasonable time on that (/■) Ranay !■. Alexander, Yelv. 76, n.

day, or the vendee is not bound. Id. (Metcalf's ed.) ; Amory v. Broderiek, 5

(q) Bach v. Owen, 5 T. E. 409, as ex- B. & Aid. 712 ; Newcomb v. Brackett,

plained in Radford v. Smith, 3 M. & W. 16 Mass. 161 ; Webster v. Coffin, 14

258, where Lord Abinger said : " In Bacli Mass. 196. See also ante, note (r), p.

v. Owen, the plaintiff was not entitled to * 532.

the horse until he offered his own and (rr) Wait v. Green, 36 N. Y. 656 ;

demanded the other. Where by the ex- Murch v. Wright, 46 111. 487.

press terms of the contract a request must (rs) Whitney v. Eaton, 15 Gray, 225.

precede delivery, or where that is to be (rt) Hirschorn v. Canney, 98 Mass.

implied from the nature of the contract, 149.

1 Sanders v. Keber, 28 Ohio St. £30, is to the effect that the seller retains his
right even against a bond fide purchaser from his vendee ; and that Wait v. Green,
supra, was modified or overruled by Ballard v. Burget, 40 N. Y. 314; and that Murch
v. Wright, supra, is unsupported by all well-considered cases. — Where goods are sold to
be paid for on delivery, if delivery is made without requiring such payment, although
on condition that the delivery shall not be considered complete so as to pass the title
until payment is made, a bond fide purchaser from the vendee, without notice, obtains
a good title discharged of the lien for the purchase-money. Comer r. Cunningham,
77 N. Y. 391. The seller may waive the condition, and the goods will be treated as
the buyer's, Freeman v. Nichols, llfi Mass. 309; but delivery is not such a waiver,
if the understanding is otherwise, Adams u. O'Connor, 100 Mass. 515 ; Hanrmett p.
Linneman, 48 N. Y. 399; but a secret understanding of the seller is insufficient.
Upton !•. Sturbridge Mills, 111 Mass. 446.

2 So Paul v. Reed, 52 N. H. 136 ; Osborn v. Gantz, 60 N. Y. 540 ; Seed v. Lord, 66
Me. 580; Van Duzor ». Allen, 90 111.499; Salomon v. Hathaway, 126 Mass. 482.
See Armour v. Pecker, 123 Mass. 143; Wabash, &c. Co. v. Toledo National Bank, 23
Ohio St. 311.

580

CH- Iy-] SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 539

him to return them within a fixed time ; or a reasonable time ;
and if he fails to exercise this option by so returning them, the
sale becomes absolute, and the price of the goods may be recov-
ered in an action for goods sold and delivered. (*) *

In sales at auction there are generally conditions of sale, and
where these are distinctly made known to the buyer, they are of
course binding on him, and the auctioneer or the owner of the
goods is bound on his part. (£) The question whether they were
sufficiently made known to the buyer would be one rather of fact
than of law. Thus where a horse is sold by warranty, and it is
the uniform custom of the auctioneer to limit all objections to the
space of twenty-four hours from the sale; if these terms are a
part of all the advertisements of the auctioneer, and were an-
nounced by him at the beginning of the sale, and the purchaser
had come in after such announcement, and no direct proof of his
knowledge of this limitation was offered, evidence would probably
be admitted that he took a paper containing such advertisement,
and of any other facts tending to show such knowledge, and the
jury would be permitted to infer the knowledge from them if
they deemed them sufficient.

If it be provided in the conditions of sale that no error or
misstatement shall avoid the sale, but that there shall be a

(s) Moss v. Sweet, 16 Q. B. 493 (over- Hemp and Flax Man. Co. 3 Sumner, 530;
ruling Hey v. Frankenstein, 8 Scott, N. Ellis v. Thompson, 3 M. & W. 445. —
R. 839, and Lyons v. Barnes, 2 Stark. 39) ; Parol evidence of the conversations of
Beverly v. Lincoln Gas Light and Coke the parties is admissible to show the cir-
Co. 6 A. & E. 829 ; Bayley v. Gouldsinith, cumstances under which the contract was
Peake, Cas. 56 ; Dearborn v. Turner, 16 made, and what the parties thought a
Me. 17. See Meldrum v. Snow, 9 Pick, reasonable time. Cocker v Franklin Hemp
441 ; Blood v. Palmer, 2 Fairf . 414 ; Eld- and Flax Man. Co. supra. And where A
ridge v. Benson, 7 Cush. 485 ; Neate v. delivers property to B, on condition that
Ball, 2 East, 116. And what is a reason- if damaged, while in B's possession, B
able time within which a contract is to be shall keep it and pay for it, this is a eon-
performed, or an act to be done, is, in the ditional sale ; and if the property is so
absence of any contract between the damaged, the sale becomes absolute, and
parties, a question of law for the court, assumpsit for goods sold and delivered
to be determined by a view of all the cir- will lie. Bianchi v. Kash, 1 M. & W. 545.
cumstances of the particular case. See See also Perkins v. Douglass, 20 Me.
Attwood v. Clark, 2 Greenl. 249; Hilly. 317; Jameson v. Gregory, 4 Met. (Ky.)
Hobart, 16 Me. 164; Murry v. Smith, 1 363.
Hawks, 41. But see Cocker v. Franklin (() Hanks v. Palling, 6 E. & B. 659.

1 If a seller receives part payment for a chattel, and takes the buyer's promise in
writing to pay the balance on a day specified or to return the chattel, the title passes
unconditionally. McKinney v. Bradlee, 117 Mass. 321. A horse, sold on condition
that it be tried for eight days and then returned if unsatisfactory, died on the third
day without fault of either party, and it was held, no sale. Elphick v. Barnes, 5
C. P. D. 321. What is a reasonable time is generally for jury; but if the delay is
too long continued, for the court. Paige v. McMillan, 41 Wis. 337 ; Schlesinger v.
Stratton, 9 R. I. 578.

581

540

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

* 540 proportionate * allowance on the purchase-money, this
condition will not, in general, save a sale, where the error
is of a material and substantial nature, although not fraudu-
lent.^) The test of this question, as a matter of law, seems to
be, whether the error or misstatement is so far material and sub-
stantial that it may be reasonably supposed that the buyer would
not have made the purchase had he not been so misled. And
such misstatement will also avoid a sale if no reasonably accurate
estimate can be made of the compensation which should be al-
lowed therefor. (y~) Any misstatement, made fraudulently, and
capable of having any effect on the sale, will avoid it. Nor will
the conditions of sale be binding against a purchaser, if so framed
as to give the seller advantages which the buyer could not readily
apprehend or understand without legal knowledge or advice ; for
a buyer is discharged from a purchase made under " catching
conditions." (w)

(u) The Duke of Norfolk v. Worthy,
1 Camp. 340 ; Flight i>. Booth, 1 Bing. N.
C. 370 ; Leach v. Mullett, 3 C. & P. 115.
See also Robinson v. Musgrove, 2 Mo. &
Rob. 02 ; s. c. 8 C. & P. 469, where it was
held, that a condition of sale, " that if any
mistake shall be made in the description
of the premises, or any other error what-
ever shall appear in the particulars of the
property, such mistake or error shall not
annul the sale, but a compensation shall
be given," &c, does not apply where any
substantial part of the property turns out
to have no existence, or cannot be found ;
or where the vendor has mala, fide given
a very exaggerated description of the
property. The purchaser may in such a
case rescind the contract in toi.o. See also
ante, p. *494, note (i), et seq.

(») See Sherwood v. Robins, 1 Mood.
& M. 194; s. c. 3 C. & P. 339, where it
was determined, that a condition in ar-
ticles of sale, " that any error in the par-
ticulars shall not vitiate the sale, but a
compensation shall be made," applies
only to cases where the circumstances
afford a principle by which this compen-
sation can be estimated. Therefore on
the sale of a reversion expectant on the
deatli of A without children, an error in the
statement of A's does not come within
the condition {as it would if the rever-
sion were simply expectant on A's death),
because it affects the probability of the
other contingency, which is not a sub-
ject of calculation ; and the buyer is
entitled to rescind the contract.

(w) Adams v. Lambert, 2 Jur. 1078 ;

582

Dykes v. Blake, 4 Bing. N. C. 463. In
the case of Dobell v. Hutchinson, 3 A. &
E. 355, on a sale of a leasehold interest
of lands, described in the particulars as
held for a term of twenty-three years at
a rent of £55, and as comprising a yard,
one of the conditions was, that if any
mistake should be made in the descrip-
tion of the property, or any other error
whatever should appear in the particu-
lars of the estate, such mistake or error
should not annul or vitiate the sale, but
a compensation should be made, to be
settled by arbitration ; and the yard was
not in fact comprehended in the property
held for the term at £55, but was held
by the vendor from year to year at an
additional rent ; and such yard was es-
sential to the enjoyment of the property
leased for the twenty-three years. It was
held, though it did not appear that the
vendor knew of the defect, that this de-
fect avoided the sale, and was not a mis-
take to be compensated for under the
above condition, although after the day
named in the conditions for completing
the purchase and before action brought
by the vendee, the vendor procured a
lease of the yard for the term to the
vendee, and offered it to him. But where
the particidars of sale described the prop-
erty as a family residence, with the right
of a pew in the centre aisle of the parish
church, and the title of the pew was de-
fective, as the use of the pew was not es-
sential to the enjoyment of the property,
this error gave a right to compensation
only. Cooper v. , 2 Jur. 29. Arid

CH. IV.] SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 541

♦SECTION VII. *541

OP BOUGHT AND SOLD NOTES.

Much of the commercial business of the country is transacted
by the agency of brokers, who buy and sell goods for others, on
commission. Though employed at the outset by only one of the
parties, a merchandise broker becomes the agent of the other
also, when he treats with him. (x)

It is the duty, though not always the practice of brokers, to
make a memorandum of the terms of the contract and the names
of the parties, in their books, to sign such memorandum, and
to transcribe therefrom the bought and sold notes. («/) 1 The
bought note is addressed to the purchaser, notifying him that
the broker has bought for his account of the vendor, the goods
described, stating price and terms, and signed by the broker.
The sold note is a similar statement addressed to the vendor,
informing him that he has sold to the purchaser, for his account,
the same goods, giving the price and terms. The broker's signa-

where there was a written agreement to be calculated from the last preceding day
sell and assign " the unexpired term of when the rent was payable, and including
eight years' lease and good-will " of a pub- therefore the current half year. Any
lie-house ; it was held, that the purchaser fraud or material misdescription, though
could not refuse to perform the agree- unintentional, would vacate the agree-
ment on the ground that when it was en- ment, but the defendant might have had
tered into there were only seven years and substantially what he had agreed to pur-
seven months of the term unexpired, chase." Belworth v. Hassell, 4 Camp.
Lord EUenborough said : " The parties 140.

cannot be supposed to have meant, that (x) Grant v. Fletcher, 5 B. & C. 436 ;

there was the exact term of eight years Merritt v. Clason, 12 Johns. 102 ; Davis

unexpired, neither more nor less by a. v. Shields, 26 Wend. 341 ; Suydam v.

single day. The agreement must there- Clark, 2 Sandf . 133 ; Toomer v. Dawson,

fore receive a reasonable construction ; 1 Cheves, 68.

and it seems not unreasonable that the (y) Per Abbott, C. J., in Grant v.

period mentioned in the agreement should Fletcher, 5 B. & C. 437.

1 Where one keeps a bought or sold note, he plainly admits that the broker acted
by his authority and as his agent, and the broker's signature is his signature.
Thompson v. Gardiner, 1 C. P. D. 777. The following memorandum of a contract
of sale signed by the agents of the seller and purchaser : " Sold for Messrs. B. & Co.,
Boston, to Messrs. T. & Co., New York, seven hundred and five (705) packs first
quality Russia sheet-iron, to arrive at New York, at twelve and three-quarters (12|)
cents per pound, gold, cash, actual tare. Iron due about Sept. 1 '67, W. & H.,
Brokers," binds both parties thereto. Butler v. Thompson, 92 U. S. 412. " The mem-
orandum in question, expressing that the iron had been sold, imported necessarily
that it had been bought." Per Hunt, J.

583

542

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

ture to the entry in his book, or to the notes, will satisfy the
Statute of Frauds, it being in law the signature of the parties by

the agent of both parties. («)
* 542 * It is not uncommon for the principals to sign their

approval, upon the note to be handed to the other party ;
but this proceeding, though convenient as settling the question
of the broker's authority, is not necessary to give validity to

(z) Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East, 558 ;
Heyman v. Neale, 2 Camp. 337 ; Cabot v.
Winsor, 1 Allen, 546. — This was an ac-
tion of contract to recover the price of
475 bundles of gunny bags, sold by the
plaintiff to the defendant, of which the
plaintiff received and accepted 200 bun-
dles, and declined to receive the balance,
as they could not be stowed in his ship.
The sale was effected through the inter-
vention of a broker, and his sale note
approved by defendant, expressed that
the sale was of " 500 bundles more or less
gunny bags." Plaintiff offered evidence
to show that at the time when the broker's
note was signed, he had some 521 bundles
on hand, which he had given orders to
have compressed into bales ; that when
the sale was made, a small portion of
the lot had been compressed, and that he
at once gave orders to stop the work.
These facts were known to both parties ;
and the plaintiff, under objection, intro-
duced evidence to prove that it was the
uncompressed bundles which were the
subject of the contract. It appeared in
evidence that the plaintiff knew that the
object of the defendant in making the
purchase, was, to complete the loading
of his ship, then about to sail, and that
at the time of the sale, it was uncertain
what number of bundles would be neces-
sary for that purpose. The defendant
claimed that under the contract, he was
to have 500 bundles, more or less than
that number, as might be needed to fill
the ship, or at his election ; and that as
he did not require more than 200, and
never in fact received any more than
that number, he was only bound to pay
for 200. It was also contended for the
defendant, that there was a latent ambi-
guity in the contract, as presented in the
sale notes, and that he and the plaintiff,
at the time of the sale, understood it as
now construed by the defendant. He
therefore claimed to introduce parol evi-
dence to show that such was the plain-
tiff's construction. The court below ruled
that there was no latent ambiguity, and
that the construction of the contract was
for the court. The judge instructed the
jury that the contract covered all the

584

gunny bags that had not been com-
pressed ; and that a delivery of a part
of the lot, under and in pursuance of the
contract, was a delivery of the whole.
The defendant further contended, that a
delivery of 475 bundles, or a readiness to
deliver that number, was not a compli-
ance with the contract, which called for
a delivery of " 500 bundles more or less,"
and requested the judge so to instruct the
jury. The court declined so to do, and
ruled that, if in point of fact the lot re-
specting which the parties were negoti-
ating, consisted of 476 bundles, neither
party knowing the precise number, there
was no such discrepancy as to avoid the
contract ; and that the plaintiff was
bound to deliver, and the defendant to
receive, 475 bundles in execution of the
contract. The jury found for the plain-
tiff, for the price of the 475 bundles, and
interest ; and exceptions were alleged by
the defendant. In arguing the case be-
fore the Supreme Court upon the excep-
tions, the defendant claimed that the
alleged contract or sale notes, was but a
bill of parcels, so far as relates to quan-
tity and price, and was not subject to the
rules of law excluding parol evidence.
The Supreme Court sustained the ruling
of the court below as to the construction
of the contract, and the exclusion of
parol evidence, and overruled the excep-
tions. Upon the nature of a bought and
sold note, Biijdow, C. J., remarks as fol-
lows : " The paper or writing on which
the plaintiff relies in support of his case,
is not a mere bill of parcels, designed to
specify only the quantity and price of
articles sold, nor was it so intended or
understood by the parties. It is a writ-
ten memorandum or contract of sale
drawn up by a broker as the agent of
both parties, in the form of what is usu-
ally termed a sold note, and designed to
embody the terms and conditions of a
bargain for the sale of merchandise, so
as to bind the parties by an agreement
valid and sufficient under the statute of
frauds. To this contract the defendant
has bound himself by his written accept-
ance of its terms."

CH. IT.] SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 543

the contract, if the broker's authority can be shown by other
means.

Formerly the question was in some doubt whether the broker's
entry in his book, duly signed by him, should not be regarded as
the actual contract between the parties, and the bought
and * sold notes as merely the evidence thereof, (a) 1 It * 543
certainly appears unreasonable that the entry in the bro-
ker's book, which the parties do not see, should be taken as the
contract between them, when it is obvious that their understand-
ing of the agreement must be drawn from the notes delivered
to them respectively. By retaining the note without objection,
either party ratifies the contract set forth therein. By returning
it at once, with his dissent, he repudiates the contract ; and his
liability then depends, not upon what the broker has done, but
upon the authority which he actually gave to his agent.

The custom of delivering bought and sold notes has at length
obtained so generally, that the courts both in this country and in
England have been obliged, from the necessity of the case, to look
to them rather than to the broker's book, for the terms and con-
ditions of the contract. It seems accordingly to be settled, under
the influence of this custom, that the bought and sold notes, if
there be any, are the best evidence of the bargain ; although if
there be none, the broker's entry in his book, if signed, will be
sufficient. (J)

If these notes are signed by the broker and agree, but differ
from an unsigned entry in the book, the notes constitute the con-
tract. If they agree, but differ from a signed entry, and have
been received and adopted by the vendor and purchaser, though
the entry present the contract correctly, as made, the notes will,
it seems, constitute a new contract, in substitution and extin-
guishment of the contract evidenced by the signed entry, (r) 2 If
the notes differ from each other, and one of them agrees with the
signed entry, the entry and note agreeing with it, may, it seems,

(a) See remarks of Ld. Ellenborough, s. c. 8 D. & R. 59; Goom v. Aflalo, 6 B.

in Dickenson v. Lilwal, 1 Stark. 128 ; but & C. 117 ; s c. 9 D. & R. 148.
see dimming v. Roebuck, Holt, N. P. (c) Hawes v. Forster, 1 Mo. & Rob.

173. 368 ; and see remarks of Campbell, C. J.,

(6) Hawes v. Forster, 1 Mo. & Rob. in Sievewright v. Archibald, 17 A. & E.

368; Grant v. Fletcher, 6 B. & C. 436; (n. s.) 121, 126.

i Remick v. Sandford, 118 Mass. 102 ; Thompson v. Gardner, 1 C. P. D. 777.
2 Jeffcott v. No. Brit. Oil Co. Ir. R. 8 C. L. 17.

585

* 544 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK in.

be taken together as constituting the contract of sale, to the ex-
clusion of the other note. (cT) It seems that a printed sig-

* 544 nature * of the broker is not a sufficient signing within the

Statute of Frauds in New York, which requires that the
memorandum shall be subscribed, (e) But it is well settled, that
under the English statute, the appearance of the vendor's name
printed in a bill of parcels is a sufficient signature to bind
him. (/)

If the broker does not sign the same contract for both parties,
neither will be bound. It has been decided accordingly, that where
the broker delivers different notes of the contract to each of the
contracting parties, and there is no signed entry in his books to
cure the discrepancy, there is no valid bargain at all. There is no
proof of the assent of the parties to the same terms, no common
understanding, and neither of them has the means of determining
whether the broker has exceeded the authority given to him by
the other, (g) "Where a broker's bought note signed by him and
delivered to the purchaser, described the subject-matter of the
contract as " Riga Rhine hemp," and the sale note signed by him
and delivered to the vendor, described it as " St. Petersburg
clean hemp ; " and it appeared that the description in the first

(d) Thornton v. Charles, 9 M. & W. at different prices for each, and that the
802 ; Sievewright v. Archibald, 17 A. & flour of one brand was to be delivered
E. (n. s.) 104; Townend v. Drakeford, when it arrived, but not later than three
1 Car. & K. 20 ; Goora v. Aflalo, 6 B. & days from the date of sale ; nothing was
C. 117; s. c. 9 D. & R. 148; Thornton v. said therein as to the time for delivery
Meux, 1 Mo. & Malk. 43. of the other brand. The bought note,

(e) Zachrisson v. Poppe, 3 Bosw. sent to the purchaser, varied from the
171. other in representing that the whole

(/) Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 B. & P. quantity was to be delivered on arrival,

238; Schneider v. Norris, 2 M. & Sel. nor later than three days. The pur-

286, per Ld. Eldon, C. J. chaser received a portion of the flour

(g) Grant v. Fletcher, 5 B. & C. 436 ; within the time limited, but could not
Heyman v. Neale, 2 Camp. 337 ; Gregson obtain the rest in season, and was ob-
v. Ruck, 4 A. & E. (n. s.) 737; Sieve- liged to purchase elsewhere to meet his
wright i>. Archibald, 17 A. & E. (x. s.) wants. He therefore declined to receive
104. In this case the broker's bought that which arrived out of season, and the
note specified "500 tons of Dunlop, Wil- vendor sold on his account at less than
son & Co. pig iron," and the sold note, the contract price, and sued him for the
" 500 tons of Scotch pig iron," and there difference. The defendant obtained a
was no signed entry in the broker's book, nonsuit on the ground that the bought
There was evidence that Dunlop's iron and sold notes did not constitute a con-
was of Scotch manufacture, but that tract, within the statute of frauds, by
there were other kinds of Scotch pig reason of the variance. Upon the hear-
iron ; and the court held, that the varia- ing before the full court the ruling of
tion in the notes was material, and de- the court below was sustained. Pitts v.
stroyed the contract. Peltier v. Collins, Beckett, 13 M. & W. 743. " If the broker
3 Wend. 459; Suydam v. Clark, 2 Sandf. omit a material term in drawing up the
133. In this case the sale note sent to contract, a party who has not recognized
the vendor, stated a sale of a quantity of or adopted the contract as drawn up, will
flour, consisting of two different brands, not be bound."

586

CH. IV.] SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 545

note had been inserted by mistake, and that it designated

an article of a different and * better quality, and of higher * 545

price and value than that described in the second note ; it

was held, that as the parties were not bound to the same bargain,

and had not respectively agreed to buy and sell the same thing,

there was no contract subsisting between them. (K)

So an invoice of flour, described in a bought note to be of a
particular brand, which proved upon landing to be of a different
brand, was rightfully refused by the purchaser, the court deciding
that the word " Haxall," written in the margin of the note by
the broker, was a warranty that the flour sold should be of that
brand, (i) A statement in a bought note that the broker has sold
the purchaser " seed to arrive," where the purchaser accepts it
after arrival and an opportunity offered him to examine it, implies
no warranty that the article is merchantable ; and the purchaser
has no remedy against the seller, should it subsequently prove to
be unmerchantable, (j) In this case the contract was executed.
But where the contract is executory, such a statement is regarded
as an engagement that the goods are merchantable ; and if they
prove not to be so upon arrival, the purchaser will be released, (k)
But an unimportant or immaterial variation in the notes, will not
avoid the bargain. Thus, where a purchaser's bought note speci-
fied the day for payment, with discount off, as did also the copy
of the sold note furnished him by the broker upon the same paper,
but the vendor's sold note did not specify the day for such pay-
ment with discount, though a copy of the bought note on the
same sheet of paper did so specify ; and the purchaser when
sued for the non-fulfilment of the contract, pleaded this vari-
ance, the court held, that the mention of the day in the copy of
the bought note contained on the same sheet with the sold
note, must be taken to apply equally to the sold as to the
bought note, and that the two corresponded sufficiently to sustain
the contract. (J)

A mistake made by the broker, by describing erroneously the
firm of the vendors, in the bought and sold notes, will not
* justify the purchaser in avoiding the contract, after he * 546
has treated it as a subsisting contract, upon a subsequent

lh\ Thornton o. Kempster, 5 Taunt. (k) Cleu v. McPherson, 1 Bosw. 480.

786 (I) Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722;

(V) Flint v. Lyon. 4 Cal. 17. s. C.1M.& P. 761, 779.
( ?') Moore v. McKinlay, 6 Cal. 471.

587

* 547 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

communication from the vendors, unless he show that he has been
prejudiced, (rn)

The non-delivery of one of the notes to the party entitled to
receive it, so that he is ignorant of the contract, might possibly
destroy the contract, on the ground of want of mutuality of obli-
gation, (ri) A delivery by the broker of an invoice altered from
the name of one purchaser to that of the new purchaser, accom-
panied by a letter to the latter, saying, that to simplify the trans-
action they had transferred to him the invoice received by the
vendor, will be effective to establish a valid contract, (o) And it
is sufficient in an action by a purchaser against a vendor, on a
contract made through a broker, for the plaintiff to produce the
bought note handed to him by the broker, and show the employ-
ment of the latter by the vendor, (p) Where the sold note varies
from the bought note, it lies on the vendor to prove the variance
by producing the former. (q) It is held in New York, that where
no sale note is delivered by the broker, his entry on his book must

agree with the contract as actually concluded, or neither
*547 party is bound, (r) Parol evidence of * mercantile usage

is admissible to explain apparent variances between bought
and sold notes ; (s) but it is questionable whether such evidence
is admissible to explain their meaning, where there is an actual

(m) Mitchell c. Lapage, Holt, N. P. name had been subscribed to the memo-
253. randum, which was never shown to
(n) Per Best, C. J., in Smith v. Spar- Shields, it would not have made such a
row, 2 C. & 1'. 544 ; s. c. 4 Bing. 85, and contract, which he had never assented to,
12 Moore, 200 ; per Hullock, B., in Hen- binding upon him ; nor even would it
derson v. Barnewall, 1 Y. & J. 304 ; but have been evidence of the acceptance of
see Burrough, J., 12 Moore, 206. such a contract on the part of Shields ;
(o) Pauli r. Simes, 6 C. & P. 506. and without an acceptance on the part
(p) Hawes v. Forster, 1 Mo. & Rob. of Shields, it could not be binding on
368. Davis & Brooks. The omission of the
(17) Id. stipulated time of credit in the written
(r) Davis v. Shields, 26 Wend. 341. memorandum, rendered the supposed
In giving the opinion of the Court of agreement stated therein, wholly inoper-
Errors in this case, Walworth, Chancellor, ative as to both parties ; as to the pur-
says: "The broker's memorandum was chaser, because he had not signed any
fatally defective in not containing the such contract, or authorized any one to
real agreement between the parties, as well sign it for him, and as to the vendors,
as in not being subscribed by the agent because he had never consented to ac-
of Davis & Brooks. Although it is not cept such an agreement from them ; and
necessary that both parties should sub- there being no contract which was hind-
scribe the agreement, to make it obliga- ing upon either party at the time the
tory upon the one who does subscribe the parol agreement was made, Shields could
same, it is necessary that they should not miike it a valid agreement, as against
both assent to such agreement to make the other party, by assenting to the writ-
it binding upon either. Here Green was ten memorandum after the subject of the
not the broker of the buyer, who made contract had risen more than twenty-five
his own contract. He was, therefore, the per cent in value." •
agent of the vendors merely ; and if his (s) Bold v. Rayner, 1 M. & W. 343.

588

CH. IV.J SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 548

discrepancy between them, (i) The true office of mercantile usage
is to interpret the otherwise indeterminate intentions of parties,
and to ascertain the nature and extent of their contracts, arising
not from express stipulation, but from mere implications and pre-
sumptions, and acts of a doubtful or equivocal character ; or to
ascertain the true meaning of particular words in an instrument,
when those words have various senses, (w)

Where upon a sale of goods the vendor produces a sample and
represents the bulk as of equal quality, if there be sale notes which
do not refer to the sample, it is not a sale by sample ; for the writing
is the only evidence of the contract. (z>) But a warranty in the
sale of a chattel is an essential part of the bargain, and should be
stated in the bought and sold notes constituting the memorandum
of sale ; and it is held in New York, that the omission renders
the contract void, and that parol evidence, in a suit for non-per-
formance, is inadmissible to take the case out of the statute
of frauds, (w) If the contract * has been executed in con- * 548
formity with the written memorandum by which it is evi-
denced, it is clear that parol evidence of a warranty not mentioned
in the writing, is not admissible in a suit brought by the purchaser,
for damages for breach of warranty, (x)

(t) Godts v. Rose, 17 C. B. 229. chaser for not fulfilling a contract for

(«) Per Story, J., in The Eeeside, 2 the purchase of rice, and the defendant

Sumn. 667. resisted on the ground that the entry of

(v) Meyer v. Everth, 4 Camp. 22; the sale written in the vendor's book of
Van Ostrand v. Reed, 1 Wend. 424. But sales, and signed by the broker who ef-
see Waring v. Mason, 18 Wend. 425. In fected the sale, did not correspond with
this case there was a sale by sample of the bought note which the broker handed
sundry bales of cotton, and a receipt of to him, in not including a guaranty of the
the goods by the purchaser. Upon open- quality. The court regarded the part
ing the bales they were found packed in omitted as one of the substantial terms
the interior with masses of damaged cot- of the contract, and held that its omission
ton. The purchaser sued for damages was fatal, because it left the actual con-
for breach of the warranty implied in the tract without any written memorandum
sale by sample ; and the court held " that that would take it out of the statute of
parol evidence of a sale by sample is ad- frauds. Upon this point, Mara/, J., re-
missible, although the broker who ef- marked, in giving the opinion of the
fected the sale made an entry thereof in court : " Suppose the contract had been
his books without mentioning that it was with warranty, and the memorandum in
a sale by sample ; it not having been the plaintiff's sales book had been signed
signed by the broker, and a bought by the defendant, but the warranty clause
and sold note not having been deliv- omitted, and suppose the rice had been
ered by him to either of the parties." delivered and had proved to be of inferior
The contract being an executed one when quality ; could the defendant have shown
the action was brought, there was no the warranty by parol 1 The authorities
question as to the validity of the agree- to which I have referred show abun-
ment under the statute of frauds. Pick- dantly that he could not. Is the rule of
ering v. Dowson, 4 Taunt. 779 ; Kain v. proof different where the memorandum
Old, 2 B. & C. 627 ; Cabot v. Winsor, 1 is subscribed by an agent ? Most cer-
Allen, 546. tainly not."

(to) Peltier v. Collins, 3 Wend. 459. (x) Reed v. Wood, 9 Vt. 285; and see

The plaintiff in this case sued a pur- Marcy, J., quoted in the preceding note.

589

549

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

When a broker does not disclose the name of his principal in
his sold note, he is liable to be looked to as the purchaser ; and
if the principal be not revealed within a reasonable time, the
vendor can hold the broker on the contract. This rule, recog-
nized in the usage of trade, (y) 1 is founded upon the
* 549 general * law of agency, which holds, that where one con-
tracts with another and represents himself to be an agent,
but without naming his principal, if he have no principal, he will
himself be liable ; and if he have one who is subsequently dis-
covered, the other party may, upon the discovery, elect which of
the two to hold. (2) If in such case the vendor sue the broker,
for non-performance of the contract, the sold note signed by the
latter, stating that he has sold to his principal, will be sufficient

(y) Thomson v. Davenport, 9 B. & C.
78;Pennell v. Alexander, 3 E. & B. 77
Eng. C. L. 288 ; Humphrey v. Dale, 7 E.
& B. 90 Eng. C. L. 266. In this case the
plaintiff employed A, as a broker, to sell
a quantity of oil, who negotiated with the
defendant, another broker, by whom the
oil was bought for a dealer in the article.
The sold note, signed by the defendant
and given to A, stated that the oil was
sold by defendant for A, to defendant's
" principal," without disclosing the name
of the purchaser. A then sent a sold note
to the plaintiff, stating that he had sold
the oil to defendant for account of the
plaintiff. By the terms as set forth in
both of these notes, the oil was to be de-
livered within fourteen days of a day six
months after the date of the sale. Before
the six months elapsed the purchaser be-
came insolvent. After the insolvency,
on the day before the last of the four-
teen, when delivery could be made, the
defendant disclosed the name of his prin-
cipal to the vendor. An action was
brought by the latter against the pur-
chasing broker, for the price of goods
bargained and sold, on his personal lia-
bility as the agent of an undisclosed prin-
cipal. At the trial at nisi prius, the above
facts were given in evidence, and it was
also proved, that according to the usage
of trade, whenever a broker purchased
without disclosing the name of his prin-
cipal, he was liable to be looked to as
the purchaser. On this evidence the de-
fendant contended, that the contract be-
tween the parties, as laid in the decla-
ration, was not proved. A verdict was
taken for the plaintiff, leave being re-

served to move for a nonsuit. A rule
nisi for a nonsuit, being obtained on the
grounds that there was no evidence of
the alleged contract of the sale and pur-
chase, and that evidence of the alleged
custom was not admissible ; the case was
argued before the full bench, the defend-
ant contending that there was no bargain
with the plaintiff, because the sold note
relied upon as constituting the contract,
represented that the sale was for account
of A ; also, that the evidence of the cus-
tom if admitted, would contradict the
language of the written instrument, and
show a different contract ; that if the
contract was with the defendant as pur-
chaser, it was a contract not shown by
any memorandum in writing, and there-
fore not to be enforced under the statute
of frauds. But the court held, that the
parol evidence was competent to show
that A acted as the broker of the plain-
tiff ; also that parol evidence as to the
usage of trade making brokers liable
where their principals are not disclosed,
was admissible ; on the ground that it
did not vary the terms of the written
contract, but merely annexed a particu-
lar or incident thereto, which though not
mentioned in the contract, was connected
with it, or with the relations growing out
of it. It was therefore to be admitted
with the view of giving effect as far
as possible to the presumed intentions
of the parties. The rule to enter a non-
suit was accordingly ordered to be dis-
charged.

(z) 2 Smith Lead. Cas. 223. See ante,
chapter on Agents, sect. vii.

1 A broker making a sold note " on account of " a foreign principal is not person-
ally liable on the contract. Gadd v. Houghton, 1 Ex. D. 357.

590

CH. IV.] SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 550

evidence of the contract ; for the statement of a sale to a princi-
pal, though unnamed, necessarily implies that he has bought for
him. Indeed the word principal in that connection itself imports
a buyer, (a)

Where the contract is made through the agency of two
brokers, one acting for the vendor and the other for the pur-
chaser, and the sold note given by the purchaser's to the vendor's
broker, states, that the sale is made on account of the latter
instead of his principal, the vendor may nevertheless treat the
contract as his own, and enforce it upon the terms of the
sold note. (b~)

If the broker in his bought note give the name of a wrong
person as the vendor, the purchaser upon discovery of the real
vendor, may proceed against him for the non-fulfilment of
the contract, (c)

Upon general principles we should be inclined to the con-
clusion, that the memorandum signed by the broker, whether
it be an entry in his books, or the customary sale notes, must
be signed by him at the time the contract is made, and not
afterwards, in order to satisfy the statute of frauds, which requires
a signing by the party to be charged or his agent ; for, the broker
being the agent of the principals only for the purpose of effecting
the contract, after that duty is performed, he is functus officio,
and no longer the agent of the contracting parties, (d) The
principals are not however thus restricted, but may sign a valid
memorandum of the bargain thus effected, at any subse-
quent * time, either personally or by an agent duly author- * 550
ized to perform that act.

So, too, the principal may, by ratifying the inoperative signa-
ture of the broker, render it effective to answer the requirements
of the statute, and this result would be accomplished by the
ratification, whether the original defect arose from the broker's
signing after the contract was made, or from a want of authority
to make the contract. The English statute of frauds, and gen-
erally those of the several States of the Union, while they require
that the memorandum in writing shall be signed by the party to
be charged, or his agent, do not provide as to the mode in which

(a) Humfrey u. Dale, 7 E. & B. 90 (d) See a remark by Campbell, C. J.,

Ene C L 266. favoring this conclusion in Sievewright

( j) id. v. Archibald, 17 A. & E. (n. s.) p. 124.
(c) Trueman v. Loder, 11 A. & E. 589.

591

* 551 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

the agent is to receive his authority, but leave the question to
be settled by the rules of common law. By the common law,
the subsequent sanction of an agent's acts is considered as the
same thing in effect, as assent at the time, upon the principle
that omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori cequipara-
tur. (e)

By the Internal Revenue law of the United States, a broker's
note or memorandum of sale must be stamped with a ten cent
stamp, and the penalty imposed for issuing a document of this
kind without the prescribed stamp is fifty dollars. It is also pro-
vided by the same act of Congress, that an unstamped instrument
shall be deemed invalid and of no effect. (/) It has been ruled
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, that the law applies to
both the bought and the sold note, issued in the same transac-
tion. (#) This ruling would seem to be a reasonable construction
of the law, and we cannot doubt that it would be sustained by the
courts of the United States, should the question be brought before
them. It may be a question, however, of more uncertainty, whether
the signed entry of the broker made in his books, at the time of
the sale, would be liable to a stamp duty, and invalid if not

* 551 stamped. As we have shown by the * authorities cited in

the foregoing pages, such an entry, in the absence of perfect
bought and sold notes, will be regarded by the courts as sufficient
written evidence to take the contract out of the statute of frauds.
The question, therefore, becomes one of interest, whether such
an entry must be stamped in order to be valid. Though such an
entry might be regarded by the courts as a " memorandum of
sale " within the terms of the law, yet as the law only imposes a
stamp duty upon such a memorandum, when it is issued, and as
the entry made by the broker is not in any sense issued, we are
inclined to think that the decision would be, that no stamp was
required.

It is held in England, that where the written contract is inad-
missible in evidence for want of a stamp, neither party can give

(e) Soames v. Spencer, 1 Dow. & R. hand, the party must trust to his agent;

32 ; Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 724 ; s. c. if it is given subsequently to the con-

1 M. & P. 779. In this case, Best, C. J., tract, the party knows that all has been

says: "In my opinion the subsequent done according to his wishes."
sanction of a contract signed by an (/) Revenue Act of July 1, 1862,

agent, takes it out of the operation of §§ 94, 95.

the statute of frauds more satisfactorily [g) Boutwell's Tax System, ruling

than an authority given beforehand. No. 274, p. 346.
When the authority is given before-

592

CH- IV-] SALE OP PERSONAL PEOPEETT. * 552

parol evidence of such contract ; and we presume the same rule
would obtain in this country. (K) We have the authority of the
English Court of Exchequer for the doctrine, that a factor selling
goods for his principal, has not the same authority as a broker
to bind the purchaser by bought and sold notes ; for he is not
regarded in law as the agent of the purchaser. And though the
sale notes be made out by him in the presence of the two prin-
cipals, and delivered to them respectively, and the purchaser
receive the bought note without objection at the time, or even so
far recognize it as to request the factor to make an alteration in
the date thereof ; the transaction will not thereby be taken out
of the statute of frauds, so that the owner of the goods can main-
tain an action against the purchaser for non-performance. All
these circumstances, it is held, fall short of authorizing the factor
to act for the purchaser, and unless express authority to sign for
him be given by the purchaser, the bought note will not
hold him. («') This case strongly defines a * distinction * 552
between a factor and a broker, making the latter the agent
of both contracting parties, and the former the agent of his prin-
cipal only.

(h) 3 Starkie on Evid. 1005, 1006. tide had fallen in price considerably at

See 1 H. & C. 174. that time. The plaintiff sued the defend-

(i) Durrell o. Evans, 6 H. & N. 660. ant for non-performance of the contract,
The plaintiff having hops for sale, sent and the question was reserved for the
samples to a hop factor in London to sell Court of Exchequer, whether the bought
them. The defendant saw the samples note signed by the factor was a sufficient
at the factor's and inquired the price, memorandum in writing to bind the de-
Subsequently he met the owner at the fendant. That court decided that it was
factor's and offered him a certain price not. Pollock, C. B., in agreeing with the
for the hops, which the owner upon the rest of the court that the rule for a non-
advice of the factor, accepted. The suit should be made absolute, says : "At
factor at once made out bought and the trial I thought it right to reserve the
sold notes which he gave to the parties, defendant leave to move upon it, and let
and upon request of the defendant al- the matter be discussed. The defendant
tered the date of the bought note handed did not sign the note, nor was it signed
to him. A time was then appointed for by any one for him, or on his behalf,
1 the hops to be sent up from the country and the defendant's subsequent conduct
and weighed, and the defendant caused amounts to nothing, because a party
the samples to be sent to his store, does not adopt and ratify that which
When the hops were weighed, the plain- was not originally done on his behalf,
tiff and defendant were present, and upon If the required act was not originally
some dispute about the weight, and ob- done on his behalf, he cannot be after-
jection to the condition of the hops, wards legally bound or said to have
which the defendant pronounced to be adopted it. The factor here was the
unsalable, he refused to perform the agent of the seller only, and not of the
contract, or to accept the hops. The ar- buyer at all."

vol. I. 38 593

553 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

SECTION VIII.

OP SALES TO ARRIVE.

A very common form of contract at the present day, is a sale
of goods " to arrive." This is a sale of merchandise expected
from abroad, effected before arrival, the condition being that the
thing sold shall arrive, and that if it do not, the bargain shall be
void.

Upon the question whether under such a contract there is a
present and executed sale, subject to be defeated by the non-
arrival of the goods, or only an executory contract to sell and
buy, there has been much discussion ; but the authorities are
strongly in favor of the latter view. Where however the quantity,
quality, and price of the goods are specifically ascertained, and
the bill of lading thereof is assigned by indorsement and delivery
to the purchaser under a contract of this kind, we think that the
general principles of the law-merchant would lead to the conclu-
sion that there was a constructive delivery and executed sale,
and that the right of property passed. (&) And if any
* 553 * other act of equivalent import to the assignment of a bill
of lading, be performed, as an assignment upon the back of
the invoice, the transfer of a policy of insurance upon the goods,
and the giving an order on the vessel to deliver to the purchaser
on arrival, the effect might be the same. (7) But this conclusion

(k) Alexander v. Gardner, 1 Bing. N. 5 Ham. (Ohio) 89; Lee v. Kimball, 45

C. 671; 1 Scott, 630; 1 Hodges, 147. In Me. 172.

this case the plaintiff made a contract in (/) Gardner v. Howland, 2 Pick. 599;

London to sell to defendant butter which Howland v. Harris, 4 Mason, 497 ; in this

he expected from Sligo, Ireland, and the case the original cargo was assigned to

quality and price were specified by the the plaintiff, while at sea, by the owner,

contract. The goods were shipped on a bond fide in payment and satisfaction of a

specific day ; the defendant having ac- pre-existing debt, and the return cargo,

cepted the invoice and bill of lading. It which was the proceeds of the original,

was held, that the property in the butter was attached by the U. S. Marshal for

had passed to the defendant, and that duties then owing to the government by

though the goods were lost by shipwreck, the assignor upon a former importation.

the price might be recovered of the de- It was held, that the assignment passed a

fendant in an action for goods bought constructive possession to. the vendee, suf-

and sold. — Caldwell v. Ball, 1 T. R. 205 ; ficient to enable hira to maintain trespass

Stubbs v. Lund, 7 Mass. 453; Walter i>. against a wrong-doer. Per Story, J. —

Ross, 2 Wash. C. C.283; Jordon i\ James, Pratt v. Parkman, 24 Pick. 42; Lanfear

v. Sumner, 17 Mass. 110.

594

CH. IV.J SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 554

must be subject to important qualifications. Perhaps rules anal-
ogous to those which give and govern the right of stoppage in
transitu, might be held applicable. If, for example, the purchaser
becomes insolvent before the arrival, we cannot suppose that his
assignees could take the goods without paying or securing the
price agreed upon, (ni) But they might take them by so doing,
and make what profit they could out of them, for the benefit of
the insolvent eslate. We reach the same result by simply sup-
posing that the constructive delivery above spoken of, did not
terminate the common law lien of the vendor for his price.

In all cases of this kind, the intention of the parties, as gathered
from the contract and the attending circumstances, will govern ;
and if from these it be apparent that the property was to pass
immediately, the courts will so construe the contract ; for no
particular form is required for the sale of personal property. All
that is necessary is, that the parties should intend, the one, to
part with his property, the other, to become the owner of it.
The union of intention constitutes the contract of sale. And it
may be proved by any kind of legal evidence, parol or written ;
by a formal conveyance under seal, or by a loose correspon-
dence ; by a conversation direct between the parties, or mediate
through the agency of other persons, (w)

* Ordinarily, a sale to arrive by a specified vessel, does * 554
not pass any property in any specific chattel on board the
vessel at the time the bargain was made ; it being merely an
agreement for the sale and delivery of a portion of the cargo at a
future period, namely, when the vessel shall arrive ; and to fulfil
this condition a double event must take place ; that is, the arrival
of the vessel, with the goods on board. The contract is therefore
both executory and conditional, (o) a

(m) Benedict v. Field, 16 N. Y. 595. sell to the plaintiffs, " 100 tons nitrate of

(n) Per' Morton, J., in Pratt v. Park- soda, at 18s. per cwt. to arrive ex Daniel

man, 24 Pick. 42. Grant, to be taken from the quay at

(o) Chitty, Cont. *444; Russell v. landing weights," &c, and below the sig-

Nichols, 3 Wend. 112 ; Shields v. Pattee, nature of the brokers was this memoran-

2 Sandf. 202, 4 Corast. 122 ; Benedict v. dum, "should the vessel be lost, this

Field, 10 N. Y. 595 ; Lovatt v. Hamilton, contract to be void." The vessel arrived,

5 Mee. & W. 039 ; Stockdale v. Dunlop, but brought no nitrate of soda, and the

6 M. & W. 224 ; Johnson v. McDonald, 9 plaintiffs sued for breach of contract in
M. & W. 600. In this case the defend- the non-delivery of the goods. , The de-
ant by a bought and sold note agreed to fence was, that the contract was at an

1 A sale to arrive is executory, and the title does not pass until the arrival and
delivery of the goods. Neldon v. Smith, 7 Vroom, 148, 154.

595

* 555 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

Whether the expression used in the contract be " to arrive " or
" on arrival," the construction will be the same. Efforts have
sometimes been made to induce the courts to give a more ex-
tended meaning to the former expression, as importing a warranty
at the article shall arrive if the vessel does. It is held, how-
ever, that the word " to " does not mean that the goods " shall "
arrive, but merely that they shall be sold on their arrival. (p~) 1
Nor will this construction be varied if there be an express condi-
tion appended to the contract, that the contract itself shall be
void should the vessel be lost. Whether appending a negative
condition, — as, that "this contract shall not be valid unless the
vessel arrives," would vary the construction by excluding any
implied condition, admits of some doubt. Baron Alderson, in the
case just cited, expresses the opinion that a negative instead of

an affirmative condition, might make a difference. (g)
* 555 * A sale on arrival by a certain vessel, is held to mean

on the arrival of the goods and not the vessel only ; and this
construction will always be put upon the condition, unless the
language used in the contract is so plain to the contrary as not
to admit of it. For the courts are unwilling to assume that the
contracting parties meant to enter into a mere wager, (r) In
fact, the arrival of the goods by that particular vessel, is held to

end, it being conditional on the arrival (r) Boyd v. Siffkin, 2 Camp. 325. In
of the requisite quantity of nitrate of this ease the broker's note, proved at
soda by the Daniel Grant. The case the trial, was in the following words :
was argued in the Court of Exchequer, " Sold to Mr. H. Siffkin, for Mr. M
upon this point, the plaintiffs insisting Boyd, about 32 tons more or less of Riga
that the words " to arrive " meant that Khine hemp on arrival per Fannie & Al-
tlie seller warrants the arrival of the mira, at £82 10s. per ton." The ship
goods. He also contended that the effect arrived without the hemp, and the ae-
of the express condition as to when the tion was brought against the vendor on
contract should be void, excluded the the note. Lord FMenborougli said, in decid-
implied condition upon non-arrival. The ing that the action was unmaintainable :
court held that the contract did not " 1 clearly think that 'on arrival' means
amount to a warranty on the part of the the arrival of the hemp. The parties
seller, that the nitrate of soda should did not mean to enter into a wager. By
arrive if the vessel arrived, but to a 'bought and sold ' in the note, must be
contract for the sale of goods at a future understood, contracted to sell and buy.
period, subject to the double condition The hemp was expected by the ship ;
of the arrival of the vessel, with the had it arrived it was sold to the plaintiff,
specified cargo on board ; and gave judg- As none arrived, the contract was at an
ment for the defendant. Hawes v. Law- end." — We think that the whole of the
rence, 4 Comst. 345; Boyd ». Siffkin, 2 language here used, is consistent with
Camp. 320, and Hawes ,: Humble, there the doctrine that the contract was ex-
cited, ecutory and not executed ; for the words,

(p) Per Parke, B., in Johnson v. Mc- " had it arrived, it was sold," clearly im-

Donald, 9 M. & W. 600. port that the sale depended upon the

(q) Per Alderson, B., same case. arrival.

1 As to what is " arrival," see Montgomery v. Middleton, 13 Ir. C. L. 173.

596

CH- IT-J SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 555

be a conlition precedent to the vendor's obligation to deliver; so
that if the goods which are the subject of the negotiation, should
arrive by some other vessel, the contract would be void. (*) J

If the sale is of a definite quantity or number, as so many hun-
dred bags of an article, the contract is not apportionable, and the
vendor cannot recover damages for a refusal to take any less
quantity or number. (ss~)

They must also arrive at the agreed port of delivery, and in the
ordinary course of trade and navigation, or the vendor will not be
held. And if by any accident such an arrival is rendered impos-
sible, it seems that the vendor is not obliged to adopt other means
of transportation, by which the goods might readily be delivered
to the purchaser within the stipulated time, in order to avoid his
liability. (t)

(s) Lovatt v. Hamilton, 5 Mee. & W. contracts made for the Mansfield's cargo.

639. This was a contract whereby the The plaintiff sued for the non-delivery

defendants sold to the plaintiff 50 tons of the oil, and the principal question

palm oil " to arrive " per the Mansfield raised, was, whether the arrival of the

from the coast of Africa; in case of non- oil at Liverpool in the Mansfield, was a

arrival, or the vessel's not having so condition precedent to the plaintiff's

much in, after delivery of former con- right to the delivery of it, or whether

tracts, the sale to be void. The Mans- the arrival of the oil from the Mansfield

field arrived with an insufficient quantity by another vessel, did not entitle him to

of oil to fill the contract, after delivery it. The Court of Exchequer were clearly

under the former contracts; but a larger of opinion that the arrival of the oil in

quantity than was necessary to make up the Mansfield was a condition precedent,

the deficiency, had previously been trans- See also Shields v. Pattee, 2 Sandf 262,

shipped on the coast of Africa, from the 4 Comst 122.

Mansfield to another vessel belonging to (ss) Reimers v. Ridner, 2 Rob. 11.

the defendants, and had arrived before (() Idle v. Thornton, 3 Camp. 274.

the Mansfield. The transshipment was This was a sale of tallow on arrival, to

made by an agent of the defendants, arrive on or before a certain day, or the

without any instructions from them so bargain to be void. The vessel was

to do, and without any knowledge of the wrecked on the English coast, but the

1 A.'s firm having purchased certain nitrate of soda, and chartered the Precursor
to bring it home, subsequently sold to B. "the entire parcel of nitrate of soda ex-
pected to arrive at port of call per Precursor. , . . Should any circumstance or acci-
dent prevent the shipment of the nitrate, or should the vessel be lost, this contract to
be void." Before the date of this contract, and without their knowledge, the greater
part of the nitrate was destroyed by an earthquake, and the charter of the Precursor
cancelled. A.'s firm then purchased other soda, sold it to other parties, and chartered
the Precursor anew, which brought it home, where B. claimed it under the contract.
Held, in the Queen's Bench (Smith v. Myers, L. R. 5 Q. B. 429), that the contract,
though not for a specific lot of nitrate of soda, was for a specific adventure or
voyage which both parties contemplated as about to take place, and did not attach
to this second lot; in the Exchequer Chamber (L. R. 7 Q. B. 139, affirming the
decision of the Queen's Bench), that the contract referred to a specific quantity of
nitrate of soda, which was prevented from being shipped by an accident, and con-
sequently became void. A lot of scrap iron was sold to arrive by the Christopher.
It came in the St. Christopher, and it was held that unless the misnomer was of
some consequence the buyer was not justified in refusing the goods. Smith v. Pettee,
70 N. Y. 13. " Cargo " means a vessel's entire load, and the vendee is not bound to
accept less. Borrowman ». Drayton, 2 Ex. T). 15.' See Ireland v. Livingston, L. R.
2 Q. B. 90; L. R. 5 Q. B. 516; L. R. 5 H. L. 395-410.

597

*556 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

* 556 * A sale of a specified quantity of goods to arrive by a

particular vessel, will become an executed contract by the
arrival of that vessel with the requisite quantity of goods to fill
the contract, whether they are consigned to the vendor, or sub-
ject to his control or not. The implied conditions of the arrival
of the goods, which the law has attached to contracts of sale to
arrive, seem to arise so naturally from a contract of this charac-
ter, that their recognition by the courts as material terms thereof,
meets with very general approbation. But when it is proposed to
add to these conditions an implication which lias no foundation in
necessity, and which no merchant of ordinary prudence could
suppose the law would intend in his behalf, the well recognized
principle, that courts will not make a contract for the parties
which they have not made themselves, will probably prevent the
courts from interpolating such an implied condition. There is
no legal necessity that the vendor should be able to dispose of the
goods at the time he enters into the contract ; for he may acquire
the ability to control them, by purchase or otherwise, subsequently
to his engagement, and before the goods must be delivered, (u)
And if he carelessly omits to guard against the possibility that
the goods may arrive consigned to another instead of himself, the
fault is his own, and he alone should suffer the consequences.

In a case before the English Common Bench, where a

* 557 * purchaser had sued his vendor for non-delivery of a

specified quantity of goods, expected to arrive by a partic-
ular vessel, the vessel having arrived with the necessary quantity

tallow was saved, and it might have been order to fulfil his engagement ; and if

forwardpd to London by other convey- the real owner will not part with thpm,

ance in season; but was not. The pur- the debtor cannot insist that he is dis-

chaser sued for breach of contract in charged from his obligation under the

non-delivery, and the court held that " an pretext that no man can be obliged to

arrival" meant at the port of London, perform an impossibility. For this ex-

and that the defendants were not bound cuse is only valid in case of an absolute

to forward the tallow after the wreck, impossibility ; but where the thing is pos-

there having been no tender of indemnity sible in itself, the obligation subsists, not-

by the plaintiff. The contract was void withstanding it is beyond the means of

unless the commodity, in the ordinary the person obliged to accomplish it ; and

course of trade and navigation, arrived he is answerable for the non-performance

at the port of destination by the appoint- of his engagement. The thing being

ed day. possible in its nature, it is sufficient to

(«) Hihhlewhite v. M'Morine, 5 M. & induce the creditor to rely upon the per-

W. 462. In Pothier on Obligations, vol. formance of the promise. The fault is

i. § 133, it is said: "Even things which imputable to the debtor, for not having

do not belong to the debtor, but to an- duly examined whether it was in his

other person, may be the object of an power to accomplish what he promised

obligation, as he is thereby obliged to or not." Paradine v. Jane, Ah yn, 27.
purchase or otherwise procure them in

598

CH. IV.J

SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY.

e558

on board, though not shipped for or on account of the vendor, the
defendant resisted on the ground that, though the expected quan-
tity arrived, it was not consigned to him or subject to his control.
But the court were so strongly inclined to consider the contract
as warranting the defendant's power of disposal over the goods,
that without further prosecuting the appeal, he assented to this
construction, and paid the damages as assessed upon that prin-
ciple. (y~)

* A sale of goods at sea, to be paid for on delivery at * 558

(r) Fischel w. Scott, 15 C. B. 69. The
defendants contracted to sell to the plain-
tiff, 100 lihds. Gingelly oil, expected to
arrive by the ship Resolute from Madras.
The vessel arrived with more than 100
hhds. of Gingelly oil on board, but only
34 hhds. were consigned to, or under the
power or control of, the defendants.
The declaration set forth, that the 100
hhds. oil contracted for, did arrive by the
Resolute, that the defendants had not de-
livered the same to the plaintiff, and al-
leged special damage. The defendants
admitted that 100 hhds. and more, did
arrive from Madras in the Resolute, but
pleaded that only thirty-four of the said
hhds. were shipped for, or on account of
them ; that they had no property in, or
power to deliver the residue, and that
they had tendered the 34 hhds., which
the plaintiff had refused to accept. To
this plea the plaintiff demurred, on the
ground that as 100 hhds. did arrive by
the vessel, the defendants were bound to
deliver them according to the contract.
In the course of the argument upon the
demurrer by the counsel for the defend-
ants, Maule, J., said : " The oil is de-
scribed pretty clearly ; the question is,
whether the oil which came was ' oil ex-
pected to arrive by the Resolute.' "
Jervis, C. J. : " It is quite inconsistent
with this plea, that the oil contracted to
be sold to the plaintiff did not arrive by
the Resolute. The oil which was ex-
pected did arrive. The defendants ex-
pected it to come consigned to them ; but
it turned out that it was consigned to
some one else." — " How is this plea an
answer to the declaration?" — ''The
question is, whether the contract must
mean something in which the defendants
have a property, and which they have
power to deliver." Maule, J. : " The
contract simply says, that the defendants
agree to sell to the plaintiff certain oil
expected to arrive by a particular vessel.
The defendants mean to abide by their
contract if the oil arrives, whether there
is any title or not." To this last inter-

ruption, the counsel for the defendants
replied : " If that be the true construction
of the contract, undoubtedly the plea is
no answer." Finding the impression of
the court to be against him, he asked
leave to amend his plea. Leave was
granted ; but the amendment was not
made, and the defendants settled the case
by paying damages, as stated in the
text. — See also Gorrissen v. Perrin, 2 C.
B. (n. s.) 681, upon this point, where the
same court say, in reference to the rule
that the obligation of delivery is condi-
tional upon the arrival of the ship, and
of the goods being on board, as laid down
in previous cases of sales to arrive:
" Without desiring at all to interfere
with the rule laid down in the cases re-
ferred to, we may, in passing, observe
that we think it has been carried far
enough, and that its effect may have been
to introduce uncertainty into contracts
which were not intended by the parties
to be contingent on accidental circum-
stances, sucli as the transfer of a cargo
from one ship to another." The case of
Fischel v. Scott, above cited, having been
pressed upon the court in the argument
of Gorrissen v. Perrin, the court, after re-
marking that there was in that case no
positive adjudication by the court, and
showing that the facts in that case were
plainly distinguishable from the one be-
fore the court, proceed to say, in affirma-
tion of the principle foreshadowed in
Fischel v. Scott : " Now, it may well be,
that if a man takes upon himself to dis-
pose of goods expected to arrive by a
certain ship, as goods over which he has
a power of disposal, and the goods after-
wards arrive not consigned to him, he
shall he precluded from saying that, in
addition to the contingency of their ar-
rival, there was implied the further con-
tingency of their coming consigned to
him. He has dealt with them as his own
and cannot be allowed to import into the
contract a new condition, viz., that the
goods on their arrival shall prove to be
his."

599

559

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

the place of the contract, is considered as equivalent to a contract
to sell and deliver on arrival, and will be governed by the same

rules. (w>)
* 559 * A verbal contract for the sale of goods to arrive, from

its non-compliance with the requirements of the statute of
frauds, gives the purchaser no insurable interest therein ; and if
there be afterwards an arrival and delivery of part of the goods
thus bought under an entire contract, such partial delivery,
though it will amount to a ratification of the contract as between
the parties, will not relate back in its effects, so as to confer on

(u>) Shields v. Pettee, 2 Sandf. 262, i
Comst. 122. This was an action of as-
sumpsit for a quantity of pig iron, sold
and delivered ; but the case turned upon
an alleged breacli of contract by the
vendor, and a consequent claim of the
purchaser for a recoupment of damages.
The plaintiff througli a broker sold to
the defendant a quantity of pig iron, of
No. 1 quality, on board the ship Siddons,
then at sea, and so understood to be, by
both parties. Upon the arrival of the
ship, this description of iron had advanced
in price beyond the contract rate, and
subsequently continued to advance. The
plaintiff received by the vessel a single
lot of the kind of iron sold to the de-
fendant, but it was not of No. 1 quality,
it being a mixture of that and of inferior
qualities, so that the whole lot was worth
one dollar per ton less than No. 1. The
plaintiff commenced delivering the iron
to the defendant upon the unloading of
the ship, and had delivered about two-
fifths of the quantity sold when the de-
fendant objected that the quality was not
No. 1, and that he could not pay for it as
such. Upon this the plaintiff offered to
deliver the balance of the lot in compli-
ance with the contract, provided the de-
fendant would receive and pay for it as
No. 1 . This was declined by the defend-
ant, who was then informed by the plain-
tiff that if he persisted in the refusal of
the iron at the price agreed upon, it
would be sold to other parties. A bill
was subsequently presented by the plain-
tiff for the quantity delivered, and pay-
ment demanded. The defendant de-
clined to pay the bill, and insisted upon
the fulfilment of the contract. The
plaintiff then demanded the return of
the iron delivered, and the defendant not
returning it, the plaintiff brought his ac-
tion, claiming the market value, at the
date of delivery, for the quantity deliv-
ered, which value was proved to be, for
that quality, some two dollars and fifty

600

cents per ton higher than the contract
price for No. 1 iron. The defendant ad-
mitted his obligation to pay for what he
had received, but claimed to recoup the
damage sustained by the non-delivery
of the article contracted for. The
court in giving judgment, denied the
right to recoup, on the ground that
the contract between the parties was
equivalent to an agreement to sell and
deliver iron to arrive ; that it was an
agreement to deliver No. 1 pig iron of
the kind specified, if any iron of that
description arrived in the Siddons, on
the voyage she was then making. No
consignment of that quality of iron hav-
ing arrived in the ship, the court held
that the contract was at an end, and
therefore, that the defendant could not
claim to recoup in damages, and must
pay the full market value of the iron at
the time of delivery, without regard to
the contract. This case was affirmed
upon appeal from the Superior Court to
the Court of Appeals, 4 Comst. 122 ; and
in giving the judgment of the higher
court, Hurlbut, J., says: "In my judg-
ment, the contract was not a sale, but an
agreement to sell, which was not exe-
cuted, and which could only be required
to be executed on the arrival of the ship
with the iron on board. The arrival of
the vessel without the iron would have
put an end to the contract, which was
conditional, and a sale to arrive. The
vessel was at sea at the time ; this was
known to both parties, and neither could
be certain either of her arrival, or of her
bringing the iron. If a part only had
arrived, the plaintiff would not have
been bound to deliver, nor the defendant
to accept it. There was no warranty,
express or implied, either that the iron
should arrive, or that arriving, it should
be of a particular quality. The iron
called for by the contract, did not arrive,
but iron of a different quality, and I
think that the contract was at an end."

CH. IV. J

SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY.

559

the purchaser an insurable interest on a part of the goods which
were wrecked at a date prior to the partial delivery, (x) 1

A statement in a contract of sale of goods to arrive by a par-
ticular vessel, that the vessel sailed on or about a day named, is
considered as a representation, rather than a condition or war-
ranty, as to the time of sailing; and if made without fraud,
though the vessel in reality sailed at a day considerably later
than the day named, and her arrival in port is thereby delayed,
the purchaser is bound to accept and pay for the goods. («/)

(x) Stockdale v. Dunlop, 6 M. & W.
224. The plaintiff having made a parol
contract for the purchase of 200 tons of
palm oil, to arrive by two vessels from
the African coast, one of the vessels ar-
rived safely with her cargo, and one
hundred tons of her oil was delivered to
him by the vendor, in pursuance of the
agreement. Some twelve days after
this partial delivery, the plaintiff ef-
fected a policy of insurance with the de-
fendant, upon his valued profits on the
100 tons expected by the other vessel.
It subsequently appeared that the vessel
was wrecked upon the coast of Africa,
nearly two months before the time of
the delivery of the first hundred tons of
oil, and was condemned and sold. When
wrecked, she had only 50 tons of oil on
board, which was transshipped and sent
to Liverpool by other vessels. Suit was
brought by the plaintiff upon his policy,
and the defendant resisted, on the
ground that the plaintiff had not such
an interest in the goods or the profits to
be derived from them as to make Uim
capable of being insured. At the trial,
it was proved that " oil to arrive " was a
mercantile term, and that if the oil did
not arrive by the vessel, the purchaser
had no right to it. A verdict was taken
for the plaintiff, with leave for the de-
fendant to move to enter a verdict on
the above ground if sustained. After
argument before the Court of Exchequer
by the counsel for the plaintiff, the
court declined to hear the other side,
and gave judgment unanimously for the
defendant. By Parke, B. : "The con-
tract is to sell goods when they arrive,
but there was no memorandum in writ-
ing, and consequently no contract which

was capable of being enforced, at the
time either of the insurance or of the loss ;
and if it ultimately did become capable
of being enforced, that was only by the
subsequent part-delivery and acceptance,
which was after the loss had occurred."
— By Abinger, C. B. : " There is a contract
to sell 100 tons of palm oil to arrive by
the Maria ; if the vessel do not arrive,
or the goods do not arrive, the contract
is void. Then where is the interest ?
The transaction amounts in effect to an
insurance of a void contract."

[y) Hawes v. Lawrence, 4 Comst. 346.
The plaintiff, through a broker, sold the
defendant a quantity of linseed oil, as
stated in the sale notes, " to arrive per
ship Marcia from Liverpool, sailed on or
about the 15th of March ult." The vessel
did not leave the London docks until the
26th of March, and had an uncommonly
long passage. Upon arrival, the defend-
ant refused to accept the oil, and the
plaintiff sued for the breach of contract.
Under the ruling of the Superior Court,
that the sailing of the vessel on or about
the 15th of March, was not a condition of
the contract, and that the representation
of the time of sailing, if made without
fraud, did not prevent the plaintiff from
recovering, the case was carried up to the
Court of Appeals, where the judgment
of the Superior Court for the plaintiff
was affirmed. In giving judgment, Pratt,
J., says : " Although it is by no means
free from doubt, I am inclined to the
opinion that no warranty was intended
by the parties. If, in the first place, the
time of sailing had been deemed impor-
tant by the parties, and likely to affect
materially their interests, it is somewhat
strange that they had not specified a par-

1 The purchaser of a " cargo " of rice which is to be loaded on board a ship ex-
pected to arrive at acertain port, where it is to load for a voyage, agreeing to pay
a sum certain " per cwt., cost and freight," has no such insurable interest in the pur-
chase (diss. Lord O'Hagan and Lord Selbome), that should the rice put on board
be lost before the loading is completed, he can recover on a policy of insurance
effected on goods in the vessel. Anderson v. Morice, 1 App. Cas. 713.

601

560

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

* 560 * Indeed, it may be questionable whether even fraud in
fixing the time of sailing, could be pleaded in such a case ;
the proper remedy for that being an action for deceit, as appears
by a remark made by the Court of King's Bench, in giving judg-
ment in a case somewhat similar to that above supposed. (2)

A sale of goods to arrive imports that they are merchantable,
and conformable generally, in their condition and appearance, to
that which would be understood by the trade, from the terms
of description used in the contract ; (a) for the contract be-

ticular day, after which if the vessel
should sail, the contract should be void.
The fact that the time was left vague,
raises a strong presumption that the
parties did not intend to make the
time of sailing a material part of the
contract. Neither party knew the exact
time of sailing, but both supposed it was
near the 15th. Again, if these words
amount to a warranty, the plaintiff
would have been liable to the defendant
for any damages which he might have
suffered in consequence of the delay.
Nay more, if for any cause the vessel
had failed to sail altogether, the plaintiff
would have been responsible for any loss
of profits in the adventure which the de-
fendant might have sustained, I cannot
think that the parties would have couched
a provision so important in its bearing
upon their interests, in so uncertain and
vague terms. I think it should be con-
strued rather as a mere representation
of the belief of the factor, which in the
absence of any fraud or intentional
misrepresentation, cannot affect the
contract." In Olive v. Booker, 1 Exch.
41G, — which was an action for not load-
ing a vessel in pursuance of the terms of
a charter-party, which stated the vessel
to be " note at sea, having sailed three weeks
ago, or thereabouts," whereas, in point of
fact, the vessel had not sailed three
weeks before, but only two weeks, — it
was held, that the time at which the ves-
sel sailed was material, and that the
statement in the charter-party amounted
to a warranty. Parke, B., in giving
judgment in this case, says : " Here it is
stated that the vessel was now at sea,
having sailed three weeks ; and, if the
time is of the essence of the contract, no
doubt it is a warranty, and not a repre-
sentation. So also is the ease in policies
of insurance. It appears to me that it is
a warranty, and not a representation,
that the vessel had sailed three weeks.
It is, therefore, a condition precedent.
The rule depends upon each particular
contract, and here time was of the es-

602

sence of the contract, as much so as the
statement that she was a sound vessel."

(«) llawes v. Humble, 2 Camp. 327, n.
This was an action for a breach of con-
tract, by non-delivery of a quantity of
barilla, sold on arrival by a named ves-
sel. The barilla did not arrive in the
vessel. Wood, B., in giving judgment
for the defendant, was of opinion that
the contract was conditional ; but inti-
mated, that if any negligence could have
been proved against the captain, he
would have received the evidence. The
question was carried before the Court of
King's Bench, where the judges unani-
mously agreed that the contract was
conditional, and that if there had been
any fraud on the part of the defendant,
the plaintiff's remedy was in an action for
deceit.

(a) Cleu v. McPherson, 1 Bosw. (N.
Y.) 480. The defendant having bought
of the plaintiff " 25 bales of French wal-
nuts," to arrive per ship H. E. Miller,
then on her way from Havre to New
York, and received a broker's bought
note of the bargain, corresponding with
a sale note delivered by the broker to
the plaintiff upon the arrival of the
goods, refused to receive or pay for
them, on the ground that the nuts were
not merchantable, but unsound, damaged,
and injured. The plaintiff sued for breach
of contract, and the question of law,
whether the sale notes of themselves,
and without any extraneous testimony,
implied that the walnuts were and should
be merchantable, was reserved for the
Court at General Term. The court
(Hoffman, J.), in giving judgment for
the defendant, say : " In the present
case the complaint states, that the plain-
tiff, being in expectation of receiving a
large quantity of French walnuts, by the
ship H. E. Miller, agreed to sell 25 bales
of the walnuts so expected ; and this
part of the complaint may be treated as
admitted. The witness Paddock states,
that lie showed to the defendant McPher-
son, the whole pile of nuts on the wharf,

CH. IV.J

SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY.

;561

ing * conditional and executory, the rule of the common * 561
law, Caveat emptor, does not apply ; but rather the rule
of the civil law, Caveat venditor. Where an examination of the
goods is morally impracticable, as in the case of goods sold before
their arrival, it seems but reasonable and just that 'this implica-
tion should be attached by courts to the contract. (5) l

A contract for a sale of goods to be delivered on their arrival,
at any time before a specified date, does not render the vendor
liable for the non-delivery of the goods if they have not arrived
within the time limited ; for the specification of the time is held
to be only a limitation fixing the period beyond which neither
party is bound by the contract, and not as warranting that the
goods shall, at all events, be delivered by the day fixed, (c)

landed from the vessel, that there were
100 bales of them, and told him he could
have any he wished. The case is then
made out of a sale purely conditional
and executory ; of the sale of an article
then about being shipped at a foreign
port, or then upon the seas ; of a sale
of a parcel or number, out of an aggre-
gate larger mass, not specially defined
and determined. In such a case, we are
of the opinion that there is an implied
engagement in the contract itself, that
the article shall be merchantable. It
may be more appropriate to say, that
this is a condition of the agreement for
a sale, than an implied warranty. It
may also be that the rule can be carried
further, and applied to a case where the
article is specific and defined ; but it is
Heedless to go this length for the deci-
sion of the present cause." — Gorrissen v.
Perrin, 2 C. B. (n. s.) 681. In this case
it appeared that the defendant had con-
tracted to sell to the plaintiff a certain
number of "bales of gambier," then at
sea, on the way to London, and tendered
in fulfilment of his contract the requisite
number of packages of the article re-
ceived by him by the vessels named in
the contract. These packages were much
smaller than the article known in the
usages of trade as a " bale of gambier,"
containing only about one-third the quan-
tity, and the plaintiff refused to receive
them, and sued for the breach of con-
tract in the non-delivery of the " bales "
thereby meant. The court below admit-

ted evidence upon the question of what
was regarded as a " bale," by the usage
of trade. The question as to the con-
struction of the contract upon this point,
went up to the Court of Common Bench,
and it was there decided that the con-
tract called for the specified number of
" bales," of the usual size and weight, as
recognized by the term in the gambier
trade.

(6) Per Coiven, J., in Wright v. Hart,
17 Wend. 267, 18 id. 449 ; Paige, J., in
Hargous v. Stone, 1 Seld. 86; Chanter v.
Hopkins, 4 M. & W. 399; Hyatt v.
Boy Is, 5 G. & J. 110; and see Moore u.
McKinlay, 5 Cal. 471, for distinction as
to warranty before and after arrival.

(c) Russell v. Nicoll, 3 Wend. 112. It
was held, in this case, that a contract
made in the city of New York, for the
sale of 500 bales of cotton, to be deliv-
ered on its arrival at New York from
New Orleans, at any time between the
date of the contract (9th February) and
the 1st of June thereafter, to be paid for
in cash on delivery, the cotton to be
weighed, and two per cent tare to be al-
lowed, is an executory contract, and the
title of the cotton does not pass. The
vendors are not chargeable for the non-
delivery of the cotton until its arrival
in New York ; and the specification of
the time is only a limitation fixing the
period beyond which neither party is
bound by the contract, and not an agree-
ment that the vendor shall, at all events,
deliver the cotton by the specified day.

1 If an article proves defective, the purchaser may. without returning or offer-
ing to return, and without notifying the vendor of such defects, sue for damages;
or if sued for the price, recoup his damages from the price to be paid. Bonnell v.
Jacobs, 36 Wis. 59 ; Morehouse v. Comstock, 42 Wis. 626.

603

*562

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

* 562 * Under such a contract the obligations of the vendor and
purchaser are mutual, the one, to deliver, and the other, to
accept, if the condition of time be fulfilled. Accordingly it is
held, that where the contract is for the sale of goods to be deliv-
ered on arrival, but not to exceed a specified day, the purchaser
is not bound to accept them after that day. (d) But a statement
that the goods contracted for are now on the passage, and ex-
pected to arrive, naming the vessels and the quantity in each, is
held to be a warranty that the goods were on the passage at the
making of the contract ; the term " expected to arrive," in that
connection, being regarded as limited in its operation to goods
that are on the passage, and not as rendering the shipment itself
conditional, (e)

(d) Alewyn v. Pryor, Ryan & Moo.
406 ; and see Russell v. Mcoll, 3 Wend.
112, on this point.

(e) Gorrissen u. Perrin, 2 C. B. (n.
s.) 681. This was an action for a
breach of contract, in not delivering
1170 bales of gambier, pursuant to a
contract of sale, whereby the defendant
contracted to sell and deliver to the
plaintiff that number of bales, stated to
be "now on passage from Singapore,
and expected to arrive at London ; 805
bales per Ravenscraig, and 305 per Lady
Agnes Duff, at 15s. 6d. per cwt. ; " with a
proviso, that should either or both ves-
sels be lost, the contract was to be void
for the quantity so lost. The two vessels
arrived with 1170 bales consigned to the
defendant ; but the bales were of about
one-third only of the size and weight of
the packages known in the gambier
trade, under the designation of bales,
and the plaintiff declined to accept tliem
as a performance of the contract. By
arrangement between the parties, they,
were received by the plaintiff without
prejudice to his rights under the con-
tract, and he brought this action in re-
spect to the difference. Besides the
small bales consigned to the defendant,
there came in the two vessels, but con-
signed to other parties, a number of
bales of gambier of the full and accus-
tomed size and weight, sufficient to have
satisfied the contract. The plaintiff con-
tended, in the first place, that the state-
ment in the contract, that the bales were
then on their passage from Singapore, was
a warranty that 1170 bales of the usual
size and weight were then on the passage,
and claimed damages for the breach of
warranty ; and in the second place, that,
if not a warranty, yet as 1170 such bales

604

had arrived by the ships in question,
they were entitled to a delivery of them
under the contract, and claimed dam-
ages for the non-delivery. Or, in other
words, he contended, that either the con-
tract, by virtue of the warranty, was an
absolute sale, in which case there was
a breach of the contract by omission to
deliver bales of the proper weight, ac-
cording to the trade-meaning of the
term ; or, if the contract was to be re-
garded as conditional upon the arrival of
the bales known to the trade as such,
then this condition was satisfied by the
arrival in the two ships of the bales
which came consigned to other parties.
The Court of Common Bench gave
judgment for the plaintiff, basing their
decision upon the grounds that the con-
tract called for the bales known as
such in mercantile usage, and that the
statement that the bales were on their
passage at the date of the contract,
amounted to a warranty that such bales
were on the passage. Cockburn, C. J., in
delivering the opinion of the court, says,
in reference to the bearing of the expres-
sion, " expected to arrive," upon the
question of conditionality in the contract :
" We are of opinion that the statement
that the goods were on board at the time
the contract was entered into, amounts
to a warranty ; and although, if cir-
cumstances had subsequently occurred
whereby the arrival of the goods had
been prevented, the defendant might
have been protected by the words ' ex-
pected to arrive,' we think they cannot
resort to them to get rid of the positive
assurance that the goods were on their
passage ; on the faith of which, possibly,
the purchaser may have entered into the
contract to buy."

CH. IV.] SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 563

* A contract for the sale of goods expected, may how- * 563
ever be construed to be conditional on the arrival of the
vessel instead of the goods, if the terms are so explicit as entirely
to exclude the implication that the time of arrival applies to the
goods. In such a case, the condition of the arrival of the vessel
is regarded as precedent in its nature, and if the vessel do not
arrive the vendor will not be held under his contract. If how-
ever the vessel arrives, he will be liable, even though he does not
receive the goods expected by the vessel, and though there be no
default on his part. (/) In the case cited, the court observed,
that the vendor had by his own heedlessness undertaken to per-
form an impossibility which he might have provided against in
his contract, and therefore he, rather than the innocent purchaser,
should suffer for his failure to perform.

A ship-owner's agreement to take freight at a foreign port, by
a certain vessel which the owner says is to arrive at that port, is
not regarded as conditional upon the arrival of the vessel, unless
expressly made so by the terms of the contract. And if the only
exceptions made, are the dangers of the seas and fire, and the
non-arrival is owing to a different cause from either of these, the
owner will be held liable for the damage which the freighter may
suffer by breach of contract. (#)

(/) Hale v. Rawson, 4 Com. B. (n. s.) ceive that such was its true intent and

85. meaning. The agreement seems to us to

(g) Higginson v. "Weld, 14 Gray, 165. hare been an absolute one, that the de-
This was an action of contract upon a fendants would receive at Calcutta the
written agreement between the plaintiffs cargo which the plaintiffs on their part
and defendants, whereby the plaintiffs undertook to furnish for the return voy-
agreed to furnish 150 tons of freight for age, and that the only exception was of
the defendants' ship at Calcutta, at a spe- the dangers of ' the seas and fire.' There
cified rate per ton, and the defendants seems to be nothing in the terms of the
agreed to receive such freight on the contract, in its obvious purpose and ob-
terms named, the dangers of the seas and ject, or in the relation of the parties,
fire excepted. The agreement further which should lead to the restricted inter-
stated, that it was understood that the pretation for which the defendants argue,
ship was then on a voyage to Australia, ' It is understood,' in the ordinary use of
thence to Calcutta, where she was to load that phrase, when it is adopted in a wnt-
for Boston; and a penalty of $2,200 was ten contract, has the same force as 'it is
stipulated for the non-performance of the agreed.' The obligation of the plaintiffs
agreement by either party. The ship was absolute." . . . "They could have
came direct from Australia to New York, no inducement, it would seem, to bind
without proceeding to Calcutta ; and the themselves to furnish the freight, with-
plaintiffs sued for damages for the breach out any corresponding obligation to pro-
of contract. The court gave judgment vide a vessel to receive and transport it.
for the plaintiffs, and in their opinion There would be no mutuality in such an
say : " The defendants contend that the agreement. If the defendants intended
contract was conditional, and was only to make their contract conditional upon
to become obligatory upon them in case the arrival of the vessel at Calcutta, it
the ship arrived at Calcutta, and there would have been easy to say so in express
loaded for Boston. But we cannot con- terms. In the absence oi such a state-

605

* 564 THE LAW OF CONTKACTS. [BOOK III.

* 564 * A sale of goods to be shipped by a specified vessel at a

certain time, is an absolute engagement that the goods
shall be shipped as indicated, and if they are not so shipped the
vendor is liable for the breach of contract, from whatever cause
the failure arises. (K) ..

It will be noticed, that in construing a contract for the sale of
goods by a particular vessel, a distinction is made between the
specification of a day certain for the shipment, (T) and the limit-
ing a time for the delivery ; (/) the former being regarded as a
warranty, and the latter as merely a condition upon which the
execution of the contract depends. If goods are not shipped
when the vendor says they shall be, he is liable in all events to
the purchaser for their non-arrival ; if goods are not delivered
within the time limited, in consequence of non-arrival, neither
party can compel the other to perform the contract of sale. In
both these cases time is an essential element in the contract, but

not for the same purpose in both. In the one, it fixes the

* 565 * period when the vendor's absolute liability is to begin ;

in the other when the conditional liability of vendor and
purchaser is to end. Some confusion occasionally arises in dis-
cussing the question in any given case, whether time is or is not
of the essence of the contract ; but as a general thing, we think
the matter may be rendered clear, by considering whether, in the
particular case, the time mentioned, is or is not . subordinate to
any other condition. If it is, then its observance is less impor-

ment, the court cannot arid to it by con- the vendor. The names of the ships were
struction. — The second clause of the given, but they arrived in England with
stipulation of the defendants is very ex- only a very small portion of the hemp
plicit and free from ambiguity ; ' that contracted for. The hemp designed for
they will receive the said freight upon the ships was confiscated as British prop-
the terms named, the dangers of the seas erty on board the lighters in the Baltic,
and fire excepted.' The exception direct- before it was put on board the ship, the
ly follows the agreement to receive, and latter being obliged to cut cable and put
marks the only limit of the undertaking." to sea, to avoid an embargo. Lord Elien-
— In reference to an offer by defendant borough in giving judgment for the plain-
to show that the deviation in the voyage tiff, said, this case was decided by that
was owing to the insanity of the master, of Atkinson v. Ritchie, 10 East, 530; and
evidence upon which point was ruled out as the defendants had absolutely engaged
at the trial, the court say, that the mas- that the hemp should be shipped, they
ter's insanity was no sufficient excuse for were liable for this not being done, from
the failure to furnish the vessel, " as that whatever cause the circumstance had
was a misfortune of which the plaintiffs arisen.

did not assume the risk." \i) Splidt v. Heath, 2 Camp. 67, n.

(h) Splidt v. Heath, 2 Camp. 57, n. Atkinson v. Ritchie, 10 East, 530; Gor-

This was an action for the non-delivery rissen v. Perrin, 2 C. B. (n. s.) 681.

of certain quantities of St. Petersburg (;') Russell v. Nicoll, 3 Wend. 112;

hemp, to be shipped on or before the 31st Alewyn v. Pryor, Ryan & Moo. 406.
August, O. S., in ships to be named by

606

CH- IV-] SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY. * 566

tant, and it may be regarded as not of the essence of the contract.
If, on the other hand, it be a condition, and not subordinate to
any other condition of the contract, then, since the parties have
seen fit to give it this primary place and controlling influence in
their contract, courts must hold it to be of the essence of the con-
tract.

Thus, in the case of a sale on arrival, the goods to be delivered
within a certain time ; if the question be whether the mention of
a time of delivery imposes an absolute obligation to deliver by
that time, although the goods have not arrived, the answer is,
that, as the delivery depends, by the very terms of the contract,
upon the arrival, it is therefore subordinate to the arrival, and the
time limited for delivery cannot control the condition of arrival,
and cannot be so far of the essence of the contract as to make the
seller responsible for the non-delivery. But if the goods arrive
after the time of delivery has expired, and the question be,
whether the vendor is then bound to deliver, or the purchaser to
receive, the answer is, that, as the arrival has already taken
place, there is no longer anything to control the delivery but
the specification of time, and as the condition of time is no longer
subordinate, it must be allowed its full effect in determining the
liability of the parties, and thus be regarded as of the essence of
the contract. Again, if the question be, whether the mention of a
time for shipment imposes an absolute obligation that the goods
shall be shipped at that date, the answer is, that there is no other
obligation in the contract to which the time of shipment is subordi-
nate, and therefore, since the parties have seen fit to embody it in
the contract, time must in this case be regarded as of the essence
of the contract.

When the engagement to deliver is absolute, the vendor
cannot * excuse himself by showing that he was prevented * 566
from completed his bargain by the blockade of the port, or
by any other inevitable accident. (&)

Where there is a contract for the sale of a cargo to be shipped
by a particular vessel then on her way to the port of lading, and
the kind and quality of the goods is fixed, as well as the price,
and provision is made for a fair allowance to the buyer for an
inferior description of the same kind of goods, the vendor

(it) Atkinson o. Ritchie, 10 East, 530; 517; Hayward ». Scongall, 2 Camp. 56;
Spence v. Chadwick, 10 A. & E. (n. s.) DeMedeiros i>. Hill, 5 Car. & P. 182.

607

567

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

also engaging to deliver what may be shipped on his account
and in conformity with his invoice ; and it is stipulated, that
the contract shall be void if the vessel should make an inter-
mediate voyage, or should be lost ; it is held that, with the two ex-
ceptions stipulated, this is a warranty that a cargo of the kind and
quality specified shall be shipped by the vessel, and brought home

for the benefit of the buyers. (7) But if there be also a
* 567 * proviso that goods of the kind and quality contracted for

are shipped on the vendor's account, and instead thereof a
cargo of an inferior description of the same kind of goods should
be shipped, the vendor would not in that event be liable for a
breach of warranty ; nor could the purchaser claim the delivery
of such cargo, with the stipulated reduction in price for inferior

{I) Simond v. Braddon, 2 Com. B. 324,
40 E. L. & Eq. 285. The plaintiff bought
of the defendant a cargo of Arracan rice,
per Severn then on her way to Akyab ;
the cargo to consist of fair average Ne-
crenzie rice, the price to be lis. Hd. per
cwt. with a fair allowance for Larong, or
any inferior description of rice (if any),
but the vendor engaged to deliver what
was shipped on his own account and in
conformity with his invoice. The buyer
to have the option of discharging the
vessel at any good and safe European
port, within certain specified limits. The
contract to be void provided the vessel
made the intermediate voyage between
Akyab and Calcutta, allowed in the char-
ter-party. Payment to be made in cash
on arrival of vessel with the rice, at the
port of call in England. There were
other provisions as to the insurance, &c,
and the contract was to be void if the
vessel was lost. The vessel proceeded to
Akyab, shipped a full cargo of Necrenzie
rice, and arrived with it at Falmouth,
Eng., her port of call, in good season.
The plaintiff then paid the full price for
the cargo, received the shipping docu-
ments, and sent the vessel to Amsterdam,
her port of discharge. The plaintiff al-
leged, that the rice proved inferior in
quality to what he bargained for, and
sued for damages. The results of the evi-
dence at trial was, that the rice shipped
was not fair, average Necrenzie. A ver-
dict was found for the plaintiff, with
leave for defendant to move to enter a
verdict for him, if the court should be of
opinion that the contract did not contain
a warranty. Upon the argument before
the Court of Common Bench, the defend-
ant contended, that the contract con-
tained no warranty, but a condition

608

merely ; that he was bound to deliver what-
ever cargo was shipped, but not any par-
ticular cargo ; and that the purchaser on
the other hand, was not bound to take the
cargo unless it was of the description
contracted for. The court decided unani-
mously, that, except in the cases in which
it was provided that the contract should
be void, there was a warranty on the
part of the vendor, that he would ship
and bring home a cargo of Necrenzie rice,
and that it should be fair, average Ne-
crenzie. The rule was accordingly dis-
charged. Cockburn, C. J., in his opinion
says : " Looking at the whole, I think the
true construction of the contract is, that
there is a warranty by the seller that a
cargo of fair, average Necrenzie rice shall
be shipped, with a stipulation in favor of
the buyer, that he may either claim per-
formance of the warranty, or claim the
rice which absolutely arrives ; and that
if he does take a cargo with inferior rice
amongst it, he may take advantage of
the contract to deliver fair, average Ne-
crenzie rice, and claim a deduction for
Larong or Latoorie rice. No question
arises here as to Larong or Latoorie, for
none came. The plaintiff is therefore
entitled to recover on the warranty of
fair, average Necrenzie rice." Cresweil,
J., in delivering his opinion, seemed to
view the stipulation for a fair allowance
of Larong and any other inferior descrip-
tion of rice, as a mode provided by the
contract for satisfying the breach of the
warranty in case there was a mixture of
such inferior descriptions in the cargo;
saying, that, " as there was no stipulation
of that nature as to Necrenzie rice of
inferior quality, in case any should be
shipped, the parties must be presumed to
rest on the contract as to that."

CH. IT.]

SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.

568

quality, if the vendor has not expressly bound himself to deliver
what may be shipped on his account, and in conformity with his
invoice. (?w)

A sale of a cargo at sea, with a transfer of all the indicia
of * property, is a different contract from a simple sale of . * 568
goods to arrive, as we have before intimated, and necessarily
imports that the purchaser is to be holden, whether the cargo arrives
or not. But this sale must be subject to the conditions that the
cargo is in existence at the time of the contract, and within the
power to sell of the vendor, at that time. For if the cargo has
previously been destroyed, there is nothing to which the contract
can attach ; and if the property has already been disposed of by
an authorized agent of the vendor, so as to be beyond the control
of the latter, the purchaser cannot be called on to fulfil the con-
tract, though he may have the right to hold the vendor responsi-
ble for non-performance on his part. A case in which the vendor's

(m) Vernede v. Weber, 1 H. & N. 311 ;
38 E. L. & E. 277. This was an action
on contract for the non-delivery of a
cargo of rice sold by the defendant to
the plaintiff. By means of bought and
sold notes the plaintiff bought of the de-
fendant, " the cargo of 400 tons, provided
the same be shipped for seller's account,
of Necrenzie rice, more or less of the
average quality as shipped per Minna,
to proceed from Akyab to a port in the
channel for orders, at lis. 6d. per cwt.
for Necrenzie rice, or at lis. for Larong,
the latter quality not to exceed 50 tons,
or else at the option of buyers, to
reject any excess ; to be paid for in cash
on the arrival of the vessel at the port
of call, on delivery of bills of lading,
charter-party, and policy of insurance ;
should the vessel be lost before the ar-
rival at the port of call, this contract to
be void." The vessel arrived at the port
of call with a cargo of rice, consisting of
about two-thirds Larong and one-third
Latoorie, and with no Necrenzie what-
ever. The plaintiff claimed that there
was a breach of warranty in not ship-
ping a cargo of Necrenzie rice, and a
breach of the contract in not delivering
the cargo shipped. The defendant de-
nied the warranty, and the obligation to
deliver the cargo received, it not being
Necrenzie rice. The case came before
the Court of Exchequer upon these ques-
tions, and upon both points the judg-
ment was given for the defendant. By
Alderson, B., for the court : " We think
there is no such warranty in this con

VOL. I.

tract as would support the first breach.
The cargo contemplated by both parties
— for no fraud was imputed — was one
principally of Arracan Necrenzie rice.
This was not an absolute contract ; it
was subject to the proviso that such a
cargo should be shipped ; and we are of
opinion that there was no absolute war-
ranty that the rice shipped should be of
this quality." . . . "We are of opinion
that the plaintiff is not entitled to the
delivery of the entire cargo. We think
the contract was not for such cargo of
rice as the vessel should bring to Europe,
but for rice, the price of which was fixed
and agreed on between the parties. If
the plaintiff was entitled to the Arracan
Necrenzie rice, a jury must determine,
in the event of a difference of opinion,
the price to be paid ; and we do not
think either party contemplated the sale
of rice which was not at a stipulated price,
and which was to be left to the deter-
mination and decision of a jury." The
plaintiff having also claimed that he was
entitled at all events, to a delivery of
that part of the cargo received which
was composed of Larong rice, the court
decided upon this point, that, the con-
tract being entire, and there being in the
cargo none of the kind which constituted
the principal subject of the contract, the
plaintiff could not insist upon the de-
livery of that kind which was, by the
terms of the contract, to form only
a subsidiary part of the cargo to be
shipped.

89 609

568

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[book in.

right under such circumstances, was adjudicated, came before the
House of Lords on writ of error from the Exchequer Chamber,
and the decision of the House sustaining that of the Exchequer
Chamber, was against the liability of the purchaser. The policy
of insurance upon the cargo at sea had been transferred to the
purchaser at the time of sale, but the cargo had already been
destroyed as cargo, by damage, at the time the sale was made,
though this was then unknown to the contracting parties. It
was contended for the owner, that the interest secured to the pur-
chaser by the transfer of the policy of insurance, was a sufficient
support to the contract. The decision of the House of Lords
against the vendor, was upon the ground that the parties must
have contemplated by the contract, that there was an existing
something to be sold and bought, and if sold and bought, then the
benefit of insurance should go with it. («)

(n) Couturier i>. Hastie, 8 Exch. 40;
9 Exch. 102 ; 5 H. L. Cas. 073. In
this case a merchant of Smyrna sued
his factor in London, for the value of
a cargo of corn sold by the latter on
a del credere commission. The factor
sold the cargo at sea, "free on board,
including freight and insurance," and
the contract described the corn " as of
average quality when shipped." Before
the date of the sale, the vessel while on
her voyage home had put into a foreign
port, in consequence of the corn getting
so heated in the early part of the voyage
as to render it impossible to bring it to
England, and (he cargo had been landed,
condemned, and sold. This was unknown
to the factor and to the purchaser when
the sale was made. As soon as the pur-
chaser heard of it, he wrote to the factor,
repudiating the sale, on the ground that
the cargo did not exist at the date of the
contract. In answer to the plaintiff's
declaration, the defendant pleaded the
prior sale of the corn by the captain of
the vessel as the agent of the plaintiff,
the destruction of the cargo by reason
of damage, unloading and sale, and the
consequent repudiation of the contract
by the purchaser. At the trial before

Martin, Baron, his lordship ruled that
the contract imported that at the time of
sale the cargo of corn was in existence
as such, and capable of delivery, and
that as it had been sold and delivered by
the captain, before the contract was
made, the plaintiff could not recover in
the action. The case was afterwards
argued in the Court of Exchequer, and
this ruling reversed by a majority of the
judges, with liberty to the defendant to
bring a bill of exceptions. Upon argu-
ment before the Court of Exchequer
Chamber on the bill of exceptions, the
judgment of the Court of Exchequer
was unanimously reversed. Upon the
hearing of the case upon writ of error
in the House of Lords, the judges who
were called in by the House, were unani-
mous in the opinion that the judgment
of the Exchequer Chamber was right,
and that the judgment of the Court of
Exchequer was wrong. Alderson, B., was
present. He was one of the majority
judges in the Court of Exchequer; but
having changed his opinion, he now con-
curred with the other judges called in
by the House. Judgment was accord-
ingly given in the House of Lords for
the defendant in error.

610

CH. IV.]

SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.

*569

* SECTION IX.

MORTGAGES OP CHATTELS.

f569

Sales of chattels, by way of mortgage, constitute a very im-
portant, and, in recent times, a very frequent class of sales on
condition, (o) There has not been as yet much adjudication in
respect to them. Whether a mortgage of personalty has at com-
mon law any equity of redemption does not seem to be positively
determined ; but it is believed that equity would interfere to
prevent gross injustice, (p) This subject is regulated
*in many of the States by statute, and, in general, record *570
is required if possession of the goods be retained by the
mortgagor ; and an equity of redemption is allowed. ((?) It seems
that a mortgage of personal property, where the mortgagor retains
possession, is not valid against a subsequent bond fide purchaser
or attaching creditor, if there be neither record of the mort-
gage, nor actual knowledge of it on the part of the purchaser or
creditor, (r)

(o) See 4 Kent, Com. 138, where the
distinction between a pledge and a mort-
gage of personal property is fully set
forth. A mortgage of goods is a con-
veyance of title upon condition, and if the
condition is not performed, such title be-
comes absolute in law, but equity will, it
seems, interfere to compel a redemption.
Story on Bailm. § 287 ; Flanders v. Bar-
stow, 18 Me. 357 ; 2 Story, Eg.. § 1031.
As to what instruments will be construed
as a mortgage, and what as merely a
pledge, see Langdon v. Buel, 9 Wend. 80 ;
Wood v. Dudley, 8 Vt. 435 ; Barrow v.
Paxton, 5 Johns. 258 ; Coty ;>. Barnes, 20
Vt. 78; Whitaker v. Sumner, 20 Pick.
399, and post, Bailments under the head
of Pledge. A mortgage of personal
property, like that of real estate, may
consist of an absolute bill of sale, and a
separate instrument of defeasance, given
at the same time. Brown u. Bement, 8
Johns. 96 ; Hopkins v. Thompson, 2 Port.
(Ala.) 433 ; Winslow v. Tarbox, 18 Me.
132; Williams a. Roser, 7 Mo. 556;
Barnes v. Holcomb, 12 Sm. & M. 306;
Knight v. Nichols, 34 Me. 208. And
although the bill of sale is absolute, and
no writing of defeasance is given back,
parol testimony is still admissible to
prove that it was intended only as col-
lateral security. Reed v. Jewett, 5

Greenl. 96 ; Carter v. Burris, 10 Sm. &
M. 527 ; Freeman v. Baldwin, 13 Ala.
246. But see Whitaker v. Sumner, 20
Pick. 399 ; Montany v. Rock, 10 Mo. 606.
It is well settled, that mortgages of per-
sonal property need not be under seal.
Despatch Line v. Bellamy Co. 12 N. H.
205; Milton v. Mosher, 7 Met. 244;
Flory v. Denny, 11 E. L. & E. 584 ; s. c.
7 Exch. 581.

(p) In Hinman v. Judson, 13 Barb.
629, which was an action brought by the
mortgagee of personal property, against
a party claiming under the mortgagor,
for conversion of the property, it was
held, that a mortgagor of chattels may
redeem them after condition broken and
before they are sold on the part of the
mortgagee, and that in the present action
the defendant might exercise this right
by reducing the damages to be recovered,
to the amount actually due upon the
mortgage debt.

(</) Thus in Massachusetts, an equity
of redemption of sixty daj-s is allowed
the mortgagor after condition broken, or
after notice of an intention to foreclose
given by the mortgagee for such breach.
R. S. ch. 107, § 40; Stat, of 1843, ch. 72.
Nearly similar provisions exist in Maine.
R. S. ch. 125, § 30.

(r) As between mortgaqor and mortga-

611

571

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

It has been frequently attempted to make a mortgage of per-
sonalty extend over chattels not then owned by the mortgagor,
but to be subsequently purchased. As where a shopkeeper makes
a mortgage of " all the goods in his store, and of all which shall
be bought to replace or renew the present stock." Such a mort-
gage might operate against the mortgagor somewhat by way
* 571 of estoppel ; but it has been decided that it is not * valid
against a third party, (s) In general one cannot transfer
what he has not at the time ; but an assignment of property, with
what may be its future increase or incidents, is valid, at least in

gee, a mortgage of personal property is
valid, although there be no delivery of
the property, and no possession by the
mortgagee, or record of the mortgage on
the registry. Smith v. Moore, 11 N. H.
55; Winsor v. McXellan, 2 Story, 492;
Hall o. Snowhill, 2 Green (N. J.), 8. But
as to subsequent purchasers, and attach-
ing creditors of the mortgagor, without
notice of the existence of the mortgage,
by statute in several States, the mortga-
gee must either have and retain posses-
sion of the mortgaged property, or the
mortgage must be recorded in the town
where the mortgagor resided at the time
of its execution. Smith o. Moore, supra.
— And where such provision is made by
statute, the recording is equivalent to
actual delivery. Forbes v. Paiker, 16
Pick. 462. But in New York it has been
decided that the record of a mortgage
does not rebut the presumption of fraud
occasioned by the mortgagor's retention
of the property, such record being merely
an additional requirement. Otis r. Sill,
8 Barb. 102. The necessity of delivery
to the mortgagee or of a record, is wholly
the effect of statutory provisions, and at
common law a mortgage of personal
property might be valid, in the absence
of fraud, even against subsequent hona
fide purchasers and attaching creditors,
although the mortgagor remained in
possession, and although no record of
the mortgage existed. Holbrook v.
Baker, 5 Greenl. 309; Bissell v. Hop-
kins, 3 Cowen, Vfi ; Bucklin v. Thomp-
son, 1 J. J. Marsh. 223 ; Letcher v. Nor-
ton, 4 Scam. 575; Ash v. Savage, 5 N.
H. 545 ; Homes v. Crane, 2 Pick. 610.
Such continued possession by the mort-
gagor may be sufficient evidence of fraud,
but it would not alone be, in most States,
conclusive. Id. In Vermont it would
be. Russell u. Fillmore, 15 Vt. 130.
Although the mortgagor remain in
possession, and without any record of
the mortgage, it seems that a subsequent

612

purchaser, or attaching creditor, having
uctual notice of the existence of the mort-
gages, acquires no rights against the
mortgagee, the latter being guilty of no
fraud. Sanger v. Eastwood, 19 Wend.
514 ; Stowe v. Meserve, 13 N. H. 46 ;
Gregory v. Thomas, 20 Wend. 17. The
contrary has beenjield in Massachusetts.
Travis v. Bishop, 13 Met. 304. And see
Denny v. Lincoln, id. 200.

(s) Jones v. Richardson, 10 Met. 481.
In this case the property mortgaged was
thus described, namely : " The whole
stock in trade of said A., as well as each
and every article of merchandise which
the said A. (the mortgagor) bought of
one T. W., as every other article consti-
tuting said A.'s stock in trade, in the
shape the same is and mat/ hecome, in the
usual course of the said A.'s business as
a trader." It was admitted that the
goods in question, which had been at-
tached by a creditor of the mortgagor,
were at the time of the attachment the stock
in trade of the said A., but that only a
part of them was owned by him, until
after he had made said mortgage. The
court after a critical review of the au-
thorities bearing upon this point, htlil,
that the mortgagee could not, as against
third persons, acquire under this mort-
gage any valid title to those goods pur-
chased by the mortgagor after the giving
of the mortgage. The same view is sup-
ported by the case of Lunn r. Thornton,
1 C. B. 379; Rhines v. Phelps, 3 Oilman,
455; Barnard v. Katon, 2 Cush. 294;
Pettis v Kellogg, 7 Cush. 471 ; Winslow
v. Merchants' Ins. Co. 4 Met 306 ; Otis ».
Sill, 8 Barb. 102. The case of Abbott v.
Goodwin. 20 Me. 408, which may seem to
conflict with the rule laid down in the
text, does not seem to us correct, and
is apparently inconsistent with the views
of the same court as expressed in the later
case of Goodenow v. Dunn, 21 Me. 96.
And see also Hope v. Hayley, 5 E. & B.
830.

CH. IV.J

SALE OP PERSONAL PROPERTY.

571

equity ; as the assignment of a ship, with the oil then in her, and
all the oil to be taken during the voyage. (£) 1

Where the mortgagee permitted the mortgagor to remain in
possession, for the purpose and with the power of selling the
goods, such mortgage, although recorded, would not avoid the
sale, even if it did not express in any way such purpose and
power, if they could be inferred from the circumstances. Suppos-
ing the whole transaction to be bond fide, the mortgagor would be
considered as selling the goods as the agent of the mortgagee,
and the proceeds would belong to the mortgagee ; and, if sold on
credit, the debt could not be reached by an attaching creditor of
the mortgagor through the trustee process, (m)

(t) Langton v. Horton, 1 Hare, 549.

(u) Unless there is some stipulation
in the mortgage, allowing the mortgagor
to remain in possession of the goods, the
right of immediate possession vests, to-
gether with the property in them, in the
mortgagee ; and he may have an action
against any one taking them from the
mortgagor. Pickard v. Low, 15 Me. 48 ;
Brackett v. Bullard, 12 Met. 308 ; Coty
v. Barnes, 20 Vt. 78. And parol proof
is not admissible to show an agreement
that the mortgagor should remain in
possession, the mortgage itself being
silent upon the subject. Case v. Win-
ship, 4 Blackf. 425. And although the
mortgage contains an express stipulation
that the mortgagor shall remain in pos-
session, until default of payment, and
with a power to sell for the payment of
the mortgage debt, the mortgagee may
nevertheless sustain trover against an
officer attaching the goods as the prop-
erty of the mortgagor. Melody v.
Chandler, 3 Fairf. 282 ; Forbes v. Parker,
16 Pick. 462 ; Welch o. Whittemore, 25
Me. 86 ; Ferguson v. Thomas, 26 Me.
499. In the case of Barnard v. Eaton,
2 Cush. 294, where a mortgage was
made of all the goods then in the mort-
gagor's store, and of all goods, &c,
which might be afterwards substituted
by the mortgagor for those which he
then possessed, — the mortgage provid-
ing that until default the mortgagor
might use and make sales of the mort-

gaged property, other goods, &c, of equal
value being substituted therefor, — it
was held, that the mortgage could not
apply to goods not in existence, or not
capable of being identified, at the time
it was made, or to goods intended to be
afterwards purchased to replace those
which should be sold. It was also held,
in the same case, that an agreement, in
a mortgage of the stock of goods then in
the mortgagor's store, that until default,
the mortgagor might retain possession of
the property, and make sales thereof in
the usual course of his trade, other
goods of equal value being substituted by
him for those sold, will not authorize the
mortgagor to put the mortgaged prop-
erty into a partnership as his share of
the capital. In New York, unless the
mortgage is filed in pursuance with the
statute, the mortgagor cannot remain in
possession for the purpose of selling the
goods. Camp v. Camp, 2 Hill (N. Y.),
628. See also Collins o. Myers, 16 Ohio,
547. And in Edgell v. Hart, 13 Barb.
380, where a mortgage, although re-
corded, was intended to cover prop-
erty afterwards to be procured by
the mortgagor, and in it the mortgagee
gave him the right to sell the goods for
ready pay, without being under any
obligation to apply the proceeds to the
discharge of the mortgage, or any other
debt, it was held, that the mortgage was
void, as calculated to delay, hinder, and
defraud other creditors of the mortgagor.

1 As to a valid chattel mortgage upon the product of property in which the mort-
gagor has a present interest, see Conderman v. Smith, 41 Barb. 404 ; Wilson v. Wilson,
37 Md. 1, 11; Robinson v. Elliott, 22 Wall. 513; Tennessee Bank i>. Ebbert, 9
Heiskell, 153 ; Meyer v. Johnston, 53 Ala. 237 ; Gittings v. Nelson, 86 111. 591. In Cali-
fornia,, a mortgage of a crop before seed-sowing, if the mortgagor owns the land, may
be made. Arques v. Wasson, 51 Cal. 620. In Indiana, after-acquired property may
be mortgaged. Headrick v. Brattain, 63 Ind. 438. See Brett v. Carter, 2 Lowell, 458.

613

573 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK in.

*573 * CHAPTER V.

WARRANTY.

The warranties which accompany a sale of chattels are of two
kinds in respect to their subject-matter ; they are a warranty of
title and a warranty of quality. They are also of two kinds in
respect to their form, as they may be express or implied.

Blackstone says, " a purchaser of goods and chattels may have
a satisfaction from the seller, if he sells them as his own, and
the title proves deficient, without any express warranty for that
purpose. " (a) But he also says afterwards, " in contracts for
sales, it is constantly understood, that the seller undertakes that
the commodity he sells is his own, and if it proves otherwise, an
action on the case lies against him to exact damages for this
deceit." (£) Prom this it might be inferred that the action is
grounded on the deceit, and therefore does not lie where there
is no deceit, as where one sells as his own that which is not his
own, but which he verily believes to be his own. But although
the English authorities are somewhat uncertain and conflicting,
we consider that a rule is recognized in the English courts, or
in some of them, which, although not distinctly and positively
asserted, nor so well supported by direct decision as the Ameri-
can rule, may yet be regarded as essentially the same, (c) And

(«) 2 Bl. Com. 451. commenced an action against the pawn-

(b) 3 Bl. Com. 166 (Wendell's ed.), broker for the price at which he bid oft
and note. the harp, on a warranty of title. It was

(c) Medina v. Stoughton, 1 Salic. 210; agreed that there was no express warran-
Crosse !'. Gardner, Carth. 90. This sub- ty ; and the court held, that under these
ject was much discussed in England, in circumstances there was no implied war-
the case of Morley v. Attenborough, 3 ranty of an absolute and perfect title, on
Exch. 500. There a person having hired the part of the pawnbroker, but only that
a harp, pledged it with a pawnbroker for the subject of the sale was a pledge, and
his own debt, without authority from the irredeemable, and that the pawnbroker
trueowner. The harp not being redeemed was not cognizant of any defect of title
at the stipulated time, the pawnbroker to it. This case has sometimes been
sold it at auction at his usual quarterly cited as deciding the general principle,
sales. The harp was advertised as for- that in all cases of sales of personal prop-
feited property, pledged with the broker, erty there is no implied warranty of title,
The purchaser at the auction bought, not and it has been thought to be opposed to
knowing that the harp did not belong to the American doctrine on this subject;
the party pledging it ; but after the sale, and some of the language of Parke, B.,
being sued by the former owner, he gave who delivered the judgment, may go
up the harp, and paid the costs. He then somewhat to sustain such a view. But

614

CH. T.J

WARRANTY.

574

in this country it is now well settled, * by adjudications *574
in many of our States, that the seller of a chattel (d),
if in possession, warrants by implication that it is his own,
and is answerable to the purchaser if it be taken from him by one
who has a better title than the seller, whether the seller knew
the defect of his title or not, and whether he did or did not
make a distinct affirmation of his title. But if the * seller * 575
is out of possession, and no affirmation of title is made,
then it may be said that the purchaser buys at his peril. And
this is the established rule of law in this country, (e) 1 In any

we conceive that the case, as an authority,
cannot be pressed further than the actual
facts and circumstances warrant ; and in
this light the decision itself seems not in
conflict, but in harmony with the Ameri-
can cases. For a sale by a pawnbroker,
under the circumstances detailed in that
case, may be analogous to that of a sale
of a chattel by a sheriff on execution.
And here all authorities, English and
American, agree that the sheriff does
not impliedly warrant the title of the ex-
ecution debtor to the property seized on
execution ; but only that he does not
know that he had no title to the goods.
Peto v. Blades, 5 Taunt. 657 ; Hensly v.
Baker, 10 Mo. 157 ; Chapman v. Speller,
14 Q B. 621; Yates v. Bond, 2 McCord,
382 ; Bashore v. Whisler, 3 Watts, 490 ;
Stone v. Pointer, 5 Munf . 287 ; Morgan v.
Fencher, 1 Blackf. 10; Davis v. Hunt, 2
Bailey, 412; Priedly v. Scheetz, 9 S. & R.
156 ; Rodgers v. Smith, 2 Cart. (Ind.) 526 ;
Bostick v. Winton, 1 Sneed, 525. So a
sale by an executor, administrator, or
other trustees, does not raise an implied
warranty of title ; such person does not
sell the property as his own ; he does not
offer it as his own ; and unless guilty of
fraud, he would not be responsible, if the
title failed. Ricks v. Dillahunty, 8 Port.
(Ala.) 134; Forsythe u. Ellis, 4 J. J.
Marsh. 298; Bingliam v. Maxcy, 15 111.
295 ; Prescott v. Holmes, 7 Rich. Eq. 9.
On consideration of all the cases on this
subject, we must believe the language of
Blackstone to be correct, that if a person
in possession of a chattel sells it, as his
own, there is an implied warranty of title.
That the case of Morley v. Attenborough
should not be considered as an authority,
further than the actual facts of the case
warrant, see the case of Sims v. Maryatt,
7 E. L. & E. 330 ; s. c. 17 Q. B. 281, where,

however, there was an express warranty.
Lord Campbell said : " It does not seem
necessary to inquire what is the law as
to implied warranty of title on the sales
of personal property, which is not quite
satisfactorily settled. According to Morley
v. Attenborough, if a pawnbroker sells
unredeemed pledges he does not warrant
the title of the pawner, but merely under-
takes that the time for redeeming the
pledges has expired, and he sells only such
right as belonged to the pawner. Beyond
that the decision does not go, but a great
many questions are suggested in the judg-
ment which still remain open. Although
the maxim of caveat emptor applies gen-
erally to the purchaser of personal prop-
erty, there may be cases where it would
be difficult to apply the rule." It seems
always to have been held, that if a ven-
dor sells, knowing he has no title, and
conceals that fact, he is liable as for a
fraud. Early v. Garret, 9 B. & C. 932 ;
Sprigwell v. Allen, Aleyn, 91. In Robin-
son v. Anderton, Peake, Cas. 94, a pur-
chaser of fixtures, the title of which was
not in the vendor, was allowed to recover
their price as money had and received,
although the vendor was not guilty of
fraud, and bond fide believed himself the
owner. See on warranty of title, Mil-
ler v. Tassel, 24 Cal. 458; Linton v. Por-
ter, 31 111. 107.

(d) This must be confined to sales of
chattels. In the sale of real estate by deed
there are no implied warranties. The
words "containing so many acres," &c.,
do not import a covenant of quantity.
Huntley v. Waddell, 12 Ired. L. 32 ; Rick-
ets v. Dickens, 1-Murphey, 343; Powell
v. Lyles, 1 id. 348 ; Roswel v. Vaughan,
Cro. J. 196. See ante, p. » 501.

(e) No case more directly asserts the
implied warranty of title, in all cases of

1 In Pennsylvania, a buyer, to avail himself of a breach of warranty of title in an
action for the price, must show an eviction or involuntary loss of possession. Krumb-
haar v. Birch, 83 Penn. St. 426. In California, there is no breach until the buyer's

615

*575

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

case where there was this warranty of title, it would seem to
follow from acknowledged principles, that a title subsequently
acquired by the vendor would enure to the benefit of the ven-

sales of personal property, than that of
Defreeze v. Trumper, 1 Johns. 274 (1806).
There the purchaser of a horse brought
a suit against the vendor to recover
damages ; the title having been in a
third person, and not in the vendor at
the time of the sale. The principal ob-
jection at the trial was, that the evidence
did not prove any warranty, nor any
fraud in the sale. But the court said :
" We are of opinion that an express
warranty was not requisite, for it is a
general rule that the law will imply a war-
ranty of title upon the sale of a chattel."
And this doctrine has been steadily ad-
hered to and uniformly followed by the
courts of New York. See Heermance v.
Vernoy, 6 Johns. 5 (1810) ; Vibbard v.
Johnson, 19 Johns. 77 (1821) ; Swett
v. Colgate, 20 Johns. 196 (1822) ; Eeid
o. Barber, 3 Cowen, 272 (1824) ; McCoy v.
Artcher, 3 Barb. 323 (1848). In this case
a very able judgment was pronounced in
favor of the doctrine of the text, namely,
that in sales of personal property, in the
possession of the vendor, there is an im-
plied warranty of title, for the posses-
sion is equivalent to an affirmation of title.
But it is held otherwise where the prop-
erty sold is then in the possession of a
third person, and the vendor made no
affirmation or assertion of ownership.
And the same was again distinctly af-
firmed in the case of Edick v. Crim, 10
Barb. 445. Dresser v. Ainsworth, 9 Barb.
619, is a valuable case upon this point.
It is there held, that this implied war-
ranty of title not only means that the
vendor has a right to sell, but it extends
to a prior lien or incumbrance. The
essence of the contract is, that the ven-
dor has a perfect title to the goods sold ;
that the same are unincumbered, and
that the purchaser will acquire by the
sale a title free and clear, and shall
enjoy the possession without disturbance
by means of anything done or suffered
by the vendor. So in Coolidge v. Brig-
ham, 1 Met. 551, Wilde, J., says : " In

contracts of sales a warranty of title is
implied. The vendor is always under-
stood to affirm that the property he sells
is his own. And this implied affirmation
renders him responsible, if the title prove
defective. This responsibility the ven-
dor incurs, although the sale may be
made in good faith, and in ignorance of
the defect of his title. This rule of law is
well established, and does not trench un-
reasonably upon the rule of the common
law, caveat emptor." The general doctrine
of the text is also directly asserted or
recognized in Bucknam v. Goddard, 21
Pick. 70; Hale c. Smith, 6 Greenl. 420;
Butler v. Tufts, 13 Me. 302 ; Thompson
r. Towle, 32 Me. 87 ; Huntingdon v. Hall,
36 Me. 501; Robinson r. Bice, 20 Mo.
229 ; Lines v. Smith, 4 Fla. 47 ; Lackey
v. Stouder, 2 Cart. (Ind.) 376; Gookin v.
Graham, 5 Humph. 480 ; Trigg v. Faris,

5 Humph. 343; Dorsev r. Jackman, 1 S.

6 R. 42 ; Eldridge r. Wadleigh, 3 Fairf.
372 ; Cozzins v. Whitaker, 3 Stew. & P.
322; Mockbee r. Gardner, 2 Har. & G.
176 ; Payne i\ Eodden, 4 Bibb, 304 ; Inge
v. Bond, 3 Hawks, 103, Taylor, C. J.;
Chism i'. Woods, Hardin, 531 ; Scott o.
Scott, 2 A. K. Marsh. 217 ; Chancellor r.
Wiggins, 4 B. 11™. 201 ; Boyd i\ Bopst,
2 Dallas, 91 ; Colcock v. Good, 3 McCord,
513; Ricks i. Dillahunty, 8 Port. (Ala.)
134 ; see also a well reasoned article in
12 Am. Jur. 311 ; 2 Kent, Com. 478. We
have been thus full in the citation of au-
thorities upon this apparently well-settled
point, because there is still some conflict
of opinion upon it, and because the
American doctrine has been thought not
to rest upon good foundation. The ar-
guments and authorities upon the op-
posite side of the question are very ably
stated in 11 Law Rep. 272, et seq. Scran-
ton !'. Clark, 30 N. V. 220. In this last
case it was decided that if the vendor be
not in possession there is no warranty,
and if he afterwards acquire a good title
it will not enure to the benefit of the
purchaser.

possession is disturbed by the true owner. Gross v. Kierski, 41 Cal. 111. In Massa-
chusetts, that a buyer has not been so disturbed, is immaterial. Perkins v. Whelan,
116 Mass. 542. In Iowa, a buyer may remove a lien and deduct from the purchase-
money. Harper v. Dotson, 43 la. 232. See Northampton Bank v. Mass., &c. Co. 123
Mass. 330; McKnight v. Devlin, 52 N. Y. 399; Sargent v. Currier, 49 N. H. 310;
Storm v. Smith, 43 Miss. 497; Rice v. Forsyth, 41 Md. 389; Marshall r. Duke, 51
Ind. 62; Whitaker o. Eastwick, 75 Penn. St. 229; Gross v. Kierski, 41 Cal. Ill;
Morris v. Thompson, 85 111 16. — A warranty of title is equally implied with an ex-
change as a sale. Hunt v. Sackett, 31 Mich. 18; Patee v. Pelton, 48 Vt. 182; Byrn-
side v. Burdett, 15 W. Va. 702.

616

CH- V-J WARRANTY. * 57g

dee. (/) If the seller is in possession, but the possession
is * of such a kind as not to denote or imply title in him, * 576
there would be no warranty of title in England, (#) and
we are confident that there would be none in this country.

All warranties, however expressed, are open to such construc-
tion from surrounding circumstances, and the general character
of the transaction, and the established usage in similar cases, as
will make the engagement of warranty conform to the intention
and understanding of the parties; provided, however, that the
words of warranty are neither extended nor contracted in their
significance beyond their fair and rational meaning. For these
words of warranty are usually subjected to a careful, if not a
precise and stringent interpretation, as it is the fault of the buyer
who asks for or receives a warranty, if it does not cover as
much ground and give him as effectual protection as he in-
tended. (A) *

(/) In the recent case of Sherman v. from a sound price, as is the case in

Champlain Trans. Co. 31 Vt. 162, it is some States. Richardson v. Johnson, 1

laid down as settled law by Redfie/d, La. An. 389. But care should be taken

C. J., that in a sale of personal property not to misunderstand or misapply this

there is always an implied warranty of rule. A vendor may warrant against a

title, unless the subject of the sale is the defect which is patent and obvious, as

vendor's title and not the thing itself, well as against any other. And a gen-

Therefore if after such a sale the vendor eral warranty that a horse was sound,

acquire the full title, it will enure to the for instance, would in our judgment be

benefit of the vendee. See also to the broken, if one eye was so badly injured,

same effect, Word v. Cavin, 1 Head, 506. or so malformed, as to be entirely useless,

(g) See ante, p.* 573, note (c). and although this defect might have been

(A) A general warranty is said not to noticed by the purchaser at the time of

cover defects plain and obvious to the sale. He may choose to rely upon the

purchaser, or of which he had cogni- warranty of the vendor, rather than upon

zance; thus if a horse be warranted per- his own judgment, and we see not why

feet, and want a tail or an ear. 13 H. 4, he should not be permitted to do so. A

1 b, pi. 4 ; 11 Ed. 4, 6 b, pi. 10 ; South- warranty that a horse is sound is broken
erne v. Howe, 2 Rolle, 5 ; Long v. Hicks, if he cannot see with one eye. House v.

2 Humph. 305 ; Schuyler v. Russ, 2 Fort, 4 Blackf . 294. Why may not the
Caines, 202 ; Margetson v. Wright, 5 vendor be equally liable if one eye was
Mo. & P. 006 ; Dillard v. Moore, 2 Eng. entirely gone ? In Margetson v. Wright,
(Ark.) 166. See also Birdseye v. Frost, 8 Bing. 454, s. c. 7 Bing. 603, a horse
34 Barb. 367. The same rule applies warranted sound had a splint then; this
whether the warranty is expected or was visible at the time of sale ; but the
whether a warranty is implied by law, animal was not then lame from it. He

1 To create a warranty, however, no special words are necessary. Sceales v.
Scanlan, 6 Ir. L. R. 367, 371; Robinson v. Harvey, 82 111. 58; Polhemus v. Heiman,
45 Cal. 573. The intention of the parties will govern, and, even where the alleged
warranty is in writing, it may be left to the jury to say whether it is so or not.
Tewkesbury v. Bennett, 31 la. 83 ; Horton v. Green, 66 N. C. 596. Any assertion by
the seller, not an opinion or judgment, respecting the kind, quality, or condition of
the article, upon which he intends the buyerrto rely as an inducement, and upon which
buyer does rely, is an express warranty. Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51 N. Y. 198 ; Bishop
v. Small, 63 Me. 12 ; Warren v. Philadelphia Coal Co. 83 Penn. St. 437 ; Wolcott v.
Mount, 7 Vroom, 262; Byrne v. Jansen, 50 Cal. 624; Sparling v. Marks, 86 111. 125;
Clark o. Ralls, 50 la. 275 ; Horn v. Buck, 48 Md. 358 ; Patrick v. Leach, 8 Neb. 530.

617

* 577 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

* 577 * If there be no express warranty, the common law, in

general, implies none. Its rule is, unquestionably, both
in England and in this country, caveat emptor, (i) 1 — let the pur-
chaser take care of his own interests. This rule is apparently
severe, and it sometimes works wrong and hardship ; and it is not
surprising that it has been commented upon in terms of strong
reproach, not only by the community, but by members of the legal
profession ; and these reproaches have in some instances been
echoed from tribunals which acknowledge the binding force of the
rule. But the assailants of this rule have not always seen clearly
how much of the mischief apparently springing from it arises
rather from the inherent difficulty of the case. As a general rule,
we must have this or its opposite ; and we apprehend that the
opposite rule, — that every sale implies a warranty of quality, —
would cause an immense amount of litigation and injustice. It is
always in the power of a purchaser to demand a warranty ; and
if he does not get one he knows that he buys without warranty,
and should conduct himself accordingly ; for it is always his duty
to take a proper care of his own interests, and to use all the pre-
caution or investigation which such case requires ; and he must
not ask of the law to indemnify him against the consequences of

afterwards became lame from the effects Stucky v. Clyburn, Cheves, 186, a slave
of it; and the warranty was held to be sold had a hernia ; this was known to the
broken. In Liddard v. Kain, 2 Bing. buyer. Yet it was held to be within an
183, an action was brought to recover express warranty of soundness. So of a
the value of horses sold and delivered, swelling in the abdomen, plainly visible
The defence was that at the time of the and known to the purchaser. Wilson v.
purchase the plaintiff agreed to deliver Ferguson, Cheves, 190. So where a slave
the horses at the end of a fortnight, had the scrofula at the time of sale,
sound and free from blemish, and that Thompson r. Botts, 8 Mo. 710. And
at the end of the fortnight one had a where a defect is obvious, yet if the
cough, and the other a swelled leg; but purchaser be misled as to its character
it also appeared, that the seller informed or extent, a warranty is implied. Wood
the buyer that one of the horses had a v. Ashe, 3 Strob. L. 64.
cold on him, and that this as well as the (i) Mixer v. Coburn, 11 Met. 559;
swelled leg was apparent to every ob- Winsor r. Lombard, 18 Pick. 59; Parkin-
server. The jury having found a verdict son v. Lee, 2 East, 321 ; Stuart v. Wil-
for the defendant, » rule for a new trial kins, Dougl. 20; Johnson v. Cope, 3 Har.
was moved for, on the ground that & J. 89 ; Seixas u. Woods, 2 Caines, 48;
where defects are patent a warranty Holden v. Dakin, 4 Johns. 421 ; Dean v.
against them is inoperative. The court Mason, 4 Conn. 428; West v. Cunning-
refused the rule, on the ground that the ham, 9 Port. (Ala.) 104; Mores v. Mead,
warranty did not apply to the time of 1 Denio, 378 ; McKinney v. Fort, 10 Tex.
sale, but to a subsequent period. — In 220.

1 Hawkins o. Pemberton, 51 N. Y. 198 ; Whitaker v. Eastwick, 75 Penn. St. 229 ;
Roberts v. Hughes, 81 111. 130 ; Hadley v. Prather, 64 Ind. 137. In the sale of a
chattel in existence which is inspected by the buyer, there is no exception to the rule
of caveat emptor. Morris v. Thompson, 85 111. 16 ; Byrne v. Jansen, 50 Cal. 024 ;
Robinson Works v. Chandler, 56 Ind. 575 ; Dooley v. Gallagher, 3 Hughes C. C. 214.

618

CH. V.J WARRANTY.

578

his own neglect of duty. It is a most reasonable principle and
is now established as a rule of law, that a purchaser who is put
upon inquiry, is chargeable with notice or knowledge of all those
facts which he would have learned by reasonable inquiry, and
such investigation as a man of common prudence would have
made, (ii)

The decisions under the rule of caveat emptor have fluctuated
very much, and there is a noticeable conflict and uncertainty in
respect to many points of the law of warranty upon sales. But
some exceptions and qualifications to the general rule are now
nearly, if not quite, established, both in England and in this
country; and the rule of caveat emptor, as it is now explained
and modified, may perhaps be regarded as upon the whole well
adapted to protect right, to prevent wrong, and to provide a
remedy for a wrong where it has occurred.

* One important and universal exception is this : the * 578
rule never applies to cases of fraud, never proposes to pro-
tect a seller against his own fraud, nor to disarm a purchaser
from a defence or remedy against a seller's fraud. (/) : It be-
comes, therefore, important to know what the law means by fraud
in this respect, and what it recognizes as such fraud as will pre-
vent the application of the general rule. If the seller knows of a
defect in his goods, which the buyer does not know, and if he had
known would not have bought the goods, and the seller is silent,
and only silent, his silence is nevertheless a moral fraud, and
ought perhaps on moral grounds to avoid the transaction. But
this moral fraud has not yet grown into a legal fraud. In cases
of this kind there may be circumstances which cause this moral
fraud to be a legal fraud, and give the buyer his action on the
implied warranty, or on the deceit. And if the seller be not
silent, but produce the sale by means of false representations,
then the rule of caveat emptor does not apply, and the seller is
answerable for his fraud. But the weight of authority requires
that this should be active fraud. The common law does not
oblige a seller to disclose all that he knows, which lessens the
value of the property he would sell. He may be silent, leaving
the purchaser to inquire and examine for himself, or to require a

(ii) Cooper v. Newman, 45 N. H. 339. (j) Irving v. Thomas, 18 Me. 418;

Otts v. Alderson, 10 Sm. & M. 476.

i Warren v. Philadelphia Coal Co. 83 Penn. St. 437.

619

578

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

warranty. He may be silent, and be safe ; but if he be more
than silent ; if by acts, and certainly if by words, he leads the
buyer astray, inducing him to suppose that he buys with warranty,
or otherwise preventing his examination or inquiry, this becomes
a fraud of which the law will take cognizance. The distinction
seems to be — and it is grounded upon the apparent necessity
of leaving men to take some care of themselves in their busi-
ness transactions — the seller may let the buyer cheat himself
ad libitum, but must not actively assist him in cheating
himself, (/c) 1

(h) The case of Laidlaw v. Organ, 2
Wheat. 176, is the leading case on this
subject in America. The facts were,
that one Shepherd, interested with Or-
gan, and in treaty with Girault, a mem-
ber of the firm of Laidlaw & Co., at New
Orleans, for a quantity of tobacco, had
secretly received intelligence over night
of the peace of 1815, between England
and the United States, which raised the
value of the article from thirty to fifty
per cent. Organ called on Girault on
Sunday morning, a little after sunrise,
and was asked if there was any news, by
which the price of it might be enhanced ;
but there was no evidence that Organ
had asserted or suggested anything to
induce a belief that such news did not
exist, and under the circumstances the
bargain was struck. Marshall, C. J., de-
livered the opinion of the court, to the
effect that the buyer was not bound to
communicate intelligence of extrinsic cir-
cumstances which might influence the
price, though it were exclusively in his
possession, and that it would be difficult
to circumscribe the contrary doctrine
within proper limits, where the means of
intelligence are equally accessible to loth par-
ties. Bench v. Sheldon, 14 Barb. 60;
Kintzing v. McElrath, 5 Penn. St. 407,
also well illustrate the principle of the text,
that where the means of knowledge is ac-
cessible to both parties, eacli must judge
for himself, and it is neither the duty of

the vendor to communicate to the vendee
any superior knowledge which he may
have of the value of the commodity, nor
of the vendee to disclose to the vendor
any facts which he may have, rendering
the property more valuable than the
vendor supposed. And in the case of
Irvine v. Kirkpatrick, 3 E. L. & E. 17, it
was decided by the House of Lords that
a concealment upon a sale of real estate, to
avoid the sale, must be of something that
the party concealing was bound to dis-
close. See also Blydenburgh r. Welsh,
1 Baldw. 331 ; Calhoun v. Vechio, 3
Wash. C. C. 165; Eichelberger v. Bar-
nitz, 1 Yeates, 307 ; Pearce v. Blackwell,
12 Ired. L. 49. The case of Hill v. Gray,
1 Stark. 434, might seem at first view to
conflict with this doctrine. There a pic-
ture was sold, which the buyer believed
had been the property oi Sir Eelix Agar,
a circumstance- which might have en-
hanced its value in his eyes. The seller
knew that the purchaser was laboring
under this delusion, but did not remove
it, and it did not appear that he either
induced or strengthened it. In an action
for the price, Lord Elknborovgh nonsuited
the plaintiff, saying the picture was sold
under a deception. The seller ought not
to have let in a suspicion on the part of
the purchaser which he knew enhanced
its value. He saw the purchaser had
fallen into a delusion, but did not re-
move it. From the report itself, it

1 Thus a seller of a bill purchased by him from, and known by him to have been
drawn for the accommodation of, the acceptor, as a means of borrowing money, is
not bound, in the absence of any inquiry by the buyer, and where the means of infor-
mation are open to the latter, to disclose at the time of the sale the circumstances
under which the paper was made. People's Bank v. Bogart, 81 N. Y. 101. Where
a buyer believes an article offered for sale to possess a certain quality, which it does
not, and the seller is conscious of the existence of such belief, but does nothing,
directly or indirectly, to bring it about, simply offering his article and exhibiting his
sample, remaining perfectly passive as to what was passing in the mind of the other
party, such "passive acquiescence of the seller in the self-deception of the buyer
will not entitle the latter to avoid the contract." Per Cockburn, C. J., in Smith v.
Hughes, L. R. 6 Q. B. 597.

620

CH. V.]

WARRANTY.

579

* As mere silence implies no warranty, neither do re- * 579
marks which should be construed as simple praise or con-
demnation ; (7) but any distinct assertion or affirmation of
quality made by the * owner during a negotiation (m) for * 580
the sale of a chattel, which it may be supposed was in-
tended to cause the sale, and was operative in causing it, will be
regarded either as implying or as constituting a warranty, (mm)
If such affirmation were made in good faith it is still a warranty ;

might seem that Lord Ellenborough here
held, that silence alone was a fraudulent
concealment, sufficient to vitiate the
contract. But the case is explained in
the English case of Keates v. Cadogan,
2 E. L. & E. 318 ; s. c. 10 C. B. 591,
Jervis, C. J., saying in Hill v. Gray, there
was a "positive aggressive deceit. Not
removing the delusion might be equiva-
lent to an express misrepresentation."
And in that case it was held, that where
the intended lessor of a particular house
knows that the house is in a ruinous
state, and dangerous to occupy, and that
its condition is unknown to the intended
lessee, and that the intended lessee takes
it for the purpose of residing in it, he is
not bound to disclose the state of the
house to the intended lessee, unless he
knows that the intended lessee is influ-
enced by his belief of the soundness of
the house in agreeing to take it, or un-
less the conduct of the lessor amounts to
a deceit practised upon the lessee. See
also Fox c. Mackreth, 2 Bro. Ch. 420,
and McEntire «. McEntire, 8 Ired. L.
297. — On the other hand, the vendor
must not practise any artifice to conceal
defects, nor make any representations
for the purpose of throwing the buyer
off his guard. See Matthews v. Bliss, 22
Pick. 48 ; Arnot v. Biscoe, 1 Ves. Sen. 95.
It is well settled, that misrepresentations
of material facts, by which a purchaser
is misled, vitiate the contract. Bench a,
Sheldon, 14 Barb. 66 ; Doggett v. Emer-
son, 3 Story, 700; Daniel v. Mitchell, 1
id. 172; Small e. Attwood, 1 Younge,
407; Hough v. Richardson, 3 Story, 659;
Warner v. Daniels, 1 Woodb. & M. 90.
For a case where the suppressio veri is
held to be an actionable deceit, see Pad-
dock v. Strowbridge, 3 Williams, 470.
The whole subject is ably examined in 2
Kent, Com. 482, et seq. See also Bean v.
Herrick, 3 Fairf . 262 ; Ferebee v. Gordon,
13 Ired. L. 350 ; Wood v. Ashe, 3 Strob.
L. 64 ; Weimer v. Clement, 37 Penn. St.
147.

(/) Thus in Arnott v. Hughes, Chitty
on Cont. 393, n., an action was brought

on a warranty that certain goods were
fit for the China market. The plain-
tiff produced a letter from the defend-
ant, saying, that he had goods fit for the
China market, which he offered to sell
cheap. Lord Ellenborough held, that such
a letter was not a warranty, but merely
an invitation to trade, it not having any
specific reference to the goods actually
bought by the plaintiff. See also Carter
v. Brick, 4 H. & N. 412, where it was
held that no warranty was implied in a
purchase by sample, where both parties
upon inspection took it for granted that
the article was of the quality repre-
sented by a third party.

(m) It is essential that a warranty,
to be binding, be made during the nego-
tiation ; if made after the sale is com-
pleted, it is without consideration and
void. Roscorla v. Thomas, 3 Q. B. 234 ;
Bloss v. Kittredge, 5 Vt. 28; Towell v.
Gatewood, 2 Scam. 22. — If, however,
the vendor in a negotiation between the
parties a few days before the sale, offer
to warrant the article, the warranty will
be binding. Wilmot v. Hurd, 11 Wend.
584 ; Lysney v. Selby, Ld. Raym. 1120.
But see Hopkins v. Tanqueray, 26 E. L.
& E. 254; s. c. 15 C. B. 130. In this
case, the defendant having sent his horse
to Tattersall's to be sold by auction, on
the day previous to the sale, saw the
plaintiff (with whom he was acquainted)
examining the horse, and said to him
bond fide, " You have nothing to look
for, I assure you ; he is sound in every
respect;" to which the plaintiff replied,
" If you say so I am satisfied," and desisted
from his examination. The horse was
put up the next day at auction, and the
plaintiff bought him, being induced, as
he said, by the defendant's assurance of
soundness. Held, in an action for breach
of warranty, that there was no evidence
to go to the jury of a warranty, the rep-
resentation not being made in the course
of, or with reference to the sale.

(mm) Hahn v. Doolittle, 18 Wis. 196;
Marsh v. Webber, 13 Minn. 109; Tewkes-
bury v. Bennett, 31 la. 83.

621

* 580 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

and if made with a knowledge of its falsity, it is a warranty, and
it is also a fraud. Whether such affirmation was intended to be,
and was received as, a warranty, seems to be a question for the
jury; (mn) but whether the statements were in law mere expres-
sions of opinion, or affirmations equivalent to warranty is a ques-
tion of law. Some light may be thrown on this question, which is
sometimes one of much difficulty, by a comparison of two recent
cases. It was held in California, that statements of a seller of
mining stock, concerning the amount and richness of the ore
taken out and the wood and water within reach, were not matters
of opinion, but statements on which the buyer had a right to
rely, (mo) While it was held in Illinois, that statements by a
seller of a patent right for a certain kind of cast-iron coffins, con-
cerning their durability and probable sale, were only expressions
of opinion, (ynp) ' It will be noticed that the statements in the
case in California referred to the past or present, and those in
the case in Illinois referred to the future.

The rule, on the subject of representations, recently laid down,
in Pennsylvania, is substantially this : if the parties to a sale are
not in a condition of perfect equality as to their ability to judge
accurately of the thing sold, false representations of the seller
will avoid the contract, (mq)

It is certain that the word warrant need not be used, nor any
other of precisely the same meaning. It is enough if the words
actually used import an undertaking on the part of the owner that
the chattel is what it is represented to be ; or an equivalent to
such undertaking, (w) It may be often difficult to distinguish

(mn) Bond v. Clark, 35 Vt. 577. Colgate, 20 id. 196; Conner v. Henderson,

(mo) Gifford v. Carvill, 29 Cal. 589. 15 Mass. 320; Stewart v. Dougherty, 3

(mp) Miller v. Young, 33 111. 354. Dana, 479; House i>. Fort, 4 Blaekf. 293;

(mq) Binler r. Flicklngers, 55 I'onn. Adams v. Johnson, 15 111. 345. So where

St. 279. See also Harris v. Mullins, 32 a horse was sold under the following ad-

Ga. 704, and Overbay u. Lighty, 27 Ind. vertisement : "To be sold, a black geld-

27. ing, five years old ; has been constantly

(n) The authorities from Chandelor v. driven in the plough. Warranted," the

Lopus, Cro. J. 4, to the present day, all warranty was held to apply only to his

agree that a bare affirmation, not intend- soundness, and the statement as to age

ed as a warranty, will not make the was considered only as an affirmation or

vendor liable. Bacon v. Brown, 3 Bibb, representation of his age, and as creating

35 ; Davis v. Meeker, 5 Johns. 354 ; Budd no liability unless there was deceit. Rich-

v. Fairmaner, 8 Bing. 52, where a receipt ardson v. Brown, 1 Bing. 344. See also

for " a gray four-year old colt " was held Dunlop v. Waugh, Peake, Cas. 123 ; l'ow-

only an affirmation or representation that ere. Barham, 4 A. & E. 473; Jendwine

he was four years old, but was no war- v. Slade, 2 Esp. 572 ; Willard v. Stevens,

ranty to that effect. See also Seixas v. 4 Foster (N. H), 271. On the other hand,

Woods, 2 Caines, 48, a very strong ci.se ; any affirmation of the quality or condi-

Holden e. Dakin, 4 Johns. 421 ; Swett v. tion of the thing sold (not intended as

622

CH,

V-]

WARRANTY.

*581

* between such warranty as this, and the naked praise * 581
(nuda laus~), or simple commendation (simplex commenda-
tion, which neither by the common law nor by the civil law impose
any obligation ; but, as matter of law, the distinction is well settled.

matter of opinion or belief), made by the
seller at the time of sale, for the purpose
of assuring the buyer of the truth of the
fact affirmed, and inducing him to make
the purchase, if so received an d relied upon
by the purchaser, is an express warranty.
Osgood v. Lewis, 2 Har. & G. 495, a very
important case on the subject of warranty.
Hawkins v. Berry, 5 Gilman, 36 ; Hilman
v. Wilcox, 30 Me. 170 ; Otts u. Alderson,
10 Sm. & M. 470; McGregor r. Penn, 9
Yerg. 74 ; Kinley v. Fitzpatrick, 4 How.
(Miss.) 59; Beals v. Olmstead, 24 Vt. 115.
See also Towell v. Gatewood, 2 Seam. 22 ;
Pennock v. Tilford, 17 Penn. St. 456. In
Roberts v. Morgan, 2 Cowen, 438, the
plaintiff and defendant being in negotia-
tion for an exchange of horses, the for-
mer said "he would not exchange unless
the latter would warrant his horse to be
sound." The defendant answered : " He
is sound except the bunch on his leg."
The horse had the glanders. Held, that
this was an express warranty. See also
Oneida Manuf. Society v. Lawrence, 4
Cowen, 440 ; Chapman v. Murch, 19
Johns. 290. In Cook v. Mosely, 13 Wend.
277 (a sale of a mare), the buyer asked
the seller if the mare was lame ; the latter
answered, " She was not lame, and that he
would not be afraid to warrant that Blie
was sound every way as far as he knew."
Held, to amount to a warranty. In Bee-
man v. Buck, 3 Vt. 53, the same principle
is adopted. So in Wood v. Smith, 4 C. &
P. 45, the buyer of a horse said to the
seller, " She is sound, of course 1 " The
latter said, " Yes, to the best of my knowl-
edge." On being asked if he would war-
rant her, he replied : " I never warrant. I
would not even warrant myself." This
was held to amount to a qualified war-
ranty. The general rule of the text is
well stated in Kicks v. Dillahunty, 8 Port.
(Ala.) 134. See also Carley v. Wilkins,
6 Barb. 657, where it was held, that a
representation made by a vendor, upon a
sale of flour in barrels, that it is in qual-
ity superfine, or extra superfine, and
worth a shilling a barrel more than com-
mon, coupled with the assurance to the
buyer's agent that he may rely upon such
representation, is a warranty of the qual-
ity of the flour. In Cave v. Coleman, 3
Man. & R. 2, the vendor of a horse told
the vendee, "you may depend upon it,
the horse is perfectly quiet and free from

vice." This was held to amount to an ex-
press warranty. But see Erwin v. Max-
well, 3 Murphey, 241. In Jackson v.
Wetherill, 7 S. & R. 480, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, although recog-
nizing the rule that no particular words
were necessary to constitute a warranty,
held, that when the vendor of a horse told
the purchaser before the sale that he uus
sure he was perfeHly safe, kind, and gentle in
harness, this created no warranty, being
but a bare affirmation of quality. See also
McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts, 56. In
Sheperd w. Temple, 3 N. H. 455, the ven-
dor of a lot of timber, most of which was
covered with snow, declared that it was
of as good quality as some of the sticks
which were visible; held, that this did
not necessarily amount to a warranty.
See Stevens o. Fuller, 8 N. H. 463, as to
what is competent evidence to prove a
warranty. A statement that a horse's
eyes " are as good as any horse's eyes in
the world," does not, of itself necessarily
amount to a warranty. House v. Fort, 4
Blackf. 293. The question whether any
particular affirmation amounts to a war-
ranty is for the jury. The criterion is
the understanding and intention of the
parties. Duffee v. Mason, 8 Cowen, 25;
Morrill v. Wallace, 9 N. H. Ill; Chap-
man i\ Murch, 19 Johns. 290. It is for
the jury to say whether the language
used was intended as a mere expression
of opinion, or belief, or as a representation.
Whitney v. Sutton, 10 Wend. 411; Foster
v. Caldwell, 18 Vt. 176; Bradford v.
Bush, 10 Ala. 386 ; Baum v. Stevens, 2
Ired. L. 411 ; Foggart v. Blackwcller, 4
id. 238; Tuttle v. Brown, 4 Gray, 457.
A bare affirmation of soundness of a
horse which is then exposed to the pur-
chaser's inspection, is not, per se, a war-
ranty. It is of itself only a representa-
tion. To give it the effect of a warranty,
it must be shown to the satisfaction of
the jury that the parties intended it to
have that effect. House v. Fort, 4
Blackf. 296. See also Tyre v. Causey, 4
Harring. (Del.) 425. The affirmation
must be made to assure the buyer of the
truth of the fact asserted, and induce
him to make the purchase, and must be
so received and relied upon by him.
Ender v. Scott, 11 111. 35; Humphreys v.
Comline, 8 Blackf. 508.

623

582

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

If a bill of sale be given, in which the article sold is
* 582 described, * we consider it tbe better rule tbat this descrip-
tion lias the full effect of warranty ; (o) 1 although there is

(o) Henshaw v. Robins, 9 Met. 83, is
one of the best considered cases upon this
subject. There the bill of sale was as
follows : " Henshaw & Co. bo't of T. W.
S. & Co. two cases of indigo, §272.35."
The article sold was not indigo, but prin-
cipally Prussian blue. There was no
fraud imputed to the vendor, and the
article was so prepared as to deceive
skilful dealers in indigo. The naked
question was presented whether the bill
of sale constituted a warranty that the
article was indigo. The court, after an
able analysis of the cases upon this
point, decided in the affirmative. The
same question has been very ably con-
sidered by the same court in the prior
case of Hastings v. Lovering, 2 Pick. 214.
In that case the bill of parcels was :
" Sold E. T. II. 2,000 gallons )>rime quality
winter oil." The article sold was oil, but
was not prime quality. In this respect,
the case differs from the preceding.
There the kind of commodity was differ-
ent ; here only the quality. The court
applied the same rule, and held the writ-
ing to be a warranty that the article was
of the quality described. So, in Yates v.
Pym, 6 Taunt. 446, the article was de-
scribed in the sale note as " 58 bales of
prime singed bacon." It was held to
amount to a warranty that the bacon
was prime singed. Osgood v. Lewis, 2
Har. & G. 495, supports the same view ;
in that case the words in the bill of par-
cels were " winter pressed sperm oil."
This was considered as a warranty that
the oil was winter pressed. So in The
Richmond Trading, &c. Co. v. Farquar, 8
Blackf. 89, it was held, where wool was
sold in sacks, and the sacks marked by
the seller and descriled in the invoice as
being of a certain quality, that this is
an express warranty that it is of such
quality. And where a vessel was adver-
tised for sale as being "copper f .stened,"
this was held to be a warranty that she
was so, according to the understanding of
the trade. Shepherd v. Kain, 5 B. & Aid.
240. See Paton v. Duncan, 3 C. & P. 336 ;
Teesdale v. Anderson, 4 id. 198 ; Wilson r.
Backhouse, Peake, Ad. Cas. 119. — So in
Pennsylvania it is held, that in a sale of
goods described in a bill or sold note

there is an implied warranty that the
commodity sold is the same in specie as
the description given of it in the bill.
Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 Rawle, 23. But
the courts of that State refuse to extend
the same doctrine to a statement of
quality of the article sold. Therefore,
where the article was described in the
bill of sale as " superior sweet-scented Ken-
tucky leaf tobacco," the seller was held
not liable on a warranty, if the tobacco
was Kentucky leaf, though of a very
low quality, ill-flavored, unfit for the
market, and not sweet-scented. Fraley
!'. Bispham, 10 Penn. St. 320. And see
Jennings v. Gratz, 3 Rawle, 168. Seo
also Hyatt v. Boyle, 5 G. & J. 110. A
contract for " good fine wine " has been
held to import no warranty, these words
being too uncertain and indefinite to raise
a warranty. Hogins v. Plynipton, 11
Pick. 97. A warranty that certain oil
" should stand the climate of Vermont
without chilling," means, that it will not
chill, when used in Vermont, in the or-
dinary manner in which lamp oil is used.
Hart v. Hammett, 18 Vt. 127. So a bill
of sale describing the article sold simply
as " tallow," raises no implied warranty
that the tallow should be of good quality
and color. Lamb p. Crafts, 12 Met. 353.
And in a bill of sale of " certain lots of
boards and dimension stuff now at and
about the mills at P." there is no implied
warranty that the boards are merchantable.
Whitman v. Freese, 23 Me. 212. A bill
of sale of a negro described her as " be-
ing of sound wind and limb, and free
from all disease." Held, an express war-
ranty that she was sound. Cramer i\
Bradshaw, 10 Johns. 484. But a bill of
sale of a horse as follows : " T. W.
bought of E. R. one bay horse, five years
old last July, considered sound," signed
by the vendor, creates no warranty of
the soundness of the horse. Wason r,
Rowe, 16 Vt. 625. See also Towell v.
Gatewood, 2 Scam. 22 ; Baird v. Mat-
thews, 6 Dana, 129. So in Winsor i*.
Lombard, 18 Pick. 57, the bill of sale
described the article as so many " bar-
rels No. 1 mackerel, and so many barrels
No. 2 mackerel." The mackerel sold
were in fact branded by the inspector as

1 If an article sold is described, the description amounts to a warranty or a condi-
tion precedent that it shall be an article of the kind described. Per Lord Blackburn,
in Bowes v. Shand, 2 App. Cas. 455. Failure to correspond to a description was held
a breach of a condition precedent in Gaylord Manuf. Co. v. Allen, 53 N. Y. 516, 619.

624

CH. V.] WARRANTY. * 583

some disposition to * confine this rule to cases where the * 583
buyer either could not, or did not, examine into the char-
acter and condition of the goods himself; thus it has been held,
that a sale with a bill of parcels implies no warranty, if the buyer
actually inspected the articles for himself. ( p) 1 But it was held
that a bill of sale of ". one horse, sound and kind " carried a war-
ranty of soundness, although the buyer saw the horse before the
sale and knew that he was lame, and the seller, when asked, re-
fused to give a warranty. ( pp~) A renunciation of warranty by
the buyer, does not bind him if there be fraud on the part of the
seller. (pq~)

One exception to the rule of caveat emptor springs from the rule
itself. For a requirement that the purchaser should " beware,"
or should take care to ascertain for himself the quality of the
thing he buys, becomes utterly unreasonable, under circumstances
which make such care impossible. If, therefore, the seller alone
possesses the requisite knowledge, or the means of knowledge,
and offers his goods for sale under circumstances which compel
the purchaser to rely upon the judgment and honesty of the
seller, without any examination on his own part as to the quality
of the thing offered, it has been held, that the rule of caveat emptor
does not apply, because it cannot apply, and that the seller war-
No. 1 and No. 2. It was held, that there Pemberton, 6 Rob. 42. In some early
was no implied warranty that they were cases in America, it was held, that the
free from rvst at the time of sale, although description given to property in adver-
it was proved that mackerel affected by tisements, bills of sale, sold notes, &c,
rust are not considered No. 1 and No. 2. did not enter into the contract, and
But the general doctrine of this note was therefore being but matters of descrip-
expressly recognized by Shaw, C. J., who tion, created no warranty. Such are the
said : " The rule being, that upon a sale cases of Seixas p. Woods, 2 Caines, 48 ;
of goods by a written memorandum or Barrett v. Hall, 1 Aik. 2t>fc> ; Svvett v. Col-
bill of parcels, the vendor undertakes, in gate, 20 Johns. 196, and some others ;
the nature of warranting, that the thing but we think the more modern cases
sold and delivered is that which is de- have decided, that a rule of law, in itself
scribed, this rule applies whether the sound, was in those instances erroneously
description be more or less particular applied. See Henshaw v. Robins, 9 Met.
and exact in enumerating the qualities 83, and 2 Kent, Com. 489. See also the
of the goods sold." A sale of vitriol in valuable notes to Chandelor v. Lopus. 1
casks as "blue vitriol, sound and in Smith, Lead. Cas. 76, et seq., where will
good order," is no warranty that the be found an able examination of the
vitriol is unmixed sulphate of copper, whole subject of warranty,
and there being proof that the term (p) Carson v. Bailie, 19 Penn. St. 375 ;

"blue vitriol" was used only as a com- Lord v. Grow, 39 Penn. St. 88.
mercial designation, the question of war- Ipp) Brown v. Bigelow, 10 Allen, 242.

ranty was left to the jury in Hawkins v. (pq) Berans v. Farrell, 18 La. Ann. 232.

1 Where there is no opportunity to inspect the commodity, as in the case of
canned fruit or vegetables, the maxim caveat emptor does not apply. Boyd v. Wilson,
83 Penn. St, 319.

vol. i. 40 625

* 584 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

rants that the goods ho offers for sale are, in respect to their
qualities, what the purchaser may fairly understand them to be ;
in other words, that they are of merchantable value, and proper
subjects of trade, (q)

* 584 * It might seem that the reason of this rule should apply

to all cases where an article is sold of which the value is
materially affected by some defect which the buyer cannot know
or discover. But it is not yet conceded that in all such cases
there is an implied warranty. The implication does not appear
to extend to cases where an examination would be fruitless, but
only to those in which there can be no examination. It is true,
that in the fluctuation which has marked the course of adjudi-
cation on the subject of warranty with sale, there is a series of
cases in which, for a considerable time, a principle seemed to be
acquiring favor, which was almost equivalent to a rule that every
sale carried with it an implied warranty of the merchantable
quality of the goods sold. Of course such a rule would in fact
annul that of caveat emptor. But of late the courts seem to be
retracing their steps ; and, in this country at least, we consider
the ancient rule as distinctly established, (r~) 1 There are but two

(q) Hanks v. McKee, 2 Lit. 227. Gar- the place where both vendor and vendee
diner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144, is the leading resided, notwithstanding that the ven-
case upon this point. In that case, Lord dor had no better opportunity than the
Ellenborough, speaking to this point, says : vendee for the inspection of the article.
" I am of opinion that under such cir- The case of Hyatt v. Boyle, 5 G. & J.
cmnstances the purchaser has a right to 110, also holds, that the rule of caveat
expect a salable article answering the emptor does not apply, if the buyer has
description in the contract. Without no opportunity to inspect the goods, and
any particular warranty, this is an im- in such ease the seller impliedly war-
plied term in every such contract, rants them to be merchantable. Sec a
Where there is no opportunity to inspect strong case to this effect in Merriam v.
the commodity, the maxim of caveat emp- Field, 24 Wis. 040. But the mere fact
tor does not apply. He cannot without that the examination is attended with in-
a warranty insist that it shall be of any comrniew-r to the purchaser is not suffl-
particular quality or fineness, but the cient to dispense with the rule. It must
intention of both parties must be taken be morally impracticable. See, on the
to be, that it shall be salable in the mar- point that an opportunity which the
ket under the denomination mentioned buyer has to inspect the thing sold pre-
in the contract between them. The pur- vents an implied warranty, Taymon v.
chaser cannot be supposed to buy goods Mitchell, 1 Md. CI). 496, and Carley v.
to place them on a dunghill." This case Wilkins, 6 Barb. 557. And see also, as
is confirmed by Wieler v. Schilizzi, 17 C. qualifying this rule, Foster v. Swasey, 2
B. 619. See also the case of Gallagher Wood. & M. 217, and Taylor v. Fleet, 1
v. Waring, 9 Wend. 20, where the court Barb. 471.

were inclined to extend the rule to the (r) The weight of authority decidedly

case of a sale of cotton in bales, lying in determines that a sale for a sound price

the storehouse of the vendor, situate in implies no warranty of quality, or that

1 That there is an implied warranty generally that an article shall be salable
or merchantable, see Gaylord Manuf. Co. u. Allen, 53 N. Y. 515, 518; Morehouse
v. Comstock, 42 Wis. 62G. If a manufacturer undertakes to supply goods manuf ac-

626

CH. V.] WARRANTY. * 584

of our States in which it is an acknowledged rule of law, that a
sale of a chattel for a full price carries with it an implied war-
ranty. And in one of these the civil law, of which this is a prin-
ciple, prevails, (s)

This distinction has been asserted. If the contract be exe-
cuted, the buyer must take the thing sold with all its defects, if
there be neither warranty nor fraud ; but an executory contract
to sell carries an obligation that the thing sold shall be merchant-
able, (ss) 1 The reasons for this distinction are now quite clear.

If one contracts to manufacture for a buyer an article of a
certain quality, and when the article is delivered it is so deficient
as to justify a refusal to accept, it is held that the buyer may
tender the article to the seller, and if he refuses to receive it, may
sell it for the best price he can obtain without giving notice to
the seller of the time and place. (s£) 2 And the rule requiring
that the deficient article must be returned when the deficiency is

the article is merchantable. Dean v. contract, although it be a losing one.

Mason, 4 Conn. 428, is an able case on Whitefield v. McLeod, 2 Bay, 880. And

this subject ; Holden o. Dakin, 4 Johns, see Carnochan v. Gould, 1 Bailey, 179 ;

421 ; Snell v. Moses, 1 id. 96; Johnston Rose w. Beatic, 2 Nott & McC. 638. And

v. Cope, 3 Har. & J. 89 ; Cozzins v. Whit- if the parties expressly agree that the

aker, 3 Stew. & P. 322 ; La Neuville v. buyer shall take the property at his own

Nourse, 3 Camp. 351 ; West v. Cunning- risk, the vendor is not answerable for its

ham, 9 Port. (Ala.) 104; Wetherill v. soundness. Thompson v. Lindsay, 3

Neilson, 20 Penn. St. 448. Brevard, 305. And a sound price does

(s) South Carolina and Louisiana are not imply a value of the property equal to

the only States in which it is held that the price, but only that there is no un-

tlie sale of a chattel for a sound price ere- soundness. And such unsoundness must

ates a warranty against all faults known materially affect the article. Smith v.

or unknown to the seller. Timrod v. Rice, 1 Bailey, 048. In Presbury v. Mor-

Shoolbred, 1 Bay, 324; Dewees v. Mor- ris, 18 Mo. 165, it is held, that the sale of

gan, 1 Mart. (La.) 1 ; State v. Gaillard, a land-warrant carries with it an implied

2 Bay, 19 ; Barnard v. Yates, 1 Nott & warranty of its validity, and the Court

McC. 142 ; Missroon v. Waldo, 2 id. 76 , of Claims holds that a sale of govern-

Melancon v. Robichaux, 17 La. 97. But ment goods captured in war, carries a

this does not extend to sales of real es- warranty of title to the purchaser. Post

tate. Rupart v. Dunn, 1 Rich. L. 101. v. U. S. 19 Law Rep. 12.
And in sales of personal property, if the (ss) McClung v. Kelley, 21 Iowa, 508.

buyer is informed fully of all the cir- {si) Messmore v. N. Y. Shot Co. 40 N.

cumstances, and has a fair opportunity Y. 422.
of informing himself, he is bound by his

tured by himself, or in which he deals, and which a buyer has had no opportunity to
inspect, there is an implied warranty that the articles supplied shall be merchantable.
Mann v. Everston, 32 Ind. 355. See Dounce v. Dow, 64 N. Y. 411 ; Leopold v. Van
Kirk, 27 Wis. 152 ; Wilcox v. Hall, 53 Ga. 635 ; Weiger v. Gould, 86 111. 180 ; Harris
u. Waite, 51 Vt. 480 ; Gerst v. Jones, 32 Gratt. 518 ; Merriam v. Field, 39 Wis. 578.

1 In the case of an executory sale, " when defects in the goods are patent, and
obvious to the senses, when the purchaser has full opportunity for examination, and
knows of such defects, he must, either when he receives the goods or within what,
under the circumstances, is a reasonable time thereafter, notify the seller that the
goods are not accepted as fulfilling the warranty ; otherwise, the defects will be
deemed waived." Locke v. Williamson, 40 Wis. 377.

2 Smith u. Love, 64 N. C. 439.

627

585

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[book m.

discovered, has no application where the deficiency was discovered
only by the destruction of the article in using it ; as in a case of

guano sold and found to be worthless, (sm)
* 585 * If goods are sold by sample, there can be no examina-
tion of the goods, but there may be of the sample. There
is, therefore, in this country, an implied warranty that the goods
correspond to the sample. (t) a A recent English case seems to
hold, that if the goods do not correspond to the sample, the vendee

(sii) Smith v. Love, 64 N. C. 439.

(t) Bradford u. Manley, 13 Mass. 139,
is a leading case in America upon this
point. Oneida Manuf. Society v. Law-
rence, 4 Cowen, 440 ; Andrews v. Knee-
land, 6 id. 354; Gallagher v. Waring, 9
Wend. 20; Beebce v. Robert, 12 id. 413;
Boorman v. Jenkins, 12 id. 560 ; Moses v.
Mead, 1 Demo, 38B ; Brower v. Lewis, 19
Barb. 674 ; Beirne r. Dord, 1 Seld. 95;
Hargous v. Stone, id. 70 ; Borrckins r.
Bevan, 3 Eawle, 37 ; Rose v. Beatie, 2
Kott & McC. 538 ; Beirne v. Dord, 2 Sandf .
89, is an excellent case upon this point.
It is there held, that in order to constitute
a sale by sample, it must appear that the
parties contracted solely in reference to
the sample, or article exhibited, and that
both mutually understood they were deal-
ing with the sample, and with an under-
standing that the bulk was like it. And
in the same case upon appeal, 1 Seld. 95,
and in Hargous v. Stone, 1 id. 73. it is de-
cided, that the mere exhibition of a sam-
ple is not sufficient to constitute a war-
ranty that the bulk of the goods is of the
same quality with the sample; that such
exhibition is but a representation that the
sample has been fairly taken from the
bulk of the commodity ; and that for
the production of the sample to have the
effect of a strict warranty, it must be
shown that the parties mutually under-
stood that there was an agreement on the
part of the seller that the bulk of the

commodity should correspond with the
sample. — An opportunity for a personal
examination of the bulk is a strong cir-
cumstance against considering the sale to
have been made by sample. Hargous v.
Stone, 1 Seld. 73; Beirne v. Dord, 1 id.
95. See also Waring v. Mason, 18 Wend.
434. In Williams v. Spafford, 8 Pick.
250, a leather hag of indigo was sold,
which the bill of sale described as " one
seroon of indigo." There was a small
triangular hole in one side of the seroon,
where the purchaser might draw out a
specimen, and at the sale the plaintiff ex-
amined the article in this mode. The se-
roon proved to be mainly filled with other
substances than indigo. It was held, a sale
" by sample," and that there was a war-
ranty that the bulk was of the same kind
and quality with the sample. In Salis-
bury !'. Stainer, 19 Wend. 159, several
bales of hemp were sold. The purchaser
was told to examine the hemp for him-
self. He cut open one bale, and appeared
satisfied with the quality. He might have
cut open every bale had he chosen to do
so. It was proved that the interior of
the bales consisted of tow, and of a qual-
ity of hemp very much inferior to that on
the outsides of the bales. This was held,
not to be a sale by sample, and that there
was no warranty that the interior should
correspond with the exterior of the bales.
See Dickinson v. Gay, 7 Allen, 29 ; Gun-
ther v. Atwell, 19 Ind. 157.

1 But the sale must be solely by sample. Day v. Raguet, 14 Minn. 273. In
Pennsylvania, a sale by sample is not a warranty, but a guaranty simply that the
goods are like in kind and merchantable. Boyd r. Wilson, 83 Penn. St. 319. As
to a sample being free from any secret defect of manufacture not discoverable on
inspection, and unknown to both parties, see Heilbutt v. Hickson, L. R. 7 C. P. 438.
If the goods sold by sample are delivered and accepted by the buyer, he cannot
return them. Gaylord Manuf. Co. c. Allen, 53 N. Y. 515 ; Couston v. Chapman,
L. R. 2 Sc. & D. App. 250. If the goods are sold by an average sample, it is only
necessary that all the goods sold when mixed together be equal to such sample.
Leonard v. Fowler, 44 N. Y. 289 ; Schnitzer v. Oriental Works, 114 Mass. 123. Grim-
oldby v. Wells, L. R. 10 C. P. 391, held that where the bulk of goods sold by sample
are found by the purchaser on inspection after delivery not to be equal to the sample,
he may reject the goods by giving notice to the vendor that he would not accept
them, and that they are at vendor's risk, and need not send or offer to send them
back or place them in neutral custody.

628

CH- v-] WARRANTY. * 586

can recover only by showing some knowledge on the part of the
vendor of this want of correspondence, (w) We doubt this, be-
cause we hold that such a sale implies warranty. If they do
correspond, and the sample itself has a defect, even if this defect
be unknown, and not discoverable by examination, there is no
implied warranty against this defect, and the seller is not respon-
sible, (v) J If there be an express warranty, an examination
* of samples is no waiver of the warranty ; nor is any in- * 586
quiry or examination into the character or quality of the
things sold ; for a man has a right to protect himself by such
inquiry, and also by a warranty, (w) But if the purchaser is told
that the sale must be on examination of the goods, there is no
warranty, although he chooses to make no examination, and trusts
to the samples, (ww)

Evidence of usage has been refused, when offered as to war-
ranty by sample, (x) and as to warranty in general ; Qf) but this
cannot be a universal rule. Indeed, we should admit it only when
the evidence was itself objectionable, or the usage to be proved
was insufficient, (z) 2

If a thing be ordered of the manufacturer for a special purpose,
and it be supplied and sold for that purpose, there is an implied

(u) Ormrod o. Huth, 14 M. & W. modity was merchantable at the time of

651. sale, although a merchantable price was

(v) Parkinson v. Lee, 2 East, 314, is a given. — In Xiehol v. Godts, 10 Exch. 191,

very important case upon this subject, the plaintiff agreed to sell to the defend-

which has been much discussed, and some- ant a quantity of oil, described as foreign

times doubted, but which, when properly refined rape oil, but warranted only equal

understood, seems to be well supported to samples ; and having delivered oil

by principle and analogy. It was a sale which was not foreign refined oil, but

of five pockets of hops, with express war- which corresponded with the samples, it

ranty that the bulk answered the samples was held, that the defendant was not bound

by which they were sold. The sale was to accept the same, as he was entitled to

in January, 1801 ; at that time the samples the delivery of oil answering to the de-

fairly answered to the commodity in bulk, scription of foreign refined rape oil, and

and no defect was at that time perceptible to that the statement in the contract as to

the buyer. In July following every pocket samples related only to the quality of

was found to have become unmerchant- the oil.

able and spoiled by heating, caused prob- (w) Willings u. Consequa, Pet. C. C.

ably by the hops having been fraudu- 301.

lently watered by the grower, or some (ww) Kellogg v. Barnard, 6 Elatch.

other person, before they were purchased 279, and Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wallace,

by the defendant. The defendant knew 383.

nothing of this fact at the time of sale, (x) Beirne v. Dord, 1 Seld. 95.

and it was then impossible to detect it. (z/j Wetherill v. Neilson, 20 Penn. St.

It was held, that there was here no im- 448.
plied warranty that the bulk of the com- (z) Carter v. Crick, 4 H. & N. 412.

1 Unless he is the manufacturer or grower. Heilbutt v. Hickson, L. R. 7 C. P. 438.

2 Atwater v. Clancy, 107 Mass. 369; Jones v. Wasson, 3 Baxter, 211; Graff v.
Foster, 67 Mo. 512.

629

587

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

warranty that it is fit for that purpose, (a) 1 This prin-
: 587 ciple * has been carried very far. It must, however, be

(a) Beals v. Olmstead, 24 Vt. 114;
Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 633, is the lead-
ing English ease on the subject. There
the defendant was a manufacturer and ven-
dor of copper. The plaintiff applied to
him "for copper for sheathing a vessel."
The defendant said : " I will supply you
well." From the defendant's warehouse
the plaintiff's agent then selected such
copper as was wanted, and applied it to the
plaintiff's vessel. It proved to be very
defective, and lasted only about four
months, in place of four years, the usual
time of wear of good sheathing : the jury
found that the decay was caused by some
intrinsic defect in the quality of the copper,
but that there was no satisfactory evi-
dence of what the defect was. No fraud
was imputed to the defendant. After
full argument and deliberation, it was
he/dhy the whole Court of Common I'lcns,
that there was an implied warranty that
the article was fit for the purpose for
which it was sold. See also Brenton v.
Davis, 8 Blackf. 317; Ttodgers & Co. „.
Xiles & Co. 11 Ohio St. 43, and Bird v.
Mayer, 8 Wis. 302; Fisk v. Tank, 12 Wis.
2TG, JLaing /•. Fidgeon, G Taunt. 108, is
also an important case- The defendant
was a saddle manufacturer. He sent the
plaintiff a sample of saddles that could
be made for a certain price. The plain-
tiff then gave him an order for "goods
for North America, 3 dozen single flap
saddles, 24s. a 20s. with cruppers/' &c.
The saddles delivered were inferior in
material and workmanship, useless and
winiiir/iitntahle, and did not enrn spoiid icil/i
the sample sent. The court held the whole
transaction to amount to a contract that
the art'de should be merchantable, and
the plaintiff had judgment. Brown v.
Islington, 2 Man. & (j. 27!', also deserves
attention. The defendant was a dealer
in ropes, and represented himself to be a
manufacturer of the article. The plain-
tiff, a wine merchant, applied to him for

a crane rope. The defendant's foreman
went to the plaintiff's premises in order
to ascertain the dimensions and kind of
rope required. He examined the crane
and the old rope, and took the necessary
admeasurements, and was told that the
new rope was wanted for the purpose of
raising pipes of wine out of the cellar,
and letting them down into the street ;
when he informed the plaintiff that a rope
must be made on purpose. The defend-
ant did not make the rope himself, hut
sent the order to his manufacturer, who
employed a third person to make it. It
was held, that, as between the parties to
the sale, the defendant was to he consid-
ered as the manufacturer, and that there
was an implied warranty that the rope
was a fit and proper one for the purpose
for which it was ordered. Tiiidnl, C. J.,
said : " It appears to me to be a distinc-
tion well founded, both in reason and on
authority, that if a party purchases an
article upon his own judgment, he cannot
afterwards hold the vendor responsible,
on the ground that the article turns out
to be unfit for the purpose for which it
was required ; but if he relies upon the
judgment of the seller, and informs him
of the use to which the article is to be ap-
plied, it seems to me the transaction car-
ries with it an implied warranty, that the
thing furnished shall be fit and proper for
the purposes for which it was designed."
In Shepherd v. Pybus, 3 Man. & G. 808,
it was held, that in a sale of a barge by
the buildir, there was an implied warran-
ty that it was reasonably Jit for use, but
it was left undetermined whether there
was an implied warranty that the barge
was fit for some particular purpose, for
which the builder knew it was designed
by the purchaser. See also Chambers r.
Crawford, Addison, 150, that a boat-build-
er, constructing a boat, is held to warrant
it sufficient for ordinary use. — In ( Hlivant
v. Bayley, 5 Q. B. 288, the plaintiff was

i White r. Miller, 71 N. T 118 ; Chicago Packing Co. v. Tilton, 87 111. 547 ; Rob-
inson Machine Works v. Chandler, 00 Ind. 575. In such a case there is a warranty
by the vendor that it i< reasonably fit for the purpose, and there is no exception as
to latent undiscoverable defects. Randall p. Newson, 2 Q. B. D. 102. But if a
purchaser inspects for himself the specific article sold, and there is no express war-
ranty, and the seller is guilty of no fraud, and is not himself the manufacturer of the
article, and the particular use which is to be made of it is not communicated by
the purchaser at the time of the sale, there is no implied warranty on the part of the
seller that the article is reasonably fit for the purpose to which it is to be applied,
although the seller supposes that the purchaser intends to use it for the purpose for
which lie in fact buys it. Hight v. Bacon, 120 Mass. 10. See Bragg v. Morrill, 49
Vt. 45; Byers v. Chapin, 28 Ohio St. 300; Leopold v. Van Kirk, 27 Wis. 152.

630

CH. V.]

WARRANTY.

588

limited to cases where a thing is ordered for a special pur-
pose, and not applied to those where a special thing is ordered,
although this be intended for a special purpose. For if
the thing is itself * specifically selected and ordered, there * 588
the purchaser takes upon himself the risk of its effecting
its purpose. Nor can he rely upon statements and assertions
made by the maker in circulars and advertisements concerning
the article, as a warranty that it will do what is stated. (6) J But
where he orders a thing for a special purpose, or to do a specific
work, there he puts this risk upon the person who is to supply the
thing, (c) 2 If the thing were not ordered and sold for a special

the patentee and manufacturer of a pat-
ent machine for printing in two colors.
The defendant saw the machine on the
plaintiff's premises, and ordered one, the
plaintiff undertaking by a written memo-
randum to make him " a two color print-
ing machine on my patent principle." In
an action for the price, the defendant
excused himself from liability on the
ground that the machine had been found
useless for printing in two colors. The
judge, in summing up, told the jury that,
if the machine described was a known,
ascertained article, ordered by the defend-
ant, he was liable, whether it answered
his purpose or not ; but that if it was
not a known ascertained article, and the
defendant had merely ordered, and the
plaintiff agreed to supply, a machine for
printing two colors, the defendant was
not liable unless the instrument was rea-
sonably fit for the purpose. The Court
of Queen's Bench hrld this to be a proper
direction ; and the jury having found for
the plaintiff under it, they refused to dis-
turb the verdict. See also the next note.
In Barnett o. Stanton, 2 Ala. 195, it was
determined, that if manufactured goods
are open to inspection, and are actually
examined by the purchaser, before the
sale, there is no implied warranty of qual-
ity, although the manufacturer himself
be the vendor. See Kirk v. Nice, 2 Watts,
307, that a manufacturer even does not
always undertake that the goods made
are merchantable. The principle of the
text, and the distinction between a sale
of a manufactured article by the manu-
facturer himself, and of an ordinary sale

of a chattel, as to implied warranty, is
recognized in Misner v. Granger, 4'Gil-
nian, 0'); and in Leflore v. Justice, 1 Sm.
& M. 381, where it is said, that every
person who contracts to do a piece of
work, impliedly undertakes to apply suf-
ficient skill and dexterity to its perform-
ance to complete it in a just and work-
manlike manner. So in Howard v. Hoey,
23 Wend. 3ol, the distinction between
manufactured articles and others is rec-
ognized. See also Hart v. Wright, 17
Wend. 267 ; s. c. 18 id. 449 ; Getty v,
Kountree, 2 Chandl. 28; Bull v. Robin-
son, 28 E. L. & E. GyO ; s. c. 10 Exch. 342 ;
Brown !■. Sayles, 1 Williams, 227 ; Dick-
son v. Jordan, 11 Ired. L. 166; Pease v.
Sabin, 38 Vt. 432; Bartlett v. Hoppock,
34 N. Y. 118.

(6) Prideaux v. Burnett, 1 C. B. (n. 8.)
613.

(c) " If a man says to another, ' Sell
me a horse fit to carry me,' and the other
sells a horse which he knows to be unfit
to ride, he may be liable for the conse-
quences ; but if a man says, ' Sell me that
gray horse to ride,' and the other sells it,
knowing that the former will not be able
to ride it, that would not make him lia-
ble." Mavle, J., in Keates n. Cadogan, 2
E. L. & E. 320; s. c. 10 C. B. 591. See
also Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 M. & W. 399,
which fully establishes the distinction
taken in the text, and is a leading case
on the subject. There the defendant sent
to the plaintiff, the patentee of an inven-
tion, known as "Chanter's smoke-consum-
ing furnace," the following written order :
" Send me your patent hopper and ap-

1 There is no warranty that a known article ordered of a manufacturer shall
answer a buyer's particular purpose, although stated in the order. Hight v. Bacon,
126 Mass. 10 ; Dounce v. Dow, 64 N. Y. 411 ; Wolcott v. Mount, 7 Vroom, 262, 267 ;
s. c. 9 Vroom, 496 ; Port Carbon Co. v. Groves, 68 Penn. St. 149 ; Tilton Safe Co. v.
Tisdale, 48 Vt. 83 ; Gerst v. Jones, 32 Gratt. 518.

2 Macfarlane v. Taylor, L. R. 1 Sc. & D. App. 245 ; Thorns i>. Dingley, 70 Me. 100.

631

589

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

purpose, evidence is inadmissible to show that the buyer in fact

bought it intending to apply it to a special purpose and found it

unfit, (cc)

In all sales of provisions for immediate domestic use, there is

an implied warranty that they are wholesome and fit for use.

But this warranty extends no farther, and docs not cover a

sale of provisions for any other than immediate consump-
tion, (erf) :

* 589 * But whatever may be the law as to an implied war-
ranty that personal property bought and sold, or ordered

and manufactured for a particular purpose, shall be reasonably fit

paratus, to fit up my brewing copper with
your smoke-consuming furnace. Patent
right £15 15s., iron work not to exceed
£5 5s. ; engineer's time fixing, 7s. (id. per
day." The plaintiff accordingly put up
on the defendant's premises one of his
patent furnaces, but it was found not to
be of any use for the purposes of brewery,
and was returned to the plaintiff. It was
held (no fraud being imputed to the plain-
tiff), that there was not an implied war-
ranty on his part that the furnace sup-
plied should be fit for the purposes of
brewery ; but that, the defendant having
defined by the order the particular ma-
chine to be supplied, the plaintiff per-
formed his part of the contract by sup-
plying that machine, and was entitled to
recover the whole £15 15s., the price of
the patent right. See also Prideaux i\
Burnett, 1 C. B. (k. s.) G13. Bluett v.
Osborne, 1 Stark. 381, supports this dis-
tinction. In that case the plaintiff sold
the defendant a bowsprit. It appeared
at the time to be, in every respect, good
and perfect. The defendant had ample
opportunity to inspect it. Soon after the
bowsprit was cut up and found to be
rotten. The defendant resisted payment,
on the ground that there was an implied
warranty by the vendor that the article
should be made of good and sufficient
materials. No fraud was attributed to
the vendor. The defence was not sus-
tained, and the plaintiff had a verdict for
the whole price. Here there was a sale
of a specific chattel — inhudul, it is true,
for a particular purpose by the purchaser,
but not furnished or made for that pur-
pose by the vendor. See also Gray „.

Cox, i B. & C. 108; Dickson v. Jordan,
11 Ired. L. 166; Burns v. Fletcher, 2 Cart.
(Ind.) 372.

(cc) Bartlett u. Hoppock, 34 N. Y.
118.

(cd) Moses v. Mead, 1 Denio, 378.
And it seems not to matter that they are
purchased for domestic use, unless they
were exposed to sale for that purpose, or
the seller was a, provision dialer. Burnby
o. Bollett, IS M. & W. 644. In this case,
A, a farmer, bought in the public market
of a country town, from B, a butcher
keeping a stall there, the carcass of a
dead pig for consumption, and left it
hanging up, intending to return after
completing other business and take it
away. In his absence, C, a farmer, see-
ing it and wishing to buy, was referred
to A as the owner, and subsequently, on
the same day, bought it of A, the original
buyer, without any warranty. It did not
appear that any secret defect in it was
known to any of the parties. It turned
out to be unsound, and unfit for human ,
consumption. It was held, that no war-
ranty of soundness was implied by law
between the farmers A and C. But see
Divine v. McCormick, 50 Barb. 116. See
also Van Branklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns.
408; Emerson r. Brigham, 10 Mass. 197;
Hart v. Wright, 17 Wend. 207 ; s. c. 18
id. 441) ; Winsor r. Lombard, 18 Pick. 57 ;
Humphreys v Comline, 8 Blackf . 616. —
If an innkeeper agree with a brewer to
take all his beer of him, he is bound to
furnish him with beer of a wholesome
quality. Holcombe v. Hewson, 2 Camp.
391 ; Cooper v. Twibill, 3 Camp. 286.

1 As in sale of a live cow by a farmer to retail butchers, there is no implied war-
ranty that she is fit for food, although he knows that they buy her for the purpose
of cutting her up into beef for immediate domestic use. Howard v. Emerson, 110
Mass. 320. See also to the same point, Ward o. Hobbs, 2 Q. B. D. 331 ; 3 Q. B. D.
150. ^

632

CH.

V-]

WARRANTY.

*590

for such a purpose,— no such rule applies to real estate. It
seems, indeed, to be quite well settled, that in a lease or purchase
of a house and land, there is no implied warranty that it shall be
reasonably fit for habitation, occupation, or cultivation ; still less
that it shall be fit for the purpose for which it was taken. (<f) 1

No warranty can be implied from circumstances, if there be an
express refusal to warrant, (e) And where the contract of sale is
in writing, and contains no warranty, there parol evidence is
not admissible to add a warranty. (/) 2 And if there *be * 590
a warranty in writing, it cannot be enlarged or varied by

(d) Hart v. "Windsor, 12 M. & W. 68;
Sutton v. Temple, 12 M. & W. 62, where
the subject is very ably examined and
discussed. In the last case, A hired in
writing the eatage of twenty-four acres
of land from B for seven months, at a
rent of .£40, and stocked the lands with
beasts, several of which died a few days
afterwards, from the effect of a poison-
ous substance which had been acciden-
tally spread over the land without B's
knowledge. Held, that A could not
abandon the land for breach of an im-
plied contract in B, but continued liable
for the whole rent. These decisions may
be in conflict with, and if so, doubtless
overrule, the case of Smith v. Marrable,
11 M. & W. 5, where it was held, that in
a lease of a house and furniture, for a
temporary residence at a watering-place,
and where the furniture formed the
greater part of the consideration of the
contract, there was an implied warranty
that the house and furniture should be
fit for the purpose for which it was
hired; and Lord Abimjer, in Sutton v.
Temple, attempted to distinguish the
two cases. The other judges, however,
were inclined to think, both in Sutton v.
Temple, and Hart;'. Windsor, that Smith
v. Marrable could not be supported. And
the same may be said of Edwards ;>.
Etherington, Ry. & M. 208 ; s. c. 7 Dow.
& R. 117 ; Collins u. Barrow, 1 Mood. &
R. 112 ; Salisbury v. Marshall, 4 C. & P.
65. The doctrine of the text is sus-
tained also in two cases in Massachu-
setts. Thus, in Dutton v. Gerrish, 9
Cush. 89, the defendant being the owner
of a store, in April, 1849, leased the same
to the plaintiffs, who filled it with dry

goods. In June, 1849, the roof and walls
of the store fell in, and buried the plain-
tiffs' goods in the ruins ; and to recover
the price of these goods the plaintiffs
brought their action. The lease of the
plaintiffs contained no express warranty
that the building was fit for a dry goods
warehouse, or for any other purpose.
The plaintiffs disclaimed any imputation
of fraud or misrepresentation on the part
of the defendant. The court held that,
as the lease contained no express war-
ranty, the plaintiffs could not recover,
there being no warranty implied in law
on the part of the lessor of real estate,
that it is fit or suitable for the purposes
for which it is leased or occupied. They
also held, that decisions in reference to
leases of furnished lodgings, and to war-
ranties implied upon the sale of goods,
were not applicable to this case. The
same doctrine is hijld in Foster r. Peyser,
9 Gush. 242. See also the learned note
to this last case, in 5 Law Rep. (s. s.)
155, where the authorities on this point
are reviewed. See also ante, p. *501,
note (/).

(e) Rodrigues v, Habersham, 1 Spears,
314. See also Bywater v. Richardson, 1
A. & E. 508 ; Atkins v. Howe, 18 Pick.
16.

(/) This was distinctly adjudged in
Van Ostrand r. Reed, 1 Wend. 424. It
rests upon the familiar principle that the
writing is supposed to contain all the
contract. Reed v. Wood, 9 Vt. 285 ;
Mumford v. McPherson, 1 Johns. 414 ;
Wilson v. Marsh, 1 Johns. 503; Lamb v.
Crafts, 12 Met. 353 ; Dean v. Mason, 4
Conn. 432 ; Randall u . Rhodes, 1 Curtis,
90.

i Wilson v. Hatton, 2 Ex. D. 336, however, approved and followed Smith v. Mar-
rable supra, to the effect that there is an implied condition that a furnished house
shall 'be in tenantable condition at the time tenancy is to begin, the defect alleged
being a foul smell.

2 Mast v. Pearce, 58 la. 579.

633

590

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

parol evidence. (g~) But although there be a writing between the
parties, if it does not amount to a contract of sale, as if it be an
ordinary bill of sale, merely intended as a receipt, or an acknowl-'
edgment of the payment of the price, then it seems that parol
evidence is admissible to show the actual terms of the sale, and
that there was a warranty. (A)

Ships often are, and any property may be, sold " with all faults."
This is an emphatic exclusion of all warranty. But it gives the
seller no right to commit a fraud, nor will it prevent the sale
from being avoided on proof of fraud. And it is fraud if the
seller conceals existing faults, and draws the attention of the
buyer away so as to prevent bis discovering them, or places
the property in such circumstances that discovery is impossible,
or made very difficult, (i) l

(g) Kain v. Old, 2 B. & C. 084 ; Pick-
ering i'. Dowson, 4 Taunt. 779 ; Pender
v. Fobcs, 1 Dev. & JB. 250 ; Smith v. Wil-
liams, 1 Murphey, 420. — So, an express
warranty will not be extended by impli-
cation from other parts of the contract
in which it occurs. Dickson v. Zizinia, 2
E. L. & E. 314 ; s. c. 10 C. B. 002. In
this case the declaration stated, that the
defendants sold to the plaintiff a cargo
of corn then shipped at Orfano on board
the O., at a certain price, including
freight to Cork, Liverpool, or London ;
that it was agreed that the quality
should be of a certain average, and that
the corn had been Shipped on board
in good and merchantable condition.
Breach, that it was not shipped in good
and merchantable condition for the per-
formance of the said voyage. Held, that
it was a misdirection to ask the jury
whether the corn was good and mer-
chantable lor a foreign voyage. And
Alnule, J., said : " It would be most mis-
chievous to superadd a tacit condition
relating to a circumstance provided for
by the express words of the parties. If
a man sold a horse and warranted it
sound, and the vendor knew that it was
intended to carry a lady, and the horse
was sound, but was not fit to carry a
lady, there would be no breach. So,
with respect to any other warranty, the
maxim to be applied is, ' expressum fac.it
ci:ssure tiirilum.' Were the law otherwise,
it would very much infringe on the lib-
erty of parties making contracts. It
would in such case be necessary to ex-
press that it is not intended to go be-
yond the language employed."

(/)) Allen v. Pink, 4 M. & W. 140;
Ilersnn r. Henderson, 1 Foster fS. H.),
224; Hogins t>. Plympton, 11 Pick. 97;
Bradford v. Manly, 13 Mass. 142. So
parol proof is admissible to show a
usage of trade as to the mode of mak-
ing sales, tlie written memorandum and
bought and sold notes being silent upon
the subject. Boorman v. Jenkins, 12
Wend. 507 : and to prove that the vendor
informed the vendee at the time of sale
of the defect complained of. Schuyler
v. B.USS, 2 Cnincs, 202.

(i) Baglehole v. Walters, 3 Camp. 154,
is a leading case on this subject. It was
there held, that if a ship is sold " with
all faults," the seller is not liable for
latent defects, which he knew of but did
not disclose at the time of sale, unless he
used some ortijice to ciireal them from the
purchaser. The case of Mellish v. Mot-
teux, Peake, Cas. 115, where a contrary
rule was adopted by Lord A7mi/«», was
cited, but Lord Ellenborouqh said: "I can-
not subscribe to the doctrine of that
case " See also Pickering c. Dowson,
4 Taunt. 785. The doctrine of the text
was laid down by Mansfield, C. J., in
Schneider v. Heath, 3 Camp. 508. A
ship was sold, "to be taken with all
faults." Her bottom was worm-eaten,
and her keel broken. When the ship
was advertised for sale, the captain took
her from the ways and kept her con-
stantly afloat, so that these defects were
completely concealed by the water. This
■was held to be a fraud upon the pur-
chaser, and the sale was avoided. A
similar principle was applied in Fletcher
v. Bowsher, 2 Stark. 501, where a vendor

634

1 See also Whitney v. Boardman, 118 Mass. 242.

CH. T.]

WARRANTY.

591

* There has been much question as to what is a breach * 591
of the warranty of soundness ; and what are the rights and
remedies of a party who bought with warranty, which warranty
has been broken. For an answer to the first question we will
refer to the definitions and illustrations in our notes. (/) x On
the second point, it may be gathered from the somewhat conflict-
ing authorities, first, that the buyer may bring his action at once,
founding it upon the breach of warranty, without returning
the goods ; but his continued possession of the goods * and * 592
their actual value would be considered in estimating the

of a ship represented her to have been
built in 1816, when she had in fact been
launched the year before. She was sold
" with all faults, as they now are, with-
out any allowance for any defect whatso-
ever." The sale was held void. But
in all these cases actual fraud in the
vendor must be proved in order to ren-
der him liable. See Freeman v. Baker,
6 B. & Ad. 797 ; Early v. Garrett, 9 B. &
C. 928. As to the construction of con-
tracts of the kind mentioned in the text,
see Freeman e. Baker, supra ; Shepherd
v. Kain, 5 B. & Aid. 240; Taylor v. Bul-
len, 1 E. L. & E. 472 ; s. c. 5 Exch. 779.
And see ante, p. * 578.

(j ) The question has been often
raised, what is soundness or unsound-
ness in a horse or other animal, sold
with a warranty of soundness. The sub-
ject was ably examined in Kiddell v.
Burnard, 9 M. & W. 6S8. Parke, B.,
there said : " The rule as to unsound-
ness is, that if at the time of sale the
animal has any disease, which either
actually does diminish the natural use-
fulness of the animal, so as to make him
less capable of work of any description,
or which, in its ordinary progress, will
diminish the usefulness of the animal;
or if he has, either from disease or acci-
dent, undergone any alteration of struc-
ture, that either actually does at the
time, or in its ordinary effect will di-
minish his natural usefulness, such an-
imal is unsound." See also Coates v.
Stephens, 2 Mo. & Rob. 157; Elton v.
Jordan, 1 Stark. 127 ; Elton v. Brogden,
4 Camp. 281. So if a horse has at the
time of sale the seeds of disease, which in
its ordinary progress will diminish his
natural usefulness, this is unsoundness.
Kiddell v. Burnard, 9 M. & W. 668. But
a temporary and curable injury, although

existing at the time of sale, if it does not
injure the animal for present service, is not
an unsoundness. Roberts v. Jenkins, 1
Foster (N. H.), 116. It seems to be im-
material whether the injury be perma-
nent or temporary, curable or incurable,
if it render the animal less fit for present
usefulness and convenience. Roberts v.
Jenkins, supra; Elton v. Brogden, 4 Camp.
281 ; Elton v. Jordan, 1 Stark. 127 ;
Kornegay v. White, 10 Ala. 225. But
see Garment v. Barrs, 2 Esp. 673. Roar-
ing has been held to be an unsoundness.
Onslow v. Eames, 2 Stark. 81 ; contra,
Basset v. Collis, 2 Camp. 523. But " crib-
biting " has been held not to be an un-
soundness. Broennenburgh v. Haycock,
Holt, 630. If not an unsoundness, it is
a " vice," and if a horse is warranted
free from vice, it is a breach of the war-
ranty. Paul v. Hardwick, Chitty on
Cont. 403, n. (r). A "bone spavin " is
an unsoundness. Watson v. Denton, 7
C. & P. 85. A nerved horse is unsound.
Best v. Osborne, Ry. & M. 290. But a
defective formation, or badness of shape,
which has not produced lameness at the
time of sale, although it may render the
horse liable to become lame at some
future time (e. g. "curby hocks "), is not
an unsoundness. Brown v. Elkington,
8 M. & W. 132. See also Dickinson v.
Follett, 1 Mood. & R. 299. The " navicu-
lar disease " is an unsoundness. Mat-
thews v. Parker, Oliphant Law of Horses,
228. So of " thick wind." Alkinson v.
Horridge, id. 229. " Ossification of the
cartilages." Simpson v. Potts, id. 224.
The question of soundness or unsound-
ness is particularly for the jury ; and
the court will not set aside a verdict on
account of a preponderance of the testi-
mony the other way. Lewis u. Peake,
7 Taunt. 153.

1 Crib-biting was held covered by a warranty against vices, in Dean v. Morey, 33
la. 120; as to which, however, see Walker v. Hoisington, 43 Vt. 608. Corns were
held a breach as to soundness, in Alexander v. Button, 58 N. H. 282.

635

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

damages. (&) 1 Secondly, he may return the goods forthwith,
and if he does so without unreasonable delay, this will be a rescis-
sion of the sale, and he may sue for the price if he has paid it, or
defend against an action for the price, if one be brought by the
seller. But if he has sold a part before his discovery of the
breach, and therefore cannot return them, he may still rescind
the sale, and will be liable for the market value of what he does
not return. (J) And if the vendor refuses to receive the goods
back, when tendered, the purchaser may sell them ; and if he sells
them for what they are reasonably worth, and within a reasonable
time, he may recover of the vendor the loss upon the resale, with
the expense of keeping the goods and of selling them, (m) We

should say, on the reason of the thing, that if the buyer
* 593 sells the goods with all proper precautions as * to time,

place, and manner, to insure a fair sale, the vendor will be

(&) Fielder v. Starkin, 1 H. Bl. 17, is
a leading case upon this point. A neg-
lect to inform the vendor of the dis-
covered breach of the warranty for
several months after the sale, will not
bar the purchaser's right to an action
for breach of warranty. Pateshall v.
Tranter, 3 A. & E. 103. Rutter v. Blake,
2 Har. & J. 353, is a strong American
case, that an action may be maintained
for breach of warranty without return-
ing the goods, but it was here held, that
the purchaser ought to give the vendor
notice where the goods were deposited.
In Kellogg v. Denslow, 14 Conn, ill,
where the authorities are very elabo-
rately and critically examined by Slur-
man, J., the rule of the text is adopted.
There A agreed to furnish B with sundry
articles of machinery, to be delivered sub-
sequently, and to be free from defect. A
delivered the articles accordingly, which
were received and used by B for nearly
a year, without notice to A of any de-
fects therein. In an action brought by
B against A on the warranty, claiming
damages for defects in the articles at the
time of delivery, it was held, that the
effect of B's not having given notice of
such defects in a reasonable time, was,
that he had thereby affirmed the con-
tract, but such omission constituted no
defence to the action, which assumed the
subsistence of the contract. See also
Waring v. Mason, 18 Wend. 425; Thomp-
son v. Botts, 8 Mo. 710 ; Borrekins v.

Bevan, 3 Rawle, 23 ; Cozzens v. Whitaker,
3 Stew. & P. 322 ; Carter v. Stennel, 10

B. Mon. 250 ; Parker c. Pringle, 2 Strob.
L. 242 ; Milton v. Rowland, 11 Ala. 732 ;
Ferguson v. Oliver, 8 Sm. & M. 302.
The weight of modern authority is de-
cidedly in favor of the rule of the text,
that an action lies for breach of a war-
ranty, express or implied, without re-
turning the property, or giving any
notice of the defect. In Hills v. Ban-
nister, 8 Cowen, 31, A sold B a bell,
warranting it not to crack within a year,
and promising to recast it if it did. He
was held not liable on his warrant}',
without notice, and neglect to recast it.
Of course, if the purchaser has not re-
turned the goods, their real value will be
deducted from his damages ; the differ-
ence between the price paid, or to be
paid, and the real value, being the
measure of damages Caswell v. Core, 1
Taunt. 560 ; Germaine v. Burton, 3 Stark.
32; Cary r. Gruman, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 625 ;
Voorhees o. Earl, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 288;
Comstock u. Hutchinson, 10 Barb. 211 ;
Hitchcock v. Hunt, 28 Conn. 343; Crab-
ton v. Kile, 21 111. 180; Plant v. Condit,
22 Ark. 454.

(/) Shields v. Pettee, 4 Comst. 122.

(m) Chesterman v. Lamb, 2 A. & E.
129; McKenzie v. Hancock, Ry. & M.
436 ; Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722, Best,

C. J.; Woodward v. Thacher, 21 Vt.
580; Buffington u. Quantin, 17 Penn. St.
310.

1 A purchaser may, on breach of warranty, elect to return the article and recover
the price, or retain it and recover damages. Wright v. Howell, 35 la. 2d8.

636

CH. V.] WARRANTY. * 593

bound by the price the goods bring, whether that be in fact equal
to their value or not ; but this may not yet be established by ad-
judication. If he has a right to return the goods, his tender of
them completes his right to sue for the price, whether the vendor
receives them or not. (n) But some authorities of great weight
limit his right to return the goods for breach of warranty to cases
of fraud, or where there was an express agreement to that effect
between the parties, (o)

The general rule for the amount of damage would be the price
paid if the thing bought were returned. If not, it would be the
difference between the price paid and the actual value. But if
farther damage resulted directly from the breach of warranty, that
too would be recovered. Thus one selling coal dust to be used in
making brick, and warranting it free from soft coal, was held
responsible for the damage done to the bricks by the soft coal
dust in that which was sold. (oo~)

When a seller with warranty, brings an action for the price, it
seems to be settled in England, that a mere breach of warranty,
which is not accompanied with fraud, or does not go to destroy
the identity or the value of the thing sold, is not a bar to the
action ; (p) and the tendency of American law is in the same
direction. (<?)

In general, when a buyer asserts that the goods he purchased
are not what they were warranted to be, or are so different from
what he ordered, or from the seller's representation of them, or
from the quality and value such articles should possess, as to
give him a right to rescind and avoid the sale, he must forthwith
return the goods if he would exercise this right. Delay in doing
so, or any act equivalent to acceptance, employment, or disposi-
tion of the goods, after he knows or should know their deficiency,
if it exists, would be construed either into an admission that

[n) Washington, J., in Thornton v. son v. Sexton, 4 C. B. 899; Ollivant v.

Wynn, 12 Wheat. 193. Bavley, 5 Q. B. 288 ; Dawson v. Collis, 4

. (o) See Carter v. Walker, 2 Rich. L. E. L. & E. 338; s. c. 10 C. B. 523. And

40. This is the rule in New York. Cary in action brought for the price of goods

v. Gruman, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 625; Voorhees sold or services performed, the defendant

v. Earl, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 288. In Kentucky, may reduce the damages by showing a

Lightburn v. Cooper, 1 Dana, 273. In breach of warranty on the part of the

the United States courts, Thornton v. plaintiff. Allen t>. Hooker, 25 Vt. 137.
Wynn, 12 Wheat. 183. In Pennsylvania, (oo) Milburn v. Belloni, 39 N. Y. 53.

Kase v. John, 10 Watts, 107. In Ten- (p) Parson v. Sexton, 4 C. B. 899;

nessee, Allen v. Anderson, 3 Humph. 581. Dawson v. Collis, 4 E. L. & E. 338; 3. o.

It has been said that this is the English 10 C. B. 523.

rule. See Street v. Blay, 2 B. & Ad. 456 ; (q) Freeman v. Clute, 3 Barb. 424 ;

Gompertz c. Denton, 1 Cr. & M. 207 ; Par- West i\ Cutting, 19 Vt. 536.

63T

594

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

there was no such deficiency, or into a waiver of his right to re-
scind the sale because of such deficiency, (r) *

* 594 * In general, there is no implied warranty whatever aris-
ing from judicial sales, (s)

(r) Thus, in Milner v. Tucker, 1 C. &
P. 15, a person contracted to supply a
chandelier sufficient to light a certain
room. The purchaser kept the chande-
lier six months, and then returned it; he
was held liable to pay for it, although it
was not according to the contract. So in
Cash r. Giles, 0 C. & P. 407, a threshing
machine was kept several years, without
complaint, but only used twice ; the ven-
dee was held liable for the price, although
it was of little or no value. And in Per-
cival v. Blake, 2 C. & P. 514, keeping
property two months without objection
was held to be an acceptance, and the

purchaser was bound to pay for it, there
being no fraud. See Grimaldi v. White,
4 Esp. 95; Groning v. Mendham, 1 Stark.
257; Hopkins v. Appleby, 1 Stark. 477;
Kellogg o. Denslow, 14 Conn. 411. Keep-
ing a warranted article for a length of
time without objection, and selling part,
is evidence tending to prove that it cor-
responded with the warranty. I'rosser
v. Hooper, 1 J. B. Moore, 100. But the
delay must take place after the discovery
of the deficiency in the goods. Clements
v. Smith's Administrators, 9 Gill, 156.

(s) The Monte Allegre, 9 Wheat. 644 ;
Puckett v. U. S. 19 Law Rep. 18.

Gilson v. Bingham, 43 Vt. 410.

638

CH- VL] STOPPAGE IN TKANSITU.

*595

* CHAPTER VI. *595

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

Sect. I. — What the right of Stoppage is, and who has it.

If a vendor, who has sent goods to a purchaser at a distance,
finds that the purchaser is insolvent, he may stop the goods at
any time before they reach the purchaser. This right is called
the right of stoppage in transitu. It has been held, although it
cannot be considered as settled, that the discovery of the false-
hood of material representations on the part of the buyer, gives
the seller this right, (a) 1

This right exists, strictly speaking, only when the vendor has
parted with the goods. If they have never left his possession, he
has a lien on them for the full payment of their price ; but not
this right of stoppage. (6) 2

While insolvency is necessary to create this right, it is not per-
fectly well settled what constitutes, for this purpose, insolvency.
It would seem, however, that it should be not merely a general
inability to pay one's debts ; but the having taken the benefit of
an insolvent law, or a stoppage of payment, or a failure evinced
by some overt act. (c) Or, as it has been denned, " an inability

(a) Fitzsimmons v. Joslin, 21 Vt. 129. See also Gibson v. Carrutbers, 8 M. & W.

(6) Parks v. Hall, 2 Pick. 212. As to 321 ; Jones v. Bradner, 10 Barb. 193.
the difference between these rights, see (c) In Rogers v. Thomas, 20 Conn. 54,

McEwan v. Smith, 2 H. of L. Cas. 309. Storrs, J., on the meaning of the phrase

1 Stoppage in transitu is called into existence for the vendor's benefit after the
buyer has acquired title and right of possession, and even constructive possession,
but not yet actual possession, Keeler v. Goodwin, 111 Mass. 490, 492; Treadwell v.
Aydlett, 9 Heiskell, 388; for the reason, it is said, that the seller's property ought
not to be used in paying the buyer's debts, Keeler v. Goodwin, 111 Mass. 490, 492.
As to a seller in such a case becoming the bailee of the buyer, see Farmeloe v. Bain,
1 C. P. D. 445 ; Gunn v. Bolckow, L. R. 10 Ch. 491. As to estoppel of a vendor gen-
erally who has given a delivery order, see Voorhis v. Olmstead, 66 N. Y. 113.

2 That his remedy is not impaired by giving a delivery order, if countermanded
before his bailee attorns to the buver, see Keeler v. Goodwin, 111 Mass. 490.

639

596

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

* 596 * to pay one's debts in the ordinary course as persons
generally do." (i) 1
The mere insolvency or bankruptcy of the vendee will not,
per se, amount to a stoppage in transitu; for there must be
some act on the part of the consignor indicative of his intention
to repossess himself of the goods, (e) But if it was ever con-
sidered necessary for the consignor, or some one in his behalf, to

insolvency said : " The cases on this sub-
ject generally mention insolvency as one
of the conditions on which the right of
stoppage in transitu accrues ; but they are
wholly silent as to what constitutes such
insolvency ; and therefore its sense, as
thus used, is to be gathered from the
circumstances of the cases. For it is a
term which is used with various mean-
ings. In a technical sense it denotes the
having taken the benefit of an insolvent
law ; in the popular sense, a general ina-
bility to pay debts ; and in a mercantile
sense, a stoppage of payment, or failure
in one's circumstances, as evinced by
some overt act. That a technical insol-
vency is sufficient to authorize the exer-
cise of the right of stoppage in transitu
has always been conceded. That it is
not indispensable for that purpose is
equally clear. Mr. Smith, in his Compen-
dium of Mercantile. Law, p. 549, n., ex-
presses his belief that merchants have
very generally acted as if the right to
stop goods was not postponed till the oc-
currence of insolvency in the technical
sense, and pertinently adds : ' The law of
stoppage in transitu is as old, it must be
recollected, as 1670, on the 21st of March,
in which year Wiseman i.\ Vandeput was
decided; so that if insolvency is to be
taken in a technical sense, the law of
stoppage in transitu has been varying with
the varied enactments of the legislature
regarding it.' That stoppage of payment
amounts to insolvency for this purpose,
is assumed in many of the cases. Lord
Ellenborough, in Newson v. Thornton, 6
East, 17, places the right of the vendor
to stop the property on the ' insolvency ' of
the consignee, where there had been only
a stoppage of payment by the vendee,
when notice was given to the carrier by
the vendor to retain the goods. In Ver-
tue p. Jewell, 4 Camp. 31, the terms used
were, ' stopped pavment.' See also Dixon
v. Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313. We have been
able to find no case in which the right of

stoppage in transitu has been either sanc-
tioned or attempted to be justified on the
ground of the insolvency of the vendee,
where there was not a technical insol-
vency, or a stoppage of payment, or fail-
ure in circumstances, evidenced by some
overt act ; and Mr. Blackburn, in his
Treatise on the Contract of Sale, p. 130,
where this subject is very minutely ex-
amined, says, that there seems to have
been no such case ; and adds, that al-
though the text-books and dicta of the
judges do not restrict the use of the term
'insolvent,' or 'failed in his circum-
stances,' to one who has stopped pay-
ment, there must be great practical
difficulty in establishing the actual insol-
vency of one who still continues to pay
his way ; and as the carrier obeys the
stoppage in transitu at his peril, if the
consignee be in fact solvent, it would
seem no unreasonable rule to require,
that at the time the consignee was re-
fused the goods, he should have evi-
denced his insolvency by some overt act.
Mr. Smith, in his work which has been
mentioned, clearly favors the same view.
Comp. Merc. Law, 130, n. Hence it ap-
pears, that the authorities and text-
writers furnish no support to the claim,
that a mere general inability to pay
debts, unaccompanied with any visible
change in the circumstances of the debt
or, constitutes insolvency, in such a sense
as to confer the right of stoppage in tran-
situ." But see Hays v. Mouiile, 14 Penn.
St. 51 ; Biddlecombe v. Bond, 4 A. & E.
332 ; Naylor v. Dennie, 8 Pick. 205 ;
Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2; Lee c.
Kilburn, 3 Gray, 594.

(d) Thompson v. Thompson, 4 Cnsh.
134; Shore r. Lucas, 3 Dow. & R. 218;
Bayly v. Schoneld, 1 M. & Sel. 338;
Secomb v. Nutt, 14 B. Mon. 326.

(/>) 2 Kent, Com. 543. But the right
exists only in cases of insolvency of the
vendee. The Constantia, 6 Rob. Adm.
321.

1 "By the term, 'insolvency' of the buyer is meant his inability to pay his debts
in the usual course of business. It is not necessary that he should have been
adjudicated a bankrupt or insolvent debtor." Per Morton, J., in Durgy, &c. Co. v.
O'Brien, 123 Mass. 12, 13.

640

CH- VI.] STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. * 597

take actual possession of the goods, in order to perfect and ex-
ecute his right, that doctrine is now exploded. Notice of the
consignor's claim and purpose given to the carrier before delivery
by him is sufficient ; (/) and it should be given to the car-
rier having possession *and not to the vendee himself *597
without giving notice to the carrier, (jr) 1 This notice and
demand on behalf of the consignor need not be made by any per-
son specially authorized for that purpose ; it may be made by a
general agent of the consignor ; or even by a stranger, if it be
ratified by the vendor before the delivery to the vendee. (A) 2
But a ratification of a notice and demand by an unauthorized
person, not made until after delivery to the vendee will not suf-
fice, (i)

The question has been raised when the insolvency may take
place, in order to give this right ; that is, whether the right exists
by reason of an insolvency before the sale ; and it was held that
the insolvency must take place between the time of the sale
and that of the exercise of the right of stoppage. (/) * But * 598

(/) Litt v. Cowley, 7 Taunt. 169 ; Quebec, to be delivered at Port Fleetwood
Hoist v. Pownal, 1 Esp. 240 ; Newhall v. in Lancashire, a notice of stoppage given
Vargas, 13 Me. 93. Notice should be to the ship-owner at Montrose, while the
given, it seems, to the carrier, middleman, goods were on their voyage, whereupon
or other person having at the time the he sent a letter to await the arrival of the
actual custody of the goods ; or given to captain at Fleetwood, directing him to
such a person, that it may reach the car- deliver the cargo to the agents of the
rier before delivery. Mottram v. Heyer, vendor — was held not to be sufficient
5 Denio, 629. But in Bell v. Moss, 5 notice of stoppage in transitu.
Whart. 189, it was given to the assignees (g) Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio, 629.
of the consignee, who had become insol- (h) Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M. &
vent, and was held sufficient. In Northey W. 518 ; Bell v. Moss, 5 Whart. 189 ;
v. Field, 2 Esp. 613, the demand was on Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Me. 93. See ante,
the officer of the custom-house where the p. *49, note (g).
goods were stored. Whitehead v. Ander- (i) Bird «. Brown, 4 Exch. 786.
son, 9 M. & W. 518, is an important case (j) Rogers v. Thomas, 20 Conn. 53, is
upon this point. There it is held, that a a very able case on this point. As thi9
notice of stoppage in transitu, to be effect- question seems to have been first raised
ual, must be given either to the person in this case, we give the language of
who has the immediate custody of the Storrs, J. : " The remaining inquiry re-
goods, or to the principal whose servant spects the time when such insolvency
has the custody, at such a time, and under must occur, in order to confer this right,
such circumstances, as that he may, by On this point we are of opinion that it is
the exercise of reasonable diligence, com- not sufficient that it exists when the sale
municate it to his servant, in time to takes place, but that it must intervene
prevent the delivery to the consignee, between the sale and the exercise of such
Therefore, where timber was sent from right. It is well settled, that after the

1 Notice must be given to the person in possession, or if to his employer, reason-
able opportunity must be allowed the latter to give orders to such person. Ex parte
Falk, 14 Ch. D. 446.

2 In Durgy, &c. Co. v. O'Brien, 123 Mass. 12, where the demand was made by a
person sent by the seller's agent, whose acts were subsequently ratified, before the
buyer came into possession, but after a creditor of the buyer had attached them, the
right of stoppage was held to have been reasonably exercised.

vol. i. 41 641

598

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

we are far from certain that the insolvency of the buyer, existing
at the time of the sale, but then unknown to the seller, and dis-
covered by him before delivery to the buyer, does not give this
right.

It has been much disputed, and may not yet be entirely settled,
whether this is a right to rescind the sale, (&) 1 or only an exten-
sion of the common-law lien of the seller. (7) The difference is

sale, and before the vendor has taken
any steps to forward the property to the
vendee, the former has a lien upon it, by
virtue of which he may, on the occur-
rence of the insolvency of the latter,
retain the goods in his possession, as a
security for the price. This is a strictly
analogous right to that of stopping them
after they have been forwarded, and
while they are on their way to the ven-
dee, and depends on the same principles.
And it may be here remarked, that the
cases decided on the subject of that right
of lien, confirm the views which we have
expressed as to the meaning of insolvency
as applied to the right of stoppage, after
the transitus has commenced. The same
equitable principle which authorizes a
retention of the possession in the one
case, and a recovery of it in the other,
would seem to authorize the latter, where
the insolvency occurred after the sale
and before the forwarding of the prop-
erty. The right of stopping it after the
transitus has commenced, may not, there-
fore, be limited to the case where in-
solvency occurs after it has left the
possession of the vendor, but may extend
to cases where it occurred at any time
after the 6ale. However that may be,
we are clear that it must occur after the
sale. In favor of this position, there is
the same argument, from an entire ab-
sence of authority against it, as was de-
rived from that source on the point which
we have just considered ; and it applies
with equal force. We find no decided
case in which the right in question has
been sanctioned, excepting where the in-
solvency occurred subsequent to the sale.
And although the language of the courts
may sometimes seem to import that the
right exists irrespective of the time when
the insolvency took place, it is quite
plain, that applying their expressions to
the cases they were considering, and
which did not involve this point, they

were not intended to have that construc-
tion. But in most of the decided cases
on this subject, it will be seen that their
language is most unequivocal, and in
terms limits the right of stoppage to
cases of bankruptcy or insolvency, oc-
curring while the goods are in transitu,
and of course after the sale." See contra
Reynolds v. Kailroad, 43 N. H. 580.

(k) This question was much discussed
in Clay v. Harrison, 10 B. & C. 99, but,
according to a dictum of Parke, J., in Ste-
phens v. Wilkinson, 2 B. & Ad. 323, not
decided. See Litt v. Cowley, 7 Taunt.
169 ; Wilmhurst v. Bowker, 5 Bing. N. C.
547; s. c. 7 M. & G. 882; Edwards v.
Brewer, 2 M. & W. 375; Key v. Cotes-
worth, 14 E. L. & E. 435 ; s. c. 7 Exch.
595. The old case of Langfort v. Tiler,
1 Salk. 113, permitting the vendor to re-
sell the goods, seems to proceed upon
the ground of a rescission of the contract.
The history and character of this right
were much discussed in Lord Abinger's
judgment in Gibson v. Carruthers, 8 M.
& W. 336. And see Wentworth v. Outh-
waite, 10 M. & W. 461.

(/) The weight of authority, as well as
the reason of the thing, is decidedly in
favor of considering the right as an ex-
tension of the common-law lien for the
price, or, as Lord Kenyon observed in
Hodgson v. Loy, 7 T. B 445, " an equi-
table lien adopted by the law for the pur-
pose of substantial justice." And it
seems that the right was first introduced
into equity before it was applied by the
common-law courts. See Wiseman v.
Vandeput, 2 Vern. 203 ; Snee v. Prescot,
1 Atk. 246; D'Aquila r. Lambert, 2
Eden, 75 ; s. c. Ambl. 399. In the fol-
lowing cases this right has been consid-
ered not a rescission of the sale, but
merely an extension of the lien. Went-
worth v. Outhwaite, 10 M. & W. 436;
Bloxam v. Sanders, 4 B. & C. 941 ; Jor-
dan v. James, 5 Hamm. 88; Rowley v.

1 A vendor's right must be considered as a right of lien till the price is paid,
not a right to rescind the bargain. Cross v. O'Donnell, 44 N. Y. 661 ; Rucker v.
Donovan, 13 Kan. 251. — Equity has jurisdiction to enforce a seller's right of stop-
page. Schotsmans v. Lancashire, &c. R. Co. L. R. 2 Ch. 332.

642

CH- VI.] STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. * 599

important. If stoppage in transitu rescinds the sale, the vendor
thereby takes possession of the goods as his own, and the debt is
at an end, and the seller has no claim on the purchaser for the
price. But if it be only the exercise of a right of lien, then the
property in the goods remains in the purchaser, or those who
represent him, and the right to the price of the goods remains
with the vendor, (wi) Therefore, if the vendor now sells them, it
must be as any one may sell goods on which he has a lien to
secure an unpaid debt ; if they bring more than the debt * he * 599
must account for the surplus ; if they bring less he may
demand the balance from the purchaser, (n) If he sells them
only to enforce his lien, and they bring more than the price, he
must return the balance to the original buyer.

This question has been much agitated ; but we think the strongly
prevailing authority and reason are in favor of its being an exer-
cise of a lien by the seller, and not a rescission of the sale.
Doubtless there are difficulties attendant upon either view of this
question. Thus, it may be said that a seller cannot retain a lien
who has parted with his possession. And then the right would
be considered rather as a quasi lien ; or, in other words, the right
of stoppage in transitu is measured and governed as to its effect
and consequences, rather by the rules of law applicable to lien
than by those which belong to rescission of sale. Perhaps the
difference of opinion on this subject may be attributed in some
degree at least to the difference in the circumstances of the cases
in which the question has arisen. Thus, if there has been a
complete sale of a specific chattel, agreeably to a specific order of
the purchaser, the property in the chattel would, it should seem,
pass thereby to the purchaser, subject only to the exercise of the
seller's lien for the price. And, in such a case, the exercise of
the right of stoppage would revest in the seller only the possession,
just as it was when he sent the goods away ; that is, subject to the
property in the purchaser, and only for the purpose of restoring
and making effectual the seller's lien. But, on the other hand, if

Bigelow, 12 Pick. 307 ; Newhall v. Var- of the goods; notwithstanding he has

gas, 13 Me. 93 ; s. c. 15 Me. 315 ; Rogers stopped them in transitu, provided he is

v. Thomas, 20 Conn. 53; Gwynne, ex ready to deliver them on demand and

parte, 12 Ves. 379 ; Martindale v. Smith, payment. Kymer v. Suercropp, 1 Camp.

1 Q. B. 389; Chandler v. Fulton, 10 109.

Tex. 2. (n) This was distinctly adjudged in

(m) There would seem to be no doubt Newhall o. Vargas, 15 Me. 314, a very

that the vendor may sue for the price able case on this subject.

643

* 600 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

A should send to B an order for a certain quantity of goods of a
certain kind or description, and B should procure goods which he
supposed answerable to the order, and send them to A, and should
then hear of the failure of A, and thereupon stop the goods on
their passage, B's rights might become the same as if he had
never sent the goods ; and the property would remain in him,
because they had never been accepted by A, and now never could
be. (0) Still, however, we think there is a strong ten-

* 600 dency in the courts, both of England and this country, * to

treat the right of stoppage in transitu as the exercise
of a lien.

In some respects it is treated as an absolute lien, and on this
ground denied to exist at all, where it cannot exist as a lien.
Thus it is said, that this right belongs only to one who sold the
goods, or had distinctly the property in them ; and not to one who
has himself only a lien on them, as a bailee who has a lien for
work done, or the like ; for when such a party sends the goods
away from him, he parts with the possession, and his own lien
ceases, (p)

It is indeed quite well settled, that the right of stoppage in
transitu exists only between vendor and vendee, or between per-
sons standing substantially in that relation. A mere surety for
the price, upon whom there is no primary liability to pay for the
goods, cannot stop them upon the insolvency of the vendee merely
to secure himself from loss. (<?) But if the consignor is virtually
the vendor, he may exercise the right. Thus, if a person in this
country should send an order to his correspondent in Paris to
procure and ship to him certain goods, which the latter should
procure on his own credit, without naming the principal, and ship
to him at the original price, adding only his commission, he would
be considered as an original vendor, so far at least as to give him
the right of stoppage in transitu, (r) if not for all purposes. So
a principal, who consigns goods to his factor upon credit, may stop
them on the factor's insolvency, (s)

The right of stoppage in transitu is not confined to a sale of
goods. A person remitting money on a particular account, or for
a particular purpose, may stop the same on hearing of the insol-

(0) See Clay v. Harrison, 10 B. & C. (?) Siffkin v. Wray, 6 East, 371.

flf), n. ; James v. Griffin, 2M.&W, 623, (r) Feise v. Wray, 3 East, 93.

632, Parke, B. (s) Kinlock v. Craig, 3 T. R. 119.

[p) Sweet v. Pyin, 1 East, 4.

644

OH. VI.] STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. * 601

vency of the consignee. («) 1 The fact that the accounts between
the consignor and consignee are unadjusted, rendering it uncer-
tain whether there is, or will be, a balance due the consignor, will
not prevent the consignor from exercising this right, (u)
But goods shipped to pay a precedent and existing * debt, * 601
cannot be stopped on the insolvency of the consignee. (y~)

A consignor may exercise this right, although he has received
a bill of exchange for the goods, and indorsed it over ; (iv) or even
if he has received actual payment for a part of the goods, (x)

SECTION II.

WHEN AND HOW THE RIGHT MAY BE EXERCISED.

The general rule is, that this right exists as long as the goods
are in transitu. But it is sometimes difficult to determine whether
the goods which it is sought to stop are still in transitu, (y) a

(t) Smith v. Bowles, 2 Esp. 578. Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Me. 93 — Qimre,

Aliter upon a general remittance from whether in those States where a negotia-

a debtor to his creditor on account of ble bill or note is considered prima fucii)

his debt. as payment, such a bill or note, given for

(w) Wood v. Jones, 7 Dow. & R. 126; the whole price, would defeat the right

Vertue v. Jewell, 4 Camp. 31. of stoppage ? See Chapman v. Searle, 3

(«) Wood v. Roach, 1 Yeates, 177; Pick. 38; Hutchins o. Olcutt, 4 Vt. 549;

s. o. 2 Dallas, 180 ; Summeril v. Elder, 1 White v. Dougherty, Mart. & Y. 309.

Binn. 106 ; Clark u. Mauran, 3 Paige, See Horncastle v. Farran, 3 B. & Aid.

373. 497 ; Bunney v. Poyntz, 4 B. & Ad. 568.

(w) And this is true although the bills (ij) If part of the goods have been de-
are not yet mature. Newhall v. Vargas, livered, the rest may nevertheless be
13 Me. 93; Bell ». Moss, 5 Whart. 189; stopped. Buckley v. Furniss, 17 Wend.
Feise v. Wray, 3 East, 93 ; Jenkyns v. 504. So held where the goods were sep-
Usborne, 7 Man. & G. 678, 698 ; Donath arated, and one wagon-load had been de-
v. Broomhead, 7 Penn. St. 301. And it livered before the rest arrived. See also
is said that the consignor need not tender Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East, 014. In Tan-
back the bill. Edwards v. Brewer, 2 It. ner v. Scovell, 14 M. & W. 28, goods were
& W. 375 ; Hays v. Mouille, 14 Penn. St. shipped for London, and were landed at a
48. But of this we should have some wharf, and entered on the wharfinger's
doubts. books in the consignor's name ; he had

(x) Hodgson v. Jjoy, 7 T. R. 440; also given the vendee an order for their

1 Thus the right of stoppage in transitu is applicable to bills of exchange. Muller
v. Pondir, 55 N. Y. 325.

2 Goods are liable to be stopped as long as they are in the possession of a carrier
as carrier. White v. Mitchell, 38 Mich. 390. The Iransitus is not at an end until
the goods have reached the place named by the buyer to the seller as the place
of destination. Ex parte Golding, Davis, & Co. 13 Ch. D. 628 ; Treadwell v. Aydlett,
9 Heiskell, 388. But the transit may be at an end at a place where the buyer in-
tends them to remain until he chooses a fresh or final destination. Becker v. Hall-
garten, 86 N. Y. 167. An attachment of the goods in transit as the property of the
buyer does not put an end to the right. Durgy, &c. Co. v. O'Brien, 123 Mass. 12;
Calahan v. Babcock, 21 Ohio St. 281 ; Morris v. Shryock, 50 Miss. 590.

645

602

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

It seems to be settled, that they are so not only while
* 602 * in motion, and not only while in the actual possession of

the carrier (although he was appointed and specified by the
consignee), but also while they are deposited in any place dis-
tinctly connected with the transmission or delivery of them, (z) 1

delivery, under which he had received
and sold the greater part ; held, notwith-
standing that the transitus of the rest
might be arrested. On the other hand,
in Hammond v. Anderson, 4 B. & P. 69,
the vendor and vendee both lived in the
same town ; and the goods lay at the
wharf of a third person. The vendee
having received an order for the delivery
of the property, went to the wharf,
weighed the whole, and took away a part ;
it was held, that the vendor had then no
right to stop the remainder. So in Slu-
bey v. Heyward, 2 H. Bl. 504, the whole
property arrived at the port of delivery ;
the consignees entered the whole cargo at
the custom-house ; they also removed a
part before the consignor attempted to
stop the goods. It was held too late.
See also Jones v. Jones, 8 M. & W. 431 ;
Bunney i>. Poyntz, 4 B. & Ad. 571, where
part delivery of a portion of a haystack,
with intent to separate that from the
remainder, was held not sufficient. A
valid stoppage of a part of the goods
forwarded under an entire contract, will
not abrogate the effect of an actual or
constructive possession acquired by the
consignor of the residue. Wentworth v.
Outhwaite, 10 M. & W. 436, a very im-
portant case. The dictum of Taunton, J.,
in Betts ••. Gibbins, 2 A. & E. 57, that a
partial delivery is prima Jane a delivery
of the whole, has been denied. See Tan-
ner r Suovell, 14 JI. & W. 37. This
seems to have been mainly on the
ground that it was not intended by the
i entice, by taking possession of part, to
take possession of the whole, but to
separate that part, and take possession
of it alone. In Crawsbay r. Eades, 1 B.
& C. 181, A delivered a quantity of iron
to be conveyed to B the vendee. The
carrier landed a part of the iron on
B's wharf, when, learning that B had
stopped payment, he reloaded the same
on his barge, and carried the whole to his
own premises. Held, that the vendor
might stop all the goods, the carrier
having a lien on the whole for his
freight, and as he had shown no assent
to their delivery without payment of his

lien, no part of the goods ever came into
the possession of the vendee. See on
this subject also Miles v. Gorton, 2 Cr. &
M. 504 ; Dixon v. Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313 ;
Blackman v. Pierce, 23 Cal. 508.

(-) This point was much discussed in
Sawyer v. Joslin, 20 Vt. 172. There the
goods were shipped at Troy, N. Y., di-
rected to the purchaser at Vergennes, Vt.
They were landed upon the wharf at
Vergennes, half a mile from the pur-
chaser's place of business. The pur-
chaser's goods were usually landed at
the same place, and it was not customary
for the wharfinger or the carrier or any
one for them, to have any care of the
goods after they were landed ; but the
consignee was accustomed to transport
the goods from the wharf to his place of
business, as was also the custom with
other persons having goods landed there.
The goods while on the wharf were not
subject to any lien for freight or charges ;
it was held, that a delivery on the wharf
was a constructive delivery to the vendee,
and that the right of stoppage was gone
when the goods were landed. The cases
on this point were thus classified by Ball,
J , who delivered the opinion of the court :
" The cases cited and relied upon by the
plaintiff's counsel, where the transit was
held not to have terminated, will, I think,
all be found to fall within one or the
other of the following classes : 1. Cases
in which it has been held that the right
of stoppage existed, where the goods
weri' originally forwarded on board of a
ship chartered by the vendee. 2. Where
the delivery of the goods to the vendee
has been deemed incomplete, by reason
of his refusal to accept them. 3. Where
goods remained in the custom-house, sub-
ject to a government bill for duties. 4.
Where they were still in the hands of the
carrier, or wharfinger, as his agent, sub-
ject to the carrier's lien for freights. 5.
Where the goods, though arrived at their
port of delivery, were still on shipboard,
or in the hands of the ship's lighterman,
to be conveyed to the wharf. 6. Where
the goods had performed part of their
transit, but were in the hands of a mid-

1 See Sherman v. Rugee, 55 Wis. 346, where the right was not lost, although the
attaching officer had, with the consent of the vendees, placed the goods in their
building.

646

CH« VI. J STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. * 603

or rather, while in any place not actually or constructively the
place of the consignee, or so in his possession or under his con-
trol, that the putting them there implies the intention of delivery.
Thus, if goods are lodged in a public warehouse for non-
payment * of duties, they are not in the possession of the * 603
vendee, and the vendor may stop them, (a) l So where
goods are still in the custom-house, the right to stop them is not
defeated, although the vendee has paid the freight, the goods
having been not entered through loss of the invoice. (6) The
entry of the goods without payment of duties is not a termination
of the transit, (c)

They are in transit until they pass into the possession of the
vendee. But this possession may be actual or constructive.
The doctrine that the goods must come to the " corporal touch "
of the vendee, as was once said by Lord Kent/on, has long since
been exploded, (d) Thus, suffering the goods to be marked and
resold, and marked again by the second purchaser, has been con-
sidered a constructive delivery, (e) So, a delivery by the vendor,
to the vendee, of the key of the vendor's warehouse, where the

die-man, to be forwarded on by other v. Olive, cited in Abbott on Shipping,

carriers." Tucker o. Humphrey, 1 Mo. 490 ; Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio, 629.
& P. 378, is an important case. There (6) Donath v. Brownhead, 7 Penn. St.

goods were shipped on board a vessel ad- 301.

dressed to the defendant's wharf for one (c) Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio, 629;
Gilbert. An invoice was sent to Gilbert, s. c. 1 Denio, 483, is an important case,
stating that the goods were bought and The defendants were merchants in New
shipped for him, and on his account and York. They ordered the plaintiffs to
risk ; and in the ship's manifest they send them from England a case of hard-
were marked to be delivered " to order." ware. It arrived April 7, when the bill
Before the arrival of the vessel, the pur- of lading was delivered to the plaintiffs,
chaser became bankrupt, and after the and the freight paid. On the 9th, the
vessel reached the wharf, but before the goods were entered at the custom-house,
goods were landed, they were claimed by and carried from the ship to the public
a person on behalf of the consignor, and store. While there, and before the
they were delivered to him. In an ac- duties were paid, the defendants became
tion by the assignees of the consignee to insolvent, and the plaintiffs demanded
recover the goods, held, that the consignor of them the goods. They refused to de-
had a right to stop them. See other in- liver them, and afterwards paid the
stances in Richardson v. Goss, 3 B. & P. duties, and removed them to their store.
127 ; Loeschman o. Williams, 4 Camp. It was held, that the demand was not suf-
181 ;■ Mills a. Ball, 2 B. & P. 457 ; Rowe ficient to revest the title in the plain-
v. Pickford, 1 J. B. Moore, 526 ; Leeds v. tiffs.

Wright, 3 B. & P. 320; Marshall v. Pall, (d) Wright v. Lawes, 4 Esp. 82;

9 La. An. 92. Mottram v. Heyer, 1 Denio, 483.

(a) Northey v. Field, 2 Esp. 613 ; Nix (e) Stoveld v. Hughes, 14 East, 308.

1 So if the goods are stored in a government bonded warehouse, upon the records
of which they are transferred to the buyer, the right to stop them is not defeated if,
by the terms of the sale, the seller is to forward them to their destination on the
buyer's order. Mohr v. Boston, &c. R. Co. 106 Mass. 67.

647

*604

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

goods are stored, amounts to a delivery. (/) 1 So, demanding
and marking the goods by the vendee's agent at the inn where
the goods arrived at their destination. (#)

If the carrier, by reason of an arrangement with the consignee,
or for any cause, remains in possession, but holds the goods only

as the agent of the consignee, and subject to his order, this
* 604 is * the possession of the consignee. (K) Yet, even in

cases where an existing usage authorizes a carrier to re-
tain the goods in his hands as security for his whole claim against
a consignee, the consignor may still stop them as in transitu, and
take them from the carrier, by paying to him the amount due
specifically for the carriage of those goods, (i) And the master
of a ship chartered wholly, or even owned by the consignee, may,
nevertheless, be a carrier in whose hands the consignor may stop
the goods, if the goods are to be delivered finally to the charterer
himself ; but if they are on board the buyer's ship to be carried
to some third party, they are so far delivered to the buyer when

( f) So thought Lord Kenyon himself
in Ellis v. Hunt, 3 T. R. 464.

(g) Ellis *. Hunt, 3 T. R. 464. So if
the vendor agreed to let the goods lie in
his warehouse, for a short time, although
free of rent, and to accommodate the ven-
dee. Barrett v. Goddard, 3 Mason, 107.
But see Townley v. Crump, 4 A. & E. 58,
contra. So if rent be paid. Hurry v.
Mangles, 1 Camp. 452. So delivering to
the vendee a bill of parcels with an order
on the store-keeper for the delivery of
the goods. Hollingsworth v. Napier, 3
Caines, 182. But quazre, see post. So
giving an order by the vendor to the
keeper of a warehouse, for the delivery
of the goods. Harman v. Anderson, 2
Camp. 243. See also Frazier t>. Hilliard,
2 Strob. L. 309. Delivery to mercantile
house, merely for transmission to the
vendee, by a forwarding house, does not
take away the right of stoppage. Hays
u. Mouille, 14 Penn St. 48.

(h) This principle is well illustrated
by the case of Allan v. Gripper, 2 Cr. &
J. 218; b. 0. 2 Tyr. 217. The goods
were conveyed by a carrier by water,
and deposited in the carrier's warehouse,
to be delivered thence to the purchaser
or his customers, as they should be
wanted, in pursuance of an agreement to

this effect between the carrier and the
purchaser. This was the usual course of
business between them. It was held, that
the carrier became the warehouseman of
the purchaser upon the goods being de-
posited there, and that the vendor's right
of stoppage was gone. And the case
was likened to Foster v. Frampton, 6 B.
& C. 107; s. o. 9 Dow. & R. 108, where
the vendee desired the carrier for his
own convenience to let the goods remain
in his warehouse until he received fur-
ther directions ; and also took home
samples of the goods ; but before the
bulk was removed, he became insolvent;
held, that the right of stoppage in transitu
was gone. Scott v. Pettit, 3 B. & P.
469, was decided on the same principle.
Goods were sent from Manchester di-
rected to the purchasers at London ; but
in pursuance of a general order from the
buyer to the seller, were sent to the
warehouse of the buyer's packer, and by
the warehouseman were booked to the
buyer's account, and the warehouseman
unpacked them. The transilvs was held
at an end when the goods reached the
warehouse.

(0 Oppenheim v. Russell, 3 B. & P.
42, is a very excellent case upon this
subject.

1 The giving a delivery order to the buyer, who gives it to a warehouseman, puts
an end to the right of stoppage. Croker v. Lawder, 9 Ir. L. R. 21.

648

CH. VI.J

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

*604

they go on board his ship, as to destroy the right of stop-
page. (/)

(j) Stubbs v. Lund, 7 Mass. 453,
recognizes this principle. There the
vendors resided in Liverpool, England;
the vendees in America. The goods
were delivered on board the vendees'
own ship, at Liverpool, and consigned to
them or assigns, for which the master
had signed bills of lading. The vendors,
hearing of the insolvency of the vendees
before the vessel left Liverpool, refused
to let the vessel sail, claiming a right to
stop the goods, and that they had not
reached their destination. The right of
stoppage was allowed, mainly, it seems,
on the ground that the goods were, by
the bills of lading, to be transported to the
vendees, and were in transit until they
reached them ; but it was thought that
if the goods had been intended for some
foreign market, and never designed to
reach any possession of the purchasers,
more than they then had at the time of
their shipment, the case would be differ-
ent, and the transit in such a case would
be considered as ended. Parsons, C. J.,
thus laid down the law on this point:
" In our opinion, the true distinction is,
whether any actual possession of the
consignee or his assigns, after the ter-
mination of the voyage, be or be not pro-
vided for in the bills of lading. When
such actual possession, after the termi-
nation of the voyage, is so provided for,
then the right of stoppage in transitu
remains after the shipment. Thus, if
goods are consigned on credit, and deliv-
ered on board a ship chartered by the
consignee, to be imported by him, the
right of stopping in transitu continues
after the shipment (3 East, 381), but if
the goods are not to be imported by the
consignee, but to be transported from
the place of shipment to a foreign mar-
ket, the right of stopping in transitu
ceases on the shipment, the transit being
then completed ; because no other actual
possession of the goods by the consignee
is provided for in the bills of lading,
which express the terms of the ship-
ment." The court in this case, rely
upon Bohtlingk v. Inglis, 3 East, 381,
where a person in England chartered a
ship to go to Russia, and bring home
goods from his correspondent there, the'
goods to make a complete cargo. The
vessel proceeded to Russia, and the cor-
respondent shipped the goods ordered at
the risk of the freighter, and sent him
the invoice and bills of lading. The
goods were to be conveyed to the
freighter in England. It was held, that
the delivery on board the vessel was not

a final delivery, and that the goods
might be stopped on the way; and on
the same ground as before stated that
they " were in their passage or transit
from the consignor to the consignee." The
distinction alluded to in the next note,
was, however, fully recognized. See also
Coxe v. Harden, 4 East, 211. Newhall v.
Vargas, 13 Me. 93, is also a clear illus-
tration of the rule of the text. The pur-
chaser lived in America ; the consignor
in Havana. The former sent his own ves-
sel to Havana for a cargo of molasses,
which was shipped on board the vessel,
consigned to the vendee, and to be deliv-
ered to him at his port of residence ; it
was held, that the vendor had the right
to stop the goods at any time before
they came into the actual possession of
the vendee, and the case of Stubbs v.
Lund, was fully approved. See also
Thompson v. Trail, 2 C. & P. 334;
Buckley v. Eurniss, 16 Wend. 137 ; s. c.
17 Wend. 504. The case of Bolin v.
Huffnagle, 1 Rawle, 1, seems in direct
conflict with these authorities, and we
think cannot be supported. But see the
opinion of Parke, B., in Van Casteel v.
Booker, 2 Exch. 708. The case of Tur-
ner v. The Trustees of Liverpool Docks,
in the Exchequer Chamber, 6 E. L. & E.
607 ; s. c. 6 Exch. 543, is an important
case on this point. There A. & Co., re-
siding in Charleston, America, consigned
cotton to B & Co., living at Liverpool,
and delivered it on B. & Co.'s own vessel
at Charleston, taking a bill of lading
to deliver to their order or their assigns,
they paying no freight, "being owner's
property." The consignors indorsed the
bill to the "Bank of Liverpool or or-
der." The consignees became bank-
rupt before the cotton arrived at Liv-
erpool. The consignors, on its arrival,
claimed to stop the cargo in transitu.
The assignees in bankruptcy claimed
the cotton, as having been so com-
pletely delivered as to vest in the
bankrupts as soon as it was put on
board their own vessel at Charleston,
specially appointed by them to bring
home such cargo. Patteson, J., said :
" There is no doubt that the delivery of
goods on board the purchaser's own ship
is a delivery to him, unless the vendor
protects himself by special terms re-
straining the effect of such delivery. In
the present case, the vendors, by the
terms of the bill of lading, made the cot-
ton deliverable at Liverpool to their or-
der or assigns, and therefore there was
not a delivery of the cotton to the pur-

649

605

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

* 605 * So, if by the bill of lading the goods are deliverable

to the order of the consignor or his assigns, the property
therein does not pass to the consignee, so as to defeat this right,
although they may be delivered on board the consignee's own
vessel, (&) or on one chartered by him, (kk~) and although the bill
of lading expressed that the consignee was to pay no freight, the
goods " being owner's property." (J) But it might be otherwise

if it appeared by the bill of lading that the goods were put

* 606 on board to be carried for and on * account and risk of the

consignee, (m) So if the goods are intended for a market
foreign to the residence of the consignee, and never designed to
come into the actual possession of the charterer, then it would
seem that a delivery on board of the vessel, whether owned or
hired by the purchaser or not, has been held final, and the right
of stoppage in transitu gone, (n)

chasers as owners, although there was a
delivery on board their ship. The ven-
dors still reserved to themselves, at the
time of the delivery to the captain,
a jus disponendi of the goods, which
he by signing the bill acknowledged."
See also Ellershaw v. Magniac, 6 Exch.
570, n. ; Van Casteel e. Booker, 2 Exch.
691 ; Wait v. Baker, id. 1 ; Mitchel v.
Ede, 11 A. & E. 888; Jenkyns v. Brown,
14 Q. B. 406 ; Key v. Cotesworth, 14 E. L.
& E. 435 ; s. c. 7 Exch. 590 ; Aguirre v.
Parmelee, 22 Conn. 473. See note (n),
post.

(1c) Wait v. Baker, 2 Exch. 1.

(Ick) Berndtson v. Strang, Law Rep. 4
Eg.. 481.

(/) Turner o. Trustees of Liverpool
Docks, 6 E. L. & E. 507 ; s. c. 6 Exch.
543.

(m) Van Casteel v. Booker, 2 Exch.
691; Wilmshurst v. Bowker, 7 Man. &
G. 882; Jenkyns v. Brown, 14 Q. B. 496.

(n) This distinction is fully supported
by Fowler v. Kymer, cited in 3 East, 396,
and recognized in Stubbs r. Lund, 7 .Mass.
457 ; Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Me. 93 ; and
Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. 308, supports
the same view. The court there said:
" We think it very clear, that a delivery
of the corn on board of a vessel appoint-
ed by the vendee to receive it, not for the
purpose of transportation to him, or to a
place appointed by him, to be delivered
there for his use, but to be shipped by
such vessel, in his name, from his own
place of residence and business, to a third
person, was a termination of the transit,
and the right of the vendor to stop in
transitu was at an end." In Valpy v. Gib-

650

son, 4 C. B. 837, it was held, that if goods
are sold to be shipped to some ultimate
destination, of which the vendor had
knowledge, but were first to go into the
hands of an agent of the purchaser, and
there await the purchaser's orders, the
right of stoppage in transitu was deter-
mined on delivery to such agent. See
also the still later case of Cowas-jee v.
Thompson, 5 Moore, P. C. 165. There
goods contracted to be sold and delivered
" free on board," to be paid for by cash
or bills, at the option of the purchasers,
were delivered on board, and receipts
taken from the mate by the lighterman
employed by the sellers, who handed the
same over to them. The sellers apprised
the purchasers of the delivery, who elect-
ed to pay for the goods by a bill, which
the sellers having drawn, was duly ac-
cepted by the purchasers. The sellers
retained the mate's receipts for the goods,
but the master signed the bill of lading
in the purchasers' names, who, while the
bill they accepted was running, became
insolvent. In such circumstances, held by
the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council (reversing the verdict and judg-
ment of the Supreme Court at Bombay),
that trover would not lie for the goods,
for that on their delivery on board the
vessel they were no longer in transitu, so
as to be stopped by the sellers ; and that
the retention of the receipts by the sel-
lers was immaterial, as, after their elec-
tion to be paid by a bill, the receipts of
the mate were not essential to the trans-
action between the 6eller and purchaser.
See also Schotsmans v. Lancashire R. R.
Co. Law Rep. 2 Ch. 332.

CH. VI.] STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. * 607

As the goods may pass constructively into the possession of the
consignee, so they may be transferred by him before they reach
him, in such a way as to destroy the consignor's right of stoppage
in transitu. This may be done by an indorsement and delivery of
the bill of lading. This instrument is now (as we had occasion
to say in an earlier part of this work), (o) 1 by the custom of
merchants, which is adopted by the courts, and made a rule of
law, regarded as negotiable ; or, more accurately speaking, as
quasi negotiable, its indorsement and delivery operating as a sym-
bolic delivery of the goods mentioned in it. (p) 2 And
such transfer, if it is in good faith and for a * valuable * 607
consideration, passes the property to the second vendee,
who holds it free from the right of the original vendor to stop the
goods in transitu. (9) But a second vendee, to whom the bill of

(o) See ante, p. *289, and post, vol. Lickbarrow v. Mason, some of the judges

ii., p. * 291, * 292. did indeed liken a bill of lading to a bill

(p) Small v. Moates, 9 Bing. 574; of exchange, and considered that the

Dixon v. Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313 ; Jen- indorsement of the one did convey

kyns v. Usborue, 7 Man. & G. 678. The the property in the goods in the same

case of Thompson v. Dominy. 14 M. & manner as the indorsement of the other

W. 402, shows that the mere indorse- conveyed the sum for which it was

ment of a bill of lading does not authorize drawn. But in the Exchequer Cham-

the indorsee to bring a suit in his own ber there was much argument to show

name against the signers, for their failure that, in itself, the indorsement of a

to deliver the goods according to its terms: bill of lading was no transfer of the

it would not be correct, therefore, to con- property, though it might operate, as

sider such bills negotiable, exactly, al- other instruments, as evidence of the

though they have sometimes been so ' transfer." See Lows v. Cobb, 12 Barb,

called (see Berkley v. Watling, 7 A. & E. 310.

29 ; Bell v. Moss, 5 Whart. 189, 205), (q) The leading case on this subject

but rather that an indorsement of such is Lickbarrow o. Mason, first decided in

bill would amount to a symbolical delivery, the King's Bench, 1787, and reported in

And if there were also a bond fide sale 2 T. R. 63, and from thence carried to

accompanying the transfer, the right of the Exchequer Chamber, where, in 1790,

the vendor to stop in transitu is gone, the decision below was reversed ; re-

Newsom v. Thornton, 6 East, 41, shows ported in 1 H. Bl. 357. The record was

this. There Lord Ellenborough, C. J., thence removed into the House of Lords,

said : " A bill of lading indeed shall pass where the judgment of the Exchequer

the property upon a bond fide indorse- Chamber was itself reversed, and a venire

ment and delivery, where it is intended de novo awarded in June, 1793. Buller's

so to operate, in the same manner as a able opinion before the House of Lords

direct delivery of the goods themselves is reported in 6 East, 21, n. The cause

would do, if so intended. But it cannot was again tried before the King's Bench

operate further." Lawrence, J., added : " In in 1794, at the head of which Lord Ken-

1 A seller's right of stoppage is put an end to by a transfer of the bill of lading
by the buyer to a third person who bond fide gives value for it. Audenreid v. Ran-
dall, 3 Clifford, 99 ; Kemp v. Canavan. 15 Ir. C. L. 216. In Leask v. Scott, 2 Q. B. D.
376, it was held that a transfer of a bill of lading for value to a bond fide transferee
defeats the stoppage in transitu of an unpaid vendor, although the consideration of
the transfer was past and not given at the time of the transfer. Contra, Rodger v.
Comptoir d'Escompte, L. R. 2 P. C. 393.

2 It is not negotiable like a bill of exchange, Buffalo Bank v. Fiske, 71 N. Y. 353 ;
Stollenwerck o. Thacher, 115 Mass. 224, 226, 227 ; and its indorsement gives no better
right than that of the indorser, Farmers', &c. Bank v. Erie R. Co. 12 N Y. 188.

651

* 608 THE LAW OP CONTRACTS. [BOOK III.

lading is not transferred, or not so transferred as to carry good
title, and who neglects to take actual or constructive

* 608 * possession, is in no better position than the first vendee,

under whom he claims ; and the goods may be taken from
him by the first vendor, on the insolvency of the first vendee.
And if the bill of lading be so transferred and indorsed by way of
pledge to secure the consignee's debt, the consignor does not lose
entirely his right to stop the goods in transitu, but holds it sub-
ject to the rights of the pledgee. That is, he may enforce his
claim to hold the surplus of the value of the goods, after the
pledgee's claim is satisfied ; and he holds this surplus to secure
the debt of the consignee to him. (r) 1 But the pledgee's claim,
which the consignor is thus bound to recognize, would not be for
a general balance of account ; but only for the specific advances
made upon the security of that particular bill of lading. And
therefore, by paying or tendering that amount, the consignor
acquires the right of retaking all the goods, (s) x And if the
pledgor had pledged some of his own goods, together with those
of the consignor, the latter would have a right to insist upon the
appropriation of all the pledgor's own goods towards the claim of

yon had in the mean time been placed, note of the goods, or a delivery order

and decided in the same manner as in for them, instead of a bill of lading.

1787, when the case was first before Jenkyns v. Usborne, 7 Man. & G. 678;

them. If a writ of error was again Akerman v. Humphrey, 1 C. & P. 53;

brought, it was probably abandoned, as McEwan «. Smith, 13 Jur. 205, 2 House

no further report of the case appears, of L. Cas. 309; Townley v. Crump, 4 A.

A clear and succinct history of the law & E. 68. See, however, Hollingsworth

on this point is given in Abbott on Ship- v. Napier, 3 Caines, 182. In Walter v.

ping, 471. The case of Lickbarrow v. Ross, 2 Wash C. C. 283, is an excellent

Mason is to be understood as deciding summary of the law on this point. It is

only, that if there lias been an actual there held, that the indorsement and de-

and bond fide sale of goods by the con- livery of a bill of lading, or the delivery

signee, the consignor cannot stop them, without indorsement, if by the terms of

if the purchaser of the consignee has the bill the property is to be delivered to

also taken an assignment to himself of a particular person, amounts to a trans-

the original hill of lading from the con- fer of the property, but not to defeat the

signor to the consignee. The mere as- vendor's right of stoppage before the

signment of a bill of lading, not based goods came actually into the possession

on an actual sale of the goods, it is be- of the vendee. But goods at sea may be

lieved, would not destroy the vendor's sold, and if the bill of lading is indorsed,

right. The delivery of a bill of lading the right to stop in transitu is gone. See

merely, the same being in the hands of also Ryberg v. Snell, id. 403, and Gur-

the original consignee, unindorsed, will ney v. Behrend, 25 E. L. & E. 128 ; s. c.

not, of course, interfere with the ven- 3 E. & B. 622.

dor's right of stoppage. Tucker t>. (r) In re Westzinthus, 5 B. & Ad. 817 ;

Humphrey, 4 Bing. 616 ; s. c. 1 Mo. & P. Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2.
394, Parke, 3. And a fortiori, the deliv- (s) Spalding v. Ruding, 6 Beav. 376.

ery to the vendee of a mere shipping

1 Kemp v. Falk, 7 App. Cas. 573, approves and confirms In re Westzinthus and
Spalding v. Ruding, supra.

652

CH. VI.]

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

*609

the pledgee, before any of the goods contained in the bill of
lading. (£)

It is said, that the exercise of this right is an act so far adverse
to the vendee, that if the goods be stopped by virtue of an agree-
ment between the buyer and seller, it is no longer a stoppage in
transitu ; but either a cancelling of the sale by mutual con-
sent, or a reconveyance by the buyer, (w) And it * then * 609
becomes in some cases a question of considerable difficulty,
whether the buyer can dispossess himself of the goods, or of his
right to them, for the benefit of the seller ; or must hold them as
a part of the funds to which his creditors generally may look. (v)
The principle which must decide such a question would seem to
be this : if the sale is so far complete that the property in the
goods has passed to the buyer, and the seller has become his
creditor for the price, the buyer can have no more right to give
to the seller security or satisfaction or other benefit from those
goods than from any others which he may possess. But so long
as the transaction is incomplete, the buyer may warn the seller
of the danger of going on with it, and may aid him in the use of
all legal means to arrest the transaction where it stands, and so
save to him his property, (w)

(t) In re Westzinthus, 5 B. & Ad. 817.

(«) This question was raised in Ash
v. Putnam, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 302. So in
Naylor v. Dennie, 8 Pick. 198, the same
question was examined. It was there
said, that although the right of stoppage
in transitu is adverse to the consignee,
that means only that it cannot be exer-
cised under a title derived from the con-
signee ; not that it must be exercised in
hostility to him. And this right of stop-
page is not defeated, merely because the
consignee gives the consignor a writing
declaring that he revokes the order for
the goods, and will not receive them, and
requests the carrier to deliver them to
the consignor. If the consignor, there-
fore, without regard to any such rescis-
sion of the sale by the consignee, duly
exercise his right, no previous attach-
ment by the creditors of the consignee,
made during their transit, can be set up
to defeat it. The consignor may rely
upon his original property in the goods,
and not upon any transfer or reconvey-
ance by the vendee. — It is perfectly
well settled, that the mere sale of the
goods by the vendee during their transit,
unaccompanied with any indorsement
or delivery of a bill of lading, &c., will

not defeat the consignor's right of stop-
page. Craven v. Ryder, 6 Taunt. 433;
Whitehouse v. Frost, 12 East, 614; Sto-
veld v. Hughes, 14 East, 308 ; Miles v.
Gorton, 2 Cr. & M. 504 ; Dixon v. Yates,
5 B. & Ad. 330; Stanton v. Eager, 16
Pick. 467. A fortiori, an attachment, or
seizure, on execution, by the creditors of
the vendee will not. They can take no
more rights than the vendee himself had.
Smith v. Goss, 1 Camp. 282 ; Buckley v.
Furniss, 15 Wend. 137 ; Naylor v. Den-
nie, 8 Pick. 198.

(«) See Heinecke v. Earle, 20 Law
Rep. 702.

(w) In Smith v. Field, 5 T. R. 402, it
was said, that a contract of sale might
be rescinded by the consent of vendor
and vendee, before the rights of others
were concerned. But where the vendee
wished to return the goods, and the
vendor instituted an attachment to at-
tach them in the hands of the packer as
the property of the vendee, it was con-
sidered as an election by the former not
to rescind the contract ; and the vendee
afterwards having become bankrupt, the
vendor was not allowed to recover the
goods in trover against the packer. In
Salte v. Field, id. 211, goods were bought

653

* 609

THE LAW OP CONTRACTS.

[BOOK III.

by the vendee's agent, and lodged in the
hands of the vendee's packer. While there,
they were attached as the property of
the vendee by some of his creditors.
The vendee had in fact countermanded
the purchase by letter to his agent, writ-
ten before the delivery of the goods to
he packer, though not received until
afterwards. Held, the vendor assenting
to take back the goods, that the prop-
erty revested in him, and the attach-
ment was avoided. See Atkin v. Bar-
wick, 1 Stra. 165 ; Harman c. Fisher, 1
Cowp. 125 ; Alderson v. Temple, 4 Burr.
2239. The consent of the vendor to
retake the goods is, however, essential,
where the sale has been completed by
actual delivery. Salte v. Field, 5 T. E.

211. See Richardson v. Goss, 3 B. & P.
119 ; Bartram v. Farebrother, Dan. & L.
42. Such consent may be inferred by
the jury, if the vendor use and offer the
property again for sale, although when
he received it back, he 6aid he would
keep it " without prejudice." Long v.
Preston, 2 Mo. & P. 262. In Quincy v.
Tilton, 5 Greenl. (Bennett's ed.) 277, it
is said, that where parties agree to re-
scind a sale, the same formalities of de-
livery, &c, are necessary to revest the
property in the original vendor, which
were necessary to pass it from him to
the vendee. See also Lanfear v. Sum-
ner, 17 Mass. 110; Miller v. Smith, 1
Mason, 437.

654

END OP VOL. I.