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HAND-BOOK 


OF    THE 


LAW   OF   TORTS 


BY 

EDWIN  A.  JAGGARD,  A.  M.,  LL.  B. 

Professor  of  the  Law  of  Torts  m  the  Law  School  of  the  University  of  Minnesota 


IN  TWO  VOLUMES 


VOL.  II 


St.  Paul,  Minn. 

WEST  PUBLISHING   CO. 

189s 


COPTRIGHT,  1895, 
BY 

WEST  PUBLISHING  COMPANY. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


YOL.  II. 


Part  II. 
SPECIFIC  WRONGS. 

(CONTINUED). 


CHAPTER  X. 

WRONGS  TO  POSSESSION  AND  PROPERTY. 

Section  Page 

208.    Duty  to  Respect  Property  and  Possession— Remedies ...653-657 

200.    Nature  of  Possession 657-G5S 

210.  Objects  of  Possession 658-660 

211.  Trespass— Definition    660-663 

212-214.  Possession  to  Maintain 663-673 

21."i-216.  Defenses    673-690 

217.  Remedies    690-69.J 

218.  Waste— Definition    695-696 

219-222.  Kinds   of  Waste 697-703 

223.  Remedies   703-706 

224.  Conversion— Definition    706-710 

225.  Title  to  Jlaintain 710-716 

226-229.  The   Unauthorized  Act 716-730 

230.  Parties    731-736 

231.  Remedies    737-743 


CHAPTER  XI. 

NUISANCE. 

232.  Definition   744-748 

233.  Rights   Invaded    74S-767 

234-238.    The  Annoyance  or  Interference 708-7S1 

239.  Kinds  of   Nuisances 782 

240.  Public,  Private,  and  Mixed 782-788 

241.  Continuing 788 

242.  Legalized    788-793 

243-244.    Parties  to  Proceedings  against 793-798 

245.    Remedies    799-809 

T.2 — LAW  OP  TORTS  (iii) 


IV 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


; 

section 

246. 

247. 

248. 

249. 

250. 

250a. 

251. 

252. 

253. 
254-258. 
259-262. 

263. 
264^268. 

269. 

270. 
271-274. 

275. 
276-278. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

NEGLIGENCE. 

Pase 

Essential  Elements  810-815 

Care— Degrees    816-820 

Mental   Element   820-825 

Duty    825-826 

Common-Law  Duties  ^^^ 

Course  and  Constitution  of  Nature 827-832 

Use  of  One's  Own— Insurance  of  Safety 832-867 

Knowledge  of  Danger 867-871 

Capacity  and  Class  of  Parties  to  Wrong 871-875 

Custom  and  License 875-897 

Contract   Duties    897-918 

Statutory   Duties    918-930 

Violation  of  Duty 931-958 

Damages    959 

Contributory  Negligence   959-961 

Elements  of  Contributory  Negligence 9G2-977 

Comparative  Negligence  978-979 

Vicarious  Negligence  980-989 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT. 

279.  Master's  Duties  to  Servant 990-1009 

280.  Master  not  an  Insurer 1010-1013 

281-282.    Assumption  of  Risk  by  Servant 1013-1014 

283.  Ordinary  Risks    1014-1019 

284.  Extraordinary  Risks    1019-1020 

285.  Exceptions   1021-1029 

286-287.  Risk  of  Fellow  Servants 1029-1037 

288-289.  Vice  Principals   1037-1049 

290-291.  Concurrent  Negligence  of  Master 1050-1053 

292.  Statutory  Provisions   1053-1056 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

COMMON  CARRIERS. 


293.  Who   are   Common   Carriers 1057-1059 

294.  Carriers  of  Goods 1059-1066 


TABLE    OB'    CONTENTS.  V 

■irctiou  Paffe 

2U5.  Duties     ' 10(!G-1(JT3 

296.  Carriers  of  Live   Stock lOTo-lOTU 

297.  Carriers  of  Baggage 1076-li)7S 

298.  Carriers  of  Passengers 1078-1094 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED. 

(Vol.  2,  pages  1095-1254.) 

INDEX. 

(Vol.  2,  pages  1255-1307.) 


HAND-BOOK 


OF     THE 


LAW  OF  TORTS. 


VOLUME  2. 


LAW   OF   TORTS   V.2.  (G5ia)* 


CHAPTER   X. 

WRONGS  TO  POSSESSION  AND  PROPERTY. 

208.  Duty  to  Respect  Property  and  Post  tssion— Remedies. 

209.  Nature  of  Possession. 

210.  Objects  of  Possession. 

211.  Trespass — Definition. 
212-214.  Possession  to  Maintain. 
215-216.          Defenses. 

217.  Remedies. 

218.  Waste— Definition. 
219-222.  Kinds  of  Waste. 

223.  Remedies. 

224.  Conversion — Definiilon. 

225.  Title  to  Maintain. 
22G-2i:9.  The  Unauthorized  Act 

230.  Parties. 

231.  Remedies. 

DUTY  TO  RESPECT  PROPERTY  AND  POSSESSION- 
REMEDIES. 

208.  The  common  la'w  recognized  an  absolute  duty  to  re- 
spect the  property  of  others,  but  based  its  remedies 
for  the  violation  of  such  duties  upon  possession 
rather  than  on  OTvnership. 

The  duty  of  abstaining  from  interforence  with  property  and  pos- 
session is  absolute,  and  the  courts  have  gone  to  great  lengtli  in  rec- 
ognizing corresponding  absolute  rights.  That  a  disturbance  of  prop- 
erty or  possession  was  involuntary  and  by  mistake  is  no  defense,  if 
the  physical  act  was  voluntary.  Therefore,  where  one  person,  in 
mowing  his  own  gi*ass,  mowed  by  mistake  a  little  of  his  neighbor's, 
which  was  growing  alongside,  he  was  held  liable.^   If,  however, the  act 

1  Baseley  v.  Clarkson,  3  Lev.  37;  Blaen,  etc.,  Co.  v.  McCulloh,  .".'.)  Jld.  403. 
Permission  to  trim  plaintiff's  trees,  given  defendant  by  a  person  having  no 
authority,  does  not  excuse  defendant's  trespass  in  acting  on  such  perniis- 
sion,  though  he  thought  such  person  had  authority.  Huling  v.  Heiuleiscjn 
(Pa.  Sup.)  29  Atl.  270.     But  see  Webber  v.  Quaw,  40  Wis.  118,  40  N.  A\'.  SJO.. 

LAW  OF  TOKTS,  V.  3  (653) 


654  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

is  involuntarj',  it  is  otlierwise.  "If  a  man  who  is  assaulted  and  in  dan- 
ger of  his  life  run  through  the  close  of  another  without  keeping  in  a 
footpath,  an  action  for  trespass  does  not  lie."  -  It  is  immaterial 
whether  the  person  trespassing  is  acting  for  his  own  benefit,^  or  in 
good  faith  to  benefit  the  true  owner,*  even  if  benefit  result  to  the 
owner.^  Indeed,  intention  does  not  necessarily  enter  into  tres- 
pass or  conversion.  It  is  sufficient  if  the  act  is  done  without  jus- 
tifiable cause  or  purpose.  Ordinarilv,  the  only  effect  of  intent  is- 
upon  damages."  Mistake  or  ignorance  affords  no  excuse;  for  ex- 
ample, where  one  buys  an  ox  of  another,  and  by  mistake  takes 
away  the  wrong  ox,  he  is  liable.'  On  the  same  principle,  a  pur- 
chase of  property  in  good  faith  from  a  person  having  no  title  is  no 
defense.*  Indeed,  it  has  been  said  that  probably  one-half  the  cases 
in  which  trespass  de  bonis  asportatis  is  maintained  arise  from  mere 

2  9  Bac.  Abr.  "Trespass,"  F.  So,  where  cattle  join  a  herd  driven  along  the 
highway,  the  driver,  if  innocent,  is  not  liable  for  conversion.  Young  v. 
Vaughn,  1  Houst.  331;  Brooks  v.  Olmstead,  17  Pa.  St.  24.  A  horse  which 
becomes  frightened,  and  escapes  from  the  owner,  is  not  "running  at  large," 
within  tlie  meaning  of  an  ordinance  prohibiting  animals  from  running  at 
large.  Presnall  v.  Raley  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  200.  Rightmire  v.  Shep- 
ard,  59  Hun,  G20,  12  N.  Y.  Supp.  800. 

3  Hollins  V.  Fowler,  44  Law  J.  Q.  B.  1G9. 

*  Trespass,  Kirk  v.  Gregory,  1  Exch.  Div.  55;  trover,  Hiort  v.  Bott,  9  L. 
R.  Exch.  56. 

5  Where  defendant  filled  in  plaintiffs'  lot  without  their  consent,  and  there- 
l)y  destroyed  their  fence  and  certain  vegetables,  plaintiffs  are  entitled  to 
recover  any  actual  damages  they  suffered  by  reason  of  defendant's  tres- 
pass, and  any  advantage  to  the  lot  arising  by  reason  of  such  filling  in  Is 
not  to  be  considered  in  estimating  plaintiffs'  damages.  Hurley  v.  Jones 
(Pa.  Sup.)  30  Atl.  499. 

«  Weaver  v.  Ward,  Hob.  134;  Tobin  v.  Deal,  60  Wis.  87,  18  N.  W.  634; 
Wakeman  v.  Robinson,  1  Bing.  213;  Jennings  v.  Fuudeburg,  4  McCord,  161; 
Stephenson  v.  Brown,  147  Pa.  St.  300,  23  Atl.  443;  Wallard  v.  Worthman, 
84  111.  446;  Flanders  v.  Colby,  28  N.  H.  .34;  Gate  v.  Cate,  44  N.  H.  211;  Amick 
V.  O'Hara,  6  Blackf.  258;  Mairs  v.  Manhattan,  etc.,  Co.,  89  N.  Y.  498;  Bruch 
V.  Carter,  34  N.  J.  Law,  554;  Maye  v.  Yappen,  23  Cal.  30G;  Hobart  v.  Hag- 
get,  12  Me.  67;  Luttrell  v.  Hazen,  3  Sneed  (Tenn.)  20;  ante,  p.  391,  "Ex- 
lunplary  Damages." 

7  Hobart  v.  Hagget,  12  Me.  67.    Et  vide  Wallard  v.  Worthman,  84  111.  446. 

8  As  to  timber,  see  Loewenberg  v.  Rosenthal,  18  Or.  178,  22  Pac.  601;  Hig- 
ginson  v.  York,  5  JIass.  341;  Allison  v.  Little,  85  Ala.  512,  5  South.  221.  Et 
vide  Cundy  v.  Lindsay,  L.  R.  3  App.  Cas.  459;  Smith  v.  Webster,  23  Mich 


Oh.    10]  DUTY    TO    RESPECT    PROPERTY    AND    POSSESSION.  655 

misapprehension  of  legal  rights.'    In  trover  and  conversion,  liowever, 
it  has  been  held  that  under  certain  circumstances  intention  may 
become  an  essential  of  the  legal  vs^rong.^"      So,  in  nuisance,  it  is 
not  universally  true  that  motive  is  immaterial.^^ 
Remedies. 

The  common  law  provided  remedies  for  injuries  to  possession 
and  property,  and  based  them  upon  possession  rather  than  on  the 
right  of  the  property.  The  action  of  detinue  at  common  law  lay 
where  a  party  claimed  the  specific  recovery  of  goods  and  chattels, 
or  deeds  and  writings  detained  from  him.^-  For  the  same  pur- 
pose, however,  trover,  one  of  the  actions  on  the  case  not  requiring 
the  exactness  of  description  necessary  for  detinue,  came  into  more 
general  use.  It  claims  damages,  and  is  based  on  the  innocent 
fiction  that  the  defendant,  having  found"  the  goods,  converted  them 
to  his  own  use.^^  Replevin  could  only  be  brought  where  thei'e  had 
been  a  taking  by  trespass,  whether  under  color  of  legal  process  or 
otherwise.^*  Trespass,  in  its  largest  and  most  extensive  sense, 
signifies  any  transgression  or  offense  against  the  laws  of  nature, 
of  society,  or  of  the  country  in  which  we  live,  whether  it  relates 

298;  Pileher  v.  Rawlins,  L.  R.  7  Cli.  App.  Cas.  259;  Hazelton  v.  Week,  49 
Wis.  661,  6  N.  W.  309. 
»  Stanley  v.  Gaylord,  1  Gush.  530-551,  per  iletcalf,  J. 

10  Post,  p.  706,  "Conversion." 

11  Post,  p.  744,  "Nuisance." 

12  Steph.  PI.  16.  Et  vide  Robinson  v.  Richards,  45  Ala.  354;  Caldwell  v. 
Fenwlck,  2  Dana,  332;  Jennings  v.  Gibson,  1  Miss.  234.  Where  a  foreign 
corporation,  which  has  failed  to  comply  with  the  requirements  nfiide  a  con- 
dition precedent  to  its  right  to  do  business  in  the  state  of  Alabama,  makes 
a  conditional  sale  of  a  chattel  therein,  the  contract  is  void,  and,  as  the  legal 
title  consequently  never  passes  out  of  the  seller,  it  may  maintain  detinue 
for  the  chattel.     Boulden  v.  Estey  Organ  Co.,  92  Ala.  181,  9  South.  283. 

13  Steph.  PI.  19.  Et  vide  Burroughes  v.  Bayne,  5  Hen.  &  M.  296;  Pillot 
V.  Wilkinson,  2  Hurl.  &  C.  72;  Grand  Island  Banking  Co.  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 
34  Neb.  93,  51  N.  W.  596;  Lucas  v.  Pittman,  94  Ala.  616,  10  South.  603;  Rey- 
nolds V.  Horton,  2  Wash.  St.  185,  26  Pac.  221;  Michigan  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co. 
v.  Oronk,  93  Mich.  49,  52  N.  W.  1035;  Tognini  v.  Kyle,  17  Neb.  209,  30  Pac. 
829;  Cain  v.  Cain  (Sup.)  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  45.  Moreover,  trover  being  allied  to 
trespass,  could  not  be  defeated  by  wager  of  law. 

14  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  186,  collecting  cases.  And  see  Mennie  v.  Blake,  6  El. 
&  Bl.  842;  Mellor  v.  Leather,  1  El.  &  Bl.  619. 


656  WRONGS    TO    rOSSESSIOX    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

to  a  man's  person  or  his  property.'"  Trespass  was  used  at  common 
law  as  the  name  of  an  action  wliere  the  injury  to  the  person  or  prop- 
erty was  direct,  as  trespass  vi  et  armis,  for  assault  and  battery  or 
for  false  imprisonment.  Ejectment  was  a  species  of  personal  ac- 
tion of  trespass  for  the  recovery  of  both  land  and  of  damages  for 
detention  of  possession.  Trespass  on  the  case  was  an  action  arising 
from  the  statute  of  Westminster  II.,  and  lay  for  consequential  in- 
juries.'" Waste  was  a  wrong '^  as  well  as  a  remedy.'*  Trespass 
for  damages  afforded  a  simple  means  for  trying  title  to  land.  Its 
use  for  this  purpose  has  not  entirely  disappeared." 

''The  forms  of  [common  law]  action,"  says  Mr.  Pollock,^"  "brought 
not  ownership,  but  possession,  to  the  front,  in  accordance  with  a 
habit  of  thought  which,  strange  as  it  may  now  seem  to  us,  found 
the  utmost  difficulty  in  conteiving  rights  of  property  as  having  full 
existence,  or  being  capable  of  transfer  and  succession,  unless  in  close 
connection  with  the  physical  control  of  something  which  could  be 
passed  from  hand  to  hand,  or  at  least  a  part  of  it  delivered  in  the 
name  of  the  whole.  *  *  *  An  owner  who  had  neither  possession 
nor  the  immediate  right  to  possession  could  redress  himself  by  a 
special  action  on  the  case,  which  did  not  acquire  any  technical  name." 

The  protection  which  the  law  gives  to  possession  seems  to  be  an 

IB  3  El.  Comm.  208. 

18  Ante,  e.  1;  Leame  v.  Bray,  3  East,  593;  Cole  v.  Fisher,  11  Mass.  137; 
Beriy  v.  Hamill,  12  Serg.  &  R.  210;  Case  v.  Mark,  2  Obio,  169.  As  to  aboli- 
tion of  distinction  between  trespass  and  case,  vide  Duffield  v.  Rosenzweig, 
144  Pa.  S1»520,  23  Atl.  4;  Welch  v.  Whittemore,  2.5  Me.  86;  Coe  v.  English, 
6  Houst.  (Del.)  456;  Wright  v.  Wilcox,  19  Wend.  343;  Luttrell  v.  Hazen,  3 
Sneed  (Tenn.)  20;  Schultz  v.  Frank,  1  Wis.  ^.'32;  Guilford  v.  Kendall,  42 
Ala.  651. 

17  The  common-law  action  for  waste  might  have  been  assumpsit  (1  Chit. 
102,  141),  or  covenant  (Id.  141),  or  case  (Id.  140). 

18  St.  Glouc.  6  Edw.  I.,  c.  5. 

IS  Kircher  v.  Murray,  8  C.  C.  A.  448,  60  Fed.  48-52;  Cox  v.  Hart,  145  U. 
S.  376,  12  Sup.  Ct.  962;  Downing  v.  Diaz,  80  Tex.  436,  16  S.  W.  49;  Stephen- 
son V.  Wilson,  37  Wis.  482.  In  Kentucky,  however,  in  an  action  of  trespass, 
the  jury  has  no  power  to  establish  by  its  verdict  a  disputed  line  between 
the  lands  of  the  parties.    Scale  v.  Shepherd  (Ky.)  29  S.  W.  31. 

20  Pol.  Torts,  416.  Et  vide  Lambert  v.  Stroother,  Willes.  218;  Dixon  v. 
White  Sewing  Mach.  Co.,  128  Pa.  St.  397-405,  18  Atl.  502. 


^h.    10]  NATURE    OP    POSSESSION.  657 

extension  of  the  protection  it  affords  to  the  person.'^  The  inviola- 
bility of  the  person  extends  to  those  sorts  of  disturbances  by  which 
the  person  might  at  the  same  time  be  interfered  with."  In  other 
words,  the  explanation  of  protection  is  to  be  found  in  the  paramount 
necessity  of. preventing  a  breach  of  the  peace.^^ 

NATUEE  or  POSSESSION". 

309.  Possession,  in  its  legal  sense,  is  the  present  enjoy- 
ment or  right  of  enjoyment  of  definite  property  by 
a  person  -with  a  purpose  to  exercise  such  property 
for  the  benefit  of  the  holder,  or  facts  from  which 
such  purpose  could  be  assumed  if  the  mind  -were 
directed  to  the  object  of  possession.^ 

Simple  as  it  would  seem  to  be,  the  idea  of  possession  as  the  basis 
of  an  action  for  trespass  is  by  no  means  clear.^^ 

The  enjoyment  may  consist  in  the  contact,  the  detention,  or  con- 
trol of  the  property;  or  it  may  arise  from  the  right  to  reduce  the 
property  to  physical  control  at  the  time,  and  the  absence  of  any 
opposition  to  the  exercise  of  that  right.  Mere  temporary  physical 
control  does  not  necessarily  constitute  possession  in  its  legal  sense. 
There  must  be  "something  like  acquiescence"  in  the  physical  fact 
of  occupation  on  the  part  of  the  rightful  owner.^°  Possession  of 
lands  which  is  merely  incidental  and  subsidiary  to  the  commission 
of  a  trespass  thereon,  as  by  cutting  and  removing  the  timber  which 

21  Lord  Denman,  in  Rogers  v.  Spence,  13  Mees.  &  W.  571. 

22  1  Sav.  Pos.  §  6.  The  taking  of  a  chattel  out  of  a  man's  possession  is 
an  assault  on  his  person.    Powell,  J.,  in  Green  v.  Goddard,  2  Salk.  641. 

2  3  CJierk  &  L.  Torts,  243. 

24  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  240;  Bigelow,  Torts,  183;  London  &  County  Banking  Co. 
V.  London  &  River  Plate  Rank,  21  Q.  B.  Div.  535-542;  Regina  v.  Ash  well,  IG 
Q.  B.  Div.  190. 

25  Essay  on  "Possession  in  Common  Law,"  by  Sir  Frederick  Pollock  and  Mr. 
Justice  Wright.     And  see  Holmes,  Com.  Law  (9th  Ed.)  p.  244,  lect.  6. 

2  8  Pol.  Torts,  468.  "A  mere  trespasser  cannot,  by  the  very  act  of  trespass. 
immediately  and  without  acquiescence  give  himself  what  the  law  understands 
by  possession  against  the  person  whom  he  ejects,  and  drive  him  to  produce  his 
title,  if  he  can  without  delay  reinstate  himself  in  his  former  possession." 
Browne  v.  Dawson,  12  Adol.  &  E.  624-629;   Ex  parte  Fletcher,  5  Ch.  Div.  809- 

LAW  OF  TOUTS— 43 


658  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

is  abandoned  when  that  object  is  accomplished,  is  not  legal  posses- 
sion." Again,  mere  occupation  or  control  by  a  servant  or  tenant 
at  will  does  not  seem  to  be  legal  possession. ^"^  Possession  may  be 
based  on  title  or  on  bare  physical  occupancy  or  prehension  without 
title.  It  may,  accordingly,  be  actual  or  constructive.^"  .It  may  also 
be  subordinate  or  permissive,  as  that  of  a  tenant  under  his  landlord. 
The  question  of  possession  is  one  of  fact  for  the  jury.^" 

OBJECTS  OF  POSSESSION. 

210.  Possession  entitling  one  to  the  common-law   actions 
ex  delicto  may  concern — 

(a)  Personal  or  real  property; 

(b)  The  appropriated  or  unappropriated  benefits   of  na- 

ture. 

lieal  and  Personal  Property. 

As  to  personal  property,  the  right  to  assume  physical  possession, 
it  will  hereafter  be  shown,  is  always  sufficient.     But,  as  to  real  prop- 

812;  Holmes  v.  Wilson,  10  Adol.  &  E.  503;  Bowyer  v.  Cook,  4  C.  B.  236; 
Hughes  V.  Stevens,  3U  Pa.  St.  320;  Ozaik  Land  Co.  v.  Leonard,  20  Fed.  881; 
Ware  v.  Johnson,  55  Mo.  500;  Illinois  &  St.  L.  Railroad  &  Coal  Co.  v.  Cobb, 
82  111.  183;  Pettit  v.  Cowherd,  83  Va.  20,  1  S.  E.  393;  Storrs  v.  Felck,  24  W. 
Va.  606;   GuUedge  v.  AVhite,  73  Tex.  498,  11  S.  W.  527. 

2  7  Austin  V.  Holt,  32  Wis.  478.  "Going  upon  land  from  time  to  time,  and  cut- 
ting logs  thereon,  does  not  give  possession.  Such  acts  are  merely  trespasses 
upon  the  land  against  the  true  owner,  whoever  he  may  be.  *  *  *  But  it  was 
never  supposed  tliat  the  hunter  had  possession  of  the  forest  through  which  he 
roamed  in  pursuit  of  game."  Thompson  v.  Burhans,  79  N.  Y.  93.  Generally 
occasional  intnisions  do  not  constitute  possession,  whether  done  under  claim 
of  title  or  not. 

28  Hughes  V.  Stevens,  36  Pa.  St.  320;  Ozark  Land  Co.  v.  Leonard,  20  Fed. 
881;  Ware  v.  Johnson,  55  llo.  500;  Illinois  &  St.  L.  Railroad  &  Coal  Co.  v. 
Cobb,  82  111.  183;  Pettit  v.  Cowherd,  88  Va.  20,  1  S.  E.  302;  Storrs  v.  Feick, 
24  W.  Va.  600;   GuUedge  v.  White,  73  Tex.  408,  11  S.  W.  527. 

2  0  The  term  "constructive  possession,"  while,  as  used,  often  confused  with 
"actual  possession,''  serves  a  useful  pui-pose,  as  meaning  the  right  to  take  pos- 
session. The  distinction  is  too  firmly  imbedded  in  the  body  of  decisions  to  be 
disregarded. 

3(1  Hulse  V.  Brantley,  110  N.  C.  134,  14  S.  E.  510;  Firth  v.  Veeder,  58  Hun, 
605,  12  N.  Y.  Supp.  579;   Kinney  v.  Ferguson.  101  Mich.  178,  SO'N.  W.  401. 


Ch.   10]  OBJECTS    OF    POSSK-^SIOX.  659 

erty,  the  right  to  possession  is  not  sufficient  to  maintain  trespass 
when  some  other  person  is  in  actual  possession.  Injuries  to  real 
property  may  be  either  to  land  or  to  easements  (or  rights  in  the  na- 
ture of  easements),  such  as  rights  of  way,  water  rights,  rights  to 
support  of  land  and  buildings,  ancient  lights,  and  the  like.  Injuries 
to  such  incorporeal  hereditaments  give  rise  to  causes  of  action,  both 
in  trespass  and  nuisance.  It  will  be  convenient  to  postpone  their 
chief  discussion  until  trespass  is  explained  and  nuisance  comes  un- 
der consideration. 

Things  Ferse  Naturse. 

As  to  things  ferse  naturae,'^  the  act  of  reducing  them  to  possession 
is  essential  to  create  title  sufficient  to  maintain  the  common-law 
possessory  remedies.  "Property  ratione  soli  is  the  common  right 
which  every  owner  of  land  has  to  take  and  kill  all  such  animals  ferae 
naturte  as  may  from  time  to  time  be  found  on  his  land;  and,  as 
soon  as  this  right  is  exercised,  the  animal  so  killed  or  caught  be- 
comes the  absolute  property  of  the  owner  of  the  soil."  ^^  Thus  no 
one,  before  actual  reduction  into  possession,  can  have  a  right  in 
creatures,  as  fish  in  the  sea,  which  are  open  to  the  pursuit  of  all.'* 
But  the  act  of  reducing  animals  ferse  naturse  to  possession  must  not 
be  wrongful,  and,  if  it  is  effected  by  one  who  is  at  the  moment  a 
trespasser,  no  title  to  property  is  created.    This  principle  has  been 

31  As  to  what  are  ferae  naturse,  see  1  Broom  &  H.  Oomm.  (Wait's  Ed.)  799. 
Doves:  Com.  v.  Chace,  9  Pick.  15.  A  fox:  Pierson  v.  Post,  3  Caines,  !".:>.  A 
hare:  Sutton  v.  Moody,  1  Ld.  Raym.  250.  A  buffalo:  Ulery  v.  Jones,  81  111. 
40o.  Wild  geese:  Amory  v.  Flyn,  10  Johns.  102.  Property  in  monkeys  and 
parrots:     Grymes  v.  Shack,  Cro.  Jac.  262. 

3  2  Blades  v.  Higgs,  11  H.  L.  Cas.  C21.  Cf.  Rigg  v.  Earl  of  Lonsdale,  1  Hurl. 
&  N.  023.  No  property  is  acquired  where  an  animal  ferae  natm-ae  is  wounded 
and  followed  by  dogs  if  the  owner  abandons  the  chase.  Buster  v.  Newkirk, 
20  Johns.  73.  Finding  and  marking  bee  trees  do  not  confer  title  sufficient 
to  sustain  trespass:  Goff  v.  Kitts,  15  Wend.  550;  Ferguson  v.  Miller,  1  Cow. 
243;  Gillet  v.  Mason,  7  Johns.  IG;  Fisher  v.  Steward,  Smith  (N.  H.)  CO,  and 
note.     Et  vide  Olmstead  v.  Rich,  53  Hun,  G38,  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  826. 

33  Young  V.  Hicheus,  6  Q.  B.  606;  Stevens  v.  Jeacocke,  11  Q.  B.  731.  Ci". 
Marsh  v.  Colby,  30  Mich.  626;  McCartiiy  v.  Holman,  22  Hun,  53;  Paul  v. 
Hazelton,  37  N.  J.  Law,  100.  Oysters  planted  in  navigable  river  are  not  such 
property  as  will  sustain  trespass  against  owner  of  adjacent  land  for  taking 
them  away.  Brinckerhoff  v.-  Starkins,  11  Barb.  248.  Cf.  Arnold  v.  iluudy,  6 
N.  J.  Law,  1;   1  Am.  Law.  Reg.  (N.  S.)  570,  580. 


660  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

applied  where  the  plaintiff,  without  the  permission  of  the  owner, 
put  an  empty  box  for  bees  to  hide  in  on  the  latter's  land,  and  a  third 
person  took  out  the  swarm  of  bees,  and  ret)laced  the  box.  The  court 
denied  the  plaintiff's  right  to  recover  in  trover  for  the  value  of  the 
bees,  the  honey,  and  the  honeycomb.^* 

TBESPASS— DEriNITION. 

211.  Trespass  is  the  -wrongful  disturbance  of  another's 
possession  of  lands  or  goods.  The  disturbance  may 
consist  of  physical  entry  on  lands,  or  seizure  of 
goods,  or  of  any  other  exercise  of  ownership  or 
control  over  them  inconsistent  with  the  ow^ner's 
possession. 

An  unauthorized  entry  of  another's  lands  was  a  trespass  for  which 
at  common  law  an  action  quare  clausum  fregit  lay.  Forcible  dis- 
turbance of  peaceable  possession  is  a  trespass.^"  If  a  man's  land 
is  not  surrounded  by  any  actual  fence,  the.  law  encircles  it  with  an 
imaginary  inclosure,  to  pass  which  is  to  break  and  enter  his  close.'" 
Actual  and  malicious  exercise  of  force  is  sufficient.'^  But  force  as 
an  essential  element  of  disturbance  may  not  be  violence;  nor  need 
it  be  actual  force,  in  the  popular  sense  of  the  term;  it  may  be  im- 
plied.'' The  mere  walking  over  a  place  whereon  is  neither  grass 
nor  herbage  is  sufficient,' ''  and  so,  in  general,  is  any  unauthorised 

34  Rexroth  v.  Coon,  1.5  R.  I.  35,  23  Atl.  37. 

3  5  Dolahanty  v.  Lucey,  101  Mich.  113,  59  N.  W.  413. 

3  6  Add.  Torts,  300.  Wrongful  entiy  is  the  gist  of  the  action.  Hill  v.  Bar- 
tholomew, 71  Hun,  453,  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  944.  As  to  crossing  boundaries:  Os- 
walt v.  Smith,  97  Ala.  62T,  12  South.  604;  Pace  v.  Potter  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  20  S. 
W.  928,  reversed  So  Tex.  473,  22  S.  W.  300. 

37  American  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Middleton,  80  N.  Y.  408.  Forcible  disturbance 
of  peaceable  possession  is  a  trespass,  and  an  action  therefor  involves  no  ques- 
tion of  title.     Dolahanty  v.  Lucey,  101  Mich.  113,  59  N.  W.  415. 

3  8  Green  v.  Goddard,  2  Salk.  641;  Meriwether  v.  Asbeck  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25 
S.  W.  1100;  Weaver  v.  Bush,  8  Term  R.  78;  Co.  Litt.  256,  B;  Id.  1G2,  A; 
Hatch  V.  Donnell,  74  Me.  163,  Chase,  Lead.  Cas.  150;  Van  Leuven  v.  Lyke, 
1  N.  Y.  515,  Chase,  Lead.  Cas.  152. 

39  Entick  V.  Carrington,  19  State  Tr.  1030-1066;   Dougherty  v.  Stepp,  1  Dev. 


Ch.  10]  TRESPASS.  661 

intrusion/"  So  to  drive  nails  into  a  wall  or  to  place  stones  and  rub- 
bish against  it  may  amount  to  trespass.*^  The  disturbance,  how- 
ever, is  not  necessarily  confined  to  the  surface  of  the  land.  Inter- 
ference with  minerals  ^^  beneath  the  surface,  and  perhaps  inter- 
ference with  the  column  of  air  above  the  surface,  may  constitute 
trespass.^^  A  mere  nonfeasance  is  not  sufficient,  as  neglect  to  re-, 
pair  banks  whereby  another's  land  is  overflowed.**  Similarly,  to  en- 
title the  owner  or  possessor  of  personal  property  to  bring  trespass 
de  bonis  asportatis,  he  can  show  a  forcible  taking  of  goods;  but  this 
is  not  necessary.  "No  actual  force  need  to  be  proved.  He  who  in- 
terferes with  my  goods,  and  without  my  consent  undertakes  to  dis- 
pose of  them  as  having  the  property,  general  or  special,  does  it  at 
his  peril  to  answer  me  the  value  in  trespass  or  trover."  *^-   Manual 

&  B.  371;  MeCall's  Adm'r  v.  Capehart,  20  Ala.  521;  Newson  v.  Anderson,  2 
Ired.  42. 

*o  Douglierty  v.  Stepp,  1  Dev.  &'B.  371.  Nailing  a  board  on  one's  own  prem- 
ises, as  to  overhang  neighbor's  premises,  is  a  trespass.  Of.  Pickering  v.  Rudd, 
4  Camp.  219,  220,  with  Pinehin  v.  London  &  B.  Ry.  Co.,  1  Kay  &  J.  34;  Leland 
V.  Hathorn,  42  N.  Y.  547;  Smith  v.  Smith,  110  Mass.  302.  Projecting  of  win- 
dow sills;  Richardson  v.  Pond,  ,15  Gray,  387-300;  J.  S.  v.  Appleton,  1  Sumii. 
(U.  S.)  492-500,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  14,463;  Story  v.  Odin,  12  Mass.  157,  7  Am.  Dec. 
49,  note, 

11  Lawrence  v.  Obee,  1  Starkie,  22;  Gregory  v.  Piper,  9  Barn.  &  0.  591. 
Or  a  sign:  Devlin  v.  Snellenburg,-  132  Pa.  St.  186,  18  Atl.  1119.  Use  of 
gas  after  arrearage  In  payment  is  not.  Alexandria  Mining  &  Exploring  Co. 
v.  Painter,  1  Ind.  App.  587,  28  N.  E.  113. 

4  2  Parker,  B.,  in  Smith  v.  Lloyd,  9  Exch.  5C2;  Ashton  v.  Stock,  6  Oh.  Div.  719. 

43  Firing  bullets  into  another  man's  land  has  been  held  sufficient  Picliering- 
v.  Rudd,  1  Starkie,  56.  But  see  Kenyon  v.  Hart,  6  Be.st  &  S.  249;  Wadswortli 
Board  of  "Works  v.  United  Tel.  Co.,  13  Q.  B.  Div.  904-907.  So,  perhaps,  man 
firing  over  another's  field.  Clifton  v.  Bury.  4  Times,  Law  R.  8.  As  to  balloon: 
Guille  V.  Swan,  19  Johns,  381;  Pol.  Torts,  34.  As  to  blasting:  Hunter  v. 
Farren,  127  Mass.  481. 

44  Brooke,  Abr.  Sur  le  C.  PI.  36;  Hinks  v.  Hinks,  4G  Me.  423;  Turner  v. 
Hawkins,  1  Bos.  &  P.  472;   Shapcott  v.  Mugford,  1  Ld.  Raym.  187. 

4  5  Sewall,  J.,  in  Gibbs  v.  Chase,  10  Mass.  12.");  Miller  v.  BalMr,  1  Mete. 
(Mass.)  27;  Morgan  v.  Varick,  8  Wend.  587;  Dexter  v.  Cole,  G  Wis.  319; 
Reynolds  v.  Shuler,  5  Cow.  323.  The  removal  of  a  chattel  from  one  town 
to  another  entitles  to  nominal  damages,  when  done  without  authority.  Pol- 
lock, C.  B.,  in  Reg.  v.  Riley,  Dears.  Crown  Cas.  157;  Kirk  v.  Gregory,  1  Exch. 
Div.  55. 


662  wjioNGs  TO  rossKssiox  and  pkoperty.  [Cli.  10 

taking  or  removal  is  not  necessary,  although  sufficient.*"  The  two 
causes  of  action,  trespass  quare  clausum  fregit  and  de  bonis  as- 
portatis,  may  be  united  in  one  proceeding;  as  where  defendant  was 
sued  in  one  action  for  breaking  into  a  dwelling  house  and  carrying 
away  goods.*^ 

•  To  show  a  disturbance  of  possession,  it  is  not  necessary  to  prove 
actual  damages;*^  every  invasion  of  property,  be  it  ever  so  minute, 
constitutes  a  trespass.*^  The  gist  of  the  action  is  disturbance  of 
possession.  Other  averments  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  tres- 
pass was  committed  relate  to  damages  only.°°  This  is  for  the  same 
reason  which  renders  it  unnecessary  to  prove  actual  damages  in  as- 
sault and  battery.  This  is  a  breach  of  absolute  duty,  for  which 
damages  are  awarded  to  prevent  a  breaohof  the  peace. '^^ 

The  disturbance  may  be  committed  by  the  defendant  himself, '^^ 
or  by  animals  (even  though  the  owner  had  no  knowledge  of  their 

4  0  Holmes  v.  Doane,  3  Gray,  328.  "Scratching  the  panel  of  a  carriage  would 
be  a  trespass."  Fouldes  v.  Willoughby,  8  Mees.  &  W.  540.  Et  vide  Gay- 
lard  V.  Morris,  3  Exch.  095.  So,  striking  or  killing  an  animal.  Dand  v.  Sex- 
ton, 3  Term  R.  37;  AVright  v.  Ramscot,  1  Saund.  83.  A  sheriff's  levy  dis- 
turbs possession,  so  as  to  entitle  to  trespass,  although  there  be  no  taking. 
Welsh  V.  Bell,  32  Pa.  St.  12;  Wintringhiim  v.  Lafoy,  7  Cow.  735;  Phillips 
v.  Hall,  8  AVend.  610.  Et  vide  Dixon  v.  Sewing-Mach.  Co.,  128  Pa.  St.  397, 
18  Atl.  502;  Kitchen  v.  McCloskey,  150  Pa.  St.  376,  24  Atl.  688;  Burgess  v. 
Graffam,  10  Fed.  216,  18  Fed.  251.  But  see  Mennie  v.  Blake,  0  El.  &  Bl.  842. 
As  to  what  disturbance  is  sufficient  to  jusitify  trespass  by  reversioner  against 
third  person,  or  by  one  tenant  against  another,  see  post,  pp.  6G6-668. 

■»7  Eamcs  v.  Prentice,  8  Gush.  337;  Bishop  v.  Baker,  19  Pick.  517.  So,  tres- 
pass quare  clausum  fregit  and  trespass  vi  et  armis  as  for  trespassing  on  free- 
hold and  Injuring  plaintiff's  wife.     Robbins  v.  Sawyer,  3  Gray,  375. 

*  8  Williams  v.  Esling,  4  Pa.  St.  486,  Bigelow,  Lead.  Gas.  371;  Dougherty 
V.  Stepp,  1  Dev.  &  B.  371;  Murphy  v.  Fond  du  Lac,  23  Wis.  305;  Parker  v. 
Griswold,  17  Conn.  288. 

*a  Entick  v.  Can-ington,  19  State  Tr.  1029-1066.  Et  vide  Tunbridge  Wells 
Dipper  Case,  2  Wils.  414. 

50  Taylor  v.  Cole,  3  Tei-m  R.  292;  Whatling  v.  Nash,  41  Hun,  579;  Cui-tis  v. 
Groat,  6  Johns.  168;  Smith  v.  Ingram,  7  Ired.  175;  Wendell  v.  Johnson,  8  N. 
H.  222;  Ferrin  v.  Symonds,  11  N.  H.  363. 

51  Clerk  &  L.  Torts.  267. 

«2  Hatch  V.  Donnell,  74  Me.  163,  Chase,  Lead.  Cas.  50. 


Ch.  10]  TRESPASS.  663 

vicious  propensities),"  or  by  inanimate  things."  Every  one  aiding 
or  encouraging  a  trespass,  as  in  destroying  a  liquor  shop,  is  liable 
in  trespass;  and  mere  presence,  in  connection  with  other  circum- 
stances, may  be  sufficient  to  attach  liability  as  a  principal." 

SAME— POSSESSION"  TO  MAINTAIN. 

212.  Only  persons  in  actual  or  constructive  possession  of 
lands  or  chattels  at  the  time  the  ■wrong  is  com- 
mitted can  maintain  trespass  in  reference  thereto, 
and  such  constructive  possession  is  that  of  the 
owner  when  no  person  is  in  actual  possession. 

To  maintain  trespass,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  the  plaintiff 
be  in  actual  possession,  or  have  the  right  to  take  possession  at  the 

0  3  Van  Leuven  v.  Lyke,  1  N.  Y.  515,  Chase,  Lead.  Cas.  152;  Marsh  v.  Hand, 
120  N.  Y.  315,  24  N.  E.  463.  Compare  Moynahan  v.  Wheeler,  117  N.  Y.  285, 
22  N.  E.  702.  Recent  English  cases  on  trespassing  animals  will  be  found  dis- 
cussed in  28  Ir.  Law  T.  406. 

5  4  Thus,  if  one  throws  stones  and  rubbish  on  another's  land  with  intention 
to  cause  stintlngi  water  in  his  yard  to  penetrate  the  walls  of  his  neighbor's 
house,  and  flow  into  his  cellar,  these  are  acts  for  which  trespass  will  lie  with- 
out proof  of  actual  damages.  Preston  v.  Mercer,  Hardr.  60.  See  Reynolds 
V.  ClarUe,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1399.  But,  if  defendant  unintentionally,  as  the  re- 
sult of  the  exercise  of  his  own  rights,  as  where  his  privy,  allowed  to  be  out 
of  repair,  flows  into  his  neighbor's  cellar,  he  is  liable  in  nuisance  on  proof  of 
damages,— not  in  trespass.  Tenant  v.  Goldwin,  Id.  1089.  In  these  cases,  ac- 
cordingly, the  inattention  of  defendant  determines  whether  or  not  trespass 
will  lie.  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  268.  And  see  Gregory  v.  Piper,  9  Barn.  &  C.  591. 
As  to  trespass  by  an  engine,  see  Ambergate,  etc..  Ry.  Co.  v.  Midland  Ry. 
Co.,  2  El.  &  Bl.  793. 

0  5  Brown  v.  Perkins,  1  Allen,  89.  Et  vide  Com.  v.  Hurley,  99  Mass.  433; 
Gate  V.  Gate,  44  N.  H.  211.  As  to  liability  of  city,  see  Cavanagh  v.  City  of 
Bos.ton.  139  Mass.  426,  1  N.  E.  834.  Further,  as  to  joint  trespass,  see  Fields 
V.  Williams,  91  Ala.  502,  8  South.  808;  Murray  v.  Mace,  41  Neb.  60,  59  N.  W. 
387;  Thompson  v.  Albright  (Tex.  App.)  14  S.  W.  1020;  McFadden  v.  Schill, 
84  Tex.  77,  19  S.  W.  368.  An  attorney  who  issues  an  execution,  upon  which 
goods  of  a  stranger  are  seized  and  sold,  but  took  no  part  in  seizure,  is  not  lia- 
ble to  owner  in  ti-espass.  Hammon  v.  Fisher,  2  Grant,  Cas.  330.  Cf.  McDan- 
iels  V.  Cutler,  3  Brewst.  (Pa.)  57. 


6(54  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

time  of  trespass."  A  person  out  of  possession  of  land  actually  oc- 
cupied by  another  cannot  succeed  in  trespass  until  he  has  first  ousted 
the  possessor  and  put  himself  into  possession."  Nor  can  the  owner 
maintain  trespass  for  taking  personal  property  unless,  at  the  time 
of  taking,  he  had  possession  or  the  right  of  taking  actual  posses- 
sion."' If  the  house  and  land,  however,  be  occupied,  not  by  a  ten- 
ant who  is  not  a  tenant  at  will  or  lessee,  but  by  a  servant  of  the  owner 

5  6  Ward  V.  Taylor,  1  Pa.  St.  238;  Hersey  v.  Chapin,  162  Mass.  176,  38  N. 
E.  442;  Fitch  v.  New  York,  P.  &  B.  R.  Co.,  59  Conn.  414,  20  Atl.  345.  A 
stranger  to  title  of  land  cannot  maintain  trespass  against  a  railroad  company 
for  injuries  by  fires,  land  on  which  plaintiff  intended  to  graze  his  cattle,  with- 
out owner's  consent.  There  was  neither  actual  nor  constructive  possession. 
Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Torrey  (Tex.  App.)  16  S.  W.  547;  Danihee  v.  Hy- 
att, 59  Hun,  616,  12  N.  Y.  Supp.  465;  Odd  Fellows'  Sav.  Bank  v.  Turman 
(Cal.)  30  Pac  966;  Fruitport  Tp.  v.  Muskegon  Circuit  Judgie,  90  Mich.  29, 
51  N.  W.  109;  Smith,  Dam.  3(;3,  note  3,  collecting  cases;  Zeitinger  v.  Hack- 
worth,  117  Mo.  505,  23  S.  W.  763.  Plaintiff,  having  bought  a  strip  of  land 
from  defendant,  an  adjoining  landowner,  defendant  ran  it  off,  and  erected  a 
building  on  the  line.  Afterwards,  plaintiff  claimed  that  the  line  so  run  was 
incorrect,  and  that  the  true  line  was  several  inches  within  the  line  of  the 
building.  It  was  held  that  plaintiff  never  had  either  actual  or  constructive 
possession,  so  as  to  support  an  action  of  trespass  quare  dausum  fregit.  Wil- 
kinson V.  ConneU,  158  Pa.  St.  126,  27  Atl.  870.  An  action  of  trespass  on  land 
can  only  be  maintained  where  the  plaintiff  had  title  or  possession  at  the  time 
of  the  acts  complained  of.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shepherd,  39  Neb. 
523,  58  N.  W.  189,  followed  in  Hanlon  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  40  Neb.  52,  58  N. 
W.  590. 

"  Chicago  &  W.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Slee,  33  111.  App.  420;  Potter  v.  Lambie,  142 
Pa.  St.  535,  21  Atl.  888;  Wood  v.  Michigan  Air-Line  R.  Co.,  90  M'ich.  334,  51 
N.  W.  2G.J.  Where  a  widow  and  her  son  agree  on  a  division  of  the  land  of 
the  deceased  husband  and  father,  and  the  son  takes  possession  of  land  al- 
lotted to  him  in  such  division,  she,  not  having  given  him  notice  to  quit,  can- 
not maintain  trespass  against  him,  though  a  judgment  was  afterwards  ren- 
dered, including  it  in  her  dower  land.     Norton  v.  Norton  (Ky.)  27  S.  W.  85. 

S8  Wilson  V.  Haley  Live-Stock  Co.,  153  U.  S.  39,  14  Sup.  Ct  768  (trespass  d. 
b.  a.);  Ward  v.  Macauley,  4  Term  R.  489;  Staples  v.  Smith,  48  Me.  470;  Put- 
man  V.  Wyley,  8  Johns.  387;  Freeman  v.  Rankins,  21  Me.  446;  Clark  v.  Carlton, 
1  N.  H.  110;  Codman  V.  Freeman,  3  Cush.  306.  A  mortgagee,  having  the  right 
to  take  possession,  may  maintain  trespass  against  a  stranger  who  unlawfully 
interferes,  before  the  debt  falls  due.  Woodruff  v.  Halsey,  8  Pick.  333; 
Foster  v.  Perkins,  42  Me.  168;  Joseph  v.  Henderson,  95  Ala.  213.  10  South.  843. 


Ch.  10]  TRESPASS.  665 

or  a  tenant  at  will,^"  the  occupation  of  the  servant  or  the  tenant  at 
will  is  the  occupation  of  the  master  or  owner,  and  the  latter  maj- 
therefore  sue  for  any  act  of  trespass.  The  same  principle  applies  es- 
pecially with  respect  to  personal  property.  Under  such  circumstan- 
ces, it  is  not  necessary  for  the  owner  to  reduce  the  property  to  pos- 
session. Indeed,  the  tendency  of  the  cases  may  be  said  to  be  to 
recognize  such  possession  as  concurrent,  and  as  entitling  both  per- 
sons to  maintain  an  action  based  on  rights  of  possession.*" 

A8  hetucea  Pcrsrms  in  Special  Relations. 

While  a  landlord  ordinarily  cannot  sue  in  trespass  his  tenant  who 
is  in  possession,*^  the  tenant  may  become  a  trespasser  by  willful 

50  Curtis  V.  Galvin,  1  Allen,  215;  Moore  v.  Mason,  Id.  406;  Meader  v. 
Stone,  7  Mete.  (Mass.)  147;  2  Bl.  Comm.  150;  Jackson  v.  Parkhurst,  5  Johns. 
128;  Livingston  v.  Tanner,  14  N.  Y.  64;  Esty  v.  Baker,  50  Me.  325;  Daniels 
V.  Pond,  21  Pick.  367. 

«o  Knight  V.  Legh,  4  Bing.  589;  Starr  v.  Jackson,  11  Mass.  519;  Gunsolus 
V.  Lormer,  54  Wis.  630,  12  N.  W.  62;  Holman  v.  Herscher  (Tex.  Sup.)  16  S. 
W.  984;  Bertie  v.  Beaumont,  16  East,  33;  Mayhew  v.  Suttle,  4  El.  &  Bl.  347; 
White  V.  Bayley,  10  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  227;  Lessee  of  Moore  v.  Doherty,  5  Ir.  Law 
R.  449.  Where  a  chattel  is  tortiously  taken  from  the  actual  or  constructive 
possession  of  the  owner,  he  may  bring  trespass  de  bonis  asportatis.  The 
owner  is  in  constructive  possession,  though  a  bailee,  at  time  of  actual  taking, 
may  have  actual  possession.  Ely  v.  Ehle,  3  N.  Y.  506,  collecting  cases,  pages 
507,  508.  The  owner  still  has  constructive  possession  where  the  person 
who  has  possession  is  his  agent  or  servant.  Becker  v.  Smith,  59  Pa.  St.  469. 
Also,  replevin:  Stadtfeld  v.  Henlsman,  92  Pa.  St.  53;  Staples  v.  Smith,  48 
Me.  470;  Harris  v.  Smith,  3  Serg.  &  R.  20;  Hampton  v.  Brown,  13  Ired.  18. 
But  see  Holmes,  Lead.  Gas.  226-2128;  Moore  v.  Robinson,  2  Barn.  &  Adol. 
817.  Mr.  Bigelow  has  suggested  that  the  reason  why  it  was  not  necessary 
for  the  owner  of  a  chattel  to  reduce  it  to  possession  when  actually  In  the 
hands  of  another  was  that  land,  being  permanent,  could  be  reduced  to  pos- 
session at  any  time,  while  this  might  be  often  impossible  as  to  personalty, 
and  that,  damages  being  the  object,  substantial  injustice  might  result  from 
any  other  rule  as  to  personalty. 

61  Chadboume  v.  Straw,  22  Me.  450;  Briggs  v.  Thompson,  9  Pa.  St.  338; 
Ripley  v.  Yale,  16  Vt.  257;  Mueller  v.  Kuhn,  46  111.  App.  496;  Schaefer  v. 
Silverstein,  Id.  UOS;  post,  p.  608.  Trespass  cannot  be  maintained  against 
the  owner  of  premises  having  the  right  of  possession  for  making  an  entry 
thereon  against  the  will  of  the  tenant  in  possession  after  the  lease  had  ter- 
minated. Mueller  v.  Kuhn,  46  111.  App.  496.  A  landlord  may  put  out  with 
force  a  tenant  holding  under  a  lease  containing  a  clause  of  re-entiT  for 


666  WKONGS    TO    POSSp;SSK)N    AND    PROPERTY.  [(^'ll.    10 

wrong,  and  render  Mmself  liable  to  his  landlord  in  trespass.*^  Tres- 
pass cannot  be  maintained,  against  the  owner  of  premises  liaving 
the  right  of  possession,  for  making  an  entry  thereon  against  the 
will  of  the  tenant  in  possession  after  the  lease  has  terminated.*^ 
The  owner  may  sue  in  trespass  a  tenant  at  will  who  is  in  actual 
possession  of  the  premises."  A  landlord  can  maintain  an  action 
of  trespass  for  injury  to  the  freehold  committed  by  a  stranger  while 
his  tenant  is  in  possession  of  the  land."  As  between  landlord  and 
tenant,  or  occupier  and  reversioner,  a  tenant  in  actual  possession  or 
occupier,  and  not  the  landlord  or  reversioner,  can  maintain  an  ac- 
tion, in  the  nature  of  trespass,  for  an  act  which  is  not  an  injury 
to  the  reversioner."  °  Thus,  the  occupier,  and  not  the  reversioner, 
can  maintain  an  action  against  a  stranger  for  merely  entering  upon 
the  land.°^  But  where  a  window  was  obstructed  by  the  erection  of 
a  wall  on  the  adjoining  premises,  it  was  held  that  the  reversioner 
was  entitled  to  recover  damages  because  the  obstruction  was  of  per- 
manent character,  and  would  remain  unless  something  was  done  to 
remedy  the  mischief."*     The  right  of  the  mortgagor  and  mortgagee 

covenant  broken  on  the  breach  of  such  covenant.  Schaefer  v.  Silverstein, 
46  111.  App.  60S. 

0  2  Rogers  v.  Brooks,  90  Ala.  31,  11  South.  753;  Emry  v.  Roanoke  Naviga- 
tion &  Water-Power  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  &i,  16  S.  E.  18. 

63  Mueller  v.  Kuhn,  46  ni.  App.  496.    Of.  Schaefer  v.  Silverstein,  Id.  608. 

6*  Ripley  v.  Yale,  16  Vt.  257.  The  jurisdiction  of  law  and  equity  being 
amalgamated,  the  owner  of  an  equity  of  redemption  can  sue  for  trespass  to 
the  property,  and  injury  to  the  freehold,  though  before  action  he  has  conveyed 
his  equity.  Gwynne,  J.,  dissenting,  in  Brookfield  v.  Brown,  22  Can.  Sup.  Ct. 
398. 

»6  Bailey  v.  Siegel  Gas  Fixture  Co.,  51  Mo.  App.  50;  Miller  v.  Mutzabaugh, 
3  Pa,  Dist.  Ct.  R.  449. 

66  Halligan  v.  Chicago  &  C.  Ry.  Co.,  15  111.  558;  Clark  v.  Smith,  25  Pa.  St. 
137;  Rogers  v.  Brooks,  99  Ala.  31,  11  South.  753;  Bascom  v.  Dempsey,  143 
Mass.  409,  9  N.  E.  744;  Mayo  v.  Springfield,  138  Mass.  70;  Stoltz  v.  Kretsch- 
mar,  24  Wis.  283;  Cooper  v.  Crabtree,  20  Ch.  Div.  589;  Gnnsolus  v.  Lormer, 
54  Wis.  030,  12  N.  W.  62;  Holmes  v.  Seely,  19  Wend.  506.  As  to  right  of 
possession  of  a  lessee  of  a  market  stall,  see  Strickland  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 
R.,  154  Pa.  St.  348,  26  Atl.  431;  Vidalat  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  43  La.  Ann. 
1121,  10  South.  175. 

67  Baxter  v.  Taylor,  4  Bam.  &  Adol.  72.  Et  vide  Simpson  v.  Savage,  1  C. 
B.  (N.  S.)  347. 

68  Jesser  v.  GifEord,  4  Burrows,  2141;  Tucker  v.  Newman,  11  Adol.   &  E. 


^h.    10]  TRESPASS. 


t)G7 


to  recover  for  damages  is  governed  by  the  same  principles.  If  the 
mortgagor  is  entitled  to  possession,  he  and  only  he  can  sue  for  mere 
entry  on  the  premises;  but  if  the  trespass  affect  the  value  of  the  se- 
curity, the  mortgagee  will  have  his  right  of  action.""  Similarly, 
a  tenant  for  life  can  recover  only  for  injury  to  his  particular  estate. 
This  includes  only  injury  to  the  possession  and  enjoyment  of  the 
estate  during  his  life.  The  reversioner  can  recover  for  an  injury 
to  the  reversion.'"' 

As  between  tenants  in  common,  possession  is  concurrent,  and  all 
have  equal  rights  of  possession  and  property.  No  action  of  trespass 
will  lie  unless  there  be  an  actual  ouster  of  one  tenant  in  common  by 
another.^^     As  to  what  constitutes  ouster,  regard  must  be  had  to 

40;  Alston  v.  Scales,  9  Bing.  3.  Where  fire  destroys  grass  in  a  leased  pas- 
ture, and  injures  the  sod,  the  owner  can  recover  for  the  injury  to  the  sod, 
and  for  the  vaUie  of  the  grass  in  the  condition  it  would  have  been  but  for 
the  fire  at  the  time  the  owner  would  have  been  entitled  to  resume  posses- 
sion.   Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Fulmore  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  238. 

oo  Page  V.  Robinson,  10  Cush.  99;  Cole  v.  Stewart,  11  Cush,  181;  James  v. 
Worcester,  141  Mass.  361,  5  N.  E.  826.  See  cases  there  cited;  Sanders  v. 
Reed,  12  N.  H.  .j.jS;  Fox  v.  Harding,  21  Me.  104. 

"oBascom  v.  Dempsey,  143  Mass.  409,  9  N.  E.  744;  Rockwood  v.  Robin- 
son, 159  Mass.  406,  34  N.  E.  521;  Ohio  &  M.  Ky.  Co.  r.  Ti-app,  4  Ind.  App. 
69,  30  N.  E.  812;  Willey  v.  Laraway,  04  Vt.  .559,  25  Atl.  436.  One  who  is 
made  trustee  of  land  for  his  children,  with  the  right  to  hold  for  life,  or  to 
dispose  of  it  for  the  benefit  of  his  children  during  life,  as  he  should  see  fit, 
may  waive  his  own  Interest,  and  sue  as  trustee  for  a  trespass.  Meehan  v. 
Edwards,  92  Ky.  574,  IS  S.  W.  519.  As  between  heirs  and  personal  repre- 
sentatives: Marcy  v.  Howard,  91  Ala.  133,  8  South.  566.  On  the  same 
principle,  a  person  entitled  to  a  possession  of  the  subsoil  may  maintain  an 
action  of  trespass  against  the  party  who  digs  holes  in  it,  although  other 
persons  may  for  the  time  being  have  exclusive  right  to  the  possession  of  the 
surface.     Cox  v.  Glue,  5  C.  B.  533. 

'1  Kea.r  v.  Goodwin,  16  Mass.  1;  Wilkins  v.  Bm-ton,  5  Vt.  70;  Owen  v. 
Fostoi-.  13  Yt.  263;  Jliller  v.  Holland,  13  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  622;  McPherson  v. 
Seguine,  3  Dev.  (N.  C.)  153;  Booth  v.  Sherwood,  12  Minn.  426  (Gil.  310); 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cusenberry,  86  Tex.  525,  26  S.  W.  43.  As  ad- 
verse possession  between  cotenants,  compare  In  re  Grider,  81  Cal.  571,  22 
Pac.  908,  with  Milner  v.  Miluer,  101  Ala.  599,  14  South.  373;  Gregory  v. 
Gregory,  102  Cal.  50,  36  Pac.  364.  As  to  coparceners  as  plaintiffs  on  tres- 
pass, vide  Thorn  v.  Maurer,  85  Mich.  569,  48  N.  W.  640.  As  to  action  by 
coteuants  to  try  title,  see  Boone  v.  Knox,  80  Tex.  642,  16  S.  W.  448.     Further, 


G68  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

the  nature  of  the  property.  The  effectual  carrying  away  of  a  chat- 
tel is  an  ouster.' 2  If  one  tenant  in  common  expels  his  cotenant 
from  the  premises,  he  will  he  liable  in  trespass.'^'  He  would  also 
be  liable  if  a  tenant  should  dig  and  carry  away  the  turf  from  prem- 
ises in  which  there  is  a  cotenancy.''''  But  a  tenant  in  common  of 
a  coal  mine  is  entitled  to  dig  and  carry  away  coal,  subject  to  the 
restriction  of  not  appropriating  more  than  his  share.  If  the  rule 
was  otherwise,  he  could  not  enjoy  his  proportion  of  the  common 
property.'^  Denial  of  the  cotenant's  right  with  manifestation  of 
force,  is  sufficient  to  constitute  ouster.'^ 

213.  Actual  physical  occupation  or  control  is  sufficient 
title  to  sustain  trespass,  but  not  against  the  true 
o^nrner  or  person  having  right  of  possession.  If  it 
be  -without  title  it  must  be — 

(a)  Substantially  exclusive, 

(b)  With  a  purpose  to  exercise  possession  for  the  bene- 

fit of  the  holder,  and 

(c)  At  the  time  of  the  alleged  -wrong. 

as  to  what  Is  ouster  by  adverse  possession  between  tenants  in  common,  see 
an  able  note  by  William  L.  Murfree,  33  Cent.  Law  J.  296.  And  see  Jordan 
V.  Sm-glmor,  107  Mo.  520,  17  S.  W.  1009;  Ingalls  v.  NewhaU,  139  Mass.  268, 
30  N.  E.  96;  Winterburn  v.  Chambers,  91  Cal.  170,  27  Pac.  6.o8;  Sorenson  v. 
Davis,  83  Iowa,  405,  49  N.  W.  1004. 

7  2  Jacobs  V.  Seward,  L.  R.  5  H.  L.  464.  On  the  same  principle,  trover  lies 
against  one  cotenant  who  sent  the  ship  owned  in  common  out  to  sea,  where- 
by it  was  lost.     Bamardiston  v.  Chapman,  BuU.  N.  P.  34,  4  East,  121,  note. 

73  Mun-ay  v.  Hall,  7  C.  B.  441,  overruling  the  doctrine  of  Littledale,  J., 
in  Cubitt  v.  Porter,  8  Barn.  &  C.  257;  Stedmaji  v.  Smith,  8  El.  &  Bl.  1;  Br- 
win  V.  Olmstead,  7  Cow.  22f);  Dubois  v.  Beaver,  25  N.  Y.  123;  Odiorne  v.  Ly- 
I'ord,  9  N.  H.  502;  Great  Falls  Co.  v.  Worster,  15  N.  H.  412;  Thomas  v.  Pick- 
ering, 13  Me.  337;  Owen  v.  Foster,  13  Yt.  263;  JXunroe  v.  Luke,  1  Mete. 
(Mass.)  459,  467-^72;  Bennett  v.  Clemence,  6  Allen,  10-19;  Midford  v.  Hardi- 
son,  3  Murph.  164. 

Ti  Wilkinson  v.  Hay  garth,  12  Q.  B.  837. 

7 .-.  Job  V.  Potton,  L.  E.  20  Eq.  84. 

7  0  Jefcoat  V.  Knotts,  13  Rich  (S.  C.)  50;  Carpentier  v.  Gardiner,  29  Cal.  ICO; 
Lessee  of  Clymer  v.  Dawkins,  3  How.  (U.  S.)  674;  'Xhomas  v.  Hatch,  3  Sumn. 
(O.  S.)  170,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  13,899. 


Ch.   lOJ  TRESPASS.  669 

Possession  may  be  with  or  without  Title. 

When  both  ownership  and  possession  coincide,  trespass,  of  course, 
lies,^^  but  mere  possession  without  title,  but  under  claim  of  right,  is 
suflicient  to  sustain  the  action.^'  And  even  if,  in  conversion,  the 
■defendant  might  sometimes  be  allowed  to  show  title  in  a  third  per- 
son, in  trespass  he  certainly  cannot.^*  Jus  tertii  is  no  defense  un- 
less the  defendant  can  show  that  the  act  complained  of  was  done 
by  the  true  owner  or  by  his  authority.*^  Thus  a  "squatter"  has  such 
possession  as  will  entitle  him  to  sue  a  railroad  company  for  crossing 
his  land  or  disturbing  his  house,  even  though  situated  on  its  right 
of  way.**     Indeed,  as  to  a  person  not  the  owner,  it  is  immaterial 

8  2  As  where  adverse  possession  may  have  ripened  into  title.  Chesapealse  & 
■O.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Hickey  (Ky.)  22  S.  W.  441.  Et  vide  Dhein  v.  Beuscher,  83  "Wis. 
316,  53  N.  W.  551;  Mitchell  v.  Bridgev,  113  N.  C.  63,  18  S.  K.  91. 

S3  Cary  v.  Holt,  2  Strange,  1238,  11  East,  70;  Catteris  v.  Oowper,  -I  Tannt. 
547;  .Teffries  v.  Railway  Co.,  5  El.  &  Bl.  802;  Harker  v.  Birkbeck,  3  Bur- 
rows, 1556;  Anthony  v.  Railroad  Co.,  162  Mass.  60,  37  N.  E.  780;  Marks  v. 
Sullivan,  8  Utah,  40G,  32  Pac.  GO  J;  McFeters  v.  Pierson,  15  Colo.  201;  24  Pac. 
1076;  Martin  v.  Pittman,  3  Colo.  App.  220,  32  Pac.  840;  Stahl  v.  Grover,  80 
Wis.  O."')0,  50  N.  W.  589;  Rogers  v.  Duhai-t,  97  Cal.  500,  32  Pac.  570;  Barbarick' 
V.  Anderson,  45  Mo.  App.  270. 

81  Sweetland  v.  Stetson,  115  Mass.  49;  Anthony  v.  Railroad  Co.,  162  Mass. 
60,  37  N.  E.  780;  Hoyt  v.  Gelston,  13  .Johns.  141;  Cook  v.  Howard,  Id.  276-2,S4; 
Aikin  v.  Buck,  1  Wend.  466;  Demick  v.  Chapman,  11  Johns.  132;  Squire  v. 
HoUenheck,  9  Pick.  551;  Hanmer  v.  Wilsey,  17  Wend.  91;  Parker  v.  Hotch- 
kiss,  25  Conn.  321;  Todd  v.  Jackson,  26  N.  J.  Law,  525;  Ashmore  v.  Hardy, 
7  Car.  &  P.  501;  Whittington  v.  Boxall,  5  Q.  B.  139;  Cai-y  v.  Holt,  2  Strange, 
1238;  Wustland  v.  Potterfield,  9  W.  Va.  438;  Craig  v.  Gilbreth,  47  Me.  416; 
Gilson  V.  Wood,  20  111.  38;  Gardiner  v.  Thibodeau,  14  La.  Ann.  732;  Boston 
V.  Neat,  12  Mo.  125;  Crawford  v.  Bynum,  7  Yerg.  381;  Fuller  v.  Bean,  30  N. 
H.  181;  Golden  Gate  Mill  &  Min.  Co.  v.  Joshua  Hendy  Mach.  Works,  82  Cal. 
184,  23  Pac.  45;  Criner  v.  Pike,  2  Head  (Tenn.)  .398;  Tarry  v.  Brown,  34  Ala. 
r59;  Kemp  v.  Seely,  47  Wis.  687,  3  N.  W.  830. 

86  Trevllian  v.  Pyne,  1  Salk.  107;  Graham  v.  Peat,  1  East,  244;  Chambers 
V.  Donaldson,  11  East,  65;  Catteris  v.  Cowper,  4  Taunt.  547.  The  plea  lib- 
erum  tenementum  is  a  complete  answer  to  an  action  of  trespass  quare  clau- 
sum  fregit.    See  post,  pp.  686,  687,  "Defenses." 

.86  Witt  V.  St.  Paul  &  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  38  Minn.  123,  35  N.  W.  SG2;  Ft.  Worth 
&  N.  O.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Smith  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  2.j  S.  W.  1032;  Galveston,  H.  & 
S.  A.  Ry,  Co.  v.  Rhelner,  Id.  971;  Pacific  Exp.  Co.  v.  Duun,  81  Tex.  85,  16  S. 
W.  792. 


670  WKONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

whether  or  not  the  defehdant's  claim  of  title  is  valid,  if  he  has  actual 
possession."  Persons  in  possession  of  lands  may  recover  for  crops 
taken  away.^^  So  a  trespasser  may  sue  a  wrongdoer  for  burning  wood 
he  had  gathered.'^  Actual  possession  of  chattels  pure  and  simple 
will  sustain  an  action  of  trespass.  Thus,  a  drayman,  who,  as  bailee, 
had  a  wagon  containing  a  load  of  furniture  in  the  street,  may  re- 
cover against  one  who  injured  the  horse,  wagon,  and  load.""  In 
case  of  purchase,  possession  is  sufficient,  although  the  title  by  agree- 
ment remains  in  the  vendor."^ 

8T  Graliam  v.  Peat,  1  East,  244;  Cutts  v.  Spring,  15  Mass.  135;  Bigelow, 
r^eacl.  Cas.  341.  Where  there  i§  a  tortious  possession  of  land  not  amounting^ 
to  disseisin,  the  constructive  possession  as  between  the  tort  feasor  and  the 
party  having  the  legal  title  continues  in  him  who  has  the  right;  but  the  tort 
feasor  may  maintain  trespass  against  a  stranger  who  disturbs  his  possession, 
and  the  stranger  cannot  plead  that  the  tort  feasor's  possession  was  the  pos- 
session of  the  true  owner.  Langdon  v.  Templeton,  66  A't.  173,  28  Atl.  866. 
Compare  Hulse  v.  Brantley,  110  N.  C.  134,  14  S.  E.  510;  United  Copper  Min- 
ing <fe  Smelting  Co.  v.  Franks,  S.5  Me.  321,  IX  Atl.  185. 

8  8  Potter  v.  Lambie,  142  Pa.  St.  535,  21  Atl.  888.  Where  plaintiff  was  in 
possession  of  lands  under  claim  of  title,  he  can  recover  for  hay  raised  thereon, 
and  destroyed  by  Are  set  by  defendant's  locomotive,  without  showing  title  to 
the  land.     McClellan  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  (Mian.)  59  N.  W.  978. 

8  0  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  2  C.  C.  A.  446,  51  Fed.  658;  Gulf,  etc., 
Co.  V.  Johnson,  4  C.  C.  A.  447,  54  Fed.  474.  As  to  right  of  owner  to  sue  for 
removal  of  timber  cut,  see  Buker  v.  Bowden,  83  Me.  67,  21  Atl.  748;  McOlos- 
key  v.  Powell,  138  Pa.  St.  .ly.!,  21  Atl.  14S,  150;  Gunn  v.  Han-is,  88  Ga.  439, 
14  S.  E.  593. 

i)o  Laing  v.  Nelson,  41  Minn.  521,  A:\  N.  W.  476;  Brewster  v.  Warner,  l:!!! 
Mass.  .57;  Wilson  v.  Haley  Live-Stock  Co.,  153  TJ.  S.  30,  14  Sup.  Ct.  768; 
Matthews  v.  Smith's  Exp.  Co.  (Co.  Ct.)  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  132;  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 
S.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Biggs,  50  Ark.  169,  6  S.  W.  724,  followed  by  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 
S.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Taylor,  57  Ark.  136,  20  S.  W.  1083.  Possession  of  wife's  cow 
entitles  to  trespass  against  one  who  shot  it.  Taylor  v.  Hayes,  63  Vt.  475.  21 
Atl.  610.  Even  if  the  wife  owns  the  fee  on  which  the  husband  built  a  house 
in  which  he  lived,  she  can  sue  in  trespass  for  forcibly  entering  it.  Alexander 
V.  Hard,  04  N.  Y.  228.  Et  vide  Martin  v.  Rector,  101  N.  Y.  77,  4  N.  E.  183. 
The  sheriff,  only,  can  sue  in  trespass  for  property  taken  under  execution  by 
him.  Special  property:  Dufour  v.  Anderson,  95  Ind.  302.  And  see  Simpson 
V.  Dufour,  120  Ind.  322,  26  N.  E.  69,  collecting  cases  at  page  305,  126  lud., 
and  page  69,  26  N.  E.;   Hanchett  v.  Ives.  33  111.  App.  471. 

»i  Fields  V.  Williams,  91  Ala.  502,  8  South.  808. 


Ch.  10]  TRESPASS.  671 

Possession  must  be  Exclusive. 

The  possession  must,  however,  be  substantially  exclusive.  Where 
the  basis  of  the  action  for  trespass  is  possession  de  facto,  the  physical 
control  must  extend  over  the  whole  subject-matter  °-  for  which  pos- 
session is  claimed,  and  must  be  substantially  exclusive.'''  Thus,  one 
who  works  a  part  of  a  seam  of  coal  does  not  thereby  acquire  a  de 
facto  possession  of  the  whole  seam.  If  two  persons  are  in  one  field 
at  the  same  time,  and  both  assert  ownership,  and  neither  has  title, 
neither  can  sue  in  trespass,  because  the  possession  is  not  exclusive.'* 

Possession  must  be  Had  Animo  Possidendi. 

"The  corporeal  act  by  which  possession  is  acquired  must  be  ac- 
companied by  a  definite  act  of  the  mind,  in  order  to  enable  posses- 
sion actually  to  arise."  °°  Therefore,  where  one  used  land  which  he 
knew  was  to  have  been  ultimately  dedicated  to  the  public  for  the 
use  of  a  street,  not  under  an  assertion  of  ownership,  but  merely  as 
a  dumping  ground  for  refuse  from  his  foundry,  there  was  no  posses- 
sion."" 

Possession  at  Time  of  Wrong,  not  of  Action. 

The  possession  which  the  law  requires  is  possession  at  the  time 
of  the  alleged  trespass,  not  at  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the 
action.*  If,  therefore,  such  possession  be  negatived,  by  the  plead- 
ings, the  plaintiff  cannot  recover.!     He  must  prove  such  possession, 

9  2  Aiken  v.  Buck,  1  Wend.  466;  Bramwell,  J.,  in  Coverdale  v.  Charlton,  3  Q. 
B.  Div.  376. 

0  3  Eavl  of  Dartmouth  v.  Spittle,  19  Wkly.  Rep.  444;  Ashton  v.  Stock,  6  Ch, 
Div.  719. 

94  Barnstable  v.  Thacher,  3  Mete.  (Mass.)  239;  Reilly  v.  Thompson,  11  Ii-, 
R.  Com.  Law,  238;   Tottenham  v.  Byine,  12  Ir.  Com.  Law,  376. 

95  2  Sav.  Boss.  §  21. 

96  Leigh  V.  Jack,  5  Exch.  Div.  264;  Coveidale  v.  Charlton,  4  Q.  B.  Div.  104- 
122. 

*  Williams  v.  McGrade,  18  Minn.  82  (Gil.  65);  Hanlon  v.  Union  Bae.  Ry. 
Co.,  40  Neb.  52,  58  N.  AV.  590;  Dhein  v.  Beuseher,  83  Wis.  316,  53  N.  W.  .j.jI. 
Scheffel  v.  Weiler,  41  111.  App.  85.  Where,  in  an  action  for  injury  to  land, 
plaintiff  shows  th.it  the  patent  was  issued  to  a  person  with  whom  he  does 
not  connect  himself,  proof  of  title  by  adverse  possession,  which  did  not  ma- 
ture until  after  the  injury,  will  not  support  a  recovery.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.  Y.  Cusenberry,  86  Tex.  525,  26  S.  AV.  43. 

t  Moon  v.  Avery,  42  Minn.  405,  44  N.  AV.  257. 


672  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

although  the  defendant  pleaded  only  the  general  issue.J  It  does 
not  assist  the  tase  of  the  plaintiff,  who  did  not  have  actual  posses- 
sion at  the  time  of  the  wrong  charged,  that  subsequently,  and  be- 
fore his  suit  was  brought,  he  corrected  an  imperfect  title  or  ac- 
quired title.  1 1  But  one  who  acquires  property  after  levy  and  before 
sale  may  recover  in  trespass  against  a  sheriff  for  selling  such  prop- 
erty as  that  of  another.ff 

214.  Constructive  possession  is  either  the  possession  of  an 
agent  or  servant,  or  an  immediate  right  to  posses- 
sion, or  possession  conferred  by  law  in  certain 
cases,  independently  of  any  physical  apprehension 
or  transfer.^ 

Where  there  is  no  actual  physical  control,  or  occupancy,  pos^ 
session  is  determined  by  title.  The  occupation  of  premises  by  a 
servant,  where  there  is  no  intention  to  possess  them  in  any  other 
way,  is  that  of  the  owner.  Where  there  is  no  actual  possession,  in 
proof  of  the  right  to  possess,  upon  such  proof,  the  law  confers  pos- 
session, independent  of  physical  control."*  Thus,  a  party  in  pos- 
session of  an  inclosed  piece  of  land  may  have  an  action  for  trespass 
committed  on  an  adjoining  unfenced  woodland  to  which  he  had 
title."*  If  two  persons  are  in  possession  of  one  field,  and  each  assert 
ownership,  whoever  has  title  can  sue  in  trespass.^""     But,  to  war- 

t  Meeks  v.  Willard  (N.  J.  Sup.)  29  Atl.  318. 

II  Davis  V.  Elmore,  40  S.  C.  533,  19  S.  E.  204;  Colorado  Consolidated  Land 
&  Water  Co.  v.  Morris,  1  Colo.  App.  401,  29  Pac.  302;  Missouri  Li.  &  M. 
Co.  V.  Zeitinger,  45  Mo.  App.  114;  but  see  Ballard  v.  Carmicliael,  83  Tex.  355, 
18  S.  W.  734;    Groner  v.  Westin,  66  Tex.  209,  18  S.  W.  512. 

•ft  Kitcben  v.  McCloskey,  150  Pa.  St.  376,  24  Atl.  688;  Schwartz  v.  McClos- 
key,  156  Pa.  St.  258,  27  Atl.  3O0;  Whitman  v.  Merrill,  125  Mass.  127.  As  be- 
tween lessor  and  lessee,  see  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ousenberry,  80  Tex.  525, 
26  S.  W.  43. 

97  Fraser,  Torts,  38;  Smith  v.  Milles,  1  Term  R.  480;  Pol.  Torts  (3d  Ed.)  300, 
note  k. 

98  Booth  V.  Sherwood,  12  Minn.  426  (Gil.  310);  Meehan  v.  Edwards,  92  Ky. 
574,  18  S.  W.  519;  Thacker  v.  Howell  (Ky.)  26  S.  W.  719;  Maysville  &  B.  S.  R. 
Co.  v..  Pelham  (Ky.)  20  S.  W.  384. 

0  9  Penn  v.  Preston,  2  Rawle,  14.     Compare  Aiken  v.  Buck,  1  Wend.  466. 
100  .Tones  v.  Chapman,  2  Exch.  803;  Reading  v.  Royston,  2  Salk.  423;  Butcher 
V.  Butcher,  7  Barn.  &  0.  899. 


Ch.  10]  TRESPASS.  673 

rant  recovery,  the  title  must  be  proved.^"  An  equitable  title  may 
be  suflScient.^"^  But  a  person  holding  lands  under  contract  of  sale 
not  giving  possessoi-y  rights,  cannot  sue  for  trespass  to  such  lands 
if  vacant;  ^"^  but  a  contract  is  sufficient,  if  it  entitles  to  posses- 
sion."* 

SAME— DEFENSES. 

215-216.  Justification  of  a  trespass  may  be — 

(a)  Authority  of  law  in  the  form  of — 

(1)  Legal  process,  civil  or  criminal;  or 

(2)  Otherwrise,  as  abatement  of  nuisance,   distress, 

necessity,  or  private  defense. 

(b)  Consent  of  o-wrner  or  possessor,  which  may  be— 

(1)  Express  or  implied; 

(2)  Revocable  or  irrevocable. 

(c)  Property  in  defendant,  which  may  be — 

(1)  An  estate  in  fee,  or  less  estate;  or 

(2)  Special  property,  like  easements. 

AtdJiority  of  Law — Legal  Process. 

As  has  been  previously  seen,  authority  of  law  without  excess  or 
abuse  is  a  good  defense  to  an  action  on  tort.^"^ 

101  OcW  Fellows'  Sav.  Bank  v.  Turinan  (Cal.)  30  Pac.  OCO;  Mayo  v.  Sparta)i- 
burg,  U.  &  C.  R.  Co.,  40  S.  C.  517,  19  S.  E.  73.  Proof  of  title  to  an  undividea 
interest  in  a  survey  will  support  a  recovery  of  the  entire  survey  against  a 
stranger  to  the  title.  Hill  v.  Smith  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  1079.  PlaintiflE, 
having  shown  title  to  only  half  the  surs'ey,  cannot  recover  for  an  injury  where 
the  evidence  leaves  it  indeterminable  on  which  half  it  was  inflicted.  Gulf,  C. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Cusenberry,  80  Tex.  525,  26  S.  W.  43. 

11)2  Walton  V.  Pollock,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  216;  New  York  &  T.  Land  Co.  v. 
Gardner  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  737.  Compare  Kircher  v.  Murray,  8  C.  C.  A. 
448,  60  Fed.  48,  with  Dawson  v.  McLeary  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  705.  Ten- 
ant in  dower  may  sue  trespasser.     Willey  v.  Laraway,  04  Vt.  559,  25  Atl.  436. 

10  3  Des  Jardins  v.  Thunder  Bay  River  Boom  Co.,  95  Mich.  140,  54  N.  W.  718; 
Fletcher  v.  Livingston,  153  Mass.  388,  26  N.  E.  1001. 

io4iuderlied  v.  Whaley,  65  Hun,  407,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  183;  Salimonie  Mining 
&  Gas  Co.  V.  Wagner,  2  Ind.  App.  81,  28  N.  E.  158. 

los  Ante,  p.  143.  As  to  trespass  by  contractors  making  public  improve- 
ment, see  Kinser  v.  Dewitt,  7  Ind.  App.  597,  34  N.  B.  1014.    By  officer  exe- 

LAW  OF  TORTS— 43 


674  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Oh.    10 

An  entry  upon  the  land  of  another  is  not  a  trespass  unless  it  be 
unjustifiable.  It  may  be  justified,  among  other  things,  by  legal  pro- 
oess.i""  Civil  process  of  law  justifies  an  officer  in  breaking  in  the 
door  of  an  inner  room,^"  but  it  does  not  justify  him  in  breaking  the 
outer  door.i"'  "Every  man's  house  is  his  castle."  This  is  an  old 
expression,  and  comes  down  to  us  from  those  feudal  times  when  the 
grand  people  lived  in  large  and  fortified  houses,  which  were  called 
"castles."  In  these  castles  they  resisted  any  entrance  except  by 
permission.  From  this  source  has  come  the  expression.  In  accord- 
ance therewith,  every  man's  abode,  however  humble,  is  bis  castle; 
and  it  is  said,  "Even  though  the  winds  of  heaven  may  blow  through 
it,  the  king  of  England  cannot  enter  it."  ^"^ 

Where  the  officer  executing  civil  process  is  guilty  of  a  trespass 
in  forcing  an  entrance  into  a  dwelling  house,  its  owner  is  justified 
in  resisting  further  progress  in  service  of  the  writ  by  force.^^" 
Where,  however,  the  writ  required  the  officer  to  take  possession  of 
a  particular  thing,  as  in  a  writ  of  replevin,  the  officer  has  been  jus- 
tified in  breaking  down  the  outer  door,  after  first  demanding  admis- 
sion.^^^     Moreover,  it  would  seem  that  specific  orders  of  the  court 

cuting  process:  Sternwald  v.  Siegel,  7  Misc.  Rep.  70,  27  N.  X.  Supp.  375; 
Richardson  v.  Janlcofsky  (Tex.  Olv.  App.)  23  S.  W.  815;  Palmer  v.  Shenliel, 
50  Mo.  App.  571;  Howell  v.  Caryl,  Id.  440;  Piepgras  v.  Edmunds,  5  Misc. 
Hep.  314,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  9G1;  Id.  (Super.  N.  Y.)  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  1134;  Breck- 
woldt  v.  Jlorris,  149  Pa.  St.  291,  24  Atl.  300. 

103  Breckwoldt  v.  Morris,  149  Pa.  St.  291,  24  Atl.  300. 

107  Williams  v.  Spencer,  5  Johns.  3o2;  Butterfleld  v.  Oppenheimer,  04  Hun, 
033,  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  826;  Breckwoldt  v.  Morris,  149  Pa.  St.  291,  24  Atl.  300; 
Gi-im  V.  Robinson,  31  Neb.  .j40,  48  N.  W.  388;  Hubbard  v.  Mace,  17  .Johns. 
127;  State  v.  Beckner,  132  Ind.  371,  31  N.  E.  950;  Com.  v.  Tobin,  108  Mass. 
426.  Compare  Jones  v.  HeiTon,  31  Wkly.  Notes  Cas.  263,  -with  iJexter  v. 
Alfred,  64  Hun,  636,  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  770. 

los  Curlewis  v.  Laurie,  12  Q.  B.  640;  Burdett  v.  Abbott,  14  East,  1-154; 
Semayne's  Case,  1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  (9th  Am.  Ed.)  228,  5  Coke,  91a;  Lloyd  v. 
Sandilands,  8  Taunt.  250;  Ratcliffe  v.  Burton,  3  Bos.  &  P.  223;  Welsh  v.  Wil- 
son, 34  Minn.  92,  24  N.  W.  327. 

109  Hammond  v.  Hightower,  82  Ga.  290-292,  9  S.  E.  1101.  Et  vide  State  v. 
Armfield,  2  Hawks,  246. 

110  Cmtis  V.  Hubbard,  4  Hill,  437;  State  v.  Beckner,  132  Ind.  371,  31  N.  E. 
950. 

111  Keith  v.  Johnson,  1  l>ana,  604;  Howe  v.  Oyer,  50  Hun,  559,  3  N.  Y. 
Supp.  726. 


C!h.  10]  TRESPASS.  675 

may  justify  the  officer  in  breaking  such  door.^^^  At  common  law, 
the  sheriff  may  justify  the  breaking  open  of  the  doors  of  a  third  per- 
son to  execute  legal  process  on  a  person,  or  property  removed  there 
to  avoid  levy  of  an  execution.  He  does  the  same,  however,  at  his 
peril,  and,  if  he  does  not  find  the  person  or  his  property,  he  is  a 
trespasser.^"  An  officer  having  once  gone  lawfully  to  another  man's 
house,  and  been  by  force  ejected  therefrom,  may  break  open  the 
door  in  order  to  re-enter.^ ^*  The  reservation,  however,  extends  only 
to  a  man's  house.  It  will  not  be  extended  to  a  mill,  shop,  barn,  or 
outhouse  connected  with  it.^^"*  [An  officer  may  break  into  such  a 
building  to  serve  civil  process,  if  his  demand  for  admission  is  re- 
fused. \ 

It  was  one  of  the  resolutions  in  Semayne's  Case  that,  "within  all 
cases  where  the  king  is  party,  the  sheriff  (if  the  doors  be  not  opened) 
may  break  into  the  party's  house,  either  to  arrest  him,  or  to  do  some 
other  execution  of  the  king's,  if  otherwise  he  cannot  enter.  But  be- 
fore he  breaks  in,  he  ought  to  signify  the  cause  of  his  coming,  and 
to  make  request  to  open  the  doors."  In  accordance  with  this,  it  is 
generally  recognized  that  a  party's  own  house  is  no  sanctuary  for  him 
against  criminal  process.^*"     Thus,  an  officer  armed  with  a  search 

112  Harvey  v.  Harvey,  20  Oh.  Div.  644.  The  second  resolution  of  Semayne's 
Case  was  that  "when  any  house  is  recovered  by  any  real  action  for  hy  ejei- 
tione  firm£e,  the  sheriff  may  break  the  house,  and  deliver  the  seisin  or  pos- 
session to  the  demandant  or  plaintiff."    5  Colse,  91a. 

113  Semayne's  Case,  5  Coke,  91a,  1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  (9th  Am.  Ed.)  228; 
.Tohnson  v.  Leigh,  6  Taunt.  246;  Hutchison  v.  Birch,  4  Taunt.  (127,  explainiug 
Rateliffe  v.  Burton,  3  Bos.  &P.  223. 

iiiBagleton  v.  Gutteridge,  11  Mees.  &  W.  4(1.5;  Pugh  v.  Griffiths,  7  Adol. 
&  E.  838;  Aga  Kurboolie  Mahomed  v.  Queen,  4  Moore,  P.  C.  239;  Bannister 
V.  Hyde,  2  El.  &  El.  (527. 

3  15  Clark  V.  Wilson,  14  R.  I.  11,  citing  Penton  v.  Brown,  .Sid.  18(j;  I■^a.^Kerty 
V.  Wilber,  IG  Johns.  287;  Brown  v.  Glenn,  16  Q.  B.  254;  Solinsky  v.  Lincoln 
Sav.  Bank,  85  Tenn.  3(j8,  4  S.  W.  836;  Douglass  v.  State,  G  Yerg.  525;  Fiil- 
1am  V.  Stearns,  30  Yt.  443;  Crocker  v.  Carson,  33  Me.  4:!(i.  As  to  wliat  eim- 
stitutes  breaking  into  a  house  by  an  officer  who  holds  civil  process,  see  Curtis 
V.  Hubbard,  4  Hill,  437,  1  Hill,  336;  Ryan  v.  Schilcock,  7  Lxcli.  72,  21  Law  .J. 
Exch.  55;    Nash  v.  Lucas,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  590. 

116  Harvey  v.  Harvey,  26  Ch.  Div.  644;  Hancock  v.  Balier,  2  Bus.  &  P. 
260;  Barnard  v.  Bartlett,  10  Cush.  501;  Burdett  v.  Abbott,  14  lOast,  157; 
Launock  v.  Brown,  2  Barn.  &  Aid.  592;    Post.  Hom.  320.     But  the  breaking 


<)76  WliOXCJS    TO    POSSKSSION    AND    PROFEltTY.  [Oil.    10 

w.arrant  may  search  for  stolen  goods,  and,  if  the  door  of  the  house 
he  shut,  he  may  break  it  open,  after  his  demand  to  open  it  has  been 
refus(>d,  whether  the  stolen  goods  are  there  or  not.^^^ 

Same —  Without  Legal  Process. 

The  la\\-  authorizes  entry  irrespective  of  the  actual  consent  of  an- 
other, although  no  legal  process  be  issued.  "The  law  gives  authority 
to  enter  into  a  common  inn  or  tavern.  So  to  the  lord  to  distrain 
*  *  *  to  him  in  reversion,  to  see  if  waste  be  done,  or  to  demand 
money  payable."  ^^*  One  of  the  most  important  licenses  to  enter 
given  by  law  is  to  go  upon  adjoining  land  to  abate,  without  un- 
reasonable damage,  a  nuisance,  if  such  abatement  can  be  effected 
without  a  breach  of  the  peace.^^* 

Analogous  to  the  right  of  abatement  is  the  right  of  distress.^^" 
Distress  damage  feasant  is  the  taking  by  the  occupier  of  lands  of 
chattels  (commonly,  but  not  necessarily,  animals)  found  incumbering 
or  doing  damage  on  the  land.  The  right  given  by  the  law  is  the 
right  of  self-protection  against  the  continuance  of  a  trespass  already 
committed.^^^  At  common  law,  the  remedy  was  employed  most 
commonly  where  cattle  strayed  by  reason  of  defect  of  fences  which 
the  occupier  was  bound  to  repair.  To  entitle  a  party  to  distress 
damage  feasant,  "the  thing  distrained  must  be  taken  in  the  very 

into  a  house  cannot  be  justified  by  mere  suspicion  of  a  crime.  1  Hale,  P.  C. 
459;   State  v.  Smith,  1  N.  H.  346. 

117  2  Hale,  P.  C.  151;  CMpman  v.  Bates,  15  Vt  51;  Beaty  v.  Perkins,  6 
Wend.  382;  Allen  y.  Colby,  47  N.  H.  544. 

lis  The  Six  CaiTpenters'  Case,  8  Coke,  14Ga;  3  Bl.  Comm.  212;  1  Cow.  Treat. 
§  506;   Newkirk  v.  Sabler,  9  Barb.  652. 

119  Bac.  Abr.  "Nuisance,"  C;  3  Bl.  Comm.  5;  Rex  v.  Rosewell,  2  Salk.  459; 
Mayor  of  Colchester  v.  Brooke,  7  Q.  B.  330-376.  As  to  notice  of  nuisance  and 
request  to  abate,  see  Davies  v.  Williams,  16  Q.  B.  546.  It  would  appear  that 
after  such  notice  and  request  a  building  wrongfully  erected  may  be  pulled 
down  (Jones  v.  Jones,  1  Hurl.  &  C.  1),  even  if  a  person  be  in  it  at  the  time 
(Burling  v.  Read,  11  Q.  B.  004).  The  subject  is  discussed  somewhat  at  length 
under  "Abatement  of  Kuisance." 

120  Ante,  p.  350,  "Remedies";  .Sansiug  v.  Risinger  (Tex.  App.)  16  S.  W. 
249;  Brown  v.  Stackhouse,  155  Pa.  St.  582,  26  Atl.  069.  As  to  right  to 
enter  premises  to  distrain  for  rent,  see  Keane.  v.  Reynolds,  2  El.  &  Bl.  748. 

121  Pol.  Torts,  473;  Tyn-ingham's  Case,  4  Coke,  360;  Hannan  v.  Mockett,  2 
Barn.  &  C.  934;  Hamlin  v.  Mack,  33  Mich.  103;  Hale  v.  Clark,  19  Wend.  498' 
Pierce  v.  Hosmer,  66  Barb.  345. 


Ch.  10]  TEEsrASS.  677 

act."  ^-^  Entry  to  make  a  distress  is  only  justified  when  it  does  not 
result  in  a  breach  of  the  peace.^^'  The  common-law  rules  as  to  dis- 
tress, and  especially  as  to  distress  damage  feasant/"*  have  been 
declared  inapplicable  by  decisions,  and  abolished  or  extremely  re- 
stricted by  statute,  in  almost  all  parts  of  the  United  States. 

Entering  on  one's  lands  for  the  purpose  of  recapturing  goods^ 
wrongfully  placed  there  by  the  trespass  of  the  landowner  himself 
may  be  justified;  ^-^  but  this  is  not  true  if  it  cannot  be  shown  how 
the  goods  got  there,  or  if  it  be  proved  that  they  were  put  there  by 
the  trespass  of  a  third  partj^^^'  But  there  is  no  implied  right  of 
this  kind  which  justifies  a  breach  of  the  peace,  although  there  is 
no  statute  analogous  to  the  statute  of  forcible  entry  and  unlawful 
detainer.^^^  Nor  may  defendant  take  goods  which  came  lawfully 
into  plaintiff's  hands.  ^^^    Where  cattle  stray  into  another's  field  be- 

.  122  Vaspor  V.  Edwards,  12  Hod.  658.  Further,  as  to  common  law,  see 
Cape  V.  Scott,  L.  R.  9  Q.  B.  269;  Goodwyn  v.  Cheveley,  4  Hurl.  &  N.  G31; 
Williams  v.  Spencer,  5  Johns.  352. 

123  Nash  V.  Lucas,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  590;  Crabtree  T.  Robinson,  15  Q.  B. 
Div.  312. 

124  Sprague  v.  Railroad  Co.,  6  Dak.  86,  50  N.  W.  617;  Frazier  v.  Noitimis, 
34  Iowa,  82;  Oil  v.  Rowley,  G9  111.  469;  Buter  v.  Foy,  46  Iowa,  132;  Northcote 
V.  Smith,  4  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R.  505;  Little  Rock  &  F.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Finley,  37 
Ark.  .5(i2;  Eastman  t.  Rice,  14  Me.  419;  Crocker  v.  JIann,  3  Mo.  472;  Mooney 
V.  Maynard,  1  Vt.  470.  Contra,  Stewart  v.  Benninger,  138  Pa.  St.  437,  21 
Atl.  1,59;   Bulpit  v.  Matthews,  42  III.  App.  561. 

12-'  Patrick  v.  Colerick,  3  Meos.  &  W.  483;  Chambers  v.  Bedell,  2  Watts  & 
S.  225;  Hartwell  v.  Kelly,  117  Mass.  235;  Spencer  v.  M'Gowen,  13  Wend. 
25G. 

126  3  Bl.  Comm.  4;  Anthony  v.  Haney,  8  Bing.  186;  Heermance  v.  Veruoy. 
6  Johns.  5;  Salisbury  v.  Green;  17  R.  I.  758,  24  Atl.  787;  Blake  v.  Jerome,  14 
Johns.  406;  Boiling  v.  Whittle,  37  Ala.  35;  Dixon  v.  Clow,  24  Wend.  18S. 
Compare  JIcLeod  v.  .Tones,  105  Mass.  403,  with  Hartwell  t.  Kelly,  117  Mass, 
2;j5. 

127  Harding  v,  Sandy,  43  111.  App.  442;  Salisbury  r.  Green,  17  R.  I.  758,  24 
Atl.  787;  Richardson  v.  Anthony,  12  Vt.  273.  However,  where  proijerty  is 
taken  away  from  those  in  possession,  and  in  good  faith  claiming  possession, 
forcibly,  without  authority,  and  in  thoir  presence,  they  may  recaptiu-e  it  with- 
out resorting  to  legal  process.     State  v.  Dooley,  121  Mo.  591.  2!l  S.  W.  558. 

128  "If  I  bail  my  goods  to  a  man,  I  cannot  justify  entering  his  house  to  take 
my  goods,  for  it  was  by  no  wrong  that  they  came  there,  but  by  the  act  of  us 


67J^  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PEOPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

cause  of  defective  fences,  the  owner  is  bound  to  remove  tliem  within 
a  reasonable  time/-"  Fiesh  re-entry  is  not  so  much  justified  as 
authority  of  law  to  re-enter  as  it  is  recognized  by  a  denial  of  any 
right  acquired  from  temporary  possession  by  the  trespasser. ^^^ 

In  the  same  class  of  justification  by  law  are  those  cases  which 
necessity  constitutes  as  justification.  Thus,  where  a  highway  or 
way  of  necessity  has  become  impassable  it  is  for  the  public's  good 
that  people  should  be  allowed  to  pass  over  the  adjoining  land.^°^ 
Where  it  is  necessary  to  enter  upon  the  land  of  another  for  the 
preservation  of  life  ^"^  or  property,  as  by  entry  for  the  purpose  of 
preventing  the  spread  of  fire,^"^  necessity  is  a  sufficient  excuse.  By 
way  of  contrast,  the  right  to  commit  a  trespass  in  pursuit  of  ani- 
mals ferse  naturae  is  not  now  recognized  by  English  or  American 

l)oth."  9  Edw.  IV.  p.  35,  pi.  10;  Wmiams  v.  Morris,  S  Mees.  &  W.  488;  Wilde 
T.  Waters,  2i  Law  J.  O.  P.  193;  Webb  v.  Beavan,  6  Man.  &  G.  1053.  But 
■one  may  enter  tbe  close  of  another  to  rescue  a  boat  of  another  cast  there  by* 
a.  storm.     Proctor  v.  Adams,  113  Mass.  376.     • 

129  "If  I  drive  my  beasts  along  the  highway,  and  j'ou  have  opened  unin- 
■closed  land  adjoining  the  highway,  and  my  beasts  enter  your  land  and  eat  the 
herbage  thereof,  and  I  come  freshly  and  chase  them  out  of  your  land,  you 
shall  not  have  an  action  against  me,  for  the  chasing  of  them  was  lawful." 
<3  Edw.  IV.  p.  7,  pi.  IS;  Goodwyn  v.  Cheveley,  4  Hurl.  &  N.  (531;  Tillett  v. 
Ward,  10  Q.  B.  Div.  17;  Hartford  v.  Brady,  114  Mass.  46G.  Et  vide  Browne 
v.  Providence,  H.  &  F.  R.  Co.,  12  Gray,  55;  Towne  v.  Nashua  &  L.  R.  R., 
124  Mass.  101;  Amstein  v.  Gardner,  132  Mass.  2S;  Taft  v.  New  York,  P.  & 
B.  B.  Co.,  157  Mass.  297-302,  32  N.  E.  168;  Cool  v.  Crommet,  13  Me.  250; 
Bush  V.  Brainard,  1  Cow.  78,  and  note. 

130  Ante,  pp.  650,  657. 

131  Absor  V.  French,  2  Show.  28;  Asser  v.  French,  2  Lev.  234;  Ante,  note 
122,  to  necessity  under  variations  to  the  normal  right  to  sue;  Campbell  v. 
Race,  7  Cush.  408;  Morey  v.  Fitzgerald,  56  Vt.  487;  Carey  v.  Rae,  58  Cal.  159. 
There  is,  however,  no  such  privilege  with  respect  to  a  private  right  of  way, 
which  must  be  confined  strictly  to  the  terms  of  granO  Ponifret  v.  Ricroft, 
1  Saund.  321;  Taylor  v.  Whitehead,  2  Doug.  745;  Bullar^v.  Harrison,  4  Maule 
&  S.  387.  It  is  otherwise  where  the  grantor  of  a  pri^te  right  of  way  has 
obstructed  it  so  it  cannot  be  used  except  by  deviaticjil  on  his  adjacent  land. 
Selby  V.  Nettlefold,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  111. 

132  y.  B.  37  Hen.  VI.  p.  37,  pi.  26. 

133  Per  Littleton,  J.,  9  Edw.  IV.  p.  35,  pi.  10;  American  Print  Works  v. 
Lawrence,  23  N.  J.  Law,  590,  collecting  cases;  Proctor  v.  Adams,  113  Mass. 
376.     Compare  Jones  v.  Richmond,  18  Grat  (Va.)  517. 


'^'h.    10]  TRESPASS.  679 

law.i  =  *  Xor  is  entry  upon  another's  premises  to  cut  down  timber 
justified  simply  because  it  stood  close  to  the  line."^  A  trespass  may 
be  excused  on  the  ground  that  it  is  committed  in  self-defense,  in  order 
to  escape  some  special  danger  or  apparent  peril,  or  in  defense  of  the 
possession  of,  or  to  rescue,  a  man's  goods  or  chattels.^'"  Generally, 
any  public  authority  or  direction  carries  with  it  an  exemption  from 
liability  for  what  is  necessary  and  proper  to  carry  it  into  effect."^ 
A  trespasser  cannot  escape  liability  by  handing  the  fruits  of  the  tres- 
pass or  wrong  over  to  another.  Thus,  where  the  sheriff  takes  the 
goods  of  one  man  under  an  attachment  of  another,  a  recovery  may 
be  had  against  him  for  the  trespass  after  he  has  gone  out  of  office, 
though  his  successor  sold  the  goods,  and  received  the  proceeds  aris- 
ing therefrom.^''*  i 

Abuse  of  License — Trespass  ab  initio.      //v'^'  ^ 

Abuse,  not  consisting  in  mere  nonfeasance,  of  license  given  by 
law  but  not  of  license  given  by  parties,  to  enter  upon  lands,  makes 
trespass  ab  initio. 

131  Paul  v.  Summerhayes,  4  Q.  B.  Div.  9;  Glenn  v.  Kays,  1  111.  App.  479; 
Sterling  v.  Jackson,  C9  Mich.  488,  37  N.  W.  mr,. 

135  "No  doubt,"  said  Howard,  J.,  in  Toledo,  St.  L.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Loop 
(Ind.  Sup.)  39  N.  B.  306,  "if  a  boulder,  a  log,  or  a  decrepit  tree  threaten  to 
roll  or  fall  from  an  adjoining  land  upon  a  railroad  track  or  other  highway,  and 
there  was  no  time  to  lose  in  seeking  permission  from  the  owner,  anj'  one  might 
enter  on  the  land  to  avert  the  danger."  Mayhew  v.  Burns,  103  Ind.  328,  2 
N.  E.  793;  Cooley,  Torts,  p.  46;  Wood,  Nuis.  §  t07.  "However.  *  *  * 
all  peril  may  not  be  averted.  It  is  the  immediate  and  probable,  and  not 
the  remote  and  barely  possible,  that  we  are  called  upon  to  guard  against. 
*  *  *  As  for  trees  that  gi'ow  so  close  to  the  line  that  their  branches  ex- 
tend over  the  adjoining  premises,  there  is  no  doubt  that,  if  injury  is  shown, 
the  adjoining  owner  may  have  his  action  in  damages,  or  he  may  cut  off  the 
overhanging  branches  so  far  as  they  extend  above  the  soil.  He  may  not, 
though,  cross  his  neighbor's  line  and  cut  down  tlie  tree.  Wood,  Nuis.  §  108; 
Lemon  v.  Webb  [1894]  3  Ch.  1." 
130  Ball,  Torts  &  Cont.  21. 

137  Southern  Bell  Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Constantine,  9  C.  C.  A.  3."i9, 
61  Fed.  61. 

138  Duke  V.  Vincent,  29  Iowa,  308;   Wise  v.  .Jeffcris,  2  C.  0.  A.  -t!2,  51  Fed. 

643.     The  rule  is  the  same  in  trover.     Livermore  v.  Northrup,  44  N.  Y.  107. 

Nor  can  liability  for  a  nuisance  be  escaped  by  demise  of  premises  on  which 

ft 
It  is  created.     Post,  p.  795,  "Xuisance." 


680  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

Where  the  law  authorizes  one  to  enter  upon  the  premises  of  an- 
other, and  such  person,  having  entered,  abuses  that  license,  he  be- 
comes a  trespasser  ab  initio.  His  misconduct  relates  back  so  as  to 
make  his  original  entry  tortious.  In  the  celebrated  Six  Carpenters' 
Case,  ^"^  six  carpenters  entered  an  inn  and  were  served  with  wine, 
for  which  they  paid.  They  afterwards  asked  for  more  wine,  and 
were  supplied  with  it.  This  they  refused  to  pay  for.  They  were 
sued  as  trespassers  ab  initio.  The  court  laid  down  the  three  follow- 
ing rules:  (1)  Where  a  man  abuses  an  authority  or  license  given 
him  by  law,  he  becomes  a  trespasser  ab  initio;  (2)  where  a  man 
abuses  an  authority  or  license  given  him  by  another  party,  he  may 
be  punished  for  such  an  abuse,  but  he  is  not  a  trespasser  ab  initio; 
and  (3)  a  mere  nonfeasance  cannot  make  a  person  who  had  authority 
or  license  given  him  by  law  a  trespasser  ab  initio.  The  doctrine  of 
the  case  has  been  repeatedly  confirmed.^**  However,  its  last  rule 
has  been  criticised  as  being  merely  artificial,  and  in  many  cases 
has  been  practically  disregarded.^*^  The  present  tendency  of  the 
cases,  moreover,  is  to  disregard  the  merely  verbal  difference  in- 
volved in  the  distinction  between  misfeasance  and  nonfeasance.^*'* 
But  if  a  landlord,  lawfully  entering  upon  premises  for  the  purpose 
of  making  a  distress,  abuse  this  right,  given  him  by  law,  by  con^ 
vertiug  the  goods  to  his  own  use,  this  would  be  such  a  positive 
wrong,  and  not  the  mere  omission  to  do  something,  and  would  make 
him  a  trespasser  ab  initio.^*^  In  order  that  a  man  may  be  made  a 
trespasser  ab  initio,  where  the  law  has  given  him  the  entry,  the  acts 

13  0  8  Coke,  146a;   1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  144. 

140  Oxley  V.  Watts,  1  Term  R.  12;  Bagshaw  v.  Go  ward.  Bull.  N.  P.  81; 
Gargrave  v.  Smith,  1  Salk.  221;  Dye  v.  Leatherdale,  3  Wils.  20;  Barnett  v. 
Earl  of  Guildford,  11  Exch.  19.  And  see  Ordway  v.  Ferrin,  3  N.  H.  69; 
Adams  v.  Rivers,  11  Barb.  390;  Hale  v.  Clark,  19  Weud.  498;  Whitney  v. 
Backus,  149  Pa.  St.  29,  24  Atl.  51;  Wilbur  v.  Turner,  39  111.  App.  526;  Baker 
v.  Lewis,  150  Pa.  St.  251,  24  Atl.  616;  Spades  v.  MuiTay,  2  Ind.  App.  401,  28 
N.  E.  709. 

"1  Note  to  Barrett  v.  White  (3  N.  H.  210)  in  14  Am.  Dee.  365. 

142  Ante,  0.  1. 

143  Gargrave  v.  Smith,  1  Salk.  221.  But  see  11  Geo.  II.  c.  19,  §  19.  Attack 
V.  Bramwell,  3  Best  &  S.  520.  Further,  as  to  nonfeasance,  see  West  v.  Nibbs, 
4  C.  B.  172;  Vertue  v.  Beasley,  1  Moody  &  R.  21;  Evans  v.  Elliott,  5  Add. 
&  E.  142;   Jacobsohn  v.  Blake,  6  Man.  &  G.  925. 


Ch.   10]  TRESPASS.  681 

of  abuse  must  be  of  such  a  character  that  there  will  be  continued 
trespass  in  the  absence  of  license.^^* 

Consent  of  Owner  or  Occupant. 

The  justification  of  a  trespass  by  the  consent  of  owner  or  occu- 
pant is  the  logical  application  to  trespass  of  the  familiar  principles 
already  considered  that  no  one  can  object  to  what  he  has  con- 
sented to.  The  consent  of  the  party  may  be  expressed,  or  it  may 
be  implied.  "In  the  common  intercourse  of  life  between  friends  and 
neighbors,  tacit  licenses  ar&  constantly  given  and  acted  on."  ^^^  Thus, 
the  license  to  enter  on  land  may  be  inferred  from  entries  made  in 
course  of  friendly  visiting  extending  over  a  great  period  of  time.^^* 
.  A  mere  agreement  to  sell  does  not  necessarily  import  a  license  to 
enter  on  the  premises;  ^^''  but  if  a  man  made  a  lease  reserving  the 
trees,  the  law  will  imply  a  right  to  enter  and  to  show  them  to  the 
purchaser. ^''^  It  is  to  be  determined  by  the  jury,  upon  considera- 
tion of  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case.^^°  The  consent,  however, 
must  be  that  of  the  owner  and  occupant,  and  not  of  a  third  per- 
son.^^"     One  person  cannot  protect  himself  by  an  alleged  or  actual 

144  Taylor  v.  Jones,  42  N.  H.  25-34,  and  cases  cited;  Stone  v.  Knapi),  29  Vt. 
501;  Mitchell  v.  Mitchell,  54  Minn.  301,  55  N.  W.  1134  (special  administrator); 
Adams  v.  Rivers,  11  Barb.  390.  And,  generally,  see  discussion  ol;  this  subject 
in  English  and  American  note  to  the  Six  Carpenters'  Case  in  Smith,  Lead. 
Cas.  (Sth  Am.  Ed.)  p.  257. 

155  Pol.  Torts,  §  308. 

156  Martin  v.  Houghton,  45  Barb.  258,  and  cases  cited  at  page  260. 

157  Eggleston  v.  Railway  Co.,  35  Barb.  162;    Fagan  v.  Scott,  14  Hun,  1G2. 

158  Harmon  v.  Harmon,  61  Me.  222-224.  As  to  right  to  open  family  tomb- 
and  dispose  of  corpse,  see  Lakln  v.  Ames,  10  Cush.  198.  Et  vide  Fletcher 
V.  Evans,  140  Mass.  241,  2  N.  E.  837.  As  to  what  license  is  sufficient  to 
justify  entering  a  house,  see  Cutler  v.  Smith,  57  111.  252. 

isoLampet  v.  Starkey,  10  Coke,  46b.  So,  imder  a  verbal  contract  of  sale 
of  standing  trees  to  be  cut  and  removed  by  the  purchaser,  the  law  implies 
a  license  for  the  purpose  of  cutting  and  removing  the  same.  Duryea  v. 
Smith,  62  Hun,  019,  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  688.  Et  vide  Wlnterbourne  v.  Morgan, 
11  East,  .396;  Bac.  Abr.  "Trespass,"  F;  Keane  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  161 
Mass.  203,  36  N.  E.  788. 

160  Neither  a  trespasser  nor  tenant  can  grant  a  valid  easement  over  the 
land  of  another.  Gentleman  v.  Soule,  32  111.  27^.  Permission  to  trim  plain- 
tiff's trees,  given  defendant  by  a  person  Ijaving  no  authority,  does  not  ex- 
cuse defendant's  trespass  in  acting  on  such  permission,  though  he  thought 


682  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPKKTY.  [Ch.   10 

agreement  with  another  trespasser.'"  Nor  does  the  instruction  of 
plaintiff's  wife  to  remove  household  goods  justify.'"-  Cases  of  this 
kind  often  arise,  where  the  third  person  acts  on  the  mistaken  sup- 
position that  he  can  confer  the  authority.  As  to  lands,  possession 
of  color  of  title  only  by  the  licensor  is  no  defense  to  the  licensee.'"'' 
The  cases  as  to  personal  property  would  not  seem  to  be  agreed 
whether  or  not,  under  such  circumstances,  taking  possession  by  the 
supposed  owner  is  trespass,  where  there  has  been  no  demand  on  the 
real  owner  and  refusal  to  deliver  to  him,'"''  Where  a  party  justi- 
fies under  authority  from  the  individual  or  authority  of  law,  he  must 
alike  show  that  he  acted  strictly  within  the  provisions  of  such  au- 
thority.'"'    An  excess  of  license  is  a  trespass.'"" 

A  license  which  is  not  so  coupled  with  an  interest  as  to  become  a 
grant  is  personal  as  between  the  parties,  and  cannot  be  assigned  to 
a  stranger.'"^  It  is  said  that  there  is  no  such  right  as  a  license,  fall- 
such  person  had  authority.  Huling:  v.  Henderson,  101  Pa.  St.  5.J3.  29  Atl. 
276;    Beaumont  Lumber  Co.  r.  Ballard  (Tex.  Cly.  App.)  23  S.  W.  920. 

i«i  Hazelton  v.  Week,  40  Wis.  GGl,  6  N.  W.  309.  Et  vide  Olsen  v.  Upsahl, 
69  111.  273;  Williamson  v.  Fischer,  50  Mo.  198;  Smith  v.  Felt,  50  Barb.  612; 
Mclntyre  v.  Green,  36  Ga.  48;  Williams  v.  Sheldon,  10  Wend.  654;  Woodruff 
V.  Halsey,  8  Pick.  333;    Vosburgh  v.  Moak,  1  Cush.  453. 

102  Burns  y.  Kirkpatrick,  91  Mich.  364,  51  N.  W.  803.  Compare  Grim  t. 
Robinson,  31  Neb.  540,  48  N.  W.  388. 

103  Sandborn  v.  Sturtevant,  17  Me.  200.  Et  vide  Huling  v.  Henderson,  161 
Pa.  St.  553,  29  Atl.  276. 

164  Compare  Stanley  y.  Gaylord,  1  Cush.  536,  Hyde  v.  Noble,  13  N.  H.  494, 
and  Galvin  v.  Bacon,  11  Me.  28,  with  Pierce  v.  Vandyke,  6  Hill,  613. 

165  Gate  V.  Gate,  44  N.  H.  211. 

160  Capel  V.  Lyons  (City  Ct.  N.  Y.)  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  49;  Inderlied  v.  Whaley, 
«>5  Hun,  407,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  183;  Kisseeker  v.  Monn,  30  Pa.  St.  313;  Abbott 
V.  Wood,  13  Me.  ll.j;  Riddle  v.  Brown,  20  Ala.  412;  Juchter  v.  Boehm,  67 
Ga.  539.  No  permanent  interest  in  land,  even  by  easement,  can  be  created 
by  parol  license,  but  such  license  is  a  protection  as  to  anything  properly  done 
under  It  before  revocation,  although  not  where  the  act  is  negligently  done  to 
plaintiff's  damage.     Selden  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  29  N.  Y.  634. 

167  Ackroyd  v.  Smith,  10  C.  B.  164;  Gronendyke  v.  Cramer,  2  Ind.  382; 
Carleton  v.  Redington,  21  N.  H.  291;  Ruggles  v.  I<esure,  24  Pick.  187;  Harris 
V.  Gillingham,  6  N.  H.  9;  Paine  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  14  Fed.  407;  Rein- 
miller  V.  Skidmore,  7  Lans.  161;  Jackson  v.  Babcock,  4  Johns.  418;  Menden- 
hall  V.  Klinck,  51  N.  Y.  246;  De  Haro  v.  V.  S.,  5  Wall.  599;  Blaisdell  v.  Rail- 
road, 51  N.  H.  483. 


<-">•    10]  TRESPASS.  683 

ing  short  of  an  easement,  which  is  not  subject  to  revocation  at 
^y}]l_i6s  rpjjg  1j(j](J(,j.  Qf  .^  general  admission  ticlcet  to  a  theater  seems 
to  have  only  a  license  revocable  at  will,  and  that  on  ejection  the 
holder  must  sue  on  contract^""  The  revocation  of  a  license,  like 
that  of  a  grant,  may  either  be  by  express  words  or  by  any  act  "suf- 
ficiently signifying  the  licensor's  will.  If  a  man  has  leave  and  li- 
cense to  pass  through  a  certain  gate,  the  license  is  as  effectually  re- 
voked by  locking  the  gate  as  by  further  notice."  ^'"'  In  general,  a 
mere  use  of  land  by  a  licensor  in  a  manner  incompatible  with  the 
license,  terminates  it  without  notice.^'^  It  is  terminated  by  a  trans- 
fer of  the  property  ^"  on  or  by  the  death  of  the  licensor.^" 

i»s  Shirley  v.  Orabb  (Iiul.  Sup.)  37  N.  B.  130.  Thus,  tlie  facts  that  the 
owner  once  orally  consented  to  the  construction  of  the  sewer  which  polluted 
a  stream  ranning  through  his  farm,  and  that  the  village  went  to  considerable 
expense  towards  constructing  it  before  suit  was  begun,  do  not  estop  him  from 
asking  an  injunction,  since  such  consent  constitutes  a  mere  license,  revocable 
at  will.  Village  of  Dwight  v.  Hayes,  150  111.  273,  37  N.  K.  218  (49  111.  App. 
530,  affirmed).  Et  vide  Bohn  v.  Hatch  (Super.  Buff.)  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  550;  Giles 
V,  Simonds,  15  Gray,  441;  Houston  v.  Laft'ee,  46  N.  H.  505;  Carleton  v. 
Redington,  21  N.  H.  201;  Hetfield  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  29  N.  J.  Law,  571;  Kim- 
ball V.  Yates,  14  111.  4G4;  Jamieson  v.  Millemann,  3  Duer,  255;  Duinneen  v. 
Rich,  22  Wis.  550;  White  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  63  Hun,  634,  IS  N.  Y.  Supp. 
390;  Giles  v.  Simonds,  15  Gray,  441;  Burton  v.  Scherpl',  1  Allen,  133;  Allen 
V.  Fiske,  42  Vt.  462;  Eckerson  v.  Crippen,  110  N.  Y.  585,  18  N.  E.  443; 
Owen  V.  Field,  12  Allen,  457;  Kremer  v.  Railway  Co.,  51  Jlinn.  15,  52  N.  W. 
977;  Croukhite  v.  Cronkhite,  94  N.  Y.  323;  Fargis  v.  AValton,  107  N.  Y.  398, 
14  N.  E.  :?03;  Totel  v.  Bonuefoy,  12:!  111.  653,  14  N.  E.  687;  Howe  v.  Searing, 
6  Bosw.  354;  Lake  Erie  .&  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kennedy,  132  Ind.  274,  31  N.  E. 
943;  Rayner  v.  Nugent,  00  Md.  515;  Parish  v.  Kaspare,  109  Ind.  580,  10  N. 
E.  109. 

160  Wood  V.  Leadbitter,  13  Mees.  &  W.  838;  Hyde  v.  Graham,  32  Law  J, 
Bxch.  27.  Wood  v.  Leadbitter  involved  a  general  admission  ticket  By  an- 
alogy to  the  rule  as  to  lodgers,  a  license  to  occupy  exclusively  a  particular 
seat  would  seem  to  amoimt  to  a  demise  for  the  time  of  the  particular  seat, 
and  therefore  not  be  revocable.     Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  27.s,  note  C. 

17  0  Pol.  Torts,  §  308. 

171  Simpson  v.  Wright,  21  111.  App.  67;  Wilson  v.  ICailway  Co.,  41  Minn.  56, 
42  N.  W.  6t)0;    Johnson  v.  Skillman,  29  Minn.  95,  12  N.  W.  149. 

172  As  by  a  conveyance  of  the  land.  Harris  v.  Gillingham,  6  N.  II.  9; 
Drake  v.  Wells,  11  Allen,  141;    Cook  v.  Stearns,  11  Mass.  533;    Foot  v.  New 

173  Putney  y.  Day,  6  N.  H.  430;  Eggleston  v.  New  York  &  H.  R.  Co.,  35 
Barb.  162;    Carter  v.  Harlan,  6  Md.  20;    Jenkins  v.  Lykes,  19  Fla.  14S. 


684  WliONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

There  is  an  important  distinction  between  a  license  and  a  license 
coupled  with  an  interest  which  becomes  a  grant.  "License  under 
seal  (provided  it  be  a  mere  license)  is  as  revocable  as  a  license  by 
jiarol;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  license  by  parol  coupled  with  a 
grant  is  as  irrevocable  as  a  deed,  provided  only  that  the  grant  is  of 
a  nature  capable  of  being  made  by  parol."  ^'*  A  license  is  coupled 
with  an  interest  where  the  person  obtaining  a  license  to  do  a  thing 
also  acquires  a  right  to  the  possession  and  control  of  the  property 
witli  which  the  license  is  connected.  In  such  cases  the  authority 
conferred  by  the  license  is  not  merely  a  permission,  but  amounts  to 
a  grant,  and  may  be  assigned  to  a  third  person."^ 

If  the  interest  to  which  the  license  is  annexed  is  an  interest  in 
the  lands  itself,  as  to  go  upon  the  lands  to  take  the  profit  or  enjoy 
an  easement,  and  the  license  is  in  due  form,  it  is  irrevocable.     Doubt 

Haven  &  N.  Co.,  23  Conn.  214;  Seldensparger  v.  Spear,  17  Me.  123;  Carter  v. 
Harlan,  6  Md.  20;  Prince  v.  Case,  10  Conn.  375;  Jenkins  v.  Lykes,  19  Fla. 
148;  Maxwell  v.  Bay  City  Bridge  Co.,  41  Micli.  453,  2  N.  W.  639;  Bridges  v. 
Purcell,  1  Dey.  &  B.  492;  Giles  v.  Simonds,  15  Gray,  441;  Dark  v.  Johnston, 
55  Pa-  St.  164;  Whitaker  v.  Cawthorne,  3  Dev.  (N.  C.)  389;  Houx  v.  Seat, 
26  Mo.  178. 

If*  "A  license  creates  no  estate  in  lands.  It  is  a  mere  poAver  or  authority 
founded  on  personal  confidence,  not  assignable,  and  revocable  at  pleasure  un- 
less subsidiary  to  a  valid  grant,  to  the  beneficial  enjoyment  of  which  its  exer- 
cise is  necessary,  or  unless  executed  under  such  circumstances  as  to  warrant 
the  interposition  of  equity.  This  is  the  result  of  the  best  considered  cases. 
The  doctrine  of  the  early  cases  which  converted  and  executed  license  into  an 
easement  is  now  generally  discarded  as  being  'in  the  teeth  of  the  statutes  of 
frauds.'  *  *  *  In  cases  where  the  license  is  connected  with  a  valid  grant, 
as  of  cliattels  or  fixtures  upon  the  land  of  the  licensor  susceptible  of  being  re- 
moved, it  is  subsidiaiy  to  the  right  of  property,  and  irrevocable  to  the  extent 
necessary  to  protect  the  licensee,  and  saves  to  him  the  right  of  entry,— the 
right  of  possession  following  the  right  of  property."  Vanderburg,  J.,  in  John- 
son V.  Skillman,  29  Minn.  95-97,  12  N.  W.  149,  and  cases  there  cited;  Miller 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  6  Hill,  61,  2  Am.  Lead.  Cas.  (5th  Ed.)  576;  Kremer  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  51  Minn.  15,  52  N.  W.  977;  Wood  v.  Leadbitter,  13  Mees.  &  W.  838; 
Thomas  v.  Sorrell,  Vaughan,  330.  Et  vide  Lee  v.  Stevenson,  El.,  Bl.  &  El.  512; 
Nettleton  v.  Sites,  8  Mete.  (Mass.)  34;    Heath  v.  Randall,  4  Gush.  195. 

17  5  Sterling  v.  Warden,  51  N.  H.  217.  A  person  having  an  Irrevocable 
license  to  enter  on  the  land  of  another,  and  there  do  an  act,  may  use  such 
force  as  is  required  for  the  purpose,  without  being  liable  to  an  action.  Lam- 
bert V.  Robi-sson,  162  Mass.  34,  37  N.  E.  753. 


<^h-    10]  TRESPASS.  685 

lias  been  expressed,  however,  as  to  whether  a  license  can  be  so  an- 
nexed to  an  interest  in  mere  personal  prt)perty  as  to  become  irrev- 
ocable. In  Vin.  Abr.^o  it  is  said  that  "when  a  man  bails  goods 
to  another  to  keep,  it  is  not  lawful  for  him,  though  the  doors  are 
open,  to  enter  into  the  house  of  the  bailee  and  to  take  the  goods; 
but  he  ought  to  demand  them;  and  if  they  are  denied,  to  bring  writ 
<.f  detinue  and  to  obtain  them  by  law."  But  it  has  been  held  that 
where  one  who  has  cut  hay  belonging  to  another,  and  put  it  into 
the  latter 's  barn,  obtains  and  carries  away  the  hay,  the  owner  can- 
not revoke  the  license  so  as  to  prevent  it.^"  However,  even  if  the 
license  be  not  actually  coupled  with  the  grant,  but  be  so  far  exe- 
cuted as  to  induce  the  belief  that  there  has  been  a  grant,  and  the 
defendant  has  expended  considerable  monej^  in  making  permanent 
improvements,  induced  by  the  silence  of  the  plaintiff  to  believe  the 
license  to  be  permanent,  it  has  been  held  to  be  irrevocable.  Thus,  in 
a  celebrated  English  case,  defendant  gave  verbal  permission  to  run 
a  water  course  through  his  land.  This  was  constructed  at  a  great 
cost,  and  was  used  for  nine  years.  The  defendant  cut  the  water 
off  but  was  restrained  from  obstructing  its  flow  by  an  injunction. ^^^ 
Where  the  owner  of  land  gives  parol  permission  to  a  railroad  com- 
pany to  enter  thereon  and  construct  its  roadbed,  such  license  is  rev- 
ocable only  so  long  as  it  is  executory;  and  after  the  company  has 
spent  large  sums  of  money  in  pursuance  thereof  in  the  construction 
of  its  roadbed,  such  license  cannot  be  revoked.""  On  the  other 
hand,  the  principle  is  enforced   that  a  license  is  revocable  even 

176  "Trespass,"  20  Hen.  VI.,  p.  4,  pi.  12.  Et  vide  9  Eclw.  IV.,  p.  3.5,  pi.  10; 
"Wood  V.  Mannley,  11  Add.  &  E.  31. 

177  WUite  V.  Elwell,  48  Me.  300,  And  generally  whenever  a  license  amounts 
to  a  legal  grant  it  is  irrevocable.  Bracken  v.  RusliviUe  &  V.  G.  R.  Co.,  27  Ind. 
346;  Collins  Co.  v.  Marcy,  25  Conn.  239;  Rogers  v.'  Cox,  96  Ind.  157;  Bing- 
liam  V.  Salene,  15  Or.  208,  14  Pac.  523;  Nettleton  v.  Sikes,  8  Mete.  (Mass.)  34; 
Claflin  V.  Carpenter,  4  Mete.  (Mass.)  580;  Hetfield  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  29  N.  J. 
Law,  571;  Lewis  v.  McNatt,  65  N.  C.  63;  GofE  v.  Oberteiiffer,  3  Phila.  71; 
Douglas  v.  Sliuiuway,  13  Gray,  498. 

178  Feltham  v.  Cartwright,  5  Bing.  N.  C.  509.  A  license  executed  is  not 
countermandable.  See  Patrick  v.  Colerick,  3  Mees.  &  W.  483;  Wood  v.  Jlan- 
ley,  11  Adol.  &  E.  34. 

179  Messick  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  128  Ind.  81,  27  N.  E.  419;  Heath  v.  Raiv- 
dall,  4  Cush.  195;    Saucer  v.  Keller  (Ind.  Sup.)  28  N.  E.  1117;    Cook  v.  Stearns, 


686  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.   10 

though  the  licensor  permits  improTements  to  be  made.  This  has 
been  applied,  for  example,  to  the  occupation  of  "a  milling  district" 
by  railroad  tracks.^'" 

Liberum  TenemenUim. 

The  plea  "liberum  tenementum"  (that  it  is  the  defendant's  land) 
raises  the  question  of  title.  A  person  who  has  the  freehold  and  a 
right  to  possession  of  the  land  may,  by  a  peaceable  entry  upon  the 
land,  acquire  sufficient  possession  of  it  to  enable  him  to  maintain  an 
action  for  trespass  against  any  person  who,  being  in  possession  at  the 
time  of  his  entry,  wrongfully  continues  upon  the  land.*  The  per- 
mission of  the  owner  to  a  third  person  is  a  sufficient  license  for  a 
peaceable  entry.f   A  person  in  possession,  even  if  not  legally  entitled 

11  Mass.  533;  Cheever  v.  Pearson,  16  Pick.  266;  Ruggles  v.  Lesure,  21  Pick. 
187;  Claflin  v.  Carpenter,  4  Mete.  (Mass.)  5S0;  Smith  v.  Benson,  1  Hill,  176; 
Sterling  v.  Warden,  ol  N.  H.  217;  Yale  t.  Seeley,  15  Vt.  221;  Arrington  v.  Lar- 
rabee,  10  Gush.  512;  Snowden  v.  Wilas,  10  Ind.  10;  Ameriscoggin  Bridge  Co. 
V.  Bragg,  11  N.  H.  102;  Stephens  v.  Benson,  19  Ind.  367;  liOng  v.  Buclianan, 
27  Md.  502;  Cook  v.  Pridgen,  45  Ga.  331;  Lee  v.  McLeod,  17  Xev.  103;  Wick- 
ersham  v.  Orr,  9  Iowa,  25.S;  Gibson  v.  St.  Louis  A.  &  M.  Ass'n,  33  Mo.  App. 
165;  Rhodes  v.  Otis,  :i;',  Ala.  578;  Grimshaw  t.  Belcher,  88  Cal.  217,  26  Pac.  84; 
Flickinger  v.  Shaw,  87  Cal.  126,  25  Pac.  268;  ^^'ilson  y.  Chalfant,  15  Ohio,  248; 
Reriek  v.  Kem,  14  Serg.  &  R.  267;  Veghte  v.  Raritan,  etc.,  Co.,  19  N.  J.  Eq. 
142;  Risien  v.  Brown,  73  Tex.  135,  10  S.  W.  661;  Clark  v.  CHidden,  60  Vt 
702,  15  Atl.  358;  Lane  v.  Miller.  27  Ind.  534.  A  parol  license  to  divert  part 
of  the  water  of  a  stream  cannot  be  revoked  after  the  licensee  has  expended 
money  and  labor  in  pursuance  of  the  license.  JIcBroom  v.  Thompson  (Or.)  37 
Pac.  57.  After  a  city  has  given  a  license  to  place  awnings  over  the  side- 
walk, it  cannot  needlessly  revolve  it  until  the  licensees  have  enjoyed  it  suffi- 
ciently long  to  give  them  a  fair  return  for  their  outlay.  City  Council  of  Au- 
gusta V.  Burum,  93  Ga.  68,  19  S.  E.  820. 

ISO  Jackson  &  Sharp  Co.  v.  Philadelphia,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  4  Del.  Ch.  180;  Min- 
neapolis ilill  Co.  V.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  51  Minn.  .•!()4,  53  N.  W.  639; 
Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Michener,  117  Ind.  Km,  20  N.  E.  254;  Williams  v. 
Morrison,  32  Fed.  177;  Kivctt  v.  McKeithan,  90  N.  O.  106;  Woodward  v. 
Seeley,  11  111.  157;  St.  Louis  Stock  I'ards  v.  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.,  112  111.  384; 
Ketchum  v.  Newman,  116  N.  Y.  422,  22  N.  E.  10.52. 

"  Ball,  Torts  &  Cont.  19;  Butcher  v.  Butcher,  7  Barn.  &  C.  399. 

t  Hey  V.  Moorhouse,  6  Bing,  N.  C.  .52;  Chambers  v.  Donaldson,  11  East, 
65;  Sharon  v.  Wooldrick,  18  Minn.  354  (Gil.  325).  ' 


Ch.  10]  TRESPASS.  687 

to  it,  may  have  trespass  against  a  wrongdoer,  but  not  against  the 
rightful  owner4  Indeed,  by  statute,  the  owner  may  in  the  same  ac- 
tion recover  possession  and  damages.ft  It  is  required  that  plaintiff 
must  have  re-entered  before  he  can  maintain  his  action.||  Yet  it 
would  seem  that  it  is  not  a  valid  objection  that  proceedings  in  error 
upon  ejectment  are  pending.JJ 

Originally,  if  a  man  had  a  right  to  the  posssession  of  lands,  he  might 
enter  and  take  possession  by  force  of  arms.  In  1381,  by  the  statute 
of  5  Rich.  n.  c.  7,  it  was  provided  "that  none  from  henceforth  shall 
make  an  entry  into  any  lands  or  tenements  but  in  case  where  entry 
is  given  by  the  law,  and  in  such  case  not  with  a  strong  hand  nor 
with  a  multitude  of  people,  but  only  in  a  lisible,  aisie,  and  peisable 
manner."  This  statute  has  in  substance  been  re-enacted  in  all  parts 
of  the  United  States.  Therefore,  if  a  claimant  of  real  estate  out 
of  possession  resorts  to  force  or  violence  amounting  to  a  trespass 
of  the  person,  to  obtain  possession  from  another  claimant  who  is  in 
peaceable  possession,  the  party  using  such  force  and  violence  is 
liable  in  damages,  without  regard  to  legal  title  or  right  of  posses- 
sion.||  II  If  he  commit  a  breach  of  the  peace,  the  state  only  could 
prosecute  him  theref or.ftf  The  statute,  however,  is  not  inconsistent 
with  the  right  of  the  owner  of  the  premises  to  make  peaceable  en- 
try without  the  use  of  force  or  intimidation,  as  by  means  of  a  key.J+t 
When  the  rightful  owner  has  also  the  right  of  possession,  he  has  the 
right  to  enter  upon  his  own  land  peaceably;  and  if  his  entry  is  re- 
sisted by  force,  he  may,  it  seems,  repel  force  by  force,  and,  although 

t  Beddall  v.  Maitland,  17  Ch.  Div.  174;  Gunsolus  v.  Lormer,  54  Wis.  630, 
12  N.  W.  62. 

tt  Raymond  v.  Andrews,  6  Cush,  265;   Leland  v.  Tousey,  6  Hill,  ;;l;S. 

II  King  V.  Baker,  25  Pa.  St.  186;  Tongue  v.  Nutwell,  31  Md.  o02;  Caldwell 
V.  Walters,  22  Pa.  St.  378;  Fry  v.  Branch  Bank  at  Mobile,  16  Ala.  282;  Car- 
son V.  Smith,  1  Jones  (N.  C.)  106;  Stancill  v.  Calvert,  63  N.  C.  616. 

ttDouford  v.  EUys,  12  Mod.  1;;S;  Wilkinson  v.  Kirby,  15  C.  B.  430;  Bar- 
nett  V.  Earl  of  Guildford,  11  Exch.  19. 

II  II  Denver  &  K.  G.  Ky.  Co.  v.  Harris,  122  U.  S.  597,  7  Sup.  Ct.  128G. 

ttt  I.'OW  V.  Elwell,  121  Mass.  309. 

Pit  Livingston  v.  Webster,  2(i  Fla.  325,  8  South  442;  Fort  Dearborn  Lodge 
V.  Klein,  115  111.  177,  3  N.  E.  272;  Lee  v.  Town  of  Mound  Station,  118  111. 
£(04,  8  N.  E.  7.59;   Gage  v.  Hampton,  127  111.  S7,  20  X.  E.  3  2. 


<388  WRONGS   TO    POSSESSION    AND    PEOPERTY.  [Oh.    10 

he  may  be  liable  civilly  and  criminally  for  assault,  he  is  not  responsi- 
ble for  damages  in  trespass.||  ||  || 

Easement  or  Special  Property. 

A  person  may  justify  his  trespass  to  land  by  showing  that  he  has 
a  right  of  way  over  such  land.  Although  the  premises  to  which  the 
right  of  \^•ay  is  an  appurtenant  may  be  in  the  occupation  of  the  de- 
fendant, the  right  of  way  is  nevertheless  constructively  in  the  occu- 
pation of  the  defendant;  so  he  may  use  it  for  any  purpose  con- 
nected with  his  rights  as  a  landlord.^ ^^  This  is  true  of  a  private 
right  of  way,  so  far  as  where  access  and  use  is  allowed  by  the  terms 
of  the  grant,^^^  or  by  use.^^^     In  England,  a  right  of  way  may  exist 

II  II  II  1  "O'aslib.  Real  Prop.  §  390;  Jones  v.  .Tones.  31  Law  J.  Excli.  500;  Tvirner 
V.  Meymott,  1  Bing.  1.j8;  Butclier  v.  Butcher,  7  Barn.  &  C.  399;  Browne  v. 
Dawson,  12  Adol.  &  E.  624;  Lows  v.  Tellford,  1  App.  Cas.  414;  Blades  v. 
Higgs,  10  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  713;  Yeates  v.  AUin,  2  Dana,  i:;4;  Davis  v.  Burrell, 
10  C.  B.  821-825;  Burling  v.  Read,  11  Q.  B.  904;  Davison  v.  Wilson,  Id.  890; 
Harvey  v.  Brydges,  14  Meps.  &  W.  437;  Lyon  v.  Fairbanks,  79  Wis.  4.j,"i,  48 
N.  W.  492;  Manning  v.  Brown,  47  JId.  500;  Hoffman  v.  Harrington,  22  Mich. 
52;  Sterling  v.  Warden,  51  N.  H.  217;  Krevit  v.  Meyer,  24  Mo.  107;  Todd  v. 
Jackson,  20  N.  J.  Law,  525;  Hoots  v.  Graham,  23  111.  81.  But  see  Harding 
V.  Sandy,  43  111.  App.  442;  Ostatag  v.  Taylor,  44  111.  App.  469:  Twombly  v. 
JSIonroe,  130  Mass.  4il4;  Dustin  v.  Cowdry,  23  Vt.  031.  Et  vide  3  Bl.  Uomm. 
214;  1  Chit.  Gen.  Prac.  640;  Parsons  v.  Brown,  15  Barb.  590;  Newton  v.  Har- 
land,  1  Jlan.  &  G.  044;  Reeder  v.  Pm-dy,  41  111.  279;  cases  collected  in  Prazier 
V.  Caruthers,  44  111.  App..  at  page  02.  One  in  possession  of  immovable  property 
may  maintain  trespass  against  the  lawful  owner  for  unlawfully  and  forcibly 
distm-bing  his  possession.  Nicol  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  44  La.  Ann.  816,  11 
South.  34.  And  see  Green  v.  Hammock  (Ky.)  16  S.  W.  857.  Generally,  as  to 
when  action  of  forcible  entry  and  detainer  lies,  see  Cain  v.  Flood  (Com.  PI.) 
14  N.  T.  Supp.  770;  Giddens  v.  Boiling,  92  Ala.  586,  9  South.  274;  James  v. 
Miles,  54  Ark.  460,  16  S.  W.  195;  Peddicord  v.  Kile,  83  Iowa,  542,  49  N.  W.  997. 

181  Edwards  v.  Halinder,  Poph.  46. 

182  Watts  V.  Kelson,  L.  R.  6  Ch.  App.  Cas.  109;  United  Land  Co.  v.  Great 
Eastern  Ry.,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  App.  Cas.  582.  Compare  Newcomen  v.  Coulson,  L.  R. 
5  Ch.  Div.  133.  Where,  by  deed  in  1630,  a  sufficient  way  leave  was  granted  to 
a  colliery,  the  owners  were  allowed,  200  years  afterwards,  to  adapt  the  way 
to  the  improvements  of  the  age.  Dand  v.  Kingscote,  6  Mees.  &  W.  174,  as 
■expressed  by  ilalins,  V.  C,  in  5  Ch.  139.  Compare  Finch  v.  Great  Westei-n 
Ry.  Co.,  5  Exch.  Div.  254,  with  Skull  v.  Glenister,  16  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  SI. 

183  Cowling  V.  Higginson,  4  Mees.  &  W.  257;  Williams  v.  James,  L.  R. 
2  C.  P.  Cas.  577;  Wimbledon  v.  Dixon,  1  Ch.  Div.  371;  Dare  v.  Heathcote, 
25  L.  J.  Exch.  245.     But  proof  of  a  driveway,  by  prescription,  of  one  kind  of 


C'h.   10]  TRESPASS.  bSy 

by  custom  in  favor  of  a  limited  proportion  of  the  public,  as  a  rigM 
of  way  to  church  in  favor  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  particular  par- 
ish.^^*  No  action  lies  for  passing  or  repassing""^  on  a  public  way. 
An  individual  cannot  ordinarily  maintain  an  action  caused  by  ob- 
structing a  highway  unless  he  suffers  some  private,  direct,  and  ma- 
terial damages  beyond  the  public  at  large,  as  well  as  damages  other- 
wise irreparable.^*^  An  injunction  will,  however,  lie  at  the  instance 
of  an  abutting  property  owner  to  restrain  the  construction  of  an 
elevated  road,  where  no  law  authorizes  its  construction.^*'  It  is  not 
a  trespass  to  open  a  swinging  window  over  a  street.^**  If,  however, 
a  highway  be  used  for  purposes  foreign  to  its  dedication,  the  owner 

animals,  is  evidence  of  a  right  to  drive  otlier  kind  of  animals.  Ballard  v. 
Dyson,  1  Taunt.  279.  But  see  Lawton  v.  "Ward,  Ld.  Raym.  75;  Howell  v. 
King,  1  Mod.  190.  An  action  will  lie  to  a  private  individual  foi;  obstructioii 
to  a  private  way,  as  to  any  other  easement.  Williams  v.  Esling,  4  Pa.  St. 
486.  Where  a  person  has  a  right  of  way  for  logging  purposes,  and  defend- 
ant hauls  logs  over  it  for  him,  the  fact  that  other  persons  have  an  interest 
in  the  logs  does  not  make  defendant  a  trespa.sser.  Robinson  v.  Crescent  City 
Mill  &  Transp.  Co.,  93  Cal.  316,  28  Tac.  950. 

184  Poole  V.  Huskinson,  11  Mees.  &  W.  827;  Gateward's  Case,  6  Re- 
porter, 59b. 

185  Dovaston  v.  Payne,  2  H.  Bl.  527. 

1S6  Halsey  v.  Rapid  Transit  St.  Ry.  Co.,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  380,  20  Atl.  859;  Bur- 
lington Gaslight  Co.  v.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  59  N.  W.  292; 
Morris  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Newark  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  51  N.  J.  Ea.  379,  29  Atl.  184. 
A  civil  action  to  abate  a  public  nuisance  constituting  an  obstruction  to  a 
highway,  and  to  enjoin  its  maintenance,  may  be  maintained  by  a  town  in 
its  own  name.  Township  of  Hutchinson  v.  Filk,  44  Minn.  255,  47  N.  W. 
255.  A  city  in  which  is  vested  the  fee  of  its  streets,  in  trust  for  the  public, 
has  a  right  of  action  against  one  who  mines  coal  underlying  such  street, 
without  its  consent,  for  the  full  value  of  the  coal  so  mined,  though  the  re- 
moval of  the  coal  does  not  aft'ect  the  use  of  the  land  for  streets.  Union 
Coal  Co.  v..City  of  La  Salle,  136  111.  119,  26  N.  E.  506;  Upham  v.  Marsh,  128 
Mass.  546;  Weld  v.  Brooks,  152  Mass.  297,  25  N.  E.  719;  Conklin  v.  Old  Colony 
R.  Co.,  154  Mass.  155,  2S  N.  E.  143;  Nisley  v.  Harrisburg,  P.  Mt.  J.  &  L.  R.  Co., 
1  Pears.  23;  Bills  v.  Belknap,  36  Iowa,  583;  Matter  of  New  York  Catholic 
Protectory,  77  N.  Y.  342;  Bissell  v.  Collins,  28  Mich.  277;  Griswold  v.  Bay 
City,  35  Mich.  452;  City  of  Delphi  v.  Evans,  36  Ind.  90;  Hovey  v.  Mayo,  43 
Me.  322. 

187  Potts  V.  Quaker  City  El.  R.  Co.,  101  Pa,  St.  396,  29  Atl.  108;  Earll  r. 
City  of  Chicago,  136  111.  277,  26  N.  E.  370. 

188  OXinda  v.  Lothrop,  21  Pick.  292. 

LAW  OF  TOUTS — 44 


690  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

of  the  fee  has  constructive  possession,  so  far  that  he  may  maintain 
trespass  for  such  abuse.  Thus,  trespass  will  lie  on  the  part  of  abut- 
Tins  owners  for  erecting  telephone  poles  on  a  highway.^*"  So  tres- 
pass lies  for  stopping  in  front  of  a  man's  house  and  using  towards 
him  abusing  and  insulting  language.^""  What  would  otherwise  be 
a  trespass  may  be  justified  by  various  easements  of  other  descrip- 
tions."^ The  right  conferred  by  an  easement  includes  incidentally 
the  privilege  to  enter  upon  lands  to  repair  the  subject-matter  of  the 

SAME— REMEDIES. 

217.  Remedies  for  trespass  may  be — 

(a)  Self-help; 

(b)  Injunction; 

(c)  Damages.''^ 

The  remedy  for  a  trespass,  as  we  have  seen,  may  be  self-help ;  as 
where  possession  of  lands  or  chattels  is  regained  by  force,  or  a  fresh 

189  Board  of  Trade  Tel.  Co.  v.  Bamett,  107  111.  507. 

100  Adams  v.  Rivers,  11  Barb.  390.  So  for  shooting  at  game  on  the  high- 
way. Reg.  V.  Pratt,  4  El.  &  Bl.  S60.  The  public  have  no  right  of  holding 
public  meetings  in  a  public  thoroughfare.  Ex  parte  Lewis,  L.  R.  21  Q.  B. 
Div.  191.  And,  generally,  see  Lade  v.  Shephard,  2  Strange,  1004;  Eastman 
V.  Richmond  Highway  Board,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  Cas.  75;  BlundeU  v.  Catterall,  5 
Bam.  &  Aid.  268;  Every  v.  Smith,  26  Law  J.  Exch.  ,S44;  Beardslee  v.  French, 
7  Conn.  125;  New  Haven  v.  Sargent,  38  Conn.  50;  Fisher  v.  Rochester,  6 
Lans.  22.j;  Lyman  v.  Hale,  11  Conn.  185. 

i»i  To  hang  drying  lines:  Drewell  v.  Towler,  3  Barn.  &  Adol.  735.  To 
erect  a  signboard:  Hoare  v.  Metropolitan  Board  of  Works,  L.  R.  9  Q.  B. 
297;  Moody  v.  Steggles,  L.  B.  12  Ch.  Div.  261;  Francis  v.  Haywood,  L.  R. 
22  Ch.  Div.  177.  To  dig  a  ditch:  Don-is  v.  Sullivan,  90  Cal.  279,  27  Pac.  21G; 
Dexter  v.  Riverside  &  O.  Mills,  61  Hun,  610,  15  X.  Y.  Supp.  374.  A  water 
right:  Spargur  v.  Heard,  90  Cal.  221,  27  Pac.  198;  Riverdale  Park  Co.  v.  West- 
cott,  74  Md.  311,  22  Atl.  270. 

102  Pomfret  v.  Ricroft,  1  Saund.  321. 

193  An  action  may  be  maintained  for  a  trespass  on  land  though  no  actual 
damage  has  been  suffered,  since  repeated  trespasses  might  be  used  as  evi- 
dence of  title;  and  hence  the  maxim  "de  minimis"  does  not  apply.  Bragg 
V.  Lara  way,  65  Vt.  673,  27  Atl.  492.  In  an  action  for  trespass  on  land,  it 
appeared  that  from  60  to  100  of  defendant's  sheep  went  on  plaintiff's  land 
a  number  of  times;  that  they  were  on  the  land  about  four  weeks;  that  thev 


Ch.    10]  TRESPASS.  B91 

entry  is  made  on  a  trespasser,  or  where  the  right  of  distress  ^"^  and 
distress  damage  feasant  is  exercised. 

An  injunction  will  be  issued  by  the  court,  on  a  proper  showing 
for  equitable  interference.  Good  title  in  the  plaintiff  and  insolvency 
of  the  trespasser  have  been  held  sufficient."^  An  injunction  will  lie 
to  restrain  a  continued  trespass  when  threatened,""  or  against  a 
permanent  trespass.^"  And,  generally,  wherever  there  is  a  proba- 
bility of  irreparable  injury,  for  which  there  can  be  no  adequate  pe- 
cuniary compensation,  or  where  otherwise  a  multiplicity  of  suits 
cannot  be  prevented.^"*     On  the  other  hand,  where  the  injury  can 

broke  into  plaintiff's  wlieat  field  and  meadow;  that  plaintiff  only  cut  10 
loads  of  hay  from  the  part  of  the  meadow  on  which  the  sheep  were,  while 
14  loads  were  had  from  the  part  of  the  person  who  cut  the  hay  on  shares. 
Held,  that  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  recover  substantial  damages,  and  the 
rule  that  a  verdict  for  defendant  in  a  justice  court  will  not  be  reversed 
merely  to  enable  plaintiff  to  recover  nominal  damages  does  not  apply.  Phil- 
lips V.  Oovell,  79  Hun,  210,  29  N.  Y.  S.  613.  As  between  trespass  and  breach 
of  covenant,  see  Hill  v.  Bartholomew,  71  Hun,  453,  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  944. 

184  Talbot  V.  New  York  &  H.  R.  Co.,  78  Hun,  473,  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  187;  ante, 
p.  3.53,  "Injunction  under  Remedies." 

10  5  Hanly  v.  Watterson,  39  W.  Va.  214,  19  S.  E.  536.  And,  generally,  see 
Baltimore  Belt  R.  Co.  v.  Lee.  75  Md.  596,  23  Atl.  901;  Whitlock  v.  Con- 
sumers' Gas  Trast  Co.,  127  Ind.  62.  26  N.  E.  570;  Ashurst  v.  McKensie,  92 
'Via.  484,  9  South.  262;  Gilchrist  v.  Van  Dyke,  63  Vt.  75,  21  Atl.  1099. 

186  Murphy  v.  Lincoln,  63  Vt.  278,  22  Atl.  418. 

187  Miller  v.  Lynch,  149  Pa.  St.  460,  24  Atl.  80.  As  to  protection  of  water 
and  riparian  rights,  see  Carpenter  v.  Gold,  88  Va.  551,  14  S.  E.  329;  Lathrop 
V.  Haley,  81  Iowa,  649,  47  N.  W.  878;  Cedar  Lake  Hotel  Co.  v.  Cedar  Creek 
Hydraulic  Co.,  79  Wis.  297,  48  N.  W.  371.  As  to  title  to  support  water 
rights,  see  Wattupa  Reservoir  Co.  v.  City  of  Fall  River,  154  Mass.  305,  28 
N.  B.  257.  As  to  protection  of  easements  by  injunction,  see  Hoosier  Stone  Co. 
V.  Malott,  130  Ind.  21,  29  N.  E.  412;  Cunningham  v.  Fitzgerald,  63  Hun,  624, 
17  N.  Y.  Supp.  341,  and  IS  N.  Y.  Supp.  946;  Power  v.  Klein,  11  Mont.  159,  27 
Pac.  513;  Bank  of  State  of  Georgia  v.  Porter,  87  Ga.  511, 13  S.  E.  650;  Walker 
V.  Emerson,  89  Cal.  456,  26  Pac.  968;  Town  of  Marion  v.  Skillman,  127  Ind. 
130,  26  N.  E.  676. 

188  .Jerome  v.  Ross,  7  Johns.  Ch.  315,  per  Kent,  C;  Anderson  v.  Harvey's 
Heirs,  10  Grat.  38G;  Wood  v.  Braxton,  54  Fed.  1005;  Lembeck  v.  Nye,  47  Ohio 
St.  336,  24  N.  B.  686  (riparian  rights);  McMillan  v.  Ferrell,  7  W.  Va.  223; 
Moore  v.  Ferrell,  1  Ga.  7;  Erhardt  v.  Board,  113  U.  S.  537,  5  Sup.  Ct  565; 
Ellis  V.  Wren,  84  Ky.  254,  1  S.  W.  440;  Natoma  Water  &  Mining  Co.  v. 


()•-'-  WKDNCS    TO    POSSKSSION"    AND    PROPEKTY.  [Ch.    10 

be  fully  compensated  by  the  award  of  damages,  an  injunction  will 
not  be  issued.'"" 

There  can  be  no  fixed  rule  whereby  damages  for  trespass  will  be 
assessed.  The  extent  of  the  recoveiy  will  vary  with  the  right  of  the 
pfointiff.  Tlie  merest  intrusion  upon  bare  possession  will  entitle  at 
least  to  nominal  damages,  without  proof  of  actual  harm.^""  The  re- 
versioner alone  may  rgcoTer  for  future  injury,  unless  the  right  of  the 
person  in  possession  entitle  him  thereto.  Separate  actions  may  be 
brought  for  the  same  wrong.^"^  Where  a  stranger  cuts  down  trees, 
a  tenant  can  recover  only  in  respect  of  shade,  shelter,  and  fruit,  for 
he  is  entitled  to  no  more.^°-  On  the  other  hand,  an  heir  at  law  can- 
not maintain  trespass  for  an  injury  done  to  land  descended  to  him 
without  entry ;  but  after  entry,  his  right  of  possession  relates  back, 
so  as  to  support  an  action  against  a  wrongdoer  for  trespass  com- 
mitted at  an  antecedent  period.^"" 

The  measure  of  the  damages  will  also  depend  upon  the  nature  of 

Claikin,  14  Cal.  544;  Tainter  v.  Mayor,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  46;  Sullivan  v.  Rabb, 
86  Ala.  433,  5  South.  746;  Clendening  v,  OW,  118  Ind.  46,  20  N.  E.  639;  Clark 
V.  Jeffei-sonville,  M.  &  I.  E.  Co.,  44  Ind.  248;  Mui-phy  v.  Lincoln,  63  Vt.  278, 
22  AU.  418;  Ward  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  35  W.  Va.  481,  14  S.  E.  142;  Richards 
V.  Dower,  64  Cal.  62,  28  Pac.  113;  MiUer  v.  Lynch,  149  Pa.  St.  460,  24  Atl.  80; 
Gilchrist  v.  Van  Dyke,  03  Vt.  75,  21  Atl.  1099;  Yates  v.  Town  of  West  Graf- 
ton, 33  W.  Va.  507,  11  S.  E.  8;  Thompson  v.  Engle,  4  N.  J.  Eq.  271;  Sara- 
toga Co.  V.  Devoe,  77  N.  Y.  219. 

ISO  Cui-tis  V.  Paggett,  47  Kan.  86,  27  Pac.  109;  Bierer  v.  Hurst,  102  Pa. 
St.  1,  29  Atl.  9S;  Thomas  v.  James,  32  Ala.  723;  Crown  v.  Leonard,  32  Ga, 
241;  New  York  P.  &  D.  Establishment  v.  Fitch,  1  Paige,  97;  Hatcher  v. 
Hampton,  7  Ga.  49;  James  v.  Dixon,  20  JIo.  79;  Smith  v.  Pettingill,  15  Vt. 
82;  Rebelling  v.  ITirst  Nat.  Bank,  30  Fed.  744;  Ewing  v.  Rourke,  14  Or.  514, 
13  Pac.  413;  Jliller  v.  Burket,  132  Ind.  469,  32  N.  E.  309;  Heaney  v.  Butte  & 
M.  Commercial  Co.,  10  Mont.  590,  27  Pac.  379;  Latham  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.,  45  Fed.  721;  McCuUongh  v.  City  of  Denver,  39  Fed.  307;  German  v.  Clark, 
71  N.  0.  417;  West  Point  Iron  Co.  v.  Reymert,  45  N.  Y.  703;  Burnley  v. 
Cook,  13  Tex.  586;  Thornton  v.  Roll,  118  111.  350,  8  N.  E.  145. 

2  00  Ante,  p.  81. 

201  George  v.  Fisk,  32  N.  H.  32-45;  Lane  v.  Thompson,  43  X.  H.  320;  Reeder 
v.  Purdy,  41  111.  279;  Towne  v.  Kice,  24  Conn.  350;  Starr  v.  Jackson,  11  Mass. 
519;   Jackson  v.  Todd,  25  N.  J.  Law,  121;    Bennett  v.  Thompson,  13  Ired.  140. 

202  Bedingfield  v.  Onslow,  3  Lev.  209. 

203  Barnett  v.  Earl  of  Guildford,  11  E.\ch.  19. 


-•  TRESPASS.  693 

the  mjury.^oo  The  ordinary  rule  is  compensation.=»=  General  dam- 
ages will  also  be  inferred  by  the  law,  and  special  damages.^'^  when 
properly  pleaded  and  proved,  may  be  recovered.^"^  Thus,  general 
damages  will  lie  for  breaking  anothers  close,  and  special  damages 
for  the  use  of  the  property  interfered  with.^''^  Where  a  railroad 
company  lays  its  track  on  lands  without  the  consent  of  the  owner, 
it  is  liable  for  the  difference  in  the  market  value  of  the  land  im- 
mediately before  the  commission  of  the  injuries,  and  the  market 
value  of  the  land  immediately  afterwards. ^"^  Such  a  trespass  is  a 
continuing  one,  and  entitles  to  successive  actions.  Accordingly, 
prospective  damages  cannot  be  recovered.^^"  Where  trees,  timber, 
stone,  and  the  like  are  carried  away,  the  owner  may  adopt  the  prop- 
erty so  removed  as  the  measure  of  his  damages,  or  he  may  recover 
the  difference  between  the  value  of  the  land  with  such  property  on 

204  Gilbert  v.  Kennedy,  22  Mich.  5,  per  Clii'istiancy,  J.  And  see  The  Re- 
demptorist  v.  Wenig  (Md.)  29  Atl.  C67,  608,  per  Robinson,  0.  J. 

20  5  Murray  v.  Mace,  41  Neb.  60,  59  N.  W.  387. 

208  Such  damages  as  are  not  the  usual  consequence  of  the  trespass  are 
special,  and  should  be  specially  pleaded  and  proved,  by  way  of  agg-ravation. 
Dickinson  v.  Boyle,  17  Pick.  78;  McTavish  v.  CaiToll,  13  Md.  429;  Sherman 
v.  Dutch,  16  111.  283. 

207  Hawthorne  v.  Siegel,  88  Cal.  159,  25  Pac.  1114;    Fields  v.  Williams,  91 
Ala.  502,  8  South.  808;    Jackel  v.  Reiman,  78  Tex.  588,  14  S.  W.  1001;    Chi- 
cago, K.  &  W.  R.  Co.  V.  Willits,  45  Kan.  110,  25  Pac.  576;    Clai-k  v.  Bates, 
1  Dak.  42,  46  N.  W.  510;  Wall  v.  Pittsburg  Harbor  Co.,  152  Pa.  St.  427^32,  i'.-| 
Atl.  047;    Saginaw  Union  St  Ry.  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  91  Mich.  657,  52 
N.  W.  49;    Cavanagh  v.  Durgin,  156  Mass.  466,  31  N.  E.  643.     A  reasonable 
sum,  without  proof  of  special  damages,  may  be  recovered.     Moore  v.  Smith 
(Tex.  Sup.)  19  S.  W.  781;    Harrison  v.  Adamson,  86  lOAva,  093,  53  N.  W.  3:U. 
Et  vide  Cavanagh  v.  Durgin,  150  Mass.  466,  31  N.  E.  643;    JIc Arthur  v.  Corn- 
wall (1892)   L.   R.  App.   Cas.  75.     As  to  statutory  regulations,   see   St.   Croix 
Land  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  Ritchie,  78  Wis.  492.  47  N.  W.  658;    Oskaloosa  Collese 
V.  Western  Union  Fuel  Co.  (Iowa)  54  X.  W.  152;    Befay  v.  Wheeler,  84  Wis. 
135,  53  N.  W.  1121. 

208  Ward  V.  Warner,  8  Alich.  508-525;    Mc Williams  v.  Morgan.  75  HI.  4t;i. 

209  Chicago,  K.  &  AV.  R.  Co.  v.  Willits,  45  Kan.  110,  25  Pac.  576. 

210  Blesch  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  43  Wis.  183;  Adams  v.  Hastings  & 
D.  R.  Co.,  18  Minn.  260  (Gil.  236).  Compare  Town  of  Troy  v.  Cheshire  R.  11., 
23  N.  H.  83,  to  effect  that  entire  damages,  rather  than  damages  anterior  to 
the  commencement  of  an  action,  should  be  recovered.  And  see  Wood  v.  M  ch'- 
gan  Air-Line  R.  Co.,  90  Mich.  334,  51  N.  W.  205. 


^^4  WROiNGS    TO    POSSESSION    AAD    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

or  in  it,  and  with  such  property  removed."^  Where  the  trees  are 
ornamental,  the  latter  measure  of  damages  may  be  more  advantage- 
ous to  the  owner.  "2  Under  such  circumstances,  there  are  virtually 
two  causes  of  action,— one  for  the  disturbance  of  the  real  estate,  and 
one  to  recover  the  value  of  property  unlawfully  converted.^'^ 

Exemplary  damages  will  be  awarded  where  there  are  circumstan- 
ces of  outrage,  insult,  or  willful,  wanton,  and  malicious  destruction 
of  property.^"  Spite  or  ill-will  is  not  necessary  to  entitle  to  puni- 
tive damages  in  trespass.  The  intentional  doing  of  a  wrongful  act 
without  just  cause  or  excuse  is  sufflcient.^^^  Eatiflcation  of  a  tres- 
pass is  not  a  ground  for  vindictive  damages.''^*  It  would  seem  that 
recovery  may  be  had  for  mental  suffering.^^'  By  the  statutes  of 
many  states,  double  or  treble  damages  are  awarded  for  willful  tres- 
pass.^ ^*     If  treble  damages  are  improperly  claimed,  the  plaintiff, 

211  Stui-ges  v.  Warren,  11  Vt  433;  Kolb  v.  Bankhead,  18  Tex.  229;  Foote  v. 
Merrill,  54  N.  H.  490;  Wallace  v.  Goodall,  18  N.  H.  439;  Ensley  v.  Nashville, 
2  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  144;  Harder  v.  Harder,  26  Barb.  409;  Templemore  v.  Moore. 
15  Ir.  Com.  Law,  14.  In  an  action  for  unlawfully  cutting  timber  from  plain- 
tiff's land,  tlie  measure  of  damages  is  not  necessarily  the  value  of  the  timber, 
but  may  be  the  depreciation  of  the  market  value  of  the  land.  Knisely  v. 
Hire,  2  Ind.  App.  86,  28  N.  E.  195. 

212  Van  Deusen  v.  Yoimg,  29  Barb.  9. 

213  Smith  V.  Smith,  50  N.  H.  212;  Wooley  v.  Carter,  7  N.  J.  Law,  85; 
Thayer  v.  Sherlock,  4  Mich.  173.  Bt  vide  Seely  v.  Alden,  61  Pa.  St.  302. 
Post,  p.  70G,  "Conversion." 

214  Nagle  V.  Nicholson,  34  Pa.  St.  48;  Cutler  v.  Smith,  57  111.  252;  Carli  v. 
Union  Depot,  etc.,  Co.,  32  Minn.  101,  20  N.  W.  89.  For  maliciously  injufin? 
a  dog,  see  Heiligmann  v.  Rose,  81  Tex.  222,  16  S.  W.  931;  Jacquay  v.  Hart- 
zell,  1.  Ind.  App.  500,  27  N.  E.  1105.  Therefore,  where  such  circumstances 
are  proved,  a  verdict  of  $1,350  vs-ill  not  be  set  aside  as  excessive,  although  the 
actual  damage  proved  was  only  $950.  Pearson  v.  Zehr,  138  HI.  48,  29  N.  B. 
&54;  Jackel  v.  Reiman,  78  Tex.  588,  14  S.  W.  1001.  Compare  Negley'v.  CoweU 
(Iowa)  59  N.  W.  48.  Et  vide  3  Suth.  Dam.  §  1031,  note  1,  collecting  cases.  Fur- 
ther, as  to  damages,  see  Henderson  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co  83  Iowa. 
221,  48  N.  W.  1029. 

215  Trauerman  v.  Lippencott,  39  Mo.  App.  478.     Et  vide  Koester  v   Cowan 
37  m.  App.  252. 

21  c  Grund  v.  Van  Vleck,  69  III.  478;    Rosenkrans  v.  Barker,  115  m    331 
3  K.  E.  93. 
21T  Bonnelli  v.  Bowen,  70  Miss.  142,  11  South.  791. 
218  Werner  v.  Flies  (Iowa)  59  N.  W.  18;  McDonald  y.  Montana  Wood  Co., 


Ch.  10]  WASTE.  695 

upon  proper  proof,  may  recover  single  damages."'  The  presump- 
tion of  law  is  that  the  jury,  where  such  treble  or  double  damages  are 
demanded,  gave  all  the  damages  authorized  by  the  statutes.  This 
presumption  can  be  rebutted  by  showing  that  the  jury  gave  only 
single  damages,  and  this  fact  must  be  shown  by  the  verdict.  With- 
out this  there  is  no  power  in  the  court  to  double  or  treble  the  dam- 
ages."" "The  fact  that  property  taken  by  a  trespasser  has  been  ap- 
propriated to  the  owner's  use  by  his  consent,  express  or  implied,  goes 
in  mitigation."  "^  The  action  under  the  statute  is  sometimes  held 
to  be  for  a  statutory  penalty, — a  cause  of  action  which,  though  aris- 
ing from  the  same  subject-matter,  is  different  from  that  accruing 
at  common  law.-^'' 

WASTE— DEriNITION. 

218.  "Waste  is  an  injury  done  or  suffered  by  the  owner  of 
the  present  estate  -which  tends  to  destroy  or  lessen 
the  value  of  the  inheritance.^ 

14  Mont.  88,  35  Pac.  668;  McCruden  v.  Rochester  Ky.  Co.,  77  Hun,  609,  28 
N.  y.  Supp.  1135,  affirming  5  Misc.  Rep.  59,  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  11-1;  Humes  v. 
Proctor,  73  Hud,  205,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  315. 
21 »  Von  Hoffman  v.  Kendall,  63  Hun,  628,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  713. 
220  Clark  v.  Sargeant,  112  Pa.  St.  16,  5  Atl.  44.  It  is  proper  to  include  inter- 
est on  treble  damages  on  entering  judgment  against  defendant.  McClosliey 
V.  Ryder  (Pa.  Sup.)  21  Atl.  150;  Fairchild  v.  Dunbar  Furnace  Co.,  128  Pa.  St. 
485,  18  Atl.  443,  444. 

2212  Sedg.  Dam.  526.  See,  also,  1  Suth.  Dam.  §  157;  Huning  v.  Chavez 
<N.  M.)  34  Pac.  44. 

222  Mr.  Pollock  (Torts,  p.  322),  in  course  of  consideration  of  costs,  where 
damages  are  nominal,  refers  to  the  "common  practice  of  putting  up  notice 
boards  with  these  or  the  hke  words,  'Trespassers  will  be  prosecuted  accord- 
ing to  law'  (words  which  are,  'if  sti-ictly  construed,  a  wooden  falsehood'), 
*  *  *  originally  intended  to  secm-e  the  benefits  *  *  *  in  the  matter 
of  costs.  *  *  *  Several  better  and  safer  forms  of  notice  are  available. 
A  common  American  one,  'No  trespassing,'  is  as  good  as  any."  An  equally 
futile  proceeding  is  the  common  practice  of  publishing  notices  specifying  the 
amount  of  fine  arbitrarily  fixed  by  the  owner  of  the  premises  for  trespassing 
■"on  these  grounds."  The  criminal  fine  is  determined  by  statute.  The  amount 
of  damages  which  may  be  recovered  by  civil  action  is  in  the  discretion  of  the 
jury. 

2  23  Cooley,  Torts,  §  332.  This  would  appear  to  be  more  in  concord  with  the 
modern  conception  of  waste  than  the  English  definitions.     "Waste  is  the  com- 


6'J6  WliONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

Besides  the  payment  of  rent  reserved,  if  any,  and  tlie  observance 
of  the  covenants  of  demise,  there  are  other  duties  imposed  on  a 
tena.nt  towards  the  landlord  or  reversioner  and  on  the  tenant  for 
life  or  for  years  with  regard  to  their  remainder-men.  The  breach 
of  these  duties  is  waste  at  common  law.^^*  It  was  usual  to  declare 
in  case  at  common  law  unless  there  was  also  a  money  demand  which 
might  be  included  in  a  declaration  in  assumpsit.^^^  Covenant  might 
also  have  lain  at  common  law.^^"  The  famous  statute  of  Glou- 
cester extended  the  ancient  law  of  waste  by  the  writ  of  waste.^^^ 
Waste  is  a  wrong  depending  peculiarly  upon  the  local  conditions. 
To  meet  these  conditions,  many  statutory  changes  have  been  intro- 
duced. Modern  cases  must  be  construed  in  connection  with  such 
statutes.^^*  Waste,  however  intimately  allied  with,  is  a  wrong  dis- 
tinct from  trespass  and  from  conversion.  It  pertains  to  land  only, 
but  trespass  may  apply  to  land  and  personalty;  conversion,  only  to 
movable  property.  In  both  trespass  and  conversion,  the  remedy  is 
based  on  the  possession,  or  right  of  possession;  in  waste,  the  wrong 
is  inflicted  by  the  person  in  possession. ^''^ 

mitting  of  any  spoil  or  destruction  in  bouses,  lands,  etc.,  by  tenants,  to  tlie 
damage  of  the  heir,  or  of  him  in  reversion  or  remainder."  10  Bac.  Abi-. 
"Waste  is  any  unauthorized  act  of  a  tenant  of  a  freehold  estate  not  of  in- 
heritance, or  for  any  lesser  interest,  which  tends  to  the  destruction  of  the 
tenement,  or  otherwise  to  the  injury  of  the  inheritance."     Pol.  Torts,  p.  285. 

22  4  Ball,  Torts,  c.  C,  p.  56. 

220  Govett  v.  Eadnidge,  3  East,  62;  1  Chit.  PI.  140,  141. 

226  1  Chit.  PI.  141. 

22  7  6  Edw.  I.  c.  5.     See  1  Saund.  323b,  note  7. 

228  For  illustrations  of  statutory  changes,  see  Sullivan  v.  O'Hara,  1  Ind. 
App.  259,  27  N.  E.  590;  Mcllvain  v.  Porter  (Ky.)  7  S.  W.  309;  Davis  v.  Clark, 
40  Mo.  App.  515;  Curtiss  v.  Livingston,  36  Minn.  380,  31  N.  W.  357;  Uni- 
versity V.  Tucker,  31  W.  Va.  C21,  8  S.  E.  410.  Compare  Laws  I'a.  1891,  No. 
179,  p.  208. 

22  9  Dodge  V.  Davis,  85  Iowa,  77,  52  N.  W.  2;    Cooley,  Torts,  §  332. 


Ch.  10]  WASTE.  C97 

SAME— KINDS  OP  WASTE. 

319.  The  substance  of  waste  is  the  unauthorized  wrong  to 
the  inheritance,  either  in  the  sense  of  the  value  or 
in  the  sense  of  destroying  the  identity.^"  What  con- 
duct amounts  to  waste  is  a  question  of  fact.  In 
kind  it  may  be— 

(a)  Permissive  or  commissive;  and 

(b)  Legal  or  equitable. 

220.  Permissive  w^aste  is  merely  passive  conduct.. 

221.  Commissive  waste  is  the  doing  of  a  willful  injury  to 

the  premises  concerned. 

Allowing  a  house  to  go  to  ruin  by  reason  of  nonrepair  is  permissive 
waste.  An  action  does  not  lie  for  such  waste  against  a  tenant  at 
will  who  has  not  covenanted  to  repair,^^^  nor  against  a  tenant  from 
year  to  year.^^^  While  there  is  some  doubt  on  the  question,  it 
seems  that  a  tenant  for  years  who  has  not  covenanted  to  repair 
is  liable  for  permissive  waste.^^^  A  tenant  for  life  is  liable  for  sudi 
waste.^'*  But  an  equitable  tenant  for  life  is  not.^^°  A  dowies^ 
is  not  liable  for  permissive  waste,  unless  the  property  involved  is 
such  that  a  prudent  owner  of  the  fee  would  keep  in  repair  to  pre- 
vent permanent  injury  to  the  fee.  Therefore,  it  is  not  waste  to  allow 
buildings  used  for  housing  slaves  before  the  emancipation  to  re- 
main unrepaired  thereafter,  unless  their  utility  in  some  other  direc- 
tion be  apparent.^'"     To  suffer  a  gin  mill  to  be  dismantled  ^^'  there- 

230  Jessel,  M.  R.,  in  Jones  v.  Chappell,  L.  E.  20  Eq.  539-542;  Mens  v.  Cob- 
ley  [1892]  2  Ch.  253.  "Whatever  does  a  lasting  damage  to  the  freehold  or 
inheritance  is  waste."    2  Bl.  Comm.  c.  18,  p.  281. 

2  31  Harnett  v.  Maitland,  16  Mees.  &  W.  257. 

232  Torriano  v.  Young,  -6  Car.  &  P.  8;  Martin  v.  Gilham,  7  Adol.  &  E.  540. 
Indeed,  in  Kentucky  an  action  at  law  for  permissive  waste  will  not  lie.  Smith 
V.  Mattingiy  (Ky.)  28  S.  W.  503. 

233  Torriano  v.  Young,  6  Car.  &  P.  8;  Heme  v.  Bembow,  4  Taunt.  764; 
Greene  v.  Cole,  2  Saund.  252;   Woodhouse  v.  AValker,  5  Q.  B.  Div.  404. 

23  4  Yellowly  v.  Gower,  11  Exch.  274-294. 

23  5  Fowys  V.  Blagrave,  4  De  Gex,  JM.  &  G.  448;   Freke  v.  Calmady,  32  Ch. 
Div.  408. 
230  Sherrill  v.  Connor,  107  N.  C.  6.30,  12  S.  E.  588. 
237  Cannon  v.  Barry,  59  Miss.  289. 


698  WKOiNGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PllOPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

after  is  permissive  waste.  It  is  also  permissive  waste  to  allow  a 
pasture  to  be  overrun  with  weeds.-'" 

The  wrong  may  be  committed  by  tenants  at  will  for  life,  for  a 
term  of  one  j'ear,  and  from  year  to  year.  Tenants  at  will  guilty  of 
permissive  waste  may  be  treated  as  mere  trespassers.^ ^^  The  ten- 
dency of  American  cases  is  to  hold  a  tenant  liable  for  either  con- 
version or  Avaste,  regardless  of  the  duration  or  origin  of  his  term.^*" 
Thus,  a  devisee  having  a  life  interest,  with  possibility  of  shares  in 
fee,  may  commit  M'aste.^*^  Cutting  down  trees  on  public  land  is 
waste,  within  the  meaning  of  a  statute  which  provides  that  where 
there  are- opposing  claimants  to  public  land,  and  one  is  threatening 
to  commit  on  such  land  waste  which  tends  materially  to  lessen  the 
value  of  the  inheritance,  and  which  cannot  be  compensated  by  dam- 
ages, an  injunction  will  lie  to  restrain  him  therefrom.^^^ 

So,  the  receiver  of  a  railroad  company  who  fails  to  exercise  an 
option  of  purchase  "^^  is  liable  for  waste.    Many  cases  arise  in  the 

238  Clemence  v.  Steere,  1  R.  I.  272. 

239  Ball,  Torts,  56-58.  A  tenant  at  will  is  under  an  implied  agreement  to 
use  the  premises  in  a  tenant-like  manner,  and  not,  by  his  voluntary  acrt,  un- 
necessarily to  injure  them;  and  if  he  places,  in  a  barn  hired  by  him,  a  weight 
apparently  and  in  fact  excessive,  which  causes  the  bam  to  fall,  he  is  guilty  pf 
voluntary  waste,  and  is  liable  fhei-efor  upon  his  implied  agreement  Ac- 
ceptance of  rent  by  a  landlord  for  the  full  term  for  which  the  premises  are 
let  is  not  necessarily  a  waiver  of  his  right  to  damages  for  breach  of  the  ten- 
ant's implied  agreement  not  to  commit  voluntary  waste.  Chalmers  t.  Smith, 
152  Mass.  5G1,  26  N.  E.  95. 

240  Boefer  v.  Sheridan,  42  Mo.  App.  226. 

241  Farabow  v.  Green,  108  K.  C.  339,  12  S.  E.  1003.  As  to  life  tenant,  see 
Smith  V.  Mattingly  (Ky.)  28  S.  W.  503;  Smith  v.  Meiser  (Ind.  App.)  38  N.  B. 
1092. 

242  Arment  v.  Hensel,  5  Wash.  152,  31  Pac.  464.  A  person  who  has  not  the 
immediate  estate  of  inheritance,  expectant  on  the  termination  of  the  life  est- 
tate,  cannot  maintain  an  action  of  waste  against  the  life  tenant.  Hatch  v. 
Hatch,  31  Cin.  Law  Bui.  57. 

243  Powell  V.  Dayton,  S.  &  G.  R.  Co.,  16  Or.  .'33,  16  Pac.  863.  As  between 
vendor  and  vendee,  see  Ilolmberg  v.  Johnson,  45  Kan.  197,  25  Pac.  575;  Moses 
V.  Johnson,  88  Ala.  517,  7  South.  140.  Waste  by  a  purchaser  at  foreclosure 
sale  pendente  lite,  Mitchell  v.  Minin.?  Co..  75  Cal.  264,  17  Pac.  296;  by  remain- 
der-men, Solomon  v.  Tarver,  79  Ga.  601,  4  S.  E.  317;  Simms  v.  Greer,  S3  Ala. 
263,  3  South.  423;  mortgagee,  Moriarty  v.  Ash  worth,  48  Minn.  1,  44  N.  W. 
531;   Miller  v.  Waddingham,  91  Cal.  377,  27  Pac.  750.    The  levy  of  a  distress 


Ch.  10]  WASTE.  699 

United  States  from  tenancies  in  dower.^^*  A  tenant  in  dower  is  iin- 
Soubtedly  liable  for  commissive  waste.^*^  The  authorities  do  not 
-igree  as  to  whether  a  lessee  for  life  or  years  is  liable  for  waste  com- 
mitted by  a  stranger.  The  English  authorities  seem  to  think  that 
the  lessee  is  presumed  to  be  capable  of  preventing  it.  Therefore  the 
lessor  has  his  action  against  the  lessee  for  waste,  and  the  lessee  has 
his  action  of  trespass  against  the  wrongdoer.^*^  A  dowress  has 
been  held  not  liable  for  waste  committed  by  third  persons  without 
her  consent.^*'  The  tendency  of  the  law  to  extend  th&  scope  of  the 
action  is  apparent  in  the  recognition  of  the  right  of  the  state  to  pre- 
vent commissive  waste.^*^  As  to  the  nature  of  commissive  waste, 
the  American  authorities  are  neither  in  harmony  with  themselves 
nor  with  the  English  cases.  "While  our  ancestors  brought  over  to 
this  country  the  principles  of  the  common  law,  these  were  neverthe- 
less accommodated  to  these  new  conditions."  ^■"'  Accordingly,  it  is 
a  question  of  fact  as  to  what  acts  constitute  waste,  having  reference 
to  actually  existing  conditions,  and  the  finding  on  such  question 
will  not  be  disturbed  on  conflicting  evidence.^ ^^  Commissive  waste, 
as  to  land,  may  consist,  for  example,  in  the  removing  of  virgin  soil, 

warrant  has  not  the  effect  prima  facie  of  satisfying  the  debt,  so  as  to  put  on 
plaintiff  the  burden  of  showing  that  the  property  levied  on  has  not  been 
wasted;  and,  if  defendant  claims  waste,  the  burden  is  on  him  to  prove  it 
Taylor  v.  Felder,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  417,  23  S.  W.  480.  As  to  liability  of 
guardian  and  ward,  see  State  v.  Tittman,  54  Mo.  App.  490. 

244  Ante,  p.  697;  Sherrill  v.  Connor,  107  N.  C.  630,  12  S.  E.  588;  Willey  v. 
Lara  way,  64  Vt.  559,  25  Atl.  436;  Calvert  v.  Rice,  91  Ky.  533,  16  S.  W.  351. 

245  Cooley,  Torts,  §  333;   1  Scrib.  Dower,  212-214;   2  Scrib.  Dower,  795. 
2i6  Ball,  Torts,  59;  Regan  v.  Luthy  (Com.  PI.)  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  709. 

247  Willey  V.  Lara  way,  64  Vt.  559,  2."i  Atl.  436.  A  man-ied  woman  is  not 
liable  for  waste  committed  by  her  husband  in  his  representative  capacity  as 
executor.     Lilly  v.  Menke  (Mo.  Sup.)  28  S.  W.  043. 

248  State  V.  Gramelspacher,  12(i  Ind.  398,  20  N.  E.  81;  McBride  v.  Board  of 
Com'rs  of  Pierce  Co.,  44  Fed.  17;  Caldwell  v.  Ward,  83  Mich.  13,  46  N.  W. 
1024,  explained  in  88  Mich.  378,  50  N.  W.  303. 

249  Gaston,  J.,  in  Shine  v.  Wilcox,  1  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  631. 

2  50  Jackson  v.  Brownson,  7  Johns.  227,  followed  in  Eysaman  v.  Small,  61 
Hun,  618,  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  288;  Shephard  v.  Shephard,  2  Hayw.  (N.  C.)  580; 
Balleutine  v.  Poyner,  Id.  268;  Lambeth  v.  Warner,  2  Jones,  Eq.  165;  Craw- 
ley v.  Timberlake,  2  Ired.  Eq.  460;   Davis  v.  Gilliam,  5  Ired.  Eq.  308;  Dot-- 


700  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

diversion  of  the  course  of  a  stream,  destruction  of  game,  flsh  ponds, 
and  tlie  like.^°^  It  is  not  waste  to  use  the  premises  in  accordance 
with  good  usage  and  for  purposes  for  which  they  were  manifestly 
designed.  Thus,  the  unauthorized  digging  of  clay  by  a  tenant  is 
waste,  where  there  is  nothing  in  the  situation  of  the  premises  or 
other  special  circumstances  to  take  the  case  out  of  the  general 
rule.^"  But,  where  the  work  for  carrying  on  the  business  of  mak- 
ing brick  has  been  constructed  and  established,  and  the  business 
lawfully  undertaken  by  the  owners  of  the  land,  it  is  not  waste  for  a 
tenant  to  continue  the  business  in  the  customary  way.^°^  On  the 
same  principle,  while  a  tenant  may  not  open  new  or  discontinued 
mines  or  quarries,^ ^*  yet  he  may  exhaust  mines  and  quarries  opened 
at  the  commencement  of  the  estate  without  committing  waste.^^^  As 
to  the  use  of  soil  in  husbandry,  it  was  originally  held  that  any  con- 
version of  land  from  one  species  to  another,  as  plowing  up  wood- 
land, or  turning  arable  into  pasture  land,  was  waste;  but  modern 
authorities  do  not  bear  this  out.^  °°  Whether  such  conversion  interferes 
with  the  value  as  a  whole,  and  the  sanction  of  similar  usage  by 
good  farmers,  are  proper  considerations  for  the  jury.^^^  Putting 
all  the  land  into  wheat  may  be  waste;  so  may  negligence  to  observe 
the  proper  rotation  of  crops.^°*    The  exhaustion  of  the  soil  may  be 

sey  v.  Moore,  100  N.  C.  41,.  6  S.  E.  270;  Hasting  v.  Crunckleton,  3  Yeates 
(Pa.)  261;  Clemence  v.  Steere,  1  R.  I.  272;  Wilson  v.  Edmonds,  24  N.  H. 
017;  Harvey  v.  Harvey,  41  Vt.  373;  Kidd  v.  Dennison,  6  Barb.  9;  Keoler 
V.  Eastman,  11  Vt.  293;   Findlay  v.  Smith,  6  Munf.  (Va.)  134. 

2  51  Ball,  Torts,  57. 

2  52  Livingston  v.  Reynolds,  2  Hill,  157. 

2  53  Russell  V.  Merchants'  Bank  of  Lake  City,  47  Minn.  286,  50  N.  W.  228. 
Compare  University  v.  Tucker,  31  W.  Va.  621,  8  S.  E.  410;  Dodge  v.  Davis, 
85  Iowa,  77,  52  N.  W.  2.  As  to  when  the  liability  is  only  ex  contractu,  see 
Patureau  v.  McArdle,  44  La.  Ann.  355,  10  South.  782. 

204  Gaines  v.  Green  Pond  Iron  Min.  Co.,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  86.  If  coal  has  been 
mined  for  domestic  use,  the  life  tenant  may  not  mine  for  sale.  Franklin  Coal 
Co.  V.  McMillan,  49  Md.  549. 

255  Sayers  v.  Hoskinson,  110  Pa.  St.  473,  1  Atl.  308.  Compare  Grubbs'  Ap- 
peal, 90  Pa.  St.  228;  McCord  v.  Oakland  Quicksilver  Min.  Co.,  64  Cal.  134,  27 
Pac.  863. 

2  56  Pol.  Torts,  285. 

257  Chapel  V.  Hull,  60  Mich.  167,  26  N.  W.  874 

2  58  Wilds  V.  Lay  ton,  1  Del.  Ch.  220. 


Ch.  10]  WASTE.  701 

waste,^'^"  although  mere  bad  farming  is  not.''"  Commissive  waste 
may  affect  timber  and  other  products  grown  on  land.  With  regard 
to  such  products  the  law  Avill  depend  largely  on  the  local  custom 
and  on  the  peculiar  condition  of  the  country  in  which  the  question 
may  arise.  Thus,  in  England,  where  local  usage  allowed  it,  taking 
"annual  cuttings"  was  held  not  to  be  waste  between  the  tenant  for 
life  and  the  remainderman.'"!  While,  in  England,  outside  of  such 
local  usage,  the  tenant  could  take  wood  for  ordinary  use,  as  for  fuel 
or  for  repair,  he  would  be  liable  for  waste  if  he  exceeded  what  was 
reasonable.'"-  In  this  country,  cutting  valuable  forest  trees  where 
there  is  little  woodland  on  a  farm  may  be  waste;'"'  but  it  is  not 
waste  to  cut  timber  for  necessary  repair, — for  exami)le,  to  fcmre.'"* 
"Any  such  strictness  as  existed  in  England  would  be  manifestly 
unsuited  to  the  condition  of  things  in  other  parts  of  this  country, 
because  it  would  be  of  some  service  to  the  inheritance.  In  newer 
states,  Avhere  timber  is  abundant,  it  might  indeed  be  beneficial  to 
the  inheritance,  rather  than  wasteful,  to  permit  the  timber  to  be 
removed;  and  therefore  what  is  wasteful  elsewhere  might  in  these 
sections  of  the  country  be  permissible."  '"^    Ordinarily,  a  tenant  for 

250  Sarles  v.  Sarles,  3  Sandf.  Oh.  (N.  Y.)  COl. 

280  Richards  v.  Torbett,  3  Houst.  (Del.)  172. 

2oiDashwood  v.  Magniac  [1891]  3  Ch.  306;  Honey  wood  v.  Honey  wood,  L. 
R.  18  Eq.  306-309.  To  eradicate  whitethorn  is  waste,  but  not  to  eradicate 
blaclithorn.    Gage  v.  Smith,  Godb.  209. 

262  2  Bl.  Comm.  35;  1  Washb.  Real  Prop.  129.  See  McCord  v.  Oakland 
Quicksilver  Min.  Co.,  64  Cal.  134,  27  Pac.  863. 

263  Powell  V.  Chesire,  70  Ga.  357;  Huddleston  v.  Johnson,  71  Wis.  336,  37  X. 
W.  407.  Defendant  may  be  liable  to  remainder-men  for  such  waste,  although 
timber  was  cut  under  contract  of  sale  with  life  tenant,  and  i^aid  for  in  full. 
Dorsey  v.  Moore,  100  N.  0.  41,  6  S.  E.  27U.  Et  vide  Webster  v.  Webster,  33 
N.  H.  IS;  Lester  v.  Young,  14  R.  I.  579;  Silva  v.  Garcia,  65  Cal.  591,  4  Pac. 
C28;  Duncombe  v.  Felt,  81  Mich.  332,  45  N.  W.  1004;  Moses  v.  Johnson,  88 
Ala.  517,  7  South.  146;   Carrington  v.  Lentz,  40  Fed.  18. 

2  04  Calvert  v.  Rice,  91  Ky.  533,  16  S.  W.  351.  Compare  Den  v.  Keuney,  o 
N.  J.  Law,  634. 

26  5  Cooley,  Torts,  333,  approved.  Pol.  Torts,  §  28l;;  King  v.  Miller,  99  N.  C. 
58.3,  6  S.  E.  660;  Alexander  v.  Fisher,  7  Ala.  514;  Drown  v.  Smith,  52  Me.  141; 
Gai'dner  v.  Dering,  1  Paige,  593;  Keeler  v.  Eastman,  11  Vt.  293;  McGregor  v, 
Brown,  10  N.  Y.  114;  Clemence  v.  Steere,  1  R.  I.  222. 


702  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

life  may  not  cut  timber  simply  for  the  money  it  will  bring;  ^^°  but 
it  is  not  waste  for  the  life  tenant  to  cut  wood  or  timber  so  as  to  fit 
the  land  for  cultivation  or  pasture  conformable  to  the  rules  of  good 
husbandry;  and  this  is  so  even  where  the  wood  or  timber  so  cut  is 
sold,  used,  or  consumed  on  the  premises.""^  But  the  mere  fact  that 
the  value  of  the  land  is  not  diminished,  or  that  it  may  be  increased, 
is  no  defense  in  an  action  for  actual  waste.^"' 

It  is  waste  to  pull  down  houses,  outbuildings,  or  walls,  to  remove 
wainscots  or  floors,  to  build  up  old  windows  or  doors,  or  to  open 
new  ones,  or  to  change  one  species  of  building  into  another, — as  a 
water  mill  into  a  wind  mill,  or  a  corn  mill  into  a  malt  mill.-"''  The 
tearing  down  of  a  house  is  waste,  even  if  it  be  done  for  the  purpose 
of  erecting  a  better  one.^'"  The  measure  of  damages  would  be  the 
diminution  of  the  value  of  the  premises,  and  not  the  value  of  the 
building  destroyed  or  removed.^'^  Considerable  latitude  has  been 
allowed  with  respect  to  the  right  of  the  tenement  to  remove  fixtures. 
"The  rule  as  to  fixtures  has  always  been  relaxed  more  as  between 
landlord  and  tenant  than  as  between  persons  standing  in  other  re- 
lations. It  has  been  held  that  stoves  are  movable  during  the  term; 
grates,  ornamental  chimney-pieces,  wainscots  fastened  with  screws, 
coppers,  and  various  other  articles."  "''^ 

266  Dorsey  v.  Moore  (S.  C.)  6  S.  E.  270;  1  Washb.  Real  Prop.  116-128;  White 
V.  Cutler,  17  Pick.  248;  Padelford  v.  Padelford,  7  Pick.  152;  Sarles  v.  Sarles, 
3  Sandf.  Ch.  601;  Jackson  v.  Brownson,  7  Johns.  227;  Livingston  v.  Reynolds, 
26  Wend.  115,  2  Hill,  157;  McGregor  v.  Brown,  10  N.  Y.  114;  Robinson  v. 
Kime,  70  N.  Y.  147;  Van  Deusen  v.  Young,  29  N.  Y.  9;  Kidd  v.  Dennison,  6 
Barb.  9;   Davis  v.  Gilliam,  5  Ired.  Eq.  308. 

267  Keeler  v.  Eastman,  11  Yt  293;  Alexander  v.  Fisher,  7  Ala.  514;  Hastings 
V.  Crunckleton,  3  Yeates  (Pa.)  261;  Williard  v.  Williard,  56  Pa.  St.  119;  Drown 
V.  Smith,  52  Me.  141;  Davis  v.  Gilliam,  5  Ired.  Eq.  308;  Owen  v.  Hyde,  6 
Yerg.  334;  Findlay  v.  Smith,  6  Muuf.  (Va.)  134;  Appeal  of  Campbell,  2  Doug. 
(Mich.)  141;  Jackson  v.  Brownson,  7  Johns.  227;  Van  Deusen  v.  Young,  29  N. 
Y.  9;  Schnebly  v.  Schnebly,  23  111.  116;  Wilkinson  v.  Wilkinson,  59  Wis.  557, 
18  N.  W.  527. 

268  Rossman  v.  Adams,  91  Mich.  69,  51  N.  W.  685;  Moses  v.  Johnson,  8S  Ala. 
517,  7  South.  146. 

289  Smyth  V.  Carter,  18  Beav.  78;  Ball,  Cas.  Torts,  57. 

270  Dooly  V.  Stringham,  4  Utah,  107,  7  Pac.  405. 

271  Stoudenmire  v.  De  Bardelaben,  85  Ala.  85,  4  South.  723. 

27  2  Tindal.  0.  J.,  in  Grymes  v.  Boweren,  6  Bing.  437;  Elwes  v.  Maw,  S 
East,  38. 


Ch.  10]  WASTE.  703 

222.  Legal -waste  is  a  term  used  to  describe -waste  for -which 

there  lay  a  remedy  at  la-w.  Equitable  -waste  is  a 
term,  used  to  describe  -waste  -which  -was  only  recog- 
nized as  such  and  relieved  against  in  equity. ^^ 

When  a  life  estate  is  given  "without  impeachment  of  waste,"  the 
tenant  for  life  will  still  be  restrained  from  committing  wanton  or 
malicious  waste,  such  as  damaging  and  destroying  buildings  or 
boundary  walls,  cutting  down  wood  unfit  for  timber,  or  trees  grown 
for  shelter  or  ornament,  or  destroying  a  field  by  carrying  away  brick 
earth."*  The  words  "to  have  and  to  hold,  and  to  use  and  control 
as  the  lessee  thinks  proper,  for  his  benefit  during  his  natural  life," 
import  a  lease  without  impeachment  for  waste.  But  such  words 
are  not  to  be  treated  as  importing  a  license  to  destroy  or  injure  the 
estate,  but  to  do  all  reasonable  acts  consistent  with  the  preservation 
of  the  estate  which  in  law  might  be  waste.  Such  a  lease  does  not 
permit  the  tenant  to  entirely  strip  the  land  of  timber,  convert  it 
into  lumber,  and  sell  it  away  from  the  inheritance.^'" 

SAME— REMEDIES. 

223.  T"he  ordinary  remedies  for  -waste  are 

(a)  An  a-ward  of  damages;  or 

(b)  The  issuance  of  an  injunction  against  the  recurrence 

of  mischief. 

Damages. 

The  actual  damages,  where  recovery  is  allowed,  are  meted  out  on 
the  same  principles  which  would  govern  recovery  in  trespass,  and  in 
proportion  to  the  injury  sustained.^'"'     One  can  recover  only  such 

27  3  Fraser,  Torts,  .14. 

274  Vane  v.  Barnard,  2  Vern.  738;  Bishop  of  London  v.  Web,  1  P.  Wms.  528; 
2  Bl.  Comm.  282,  283;  Downshire  v.  Sandys,  G  Yes.  107.  But  see  Baker  v. 
Sebright,  13  Oh.  Div.  179. 

27 s  Duncombe  v.  Felt,  81  Mich.  3.'52,  45  N.  W.  1004.  As  to  use  of  writ  of 
estrepement,  see  Hensal  v.  Wright,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  416.  As  to  forfeitui-e, 
see  Sullivan  v.  O'Hara,  1  Ind.  App.  259,  27  N.  E.  590.  As  to  appointment  of 
receiver,  see  Dunlap  v.  Hedges,  35  W.  Va.  2S7,  13  S.  E.  656. 

276  3  Suth.  Dam.  §  1033,  citjng  Van  Deusen  v.  Young,  29  N.  Y.  9;  Randall  v. 
Cleveland,  6  Conn.  328;  Shadwell  v.  Hutchinson,  2  Barn.  &  Adol.  97;  Dutro 
V.  Wilson,  4  Ohio  St.  101.     As  to  refusal  subsequent  to  commencement  of  ac- 


70-1  WKONliS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PEOfKUTY.  [Ch.    10 

damages  as  affect  liis  expectant  estate,  and,  in  general,  these  dam- 
ages are  tlic  amount  the  estate  is  diminished  thereby  in  value."^ 
The  damage  may  be  recovered  by  a  moitgagor  or  his  vendee  for  acts 
of  waste  committed  with  a  knowledge  that  the  value  of  the  security 
will  be  injured  thereby,"*  even  though  in  its  damaged  condition  it 
is  of  sufficient  value  to  satisfy  the  mortgage  debt.-'"  Treble  dam- 
ages are  often  awarded  by  statute.^*" 

Injiinction. 

The  issuance  of  an  injunction  to  prevent  the  commission  or  con- 
tinuance of  waste  is  governed  by  ordinary  equitable  principles.  A 
court  of  equity  will  not  interfere  to  prevent  by  injunction  permissive 
waste,  but  will  leave  the  aggrieved  party  to  his  remedy  at  law.^*^ 
Nor  will  it  grant  an  injunction  against  ameliorating  or  improving 
waste,  as  building  a  valuable  house  on  the  land.^^^  In  general,  it 
will  not  issue  unless  the  injury  is  so  Irreparable  that  damages  would 
afford  no  adequate  compensation,"'^  and  where  there  is  no  adequate 

tion,  see  Davis  v.  Clark,  40  Mo.  App.  515;  Evelyn  v.  Baddish,  Holt,  N.  P.  543; 
Dawson  v.  Tremaine,  93  Mich.  320,  53  N.  W.  1044. 

=  T7  3  Siitli.  Dam.  §  10.34,  note  4;  Webb  v.  Portland  Manuf'g  Co.,  3  Siuiiu. 
189,  Fed.  Cas.  Xo.  17,322. 

278  Van  Pelt  v.  McGraw,  4  N.  Y.  110;  Manning  v.  Monaghan,  23  N.  Y.  539; 
Wll.son  V.  Maltby,  59  N.  Y.  126-129. 

279Bryom  v.  Chapin,  113  Mass.  308.  So,  as  to  replevin,  Allen  v.  Butmau, 
138  Mass.  58G;  as  to  trover,  Searle  v.  Sawyer,  127  Mass.  491.  Et  vide 
Waterman  v.  jMatteson>  4  R.  I.  539.  Compare  Coggill  v.  Millburn  Land  Co., 
25  N.  J.  Eq.  27.  Generally,  as  to  right  of  mortgagee  to  recover,  see  Adams 
V.  Corriston,  7  Minn.  4'>Cj;  aialone  v.  Jlarriott,  64  Ala.  480;  Cooper  v.  Davis, 
15  Conn.  556;  Phwnix  v.  Clark,  6  N.  J.  Eq.  447;  Ward  v.  Carp  River  Iron  Co., 
47  Mich.  6.-),  10  N.  W.  109.  Timber  cut  on  land,  not  for  consumption,  be- 
longs to  a  purchaser  of  tax  title  at  the  period  of  redemption.  Nicklase  v. 
Morrison,  56  Ark,  5.')3.  20  S.  W.  414. 

2S0  SheiTill  V.  Connor,  107  N.  C.  543,  630,  12  S.  E.  588;  Smith  v.  Mattingly 
(Ky.)  28  S.  W.  503.  As  to  limitation  against  an  action  of  waste,  see  Powell 
V.  Dayton,  S.  &  G.  R.  Co.,  16  Or.  33,  16  Pac.  863;  Danziger  v.  Silverthau 
(Super.  Ct.  N.  Y.)  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  350. 

2  81  Powys  v.  Blagrave,  4  De  Gex,  M.  &  G.  448. 

2  82  Doherty  v.  AUman,  L.  E.  3  App.  Cas.  709.  Compare  Miller  v..  Wadding- 
ham,  91  Cal.  377,  27  Pac.  750.  But  see  Smyth  v.  Carter,  18  Beav.  78,  per  Sir 
John  Romilly,  M.  R.  . 

283  Holmberg  v.  Johnson,  45  Kan.  197,  25  Pac.  575;    Atkins  v.  Chilson,  7 


Ch.  10]  WAbTE.  705 

remedy  at  law.^^*  An  injunction  will  issue  upon  threats  to  commit 
waste.^*'  As  between  mortgagee  and  mortgagor,  if  the  waste  com- 
plained of  will  diminish  the  yalue  of  the  property  so  as  to  render 
it  insufficient  or  of  doubtful  sufficiency,  it  will  be  restrained  by  an 
injunctionj^^"  though  the  mortgage  debt  is  not  yet  due.^"  It  may 
issue  to  restrain  injury  to  the  freehold  in  the  nature  of  waste,  be- 
tween tenants  in  common,^^*  and  between  a  vendor  in  possession 
and  the  vendee.^^"  It  will  lie  on  the  part  of  the  state, — as,  for  ex- 
ample, to  preserve  security  for  taxes.^""  The  decisions  are  in  con- 
flict as  to  whether  an  injunction  will  issue  where  the  title  is  in  dis- 
pute.^"^     An  injunction  will  not  lie  for  use  authorized  by  law.^"^ 

Mete.  (Mass.)  398;  Poindexter  v.  Henderson,  1  Miss.  176;  Terry  v.  Allen,  G'l 
Conn.  530,  23  Atl.  150. 

284  A  landloi'd  Is  not  entitled  to  an  injunction  to  restrain  a  solvent  tenant 
from  cutting  and  removing  fodder  from  the  demised  premises,  as  he  has  aii 
adequate  remedy  at  law  for  any  injury  resulting  therefrom.  Pen-y  v.  Ham- 
ilton (Ind.)  35  N.  E.  83G.  Mills'  Ann.  St.  §  2272,  part  of  an  act  giving  the 
right  to  construct  reservoirs  for  certain  puiiDoses,  by  providing  that  the  own- 
ers thereof  shall  he  liable  for  all  damages  arising  from  leakage  therefrom, 
merely  affirms  a  common-law  principle,  and  does  not  take  away  the  right  to 
injunctive  relief  against  the  filling  of  a  reservoir,  where  the  injuries  suffered 
therefrom  are  irreparable.     Sylvester  v.  Jerome,  19  Colo.  128,  34  Pac.  7(30. 

2  86  Whitewater  Valley  Canal  Co.  v.  Comegys,  2  Ind.  469;  Loudon  v.  War- 
fleld,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  196. 

286  Moriarty  v.  Ashworth,  43  Minn.  1,  44  N.  W.  531;  Miller  v.  Waddiug- 
ham,  91  Cal.  377,  27  Pac.  750. 

287  Cahn  V.  Hewsey,  8  Misc.  Rep.  384,  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  1107. 
2SsHawley  v.  Clowes,  2  Johns.  Ch.  122;    Coffin  v.  Loper,  2.j  N.  J.  Eq.  443; 

Atkinson  v.  Hewitt,  51  Wis.  275,  8  N.  W.  211. 

2  89  An  injunction  has  been  granted  to  restrain  quarrying  and  removing  rock, 
or  removing  trees,  except  nursery  stock,  by  purchaser  under  contract  against 
a  vendor  in  possession.     Holmherg  v.  Johnson,  45  Kan.  197,  25  Pac.  575. 

290  Rossman  v.  Adams,  91  Mich.  69,  51  N.  W.  685;  Caldwell  v.  Ward,  88 
Mich.  378,  50  N.  W.  303. 

291  Compare  Preston  v.  Smith,  26  Fed.  884,  McBride  v.  Board  of  Com'rs,  44 
Fed.  17,  and  Nevitt  v.  Gillespie,  2  How.  (Miss.)  108,  with  Arment  v.  Hensel, 
5  Wash.  152,  31  Pac.  464;  Wadsworth  v.  Goree,  96  Ala.  227,  10  South.  84S; 
Kinsler  v.  Clarke,  2  Hill,  Eq.  (S.  C.)  617;  Snyder  v.  Hopkins,  31  Kan.  557, 
3  Pac.  367;  Duvall  v.  Waters,  1  Bland  (Md.)  569;  Lanier  v.  Alison,  31  Fed. 
100. 

292  The  tenant  in  dower  will  not  be  enjoined  from  cutting  timber  to  make 
rails  to  put  the  fences  in  repair,  even  though  the  timber  on  the  farm  is  very 

LAW  OF  TOKTS— 45 


"0(3  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [(-ll-    10 

The  right  of  an  injunction  against  waste  may  be  lost  by  long  delay 
and  practical  acquiescence.^"^ 

CONVSiESION— DEFINITION. 

224.  Conversion  is  an  unauthorized  act  which  deprives 
another  of  his  property,  permanently  or  for  an  in- 
definite time.^* 

The  law  of  conversion,  as  we  have  seen,  was  to  a  great  extent  de- 
veloped through  the  common-law  action  on  the  case,  "trover."  The 
question  which  was  originally  asked  was,  not  whether  there  was 
the  substantive  wrong,  conversion,  in  a  given  instance,  but  whether 
trover  would  lie.  Indeed,  the  remedy  and  the  wrong  are  now  alike 
commonly  referred  to  as  "trover  and  conversion." 

The  action  of  trover,  according  to  the  original  form  of  declaration, 
was  applicable  only  to  cases  where  the  plaintiff  had  lost  his  goods 
and  they  were  subsequently  found  and  appropriated  by  the  defend- 
ant. Even  under  common-law  practice  and  pleading,  the  aver- 
ments of  loss  and  finding  have  long  been  considered  immaterial, 
and  are  not  traversable  by  the  defendant.^"^  Even  in  jurisdic- 
tions where  the  code  system  of  pleading  is  in  force,  the  name  is 
still  applied  to  the  action  brought  to  recover  the  legal  measure  of 
damages  for  personal  chattels  wrongfully  converted.^"" 

scarce,  for  it  is  the  duty  and  riglit  of  tlie  life  tenant  to  reasonably  use  the 
timber  for  purposes  of  repair,  and  such  use  is  no  injury  to  the  remainder- 
man. Calvert  v.  Rice,  91  Ky.  533,  16  S.  W.  351;  Neel  v.  Neel,  19  Pa.  St. 
323.     So,  between  cotenants,  McCord  v.  Mining  Co.,  64  Cal.  134,  27  Pae.  863. 

2  93  Ball,  Torts,  GO. 

2  94  Pol.  Torts,   p.   288. 

295  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  167.  "We  should  not  allow  this  nonsensical  form  of 
losing  and  finding  to  be  extended  any  further."  Best,  C.  J.  ("certainly  no 
Rreat  friend  to  the  action  of  trover"),  in  Mallalieu  v.  Laugher,  3  Car.  &  P. 
551.  The  origin  of  trover,  its  distinction  from  other  forms  of  common-law 
actions,  and  its  justification,  will  be  found  set  forth  in  Burroughes  v.  Bayne, 

5  Hurl.  &  N.  296;   especially  by  Martin,  B.    And,  generally,  see  Glyn  v.  East 

6  "W.  India  Dock  Co.,  6  Q.  B.  Div.  475;  England  v.  Cowley,  L.  R.  8  Exch. 
126;  Hiort  v.  Bott,  L.  R;  9  Exch.  86.  For  a  statutory  action  allied  to  trover, 
see  Smith  v.  Briggs,  64  Wis.  497,  25  N.  AV.  558;  National  Transit  Co.  v. 
Weston,  121  Pa.  St.  485,  15  Atl.  569. 

286  This  is  justified,  not  only  because  of  the  historical  confusion  of  the  law 


^-'•l-    1<J]  CONVERSION.  707 

Trespass  and  trover,  while  distinct  forms  of  action,  may  in  many 
instances  lie  for  the  same  wrong,  at  the  plaintiff's  option.     They 

adjective  and  of  the  law  substantive  on  this  point,  but  also  by  its  avoidance 
of  confusion  of  the  tort  conversion  with  the  equitable  docti-lne  of  conversion. 
This  chain  of  reasoning  would  seem  to  add  cogency  to  the  insistence  that 
"deprivation"  should  be  used  instead  of  "convereion,"  as  the  name  descrip- 
tive of  this  species  of  civil  wrong.  Complaint  in  trover  should  contain:  (1) 
Allegation  of  ownership  or  possession  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  wrong.  It 
need  not  show  nature  or  evidence  of  plaintiff's  title;  it  is  enough  to  allege 
ownership  generally.  Reed  v.  McUill,  41  Neb.  20(i,  59  N.  W.  775;  Warren  v. 
Dwyer,  91  Mich.  414,  51  N.  W.  106;  Oberf elder  v.  Kavanaugh,  21  Neb.  48.3, 
32  N.  W.  295;  Stall  v.  Wilbur,  77  N.  Y.  158;  Swift  v.  .Tames,  50  Wis.  540,  7  N. 
W.  OriC;  Sturmau  v.  Stone,  31  Iowa,  115;  Keruer  v.  Boardiuan  (Com.  PI.)  14 
N.  Y.  Supp.  787.  A  complaint  alleging  possession  of  plaintiff  is  sufficient, 
although  the  judgment  shows  title.  Rosenthal  v.  McMann,  93  Cal.  505,  29 
Pac.  121.  Property  or  possession  must  be  shrvwn  at  the  time  of  the  wrong, 
and  not  at  the  commencement  of  the  action.  Sawyer  v.  Robertson,  11  Mont. 
416,  28  Pac.  456;  Smith  v.  Foi-ce,  31  Minn.  119,  16  N.  W.  704;  Bond  v.  Mitchell, 
3  Barb.  304.  (2)  A  reasonably  certain  description  of  property.  "All  the  sa- 
loon fixtures  on  the  premises  No.  424  M.  street,"  giving  city  and  county,  is  suf- 
ficient. Greenebaum  v.  Taylor,  102  Cal.  624,  36  Pac.  957.  And  see  Crocker  v. 
Hopps,  78  Md.  200,  28  Atl.  99;  Leitner  v.  Strickland,  89  Ga.  303,  15  S.  E. 
469.  (3)  A  sufficient  allegation  of  the  act  of  conversion.  That  defendant 
"converted"  the  property  is  an  allegation  of  fact,  not  of  law,  and  is  suffi- 
cient, Duggan  V.  Wright,  157  Mass.  228,  32  N.  E.  159;  Johnson  v.  Ashland 
Lumber  Co.,  45  Wis.  119;  or  "sold,"  Edwards  v.  Sonoma  Valley  Bank,  59  Cal. 
136;  Cone  v.  Ivinson  (Wyo.)  33  Pac.  31,  35  Pac.  933.  Plaintiff  need  not  allege 
particulars.  Green  v.  Palmer,  15  Cal.  412.  An  allegation  as  to  place  is  im- 
material. First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Brown,  85  Tex.  80,  23  S.  W.  862.  An  allegation 
of  essential  elements  of  conduct  constituting  conversion  is  sufficient.  Cf. 
Hatchings  v.  Castle,  48  Cal.  152,  with  Triscony  v.  Orr,  49  Cal.  612.  As  to  de- 
mand and  refusal,  see  Holdridge  v.  Lee,  3  S.  D.  134,  52  N.  W.  265;  Schmidt 
v.  Garfield  Nat.  Bank,  64  Hun,  298,  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  252;  Proctor  v.  Cole,  66 
Ind.  576;  Pugh  v.  Calloway,  10  Ohia  St.  488;  Kronschnable  v.  Knoblauch, 
21  Minn.  56.  And  (4)  an  allegation  of  damage.  Morish  v.  Mountain,  22 
Minn.  564;  Washburn  v.  Mendenliall,  21  Minn.  332.  It  is  usual,  but  not 
necessary,  to  allege  the  value  of  the  property.  Jones  v.  Rahilly,  16  Minn.  320 
(Gil.  283);  Connoss  v.  Meir,  2  E.  D.  Smith,  314;  Jefferson  v.  Hale,  31  Ark. 
286;  Woodruff  v.  Cook,  25  Barb.  505.  Generally,  as  to  complaint,  see  Howard 
V.  Seattle  Nat  Bank  (Wash.)  38  Pac.  1040.  Kyle  v.  Caravello  (Ala.)  15  South. 
527.  As  to  general  denial,  see  Warnick  v.  Baker,  42  Mo.  App.  439;  Sparks 
V.  Heritage,  45  Ind.  66;  Richardson  v.  Smith,  29  Cal.  529.  As  to  answers, 
generally,  see  Dubois  v.  Sistare,  59  Hun,  353,  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  99;   Benedict  v. 


708  WRONc;s    TO    POSSI'>SION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Cll.    10 

liave  become  largely,  if  not  wholly,  interchangeable  ^'^  as  to  in- 
juries to  personal  property.="^  The  fundamental  distinction  be- 
tween them  is  founded  on  this:  Trespass  is  essentially  a  wrong 
to_the  actual,  possessor;-  conversion  is  a  wrong.  to_.the  person  -ea- 
titled  to  immediate  possession.-""      The  actual  possessor  is  fre- 

Farlow,  1  Ind.  App.  IGO,  27  N.  E.  307;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Lawson,  88 
Ky.  400,  11  S.  W.  511.  As  to  reply,  McFadclen  v.  Schroeder,  4  Ind.  App.  305, 
29  N.  E.  491,  and  30  N.  E.  711.  As  between  trover  and  remedy  for  breach  of 
contract,  see  Shea  v.  Inhabitants  of  Milford,  145  Mass.  525,  14  N.  E.  769. 

297  Innes,  Torts,  9;  3  Bl.  Comm.  152.  Thus,  the  destruction  of  property 
may  be  the  basis  of  an  action  either  of  trespass  or  conversion.  Pig.  Torts, 
345.  Abuse  of  license  of  law,  e.  g.  to  drive  sheep  away  from  defend- 
ant's close,  may  make  trespass  ab  initio  and  enable  owner  to  sue  in  trover. 
Gilson  V.  Fisk,  8  N.  H.  404.  Cf.  Brown  v.  Boyce,  G8  111.  294.  The  distinc- 
tion between  trespass  and  conversion  may  be  veiy  material  on  the  ques- 
tion of  damages.  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  1(38,  note  c.  It  is  well  illustrated  in 
Shea  V.  Inhabitants  of  Milford,  145  Mass.  525,  14  N.  E.  769.  Here  property 
of  the  plaintiff  was  on  defendants'  land.  Defendants  requested  plaintiff  to  re- 
move it,  and  upon  his  refusal  so  to  do,  defendants  removed  it.  It  was  held 
that,  if  plaintiff  had  the  right  to  occupy  the  land,  which  he  claimed,  the  acts 
of  defendants  were  wrongful,  and  they  would'be  liable  to  him  for  damages  tor 
breach  of  contract  or  for  trespass,  but  not  for  value  of  property  converted 
to  their  own  use.  So,  in  Downs  v.  Finnegan  (Minn.)  59  N.  W.  981,  a  further 
dilSerence  is  well  illustrated.  While  the  plaintiff  in  conversion  may  waive 
the  tort  and  sue  in  assumpsit,  a  trespass  is  not  so  convertible.  It  was  accord- 
ingly held  that,  though  a  naked  trespass,  creating  a  liability  for  damages, 
cannot  be  the  basis  of  an  action  as  on  implied  assumpsit,  where  one  has 
wrongifully  quaiTied  stone  on  the  land  of  another,  and  converted  the  same  to 
his  own  use  so  that  replevin  or  trover  would  lie,  the  tort  may  be  waived,  and 
the  value  of  the  stone  recovered  in  assumpsit.  And  see  article  by  Judge 
Cooley  in  3  Alb.  Law  J.  141.  Further,  as  to  difference  between  trespass  and 
conversion,  see  Stanley  v.  Gaylord,  1  Cush.  536-553.  Thorogood  v.  Robin- 
son, 6  Q.  B.  769;  Town  v.  Hazen,  51  N.  H.  596;  Bushel  v.  Miller,  1  Strange, 
128;    Pams worth  v.  Lowery,  134  Mass.  512. 

208  Trover  will  not  lie  for  an  injury  to  real  estate.  But  a  building  may  be 
converted.  Osborn  v.  Potter,  101  Mich.  300,  59  N.  W.  606;  Jonsson  v.  Lind- 
strom,  114  Ind.  152,  16  N.  E.  400.  And  if  it  be  wrongfully  taken  away  from 
a  homestead,  such  severance  does  not  destroy  its  exemption  from  legal  pro- 
cess.    Wylie  V.  Grundysen,  51  Minn.  360,  53  N.  W.  805. 

299  That  plaintiff's  ties  are  on  defendant's  right  of  way  does  not  defeat  an 
action  for  conversion.  Baker  v.  Railway  to.,  52  Mo.  App.  602.  Trover  wiU 
lie  although  the  property  be  in  the  custody  of  a  court  of  chancery.  Gara- 
baldi  V.  Wright,  52  Ark.  416,  12  S.  W.  875.     Indorsee  in  blank  of  note  held 


Ch.   10]  CONVERSION.  709 

quently,  but  not  always,  the  person  entitled  to  immediate  posses- 
sion. So  that  trover  sometimes  may,  but  does  not  necessarily,  in- 
clude  trespass.^"" 

Conversion  differs  from  negligence  in  being  a  breach  of  an  abso- 
lute duty,  and  the  result  of  what  is  done  or  omitted  at  ])eril;  so 
that  the  question  of  culpability,  or  want  of  care,  is  not  an  element  | 
of  conversion.  Such  personal  fault  is  of  the  essence  of  negli- 
gence.^"^ Unlike  negligence,  it  cannot  be  brought  for  a  personal 
injury.  The  line  of  distinction  between  the  two  is,,  in  actual  prac 
tice,  by  no  means  always  distiflct.^"^ 

Conversion  is  a  transitory,  as  distinguished  from  a  local,  wrong. 
It  has,  therefore,  been  held  that  trover  will  not  lie,  at  the  suit  of  the 
owner  of  lands,  against  a  person  who  removes  timber  from  it  under 
claim  of  title,  since  that  would  put  the  title  to  lands  in  issue."."^ 
Where,  however,  one  has  recovered  possession  of  the  land  in  eject- 
ment, he  may  recover  in  trover  for  the  removal  of  standing  timber 
by  a  person  in  possession  under  claim  of  title.^"*-  Trover  does  not 
lie  to  recover  money  paid  by  mistake.^""  The  owner  is  not  bound 
to  follow  the  property  converted,  although  by  law  he  may  be  en- 
titled so  to  do,  but  may  sue  at  once  for  damages.  Therefore,  n 
mortgagee  whose  mortgaged  property  has  been  unlawfully  sold  is 

as  collateral  security  may  sue  lndorser,j^Ko  has  note  for  collection  in  tro- 
ver. Carter  v.  Lehman,  90  Ala.  126,  7  Sotath.  735.  Where  plaintiff  in  trover 
claims  under  a  chattel  mortgage,  such  special  property  must  be  alleged;  a 
general  allegation  of  a  right  to  possession  not  being  sufficient.  Kennett  v. 
Peters,  54  Kan.  119,  37  Pac.  999.  See  Axford  v.  Mathews,  43  Mich.  32T,  5 
N.  W.  377;  Foster  v.  Miuingi  Co.,  68  Mich.  188,  36  N.  W.  171;  Stevenson  v. 
Fitzgerald,  47  Blich.  166,  10  N.  W.  185. 

3  00  Fraser,  Torts,  62;   Lexington  &  O.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Kidd,  7  Dana,  245. 

301  Post,  821,  "Negligence." 

802  Post,  p.  814,  "Negligence."  And  see  Graves  v.  Smith,  14  Wis.  5;  Piatt  v. 
Tuttle,  23  Conn.  233;   Williams  v.  Geese,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  849. 

303  Lehigh  Zinc  &  Iron  Co.  v.  New  Jersey  Zinc  &  Iron  Co.,  55  N.  J.  Law, 
350,  26  Atl.  920;  Washburn  v.  Cutter,  17  Minn.  361  (Gil.  335);  Nash  v.  Sul- 
livan, 32  Minn.  189,  20  N.  W.  144. 

804  Wilson  V.  Hofeman,  93  Mich.  72,  52  N.  W.  1037.  But  timber  has  been 
regarded  as  personalty  under  such  circumstances.  Brooks  t.  Rogers,  101  Ala. 
Ill,  13  South.  386. 

805  Muskegon  Booming  Co.  v^^ieudiicks,  89  Mich.  172,  50  N.  W.  799. 


710  WUONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

not  compelled  to  pursue  the  lien  to  wliich  he  may  be  entitled,  but 
may  recover  in  trover.^"" 

SAME— TITLE  TO  MAINTAIN. 

225.  To  entitle  him  to  recover  in  trover  and  conversion, 
the  plaintiff  or  his  assignor*"'  must  have  had  at 
the  time  of  the  alleged  -wrrong — 

(a)  Property,  general  or  special,  entitling  him  to  imme- 

diate possession;  or 

(b)  Actual  possession.^ 

To  recover  in  trover,  plaintiff  must  show  possession  in  fact,  or  the 
right  to  recover  possession.  The  wrong  is  not  done  to  the  thing 
itself,  but  to  the  abstiii.;t  right  to  the  thing.'°»  The  plaintiff,  ac- 
cordingly, must  allege  and  prove  possession  or  right  of  possession 
at  the  time  of  the  alleged  wrong;  not  indefinitely  or,  for  example, 
at  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the  action.^^"  Absolute  own- 
so  o  Cone  V.  I  Vinson  (Wyo.)  33  Pac.  31,  35  Pac.  933;  House  v.  Phelan,  83  Tex. 
595,  19  S.  W.  140;  Moore  v.  Baker,  4  Ind.  App.  115,  30  N.  E.  629.  And  see 
Searle  v.  Sawyer,  127  Mass.  491.  That  a  railroad  company  converting  goods 
by  delivery  could  also  be  sued  is  no  bar  to  an  action  againsit  a  i>erson  to 
whom  such  goods  were  delivered.  Dickinson  v.  Merchants'  Elevator  Co.,  44 
Mo.  App.  498.  Generally,  as  to  when  a  given  action  is  trover,  Hoowe  v.  Krel- 
ing,  93  Cal.  136,  28  Pac.  1042;  Knipper  v.  Blumenthal,  107  Mo.  665,  18  S.  W. 
23;    Below  v.  Bobbins,  76  Wis.  600,  45  N.  W.  416. 

307  Tome  v.  Dubois,  6  Wall.  548-554;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Humphries, 
4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  333,  23  S.  W.  556;  Brady  v.  Whitney,  24  Mich.  154. 

308  Hunter  v.  Croukhite,  9  Ind.  App.  470,  36  N.  E.  924;  Tribble  v.  Laird, 
92  Ga.  686,  19  S.  E.  26. 

30  0  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  168.     Conversion  cannot  be  maintained  for  a  stock  of 
liquor  by  one  who  does  not  own  it,  or  have  an  interest  therein,  though  the 
business  is  carried  on  in  his  name,  for  the  purpose  of  savingi  the  real  owner 
the  expense  of  a  wholesale  license.     Epstein  v.  Meyer  Bros.  Drug   Co.,  82  • 
Tex.  572,  18  S.  W.  592.. 

310  Gordon  v.  Harper,  7  Term  R.  9,  Chase,  Lead.  Cas.  201;  Pyne  v.  Dor, 
1  Term  R.  55;  Bradley  v.  Copley,  1  C.  B.  685;  Sawyer  v.  Robertson,  11  Mont. 
416,  28  Pac.  456;  Hunter  v.  Cronkhite,  9  Ind.  App.  470,  36  N.  E.  024;  Parker 
v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  3  N.  D.  87,  54  N.  W.  313;  McLaughlin  v.  Waite,  9  Cow. 
670;  Smith  v.  Force,  31  Minn.  119,  16  N.  W.  704;  Vanderburgh  v.  Bassett, 
4  Jlinn.  242  (Gil.  171);   Balme  v.  Hutton,  9  Bing.  471-^77. 


"•    ^^^  CONVERSION.  711 

orship  of  chattels— the  right  of  general  property— Is  said  to  draw 
to  it  the  right  of  possession."!  This  would  seem  to  mean  no  more 
than  that  ownership  confers  the  right  to  take  possession.  There- 
fore one  in  whom  is  vested  absolute  property  in  a  chattel  may  main- 
tain trover  and  conversion  against  one  who  interferes  with  it,  al- 
though the  owner  has  never  had  possession  in  fact."^  Constructive 
possession  is  sufficient."' 

There  are,  however,  many  kinds  of  special  property,  not  amount- 
ing to  absolute  ownership,  which  are  sufficient  to  entitle  one  to  re- 
•cover  for  conversion.  Special  property  denotes  the  possession  of 
one  who  has  a  qualified  interest;  and  it  is  sometimes  added  to  one 
who  has  only  bare  possession."*  Where  a  person  relies  on  special 
property,  there  must,  ordinarily,  be  adduced  evidence  of  possession. 
Possession  is  not  annexed  to  it  by  a  construction  of  law."=  Bare 
possession,  as  of  a  finder,  gives  sufficient  right  to  maintain  trover.^^'* 


311  Lexington  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kidd,  7  Dana,  245;  Abei'crombie  v.  Bradford, 
16  Ala.  560-567. 

312  Ball,  Torts,  70;  Gordon  v.  Harper,  7  Term  R.  9;  2  Saund.  47a,  note  1; 
Ayer  v.  Bartlett,  9  Pick.  156;  Foster  v.  Gorton,  5  Pick.  185;  Stewart  v. 
Bright,  6  Houst.  344. 

313  Bristol  v.  Burt,  7  Johns.  254;  McCombie  v.  Davies,  6  East,  540;  post,  p. 
722.  And  see  cases  collected,  1  Ames  &  S.  Lead.  Gas.  357.  Cf.  McNa'ir  v.  Wil- 
cox, 121  Pa.  St.  437,  15  Atl.  575. 

314  1  Chit.  PI.  151-169;  Webb  v.  Fox,  7  Term  R.  391.  "What  is  meant  by 
-a  special  prOT>erty  in  a  thing?  Does  it  mean  a  qualified  right  or  interest  in 
the  thlng.^li  jus  in  re,  or  a  right  annexed  to  the  thing?  Or  does  it  mean 
merely  a  lawful  right  of  custody,  or  possession,  of  the  thing,  ^Vhich  con- 
stitutes a  sufficient  title  to  maintain  that  possession  against  wrongdoers 
by  action  or  otherwise?  If  the  latter  be  its  true  signification,  it  is  little 
more  than  a  dispute  about  terms,  as  all  persons  will  now  admit  that  every 
bailee,  even  under  a  naked  bailment  from  the  owner,  and  every  rightful  pos- 
sessor by  act  or  operation  of  law,  has  in  this  sense  a  special  property  in  the 
thing;  but  this  certainly  is  not  the  sense  in  which  the  phrase  is  ordinarily 
imderstood."  See  Story,  Bailm.  §  93,  notes  g,  h,  i.  It  is  consistent  with  the 
treatment  of  possession  and  property  by  Mr.  Pollock,  as  heretofore  followed 
in  this  book,  to  continue  to  sepai-ate  possession  from  property.  It  would 
seem  that  the  preservation  of  this  distinction  conduces  to  clearness. 

31 B  2  Greenl.  Ev.  §  637,  note  2  et  seq.;  Clark  v.  Draper,  19  N.  H.  419. 
818  Armory  v.  Delamlrie,  1  Strange,  505;  1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  (8th  Ed.)  pt. 


"12  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Cil.    10 

A  forMoii,  where  there  is  possession  under  claim  of  title.'"  The 
I)Ossession  of  chattels  is,  in  general,  prima  facie  evidence  of  prop- 
erty, and  of  a  right  to  their  possession,  if  not  against  all  who  cannot 
sliow  a  better  title,  at  least  against  all  who  rely  on  an  inferior 
one.'^'  As  between  the  finder  and  one  who  claims  the  chattel  as 
owner,  the  former  may  retain  the  property  a  reasonable  length  of 
time  to  satisfy  himself  whether  the  claimant  is  the  owner.^^"  In- 
deed, a  party  in  or  entitled  to  rightful  possession  may  sometimes 
maintain  trover  against  the  owner.^^"  On  the  other  hand,  however, 
mere  lawful  possession  of  property  may  not  deprive  the  owner  of 
his  right  to  recover,  although  he  had  intended  to  part  with  both  pos- 
session and  property.  By  the  doctrine  of  constructive  repossession, 
he  may  be  entitled  to  maintain  trover.'''^     Thus,  where  goods  are 

1,  p.  679;  Chase,  Lead.  Cas.  201;  Nicholls  v.  Bastard,  2  Cromp.,  M.  &  R.  G59; 
Wilbraham  v.  Snow,  2  Wm.  Saund.  47a;  Northam  v.  Bowden,  11  Exch.  70; 
Buckley  v.  Gross,  3  Best  &  S.  566;  Sutton  v.  Buck,  2  Taunt.  302;  Linscott  v. 
Trask,  35  Me.  150;  Krewson  v.  Purdom,  15  Or.  589,  16  Pae.  480.  And  see 
article  on  "Eights  and  Liabilities  of  the  Finder  of  Chattels"  in  16  Chi.  Leg. 
News,  .34a. 

317  Possession  of  land  under  claim  of  title  is  sufficient  evidence  of  owner- 
ship to  entitle  the  person  in  possession  to  maintain  trover  for  crops  grown 
on  the  land.  Kussell  v.  Willette  (Sup.)  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  490.  Seymour  v. 
Peters,  67  Mich.  415,  35  N.  W.  62;  Wessels  v.  Beeman,  87  Mich.  4S1.  49  N.  W. 
483. 

318  Brown  v.  Ware,  25  Me.  411;  Adams  v.  McGlinchy,  66  Me.  474;  Cook  v. 
Patterson,  33  Ala.  102;  Gilson  v.  Wood,  20  111.  38.  One  who,  without  per- 
mission, has  cut  cord  wood  from  public  lands  and  piled  it  along  a  railroad,  is 
in  actual  possession  thereof,  and  is  engaged  in  selling  it  for  his  own  benefit, 
may  recover  its  full  value,  if  negligently  destroyed  by  fire  from  a  locomotive; 
for  the  railroad  company  cannot  justify  its  negligence  by  showing  that  plain- 
tiff was  a  trespasser,  or  question  his  title  without  connecting  itself  with  the 
true  title.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  2  C.  C.  A.  446,  51  Fed.  658.  And 
see  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  4  C.  C.  A.  447,  54  Fed.  474-480.  A 
recent  statement  of  the  rule  is  that,  in  an  action  for  conversion,  title  in  a  third 
person  is  no  defense,  unless  defendant  can  in  some  manner  connect  himself 
with  such  person,  and  claim  under  him.  Brown  v.  Shaw,  51  Minn.  266,  53 
N.  W.  033. 

310  Isack  V.  Clarke,  1  Rolle,  130;   Clark  v.  Chamberlin,  2  Mees.  &  W.  78. 

320  Roberts  v.  Wyatt,  2  Taunt.  268;  Engel  v.  Scott  &  H.  Lumber  Co.  (Minn.) 
61  N.  W.  825. 

321  Ball,  Torts,  379. 


Ch.   10]  CONVERSION.  7^3 

delivered  for  an  illegal  purpose  (as  to  defraud  creditors),  the  owner 
may  repudiate  the  illegal  purpose  at  any  time  before  it  is  carried 
out,  and  bring  trover  to  recover  his  goods  from  the  person  to  whom 
they  were  intrusted-^*^^ 

Few  things  in  law,  it  is  said,  are  more  difficult  to  determine  than 
what  is  a  suflQcient  right  of  property  to  support  trover  or  replevin.^^' 
The  defendant  cannot  succeed  by  setting  up  the  title  of  a  third  per- 
son, unless  he  can  so  connect  himself  with  such  third  person  as  to 
claim  title  under  him.^^*  Accordingly,  he  is  driven  to  defending 
his  right  to  the  property,  and  to  attacking  that  of  the  plaintiff.  The 
respective  rights  of  possession  of  defendant  and  plaintiff  vary  from 
those  of  an  absolute  owner  to  those  of  a  thief.  To  illustrate,  it 
seems  clear  that  the  owner  of  personal  property  leased  to  another 
cannot  maintain  trover  for  a  conversion  pending  the  demise.'^'  On 
the  same  principle,  one  who,  in  accordance  with  his  authority,  dis- 
poses of  property  coming  into  Ms  possession,  is  not  liable  in  trover, 
though  he  misapplies  the  proceeds,  takes  inadequate  security,  or 
sells  for  a  less  price  than  authorized.     He  would,  however,  be  liable 

3  22  Taylor  v.  Bowers,  1  Q.  B.  Div.  291. 

323   1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  (8tli  Am.  Ed.)  pt.  1,  p.  690. 

3^i  "I  am  of  the  opinion,"  said  Lord  Campbell,  C.  J.,  in  Jeffries  v.  GroiU 
Western  Ey.  Co.,  5  El.  &  Bl.  802-805,  "that  the  law  is  that  a  person  possessed 
of  goods  as  his  property  has  a  good  title  as  against  every  stranger,  and  that 
one  who  takes  them  from  him,  having  no  title  himself,  is  a  wrongdoer,  and 
cannot  defend  himself  by  showing  that  there  was  title  in  some  third  person, 
for  against  a  wrongdoer  possession  is  a  title."  Thorne  v.  Tilbury,  3  Hurl.  & 
N.  534;  Biddle  v.  Bond,  34  Law  .T.  Q.  B.  137;  Harrington  v.  Tremblay,  CI  N. 
H.  413;  Cheesman  v.  Exall,  6  Exch.  341;  Bridges  v.  Hawkesworth,  21  Law 
J.  Q.  B.  75;  Brown  V.  Shaw,  51  Minn.  266,  53  N.  W.  033;  Barker  v.  Dement, 
9  Gill  (Md.)  .7;  Jones  v.  Kellogg,  51  Kan.  263,  33  Pac.  997;  Duncan  v.  Spear, 
11  Wend.  54;  Wheeler  v.  Lawson,  103  N.  Y.  40,  8  N.  E.  360;  Lowremore  v. 
Berry,  19  Ala.  130;  Weymouth  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  17  Wis.  5U7; 
Steele  v.  Schricker,  55  Wis.  134,  12  N.  W.  39G;  Jeffries  v.  Great  Western  Ry. 
Co.,  34  Eng.  Law  &  Eq.  122;  Brown  v.  Shaw,  51  Minn.  266,  53  X.  W.  63:!. 
But  see  Krewson  v.  Pm-dom,  13  Or.  .50.!,  11  Pac.  281. 

325  Gordon  v.  Harper,  7  Tei-m  R.  9;  1  Chit.  PI.  152;  2  Greenl.  Ev.  §  640. 
Possession  under  a  pledge  is  defense  to  an  action  for  conversion.  Clark  v. 
Costello,  79  Hun,  58S,  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  037.  And  see  Borland  v.  Stokes,  120 
Pa.  St  278,  14  Atl.  61.     Cf .  Kern  v.  Wilson,  73  Iowa,  490,  35  N.  W.  594. 


714  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

if  he  should  dispose  of  it  in  a  way  or  for  a  purpose  not  authorized."" 
A  vendor  may  deliver  personal  property  under  a  conditional  sale, 
reserving  title  in  himself,  and  under  such  an  agreement  regain  pos- 
session, without  becoming  liable  in  conversion.  And  he  has  been 
allowed  to  recover  in  trover  against  such  vendee  for  disposing  of  it 
without  his  consent,^"''  and  against  third  persons  purchasing  it 
with  knowledge  of  the  terms  under  which  the  vendee  held  it."^ 
But  such  third  persons  are  not  liable  to  the  vendee  under  such  cir- 
oumstances.^^^  A  bailee,  pledgee,  mortgagee,  or  holder  of  other 
special  interest  has  sufficient  property  to  enable  him  to  recover  the 
full  value  of  the  personal  property  as  against  a  stranger  to  the  title; 
but  he  must  account  to  the  general  owner  for  the  surplus  recovered 
beyond  the  value  of  his  own  interest.'^"     As  against  the  general 

326  Lewis  V.  Metcalf,  53  Kan.  217,  36  Pac.  345:  Willis  v.  Adams,  60  Vt.  223, 
28  Atl.  1033;  Chase  v.  Blaisdell,  4  Minn.  90;  Laverty  v.  Snethen,  G8  N.  \. 
522;  Chase,  Lead.  Cas.  197;  Coleman  v.  Pearce,  26  Minn.  123,  1  N.  W.  84(i. 
A  maker  of  a  note  pledged  certain  collateral  security,  and  agreed  to  maintain 
on  demand  10  per  cent,  margin,  "and  on  the  nonperformance  of  this  iDromise, 
or  any  part  of  It,  I  authorize  S.,  agent,  to  sell  the  collateral,"  etc.  It  was 
held  that  the  authority  to  sell  related  to  the  failure  to  pay  the  note  as  well 
as  the  failure  to  maintain  such  margin,  and  that  a  sale  for  nonpayment  was 
not  a  conversion  of  the  collaterals.  Manning  v.  Shriver  (Md.)  28  Atl.  899. 
In  an  action  for  money  intrusted  to  defendant  for  application  in  a  certain 
way,  proof  that  he  failed  to  so  apply  it  is  sufiSeient  to  sustain  a  recovery,  with- 
out proof  of  how  he  appropriated  it.  Crosby  v.  Clark,  80  Hun,  426,  30  N.  Y. 
Supp.  329;    Syeds  v.  Hay,  4  Tei-m  R.  260. 

32T  Watson  v.  Goodno,  06  Vt.  229,  28  Atl.  987.  And  see  Rhodes  v.  Dickin- 
son, 79  Ga.  724,  4  S.  E.  164. 

328  of.  Smith  V.  Wood,  63  Vt.  534,  22  Atl.  .575.  And  see  cases  collected  by 
counsel  for  defendant,  page  535,  03  Vt.,  and  page  575,  22  Atl.  Although  the 
agreement  be  not  recorded,  as  required  by  the  statute,  to  enable  it  to  avail 
against  third  persons.  Rodney  Hunt  Maeh.  Co.  v.  Stewart,  57  Hun,  545,  11 
N.  Y.  Supp.  448.  But  see  as  to  executoi-y  agreement,  Snell  v.  Thorp  (Sup.)  15 
N.  Y.  Supp.  411.  And,  generally,  see  McNail  v.  Ziegler,  08  111.  224;  NewhaU  v. 
Kingsbury,  131  Mass.  445;  Hardy  v.  Munroe,  127  Mass.  04;  Hance  v.  Titta- 
bawassee  Boom  Co.,  70  Mich.  227,  38  N.  W.  228;  Scott  v.  Hodges,  02  Ala.  337; 
Northington  v.  Faber,  52  Ala.  45. 

3  20  A  person  who  pays  tor  putting  designs  on  a  lithographic  stone,  title  to 
which  is  agreed  to  be  in  the  printer,  cannot  sue  third  person  for  its  conver- 
sion.    Knight  V.  Sackett  &  Wilhelms  Lith.  Co.,  141  N.  Y.  404,  36  N.  E.  392. 

880  Fallon  v.  Manning,  35  Mo.  271;   Atkins  v.  Moore,  82  111.  210;    Leoncini 


^"-    1*^3  CONVERSION.  71.1 

owner,  or  one  in  privity  with  the  general  owner,  he  can  recover  only 
the  value  of  his  special  property.  On  the  other  hand,  abuse  by  the 
bailee  of  his  special  property  renders  him  liable  in  conversion  to  its 
owner.  The  hirer  of  a  piano,  who  sends  it  to  an  auctioneer  to  be 
sold,  is  guilty  of  conversion;  and  so  is  the  auctioneer  who  refuses  to 
deliver  it  up  unless  expenses  incurred  be  first  paid.""  Trover  will 
not  lie  against  a  mortgagee  for  repossessing  himself  of  the  goods  on 
condition  broken  by  mortgagor.^"     a  vendor  may  maintain  conver- 

V.  Post,  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  825;  Mechanics'  &  Traders'  Bank  of  BufEalov.  Farmers' 
&  Mechanics'  Nat.  Banlc  of  Buffalo,  GO  N.  Y.  40;  Russell  v.  Butterfleld,  21 
Wend.  300;  .Tellett  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  30  Minn.  205,  15  N.  W.  237. 
Warehousemen  have  an  entire  cause  of  action  in  trover  against  persons  who 
have  bought  goods  stolen  from  their  warehouses,  though  such  goods  may  have 
belonged  to  divers  baUors.  Bode  v.  Lee,  102  Cal.  583,  36  Pac.  936.  The  otti- 
cer  holding  property  under  attachment,  not  plaintiff  in  attachment,  is  proper 
party  plaintiff  for  con-version  of  goods  attached.  Baker  v.  Beers,  64  N.  H. 
102,  6  Atl.  35.  1  Sedg.  Dam.  note  a;  1  Smith,  Lead.  Gas.  210;  Northam  v. 
Bowden,  11  Exch.  70;  Buckley  v.  Gross,  3  Best  &  S.  566.  The  bailee  may 
maintain  such  action,  not  only  for  conversion,  but  for  failure  of  duty,  whereby 
property  has  been  lost,  as  against  a  common  carrier  or  innkeeper.  Moi-an  v. 
Portland  Steam  Packe't  Co.,  35  Me.  55;  Finn  v.  Western  Ry.  Coi-p.,  112  Mass. 
524;  Duggan  v.  Wright,  157  Mass.  228,  32  N.  E.  159  (mortgagee);  Merchants' 
&  Planters'  Bank  v.  Meyer,  50  Ark.  499,  20  S.  W.  406  (landlord's  lien  on  cot- 
ton). And  see  Graw  v.  Patterson,  47  111.  App.  87.  Cf.  Darden  v.  Callaghau 
(Cal.)  31  Pac.  263  (contract  of  purchase). 

331  Loeschman  v.  Machin,  2  Starkie,  311;  Bigelow,  Lead.  Cas.  Torts,  393. 
So  a  sale  of  samples  by  a  drummer.  Kruse  v.  Seeger  &  Guernsey  Co.  (Com. 
PI.  N.  Y.)  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  529,  affirming  (City  Ct.  N.  Y.)  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  825.  The 
owner  of  the  reversionai-j'  interest  in  such  case  must  show  actual  damage  to 
recover  more  than  nominal  damage.  .Johnson  v.  Stear,  15  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  330; 
Blackburn,  J.,  1,.  R.  1  Q.  B.  Gli;  Bramwell,  J.,  3  Q.  B.  Div.  490.  The 
bailee  cannot  deny  his  bailor's  title.  Hence  lu  case  of  adverse  claim  he  can 
return  to  bailor  before  he  has  been  under  pressure,  equivalent  to  eviction  by 
paramount  title.  Biddle  v.  Bond,  34  Law  J.  Q.  B.  137.  As  to  conversion  of 
stock,  see  Ryman  v.  Gerlach,  153  Pa.  St.  197,  25  Atl.  1031,  and  26  Atl.  302. 

332  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Colorado  Springs  v.  Wilbur,  IS  Colo.  316,  2(!  Pac. 
777;  Hanson  v.  Tarbox,  47  Minn.  433,  50  N.  W.  474;  Hawver  v.  Bell,  64  Huu, 
G36,  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  612.  Compare  Dozier  v.  Pillot,  79  Tex.  224,  14  S.  W. 
1027,  with  Lewis  v.  Ocean  Nav.  &  Pier  Co.,  125  N.  Y.  341,  20  N.  E.  .301.  As 
to  attacking  for  usury  the  mortgage  involved  in  convereion,  see  Omaha  Auc- 
tion &  Storage  Co.  v.  Rogers,  35  Neb.  61,  52  N.  W.  826.  As  to  tender  after 
repossession  by  mortgagee,  see  Blain  v.  Foster,  33  111.  App.  297.     But  con- 


716  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

sion  against  liis  vendee  for  repudiating  conditions  of  sale.'"  And 
an  action  will  lie  by  a  mortgagee  against  the  mortgagor  or  his  priv- 
ies for  removing  the  chattels  mortgaged,  whether  the  mortgage  is 
due  or  not.^"  Generally,  any  form  of  contract  or  consent  by  the 
owner  will  justify  an  alleged  wrongful  disposition.'"  An  equitable 
lien  is  not  sufficient.""  Authority  to  dispose  and  collect  proceeds 
does  not  entitle  one  to  sue  third  persons  for  conversion."'  Labor 
of  an  agister  under  mistake  of  title  does  not  sustain  trover."* 

SAME— THE  UNAUTHORIZED  ACT. 

226.  The  act  of  conversion  is  the  distinct,  unauthorized, 

and  positive   assumption  of  the   powers   of  a  true 
ow^ner.^' 

227.  Neither  the  benefit  to  defendant  resulting  from  the 

act,  nor  ordinarily  the  motive  inducing  it,  but  the 
loss  to  plaintiff,  is  the  basis  of  the  -wrong. 

version  will  not  lie  against  a  carrier  on  demand  by  mortgagee  after  condition 
brolien.     Kohn  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  37  S.  C.  1,  16  S.  B.  376. 

333  Vendee  refusing  to  apply  proceeds  of  timber  to  payment  of  notes,  as  re- 
quired by  deed,  is  liable  in  trover  to  vendor.  Willis  v.  Adams,  66  Vt.  223,  2S 
Atl.  1033  (Ross,  0.  J.,  dissenting). 

3  34  Gill  V.  Weston,  110  Pa.  St.  312,  1  Atl.  921. 

335  Tousley  v.  Board  of  Education,  39  Minn.  419,  40  N.  W.  509;  Henry  Bill 
Pub.  Co.  V.  Durgin,  101  Mich.  458,  59  N.  W.  812;  Benedict  v.  Farlow,  27  N.  B. 
307.  Cf.  Story,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Story,  100  Cal.  30;  Marks  v.  Wright,  81  Wis.  572, 
51  N.  W.  882.  As  to  transfer  as  collateral  security,  see  Ricards  v.  Wedemeyer, 
75  Md.  10,  22  Atl.  1101;  Mallory  v.  Cowart,  90  Ga.  600,  16  S.  E.  058;  Johnson 
v.  Osborn,  85  Ga.  664,  11  S.  E.  841.  A  license  may  be  a  full  protection  to  the 
defendant.  Ante,  p.  679,  "Trespass."  But  only  so  far  as  fair  construction  will 
justify.  Huddleston  v.  Johnson,  71  Wis.  336,  37  N.  W.  407.  But  authority 
from  one  who  is  not  the  owner  is  no  defense,  and  there  is  no  presumption  that 
the  licensor  had  any  license  from  the  owner.  Applied  to  conversion  of  timber 
under  license  from  one  having  no  authority,  in  Jlillard  v.  McDonald  Lumber 
Co.,  64  Wis.  620,  25  N.  W.  656. 

330  Deeley  v.  Dwight,  132  X.  Y.  59,  30  N.  E.  258. 

33T  Swenson  v.  Kleinschmidt,  10  Mont.  473,  26  Pac.  198. 

3  3  8  Therefore,  an  innocent  trespasser  who  gets  out  logs  on  defendant's  land 
cannot  recover  for  latter's  disposal  of  them.  Gates  v.  Rifle  Boom  Co.,  70  Mich. 
309,  38  N.  W.  245. 

8  39  Pol.  Torts,  §  290.     More  elaborate  statement  in,  15  Am.  Law  Rev.  363. 


■Ch.  10]  CONVERSION.  717 

228.  The  fact  of  wrongful  assumption  of  the  dominion, 
when  established,  entitles  the  owner  or  possessor 
to  recover  in  trover,  despite  his  subsequent  dealings 
w^ith  the  property  not  amounting  to  a  legM  dis- 
charge. 

Every  distinct  act  ,of  dominion  exerted  over  property  in  denial 
of  the  owner's  right  or  inconsistent  therewith  amounts  to  conver- 
sion.''*'' By  an  act  of  dominion  is  meant  an  act  tantamount  to  an 
exercise  of  ownership.^*i  Mere  assertion  of  ownership  would  not 
seem  to  be  sufficient.  =="  The  act  must  be  unauthorized.  If  it  is 
done  in  accordance  with  authority  of  law,  whether  process  of  lav- 
si  o  This  would  seem  to  be  the  test  of  conversion,  rather  than  either  (1)  inten- 
tion, actual  or  oonstvuctive,  to  assert  title  in  defendant  or  against  iilaintilif; 
or  (2)  act  of  asportation  or  detention  without  authority.  See  Fouldes  v.  Wil- 
loughby,  8  Mees.  &  W.  540;  Bristol  v.  Burt,  7  Johns.  2.54;  Frome  v.  Dennis,  4.") 
N.  J.  Law,  515,  Chase,  Lead.  Cas.  199;  McPheters  v.  Page,  S3  Me.  234,  22  Atl. 
101;  Webber  v.  Davis,  44  Me.  147-152;  Nichols  v.  Newsom,  2  Murph.  (N.  C.) 
302;  Jliller  v.  Baker,  1  Mete,  (ilass.)  27;  Baker  v.  Beers,  64  N.  H.  102,  6  Atl. 
35;  Gibbs  v.  Chase,  10  Mass.  125-128;  Forbes  v.  Railroad  Co.,  133  Mass.  154; 
Guthrie  v.  Jones,  108  Mass.  191;  Hinckley  v.  Baxter,  13  Allen,  139;  AVoodes  v. 
Jordan,  62  Me.  490;  Spooner  v.  Manchester,  133  Mass.  270;  Pease  v.  Smith, 
<51  N.  Y.  477;  Salt  Springs  Nat.  Bank  v.  Wheeler,  48  N.  Y.  492;  Alexander  v. 
Swackhamer,  105  Ind.  81,  4  N.  E.  433,  and  5  N.  E.  908;  HoUins  v.  Fowler,  L. 
R.  7  H.  L.  7.57;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Northern  R.  Co.,  58  N.  H,  203;  Baker  v. 
Beei-s,  64  N.  H.  102,  6  Atl.  35;  Gordon  v.  Stockdale,  89  Ind.  240.  See  Robert- 
son V.  Hunt,  77  Tex.  321,  14  S.  W.  08;  Rhodes  v.  Dickinson,  79  Ga.  724,  4  S.  E. 
164;  Rodney  Hunt  Mach.  Co.  v.  Stewart,  57  Hun,  545,  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  448; 
Lewis  V.  Ocean  Nav.  &  Pier  Co.,  125  N.  Y.  841,  26  N.  E.  301;  Olds  v.  Chicago 
Open  Board  of  Trade,  33  111.  App.  445;  Thomson  v.  Gortner,  73  Md.  474,  21 
Atl.  371;  Boiling  v.  Kirliy,  90  Ala.  215,  7  South.  914;  Omaha  Auction  &  Storage 
€o.  V.  Rogers,  35  Neb.  61,  52  N.  W.  826;  Smith  v.  Wood,  63  Vt.  534,  22  Atl.  575; 
Johnson  v.  Farr,  60  N.  H.  426;  Miller  v.  Thompson,  60  Me.  322;  Reeve  v.  Fox. 
40  111.  App.  127;  Loeffel  v.  Pohlman,  47  Mo.  App.  574;  Petrie  v.  Williams,  68 
Hun,  589,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  237;  Williams  v.  Smith,  153  Pa.  St.  462,  25  Atl.  1122; 
Sanborn  v.  Hamilton,  18  Vt.  590. 

341  Bigelow,  Torts,  184. 

342  Burnside  v.  TwitcheU,  43  N.  H.  390.  But  see  Rembaugh  v.  Phipps,  75 
Mo.  422.  Slander  of  title  might  lie.  Bigelow,  Torts,  198,  199.  Writ  of  re- 
plevin may  justffy  a  sheriff.     Swantz  t.  Pillow,  50  Ark.  300,  7  S.  W.  167. 


718  WRONGS    TO    POSSICSSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

or  otherwise,"'  or  with  the  consent  of  the  party/**  it  is  no  wrong. 
The  conversion  must  be  without  "lawful  occasion."  The  act  must  be 
a  positive  tortious  act."'*  A  merely  passive  defendant  cannot  be 
guilty  of  conversion.^*"  Nonfeasance  or  neglect  of  legal  duty,  as 
a  mere  failure  to  perform  an  act  made  obligatory  by  contract  or 
by  ^Ahich  property  is  lost  to  the  owner,  does  not  constitute  conver- 
sion.^^' Thus,  a  bailee  is  not  liable  in  trover  for  loss  of  property 
through  larceny  from  him,  or  because  of  negligence  resulting  in  its 
destruction.'**     Indeed,  it  is  doubtful  whether  a  person  already  in 

343  Distress  is  no  conversion  (Agars  v.  Lysle,  Hut.  10),  unless  it  be  illegal 
(Shipwick  V.  Blanchard,  6  Term  E.  298).  And  see  Holswortli's  Case,  Clayt. 
r>7,  and  Mires  v.  Solebay,  2  Mod.  242.  But  an  officer  is  liable  for  conversion 
for  carrying  away  nonseizable  property  under  judicial  writ  (Tinker  v.  Pool,  5 
Burrows,  2657),  or  property  not  described  in  the  writ  (Carpenter  v.  Scott,  80 
Iowa,  503,  53  N.  W.  328).  Generally,  see  Stuart  v.  Phelps,  39  Iowa,  14;  Pres- 
cott  v.  Wright,  0  Mass.  20;  Case  v.  Hart,  11  Ohio,  304.  Ante,  p.  126,  "Liabil- 
ity of  Executive  Officers";  ante,  p.  130,  "Sheriffs";  post,  p.  722,  note  364. 
So  it  is  no  conversion  to  drive  trespassing  cattle  out  of  defendant's  close. 
Stevens  v.  Curtis,  18  Pick.  227.  And  see  Wilson  v.  McLaughlin,  107  Mass.  587; 
Bonney  v.  Smith,  121  Mass.  155;  Tobin  v.  Deal,  60  AVis.  87,  18  N.  W.  634. 
Necessity  may  be  justification,  as  throwing  goods  over  in  a  stoim.  Bird  v. 
Astcock,  2  Bulst.  280;  Drake  v.  Shorter,  4  Bsp.  lO.j;  Macon  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Holt,  8  Ga.  157;  McCan-oll  v.  Stafford,  24  Ark.  224;  Nelson  v.  Merriam,  4  Pick. 
249;  Perkins  v.  Ladd,  114  Mass.  420. 

344  Hills  V.  Snell,  104  Mass.  173.  Although  it  need  not  have  been  against  the 
will  of  defendant.  Humpfner  v.  D.  M.  Osborne  &  Co.,  2  S.  D.  310,  50  N. 
W.  88. 

345  One  who  surrenders  bonds  to  another  cannot  maintain  trover  on  refusal 
of  such  other  to  redeliver  the  bonds,  where  th,ere  is  no  evidence  that  his  pos- 
session, retention,  or  disposal  of  the  bonds  was  tortious.  Biel  v.  Horner  (Com. 
PI.)  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  227. 

346  Ragsdale  v.  Williams,  8  Ired.  498.  Thus,  refusal  to  return  a  borrowed 
sled  is  not  conversion.     Farrar  v.  Rollins,  37  Vt.  295. 

34T  sturges  V.  Keith,  57  111.  451;  Dame  v.  Dame,  38  N.  H.  429;  Bailey  v. 
Moulthorp,  55  Vt.  17;  Munger  v.  Hess,  28  Barb.  75;  Rogers  v.  Huie,  56  Am. 
Dec.  303;  Bowlin  v.  Nye.  10  Cush.  410;  Ragsdale  v.  Williams,  49  Am.  Dec.  406; 
Devereux  v.  Barclay,  2  Barn.  &  Aid.  702.. 

34S  Ross  V.  Johnson,  5  Burrows,  2825,  and  cases  cited  in  Ames,  Lead.  Cas. 
405;  Hawkins  v.  Hoffman,  0  Hill.  580;  Packard  v.  Getman.  4  Wend.  613; 
Farrar  v.  Rollins,  37  Vt.  295.  Cf.  Jones  v.  Hodgkins,  01  Me.  480.  If  the 
finder  allows  butter  to  spoil,  a  horse  to  starve,  a  garment  to  be  eaten  by 
moths,  he  is  not  liable  in  trover;  but  it  is  otherwise  if  he  uses  or  jnisuses 


Cli.  10]  ujsvvAiiiios.  71t> 

possession  cap  commit  the  wrong  of  conversion  by  any  act  of  inter- 
ference limited  to  a  special  purpose,  and  falling  short  of  the  total 
assumption  of  the  powers  of  a  true  owner,  and  depriving  such  owner 
of  all  beneficial  use  of  the  property.'" 

Violation  of  Absolute  Duty. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  show  advantage  on  the  part  of  the  defend- 
ant. The  property  need  not  have  been  converted  to  his  own  use; 
deprivation  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  is  suflacient.^^"  In  such 
cases,  however,  there  must  be  an  intention  to  deprive  the  owner,  for 
some  period,  of  the  use  of  his  property,  except,  indeed,  in  the  case 
of  common  carrier.  He,  being  in  the  eyes  of  the  law  an  insurer, 
is  liable  for  an  innocent  misdelivery  of  goods  intrusted  to  him.''^ 
As  has  been  seen,  the  duty  to  respect  the  property  and  possession 

^Ijiat  he  has  found.  Mulgrave  v.  Ogdeu,  Cro.  Eliz.  219,  Ames,  Lead.  Cas. 
391,  and  cases  cited  in  note.  But  see,  contra,  Story,  Bailm.  §  87;  2  Kent, 
Comm.   56S.  ' 

349  "The  truth  is  that,  in  order  to  maintain  trover,  a  plaintiff  who  is  left 
in  possession  of  the  goods  must  prove  that  his  dominion  over  his  property  has 
been  interfered  with,  not  In  some  particular  way,  but  altogether;  that  he 
has  been  entirely  deprived  of  the  use  of  it..  It  is  not  enough  that  a  mai' 
should  say  that  something  shall  not  be  done  by  the  plaintiff;  he  must  say 
that  nothing  shall."  Bramwell,  B.,  In  England  v.  Cowley,  L.  R.  8  Exch.  126. 
It  is  not  conversion  to  prevent  the  removal  of  chattels  not  in  defendant's  pos- 
session.   Post,  p.  725;  Pol.  Torts,  *p.  290. 

350  Perkins  v.  Smith,  1  Wils.  328;  Parker  v.  Goden,  2  Strange,  813;  Hiort 
V.   Bott,    L.    R.   9   ISxch.    SO,   and   cases  post,   p.   723,   note  307;    ilcPheters 

'V.  Page,  83  Me.  234,  22  Atl.  101;  Lip  trot  v.  Holmes,  1  Kelly.  381-391;  Nut- 
ter V.  Ricketts,  6  Iowa,  92;  Stephens  v.  Elwall,  4  Maule  &  S.  259;  Fine  Art 
Soc.  V.  Union  Bank,  17  Q.  B.  Div.  705.  As  to  mitigation  of  damages  where 
proceeds  were  applied  to  plaintiff's  benefit,  see  Mississippi  Mills  v.  Meyer, 
83  Tex.  433.  IS  S.  W.  748. 

351  Devereux  v.  Barclay,  2  Barn.  &  Aid.  702;  Mills  v.  Ball,  2  Bos.  &  P. 
457;  Dewell  v.  Moxon,  1  Taunt.  391;  Oppenheim  v.  Russell,  3  Bos.  &  P.  A2; 
Stephenson  v.  Hart,  4  Bing.  476;  Youl  v.  Harbottle,  Peake,  68;  Ball,  Torts, 
.388;  Alabama  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kidd,  35  Ala.  209;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co. 
V.  Bai-khouse,  100  Ala.  543,  13  South.  534;  Adams  v.  Blankenstein,  2  Cal. 
413-  Hanna  v.  Flint,  14  Cal.  74;  Indianapolis  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Herndon,  81 
III.  143;  Claflin  v.  Railroad  Co.,  7  Allen,  341;  Guillaume  v.  Hamburg  &  A. 
Packet  Co.,  42  N.  Y.  212.  A  common  carrier  is  therefore  not  liable  for  re- 
fusal to  deliver  until  satisfied  as  to  the  propriety  of  "so  doing.  McEntee  v. 
Steamboat  Co..  45  N.  Y.  34. 


720  WRONGS    TO    rOSSESSIOX    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

of  another  is  absolute.  One  is  not  excused  by  showing,  for  exam- 
ple, that  he  was  not  personally  guilty  of  intentional  fraud,^'^  or 
that  he  acted  under  an  honest  but  mistaken  idea  of  title.^"*'  The 
duty  to  respect  property,  however,  is  not  so  absolute  as  entirely 
to  disregard  the  intention  of  the  defendant.  It  has  been  held  by 
the  highest  authorities  that,  when  the  act  done,  is  equivocal  in  its 
nature,  there  must  be  an  intention  of  the  defendant  to  take  to  him- 
self the  property  in  the  goods,  or  to  deprive  plaintiff  of  it,  to  make 
him  liable  for  conversion.^"  The  absence  of  an  improper  motive, 
however,  while  not  ordinarily  a  matter  of  justification,  may  mate- 
rially affect  the  measure  of  plaintiff's  damage.^ ^^ 

Subsequent  Dealings  with  Property. 

The  subsequent  offer  to  return,  or  the  subsequent  recovery  or  re- 
turn, of  the  property  wrongfully  converted  by  another,  or  its  pro- 
ceeds, in  part  or  whole,  does  not  extinguish  the  owner's  right  of  ac- 

3  52  Bonaparte  v.  Clasett,  78  Md.  87,  27  Atl.  619. 

ssswavei'ley  Timbei-  &  Iron  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  Cooperage  Co.,  112  Mo.  383, 
20  S.  W.  506;  Benton  v.  Beattie,  63  Vt.  186,  22  Atl.  422;  Morrill  v.  Moulton, 
40  Vt.  242;  Baker  v.  Kansas  City,  C.  &  S.  K.  Co.,  52  Mo.^  App.  602;  Williams 
T.  Deen,  24  S.  W.  536;  Spraights  v.  Hawley,  39  N.  Y.  441;  Wilson  v.  Hoff- 
man, 93  Mich.  72,  52  N.  W.  1037;  Camody  v.  Portlock  (Ala.)  12  South.  871; 
Kimball  v.  Billings,  55  Me.  147;  Scofield  v.  Kreiser  (City  Ct.  N.  Y.)  3  N.  Y. 
Supp.  803.  One  who  sells  property  as  under  a  mortgage  which  was  not  in- 
•cluded  therein  is  liable  for  the  conversion,  whether  he  knew  it  or  not.  Ken- 
ney  v.  Ranney,  96  Mich.  617,  55  N.  W.  982. 

3  54  Simmons  v.  Lillystone,  8  Exch.  431;  Fouldes  v.  Willoughby,  8  Mees.  & 
W.  540.  Post,  pp.  734-736,  "Ministerial  Duties";  ante,  p.  129,  note  92. 
In  the  driving-  cases  a  defendant  may  drive  further  or  otherwise  differently 
than  the  contract  provides.  If  he  do  this  -with  intention  to  brealc  a  contract, 
lie  may  be  liable  in  conversion;  or,  if  he  do  it  j^grelessly,  in  case  (negligence); 
but,  if  he  does  It  because  he  has  innocently  lost  his  way,  he  is  not  liable  at  all. 
Post,  p.  730,  note  410.  Thus,  if  a  person  who  hires  a  horse  to  drive  to  a 
particular  place,  by  mistake,  takes  the  wrong  road,  and  on  such  discovery 
returns  by  a.  circuit  through  another  town,  he  is  not  liable  in  trover  for  con- 
version of  the  horse.  Spooner  v.  Manchester,  133  Mass.  270,  reviewing  cases; 
T'amsworth  v.  Lowery,  134  Mass.  512-519;  Shea  v.  Milford,  145  Mass.  525, 
14  N.  B.  769.  So  intent  to  preserve  wine  may  justify  handling  it  otherwise 
tortiously.  "Post,  p.  730,  note  407. 

335  Baltimore  &  O.'  R.  Co.  v.  O'Donnell,  49  Ohio  St.  489,  32  N.  E.  47B; 
Wooden-Ware  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  lOG  U.  S.  432,  1  Sup.  Ct.  398. 


th.    10]  CONVERSION.  721 

tion  against  the  wrongdoer, ''^^  but  operates  only  by  way  of  mitigat- 
ing damages.^''  A  judgment  in  trover  does  not  vest  the  title  of 
the  property  in  the  defendant,  unless  such  judgment  be  for  the 
value  of  the  property,^not  for  merely  nominal  damages,— and  is 
followed  by  satisfaction.^  =  «  The  owner  may,  however,  treat  the 
transaction  as  a  sale,  and,  by  waiving  the  tort,  maintain  an  action 
ex  contractu.      The  effect  of  this  would  be  to  pass  title.^'^'     A  land- 

3  56  Robinson  v.  Lewis,  6  Misc.  Rep.  37,  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  3004.  An  offer  to 
reinstate  plaintiff,  wliose  stocli  w.as  illegally  sold  for  nonpayment  of  dues,  is 
no  defense  to  the  conversion.  Carpenter  v.  American  Bldg.  &  Loan  Ass'n, 
5i  Minn.  403,  56  N.  W.  95,  577.  And  see  AUen  v.  American  Bldg.  &  Loan 
Ass'n,  49  Minn.  544,  52  N.  W.  144. 

3  57  Williams  v.  Archer,  5  0.  B.  318;  Watson  v.  Coburn,  35  Neb.  492,  53  N. 
W.  477;  Carpenter  v.  American  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n,  54  Minn.  403;  Gilbert 
v.  Peck,  43  Mo.  App.  577;  Gibbs  v.  Chase,  10  Mass.  125;  Brewster  v.  S.lll- 
man,  38  N.  Y.  423;  Reynolds  v.  Shuler,  5  Cow.  323;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 
O'Donnell,  49  Ohio  St.  489,  32  N.  B.  470;  ante,  p.  B98,  "Damages."  Where  the 
property  has  been  returned,  plaintiff  is  entitled,  not  merely  to  nominal  dam- 
ages, but  to  the  difference  of  the  value  of  the  property  when  converted  and 
when  returned.  Stillwell  v.  Farrell,  64  Vt.  286,  24  Atl.  243.  On  tender, 
owner  is  not  bound  to  receive  property  converted.  Higgins  v.  Whitney,  24 
Wend.  379.  Voluntary  payments  by  defendant  on  plaintiff's  obligations  can- 
not be  set  up.  Frank  v.  Tatum  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  900;  ante,  p.  400, 
note  233.  A  short  note  on  the  effect  of  the  return  of  the  property  on  the 
question  of  damages,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  43.     Watson  v.  Coburn,  53  Mo.  477. 

3  58  Singer  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Stillman,  52  N.  J.  Law,  263,  19  Atl.  260.  Rlain- 
tiff  brought  trover,  aided  by  attachment  of  the  converted  property,  against 
defendant  B.  and  defendant  C,  to  whom  B.  had  sold  the  property,  and  ob- 
tained judgment  against  B.  alone.  The  property  was  seized  under  execution 
under  such  judgment.  Before  it  was  sold  C.  replevied  the  property,  and  the 
judgment  remained  unsatisfied.  This  did  not  divest  plaintiff  of  title  to  the 
property,  nor  estop  her  from  bringing  replevin  to  recover  such  property  from 
one  to  whom  O.  had  intrusted  it.  (I'ield,  C.  J.,  and  Knowlton  and  Holmes, 
JJ.,  dissenting.)  Miller  v.  Hyde,  161  Mass.  472,  37  N.  E.  760.  And  see  Hep- 
biirn  V.  Sewell,  5  Har.  &  J.  211;  Acheson  v.  Miller,  2  Ohio  St.  203;  At  water 
V.  Tupper,  45  Conn.  144;  Hopkins  v.  Hersey,  20  Me.  449;  Thurst  v.  West,  31 
N.  Y-  210;'Lovejoy  v.  Murray,  3  W^all.  1-16;  Elliott  v.  Hayden,  104  Mass.  180. 
Cf.  Galvin  v.  Parker,  154  Mass.  346,  28  N.  E.  244.  But  compare,  as  to  bar 
of  judgment.  White  v.  Philbrick,  5  Me.  146.  See  Id.,  17  Am.  Dec.  214,  note 
at  page  218;  Kenyon  v.  Woodruff,  33  Mich.  310-315;  Parmelee  v.  Loomis,  24 
Mich.  242;  ante,  c.  4,  "Judgment  against  Joint  Tort  Feasors." 

369  Terry  v.  Munger,  121  N.  Y.  161,  24  N.  E.  272;  Kalckoff  v.  Zoehrlaut,  40 

LAW  OF  TOKTS— 46 


722  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    ANJ)    PliOPEKTY.  [Ch.    10 

lord  does  not  waive  conversion  of  timber  cut  by  a  tenant  on  the 
demised  premises  by  the  acceptance  of  rent  for  a  period  subsequent 
to  such  conversion.""  Conversion  may,  however,  be  waived  by 
subsequent  ratification,  express  or  implied.^  °^ 

229.  An  act  of  conversion  is  committed  "wrhen  one  of  the 
following    circumstances  exist,   or  more  tlian  one 
concur: 
(a")  "When  the  property  is  wrongfully  taken; 

(b)  When  it  is  w^rongfully  parted  with; 

(c)  When  it  is  wrongfully  retained; 

(d)  When  it  is  wrongfully  destroyed.'^^ 

Taking  Property. 

The  fiction  of  finding,  as  an  essential  of  trover,  has  been  abolished. 
"It  is  not  material  whether  the  tenant  got  possession  lawfully,  or 
unlawfully.  In  the  latter  case  he  waives  the  trespass  and  admits 
the  possession  to  have  been  lawfully  gotten,  when  he  sues  in  tro- 
ver.'"*^^     Taking  may  constitute  the  act  of  conversion.**"*     "Any 

Wis.  427;  ante,  p.  295,  "Waiver."  Election  to  sue  ex  contractu  or  ex  delicto. 
Moore  v.  Hill,  02  Vt.  424,  19  Atl.  997. 

3  60  Brooks  v.  Rogers,  101  Ala.  Ill,  13  South.  386.  See  Singer  Manuf  g 
Co.  v.  Greenleaf,  100  Ala.  272,  14  South.  109. 

381  Firemen's  Ins.  Co.  of  Mobile  v.  Cochran,  27  Ala.  228.  See  Hotchkiss 
v.  Hunt,  49  Me.  213. 

362  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  167. 

363  Lord  Mansfield,  in  Cooper  v.  Chitty,  1  Burrows,  20-31. 

364  The  very  act  of  taking  goods  from  one  who  has  no  right  to  dispose  of 
them  is  in  itself  a  conversion.  Both  the  person  who  takes  and  the  person 
who  disposes  are  liable.  Hurst  v.  Gwennap,  2  Starkie,  306;  Yates  v.  Cam- 
sew,  3  Car.  &  P.  99;  Hilbery  v.  Hatton,  2  Hurl.  &  C.  822;  Thatcher  v.  Mor- 

t  ris,  134  Mass.  150-107;  post,  p.  734,  note  432.  And  see  Bearce  v.  Bow- 
ker,  115  Mass.  129;  BaiTett  v.  Warren,  3  Hill,  348.  In  McCombie  v.  Davlea, 
6  East,  538,  there  was  wrongful  detention,  without  redelivery  to  the  bailor, 
by  the  pawnee  of  property  wrongfully  pawned  by  an  agent.  This  case  is 
said  to  be  the  extreme  verge  of  the  law.  Mallalieu  v.  Laugher,  3  Car.  &  P. 
551.  Et  vide  Spackman  v.  Foster,  11  Q.  B.  Div.  99.  It  has,  however,  been 
approved.  Fine  Art  Soc.  v.  Union  Bank,  17  Q.  B.  Div.  712.  Et  vide  Wilkin- 
son V.  King,  2  Camp.  335.  Trespass  may  also  lie  for  such  taking.  Stanley. 
V.  Gaylord,  1  Cush.  536.  But  taking  is  not  conversion,  where  plaintiff's  own 
wrong  was  the  occasion,  as  where  plaintiff  allowed  cattle  taken  by  defend-' 


Ch.  10]  coxvERSioN.  725 

asportation  of  a  chattel,"  says  Mr.  Baron  Alderson,"^  "for  the  use 
of  the  defendant  or  a  third  person,  amounts  to  a  conversion,  for  this 
simple  reason :  that  it  is  an  act  inconsistent  with  the  general  rights 
of  dominion,  -nhich  the  owner  of  the  chattel  has  in  it,  who  is  en- 
titled to  the  use  of  it  at  all  times  and  in  all  places.  When,  theret 
fore,  a  man  takes  that  chattel,  either  for  the  use  of  himself  or  of 
another,  it  is  conversion."  In  order,  however,  that  a  mere  actual 
taking  should  constitute  a  conversion,  there  must  be  an  intention  to 
exercise  dominion.^^^  An  actual  taking  away  is  not  always  neces- 
sary^ Thus,  if  an  officer  levy  on  a  wood  pile  as  the  property  of  An- 
other, taking  it  under  his  control  and  into  his  custody  so  far  as  pos- 
sible, this  is  such  an  exclusion  of  the  lawful  owner  as  will  constitute 
conversion.^ ''^  However,  the  mere  assertion  of  a  pretended  right 
by  one  not  in  possession,  nor  entitled  to  an  immediate  possession, 
of  property,  or  the  threatening  by  such  a  person  to  prevent  the  true 
owner  from  dealing  with  his  property,  though  it  may  be  a  cause  of 
action  if  it  results  in  special  damages,  is  not  convereion.^"*  Cases 
in  which  taking  is  the  sole  element  of  conversion  are  not  common. 
Ordinarily  other  elements  of  conversion  concur.^^' 

ant  to  run  at  large.  Wellington  v.  Wentworth,  8  Mete.  (Mass.)  548;  Xortli 
Penn.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rehman,  49  Pa.  St.  101;  Van  Tallvenburg  v.  Tliayer,  57 
Barb.  196.    But  see  Piatt  v.  Tuttle,  23  Conn.  233. 

365Fouldes  v.  Willoughby,  8  Mees.  &  W.  540.  Et  vide  Beckwith  v.  El- 
sey,  Clayt.  112;  Hougbton  v.  Butler,  4  Term  R.  3(54. 

36  0  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  IGS. 

367  Molm  V.  Barton,  27  Minn.  530,  8  N.  W.  765;  Hossfeldt  v.  Dill,  28  Minn. 
409,  10  N.  W.  781.  Compare  Appleton  Mill  Co.  v.  Warder,  42  Minn.  117,  43 
N.  W.  791.  But  see  Mallalieu  v.  Laugber,  3  Car.  &  P.  551;  Hen-ou  v. 
Hugbes,  2.J  Cal.  556;  Fernald  v.  Chase,  37  Me.  289;  Bailey  v.  Adams,  14  Wend. 
201;  Johnson  v.  Farr,  60  N.  H.  426. 

368  A  transfer  on  books  or  indorsement  on  document  of  title  constitutes 
constructive  taking.  McCombie  v.  Davies,  6  Ea.st,  538.  England  v.  Cow- 
ley, L.  R.  8  Exch.  126;  Hartley  v.  Moxbam,  3  Q.  B.  701.  Compare  Waus- 
bro'ugh  V.  Maton,  4  Adol.  &  E.  884.  Et  vide  Guthrie  v.  .Tones,  108  Mass.  191. 
Cf.  Chapin  v.  Freeland,  142  Mass.  383,  8  N.  E.  128  (replevin),  and  Leonard 
V.  Stickney,  131  Mass.  541.  And  see  Ti-aylor  v.  Horrall,  4  Blaekf.  317;  Xorth- 
j.,^p  ^  Trask,  39  Wis.  51-5;  Boobier  v.  Boobier,  39  Me.  406;  Davis  v.  Buffum, 
51  Me.  160.  Contra,  Crocket  v.  Beaty,  8  Humph.  20.  Cf.  Huddlestons'  Adm'r 
V.  Currin,  4  Humph.  237. 

369  In  an  action  against  a  bank  cashier  for  embezzlement,  plaintiff  must 
show  receipt  as  well  as  misappropriation.    Panama  B.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  63 


"^^24  WKOiNGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Oil.    10 

Parting  with  Property. 

One  of  the  most  common  exercises  of  dominion,  unequivocally  in- 
dicating an  assumption  of  title,  is  a  sale  of  a  chattel  without  the 
authority  of  the  owner.^""  There  is  liability  for  a  sale  under  mis- 
take of  ownership.  "The  very  assuming  to  one's  self  the  property 
and  right  of  disposing  of  another  man's  goods  is  a  conversion."  ^^^ 
There  may  be  liability  for  an  excessive  sale.^'^  An  officer  is  liable 
for  the  wrongful  sale  of  property,'^^  and  also  the  party  at  whose  in- 
stance the  officer  makes  the  wrongful  sale.^'*    An  attempt  to  sell  is 

Him,  fi29,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  777.  Et  vide  Rushin  v.  Tharpe,  88  Ga.  779,  15  S. 
E.  830;  Trajdor  v.  Hughes,  88  Ala.  617,  7  South.  159.  Compare  Freeman  v. 
Grant,  132  N.  Y.  22,  30  N.  E.  247.  A  vendor  who  has  shipped  goods  to  an- 
other on  credit,  and  who  notifies  the  railroad  company  not  to  deliver  them, 
may  maintain  trover  against  a  sheriff  who  takes  them  from  the  railroad 
i  company  on  attachment  against  the  vendee.  Wolf  v.  Shepherd  (Ala.)  15 
South.  519.  Obtaining  possession  of  property  from  an  owner  incapacitated 
by  intoxication,  and  retaining  possession,  constitutes  conversion.  Baird  v. 
Howard  (Ohio)  36  N.  E.  732.  Obtaining  a.  check  without  plaintiff's  author- 
ity, as  by  forgery,  is  a  conversion.  Schmidt  v.  Garfield  Nat  Bank,  64  Hun, 
298,  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  252. 

3  70  Fette  V.  Lane   (Gal.)  37  Pac.  914. 

sTi  Baldwin  v.  Cole,  6  Mod.  212,  cited  in  JlcCombie  v.  Davies,  6  East  538. 
Thus,  the  conveyance  of  property  by  the  receiptor  under  attachment  is 
conversion.  Et  vide  post,  note  432;  Miller  Piano  Co.  v.  Parker,  155  Pa.  St. 
:;i)S,  2(;  Atl.  3(1:';  Lyon  v.  Gormley,  93  Pa.  St.  261.  But  a  void  attempt  at 
foreclosure  of  a  chattel  mortgage  is  not  a  conversion.  Powell  v.  Gagnon, 
52  Jlinn.  232,  53  N.  W.  1148.  Compai'e  Comfort  v.  Creelman,  52  Minn.  280, 
.')o  N.  W.  1157.  And,  further,  see  Fine  Ai-t  Society  v.  Union  Bank,  17  Q.  B. 
Div.  70-"i;  Wilkinson  v.  King,  2  Camp.  335;  Spackman  v.  Foster,  11  Q.  B. 
Div.  99. 

3' 2  A  chattel  mortgagee  is  liable,  and  liable  only,  when  he  sells  more  prop- 
erty than  enough  to  satisfy  the  mortgage  and  the  costs.  Omaha  Auction  & 
Storage  Co.  v.  Rogers,  ?>'>  Neb.  01,  52  N.  W.  826.  Generally,  see  Alderd  v. 
Constable,  6  Q.  B.  370;  Lancashire  Wagon  Co.  v.  Fitzhugh,  G  Hurl.  &  N.  502. 
But  an  assignment  of  the  right  of  assignor  in  a  chose  of  action  on  which  an- 
other has  a  lien,  of  which  the  assignee  has  notice,  is  not  conversion  against 
the  holder  of  such  a  lien.    Comfort  v.  Creelman,  52  Minn.  280,  53  N.  W.  1157. 

373  Jones  V.  Kellogg,  51  Kan.  2i>3,  oM  Pac.  997;  AVliituey  v.  Preston,  29 
Neb.  243,  45  N.  W.  619.  Compare  Freeman  v.  Grant,  132  N.  Y.  22,  30  N.  E. 
247;  ante,  p.  130,  "Sheriff." 

374  Kane  v.  Hutchison,  93  Mich.  488,  53  N.  W.  024;  Phelps  v.  Delmore,  09 
Hun,  18,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  229. 


t^'fl-    10]  CONVERSION.  72-5 

sufficient."  =  Assignment  of  a  qualified  interest  in  property  is  a 
conversion  only  when  the :  assignor  has  no  assignable  interest.  A 
premature  sale,"«  or  a  mere  in-egularity,  as  a  subpledge  by  a 
pawnee,  does  not  amount  to  convert^ion."''  A  disposal  of  a  part  of 
the  chattel  is  such  an  act  of  dominion  as  may  amount  to  a  conver- 
sion."^ Forms  of  parting  with  property  other  than  by  sales  may 
amount  to  conversion;  as  delivery  of  goods  by  bailee  to  .officers  un- 
der an  illegal  attachment,  or  to  another  person  after  notice  of  the 
claim  of  the  true  owner,  or  under  mistake.^",*^ 

Retnining  Property. 

Mere  retention  of  the  property  of  another  in  violation  of  his  right 
may  constitute  conversion.' «"     Thus,  claiming  a  lien  on,''^^  or  min- 
gling special  with  general,  deposits,'^^  or  locking  up  a  building  cen- 
sus Dickey  v.  Franklin  Bank,  32  Me.  572.     As  to  fraudulent  sale,  see  White 
V.  Garden,  10  C.  B.  919. 
37  6  Donald  v.  Suckling,  L,  R.,1  Q.  B.  585;  Bigelow,  Lead.  Cas.  394. 

377  Halliday  v.  Holgate,  L.  R.  3  Exch.  299-302;  Niles  v.  Edwards,  90  Cal. 
10,  27  Pac.  159.  A  sale  for  CL-edit  by  agent  autliorized  to  sell  for  cash  only 
is  not  a  conversion.    Loveless  v.  Fowler,  79  Ga.  134,  4  S.  E.  103. 

378  Olendon  v.  Dirmeford.  5  Car.  &  P.  13;  Philpot  v.  Kelley,  3  Adol.  &  E. 
106;  Brown  v.  Ela  (N.  H.)  30  Atl.  412.  A  "short  sale"  ^Yill  not  support  con- 
version.   Campbell  v.  Wright,  118  N.  Y.  594,  23  N.  E.  914. 

870  Alabama  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kidd,  35  Ala.  209.  Phillips  v.  Brigham, 
20  Ga.  617.  A  collection  of  authorities  as  to  the  duty  and  liability  of  a  car- 
rier when  adverse  claim  is  set  up  to  property  received  for  transportation, 
34  Am.  St.  Rep.  731.  Insurance  agent  does  not  convert  by  returning  policy 
to  the  company.  Bull  v.  Knowlton,  21  Can.  Sup.  Ct.  371. 
'     380  Osborn  v.  Potter,  101  Mich.  300,  59  N.  W.  606. 

381  Jacaoby  v.  Laussatt,  6  Serg.  &  R.  300. 

382  Moving  and  shipping  wheat,  Phillip  Best  Brewing  Co.  v.  Pillsbury  & 
Hurlbut  Elevator  Co.,  5  Dak.  62,  37  N.  W.  763.  A  creditor  of  an  estate,  who 
has  possession  of  stocks  payable  to  deceased,  as  executrix,  commits  no  con- 

•  version  in  holding  them  for  her  executor,  as  against  her  successor  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  her  husband's  estate,  pending  the  decision  of  said  successor's 
suit  against  her  estate  for  her  conversion  of  said  stocks.  Mills  v.  Brittcm,  04 
Conn.  4,  29  Atl.  231.  When  a  trustee  mingles  his  own  funds  with  trust  funds. 
and  then  takes  a  part  for  his  own  use,  the  part  taken  will  be  presumed  to  be 
his  own,  and  not  that  which  he  held  as  trustee.  Standish  v.  Babcock  (N.  J. 
Ch.)  29  Atl.  327. 


726  WRONGS    TO    P(iSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

taining  chattels  bought  by  another,^ *^  may  be  conversion.  On  the 
other  hand,  for  example,  mere  delay  in  transportation  is  not  a  suffi- 
cient retention  to  constitute  conversion,^'*  nor  the  negligent  keeping 
of  what  a  man  has  found.^*^  Demand  and  refusal,  before  com- 
mencement of  an  action,"**  while  they  do  not  in  themselves  consti- 
tute conversion,  may  be  necessary  to  show  conversion  when  other 
conduct  fails  to  show  it,"*'  and  are  prima  facie  but  not  conclusive 
evidence  of  conversion."**  Notwithstanding  many  loose  sayings  to 
the  contrary  they  are  not  the  only  evidence  of  conversion."*'  Thus, 
such  refusal  does  not  prove  conversion  if  the  party  has  not  the 
power  of  compliance,"  °°  although  the  act  whereby  the  goods  are  pur 

383  Hughes  V.  Cooi-s,  3  Colo.  App.  303,  33  Pac.  77.     Et  vide  Jones  v.  Hunt, 

74  Tex.  657,  12  S.  W.  832. 

3S4  Briggs  v.  Railway  Co.,  28  Barb.  515.  Et  vide  Stackpole  v.  Railway  Co., 
62  N.  H.  493. 

2S5Mulgrave  v.  Ogden,  Cro.  Eliz.  219;  Burrougbes  v.  Bayne,  5  Hurl.  &  N. 
296.  And  see  Gilmore  v.  Newton,  9  Allen,  117.  A  bona  fide  purchaser  of  per- 
sonal property  wrongfully  taken  from  possession  of  the  owner  is  not  liable  for 
conversion  until  after  demand  and  refusal.  Gellet  v.  Roberts,  57  N.  Y.  28 
(disapproving)  Dunning  v.  Austin,  34  Vt  330;  limiting  Wooster  v.  Sherwood, 
2.J  N.  Y.  278). 

380  Cross  V.  Barber,  16  R.  I.  2G6,  15  Atl.  69. 

3S7  Demand,  Nixon  v.  Whitsett,  2  H.  Bl.  130;    Castle  v.  Corn  Exch.  Bank, 

75  Hun,  89,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  1035;  refusal,  Severn  v.  Keppel,  4  Esp.  156;  Hol- 
brooli  V.  Wright,  24  "Wend.  1C9.  Plaintiff  is  sometimes  said  to  be  bound  to 
prove  either  actual  conversion  or  demand  and  refusal.  Jones  v.  Fortp;9  Barn. 
&  C.  764.    This  is  not  accurate.    Post,  p.  727,  note  394.  -^t 

388  Anon.  (Holt,  C.  J.)  12  Mod.  344,  Ames,  Lead.  Cas.  399;  Baldwin  v.  Cole, 
6  Mod.  212;  Esmay  v.  Fanning,  9  Barb.  176;  Singer  Co.  v.  King,  14  R.  I.  5, 
Chase,  Lead.  Cas.  205;  Osborn  v.  Potter,  101  Mich.  300,  59  N.  W.  606  (con- 
version of  a  building);  Jorgensen  v.  Tait,  26  Minn.  327,  4  N.  W.  44;  Catterall 
V.  Kenyon,  3  Q.  B.  310.  Compare  with  Duggan  v.  Wright,  157  Mass.  228,  32 
N.  E.  159;   Daggett  v.  Davis,  53  Mich.  35,  18  N.  W.  548. 

3  89  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Donnell,  49  Ohio  St.  489,  32  N.  E.  470  (a 
leading  case).  "Any  wrongful  exercise  of  dominion  over  chattels  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  the  right  of  the  owner,  or  withholding  them  from  his  possession 
under  a  claim  inconsistent  with  his  rights,  constitutes  conversion."  Dietus  v. 
Fuss,  S  Md.  148. 

390  Thus,  in  "trover  for  a  deed,"  the  evidence  of  conversion  was  that  when 
the  deed  was  demanded  from  the  defendant  he  said  he  would  not  deliver 
it  up,  but  that  it  was  then  in  the  hands  of  his  attorney.    He  had  a  lien  upon 


Ch.    10]  CONVERSION.  727 

out  of  such  power  may  be  conversion,  as  where  they  are  sold.'" 
The  demand  must  he  unconditional.^''^ 

Demand  is  not,  however,  alwaj's  necessary;  as  where  the  taking 
is  tortious,  where  there  has  been  an  actual  conversion  of  the  prop- 
erty,3»3  where  there  has  been  refusal  before  demand,"*  or  where 

it.  This  was  held  sufficient.  Smith  v.  Young,  1  Camp.  439.  Denial  is  not  evi- 
dence of  conversion  iC  the  property  be  lost  by  negligence.  Anon.,  coram 
Tryor,  O.  J.  (1705);  Ames,  Lead.  Gas.  400.  And  see  liJngland  v.  Cowley,  L.  R. 
8  Exch.  12U;  If'eatherstonhaugb  v.  Johnston,  8  Taunt.  237;  Spackman  v. 
Foster,  L.  K.  H  Q.  B.  99;  Tear  v.  Freebody,  4  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  228.  This  doc- 
ti-ine  is  generally  recognized  by  American  cases.  Thus,  in  Dearbourn  v. 
Union  Nat.  Bank,  58  jNIe.  273,  it  was  held  that  demand  and  refusal  were 
not  sufficient  evidence  of  conversion,  where  it  appeared  that  defendant  was 
not  in  possession  or  conti-ol  of  the  property,  it  having  been  previously  lost, 
stolen,  or  misdelivered.  Indeed,  a  common  carrier  does  not  seem  to  be 
liable  for  conversion  if  the  goods  have  been  either  lost  or  stolen.^  Pack- 
ard V.  Getman,  4  Wend.  613.  In  general,  see  Carr  v.  Clough,  26  N.  H. 
280;  Hill  v.  Oovell,  1  N.  Y.  522;  Kelsey  v.  Griswold,  6  Barb.  436;  WMtney 
V.  Slauson,  30  Barb.  276;  McCormick  v.  Railroad  Co.,  80  N.  Y.  353;  Davis  v. 
Buffam,  51  Me.  160;  Johnson  v.  Couillard,  4  Allen,  440;  Pitlock  v.  Wells, 
Fargo  &  Co.,  109  Mass.  452  (citing  Smith  v.  Bank,  90  Jlass.  605,  to  the  effect 
that  there  is  no  liability  for  negligence  unless  something  could  not  be  ac- 
counted for  upon  search).    Et  vide  Dietus  v.  Fuss.  8  Md.  148. 

331  Ante,  p.  724,  "Parting  with."'  And  see  Crampton  v.  Valido  Marble  Co., 
60  Vt.  291,  15  Atl.  153. 

392  Eushworth  v.  Taylor,  3  Q.   B.  699. 

393  Forsdick  v.  Collins,  1  Starkie,  173;  Lovell  v.  Martin,  4  Taunt.  799; 
Edgerly  v.  Whalan,  106  Mass.  307;  Smith  v.  Jensen,  13  Colo.  213,  22  Pac. 
4,^4;  Rice  v.  Yocum,  155  Pa.  St.  538,  26  Atl.  C98:  Taylor  v.  Lyon  tPa.  Sup.) 
]3  Atl.  739;  Springer  v.  Groom  (Pa.  Sup.)  12  Atl.  440;  Baker  v.  Lothrop,  1.55 
Mass.  376,  29  N.  E.  043;  Velsian  v.  Lewis,  15  Or.  539,  10  Pac.  031;  Follott  v. 
Edwards,  30  111.  App.  380;  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hoidenheimer,  82  Tex. 
195,  17  S.  AV.  008;  Gould  v.  Blodgett,  61  N.  H.  115;  Rosum  v.  Hodges,  1  S. 
D.  308,  47  N.  W.  140;  Lafayette  Co.  Bank  v.  Metcalf,  40  Mo.  App.  494.  So, 
where  there  has  been  a  sale  of  part  of  the  property,  and  the  remainder  is 
letained  under  denial  of  title,  no  tender  or  demand  is  necessary.  Her  v. 
Baker,  82  Mich.  226.  46  N.  W.  377.  So  where  the  custodian  of  a  cask  of 
wine  bottles  it  for  his  own  use,  though  he  does  not  drink  it.  Philpott  v. 
Kelley,  3  Adol.  &  E.  106.  And  see  RiUy  v.  Boston  Water  Power  Co.,  11  Cush. 
11;  Ames,  Lead.  Cas.  Torts,  561  (cases  collected,  page  563).  And  see  Rose- 
nau  V.  Syring,  25  Or.  386,  35  Pac.  844. 

394  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kiekbusch,  78  Wis.  218,  47  N.  W.  207;  Bonaparte 
V.  Clagett,  78  Md.  87,  27  Atl.  619;    Claflin  v.  Gurney,  17  U.  I.  1S5,  20  Atl.  932; 


728  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.   ]0 

the  purchase  of  goods  has  been  effected  through  the  fraud  of  the 
^'endee.^'''  The  refusal,  ordinarily,  must  also  be  unconditional. '''* 
If  the  defendant  is  in  doubt  as  to  the  plaintiff's  title,  he  may  wait 
what  a  jury  will  consider  a  reasonable  time  to  clear  up  the  doubt.^'^ 
But,  while  an  unqualified  refusal  to  abide  by  the  conditions  of  spe- 
cial property  is  conclusive  evidence  of  a  conversion,  if  there  be  a 
qualification  annexed  to  it,  the  question  then  is  as  to  the  reasonable- 
ness of  such  qualification.  Thus,  a  keeper  of  a  key  to  a  warehouse 
may  say  to  a  bailor,  "You  must  have  my  master's  orders."  ^"^  The 
substance  of  the  refusal  is  the  denial  of  title. ^"^    The  jury,  under 

Fulton  V.  Lydecker  (Oity  Ot.  N.  Y.)  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  451.  And,  generally, 
see  Aslifleld  v.  Edgell,  21  Ont.  195.  As  to  what  constitutes  sufficient  demand, 
see  Duggan  v.  Wright,  157  Mass.  228,  32  N.  Ii).  150;  Baumann  v.  Jefferson 
(Com.  PI.)  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  635.  Where  a  tenant  in  common  is  present,  and 
forbids  the  conversion  of  personal  property  as  cotenant,  demand  for  return  is 
not  necessary  before  suit.     Waller  v.  Bowling,  108  N.  C.  289,  12  S.  E.  990 

3  0  5  Thurston  v.  Blanchard,  22  Pick.  18;  Green  v.  Russell,  5  Hill,  183; 
Thompson  v.  Rose,  16  Conn.  71;  Stevens  v.  Austin,  1  Mete.  (Mass.)  557;  Ladd 
V.  Moore,  3  Sandf.  589;  Bowen  v.  Fenner,  40  Barb.  383;  Yeager  v.  Wallace, 
r,!  Pa.  St.  365;  Noble  v.  Adams,  7  Taunt.  59.  Aild  see  Earl  of  Bristol  v.  Wils- 
more,  2  Dowl.  &  R.  75.j.  But  see  Parke,  B.,  in  Powell  v.  Hyland,  6  Exch. 
67-72;   Gregory  v.  Fiehtner  (Com.  PI.)  14  N.  Y.  Supp.  891. 

396  See  Felcher  v.  McMillan  (Mich.)  61  N.  W.  791. 

3  9T  Vaughan  v.  Watt,  6  Mees.  &  W.  492;  Pillott  v.  Wilkinson,  3  Hurl.  &  C. 
:U5;  Le«  v.  Bayes,  18  C.  B.  599;  Zachary  v.  Pace,  9  Ark.  212;  Fletcher  v. 
Fletcher,  7  N.  H.  452;  Ball  v.  Liney,  48  N.  Y.  6.  But  see  Thorogood  v.  Robin- 
son, 6  Q.  B.  769. 

3  0  8  Solomons  v.  Dawes,  1  Esp.  83;  Green  v.  Dunn,  3  Camp.  215,  note;  Gun- 
ton  T.  Nurse,  2  Brod.  &  B.  447;  Alexander  v.  Southey,  5  Barn.  &  Aid.  247; 
Burroughes  v.  Bayne,  5  Hm-1.  &  N.  296;  Connah  v.  Hale,  28  Wend.  462.  So 
if,  after  dispute  as  to  payments  on  machine,  defendant  promises  to  return 
next  day  if  payment  had  not  been  made,  this  is  not  conversion.  Boiling  v. 
Kirby,  90  Ala.  215,  7  South.  914.  And  see,  generally,  as  to  refusal  to  deliver. 
Banking  House,  v.  Brooks,  52  Mo.  App.  364;  Clay  v.  Gage,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
661,  20  S.  W.  948;  Forehand  v.  Jones,  84  Ga.  508,  10  S.  E.  1090;  Dent  v. 
Chiles,  5  Stew.  &  P.  (Ala.)  383;  Butler  v.  Jones,  80  Ala.  436,  2  South.  300. 
So  refusal  to  deliver  until  owner  paid  bill  due  to  third  person.  Hearn  v.  Bit- 
terman  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  158.  Refusal  to  allow  an  owner  to  take  his 
goods  away  until  he  paid  a  debt  to  a  third  person  (Hearn  v.  Bitterman  [Tex. 
Civ.  App.]  27  S.  W.  158),  or  until  a  replevin  suit  had  been  determined  (Bant- 
ing House  V.  Brooks,  52  Mo.  App.  364)  is  conversion. 

399  If  defendant  retain  a  horse  for  board  bill,  this  is  no  conversion;   but, 


Ch.  10]  coNVicnsiox.  729 

proper  instructions  from  the  court,  passes  on  the  reasonableness  of 
the  qualiflcation.*""  A  refusal  has  been  held  not  to  constitute  con- 
version, although  defendant  assigned  as  a  reason  his  inability  to  de- 
liver the  property.*"^  Noncompliance  on  demand  may  be  sufficient 
refusal. ^"^     An  offer  to  return  the  property  demanded  before  the 

commencement  of  trover  may  cure  the  refusal,  if  the  refusal  be 
qualifled.^os 

Destruction  of  Property. 

When  property  is  wrongfully  dealt  with,  so  that  its  identity  is 
destroyed,  it  is  converted.  Thus,  a  railroad  company  which  kills 
and  uses  the  animal  of  another  is  liable  in  trover,  whether  the  kill- 
ing be  negligent  or  not.*"*  So,  fraudulently  obtaining  possession 
of  a  note,  putting  it  in  judgment,  and  collecting  it  constitutes  con- 
version, although  the  plaintiff  knew  the  facts  before  bringing  his 
action.*"^  To  apply  any  process  of  manufacture  to  raw  material 
without  the  authority  of  the  owner  of  such  material  may  constitute 

if  he  deny  the  owner's  title,  he  waiyes  his  right  to  detain  the  horse,  and  is 
guilty  of  conversion.     Williams  v.  Smith,  153  Pa.  St.  4G2,  25  Atl.  1122. 

400  McCormick  v.  Pennsylvania  Cent.  K.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  303  (et  vide  SO  N.  Y. 
353);  Alexandria  v.  Southey,  5  Barn.  &  Adol.  247.  Et  vide  Ingalls  v.  Bulk- 
ley,  15  111.  224;    Mount  v.  Derick,  5  Hill.  4.j5;    Blankeuship  v.  Berry,  2S  Tex. 

448. 

4*1  As  where  a  proprietor  who  received  skates  from  his  patrons,  giving  a 
check  therefor,  fails  to  give  them  up  because  of  his  inability  to  find  them. 
Donlin  v.  McQuade,  61  Mich.  275,  28  N.  W.  114.  See  argument  for  defendant, 
page  276,  61  Mich.,  and  page  114,  28  N.  AV.;    ante,  pp.  720,  727;    Towne  v. 

Lewis,  7  0.  B.  608.  v\ 

40  2  In  Davis  v.  Nicholas,  7  Car.  &  P.  339,  a  p^on  lent  the  goods  to  an- 
other, which  passed  on  the  latter's  death  into  deflftdant's  possession,  who, 
on  demand,  said  he  should  do  nothing  except  what  the  law  required.  This 
was  held  to  be  conversion.  In  Watkins  v.  WooUey,  Gow.  69,  demand  and 
nondelivery  of  a  "landau"  was  held  to  be  evidence  of  conversion.  Davies  v. 
Nicholas,  7  Car.  &  P.  339. 

403  Hayward  v.  Seaward,  1  Moore  &  S.  459;  Wells  v.  Kelsey,  15  Abb.  Prac. 
53;    Savage  v.  Perkins,  11  How.  Prac.  17.     Ante,  p.  721,  note  387. 

404  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Tanner,  19  Colo.  559,  36  Pac.  541.  And  seo 
Burgess  v.  Isherwood,  101  Mich.  319,  59  N.  W.  602. 

405  Paishin  V.   Tharpe,  88  Ga.  779,  15  S.   B.   830.    Compare  Wittinghani  v.^ 
Owen,  19  D.  C.  277.     So,  cancellation  of  certificate  of  membership  in  a  board 
of  trade  amounts  to  the  act  of  conversion.     Olds  v.  Chicago  Board  of  Trade, 
33  111.  Add.  445. 


730  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPKRTY.  [Ch.    10 

conversion.'"'"  The  adulteration  of  liquor  destroys  its  identity,  and 
may  be  the  basis  of  an  action  of  trover.*"^  It  is  said,  however,  that 
if  the  chattel  continues  to  exist  as  such,  any  injury  done  to  it  is 
a  trespass,  and  nothing  more.  Thus,  where  the  one  had  sawed  a 
log  of  timber,  the  owner  thereof  could  not  recover  in  conversion.*"' 
However,  the  unauthorized  use  by  an  agister  may  amount  to  a  conver- 
sion.*"" So  improperly  driving  a  horse  *"  may  be  conversion.  The 
wearing  of  a  pearl  has  been  held  to  be  sufficient  evidence  of  conver- 
sion.*^^ On  the  other  hand,  mere  destruction  of  property  while  in 
the  bailee's  hands  does  not  constitute  conversion  j  as  where  it  is 
accidentally  burned. *^^ 

40C  Com.  Dig.  "Action;   Trover,"  E. 

*07  Richardson  v.  Atchison,  1  Strange,  576;  Philpott  v.  Kelley,  3  Adol.  &  E. 
106.  I.  e.  substitution  of  water  for  wine  is  conversion;  but  an  act  done  to 
preserve  goods  is  not.     Dench  v.  Walljer,  14  Mass.  499. 

40  8  Simmons  v.  Lillystone,  8  Exch.  431.  Of.  Sanderson  v.  Haverstick,  8  Pa. 
St.  294;  O'Reilly  v.  Shadle,  33  Pa.  St.  489.  Castrating  a  "scrub  hog"  is  not 
conversion.     Byrne  v.  Stout;  15  111.  180. 

40  9  Gove  V.  Watson,  61  N.  H.  13G. 

410  Still  well  V.  Farwell,  64  Vt.  280,  24  Atl.  243;   Wheeloek  v.  Wheelwright, 

5  Mass.  104.  Impounding  a  horse  in  defense  of  property  does  not  constitute 
conversion.  Walker  v.  Wetherbee,  65  N.  H.  656-662,  23  Atl.  621.  So,  driving 
a  hired  horse  a  greater  or  different  distance  than  stipulated,  altlioiagh  the 
journey  was  made  on  the  Lord's  day.  Doolittle  v.  Shaw  (Iowa)  60  N.  "VSif  621; 
Hall  V.  Corcoran,  107  Mass.  251;  Wheeloek  v.  Wheelwright,  5  Mass.  104; 
Homer  v.  Thwing,  3  Pick.  492;  Hart  v.  Skinner,  16  Vt.  138.  But  mere  delay 
is  not.  Evans  v.  Mason,  64  N.  H.  98,  5  Atl.  766.  A  short  note  on  the  liability 
of  a  hirer  for  driving  a  team  to  places  where  it  was  not  hired  to  go.  Doolittle 
V.  Shaw  (Iowa)  26  Lawy.  Rep.  Ann.  366,  60  N.^  W.  021.  And  see  ante,  p.  720, 
note  354. 

411  Lord  Petre  v.  Heneage,  12  Mod.  519.  And  see  cases  collected  in  note  to 
Ames,  Lead.  Cas.  398. 

412  Heald  v.  Carey,  21  Law  J.  C.  P.  97  (and  see  Bromley  v.  Coxwell,  2  Bos. 

6  P.  438;  Cairns  v.  Bleeker,  12  Term  B.  300);  Jervis  v.  JollefCe,  6  Term  R.  9; 
Salt  Springs  Nat.  Bank  v.  Wheeler,  48  N.  Y.  492.     ■ 


^'         J  COiNVERSION.  731 


SAME— PARTIES. 
230.  The  parties   to  the   wrongful  assumption  of  owner- 
ship involved  in  conversion  are   governed  by  ordi- 
nary principles,  except,  especially,  as  to  cases  of— 

(a)  Joint  ownership. 

(b)  Performance  of  a  ministerial  duty. 

The  law  as  to  disabilities  is  the  same  in  trover  as  in  other  torts. 
A  principal  is  liable  for  conversion  by  his  servant."  =  One  who  in- 
stigates is  as  much  a  principal  as  he  who  performs  the  act  of  conver- 
sion."^ An  infant  "=  or  a  lunatic  "«  may  be  held  liable  in  trover. 
A  wife  holding  a  mortgage  on  the  property  of  her  husband  may 
maintain  trover  against  an  officer  attaching  such  property.*"  The 
liability  may  arise  from  a  joint  wrong,  as  for  wrongfully  procuring 
a  levy  on  which  a  sale  was  made."^     A  defense  set  up  by  one  joint 

"3  Lee  v.  McKay,  3  Ired.  29;  Powell  v.  Sattler,  Ames,  Lead.  Cas.  419, 
reported  in  Paley,  Ag.  80;  Mayer  v.  Kllpatrick,  7  Misc.  Rep.  689,  28  N.  Y.' 
Supp.  145.  As  to  conversion  of  property  of  principal  b.y  the  agent,  see  Hol- 
brook  V.  Wright,  24  Wend.  169;  Witman  v.  Felton,  28  Mo.  601.  Cf.  Hardman 
T.  Willcock,  9  Bing.  382;  Story,  Bailm.  §§  102,  103.  As  to  liability  of  agent, 
see  post,  p.  734,  "Ministerial  Duties." 

414  Cone  v.  Ivinson  (Wyo.)  33  Pac.  31,  affirmed  35  Pac.  933;  Bigelow  Co.  y. 
Heintze,  53  N.  J.  Law,  69,  21  Atl.  109. 

■»  15  Freeman  v.  Boland,  14  R.  I.  39,  Chase,  Lead.   Cas.  200;    ante,  p.  1.58, 
"Infants." 
418  Morse  v.  Crawford,  17  Vt.  499. 

417  As  to  liability  of  husband  and  wife  in  trover  at  common  law,  see  Draper 
V.  Fulkes,  I'el.  105;  Ames,  Lead.  Cas.  392,  and  note;  Key  worth  v.  Hill  3 
Barn.  &  Aid.  685;  Tobey  v.  Smith,  15  Gray,  535.  And  see  Handy  v.  Foley, 
121  Mass.  259;  ante,  p.  210,  "Husband  and  Wife."  In  an  action  against  a 
husband  for  the  conversion  of  bonds,  the  property  of  his  deceased  wife,  re- 
ciprocal wills  of  the  husband  and  wife,  giving  the  property  of  each  to  the 
other,  neither  of  which  was  in  force  at  the  time  of  the  wife's  death,  nor  made 
any  mention  of  the  bonds,  are  inadmissible  (21  N.  Y.  Snpp.  309,  afflrnied). 
Martin  v.  Hillen,  142  N.  Y.  140,  36  N.  E.  803.  And  see  Lewis  v.  Beckler 
(Me.)  12  Atl.  627. 

418  Phelps  V.  Delmore,  69  Hun,  18,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  229;  Marks  v.  Wright, 
81  Wis.  572,  51  N.  W.  882;  Gilbert  v.  Peck,  43  Mo.  App.  577;  Robertson  v' 
Hunt,  77  Tex.  321,  14  S.  W.  68.  As  to  conspiracy  in  convereion,  see  Lock- 
wood  V.  Bartlott,  130  N.  y.  340,  29  N.  B.  257.     And,  genet-ally,  as  to  general 


'''■i'^  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PROPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

tort  feasor  avails  to  all.*^°  So  conversion  by  one  partner,  of  prop- 
erty wliich  came  into  possession  of  the  firm  on  partnership  account, 
is  conversion  by  the  flrm.^^"  The  liability  may  arise  from  actual  or 
implied  consent  subsequent  to  the  wrong.  Thus,  the  acceptance 
by  a  creditor  of  the  proceeds  of  a  wrongful  sale  of  mortgaged  prop- 
erty makes  him  liable  in  trover  to  the  mortgagee.*''^  Wrongdoing 
by  plaintiff  may  disentitle  him.*^^ 

Joint  Owners. 

There  are,  however,  circumstances  which  raise  questions  as  to 
parties  somewhat  peculiar  to  conversion  and  trespass.  Thus,  as 
'between  cotenants,  an  action  for  conversion  will  not  lie  by  one 
against  the  other,  so  far  as  the  land  is  concerned.*-^  This  is  cer- 
tainly true  as  to  the  legitimate  use  of  the  property;  and  the  courts 
are  averse  to  construing  conduct  of  the  tenant  in  common  into  an 
ouster.*^*  "Short  of  destruction  or  something  equivalent,"  one  ten- 
ant in  common  may  exercise  full  rights  of  property  over  a  chattel,, 
in  defiance  of  the  wishes  of  the  other  co-owners.*^ ^  But  any  con- 
duct on  the  part  of  a  cotenant  which  amounts  to  an  exclusion  of  the 

joint  liability,  see  Kavanaugb  v.  Taylor,  2  Ind.  App.  502,  28  N.  E.  553;  Steven- 
son V.  Valentine,  27  Neb.  338,  43  N.  W.  107;   Stevens  v.  Banes,  22  N.  H.  568. 

419  Stoi-y  &  I.  Commercial  Co.  v.  Story,  100  Cal.  30,  34  Pac.  671. 

42  0  Nisijgt  y_  patton,  4  Rawle,  119;  Hawkins  v.  Appleby,  2  Sandf.  421,  and 
cases  cited;  Stockton  v.  Frey,  4  Gill,  406;  1  Colly.  Partn.  §  449;  Cutter  v. 
Fanning,  2  Iowa,  580;  ante,  p.  291,  "Partners,"  note  308.  The  fact  that  one 
member  of  a  firm  of  attorneys  employed  to  manage  a  will  contest  conspired 
with  one  of  the  heirs  to  cheat  the  others  out  of  their  share  of  a  settlement, 
after  the  money  had  been  paid  over  to  the  attorney  in  fact  of  the  contesting 
heirs,  does  not  render  the  firm  liable  for  a  diversion  of  the  funds,  where  it 
aoted  in  good  faith  until  the  settlement  was  made  and  money  paid  over. 
Richardson  v.  Richardson,  100  Mich.  364,  59  N.  W.  178. 

421  Cone  V.  Ivinson  (Wyo.)  33  Pac.  31,  and  35  Pac.  933.  But  may  not  if 
ignorant  of  wrong.  See  Benton  v.  Beattie,  63  Vt.  186,  22  Atl.  422.  As  to 
conversion  by  warehouseman,  see  Burnham  v.  Cape  "Vincent  Seed  Co.,  142 
N.  Y.  100,  36  N.  E.  889. 

422  Miller  v.  Lamery,  62  Vt.  116,  20  Atl.  199.  And  see  Rogers  v.  Miller, 
02  N.  H.  131.  As  to  parties  according  to  Interest  improperly  converted,  see 
post,  p.  737,  note  442. 

423  Stafford  v.  Azbell,  8  Jlisc.  Rep.  316,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  733. 

424  Jacobs  V.  Seward,  L.  R.  5  H.  L.  464^72;  Parker  v.  Proprietors  of  the 
Locks  and  Canals,  3  Mete.  (Mass.)  91. 


<^Jl-    10]  CONVERSION.  733 

othei's  from  ownership  renders  him  liable  in  conversion.  A  sale  of 
the  wliole  estate  to  a  stranger  is  conversion;  ■i^"  or  the  seizure  of 
the  whole  common  crop  in  denial  of  the  rights  of  other  cotenants.''^'  ■ 
The  purchase  of  an  outstanding  title,  however,  inures  to  the  benefit 
of  the  whole,  and  does  not  constitute  ouster."^  Intention  to  bene- 
fit the  common  property,  as  where  one  tenant  in  common  unlawfully 
■cuts  and  removes  timber  to  save  it  from  destruction  by  fire,  is  tro- 
ver.^^"  Joint  owners  may  sue  third  persons  for  conversion,  without 
showing  the  exact  interest  of  each.*^" 


Imll,  28  Cal.  484;  Compau  v.  Compan,  45  Mich.  367,  8  N.  W.  85.  Vide  ante, 
p.  G68,  note  72.  Although  not  in  a  suit  of  law.  Greer  v.  Tripp,  56  Cal.  209. 
But  adverse  possession  under  claim  of  title  with  notice  to  the  coteuant  is  a 
tort.  Ante,  p.  0G7,  "Trespass,"  13;  Chandler  v.  Ricker,  49  Vt.  128;  Ball  v. 
Palmer,  81  111.  370;  Culver  v.  Rhodes,  87  N.  Y.  348;  Mayes  v.  Manning,  73 
Tex.  43,  11  S.  W.  136;  Cummings  v.  Wyman,  10  Mass.  464;  English  v.  Pow- 
ell, 119  Ind.  93,  21  N.  E.  4.58.  Process  of  manufacture:  Pennings  v.  Lord 
Crrenville,  1  Taunt.  241.  A  sale  in  market  overt  is  equivalent  to  a  destruc- 
tion. I'ark,  B.,  in  Farrar  v.  Beswick,  1  Mees.  &  W.  688.  But  cultivation  on 
shares  does  not  make  owner  and  cultivator  tenants  in  cemmon  as  to  crops 
raised.     Richards  v.  Wardwell,  S2  Me.  343,  19  AU.  863. 

420  Odom  V.  Weathersbee,  2(;  S.  C.  244,  1  S.  E.  890;  Lobdell  v.  Slowell,  51 
N.  Y.  70;  Weld  v.  Oliver,  21  Pick.  559,  Chase,  Lead.  Cas.  202;  Dyckman  v. 
Valiente,  42  N.  Y.  549;  Person  v.  Wilson,  25  Minn.  ISO;  Browning  v.  Cover, 
108  Pa.  St.  595;  Wheeler  v.  Wheeler,  33  Me.  347;  White  v.  I'helps,  12  N.  H. 
382;    Davis  v.  Lottich,  46  N.  Y.  393. 

427  Reed  V.  McRill,  41  Xeb.  200,  59  N.  W.  775;  Marlowe  v.  Rogers  (Ala.) 
14  South.  790.     And  see  Wood  v.  Noack,  84  Wis.  398,  54  N.  W.  785. 

428  Jones  V.  Stanton,  11  Mo.  433;  Weaver  v.  Wible,  25  Pa.  St.  270;  Bracken 
V.  Cooper,  80  111.  221;  Page  v.  Branch,  97  N.  C.  97,  1  S.  E.  025.  But  see 
Peck  V.  Lockridge,  97  Mo.  549,  11  S.  W.  246;  Clark  v.  Crego,  47  Barb.  599. 
Where  land  is  conveyed  by  coteuants  to  a  third  person,  to  be  sold  by  him  for 
their  use,  the  title  to  purchase  money  received  by  him  immediately  vests  in 
the  cotenants,  entirely  unaffected  by  the  statute  of  uses;  and  the  refusal  of 
the  grantee  to  pay  it  over  on  demand  constitutes  a  conversion.  Bork  v.  Mar- 
tin (Super.  Buff.)  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  569. 

429  Clow  V.  Plummer,  85  Mich.  550,  48  N.  W.  795. 

430  As  to  liability  of  sherift  for  seizing  partnership  property,  see  May  hew 
V.  Herriok,  7  C.  B.  229.  As  to  liability  of  pledgee  to  one  of  several  owners 
on  refusal  to  deliver  on  demand,  see  Harper  v.  Godsell,  L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  421i: 
Atwood  V.  Eniest,  13  C.  B.  SM;  Wright  v.  Robotham,  33  Ch.  Div.  106;  Rob- 
ertson V.  Gourlcy,  84  Tex.  575,  19  S.  W.  1006.  As  to  action  by  less  than  all 
■of  cotenants  to  enforce  rights  based  on  injui-y  to  common  propei-ty,  see  Ney 


V34  WRO.NGS    TO    POSSESSIOK    AND    PHOPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

Ministe)ial  Duties. 

Where  there  has  been  merely  ministerial  dealing  with  goods,  the 
liability  of  the  agent  or  servant  in  conversion  has  been  a  matter  of 
much  dispute.  Three  propositions  on  the  point  have,  however,- been 
very  clearly  enunciated:*"  (1)  A  defendant  is  always  liable  if  he 
has  taken  goods  as  his  own  and  used  them  as  his  own.  The  rule 
is  that  persons  who  deal  with  property  or  chattels,  or  exercise  do- 
minion over  them,  do  so  at  their  peril.''^^  Therefore,  one  who  has 
innocently  taken  goods  in  pledge  from  a  person  wrongfully  dealing 
with  them  is  liable  in  trover  at  the  suit  of  the  real  owner.*"  (2) 
When  a  person,  though  only  an  agent  or  a  servant,  takes  part  in  a 
transaction  which  pur-ports  to  effect  a  transfer  of  property  in  a  chat- 
tel, and  it  turns  out  that  his  principal  had  no  title,  his  ignorance  of 
this  fact  does  not  protect  him,  for  he  has  clearly  intended  and 
brought  about  that  which  is  inconsistent  with  the  rights  of  the  true 
owner.*^*  Even  an  auctioneer  or  broker  who  sells  property  and 
pays  the  proceeds  to  his  principal,  who  has  no  title,  is  liable  in 
trover  to  the  real  owner,  although  he  may  have  no  knowledge  of  the 
defective  title  or  the  principal's  want  of  authority.*"'     (3)  If  an 

v.  Mumme,  66  Tex.  268,  17  S.  W.  407;  Lee  Chuck  v.  Quang  Wo  Cliong,  91  Cal. 
59.3,  28  Pac.  45;   Bowser  v.  Cox,  3  Ind.  App.  309,  29  N.  E.  010. 

*3i  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  180,  from  which  the  English  illustrations  on  this  sub- 
ject are  taken.  "A  merely  ministerial  dealing  with  goods  at  the  request  of 
an  apparent  owner  having  the  actual  control  of  them  appears  not  to  be  con- 
version." Pol.  Torts,  p.  293,  commentiag  on  Heald  v.  Carey,  11  C.  B.  977,  as 
being  a  case  where  defendant  did  something  that  did  not  amount  to  a  con- 
version. 

432  In  the  celebrated  case  of  Hollins  v.  Fowler,  L.  R.  7  H.  L.  757,  it  was 
decided  that  any  person  who,  however  innocently,  obtains  the  possession  of 
goods  of  another  person  fraudulently  deprived  of  them,  and  disposes  of  them 
for  his  own  benefit,  or  that  of  any  other  person,  is  guilty  of  conversion.  Ac- 
cordingly, if  a  cotton  broker,  in  expectation  of  finding  a  customer,  buys  from 
an  apparent  owner  in  good  faith,  and  afterwards  sells  the  cotton,  he  is  liable 
to  the  real  owner,  though  he  only  made  a  commission.  Merchants'  &  P.  Bank 
V.  Meyer,  56  Ark.  499,  20  S.  W.  406. 

■433  McCombie  v.  Davies,  6  East,  538;  Burroughes  v.  Bayne,  5  Hurl.  &  N.  290. 
And  cf.  Coleridge,  J.,  in  Mennie  v.  Blake,  6  El.  &  Bl.  851. 

43  4  Hoffman  v.  Carew,  22  Wend.  285;  Coles  v.  Clark,  3  Cush.  399.  But  see 
Spooner  v.  Holmes,  102  Mass.  503. 

4.16  Everett  v.  Coffin,  C  AVend.  603.  Et  vide  Milliken  v.  Hathaway,  148  Mass. 
69,  19  N.  E.  16;  Kearney  v.  Clutton  (Mich.)  59  N.  W.  419;   Hoffman  v.  Carow, 


^'^-    ^*^]  COi\' VERSION-.  7>>:y 

agent  intermeddles  with  the  custody  of  chattels,  in  ignorance  of  his 
principal's  lack  of  title,  and  also  in  ignorance  that  any  alteration  of 
the  property  is  intended,  he  is  not  guilty  of  a  conversion.  "The 
true  proposition  as  to  possession  and  detention  and  asportation 
seems  to  me  to  be  that  a  possession  or  detention  which  is  a  mere 
custody  or  a  mere  asportation,  made  without  reference  to  the  ques- 
tion of  the  property  in  goods  or  chattel,  is  not  a  conversion."'  "" 

If  a  bailee,  asserting  no  title  in  himself,  restores  the  property  to 
the  bailor  in  accordance  with  the  expressed  or  implied  terms  of  the 
bailment,  before  notice  or  knowledge  that  the  title  is  in  a  third  per- 
son, he  is  not  liable  for  conversion.  To  warrant  recovery  against 
him  in  trover,  under  such  circumstances,  it  must  be  shown  that  it 
was  his  intention  to  deprive  the  plaintiff  of  property  in  the  goods, 
or  to  take  it  to  himself.*"      On  this  principle,  one  who  allowed 

22  Wend.  285;  Courtis  v.  Cane,  32  Vt.  232;  Robinson  v.  Bli-d,  158  Mass.  357, 
33  N.  E.  391;  CoTes  v.  Claris:,  8  Ciish.  399;  Abernathy  v.  Wlieeler,  92  Ky.  320, 
17  S.  W.  S-OS;  Taylor  v.  Pope,  5  Cold.  (Tenn.)  413;  Perkins  v.  Smith,  1  Wils.  328. 
So  a  sberift".  Garland  v.  Carlisle,  4  Clark  &  F.  G93.  So  a  clerk  or  servant  In- 
nocently disposing  of  goods  to  which  his  master  had  no  title,  under  his  mas- 
ter's direction.  Stevens  v.  Elwall,  4  Maule  &  S.  2.j0.  And  see  Edgerly  v. 
Whalan,  106  Mass.  307;  Hempfing  v.  Burr,  59  Mich.  294,  20  N.  W.  490; 
Morrow  Shoe  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  New  England  Shoe  Co.,  6  C.  C.  A.  .308,  57  Fed. 
G80. 

43  0  Per  Brett,  .!.,  in  Fowler  v.  Hollins,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  G16-G30.  A  succinct 
statement  of  facts  and  legal  principles  applied  in  this  celebrated  case  will  be 
found  at  page  348,  Pig.  Torts,  And  see  Spackman  v.  Foster,  11  Q.  B.  Div.  99. 
Defendant  may  be  a  mere  "conduit  pipe  in  ordinary  course  of  trade."  Ab- 
bott, C.  J.,  in  Greenway  v.  Fisher,  1  C.  &  P.  190.  Cf.  Sa.xeby  v.  AVynne,  3 
Starkie,  Ev.  (3d  Ed.)  1159.  So  defendant,  an  attorney,  may  be  a  "strong 
box."  Canot  v.  Hughes,  2  Bing.  N.  O.  448.  Payment  by  a  banker  of  a  spe- 
cially indorsed  check  to  a  fraudulent  indorsee  creates  liability  in  conver- 
sion. Kleinwort,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Cornplow,  etc.,  de  Paris  [1894]  2  Q.  B.  157;  La 
Fayette  Co.  Bank  v.  Metcalf,  40  Mo.  App.  494;  Burditt  v.  Hunt,  25  Me.  419. 
And  see  Smith  v.  Colby,  67  Me.  169;  Freeman  v.  Scurlock,  27  Ala.  407;  Strick- 
land V.  Barrett,  20  Pick.  415;  Deering  v.  Austin,  84  Vt.  330.  An  aj;vnt  for  a 
bailee  of  property  is  not  liable  for  a  conversion  thereof  by  his  principal  in 
which  he  does  not  actually  participate.  McLennan  v.  Lemen  (Minn.)  59  N. 
W.  628. 

437  Koch  V.  Branch,  44  Mo.  542,  and  cases  considered;  Eldridge  v.  Adams, 
54  Barb.  417;  Jordan  v.  Greer,  5  Sneed,  105;  Fouldes  v.  Willoughby.  8  Mees. 
&  W.  540;  Loring  v.  Mulcahy,  .">  Allen.  575;  Polley  v.  Lenox  Iron  Works,  2 
AllOH,  182;  Hill  v.  Hayes,  38  Conn.  532.    Defendant,  however,  it  is  said,  is 


736  WHONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    rUOPERTY.  [Ch.    10 

wheat  to  be  stored  in  his  barn  and  shipped  out  by  the  storer,  with- 
out knowledge  of  a  replevin  suit,  which  the  plaintiff  won,  is  not 
liable  in  trover.''"  A  carrier  who  received  goods  and  delivered  them 
in  accordance  \\ith  directions  of  consignor,  without  notice  of  adverse 
title,  is  free  from  responsibility.''^'  The  exemption  of  the  carrier-is 
said  to  rest,  not  on  the  special  ground  of  the  exercise  of  public  em- 
ployment allowing  no  choice  as  to  refusal  or  acceptance  of  goods, 
hut  upon  this  wider  principle.  If  a  common  carrier  assists  in  a 
wrongful  transfer  of  property,  liability  will  attach.^*" 

liable  In  conversion,  if  lie  refuses  to  return  plaintiff's  goods,  although  he 
lias  not  used  them  nor  claimed  them  as  his  own.  The  law  loolvs  to  liis  acts 
rather  than  to  his  words.  Fothergill  v.  Lovegrove,  2  Fost.  &  F.  132.  Et 
vide  Fillot  v.  Wilkinson,  2  Hurl.  &  C.  72,  3  Hurl.  &  C.  345. 

438  'Valentine  v.  Duff  (Ind.  App.)  33  N.  E.  529;  and  see  Pai'ker  v.  Lombard, 
100  Mass.  405;  Spooner  v.  Holmes,  102  Mass.  .503.  A  commission  merchant, 
-\vho  receives  tobacco,  and  sells  the  same  in  regular  course  .of  business,  with- 
out notice  of  adverse  claim,  is  not  liable.  Abernathy  v.  'Wheeler,  92  Ky. 
320,  17  S.  W.  858.  Where  goods  which  left  a  warehouseanan  were  wrong- 
I'uUy  taken  in  replevin  and  sold,  the  warehouseman,  having  no  knowledge 
thereof,  was  not  liable  for  their  conversion.  Kearney  v.  Glutton  (Mich.)  59 
X.  W.  419.  If  a  bailee,  having  temporary  possession  of  property,  holding  the 
same  as  the  property  of  the  bailor,  and  asserting  no  title  in  himself,  and  in 
_good  faith,  in  fulfillment  of  the  terms  of  the  bailment,  either  as  expressed 
by  the  iiarty  or  implied  by  law,  restores  the  property  to  the  bailee  before 
lie  is  notified  that  the  true  owner  will  look  to  him  for  it,  no  action  will  lie 
against  him,  for  he  has  only  done  what  was  his  duty.  Steele  v.  Marsicano, 
102  Cal.  G60,  30  Pac.  920,  collecting  and  commenting  on  cases  at  page  921. 
And  see  Leonard  v.  Tidd,  3  Mete.  (Mass.)  <3;  Gurley  v.  Armstead,  14S  Mass. 
267,  19  N.  E.  389;  Hill  v.  Hayes,  38  Conn.  532;  Nelson  v.  Iverson,  17  Ala. 
216;  Hudmon  v.  Du  Bose,  85  Ala.  446,  5  South.  162. 

439  Per  Willes,  J.,  in  Sheridan  v.  New  Quay  Co.,  4  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  650;  Martin. 
ti.,  in  Fowler  v.  Hollins,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  632. 

44  0  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  182,  referring  to  Fowler  v.  Hollins,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  616. 


Ch.    10]  CONVERSION.  737 


SAME— REMEDIES. 

231.  The   -wrong    involved   in    conversion    may    give    the 
plaintiff: 

(a)  An  option  to  -waive  the  tort  and  sue  in  assumpsit,  or 

to  resort  to  equity. 

(b)  A  right  to  sue  in  detinue. 

(c)  A  right  to  sue  in  replevin.*" 

(d)  A  right  to  sue  in  trover  for  damages. 

Compensatory  Damages. 

The  extent  of  plaintiff's  recovery  of  damages  is  determined  by 
the  nature  of  his  interest.  The  right  of  the  absolute  owner  to  re- 
cover has  already  been  considered.  If  the  plaintiff  has  but  limited 
title,  he  can  recover  only  according  to  his  interest.*^^      The  ordi- 

441  The  first  three  of  these  remedies  have  been  already  sufficiently  dis- 
fussed.  Ante,  p.  351 .  The  institution  of  a  chancery  suit  by  a  landlord,  pray- 
ing for  an  order  restraining  a  tenant  in  an-ears  from  removing  certain  articles 
from  the  premises,  the  tenant  meanwhile  remaining  in  actual  possession,  is 
not  an  act  of  conversion  with  reference  to  those  fixtures.  Felcher  v.  Mc- 
Millan (Mich.)  61  N.  W.  7!)1.  The  jury  may  be  called  on  to  deterniiuo  waiver 
of  tort,  and  election  to  proceed  on  contract.  Moore  v.  Hill,  62  Vt.  424,  19  Atl. 
997.  And  see  Burroughes  v.  Bayne,  5  Hurl.  &  N.  296.  Trover  and  replevin 
as  concuiTent  remedies.  Below  v.  Robbins,  7f;  Wis.  600,  45  N.  W.  416.  A 
review  of  the  remedy  by  damages  for  conversion,  compared  with  that  by 
trespass  and  by  replevin,  will  be  found  in  2  Univ.  Law  Rev.  67.  As  to  re- 
sort to  equity,  see  Thayer  v.  :\Ianley,  73  N.  Y.  305.  This  was  an  action  for  the 
conversion  of  notes.  Plaintiff,  it  was  held,  could  have  gone  into  equity,  and 
have  had  defendant  restrained  from  disposing  of,  and  compelled  to  cancel, 
them,  or  he  could  sue  for  damages  in  conversion. 

442  Fowler  V.  Gilnian,  l.t  Jletc.  (Mass.)  267;  Tenney  v.  Bank,  20  Wis.  152; 
Peebles  v.  Railway,  112  Mass.  40S.  As  between  bailee,  pledgee,  and  mort- 
gagee, see  note  26  in  "Conversion."  Further,  as  to  measure  of  damages  be- 
tween mortgagor  or  mortgagee,  see  Kearney  v.  Glutton,  101  Mich.  106,  TiO 
N.  W.  419;  Brierly  v.  Kendall,  17  Q.  B.  937;  Flanders  v.  Thomas,  12  Wis. 
410;  Gravel  v.  Clough,  81  Iowa,  272,  46  N.  W.  1002.  Between  pledgee  and 
pledgor,  see  Johnson  v.  Stear,  15  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  330.  Between  vendee  and 
vendor,  see  Chinery  v.  Viall,  5  Hurl.  &  N.  288.  A  mortgagee  who  wrong- 
fully seizes  the  mortgaged  property  before  condition  broken  is  liable  for 
the  full  value  thereof  where  possession  cannot  be  delivered,  and  not  merely 
for  the  value  of  its  use  for  the  time  intervening  between  the  seizure  and 

LAW  OF  TORTS — 47 


738  WKO.NGS    TO    POSSliSSlOX    AND    PEOFKKTY.  [Oh.    10 

nary  measure  of  compeusatory  damages  in  an  action  for  conversion 
by  a  plaintiff  who  has  been  deprived  of  his  chattel  is  the  value  of 
the  property  at  the  time  of  conversion,  together  with  interest,  and 
any  special  damages  which  may  be  incurred  in  consequence  of  the 
wrong.**'      The  value  is  ordinarily  to  be  taken  as  of  the  time  of  the 

the  maturity  of  the  mortgage  debt.  Finley  v.  Cudd  (S.  C.)  20  S.  B.  32.  As 
to  right  of  lien  holder  to  deduct  the  value  of  the  special  property,  see  MuUi- 
ner  v.  Florence,  3  Q.  B.  Div.  484;  Work  v.  Bennett,  70  Pa.  St.  484.  And  see 
Jarvis  v.  Rodgers,  15  Mass.  389;  Stearns  v.  Marsh,  4  TJenio,  227;  Wheeler  v. 
Pereles,  43  Wis.  332;  McCalla  v.  Clark,  55  Ga.  53.  As  to  conversion  of  books 
by  canvassing  agent,  Henry  Bill  Pub.  Co.  v.  Dm-gin,  101  Mich.  458,  59  N.  W. 
812.  Action  by  assignee  for  benefit  of  creditors,  Abbott  v.  Chaffee,  83  Mich. 
256,  47  N.  W.  216.  And  see  Hamm  v.  Drew,  83  Tex.  77,  18  S.  W.  434;  Meyer 
V.  Orynski  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  655.  Sale  by  railroad  coiupauy  on  un- 
claimed baggage,  see  McClellan  v.  Wyatt  (City  Ct.  N.  Y.)  11  N.  Y.  Supp. 
686.  As  to  conversion  by  administrators,  Kenyon  v.  Olney,  61  Hun,  618,  15 
X.  Y.  Supp.  416;  Reynolds  v.  St.  Paul  Trust  Co.,  51  Minn.  236,  53  N.  W.  457. 
Sheriff,  Bigelow  Co.  v.  Heintze,  53  N.  J.  Law,  69,  21  Atl.  109.  Execution 
creditor,  Wessels  v.  Beeman,  87  Mich.  481,  49  N.  W.  483.  Surviving  partner 
and  representatives  of  deceased,  Hawkins  v.  Capron,  17  R.  I.  679,  24  Atl. 
466;  Russell  v.  McCall,  141  N.  Y.  437,  36  N.  E.  498.  Vendee  of  partner, 
Kingsbury  v.  Tharp,  61  Jlich.  216,  28  N.  W.  74.  Attorney,  Petrie  v.  Wil- 
liams, 68  Hun,  589,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  237.  Mortgagee,  Brotherton  v.  Goldman, 
90  Mich.  340,  51  N.  W.  508.  Second  mortgagee.  Brown  v.  Miller,  108  N.  C. 
395,  13  S.  E.  167.  Senior  mortgagee,  Peregoy  v.  Wheeler,  88  Iowa,  732,  55 
N.  W.  462;  Simpson  v.  Hinson,  88  Ala.  527,  7  South.  264.  And  see  Brown 
v.  Miller,  108  N.  C.  395,  13  S.  E.  167.  Between  landlord  and  tenant,  Lewis 
V.  Ocean  Nav.  &  Pier  Co.,  125  N.  Y.  341,  26  N.  E.  301;  Marlowe  v.  Rogers 
(Ala.)  14  South.  790;  Brooks  v.  Rogers,  101  Ala.  Ill,  13  South.  386;  Taylor 
V.  Felder,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  417,  23  S.  W.  480.  Landlord  and  vendee  of  ten- 
ant, Finney  v.  Harding,  136  111.  573,  27  N.  E.  289,  reversing  32  111.  App.  98. 
By  tenant  against  landlord  for  removing  trade  fixtures,  Rosenau  v.  Sy- 
ring,  25  Or.  386,  35  Pac.  844;  Voss  v.  Bassett  (Tex.  App.)  15  S.  W.  503.  Un- 
der mining  lease,  Hartford  Iron  Min.  Co.  v.  Cambria  Min.  Co.,  93  Mich. 
90,  53  N.  W.  4.  Between  tenants  in  common.  Wood  v.  Noack,  84  Wis.  398, 
54  N.  W.  785. 

443  Shepard  v.  Pratt,  16  Kan.  209;  Smith  v.  Bates  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W. 
1044;  Jefferson  v.  Hale,  31  Ark.  286;  Coffey  v.  Bank,  46  Mo.  140;  Skinner  v. 
Pinney,  19  Fla.  42;  State  v.  Hojie,  25  S.  W.  893;  McCormlck  v.  Railroad  Co., 
49  N.  Y.  303.  Of.  Railway  Co.  v.  Hutchins,  32  Ohio  St.  571;  Hull  v.  Davidson. 
6  Tex.  Civ.  App.  588,  25  S.  W.  1047;  Perkins  v.  Marrs,  15  Colo.  262,  25  Pac.  168; 
Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  199.  Where  assignors  for  benefit  of  creditors,  before  the  as- 
signment, pledge  for  their  own  debts  collaterals  held  by  them  as  security  for 


Ch.   10]  CONVEKSION.  739 

wrongful  act.*"  It  has  been  held  that  a  person  cannot  take  any 
advantage  of  increased  value  given  to  the  chattel  by  its  improve- 
ment subsequent  to  the  date  of  conversion.**^  Thus,  the  normal 
measure  of  damages  for  conversion  of  timber  has  been  held  its  value 

debts  due  them,  and  the  pledgees  sell  the  collaterals  so  pledged,  the  measure 
of  damages  of  the  owners  of  such  collaterals  is  their  market  value  at  the  date 
of  their  conversion.  In  re  Jamison  &  Co.'s  Estate,  163  Pa.  St.  143,  29  Atl.  1001; 
Appeal  of  Boyer,  Id.;  3  Suth.  Dam.  §  1109,  note  12.  As  to  conversion  of  note, 
plaintifC  is  entitled  to  actual,  and  not  face,  value.  Griggs  v.  Day,  187  N.  Y. 
542,  32  N.  E.  1001.  Of.  Hersey  v.  Walsh,  38  Minn.  521,  38  N.  W.  C130.  Et  vide 
Decker  v.  Mathews,  12  N.  Y.  313.  As  to  conversion  of  insurance  policy: 
Hayes  v.  Massachusetts  Mut.  Lire  Ins.  Co.,  125  111.  626,  18  N.  E.  322.  In  an 
action  for  the  conversion  of  a  plctm-e  left  by  plaintiff  with  defendants  to  be 
sold  for  not  less  than  a  certain  price,  he  can  recover  only  the  actual  value  of 
the  picture.  Sinnette  v.  Hoddick,  10  Misc.  Rep.  580,  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  453.  As 
to  loss  of  title  deeds  in  America,  see  Towle  v.  Lovet,  6  Mass.  394;  Mowry  v. 
Wood,  12  Wis.  413-12'3;  1  Sedg.  Dam.  §  262.  Defendant  may  recover  loss  of 
profits  from  suspension  of  business  caused  by  wrongful  sale  of  plaintiff's  fix- 
tures, Haverly  v.  Klliott,  39  Neb.  201,  57  N.  W.  1010;  and,  generally,  loss 
occasioned  by  detention  of  property,  Moore  v.  King,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  397, 
23  S.  W.  484.  Allowance  of  interest  may  be  in  discretion  of  the  jury.  State 
V.  Hope,  121  Mo.  34,  25  S.  W.  803.  But  see  Arkansas  Val.  Land  &  Cattle  Co. 
V.  Mann,  130  U.  S.  69,  9  Sup.  Ct.  458. 

4*4  Heinekamp  v.  Beaty,  74  Md.  388,  21  Atl.  1008;  Talk  v.  I<;ietcher,  18  C. 
B.  (K.  S.)  403;  Johnson  v.  Lancashire  &  Y.  Ry.  Co.,  3  C.  P.  Div.  499;  Hen- 
dricks V.  Evans,  40  JXo.  App.  313.  Cf.  Bwbank  v.  Nutting,  7  0.  B.  797,  with 
Bur'mah  Trading  Corp.  v.  Mirza  JIahomed  Aally  Sherazee,  L.  R.  5  Ind.  App. 
130;  Douglass  v.  Kraft,  9  Cal.  502;  Hamer  v.  Hathaway,  33  Cal.  117.  As  to 
fluctuations  in  value,  see  post,  p.  741,  note  451.  Consignor  may  recover  from 
a  common  can-ier  the  value  of  the  goods  at  the  time  they  should  have  been 
delivered  to  him.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Donnell,  49  Ohio  St.  489,  32  N. 
B.  470.  In  trover  for  iiroperty,  possession  of  which  defendant  obtained  by 
purchase  of  plaintiff  while  the  latter  was  incapable,  because  of  intoxication, 
to  m-dlie  a  contract,  the  measure  of  damages  is  the  difference  between  the 
value  of  the  property  delivered  and  the  consideration  received.  Baird  v.  How- 
ard (Ohio  Sup.)  36  N.  E.  732. 

44  5  Reid  V.  Fairbanks,  13  C.  B.  692,  where  it  was  held  Uiat  the  measure  of 
damages  for  conversion  of  a  half-built  ship  was  its  value  in  its  unfinished 
condition,  and  not  as  subsequently  completed.  As  to  discretion  of  the  jury 
to  find  the  value  at  a  subsequent  time,  see  Greening  v.  Wilkinson,  1  Car.  & 
P.  025;  West  v.  AVentworth,  3  Cow.  82;  Ewing  v.  Blount,  20  Ala.  694;  Jenk- 
ins V.  McConico,  20  Ala.  213;  Loeb  v.  Flash,  65  Ala.  526;  3  Suth.  Dam.  pp. 
500-518. 


740  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PEOPEiilY.  [Ch.    10 

when  first  separated  from  the  freehold,  and  not  the  value  of  the 
article  into  which  it  may  have  been  converted.**"  On  the  other 
hand,  it  has  been  urged  that  "the  right  to  the  improved  value  in 
damages  is  a  consequence  of  the  continued  ownership.  It  would 
be  absurd  to  say  that  the  original  owner  may  retalce  the  thing  by 
an  action  of  replevin  in  its  improved  state,  and  yet  that  he  may 
not,  if  put  to  his  action  of  trespass  or  trover,  recover  its  improved 
value  in  damages."  ^" 

Much  of  the  confusion  and  uncertainty  as  to  the  measure  of  dam- 
ages in  conversion,  especially  where  intentional  wrong  is  involved, 
has  been  removed  by  Mr.  Justice  Miller  in  the  celebrated  ***  case 
of  Wooden-Ware  Co.  v.  U.  S.**°  The  rule  he  there  laid  down  for 
assessing  damages  against  defendant  is:  (1)  Where  he  is  a  will- 
ful trespasser,  the  full  value  of  the  property  at  the  time  and  place 
of  demand  or  of  suit,  but  with  no  deduction  for  his  labor  and  ex- 
penses; (2)  where  he  is  an  unintentional  or  mistaken  trespasser  or 
an  innocent  vendee  from  such  trespasser,  the  value  at  the  time  of 
conversion,  less  the  amount  which  he  and  his  vendor  have  added  to 
its  value ;  (3)  where  he  is  a  purchaser  without  notice  of  wrong  from 
a  willful  trespasser,  the  value  at  the  time  of  such  purchase.*'" 

146  Where  timber  of  the  value  of  $25  had  been,  in  the  exercise  of  what  was 
supposed  to  be  proper  authority,  converted  into  hoops  of  the  value  of  $700, 
and  in  its  converted  form  passed  to  the  party  by  whose  labor  in  good  faith  the 
change  had  been  wrought.  Wetherbee  v.  Green,  22  Mich.  311,  discussing  at 
length  and  reviewing  cases  as  to  what  changes  of  identity  will  prevent  a 
recovery  in  specie.  And  see  Beede  v.  Lamprey,  64  N.  H.  510,  15  Atl.  133; 
Moody  V.  Whitney,  38  Me.  174;  Penfield  v.  Sage,  71  Hun,  573,  24  N.  Y.  Supp. 
994;  Brooks  v.  Rogers,  101  Ala.  Ill,  13  South.  38G;  Ellis  v.  Wire,  33  Ind. 
127.  As  to  reimbursing  defendant  for  increased  value  of  property  by  cut- 
ting trees,  see  Nicklase  v.  Morrison,  5G  Ark.  553,  20  S.  W.  414. 

447  Silsbury  v.  McCoon,  3  N.  Y.  379.  And  see  Nesbitt  v.  St.  Paul  Lumber 
Co.,  21  Minn.  491. 

448  This  case  has  been  generally  followed  and  approved.  U.  S.  v.  Baxter, 
46  Fed.  350-353;  U.  S.  v.  Windgate,  44  Fed.  129  (collecting  cases  applying  the 
rule  on  page  131);  ICingory  v.  U.  S.,  44  Fed.  G69,  670;  U.  S.  v.  Perkins,  44  Fed. 
670-674;   U.  S.  v.  Mock,  149  U.  S.  273--277,  13  Sup.  Ct.  848. 

449  106  U.  S.  432. 

460  Wright  V.  Skinner  (Fla.)  16  South. 335.  On  this  principle,  in  Benson  Min- 
ing &  Smelting  Ck).  v.  Alta  Mining  &  Smelting  Co.,  145  U.  S.  428,  12  Sup.  Ct. 
877,  it  was  held  that  a  person  who  wrongfully  works  a  mine,  takes  out  ores 


Gh.    10]  CONVERSION.  741 

Where  property  fluctuates  in  value,  as  stocks  and  bonds,  plaintiff 
has  been  held  entitled  to  the  highest  market  price  betvi^een  the 
time  of  conversion  and  the  time  of  trial.*"  The  authorities  on  this 
point  are,  however,  by  no  means  in  harmony.*'^  Value,  in  general, 
means  market  value,  not  the  value  to  the  plaintiff.*"  Ordinarily, 
the  value  at  the  place  of  the  conversion  controls;  not  that  in  the 
wholesale  market  with  an  allowance  for  freight.*''*  Where  the  con- 
therefrom,  removes  tliem,  and  converts  tbem  to  his  own  use  is  not  entitled,  in 
an  action  to  recover  their  value,  to  be  credited  for  the  cost  of  mining  the  ores. 

451  Markham  v.  Jaudon,  41  N.  Y.  235;  Burt  v.  Dutcher,  34  N.  Y.  493; 
Rosum  V.  Hodges,  1  S.  D.  308,  47  N.  W.  140;  Romaine  v.  Van  Allen,  26  N.  Y. 
309;  Morgan  v.  Gregg,  40  Barb.  183;  Jaques  v.  Stewart,  81  Ga.  81,  6  S.  E. 
815;  Wilson  v.  Mathews,  24  Barb.  20.".;  Pickert  v.  Rugg,  1  N.  D.  230,  46  N. 
W.  446;  Carter  v.  Du  Pre,  18  S.  0.  179;  Dimock  v.  U.  S.  Nat.  Bank,  55  N.  J. 
Law,  296,  25  Atl.  926.  Et  vide  Baker  v.  Drake,  53  N.  Y.  211;  Page  v. 
Fowler,  39  Cal.  412;  AVaymouth  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  17  Wis.  550; 
Meixell  v.  Kirkpatrick,  33  Kan.  282,  0  Pac.  241;  Seymore  v.  Ives,  46  Conn. 
109;  3  Suth.  Dam.  §  1118. 

452  Compare  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Philadelphia,  G.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  iri3  Pa.  St. 
160,  25  Atl.  1043;  Stewart  v.  Bright,  6  Houst.  (Del.)  344;  Gresham  v.  Island 
City  Sav.  Bank,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  52,  21  S.  W.  556;  President  and  Directors 
of  Franlvlin  Banl<  v.  Harris,  77  Md.  423,  2(;  Atl.  523;  Andrews  v.  Clark,  72 
Md.  396,  20  Atl.  429,— with  cases  in  note  452.  A  very  clear  statement  of 
what  is  perhaps  the  best  view  of  this  subject  will  be  found  in  Huntingdon  & 
B.  T.  R.  Co.  V.  English,  86  Pa.  St.  247.  Et  vide  Neiler  v.  Kelly,  69  Pa.  St. 
403.  Where  there  is  no  trust  relationship  between  the  parties,  and  no  obli- 
gation to  deliver  specific  stock  at  a  iiarticular  time,  the  measui-e  of  damages 
for  failure  to  deliver  is  the  market  value  on  the  day  when  it  should  have  been 
delivered,  with  interest  to  the  day  of  trial;  but  if  there  be  a  duty  to  deliver  at 
a  particular  time,  and  that  duty  has  not  been  fulfilled,  plaintiff  may  recover 
the  highest  market  value  between  that  time  and  the  time  of  trial. 

453  iier  V.  Baker,  82  Mich.  22G,  46  N.  W.  377;  Beebe  v.  Wilkinson,  30  Minn. 
548-552,  16  N.  W.  4r)U.  Where  the  property  has  no  market  value,  the  damag)3 
consists  of  its  value  to  the  owner  for  a  particidar  use,  and  cost  of  replacing. 
Leoncini  v.  Post  (Com.  PI.)  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  825.  In  an  action  for  the  detach- 
ment and  removal  of  saloon  fixtures,  it  is  proper  to  exclude  evidence  of  the 
value  of  the  fixtures  when  removed  from  their  position,  and  considered  with- 
out reference  to  their  intended  uses.  Greenebaum  v.  Taylor,  102  Cal.  624, 
36  Pac.  957;  Suydam  v.  Jenkins,  3  Sandf.  614-620.  Where  evidence  as  to 
value  is  conflicting,  the  price  at  \\hlch  defendant  sold  the  goods  converted 
may  be  accepted  as  true  value.  Keiley  v.  Mechanics'  &  Tradei-s'  Bank,  72 
Hun,  168,  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  .5.7.6. 

4  64  Gentry  v.  Keiley,  49  Kan.  82,  30  Pac.  186. 


742  WRONGS    TO    POSSESSION    AND    PBOFEKTY.  [Ch.   10 

version  occurs  at  some  distance  from  market,  the  value  at  the  near- 
est market,  less  the  cost  of  transportation,  is  the  value  to  be 
taken.  "= 

Special  Damatjes. 

Where  the  circumstances  are  such  that  a  defendant  must  be 
aware  that  the  chattel  converted  by  him  is  required  for  some  par- 
ticular purpose,  he  may  be  liable  to  pay  special  damages  for  caus- 
ing the  failure  of  that  purpose.*^"  Thus,  in  Bodley  v.  Reynolds  ■*" 
it  was  held  that  a  carpenter  who  lost  his  employment  because  of  the 
conversion  of  his  tools  might  recover  for  loss  of  both  the  employment 
and  the  tools.  There  is,  however,  a  distinction  between  special 
damages  and  special  value.  To  eutitle  one  to  recover  special  dam- 
ages not  forming  part  of  the  actual  present  value  of  the  goods,  the 
defendant  must  have  some  notice  of  the  inconvenience  likely  to  be 
occasioned.*"'  Mere  capacity  for  profitable  use  is  a  part  of  the 
value  of  the  chattel;  and  the  loss  of  such  use  cannot  be  a  separate 
item  of  damages,  for,  if  so,  the  plaintiff  would  be  entitled  to  a  dou- 
ble recovery  pro  tanto.*''* 

Nominal  Damages. 

The  damages  may  be  merely  nominal.  Thus,  nominal  damages 
only  can  be  recovered  where  the  property  converted  has  been  at- 
tached by  a  creditor  of  the  owner.*""  So,  where  property  came 
lawfully  into  the  plaintiff's  possession,  and  remains  in  the  same 
condition  as  before  the  conversion,  ho  may  be  compelled  to  accept 

*6B  Hodson  V.  Goodale,  22  Or.  68,  29  Pac.  70. 

4  56  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  282;  Heald  v.  MacGowan  (Com.  PL)  14  N.  T.  Supp, 
280;  Parsons  v.  Sutton,  66  N.  Y.  92.  And,  generally,  see  Rank  v.  Rank,  5 
Pa.  St.  211;  Bennett  v.  Lockwood,  20  Wend.  222;  Mayne,  Dam.  206;  2  Sedg. 
Dam.  c.  14;  2  Greenl.  Ev.  §  276. 

4  57  8  Q.  B.  779. 

458  France  v.  Gaudet,  L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  199.  And  see  The  Netting  Hill,  9  Prob. 
Div.  105,  a  case  of  collision,  considering  loss  of  market  as  remote  damage. 

45  9  Reid  V.  Fairbanks,  13  C.  B.  692.  As  to  special  damages  where  prop- 
erty has  been  returned,  see  Barrelett  v.  Bellgard,  71  111.  280;  Rank  v.  Rank, 
5  Pa.  St.  211.  As  to  special  damages  for  detention  of  a  horse,  for  value  of 
its  hire,  see  Huckins  v.  Kapf  (Tex.  App.)  14  S.  "W.  lOlG.  Expense  of  recov- 
ery in  specie,  by  prosecution  of  detinue,  of  property  converted,  should  be  spe- 
cially pleaded.     Ross  v.  Malone,  97  Ala.  529,  12  South.  182. 

460  Jones  V.  Cobb,  84  Me.  153,  24  Atl.  798. 


Ch.lO]  CONVERSION.  743 

it  in  mitigation  of  damages  which  may  thus  be  reduced  to  a  merely 
nominal  sum.*"^ 

Exemplary  Damages. 

As  to  exemplary  damages  in  trover,  where  the  injury  has  been 
inflicted  wantonly  and  iiialicioiisly,  I  lie  jiiiy  is  at  lilx-iiy  to  y,ivi'. 
and  it  is  proper  for  them  to  give,  damages  beyond  the  mere  com- 
pensation for  the  loss  or  injury,  and  oxemjilary  or  vindicdve  in  pro- 
portion to  the  degree  of  malice  or  wantonness  evinced  by  the  act 
of  the  defendant.^'*  When,  however,  the  act  which  produced  the 
injury  does  not  appear  to  have  been  wanton  or  malicious,  as  whei'c 
there  was  a  mistake  in  tltle,*"^  and  when  the  parties  came  before  the 
court  in  the  character  of  bona  fide  claimants  of  property  honestly 
contending  for  their  rights,  vindictive  or  exemplary  damages  ought 
not  to  be  allowed.  Indeed,  where  persons  in  good  faith  make  an 
insufiScient  or  invalid  levy,  and  on  discovering  their  mistake  tender 
the  property  back  to  the  person  from  whom  it  was  taken,  leave  it 
on  his  premises,  and  do  not  thereafter  assert  any  claim  to  it,  they 
are  liable  only  for  nominal  damages,  unless  the  conversion  resulted 
in  injury  to  the  property."^ 

461  Bigelow  Co.  v.  Heintze,  53  N.  J.  Law,  69,  21  Atl.  109.  Et  vide  Bar- 
relett  v.  Bellgard,  71  111.  280;  Hiort  v.  London  &  Northwestern  Ry.  Co.,  4 
Bxch.  Div.  188.  Et  vide  Fan-  v.  Hunt,  87  Wis.  223,  58  N.  W.  377.  The  court 
may  stay  the  action,  in  whole  or  in  part,  if  plaintiff  obtained  redress  by  de- 
livery of  chattel  and  payment  of  costs.  Fisher  v.  Prince,  3  Pa.  St.  1363; 
Pickering  v.  Truste,  7  Term  R.  53;  Earle  v.  Holderness,  4  Bing.  462.  And 
see  Rutland  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Banljc,  32  Vt.  639;  1  Sedg.  Dam.  (8th  Ed.)  §  54. 
As  to  transaction  equivalent  to  a  return,  see  Plevin  v.  Henshall,  10  Bing.  24. 
Cf.  Edmondson  v.  Nuttal,  17  0.  B.  (N.  S.)  280. 

462  Wilde  V.  Hexter,  50  Barb.  448;  Neiler  v.  Kelly,  69  Pa.  St.  403  (collection 
of  Pennsylvania  cases  at  page  408);  Mowiy  v.  Wood,  12  Wis.  413;  Allaback 
V.  Utt,  51  N.  Y.  651.     Et  vide  Day  v.  Woodworth,  13  How.  363;    Sedg.  Dam. 

.531. 

403  So  where  defendant  acted  imder  contract  as  the  plaintiff's  agent.  Slo- 
oum  V.  Putnam  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  52. 

464  Pan-  V.  Hunt,  87  Wis.  223,  58  N.  "W.  377.  A  judgment  for  punitive 
damages,  in  an  action  for  the  malicious  conversion  of  certain  wheat,  peace- 
ably taken  by  defendant  under  a  bona  fide  claim  of  title,  and  by  the  advice 
of  reputable  counsel,  wiU  be  set  aside,  where  the  only  evidence  of  malice  is  a 
statement,  made  by  defendant  at  tJie  time,  that  it  was  too  rich  for  plaintiff  to 
litigate  with.     Abbott  v.  76  Land  &  Water  Co.,  103  Cal.  607,  37  i*.  .327. 


744  i<uiSAiNCiii.  [Uh.  11 

CHAPTER  XI. 

NUISANCK. 

232.  Deflnition. 

233.  Rights  Invaded 

234-238.    The  Annoyance  or  Interference. 

239.  Kinds  of  Nuisances. 

240.  Public,  Priyate,  and  Mixed. 

241.  Continuing. 

242.  Legalized. 

243-244.    Parties  to  Proceedings  against. 
245.    Kemedies. 

DEFINITION". 

232.  Nuisance  is  a  distinct  civil  wrong,  consisting  of  any- 
thing -wrongfully  done  or  permitted  -whicli  inter- 
feres with  or  annoys  another  in  the  enjoyment  of 
his  legal  rights.^ 

1  This  definition  is  substantially  that  of  Mr.  Cooley.  Cooley,  Torts,  §  565. 
Perhaps  the  most  that  can  be  said  for  any  definition  of  nuisance  is  that  It  is 
not  so  objectionable  as  many  others.  From  the  nature  of  the  subject,  every 
one  must  be  unsntisfactoiy,— perhaps  more  unsatisfactory  than  the  average 
legal  definition.  In  an  interesting  article  by  L.  M.  Countryman  on  "Nui- 
sance" in  16  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law,  92t-926,  a  collection  of  definitions  will 
be  found.  And  see  Bish.  Noncont.  Law,  §  411,  note  1;  Wood.  Nuis.  §  SCT  et 
seq.  Many  statutes  have  undertaken  apparently  the  impossible  task  of  de^ 
fining  a  nuisance.  A  common  definition  b.y  such  statutes  is  that  a  nuisance 
is  anything  injurious  to  health,  or  indecent  or  offensive  to  the  senses,  or  an 
obstruction  to  the  free  use  of  property,  so  as  to  interfere  with  comfortable 
enjoyment  of  life  or  property.  The  statutes  of  the  various  states  would  in 
general  seem  to  be  essentially  declaratory  of  the  common  law.  Gen.  St. 
Minn.  1878,  p.  820,  c.  75,  §  44.  Cf.  Pen.  Code  Minn,  tit  2,  §  319  (Gen.  St.  1894, 
§  6613  et  seq.);  Eev.  St.  Ind.  1881,  §§  289-291  (lUsv.  St.  Ind.  1894,  §§  290-292); 
Steinke  v.  Bcutley,  6  Ind.  App.  663,  34  N.  E.  97;  Indianapolis  Water  Co.  v. 
American  Strawboard  Co.,  53  Fed.  970;  Code  Wash.  T.  §  1247;  Northern  Pac. 
R.  Co.  V.  Whalen,  149  U.  S.  157,  13  Sup.  Ct.  822;  Sanb.  &  B.  Ann.  St.  §  3180; 
Wendlandt  v.  Cavanaugh,  85  Wis.  256,  55  N.  W.  408;  Code  Iowa,  §  3331; 
Downing  v.  City  of  Oskaloosa,  86  Iowa,  352,  53  N.  W.  256;  Harley  v.  Merrill 
Brick  Co.,  83  Iowa,  73,  48  N.  W.  1000.    But  see  Innis  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  I.  F'. 


Ch.    11]  DEFINITION.  745 

The  subject  of  nuisance  is  one  of  the  oldest  heads  of  the  English 
law.^  The  early  actions  of  assize  of  nuisance  and  of  quod  permittat 
prosternere  were  real  actions,  and  were  based  upon  the  freehold 
title  in  the  plaintiff  and  the  defendant,  respectively.' 

Distinguished  from  a  Purpresture. 

A  purpresture  is  "an  inclosure  by  a  private  party  of  a  part  of  that 
which  belongs  to,  and  ought  to  be  open  and  free  to  the  enjoyment 
of,  the  public  at  large.*  It  is  not  necessarily  a  public  nuisance.  A 
public  nuisance  must  be  something  that  subjects  the  public  to  some 
degree  of  inconvenience  or  annoyance,  but  a  purpresture  may  exist 
without  putting  the  public  to  any  inconvenience  whatever." "  The 
public  character  of  a  purpresture  appears  especially  in  the  remedies 
provided  by  law.*  Proceedings  in  equity  to  abate  a  purpresture  are 
usually  upon  the  relation  of  the  attorney  general,  and  not  usually  or 
necessarily  upon  information  by  private  parties.'' 

Distinguished  from  Trespass. 

Nuisance  is  distinguished  from  trespass.  "The  distinction  be- 
tween nuisance  and  trespass  is  that  nuisance  is  only  a  consequence 
or  result  of  what  is  not  directly  or  immediately  injurious,  but  its 

&  N.  W.  Ity.  Co.,  7G  Iowa,  105,  40  N.  W.  701;  Rev.  St.  Idaho,  §  3633;  Rodway 
V.  Moore,  2  Idaho,  1036,  29  Pac.  104;  Civ.  Code  Cal.  §  3483;  Castle  v.  Smith 
(Cal.)  36  Pac.  859;  Gardner  v.  Sti-oever,  89  Cal.  20,  26  Pac.  618;  Gen.  St.  Nev. 
§  3273;  Fogg  v.  Nevada  C.  O.  Ry.  Co.,  20  Nev.  429,  23  Pac.  840;  Civ.  Code  Or. 
§  330;  Kothenberthal  v.  City  of  Salem  Co.,  13  Or.  604,  11  Pac.  287.  And  see 
Norcross  v.  Thorns,  51  Me.  503. 

-  Bigelow,  Lead.  Cas.  462,  contain.s  a  learned  review  of  the  early  history 
of  nuisance. 

a  3  Bl.  Comm.  §§  221,  222;  Waggoner  v.  Jermalne,  45  Am.  Dec.  474. 

•*  Black,  Law  Diet.  tit.  "Purpreisture."  And  see  Smith  v.  McDowell,  148 
lU.  51,  35  N.  E.  141. 

0  Attorney  General,  etc.,  v.  Evart  Booming  Co.,  34  Mich.  462.  And  sec- 
Moore  V.  .Jackson,  2  Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  211. 

6  As  indictment,  Reg.  v.  United  Kingdom  Electric  Tel.  Co.,  6  Law  T.  (N. 
S.)  378;   or  infoi-mation  of  intjusion.  Wood,  Nuis.  §  78. 

7  2  Story,  Eg.  .Tur.  (13th  Ed.)  §  924.  And  see  Soltau  v.  De  Held,  9  Eng. 
Law  &  Eg.  104;  Ewell  v.  Greenwood,  26  Iowa,  377.  See,  al.so,  2  Wat.  luj 
260;  Wood,  Nuis.  S§  7M-80;  16  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law,  939-942;  United  SUtes 
V.  Debs,  64  Fed.  724. 


746  NUISANCE.  [<-!h-  11 

effect  is  injurious,  while  trespass  is  an  immediate  invasion  of  prop- 
erty." "  Moreover,  nuisance  usually  consists  in  the  use  of  one's  own 
property  to  the  injury  of  a  neighbor,"  whereas  a  trespasser  or- 
dinarily does  wrong  by  his  person,  and  not  in  the  use  of  property. 
Certain  wrongs,  however,  may  be  considered  trespasses  or  nuisances, 
at  the  plaintiff's  option.^"  Thus,  to  keep  a  vicious  animal,  after  no- 
tice, is  to  maintain  a  nuisance;  but,  when  it  attacks  an  individual, 
he  may  sue  in  trespass.^ ^  Again,  an  overhanging  wall,  roof,  or  tree 
is  an  actionable  nuisance.^^  Yet,  said  Mr.  Blackstone,  it  is  also 
"a  species  of  trespass;  for  cujus  est  solum,  ejus  est  usque  ad 
coelum."  "  There  are  many  wrongs  to  easements,  or  to  property  in 
the  nature  of  an  easement,  which  partake  both  of  the  nature  of  a 
trespass  and  a  nuisance,  and  involve  as  well  questions  of  negli- 
y^ence.^* 

8  Ang.  Water  (3ourses,  §  3S8;   Pol.  Torts,  330. 

0  1  Hil.  Torts,  326,  327;   Norcross  v.  Thomas,  81  Am.  Dec.  588. 

10  Post,  p.  7.5^1,  note  48. 

11  Cooler,  Torts,  §  565. 

12  Best,  J.,  in  Earl  of  Lonsdale  v.  Nelson,  2  Bam.  &  C.  302-311;  Fitzli.  Nat. 
Brev.  184.  And  see  Miles  v.  City  of  Worcester,  154  Mass.  511,  28  N.  E.  67r> 
(distinguishing  Middlesex  Co.  v.  McCue,  149  Mass.  103,  21  N.  E.  230,  and 
Landfeldt  v.  McGrath,  33  111.  A  pp.  158). 

13  3  Bl.  Comm.  §  217;  Pol.  Torts,  §  329;  Conner  v.  Woodfill,  126  Ind.  85, 
25  N.  E.  876.  Accordingly,  there  is  error  in  the  constantly  approved  defini- 
tion contained  in  3  Steph.  Comm.  39,  that  a  nuisance  is  anything  done  to 
the  annoyance  of  lands,  tenements,  or  hereditaments  of  another  not  amount- 
ing to  a  trespass. 

1*  Thus,  trespass  is  the  proper  remedy  for  a  breach  of  an  agreement  under 
seal  between  riparian  owners  adjusting  their  rights  to  the  waters  of  the 
stream.  Horn  v.  Miller,  i;^6  Pa.  St.  640,  20  Atl.  706.  Surface  water  may  be  so 
used  as  to  constitute  a  trespass.  Conner  v.  Woodfill,  126  Ind.  85,  25  N.  K. 
876.  And  see  post,  p.  757,  note  65.  But,  ordinarily,  interference  with  water 
rights  is  a  nuisance.  Post,  p.  753.  As  to  negligence,  cf.  Emery  v.  Raleigh 
&  G.  R.  Co.,  102  N.  C.  209,  9  S.  E.  139.  Comiption  of  water,  as  by  drilling 
a  well,  may  render  liable  in  damajfes  for  negligence.  Collins  v.  Chartiers 
Val.  Gas.  Co.,  139  Pa,  St.  Ill,  21  Atl.  147  (a  leading  case).  And  see  Buck- 
ingham v.  Plymouth  Water  Co.,  142  Pa,  St.  221,  21  Atl.  824.  But  befouling 
waters  is  distinctly  a  nuisance.  Post,  p.  757.  Again,  an  overflow  of  water 
from  defendant's  to  plaintiff's  land  may  be  actionable  as  negligence.  Clarke 
V.  Anderson,  14  Daly,  464  (see,  also,  Meister  v.  Lang^  28  111.  App.  624);  or 
as  trespass,  or  as  nuisance.    Post,  p.  760,  note  39. 


Ch.    11]  DEFINITION.  747 

Distinguished  from  Negligence. 

Nuisance  and  trespass,  however,  are  alike  in  having  ordinarily  no 
reference  to  want  of  care,  notice,  or  other  mental  condition.^"  A 
nuisance,  moreover,  is,  properly  speaking,  something  which  works 
har-m  while  in  integro;  that  is,  in  the  condition  in  which  the  defend- 
ant has  put  or  left  it.  A  reservoir  or  boiler,  not  being  in  itself  a 
nuisance,  does  not  become  so  by  bursting.^"  A  nuisance,  again,  is, 
in  its  commonest  form,  an  annoyance  to  the  person  or  property,  as 
by  bad  smells,  unpleasant  noises,  offensive  sights,  disagreeable 
vapors.  Negligence  and  breach  of  duty  to  insure  safety  have  no 
reference  to  such  matters.  But,  for  example,  a  thing  dangerous 
may  be  regarded  from  the  point  of  view  of  nuisance,  negligence,  or 
breach  of  duty  to  insure  safety.^' 

Damnum  Absque  Injuria. 

But  it  is  especially  difficult  to  distinguish  between  cases  of  nui- 
sance and  cases  resembling  nuisance,  but  to  which  the  law  applies 
the  principle  damnum  absque  injuria,  as  in  instances  of  damages 
incident  to  authorized  act,  previously  considered.  In  this  construct- 
ive labor,  the  courts  have  had  to  reconcile  the  inconsistent  rights 
of  one  person  to  carefully  use  his  own  property  for  lawful  purposes, 
and  of  other  persons  to  enjoy  their  lives,  families,  and  property 

15  Upjohn  V.  Board,  46  Mich.  542,  9  N.  W.  845;  Caimeross  v.  Village  of 
I'ewaukee,  86  Wis.  181,  56  N.  W.  648;  Lamming  v.  Galusha,  135  N.  Y.  239, 
31  N.  E.  1024.  The  use  of  ordinary  skill  and  caution  in  the  construction  of 
work  (as  diraining  surface  water)  will  not  protect  from  liability,  if  there 
has  been  a  failure  to  provide  against  any  damage  which  might  have  been  fore- 
seen. Staton  V.  Norfolk  &  C.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  278,  10  S.  E.  181.  Cf.  Gulf,  C. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Steele  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  926.  Contributory  negli- 
gence is  ordinarily  no  defense  to  a  nuisance.  Philadelplila  &  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Smith,  12  C.  C.  A.  384,  64  Fed.  679.  Cf.  Willis  v.  City  of  Perry  (Iowa)  60 
N.   W.  727. 

10  Ball,  Lead.  Cas.  322. 

17  Cumberland  Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co.  v.  United  Electric  Ry.  Co.,  42 
Fed.  273-281.  The  opinion  of  Brown,  J.,  in  this  case  is  eminently  clear  and 
able.  Van  Norden  v.  Robinson,  45  Hun,  567.  As  to  contributory  negligence 
as  a  defense  to  nuisance,  see  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Baltimore  v.  Maniott,  66  Am. 
Dec.  326.  Cf.  Simmons  v.  Everson,  124  N.  Y.  319,  26  N.  E.  911,  with  Han- 
nem  v.  Pence,  40  Minn.  127,  41  N.  W.  657.  And  see  Laflin  &  R.  P.  Co.  v. 
Tearaey,  131  111.  322,  23  N.  E.  389;  Keiser  v.  Gas  Co.,  143  Pa.  St.  276,  22  Atl. 
759. 


748  NUISANCE.  [Ch.  11 

without  damaging  interference.  They  have  been  called  upon  to 
adjust  abstract  right  with  demands  of  expediency  in  connection 
with  the  conditions  of  modern  business.  That  the  tendency  is  to  be 
guided  by  considerations  of  convenience  and  utility,  and  that  the 
line  of  demarcation  between  what  is  and  what  is  not  nuisance  is 
often  indistinct,  are  natural  results.  Accordingly,  courts  continu- 
ally refer  questions  of  nuisance  to  a  jury  for  determination  as  a 
matter  of  fact." 

RIGHTS  INVADED. 

233.  The  legal  rights  with  w^hich  a  nuisance  interferes  may 
confcern — 

(a)  Property, 

(1)  Corporeal,  or 
(S)  Incorporeal;  or 

(b)  Personal  enjoyment  of  health  and  comfort. 

Injury  to  Corporeal  Property. 

There  is  a  distinction,  it  was  held  in  the  leading  case  of  St.  Helen's 
Smelting  Co.  v.  Tipping,^*  between  an  action  for  a  nuisance  in  re- 
spect to  an  action  producing  a  material  injury  to  the  property,  and 
one  in  respect  to  an  action  producing  personal  discomfort.  As 
to  the  latter,  a  person  must,  in  the  interest  of  the  public  generally, 
submit  to  the  discomfort  of  the  circumstances  of  the  place  and 
trades  carried  on  around  him.  As  to  the  former,  the  same  rule 
would  not  apply.  ^^  The  nuisance  may  be  to  corporeal  heredita- 
ments. Thus,  if  one  erects  a  smelting  house  so  near  the  house  of 
another  that  the  rapor  and  smoke  kill  his  corn  and  grass,  and  dam- 
age his  cattle  "^  or  injure  his  trees,"  this  is  a  nuisance.     "So,  also, 

18  Lake  v.  Milliken,  16  Am.  Rep.  456;  King  v.  Thompson,  30  Am.  Rep.  364; 
Ayer  v.  City  of  Norwicli,  12  Am.  Rep.  396;  Fosliay  v.  Town  of  Glen  Haven, 
3  Am.  Rep.  T3. 

IS  11  H.  L.  Cas.  642  (1865). 

20  Lord  Westbury  in  St.  Helen's  Smelting  Co.  v.  Tipping,  11  H.  L.  Cas. 
642. 

21  By  lead  smelting  works,  Hale,  Fitzh.  Nat  Brev.  184,  quoted  in  3  Bl. 
Oomm.  p.  218;  People  v.  Detroit  White  Lead  Works,  82  Mich.  471,  46  N.  W. 
735.    , 

22  By  copper  smelting  works,  St  Helen's  Smelting  Works  v.  TippinR,  su- 


Ch.    11]  RIGHTS    INVADED.  749 

if  my  neighbor  ouf^ht  to  scour  a  ditch,  and  does  not,  whereby  my 
land  is  overflowed,  this  is  an  actionable  nuisance."  ^^  Overhanging 
eaves,  from  which  water  flows  on  another's  premises,  constitute  a 
nuisance.^^  Corrupting  the  air  with  ofliensive  smells,^^  or  disturb- 
ing the  adjoining  property  with  distressing  noises  on  adjoining 
premise,  may  constitute  a  nuisance.^^  By  way  of  contrast,  an  occu- 
pant of  land  is  under  no  duty  to  his  neighbor  to  cut  thistles  natural- 
ly growing  on  his  own. land,  to  prevent  them  from  seeding;  and  if, 
because  he  neglects  to  cut  them,  seeds  are  blown,  on  his  neighbor's 
land,  to  the  tatter's  damage,  there  is  no  liability.^' 

Incorporeal  Property — Injury  to  Easement  of  Light  and  Air. 

A  nuisance  may  affect  incorporeal  hereditaments.  There  is  no 
right,  ex  jure  naturse,  to  the  free  passage  of  light  and  air  to  a  house 
or  building.  Light  and  air  are  not  subjects  of  property,  beyond  the 
moment  of  actual  occupancy.^  °  At  common  law,  when  windows  had 
subsisted  at  a  particular  place  for  a  long  time,  they  were  said  to  be 
ancient;  and,  if  the  adjoining  landowner  constructed  a  building  so 
as  to  interfere  with  such  ancient  lights,  his  wrong  fell  short  of  a 

pra,  note  20.  Noxious  gases  from  burning  brick,  Bamf ord  v.  Turnley,  3  Best  & 
B.  62-6C;  Fogarty  v.  Junction  Citj-  Pressed-Brick  Co.,  00  Kan.  478,  31  Pac. 
1052;  Harley  v.  Jlerrill  Brick  Co.,  S3  Iowa,  73,  48  N.  W.  1000.  And  see 
Campbell  v.  Seaman,  63  N.  Y.  568;  Demarest  v.  Hardham,  34  N.  J.  Eq.  469; 
Pennoyer  v.  Allen,  56  Wis.  502,  14  N.  W.  609;  Bolian  v.  Port  Jervis  Gas- 
Light  Co.,  122  N.  Y.  18,  25  N.  E.  246. 

23  Hale,  Fitzh.  Nat.  Brev.  183,  note  a.  And  see  3  Bl.  Comm.  §  218;  post,  p. 
754,  note  48. 

24  Fitzh.  Nat.  Brev.  184;  Battishill  v.  Reed,  18  O.  B.  696;  Hazeltine  v.  Edg- 
mand  (Kan.  Sup.)  10  Pac.  544;  Gould  v.  McKenna,  27  Am.  Rep.  705. 

25  3  Bl.  Comm.  217;  Smiths  v.  McConathy,  11  Mo.  517. 

2  8  Fish  V.  Dodge,  4  Denio,  311;  Spaihawk  v.  Union  Passenger  Ry.  Co.,  54 
Pa.  St.  401.  As  a  dog  howling  by  uisht.  Street  v.  Gugell,  Selw.  N.  P.  (13th 
Ed.)  1090;  Brill  v.  Flagler,  23  AA'end.  354.  A  review  of  the  English  authori- 
ties as  to  nuisance  to  dwelling  house,  especially  as  to  the  measure  of  an- 
noyance which  may  be  inflicted  without  damage,  will  be  found  reviewed  in 
53  J.  P.  817. 

2T  Giles  V.  Walker,  24  Q.  B.  Div.  656. 

2  8  Guest  V.  Reynolds,  68  111.  478,  Chase,  Lead.  Gas.  1.  And  see  Yates  v. 
Jack,  1  Ch.  App.  295. 


750  NUISANCE.  [Ch.    1 1 

trespass,  for  there  was  no  violatioii  of  another's  possession  or  lands. 
The  injury  was  recognized  as  a  nuisance. "'  But  the  rule  was  other- 
wise as  to  air.  In  America,  however,  the  doctrine  of  easement  of 
light  and  air  over  the  land  of  another  has  not  been  generally  ac- 
cepted as  arising  by  prescription,'"  although  the  easement  may  be 
created  by  grant.'^  Accordingly,  interference  with  another's  light 
and  air  does  not  ordinarily  constitute  a  nuisance.  "Depriving  one 
■  of  a  mere  pleasure,  as  of  a  fine  prospect,  by  building  a  wall  or  the 

2!>  Aldred's  Case,  9  Coke,  58.  Extent  of  right  will  be  found  accurately- 
stated  by  James,  I-.  J.,  in  Kellr  v.  Pearson,  6  Ch.  App.  809-811.  Et  vide  Par- 
ker V.  Smith,  5  Car.  &  P.  4.S8;  Wells  v.  Ody,  7  Car.  &  P.  410;  Dent  v.  Auc- 
tion Mai-t  Co.,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  238.  Extent  of  obstruction  is  always  a  question  of 
fact,  which  depends  upon  the  evidence  in  each  ease.  The  fact  that  an  obstruc- 
tion leaves  45  degrees  unobstructed  may  be  evidence  showing  no  occasion 
for  interference  by  court.  Compare  Parker  v.  First  Ave.  Hotel  Co.,  24  Ch. 
Div.  282,  with  City  of  London  Brewery  Co.  v.  Tennant,  9  Oh.  App.  212. 
Generally,  as  to  acquisition  and  obstruction,  see  Tapling  v.  Jones,  11  H.  I.. 
Cas.  290;  Arcedeckne  v.  Kelk,  2  GifC.  683;  Staight  v.  Burn,  5  Ch.  App.  163. 
An  article  on  the  obstruction  of  ancient  lights,  with  a  review  of  the  recent 
cases  In  relation  thereto,  J.  P.,  republished  in  29  Ir.  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  755-757. 
See,  however,  as  to  wind  for  windmill.  Webb  v.  Bird,  13  C.  B.  (N.  S.) 
841;  air  for  chimneys,  Bryant  v.  Lefever,  4  C.  P.  Div.  172.  A  short  review 
of  the  variety  of  questions  arising  as  to  the  obstruction  of  lights,  especially 
when  premises  are  rebuilt  and  in  an  altered  foi-m,  will  be  found  in  58  J.  P. 
049. 

3  0  Mullen  v.  Strieker,  19  Ohio  St.  135;  Mahan  v.  Brown,  13  Wend.  261; 
Parker  v.  Foote,  19  Wend.  309;  Haverstick  v.  Sipe,  33  I'a.  St.  368;  Pierre  v. 
Femald,  26  Me.  436;  Randall  v.  Sanderson,  111  Mass.  114;  Jenks  v.  Williams, 
115  Mass.  217;  Ward  v.  Neal,  37  Ala.  500;  Hubbard  v.  Town,  33  Vt.  295; 
Keiper  v.  Klein,  51  Ind.  316;  Ttirner  v.  Thompson.  58  Ga.  268;  Cherry  v. 
Stein,  11  Md.  1;  Powell  v.  Sims,  5  W.  Va.  1.  See  note  to  Story  v.  Odin,  7 
Am.  Dec.  46-49;  Knabe  v.  Levelle  (Super.  N.  Y.)  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  818.  Au- 
thorities on  the  easements  of  light  and  air  will  be  found  collected  in  Keating 
V.  Springer,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  175-184  (146  111.  481,  34  N.  E.  805).  See  Llndsey 
V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  20  S.  E.  621;  Knabe  v.  Levelle  (Super.  N.  Y.)  23  N.  Y. 
Supp.  818;  Levy  v.  Samuel  (Super.  N.  Y.)  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  825;  Western  Granite 
&  Marble  Co.  v.. Knickerbocker,  103  Cal.  Ill,  37  Pac.  192.  Nor  will  such  ease- 
ment be  applied  as  to  land  of  lessor  by  the  lease  of  a  building  to  be  used  for 
a  purpose  requiring  light,  such  as  marble  cutting.  Keating  v.  Springer,  146 
lU.  481,  34  N.  E.  805. 

31  Keats  V.  Hugo,  115  Mass.  204.  The  grant  may  be  expressed  or  Implied. 
Compton  V.  Richards,  1  Price,  27. 


Ch.    11]  EIGHTS    INVADED.  751 

like,  as  it  abridges  nothing  really  convenient  or  necessary,  is  no  in- 
jury to  the  sufferer,  and  is,  therefore,  not  an  actionable  nuisance."  -'- 
Same — Support . 

At  common  law,  depriving  a  neighbor  of  the  subadjacent  or  ad- 
jacent support  necessary  to  sustain  his  land  in  its  natural  and  unin- 
cumbered state,  by  use  of  one's  own  land  to  the  neighbor's  damage, 
was  an  actionable  wrong.'^  The  right  of  lateral  support  existed 
only  in  favor  of  land  unweighted  by  buildings;  and  no  action  lay 
without  proof  of  appreciable  damages.^*  Liability  under  such  cir- 
cumstances depends  on  the  negligence  of  the  defendant  in  removing 
adjacent  soil.  If  the  weight  of  buildings  prevented  his  making  the 
excavation,  carefully,  without  damage,  there  is  no  liability.^ '^  There 
is,  it  is  insisted,^"  no  such  thing  us  an  absolute  right  to  support, 
but  there  is  a  qualified  right  entitling  every  man  to  have  his  soil 

3  2  Aldi-ed's  Case,  9  Coke,  58,  referred  to  in  3  Bl.  Coiiuii.  §  217.  Nor  Is  ob- 
structing view  of  hotel  from  depot,  diverting  travel,  actionable.  Stufflebeani 
V.  Montgomery,  2  Idaho,  763,  20  Pac.  125.  Bt  vide  Hay  v.  AA'eber,  79  Wis. 
587,  48  N.  W.  859. 

3  3  Humphries  v.  Bru^den,  12  Q.  B.  7;!9;  Bouomi  v.  Baelchouse,  28  Law  J. 
Q.  B.  378;  Farrand  v.  MarshaU,  19  Barb.  380,  21  Barb.  409;  Lasala  v.  Hol- 
brook,  4  Paige,  169;  McGuire  v.  Grant,  25  N.  .1.  Law,  356;  Richai-dson  v. 
Vermont  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  25  Vt.  4G5;  Stimmel  v.  Brown,  7  Houst.  (Del.)  219, 
30  Atl.  996;  Shrieve  v.  Stokes,  8  B.  Mon.  453;  Jloody  v.  Mc(nelland,  3!) 
Ala.  45;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Bonhayo,  94  Ky.  07,  21  S.  W.  526;  Curr 
V.  Hundley,  3  Colo.  App.  54,  31  Pac.  939;  Pai'ke  v.  City  of  Seattle,  5  Wash. 
1,  31  Pac.  310,  and  32  Pac.  82;  Stearns'  Ex'r  v.  City  of  Richmond,  88  Va. 
•992,  14  S.  E.  847.  As  to  measure  of  damages,  see  McGettigan  v.  Potts,  149 
Pa.  St  155,  24  Atl.  19S;  Ulrick  v.  Dakota  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  (S.  D.)  51  N.  W. 
1023;    Conboy  v.  Dickinson,  92  Cal.  600,  28  Pac.  809. 

34  Smith  V.  Thackerah,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  564;  Wyatt  v.  HaiTison,  3  Barn.  & 
Adol.  871;  Thurston  v.  Hancock,  12  Mass.  220;  Chase,  Lead.  Cas.  Torts,  2:',; 
Stone  V.  Hunt,  94  Mo.  475,  7  S.  W.  431. 

s 5  As  to  negligence  in  excavating  without  notice,  see  Schultz  v.  Byers,  53  N. 
J.  Law,  442,  32  Atl.  514;  City  of  Covington  y.  Gt-ylor  (Ky.)  19  S.  W.  741;  Ul- 
rick V.  Dakota  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  (S.  D.)  49  N.  W.  1054;  First  Nat.  Bank  of 
San  Francisco  v.  ViUegra,  i)2  Cal.  600,  28  Pac.  97;  Conboy  v.  Dickinson,  92 
Cal  600  28  Pac.  809.  Generally,  as  to  the  duty  of  owner  in  making  excava- 
tion, see'  editorial  note,  Schultz  \'.  Byers,  1:!  Lawy.  Rep.  Ann.  569.  Et  vide 
Stone  V.  Hunt,  94  Mo.  475,  7  S.  W.  4:n;  Louisville  &  X.  R.  Co.  v.  Bonhayo,  M 
Ky.  67,  21  S.  W.  526;    Moellering  v.  Evans,  121  Ind.  19.5,  22  N.  B.  989. 

3  8  Ante,  c  1. 


75i2  NUISANCE.  [Ch.  11 

left  intact,  that  no  removal  of  the  adjoining  soil  can  be  made  so  as 
to  disturb  the  integrity  of  the  soil  of  others.^'  It  is,  however,  abso- 
lute in  the  sense  that  negligence  in  the  removal  of  the  support  need 
not  be  shown.3* 

On  the  other  hand,  buildings  are  not  deprived  of  this  qualified 
right  to  support  unless  they  sensibly  increase  the  pressure  on  the 
lands.  This  is  a  logical  application  of  the  requirement  of  the  con- 
nection as  cause.  Where  the  structures  do  not  contribute  to  the 
injury,  there  is  no  reason  why  they  should  affect  the  plaintiff's  right 
to  recover.'"  But  the  right  to  support  of  land  weighted  by  buildings 
may  be  acquired  by  grant  and  modeled  by  statute.*"  A  grant  may 
be  implied,  as  well  as  express,  as  in  Rigby  v.  Bennett,*^  where  a 
man  granted  part  of  his  land  for  a  building.  In  England,  such  right 
to  support  of  land  may  also  be  acquired  by  prescription.*^  The 
soundness  of  this  doctrine  has  been  strenuously  denied,*'  and  it 
would  seem  that  the  better  opinion  is  that  the  erection  of  a  building 

37  Wood.  Nuis.  §  172. 

38  Nichols  V.  City  of  Duluth,  40  Minn.  389,  42  N.  W.  84;  Schultz  v.  Bowei 
(Minn.)  59  N.  W.  631.  Compare  City  of  Covington  v.  Geylor  (Ky.)  19  S.  W. 
741;  Schultz  v.  Byers,  53  N.  J.  Law,  442,  22  Atl.  514.  As  to  malice  as  an  ele- 
ment, see  Conboy  v.  Dickinson,  92  Cal.  600,  28  Pac.  809.  But  the  right  of  an 
owner  of  a  building  to  take  down  or  change  any  foundation,  wall  or  other  part 
thereof,  without  being  answerable  for  the  consequent  injury  to  his  neighbor's 
building,  attached  thereto,  is  subject  to  the  qualification  that  he  will  be  liable 
in  damages  if  the  injury  to  his  neighbor  is  occasioned  by  the  negligent  manner 
in  which  the  work  is  performed.  Leavenworth  Lodge  No.  2  v.  Byers,  54  Kan. 
323,  38  Pac.  261. 

3  9  Wood,  Nuis.  §§  177,  178,  collecting  cases;  Victor  Min.  Co.  v.  Morning  Star 
Min.  Co.,  50  Mo.  App.  525. 

io  Sullivan  v.  Zeiner,  98  Cal.  346,  33  Pac.  209;  Jencks  v.  Kenny  (Super.  N. 
Y.)  19  N.  T.  Supp.  243. 

41  21  Ch.  Div.  559.  When  the  owner  of  land  sells  a  part  thereof,  he  im- 
pliedly grants  to  the  grantee  all  those  apparent  easements  which  are  necessary 
for  the  reasonable  use  of  the  part  granted,  and  which  are,  at  the  time  of  the 
grant,  used  by  the  owner  of  the  entirety,  for  the  benefit  of  the  part  granted. 
Lampman  v.  MiUis,  21  N.  Y.  505.  As  to  party  walls,  see  Heartt  v.  Kruger, 
121  N.  Y.  388,  24  N.  E.  841;  Rogers  v.  Sinsheimer,  50  N.  Y.  646;  Briggs  v. 
Klosse,  5  Ind.  App.  129,  31  N.  E.  208. 

42  Dalton  V.  Angus,  L.  R.  6  App.  Cas.  740;  Lemaitre  v.  Davis,  19  Ch.  Div. 
281.     But  see  Solomon  v.  Master,  etc.,  of  Vintners'  Co.,  4  Hurl.  &  N.  585. 

*3  Wood,  Nuis.  §  200. 


Ch.    11]  RIGHTS    INVADKD.  753 

wholly  on  one's  own  land  is  not  the  basis. of  a  prescriptive  right  to 
have  it  supported  by  the  soil  of  the  adjacent  owner,  since  no  injury 
is  inflicted  on  the  latter,  on  which  he  could  base  an  action  to  secure 
the  removal  of  the  building.** 

As  to  subjacent  support,  the  rule  is,  where  one  possesses  the  sur- 
face and  another  the  subsoil,  the  former  has  a  right  to  such  support 
from  the  lower  strata  as  will  suffice  to  maintain  the  surface  in  its 
natural  state,  i.  e.  unburdened  by  buildings;  and  the  owner  of  the 
surface  may  not  dig  into  the  subsoil  beyond  what  is  necessary  for 
the  cultivation  of  the  land  or  its  proper  enjoyments.*^  The  natural 
rights  of  the  parties  may,  however,  be  varied  by  contract  or  by  cus- 
tom.*" 

Same — Interference  with  Water  Rights. 

Every  proprietor  has  a  right  to  the  continued  flow  of  a  natural 
stream  running  thro.ugh  his  land,  and  to  the  use  of  its  water  to  a 
reasonable  extent.  He  may  not  accumulate  it  so  as  to  overflow 
lands  above  him,  nor  seriously  lessen  the  quantity  of  water  which 
would  naturally  descend,  or  defile  it  so  as  to  render  it  unfit  for  use.*' 
What  is  reasonable  use  of  running  water  is  a  question  for  the  jury. 

**  Sullivan  v.  Zeiner,  98  Cal.  346,  33  Pac.  209;  Handlam  v.  ilcManus,  42  Mo. 
App.  551. 

4  5  Ball,  Torts,  43;  Humpliries  v.  Brogden,  12  Q.  B.  739;  Cox  v.  Glue,  .5  0.  B. 
533;  Harris  v.  Rydlng,  5  Mees.  &  W.  60;  Wilms  v.  Jess,  94  lU.  464,  4ijo  (per 
Scholfield,  J.,  collecting  cases);  Marvin  v.  Brewster  Iron  Miu.  Co.,  .'5  N.  Y.  .^38; 
Coleman  v.  Obadwick,  80  Pa.  St.  81;  Yandes  v.  Wright,  66  Ind.  319;  Wakefield 
V.  Duke  of  Buccleuch,  L.  K.  4  Eq.  Cas.  624,  L.  R.  4  H.  L.  377;  HartweU  v. 
Camman.  10  N.  J.  Eq.  128;  Stewart  v.  Chadwiek,  8  Iowa,  463;  Caldwell  v. 
Copeland.  37  Pa.  St.  427. 

40  Hilton  V.  Granville,  5  Q.  B.  701.  But  see  Harris  v.  Ryding,  5  Mees.  &-. 
W.  60. 

4  7  Ball,  Torts,  43.  A  review  of  recent  decisions  as  to  the  law  of  easements 
in  running  waters,  J.  P.,  reprinted  in  28  Ir.  Law  T.  448.  Wood,  Nuis.  c.  8 
(nuisance  relating  to  water,  especially,  §§  345,  349,  356).  The  right  of  the  pro- 
prietor of  the  land  is  not  measured  by  the  demands  of  his  business.  "The 
necessities  of  one  man's  business  cannot  be  the  standard  of  another's  rights 
in  a  thing  which  belongs  to  both."  Per  Black,  J.,  in  Wheatley  v.  Chrisman, 
24  Pa.  St.  298,  302;  MarshaU  v.  Peters,  12  How.  Prac.  (N.  Y.)  218;  Black, 
Pom;  Water  Rights;  Middleton  v.  Pritchard,  3  Scam.  (111.)  510;  City  of  Chicago 
v.Xaflin,  49  HI.  172;  3  Kent,  Comm.  427;  2  Hil.  Real  Prop.  02;  Ang.  Water 
Courses,  §  5. 

,  .      '  >  LA-tVi  flF  T0RT8->-48 


754  NUISANCE.  [CJh.   11 

Thus,  the  erection  and  maintenance  of  a  dam,  flooding  the  land 
above,  is  a  nuisance,  rendering  the  wrongdoer  liable  in  nuisance  for 
damages  to  all  persons  whose  lands  are  flooded.**  An  obstructira 
of  a  stream  may  give  a  cause  of  action  for  damages;  as  where  a 
railroad  company,  by  blasting,  created  a  fill  or  bar  in  a  stream,  in- 
juring a  mill.*'  As  to  what  constitutes  use  to  a  reasonable  extent, 
the  authorities  are  not  agreed.  OMinary  use  of  water  ad  lavan- 
dum  et  potandum  for  domestic  purposes  and  for  cattle  is  a  reasonable 
use,  but  the  question  is  largely  for  the  jury.'^"    A  riparian  owner  may, 

*«  Bute  T.  Ibrie,  1  Rawle,  218;  Strout  v.  Millbridge,  45  Me.  76;  Wheatley  v. 
Ghrisman,  24  Pa.  St.  298;  Payne  v.  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R.  Co.,  112  Mo. 
G,  20  S.  W.  322;  Knight  v.  Albemarle  &  K.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  O.  80,  15  S.  E.  929; 
Wallace  v.  Columbia  &  G.  K.  Co.,  37  S.  C.  335,  16  S.  E.  35.  But  the  erection 
of  the  frame  of  a  miUdam,  which,  when  completed,  will  pond  the  water  back, 
and  tliereby  create  a  nuisance,  does  not  itself  constitute  a  nuisance.  State  v. 
Suttle,  115  N.  C.  784,  20  S.  E.  725;  Stout  v.  McAdaras,  3  111.  67;  Brown  v. 
Bowen,  30  N.  Y.  519.  Et  vide  Ellis  v.  Clemens,  21  Ont.  227;  Hartshorn  v. 
Chaddock,  135  N.  Y.  116,  31  N.  E.  997;  Krug  v.  St.  Mary's  Borough,  152  Pa. 
St.  30,  25  Atl.  161;  Paine  Lumber  Co.  y.  U.  S.,  55  Fed.  834;  Dunman  v.  Gulf, 
C.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  304.  The  wrong  may  also  be  re- 
garded as  a  trespass.  McKee  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  125  N.  Y.  353, 
26  N.  E.  303,  affirming  (Sup.)  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  753;  Wharton  v.  Stevens,  84  Iowa", 
107,  50  N.  W.  562;  Glass  v.  Fritz,  148  Pa.  St.  324,  23  Atl.  1050;  Barden  v.  City 
of  Portage,  79  Wis.  126,  48  N.  W.  210;  McKee  v.  President,  etc.,  of  Delaware 
&  H.  Canal  Co.,  125  N.  Y.  353,  26  N.  E.  303;  McGee  v.  Pox,  107  N.  C.  768,  12 
S.  E.  369;  ante,  p.  74<J,  note  23;  Irwin  v.  Janesville  Cotton  Mills,  88  Wis.  429, 
60  N.  W.  786;    Clement  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Wood,  162  Mass.  173,  38  N.  E.  444. 

49  Watts  V.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.,  39  W.  Va.  196,  19  S.  E.  521.  As  to  ob- 
struction of  water  course  by  railroad  embankment,  see  Ohio,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v. 
ThiUman,  43  111.  127.  As  to  obstruction  by  booms,  see  Stevens  Point  Boom 
Co.  V.  Reilly,  46  Wis.  237,  49  N.  W.  978.  By  a  city  in  constructing  a  smaU 
sewer,  see  Orchard  Place  Land  Co.  v.  Brady,  53  Kan.  420,  36  Pac.  728.  As  to 
injunction  to  restrain  obstruction  of  water  com-se,  see  Spargur  v.  Heard,  90 
Cal.  221,  27  Pac.  198;  Kerr  v.  West  Shore  R.  Co.,  127  N.  Y.  269,  27  N.  E.  833. 
Further,  as  to  obstruction,  see  Ferris  v.  Wellborn,  64  Miss.  29,  8  South.  165; 
Kankakee  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Horan,  131  111.  288,  23  N.  E.  621;  Mississippi  &  T. 
R.  Co.  V.  Archibald,  67  Miss.  38,  7  South.  213.  As  to  action  to  restrain  ob- 
struction, see  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Long,  46  Kan.  701,  27  Pac.  182; 
Hoyt  V.  Cline  (Sup.)  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  337.  Compare  Jolliffe  v. .  Chesapeake  & 
O.  R.  Co.  (Va.)  20  S.  E.  781,  with  Fleming  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  Co.,  115 
N.  C.  676,  20  S.  E.  714. 

60  Washb.  Easem.  213,  220;  Wadsworth  v.  TiUotson,  15  Conn.  369;  Wood, 
Nuis.  §  356. 


Oh.    11]  RIGHTS    INVADED.  755 

without  regard  to  the  necessity  of  the  lower  owner,  take  water  from  a 
stream,  even  to  the  exhaustion  of  the  whole  supply;  "  but  this  prop- 
o'  ;tion  has  been  doubted."^  "Indeed,"  said  Mr.  Wood,  "he  may  use 
it  for  any  ordinary  purpose  of  life,  but  his  use  must  be  such  as  not 
to  interfere  measurably  with  the  rights  of  those  above  or  below 
him  on  the  stream."  ^^  Tlie  use  of  water  for  any  purpose  not  do- 
mestic, such  as  irrigation  or  manufacturing,  sensibly  diminishing  the 
volume  of  the  stream,  is  a  nuisance.^*  Use  of  water  from  a  running 
stream  by  a  railroad  company,  although  essential  to  the  operation 
of  its  road,  is  not  a  domestic  use,  and  damages  may  be  recovered 
for  such  diversion,  so  far  as  they  actually  concern  the  employment 
of  the  land,  but  not  for  an  unused  water  power.""  The  owner  of 
the  fee  abutting  on  a  running  stream  is  entitled  to  take  ice  there- 
from, if  the  taking  does  not  interfere  with  navigation,  or  with  the 
use  of  the  water  for  hydraulic  or  other  rightful  purposes."  Diver- 
sion of  water  may  be  a  wrong  "  which  may  be  restrained,"^  and  be 

01  Clerk  &  li.  Torts,  294;  Lord  Kingsclowu  in  Miner  v.  Gilmour,  12  Moore, 
P.  C.  131-156. 

02  Lord  Norbui-y  v.  Kitcliin,  9  Jur.  (N.  S.)  132. 
0  3  Wood,  Nuis.  §  345. 

B4  Directors,  etc.,  of  Swindon  Waterworks  Co.  v.  Proprietors  of  Wilts  & 
B.  Canal-Nav.  Co.,  L.  R.  T  H.  L.  697.  But  the  diversion  of  small  quantites 
of  water  for  irrigating,  when  water  was  more  than  sufficient  for  use  of  mill, 
which  water  was  retui-ned  into  the  stream  above  the  mill,  except  the  inap- 
preciable quantity  absorbed,  it  was  held  not  such  an  unreasonable  use  of 
water  as  was  prohibited  by  law.  Embrey  v.  Owen,  6  Exch.  353.  And  see 
Washb.  Easem.  c.  3,  §  2. 

0  5  Clark  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  145  Pa.  St.  438,  22  Atl.  989.  Et  vide  At- 
torney General  v.  Great  Eastern  R.  Co.,  18  Wkly.  Rep.  1187.  A  railroad  com- 
pany is  liable  for  total  diversion  of  a  water  course  in  the  construction  of  its 
road.     Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Long,  46  Kan.  701,  27  Pac.  182. 

5  6  Edgerton  v.  Huff,  26  Ind.  35.  As  to  rights  of  riparian  proprietors  to  ice 
la  streams,  see  51  Law  T.  23.  Brown  v.  Cunningham,  82  Iowa,  512, 
48  N.  AV.  1042;  Marsh  v.  McNider,  88  Iowa,  390,  55  N.  W.  469;  Concord 
Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Robertson  (N.  H.)  25  Atl.  718;  Howe  v.  Andrews,  62  Conn. 
398,  26  Atl.  394;  Sowlos  v.  Moore,  65  Vt.  322,  26  Atl.  629;  Allen  v.  Weber, 
80  Wis.  531,  50  N.  W.  514. 

oT  Webb  V.  Portland  Manuf'g  Co.,  3  Sumn.  1S9,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  17,322;  Kim- 
berly  «&  Clark  Co.  v.  Hewitt,  79  Wis.  334,  48  N.  W.  373;  Blanchard  v.  Baker, 
8  Me.  253. 

08  Mo1:t  v.  Ewing,  90  Cal.  231,  27  Pac.  194;  Conkling  v.  Pacific  Imp.  Co., 
87  Cal.  296,  25  Pac.  399. 


756  KUiSANt]-:.  [Ch.  11 

the  basis  of  an  action  for  damages.^"  Diversion  of  water  for  pur- 
poses of  irrigation  and  mining  in  Western  states  depends  largely 
upon  statutory  regulations,  especially  as  to  prior  appropriation. °'> 
Substantial  pollution  of  a  stream  by  discharging  foul  matter  into 
it  may  be  a  nuisance."^  "Care  must  be  taken  to  distinguish  be- 
tween the  natural  and  necessary  development  of  land  itself,  and  in- 
jury resulting  from  the  character  of  some  business  not  incident  and 
necessary  to  the  development  of  the  land  or  other  substances  lying 
within  it.  The  owner  of  the  land  has  the  right  to  develop  it  by 
digging  for  coal,  iron,  gas,  oil,  or  other  minerals ;  and  if,  in  progress 
of  these  developments,  an  injury  occurs  to  the  owner  of  adjoining 
lands,  without  fault  or  negligence  on  his  part,  an  action  for  such 
injury  cannot  be  maintained.  If  this  were  not  so,  a  man  might  be 
utterly  deprived  of  the  use  of  his  property."     It  is  not  so  where  the 

6  9  Vaa  Bibber  v.  Hilton,  84  Cal.  5S5,  2i  Pac.  308,  598;  Fleming  v  Raili-oad 
Co.,  115  N.  C.  676,  20  S.  E.  714;  New  York  Rubber  Co.  v.  Rothery,  57  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  590,  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  872;  Williams  v.  Fulmer,  151  Pa.  St.  405,  25  Atl. 
103,  affirming  122  Pa.  St.  191,  15  Atl.  726. 

80  McGee  Irrigating  Ditcb  Co.  v.  Hudson  (Tex.  Sup.)  22  S.  W.  967;  Bar- 
rows v.  Fox  (Cal.)  30  Pac.  768;  Id.,  98  Cal.  63,  32  Pac.  811;  Southern  Pac.  R. 
Co.  V.  Dufour,  95  Cal.  615,  30  Pac.  783;  Oppeulander  v.  liCft-Hand  Ditcti  Co., 
18  Colo.  142,  31  Pac.  854;  Healy  v.  Woodruff,  97  Cal.  464,  32  Pac.  528;  Conant 
v.  Jones  (Idaho)  32  Pac.  250;  Cole  v.  Logan,  24  Or.  304,  33  Pac.  568;  Salina 
Creek  Irr.  Co.  v.  Salina  Stock  Co.,  7  Utah,  456,  27  Pac.  578;  Chiatovich  v. 
Davis,  17  Nev.  133*,  28  Pac.  239;  Shotwell  v.  Dodge,  8  Wash.  337,  36  Pac. 
254;  Taylor  v.  Abbott,  103  Cal.  421,  37  Pac.  408.  Generally,  as  to  appropria- 
tion of  water  for  mining  or  irrigation,  see  Isaacs  v.  Barber  (Wash.)  38  Pac. 
871;  Wimer  v.  Simmons  (Or.)  39  Pac.  6.  As  to  diversion  from  canal  for 
water  power,  see  Green  Bay  &  il.  Canal  Co.  v.  Kankauna  Water-Power  Co. 
(Wis.)  61  N.  W.  1121. 

61  Wood  V.  And,  3  Exch.  748;  Hodgkin  v.  Ennor,  4  Best  &  S.  229.  As  to 
discharge  of  sewage  into  stream,  see  Bainard  v.  City  of  Newton,  154  Mass. 
255,  27  N.  E.  995.  As  to  liquor  distillery,  see  Price  v.  Lawson,  74  Md.  499,  22: 
Atl.  206.  See  an  interesting  article  on  ability  of  riparian  owner  to  recover 
against  one  of  several  persons  who  has  polluted  stream  above  him.  96  Law 
T.  503;  ante,  p.  213,  "Joint  Tort  Feasors."  Befouling  sti-eam  by  cattle  drop- 
pings. Barton  v.  Union  Cattle  Co.,  28  Neb.  350,  44  N.  W.  454;  dumping  refuse, 
Easton  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  52  N.  J.  Law,  267,  19  Atl.  722;  pollu- 
tion by  gas  works,  Pensacola  Gas  Co.  v.  Pebley,  25  Fla.  381,  5  South.  593  j 
Pottstown  Gas  Co.  v.  Murphy,  39  Pa.  St.  257;  Laing  v.  Whaley,  3  Hurl.  &  N^ 
675. 


€h.    11 J  RIGHTS    INVADED.  757 

injury  is  caused  by  the  prosecution  of  a  business  which  has  no  nec- 
essary relation  to  the  land  itself,  and  is  not  necessary  to  its  devel- 
opment. It  was  accordingly  held  that  where  a  pipe-line  company 
carried  oil  from  a  distance,  and  allowed  it  to  escape  and  percolate 
through  another's  land,  and  destroy  his  springs,  the  company  is  lia- 
ble in  damages."^  A  prescriptive  right  to  use  a  stream  in  a  man- 
ner amounting  to  a  public  nuisance  cannot  be  acquired  so  as  to  be 
a  defense  to  an  action  by  a  private  party,  especially  injured  there- 
by, to  enjoin  the  maintenance  of  such  wrong."''  On  the  other 
hand,  where  mine  water,  with  the  impurities  it  had  absorbed  from 
the  earth  and  minerals  in  the  mines,  flowed  or  was  pumped  from 
them,  and  allowed  to  take  its  natural  course,  the  owner  of  the  mines 
was  not  liable  for  damages  produced,  because  the  flow  of  such  water 
was  the  natural  and  necessary  result  of  the  development  by  the 
owner  of  his  own  property."* 

Same — Interjerence  with  Percolating ,  Subterranean,  and  Artificial  Waters. 

It  is  not  material,  so  far  as  to  wrongs  of  befouling  water  is  con- 
cerned, whether  the  damage  is  done  to  a  defined  water  course,  or  wa- 
ter which  has  merely  percolated.*"*    Therefore,  the  pollution  of  a  well 

02  Hauck  v.  Tidewater  Pipe-Liue  Co.,  153  Pa.  St.  3CG-37.5,  26  Atl.  G44,  dis- 
tinguishing Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Lippincott,  116  Pa.  St.  472,  9  AU.  871; 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Mareliant,  11!)  Pa.  St.  541,  559,  13  Atl.  690;  Pottstown 
Gas  Co.  V.  Mui-phy,  39  Pa.  St.  1257;  Robb  v.  Carnegie,  145  Pa.  St.  324,  22  Atl. 
649;  Pennsylvania  Coal  Co.  v.  Sanderson,  113  Pa.  St.  126,  6  Atl.  453.  Et  vide 
Klnnaird  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  89  Ky.  468,  12  S.  W.  937. 

0  3  Bowen  v.  Wendt,  103  Cal.  236,  37  Pae.  149. 

04  Pennsylvania  Coal  Co.  v.  Sanderson,  113  Pa.  St.  126,  G  Atl.  453;  Id.,  102 
Pa.  St.  370,  86  Pa.  St.  401,  94  Pa.  St  302.  A  discussion  of  this  doctrine  will 
be  found  in  an  able  article  by  Mr.  J.  M.  Gesi,  on  the  "Natural  Use  of  Land," 
in  the  .January  and  February  numbers,  1894,  of  1  Am.  Law  Reg.  &  Rev.  pp.  1, 
97.  The  doctrine  of  Pennsylvania  Coal  Co.  v.  Sanderson  was  repudiated  by 
Young  V.  Bankier  Distillery  Co.  [1893]  App.  Cas.  691.  See  March  numiber,  1894, 
1  Am.  Law  Reg.  &  Rev.  254.  As  to  injury  between  owners  of  adjoining  mines, 
see  Smith  v.  Kenriek.  7  C.  B.  515;  Baird  v.  Williamson,  33  Law  J.  C.  P.  101. 
A  sanitarium  maj'  use  water  for  bathing  patients,  and  allow  it,  so  polluted, 
to  flow  into  a  strram.  and  thus  damage  an  adjoining  owner,  there  being  no 
negligeijce  or  malice.    Barnard  v.  Shirley  (Juue,  189;;;   Ind.  Sup.)  34  N.  E.  600. 

00  Womersley  v.  Church,  17  Law  T.  (X.  S.)  190;  Snow  v.  Whitehead,  27 
Ch,  Div.  588;  Ballard  v.  Tomlinson,  54  Law  J.  Ch.  454.  A  fortiori,  where  a 
city's  sewers  pollute  a  stream  going  underground,  through  seams  and  tissures 


758  NUISANCE.  [Ch.  11 

is  a  nuisance."'  But  any  person  may  appropriate  tke  whole  of  wa- 
ter percolating  through  or  under  his  land."''  On  the  other  hand, 
there  is  no  liability  on  the  part  of  the  landowner  °'  for  merely  in- 
tercepting the  percolation  of  water  into  a  well."^  There  is  differ- 
ence of  opinion  as  to  whether  such  appropriation  is  actionable  if 
it  be  malicious.'"  No  right  to  such  percolating  water  can  be  ac- 
quired by  prescription,  because  of  the  indefiniteness  of  the  right  and 
the  inability  of  the  servient  owner  to  prevent  the  user  by  which  the 
right  is  claimed  to  be  acquired.'^    But  where  the  water  is  subterra- 

in  the  limestone  bed  of  the  stream,  the  owner  of  a  farm>  -whose  waters  are 
rendered  unfit  for  use  may  recover  damages.  Good  v.  Altoona  City,  162  Pa. 
St.  493,  29  Atl.  741. 

6  6  Beatrice  Gas  Co.  v.  Thomas,  41  Neb.  662,  59  N.  W.  925.  Compare  Dillon 
V.  Acme  Oil  Co.,  49  Hun  (N.  Y.)  565,  2  N.  Y.  Supp.  289.  The  American  au- 
thorities are  not,  however,  in  harmony  on  the  point.  As  to  waters  polluted 
by  a  cemetery,  compai-e  City  of  Greencastle  v.  Hazelett,  23  Ind.  186;  Ball  v. 
Nye,  99  Mass.  582.  The  liability  may  aiise  from  negligence.  Collins  v.  Char- 
tiei-s  Val.  Gas  Co.,  131  Pa.  St.  143,  18  Atl.  1012;  Id.,  139  Pa.  St.  Ill,  21  Atl. 
147. 

67  New  River  Co.  v.  Johnson,  2  El.  &  El.  435;  Wheatley  v.  Baugh,  25  Pa. 
St.  528  (a  leading  case);  Dexter  v.  Riverside  &  O.  Mills,  61  Hun,  619,  15  N. 
Y.  Supp.  374;  Ocean  Grove  v.  Asbury  Park,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  447,  3  Atl.  168; 
Alexander  v.  U.  S.,  25  Ct.  CI.  87;  Roath  v.  DriseoU,  20  Conn.  533;  Williams 
V.  Ladew,  161  Pa.  St.  283,  29  Atl.  54;  Brain  v.  Marfell,  28  Wkly.  Rep.  130; 
Bloodgood  V.  Ayers,  108  N.  Y.  400,  15  N.  E.  433;  BufEum  v.  Harris,  5  R.  I. 
248;  Ohatfield  v.  Wilson,  18  Vt.  49;  New  Albany  R.  Co.  v.  Peterson,  14  Ind. 
112;  Frazier  v.  Brown,  12  Ohio  St.  294;  Swett  v.  Outts,  50  N.  H.  439;  Chase 
V.  Silverstone,  62  Me.  175;  Taylor  v.  Fickas,  64  Ind.  167.  But  see,  as  to  rea- 
soning on  other  point,  Bassett  v.  Salisbury  Manufg  Co.,  43  N.  H.  569. 

68  Trowbridge  v.  Brookline,  144  Mass.  139,  10  N.  E.  796.  Compare  Hougan 
V.  Milwaukee  &  St  P.  Ry.  Co.,  35  Iowa,  558. 

6  9  Acton  V.  Blundell,  12  Mees.  &  W.  324. 

7  0  30  Am.  Law  Reg.  237-251,  comparing,  as  to  this  point,  Greenleaf  v.  Fran- 
cis, 18  Pick.  (Mass.)  117;  Wheatley  v.  Baugh,  25  Pa.  St.  528;  Haldeman  v. 
Bruckhardt,  45  Pa.  St.  514;  Trustees  v.  Youmans,  50  Barb.  316;  Chesley  v. 
King,  74  Me.  164  (a  leading  case);  Redman  v.  Forman,  83  Ky.  214;  Chatfleld 
V.  Wilson,  28  Vt.  49;  Phelps  v.  Nowlen,  72  N.  Y.  39;  and  Chasemore  v.  Rich- 
ards, 7  H.  L.  Cas.  349-357,  2  Hurl.  &  N.  168. 

71  Wrightman,  J.,  in  Chasemore  v.  Richards,  supra;  Dickinson  v.  Grand 
Junction  Canal  Co.,  7  Exch.  282;  Broadbent  v.  Bamsbotham,  11  Exch.  602; 
Lybe's  Appeal,  106  Pa.  St  626;  Colrick  v.  Swinburne,  105  N.  Y.  503,  12  N. 
E.  427;  "The  Law  of  SubteiTanean  Waters,"  by  Henry  Budd,  Esq.,  in  30 
Am.  Law  Rev.  237  (and  see  references  at  page  264). 


Ch.    11]  BIGHTS    INVADED.  759 

nean,  but  follows  a  defined  course,  it  is  subject  to  the  law  governing 
running  streams  or  water  courses,  and  not  to  the  law  of  mere  perco- 
lating waters.'^  It  would  seem  that  artificial  water  above  ground  has 
been  generally  regarded  on  the  same  basis  with  underground  per- 
colating water.  A  person  from  whose  land  such  a  water  course 
flows,  though  he  may  have  no  right  to  have  the  flow  continued,  is 
entitled  to  sue,  for  a  nuisance,  any  owner  higher  up  the  stream  who 
pollutes  it  so  as  to  deprive  him  of  the  beneficial  enjoyment  of  the 
water  while  it  continues  to  flow.'''  But  an  uninterrupted  adverse 
use  of  water  of  an  artificial  aqueduct  has  been  held  to  create  a 
prescriptive  right  to  its  enjoyment.'*  Water  rights  may,  however, 
be  acquired  and  altered  by  agreement,  express"  or  implied,'^  and 
by  prescription." 

7  2  Willis  V.  City  of  Pei-ry  (Iowa)  60  N.  W.  727,  and  cases  cited;  BurrougBs 
V.  Saterlee,  67  Iowa,  396,  25  N.  W.  808;  Grand  Junction  Canal  Co.  v.  Shugar, 
6  Ch.  App.  483.  Et  vide  Hosier  v.  CaldweU,  7  Nev.  1002.  Article  In  Current 
Comment  in  Legal  Miscellany  on  "Subterranean  Waters,"  March  1,  1891,  May 
18,  1890.  The  reason  for  the  distinction  is  not  clear.  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  295. 
As  to  liability  for  befouling,  see  Woodward  v.  Aborn,  35  Me.  271;  Stainton  v. 
Woolrych,  23  Beav.  225;  Pottstown  Gas  Co.  v.  Murphy,  39  Pa.  St.  2."7;  Co- 
lumbus Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Freeland,  12  Ohio  St.  392;  Ottawa  Gas  Light  Co.  v. 
Graham,  28  111.  73. 

73  Wood  V.  Wand,  3  Exch.  748,  779;  Arkwright  v.  Gell,  5  Mees.  &  W.  203; 
Greatrex  v.  Hayward,  8  Exch.  291;  Sampson  v.  Hoddinott,  1  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  590; 
Trustee  v.  Dickinson,  9  Cush.  (Mass.)  544;  Cnrtiss  v.  Ayrault,  47  N.  Y.  73; 
Nuttall  V.  Bracewell,  L.  E.  2  Exch.  1;  Woodbury  v.  Short,  17  Vt.  387;  Wat- 
kins  V.  Peck,  13  N.  H.  360;  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  296;  Wood,  Nuis.  §  401;  ante, 
p.  753,  note  47.  Et  vide  Powell  v.  Buitler,  5  Ir.  Com.  Law,  309;  Magor  v. 
Chadwick,  11  Adol.  &  E.  584. 

74  Cole  T.  Bradbury,  86  Me.  380,  29  Atl.  1097. 

75  Horn  v.  MiUer,  136  Pa.  St.  640,  20  Atl.  70:;;  Oneto  v.  Restano,  89  Cal. 
63,  26  Pac.  788;  Smith  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  (Wis.)  50  N.  W.  497. 
Mill  and  water  privilege.  Smith  v.  Thayer  (Mass.)  28  N.  E.  1131;  reservation 
of  riparian  rights,  E.  G.  Blackslee  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  E.  G.  Blackslee's  Sons  Iron 
Works,  129  N.  Y.  155,  29  N.  E.  2. 

7  6  Where,  however,  an  owner  of  two  adjoining  farms,  on  one  of  which  a 
spring  furnished  water  for  stock  conveyed  to  the  other  by  pipes,  defendant 
sold  and  conveyed  the  latter  farm  to  plaintiff,  such  owner  may  not  interfere 
with  the  supply  of  said  spring.  Paine  v.  Chandler,  134  N.  Y.  385,  32  N.  E.  18; 
Crooker  v.  Benton,  93  Cal.  365,  28  Pac.  953;  Wood,  Xuis.  473,  note  1,  collect- 
ing cases;  ante,  p.  753,  note  47. 

7  7  Chauvet  v.  HiU,  93  Cal.  407,  28  Pac.  1066;  Horn  v.  Miller,  142  Pa.  St. 
557,  21  Atl.  994;   Ball  v.  Kehl,  95  Cal.  606,  30  Pac.  780;   Attorney  General  v. 


7U0  NUISANCE.  [Ch.    11 

Same —  Interference  mth  Surface  Water. 

It5>is  often,  somewhat  loosely,  said  that  a  landowner  may  deal 
with  casual  and  intermittent  surface  waters  on  his  own  estate  as 
he  may  choose,  or  that  a  landowner  cannot  collect  surface  water 
so  as  to  cause  it  to  flow  on  the  land  of  an  adjoining  owner  in  a 
manner  different  from  its  natural  flow.'"  It  may  be  safely  said  that 
no  right  of  action  accrues  for  injury  arising  from  the  natural  flow 
or  drainage  of  water  from  the  premises  of  one  upon  or  through  the 
premises  of  another.*"  But  beyond  this  the  limitations  placed  by 
law  on  the  right  to  gather  and  divert  the  flow  of  surface  water,  or  to 
exclude  it,  are  not  clear. 

According  to  the  civil  law,  the  owner  of  the  upper  or  dominant 
estate  has  a  natural  easement  or  servitude  in  the  lower  or  servient 
one  to  discharge  all  waters  falling  or  accumulating  upon  his  land 
upon  the  land  of  the  servient  owner;  and  that  such  natural  flow 
or  passage  of  water  cannot  be  interrupted  or  prevented  by  the 
servient  owner  to  the  detriment  or  injury  of  the  estate  of  the  domi- 
nant or  any  other  proprietor.*^  This  rule  of  the  civil  law  has  never 
been  accepted  by  common-law  countries.  By  the  common  law, 
there  is  no  right  jure  naturae  in  the  flow  of  surface  water.  Neither 
its  detention,  diversion,  nor  repulsion  is  actionable,  though  dam- 
ages ensue.*^     This  common-law  rule  is  of  a  very  recent  origin.*' 

Revere  Copper  Co.,  152  Mass.  444,  25  N.  E.  605;  Rivereide  Water  Co.  v.  Gage, 
89  Gal.  410,  26  Pac.  889.  Compare  Last  Chance  Water  Ditch  Co.  v.  Heilbron, 
86  Cal.  1,  26  Pac.  523;  Hlndman  v.  Rizor,  21  Or.  112,  27  Pac.  13.  As  to 
alteration  of  servitude,  see  Allen  v.  San  Jose  Land  &  Water  Co.,  92  Cal.  138, 
28  Pac.  215. 

7  8  Ball,  Torts,  48.  The  term  "surface  water"  includes  such  water  as  is 
carried  off  by  drainage  independently  of  a  water  course.  Bunderson  v.  Bur- 
lington &  M.  R.  Co.  (Neb.)  61  N.  W.  721.  Cf.  Rigney  v.  Taeoma  Ligiht  & 
Water  Co.,  9  Wash.  576,  38  Pac.  147. 

80  Livezey  v.  Schmidt  (Ky.)  29  S.  W.  25. 

813  AYait,  Act.  &  Def.  711,  §  15,  and  cases  cited;  Domat,  Civ.  Law  (Cush. 
Ed.)  p.  610,  §  1583;  Minor  v.  Wright,  16  La.  Ann.  151.  Cases  referring  to 
the  civil  law  will  be  found  collected  by  counsel  for  appellant  in  Barkley  v. 
Wilcox,  86  N.  Y.  140,  141. 

82  Bowlsby  V.  Speer,  31  N.  .T.  Law,  351;  Gannon  v.  Hargadon,  10  Allen, 
109;  Chatfield  v.  Wilson,  28  Vt.  49;  Dickinson  v.  Worcester,  7  Allen,  19; 
Greeley  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  53  Me.  200;    Swett  v.  Cutts,  50  N.  H.  439; 

S3  Bowlsby  V.  Speer,  31  N.  J.  Law,  351. 


^h.    11]  EIGHTS    INVADED.  761 

Rawston  v.  Taylor  '*  appears  to  be  the  first  English,  case  on  the 
subject."  In  Barkley  v.  Wilcox  (1881),*«  a  leading  case  on  the  sub- 
ject," it  is  said  that  the  question  as  to  the  right  of  the  owner  of 
lower  tenement  to  obstruct  the  flow  of  surface  water  to  the  injury 
of  the  owner  above  had  not  at  that  time  been  authoritatively  decided 
in  New  York.  The«rule  is  sometimes  called  the  "Massachusetts 
rule."  ^«  There  would  seem,  however,  to  be  uncertainty  as  to  what 
the  common-law  rule  is.  The  ordinary  rule  is  that  the  upper  pro- 
prietor is  not  bound  to  permit  water  to  flow  onto  the  lower  estate.'' 
The  courts  are  by  no  means  agreed  ^^  as  to  how  far  the  upper  ten- 
ant may  collect  and  concentrate  surface  waters,  and  pour  them, 
as  by  means  of  an  artificial  ditch,  upon  the  adjacent  propriett)r  in 
an  unusual  -quantity.     Ordinarily,  this  right  is  denied,"^  unless  a 

Broadbent  v.  Ramsbotham,  11  Excli.  602;  Rawston  v.  Taylor,  Id.  369; 
Greatrex  v.  Hayward,  8  Exch.  291. 

84  11  Excb.  369  (1885). 

8  5  21  Lawy.  Rep.  Ann.  593,  containing  an  exceptionally  valuable  note  by 
Henry  P.  Famham. 

8  6  86  N.  Y.  140. 

8  7  Drake  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  63  Iowa,  305,  19  N.  W.  215;  Kan- 
sas City  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Riley,  33  Kan.  374-377,  6  Pac.  581;  Jackman  v.  Ar- 
lington Mills,  137  Mass.  277-284;  Boyd  v.  Conklin,  54  Mich.  583-589,  20  N. 
AV.  595;   Crawford  v.  Rambo,  44  Ohio  St.  279-284,  7  N.  B.  429. 

8  8  Boyd  V.  Conklin,  54  Mich.  583,  20  N.  W.  595. 

so  Frazier  v.  Brown,  12  Ohio  St.  294;  Livingston  v.  McDonald,  21  Iowa,  160; 
Oibbs  V.  Williams,  25  Kan.  214. 

"0  Disagi-eements  generally,  in  the  application  of  the  common-law  rule  as 
to  surface  waters,  arise  from  the  natural  inconsistency  of  the  maxims,  "Sic 
utere  tuo  ut  alienum  non  lajdas,"  and  "Cujus  est  solum  ejus  est  usque  ad 
coelum."    Shane  v.  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  Ry.  Co.,  71  Mo.  237. 

91  Hurdman  v.  Northeastern  Ry.,  3  C.  P  Div.  168;  Broder  v.  Saillard,  2  Ch. 
Div.  G02;  Reynolds  v.  Clarke,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1399;  Jenkins  v.  Wilmington  & 
W.  R.  Co.,  110  N.  C.  438,  15  S.  E.  193;  Smith  v.  Faxon,  156  Mass.  589,  31 
N.  E.  687.  Defendant's  land,  a  part  of  which  was  swamp,  adjoined  plain- 
tiff's. Defendant  dug  a  ditch,  which  drained  the  water  from  the  swamp  onto 
the  land  of  plaintiff,  rendering  it  unproductive.  Held,  in  an  action  for  dam- 
ages, that  the  fact  that  the  digging  of  the  ditch  was  good  husbandry  and  im- 
proved defendant's  land  was  no  defense.  Yerex  v.  Eineder,  86  Mich.  24,  48 
N.  W.  875;  Williamson  v.  Oleson  (Iowa)  59  N.  W.  267.  Discussion  by  Clark, 
J.,  and  Merriman,  J.,  in  Gregory  v.  Bush,  04  Mich.  37,  31  N.  W.  90;  Davis  v. 
Sullivan,  36  Neb.  69,  53"  N.  W.  1025;  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Cook, 
57  Ark.  387,  21  S.  W.  1006;    Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  68  Miss.  760,  10 


762  NUISANCE.  [Ch.  li 

prescriptive  right  has  been  acquired."^  It  has,  however,  been 
recognized."^  When  the  improvement  of  land  for  ordinary  pur- 
poses without  negligence  accumulates  surface  waters,  and  causes 
them  to  flow  upon  the  land  of  another,  there  is  no  liability."*  On 
the  other  hand,  the  landowner  may  appropriate  surface  water 
flowing  over  his  land  in  no  definite  channel,  although  it  is  thereby 
prevented  from  reaching  a  water  course  which  it  previously  sup- 
plied."" 

The  old  common-law  rule,  that  surface  water  is  a  common  enemy, 
is  materially  modified  by  a  recognition  of  the  vague  principle,  "Sic 

South.  61;  Larkins  v.  Lamping,  44  111.  App.  649;  Drew  v.  Cole  (Cal.)  32  Pac. 
229;  Lambert  v.  Alcorn,  144  111.  313,  33  N.  E.  53,  55;  Schnitzius  v.  Bailey,  48- 
N.  J.  Eq.  409,  22  Atl.  732.  But  culverts  or  ditches  must  be  connected  as  the 
cause  of  the  wrong.  Felt  v.  Vicksburg,  S.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  46  La.  Ann.  549,  15 
South.  177;  Kelley  v.  Dunning,  39  N.  J.  Eq.  482;  Rhoads  v.  Davidheiser,  133 
Pa.  St.  226,  19  Atl.  400.  Cf.  Meixell  v.  Morgan,  149  Pa.  St.  415,  24  Atl  216; 
Lattimore  v.  Davis,  14  La.  161;  Hughes  v.  Anderson,  68  Ala.  280;  Beach  v. 
Gay  lord,  43  Minn.  476,  45  N.  W.  1095;  Conner  v.  WoodfiU,  126  Ind.  85,  25 
N.  B.  876;    Rathke  v.  Gardner,  134  Mass.  14. 

8  2  Chapel  v.  Smith,  80  Mich.  100,  45  N.  MV.  69;  Osten  v.  Jerome,  03  Mich. 
196,  53  N.  W.  7;  Eshleman  v.  Martic  Tp.,  152  Pa.  St.  68,  25  Atl.  178;  Bunder- 
son  V.  Railroad  Co.,  43  Neb.  545,  61  N.  W.  721. 

0  3  Lambert  v.  Alcorn,  144  111.  313,  33  N.  E.  53.  (This  case  Is  perhaps  the 
most  radical  in  support  of  right  to  rid  one's  lands  of  surface  water  which  has 
yet  been  decided.)  Note  to  Lambert  v.  Alcorn  (111.)  21  Lawy.  Rep.  Ann.  611. 
Cf.  with  Gray  v.  Mc Williams  (Cal.)  21  Lawy.  Rep.  Ann.  593,  32  Pac.  976; 
Paddock  v.  Somes,  102  Mo.  226,  14  S.  W.  746;  Wharton  v.  Stevens  (Iowa)  50 
N.  W.  562;  Johnson  v.  Railway  Co.,  80  Wis.  641,  50  N.  W.  771;  Jones  v. 
Wabash  Ry.,  18  Mo.  App.  251. 

9*  Brown  v.  Winona  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  53  Minn.  259,  55  N.  W.  123.  Thus, 
an  erection  of  a  building  on  one's  premises,  diverting  surface  water  and  caus- 
ing it  to  flow  on  the  land  of  an  adjoining  owner,  is  not  an  actionable  wrong. 
Bowlsby  V.  Speer,  31  N.  J.  Law,  351.  May  change  course,  Johnson  v.  Chicago, 
St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  80  Wis.  641,  50  N.  W.  771.  Increase  flow  by  under- 
ground drains,  Meixell  v.  Morgan,  149  Pa.  St.  415,  24  Atl  216. 

9  5  In  Broadbent  v.  Ramsbotham,  11  Exch.  602,  it  was  held  that  where  the 
plaintiff's  mill,  for  more  than  50  years,  has  been  worked  by  the  stream  of  a 
brook  which  was  supplied  by  the  water  of  a  pond  filled  by  rain,  a  shallow 
well  supplied  by  subterraneous  water,  a  swamp,  and  a  well  formed  by  a 
stream  springing  out  of  the  side  of  a  hill,  the  waters  of  all  which  occasionally 
overflowed  and  ran  down  the  defendant's  land  in  no  definite  channel  into  the 
brook,  the  plaintiff  had  no  riglit,  as  against  the  defendant,  to  the  natural  flow 


^h.   11]  RIGHTS    INVADKD.  763 

iitere  tuo,  ut  alienum  non  Isedas." ""  The  law  allows  the  "reason- 
able use""'  of  one's  own  land,  and  all  this  involves.  More  specif- 
ically, in  this,  as  in  other  questions  of  nuisance,  courts  are  governed 
by  considerations  of  expediency.  The  comparative  injury  pro- 
duced or  relieved  in  many  cases  will  determine."^  Thus  one  drain- 
ing his  land  may  deposit  the  surface  water  in  a  natural  drain, 
though  it  is  thereby  conveyed  on  a  neighbor's  land,  if  it  does  not 
unreasonably  injure  the  latter;  and  such  drainage  which  reclaims 
twenty  acres  of  agricultural  land,  and  causes  only  an  acre  or  two 
of  his  neighbor's  land  to  be  submerged  for  a  time  in  the  spring  of 
the  year,  is  not  unreasonable.""  The  law  as  to  siirface  waters  ap- 
plies alike  to  private  individuals,  private  corporations,  like  rail- 
road companies,^""  and  municipal  corporations.^"^  Ordinarily,  cor- 
porate character  confers  no  immunity  not  extended  to  a  private  indi- 
vidual. 

of  any  of  the  waters.  Gibbs  v.  Williams,  25  Kan.  214;  Bangor  v.  Lansil,  51 
Me.  521;  Parks  v.  Newburyport,  10  Gray,  28;  Waffle  v.  New  York  Cent.  Ry., 
58  Barb.  413;  Goodale  v.  Tuttle,  29  N.  Y.  459. 

0  6  Ante,  c.  1.  And  see  article  on  "Right  of  Action  Arising  Against  a  Neigh- 
bor from  Nuisance  Committed  on  One's  Land,"  58  J.  P.  745. 

97  Ante,  c.  1;  John  M.  Gest,  in  1  Am.  Law  Reg.  &  Rev.  1;  Ray,  Neg.  301.  One 
who  negligently  allows  filth  and  surface  water  to  accumulate  on  his  land, 
and  percolate  through  the  soil  onto  adjacent  land,  is  liable  for  the  injuries 
therefrom.  Anheuser-Busch  Brewing  Ass'n  v.  Peteraon,  41  Neb.  897,  60  N. 
W.  373.     And  see  Pfeiffer  v.  Brown,  165  Pa.  St.  267,  30  Atl.  844. 

»8  Hughes  V.  Anderson,  68  Ala.  280. 

99  Canty,  .J.,  in  Sheehan  v.  Flynn  (Minn.)  61  N.  W.  462. 

100  Booth  v.  Railroad  Co.,  140  N.  Y.  267,  35  N.  E.  592;  WhaUey  v.  Lan- 
cashire Ry.,  13  Q.  B.  Div.  131;  Staton  v.  Norfolk  &  C.  R,  Co.,  109  N.  C.  337, 
13  S.  E.  933;  Wead  v.  St.  Johnsbury  &  L.  O.  R.  Co.,  64  Vt.  52,  24  Atl.  361; 
Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Donahoo,  59  Tex.  128;  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Tait,  63  Tex.  223;  Gilbert  v.  Savannah,  G.  &  N.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  69  Ga. 
396;  Indianapolis,  B.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith,  52  Ind.  428;  Hogenson  v.  St. 
Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  31  Minn.  224,  17  N.  W.  374;    Curtis  v.  Eastern  Ry., 

98  Mass.  428. 

101  Municipal  corporations,  in  raising  grade  of  street  and  interfering  with 
natural  drainage,  have  been  held  liable  for  failure  to  provide  a  sufficient  es- 
cape of  the  water  dammed  up.  Ross  v.  Clinton,  46  Iowa,  606.  Cf.  Town  of 
Martinsville  v.  Shirley,  84  Ind.  546.  But  a  city  is  not  bound  to  provide  against 
extraordinary  storms.  Allen  v.  City  of  Chippewa  Falls,  52  Wis.  430,  9  N.  W. 
284.     Ordinai-ily,  it  is  not  responsible  for  effect  on  surface  water  by  changing 


764  KUISANCE.  [Ch.  11 

Same — Nuisance  on  Highways. 

There  is  no  particular  form  or  ceremony  necessary  to  the  dedica- 
tion of  land  to  public  use.  All  that  is  required  is  the  consent  of 
the  owner  of  the  land,  and  the  fact  of  its  being  used  for  public  pur- 
poses intended  by  the  appropriation.^"^  This  principle  is  applied 
to  a  public  highway.^"^  Highwiiys  may  also  be  acquired  by  pre- 
scription.^"* Almost  universally  statutory  methods  are  provided 
for  the  acquisition  of  highways.^"" 

Interference  v^ith  the  right  of  free  and  safe  passage  over  a  public 
highway  has  been  regarded  from  the  point  of  view  of  trespass,"" 
and  of  negligence.^"^  The  obstruction  or  use  of  a  street,  so  as  to 
unreasonably  impede  travel,  and  render  its  use  inconvenient  or  dan- 
grade  of  street,  Wakefleld  v.  Newell,  12  R.  I.  75;  Alden  v.  City  of  Minneapolis, 
24  Minn.  254;  Lynch  v.  Mayor,  76  N.  Y.  60;  Murphey  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Wil- 
mington, 5  Del.  530;  Stewart  v.  City  of  Clinton,  79  Mo.  603;  but,  no  more 
than  an  individual,  cannot  precipitate  surface  water  on  adjoining  property, 
in  unnatural  quantity,  by  ditches  or  drains.  Smith  v.  City  Council  of  Alexan- 
dria, 33  Grat.  208;  O'Brien  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  25  Minn.  333;  Gillison  v. 
City  of  Charleston,  36  W.  Va.  282;  Inhabitants  of  West  Orange  v.  Field,  37 
N.  J.  Eq.  600;  Noonan  v.  City  of  Albany,  79  N.  Y.  470;  City  of  North  Vernon 
T.  Voegler,  89  Ind.  77.  And,  generally,  see  Inhabitants  of  Township  of  Ham- 
ilton v.  Wainwright  (N.  J.  Ch.)  29  Atl.  200;  Rhodes  v.  City  of  Cleveland,  10 
Ohio,  139;  Pennoyer  v.  City  of  Saginaw,  8  Mich.  534;  New  York  Cent.  &  H. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Rochester,  127  N.  Y.  591,  28  N.  E.  416;  Aurora  v.  Love, 
93  m.  521;  Arn  v.  City  of  Kansas,  14  Fed.  236;  Kobs  v.  City  of  Minneapolis, 
22  Minn.  150;  Young  v.  Commissioners,  134  HI.  569,  25  N.  E.  689.  Commis- 
sioners of  highway  are  personally  liable.     Tearney  v.  Smith,  8(5  111.  391. 

102  President,  etc.,  of  City  of  Cincinnati  v.  White,  6  Pet.  431.  And  see 
Morgan  v.  Raih-oad  Co.,  96  U.  S.  716;  Joy  v.  St.  Louis,  138  U.  S.  1,  11  Sup. 
Ct  243;  Godfrey  v.  City  of  Alton,  12  111.  29;  Columbus  v.  Dahn,  36  Ind.  330; 
Holdane  v.  Trustees  of  Cold  Spring,  21  N.  Y.  474. 

103  State  V.  Trask,'6  Vt.  355;  Noyes  v.  Ward,  19  Conn.  250;  3  Kent,  Comm. 
432. 

104  Com.  V.  Cole,  26  Pa.  St  187.  A  way  of  necessity  is  an  accessorial  servi- 
tude, founded  on  the  principle  that  a  man  shall  not  derogate  from  his  own 
grant.  "If  A.  has  an  acre  of  ground  surroimded  by  the  ground  of  B.,  A.,  for 
necessity,  has  a  way  over  a  convenient  part  of  B.'s  ground  to  his  own  soil, 
as  a  necessary  incident  to  his  ground."     Staple  v.  Heydon,  6  Mod.  1-4. 

106  Wood,  Nuis.  §  233. 
10  6  Ante,  p.  745. 

107  Excavations  making  a  sidewalk  or  highway  unsafe  attach  liability  for 
negligence.     Smith  v.  Ryan  (City  Ct.  Brook.)  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  853;    Galvin  v. 


t'h-    11]  RIGHTS    INVADED.  765- 

gerous  to  travelers,  may  become  a  public  nuisance."'  The  appropri- 
ation of  a  street  by  an  individual,  to  be  an  actionable  nuisance,  need 
not  be  exclusive.  Itissuflficient  if  it  renders  the  free  passage  less  com- 
modious."" Thus,  in  Barber  v.  Penley,^"  a  person  who,  by  carrying 
on  a  theater,  caused  a  crowd  to  assemble  and  obstruct  the  highway, 
thereby  creating  a  nuisance  to  private  adjoining  owners,  is  an 
swerable  for  the  obstruction,  if  it  be  the  necessary  result  of  his 
acts,  even  though  it  be  not  his  actual  object.  There  is  no  differ- 
ence of  principle  in  this  respect  between  entertainments  carried  on 
out  of  doors  or  inside  of  a  building.  On  the  other  hand,  howeverr 
sliding  in  a  street,  accompanied  by  boisterous  conduct,  even  if  it 
be  contrary  to  city  ordinance,  and  cause  a  person's  horse  to  run 
away,  is  not  a  nuisance.^^^  A  nuisance  may  be  actionable  if  it 
detract  from  the  safety  of  travelers,^^^  whether  from  something 
suspended  in  the  air,^^'  on  the  surface,^^*  or  from  an  excavation.^ ^'* 
The  safety  of  the  traveler  has  reference  to  the  ordinary  means  of 
locomotion.      Therefore,  things  calculated  to  frighten  horses  may 

Mayor,  112  N.  Y.  223,  19  N.  E.  675;   Brezee  v.  Powers,  80  Mich.  172,  45  N.  W. 
130;    Kelly  v.  Bennett,  132  Pa.  St.  218,  19  Atl.  69;    ante,  t>.  176,  "Municipal- 
Corporations";   post,  p.  771,  note  154. 
los  Holmes  v.  Corthell,  80  Me.  31,  12  Ati.  730. 

109  Hart  v.  Mayor,  24  Am.  Dec.  165;  Norristown  v.  Moyer,  67  Pa.  St.  355; 
State  V.  Mayor,  30  Am.  Dec.  564. 

110  [1803]  3  Oh.  480. 

111  Jackson  v.  Castle,  80  Jle.  119,  13  Atl.  49;    Id.,  82  Me.  579,  20  Atl.  237. 

112  Dygert  v.  Schenck,  35  Am.  Dec.  575. 

1 1 3  As  an  awning,  McConnell  v.  Bostelmann,  72  Hun,  238,  25  N.  Y.  Supp. 
30O;  a  roof,  Garland  v.  Towne,  55  N.  H.  55  (cf.  Mellen  v.  Morrill,  126  Mass. 
545);  a  cornice.  Grove  v.  Ft.  Wayne,  45  Ind.  429;  a  bow-window,  Jenks  v. 
Williams,  115  Mass.  217. 

11*  A  cellar  door,  Daniels  v.  Potter,  4  Car:  &  P.  262;  Proctor  v.  Harris,  Id. 
337;  a  gate,  .Tames  v.  Haywai-d,  Cro.  Car.  184;  a  fence,  NefE  v.  Paddock,  26 
Wis.  540;  »  building',  Houston  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Parker,  50  Tex.  330;  Stet- 
son V.  Faxon,  19  Pick.  147.  An  unguarded  opening,  four  feet  and  nine  Inches 
in  width,  in  a  pavement,  and  extending  from  the  building  line  into  the  street 
five  feet  and  sis  inches,  if  located  in  a  frequented  street,  is  a  pubUc  nuisance, 
and  neither  lapse  of  time,  nor  the  existence  of  like  nuisances  elsewhere  with 
the  consent  of  the  mimicipality,  will  legalize  it  King  v.  Thompson,  87  Pa. 
St.  365,  distinguishing  McNerney  v.  Reading  City,  150  Pa.  St.  611,  25  Atl.  57. 

118  Cellar  opening  unguarded,  Coupland  v.  Hardingham,  3  Camp.  389;    coal 


766  NUISANCE.  [Ch.  11 

be  actionable  miisanrcs.^^"  It  would  seem  that  no  liability  exists 
for  injuries  caused  by  a  nuisance  outside  the  limits  of  a  highway.^^'^ 
But,  to  enable  a  private  person  to  sustain  the  action,  he  must  show 
special  injury.  The  public  may  institute  proceedings  for  the  abate- 
ment or  prevention  of  such  a  nuisance,  irrespective  of  the  question 
of  pecuniary  damage,  by  the  speediest  and  most  effectual  remedy."' 

Interference  ivith  Health,  Comfort,  and  Convenience. 

It  is  not  essential,  however,  to  constitute  a  nuisance,  that  the  in- 
jury should  be  to  property.^^*  The  early  conception  of  nuisance  as 
appears  in  Blackstone's  definition  and  by  the  early  forms  of  remedy 
provided  by  law,  was  an  injury  to  lands,  tenements,  and  heredita- 
ments. And,  in  some  cases,  only  property  owners  can  at  the  pres- 
ent time  sue  for  nuisance.^ ^^     The  scope  of  nuisance  has,  however, 

bole,  Clifford  v.  Dam,  M  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  391;  Hadley  v.  Taylor,  L.  R.  1  C.  P. 
53;  Hobbit  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  4  Excb.  254.  Et  vide  Barnes  v.  Ward, 
9  C.  B.  392;  post,  p.  919,  "Negligence";  post,  799,  "Personal  Interference." 

lie  A  hollow,  burnt,  and  blackened  log  witbin  tbe  limits  of  tbe  bighway, 
Foshay  v.  Town  of  Glen  Haven,  25  Wis.  288;  a  derrick,  Jones  v.  Housatonic 
R.  Co.,  107  Mass.  261;  a  tent,  Ayer  v.  City  of  Norwicb,  12  Am.  Rep.  396; 
drumming  near  higbway,  Loubz  v.  Hafner,  1  Dev.  (N.  C.)  185;  water  wheel, 
House  V.  Metcalf,  27  Conn.  631;  sled  with  tub,  Judd  v.  Fargo,  107  Mass.  264; 
traction  engine,  McComber  v.  Nichols,  22  Am.  Rep.  522;  post,  p.  919,  "Negli- 
gence." 

117  Wood,  Nuis.  §§  322-328;  Irvine  v.  Wood,  51  N.  Y.  224.  ^f.  Drake  v. 
Lowell,  13  Mete.  (Mass.)  292,  with  Congreve  v.  Smith,  18  N.  Y.  79,  Hixon  v. 
Lowell,  13  Gray,  59,  Congireve  v.  Morgan,  18  N.  Y.  84,  and  Hewison  v.  New 
Haven,  34  Conn.  136.  And  see  Morse  v.  Town  of  Richmond,  41  Vt.  435. 
Cases  of  this  kind,  however,  often  turn,  not  so  much  upon  tbe  nature  of  a 
nuisance,  as  tbe  responsibility  of  an  owner  to  abutting  property,  or  of  a  city 
for  damage.    Post,  p.  919,  "Negligence";  post,  p.  799,  "Personal  Interference." 

118  Smith  V.  McDowell,  148  111.  51,  35  N-  B.  141. 

119  This  distinction  has  already  been  referred  to  in  St.  Helens  Smelting 
Co.  V.  Tipping,  ante,  p.  748,  note  20.  Mr.  Bigelow  says  it  is  impossible  to 
say  just  what  this  distinction  is  to  be.  Tbe  meaning  appears  to  be  that  the 
degree  of  harm  in  an  action  for  personal  discomfort  must  be  greater  than  in 
an  action  for  injury  to  property.  Bigelow,  Lead.  Gas.  467;  in  same  language, 
Ball,  Lead.  Gas.  Torts,  400. 

120  This  right  to  complain  of  pollution  of  a  stream  may  be  confined  to  ri- 
parian owners  (Conrad  v.  Arrowhead  Hot  Springs  Hotel  Co.,  103  Gal.  399, 
37  Pac.  386;  Chance  v.  Warsaw  Water  Works  [Sup.]  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  729); 
and  damage  by  nuisance  to  an  alley  can  be  recovered  only  by  owner  or  oc- 


<2h-    11]  EIGHTS    INVADED.  767 

been  widened  so  far  as  to  clearly  include  such  use  of  property  or 
conduct  of  person  as  renders  the  enjoyment  of  life  uncomfortable, 
or  is  indecent  and  offensive  to  the  senses.  Thus,  noise  ^"  may  be 
so  continuous  and  excessive,  or  vapors  or  noxious  smells  ^^^  render 
the  enjoyment  of  life  and  property  so  uncomfortable,  as  to  be  a  nui- 
sance. A  fortiori,  the  maintenance  of  anything  injurious  to  health  ^" 
may  be  a  nuisance.  It  usually  occurs  that  such  interference  with 
personal  comfort  or  such  personal  offense  is  coincident  with  dam- 
age to  property.^^*  But  the  word  "nuisance"  is  said  to  be  applied 
by  the  English  law  indiscriminately  to  infringement  of  property  and 
personal  rights.  ^^^  It  seems,  however,  that  mental  discomfort  and 
injury  which  are  not  of  temporal,  but  of  spiritual,  character,  are 
not  nuisances;  as  that  resulting  from  running  street  cars  on  Sun- 
day.^ ^° 

cupier  of  land  to  which  the  alley  is  appurtenant  (Commissionei's  of  Kensing- 
ton V.  Wood,  49  Am.  Dec.  582). 

121  Brill  V.  Flagaer,  23  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  354;  Elliotson  v.  Feetham,  2  Bing. 
N.  C.  134;  Street  v.  Tugwell,  2  Selw.  N.  I*.  1138;  Carrington  v.  Taylor,  11 
East,  571;  Keeble  v.  Hickeringill,  Id.  574;  Rex  v.  Smith,  2  Strange,  704; 
Fish  v.  Dodge,  4  Denio  (N.  Y.)  311;  Dennis  v.  Eckhardt,  3  Grant,  Cas.  (Pa.) 
390;  King  v.  Lloyd,  4  Esp.  200;  Campbell  v.  Seaman,  63  N.  Y.  568;  Pickard 
V.  Collins,  23  Barb.  444;  Catlin  v.  Valentine,  9  Paige,  575;  Walter  v.  Selfe,  4 
De  Gex  &  S.  315-323. 

122  Bohan  v.  Port  Jervis  Gas-Light  Co.,  122  N.  Y.  18,  25  N.  E.  246. 

123  A  hospital  in  residential  locality,  Gilford  v.  Babies'  Hospital  (Sup.)  1 
N.  Y.  Supp.  448.  A  cemetery,  Jung  v.  Neraz,  71  Tex.  396,  9  S.  W.  344  (cases 
collected  at  page  397,  71  Tex.,  and  page  344,  9  S.  W.). 

124  This  kind  of  nuisance  is  most  commonly  spoken  of  by  the  technical  name. 
Webb,  Pol.  Torts,  494. 

12  0  Moak,  Underh.  Torts,  p.  229,  side  p.  125,  citing  Add.  155.  In  this  treatise 
nuisance  is  discussed  under  chapter  5,  "Of  Bodily  Injury  Caused  by  Nuisance," 
and  chapter  9,  "Of  Private  Nuisance  Affecting  Realty."  Cases  on  conven- 
ience and  enjoyment  will  be  found  collected,  also,  in  Webb,  Pol.  Torts,  p.  494. 
In  Johnson  v.  Porter,  42  Conn.  234,  it  was  held  that  offensive  odors  preventing 
comfortable  use  of  a  house  do  not  entitle  to  recover  for  diminished  value  of 
house.     Comminge  v.  Stevenson,  76  Tex.  642,  13  S.  W.  556. 

126  Sparhawk  v.  Union  Passenger  R.  Co.,  54  Pa.  St.  401  (opinion  of  Strong, 
J.,  at  nisi  prius,  page  404);  First  Bapl^t  Church  v.  Schenectady  &  T.  B.  Co., 
5  Barb.  79;  State  v.  Linkhaw,  69  N.  C.  214;  Com.  v.  Wolf,  3  Serg.  &  R.  49. 
Contra,  see  authorities  collected  in  Sparhawk  v.  Union  Passenger  R.  Co.,  54 
Pa.  St.  419. 


768  NUISANCE.  [Ch.   11 


THE  ANNOYANCE  OR  INTERFERENCE. 

234.  The  annoyance  or  interference  constituting  a  nuisance 
may  arise  from  either  or  both — 

(a)  The   use,  management,  custody,  or  control  of  prop- 

erty; or 

(b)  Personal  conduct. 

Use  of  Property. 

Nuisance  is  ordinarily  spoken  of  as  a  wroDg  arising  where  a  per- 
son uses  his  own  property  so  as  to  injure  another's.^^^  Many  nui- 
sances arise  from  the  use  of  lands,  as  between  adjoining  owners  with 
respect  to  water  rights,  structures  on  the  land,  and  generally  with 
respect  to  the  use  of  the  land.^^*  So,  where  premises  become  dan- 
gerous, or  are  made  dangerous,  for  example,  by  spring  guns  and 
traps,  a  nuisance  may  arise,^^"  or  where  offensive  agencies,  like 
privies  and  cesspools,  are  allowed  to  exist  to  the  annoyance  of  a 
neighborhood,  or  the  pollution  of  waters; ""  or  where  a  useful  ele- 
ment is  improperly  turned  aside.^^^ 

A  nuisance  may  arise  from  the  ownership  or  control  of  personal 
property,  as  of  dangerous  animals;  ^^^  also  from  the  custody  or  use 

127  Norci'oss  V.  Thorns,  51  Me.  503. 

128  Ante,  p.  233,  "Injury  to  Property." 

129  Murray  v.  McSbane,  52  Md.  217;  Harvey  v.  De  Woody,  18  Ark.  232; 
Wood,  Nuis.  §  132.  And  see,  as  to  spring  guns  as  public  nuisance.  State  v. 
Moore,  83  Am.  Dec.  159. 

130  Jones  V.  Powell,  Hut.  135;  Norton  v.  Scholefield,  9  Mees.  &  W.  665; 
Haugh's  Appeal,  102  Pa.  St  42;  Wahle  v-  Reinbach,  76  111.  322.  Of.  Ball  v. 
Nye,  99  Mass.  582,  with  Middlesex  Co.  v.  McOue,  149  Mass.  103,  21  N.  E. 
230,  and  Allen  v.  Boston,  159  Mass.  324,  34  N.  E.  519.  State  v.  Moore,  31 
Conn.  479;  Ilott  v.  Wilkes,  3  Barn.  &  Aid.  304;  Dean  v.  Clayton,  7  Taunt.  489; 
Bird  V.  Holbrook,  4  Bing.  628;  Jay  v.  Whitefield,  cited  in  3  Barn.  &  Aid. 
308;   Jordin  v.  Crump,  8  Mees.  &  W.  782-787. 

131  Parke  v.  Kllham,  68  Am.  Dec.  310. 

132  Cox  V.  Burbidge,  9  Jur.  (N.  S.)  970.  "Recent  Developments  in.  English 
Jurisprudence,"  4  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  1,  129,  by  Judge  Redfleld.  A  dis- 
eased animal.  Mills  v.  New  York  &  H.'  R.  Co.,  2  Rob.  (N.  Y.)  326;  a  savage 
dog,  Nehr  v.  State,  So  Neb.  638,  53  N.  W.  589;  a  horse  unlawfully  at  large 
(Baldwin  v.  Ensign,  44  Am.  Rep.  205),  whether  vicious  or  not. 


Ch.    11]  THE    ANNOYANCE    OR    INTERFERENCE.  769 

of  explosives,"''  or  of  fire  "•*  or  water."=  In  the  conduct  of  busi- 
ness, and  especially  where  vapors"^  or  smolie  "'^  or  stenches"^  or 
dust""  or  noises""  or  jarring,  or  other  similar  annoyances  arise, 
actions  for  nuisance  are  constantly  sustained.^"  The  old  familiar 
principles  of  nuisance  are  changed,  adapted,  and  extended  to  meet 
the  emergencies  of  modern  civilization.  This  is  conspicuously  true 
with  respect  to  the  commercial  uses  of  electricity.^*^    It  seems  to  be 

133  Post,  p.  810.  "Care."  Shooting  a  gas  well  is  prima  facie  a  nuisance. 
Tyner  v.  People's  Gas  Co.,  131  Ind.  408,  31  N.  E.  61.  Blasting,  Morgan  v. 
Bowes,  62  Hun,  623,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  22;  may  be  restrained,  Rogers  v.  Han- 
field,  14  Daly,  339.  I'owder  magazine  a  nuif^ance,  Comminge  v.  Stevenson, 
76  Tex.  642,  13  S.  W.  556. 

134  Add.  Torts,  370-373;  Vary  v.  Thomson,  13  Fac.  Col.  491;  League  v.  Jour- 
nea.y,  2.j  Tex.  172;  Burroughs  v.  Housatonic  Ry.,  15  Conn.  124;  Galpin  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  19  Wis.  637;  Vaughan  v.  Menlove,  32  B.  C.  L.  740;  Tubervil  v. 
Stamp,  1  Salk,  13;  Cuff  v.  Railroad  Co.,  35  N.  J.  Law,  17;  Wood,  Nuis.  §§  147- 
149. 

135  Rylands  v.  Fletcher,  L.  R.  3  H.  L.  330. 

138  Ric.  de  D.  V.  Richards,  4  Ass.  p.  3,  fol.  3;  Rex  v.  Wilcox,  2  Salk,  458; 
Holsman  v.  Boiling  Spring:  Bleaching  Co.,  14  N.  J.  Bq.  335;  People  v.  Detroit 
White  Lead  Works,  82  Mich.  471,  46  N.  W.  735;  Campbell  v.  Seaman,  63  N.  Y. 
568;  Huckenstine's  Appeal,  70  Pa.  St.  102;  Crossley  v.  Lightowler,  L.  R.  3  Bq. 
279;  Fogarty  v.  Junction  City  Pressed  Brick  Co.,  50  Kan.  478,  31  Pac.  1052; 
Harley  v.  ilerrill  Brick  Co.,  S:;  Iowa,  73,  48  N.  W.  1000. 

187  Walter  v.  Selfe,  4  Eng.  Law  &  Bq.  15;  Catlin  v.  Valentine,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.) 
'i7r,;  Smith  v.  McOonathy,  11  Mo.  331.  See  Rhodes  v.  Dunbar,  57  Pa.  St.  274; 
Cartwright  v.  Gray,  12  Grant,  Ch.  (U.  C.)  399,  400. 

138  As  from  a  pig  sty:  Aldred's  Case,  9  Coke,  58a.  Tanneiy:  Francis  v. 
Schoellkopf,  53  N.  Y.  152;  Pennoyer  v.  Allen,  56  Wis.  502,  14  N.  W.  609;  Bliss 
V.  Hall,  4  Bing.  X.  C.  183.  Slaughterhouse:  Cf.  Ballentine  v.  Webb,  84  Mich. 
38,  47  N.  W.  485,  with  Bishop  v.  Banks,  33  Conn.  118-121,  and  Pruner  v.  Pen- 
dleton, 75  Va.  516.  Fertilizing  factories:  Tuttle  v.  Church,  53  Fed.  422.  Cf. 
Susquehanna  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Malone,  73  Md.  268,  20  Atl.  900,  with  Fertilizing 
Co.  V.  Hyde  Park,  97  U.  S.  659;  Meigs  v.  Lister,  23  N.  J.  Bq.  199;  Appeal  of 
Czarniecki  (Pa.  Sup.)  11  Atl.  660. 

130  Hutchins  v.  Smith.  63  Barb.  251;  Cooper  v.  Randall,  53  111.  24;  Cooper 
V.  North  British  R.  Co.,  36  Jur.  169,  2  Macph.  117. 

140  Shepard  v.  Hill,  151  Mass.  540,  24  N.  E.  1025;  Dennis  v.  Eckhardt,  3 
Grant,  Cas.  (Pa.)  390;  Bishop  v.  Banks,  33  Conn.  118-121;  State  v.  Haines,  30 
Me.  05. 

141  Demarest  v.  Keefe,  34  N.  J.  Eq.  469. 

142  As  in  Chandler  Electric  Co.  v.  Fuller,  21  Can.  Sup.  Ct.  33T.     Telegraph 

1,AW  OF  TOUTS — 49 


770  NUISANCK.  [Oh.  11 

settled,  both  in  England  and  America,  that  electrical  interference 
is  a  statutory  nuisance,  for  which  there  is  no  remedy  at  common 
law."' 

Personal  Conducl. 

A  nuisance  may  be  committed  by  personal  conduct  without  in- 
Tol\ing  property.  Thus,  indecent  exposure  in  a  public  place,  in  the 
presence  of  several  persons."*  So,  singing  a  ribald  song,""  swear- 
ing, using  indecent  language  in  a  public  place,  or  uttering  loud 
cries  in  a  public  street,  may  constitute  a  nuisance.'^**  Eavesdrop- 
ping was,  at  an  early  date,  regarded  as  a  nuisance,"'  but  this 
"barbarism"  (?)  has  vanished.""  Personal  conduct  often  combines 
with  use  of  property  to  constitute  nuisance ;  as  where  public  drink- 
ing saloons' ^''^  or  inns  ^'^  are  the  scenes  of  noisy  carousals  by  night 
and  by  day.  So  the  indecent  and  boisterous  behavior  of  inmates 
and  visitors  of  a  house  of  ill  fame,  although  constituting  a  public 
nuisance,  may  also  be  the  basis  of  recovery  of  damages  and  the 
issuance  of  an  injunction  on  behalf  of  private  individuals  whose 
property  is  thereby  injured.^  ^^     And  so,  generally,  any  business  or 

poles  in  street,  a  nuisance:  Barber  v.  Railway  Co.,  83  Mich.  299,  47  N.  W.  219; 
Reg.  T.  United  Kingdom  Electric  Tel.  Co.,  31  Law  J.  M.  C.  166,  10  Wkly.  Rep. 
538.  As  to  liability  of  municipal  corporation  for  allowing  telephone  poles  to 
be  erected  in  its  streets,  see  Tliomp.  Electr.  §  29.  As  to  power  to  remove  elec- 
trical poles,  see,  Id.  §  31. 

1*3  Hudson  River  Tel.  Co.  v.  Watervliet  Turnpike  &  R.  Co.  (N.  Y.  App.)  32  N. 
B.  148.  And  see  'iElectric  Railroads  on  Public  Highways,"  2  Am.  Law  Reg. 
&  Rev.  38. 

lii  Boom  V.  Utiea,  2  Barb.  104.  Cf.  State  v.  Rose.  32  Mo.  560;  Reg.  v.  El- 
liott, Leigh  &  C.  103;  State  v.  Millard,  18  Vt.  574;  Rex  v.  Gallard,  1  W.  Kel. 
163. 

"5  State  V.  Toole,  106  N.  C.  736,  11  S.  E.  168. 

146  Wood,  Nuis.  75;  Com.  v.  Harris,  101  Mass.  29;  Com.  v.  Oaks,  113  Mass. 
S;  Com.  V.  Spratt,  14  Phila.  365;  State  v.  Graham,  3  Sneed  (Tenn.)  71;  State 
V.  Powell,  TO  N.  C.  67. 

1  * '  Wood,  Nuis.  §  55. 

148  Wood,  Nuis.  §  50.    Cf.  1  Bish.  Cr.  Law,  1124. 

140  State  V.  Bertheol,  6  Blackf.  474;  State  v.  Buckley,  5  Har.  (Del.)  508.  As 
to  skating  rink  erected  within  a  few  yards  of  a  dwelling  house,  Snyder  v.  Ca- 
bell, 29  W.  Va.  48,  1  S.  E.  241. 

150  Hawk.  P.  C.  c.  78,  §  182;  3  Bac.  Abr.  Tit.  "Inns." 

151  Cranford  v.  Tyrrell,  128  N.  Y.  341,  28  N.  E.  514. 


Ch.    11]  TH)C    ANNOYANCE    OR    INTEKFEIiENCK.  771 

act  calling  together  disorderly  crowds  in  public  places  is  an  action- 
able nuisance.^°^ 


235.  The  interference  with  legal  rights,  which  constitutes 
a  nuisance,  does  not  depend,  ordinarily,  upon 
either — 

(1)  The  care  exercised  by  the  wrongdoer;  or 

(2)  His  motive. 

Care  Ivimaterial. 

Want  of  care  is  not  an  element  of  nuisance.  "Whoever  does  an 
unlawful  act  in  placing  in  jeopardy  the  lives  or  property  of  others 
does  so  at  his  peril,  and  if  injury  results  to  others  as  a  consequence 
of  such  unlawful  act,  he  must  respond  in  damages.  The  rule  is  well 
nigh,  if  not  entirely,  uni\ersal,  that  men  must  so  use  their  own 
property,  and  so  exercise  their  own  privileges,  that  they  do  not 
thereby  destroy  or  imperil  the  rights  of  others;  and  this  is  so,  even 
in  the  exercise  of  rights  not  prohibited  by  law,  and  in  the  exercise 
of  trades  and  business  not  nuisances  per  se."  It  is  therefore  held 
that  a  person  ^\■ho  placed  a  powder  magazine  in  dangerous  prox- 
imity to  another's  dwelling  is  liable  for  damages  resulting  from 
its  explosion  without  his  direct  negligence.^ °^  In  general,  no  exer- 
cise of  care  is  a  defense  to  the  maintenance  of  a  nuisance."'*  In 
legalized  n\iisance,  however,  the  question  of  negligence  may  be  ma- 

102  Wood,  Niiis.  §  48. 

153  Chicago,  AV.  &  \.  Coal  Co.  y.  Glass,  .34  111.  App.  364.  Bt  vide  Laflin  & 
R.  Powder  Co.  v.  Tenrney,  131  111.  :'.22,  23  N.  E.  389;  Heeg  v.  Llclit,  80  N. 
Y.  .570;  Clipiitliam  v.  Sliearoii,  1  Swan,  "Ji:!. 

104  Frost  v.  Berkeley  Phosphate  Co.  (S.  C.)  20  S.  E.  280,  and  cases  cited; 
Tarry  v.  Ashton,  1  Q.  B.  Div.  314.  As  to  pollution  of  a  well  by  habitual  dis- 
<  barge  of  flltli,  to  defendant's  knowlo<lge.  Ball  v.  Nye,  97  Am.  Dec.  56; 
Klnnaird  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  89  Ky.  468,  12  S.  W.  937;  Haugh's  Appeal,  48 
Am.  Rep.  193;  Hauck  v.  I'ipi'  Line  Co.,  l-")3  Pa.  St.  360,  26  Atl.  644;  Moses 
X.  State,  58  Ind.  1S.">.  Ccmipare  Ball  v.  Nye,  99  Mass.  582;  Hodgkinson  v. 
Ennor,  1  Best  iV;  S.  221).  .\nd,  generally,  see  Fletcher  v.  Rylands,  L.  R.  1 
Exch.  265:  Cahill  r.  Eastman,  18  Minn.  324  fCil.  202);  McAndrews  v.  Collerd, 
42  N.  J.  Law,  189;  post,  p.  78S,  "Legalized  Nuisance."  In  Dygert  v.  Schenek, 
23  Wend.  446,  447,  Co  wen,  .1.,  held  that:  "Any  act  of  an  individual  done  to 
a  highway,  if  it  be  detracted  from  the  safety  of  travelei-s,  is  a  nuisance. 
*    *    *    Special  damages  arising  from  it,  therefore,  furnish  ground  for  pri- 


772  NUISANCE.  [Ch.  U 

terial  with  respect  to  liability.^"  But  if  the  powers  conferred  by 
the  legislature  are  conceded,  the  liability  is  independent  of  negli- 
gence, and  rests  upon  the  theory  of  nuisance.^'"' 

Motive  Immaterial. 

It  is  ordinarily  said  that  the  intent  or  motive  is  immaterial  to 
the  determination  of  the  question  of  whether  a  given  case  consti- 
tutes or  does  not  constitute  a  nuisance.^ ^'  This,  however,  is  not 
safe  as  a  universal  proposition.  Where  a  high  fence  serving  no  use- 
ful or  needful  purpose  is  built  and  maintained  out  of  pure  spite  and 
malice,  a  nuisance  is  created.  "A  wanton  infliction  of  damage  can 
never  be  right.  It  is  a  wrong,  and  a  violation  of  right,  and  is  not 
without  remedy.  What  right  has  the  defendant,  in  the  light  of  just 
and  beneficent  principles  of  equity,  to  shut  out  God's  free  air  and 

vate  action,  without  regard  to  the  question  of  negligence"  in  defendant. 
Congreve  v.  Smith,  18  N.  Y.  79.  Et  vide  Babbage  v.  Powers,  130  N.  Y.  281, 
29  N.  E.  132;  Adams  v.  Fletcher,  17  R.  I.  137,  20  Atl.  263.  Obstruction  of  a 
highway  by  the  operation  and  management  of  a  train  is  a  nuisance,  irre- 
spective of  negligence.    Lamming  v.  Galusha,  135  N.  Y.  239,  31  N.  E.  102-1:. 

IBS  Weld  V.  Gas-Light  Co.,  1  Starkie,  189.  Thus,  where  one  uses  his  land 
in  the  manufacture  of  fertilizers,  and  so,  necessarily,  in  the  manufacture 
of  sulphuric  acid,  in  the  process  of  which  noxious  gases  escape,  by  reason 
of  which  injury  to  his  neighbors  will  either  necessarily  or  probably  ensue, 
he  is  liable,  if  such  injury  does  result,  even  though  he  may  have  been  rea- 
sonably careful.    Frost  v.  Berkeley  Phosphate  Co.  (S.  C.)  20  S.  E.  280. 

150  Hay  V.  Cohoes  Co.,  2  X.  Y.  159;  Tremain  v.  Cohoes  Co.,  2  N.  Y.  163; 
Phinizy  v.  City  Council  of  Augusta,  47  Ga.  263.  In  an  action  against  a  mu- 
nicipal corpoi'ation,  however,  liability  under  such  circumstances  seems  to 
depend  on  negligence.  Lincoln  v.  City  of  Detroit,  101  Mich.  245,  59  N.  W, 
617;  2  Thomp.  Neg.  701;  ante,  p.  175,  "Municipal  Corporajtions."  And  see 
Boston  Belting  Co.  v.  City  of  Boston,  149  Mass.  44,  20  N.  E.  320. 

iiiTAldred's  Case,  9  Coke,  57a.  The  owner  of  land  may  erect  cheap,  mov- 
able tenement  houses  to  the  line  of  an  adjacent  owner,  and  fill  them  with  col- 
ored tenants,  to  punish  such  owner  for  refusal  to  selL  Falloon  v.  Schilling,  44 
Am.  Rep.  642.  South  Royalton  Bank  v.  Suffolk  Bank,  27  Vt.  505,  in  which 
it  was  held  that  motive  was  immaterial  in  obstruction  of  water.  So  in  Brady 
V.  Detroit  Steel  &  Spring  Co.  (Mich.)  60  N.  W.  687,  damage  from  escape  of 
pernicious  gas  may  be  recovered,  irrespective  of  intention.  Bonnell  v.  Smith, 
53  Iowa,  282,  5  N.  W.  128;  Ashby  v.  White,  1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  472,  and 
note;  Wood,  Nuis.  §  6  (but  compare  sections  141,  818);  16  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc. 
Law,  930,  collecting  cases  in  note  2.  But  see  inconsistency  with  subd.  2, 
"Noise,"  p.  944. 


Ch.    11]  THE    ANiNOYANCE    OR    INTERFERENCE.  773 

sunlight,  not  for  any  benefit  or  advantage  to  himself,  or  profit  to  his 
land,  but  simply  to  gratify  his  own  wicked  malice  against  his  neigh- 
bor." ^^'  In  such  cases  malice  is  made  an  essential  element  of  nui- 
sance by  statute  in  Massachusetts.""  If  the  person  was  actuated  in 
the  construction  of  such  fence  by  two  motives,  one  of  utility  (the 
fence  being  used  as  a  bill  board)  and  the  other  of  malice  and  annoy- 
ance, the  one  injured  cannot  recover  if  the  former  motive  con- 
trolled.^"" So,  it  is  said  that  a  noise  may  be  a  nuisance  if  mis- 
chievously or  maliciously  made,  while  a  similar  noise  might  not  be, 
if  made  in  caiTying  on  a  lawful  calling.^"  There  is,  moreover,  a 
distinct  class  of  nuisances  arising  from  interference  by  force  or 
iraud  by  the  free  exercise  of  another's  trade  or  occupation.^  "- 
Actual  or  constructive  knowledge  is  said  to  be  essential  to  charge 
a  town  with  damages  from  defects  in  a  highway,  or  from  any  other 

1S8  Morse,  J.,  In  Burke  v.  Smith,  69  Mich.  380,  37  N.  W.  838,  affirmed  in 
Flaherty  v.  Moran,  81  Mich.  52,  45  N.  W.  381,  atfirmed,  also,  in  Kirkwood 
V.  Finegan,  95  Mich.  543,  55  N.  W.  457;  Kessler  v.  Letts,  7  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  108. 
The  ordinary  rule,  however,  would  seem  to  be  that  if  a  man  wantonly  and 
maliciously  erect  on  his  premises  a  high  fence  or  window,  for  the  sole  pur- 
pose of  annoying  plaintiff,  by  obstructing  the  light  and  air  from  euterinjc 
plaintiff's  house,  and  rendering  it  unhabitable,  no  action  would  lie  on  behalf 
of  plaintiff.  Mahan  v.  Brown,  13  Wend.  2G1;  Jenkins  v.  Fowler,  24  I'a. 
St.  308-310;  Gerard  v.  Lewis,  L.  K.  2  O.  P.  305;  Jenks  v.  Williams,  ll.j  Mass. 
217;  Brothers  v.  Morris,  49  Vt  460;  McMillin  v.  Staples,  36  Iowa,  532;  Glen- 
don  Iron  Co.  V.  TJhler.  75  Pa.  St.  467;  Auburn  &  C.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Douglass,  9 
N.  Y.  444;  Stevenson  v.  Newnham,  13  C.  B.  285-297;  Lucas  v.  Nockells.  4 
Bing.  729,  10  Bing.  157.  This  is  in  accord  witb  the  earlier  conception  of  the 
law  of  tort  (auto,  c.  1,  p.  2)  that  "as  long  as  a  man  keeps  within  the  law, 
by  doing  no  act  which  violates  it,  we  must  leave  his  motive  to  Him  who 
searches  hearts."  .Jenkins  v.  Fowler,  24  Pa.  St.  308;  Adler  v.  Fenton,  24  How. 
407-il2;  Hutchins  v.,Hutchins,  7  Hill,  104;  Phelps  v.  Nowlen,  72  N.  Y.  39, 
46  N.  Y.  511;  Benjamin  v.  Wheeler,  8  Gray,  410;  Estey  v.  Smith,  45  Mich. 
402,  8  N.  W.  83.  One  who  builds  a  fence  on  a  traveled  highway  is  guilty 
of-  maintaining  a  public  nuisance,  though  he  honestly  believes  the  fence  to 
be  on  his  own  land.  Com.  v.  Dicken,  145  Pa,  St.  453,  22  Atl.  1043.  See  Chris- 
tie V.  Davey  [1893]  1  Ch.  Div.  31(i. 

100  Smith  V.  Morse,  148  Mass.  407,  19  N.  E.  393;  Ilice  v.  Moorehouse,  150 
Mass.  482,  23  N.  E.  229.  , 

160  Hunt  V.  Coggin  (N.  H.)  20  Atl.  250. 

161 16  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law,  944  (cases  collected  in  note  7). 

162  Wood,  Nuis.  §  141;  Columbus  &  H.  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Tucker,  48  Ohio 
St.  41,  26  N.   E.  630. 


774  NUISANCE.  [Ch.   11 

nuisance  which  it  is  under  obligation  to  remove/""  or  to  chari,'e  an 
owner  of  domestic  animals  with  liability  for  them  as  nuisances.^" 

236.  The  plaintiff  in  a  judicial  proceeding  against  a  nui- 
sance is  not  ordinarily  disentitled  by  having  come 
to  the  nuisance,  unless  the  right  of  the  defendant 
amounts  to  an  easement. 

The  early  cases  ^"'^  on  nuisance  held  that  one  who  came  to  a  pri- 
vate nuisance  by  that  act  disentitled  himself  to  complain  of  it.  This 
amounted  to  saying  that  if  the  nuisance  had  been  in  existence  for 
ever  so  short  a  time  before  the  plaintiff  came  to  it,  that  was  enough 
to  justify  its  continuance.  However,  this  doctrine  is  exploded. ^"^ 
No  doubt,  when  it  is  once  decided  that  a  certain  liability  or  risk 
shall  be  attached  to  a  voluntary  relation,  the  party  entering  into 
that  relation  takes  that  risk,  but  what  risks  shall  be  attached  to 
any  relation  is  a  pure  question  of  policy  in  the  particular  instance. 
And  it  is  the  policy  of  the  law  that  a  purchaser  is  not  disentitled  by 
having  come  to  a  nuisance.^"'  "Carrying  on  an  offensive  trade  for 
twenty  years  in  a  place  remote  from  buildings  and  public  roads 
does  not  entitle  the  owner  to  continue  it  in  the  same  place  after 
houses  have  been  built  and  roads  laid  out  in  the  neighborhood,  to 
the  occupants  of  and  travelers  upon  which  it  is  a  nuisance."  ^"^    But 

183  Foster  v.  Boston,  127  ilass.  290;  Reed  v.  Inhabitants  of  Northfield,  lo 
Pick.  94;  Conhocton  Stone  Road  v.  Buffalo,  N.  Y.  &  E.  R.  Co.,  51  N.  Y.  573; 
Morse  v.  Borough  of  I<''air  Haven,  48  Conn.  220. 

16*  Spalding  v.  Oakes'  Adm'r,  42  Vt.  343;  Partlow  v.  Hasgarty,  35  Ind. 
178;  Kelly  v.  Tilton,  *42  N.  Y.  263. 

186  2  Cooley,  Bl.  §  403;  Susquehanna  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Malone,  73  Md.  268, 
20  Atl.  900  (reviewing  many  cases). 

168  Fertilizing  Co.  v.  Hyde  Park,  07  U.  S.  059;  :McC;illum  v.  Gcrmantowu, 
54  Pa.  St.  40;  Bi-ady  v.  Weeks,  3  Barb.  157;  Smith  v.  Phillips,  8  Phila.  It); 
EUiotson  v.  Feethain,  2  Bing.  N.  C.  134;  Bliss  v.  Hall,  4  Bing.  N.  C.  183; 
Barwell  v.  Brooks,  1  Law  T.  75.  And  see  Hazard  Powder  Co.  v.  Volgor,  7 
C.  C.  A-  130,  58  Fed.  152;  People  v.  Detroit  White  Lead  Works,  82  Jlich. 
471-477,  46  N.  W.  735. 

167  Holmes,  J.,  in  Boston  Ferrule  Co.  v.  Hills,  159  Mass.  147-151,  34  N.  E. 
85,  citing  cases.  Wood,  Nuis.  §§  574.  575;  10  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law,  934,  note 
1,  cases  collected  in  number. 

168  Com.  v.  Upton,  6  Gray,  473. 


Ch-    11]  THK    ANNClYA.NCE    OR    INTEEFEKEKCp;.  775 

it  is  not  accurate  to  say  that  it  is  "wholly  immaterial"  that  the 
plaintiff  has  come  to  a  nuisance.  A  distinction  is  recognized,  es- 
pecially with  respect  to  restraining  by  an  injunction/""  between 
a  long-established  business  which  has  jbecome  a  nuisance  in  a  lo- 
cality from  increase  of  business,  and  a  new  erection  threatened  in 
such  vicinity.  A  right,  however,  to  commit  a  private  nuisance  may 
be  acquired  by  prescription,  as  by  an  easement.^^"  It  seems,  also, 
that  an  estoppel  to  object  to  a  nuisance,  to  the  continuance  of  which 
there  is  no  prescriptive  right  because  the  acquiesrence  is  short  of 
20  years,  may  be  based  upon  conduct  inducing  the  puty  causing 
the  nuisance  to  incur  legal  expenditures."^ 

237.  In  determining  Tvliat  annoyance  amounts  to  a  nui- 
sance, the  courts  are  governed  by  practical  consid- 
erations as  to  the  thing  done,  the  place  -wrhere,  and 
the  circumstances  under  -wrhich,  it  is  done."^ 

A  business  which  is  necessary  and  useful  in  large  communities, 
and  which  is  not  a  nuisance  in  itself,  may  become  so  in  view  of  the 
circumstances  in  the  neighborhood  in  which  it  is  proposed.^ ^■' 
"Two  things  essential  to  general  prosperity  and  happiness  are 
useful  trades  whereby  people  are  supplied  with  things  necessary  in 
life,  and  healthful  and  peaceful  dwellings.  And  the  structures  for 
habitation  and  trade  cannot  well  be  remote  from  one  another. 
Here,  therefore,  are  two  interests  traveling  to  one  ultimate  goal, 

169  Wier's  Appeal,  74  Pa.  St.  230  (where  the  erection  of  a  powder  maga- 
zine was  restrained).  And  see  City  of  New  Castle  v.  Eaney,  130  Pa.  St.  546, 
18  Atl.  1066. 

170  Post,  p.  792,  "Legalized  Nuisance,"  note  250. 

171  Campbell  v.  Seaman,  63  N.  T.  568;  Radenhurst  v.  Ooate,  6  Grant  (U.  C.) 
139;  Dewell  v.  Sanders,  Cro.  Jac.  490.  Of.  City  of  New  Castle  t.  Raney, 
130  Pa.  St.  546,  .j5T,  18  Atl.  1066. 

172  John  B.  Gest,  article  in  1  Am.*  Law  Reg.  &  Rev.  (N.  S.)  112. 

17  3  Pennoyer  v.  Allen,  56  Wis.  502,  14  N.  W.  609;  City  of  Fresno  v.  Fresno 
Canal  &  Irr.  Co.,  98  Cal  179,  32  Pac.  943;  Cleveland  v.  Citizens'  Co.,  20  N.  J. 
Bq.  201.  Et  vide  Slaughter-House  Case,  16  Wall.  36;  New  Orleans  Gas  Light 
Co.  V.  Louisiana  Light  &  Heat  Producing  &  Manuf'g  Co.,  115  U.  S.  650-669,  6 
Sup.  Ct.  252;  Aldred's  Case,  9  Coke,  57a;  Jones  v.  Powell,  Palm.  530.  Of. 
Broder  v.  Saillard,  2  Ch.  Div.  692-701;  Reinhardt  v.  Mentasti,  42  Oh.  Div. 
685. 


776  NUISANCE.  [Ch.   11 

yet  in  constant  conflict  during  the  journey.  And  the  courts,  in 
administering  justice  between  them,  necessarily  request  each  to  lay 
aside  something  of  what  pertains  to  mere  convenience  and  com- 
fort, yet  they  permit  each  to  stand  so  far  on  its  own  rights  as  not 
to  be  destroyed."  ^'*  In  this  unavoidable  conflict,  the  courts  will 
interfere  with  the  transaction  of  business,  by  means  of  injunction, 
with  great  caution.^' °  Public  convenience,  and  even  public  neces- 
sity, does  not  justify  the  continuance  of  a  nuisance,  or  constitute 
a  reason  wtj  an  injunction  should  not  be  issued.  Thus,  neither 
the  advantage  nor  need  that  the  city  of  New  York  should  have 
some  place  where  it  can,  deposit  and  utilize  its  filth  justifies  a  per- 
son in  carrying  on  a  rendering  establishment,  so  offensive  and  dis- 
agreeable as  to  render  life  uncomfortable,  nor  compels  neighboring 
residents  to  submit  to  such  consequences  as  damnum  absque  in- 
juria.^^''      The  existence  of  similar  nuisances  in  the  same  locality 

17*  Bish.  Noncont.  Law,  §  418,  citing  Sanderson  v.  Pennsylvania  Coal  Co., 
86  Pa.  St.  401;  Daniels  v.  Keokuk  Waterworks,  61  Iowa,  549,  16  N.  W.  705; 
SicCaft'ery's  Appeal,  105  Pa.  St.  253;  Daughtry  v.  Warren,  85  N.  G.  136. 
The  leading  English  cases  on  tliis  point  are  Hole  v.  Barlow,  4  C.  B.  (N.  S.) 
334;  Kich  v.  Basterfield,  4  C.  B.  783;  Bamford  v.  Turnley,  3  Best  &  S.  66. 
And  the  like  will  be  found  discussed  in  Bigelow,  Lead.  Gas.  465-467.  In 
Ball,  Lead.  Gas.  (1884)  406-409,  the  same  language  is  employed  (see  pref- 
ace). A  further  discussion  of  the  English  cases  will  be  found  in  Campbell 
V.  Seaman,  63  N.  T.  568. 

17  6  "It  would  have  been  wrong,  as  it  seems  to  me,  for  this  court,  in  the 
reign  of  Henry  VI.,  to  have  interfered  with  the  further  use  of  sea  coal  in 
London,  because  it  has  been  ascertained  to  their  satisfaction,  or  predicted 
to  their  satisfaction,  that  by  the  reign  of  Queen  Victoria  both  white  and 
red  roses  would  have  ceased  to  bloom  in  the  temple  gardens.  If  some  pictur- 
esque haven  opens  its  arms  to  invite  the  commerce  of  the  world,  it  is  not  for 
this  court  to  forbid  the  embrace,  although  the  fruit  of  it  should  be  the 
sights  and  sounds  and  smells  of  a  common  seaport  and  ship-building  town, 
which  would  drive  the  Dryads  and  their  master  from  their  ancient  solitudes." 
James,  L.  J.,  in  Salvin  v.  North  Brancepeth  Coal  Co.,  9  Ch.  App.  705-709, 
refusing  an  injunction  to  stop  large  commercial  works  because  of  alleged 
smoke  nuisance.  "A  court  exercising  the  power  of  chancellor,  whose  arm 
may  fall  with  crushing  force  upon  the  every-day  business  of  men,  destroying 
lawful  means  of  support,  and  diverting  property  from  the  legitimate  uses, 
cannot  approach  such  eases  as  this  with  too  much  caution."  Agnew,  J.,  in 
Huckenstine's  Appeal,  70  Pa.  St.  102-106.    Post,  p.  799,  "Injunction." 

178  Meigs  V.  Lister,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  199-205;    Fertilizing  Co.  v.  Hyde  Park,  97 


Ch.    11]  THE    ANNOYANCE    OR    l.NTKRFEKENCE.  777 

is  not  necessarily  an  excuse/"  However,  in  determining  how  far 
locality  enters  into  a  nuisance,  the  courts  are  governed  by  practical 
considerations."*     The  usefulness,^'''  the  relative  convenience,"" 

U.  S.  659;  Susquehanna  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Malone,  73  Md.  2G8-280,  20  Atl.  900; 
Bennington  v.  Klein,  6  Wtly.  Notes  Gas.  281;  Attorney  General  v.  Council, 
«tc.,  of  Birmingliam,  4  Kay  &  J.  528.  So  a  livery  stable:  Craven  v.  Roden- 
hausen  (Pa.  Sup.)  21  Atl.  774;  GifEord  v.  Hulett,  02  Vt  342,  19  Atl.  230;  Fil- 
son  V.  Crawford  (Sup.)  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  882;  Robinson  v.  Smith,  53  Hun,  638, 
7  N.  Y.  Supp.  38;  Shivery  v.  Streeper,  24  Fla.  103,  3  South.  865.  Et  vido 
livery  stable  cases  collected  in  Webb,  Pol.  Torts,  p.  505;  Wood,  Nuis.  679-682, 
note.  Cf.  Lippincott  v.  Lasher,  44  N.  .7.  Bq.  120,  14  Atl.  103.  Stock  yards: 
Shirlely  v.  Railway  Co.,  74  Iowa,  169,  37  N.  W.  133.  Manufacturing,  produc- 
ing "overpowering,  intolerable,  and  crashing  vibrations":  McCaffrey's  Ap- 
peal, 105  Pa.  St.  25.3-255. 

m  Euler  V.  Sullivan,  75  Md.  610,  23  Ati.  845;  Aldrich  v.  Howard,  8  R.  I. 
246;    Fay  v.  Whitman,  100  Mass.  70;    Crossley  v.  Tomey,  2  Ch.  Div.  533. 

17  8  Demarest  v.  Hardham,  34  N.  J.  Eq.  469.  "In  the  Sanderson  Case  [San- 
derson V.  Pennsylvania  Coal  Co.,  86  Pa.  St  401]  the  property  of  a  coal  com- 
pany could  not  be  used  without  fouling  the  water.  The  great  public  interests 
and  the  private  rights  of  mining  could  not  be  sacrificed  to  preserve  the  inferior 
right  and  interest  of  the  lower  proprietor.  The  reason  for  the  general  rule 
failed,  and  the  rule  was  not  followed."  See  Collins  v.  Chartiers  Val.  Gas 
Co.,  131  Pa.  St.  143-152,  18  Atl.  1012.  A  slaughterhouse  may  without  oftense 
be  located  and  conducted  in  the  outsiiirts  of  a  city,  away  from  the  abodes  of 
its  inhabitants,  and  in  such  case  it  would  not  be  a  nuisance;  but  if  the  same 
business  should  be  operated  on  a  residence  street,  and  in  close  contact  with 
the  homes  of  the  people,  it  might  become  a  great  offense  and  a  nuisance  that 
then  ought  to  be  abated.  GiU,  J.,  in  Bielman  v.  Railroad  Co.,  50  Mo.  App. 
151-154,  citing  Craven  v.  Eodenhausen  (Pa.  Sup.)  21  Atl.  774;  Whitney  v. 
Bartholomew,  21  Conn.  213;  Wylie  v.  Blwood,  134  111.  281,  25  N.  B.  570; 
Flint  V.  Russell,  5  Dill.  151,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  4,876;   State  v.  Ball,  59  Mo.  321. 

179  Tanner  v.  Trustees,  etc.,  of  Albion,  5  Hill,  121.  Circus:  Inchbald  v. 
Robinson,  4  Gh.  App.  388.  Et  vide  Walker  v.  Brewster,  L.  R.  5  Eq.  2:,. 
Bawdyhouse:  Cranford  v.  Tyrrell,  128  N.  Y.  341,  28  N.  E.  514;  Miller  v.  Blue, 
43  Kan.  441,  23  Pac.  588;  Marsan  v.  French,  61  Tex.  173;  Hamilton  v.  Whit- 
ridge,  11  Md.  128. 

180  Pilcher  v.  Hart,  1  Humph.  (Tenn.)  524;  RadclifC  v.  Mayor,  4  N.  Y.  195; 
Carroll  v.  Wisconsin  Cent.  R.  Co.,  40  Minn.  168,  41  N.  W.  661.  Cf.  Attorney 
General  v.  Conservators,  1  Hem.  &  M.  1;  Hilton  v.  Earl,  5  Q.  B.  701;  Morris 
&  E.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Prudden,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  530;  Richard's  Appeal,  57  Pa.  St  105- 
113.  That  the  mill  complained  of  as  a  nuisance  occasioned  no  more  annoy- 
ance'than  other  similar  mills  is  proper  evidence.  Sliepard  v.  Hill,  151  Mass. 
540,  24  N.  E.  1025. 


778  NUISANCE.  [Ch.  IL 

priority  in  establishment/*^  danger,^*'  temporary  character,  law- 
fulness of  object,'"^  and  similar  considerations  are  given  due 
weight.^"  It  is  constantly  said  to  be  the  law,  however,  that  bene- 
ficial character  will  not  excuse  or  justify  the  continuance  of  a  pub- 
lic nuisance,^^^  and  that  no  place  is  convenient  or  proper  for  th<^ 
maiiilpnance  thereof.^*" 

238.  Annoyance,  to  constitute  a  nuisance,  must  cause  sub- 
stantial damage;  for  damages  are  the  gist  of  the 
Tvrong,  unless  there  is  a  physical  invasion  of,  or 
interference  with,  another's  property,  in  which  case 
the  presence  or  absence  of  actual  damage  is  imma- 
terial. 

The  creating  or  continuing  of  a  nuisance  in  any  form  which  in- 
volves the  phj'sical  invasion  of  or  interference  with  another's  prop- 
erty is  a  wrong  for  which  at  least  nominal  damages  may  be  recover- 

181  Whitney  v.  Bartholomew,  21  Conn.  213;  Wiers'  Appeal,  74  Pa,  St  230; 
Robinson  v.  Baugh,  31  Mich.  290;    Rhodes  v.  Dunbar,  57  Pa.  St.  274. 

182  Ante,  p.  7G!);  McAndrews  v.  CoUerd,  42  N.  J.  Law,  189;  Williams  v.  East 
India  Co.,  3  East,  192. 

183  Ball  v.  Ray,  8  App.  Gas.  467;  Harrison  v.  South wark  &  V.  Water  Co. 
[1891]  2  Ch.  409. 

184  Tuttle  v.  Church,  53  Fed.  422,  in  which  many  cases  are  collected  and 
considered.  As  to  abatement  by  improved  mechanism:  Weil  v.  Schultz,  33- 
How.  Prac.  7.  Constancy  of  nuisance  as  an  element:  Fay  v.  Whitman,  100 
Mass.  76;  Meigs  v.  Lister,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  199;  Campbell  v.  Seaman,  63  N.  Y. 
568. 

186  Cases  collected  in  Wood,  Nuis.  §  19;  16  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law,  932,  note 
1.  In  People  v.  Detroit  White  Lead  Works,  82  Mich.  471-479,  4C  N.  W.  735, 
Grant,  J.,  said  that  no  case  has  been  cited,  and  we  think  none  can  be  found, 
sustaining  the  continuance  of  a  business  in  the  midst  of  a  populous  com- 
munity which  constantly  produces  odors,  smoke,  and  soot  of  such  a  noxious 
character  as  to  such  an  extent  that  they  produce  headache,  nausea,  vomiting, 
and  other  pains  and  aches  injurious  to  health,  and  taint  the  food  of  the  in- 
habitants. Et  vide  City  of  Grand  Rapids  v.  Weiden,  97  Mich.  82,  56  N.  W. 
233;  Susquehanna  Fei-tilizer  Co.  v.  Malone,  73  Md.  268,  20  Atl.  900;  Lurssen 
V.  Lloyd,  76  Md.  360,  25  Atl.  294. 

180  Bamford  v.  Turnley,  3  Best  &  S.  62.  The  jury  cannot  be  asked  whether 
the  causing  of  a  nuisance  was  a  natural  and  reasonable  use  of  defendant's 
own  land. 


f'h.    11]  THE    ANNOYANCE    OR    INTERFERENCE.  779 

ed.i"  Neither  absence  of  actual  ^'*  damages,  nor  even  benefit  from 
the  nuisance,  nor  abatement,  will  prevent  such  recovery.^*"  Thus, 
the  overhanging  of  another's  land  is  a  nuisance  for  which  an  action 
will  lie  without  allegation  or  proof  of  actual  damages/""  So,  to 
cause  water  to  flow  wrongfully  upon  anotlier's  land  in  such  a  way 
that  its  continuance  M'ould  create  an  easement  is  sufficient  to  justify 
an  injunction,  irrespective  of  damages."^ 

But  when  the  act  complained  of  is  lawful  in  itself,  a  different  rule 
prevails.  Then  it  is  only  when  some  actual  damage  is  done  that  a 
right  of  action  ensues.^'"'  Where  the  nuisance  complained  of  is  in- 
jurious to  property,  the  damage  must  be  substantial.  "Everything 
must  be  looked  at  from  a  reasonable  point  of  view.  The  law  does 
not  regard  a  trifling  inconvenience,  but  only  large,  sensible  incon- 
veniences and  injuries,  which  sensibly  diminish  the  comfort,  en- 
joyment, or  value  of  the  property  which  they  affect"  ^°^  To  main- 
tain an  action  for  nuisance  against  the  proprietor  of  a  lawful  busi- 
ness carried  on  in  neighborhood  of  another's  premises,  it  must  be 
shown  that  the  latter  has  suffered  a  substantial  injury  because  of 

187  Frank  v.  New  Orleans  &  C.  R.  Co.,  20  La.  Ann.  25;  Tootle  v.  Clifton,  22 
Ohio  St.  247;  Casebeer  v.  Mowry,  93  Am.  Dee.  766;  Munroe  v.  Stickney,  48 
Me.  462;  Blodgett  v.  Stone,  60  N.  H.  167;  Alexander  v.  Kerr,  2  Rawle  (Pa.) 
83;   Cooper  v.  Dolvin,  56  Am.  Rep.  872. 

188  Kimel  v.  Kimel,  4  Jones  (N.  C.)  121;  Marcy  v.  Fries,  18  Kan.  353.  Et 
vide  Francis  v.  Schoellkopf,  58  N.  Y.  152;  Wesson  v.  Washburn  Iron  Co.,  13 
Allen,  95. 

189  Gleason  v.  Gary,  4  Conn.  418;   Call  v.  Buttrick,  4  Cush.  345. 

190  Tucker  v.  Newman,  11  Adol.  &  E.  40;  Baxter  v.  Taylor,  4  Barn.  &  Adol. 
72;  Fay  v.  Prentice,  14  Law  J.  C.  P.  (N.  S.)  298;  Bellows  v.  Sackett,  15  Barb. 
96;  Codman  v.  Evans,  7  Allen,  431;  post,  p.  799,  "Abatement";  ante,  p.  746, 
note  12. 

101  Learned  v.  Castle,  78  Cal.  454,  18  Pac.  872,  and  21  Pac.  11  (see  cases 
collected  on  pages  455-461,  78  Cal.,  page  872,  18  I'ac,  and  page  11,  21  Pac); 
Cooper  V.  Randall,  53  111.  24.  The  right  of  a  riparian  owner  to  have  the  stream 
flow  as  it  is  wont  to  do  by  nature,  subject  to  the  reasonable  use  of  othtr  pro- 
prietors, is  a  substantial  right  which  a  court  of  equity  will  enforce  thougjh 
the  damages  flowing  from  such  diversion  are  slight  or  merely  nominal  (Hoyt, 
J.,  dissenting).     Rigney  v.  Tacoma  Light  &  \\'ater  Co.  (Wash.)  38  Pac.  147. 

192  3  Suth.  Dam.  §  1085. 

isa  St.  Helens  Smelting  Co.  v.  Tipping,  11  H.  L.  Oas.  642;  Pickard  v. 
Cdllins,  23  Barb.  444;  Mahan  v.  Brown,  13  AVend.  201;  Barnes  v.  Hathom, 
54  Me.  124;   Rhodes  v.  Dunbar,  57  Pa.  St.  274. 


780  NUISANCE.  [Ch.  11 

an  unlawful  act  or  act  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  proprietor  in 
the  conduct  of  such  business.  Neither  depreciation  in  the  selling 
or  rental  value  of  real  estate,  nor  some  personal  discomfort  or 
annoyance  resulting  from  such  business,  necessarily  gives  a  cause 
of  action.!"*  If,  however,  the  effect  is  such  that  the  property  can- 
not be  enjoyed  as  fully  as  before,  or  renders  it  unfit  for  habitation 
by  increased  dangers,  or  has  substantially  impaired  its  value,  the 
law  will  treat  the  alleged  wrong  as  a  nuisance.^""  It  is  not  neces- 
sary that  the  owner  should  be  driven  from  his  dwelling.^''  It  is 
not,  however,  strictly  accurate  to  say  that  the  maxim  "De  minimis 
non  curat  lex"  applies.^"^  A  nuisance  may  be  independent  of  ac- 
tual damages.!"* 

Substantial  Interference  voith  Comfort. 

Where  the  wrong  complained  of  is  the  interference  with  the  ordi- 
nary physical  comfort  of  human  existence,  it  is  not  necessary  that 
the  offense  should  amount  to  an  injury  to  health.  The  discomfort 
must,  however,  be  physical,  and  not  such  as  depends  upon  the  taste 
or  imagination.!""  In  such  cases  the  degree  of  harm  must  be  great- 
er than  in  an  action  for  injury  to  property.^""  It  was  said  in  a  lead- 
ing English  case  that  "there  may  be  such  a  thing  as  legal  nuisance 
from  noise  in  a  manufacturing  or  other  populous  town."  ^"^     "But  a 

13*  Applied  to  operation  of  a  gas  generator,  Keiser  v.  Mahanoy  City  Gas 
Oc,  143  Pa.  St.  276,  22  Atl.  759.  Compare  Robb  v.  Carnegie  Bros.  &  Co.,  145 
Pa.  St.,  324,  22  Atl.  649. 

195  Ryan  V.  Copes,  11  Rich.  Law  (S.  0.)  217;  Waters-Pierce  Oil  Co.  t. 
Cook,  6  Tex.  Civ.  App.  578,  26  S.  W.  96;  Lansing  v.  Smith,  8  Cow.  146; 
Gibson  v.  Donk,  7  Mo.  App.  37. 

190  Bohan  v.  Port  Jervis  Gas-Light  Co.,  122  N.  Y.  18,  25  N.  E.  246;  Waters- 
Pierce  Oil  Co.  V.  Cook,  6  Tex.  Civ.  App.  573,  26  S.  W.  96. 

197  Wood,  Nuis.  §  7. 

IDS  Ante,  p.  779,  notes  187-191. 

190  Cleveland  v.  Citizens'  Gas-Light  Co.,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  201;  Coker  v.  Birge, 
9  Ga.  425;   Salvin  v.  North  Brancepeth  Coal  Co.,  9  Oh.  App.  705. 

200  Bigelow,  Lead.  Cas.  467;  Ball,  Lead.  Cas.  410;  Walter  v.  Selfe,  4  De 
Gex  &  S.  315;  Beardmore  v.  Tredwell,  3  Glff.  683;  Crump  v.  Lambert,  L.  R. 
3  Eq.  409;  post,  p.  847,  negligence  cases  as  to  blasting,  powder  magazines, 
dangerous  places,  etc. 

201  Soltau  V.  De  Held,  2  Sim.  (N.  S.)  133.  See  case  above,  where  the 
ringing  of  bells  by  a  Catholic  church  in  London  was  enjoined.  Davis  v. 
Sawyer,  133  Mass.  289;    Leete  v.  Pilgrim  Congregational  Soc,  14  Mo.  App. 


^h-    11]  THE    ANNOYANCE    OR    INTERFERENCK.  781 

nuisance  of  this  Itind  is  much  more  difiQcult  to  prove  than  when  the 
injury  complained  of  is  the  demonstrable  effect  of  a  visible  or  tan- 
gible case,  as  when  waters  are  fouled  by  sewerage,  or  when  the 
fumes  of  mineral  acids  pass  through  chimneys  of  factories  or  other 
works  over  lands  or  houses,  producing  deleterious  physical  changes 
which  science  can  trace  and  explain.  A  nuisance  by  noise  (sup- 
posing malice  to  be  out  of  the  question)  is  emphatically  a  question 
of  degree.  If  my  neighbor  builds  a  house  against  a  party  wall  next 
to  my  own,  and  I  hear  from  the  wall  more  than  is  agreeable  to  me 
of  the  sounds  from  his  nursery  or  music  room,  it  does  not  follow, 
even  if  I  am  nervously  sensitive  or  in  infirm  health,  that  I  can  bring 
an  action  or  obtain  an  injunction.  Such  things,  to  offend  against 
the  law,  must  be  done  in  a  manner  which,  beyond  fair  controversy, 
ought  to  be  regarded  as  excessive  and  unreasonable."  ""^ 

590;  HaiTison  v.  Rector,  etc.,  of  St.  Mark's  Church,  12  Phila.  259.  Compare 
Rogers  v.  Elliott,  146  Mass.  349,  15  N.  E.  768;  Trustees  of  First  Baptist 
Church  V.  Utica  &  S.  R.  Co.,  6  Barb.  313.  Steam  whistle  may  constitute  a 
nuisance.  Parker  v.  Union  Woolen  Co.,  42  Conn.  399;  Knight  v.  Goodyear's 
India  Rubber  Glove  Manuf'g  Co.,  38  Conn.  438.  Et  vide  interesting  note 
7,  p.  944,  16  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law,  by  L.  M.  Countryman,  Esq. 

202  Lord  Selbome  in  Gaunt  v.  Pynney,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  App.  8-11,  27  Ch.  Div. 
43.  Et  vide  Newson  v.  Pender,  Vice  Chancellor  Knight-Bruce,  quoted  in 
Underh.  Torts,  415:  The  criterion  is  whether  the  inconvenience  should  be 
considered  as  more  than  a  mere  delicacy  or  fastidiousness,  or  an  inconven- 
ience materially  interfering  with  the  ordinary  comfort,  physically,  of  human  ex- 
istence, and  not  merely  according  to  elegant  or  dainty  habits  of  living,  but  ac- 
cording to  the  plain,  sober,  and  sample  notions  of  English  people.  Vice  Chancel- 
lor Knight-Bruce  in  Walter  v.  Selfe,  4  De  Gex  &  S.  315-322;  Crump  v.  Lam- 
bert, L.  R.  3  Eq.  409;  Soltau  v.  De  Held,  2  Sim.  (N.  S.)  133;  Baltimore  &  P.  R. 
Co.  V.  Fifth  Baptist  Church,  lOS  U.  S.  317-329,  2  Sup.  Ct.  719;  Cooke  v.  Forbes, 
L.  R.  5  Eq.  166;  Ross  v.  Butler,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  294;  Attorney  General  v.  Steward, 
20  N.  J.  Eq.  415;  Duncan  v.  Hayes,  22  N.  J.  Eq.  25;  Columbus  Gas  Co.  v.  Free- 
land,  12  Ohio  St.  392-399;  Blanchard  v.  Reybum,  10  Phila.  427;  Cooper  v. 
Randall,  53  111.  24.  Jlere  theoretical  injury  is  not  sufficient.  Thompson  v. 
Crocker,  9  Pick.  59.  Compare  Oakley  Mills  v.  Neese,  54  Ga.  459.  Injury 
to  plaintiff's  feelings  by  being  deprived  of  lateral  support  to  land  intended 
for  burial  place  cannot  be  considered  where  the  defendant  intended  no  in- 
jury, although  he  was  grossly  careless.  White  v.  Dresser,  135  Mass.  150; 
Meagher  v.  DriscoU,  99  Mass.  281.  Plaintiff's  recovery  for  damages  oc- 
casioned by  dumping  dead  cattle  into  a  stream  of  water  which  he  uses 
does  not  extend  to  the  mental  or  bodily  suffering  of  his  wife  or  children,  nor 


782  NUISANCE.  [Ch.   11 

KINDS  OF  NUISANCES. 

239.  Nuisances  for  which  a  private    action  will  lie   may- 

be either — 

(a)  Public,  private,  or  mixed; 

(b)  Continuing;  or 

(c)  Legalized. 

SAME— PUBLIC,  PRIVATE,  AND  MIXED  NUISANCES. 

240.  To  entitle  a  private  person  to  maintain  an  action  for 

a  public  nuisance,  the  injury   complained  of  must 
be— 

(a)  Peculiar  to  the  plaintiff  in  kind,  not  merely  in   de- 

gree; 

(b)  Substantial,  not  fanciful  or  evanescent; 

(c)  The  proximate  result  of  the  conduct  complained  of.™' 

Kinds  of  Nuisances  for  Which  a  Private  Action  mny  Lie. 

Public  nuisances  affect  the  public,  and  are  annoyances  to  all  the 
king's  subjects.  They  are  public  wrongs.'"'*  They  result  from  the 
violation  of  public  rights,  and  produce  no  special  injury  to  one  more 
than  another  of  the  people,  and  may  be  said  to  have  a  common  effect 
and  produce  a  common  damage.  ^"^  The  criterion  by  which  to  deter- 
mine whether  a  particular  case  is  to  be  classed  as  a  public  or  a  pri- 
vate nuisance  seems  to  depend  upon  the  consideration  of  whether 
it  be  indictable  or  not.  Moreover, while  a  private  nuisance,  generally 
speaking,  is  created  upon  the  premises  of  the  defendant,  a  public  nui- 
sance may  be  created  either  upon  defendant's  premises  or  upon  the 
land  of  the  public.^"*     Mr.  Wood  ^°'  distinguishes  mixed  nuisances, 

to  his  own  mental  anguish  caused  by  tlieir  suffering.     Gulf,  0.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.  v.    Reed  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  22  S.  W.  283. 

203  Brett,  .T.,  in  Benjamin  v.  Storr,  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  400-iOO. 

204  3  Bl.  Comm.  §  217.  Et  vide  Steph.  Dig.  Cr.  Law,  art.  170;  Wesson  v. 
Washburn  Iron  Co.,  13  Allen  (Mass.)  95-101. 

20  5  Wood,  Nuis.  §  14. 

206  Bigelow,  Lead.  Cas.  46.5.     As  permitting  a  sewer  to  overflow:    Waters 

2  07  Wood,  Nuis.  §  16. 


^^^-   11]  KINDS    OF    NUISANCES.  783 

which  are  both  public  and  private  in  their  nature  (public,  in  that 
they  produce  injury  to  many  persons,  or  to  all  the  public;  and  pri- 
vate, because  at  the  same  time  they  produce  a  special  and  particular 
injury  to  private  rights),  which  subject  the  wrongdoer  to  indictment 
by  the  public  and  to  damages  at  the  suit  of  persons  injured.  Pri- 
vate nuisances,  on  the  other  hand,  are  injuries  that  result  from  the 
violation  of  private  rights  and  produce  damages  to  but  one  or  a  few 
persons,  so  that  they  cannot  be  said  to  be  public.^"'  With  public 
nuisances  pure  and  simple  there  is  no  further  logical  concern  here.-"" 

V.  City  of  Newark,  50  N.  J.  Law,  .301,  28  AH.  717;  Davis  v.  Winslow,  81  Am. 
Dec.  573;  Mayor  v.  Jlarriott,  CO  Am.  Dec.  326;  Rung  v.  Shoneberger,  26  Am. 
Dec.  95;  South  Carolina  K.  Co.  v.  Moore,  73  Am.  Dec.  778.  Mitchell,  J.,  in 
Aldrich  v.  Wetmore,  52  Minn.  164-171,  53  N.  W.  1072,  says:  "It  is  the  nature 
of  the  right  affected,  and  not  the  number  who  suffer,  which  determines  wheth- 
er a  private  action  will  lie  for  creating  or  maintaining  a  public  nuisance." 

208  Burditt  V.  Swenson,  67  Am.  Dec.  005.  But  a  fruit  stand  on  the  street 
is.  State  v.  Berdetta,  38  Am.  Rep.  117.  Obsti'uctlon  of  an  alley  has  been 
held  not  to  be  a  public  nuisance.     Bagley  v.  People,  38  Am.  Rep.  192. 

^09  Some  modem  cases  on  public  nuisance  may,  however,  be  instructive 
and  useful.  As  to  privies,  see  Com.  v.  Roberts,  155  Mass.  281,  29  N.  E.  522. 
Deposit  of  night  soil:  State  v.  Board  of  Health  of  City  of  Newark,  54  N.  J. 
Law,  325,  23  Atl.  949  (et  vide  Dierks  v.  Commissioners,  142  111.  197,  31  N.  E, 
496;  Town  v.  Carins,  44  Mo.  App.  88).  Stagnant  water:  City  of  Rochester  v. 
Simpson,  134  N.  Y.  414,  31  N.  E.  871.  Manufacturing  fertilizers:  People  v. 
Rosenberg,  138  N.  Y.  410,  34  N.  E.  285;  State  v.  Wolf,  112  N.  C.  889,  17  S. 
H.  528;  Darcantel  v.  Refrigerating  Co.,  44  La.  Ann.  032,  11  South.  239;  State 
v.  Neidt  (N.  J.  Ch.)  19  Atl.  318;  Seacord  v.  People,  121  111.  023,  13  N.  E.  194. 
Brickkiln:  Huckenstine's  Appeal,  70  Pa.  St.  102;  Com.  v.  Miller,  139  Pa. 
.St.  77,  21  Atl.  138.  Hog  pens:  Com.  v.  Perry,  139  Mass.  198,  29  N.  E.  656; 
Gay  V.  State,  90  Tenn.  645,  18  S.  W.  200.  Coal  shed:  Wylie  v.  Elwood,  134 
111.  281,  25  N.  E.  570.  Fire-engine  house:  Van  De  Vere  v.  Kansas  City,  107 
Mo.  83,  17  S.  W.  695.  Permanent  obstruction  to  public  street,  as  a  bridge: 
Rybee  v.  State,  48  Am.  Rep.  175;  Reed  v.  City  of  Birmingham,  92  Ala.  339,  9 
South,  101;  Laing  v.  City  of  Americus,  86  Ga.  75;j.  13  .S.  E.  107:  Chicago,  B. 
&  Q.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Quincy,  130  111.  489,  27  N.  E.  2:j2;  Marine  Ins.  Co.  v. 
St.  Louis,  1.  M.  i&  S.  Ry.  Co.,  41  Eed.  043.  The  draining  of  offensive  and  dan- 
gerous matter  of  a  large  factory  into  the  public  gutters  of  a  city  is  a  nui- 
sance per  se  deti-imontal  to  health.  Board  of  Health  v.  Maglnnis  Cotton  Mills, 
46  La.  Ann.  800,  15  South.  164.  Approaches  to  a  bridge:  Com.  v.  Pittston 
Ferry  Bridge  Co.,  148  Pa.  St.  621,  24  Atl.  87.  Running  ti-action  engine  on 
highway:  Com.  v.  Allen,  148  Pa.  St.  358,  23  Atl.  1115.  Electric  work:  United 
States  Illuminating  Co.  v.  Grant,  55  Hun,  222,  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  788.     Powder 


784  NUISANCE.  [Ch.  11 

Prlcnte  Action  for  Public  Xnisimce. 

Although  for  a  public  nuisance,  so  far  as  it  affects  the  public  gen- 
erally,^^" no  private  action  lies,  yet  an  individual  who  suffers  a  spe- 
cial injury  or  damage  more  than  the  rest  of  the  community  at  large 
may  have  an  action  in  respect  to  his  special  damage."^  Such  special 
damage  is  not  sufiQcient  if  it  be  trifling.  It  must  be  substantial,  as 
where  it  seriously  affects  the  substance  and  value  of  property-^*^^  It  is 
not  suflicient  if  remote."^  To  support  such  an  action  the  damage  must 

magaaine:  Laflin  &  R.  Powder  Co.  v.  Teai-ney,  131  111.  322,  23  N.  B.  389. 
Rock-crushing  machine:  City  of  Kansas  v.  McAleer,  31  Mo.  App.  433.  As  to 
constitutionality  of  statute  defining  public  nuisances,  and  providing  for  their 
redress  and  prevention,  see  Scovill  v.  McMaion,  62  Conn.  378,  26  Atl.  479; 
City  Council  of  City  of  Charleston  v.  Werner,  38  S.  C.  488,  17  S.  E.  33;  Jen- 
kins V.  Ballantyne,  8  Utah,  245,  30  Pac.  760;  Ex  parte  Sing  Lee,  96  Cal.  354, 
31  Pac.  245;  People  v.  Board  of  Health,  58  Hun,  595,  12  N.  Y.  Supp.  561; 
State  V.  Earnhardt,  107  N.  C.  789,  12  S.  E.  426.  Abatement  by  board  of  health: 
Greene  v.  Inhabitants  of  Milford,  139  Mass.  69,  29  N.  B.  376;  Hochstrasser  v. 
Jlartin,  62  Hun,  165,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  558;  Board  of  Health  &  Vital  Statistics  of 
Hudson  Co.  v.  New  York  Horse  Manure  Co.,  47  N.  J.  Bq.  1,  19  Atl.  1098.  As 
to  injunction,  see  Dierks  v.  Commissioners,  142  111.  197,  31  N.  B.  496;  Hill  v. 
City  of  New  York,  63  Hun,  633,  IS  N.  Y.  Supp.  899,  affirming  15  N.  Y.  Supp. 
393.  Of.  Com.  V.  Croushore,  145  Pa.  St  157,  22  Atl.  807.  As  to  summary  con- 
demnation of  nuisances  by  municipal  authority,  see  article  by  J.  B.  Uhle,  30 
Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.S.)  157.  As  to  mandamus,  see  People  v.  Newton,  20  Abb. 
N.  C.  387. 

210  "It  seems  that,  where  an  indictment  may  be  maintained  for  a  common 
nuisance,— that  is,  for  that  which  is  an  injury  to  all  the  queen's  subjects,— 
there  is  no  remedy  by  action  unless  you  can  prove  individual  damage.  That 
is  undisputed  law.  But  I  am  not  aware  that  the  same  rule  is  applied  where 
it  has  not  been  an  injury  to  tlae  whole  of  the  public,  in  contravention  of  the 
law,  but  an  injm'y  to  the  inhabitants  of  a  particular  district."  Channell,  B.,  in 
Harrop  v.  Hirst,  38  Law  J.  Exch.  1-5,  L.  R.  4  Exch.  43;    Washb.  Basem!  §  570, 

211  Iveson  V.  Moore,  Ld.  Raym.  486.  Here  plaintiff  was  prevented,  by  de- 
fendant's obstruction  of  a  highway,  from  using  the  way  for  hauling  coals  from 
his  colliery.  Plaintiff  was  allowed  to  recover  the  special  damages  suffered  by 
him  because  of  the  deterioration  in  value  of  the  coal  by  delay.  MayneU  v. 
Saltmarsh,  1  Keb.  847;  Hart  v.  Basset,  Jones,  156.  That  the  nuisance  is  also 
indictable  will  not  prevent  action.  Hart  v.  Boai'd  (N.  J.  Sup.)  29  Atl.  490; 
State  V.  Wilkinson,  21  Am.  Dec.  560. 

212  Talbott  V.  King,  32  W.  Va.  6,  9  S.  E.  48;  Innis  v.  Railway  Co.,  76  Iowa, 
165,  40  N.  W.  701;  Hay  v.  Weber,  79  Wis.  587,  48  N.  W.  859. 

213  Zettel  V.  City  of  West  Bend,  79  Wis.  316,  48  N.  W.  379.     The  owner  of  a 


Ch.    11]  KINDS    OF    NUISANCE?.  785 

differ  in  kind,  as  well  as  in  degree,  from  that  suffered  in  common. 
That  the  plaintiff  suffers  more  inconvenience  than  others,  from  his 
proximity  to  the  nuisance,  is  not  enough.^^*  A  liquor  nuisance  is 
ordinarily  exclusively  a  public  one.^^°  No  employer  has  such  a  prop- 
erty in  his  workmen  or  in  their  services  that  he  can  maintain  a  suit  as 
for  a  nuisance  against  the  keeper  of  a  house  at  which  they  voluntari- 
ly buy  intoxicating  liquors,  end  thereby  become  drunk  and  unfit  for 
work.^^*  The  right  to  maintain  a  private  action  for  a  liquor  nuisance 
may,  however,  be  conferred  by  statute;  "'  and,  in  a  criticised  case,-^* 
a  saloon  has  been  held  to  be  a  nuisance  per  se.^^'  A  public  nui- 
sance which  may  give  rise  to  a  private  action,  but  only  where  the 

building,  who  occupied  it  as  a  store,  cannot  enjoin  the  erection  of  bay  windows 
on  an  adjoining  building,  extending  18  to  20  inches  into  the  street,  the  damage 
which  may  result  from  the  obstruction  of  the  view  being  too  remote  and 
speculative  to  constitute  the  basis  of  a  private  action.  Hay  v.  Weber,  79 
Wis.  587,  48  N.  W.  859.  Damage  from  a  liberty  pole  in  a  public  street,  sound, 
properly  secured  and  protected,  but  caused  to  fall  by  an  extraordinary  wind, 
would  be  too  remote.  City  of  Allegheny  v.  Zimmerman,  40  Am.  Rep.  649.  But 
the  damage  need  not  be  direct.  It  may  be  consequential.  Hughes  v.  Heiser, 
2  Am.  Dec.  459.  Iveson  v.  Moore  (1699)  Holt,  10;  Kieket  v.  Metropohtan  Ry. 
Co.  (1867)  L.  R.  2  H.  L.  Cas.  175,  36  Law  .T.  Q.  B.  205;  Caledonian  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Walker's  Trustees,  7  App.  Cas.  259;  Ford  v.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.  (1886)  17  Q. 
B.  Div.  12.     And  see  London  Ass'n  v.  London  Committee  [1892]  3  Ch.  242-270. 

21*16  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law,  976  (collecting  great  number  of  eases  under 
1  Wood,  Nuis.  §  653).  Where  a  complaint  to  abate  a  nuisance  does  not 
explicitly  state  that  plaintiff  has  sustained  an  injury  different  in  kind  to 
the  general  public,  it  is  insufficient  on  special  demurrer;  but,  when  such  in- 
jury appears  by  inference,  it  is  proper  to  oveii-ule  a  motion  for  judgment 
on  the  pleadings  at  the  commencement  of  the  trial.  Hargro  v.  Hodgdon,  89 
Cal.  623,  26  Pac.  1106. 

21 -'Liquor  nuisance:  State  v.  Stanley,  84  Me.  555,  24  Ati.  983;  State  v. 
Fleming,  86  Iowa,  294,  53  N.  W.  234;  State  v.  ]MoEnturff,  87  Iowa,  691,  55  N. 
W.  2;  Johnson  r.  People,  44  111.  App.  642;  State  v.  Farley,  87  Iowa,  22,  5:; 
N.  W.  1089.  Injunction  by  state  to  abate  liquor  nuisance:  State  v.  Saund- 
ers (X.  H.)  25  Atl.  588;   :\raloney  v.  Traverse,  87  Iowa,  306,  54  N.  W.  1-55. 

216  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Whalen,  149  tl.  S.  157,  13  Sup.  Ct.  822.  Et 
vide  In  re  Swan,  150  U.  S.  637-650,  14  Sup.  Ct.  225;  Barfleld  v.  Putzel.  92 
Ga.  442,  17  S.  E.  616. 

2 IT  Craig  V.  Plumkett,  82  Iowa,  474,  48  N.  W.  984. 

218  7  Harv.  Law  Rev.  487. 

2  19  Haggart  v.  Stehlin,  l."}?  Ind.  43,  35  N.  E.  997. 

LAW  or  TOM'S— 50 


7>S(i  NUISANCE.  [Ch.    11 

plaintiff  shows  some  wrong  done  to  him  different  from  that  suffered 
l>,y  the  geni'ial  public;  as  that  his  adjoining  property  has  been  in- 
jured in  value.""  The  unreasonable  and  unnecessary  obstruction 
of  a  navigable  stream  may  be  a  public  and  at  the  same  time  a  pri- 
vate nuisance,  as  to  those  individuals  who  suffer  a  particular  dam- 
age therefrom  distinct  and  apart  from  the  people  at  large.  The 
difference  must  be  not  merely  in  extent,  but  also  in  kind.  Accord- 
ingly, the  discharge  of  garbage  by  a  city,  interfering  with  fishing, 
is  an  exclusively  public  wrong.  An  individual  may  not  enjoin  such 
discharge."^  On  the  other  hand,  where  one  by  dams  and  storage 
booms  unnecessarily  obstructs  and  delays  another's  log-driving  oper- 
ations, the  latter  is  entitled  to  a  private  action,  although  the  nui- 
sance be  also  a  public  one.  Streams  navigable  for  flooding  logs  are 
governed  by  the  rules  for  highways.^^^ 

But  mere  personal  inconvenience,  as  delay  in  a  highroad,  without 
pecuniary  loss,  is  not  sufficient  to  sustain  a  private  action,  even  if 
the  degree  of  personal  inconvenience  suffered  be  in  excess  of  that 
suffered  by  the  rest  of  the  public.^^^  On  this  principle,  a  private 
citizen  may  not  maintain  a  private  action  for  an  injury  to  the  high- 
way done  by  an  elevated  railway  company,  where  it  does  not  appear 
that  he  owns  the  soil  abutting  the  section  of  the  railway  complained 

220  Bed  way  v.  Moore,  2  Idaho,  1036,  29  Pac.  104;  Cranford  v.  Tyrrell,  128 
N.  Y.  341,  28  N.  E.  514;  Miller  v.  Blue,  43  Kan.  441,  23  Pac.  588. 

221  Kuehn  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  83  Wis.  583,  53  N.  W.  912,  where  the 
complaint  alleged  that  a  sewer  diminished  the  value  of  a  dock,  plaintiff  can- 
not recover  if  the  dock  was  at  all  times  in  possession  of  his  tenant,  and 
there  was  no  diminution  in  rents  because  there  was  no  special  damage. 
Attwood  V.  City  of  Bangor,  83  Me.  582,  22  Atl.  466.  Bt  vide  Robb  v.  Car- 
negie, 145  Pa.  St.  324,  22  Atl.  649. 

222  Page  V.  Mille  Lacs  Lumber  Co.,  53  Minn.  492,  55  N.  W.  608,  1119.  So, 
where  the  overflow  of  a  dam  puts  to  expense  of  repairing  a  highway,  a  town 
may  recover  damages.  Inhabitants  of  Charlotte  v.  Pembroke  Iron  Works, 
S2  Me.  391,  19  Atl.  902.  Interference  with  right  to  access  to  navigable  stream 
may  be  basis  of  private  action.  Lyon  v.  Fishmongers'  Co.,  1  App.  Cas.  662; 
Rose  V.  Miles,  4  Maule  &  S.  101. 

223  Winterbottom  v.  Lord  Derby,  L.  K.  2  Exch.  316;  Caledonian  Ry.  v. 
Ogilvy,  2  Macq.  H.  L.  Cas.  229;  Metropolitan  Board  of  Works  v.  McCarthy, 
L.  R.  7  H.  L.  Cas.  243.  Cf.  Hubert  v.  Groves,  1  Esp.  148.  Et  vide  West 
.Jersey  R.  Co.  v.  Camden,  G.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  (N.  J.  Ch.)  29  Atl.  423.  Cf.  Kaje 
V.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.)  59  N.  W.  493. 


*^^-    11]  KINDS    OF    NUISANCES.  787 

of,  or  that  he  has  sustained  injury  by  encroachment  upon  any  right 
appurtenant  to  his  premises.^^*  But  where,  by  reason  of  one's 
wrongdoing,  as  by  tearing  up  a  street  and  obstructing  the  side- 
wallv,"^  or  by  causing  horses  and  vans  to  stand  in  the  street  out- 
side of  another's  shop  for  an  unreasonable  length  of  time,""  or  by 
otherwise  obstructing  access  to  the  latter's  place  of  business,  where- 
by his  custom  falls  off  and  he  suffers  damages,  the  latter  may  maintain 
his  private  action.  A  private  action,  in  general,  may  be  maintained 
to  recover  damages  to  property  caused  by  operating  in  the  vicinity 
works  and  machinery  which  fill  the  air  with  smoke  and  cinders  and 
render  it  offensive  and  injurious  to  the  health,  and  shake  the 
premises  so  as  to  render  occupation  uncomfortable,  though  all  per- 
sons owning  estates  in  the  vicinity  have  sustained  similar  injuries 
from  the  same  cause.^^^ 

224  Adler  v.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  Co.,  138  N.  Y.  173,  33  N.  E.  935;  Pitts- 
burg, Ft.  W.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Clieevers,  44  111.  App.  118;  Dllley  v.  Willies 
Barre  &  K.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  270;  Zettel  v.  City  of  West 
Bend,  79  Wis.  316,  48  N.  W.  379;  Billard  v.  Erhart,  35  Kan.  611,  12  Pac.  39; 
Stufflebeam  v.  Montgomery,  2  Idaho,  763,  26  Pac.  125;  ante,  p.  764.  So, 
erection  of  a  dam  over  a  navigable  sti-eam  will  not  be  enjoined  on  applica- 
tion of  one  wbo  has  sustained  no  special  or  personal  injury.  Esson  v.  Wat- 
tier.  25  Or.  7,  34  Pac.  756. 

22  6Aldrich  v.  City  of  Minneapolis,  52  Minn.  164,  53  N.  W.  1072;  Dubach 
V.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.,  89  Mo.  483,  1  S.  W.  86;  Glaessner  v.  Anheuser- 
Busch  Brewing  Ass'n,  100  Mo.  508,  13  S.  W.  707;  Canton  Cotton-Warehouse 
Co.  v.  Potts,  68  Miss.  637,  10  South.  448;  Gardner  v.  Stroever,  89  Cal.  26, 
26  Pac.  618.  Compare  Lakkie  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  44  Minn. 
438,  46  N.  W.  912,  with  Smith  v.  Putnam,  62  N.  H.  369.  But  damage  from 
obstnictlon  of  view  from  store  by  erecting  a  window  extending  18  or  20  inches 
into  the  street  is  too  remote  for  private  action.  Hay  v.  Weber,  79  Wis.  587, 
48  N.  W.  859. 

220  Benjamin  v.  Storr,  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  400;  Rose  v.  Groves,  5  Man.  &  G.  013. 

22T  Wesson  v.  Washburn  Iron  Co.,  13  Allen,  95,  where  an  iron  furnace  dis- 
turbed the  comfort  of  the  guests  in  the  Wesson  tavern  house,  and  deprived 
plaintiff  of  gains.  So  a  steam  engine  pulling  logs:  Adams  v.  Ohio  Falls 
Car  Co.,  131  Ind.  375,  31  N.  E.  57.  A  gas  factory:  Bohan  v.  Port  .Tervis 
Gaslight  Co.,  122  N.  Y.  IS,  25  N.  E.  246.  A  fertilizing  factory:  Susque- 
hanna Fertilizer  Co.  v.  ilalone,  73  Md.  268,  20  Atl.  900.  Generally  as  to 
acid  fumes:  Rex  v.  White,  1  Buitows,  333;  Crump  v.  Lambert,  L.  R.  3  Eq. 
409;    Cooke  v.  Forbes,  L.  R.  5  Bq.  166. 


788  NUISANCE.  [Ch.   11 

Private  Nuisances. 

The  term  "private  nuisance"  is  used  indiscriminately  for  a  private 
nuisance,  as  defined,  and  for  a  mixed  nuisance,  as  distinguished,  by 
^Ir.  Wood.  Indeed,  the  ordinary  conception  of  a  private  nuisance 
would  seem  to  be  that  it  is  any  nuisance  for  which  an  action  would 
lie  on  behalf  of  a  private  individual.  There  are,  however,  many 
cases  which  would  seem  to  be  private  nuisances  pure  and  simple, — 
as  nuisance  to  private  ways,  to  adjacent  and  subjacent  support, 
water  courses,  surface  waters,  overhanging  another's  land,  damages 
by  an  upper  tenant  of  a  building  to  a  tenant  of  a  lower  story.- ^' 
Generally,  a  landowner  is  bound  to  prevent  private  nuisance  to  his 
neighbor  by  reason  of  his  erection  on  his  own  premises.^''* 

SAME— CONTINUING  NUISANCE. 

341.  This  subject  has  already  been  suflaciently  considered.^ 

SAME— LEGALIZED  NUISANCE. 

24S.  Where  the  la-wr  has  authorized  the  conduct  com- 
plained of,  -which  Tvould  other-wise  be  a  nuisance, 
there  can  be  no  proper  interference  there-with, 
either  by  the  act  of  the  party  or  by  judicial  pro- 
ceeding. 

Legalized  nuisance  can  scarcely  be  said  to  be  a  felicitous  term. 
It  is  like  calling  a  crime  lawful.  However,  the  term  has  passed  into 
general  use.  What  it  means  would  seem  to  be  this:  To  constitute 
a  nuisance  there  must  be  a  breach  of  legal  right;  or,  as  Mr.  Cooley 
puts  it,  a  mere  annoyance  without  fault  is  not  a  niiisance.^^^  Ac- 
cordingly, if  authority  to  do  a  given  act  is  conferred,  either  by  stat- 
ute or  by  common  law,  which,  but  for  such  authority,  would  consti- 
tute a  nuisance,  the  damage  suffered  in  consequence  is  damnum 
absque  injuria.  Such  damage  is  "incident  to  an  authorized  act." 
Within  the  limits  of  such  authority,  the  parties  defendant  are,  in 

228  Boston  Ferrule  Co.  v.  Hills,  159  Mass.  147,  34  N.  E.  85. 

229  Bellows  V.  Saekett,  15  Barb.  96;   Benson  v.  Suarez,  19  Abb.  Prac.  61. 

230  Ante,  p.  407. 

231  Cooley,  Torts,  p.  671. 


t!h.    11]  KINDS    OF    NUISANCES.  789 

the  absence  of  negligence,  completely  protected  from  interference 
with  the  alleged  nuisance,  either  by  the  act  of  the  parties  in  the 
abatement  of  the  nuisance,  or  by  judicial  proceedings,  public  or  pri- 
vate, in  law  or  in  equity."^ 

Nuisance  Authorized  by  Statute. 

The  authorization  of  a  statute  may  be  of  three  types:  (1)  The 
statute  may  authorize  a  nuisance;  (2)  it  may  authorize  certain 
works,  provided  they  be  done  without  causing  a  nuisance;  (3)  it 
may  authorize  the  nuisance  itself,  if  necessary  as  a  last  resort.^' ^ 
On  the  one  hand,  a  legislature,  or  a  municipal  corporation  when 
sufficiently  empowered,  may  declare  places  or  property,  used  to  the 
detriment  of  public  interest  or  to  the  injury  of  health,  morals,  or 
the  welfare  of  the  community,  a  nuisance,  although  not  such  at  com- 
mon law.  But  neither  may  decree  the  destruction  or  forfeiture  of 
property  used  so  as  to  constitute  a  nuisance,  and  appoint  oflQcers  to 
execute  its  mandate  as  a  punishment  of  the  wrong,  or  even  to  pre- 
vent the  future  illegal  use  of  the  property,  it  not  being  a  nuisance 
per  se.^^*  On  the  other  hand,  the  legislature  may  determine  by  its 
laws  that  not  to  be  a  nuisance  which  would  otherwise  be  a  nuisance, 
upon  the  ground  that  the  legislature  is  ordinarily  the  proper  judge 
of  what  the  public  good  requires.^^^    Thus,  it  may  authorize  manu- 

232  Hincliman  v.  Patterson  Horse  R.  Co.,  86  Am.  Dec.  252. 

233  Managers  of  the  Metropolitan  Asylum  Dist.  v.  Hill,  C  App.  Cas.  193; 
Truman  v.  Railway  Co.,  29  Ch.  Div.  89-108,  11  App.  Cas.  45;  Biscoe  v.  Rail- 
way, L.  R.  16  Eq.  636;  Cogswell  v.  Railroad  Co.,  103  X.  y.  10,  8  N.  E.  537; 
Edmondson  v.  City  of  Moberly,  98  Mo.  523,  11  S.  W.  990;  Eastman  v.  Amos- 
keag  Manuf'g  Co.,  82  Am.  Dec.  201. 

234Lawton  v.  Steele,  119  N.  Y.  22G,  23.  N.  E.  878;  People  v.  Board  of 
Health  of  City  of  Yonkers,  HO  N.  Y.  1,  35  N.  E.  320.  But  act  may  be  void, 
e.  g.  because  of  class  legislation;  as  where  manufacturers  were  exempted  fromi 
an  ordinance  declaring  smoke  a  nuisance,  State  v.  Sheriff  of  Ramsey  Co.,  48 
Minn.  236,  51  X.  ^V.  112;  and  where  municipal  charter  does  not  empower  city 
council  to  define  a  public  nuisance.  City  of  St.  Paul  v.  Gilflllan,  36  Minn.  298, 
31  N.  W.  49.  Et  vide  Everett  v.  City  of  Council  Bluffs,  46  Iowa,  66;  Yates 
V.  Milwaukee,  10  Wall.  497;  Clark  v.  JIayor,  etc.,  of  Syracuse,  13  Barb.  32; 
Underwood  v.  Green,  42  N.  Y.  140.  A  municipal  license  to  carry  on  an  ob- 
jectionable business  is  entitled  as  evidence  to  high  consideration,  but  is  not 
conclusive  that  the  business  is  not  a  private  nuisance.  Ryan  v.  Copes,  73  Am. 
Dec.  106. 

23  6  Bancroft  v.  City  of  Cambridge,  126  Mass.  438-440. 


790  NUISANCE.  [Ch.  11 

factures  to  notify  their  workmen  by  ringing  bells,  or  using  whistles 
and  gongs,  in  such  a  way  that,  but  for  legislative  sanction,  a  nui- 
sance would  exist.^^" 

AA'henever  the  exercise  of  a  right  conferred  by  law  for  the  benefit 
of  the  public  is  attended  with  temporan'  incom'enience  to  private 
parties,  in  common  with  the  public  in  general,  such  parties  are  not 
entitled  to  damages  therefor.  This,  again,  is  "damage  incident  to 
authorized  act."  Thus,  if  a  bridge,  constructed  in  accordance  with 
legislative  authority,  interferes  with  navigation,  the  injury  to  pri- 
vate persons  is  damnum  absque  injuria.^' ^  In  the  same  way,  the 
incidental  injury  which  results  to  the  owner  of  property  situated 
near  a  railroad,  caused  by  the  necessary  noise,  vibration,  dust,  and 
smoke  from  the  passing  trains,  which  would  clearly  amount  to  an 
actionable  nuisance  if  the  operations  of  the  railroad  were  not  au- 
thorized by  the  legislature,  must,  if  the  running  of  the  trains  is  so  au- 
thorized, be  borne  by  the  individual  without  compensation  or  remedy 
in  any  form.^^* 

However,  the  legislative  authority,  to  afford  this  immunity,  must 
be  express,  or  clearly  and  unquestionably  implied,  from  powers  ex- 
pressly conferred,  so  as  to  make  it  appear  that  the  legislature  con- 
templated the  doing  of  the  very  act  which  occasioned  the  injury. 
And  even  in  such  a  case,  the  exemption  does  not  extend  to  the  claim 
of  a  private  citizen  for  any  damage,  special  inconvenience,  or  dis- 
comfort not  experienced  by  the  public  at  large.""  Therefore,  for 
example,  the  owner  of  a  lot  abutting  on  the  public  street  may  re- 

236  Sawyer  v.  Da;ris,  136  Mass.  z39» 

237  Hamilton  v.  Railroad  Co.,  119  U.  S.  280,  7  Sup.  Ct.  206,  considered  in 
Rhea  v.  Railroad  Co.,  50  Fed.  20;  TJ.  S.  v.  North  Bloomfield  Gravel  Mln. 
Co.,  53  Fed.  627. 

23  8  Carroll  v.  Wisconsin  Cent.  R.  Co.,  40  Minn.  168,  41  N.  W.  661;  Beide- 
man  r.  Atlantic  City  R.  Co.  (N.  J.  Ch.)  19  Atl.  7P.1. 

239  Bohan  v.  Port  Jervis  Gas  Light  Co.,  122  N.  Y.  18,  25  N.  E.  246;  Hill  v. 
City  of  New  York,  139  N.  Y.  495,  34  N.  E.  1090;  Id.,  63  Hun,  633,  18  N.  Y. 
Supp.  309;  Bacon  v.  City  of  Boston,  154  Mass.  100,  28  N.  E.  9,  collecting  cases 
at  page  102,  154  Mass.,  and  pap?  9.  2S  N.  B,;  Evans  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  & 
O.  Ry.  Co.,  86  Wis.  597,  57  N.  W.  354.  Where  the  terms  of  a  statute  are  not 
imperative,  but  permissive,  the  fair  inference  is  that  the  legislature  intended 
that  the  discretion  as  to  the  use  of  the  general  powers  there  conferred  should 
be  exercised  in  strict  conformity  with  private  rights.  Lord  Watson,  in 
Managers  v.  Hill,  L.  R.  6  H.  L.  193-213. 


^"-    -^1]  KINDS    OF    NUISANCES.  791 

cover  damages  against  a  railroad  laid  on  such  street,  the  operation 
of  which  darkened  and  polluted  the  air  coming  from  that  part  of 
the  street  upon  the  lot.=="  However,  consequential  annoyance, 
which  may  necessarily  follow  the  running  of  the  cars  on  the  road 
with  reasonable  care,  is  damnum  absque  injuria;  but  the  exemp- 
tion extends  only  to  the  limit  of  legislative  authority.  When  the 
authority  ceases,  the  exemption  ceases.  ^^  The  authority  of  a  rail- 
road company  to  bring  its  tracks  within  the  limits  of  the  city  of 
Washington  did  not  authorize  it  to  construct  shops  and  engine 
houses  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  a  church  where  services  had 
been  held  during  the  week  for  a  number  of  years  before  the  erection 
of  such  shops. ^"  While,  in  England,  the  power  of  parliament  is 
omnipotent,  and  English  cases  on  this  subject  must  be  considered 
with  reference  thereto,"^  the  power  of  legislature  in  America  is  con- 
trolled by  constitutional  provisions."^  An  important  distinction 
exists  between  corporations  clothed  with  powers  of  eminent  domain 

2*0  Adams  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  39  Minn.  286,  39  N.  W.  629,  reviewing 
many  cases;  Bm-lsam  v.  Railway  Co.,  122  Ind.  344,  23  N.  E.  799;  Hyland  v. 
Transfer  Co.  (Ky.)  11  S.  .W.  79.  As  to  subsequent  damages  after  condemna- 
tion proceeding,  Oliio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  WaCliter,  123  111.  440,  15  N.  E.  279; 
Eaton  v.  Railroad,  51  N.  H.  504;  Wood,  Nuis.  §  7G4,  note  2;  Rex  v.  Pease,  4 
Barn.  &  Adol.  30;  Vaughan  v.  Tafe  Vale  R.  Co.,  5  Hurl.  &  N.  679;  London,  B.  & 
S.  C.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Truman,  11  App.  Cas.  45;  Powell  v.  Fall,  5  Q.  B.  Div.  397; 
Sadler  v.  South  Staffordshire  &  B.  D.  S.  T.  Co.,  23  Q.  B.  Div.  17.  An  article 
on  the  nuisances  arising  from  the  violation  of  the  common-law  rights  of  a 
community  by  electric  street  railways.  14  Can.  Law  T.  225. 
2*1  Evans  v.  Railway  Co.,  86  AVis.  597,  57  X.  W.  354,  collecting  cases. 
2*2  Baltimore  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Fifth  Baptist  Church,  108  U.  S.  317,  2  Sup.  Ct. 
719;  Id.,  137  U.  S.  568,  11  Sup.  Ct.  185;  Ne^Y  York  El.  R.  Co.  v.  Fifth  Nat. 
Bank,  135  U.  S.  432-142,  10  Sup.  Ct.  743;  Smith  v.  London  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co. 
L.  R.  6  C.  P.  14;  Village  of  Pine  City  v.  Munch,  42  Minn.  342,  44  N.  W.  197. 
Although  horswi  were  necessary  for  the  working  of  the  tramways,  the  com- 
pany were  not  justified  by  their  statutory  powers  in  using  the  stables  so  as 
to  be  a  nuisance  to  tlieir  neighbors,  and  it  was  no  sufficient  defense  to  say 
that  they  had  taken  all  reasonable  care  to  prevent  it.  Rapier  v.  London 
Tramways  Co.  [1893]  2  Ch.  588. 

243  Beg.  V.  Metropolitan  Board  of  Works,  3  Best  &  S.  710;  New  River  Co. 
V.  Johnson,  2  El.  &  El.  435. 

2-14  But  an  act  authorizing  an  existing  nuisance  is  a  mere  license,  and  may 
be  revoked  at  pleasure,  where  no  consideration  is  paid.  Reading  v.  Com., 
51  Am.  Dec.  534. 


792  NUISANCE.  [Ch.    1 

and  those  which  have  no  such  right.'*"  The  former  may  construe 
and  operate  their  authorized  works,  and  are  not  liable  if  damagt 
ensue,  if  there  be  no  negligence  or  malice;  ^*°  but  they  may  nc 
take  private  property  without  the  payment  of  compensation,  asce 
tained  by  a  jury.^*''  Accordingly,  legislative  grants  do  not  exemj 
corporations  for  imposing  a  burden  which  amounts  to  the  actus 
taking  of  property  for  public  purposes.^** 

XaUnnce  Authorized  by  Common  Laiv. 

Prescription  cannot  legitimate  a  nuisance,  properly  speaking.- 
But,  within  the  limits  of  actual  user,  and  not  of  claim,  prescriptio 
may  give  rise  to  an  easement.^ '^''  A  public  nuisance  cannot  be  lega 
ized  by  prescription,  even  so  far  as  the  right  of  a  private  individui 
specially  injured  is  concerned.  "In  such  cases,  prescription  has  r 
application.  Every  day's  continuance  is  a  new  offense,  and  it  is  i 
justification  that  the  party  complaining  came  voluntarily  within  i 

24S  Hauck  V.  Tidewater  Pipe-Line  Co.,  153  Pa.  St.  366,  26  Atl.  644.  C 
MeAndrews  v.  Collerd,  42  N.  J.  Law.  189. 

24S  Id.     Of.  Booth  Y.  Railroad  Co.,  140  N.  Y.  267,  35  N.  B.  592. 

247  Parker  v.  Catliolic  Bishop,  146  111.  158,  34  N.  E.  473. 

2*8  Wood,  Nuis.  §§  759,  760. 

249  Dygert  v.  Schemck,  35  Am.  Dec.  575;  MOls  v.  Hall,  24  Am.  Dec.  16 
Queen  v.  Brewster,  8  U.  C.  C.  P.  208;  post,  p.  803,  note  306. 

■■^■'0  Horner  r.  Stillwell,  35  N.  J.  Law,  307;  Bunten  v.  Chicago,  R.  L  &  : 
Ry.  Co.,  50  Mo.  App.  414;  Mueller  v.  Fruen,  36  Minn.  273,  30  N.  W.  886;  Dre 
\.  Hicks  (Cal.)  35  Pac.  563;  Leckonfleld  v.  Lonsdale,  L.  R.  5  C.  P.  657.  : 
vide  Rolle  v.  Whyte,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B.  286.  To  obstruct  the  flow  of  water  in 
natural  water  course,  see  Murgatroyd  v.  Robinson,  7  El.  &  Bl.  391.  Or  to  C£ 
ry  on  a  noisy  trade,  Sturg-es  v.  Bridgman,  11  Ch.  Div.  852.  To  pollute  wat( 
Wright  V.  Williams,  1  Mees.  &  W.  77;  Crossley  v.  Lightowler,  2  App.  Cs 
478.  Acquiescence  of  a  tenant  for  life  does  not  affect  remainder-men,  Walla 
V.  Fletcher,  10  Fost.  (N.  H.)  453.  In  an  action  for  personal  injuries  receiv 
by  falling  into  a  cellar  way,  due  to  a  defective  cover,  evidence  that  the  cell 
way  had  been  maintained  for  20  years  without  objection  from  the  city  a 
thorities  tends  to  prove  that  it  was  built  under  permission  from  the  cil 
and  therefore  an  instruction  that  it  was  a  nuisance,  per  se,  is  erroneoi 
.Tcrgensen  v.  Squire,  66  Hun,  633,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  383,  affirmed  in  144  N. 
280,  39  N.  E.  373.  As  maintaining  a  fever-breeding  dam,  see  Mills  v.  Ha 
9  Wend.  315.  As  a  city  could  not,  in  the  absence  of  express  legislative  a 
thority,  grant  the  right  to  erect  and  perpetually  maintain  awnings  over  t 
sidewalks,  no  lapse  of  time  will  render  the  license  to  erect  awnings  irrevoc 
ble.     City  Council  of  Augusta  v.  Bamum,  93  Ga.  68,  19  S.  E.  820. 


^'^-    11]  PARTIES    TO    PROCEEDINGS    AGAINST.  793 

reach.  Pure  air  and  comfortable  enjoyment  of  property  are  aa 
much  rights  belonging  to  it  as  the  right  of  possession  and  occu- 
pancy." =  "  The  confusion  in  the  cases,  and  the  uncertainty  in  the- 
ory as  to  what  the  "natural  use  of  land"  is,  which  allows  one  to  use 
his  own  without  responsibility  to  his  neighbor  for  consequent  dam- 
age, is  elsewhere  discussed.^" 

PARTIES  TO  PROCEEDINGS  AGAINST. 

243.  Subject   to    conventional    variations   in   the    normal 

right  to  sue,  the  parties  plaintiff  in  a  civil  proceed- 
ing against  a  nuisance  are  in  general  determined  by 
property  interests. 

244.  Whoever    creates    or   merely  maintains    a  nuisance, 

after  notice  to  abate,  is  a  proper  defendant  in  such 
proceedings;  but,  as  a  joint  tort  feasor,  only  when 
there  is  concert  in  action  between  the  alleged 
wrongdoers. 

Parties  Plaintiff. 

The  parties  plaintiff  in  a  civil  proceeding  against  a  nuisance  are 
determined  primarily  by  property  interests.  For  example,  the  re- 
versioner may  sue  for  permanent  depreciation  of  property,  or  set- 
ting up  an  adverse  claim  of  right ;  but  ordinarily  the  tenant  in  pos- 
session is  the  projjer  party  plaintiff.^"     Several  distinct  owners  or 

251  Board  of  Healtli  v.  Lederer  (N.  J.  Ch.)  29  Atl.  444  (a  leading  case); 
State  V.  Holman,  104  N.  C.  801,  10  S.  B.  758;  Reed  v.  City  of  Birmingliam, 
92  Ala.  339,  9  South.  161;  Meiners  v.  Frederick  ililler  Brewing  Co.,  78  Wis. 
364,  47  N.  W.  430;  Chicago  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Loeb  (111.  Sup.)  59  Am.  Rep.  341, 
note  (8  N.  E.  460);  Hargreaves  v.  Kimberly,  53  Am.  Rep.  130,  note;  Rung  v. 
Shoneberger,  26  Am.  Dec.  95;  People  v.  Cunningham,  1  Denio,  524;  People 
Y.  Maher,  141  N.  Y.  330,  36  N.  E.  396.  And  generally,  see  Wood,  Nuis.  §  18, 
note  4. 

2  52  Bowen  v.  Wendt,  103  Cal.  236,  37  Pac.  149;  Cross  v.  Mayor  of  Morris- 
town,'  18  N.  J.  Eq.  305.  Befouling  percolating  waters  by  passing  through 
a  cemetery  is  damnum  absque  injuria.  City  of  Greencastle  v.  Hazelett,  23 
Ind.  186.  Contra,  Clark  v.  Lawrence,  6  Jones,  Eq.  (N.  C.)  83.  Et  vide 
Clemens  v.  Speed,  93  Ky.  284,  19  S.  W.  660. 

2  53  Locke tt  V.  Ft.  Worth  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co.,  78  Tex.  211,  14  S.  W.  562;  Beir 
V.  Cooke,  37  Hun,  38;   Jones  v.  Chappell,  20  Eq.  Cas.  539;    Mott  v.  School- 


794  NUiSAKCE.  [Ch.  : 

tenants  may  join  in  a  suit  to  restrain  a  nuisance  which  is  common  i 
all  and  affects  each  in  a  simihir  way,  but  may  not  so  join  to  restrai 
that  which  does  a  distinct  and  special  injury  to  the  property  of  eac 
Thus,  annoyance  from  a  lunatic  asylum,  though  given  acts  do  m 
occur  at  the  same  time,  nor  to  the  same  person,  but  continually, 
not  a  distinct,  but  a  common,  nuisance.^ '**  Where,  however,  the  a 
tion  is  at  law, .owners  of  distinct  interests,  it  has  been  insistC' 
must  bring  separate  actions  for  the  same  nuisance.^^^  A  privai 
action  for  a  public  nuisance  can  only  be  maintained  by  one  wl 
is  the  owner,  or  has  some  legal  interest,  as  lessee  ^^^  or  otherwis 
in  the  land  ^^•hich  is  affected  by  the  nuisance.  Therefore,  one  wt 
lived  in  his  wife's  house  could  not  sue  for  annoyance  to  himself  ( 
his  family  for  corruption  of  the  air  by  another.^^^  Right  of  po 
session  is  sufficient  interest.^  ^*     A  municipal  corporation  may  t 

bred,  Id.  22;  Simpson  v.  Savage,  1  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  347;  Mumford  v.  Oxford,  "V 
&  W.  R.v.  Co.,  1  Hurl.  &  N.  34;  Metropolitan  Ass'n  v.  Fetch,  5  O.  B.  (N.  S 
504, 

254  Eawbotham  v.  Jones,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  337,  20  Atl.  731.  Of.  Morris  &  E.  ] 
Co.  V.  Pradden,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  530;  Fogg  v.  Nevada,  C.  O.  Ry.  Co.,  20  Ne 
429,  23  Pac.  840;  Reid  v.  GifCord,  16  Johns.  Ch.  19;  Peck  v.  Elder,  3  Sand 
(N.  Y.)  126;  Seified  v.  Hays,  81  Ky.  377;  Murray  v.  Hay,  1  Barb.  59;  Tow 
of  Sullivan  v.  Phillips,  110  lud.  320,  11  N.  E.  300;  Grant  v.  Schmidt,  '. 
Jlinn.  1.  Defendant  cannot  complain  of  the  admission  of  life  tenants  £ 
parties  plaintiff  with  remainder-men  in  a  suit  to  restrain  a  nuisance.  Raine 
V.  Herbert,  5  C.  C.  A.  183,  55  Fed.  4^.  Lessor  and  lessee  necessary  partlt 
in  an  action  to  enjoin.  O'Sullivan  v.  New  York  El.  R.  Co.  (Super.  N.  Y.) 
N.  Y.  Supp.  51. 

2  55  Snyder  v.  Cabell,  29  W.  Va.  48,  1  S.  E.  241;  Hellams  v.  Switzer,  5 
S.  C.  39. 

2  50  Cooper  V.  Randall,  59  111.  317.  By  tenant  against  landlord,  see  Kei 
V.  Myll,  94  Mich.  477,  54  N.  W.  176;  Angevine  v.  Knox-Goodrich  (Cal.)  c 
Pac.  529;    Case  v.  Minot,  158  Mass.  577,  33  N.  E.  700. 

257  Kavanagh  v.  Barber,  131  N.  Y.  211,  30  N.  E.  235,  reversing  59  Hu: 
60,  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  603.  Cf.  Ellis  v.  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R.  Co.,  f 
Mo.  131;  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Whalen,  149  U.  S.  157,  13  Sup.  Ct.  82 
Therefore  a  father  should  not  join  with  him  as  plaintiff  his  minor  children  i 
a  suit  for  damages  for  the  nuisance  of  collecting  stagnant  water,  renderir 
unhealthy  plaintiff's  house,  and  oilending  the  sight  and  smell  of  himself  ar 
children.     Lockett  v.  Ft.  Worth  '&  B.  G.  Ry.  Co.,  78  Tex.  211,  14  S.  W.  564. 

2  58  Hopkins  v.  Baltimore  &  P.  R.  Co.,  6  Mackey,  311;    Crommelin  v.  Cox 
(58  Am.  Dec.  120.     A  mortgagor  in  possession  after  foreclosure,  Lurssen 
Lloyd,  76  Md.  360,  25  Atl.  294. 


Ch.    11]  PARTIES    TO    PROCEEDINGS    AGAINST.  795 

authorized  to  proceed  against  a  nuisance,  such  as  interference  with 
water  courses.^^'  A  wrongdoer  is  not  entitled  to  relief  from  the 
courts  against  a  nuisance^""  His  consent  to  the  wrong  will  pre 
vent  him  from  afterwards  securing  judicial  interference,^"  but 
only  so  far  as  such  consent  extends.^''^ 

Parties  Defendant. 

The  person  primarily  liable  for  a  nuisance  is  he  who  creates  it, 
whether  on  his  own  land  or  not.""*^  He  cannot  escape  liability  for 
its  continuance  by  demising  the  premises  whereon  the  nuisance  is 
located;  ^^^  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  is  he  liable  for  his  grantee's 

2  59  Newark  Aqueduct  Board  v.  City  of  Passaic,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  393,  8  Atl.  106. 

260  Topeka  Water-Supply  Co.  v.  City  of  Potwin,  43  Kan.  404,  23  Pac.  578. 

261  Thus,  an  abutting  owner  who  consents  to  the  occupation  of  a  street  by 
a  railroad  company  cannot  afterwards  ask  the  court  to  enjoin  the  use  of  the 
street  or  award  him  damages.  Burltam  v.  Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  122  Ind.  344, 
23  N.  E.  799.  Tbe  fact  tliat  a  person  knows  that  a  factory  is  being  built, 
and  the  purpose  for  which  it  is  to  be  operated,  and  makes  no  objection 
thereto,  does  not  estop  him  to  afterwards  sue  to  abate  it  as  a  nuisance, 
because  of  the  smoke  arising  therefrom,  and  to  recover  for  damages  caused 
thereby,  unless  his  conduct  influenced  the  owner  in  building  the  factory. 
Harley  v.  Merrill  Brick  Co.,  83  Iowa,  73,  48  N.  W.  1000.  But  see  Whitney  v. 
Union  Ry.  Co.,  71  Am.  Dec.  715. 

262  A  parol  license  peimitting  a  city  to  discharge  the  sewage  from  a  par- 
ticular district  on  private  property  does  not  authorize  the  discharge  of  the 
sewage  from  a  much  larger  territory;  and  the  licensor  is  entitled  to  an 
Injunction  against  such  increased  discharge,  and  is  not  confined  to  a  legal 
action  for  damages.  (1  N.  Y.  Supp.  456,  modified.)  New  York  Cent.  &  H. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Rochester,  127  N.  Y.  591,  28  N.  E.  416. 

263  16  Am.  &  Eng.  Ene.  Law,  979;  Thompson  v.  Gibson,  7  Mees.  &  W.  456. 
Thus  the  erector  of  an  obstruction  to  a  right  of  way  is  liable,  although  he  is 
one  of  several  persons  claiming  the  land  over  which  the  way  is  situated. 
Connor  v.  Hall  (Ga.)  15  S.  E.  308.  Et  vide  Williamson  v.  Tobey,  86  Oal.  497, 
25  Pac.  05;  Whitenack  v.  Philadephia  &  R.  R.  Co.,  57  Fed.  901.  So,  a  rail- 
road company,  for  soot,  smoke,  and  discomfort  of  running  train,  to  adjoining 
owners.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Orr,  91  Ky.  109,  15  S.  AV.  8.  The  pui-- 
ehaser  of  a  railroad  is  not  liable  for  damages  caused  by  nuisance  in  its  opera- 
tion by  vendor.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Orr,  91  Ky.  109,  15  S.  W.  8.  The 
defense  of  independent  contractor  does  not  avail  unless  the  wrong  arise  from 
the  manner  of  doing  the  work,  rather  than  from  the  work  itself.  Ante,  p. 
228;  Skelton  v.  Fenton  Electric  Light  &  Power  Co.,  100  Mich.  87,  58  N.  W. 
609;   Aldrich  v.  City  of  Minneapolis,  52  Minn.  164,  57  N.  W.  221. 

2  64ingwersen  v.  Rankin,  47  N.  J.  Law,  18.     Compare  Roswell  v.  Prior,  12 


796  NUISANCE.  [Cll.    11 

subsequent  conduct  whereby  the  nuisance  is  created,^'"  The  bare 
fact  of  ownership  of  real  estate  imposes  no  responsibility  for  a 
nuisance  on  it.^""  Indeed,  the  occupier,  and  not  the  owner,  is,  in 
general,  liable  for  nuisance  thereon.^"''  A  fair  summary  of  the 
law  on  this  point  would  seem  to  be  that  where  the  nuisance  com- 
plained of  is  caused  by  the  physical  condition  of  the  premises,  re- 
sulting from  acts  of  commission  or  omission  while  in  the  possession 
of  the  owner,  he  is  liable,  but  where  the  nuisance  arises,  not  from 
their  physical  condition,  but  from  the  mode  of  user,  the  occupier  is 
liable.^"*  He  who  has  created  a  nuisance  on  his  own  land  being, 
accordingly,  liable  for  it,  his  grantee  is  not  liable,  when  he  was  not 
an  actor  in  creating  or  actively  maintaining  it,^°°  until  it  is  shown 
that  he  failed,  upon  request,  to  remove  it^^"  within  a  reasonable 
time.^'^      But  such  notice  may  be  waived.^'^ 

Mod.  635,  with  Ityppon  v.  Bowles,  Cro.  Jae.  373;  Plumer  v.  Harper,  14  Am. 
Dec.  333;  Fish  v.  Dodge,  47  Am.  Dec.  2.54;  Waggoner  v.  Jermaine,  45  Am. 
Dec.  474.  An  owner  who  rents  a  house,  knowing  it  to  be  used  for  prostitu- 
tion, is  liable  in  damages  to  an  adjoining  owner.  Marsan  v.  French,  48  Am. 
Rep.  272. 

28  5  Moore  v.  Langdon,  47  Am.  Rep.  262. 

268  Schmidt  v.  Cook  (Com.  PI.  N.  Y.)  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  799;  Dalay  v.  Savage, 
145  Mass.  38,  12  N.  e.  841;  Fordyce  v.  Russell,  59  Ark.  312,  27  S.  W.  82;  Lufkin 
V.  Zane,  157  Mass.  117,  31  N.  E.  757;  Ahern  v.  Steele,  115  N.  Y.  203,  22  N.  E. 
193;  McCarthy  v.  York  Co.  Sav.  Bank,  74  Me.  315.  Compare  Rex  v.  Pedly, 
1  Adol.  &  E.  822-827,  with  Gandy  v.  Jubber,  9  Best  &  S.  15.  The  English 
ease  of  this  note  will  be  found  reviewed  In  Rex  v.  Pedly,  88  Law  T.  149. 
Ante,  p.  22."),  "Landlord  and  Tenant." 

287  Ante,  p.  225,  "Landlord  and  Tenant."  In  Lufkin  v.  Zane,  34  Am.  St. 
Uep.  267,  will  be  found  citations  on  liability  of  grantee  or  lessee  of  premises 
for  nuisance  on  the  same. 

268  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  321-327,  collecting  cases;  Joyce  v.  Martin,  15  R.  I. 
558,  10  Atl.  620;  Owings  v.  Jones,  9  Md.  108;  Rich  v.  Basterfield,  4  C.  B. 
783;  ante,  p.  225,  "Landlord  and  Tenant."  And  see  Moore  v.  Browne,  3 
Dyer,  319,  compared  with  Irvine  v.  Wood,  51  N.  Y.  224,  by  Dallas,  J.,  in 
Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  12  C.  C.  A.  384,  64  Fed.  679-683. 

2  60  Whitenack  v.  Philadelpliia  &  R.  R.  Co.,  57  Fed.  901.  There  is  no  pre- 
sumption that  a  grantee  knows  that  a  dam  erected  by  his  grantor  on  the  land 
was  erected  without  the  consent  of  others  affected  thereby. 

2T0  Philadelphia  &  R.   R.   Co.  v.   Smith,   12  C.   C.   A.  34,   64  Fed.   679   (in 

271  Rychlicki  V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  115  Mo.  662,  22  S.  W.  908. 
27  2  As  by  answer,  Bartlett  v.  Siman,  24  Minn.  448. 


Ch.    11]  PARTIES    TO    PHOCEEDINGS    AGAIKS'J'.  797 

All  persons  who  join,  aid,  or  assist  in  creating  and  maintaining 
a  nuisance  may  be  jointly  and  severally  liable.^^^  But  the  liability 
of  joint  contributors  is  not  necessarily  that  of  joint  tort  feasors. 
If  the  persons  who  maintain  a  nuisance  act  independently,  and 
laot  in  concert  with  others,  each  is  liable  for  damages  which  result 
from  his  individual  conduct  only.  And  the  fact  that  it  may  be 
difficult  to  actually  measure  the  damage  caused  by  the  wrongiul 
act  of  each  contributor  to  the  aggregate  result  does  not  affect  the 
rule,  or  make  any  one  liable  for  the  acts  of  the  others. ^^*      Each 

this  case  Dallas,  J.,  discusses,  inter  alia,  the  following  New  Jersey  cases 
not  in  accord  with  the  general  rule,  viz.  Pierson  v.  Glean,  14  N.  .T. 
Law,  36;  Beavers  v.  Wimmer,  25  N.  J.  Law,  97;  Morris  Canal  &  Bank- 
ing Co.  V.  Ryerson,  27  N.  J.  Law,  457).  Steinke  v.  Bentley,  G  Ind.  App.  663, 
:!t  N.  B.  97:  Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  57  Fed.  441; 
Rouse  V.  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.,  42  111.  App.  421;  Eastman  v.  Amoskeag 
Manuf'g  Co.,  82  Am.  Dec.  201;  Plumer  v.  Harper,  3  N.  H.  88;  .Tohnson  v. 
Lewis,  13  Conn.  303;  Curtice  v.  Thompson,  19  N.  H.  471;  Crommelin  v. 
Coxt,  US  Am.  Dec.  120;  Pillsbury  v.  Moore,  69  Am.  Dec.  91;  Nichols  v. 
Boston,  93  Am.  Dec.  132;  Noyes  v.  StUlman,  24  Conn.  15;  Conhocton  Stone 
Road  v.  Buffalo,  N.  Y.  &  E.  B.  Co.,  51  N.  Y.  573;  Ahem  v.  Steele,  135  N. 
Y.  203.  22  N.  E.  193;  Grisby  v.  Clear  Lake  Water  Co.,  40  Cal.  396.  Tenant 
for  jxius,  see  City  of  McDonough  v.  Oilman,  80  Am.  Dee.  72;  Slight  v. 
GutzlafC,  17  Am.  Rep.  476;  Castle  v.  Smith  (Cal.)  36  Pac.  859  (notwithstand- 
ing Code,  §  3483);  Penruddock's  Case,  5  Coke,  101a;  Jones  v.  Williams,  U 
Mees.  &  W.  176;  Pol.  Torts,  350-351.  Mere  failure  to  remove  or  repair 
jetties  in  a  river,  whereby  plaintiff's  crops  were  damaged,  does  not  make 
receivers  of  a  railroad  liable.  They  are  made  liable  only  by  some  positive 
act  adopting  them.     Fordyce  v.  Russell,  59  Ark.  312,  27  S.  W.  82. 

27  3  Simmons  v.  Everson,  124  N.  Y.  319,  26  N.  E.  911;  Bigelow,  Lead.  Cas. 
475,  476.  A  powder  magazine,  Comminge  v.  Stevenson,  76  Tex.  642,  13  S.  W. 
556.  Et  vide  Irvin  v.  Wood,  4  Robt.  (N.  Y.)  138;  Anderson  v.  Dickie,  26  How. 
Prac.  105;  Rogers  v.  Stewart,  5  Yt.  215;  Buddington  v.  Shearer,  20  Pick. 
477;  Grogan  v.  Broadway  Foundry  Co.,  87  Mo.  321.  For  continuing  -.i 
nuisance  the  lessor,  assignees  of  lease,  lessees,  and  sublessees  are  jointly 
liable.     Rogers  v.  Stewart,  26  Am.  Dec.  296. 

274  Loughran  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  72  Iowa.  382,  34  N.  W.  172;  Ferguson 
V.  Finnenich  Manuf'g  Co.,  77  Iowa,  576,  42  N.  W.  448;  Sloggy  v.  Dilworth. 
38  Minn.  179,  36  N.  W.  451;  Chipman'v.  Palmer,  33  Am.  Rep.  500;  Sellick 
V  Hall  47  Conn.  260;  Martlnowsky  v.  City  of  Hannibal,  35  Mo.  App.  70; 
Evans  v  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  Co.,  96  X.  C.  45,  1  S.  E.  529;  Suth.  Dam. 
"57-    1  Add    Torts,    374;    Gould,    Waters,    §§   222-398;    Wood,    Nuis.    §   831; 


798  KUISA.NCE.  [Ch.   11 

must  be  definitely  connected  as  tlie  proximate,^'"  but  not  as  the 
sole,^''''  cause  of  tlie  wrong.  Municipal  corporations,  subject  to  statu- 
tory exemptions,  may  be  held  liable  for  failure  to  exercise  reason- 
able care  and  diligence  in  not  abating  a  nuisance,^^'  or  for  wrong- 
ful exercise  of  power  to  abate;  ^^^  and  they  are  generally  liable  for 
the  maintenance  of  a  nuisance.^'' 

Chipman  v.  Palmer,  77  N.  Y.  51.  Cf.  Simmons  v.  Everson,  124  N.  Y.  319, 
26  N.  E.  911;  Harley  v.  Merrill  Brick  Co.,  83  Iowa,  73,  48  N.  W.  1000; 
Lull  y.  Improvement  Co.,  19  Wis.  112.  Cf.  Thorpe  v.  Brumfitt,  8  Ch.  App. 
650;  Blair  v.  Deakin,  57  Law  T.  522,  52  J.  P.  327;  Nixon  v.  Tynemouth 
Union  Rural  Sanitaiy  Authority,  52  J.  P.  504;  ante,  p.  209,  "Joint  Tort 
Feasors." 

2TB  Russell  V.  Bancroft,  79  Tex.  377,  15  S.  W.  282.  Et  vide  Atlanta  &  F. 
R.  Co.  V.  Kimberly,  87  Ga.  161,  13  S.  E.  277;  Mirkil  v.  Morgan,  134  Pa.  St. 
144,  19  Atl.  628. 

27  6  City  of  Hannibal  v.  Richards,  35  Mo.  App.  15.  Causing  and  permitting 
are  the  same  thing,  Hochstrasser  v.  Martin,  62  Hun,  165,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  558. 

277  In  Taylor  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  City  of  Cumberland,  64  Md.  68,  20  Atl.  1027, 
a  municipal  corporation  was  held  liable  for  coasting  on  streets.  In  Lincoln 
V.  City  of  Boston,.  148  Mass.  578,  20  N.  E.  329,  the  city  was  held  not  liable 
for  injury  occasioned  by  a  running  away  of  a  horse  frightened  by  licensed 
firing  of  cannon. 

278  City  of  Orlando  v.  Pragg,  31  Fla.  Ill,  12  South.  368. 

279  As  for  discharging  sewage  on  defendant's  premises,  see  Stoddard  v. 
ViUage  of  Saratoga  Springs,  127  N.  Y.  261,  27  N.  E.  1030;  iBacon  v.  City  of  Bos- 
ton, 154  Mass.  100,  28  N.  E.  9.  Et  vide  City  of  Sherman  v.  Langham  (Tex. 
Sup.)  13  S.  W.  1042,  followed  in  City  of  Hillsboro  v.  Ivey,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  653, 
20  S.  W.  1012;  Miles  v.  City  of  Worcester,  154  Mass.  511,  28  N.  E.  676;  Att- 
wood  V.  City  of  Bangor,  83  Me.  582,  22  Atl.  466;  Bish.  Noncont.  Law,  754; 
Danaher  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  119  N.  Y.  241,  23  N.  E.  745;  Mehrhof  Bros. 
Brick  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  51  N.  J.  Law,  56,  16  Atl.  12; 
Taylor  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  64  Md.  73,  20  Atl.  1027;  Lostutter  v.  City  of  Aurora,  126 
Ind.  436,  26  N.  E.  184;  Mootry  v.  Town  of  Danbury,  45  Conn.  550;  Hubbell 
V.  City  of  Viroqua,  67  Wis.  343,  30  N.  W.  847.  If  a  person  has  created  a 
nuisance  in  a  public  street,  and  a  city  is  in  consequence  thereof  obliged  to 
pay  damages  to  a  traveler  on  the  street,  the  fact  that  the  city  is  in  fault  in 
not  removing  the  nuisance  does  not  make  it  in  pari  delicto  with  the  creator 
of  the  nuisance  and  prevent  recovery  against  him.  City  cf  Lowell  v.  Glidden, 
159  Mass.  317,  34  N.  E.  459. 


^h.    11]  REMEDIES.  799 

REMEDIES. 

345.  Private   remedies  for   a  nuisance^  not  merely  statu- 
tory^' may  be — 

(1)  Abatement  by  act  of  parties,  or  by  judicial  proceed- 

ing; 

(2)  Injunction,  and  other  equitable  remedies;   or 

(3)  Action  for  damages. ^^ 

Abatement  by  Act  of  Party. 

The  abatement  of  a  nuisance  by  private  persons  is  one  of  tlie 
oldest  of  recognized  remedies  for  torts.  It  is,  in  general,  the  re- 
moval of  the  nuisance.^'^^  where  a  party  can  maintain  an  action 
for  a  nuisance,  vs^hether  public  or  private,  he  may  enter  and  abate 
it,2^*  without  breach  of  the  peace,^^'^  unless  the  nuisance  consists  of 
unlawful  and  immoral  conduct^^" 

2 so  As  to  public  remedies,  see  ante,  p.  782,  note  206,  "Public  Nuisances." 
Public  remedies  are  not  exclusive  ordinarily  of  a  private  remedy  for  same 
wrong.    Hart  v.  Board  of  Chosen  Freeholders  (N.  J.  Sup.)  29  Atl.  490. 

2  81  The  statutory  and  common-law  remedy  for  a  nuisance  is  naturally 
cumulative.  Renwick  v.  Morris,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.)  575.  Ante,  p.  348,  "Statu- 
tory Remedies."  Where  a  summary  method  given  a  town  for  the  abatement 
of  a  nuisance  confers  no  right  not  possessed  at  common  law,  it  does  not  pre- 
clude a  resort  to  the  courts.  American  Furniture  Co.  v.  Town  of  Batesville 
(Ind.  Sup.)  38  N.  E.  408. 

282  As  to  choice  of  remedies,  see  People  v.  Detroit  White  Lead  Works,  82 
Mich.  471,  46  N.  W.  735;  City  of  Grand  Rapids  v.  Weiden,  97  Mich.  82,  56  N. 
W.  233. 

283  3  Bl.  Comm.  5.  "The  removal,  prostration,  or  destruction  of  that  whicl) 
causes  a  nuisance,  whether  by  breaking  or  pulling  down,  or  otherwise  remov- 
ing, disintegrating,  or  effacing  it.  The  remedy  which  the  law  allows  a  party 
injured  by  a  nuisance  of  destroying  or  removing  it  by  his  own  act,  so  as  he 
commits  no  riot  in  doing  it,  nor  occasions  (if  the  case  is  private  nuisance)  any 
damage  beyond  what  the  removal  of  the  inconvenience  necessarily  requires." 
Black,  Law  Diet.  p.  5. 

284Baten's  Case,  9  Coke,  53b;  Griffith  v.  McCuUum,  46  Barb.  5G1;  Amos- 
keag  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Goodale,  46  N.  H.  53;   Burd.  Lead.  Cas.  313,  collecting 

2  85  Stiles  V.  Laird,  63  Am.  Dec.  110;  Mohr  v.  Gault,  78  Am.  Dec.  687. 
2  86  Gray  v.  Ayers,  32  Am.  Dec.  107. 


800  NUISANCE.  [Ch.   11 

The  right  of  abatement  by  the  owner  is  clearly  recognized,  as  to 
private  nuisances.  Thus,  trees  whose  branches  and  roots  extend 
over  and  into  the  land  of  another  are  nuisances,  to  the  extent  that 
the  branches  overhang  and  the  roots  penetrate  the  land  of  another; 
and  the  person  whose  land  is  injured  may  cut  off  the  roots  and 
branches  only  so  far  as  they  so  penetrate  and  overhang  his  land,  but 
he  may  not  cut  down  the  trees.^"  Also,  when  a  public  nuisance 
obstructs  the  individual  right  of  a  private  person,  he  has  been  al- 
lowed to  remove  it,  to  enable  him  to  enjoy  that  right,  without  being 
called  to  answer  for  so  doing.^^^  Thus,  the  right  of  enjoyment  to 
security  of  person  may  justify  the  killing  of  a  dog  at  large,  so  fero- 
cious that  he  will,  of  his  own  disposition,  bite  persons  in  the  street.^** 
Indeed,  it  is  said  that  a  public  nuisance  may  be  abated  by  any  per- 
son, whether  he  has  been  injured  by  it  or  not.^^"  "If  the  nuisance 
is  in  the  nature  of  a  trespass,  and  cannot  be  abated  without  enter- 
ing on  another's  land,  it  does  not  appear  that  the  wrongdoer  is  en- 
titled to  notice.  If,  however,  the  nuisance  is  on  the  wrongdoer's 
own  land,  he  ought  to  be  first  warned,  and  required  to  abate  it  him- 

cases;  Rhodes  v.  Whitehead,  84  Am.  Dec.  631.  But  the  owners  of  adjoining 
tracts  of  land  are  tenants  in  common  of  trees  growing  on  the  boundary  line 
between  the  tracts.     Musch  v.  Burkhart,  83  Iowa,  301,  48  N.  W.  1025. 

287  Grandona  v.  Lovdal,  70  Cal.  161,  11  Pac.  623;  Hickey  v.  Railroad  Co., 
96  Mich.  498,  55  N.  W.  989;  Norris  t.  Baker,  1  Rolle,  Abr.  393;  Earl  of  Lons- 
dale V.  Nelson,  2  Barn.  &  C.  311;  Hickey  v.  Michigan  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  (Mich.) 
21  Lawy.  Rep.  Ann.  729,  and  note  collecting  cases  (55  N.  W.  989);  Bucking- 
ham v.  Elliot,  52  Am.  Rep.  188.  Damages  after  refusal  to  abate,  see  article 
in  50  Alb.  Law  J.  229.  So  interference  with  water  course  may  be  abated. 
Schaefer  v.  Marthaler,  34  Minn.  487,  26  N.  W.  726.  So  to  tear  down  build- 
ings wrongfully  built  on  one's  own  land  after  notice  (Burling  v.  Read,  11  Q. 
B.  904.  If  there  are  people  in  the  house  this  may  be  a  ti'espass.  Jones  v. 
.Tones,  1  Hurl.  &  C.  1)  within  a  reasonable  time  (Davies  v.  Williams,  16  Q. 
B.  546). 

288  Brown  v.  Perkins,  12  Gray,  89;  Baten's  Case,  9  Coke,  53b;  Rex  v.  Rose- 
well,  2  Salk.  459,  3  Bl.  Comm.  5;  Crosland  v.  Pottsville  Borough,  126  Pa.  St. 
511,  IS  Atl.  15. 

289  Dunlap  V.  Snyder,  17  Barb.  561.  Et  vide  Brown  v.  Carpenter,  26  Vt. 
G38;  Stump  v.  McNairy,  5  Humph.  363;  Oliver  v.  Loftin,  4  Ala.  240.  But  see 
Peckham  v.  Henderson,  27  Barb.  207. 

230  Gates  V.  Blincoe,  26  Am.  Dec.  440;   Wetmore  v.  Tracy,  28  Am.  Dec.  525. 


^h.    11]  REMKDIES.  801 

self.  After  notice  and  refusal,  entry  on  the  land  to  abate  the  nui^ 
sance  may  be  justified;  but  it  is  a  hazardous  course,  at  best,  for  a 
man  to  take  the  law  into  his  own  hands,  and  in  modern  times  it 
can  seldom,  if  ever,  be  advisable."  ^^^  However,  if  the  actions  of 
the  occupant  are  in  themselves  unlawful,  and  the  nuisance  is  imme- 
diately dangerous  to  life  or  health,  the  person  injured  may  enter  on 
the  land  of  such  occupant  to  abate  the  nuisance  without  previous 
request  or  notice  to  the  occupant  to  remove  it.  Such  notice  or  re- 
quest to  the  occupant  is  necessary  if,  when  he  acquired  possession 
of  the  land,  the  nuisance  already  existed  upon  it,  and  he  simply 
neglected  to  remove  it.^°^  In  case  of  the  abatement  of  a  public  or 
private  nuisance,  however,  a  very  pressing  exigency  is  required  to 
justify  summary  action  of  this  character;  particularly,  in  the  case 
of  a  public  nuisance.^'^  The  person  abating  is  liable  if  in  removing 
the  nuisance  he  does  more  damage  than  is  necessary,  or  converts 
the  materials  composing  the  nuisance.^ ^*  If  it  should  be  proved 
that  the  supposed  wrong  abated  was  not  in  fact  a  nuisance  at  the 
time  of  abatement,^^°  liability  attaches.^''^    And  in  this  respect  a 

291  Webb,  Pol.  Torts,  513,  514;  People  v.  Board  of  Health  of  City  of  Yonkers, 
140  N.  Y.  1,  35  N.  E.  320. 

292  Jones  V.  Williams,  11  Mees.  &  W.  176.  Removal  of  filth:  Grigsby  t. 
Clear  Lake  Waterworks  Co.,  40  Gal.  396;  West  v.  Railway,  8  Bush,  408. 
Generally,  as  to  notice,  see  United  States  Illuminating  Co.  v.  Grant,  55  Hun, 
222,  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  788;  Dunsbach  v.  Hollister,  49  Hun,  352,  2  N.  Y.  Supp.  94; 
McGowan  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  23  Mo.  App.  203;  Groff  v.  Anlcenbrandt, 
19  111.  App.  148;  Harvey  v.  Dewoody,  18  Ark.  252;  Sweet  v.  Sprague,  55  Me. 
190;  Haggerty  v.  Thomson,  45  Hun,  398.  Statutory  requirement  of  notice, 
see  Verder  v.  Ellsworth,  59  Vt.  354,  10  Atl.  SO. 

293  Ring.  Torts,  101;  Whetmore  v.  Tracy,  14  Wend.  252;  Davies  v.  AYilliauis, 
16  Q.  B.  546;   Hicks  v.  Dorn,  42  N.  Y.  47. 

29*  Lai-son  v.  Furlong,  50  Wis.  681,  8  N.  W.  1;  Id.,  63  Wis.  323,  23  N.  W. 
584. 

295  Removal  of  a  dock,  a  public  nuisance,  by  riparian  owner,  Greenslade 
V.  Halliday,  6  Bing.  379.  But  a  wrongdoer  is  not  entitled  to  consideration 
as  to  the  manner  of  abatement.  Roberts  v.  Rose,  L.  R.  1  Exch.  82-89;  Gates 
V.  Blincoe,  26  Am.  Dec.  440;  Graves  v.  Shattuck,  69  Am.  Dec.  536. 

296  An  owner  of  land  may  protect  it  by  embankments  from  overflow  by  sur- 
face water,  and  recover  damages  of  an  adjoining  owner  who  cuts  the  em- 
bankments for  the  purpose  of  allowing  the  water  to  flow  oft'  his  own  land. 
Jean  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  9  Ind.  App.  56.  36  N.  E.  159,  followed.  Jacks  v. 
Lollis,  10  Ind.  App.  700,  37  N.  E.  728. 

LAW  OF  TORTS— 61 


802  iNUISANCK.  [Cb.   11 

city  is  subject  to  the  same  perils  and  liability  as  an  individual.^" 
Liability  may  attack  for  excessive  abatement.^"' 

Abatement  by  Action. 

A  nuisance  may  be  abated  by  an  action  on  principles  similar  to 
that  which  controls  the  issuance  of  an  injunction,^ ^^  and  by  pro- 
ceedings at  law.^"""  A  nuisance  may  be  abated  in  the  same  action 
in  which  damages  are  recovered,'"^  but  one  maintaining  a  public 
nuisance  is  not  entitled  to  a  jury  trial  in  summary  proceedings  to 
abate.""-  A  public  nuisance  may  be  abated  by  a  suit  of  the  people, 
by  their  proper  officers.^""  In  order  that  a  nuisance  may  be  abated 
by  private  action,  special,^"*  though  not  necessarily  pecuniary,  dam- 

207  Cole  V.  Kegler,  64  Iowa,  59,  19  N.  W.  843,  collecting  cases  at  page  02, 
04  Iowa,  and  page  843,  19  N.  \V.  Generally,  as  to  abatement,  see  Griffith  v. 
McCullum,  4G  Barb.  5G1;  Brown  v.  De  Groff,  50  N.  J.  Ivaw,  409,  14  Atl.  219; 
Fields  v.  Stokley,  99  Pa.  St.  306;  Bowden  v.  Lewis,  13  R.  I.  189;  Roberts  v. 
Rose,  4  Hurl.  &  C.  103;  Clark  v.  Lake  St.  Claiv  &  N.  U.  R.  Ice  Co.,  24  Mich. 
508;  Gray  v.  Ayre.9,  7  Dana,  375;  School  Dist.  v.  Neil,  36  Kan.  617,  14  Pac. 
2.^3;   City  of  McGregor  v.  Boyle,  34  Iowa,  268. 

2  0  8  narrower  v.  Ritson,  37  Barb.  301;  Brightman  v.  Inhabitants  of  Bristol, 
C5  Me.  443;  Ely  v.  Supervisors,  36  N.  Y.  297;  Barp  v.  Lee,  71  111.  193.  If  a 
building  is  wrongfully  used,  the  use  should  be  stopped,  not  the  building  de- 
molished or  removed.  Barclay  v.  Com.,  64  Am.  Dec.  715;  Gray  v.  Ayres,  32 
Am.  Dec.  107.  Et  vide  Brightman  v.  Inhabitants  of  Bristol.  20  Am.  Rep. 
711.  Abatement  is  not  destruction,  unless  destruction  be  absolutely  neces- 
sary.    Morrison  v.  Marquardt,  92  Am.  Dec.  444. 

200  As  to  abate  a  breakwater,  see  Nicholson  v.  Getchell,  96  Cal.  394,  31  Pac. 
205.  Action  by  lessee,  Hadon  v.  Brown,  31  Pa.  St.  56;  obstruction  to  a  pri- 
vate way,  \'an  Bergen  v.  Van  Bergen,  8  Am.  Dec.  511;  Connor  v.  Hall,  89 
Ga.  257,  15  S.  E.  308.  Et  vide  Harley  v.  Merrill  Brick  Co.,  83  Iowa,  73,  48 
N.  W.  1000.  Cf.  Dumesnil  v.  Dupont,  68  Am.  Dec.  750  (where  a  chancellor 
declined  to  decree  abatement  of  a  powder  house  as  a  nuisance).  Equity  will 
abate  as  well  as  prevent  creation  of  nuisance.  Earl  v.  De  Hart,  72  Am. 
Dee.  395. 

300  Barclay  v.  Com.,  64  Am.  Dec.  715;  Tate  v.  Raih-oad  Co.,  71  Am.  Dec. 
309.     Et  vide  I'arsons  v.  Tuolumne  County  Water  Co.,  03  Am.  Dec.  76. 

301  Drinkwater  v.  Sauble,  46  Kan.  170,  26  Pac.  433. 

302  Hart  V.  Mayor  of  Albany,  24  Am.  Dec.  165. 

30  3  Township  of  Hutchinson  v.  Filk,  44  Minn.  536,  47  N.  W.  255;  Barclay  v. 
Com.,  25  Pa.  St.  503;  City  of  Orlando  v.  Pragg,  31  Fla.  Ill,  12  South.  368; 
City  of  Fresno  v.  Fresno  Canal  &  Irr.  Co.,  98  Cal.  179,  32  Pac.  943. 

304  To  maintain  a  private  action  to  abate  a  nuisance  for  obstructing  street, 


Ch.  11]  REjrEDiEs.  803 

ages,  must  be  shown.'"'     Prescription  is  no  defense  against  a  pri- 
vate action  to  abate  a  public  nuisance.''" 

Equitable  Remedies. 

A  court  of  equity  may  interfere,  on  behalf  of  one  complaining  of 
a  nuisance,  to  prevent  threatened  =>"  injury,  to  abate  existing  nui- 
sances,=°*  or  othervs?ise  to  effect  justice.'"*  It  exercises  this  inherent 
jurisdiction  with  great  caution.'^"  It  is  not  sufficient,  to  procure 
equitable  interference,  to  show  that  an  act  complained  of  as  a  nui- 
sance is  illegal.  "If  an  act  be  illegal,  I  am  not  to  grant  an  injunction 
to  restrain  an  illegal  act  merely  because  it  is  illegal.  I  could  not 
give  an  injunction  to  restrain  a  man  from  smuggling,  which  is  an 
illegal  act."  '^^     Equity  will  not,  except  for  urgent  and  special  rea- 

an  abutting  owner  must  show  special  damage.     Hogan  v.  Central  I'ac.  R.  Co., 
71  Cal.  83,  H  Tac.  876. 

306  Building  a  house  so  as  to  prevent  access  of  abutting  owner  to  public 
hlghwa.v  may  be  abated  by  action,  without  proof  of  special  pecuniary  dam- 
ages. Hargro  v.  Hodgdon,  89  Cal.  62.3,  26  Pac.  HOG;  Forth  v.  llanhattiin 
Ry.  Co.  (Super.  N.  Y.)  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  033;  Hogan  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  TJ 
Cal.  83,  11  Pac.  876;  Meiners  v.  Frederick  Miller  Brewing  Co.,  78  Wis.  o6i, 
47  N.  W.  430. 

3  0  8  Applied  to  a  brewery,  Meiners  v.  Frederick  Miller  Brewing  Co.,  78  Wis. 
3:64,  47  N.  W.  430.  Cf.  City  of  New  Castle  v.  Raney,  130  Pa.  St.  540,  18  Atl. 
1066. 

307  Ex  parte  Martin,  58  Am.  Dec.  321;  Wolcott  v.  Melick,  06  Am.  Dec.  790. 
See  cases  collected  in  Ryan  v.  Copes,  73  Am.  Dec.  106-116. 

308  As  to  require  remedy  of  evils  complained  of  (flom-  mill)  by  scientific  and 
skillful  appliances.  Green  v.  Lake,  28  Am.  Rep.  378.  Quasre,  as  to  smoke 
consumers. 

300  As  to  abolition  of  equity  jurisdiction  by  statute,  see  1  Pom.  Eq.  .Tur. 
§  281.  Rule  in  New  Hampshire,  Id.  §§  307,  308;  in  Massachusetts,  Id.  §  ;!in;  in 
Maine,  Id.  §  331. 

310  Ex  parte  Martin,  58  Am.  Dec.  321;    Wolcott  v.  Melick,  60  Am.  Dec.  7i30. 

311  Vice  Chancellor  Kindersley,  in  Soltau  v.  De  Held,  2  Sim.  (N.  S.)  13;3-1.j4. 
Therefore  a  public  nuisance  may  not  always  be  restrained  by  a  private  action. 
Recovery  of  damages  for  a  permanent  injui-y  to  property  does  not  necessarily 
entitle  to  an  injimction  or  order  to  abate.  Downing  v.  Citj-  of  Oskaloosa,  SO 
Iowa,  .352,  53  N.  W.  256.  Although  the  unauthorized  occupaUon  of  a  public 
street  by  a  railway  ti-ack  may  be  regarded  as  a  nuisance  per  sp,  which  will . 
be  enjoined,  an  injunction  against  it  will  not  be  granted  at  the  suit  of  a  pri- 
vate person  or  corporation,  unless  plaintiff  makes  out  a  case  of  special  damage. 
Lai-imer  &  L.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Larimer  St.  Ry.  Co.,  137  Pa.  St.  533,  20  Atl.  570. 


804  NUISANCE.  [Ch.   II 

sons,  enjoin  an  indictable  public  nuisance.'^"  Where  there  has  been 
failure  to  exercise  reasonable  diligence/^'  or  acquiescence  operating 
as  estoppel,  the  plaintiff  "*  will  be  left  to  its  remedy  at  law.  Nor 
will  a  court  of  equity  interfere  where  there  is  conflicting  evidence. 
A  chancellor  will  not  attempt  to  usurp  the  functions  of  a  jury,  and 
pass  upon  disputed  questions  of  fact.'"  Accordingly,  if  the  damages 
comjilained  of  are  remote  and  speculative,""  if  there  be  a  dispute 
as  to  whether  a  nuisance  exists,'"  or  if  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  ap- 

312  Inhabitants  of  Township  of  Ravitan  v  Port  Reading  R.  Co.,  49  N.  J.  Eq. 
11,  23  Atl.  127.  Cf.  Heni-y  v.  Trustees,  48  Ohio  St.  671,  30  N.  E.  1122.  Et  vide 
Poi-th  V.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.  (Super.  N.  Y.)  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  633.  Coux"t  of  equity 
will  not  enjoin  an  act  which  would  otherwise  be  lawful,  but  which  is  made 
unlawful  by  an  ordinance  or  by-law  of  a  city  or  town,  unless  the  act  is  shown 
to  be  a  nuisance  per  se.  Warren  v.  Cavanaugh,  33  Mo.  App.  102;  Burwell  v. 
Commissioners,  93  N.  C.  73;  Babcock  v.  New  Jersey  Stock  Yards  Co.,  20  N.  .1. 
Eq.  296.  The  question  of  nuisance  or  no  nuisance,  where  the  evidence  Is  con- 
flicting and  a  doubt  exists,  must  be  first  tried  by  a  jury.  If  the  proceeding 
was  by  indictment,  aud  the  jury  doubted  whether  it  was  a  nuisance  or  not, 
they  would  be  bound  to  acquit;  and  the  same  rule  applies  to  a  court  of  chan- 
cery. Thus,  an  injunction  will  be  refused  unless  plaintiff's  disputed  pre- 
scriptive right  has  been  tried  at  law.  Ingraliam  v.  Bunnell,  5  Mete.  (Mass.) 
118;  Dana  v.  Valentine,  5  Mete.  (Mass.)  8;  St.  Helen's  Smelting  Co.  v.  Tip- 
ping, 11  H.  L.  Cas.  642;  Flight  v.  Thomas,  10  Adol.  &  B.  590;  Bolivar 
Manuf'g  Co.  y.  Neponset  ilanuf'g  Co.,  16  Pick.  241;  Bliss  v.  Hall,  5  Scott,  500; 
Goldsmid  v.  Tumbridge  Imp.  Com'rs,  1  Oh.  App.  349;  Campbell  v.  Seaman, 
63  N.  Y.  508;  Mississippi  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Ward,  2  Black  (U.  S.)  485^95;  Parker 
V.  Woollen  Co.,  Id.  545-552;  Irwin  v.  Dixion,  9  How.  10-28;  Rhodes  v.  Dun- 
bar, 57  Pa.  St.  274;  Earl  of  Ripon  v.  Hobart,  1  Coop.  t.  Brough.  SaS;  Amelung 
V.  Seekamp,  9  Gill.  &  J.  468;  Attorney  General  v.  Hunter,  1  Dev.  Eq.  12; 
Swaine  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  33  I.aw  J.  Ch.  399;  Hart  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of 
Albany,  3  Paige,  213. 

313  Clifton  Iron  Co.  v.  Dye,  87  Ala.  468,  6  South.  192;  Wood,  Nuis.  §  804; 
Goodall  V.  Crofton,  31  Am.  Rep.  535;  Ellison  v.  Commissioners,  75  Am.  Dec. 
430;    St.  .Tames  Church  v.  Arriugton,  76  Am.  Dec.  332. 

314  2  Pom.  Eq.  Jur.  §  817;   Wood,  Nuis.  §  800. 

315  But  see  State  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Mobile,  30  Am.  Dec.  564;  Dumesnil  v. 
Dupont,  68  Am.  Dec.  750. 

318  As  to  damage  from  erection  of  bay  window,  interfering  with  view  of  a 
store.  Hay  v.  Weber,  79  Wis.  587,  48  N.  W.  859. 

317  Private  drain  from  well  in  street.  Wood  v.  McGrath,  150  Pa.  St.  451, 
24  Atl.  682;  powder  magazine.  Born  v.  Loflin  &  R.  Powder  Co.,  84  Ga.  217, 
10  S.  E.  738;  saloon  interfering  with  dentist,  Barfleld  v.  Putzel,  92  Ga.  442, 
17  S.  E.  616.  Generally,  see  Wolcott  v.  Melick,  06  Am.  Dec.  790;  Dumesnil 
V.  Dupont,  68  Am.  Dec.  750. 


dl-    11]  REMEDIES.  805 

prehended  nuisance  may  arise/"  or  from  what  source  damage  com- 
plained of  has  arisen,  no  relief  will  be  granted."*  Nor  will  equity  in- 
terfere where  damages  are  an  adequate  remedy.  Mere  injury  to  prop- 
erty, as  by  depreciation  in  value,  entitles  to  damages  only;  but  an  of- 
fensive business,  when  it  reaches  the  point  of  discomfort,  and  becomes 
injurious  to  health,  calls  forth  the  extraordinary  power  of  a  court  of 
chancery  to  destroy  it.^^"  But  if  the  injured  person  has  no  adequate 
remedy  at  law,  as  where  the  injury  would  otherwise  be  irreparable  to 
Individuals,  or  great  public  injury  ensue,^"  or  where  a  multiplicity 

sisTollution  of  water,  Newark  Aqueduct  Board  v.  City  of  Passaic,  45  N. 
J.  Eq.  393,  18  Atl.  106,  affirmed  46  N.  J.  Eq.  552,  20  Atl.  54,  aud  22  Atl.  55; 
Depien-is  y.  Mattem  (Sup.)  10  K.  Y.  Supp.  626;  a  pleasure  garden,  Pflngst 
V.  Semi,  94  Ky.  556,  23  S.  W.  358;  power  liouse,  Powell  v.  Macon  ■&  I.  S. 
R.  Co.,  92  Ga.  209,  17  S.  E.  1027;  a  privy,  IlifC  v.  School  Directors,  45  111. 
App.  419;  a  cemetery,  Dunn  v.  City  of  Austin  (Tex.  Sup.)  11  S.  W.  1125.  Cf. 
Clark  v.  Lawrence,  78  Am.  Dec.  241.  Et  vide  Ellison  v.  Commissioners,  75 
Am.  Dec.  430;    Ross  v.  Butler,  97  Am.  Dec.  G.54. 

3 IS  Rouse  V.  Martin,  75  AJa.  510,  51  Am.  Rep.  463  (a  leading  case,  citing 
many  authorities).  Plaintifl:  must  show  whether  the  water  filling  his  cellar 
came  from  defendant's  well,  complained  of,  or  from  springs.  Mirkil  v.  Mor- 
gan, 134  Pa.  St.  144,  19  Atl.  628.  And,  generally,  see  Wood  v.  McGrath, 
150  Pa.  St.  451,  24  Atl.  682;  Canton  Cotton  AVarehouse  Co.  v.  Potts,  69  Miss. 
31,  10  South.  448;  Powell  v.  Bentley  &  Genvig  Furniture  Co.,  34  W.  Va. 
804,  12  S.  E.  1085. 

320  Ballentine  v.  Webb,  84  Mich.  38,  47  N.  W.  485  (injunction  for  main- 
taining a  slaughterhouse  refused).  People  v.  Detroit  White  Lead  Works,  82 
Mich.  471,  46  N.  W.  735,  distinguished.  Cleveland  v.  Citizens'  Gas  Light  Co., 
20  N.  J.  Eq.  205,  considered.  A  slaughterhouse,  before  pronounced  a  nui- 
sance at  law,  Minke  v.  Hofeman,  29  Am.  Rep.  63;  machineiy  jai-ring  and 
shaking  plaintiff's  house,  so  as  to  render  it  unsafe  for  habitation,  Dittman  v. 
Repp,  33  Am.  Rep.  325;  Smith  v.  Ingersoll-Sergeant  Rock  Drill  Co.,  7  Misc. 
Rep.  374,  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  907.  Et  vide  Evans  v.  Fertilizing  Co.,  160  Pa.  St.  209, 
28  Atl.  702.  Special  injury  not  sufficient.  Hill  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  City  of  New 
York  (Sup.)  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  393.  A  creamery  company  will  be  enjoined  from 
causing  its  waste  matter  to  flow  into  another's  pasture  so  as  to  injure  the  pas- 
ture and  cattle  therein.  Price  v.  Oalvfleld  Highland  Creamery  Co.,  87  Wiis. 
536,  58  N.  W.  1039.  Where  a  saloon  keeper  causes  a  piano  to  be  played  in 
his  saloon  each  night  from  7  o'clock  till  10,  and  sometimes  till  11,  o'clock,  to 
the  music  of  which  dancing,  accompanied  by  loud  noises,  is  indulged  in,  the 
effect  of  which  is  to  prevent  the  occupant  of  an  adjoining  dwelling  from 
sleeping,  a  preliminary  injunction  will,  at  the  suit  of  such  occupant,  be 
granted,  restraining  the  use  of  the  piano  after  9  p.  m.  Feeuey  v.  Bartoldo 
(\.  J.  Ch.)  30  Atl.  1101. 
321  State  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Mobile,  30  Am.  Dec.  564. 


.SO(i  NUisAxrK.  [Ch.  11 

of  suits  is  liable  to  be  occasioned  by  its  repetition  or  continuance, 
the  court  of  chancery  will  assume  jurisdiction.'^^  By  irreparable 
injury  is  not  meant  such  injury  as  is  beyond  the  possibility  of  repair, 
or  beyond  compensation  in  damage,  nor  necessarily  great  injury  or 
great  damage,  but  that  species  of  injury,  whether  great  or  small, 
that  ought  not  to  be  submitted  to,  on  the  one  hand,  or  inflicted  on  the 
other,  and  which,  because  it  is  so  large  on  the  one  hand,  or  so  small 
on  the  other,  is  of  such  constant  and  frequent  occurrence  that  no  fair 
or  reasonable  redress  cam  be  had  therefor  in  a  court  of  law.'^'  Thus, 
if  the  stench  from  a  fertilizing  factory  in  a  farming  community  de- 
creases the  value  of  a  person's  house,  and  renders  it  almost  uninhabit- 
able, an  injunction  will  issue.'^*  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that 
the  OT^ners  of  a  building  have  temporarily  burned  therein  a  quality 
of  coal  that  produced  dense  smoke,  to  the  injury  of  the  neighbors, 
does  not  justify  relief  by  injunction,  since  the  remedy  at  law  is 

322  Board  of  Health  v.  New  Xork  H.  M.  Co.,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  1;  Proprietors  of 
Maine  Wharf  v.  Proprietors  of  Custom  House  Wharf,  85  Me.  175,  27  Atl.  93. 

323  vs'ood,  Nuis.  §  778,  citing,  inter  alia,  Clowes  v.  Staffordshire  Potteries 
^^'aterworks  Co.,  8  Ch.  App.  125;  Wilts  &  B.  C.  Nav.  Co.  v.  Swindon  Water- 
worlvs  Co.,  9  Ch.  App.  451:  Webb  v.  Portland  Manuf'g  Co.,  3  Sumn.  189, 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  17,322;  Babcock  v.  New  Jersey  Stock  Yard  Co.,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  296; 
Pol.  Torts,  523.  Et  vide  Rhodes  v.  Dunbar,  57  Pa.  St.  274  (opinion  of  Reed, 
J.,  at  pages  275-285);  Mirkil  v.  Morgan,  134  Pa.  St.  144,  19  Atl.  628;  Ditt- 
man  v.  Repp,  50  Md.  516;  Topeka  Water  Supply  Co.  v.  City  of  Potwin,  43 
Kan.  414,  23  Pac.  578;  Pfingst  v.  Senn,  94  Ky.  556,  23  S.  W.  358;  Powell 
V.  Macon  &  I.  S.  K.  Co.,  92  Ga.  209,  17  S.  E.  1027;  Talbott  v.  King,  32  W.  Va. 
C,  9  S.  E.  48;  Van  Wegenen  v.  Cooney,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  24,  16  Atl.  689.  When 
evils  complained  of  can  be  remedied,  an  injunction  restraining  defendant 
from  operating  a  brass  foundry  will  be  modified.  McMenomy  v.  Baud,  87 
Cal.  134,  26  Pac.  795.  As  to  when  an  injunction  will  be  refused,  see  Rosser 
V.  Randolph,  31  Am.  Dec.  712  (damage  not  irreparable);  Bigelow  v.  Hartford 
Bridge  Co.,  36  Am.  Dec.  502  (no  special  damage);  Hinchman  v.  Paterson 
Horse  II.  Co.,  86  Am.  Dec.  252  (Id.);  State  v.  Crawford,  42  Am.  Rep.  182 
(Id.;  a  saloon  declared  by  statute  to  be  a  nuisance);  Burwell  v.  Vance  Co. 
Com'rs,  53  Am.  Rep.  454  (Id.;  a  jail).  An  action  for  damages  on  account  of 
the  pollution  of  a  stream  running  through  plaintiff's  farm  is  not  a  condition 
precedent  to  enjoining  construction  of  sewers  causing  the  pollution.  Village 
of  Dwight  V.  Hayes  (111.  Sup.)  37  N.  E.  218.  See  Indianapolis  Water  Co.  v. 
American  Strawboard  Co.,  53  Fed.  970,  affirmed  57  Fed.  1000. 

32  4  Evans  v.  Reading  Chemical  Fertilizing  Co.,  160  Pa.  St.  209,  28  Atl.  702. 
And  see  Fleischner  v.  Citizens'  Real-Estate  &  Inv.  Co.,  25  Or.  119,  35  Pac. 
174;    City  of  Grand  Rapids  v.  Weiden,  07  Mich.  82,  56  N.  W.  233. 


^'ll-    11]  REMEDIES.  807- 

ample.'^'  The  destruction  of  an  easement,  existing  or  threatened, 
will  especially  be  restrained.' ''^  When  the  existence  of  a  nuisance 
has  been  established  at  law,  equity  will  issue  an  injunction,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  course,  when  the  nuisance  is  of  a  constantly  occurring  char- 
acter, and  especially  if  damages  recorered  are  merely  nominal,  and 
therefore  inadequate  to  prevent  repetition.'" 

The  injunction  should  be  confined  in  its  application  to  the  specific 
injury.'^*  It  may  be  temporary,  as  to  restrain  an  alleged  continuing 
nuisance,'^®  or  mandatory,''"  interlocutory,"^  or  final.  Indeed,  the 
court  may  retain  the  cause,  and  decree  full  and  final  relief,  including 
damages  or  an  abatement  of  whatever  caused  a  nuisance.'^^ 

3  26  Nelson  v.  Milligan,  151  111.  462,  38  N.  E.  239. 

3  20  Pom.  Eq.  Jur.  §§  350,  351.  As  to  restraining  obstruction  of  street,  City  of 
Demopolls  v.  Webb,  87  Ala.  659,  6  South.  408;  Town  of  Burlington  v. 
Schwarzman,  52  Conn.  181;  or  an  alley,  Field  v.  Barling,  149  ill.  556,  37  N. 
E.  850.  The  authorities  as  to  what  are  individual  instances  of  irreparable 
injuries  will  be  found  collected  in  Wood,  Nuis.  c.  25.  Blasting,  Wilsey  v. 
Gallanan,  66  Hun,  629,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  165;  Rogers  v.  Hanfleld,  14  Daly,  339; 
droppings  of  cattle,  Barton  v.  Union  Cattle  Co.,  28  Neb.  350,  44  N.  W.  454; 
discharge  of  sewerage.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Rochester, 
127  N.  Y.  591,  28  N.  E.  416;  elevated  railway,  Berheimer  v.  Manhattan  R. 
Co.,  26  Abb.  N.  C.  88.  Injunction  refused:  Noise  caused  by  removing  scen- 
ery, disturbing  sleep,  Penrose  v.  Nixon,  140  Pa.  St.  45,  21  Atl.  364;  Straus 
V.  Baruett,  140  Pa.  St.  Ill,  21  Atl.  253;  electric  plant,  English  v.  Progress 
Electric  Light  &  Motor  Co.,  95  Ala.  259,  10  South.  134;  neighborhood  squab- 
bles, Medford  v.  Levy,  31  W.  Va.  649,  8  S.  E.  302. 

327  Paddock  v.  Somes,  102  Mo.  226,  14  S.  W.  746;    Wood,  Nuis.  §  780. 

328  McMenomy  v.  Baud,  87  Cal.  134,  26  Pac.  795  (where  it  was  held  that 
the  injurious  portions  of  a  foundry  and  macnine  shop  would  be  abated 
without  stopping  entire  works).  But  an  injunction  against  a  livery  stable 
will  not  be  limited  to  restraining  the  manner  of  keeping  it.  Burditt  v. 
Swenson,  67  Am.  Dec.  665. 

329  East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sellers,  85  Ga.  853,  11  S.  E.  543. 

330  As  by  a  city  against  a  railroad  company  constructing  a  road  over  a 
street.  See  City  of  Moundsville  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  37  W.  Va.  92,  16  S. 
B.  514;  Gardner  v.  Stroever,  89  Cal.  26,  26  Pac.  618.  Cf.  McMenomy  v.  Baud, 
87  Cal.  134,  26  Pac.  795. 

331  City  of  Conyers  v.  Smith  (Ga.)  19  S.  E.  882;  McGuire  v.  Bloomingdale 
(Com.  PI.)  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  580. 

332  1  rom.  Eq.  Jur.  §  237;  Emory  v.  Hazard  Powder  Co.,  53  Am.  Rep.  730. 
By  statute,  Harley  v.  Merrill  Brick  Co.,  83  Iowa,  73,  48  N.  W.  1000.  The 
destruction'  of  building,  Kelk  v.  Pearson,  0  Ch.  App.  Cas.  809.  Cessation  of 
worlc,  Lingwood  v.  Stowmarket  Co.,  1  L.  R.  Eq.  77,  336. 


8(JS  NUISANCE.  [CIj.   11 

Damages. 

Damages  may  be  awarded  under  circumstances  whicli  might  not 
entitle  one  to  an  injunction  restraining  or  abating  the  alleged  nui- 
sance. Thus,  the  proximity  of  a  legal,  but  undesirable,  business 
may  inflict  such  damages  as  will  entitle  the  owner  of  the  adioining 
premises  to  redress  at  law  in  the  form  of  an  award  of  damages  by 
the  jury,  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances.^^^  Difference  in  value 
between  the  property  with  and  without  the  nuisance,  by  which  a 
sale  is  defeated,^^*  depreciation  of  property,^^^  loss  of  rents  or  rental 
value/^*  loss  of  profits  or  crops,""'  are  all  proper  elements  for  the 
consideration  of  a  jury  in  determining  compensatory  damages. 
Damages  where  the  nuisance  is  continuing,  have  already  been  con- 

333Robb  V.  Carnegie  Bros.  &  Co.,  145  Pa.  St.  324,  22  Atl.  649;  Keiser  t. 
Mahanoy  City  Gas  Co.,  143  Pa.  St.  276,  22  Atl.  759;  ante,  p.  803,  "jKquitaWe 
Keliej:." 

334  Moore  v.  Langdon,  6  Mackey,  6.  Of.  note  2,  16  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law, 
984.  Tlie  measure  of  damages  for  the  withdrawal  of  lateral  support  of  land 
is  the  diminution  of  the  value  of  the  land  caused  by  the  fall  of  the  soil. 
Sehultz  V.  Bower  (Minn.)  59  N.  W.  631;  McGettigan.  v.  Potts,  149  Pa.  St.  155, 
24  Atl.  198. 

335  Rosenthal  v.  Taylor,  B.  &  H.  Ry.  Co.,  79  Tex.  325,  15  S.  W.  268;  Babb 
V.  Curators  of  the  University  of  Missouri,  40  Mo.  App.  173.  Although  the 
property  was  vacant,  Peck  v.  Elder,  3  Sandf.  126;  Dana  v.  Valentine,  5 
Mete.  (Mass.)  8.  But  see  Hopkins  v.  Western  Pacific  R.  Co.,  50  Cal.  190. 
Cf.  Francis  v.  Schoellkopf,  53  N.  Y.  152;  Wesson  v.  Washburn  Iron  Co., 
13  Allen,  95. 

336  Willey  V.  Hunter,  57  Vt.  479;  Herbert  v.  Rainey,  162  Pa.  St.  525,  29 
Atl.  725;  Colrick  v.  Swinburne,  105  N.  y.  503,  12  N.  E.  427;  Stetson  v. 
Faxon,  31  Am.  Dec.  123;  Woodin  v.  Wentworth,  57  Mich.  278,  23  N.  W.  813; 
Crawford  v.  Parsons,  63  N.  H.  438;  Randolf  v.  Town  of  Bloomfield,  77  Iowa, 
50,  41  N.  W.  562.  But  see  Selma  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Knapp,  42  Ala.  480;  Baken  v. 
Boston,  22  Am.  Dec.  421. 

33 T  Lawson  v.  Price,  45  Md.  123;  Gibson  v.  Fischer,  68  Iowa,  29,  25  N.  W. 
914;  Simmons  v.  Brown,  5  R.  I.  299;  French  v.  Connecticut  Ri/er  Lumber 
Co.,  145  Mass.  261,  14  N.  E.  113;  Lommeland  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry. 
Co.,  35  Jlinn.  412,  29  N.  W."  119;  Folsom  v.  Apple  River  Log-Driving  Co.,  41 
Wis.  602;  Grand  Rapids  B.  Co.  v.  Jarvis,  30  Mich.  808.  Expense  of  prose- 
cuting action  has  been  held  a  proper  element  of  damage  in  action  for  injury 
by  obstruction  of  highway.  Linsley  v.  Bushnell,  15  Conn.  255;  Keay  v.  New 
Orleans  Canal  &  Banking  Co.,  7  La.  Ann.  259.  But  not  proper  in  action  for 
flooding  land.     Good  v.  Mylin,  8  Pa.  St.  51. 


■Gh.    11]  REMEDIES.  809 

sidered.^^^  Damages  for  a  nuisance  will  be  limited  to  title  or  right 
of  the  plaintiff,  as  in  trespass.""  Nominal  damages  have  already 
been  considered.  Special  damages  must  be  particularly  alleged  and 
proved.^*"  A  fortiori,  in  the  case  of  public  nuisance,  the  plaintiff 
in  a  private  action  must  plead  and  prove  special  damages  as  to  him- 
self."*^ Exemplary  damages  are  awarded  on  ordinary  principles.^*- 
In  general,  the  same  rule  of  damages  applies  in  nuisance  as  in  tres- 
pass.^*^  In  an  action  against  an  adjoining  property  owner  to  re- 
cover for  damage  sustained  by  the  caving  in  of  another's  property, 
consequent  upon  such  owner's  excavations  on  his  own  land,  any  dam- 
age further  than  the  actual  caving  in — as  the  obstruction  of  drains, 
or  destruction  of  a  fence — must  be  specially  alleged,  and  its  money 
value  shown,  to  entitle  the  plaintiff"  to  recover  therefor.^** 

33  8  3  Suth.  Dam.  2272-2277.  No  damage  accruing  after  tlie  commencement 
of  a  suit  may  be  recovered  wlien  tlie  injury  is  continuing;  subsequent  dam- 
ages are  recoverable  by  subsequent  suit.  Scblitz  Brewing  Co.  v.  Compton, 
142  111.  511,  32  N.  E.  693;  Hudson  v.  Burk,  48  Mo.  App.  314;  Comminge  v. 
Stevenson,  76  Tex.  642,  13  S.  W.  556. 

339  Francis  v.  Scboellliopf,  53  N.  Y.  152;    Seely  v.  Alden,  61  Pa.  St.  302; 
Staple  V.  Spring,  10  Mass.  72. 

340  Thus,  in  an  action  for  a  nuisance  of  a  privy,  plaintiff  was  not  permitted 
to  show  pollution  of  his  well  and  unmerchantable  character  of  beer  made 
therewith,  because  not  allegied  as  special  damages.  Solms  v.  Lias,  16  Abb. 
Prac.  311.  Et  vide  Baugh  v.  Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.,  80  Tex.  56,  15  S.  W. 
587;  Board  of  Health  and  Vital  Statistics  of  Hudson  County  v.  New  York 
Horse  Manure  Co.,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  1,  19  Atl.  1098;  Vanderslice  v.  Newton,  4  N. 
t.  30;  Griggs  V.  Fleckenstein,  14  Minn.  81.  Special  damages  from  blasting, 
and  putting  in  fear,  3  Suth.  Dam.  2296-2298.  Removing  lateral  support,  Id. 
Injury  to  business,  et  sim.,  Id.  2298-2302. 

341  Hart  V.  Evans,  8  Pa.  St.  13. 

342  Morford  v.  Woodworth,  7  Ind.  83;  McFadden  v.  Rausch,  119  Pa.  St.  507, 
13  Atl.  459;  Hays  v.  Askew,  7  Jones  (N.  C.)  272;  Parrott  v.  Housatonic  R. 
Co.,  47  Conn.  575. 

34  3  3  Suth.  Dam.  2270-2272;  ante,  p.  692.  In  an  action  for  diversion  of  water, 
the  evidence  showed  that  plaintiff,  in  order  to  use  the  water  of  the  stream, 
had  dammed  it  up  so  that  it  formed  a  pond,  which  overflowed  part  of  de- 
fendant's land,  and  it  did  not  appear  that,  without  such  ovei-flow,  defendant 
could  have  used  the  water.  Held,  that  he  could  only  recover  nominal  dam- 
ages, since  he  could  not  base  his  right  of  action  on  his  own  wrong.  Shotwell 
V.  Dodge  (Wash.)  36  P.  254. 

344  Stimmel  v.  Brown,  7  Houst.  (Del.)  219,  30  Atl.  996. 


510  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

CHAPTER  XII. 

NEGLIGENCE. 


246. 

Essential  Elements. 

247. 

Care— Degrees. 

248. 

Mental  Element. 

210. 

Duty. 

250-258. 

Common-Law   Duties. 

259-2112. 

Oonti"act  Duties. 

2(i'!. 

Statutory    Duties. 

204-268. 

Tiolation  of  Duty. 

209. 

Damages. 

270. 

Contributoi-y  Negligence. 

271-274. 

Elements  of  Contributory  Negligence. 

2 1  (>. 

Comparative   Negligence. 

276-278. 

Vicarious   Negligence. 

ESSENTIAL  ELEMENTS. 

246.  The  essential  elements  of  negligence  are: 

(a)  Failure  to  exercise  commensurate  care,  involving 

(b)  A  breach  of  duty,  resulting  in 

(c)  Damage  to  the  plaintiff.^ 

History. 

Actions  for  the  negligent  performance  of  contracts  are  very  an- 
cient, but  it  would  seem  that,  until  the  statute  of  Westm.  II.,  the 

1  This  does  not  attempt  to  be  a  definition,  but  is  designed  to  distinguish  for 
discussion  what  are  conceived  to  be  the  principle  elements  of  the  indefinable 
term  "negligence."  JIany  definitions  will  be  found  collated  in  16  Am.  &  Eng. 
Enc.  Law,  389.  Et  vide  notes  to  11  Am.  St.  Rep.  548,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  700. 
The  current  definitions  are  of  many  types.  As  to  the  conventional  type,  that 
of  Mr.  Cooley— "Negligence  is  the  failure  to  obsei-ve.  for  the  protection  of  the 
interest  of  another,  that  degree  of  care,  precaution,  and  vigilance  which  the 
circumstances  justly  demand"  (Cooley,  Torts,  p.  630)— has  met  with  general  ap- 
probation. City  of  Terre  Haute  v.  Hudnut,  112  Ind.  542-545,  13  N.  E.  686. 
Et  vide  Detroit  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Van  Steinburg,  17  Mich.  99;  Brown  v.  Con- 
gress &  B.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  49  Mich.  153,  13  N.  W.  494.  Baron  Alderson's  defini- 
tion is  famous:  "Negligence  is  the  omission  to  do  something  which  a  reason- 
able and  prudent  man,  guided  by  those  considerations  which  ordinarily  regu- 
late the  conduct  of  human  affairs,  would  do,  or  doing  something  a  prudent 


^h.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  8il 

injured  party  was  probably  without  redress  by  action  at  law.^  The 
action  on  the  case  evolved  under  this  statute  was  easily  applied  to 
trespass  or  malfeasance/'  Thus,  case  was  applied  to  the  wrong- 
ful shoeing  of  a  horse,"  or  the  malpractice  of  a  physician,^  and  to 
the  loss  of  luggage  by  an  innkeeper."     Tt  was  finally  determined 

man  would  not  do."  BlytL  v.  Bii-mingham  Water  Works,  11  Excb.  781-7S4; 
Bret,  J.,  in  Smith  v.  Loudon  &  S.  W.  R.  Oo.  (1S70)  L.  R.  5  C.  P.  98-102. 
Compare  Galloway  t.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  lly.  Co.,  8T  Iowa,  -158,  54  N.  W.  447; 
Nitroglycerine  Case,  15  Wall.  524.  "Where  a  duty  is  defined,  a  failure  to 
perform  it  is  negligence."  The  analytical  type  is  well  represented  by  that  of 
Shear.  &  R.  Neg.  §  5  (approved  in  Bev.  Neg.  5):  "Negligence  consists  in:  (.1) 
j  A  legal  duty  to  use  care;  (2)  a  breach  of  that  duty;  (3)  the  absence  of  distinct 
intention  to  produce  the  precise  damage,  if  any,  which  actually  follows.  With 
this  negligence,  in  order  to  sustain  a  civil  action,  there  must  concur:  (1)  Dam- 
age to  the  plaintiff;  (2)  a  natui-al  and  continuous  sequence,  uninterruptedly 
connecting  the  breach  of  duty  with  the  damage,  as  cause  and  effect."  The 
admirable  deljnition  contained  in  IG  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  LaAv,  389,  is:  "Actiona- 
ble negligence  is  the  inadvertent  failure  of  a  legally  responsible  person  to  use 
ordinary  care,  under  the  circumstances,  in  observing  or  performing  a  noncon- 
tractual duty,  implied  by  law,  which  failure  is  the  proximate  cause  of  in- 
jui-y  to  a  person  'to  whom  the  duty  is  due."  And  see  Farrell  v.  Waterbury 
Horse  R.  Co.,  60  Conn.  239,  21  Atl.  675,  and  22  Atl.  544.  Of  the  metaphysical 
or  psychological  type,  that  of  Austin  (1  Aust.  Jur.  lect.  20)  is  pre-eminent:  "In 
cases  of  negligence,  the  party  perfonus  not  an  act  to  which  he  is  obliged; 
he  breaks  a  positive  duty.  In  case  of  heedlessness  or  rashness,  the  party 
does  an  act  which  he  is  bound  to  forbear;  he  breaks  a  negative  duty.  In 
cases  of  negligence,  lie  averts  not  the  act  which  it  is  his  duty  to  do.  In 
cases  of  heedlessness,  he  averts  not  the  conseauences  of  the  act  he  does. 
In  cases  of  rashness,  he  adverts  to  those  conseauences  of  the  act,  but.  by 
reason  of  some  assumption  which  he  examines  insufficiently,  he  concluded 
that  those  consequences  will  not  follow  the  act  in  the  instance  before  him." 
Mr.  Piggott  has  formulated  what  may  be  called  a  "rule  of  thumb,"— ^vhicli, 
upon  reflection,  is  not  ujilikely  to  prove  more  practically  satisfactoiiy  than 
any  other  formula:  "Legally,  'negligence'  may  be  regarded  as  a  cohvenient 
tei-m  under  which  are  grouped  all  those  acts,  whether  of  commission  or 
omission,  which  do  not  fall  under  the  head  of  malice  or  fraudulent  injury, 
nor  to  which  definite  names,  as  'trespass,'  'slander,'  'libel,'  'false  imprison- 
ment,' are  applied."     Pig.  Torts,  208,  229. 

2  Bigelow,  Lead.  Cas.  Torts,  5S4,  585. 

3  2  Reeves,  Eng.  Law,  395;   1  Spence,  Eq.  Jur.  24L 

4  4%Edw.  III.   p.  19- 
0  48  Bdw.  III.  p.  6. 
«  42  'j2dw.  III.  p.  13. 


812  NEGUCEXCE.  •  [Ch.  12 

that  an  action  on  the  case  would  lie  as  well  for  nonfeasance  as  for 
malfeasance.''  In  the  celebrated  case  of  Coggs  v.  Barnard,^  it  was 
held  that,  if  a  man  undertook  to  carry  goods  safely  and  securely, 
he  is  responsible  for  any  damage  they  may  sustain  in  the  carriage, 
from  his  gross  negligence,  though  he  was  not  a  common  carrier, 
and  was  to  have  nothing  for  the  carriage.  In  this  case,  the  first " 
extensive  examination  (by  the  courts)  of  the  Roman  law  of  negli- 
gence, and  the  first  attempt  to  apply  its  doctrine  to  English  juris- 
prudence, was  made  by  Lord  Holt.  "It  so  happened,  however,  that 
both  Lord  Holt  and  Sir  W.  Jones,  who  did  so  much  to  form  opinion 
in  these  departments,  relied  for  authority  on  the  scholastic  jurists 
of  the  middle  ages,  rather  than  on  the  classical  jurists  of  business 
Rome;  and  it  was  but  natural  that  Judge  Story  and  Chancellor 
Kent — the  treatise  of  Gaius  not  having  been  as  yet  discovered,  and 
the  chief  accessible  summaries  of  the  corpus  juris  being  those  of  the 
scholastic  jurists — should  have  followed  Lord  Holt  and  Sir  W. 
Jones.  Between  the  scholastic  and  the  classical  jurists,  however, 
there  is  a  confiict.  *  *  *  The  scholastic  theories  on  the  above 
topics  are  the  products  of  a  recluse  and  visionary  jurisprudence 
scheming  for  an  ideal  humanity;  the  classical  theories  as  contained 
in  the  coi-pus  juris/  are  the  products  of  a  practical  and  regulative 
jiu-isprudence  based;  by  the  tentative  processes  of  centuries,  on  hu- 
manity as  it  really^  is,  and  so  framed  as  to  form  a  suitable  code  for 
a  nation  which  controlled,  in  periods  of  high  civilization,  the  busi- 
ness of  the  globe.  Hence,  when  the  attempt  was  made  to  enforce 
the  scholastic  jurisprudence  in  the  business  transactions  of  England 
and  of  the  United  States,  it  was  but  natural  that  judges  should 
stagger  at  refinements  so  unsuitable  for  practical  use;  and,  hence, 
we  can  understand  also  how  Judge  Story,  enthusiastic  as  was  his 
admiration  for  the  civil  law  (which  includes,  in  his  acceptation  of 
the  term,  the  scholastic  jurisprudence),  should  have  shrunk  from 
judicially  imposing  the  subtleties  which  he  accepted  as  theoretically 
sound.  The  consequence  was  that  our  adjudications  have  been  on 
one  plane  of  jurisprudence,  and  our  principles  on  another  plane, 
rhe  necessities  of  business  life  drove  us  to  approach  the  law  of  busi- 

7  21  Hen.  VII.  p.  41.  «  2  Ld.  Rnym.  909.  . 

»  Bigelow,  Lead  Cas.  589. 


^^''-    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  813 

ness  Eome,  while  the  authority  of  our  jurists  induced  us  to  still 
cling  to  the  idealistic  fictions  of  mediEevalism."  ^<> 

The  bulk  of  the  law  of  negligence  is  of  modern  origin.  The  appli- 
cation of  general  principles  to  questions  arising  from  the  modern 
kinds  of  common  carriers  generally,  street  and  ordinary  railways 
especially,  and  from  the  various  developments  of  steam  and  elec- 
tricity, has  necessarily  been  recent. 

Negligence  a  Distinct  Wrong. 

"Xegligence  is  not  used  in  legal  language  with  so  much  strictness 
as  jurisprudence  requires."  ^^  "The  undefined  latitude  of  meaning," 
said  Erie,  C.  J.,  "in  which  the  word  'neghgence'  has  been  used,  ap- 
pears to  me  to  have  introduced  the  evil  of  uncertain  law  to  a  per- 
nicious extent."  "  There  may  conveniently  be  said  to  be  two  views 
of  negligence.  One  is  historical,  and  has  reference  chiefly  to  the 
law  adjective.  At  common  law,  facts  constituting  negligence  gave 
rise  to  an  action  on  the  case,  as  distinguished  from  trespass.  ^^  This 
served  to  distinguish  it  from  assault  and  battery,^*  false  imprison- 
ment, seduction,  and  the  like.     Among  actions  on  the  case,  negli- 

10  Preface,  Wbart.  Neg.  (1st  Ed.).    The  New  World  v.  King,  16  How.  469- 
474. 

11  Pig.  Torts,  20S;    Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  p.  10. 

12  Quoted  Pig.  Torts,  p.  229. 

13  Bramwell,  B.,  in  Lay  v.  Midland  Ky.  Co.,  30  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  520. 

1*  Negligence  and  assault  and  battery  are  easily  distinguished  from  one 
point  of  view.  At  one  extreme,  where  there  is  consc;otis  intention  to  commit 
the  act,  trespass  is  the  form  of  action,  and  "assault  and  battery"  the  name  of 
the  wrong.  Where,  at  the  other  extreme,  there  is  mere  carelessness  or  inajl- 
vertence,  case  is  the  form  of  action,  and  "negligence"  the  name  of  the  wrong. 
But  between  these  extremes  the  line  of  demarcation  is  not  clear,  and  has 
been  much  confused  in  fact,  as  will  be  seen  in  the  subsequent  discussion  of 
willful  negligence.  There  may  be  actionable  assault  and  battery  without 
actual  or  specific  intent  to  do  that  wrong.  Reckless  disregard  of  consequences 
may  imply  intent  in  law,  as  riding  a  bicycle  against  an  unoffouding  person. 
Mercer  v.  Corbin,  117  Ind.  450,  20  N.  B.  132.  Contributory  negligence  of  \ 
plaintiff  may  be  a  bar  to  an  action  in  case  for  negligence,  but  not  to  an  action  j 
of  trespass  for  an  assault.  Anniston  Pipe- Works  v.  Dickey,  93  Ala.  418,  9 
South.  720.  As  to  whether  or  not  responsibility  attaches  in  course  of  hand- 
ling or  using  a  gun,  on  the  ground  of  assault  and  battery  or  negligence,  see 
:Moi-gau  V.  Cox,  22  Mo.  373.  And  see  Vincent  v.  Steinehour,  7  Vt  Gl;  Wr'gat 
v.  Clark,  50  Vt.  130. 


814  NEGUGENCE.  [Cll.    12 

gence  and  conversion,  as  has  been  seen,*  sometimes  touch  each  other^ 
but  are  manifestly  distinguishable.  Deceit,  libel  and  slander,  nui- 
sance,^ ^  and  malicious  prosecution,  at  common  law,  were,  in  practice 
and  in  historical  development,  clearly  separated  from  negligence.  But 
negligence  and  fraud  overlap.  Negligence  is  not,  and  fraud  is  pri- 
marily, a  wrong  of  intent,  actual  or  constructive.  Negligence  may, 
however,  be  evidence  of  fraud.^"  Negligence,  therefore,  was  used  as 
a  residuum.   It  included  what  was  not  taken  up  by  other  common-law 

*  Aute,  pp.  718,  270,  note  3j4. 

10  Ante,  p.  771,  "Nuisance."  The  difference  between  negligence  and  nui- 
sance, properly  speaking,  may  be  well  illustrated  by  the  cases  where  perco- 
lating waters  are  polluted,  where  the  liability  arises  from  doing  a  proper  act 
on  defendant's  land  iis.-  so  negligent  a  way  as  to  produce  damage.  Thus,  al- 
lowing manure  to  remain  after  notice,  whereby  a  well  is  corrupted,  is  negli- 
gence. Woodward  y.  Aborn,  35  Me.  271;  Stainton  v.  Woolrych,  23  Beav.  225. 
See  Collins  v.  Chartiers  Val.  Gas  Co.,  139  Pa.  SL  111,  21  Atl.  147.  But  where 
the  water  is  polluted  by  the  percolation  of  matters,  lilie  oil,  offensive  in  them- 
selves, the  -na-ong  is  nuisance  pure  and  simple.  Pottstown  Gas  Co.  v.  Jlurphy, 
30  Pa.  St.  257;  Columbus  Gas  Light  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Preeland,  12  Ohio  St.  392; 
Ottawa  Gas  Light  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Graham,  28  111.  73.  But  see  Collms  v.  Char- 
tiers  Val.  Gas  Co.,  131  Pa.  St.  143,  21  Atl.  147.' 

16  This  distinction  between  negligence  and  fraud  is  well  presented  by 
Beardsley,  J.:  "Fraud  and  negligence  are  by  no  means  identical  in  their 
nature  or  effect.  Fraud  is  a  deceitful  practice  or  willful  device  resorted  to 
with  intent  to  deprive  another  of  his  right,  or  in  some  manner  to  do  him  an  in- 
juiy.  It  is  always  positive.  The  mind  concurs  with  the  act.  What  is  done 
is  done  designedly  and  knowingly.  But  in  negligence,  whatever  may  be  its 
grade,  there  is  no  purpose  to  do  a  wrongful  act,  or  to  omit  the  performance 
of  a  duty.  There  is,  however,  an  absence  of  proper  attention,  care,  or  skill. 
It  is,  strictly,  nonfeasance,  not  malfeasance.  This  is  the  general  idea,  and  it 
marks  the  distinction  between  negligence  and  fraud.  In  the  first,  there  is  no 
positive  intention  to  do  a  wrongful  act;  but  in  the  latter,  a  wrongful  act  is 
over  designed  and  intended.  Negligence,  in  its  various  degrees,  ranges  be- 
tween pure  accident  and  actual  fraud,  the  latter  commencing  where  neijligence 
ends.  Negligence  is  evidence  of  fraud,  but  still  is  not  fraud."  Gardner  v. 
Heartt,  3  Denio  (N.  Y.)  232,  236,  237.  If  a  register  of  deeds  damages  plaintiff 
by  an  en-or  in  an  abstract  of  title,  intentionally,  the  wrong  is  fraud;  if  care- 
lessly only,  the  wrong  is  negligence.  Smith  v.  Holmes,  i54  Mich.  104,  19  N.  W. 
767.  With  respect  to  sale  of  deceased  animals,  see  .Tefferj'  v.  Biglow,  13  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  518.  Cf.  State  v.  Fox  (Md.)  29  AU.  601.  With  respect  to  dangerous  in- 
strumentalities, as  a  gun,  see  Langridge  v.  Levy,  2  Mees.  &  W.  519,  4  Mees.  «fe 
W.  337.   As  to  constructive  fraud  and  negligence,  see  Finch,  J.,  in  Rich  v.  New 


Ch.    12]  ESSE.NTIAI,    ELEMENTS.  815 

actions  ex  delicto.'''  This  use  of  the  term  leads,  inter  alia,  to  the 
anomaly  of  classifying  under  the  head  of  "Negligence"  the  group 
of  cases  of  which  Eylands  v.  Fletcher '»  is  an  exponent.  These 
cases  are  not  determined  by  the  principles  of  negligence,  but  in- 
\-olve  breach  of  duty  to  insure  safety.  Liability  in  them  is  irre- 
spective of  the  exercise  of  care.  Indeed,  no  showing  or  proof  of  due 
diligence  on  the  defendant's  part  will  exonerate  him."  Therefore,  at 
common  law,  "negligence"  was  necessarily  a  vague  term. 

The  more  modem  view  of  negligence,  emphasized  especially  by 
jurisprudents,  and  necessitated  by  the  abolition  of  forms  of  actions, 
is  much  broader.  It  is  based  on  distinctions  in  the  law  substantive. 
It  regards  negligence  as  one  of  the  three  general  bases  of  liability 
in  torts;  that  is:  (a)  in  some  cases,  a  man  acts  at  his  peril;  (b)  in 
others,  bad  motive  determines  his  liability;  and,  (c)  finally,  he  may 
be  liable  because  of  negligence  proper.  Hence,  even  as  to  libel  and 
slander,  the  question  may  arise  whether  responsibility  cannot,  in 
some  instances,  be  governed  by  principles  of  negligence,  or  be  re- 
ferred to  cases  in  which  men  act  at  their  peril.^" 

Practically,  there  is  an  increasing  tendency  to  regard  negligence, 
not  as  a  general  subject  capable  of  a  logical  division  on  the  lines 
of  general  principles  but  as  a  set  of  common  rules  applying  to 
specified  classes  of  cases;  as  railway  negligence,  negligence  as  be- 
tween master  and  servant,  negligence  of  common  cai  riers,  and  the 
like.  This  view  of  the  subject  has  the  advantage  of  convenience, 
^^not  to  be  made  light  of,  or  disregarded. 

York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  87  N.  T.  3S2.  As  to  contributoiy  negligence  on  the  part 
of  a  person  misled,  see  Smith  v.  Land  Corp-,  28  Ch.  Div.  7;  Redgrave  v.  Hard, 
20  Ch.  Div.  1;  David  v.  Parli,  10.3  JIass.  5fil;  Schweuck  v.  Naylor,  102  N.  Y. 
083  7  N.  E.  778.  The  same  rule  for  damages  should  apply  in  cases  of  fraud 
and  in  cases  of  negligence.     Bigelow,  Fraud,  634., 

"  Pig.  Torts,  208-229.  is  L.  R.  3  H.  L.  830. 

10  The  English  text-books  often  consider  these  cases  as  separate  wrongs: 
"Duties  to  insure  safety."  Pol.  Torts,  p.  11.  "Of  certain  wider  duties  imposed 
by  the  policy  of  the  law  in  certain  cases."  Fraser,  Torts,  146.  Inasmuch, 
however,  as  the  doctrine  of  Rylands  v.  Fletcher,  L.  R.  3  H.  L.  330,  has  been 
by  no  means  universally  followed  in  America,  and  eases  involving  the  same  or 
analogous  principles  are  determined  as  cases  of  negligence,  a  sepai-ate  division, 
it  is  thought,  is  neither  necessai-y  nor  usefiiL 

20  8  Harv.  Law  Rev.  200.  Ante,  p.  51(i.  nolo  352.  As  to  conversion,  see 
ante,  pp.  718,  720,  note  354.  As  to  nuisance,  ante,  p.  752,  note  38;  p.  740,  note 
14;  p.  747,  note  17;  pp.  771,  772. 


816  NEGLIGENCE.  [Cil.    1:2 


SAME— CARE— DEGREES. 

247.  The  general  tendency  is  to  recognize  one  degree  of 
care, — commensurate  care,  or  due  care  under  the 
circumstances, — and  to  disregard  the  earlier  divi- 
sions of  negligence,  as  to  degrees,  into  slight,  or- 
dinary, or  gross,  or  lack  of  care  of  a  specialist  or 
of  a  nonspecialist. 

Lord  Holt,  in  Coggs  v.  Bamard,^^  distinguished,  as  to  bailment, 
three  grades  or  degrees  of  negligence:  In  gratuitous  bailment, 
the  bailee  will  be  liable  only  for  gross  negligence;  ^^  in  bailment  for 
mutual  benefit  of  both  parties,  he  will  be  liable  for  ordinary  negli- 
gence; in  bailment  for  the '  exclusiYe  advantage  of  the  bailee,  he 
will  be  liable  even  for  slight  negligence.  The  distinction  was 
founded  upon  the  misconception  of  the  Eoman  law  already  referred 
to.  According  to  the  classical  jurists,  culpa  lata,  the  negligence 
of  a  specialist  or  an  expert,  and  culpa  leyis,  the  negligence  of  a  non- 
sjxH'ialist  or  nonexpert,  were  the  two  degrees  recognized.  The 
scholastic  jurists,  on  the  other  hand,  distinguished  three  grades, — 
culpa  lata,  culpa  levis,  and  culpa  levissima, — corresponding  to  the 
three  degrees  of  negligence.  The  third  of  these,  culpa  levissima, 
was  peculiar  to  the  scholastic  jurists,  and  is  said  to  be  no  longer 
recognized.^' 

While  the  distinction  of  the  three  degrees  of  negligence  was 
originally  applied  to  bailments,  it  has  been  extended  by  common 
acceptance  into  the  law  of  negligence  generally.^*     It  has,  how- 

21  2  Ld.  Raym.  909,  1  Smitb,  Lead.  Oas.  369. 

22  In  re  Liverpool,  etc.,  ^ss'n,  8  Ry.  &  Corp.  Law  J.  227;  Seare  v.  Pren- 
tice, 8  East,  348. 

2  3  Preface  to  Wliai-t.  Neg.  (1st  Ed.)  et  vide  chapter  2;  especially  sections 
57-59. 

24  Preface  to  1  Thomp.  Neg.  In  Smith,  Neg.  (Whittaker's  Ed.)  p.  44,  the 
stibject  is  divided  into  three  classes:  Neglect  of  duty  requiring  (1)  ordinary, 
(2)  more  than  ordinary,  (3)  less  than  ordinary,  care.  Shearw.  Torts,  12,  13; 
Cooley,  Tort§  (2d  Ed.)  753;  Shear.  &  R.  Neg.  §§  48,  49  (where  it  is  said  that 
the  distinction  as  to  three  degrees  "has  happily  been  mainly  confined  to  the 
title  'bailment'  ").  As  to  the  general  use  of  the  terms:  Shiells  v.  Blackburn, 
1  H.  Bl.  158;    Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  87  Ky.  327,  8  S.  W.  706;    Shu- 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  817 

ever,  been  frequently  and  severely  criticised.  It  is  said  that  it  has 
obscured,  rather  than  elucidated,  the  consideration  of  negligence  in 
the  law  of  bailments  itself.-^  The  objections  are  clearly  stated 
by  Curtis,  J.,  in  New  World  v.  King:  ^^  "It  may  be  doubted  if  these 
terms  [i.  e.  slight,  ordinary,  and  gross  negligence]  can  be  usefully 
applied  in  practice.  Their  meaning  is  not  fixed,  nor  capable  of 
being  so.  One  degree  thus  described  not  only  may  be  confounded 
with  another,  but  it  is  quite  impracticable  exactly  to  distinguish 
them.  Their  signification  necessarily  varies  according  to  circum- 
stances, to  whose  influences  the  courts  have  been  forced  to  yield, 
until  there  are  so  many  real  exceptions  that  the  rules  thems(;lves 
can  Scarcely  be  said  to  have  a  general  operation."  ^' 

macher  v.  St.  Louis  &.  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  39  Fed..  174;  Schindler  v.  Milwaukee,  L. 
S.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  87  Mich.  400,  49  N.  W.  670;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Coy (Ky.)  15  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  277;  Fowler  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  18 
W.  Va.  579;  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Loclse,  112  lud.  404,  14  N.  E.  391; 
Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Arms,  91  U.  S.  489;  Simkins  v.  Columbia  & 
G.  R.  Co.,  20  S.  C.  258;  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Howard,  79  Ga.  44,  3  S.  E. 
42C;  Wormell  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  79  Me.  397,  10  Atl.  49;  Norfolk  &  V>'. 
R.  Co.  V.  Burge,  84  Va.  63,  4  S.  E.  21;  Meredith  v.  Reed,  26  Ind.  334;  Parrot 
V.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  15  Wall.  524;  Petrie  v.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  Co.,  29  S. 
C.  303,  7  S.  E.  515;  Cayzer  v.  Taylor,  10  Gray  (Mass.)  274;  Cunningham 
V.  Hall,  4  Allen  (Mass.)  268;  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  24  N.  J.  Law,  824;^ 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Ogier,  35  Pa,  St.  60.  As  to  meaning  of  "gross  neg- 
ligence," see  judgment  of  Earl,  J.,  in  Cashill  v.  Wright,  6  El.  &.  Bl.  891,  and 
Camp.  Neg.  11.  It  need  not  be  willful  or  wanton.  Jacksonville  &  S.  B.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Southworth,  135  111.  250,  25  N.  E.  1093.  Gross  negligence  included  all 
lesser  degrees,  and  on  such  charge  plaintiff  may  recover  for  any  degree  of 
culpable  negligence  which  he  may  appear  to  establish.  Blair  v.  Railway  Co., 
(50  Mich.  124,  26  N.  W.  855;  Hays  v.  Gainsville  St.  Ry.  Co.,  70  Tex.  002,  8 
S.  W.  491. 

2  5  Ball,  Lead.  Cas.  Torts,  225. 

2  0  ic  flow.  469.    ' 

z'/In  Wilson  V.  Brett,  11  Mees.  &  W.  113,  it^is  said  that  gross  negligence 
is  ordinarily  negligence  with  a  vituperative  epithet.  McAdoo  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  105  N.  0.  140-150,  11  S.  B.  310.  See  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Arms  91  U.  S.  480;  Bev.  Neg.  16,  reviewing  objections  at  length;  Willis, 
J  inCxriU  V.  General  Iron  S.  C.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  600.  The  degrees  of  caw, 
however,  it  is  impossible  to  define  or  classify,  for  they  are  infinite  in  num- 
ber each  special,  set  of  circumstances  requiring  its  own  particular  degree; 
so  that  an  exhaustive  catalogue  of  the  various  degrees  of  care  would  be  a 
simple  enumeration  of  all  the  decided  cases.     Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  3oo.    It 

LAW  OF  TOUTS— 52 


818  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

On  the  Other  hand,  in  accordance  with  the  classical  jurists,  it  is  in- 
sisted that  negligence  is  of  t^^•o  kinds  or  branches,  as  distinguished 
from  degrees,  viz. :  The  lack  of  care  which  a  good  specialist  would 
exercise,  and  the  want  of  ordinary  care  that  is  taken  by  persons 
who  are  not  specialists.^^    ' 

Instead  of  adopting  these  degrees  of  negligence,  the  current  tend- 
ency of  the  courts  and  law  writers  ^°  seems  to  be  to  recognize  only 
the  standard  of  proportionate  or  commensurate  care.^"  I  In  cases  of 

may  be  doubted,  bowever,  whether  tbe  attempted  abandonment  of  the 
three  degrees  of  negligence  accomplished  much.  There  is  no  possible  es- 
cape from  the  variation  in  requirement  of  degrees  of  care,  and  it  would 
seem  that  light  is  thrown  on  this  difficult  subject  by  the  attempts  of  the 
courts  to  define  cases  in  which  the  respective  degrees  are  required,  instead 
of  leaving  the  law  as  applied  to  the  facts  in  chaos.  The  objections  as  to 
indeflniteness  to  the  distinction  between  the  degrees,  would  apply  with  equal 
effect  to  the  distinction  of  damages  into  nominal,  compensatory,  and  ex- 
emplary. No  possible  theory  will  enable  courts  to  escape  the  indeflnite- 
ness naturally  in  the  subject.  Moreover,  as  was  said  by  Lord  Chelmsford 
in  Giblin  v.  McMullen,  L.  R.  2  P.  C.  317-337:  "Gross  negligence  is  a  con- 
venient phrase  to  express  the  idea  that  the  degree  of  care  required  of  de- 
fendant is  small."  "In  each  case  the  negligence,  whatever  epithet  we  give 
it,  is  failure  to  bestow  the  care  and  skill  which  the  situation  demands; 
and  hence  it  is  more  strictly  accurate  perhaps  to  call  it  simply  'negligence.' 
And  this  seems  to  be  the  tendency  of  modern  authorities.  If  they  mean 
more  than  this,  and  seels  to  abolish  the  distinction  of  degrees  of  care, 
skUl,  and  diligence,  required  in  the  perfonnance  of  the  various  duties  and 
the  fulfillment  of  various  contracts,  we  think  they  go  too  far,  since  the 
requirement  of  different  degrees  of  care  in  different  situations  is  too  fii'mly 
settled  and  fixed  in  the  law  to  be  ignored  or  changed.  The  compilers  of  the 
French  Civil  Code  undertook  to  abolish  these  distinctions  by  enacting  that 
'every  act  whatever  of  man  that  causes  damages  to  another  obliges  him 
by  whose  fault  it  happened  to  repair  it.'  Toullier,  in  his  Commentary  on 
the  Code,  regards  this  as  a  happy  thought,  and  a  return  to  the  law  of 
nature.  But  such  an  iron  rule  is  too  regardless  of  tfle  foundation  prin- 
ciples of  human  duty,  and  must  often  operate  with  great  severity  and  iU' 
justice."  Mr.  Justice  Bradley,  in  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Lockveood,  17 
Wall.  357-383.  "It  is  impossible  for  the  law  to  furnish,  as  to  the  degree 
of  care,  any  rule  like  a  yardstick  applied  to  the  measuring  of  cloth."  Bish. 
Noncont.  Law,  §  439. 
2  8  Bev.  Neg.  30,  31;  Bigelow,  Torts,  293. 

29  A  review  of  the  disappearance  of  degrees  of  negligence  by  Frederic  0. 
Woodward  will  be  found  in  1  N.  Y.  Law  Rev.  16. 

30  Hall  V.  Chicago,  B.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  46  Minn.  439,  49  N.  W.  239;    ileredith  v. 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  ^        819 

pure  tort,  there  is  only  one  standard  of  conduct  (that  of  ordinary 
diligence),  and  only  one  criterion  of  diligence  (the  conduct  of  the 
prudent  man).^  In  talking  into  consideration  Avhat  would  he  the 
conduct  of  a  prudent  man  under  the  given  circumstances,  it  is,  of 
course,  essential,  in  cases  where  special  skill  is  required,  to  dis- 
tinguish between  what  would  be  the  conduct  of  a  prudent  man  pos- 
sessing the  particular  skill  required,  and  that  of  a  prudent  man 
who  did  not  possess  that  skill."  This  standard  may  vary  in  fact, 
but  not  in  law.^^  Even(^in  cases  of  gratuitous  bailment,  gross 
negligence  is  nothing  more  than  a  failure  to  bestow  the  care  which 
the  property,  in  its  situation,  demands.  I  The  omission  of  the  rea- 
sonable care  required  is  the  negligence  which  creates  the  liabil- 
ity."^ In  other  words,  "commensurate  care"  and  "strict  responsi- 
bility" may  be  equivalent."*  The  jury  stands  in  the  place  of  a 
inudent  man,  and  determines  the  standard  of  his  conduct."  The 
standard  of  care  required  by  law  is  a  practical  one.     Failure  to 

Reed,  26  Ind.  334.  Et  vide  Barnum  v.  Terhening,  75  Mich.  .J5T,  42  N.  W.  96T; 
Grand  Trunk  Rj'.  Co.  v.  Ives,  144  U.  S.  408,  12  Sup.  Ct.  679;  Micliigan  Cent. 
R.  Co.  V.  Coleman,  28  Mich.  440;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  O'Shaughnessy,  122 
Ind.  588,  23  N.  E.  675;  Smith  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  232;  Per- 
kins V.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  Id.  196;  Hinton  v.  Dibbins,  1  Q.  B.  Div.  661; 
McAdoo  V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  105  N.  C.  140,  11  S.  E.  316;  Wyld  v.  Piclc- 
ford,  8  Mees.  &  W.  442;  Storer  v.  Go  wen,  18  Me.  174;  Story,  Bailm.  §  11; 
I^ane  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  R.,  112  Mass.  455;  6  Alb.  Law  J.  313;  22  Am.  Law 
Reg.  (N.  S.)  126,  note. 

31  Perhaps  as  clear  a  statement  of  the  test  as  can  be  found  is  this:  "What 
a  discreet  man  should  do,  or  ordinarily  do,  in  such  cases,  where  his  own  in- 
terests are  affected,  and  all  the  risk  his  own."  Hoffman  v.  Tuolumne,  etc., 
Co.,  10  Cal.  413,  Ball,  Lead.  Cas.  Torts,  225,  226;  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  355;  Spo- 
kane Truck  &  Dray  Co.  v.  Hoefer,  2  Wash.  St.  45,  25  Pac.  1072;  Austin  & 
N.  AV.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Beatty,  73  Tex.  592,  11  S.  W.  858;  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Gorman,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  144,  21  S.  W.  158.  Not  "average."  Marsh  v.  Benton 
Co.,  75  Iowa,  469-471,  39  N.  W.  713. 

32  Ames  &  S.  Cas.  Torts,  143. 

3  3  Applied  so  as  to  attach  liability  of  bank  for  bonds  received  by  it  for  safe- 
keeping, put  in  their  vaults,  and  stolen  by  a  speculating  cashier.  Preston  v. 
Prather!  137  U.  S.  604,  11  Sup.  Ct.  162.  "Gross"  is  a  word  of  description; 
not  of  definition.     Willis,  J.,  in  Grill  v.  General  Iron  S.  C.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  C.  P. 

COO. 
34  But  see  Whart.  Neg.  §§  2G,  48. 
3  6  O.  AV.  Holmes,  Jr.,  7  Am.  L.  R.  502. 


820  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

accomplish  nn  impossibility  is  not  negligence.  The  rules  of  law 
must  be  reasonable,  not  oppressive.'"  Where  the  standard  of  the 
law  is  absolute,  the  wrong  done  is  not  negligence,  but  a  breach 
of  the  duty  of  safety."  No  analysis  of  what  is  due  care  under  the 
circumstances  is  likely  to  be  satisfactory.  They  are  infinitely  and 
curiously  various.  "Commensurate  care"  varies,  not  only  with 
dangers  inherent  in  nature,  but  also  with  the  artificial  relations 
of  parties  recognized  by  law,'*  and  the  property  rights  of  others.'" 

248,  The  prevailing  tendency  is  to  regard  negligence  not 
as  a  state  of  mind,  nor  as  involving  intention,  but 
as  requiring  inadvertence  as  an  essential  element. 

Austin's  theory  of  liability  in  tort  led  him  to  accept  the  doctrine 
that  negligence  means  a  state  of  the  party's  mind.*"  He  distin- 
guished carefully  between  negligence,  recklessness,  and  heedlessness. 
The  last  two  referred  to  intentional  acts.  I  In  the  simple  case  of 
intentional  acts,  there  is  a  knowledge  of  the  consequences  and  a  de- 
liberate intention  that  they  shall  follow  the  act.  Where,  however, 
there  is  a  knowledge  of  the  consequence  and  no  deliberate  intention 
that  they  shall  follow  the  act,  this  neglect  of  consequence  is  termed 
recklessness;  and  where  there  is  no  knowledge  of  the  consequence 
and  no  regard  is  paid  to  whether  any  or  none  follows,  the  intentional 
act  is  termed  heedlessness.  Negligence,  on  the  other  hand,  implies 
the  neglect  of  an  act.*^  Negligence  and  heedlessness  both  suppose 
unconsciousness.     In  the  first  case,  the  party  does  not  think  of  a 

3  6  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Bui-rows,  33  Midi.  6;  Batterson  v.  Gliicago  & 
G.  T.  Ry.  Co.,  49  Mlcb.  184,  13  N.  W.  508;  Micliigan  Cent.  E.  Co.  v.  Dilan, 
32  Mich.  514;  Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Huntley,  38  Mich.  537;  DaVies 
V.  Mann,  10  Mees.  &  W.  546;   Buttei-field  v.  Forrester,  11  East,  60.  \ 

3  7  Post,  p.  832. 

3  8  Cf.  Hall  V.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  ante,  note  30,  with  McDonough  v.  Lan- 
pher,55  Minn.  501, 57  N.W.152;  Wise  v.  Ackermau,  76  Md.  375-389, 25  Atl.424. 

3  9  Steamboat  Farmer  v.  McCraw,  62  Am.  Dec.  718. 

40  Aust.  Jur.  (3d  Ed.)  440,  474,  484,  lects.  20,  24,  25.  Et  vide  Holmes,  Com. 
Law,  p.  82;    Innes,  Torts,  6;   Ball,  Lead.  Cas.  Torts,  322;   Thomp.  Neg.  pref. 

41  Pig.  Torts,  207.  In  Innes  on  Torts  the  term  "rashness"  is  used,  and  is 
said  to  be  a  disregard  of  rights,  iind  want  of  due  care,  shown  in  the  prob- 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEME.NT,?.  -"^  ^  1 

given  act;  in  the  second  case,  the  party  does  not  think  of  a  given 
consequence.*^ 

Heedlessness  and  recklessness,  however,'  are  not  independently 
recognized  in  the  law.*^  And  there  is  no  doubt  but  that  in  very 
many  cases  a  party's  state  of  mind,  or,  more  accurately,  his  knowl- 
edge, is  an  essential  element  in  the  determination  of  what  is  negli- 
gence. Under  certain  circumstances,  knowledge  of  the  facts  from 
which  a  duty  arises  is  conclusively  presumed;  in  others,  the  party 
charging  negligence  must  show  that  knowledge  existed.**  Vigilance 
and  attention  are  material  elements,  and  must  conform  to  the  nature 
of  the  emergency.*^  An  extreme  view,  indeed,  is  that  negligence  is 
a  failure  of  duty,  generally  unintentional,  but  sometimes  inten- 
tional.*« 

Inadvertence  Essential  to  Necjligence. 

But  it  is  strenuously  denied  that  negligence  is  a  state  of  the 
mind,*''  and  that  it  can  ever,  strictly  speaking,  be  intentional.**     It 

ability  that  harm  will  result,  being  foreseen  more  or  less  clearly,  and  yet 
risked.  Negligent  conduct  is,  in  its  inception,  harmless,  and  is  followed, 
as  an  unintended  consequence,  by  injury  which  might  have  been  avoided  by 
the  exercise  of  due  care.  Rash  conduct  on  the  other  hand,  results  in  in- 
jury under  circumstances  where,  although  it  might  have  had  no  bad  results, 
it  must  have,  or  ought  to  have,  presented  itself  to  his  mind  as  being  likely  to 
produce  damage,  or  "as  being  such  conduct  as  in  the  absence  of  a  degree 
of  prudence  or  care  on  his  part,  or  on  the  part  of  others,  through  whose 
instrumentality  he  acted,  the  continual  exercise  of  which  prudence  or  carti 
could  not  be  expected,  entailed  a  risk,  of  itself  resulting  in  such  interference, 
and  he  nevertheless  pursued  the  course  of  conduct,  taking  the  chances  of 
such  effect  resulting  or  not."     Cf.  Holl.  Jur.  94;    Whart.  Keg.  §§  11-17. 

*2  Aust.  .Tur.  lect.  20,  §  632.  , 

4  3  Pig.  Torts,  208.  Et  vide  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Oo.  v.  Barker,  96  Ala.  435. 
11  South.  453;  Kansas  City,  M..&  B.  R.  Go.  v.  Crocker,  95  Ala.  412,  11  South. 
262. 

ii  Thus,  knowledge  of  the  vicious  propensity  of  a  wild  animal  is  presumed, 
but  such  knowledge  of  a  domestic  animal  must  be  shown.  Post,  p.  853, 
"Animals." 

i^  Hutchinson  v.  Boston  G.  L.  Co..  122  Mass.  219-222. 

46  Preface  to  Thomp.  Xeg. 

4  7  Pol.  Torts,  355,  356;    Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  35.0. 

48  Evidence  of  defendant's  intent  is  not  admissible  in  an  action  for  negli- 
gence. Hankins  v.  Watkins,  77  Hun,  360,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  867.  Generally, 
negligence  is  not  designed.     Gove  v.  Farmers'  Ins.  Co.,  48  N.  H.  41. 


822  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

is  urged  with  great  force  that  negligence  is  distinguished  from  crim- 
inal wrong  or  willful  tort  by  the  element  of  inadvertence  on  the  part 
of  the  person  causing  the  injury.**  ''When  the  injury  is  intentional, 
the  case  is  infected  with  malice  or  dolus,  and  a  suit  for  negligence 
cannot  be  maintained."  ^^  It  would  appear  certain  that  the  presence 
of  good  faith,"  or  the  absence  of  intent,^^  does  not  prevent  liability 
for  negligence.  In  its  ordinary  acceptation,  negligence  does  not 
include  malice;  and  courts  have  refused  to_  give  it  any  other."' 
Willful  wrong  differs  from  wrong  arising  from  mere  inadvertence 
in  many  practical  substantial  respects.  (The  measure  of  damages 
for  mere  negligence  is  compensation;  for  willful  wrong,  exemplary 
damages  are  awarded."*  Liability  for  negligence  extends  only  to 
proximate  consequences;  liability  for  willful  wrong  extends  also  to 
remote  consequences.""  ^Contributory  negligence  is  a  complete  answer 
in  an  action  for  negligence,  but  is  not  a  ha.r^to  an  action  for  willful 
tort.""  Again,  while  a  carrier  may  limit  his  liability  to  the  agreed 
value  of  goods  shipped,  such  limitation  will  not  protect  him  against 

40  16  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law,  392;  Detroit  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Van  Steinburg, 
17   Mich.  99. 

50  Whart.  Neg.  §  11;  2  Thomp.  Neg.  739,  note  3;   Bisli.  Noncont.  Law,  501. 

01  Lincoln  v.  Buclmiaster,  32  Vt.  652;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  McCoy,  81 
Ky.  403. 

52  Sharp  V.  Bonner,  36  Ga.  418;  Tally  v.  Ayres,  3  Sneed  (Tenn.)  677; 
Danner  v.  South  Carolina  R.  Co.,  4  Rich.  Law,  329;  Amick  v.  O'Hara,  6 
Blackf.  (Ind.)  258;  Blaen  Avon  Coal  Co.  v.  McCulloh,  59  Md.  403;  Bish. 
Noncont.  Law,  §  499. 

53  Alontgomery  v.  Muskegon  Booming  Co.,  88  Mich.  633-644,  50  N.  W.  729; 
overruled,  Richter  v.  Harper,  95  Mich.  221-226,  54  N^W.  7GS. 

54  That  exemplary  damages  are  allowed  in. cases  where  there  has  been 
some  willful  misconduct,  or  that  entire  want  of  care  which  raises  the  pre- 
sumption of  a  conscious  indifference  to  consequences,  is  settled  by  the  su- 
preme court  of  the  United  States.  Fell  v.  Northern  Pac.  Rr.  Co.,  44  Fed.  248- 
254;  Milwaukee  Ry.  Co.  v.  Arms,  91  U.  S.  489-465. 

5  5  16  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law,  393;   ante,  p.  382. 

56  If  well  pleaded:  McAdoo  v.  Railroad  Co.,  105  N.  O.  140,  11  S.  B.  316; 
Kansas  City,  M.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Crocker,  95  Ala.  412,  11  South.  262;  Penn- 
sylvania Co.  V.  Myers,  136  Ind.  242,  36  N.  B.  32;  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Bodemer,  139  111.  596,  29  N.  E.  692;  Lychfield  Coal  Co.  v.  Taylor,  81  111. 
590,  affirmed  33  111.  App.  479;  Durant  v.  Coal  Min.  Co.,  97  Mo.  62.  10  S.  W. 
484.  Where  death  results:  Louisville  Safety- Vault  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Louisville 
&  N.  R.  Co.,  92  Ky.  283,  17  S.  W.  567;   Indianapolis  Union  Ry.  Co.  v.  Boett- 


Ch.    12]  KSSENTIAL    ELEMKNTS.  823 

liability  for  fraud,  nor  for  "intentional,  wanton,  or  reckless  negli- 
gence." ^^  To  insist  that  inadvertence  is  essential  to  negligence, 
and  that  as  soon  as  conduct  ceases  to  be  careless  and  becomes  will- 
ful the  cause  of  action  is  no  longer  based  on  negligence,  is  in  accord 
with  the  traditional  distinction  between  trespass  and  case,  and  with 
a  distinct  tendency  on  the  part  of  modern  jurisprudence  and  the 
courts  to  separate  from  allied  wrongs  injuries  which  rest  primarily 
on  willful  or  malicious  disregard  of,  or  interference  with,  the  rights 
of  others.'^*  ^ 

Willful  and  Wanton  Negligence- 
It  is  vigorously  insisted  that  willful  negligence  involves  a  contra- 
diction in  terms,  and  is  a  misleading  and  dangerous  expression."" 
The  cases  of  negligence,  as  they  arise  in  practice  and  are  found  in 
reports,  are  not  determined  by  theoretical  considerations.""  The 
same  state  of  facts  may  give  rise  to  a  cause  of  action  which  may  be 
based  on  either  willfulness  or  negligence.  Gross  and  reckless  neg- 
ligence, indeed,  may  in  law  amount  to  intentional  mischief."'^  A 
plaintiff  would  naturally  claim  moral  wrong  on  the  defendant's  part 
whenever  possible,  both  for  the  purpose  of  increasing  the  measure 

Cher,  131  Ind.  82,  28  N.  B.  551;  Menger  v.  Lauer,  55  N.  J.  Law,  205,  26  Atl. 
180.  Et  vide  Cooley,  Torts,  810;  16  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law,  395,  note  3,  cit- 
ing Derby's  Adm'r  v.  Kentucky  Cent.  R.  Go.  (Ky.)  4  S.  W.  303;  Carroll  v. 
Minnesota  Val.  R.  Co.,  13  Minn.  30  (Gil.  18);  Beach,  Contrib.  Xeg.  49-53; 
"ContributoiT  Negligence,"  4  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law,  80.  But  the  fact  that 
defendant,  at  a  point  outside  the  city  limits,  was  running  cars  at  the  rate 
of  15  miles  an  hour,  and,  did  not  give  any  signal  of  approach,  is  not  such 
wanton  negligence  as  will  entitle  one  who  attempts  to  drive  across  its  track 
without  looking  to  damages  sustained  by  being  struck  by  such  a  car.  High- 
land Ave.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Maddox,  100  Ala.  618,  13  South.  615. 

57  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Sherrod,  84  Ala.  178,  4  South.  29.  Conversely 
as  to  insui-ance  policies.  Gove  v.  Farmers'  Ins.  Co.,  48  N.  H.  41.  So 
action  for  causing  death  by  "willful  negligence"  may  lie  when  it  could  not 
be  brought  for  ordinary  carelessness.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  CouiflC's 
Adm'r,  90  Ky.  560,  14  S.  W.  543. 

5  8  See  ante,  p.  555,  "Malicious  Interference  with  Rights." 

50  10  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law,  394. 

00  Pig.  Torts,  208. 

61  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ledbetter,  45  Ark.  240;  Shumacher  v.  St. 
Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  39  Fed.  174.  Et  vide  Fell  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co., 
44  Fed.  248-252;   Cooley,  Torts  (2d  Ed.)  810. 


824  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

and  extent  of  his  damages  and  to  avoid  the  defense  of  contributory 
negligence.  If,  however,  he  should  fail  to  prove  willfulness,  he  may 
be  able  to  recover  for  negligence.  At  common  law,  under  some  cir- 
cumstances, this  would  affect  the  form  of  the  action  and  necessitate 
the  use  of  trespass  instead  of  trespass  on  the  case.  Under  the  code 
system  of  pleading  there  is  no  corresponding  reason  why  the  two 
wrongs  should  be  separated  with  greater  deflniteness  than  is  re- 
quired to  meet  the  appropriate  difference  in  pleading  and  evidence. 
Hence,  actions  for  "willful  negligence"  and  "wanton  negligence"  are 
continually  brought."-  And  the  plaintiff  is  not  required  to  show 
the  appropriateness  of  every  adjective  used  in  his  complaint.  There- 
fore, if  he  alleges  that  the  defendant  willfully,  wantonly,  negligently, 

«2  Willful  neglect  is  defined  to  be  an  intentional  failure  to  perform  a  mani- 
fest duty  in  which  the  public  has  an  interest,  or  which  is  important  to  the 
jierson  injui-ed  in  either  preventing  or  avoiding  the  injury.  Kentucky  Cent;. 
R.  Co.  V.  Gastineau's  Adm'r,  83  Ky.  119-128.  And  see  Newport  News  &  M. 
V.  Co.  V.  Dentzel's  Adm'r,  91  Ky.  42,  14  S.  W.  958.  Knowledge  of  the  prob- 
able consequences  is  the  imputation  of  willfulness  in  respect  to  it,  and  there 
must  be  a  consciousness,  on  the  part  of  the  person  charged  with  misconduct 
resulting  in  injury,  that  his  conduct  will  necessarily  or  probably  induce  a 
harmful  result  complained  of,  before  the  law  will  impute  to  him  a  willing- 
ness to  inflict  the  injuiy.  Georgia  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lee,  92  Ala.  262,  9  South. 
230;  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Vance,  93  Ala.  144,  9  South.  574.  There  may 
be  a  willful  wrong,  without  a  direct  design  to  do  harm, — for  example,  collision 
of  vessels,  taking  unruly  animals  into  crowds,  carelessly  laying  out  poisons 
and  the  like  for  rats,  want  of  caution  towards  drunken  persons,  careless 
placing  of  loss  on  the  highways,  and  the  like.  Palmer  v.  Railroad  Co.,  112 
Ind.  250,  14  N.  E.  70;  Petrie  v.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  Co.,  29  S.  C.  303,  7  S.  E. 
515;  Emry  v.  Roanoke  Nav.  &  Water-Power  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  94-102,  IC  S.  E. 
18;  Jacksonville  &  S.  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Southworth,  135  111.  250,  25  N.  E.  1093; 
Holmes  v:  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  48  Mo.  App.  79;  Shumacher  v.  St 
Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  39  Fed.  174;  Eskridge's  Ex'rs  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  & 
T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  89  Ky.  367,  12  S.  W.  580;  Ensley  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ohewning,  93 
Ala.  24,  9  South.  458'  Collins  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Ky.)  18 
S.  W.  11;  Simmons'  Adm'r  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  Id.  1024;  Alabama 
G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Linn  (Ala.)  15  South.  508.  Evidence  that  a  locomotive  was 
run  in  the  dark  along  a  much-frequented  street  at  a  high  and  dangerous  rate 
of  speed,  without  headlight  lighted  or  bell  ringing,  is  sufficient  to  show 
wanton  or  willful  negligence.  East  St.  Louis  Connectingi  Ry.  Co.  v.  O'Hara, 
49  111.  App.  282,  affirmed  150  111.  580,  37  N.  E.  917.  The  term  "willful  neg- 
lect" applies  only  to  actions  for  loss  of  life  involving  punitive  damages. 
Chesapeake  &  0.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Yost  (Ky.)  29  S.  W.  32G. 


^'''    12]  liSSIiNTIAL    p:r,E.MENTS. 


825 


and  unlawfully  did  wrong,  he  can  recover  on  proof  of  negligence." 
But  there  is  no  harmony  on  the  point.  And  it  has  been  held  that 
a  complaint  which  joins  in  one  count  the  allegation  of  willful  injury 
and  negligence  is  demurrable.^* 


SAME— DUTY. 

249.  The  duty,  violation  of  which  gives  rise  to  a  cause  of 
action  in  negligence,  is  to  exercise  due  care  under 
the  circumstances.  Mere  carelessness,  resulting  in 
harm  to  another  person,  is  not  actionable  unless 
thereby  there  be  violated  a  duty  owed  by  the  wrong- 
doer to  the  sufferer,  prescribed  by — ■ 

(a)  Common  law^; 

(b)  Contract;  or 

(c)  Statute. 

Duty  and  commensurate  care  are  not  two  distinct  ideas.    There 
is  a  universal,  necessary,  and  inevitable  connection  between  them. 

6  3  Applied  to  setting  fire.     Richter  v.  Harper,  95  Mich.  221-226,  54  N.  W. 
768,  overrQiing,  as  to  this  point,  Montgomery  v.  Booming  Co.,  88  Mich.  63.S, 
50  N.  W.  729,   and  citing  2  Thomp.  Neg.  1246;    Taylor  v.   Holman,  4.j   Mo. 
371;    McCord  v.  High,  24  Iowa,  336;    Panton  v.  Holland,  17  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
92.     Et  vide  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dunleavy,  129  111.  132,  22  N.  E.  15. 
Such  an  allegation  would  sustain  a  willful  injury.     Indianapolis  Union  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Boettcher,  131  Ind.  82,  28  N.  E.  551.     But,  on  the  other  hand,  mere  | 
allegation  of  negligence  will  not  allow  recovery  for  intentional  wrong.     Nor  | 
will  a  charge  of  willfulness  be  maintained  by  proof  of  mere  negligence.  / 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  98  Ind.  42;    Highland  Ave.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v. 
Winn,  93  Ala.  306,  9  South.  509;    Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Dickson,  88  111. 
431;    O'Brien  v.  Loomis,  43  Mo.  App.  29;    Indiana,  B.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Burdge, 
94  Ind.  46.     Cf.  LouTfeville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bryan,  107  Ind.  51,  7  N. 
E.  807;    Belt  R.  R.  «&  Stock-Yard  Co.  v.  Mann,  107  Ind.  89,  7  N.  E.  893;    Louis- 
ville, N.  A.  &  0.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Ader,  110  Ind.  376,  11  N.  E.  437.    Cf.  Terra  Haute 

6  I.  R.  Co.  V.  Graham,  95  Ind.  286,  with  Southern  Exp.  Co.  v.  Brown,  G7  Miss. 
260--2CG,  7  South.  318,  and  8  South.  425.  But  allegation  of  willfulness,  in  an 
action  on  negligence,  is  sui-plusage.     Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Davis, 

7  Ind.  App.  222,  33  N.  E.  451;  Moore  v.  Drayton,  61  Hun,  624,  10  N.  Y.  Supp. 
723.  Where,  however,  the  complaint  charged  simple  negligence,  it  has  been 
held  proper  to  admit  evidence  of  willful  or  wanton  negligence.  Louisville  & 
N.  R.  Co.  V.  Hurt,  101  Ala.  34,  13  South.  130:  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  \. 
Farmer,  97  Ala.  141,  32  South.  86. 

64  Verner  v.  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  (Ala.)  15  South.  872. 


>i'2li  NICGI.IGICNCE.  [Ch.    12 

A  logical  division  of  the  subject  of  negligence  would  be  (1)  the  duty 
to  exercise  commensurate  care,  which  is  owed  by  the  wrongdoer  to 
the  sufferer;  (2)  the  violation  of  that  duty  in  fact  by  the  tort  feasor; 
(3)  damage  conforming  to  the  legal  standard  of  the  person  injured. 
To  adopt  this  division,  however,  would  be  to  sacrifice  the  cases  as 
they  occur  for  the  sake  of  mere  orderly  arrangement. 

"While  there  may  be  some  shades  of  difference  in  the  various 
definitions  of  'negligence,'  all  the  authorities  agree  that  its  essential 
element  consists  in  a  breach  of  d.uty,  and  that,  in  order  to  sustain 
an  action,  the  plaintiff  must  state  and  prove  facts  sufficient  to  show 
what  the  duty  is,  and  that  the  defendant  owes  it  to  him." ""  Al- 
though there  is  no  dispute  as  to  this  most  certain  of  the  propositions 
in  the  law  of  negligence,  there  is  no  corresponding  clearness  or  cer- 
tainty in  the  definition  of  "duty."  Common-law  duty  is  derived  from 
analysis  of  circumstances.  It  is  determined  by  the  reference  of  the 
law  to  the  various  conditions  which  determine  what  is  commensu- 
rate care.  Contract  duty  is,  perhaps,  no  more  than  the  application 
of  common-law  principles  to  a  state  of  facts  of  which  a  contract  is 
a  necessary  part.  Statutory  duty  frequently  re-enacts  the  require- 
ments of  the  common  law,  and  is  enforced  by  common-law  princi- 
ples. 

250.  The  common-la-w  duty  of  exercising  care  to  avoid 
harm  has  reference  to — 

(a)  Course  and.  constitution  of  nature,  as  appears  espe- 

cially in  cases  involving   "the  use   of  one's  own," 
or  cases  also  treated  under  insurance  of  safety; 

(b)  Knowledge  of  parties  to  the  -wrrong; 

(c)  Capacity  and  class  of  the  parties  to  the  wrong; 

(d)  Custom  and  license. 

6  5  Shepherd,  .T.,  in  Emiy  v.  Roanoke  Nav.  &  Water-Power  Co.,  Ill  N.  0. 
04,  95,  16  S.  E.  18,  and  authorities  cited.  Et  vide  Arnold  v.  Pennsylvania 
R.  Co..  115  Pa.  St.  135,  8  Atl.  213;  Newhard  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  153  Pa. 
St.  417,  26  Atl.  105.  Of.  Clements  v.  Louisiana  Electric  Light  Co.,  44  La. 
Ann.  692,  11  South.  51;  Macomber  v.  Nichols,  34  Mich.  212. 


^h.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  827 

250a.  What  is  due  care  under  the  circumstances  at  com- 
mon law  refers,  inter  alia,  to — 

(a)  The  course  and  constitution  of  inanimate  nature. 

(b)  The  course  and  constitution  of  animate  nature. 

(1)  Irrational,  or 

(2)  Rational. 

Inanimale  Nature. 

The  exercise  of  care  also  has  reference  to  the  ordinary  course  and 
constitution  of  nature.  On  this  principle  the  care  to  be  taken  of 
streets  has  reference  to  climatic  conditions,  in  so  far  as  these  aifect 
danger  caused  by  accumulations  of  snow  and  ice.  Thus,  as  to  the 
climate  of  Minnesota,  it  is  said  by  Mitchell,  J.: "'  "In  this  new  state, 
the  duty  of  a  city  with  respect  to  ice  and  snow  miist  ne.cessarily  be 
somewhat  limited,  and  care  should  be  taken  that  they  be  not  held 
to  a  degree  of  diligence  beyond  what  is  reasonable,  in  view  of  their 
situation.  What  reasonable  care  might  require  in  an  older  coun- 
try, or  in  a  milder  climate,  might  be  too  high  a  standard  in  this 
climate."  While,  on  the  one  haud,  the  natural  tendency  to  do 
harm  of  things  of  weight,  things  in  motion,  and  things  explosive 
must  be  guarded  against  with  a  high  degree  of  care,  the  law  does 
not,  on  the  other  hand,  require  provisions  against  an  unprecedented 
storm,  floods,  or  other  .inevitable  casualties  caused  by  the  hidden 
forces  of  nature,  unknown  to  common  experience,  and  wliich  could 
not  have  been  reasonably  anticipated  by  a  prudent  and  careful 
man.""  Inevitable  accident,  in  other  words,  is  equivalent  to  the  ab- 
sence of  negligence  or  the  absence  of  thought  on  the  part  of  the  de- 

8  7  In  Wright  v.  City  of  St.  Cloud,  54  Minn.  94r-97,  55  N.  W.  819. 

68  Libby  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  85  Me.  M,  26  Atl.  943;  Piedmont  &  C.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  MeKenzie,  75  Md.  458,  24  Atl.  157.  A  railroad  company,  in  construct- 
ing its  roadbed,  is  not  bound  to  provide  against  an  unprecedented  flood,  but 
i,s  bound  to  provide  sufficient  culverts  or  other  means  for  the  escape  of  ivater 
collected  and  accumulated  by  its  embankments  and  excavations  in  any  stovm 
or  rain  not  extraordinary  in  character  and  violence.  McPherson  v.  St.  Luuis, 
I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  97  Mo.  253,  10  S.  W.  846;  Brendlinger  v.  New  Hanover 
Tp.,  148  Pa.  St.  93,  23  Atl.  1105.  The  owner  of  real  estate,  who  keeps  the 
same  in  a  reasonably  safe  condition,  is  not  liable  to  a  passer-by  on  the  street 


828  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12' 

fendant.""  But  one  who  negligently  leaves  a  wire,  along  wjiicb 
lightning  passes  so  as  to  set  fire  to  a  building,  cannot  escape  liabil- 
ity on  the  ground  that  the  stroke  of  lightning  was  the  act  of  God.'*' 

Aniviate  Nature — Animal  Nature. 

The  care  which  must  be  exercised  with  respect  to  animals  has; 
reference — First,  to  the  care  of  the  owners  or  persons  having  the 
charge,  custody,  or  control  of  animals  (which  will  be  subsequently 
discussed);  and,  secondly,  to  the  care  which  other  persons  must  ex- 
ercise with  reference  to  such  animals. 

The  care  which  is  imposed  by  the  keeping  or  using  of  things  dan- 
gerous in  themselves,  or  which  may  become  dangerous,  has  regard  to 
the  natural  and  probable  effect  upon  animals,  having  reference  to 
their  peculiar  nature.'^  Thus,  an  engineer,  in  allowing  steam  to  es- 
cape,'' or  iir  blowing  a  whistle,'^  must  exercise  due  care  when  he 
knows  of  the  presence  of  horses,  and  the  company  is  liable  if  the 
frightening  of  the  animals  was  due  to  the  failure  to  exercise  that 
care  which  a  prudent  man  would  exercise  under  the  circumstances. 
Tliat  the  cause  of  fright  complained  of  was  unnecessary  is  an  element 
to  be  considered.'*     But,  as  to  damage  caused  in  frightening  animals- 

who  is  injured  by  the  falling  of  a  fence  during  a  storm  of  sufficient  violence 
to  unroof  houses  and  do  like  damages.  Norling  v.  AUee  (City  Ct.  Brook.> 
13  N.  Y.  Supp.  791. 

6  9  As  in  Cotterill  v.  Starkey,  8  Car.  &  P.  691. 

TO  Jackson  v.  Wisconsin  Tel.  Co.,  88  Wis.  243,  60  N.  W.  430. 

'1  Generally,  as  to  horses  frightened  by  locomotives,  Omaha  &  R.  V.  Ry.  Co_ 
V.  Brady,  39  Neb.  27,  57  N.  W.  767;  Carraher  v.  San  Francisco  Bridge  Co.,. 
100  Cal.  177,  34  Pac.  828;  Piollet  v.  Simmers,  106  Pa.  St.  95  (the  care  of  an 
agency  like  a  whitewash  barrel,  mounted  on  wheels,  has  reference  to  the- 
character  of  an  ordinary  horse). 

7  2  Omaha  &  R.  V.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Clarke,  39  Neb.  65,  57  N.  W.  545;  Presby  v. 
Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  (N.  H.)  22  Atl.  554;  Indianapolis  Union  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Boettcher,  131  Ind.  S2,  28  N.  E.  551.  Not  liable,  Oxford  Lake  Line  Co.  v. 
Stedham,  101  Ala.  376,  13  South.  553;  Cahoon  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,. 
S5  Wis.  570,  55  N.  W.  900.  It  is  supposed  that  horses  of  ordinary  gentle- 
ness have  become  so  familiar  with  portable  steam  engines  as  to  be  safe  when 
vinder  careful  guidance.  Piollet  v.  Simmers,  106  Pa.  St.  95;  Gilbert  v.  Flint 
&  P.  M.  Ry.,  51  Mich.  4.S8,  16  N.  W.  868:  Jlacomber  v.  Nichols,  34  Mich. 
212;  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  .v.  Schmidt,  134  Ind.  16,  33  N.  E.  774. 

T3  Fritts  V.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.,  62  Conn.  503,  26  Atl.  347. 
T4  OmalLi  &  R.  V.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Clark,  35  Neb.  867,  53  N.  W.  970;    Toledo,. 
St.  L.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.  V.  Crittenden,  42  111.  App.  469. 


'*-^°"   1"-^]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  829 

by  the  natural  use  of  an  engine,  without  negligence,  as  by  the  dis- 
charge of  smoke,'' =  or  in  the  course  of  the  performance  of  statutory 
duties,  as  sounding  a  whistle,'"'  there  is  no  liability,  because  such 
damage  is  incident  to  an  authorized  act,  and  does  not  constitute  an 
injury.  Where,  however,  there  is  abuse  or  negligence  in  the  opera- 
tion of  the  engine,  or  the  giving  of  signals,  liability  exists."  Persons 
are  held  to  know  and  exercise  care  with  reference  also  to  the  natural 
■appetites  of  animals.  Therefore,  if  a  railroad  company  places  salt  on 
its  track,  it  is  liable  for  trespassing  animals  so  lured  there,  and 
killed  by  a  passing  train. "^ 

Same — Human  Nature. 

Essentially  the  same  principle  applies  with  respect  to  human  be- 
ings. On  the  one  hand,  for  example,  the  owner  of  things  tempting 
to  children  must  exercise  care  to  prevent  the  indulgence  in  their  nat- 
ural instincts  from  doing  harm.^"  Thus,  if  the  owner  of  a  turntable 
leaves  it  unguarded  and  unprotected,  he  may  be  liable  for  damages 

's  Leavitt  v.  Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  Co.,  5  Ind.  App.  513,  31  N.  E.  800,  and  32 
J>f.  E.  86C.  Compare  SeUeck  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  93  Micli.  375, 
as  N.  W.  556,  distiuguishing  58  Mich.  195,  2-1  N.  W.  774. 

7  0  Cahoon  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  85  Wis.  570,  55  N.  AV.  900;  Louisville, 
N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stanger,  7  Ind.  App.  179,  32  N.  E.  209,  and  34  N.  E.  CSS. 

"  Bittle  V.  Camden  &  A.  R.  Co.  (N.  J.  Err.  &  App.)  28  Atl.  305;  Akridge  v. 
Atlanta  &  W.  P.  R.  Co.,  90  Ga.  232,  16  S.  E.  81;  Carraher  v.  San  Francisco 
Bridge  Co.,  100  Cal.  177,  34  Pac.  828;  Philadelphia  Traction  Co.  v.  Lightcap, 
10  C.  C.  A.  46,  61  Fed.  762. 

78  Burger  v.  St.  Louis,  K.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  52  Mo.  App.  119.  And  see  what  is 
the  difference  between  drawing  an  animal  into  a  trap  by  his  natural  Instinct, 
which  he  could  not  resist,  and  putting  him  there  by  manual  force.  Per 
Lord  Ellenborough,  Townsend  v.  AVathen,  9  East,  277.  Or  of  fowls  killed  by 
poisoned  meat,  .Johnson  v.  Patterson,  14  Conn.  1;  Burger  v.  St.  Louis,  K.  & 
N.  Ry.  Co.,  52  Mo.  App.  119.  Furthea-,  as  to  spring  guns  and  traps,  see  Hook- 
•er  V.  Miller,  37  Iowa,  613;  Henry  v.  Dennis,  93  Ind.  4.32;  Deane  v.  Clayton,  7 
Taunt.  489.  However,  on  the  theory  that  a  defendant  is  not  liable  for  eonse- 
•quences  unforeseen,  and  which  a  reasonable  man  would  not  have  foreseen, 
it  was  held  in  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Yeamans,  90  Va.  752,  19  S.  E.  7S7 
(Lewis,  P.,  dissenting),  that  where  a  horse  backed  into  a  train,  whereby  plain- 
tiff was  injured,  defendant  was  not  liable,  although  the  horse  was  frightened 
toy  the  steam  from  the  engine.- 

7  0  St.  Louis,  V.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Bell,  81  111.  76,  distinguished;  City  of 
Pekin  v.  iSIcMahon.  53  111.  App.  ISO,  affirmed;    Id.,  154  111.  141,  .39  N.  E.  484. 


830  NKGMGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

to  a  child  consequent  on  such  negligence.*"  On  the  other  hand,  the 
law  recognizes  the  right  to  presume  that  men  will  act  as  persons 
free  from  infirmity  or  defect  of  sense  ordinarily  do,  in  obedience  to 

«o  A  railway  company  is  not  required  to  make  Its  land  a  safe  playground 
for  eliildren,  nor  is  it  an  insurer  of  lives  or  limbs  of  young  children  wbo  play 
about  its  premises.  \\'lien,  howeyer,  it  sets  before  such  children  a  tempta- 
tion which  it  believes,  or  has  reason  to  believe,  will  lead  them  into  danger, 
it  must  use  reasonable  care  to  protect  them  from  the  danger  to  which  they 
are  exposed.  But  even  as  to  children  strictly  non  sui  juris,  not  more  than 
ordinary  or  reasonable  care  is  required.  What  would  be  proper  care  In 
any  case  must  in  general  be  a  question  for  the  jury  upon  all  the  circumstan- 
ces of  the  case.  KefCe  v.  Jrilwaukee  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  21  Minn.  207-212,  per 
Young,  J.,  approved  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McDonald,  152  U.  S.  262,  14  Sup. 
Ct.  619.  As  to  the  reversed  opinion  of  the  district  court,  see  2  Cent.  Law 
J.  170.  In  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McDonald,  152  U.  S.  202,  14  Sup.  Ct.  619, 
a  child,  without  any  knowledge  of  danger,  ran  onto  burning  slack,  and  was 
injured.  There  was  no  fence  around  the  slack,  nor  was  there  anything  to 
give  warning  of  its  dangerous  condition.  The  place  was  such  as  would  at- 
tract interest  and  curiosity  to  passers  by.  Plaiutilt  recovered.  Ban'ett  v. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.,  91  Cal.  290,  27  Pac.  666.  See  cases  accumulated  in  opinion, 
—page  303, — and  cases  restricting  or  departing  from  this  immediate  line  col- 
lected on  pages  298,  299.  And,  generally,  see  Nagle  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  7.> 
Mo.  653;  Uwaco  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Hendrick,  1  Wash.  446,  25  Pac.  335;  Walsh 
V.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  67  Hun,  604,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  441,  and  78  Hun,  1,  28  X. 
Y.  Supp.  1097;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Stort,  17  Wall.  657.  Daniels  v.  New  York 
&  N.  K.  R.  Co.,  154  ilass.  349,  28  N.  E.  283;  Wambaugh,  Study  of  Cases,  p. 
261;  note  33,  Cent.  Law  J.  325;  Ft  Worth  &  D.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Measles,  81  Tex. 
474,  17  S.  W.  124.  But  see  Frost  v.  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  64  N.  h.  220,  9  Atl.  790. 
The  railroad  company  is  not  bound  to  put  in  such  fastenings  as  a  child 
could  not  displace.  Kolsti  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  32  Minn.  133, 
]9  N.  W.  055.  The  ordinary  manner  of  fastening  is  proper  matter  for 
consideration  of  the  jury,  but  is  not  conclusive.  Id.;  Doyle  v.  St.  Paul,  M. 
&  M.  R.  Co.,  42  Minn.  79,  43  N.  AV.  787.  But  not  every  fastening  is  suffi- 
cient. O'Malley  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  43  Minn.  294,  45  N.  W.  440. 
If,  however,  a  car  on  grade  is  chocked  by  biuke,  set  so  that  it  takes  two 
boys  to  loosen  the  brake,  the  company  is  free  from  blame  as  matter  of 
law.  Haesley  v.  Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  46  Minn.  233,  48  N.  W.  1023.  A 
car  with  unfastened  brakes.  Gay  v.  Essex  Electric  St.  R.  Co.,  159  Mass.  238, 34 
N.  E.  186.  An  unprotected  cog  wheel,  Whirley  v.  Whiteman,  1  Head  (Tenn.) 
610.  Et  vide  Powers  v.  Harlow,  53  Mich.  507,  19  N.  W.  257;  Harriman  v. 
Pittsburgh,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  45  Ohio  St.  11,  12  N.  E.  451.  A  culvert  is 
not  a  trap,  Fredericks  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  46  La.  Ann.  1180,  15  South. 
413;    nor  windows  fastened  in  a  building  containing  torpedoes.  Slay  ton  v. 


^''-    ^2]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  831 

the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  in  the  aroidancc  of  danger;  and  it 
IS  contributory  negligence  on  the  part  of  a  person  not  to  so  act." 
Thus,  ordinarily,  an  engineer  has  a  right  to  presume  that  a  person 
on  a  track,  who  has  abundant  opportunity  to  get  off,  will  do  so  in 
time  to  avoid  being  struck.*^  But  this  is  a  question  of  fact,  to  be 
determined  by  the  jury  in  view  of  all  circumstances,  especially  with 
reference  to  notice  as  to  peril  and  failure  to  exercise  reasonable  care 
to  avoid  damages,  on  the  part  of  the  wrongdoers,  after  notice  that  in- 
jury is  probable."     The  law  recognizes  the  right  to  rely  on  the  exer- 

Fremont,  E.  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.,  40  Neb.  840,  50  N.  W.  510;  nor  swin^ng 
gate,  i-eached  by  climbing  over  another,  Chicago,  K.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Boclicven, 
.'iS  Kan.  279,  30  Pac.  322.  Further  cases  where  a  child  trespasser  has  been 
held  disentitled  of  his  wrong  because  there  was  no  "implied  invitation": 
Ratte  V.  Dawson,  50  Minn.  400,  52  N.  W.  905.  Compare  Newdoll  v.  Young, 
80  Hun,  364,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  84;  Greene  v.  Linton,  7  Misc.  Rep.  272,  27  N.  Y. 
Supp.  891;  Hargreaves  v.  Deacon,  25  Jlieh.  1;  O'Conner  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
Co.,  44  La.  Ann.  339,  10  South.  078;  Hawley  v.  City  of  Atlantic  (Iowa)  60  N. 
W.  519;   Talty  v.  City  of  Atlantic,  Id.  516. 

81  Slaughter  v.  Meti'opolitan  St  Ry.  Co.,  116  Mo.  269,  23  S.  W.  760;  Denver 
Tramway  Co.  v.  Reid,  4  Colo.  App.  53,  35  Pac.  269. 

8  2  Thus,  an  engineer,  who  saw  intestate  on  the  track,  was  justified  in  be- 
lieving up  to  the  last  moment,  in  the  absence  of  knowledge  that  intestate  was 
deaf  or  insane,  that  he  would  move  out  of  the  way.  Norwood  v.  Raleigh  & 
G.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  236,  16  S.  E.  4.  An  engineer  has  a  right  to  presume  that 
defendant,  on  a  railroad  bicycle,  will  get  out  of  ti'ain's  way,  until  proximity 
mokes  danger  of  accident  probable.  Railway  Co.  v.  Hicks,  89  Tenn.  301,  17 
S.  W.  1036;  Syme  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  113  N.  C.  558,  18  S.  B.  114;  High 
V.  Cfaolina  Cent.  R.  Co.,  112  N.  C.  385,  17  S.  15.  79  (JlcAdoo  v.  Railroad  Co., 
105  N.  C.  140,  11  S.  E.  316,  followed;  Deans  v.  Railroad  Co.,  107  N.  C.  686, 
12  S.  E.  77;  Bullock  v.  Raih-oad  Co.,  105  N.  0.  180,  10  S.  B.  988;  Clark  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  109  N.  C.  430,  14  S.  B.  43,  distinguished);  France's  Adm'r  v. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  (Ky.)  22  S.  W.  851;  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.,  v.  Roberts,  2 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  Ill,  20  S.  W.  960;  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Herrin,  6  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  718,  26  S.  W.  425;  Pittsburgh,  C,  0.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Judd  (Ind. 
App.)  36  N.  E.  775;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Myers,  136  Ind.  242,  36  N.  E.  32.  So, 
in  the  operation  of  street-car  lines,  as  to  crossings,  see  Christensen  v.  Union 
Trunk  Line,  6  Wash.  75,  32  Pac.  1018.  And  see  Doyle  v.  W.est  End  St.  Ry. 
Co.,  161  Mass.  533,  37  N.  E.  741. 

83  As  to  occupants  in  a  covered  wagon  on  a  track:  Hinkle  v.  Richmond  &  D. 
R.  Co.,  109  N.  0.  472,  13  S.  E.  884.  Et  vide  Doyle  v.  West  End  St.  K.  Co.,  161 
Mass.  533,  37  N.  E.  741;  Schmolze  v.  Chicago,  Jl.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  83  Wis.  6.59, 
53  N.  W.  743,  and  54  N.  W.  106;    Hansen  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  83 


832  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

cise  of  the  care  usual  with  men.  "We  are  entitled  to  count  on  the  or- 
dinary prudence  of  our  fellow  men  until  we  have  specific  warning 
to  the  contrary."  '* 

251.  No  person  is  liable  for  damages  incidentally  occa- 
sioned to  another  by  the  natural  and  beneficial  use 
of  his  OTsrn  property,  or  things  in  his  possession  or 
control,  or  of  a  franchise  granted  by  the  state,  un- 
less he  be  guilty — 

(a)  Of  negligence  resulting  in  damages,  or 

(b)  Of  creating  or  maintaining  a  nuisance,  or 

(c)  Of  producing  damage   consequent  neither  upon  neg- 

ligence nor  nuisance,  but  upon  the  ownership,  use, 
custody,  or  control  of  some  dangerous  instrumen- 
tality. 

It  has  been  seen  that  the  maxim  "sic  utere  tuo"  is  a  generaliza- 
tion which  expresses  the  spirit  of  the  law,  and  is  too  vague  and  un- 
certain to  be  accepted  as  a  proposition  from  which  any  specific  de- 
duction may  be  safely  made.*°  However,  the  law  recognizes  the  ap- 
plication of  the  maxim  to  instrumentalities,  especially  if  their  nature 
is  calculated  to  do  harm.  No  general  formula  of  the  result  of  this 
application  is  likely  to  be  complete  or  accurate.  That  of  the  black- 
letter  text  is  essentially  in  the  language  of  Brown,  J.,  in. Cumberland 
Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co.  v.  United  Electric  Ky.  Co.**  It  is  defective, 
conspicuously,  in  its  failure  to  recognize  the  existence  of  the  unset- 
tled classes  of  cases  in  which  uses  of  property  become  actionable 

Wis.  631,  53  N.  W.  909;  Will  v.  West  Side  K.  Co.,  84  Wis.  42,  54  N.  W.  30; 
4  Bl.  Comm.  192;  Skelton  v.  London  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  2  C.  P.  031;  Pol. 
Torts,  p.  388. 

84  Pol.  Torts,  p.  388,  citing  Daniel  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  5  H.  li.  45; 
Gee  V.  Railroad  Co.,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  161;  Adams  v.  Railway  Co.,  L.  R.  4  C.  P.  739. 

8  5  Ante,  c.  1. 

80  42  Fed.  273.  And  see  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  328.  It  would  seem  that  perliaps 
a  more  accurate  and  complete  statement  would  be  that  the  exceptions  to  the 
nonliability  in  the  use  of  "one's  own"  are  four,  viz.:  (a)  Negligence,  result- 
ing in  damage;  (b)  an  actionable  nuisance;  (c)  breach  of  duty  of  insuring 
safety;    (d)  recognized  malicious  wrong. 


Ch.    12]  ESSEXTIAL    ELEMENTS.  S'J.'! 

because  of  malice/'  In  discussing  this  general  subject,  a  number  of 
specific  classes  of  cases  in  which  these  questions  have  arisen  will  be 
first  considered,  and  the  results  of  the  cases  thus  set  forth  will  be 
afterwards  briefly  summarized. 

Accumulations  of  Water. 

In  the  celebrated  case  of  Rylands  v.  Fletcher  ''^  the  defendants, 
owners  of  a  mill,  erected  a  reservoir,  employing  competent  persons 
to  construct  it.  Under  the  land,  the  plaintiff,  the  lessee  of  mines, 
worked  up  to  a  spot  where  there  were  certain  old  passages  of  dis- 
used mines.  When  the  water  was  introduced  into  the  reservoir,  it 
broke  through  some  of  the  shafts,  flowed  through  the  old  passage, 
and  flooded  the  plaintiff's  mine.  No  care  had  been  taken  by  tht" 
engineer  or  contractor  to  block  up  the  shafts.  But,  admitting  that 
the  defendant  was  personally  free  from  fault,  he  was  held  to  be 
responsible.  Two  views  have  been  taken  of  this  case.  One  re- 
gards it  as  laying  down  specifically  the  general  proposition  that 
where  persons,  for  their  own  purposes,  bring  on  their  lands  and  col- 
lect and  keep  anything  likely  to  do  mischief,  if  it  escape,  they  are 
insurers  of  safety,  and  that  in  such  cases  the  happening  of  an  acci- 
dent creates  a  prima  facie  liability,  which  can  be  rebutted  only 
by  bringing  it  within  a  recognized  exception,^^  and  not  by  showing 
merely  unsuccessful  diligence;  and  also  as  co-ordinating  in  the  same 
category  the  scattered  classes  of  cases  which  never  became  auieuu- 
ble  to  the  test  of  due  care  under  the  circumstances.^"     This  woald 

*  "Malicious  Wrongs,"  ante,  555. 

87  Fletcher  v.  Kylands,  L.  R.  1  Exch.  265;  s.  c,  -t  Hurl.  &  C.  263;  12 
Jurist  (N.  S.)  603;  14  Wljly.  Rep.  799;  14  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  523;  35  Law  J. 
Exch.  154;  L.  R.  3  H.  L.  330;  s.  c,  37  Law  J.  Exch.  161;  19  Law  T.  (N.  S.) 
220;  s.  c,  in  all  the  courts,  1  Thomp.  Neg.  2.  And  see  Fletcher  v.  Smith, 
L.  R.  7  Exch.  305,  affirmed  in  2  App.  Cas.  781;  Humphries  v.  Cousins,  2  C. 
P.  Div.  239;  Orowhurst  v.  Amersham  Burial  Board,  4  Exch.  Div.  5,  7  Cent. 
Law  J.  465,  18  Alb.  Law  J.  514. 

ss  See  Blackburn,  J.,  Ot.  Exch.  Chamber. 

s9  In  7  Harv.  Law  Rev.  441-454,  Mr.  John  H.  Wigmore  regards  this  sentence 
of  Mr.  Justice  Blackburn  as  "epochal  in  its  consequences":  "There  does  not 
appear  to  be  any  difference  in  principle  between  the  extent  of  the  duty  cast 
on  him  who  brings  cattle  on  his  land  to  keep  them  in,  and  the  extent  of  the 
duty  imposed  on  him  who  brings  on  his  land  water,  filth,  or  stenches,  or  any 
other  thing  which  will,  if  It  escape,  naturally  do  damage,  to  prevent'  their 

■LAW  OF  TORTS— 53 


834  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

Seem  to  be  the  more  generally  accepted  view.'"  On  the  other 
hand,  it  has  been  treated,  not  as  laving  down  the  general  law  of  in- 
surance of  safety,  but  as  iuTolving  only  a  special  rule  respecting 
adjacent  landowners."  "The  defendants  might  lawfully  have  used 
their  close  for  any  purpose  for  which  it  might,  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  the  employment  of  land,  be  used;  and  if,  in  what  I  might 
term  tile  'natural  user'  of  that  land,  there  had  been  any  accumula- 
tion of  water  either  on  the  surface  or  underground,  and  if,  by  the 
operation  of  the  laws  of  nature,  that  accumulation  of  water  had 
passed  off  into  the  clo?e  occupied  by  the  plaintiff,  the  plaintiff  could 
not  have  complained  that  the  result  had  taken  place."  This  doc- 
trine of  Eylands  v.  Fletcher  has  been  followed  in  Minnesota,®^  and  in 
Massachusetts."^     But  in  both  states  the  tendency  is  to  modify  it.'* 

escaping  and  injuring  his  neighbor.  *  *  »  The  duty  is  the  same,  and  is  to 
keep  them  in,  at  his  peril." 

9  0  1  Am.  Law  Reg.  &  Rev.  (N.  S.)  97  (article  by  John  B.  Gest  on  "Natural 
Use  of  Land");    Burbank  v.  Bethel  Steam  Mill  Co.,  75  Me.  373-382. 

91  See  opinion  of  Lord  Chancellor  Cairns,  L.  R.  3  H.  L.  330-337;  Carstairs 
V.  Taylor,  L.  E.  G  Exch.  217.  Further  as  to  expression  "Natural  User  of 
Land,"  see  Lord  Blackburn  in  Wilson  v.  Waddell,  2  App.  Cas.  95,  and  Brett 
and  Cotton,  L.  JJ.,  in  West  Cumberland  Iron  Co.  v.  Kenyon,  L.  R.  11  Ch. 
783;  Madras  Ry.  v.  Zamindar,  L.  B.  1  Indian  App.  385,  per  Sir  R.  P.  Col- 
lier. 

32  Cahill  V.  Eastman,  18  Minn.  324  (Gil.  292).  And  see  St.  Anthony  Falls 
Water-Power  Co.  v.  Eastman,  20  Minn.  277  (Gil.  249). 

9  3  Gray  v.  Harris,  107  Mass.  492.  And  see  Gorhani  v.  Gross,  125  Mass. 
232.  Other  cases  in  which  Eylands  v.  Fletcher  has  been  considered  will  be 
found  collected  In  1  Thomp.  Neg.  lix. 

04,  Cahill  v.  Eastman,  18  Minn.  324  (Gil.  292),  followed  in  Knapheide  v. 
Eastman,  20  Minn.  479  (Gil.  432;  this  case  was  decided  after  and  notwith- 
standing Losee  V.  Buchanan,  51  N.  Y.  476);  Hannem  v.  Pence,  40  Minn.  131. 
41  N.  W.  657;  Berger  v.  Minneapolis  Gas-Light  Co.  (Minn.)  62  N.  W.  336. 
In  this  case.  Start,  C.  J.,  limits  the  general  statements  in  Cahill  v.  Eastman: 
"We  deem  it  proper,  to  prevent  any  misunderstanding,  to  say  that  this  in- 
struction—that every  person  who,  for  his  own  profit,  keeps  on  his  premises 
anything  .not  naturally  belonging  there,  which,  if  it  escape  therefrom,  into 
the  premises  of  another,  does  damage,  is  liable  for  all  the  consequences  of 
his  act,  without  reference  to  the  degree  of  care  he  may  have  exercised  to 
prevent  it  from  escaping— is  too  broad;  for  it  is  only  those  things  the  natural 
tendency  of  which  is  to  become  a  nuisance,  or  to  do  mischief  if  they  escape, 


^^]  KSSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  8  ;5 

Tlie  doctrine  has  also  been  recognized  and  approved  in  Oanada.»= 
In  New  York  it  has  been  held  to  be  in  direct  conflict  with  tlie 
law  as  settled  in  this  country-.  The  rule  is  laid  down  in  the  case 
of  Livingston  v.  Adams/"  as  follows:  "When  one  builds  a  mill- 
dam  upon  a  proper  model,  and  the  work  is  well  and  substantially 
done,  he  is  not  liable  to  an  action  though  it  break  away,  in  con- 
sequence of  which  his  neighbor's  dam  and  mill  below  are  de- 
stroyed." "  There  is,  of  course,  no  dispute  that  if  one  negligently 
builds  or  fails  to  properly  repair  and  safely  maintain  a  dam,  and 
it  gives  way  and  injures  those  below,  this  is  actionable  negli- 
gence.°=  The  doctrine  of  Rylands  v.  Fletcher  has  not  been  adopt- 
ed in  Pennsylvania.®^ 

Exceptions  to  Rule  in  Rylands  v.  Fletcher. 

The  severity  of  the  rule  of  Rylands  v.  Fletcher  led,  if  not  to  its 
material  modification,""  at  least  to  the  recognition  of  a  number  of 
exceptions.  Thus,  in  Madras  Ry.  Co.  v.  Zemindar  of  Carodenega- 
rum,^"  a  zemindar  (landowner)  in  India  maintained  an  extensive 
reservoir  of  water  for  the  cultivation  of  a  portion  of  his  territory. 
Notwithstanding  all  reasonable  care  to  prevent  the  escape  of  the 
water,  the  dam  burst,  and  the  water  destroyed  a  railroad  embank- 

which  the  owner  keeps  at  his  peril."  And  see  comment  on  Cork  v.  Blossom 
in  8  Harv.  Law  Rev.  22-5. 

0  0  Chandler  Electric  Co.  v.  Fuller  (1892)  21  Can.  Sup.  Ct.  337,  in  which 
damages  and  injunction  were  allowed  for  dischai-ge  of  steam  from  a  station- 
ary engine. 

0  6  8  Cow.  17.5. 

07  Earl,  J.,  in  Losee  v.  Buchanan,  51  N.  Y.  476.  See  Vanderwiele  v.  Taylor, 
65  N.  Y.  341.  But  see  Mairs  v.  Manhattan  Real  Estate  Ass'n,  89  N.  Y.  498- 
504.  Where  thei-e  is  neither  negligence  nor  folly  in  doing  a  lawful  act,  the 
party  cannot  be  charged  with  the  consequences.  Burroughs  v.  Housatonic 
R.  Co.,  15  Conn.  124. 

ospollett  v.  Long,  56  N.  Y.  200;  Inhabitants  of  Shrewsbury  v.  Smith, 
12  Cush.  (Mass.)  177;  Inhabitants  of  Brookfield  v.  Walker,  100  Mass.  94. 

0  9  Pennsylvania  Coal  Co.  v.  Sanderson,  113  Pa.  St.  126,  6  Atl.  453. 

100  In  addition  to  the  cases  subsequently  cited,  see  Cattle  v.  Stockton  Wa- 
terworks Co.,  L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  453. 

101  L.  R.  1  Indian  App.  364.     Of.  Frye  v.  Jloor,  53  Me.  583. 


S^6  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

ment.  The  landowner  was  held  not  liable,  because  the  customary 
law  of  India  justified  the  maintenance  of  the  reservoir,  and  the  con- 
sequent damage  was  held  to  be  incident  to  an  authorized  act.  It 
was  distinctly  recognized  in  Rylands  y.  Fletcher  that  the  person 
answerable  for  damage  done  by  the  escape  of  water  could  "excuse 
himself  by  showing  that  the  escape  was  owing  to  the  ckifondant's 
fault,  or,  perhaps,  that  the  escape  was  the  consequence  of  vis 
major  or  the  act  of  (lod."  A  violent  rainstorm  was  subsequently 
held  to  be  such  an  act  of  God;  ^°^  and  an  accident  caused  by  a  rat 
gnawing  a  hole  in  a  water  tank  was  held  to  be  so  due  to  vis  major  ^°* 
that  no  liability  attached  to  the  owner  of  the  tank.  And  it  would 
seem  that  one  would  be  excused  whether  the  damage  be  produced 
by  vis  major  or  the  wrongful  act  of  a  third  party  in  releasing  water 
stored  in  a  reservoir. '■''* 

Things  of  Weight. 

Whoever  places  a  heavy  substance  in  such  a  position  that  it  is 
likely  to  fall,  by  force  of  gravitation,  to  the  damage  of  persons  or 
property,  is  liable,  without  further  proof  of  negligence.^  "^     Thus, 

10  2  Xichols  V.  Mai-sland,  L.  R.  10  Exch.  255,  2  Exch.  Div.  1,  23  Wkly.  Rep. 
G93,  33  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  265,  44  Law  J.  Exch.  134,  25  Wkly.  Rep.  173,  35  Law 
T.  (N.  S.)  725,  46  Law  J.  Exgh.  174;  Stone  v.  State,  138  N.  Y.  124-127,  33  N. 
B.  733  (in  which  was  involved  a  rainstorm  which  occuiTed  at  the  same  time 
as  the  one  producing  the  Johnstown  flood). 

103  Carstairs  v.  Taylor,  L.  R.  6  Exch.  217,  per  Kelly,  C.  B.  A  railway  com- 
pany artificially  raised  the  surface  of  their  land,  whereby  the  rain  water  fall- 
ing on  the  land  made  its  way  to  and  damaged  the  plaintiff's  house.  This  was 
held  to  disclose  a  good  cause  of  action.  There  is  a  distinction  in  regard  to 
the  application  of  the  maxim,  "Sic  utere  tuo  ut  alienum  non  Isedas,"  where 
the  plaintiff  and  defendant  are  adjacent  owners,  and  where  they  are  only 
occupiers  of  different  floors  in  the  same  building.  In  the  latter  case,  an  ac- 
tion will  only  lie  where  negligence  can  be  proved.  Carstairs  v.  Taylor,  L.  R. 
6  Exch.  217;   Ross  v.  Fedden,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  661. 

104  Box  V.  Jubb,  72  Wkly.  Rep.  415  (per  Kelly,  C.  B.)  L.  R.  4  Exch.  Div.  76, 
41  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  97,  48  Law  J.  Exch.  (N.  H.)  417;  Vaughan  v.  Taff  Vale  R. 
Co.,  3  Hurl.  i<;  N.  743,  5  Hurl.  &  N.  (i7!);  Smith  v.  London,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.,  40 
Law  .T.  C.  P.  21;  Jones  v.  Festiniog  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B.  733,  37  Law  J.  Q. 
B.  214. 

105  innes,  Torts,  73;  Welfare  v.  London  &  B.  R  Co.,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  693, 
38  Law  J.  Q.  B.  241. 


^'^-    i2]  ES^-KXTIAL    ELEMENTS.  837 

where  an  employ^  repairing  a  building  let  fall  a  chisel,  which  struck 
a  person  working  on  the  sidewalk^  below,  it  was  held  that  this  estab- 
lished a  prima  facie  case  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  em.ploy<5. 
It  was  presumed  that  the  chisel  was  dropped  because  of  his  negli- 
gence."" Where,  however,  the  material  which  drops  falls  into  the 
interior  of  the  building,  the  law  does  not  imply  an  obligation  to  pro- 
tect persons  in  the  space  below,  if  it  does  not  appear  that  their  pres- 
ence was  expected."'  On  the  same  principle,  one  who  maintains 
a  heayy  sign  over  a  sidewalk  in  a  frequented  part  of  the  city  is  pre- 
sumptively negligent,  in  the  absence  of  proof  that  it  happened  out 
of  the  ordinary  course,  if  it  falls  and  damages  a  passer-by."*  Lia- 
bility for  an  overhanging  sign  has  also  been  regarded  from  the 

10  G  Dixon  V.  Pluns,  98  Cal.  384,  31  Pac.  931,  and  33  Pac.  268;  Goll  v.  Man- 
hattan Ry.  Co.,  125  N.  X.  714,  26  N.  E.  756;  Anderson  v.  Manhattan  El.  R, 
Co.,  1  Misc.  Rep.  50^,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  1;  Brooks  v.  Kings  County  El.  R.  Co., 
4  Misc.  Rep.  288,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  1031.  As  to  dropping  refuse  or  things  of 
weight,  see  Hogan  v.  Blanhattan  Ry.  Co.,  6  Misc.  Rep.  295,  26  N.  Y.  Supp. 
792;  Treanor  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  28  Abb.  N.  C.  47,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  536. 
Negligence  in  hoisting  safe  in  public  thoroughfare.  Spokane  Truck  &  Dray 
Co.  V.  Hoefer,  2  AYash.  St.  45,  25  Pac.  1072.  Piling  lumber  in  street  so  care- 
lessly and  InsecufelyThat  a  large  stick  of  timber  fell  off,  to  plaintiff's  dam- 
age. Holly  T.  Bennett,  46  Minn.  386,  49  N.  W.  189.  Cf.  Hulse  v.  New  York, 
O.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  71  Hun,  40,  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  512.  And,  generally,  see 
Kearney  v.  London  B.  &  S.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  411,  L.  R.  6  Q.  B. 
759;  Byrne  v.  Boadle,  2  Hurl.  &  C.  722.  A  high  degree  of  care  must  be  ex- 
ercised by  an  electric  railway  company  with  respect  to  the  iron  forming  part 
of  its  overhead  apparatus.  The  happening  of  an  accident  with  respect  to  it 
justifies  the  jury  in  finding  negligence.  Uggla  v.  West  End  St.  Ry.  Co.,  160 
Mass.  351,  35  N.  E.  1126. 

107  Angus  V.  Lee,  40  111.  App.  304.  Cf.  McCauley  v.  Norcross,  155  Mass. 
584,  30  N.  B.  464,  and  cases  collected  on  page  587;  Emery  v.  Minneapolis  In- 
dustrial Exposition,  56  Minn.  460,  57  N.  W.  1132. 

10  8  Railway  Co.  v.  Hopkins,  54  Ark.  209,  15  S.  W.  610,  citing  Morris  v.  Stro- 
bel  &  Wilken  Co.,  81  Hun,  1,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  571.  Et  vide  Parker,  J.,  dissent- 
ing; Mullen  V.  St.  John,  57  N.  Y.  567;  Kearney  v.  London  B.  &  S.  C.  Ry. 
Co.,  L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  759,  10  Cent.  Law  J.  261.  Ante,  p.  231,  "Independent 
Contractor."  A  municipal  corporation  has  also  been  held  liable  for  awn- 
ings over  street.  Bohen  v.  City  of  Waseca,  32  Minn.  176,  19  N.  W.  730; 
Drake  v.  Lowell,  13  Mete.  (Mass.)  292;  Day  v.  Milford,  5  Allen,  98.  As  to 
joint  tort  feasors,  owner  and  city,  see  Jessen  v.  Sweigert,  66  Cal.  182,  4  Pac. 
1188;   City  of  Lowell  v.  Glidden,  159  Mass   317,  34  N.  E.  459  (In  which  lia- 


8oS  NEX3LIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

point  of  view  of  nuisance,  independent  of  negligence.^"'  Where  a 
roof  is  so  constnicted  that  water,  snow,  and  ice  which  collect  upon  it 
from  natural  causes  will,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things,  fall  upon 
an  adjoining  highway,  or  upon  a  neighbor's  land,  the  owner  of  the 
building  is  liable  for  consequent  damages.^^"  This  would  not  be  a 
question  of  reasonable  care  and  diligence  in  the  management  of 
such  roof,  but  of  the  right  to  erect  and  maintain  it  at  all  in  that 
shape.  It  would  not  avail  the  owner  to  say  that  he  did  all  he  could 
to  prevent  the  consequences.  He  had  no  right  to  build  it  in  that 
way.  His  act  was  an  attempt  to  extend  his  right  as  proprietor  be- 
yond the  limits  of  his  own  property,  at  the  expense  of  the  safety 
of  the  traveling  public.  He  was  bound,  at  his  peril,  to  keep  the  ice 
and  snow  that  collected  on  the  roof  within  his  own  limits;  and,  if 
the  shape  of  his  roof  was  such  as  necessarily  and  naturally  threw 
it  upon  the  street,  he  was  responsible  for  all  damages,  precisely  as 
if  he  had,  under  the  same  circumstances,  thrown  it  upon  the  prem- 
ises of  the  adjacent  owner.^^^ 

bility  is  based  on  the  theory  of  nuisance).     It  has,  however,  been  held  that  a 
city  is  not  liable  for  defectively  hung  signs.    Hewison  v.  City  of  New  Ha- 
ven, 37  Conn.  475;  Taylor  v.  Peckham,  8  R.  I.  349. 
10  3  AVood,  Nuis.  §  90,  and  cases  cited. 

110  Ordinarily,  the  occupier,  and  not  the  owner,  of  the  premises  Is  liable 
for  damages  done  because  of  their  defective  or  dangerous  condition.  This 
applies  to  fall  of  snow  from  a  roof,  if  it  does  not  appear  that  the  tenant 
might  not,  by  the  use  of  reasonable  care,  have  prevented  the  accident.  Clif- 
ford v.  Atlantic  Cotton  MiUs,  14G  JIass.  47.  15  N.  E.  84.  Cf.  Caldwell  v. 
Slade,  156  Mass.  S4,  30  N.  E.  87. 

111  Mitchell,  J.,  in  Hannem  v.  Pence,  40  Minn.  127,  41  N.  W.  657,  citing, 
inter  alia,  Cahill  v.  Eastman,  18  Minn.  324  (Gil.  292);  Smethurst  v.  Barton 
Square  Ind.  Cong.  Church,  148  Mass.  261,  19  N.  E.  387.  Perhaps  the  best  illust- 
tration  that  can  be  found  of  the  identity  of  liability  for  nuisance  and  for 
breach  of  duty  to  insure  safety  is  the  celebrated  case  of  Shipley  v.  Fifty  As- 
sociates. In  the  first  report  of  this  case  (101  Mass.  251)  the  reasoning  of  the 
court  turns  largely  on  the  theory  of  nuisance  (page  254).  However,  in  both 
this  and  a  subsequent  report  (106  Mass.  194),  the  case  is  sustained  essentially 
on  the  theory  of  Eylands  v.  Fletcher.  The  cases  in  which  such  a  roof  has 
been  regarded  a  nuisance  will  be  found  In  Wood,  Nuis.  275.  And  see  Shep- 
ard  V.  Creamer,  160  Mass.  496,  36  N.  E.  475;  Bryne  v.  Boadle,  2  Hurl.  &  C. 
722.  That  liability  for  such  a  roof  depends  on  negligence,  vide  Garland  v. 
Towne,  55  N.  H.  53. 


^h.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  839 

The  owner  of  any  structure,  as  a  building,^^"  a  wall,"'  an  ele- 
vated road,"*  a  lumber  pile,^^''  is  bound  to  take  reasonable  care 
that  it  is  kept  in  a  proper  condition,  so  it  shall  not  fall  into  a  street 
or  highway  and  injure  persons  lawfully  there,  and  the  fact  of  dam- 
age from  the  fall  thereof  makes  out  a  prima  facie  case  of  negli- 
gence.^" But  further  proof  of  negligence  is  necessary,  to  enable 
persons  to  recover  for  injuries  received  while  engaged  in  tearing 
down  a  structure."'  The  rule  does  not  apply  to  the  owner  of  ad- 
jacent property  injured  by  the  fall  of  such  structure."'  When  part 
of  a  building  falls  without  any  apparent  reason,  the  owner  is  not 
relieved  from  liability  to  persons  not  in  his  employ  ^^^  by  having  used 
care  in  his  plans  and  the  selection  of  architect  and  contractor.  The 
liability  may  be  regarded  as  being  based  also  on  nuisance,^^"  or  as 
being  a  breach  of  duty  to  insure  safety.     In  the  leading  case  of 

112  Mullen  V.  St.  John,  57  N.  Y.  507.  The  owner  of  a  building  is  not  bound 
to  strengthen  it  for  extraordinary  emergencies,  like  throwing  large  quantities 
of  water  on  merchandise  therein,  to  check  a  fire,  Woodruff  v.  Bowen.  43(5 
Ind.  431,  34  N.  E.  1113;  nor  excessive  storm,  Norliug  v.  Allee  (City  Ct.  Brook.) 
13  N.  Y.  Supp.  791.  But  notice  of  dangerous  condition  is  not  essential  to  lia- 
bility.    Tucker  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  114,  7  South.  124. 

113  Nordheimer  v.  Alexander,  19  Can.  Sup.  Ct.  248;  Simmons  v.  Everson, 
124  N.  Y.  319,  26  N.  E.  911;  O'Connor  v.  Andrews,  81  Tex.  28,  16  S.  W.  628; 
rasquini  v.  Lowry  (Sup.)  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  284;    Chapin  v.  Walsh,  3'Z  111.  App. 

52G. 

114  Volkmar  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  134  N.  Y.  418,  31  N.  E.  870. 

115  Earl  Y.  Crouch,  57  Hun,  586,  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  882;  Holly  v.  Bennett,  46 
Minn.  386,  49  N.  W.  189. 

118  As  to  negligence  in  consti-uction  of  scafEold  which  fell  while  plaintiff 
was  working  on  defendant's  house,  see  Kaspari  v.  Blarsh,  74  Wis.  562,  43 
N.  W.  368;  Burton  v.  Davis,  15  La.  Ann.  448.  "Buildings  properly  con- 
structed do  not  fall  without  cause."  Mullen  v.  St.  John,  57  N.  Y.  567-569. 
I'he  falling  of  a  roof,  in  the  absence  of  other  evidence,  is  itself  sufficient  evi- 
dence of  negligence.  Barnowski  v.  Helson,  89  Mich.  523,  50  N.  W.  989.  Ice- 
house collapse,  see  Meier  v.  Morgan,  82  Wis.  289,  52  N.  W.  174. 

117  Weideman  v.  Tacoma  Ry.  &  Motor  Co.,  7  Wash,  517,  35  Pac.  414. 

118  City  of  Anderson  v.  Bast,  117  Ind.  126,  19  N.  B.  726. 

119  As  to  liability  to  employe,  see  Walton  v.  Bryn  Mawr  Hotel  Co.,  160  Pa. 

St   3,  28  Atl.  438. 

120  Wilkinson  v.  Detroit  Steel  &  Spring  Works,  73  Mich.  405,  41  X.  W.  490. 
Cf.  Couts  V.  Neer,  70  Tex.  468-474,  9  S.  W.  40;  Miles  v.  City  of  W.ircester, 
154  Mass.  511,  28  N.  E.  676. 


840  .NEc^LiGENci:.  [Ch.  12 

Gorham  r.  Gross,^^^  it  was  said  tliat  the  only  exceptions  to  the  lia- 
bility which  have  been  judicially  recognized  are  in  cases  of  the 
plaintiff's  own  fault,  or  of  vis  major,  the  act  of  God,  or  the  acts  of 
third  persons,  which  the  owner  had  no  reason  to  anticipate.  And 
in  Cork  v.  Blossom  ^^^  it  was  held  to  be  an  absolute  duty,  which 
rested  on  the  owners  of  a  chimney,  to  exercise  proper  care  to  pre- 
vent its  fall;  and  it  was  said  that  nothing  short  of  actual  exercise 
of  such  care,  or  a  fall  of  the  chimney  due  to  some  one  of  the  above- 
oxcepted  causes,  would  excuse. 

Fire. 

Actions  for  mischief  done  by  fire  were  brought  in  England  under  the 
early  common  law,  but  were  considered  ''hard  actions."'^'  The 
liability  in  these  cases  corresponded  to  that  in  trespass.  It  was 
enough  to  prove  that  fire  caused  the  damage.     Negligence  on  the 

121 125  Mass.  232;  Ktiron  v.  Brock,  144  Mass.  516,  11  N.  E.  748.  It  is  not 
necessary  that  the  owner  should  have  had  notice  of  the  dangerous  condition 
of  a  building  made  unsafe  by  the  act  of  trespassers,  which  it  was  within  his 
power  to  prevent.  Tucker  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  114,  7  South. 
124.  Et  vide  Schachne  v.  Bamett  (Super.  N.  Y.)  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  717;  Gray 
V.  Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  114  Mass.  149;  Han-y  v.  Ashton,  1  Q.  B.  Div.  314; 
Gaslight  Coke  Co.  v.  Vestry  of  St.  Mary  Abbott's,  15  Q.  B.  Div.  1. 

122  Gorham  v.  Gross,  125  Mass.  2.32;  Mahoney  v.  Libbey,  123  Mass.  20; 
Mears  v.  Dole,  133  Mass.  508;  Wilson  v.  New  Bedford,  108  Mass.  261;  Ball 
V.  Nye,  99  Mass.  582;  Khi-on  v.  Brock,  144  Mass.  516,  11  N.  E.  748;  Moreland 
v.  Boston  &  P.  K.  R.,  141  Mass.  31,  6  N.  E.  225;  Smethurst  v.  Congregational 
Church,  148  Mass.  261,  19  N.  E.  387;  Tarry  v.  Ashton,  1  Q.  B.  Div.  314; 
Nitro-Phosphate  &  O.  C.  M.  Co.  v.  London  &  St  K.  Docks  Co.,  9  Ch.  Div.  503; 
Ijawrence  v.  .Tonkins,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  274;  Benson  v.  Suarez,  28  How.  Prac.  511; 
Mullen  V.  St.  John,  57  N.  Y.  567;  Gagg  v.  Vetter,  41  lud.  228;  Scott  v.  Bay, 
3  Md.  431;  Tiffin  v.  McCormack,  34  Ohio  St.  638;  Cooper  v.  Randall,  53  111. 
24;  Cahill  v.  Eastman,  18  Minn.  324  (Gil.  292);  Hannem  v.  Pence,  40  Mimi. 
127,  41  N.  W.  657;  Phinizy  v.  City  Council,  47  Ga.  260;  G.  B.  &  L.  By.  Co. 
V.  Eagles,  9  Colo.  544,  13  Pac.  696;  Kinnaird  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  89  Ky.  468, 
12  S.  W.  937. 

123  Smith  V.  Frompton  (1696)  2  Salb.  644;  Pantam  v.  Isham  (1702)  1  Salk.  19; 
Allen  V.  Stephenson  (1700)  1  Lutw.  33;  Cudlip  v.  BundaU  (1693)  4  Mod.  9; 
Hicks  V.  Downling  (1697)  1  Salk.  13.  Bt  vide  1  RoUe,  Abr.  tit.  "Act  sur  Case," 
p.  1;  Vin.  Abr.  "Act  for  Fire,"  6.  In  Turberville  v.  Stampe  (1608)  1  Ld. 
Raym.  264,  it  was  said  as  to  a  man  who  had  started  a  fire  in  his  field:  "He 
made  it,  and  must  see  it  does  no  harm,  and  answer  the  damage  If  it  does. 
Every  man  must  use  his  own  so  as  not  to  hurt  another.    But  if  a  sudden 


■'■■^J  ESSENTIAL    ELEME.NTS.  8-11 

part  of  the  defendant  was  not  essential.^^^  The  statute  of  Anne,"^ 
and  subsequent  enactments,^"  provided  that  no  action  should  be 
brought  against  any  one  in  whose  house  or  chamber  or  bam  or  sta- 
ble, or  any  other  building,  or  lands,  fire  should  accidentally  begin,  or 
any  recompense  be  made  by  any  such  person  for  any  damage  occa- 
sioned thereby.  Since  these  statutes,  liability  for  domestic  fires  has 
been  governed  by  principles  of  negligence,  not  of  trespass,  i"  If  a 
"domestic"  fire  began  on  a  man's  own  premises,"^  by  which  those 
of  his  neighbors  were  injured,  the  latter,  in  an  action  brought  for 
such  injury,  would  not  be  bound  to  show,  in  the  first  instance,  how 
the  fire  began,  but  the  presumption  would  be  that  it  arose  from  the 
negligence  of  some  person  in  the  house.^^"  The  English  courts,  how- 
ever, have  gone  so  far  as  to  hold  that  a  nondomestic  fire  is  so  dan- 
gerous an  instrument  as  to  attach  liability,  irrespective  of  negli- 
gence. In  the  celebrated  case  of  Jones  v.  Festiniog  Ey.  00.,^=*"  a 
company  not  having  express  statutory  j)owers  given  it  to  use  loco- 
motive steam  engines  was  held  liable  at  common  law  for  damage 
done  to  a  haystack  by  fire  caused  by  sparks  from  one  of  the  corn- 
storm  had  arisen,  while  he  conld  not  stop  it,  was  matter  of  evidence,  and  he 
should  have  shown  it."  Construe  note  of  reporter  as  to  statute  of  Queen 
Anne  with  14  Geo.  III.  c.  78.    See  Filliter  v.  Phippard,  11  Q.  B.  347. 

124  Thus,  vhere  a  man  shooting  at  a  bird  hit  his  own  house,  and  set  it  on 
fire,  and  the  fire  spread  to  the  house  of  his  neighbors  and  desti'oyed  it,  it  was 
held  that  the  firer  of  the  gun  was  responsible  for  the  damage,  although  the 
fire  was  occasioned  rather  by  an  accident  or  misadventure  than  by  negligence. 
Anon.,  Cro.  Eliz.  10.    See  1  RoUe,  Abr.  "Act.  sur  Case,"  B. 

125  6  Anne,  c.  31,  §  C7.  As  to  whether  this  is  part  of  the  common  law  of 
the  United  States,  see  Spaulding  v.  Railroad  Co.,  30  Wis.  110;  Webb  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  49  N.  Y.  420;    Burton  v.  Smith,  13  Pet  (U.  S.)  4C4. 

126 12  Geo.  III.  c.  73;   14  Geo.  III.  c.  78,  especially  section  86. 

127  FiUiter  v.  Phippard,  11  Q.  B.  3.j7;  Vaughan  v.  Menlove,  3  Bing.  N.  C. 
468.  This  case  was  thought  by  Tondall,  C.  J.,  to  be  of  first  impression,  but  by 
Park,  J.,  to  be  in  principle  like  Tuberville  v.  Stampe,  12  Jlod.  152.  The  master 
is  not  responsible  for  his  servant's  independent  wrong  in  starting  a  fire. 
Williams  v.  Jones,  3  Hurl.  &  C.  256;   McKenzie  v.  McLeod,  10  Bing.  385. 

128  Filliter  v.  Phippard,  11  Q.  B.  347,  construing  14  Geo.  III.  c.  78,  §  86. 

129  Lord  Tenterden  in  Becquet  v.  MacCarthy,  2  Barn.  &  Adol.  O.jS.  Et  vide 
Taylor  v.  Stendall,  7  Q.  B.  634, 

13  0  (1868)  L.  R.  3  Q.  B'.  733;  Powell  v.  Fall,  5  Q.  B.  Div.  597;  Sadler  v. 
South  Staffordshire  &  B.  D.  S.  T.  Co.  (1880)  23  Q.  B,  Div.  17;  Pol.  Torts,  §§ 
407-409;    Clerk  &  I>.  Torts,  337,  338. 


<'^42  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

pany's  engines,  although  negligence  was  negatived.  This  was  sus- 
tained expressly  on  the  theory  that  at  common  law  the  company 
was  bound  to  keep  its  engines  from  doing  injury,  in  accordance 
with  the  theory  of  Rylands  v.  Fletcher. 

In  the  United  States,  tire  is  recognized  as  a  necessar_v  agent  in 
common  use  in  life,  and  from  damage  consequent  to  its  employ- 
ment, under  ordinary  circumstances,  negligence  or  wrongi  is  not  nec- 
essarily inferable,  but  it  may  be  so  used  as  to  make  a  person  using  it 
guilty  of  a  tortious  act.^''^  In  other  words,  destruction  of  property 
by  fire  does  not  raise  a  presumption  of  negligence,  but  negligence 
must  ordinarily  be  alleged  and  proved.  "Negligence,"  under  such 
circumstances,  is  a  relative  term,  and  denotes  the  degree  of  caution 

131  Cark  V:  Foot,  8  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  329;  Dewey  v.  Leonai-d,  14  Minn.  153  (Gil. 
120).  Compare  Krippner  v.  Biebl,  28  Minn.  139,  9  N.  W.  G71,  with  St.  Louis, 
A.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McKinsey,  78  Tex.  298,  14  S.  W.  64o;  Bachelder  v,  Heagan, 
IS  Me.  32,  with  Brummit  v.  Furness,  1  Ind.  App.  401,  27  N.  E.  650;  Jesperson 
V.  Philips,  46  Minn.  147,  48  N.  W.  770;  Barnard  v.  Poor,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  378. 
The  courts  incline  to  rule  strictly  upon  the  liability  of  masters  for  the  acts  of 
their  servants  in  kindling  and  guarding  fires  in  buildings.  Compare  Arm- 
strong V.  Cooley,  10  111.  509;  McKenzie  v.  McLeod,  10  Bing.  385;  Williams  v. 
Jones,  3  Hurl.  &  C.  256-602;  Wood  v.  Railway  Co.,  51  AVis.  196,  8  N.  W.  214. 
As  to  liability  of  tenant  at  will,  see  Lothrop  v.  Tliayor,  138  Mass.  466;  Wright 
V.  Lothrop,  149  Mass.  385,  21  N.  E.  963;  Ward  v.  Railway  Co.,  29  Wis.  144; 
Read  v.  Morse,  34  Wis.  315.  Compare  Moe  v.  Job,  1  N.  D.  140,  45  N.  W.  700. 
Louisville,  N.  A.  c&  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Nitsche,  12G  Ind.  229,  26  N.  E.  51,  holding 
that  where  a  railroad  company,  in  a  season  of  great  drought,  sets  a  fire  on  the 
right  of  way,  which  extends  over  beds  of  turf  or  peat,  the  same  material  form- 
ing the  surface  of  the  body  of  adjoining  land,  it  is  guilty  of  a  positive  wrong, 
and  not  of  mere  negligence,  and  Is  liable  for  loss  resulting  to  adjacent  owners. 
So  in  Fahn  v.  Reichart,  S  Wis.  105,  it  was  held  that  a  party  who  sets  flre  to 
logs  and  brush  on  his  own  land  is  not  liable  to  an  action  though  it  be  blown 
on  the  land  of  his  neighbor,  and  burn  his  bam,  unless  the  party  setting  the 
fire  is  also  guilty  of  negligence  or  carelessness  in  setting  it  at  that  place  and 
time.  Case  v.  Hobart,  25  Wis.  654.  Thus,  where  a  man  who  sets  and  Iceeps 
a  fire  on  his  own  land  is  liable  for  injmy  done  by  its  direct  communication  to 
his  neighbor's  land,  whether  through  the  air  or  through  the  ground,  and 
whether  or  not  he  might  reasonably  have  anticipated  the  particular  manner 
and  direction  in  which  it  was  communicated,  the  probability  that  a  fire  set 
under  the  circumstances  would  spread  to  the  plaintifE's  land  is  inadmissible 
to  disapprove  negligence.  Higgins  v.  Dewey,  107  Mass.  494;  Lothrop  v.  Thay- 
er, 128  Mass.  4G6.  Compai-e  Vaughan  v.  Menlove,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  408.  And  see 
Adams  v.  Young  (Ohio)  4  N.  E.  599. 


'-'''      1-]  ESSENTIAL    ICI.EMKNTS.  843 

which  would  be  exercised  by  a  person  of  ordinary  prudence  under 
the  peculiar  circumstances  of  each  case.  The  common-law  rule  has 
been  generally  changed  by  statute.'" 

Where,  in  addition  to  the  fact  that  a  fire  caused  damage,  circum- 
stances are  also  shown  which  ordinarily  would  cause  the  fire 
to  spread  to  other  property,  such  evidence  makes  out  a  prima  facie 
case  of  negligence.' "='  Negligently  guarding'''*  or  leaving  a  fire 
is  a  tortious  act,  which  will  attach  liability.'"  Hence,  where  the 
fire  is  lawful,  the  burden  is  on  the  plaintiff  to  prove  negligence,"" 
but  it  is  otherwise  as  to  unlawful  flres.'^^ 

In  the  pursuance  of  legal  authority,  one  may  cause  damage  by 
flre  without  liability.  Such  damage  would  be  incident  to  an  au- 
thorized act.  The  thing  itself  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  part  of 
the  instrumentality,  but  as  something  for  which  the   state  has 

132  Roberson  v.  Kirby,  7  Jones  (N.  C.)  477;  Garnier  y.  Porter,  90  Cal.  105, 
27  Pac.  55;  Armstrong  v.  Cooley,  10  111.  509;  Dunleavy  v.  Stockwell,  45  111. 
App.  230;  Galvin  v.  Gualala  Mill  Co.,  98  Cal.  2GS,  33  Pac.  93;  Lamb  v.  Sloan, 
94  N.  C.  534;  Finley  v.  Langston,  12  Mo.  120;  Russell  v.  Reagan,  34  Mo.  App. 
242;  Kalile  v.  Hobein,  30  Mo.  App.  472;  Saussy  v.  Railroad  Co.,  22  Pla.  327; 
Thoburn  v.  Campbell,  80  Iowa,  338,  45  N.  W.  769. 

133  Tbe  state  of  the  weather  is  a  circumstance  to  be  considered.  Needham 
v.  King,  95  Mich.  303,  54  N.  W.  891.  The  location  (e.  g.  of  a  brewery  in  a 
city)  tends  to  determine  the  degree  of  care.  Gagg  v.  Vetter,  41  Ind.  328. 
That  a  box  was  soalced  in  oil,  Perry  v.  Smith,  156  Mass.  340,  31  N.  E.  9.  And, 
generally,  see  Higgins  v.  Dewey,  107  Mass.  494;  Perley  v.  Eastern  R.  Co., 
98  Mass.  414;  Calkins  v.  Barger,  44  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  424;  Hanlon  v.  Ingram, 
3  Iowa,  81;  Miller  v.  Martin,  16  Mo.  508;  John  Mouat  Lumber  Co.  v.  Wil- 
more,  15  Colo.  136,  25  Pac.  556. 

134  Hewey  v.  Nourse,  54  Me.  257;   Hauch  v.  Hernandez,  41  La.  Ann.  992,  0 

South.  783. 

135  Hewey  v.  Nourse,  54  Me.  25T.  Vide  Read  v.  Pennsylvania  R.-  Co., 
44  N.  J.  Law,  280;  Bachelder  v.  Heagian,  18  Me.  32;  Cleland  v.  Thornton,  43 
CaL  437;    Barnard  v.  Poor,  21  Pick.   (Blass.)  378;    Tourtellot  v.  Rosebrook, 

11  Mete.  (Mass.)  460. 

136  Gregory  v.  Layton,  36  S.  C.  93,  15  S.  E.  352;  Loeber  v.  Roberts  (Super. 
N  Y)  17  N  Y.  Supp.  378;  Montgomery  v.  Booming  Co.,  88  Mich.  633,  50  N. 
W  729-  McNally  v.  Colwell,  91  Mich.  527,  52  N.  W.  70.  As  to  duty  to  pro- 
vide means  of  extinguishing  fire  in  a  lumber  mill,  Pauley  v.  Lantern  Co., 
131  N  Y  90  29  N.  E.  999,  to  the  effect  that,  at  common  law,  the  owner  of 
a  building  not  peculiarly  exposed  to  the  danger  of  fire  is  not  bound  to  adopt 
extra  or  unusual  precaution  for  the  escape  of  occupants  in  the  case  of  fire. 

137  Whai-t.  Neg.  §  St;7. 


844  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    ]  2. 

made  itself  responsible,  until  there  is,  on  the  part  of  the  person 
keeping  and  using  it,  some  conduct  independent  of  the  mere  keep- 
ing or  using  it  in  the  ordinary  course,  to  which  the  damage  can 
be  traced.^'*  Thus,  if  sparks  from  a  passing  locomotive  set  fire 
to  a  haystack,  the  railway  company  is  not  to  be  held  responsible  if 
it  has  taken  all  reasonable  care  in  the  construction  and  use  of 
the  engine.""  The  railroad  company  must  exercise  care  propor- 
tionate to  the  danger,  in  faror  of  the  public,  to  as  great  an  extent 
as  in  favor  of  its  patrons.^*"  Carelessness  in  the  operation  of,  or 
defects  in,  the  engine,  may  constitute  actionable  negligence,  and 
may  be  inferred  from  circumstances;  as  the  emission  of  an  un- 
usual quantity  of  sparks,  or  coals  of  an  unusual  size,^*^  running  at 

13  8  Innes,  Torts,  76;  King  v.  Pease,  4  Barn.  &  Adol.  30  (see  Queen  v.  Brad- 
ford Nav.  Co.,  3i  L.  J.  Q.  B.  191);  King  v.  Morris  &  E.  R.  Co.,  18  N.  J.  Eq. 
397. 

1  =  9  .Tones  v.  Festiniog  Ry.  Co.,  L.  E.  3  Q.  B.  733;  Metropolitan,  etc.,  Dist.. 
V.  Hill,  L.  R.  6  App.  Cas.  103;  Nitro-Phosphate  &  O.  C.  M.  Co.  v.  London, 
etc.,  Co.,  9  Ch.  Div.  503;  Gas  Light  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Vestry  of  St  Mary  Abbott's, 
1.0  Q.  B.  Div.  1,  54  L.  J.  Q.  B.  414;  Madras  Ry.  Co.  v.  Zemindar  of  Carvaten- 
agarnm,  L.  R.  Indian  App.  364.  But  see  Powell  v.  Fall,  5  Q.  B.  Diy. 
.")"J7,  where  it  was  held  that  defendant,  operating  a  steam  traction  engine  in 
accordance  with  statute,  without  negligience  started  a  fire,  damaging  plain- 
tiff, was  liable,  because  the  engine  was  a  dangerous  machine.  Henderson 
V.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.,  144  Pa.  St  461,  22  Atl.  851;  Vaughan  v.  Taffvale- 
R.  Co.,  3  Hurl.  &  N.  742,  5  Hui'l.  &  N.  678. 

1*0  Babcock  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  67  Hun,  469,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  449;  Fischer 
V.  Bonner  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  22  S.  W.  755;  Eddy  v.  Lafayette,  1  C.  C.  A.  441, 
49  Fed.  807;  Martin  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co..  87  Tex.  117,  26  S.  W.  1052.  The 
danger  involved  in  the  use  of  such  dangerous  machines  as  locomotives  is  so 
great  as  to  be  said  to  require  of  a  railroad  company  a  higher  degree  of  care 
than,  is  usually  exercised  by  a  prudent  man  about  his  own  property.  This- 
has  been  carried  so  far  as  to  make  proof  of  cause  of  fire  a  prima  facie  case 
of  negligence.  Illinois  Cent.  E.  Co.  v.  Mills,  12  111.  407;  Miller  v.  St.  Louis,, 
I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  90  Mo.  389,  2  S.  W.  439;  post,  p.  845. 

141  Cincinnati,  L,  St.  L.  &.C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smock,  133  Ind.  411,  33  N.  E.  108,-. 
Flinn  V.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  Hun,  631,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  473. 
reviewing  earlier  New  York  cases;  Wheeler  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  67  Hun,  639, 22  N.Y.  Supp.  561;  Kurz  &  Huttenlocher  Ice  Co.  v.  Milwaukee- 
&  N.  R.  Co.,  84  Wis.  171,  53  N.  W.  850.  Compare  Stacy  v.  Milwaukee,  L. 
S.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  85  Wis.  237,  54  N.  W.  779;  Hockstedler  v.  Dubuque  &  S. 
C.  R.  Co.,  88  Iowa,  236,  55  N.  W.  74.  Defendant  may  show  the  distance  at. 
which  sparks  emitted  by  engine  kindled  fire.    Hinds  v.  Barton,  25  N.  Y.  544. 


"Ch.    12]        ■  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS. 

an  unlawful  rate  of  speed,^*-  or  the  production  of  other  fires  near 
the  same  time."'  But  wliile  the  cases  are  essentially  agreed  that 
recovery  in  such  a  case  must  be  based  on  negligence  ""'  and  that 
negligence  may  be  shown  by  purely  circumstantial  evidence/'''' 
there  is  a  direct  conflict  of  authority  as  to  whether  the  plaintiff 
must  prove  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  or  whether 
the  defendant  must  show  that  his  engine  was  properly  constructed, 
•equipped,  and  operated.  Perhaps  the  prevailing  opinion  in  Amer- 
ica is  that,  if  it  be  shown  that  the  fire  originated  from  the  defend- 
-ant's  engine,  negligence  on  his  part  need  not  be  proved.^*"  Proof 
■of  negligence,  under  such  circumstances,  is  made  unnecessary  by 
-statute  in  some  states;  in  others,  railroad  companies  are  made 
insurers  against  damage  by  fire.^*'' 


1*2  Martin  v.  Western  Union  R.  Co.,  23  Wis.  137;  Lalie  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
liliddlecofC,  150  III.  27,  37  N.  E.  660. 

1"  Smith  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (S.  D.)  55  N.  W.  717;  Gulf,  C. 
.&  S.  F.  R.  Co.  V.  Johnson,  4  C.  C.  A.  477,  54  Fed.  474;  Flinn  v.  New  York 
Oent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  67  Hun,  631,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  473;  Railway  Co.  v.  Richard- 
son, 91  U.  S.  454,  followed  in  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilbert,  3 
O.  C.  A.  264,  52  Fed.  711;  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  2  C.  C.  A.  44(i,  51 
Fed.  G58;  Martin  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  55  Ark.  510,  19  S.  W.  314; 
Campbell  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  121  Mo.  340,  25  S.  W.  936.  But  not  evi- 
■dence  as  to  fire  caused  several  years  before,  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co. 
TT.  Rheiner  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  971;  nor  other  fire  along  the  line  of  the 
Toad,  unless  it  is  shown  that  defendant  caused  them,  St  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Jones,  59  Ark.  105,  26  S.  W.  595;  or  using  wood  in  a  coal-burning  en- 
gine may  be  negligence,  Briggs  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  72  N.  Y.  20;  but 
evidence  of  what  other  engines,  handled  by  other  engineers,  did  on  other 
■occasions,  is  immaterial,  Tribette  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  71  Miss.  212,  13 

-South.  899.  .  ^^         T       n 

14*  Burroughs  v.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  15  Conn.  124;  Mississippi  Home  Ins.  Co. 
V  Louisville  N.  O.  &  T.  R.  Co.,  70  Miss.  119,  12  South,  150;  Inman  v.  Elber- 
-ton  Ai^Lme  R.  Co.,  90  Ga.  663,  16  S.  E.  958;  Day  v.  H.  0.  Akeley  Lumber 
■Co    54  Minn.  522,  56  N.  W.  243. 

iL  union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Keller,  36  Neb.  180,  54  N.  ^Y.  420;  Kurz  .t  Hutten- 
10  hlr  ice  CO  v.  Milwaukee  &  N.  R.  Co.,  53  N.  W  850,  84  Wis.  171;  Stacy  v. 
MUwaukee  L.  S.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  54  N.  W.  770,  85  Wis.  2.'!7.  Plaintiff  may 
.^how  the  distance  at  which  sparks  emitted  by  the  engine  kindled  fires.    Hinds 

"^"iTihe'cl^se^s  o^n  this  point  are  classified  by  states  in  8  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc. 
I.aw,  9,  10;   Spaulding  v.  Chicago  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  30  Wis.  110-121. 
X.;  Connecticut.  Martin  v.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.,  62  Conn.  331,  25  AtL 


846  NEGLIGENCE.  "         [Ch.   12 

Where  a  railway  company  starts  a  fire  on  its  own  premises,  di- 
rectly, and  not  by  sparks,  it  is  liable  as  any  other  individual  might 
be,  without  reference  to  statutory  privileges.^'''  On  the  same 
principle,  if  it  should  allow  combustibles  to  be  or  accumulate  on 
its  right  of  way  in  such  quantities,  at  such  places  and  during  such 
seasons,  as  render  it  liable  to  be  ignited  and  cause  damage  to  ad- 
jacent propertj',  negligence  may  be  imputed  to  it;  and  the  fact 
that  fire  is  communicated  by  a  passing  locomotive  is  prima  facie 
evidence  of  negligence.^*"  Its  subsequent  diligence  in  attempting 
to  prevent  the  spread  of  the  fire  is  no  excuse.^ ^'' 

239;  Colorado,  Denver  &  R.  G.  E.  Co.  v.  Morton,  3  Colo.  App.  42,  32  Pac.  345 
(et  vide  Union  Pac.  Co.  v.  Askew.  2  Colo.  App.  159,  29  Pac.  103) ;  Denver  &  R. 
G.  R.  Co.  V.  De  Graff,  2  Colo.  App.  42,  29  Pac.  664;  Michigan,  Hagan  v.  Cui- 
cago,  D.  &  C.  G.  T.  J.  R.  Co.,  86  Mich.  615,  49  N.  W.  509;  South  Carolina,  Mo- 
bile Ins.  Co.  V.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  Co.  (S.  C.)  19  S.  E.  858;  Hunter  v.  Columbia, 
N.  &  "L.  R.  Co.  (S.  C.)  19  S.  E.  197  (liability  absolute) ;  Massachusetts,  Lyman  v. 
Boston  &  A'S'.  R.  Co.,  4  Cusb.  288  (compare  Bassett  v.  Connecticut  River  R.  Co., 
145  Mass.  129,  13  N.  E.  370);  Illinois,  Chicago  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  McCahill,  56  111. 
28;  Missouri,  Mathews  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  121  Mo.  298,  24  S.  W.  591 
(liability  absolute);  New  Hampshire,  Rowell  v.  Railway  Co.,  57  N.  H.  132; 
Maine,  Stearns  v.  Atlantic  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  46  Me.  95;  Maryland,  Baltimore 
&  O.  R.  Co.  V.  Dorsey,  37  Md.  19;  Wisconsin,  Spaulding  v.  Chicago  &  N.  R.  Co., 
30  Wis.  110;  Montana,  Spencer  v.  Montana  Cent.  R.  Co.,  11  Mont.  164,  27  Pac. 
081;  Kentucky  (statute  as  to  spai'k  arrester),  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Tay- 
lor, 92  Ky.  55,  17  S.  W.  198;  Kentucky  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Barrow,  89  Ky.  638,  20 
S.  y\'.  165.  As  to  Rev.  St.  U.  S.  §  4470,  see  Cheboygan  Lumber  Co.  v.  Delta 
Trnnsp.  Co.,  100  Mich.  16,  58  N.  W.  630;  Pierce,  R.  R.  437,  438;  2  Shear.  &  R. 
Neg.  §§  67G,  G77;   Cooley,  Torts  (2d  Ed.)  703. 

148  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Nitsche,  126  Ind.  229,  26  N.  E.  51.  Fire 
set  by  section  men,  Gould  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  50  Minn.  516,  52  N.  W.  924. 

i4i>  Eddy  V.  Lafayette,  1  C.  C.  A.  441,  49  Fed.  807;  Black  v.  Aberdeen  &  W.  E. 
R.  Co.,  20  S.  E.  713;  Smith  v.  London  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  5  C.  P.  98;  Gordon 
V.  Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.  Co.  (Mich.)  61  N.  W.  549;  Innes,  Torts,  77;  Chicago,  St. 
L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Wilhams,  131  Ind.  30,  30  N.  E.  696.  An  allegation  that  en- 
gine from  which  the  coal  was  dropped  or  thrown  was  improperly  constructed 
or  driven  is  not,  under  such  circumstances,  necessary.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R. 
Co.  V.  Salmon,  39  N.  J.  Law,  299.  Combustibles  may  be  grass  or  brush, 
Genung  v.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.,  66  Hun,  032,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  97;  SL 
Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Richardson,  47  Kan.  517,  28  Pac.  183;  Terre  Haute  & 
L.  R.  Co.  V.  Walsh  (Ind.  App.)  38  N.  E.  534;   San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

ISO  Chica.go  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Ludlngton,  10  Ind.  App.  636,  38  N.  E.  342. 


^"-    ^2]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  847 

Explosives. 

Liability  for  keeping  an  explosive  has  been  regarded  as  based  on 
the  theory  of  nuisance/"  and  as  a  breach  of  duty  to  insure  safe- 
ty.'=2  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  denied  that  responsibility  can  be  at- 
tached under  such  circumstances  without  fault,  although  it  is  rec- 
ognized that  the  only  exoneration  is  the  exercise  of  the  most 
watchful   care  and  most  active  diligence.^^'     Accordingly,  in  the 

Oakes  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  1116;  Pittsburgh,  C.  &  St  L.  E.  Co.  v.  Nel- 
son, 51  Ind.  150;  sawdust,  ICurz  &  Huttenlocher  Ice  Co.  v.  Milwauliee  &  N. 
R.  Co.,  84  Wis.  171,  53  N.  W.  850;  shingle  roof,  Cincinnati,  X.  O.  .fc  T.  P.  Ity.  Co. 
V.  Barlcer,  94  Ky.  71,  21  S.  W.  347;  rabbish,  Chicago  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  House, 
10  Tud.  App.  134,  37  N.  E.  731;  weeds.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cusenberry, 
5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  114,  26  S.  W.  43;  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Gains  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.)  20  S.  W.  443.  Generally,  see  Chicago,  St.  P.,  il.  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Gil- 
bert, 3  C.  C.  A.  2G4,  52  Fed.  711;   Haugen  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  3  S. 

D.  394,  53  X.  W.  769;   Lake  Erie  &  AV.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark,  7  Ind.  App.  155,  34  N. 

E.  587;  2  Shear.  &  R.  Neg.  §§  676-678,  and  citations.  Montana  statute,  Spen- 
cer v.  Montana  Cent.  R.  Co.,  11  Mont.  164,  27  Pac.  681.  As  to  combustibles 
belonging  to  ijlaintifC  placed  near  the  right  of  way,  see  JIartin  v.  Texas  &;  P. 
Ry.  Co.  (Tex.  Sup.)  26  S.  W.  1052. 

151  Thus,  a  powder  magazine  may  be  per  se  a  nuisance,  and  liability  for 
damage  consequent  upon  it  may  attach  without  proof  of  negligence.  ^'It 
will  be  seen  *  ■*  *  that  whoever  does  an  unlawful  act,  placing  in  jeopardy 
the  lives  or  property  of  others,  does  so  at  his  peril,  and  that,  if  injm-y  results 
to  others  as  a  consequence  of  such  an  unlawful  act,  he  must  respond  in  dam- 
ages. The  rule  is  well-nigh  (if  not  entirely)  universal,  that  men  must  use 
their  own  property  and  so  exercise  their  own  privileges  that  they  do  not  de- 
stroy br  imperil  the  rights  of  othei"s;  and  this  is  even  so  in  the  exercise  of 
rights  not  prohibited  by  law,  and  in  the  exercise  of  trades  and  business  not 
a  nuisance  per  se.  This  rule  is  so  consistent  with  reason  and  justice  that  it 
would  seem  no  argument  can  add  to  its  force,  or  the  citation  of  authorities  to 
its  justice."  Chicago,  W.  &  V.  Coal  Co.  v.  Glass,  34  111.  App.  364;  Comminge 
V.  Stevenson,  76  Tex.  642,  13  S.  W.  550.  Compare  Heeg  v.  Licht,  80  N.  Y.  579, 
reversing  16  Hun,  257;  Myers  v.  Malcolm,  41  Am.  Dee.  744;  Cheatham  v. 
Shearon,  55  Am.  Dec.  734. 

152  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  339.  The  storage  of  explosives  is  commonly  regulated 
by  statute.  The  English  explosive  act  (1875)  is  38  Vict.  c.  17.  Vide  AVright 
V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  27  111.  App.  20a  Prohibition  against  transporta- 
tion of  explosives  by  vehicles  engaged  in  interetate  traffic.  U.  S.  v.  Saul,  58 
Fed.  763. 

153  Hadley  v.  Cross,  34  Vt.  586.  Et  vide  Kilpatrick  v.  Richardson,  37  Neb. 
731,  56  N.  W.  481;  Wellington  v.  Dover  Kerosene  Oil  Co.,  104  Mass.  68; 
Marshall  v.  Welwood,  38  N.  J.  Law,  339;    Spencer  v.  Campbell,  9  Watts  & 


848  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

celebrated  Nitroglycerine  Case/"  where  a  package  of  nitroglycerine, 
shipped  by  a  carrier,  who  did  not  know  its  contents,  exploded,  it  was 
held  that  there  was  no  want  of  ordinary  care  or  skill  on  the  part  of  the 
carrier,  and  that  no  liability  attached.  Under  such  circumstance^!, 
the  shipper  who  failed  to  give  notice  of  the  dangerous  character  of 
the  contents  of  the  package  is  guilty  of  actionable  negligence.^''' 
With  respect  to  the  use  of  explosives,  as  in  blasting,  there  is  a  corre- 
sponding confusion  in  the  cases.^^"  As  to  gas,  while  its  manufac- 
ture may  produce  damages  recoverable  as  a  nuisance  without  proof 

S.  32;  McAndrews  v.  Collerd,  42  N.  J.  Law,  189;  Beaucliamp  v.  Saginaw  M. 
Co.,  50  Mich.  163,  15  N.  W.  65;  Colton  v.  Onderdonli,  69  Cal.  155,  10  Pac.  395; 
Allison  V.  Western  N.  C.  R.  Co.,  64  N.  C.  383. 

1C4  15  Wall.  524.  The  shipper  of  naphtha,  described  as  "carbon  oil"  in  the 
freight  bill,  in  barrels  max'ked  "unsafe  for  illuminating  purposes,"  is  liable 
to  the  conductor  of  the  train,  who  was  injured  by  an  explosion,  while  in  the 
car  whei'e  the  naphtha  was,  with  a  lamp,  if  he  did  not  know  what  was  in  the 
barrel,  although  the  carrier  had  been  informed  of  their  contents.  Standard 
Oil  Co.  v.  Tierney  (1891)  92  Ky.  367,  17  S.  W.  1025.  Negligence  on  the  part 
of  .an  oil  company  wiU  not  be  inferred  from  the  mere  fact  that  burning  oil  from 
its  yard  flowed  down  a  pipe  to  a  lighter  loaded  with  petroleum  at  its  wharf, 
causing  the  lighter  to  explode  .Tnd  destroy  a  vessel  at  an  adjacent  wharf. 
Cosulich  V.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  122  N.  Y.  118,  25  N.  B.  259. 

1  =  5  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Carney,  107  Mass.  508.  But  consigners  of  gun- 
powder to  be  sold  on  commission  are  not  liable  for  damages  resulting  from  an 
explosion  of  the  powder  while  stored  by  the  consignees,  the  doctrine  of  re- 
sijondeat  superior  having  no  application.  Abrahams  v.  California  Powder 
Co.  (N.  M.)  23  Pac.  785.  As  to  explosion  by  naphtha,  see  Lee  v.  Vacuum  Oil 
Co.,  54  Hun,  150,  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  426.  Damage  from  explosion  from  dynamite 
magazine  is  actionable  only  when  negligence  is  shown.  Laflin  &  R.  Powder 
Co.  V.  Tearney  (III.  Sup.)  21  N.  E.  516. 

156  As  to  nuisance,  see  Brennan  v.  Schreiner  (Super.  N.  Y.)  20  N.  Y.  Supp. 
130;  Wilsey  v.  Callanan  (Sup.)  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  C.j;  Morgan  v.  Bowes,  62  Hun, 
623,  17  N.  X.  Supp.  22;  Colton  v.  Onderdonk,  69  Cal.  155,  10  Pac.  395.  As  to 
insurer  of  safety,  see  Hay  v.  Cohoes  Co.,  2  N.  Y.  159  (but  see  Benner  v.  Atlantic 
Dredging  Co.,  134  N.  Y.  156,  31  N.  e.  328;  Booth  v.  Railroad  Co.,  140  N.  Y.  267, 
;!."i  N.  E.  592,  where  nuisance  is  also  referred  to;  Roemer  v.  Striker,  142  N.  Y. 
■134,  36  N.  E.  808;  Prentice  v.  Village  of  Wellsville  (Sup.)  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  820; 
Munro  v.  Pacific  Coast  Dredging  &  Reclamation  Co.,  84  Cal.  515,  24  Pac.  303; 
Scott  V.  Bay,  3  Md.  431.  As  to  negligence,  see  Cameron  v.  VandegrifC,  53  Arls. 
381, 13  S.  W.  1092;  Harris  v.  Simon,  32  S.  C.  593, 10  S.  E.  1076.  Where  blasting 
was  done  in  a  deep  cut,  so  situated  that  covering  could  have  been  easily  con- 
structed so  as  to  protect  intestate  against  danger,  it  was  negligence  not  to  pro- 


Ch.    12]  ESSEXTIAL    ELEMENTS.  849 

of  negligence/"  the  tendency  of  the  courts  is  to  base  responsibility 
for  damages  consequent  upon  its  accumulation  upon  the  theory  of 
negligence.^ ^^  The  test  is  whether  the  defendants  omitted  to  do 
something  which  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  and  skill  they 
ought  to  have  done,  or  whether  they  did  any  act  dangerous  in  itself, 
or  under  circumstances  in  which  it  was  not  consistent  with  ordinary 
care  and  prudence  that  it  should  be  done.'^^"  It  is  the  duty  of  the 
person  who  conducts  it  through  pipes  to  exercise  every  reasonable 
precaution  suggested  by  experience  and  the  known  dangers  of  the 

vide  such  structure.  Blackwell  v.  Lynchburg  &  D.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  131,  IG  S. 
B.  12.  If  the  locality  on  which  a  person  is  blasting  on  his  own  land  is  not  such 
as  to  render  blasting  a  nuisance,  he  has  been  held  liable  for  consequent  dam- 
ages only  when  he  has  been  negligent.  Klepsch  v.  Donald,  4  Wash.  43(J, 
30  Pac.  991;  Id.,  8  Wash.  162,  35  Pac.  621.  Under  such  circumstances,  how- 
ever, liability  will  be  attached  only  to  wanton  or  willful  negligence.  Emry 
V.  Roanoke  Navigation  &  Water-Power  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  94,  16  S.  E.  18.  Blast- 
ing may  be  a  nuisance,  but  no  damages  will  be  aSvarded  if  fair  warning  is 
given.  Graetz  v.  JIcKenzie,  9  Wash.  600,  35  Pac.  377.  The  person  engaged 
in  blasting  is  bound  to  take  proper  precaution  to  guard  against  danger,  as 
by  giving  actual  and  timely  notice  before  firing  the  blast,  or  by  effectually 
covering  it,  Blackwell  v.  Lyncl-.burg  &  D.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  151,  10  S.  E.  12; 
Simmons  v.  McConnell's  Adn/r,  86  Va.  494,  10  S.  E.  838;  Harris  v.  Simon. 
32  S.  0.  593,  10  S.  E.  1076;  especially  where  failure  so  to  do  violates  a  munici- 
pal ordinance  requiring  such  covering,  Branuock  v.  Elmore,  114  JXo.  55,  21  S. 
W.  451;  Hare  v.  Melntire,  82  Me.  240,  10  Atl.  453.  The  liability  of  munici- 
pality for  blasting  in  the  highway  depends  upon  negligence.  City  of  Joliet 
V.  Harwood,  86  III.  110;  City  of  Joliet  v.  Seward,  G9  111.  267;  Dean  v. 
Randolph,  132  Mass.  475;  City  of  Logansport  v.  Dick,  70  Ind.  G5;  Murphy 
V.  Lowell,  128  Mass.  396. 

167  Bohan  v.  Port  Jervis  Gaslight  Co.,  3  22  N.  Y.  18,  25  N.  B.  246.  Ante, 
p.  771, '  "Nuisance." 

issFinnegan  v.  Fall  River  Gas  Works  Co.,  159  Mass.  311,  34  N.  E.  523. 
In  Smith  v.  Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  129  Mass.  318,  the  court  declined  to  inquire 
whether,  with  respect  to  gas,  defendant  was  bound  at  his  peril  not  to  permit 
its  escape.  Et  vide  Hutchinson  v.  Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  122  Mass.  219-222; 
Holly  V.  Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  8  Gray  (Mass.)  123.  As  to  negligence  in  im- 
perfectly cutting  off  supply  of  gas,  Lauigan  v.  New  York  Gas  Co.,  71  N.  Y. 
29.     Et  vide  Holden  v.  Liverpool  Gas  &  Coke  Co.,  3  C.  B.  1. 

159  1  Thomp.  Neg.  p.  108,  §  11,  collecting  cases;  Blenkiron  v.  Great  Central 
Gas  Consumers'  Co.,  3  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  317;  2  Fost.  &  F.  437,  per  Cockburn,  U. 
J.;  Powers  v.  Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  158  Mass.  257,  33  N.  E.  523;  Schmeer  v. 
Gaslight  Co.  of  Syracuse  (Sup.)  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  168. 

LA  V  OF  TORTS — 54 


8'>0  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

substance.  "This  would  require,  in  the  case  of  a  gas  company,  not 
only  that  its  pipes  and  fittings  should  be  of  such  material  and  work- 
manship, and  laid  in  the  ground  with  such  skill  and  care,  as  to  pre- 
vent the  escape  of  gas  therefrom  when  new,  but  that  such  system 
of  inspection  should  be  maintained  as  would  insure  reasonable 
promptness  in  the  detection  of  all  leaks  that  might  occur  from  the 
deterioration  of  the  material  of  the  pipes,  or  from  any  other  cause 
within  the  circumspection  of  men  of  ordinary  skill  in  the  busi- 
ness." ^'"' 

In  the  celebrated  case  of  Losee  v.  Buchanan  ^"^  it  was  held  that 
an  explosion  of  a  boiler  purchased  from  a  reputable  manufacturer, 
in  which  there  was  an  unknown  latent  defect,  does  not  attach  re- 
sponsibility for  consequent  damages.  In  such  a  case,  the  defend- 
ant is  bound  to  use  the  degree  of  care  which  ordinary  prudence  and 
forethought  would,  under  the  circumstances,  suggest;  but  the  mere 
fact  of  the  accident  is  not  proof  of  negligence.^ °^     It  is,  however, 

leo'Koelsch  V.  Philadelphia  Co.,  152  Pa.  St.  355-364,  25  Atl.  522,  and  cases 
cited;  Haynes  v.  Raleigh  Gas  Co.,  114  N.  C.  203,  19  S.  E.  344;  Schmeer  v. 
Gaslight  Co.  of  Syracuse,  65  Hun,  378,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  168;  Misslssinewa 
Min.  Co.  V.  Patton,  129  Ind.  472,  28  N.  E.  1113;  Keiser  y.  Mahanoy  City  Gas 
Co.,  143  Pa.  St.  276,  22  Atl.  759;  District  of  Columbia  v.  W.  G.  Co.,  19  Wash. 
Law  Rep.  354;  Lannen  t.  Albany  Gaslight  Co.,  44  N.  Y.  459.  And  see  Butcher 
V.  Providence  Gas  Co.,  18  Alb.  Law  J.  372.  Accordingly,  a  gas  fitter,  who  in- 
jures plaintiff  by  allowing  gas  to  accumulate  because  of  defective  plumbing, 
and  which  exploded  when  plaintiff  struck  a  light  in  the  room,  is  liable  for  neg- 
ligence. Parry  v.  Smith,  4  C.  P.  Div.  325.  Burrows  v.  March  Gas  &  Coke  Co.. 
L.  R.  5  Exch.  67,  L.  R.  7  Exch.  96,  would  seem  to  turn  wholly  upon  contract. 
The  opinion  of  Cockburn,  J.,  in  Clark  v.  Chambers,  3  Q.  B.  Div.  327,  47  Law  3. 
Q.  B.  427;  38  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  455.  As  to  inspection  of  pipes,  see  Mose  v.  Hast- 
ings &  St.  L.  Gas  Co.,  4  Fost.  &  F.  324.  And  see  Holden  v.  Liverpool  Gas  & 
Coke  Co.,  3  C.  B.  1.  Generally,  as  to  negligence  of  gas  fitters,  see  Cleveland  v. 
Spier,  16  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  399.  As  to  natural  gas,  Misslssinewa  Min.  Co.  v.  Patton, 
129  Ind.  472,  28  N.  E.  1113. 

16151-  N.  Y.  476,  collating  and  discussing  questions  of  trespass  and  negli- 
gence, distinguishing  Hay  v.  Cohoes  Co.,  2  N.  Y.  159,  affirming  Fletcher  v. 
Ryland,  L.  R.  1  Exch.  265,  and  questing  same  case,  L.  R.  3  H.  L.  330;  Dob- 
bins V.  Brown,  119  N.  Y.  188,  23  N.  E.  537;  Marshall  v.  Welwood,  38  N.  J. 
Law,  339,  Chase,  Lead.  Cas.  221;   1  Thomp.  Neg.  p.  112. 

162  Reiss  V.  New  York  Steam  Co.,  128  N.  Y.  103,  28  N.  E.  24.  Applied  to 
the  blowing  out  ef  a  bonnet  allowing  steam  to  escape,  injuring  plaintiff's 
goods.     Nor  from  the  explosion  of  petroleum.     Cosulich  v.  Standard  Oil  Co., 


*^^'-    ^2]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS. 


S.51 


insisted  that  a  boiler  explosion  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  negligence, 
which  may  be  rebutted  by  showing  due  diligence.^^^  The  explosion 
of  fireworks  in  the  streets  of  a  city  has  been  regarded  as  a  public 
nuisance  rendering  all  persons  concerned  in  doing  the  act  or  causing 
it  to  be  done  liable  for  all  damages  proximately  resulting  there- 
from.i"  The  discharge  of  fireworks  at  suitable  places,  however, 
when  not  pj-ohibited  by  statute  or  municipal  regulation,  cannot  be 
said  to  be  unlawful,  and  the  burden  is  on  the  plaintiff  to  show  such 
circumstances  as  will  make  it  culpable  negligence.^"^  Even  where 
the  display  is  in  a  public  highway,  the  better  opinion  seems  to  be 
that  a  voluntary  spectator  assumes  the  risk  of  danger.^  ^^ 

But  the  plaintiff's  case  may  be  based  on  such  a  reckless  disregard 
of  the  rights  of  others  as  to  entitle  him  to  recover  on  mere  proof  of 
cause  and  damage.'*^      The  user  of  firearms  does  not  deal  with  them 

122  N.  y.  118,  25  N.  E.  259.  As  to  liability  of  vendor  to  tliird  person,  see 
Losee  v.  Clute,  51  N.  Y.  494.  A  nuisance,  moreover,  is,  properly  speaking, 
something  whleli  works  haita  while  in  integro;  that  is,  in  the  condition  in 
which  the  defendant  has  put  or  left  it.  A  reservoir  or  boiler,  not  being  in 
itself  a  nuisance,  does  not  become  such  by  bursting.    Ball,  Lead.  Gas.  322. 

103  Grimsley  V.  Hankins,  46  Fed.  400.  Et  vide  Morris  Co.  v.  Burgess,  44 
111.  App.  27.  Where  there  are  no  eyewitnesses  of  the  accident,  it  is  proper 
to  show  that  deceased  was  a  careful  and  competent  engineer,  to  raise 
the  presumption  that  he  was  exercising  due  cave  at  the  time  of  the  explosion. 
Toledo,  St.  L.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Bailey,  145  111.  159,  33  N.  E.  1089;  Illinois 
Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Philips,  49  111.  234,  55  111.  194;  Spencer  v.  Campbell,  9  Watts 
&  S.  32.  By  section  13  (5  Stat.  306)  explosion  of  a  boiler  on  a  steamboat  was 
made  prima  facie  evidence  of  neglect.  This  is  not  limited  in  its  application 
to  actions  by  passengers,  but  extends  to  actions  by  others.  Connolly  v.  Da- 
vidson, 15  Minn.  519  (Gil.  428).  Bt  vide  McMahon  v.  Davidson,  12  Minn. 
357  (Gil.  232);    Fay  v.  Davidson,  13  Minn.  298  (Gil.  27.j). 

104  Jenne  v.  Sutton,  43  N.  J.  Law,  257.  Explosion  of  firecracker  under 
plaintiff's  house,  Conklin  v.  Thompson,  29  Barb.  218. 

losDowell  V.  Guthrie,  99  Mo.  653,  12  S.  W.  900;  Colvin  v.  Peabody,  1.3."> 
Mass.  104,  29  N.  E.  59;  King  v.  Ford,  1  Starkie,  421.  Compare  Waixel  v. 
Harrison,  37  lU.  App.  323;   Cooley,  Torts  (2d  Ed.)  70.-.. 

106  Scanlon  v.  Wedger,  156  Mass.  402,  31  N.  B.  042,  dissenting  opinion  of 
Morton,  J.  (page  464,  156  Mass.,  and  page  042,  31  N.  E.),  and  cases  collected 
on  page  466,  156  Mass.,  and  page  642.  31  N.  B.  If  he  be  an  infant,  Bradley 
V.  Andrews,  51  Vt.  530.  What  constitutes  negligence  in  tiring  will  be  nc^ces- 
sarily  relative  to  time  and  place.  Smith  v.  London  &  S.  W.  T^y.  Co.,  L.  R. 
6  C.  P.  14. 

10'  Scott  V.  Shepherd,  2  W.  Bl.  892,— ti-espass  by  throwing  a  squib. 


^'>'^  NKGLIGEXCK.  [Cll.    12 

at  his  peril.  He  is  not  an  insurer  against  harm;  but  lie  is  bound 
to  a  standard  of  duty  which  is  variable  and  shifts  with  the  facts  de- 
veloped, whether,  under  the  circumstances,  a  reasonable  and  proper 
degree  of  care  was  exercised."*  Tlie  early  cases,  however,  went  so 
far  as  to  hold  that  an  officer  commanding  a  militia  at  regimental 
drill  was  answerable  for  damages  caused  by  firing  guns  in  or  near 
a  highway.^""  Even  a  hunter  may  be  liable  for  shooting  another 
person  while  hunting,  although  he  did  not  know  of  his  presence."* 
It  has  been  held,  moreover,  that  to  constitute  a  valid  defense  in  such 
cases  the  injury  must  be  shown  to  have  resulted  from  some  con- 
trolling, superior  agency,  and  without  the  defendant's  fault/" 
The  requirement  at  law  that  persons  having  in  their  custody  instru- 
ments of  danger  should  keep  them  with  the  utmost  care  renders  it 
actionable  negligence  to  place  a  loaded  gun  in  the  hands  of  a  per- 
son incompetent  to  use  it.^'^  But  an  air  gun  is  not  so  obviously  and 
intrinsically  dangerous  as  to  render  it  negligence  for  a  father  to 
place  it  in  the  hands  of  his  infant  son.^'^ 

Poisons. 

In  a  number  of  cases  persons  have  been  held  liable  for  dam- 
ages consequent  on  the  use,  ownership,  custody,  or  control  of  sub- 
stances poisonous  or  offensive,  essentially  on  theory  of  Eylands  v. 
Fletcher  or  on  analogy  to  that  of  nuisance.^^*  Thus,  where  one 
planted  yew  trees  on  his  own  land,  and  permitted  the  branches 

168  Morgan  v.  Cox,  22  Mo.  373;  McCleai-y  v.  Frantz,  160  Pa.  St.  535,  2S 
Atl.  929. 

189  Castle  V.  Duryee,  *41  N.  ¥.  169;  Moody  v.  Ward,  13  Mass.  299;  Weaver 
v.  Ward,  Hob.  134. 

170  Hankins  v.  Watkins,  77  Hun,  360,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  867;  Bizzell  v.  Booker, 
16  Ark.  308.    Compare  McCleary  v.  Frantz,  supra. 

171  Knott  V.  Wagner,  16  Lea  (Tenn.)  481,  1  S.  W.  155. 

172  Dixon  V.  Bell,  5  Maule  &  S.  198;  Ball,  Lead.  Gas.  210;  Bigelow,  Lead. 
Cas.  568.  So  one  wlio  sells  gunpowder  to  an  inexperienced  child  is  liable  to 
it  for  subsequent  explosion.     Carter  v.  Towne,  98  Mass.  567. 

i7  3Cliaddock  v.  Plummer,  88  Mich.  225,  50  N.  W.  135,  where  boy  was  9 
years  old;  Harris  v.  Cameron,  81  Wis.  239,  51  N.  W.  437,  where  boy  was  11 
years  old.  In  the  latter  case  the  question  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  the 
father  in  making  the  purchase  was  held  to  be  a  question  of  law  for  the  court. 
Compare  Binford  vT  Johnston,  82  Ind.  426. 

174  Pol.  Torts,  c.  12. 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  853 

to  overhang  another's  meadow,  and  horses  running  in  the  meadow 
ate  the  branches  and  died,  the  owner  of  the  trees  was  held  lia- 
ble.^'^  So,  where  wire  fencing  decayed,  and  the  pieces  fell  into 
the  adjoining  pasture  belonging  to  another  person,  and  were  eaten 
by  his  cow,  which  died  from  the  effects,  the  owner  of  the  cow  was 
held  entitled  to  damages.^^^  So,  a  landlord  has  been  held  liable  for 
knowingly  letting  infected  premises.^"  Many  cases  on  this  subject 
arise  from  sales  of  poisonous  substances,  not  only  as  between  ven- 
dor and  vendee,  but  also  as  between  the  vendor  and  third  persons. 
These  cases  will  be  subsequently  considered.^^*  Similar  questions, 
as  has  been  seen,  also  arise  in  connection  with  the  doctrine  of  fraud 
and  deceit.^" 

Animak. 

Whoever  owns  or  keeps  animals  of  a  kind  likely  to  do  harm  does 
so  at  his  peril,  and  is  liable,  on  proof  of  damage,  without  further 
proof  of  negligence. 

"If  they  are  such  as  are  naturally  mischievous,  he  shall  answer 
for  hurt  done  by  them  without  any  notice ;  but,  if  they  are  of  a  tame 
nature,  there  must  be  notice  of  the  ill  quality."  ^^^ 

In  the  leading  case,  May  v.  Burdett,^^^  a  woman  was  bitten  by  a 
monkey.  Its  owner,  knowing  its  mischievous  and  ferocious  nature, 
was  held  liable  in  case,  without  an  averment  of  negligence  or  de- 

iTsCrowhurst  v.  Amersham  Burial  Board,  4  Exch.  Div.  5. 

176  Firth  T.  Bowling  Iron  Co.,  3  C.  P.  Div.  254;  Durgin  v.  Kennett  (N.  H.) 
29  Atl.  414.  Further,  as  to  poisons,  see  Callahan  v.  Warne,  40  Mo.  132;  post, 
p.  900;  Thomas  v.  Winchester,  6  N.  Y.  397. 

177  Cesar  v.  Karutz,  60  N.  Y.  229.  Cf.  Ballai-d  v.  Tomlinson,  54  Law  J. 
Ch.  454.  In  an  action  for  personal  Injuries,  it  appeared  that  plaintiff's  intes- 
tate feU  on  some  ice  which  defendant  had  wrongfully  allowed  to  accumulate 
on  the  sidewalk,  and  was  fatally  injm-ed  by  a  large  and  very  sharp  kuife  which 
he  was  carrying  to  use  in  his  trade.  The  knife  was  wrapped  in  several  cloth 
garments,  and  tied  with  a  string,  and  it  appeared  that  decedent  had  can-led 
it  in  this  manner  for  several  years.  A  witness  for  defendant  testified  that  he 
had  warned  decedent  that  it  M'as  dangerous  to  cari-y  the  knife  as  he  did. 
Held,  that  it  could  not  be  said  aa  a  matter  of  law  that  decedent  was  negligent 
McGoldrick  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  Hun,  629,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  914. 

178  Post,  p.  906. 

170  Ante,  p.  574,  "Deceit." 

180  Holt,  C.  J.,  in  ilason  v.  Keeling,  12  :Mpd.  332;   Holmes,  Com.  Law,  22. 

181  May  V.  Burdett,  9  Q.  B.  101. 


854  NEGI.IGK.NCE.  [Ch.  12 

fault  on  his  part  in  securing  or  keeping  the  monkey.  Here  the 
owner  had  actual  knowledge  of  the  vicious  propensities  of  the  ani- 
mal. But,  though  he  "have  no  particular  notice  that  it  did  any  such 
thing  before,  yet  if  it  be  a  beast  that  is  ferte  naturae,  as  a  lion,  a 
bear,^^^  a  wolf,"^  yea,  an  ape  or  a  monkey,^**  if  he  get  loose  and  do 
harm  to  any  person,  the  owner  is  liable  to  an  action  for  the  dam- 
age." ^^^  The  tameness  of  the  disposition  of  such  an  animal,  how- 
ever, may  operate  by  way  of  mitigation  of  damages.^*^ 

As  to  animals  domitse  naturaj,  there  is  no  distinction  between  the 
case  of  an  animal  which  breaks  from  the  tameness  of  his  nature  and 
becomes  fierce  and  one  who  is  ferae  naturae,  provided  the  owner  has 
knowledge.^*^  He  is  not  liable  for  negligent  failure  to  keep  a  do- 
mestic animal,  not  known  to  be  vicious,  confined  to  his  own  premises, 
except  for  consequences  which  may  be  anticipated  because  of  its 
well-known  disposition  and  habits.^**  A  part  of  the  natural  pro- 
pensity of  such  an  animal  is  to  stray  wherever  its  instinct  leads  it. 
Accordingly,  there  is,  at  common  law,  an  absolute  liability  for- all 
damages  consequent  upon  the  gratification  of  such  instinct.^*'  Such 
damage  includes,  not  only  trespass  on  and  injury  to  real  estate,  but 
also  injury  to  person  or  personal  property.     In  an  action  for  the 

182  Marguet  v.  La  Duke,  96  Mich.  596,  55  N.  W.  1006. 

183  Manger  v.  SWpman,  30  Neb.  352,  46  N.  W.  527. 

184  May  V.  Burdett,  9  Q.  B.  101. 

185  1  Hale,  P.  C.  p.  430;  May  v.  Burdett,  9  Q.  B.  101;  Jenkins  v.  Turner, 
1  Ld.  Eaym.  109;  Mason  v.  Keeling,  Id.  006.  An  elephant  is  in  the  dangerous 
class.  Filburn  v.  People's  Palace  &  Aquarium  Co.,  25  Q.  B.  Div.  258.  As  to 
animals  as  nuisances,  ante,  p.  768,  "Nuisance,"  note  132. 

186  Besozzi  V.  Han-la,  1  Fost.  &  F.  92.     Et  vide  Worth  v.  Gilling,  L.  R.  2 

C.  P.  1. 

187  Kam,  .Tackson  v.  Smithson,  5  Mees.  &  W.  563;  a  stallion,  Hammond 
V.  Melton,  42  111.  App.  186  (compare  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.  v.  De  Hass,  37 
111.  App.  195);  a  bull,  Lettis  v.  Homing,  67  Hun,  627,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  505,  dis- 
tinguishing early  New  York  cases;  a  steer,  Cra'tis  v.  Schossler,  14  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
R.  600. 

188  Klenberg  v.  Russell,  125  Ind.  532,  25  N.  B.  596  (where  a  cow  damaged 
plaintiff),  collecting  cases  on  page  534,  125  Ind.,  and  page  596,  25  N.  E.;  Smith 
V.  Donohue,  45  N.  ,1.  Law,  548. 

18!)  Cox  V.  Burbidge,  13  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  430;  Dewell  v.  Sanders,  Cro.  Jac.  49'(); 
Hannam  v.  Mockett,  2  Bam.  &  C.  934;  Myers  v.  Parker,  74  Hun,  129,  2  >  N. 
Y.  Supp.  308;  North  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Rehmau,  49  Pa.  St.  101,  reviewing 
cases. 


^h.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  855 

latter  kind  of  injury,  it  is  not  necessary  to  allege  and  prove  scienter 
on  tlie  part  of  the  owner  where  it  is  alleged  or  proved  that  the  in- 
jury was  committed  where  the  animal  was  negligently  permitted  by 
such  owner  to  trespass  on  the  plaintiff's  premises.^*"  On  the  other 
hand,  if  one  be  driving  cattle  through  a  street,  and  they  stray  and 
do  damage,  his  act  has  the  authorization  of  law,  and  he  is  not  liable 
unless  he  has  failed  to  exercise  the  care  of  a  prudent  man  to  pre- 
vent harm.i"  In  the  absence  of  knowledge  of  vicious  propensities, 
the  owner  is  liable  only,  at  common  law,^^^  for  damage  caused  by 
the  natural  propensity  of  the  animal;  and  this  is  to  be  determined 
by  a  consideration  of  normal  disposition.  Thus,  while  it  is  natural 
for  horses  to  kick  each  other,  it  is  not  their  ordinary  nature  to  kick 
human  beings.  Hence,  where  a  horse  strayed  on  a  highway,  and 
kicked  a  child,  the  owner  was  not  held  liable,  in  the  absence  of 
knowledge  of  the  horse's  vicious  temper;  ^"^  but  if,  although  not  vi- 
cious, it  has  kicked  another  animal,  he  has  been  held  liable.^"*     If 

lao  Van  Leuven  v.  Lyke,  1  N.  Y.  515;  Marsh  v.  Hand,  120  N.  Y.  315,  24  N. 
E.  4G3;  Burke  v.  Daley,  32  111.  App.  326;  Decker  v.  Gammon,  44  Me.  322.  OSJ 
Am.  Dec.  103,  and  authority  cited;  JIalone  v.  Knowlton,  60  Hun,  585,  15  N. 
Y.  Supp.  506.  If  a  bull  break  into  an  inclosure  and  gore  a  horse,  the  owner 
of  the  bull  is  liable.  Dolph  v.  Ferris,  7  Watts  &  S.  367;  Lee  v.  Ryley,  18  C. 
B.  (N.  S.)  722;    Ellis  v.  Loftus  Iron  Co.,  L.  R.  10  C.  P.  10. 

181  Tillett  v.  Ward,  10  Q.  B.  Div.  17;  Moynahan  v.  Wheeler,  117  N.  Y.  285, 
22  N.  E.  702.  But  see  Meier  v.  Shrunk,  70  Iowa,  17,  44  N.  AV.  209.  If  defend- 
ant admits,  after  the  injury,  that  it  was  careless  to  lead  a  buU,  in  the  man- 
ner in  which  his  servant  led  it,  through  a  street,  this  justifies  the  jury  in  find- 
ing against  him.     Linnehan  v.  Sampson,  126  Mass.  508. 

10  2  As  illustrations  of  statutory  changes,  Hussey  v.  King,  83  Me.  568,  22 
Atl.  476;    Conway  v.  Grant,  88  Ga.  40,  13  S.  E.  803. 
103  Cox  V.  Burbidge,  13  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  430^41. 

10*  Bai'nes  v.  Chapin,  4  Allen  (Mass.)  444.  So  if  an  agister  of  cattle  place 
plaintilT's  horse  in  a  field  with  a  number  of  heifers,  near  a  bull  in  adjoining 
field,  he  may  be  liable  for  damage  to  the  horse,  although  he  did  not  know 
that  the  bull  was  of  mischievous  disposition.  Smith  v.  Cook,  1  Q.  B.  Div.  79. 
In  Oklahoma  it  is  held  that,  unless  the  owner  of  a  mule  has  knowledge  of  a 
projmnsity  on  its  part  to  attack  colts,  he  is  not  liable  for  a  colt  killed  by  it 
while  running  at  large.  Meegan  v.  McKay,  1  Okl.  .j9,  30  Pac.  232.  ( 'ompare 
Johanson  v.  Howells,  55  Minn.  61,  56  N.  W.  460.  Merely  tiying  a  horse  of  un- 
inown  disposition  in  a  highway  is  no  evidence  of  negligence,  Hamiuack  v. 
White,  11  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  588;  nor  trying  carriage  horses  in  a  double  harness, 
Holmes  v.  Mather,  supi'a.    But  while  known  disposition  of  a  horse  may  affect 


856  NEGLIGKNCE.  [Ch.    12 

a  dog  be  of  a  savage  disposition,  and  accustomed  to  bite,  tlie  owner 
or  keeper  ^^=  is  liable  only  if  he  knows  these  facts;  ^"^  but  if  the 
owner  is  aware  of  such  viciousness,  and  permits  the  dog  to  run  at 
large,  he  is  liable,  without  allegation  or  proof  of  negligence,  for  its 
indulgence  in  the  propensity  to  bite.^°'  The  liability  is  the  same  if 
the  plaintiff  be  bitten  while  lawfully  on  the  defendant's  premises.^"* 
There  is  probably  a  natural  propensity  in  all  dogs  to  chase  and  de- 
stroy game,  and  to  worry  sheep  and  cattle.^""      As  to  what  is  notice 

measure  of  care,  this  does  not  apply  where  a  driver  failed  to  use  care  to  re- 
lieve his  horse,  who  was  entangled  in  a  harness,  whereby  he  ran  away. 
Wissler  v.  Walsh,  1C5  Pa.  St.  352,  30  Atl.  9S1. 

195  Hornbein  v.  Blanchard,  4  Colo.  App.  92,  35  Pac.  187;  Garrison  v.  Barnes, 
42  111.  App.  21;  Whittemore  v.  Thomas,  153  Mass.  347,  20  N.  E.  875;  Galvin 
V.  Parker,  154  Mass.  346,  28  N.  E.  244.  But  see  Jennings  v.  D.  G.  Burton  Co., 
73  Hun,  545,  2G  N.  Y.  Supp.  151. 

106  Warner  v.  Chamberlain  (Del.  Super.)  30  Atl.  638,  7  Houst.  18;  Robinson 
V.  Marino,  3  Wash.  St.  434,  28  Pac.  752;  Dockerty  v.  Hutson,  125  Ind.  102, 
25  N.  E.  144;  Simpson  v.  Griggs,  58  Hun,  393,  12  N.  Y.  Supp.  162.  As  be- 
tween master  and  servant,  Auchmuty  v.  Ham,  1  Denio,  495.  "An  uncle  who 
permits  a  minor  nephew,  living  with  him,  to  keep  a  known  vicious  dog,  is 
liable  for  injuries  to  a  child  caused  by  it."  Snyder  v.  Patterson,  162  Pa.  St.  98, 
28  Atl.  1006.  A  wife,  living  with  her  husband  on  premises  owned  by  her  is  not 
liable  for  injuries  cavfeed  by  the  bite  of  a  vicious  dog  kept  on  such  premises, 
though  Code,  §  2345,  provides  that  a  married  woman  shall  be  alone  liable  for 
her  torts.  Strouse  v.  Leipf,  101  Ala.  433,  14  South.  667.  Compare  Quilty  v. 
Battle,  135  N.  Y.  201,  32  N.  E.  47.  As  to  directors  of  an  almshouse,  Sproat  v. 
Directors  of  Poor,  145  Pa.  St.  59S,  23  Atl.  380;  landlord  and  tenant.  Garrison 
V.  Barnes,  42  111.  App.  21.  Compare  Jennings  v.  D.  G.  Burton  Co.,  73  Hun, 
545,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  151.  The  occupier  of  a  place  where  a  dog  is  kept  is,  for 
purposes  under  discussion,  the  owner  of  the  dog, — ^in  England,  28  &  29  Vict.,  c. 
60;    in  Scotland,  Camp.  Neg.  53-55. 

107  Twigg  V.  Ryland,  62  Md.  380;  Harris  v.  Fisher,  115  N.  C.  318,  20  S.  E. 
461;  State  v.  Remhofe  (N.  J.  Sup.)  26  Atl.  860;  Bundschuh  v.  Mayer,  81  Hun, 
nil  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  622. 

los  Sylvester  v.  Maag,  155  Pa.  St.  225,  26  Atl.  392;  Jacoby  v.  Ockerhausen, 
59  ITun,  619,  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  499;  Melsheimer  v.  Sullivan,  1  Colo.  App.  22.  27 
Pac.  17. 

looReed  v.  Edwards,  17  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  245;  Fleeming  v.  Orr,  2  Macq.  14. 
Bt  vide  Wright  v.  Pearson,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  582;  Smith  v.  Donohue,  49  N.  J. 
Law,  548-552,  10  Atl.  150;  Murry  v.  Young,  12  Bush,  337.  As  to  statutoi-y 
regulation  of  dogis  killing  live  stock,  Davis  v.  Town  of  Seymour,  59  Conn. 
531,  21  Atl.  1004;   Jones  v.  Town  of  Chester  (N.  H.)  29  Atl.  452;   Jacobsmeyer 


Cll.    12]  KSSIC.NTIAL    ELEMENTS.  857 

of  an  unnatural,  vicious  propensity,  the  jury  are  to  judge,  in  view  of 
all  the  circumstances;  as,  that  the  animal  has  attacked  other  per- 
sons or  animals,  its  general  reputation  in  the  neighborhood,  and  the 
manner  in  which  it  is  ordinarily  restrained.^""  The  law  recognizes 
that  the  habit  of  an  animal  is  a  continuous  fact,  to  be  shown  by 
proof  of  successive  acts  of  a  similar  kind.  Therefore  proof  of  dis- 
position before  and  after  the  injury  is  admissible.^" 
Where  an  animal  suffers  from  a  contagious  disease,  which  is  likely 

V.  Poggemoeller,  47  Mo.  App.  SCO;  Wealland  v.  Palmer,  2  Pa.  Dist.  R.  777; 
Laws  AVis.  1891,  c.  218,  p.  2.j5;  State  v.  Township  Committee  of  Neptune,  52 
N.  J.  Law,  487,  20  Atl.  61;  dogs  running  at  large,  Nehr  v.  State,  35  Neb. 
638,  53  N.  W.  589;  Jones  v.  Perry,  2  Esp.  482. 

200  Fake  v.  Addicks,  45  Minn.  37,  47  N.  W.  450;  Keenan  v.  Hayden,  39 
Wis.  558;  Linek  v.  Scheffell,  32  111.  App.  17;  Turner  v.  Craighead,  83  Huu, 
112,  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  369;  Murry  v.  Xoung,  12  Bush,  337;  Brice  v.  Bauer, 
108  N.  Y.  428.  15  N.  E.  695;  Meier  v.  Shrunk,  79  Iowa,  17,  44  N.  W.  209. 
And  see  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  107,  Hahnke  v.  Frederich,  140  N.  Y.  224,  35  N. 
E.  487  (where  a  dog  was  usually  kept  chained  and  muzzled).  So  in  Kessler 
V.  Lockwood,  62  Hun,  619,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  677;  Robinson  v.  Marino,  3 
Wash.  St.  434,  28  Pac.  752.  In  Smith  v.  Pelah,  2  Strange,  1264,  the  chief 
justice  ruled  "that  if  a  dog  has  once  bit  a  man,  and  the  owner  thereof, 
with  notice,  keeiJS  the  dog,  and  lets  him  go  about  or  lie  at  his  door,  an 
action  lies  at  the  suit  of  the  person  T\'ho  is  bit,  though  it  happened  by  sucli 
person's  treading  on  the  dog's  toes,  for  it  was  owing)  to  his  not  hanging  the 
dog  on  the  first  notice,  and  the  safety  of  the  king's  subject  is  not  afterwards 
to  be  endangered."  Wood,  Nuis.  §  766;  Muller  v.  McKesson,  73  N.  Y.  200, 
201.  In  an  action  for  injuries  inflicted  by  a  ruuaway  team  of  defendant,  the 
vicious  or  dangerous  character  of  the  horses  is  a  question  for  the  jury,  where 
there  is  evidence  that  the  horses  liad  previously  run  away,  and  that  defendant 
knew  it.  Benoit  v.  Troy  &  L.  R.  Co.,  77  Hun,  576,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  1024.  No- 
tice of  viciousness  of  horse  to  superior  hos.tler  is  notice  to  street-railway  com- 
panies. McGarry  v.  New  York  &  H.  R.  Co.  (Super.  N.  Y.)  18  N.  Y.  Supp. 
195.  Generally,  as  to  notice  through  servant,  Baldwin  v.  Casella,  L.  R.  7 
Exch.  325;  Applebee  v.  Percy,  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  647.  And,  generally,  as  to  no- 
tice. Worth  V.  Gilling,  L.  R.  2  C.  P.  1;  Gladman  v.  Johnson,  36  Law  J.  C. 
P.  153;  Jones  v.  Perry,  2  Esp.  482;  Deck  v.  Dyson,  4  Camp.  198;  Judge  v. 
Cox,  1  Starkie,  285. 

201  Todd  V.  Rowley,  8  Allen,  51-58,  per  Bigelow,  C.  J.;  Chamberlain  v. 
Enfield,  43  N.  H.  356;  Maggi  v.  Cutts,  123  Mass.  535;  Kennou  v,  Gilmer, 
1.31  U.  S.  22,  9  Sup.  Ct.  696.  But  see  Cameron  v.  Bryan  (Iowa1  56  N.  W.  4.34; 
Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.  v.  De  Hass,  37  111.  App.  105;  Worth  v.  Gilling.  L.  R.  2 
C.  P.  1. 


^•38  NEGLIGENCK.  [Ch.    12 

to  affect  otlier  animals,  its  owner,  keeper,  or  person  having  it  in  con- 
trol ^°-  is  liable,  at  common  law,  for  allowing  it  to  escape,  if  he 
knew  or  ought  to  have  known  of  its  diseased  condition.^"'  The 
keeping  of  such  animals  is  now  largely  regulated  by  statute.^"* 

Things  Dangerous  because  Put  in  Motion. 

Where  the  instrument  by  which  wrong  is  done  is  innocent  in  it- 
self, and  does  harm  only  when  it  is  started  in  motion,  the  liability 
naturally  depends  upon  the  exercise  of  care  proportioned  to  probable 
harm.  Thus,  a  coupling  pin  attached  to  a  moving  car,^°^  or  a  rope 
dragged  behind  a  moving  vehicle,^"*  a  board  thrown  back  from  a 

202  As  to  liability  of  railroad  company  communicating  disease  by  shipping 
infected  cattle,  see  Pike  v.  Eddy,  53  Mo.  App.  505;  Grimes  v.  Eddy  (Mo.  Sup.) 
27  S.  W.  479;   Furley  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  57  N.  W.  719. 

203  Cooke  V.  Waring,  2  Hurl.  &  C.  332;  State  v.  Fox  (Md.)  29  Atl.  601  (a 
leading  case  of  sale  of  a  glandered  horse);  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Goolsby,  58  Ark.  401,  24  S.  W.  1071.  There  is  no  liability  on  warranty,  in 
selling  a  glandered  horse,  in  the  absence  of  representations  as  to  health,  Hill 
V.  Balls,  2  Hurl.  &  N.  299;  Mullett  v.  Mason,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  559;  although  lia- 
bility may  attach  for  fraud,  Mullett  v.  Mason,  supra.  Texas  fever:  Clareiv 
don  Land,  Inv.  &  Agency  Co.  v.  McClelland  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  21  S.  W.  170 
(reversed  in  86  Tex.  179,  23  S.  W.  576,  1100).  Evidence  that  the  fact  that 
native  cattle,  treading  over  the  ground  after  Texas  "cattle,  are  liable  to  con- 
tract Texas  fever,  is  a  matter  of  general  notoriety  does  not  show  that  defend- 
ant company  had  linowledge  of  the  fact.  Grimes  v.  Eddy  (JIo.  Sup.)  27  S. 
W.  479.  As  to  hydrophobia  communicated  by  a  dog:  French  v.  Wilkinson, 
83  Mich.  322,  53  N.  W.  530.  Liability  for  sheep  rot:  Wilcox  v.  McCoy,  21 
Ohio  St,  655;  HerricR  v.  Gary,  83  111.  85;  Peterkin  v.  Martin,  30  La.  Ann.  894. 

204  As  to  English  act,  see  41  &  42  Vict.  c.  74.  Laws  N.  M.  1891,  c.  62; 
Laws  Kan.  1891,  c.  201,  p.  340;  Laws  N.  D.  1891,  c.  125,  p.  314;  26  Stat.  c. 
839,  p.  414;  Laws  Tex.  1892,  p.  11;  Id.  1893,  c.  56;  Laws  N.  Y.  1892,  p.  9g'l, 
Laws  Nev.  1893,  c.  44,  p.  37.  Et  vide  Miller  v.  Horfon,  152"  Mass.  u40,  26  N. 
E.  100;  Pearson  v.  Zehr,  138  111.  48,  29  N.  E.  854;  Stryker  v.  Crane,  33  Neb. 
€90.  50  N.  W.  1132;  Furley  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  57  N. 
W.  719. 

20  5  Doyle  V.  Chicago,  St.  P.  &  K.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  77  Iowa,  607,  42  N.  W.  555. 
Injury  to  plaintiff  by  stick  of  wood  which  fell  or  was  thrown  from  passing 
engine  is  prima  facie  due  to  defendant's  negligence.  Savannah,  F.  &  W.  E. 
Co.  V.  Slater,  92  Ga.  391,  17  S.  E.  350. 

206  Barnes  v.  Brown,  95  Mich.  576,  55  N.  W.  439.  Cf.  McCaffrey  v.  Twen- 
ty-Third St.  Ry.  Co.,  47  Hun,  404,  where  it  was  held  that  no  liability  attaches 
because  of  damage  done  by  wire  accidentally  attached  to  axle  of  street  car. 


Cll.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMICNTS.  859 

■circular  saw,^"  a  hammer  in  use,^"'  a  swinging  sack,^""  or  a  beer 
barrel  swung  from  a  wagon  turning  suddenly  from  a  car  track,^^" 
however  harmless  in  themselves,  will  attach  liability  if  negligently 
controlled.  On  the  same  principle,  a  bicycle  is  in  itself  an  innocent 
vehicle.  It  is  entitled  to  the  rights  of  the  road  (but  not  of  the  side- 
walk) ^^^  equally  with  a  carriage  or  other  vehicle;  and,  if  it  is  go- 
ing at  such  a  rate  of  speed  as  to  frighten  horses,  there  is  liability 
on  the  part  of  the  rider  only  when  his  want  of  care  can  be  shown.^^^ 
Carriages  and  other  vehicles  drawn  by  horses  becomt  dangerous  be- 
cause of  the  motion  given  to  them,  and  because  of  the  tendency  of 
horses  to  run  away  and  otherwise  do  damage.  It  is  convenient,  how- 
ever, to  postpone  the  discussion  of  these  cases.^^^ 

A  car  with  a  defective  brake  is  not  such  an  immediately  dangerous 
instrument  as  to  render  a  railroad  company  liable  to  any  one  injured 
thereby,  in  the  absence  of  contract  or  other  relation;  ^^*  but  "cer- 
tainly the  absence  of  slight  care  in  the  management  of  so  dangerous 
an  agency  as  a  railroad  train  in  motion  is  gross  negligence."  ^^^  A 
railroad  corporation  is,  therefore,  bound  to  adopt  and  use  tried  and 
proved  modern  machinery  and  appliances  in  the  operation  of  the 
road,  and  in  the  management  and  control  of  the  trains.  And  fail- 
ure to  equip  even  freight  cars  with  air  brakes  may  be  actionable 

2  07  Frazier  v.  Lloyd  (Pa.  Sup.)  16  ^tl.  418. 

20  8  Parisli  v.  Williams,  88  Iowa,  66,  55  N.  W.  74;  Witte  v.  Dieffenbach,  54 
N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  508;   MeCaull  v.  Brunei-  (Iowa)  59  N.  W.  37. 

209  Brown  v.  Leclerc,  22  Can.  Sup.  Ct.  53  (Gwynne,  J.,  dissenting). 

210  Ledig  v.  Germania  Brewing  Co.,  153  Pa.  St.  298,  25  Atl.  870. 

211  Mercer  v.  Oorbin,  117  Ind.  450,  20  N.  E.  132. 

212  Holland  v.  Bartcli,  120  Ind.  40,  22  N.  E.  S3.  Generally,  as  to  law  of 
bicycles,  see  47  Alb.  Law  J.  404. 

213  Post,  pp.  801,  877. 

214  Roddy  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  104  Mo.  234,  15  S.  W.  112;  Lake  Shore 
&  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sundt,  140  111.  525,  30  N.  E.  458.  Nor  an  unguarded  hand 
car,  Robinson  v.  Oregon,  S.  L.  &  U.  N.  R.  Co.,  7  Utah,  493,  27  Pac.  089;  ex- 
cept when  in  rapid  motion,  Conklin  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  (Sup.) 
17  N.  Y.  Supp.  651. . 

210  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  87  Ky.  327-337,  8  S.  W.  706;  Rich- 
ardson V.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  133  N.  Y.  563,  30  N.  E.  148;  Thomas 
V.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  Ry.  Co.,  86  Mich.  49«,  49  N.  W.  547;.  Lapsley  v.  Union 
Pac.  R.  Co.,  50  Fed.  172. 


■^tJO  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12: 

negligence.^^'  The  sudden  starting  of  a  train  while  one  is  board- 
ing a  car  is  actionable  negligence.^^^  The  law  throws  upon  those 
who  launch  a  vessel  the  obligation  of  doing  so  with  the  utmost  pre- 
caution, and  giving  such  a  notice  as  is  reasonable  and  suiBcient  to  pre- 
vent any  injury  happening  from  the  launch.^^'  Collisions  between 
railroad  trains  ^'°  or  street  cars,""  and  injury  to  pedestrians,^^^  or 

218  Cbicag-o,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  y.  Grablin,  38  Neb.  90,  56  N.  W.  796. 

217  Jury  should  determine  whether  it  is  negligence  to  give  a  signal  before 
starting  a  train,  when  people  are  crossing  between  cars.  Burger  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  112  ISIo.  238,  20  S.  W.  439.  Generally,  as  to  passing  between  ob- 
structing cars,  see  Id.;  Flynn  v.  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  83  Wis.  238,  53  N.  W.  494; 
Pannell  v.  Nashville,  F.  &  S.  R.  Co.,  97  Ala.  298,  12  South.  236;  Henderson 
V.  St.  Paul  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  52  Mmn.  479,  55  N.  W.  53;  Eddy  v.  Powell,  i  U. 
S.  App.  259,  1  C.  C.  A.  448,  and  49  Fed.  814.  Hart  v.  West  Side  R.  Co.,  86 
Wis.  483,  57  N.  W.  91;  Mt.  Adams  &  J^den  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Doherty,  8  Ohio 
Cir.  Ct.  R.  349;  Hiclienbotton  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  122  N.  Y.  91,  2.3 
N.  E.  279;  Myers  v.  Dean,  132  N.  Y.  72,  30  N.  E.  259;  Fuller  v.  Jamestown 
St.  Ry.  Co.,  75  Hun,  273,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  1078.  Shunting  cars  against  a  per- 
son unloading  is  a  question  of  negligience,  for  the  jury.  Spotts  v.  Wabash. 
West.  Ry.  Co.,  Ill  Mo.  380,  20  S.  W.  190.  As  to  shunting  cars  past  crossing: 
Negligence  per  se,  Alabama  &  V.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Summei-s,  68  Miss.  566,  10  South.. 
63;  gross  negligence,  Schindler  v.  Milwauliee,  L.  S.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  87  Mien. 
400,  49  N.  W.  670.  A  collection  of  authorities  on  the  duty  of  a  railroad  com- 
pany to  maintain  lookouts  on  its  trains.  Smith  v.  Norfolk  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  (N.  C.> 
25  Lawy.  Rep.  Ann.  287,  19  S.  E.  863,  923. 

218  The  Andalusian,  2  Prob.  Div.  233.  Collisions  between  steamers  depend 
upon  negligence,  with  due  reference  to  inspector's  rule  and  general  marine 
law.  Belden  v.  Chase,  150  U.  S.  674,  14  Sup.  Ot.  264;  The  Marpesia,  L.  R. 
4  P.  C.  212. 

219  Evansville  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Krapf  (Ind.  Sup.)  36  N.  E.  901.  This  sub- 
ject is  governed  largely  by  statute.  E.  g.  Byrne  v.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  & 
M.  R.  Co.,  9  C.  C.  A.  666,  61  Fed.  605;  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Greenwood, 
99  Ala.  501,  14  South.  495. 

220  Collision  on  intersecting  lines.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Pendery  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  213;  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  McLaughlin,  40  111.  App. 
496.  Evidence  of  negligence  of  driver  of  car  at  other  times  is  inadmissible. 
Little  R<j(k  &  M.  R.  Co.  V.  Harrell,  58  Ark.  454,  25  S.  W.  117. 

221  Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Hare,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  18,  23  S.  W.  42;  Gurley- 
V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  122  Mo.  141,  26  S.  W.  953;  Blount  v.  Grand 
Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  9  0.  C.  A.  526,  61  Fed.  375;  Johnson  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 
(Iowa)  59  N.  W.  66;  Trowbridge  v.  Danville  S.  R.  Co.,  19  S.  E.  780;  Dun- 
seath  V.  Pittsburg,  A.  &  M.  Traction  Co.,  101  Pa.  St.  124,  28  Atl.  1021. 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIA  I,    ELEMENTS,  i^Gl 

persons  driving  vehicles,^^^  or  to  property,^^*  resulting  from  being 
.struclc  by  railroad  trains  or  street  cars,  are  governed  by  the  test  of 
commensurate  care  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case.-"* 
A  company  running  trains  is  not  an  insurer  of  safety."^  The  rate 
of  speed,  apart  from  statute,--"  and  failure  to  use  a  headlight  or  to 

222  Peterson  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  54  Minn.  1.52,  55  N.  W.  906;  Greeley 
V.  Federal  St.  &  P.  V.  Pass.  Ry.,  153  Pa.  St.  218,  25  Atl.  796;  Will  v.  West 
Side  It.  Co.,  84  Wis,  42,  54  N.  W.  30.  One  Is  not  necessarily  negligent  in  driv- 
ing on  a  cable-car  track.  Fleckenstein  v.  Dry-Dock,  E.  B.  &  B.  R.  Co.,  105  N. 
Y.  G55,  11  N.  E.  951;  Cambies  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  1  Misc.  Rep.  158,  20  N. 
Y.  Snpp.  633.  Et  vide  O'Neil  v.  Dry-Dock,  E.  B.  &  B.  R.  Co.,  129  N.  Y.  125, 
29  N.  E.  84;  Piper  v.  Pueblo  City  Ry.  Co.,  4  Colo.  424,  36  Pac.  158;  Little  v.  Su- 
perior Rapid  Ti-ansit  Co.,  88  Wis.  402,  GO  N.  W.  705;  Glazebrook  v.  West  End 
St.  R.  Co.,  160  Mass.  239,  35  N.  E.  5.j3;  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Yeamans,  90 
Va.  752,  19  S.  E.  787;  Haney  v.  Pittsburgh,  A.  &  JI.  Traction  Co.,  159  Pa.  St. 
395,  28  Atl.  235;  Ken-igan  v.  West  End  St.  Ry.  Co.,  158  Mass.  305,  33  N.  E. 
523;  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  McClurg,  8  C.  C.  A.  322,  59  Fed.  860; 
Kestner  v.  Pittsburgh  &  B.  Traction  Co.,  158  Pa.  St.  422,  27  Atl.  1048;  Wilson 
V.  New  York,  N.  II.  &-  H.  R.  Co.  (R.  I.)  29  Atl.  300;  Swain  v.  Fourteenth  St. 
R.  Co.,  93  Cal.  179,  28  Pac.  829;  Riegelman  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  9  Misc.  Rep. 
51,  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  299;  Shea  v.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co.,  50  Minn.  395,  52  X.  W. 
902;  Thoresen  v.  La  Crosse  City  R.  Co.,  87  Wis.  597,  58  N.  W.  1051;  Smith  v. 
•Citizens'  Ry.  Co.,  52  Mo.  App.  36;  Piper  v.  Pueblo  City  R.  Co.,  4  Colo.  App. 
424,  36  Pac.  158.  As  to  whether  injury  results  from  fright  of  hoi'ses  or  negli- 
gence of  motorman,  see  Omaha  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Duvall,  40  Neb.  29,  58  N.  W.  531; 
Gibbons  v.  Wilkes-Barre  &  S.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  155  Pa.  St.  279,  26  Atl.  417.  It  is 
not  negligence  in  matter  of  law  to  drive  between  tracks  of  railroad.  Reif- 
snyder  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  57  N.  W.  692.  A  collection  of 
authorities  on  the  liability  of  a  street  railway  for  injuries  by  collision  with 
vehicles  and  horses.  Hicks  v.  Citizens'  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  25  Lawy.  Rep.  Ann. 
-508i,  27  S.  W.  542. 

2  23  As  a  dog,  Meisch  v.  Rochester  Electric  Ry.  Co.,  72  Hun,  604,  25  N.  Y. 
Supp.  244.  And  see  Omaha  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Duvall,  40  Neb.  29,  58  N.  W.  531; 
Scott  V.  Yazoo  &  M.  V.  Ry.  Co.  (Miss.)  16  South.  205;  Missouri,  K.  &  T. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Palmer  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  889;  Harrison  v.  Chicago,  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (S.  D.)  60  N.  W.  405.  As  to  liability  of  electric  cars,  see 
Watson  V.  Minneapolis  St.  R.  Co.,  53  Minn.  551,  55  N.  W.  742;  McKillop  v. 
Duluth  St.  R.  Co.,  53  Minn.  532,  55  N.  W.  739;  Lincoln  Rapid  Transit  Co. 
V.  Nichols,  37  Neb.  332,  55  N.  W.  872.    , 

2  24  Accidents  at  railroad  crossings  will  be  found  discussed  in  9  Law.  Rep. 
Ann.  157,  note,  where  the  earlier  cases  ai-e  collected. 

22  5  Chicago,  K.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Fisher,  49  Kan.  460,  30  Pac.  462. 

226  Gilmore  v.  Federal  St.  &  P.  V.  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  153  Pa.  St.  31,  25  Atl.  651; 


8'j2  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

ring  a  bell  when  the  engine  is  running  in  the  dark,"^  may  be  suffi- 
cient to  show  negligence,  and  even  willful  and  wanton  negligence. 
The  running  of  railroad  trains  over  crossings  in  the  open  country  at 
a  high  rate  of  speed  is  not,  however,  negligence  per  se,"^  and  even 
in  a  city;  ^^^  but  it  is  a  high  degree  of  negligence  for  a  railroad  com- 
pany to  make  a  running  or  flying  switch  in  the  populous  part  of  a 
city.^'"  Prudent  men  are  accustomed  to  observe  a  less  degree  of 
care  to  avoid  teams  on  a  city  highway  than  they  would,  under  the 
same  circumstances,  to  avoid  cars  on  a  railroad  highway.^^^  What 
precautions  are  necessary  to  prevent  running  over  or  being  run  over 
is  commonly  a  matter  of  fact,  and  not  of  law.^^^  The  danger  of 
rapidly  moving  machinery  calls  for  the  exercise  of  care  on  the  part 
of  its  owner  to  avoid  damage  to  persons  lawfully  near  it,  and  to 
j'outhful  or  inexperienced  employes,  as  circumstances  may  deter- 
mine. To  the  person  injured,  however,  such  machinery  is  suggestive 
of  danger,  and  he  must  exercise  care  accordingly.^ ^^      And  disre- 

Watson  V.  Jlinneapolis  St.  Ry.  Co.,  53  Minn.  551,  55  N.  W.  742;  Quincy 
Horse  Ry.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Gnuse,  38  111.  App.  212  (reversed  in  another  point,  13T 
111.  264,  27  N.  E.  190). 

227  East  St.  Louis  Connectinp;  R  Co.  v.  O'Hara,  150  111.  580,  37  N.  B.  017. 

22S  Childs  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  150  Pa.  St.  73,  24  Atl.  341.  Compare 
Lapsley  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  50  Fed.  172. 

229  The  running  of  a  passenger  train  on  schedule  time  across  a  highway  in. 
a  city  of  17,000  inhabitants  at  a  rate  of  25  miles  an  hour  is  not,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  an  ordinance  limiting  the  speed  to  a  lower  rate,  negliglence  per  se. 
Tobias  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.  (Mich.)  61  N.  W.  514.  This  ruling  may  be 
regarded  as  carrying  to  an  extreme  the  submission  of  questions  of  fact  tO' 
the  jury.  Ordinary  cases  of  the  kind  should  of  course  go  to  the  jury.  Leder- 
man  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  1G5  Pa.  St.  118,  30  AtL  725;  Link  v.  Phila- 
delphia &  R.  R.  Co.,  165  Pa.  St.  75,  30  Atl.  820. 

230  Kentucky  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  93  Ky.  449,  20  S.  W.  392.  Et  vide 
York  V.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  84  Me.  117,  24  Atl.  790;  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Daneld,  5  Ind.  App.  108,  31  N.  E.  836;  Ward  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry. 
Co.,  85  Wis.  601,  55  N.  W.  771. 

2  31  Post.  p.  959,  "Contributory  Negligence";  Patterson  v.  Townsend  (Iowa) 
59  N.  W.  205;    Muncie  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Maynard,  5  Ind.  App.  372,  32  N.  E.  343. 

232  Purtell  V.  Jordan,  156  Mass.  573,  31  N.  E.  652;  Norton  v.  Ittner,  56  Mo. 
351;  Sandifer  v.  Lyim,  52  SIo.  App.  552;  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Coleman  (Md.) 
30  Atl.  918;  Thatcher  v.  Centi-al  Traction  Co.  (Pa.  Sup.)  30  Atl.  1048;  laquin- 
ta  V.  Citizens'  Traction  Co.  (Pa.  Sup.)  30  Atl.  1131. 

233  Post,  p.  lOO.'i;    Russell  v.  Tillotson,  140  Mass.  201,   4  N.   E.  231;    Cool- 


Ch.  12]  ess?:ntial  ei.emejnts.  86-5 

gard  of  such  danger,  as  to  put  one's  hand  in  a  revolving  machine,  is 
contributory  negligence  sufficient  to  bar  recovery.^^* 

Electricity. 

In  the  employment  of  electricity,  wrongs  may  be  done  by  the 
machinery,  poles,  wires,  and  other  appliances,  without  a  special 
reference  to  the  dangerous  character  of  the  electricity.  Such 
wrongs  may  be  regarded  from  the  point  of  view  of  nuisance  "*^ 
or  trespass  ^^'^  or  negligence.-^'  As  to  such  appliances,  a  person 
who  owns,  uses,  or  controls,  is  held  to  a  degree  of  care  at  least 
corresponding  to  similar  agencies  in  other  lines  of  business.^  ^^ 

Where  the  electrical  current  is  involved,  liability  would  seem  to 
be  determined  by  rules  of  negligence, — that  is,  by  care  proportion- 
ate to  the  danger,  ^^^ — and  not  by  the  principles  involved  in  the  duty 

broth  V.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  77  Me.  168;    Prentiss  v.  Kent  Furniture  Manuf'g 
Co.,  C3  Mich.  478,  30  N.  W.  109. 

234  Muldowney  v.  Illinois  Cent  R.  Co.,  36  Iowa,  462;  Money  v.  Lower  View 
Coal  Co.,  55  Iowa,  671,  8  N.  W.  652;  Seefeld  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co., 
70  Wis.  217,  35  N.  W.  278;  Glascock  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  73  Cal.  137,  14 
Pac.  518. 

235  Telegraph  pole.  Reg.  v.  United  Kingdom  Electric  Tel.  Co.,  31  Law  J. 
Mag.  Cas.  166,  10  Wkly.  Rep.  538;  1  Dill.  Mun.  Coi-p.  §  374;  New  York  &  N. 
J.  Tel.  Co.  v.  East  Orangie,  42  N.  J.  Eq.  490,  8  Atl.  289. 

236  Memphis  Bell  Tel.  Co.  v.  Hunt,  16  Lea  (Tenn.)  456,  1  S.  W.  159;  Tlssot 
V.  Telephone  Co.,  39  La.  Ann.  996,  3  South.  261;  Clay  v.  Postal  Tel.  Co., 
70  Miss.  406,  11  South.  658. 

23  7  In  order  to  sustain  an  action  against  a  street-railway  company  for 
maintaining  an  electric  pole  in  the  street  in  a  dangerous  manner,  it  must  be 
shown  that  it  failed  in  the  degree  of  care  for  the  public  safety  which  it  should 
have  had,  and  that  plaintiff  was  without  fault.  Cleveland  v.  Bangor  St  Ry., 
86  Me.  232,  29  Atl.  1005. 

238  By  improper  location  of  poles.  Sheffield  v.  Central  Union  Tel.  Co.,  3(> 
Fed.  164;  Wolfe  v.  Erie  Telegi'aph  &  Telephone  Co.,  33  Fed.  320.  Et  vide 
ante,  p.  145,  "Damage  Incident  to  Authorized  Act"  note  182. 

230Thomp.  Eleotr.  66,  67;  Southwestern  Telegraph  &  Teleplione  Co.  v. 
Robinson,  1  C.  C.  A.  684,  50  Fed.  810;  Aheru  v.  Oregon  Telegraph  &  Tele- 
phone Co.,  24  Or.  270,  33  Pac.  403,  and  35  Pac.  549.  Where,  however,  a  city 
ordinance  under  which  an  electric  lighting  company  is  originated  requu-ed  it  ta 
have  its  splices  on  its  wires  perfectly  insulated,  the  failure  to  do  so  is  negli- 
gence. Clements  v.  Louisiana  Electric  Light  Co.,  44  La.  Ann.  092,  11  South. 
51.  A  telephone  company  has,  however,  been  required  to  exercise  such  care 
as  will  giuard  the  public  against  the  injury  of  a  live  wire  hanging  down  on  a 


8G4  KEGI.IGENCE.  fOl-    12 

to  insure  safety/"  nor  in  nuisance.^^^  A  live  wire,  however,  is  ex- 
ceedingly dangerous.  So  that  proof  of  contact  therewith  and  con- 
sequent damages  makes  out  a  complete  case  of  prima  facie  negli- 
gence, and  throws  the  burden  on  the  defendant  to  show  that  such 
wire  was  in  the  streets  without  fault  on  his  part.**^  G-enerally, 
companies  using  electricity  on  lines  along  a  street  are  charged 
with  the  highest  degree  of  care,  having  due  reference  to  existing 
knowledge,-*'  in  the  construction,  inspection,  and  repair  of  their  wires 
and  poles,  and  in  use  of  devices  to  guard  against  harm.^**  In  the 
leading  case  of  Cumberland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  United  Electric  Ry. 
Co.,^*^  it  was  specifically  held  that,  in  the  present  state  of  elec- 

sidewalk.  As  to  absolute  liability,  Kankakee  El.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wbittemore,  45 
111.  App.  484. 

240  Tbe  English  courts  would  consistently  class  such  cases  witb  Rylands  v. 
Fletcber,  L.  R.  3  H.  L.  330.  In  that  case  Kekewich,  J.  (in  National  Tel.  Co. 
V.  Baker  [1893]  2  Ch.  186),  states  the  principle  to  be  that  "if  the  owner  of  land 
uses  it  for  any  purpose  which,  from  its  character,  may  be  called  'nonnatural 
user,' — such  as,  for  example,  the  introduction  onto  the  land  of  something 
which  in  the  natural  condition  of  the  land  is  not  upon  it,— he  does  so  at  his 
peril,  and  is  liable  if  sensible  damage  results  to  his  neighbor's  land,  or  if  the 
latter's  legitimate  enjoyment  of  his  land  is  thereby  materially  cm-tailed." 

2"  3  Minn.  Law  J.  54,  comparing  Cumberland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co,  v.  United 
El.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Fed.  284,  with  Hudson  River  Tel.  Co.  v.  Watervliet  Turnpike 
&  Ry.  Co.,  135  N.  Y.  393-409,  32  N.  E.  148. 

242  Uggla  v.  West  End.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  160  Mass.  351,  35  N.  E.  1126.  Compare 
Hector  v.  Boston  Electric  Light  Co.,  161  Mass.  558,  37  N.  E.  773;  Haynes  v. 
Raleigh  Gas  Co.,  114  N.  C.  203,  19  S.  E.  344. 

243  It  is,  therefore,  a  question  of  fact,  for  the  jury,  whether  a  company 
operating  an  electric  railroad  is  negligent  in  not  maintaining  a  guard  wire 
over  its  trolley  wire,  so  as  to  prevent  a  fallen  telephone  wire  from  resting  on 
its  trolley  wire,  and  becoming  charged  with  the  trolley  current,  to  the  injury 
of  one  driving  along  the  street.  Block  v.  Milwaukee  St.  Ry.  Co.,  89  Wis. 
371,  61  N.  W.  1101. 

244  Haynes  v.  Raleigh  Gas  Co.,  114  N.  C.  203,  19  S.  E.  344;  Arkansas  Tel. 
Co.  V.  Ratteree,  57  Ark.  429,  21  S.  W.  1059.  Concurrent  negligence  of  rail- 
way company  and  telegraph  company:  Electric  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shelton",  89  Tenn. 
423,  14  S.  W.  863;  DUlingham  v.  Crank,  87  Tex.  104,  27  S.  W.  93.  A  review 
•of  recent  decisions  caused  by  the  great  advances  in  the  use  of  telegraph  and 
telephone  wires,  and  by  the  increase  of  litigation  with  reference  to  the  rights 
and  wrongs  connected  with  such  use,  will  be  found  in  58  J.  P.  617. 

2«  Cumberland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  United  El.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Fed.  273. 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  865 

trical  science,  a  telephone  company  cannot  maintain  a  bill  for 
an  injunction  against  the  operation  of  an  electric  railway  to  pre- 
vent damages  incidentally  sustained  by  escape  of  elortricity  from 
its  rails.  However,  the  supreme  court  of  Tennessee  -*^  held  that 
when  a  telephone  company,  already  in  operation,  is  injured  by  the 
effects  of  the  more  powerful  electric  current  used  by  a  trolley  com- 
pany operating  on  the  street  on  which  the  wires  of  the  telephone 
company  are  placed,  by  reason  of  the  trolley  current  invading  the 
telephone  exchange  and  the  houses  of  subscribers,  the  trolley  com- 
pany is  liable  for  the  damage  done  to  the  business  of  the  tele- 
phone company;  and  none  the  less  so  because  the  latter  did  not 
obviate  the  effects  of  conduction  by  making  the  necessary  changes 
in  its  plant.  Being  first  on  the  ground,  it  was  not  bound  to  make 
such  change. 

Summary. 

The  common-law  duty  to  exercise  care  to  avoid  doing  harm  to 
others  may  be  derived  from  the  ownership,  (iisfody.  control,  or 
use  of  instrumentalities  which  may  of  necessity,  or  in  reason- 
able probability,  inflict  damage.  In  determining  liability  for  in- 
juries caused  by  such  instrumentalities,  the  courts  have  not  thor- 
oughly distinguished  whether  such  liability  is  to  be  referred  to 
principles  governing:  (a)  nuisance;  (b)  duty  to  insure  safety;  (c) 
negligence;  or  (d)  malicious  wrongs.^^^  More  specifically  (and 
leaving  malicious  wrongs  out  of  view)  accumulations  of  water, 
things  of  weight,  fire,  explosives,  poisons,  wild  or  vicious  animals^ 
have  been  regarded  from  the  point  of  view  of  nuisance,  negligence, 
and  absolute  duty  to  keep  safe;    while  things  in  motion  and  elec- 

246  Cumberland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  United  El.  Ry.  Co.  (Tenn.)  29  S.  W.  10-i. 
"This  commends  itself  to  the  justice,  as  well  as  the  judgment,  of  mankind,  far 
better  than  the  contrary  position  taken  by  the  Ohio  courts  in  Cincinnati  In- 
clined Plane  Ry.  Co.  v.  City  &  Suburban  Telegraph  Ass'n,  48  Ohio  St.  390,  27 
N.  B.  890,  or  the  refusal  of  the  supreme  court  of  New  York  to  enjoin  the  erec- 
tion of  an  electric  road  (Hudson  River  Tel.  Co.  v.  Watervliet  Turnpike  &  Ry. 
Co.,  135  N.  y.  393,  32  N.  E.  148),  which  was  followed  in  National  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Baker  [1893]  2  Ch.  186."  And  see  a  short  article  on  the  liability  for  escape 
of  electricity,  with  citations  of  the  most  recent  cases,  by  E.  W.  Huffcut,  in  1 
N.  Y.  Law  Rev.  56. 
2  47  Ante,  c.  9. 

LAW  OF  Tonxs— 55 


8(36  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

tricity  are  gem-rally  regaided  from  the  point  of  view  of  either  neg- 
lifVenoe  or  niiisanrc. 

The  English  rule  is"*  essentially  as  follows:  Irresponsible  in- 
struments may  be  such  as  are  not  dangerous  apart  from  the  con- 
duct of  the_  keeper  or  user  of  them,  and  such  as  are  dangerous  in 
themselves.  Everything  is  deemed  dangerous  to  rights  which  ei- 
ther causes  actual  damage  thereto,  or  which  does  so  in  the 
absence  of  a  degree  of  care  and  prudence  the  continual  exercise 
of  which  cannot  be  expected.  As  to  things  not  dangerous  in  them- 
selves, the  owner  or  keeper  is  not  held  responsible  for  harm  caused 
thereby,  provided  he  does  not  know  of  the  mischief  or  danger,  or 
only  Knows  of  it  as  existing  in  certain  circumstances,  and  the  harm 
that  occurs  does  not  arise  from  these  circumstances,  and  he  has 
taken  the  care  which  a  prudent  man  would  take  in  keeping  or 
using  such  thing  according  to  the  nature  and  properties  of  things 
of  its  class.  But  as  to  irresponsible  instrumentalities  dangerous  in 
themselves,  and  such  instrumentalities  which,  though  not  neces- 
sarily or  ordinarily  in  this  class,  are,  and  are  known  actually  or 
by  imputation  of  law  to  the  owner  or  keeper  to  be,  dangerous  to 
rights,  the  dutj'  imposed  on  the  owner  or  keeper  is  not  to  harm; 
and  harm  done,  however  careful  he  may  have  been  to  avoid  It,  is 
still  imputed  to  him  as  an  effect  arising  from  his  having  risked  the 
chance  of  harm  occurring  from  the  instrumentality  employed  by 
him.  This  doctrine  is  largely  modified,  and  is  subject  to,  at  least, 
the  following  exceptions :  (a)  The  act  of  (lod  or  vis  major ;  (b)  the 
wrongful  interference  of  third  persons;  (c)  the  plaintiff's  own 
fault;  (d) . artificial  work  maintained  for  the  common  benefit  of 
llie  plaintiff  and  the  defendant  (as  in  Carstairs  v.  Taylor);   and 

248  The  matter  following  is  substantially  in  the  language  of  Mr.  Innes 
frorts,  pp.  73-92).  In  chapter  12,  under  title  "Duties  of  Insuring  Safety,'^ 
Mr.  Pollock  discusses  the  subject  with  eminent  clearness  and  ability.  See, 
also.  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  333,  and  Pig.  Torts,  107,  for  further  English  cases 
on  the  subject.  Jackson  v.  Smithson,  15  Jlees.  &  W.  503,  15  Law  J.  Bxch. 
311;  Card  v.  Case,  5  C.  B.  G22  (compare  Popplewell  v.  Pierce,  10  Gush. 
.509);  Farrant  v.  Barnes,  11  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  553;  Williams  v.  Clough,  3  Hurl.  & 
N.  258;  Assop  V.  Yates,  2  Hurl.  &  N.  7GS;  Powell  v.  Fall,  5  Q.  B.  Div.  597. 
As  to  damage  incident  to  authorized  act,  Madras  Ky.  v.  Zemindar, of  Car- 
Tcliiiagarum,  supra. 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  867 

<e)  where,  by  virtue  of  a  custom,  there  is  damnum  absque  injuria 
<as  in  the  Zemindar  Case). 

The  American  courts  hare  only  partially,  and  by  no  means  uni- 
formly, accepted  these  views.  They  incline  to  test  liability,  un- 
der such  circumstances,  by  principles  of  negligence;  to  hold  the 
owner  and  keeper  of  such  instrumentalities  to  the  exercise  of  a 
proportionately  high  degree  of  care;  and  to  recognize  the  produc- 
tion of  damage  by  such  instrumentalities  as  prima  facie  evidence 
of  wrongdoing. 

252.  What  is  due  care  under  the  circumstances  may  have 
reference  to  a  person's  kno-wledge  of  the  danger. 
Kno\«rledge  of  danger  may  be  either  actual  or  pre- 
sumed by  lavtr. 

Knowledge. 

The  duty  to  take  care  "must  be  determined  in  all  cases  by  refer- 
ence to  the  situation  and  knowledge  of  the  parties  and  all  the  at- 
tendant circumstances.  What  would  be  extreme  care  under  one 
condition  of  knowledge  and  one  state  of  circumstances  would  be 
gross  negligence  with  different  knowledge  and  in  changed  circum- 
stances." ^*''  "Facts  which  were  known  to  the  defendant,  or  by  use 
of  proper  diligence  would  have  been  known  to  a  man  in  his  place, 
come  into  account  as  part  of  the  circumstances"  ^'°  which  deter- 
mine due  care.  Knowledge  of  facts  out  of  which  a  duty  springs  is 
especially  an  element  to  be  considered  in  determining  the  care  to  be 
exercised  in  the  use  of  some  mechanical  ^"^  or  natural  agency  ^^^ 

249  Nitroglycerine  Case,  15  'V^'all.  524. 

2  50  Pol.  Torts,  356.  That  plaintiff  had  never  ridden  on  electric  car  before 
may  be  proved,  to  show  cause  of  failure  to  alight  from  car  in  safety.  Au- 
gusta Ry.  Co.  V.  Glover,  92  Ga.  132,  18  S.  E.  406.  And,  generally,  see  Griffin 
V.  Auburn,  58  N.  H.  121-124;    Robinson  v.  Cone,  22  Vt.  213. 

251  As  an  elevator.     Smith  v.  Whittier,  95  Cal.  279,  30  Pae.  529. 

252  A  knowledge  of  the  ground  upon  which  a  dam  is  constructed.  Hoffman 
V.  Tuolumne  Water  Co.,  10  Cal.  413.  It  is  on  the  sam*  principle  that  scienter 
must  be  alleged  and  sho^^■n  to  attach  liability  to  owner  or  keeper  of  domestic 
animals.  As  to  this  there  is  also  a  principle  involved  in  the  Dynamite  Case, 
ante,  p.  847,  "Explosions." 


868  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

whose  superior  force  demands  skill  in  its  management  to  prevent 
its  getting  beyond  ordinary  control. 

On  the  same  principle,  the  owner  of  places  likely  to  be  dangerous 
to  an  innocent  third  party  may  be  held  liable  for  not  keeping  them 
safe,  if  he  knew,  or  ought  to  have  known,  their  dangerous  condition. 
The  possibility  of  harm  puts  on  him  the  duty  of  keeping  them  in 
proper  condition.  His  knowledge  of  the  condition,  therefore,  may 
be  actual  or  constructive.  This  is  well  illustrated  in  the  liability  of  a 
municipal  corporation  for  the  defective  and  dangerous  condition  of 
its  street.  If  it  has  not  actual  knowledge  of  such  condition,  notice 
may  be  imputed  to  it.-^*  In  the  absence  of  actual  notice,  however,  it 
is  liable  for  only  suih  defects  in  its  sidewalks  and  streets  as  are 
apparent  or  are  suggested  by  appearance,  or  are  disclosed  by  a  test 
in  the  nature  of  the  ordinary  use  of  such  streets  or  walks.^^*  Thus, 
the  presence  of  a  guide  rope  for  two  days  and  nights  over  a  fashion- 
able and  crowded  thoroughfare  is  sufficient  to  justify  the  inference 
of  notice,  by  lapse  of  time,  to  the  city  authorities.''^'  Even  nine 
hours  has  been  held  suflflcient  time  in  which  to  discover  and  remedy 

253Lindholm  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  19  Minn.  245  (Gil.  204);  2  Thomp.  Neg. 
762,  note  5.  And  see  City  of  Austin  v.  Colgate  (Tex.  Oiv.  App.)  27  S.  W. 
syii;  Loberg  v.  Town  of  Amherst,  87  Wis.  634,  58  N.  W.  1048;  Butler  v. 
Town  of  Malvern  (Iowa)  59  N.  W.  50;  Riddle  v.  Village  of  Westfield,  65  Hun, 
432,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  359.  A  petition  to  a  village  board  for  a  new  sidewalk 
seven  feet  wide  in  place  of  one  four  feet  wide  does  not  show  knowledge  by 
the  board  of  defects  existing  in  the  old  walk  six  months  later.  Barrett  v. 
Village  of  Hammond,  87  Wis.  054,  58  N.  W.  1053. 

2  64  Montgomery,  J.,  dissenting.  Hembling  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  99 
Mich.  292,  58  N.  W.  310;  Moore  v.  City  of  Minneapolis,  19  Minn.  300  (Gil. 
258).  A  petition  that  alleges  that  defendant  city,  at  the  date  of  the  injurj' 
complained  of,  and  for  a  long  time  prior  thereto,  negligently  permitted  a 
street  railroad  to  be  maintained  on  a  street  so  as  to  dangerously  obstruct 
travel,  is  sufficient,  in  the  absence  o"f  a  demurrer  or  motion,  to  charge  defend- 
ant with  notice.  Union  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stone,  54  Kan.  83,  37  Pac.  1012.  in 
an  action  for  injuries  caused  by  a  defective  sidewalk,  evidence  showing  the 
condition  of  the  walk  in  the  vicinity  is  admissible  to  charge  the  city  witli 
notice  of  the  defect.  Edwards  v.  Common  Council  of  Village  of  Three  Riv- 
ers (Mich.)  60  N.  W.  454;  Lynch  v.  Hubbard,  101  Mich.  43,  59  N.  W.  443; 
Smith  V.  City  of  Rochester  (Sup.)  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  539. 

2  55  City  of  Chicago  v.  Fowler,  60  111.  322.  Seven  days  is  not  sufficient- 
City  of  Chicago  v.  McCarthy,  75  111.  602. 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  869 

a  dangerous  d(?fect  on  a  much-traveled  highway.^"  What  length 
of  time  is  enough  to  impute  notice  wiiere  there  is  no  actual  notice  is  a 
question  to  be  decided  in  view  of  all  circumstances,  ordinarily  by 
the  jury,  but  sometimes  by  the  court."' 

So  the  knowledge,  actual  or  constructive,  of  a  master  as  to  ap- 
pliances,^''^ place,^'''  or  improper  fellow  servants,^""  may  be  ma- 
terial to  Ms  negligence.^"  So,  one  who,  with  knowledge,  actual 
or  constructive,  of  danger,  goes  into  a  dangerous  place,  assumes  the 

2  56  Stellwagen  v.  City  of  Winona,  54  Minn.  460,  56  N.  W.  51.  A  village 
which  has  granted  the  right  to  construct  a  street  railroad  is  chargeable  with 
knowledge  of  what  is  being  done  under  the  grant,  and  therefore  is  liable  for 
injuries  caused  by  an  excavation  left  at  night  without  signal  lights  or  guards, 
though  the  excavation  was  made  on  the  day  of  the  injury.  Hoyer  v.  "Village 
of  North  Tonawanda  (Sup.)  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  650. 

2  0T  Kirk  V.  Village  of  Homer  (Sup.)  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  1009;  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Fowler,  and  cases  cited,  supra;  Loberg  v.  Town  of  Amherst,  87  Wis.  634,  58 
N.  W.  1048. 

2S8  Houston  V.  Brush,  66  Vt.  331,  29  Atl.  380.  Cf.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
James,  6  C.  O.  A.  217,  56  Fed.  1001;  Columbus,  H.  V.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ericli 
(Ohio  Sup.)  37  N.  B.  128  (under  statute);  Louisville  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Allen,  47 
111.  App.  465;  Haskins  v.  New  York  Cent  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  (Sup.)  29  N.  Y. 
Supp.  274  (blocking  of  frog). 

2  69  The  petition  in  an  action  against  a  railroad  company  for  injuries  to  an 
employe  resulting  from  a  defect  in  defendant's  roadbed,  alleged  to  have  been 
either  a  defect  in  original  construction,  or  caused  by  washing,  was  insufficient 
where  it  did  not  aver  that  defendant  had  notice  of  the  defect,  or  facts  show- 
ing that  it  had  existed  for  such  a  time  and  under  such  circumstances  that 
defendant  could  be  charged  with  notice.  Parrott  v.  New  Orleans  &  N.  E.  R. 
Co.,  62  F.  502.  Kansas  City,  il.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Burton,  97  Ala.  240,  12  South. 
88;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Earl's  Adm'x,  94  Ky.  368,  22  S.  W.  607;  Mur- 
phey  V.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  115  JIo.  Ill,  21  S.  W.  862;  O'Driscoll  v.  Faxon,  150 
Mass.  527,  31  X.  E.  0S.j;  Smith  v.  The  Serapis,  8  U.  S.  App.  49,  2  C.  C.  A.  102, 
51  Fed.  91.  And  see  -Wallace  v.  Ccutv.-il  Vt.  R.  Co.,  138  X.  Y.  302,  3S  N.  E. 
10C9;    Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Utz,  133  Ind.  265,  32  N.  E.  881. 

280  In  an  action  by  an  engineer  against  a  railroad  company  for  personal  in- 
juries caused  by  the  negligence  of  a  brakeman,  it  is  proper,  after  giving  evi- 
dence that  the  brakeman  had  been  drinking  just  before  the  accident,  to  show 
his  reputation  for  intemperance,  for  the  purpose  of  charging  defendant  with 
knowledge  of  his  intemperate  habits.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoover  (Md.) 
29  Atl.  994. 

281  The  master  is  charged  with  knowledge  which  he  actually  has,  and  such 
knowledge  as  he  ought  to  have  in  the  exorcise  of  reasonable  care  and  dili- 


870  KEGI.IGENCKj  [Ch.    12 

apparent  risk,  and  cannot  complain  of  consequent  injuries.^"^  In- 
deed, failure  to  recognize  obviouS  defects  may  be  negligence.'"''  No 
doubt,  if  a  man  voluntarily  runs  into  a  danger  which  he  fully  ap- 
preciates, in  common  cases  he  cannot  recover  for  it;  and  it  is 
rather  a  question  of  words  than  of  substance  whether  he  shall  be 
called  negligent  .or  shall  be  said  to  have  taken  the  risk.^"*  Thus  if 
a  patient  directs  an  operation  to  be  performed,  relying  on  his  own 
judgment,  a  surgeon  is  not  liable  for  the  injuries  resulting  there- 
from.^''^  But  a  man  does  not  take  a  risk  of  any  danger  which  may 
arise  from  certain  causes  merely  because,  in  a  general  way,  he  is 
aware  of  the  existence  of  these  causes.^*"  Nor  is  previous  knowl- 
edge of  danger  conclusive  evidence  of  contributory  negligence.     For 

gence  on  his  part  In  the  performance  of  his  duty  as  a  master.  Noyes  v. 
Smith,  28  Vt.  59;  Gibson  v.  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  46  Mo.  163;  Deering,  Neg.  §  200; 
3  Wood.  li.  R.  §  376. 

262  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Montgomery,  85  Tex.  64,  19  S.  W.  1015;  Platl 
V.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  84  Iowa,  694,  51  X.  W.  254;  Williams  V. 
City,  19  Can..  Sup.  Ct.  159.  But  see  Dollard  v.  Roberts,  130  N.  Y.  269,  29  N.  E. 
104.  And,  further,  see  Wright  v.  City  of  St.  Cloud,  54  Minn.  94,  55  N.  W.  819; 
Walker  v.  Town  of  Reidsville,  96  N.  C.  382,  2  S.  B.  74;  Miner  v.  Connecticut 
R.  R.  Co.,  153  Mass.  398,  20  N.  E.  994;  Town  of  Gosport  v.  Evans,  112  Ind.  133, 
13  N.  E.  256;  Clements  v.  Louisiana  Electric  Light  Co.,  44  La.  Ann.  692,  11 
South.  51;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Schmetzer,  94  Ky.  424,  22  S.  W.  603; 
Prewitt  V.  Eddy,  115  Mo.  283,  21  S.  W.  742.  Plaintiff's  decedent,  a  railroad 
brakeman,  was  struck  and  killed  by  a  skldway  near  the  track,  the  existence 
of  which  he  had  knowledge  of,  while  standing  on  the  step  of  a  passing  -cai% 
leaning  forward  and  looking  backward  and  under  the  car.  Held  that,  be- 
cause of  decedent's  contributory  negligence,  plaintiff  could  not  recover  for  his 
death  from  the  owner  of  the  skldway.  Walker  v.  Redington  Lumber  do.,  ffe 
Me.  191,  29  Atl.  979.  In  an  action  for  injuries  caused  by  a  defective  side- 
walk, where  plaintiff  knew  of  the  defect,  and  was  watching  for  it  when  In- 
jured, but  came  to  it  sooner  than  she  expected,  and  could  not  see  it  on  ac- 
count of  the  night  being  dark  and  stormy,  she  was  not,  as  a  matter  of  law, 
guilty  of  contributory  negligence.     Slas  v.  Village  of  Reed  City  (Mich.)  61  N. 

w.  .:i02. 

2  03  Allis  V.  Columbian  University,  19  D.  C.  270;  Boy  Ian  v.  Brown,  63  Hun, 
027,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  648. 

264  Miner  v.  Connecticut  R.  R.  Co.,  1.53  Mass.  398,  20  N.  E.  994. 

26n  Gramm  v.  Boener.  .56  Ind.  497;   Haucke  v.  Hooper,  7  Car.  &  P.  81. 

266  Holmes,  J.,  in  Powers  v.  City  of  Boston,  154  Mass.  60-63,  27  X.  E.  993, 
citing  Thomas  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  100  Mass.  156-158;  Baston  v.  Springfield, 
110  Mass.  131;  Dewire  v.  Bailey,  131  ilass.  109;  Lawless  v.  Connecticut  River 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  871 

example,  it  is  not  necessary  that  tlie  thouglits  of  a  .traveler  should 
at  all  times  be  fixed  on  a  defect  in  a  public  thoroughfare  of  which  he 
may  have  had  notice.^"'  It  has  been  clearly  recognized  by  the 
courts  that  knowledge  of  defect  or  danger  is  not  necessarily  appre- 
ciation of  risk.^''*  The  application  of  these  principles  is  very  com- 
monly made  to  cases  of  master  and  servant;  but  the  principles  are 
general.  On  similar  principles,  knowledge  of  danger,  even  to  a 
trespasser  or  wrongdoer,  creates  a  duty  of  avoiding  injury.^''^ 

253.  The  common-la-w  standard  of  diligence  is  absolute. 
It  does  not  vary  with,  the  ability  of  the  individual. 
The  individual  is  held  only  to  the  exercise  of  such 
care  as  can  be  reasonably  expected  of  persons  of 
the  recognized  class  to  v?^hich  he  belongs.  The  law 
recognizes  three  classes  of  persons,  as  to  capacity: 

(1)  Persons  deprived  of  reason,  as  a  child  or  lunatic. 

(2)  Persons  of  defective  capacity  or  sense. 

(3)  Ordinary  persons. 

It  is  insisted  that  one  of  the  essential  elements  of  negligence — a 
fortiori,  of  contributory  negligence — is  that  the  person  to  whom  it 

R.  Co.,  136  Mass.  1-5;  Ferren  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  143  Mass.  IS",  9  X.  E.  GOSf 
Kelly  v.  Blackstone,  147  JIass.  448-451,  18  N.  E.  217.     And  see  Texas  &  V. 
R.  Co.  v.  Volk,  451  IT.  S.  73,  14  Sup.  Ct.  239. 

287  City  of  Aurora  v.  Dale,  90  111.  46;  VillSige  of  Clayton  v.  Brooks,  31  111. 
App.  G2>  affirmed  150  111.  1)7,  37  N.  E.  574;  Cliiltcju  v.  City  of  Carbondale,  160 
Pa.  S  403,  28  Atl.  833;  Cumisky  y.  City  of  Kenosha,  87  AVis.  286,  58  N.  W. 
395.    ' 

268  Fitzgerald  v.  Paper  Co.,  155  Mass.  155,  29  N.  E.  404,  and  eases  collected, 
page  161,  155  Mass.,  and  page  464,  29  N.  E.  Post,  p.  1021,  "JIaster  and  Serv- 
ant." 

2  0  9  Ante,  e.  1:  Plaintiff  a  -wrongdoer.  Et  vide  Louisville,  N:  O.  &  T.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Williams,  69  Miss.  631,  12  South.  957;  Reardon  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry. 
C^o.,  114  Mo.  .384,  21  S.  W.  731;  Goodwin  v.  Railroad  Co.,  00  Ala.  44.j,  11 
South.  393;  AYren's  Adm'r  v.  Louisville,  St.  L.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  (Ky.)  20  S. 
AV.  215;  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mertes,  35  Nob.  204,  52  N.  AA'.  1099;  Norwood 
V.  Raleigh  &  G.  K.  Co.,  Ill  X.  C.  230,  10  8.  E.  4,  following  Lay  v.  Richmond 
&  D.  R.  Co.,  106  N.  C.  404,  11  S.  E.  412.  ■  Guenther  v.  Railway  Co.,  108  Mo. 
18,  18  S.  AA^  846;  Strudley  v.  Railway  Co.,  48  Minn.  249,  51  X.  AV.  115;  Geor- 
gia Railroad  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Daniel,  89  Ga.  463,  15  S.  E.  538. 


872  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

i«  to  be  attributed  should  be  legally  responsible.  This  follows 
necessarily  from  the  ^iew  that  negligence  means  a  state  of  the  par- 
ly's mind,  or  that  responsibility  for  torts  depends  upon  culpabili- 
ly.  The  courts,  irrespective  of  theories,  however,  have  clearly  rec- 
ognized the  doctrine  that  responsibility  is  graduated  according 
to  capacity,  and  determined  by  recognized  classes. 

As  will  be  seen,  children  non  sui  juris  cannot  have  contributory 
negligence  attributed  to  them.^^"  So  unconscious  agents^"  and 
lunatics — persons  entire!/  bereft  of  reason — cannot  be  held  respon- 
sible for  i)ersonal  negligence,  or  have  contributory  negligence  im- 
puted to  them.^^^  With  respect  to  children,  however,  there  comes 
a  period  at  which  the  child  is  responsible.  This  period  is  not  defi- 
nite, and  the  liability  is  graduated  according  to  experience.  "All 
the  cases  agree  that  the  measure  of  a  child's  responsibility  is  his 
capacity  to  see  and  appreciate  danger,  and  the  rule  is  that,  in  the 
absence  of  clear  evidence  of  the  lack  of  it,  he  will  be  held  to  such 
measure  of  discretion  as  is  usual  in  those  of  his  age  and  experi- 
ence." ^'^  The  measure  varies  with  the  course  of  each  additional 
year,  but  the  increase  of  responsibility  is  graduated.^'''  It  has, 
however,  been  held  to  be  within  the  limits  of  the  discretion  of  a 
trial  judge  to  admit  testimony  from  the  plaintiff's  former  school- 

2'oPost,  p.  987,  "Infants,"  note  717.  But  see  JIansan  v.  Atterton,  L.  R.  1 
Exch.  239. 

2T1  Parrot  v.  Wells,  15  Wall.  524;  Pierce  v.  Winsor,  2  Cliff.  18,  Fed.  Cas. 
No.  11,150;   Hoffman  v.  Water  Co.,  10  Cal.  413;   Todd  v.  Cocliell,  17  CaV  97. 

=7  2  16  Am.  &  Eng.  Ene.  Law,  40C,  subd.  6;  Whart.  Neg.  §  88;  Washington 
V.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  17  W.  Va.  190,  per  Green,  J. 

=  -".  HufC  V.  Ames,  16  Neb.  139,  19  N.  W.  623;  Beach,  Contrib.  Neg.  §  46; 
Shear.  &  R.  Neg.  §  73;  Whit.  Smith,  Neg,  p.  411;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Stout,  17 
^^'all.  Gri7. 

274  Mitchell,  J.,  in  Kehler  v.  Schwenk,  144  Pa.  St.  348,  22  AtL  910;  Green- 
way  V.  Conroy,  160  Pa.  St.  185,  28  Atl.  692;  Lay  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  34  Law 
T.  (N.  S.)  30;  EUdns  v.  Railroad  Co.,  115  Mass.  190;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Glad- 
mon,  15  Wall.  401;  Lynch  v.  Smith,  104  Mass.  52;  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
D(!nald,  152  U.  S.  262,  14  Sup.  Ct.  619;  Lynch  v.  Nurdin,  1  Q.  B.  29,  35,  36; 
Reed  V.  City  of  Madison,  83  Wis.  171,  53  N.  W.  547;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co. 
V.  Grablin,  38  Neb.  90,  56  N.  W.  796,  and  57  N.  W.  522;  Central  Railroad  & 
Banking  Co.  v.  Phillips,  91  Ga.  526,  17  S.  E.  952;  Omaha  &  R.  V.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Iilorgan,  40  Neb.  604,  59  N.  W.  81;  Powers  v.  Railway  Co.  (Minn.)  59  N. 
AV.  307;    Mitchell  v.  Tacoma  Ry.  &  Motor  Co.,  9  Wash.  120,  37  Pac.  341. 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  873 

teacher  that  she  was  an  unusually  dull  girl,  although  at  the  time 
of  trial  she  was  17  years  old.-"'^ 

The  care  which  a  person  defective  as  to  physical  sense  must  exer- 
cise has  reference  to  his  capacity,  to  the  actual  or  constructive  knowl- 
edge thereof  by  the  defendant,  and  his  consequent  exercise  "of  care 
with  reference  thereto.  A  blind  or  deaf  man  has  as  much  right  to 
walk  on  the  streets  as  any  other  man,^"'  but  he  must  exercise  more 
care  than  a  person  pliysically  sound.  Thus,  a  deaf  person  must 
be  more  careful  in  keeping  a  lookout  for  passing  vehicles  than  if 
his  hearing-  was  not  defective.^"  However,  a  blind  person,  falling 
into  a  hole  on  the  sidewalk  carelessly  left  open,  is  entitled  to  re- 
covery.^^'  But  one  having  notice  of  another's  defective  physical 
condition  must  exercise  corresponding  care  to  avoid  injuring  him.^'^ 
No  recovery  can  be  had  if  intoxication  was  the  cause  of  the  acci- 
dent. Indeed,  drunkenness  may  tend  to  show  contributory  negli- 
gence.^'" 

The  standard  of  care  adopted  by  the  courts  is  that  of  the  aver- 
age prudent  or  reasonable  man;  that  is,  of  a  man  of  ordinary  pru- 
dence in  the  nonexpert  degree,  or  a  good  business  or  professional 
man  in  his  specially  expert  degree.^*^    It  does  not  vary  with  the 

27  5  Connors  v.  Grilley,  15.j  Mass.  575,  30  N.  B.  218.  A  master's  duty  to  in- 
struct a  minor  servant  as  to  danger  of  employment  ia  which  he  is  to  be  en- 
gaged is  to  be  measured  by  the  circumstances  of  each  particular  case,  and 
not  by  the  knowledge  and  experience  of  ordinary  youth  of  the  same  age. 
Keller  v.  Gaskill,  9  Ind.  App.  679,  36  N.  E.  303. 

27  6  Pol.   Torts,  372,  373. 

27  7  Fenneman  v.  Holden,  75  Md.  1,  22  Atl.  1049 

=  7  8  City  of  Franklin  v.  Hartor,  127  Ind.  446,  26  N.  E.  882. 

279  As  to  giving  special  warning  of  blast  to  deaf  plaintiff,  see  City  of 
Champaign  v.  White,  38  111.  App.  233. 

2 so  Bish.  Noncont.  Law,  §  513;  1  Shear.  &  R.  Neg.  93;  Alger  v.  Lowell,  3 
Allen  (Mass.)  402;  Beach,  Contrib.  Neg.  66;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Cragin,  71 
111.  177;  Fitzgerald  v.  Town  of  Weston,  52  Wis.  355,  9  N.  W.  13;  Welty  v. 
Indianapolis  &  V.  R.  Co.,  105  Ind.  55,  4  N.  E.  410;  Buddenberg  v.  Transporta- 
tion Co.,  108  Mo.  394,  IS  S.  W.  970;  Hubbard  v.  Town  of  Mason  City,  60 
Iowa,  400,  14  N.  W.  772;  Brad  well  v.  Railway  Co.,  153  Pa.  St.  105,  25  Atl. 
023;  Monk  v.  Town  of  New  Utrecht,  104  X.  Y.  532,  11  N.  E.  268;  East  Ten- 
nessee &  W.  N.  C.  R.  Co.  V.  T^' inters,  S5  Tenn.  240,  1  S.  W.  790;  Fisher  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  39  W.  Va.  366,  19  S.  E.  578. 

281  Whart.  Neg.  §  48. 


874  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

judgment  of  an  individual.  That  a  man  acts  according  to  his  best 
judgment  is  no  defense.  In  Vaughan  v.  Menlove/*^  an  action  was 
held  to  lie  against  defendant  for  so  negligently  constructing  a  hay- 
rick on  his  own  land  that,  in  consequence  of  its  spontaneous  igni- 
tion, his  neighbor's  house  was  burned.  Tindall,  C.  J.,  said,  as  to 
the  ruling,  that  the  question  ought  to  have  been  whether  the  de- 
fendant had  acted  honestly  and  bona  fide,  to  the  best  of  his  own 
judgment.  "That,  however,  would  leave  so  vague  a  line  as  to  afford 
no  rule  at  all,  the  degree  of  judgment  belonging  to  each  individual  be- 
ing infinitely  various."  Accordingly,  neither  sex  -*^  nor  ignorance  ^^* 
nor  personal  ability  nor  skilP*^  affect  the  standard  of  duty.  On 
the  one  hand,  mental  absorption  or  reverie,  induced  by  grief  or 
business,  will  not  excuse  the  omission  to  look  and  listen  for  an 
approaching  train.-*"  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  a  man 
may  be  called  upon  to  act  without  opportunity  to  deliberate  is  to 
be  considered,  in  determining  what  is  care  under  the  circumstan- 
ces.^*' 

With  respect  to  contributory  negligence,  however,  the  theory  of 
the  law  is  not  consistent.  Nor  is  the  distinction  between  an  error 
of  judgment  and  negligence  easily  determined.  It  Is  certain  that 
mere  want  of  success,  where  there  has  been  the  exercise  of  one's  best 
judgment,  does  not  constitute  negligence.  "No  one  can  be  charged 
with  carelessness  when  he  does  that  which  his  judgment  approves 
of,  or  where  he  omits  that  of  which  he  has  no  time  to  judge.  Such 
action  or  omission,  if  faulty,  may  be  called  a  mistake,  but  not  neg- 

282  3  Bins;.  N.  C.  468-474.  And  see  Berg  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  83  Wis.  599, 
."i3  N.  AV.  SOO;  Com.  v.  Pierce,  138  Mass.  16.5;  Bailey,  J.,  in  Jones  v.  Bird, 
.J  Barn.  &  Aid.  837;  Worthington  v.  Mencer,  9G  Ala.  310,  11  South.  72. 

283  Simms  v.  South  Carolina  R.  Co.,  27  S.  C.  268,  3  S.  E.  301;  Ridenhour 
V.  Kansas  City  Cable  Ry.  Co.,  102  Mo.  270,  13  S.  W.  889,  and  14  S.  W.  760; 
Hassenyer  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  48  Mich.  205,  12  N.  W.  155. 

2 84  .Jones  V.  Fay,  4  Fost.  &  F.  525. 

285  Post,  p.  911  et  seq.,  "Physician  and  Attorney." 

286  Havens  v.  Erie  R.  Co..  41  N.  Y.  296;  Mann  v.  Stock- Yard  Co.,  128  Ind. 
138,  26  N.  E.  819. 

287  Defendant  gave  warning  of  approaching  cac  containing  lumber  by 
shouting  "Boy."  Plaintiff  relied  on  this,  was  absorbed  in  his  work,  signal 
was  not  given,  and  injury  occurred.  Held  not  contributory  negligence.  An- 
derson V.  Northern  Jlill  Co.,  52  Minn.  424,  44  N.  AV.  31.j. 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  STS' 

ligence."  ^^°  Accordinj^ly,  it  has  been  held  that  where  a  pilot,  iu 
the  exercise  of  his  best  judgment  and  skill,  piloted  a  vessel  to  its 
destruction,  he  is  not  liable  for  her  loss,  although  the  result  shows 
that  his  best  judgment  was  wrong. ^^^^  And  there  is  authority  for 
the  proposition  that  an  attorney  at  law  is  not  liable  if  he  acts  hon- 
estly, and  to  the  best  of  his  ability. 

254.  "What  is  due   care  under  the'  circumstances  is  deter- 
mined by  reference,  among  other  things,  to — 

(a)  Custom  and  usage  aflfecting  the  plaintiff's  conduct; 

(b)  Lticense  and  invitation. 

Among  the  circumstances  to  be  considered  in  determining  what 
is  negligence,  the  law  recognizes  existing  usage  and  custom.  The 
usage  and  custom  may  amount  to  almost  positive  law  (as  the  law  of 
the  road,  in  the  absence  of  statute), ^°^  or,  falling  short  of  this,  it  may 
depend  upon  general  business  usage  (as  in  the  case  of  landing  of 
steamboats),^^^  or  upon  the  general  practice  of  the  parties  in  the 
particular  case  at  issue  (as  use  of  a  path  by  licensee).^"^     Care, 

2  8  0  Brown  v.  French,  304  Pa.  St.  604;    Williams  v.  Le  Bar,  141  Pa.  St.  149, 
21  Atl.  .-i2.->. 
2  0  0  Mason  V.  Ervine,  27  Fed.  459.    Et  vide  The  Tom  Lysle,  48  Fed.  690. 
201  Post,  p.  877,  "Law  of  Koad." 

292  Thus,  plaintiff,  an  employe  of  a  Mississippi  steamer,  must  conform  to  a 
well-liuo^^'h  custom  of  landing.  He  assumes  the  risk  incident  thereto,  and,  if 
thereby  injured,  he  cannot  recover.  Red  River  Line  v.  Cheatham,  9  C.  C. 
A.  124,  00  Fed.  517,  overruling  56  Fed.  248.  So  as  to  a  ship  placed  in  peril 
by  another's  improper  navigation,  takes  a  wrong  course,  and  is  damaged. 
The  Bywell  Castle,  4  Prob.  Div.  219.  Care  to  be  exercised  with  reference 
to  a  switch  crossing  the  street  has  reference  to  its  ordinary  use.  Quirk  v.  St. 
Louis  United  Elevator  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  28  S.  W.  1080.  In  view  of  a  custom  of 
placing  unfinished  cars  on  a  side  track  to  be  completed,  the  presence  of  new 
cars  on  such  track  may  be  considered  by  a  jury  as  sufficient  notification  to 
those  in  charge  of  a  locomotive  on  the  track  that  workmen  were  probably 
enffa.i;ed  on  the  car.s  during  ordinary  working  hours.  Cleveland,  C.,  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Zider.  10  C.  0.  A.  151,  61  Fed.  908. 

293  Generally,  as  to  admission  of  evidence  as  to  habits  of  plaintiff,  defend- 
ant, and  employes,  see  Chicago,  St.  P.  &  K.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  47  111. 
App.  91;  Connors  v.  Morton,  160  Mass.  333,  35  N.  E.  860;  Kennedy  v.  Spring, 
160  Mass.  203,  35  N.  E.  779;  Toledo,  St.  L.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Bailey,  145  111. 
159,  33  N.  B.  1089;    Towle  v.  Pacific  Imp.  Co.,  98  Cal.  342,  33  Pac.  207;    Chi- 


876  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

with  reference  to  a  usage  or  custom,  is  sometimes  confused  with 
customary  or  usual  care,  but  the  two  things  are  entirely  distinct. 
On  the  one  hand,  if  a  person  exercises  usual  or  customary  care,  it 
may  be  evidence,  although  not  conclusive,  of  the  exercise  of  dili- 
gence.^"* On  the  other  hand,  he  must  exercise  care  with  reference 
to  a  usage  or  custom,  known  or  which  ought  to  be  known,  which 
custom  or  usage  may  affect  the  probability  of  harm  ensuing  from 
a  given  course  of  conduct. 

The  consideration  of  these  cases  is  intimately  connected  and  some- 
times identified  with  care  having  reference  to  conditional  permission, 
or  what  are  sometimes  called  "non-contractual  relations."  Such  con- 
sideration may  depend  upon  whether  the  plaintiff  is  a  licensee,  an  in- 
vited person,  or  a  mere  volunteer,  or  a  trespasser.  The  determination 
of  such  cases  does  not  rest  merely  upon  any  one  view  of  the  circum- 
stances, but  upon  them  all.  It  will  be  convenient  to  consider  these 
cases  as  follows :  First,  the  duty  to  persons  in  public  places ;  and, 
second,  the  duty  to  persons  on  the  defendant's  premises.  Duties 
peculiar  to  the  relationship  of  master  and  servant,  or  of  contractee 
and  common  carriers,  will  be  subsequently  considered^  under  "Con- 
tractual Duties."  Injuries  to  persons  in  public  places,  where  no  ques- 
tions as  to  exemptions  of  the  state,  or  municipal  or  similar  corpora- 
tions, are  involved,  constantly  arise  (a)  from  the  operation  of  en- 
gines, trains,  electric  cars,  and  the  like  over  crossings  and  on  streets ; 
(b)  from  the  ordinary  use  of  highways  by  driving,  riding,  and  the 
like;  and  (c)  from  some  act  of  the  defendant  making  a  highway 
dangerous  and  unsafe. 

cago,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Spilker,  134  Ind.  380,  33  N.  B.  280,  and  34  N.  E. 
218;   Jagger  v.  Bank,  53  Minn.  386,  55  N.  W.  545. 
294  Day  v.  H.  C.  Akeley  Lumber  Co.,  54  Minn.  522,  56  N.  W.  243. 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  "       87" 

255.  Due  care  requires  that,  as  to  public  highways,  own- 
ers, drivers,  or  keepers  of  vehicles  or  horses,  and 
travelers  regard — 

(a)  The  custom  or  law  of  the  road;^^' 

(b)  The   danger   likely  to  result  from  ordinary  and   ex- 

traordinary use. 

The  owner,  driver,  or  rider  ^^^  of  horses  being  driven  or  ridden 
along  a  highway  is  bound  to  exercise  that  care  which  a  reasonably 
prudent  person  uses  in  the  management  of  the  ordinary  affairs  of 
life.  There  can  be  no  liability  unless  there  is  negligence  or  willful 
misconduct  on  the  part  of  rider  or  driver.^"^ 

"Foot  passengers  have  equal  rights  in  the  streets  with  those 
mounted  on  horseback,  or  driving  in  carriages.  Neither  can  have  a 
priority  of  right  over  the  other.  Both  are  bound  to  exercise  reason- 
able care  to  avoid  collision."  "^^  A  bicyclist  stands  in  the  same  po- 
sition.-"'  But  a  bicycle,  ordinarily,  may  not  lawfully  be  used  on  a 
sidewalk.^""  With  respect  to  damages  to  pedestrians,  or  from  col- 
lisions Avith  other  vehicles,  the  liability  is  governed  by  the  ordinary 
considerations  of  fact,  and  by  reference  to  the  law  of  the  road.  The 
rights  and  obligations  of  pedestrians  and  driver  are  correlative,  and 

2^5  A  short  article  ou  the  "Law  of  the  Road,"  by  Israel  H.  Peres,  will  be 
found  in  4  Yale  Law  J.  137. 

29  6  The  rule  of  the  road  applies  as  well  to  saddle  horses  as  to  vehicles.  Tur- 
ley  V.  Thomas,  8  Oar.  &  P.  103. 

297  Silsby  V.  Michigan  Car.  Co.,  95  Mich.  204,  54  N.  W.  7G1.  Compare 
Barnes  v.  Brown,  95  Mich.  576,  55  N.  W.  439;  Holmes  v.  Mather,  L.  R.  10 
Exeh.  261  (Bramwell,  B.):  "As  to  the  cases  cited,  most  of  them  are  really 
decisions  on  the  form  of  action,  whether  case  or  trespass.  The  result  of  them 
is  this  (and  it  is  intelligible  enough):  If  the  act  which  does  the  injury  is  an 
act  of  direct  force,  vi  et  armis,  trespass  is  the  proper  remedy  (if  there  is 
any  remedy),  where  the  act  is  wrongful,  either  as  being  willful  or  as  being 
the  result  of  negligence.  Where  the  act  is  not  wrongful  for  either  of  these 
reasons,  no  action  is  maintainable.  That  is  the  effect  of  the  decisions."  It 
would  seem  that  this  case  overrules  Michael  v.  Alestree,  2  Lev.  172. 

298  Stringer  v.  Frost,  116  Ind.  477,  19  N.  E.  331;   Beltou  v.  Baxter,  .54  N.  Y. 

245. 

299  Thompson  v.  Dodge  (Minn.)  60  N.  "W.  .jJ:..     And  see  47  Alb.  Law  J.  404. 

300  Mercer  v.  Corbin,  117  Ind.  450,  20  N.  E.  132. 


878  NKGLIGENCE.  [Oh.    12 

each  owes  the  other  a  duty  to  avoid  accidents.'"^  Among  considera- 
tions of  fact  there  should  be  considered  rate  of  speed  at  which  the 
horse  is  going,  tlie  harness  and  other  tackle  with  which  it  is  pro- 
vided, the  attention  of  the  driver,  and  similar  matters.'"^  The  com- 
mon American  law  of  the  road,  requiring  persons  to  turn  to  the 
right  in  traveling  upon  the  highway  or  street,^"^  and  not  on  diagonal 
crossing,''"  applies  only  when  there  is  a  contingency.  The  traveler 
or  driver  is  not  obliged  to  turn  to  the  right  rather  than  to  the  left 
unless  he  is  about  to  meet  or  pass  another  person  or  vehicle.^"^ 
But  then  traveling  on  the  wrong  side  of  a  road  may  be  such  con- 

301  Reens  v.  Mail  &  Express  Pub.  Co.,  10  Misc.  Rep.  122,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  913; 
Bckensberger  v.  Amend,  10  Misc.  Rep.  145,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  915. 

302  "Evidence  that  the  driver  of  an  express  wagon  drove  at  a  trot,  looking 
at  the  stores  along  one  side  of  the  street  for  business,  without  observing  or 
managing  his  team  with  reference  to  pedestrians  using  the  crossing,  shows 
negligence."  Thompson  v.  National  Exp.  Co.,  66  Vt.  358,  29  Atl.  Sll.  Whether 
a  driver  of  a  wagon  at  a  street  crossing  could  resume  his  course,  after  check- 
ing his  horse  to  allow  a  foot  passenger  to  get  out  of  the  v?ay,  without  negli- 
gence, is  for  the  jury.  Crowley  v.  Strouse  (Cal.)  33  Pac.  456.  Compare 
Menger  v.  Lauer,  55  N.  J.  Law,  205,  26  Atl.  180.  Et  vide  Post  v.  United 
States  Exp.  Co.,  76  Mien.  574,  43  N.  W.  636;  Cotton  v.  Wood,  8  C.  B.  (N.  S.) 
568i;  Orr  v.  Garabold,  85  Ga.  373,  11  S.  E.  778;  Perrins  v.  Devendorf,  22 
111.  App.  284;  Landa  v.  McDermott  (Tex.  Sup.)  16  S.  W.  802.  Racing  along 
a  highway  is  not  per  se  negligence.  Potter  v.  Moran,  61  Mich.  60,  27  N.  W. 
854.  Compare  Middlestadt  v.  Morrison,  76  Wis.  265,  44  N.  W.  1103.  Im- 
proper speed  is  evidence  of  negligence.  Schwartz  v.  Brahm,  130  Pa.  St.  411. 
18  Atl.  643.  •  Compare  Keck  v.  Sandford  (City  Ct.  N.  Y.)  22  N.  Y.  Sup.  78. 
The  question  of  speed  and  caution  is  of  special  importance  at  crossings. 
Williams  v.  Richards,  3  Car.  &  K.  81.  Pulling  a  wrong  rein  is  evidence  of 
negligence,  Wakeman  v.  Robinson,  1  Bing.  213;  or  spurring  a  horse  which  is 
within  kicking  distance  of  plaintiff,  North  v.  Smith,  10  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  572.  As  to 
tackle,  Welsh  v.  Lawrence,  2  Chit.  262.  The  Scottish  law  on  this  subject  will 
be  found  discussed  in  6  Sc.  Law  Rep.  121. 

30  3  Earing  v.  Lansingh,  7  Wend.  185. 

3  04  The  law  of  the  road  does  not  regulate  the  manner  in  which  persons  shall 
drive  when  they  meet  at  the  junction  of  two  streets.  Norris  v.  Saxton,  158 
Mass.  46,  32  N.  E.  054.  In  England  the  law  of  the  road  is  to  turn  to  the 
left.     7  Green  Bag,  96. 

305  Brember  v.  Jones  (N.  H.)  30  Atl.  411;  Parker  v.  Adams,  12  Mete.  (Mass.) 
41.5-119;  Brooks  v.  Hart,  14  N.  H.  307;  Johnson  v.  Small,  5  B.  Mon.  25; 
Lovejoy  v.  Dclan,  10  Cush.  495;   Damon  v.  Scituate,  119  Mass.  66-68. 


€h.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  879 

tributory  negligence  as  to  bar  recovery  for  damage  done.^""^  If, 
however,  for  courtesy  or  other  reasons,  a  driver  waives  his  right 
of  way,  and  goes  to  the  left  side  of  the  road,  this  does  not  exonerate  a 
wrongdoer  who  caused  a  dangerous  place  to  exist  in  the  road.^"^ 
It  is  not  itself  negligence  to  drive  a  wagon  on  the  left  of  the  trav- 
eled part  of  the  road;  but  this  is  a  cireuinstauce  to  be  considered, 
in  connection  with  everything  else,  in  determining  whether  the 
driver  was  reasonably  careful."""  Moreover,  if  a  collision  can  be 
better  avoided  by  going  on  the  wrong  side,  it  is  not  merely  justi- 
fiable to  do  so,  but  obligatory."""  The  rule  is  the  same  where  a  light 
vehicle  gives  place  to  a  heavier  one,"'^°  or  where  the  right  side  of  the 
street  is  crowded  or  dangerous.'^^ 

And,  on  the  other  hand,  merely  because  one  may  have  the  right 
of  way,  he  is  not  authorized  to  run  another  down,  even  if  the  latter 
be  in  fault."^^ 

Care  of  horses  on  public  streets  has  due  reference  to  the  proba- 
bility of  harm  ensuing  to  other  users  of  the  highway  because  of 

306  Damon  v.  Scituate,  119  Mass.  66;  O'Malley  v.  Dom,  7  Wis.  204;  Norris 
V.  Litclifield,  35  N.  H.  271.  A  bicycle,  Randolph  v.  O'Riordon,  155  Mass.  331, 
29  N.  E.  583.  Et  vide  Scliimpf  v.  Sliter,  64  Hun,  403,  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  644; 
O'Neil  V.  Town  of  East  AVindsor,  63  Conn.  150,  27  Atl.  237;  Thoresen  v. 
La  Crosse  City  Ry.  Co.,  87  Wis.  597,  58  N.  W.  1051. 

307  Atlanta  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Walker,  93  Ga.  462,  21  S.  B.  48. 

30  8  Meservey  v.  Lockett,  161  Mass.  332,  37  N.  E.  310,  citing,  inter  alia,  Lloyd 
V.  Ogleby,  5  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  667;  Cotterill  v.  Starkey,  8  Car.  &  P.  691.  In 
driving  from  one  side  to  the  other  of  a  street  in  which  a  railroad  track  is 
laid,  it  is  not  negligence  as  a  matter  of  law  to  cross  the  track  obliquely. 
Lynch  v.  Village  of  New  Rochelle,  78  Hun,  207,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  962.  Peculiar 
care  must  be  exercised  by  the  person  not  driving  on  the  regular  side  of 
the  road.  Pluckwell  v.  Wilson,  5  Car.  &  P.  375;  Lack  v.  Seward,  4  Car.  & 
P.  106.  Generally,  see  Spurrier  v.  Front  St.  Cable  Ry.  Co.,  3  Wash.  St.  659, 
29  Pac.  346;  O'Neil  v.  Town  of  East  Windsor,  63  Conn.  150,  27  Atl.  2;:!7;  Riepe 
V.  Elting  (Iowa)  56  N.  W.  285;  Randolph  v.  O'Riordan,  155  Mass.  331,  29  N. 
E.  5S3. 

309  Clay  V.  Wood,  5  Esp.  44;  Schimpf  v.  Sliter,  64  Hun,  463,  19  N.  Y.  Supp. 
644. 

310  Grier  v.  Sampson,  27  Pa.   St.  183. 

811  Mooney  v.  Trow  Directory  Printing  &  Bookbinding  Co.,   2  Misc.   Kep. 
238,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  957. 
312  Ante,  p.  195. 


880  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

runaways.'"  Leaving  a  horse  unattended  is  evidence  of  negligence, 
and  mar  in  itself  support  an  inference  of  negligence.'^^  Indeed,  it 
is  insisted  that  leaving  a  horse  unhitched  and  unattended  in  a  street 
is  prima  facie  evidence  of  negligence,  to  be  rebutted  by  showing 
there  were  circumstances  of  excuse  or  justification.'^''  But  the  li- 
ability of  the  OMuer  or  keeper  is  determined  by  principles  of  negli- 
gence. There  is  no  duty  to  insure  nafety.  And  a  person  is  not 
liable  for  damage  done  by  a  runaway  unless  fault  can  be  traced  to 
jjjjQ  316  rpj^g  j,j^j,g  -j-Q  i^g  exercised  to  prevent  it  depends  on  the  char- 
acter of  the  horse,  and  of  the  surroundings,  including  the  neighbor- 
hood, the  atmosphere,  and  the  like.  On  the  same  principle,  ordi- 
nary care  and  watchfulness  in  crossing  a  street  must  be  exer- 
cised. And,  while  not  bound  to  use  the  regular  crossings  exclu- 
sively, one  should  exercise  unusual  caution  if  he  crosses  at  an  unu- 
sual place.' ^' 

313  Phillips  V.  Dewald,  79  Ga.  732,  7  S.  E.  151,  and  cases  cited;  McMahon  v. 
Kelly  (City  Ct.  Brook.)  9  N.  Y.  Siipp.  544;  Grittith  v.  Clift,  4  Utah,  462,  11 
Pac.  609. 

314  Broult  v.  Hanson,  158  Mass.  17,  32  N.  E.  900.  It  is  negligence  per  se 
to  leave  a  horse  standing  unfastened  and  unattended  at  a  railroad  station. 
Edwards  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.,  148  Pa.  St.  531,  23  Atl.  894.  Et  vide 
Gilmore  v.  Federal  St.  &  P.  V.  Pass.  Ry.,  153  Pa.  St.  31,  25  Atl.  651.  One 
who  leaves  unhitched  and  unattended,  within  19  feet  of  a  railroad  track,  a 
team  of  horses,  young,  high-lifed,  and  afraid  of  cars,  is  negligent  as  a  matter 
of  law.  Olson  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  81  Wis.  41,  50  N.  W.  412, 
1096.  Compare  Hill  v.  Scott,  38  Mo.  App.  370:  Hudson  v.  Houser,  123  Ind. 
809,  24  N.  E.  243. 

316  Henry  v.  Klopfer,  147  Pa.  St.  178,  23  Atl.  337,  338.  Compare  lUidge 
v.  Goodwin,  5  Car.  &  P.  190.  Post,  p.  951.  discussion  as  to  whether  or  not  an 
act  is  ever  negligent  for  the  court,  or  whether  it  is  evidence  of  negligence  for 
the  jury. 

318  Holmes  v.  Mather,  L.  R.  10  Exch.  261;  Brown  v.  Collins,  53  N.  H.  442; 
Sullivan  v.  Scripture,  3  Allen,  564;  Lynch  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co.,  52  Hun,  614, 
5  N.  Y.  Supp.  311;  O'Brien  v.  Miller,  60  Conn.  214,  22  Atl.  544;  Thorp  v. 
Minor,  109  N.  C.  152,  13  S.  E.  702;  Hammack  v.  White,  11  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  5S8; 
Manzonl  v.  Douglas,  6  Q.  B.  Dir.  145;  Riepe  v.  Elting  (Iowa)  56  N.  W.  285. 
Compare  Luedtke  v.  Jeffery,  89  Wis.  136,  61  N.  W.  292. 

318  Henry  v.  Grand  Ave.  R.  Co.,  113  Mo.  525,  21  S.  W.  214. 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  881 

356.  Care  to   be  exercised   at  level  railroad  crossings  has 
reference — 

(a)  To  the  conduct  on  the  part  of  railroad  company  jus- 

tifying the  assumption  that  the  line  is  clear. 

(b)  To  arrangements  and  surroundings  aflfecting  ability 

to  ascertain  -whether  the  lines  are  clear.  ^'^ 
Conduct  of  Riiilroitd  Companies. 

Thus,  if  a  railroad  company  voluntarily  establishes  a  gate  at  a 
highway  crossing,  there  is  an  implied  assurance  that  the  tracks  mav 
be  safely  crossed  if  the  gates  are  open.  Accordingly,  leaving  them 
open  when  a  train  is  approaching  is  evidence  of  negligence.^^"  If  a 
railway  company  has  recognized  and  acquiesced  in  the  use  of  a  pri- 
vate crossing  over  its  tracks,  and  adopted  the  usual  signals  therefor 
on  the  approach  of  its  ti'ains,  it  cannot  lawfully  discontinue  the  sig- 
nals without  notice;  ^^^  and  it  is  immaterial  whether  the  requirement 

319  Pol.  Torts,  §  367. 

320  Wilson  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  (R.  I.)  29  Atl.  2.jS.  A  fortiori, 
where  the  gates  were  required  hj  city  ordinance,  ilissouri  Pae.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Hackett,  54  Kan.  316,  38  Pac.  294;  Evans  v.  Lake  Slioif  &  JI.  S.  R.  Co.,  88 
Mich.  442,  50  N.  W.  380;  Rhode  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  86  Wis.  309,  50 
N.  W.  872;  Gurley  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  122  .Mo.  141,  26  S.  W.  953  (open- 
ing between  cars  for  passer-by).  And  see  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 91  Ga.  466,  18  S.  E.  816;  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Carpenter,  5 
C.  C.  A.  551,  56  Fed.  451  (cattle  men  walking  on  top  of  cars);  Coif  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  87  Wis.  273,  58  N.  W.  408  (habit  of  employes  to  jump  off  moving 
cars  is  no  excuse);  Rumpel  v.  Railway  Co.  (Idaho)  35  Pac.  70(j  (uor  is  the 
habit  of  going  under  cars  which  block  the  street  an  excuse).  However,  it  is 
not  per  se  contributory  negligence  to  stop  a  train  in  accordance  with  long 
mutual  acquiescence  at  a  track  crossing,  where  a  collision  follows  througli 
failure  of  an  aijproaching  train  to  stoj)  A^ithin  50  feet  of  the  crossing  (Act 
Ky.  JIarch  10,  1894),  because  of  defective  brakes.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  9  0.  C.  A.  314,  60  Fed.  993.  Et  vide  Mat- 
thews V.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  R.,  161  Pa.  St.  28,  28  Atl.  930.  The  question 
of  implied  invitation  or  license  to  the  public  to  ci'oss  a  railroad  track  where 
there  is  no  highway  is  treated  in  a  Massachusetts  case  (Chenery  v.  Fitchburg 
R.  Co.,  35  N.  E.  5-")4)  with  somewhat  greater  strictness  than  in  other  ca.ses. 
holding  that  it  ca)i  only  arise  from  such  appearances  or  circumstance.s  as 
".onld  lead  ordinarily  prudent  and  intelligent  per.sons  to  understand  that  the 
crossing  waji  public. 

321  Westaway  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  liy.  Co.,  oC  Minn.  28,  :>T  N.  W.  222; 
Hinkle  v.  Railroad  Co.,  109  N.  C.  472,  13  S.  10.  884,  and  cases  cited,  affirmed 

LAW  OF  TOBTS — 56 


8S2  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

of  signals  is  statutory  or  merely  customary.^^^  And,  when  the 
trains  are  running  at  unusual  times  (as  on  Sunday),  particular  cau- 
tion on  approaching  a  crossing  must  be  exercised  by  those  in 
charge.^^^  Moreover,  circumstances  making  a  crossing  exceptional- 
ly dangorous,  as  where  a  much-used  highway  is  shut  off  from  the 
view  of  the  track,  may  justify  a  finding  by  a  jury  that  a  company 
is  negligent  in  not  providing  a  gate  and  a  flagman.^^*  And  while 
the  duty  in  approaching  a  crossing  with  a  train  or  engine  is  to  exer- 
cise commensurate,  and  not  the  highest,  care,^°°  it  is  a  breach  of 
•duty  to  back  a  train  of  flat  cars  over  a  crossing  in  the  suburbs  of  a 
city  on  a  dark  night  without  having  on  it  any  brakeman,  light,  or 
other  signal.^^^ 

Conduct  of  Travelers. 

It  is  negligence  per  se  on  the  part  of  a  traveler  to  disregard  the 
usual  rate  of  speed  and  the  times  at  which  trains  pass  over  a  given 
crossing.' ^^  It  is  his  clear  duty,  as  he  comes  or  goes  upon  a  railroad 
crossing,  to  use  every  reasonable  precaution  to  avoid  injury.     He 

Ward  v.  Railroad  Co.,  113  N.  C.  56C,  IS  S.  E.  211;  McGrath  v.  Railway  Co., 
(W  N.  Y.  022;  Pittsburgh,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  y.  Yundt,  78  Ind.  373;  Casey 
t".  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  78  N.  Y.  518.  Customary  speed,  Stiaber  v. 
Railway  Co.,  28  Minn.  103,  9  N.  W.  575.  Custom  at  yard  as  to  running  in 
■ears,  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Stoeliie,  104  111.  201. 

322  Yandewater  v.  Ke^Y  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.,  74  Hun,  32,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  397. 
Et  vide  Artz  v.  Railroad  Co.,  34  Iowa,  53.  So  as  to  a  gate,  Marfill  v.  S^uth 
Wales  Ry.  Co.,  8  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  525.  And  generally  see  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R. 
C!o.  V.  Sbelton,  55  N.  J.  Law,  342,  26  Atl.  937.  Compare  Vallance  v.  Boston  & 
,A.  R.  Co.,  55  Fed.  364;  Lahey  v.  lUilroad  Co.,  2  Misc.  Rep.  537,  22  N.  Y.  Supp. 
380,  distinguishing  Schmidt  v.  Railway  Co.,  132  N.  Y.  566,  30  N.  E.  389.  Owens 
T.  People's  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  155  Pa.  St.  334,  26  Atl.  748. 

323  Hyde  Park  v.  Gay,  120  Mass.  589.  Compare  Koehler  v.  Railway  Co.,  66 
Hun,  566,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  844.  Running  a  train  behind  schedule  time  does 
not  excuse  plaintiff's  failure  to  exercise  ordinary  care.  Jenkins  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  89  Ga.  756,  15  S.  E.  655. 

324  Hubbard  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  162  Mass.  132,  38  N.  E.  366. 

325  Chicago,  It.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Caulfleld,  11  C.  C.  A.  5-52,  63  Fed.  396. 

326  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sharp,  11  C.  C.  A.  337,  63  Fed.  532. 

32T  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Linn  (Ala.)  15  South.  508;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.  V.  Welch  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  1G6;  Elkins  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  115 
jNIass.  190;  Ketan  v.  Railway  Co.,  94  ilich.  146,  53  N.  W.  1094.  A  rail- 
road employe  is  negligent  in  not  keeping  a  lookout  for  customary  shunting  of 
cars.    Schaible  v.  Railway  Co.,  97  Mich.  318,  56  N.  W.  565. 


Cll.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  883 

should  look  both  ways.'^^  And  failure  or  delay  with  respect  to  cus- 
tomary or  statutory  signals  on  the  part  of  a  railroad  company  does 
not  exempt  himi  from  the  performance  of  this  duty  if  the  surround- 
ings are  such  as  to  admit  of  such  a  precaution.^  ^°  Any  one  who 
voluntarily  attempts  to  cross  a  track  in  front  of  a  moYing  train  ap- 
proaching the  crossing  at  no  considerable  distance,  where  there  is 
nothing  to  obscure  the  vision,  is  guilty  of  contributory  negligence, 

S28  Gorton  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  45  N.  Y.  06;  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Nefe,  87  Tex.  303,  28  S.  W.  283.  Compare  Pittsburg,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Burton  (Ind.  Sup.)  38  N.  E.  594. 

329  Failure  to  ring  bell  or  sound  whistle  does  not  exempt.  Chicago,  B.  & 
Q.  R.  Co.  V.  Harwood,  80  111.  88;  McGill  v.  Railway,  152  Pa.  St.  331,  25 
Atl.'540;  Wesley  v.  Railway  Co.,  84  Iowa,  441,  51  N.  W.  163;  Jennings  v. 
Railway  Co.,  112  Mo.  268,  20  S.  W.  490;  Cleveland,  C.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Craw- 
ford, 24  Ohio  St.  631;  Mann  v.  Stock- Yard  Co.,  128  Ind.  138,  26  N.  E.  819: 
Stubley  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  Exch.  13.  Where  it  is  a  phys- 
ical impossibility  for  plaintiff  not  to  see  defendant's  train  if  she  had  looked, 
there  can  be  no  recovery.  Campbell  v.  Union  Ry.  Co.  of  New  York  City  (Com. 
PI.  N.  Y.)  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  246;  Groner  v.  Delaware,  etc..  Canal  Co.,  153  Pa.  St. 
.390,  26  Atl.  7;  Graf  v.  Railway  Co.,  04  Mich.  579,  54  N.  W.  388.  Compare  Wright 
v.  Railway  Co.,  94  Ky.  114,  21  S.  W.  581.  Et  vide  Hogan  v.  Tyler,  90  Va. 
19,  17  S.  E.  723,  following  Mark's  Adm'r  v.  Railroad  Co.,  88  Va.  1,  13  S.  E. 
299;  Magner  v.  Truesdale,  53  Bliun.  436,  55  N.  W.  607;  Southeast  &  St.  L. 
R.  Co.  V.  Stotlar,  43  111.  App.  94.  But  it  is  not  negligence  per  se  for  a  person 
intending  to  cross  a  street-railway  track  to  fail  to  look  in  both  directions. 
Shea  V.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  50  Minn.  395,  52  N.  W.  902.  It  is  not  negli- 
gence as  a  matter  of  law  to  cross  a  street  without  looking  both  ways  for  ap- 
proaching vehicles.  Reens  v.  Mail  &  Express  Pub.  Co.  (Com.  PI.  N.  Y.)  30  K. 
Y.  Supp.  913.  And  see  Pyne  v.  Railroad  Co.  (Com.  PI.  N.  Y.)  19  N.  Y.  Supp. 
217,  following  Moebus  v.  Herrmann,  lOS  N.  Y.  349,  15  N.  E.  415.  But  see 
contra,  Ehrisman  v.  Railway  Co.,  150  Pa.  St.  180,  24  Atl.  596;  Wheelahan 
V.  Traction  Co.,  150  Pa.  St.  187,  24  Atl.  688;  Ward  v.  Railway  Co.,  63  Hun, 
624,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  427.  Where  one  is  struck  by  a  train  at  a  railway  cross- 
ing and  killed,  and  there  is  no  direct  evidence  to  prove  that  he  looked  and 
listened,  but  there  is  some  evidence  that,  if  he  had  done  so,  he  could  not 
have  seen  ,the  approaching  train  in  time  to  avert  a  collision,  the  question  of 
his  contributory  negligence  is  for  the  jury.  Struck  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.  (Minn.)  59  N.  W.  1022.  One  who  drives  on  a  railroad  ti-ack  at  a  proint 
where  there  is  an  unobstructed  view  of  the  track  for  200  feet,  and  does  not 
notice  an  approaching  train,  the  usual  warning  and  signals  having  been 
given,  is  guilty  of  contributory  negligence.  Shires  v.  Fonda,  .1.  &  G.  R.  Co., 
80  Hun,  92,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  175.     Plaintiff's  intestate  was  struck  and  killed 


884  NEGLIGEKCE.  [Ch.    VA 

as  a  matter  of  law.''''  T5ut,  unless  the  evidence  clearly  shows  that 
the  accident  was  due  to  want  of  ordinary  care  on  the  part  of  the 
injured  person,  the  tendency  of  modern  authority  is  to  leave  the  mat- 
ter very  much  at  large  for  the  jury.^^^  The  same  degree  of  care  is 
not  required  on  the  part  of  one  crossing  the  track  where  the  train 
is  irregular  or  on  unusual  time  as  if  it  were  a  regular  train  and  on 

by  defendant's  train  wbile  driving  ovei'  its  crossing.  The  train  was  a  wild 
train,  running  30  miles  an  hour,  and  passed  the  crossing  at  that  time  of  the 
day  when  it  was  most  used.  Though  the  train  was  light,  and  though  its 
speed  might  have  been  readily  checked,  it  ran  600  feet  beyond  the  crossing 
before  it  was  stopped.  Held  that,  though  the  whistle  was  blown  when  the 
train  came  within  1,300  feet  of  the  crossing,  and  the  bell  was  rung  continu- 
ously till  it  was  reached,  defendant's  negligence  was  a  question  for'  the 
juiT-  Stnick  y.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.)  59  N.  W.  1022.  While 
crossing  a  track  at  night,  near  defen<1ant's  station,  plaintiff's  decedent  was 
killed  by  a  car,  runnina  at  the  rate  of  five  miles  an  hour,  in  charge  of  a 
switching  crew.  There  was  no  light  on  tlie  car,  and,  because  of  darkness, 
the  switchman  present  could  not  see  decedent  in  time  to  warn  him  of  his 
peril,  and  decedent  could  not  hear  the  approaching  car  because  of  noise  by 
steam  escaping  from  a  passenger  engine  standing  near.  Held,  that  plaintiff 
could  recover  for  decedent's  death,  though  decedent  may  have  been  guilty  of 
negligence  contributing  thereto.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Nolan,  11  C.  C.  A. 
202,  (i2  Fed.  ;j.j2;  Shea  v.  Boston  &  M.  11.  Co.,  151  Mass.  31,  27  N.  E.  672, 
\.erkfetz  v.  Humphreys,  145  U.  S.  418-^151,  12  Sup.  Ct.  835;  Lynch  v.  Boston 
&;  A.  R.  Co.,  159  Jlass.  536,  34  N.  E.  1072;  Davis  v.  Railroad  Co.,  159  Mass. 
ri32,  34  N.  E.  1070,  where  the  cases  are  reviewed  by  Holmes,  J. 

3  30  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R:  Co.  v.  Hefferan  (X.  J.  Err.  &  App.)  30  Atl.  578; 
Grostick  v.  Railroad  Co.  (Mich.)  51  N.  W.  G7  (and  see  able  and  exhaustive  dis- 
senting opinion  of  McGrath,  J.) ;  Magner  v.  Truesdale,  53  Minn.  426,  55  N.  W. 
607;  Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hill,  117  Ind.  50,  18  N.  E.  461;  Dawe  v.  Flint,  etc., 
R.  Co.  (Mich.)  CO  N.  W.  838  (McGrath,  C.  J.,  dissenting);  Heaney  v.  Long  Is- 
land R.  Co.,  112  N.  Y.  122,  19  N.  E.  422;  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Houston, 
95  U.  S.  697;  Hayden  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  CSlo.  Sup.)  28  S.  W.  74; 
Tulley  V.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  134  Mass.  499;  Nelson  v.  Duluth,  S.  S.  &  A.  Ry. 
Co.,  88  Wis.  392,  60  X.  W.  703;  Noi-wood  v.  Raleigh  &  G.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C. 
236,  16  S.  E.  4;  Miller  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  81  Hun,  152,  30  N. 
y.  Supp.  751;  Rigg  v.  Boston,  K.  B.  &  L.  R.  Co.,  158  Mass.  309,  33  N.  E.  512. 
331  Pol.  Torts,  p.  367.  Compare  Dublin,  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Slattery,  3  App. 
Cas.  1155,  with  Ellis  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  li.  R.  9  C.  P.  551.  And  see  Chi- 
cago, St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Butler,  10  Ind.  App.  244,  38  N.  E.  1,  following 
Pittsburg,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Burton  (Ind.  Sup.)  37  N.  E.  150;  Bradwell 
v.  Pittsburgh  &  W.  E.  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  153  Pa.  St.  105.  25  Atl.  623;    Northern 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  885 

usual  time.'^^  The  rules  with,  respect  to  street  crossings  as  between 
persons  using  the  highway  and  a  street-railway  company  are  essen- 
tially the  same.  "Each  have  the  right  to  cross,  and  must  cross. 
Neither  has  a  superior  right  to  the  other.  The  right  of  each  must 
be  exercised  with  due  regard  to  the  right  of  the  other,  and  the  right 
of  each  must  be  exercised  in  a  reasonable  and  careful  manner,  so  as 
not  unreasonably  to  abridge  or  interfere  with  the  right  of  the 
other."  22= 

257.  The  law  recognizes  the  duty  of  avoiding  interference 
■with  high-ways  so  as  to  make  their  customary  use 
dangerous. 

Liability  for  interference  with  the  right  of  the  public  to  enjoy  a 
public  highway  with  ease  and  security,  even  by  the  use  of  a  man's 
own  property,  has  been  based  on  the  theory  of  nuisance.^^*  ^g  to 
ponderous  articles  suspended  over  a  street,  owners  have  been  held  to 
the  duty  of  insuring  safety  from  the  damage  thereby. "^^  But  the 
ordinary  basis  for  responsibility  for  damage  to  a  traveler  on  a  pub- 

Pae.  R.  Co.  v.  Austin,  12  0.  C.  A.  97,  64  Fed.  211;  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R. 
(k).  V.  Hague,  54  Kan.  284,  38  Pac.  2.57;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Larson,  38 
N.  E.  784;  Gilmore  v.  Cape  Fear  &  Y.  V.  R.  Co.,  115  N.  C.  657,  20  S".  E.  371. 
Et  vide  dissenting  opinions  of  Slieplierd,  C.  X,  and  Burwell,  J. 

332  Continental  Imp.  Co.  v.  Stead,  95  U.  S.  161;  Parsons  v.  New  York  Cent. 
&  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  114  N.  Y.  S.-.o,  21  N.  E.  145. 

33.!  Omaha  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cameron,  43  Xeb.  297,  61  N.  AV,  606;  Rolie  v. 
Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  10  Misc.  Rep.  740,  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  797;  Jones  v.  Broolilyn 
Heights  R.  Co.,  10  Misc.  Rep.  .543,  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  445;  Citizens'  St.  R.  Co. 
V.  Lowe  (Ind.  App.)  .39  N.  E.  165;  Young  v.  Atlantic  Ave.  Ry.  Co.,  10  Misc. 
Rep.  541,  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  441;  Omaha  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Duvall,  40  Neb.  29,  58 
N.  W.  531;  North  Baltimore  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Amreich  (Md.)  28  Atl.  809; 
Czezewzka  v.  Benton-Bellefontaine  Ry.  Co.,  121  Mo.  201,  25  S.  W.  911.  One 
who  attempts  to  drive  across  a  street-railroad  track,  which  he  was  unable  to 
see  as  he  approached,  owing  to  a  covering  on  both  sides  of  his  wagon,  is 
guilty  of  such  negligence  as  will  defeat  recovery  for  injuries  caused  by  a 
collision  with  a  ear.     Boerth  v.  AYest  Side  R.  Co.,  87  Wis.  288,  58  N.  W.  376. 

334  Barnes  v.  Ward,  9  C.  B.  392.  This  subject  is  discussed  at  length  in 
Wood,  Nuis.  c.  7;   ante,  p.  764,  "Nuisance." 

336  Ante,  p.  836,  "Things  of  Weight." 


886  NEGri.iGExNCE.  [Ch.  12 

Ijg  336  Qj,  customary  '"  way  is  negligence  ^'°  with  respect  to  the  duty 
to  abstain  from  so  dealing  or  interfering  therewith  as  to  make  it 
dangerous  for  ordinary  and  proper  use.^^°  The  duty  extends  to  the 
exercise  of  care  that  nothing  shall  drop  from  above  the  surface.  It 
does  not,  however,  ordinarily  apply  beyond  the  limits  of  the  high- 
way, and  attach  liability  for  the  proper  use  of  the  mere  surface  of 
the  owner's  own  land.'*"  A  barbedrwire  fence — "a  string  of  sus- 
pended daggers" — on  such  land  does  not  make  its  owner  liable  to  one 
thrown  on  it  by  a  fractious  horse,^*^  but  it  will  be  otherwise  if  it 
were  negligently  constructed,  even  on  a  man's  own  land,^*^  or  if  the 

S36  Clark  v.  Chambers,  3  Q.  B.  Div.  327,  4  L.  J.  427,  reviewing  many  cases; 
Graves  v.  Thomas,  95  Ind.  362;  Beck  v.  Carter,  68  N.  Y.  283;  Young  v. 
Harvey,  16  Ind.  314.  Et  vide  Deane  v.  Clayton,  7  Taunt.  489;  Hooker  v. 
Miller,  37  Iowa,  613. 

33  7  Philips  V.  Library  Co.,  55  N.  J.  Law,  307,  27  Ati.  478;  Johnson  v.  Lake 
Superior  Terminal  &  Transfer  Co.,  86  Wis.  64,  56  N.  W.  161;  Texas  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Watkins  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  760;  Rascher  v.  Bast  Detroit 
&  G.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  90  Mich.  413,  51  N.  W.  463;  Holland  v.  Sparks,  92  Ga.  753, 
18  S.  E.  990;  McKenna  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  54  Mo.  App.  161.  But  see 
Eggman  v.  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.,  47  111.  App.  507;  Norwood  v.  Raleigh 
&  G.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  236,  16  S.  E.  4;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Schmetzer 
(Ky.)  22  S.  W.  603;  Burg  v.  Chicagio,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  57  N.  W.  680; 
Adams  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  66  Hun,  634,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  681. 
Perhaps  the  true  solution  of  cases  of  this  kind  is  that  the  question  of  use  is 
one  of  license,  expressed  or  implied,  to  be  determined  by  the  jury.  Chenery 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  160  Mass.  211,  35  N.  E.  554;  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Hirsch,  69  Miss.  126,  13  South.  244. 

338  In  Babbage  v.  Powers,  130  N.  Y.  281,  29  N.  B.  132,  where  a  flagstone 
over  a  vault  under  the  sidewalk  broke,  plaintifC  could  not  recover  for  conse- 
quent injury,  because  no  actual  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  lot  owner  was 
shown. 

33  9  So  an  action  will  lie  for  leaving  an  unmarked  obstruction  in  a  river. 
Casement  v.  Brown,  148  U.  S.  615,  13  Sup.  Ct.  672;  Jutte  v.  Keystone  Bridge 
Co.,  146  Pa.  St.  400,  23  Atl.  235;  Hill  v.  Winsor,  118  Mass.  2.51,  Unguarded 
hole  in  ice  near  highway  no  liability,  if  runaway  horse  run  into  it,  if  its 
speed  was  so  great  that  ordinarily  proper  guard  would  not  have  prevented 
the  casualty.     Sowles  v.  Moore,  65  Vt.  322,  26  Atl.  629. 

34  0  A  collection  of  authorities  as  to  the  liability  of  abutting  owners  for 
the  dangerous  condition  of  private  grounds  beside  a  higihway  or  frequented 
path.     Lepnick  v.  Gaddis,  26  L.  R.  A.  686  (Jliss.)  16  South.  213. 

341  Worthington  v.  Wade,  S2  Tex.  26,  17  S.  W.  520. 

342  Sisk  V.  Crump,  112  Ind.  504,  14  N.  E.  381.     Bt  vide  Wabash,  St.  L.  & 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAI,    ELEMENTS.  887 

fence  is  without  warning  put  across  a  way  used  by  the  public."' 
But,  although  the  owners  of  land  abutting  the  highway  owe  no  duty 
to  persons  who  deviate  from  the  road  and  come  on  such  property, 
the  dangerous  character  of  an  excavation  below  the  surface  of  such 

P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Locke,  112  Ind.  404,  14  N.  E.  391.  Negligence;  use  and  custom; 
barb-wire  fences:  Williams  v.  Midgett,  2  Tex.  L.  R.  338.  Cf.  Atlantic  &  W. 
P.  R.  Co.  V.  Hudson,  62  Ga.  679,  where  damages  were  recovered  against  a 
railroad  company  for  negligently  running  an  engine  so  as  to  drive  frightened 
cattle  into  such  a  fence  maintained  by  a  railroad  company.  It  would  seem 
that  such  a  fence  is  not  per  se  a  nuisance,  but  may  become  such  if  allowed 
to  get  out  of  repair  so  as  to  become  essentially  dangerous.  Hillyard  v.  Grand 
Trunk  R.  Co.,  8  Ont.  583;  Lowe  v.  Guard  (Ind.  App.)  :59  N.  E.  428;  Loveland 
V.  Gardner,  79  Cal.  817,  21  Pac.  766;  Sisk  v.  Crump,  112  Ind.  504,  14  X. 
E.  381;  Carskaddon  v.  Mills,  5  Ind.  App.  22,  31  N.  E.  559.  A  complaint  al- 
leging that  it  was  defendant's  duty  to  construct  and  maintain  part  of  a 
partition  fence  between  his  land  and  adjoining  land  in  which  plaintiff's  horse 
was  pastured;  that  this  was  done  negligently,  the  posts  being  too  far  apart 
to  support  the  wires,  and  the  wires  sagging  in  such  a  manner  as  to  induce 
horses  to  attempt  to  cross  the  fence,  and  become  entangled  therein;  and  that 
plaintiff's  horse  became  entangled  in  such  wires,  and  was  killed  by  wounds 
from  the  barbs  thereon, — is  sufficient  on  demuiTer.  McParland  v.  Swihart 
(Ind.  App.)  38  N.  E.  483.  Where  defendant  moved  a  barbed-wire  fence  across 
a  path  used  by  plaintiff's  horses  in  going  to  water,  whether  plaintiff  was 
guilty  of  contributory  negligence  in  turning  his  horse  into  the  pasture,  when 
he  knew  the  nature  of  the  fence  and  its  change  of  location,  was  a  question 
for  the  jury.     Boyd  v.  Burkett  {Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  223. 

3*3  Carskaddon  v.  Mills,  5  Ind.  App.  22,  31  N.  E.  559.  Cf.  Clark  v.  Cham- 
ber, 3  Q.  B.  Div.  327,  47  Law  J.  Q.  B.  427,  38  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  454.  Robertson 
V.  Wooley,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  237,  23  S.  W.  S2S.  If  the  fence  be  unlawful,  dam- 
age therefrom  to  plaintiff's  horse  may  be  recovered.  Boyd  v.  Burkett  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  223.  A  toboggan  slide.  Haden  v.  Clarke  (Sup.)  10  N.  Y. 
Supp.  291.  In  Hurst  v.  Taylor,  33  Wkly.  Rep.  582,  a  lawful  but  dangerous 
diversion  of  an  old  footpath,  without  light  or  other  precaution  to  indicate 
the  change,  whereby  plaintiff,  passing  along  in  a  dark  night,  suffered  dam- 
age, was  held  actionable  negligence.  Circumstances,  in  the  absence  of  stat- 
ute regulating  the  giving  of  signals  and  the  employment  of  flagmen,  maj- 
make  defendant  liable  for  failure  to  give  usual  signals  and  station  a  flagman. 
Hermans  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Hun,  625,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  310; 
Hinkle  v.  Railroad  Co.,  109  N.  C.  472,  13  S.  E.  884;  Tierney  v.  Chicago  &  N. 
W.  R.  Co.,  84  Iowa,  641,  51  N.  W.  175.  Leaving  an  unguarded  open  ditch  is 
actionable  negligence.  Pine  Bluff  Water  &  Light  Co.  v.  Derreuisseaux,  5(; 
Ark.  132,  19  S.  W.  428.  It  is  no  defense  to  an  action  against  the  owner  of 
abutting  property  for  injury  caused  by  his  defective  sidewalk  to  injured 
party.     McDaneld  v.  Logi,  143  111.  487,  32  N.  E.  423.     But  this  would  seem 


888  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

laud,  rather  than  its  distance  from  the  street,  would  seem  to  be  the 
true,  but  by  no  means  certainly  settled,  criterion  of  liability.^** 

Customary  Use. 

Highways  must  be  kept  safe  by  the  person  on  whom  that  duty 
falls;  and  interference  therewith  is  actionable  in  so  far  as  it  affects 
the  ordinary  and  customary  use  of  such  highway.  Therefore,  iu  an 
action  against  a  town  for  injuries  caused  by  the  breaking  of  a  bridge 

to  be  largely  a  matter  of  statute.     Sammins  v.  Wilhelm,  6  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  K. 
565, 

3^*  City  of  Norwich  v.  Breed,  30  Conn.  535.  Substantially  adjoining: 
Burnes  v.  Ward,  supra;  Binks  v.  South  Yorkshire  R.  Co.,  3  Best  &  S.  244; 
Jones  V.  Nichols,  46  Ark.  207.  Bt  vide  cases  collected  at  ilelntire  v.  Rob- 
erts, 149  Mass.  452,  22  N.  B.  13.  A  man  is  bound  to  use  his  own  with  due 
care  to  avoid  injury  to  others,  and  having  reference  to  the  ordinary  instincts 
of  human  nature.  If  the  abutting  owners  were  to  quarry  stone  so  as  to 
place  "a  yawning  precipice  immediately  next  a  sidewalk,  and  take  no  pre- 
iiiution  to  prevent  travelers  made  dizzy  falling  into  the  excavation,  it  is  hard 
to  see  why  this  would  not  be  negligence."  See  Hounsell  v.  Smyth,  7  C.  B. 
(N.  S.)  731.  See,  however,  Hardcastle  v.  South  Yorkshire  R.  Co.,  4  Hurl.  & 
X.  67;  Blyth  v.  Topham,  Cro.  Jac.  158;  Rowland  v.  Vincent,  10  Mete.  (Mass.) 
:!T1;  Mclntire  v.  Roberts,  149  Mass.  450,  22  N.  E.  13.  In  this  case  (where 
there  was  an  unguarded  elevator  well  near  the  street,  into  which  a  horse 
■  backed  a  wagon  on  the  sidewalk,  causing  travelers  to  jostle  and  push  plain- 
tiff through  the  opening),  Field,  J.,  said  (page  453,  149  JIass.,  and  page  13,  22 
N.  E.):  "In  this  commonwealth  the  obligation  of  a  city  or  town  to  put  up 
guards  against  pitfalls  which  are  so  near  to  a  highway  as  tu  make  it  unsafe 
for  travelers,  is  similar  to  the  obligation  which,  it  seems,  is  imposed  upon 
abutters  by  the  English  law.  We  are  not  aware  that  it  has  ever  been  de- 
cided here  that  excavations  made  by  the  owner  of  land  outside  the  limits 
of  a  highway,  but  so  near  to  it  as  to  make  it  unsafe  for  travelers,  constitute 
a  ijublic  nuisance,  for  creating  or  maintaining  which  the  landowner  may  be 
punished,  or  that,  in  assessing  damages  for  land  taken  for  a  highway,  any 
allowance  is  made  to  the  landowner  for  the  loss  of  any  right  to  use  the  land 
not  taken,  in  the  same  manner  as  if  a  highway  had  not  been  laid  out."  While 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  supervisors  to  do  what  is  practicable  and  reasonable, 
under  all  the  circumstances,  to  make  the  public  road  safe,  not  only  as  against 
causes  existing  in  the  roadway  itself,  but  also  as  to  those  in  such  close  prox- 
imity as  to  render  it  natural  and  probable  that  injury  to  travelers  will  result 
if  the  cause  is  not  removed,  or  proper  safeguards  be  provided,  yet,  where 
no  danger  may  be  anticipated  from  a  cause  existing  beyond- the  limits  of  the 
roadway,  no  duty  in  respect  to  such  cause  devolves  upon  the  supervisors. 
Worrilow  v.  Upper  Chichester  Tp.,  149  Pa.  St.  40,  24  Atl.  85. 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  889 

under  the  freight  of  a  steam  thresher,  the  defendant  cannot  complain 
of  a  charge  that,  if  tlie  bridge  was  properly  constructed  and  main- 
tained with  reference  to  ordinary  travel  when  it  was  reconstructed, 
the  defendant  would  not  be  liable,  though  the  moving  of  steam 
threshers  had  in  the  meantime  become  an  ordinary  use  of  the  high- 
way.^*^  And  a  side  of  a  street  may  be  in  such  form,  and  so  used, 
with  the  knowledge  and  acquiescence  of  the  town,  as  to  be  a  portion 
of  the  traveled  part  of  the  way,  though  no  work  has  been  done  on  it 
to  fit  it  for  the  use  of  pedestrians.'*^ 

258.  "The  owner  or  occupier  of  real  estate  owes  certain 
duties  to  those  w^ho  come  thereon,  according  to  the 
cause  of  their  entry,  and  the  nature  of  the  danger 
to  w^hich  they  are  exposed. 

(a)  To  trespassers  it  is  only  against  active  injury; 

(b)  To  licensees  it  is  to   give  notice  of  hidden  dangers 

or  traps; 

(c)  While  to  invited  persons  (as  that  term  is  understood 

by  the  law^)  the  ow^ner  is  bound  to  use  reasonable 
care,  having  respect  to  the  person  and  character 
of  the  business  to  be  carried  on,  to  save  his  guest 
from  injury  w^hile  upon  the  premises."^'' 

846  Coulter  V.  Pine  Tp.,  164  Pa.  St.  543,  30  Atl.  490. 

Sid  Moran  v.  Inhabitants  of  Town  of  Palmer,  162  Mass.  196,  38  N.  E.  442. 
But  see  King  v.  Thompson,  87  Pa.  St.  365,  distinguishing  McNemey  v.  City 
of  Reading,  150  Pa.  St.  611,  25  Atl.  57. 

34734  Am.  Law  Reg.  &  Rev.  I'.i7.  It  is,  however,  said:  "The  authorities 
appear  to  have  classified  this  subject  under  these  heads,  to  wit:  (1)  Bare 
licensees,  or  volunteers;  (2)  those  who  arc  expressly  invited  or  induced  by 
the  active  conduct  of  the  defendant  to  go  upon  the  premises;  (3)  customers 
and  others,  who  go  there  on  business  with  the  occupier.  Each  case  must 
largely  depend  upon  the  circumstances  attending  the  occurrence,  and  it  is  not 
infrequently  found  to  be  difficult  to  determine  whether  the  injured  party  is 
a  mere  license'  or  whether  he  is  on  the  premises  by  the  implied  invitation  or 
enticement  of  the  owner  or  occupier."  Benson  v.  Baltimore  Traction  Co.,  77 
Md.  535,  26  Atl.  !>7:i. 


830  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

Trespassers. 

That  the  owner  of  premises  owes  no  duty  to  a  trespasser  to  keep 
the  premises  in  a  safe  condition  has  already  been  considered.'^' 
Even  in  these  cases,  however,  it  would  seem  that  the  ordinary  rule 
as  to  care  under  the  circumstances  will  apply;  but  it  must  be  care- 
fully borne  in  mind,  in  consideration  of  the  circumstances,  that  the 
trespasser  is  a  wrongdoer. ^^''  There  is  a  manifest  tendency  in  the 
cases  to  recognize  the  duty  of  the  owner  of  premises  and  instru- 
mentalities to  avoid  doing  harm  to  other  persons  even  though  they 
be  wrongdoers. '',''° 

Volunteers  and  Licensees. 

A  mere  volunteer  or  licensee,  if  he  is  on  the  premises  by  the  owji- 
er's  passive  acquiescence,  is  entitled  to  the  exercise  of  no  duty  on 
the  part  of  the  owner  as  to  the  safety  of  the  premises.  "A  mere 
naked  license  or  permission  to  enter  or  pass  over  an  estate  will  not 
create  a  duty  or  impose  an  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  owners  or 
persons  in  possession  to  provide  against  danger  of  accident." '^^ 
The  licensee  must  take  the  permission  with  concommitant  condi- 
tions, and,  it  may  be,  perils.'^^  "Suppose  the  owner  of  land  near  ' 
the  sea  gives  another  leave  to  walk  on  the  edge  of  the  cliff,  surely 
it  would  be  absurd  to  contend  that  such  permission  cast  upon  the 

34  3  Ante,  p.  196.  A  person  who  steals  a  ride  on  a  train  is  not  a  passenger. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Price,  96  Pa.  St.  236;  Mason  v.  Chicago,  St  P.,  M.  & 
O.  Ry.  Co.,  89  Wis.  151,  61  N.  W.  300;  Barney  t.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.  (Mo. 
Sup.)  28  S.  W.  1069;  Bricker  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.,  132  Pa.  St.  4,  18  Atl. 
983;  Atlanta  &  C.  Air-Line  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gravitt,  93  Ga.  369,  20  S.  E.  550;  Cleve- 
land, C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tartt,  12  C.  C.  A.  625,  64  Fed.  830;  Illinois  Cent. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Lee,  71  Miss.  895,  16  South.  349;  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
De  Bajligethy  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  28  S.  W.  829;  McGuire  v.  Vicksburg,  S.  &  P. 
R.  Co.,  46  La.  Ann.  1543,  16  South.  457. 

349  Ante,  c.  2,  p.  189. 

3  50  Ante,  p.  196.  Emery  v.  Minneapolis  Industrial  Exposition,  56  Minn.  460,^ 
57  N.  W.  1132;  Kansas  City,  Ft  S.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Berry,  53  Kan.  112,  36  Pac. 
53;    Everett  v.  Oregon,  S.  L.  &  XJ.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  9  Utah,  340,  34  Pac.  289. 

351  Bigelow,  C.  J.,  in  Sweeny  v.  Old  Colony  &  N.  R.  Co.,  10  Allen,  372. 

3  52  Evansville  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Gritfin,  100  Ind.  221;  Reardon  v.  Thomp- 
son, 149  Mass.  267,  21  N.  E.  369;  Byi-ne  v.  Railroad  Co.,  104  N.  Y.  362,  10  N. 
E.  539. 


^h.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMEJv^TS.  891 

former  the  burden  of  fencing."  ^=3  ^^^^  jf  ^  landlord  allows  tenants 
to  use  the  flat  roof  for  drying  clothes,  he  is  not  liable  if  one  of  them 
fall  from  the  roof  because  of  a  defect  in  the  iron  rail  around  it."* 
It  would  seem  to  be  a  generally  accepted  doctrine  that  firemen  and 
policemen  are  mere  licensees,  and  that  the  owners  of  buildings  are 
not  liable  to  them  when  injured  therein  in  the  discharge  of  their 
duties.^ ^=    The  owner  of  premises  may  not,  however,  actively  injure 

3B3Tounsell  v.  Smythe,  7  C.  B.  (X.  S.)  731;  Barnes  v.  Ward,  9  C.  B.  392; 
Hardcastle  v.  Railway  Co.,  4  Hoi-l.  &  N.  67;  Bolch  v.  Smith,  7  Hurl.  &  N.  736; 
Scott  v.  London  Docks  Co.,  11  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  383;  Hargreaves  v.  Deacon,  2.3 
Mich.  1  (pitfalls  in  highways  and  private  property);  Maenner  v.  Carroll,  46 
Md.   193. 

3  54  ivay  V.  Hedges,  9  Q.  B.  Div.  SO.  Cf.  Billows  v.  Moors,  162  Mass.  42,  37 
N.  E.  750.  So,  in  a  water-closet  case,  plaintiff,  going  to  it  in  accordance  with 
permission  of  owner  of  the  soil,  stumbled  and  caught  his  arm  in  moving  ma- 
chinery, and  could  not  recover.  Bolch  v.  Smith,  7  Hurl.  &  N.  736.  Cf.  Sweeny 
V.  Barrett,  151  Pa.  St.  600,  2,3  Atl.  148;  post,  note  362.  Et  vide  Cornman  v. 
Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co.,  4  Hurl.  &  N.  781;  Coupland  v.  Hardingham,  3 
Camp.  308;  Jarvis  v.  Dean,  3  Bing.  447;  Jordin  v.  Crump,  S  Mees.  &  W.  7S2; 
Gautret  v.  Egerton,  L.  R.  2  C.  P.  371;  Burchell  v.  Hickisson,  50  Law  J.  Q. 
B.  101;  Batchelor  v.  Eortescue,  11  Q.  B.  Div.  474.  A  bare  licensee,  according 
to  the  American  cases,  goes  on  another's  land  or  property  at  his  own  risk, 
and  must  take  the  same  as  he  finds  it.  Reardon  v.  Thompson,  149  Mass.  267, 
21  N.  E.  369;  Truax  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  83  Wis.  547,  53  N. 
W.  842;  CahiU  v.  Layton,  57  Wis.  600,  16  N.  W.  1;  Benson  v.  Baltimore  Trac- 
tion Co.,  77  Md.  535,  26  Atl.  973;  Gibson  v.  Leonard,  143  111.  182,  32  N.  E. 
182;  Pel  ton  v.  Schmidt,  97  Mich.  231,  56  N.  W.  689;  Stevens  v.  Nichols,  155 
Mass.  472,  29  N.  E.  11.jO  (distinguishing  Holmes  v.  Drew,  l.jl  Mass.  578,  25  N. 
E.  22);  Hector  v.  Boston  Electric  Light  Co.,  161  Mass.  558,  37  N.  E.  773;  De 
Gray  V.  Aiken,  43  La.  Ann.  798,  9  South.  747;  Stergor  v.  Van  Sicklen,  132  N. 
Y.  499,  30  N.  E.  987  (following  Larmore  v.  Crown  Point  Iron  Co.,  101  N.  Y. 
391,  4  N.  E.  752);  Plummer  v.  Dill,  156  Mass.  426,  31  N.  E.  128;  Walker  v. 
Winstauley,  155  Mass.  301,  29  N.  E.  518. 

305  Low  V.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  72  ile.  313;  cases  collected  in  11  N.  Y.  Law 
J.  090;  Learoyd  v.  Godfrey,  1.38  Mass.  315;  Beehler  v.  Daniels  (R.  I.)  29  Atl. 
6.  Gibson  v.  Leonard,  143  111.  182,  32  N.  E.  182,  affirming  37  111.  App.  344; 
Woodruff  V.  Bowen,  136  Ind.  431,  34  N.  E.  1113.  Where  plaintiff  runs  across 
a  lot  to  ecKtiuguish  a  fire,  its  owner  owes  him  no  duty  to  keep  premises  safe. 
He  cannot  recover  if  he  fall  into  a  hole.  Kohn  v.  Lovett,  44  Ga.  251.  No 
liability  to  a  constable  serving  civil  writ.  Blatt  v.  McBarron,  161  JIass.  21,  36 
N.  E.  468;  Plummer  v.  Dill,  156  Mass.  426,  31  N.  E.  128,  and  cases  cited. 
But  as  to  a  policeman  lawfully  entering  a  building  it  is  otherwise  (Parker  v. 


892  NKGLIGENCK.  [Ch.    12 

such  a  licensee; '"'  aud  if  the  licensee  comes  upon  the  premises 
by  virtue  of  express  permission,  even  though  it  may  not  amount  to 
an  Invitation,  he  is  entitled  to  be  warned  of  any  hidden  danger  in 
the  premises  known  to  the  owner  or  occupier.'*"^ 

The  doctrine  of  invitation,  express  or  implied,  applies,  at  least 
so  far  as  active  peril  goes,  to  those  cases  where  one  by  his  conduct 
has  induced  the  public  to  use  a  way  in  the  belief  that  it  is  a  street 
or  public  A^•ay,  or  where  it  has  been  recognized  as  a  crossing."^  In 
such  cases  all  persons  have  a  right  to  use  it,  and  are  entitled  to  the 
exercise  of  care.^'^^    Thus,  if  a  railroad  company  knows  of  the  dan- 

Bamard,  135  Mass.  IIG);  especially  if  at  request  of  tenant  to  make  a  proper 
aiTest  (Learoyd  v.  Godfrey,  138  JIass.  315). 

3  56  Bird  V.  Holbrook,  4  Bing.  628.  Cf.  Sullivan  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  150 
Mass.  378,  31  N.  E.  128. 

357  Bolch  V.  Smith,  supra  (per  Cliannell  and  Wilde,  BB.);  Corby  v.  Hill,  4 
C.  B.  (N.  S.)  556  (per  Willes,  J.);  Bramwell,  B.,  in  Soutticote  v.  Stanley,  1  Hurl. 
&  N.  247,  25  Law  J.  Exch.  339;  Farrant  v.  Barnes,  11  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  553,  31  Law 
.T.  C.  P.  137.  There  is  said  to  be  a  resemblance  between  this  class  of  cases 
and  those  founded  on  the  rule  as  to  voluntary  loans  and  gifts.  There  is  no 
remedy  against  lender  or  giver  for  damages  sustained  from  the  loan  or  gift, 
except  in  the  case  of  unusual  danger  known  to  and  concealed  by  the  lender  or 
giver.  Willes,  J.,  in  Indermaur  v.  Dames,  L.  R.  1  0.  P.  274,  citing  Macar- 
thy  V.  Younge,  6  Hurl.  &  N.  320,  30  Law  J.  Exch.  227.  And  see  Gautret  v. 
Egerton,  2  C.  P.  371. 

358  Johnson  v.  Lake  Superior  Terminal  &  Transfer  Co.,  86  Wis.  64,  56  N.  W. 
161.  (Vide  cases  collected  on  page  69,  86  Wis.,  and  page  161,  56  N.  W.)  If 
a  raih'oad  company  has  knowingly  acquiesced  for  a  long  time  in  the  use  of 
private  crossing  or  other  customary  path  on  its  right  of  way,  without  objec- 
tion or  attempt  to  prevent,  it  must  exercise  due  cai-e  with  reference  to  such 
usage.  Clampit  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.,  84  Iowa,  71-74,  50  N.  W. 
673  (collecting  cases).  Cf.  Barber  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  34  S.  C.  444,  13  S. 
E.  630,  and  Sanborn  v.  Detroit,  B.  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.,  01  Mich.  53S,  52  N.  W.  153. 
Et  vide  Gurley  v.  Missoiu-i  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  122  Mo.  141,  26  S.  W.  953;  Cahill  v. 
Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  92  Ky.  345,  18  S.  W.  2;  Reifsnyder  v.  Chi- 
cago, M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  57  X.  W.  692;  Maxey  v.  Missoui-i  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.,  113  Mo.  1,  20  S.  W.  654.  Cf.  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Linn  (Ala.)  15  South. 
508;  Illnois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Beard,  49  111.  App.  232;  O'Neil  v.  Duluth,  S.  S.  & 
A.  Ry.  Co.,  101  Mich.  437,  59  N.  W.  836;  Stewart  v.  Cincinnati,  W.  &  M.  R. 
Co.,  89  Mich.  315,  50  N.  W.  852;  Lillstrom  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  53  Minn. 
464,  55  N.  W.  624  (following  Kelly  v.  Southern  Minnesota  Ry.  Co.,  28  Minn. 
98,  9  N.  W.  588). 

3  50  Sweeny  v.  Old  Colony  &  N.  R.  Co.,  10  Allen,  368;   Holmes  v.  Drew,  151 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  893 

gerous  practice  of  throwing  mail  bags  from  a  moving  car  to  the 
depot  platform,  it  is  liable  to  an  ignorant  licensee  walking  there- 
on.^""  Rnt  if  a  stranger  to  the  company  stands  on  its  land  to  see 
a  crane  catch  a  mail  pouch  he  is  entitled  to  no  duty  as  to  keeping 
the  crane  in  safe  condition.'"'^  And,  generally,  premises  used  by 
many  people  must  be  kept  safe  with  reference  to  such  constant  use. 
Such  places  are  presumed  to  be  safe.'"'^  While  the  line  in  the  Eng- 
lish cases  as  to  mere  licensees  would  seem  to  be  qiiite  clearly  drawii, 
the  line  of  distinction  between  these  and  subsequent  classes  of  per- 
sons is  by  no  means  distinct,  and  the  term  "licensee"  is  often  applied 
to  persons  of  the  following  class: 

Incited  Persons. 

The  leading  case  as  to  the  injury  done  to  persons  invited  or  spe- 
cially induced  hj  the  conduct  of  the  owner  of  the  premises  to  go 
thereon  is  Indermaur  v.  Dames.'"^  In  this  case  the  plaintiff  went 
on  the  defendant's  premises  (a  sugar  refinery),  in  Mhich  he  (or  his 
employer)  and  the  defendant  both  had  an  interest,  and  fell  into  a 

Mass.  578,  25  X.  E.  22.  But  cf.  Hounsell  v.  Smith,  6  Jur.  (N.  S.)  897;  Brad- 
ford V.  Bcston  &  M.  II.  Co.,  160  Mass.  392,  35  N.  B.  1131;  Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Simms,  43  111.  App.  260;    Snow  v.  Fitohbiirfr  R.  Co.,  49  Am.  Rep.  40. 

360  Galloway  v.  Chicago,  M.  ^:  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  ."i(i  Minn.  ;U!3,  57  N.  W   lOri.S. 

361  Poling  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  38  W.  Ya.  045,  IS  S.  E.  782. 

.16  2  As  to  water  closets,  Toomey  v.  Loudon,  B.  &  S.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  3  0.  B. 
(N.  S.)  146.  Cf.  Bolch  v.  Smith,  7  Hurl.  &  N.  736;  Sweeny  v.  Barrett  (Pa  Sup.) 
25  Atl.  148;  ante  note  ;!5i.  A  platform  around  weighing  scales,  Comman  v. 
Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co.,  4  Hurl.  &  N.  781.  Platforms  generally,  Longmore 
V.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.,  19  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  183;  James  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.. 
107  Mo.  480,  18  S.  AY.  31;  New  York,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Muslirush  (Ind.  App.) 
37  N.  E.  954;  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Best,  66  Tex.  116,  18  S.  W.  224;  DillinK- 
ham  V.  Teeling  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  24  S.  W.  1094;  Redigan  v.' Boston  &  M.  R. 
Co.  (Mass.)  28  N.  E.  1133.  Steps  in  common  use,  Crafter  v.  Metropolitan 
Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  300;  Beunett  v.  Railroad  Co.,  102  U.  S.  .577.  And 
see  McDonald  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Fed.  .")79:  Id.,  1.12  U.  S.  2(12,  14  Sup. 
Ct.  619.  The  use  for  lowering  baggage  into  a  steamship  of  the  same  com- 
panion way  us6d  by  passengers  and  their  friends  in  passing  up  and  down, 
where  the  ship  has  more  than  one  that  could  be  so  used,  is  want  of  care  for 
which  the  ship  is  liable  to  such  a  person  injured  by  the  fall  of  a  trunk  caused 
by  its  handle  breaking  while  being  so  lowered.  Unitus  v.  The  Dresden,  62 
Fed.  438.  Unused  way,  damage  to  employe  by  engine  in  motion,  no  recovei-y, 
O'Donnell  v.  Duluth,  S.  S.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  so  Jlich.  174,  .10  N.  W.  SOI. 

363  Indermaur  v.  Dames.  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  274-288,  2  C.  P.  311. 


894  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

dangerous  hole  or  chute.  It  was  held  that  an  action  lay  on  his  part 
against  the  defendant  for  breach  of  duty  towards  him  in  suffering 
the  hole  to  be  unfenced.  Willis,  J.,  pointed  out  that  the  protection 
would  extend  to  customers,  and  that  "the  class  to  which  custom- 
ers^"* belong  includes  persons  who  go,  not  as  mere  volunteers  or 
licensees  or  guests  ^"^  or  servants  or  persons  whose  employment  is 
such  that  danger  may  be  considered  as  bargained  for,  but  who  go 
upon  business  which  concerns  the  occupier,  and  upon  his  invitation, 
express  or  implied."  ^"^  The  owner  of  a  building  occupied  by  a  ten- 
ant owes  him  and  those  employed  by  such  tenant  the  duty  not  to 
expose  them  to  a  dangerous  condition  of  the  place  which  reasonable 
care  on  his  part  would  have  prevented.^"    It  is  not  necessary,  how- 

364  Brosnan  v.  Sweetser,  127  Ind.  1,  26  N.  E.  555.  "Where  plaintifE  was  iu 
a  store  to  make  purcliase,  and  was  injured.  Being  a  stranger  in  the  store, 
"she  had  a  right  to  i-ely  upon  the  floor's  being  in  good,  safe  condition.  She 
was  not  called  upon  to  anticipate  danger,  and  to  be  loolsing  and  listening  for 
dangerous  signals,  though  it  was  her  duty  to  make  use  of  her  faculties  and 
guard  against  and  avoid  danger.  (The  warning  should  be  such  as  would  un- 
der the  circumstances  be  reasonably  calculated  to  attract  attention  and  warn 
of  danger. )  When  a  person  puts  a  dangerous  pitfall  af  a  place  where  he  in- 
vites people  to  come,  he  is  under  stronger  obligations  to  guard  it,  and  more 
vigilance  is  required  in  the  guarding  of  it,  than  if  it  was  placed  at  some 
point  where  the  public  are  not  invited  to  come  and  are  less  liable  to  visit. 
Hendricken  v.  Meadows,  15-1  Mass.  599,  28  N.  E.  1054;  Clopp  v.  Mear,  134 
Pa,  St.  203,  19  Atl.  504;  Gordon  v.  Cummings,  152  Mass.  513,  25  N.  E.  978; 
Freed  v.  Cameron,  4  Rich.  Law,  228;  O'Callaghan  v.  Bode,  84  CaJ.  489,  24  Pac. 
269  (excursion  wharf);  Campbell  v.  Portland  Sugar  Co.,  62  Me.  552  (excur- 
sion wharf).  If,  however,  plaintiff  comes  into  defendant's  store,  without  in- 
vitation, on  his  own  business,  and  is  injured  by  a  fall  into  the  elevator  shaft 
in  a  part  of  the  store  unfrequented  by  visitors,  he  is  a  bare  licensee.  Faris 
V.  Hoberg,  134  Ind.  2G9,  33  N.  E.  1028. 

365  Southcote  V.  Stanley,  1  Hurl.  &  N.  247;  Plummer  v.  Dill,  156  Mass. 
426,  31  N.  B.  128;  Hart  v.  Cole,  156  Mass.  475,  31  N.  E.  644  (see  cases  col- 
lected on  page  479,  156  Mass.,  page  644,  31  N.  E.);  Woolwine's  Adm'r  v. 
Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.,  36  W.  Va.  329,  15  S.  E.  81;  Webb,  Pol.  Torts,  641,  642. 

366  Evaasville  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Griffin,  100  Ind.  221;  Howe  v.  Ohmart, 
7  Ind.  App.  32,  .33  N.  E.  4m. 

367  Holmes  v.  Drew,  151  Mass.  578,  25  N.  E.  22;  Leydecker  v.  Brintnall,  158 
Mass.  292,  33  N.  E.  399;  Crane  Elevator  Co.  v.  Lippert,  11  C.  C.  A.  521, 
G3  Fed.  94.  However,  it  was  held,  in  an  action  against  a  landlord  for  in- 
juries to  a  child  by  the  breaking  of  a  platform  used  for  hanging  out  washing, 
where  it  appeared  that  the  platform  was  in  the  same  condition  when  the  acci- 


^^-    12]  ESSENTIAL   ELEMENTS.  895' 

ever,  that  there  should  be  privity  of  contract  between  the  parties 
to  the  action.  Thus,  where  a  laborer  was  killed  by  falling  from  a 
defectiye  staging  which  the  defendant  had  contracted  with  his  em- 
ployer to  furnish,  recovery  of  statutory  damages  was  allowed.^^"^ 
The  class  of  invited  licensees  includes  persons  generally  having  a 
right  to  be  on  the  premises  where  the  injury  is  received,  as  where 
^one  was  injured  by  placing  materials  on  a  private  road  which  he 
was  entitled  to  use.^""     A  passenger  wrong-fully  ejected  from  a 

dent  occurred  as  when  plaintifE's  father  hired  the  house  as  it  was,  and  that 
its  defects  could  have  been  discovered  by  him  by  exercising  reasonable  care, 
plaintiff  cannot  recover.    Moynihan  v.  Allyn,  102  ilass.  270,  38  N.  E.  497. 

808  Bright  V.  Baniett  &  R.  Co.,  88  Wis.  299,  60  X.  W.  418,  citing,  as  to  im- 
plied invitation,  inter  alia,  Devlin  v.  Smith,  89  N.  Y.  470;  Gilbert  v.  Nagle. 
118  Mass.  278;  Elliott  v.  Pray,  10  Allen,  378;  Pickard  v.  Smith,  10  C.  B.  (R. 
S.)  470;  Holmes  v.  North  Eastern  K.  Co.,  L.  K.  4  Exch.  254;  Coughtry  v.  Globs 
Woolen  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  124;  Mulchey  v.  Methodist  Religious  Soc,  125  Mass.  4sT. 
And  as  to  the  doctrine  of  Winterbottom  v.  Wright,  10  Mees.  &  W.  109,  inter 
alia,  Hayes  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  Coal  &  Iron  Co..  150  Mass.  457,  23  N.  E. 
225;  Elliott  V.  Hall,  15  Q.  B.  Div.  315;  Bennett  v.  Railroad  Co.,  102  U.  S. 
577;  New  Orleans,  M.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hanning,  15  Wall.  649;  Cooley,  Torts, 
604-607;  Whart.  Neg.  §§  349-352;  Corby  v.  Hill,  4  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  562;  Powers 
v.  Harlow,  .53  Mich.  507,  19  N.  W.  257;  Campbell  v.  Portland  Sugar  Co.,  62 
Me.  552;  Van  Winkle  v.  Insurance  Co.  (N.  J.  Sup.)  19  Atl.  472;  16  Am.  &  Eng. 
Enc.  Law,  413,  414;  Heaven  v.  Pender,  11  Q.  B.  Div.  503;  Francis  v.  Cockrell, 
L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  184-195. 

368  Corby  v.  HiU,  4  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  556  (see  ChanneU,  B.,  in  Bolch  v.  Smith, 
7  Hurl.  &  N.  736);  Krey  v.  Schlussner,  62  Hun,  620,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  695. 
An  employs  of  a  railroad  corporation  who  is  engaged  in  delivering  a  car  to 
another  railroad  corporation  upon  the  latter's  tracks,  in  the  regular  course 
of  business  between  the  two  corporations,  is  not  a  mere  licensee.  Turner  v. 
Boston  &  M.  R.  R.,  158  Mass.  261,  33  N.  E.  520.  Cf.  Montgomery's  Ex'rs 
V.  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.,  97  Ala.  305,  12  South.  170;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co. 
V.  Hairston,  97  Ala.  351,  12  South.  299.  Child  a  licensee,  see  Mexican  Nat. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Ci-um,  6  Tex.  Civ.  App.  702,  25  S.  W.  1126.  Employes  of  a  rail- 
road company  have  ordinarily  no  authority  by  invitation  or  employment  or 
permission  to  make  a  stranger  to  the  company  a  passenger  or  licensee  to 
whom  duty  of  care  is  due.  Id.;  Cooper  v.  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.,  136  Ind.  366, 
36  N.  E.  272;  Houston,  C.  A.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Boiling,  59  Ark.  .39-5,  27  S.  W. 
492.  But  see  Buck  v.  Power  Co.,  108  Mo.  179,  18  S.  W.  1090,  affirmed  46 
Mo.  App.  555.  Persons  loading  and  unloading  cars  are  entitled  to  exercise  of 
care.  Chadderdon  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  100  Mich.  293,  58  N.  W.  998;  Inter- 
national &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Hall  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  52;  Toledo,  St.  L.  & 
K.  C.  R.  Co.  V.  Hauck,  8  Ind.  App.  367,  35  N.  E.  573;  Conlan  v.  Railroad  Co.,  74 


896  NEGLIGENCE.  [Oh.    12 

train  is  not  guilty  of  contributory  negligence  unless  he  fails  to  get 
off  the  track  at  the  earliest  practicable  opportunity  that  a  reason- 
ably pnident  man  would  have  discovered  and  seized.'^" 

Test  of  Mutuality. 

An  invitation  to  go  on  the  premises  of  another  imposes  a  duty  to 
prevent  harm  to  a  person  accepting  it.  Such  invitation  may  be  ex- 
press or  implied,  and  depends  upon  mutuality  of  interest.  Invita- 
tion, therefore,  in  the  technical  sense,  differs  from  invitation  in  the 
ordinary  sense,  implying  the  relation  of  host  and  guest.^'^  "It  is 
well  settled  that  to  come  under  an  implied  invitation,  as  distin- 
guished from  a  mere  license,  the  visitor  must  come  for  a  purpose 
connected  with  the  business  in  which  the  occui)ant  is  engaged,  or 
which  he  permits  to  be  carried  on  there.  There  must  at  least  be 
some  mutuality  of  interest  in  the  subject  to.  which  the  visitor's  busi- 
ness relates,  although  the  particular  thing  which  is  the  object  of 
the  visit  may  not  be  for  the  benefit  of  the  occupant."  ^''^  For  example, 
if  a  person  called  at  the  office  of  a  manufacturer's  establishment  for, 
and  is  granted,  permission  to  see  an  employe,  and  while  searching 
for  such  employ^  is  injured  by  the  machinery,  the  peril  of  which 
was  hidden,  there  can  be  no  recovery.  "To  requiru  the  proprietor^ 
of  a  steamboat,  factory,  or  a  mill,  conducted  in  the  usual  manner, 
whenever  a  man  should  ask  permission  to  see  an  employ^  engaged 
in  Ms  duties,  to  anticipate  that  such  peraon  might  become  involved 

Hun,  115,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  6.59,  distinguishing  Nicholson  v.  Railroad  Co.,  41  N. 
Y.  525;  De  Bolt  v.  Railway  Co.,  123  Mo.  496,  27  S.  W.  575  (where,  however, 
plaintiff's  own  negligence  was  held  to  cause  his  death).  But  if,  after  the  car 
has  been  loaded,  plaintiff  get  onto  the  car  to  remove  a  chute,  he  is  a  mere 
licensee  or  trespasser,  and  defendant  is  not  liable  for  an  accident  caused 
negligently  but  not  willfully.  Cleveland,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stephen- 
son (Ind.  Sup.)  37  N.  E.  720. 

3T0  Ham  V.  Canal  Co.,  155  Pa.  St.  548,  26  Atl.  757,  explaining  Id.,  142  I'a. 
St.  617,  21  Atl.  1012.  One  who  is  wrongfully  ejected  from  train  has  no  right 
to  travel  on  the  railroad  tracks,  if  there  is  any  other  safe  and  convenient 
route.     Verner  v.  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  (Ala.)  15  South.  872. 

371  Campb.  Neg.  §  44. 

3T2  Plummer  v.  Dill,  156  Mass.  426,  427,  31  X.  E,  128.  And  see  Pelton  v. 
Schmidt  (Mich.)  62  N.  W.  552  (teamster  delivering  goods);  Pol.  Torts,  p.  427; 
Whart.  Xeg.  §  350;  Southcote  v.  Stanley,  1  Hurl.  &  N.  247,  criticised  in  Clerk. 
&  L.  Torts,  59;   Pol.  Torts,  p.  427. 


^h-    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  897 

in  some  dangerous  machinery,  liidden  or  open,  would  be  to  exact 
too  high  a  degree  of  diligence;  but  the  presumption  should  be  in- 
dulged that  the  person  making  the  inquiry-  is  acquainted  with  the 
machinery,  its  constriiction  and  position,  and  needs  no  attendant, 
or  otherwise  he  would  have  made  a  request  to  that  eifect."  "'  It 
has,  however,  been  held  that  where  a  former  student  of  a  school, 
in  accordance  with  an  invitation  sent  out  with  the  api^roval  of  the 
college  authorities,  attended  a  meeting  of  a  society  of  which  he  ^\  as 
a  member,  and,  while  leaving  the  room,  fell  into  an  opening  in  the 
floor  of  the  hallway,  only  partially  covered,  he  could  recover  for  in- 
jury caused  thereby.^'*  The  solution  of  the  difficulty  probably  lies 
in  the  division  of  the  subject  into  express  and  implied  invitation, 
and  in  limiting  the  mutuality  of  the  rule  to  the  latter  cases  only.""' 

259.  While  normally  a  breach  of  a  contract  gives  rise  to 
a  cause  of  action  ex  contractu,  a  contract  may 
impose  a  duty  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  as 
party  to  it,  for  the  violation  of  which  the  plaintiff 
may  recover  ex  contractu  or  ex  delicto,  at  his  op- 
tion. The  common-law  liability,  however,  w^ithin 
the  limits  allowed  by  law,  is  regulated  by  the  terms 

S73  Maltbie,  J.,  in  Galveston  Oil  Co.  v.  Moi-tou,  70  Tex.  400,  403,  7  i>. 
W.  756.  And  see  Woolwine's  Adm'r  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co.;  36  W. 
Va.  329,  15  S.  E.  SI.  So  in  Benson  v.  Baltimore  Traction  Co.,  77  ili 
535,  26  Atl.  973,  one  of  a  class  of  boys  viewing  macliinery  by  defendant's 
permission  fell  into  an  uufeneed  pit  of  hot  water.  Because  of  absence 
of  mutuality  of  interest,  the  perniissinu  was  held  not  to  be  an  invitation,  ami 
recovery  was  denied.  And  see  I.aclvat  v.  Lutz,  94  Ky.  2ST,  22  S.  W.  21 S; 
Sterger  v.  Van  Siclilon.  1.32  N.  Y.  499,  :',0  X.  E.  9ST;  Larmore  v.  Crown  Poiul 
Iron  Co.,  101  N.  Y.  391,  4  N.  E.  752;  Wallier  v.  Winstanlcy,  l.Vi  Mai^s. 
301,  29  N.  E.  518.  See,  also,  Gillis  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  59  Pa-  8r. 
129;  Redigan  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  l."i.-)  ilass.  44,  28  N.  E.  1133;  Metcalfii 
V.  (Junard  S.  S.  Co.,  147  Mass.  66,  16  N.  E.  701;  Parlcer  v.  Portland  Pub.  Co., 
69  Me.  173;    Sullivan  v.  AN'aters,  14  Ir.  Com.  l.\w,  4m. 

874  Howe  V.  Olimart,  7  lud.  App.  32,  33  X.  E.  460.  And  see  Davis  v.  Centi-al 
Congregational  Sou.,  129  Mass.  367;  Southcote  v.  Stanley,  1  Hiurl.  &  N.  247; 
Plummer  v.  Dill,  156  Mass.  426,  31  N.  E.  128;    Pol.  Torts,  p.  *427. 

37  6  34  Am.  Law  Reg.  196,  202,  citing  Bigelow.  Torts,  o2(J;  Cooley,  Torts,  004. 
607;    Plummer  v.  Dill,  156  Mass.  426,  31  N.  E.  128. 

LAW  OF  TORTS — 57 


898  NEGLIGEKCE.  [Ch.    12 

of  the  contract,  and  a  party  to  such  contract,  being 
a  party  plaintiflf,  is  determined  in  his  cause  of  ac- 
tion by  the  terms  of  that  contract,  so  far  as  the  la"w 
will  sustain  them. 

While  norm  ally,  as  has  been  seen,  a  breach  of  contract  gives  rise 
to  an  action  ex  contractu,  the  common-law  courts  were  liberal  in 
allowing  the  use  of  an  action  ex  delicto,'' '°  and  especially  where 
there  was  negligence  in  the  performance  of  such  contract. 

All  persons  contracting  to  do  certain  things  owe  a  duty  not  to 
injure  the  person  or  property  of  another  while  in  the  performance 
of  the  contract.  That  duty  does  not  necessarily  depend  on,  or  grow 
out  of,  the  contract.  Thus,  if  one  undertook  the  construction  of  a 
ditch  so  as  to  drain  the  water  oi?  another's  land,  but,  instead,  the 
ditch  was  constructed  so  as  to  gather  surface  water  and  empty  it 
on  his  land,  the  latter  may  maintain  an  action  of  tort  for  the  dam- 
age resulting  from  the  negligence,  and  is  not  confined  to  an  action 
for  a  breach  of  contract.^^'  An  action  for  damages,  on  a  similar 
principle,  may  be  maintained  for  failure  to  discharge  duty  imposed 
by  contract, — to  fence  a  I'ailway  track  and  to  maintain  guards  and 
gates, — whereby  an  adjoining  landowner's  stock  is  killed.^'*     The 

3T6  Ante,  p.  25;    Fromm  v.  Ide,  68  Hun,  310,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  56. 

377  Stock  V.  City  of  Boston,  149  Mass.  410,  21  N.  E.  871.  Tort  will  lie  for 
negligent  construction  or  maintenance  of  a  reservoir,  though  petition  is  the 
remedy  given  for  injuries  resulting  from  a  proper  exercise  of  the  authority  of 
the  statute  for  its  construction.  Aldworth  v.  City  of  Lynn,  153  Mass.  53,  26 
N.  E.  229.  As  to  recovery  in  the  same  proceeding  of  a  cause  of  action  sound- 
ing in  tort  and  a  cause  of  action  in  conti-act,  because  arising  from  the  same 
transaction,  see  Craft  Refrigerating  Mach.  Co.  v.  Quinnipiac  Brewing  Co.,  63 
Conn.  551,  29  Atl.  76;  Central  Vermont  R.  Co.  v.  Soper,  8  C.  C.  A.  341,  59  Fed. 
879;  Whitworth  v.  Darbishire,  5  Reports,  198.  As  to  contract  and  fraud,  see 
Steiiiam  v.  Bell,  7  Misc.  Rep.  31S,  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  905.  Contract  not  fraud  or 
conversion.  Stafford  v.  Azbell,  6  Misc.  Rep.  89,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  41.  The  ac- 
tion against  an  abstractor  is  ex  contractu.  Wacek  v.  Frink,  51  Minn.  282,  53 
X.  W.  633.  Generally,  as  to  election  to  sue  ex  contractu  or  ex  delicto,  see 
City  of  Elgin  v.  Joslyn,  1.36  111.  525,  26  N.  E.  1090;  Aldine  Manuf'g  Co.  v, 
Barnard,  84  Mich.  632,  48  N.  W.  281);  Parker  v.  Knox,  60  Hun,  550,  15  N.  Y. 
Sunp.  256;  Barndt  v.  Frederick,  78  Wis.  1,  47  N.  W.  6;  People  v.  Wood,  121 
X.  Y.  522.  24  N.  E.  952;  Nysewander  v.  Lowman,  124  Ind.  584,  24  X.  E.  .355; 
Tc!wnsbip  of  Buckeye  v.  Clark,  90  Mich.  432,  51  N.  W.  528. 

37S  Toledo,  St.  L.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Burgan,  9  Ind.  App.  604,  37  N.  E.  31; 


^^-   12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  '  899 

duty  of  a  railroad  compuny,  under  such  a  contract,  is  a  continuing 
one,  running  with  the  hmd.^'" 

Applied  to  Master  and  Servant. 

The  duty  owed  the  servant,  for  example,  in  respect  to  the  condi- 
tion of  premises  and  machinery,  has  been  supposed  to  exist  by 
virtue  of  contract.^^o  But  duty,  if  derived  from  contract  at  all,  is 
only  implied  in  it;  and,  if  new  terms  are  to  be  inserted  into  the 
agreement,  every  duty  which  the  master  owes  might  be  treated  as 
contractual,  and  thus  the  servant  might  sue  the  master  in  contract 
for  assault  and  battery.  The  universal  trend  of  authority  on  analo- 
gous cases  is  to  regard  such  duty  as  not  contractual,  but  as  of  the 
general  law.  It  does  not  appear  Mhy  the  duty  due  from  a  carrier 
to  a  passenger  should  be  under  the  general  law,  and  that  due  a 
servant  by  the  carrier  should  be  contractual,  where  both  the  passen- 
ger and  servant  are  injured  by  the  same  accident.^" 

Applied  to  Telegraph  Companies. 
.  A  telegraph  or  telephone  company,  even  if  not  held  to  the  same 
duties,  or  to  the  performances  of  duties  in  the  same  manner,  as  a 
common  carrier,^  ^^  is  engaged  in  a  quasi  public  employment,  and 
owes  a  recognized  public  duty."*''  Such  a  company  is  bound  to  exer- 
cise due  diligence  both  to  correctly^**  and  promptly^*"  transmit 

Toledo,  St.  L.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Fenstemaker,  3  Ind.  App.  151,  29  N.  E.  440; 
Toledo,  St.  L.  &  K.  C.  I^.  Co.  v.  Cosand,  6  Ind.  App.  222,  33  N.  B.  251. 

37  9  Midland  R.  Co.  v.  Fisher,  12.5  Ind.  19,  24  N.  E.  756;  Terre  Haute  &  I. 
R.  Co.  V.  Schaefer,  5  Ind.  App.  86,  31  N.  E.  557;  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Fisliback,  5  Ind.  App.  403,  32  N.  E.  346;  Bond  v.  Evansville  &  T.  H.  R.  Co., 
100  Ind.  301. 

380  Albro  V.  Jaquith,  4  Graj'  (Mass.)  99;  Coombs  v.  New  Bedford  Cordage 
Co.,  102  JIass.  572. 

3  81  Bigelow,  Lead.  Cas.  707;  Jervis,  C.  J.,  in  Marshall  v.  York,  N.  &  B.  Ry. 
Co.,  11  C.  B.  0.">5.  A  plaintiff  injured  by  the  wrongful  act  of  defendant  in 
running  trains  faster  than  the  ordinance  allowed  is  determined  as  to  his  right 
by  the  ordinance,  and  not  by  the  contract  of  employment.  Bluedorn  y.  Mis- 
souri Pac.  R.  Co.,  IDS  Mo.  439,  18  S.  W.  1103. 

382  Ante,  p.  298,  "Discharge  of  Torts  by  Contract  before  a  Wrong." 

383  Ayer  v.  "W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  79  Me.  493,  10  Atl.  49.j;  Dorgan  v.  Telegraph 
Co.,  1  Am.  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  406,  per  William,  J. 

384  Cahn  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  48  Fed.  810  (where  there  was  no  liability);  White 
V.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  14  Fed.  710;  Jones  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  18  Fed.  817.  And 
see  post,  p.  O.'iO,  "Damages." 

385  Fleischner  v.  Pacific  Postal  Tel.  Co.,  55  Fed.  738. 


900  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

the  message  aud  to  deliver  it  to  the  person  to  whom  it  is  sent.''* 
But  it  owes  no  duty  to  a  person  not  a  party  to  the  contract,  when 
there  is  no  information,  direct  or  indirect,  that  the  contract  is  for 
his  benefit.'^"  Ho'^^ever,  the  measure  of  damages  for  breach  of  duty 
to  the  sender  of  a  message  is  rather  that  of  contract,  not  of  torts. ''^* 
Accordingly,  the  law  of  torts  would  seem  to  apply  to  the  recipient 
of  the  message,  who  is  a  stranger  to  the  contract,  rather  than  to  the 
sendei',  who  is  a  party  to  it.^^" 

Ap2died  to  Bailments. 

An  action  in  tort,  for  negligence,  lies  against  a  bailee  for  breach 
of  recognized  duty.'^" 

The  bailee  is  bound  to  take  care  of  property  intrusted  to  him.  If, 
without  negligence  on  his  part  of  which  the  bailor  can  complain, 
and  without  abuse  of  the  terms  of  this  bailment,  damage  ensues, 
there  can  be  no  recovery.  His  liability  continues  only  during  the 
period  ^^^  of  the  contract.'"^ 

S86  w.  U.  Tel.  Co.  T.  Timmous,  9.3  Ga.  34.5,  20  S.  E.  649;  W.  U.  Tel!  Co.  v. 
Bates,  93  Ga.  352,  20  S.  E.  639. 

3  87  w.  U.  Tel.  Co.  V.  Wood,  6  C.  0.  A.  432,  57  Fed.  471.  And  see  W.  U.  Tel. 
Co.  V.  Fore  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  20  S.  W.  7S3. 

388  Garrett  v.  W.  XJ.  Tel.  Co.  (Iowa)  58  N.  W.  10«4;  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Hall, 
124  U.  S.  444,  8  Sup.  Ct.  577.  Cf.  Playford  v.  United  Kingdom  Electric  Tel. 
Co.,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  700;  Dickson  v.  Renter's  Tel.  Co.,  3  C.  P.  Div.  1.  As  to 
remoteness  of  damage,  see  Cahn  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  40  B'ed.  40;  Id.,  1  C.  C.  A. 
107,  48  Fed.  810.  Where  plaintiff,  through  delay  in  receiving  a  telegram, 
made  a  journey  which  he  would  not  have  made  until  later  if  it  had  been  re- 
ceived, he  is  entitled  to  recover  only  the  inci-eased  expenses  of  the  premature 
journey.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Bates,  93  Ga.  352,  20  S.  E.  639;  ante,  c.  5,  "Senti- 
mental Damages." 

389  New  York  &  W.  P.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Dryburg,  35  Pa.  St.  298.  The  sendee  of  a 
telegraphic  message  cannot  maintain  an  action  against  a  telegraph  company 
for  delay  or  nondelivery  of  a  message,  in  the  absence  of  a  showing  that  it 
was  sent  by  his  agent  or  for  his  benefit,  and  that  the  company  had  notice 
that  it  was  so  sent.    Butner  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  (Okl.)  37  Pac.  1087. 

380  As  to  bm'den  of  proof,  see  Wintringham  v.  Hayes,  144  N.  Y.  1,  38  N.  E. 
999;  Townsend  v.  Rich  (Minn.)  60  N.  W.  545.  A  mere  depositary  is  answerable 
only  for  such  gross  negligence  as  is  equal  to  fraud.  Foster  v.  Bauk,  17  Mass. 
479;   Sodowsky  v.  M'Faland,  3  Dana  (Ky.)  204. 

391  Brown  v.  Hitchcock,  2  Williams  (Vt.)  452. 

39  2  A  bailee,   after  expiration   of  hiring,  and  pending   return   of  property 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  901 

While  failure  to  return  property  involved  in  a  bailment  may  give 
rise  to  an  action  in  trover,^"^  the  loss  of  a  hired  chattel  while  in  the 
possession  of  the  hirer  may  be  actionable  as  negligence.^"*  But 
mere  failure  to  return  the  property  is  not  negligence,  unless  there 
be  proof  of  carelessness  on  the  part  of  the  bailee.  Thus,  property 
may  be  stolen, ^"'^  an  animal  may  die,  and  no  liability  attach  to 
the  bailee.  As  has  been  shown,  Coggs  ^^  Bernard  ^"'^  established  the 
law  as  to  the  degrees  of  care,  respectively,  required  in  various  kinds 
of  bailments.  Accordingly,  gross  negligence  may  make  liable  gratui- 
tous bailees  of  securities  left  as  a  special  deposit,  stolen  by  a  cash- 
jgp  398  A^n^^  on  the  other  hand,  assumpsit  may  be  maintained  if  the 
destruction  of  the  property  involved  in  the  bailment  was  occasioned 
by  actionable  negligence.^''" 

What  the  terms  of  a  particular  bailment  may  require  is  partially 
subject  to  control  by  the  parties,  but  also,  in  large  measure,  to  regu- 
lation by  the  state.  It  is  not  feasible  in  this  book  to  undertake 
the  discussion  at  length  of  the  subjects  of  innkeepers,  warehouse- 
men, and  the  like.*""  The  general  principles  involved,  however, 
may  be  well  illustrated  in  the  case  of  common  carriers. 

would  not  seem  to  be  liable  for  failure  to  insure.    Young  v.  Leary,  135  N.  T. 
.jG9,  32  N.  E.  GOT. 

393  American  Preservers'  Co.  v.  Drescher,  4  Misc.  Rep.  482,  24  N.  Y.  Supp. 
361.  As  to  liability  of  a  miller,  see  Wallace  v.  Canaday,  4  Sneed  (Tenn.)  364. 
A  warehouseman  need  not  show  the  precise  manner  in  which  the  loss  oc- 
curred.    Lichtenhein  v.  Boston  &  P.  R.  Co.,  11  Cush.  (Mass.)  70. 

394  u.  S.  V.  Yukers,  9  C.  C.  A.  171,  60  Fed.  641. 

395  Cass  V.  Boston  &  L.  R.  Co.,  14  Allen  (Mass.)  448.  Cf.  Chenowith  v. 
Dickinson,  8  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  156. 

397  2  Ld.  Raym.  !X)9. 

39  8  Preston  v.  Prather,  137  U.  S.  604,  11  Sup.  Ct.  162;  Gray  v.  Merriam, 
148  IlL  179,  35  X-  E.  810.  Cf.  Hibernia  Bldg.  Ass'n  v.  McGrath,  l.")4  Pa. 
St.  296,  26  Atl.  377.  Where  defendant  bon-owed  coins  from  plaintiff  for  ex- 
hibition in  its  museum,  it  is  liable  for  their  loss  by  reason. of  its  gross  negli- 
gence, though  it  passed  a  resolution  that  it  would  not  be  responsible  in  any 
way,  and  so  notified  plaintiff.  Smith  v.  Library  Board  of  City  of  Jlinncap- 
olis  (Minn.)  59  N.  W.  979. 

399  Zell  V.  Dunkle,  156  Pa.  St.  M^.S,  27  Atl.  38.  And  see  Ballou  v.  Earle,  17 
R.  I.  441,  22  Atl.  1113. 

400  The  law  of  innkeepers  is  a  branch  of  the  law  bailments.  An  inn  is  "a 
house  where  a  traveler  is  furnished  with  everything  he  has  occasion  for 
while  on  his  way."     Thompson   v.   Lacy,   3  Bnrn   &   Aid.   2S3.     A   bn.arrlinc 


902  NEGLIGK.NCE.  [Ch.   12 

A2^pl'icd  (o  Carriers. 

There  can  be  no  question  as  to  the  right  of  one  injured  in  person 
or  property  by  a  common  carrier  to  sue  ex  delicto  or  ex  contractu; 
that  is,  to  sue  on  the  common-law  duty  arising  from  the  relation- 
ship, or  on  the  contract  entered  into.*°^  And,  when  he  sues  ex 
delicto,  he  does  not  sue  on  the  agreement,  but  on  the  common-law  duty 

house  is  not  an  inn.  Dansey  y.  Richardson,  3  El.  &  Bl.  144.  But  a  restaurant 
Iceeper  is  liable,  in  the  al)sen(e  of  due  care,  for  the  loss  of  a  customer's  wraps 
left  in  his  charge.  Bunnell- v.  Stern,  L'5  N.  E.  910,  122  N.  Y.  539,  and  Bird 
V.  Evei-ard  (Com.  I'l.  N.  Y.)  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  lOOS,  followed.  Buttman  v. 
Dennett  (Com.  PI.  N.  Y.)  30  X.  Y.  Supp.  247.  An  innkeeper  is  by  common 
law  responsible  for  the  loss  in  his  inn  (infra  hospitium)  of  the  goods  of  a 
traveler  who  is  his  guest,  except  when  the  loss  arises  from  the  wrong  of 
the  guest,  the  act  of  God,  or  of  the  public  enemy.  Berry,  J.,  in  Lusk  v. 
Belote,  22  Minn.  468;  2  Kent,  Comm.  592-597;  Shaw  v.  Berry,  31  Me.  478; 
Sibley  v.  Aldrich,  33  N.  H.  553;  Hulett  y.  Swift,  33  N.  Y.  571;  Wilkins  v. 
Earle,  44  X.  Y.  172;  1  Chit.  Cent.  (11th  Am.  Ed.)  674-077,  and  notes.  For  the 
innkeeper  is  bound  in  law  to  keep  his  guest's  goods  and  chattels  within  his 
inn  without  any  stealing  or  pmloining;  and  it  is  no  excuse  for  the  inn- 
keeper to  say  that  he  delivered  the  guest  the  key  of  the  chamber  in  which 
he  is  lodged,  and  that  he  left  the  chamber  unlocked.  But  the  innkeeper  is 
not  liable  if  his  guest's  horse  has  been  put  in  pasture  by  his  owner's  request, 
and  is  stolen;  for  this  is  not  infra  hospitium.  Calye's  Case,  8  Coke,  32; 
Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  (H.  &.  W.'s  Ed.)  *194,  and  notes.  Commonly,  modern 
statutes  provide  for  modification  of  the  liability,  and  for  the  discharge  of 
liability  on  the  part  of  tlie  landlord,  on  compliance  with  statutory  require- 
ments of  posting  notice  that  all  valuables  must  be  left  in  the  safe  of  the  office 
of  the  inn.  Under  such  a  statute  a  guest  at  a  public  inn  may  retain  personal 
custody  of  necessary  wearing  apparel;  and  jewelry  worn  daily  by  her  need 
not  be  deposited  with  the  innkeeper,  when  not  in  use,  to  make  him  liable  for 
its  loss  by  Are.  (26  Pac.  1099,  affirmed)  Eay  v.  Pacific  Imp.  Co.,  93  Cal.  2.53,  28 
Pac.  943.  An  interesting  article  on  the  liability  of  innkeepers  for  the  commis- 
sion of  illegal  acts  on  their  premises,  with  numerous  English  authorities.  J. 
P.,  reprinted  in  23  Ir.  Law  T.  382.  The  Pullman  Palace-Car  Co.  has  been 
held  to  the  same  liability  as  an  innkeeper.  Pullman  Palace-Car  Co.  v.  Lowe, 
28  Xeb.  239,  44  X.  AV.  220.  As  to  liabilities  of  owners  and  operators  of  ele- 
vators, see  Goodsell  v.  Taylor,  41  Minn.  207,  42  X.  W.  873:  Treadwell  v.  M'^hit- 
tier,  80  Cal.  574,  22  Pac.  266.  And  see  authorities  collected  in  Mitchell  v. 
Marker,  2.5  Lawy.  Rep.  Ann.  33,  62  Fed.  1.39. 

id  Common  carriers  may  be  sued  either  in  case  on  the  custom  or  in  as- 
sumpsit on  their  contract.  Orange  v.  Brown,  9  Wend.  85.  And  see  McCall 
V.  Forsyth,  4  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  179;  Porter  v.  Hildebrand,  14  Pa.  St.  129- 
132;    Mershon  v.  Hobensack,   22  N.  J.   Law,  373;    Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F-  R- 


^h-    12]  ESSEN'TIAI.    ELEMENTS.  903 

to  carry  safely."^  Indeed,  the  original  liability  of  a  common  car- 
rier was  exclusively  ex  delicto.-"'^  The  first  innovation,  the  result 
of  which  was  to  allow  assumpsit  to  be  brought,  is  said  to  have  been 
made  in  1750  in  Dale  v.  Hall."*  The  obligations  and  liability  of  a 
railroad  company  are  of  a  general  and  public  character,  and  do  not 
depend  primarily  upon  the  contract  between  ihe  parties."'  There- 
fore, recovery  may  be  had  against  a  railroad  company  for  its  failure 
to  care  properly  for  the  safety  and  security  of  the  public,  where  it 
would  not  lie  on  the  contract.'""' 

Under  the  code  pleading,  formal  distinctions  between  actions  are 

Co.  v.  Dill,  48  Kan.  210,  29  Pac.  148;  Baltimore  City  R.  Co.  y.  Kemp,  61  Md, 
619;  Nevin  v.  Pullman,  etc.,  Co.,  106  111.  222;  Centi-al  Railroad  &  Banking  Co. 
V.  Pickett,  87  Ga.  734,  13  S.  E.  750.  Cf.  Oliattanooga,  R.  &  0.  R.  Co.  V. 
Palmer,  89  Ga.  161,  15  S.  E.  34.  The  court  determines  whether  the  contract 
of  the  carrier  is  on  the  custom  or  is  a  special  contract.  Kimball  y.  Rutland 
&  B.  R.  Co.,  26  Vt.  247.  And  see  as  to  effect  of  deviation  from  prescribed 
mode  of  shipment,  Pavitt  v.  Lehigh  "S'al.  R.  R.,  153  Pa.  St.  302,  25  AtL  1107. 
The  Queen  of  Pacific,  61  Fid.  213;  Bancroft- Whitney  Co.  v.  Pacific  Coast 
Steamship  Co.,  Id. 

■402  Bretheitou  v.  Wood,  3  Brod.  &  B.  54;  Baltimore  City  R.  Co.  v.  Kemp, 
61  Md.  619;  Wheeler  v.  Oceanic  Steam  Nav.  Co.,  125  N.  Y.  155-1G2,  26  N.  E. 
248;  Citizens'  St.  R.  Co.  of  Indianapolis  v.  Willoeby,  134  Ind.  563,  33  N.  E. 
627;  Central  Railroad  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Pickett,  87  Ga.  734,  13  S.  E.  750. 

403  Merritt  v.  Earle,  31  Barb.  38;  People  v.  Willett,  26  Barb.  79;  Heirn 
V.  JIcGaughan,  32  Miss.  17;  Johnson  v.  Richardson,  17  111.  303;  Bretherton  v. 
Wood,  3  Brod.  &  B.  .54; 

■104  1  Wils.  281. 

40  5  But  the  ordinary  action  for  damages  by  a  passenger  is  ex  delicto,  not 
ex  contractu.  Therefore,  if  plaintiff  sues  one  of  two  railroad  companies  for 
Injuries  caused  by  derailment,  and  is  defeated,  this  is  no  bar  to  a  suit  against 
the  other,  Atlantic  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Laird,  7  0.  C.  A.  489,  58  Fed.  760.  And 
see  Hannibnl  R.  Co.  v.  Swift,  12  Wall.  262;  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Derby,  14  How.  468.  So  action  for  refusal  to  stop  at  destination  is  usually 
ex  delicto,  not  ex  contractu.  Fordyce  v.  Nix,  58  Ark.  136,  23  S.  W.  967. 
Thus  putting  a  passenger  off  at  a  point  not  destination  gives  a  cause  of 
action  ex  delicto,  not  ex  contractu.  New  Orleans,  J.  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Hurst. 
36  Miss.  660.  An  action  against  a  railway  company  for  refusing  to  deliver 
goods  to  an  unpai,.  vendor,  who  has  stopped  them  in  transit,  is  an  action 
ex  delicto.     Pontifex  v.  Midland  R.  Co.,  3  Q.  B.  Div.  23,  47  Law  J.  Q.  B.  28. 

406  Sawyer  v.  Rutland  &  B.  R.  Co.,  27  Vt.  370. 


tK)4  NKGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

iibolished.  Regavd  is  had  to  the  facts  constituting  the  cause  of 
complaint,  and  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  the  most  ample  redress 
and  relief  Mhich  the  facts  will  justify;  and,  unless  a  special  con- 
tract Terj'  clearly  appears  to  be  made  the  gravamen,  an  objection 
to  the  complaint  in  an  action  against  a  common  carrier,  as  for  ex- 
ample in  carrying  a  passenger  beyond  his  destination,  is  founded 
in  tort.*"  AYliei-e  there  is  a  special  contract,  varying  the  liability 
of  the  carrier  ^Yithin  limits  allowed  by  law,  the  action  is  properly 
brought  on  the  special  contract,  but  not  counting  in  tort  upon  the 
public  duty  of  the  carrier.*"^  AVhere  a  common  carrier  limits  his 
liability,  not  caused  by  negligence,  through  a  contract  stipulation, 
the  owner  of  goods  destroyed  by  fire  must  sue  in  contract,  and  not 
on  the  common-law  liability,  ex  delicto.*"" 

260.  A  contract  ordinarily  creates  no  duty,  except  to  par- 
ties and  privies.  Therefore,  the  normal  rule  is  that 
no  action  ex  delicto  may  be  maintained  by  stran- 
gers to  it  for  its  negligent  breach. 

Thus,  in  actions  against  members  of  the  bar  for  negligence, 
it  is  well  settled  that  only  the  person  with  whom  the  attorney  con- 
tracts can  maintain  the  action,  for  it  is  to  him  alone  that  the  at- 

407  Heirn  v.  McCaughan,  32  Miss.  17;  New  Orleans,  J.  &  G.  N.  R.  v.  Hurst, 
36  Miss.  660. 

*08  2  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law,  903;  Bliss,  Code  PI.  §  14;  1  Bate,  PI.  372; 
Oxley  V.  Railway  Co.,  65  Mo.  629;  Boaz  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  87  Ga,  463,  13  S. 
E.  711;  Indianapolis,  D.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Forsythe,  4  Ind.  App.  326,  29  N. 
E.  ll.SS;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Touart,  97  Ala.  514,  11  South.  756;  John- 
stcjiie  r.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  39  S.  C.  55,  17  S.  E.  512. 

409  Indianapolis  &  D.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Forsythe,  4  Ind.  App.  326,  29  N.  E.  1138. 
But  where  the  carrier  does  not  stipulate  in  a  special  contract  against  liability 
for  his  own  negligence  (even  if  it  could  do  so  effectively),  the  existence  of  such 
.special  contract  for  the  shipment  of  live  stock,  with  certain  stipulations  there- 
in exempting  the  carrier  from  liability,  is  no  obstacle  to  the  maintinance  of 
an  action  of  tort  based  on  its  legal  duty,  and  a  breach  thereof  by  negligence. 
The  special  contract  will  be  a  defense  only  in  connection  with  evidence  show- 
ing that  the  loss  or  injury  complained  of  was  not  caused  by  the  negligence 
alleged.  Nicoll  v.  East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.,  89  Ga.  260,  15  S.  B.  309. 
And  see  White  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  2  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  7. 


^'')-    1^]  JCSSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  905 

torney  owes  a  particular  duty.""  On  the  same  principle,  it  has 
been  held  that,  ^^•hel■e  a  servant,  having  a  ticket,  is  injured  while 
riding  on  a  railway  train,  he  can  sue  in  contract  or  tort,  but  the 
master  cannot  maintain  his  action  against  the  company  for  the 
loss  of  the  service  of  his  servant,  because  it  ^\as  caused  by  a  breach 
of  contract  to  which  he  was  not  a  party.*"  So,  in  Winterbottom 
V.  Wright,*^^  the  defendant  hired  a  mail  coach  from  the  postmaster 
general,  and  contracted  to  keep  it  in  repair.  A  tliii'd  person  also 
contracted  to  furuisli  horses  for  the  coach,  and  the  plaintiff  hired 
to  drive  it  for  such  third  person.  The  coach  broke  down,  and  the 
plaintiff  was  injured;  and  he  was  not  allowed  to  recover,  because, 
"if  we  were  to  hold  that  the  plaintiff  could  sue  in  such  a  case, 
there  is  no  point  at  which  such  action  would  stop.  The  only  safe 
rule  is  to  confine  the  right  to  recover  to  those  who  enter  into  the 
contract.  If  we  go  one  step  beyond  that,  there  is  no  reason  why 
we  should  not  go  fifty."  A  further  reason  assigned  is  that  "the 
object  of  the  parties  in  insei-ting  in  their  contract  specific  under- 
takings with  respect  t(j  the  work  to  be  done  is  to  create  obliga- 
tions and  duties  inter  sese.  These  engagements  and  undertakings 
must  necessarily  be  subject  to  modifications  and  waiver  by  the 
contracting  parties.  If  third  persons  can  acquire  a  right  in  the 
contract,  in  the  nature  of  a  duty  to  have  it  performed  as  contracted 

*io  Dundee  Mortgage  &  Trust  Inv.  Oo.  v.  Hughes,  20  Fed.  39;  Savings 
Bank  v.  Ward,  100  U.  S.  395;  Fisli  v.  Kelly,  17  C.  B.  (X.  S.)  194.  So  a  notary 
is  liable  only  to  party  to  original  deed  as  to  Mbom  he  had  made  a  false  cer- 
tificate. Ware  v.  Brown,  2  Bond,  267,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  17,170.  A  register  of 
deeds  is  liable  in  damages  for  a  false  certificate  of  title  only  to  the  party 
employing  him  to  make  a  search,  and  not  to  his  assignee  or  alienee.  House- 
man v.  Gu-ard  Mut.  Bldg.  &  Loan  Ass'n,  81  Pa.  St.  256.  Where,  under 
coverture,  the  wife  could  not  contract,  and  her  alleged  servant  was  guilty 
of  negligence,  the  action  is  against  the  husband,  and  not  against  the  wife. 
Ferguson  v.  Neilson,  17  R.  I.  81,  20  Atl.  229. 

411  Alton  V.  Midland  R.  Co.,  19  0.  B.  (N.  S.)  23.  Et  vide  BeiTinger  v. 
(ireat  Ea.oiern  R.  Co.,  4  C.  P.  Div.  163.  Cf.  Gladwell  v.  Steggall,  5  Bing.  N. 
C.  733;    Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  158. 

412  10  Mees.  &  W.  100.  Ft  vide  Parry  v.  Smith,  4  C.  P.  Div.  32.:,,  48  Law 
.T.  C.  P.  731,  41  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  93;  Heaven  v.  Pender,  9  Q.  B.  Div.  302; 
George  v.  Skivington,  L.  R.  5  Exch.  1;  Collett  v.  London  &  N.  R.  Co.,  16  Q. 
B.  984.  These  and  other  English  cases  will  be  found  discussed  in  Ball, 
Lead.  Cas.  Torts,  tit.  "Negligence." 


906  KEGI.IGEN-CE.  [Ch.    12 

for,  the  parties  will  be  deprived  of  control   over  their  own  con- 
tract." "^ 

S61.  Neither  the  contract  itself  nor  its  limitations  exclude 
liability  to  third  persons  for  negligence  where  it 
•would  attach  under  the  logical  application  of  the 
normal  principles  of  negligence.  Actions  for  dam- 
ages may  be  maintained  by  persons  -who  are  neither 
parties  nor  privies  to  a  contract,  when  the  injury 
complained  of  arises  from  w^ant  of  care — 

(a)  With  respect  to  a  dangerous  thing  sold; 

(b)  Occurring  in  the  performance  of  a  contract  resulting 

in  direct  and  immediate  damage  to  one's  person  or 
property. 

Damage  Caused  by  Dangerous  Thivgs. 

If  a  common-law  duty  results  from  the  facts,  the  party  may  be 
sued  in  tort  for  any  negligence  or  misfeasance  in  the  execution  of 
the  contract.*^*  This  applies  to  articles  which  are  imminently 
dangerous.*^ ^  Thus,  in  the  celebrated  case  of  Thomas  y.  Winches- 
ter,*^" a  manufacturer  of  and  dealer  in  vegetable  extracts  for  medi- 
cal purposes  was  sued  by  a  stranger  for  damages  suffered  by  him 
because  of  the  use  of  one  of  such  preparations,  labeled  as  extract  of 
dandelion,  a  harmless  medicine,  but  which  was,  in  fact,  the  ex- 
tract of.  belladonna,  a  poison.  It  was  held  that  the  defendant's 
negligence  had  put  human  life  into  imminent  danger,  and  that  his 
duty  arose  out  of  the  nature  of  the  business  and  the  danger  to 
others  incident  to  his  mismanagement.      He  was  therefore  held 

413  Marvin  Safe  Co.  v.  Ward,  46  N.  .T.  Law,  19;  White  v.  Norfolk  &  S.  R. 
Cc,  115  N.  C.  031,  20  S.  .B.  191.  In  this  case  it  wa.s  held  that  a  corporation 
chartered  as  a  common  carrier,  with  power  to  use  steamboats  as  well  as 
trains,  is  liable  as  a  carrier  to  a  passenger  on  one  of  its  boats,  though  the 
boat  is  at  the  time  let  for  an  excursion,  where  it  also  lets  the  crew,  which 
is  still  in  its  pay,  and  subject  to  be  discharged  or  changed  by  it.  And,  gen- 
erally, see  Whitt.  Smith,  Neg.  pp.  10.  11. 

414  1  Chit.  ri.  13D. 

415  2  Suth.  Dam.  43.j. 

416  In  Heaven  v.  Pender,  11  Q.  B.  Div.  508,  Brett,  M.  R.,  said  he  doubted 
whether  this  case  did  not  go  too  far. 


Ch-    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  907 

liable  in  damages,  although  there  was  no  privity  betAveen  him  and 
the  injured  party.  In  Langridge  v.  Levy,*"  A.  bought  a  gun,  which 
was  warranted.  He  gave  tliis  gun  to  B.,  who  was  injured  by  its  ex- 
plosion. It  was  held  that  A.  ahme  t-ould  sue  in  contract,  and  that 
B.'s  cause  of  action  was  in  tort. 

Poisons,*^*  spoiled  food,""  or  materials  otherwise  mischievous"'* 

417  2  Mees.  &  W.  519,  4  Jlees.  &  W.  337.  And  see  George  v.  Skivington. 
L.  R.  5  Exch.  1.  Cf.  Dixon  v.  Bell,  5  JIaule  i:  S.  198;  Harris  v.  Cameron, 
81  Wis.  239,  51  N.  W.  437.  And  see  Renner  v.  Canfield,  36  Minn.  90,  30' 
N.  \V.  43.J. 

418  Walton  V.  Booth,  34  La.  Ann.  913.  Sulphate  of  zinc  sold  for  Epsom 
salts:  "The  question  is  whether  the  deliveiy  at  a  drug  store  of  a  deleterious 
drug  to  one  who  calls  for  one  that  is  harmless,  and  damage  resulting  there- 
from, of  themselves,  give  a  right  of  action,  even  though  there  may  have  been 
no  intentional  Avrong,  and  the  juiy  may  believe  there  is  no  negligence.  That 
such  an  error  might  occur  without  fault  on  the  part  of  the  druggist  or  his- 
clerk  is  readily  supposable.  He  might  have  bought  his  drugs  from  a  reput- 
able dealer,  in  whose  warehouse  they  have  been  tampered  with  for  the  pur- 
pose of  mischief.  It  is  easy  to  suggest  accident  after  they  come  to  his  (jWii 
possession,  or  wrongs  by  others,  of  which  lie  would  be  ignorant,  and  against 
which  a  high  degree  of  care  would  not  give  perfect  protection.  But  how 
misfortune  occurs  is  unimportant.  If,  under  all  circumstances,  the  fact  of 
occurrence  is  attributable  to  him  as  a  legal  fault.  The  case  is  one  in  whicli 
a  high  degree  of  care  may  justly  be  required.  *  *  *  it  is  proper  and  rea- 
sonable that  the  care  required  shall  be  proportionate  to  the  danger  involved. 
But  we  do  not  find  that  the  authorities  have  gone  so  far  as  to  dispen.se 
with  actual  negligence  as  a  necessary  element  in  the  liability  when  a  mis- 
take has  occurred."  Brown  v.  Marshall,  47  Mich.  576,  11  N.  AY.  3012. 
Norton  v.  Sewall,  106  JIass.  143;  Savings  Bank  v.  Ward,  100  U.  S.  105.  Where 
a  passenger  on  a  steamer  was  injured  by  a  mistake  of  a  physician  in  gdving 
a  dose  of  calomel  in  response  to  a  request  for  quinine,  natural  confusion 
aboard  ship  was  held  to  negative  negligence.  Allan  v.  State  S.  S.  Co.,  132 
N.  Y.  91,  30  X.  E.  482..  Et  vide  Quin  v.  Moore,  l."  N.  Y.  432;  Hansford  v- 
Payne,  11  Bush  (Ky.)  381.     The  use  of  a  dye,  like  mordant,  ordinarily  harm- 


no  Craft  V.  rarker,  Webb  &  Co.,  96  Mich.  245,  55  X.  AV.  812."  As  to  con- 
taminated water,   see  Buckingham  v.  Plymouth  AA'ater  Co.,  142  Pa.  St.  221. 

21  Atl.  S24. 

420  As  distinguished  from  a  trespass,  Gwynn  v.  Duffield,  66  Iowa,  708,  24 
N.  AV.  523;  or  one  who  took  an  overdose  of  poison,  not  labeled  according  to 
statute,  but  with  respect  to  which  he  had  been  acUially  warned,  Wohlfahrt 
V.  Beckert,  92  N.  Y.  490.  Cf.  Osborne  v.  JIcMasters,  40  Minn.  903,  41  N.  AA'. 
543. 


008  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

or  dangerous,*"  wliicla  do  damage  to  innocent  third  persons,  attach 
liability  to  the  vendor  or  manufacturer  only  when  he  has  been 
guilty  of  negligence.*--  His  duty  is  not  ordinai'ily  absolute, 
'  but  he  must  exercise  a  very  high  degree  of  care.  He  is  not  liable 
for  latent  defects  in  things  sold, — for  example,  machinery, — but 
he  is  liable  for  obvious  defects.*^*  "The  rule  is  limited,  however, 
axid  justly  so,  to  instrumentalities  and  articles  in  their  nature  cal- 
culated to  do  injury,  such  as  are  essentially  and  in  their  elements 

less,  does  not  make  the  mauufacturer  liable  to  a  purchaser  poisoned  by  hand- 
ling cloth,  when  he  ueitlier  knew,  nor  had  reason  tL,  know,  that  the  clotli  so 
■dyed  would  be  injurious.  Gould  v.  Slater  Woolen  Co.,  147  Mass.  315,  17  N. 
B.  531.  Defendant  sold  food  for  animals,  containing  a  small  quantity  ofl 
lead,  accidentally  mixed  with  it  during  a  fire,  and  was  lield  liable  for  tha 
value  of  the  cattle  poisoned.  Wilson  v.  Dnnyille,  6  Ir.  Law  Rep.  210;  French 
v.  "S'ining,  102  Mass.  132.  And,  generally,  see  George  v.  Skivington,  L.  R. 
r,  Bxch.  1;  Brufe  v.  Mali,  36  N.  X.  400;  Bishop  v.  Weber,  139  Mass.  411,  1  N. 
E.  154;  Davis  v.  Guarnieri,  45  Ohio,  470,  15  X.  E.  .'J.-iO;  Look  v.  Litchfield, 
42  N.  Y.  351. 

*2i  As  chloride  of  lime  stored  in  vessel.  Brass  v.  Maitland,  6  Bl.  &  Bl. 
470,  per  Crompton,  J.  Et  vide  Farrant  v.  Barnes,  11  0.  B.  (N.  S.)  553  (carboy 
of  nitric  acid).  Explosive  oil,  Quin  v.  Moore,  15  N.  Y.  432;  Elkins  v.  Mc- 
Kean,  79  Ta.  St.  493.  Et  vide  Fleet  v.  HoUenkemp,  13  B.  Hon.  (Ky.)  219, 
where  defendant's  liability  was  held  to  be  absolute. 

422  Where  a  vendor  of  a  horse  fraudulently  concegJs^the  fact  that  it  is 
afflicted  with  glanders,  he  is  liable  for  the  death  of  one  employed  by  the 
owner  to  take  care  of  the  horse,  who  contracts  the  disease  as  a  natural  and 
probable  consequence.  State  v.  Fox  (Md.)  29  Atl.  601  (reviewingi  cases).  Of. 
Hill  V.  Balls,  2  Hurl.  &  N.  299. 

■424  A  manufacturer  is  not  liable  for  explosion  of  a  steam  thrashing  engine 
because  of  defects  not  known  to  him.  Heizer  v.  Kingsland  &  Douglass 
Manuf'g  Co.,  110  Mo.  605,  19  S.  W.  630.  And  see  Losee  v.  Clute,  51  N.  Y. 
494;  Loop  v.  Litchfield,  42  N.  Y.  351;  Losee  v.  Buchauuau,  51  N.  Y.  476; 
King  V.  New  York  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  66  N.  Y.  181,  72  N.  Y.  607;  Davidson  v. 
Nichols,  11  Allen,  514;  Mai'shaU  v.  Welwood,  38  N.  J.  Law,  339;  Horsfall 
V.  Thomas,  1  Hurl.  &  C.  90.  The  manufacturer  and  vendor  of  a  steam  boiler 
is  only  liable  to  the  purchaser  for  defective  material,  or  for  any  want  of  care 
and  skill  in  its  construction,  and  if,  after  delivery  to  and  acceptance  by  the 
purchaser,  and  while  in  use  by  him,  an  explosion  occurs,  in  consequence  of 
such  defective  consti-uction,  to  the  injury  of  a  third  person,  the  latter  has 
no  cause  of  action,  because  of  such  injury,  against  the  manufacturer.  Losee 
V.  Clute,  51  N.  Y.  494;   Wyllie  v.  Palmer,  137  N.  Y.  248,  33  N.  E.  381. 


t'h.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  909 

instruments  of  danger,  and  to  acts  that  are  ordinarily  dangerous 
to  life  and  property.'"  *"  By  way  of  contrast,  a  car  with  defective 
brakes  is  not  such  an  imminently  dangerous  instrument  as  to  ren- 
der the  company  liable  to  any  one  injured  thereby,  in  the  absence 
of  any  contractual  or  other  relation. *="  It  was  held,  in  Eichmond 
&  D.  E.  Co.  v.  Elliott,*^^  that  if  a  railroad  company,  in  x'urchasing 
a  locomotive  "from  a  manufacturer  of  recognized  standing,  *  *  * 
made  such  reasonable  examination  as  was  possible  without  tear- 
ing the  machinery  to  pieces,  and  subjected  it  fully  to  all  the  ordi- 
nary tests  which  are  applied  for  determining  the  efficiency  and 
strength  of  completed  engines,  and  such  examination  and  tests 
had  disclosed  no  defect,  it  cannot,  in  an  action  by  one  who  is  a 
stranger  to  the  company,  be  adjudged  guilty  of  negligence." 

Damage  in  Course  of  Negligent  Performance  of  Contract. 

Where,  under  a  contract  to  which  the  plaintiff  is  not  a  party, 
damage  is  done  immediately  to  his  person  or  property  by  the  negli- 
gence or  otherwise  wrongful  performance  of  such  contract,  he  may 
recover.  Thus,  an  attorney,  while  not  liable  on  his  opinion  to  per- 
sons not  parties  to  a  contract,  is  liable  for  any  wrong  he  may  do 
to  a  party  in  course  of  the  performance  of  such  contract,  as  for 
negligence  or  wrong  in  seizing  goods.*^^  So  a  physician  rendering 
service  to  a  charity  patient  is  liable  for  injury  resulting  from  care- 
lessness in  treatment,  although  he  may  be  paid  by  the  county.^^'* 

^25  Jenkins.  .1.,  in  Goortlanrtei-  Mill  Co.  v.  Staudarcl  Oil  Co.,  11  0.  C.  A.  2ry.]. 
C3  Fed.  400—1:02,  citing  Loop  v.  Litchfield,  42  X.  Y.  351-357.  And  see  Baile.v 
V.  Gas  Co.,  4  Ohio  Cir.  Ct  R.  471  (natural  gas  engine);  Davidson  v.  Nichols. 
11  AUen,  514  (sulphide  of  antimony  delivered  instead  of  black  oxide  of  man- 
ganese). And  see  Collis  v.  Selden,  L.  R.  3  C.  P.  495,  approved  Savings  Bank 
V.  Ward,  100  U.  S.  195;  Blakemore  v.  Railway  Co.,  S  El.  &  Bl.  1035;  Burdick 
V.  Cheadle,  20  Ohio  St.  393;    Curtain  v.  Somerset,  140  Pa.  St.  70,  21  Atl.  241-. 

426  Roddy  V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  104  Mo.  2.14,  15  S.  W.  1112. 

■12  T  149  U.  S.  266,  13  Sup.  Ct.  837. 

*2s  Weeks,  Attys.  p.  628.  On  the  other  hand,  he  may  he  liable  to  third  per- 
sons for  malpractice,  trespas.s,  and  malicious  prosecution.  Id,  §§  l.'j.'l,  13i. 
Negligence  is  a  good  offset  to  action  for  services.  Cavorl.\-  v.  .^I(0\\(,'ns,  12;i 
Mass.  574;  Weeks,  Attys.  p.  607.  Action  on  the  case  is  the  usual  procedure. 
Russel  V.  Palmer,  2  Wils.  325. 

■12!)  The  physician  of  an  almshouse  may  be  held  liable  for  malpractice  at 
the  suit  of  a  charity  patient.  Dubois  v.  Docker,  130  N,  Y.  325,  29  N.  E.  313. 
And  see  Becker  v.  Janinski  (Com.  PI.)  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  675.     The  child  injured 


^10  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

The  principle  is  the  same  where  the  damage  is  to  the  property. 
Similarly,  if  a  contractor  who  agrees  to  iiiove  and  fit  up  a  building 
in  a  workmanlike  manner,  makes  a  subcontract  with  another  to 
do  the  work,  the  latter  is  liable  to  the  owner  of  the  building  for 
negligence  and  misfeasance  in  performing  the  same,  although  there 
is  no  privity  of  contract  between  them.^^"  One  person  may  sus- 
tain different  relations  to  another,  as  well  as  different  relations  to 
different  persons."^^ 

'Eff'ect  of  Limitations  as  to  Third  Persons. 

It  has  been  seen  that  many  limitations  on  liability  which  may  be 
regarded  and  remedied  as  tortious  may  be  altered  by  agreement.'' ^^ 
Such  limitations,  however,  affect  only  the  parties  to  the  contract, 
and  not  third  persons  who  may  be  entitled  to  recovery  for  a  wrong 
a  part  of  which  is  a  breach  of  contractual  duty.  Thus,  limita- 
tions in  the  telegraph  contract  limiting  responsibility  to  messages 
repeated,  applies  to  the  sender,  and  not  to  the  recipient.  Accord- 
ingly, where  the  latter  receives  a  telegram  sent  from  Staten  Island, 
but  reading  as  if  sent  from  South  Carolina,  whereby  he  was  misled 
into  taking  a  fruitless  trip  to  South  Carolina,  he  can  recover  damages 
from  the  telegraph  company,  notwithstanding  the  absence  of  privity 
between  him  and  it.*'^ 

262.  Negligence  in  the  performance  of  a  contract  includes 
•want  of  competent  skill.  Diligence  includes  com- 
J)etency. 

In  general,  when  a  person  offers  his  services  to  the  public  in  any 
business,  trade,  or  profession,  there  is  an  implied  engagement  with 
those  who  employ  him  that  he  possesses  that  reasonable  degree  of 
learning,  skill,  and  experience  which  is  ordinarily  possessed  by  per- 

by  a  surgeon's  malpractice  may  recover,  although,  the  contract  was  made  with 
the  parent.  Gladwell  v.  Steggall,  5  Bing.  N.  C.  733;  Pippin  v.  Sheppard,  11 
Price,  400;  Baird  v.  Gillett,  1  Alb.  Law  J.  238  (reversed  on  another  point,  47 
N.  Y.  186). 

iso  Bicliford  v.  Richards,  154  ^ass.  1G3,  27  N.  E.  1014;  Toomey  v.  Dono- 
van, 158  Mass.  232,  33  N.  E.  396. 

431  Toomey  v.  Donovan,  158  JIass.  232-237,  33  N.  E.  396. 

432  Ante,  p.  298,   "Discharge  by  Contract."' 

433  Tobin  V.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  146  Pa.  St.  37.5,  23  Atl.  324;  New  York  P.  & 
Tel.  Co.  V.  Dryburg,  35  Pa.  St.  298. 


^''-    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  911 

sons  in  the  same  business,  trade,  and  profession,  and  whicli  is  or- 
dinarily regarded  by  tlie  community  and  by  tliose  conversant  with 
that  employment  as  necessaiy  and  sufficient  to  qualify  him  to  engage 
in  such  business,  trade,  or  profession,  and  that  he  will  perform  mat- 
ters intrusted  to  him  diligently  and  faithfully."*  As  no  prudent 
person  would,  unless  possessed  of  competent  skill,  undertake  the 
doing  of  any  act  which  in  the  absence  of  skill  would  cause  great 
risk  of  injury  to  another,  the  doing  of  such  acts  by  an  unskilled 
person  will  amount  to  negligence.*^''  Undertaking  to  exercise  judg- 
ment without  skill  in  a  matter  which  requires  skill  is  not  a  mere 
error  of  judgment,  but  it  is  negligence.*'*  Therefore  negligence  in- 
cludes the  want  of  competent  skill,  as  where  an  incompetent  person 
produces  injury  in  the  management  of  horses,*"^  or  of  a  railway 
train.*^^  Where,  however,  an  emergency  elicits  a  volunteer  to  act 
without  pretending  to  possess  special  qualifications,  the  law  recog- 
nizes the  necessity  as  forming  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  re- 
quiring skill.*^*  This  has  been  regarded,  not  as  an  exception  as 
to  the  standard  of  conduct  of  a  prudent  man.**"*  On  the  other 
hand,  Mr.  Bigelow  argues  that  the  test  of  the  prudent  man's  conduct 
does  not  hold  good  where  the  defendant  has  stepped  out  of  his  own 
business.**^ 

Medical  Men. 

The  implied  contract  of  a  physician  or  surgeon  (a  "medical  man," 
as  he  is  called  in  England)  **^  is  not  to  cure,  but  to  possess  and  em- 
ploy in  the  treatment  of  a  case  such  reasonable  skill  and  diligence 

isi  Shepley,  J.,  in  O.dlin  v.  Stetson,  17  Me.  244;  Cayford  v.  Wilbur,  86  Me. 
414,  29  Atl.  1117;  Bell,  J.,  in  Leighton  v.  Sargeant,  7  Fost.  (N.  H.)  460;  Cooley, 
Torts,  647;  Smith  v.  Holmes,  54  Mich.  104,  19  N.  W.  767.  And  see  Chase  v. 
Heaney,  70  111.  2GS;  Clarli  v.  ilarshall,  34  JIo.  429;  Savings  Bank  v.  Ward, 
100  U.  S.  195. 

43  5  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  356. 

•13  0  City  of  Terre  Haute  v.  Hudnut,  112  Inil.  542,  13  N.  E.  686. 

43T  Hammaek  v.  White,  11  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  588. 

438  Hutchinson  v.  York,  X.  &  B.  K.  Co.,  5  Exch.  343. 

439Higgins  v.  McCabe.  126  JIass.  13;  Beardslee  v.  Ricliardson,  11  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  2.j;    Gladwell  v.  Steggall,  5  Bing.  N.  C.  733. 

440  Pol.  Torts,  p.  359;   Ball,  Lead.  Cas.  225,  226. 

441  Bigelow,  Lead.  Cas.  590.     Et  vide  Pig.  Torts,  218,  219. 
«42  Hastings,  Torts,  189. 


912  NEGLIGENCE.  [Cll.    l2 

as  are  ordinarily  exercised  in  his  profession  by  thorouglily  educated 
physicians;  and  in  judging  of  the  degree  of  skill  required,  regard 
is  had  to  the  advanced  stage  of  the  profession  at  the  time.  Tlie 
law  does  not  require  the  highest  degTee  of  skill  and  science.**'  The 
standard  must  be  a  practical  and  attainable  one.  The  standard  of 
ordinary  skill  may  vary,  even  in  the  same  state,  according  to  greater 
or  less  opportunity  afforded  by  the  locality  for  the  observation  and 
practice  from  which  alone  the  highest  skill  can  be  acquired.***  A 
physician  does  not  insure  that  his  treatment  will  be  successful;  and 
a  failure  to  effect  a  cure  does  not  raise  a  presumption  of  want  of 
skill  or  failure  to  exercise  diligence.**'^ 

The  courts  will  take  no  notice  of  different  "schools"  in  medicine. 
They  recognize  all  systems  as  legitimate  and  require  the  physician 
to  practice  according  to  his  professed  and  avowed  system.**'  The 
right  of  the  state  to  prescribe  the  rule  and  test  for  the  ascertain- 
ment of  the  qualifications  for  the  applicants  for  authority  to  prac- 
tice medicine  as  a  livelihood  is  a  part  of  the  police  power  which  has 

443  Saybord  v.  Wilbur,  86  Me.  414,  29  Atl.  HIT;  McCandless  v.  McWha, 
22  Pa.  St.  261,  approved  Smothers  v.  HanliS,  34  Iowa,  2S6;  Leiglaton  v.  Sar- 
;;eant,  7  Fost.  (N.  H.)  460,  cases  collected;  Peck  v.  Hutchinson,  SS  Iowa,  320, 
55  N.  W.  511;  Hewitt  v.  Eisenbart,  36  Neb.  794,  55  N.  W.  252;  Lawson  v. 
Conaway,  37  W.  Va.  159,  16  S.  E.  564;  1  Hil.  Torts  (2d  Ed.)  253;  TefEt  v. 
Wilcox,  6  Kan.  46;  McNevins  v.  Lowe,  40  111.  209;  Wood  v.  Clapp,  4  Sueed 
(Tenn.)  65;  Lamphier  v.  Phipos,  8  Car.  &  P.  475.  Of.  Seare  v.  Prentice,  8 
East,  348.  Defendant  cannot  show  that  he  was  generally  reputed  to  possess 
a  high  degree  of  skill  in  his  profession,  where  plaintiff  did  not  allege  or  ofter 
to  prove  that  he  lacked  ordinary  skill.  Carpenter  v.  Blake,  60  Barb.  490, 
50  N.  Y.  696,  explained.    Degnan  v.  Ransom,  83  Hun,  267,  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  960. 

m  Smothers  v.  Hanks,  34  Iowa,  286;  Shear.  &  R.  Xeg.  p.  491,  §  436;  Hew- 
itt V.  Eisenbart,  36  Xeb.  794,  55  N.  W.  252;  Peck  v.  Hutchinson,  88  Iowa, 
320,  55  N.  W.  511. 

4-t'' Lawson  v.  Conaway,  37  W.  Va.  1-59,  16  S.  E.  5i>4.  A  short  note  as  to 
the  skill  and  care  required  of  a  physician,  38  Am.  St.  Rep.  30. 

44  6  A  homeopath's  care  is  to  be  measured  by  homeopath's  peculiar  standard. 
Force  V.  Gregory,  63  Conn.  167,  27  Atl.  1116.  And  see  Burnham  v.  Jackson, 
1  Colo.  App.  237,  28  Pac.  250.  Accordingly,  evidence  to  prove  that  defend- 
ant's treatment  of  a  case  was  according  to  the  botanic  system  of  practicing 
medicine,  which  he  professed  and  was  known  to  follow,  is  admissible.  Bow- 
man v.  Woods,  1  G.  Greene  (Iowa)  441;  Cum.  v.  Thompson,  6  Mass.  134; 
Patten  v.  Wiggien,  51  Me.  594.  Et  vide  Dr.  Groenvelt's  Case,  Esp.  601. 
There  is,  however,  a  civilized  tendency  to  test  malpractice  according  to  well- 


Cll-    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  91;5 

been  constantly  exercised  by  the  legislatures.  Such  statutes  do  not 
alter  the  law  of  negligence  of  licensees,  however  they  may  affect 
the  question  of  initial  skill;  and  if  a  pcrsdn  act  as  a  medical  prac- 
titioner, he  is  liable  for  malpractice,  tli<ingli  he  may  not  have  con- 
formed to  the  statutes.^" 

A  physician's  liability  does  not  depend  upon  the  person  by  whom 

settled  rules  of  medical  and  surgical  science.  Mucci  v.  Houghton  (Iowa) 
57  N.  W.  305.  But  see  Winner  v.  Lathrop,  67  Hun,  511,  22  X.  Y.  Supp.  516. 
Fractures  near  shoulder  joint,  Baird  v.  iXorford,  2li  Iowa,  5:J1;  Tefft  v.  Wil- 
cox, 6  Kan.  46.  Fractures  near  elbow  joint,  Wilmont  v.  Howard,  39  Vt.  447. 
Fracture  near  wrist  joint,  Smothers  v.  Hanlis,  34  Iowa,  2Si;;  Ritcliey  v.  West, 
23  111.  385;  Scudder  v.  Crossan,  43  Ind.  343;  Stevenson  v.  Gelsthorpe,  10  Mont 
563,  27  Pac.  404.  Fracture  near  ankle  joint,  Almond  v.  Nugent,  34  Iowa,  300. 
Generally,  as  to  fractures,  Young  v.  Mason.  8  Ind.  App.  204,  35  N.  E.  521 ;  Geil- 
ney  v.  Kingsley,  62  Hun,  620,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  792.  Dislocation,  Carpenter  v. 
Blake,  60  Barb.  fN,  Y.)  4SS.  "Colles'  fracture,"  Link  v.  Sheldon,  136  X.  Y.  1, 
32  X.  E.  696.  Amputation,  Alder  v.  Buckley,  1  Swan  (Tenn.)  09;  Howai'd 
T.  Grover,  28  Me.  97.  One  of  the  most  celebrated  of  malpractice  cases,  in 
which  alleged  malpractice  consisted  in  opening  an  abscess,  is  Walsh  v.  Sayre, 
52  How.  Tiac.  335.  Et  ride  Kay  v.  Thompson,  10  Am,  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.) 
594.  Failure  to  discover  serious  rui)ture  of  perineum  is  negligence.  Lewis 
V.  Dwinell,  84  Me.  497,  24  Atl.  945.  Cf.  Langford  v.  Jones.  18  Or.  307,  22 
Pac.  1064;  Beck  v.  German  Klinik,  78  Iowa,  606,  43  X.  AV.  617.  In  obstetiie 
cases,  Grainnis  v.  Branden,  5  Day  (Conn.)  260.  In  venesection,  Hancke  v. 
Hooper,  7  Car.  &  P.  81.  Treatment  of  frost  bite,  Kay  v.  Thompson,  10  Am. 
Law  Reg.  (X.  S.)  504;  Patten  v.  Wigigin,  .51  Me.  .594.  Liability  of  hospital 
physician  for  nurse.  Perionnwsky  v.  Freeman.  4  Fost.  &  F.  077.  Vaccina- 
tion, Landon  v.  Humphrey,  9  Conn.  209.  A  felon,  Twombly  v.  Leach,  11 
Cush.  397.  Ery.sipelas,  Cochran  v.  Miller,  13  Iowa,  128.  In  medical  case. 
Peck  v.  Martin,  17  Ind.  115;  Rex  v.  Long,  4  Car.  &  P.  :!'.>s-423;  Com.  v, 
Thompson,  C  Mass.  134. 

**7  Ruddock  V.  Lowe,  4  Fost  &  F.  519,  note  a,  p.  521;  Jones  v.  Fay,  Id 
525,  note  a,  p.  526.  As  to  diploma  as  evidence  of  competency,  under  statute 
and  at  common  law,  cf.  Stough  v.  State,  88  Ala.  234,  7  South.  150,  and  Town- 
shend  v.  Gray,  62  Vt.  373,  19  Atl.  635,  with  Hunter  v.  Blount,  27  Ga.  76.  Et 
vide  Ordronaux,  Jur.  Med.  26.  And  generally,  as  to  liability  of  physician 
and  surgeon,  see  Rowo  v.  Lent,  62  I-Iun,  621,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  131;  Barney  v. 
Pinkham,  29  Neb.  350,  45  X.  AV.  694;  Becker  v.  Janinski  (Com.  PI.)  15  X. 
Y.  Supp.  675;  Hitchcock  v.  Burget,  38  Mich.  501;  Hesse  v.  Knippel,  1  Mich. 
N.  P.  109;  Getchell  v.  Hill,  21  Minn.  404:  Getchell  v.  Lindley,  24  Minn.  265; 
Reynolds  v.  Graves,  3  Wis.  371;  Gates  v,  Fleischer,  67  Wis.  504,  30  X.  W. 
674;  Briggs  v.  Taylor,  28  Vt.  180;  AVood  v.  Clapp,  4  Sneed  (Tenn.)  65;  Alder 
V.  Buckley,  1  Swan  (Tenn.)  69;    Graham  v.  Gautier,  21  Tex.  Ill;    Hathom  v. 

LAW  OF  TORTS — 58 


914  .  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

he  is  paid.  A  city  physician  owes  to  a  patient  in  an  almsliouse  tlie 
cxeiiisi'  of  proft'ssidnal  skill.**^ 

Uicliinoud,  48  Vt.  O.jT;  Potter  v.  Warner,  91  Pa.  St.  362;  Haire  v.  Reese, 
7  Phila.  138;  Fowler  v.  Sergeant,  1  Grant,  Cas.  355;  Small  v.  Howard,  128 
Mass.  131;  Branner  v.  Stormont,  9  Kan.  51;  Utley  v.  Burns,  70  111.  162; 
Fisher  v.  Niccolls,  2  111.  App.  484;  Qulnn  v.  Donovan,  85  111.  194;  Long  v. 
Morrison.  14  Ind.  .'On;  Jones  v.  Annx^U,  05  Ind.  376;  Tefft  v.  "Wilcox,  6  Kan. 
4(;;  Peck  V.  Martin,  17  Ind.  115;  Gramm  v.  Baener,  56  Ind.  497;  Holtzman 
V.  Hoy,  19  111.  App.  459;  I.andon  v.  Humphrey,  9  Conn.  209;  Ritchey  v. 
West,  23  111.  385;  :\IcNevins  v.  Lowe,  40  111.  209;  Kendall  v.  Brown,  74  111. 
232;  Barnes  v.  Mtans,  82  111.  379;  Driscoll  v.  Com.,  93  Ky.  393,  20  S.  W. 
431;  Harsau  r.  Purdy,  03  Ky.  424,  20  S.  W.  4:!2;  Nelson  v.  State,  97  Ala. 
79,  12  South.  421;  Brooks  v.  State,  88  Ala.  122,  (j  South.  902;  Harrison  v. 
State  (Ala.)  15  South.  563;  State  v.  Hathaway,  115  Mo.  36,  21  S.  W.  1081; 
State  V.  Carey,  4  Wash.  424,  30  Pac.  729;  Roberts  v.  Levy  (Cal.)  31  Pac. 
.570;  State  v.  Van  Doran,  109  N.  C.  864,  14  S.  E.  32;  Moore  v.  Bradford, 
148  Pa.  St.  342,  23  Atl.  896;  Craig  v.  Board,  12  Mont.  203,  29  Pac.  532; 
State  V.  Kelloggi,  14  Mont.  451,  36  Pac.  1077;  Ha  worth  v.  Jlontgomery,  91 
Tenn.  16,  18  S.  W.  399;  Girard  v.  Bissell  (Kan.)  25  Pac.  232;  Undei-wood 
V.  Scott,  43  Kan.  714,  23  Pac.  942;  Townshend  v.  Gray,  62  Vt.  373,  19  Atl. 
635;  Stewart  v.  Raab,  55  Minn.  20,  56  N.  W.  256;  State  v.  Buswell,  40  Neb. 
158,  58  N.  W.  728  (as  to  Christian  Scientists);  Wliitlock  v.  Com.,  89  Va. 
337,  15  S.  B.  893;  State  v.  Mosher,  78  Iowa,  321.  43  N.  W.  202;  State  v. 
.Tones,  18  Or.  256,  22  Pac.  840;  State  v.  Hathaway,  115  Mo.  36,  21  S.  W. 
1081.  As  to  English  medical  act,  vide  Leeson  v.  General  Council,  43  Ch. 
Div.  366.  As  to  liability  of  irregular  iDractitioner,  vide  Ruddock  v.  Lowe, 
4  Fost.  &  F.  519. 

448  Du  Bols  V.  Decker,  130  N.  Y.  325,  29  N.  E.  313.  The  action  against  a 
physician  for  negligence  is  not  ex  contractu,  but  ex  delicto.  Gladwell  v.  Steg- 
gall,  5  Bing.  X.  C.  733.  Bellinger  v.  Craigue,  31  Barb.  534,  treats  the  ques- 
tion as  principally  one  of  contract.  Either  case  or  assumpsit  will  lie  for  im- 
proper treatment.  Kuhn  v.  Brownfield,  34  W.  Va.  252,  12  S.  E.  519.  Whether 
required  by  statute,  or  assuming  the  duty,  the  master  who  employs  a  physi- 
<ian  to  attend  his  employfes,  the  carrier  who  employs  one  to  attend  its  pas- 
sengers, or  the  hospital  or  other  institution  that  employs  one  to  attend  its 
inmates,  is  only  bound  to  procure  one  who  is  competent,  and  when  that  duty 
has  been  performed,  he  is  free  from  all  liability  for  the  physician's  negli- 
gence. 2  Am.  Law  Reg.  &  Rev.  163;  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Artist,  9  0.  C. 
A.  14,  60  Fed.  365;  South  Florida  R.  Co.  v.  Price,  32  Fla.  46,  13  South.  638; 
O'Brien  v.  Cuuard  S.  S.  Co.,  154  Mass.  272,  28  N.  E.  206;  McDonald  v.  Massa- 
chusetts Gen.  Hospital,  120  Mass.  432;  Laubheim  v.  De  Koninglyke  N.  S. 
Co..  107  X.  Y.  228,  13  N.  E.  781;  Allan  v.  State  S.  S.  Co.,  132  X.  Y.  91,  30 
X.  E.  482  (reversing  [Sup.]  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  803).  And  see  Eighmy  v.  Union 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  61  N.  W.  1056;    Campbell  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  51 


^"-    ^2]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  91.') 

Lawyers. 

As  to  attorneys,  Tindal,  0.  J.,  has  said:""  "It  would  be  ex- 
tremely difficult  to  define  the  exact  limit  by  which  the  skill  and 
diligence  which  an  attorney  undertakes  to  furnish  in  the  conduct 
of  a  cause  is  bounded,  or  to  trace  precisely  the  dividing  line  between 
that  reasonable  skill  and  diligence  which  appears  to  satisfy  his  un- 
dertaking and  that  crasse  negligentia  or  lata  culpa  mentioned  in 
some  of  the  eases,  for  which  he  is  undoubtedly  responsible.  The 
cases,  however,  *  *  *  appear  to  establish,  in  general,  that  he  is 
liable  for  the  consequences  of  ignorance  or  nonobservance  of  the  rules 
of  practice  of  this  court;  *^°  for  the  want  of  care  in  the  preparation  of 
the  cause  for  trial,*"  or  of  attendance  thereon  with  his  witnesses; 
and  for  the  mismanagement  of  so  much  of  the  conduct  of  a  cause  as  is 
usually  and  ordinarily  allotted  to  his  department  of  the  profession. 
Whilst,  on  the  other  hand,  he  is  not  answerable  for  error  in  judgment 
upon  points  of  new  occurrence  or  of  nice  or  doubtful  construction." 
"God  forbid  that  it  should  be  imagined  that  an  attorney,  or  even  a 
judge,  is  bound  to  know  all  the  law."  *°^     The  liability  of  an  English 

Midn.  488,  53  N.  W.  768;  Clark  v.  Missouri  Pae.  R.  Co.  (Wasli.)  29  Pac.  1138. 
And  see  Richardson  v.  Carbon  Hill  Coal  Co.  (Wash.)  39  Pac.  95.  But  if  the 
physician  is  incompetent,  or  unfit  to  perform  his  duties,  the  employer  is  lia- 
ble; though,  if  he  has  used  ordinary  care,  he  is  not  responsible,  even  when  the 
hospital  is  supported  by  the  forced  contributions  of  the  employes.  2  Am.  Law 
Reg.  &  Rev.  163,  citing  Richardson  v.  Carbon  Hill  Coal  Co.  (Wash.)  39  Pac.  95. 

**!>  Godefroy  v.  Dalton,  6  Bing.  407-409.  Further  as  to  difference  be- 
tween English  members  of  the  bar,  see  Ireson  v.  Peai-man,  3  Barn.  &  C.  799. 
An  action  for  professional  negligence  will  not  lie  against  the  barrister. 
Swinfen  v.  Chelmsford,  5  Hurl.  &  N.  918,  29  Law  J.  Exch.  382. 

4=0  Caldwell  v.  Hunter,  10  Q.  B.  83;  Bracey  v.  Carter,  12  Adol.  &  E.  373. 
Negligently  suffering  judgment  by  default.  Godefroy  v.  Jay,  7  Bing.  413; 
Hoby  V.  Built,  3  Barm  &  Adol.  350. 

J  SI  Or  bringing  an  action  in  a  court  without  jurisdiction.  Williams  v. 
Gibbs,  6  Nev.  &  M.  788;  Cox  v.  Leech,  1  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  617,  26  Law  J.  C.  P. 
125.     Compare  Meredith  v.  Woodward,  IG  Wkly.  Notes  Cas.  146. 

■ni2  Abbott,  C.  J.,  in  Montriou  v.  JefCreys,  2  Car.  &  P.  133.  Lord  Jlans- 
field's  saying  in  Pitt  v.  Yalden,  4  Burrows,  2060,  20G1,  is  famous:  "That 
part  of  the  profession  which  is  carried  on  by  attorneys  is  liberal  and  rep- 
utable, as  well  as  useful  to  the  public,  when  they  conduct  themselves  with 
honor  and  integrity;  and  they  ought  to  be  protected  when  they  act  to  the 
best  of  their  skill  and  knowledge.  But  every  man  is  liable  to  error,  and  I 
should  be  very  sorry  that  it  should  be  taken  for  granted  that  an  attorney  is 


916  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

attorney  or  solicitor  *°'  is  essentially  that  of  a  member  of  the  bar  in 
America,  viz.  he  is  required  to  exercise  such  diligence  as  a  good 
lawyer  is  accustomed  to  apply  under  similar  circumstances.*^*  He 
cannot  be  held  liable  for  a  niistake  in  reference  to  a  matter  as  to 
which  members  of  the  profession  possessed  of  reasonable  skill  and 
knowledge  may  differ  as  to  the  law,  until  it  has  been  settled  in  the 
courts;  nor  if  he  is  mistaken  in  a  point  of  law  on  which  reasonable 
doubt  may  be  entertained  by  well-informed  lawyers.*'*^ 

The  standard  of  skill  required  of  lawyers  is  substantially  the  same 
as  that  of  physicians."*  It  is  determined  by  the  particular  practice 
of  the  particular  bar.     "A  metropolitan  standard  is  not  to  be  ap- 

I 

answerable  for  eveiy  error  or  mistake.  *  *  *  a  counsel  may  mistake,  as 
well  as  an  attorney.  Yet  no  one  will  say  that  a  counsel  who  has  been  mis- 
taken shall  be  charged.  *  *  *  Not  only  a  counsel,  but  judges,  may  differ 
or  doubt,  or  take  time  to  consider.  Therefore,  an  attorney  ought  not  to  be 
liable  in  case  of  a  reasonable  doubt."  The  saying  of  Lord  Cottenham  in 
Hart  V.  Frame,  6  Clark  &  F.  193,  is  also  much  quoted.  Et  vide  Laidler  v. 
Elliott,  3  Bam.  &  C.  738;   Russell  v.  Palmer,  2  Wils.  32.5. 

153  Hart  V.  Frame,  6  Clark  &  F.  193;  Caldwell  v.  Hunter,  10  Q.  B.  83;  Par- 
ker V.  Rolls,  14  C.  B.  69J.;   Purves  v.  Landell,  12  Clark  &  F.  91. 

4  54  AVhart.  Neg.  §  749;  Sprague  v.  Baker,  17  ilass.  5SG;  Kepler  v.  Jessupp 
(Ind.  App.)  37  N.  E.  655;  Isham  v.  Parker,  3  Wash.  St.  755,  29  Pac.  835; 
White  V.  Washiugiton,  1  Barnes,  Notes  Cas.  411;  Holmes  v.  Peck,  1  R.  I.  242; 
.Stevens  v.  Walker,  55  111.  151;  Wilson  v.  Russ,  20  Me.  421;  Stubbs  v.  Beene, 
37  Ala.  627;  Gambert  v.  Hart,  44  Cal.  542.  Reasonable  care  and  diligence. 
Kepler  v.  Jessupp  (Ind.  App.)  37  N.  E.  655.  A  contract  for  the  services  of 
members  of  a  legal  profession  is  not  a  hiring  of  labor,  but  a  mandate.  Gur- 
ley  V.  City  of  New  Orleans,  41  La.  Ann.  75,  5  South.  659.  Generally,  as  to 
liability  of  attorneys  for  erroneous  advice,  see  4  Yale  L.  J.  65,  by  William 
B.  Bosley. 

*s=  Citizens'  Loan  Fimd  &  Sav.  Ass'n  v.  P'riedley,  123  Ind.  143,  23  N.  E. 
1075.  Compare  Cochrane  v.  Little,  71  Mil.  32:!,  18  Atl.  698.  An  attorney  can- 
not be  charged  with  negligence  when  he  accepts,  us  a  correct  exposition  of  the 
law,  a  decision  of  the  supreme  court  of  his  state  in  another  case  upon  tlie 
question  of  the  liability  of  stockholders  of  corporations  of  the  state,  in  ad- 
vance of  any  decision  thereon  in  his  own  case.  Marsh  v.  Whitmore,  21  Wall. 
178.  Nor  is  he  liable  for  an  insufficient  affidavit  in  attachment.  Ahlhauser 
V.  Butler,  57  Fed.  121. 

466  W'atson  V.  Muirhead,  57  Pa.  St.  161.  "The  law  is  not  a  mere  art,  but 
a  science."  Sharswood,  J.  Citizens'  Loan  Fund  &  Sav.  Ass'n  v.  Friedley, 
123  Ind.  145,  23  N.  E.  1075,  reviewing  many  cases.     Approved  126  Ind.  400. 


^h-    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  917 

plied  to  a  rural  bar."  *"  A  lawyer  is  not  expected  to  guaranty  suc- 
^pgg_458  ipjjjg  standard  would  not  seem  consistent  with  the  early 
theory  that  an  attorney-at-law  is  not  liable  if  he  acts  honestly  and 
to  the  best  of  his  ability.*"  Of  course,  he  must  exercise  reasonable 
diligence  generally  in  the  conduct  of  his  client's  business.*""  Thus, 
in  examination  of  titles  he  must  scrutinize  vigilantly,  and  is  lia- 
ble, for  example,  for  failure  to  note  the  existence  of  an  incum- 
brance.*" But  as  to  doubtful  points  of  law  it  is  sufficient  if  he  con- 
forms to  the  standard  of  good  professional  men  of  the  place.*"^ 

*"  Weeks,  Attys.  §  -:8'J;  Pennington  v.  Yell,  11  Ark.  212;  Whart.  Neg.  § 
750. 

458  Weeks,  Attys.,  §  290. 

459  Lynch  v.  Com.,  16  Serg.  &  R.  368;  Crosby  v.  Murphy,  8  Ir.  C.  L.  301; 
Kemp  y.  Burt,  4  Bam.  &  Adol.  424;    Gilbert  v.  Williams,  8  Mass.  57;   post, 

,  note  153.  He  has,  however,  been  held  liable  for  gross  negligence.  Purves 
V.  Landell,  12  Clark  &  F.  91;  Baikie  v.  Chandless,  3  Camp.  17;  Elkington 
V.  Holland,  9  Mees.  &  W.  661. 

460  In  not  commencing  an  action  against  a  debtor  in  failing  circumstan- 
ces, Rhines  v.  Evans,  66  Pa.  St.  192;  in  time  to  avoid  bar  by  the  statute  of 
limitations.  Fox  v.  Jones  (Tex.  Sup.)  14  S.  W.  1007;  Hett  v.  Pun  Pong,  18 
Can.  Sup.  Ct.  290;  to  be  present  when  his  case  is  reached,  City  of  Lincoln 
V.  Staley,  32  Neb.  63,  4S  N.  W.  887;  to  advise  client  aV  to  expenses  on  appeal, 
Jamison  v.  Weaver,  81  Iowa,  212,  46  N.  W.  990;  not  to  make  negligent  in- 
vestments, Blyth  v.  Fladgate  [1S01]  1  Ch.  337  (et  vide  Mellish,  L.  J.,  in  Saw- 
yer v.  Goodwin,  1  Ch.  Div.  351);  loaning  money,  AVhitney  v.  Martine,  88  N. 
Y.  535;  for  not  notifying  his  client  of  impending  tax  sales.  Wain  v.  Beaver, 
161  Pa.  St.  605,  29  Atl.  114;  for  negligence  in  preparing  mechanic's  lien,  Joy 
V.  Morgan,  35  Minn.  184,  28  N.  W.  237;  generally,  for  misdescription,  Taylor 
V.  Gorman,  4  Ir.  Bq.  550;  for  loss  of  bund,  Walpole  v.  Carlisle,  32  Ind.  415. 
Not  liable  for  failure  to  transfer  insurance  policy  to  vendee,  Herbert  v. 
Lukens,  153  Pa.  St.  180,  2."i  Atl.  1116.  When  not. liable  for  failure  to  plead 
statutory  limitations,  Thompson  v.  Dickinson,  159  Mass.  210,  34  N.  E.  262. 

461  Pennoyer  v.  Willis  (Or.)  32  Pac.  57.  But,  even  under  such  circumstan- 
ces, the  auestion  of  negligence  has  been  left  to  the  jury.  Pinkston  v.  Ar- 
rington,  98  Ala.  4S9.     And  see  Hinckley  v.  Ki-ug  (Cal.)  34  Pac.  118. 

462  Watson  V.  JIuirhead,  57  Pa.  St.  161;  Whart.  Ag.  §  507;  Potts  v.  Dut- 
ton,  8.  Beav.  493;  Taylor  v.  Gorman,  4  Ir.  Eq.  550;  Wilson  v.  Tucker,  3 
Starkie,  154,  Dowl.  &  R.  N.  P.  30;  Knights  v.  Quarles,  4  Moore,  532;  Allen 
V,  Clark,  7  Law  T.  R.  (N.  S.)  781,  1  N.  It.  358:  Drax  v.  Scroope,  2  Barn.  & 
Adol.  581;  Stannard  v.  Uliithorne,  10  Bing.  491;  Ireson  v.  Pearman,  5  Term 
R.  687  •  Howell  v.  Young,  5  Barn.  &  C.  259;  Whitehead  v.  Greetham,  2 
Bing.  464,  10  Moore,  183;  Dartnall  v.  Howard,  6  Term  R.  438,  4  Barn.  &  C. 
345;   Brumbridge  v.  Massey,  28  Law  J.  Exch.  .59;   Cooper  v.  Stephenson,  21 


918  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

Special  Cases  of  Contract  Duty. 

The  violations  of  duty  wliich  arise  from  contract  or  from  a  state 
of  facts  of  wliich  a  contract  forms  a  necessary  part,  giving  rise  to  an- 
action  based  on  negligence,  are  almost  infinite  in  variety  and  oc- 
currence. They  are  illustrated  in  all  main  features  in  two  impor- 
tant classes  of  cases,  viz.  master  and  servant,  and  common  carriers. 
These  subjects  will  be  considered  at  length  in  subsequent  chapters 
for  sake  of  convenience  of  arrangement 

S63.  In  order  that  a  complainant  may  recover  for  negli- 
gence in  the  performance  of  statutory  duty,  he  must 
sho"W — 

(a)  That  he  is  within  the  class  for  w^hose  benefit  legisla- 

tion creating  not  a  purely  public  duty  -was  designed; 

(b)  That  there  was  a  negligent  violation  of  statutory  re- 

quirement by  the  defendant; 

(c)  That  he  suffered  damage  as  the  proximate  result  of 

such  violation. 

It  has  already  been  shown  that  an  action  may  lie  on  behalf  of  a 
person  injured  by  a  breach  of  a  statutory  duty.  As  the  principle 
is  sometimes  stated,  all  that  is  necessary  to  entitle  one  to  recover  un- 
der such  circumstances  is  to  show  the  statutory  requirement,  its 
nonperformance,  and  special  injury  to  himself.*^^  But,  as  has  been 
seen,  this  general  principle  has  been  modified  in  at  least  three  re- 
spects.* So  far  as  liability  for  negligence  is  concerned,  the  principal 
propositions  would  seem  to  be  as  stated  in  the  black-letter  text. 

Purely  Public  Duty. 

If  the  duty  is  wholly  public,  and  not  at  all  for  the  b||^HM|pri- 
vate  individuals,  no  private  person  can  recover  for  i^^^^^WQ- 


Law  J.  Q.  B.  292;   Hayne  v.  Khodes,  8  Q.  B.  342.  10  Jur.  71,  15  Law  J.  Q.  B. 

137. 

463  Chamberlaine  v.  Chester  &  B.  R.  Co.,  1  Exeh.  870;  Couch  v.  Steel,  3  El. 
&  Bl.  402  (in  this  noted  ease  a  seaman  recovered  from  a  shipowner  for  dam- 
ages suffered  because  of  broach  of  statutory  duty  to  keep  medicine  aboard  a 
ship). 

*  Ante,  p.  'JS. 


Ch-    12]  ESSE.NTIAL    ELEMENTS.  919 

Thus,  in  the  celebrated  Atkinson  Case,*''*  a  water  company,  I'equired 
by  statute  to  keep  the  pressure  in  their  pipes  so'  as  to  reach  the  liigh- 
est  story  in  the  highest  house  in  the  area  supplied,  was  not  held  lia-  f 
ble  to  one  who  suffered  special  damage  by  fire  to  his  house  because 
of  insufficient  pressure.  The  act  was  held  to  be  in  the  nature  of  a 
private  legislative  bargain,  and  not  to  create  a  duty  to  such  person. 
Even  if  a  public  duty  be  created  and  special  damage  ensue,  the  right 
of  an  individual  action  does  not  necessarily  follow.  While  it  is 
generally  conceded  that,  in  the  absence  of  statutory  obligation,*"' 
no  liability  rests  on  the  owner  of  a  lot  abutting  a  street  to  repair  or 
maintain  in  safe  condition  the  street  or  sidewalk,  it  is  insisted  by 
many  authorities  that  failure,  for  example,  to  remove  snow,  as  ri'- 
quired  by  an  ordinance,  is  a  breach  of  duty  to  the  public  from  which 
an  individual  action  does  not  arise.*""  The  general  opinion,  how- 
ever, on  this  point  would  sustain  an  action  by  private  individuals 
against  the  municipality  for  negligence  in  the  breach  of  a  charter 
requiring  the  municipality  to  keep  its  streets  and  sidewalks  in  a 
good  and  safe  condition.*"' 

■184  Atkinson  v  Newciistle  iV-  (i.  Water  AVorks,  L.  R.  r>  Exch.  404,  2  Exch.  Div. 
441.  Et  vide  Stevens  y.  Jeacocke,  11  Q.  B.  7^1 ;  Davis  v.  Clinton  Water 
Works  Co.,  37  Am.  Kep.  185.  A  collection  of  recent  decisions  on  their  lia- 
bility for  loss  by  fire  due  to  lack  of  adequate  water  supply  will  be  found  in 
23  L.  It.  A.  146.  A  municipal  corporation  maintaining  waterworks,  however, 
may  be  liable  to  a  private  individual  under  such  circumstances.  Springfield 
Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Village  of  Keeseville,  80  Huu,  102,  29  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1130.  The  liability  of  a  water  company  often  depends  on  construction  of 
contract.    Mott  v.  Cherry  vale  Water  &  Manut'g  Co.,  48  Kan.  12,  2S  P.  980. 

46  5  Dill.  Mun.  Corp.  (4th  Ed.)  §  976. 

466  Taylor  v.  Lake  Shore  &  JX.  S.  R.  Co.,  45  Mich.  74,  7  N.  W.  72S.  And  see 
cas^^tf|k|d  in  Hayes  v.  Michigan  Cent.  It,  Co,,  111  U.  S.  228-240,  4  Sup, 
C^^^^^mnVL  V.  Canton  Co.,  40  Md.  312-;i2:;;  Kirby  v.  Boylston  Market 
A.]^^^^Biy,  249;  Moore  v.  Gadsden,  03  N.  Y.  12;  Hartford  v,  Talcott,  48 
C(S^!^Sniith  V,  'Donohue,  49  N,  J,  Law,  54.S,  10  Atl,  150;  IL-eney  v, 
Sprague,  11  R.  I.  456.  The  rule  was  once  laid  down  in  Pennsylvania  that 
"a  municipal  ordinance  creates  no  new  liability  in  favor  of  one  injured  by  the 
negligence  of  another,-  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ervin,  Si)  Pa.  St.  71;  PL.ila- 
delphia  &  R.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Boyor,  2  Am.  &  Eng.'  R.  Cas.  172.  Et  vide  Vandyke 
V.  Cincinnati,  1  Disn.  (Ohio)  532;  Centi-al  Ohio  R.  Co.  v.  Lawrence,  13  Ohio 
St.  tiC;    Meek  v.  Pennsylvania  Ry.  Co.,  38  Ohio  St.  632. 

407  City  of  Rochester  v.  Campbell,  123  N.  Y,  405,  25  N.  E.  9.17,  In  this 
case  Chief  .Justice  Ruger  in  an  elaborate  opinion  lays  down  seven  proposl- 


'■'-O  NEGLIGENCK.  [Cll.    12 

Private  Duty. 

The  statute  or  ordinance  may  create,  not  only  a  public  duty,  but  a 
duty  to  private  persons,  a  breach  of  which  may  be  actionable  negli- 
gence; and  yet  an  individual  may  not  be  able  to  recover,  because  he 
is  not  of  the  class  of  persons  for  whose  benefit  the  statute  was  de- 
signed. Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  an  ordinance  requiring  a  rail- 
road company  tO'  keep  flagmen  at  street  crossings  was  not  intended 
for  the  protection  of  the  company's  employes,  and  creates  as  to  them 
no  duty,  the  violation  of  which,  resulting  in  damage,  is  actionable 
negligence.*"*      So  an  ordinance'  requiring  precautions  to  be  taken 

'.ions  as  to  liability  of  corporations  for  streets  and  sidewalks,  whicli  em- 
body the  substaneu  of  the  law  on  this  point.  Many  cases  usually  cited  as 
sustaining  the  former  doctrine  may  be  brought  within  the  consti'uction  of 
language  and  purview  of  statute  so  as  to  deny  creation  of  private  duty  or 
remedy  within  the  principle  that  a  breach  of  mere  ordinance  is  not  neces- 
sarily conclusive  e\'idence  of  negligence,  but  Is  to  be  considered  as  evidence 
of  want  of  due  care,  in  connection  with  the  other  facts  in  the  case.  The 
tither  would  seem  to  be  at  variance  with  prevalent  ideas  as  to  the  responsi- 
bility of  municipal  corporations.  McNerney  v.  Reading  City,  150  Pa.  St.  611, 
■-'.-.  Atl.  57;  McRickard  v.  Flint,  114  N.  Y.  222,  21  N.  E.  153;  Knupfle  v. 
ICuiclvcrbocker  Ice  Co.,  84  N.  Y.  488;  Cook  v.  Johnston,  58  Mich.  437,  25  N. 
W".  ;-:SS;  Siemers  v.  Eisen,  54  Cal.  418;  Rainey  v.  New  York  Cent  &  H.  R. 
R.  Co.,  68  Hun,  405,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  80.  The  general  current  of  opinion  sus- 
tains the  rule  as  already  stated.  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Hensil,  70  Ind.  560; 
Bott  V.  Pratt,  33  Me.  323;  Mason  v.  Shawneetown,  77  111.  533;  Flynn  v.  Can- 
ton Co.,  40  Md.  312;  Jackson  v.  Shaw,  20  Cal.  267;  Lane  v.  Atlantic  Works, 
111  Mass.  13G;  Brannock  v.  Elmore,  114  Mo.  55,  21  S.  W.  451;  Hayes  v.  Michi- 
Siin  Cent.  R.  Co.,  Ill  U.  S.  228,  4  Sup.  Ct.  369. 

408  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Kirksey,  9  C.  C.  A.  321,  60  Fed.  999. 
Ill  absence  of  statute  imposing  such  duty,  it  has  been  held  that  negUgence 
fiinnot  be  predicated  by  railroad  company  for  failure  to  station  a  flagman 
ur  maintain  gates  and  lights  at  highway  crossings.  Case  v.  New  York.O^nt 
&  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  75  Hun,  527,  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  406.  Perhaps  a  true  vi^is 
that  the  jury  is  to  determine  the  question  of  negligence  as  to  this  point  unSer 
;ill  (he  circumstances  of  the  case.  Omaha  &  R.  V.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Brady,  39  Neb. 
27,  57  N.  W.  767.  Cf.  Artz  v.  Railroad  Co.,  34  Iowa,  153.  Where  the  statute 
crvates  a  liability  for  inj|LTry  to  stock  running  at  large  caused  by  failure  to 
fence,  an  action  will  not  lie  for  personal  injmy  received  by  the  driver  of 
horses  and  wagon.  Cohoon  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  (Iowa)  57  N.  W.  727. 
Et  vide  Case  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  75  Hun,  527,  27  N.  Y.  Supp. 
496.  As  to  blowing  whistle,  Toudy  v.  Norfolk,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.,  38  W.  Va.  694.  A 
lailioad  company  will  he  liable  to  its  engineer  for  injury  caused  by  collision  ot 


^'^■-    1'-^]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  921 

to  secure  the  safety  of  buildings  applies  only  to  citizens  in  them  on 
business,  and  not  to  a  fireman  going  there  to  extinguish  a  fire."" 
And  a  statute  requiring  railway  companies  to  block  "frogs"  in  their 
yards  and  terminal  stations  does  not  lender  them  liable  to  a  tres- 
passer for  injuries  resulting  from  a  failure  to  comply  therewith.*'" 
When  the  statute  or  ordinance  is  manifestly  for  the  benefit  of  a 
particular  class,  persons  within  that  class  can  recover.*"  Thus, 
where  a  statute  re(juires  the  owner  of  tenement  houses  to  provide 
them  with  fire  escapes,  and  he  fails  to  comply  therewith,  he  is  lia- 
ble for  damages  caused  his  tenant  by  breach  of  this  duty.*'? 

engine  with  a  bull  whicli  has  come  on  the  track  through  detect  in  the  fence. 
Dielison  v.  Omaha  &  h>t.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  124  Jto.  140,  27  S.  AV.  47G.  To  the  same 
effect,  Atchison,  T.  &  ,S.  F.  K.  Co.  v.  Reesinan,  9  C.  C.  A.  20,  uo  Fed.  370. 
Of.  French  v.  AVestern  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  72  Hun,  469,  2.5  N.  Y.  Supp. 
229;  Dean  v.  Railroad  Co.,  54  Jlo.  App.  047;  MiUhouse  v.  Railway  Co.,  7 
Ohio  Clr.  Ct.  R.  406.  See  Morse  v.  Boston  &  L.  R.  Co.  (N.  H.)  28  Atl.  286. 
A  statute  requiring  certain  notice  as  to  blasting,  so  that  all  persons  or  teams 
approaching  may  have  time  to  retire  safely,  does  not  create  a  duty  towards 
workmen  in  a  quarry.  "Approaching"  is  a  word  of  limitation.  Hare  v.  M.c- 
Intire,  82  iVIe.  240.  Ft  vide  Harty  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  42  N.  Y.  468.  And, 
generally,  as  to  what  is  within  the  scope  of  statutory  duty,  see  Fennpll  v. 
Seguin  St.  Ry.  Co.,  70  Tex.  670,  s  S.  W.  4SG;  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  ilcD.m- 
ald,  152  U.  S.  262,  14  Sup.  Ot.  619. 

*8  9  Woodruff  v.  Bo  wen,  136  Ind.  431,  34  N.  B.  1113.  And  see  Pauley  v. 
Steam-Gauge  &  Lantern  Co.,  131  N.  Y.  90,  29  N.  E.  999.  A  city  ordinance 
which  requires  machinery  that  is  so  located  as  to  endanger  the  lives  and 
limbs  of  those  employed  in  the  building  to  be  so  covered  or  guarded  as  to.  in- 
sure such  employes  against  injury,  gives  no  right  of  action  to  an  injured  person 
who  is  not  an  employe.    Gibson  v.  Leonard,  143  111.  182,  32  N.  E.  182. 

*70  Akers  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.)  60  N.  W.  669. 

4T1  Where  an  ordinance  reciuired  a  motorman  to  watch  for  persons  on  the 
track  or  moving  towards  it,  it  was  held  to  be  actionable  for  him  to  be  look- 
ing back  and  talking  to  some  one  on  the  car,  whereby  plaintiff  was  injured. 
Dallas  Rapid-Transit  Ry.  Co.  v.  Elliott  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  455.  Dam- 
ages caused  to  landowner  by  defective  fence.  Gulf,  0.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Slmonton,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  5.58,  22  S.  W.  285;  Welles  v.  Northern  Cent.  Ry. 
Co.,  1J50  Pa.  St.  620,  25  Atl.  51;  Nelson  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  49  Kan. 
165,  30  Pac.  178.  A  collection  of  statutory  regulations  for  the  protection  and 
safety  of  workmen  in  mines,  with  the  decisions  thereon.  Consolidated  Coal 
&  Min.  Co.  V.  Clay's  Adm'r   (Ohio)  25  Lawy.  Rep.  Ann.  848,  38  N.  E.  610. 

472  Willy  V.  MuHedy,  78  N.  Y.  310;  McLaughlin  v.  Armfield,  58  Hun,  376, 
12  N.  y.  Supp.  1<34;   PeriT  v.  Bangs,  161  Mass.  35,  36  N.  E.  683. 


922  NKGUGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

Damages  may  be  recovered  when  caused  by  obstructing  a  high- 
way in  violation  of  the  provisions  of  a  statute  prohibiting  railway 
companies  from  obstructing  a  street  crossing  longer  than  five  min- 
utes.*" Moreover,  the  courts  are  inclined  to  liberally  view  the  pur- 
pose of  a  statute,  and  to  so  construe  it  as  to  include,  not  only  the  class 
for  whose  benefit  it  is  primarily  intended,  but  to  extend  its  protec- 
tion to  all  who  need  such  protection.*^* 

In  Hayes  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  (\o..  ^^^  an  action  was  broii'^ht  by 
an  infant  for  personal  injury  sustained  bpcanse  of  the  alleged  negli- 
gence of  the  railroad  company  in  not  fencing  its  trade  from  a  park, 
as  required  by  statute.  The  statute  was  held  not  to  be  a  mere  con- 
tract for  the  benefit  of  the  public,  but  to  create,  a  duty,  "not  to  the 
city  as  a  municipal  body,  but  to  the  public  considered  as  composed 
of  individual  persons;  and  each  person  specially  injured  by  the 
breach  of  the  obligation  is  entitled  to  his  individual  compensation, 
and  to  an  action  for  its  recovery." 

Negligent  Violation. 

Where  a  statute  has  defined  precautions  to  be  exercised  to  avoid 
doing  harm,  compliance  with  such  requirements  exonerates.     There 

*7  3  Patterson  v.  Detroit,  L.  &  L.  N.  R.  Co.,  56  Mich.  172,  22  N.  W.  260. 
An  action  for  damages  lies  on  behalf  of  a  person  injured  through  defend- 
ant's omission  in  disregarding  of  statute  to  protect  a  hatchway  with  a  rail- 
ing. Parker  v.  Barnard,  135  Mass.  116.  Defendant  is  liable  to  a  party  in- 
jured through  negligent  omission  to  comply  with  city  ordinance  providing 
mode  of  protection  for  vaults  in  public  streets.  Owings  v.  .Tones,  9  Md.  108- 
117. 

474  See  Brewer,  C.  J.,  in  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Reesman,  9  C.  C.  A. 
20,  60  Fed.  370,  373.  This  case  held,  inter  alia,  that  where  an  animal, 
through  failure  of  a  railroad  company  to  fence  as  required  by  statute,  gets 
on  track,  and  causes  derailment  of  a  train,  whereby  plaintiff,  an  employe 
on  the  train,  is  injured,  he  can  recover.  A  short  note  on  the  rights  of  em- 
ployes of  a  railroad  company  injured  by  violation  of  statute  requiring  main- 
tenance of  fences.  Dickson  v.  Omaha  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  59  Am.  ifc 
Eng.  R.  Cas.  312,  27  S.  W.  47G. 

47  5  Hayes  v.  Jlichigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  Ill  U.  S.  228,  4  Sup.  Ct.  369.  Et  vide 
Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  McDonald,  152  U.  S.  262,  14  Sup.  Gt.  619;  Chicago  v. 
Robbins,  2  Black,  418,  4  Wall.  (J-'>T;  Doran  v.  Flood,  47  Fed.  543.  And  gen- 
erally, as  to  fencing,  see  Donnegan  v.  Erhardt,  119  N.  T.  468,  23  N.  E.  1051; 
Dayton  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  81  Hun,  284,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  783; 
Quackenbush  v.  Wisconsin  &  M.  R.  Co.,  62  Wis.  411,  22  N.  W.  519;  Fi-ice  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  49  Mo.  438-440.     And  see  Thomt.  R.  R.  Fences,  571  et  seq. 


^h-    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  923 

would  seem  to  be  no  duty  of  extrastatutory  care;"°  but  the  stat- 
utory duty  may  not  exclude  an  additional  common-law  duty.*"  No 
custom  or  usage  will  justify  the  disregard  of  a  positive  statutory 
regulation;  *^  8    nor   can   the   consent*"   or   other   conduct""   not 

*Tc  Thus,  if  a  railroad  company  provide  a  bell  and  whistle  of  given  charac- 
ter, to  be  used  in  a  prcKcribed  w:iy  at  crossings,  the  company  has  performed 
Its  duty  when  it  has  furnished  and  used  such  bell  and  whistle,  and  is  not 
liable,  although  the  signal  so  given  may  not  be  heard  or  heeded  by  a  per- 
son crossing  the  track.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  K.  Co.  v.  Leaman,  .54  N. 
.1.  Law,  202,  2:5  Atl.  691.  Cf.  Calhoun  v.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  84  Tex. 
226,  19  S.  W.  341. 

477  The  giving  of  the  statutory  signals  is  not  always  the  full  measure  of 
the  railroad  company's  duty  to  those  who  may  be  passing  over  a  crossing. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Hague,  54  Kan.  2S4,  38  Pac.  2.57.  Therefore, 
even  if  defendant  have  complied  with  statutory  requirements  that  his  fences 
should  prevent  the  escape  of  his  domestic  animals,  he  may  still  be  liable  for 
breach  of  common-law  duty  to  maintain  the  fence  required  by  statute  in  a 
reasonably  safe  condition,  and  unlikely  to  injure  his  neighbor's  animals 
while  they  are  on  his  neighbor's  land.  Durgin  v.  Kennett  (N.  H.)  29  Atl. 
414,  citmg  Firth  v.  Iron  Co.,  3  C.  P.  Div.  254;  Alabama  &  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Philips. 
70  Miss.  14,  11  South.  602;  Chicago,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Spilker,  134  Ind. 
380,  33  N.  E.  280;  HcGill  v.  Pittsburgh  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  152  Pa.  St.  331,  25  Atl. 
540;  McDonald  v.  International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  86  Tex.  1,  22  S.  W.  939. 

17  8  An  employe  in  a  factory  cannot  waive  the  protection  afforded  by  Laws 
1892,  c.  673,  requiring  the  machineiT  to  be  properly  guarded.  Simpson  v. 
New  York  Rubber  Co.,  80  Hun,  416,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  339.  See  Billings  v. 
Breinig,  45  Jlich.  65,  7  N.  AV.  722,  where  it  is  customai-y  to  violate  duty  to  ex- 
hibit li-ghts  on  boats  moving  at  night.  Tliat  ordinance  regulating  speed  is 
absolute,  is  no  defense.  Cleveland,  C,  C.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Harrington,  131  Ind. 
426,  30  N.  E.  37.  — 

*7  9  Knott  V.  Wagner,  16  Lea,  481,  1  S.  AY.  155;  ante,  p  203,  "Consent," 
note  429;  Duraut  v.  Lexington'  Coal  Min.  Co.,  97  Mo.  62,  10  S.  W.  484  (here, 
however,  the  question  wafe  willful  violation);  Hines  v.  New  York  Cent. 
&  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  78  Hun,  239,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  829.  Assumption  of  risk  by 
plaintiff  will  not  excuse  breach  of  positive  statutory  duty.  Thomas  v.  Quar- 
tei-maine,  56  Law  J.  Q.  B.  340.  And  see  Baddeley  v.  Granville,  19  Q.  B. 
Div.  423,  56  Law  J.  Q.  B.  .501. 

480  A  railway  company  is  not  relieved  of  liability  for  cattle  killed  by  its 
trains  from  its  failure  to  fence  its  right  of  way  because  the  owner  of  the  cat- 
tle whose  land  adjoins  the  railroad,  maintains  a  fence  between  his  irasture 
land  and  the  right  of  way.  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Peterson  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  969. 


924  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

amounting  to  contributory  negligence  **^  of  one  individual  be  con- 
strued into  a  license  justifying  such  violation  of  law.  An  employ^ 
has.  liowever,  been  held  to  assume  the  risk  incident  to  known  violation 
of  statutory  requirements  of  precaution  for  his  benefit.**^  A  person 
to  whom  the  statutory  duty  is  owed  has  a  right  to  assume,  in  the  ab-  , 
sence  of  contrary  knowledge,  that  such  duty  has  been  performed.^"  ' 

Question  for  Jury. 

On  the  one  hand,  the  violation  of  a  duty  prescribed  by  a  statute  or 
ordinance  is  regarded  as  negligence  per  se,  and  as  entitling  an  in- 
jured party  to  recover,  if  no  other  consideration  (as  his  own  negli- 
gence, or  failure  to  connect  as  cause)  prevents."**     On  the  other  hand, 

4  81  One  who,  knowing  of  an  obstniction  on  a  street,  negligently  falls  over 
the  same,  cannot  predicate  her  right  to  recover  on  an  ordinance  requiring 
:i  light  to  be  placed  on  the  obstniction.  Davis  v.  California  Street  Cable 
R.  Co.,  105  Cal.  131,  38  Pac.  647. 

482  Post,  p.  lOl-i,  "Master  and  Servant." 

483  A  person  skating  on  a  river  is  not  negligent  in  assuming  that  guards 
had  been  placed,  as  required  by  Pen.  Code,  §  429,  wherever  the  ice  had  been 
■cut.  Sickles  v.  New  Jersey  Ice  Co.,  80  Hun,  213,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  10.  The 
traveler  has  the  right  to  assume  that  statutory  signals  will  be  given.  Fusili 
V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  45  Mo.  App.  535;  Crumpley  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J. 
R.  Co.,  Ill  Mo.  152,  19  S.  W.  820.  Cf.  Richmond  v.  Chicago  &  W.  M.  R.  Co., 
87  ilich.  374,  40  N.  AV.  021;  Duncan  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  46  Mo.  App. 
198.  But  failure  to  give  signals  is  not  actionable,  if  defendant  actually 
knew  of  the  approach  of  engine  or  train  on  a  track.  Barber  v.  Richmond 
&  D.  E.  Co.,  34  S.  C.  444,  33  S.  E.  C30. 

484  Thomp.  Neg.  419,  1232;  Correll  v.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  38 
Iowa,  120;  Shear.  &  R.  Neg.  §§  484,  485;  Schlereth  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co., 
115  Mo.  87,  21  S.  W.  1110;  Platte  &  D.  Canal  &  Milling  Co.  v.  Dowell,  17 
€olo.  376,  30  Pac.  68;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Hensil,  70  Ind.  569  (failure  to 
keep  flagman  at  crossing).  So  it  is  negligence  per  se  to  mn  a  train  of  cars 
faster  than  the  ordinance  allows.  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Horton,  132  Ind.  189, 
31  N.  E.  45;  Dahlstrom  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.,  108  Mo.  525,  18  S. 
W.  919.  In  Osborne  v.  McMasters,  40  Minn.  103,  41  N.  W.  543,  in  an  opin- 
ion of  simplicity  and  clearness,  Jlitchell,  J.,  held  that  it  was  negligence  per 
se  in  a  druggist  to  fail  to  label  a  poison  as  required  by  statute.  But  it  is 
•otherwise  if  he  fully  explained  the  dangerous  character  of  the  drug  to  plain- 
tiff. Wohlf  art  v.  Beckert,  92  N.  Y.  490.  In  Siemers  v.  Eisen,  54  Cal.  418, 
proof  that  plaintiff  was  injured  by  a  runaway  horse,  left  unfastened  in  the 
street  in  violation  of  an  ordinance,  fully  established  defendant's  negligence. 
Et  vide  Bott  v.  Pratt,  33  Jlinn.  323,  23  N.  W.  237.  Cf.  Knupfle  v.  Knicker- 
bocker Ice  Co.,  84  N.  Y.  488.     Blowing  a  whistle  in  violation  of  statute  is 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  92& 

there  are  many  authorities  which  regard  such  violation  not  as  neg- 
ligence per  se,  or  as  matter  of  law,  but  merely  as  evidence  of  negli- 
gence to  be  considered  in  connection  with  all  the  circumstances  of 
the  case/»=     The  statute  itself  may  determine  this  question."^     The 

negligence  per  se.  Dugan  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  40  Minn.  545,  42  N.  W. 
538.  Cf.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Sullivan,  3  O.  C.  A.  506,  53  F.  219.  Et  vide 
Evison  V.  Chicago,  St  P.,  JI.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  45  Minn.  370,  48  N.  W.  6.  It  is 
negligence  at  law  to  fail  to  give  statutory  signals  at  a  street  crossing  only 
when  the  damage  is  done  to  persons  or  animals  endeavoring  or  Intending 
to  cross  the  track  upon  street  or  highway,  ilaney  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 
Co.,  49  111.  App.  105.  Cf.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Elder,  149  111.  173, 
36  N.  B.  565.  Plaintiff  may  recover  damages  occasioned  by  the  falling  of  a 
sign  (in  an  extraordinary  gale)  which  had  been  suspended  by  defendant  over 
a  street,  contrary  to  the  city  ordinance,  although  defendant  was  not  other- 
wise negligent.  Salisbury  v.  Herschenroder,  106  Mass.  458.  In  Lane  v.  Atlan- 
tic Worlis,  111  Mass.  136,  it  was  held  that,  where  injui-y  was  consequent  on  a 
truck  standing  in  the  streets,  the  jury  may  consider  that  such  standing  was 
forbidden  by  the  ordinance.  Steele  v.  Burkhardt,  104  Mass.  59.  In  Hanlon 
V.  South  Boston  H.  R.  Co.,  129  Mass.  310,  driving  at  a  rate  of  speed  pro- 
hibited by  ordinance  was  held  to  be  evidence,  but  not  conclusive  evidence, 
of  negligence  on  the  part  of  its  owner.  That  fact  alone,  however,  it  was 
said,  would  entitle  a  plaintiff  without  fault  to  recover.  Et  vide  Hall  v. 
Ripley,  119  Mass.  135;  Damon  v.  Scituate,  Id.  66.  In  Hyde  Park  v.  Gay, 
120  Mass.  589,  running  a  train  in  violation  of  the  Suuday  law  was  held  to  be 
actionable,  if  it  directly  produced  damage  to  plaintiff,  without  fui-ther  proof 
of  negligence.  Et  vide  Newcomb  v.  Boston  I'rotective  Department,  146 
Mass.  596,  16  N.  E.  555;  Parker  v.  Barnard,  i:^5  Mass.  116;  Hanlon  v.  South 
Boston  H.  R.  Co.,  129  Mass.  310.  Where  a  powder  magazine  is  maintained 
in  city  limits  in  violation  of  city  ordinance,  and  explodes,  the  owner  is  liable 
for  injury  caused  to  stranger  by  explosion,  from  whatever  cause  resulting. 
Here  the  magazine  was  regarded  as  a  nuisance.  Hazard  Powder  Co.  v. 
Volger,  7  C.  C.  A.  136,  58  Fed.  152.  So,  as  to  blasting  in  disregard  to  city  or- 
dinance, see  Brannock  v.  Elmore,  114  Mo.  55,  21  S.  W.  451. 

485  vandewater  v.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.,  135  N.  Y.  583,  32  N.  E.  63r,; 
Cook  V.  .Tohnston,  58  Mich.  437,  25  X.  ^X.  388  (where  it  was  held  not  to  be  neg- 
ligence per  se  to  put  ashes  into  a  wooden  barrel,  in  violation  of  an  ordinance). 
So,  in  Rainey  v.  New  York  Cent  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  68  Hun,  495,  23  N.  Y.  Supp. 
80,  failure  of  defendant  to  operate  its  gates  at  night  is  evidence  bearing  upon 
the  question  of  negligence.  In  Knupfle  v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.,  84  N.  Y. 
488,  proof  of  violation  of  ordinance  prohibiting  the  leaving  of  horse  untied 
or  unattended  upon  the  street  does  not  establish  negiligence  per  se.  It  is 
competent,  but  not  conclusive,  evidence  to  be  submitted  to  the  jury.     Et  vide 


4  86  See  note  486  on  following  page. 


926  NEGLIGENCE.  [Cll.    12 

statute  may,  for  example,  prescribe  the  duty  of  insuring  safety;  as 
to  construct  a  boom  so  as  to  keep  logs  safely.  Upon  proof  of  failure 
to  keep  logs  safely,  liability  is  shown,  although  there  is  no  evidence 

Moore  v.  Gadsden,  93  N.  Y.  12.  In  Bott  v.  Pratt,  33  Minn.  323-333,  23  N. 
W.  237,  this  case  is  said  to  be  of  not  much  value  as  an  authority.  In  iSIc- 
Ricliard  v.  Flint,  114  N.  Y.  222,  21  N.  B.  153,  omission  of  an  owner  of  a 
building  to  comply  with  statutory  requirements  for  protecting  elevator  open- 
ings is  prima  facie  evidence  of  negligence.  Et  vide  Rainey  v.  New  York 
Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  68  Hun,  495,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  ,su;  JIassoth  v.  Delawaie 
&  H.  Canal  Co.,  64  N.  Y.  .524;  Brown  v.  Buffalo  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  N.  Y. 
191-198;  McGrath  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  N.  Y.  .522;  Allis  v. 
Leonard,  58  N.  Y.  2,S8;  Jetter  v.  New  York  &  H.  R.  Co.,  2  Abb.  Dec.  4.5.'s; 
KnuiJfle  V.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.,  84  N.  Y.  491;  Beisiegel  v.  New  York 
Cent.  R,  Co.,  14  Abb.  Prac.  (N.  S.)  29;  Devlin  v.  Gallagher,  6  Daly  (N. 
Y.)  494;  Wasuer  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  SO  N.  Y.  212.  The  same 
rule  is  followed  in  Nebraska.  Burlington  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wendt,  12  Neb. 
76,  10  N.  W.  456;'  Union  Pac.  Ky.  Co.  v.  Rassniussen,  25  Neb.  810,  41  N.  W. 
778.  In  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Walter  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  2.5  S.  W.  163,  it 
was  held  that  failure  to  keep  a  fence  in  good  repair,  where  defendant  could 
have  discovered  the  defect  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care,  was  sufficient, 
and  that  plaintiff  need  show  no  further  negligence  on  the  part  of  defendant 
Cf.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Elder,  149  111.  173,  36  N.  E.  565.  One  doing 
a  lawful  act  in  a  manner  forbidden  by  law  is  not  absolutely  liable  to  an  in- 
Jury  caused  to  third  person  by  the  act.  Such  violation  of  law  is  not  con- 
clusive evidence  of  negligence.  Lockwood  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  55 
Wis.  50,  12  N.  W.  401;  Spofford  v.  Harlow,  3  Allen,  176;  Kidder  v.  Dun- 
stable, 11  Gray,  342;  Gllmore  v.  Ross,  72  Me.  194;  Larrabee  v.  Sewall,  66 
Me.  376;  Baker  v.  Portland,  58  Me.  199;  Burbank  v.  Bethel  Steam-Mill  Co., 
75  Me.  373;  Hayes  v.  Michigian  Cent.  R.  Co.,  Ill  U.  S.  228,  4  Sup.  Ct.  369; 
Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ives,  144  U.  S.  408,  12  Sup.  Ct.  679;  Northern  Pac. 
R.  Co.  V.  Sullivan,  3  C.  C.  A.  506,  53  Fed.  219;  Meek  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 
38  Ohio  St.  632. 

486  As  where  failure  to  free  track  from  combustibles  is  made  prima  facie 
evidence  of  negligence.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  2  0.  C.  A.  446,  51  Fed. 
658.  So  right  of  action  sometimes  expressly  depends  upon  willful  violation 
of  act.  Litchfield  Coal  Co.  v.  Taylor,  81  111.  590;  Durant  v.  Lexington  Coal 
Jlin.  Co.,  97  JIo.  484.  Gross  contributory  negligence  on  plaintitt''s  part  is 
no  defense  to  statutory  negligence  on  defendant's  part  as  to  customary  sig- 
nals. Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Howard,  90  Tenu.  144,  19  S.  W.  116;  Wall 
V.  Des  Moines  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  56  N.  W.  436;  Memphis  &  C.  R.  Co. 
V.  Davis  (Ala.)  14  South.  643;  Hodgins  v.  Minneapolis,  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  R. 
Co.,  3  N.  D.  382,  56  N.  W.  139;  Straub  v.  Eddy,  47  Mo.  App.. 189;  Cleveland, 
C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Abney,  43  111.  App.  92. 


■       "•    -^^^  ESSENTIAL   ELEMENTS.  927 

■of  negligence.*"  A  law  affecting  railroads,  making  every  railroad 
company  liable  for  "damages  inflicted  upon  the  persons  of  passen- 
gers, while  being  transported  over  its  road,"  except  where  the  injurv 
arises  from  the  criminal  negligence  of  the  person  injured,  or  "when 
the  injury  complained  of  shall  be  the  violation  of  some  express  rule 
or  regulation  of  said  road  actually  bronght  to  his  or  her  notice,"  has^ 
been  held  constitutional."^ 

Even  in  that  class  of  cases  ^hich  hold  a  breach  of  statutory 
duty  to  be  negligence  per  se,  in  actual  practice,  the  question  of 
negligence  is  still  submitted  to  the  jury  in  the  great  majority  of 
instances.  The  jury  must  ordinarily  determine  whether  there  has 
been  a  breach  of  such  duty  in  fact.  According  to  the  better  opinion, 
an  ordinance  and  a  statute  stand  on  essentially  the  same  basis  in 
this  respect.*«»  ^Thus,  where  there  is  a  complete  failure  and  omis- 
sion to  comply  with  the  requirements  of  law,  there  may  be  negli- 
gence per  se;  but  if  there  is  an  attempt  at  such  compliance  which  is 

487  Brown  V.  Siisquelianna  Boom  Co.,  109  Pa.  St.  57,  1  Atl.  156.  And  see 
West  Branch  Boom  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  .Toint  Lumber  &  Land  Co.,  121  Pa. 
St.  143,  15  Atl.  509.  But  this  has  been  held  to  be  a  question  for  the  jm-y. 
Turner  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Vv..  l."s  Jiass.  2(il,  33  N.  E.  520. 

•188  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Porter,  38  Neb.  22G,  56  N.  W.  808.  But  Gen.  St. 
c.  93,  §§  13,  14,  as  amended  by  Sess.  Laws  1895,  p.  304,  and  Sess.  Laws  1891, 
p.  281  (known  as  "Railroad  Stock-Killing  Acts"),  making  railroad  companies 
absolutely  liable  for  stock  killed,  and  arbitrarily  fixing  the  amount  to  be 
paid,  contravene  the  constitutional  provision  for  equal  protection  and  due 
process  of  law.  (Rio  Grande  Western  R.  Co.  v.  Vaughn,  3  Colo.  App.  465, 
34  Pac.  264,  followed.)  Rio  Grande  Western  R.  Co.  v.  Chamberlin,  4  Colo. 
App.  149,  34  Paci  1113.  But  Gen.  St.  S.  C.  §  1511,  making  every  railroad  com- 
pany liable  for  the  property  of  persons  injured  from  fire  from  its  locomotives, 
but  allowing  it  to  insure  any  such  property,  is  not  a  taking  of  property  from  a 
railroad  without  due  process  of  lav,"  or  a  denial  of  equal  protection,  within 
Const.  U.  S.  Amend.  14.  McCandless  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  38  S.  C.  103, 
16  S.  E.  429;  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  De  Busk,  12  Colo.  294,  20  Pac.  7-52; 
JIathews  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  C(i.  (.AIo.  Sup.)  24  S.  W.  591;  Campbell  v. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  121  Mo.  340,  25  S.  W.  030. 

189  Ante,  p.  99.  In  Xorthern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Sullivan,  3  C.  G.  A.  506,  53 
Fed.  219,  it  is  said  that  there  are  three  classes  of  cases:  (1)  The  nonob- 
servance  of  a  city  ordinance  is  not  any  evidence  whatever  of  negligence.  (2) 
It  is  evidence  of  negligence  to  go  to  the  jury.  (3)  It  is  conclusive  evidence 
of  negligence.  Grand  Ti'unk  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ives,  144  U.  S.  408,  12  Sup.  Ct.  679. 
^'Perhaps  the  better  and  more  generally  accepted  rule  [relative  to  the  effect 


928  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

imperfect  originally,  or  if  there  be  carelessness  in  the  subsequent  in- 
spection or  maintenance  of  statutory  precautions,  and  there  is  dis- 
pute with  respect  to  the  facts  on  these  points,  the  decision  of  such 
dispute  is  for  the  jury.  Thus,  the  jury  is  called  on  to  pass  upon  ac- 
tual olisi  rvance  and  other  considerations  of  fact  as  to  statutory  re- 
quirements of  signals,*""  telltales,''"^  fences  and  cattle  guards,*^^  and 

of  the  non observance  of  an  ordinance]  is  that  such  an  act  on  the  part  of  the 
raih'cad  company  is  always  to  be  considered  by  the  juiy  as,  at  least,  a  circum- 
stance from  which  negligence  may  be  infeired  in  detc'rminiug  whether  the 
company  was  or  was  not  guilty  of  negligence."  A\'helan  v.  A\w  York,  L.  E.  & 
W.  R.  Co.,  38  Fed.  15;  Olason  v.  City  of  Milwaukee.  .30  Wis.  ;!1G;  Baltimcnc 
&  O.  R.  Co.  V.  State,  29  Md.  2.12;  Flynn  v.  Canton  Co.,  40  Md.  312  (a  lead- 
ing case);  Baltimore  City  Passengier  Ry.  Co.  v.  McDonnell,  43  Md.  Cio4;  Bal- 
timore &  O.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Mali  (Md.)  5  Atl.  87;   Owings  v.  Jones,  9  Md.  108. 

■loo  McCormick  v.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  50  Mo.  App.  109;  Lee 
V.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  80  Iowa,  172,  45  N.  W.  7:!9;  Horn  v.  Baltimore 
&  O.  R.  Co.,  4  C.  C.  A.  346,  54  Fed.  301;  Lees  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co., 
154  Pa.  St.  56,  25  Atl.  1041;  Palmer  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  ;;.S  Minn.  415,  :j.s 
N.  W.  100;  McNamara  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  136  N.  Y.  650,  32 
N.  B.  765;  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  French,  69  Miss.  121,  12  South. 
;',:'>8;  Alexander  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  112  N.  O.  720,  16  S.  B.  896;  Hager  v. 
Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  98  CaJ.  309,  33  Pac.  119;  Thayei-  v.  Flint  c&  P.  M.  R. 
Co.,  93  Mich.  150,  53  N.  W.  216;  Hubbard  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  .;L59  Mass. 
■:520,  34  N.  E.  459;  Vallance  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  55  Fed.  364;  Newhard  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  153  Pa.  St.  417,  26  Atl.  105;  Bennett  v.  New  York  Cent. 
&  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  133  N.  Y.  563,  30  N.  E.  1149. 

*9i  Bines  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  78  Hun,  239,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  829. 
But  see  NefC  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  80  Hun,  394,  30  N.  Y. 
Supp.  323. 

402  Parker  t.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  93  Mich.  «i)7.  53  N.  W.  s:;4; 
Jacksonville,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Prior,  34  F!a.  271,  15  Soutli.  760;  Manwell  v. 
Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  57  N.  W.  441;  New  York,  C.  &  St  L.  R. 
Co.  V.  Zumbaugh  (Ind.  App.)  38  N.  E.  531;'  Wines  v.  Rio  Grande  W.  Ry.  Co.,  9 
Utah,  228,  33  Pac.  1042;  Schuyler  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  65  Hun,  622,  20  N.  Y. 
Supp.  2S7;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rowland  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  23  S.  Vy\ 
421;  Clarke  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  39  W.  Va.  732,  20  S.  B.  696;  Chicago,  B.  cV- 
Q.  R.  Co.  V.  Dennell,  48  lU.  App.  251;  Moeckley  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co. 
(Iowa)  61  N.  W.  227;  Fremont,  B.  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Pounder,  36  Neb.  247, 
54  N.  W.  509;  Toledo,  St  L.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Fly,  «  Ind.  App.  002,  36  N.  B. 
215;  Toledo,  St  L.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cupp,  9  Ind.  App.  244,  30  N.  E.  445; 
Chisholm  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  53  Minn.  122,  54  N.  W.  1061;  Kennedy 
V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  57  N.  W.  862;  Ham  v.  Newburgh,  D.  & 
O.  R.  Co.,  69  Hun,  137,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  197;   Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  Ferris,  6  Ind. 


Ch.   12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  929 

the  rate  of  speed  at  which  a  train  "=  or  vehicle  "*  is  moving,  and  the 
like.  Moreover,  a  breach  of  statutory  duty  cannot  be  the  basis  of 
recovery,  unless  it  is  proximately  connected  as  the  cause  of  the 
wrong;  ^"'^  and  the  jury  detei'iiiines  the  question  of  connection  as 
cause.""  Such  questions  are  also  carried  before  a  jury  by  the  con- 
sideration of  contributory  negligence,  or  assumption  of  risk  on  be- 
half of  the  defendant.*" 

Connection  as  Cause  of  Harm. 

The  mere  fact  that  one  is  a  wrongdoer,  we  have  seen,  does  not  dis- 
qualify him  to  recover  in  tort,  unless  his  wrong  is  connected  as  a 

App.  30,  32  N.  E.  112;  Taft  v.  New  York,  P.  &  B.  II.  Co.,  l'>7  Mass.  297, 
.■?2  N.  E.  los;  ;Peet  v.  Chicago,  JI.  &  St  P.  Ity.  Co.,  SS  Iowa,  520,  .j5  N.  W. 
50S. 

iS3  Painiiiug  a  train  in  a  populous  city  at  a  rate  of  .speed  greatly  in  excess 
of  tlie  limit  fixed  by  ordinance  may  be  such  gro.ss  and  wanton  negligence 
as  to  attach  liability,  despite  plaintiff's  conti-ibutory  negligence.  Louisville 
it  N.  R.  Co.  V.  Webb,  97  Ala.  308,  12  South.  374;  Gratiot  v.  .Alissourl  Pac.  E. 
Co.,  116  ilo.  450,  21  S.  W.  1094.  The  construction  of  a  statute  is  for  the 
court.  Wilson  V.  New  Yorli,  X.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  (R.  I.)  21)  Atl.  300;  East  Si. 
Louis  Connecting  Ry.  Co.  v.  O'PIara,  150  111.  580,  37  X.  E.  917,  afBrming 
49  111.  App.  282;  Jenson  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  86  Wis.  589,  57 
.\.  AV.  359;  DriscoU  v.  JIarket  St.  Cable  R.  Co.,  97  Ca!.  oo.i,  ;;2  Pac.  591.  So 
the  reasonableness  of  an  ordinance  regulating  .speed  of  street  cai's  is  for  the 
court,  unless  particular  facts  are  disputed,  and  such  facts,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  comt,  are  material.  Metroijolitan  St.  R.  Co.  v.  .Johnson,  90  Ga.  500,  16 
S.  E.  49.  Cf.  Centr;U  Railroad  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Brunswick  &  W.  R.  Co., 
87  Ga.  ;!.S(i,  13  S.  E.  520. 
494  Lind  V.  Beck,  .17  111.  App.  430. 
*9  3  Post,  p.  941. 

486  Billings  V.  Breinig,  45  ilich.  ()5.  7  X.  W.  722;  Louisville,  X.  A.  &  C.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Ousler  (Ind.  App.)  36  X.  E.  21  lO;    ante,  c.  1. 

*97  Sandifer  v.  Lynn,  52  JIo.  App.  'Cy.i;  Clements  v.  Louisiana  Electric  Light 
Co.,  44  La.  Ann.  692,  11  South.  51;  ilaxey  v.  iIissoiu:i  Pac.  R.  Co.,  113  Mo.  1, 
20  S.  W.  654;  Hansen  v.  Chicago,  JI.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  83  Wis.  g:!1,  53  X.  W. 
909;  Hector  v.  Boston  Electric  Light  Co.,  161  Mass.  558,  37  X.  E.  773;  lUings- 
worth  V.  Boston  Electric  Light  Co.,  161  Mass.  ."83,  37  X.  E.  77S;  Texas  &  P. 
R.  Co.  V.  Bryant,  0  C.  C.  A.  138,  56  Fed.  791);  Cleveland,  C,  C.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v. 
Elliott,  28  Ohio,  340;  Wilcox  v.  Rome  &  W.  R.  Co.,  39  X.  Y.  358  (reviewing 
Xew  York  ca.ses);  Galena  &  C.  Union  R.  Co.  v.  Dill,  22  111.  2r)5.  See  Artz  v. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  ;14  Iowa,  1.'4;  Spencer  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  21) 
Iowa,  55;  Lee  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  SO  Iowa,  172,  45  X.  W.  73:»; 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Harwood,  80  III.  88;    Ernst  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co., 

LAW  OF  TOUTS— 59 


930  NEGLIGENCE,  [Ch.   12 

cause  of  the  damage  complained  of.*°^  This  logical  application  of 
the  general  doctrine  of  cause  is  extended  to  the  cpnverse  proposition. 
A  defendant,  although  he  may  have  been  violating  a  statutory  duty 
owed  to  the  plaintiff  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  wrong,  is  not  liable 
to  him  in  damages,  unless  such  violation  caused  the  damage.  Thus, 
city  ordinances  requiring  elevators  to  be  built  and  protected  in  a 
certain  way,  and  to  be  periodically  inspected,  do  not  create  a  civil 
liability  against  a  person  who  violates  them  towards  one  who  i3  in- 
jured by  an  accident  that  was  in  no  way  caused  by  such  violation.*'' 

:;:)  N.  Y.  61;  Gorton  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  45  N.  Y.  G60;  Korrady  v.  I^ake  Shore  & 
M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  131  Ind.  261,  29  N.  E.  1069;  Ballefoutaine  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hunter, 
33  Ind.  335;  Leavenworth,  L.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Rice,  10  Kan.  426;  Baxter  v. 
Troy  &  B.  R.  Co.,  41  N.  Y.  502;  Cadwallader  v.  Ix)uisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry. 
Co.,  128  Ind.  518,  521,  27  N.  E.  161.  When  a  boy  only  nine  years  old,  while 
walking  on  a  railroad  track,  which  is  usually  so  used  by  the  people  of  that 
neighborhood,  is  run  over  by  a  train  running  at  a  rate  of  speed  prohibited 
by  ordinance,  whether  he  was  guilty  of  contributory  negligence  is  for  the 
lui'y.    Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Varnadore  (Miss.)  15  South.  933. 

498  Where  animals  are  injured  because  of  a  railroad  company's  failure  to 
fence  its  road  as  required  by  law,  the  fact  that  their  owner  permitted  them 
to  run  at  large,  contrary  to  law,  does  not,  as  between  him  and  the  company, 
necessarily  constitute  contributory  negligence.  Erickson  v.  Duluth  &  I.  R. 
R.  Co.  (Minn.)  58  N.  W.  822;  Austin  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Saunders  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.)  26  S.  W.  128. 

499  Gibson  v.  Leonard,  143  111.  182,  32  N.  E.  182;  Hayes  v.  Railway  Co., 
Ill  U.  S.  228,  240,  4  Sup.  Ct.  369;  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  McDonald,  152  U.  S. 
262-283,  14  Sup.  Ct.  619.  And  see  cases  collected  in  IG  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc. 
liaw,  423,  note  1.  But  see  Raih-oad  Co.  v.  Walker,  11  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  383; 
Hill  V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  9  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  823.  As  breach  of  municipal  ■ 
erdinance  as  to  regulation  of  fire,  Briggs  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
72  N.  Y.  26.  Failure  to  build,  protect,  and  inspect  elevators  creates  no  lia- 
bility in  favor  of  plaintiff,  Avhose  injury  was  in  no  way  caused  by  such  viola- 
tion. Gibson  v.  Leonard,  143  111.  182,  32  N.  E.  182.  Failure  to  give  statutory 
signal  at  crossing:  Leavitt  v.  Railroad  Co.,  5  Ind.  App.  513,  31  N.  E.  860,  and  32 
N-.  B.  866;  Horn  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  4  C.  C.  A.  346,  54  Fed.  301;  Chicago, 
B.  «&  Q.  R.  Co.  V.  AVells,  42  111.  App.  26;  SleDonald  v.  Railway  Co.,  86  Tex. 
1,  22  S.  W.  939;  Cleveland,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Richey,  43  111.  App.  247; 
Smith  V.  Railroad  Co.,  47  Mo.  App.  546.  Compare  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Balkam  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  20  S.  W.  8U0.  Killing  of  animals  by 
trains  rimning  at  unlawful  rate  of  speed  will  be  presumed  to  be  the  re- 
sult of  defendant's  negligence,  in  the  absence  of  contrary  evidence.  Cleve- 
land, C,  O.  &  St  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ahrens,  42  111.  App.  434.     But  see  St.  Louis 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS,  931 

264.  In  order  that  liability  may  attach  for  negligent  con- 
duct, two  steps  must  be  taken:  Facts  must  be  shown 
suflficient  to  justify  an  inference  of  negligence,  and 
that  inference  must  be  draw^n.  Ordinarily,  dispute 
in  testimony  as  to  fact,  and  draw^ing  the  inference 
of  negligence  therefrom,  is  for  the  jury;  but  both 
matters  may  be  determined  by  the  court  as  ques- 
tions of  law. 

Province  of  Court  and  Jury. 

"The  jury  are  not  judges  of  law  in  any  case,  civil  or  criminal.  The 
determination  of  the  law  applicable  to  the  cause  on  trial  is  no  part 
of  their  right  or  duty."  ^"''  The  court  determines  the  admissibility  of 
evidence,  passes  upon  the  law,  and  instructs  the  jury  with  reference 
thereto;  and  the  jury  applies  the  law  to  the  facts  in  evidence. ^"^ 
It  is  therefore  the  normal  function  of  the  jury  both  to  find  whether 
the  facts  in  evidence  are  sufficient  to  justify  the  inference  and  to 
draw  or  deny  the  inference  of  actionable  negligence,  and  to  deter- 
mine the  extent  of  the  recovery.  In  many  cases,  however,  courts 
pass  not  only  upon  the  law,  but  also  upon  the  facts,  and  either  in- 
struct the  jury  as  to  what  their  verdict  shall  be  or  take  the  case 
away  from  them.^"^ 

&  S.  F.  Ky.  Co.  V.  Sageley,  56  Ark.  549,  20  S.  W.  413;  Georgia  Railroad  & 
Banking  Co.  v.  Parks,  91  Ga.  71,  16  S.  B.  266;  Georgia  Railroad  &  Banking 
<Jo.  V.  Middlebrooks,  91  Ga.  76,  16  S.  E.  989;  Birmingham  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Harris, 
lis  Ala.  326,,  13  South.  377;  Vallance  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  55  Fed.  364. 
Cases  as  to  violation  of  statutory  duty  as  proximate  cause  of  damage  will  be 
found  collected  in  16  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law,  p.  42:3,  note  1. 

50  0  Com.  V.  McManus  (Pa.  Sup.)  22  Atl.  761.  See  30  Am.  Law  Reg.  731, 
collecting  cases  in  great  number.  There  is  no  respectable  adverse  English 
decision,  and  only  one  single  well-considered  American  case,  State  v.  Croteau, 
23  Vt.  14,  in  which  the  court  was  divided.  A  ballad  was,  however,  in  vogue 
at  the  time  of  the  Fox  libel  act  (1792),  "For  twelve  honest  men  have  decided 
the  cause,  who  are  judges  alike  of  the  facts  and  the  laws."  State  v.  Croteau, 
30  Am.  Law  Reg.  745.  And  this  anomaly  in  libel  is  still  recognized.  Ante, 
p.  500,  "Defamation." 

501  Sears  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  43  Neb.  720,  62  N.  W.  C8,  and  cases 
collected. 

50  2  As  applied  to  negligence,  generally,  see  Cope  v.  Hampton  Co.  (S.  C.)  19 
S.  E.  1018;  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Locke,  112  Ind.  404,  14  N.  E.  391; 
Evans  v.  Adams  Exp.   Co.,  122  Ind.  362,  23  N.  E.  1039;   Directors,  etc.,  v. 


932  NEGLIGENCE.  [Cll.    12 

Same — Analysis  of  Functions. 

The  confused  subject  of  when  negligence  is  a  auestion  of  law, 
and  when  of  fact,  may,  perhaps,  be  chirified  by  analyzing  what  mat- 
ters may  properly  be  for  the  court,  and  what  for  the  jury.""'  Three 
different  elements  essential  to  the  plaintiff's  recovery  may  be  either 
for  the  court  or  for  the  jury,  as  circumstances  may  determine:  (a) 
Facts  showing  the  existence  of  a  duty  owed  by  the  defendant  to  the 
plaintiff;  (b)  the  Aiolation  of  that  duty  in  fact  by  the  defendant; 
(c)  damages  to  the  plaintiff,  conforming  to  legal  standards. 

The  facts  to  be  proved  may  or  may  not  show  the  duty  owed  to  the 
plaintiff  by  the  defendant.  With  respect  to  the  violation  of  a  com- 
mon-law duty,  the  same  proof  usually  shows  the  duty  and  its  viola- 
tion. So,  in  cases  to  which  res  ipsa  loquitur  applies,  and,  a 
fortiori,  where  an  instrumentality  is  so  dangerous  that  its  owner- 
ship or  custody  attaches  responsibility,  despite  the  exercise  of  great- 
est diligence,  the  inference  of  duty  is  a  matter  of  law.  And,  gen- 
erally, where  undisputed  facts  show  negligence  which  is  the  pri- 
mary, substantial  cause  of  the  injury  complained  of,  and  there  is 

Jackson,  L.  R.  3  H.  L.  193;  Ohio  &  M.  R.  W.  Co.  v.  Collarn,  73  Ind.  261; 
Baltimore  &  O.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Walborn,  127  Ind.  142,  26  N.  E.  207;  Cincin- 
nati, X-I.  &  I.  R.  Co.  V.  Butler,  103  Ind.  31,  2  N.  E.  138;  Chicago  &  E.  I.  Ry. 
Oo.  V.  Hedges,  118  Ind.  5,  20  N.  E.  530;  Indiana,  B.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ham- 
mock, 113  Ind.  1,  14  N.  E.  737;    Schofleld  v.   Railway  Co.,   114  U.   S.   615,' 

5  Sup.  Ct.  1125;    Belief  on  taine  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hunter,  33  Ind.  335;    Indiana,  B. 

6  W.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Greene,  106  Ind.  279,  6  N.  E.  603.  However,  it  is  error  to 
state  to  the  jury  a  group  of  circumstances  as  to  which  there  has  been  evi- 
dence on  the  trial,  and  instruct  that  such  facts  amount  to  negligence  per  se; 
the  question  of  negligence  being  for  the  jury.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v. 
Oleson,  40  Neb.  889,  59  N.  W.  354.  And  it  is  said  in  Clerk  &  Lindsell  on 
Torts  (357-391)  that  the  common  practice  is  to  speak  of  certain  classes  of 
acts  as  negligent  acts,  and  not  merely  as  evidence  of  negligence;  but  it  is 
apprehended  that  negligence  can  never  be  predicated  of  an  g^ct  as  matter  of 
law,  the  character  of  the  act  being  in  each  case  a  question  for  the  jury.  Even 
thougli  the  inference  of  want  of  due  care  be  irresistible,  still  the  judge  can- 
not withdraw  the  question  of  negligence  from  the  jury,  and,  if  the  jury  choose 
perversely  to  find  that  there  was  no  negiligence,  the  only  remedy  is,  appar-, 
ently,  a  new  trial. 

B03  See  article  on  "Law  and  Fact  in  Jury  Trial,"  by  J.  B.  Thayer,  in  4  Harv. 
Law  Rev.  147.  For  illustration  of  a  prudent  man's  conduct,  as  defined  by  a 
judge,  see  Cox  v.  Burbidge,  13  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  430;  Dixon  v.  Bell,  5  Maule  & 
S.  198. 


^h-    i2]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  933 

no  just  ground  for  imputing  contributory  negligence  to  the  plain- 
tiff, it  is  not  error  to  instruct  the  jury  that  the  defendant  is  guilty 
of  negligence,  and  that  the  disputed  issue  is  the  question  of  dam- 
ages.'"''^ I 

On  the  other  hand,  there  may  be  conduct  inducing  harm  (i.  e.  vio- 
lation and  damage),  but,  as  a  matter  of  \a\\,  no  duty;  ^"'^  as  in  the 
clearest  cases  of  an  independent  contractor.  This  is  also  true  in 
cases  of  damages  incident  to  authorized  act.  And,  again,  the  facts 
may  be  undisputed,  and  the  jury  be  called  upon  to  determine 
whether  the  conduct  was  negligent.^"'  But  «ith  respect  to  con- 
tract duty,  proof  of  contract,  for  example,  with  a  common  carrier 
of  goods,  is  distinct  from  proof  of  its  violation,  for  example,  by  de- 
struction of  the  goods.  Here  the  court  finds  the  duty  as  a  matter 
of  law,  and,  if  there  is  dispute  as  to  facts,  the  violation  and  damage 
may  be  left  to  the  jury.  If  there  is  no  dispute  as  to  the  facts,  be- 
cause the  plaintiff  wholly  fails  to  sufficiently  prove  a  contract  or  dam- 

005  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  McDonnald,  42  Fed.  579,  affii-med  in  152  U.  S.  2i;2. 
14  Sup.  Ct.  619.  And  see  opinion  of  Macfarlane,  J.,  in  Bluedorn  v.  Missouri 
Pae.  Ey.  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  24  S.  W.  57-60. 

508  When  the  facts  are  clearly  settled,  and  the  course  which  common  pru- 
dence dictated  can  be  clearly  discerned,  the  courts  should  decide  the  question 
as  a  matter  of  law.  Shear.  &  R.  Neg.  §  56,  citing  Beisiegal  v.  Railroad  Co., 
40  N.  Y.  9;  Stubley  v.  Railroad  Co.,  L.  R.  1  K\eh.  13;  Crafter  v.  Metro- 
politan R.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  300.  And  see  Bev.  Neg.  11;  Hathaway  t.  Rail- 
road Co.,  29  Fed.  489;  Abbett  v.  Railway  Co..  30  ilinn.  482,  16  N.  W.  266; 
Reading  &  0.  R.  Co.  v.  Ritchie,  102  Pa.  St.  42.-5;  Detroit  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Van 
Steinburg,  17  Mich.  99.  Thus,  it  is  negligence  which  will  justify  the  with- 
drawal of  a  case  from  the  jury  for  a  licensee  to  walk  on  or  near  a  track  in 
a  railroad  yard  when,  in  the  exercise  of  due  care,  it  is  admitted  that  he 
could  have  walked  safely  by  the  side  of  the  track.  Tucker  v.  Baltimore  & 
O.  R.  Co.,  8  O.  C.  A.  416,  59  Fed.  968.  And  this  is  true  although  the  defend- 
ant introduced  no  evidence.  Kane  v.  Railway  Co.,  128  U.  S.  91,  9  Sup.  Ct.  • 
16;  Mitchell  v.  Railroad  Co.,  146  U.  S.  513,  13  Sup.  Ct.  259;  Delaware,  I;. 
&  W.  R.  Co.  V.  Converse,  139  U.  S.  469,  11  Sup.  Ct.  569;  Central  Tiansp.  Co. 
V.  Pullman's  Palace-Car  Co.,  139  U.  S.  24,  11  Sup.  Ct.  478.  Cf.  Sliaw  v. 
Philadelphia,  159  Pa.  St.  487,  where  it  was  left  to  the  jury  to  determine  the 
amount  of  damages  caused  by  plaintiffs  being  thrown  from  a  wagion  because 
of  dangerous  higihway,  the  testimony  being  such  "as  to  leave  no  doubt  as 
to  the  alleged  negligence  of  the  defendant." 

507  Vinton  v.  Schwab,  32  Vt.  612;    Ohio  &  M.  R.  W.  Co.  v.  CuUarn,  73  Ind. 

261. 


934  KEGI.IGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

age,  the  court  may  withdraw  the  case  from  the  jury;  or,  if  the  facts 
be  sufficiently  proved,  a  recovery  may  be  directed,  and  the  amount  of 
the  judgment  left  to  the  jury.  And  so,  with  respect  to  a  statutory 
duty,  in  many  cases  only  violation  and  damage  need  be  shown,  inas- 
umch  as  the  court  judicially  knows  all  general  laws,  including  the 
particular  statute  by  which  a  duty  is  created.  But  especially  where 
the  cause  of  action  accrued  under  the  statute  peculiar  to  one  state, 
and  the  suit  is  brought  under  the  different  statutes  of  another  state, 
then  it  may  be  necessary  both  to  plead  and  prove  such  statutes.  On 
proof  of  the  violation  of  such  duty,  sometimes  the  court  will  in- 
struct the  jury  to  draw  a  conclusive  presumption,  sometimes  a 
prima  facie  presumption,  of  actionable  negligence,  and  sometimes 
it  will  leave  such  violation  to  the  jury,  to  be  considered,  in  connec- 
tion with  other  circumstances,  in  determining  the  defendant's  lia- 
bility. 

And,  finally,  proving  damages  is,  strictly  speaking,  an  essen- 
tial part  of  the  plaintiff's  duty,  although  not  the  whole.  He  can- 
not, however,  show  actionable  negligence  without  proof  of  damage. 
Courts  may  leave  the  extent  of  his  recovery  to  the  jury,  but  they 
will  determine  what  damages  are  legal.  Thus,  they  will  exclude 
remote  damages,  and  will  determine,  in  some  cases,  what  damages 
are  remote.  They  will  also  find  as  a  matter  of  law  that^damages  of 
other  descriptions  are  too  trifling,  uncertain,  speculative,  or  other- 
wise objectionable  in  their  character,  to  become  the  basis  of  re- 
sponsibility. 

265.  The  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  plaintiff  to  show  the 
negligence  of  the  defendant,  except — 
EXCEPTIONS— (a)  Where  proof  of  some  contract  or  un- 
dertaking, and   damage,   makes    out   a  prima  facie 
case; 

(b)  Where  the  thing  is  sho'wn  to  be  under  the  manage- 

ment of  the  defendant,  and  the  accident  is  such  as, 
in  the  ordinary  course  of  things,  does  not  happen 
if  those  -arho  have  the  management  use  proper  care ; 
and 

(c)  Where  this  rule  is  changed  by  statute. 


Ch-    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  935 

There  is  logically  applied  to  the  law  of  negligence  the  ordinary 
rule  governing  the  production  of  evidence,  that  the  obligation  of 
proving  the  fact  lies  upon  the  party  who  substantially  asserts  the 
affirmative  of  the  issue.=°^  "Where  the  evidence  is  equally  consist- 
ent with  either  view, — the  existence  or  nonexistence  of  negligence, 
— it  is  not  competent  for  the  judge  to  leave  the  matter  to  the  jury."  ="' 
Indeed,  the  law,  so  far  from  not  presuming  negligence  without  evi- 
dence, recognizes  a  presumption  that  at  least  ordinary  care  was 
used.""  The  plaintiff  must  establish  his  case  by  a  preponderance 
of  evidence;  "^  but  the  rule  of  criminal  law  does  not  apply,  and  he 
is  not  bound  to  establish  it  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,"^  or  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  jury.^^^  The  mere  happening  of  an  accident  In 
not  sufficient  evidence  of  negligence  to  be  left  to  the  jury.  The 
plaintiff  must  show  some  affirmative  evidence  of  the  defendant's 
negligence.^^*     Thus,  no  inference  of  negligence  follows  from  the 

508  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  74.  In  Ohlweiler  v.  Lohmann,  8b  Wis.  75,  59  N.  W.  67a 
the  burden  was  on  plaintiff  as  to  one  proposition,  and  on  defendant  as  tft 
another.  Futher,  see  Hayes  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  Ill  U.  S.  228.  4  Sup 
Ct.  369;  Rosenfield  v.  Arrol,  44  Minn.  395,  46  N.  W.  768;  Searles  v.  Man- 
hattan Ry.  Co.,  101  N.  Y.  661,  5  N.  B.  66;  Welch  v.  Jugenheimer,  56  Iowa,  11, 
8  N.  W.  673;  Allen  v.  WiUard,  57  Pa.  St.  374;  Dowell  v.  Guthrie,  99  Mo. 
653,  12  S.  W.  900. 

509  Williams,  J.,  in  Cotton  v.  Wood,  8  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  568.  And  see  Ham- 
mack  v.  White,  11  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  588,  31  Law  J.  C  P.  129;  Marfell  v.  South 
Wales  R.  Co.,  8  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  525. 

510  Weiss  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  79  Pa.  St.  387,  390;  Lansing  v.  Stone,  37 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  15;  Lyndsay  v.  Connecticut  &  P.  R.  Co.,  27  Vt.  643;  Brown  v. 
Congress  &  B.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  49  Mich.  153,  13  N.  W.  494;  Allen  v.  Willard, 
57  Pa.  St.  374.  And  see  Watson  v.  Bauer,  4  Abb.  Prac.  (N.  S.)  273;  Mc- 
Cully  V.  Clarke,  40  Pa.  St.  399. 

511  Daniel  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  3  C.  P.  216,  591,  affirmed  in  Wil- 
liams V.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  9  Exch.  157;  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B. 
R.  Co.  r.  Stibbing,  62  Md.  504;  Hayes  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  Ill  U.  S. 
228-241,  4  Sup.  Ct.  369.  And  see  Crandell  v.  Goodrich  Transp.  Co.,  16  Fed- 
75;    Seybolt  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  95  N.  Y.  562. 

612  Whitney  v.  Clifford,  57  Wis.  156,  14  N.  W.  927;  Welch  v.  Jugenheimer, 
56  Iowa,  11,  8  N.  W.  673;  Ellis  v.  Buzzell,  60  Me.  209;  Elliott  v.  Van  Buren, 
33  Mich.  49. 

613  Stratton  v.  Central  City  H.  R.  Co.,  95  111.  25. 

514  Hammack  v.  White,  11  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  588;  Curtis  v.  Railway  Co.,  18  N.  Y. 
534:  Knight  v.  Cooper,  36  W.  Va.  232,  14  S.  E.  999.    The  plaintiff  was  bound 


'•-'36  XEGLIGEN-CE.  [Ch.    12 

follision  on  a  public  way  of  two  persons,  or  of  a  traveler  and  a 
vehicle,  or  of  two  vehicles."'  It  cannot  be  assumed,  in  the  absence 
of  all  explanation,  that  a  train  ran  over  a  man,  more  than  that  a 
man  ran  as^ainst  a  train.""  The  circumstances  under  which  the 
mere  happening  of  an  accident  is  inaccurately  said  to  give  rise  to  a 
presumption  of  that  negligence  will  be  subsequently  considered."' 
The  burden  of  proof  imposes  on  the  plaintiff  the  necessity  of 
sliowing  the  defendant  to  have  been  the  juridical  cause  of  the  dam- 
.^gg_6i8     Absolute  proof  is  not  necessary,  but  the  matter  must  not 

to  introduce  evidence  from  which  the  jury  might  properly  infer  that  the  ac- 
cident was  caused  by  the  defendant's  negligence,  but  was  not  required  to 
point  out  the  particular  act  or  omission  which  caused  the  accident.  Griffin 
V.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  148  Mass.  143,  19  N.  E.  166;  Stewart  v.  Ohio  River  R. 
Co.  (W.  Va.)  20  S.  B.  922;  ilooney  v.  Connecticut  River  Lumber  Co.,  154 
Mass.  407,  28  N.  E.  352;  Mobile  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Godfrey,  155  111.  78,  39  N.  E. 
590. 

515  Hazel  V.  People's  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  132  Pa.  St.  96,  18  Atl.  1116;  Piollet  v. 
Simmers,  106  Pa.  St.  95;  North  Side  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tippins  (Tex.  App.)  14 
S.  W.  1007;  Broschart  v.  Tuttle,  59  Conn.  1,  21  Atl.  025;  Cotton  v.  Wood,  8 
C.  B.  (N.  S.)  568,  29  Law  J.  G.  P.  333. 

616  Lord  Halsbury,  in  Wakelin  v.  London  &  S.  W.  R.  Co.,  12  App.  Cas.  41. 
at  page  45. 

517  Post,  p.  938. 

518  Thus,  where  a  section  hand  stepped  aside  to  let  a  passenger  train  pass, 
and  a  stone  fell  out  of  ballast  and  injured  him,  he  could  not  recover  unless 
he  could  show  what  force  threw  the  stone.  Steffen  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  46  Wis.  259,  50  N.  W.  34S.  Cause  may  be  proved  by  opinion  evidence 
based  on  personal  knowledge;  e.  g.  where  Are  started.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co. 
V.  Gilland  (Wyo.)  34  Pac.  953;  or  that  embankment  caused  overflow.  Gulf, 
C.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Haskell,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  550,  23  S.  W.  540;  or  that  de- 
lect in  roadbed  caused  accident,  Horan  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  JI.  &  O.  Ry.  Co. 
(Iowa)  56  N.  W.  507.  That  an  inexperienced  fireman  ran  the  engine  which 
damaged  plaintiff  does  not  show  connection  as  cause.  Mexican  Nat.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Mussette,  SO  Tex.  708,  26  S.  W.  1075.  Evidence  that,  while  plaintiff  was 
attempting  to  uncouple  cars  in  a  yard,  the  cars  moved  suddenly,  throwing 
him  off,  and  injuring  him,  and  that  the  railroad  company  had  failed  to  pro- 
mulgate and  enforce  rules  in  regard  to  its  work,  is  insufficient  to  justify  a 
recovery,  in  the  absence  of  any  evidence  showing  a  causal  connection  be- 
tween the  accident  and  the  failure  to  have  rules.  Rutledge  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.,  110  Mo.  312,  19  S.  W.  38.  But  where  plaintiff's  intestate,  about  half 
an  hour  after  starting  home,  was  found  on  the  sidewalk  at  the  end  of  a 
temporary  bridge  over  an  excavation  in  the  sidewalk,  and  the  hand  rail  at 
that  end  of  the  bridge  was  broken,  and  there  is  evidence  that  the  bridge  was 


^h.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  937 

be  left  inequilibrio."^  The  proof  may  be  so  clear  as  to  justify  the 
court  in  directing  the  jury  to  find  for  the  plaintiff/^"  or  so  insuffi- 
cient as  not  to  sustain  a  verdict.^^^  Thus,  the  mere  occurrence  of 
an  abcess  a  year  after  a  fall  does  not  sufficiently  establish  the  con- 
ne-ction  of  the  defendant's  negligence  occasioning  the  fall  as  the 
cause  of  the  injury  complained  of.'"  Ordinarily,  connection  as 
cause  is  for  the  jury.^-^ 

Contract  or  Undertaking. 

The  burden  of  proof  of  negligence,  notwithstanding  its  negative 
character  is  on  the  party  making  the  allegation  of  nonfeasance  or 
negligence.^2*     Thus,  the  burden  of  proof  resting  on  the  plaintiff 

defective,  it  is  sufficient  to  sustain  a  finding  tliat  intestate's  deatti  was  caused 
by  the  defective  condition  of  the  bridge.  Willdigg  v.  City  of  Brooklyn  (Sup.) 
30  N.  Y.  Supp.  75. 

519  Orth  V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ey.  Co.,  47  Minn.  384,  50  N.  W.  363.  In  an 
action  for  injuries  causing  death,  where  the  evidence  showed  that  deceased 
was  found  lying  beside  defendant's  tracks,  severely  injured,  soon  after  de- 
fendant's train,  from  which  he  had  alighted,  had  passed,  but  failed  to  show 
more  particularly  how  the  injury  was  received,  though  it  appeared  that  de- 
ceased, while  on  the  train,  was  obviously  ill,  and  in  need  of  defendant's  help 
to  reach  a  place  of  safety,  a  judgment  for  defendant  will  not  be  disturbed. 
Brady  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  162  Mass.  408,  38  N.  E.  710. 

6  2i>  Bluedom  v.  Missouri  Pae.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  24  S.  W.  57. 

521  Alere  theories  as  to  possible  cause  of  movement  of  an  elevator,  causing 
plaintiff's  death,  does  not  justify  verdict  for  plaintiff.  JIurphy  v.  Hays,  OS 
Hun,  450,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  70.  The  mere  starting  of  a  freight  train,  unex- 
pectedly throwing  a  brakeman  oflf  a  rear  car,  is  not  actionable  unless  it 
was  done  suddenly,  violently,  or  negligently.  Johnston  v.  Canadian  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.,  50  Fed.  886.  But  see  Northeastern  R.  Co.  v.  Barnett,  89  Ga.  399, 
15  S.  E.  492.  Sudden  and  unexplained  starting  of  "blood  mill"  out  of  usual 
manner  of  its  operation  is  evidence  of  some  want  of  care  in  its  construction 
or  condition.  Blanton  v.  Dold,  109  Mo.  64,  18  S.  W.  1149.  As  to  leakage  of 
throttle  valve,  see  Connors  v.  Durite  Manuf'g  Co.,  156  Mass.  163,  30  N.  E. 
559.  Unexpected  backing  up  of  engine  may  be  negligence.  Barnett  v. 
Northeastern  R.  Co.,  87  Ga.  199,  13  S.  E,  640.  And  see  Latremouille  v.  Ben- 
nington &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  63  Vt.  336,  22  Atl.  G-'jO;  Wanamaker  v.  City  of  Rochester 
(Sup.)  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  321.  As  to  sudden  starting  of  machinery,  see  Blanton 
V.  Dold,  109  Mo.  64,  18  S.  M'.  1149;  Connors  v.  Dui-ite  Manuf'g  Co.,  156  Mass. 
163,  30  N.  E.  559;   Hudson  v.  Charleston,  C.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.,  55  Fed.  248. 

52  2  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Farr,  6  C.  C.  A.  211,  56  Fed.  994. 

52  3  Ante,  c.  1. 

524  Crowley  v.  Page,  7  Car.  &  P.  7S'.>:  Clark  v.  Spence,  10  Watts  (Pa.)  33.1; 
Story,  Bailm.  §§  454-457;  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  81. 


938  KEGUGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

to  show  negligence  on  the  part  of  a  physician,"^  a  lawyer  or  other 
professional  man/^°  is  not  sustained  by  mere  proof  of  contract,  and 
of  damage.  With  respect  to  carriers  of  passengers  °^*  and  of  freight, 
proof  of  contract,  of  the  commencement  of  passage  or  transportation, 
and  of  damage,  raises  a  presumption  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  the 
carrier,  without  further  proof  on  plaintiff's  cause.  On  similar  prin- 
ciples, it  has  been  held  that  where  a  message,  delivered  to  a  tele- 
graph company  for  transmission  as  an  unrepeated  message,  is  plainly 
and  distinctly  written,  and  such  mistake  is  made  in  its  transmission 
that  it  reaches  the  connecting  company,  after  passing  over  only  a 
single  line,  in  a  materially  altered  condition,  there  is,  in  the  absence 
of  explanation,  sufficient  evidence  of  negligence  to  justify  a  recovery 
against  the  company.'^' 

Res  Ipsa  Loquitur. 

"While  it  is  true,  as  a  general  proposition,  that  the  burden  of 
showing  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  one  occasioning  an  injury 
rests  in  the  first  instance  upon  the  plaintiff,  yet,  *  »  *  when 
he  has  shown  a  situation  which  could  not  have  been  produced  ex- 
cept by  the  operation  of  abnormal  causes,  the  onus  rests  upon  the 
defendant  to  prove  that  the  injui-y  was  caused  without  his  fault."  ^^^ 
When  the  physical  facts  surrounding  an  accident  in  themselves  cre- 
ate a  reasonable  probability  that  the  accident  resulted  from  negli- 
gence, the  physical  facts  themselves  are  evidential,  and  furnish 
what  the  law  terms  evidence  of  negligence,  in  conformity  with  the 
maxim,  "Res  ipsa  loquitur."  ^^^  It  would  seem  more  accurate  to 
say,  not  that  negligence  is  presumed  from  the  mere  fact  of  the  in- 
jury or  accident,  but,  rather,  that  it  may  be  inferred  from  the  facts 
and  circumstances  disclosed,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  showing 

52  5  Swanson  v.  French  (Iowa)  61  N.  W.  407. 

62  6  Allan  V.  State  S.  S.  Co.,  132  N.  Y.  91,  95,  30  N.  E.  482,  and  cases  cited. 

52  8  Post,  p.  1078. 

029  Marr  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  85  Tenn.  529,  3  S.  W.  496. 

530  Ruger,  C.  J.,  in  Seybolt  v.  New  York,  L.  B.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  95  N.  Y.  562. 
Fall  of  hydraulic  elevator  raises  presumption  on  part  of  defendant,  its  owner. 
Tieadwell  v.  Whittier,  80  Cal.  574,  22  Pac.  266;  Dehring  v.  Comstock,  78 
Jlich.  53,  43  N.  W.  1049. 

531  Houston  V.  Brush,  6(3  Vt.  331,  29  Atl.  380,  383  (a  leading  case,  collecting 
and  commenting  on  authorities). 


C'h.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS. 


939 


that  it  occurred  without  negligence.^'^  Thus,  "whenever  a  car  or 
train  leaves  the  track,  it  proves  either  that  the  track  or  the  machinery, 
or  some  other  portion  thereof,  is  not  in  a  proper  condition,  or  that 
the  machinery  is  not  properly  operated,  and  presumptively  proves 
that  the  defendant,  whose  duty  it  is  to  keep  the  track  and  machinery 
in  the  proper  condition,  and  to  operate  it  with  the  necessary  pru- 
dence and  care,  has  in  some  respect  violated  this  duty;  and  the 
court  may  properly  charge  that  such  owner  was  bound  to  show  some 
explanation  of  the  cause  of  the  accident."  ^^=  So,  in  the  leading 
English  case  of  Byrne  v.  Boadle,"*  a  barrel  of  flour  fell  from  a  ware- 
house, and  struck  the  plaintiff,  who  was  lawfully  passing  on  a  public 
street;  and  in  Kearney  v.  Railway  Co.,"=  a  brick  fell  from  a  bridge 
and  struck  and  injured  the  plaintiff.  It  was  held  that  the  maxim, 
"Res  ipsa  loquitur,"  applied  to  the  cases."^^     In  Mullen  v.  St.  John,°^' 

532  Huey  v.  Gahlenbeck,  121  Pa.  St.  238,  15  Atl.  520;  Alpern  v.  Churchill, 
53  Mich.  COT,  19  N.  W.  549;  Holbrook  v.  Railway  Co.,  12  N.  Y.  236,  64  Am. 
Dec.  502,  note.     Compare  Shear.  &  R.  Neg.  §  13. 

033  Grover,  J.,  in  Edgerton  v.  New  York  &  H.  R.  Co.,  39  N.  Y.  227,  229. 

534  2  Hurl.  &  C.  722,  :K  Law  J.  Bxch.  13;  Bigelow,  Lead.  Cas.  578,  where 
a  valuable  discussion  will  be  found.  Compare  Scott  v.  London  &  St.  K. 
Docks  Co.,  3  Hurl.  &  C.  596,  34  Law  J.  Exch.  220,  393. 

535  L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  759-762.  Et  vide  TaiTy  v.  Ashton,  1  Q.  B.  Div.  314;  In- 
land &  Seaboard  Coasting  Co.  v.  Tolson,  139  U.  S.  551-554,  11  Sup.  Ct.  653; 
The  William  Branfoot,  3  C.  C.  A.  155,  52  Fed.  390;  Miller  v.  Railway  Co.,  25 
N.  Y.  753.  But  the  fact  that  a  fractured  limb  is  shorter  when  the  patient  is 
discharged  is  not  prima  facie  evidence  of  physician's  negligence.  Piles  v. 
Hughes,  10  Iowa,  579. 

536  Brigg  V.  Oliver,  4  Hurl  &  C.  403;  Skinner  v.  London,  B.  &  S.  C.  R.  Co., 
5  Exch.  787  (inference  of  negligence  from  collision);  Scott  v.  London  &  St. 
K.  Dock  Co.,  3  Hurl.  &  C.  596;   AYhit.  Smith,  Neg.  §  22. 

537  57  N.  Y.  567.  And  see  Gl^eson  v.  Virginia  Midland  R.  Co.,  140  U.  S. 
435,  11  Sup.  Ct.  859  (landslide).  Lyons  v.  Rosenthal,  11  Hun,  46;  Kirst  v. 
Raili-oad  Co.,  46  Wis.  489,  1  N.  W.  89;  Smith  v.  Gaslight  Co.,  129  Mass.  318; 
Clare  v.  Bank,  1  Sweeny,  539;  Brehm  v.  Railway  Co.,  34  Barb.  256;  Sullivan 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  39  La.  Ann.  800,  2  South.  586;  Hays  v.  Gallagher,  72  Pa. 
St.  136;  Thomas  v.  Telegraph  Co.,  100  Mass.  156;  Dixon  v.  Pluns,  98  Cal. 
384,  33  Pac.  268;  Cummings  v.  National  Furnace  Co.,  60  Wis.  603,  18  N.  W. 
742.  "Cases  i-estiug  in  contract  have  frequently  received  our  consideration, 
and  they  are  generally  free  ^-om  difliculty,  because  the  mere  happening  of 
the  accident  will  be  prima  facie  evidence  of  a  breach  of  contract,  without 
further  proof ;  while  in  those  not  resting  in  coutnict  it  must  not  only  appear 
that  the  accident  happened,  but  the  surrounding  circumstances  must  be  such 


^^0  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

the  walls  of  a  building,  without  any  special  circumstances  of  storm 
and  violence,  fell  into  one  of  the  streets  of  the  city  of  Brooklyn, 
Ivnocking  down  a  woman  who  was  on  the  sidewalk,  and  seriously 
injuring  her.  Dwisht,  C,  said:  "There  was  some  evidence  tending 
to  show  that  it  was  out  of  repair.  Without  laying  any  stress  upon 
the  affirmative  testimony,  it  is  as  impossible  to  conceive  of  this 
building  so  falling,  unless  it  was  badly  constructed  or  in  bad  repair, 
:i.s  it  is  to  suppose  that  a  seaworthy  ship  would  go  to  the  bottom 
in  a  tran(iuil  sea  and  without  collision.  The  mind,  necessarily, 
*?eeks  for  a  cause  for  the  fall.  That  is  apparently  the  bad  condition 
of  the  structure.  This,  again,  leads  to  the  inference  of  negligence, 
which  the  defendant  should  rebut." 

On  the  other  hand,  for  example,  a  switchback  at  a  pleasure  re- 
sort on  the  line  of  a  street-railway  company  which  advertises  it,  is 
not  in  itself  dangerous  or  unlawful.  Therefore,  such  street-railway 
company  is  not  liable,  on  mere  proof  of  damage  caused  by  the  care- 
lessness of  the  owner  of  the  switchback  or  his  servants.^''  Indeed, 
the  English  courts  have  held  that  the  presumption  of  negligence 
could  not  be  extended  to  all  accidents,  but  only  to  those  where  the 
accident  happens  in  course  of  the  defendant's  business,  over  which 
he  is  bound  to  exercise  proper  control. °^° 

as  to  raise  the  presumption  of  a  failure  of  duty  on  tlie  part  of  the  defendant 
towards  the  plaintiff."  Article,  "Res  Ipsa  Loquitur,"  Judge  Seymour  D. 
Thompson,  in  10  Cent.  Law  J.  261,  approved  in  Howser  v.  Cumberland  & 
P.  R.  Co.  (ild.)  30  Atl.  90G.  This  case  held  that  in  an  action  for  injuries 
caused  by  plaintiff,  who  was  walliing  along  a  pathway  outside  of  a  railroad 
■company's  right  of  way,  being  struck  by  cross-ties  as  they  fell  from  a  mov- 
ing train,  the  mere  fact  that  the  ties  fell  from  a  gondola  car,  on  which  they 
were  loaded,  is,  under  the  doctrine  of  "res  ipsa  loquitur,"  prima  facie  evi- 
dence of  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  railway  company.  (McSherry  and 
Fowler,  .JJ.,  dissenting.) 

538  Knottnerus  v.  North  Park  St.  Ry.  Co.,  93  Mich.  348,  53  N.  W.  529.  And 
«ee  Gulvin  v.  Gualala  Mill  Co.,  98  Cal.  268,  33  Pac.  93  (starting  fire);  Cross 
v.  California  St.  Cable  Ry.  Co.,  102  Cal.  313,  36  Pac.  673  (driving  heavily  load- 
ed team  on  street-car  track);  Eascher  v.  East  Detroit  &  G.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  90  Mich. 
413,  51  N.  W.  463;  Dehring  v.  Comstock,  78  Mich.  153,  43  N.  W.  1049;  Cor- 
rigan  v.  Union  Sugar  Refinery,  98  Mass.  577. 

B39  Scott  V.  London  &  St.  K.  Dock  Co.,  3  Hurl.  &  C.  596;  Higgs  v.  Maynard, 
12  Jm\  (N.  S.)  705;  Welfare  v.  Railway  Co.,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  693;  Smth  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  L.  R.  2  C.  P.  10;    Pol.  Torts,  224. 


Ch.    12J  ESSENTIAL    ELEME.NTS.  941 

Statutory  Changes. 

Many  statutes  have  changed  the  common  law  rule  of  the  various 
states  as  to  the  matter  of  proof  of  negligence.  Xew  rules  have 
been  directly  introduced.  Thus,  it  has  been  enacted  that  the  bur- 
den is  on  the  owners  of  reservoirs  to  exonerate  themselves  by  rebut- 
ting the  statutory  presumption  of  negligence  from  the  escape  of  wa 
ters.'*"  So  a  presumption  that  damages  produced  by  a  railroad 
company  to  persons,  servants,  strangers,  or  property,  in  some  states, 
is  by  statute  created  from  the  happening  of  an  accident.^*^  The 
presumption  of  negligence  from  the  starting  of  fires  is  constitution- 
al.''*^ Whether  or  not  a  violation  of  a  statutory  duty  is  negligence 
per  se,  or  only  evidence  of  negligence,  to  be  considered  with  other 
circumstances,  has  been  previously  considered.^*^ 

266.  The  burden  of  showing  contributory  negligence  is 
generally,  but  not  invariably,  held  to  be  on  the  de- 
fendant. 

It  Is  a  generally  recognized  rule  that  contributory  negligence  is 
a  defense,  to  be  specially  pleaded;  ^■'^  and  that  the  burden  is  on  the 
defendant  to  establish  contributory  negligence  by  evidence."^     He 

54  0  Larimer  County  Ditch  Co.  v.  Zimmerman,  4  Colo.  App.  78,  34  I'ac.  1111. 

'oil  Laws  Ma.  1890,  p.  113,  c.  40;  Duval  v.  Hunt,  34  Fla.  85,  15  South.  876; 
Jacksonville,  T.  &  K.  "W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jones,  34  Fla.  286,  15  South.  924.  So 
in  Georgia.  Georgia  Midland  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Evans,  87  Ga.  673,  13  S.  E.  580; 
Savannah,  F.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Slater  (Ga.)  17  S.  E.  3.j0. 

542  Campbell  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  121  Mo.  .■J40,  25  S.  W.  936.  And  sec 
Galvin  v.  Gualala  Mill  Co.,  98  Cal.  268,  33  Pac.  93. 

543  Ante,  p.  918,  "Statutory  Negligence." 

544  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tracy,  19  Colo.  331,  3-')  Pac.  537;  Bonknight  v. 
Charlotte,  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.  (S.  C.)  19  S.  E.  915;  House  v.  Meyer,  100  Cal.  .".92, 
.35  Pac.  308;  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Hissong  (Ala.)  12  South.  393;  Kansas 
Citj',  H.  &  B.  R.  Co.  V.  Crocker,  95  Ala.  412,  11  South.  202;  Willis  v.  City  of 
Perry  (Iowa)  60  N.  W.  727;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Markee  (Ala.)  15  South. 
511. 

=  45  Hough  V.  Railway  Co.,  100  U.  S.  213;  Amato  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co., 
46  Fed.  561;  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Volk,  151  U.  S.  73,  14  S.  Ct.  2  !0;  Pennsyl- 
vania Co.  V.  Roy,  102  U.  S.  451;  Inland  &  Seaboard  Coasting  Co.  v.  Tolsou, 
139  U.  S.  551-557,  11  Sup.  Ct.  653,  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Madison, 
123  U.  S.  524,  8  Sup.  Ct.  216;   Baker  v.  AVestmoreland  &  C.  Nat.  Gas  Co.,  1.57 


942  NEGUGENrE.  [Ch.   12 

may  also  avail  himself  of  any  evidence  given  by  the  plaintifE."" 
But  the  defenye  may  be  founded  on  facts  shovs^n  by  the  plaintiff's 
evidence  alone."'  And  if  the  evidence  shows  the  plaintiff  to  be 
guilty  of  contributory  negligence,  he  cannot  recover."*  On  the 
other  hand,  however,  in  some  jurisdictions  this  rule  is  not  in  force, 
and  the  plaintiff  must  aver  "^^  and  prove  ^^°  that  he  exercised  due 
care,  or  was  not  guilty  of  contributory  negligence. 

Pa.  St.  593,  27  Atl.  789;  Downey  v.  Pittsburg,  A.  &  M.  Traction  Co.,  161  Pa.  St. 
131,  28  Atl.  1019;  Card  y.  Eddy  (Mo.  Sup.)  24  S.  W.  746;  Bluedorn  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  24  S.  W.  57;  Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Tomlinson  (Ariz.) 
33  Pac.  710;  Thorpe  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  89  Mo.  650,  2  S.  W.  3;  Fulks 
V.  St.  Louis  &  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  Ill  Mo.  335,  19  S.  W.  818;  Crumpley  v.  Han- 
nibal &  St.  J.  R.  Co.,  Ill  Mo.  152,  19  S.  W.  820;  Jordan  v.  City  of  Aslie- 
ville,  112  N.  C.  743,  16  S.  E.  700;  Bromley  v.  Birmingham  Mineral  R.  Co., 
95  Ala.  397;  11  South.  341;  Birmingham  Mineral  R.  Co.  v.  Wilmer,  97  Ala.  165, 
11  South.  886;  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Ryan,  17  Colo.  98,  28  Pac.  79; 
Spm-rier  v.  Front  St.  Cable  Ry.  Co.,  3  Wash.  St.  659,  29  Pac.  346;  MerriU 
V.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  139  Mass.  252,  29  N.  E.  666;  City  of  Omaha  v.  Ayer,  32 
Neb.  375,  49  N.  W.  443;  Anderson  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  35  Neb.  95, 
52  N.  W.  840;  St.  Louis  &  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  v.  Weaver,  35  Kan.  412,  11  Pac.  408; 
Dugan  V.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  85  Wis.  609,  55  N.  W.  894;  Jones 
V.  Malvern  Lumber  Co.,  58  Ark.  125,  23  S.  W.  679;  Lorimer  v.  St.  Paul  City 
Ry.  Co.,  48  Minn.  391;  Dublin,  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Slattery,  3  App.  Oas.  1155 
(per  Lord  Hatherly,  page  1169;  per  Lord  Penzance,  page  1173);  Wakelin  v. 
London  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  12  App.  Cas,  41,  43,  47,  per  Ix)rd  Watson;  Bridges 
V.  North  London  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  7  Eng.  &  Ir.  App.  213,  232. 

BiB  Waterman  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  82  Wis.  613,  52  N.  W.  247;  Washing- 
ton &  G.  R.  Co.  V.  Tobi-iner,  147  U.  S.  571,  13  Sup.  Ct.  557. 

547  i-iorn's  Adm'x  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  4  C.  C.  A.  346,  54  Fed.  301,  6 
U.  S.  App.  381.  Running  a  train  at  a  high  rate  of  speed  in  a  city  and  pop- 
ulous district,  or  failure  to  keep  a  lookout  at  such  point,  renders  the  com- 
pany liable,  though  the  injured  person  was  guilty  of  contributory  negligence, 
and  the  trainmen  were  without  fault  after  they  discovered  his  danger.  Nave 
V.  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.,  96  Ala.  264,  11  South.  391.  But  in  Parker  v.  Penn- 
sylvania Co.,  134  Ind.  673,  34  N.  E.  504,  it  was  held  that  a  similar  state  of 
facts  does  .not  constitute  such  willfulness  as  renders  the  company  liable 
notwithstanding  contributory  negligence. 

548  Smith  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (S.  D.)  55  N.  W.  717;  McMur- 
try  V.  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  R.  Co.,  67  Miss.  601,  7  South.  401. 

549  Terre  Haute  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tappenbeck,  9  Ind.  App.  422,  36  N.  E.  915.  Et 
vide  New  York,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Mushrush  (Ind.  App.)  37  N.  E.  954;   Ev- 

B6  0  See  note  550  on  following  page. 


^h     12]  KSSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  943 

287.  Negligence  is  a  conclusion,  to   be   drawn   from  facts 
proved,  and  not  a  matter  to  be  proved,  ordinarily — 

(a)  By  expert  and  opinion  evidence;''^'  or 

(b)  By  evidence  as  to  custom. 

Expert  and  Opinion  Evidence. 

Negligence,  as  has  been  seen,  is  an  inference  drawn  by  tbe  jury 
from  tlie  facts  in  evidence.  It  is  not,  ordinarily,  the  subject  of  di- 
rect proof."^     Circumstantial  evidence  is  suflflcient."^     The  prem- 

ansville  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Krapf  (Ind.  Sup.)  36  N.  E.  901;  Richmond  Gas  Co. 
V.  Baker  (Ind.  Sup.)  39  N.  E.  552;  Lake  Brie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Griffin,  8  Ind. 
App.  47,  35  N.  E.  39G;  Gregoi-y  v.  Woodworth  (Iowa)  CI  N.  W.  962  (under 
statute  as  to  damages  caused  by  animals);  Board  of  Com'rs  v.  Creviston, 
133  Ind.  39,  32  N.  E.  735;  Chicago  &  I.  Coal  Ry.  Co.  v.  McDaniels,  134  Ind. 
166,  32  N.  E.  728;  Di  Marcho  v.  Builders'  Iron  Foundry  (R.  I.)  27  Atl.  328; 
State  V.  Baltimore  &  L.  R.  Co.,  77  Ind.  489,  26  Atl.  865;  Walker  v.  Chester 
Co.,  40  S.  C.  342,  18  S.  E.  936  (under  statute).  A  reply  is  necessary  to  an 
answer  alleging  contributory  negligence,  although  the  complaint  denies 
it.     Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Copas,  95  Ky.  460,  26  S.  W.  179. 

6  50  The  absence  of  contributory  negligence  need  not  be  directly  alleged. 
The  allegation  is  involved  substantially  in  the  averment  that  defendant's 
negligence  occasioned  the  injury.  In  an  action  for  negligence  the  burden 
is  on  the  plaintiff  to  Establish  that  he  did  not  cause  or  contribute  to  the  in- 
jury. Lee  V.  Troy  Citizens'  Gas  Light  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  115;  Pittsburgh,  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Bennett,  9  Ind.  App.  02,  35  N.  E.  1033.  But  see  Illinois  Cent. 
11.  Co.  V.  Nowicki,  148  111.  29,  .35  N.  E.  358;  Ryan  v.  Town  of  Bristol,  63  Conn. 
26,  27  Atl.  309;  Lauster  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  43  111.  App.  534; 
Clements  v.  Louisiana  Electric  Light  Co.,  44  La.  Ann.  692,  11  South.  51  (cf. 
Ryan  v.  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  44  La.  Ann.  806,  11  South.  30); 
Owens  V.  Railroad  Co.,  88  N.  C.  506;  Keller  v.  Gaskill,  9  Ind.  App.  670,  36 
N.  E.  303;  Buttons  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  18  N.  Y.  252  (cf.  Tolman  v.  Syra- 
cuse, B.  &  N.  Y.  R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  198).  And  see  Dobbins  v.  Brown,  119  N. 
Y.  188,  23  N.  E.  537;  Reynolds  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  58  N.  Y. 
248;  Cordell  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  75  N.  Y.  330;  Bond  v. 
Smith,  113  N.  Y.  378,  21  N.  E.  128;  Stone  v.  Dry-Dock,  E.  B.  &  B.  Ry.  Co., 
115  N.  Y.  Ill,  21  N.  E.  712;  The  Frank  and  Willie,  45  Fed.  494. 

551  Black,  Prac.  &  PI.  Ace.  Cas.  pp.  46-52. 

5  52  Callahan  v.  Warne,  40  Mo.  132-137;  post,  p.  952.  Et  vide  Illinois  Cent. 
Ry.  V.  Oragin,  71  111.  177;  Garrett  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  36  Iowa,  121; 
Griffin  v.  Overman  Wheel  Co.,  9  C.  C.  A.  542,  61  Fed.  568;  Dobbins  v.  Brown, 
119  N.  Y.  188,  195,  23  N.  E.  537. 

053  Waycross  Lumber  Co.  v.  Guy,  89  Ga.  148,  15  S.  E.  22;  Rosenfield  v. 
Arrol,  44  Minn.  395,  46  N.  W.  768. 


9J4  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    3  2 

ises  from  which  it  follows  may  be  shown  by  the  direct  testimony, 
but  the  wrong  itself  is  a  conclusion,  to  be  drawn,  not  proved.^''* 
Therefore  evidence  should  be  confined  to  showing  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances, but  not  ct)nclusions.°°°  Witnesses  who  are  not  experts 
are  confined  in  their  testimony  to  statements  of  facts.  They  are 
not  allowed  to  give  opinions  as  to  matters  requiring  skill  or  knowl- 
edge, becau.se  they  are  not  experts;  ^^^  and  as  to  other  classes  of 
matters,  because  the  inference  from  the  fact  is  to  be  drawn,  not  by 
them,  but  by  the  jury.  Therefoi-e,  for  example,  it  is  not  competent 
for  a  witness  to  state  that  he  used  all  the  means  he  had  to  avoid 
the  accident.     He  should  state  what  means  were  at  hand.'^"     But 

654  See  Wilson  v.  Eeedy,  33  Minn.  503,  24  N.  \V.  101;  Lester  v.  Town  of 
Pittsford,  7  Vt.  158;    Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Stoelke,  104  111.  201. 

655  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kellogg,  94  U.  S.  469;  Lester  v.  Town  of 
Pittsford,  7  Vt.  158;  Freeberg  v.  St.  Paul  Plow  Works,  48  Minn.  99,  50  N. 
W.  1020;  Simmons  v.  St.  Paul  &  C.  Ry.  Co..  18  Minn.  184-194  (Gil.  168); 
Hinds  V.  Keith,  6  C.  C.  A.  231.  57  Fed.  10;  Madden  v.  Blissouri  Pac.  R.  Co., 
r,0  Mo.  App.  666;  Alton  L.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Calvey,  47  111.  App.  343;  Healy  y.  Vi- 
salia  &  T.  R.  Co.,  101  Cal.  585,  30  Pac.  125;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Rambo, 
S  C.  0.  A.  .6,  59  Fed.  75;  Johnson  v.  Oregon  S.  L.  &  V.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  23  Or.  94, 
31  Pac.  283;  Kendrick  v.  Central  Railroad  &  Banking  Co.,  89  Ga.  782,  15  S. 
E.  685;  Dowdy  v.  Georgia  R.  Co.,  88  Ga.  726,  16  S.  E.  62;  Brunker  v.  Cum- 
mins, 133  Ind.  443,  32  N.  B.  732.  It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  book  to  con- 
sider when  expert  evidence  is  admissible  and  when  it  is  not.  See  1  Thomp. 
Neg.  513;  Shafter  v.  Evans,  53  Cal.  32;  White  v.  Ballon,  8  Allen  (Mass.)  408; 
Wood  V.  Railway  Co.,  51  Wis.  196,  8  N.  W.  214;  Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.  Co. 
V.  Huntley,  38  Mich.  537. 

5  58Peteler  Portable  Ry.  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Northwestern  Adamant  Manuf'g 
Co.  (Minn.)  61  N.  W.  1024  (stone  mason  not  competent  to  give  opinion  In 
evidence  as  to  cause  of  collapse  of  building).  Cf.  Ouillette  v.  Overman 
Wheel  Co.,  162  Mass.  305,  38  N.  E.  511  (as  to  oscillation  of  shaft),  and  Wash- 
ington, C.  &  A.  Turnpike  Case  (Md.)  30  Atl.  571  (defective  bridge). 

557  Hart  V.  Hudson  River  Bridge  Co.,  84  N.  Y.  56;  2  Thomp.  Neg.  p.  799. 
§  14,  note  2;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Stoelke  (1882)  104  111.  201;  Coates  v.  Bur- 
lington, C.  R.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  (1883)  G2  Iowa,  486,  17  N.  W.  760;  Michigan  Cent. 
R.  Co.  V.  Gilbert  (1881)  46  Mich.  176,  9  N.  W.  243;  Bayley  v.  Eastern  R.  Co. 
(1878)  125  Mass.  62;  Lund  v.  Inhabitants  of  Tyngsborough  (1851)  9  Cush. 
(Mass.)  36;  Tanner's  Ex'r  v.  Railroad  Co.  (1877)  60  Ala.  621;  North  Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co.  V.  Kirk  (1879)  90  Pa.  St.  15;  Town  of  Albion  v.  Hetrick  (1883) 
90  Ind.  545;  HoUenbeck  v.  City  of  Marshalltown  (1883)  62  Iowa,  21,  17  N. 
W.  155;  Street  R.  Co.  v.  Nolthenius  (1883)  40  Ohio  St.  376;  Wright  v.  City 
of  Ft.  Howard  (1884)  60  Wis.  119,  18  N.  W.  750. 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  945 

where  expert  testimony  is  properly  admitted,"*  it  is  often  a  matter 
of  great  nicety  and  uncertainty  to  determine  how  far  an  exi)crt  may 
express  his  opinion  without  testifying  to  this  inference  which  the 
jury  should  draw.  At  the  one  extreme,  if  he  gives  his  opinion  di- 
rectly, that  the  conduct  in  issue  was  or  was  not  negligence,  he 
clearly  usurps  the  functions  of  the  jury;  ^^^  and  it  would  seem  that 
he  does  this  also  indirectly  if  he  testifies  that  such  conduct  was  or 
was  not  "safe," '""'  "proper,"  ^°^  "necessary,"  ^''-  or  the  like,  or  that 

058  Neubauer  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Oo.  (Minu.)  61  X.  W.  012  (large  ice  toiiss). 

B59  Hankins  v.  Watkins,  77  Hun,  360,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  SOT:  Louisville,  E.  l^ 
St.  L.  C.  R.  Oo.  V.  Beny,  9  Ind.  App.  63,  .•15  N.  E.  .">Ik),  and  3i;  X.  i:.  646 
(careless);  Print  v.  Patten,  1)1  Ga.  422,  18  S.  E.  311  (rareful  as  he  shoulil  have 
been);  Mantel  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  33  Minn.  62,  21  N.  W.  sr,:;; 
Butler  V.  Railroad  Co.,  87  Iowa,  206,  54  N.  W.  208  (skill  ot  engineer  for  jury). 

D60  Prendible  v.  Connecticut  River  Manuf'g  Co.,  160  Mass.  1.31,  35  N.  E. 
675  (whether  a  staging  can  safely  can-y  a  given  load);  Ilarley  v.  Buflalu 
Car  ilanuf'g  Co.,  142  X.  T.  31,  36  X.  E.  813  (safety  and  fitness  of  fastenere 
in  a  belt);  Godsell  v.  Taj'lor,  41  Minn.  207,  42  N.  W.  873;  Flanagan  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  S3  Hun,  522,  32  N.  Y.  Suiop.  84  (operation  of  railroad  gates);  Atchi- 
son, T.  ..t  S.  E.  R.  Co.  V.  Myers,  11  0.  C.  A.  439,  (j3  Fed.  793  (not  admissible 
to  prove  particular  mode  of  coupling  cars  to  be  specially  dangerous).  But 
an  expert  witness  may  testify  as  to  whether  a  car  furnished  for  the  ship- 
ment of  stock  was  reasonably  safe  for  such  purpose.  Betts  v.  Chicago,  R. 
I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  60  X.  W.  623.  So,  evidence  l>y  those  familiar  with 
oil  used  for  Illuminating  purposes  is  competent  to  show  that  it  was  not  dan- 
gerous for  one,  in  the  use  of  ordinary  care,  to  enter  with  a  lighted  lamp  a  car 
containing  that  substance.  Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Tierney  (Ky.)  27  S.  W.  !)8."i. 
And  see  McGouigle  v.  Kane  (Colo.  Sup.)  38  Pac.  367  (elevator). 

SOI  Houston  V.  Brush,  66  Vt.  331,  20  Atl.  ;!.si);  Armstrong  v.  Railway  Co.,. 
45  Minn.  85,  47  N.  W.  459  {whether  a  stable  was  suitable  and  proper).  But 
see  Playward  v.  Knapp,  23  Minn.  430.  It  is  error  to  admit  the  opinion  of 
an  export  as  to  whether  it  was  a  defect  in  a  freight  car  that  then;  was  noth- 
ing OD  the  end  of  it  for  a  brakeman,  after  uncoupling  for  a  flying  switch,  to. 
lay  hold  of.  Dooner  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  164  Pa.  St.  17,  30  Atl.  209. 
But  a  medical  expert  has  been  allowed  to  testify  wlu'ther  given  treatment  was 
proper.  Wright  v.  Hardy,  22  "\\'is.  334.  A  witness  may  be  asked  what 
course  a  carrier  should  properly  pursue  with  respect  to  live  stock  suffering 
from  heat  in  transit,  Liudsley  v.  Railway  Co.,  36  Minn.  539,  33  X.  ^Y.  7;    or 


562  Receivei's  International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Armstrong,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

146,  23  S.  W.  236  (position  of  shipper  of  live  stock  on  drawhead  of  car).    But 

see  Terre  Haute  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Walsh  (Ind.  App.)  38  X.  E.  5:!4  (what  will  b^ 

necessary  to  drain  meadow).     And  see  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Conlan,  101  lU.  9.j. 

LAW  OF  Toms — 60 


946  KEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

certain  things  should  or  should  not  have  been  done. ''''='  So  to  pass 
on  the  niciits  of  the  case  is  not  commonly  justifiable,  and  certainly 
not  where  the  drawing  of  such  inference  requires  no  particular  skill 
or  knowledge;  but  the  jury,  in  the  light  of  the  evidence  and  by  the 
exercise  of  sound  judgment,  can  infer  as  well  as  the  witness.^^* 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  expert  is  confined  to  the  mere  statement 
of  the  facts,  and  the  principles  of  his  science,  and  the  methods,  instru- 
mentalities, and  effects  of  that  science  as  applied,  mere  comment 
on  such  testimony  and  upon  the  other  facts  by  the  counsel  is  often 
inadequate  to  present  the  case  to  the  jury  properly,  if,  indeed,  in- 
telligibly.^°°     But  this  is  the  safe,  and  perhaps  the  only  safe,  course 

what  is  a  proper  position,  e.  g.  of  a  bralveman,  under  the  circumstances, 
Czezewzka  v.  Kailway  Co.,  121  Mo.  201,  25  S.  W.  911;  Cincinnati  &  Z.  R.  Co. 
V.  Smith,  22  Ohio  St.  227;  Schlaff  v.  Railroad  Co.,  100  Ala.  377,  14  South.  105. 
So,  expert  evidence  may  show  position  of  brakeman  is  at  air  brake  to  make  a 
flying  switch.  Reifsuyder  v.  Railway  Co.  (Iowa)  57  N.  W.  G92.  And  experts 
may  testify  to  imperfections  of  contiivances  by  which  an  electric  lamp  was 
suspended.     Excelsior  Electric  Co.  v.  Sweet  (N.  J.  Sup.)  30  Atl.  553. 

563  Hoffman  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ry.  Co.,  51  Mo.  App.  273;  Cleveland,  C,  C. 
i^-  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  De  Bolt,  10  Ind.  App.  174,  37  N.  E.  737.  But  see  Galves- 
ton, H.  .t  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Croskell,  6  Tex.  Civ.  App.  100,  25  S.  W.  4S6;  Ala- 
bama G.  S.  R.  Co.  V.  Linn  (Ala.)  15  South.  508.  Cf.  Frost  v.  Railroad  Co.,  96 
Mich.  470,  56  N.  W.  19;  Bennett  v.  Morris  (Cal.)  37  Pac.  929  (whether  given 
conduct  is  practicable  in  hydraulic  mining);  Watson  v.  Minneapolis  St.  Ry. 
C^.,  53  iiinn.  551,  55  N.  W.  742  (within  what  distajice  sti-eet  car  going  at  given 
rate  of  speed  can  be  stopped).  Tholen  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co.,  10  Misc.  Rep. 
283,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  loSl.  But  see,  as  to  same  matter,  Adams  v.  Chicago, 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  Gl  N.  W.  1050;  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Farr, 
6  C.  C.  A.  211,  56  Fed.  994  (expert  testimony  received  to  show  whether  or 
not  a  given  defect  could  have  been  discovered  on  inspection). 

564  Thus,  the  jm-y  only  can  determine  whether  a  walk  was  in  condition 
of  reasonable  repair  and  reasonably  safe  for  public  travel.  Girard  v.  City  of 
Kalamazoo,  92  Mich.  610,  52  N.  W..  1021.  And  see  Cross  v.  Lake  Shore  & 
il.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  69  Jlich.  363,  37  N.  W.  361,  distinguished  in  Meyer  v.  Brooklyn 
City  R.  Co.,  10  Misc.  Rep.  11,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  .534;  Overby  v.  Chesapeake  & 
O.  Ry.  Co.,  37  W.  Ta.  534,  16  S.  B.  818;  Nutt  v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  25  Or. 
291,  35  Pac.  653;  ClifCord  v.  Richardson,  18  Vt.  620,  626;  Praser  y.  Tupper, 
29  Vt.  400;  Bryant  v.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co.,  56  Vt.  710;  Carpenter  v.  Corinth,  58 
Vt.  214,  2  Atl.  170;  Bemis  v.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co.,  58  Vt  637,  3  Ati.  531;  Moore 
V.  Haviland,  61  Vt.  58,  17  Atl.  725. 

56  5  The  conclusions  of  such  a  witness  from  facts  which  he  observed  are  not 
incompetent  where  they  are  inferences  from  many  minor  details,  which  could 


t!h.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  947 

to  pursue,  notwithstanding  a  manifest  tendency  to  relax  the  rigid 
operation  of  the  rule.  A  greater  liberality  is  extended  as  to  opin- 
ion evidence  applied  to  cases  where  there  is  a  personal  knowledge 
of  facts  on  which  the  opinion  is  based. ^''^ 

Evidence  as  to  Custom. 

Testimony  of  experts  as  to  what  witness  would  or  would  not 
do  under  the  same  or  similar  circumstances  is  objectionable,  be- 
cause the  standard  of  diligence  is  absolute,  and  the  question  is, 
not  what  care  a  particular  individual  would  exercise,  but  what  is 
reasonable  care  under  the  circumstances.^"'  This  reasoning,  how- 
ever, does  not  exclude  proof  of  general  usage  and  custom  and 
good  practice   among   prudent  and   competent  men   in    the    same 

not  be  adequately  presented  to  the  jury  except  by  the  statement  of  such  infer- 
ence or  opinion.  Baltimore  &  O.  K.  Co.  v.  Rambo,  8  C.  C.  A.  0,  59  Fed.  75. 
For  this  reason,  a  physician  may  testify  as  to  the  cause  of  personal  injuiy. 
Edwards  v.  Common  Council  of  Three  Rivers,  96  Mich.  G25,  5-5  N.  W.  1003; 
Vosburg  V.  Putney,  80  AMs.  278,  56  N.  W.  480;  Manufacturers'  Accident  In- 
demnity Co.  V.  Dorgan,  7  C.  G.  A.  581,  58  Fed.  945.  So,  whether  or  not  plain- 
tiff was  apparently  well.  Robinson  v.  Exempt  Fire  Co.  of  San  Francisco,  103 
Cal.  1,  36  Pac.  955.  In  an  action  for  injuries,  the  attending  physician  may  tes- 
tify as  to  the  probable  result  of  the  injm-ies  upon  plaintiff's  health  and  life. 
Bai,T  v.  City  of  Kansas,  121  Mo.  22,  25  S.  AV.  562.  Probable  effect,  Sabine  & 
E.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Ewing  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  638;  probable  or  possible  and 
immediate  effect.  Bliss  v.  Xew  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  160  Mass.  447,  36  N.  E. 
(>5;  permanency,  Louisville,  N.,  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Holsapple  (Ind.  App.)  38 
X.  E.  1107.    And  see  "Cause,"  ante,  p.  936,  note  518. 

5G6  Thus,  a  witness  with  personal  knowledge  may  testify  as  to  control  of  a 
driver  of  a  horse,  and  that  he  seemed  to  drive  carefully,  Wilson  v.  New  York, 
N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  (R.  I.)  29  Atl.  300;  or  that  he  was  driving  at  a  safe  rate 
of  speed,  Houston  City  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Richart  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  918; 
whether  a  driver  could  have  seen  cars  in  time  to  avoid  accident,  Alabama 
G.  S.  R.  Co.  V.  Linn  (Ala.)  15  South.  508.  So  as  to  movement  in  speed  of 
trains.  Sears  v.  SeatUe  Consol.  St.  R.  Co.,  6  AVash.  227,  33  Pac.  .-.SO;  Camp- 
bell V.  AVarner  (Tex.  Civ.  Ai^p.)  24  S.  AA''.  703;  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Parr  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  20  S.  AA^  861;  Ryan  v.  Town  of  Bristol,  63  Conn.  26,  27 
Atl.  309  (condition  of  highway);  Noble  v.  St.  .Joseph  &  B.  H.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  OS 
Alich.  249,  57  N.  AV.  126.  And,  generally,  see  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  It.  Co.  v.  Haskell 
4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  550,  23  S.  AA'.  546;  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ky.  Co.  v.  Miller 
and.  Sup.)  37  N.  E.  343;  AA'ard  v.  Charleston  City  Ry.  Co.  (1883)  19  S.  0.  521, 
Yahu  V.  City  of  Ottumwa  (1883)  60  Iowa,  429,  15  N.  W.  257. 

06  7  But  see  Miller  v.  Illinois  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  57  N.  AV.  418. 


948  NEGLIGENCE.  [Oil.   J  2 

class/'"^  although  such  standard  of  care  is  not  conclusive.'"'  Such 
general  usage  may  itself  be  negligent.  Under  such  circumstances, 
failure  to  conform  thereto  is  not  evidence  of  negligence."^"  To  give 
such  usage,  custom,  or  practice  a  final  effect  would  substitute  the 
care  commonly  exercised  in  fact  for  the  care  required  by  court  and 
jury."^^  Moreover,  besides  thus  making  the  standard  of  care  com- 
mercial, as  distinguished  from  legal,  this  ^ould  tend  to  limit  the 
progress  which  may  reasonably  be  made  in  requiring  increased  care 
as  means  of  avoiding  harm.  No  custom  justifies  conduct  negligent 
in  law.^'^^ 

5  6  8  Experts  may  testify  as  to  practice  of  pliysicans  as  to  consultation,  but 
uot  as  to  measure  of  defendant's  responsibility  to  patient.  Mertz  v.  Det- 
weiler,  8  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  376;  Jeffrey  v.  Railway  Co.,  56  Iowa,  546,  9  N. 
W.  884  (uncoupling  cars  in  motion;  unusual);  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cowser,  57  Tex.  293  (ordinary  mode  of  switebing  cars);  Aldricli  v.  Monroe. 
60  N.  H.  118  (usage  as  to  loaded  teams  on  steep  higliway);  Ooates  v.  Bur- 
lington, C.  R.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  62  Iowa,  486,  17  N.  W.  760  (blocking  frogs);  Hart 
V.  Hudson  R.  Bridge  Co.,  84  N.  Y.  56  (gates  in  drawbridge);  Kolsti  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  32  Minn.  133,  19  N.  W.  655  (fastening  turntable).  Cf.  Gulf,  C.  & 
S.B\  R.  Co.  V.  Evansicb,  61  Tex.  3;  Fitts  v.  Cream  Citj-  R.  Co.,  59  Wis.  32".. 
18  N.  W.  186.  And,  generally,  see  North  Chicago  Rolling-Mill  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 114  111.  57,  29  N.  E.  186;  Burns  v.  Sennett,  99  Cal.  3G3,  33  Pac.  916; 
Kansas  City,  M.  &  B.  R.  Co.  y.  Burton,  97  Ala.  240,  12  South.  88.  But  see- 
East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Kane,  92  Ga.  187,  18  S.  E.  IS;  Holmes  v. 
South  Pac.  Coast  R.  Co.,  97  Cal.  161,  31  Pac.  834;  Doyle  v.  St.  Paul,  51.  & 
M.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Minn.  79,  43  N.  W.  787;  O'Malley  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry. 
Co.,  43  Minn.   289,  45  N.   AV.   440. 

569  Congdon  v.  Howe  Scale  Co.,  66  Vt.  255,  29  Atl.  253;  Flanders  v.  Chicago, 
St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  51  Minn.  193,  53  N.  W.  544.  An  instruction  that  if 
the  employes  in  charge  of  defendant's  ti'ain,  when  they  injured  plaintiff,  were 
endeavoring  to  make  what  is  known  as  a  "flyingi"  switch,  and  that  such  con- 
duct was  dangerous  and  not  permitted  by  railway  companies  exercising  care 
in  managing  their  trains,  defendant  was  liable,  is  improper,  as  it  bases  the 
question  of  negligence  on  the  conduct  of  other  railway  companies.  Gulf,  C. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith,  87  Tex.  348,  28  S.  W.  520. 

57  0  Austin  V.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  61  N.  W.  849  (building 
switches). 

571  Hill  V.  Portland  &  R.  R.  Co.,  55  Me.  438. 

67  2  Central  R.  Co.  v.  De  Bray,  71  Ga.  406;  Cleveland  v.  New  Jersey  Steam- 
boat Co.,  5  Hun,  523;  Mason  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  27  Kan.  83;  Michigan 
Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Coleman,  28  Mich.  440. 


(Jh.    12]  JJSSEiNTIAL    ELEMf:NTS.  949 

Evidence  Must  be  Rdccaat. 

It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  book  to  discuss  the  rules  of  evi- 
dence, with  regard  to  releA'ancy,  as  applied  to  negligence,  beyond 
a  brief  reference  to  a  few  considerations  having  a  general  bearing. 

Kelevancy  of  evidence  to  prove  negligence  is  determined,  inter 
alia,  by  the  connection  of  the  fact  sought  to  be  proved  as  the  cause 
of  damage  complained  of."^  Testimony  admitted  is  generally  lim- 
ited to  the  period  and  the  circumstances  immediately  involved. 
Therefore,  one  is  not   allowed  by  the  prevailing,"*  but  not  uni- 

"3  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Pearson,  97  Ala.  211,  12  South.  ITG;  Reich  v. 
Union  Ry.  Co.,  78  Hun,  417,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  1105;  Williams  v.  Oilman,  71 
Me.  21  (where  evidence  as  to  cause  of  death  of  a  colt,  in  gelding,  was  held 
admissible).  Evidence  as  to  intent  is  not  admissible.  Hanklns  v.  Watkins, 
77  Hun,  360,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  807.  A  short  note  on  the  question  of  evidence 
admissible  to  show  injuries  received  in  accident  on  a  railroad  train.  Cooper 
^.  St.  Paul  Ry.  Co.,  58  Am.  &  Eng.  Ry.  Cas.  602  (Minn.)  50  N.  W.  42. 

5T-1  Opinion  of  Mitchell,  J.,  in  Morse  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  30 
:\Iinn.  465,  16  N.  W.  358,  approved  by  Gray,  J.,  in  Columbia  &  P.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hawthorne,  144  U.  S.  202,  12  Sup.  Ct.  591;  Aldrich  v.  Concord  &  M.  R.  R. 
(N.  H.)  20  Atl.  408,  overruling  ilartin  v.  Towle,  59  N.  H.  31;  Clapper  v.  Town 
of  Waterford,  131  X.  Y.  US2.  30  N.  E.  240;  Naliey  ,-,  Hartford  Carpet  Co.,  51 
cionn.  524;  McGuerty  v.  Hale,  161  Slass.  51,  36  N.  E.  (iS2;  Terre  Haute  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Clem,  123  Ind.  15,  23  N.  E.  965;  Barber  Asphalt  Pav.  Co.  v.  Odasz, 
S  C.  C.  A.  471,  60  Fed.  71;  Ely  v.  Railway  Co.,  77  Mo.  34;  Cramer  v.  City 
of  Burlington,  45  Iowa,  627;  Anderson  v.  Chicagio,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co., 
87  Wis.  195,  58  N.  W.  79;  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hennessey,  75  Tex.  l.J5, 
12  S.  W.  608;  Morse  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  30  A I  inn.  465,  468,  16 
N.  W.  358;  Holt  v.  Spokane  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Idaho)  35  Pac.  39;  Corcoran  v.  Vil- 
lage of  PeekskiU,  108  N.  Y..151,  15  N.  E.  300;  Dougan  v.  Champlain  Transp. 
Co.,  56  N.  Y.  1;  Day  v,  H.  C.  Akeley  Lumber  Co.,  54  Minn.  522,  5(;  X.  W. 
243;  Lombar  v.  Village  of  East  Tawas,  86  Mich.  14,  48  N.  W.  947;  Hodges 
V.  Percival,  132  111.  53,  23  N.  E.  423,  affirmed  City  of  Streator  v.  Hamilton, 
49  111.  App.  449;  Shinners  v.  Proprietors  of  Locks  &  Canals,  154  JIass.  168, 
28  N.  E.  10;  Hager  v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  98  Cal.  309,  .S3  Pac.  119;  Atchi- 
son, T.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Parker,  5  C.  C.  A.  220,  55  Fed.  595.  This  is  also  the 
English  rule.  Hart  v.  Lancashire  &  Y.  Ry.  Co.,  21  Law  T.  X.  S.  201.  But 
in  an  action  for  the  death  of  a  child  ran  over  at  a  street  crossing,  evidijnce 
that  defendant,  soon  after  the  accident,  erected  gates  at  the  crossing  at  which 
it  occurred,  is  proper,  where  the  jury  is  permitted  to  view  the  premises  and 
see  the  gates.     Lederman  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  165  Pa.  St.  118,  30  Atl. 


yoO  NEGLIGENCE.  ■  [Ch.   12 

versal,"^  opinion,  to  show  that,  subsequently  to  the  damage,  pre- 
cautions were  taken  and  alterations  made  to  avoid  recurrence  of 
similar  harm.  Nor  may  he  show  the  occurrence  of  similar  acci- 
dents.^^^  However,  the  condition  of  the  place  when  the  alleged  in- 
jury was  inflicted,  a  reasonable  time  before  and  after  the  time  of 
its  occurrence,"'  and  the  immediately  subsequent  operation  of  the 
instrumentality  of  harm  may  be  shown. ^'^  Indeed,  the  cases,  un- 
der appropriate  circumstances,  have  allowed  the  admission  of  evi- 
dence to  show  defects  other  than  strictly  the  ones  producing  dam- 
age.^'* 

=  75  Alberts  v.  Tillage  of  Vemou,  9G  Micb.  549,  55  N.  W.  1022;  "\yoods  v. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.,  51  Mo.  App.  500  (not  to  show  negligence,  but 
duty).  And  see  WUlitts  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  K.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  88  Iowa,  281,  55  N. 
W.  313;    Stone  v.  Town  of  Poland,  81  Hun,  132,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  748. 

576  E.  gi.  another  elevator  at  another  time.  Wise  v.  Ackerman,  76  Md.  375, 
25  Atl.  424;  or  negligence  of  same  servant  at  other  times,  Burke  v.  New 
York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  Hun,  627,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  808  (and  see  Ken- 
nedy V.  Spring,  160  Mass.  203,  35  N.  E.  779);  City  Covmcil  of  Augusta  v. 
Lombard,  93  Ga.  284,  20  S.  E,  312;  or  that  other  horses  caught  feet  in  same 
crossing,  North  Chicago  St,  R.  Co.  v.  Hudson,  44  111.  App.  60;  or  that  same 
overhead  bridge  struck  other  brakemen,  Schlaff  v.  LouisviUe  &  N.  R.  Co., 
100  Ala.  377,  14  South.  105;  Dorman  v.  Ames,  12  Minn.  451  (Gil.  347),  But 
see  Morse  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L,  Ry,  Co.,  30  Minn.  405,  16  N.  AY,  358;  Bemls 
Y.  Temple,  162  Mass.  342,  38  N.  E.  970;  Wooley  v.  Grand  St,  &  N,  R.  Co., 
83  N.  Y.  121;  Higley  v.  Gilmer,  3  Mont.  90;  Field  v.  Davis,  27  Kan.  400; 
Smith  V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  84  Iowa,  685,  51  N.  AV,  77;  Kent  v.  Town  of 
Lincoln,  32  Vt.  591. 

677  Shepard  v.  Creamer,  160  Mass,  496,  36  N,  E,  475;  Thelps  v.  Winona  & 
St.  P.  R.  Co.,  37  Minn.  485,  35  N.  W.  273,  and  cases  cited  at  page  487,  37 
Minn.,  and  page  273,  35  N,  W.;  Swadley  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  118  Mo. 
268,  24  S.  W.  140;  Jessup  v.  Oseeula  Co.  (Iowa)  60. N,  AV.  485;  Chicago,  P. 
&  St.  L,  R.  Co.  V.  Lewis,  145  111.  CI,  .33  N.  B.  960  (but  see  Gerdes  v.  Christo- 
pher &  S.  A.  Iron  &  Foundry  Co.  [Aid.  Sup.]  25  S.  W.  .557);  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Powei-s,  42  111.  169.  Especially  if  it  be  shown  that  the  place  remained  the 
same.  Sullivan  v.  City  of  Syracuse,  77  Hun,  440,  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  105.  Of. 
Hoyt  V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  76  Iowa,  430,  41  N.  W.  63.  And  see  Munger  v. 
City  of  AVaterloo,  83  Iowa,  559,  49  N.  AV,  1028.  But  see  House  v.  Metcalf,  27 
Conn,  631;  Hill  v.  Portland  &  R.  R.  Co.,  55  Me.  438;  Piggott  v.  Eastern 
Counties  Ry.  Co.,  3  C.  B.  229. 

57 sE.  g.  a  defective  brake.  Mixter  v.  Imperial  Coal  Co.,  152  Pa.  St.  395, 
25  Atl.  587. 

67  9  E.  g.  defective  condition  of  track  several  hundred  feet  on  each  side  of 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  951 

The  character  of  the  defendant's  conduct  in  a  case  at  issue  has 
immediately  to  do  with  the  damage  caused;  but  his  character  for 
care  or  caution,^^"  or  his  general  conduct,"^  has  no  logical  connec- 
tion with  the  wrong.      Such  evidence  is,  therefore,  excluded. 

268.  Negligence  is  ordinarily  a  question  of  fact,  not  of 
law,  to  be  determined  by  the  jury,  not  by  the  court. 
And  this  is  true  ■whether  the  uncertainty  arises 
from  a  conflict  in  the  testimony,  or  because,  the 
facts  being  undisputed,  fair-minded  men  may  hon- 
estly dra"w  different  conclusions  from  them.*-  But 
there  are  circumstances  under  -which  the  court  may 
pass  upon  the  sufficiency  or  insufficiency  of  the  evi- 
dence   of  negligence  presented  as  a  matter  of  law^. 

In  determining  when  the  courts  will  take  a  case  from  the  jury 
and  decide  as  a  matter  of  law  either  that  there  is  or  is  not  negli- 
gence proved,  the  cases  are  very  much  at  sea.  It  was  early  sug- 
gested as  a  test  that,  if  there  be  a  scintilla  of  evidence  showing  neg- 
ligence, this  would  be  sufficient  to  send  the  case  to  the  jury.'^*^ 

At  the  other  extreme,  it  has  been  insisted  that  cases  of  negli- 
gence form  no  exception  to  the  rule  that  it  is  the  judge's  duty  to 
nonsuit  wherev6r  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff  would  be  clearly  against 
the   weight   of   evidence.^'^     A  mere   scintilla,   therefore,  is   not 

place  of  accident.  Ohio  Val.  R.  Co.  v.  Watsou's  Adm'r,  93  Ky.  654,  21  S.  W. 
244.  Defective  condition  of  braises  on  otlier  cars.  Bailey  v.  Rome,  AV. 
&  O.  R.  Co.,  139  N.  Y.  302,  34  N,  E.  918. 

580  Hays  v.  Millar,  77  I'a.  St.  238;  Tenney  v.  Tuttle,  1  Alien  (Mass.)  ISri; 
Dunham  v.  Rackliff,  71  Me.  34.-;   Hill  v.  Snyder,  44  ilicb.  318,  6  X.  W.  074. 

Bsi  Bannon  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  24  Md.  108,  and  see  Darling  v.  West- 
moreland, 52  N.  H.  401. 

582  Rielimoud  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Powers,  149  U.  S.  43,  13  S.  Ct.  748. 

5  83  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Horst,  110  Pa.  St.  220,  1  Atl.  217;  Robinson  t. 
Railroad  Co.,  2  Lea,  .594;  Dick  v.  Railroad  Co.,  38  Oliio  St.  3S!i:  Mercier  v 
Mercier,  43  Ga.  32:!.  And  see,  generally,  Improvement  (.'o.  v.  Mmison,  14  Wall. 
(U.  S.)  442-448;  Smitb  v.  Sioux  City  &  P.  R.  Co.,  15  Xeb.  .583,  19  N.  W.  038; 
Hathaway  v.  lOast  Tennessee,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  29  Fed.  489;  I'arks  v.  Rose,  11  How. 
(U.  S.)  362;   Pleasants  v.  Fant,  22  Wall.  (U.  S.)  110-121. 

ssr,  Wild's  Adm'r  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  430. 


052  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

cuough/*"     Thus,  against  positive,  affiimative  testimony  of  cred- 
itable witnesses  that  a  customary  signal  was  given,  mere  "I  did  not 
hear"  of  one  or  more  witnesses  will  not  authorize  submission  to  a 
jury-'" 
Weight  of  Evidence  and  Failure  of  Proof. 

But  courts  incline  to  generally  accept,  although  in  varying  words, 
the  somewhat  vague  principle  that  the  weight  of  evidence  is  for  the 
jury,  and  failure  of  proof  is  for  the  court.  This  would  appear  to 
be  the  gist  of  the  many  different  phases  assumed  by  the  cases,  and 
of  the  equally  numerous  formuhTS  of  the  court. '^^^  It  may  clarify  the 
subject  to  consider  some  conspicuous  rulings. 

A  very  clear  statement  of  the  general  theory  on  which  the  ques- 
tion is  now  decided  will  be  found  in  Callahan  v.  Wame:  ^^°  "Negli- 
i;(ence  is  a  thing  which,  by  its  very  nature,  pertains  to  human  con- 
duct and  the  action  of  the  mind  and  will.  It  is  something  invisi- 
ble, intangible,  and,  for  the  most  part,  incapable  of  direct  proof,  like 
sensible  facts  or  physical  events.  It  is,  in  general,  a  matter  of  in- 
ference from  other  facts  and  circumstances  which  admit  of  direct 
proof,  and  which  may  raise  a  presumption  of  the  truth  of  the  main 
fact  to  be  proved.  These  facts  and  circumstances  must  be  such  as 
would  warrant  a  jury  in  inferring  from  them  the  fact  of  negligence 
by  reasoning  in  the  ordinary  way,  according  to  the  natural  and 
proper  relation  of  things,  and  consistently  with  the  common  sense 
and  experience  of  mankind.  A  jury  is  not  to  be  left  or  permitted 
to  act  or  reason  in  any  other  way  on  such  facts.  Where  it  is  plain 
that  the  jury  could  not  find  a  verdict  on  the  evidence  offered  with^ 

586  Dwight  y.  Germauia  Life  Ins.  Co.,  103  X.  Y.  341,  8  N.  E.  654. 

5  87  Culhane  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R  Co.,  60  N.  Y.  133. 

588  Commissioners  of  Marion  Co.  v.  Clark,  94  U.  S.  278-284;  Cooper  v.  Wal- 
dron,  50  Me.  80;  Morton  v.  Frankfort,  55  Me.  40;  Mason  v.  Lewis,  1  G. 
Greene  (Iowa)  494;  Bailey  y.  Kimball,  26  N.  H.  351;  Colt  v.  Sixth  Ave.  R. 
Co.,  49  N.  Y.  671.  In  Jeauscli  y.  Lewis,  48  N.  AT.  128,  this  court  stated  the 
rule  applicable  to  such  cases  as  follows:  "Where,  in  a  case  tried  by  a  jury, 
the  evidence  is  conflicting,  this  court  will  not  weigh  the  evidence,  or  go  fur- 
ther than  determine  therefrom  whether  or  not  the  party  has  given  sufficient 
legal  evidence  to  sustain  his  verdict,  without  regard  to  the  evidence  given  by 
the  other  party,  except  so  far  as  such  evidence  tends  to  sustain  the  plain- 
tiff's case."     Brewing  Co.  v.  Mlelenz,  5  Dak.  186,  37  N.  W.  728. 

5  89  40  Mo.  132,  136,  137. 


Ch.    12]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  953 

out  reasoning  irrationally,  against  all  ordinary  common  sense,  and 
against  all  proper  notions  of  justice  and  right,  or  against  law,  or 
without  being  influenced  by  undue  sympathy,  prejudice,  gross  mis- 
judgment,  or  mistalcen  impression  of  law  and  facts  of  the  case,  the 
court  will  declare  as  a  matter  of  law  that  there  is  no  competent  evi- 
dence to  be  submitted  to  the  jury."  °°'' 

In  Gardner  v.  Michigan  Cent.  E.  Co.=^^  the  rule  was  laid  down  that 
a  question  as  to  the  existence  of  negligence  should  not  be  withdrawn 
from  the  jury  unless  the  conclusion  follows,  as  matter  of  law,  that 
no  recovery  can  be  had  upon  any  view  which  can  be  properly  taken 
of  the  facts  which  the  evidence  tends  to  establish.  And  more  defi- 
nitely, it  was  said  in  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ives  ^'^  that  "there  is  no 
fixed  standard  in  the  law  by  which  a  court  is  enabled  to  arbitrarily 
say  in  every  case  what  conduct  shall  be  considered  reasonable  and 
prudent,  and  what  shall  constitute  ordinary  care,  under  all  the  cir- 
cumstances. The  terms  'ordinary  care,'  'reasonable  prudence,'  and 
such  like  terms  as  are  applied  to  the  conduct  and  affairs  of  men, 
have  a  relative  significance,  and  cannot  be  arbitrarily  defined.  What 
may  be  deemed  ordinary  care  in  one  case  may,  under  different  sur- 
roundings and  circumstances,  be  gross  negligence.  The  policy  of 
the  law  has  relegated  the  determination  of  such  questions  to  the  jury, 

590  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §§  44^8;    Smith  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.,  37  Mo.  287. 

6  91  1.-50  U.  S.  349,  14  S.  Ct.  140,  per  Fuller,  C.  J. 

59  2  144  U.  S.  408-417,  12  S.  Ct.  679;  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Everett,  152 
U.  S.  107,  14  Sup.  Ct.  474  (where  a  switchman,  in  the  line  of  his  regular  duty, 
undertook  to  couple  cars,  one  of  which  was  loaded  in  an  unusual  and  dan- 
gerous way  with  bridge  timbers);  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Powers,  149  U. 
S.  43,  13  Sup.  Ct.  748  (where  a  man  was  killed  while  crossing  a  track).  And, 
generally,  see  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Cox,  145  U.  S.  593,  12  Sup.  Ct.  905,  and 
cases  at  page  606,  145  U.  S.,  and  page  905,  12  Sup.  Ct.  Sioux  City  &  P.  R.  Co. 
V.  Stout,  17  Wall.  (.."57;  W.is^hington  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Harmon's  Adm'r,  147  TJ. 
S.  571,  13  Sup.  Ct.  557;  Washington  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  McDade,  135  U.  S.  5.54, 
10  Sup.  Ct.  1044;  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Converse,  139  U.  S.  469,  11 
Sup.  Ct.  569;  Tucker  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  8  C.  C.  A.  416,  59  Fed.  968; 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Moseley,  6  C.  C.  A.  641,  57  Fed.  921;  Boyer  v.  St. 
Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  54  Miun.  127,  55  N.  W.  825;  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M.  R. 
Co.  V.  Kirkscy,  9  C.  C.  A.  321,  60  Fed.  999;  Sullivan  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  & 
H.  R.  Co.,  154  Mass.  524-527,  28  N.  E.  911;  Gardner  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co., 
150  U.  S.  349,  14  Sup.  Ct.  140;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Foley,  3  C.  C.  A.  .jS9, 
53  Fed.  459;   Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ellis,  4  O.  C.  A.  454,  54  Fed.  481. 


954  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

under  proper  instructions  of  the  court.  It  is  their  province  to  note 
the  special  circumstances  and  surroundings  of  eacli  particular  case, 
and  then  to  say  whether  the  conduct  of  the  parties  in  that  case  was 
such  as  would  be  expected  of  reasonable,  prudent  men,  under  a  sim- 
ilar state  of  affairs.  When  a  given  state  of  facts  is  such  that  rea- 
sonable men  may  fairly  differ  upon  the  question  as  to  whether  there 
was  negligence  or  not,  the  determination  of  the  matter  is  for  the 
jury.  It  is  only  where  the  facts  are  such  that  all  reasonable  men 
must  draw  the  same  conclusion  from  them  that  the  question  of  neg- 
ligence is  ever  considered  as  one  of  law." 

In  Crane  Elevator  Co.  v.  Lippert,^"^  a  boy,  while  walking  slowly 
through  an  unlighted  hall,  in  the  dark,  stumbled  over  an  obstruc- 
tion, and  was  injured.  He  could  not  see  the  obstruction,  but  he 
knew  it  was  there,  and  he  tried  to  go  around  it,  but  miscalculated 
the  distance.  It  was  held  that  the  question  of  contributory  negli- 
gence was  for  the  jury.  So,  where  a  brakeman  was  injured  while 
coupling  cars  by  stepping  into  a  hole  covered  with  snow  and  slush, 
it  was  the  province  of  the  jury  to  determine  whether  the  company 
had  discharged  its  duty  of  keeping  the  track  in  a  reasonably  safe 
condition,  and,  if  not,  whether  its  neglect  was  the  proximate  cause 
of  the  injury,  unmixed  with  any  contributory  negligence.^'* 

593  11  C.  C.  A.  521,  G3  Fed.  942. 

5  9  4  Xorthei-u  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Teeter,  11  C.  C.  A.  332,  G3  Fed.  527.  Wbere  a 
brakeman  standing  on  a  box  car  was  injured  by  overhead  beams  of  a  railroad 
bridge,  held,  that  the  questions  of  negligence  and  contributory  negligence  were 
for  the  jury.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Mortenson,  11  C.  C.  A.  335,  63  Fed. 
530.  Brown  v.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  R.  Co.  (Iowa)  60  N.  W.  779  (negli- 
gence of  engineer  injuring  brakeman  engaged  in  coupling);  Baltzer  v.  Chi- 
cago, JI.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  89  Wis.  257,  60  N.  W.  716  (coupling  from  pilot) ;  Bow- 
ers V.  Connecticut  River  R.  Co.,  162  llass.  312,  38  N.  E.  508  (negligence  in  al- 
lowing lateral  motion  of  drawbars) ;  Brouillette  v.  Connecticut  River  R.  Co., 
162  Jlass.  108,  38  N.  E.  507  (spare  brakeman  engaged  in  electric  signal  serv- 
ice); Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Sears  (Ind.  App.)  38  N.  E.  837  (negli- 
gence of  minor  plaintiff);  Tholen  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co.  (City  Ct.  Brook.) 
30  N.  Y.  Supp.  1081;  Whalen  v.  Citizens'  Gas  Co.  (City  Ct.  Brook.)  30 
N.  y.  Supp.  1077  (negligence  of  woman  70  years  old);  Excelsior  Electric  Co. 
V.  Sweet  (N.  J.  Sup.)  30  Atl.  553  (fall  of  electric  lamp  suspended  by  imperfect 
rope);  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Kirk.sey,  9  C.  C.  A.  321,  60  Fed. 
999  (Signals);  Ward's  Adm'r  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.,  39  W.  Va.  46,  19  S. 
E.  389  (Id.) ;   Hennessy  v.  City  of  Boston,  161  Mass.  502,  37  N.  E.  668  (caving 


^"-    ■'■•^]  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS. 


955 


This  rule  has  been  generally  accepted. '="'  In  New  York,  how- 
ever, the  supreme  court  has  gone  so  unreasonably  far  as  to  hold  con- 
duct to  be  contributory  negligence  as  a  matter  of  law,  although 

in  sewer);  Stuber  v.  JIcEntee,  142  N.  Y.  200,  36  N.  E.  878  (caving  of  street 
excavation);  Cameron  v.  Union  Trunk  Line  (Wash.)  30  Pac.  128  (walking 
on  street-car  track);  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Coleman  (Md.)  30  Atl.  918;  Central 
Pass.  II.  Co.  V.  Chatterson  (Ky.)  29  S.  W.  18  (collision  of  street  car  with  car- 
riage); Jaquinta  v.  Citizens'  Traction  Co.  (Pa.  Sup.)  30  Atl.  1131  (Id.); 
Thatcher  v.  Central  Traction  Co.  (Pa.  Sup.)  30  Atl.  1018;  Denver  &  B.  P. 
Rapid-Transit  Co.  v.  Dwyer  (Colo.  Sup.)  36  Pac.  1106  (riding  on  platform  of 
motor  with  feet  on  step);  llccilvern  v.  Wilson,  160  Mass.  370,  35  N.  E.  861  (fail- 
ure of  stevedores  to  discover  a  defect  in  a  guy  rope);  Birnburgv.  Schwab,  55 
Minn.  495,  56  N.  W.  341  (falling  down  elevator  shaft);  Robertson  v.  Boston 
&  A.  R.  Co.  160  Mass.  191,  35  N.  E.  775  (negligence  of  engineer  in  not  leaving 
his  engine,  to  avoid  danger) ;  Texarkana  Gas  &  Electric  Light  Co.  v.  Orr,  59 
Ark.  215,  27  S.  W.  66  (electric  wire);  Otterback  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  161 
Pa.  St.  Ill,  28  Atl.  991  (asphyxia  from  escaping  gas);  American  Water- 
Works  Co.  V.  Dougherty,  37  Keb.  373,  55  N.  W.  1051  (where  plaintiff  was 
drank);  McCleary  v.  Frantz,  160  Pa.  St.  535,  28  Atl.  929  (contributory  negli- 
gence of  hunters) ;  Ryan  v.  Town  of  Bristol,  63  Cona.  26,  27  Atl.  309  (defect- 
ive highway);  Coffin  v.  Inhabitants  of  Palmer,  162  Mass.  102,  38  N.  E.  509 
(defective  highway).  Compare  Casey  v.  City  of  Fitehburg,  102  Mass.  321,  38 
N.  E.  499. 

595  American  Waterworks  Co.  v.  Dougherty,  37  Xeb.  373,  ">  X.  AV.  1051. 
followed  in  Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Morgan,  40  Neb.  604,  59  X.  W.  81;    Chi- 
cago, B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  V.  Wymore,  40  Xeb.  645,  58  N.  W.  1120-1125;    Bannon 
V.  Lutz,  158  Pa.  St.  166,  27  Atl.  890;    Brezee  v.  Powers,  80  Mich.  182,  4.")  N. 
W.  130;    Roux  v.  Blodgett  &  Davis  Lumber  Co.,  85  Mich.  519,  48  X.  W.  1032; 
Swaboda's  Case,  40  Mich.  424;    Hagen  v.  Chicago,  D.  &  C.  G.  T.  J.  Ry.  Co., 
86  Mich.  615,  49  X.  W.  .510;   Adams  v.  Iron  Cliffs  Co.,  78  .Alich,  271,  44  N.  W. 
270;    Luke  v.  Wheat  Min.  Co.,  71  Mich.  3(>4,  39  X.  W.  11;    Chicago,  B.  &  Q. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Oleson,  40  Xeb.  889,  59  X.  W.  3.54;    Ameiican  Waterworks  Co.  v. 
Dougherty,  37  Xeb.  373,  55  N.  W.  1051,  followed  in  Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  Co. 
V.  Brady,  39  Xeb.  27,  57  N.  W.  767;    Ft.  Worth  &  N.  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wallace, 
74  Tex.  581,  12  S.  W.  227;    Campbell  v.  Goodwin  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  2iJ  S.  W. 
S64;    Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wymore,  40  Xeb.  645,  58  X.  W.  1120;    Chi- 
cago, B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wilgus,  40  Xeb.  660,  58  N.  W.  1125;    McCleary  v. 
Frantz,  160  Pa.  St.  535,  28  Atl.  929;   Xewark  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Block,  55  X.  J. 
Law,  005,  27  Atl.  1067;   Emery  v.  Minneapolis  Industrial  Exposition,  50  Minn. 
460,  57  N.  W.  1132;   Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Turner,  71  Miss.  402,  14  South.  450. 
And  see  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Wymore,  40  Xeb.  645,  58  X.  W.  1120;   Chi- 
cago, B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  V.  Oleson.  40  Xeb.  889,  59  X.  W.  354;   American  Water- 
works Co.  v.  Dougherty,  37  Xeb.  373,  55  X.  W.  1051,  followed  in  Omaha  &  R. 
V.  R.  Co.  V.  Brady,  39  Xeb.  27,  57  X.  W.  767. 


956  NEGI.IGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

members  of  the  deciding  bench  could  not  reach  the  conclusion  that 
there  was  contributory  negligence.^"" 

The  English  rule  is  even  moif  favorable  to  the  plaintiff  than  is 
the  American  rule.  The  view  of  a  majority  of  the  court  in  Dublin, 
«tc.,  R.  Co.  V.  Slattery  ^"'  is  that  whenever  there  is  evidence  of 
negligence  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  conducing  to  the  accident, 
upon  which  evidence,  apart  from  any  consideration  of  the  character 
of  tlic  plaintiff's  conduct,  the  jury  might  not  unreasonably  find  a 
verdict  for  the  plaintiff,  the  judge  can  never  nonsuit.^"* 

On  the  other  hand,  however,  where  the  undisputed  evidence  is  so 
conclusive  as  to  plaintiff's  contributory  negligence  that  the  court 
would  be  compelled  to  set  aside  a  verdict  returned  in  opposition  to 
it,  the  case  m;iy  be  withdrawn  from  the  consideration  of  the  jury, 
and  a  verdict  directed  for  the  defendant.  Thus,  if  an  experienced 
railroad  man  deliberately  steps  on  a  track  in  front  of  an  approach- 
ing train,  without  looking  or  taking  any  precaution  for  his  own 
safety,  as  a  matter  of  law  he  is  guilty  of  such  contributory  negli- 
.nence  as  will  defeat  his  recovery.^^"     So  where  a  boy,  riding  on  a 

598  Hunter  v.  Cooperstown  &  S.  V.  R.  Co.,  126  N.  Y.  18,  26  N.  E.  958. 

.  597  3  App.  Cas.  1155,— per  Lord  Cairns.  i>age  1167;  per  Lord  Selborne,  page 
1189;  per  Lord  O'Hagau,  page  1182;  per  Lord  Gordon,  page  1216.  But  see 
Ilyder  v.  Wombwell,  L.  R.  4  Exch.  32;  Dublin,  W.  &  W,  R.  Co.  v.  Slattery, 
r,upra,  per  Lord  Blackburn,  page  1190,  and  per  Lord  Hatberley,  page  1168. 
And  see  Davey  v.  London  &  S.  AV.  Ry.  Co.,  12  Q.  B.  Div.  70;  Wakelin  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  12  App.  Cas.  41. 
59S  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  390.    Ante,  p.  932,  note  502. 

599  Elliott  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  150  U.  S.  245,  14  Sup.  Ct.  85.  Et 
vide  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Converse,  139  U.  S.  469-472,  11  Sup.  Ct.  569; 
Anderson  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Beal,  113  U.  S.  227,  5  Sup.  Ct.  433;  Rebm  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.,  164  Pa.  St.  91,  30  Atl.  356;  Cliaffee  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  17  R.  I. 
058,  24  Atl.  141;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Markee  (Ala.)  1.3  Soutb.  511;  Carroll 
V.  Minnesota  Val.  R.  Co.,  13  Minn.  30  (Gil.  18);  Griggs  v.  Fleckenstein,  14  Minn. 
81  (Gil.  62) ;  St.  Anthony  Falls  Water-Power  Co.  v.  Eastman,  20  ilinn.  277 
(Gil.  249);  Barbo  v.  Bassett,  35  Minn.  485,  29  X.  AV.  198;  Rosenfield  v.  Arrol,  44 
Minn.  395,  46  N.  W.  768;  Shouer  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  130  Ind.  170,  28  N.  E. 
016,  and  29  N.  E.  775;  Rogers  v.  Leyden,  127  Ind.  50,  26  N.  E.  210  (a  full 
citation  of  authorities).  Cf.  Sobieski  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  41  Minn.  169, 
42  N.  W.  8U3;  Robel  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  35  Minn.  84,  27  N.  W. 
305.  One  who  rushes  on  a  street-car  track  -uithout  looking  or  listening  for 
a  car  which  he  knows  is  approaching,  is  guilty  of  contributory  negligence. 
Hickey  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.)  61  N.  W.  893.    As  to  contributory 


^^'-    ^-^l  ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  957 

familiar  elevator,  stuck  his  head  eij^lit  or  ten  inches  outside  of  it, 
and  was  injured,  the  case  was  properly  taken  from  the  jury."""  So 
failure  on  the  plaintiff's  part  to  heed  warnings  and  signals  may 
justify  the  court  in  directing  a  verdict  for  the  defendant,""!  hut  evi- 
dence of  such  failure  is  more  commonly  for  the  jurj^''"^ 

In  the  "invitation  to  alight"  group,'"'^  the  cases  in  which  a  re- 
covery has  been  allowed  notwithstanding  the  fact  Ihat  the  passen- 
ger undertook  to  leave  a  car  in  motion  are  exceptional,  and  depend  up- 
pend  upon  peculiar  circumstances.  Alighting  from  a  moving  train 
may  justify  the  court  in  taking  the  case  from  the  jury.""*  And  on 
the  same  principle,  where  a  passenger  attempts  to  get  on  a  train 
moving  at  a  dangerous  rate  of  speed,  whereby  he  is  killed,  it  is 

negligence  in  failure  to  discover  and  repair  defects  in  instrumentalities,  see 
Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Dudley  (Va.)  IS  S.  E.  274;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Kizziah,  86  Tex.  81,  23  S.  AV.  578;  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Braiiyan,  10  Ind. 
App.  570,  37  N.  E.  190;  (Jibson  v.  Minneapolis,  St.  P.  &  S.  S.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  5."i 
Minn.  177,  56  N.  W.  686;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Pearson,  97  Ala.  211,  12 
South.  176. 

eoo  Ludwig  V.  Pillsbury,  35  Minn.  256,  28  X.  W.  .jO.j.  Tide  Barbo  v.  Bassett, 
35  Minn.  485,  29  N.  W.  198.  But  resting  a  hand  on  and  partially  out  of  ;i 
street-car  window,  so  that  a  projecting  sewer  planli  injures  it,  leaves  the 
question  of  contributory  negligence  to  the  juiy.  Dahlberg  v.  Minneapolis  St. 
Ry.  Co.,  32  Minn.  404,  21  N.  W.  545. 

601  Lendberg  v.  Brotherton  Iron  Min.  Co.,  97  Jlich.  443,  56  N.  W.  846. 

602  Kansas  City,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Kirksey,  9  C.  C.  A.  321,  60  Fed.  999;  Ward's 
Adm'r  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.,  39  W.  Va.  46,  19  S.  E.  389. 

603  Leading  English  cases:  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jackson,  3  App.  Cas. 
193;  Bridges  v.  North  London  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  7  H.  L.  213;  post,  p.  964,  note  630. 

604  Rapalje,  J.,  in  Burrows  v.  Railway  Co..  63  N.  Y.  556-5.")9;  Pennsyl- 
vania Co.  V.  Kilgore,  32  Pa.  St.  292;  Filer  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y. 
47;  Montgomery  &  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stewart,  91  Ala.  421,  8  South.  70S;  Renner 
V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  46  Fed.  344;  Gavett  v.  Manchester  tt  L.  R.  Co.,  in 
Gray  (Mass.)  501;  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bangs,  47  Mich.  470,  11  N. 
W.  276;  Kirchner  v.  Detroit  City  Ry.  Co.,  91  Mich.  400,  51  N.  W.  1059;  Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co.  v.  A  spell,  23  Pa.  St.  147;  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Randolph, 
53  111.  510;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Hazzard,  26  111,  373;  Dougherty  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  86  111.  467;  Damont  v.  Railroad  Co.,  9  La.  Ann.  441;  JefEerson- 
ville  R.  Co.  V.  Hendricks,  26  Ind.  228;  Jeffersonville  R.  Co.  v.  Swift,  Id.  4.j'.i. 
A  passenger  who  alights  from  a  moving  car,  after  seeing  one  immediately  in 
front  of  him  fall  in  getting  off,  is  guilty  of  contributory  negligence,  and  the 
can-ier  is  not  liable  for  his  injuries.  Brown  v.  Barnes,  151  Pa,  St.  502,  2.> 
Atl.  144.    A  passenger  on  a  freight  train  wished  to  get  off  at  a  station  where 


958  NEGLIGENCE.  [Oil.    12 

proper  to  instruct  the  jury  to  find  for  the  defendant. ''"'  This,  how- 
ever, does  not  apply  where  one  has  safely  boarded  the  moving  car, 
and  is  injured  by  the  subsequent  negligence  of  the  defendant,  as 
in  suddenly  starting  the  car."""  And  the  tendency  of  the  cases 
would  seem  to  be  to  leave  such  matters  to  the  jury.""^  This  is  also 
true  of  the  "level  crossing"  cases.^"^  And  again,  a  court  may  find 
as  a  matter  of  law  that  there  is  no  negligence  or  contributory  negli- 


the  train  was  accustomed  to  slowing  up,  so  that  passengers  could  alight 
without  danger.  On  this  occasion  the  train  did  not  slacken  at  the  station, 
and  shortly  after  passing  it  the  passenger  jumped  therefrom,  and  received 
injuries  which  caused  his  death.  Held,  in  an  action  by  his  administratrix, 
that  deceased's  contributory  negligence  would  defeat  a  recovery.  Brown 
V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  E.  Co.,  80  Wis.  162,  49  N.  W.  807. 

60  5  Bacon  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  143  Pa.  St.  14,  21  Atl.  1002.  Et 
vide  Finnegan  v.  Railway  Co.,  48  Minn.  378,  51  N.  W.  122. 

600  Sahlgaard  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  48  Minn.  232,  51  N.  W.  111. 

607  Plaintiff,  half  asleep,  was  aroused  as  the  train  was  leaving  his  destina- 
tion. Held  negligence  on  part  of  conductor.  Ordinarily,  jumping  from  mov- 
ing train  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  contributory  negligence,  but  not  here. 
Jones  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Minn.  183,  43  N.  W.  1114.  Whether 
or  not  jumping  from  a  moving  street  car  is  negligence  is  a  question  for  the 
jury.  It  is  not  negligence  per  se.  Schacherl  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  42  Minn. 
42,  43  K.  W.  837.  After  a  train  has  stopped,  and  a  passenger  proceeds  to 
alight,  it  Is  not  negligence,  per  se,  for  her  to  alight  at  the  invitation  and  with 
the  assistance  of  the  brakeman  after  the  train  has  started  again,  unless  the 
speed  is  so  great  that  the  danger  is  obvious.  McCaslin  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  93  Mich.  553,  53  N.  W.  724.  And  see  Strand  v.  Chicago  &  W.  M. 
Ry.  Co.,  64  Mich.  216,  31  N.  W.  184.  See  pages  219-220,  64  Mich.,  and  page 
184,  31  N.  W.  Whether  an  employ^  was  negligent  in  jumping  fron  an  engine 
to  perform  his  duty  is  for  juiy.  Coif  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  87 
Wis.  273,  58  N.  W.  408;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Woods  (Tex.  Civ.  App.) 
25  S.  W.  741. 

00  8  Ante,  p.  881. 

60  9  Tucker  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  8  C.  C.  A.  416,  59  Fed.  908;  Elliott  v. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  150  U.  S.  245,  14  Sup.  Ct.  85;  Union  Pac.  R.  Co. 
V.  McDonald,  152  U.  S.  262,  14  Sup.  Ct.  619;  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Moseley, 
6  0.  C.  A.  641,  57  Fed.  921. 


^tl-    12]  CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  959 


SAME— DAMAGES. 

269.  A  cause  of  action  for  negligence  cannot  be  made  out 

■without  proof  of  damage  of  the  kind  required  by 
law.     Damage  is  the  gist  of  the  -wrong. 

The  distinct  common-law  remedy  for  negligence  was  case.  That 
is  to  say,  it  gives  rise  to  a  cause  of  action  in  which  the  damages  are 
not  direct,  are  never  presumed,  but  must  be  pleaded  and  proved."" 
It  may  be  stated  as  axiomatic  that  no  negligence  will  be  actionable 
unless  it  results  in  an  injury  or  damage.""  Thus  an  attorney's  er- 
ror, arising  from  carelessness,  is  not  the  basis  of  recovery  against 
him  unless  it  produce  damage."^^  The  plaintiff  is  conhned  to  proof 
of  such  damages  as  he  has  pleaded.  If  special  damages  are  not 
pleaded,  they  may  not  be  recovered.""  So  if  the  proof  fails  as  to 
damages  in  toto,  there  can  be  no  recovery.  The  damages  pleaded 
and  proved  must  comply  with  the  legal  standard.  If  they  are  too 
petty,  the  law  will  apply  the  maxim  "De  minimis  non  curat  lex." 
If  they  are  purely  sentimental,  they  will  not  complete  the  cause  of 
action.  And  so,  if  they  be  remote,  the  plaintiff  may  show  the  other 
two  elements  of  negligence,  and  for  failure  to  show  the  third — proxi- 
mate damage — will  fail  to  reco^'er. 

CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 

270.  To  maintain  successfully  an  action  for  negligence  the 

ordinary  rule  is  that  it  must  appear  that  the  injury 
■was    occasioned   by    actionable    negligence    on   the 
defendant's  part,  and  it  must  not  appear  that  there 
was  contributory  negligence  on  the  plaintiff's  part 
But  contributory  negligence  is  no  defense  to  a  will 
fui  or  wanton  wrong. 

610  Pig.  Torts,  179. 

oil  Bluedorn  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  24  S.  W.  57-GO. 

612  Ante,  p.  915. 

613  Hinckley  v.  Krug  (Cal.)  34  Pac.  118. 

614  Wasbington  &  G.  E.  Co.  v.  Gladmon,  15  Wall.  401. 


GU 


960  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

The  doftiliK'  (if  oouliilnitoi'T  negligence  soems  to  be  founded  upon 
these  considerations:  (1)  The  mutual  wrong  and  negligence  of  the 
parties  and  the  reluctance  of  the  law  to  attempt  an  apportionment 
of  the  wrong  between  them.  (2)  The  principle  which  requires  every 
suitor  who  seeks  to  enforce  his  rights  or  redress  his  wrongs  to  go 
into  court  with  clean  hands,  and  m  hich  will  not  permit  him  to  re- 
cover for  his  own  wrong.  (3)  The  policy  of  making  the  personal  in- 
terests of  parties  dependent  upon  their  care  and  prudence.*^'  (4) 
The  logical  necessity  of  recognizing  that,  if  the  plaintiff's  own  neg- 
ligence caused  the  damage,  the  defendant  is  not  connected  as  the 
juridical  cause.  Such  considerations  seem  to  control  courts  at  pres- 
ent, rather  than  the  misleading  application  of  the  maxim  "In  pari 
delicto  potior  est  conditio  defendentis."  "'^ 

Ariahgy  to  the  Defendant's  Negligence. 

Negligence,  as  the  word  is  commonly  used,  is  the  tort  of  the  de- 
fendant; but  much  supefflcial  criticism  has  arisen  from  a  failure  to 
attend  adequately  to  the  similarity  of  the  plaintiff's  negligence,  or 
contributory  negligence,  and  that  of  the  defendant.  In  the  considera- 
tion of  the  general  subject  upon  this  point,  the  negligence  of  the 
plaintiff  and  the  negligence  of  the  defendant  have  intentionally  not 
been  separated.  In  many  respects  they  are  identical.  Both  involve 
the  exercise  of  care  proportionate  to  the  circumstances,  whenever 
a  duty  is  placed  on  either  party  to  exercise  such  care.""^'  But,  on 
the  one  hand,  the  duty  of  the  plaintiff  to  exercise  care  is  a  negative 
one.  The  obligation  is  imperfect.  Its  violation  is  not  actionable. 
He  cannot  be  sued  for  a  breach  of  such  duty.''"  On  the  other  hand, 
unless  he  has  been  guilty  of  a  breach  of  duty,  the  question  of  con- 

616  The  matter  of  burden  of  proof  is  subsequently  considered. 

616  Davis  V.  Guarnieri,  4.5  Ohio  St.  470-489,  l.o  N.  E.  350;  Pol.  Torts,  3(;0; 
Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  389;  Lord  Halsbury  in  Wakelin  v.  London  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
12  App.  Gas.  41. 

617  Brick  V.  Bosworth,  162  Mass.  334,  39  N.  E.  36.  But  see  Cleveland,  C, 
C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Sloan  (Ind.  App.)  39  N.  E.  174.  And  see  Cloutier  v. 
Grafton  &  U.  R.  Co.,  162  Mass.  471,  39  N.  E.  110. 

618  Unless,  indeed,  such  contributory  negligence  sliould,  in  its  turn,  become 
an  affirmative,  origjinal  cause  of  damage  to  defendant's  property  or  person. 
Such  damage  might  then  be  set  up  by  defendant  as  a  counterclaim  to  plain- 
tiff's cause  of  action. 


Ch.    12]  CONTEIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  961 

tributoiy  negligence  rnnnot  arise.  Any  damage  resulting  from  hi.« 
conduct,  not  otherwise  actionable,  is  damnuui  absque  injuria."^' 
Moreover,  the  duty,  the  violation  of  which  involxcs  contributory 
negligence,  is  the  duty  to  avoid  doing  harm;  and  contributory  neg- 
ligence is  a  defense  only  to  a  breach  of  such  duty.  If  one  negli- 
gently and  proximately  contributes  to  his  injury,  he  cannot  recover, 
no  matter  how  negligent  the  defendant  may  have  been,  unless  such 
negligence  is  so  gross  as  to  imply  a  willful  intention  to  inflict  the  in- 
jury."^" But  when  the  harm  is  intentional,  as  in  casis  of  assault 
and  battery, "^^  or  is  the  result  of  willful  or  wanton  negligence,'^- 
it  does  not  avail  to  prevent  recovery.  For  essentially  the  same  rea- 
son, contributory  negligence  is  no  defense  to  an  action  for  nui- 
sance.'^^  But  negligence  and  fraud  are  so  closely  related  from  cer- 
tain points  of  view  that  contributory  negligence  may  bar  recovery 
in  fraud.^2^ 


610  Ante,  p.  86. 

620  Carrlngton  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  88  Ala.  472,  6  South.  910.  Et 
vide  McAdoo  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  lO."  N.  C.  140,  11  S.  E.  316. 

621  Ruter  V.  Foy,  46  Iowa,  132;  Steinmetji  v.  Kelly,  72  Ind.  442;  Anniston 
Pipe-Works  v.  Dickey,  93  Ala.  418,  9  Smith.  TJO. 

622  Florida  South.  R.  Co.  v.  Hiist.  .30  Fla.  1,  11  South.  .506;  Brown  v. 
Scarboro,  97  Ala.  316,  12  South.  289;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Markee  (Ala.* 
15  South.  511;  Christian  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  iJIiss.)  12  South.  710;  Lake 
Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Bodemer,  1.39  111.  ."9ii,  29  N.  B.  692;  Louisville  Safety- 
Vault  &  Trust  Co.  V.  Louisville  &  X.  R.  Co.,  92  Ky.  233,  17  S.  W.  567;  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  Co.  V.  ConifE's  Adm'r  (Ky.)  27  S.  W.  865;  Catlett  v.  Young,  14.5 
111.  74,  32  N.  E.  447;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Mavkee  (Ala.)  15  South.  511; 
ilcDonald  v.  International  it  G.  N.  R.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  21  S.  AV.  774. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  admiralty,  defendant's  contributory  ncsjliRence  will 
not  defeat  plaintiff's  cause  of  action,  unless  his  fault  is  willful,  gross,  or  in- 
excusable. The  Jlax  Morris.  137  U.  S.  1,  11  Sup.  Ct.  29.  Under  the  Euirlish 
admiralty  rule  In  case  of  collision,  when  both  vessels  are  at  fault  the  damage 
is  divided.  Sherwood,  L.  T.  16.  The  conti-ibutory  negligenci-  of  a  per- 
son injured,  on  failure  of  the  engineer  to  observe  the  statutory  precautions, 
will  not  bar  a  recovery,  but  the  jury  must  consider  such  contributory  neg- 
ligence in  mitigation  of  damages.  Western  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Roberson.  9  C. 
C.   A.   646,   61   Fed.   592.     Cf.   Catlett  v.   Young,  143  111.   74,   32   N.   E.   447 

623  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  12  C.  C.  A.  384.  64  Fed.  679.  Con- 
tributory negligence,  however,  has  been  recognized  as  a  defense  to  nuisance. 
Mayor  &  City  Council  of  Baltimore  v.  Marriott,  06  Am.  Dec.  320. 

6  24  Ante,  p.  595,  "Deceit." 

LAW  OF  TOKTS — 61 


S62  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.   12 


SAME— ELEMENTS  OF  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 

271.  To  make  out  the  defense  of  contributory  negligence, 

the  plaintiflF's  conduct  must  have  the  three  essential 
elements  of  negligence;  i.  e.: 

(a)  A  duty  to  exercise  care; 

(b)  A  violation  of  that  duty  in  fact;  and 

(c)  Connection  as  cause  of  the  damage  complained  of. 

272.  The  duty  of  exercising  care  to  avoid  injury  includes, 

inter  alia — 

(a)  The  duty  of  not  voluntarily  exposing  one's  person  or 

property  to  harm. 

(b)  The  duty  of  avoiding  harm  before  or  after  the  dam- 

age is  done,  ■when  voluntary  and  deliberate  action 
is  allo-wred  by  circumstances. 

272a.  The  duty  of  exercising  care  does  not  require  one  to 
anticipate  a  -wrongful  act. 

Exposure  to  Danger. 

The  care  to  be  exercised  by  the  plaintiff  is  governed  by  the  same 
principles  which  determine  the  negligence  of  the  defendant.  It 
varies  with  the  apparent  risk.  The  plaintiff  may  be  negligent  in 
exposing  himself  to  known  dangers,  or  dangers  which  he  should 
know.^^°  Thus  the  plaintiff  may  be  negligent  in  interfering  with  a 
dog  flght."^"  If  a  drunken  man  goes  to  sleep  on  a  railway  track, 
he  takes  his  chances  of  being  killed  before  his  peril  is  discovered 
and  averted."-^     So,  where  a  brakeman  deliberately  put  his  foot 

625  Lebanon  Light,  Heat  &  Power  Co.  v.  Leap  (Ind.  Sup.)  39  N.  E.  57 
(meddling!  witli  natural  gas  pipe). 

026  Jiiitteson  V.  Strong,  l.'iO  JIass.  497,  34  N.  E.  1077;  Boulester  v.  Parsons, 
161  Mass.  182,  36  N.  E.  790;  Raymond  v.  Hodgson,  161  Mass.  184,  36  N.  E. 
791;  Farley  v.  Picard,  78  Hun,  560,  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  802.  Where  a  person 
voluntarily  and  unnecessarily  provokes  a  vicious  animal,  and  thus  invites  or 
induces  the  injury,  knowing  the  probable  consequences,  he  is  not  entitled  to 
recover.  Lynch  v.  McNally,  73  N.  Y.  350.  So  a  woman  driving  a  horse  near 
an  electric'  road.  Benjamin  v.  Holyoke  St.  Ry.  Co.,  160  Mass.  3,  3-5  N.  E. 
95.     Cf.  City  of  Denver  v.  Peterson  (Colo.  App.)  36  Pac.  1111. 

02-  O'Keefe  v.  Railroad  Co.,  32  Iowa,  467;   Donaldson  v.  Milwaukee  &  St. 


^"-    ^"2]  COKTRIBDTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  963 

into  an  unblocked  frog,  and,  before  he  could  extricate  it,  wasi  tilled, 
his  recklessness  will  prevent  a  recovery.^^s  But  a  pedestrian  is 
not  necessarily  negligent  in  attempting  to  pass  over  a  road  which 
he  knows  to  be  dangerous,  provided  a  man  of  ordinary  intelligence 
would  reasonably  believe  that  he  could  go  there. "2* 

V.  Ry.  Co.,  21  Minn.  293;  Schmolze  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  83  Wis. 
659,  53  N.  W.  743  (a  leading  case). 

6  2  8  Southern  Paa  Co.  v.  Seley,  152  U.  S.  145-156,  14  Sup.  Ct.  530.  Gen- 
erally, as  to  contributory  negligence  in  getting  into  a  place  of  risk,  see  Dixon 
V.  Pluns,  98  Cal.  384,  33  Pac.  268;  Man  v.  Morse,  3  Colo.  App.  359,  33  Pac. 
283;  Knox  v.  Hall  .Steam-Power  Co.,  69  Hun,  231,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  490  (ele- 
vators); Clements  v.  Louisiana  Electric  Light  Co.,  44  La.  Ann.  f;0'i,  11  South. 
51;  CoMn  v.  Peabody,  155  Mass.  104,  2!)  N.  E.  59;  Van  Steinburg's  Case,  17 
Mich.  99;  Williams'  Case,  31  Mich.  276;  Miller's  Case,  46  Mich.  532,  9  N.  W. 
841;  Staal's  Case,  57  Mich.  244,  23  N.  W.  795;  Dickinson's  Case,  53  Mich.  47, 
18  N.  W.  5.j3;  Guggenheim's  Case,  57  Mich.  488,  24  N.  W.  827;  Id.,  66 
Mich.  157,  33  X.  W.  161;  Klanowski's  Case,  57  Mich.  528,  24  N.  W.  801;  Har- 
ris' Case,  64  Mich.  447,  31  N.  W.  42."j;  Little's  Case,  78  Mich.  2*  IT,  44  N.  W. 
137;  Richmond's  Case,  87  Mich.  374,  49  N.  W.  621;  Kinney  v.  Folkerts,  78 
Mich.  697,  44  X.  W.  152;  Id.,  84  JNIich.  619,  48  N.  W.  283.  Further,  as  to  con- 
tributory negligence  on  part  of  servant  In  taking  needless  risks:  Piper  v. 
Cambria  Iron  Co.,  78  Md.  249,  27  Atl.  939  (falling  while  unloaaing  iron); 
Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Bivins  (Ala.)  15  South.  515  (catching  clothes  In 
switch);  Towner  v.  Missouri  &  P.  R.  Co.,  52  Mo.  App.  648  (coupling  cars 
moving!  four  to  six  miles  an  hour).  Et  vide  Romona  Oolitic  Stone  Co.  v.  Tate, 
(Ind.  App.)  37  X.  E.  1065;  York  v.  Railway  Co.,  117  Mo.  405,  22  S.  W.  1081. 
Use  of  defective  appliances:  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowles,  71  Miss.  1003, 
15  South.  138;  Seaboard  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Woodson,  98  Ala.  378,  11  South.  733; 
Cpater  V.  Oil  Co.,  37  S.  C.  604,  15  S.  E.  928;  Hopkins  Bridge  Co.  v.  Burnett, 
■'^Tex.  16,  19  S.  W.  886. 

629  Skjeggerud  v.  Railway  Co.,  38  Minn.  61,  35  N.  W.  572.  Ct  Gates  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  l.'>4  Pa.  St.  567,  26  Atl.  598.  The  fact  that  a  traveler 
chooses  to  cross  a  bridge  on  foot,  knowing  that  there  are  no  barriers  to  pro- 
tect foot  passengers  from  teams  and  animals  crossing  the  bridge,  thougili  it 
may  be  evidence  of  negligence,  does  not  constitute  negligence  per  se.  St. 
Louis  Bridge  Co.  v.  Miller,  138  111.  465,  28  N.  E.  1091;  Korrady  v.  Lake 
Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  131  Ind.  201,  29  X.  E.  1069;  Cadwallader  v.  Railway 
Co.,  128  Ind.  518,  27  N.  E.  161;  Clayards  v.  Dethick,  12  Q.  B.  430;  Wright 
V.  City  of  St.  Cloud,  54  Jliun.  94,  55  X.  W.  819;  Hall  v.  Incorporated  Town 
of  Manson  (Iowa)  58  N.  W.  881;  Parcells  v.  City  of  Auburn,  77  Hun,  137, 
28  X.  Y.  Supp.  471;  Town  of  Fowler  v.  Linguist  (Ind.  Sup.)  37  N.  E.  133; 
Lvnch  V.  Erie  City.  151  Pa.  St.  ."sn,  1:5  Atl.  43.  As  between  master  and  serv- 
ant, see  Galvin  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  162  Mass.  oi3,  39  X.  E.  186. 


9G4  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

The  "invitation  to  alight"'  ''^''  and  the  "lerel  crossing"  °'^  groups 
of  eases  are  familiar  illustrations  of  careless  exposure  to  dangers. 
The  same  principle  applies  to  contributory  negligence  as  to  property. 
Thus,  leaving  an  article  exposed  may  prevent  recovery  for  the  loss 

830  Lax  V.  JIayor,  4>J  Law  J.  <}.  B.  100.  The  question  of  contributory  neg- 
ligence in  getting  on  or  off  is  nrdinai-ily  for  the  jury,  Merritt  v.  New  York, 
N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.,  162  Mass.  326,  38  N.  E.  447;  BischofE  v.  People's  Ry. 
Co.,  121  Mo.  216,  25  S.  W.  908;  New  Orleans  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Schneider,  8 
C.  C.  A.  571,  60  Fed.  210;  North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Eldridge,  151  111.  542, 
38  N.  E.  240;  but  not  always,  '\'ictor  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.,  164  Pa.  St.  195, 
30  Atl.  381  (where  plaintiff  ali^ihted  after  the  car  started);  Tillett  v.  Lynch- 
burg &  D.  R.  Co.,  115  N.  O.  662,  20  S.  E.  480;  Butler  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co. 
(Jliun.)  60  N.  W.  1090;  Reed  v.  Covington  &  C.  Bridge  Co.  (Ky.)  28  S.  W.  149; 
Burgin  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  115  N.  C.  073,  20  S.  E.  473;  Toledo,  St.  L. 
&  K.  C.  R.  Co.  V.  Wingate  (Ind.  Sup.)  37  N.  E.  274  (woman  with  bundles). 
The  New  York  rule  is  very  s.trict  in  respect  to  boarding  a  train  in  motion. 
Distler  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  78  Hun,  252,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  865;  Fahr  v.  Man- 
hattan Ry.  Co.,  9  Misc.  Rep.  57,  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  1.  However,  it  is  not,  as  a 
matter  of  law,  contributory  negligence  for  a  passenger,  after  having  signaled 
the  driver  of  a  stage  to  stop,  to  attempt  to  enter  the  stage  before  it  has  fully- 
stopped,  where  "its  motion  was  hardly  perceptible."  Frobisher  v.  Fifth  Ave. 
Transp.  Co.,  81  Hun,  544,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  1099.  The  belief  that  the  train 
from  which  plaintiff  stepped  while  in  motion  was  standing  still  does  not 
rebut  the  presumption  of  contributory  negligence,  in  the  absence  of  evidence 
showing  that  such  belief  was  reasonable.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Lan- 
dauer,  39  Neb.  803,  58  N.  W.  434.  As  to  the  right  of  passengier  to  believe 
that  the  place  at  which  he  alighted  is  safe,  see  Cazneau  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co., 
161  Mass.  355,  37  N.  E.  311;  Falk  v.  Railroad  Co.,  56  N.  J.  Law,  380,  29  Atl. 
157;  St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  59  Ark.  122,  26  S.  W.  593.  It  is 
not  contributory  negligence  for  a  passenger  on  a  strefit  car  to  remain  on  the 
platform  when  there  is  no  room  inside.  Marion  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Shaffer,  9  Ind. 
App.  486,  36  N.  E.  861.  Where  an  intoxicated  passenger  refuses  to  go  into 
the  car  after  being  requested  to  do  so  by  the  conductor,  but  remains  on  the 
platform,  from  which  he  afterwards  falls,  he  cannot  recover  for  the  injury 
(Holt,  J.,  dissenting,  on  the  ground  that  the  conductor  should  have  compelled 
him  to  enter  the  car,  or  leave  the  train  at  a  station).  Fisher  v.  West  Virginia 
&  P.  R.  Co.,  39  W.  Va.  366,  19  S.  E.  578;   ante,  p.  957,  note  603. 

631  Buelow  V.  Chicago,  St.  P.  &  K.  C.  Ky.  Co.  (Iowa)  60  N.  W.  617  (running 
switch);  Hayes  v.  Noreross,  162  Mass.  546,  39  N.  E.  282  (boy  5i^  years  old, 
crossing  street);  Winey  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  61  N.  W.  21S 
(railway  crossing);  Link  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.,  165  Pa.  St.  75,  30  Atl. 
820,  822  (Id.);  Tobias  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.  (Mich.)  61  N.  W.  514  (Id.). 
Ante,  p.  881. 


^''-    12]  CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


965 


or  damage,  for  example,  by  fire."^^  One's  knoAvledge,  actual  or 
constructive,  may  be  a  m.ifenal  element  in  detf-uniining  contribu- 
tory negligence.  Their-fore,  y\heve  the  owner  of  a  carriage,  with 
whom  the  plaintiff  Mas  riding,  carelessly  drove  over  a  pile  of  sand 
in  the  street,  with  full  knowledge  of  the  obstruction,  at  a  rate  of 
speed  not  allowed  by  ordinance,  overturning  the  carriage,  and  caus- 
ing the  injuries  complained  of,  thcie  can  be  no  recovery."^!*  But 
such  knowledge  does  not  necessarily  control.  In  an  action  against 
a  town  for  personal  injuries  caused  by  the  plaintiff's  wagon  collid- 
ing with  a  post  in  the  street,  it  appeared  that  the  team  became 
frightened  and  got  beyond  control,  but  that  it  was  not  accustomed 
to  run  away,  and  that  the  post  was  several  feet  from  the  traveled 
road.  It  was  held,  even  though  plaintiff  knew  of  the  post,  he  was 
not  guilty  of  contributory  negligence. "=*    On  the  same  principle,  the 

832  Bex  v.  Kelse,  5  Wash.  360,  31  Pac.  973;  Curran  v.  Weiss,  6  Misc.  Rep. 
138,  20  N.  y.  Supp.  8;  Richter  v.  Harper,  95  Mich.  221,  54  N.  W.  7G8;  Danver 
&  R.  G-.  R.  Co.,  V.  Morton  (Colo.  App.)  32  Pac.  34.j.  But  see  Great  Western 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Hawarth,  39  111.  347  (open  window);  Fero  v.  Railroad  Co.,  22  N.  Y. 
209  (open  door) ;  Philadelphia  &  Reading  R.  Co.  v.  tlendrlckson,  SO  Pa.  St.  is:! 
(roof)/  Toledo,  W.  k  W.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Maxfield,  72  111.  95  (Id.).  As  to  failui-e  to 
plow  ti-ench,  see  Burlington  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Westover,  4  Neb.  268,  and  Jefferis 
V.  Philadelphia,  W./&  B.  Ry.  Co.,  3  Houst  (Del.)  447.  As  to  exposure  of  ani- 
mals to  damages  Iw  barb-wire  fences,  see  Boyd  v.  Burkett  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27 
S.  W.  223.  But  where  defendant  railroad  company,  in  repairing  its  road,  al- 
tered its  embanknient  on  the  sides  of  a  stream  running  tlirough  plaintiff's  land, 
so  as  to  extend  toe  embankment  fmrther  Into  the  stream,  and  causing  it  at 
times  to  pond  baclaon  plaintiff's  land,  plaintiff  is  not  guilty  of  contributory 
negligerce  because  He  planted  crops  on  the  land  knowing  that  such  land  was 
liable  to  be  overllowecl  and  the  crops  injui-ed.  Knight  v.  Albemarle  &  R.  R. 
Co.,  Ill  N.  0.  80,  13  S.  ^E.  921). 

833  Mullen  V.  City  of  Owasso,  100  Mich.  103,  58  N.  W.  003  (see  dissenting 
opinion);  Goodlander  Mill  Co.  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  11  C.  C.  A.  2.j3,  63  Fed.  400 
(where  a  consignee  undertook  to  draw  oil  from  a  leaking  car,  whereby  the  oil 
ran  into  his  engine  room,  exploded,  and  destroyed  his  mill.  The  negligence  of 
defendant,  the  shipper  of  the  car,  was  held  not  to  be  the  proximate  cause); 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Ward,  10  C.  C.  A.  160,  01  Fed.  927  (switchman  and 
hole  in  the  track);  Boyd  v.  Burkett  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  233  (barb-wire 
fence  over  path). 

834  Town  of  Fowler  v.  Liuquist  (Ind.  Sup.)  37  N.  E.  133.  How  far  com-ts 
go  in  sending  contributory  negligence  to  a  jury  is  seen  in  the  holding  that 
where  a  youth  ^as  killed  by  picking  up  the  end  of  an  clecti'ic-light  wire,  lying 
on  a  sti'eet  crossing,  which  showed  no  siuus  of  being  alive,  the  question  of 


966  KEGUGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

moniipiitary  diversion  of  a  person's  attention,  while  walldng  on  a 
siidewalk,  does  not,  as  matter  of  law,  constitute  contributory  negli- 
gence, so  as  to  pre\'ent  a  recovery  for  injuries  due  to  defects  in  the 
sidewalk.«35 

Avoiding  Threatened  Danger  Before  Damage  is  Done. 

Where  there  was  any  considerable  interval  of  time  between  the 
discovery  of  the  negligence  and  its  injurious  effect,  the  jury  ought  to 
be  made  acquainted  with  the  rule  of  law  which  requires  the  plaintiff 
to  exercise  ordinary  care  to  avoid  the  consequences  of  the  negli- 
''gence.  A  failure,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  to  make  diligent 
use  of  available  means  to  avoid  a  known  or  apprehended  danger, 
when  it  is  apparent  that  if  such  means  had  been  used  the  danger 
would  have  been  averted,  will  be  regarded  as  contributory  negli- 
gence.^'^  But  where  there  are  two  or  more  different  lines  of  actions, 
any  one  of  which  may  be  taken,  and  a  person  of  ordinary  skill,  in  the 

contributory  negligence  is  for  the  jmy,  thougti,  when  touching  a  dead  wire,  a 
few  minutes  before,  he  was  wai-ned  to  be  eaieful,  and  though,  while  he  was 
standing  there,  and  in  a  position  to  see,  a  hog  on  the  other  side  of  the  road 
had  come  in  contact  with  a  live  wire,  and  given  evidence  of  receiving  a 
shock.     Texarkana  Gas  &  Electric  Light  Co.  v.  Orr,'.59  Ark.  21.j,  27  S.  W.  (30. 

63  5  West  V.  City  of  Eau  Claire  (Wis.)  61  N.  W.  .313. 

esr  Green  v.  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  R.  Co.  (Miss.)  12  South.  820;  Christian  v. 
niinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  Id.  710;  Bartlett  v.  Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  122  iXass.  209. 
In  Keefe  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  00  N.  W.  503,  plaintiff's  intestate, 
while  standing  idle  on  tlie  track  in  defendant's  yard,  was  killed  by  an  engine 
which  was  backing  away  from  a  switch.  The  comt  said:  "It  is  certain  that 
he  was  in  a  place  of  danger.  The  presence  of  the  tracks,  and  cars  thereon, 
and  the  movement  of  engines,  were  constant  warnings  to  him  of  danger.  It 
is  the  duty  of  persons  employed  in  such  places  to  be  reasonably  diligent  in 
guarding  against  accidents,  and  especially  to  obswve  and  keep  out  of  the  way 
of  moving  engines  and  cars.  They  have  no  right  to  rf!y  wholly  upon  the 
persons  in  charge  of  them  to  prevent  accidents,  but  must  use  due  care  to  avoid 
danger.  These  rules  are  founded  upon  the  necessities  of  the  business  of  op- 
erating railways.  They  are  reasonably  just,  and  are  fully  sustained  by  the 
decisions  of  this  and  other  courts.  (Jollins  v.  Raihvay  Co..  .S3  Iowa,  340,  49 
N.  W.  848;  ilagee  v.  Railway  Co.,  82  Iowa,  2r;(t,  48  N.  AV.  92;  Haden  v.  Rail- 
road Co.  (Iowa)  48  N.  W.  733;  Elliott  v.  Railway  Co.,  150  U.  S.  245,  14  Sup. 
Ct.  85;  Aerkfetz  v.  Humphreys,  145  U.  S.  418,  12  Sup.  Ct.  835.  The  jury 
would  have  been  justified  in  finding  that  the  negligence  of  Keefe  conti-ibuted 
to  the  injury."  It  was  accordingly  held  that  plaintiff  was  guilty  of  contribu- 
tory negligence. 


^'^-    12]  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE.  967 

presence  of  imminent  danger,  is  compelled  to  dioose  one  or  the  other, 
and  does  so  in  good  faith,  the  mere  fact  that  it  is  afterwards  discov- 
ered, by  the  result,  that  his  choice  was  not  the  best  means  of  escape, 
or  that  no  harm  would  haA'e  resulted  if  he  had  done  nothing,  such 
choice  cannot  be  imputed  to  him  as  negligence."^  This  is  clearly 
true  where  -the  danger  to  which  he  is  exposed  is  the  result  of  an- 
other's negligence.''^''  Thus,  if  a  passenger  jump,""  or  does  not 
jump  ""  from  a  moving  car,  train,  or  engine,  to  avoid  an  impending 

638  Schultz  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  44  Wis.  ivJS;  Gumz  v.  Chicago,  St  P. 
&  II.  Ry.  Co.,  52  Wis.  672,  10  N.  W.  31;  Stackmaii  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
SO  Wis.  428,  50  N.  W.  404.  But  see  Balteer  v.  Chicago,  M.  lV:  X.  B.  Co.,  83  Wis. 
459,  53  N.  W.  885;  Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Cox,  8  Ind.  .\i)i).  29,  ;!5  N.  E. 
183;  Hass  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  F.  R.  Co.  (lowii)  .".7  X.  W.  .S!i4;  Spaiilding  v. 
W.  N.  Plynt  Granite  Co.,  159  Mass.  587,  34  N.  E.  1134;  Adams  v.  Lancashire 
&  Y.  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  4  O.  P.  739;  Peoria,  D.  &  B.  Uy.  Co.  v.  Rice,  144  111.  227, 
33  N.  E.  95;  Blackwell  v.  Lynchburg  &  D.  R.  Co.,  Ill  X.  C.  151,  IG  S.  E.  12; 
Clayards  v.  Dethick,  12  Q.  B.  439.  But  see,  per  Braniwell,  L.  .J.,  Lax  v.  Dar- 
lington, 5  Exch.  Div.  28;  Stokes  v.  Saltonstall,  13  Pet.  ISl;  New  Jersey  R. 
Co.  V.  Pollard,  22  WaU.  341;  Buel  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  31  N.  Y.  314; 
Johnson  v.  West  Chester  R.  Co.,  70  Pa.  St.  357;  Toledo,  AV.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
O'Connor,  77  111.  391;  ilobile  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  AsUeraft,  48  Ala.  l.'i.  But  si-c 
Chicago  &  E.  111.  R.  Co.  v.  Robei-ts,  44  111.  App.  179;  Lincoln  Rapid  Transit 
Co.  v.  Nichols,  37  Neb.  332,  55  N.  W.  872.  AVhere  the  jury  find  defendants 
were  in  fault  in  not  giving  timely  notice  of  the  blast  whereby  decedent  was 
killed,  or  in  failing  to  construct  a  covering,  it  is  immaterial  whether  or  not 
deceased  took  refuge  in  a  safe  place,  it  being  sufficient  that  he  made  an  effoit 
to  protect  himself.  Blackwell  v.  Lynchbui-g  it  D.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  I-jI,  10  S. 
E.  12. 

63  9  Kreider  v.  Lancaster.  10.  iV:  M,  Turnpike  Co.,  1(12  Pa.  St.  537,  29  Atl.  721; 
Trowbridge's  Adm'r  v.  Danville  Street  Car  Co.  i  Va.j  19  S.  E.  7S0:  Baltzer  v. 
Chicago,  M.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  S3  AVis.  4.7.),  .jo  X.  W.  ss.-,;  Dublin,  W.  &  W.  11.  Co.  v. 
Slattery,  3  App.  Cas.  1155. 

6-1"  Georgia  Railroad  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Rhodes,  50  Ga.  (U.'j;  Stephenson  v. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.,  102  Cal.  143,  34  Pac.  G18,  and  ;!G  Pac.  4i)7;  Louisville  &  X. 
R.  Co.  V.  Rains  (Ky.)  23  S.  W.  505;  Haney  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.,  38  W. 
Va.  570,  18  S.  E.  748;  Eckert  v.  Railroad  Co.,  43  X.  Y.  5n2;  Simmons  v.  East 
Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.,  '.)2  Ga.  (i5S,  18  S.  E.  999.  So  jumping  out  of  room 
on  account  of  fire  makes  contributoiy  negligence  a  question  for  the  jm-y.  fJijr- 
man  v.  McArdle,  67  Huu,  4f-'4.  22  X.  Y.  Supii.  479.  So  as  to  natural  gas  bm-n- 
ing  plaiutilt's  house.  Stouyliton  v.  Manufacturers'  Xatural  Gas  Co.,  159  Pa. 
St.  04  28  Atl.  227.  Losing  hold  of  hand  ear  in  sudden  danger  not  contiibu- 
tory  negligence.     Clarke  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  31  X.  E.  SOs,  l.-!2  Ind.  19;i. 

041  Spauldiug  v.  W.  N.  Flynt  Granite  Co.,  159  Mass.  O.sT.  34  X.  E.  1134;  Hass 


NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.   12 

collision,  or  other  danger,**^  he  is  not  guilty  of  contributory  negli- 
gence, and  the  act  will  not  bar  his  recovery.  Or  if  a  woman  in 
terror  spring  aside  to  avoid  a  threatened  danger  from  an  express 
wagon,  and  injures  herself  against  a  wall,  she  can  recover,  although 
she  would  have  received  no  injury,  had  she  remained  passive  on  the 
sidewalk. °^^  But  the  sudden  peril  which  will  excuse  what  would 
otherwise  be  contributory  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff 

Y.  Chicago.  M.  &  St.  P.  K.  Co.  (Iowa)  57  N.  ^^■.  .s:)4.  Though  a  flagman  may 
have  sig'naled  per.sons  in  a  carriage^to  advance  over  tlie  crossing,  yet  on  dis- 
covering a  train  almost  ou  the  ci-ussing,  and  the  carriage  coming  in  disregard 
of  it,  he  is  not  negligent  in  stoispiug  the  horse  by  any  means  in  his  power, 
even  if  in  doing  so  ho  frighten  the  horse, — a  thing  which,  with  cooler  judg- 
ment, he  might  have  avoided.  Floyd  v.  Philadelphia  &  K.  R.  Co.,  162  Pa.  St. 
29,  20  Atl.  396.  So.  in  crossing  a  street,  failure  to  take  the  best  course  is  not 
contributory  negligence.     Cro\Yloy  v.  Strouse  (Cal.)  33  Fac.  456. 

6*2  Piper  V.  Minneapolis  St.  Ry.  Co.,  52  Minn.  269,  53  N.  W.  1060. 

e*3  Coulter  v.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  50  N.  Y.  585.  And  see  Richmond  &  D.  R. 
Co.  V.  Farmer,  97  Ala.  141,  12  South.  86.  l-^m-ther,  as  to  increasing  peril  by 
effort  to  avoid.  Gibbons  v.  Wilkesbarre  St.  R.  Co.,  155  Pa.  St.  279,  26  Atl.  417; 
Dunham  Towing  &  Wrecking  Co.  v.  Dandelin,  41  HI.  App.  175  (affirmed  143 
111.  409,  32  N.  E.  258,  but  not  on  this  point).  But  see  Graetz  v.  McKenzie,  9 
\A'ash.  696,  35  Pac.  377.  Where  a  passenger  on  a  sti'eet-railway  car  is 
brought  into  apparent  imminent  danger  from  a  colhsion  at  a  railroad  cross- 
ing by  the  negligence  of  the  motoi'-man  in  attempting  to  cross  where  he  could 
see  that  there  was  a  probability  of  the  engine  reaching  there  first,  she  can 
recover  for  injuries  received  in  attempting  to  flee  from  it,  though  she  would 
have  been  uninjured  if  she  had  kept  her  seat;  but,  if  the  car  would  not  have 
been  brought  into  such  danger  except  for  the  sudden,  unexpected,  and  un- 
anticipated obstruction  by  a  wagon,  then  there  would  be  no  liability  on 
the  part  of  the  company.  Shanlienbery  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ry.  Co.,  40  Fed.  177. 
If  plaintiff,  trying  to  escape  a  kicking  mule,  jumps  into  an  excavation  render- 
ing the  street  dangerous,  to  defendant's  knowledge,  plaintiff  can  recover  for 
eonsequent  damages.  Bassett  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  53  Mo.  290.  Contra, 
:Moulton  V.  Inhabitants  of  Sandford,  51  :Me.  127;  Liermann  v.  Chicago,  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  82  Wis.  286,  52  N.  W.  91;  Robinson  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  25 
N.  Y.  Supp.  91;  Jleugcr  v.  Lauer,  55  N.  J.  Law,  205,  2(;  Atl.  ISO.  But  com- 
pare Watson  V.  Camden  <!i  A.  R.  Co.,  55  N.  J.  Law,  125,  21  Atl.  136.  Approach 
of  a  train  at  a  crossing  is  a  distracting  circumstance  for  the  jury  to  consider 
in  determining  whether  or  not  plaintiff  acted  prudently.  Loucks  v.  Chi- 
cago, M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  31  Minn.  526,  IS  N.  W.  651.  So  jumping  off  car 
in  motion,  which  had  run  off  the  track,  would  not  be  a  new,  independent 
eausi'  between  derailment  and  injmy.  Smith  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co., 
Ui  I  Minn.  169,  14  N.  W.  797. 


Ch.  12]  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE.  969 

must  ordinarily  have  been  caused  by  the  action  of  the  defendant,  and 
not  of  a  third  person. »*■'  However,  negligence  cannot  be  imputed  by 
law  to  a  person  in  his  effort  to  save  the  life  of  another  in  extrt-m' 
peril,  unless  made  under  such  circumstances  as  to  constitute  ra-^h- 
ness,  in  the  judgment  of  prudent  persons.^"  Such  exception  to 
ordinary  liability  for  failure  to  avoid  harm  does  not  exist  where  a 
person  voluntarily  and  negligently  brings  an  injury  on  himself,  or 
puts  himself  in  a  place  of  danger."*"'  But,  where  the  negligence 
complained  of  resulted  in  death,  the  natural  in.stinct  of  avoiding 
hai-m  is  a  proper  consideration  for  the  jury.'^*^ 

Avoiding  Urmecemi ry  Damage  After  Ivjury. 

After  injury  has  occurred  because  of  the  defendant's  negligence, 
the  plaintiff  must  take  care  to  avert  what  harm  he  can,  and,  if  he 
fails  so  to  do,  his  own  carelessness  becomes  an  efficient  cause,  and  he, 
and  not  the  defendant,  should  suffer  for  such  subsequent  negligence. 
Therefore,  in  an  action  to  recover  damages  done  to  the  plaintiff's 
premises  by  fire  alleged  to  have  been  negligently  started  on  the  de- 
fendant's land,  it  apj^earing  that  the  plaintiff  discovered  the  fire 
shortly  after  it  reached  his  premises,  and  neglected  to  extinguish  it, 
though  he  could  have  done  so,  it  was  held  that  he  had  no  right  to 
neglect  the  obvious  means  of  lessening  the  damage,  and  that  he  could 
not  recover  for  any  loss  sustained  by  the  tire  subsequent  to  the  time 
he  had  discovered  it  and  neglected  to  extinguish  it.°*^  In  an  action 
for  personal  injury  the  defendant  may  show  that  the  injury  was  en- 
hanced by  the  plaintiff's  continued  use  of  intoxicating  liquors, "^^  or 

644  Trowbridge's  Adm'r  v.  Danville  Sti-eet-Car  Co.  {Ya.)  19  S.  B.  780. 

645  Ackert  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  43  N.  Y.  502.  And  see  Spooner  v.  Dela- 
ware, L.  &  W.  E.  Co.,  115  N.  Y.  22,  21  N.  E.  698;  Linnehan  v.  Sampson,  12C 
:^Iass.  506;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Honey,  80  Ind.  453;  Cottrill  v.  Chicago,  M.  & 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  47  Wis.  034,  3  N.  ^Y.  376;  Simmons  v.  East  Tennessee,  V.  & 
G.  Ry.  Co.,  92  Ga.  658,  18  S.  E.  999;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Langendorf,  48  Ohio 
St.  316,  28  N.  E.  172;    Gibney  r.  State,  137  N.  Y.  1,  33  N.  E.  142. 

646  Vreeland  v.  Chica.L:i.),  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  60  N.  "\V.  .j42. 

647  Hopkinson  v.  Knapp  &  Spaulding  Co.  (Iowa)  60  N.  W.  i;53. 

648  TaUey  v.  Com-ter,  1>:!  Mich.  473,  53  N.  "W.  021.  And  see  Hogle  v.  New 
York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  28  Hun,  363;  Loker  v.  Damon,  17  Pick.  284  (fail- 
ure to  close  opening  in  plaintiff's  fence  made  by  defendant);  Krum  v.  An- 
thony, 115  Pa.  St.  431,  8  Atl.  508. 

640  Boggess  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ry.  Co.,  118  Mo.  328,  23  S.  W.  159,  and  24 
S.  W.  210. 


970  NEGLIGEXCE.  [Ch.    12 

that  the  plaintiff's  imprudenci'  cansinl  new  injury.""  Moreover,  the 
plaintiff's  subsequent  Mrong,  if  it  does  not  bar  recovery,  may  miti- 
gate damages.^  ^^ 

Xo  Duty  to  Anticipate  Negligence. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  law  recognizes  no  duty  to  anticipate  the 
negligence  of  others.  The  presumption  is  that  every  person  y\\\\  per- 
form the  duty  enjoined  by  law  or  imposed  by  contract.""  Therefore, 
a  repairer  has  the  right  to  rely  upon  compliance  with  an  ordinance 
requiring  insulation  of  wires,  and  is  bound  to  look  for  patent  defects 

650  Carpenter  v.  McDavitt,  53  Mo.  App.  393.  And  see  City  of  Galesbnig  v. 
Ralin,  45  111.  App.  351,  where  plaintiff,  not  a  physician,  undertook  to  treat  her- 
self. Childs  V.  Xew  York,  O.  &  W.  Ky.  Co.,  77  Hun,  589,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  894. 
In  an  action  for  personal  injuries  the  court  properly  refused  to  direct  the  jury 
to  disregard  the  testimony  of  plaintiff  that  slie  did  not  procure  medical  attend- 
ance because  her  husband  was  out  of  employment.  Feather  v.  City  of  Read- 
lug,  I.")."!  Pa.  St.  1S7,  26  Atl.  212.  And  see  Alexander  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co., 
112  N.  0.  720,  16  S.  E.  896.  A  patient  is  guilty  of  contributory  negligence  if 
he  fail  to  follow  treatment  and  directions.  Potter  v.  Warner,  91  Pa.  St.  362; 
Geiselman  v.  Scott,  25  Ohio  St.  80.  So,  if  he  negligently  throw  off  splints  and 
walk  on  crutches.    Hichcock  r.  Burgett,  38  ilich.  ."i(il. 

651  Lurch  V.  Holder  (N.  J.  Ch.)  27  Atl.  81  (failure  to  use  remedy  for  black 
rot);  Burger  v.  St.  Louis,  K.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  52  Mo.  App.  119  (where  defend- 
ant could  not  diminish  damage  by  showing  breach  of — alleged,  but  not  found — 
duty  of  utilizing  carcassies  of  animals  for  killing  of  which  the  act  was  brought). 
If  plaintiff  can  remedy  defect  in  machinery,  and  does  not,  he  cannot  comijlain. 
Frick  Co.  v.  Falk,  50  Kan.  644,  32  Pac.  360.  But  not  if  plaintiff  could  only^^ 
remedy  by  committing  a  wrong  (as  abating  ditch  by  going  on  third  person's 
land).  Fromm  v.  Ide,  68  Hun,  310,  23  X.  Y.  Supp.  56.  And  see  Pennsylvania 
R.  Co.  V.  Washburn,  50  Fed.  335  (failure  to  remove  cargo  from  careened  boat 
because  stevedores  demanded  double  wages);  Childs  v.  New  York,  O.  &  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  77  Hun,  539,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  894  (where  plaintiff,  caused  to  alight  by 
defendant's  negligence  at  wrong  place,  walked  to  destination,  although  she 
could  have  found  a  place  to  stay  all  night,  she  cannot  recover  for  injury  to 
her  health).     Cf.  Schumaker  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  46  Jlinn.  39,  48  N.  W.  SCO. 

652  It  was  said  in  Engel  v.  Smith,  82  Jlich.  1,  4fi  X.  AV.  Rep.  21,  that  "it  is  a 
sound  rule  of  law  tliat  it  is  not  contributory  ucKliy<'nce  not  to  look  out  for 
danger  where  there  is  no  reason  to  apprehend  any."  In  Thomas  v.  Railway 
Co.,  8  Fed.  729,  it  was  held  that  "it  was  correct  to  instruct  the  jury  that 
plaintiff  had  a  right  to  assume  that  the  defendant  would  use  more  care,  in 
view  of  the  obstructed  condition  of  the  crossing,  than  ordinary.  The  law  will 
never  hold  it  imprudent  in  any  one  to  act  upon  the  presumption  that  anothci", 
in  his  conduct,  will  act  in  accordance  with  the  rights  and  duties  of  both,"— cit- 


Ch.    12]  CONTnjIBDTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  971 

Qj2]y_653  Qjj  |-]jg  game  principle,  a  teamster  has  a  right  to  assume 
that  an  engine  driver  will  use  ordinary  care.''^*  Even  children  are 
presumed  to  know  of  statutory  duty.  A  boy  of  10  is  presumed  to 
know  of  the  statutory  duty  of  a  railway  company  to  keep  a  crossing 
in  safe  condition." ^^  He  may  act  on  conventional  invitation  to  go 
over  a  public  crossing.''-^" 

373.  In  order  that  the  plaintiff's  contributory  negligence 

may  bar  his  recovery,  it  must  be  connected  as  at 
least  a  part  of  the  legal  cause  of  the  damage.*"' 

374.  There  ma7  be  a   recovery,  notwithstanding   mutual 

negligence  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  and  the  de- 
fendant— 

(a)  If  the   injury  -would   have   happened    although  the 

plaintiff  had  been  in  no  wise  negligent; 

(b)  If  the  defendant,  after  he  has  discovered  the  danger 

to  w^hich  the  plaintiff  is  exposed  by  his  ow^n  negli- 
gence, refuses  or  neglects  to  exercise  due  care,  un- 
der the  circumstances,  to  avoid  harm."^ 

ing  Newson  v.  Raili-oad  Co.,  29  N.  Y.  .383:  LuUly  v.  Railway,  40  Mo.  507; 
Langhoff  V.  Railroad  Co.,  19  Wis.  51.5;  Hegau  v.  Railway  Co.,  15  N.  Y.  383; 
Pennsylvauia  R.  Co.  v.  Ogier,  35  Pa.  St.  60-72;  Garrett  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co. 
(Iowa)  58  N.  W.  lOlyi;  Gee  v.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  101;  Wyatt 
V.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.,  6  Best  &  S.  709;   Cooley,  Torts,  050-661. 

853. Clements  v.  Louisiana  Electric  Light  Co.,  44  La.  Ann.  692,  11  SoutJh.  5i. 
Of.  Haynes  v.  Raleigh  Gas  Co.,  114  X.  O.  203,  19  S.  E.  344. 

8  54Hobson  V.  New  Me.xieo  it  A.  R.  Co.  (Ariz.)  11  Pac.  545;  Northeastern  R. 
Co.  V.  WanU'ss.  L.  R.  7  H.  L.  12-15;  Dublin,  W.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Slattery,  3 
App.  Cas.  1155;  Bridges  v.  North  Loudon  R.  Co.,  7  H.  L.  Cas.  213;  Praeger 
V.  Bristol  &  E.  R.  Co.,  24  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  105. 

665  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Red,  47  111.  App.  002. 

656  Applied  to  a  boy  ut  13,  crossing  over  bumpers.  Faulk  v.  Central  R.  &  B. 
Co.,  91  Ga.  soil,  IS  S.  E.  3ii4. 

657  Missouri  rae.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Moscley,  6  0.  C.  A.  641,  57  Fed.  925. 

658  ran-ico  V.  West  Yirgiuia  Cent.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  35  AV.  Va.  .",SI1,  14  S.  E.  12. 
This  statement  of  the  rule  is  selected  because  its  clearness  overbalances  its 
Inaccuracy  or  incompetency. 


972  NEGLIGENCE.  [Oil.    12 

The  requirement  that  contributory  negligence,  to  bar  the  right  of 
action,  must  be  the  proximate  cause,  without  which  the  damage 
would  not  have  occurred,  is  the  logical  application  of  the  general 
principle  that  the  plaintilf's  wrongdoing,  in  order  to  disentitle  him 
to  recover,  must  be  the  cause,  in  law,  of  the  damage.  If  the  wrong 
be  merely  collateral,  it  does  not  affect  the  right  to  legal  redress. 
Thus,  it  would  be  manifestly  absurd  to  hold  that  if  a  passenger  was 
sitting  with  his  arm  out  of  a  window,  and  the  injury  inflicted  would 
have  been  just  the  same  if  his  elbow  had  been  inside  of  the  window, 
he  could  not  recover,  on  account  of  his  position."^^  So,  if  one  be  negli- 
gent in  boarding  a  moving  train,  this  does  not  affect  his  right  to  re- 
cover for  damages  consequent  upon  the  violence  of  the  brakeman  in 
pushing  him  off  the  car.°°"  And  a  surgeon  called  to  set  a  leg  care- 
lessly broken  will  not  be  heard  to  say,  in  an  action  for  his  own  care- 
lessness in  treating  his  patient,  that  the  latter's  negligence  in  break- 
ing his  leg  caused  the  crooked  or  shortened  limb.""^  On  the  other 
hand,  a  person  is  not  responsible  for  damages  proximately  caused 
by  any  person  except  himself-  If  the  damage  complained  of  was 
legally  caused  by  the  plaintiff,  he  must  bear  it,  as  the  consequence 
of  his  own  act.     In  such  a  case,  and  in  case  the  damage  was  caused 

659  2  Wood,  Ry.  Law,  12.-,7;  Gulf,  0.  &  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Danshank,  6  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  385,  25  S.  W.  295;  Caivico  v.  AVest  Virginia,  Cent.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  39 
W.  Va.  86,  19  S.  E.  571.  Ttie  siime  principle  applies  to  intoxicated  persons. 
Ante,  p.  1C5.  "Wrongdoer."  Et  vide  Loftus  v.  Inhabitants  of  North  Adams, 
160  Mass.  161,  35  N.  E.  674;  Ward  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  85  Wis. 
601,  55  N.  W.  7T1.  Cf.  Brad^ell  v.  Pittsburgh  &  W.  E.  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  153  Pa. 
St.  105,  25  Atl.  623;  Buddenberg  v.  Charles  P.  Chouteau  Transp.  Co.,  108  Mo. 
394,  18  S.  W.  970.  So,  riding  on  baggage  car  (Jacobus  v.  St.  Paul  &  C.  E.  Co., 
20  Minn.  125,  Gil.  110),  or  on  a  street-car  platform  (Matz  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry. 
Co.,  52  Minn.  159,  53  N.  W.  1071),  may  be  forbidden,  but  are  not  necessarily 
contributory  negligence  (Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  89  Va.  749,  17  S.  B. 
132;   Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Pearson,  97  Ala.  211,  12  South.  176). 

000  Reed  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  56  Fed.  1S4.  Et  vide  Gale  v.  Lisbon,  52  N. 
H.  174;  Smith  v.  Conway,  121  Mass.  216;  Spofford  v.  Harlow,  3  Allen,  176; 
Welch  V.  Wesson,  6  Gray,  505.  As  to  fire  as  a  remote  cause,  see  Atchison, 
T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  V.  Bales,  16  Kan.  252;  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Stan- 
ford, 12  Kan.  354;   Doggett  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  78  N.  C.  305. 

601  Lannen  v.  Albany  Gaslight  Co.,  44  N.  Y.  459^63;  Hibbard  v.  Thomp- 
son, 100  Mass.  286-289.  And  see  Bartlett  v.  Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  117  Mass. 
533;   Clayards  v.  Dethick,  L.  R.  12  Q.  B.  439^95. 


^^-    '^]  CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  973 

by  a  third  person,<'«=  the  defendant  is  not  a  legal  canse,  and  cannot 
be  logically  held  responsible. 

Avoidable  Consequencen — English  Rule. 

In  Davies  v.  Mann,''^^  the  plaintiff  negligently  allowed  his  fettered 
donkey  to  be  in  a  highway,  and  the  defendant's  wagon  was  driven  in 
broad  daylight  over  the  donkey.    The  defendant  was  held  to  be  aware 
of  the  plaintiff's  negligence;  but,  as  his  rate  of  speed  was  improper, 
he  was  held  liable  for  damages,  notwithstanding  the  plaintiff's  neg- 
ligence in  allowing  the  animal  to  run  at  large.      This  case,  while 
criticised,'"'*  seems  to  be  a  simple  and  logical  application  of  the 
principle  of  proximate  cause.""^     Tliere  is  uo  necessary,  although 
there  may  be  an  imaginary,  inconsistency  between  the  case  and 
Butterfield  v.  Forrester."""     Here  a  person  riding  violently  down  a 
street  in  daylight  was  injured  by  coming  in  contact  with  a  pole 
placed  across  the  street.     It  was  held,  in  an  action  against  the 
owner  of  the  pole,  that  the  plaintiff  could  not  recover  because  he 
might  have  evaded  the  consequence  of  the  owner's  negligence.     In 
Tuff  V.  Warman,""^  a  barge  negligently  operated  without  a  lookout 
was  run  down  by  a  steamer.      It  was  distinctly  held  that  the  plain- 
tiff's negligence  would  not  prevent  his  recovery,  unless  it  be  such 

'•«2  Arey  v.  City  of  Newton,  148  Mass.  598.  20  N.  E.  327,  and  cases  cited  page 
602.  lis  Mass.,  and  page  327,  20  N.  E. 

lis 3 10  ilees.  &  W.  546.     See  State  v.  Sauer  (N.  J.  Sup.)  26  Atl.  18(i;    Stiles 
V.  Geesey,  71  Pa.  St.  430. 

"8*  Mr.  Beach  (Contrib.  Neg.  §  5)  coasiders  tliis  a  persistent  and  misehiet- 
making  autliority. 

66  5  The  shallowness  of  this  criticism  is  manifest  in  the  opinion  of  Carpen- 
ter, J.,  in  Nashua,  I.  &  S.  Co.  v.  Worcester  &  N.  R.  Co.,  62  N.  H.  159.  "This 
case  has  been  much  misunderstood  and  maligned,  and  its  principles  put  to 
very  unjust  uses  and  applications.  Analysis  of  it  will  demonstrate  the  pei- 
fect  soundness  of  its  reasoning,  and  the  validity  of  the  principle  there  laid 
down."  Priest,  District  Judge,  in  Kirtley  v.  Railway  Co.,  65  Fed.  .386.  In 
this  case  it  was  held  that  recovery  cannot  be  had  for  a  pei-son  killed  on  a 
track,  where  the  engineer  did  not  discover  him  in  time  to  prevent  the  acci- 
dent, though  by  ordinary  care  he  might  have  done  so,  deceased  being  negli- 
gent. 
686  11  East,  60;  Day  v.  .Highland  St.  Ry.  Co.,  135  Mass.  113. 
ii87  2  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  740,  o  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  573,  and  27  Law  .1.  C.  P.  322.  Cf. 
Murphy  v.  Deane,  101  Mass.  45."i,  466.  And  see  Horrigan  v.  Inhabitants  of 
Clarksburg,  150  Mass.  218-220.  22  N.  E.  897,  and  Pierce  v.  Cunard  S.  S.  Co.. 
153  Mass.  87-89,  26  N.  E.  415. 


974  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

that,  without  it,  the  harm  complained  of  could  not  have  happened; 
"nor  if  the  defendant,  by  the  exercise  of  care  on  his  part,  might 
have  avoided  the  consequence  of  the  negligence  or  carelessness  of 
the  plaintiff."  In  Radley  v.  London  &  Northwestern  Ry.  Co.,""'  a 
railway  corporation  ran  trucks  on  a  siding  under  a  bridge  8  feet 
from  the  ground.  One  truck  contained  another.  Their  joint  height 
amounted  to  11  feet.  The  driver  of  the  engine,  feeling  resistance 
when  the  trucks  struck  the  bridge,  pushed  ahead,  and  broke  the 
bridge.  It  was  originally  held  that  the  owner  of  the  bridge  could 
only  recover  if  the  accident  happened  solely  through  negligence  of 
the  engineer,  and  that,  if  both  sides  were  negligent,  so  as  to  con- 
tribute to  the  accident,  no  recovery  could  be  had.  This  was,  on 
appeal,  regarded  to  be  a  misdirection,  because  the  result  might  have 
been  avoided  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  and  diligence.  These 
leases  have  settled  the  English  rule  to  the  effect  that,  in  the  case  of 
successive  acts  of  negligence,  the  one  who  had  the  last  opportunity 
lof  avoiding  harm  by  the  exercise  of  due  care,  under  the  circum- 
ptances,  is  liable  if  he  did  not  do  so. 

Savie — American  Rule. 

The  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  held,  in  Inland  &  Sea- 
board Coasting  Co.  v.  Tolson,""'  that  any  negligence  on  the  part  of 
the  plaintiff,  directly  contributing  to  his  injury,  would  incapacitate 
him  from  recovery;  but'that  such  negligence  on  his  part  would  not 
have  this  effect  if  the  defendant  might,  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable 
care  and  prudence,  have  avoided  the  consequence  of  the  plaintiff's 
negligence.  It  was  therefore  left  to  the  jury  to  decide  the  ques- 
tion of  contributory  negligence,  where  a  steamboat  negligently 
crashed  into  a  wharf  and  damaged  a  person's  foot,  which  he  had  care- 
lessly placed  between  the  planking.  The  same  general  doctrine  is 
recognized  in  many  subsequent  cases."'" 

6  0  8  L.  R.  1  App.  Cas.  754. 

669  139  u.  S.  551,  11  Sup.  Ct.  653.  Et  vide  page  558, 139  V.  S.,  and  page  053, 
11  Sup.  Ct,  reviewing  cases.  Et  vide  3  Harv.  Law  Rev.  203. 
f  670  If  the  proximate  and  immediate  cause  of  the  injury  can  be  traced  to 
the  want  of  ordinary  care  and  caution  in  the  persons  Injured,  an  action  for 
the  injury  cannot  be  maintained  unless  it  further  appears  that  the  defend- 
ant might,  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care  and  prudence,  have  avoided 
the  consequences  of  the  injured  party's  negligence.  Lamar,  J.,  in  Grand 
Trunk  Ky.  Co.  v.  Ives,  144  U.  S.  408,  12  Sup.  Ct.  679;    Clark  v.  Wilmington 


Ch.    12r3  CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  975 

Connection  as  Cause. 

The  term  "proximate  cause,"  in  this  connection,  the  English  au- 
thorities do  not  regard  as  the  best  possible  term.  It  is  suggested 
that  "decisive  cause"  or  "decisive  antecedent"  would  convey  the 
meaning  better,"'^  and  that  "where  the  respective  negligences  are 
equal,  the  party  who  was  the  'efficient  cause'  is  responsible."  °" 
The  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  uses  the  terms  "proximate," 
"direct,"  .and  "efficient."  "=> 

Whatever  phrase  be  employed,  however,  care  should  be  used  to 
avoid  requiring  the  contributory  negligence  on  the  part  of  plaintiff 
to  have  "materially"  contributed  to  the  injury.  "Courts  are  in- 
clined to  regard  as  error  any  limitation  upon  the  effect  of  any  de- 
gree of  contributory  negligence  of  the  plaintiff  as  defeating  his  right 
of  recovery."  °^*  And  the  question  is  not  which  is  the  "more  prox- 
imate" of  two  possible  causes."' ° 

&  W.  E.  Co.,  14  S.  E.  -13;  Spencer  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  20  Iowa,  55;  New- 
port News  &  M.  V.  Co.  v.  Howe,  3  C.  C.  A.  121,  .'32  Fed.  303;  Morris  v.  Cbi- 
t-ago,  B.  &  Q.  Ky.  Co.,  45  Iowa,  29;  Deeds  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  69 
Iowa,  164,  28  N.  W.  488;  Czezewzka  v.  Railway  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  25  S.  W.  911; 
MeKean  v.  Railroad  Co.,  55  Iowa,  192,  7  N.  W.  505;  O'Rourke  v.  Chicago,  B. 
&  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  44  Iowa,  526;  Denver  &  B.  P.  Rapid  a?ransit  Co.  v.  Dwyer 
(Colo.  Sup.)  36  Pac.  1106;  Nashua,  I.  &  S.  Co.  v.  Worcester  &  N.  R.  Co.,  62 
N.  H.  159;  Indiana  Stone  Co.  v.  Stewart,  7  Ind.  App.  563,  34  N.  E.  1019; 
Tobin  V.  ^Omnibus  Cable  Co.  (Cal.)  ;54  Pac.  124.  And  cf.  Holmes  v.  South. 
Pac.  Coast  Ry.  Co.,  97  Cal.  IGl,  31  Pac.  834,  with  Overby  v.  Chesapeake  &  O. 
Ry  Co.,  37  W.  Va.  524,  16  S.  E.  813;  Pierce  v.  Cunard  S.  S.  Co.,  153  Mass.  8J. 
26  N.  K.  415;  Evarts  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.)  57  N.  W.  459; 
Keefe  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  60  N.  W.  503;  Little  v.  Superior 
Rapid  Ti'ausit  Ry.  Co.  (Wis.)  GO  N.  W.  705.  This  rule  applies  usually  in 
cases  when  the  plaintiff  or  his  property  is  in  some  position  of  danger  from 
a  threatened  contact  with  some  agency  under  control  of  the  defendant,  when 
the  plaintiff  cannot,  and  the  defendant  can,  prevent  the  injuiy. 

0  71  Pol.  Torts,  §  380. 

(1T2  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  :_;«. 

0  7  3  Case  in  note  069,  supra. 

oT-i  Monongahela  City  v.  Fischer,  111  Pa.  St.  9,  2  Atl.  87;  Oil  City  Fuel 
Supply  Co.  V.  Boundy,  122  Pa.  St.  440,  15  Atl.  Sti-I;  Mattimore  v.  City  of  Erie, 
144  Pa.  St.  14,  22  Atl.  817;  lOrie  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Grime.s,  S2  Tex.  89,  IT  S. 
W.  831;  Banning  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  '<(>  N.  W.  277.  '^t  vide 
Portman  v.  City  of  Dccorah,  Id.  512;  North  Birmingham  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Calder- 
woo<l,  89  Ala.  247,  7  South.  300. 

oTsif  plaintiff  is  on  a  track,  and  walk  on  it  without  looking  behind  hira. 


976  NKGLIGENCE.  ["^h.    12 

But,  while  tlio  authorities  are  generally  agreed  as  to  tHs  funda- 
mental lu'oposition,  in  its  application  there  is  mufli  uncertainty  and 
confusion.  There  is  material  error  in  the  common  statement  that, 
if  a  person's  injury  could  not  have  occurred  except  for  his  negli- 
gence, or  if  his  negligence  contributed  to  his  injury,  he  cannot  re- 
cover."'" His  negligence  may  be  a  sine  qua  non  of  the  damage, 
and  be  prior  to,  concurrent  with,  or  subsequent  to  the  defendant's 
negligence.  In  any  of  these  cases  the  negligence  may  be  contribu- 
tory. Jlerely  verbal  reasoning  on  such  "an  unsafe  and  much  too 
loose"  "''  term  as  contributory  negligence  has  naturally  produced  dire 
(onfusion  in  reasoning  and  adjudication.  It  may  be  a  condition, 
and  not  a  cause."'*  It  may  be  remote,  but  not  proximate.  It  may  be 
of  such  a  character  as  to  put  upon  one  person  the  duty  of  avoiding 
harm  to  another  even  though  such  other  be  a  wrongdoer,  and  al- 
though damage  could  not  have  happened  to  him  but  for  his  wrong. 
The  violation  of  this  duty  may  be  actionable. 

The  ignorance  of  the  plaintiff  and  the  defendant,  respectively,  and 
the  fact  as  to  which  one  is  in  motion  and  which  one,  or  whethnr 
both,  are  prcseut  at  the  time  the  damage  is  done,  may  also  affect 
their  relative  rights."'"     These  considerations  are  often  overlooked 

and  Is  struck  b:i'  an  euginp.  where  there  was  failure  to  ring  a  bell,  his  negli- 
gence directly  contributed  to  the  wrong.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Moseley, 
6  C.  C.  A.  641,  57  Fed.  921. 

876  In  other  words,  that  plaintiff's  negligence  bars  recovery  when  it  is  a 
sine  Qua  non  of  his  damage.  "When  a  person's  own  negligence  or  want  of 
!>!-fiiaaiy  care  or  caution  so  far  contributes  to  an  injury  to  himself  that  but 
for  such  negligence  or  want  of  ordinary  care  or  cavTtion  on  his  part  the  injury 
would  not  have  happened,  he  cannot  recover  therefor."  Baltimore  &  P.  Ey. 
Co.  V.  Jones,  95  U.  S.  439.  It  is  almost  equally  misleading  to  say  that  plain- 
tiff cannot  recover  if  he,  "by  some  negligence  on  his  part,  directly  contributed 
to  the  injury,  it  was  caused  by  the  joint  negligence  of  both,  and  no  longer 
solely  by  the  negligence  of  the  defendant,  and  that  formed  a  defense  to  the 
action."  Lord  Esljer,  in  Thomas  v.  Quartermaine,  18  Q.  B.  Div.  085.  The 
statement  of  Bowen,  J.,  in  the  same  case,  ,is  much  clearer.  And  see  Mc- 
Grath  v.  City  &  S.  liy.  Co.,  93  Ga.  312,  20  S.  E.  317;  Walker  v.  City  oiC  Vicks- 
burg,  71  Miss.  899,  15  South.  132. 

"7  Crompton,  J.,  in  Tuff  v.  Warnian,  5  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  573, 

67  8  As  blindness  of  an  unattended  traveler  killed  by  a  collision,  even  if 
escape  might  have  been  possible  if  he  had  had  his  sense  of  sight.  St.  Louis, 
1.  il.  &  S.  K.  qo.  V.  Jiaddry,  57  Ark.  306,  21  S.  W.  472. 

670  Clerk  &  L.  Torts,  380-383,  incl.  In  Butterfield  y.  Forrester,  II  East, 
60,  and  Radley  v.  London  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  1  App,  Cas.  754,  defendant  was 


Ch.    12]  CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  0T7l 


in  determining  N\Iiether,  in  a  given  case,  a  person's  ne.nligenro  is 
such  as  to  prevent  liis  recovery  at  law. 

Perhaps  the  most  philosophical  statemciil  of  the  law  of  contribu- 
tory negligence  to  be  found  is  that  of  :Mr.  Innosi^^o  ^if  r^  person  is 
harmed  by  the  negligence  of  another,  and  he  has  by  his  own  con- 
duct contributed  to  biing  about  the  harm,  he  is  still  entitled  to 
redress  from  the  other  person,  if  he  was  unable  to  avoid  the  conse- 
quences of  the  other  person's  conduct.""^  Tf  a  jierson  is  banned  by 
the  negligence  of  another,  and  he,  by  his  own  conduct,  contributed 
to  bring  about  the  harm,  and  if  he  was  able  to  avoid  the  conse- 
quences of  the  negligence  of  the  other  person,  but  did  not  avoid 
them,  he  is  still  entitled  to  redress,  if  the  other  person  was  able  to 
avoid  the  effects  of  the  conduct  of  the  person  liamied.  but  did  not 
avoid  them.*^^  If  a  person  is  harmed  by  the  negligence  of  another,! 
and  he  has  by  his  own  conduct  contributed  to  bring  about  the  harm, 
if  he  Avas  able  to  avoid  tbe  consequences  of  the  conduct  of  the  other 
person,  but  did  not  do  so,  and  the  other  person  was  not  able  to  avoid 
the  effects  of  the  conduct  of  the  person  harmed,  the  person  harmed 
is  not  entitled  to  redress."  '^^^ 

ignorant  of  negligence  of  plaintiff.  But  in  tlie  former  plaiutifC  was  in  motion 
attlietime  of  tlie  accident,  and  in  the  latter  he  wiis  not.  And  see  Nashua 
Iron  &  .'^teel  Co.  v.  Worcester  &  N.  Ky.  Co.,  62  N,  H.  159. 

680  Innis,  Torts,  c.  5,  §  123,  p.  136. 

681  Davies  v.  JIaun,  10  Mees.  &  W.  545;  ante,  p.  973.  Here  plaintiff  could 
recover  despite  his  precedent  act  of  negligence,  if  he  could  not  have  avoided 
the  consequence  of  defendant's  subseiiuent  conduct  producing  damage.  Com- 
pare Richardson  v.  Jletropoiltan  Ky.  Co.,  37  Ij.  J.  C.  P.  300.  Butterfleld  v. 
Forrester,  supra,  involves  a  precedent  act  of  defendant  and  subsequent  act  of 
plaintiff  producing  damage.  Bt  vide  Flower  v.  Adam,  2  Taunt.  314.  Simul- 
taneous act  of  a  defendant  producing  damage  to  plaintiff,  no  recovery. 
Hill  V.  Warren,  2  Starkie,  377.  And  see  Northern  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  State, 
29  Md.  420. 

682  Radley  v.  Loudon  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  1  App.  Cas.  754,  46  L.  J.  Exch.  573. 
6  83  Mangan  v.  Alterton,  4  Hm-1.   &  C.  388  (criticised  by  Cockbum,  J.,   in 

Clark  V.  Chambers,  3  Q.  B.  Div.  32);  Abbott  v.  Jlaxfie,  2  Hurl.  &  C.  744; 
Neal  V.  Gillett,  23  Conn.  437.  Cf.  Bailey  v.  Cincinnati,  X.  O.  &  T.  P.  It. 
Co.  (Ky.)  20  S.  W.  198;  Stauley  v.  Union  Depot  R.  Co.,  114  Mo,  600,  21  S.  W. 
832.  No  one  can  justly  complain  of  another's  negligence,  which,  but  for  his 
own  interposition,  would  be  harmless.  Parker  v.  Adams,  12  Mete.  (Mass.) 
415;  Nashua  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  Worcester  &  X.  R.  Co..  62  X.  H.  159-163;  State 
V.  Manchester  L.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  H.  528,  557;   White  v.  Wiuuismmet  Co.,  7  Gush. 

LAW  OP  TORTS— 62 


978  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 


SAME— COMPARATIVE  NEGLIGENCE. 

275.  The  doctrine  of  comparative  negligence  is  not  gener- 
ally recognized.  Courts  decline  to  apportion  dam- 
age according  to  the  blame. 

If  one  ii3  guilty  of  gross  negligence,  it  has  been  held  that  he  can- 
not set  up  a  trifling  negligence  or  inadvertence  on  the  part  of  an- 
other as  a  defense."^*  Therefore,  if  a  railroad  company  is  grossly 
negligent  at  a  railroad  crossing,  the  slight  negligence  of  a  youthful 
driver  will  not  deprive  him  of  his  right  to  damages."'"  But,  while 
some  cases  have  fully  recognized  the  doctrine  of  comparative  negli- 
gence, and  have  undertaken  to  strike  a  legal  balance  between  the 
negligence  of  the  two  persons,"'"  the  general  trend  of  opinion  is 

<Mass.)  155-157;  Robinson  v.  Cone,  22  Vt.  213.  If  a  patient's  own  negli- 
gence contributes  to  her  damages  as  well  as  tlie  malpractice  of  defendant,  she 
cannot  recover.  Becker  v.  Janenislii,  27  Abb.  N.  O.  45.  Accordingly,  if  a 
druggist  by  mistake  sell  one  medicine  for,  another,  and  injuries  result  to 
plaintiff  from  taking  it,  it  is  no  defense  that  a  physician  negligently  treated 
the  case.  But  it  is  otherwise  if  the  negligence  of  the  physician  and  patient 
concur.  Brown  v.  Marshall,  47  Mich.  576,  11  N.  W.  392.  Compare  Murdock 
V.  Walker,  43  111.  App.  590.  "While  this  holding  may  accord  with  the  rule  that 
the  legal  cause  need  not  be  the  sole  cause  of  the  harm  complained  of,  the 
line  is  a  fine  one.  And  it  is  insisted  in  Du  Bois  v.  Decker,  130  N.  Y.  325,  29 
N.  B.  313,  that  plaintiff's  fault  should  operate  only  by  way  of  mitigation  of 
■damages. 

■0814  Am.  &  Eug.  Enc.  Law,  367;   Bailey,  Mast.  &  S.  403. 

6  8.0  Schindler  v.  Milwaukee,  L.  S.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  87  Mich.  400,  49  N.  W.  G70. 
'Compare  Long  v.  Township  of  Milford,  137  Pa.  St.  122,  20  Atl.  425,  with 
Mattimore  v.  City  of  Erie,  144  Pa.  St.  14,  22  Atl.  817.  Bt  vide  Galena  & 
€.  Ry.  Co.  V.  .Jacobs,  20  111.  478-^97,  per  Breese,  J. ;  North  Chicago  Rolling 
Mill  Co.  V.  Johnson,  114  111.  57,  29  N.  E.  186;  Bast  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Aiken,  89  Tenn.  245,  14  S.  "W.  1082.  In  Kentucky  the  rule  applies  only 
as  to  cases  resulting  in  death.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Dick,  91  Ky.  434,  15.  S. 
W.  665. 

0  8  6  Jacobs'  Case,  20  111.  478;  Chicago,  etc.,  Ry  v.  Gregory,  58  111.  272; 
North  ChicagK)  RoUing-Mill  Co.  v.  Johnson,  114  111.  57,  29  N.  B.  186;  Chicago, 
B.  &  Q.  B.  Co.  V.  Warner,  123  111.  38,  14  N.  B.  206;  Tomle  v.  Hampton,  129 
111.  379,  21  N.  B.  800;  Willard  v.  Swansen,  126  111.  381,  18  N.  E.  548;  Louis- 
ville, N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  44  111.  App.  50;  City  of  Beardstown  v. 
Smith,  150  111.  169,    37  N.  E.  211;    Calumet  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  Martlo,  115 


fh.    12]  CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  979 

to  determine  the  defendant's  liability  by  the  test  of  i^'oximate,  effi- 
cient, or  distinctive  cause.'^"  Even  in  Illinois,  the  latest  decisions 
no  longer  recognize  the  doctrine  of  comparative  negligence." ^^  The 
true  rule  seems  to  be  that  "it  is  an  incontestable  principle  that 
where  the  injury  complained  of  is  the  product  of  mutual  or  concur- 
rent negligence,  no  action  for  damages  will  lie.  The  parties  being 
mutually  at  fault,  there  can  be  no  apportionment  of  damages.  The 
law  has  no»  scale  to  determine  in  such  cases  whose  wrongdoing 
weighed  most  in  the  compound  that  occasioned  the  mischief."  It 
has,  however,  been  held  by  the  circuit  court  of  appeals,  in  Alaska 
Treadwell  Gold  Min.  Co.  v.  Whelan,"""  that  "gross  negligence  of  a  de- 
fendant may  excuse  slight  contributory  negligence  of  the  plaintiff." 

ni.  358,  3  N.  E.  45(3,  followed  in  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Feelian.  14!) 
III.  202,  36  N.  E.  1036;  Kentucky  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith,  93  Ky.  449,  20  S. 
W.  302;  Louisville,  C.  &  L.  Ry:  Co.  v.  Mahony,  7  Bush  (Ky.)  2:;5;  Snllivan 
V.  Louisville  Bridge  Co.,  9  Bush  (Ky.)  81;  Jacobs  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co., 
10  Bush  (Ky.)  263.  The  admiralty  rule  is  to  divide  damage.  The  Max  Mor- 
ris, 137  U.  S.  1,  11  Sup.  Ct.  29.  However,  in  a  common-law  action  for  a 
maritime  tort  based  on  collision,  this  rule  does  not  apply,  and,  if  both  vessels 
are  culpable  in  respect  of  faults  operating  directly  and  immediately  to  produce 
a  collision,  neither  can  have  damages  for  injuries  so  caused.  Beklen  v. 
Chase,  150  U.  S.  674,  14  Sup.  Ct.  2i;4;   Atlee  v.  Packet  Co.,  21  Wall.  389. 

687  Ante,  p.  971.  Et  vide  Rowen  v.  New  York,  X.  H.  &  H.  Ry.  Co.,  59  Conn. 
:!G4,  21  Atl.  1073;  Erie  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Grimes,  82  Tex.  89,  17  S.  W.  831; 
(Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Thornsberry  (Tex.  Sup.)  17  S.  W.  521;  Pres- 
cott  &  A.  C.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Rees  (Ariz.)  28  Pac.  1134;  Dennis  v.  Harris  (Sup.)  19 
X.  Y.  Supp.  524;  Fenneman  v.  Holden,  75  Md.  1,  22  Atl.  1049;  O'Keef  v.  Chi- 
cago R.  Co.,  32  Iowa,  467  (iier  Cole,  J.);  .lohnson  v.  Tilson,  36  Iowa,  89;  A.  L. 
&  J.  J.  Reynolds  Co.  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  8  Misc.  Rep.  313,  2S  N.  Y.  Supp. 
734;  Boyd  v.  Burkett  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  223;  Chicago,  K.  &  N.  R.  Co. 
V.  Brown,  44  Kan.  384,  24  Pac.  497. 

083  City  of  Lanark  v.  Dousherty,  153  111.  163,  38  N.  E.  892. 

600  12  C.  C.  A.  225,  &i  Fed.  462. 


980  NEGLIGE.NCE.  [Ch.    12 


SAME— VICARIOUS  NEGLIGENCE. 

276.  The  contributory  negligence  of  a  person  other  than 
the  plaintiflF  is  a  proximate  cause  of  harm,  and  op- 
erates as  a  bar  to  recovery,  only  -when  such  person 
sustains  a  relation  to  the  plaintiff  which  makes  the 
latter  liable  to  third  persons  for  the  negligence  of 
such  other  person. 

Where  third  persons  are  inyolved  in  the  alleged  contributory  neg- 
ligence, the  plaintiff  is  not  deprived  of  his  remedy  unless  it  be  shown 
that  such  persons  and  himself  are  so  identified  by  the  law  that  their 
negligence  may  be  imputed  to  him.  Thus,  as  between  master  and 
servant,  the  same  principle  which  makes  the  master  liable  for  the 
negligence  of  his  servant  attributes  to  the  master  the  contributory 
negligence  of  his  servant  in  dealing  with  his  mastei-'s  business,  and 
prevents  recovery  by  the  master  for  wrong  caused  by  his  servant's 
negligence.""^  On  the  other  hand,  an  employ^  is  not  so  identified 
with  a  coemploy^  that  the  latter's  negligence  is  necessarily  imputed 
to  the  employ^.""^ 

The  doctrine  of  identification  was  applied  in  Thorogood  v.  Bry- 
^Q  693  (ig49)  so  as  to  hold  that  a  passenger  in  one  omnibus  injured  by 
a  collision  caused  by  the  negligence  of  the  driver  was  so  identified 
with  such  driver  as  to  prevent  his  recovery  of  damage  because  of  the 
driver's  contributory  negligence.      This  doctrine  though  subsequent- 

691  La  Riviere  v.  Pemberton,  46  Minn.  5,  7,  48  N.  W.  400.  Here  the  defense 
of  contributory  negligence  of  plaintiff's  servant  in  allowing  cattle  to  go  at 
large  availed  to  defendant  in  an  action  by  the  master  to  recover  damages  for 
cattle  which  dropped  through  a  hole  in  the  ice  made  by  icemen.  The  negli- 
gence of  a  nurse  injuring  a  child  is  imputable  to  the  parents  of  the  child. 
Schlenks  v.  Central  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (Ky.)  23  S.  W.  589. 

692  Poor  V.  Sears,  154  JIass.  539,  28  N.  E.  1046,  applied  so  that  negligence  of 
coemployfis  in  not  warning  plaintiff  of  a  falling  shaft  was  not  imputed  to 
plaintiff.  Wrong  of  children  in  vexing  a  ram  is  not  atU'ibutable  to  teacher 
whom  the  ram  attacked.  Kinmouth  v.  McDougall,  04  Hun,  636,  19  N.  Y. 
Supp.  771. 

693  Thorogood  v.  Brj^an,  8  C.  B.  115.  Et  vide  Bridge  v.  Grand  Junction  Ry. 
Co.,  3  Jlees.  &  W.  244;    Cattlin  v.  Hills,  8  C.  B.  123. 


Ch.    12]  CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  981 

ly  followed,^"*  was  finally  overruled  in  England.  In  The  Bernina  "" 
(1887)  a  collision  occurred  between  two  steamships,  through  the  neg- 
ligence of  the  master  and  crews  of  both  yessels,  and  an  engineer  and 
passenger  on  board  of  one  of  the  ships  were  drowned.  Neither  had 
anything  to  do  with  the  negligent  naTigation.  The  representatives 
of  the  deceased  persons  were  held  entitled  to  recover  against  the 
owners  of  the  colliding  vessel  on  which  they  were  not  riding. 

Lord  Herschell  said,  in  commenting  on  the  three  reasons  assigned 
in  Thorogood  v.  Bryan :  "To  say  that  it  [the  negligence  of  the  driver] 
is  a  defense,  because  the  passenger  is  identified  with  the  driver, 
appears  to  me  to  beg  the  question,  when  it  is  not  suggested  that 
this  identification  results  from  any  recognized  principles  of  law, 
or  has  any  other  eflect  than  to  furnish  that  defense,  the  validity  of 
which  is  the  very  point  in  issue.  *  *  *  What  kind  of  control  has 
the  passenger  over  the  driver  which  would  make  it  reasonable  to 
hold  the  former  affected  by  the  negligence  of  the  latter?  *  *  * 
And  when  it  is  attempted  to  apply  this  reasoning  to  passengers 
traveling  in  steamships  or  on  railways,  the  unreasonableness  of 
such  a  doctrine  is  even  more  glaring.  *  *  *  if  the  master  in  such 
case  could  maintain  no  action,  it  is  because  there  existed  between 
him  and  the  driver  the  relation  of  master  and  servant.  It  is  clear 
that,  if  his  driver's  negligence  alone  had  caused  the  collision,  he 
would  have  been  liable  to  an  action  for  the  injury  resulting  from 
it  to  third  persons.  The  learned  judge  would,  I  imagine,  in  that 
I'ase,  see  a  reason  why  a  passenger  in  the  omnibus  stood  in  a  bet- 
ter position  than  the  master  of  the  driver." 

In  rendering  this  decision,  the  English  followed  the  lead  of  the 
American  courts.  The  original  doctrine  had  been  previously  re- 
jected in  Chapman  v.  Xew  Haven  E.  Co.,"'"  and  by  the  supreme 
court  of  the  United  States  in  Little  v.  Hackett.®^^  It  was  held  in 
the  latter  case  that  a  person  who  bad  hired  a  public  hack,  and 

e«i  Armstrong  v.  Lancashire  &  Y.  K.  Co.,  L.  R.  10  Exch.  47.  And  see  Child 
V.  Hearn,  L.  R.  9  Exch.  176. 

095  L.  R.  13  App.  Gas.  1;    Chase,  Load.  Cas.  233. 

696  Chapman  v.  Xew  Haven  R.  Co.,  19  X.  Y.  j41. 

60  7  (1886)  116  U.  S.  300,  6  Sup.  Ct.  .S!Jl,— "a  decision  of  the  supreme  court  of 
United  States,  whoso  decision.^,  on  account  of  its  high  character  for  learning 
and  ability,  ai-e  always  to  be  regarded  with  respect."     Herschell,  .T.,  in  The 


982  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

given  the  driver  directions  as  to  the  place  to  which  he  wished  to 
be  conveyed,  but  exercised  no  other  control  over  the  conduct  of  the 
driver,  was  not  responsible  for  the  latter's  acts  or  negligence,  nor 
prevented  from  recovering  against  a  railroad  company  for  injury 
suffered  from  a  collision  of  its  train  with  the  liack,  caused  by  the 
negligence  of  both  the  managers  of  the  train  and  the  driver.  It  is 
the  almost  universally  accepted  opinion  that  the  negligence  of  a 
public  or  hired  carriage  is  not  to  be  imputed  to  a  passenger  who  in 
the  management  of  the  conveyance  exercised  no  control. "^^  If,  how- 
ever, the  person  being  conveyed  by  such  vehicle  assumes  control, 
and  gives  the  driver  directions,  beyonS  merely  naming  his  destina- 
tion, he  may  become  a  dominus  pro  tempore,  and  make  the  driver 
II  his  servant."""  But  one  who  rides  by  invitation,  with  an  apparently 
safe  horse,  and  a  driver  whom  he  has  no  reason  to  believe  incompe- 
tent, and  exercises  no  control  over  either,  is  not  chargeable  with 
any  negligence  of  the  driver  contributing  to  an  accident.^" °    While 

Bernina,  13  App.  Cas.  10.  This  case  settled  the  law  in  this  country,  and  seems 
to  have  convinced  the  English  judges  of  the  error  in  Thorogood  v.  Bryan,  8 
C.  B.  115.  Sanborn,  J.,  m  Union  Pac.  Ky.  Co.  v.  Lapsley,  2  C.  C.  A.  liO,  51 
Fed.  174-178. 

698  Missouri  Pac.  Ky.  Co.  v.  Texas  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  41  Fed.  316;  Larkin  v.  Bur- 
lington, C.  R.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  85  Iowa,  402,  52  N.  AV.  480;.  East  Tennessee,  V. 
&  G.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Markens,  88  Ga.  60,  13  S.  B.  85.");  Little  Rock  &  JI.  R.  Co.  v. 
Harrell,  58  Ark.  454,  25  S.  W.  117;  Bunting  v.  Hogsett,  139  Pa.  St.  363-375,  21 
Atl.  31,  33,  34;  Becke  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  102  Mo.  544,  13  S.  W.  1053; 
Garteiser  v.  Galveston,  PI.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  230,  21  S.  W.  631 
(hand  car). 

609  Thus,  a  livery  stable  keeper  is  liable  for  his  driver's  negligence,  but 
if  the  hirer  directs  or  perhaps  duly  sanctions  rash  or  careless  acts,  as  by 
forcing  a  coach  through  a, crowd,  he  is  liable.  JIcLaughlin  v.  Pryor,  4  Man. 
&  G.  48;   Holmes  v.  Mather,  L.  R.  10  Exeh.  261. 

TOO  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lapsley,  2  C.  C.  A.  149,  51  Fed.  174  (a  leading 
case),  and  eases  cited  at  page  178,  ."il  Fed.,  and  page  149,  2  C.  C.  A.;  Phil- 
adelphia, AV.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Hogeland,  66  Md.  149,  7  Atl.  105,  followed  in 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State  (ild.)  29  Atl.  518;  Metropolitan  St.  Ry.  v. 
Powell,  89  Ga.  601,  16  S.  E.  118;  Alabama  &  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  69  Miss. 
444,  13  South.  693;  Follman  v.  City  of  ilankato,  35  Minn.  522,  29  X.  W. 
317;  Board  of  Com'rs  of  Boone  Co.  v.  Mutchler,  137  Ind.  140,  36  N.  E.  534. 
But  see  Wliittaker  v.  City  of  Helena,  14  Mont.  124,  35  Pac.  904;  Johnson  v. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  139,  21  S.  W.  274. 


Ch.    12]  CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  !j8o 

there  is  some  difference  of  opinion  on  the  subji-i-t,  arising  in  part 
from  peculiarities  of  the  statutory  status  of  husband  and  wife,'"^ 
it  is  generally  regarded  that  the  negligence  of  either  in  driving  is 
not  necessarily  to  be  attributed  to  the  other.'^"^  The  original  Eng- 
lish doctrine  of  imputing  the  negligence  of  the  person  in  charge  of  a 
vehicle  or  conveyance  on  vshich  a  person  may  be  riding  is  generally 
rejected  in  America.'"^ 

7  01  Toledo,  8t.  L.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cvittendeu,  42  111.  App.  460;  Lake  Shore 
&  M.  S.  R.  Co.  V.  Miller,  25  Mich.  274  (a  level  crossing  ea.se);  Louisville,  N. 
A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Creek,  130  Ind.  139,  29  N.  E.  481.  And  see  McCuUough 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  101  Mich.  234,  59  N.  W.  618. 

702  Honey  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  59  Fed.  423  (per  Shiras,  J.).  Here 
it  was  held  that,  to  render  the  contributoi-y  negligence  of  a  wife  as  the  agent 
or  servant  of  her  husband  imputable  to  him,  the  circumstances  must  be  such 
that  he  ■^^•ould  be  liable  for  her  negligent  act  if  it  had  resulted  in  injury  to  n 
third  person.  Et  vide  Chicago,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Spilker,  134  Ind.  380, 
33  N.E.  280,  and  34  N.  E.  218.,  The  negligence  of  a  husband- who  is  di-iving 
his-  wife  over  a  railroad  crossing,  where  she  is  injured,  cannot  be  imputed 
to  the  wife.     Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mcintosh  (Ind.  Sup.)  38  N.  E.  476. 

703  Xew  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Steinbrenner.  47  N.  J.  Law.  161;  Robin- 
son V.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  66  N.  Y.  11;  Noyes  v.  Boscawen,  64 
N.  H.  361,  10  Atl.  690;  State  v.  Boston  &  M.  B.  Co.,  SO  Me.  430,  15  Atl.  36; 
Nesbit  V.  Town  of  Garner,  75  Iowa,  314,  39  N.  AV.  516;  Philadeli>hia,  W.  &  B. 
R.  Co.  V.  Hogelaud,  66  Md.  1-19,  7  Atl.  105;  St.  Clair  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Eadie,  43 
Ohio, St.  91,  1  N.  E.  51'. I;  Brickell  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  120  N.  Y. 
290,  24  N.  E.  449;  Randolph  v.  O'Riordon,  155  Mass.  331,  29  N.  E.  58:];  Ben- 
nett V.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  133  N.  Y.  563,  30  N.  E.  1149;  Cahill 
V.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  92  Ky.  345,  is  S.  AA'.  2;  Darling  v.  Passa- 
dumkeag  Log  Driving  Co.,  85  Me.  221,  27  Atl.  109;  Elyton  Land  Co.  v.  Min- 
gea,  89  Ala.  521,  7  South.  666  (a  fireman  on  an  overturned  hose  cart).  In  Wis- 
consin, however,  the  driver  of  a  private  conveyance  is  the  agent  of  the  person 
in  such  conveyance,  so  that  his  contributory  negligence  «-ill  defeat  his  action. 
Houfe  V.  Town  of  Fulton,  29  Wis.  296;  Prldeaux  v.  City  of  Mineral  Point,  4.". 
Wis.  513.  In  iliohigan  the  same  ruling  has  been  followed.  Lake  Shore  &  M. 
S.  B.  Co.  V.  Miller,  25  Mich.  274;  JIullen  v.  City  of  Owosso,  100  Mich.  103,  58 
N.  W.  603.  Where  a  person  was  killed  while  in  a  wagon  crossing  a  railroad 
track,  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  driver  of  the  wagon  is  imputable  to  de- 
ceased, who  was  blind,  and  unable  to  take  care  of  himself,  and  who,  of  his 
own  volition,  confided  himself  to  the  care  of  such  driver,  his  father.  Johnson 
V.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  404,  21  S.  W.  274.  The  con- 
tributory negligence  of  a  gripman  under  the  control  6t  a  conductor  will  not 
be  imputed  to  the  latter.    Minister  v.  Citizens'  Ity.  Co.,  53  JIo.  App.  270. 


'^'"^■1  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

C77.  While  the  doctrine  that  the  negligence  of  the  custo- 
dian of  a  child  of  such  tender  years  as  to  be  non 
sui  juris  is  imputed  to  it  so  far  as  to  bar  the  cause 
of  action  for  damages  caused  by  the  negligence  of 
another  is  recognized,  such  doctrine  -would  seem  to 
be  opposed  alike  to  the  ■weight  of  reasoning  and 
of  authority.""^ 

The  doctrine  of  identification  has  been  carried  so  far  beyond  the 
limits  of  Thorosood  y.  Bryan  as  to  take  away  from  a  child  non  sui 
juris  the  right  to  recover  damages  suffered  by  it  in  consequence  of 
another's  negligence.  In  England,  Waite  v.  Northeastern  Ry.  Co.''°^ 
is  supposed  to  be  authority  for  the  proposition  that  "they  have  suc- 
ceeded in  performing  the  dialectical  feat  of  identifying  a  child  with 
its  grandmother."  In  this  case  a  child  of  five  years  was  taken  to 
a  railroad  station  by  its  grandmother.  The  ground  of  decision  wafe 
that  "the  contract  of  conveyance  is  on  the  implied  condition  that 
the  child  is  to  be  conveyed  subject  to  due  and  proper  care  on  the 
I  art  of  the  person  having  it  in  charge."  The  needful  foundation 
of  liability  is  ^\-anting  in  this  case,  viz.  that  the  defendant's  negli- 
gence, and  not  something  else,  for  which  he  is  not  answerable,  and 
^\hich  he  had  no  reason  to  anticipate,  should  be  the  proximate 
cause.'^'"'  >Jo  English  decision  goes  to  the  length  of  depriving  the 
child  of  rearess  on  the  ground  that  a  third  person's  negligence  al- 
lowed it  to  go  alone.''''''  In  America,  however,  the  doctrine  has 
been  frequently  recognized  '°^  since  its  first  enunciation  ''""  in  Hat- 

704  1  Shear.  &  R.  Neg.  (4tli  Ed.)  §  75;  Whart.  Nejj.  §  311;  2  Wood,  Ry.  Law, 
322. 

705  El.,  Bl.  &  El.  719. 

706  Pol.  Torts,  382. 

70  7  Pol.  Torts,  383,  where  it  was  said  of  Mangan  v.  Atterton,  L.  R.  1  Bxch. 
239:    "We  think  it  not  law."    But  see  Child  v.  Hearn,  L.  R.  9  Exch.  176. 

T08  Hartfield  v.  Roper,  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  615;  Meekg-v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co., 
Z>2  Cal.  602;  Toledo,  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Grable,  88  111.  441;  Pittsburgh,  Ft 
AV.  &  C.  R.  Co.  V.  Vining's  Adm'r,  27  Ind.  513;    Hathaway  v.   Toledo,  W. 

709  Beasley,  J.,  in  Newman  v.  Phillipsburg  Horse-Car  R.  Co.,  52  N.  J.  Law, 
446,  19  Atl.  1102. 


Ch.    12]  COJSTRIBDTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  985 

field  V.  Rofer  &  Xewell.'^i''  Thus,  where  two  children,  aged  respec- 
tively seven  and  fourteen  years,  undertook  to  cross  a  railroad  track, 
the  negligence  of  the  attendant  was  not  attributed  to  the  older 
child,  and  her  conduct  was  considered  with  respect  to  the  capacity 
and  discretion  which  at  her  age  she  was  presumed  to  posses-:.  "The 
wholly  irresponsible  infant  has  imputed  to  it  without  limit  or  quali- 
fication the  conduct  of  the  parent  or  other  person  standing  in  loco 
parentis,  but  this  is  not  the  rule  of  reason  or  of  law  in  the  case  of 
the  child  which  has  arrived  at  an  age  where  capacity  and  discretion 
are  presumed." ''^^  The  "reasons  and  considerations  are  (1)  the 
mutuality  of  the  wrong  entitling  each  party  alike,  when  both  are 
injured,  to  his  action  against  the  other,  if  it  entitles  either;  (2)  the 
impolicy  of  allowing  a  ijarty  to  recover  for  his  own  wrong;  and  (3) 
the  policy  of  making  personal  interest  of  parties  dependent  on  their 
own  prudence  and  care."  ^^-  But  to  disentitle  an  infant  to  recover, 
the  contributory  act  must  be  negligent.  While  the  negligence  of  a 
parent  in  allowing  a  child  non  sui  juris  to  go  unattended  on  the 
street  may  be  a  bar  to  the  recovery  by  such  child  for  damages,  this 
is  not  true  if,  while  so  unattended,  the  child  does  nothing  which 
would  be  deemed  dangerous  or  lacking  in  due  care,  provided  its  I 
movements  had  been  directed  by  an  adult  person  of  reasonable  and ' 

&  W.  R.  Co.,  46  Ind.  25;  Lafayette  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Hn£eman,'>"  Ind.  2ST; 
Fitzgerald  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  29  Minn.  33G,  13  N.  W.  luo,  Wrislit 
V.  Maiden  &  M.  R.  Co.,  4  Allen  (Mass.)  2S3;  Stlllsou  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J. 
R.  Co.,  67  Mo.  671;  Flynn  v.  Hatton,  4  Daly  (N.  Y.)  5.52,  43  How.  Prac. 
(N.  Y.)  333;  Mangam  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  38  X.  Y.  455;  Cauley  v.  Pittsburgli, 
C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  95  Pa.  St.  398;  Dudley  v.  Westcott  (Com.  PI.)  18  N.  Y.  Supp. 
130,  overruling  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  052;  Foley  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
78  Hun,  248,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  816;  Mattise  v.  Consumers'  Ice  Manuf'g  Co.,  46 
La.  Ann.  1535,  16  South.  400  (dangerous  boiler). 

710  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  615. 

711  Louisville,  N..  O.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hirseh,  69  Miss.  126,  13  South.  244. 
Where  one  is  intnisted  by  a  father  with  the  care  of  his  minor  son,  and,  by 
reason  of  his  gross  negligence,  the  son  is  killed,  such  negligence  is  imputable 
to  the  father,  but  not  to  the  mother.  Atlanta  &  C.  Air-Line  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gravitt, 
'.)::  Ga.  369,  20  S.  E.  550;  Railway  Co.  v.  Wilcox,  27  N.  E.  899,  138  111.  370; 
City  of  Pekin  v.  McMahon,  154  111.  141,  39  N.  B.  484. 

712  Welch,  J.,  in  Bellcfdutaine  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Snyder,  18  Ohio  St.  399,  408, 
409.    And  see  Glassey  v.  Hestonville  Ry.  Co.,  57  Pa.  St  172. 


9S6  NEGLIGKXCE.  [Ch.   12 

ordinary  prudence  in  charge  of  it.  The  sole  cause  of  damage  may  have 
been  the  carelessness  of  another  person.'^^  On  the  other  hand,  howev- 
ev^it  is  more  generally  insisted  that  when  negligence  of  the  defend- 
ant is  "proven  in  a  suit  by  the  child  the  parent's  negligence  is  no  de- 
fense, because  it  is  regarded,  not  as  the  proximate,  but  as  the  remote, 
cause  of  injury.  )  And  the  reason  lies  in  the  irresponsibility  of  the 
child,  who,  itself  being  incapable  of  negligence,  cannot  authorize 
it  in  another.  It  is  not  correct  to  say  that  the  parent  is  the  agent , 
of  the  child,  for  the  latter  cannot  appoint  an  agent.  (  The  law  con- 
fides the  care  and  custody  of  a  child  non  sui  juris  to  the  parent, 
but,  if  this  duty  be  not  performed,  the  fault  is  the  parent's,  not  the 
child's."/ (To  impute  the  fault  of  parents  to  children  is  to  deny  to 
the  children  the  protection  of  the  law.^^^  /J  In  fact,  this  "doctrine  of 
imputability  of  the  misfeasance  of  the  keeper  of  the  child  to  the 

713  Wiswell  V.  Doyle,  160  Mass.  i2,  35  N.  E.  107,  and  cases  collected,  pas*- 
43,  IGO  Mass.,  and  page  107,  35  N.  E. 

714  Newman  v.  Phillipsburg  Horse-Car  R.  Co.,  ."i2  N.  .T.  Law,  446,  19  Atl. 
1102;  Lewis,  P.,  in  Norfolk  &  W.  E.  Co.  v.  Groseclose's  Adm'r,  88  Va.  267- 
270,  13  S.  E.  4.54,  and  cases  cited;  Sioux  City  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Stout,  17  Wall. 
057;  Wymore  v.  Maliaska  Co.,  78  Iowa,  390,  43  N.  W.  264;  Battishill  v. 
Humphreys,  64  Mich.  4!>4,  503,  31  N.  W.  894;  Shippy  v.  Village  of  Au  Sable,  85 
Micli.  280,  48  N.  W.  584.  The  negligence  of  sister  not  imputed.  Newman  v. 
Phillipsburg  Horse-Car  R.  Co.,  52  N.  J.  Law,  440,  19  Atl.  1102.  See,  also,  Win- 
ters V.  Kansas  City  Cable  Ry.  Co.,  99  Mo.  509, 12  S.  W.  652;  Chicago  City  R.  Co. 
V.  Wilcox  (111.  Sup.)  24  N.  E.  419;  Ferguson  v.  Columbus  &  R.  R.  Co.,  77  Ga. 
102;  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Robinson,  127  111.  9,  18  X.  E.  772;  Robinson  v. 
Cone,  22  Vt.  213;  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wilcox,  138  111.  370,  27  N.  E.  "S9D; 
Whart.  Neg.  §  312;  Patterson,  Ry.  Ace.  Law,  c.  2,  §  12;  4  Am.  &  Bug.  Enc. 
Law,  88;  Beach,  Contrib.  Xeg.  42;  Shear.  &  R.  Neg.  48a;  Deering,  Neg. 
§  28;  Bigelow,  Lead.  Cas.  72!);  Cleveland,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Keely 
(Ind.  Sup.)  37  K.  E.  406;  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Fletcher,  6  Tex.  Civ.  App.  736, 
26  S.  W.  446;  City  of  Jlurpliysboro  v.  Woolsey,  47  111.  App.  447;  Allen  v.  Texas 
&  P.  R.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  943;  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Rexroad,  59  Ark.  180,  26  S.  W.  1037.  The  negligence  of  a  custodian  is  not 
imputed  to  a  child  having  capacity  to  exercise  discretion  on  its  own  behalf, 
and  a  general  averment  that  a  child  was  without  fault  is  sufficient  to  nega- 
tive imputed  negligence  of  custodian.  Louisville,  X.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sears 
(Ind.  App.)  38  N.  E.  837.  The  phrase  "minor  of  tender  years,"  occm-ring  in 
the  declaration  in  an  action  to  recover  for  the  death  of  such  minor,  together 
with  an  allegation  that  he  was  "employed  as  a  clerk  in  a  grocery  store,  and 
earning  a  reasonable  and   substantial  compensation,"   imports   a  minor   of 


Ch.    12]  CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  987 

child  itself  is  deemed  a  pure  interpolation  into  the  law ;  *  »  *  nor 
is  it  sustained  hy  legal  analogies."  '^°  The  infant  "is  incapable  by 
himself  of  committing  any  act  of  negligence,  and  cannot  authorize 
another  to  commit  one.  Therefore  it  seems  unreasonable  to  require 
him  or  his  estate  to  suffer  loss  because  of  the  neglect  or  unauthor- 
ized act  of  his  parents  or  others."  '^° 

While,  ordinarily,  at  the  age  of  seven  years,  children  are  said  to 
cease  to  be  non  sui  juris,  and  to  become  sui  juris,  courts  are  inclined 
to  regard  the  question  as  one  of  capacity  in  fact,  and  usually  to  re- 
quire the  jury  to  determine  the  measure  of  care  required  of  the 
particular  child  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case.'^^ 

years  of  discretion,  capable  of  contributorj'  negligence.  Meyer  v.  King 
(Miss.)  16  South.  245. 

715  Beasley,  C.  J.,  in  Newman  v.  Phillipsburg  Horse-Car  R.  Co.,  52  N.  J. 
Law,  44(i-4-ta,  19  Atl.  1102. 

716  Robinson,  J.,  in  Wymore  v.  Mabaska  Co.,  78  Iowa.  396,  399,  43  N.  W. 
264. 

717  Not  attributable  to  a  boy  of  4,  Gunn  v.  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.,  36  W.  Va.  165,  14 
S.  B.  465;  Id.,  37  W.  Va.  421,  16  S.  E.  628;  6  years  old,  Buck  v.  People's  Si. 
Ry.,  E.  L.  &  P.  Co.,  46  Mo.  App.  555;  not  child  under  6,  Schnur  v.  Citizens' 
Traction  Co.,  153  Pa.  St.  29„  25  Atl.  650;  8  years  old,  for  jury,  Louisville,  N. 
A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Sears  (Ind.  App.)  38  N.  E.  837;  22  months  old.  Bottoms  v. 
Seaboard  &  R.  R.  Co.,  114  N.  C.  699, 19  S.  E.  730;  child  under  7,  Chicago  City 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Wilcox  (111.  Sup.)  24  N.  E.  419;  Wambaugh,  Study,  Cas.  246  (and 
see  note);  Tobin  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  18  S.  W.  996;  Bennett 
V.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  133  N.  Y.  563,  30  N.  E.  1149;  13  years  old, 
Merryman  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  A:  P.  Ry.  Co.,  85  Iowa,  634,  52  N.  W.  545; 
14  years  old,  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hall,  83  Tex.  675,  19  S.  W.  121;  for 
the  jury,  a  lioy  of  10,  Avey  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  (Tex.  Sup.) 
17  S.  AY.  31;  boy  of  9  yeais,  Schmit/.  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  119 
Mo.  250.  24  S.  W.  472;  a  girl  of  6,  Brown  v.  Sherer,  155  Mass.  S3,  29  N.  E. 
50;  child  of  14,  Central  Railroad  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Rylee,  87  Ga.  491,  13 
S.  E.  5S1;  12  years  old,  Hepfel  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  49  Minn.  263, 
51  N.  W.  1049;  11  years,  Wynn  v.  City  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  91  Ga.  344,  17  S.  E, 
649;  boy  of  10  years.  Lynch  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ry.  Co..  112  JIo.  421),  20  S.  W. 
642.  Generally,  see  Spillane  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  Ill  Mo.  5.">o,  20  S.  W. 
293;  Schmidt  v.  Cook,  1  Misc.  Rep.  227,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  889;  Beach,  Contrib. 
Neg.   §  117. 


•'S'^  NEGLIGENCE.  [Ch.    12 

278.  "Where  the  action  is  by  the  parent  for  the  loss  of  serv- 
ice caused  by  an  injury  to  the  cliild,  the  contribu- 
tory negligence  of  the  plaintiff  is  a  good  defense/"* 

Parents  of  children  of  tender  years  must  exercise  care  with  ref- 
erence to  the  tender  years  and  discretion  of  the  child,  to  the  family 
exigencies,  and  to  known  dangers,  or  dangers  that  might  be  known 
by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  diligence.  The  care  of  the  custodian 
of  children  has  reference  alike  to  the  tender  age  of  the  child  and  to 
any  defect  in  its  faculties.''^'  The  parent  is  not  necessarily  negli- 
gent in  allowing  the  child  to  go  in  company  of  another,  personally 
capable  of  caring  for  it,  near  a  concealed  danger  unknown  to 
both.'^"  Domestic  exigencies,  as  the  sickness  of  the  mother,^^^  or 
her  exhausted  condition,^^^  are  proper  matters  for  consideration. 
Thus,  where  a  sick  mother  sends  her  boy  across  the  street  on  a  nec- 
essary errand,  such  act  is  not  necessarily  contributory  negligence.'^' 

718  Erie  City  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Schuster,  113  Pa.  St.  412,  6  Atl.  269;  Smith 
■V.  Railway  Co.,  02  Pa.  St.  450;  Albertson  v.  Keoliuk  &  D.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  48 
Iowa,  292;  Pratt  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Brawley,  83  Ala.  371,  3  South.  nSo; 
Evansville  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wolf,  59  Ind.  89;  HufC  v.  Ames,  16  Neb.  139. 
19  N.  W.  623;  Beach,  Contrib.  Neg.  44;  1  Shear.  &  R.  Neg.  71;  Slattery  y. 
•O'Connell  (JIass.)  26  N.  E.  430. 

718  It  is  not  contributory  negligence  to  allow  an  epileptic  child  of  14  to 
be  at  large  unattended.  Platte  &  D.  Canal  &  Milling  Co.  v.  Do  well,  17  Colo. 
376,  30  Pac.  68.  But  the  jury  is  generally  called  upon  to  determine  the 
contributory  negligence  of  allowing  a  defective  child  to  go  at  large  unat- 
tended.   Lynch  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ry.  Co.,  112  Mo.  420,  20  S.  W.  642. 

720  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  McDonald,  152  U.  S.  262,  14  Sup.  Ct.  019. 

'21  Citizens'  St.  R.  Co.  of  Indianapolis  v.  Stoddard,  10  Ind.  App.  278,  37 
N.  E.  723;  McMahon  v.  Northern  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  39  Md.  488;  Atchison,  T. 
•&  S.  F.  R.  Co.  V.  Calvert,  52  Kan.  547,  34  Pac.  978;  Wis  well  v.  Doyle,  160 
Mass.  42,  35  N.  E.  107. 

722  Slattery  v.  O'Connell,  153  Mass.  94.  26  N.  E.  430.  Et  vide  Rosenkranz 
V.  Lindell  Ry.  Co.,  108  Mo.  9,  18  S.  W.  890;  Gunderson  v.  Northwestern 
Elevator  Co.,  47  Minn.  101,  49  N.  W.  694;  Avey  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A. 
Ry.  Co.  (Tex.  Sup.)  17  S.  W.  .31.  So  an  escape  through  a  door  left  open 
for  a  few  moments  is  not  necessarily  contributory  negligence  on  the  mother's 
part.  Weissner  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  47  Minn.  468,  50  N.  AV.  606.  Et 
vide  Strutzel  v.  St.  Paul'  City  Ry.  Co.,  47  Minn.  543,  50  N.  W.  690;  City  of 
St.  Paul  V.  Kuby,  8  Minn.  154  (Gil.  125). 

7  23  Cases  cited  in  preceding  note. 


Ch.    12]  CONTRIBUTORY    NEGUGENCE.  98& 

The  care  that  is  to  be  exercised  has  reference  to  dangers  customary 
in  the  given  place, '^^  and  to  other  dangers  known,  or  which  ought  to 
be  known.  But  the  parent  is  bound  to  exercise  care  with  refer- 
ence to  circumstances,  and  is  not  bound  to  anticipate  carelessness 
on  the  part  of  others.  And  if  the  defendant,  in  the  exercise  of 
ordinary  care,  could  have  averted  the  parent's  negligence,  the  infant 
or  his  representative  may  recover.^^'^  The  question  of  the  negli- 
gence of  parents  is  ordinarily  for  the  jury;  not  for  the  court.''^'  If, 
however,  the  danger  of  the  child  could  have  been  discovered  by  the 
defendant  in  time  to  avoid  injury  to  it  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary 
care,  neither  the  parent's  nor  the  child's  right  to  recover  is  barred 
by  this  alleged  contributory  negligence  in  allowing  it  to  be  at  large 
unattended.'-^  Thus  it  is  contributory  negligence  for  a  mother  not 
to  recognize  her  own  child  sitting  on  a  track  in  full  view.'^* 

724  Applied  to  jars  eustomarj-  in  coupling  cars.  De  Maliy  v.  Morgan's  L. 
&  T.  R.  K.  &  S.  S.  Co.,  45  La.  Ann.  1329,  14  Soutli.  01. 

7  26  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Slianks,  132  Ind.  395,  31  N.  E.  1111. 
Citizens'  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stoddard,  10  Ind.  App.  278.  37  N.  E.  723.  Ante,  p. 
S73,  contributory  negligence  of  the  pa  lent  as  a  bar  to  action  for  injury 
to  a  child. 

727  Creed  v.  Kendall,  156  Mass.  2'.il,  31  N.  E.  (>;  Balier  v.  Flint  &  P.  M. 
Ry.  Co.,  91  Mich.  298,  51  N.  W.  897;  Tobin  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo. 
Sup.)  18  S.  W.  996;  Meagher  v.  Cooperstowu  &  C.  V.  R.  Co.,  75  Hun,  455, 
27  N.  y.  Supp.  ,.j04;  Huerzeler  v.  Central  Cross  Town  R.  Co.,  139  N.  Y. 
49(1,  34  X.  E.  1101;  Lederman  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  165  Pa.  St.  118,  30 
Atl.  725. 

729  Gunn  V.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  36  W.  Va.  165,  14  S.  E.  465:  Id.,  37  W. 
Va.  421,  16  S.  E.  628;  Baltimore  C.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McDonnell,  43  Md.  0:i4: 
McEnery,  .!..  dissents  in  McGuire  v.  Yiclvsburg,  S.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  46  La. 
Ann.  1543,  16  South.  457.  Where  a  driver  of  a  ear,  after  discovering  a 
child  on  the  track,  notwithstanding  that  he  had  ample  time  and  opportunity 
to  avert  an  accident,  injured  the  child,  the  latter's  negligence  in  being  on 
the  track  would  not  prevent  its  recovery.  Huerzeler  v.  Central  Cross  Town 
R.  Co.,  1  Misc.  Rep.  136,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  676. 

72  9  Johnson  v.  Reading  City  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  160  Pa.  St.  647,  28  Atl.  1001. 
Et  vide  Grant  v.  City  of  Fitchburg,  160  Mass.  16,  35  X.  E.  84;  Alabama  G. 
S.  R.  Co.  V.  Dobbs,  101  Ala.  219,  12  South.  770. 


9U0  MASTER    AND    SERVANT.  [Ch.    13 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT. 

279.  Master's  Duties  to  Servant. 

280.  MastJBfct  an  Insurer. 
281-282.    AssumdBi%f  Risk  by  Servant 

283.  Ord^ty  Risks. 

284.  Ext-^fc^aCTRisks. 

280-287.  Risk  -of  Fellovif  Servants. 
288-289.  Vice  Principals. 

290-291.  Concurrent  Negligence  of  Master, 

292.  Statutory  Provisions. 

MASTER'S  DUTIES  TO  SERVANT. 

279.  A  master  o-wes  to  his  servant  certain  inalienable, 
nonassignable  duties  peculiar  to  tbe  relationship, 
based  in  general  upon  the  duty  not  to  expose  him 
to  unnecessary  or  unreasonable  risks.  The  servant 
has  a  right  to  assume  that  his  employer  has  per- 
formed these  duties.^  They  consist  in  the  exercise 
of  reasonable  care  -with  reference  to — 
(a)  Providing  and  maintaining  suitable  appliances,  ma- 
chinery, and  places  to  work. 

1  This  will  be  found  discussed  in  the  text  under  the  various  specific  .duties 
of  the  master.  For  example,  the  servant  may  rely  on  the  presumption  that 
the  master  vrill  fui-nish  safe  machinery,  and,  in  the  absence  of  notice,  actual 
or  constructive,  is  under  no  primary  obligation  to  investigate  and  test.  Chi- 
cago &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  V.  Hines,  132  111.  IGl,  23  N.  E.  1021.  Et  vide  Chicago  & 
E.  R.  Co.  V.  Branyan  (Ind.  App.)  37  N.  E.  190;  Richland's  Iron  Co.  v. 'El- 
kins,  90  Va.  249,  17  S.  E.  890;  Pringle  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  64  Iowa, 
613-616,  21  N.  W.  108;  Rigdon  v.  Alleghany  Lumber  Co.,  59  Hun,  627,  13  N. 
Y.  Supp.  871;  Helm  v.  O'Rourke,  46  La.  Ann.  178,  15  South.  400;  Granuis  v. 
Chicago,  St.  P.  &  K.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  81  Iowa,  444,  46  N.  W.  1067;  Evans  v.  Cham- 
berlain, 40  S.  C.  y)4,  18  S.  E.  213;  Banks  v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.,  40  Mo.  App.  458; 
Beard's  Adm'r  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.,  90  Va.  351,  18  S.  E.  559;  Ohio  & 
M.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Pearcy,  128  Ind.  197,  27  N.  E.  479;   Heltonville  Manuf'g  Co.  v. 


^'li-  13]  master's  duties  to  servant.  991 

(b)  Providing  proper  fellow  servants  in  sufificient  num- 

ber. 

(c)  Making  and  promulgating  rules  for  the  regulation  of 

servants  and  giving  -warning  and  instruction 
especially  to  youthful  and  inexperienced  em- 
ployes, "vpith  reference  to  danger,  -srhetlier — 

(1)  Naturally  incident  to  the  employment,  or 

(2)  Arising  from  caused  extraneous  to  it. 

(d)  Inspecting  appliaiftiis;  machinery,  and  places  to  -wrork, 

supervising  fellow  servants,  and  securing  the 
observance  of  rules. ^ 

Duties  are  Peculiar  to  the  Relationship. 

The  liability  of  the  master  to  his  servant  is  governed  by  the  or- 
dinary principles  of  tort.  The  burden  is  on  the  servant  to  show  a 
breach  of  duty  by  the  master.^  The  law  presumes  that  the  master 
has  done  his  duty.  These  peculiar  duties  apply  only  when  the  re- 
lation of  the  master  and  servant  exist.*  Therefore,  ordinarily  a 
mere  volunteer  assisting  a  servant  cannot  recover.  If  he  is  injured 
by  the  negligence  of  the  servant,  he  can  have  no  recourse  against 
the  master.''  The  assent  of  the  master,  however,  may  be  implied 
to  the  act  of  u  volunteer  in  rendering  prudent  and  reasonable  assist- 

Flelds  (Ind.  Sup.)  36  N.  E.  529;  Chicagio  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Bianyan  (Ind.  App.) 
37  N.  E.  190;   Houston  v.  Brush,  66  Vt.  331,  29  Atl.  380;  post,  p.  1003,  note  55. 

2  In  24  Am.  Law  Rev.  184,  will  be  found  an  Interesting  article  on  this  gen- 
eral subject  by  the  Honorable  J.  F.  Dillon;  and  in  a  note  to  White  v.  Ken- 
non,  39  Am.  &  Eng.  Ry.  Cas.  332  (Ga.;  9  S.  E.  1082),  wiU  be  found  a  collection 
of  cases  on  various  points.  And  see  Watts  y.  Hart  &  T.  E.  Ry.  Co.,  59  Am.  it 
Eng.  Ry.  Cas.  399  (Wa.sh.,  34  Pac.  423). 

s  Wood,  Mast.  &  S.  §§  382,  419. 

*  A  wife  living  with  her  husband  Is  not  liable  for  injuries  to  a  domestic 
servant  who,  at  her  request,  went  to  a  loft  on  the  husband's  premises,  and 
\\'as  injured  because  the  ladder  to  the  loft  was  n-^-.t  suitable  for  the  pui^pose. 
Steinhauser  v.  Spraul  (Mo.  Sup.)  28  S.  W.  620.  A  collection  of  authorities 
as  to  who  are  employes  of  a  railroad  company,  59  Am.  &  Eng.  Ry.  Cas.  120, 
125  (Pa.  Sup.,  25  Atl.  497). 

5  Flower  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  69  Pa.  St.  210;  New  Orleans,  J.  &  G.  X. 
R.  Co.  V.  Harrison,  48  Miss.  112;  Osborne  v.  Knox  &  L.  R.  Co.,  68  Me.  49: 
Mayton  v.  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.,  03  Tex.  77;  Mclntire  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bolton, 
43  Ohio  St.  224,  1  N.  E.  333;   Eason  v.  Railroad  Co.,  65  Tex.  577;   Degg  v.  Mid- 


992  MASTER    AND    SERVANT.  [Ch.    lo 

ance  in  the  mastei's  business  in  accordance  with  the  actual  or  im- 
plied requests  of  his  servants."  Conversely,  the  fact  that  the  dam- 
age done  to  a  servant  was  caused  by  a  stranjjer  or  a  volunteer,  will 
not  excuse  a  master  who  was  guilty  of  a  breach  of  duty  to  the  serv- 
ant. The  master  is  bound  to  exercise  due  care  for  the  safety  of 
his  employes;  and,  if  he  fails  to  do  so,  his  wrong  is  the  legal  cause, 
notwithstanding  the  intervention  of  some  unauthorized  actor.''  A 
substitute  hired  by  an  employ^  stands  in  the  employe's  place,  with 
all  of  his  responsibilities  and  liabilities,  so  far  as  the  master  is  con- 
cerned; and  a  fellow  servant  with  the  employ^  is  a  fellow  servant 
with  the  substitute,  though  no  contractual  relation  exists  between 
the  substitute  and  the  master,  and  though  the  employ^  alone  is  re- 
sponsible for  the  substitute's  wages.^  The  master  owes  peculiar 
duties  to  the  servant  only  when  the  servant  is  in  his  employ  and 
doing  his  work.  At  other  times  he  owes  him  the  same  duty  he 
owes  to  a  third  person  in  a  corresponding  situation.  Whether  the 
servant  when  injured  was  acting  within  the  scope  of  his  employ- 
ment and  on  the  line  of  his  duty,  or  as  a  mere  stranger,  is  ordinarily 
a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.' 

The  hours  of  labor  afford  a  material  test  of  when  the  given  in- 
dividual is  engaged  in  the  service  of  his  master.  When,  however, 
the  master  provides  trains  in  which  the  servant  rides  in  coming  and 
going  to  his  work,  the  servant  is  in  his  employ  while  riding  on  such 
trains,  and,  as  such  servant,  is  entitled  to  the  performance  of  du- 
ties due  a  servant  by  a  master,  and  is  limited  in  his  right  to  recover 

land  Ky.  Co.,  1  Hurl.  &  N.  773;  Potter  v.  Faulker,  1  Best.  &  S.  800.  But 
see  Cleveland  v.  Spier,  30  C.  B.  (X.  S.)  399;  Althrof  v.  Wolfe,  22  N.  Y.  355. 

6  Mclntire  St  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bolton,  43  Ohio  St  221,  1  N.  E.  333;  Marks  v.  Roch- 
ester Ry.  Co.,  77  Huu,  77,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  314;  Eason  v.  Railroad  Co.,  65  Tex. 
577;  Wright  v.  Railway  Co.,  1  Q.  B.  Div,  2."2;  Holmes  v.  Northeastern  Ry. 
Co.,  L.  R.  4  Exch.  2.34. 

1  Southern  Tac.  B.  Co.  v.  Lafferty,  6  C.  C.  A.  474.  57  Fed.  536. 

8  Anderson  v.  Guineau,  9  Wash.  304,  37  Par.  449. 

?  iluUin  v.  Northern  Mill  Co.,  53  Minn.  29,  5.5  N.  W.  1115;  Walbert  v.  Ti-ex- 
ler,  156  Pa.  St.  112.  27  Atl.  65.  Where  a  servant  was  injured  by  being  caught 
in  a  set  screw  which  projected  a  little  beyond  the  pulleys  and  belt,  but  was 
almost  in  their  line  of  motion,  the  fact  that  he  was  not  told  about  the  set 
screw  does  not  make  the  master  liable,  when  the  servant  knew  that  the  pul- 
leys, belt,  and  shaft  were  dangerous.  Rooney  v.  Sewall  &  Day  Cordage  Co.. 
161  Mass.  153,  36  N.  E.  789. 


Ch.  13]  master's  duties  to  servant.  99S 

by  limitations  peculiar  to  the  relationsliip  aud  by  the  doctrine  of 
fellow  servant.^" 

Providing  Appliances. 

The  employer  is  bound,  at  least,  to  exercise  reasonable  care  to 
furnish  his  employes  with  appliances  and  macliiuerv  suitable  to 
carry  on  the  employment,  having  reference  to  its  character,  the  state 
of  the  art  wliich  it  involves,  and  statutory  requirements.  Thus,  a 
railroad  company  must  exercise  care  to  furnish  a  reasonably,  but  not 
absolutely,  safe  roadbed  and  tracks,^'  switches,^-  hand  cars,^'  cars," 

1"  See  ante,  280,  "Master  and  Servant." 

iiBudict  V.  Missouri  Pac  Ey.  Co.,  123  Mo.  221,  27  S.  W.  453;  Swadley 
V.  Blissouri  Pae.  Ry.  Co.,  118  Mo.  2(;8.  24  S.  W.  140;  Drymala  v.  Thompson, 
26  Minn.  40,  1  N.  W.  2.V,:  Ford  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  (Iowa)  59  N.  W. 
5  (cattle  guard);  Muiphy  v.  Wabasli  R.  Co.,  11.".  Mo.  Ill,  21  .'^.  W.  862;  Ragon 
V.  Toledo,  A.  A.  &  N.  il.  Uy.  Co.,  97  Micb.  2G.j,  .56  N.  W.  612  (ballast);  Tuttle 
V.  Detroit,  G.  H.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  122  U.  S.  189,  7  Sup.  Ct.  1166  (sharp  curve); 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Robbins,  57  Ark.  377,  21  S.  W.  886  (switch  en- 
gline);  Kansas  City,  M.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Webb,  97  Ala.  l.'>7.  11  South.  888 
(track  under  statute);  Kansas  City,  M.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Burton,  97  Ala.  240, 
12  South.  88.     And  see  cases  59  Am.  &  Eng.  Ry.  Cas.  209. 

12  Birmingham  Railway  &  Electric  Co.  v.  Allen,  99  Ala.  3.j9,  13  South.  8; 
Mary  Lee  Coal  &  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chambliss,  97  Ala.  171,  11  South.  897;  Hoosier 
Stone  Co.  v.  McCain,  133  Ind.  231,  31  N.  E.  956. 

13  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Charless,  2  C.  C.  A.  380,  -"il  Fed.  .562  (defective 
brake);  Anderson  v.  Minnesota  &  N.  W  R.  Co..  ::,U  :\Iinii.  .523,  41  X.  W.  104. 
But  an  engineer  in  temporary  charge  of  a  train,  in  the  absence  of  any  con- 
ductor, cannot  waive  a  rule,  well  known  to  a  brakeman,  absolutely  prohibit- 
ing brakemen  from  coupling  and  uncoupling  cars  except  with  a  stick,  by 
ordering  such  brakeman  to  go  between  cars,  and  place  in  position,  by  hand, 
a  bent  coupling  link,  which  cannot  be  controlled  with  coupling  sticks.  Fin- 
ley  V.  Richmond  &  T).  R.  Co.,  .59  Fed.  420,  reversed.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co. 
V.  Fiuley,  12  O.  C.  A.  .595.  03  Fed.  228. 

14  Le  Clair  v.  First  Division  St.  P.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  20  Minn.  9  (Gil.  1);  Salem 
Stone  &  Lime  Co.  v.  Griffin  (Ind.  Sup.)  .38  N.  E.  411;  Chicago.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Linney,  7  C.  C.  A.  656,  59  Fed.  45  (coupling);  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Robertson,  82  Tex.  657,  17  S.  W.  1041  (defective  brake  beam);  Eddy  v.  Pren- 
tice (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  1063;  Graham  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  1-56  Jlas.s. 
4,  30  N.  E.  359  (absence  of  handle  in  coupling) ;  Dooner  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Ca- 
nal Co.  (Pa.  Sup.)  30  Atl.  269  (customary  handles,  ladders,  and  safeguards); 
Rodney  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  28  S.  W.  887  (defective  draw- 
head)  ;  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Kneirim  (111.  Sup.)  39  N.  E.  324  (brake  wheel). 

LAW  OF  TOKTS — 63 


994  MASTER    AKD    SERVANT.  [Cll.    13 

engines/"  bridges/"  and  other  instrumentalities.^^  Failure  to  exer- 
cise care  so  to  equip  its  road  and  roadbed  is  negligence. 

But  knowledge  by  a  master  of  the  defective  condition  of  machin- 
ery does  not  make  him  liable  for  injuries  resulting  therefrom  to  one 
of  his  servants,  unless  he  had  a  reasonable  opportunity,  after  ac- 
quiring such  knowledge,  to  remedy  the  defect,^*  and  no  action  will 
lie  against  a  master  for  damages  caused  by  a  defective  tool  where 
the  employ^  injured  could  have  obtained  a  proper  one  at  any  or 
within  a  reasonable  time." 

The  rule  applies  alike  to  animate  and  inanimate  instrumentali- 

15  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Patton,  9  C.  0.  A.  487,  61  Fed.  259. 

18  Conlon  v.  Oregon  S.  L.  &  U.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  23  Or.  499,  32  Pac.  397.  Over- 
head bridge:  Clevelandj  C,  0.  &  St.  li.  R.  Co.  v.  Walter,  147  111.  60,  35  N. 
E.  529;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Sears,  136  Ind.  400,  34  N.  B.  15;  Galveston,  H. 
&  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Daniels  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  28  S.  W.  711.  But  see  LouisvUle 
&  X.  R.  Co.  V.  Banks  (Ala.)  16  South.  547. 

17  And,  generally,  see  59  Am.  &  Eng.  Ry.  Cas.  150,  158,  173,  189,  197,  246. 
Scaffolding,  Cadden  v.  American  Steel-Barge  Co.,  88  Wis.  409,  60  N.  W.  800. 
And,  generally,  see  Painton  v.  Northern  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  83  N.  Y.  7;  O'Don- 
nell  V.  Allegheny  "S^alley  R.  Co.,  59  Pa.  St.  239;  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R.  Co. 
v.  Keenan,  103  Pa.  St.  124.  As  to  negligence  on  part  of  the  master  with 
respect  to  elevators,  see  Thompson  v.  Johnston  Bros.  Co.,  86  Wis.  576,  57  N. 
W.  29S;  Wise  V.  Ackerman,  76  Md.  375,  25  Atl.  424;  McCormick  Harvesting 
Mach.  Co.  V.  Burandt,  136  111.  170,  26  N.  E.  588.  Defective  rope  suspending 
a  tub  filled  with  coal,  Cunard  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Carey,  119  U.  S.  245,  7  Sup.  Ct.  1360. 
Negligent  adjus.tment  of  discharging  gear  provided  by  the  ship,  Cameron  v. 
Xystrom  [1893]  1  App.  Cas.  308. 

18  Seaboard  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Woodson,  98  Ala.  378,  11  South.  733. 

10  Allen  V.  G.  W.  &  F.  Smith  Iron  Co.,  160  Mass.  .557,  36  N.  E.  581;  Carroll 
V.  AVestern  Union  Tel.  Co.,  160  Mass.  152,  35  N.  E.  456.  Compare  Oellerich 
V.  Hayes,  8  Misc.  Rep.  211,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  579.  Et  vide  East  Tennessee, 
V.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Perkins,  88  Ga.  1,  13  S.  E.  952;  Binningham  Furnace  & 
Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Gross,  97  Ala.  220,  12  South.  36.  Where  the  blocks  of  wood 
necessary  for  doing  certain  work  can  be  picked  up  at  any  time  around  the 
workshop,  the  failure  of  the  master  to  specially  furnish  them  does  not  ren- 
der him  liable  for  injuries  to  an  employg,  caused  by  their  nonuser.  Hatha- 
way V.  Illinois  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  60  N.  W.  651.  Nor  is  the  master  liable 
for  failure  of  employes  to  use  enough  of  appliances  furnished.  Applied  to 
light  and  torches,  Kaare  v.  Troy  Steel  &  Iron  Co.,  139  N.  Y.  369,  34  N.  E. 
901.  Thyng  v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  (JIass.)  30  N.  E.  169;  Rawley  v.  Oolliau,  90 
Mich.  31,  51  N.  W.  350,  following  Hefleren  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  45  Minn. 
471,  48  N.  W.  1,  520. 


^'h.  13]  mastek's  duties  to  servant.  995 

ties.  The  employer  may  be  liable  for  negligence  in  furnishing  un- 
fit or  dangerous  horses  for  his  servant's  use.^"  The  fact  that  the 
employer  may  be  using  the '  appliances  of  a  third  person  does  not 
exempt  him  from  the  performance  of  this  duty.  Therefore,  who- 
ever uses  a  car  may  be  liable  for  negligence  if  its  defects  result 
in  damage,  although  the  car  may  have  belonged  to  some  one  else.'^^ 
The  employer,  hovs^ever,  is  not  bound  to  provide  the  best,  safest, 
or  newest  instruments,  although  he  must  discontinue  insecure  or 
unsafe  methods.^^     On  the  one  hand,  he  is  not  required  to  invest  in 

20  Hammond  Co.  v.  Johnson,  38  Neb.  244,  56  N.  W.  9GT;  Martin  v. 
Wrought  Iron  Range  Co.,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  185,  23  S.  W.  387.  Cf.  Craven  v. 
Smith,  89  Wis.  119,  61  N.  W.  317. 

21  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  95  Ky.  199,  24  S.  W.  1;  Spaulding  v. 
W.  N.  Flynt  Granite  Co.,  159  Mass.  587,  34  N.  E.  1134;  Eddy  v.  Prentice  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  1063;  Bowers  v.  Connecticut  River  K.  Co.,  162  Mass. 
312,  38  N.  E.  508;  Dooner  v.  Delavsare  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  164  Pa.  St.  17,  30  Atl. 
269;  Bennett  v.  Northern  Pae.  R.  Co.,  2  N.  D.  112,  49  N.  W.  408;  Id.  (N.  D.) 
61  N.  AV.  18;  Fay  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  30  Minn.  231,  15  N.  W. 
241;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dorsey,  66  Tex.  148,  18  S.  W.  444.  But 
mere  difference  in  style  of  coupling  cars  is  not  necessarily  an  actionable  de- 
fect, especially  where  carriers  are  required  by  law  to  handle  cars  of  other 
companies.  Thomas  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  109  Mo.  187,  18  S.  W.  980. 
Et  vide  post,  p.  1088.  It  has,  however,  been  held  that  a  master  is  not  bound 
to  test  the  safety  of  such  cars,  but  may  assume  it,  unless  the  contrary  ap- 
pears. Ballou  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  54  Wis.  257,  41  N.  W.  559; 
Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Smithson,  45  Mich.  212,  7  N.  W.  791.  A  railroad 
company  is  not  responsible  to  its  switchman  for  injuries  caused  by  defects 
in  a  foreign  car,  if  it  has  inspected  the  car,  and  warned  him  of  its  defects. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  B.  Co.  v.  Jlyers,  11  C.  C.  A.  439,  63  Fed.  793.  And  see 
article  by  E.  J.  Marshall,  1  N.  Y.  L.  Rev.  23.  But  see  Kohn  v  McNulta,  147 
U.  S.  238,  13  Sup.  Ct.  2'.:i8. 

2  2  Washington  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  McDade,  135  U.  S.  554-570,  10  Sup.  Ct.  1044; 
Rooney  v.  Sewall  &  Day  Cordage  Co.,  161  Mass.  153,  36  N.  E.  789;  Harley 
V.  Buffalo  Car  Manuf'g  Co.,  142  N.  Y.  31,  36  N.  E.  813;  Roughan  v.  Boston 
&  L.  Blocli  Co.,  161  Mass.  24,  36  N.  E.  461;  La  Pierre  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  Ry. 
Co.,  99  Mich.  212,  58  N.  W.  60;  Schroeder  v.  Michigan  Car  Co.,  00  Mich.  132, 
22  N.  W.  220;  Walsh  v.  "\"S'hiteley,  21  Q.  B.  Div.  371,  378,  379;  Sweeney  v. 
Berlin  &  J.  Env.  Co.,  101  N.  Y.  520-524,  5  N.  B.  358;  Steinhauser  v.  Spraul 
(Mo.  Sup.)  28  S.  W.  620;  Lyttle  v.  Chicago  &  W.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  84  Mich.  289, 
47  X.  W.  571.  The  testimony  of  experts  is  admissible.  Richmond  &  D.  R. 
Co.  v.  Jones,  92  Ala.  218,  9  South.  276.  The  jury  determines  the  question. 
Muirhead  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.,  103  Mo.  251,  15  S.  W.  530;  Gibson  v. 
Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  46  Mo.  163. 


99G  MASTER    AND    SERVANT.  [Ch.    13 

experiments.  The  utility  of  the  device  which  it  is  insisted  he  should 
have  used  must  have  been  demonstrated  before  the  law  will  require 
him  to  use  it.  Thus,  an  electric  street-car  company  is  not  bound 
to  use  a  reduction  coil  in  its  experimental  stages.-'  On  the  other 
hand,  the  employer  must  exercise  due  care  in  introducing  "untried 
novelties."  ^* 

The  master  is  bound  to  comply  with  statutory  requirements  de- 
signed for  the  safety  of  his  employes.  In  many  cases  the  statutes 
are  declaratory  of  common-law  requirements  for  the  protection  of 
servants.  Thus,  where,  in  the  absence  of  statute,  an  unprotected 
frog  caused  the  accident,  it  was  determined  that  the  finding  of  neg- 
ligence was  sustained  by  evidence  that  devices  (e.  g.  wooden  blocks) 
practicable,  reasonable,  adequate,  and  inexpensive,  were  known  to 
the  railroad  company  for  protection  against  such  danger.  It  was 
held  bound  to  use  devices  for  the  protection  of  its  employes  known 
to  it  or  ascertainable  by  the  use  of  proper  diligence,  intelligence, 
and  care.^°  This  common-law  duty  of  blocking  frogs  is  commonly 
subject  to  statutory  enactment.^" 

Providing  Safe  Place  for   Work. 

The  general  duty  of  the  master  to  the  servant  requires  him  to 
exercise  reasonable  care  in  seeing  that  the  place  where  the  servant 
works  is  safe  for  the  purpose; "''  and  this  duty  extends  not  only  to 

23  Lorimer  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  48  Minn.  391,  51  N.  W.  125.  In  9  Nat. 
Corp.  R.  143,  win  be  found  an  article  discussing  the  duty  of  a  railroad  com- 
pany to  adopt  scientific  appliances. 

2*  Applied  to  revolving  shaper  head.  Marshall  v.  Wlddicomb  Furniture 
Co.,  67  Mich.  167,  34  N.  W.  541. 

2  5  Sherman  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  34  Minn.  159,  25  N.  W.  593, 
collecting  cases.  Cf.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Baxter  (Xeb.)  60  N.  W.  1044. 
But  see  Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Seley,  152  U.  S.  145,  14  Sup.  Ct.  530;  Sheets 
V.  Chicago  &  I.  Coal  Co.  (Ind.  Sup.)  39  N.  E.  154. 

20  Holum  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  80  Wis.  299,  50  N.  W.  99;  Bohan 
v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  49  Minn.  488,  52  N.  W.  133.  Statutory  duty  as  to 
elevator  shaft,  Dleboldt  v.  United  States  Baking  Co.,  81  Hun,  195,  30  N.  Y. 
Supp.  745.  Props  for  roofs  of  mine,  Victor  Coal  Co.  v.  iluir  (Colo.  Sup.)  38 
Pac.  378;  Consolidated  Coal  &  M.  Co.  v.  Clay's  Adm'r  (Ohio  Sup.)  38  N.  E. 
610. 

2  7  Fosburg  V.  Phillips  Fuel  Co.  (Iowa)  61  N.  W.  400.  Cf.  Collins  v.  Crlm- 
mins  (Super.  N.  Y.)  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  860.  And  see  Blondcn  v.  Oolite  Quarry 
Co.  (Ind.  App.)  37  N.  E.  812,  affirmed  in  39  N.  E.  200. 


Ch.  13]  master's  duties  to  servant.  997 

such  unnecessary  and  unreasonable  risks  as  are  in  fact  known  to 
employer,  but  also  to  such  as  he  ought  to  have  known,  in  the  exer- 
cise of  proper  diligence.  Therefore  the  jury  niut^t  determine  the 
question  of  negligence  of  the  master  in  allowini;-  his  servant  to  work 
near  the  standing  walls  of  a  burnt  elevator,  where  the  walls,  de- 
signed to  sustain  direct,  but  not  lateral,  pressure,  were  in  fact  sub- 
jected to  lateral  pressure,  and,  giving  way,  damaged  the  servant.^* 
The  servant  has  a  right  to  rely  upon  the  perfonnance  of  the  duty 
of  his  master  to  protect  him  against  the  obvious  hazard  of  the  place 
of  his  work.  Thus,  where  a  car  repairer  is  engaged  under  a  jacked- 
up  car,  and  an  engine  moves  up  the  track  and  strikes  the  car,  where- 
by the  servant  is  injured,  the  master  is  liable,  although  the  act  of 
the  engineer  was  in  violation  of  rules.^°  But  a  master  is  not  bound 
to  provide  a  safe  place,  where  the  work  on  which  the  servant  is 
engaged  is  such  as  to  render  the  place  where  it  is  done  temporarily 
insecure.^" 

The  care  that  is  to  be  exercised  has  reference  to  the  danger  to 
which  the  customary  use  of  the  place  or  appliances  is  likely  to  ex- 
pose the  servant.  Where  a  brakeman,  while  descending  a  ladder 
on  the  side  of  a  car,  to  open  a  switch,  was  struck  by  a  section  house 
built  near  the  track,  evidence  that  brakemen  customarily  passed 

2  8  Pi-eudible  v.  Connecficut  River  Manuf' g  Co.,  160  Mass.  131,  35  N.  E.  675 
(platform  and  support);  Denning  v.  Gould,  157  Mass.  5G3,  32  N.  E.  802 
(same) ;  Cougle  v.  McKee,  151  Pa.  St.  602,  25  Atl.  115  (same) ;  Union  Pac.  R. 
Co.  V.  Jarvi,  10  U.  S.  App.  439,  3  C.  C.  A.  433,  53  Fed.  65  (Support  in  mine); 
Lineoski  v.  Susquehanna  Coal  Co.,  157  Pa.  St.  153,  27  Atl.  577;  Linton  Coal- 
Min.  Co.  V.  Persons  (Ind.  App.)  39  N.  E.  214  (roof  of  mine);  Union  Pac.  Ry 
v.  Erickson,  41  Neb.  1,  59  N.  W.  347  (coal  thrown  from  locomotive  tender). 
Muncie  Pulp  Co.  v.  Jones  (Ind.  App.l  .38  N.  E.  547  (large  hole  covered  b> 
rotten  canvas);  Henuessy  v.  City  of  Boston,  161  Jlass.  502,  37  N.  E.  668;  Nor- 
folk &  W.  R.  Co.  y.  Ward  (Va.)  19  S.  E.  849  (excavation).  Cf.  Victor  Coal 
Co.  V.  Muir  (Colo.  Sup.)  38  Pac.  378. 

2  9  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Triplett,  54  Ark.  280,  15  S.  W.  831,  and  16 
S.  W.  266;  Cleveland,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Brown,  6  C  C.  A.  142,  56 
Fed.  804  (falling  shed);  Fitzsimmons  v.  City  of  Taunton,  160  Mass.  223,  35 
N.  E.  549  (caving  in  of  bank);  Joliet  Steel  Co.  v.  Shields,  146  111.  603,  34  N.  E. 
1108  (falling  of  upright  steel  molds);  Vanesse  v.  Catsburg  Coal  Co.,  159  Pa.  St. 
403,  28  Atl.  2(X)  (roof  of  mine);  Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v.  Bruce,  47  111.  App. 
444  (same). 

30  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jackson,  12  C.  C.  A.  507,  65  Fed.  48. 


998  MASTEIt    AND    SERVANT.  [Ch.    13 

down  the  sides  of  cars,  while  in  motion,  to  open  switches,  was  ad- 
missible to  prove  that  he  was  not  negligent,  and  also  that  the  com- 
pany had  located  its  structure  in  an  improper  place.^^  The  master 
however  is  not  responsible  where  the  place  or  appliances  are  put  to 
an  unusual  test,^^  or  to  a  use  not  anticipated.''^ 

Providing  Fellow  Servants. 

The  same  degree  of  care  which  an  employer  should  take  in  pro- 
viding and  maintaining  its  machinery,  place,  and  appliances  must 
be  observed  in  selecting  and  retaining  its  employ 6s.^*  The  em- 
ployer is  not  justified  in  subjecting  his  servant  to  injury  from  in- 
competent,^^ unskillful,^^  dininken,^'  habitually  negligent,'*  or  oth- 

31  Flanders  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  51  Minn.  193,  53  N.  W.  544. 
Tlie  rule  that  one  who  attempts  to  cross  a  railroad  tracli  without  looking 
and  listening,  when,  by  so  doing,  he  may  discover  the  danger  from  an  ap- 
proaching train,  is  guilty  of  negligence  per  se,  does  not  apply  to  the  case  of 
one  who  is  employed  in  a  railroad  yard,  and  whose  duties  frequently  make 
it  necessary  for  him  to  go  on  the  tracks.  (Giliillan,  C.  J.,  dissenting.)  Jor- 
dan V.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.)  59  N.  W.  633.  Foster  v.  Mis- 
souri Pac.  R.  Co.,  115  Mo.  165,  21  S.  W.  916;  Goodes  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co., 
162  Mass.  287,  38  N.  E.  500;  Ford  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (Iowa)  59  N. 
W.  5.     Cf.  Galvin  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  162  Mass.  533,  39  N.  E.  186. 

3  2  Preston  v.  Chicago  &  W.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  98  Mich.  128,  57  N.  W.  31. 

33  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Dickey,  90  Ga.  491,  16  "S.  B.  212. 

34  An  extensive  collection  of  authorities  on  the  liability  of  a  master  for  in- 
juries caused  to  one  servant  by  the  incompetency  of  a  fellow  servant.  25 
Lawy.  Rep.  Ann.  710. 

3s  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Arispe,  81  Tex.  517,  17  S.  W.  47;  St. 
Louis,  I.  JI.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hackett,  58  Ai-k.  381,  24  S.  W.  881;  Louisville,  N. 
A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Breedlove,  10  Ind.  App.  657,  38  N.  E.  357;    Campbell  &  Zell 

3  6  East  Tennessee  &  W.  N.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Collins,  85  Tenn.  227,  1  S.  W.  883. 
In  five  or  six  years  a  fireman  can  graduate  into  an  engineer.  Roblin  v. 
Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R.  Co.,  119  Mo.  476,  24  S.  AV.  1011. 

37  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Newmeyer,  129  Ind.  401,  28  N.  E.  860  (drunken  en- 
gineer). How  often  a  servant  can  get  drunk  without  making  his  master 
legally  aware  of  such  habit  is  for  the  jury.  Tonnesen  v.  Ross,  58  Hun,  415, 
12  N.  Y.  Supp.  150,  151.  As  to  admissibility  of  general  reputation  for  in- 
temperance, see  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoover  (Md.)  29  Atl.  994;  Cosgrove 
V.  Pitman,  103  Cal.  208,  37  Pac.  232;  Stevens  v.  San  Francisco  &  N.  P.  R. 
Co.,  100  Cal.  5.j4,  35  Pac.  165. 

3  8  See  note  38  on  following  pa^ge. 


Ch.  13]  master's  duties  to  servant.  999 

erwise  unfit  fellow  servants.^"  He  is  liable  if  he  knew,  or,  in  the 
exercise  of  reasonable  diligence,  could  have  known,  of  such  unfit- 
ness, incompetency,  intemperance,  or  insufficiency.*"  He  has  the 
right  to  rely  upon  the  presumption  tliat  the  sevvant  will  continue 

Co.  V.  Roediger,  78  Md.  601,  28  Atl.  901;  Oliio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dimn  (Ind.  ' 
Sup.)  36  N.  E.  702;  McGuerty  v.  Hale,  1(11  Mass.  .".1,  .".li  N.  E.  082;  Hatha- 
way V.  Illinois  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  60  N.  W.  051.  Wliethm-  a  master  is 
guilty  of  negligence  in  employing  an  incompetent  servant  is  a  question  of 
fact,  not  reviewable  in  the  supreme  court.  Western  Stone  Co.  v.  Whalen. 
1.51  111.  472,  38  N.  E.  241.  An  expert  may  testify  that  a  given  person  was  not 
a  competent  foreman.  Bunnell  v.  St.  Paul,  JI.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  29  j\Iinn.  '.W'). 
13  N.  W.  129.  Evidence  of  specific  acts  of  negligence  are  inadmissible  to 
show  that  a  servant  was  Incompetent.  Kennedy  v.  Spring,  160  Mass.  203, 
35  N.  E.  779;  Connors  v.  Morton,  160  Mass.  333.  35  N.  E.  860.  The  fact  that 
the  engineer  of  a  hoisting  engine,  whose  negligence  in  mishoisting  the  cage 
caused  the  death  of  a  miner,  had  once  before  made  si  misholst,  would  not 
make  the  owner  liable  for  such  death,  unless  he  had  notice  of  it.  Mulhern  v. 
Lehigh  Val.  Coal  Co.,  161  Pa.  St.  270,  28  Atl.  10S7;  O'Boyle  v.  Lehigh  Val. 
Coal  Co.,  161  Pa.  St.  270,  28  Atl.  lOSS.  Compare  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Thomas'  Adm'r,  17  S.  E.  884,  and  Lebbering  v.  Struthers,   157  Pa.   St.   .112. 

27  Atl.  720,  with  Timm  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  98  Mich.  22G,  57  N.  AV.  116; 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Baltimore  v.  War,  77  Md.  .'>03,  27  Atl.  83. 

38  Where  there  was  evidence  that  plaintiff,  a  freight  conductor,  was  iuiured 
without  fault  on  his  part,  and  whoUy  from  the  negligence  of  a  flagman,  who 
was  habitually  careless,  and  whose  unfitness  for  the  iiosition  was  known  to 
the  defendant  long  enough  before  the  accident  to  enable  it  to  procure  some 
one  else,  the  liability  of  defendant  is  a  question  for  the  jury.  Hughes  v.  Bal- 
timore &  O.  R.  Co.,  104  Pa.  St.  178,  30  Atl.  383.  Where  an  injury  has  occurred 
through  the  negligence  of  a  servant,  evidence  that  he  was  generally  known 
to  be  unfit,  reckless,  or  unskillful  is  competent  to  show  that  the  master  was 
negligent  in  employing  him.  (51  111.  App.  512,  affirmed.)  Western  Stone  Co. 
V.  Whalen,  151  111.  472,  38  N.  E.  241. 

S9  A  one-armed  watchman  is  not  a  fit  brakeman.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co. 
V.  Davis,  91  Ala.  487,  8  South.  552.  Whether  a  boy  was  a  proper  person  to 
work  on  a  machine  is  not  a  proper  question  for  an  expert.  McGuerty  \-. 
Hale,  101  Mass.  51,  36  N.  E.  682. 

40  Xorthern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Herbert,  116  U.  S.  042,  6  Sup.  Ct.  rm.  As  to 
what  is  notice  of  incompetency,  Lati-emouille  v.  Bonninslon  &  It.  Ry.  Co., 
03  Vt.  636,  22  Atl.  650;  Cameron  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  K.  Co.,  77  Hun,  .j19, 

28  N.  1'.  Supp.  898;  Mulhern  v.  Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.,  161  Pa.  St.  270,  28 
Atl.  1087;  Craig  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  54  Mo.  App.  523;  St.  Louis,  A.  & 
T.  H.  R.  Co.  V.  Corgan,  49  111.  App.  229  (Crazy  Pete).  Knowled.c;e  by  a 
chief  train  dispatcher  of  the  incompetency  of  a  station  agent  and  telegraph 


1000  MASTER    AND    SERVANT.  [Ch.    13 

careful  and  skillful,  and,  when  notified  that  he  has  become  careless, 
he  is  ordiuaiily  not  bound  to  discharge  him  without  an  investiga- 
tion into  the  charge,  unless  notice  is  accompanied  by  such  evidence 
iis  leaves  no  reasonable  doubt  of  the  truth  of  the  charge.  A  rule 
(hat  would  require  the  master  to  discharge  a  servant,  careful  and 
competent  Avhen  employed,  without  an  investigation  of  a  charge  of 
carelessness,  would  be  a  hard  one,  and  would  often  result  in  great 
injustice  to  employes.*^  The  employer  may  be  negligent  in  supply- 
ing an  insuflScient  force  of  workmen.*  =  Thus,  it  is  the  duty  of  a 
vailroad  company  to  take  reasonable  precautions  to  prevent  its  en- 
gines being  tampered  with  or  moved  while  in  a  yard  and  unused; 
and  whether  the  employment  of  one  person  to  take  care  of  the  en- 
gines and  to  act  as  watchman  was  such  reasonable  precaution,  the 
jury  must  determine.  If  an  engine  be  left  with  fire  up,  and  water 
in  the  boiler,  the  railroad  company  cannot  excuse  itself  to  an  em- 
ploy^ damaged  because  of  the  engine's  unexpected  motion  by  say- 
ing that  it  would  not  have  started,  except  for  the  unauthorized  in- 
terference of  a  stranger.  It  is  required  to  exercise  due  care  to  pre- 
vent such  interference.*^ 

operator  employed  by  the  same  company,  but  without  authority  on  the 
part  of  the  dispatcher  to  hire  or  discharge  such  serrants,  cannot  be  im- 
puted to  the  company.  Lewis  v.  Seifert,  116  Pa.  St.  628,  11  Atl.  511,  distin- 
guished in  Reiser  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  152  Pa.  St.  38,  25  Atl.  175. 

41  Chapman  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  55  N.  Y.  579;  Moss  v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  49  Mo. 
167;  Blake  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  70  Me.  60;  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co. 
V.  Stupak,  123  Ind.  210-230,  23  N.  E.  246. 

4  2  Harvey  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  57  Hun,  589,  10  N.  Y.  Supp. 
r45.  Cf.  Georgia  Pac^  Ry.  Co.  v.  Propst,  90  Ala.  1,  7  South.  635;  Reichel 
V.  New  YorK  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  130  N.  Y.  682,  29  N.  E.  763;  Relyea  v. 
Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  19  S.  W.  1116.  If  he  simply 
use  the  usual  number  of  crew  sufficient  for  ordinary  occasions,  there  is  no 
negligence.  Relyea  v.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  G.  R.  Co.,  112  Mo.  86,  20  S. 
W.  480.  And  see  Alberts  v.  Bache,  09  Hun,  235,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  502.  Proof 
of  negligence  as  to  insufficient  force  is  not  admissible  under  allegation  of 
incompetency.  Parrish  v.  Pensacola  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  28  Fla.  251,  9  South.  696. 
Testimony  of  expert  is  admissible  to  show  whether  one  brakeman  was  suf- 
ficient to  control  sp(«d  of  gravel  train.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Novak,  9 
r    C.  A.  629,  61  Fed.  573. 

i3  Southern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lafierty,  6  C.  C.  A.  474,  57  Fed.  536. 


Ch.  13]  master's  duties  to  servant.  1001 

Rules. 

The  employer  is  bound  to  make  and  promulgate  general  rules  for 
the  conduct  of  employes  exposed  to  danger  whenevei-  the  nature  of 
the  work  demands  it.*^  If  he  fails  to  do  so,  he  will  be  liable  for 
damage  consequent  upon  such  negligence.*^  If  he  had  made  them, 
and  they  are  violated,  he  may  still  be  responsible.**'  The  servant 
has  a  right  to  rely  upon  the  obedience  to  such  rules  on  the  part  of 
other  employes.  Thus,  workmen  engaged  in  track  repairing  are  not 
liound  to  keep  out  of  the  way  of  moving  trains,  unless  the  required 
signals  are  given.  If  the  trainmen  give  the  proper  signals,  they 
may  then  go  ahead;  but,  if  they  discover  that  their  warning  was 
unheeded,  they  must  try  to  stop  the  train.  If  the  rules  of  the  com- 
pany do  not  require  such  signals,  this  is  neglect  of  duty.*'     How- 

4  4  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lavalley,  36  Ohio  St.  221;  Pittsburg, 
F.  W.  &  C.  Uy.  Co.  V.  Powers,  74  111.  341.  And,  generally,  see  Berrigan  v. 
New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  131  N.  Y.  582,  30  N.  E.  57;  Richmond  &  D. 
R.  Co.  V.  Williams,  88  Ga.  16,  14  S.  E.  120;  .\bel  v.  President,  etc.,  128  N. 
Y.  662,  28  N.  E.  (ii;:-!;  Morgan  v.  Iron  Co.,  133  N.  Y.  666,  31  N.  E.  234; 
Gordy  v.  Railroad  C(^.  75  ^Id.  207,  23  Atl.  607.  The  reasonableness  of  such 
a  rule  is  a  question  of  law.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hammond, 
58  Ark.  324,  24  S.  \^'.  723.  The  master  must  exercise  such  supervision  as 
to  have  reason  to  believe  that  the  business  is  conducted  in  pursuance  to 
such  rule.  Warn  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  80  Hun,  71,  29  N. 
Y.  Supp.  897.  Oliieers  are  charged  with  notice  of  customary  breach.  liOwe 
Y.  Railway  Co.  (iov/a.)  56  N.  W.  519.  Cf.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Hissong, 
97  Ala.  187,  13  South.  209,  modifying  91  Ala.  .".14,  8  South.  776. 

45  A  valuable  note  on  the  duties  of  railroad  companies  to  adopt  and  en- 
force rules,  and  the  effect  of  a  failure  of  an  employe  to  obey  the  same,  59 
Am.  &  Eng.  Ry.  Cas.  574. 

4  0  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Nickels,  1  C.  C.  A.  625,  50  Fed.  718;  Fay  v. 
Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  30  Minn.  234,  15  N.  "^'.  241;  Hayes  v.  Bush 
&  D.  Manuf'g  Co.,  41  Hun,  407;  Sprang  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  58  N. 
Y.  56. 

47  Erickson  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  41  Minn.  500,  43  N.  W.  332;  Moran 
T.  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  48  Minn.  46,  50  N.  W.  030;  Schulz  v.  Railway  Co. 
<Minn.)  59  N.  W.  192;  Sobieski  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  41  Minn.  169,  42 
X.  W.  868;  Anderson  v.  Mill  Co.,  42  Minn.  424,  44  N.  W.  315  (logs  on  slide). 
Failure  to  give  signals  is  not  one  of  the  usual  and  ordinary  risks  assumetl 
by  a  section  hand  on  a  hand  car,  as  an  incident  to  his  employment.  Nor- 
thern Pac.  R.  Co.  V.  Charless,  7  U.  S.  App.  350,  2  C.  C.  A.  380,  and  52  Fed. 
562.  Evidence  that  plaintiff,  a  brakeman,  who  was  directed  by  the  con- 
ductor to   go  between  moving  cars  to  uncouple  them,  caught  his  foot  in 


1002  MASTER    AND    SERVANT.  [Ch.    IS 

ever,  a  uniform  custom  may  be  a  suflQcient  substitute  for  a  formal 
rule;  as  that  only  the  person  uncoupling  cars  should  give  the 
signals  for  the  movement  of  the  train.**  It  is  the  duty  of  the  serv- 
ant to  regulate  his  conduct  with  due  reference  to  the  master's  rules, 
which  he  knows,  or  ought  to  know,  provided  such  rules  are  rea- 
sonable, and  if  he  fails  to  do  so  he  cannot  recover.*'  But  a  master 
cannot  escape  liability  for  negligence  by  prescribing  rules,  any  more 
than  he  can  by  expressly  contracting  against  liability  for  it.  Ac- 
cordingly, he  may  not,  by  rule,  provide  that  employes  must  look 
after,  and  be  responsible  for,  their  own  safety.  Therefore,  a  rule 
was  held  to  be  properly  excluded  which  required  brakemen  to  ex- 
amine brakes  before  leaving  the  terminal  station,  and  to  report  any 
found  out  of  order.^"  But  where  a  road  requires  the  signature  of  an 
employ^  to  its  rules,  calling  his  attention,  inter  alia,  to  differences 
in  coupling  apparatus,  and  to  the  danger  naturally  incident  there- 
to, and  also  expressly  allows  time  for  examination,  this  takes  away 
the  right  of  the  employ^  to  rely  on  presumption  of  performance  of 
duty  by  the  master,  and  increases  the  care  which  the  servant  is 
bound  to  exercise;  that  is,  while  the  master  may  not  contract 
against  negligence  on  his  part,  he  may  secure  additional  care  on 
the  part  of  his  employ^  by  such  a  rule.°^ 

Warning  and  Instructing  as  to  Incidental  Dangers. 

If  the  servant  knows  all  the  master  could  teach  him,  he  is,  under 
ordinary  circumstances,  entitled  to  no  warning  or  instruction  from 
the  master.^^     The  right  of  the  servant  to  assume  that  the  employer 

the  guard  rail,  and  was  run  over  and  injured  because  of  the  conductor's 
neglect  to  stop  the  cars  in  accordance  with  plaintiff's  signal,  is  sufficient 
to  sustain  a  verdict  for  plaintiff.  Alabama  Great  Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Ful- 
ghum  (Ga.)  19  S.  E.  981.  As  to  when  rules  are  not  required  by  the  nature 
of  business,  see  Texas  &  N.  O.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Echols,  87  Tex.  339,  27  S.  W.  60, 
and  28  S.  W.  517  (ties,  creosote  works). 

48  Kudik  V.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  Co.,  78  Hun,  492,  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  533;  Rutledge 
V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  123  Mo.  121,  2-1  S.  W.  1053,  affirmed  27  S.  W.  327. 

io  Post,  p.  1018,  "Assumption  of  Risk— Rules." 

50  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Orr,  91  Ala.  518,  8  South.  300. 

51  Bennett  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  2  N.  D.  112,  49  N.  W.  408.  And  see 
Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Smithson,  45  Mich.  212,  7  N.  AV.  791.  But  see 
Chicago,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Fry,  131  Ind.  319,  28  X.  E.  989. 

5  2  Hickey  v.  Xaaffe,  105  N.  Y.  26,  12  N.  E.  280.     Et  vide  Foley  v.  Pettee 


Ch.  13]  master's  duties  to  servant.  lOOS 

has  perfonned  Ms  duty  includes  the  right  to  rely  on  the  principle 
that  -nhen  he  is  placed  in  a  situation  of  danger  requiring  engrossing 
attention  the  master  will  not  without  warning  subject  him  to  other 
perils  unknown  to  him."  And  in  general  the  master  should  give 
warning  as  to  perils  not  obvious,  or  known  to  him  only,  whether  he 
actually  knew  of  them,  or  should  have  known  of  them  in  the  exer- 
cise of  reasonable  care."*  Thus,  where  a  man  is  sent  to  work  to 
undermine  a  bank  which  is  expected  to  fall  by  the  law  of  gravita- 
tion, and  where  he  was  expected  to  look  out  for  himself,  the  danger 
would  be  obvious,  and  the  master  under  no  obligation  to  give  warn- 
ing." But  where  the  work  is  such  that  the  servant  did  not  know 
of  the  danger  of  a  bank  falling  by  force  of  gravitation,  and  the  mas- 
ter's superintendent  recognized  and  intended,  but  failed,  to  guard 
against  the  danger,  the  jury  must  determine  the  question  of  negli- 
gence of  the  master.""     And  generally  the  master  is  bound  to  give 

Mach.  Works,  149  Mass.  294,  21  N.  E.  304;  Delaware  River  Iron  Ship-Build- 
ing Co.  v.  Nuttall,  119  Pa.  St.  149,  13  Atl.  or,;  Tliain  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co., 
161  Mass.  .353,  37  N.  B.  309;  White  v.  Wittemaun  Lith.  Co.,  131  N.  Y.  631, 
30  N.  E.  236;  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Uy.  Co.  v.  :\Iealer,  1  C.  C.  A.  633,  50 
Fed.  725;  Hughes  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  79  Wis.  264,  48  N.  W.  259; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Fort,  17  Wall.  553;  Dowling  v.  Allen,  74  Mo.  13;  Morbach 
V.  Home  Min.  Co.,  53  Kan.  731,  37  Pac.  122.  As  to  raising  issue  outside  of 
pleading  with  re.-iieet  to  warning,  rules,  and  providing  servants,  see  Alaska 
Treadwell  Gold  Min.  Co.  v.  AVhelan,  12  C.  C.  A.  22.'i,  64  Fed.  462;  Yeager  v. 
Burlington,  0.  R.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  61  N.  W.  21.j  (railroad  company  is  not 
bound  to  instruct  experienced  brakeman  how  to  mount  moving  cars). 

5  3  Michael  v.  Roanoke  Mach.  Works,  90  Va.  492,  19  S.  E.  261;  St.  Louis, 
A.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Triplett,  54  Ark.  289,  15  S.  W.  831,  and  16  S.  "\^'.  266; 
ante,  p.  280;  Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Banning,  131  Ind.  528,  31  N.  B. 
187. 

5  4  As  to  the  vicious  working  propensity  of  a  horse,  Helmke  v.  Stetler,  69 
Hun,  107,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  392;  Lowe  v.  Railway  Co.  (Iowa)  56  N.  W.  519;. 
a  broncho,  Leigh  v.  Omaha  St.  Ry.  Co.,  36  Neb.  131,  54  N.  W.  134.  Et  vide 
Williams  v.  Clough,  3  Hurl.  &  N.  258;   Malone  v.  Haweley,  40  Oal.  400. 

5  6  Griffin  v.  Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  124  Ind.  326,  24  N.  E.  8S8;  Swauson  v. 
City  of  Lafayette,  134  Ind.  025,  ;'.3  N.  B.  1033. 

56  Lynch  V.  AUyn,  160  Mass.  248,  35  N.  E.  550.  Et  vide  Railsback  v.  Pres- 
ident, etc.,  10  Ind.  App.  (i22,  38  N.  E.  221;  Larich  v.  Moies  (R.  I.)  28  Atl.  661. 
But  see  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Torrey,  58  Ark.  217,  24  S.  W.  244,  to 
the  effect  that  a  bridge  carpenter  Avas  not  entitled  to  warning  where  there- 
was  no  evidence  of  inexperience  or  necessity  for  special  training. 


1004  MASTER    AND    SERVANT.  [Oh.    13 

warning  of  latent  defects  and  natural  dangers  not  obvious,  of  which 
he  knew,  or  ought  to  have  Icnown."  In  Bohn  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Erick- 
son  ^*  the  law  on  this  subject  is  stated  by  Sanborn,  J.,  with  great 
clearness.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  master  to  notify  the  servant  of 
latent  dangers.  "Obviously  the  line  between  dangers  apparent  and 
latent  varies  with  the  varying  experience  and  capacity  of  the  serv- 
ants employed.  Risks  and  dangers  that  are  apparent  to  the  man 
of  long  experience  and  of  a  high  order  of  intelligence  may  be  un- 
known to  the  inexperienced  and  ignorant.  Hence,  if  the  youth, 
inexperience,  and  incapacity  of  a  minor  who  is  employed  in  a  haz- 
ardous occupation  are  such  that  a  master  of  ordinary  intelligence 
and  prudence  would  know  that  he  is  unaware  of,  or  does  not  appre- 
ciate the  ordinary  risks  of,  his  employment,  it  is  his  duty  to  notify 
him  of  them,  and  instruct  him  how  to  avoid  them.  This  notice  and 
instruction  should  be  graduated  to  the  age,  intelligence,  and  ex- 
perience of  the  servant.  They  should  be  such  as  a  master  of  or- 
dinary prudence  and  sagacity  would  give  under  like  circumstances, 
for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the  minor  °'  not  only  to  know  the  dan- 
gerous nature  of  his  work,  but  also  to  understand  and  appreciate 
its  risks,  and  avaid  its  dangers.     They  should  be  governed,  after 

5T  Salem  Stone  &  Lime  Co.  v.  Griffin  (Ind.  Sup.)  38  N.  E.  411.  Whether 
the  tendency  of  a  revolving  saw  to  throw  upward  any  object  touching  It  at 
the  back  was  such  a  latent  danger  as  defendant  was  required  to  warn  his 
■employs  thereat  (a  minor)  was  for  the  jury.  And  see  Hopkinson  v.  Knapp 
&  Spaulding  Co.  (Iowa)  60  N.  W.  653  (unlighted  elevator  shaft).  But  see 
Siddall  V.  Pacific  Mills,  162  Mass.  378,  38  N.  E.  969  (minor  working  at  tank 
■containing  hot  caustic  for  bleaching.  Master  held  not  in  fault  in  having 
failed  to  notify  plaintiff  what  to  do  in  case  fellow  servant  was  negligent). 
And  see  Griffin  v.  Glen  Manuf'g  Co.  (N.  H.)  30  Atl.  344. 

68  55  Fed.  943.  This  was  applied  to  a  boy  of  15  employed  at  a  wood-work- 
ing machine.  It  was  held  that  the  revolving  knives  were  an  obvious  peril 
assumed  by  the  boy,  unless  they  created  a  suction,  tending  to  draw  his  hand 
into  them,  unknown  to  the  boy.  In  the  subsequent  trial  of  the  case  the 
juiy  viewed  the  premises,  and  found  against  the  existence  of  such  suction. 
Chicago  Anderson  Pressed-Brick  Co.  v.  Reinneiger,  140  111.  334,  29  N.  E.  1106; 
Dowling  V.  Allen,  74  Mo.  13-16;  St.  Louis  &  S.  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Valirius,  56 
Ind.  511-518;  Buckley  v.  Gutta-Percha  &  Rubber  Manuf'g  Co.,  113  N.  Y. 
540,  21  N.  E.  717;  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Frawley,  110  Ind.  18, 
9  N.  E.  594-598.  Cf.  Pullman  Palace-Car  Co.  v.  Laack,  143  111.  242,  32  N. 
E.  285. 

69  Railroad  Co.  v.  Fort,  17  Wall.  553. 


Ch.  13]  master's  duties  to  servant.  1005 

all,  more  by  the  experience  and  capacity-  of  the  servant  than  by  his 
age,  because  the  intelligence  and  experience  of  men  measure  their 
knowledge  and  appreciation  of  the  dangers  about  them  far  more 
accurately  than  their  years."  ^°  By  way  of  illustration,  a  master  has 
a  right  to  expect  a  minor  to  keep  his  hands  out  of  a  revolTing  ma- 
chine, just  as  he  would  keep  away  from  a  locomotive  in  motion. °^ 
If,  however,  the  danger  be  concealed,  the  minor  may  be  allowed  to 

6  0  Experienced  engineer  is  not  entitled  to  detailed  notice  of  pliysical  pe- 
culiarity of  the  road  or  engine.  Tliain  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  161  Mass.  353, 
37  N.  K.  309;  Bellows  v.  Pennsylvania  &  N.  Y.  Canal  &  R.  Co.,  157  Pa.  St. 
51,  27  Atl.  685.  Revolving  maeliineiT,  Richstain  v.  Washington  Mills  Co., 
1.17  Mass.  538,  32  N.  E.  908;  coxiplers,  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Mealer,  1  C.  C.  A.  633,  50  Fed.  725. 

01  Berger  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  II.  Co.,  39  :\Iiun.  78.  38  N.  W.  814;  Cheney  v. 
Middlesex  Co.,  161  Mass.  296,  37  N.  E.  175;  Kaillen  v.  North  Western  Bed- 
ding Co.,  46  Minn.  187,  48  N.  W.  77'J;  Mackin  v.  Alaska  Refrigerator  Co.. 
100  Mich.  276,  58  N.  W.  999;  McCool  v.  Lucas  Coal  Co.,  150  Pa.  St.  638,  24 
Atl.  350;  McCue  v.  National  Starch  Manuf'g  Co.,  142  N.  Y.  106,  36  N.  E. 
809;  International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hinzie,  82  Tex.  623,  18  S.  W.  681; 
Briggs  V.  Newport  News  &  M.  V.  Co.  (Ky.)  24  S.  W.  1069.  But  to  set  a 
minor  to  work  on  a  heavy  piece  of  iron  near  a  steam  trip  hammer  is  negli- 
gence. Yeaman  v.  Noblesville  Foundry  &  Mach.  Co.  (Ind.  App.)  30  N.  E.  10; 
Leistritz  v.  American  Zylonite  Co.,  154  Mass.  382,  28  N.  E.  294.  Et  vide 
Reisert  v.  Williams,  51  Mo.  App.  13;  Keller  v.  Gasklll,  9  Ind.  App.  670,  :".(; 
N.  E.  303.  An  employer  should  explain  to  an  inexperienced  lad  the  danger 
of  a  brakeman's  life.  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Brick,  83  Tex.  598,  20  S.  W.  511 : 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  55  Ark.  462,  18  S.  W.  628.  So  the  dan- 
ger of  cleaning  a  "woolen  mule."  Tagg  v.  McGeorge,  155  Pa.  St.  368,  26  Atl. 
671.  The  question  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  as  to  existence  of  special  and 
not  obvious  danger,  and  the  necessity  of  warning  or  teaching  becau.se  of  in- 
experience. May  V.  Smith,  92  Ga.  95,  18  S.  E.  360;  Harris  v.  Shebek,  151  III. 
287,  37  N.  E.  1015.  In  Chicago  Anderson  Pressed-Brick  Co.  v.  Reinneiger. 
140  111.  334,  29  N.  E.  1106,  a  very  satisfactory  statement  of  the  principle  will 
t)e  found,  as  follows:  That,  to  exculpate  the  master  for  damage  done  by 
danger  not  obvious,  he  must  show  fact  of  instruction,  capacity  of  the  mindi- 
to  receive  instruction,  understanding  of  the  danger  in  fact  by  the  minor,  ami 
the  minor's  fitness  for  working.  However,  the  employment  of  a  child  under 
age  allowed  by  employment  act  is  per  se  negligence.  Evidence  that  the 
same  kind  of  machines  were  used  without  guards  in  another  factory,  whci  e 
the  boy  had  previously  worked,  was  also  competent,  as  bearing  on  the  ques- 
tion whether,  if  the  boy  had  only  been  accustomed  to  the  machine  with  a 
Kuard,  and  might  be  liable,  from  force  of  habit  or  ignorance  of  the  increased 
danger,  to  push  his  finger  too  close  to  the  rolls,  he  would  have  been  entitled 


1006  MASTER    AND    SERVANT.  [Cll.    13 

recover."-  Inexperienced  seivants,  on  the  same  principle,  are  en- 
titled to  instruction  whenever  the  dangers  or  means  of  avoiding 
danger  are  not  obvious.''^  Thus  where  an  inexperienced  brakeman, 
who  has  been  told  how  to  couple  cars  with  single  deadwood,  but 
has  never  seen  nor  been  told  of  coupling  with  double  deadwood, 
was  injured  by  the  latter,  he  has  a  cause  of  action  against  his  em- 
ployer."* The  duty  as  to  warning  does  not  apply  where  the  servant 
received  the  needed  information  from  persons  other  than  the  em- 
ployer, or  where  such  information  may  be  attributed  to  him  as  the 
ordinary  danger  of  the  service."' 

to  special  instruction  as  to  the  danger.  Reese  v.  Hershey,  163  Pa.  St.  253, 
29  Atl.  907. 

8  2  Haynes  v.  Eric,  6  Ind.  App.  332,  33  N.  E.  637  (concealed  knives);  Arm- 
strong V.  Forg,  162  Mass.  541,  39  N.  E.  190  (treadle  machine);  Owens  v.  Ernst, 
1  Misc.  Rep.  388,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  426  (where  a  combination  of  starch,  heat, 
and  dampness,  and  a  hot  cylinder  caused  injury) ;  Chicago  Anderson  Pressed- 
Brick  Co.  v.  Reinneiger,  140  111.  334,  29  N.  E.  1106  (where  the  machine,  inter 
alia,  had  a  jerky  motion).  And  see  Atlanta  &  W.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith  (Ga.) 
20  S.  E.  763. 

63  Atlas  Engine  Works  v.  Randall,  100  Ind.  293;  Walsh  v.  Peet  Valve  Co., 
110  Mass.  23;  Cayzer  v.  Taylor,  10  Gray,  274;  Connolly  v.  Paillon,  41  Barb. 
366;    Baxter  v.  Roberts,  44  Cal.  187. 

«4  Reynolds  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  64  Vt  66,  24  Atl.  134.  Cf.  McLaren  v. 
WiUiston,  48  Minn.  290,  51  N.  W.  373.  So  as  to  an  inexperienced  lad.  St. 
Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Davis,  55  Ark.  462,  18  S.  W.  628.  Cf.  Arizona 
Lumber  &  Timber  Co.  v.  Mooney  (Ariz.)  33  Pac.  590  (circular  saw);  Texas 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  White,  82  Tex.  543,  18  S.  W.  478  (unusual  brake  beam); 
Darling  v.  New  York,  P.  &  B.  R.  Co.,  17  R.  I.  70S,  24  Atl.  462  (telltale  of 
unusual  height) ;  Bennett  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  2  N.  D.  112,  49  N.  W.  408 
(drawbars  of  unusual  dimensions);  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Higgins, 
53  Ai-k.  458,  14  S.  W.  653  (links). 

6  5  Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v.  Scheller,  42  111.  App.  619;  Downey  v.  Sawyer, 
157  Mass.  418,  32  N.  E.  654;  Truntle  v.  North  Star  Woolen  Mills  Co.  (Minn.) 
58  N.  W.  832;  Alabama  Counellsville  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Pitts,  98  Ala.  285, 
13  South.  135;  Benfield  v.  Vacuum  Oil  Co.,  75  Hun,  209,  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  16; 
East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Turvaville,  97  Ala.  122,  12  South.  63; 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Eolaud,  96  Ala.  626,  11  South.  667;  Cincinnati,  N. 
O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Mealer,  1  C.  C.  A.  633,  50  Fed.  725;  Gibson  v.  Oregon 
S.  L.  &  U.  X.  Ry.  Co.,  23  Or.  493,  32  Pac.  295.  But  the  master  does  not  dis- 
charge his  duty  of  warning  of  danger  by  notifying  a  fellow  sei-vant  who  fails 
to  communicate  to  plaintiff.  Pullman  Palace-Car  Co.  v.  Laack,  143  111.  242, 
32  N.  E.  285. 


Ch.  13]  master's  Dxy*riES  to  servant.  1007 

Warning  and  Instructing  as  to  Extraneous  Dangers. 

It  is  to  be  remembered,  however,  that  the  master's  liability  is 
broader  than  for  mere  negligence  in  its  popular  sense.  The  master 
may  be  bound  to  give  to  his  employ^  all  the  information  he  may  pos- 
sess with  regard  to  the  danger  of  employment,  whether  arising  from 
the  nature  of  the  occupation  or  from  extraneous  causes,  to  enable 
the  employ^  to  determine  for  himself  whether  he  is  willing  to  incur 
the  hazard  for  the  wages  offered.  The  liability  of  the  master  in 
cases  of  negligence  usually  arises  from  his  failure  to  protect  against, 
or  to  advise  as  to  the  existence  of,  dangers  incident  to  the  employ- 
ment. He  is  bound,  however,  to  protect  his  employ^  from  danger 
known  to  him  to  arise  from  the  felonious  or  tortious  designs  of 
third  persons  acting  in  hostility  to  the  employer.^"  The  master  may 
expose  the  servant  to  danger  of  arrest  in  an  employment  which  the 
master  knows  to  be  in  violation  of  an  injunction  of  a  court  having 
jurisdiction,  as  to  the  existence  of  which  the  servant  is  ignorant.*' 

Inspection,  Supervision,  and  Enforcement, 

The  general  duty  of  the  master  includes  the  duty  and  involves 
the  exercise  of  care  in  maintaining  "*  such  appliances,  machinery, 
and  place  of  work  in  proper  condition  and  safety,  and  in  making 
tests  and  examinations  at  proper  intervals.*^  If  a  defect  in  the  con- 
struction of  a  railroad  track,  which  the  servant  had  just  inspected 

6  6  Baxter  v.  Roberts,  44  Cal.  187.  A  principal  is  bound  to  reimburse  his 
agent  where  the  agent  has  innocently  taken  personal  property  which,  though 
claimed  adversely  by  another,  he  had  reasonable  ground  to  believe  belonged 
to  his  principal.  Moore  v.  Appleton,  26  Ala.  633.  And  see  Guirney  v.  St. 
Paul,  M.  &  il.  Ry.  Co.,  43  Minn.  496,  46  N.  W.  TS.  And,  generally,  see 
Sti-ahlendorf  y.  Rosentahl,  30  Wis.  674. 

8  7  Guirney  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  43  JMinu.  406,  46  N.  W.  7S. 

6  8  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Templeton,  87  Tex.  42,  26  S.  W.  1066 
(brake  socket), 

6  9  Fuller  V.  Jewett,  80  N.  Y.  46;  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Herbert,  116  U.  S. 
C42,  6  Sup.  Ct.  590;  Biann  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  53  Iowa,  595,  6  N. 
W.  5.  In  an  action  against  a  raih-oad  company  by  a  conductor  on  an  engine 
for  injuries  caused  by  the  breaking  of  the  flange  of  a  wheel  of  Uie  tender, 
it  appeai-etl  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  engineer  to  inspect  such  wheels. 
There  was  evidence  of  an  old,  rusty  crack  in  the  flange,  which  could  have 
been  discovered  by  a  reasonably  careful  inspection.  Held,  that  a  demurrer 
to  the  evidence  by  defendant  was  properly  overruled.  Coontz  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  121  Mo.  652,  26  S.  W.  UUl. 


1008  MASTER    AND    SERVANT.  [Cll.    13 

in  the  couih'e  of  his  employmeni:,  caused  the  accident  in  which  he 
was  injured,  it  is  immaterial  whether  in  inspecting  it  he  had  acted 
as  the  company's  engineer  or  as  an  arbitrator  in  its  behalf.'"  This 
duty  is  a  continuing  one,  and  daily  use  of  appliances  and  place  in 
safety  is  not  sufficient  to  show  the  performance  of  the  duty  of 
inspection."  Thus  a  railroad  company  is  bound  to  inspect  the 
wheels  of  its  cars,  and  is  liable  if  it  negligently  permits  a  car  to 
go  into  service  in  a  train  with  one  of  its  wheels  in  a  dangerously 
defective  condition,  which  could  have  been  detected  without  diffi- 
culty, and,  in  consequence  of  the  wheel  giving  way,  injury  results.'* 
Tlie  duty  of  inspection  is  affirmative,  and  must  be  continuously  ful- 
filled, and  positively  performed.'^  Accordingly,  to  render  the  mas- 
ter liable  for  an  injury  to  a  servant,  caused  by  defective  machinery, 
appliances,  and  place,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  master  have  actual 
knowledge  of  the  defect  or  danger.  It  is  sufficient  to  show  that 
he  could  have  discovered  the  defect  or  danger  by  the  exercise  of  rea- 
sonable care  and  diligence  in  the  performance  of  his  duties.'*     If, 

■">  Bvansville  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnes,  137  Ind.  306,  36  N.  E.  1092;  Chicago 
&  E.  R.  Co.  V.  Branyan,  10  Ind.  App.  570,  37  N.  E.  190;  Missouri,  K.  &  T. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  WalJier  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  513. 

71  Tangney  v.  J.  B.  Wilson  &  Co.,  87  Micli.  453,  49  N.  W.  666  (rusty  chain 
over  pulley);  Moynihan  v.  Hills  Co.,  146  Mass.  586,  16  N.  E.  574;  Myers  v. 
Hudson  Iron  Co.,  150  Mass.  125,  22  N.  B.  631;  Ryalls  v.  Mechanics'  Mills,  150 
Mass.  190,  22  N.  E.  766;  Babcock  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  150  Mass.  467,  23 
N.  E.  325;  Mooney  v.  Connecticut  R.  I^umhier  Co.,  154  Mass.  407,  28  N.  E.  352; 
Toy  V.  United  States  Cartridge  Co.,  159  Mass.  313,  34  N.  E.  461.  But  see 
Reilly  v.  Campbell,  8  C.  C.  A.  438,  59  Fed.  990. 

7  2  Coontz  V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  121  Mo.  652,  26  S.  W.  661;  Kennedy  v. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  (Minn.)  58  N.  W.  878  (brake  and  jack  screw) ; 
Sheedy  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  55  Minn.  357,  57  N.  W.  60  (brake  stafE); 
Bailey  v.  Rome,  W.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  139  N.  Y.  302,  34  N.  B.  918  (a  rod);  McDon- 
ald V.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  41  Minn.  439,  43  N.  W.  380  (turntable); 
Oilman  v.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  13  Allen,  443;  Lake  Shore  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Pitz- 
patrick,  31  Ohio  St.  479;  Anderson  v.  Minnesota  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  39  Minn.  523, 
41  N.  W.  104  (hand  cars). 

73  Buzzell  Y.  Manufacturing  Co.,  48  Me.  113,  77  Am.  Dec.  212  (and  see  note, 
p.  220) ;  Brann  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  53  Iowa,  595,  6  N.  W.  5. 

7*  Houston  V.  Brush,  66  Vt.  331,  29  Ati.  380  (machinery);  Chicago  &  E.  R. 
Co.  V.  Branyan,  10  Ind.  App.  570,  37  N.  E.  190  (a  car).  Cf.  Illinois  Cent  R.  Co. 
V.  Bowles,  71  Miss.  1003,  15  South.  138;  Columbus,  H.  V.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Erick  (Ind.  Sup.)  37  N.  E.  128  (engine,  by  statute);    Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 


*^'h.    13]  MASTER'S    DUTIES    TO    SERVANT.  1009 

however,  a  defect  in  an  appliance  is  shown  to  be  structural,  and  is 
of  such  character  as  renders  it  unsafe,  it  may  be  inferred  that  the 
employer  was  aware  of  the  defect.  The  burden  does  not  rest  on 
the  employ^,  when  injured  thereby,  to  produce  further  evidence  that 
the  master  had  notice  thereof.''^  Actual  knowledge  of  defect  or 
danger  is  sufficient  to  attach  liability.''*  On  the  same  principle,  the 
master  must  supervise  his  servants  and  see  that  they  do  their  duty." 
Tlius  he  must  follow  them  in  making  needed  repairs.''^  The  master 
must  also  see  that  his  rules  are  enforced.  Therefore  a  railroad 
company  is  liable  for  negligence  if  it  permits  its  servants  habitually 
to  disregard  regulations  the  enforcement  of  which  is  necessary  to 
the  safety  of  other  servants.  It  is  responsible  for  negligence  in  al- 
lowing a  dangerous  method  of  doing  its  work  to  be  followed." 

McHenry,  10  Ind.  App.  525,  37  N.  E.  186  (engine,  common  law);  Finley  v. 
Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  59  Fed.  419  (Id.);  Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Heaton  (Ind. 
App.)  35  N.  E.  687  (switch  lock);  Beardsley  v.  Minneapolis  St.  Ry.  Co.,  54 
Minn.  504,  56  N.  W.  176  (bucking  electric  car). 

7  5  Thayer,  J.,  in  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  James,  6  C.  C.  A.  217,  56  Fed.  lOOl- 
1003,  collecting  eases.  This  was  applied  to  injury  caused  by  a  frog  which 
had  never  been  bloieked.  IjC  the  frog  should  have  been  originally  blocked,  and 
the  blocking  came  out,  defendant  is  only  liable  in  catie  of  actual  or  construc- 
tive notice.  Haskins  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co..  79  Hun,  159,  29  N. 
Y.  Supp.  274.  And  see  Salem  Stone  &  Lime  Co.  v.  Tepps,  10  Ind.  App.  51»), 
38  N.  E.  229;  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Herbert,  116  U.  S.  642-640,  6  Sup.  Ct. 
590. 

7  0  Union  Stock  Yards  Co.  of  Omaha  v.  Larson,  38  Neb.  492,  56  N.  W.  1079 
(drawhead).     Cf.  Evans  v.  Chamberlain,  40  S.  C.  104,  18  S.  E.  213. 

T7  A  railroad  company,  which  has  provided  a  competent  switchman,  is  not, 
so  far  as  its  employes  are  concerned,  required  to  see  that  he  remains  at  his 
post.  Parker  v.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.  (R.  I.)  30  Atl.  849;  Connors  v. 
Durite  Manuf  g  Co.,  loG  Mass.  163,  30  N.  E.  559. 

78  Sweat  V.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  156  Mass.  84,  31  N.  E.  296,  collecting  cases. 

7  0  Cooley,  Torts,  539;  Mitchell  v.  Crasswedler,  13  O.  B.  237.  A  railroad 
<;ompany  is  guilty  of  negligence  in  permitting  its  order  forbidding  a  fireman 
1o  handle  its  engine  to  be  violated  by  an  engineer.  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Col- 
larn,  73  Ind.  261.  And,  generally,  see  Warn  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  I!. 
O.  (Sup.)  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  879. 

LAW  OP  TOBTS— 64 


1010  MASTER    A.NU    SKKVANT.  L^h.    13 


SAME— MASTER  NOT  AN  INSURER, 

280.  A  master  is  liable  only  for  failure  to  exercise  rea- 
sonable care  in  the  performance  of  his  duties  to  his 
servant.     He  is  not  an  insurer. 

The  master  is  not  an  insurer.'"  He  is  liable  for  failure  to  exercise 
care  proportionate  to  the  danger.  This  care  is  not  controlled  by  the 
custom  or  current  usage  and  practice  among  other  employers  in 
the  same  line  of  business,'^  but  has  reference  to  the  care  of  a  pru- 
dent man  '^  in  avoiding  natural  perils,  and  in  using  known  devices 
for  avoiding  them.*^  The  employer  is,  however,  required  to  know 
what  appliances  are  suitable,  and  in  common  and  ordinary  use,  for 
the  purpose.'^    The  master  is  not  liable  for  latent  defects.*^    Thus, 

80  Peoria,  D.  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Hardwick,  48  111.  App.  562;  Camp  Point 
Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Ballon,  71  111.  417;  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Lonergan, 
IIS  111.  41,  7  N.  E.  55;  ReiEy  v.  Campbell,  8  C.  O.  A.  438,  59  Fed.  990;  Bm-ke  v. 
AVitherbee,  98_  N.  Y.  562;  Powei-s  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  Id.  274; 
Nutt  Y.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  25  Or.  291,  35  Pao.  653;  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  McCormick,  74  Ind.  440;  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr,  148  111.  605, 
35  N.  E.  1117;  Watts  v.  Hart,  7  Wash.  178,  34  Pac.  423,  771;  Texas  &  P.  R. 
Co.  V.  Patton,  9  C.  0.  A.  487,  61  Fed.  259;  Illinois  Cent.  B.  Co.  v.  Bowles 
(Miss.)  15  South.  138;  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gormley  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.)  27  S.  W.  1051. 

SI  McCormick  Hai-vesting  Maeh.  Co.  v.  Burandt,  136  111.  170,  26  N.  E.  588. 

8  2  But  evidence,  for  example,  that,  at  another  place  besides  defendant's, 
similar  machines  are  used  without  guards,  is  admissible.  Reese  v.  Hershey, 
163  Pa.  St.  253,  29  Atl.  907.  Et  vide  Kehler  v.  Schwenk,  144  Pa.  St.  348,  22 
Atl.  910;  Gates  v.  Southern  Minnesota  Ry.  Co.,  28  Minn.  110,  9  N.  W.  579; 
Van  Winkle  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  (Iowa)  61  N.  W.  929;  Dougan  v. 
Champlain  Transp.  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  1;  Goodnow  v.  Walpole  &  G.  Emery  Mills, 
146  Mass.  261,  15  N.  E.  576;  Washington  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  McDade,  135  U.  S. 
554,  10  Sup.  Ct.  1044.  Generally,  as  to  precaution  of  prudent  persons  before 
accident,  see  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Locke,  112  Ind.  404,  14  N.  B.  391; 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Stumps,  55  111.  367. 

S3  The  exercise  of  customary  care  with  respect  to  instruments,  as  a  turn- 
table is  no  defense.     Koons  v.  Railroad  Co.,  65  Mo.  592;   Deer.  Neg.  §  9. 

8  4  Baunon  v.  Lutz,  158  Pa.  St  166,  27  Atl.  890.  Hammer  test  of  boiler 
strength,  Jones  v.  Malvern  Lumber  Co.,  58  Ark.  125,  23  S.  W.  679. 

8  6  In  other  words,  the  master  must  have  knowledge  or  notice  of  defect.  Ma- 


t^h-  13]  master's  duties  to  servant.  1011 

he  cannot  be  held  responsible  for  a  hidden  defect  in  switches.*" 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  for  example,  if  a  hook  holding  a  very  heavy 
weight  has  a  crack  plainly  in  sight,  the  master  is  negligent  in  allow- 
ing it  to  be  used.*^  The  jury  determines  the  exercise  of  care.** 
That  an  appliance  is  simple  in  construction,  has  been  in  use  a  long 
time,  and  duly  inspected,  are  matters,  the  consideration  of  which 
may  justify  a  court  in  taking  the  case  from  the  jury.*^  The  master 
seems  to  be  liable  for  only  such  damages  as  are  likely  to  occur,  or 
may  be  reasonably  apprehended,  because  of  an  alleged  unsafe  con- 
dition of  the  place  or  appliance  furnished.^" 

The  duty  of  the  master  is  sometimes  stated  with  reference  to  the  | 
results  of  care,  i.  e.  that  he  is  bound  to  furnish  instrumentalitiL's,/ 
place,  and  servants  reasonably  safe  as  a  matter  of  fact.     On  the 
other  hand,  however,  it  is  insisted  by  the  later  cases  that  this  is 
inaccurate  and  objectionable,  especially  because  it  is  likely  to  con- 
fuse his  duty  with  insurance,  and  that  the  rule  should  have  refer- 

honey  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  E.  Co.,  64  Hun,  638,  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  511; 
Chicago,  St  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Fiy,  131  Ind.  319,  28  N.  E.  989;  Sweat  v.  Bos- 
ton &  A.  R.  Co.,  156  Mass.  28i,  31  N.  E.  296. 

as  Ladd  v.  New  Bedford  Ry.  Co.,  119  JIass.  412. 

87  Spicer  v.  South  Boston  Iron  Co.,  138  Ma^■s.  426.  Cf.  Reichla  v.  Graens- 
f older,  52  Mo.  App.  143;  Kansas  City  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Ryan,  52  Kan.  637,  35 
Pac.  292  (lifting  jack). 

8  8  As  to  appliances:  Use  of  safety  chains  in  connection  with  cinder  pot, 
Tennessee  C,  I.  &  R.  Co.  v.  Hemdon,  100  Ala.  451,  14  South.  287.  Et  vide 
Tabler  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.,  93  Mo.  79,  5  S.  W.  810;  Muirhead  v.  Han- 
nibal &  St.  J.  R.  Co.,  103  Mo.  251,  15  S.  W.  5.30. 

80  BradbuiT  v.  Kingston  Coal  Co.,  157  T'a.  St.  231,  27  Atl.  400.  Cf.  La 
Pierre  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  R.  Co.,  09  Mich.  212,  58  N.  W.  60.  Et  vide  Lafflin 
v.  Buffalo  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  106  N.  Y.  136,  12  N.  B.  599;  Stringham  v.  Hilton. 
Ill  N.  Y.  188,  18  N.  E.  870. 

90  Hence,  if  a  brakeman  lean  down  on  the  ladder  of  a  moving  car  to  ascer- 
tain why  stones  were  being  thrown  under  the  car,  the  employer  is  not  liable 
if  he  should  strike  a  cattle  guard.  McKee  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  83 
Iowa,  616,  50  N.  W.  209.-  Even  if  the  machinery  be  defective,  but  no  danger 
be  supposable  under  the  circumstances,  the  injured  servant  cannot  recover. 
Trinity  County  Lumber  Co.  v.  Denham,  85  Tex.  56,  19  S.  W.  1012.  So,  if 
servants  undertake  to  use  machinery  or  instruments  for  purposes  for  which 
they  were  not  designed,  and  for  which  the  employer  had  no  reason  to  suppose 
they  would  be  used,  it.  is  their  own  fault  or  folly  if  harm  comes  from  it. 
Stewart  v.  Harvard  College,  12  Allen,  58;  Felch  v.  Allen,  98  Mass.  572. 


1012  MASTER    AiND    SER^'.VNT.  [Ch.    13 

ence,  not  to  the  result,  but  to  the  exercise  of  care."  The  duty  of  the 
master,  according  to  this  line  of  authorities,  is  performed  if  he  uses 
due  care  and  diligence  in  the  performance  of  his  duty."^ 

The  line  of  distinction,  however,  between  the  duty  of  exercising 
reasonable  care  to  provide  safe  instrumentalities,  and  the  like,  and 
of  providing  such  instrumentalities,  is  a  fine  one.°^  Essentially  the 
same  limitations  on  liability  may  be  introduced,  whether  the  care 
be  referred  to  either  fonnula;  for  example,  whether  the  reasonable 
care  be  determined  by  the  state  of  art  or  science,  or  whether  the 
safety  of  the  instrumentality  is  reasonable,  having  due  regard  to 
the  state  of  art  or  science.  In  either  view,  the  physical  facts  in  the 
case  in  issue  (for  example,  with  reference  to  the  danger  of  place  or 
instrumentality)  are  the  natural  and  customary  basis  of  proof.  To 
change  this  rule  and  practice,  and  make  the  subject-matter  of  the 
jury's  inquiry  not  the  actual  performance  of  the  master's  duty  (for 
example,  the  condition  of  place  or  instrumentality),  but  the  conduct 
of  the  master  with  respect  thereto  (for  example,  his  department  of 
tests  or  system  of  inspection),  would  put  the  servant  at  an  unfair 
and  unreasonable  disadvantage.  The  physical  facts  which  caused 
the  injury  complained  of,  he  ought  to  be  able,  and  may  reasonably 
be  required,  to  showj  but  that  part  of  the  management  of  an  em- 
ployer's business  which  results  in  the  exercise  of  due  care  is  pe- 
culiarly within  such  employer's  knowledge  and  control.  Investiga- 
tion thereof  would  be  likely  to  be  as  inquisitorial  to  a  defendant 

91  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Linney,  7  C.  C.  A.  G5G,  59  Fed.  45  (coupling 
apparatus  of  cars);  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Jarvi,  3  Wyo.  375,  23  Pac.  398;  Il- 
linois River  Paper  Co.  v.  Albert,  49  111.  App.  363;  Dewey  v.  Detroit,  G.  H,  & 
M.  Ry.  Co.,  97  llich.  329,  52  N.  W.  942,  and  56  N.  W.  756;  St.  Louis  S.  W. 
R.  Co.  v.  Jagei-man,  59  Ark.  98,  26  S.  W.  591;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Neill (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  647;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Woods, 
Id.  741;  Eddy  v.  Adams  (Tex.  Sup.)  18  S.  W.  490.  Cf.  Brymer  v.  Soutbern 
Pac.  Co.,  90  Cal>  496,  27  Pac.  371,  with  Sappenfield  v.  Main  St.  &  A.  P.  R.  Co., 
91  Cal.  48,  27  Pac.  590. 

02  St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Jagerraan,  59  Ark.  98,  26  S.  W.  591;  Park 
Hotel  Co.  V.  Lockhart  (Ark.)  28  S.  W.  23. 

S3  In  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  11  C.  C.  A.  200,  63  Fed.  407,  it  was 
held  that  the  master  is  not  liable  for  the  carelessness  or  unskillfulness  of  a 
fellow  servant,  if  due  care  had  been  exercised  in  his  employment;  and  that 
it  was  error  to  refuse  to  instruct  the  jury  that,  if  the  instrumentality  involved 
(•a  car)  was  reasonably  and  ordinarily  safe,  plaintiff  could  not  recover. 


Ch.    13]  ASSUilPTION    OF    RISK    BY    SERVANT.  1013 

as  impracticable  to  a  plaintiff.  Many  well-considered  cases,  more- 
over, retain  the  earlier  phraseologj',  of  requiring  the  master  to  fur- 
nish reasonably  safe  place,  instrumentality,  and  the  like."* 

However,  with  respect  to  the  employment  of  a  fellow  servant,  the 
law  seems  to  be  quite  definitely  settled  that  the  duty  of  an  employer 
is  discharged  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care  in  the  selection  of 
his  servants.  Thus,  if  a  railway  company  employ  a  competent  phy- 
sician to  take  care  of  an  injured  employ*?,  it  is  not  liable  for  the 
death  of  the  employ^  through  a  mistake  of  the  phj^sician.^'  But 
the  exercise  of  the  greatest  diligence  on  the  part  of  the  master  in 
the  selection  of  his  servant  is  no  excuse  to  third  persons  not  in  his 
employ,  if  such  servant,  by  his  negligence,  does  damage  to  any  one 
to  whom  the  master  owes  a  duty."" 

The  doctrine  would  seem  to  be  fully  sustained,  from  whatever 
point  of  view  it  be  regarded,  that  the  master  is  only  exonerated  by 
showing  that  he  actually  exercised  due  care.  Accordingly,  neither 
having  prescribed  regulations  nor  having  enforced  them  will  ex- 
culpate the  master  for  liability  to  servant  injured  by  a  defective 
engine,  unless  there  resulted  the  actual  exercise  of  due  care." 

ASSUMPTION  or  RISK  BY  SERVANT. 

281.  On  entering  service,  a  servant  is  said  to  impliedly 
contract  that  he  possesses  the  ordinary  skill  and 
experience  of  those  engaged  in  the  occupation  he 
undertakes,  that  he  -will  exercise  ordinary  care  to 
protect  himself  -while  engaged  in  that  occupation, 


98 


9*  Houston  v.  Brush  (1894)  66  Vt.  331,  29  Atl.  3S0. 

0  5  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Zeiler,  51  Kan.  340,  38  Pac.  282;  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  Co.  V.  Kelly,  11  C.  C.  A.  260,  63  Fed.  407. 

90  And  see  "Fellow  Servants,"  post,  p.  1029;  Osborne  v.  McMasters,  40  Minn. 
103,  41  N.  W.  543. 

07  Jlissouri  Pac.  K.  Co.  v.  HcElyea,  71  Tex.  386,  9  S.  W.  313. 

0  8  Russell  V.  Tillotson,  140  Blass.  201,  4  N.  E.  231.  Custom  may  be  evi- 
dence of  due  care.  In  an  action  against  a  railroad  company  for  the  death  of 
a  switchman  caused  by  his  attempting  to  get  on  a  defective  footboard  on  an 
engine,  evidence  as  to  a  custom  of  switchmen,  in  yards  other  than  defend- 
ant's, of  getting  on  footboards  of  moving  engines,  is  admissible,  as  the  meas- 
ure of  decedent's  care  is  the  prudence  of  careful  switchmen,  no  matter  by 


1014  MASTEU    AM)    SJiUVA.NT.  [Ch.    13 

and  that  he  will  assume  the  risks  of  his  occupa- 
tion.'' 

282.  The  risks  "wrhich  the  servant  assumes  may  arise — 

(a)  From  circumstances  exclusive  of  the  risk  of  fellow 

servants,  and  may  be  either  — 

(1)  The  ordinary  risks  of  the  employment; 

(2)  The  extraordinary  risks  of  the  employment. 

(b)  From  the  negligence  of  fellow  servants. 

SAME— ORDINARY  RISKS. 

283.  Excluding  the  negligence  of  fellow  servants,  a  serv- 

ant assumes  the  ordinary  risks"*  of  his  employ- 
ment, with  the  instrumentalities,  in  the  place,  and 
under  the  rules  of  the  w^ork  for  w^hich  he  is  en- 
gaged, w^hich  are  reasonably  necessary  and  inci- 
dental to  it,  and  w^hich  are  apparent  to  ordinary 
observation:  provided — 
(a)  He  knew  and  appreciated,  or  should  have  knoyrn  and 
appreciated,  the  risks  and  dangers,  in  the  prudent 

whom  employed.     O'Mellia  v.  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R.  Co.,  115  Mo.  205, 
21  S.  W.  503. 
o»  However  finely  settled  this  doctrine  may  be,  it  is  subject  to  much  criti- 
J  cism.     The  objections  will  be  found  stated  in  the  argument  for  plaintiff  In 
\  Freeberg  v.  St.  Paul  Plow  Works,  48  Minn.  101,  50  N.  W.  1026.    A  state- 
ment of  the  rule  favorable  for  sei-vant  will  be  found  in  Little  Rock,  M.  R.  & 
\T.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Leverett,  48  Ark.  333-347,  3  S.  W.  50;    for  matter,  in  Hamilton  v. 
Rich  Hill  Coal  Min.  Co.,  108  Mo.  3G4,  18  S.  W.  977.     Bohn  Manuf'g  Co.  v. 
Erickson,  5  C.  0.  A.  341,  55  Fed.  946.    An  employe  is  not  presumed  to  know 
whether  his  employer  has  furnished  appliances  which  are  reasonably  safe 
and  in  ordinary  use  in  case  of  latent  danger,  and  in  such  case  he   is   not 
chargeable  with  an  assumption  of  the  risks  involved  in  the  failure  to  pro- 
vide them.     Bannon  v.  Lutz,  158  Pa.  St.  166,  27  Atl.  890.     A  brakeman  does 
not  assume  a  risk  of  a  telltale  not  maintained  as  required  by  law.     Hines  v. 
New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  78  Hun,  239,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  829.     But  see 
Mattise  v.  Consumers'  Ice  Manuf'g  Co.,  16  South.  400. 

xooin  Stewart  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.  (W.  Va.)  20  S.  E.  922,  it  was  pointed 
out  that  the  servant  assumes  all  the  ordinarj'  hazards  incident  to  the  em- 
ployment, whether  the  employment  be  dangerous  or  otherwise;   and  that  the 


Ch.    13]  ASSUMPTION    OF    RISK    BY    SERVANT.  1015 

exercise  of  his  senses  and.  common  sense,  regard 
being  had  to  his  age,  capacity,  and  experience; 
(b)  The  master  has  exercised  reasonable  care  to  prevent 
them.^" 

Instrumen  talities. 

The  servant  assumes  risks  ordinarily  incidental  to  the  instrumen- 
talities of  his  employment.  Thus,  cars  carrying  rails,  in  course  of 
travel,  disarranged  such  rails  so  as  to  make  coupling  cars  impossi- 
ble in  the  ordinary  way.  The  cars  stopped  at  a  station  long  enough 
to  enable  the  rails  to  be  properly  placed.  An  accident  occurred, 
partly  on  account  of  irregular  position  of  rails.  It  was  held  that 
the  disarrangement  was  a  natural  result  of  the  transportation;  that 
the  danger  was  obvious,  and  the  risk  assumed.  If  the  servant 
knew,  or  by  the  use  of  ordinary  observation  could  or  ought  to  have 
known,  that  danger  arose  from  the  splintered  rails,  or  if  he  knew 
and  appreciated,  or  ought  to  have  known  or  appreciated,  the  nature 
and  extent  of  danger  therefrom,  he  should  be  presumed  to  have  as- 
sumed the  risk  of  employment.^"'    A  brakeman  does  not  assume  the 

test  of  liabilty  is  the  negligence  of  tlie  master,  not  tbe  danger  of  tlie  employ- 
ment, tliough  the  danger  of  the  employment  may  determine  the  ordinary  care 
required  in  the  case. 

101  The  servant  and  the  master  do  not  stand  on  the  same  footing  as  to 
ascertaining  risks.  The  servant  has  by  no  means  the  same  opportunity  for 
inspecting  as  the  master  has.  Ryan  v.  Fowler,  24  N.  Y.  410;  Noyes  v.  Smith, 
28  Vt.  59;  Hayden  v.  Smithville  Manuf'g  Co.,  29  Conn.  548.  And  see  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  Co.  V.  Kelly,  63  Fed.  407^10,  11  C.  C.  A.  260.  A  foreman  of 
a  blacksmith  shop  does  not  assume  risks  arising  from  the  failure  of  the 
master  to  use  reasonable  care  in  providing  and  keeping  in  repair  the  appli- 
ances furnished  for  use  in  the  shop.  Nicholds  v.  Crystal  Plate  Glass  Co. 
(Mo.  Sup.)  28  S.  AV.  991. 

102  Doyle  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Minn.  79,  43  N.  W.  787.  Et 
vide  Jacksonville,  T.  &  K.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Galvin,  29  Fla.  63(;,  11  South.  231. 
Cf.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Everett,  152  U.  S.  107,  14  Sup.  Ct.  474.  But  see 
Dewey  v.  Detroit,  G.  H.  &  M.  R.  Co.  (Mich.)  56  N.  W.  750.  Uneven  new 
side  track,  O'Neal  v.  Chicago  &  I.  C.  R.  Co.,  132  Ind.  110,  31  N.  E.  609. 
Appliances  generally,  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Rogers,  0  C.  C.  A.  -103,  57  Fed. 
378;  Craven  v.  Smith,  89  Wis.  119,  61  N.  W.  317;  McGuirk  v.  Shattuck,  160 
Mass.  45.  35  N.  E.  110;  McXamara  v.  Logan,  100  Ala.  187,  14  South.  175. 
The  servant  assumes  the  danger  of  moving  a  "dead"  engine  in  daylight. 
Anglin  v.  Texas  &.  P.  R.  Co.,  9  C.  C.  A.  130,  00  Fed.  553;   Schulz  v.  .Johnson, 


1016  MASTER    AND    SERVANT.  [Ch.   13 

risk  of  injury  from  a  defective  track  or  roadbed."'  By  way  of  con- 
trast, in  a  cold  climate,  railroad  employes  assume  the  risks  incident 
to  the  accumulation  of  snow  and  ice  on  the  tracks.*  They  assume  maxii- 
fest  risks  of  instrumentalities,  although  not  necessarily  incidental  to 
the  service.  Thus,  if  an  employ^  yoluntarily  and  without  specific 
command  as  to  time  and  manner  uses  a  ladder  for  adjusting  electric 
wires,  and  that  ladder  is  known  to  both  employer  and  employ^  to  be 
obviously  defective,  they  both  stand  on  common  ground.  The  em- 
ploy6  elects  to  take  the  risk,  and  cannot  recover  for  resulting  dam- 
age.^"* But  where  a  common  laborer  was  set  to  work  near  the 
fumes  of  nitric  acid,  as  to  the  injurious  effects  of  which  on  the  hu- 
man system  under  the  circumstances  experts  disagree,  the  danger 

7  Wasb.  403,  35  Pac.  130  (saw);  Crown  v.  Orr,  140  N.  Y.  450,  35  N.  E.  64cS; 
Essex  County  Electric  Co.  v.  Kelly  (N.  J.  Sup.;  29  Atl.  427  (electric  pole); 
Johnson  v.  Hovey,  98  Michi.  343,  57  N.  W.  172  (saw  frame  working  im- 
properly because  of  dust  and  dirt);  McGuerty  v.  Hale,  161  Mass.  51,  36 
N.  E.  G82  (uncovered  gearing  of  machine  in  plain  sight).  Cf.  McCue  v. 
National  Starch  Manuf'g  Co.,  142  N.  Y.  106,  36  N.  E.  809,  reversing  66  Hun, 
(&2,  21  X.  Y.  Supp.  551;  Burnell  v.  West  Side  R.  Co.,  87  Wis.  387,  58  N. 
AV.  772  (commutator  of  electric  motor);  Red  River  Line  v.  Cheatham,  9 
C.  C.  A.  124,  60  Fed.  517,  reversing  56  Fed.  248  (steamboat  custom). 

103  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dohl  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  29  S.  W.  1131;  Stein- 
hauser  v.  Spraul  (Jto.  Sup.)  28  S.  W.  620.  So  an  unexpected  starting  of  ma- 
chinery, Blauton  v.  Dold,  109  Mo.  64,  18  S.  W.  1149. 

*  Lawson  v.  Truesdale  (Minn.)  62  N.  W.  546. 

lOiJenney  Electric  Light  &  Power  Co.  v.  Murphy,  115  Ind.  560,  IS  N. 
E.  30.  Steinhauser  v.  Spraul  (Mo.  Sup.)  30  S.  W.  102.  Et  vide  Burns  v. 
Ocean  S.  S.  Co.,  84  Ga.  709,  11  S.  B.  493;  O'Neal  v.  Chicago  &  I.  Coal  Ry. 
Co.,  132  Ind.  110,  31  N.  E.  669;  Matehtett  v.  Cincinnati,  W.  &  M.  Ry.  Co., 
132  Ind.  334,  31  N.  E.  792.  So  with  respect  to  defective  telegraph  pole. 
Foley  V.  Electric  Light  Co.,  54  N.  J.  Law,  411,  24  Atl.  487.  And  see  .Tunior 
V.  Missouri  Electric  Light  &  Power  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  29  S.  W.  988.  Chip- 
ping from  a  tool  is  naturally  incident  to  riveting.  H.  S.  Hopkins  Bridge 
Co.  V.  Burnett,  85  Tex.  16,  19  S.  W.  886.  Where  the  evidence  shows  that 
the  danger  of  the  work  in  which  the  plaintiif  was  engaged  must  have  been 
as  obvious  to  himself  as  to  his  employer,  and  that  there  was  no  emergency 
requiring  him  to  expose  himself  to  the  danger,  he  is  not  entitled  to  recover. 
Hazlehurst  v.  Brunswick  Lumber  Co.  (Ga.)  19  S.  E.  756.  In  an  action  by  an 
employe  for  injuries  caused  by  a  machine,  a  charge  which  assumes  that  plain- 
tiff did  not  know  the  machine  was  dangerous  is  erroneous  when  plaintifC  had 
seen  the  machine  in  operation  for  six  months.  B.  F.  Avery  &  Sons  v.  Meek 
(Ky.)  28  S.  W.  337. 


Gh.    13]  ASSUMPTION    OF    RISK    BY    SERVANT.  1017 

was  not  so  apparent  that  he  could  be  held  to  have  voluntarily  as- 
sumed it.^"^ 

Place. 

The  risks  assumed  include  the  obvious  dangers  of  the  place  at 
which  the  servant  is  engaged.  Thus  an  employ^  who,  while  en- 
gaged in  removing  a  wrecked  train,  goes  upon  an  obviously  new  and 
temporary  bridge,  defects  of  which  are  visible,  assumes  the  risks 
arising  from  such  defects.^°°     On  the  other  hand,  however,  an  en- 

10  5  Wagner  v.  H.  W.  .Tayne  Chemical  Co.,  147  Pa.  St.  475,  23  Atl.  772. 

100  McGrath  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ity.  Co.,  9  C.  C.  A.  133,  60  Fed.  5.j5.  So,  if 
brakeman  knew  of  low  bridge,  and  failed  to  stoop,  ne  cannot  recover  for 
injury  caused  by  striking  it.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Hafner's  Adm'r, 
90  Va.  621,  19  S.  E.  166.  So  in  Gibson  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  63  N.  Y.  449;  Odell 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  120  N.  Y.  325,  24  N.  E.  478;  Quick  v.  jjinnesota  Iron  (>.,. 
47  Minn.  361,  50  N.  W.  244  (bell  in  mine);  Chesapeake,  O.  &  S.  W.  R.  Co. 
T.  aicDowell  (Ky.)  24  S.  W.  007  (unrailed  platform);  Kaare  v.  Troy  Steel 
&  Iron  Co.,  139  N.  Y.  369.  34  N.  E.  901;  Peely  v.  Pearson  Cordage  Co.,  101 
Mass.  42C.  37  N.  E.  368  (well,  obvious  and  known);  Connors  v.  Morton. 
160  Mass.  333,  35  N.  E.  S60;  Kleinest  v.  Kunhardt,  160  Mass.  230,  35  >r. 
E.  458  (slippei'y  floor  and  exposed  pulley).  Cf.  Scharenbroieh  v.  St.  Cloud 
Fiber-Ware  Co.  (Minn.)  60  N.  W.  1093;  Ragon  v.  Railway  Co.,  97  Mich.  265, 
56  N.  W.  612  (visible  hole  in  roadbed);  McNeil  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W. 
R.  Co.,  142  N.  Y.  631,  37  N.  E.  566;  Id.,  71  Hun,  24,  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  616  (foot 
caught  in  unblocked  guard  rail),  following  Appei  v.  Railway  Co.,  Ill  N.  Y. 
550,  19  N.  E.  93:  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mealer,  1  C.  C.  A.  633. 
50  Fed.  72.5  (this  would  seem  to  be  an  extreme  case.  A  switchman  coupling- 
cars  in  a  yard  stumbled  over  a  piece  of  colte  dropped  from  one  of  the  cars 
he  was  coupling.  The  court  took  the  case  from  the  jury,  on  the  theory  of 
assumption  of  risk).  And,  generally,  see  Emma  Cotton-Seed  Oil  Co.  v. 
Hale,  56  Ark.  232,  19  S.  ^Y.  600;  GTlilf,  0.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  .Tackson,  12' 
C.  C.  A.  507,  65  Fed.  48;  Scidmore  v.  Milwaukee,  L.  S.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Wis.) 
61  N.  AY.  765;  Coal  Creek  Min.  Co.  v.  Davis,  90  Tenn.  711,  18  S.  W.  387 
(where  defendant  assumed  the  risk  cf  suffocation  from  smoke  in  a  mine). 
And  see  Baltimore  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  75  Md.  152,  23  Atl.  310;  Paule  v. 
Florence  Min.  Co.,  80  AVis.  350,  50  N.  W.  189  (where  a  "trammer,"  assist- 
ing in  work  on  the  roof  of  a  "stope,"  was  injured  by  falling  rock),  distin- 
guishing Gill  V.  Homrighausen,  79  Wis.  634,  48  N.  AY.  862;  Brooks  y. 
Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  47  Fed.  687  (where  the  drawhead  was  manifestly 
and  dangerously  short);  Rutledge  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  110  Mo.  312^ 
19  S.  W.  38  (ordinary  movement  of  train);  Ben-igan  v.  Railroad  Co.,  131 
N.  Y.  582.  30  N.  E.  57;  Mobile  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  George,  94  Ala.  199,  10  South.. 
145  (giving  slack);    Louisville  &  N.  K.  Co.  v.  Banks  (Ala.)  16  South.  547. 


1018  MASTER    AND    SERVANT.  [Ch.    lo 

gineer  working  on  a  mountain  division  does  not  assume  the  risks 
of  faulty  consti'uction  and  maintenance  of  the  road,  whereby  sand 
and  gravel  accumulate  on  the  track,  and  cause  derailment  of  engine, 
and  his  injury.^"^ 

Rules. 

If  an  employ^  has  assented  to  certain  reasonable  rules  of  his 
master,  his  conduct  must  conform  to  them,  and,  if  his  damage  com- 
plained of  is  the  consequence  of  their  violation  he  cannot  recover.^"' 
Such  assent  is  not  objectionable  as  being  an  illegal  limit  on  the 
master's  liability  for  negligence.  Thus,  if  the  rules  of  a  railroad 
company  forbid  coupling  without  the  use  of  a  stick,  and  a  servant 
is  injured  while  undertaking  to  make  a  coupling  without  a  stick,  he 
cannot  recover.^  "^  But  an  employ^  is  not  bound  by  such  a  rule 
unless  it  is  actually  or  constructively  brought  to  his  attention. ^^^ 
However,  if,  with  the  actual  or  constructive  acquiescence  of  the 

lor  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  1  C.  C.  A.  354,  49  Fed.  538;  Mollie 
Oibson  Consol.  Jllning  &  Jlilling  Co.  v.  Sharp  (Colo.  App.)  38  Pac.  850; 
St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  li.  Co.  v.  Holman,  155  III.  21,  39  N.  E.  573. 

los  Mason  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  114  N.  C.  718,  19  S.  B.  362;  .Tohnson 
V.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  38  W.  Va.  206,  18  S.  E.  573  (coupling  moving 
<.-ai-s);  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Dudley,  90  Va.  304,  18  S.  E.  274  (allowing 
cars  to  go  down  grade  without  engine). 

109  Russell  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  47  Fed.  204;  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co. 
V.  Briggs  (Va.)  14  S.  E.  753;  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Mugg,  132  Ind.  168, 
31  N.  E.  504;  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  88  Ga.  16,  14  S.  E.  120: 
Ford  V.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  59  N.  W.  5;  Bennett  v.  Northern 
Pac  R.  Co.,  2  N.  D.  112,  49  N.  W.  408;  McGrath  v.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R. 
Co.,  15  R.  I.  95,  22  Atl.  927  (where  there  was  failure  to  put  out  signal  flags 
to  protect  trackman  against  coining  trains).  Et  vide  Knight  v.  Cooper,  3(i 
W.  Ta.  232,  14  S.  E.  909;  Francis  v.  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R.  Co.,  110 
Mo.  387,  19  S.  W.  935  (where,  contrary  to  rules,  plaintiff,  standing  in  mid- 
dle of  track,  jumped  on,  and  was  injured  by  moving  engine). 

110  Fay  V.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  30  Minn.  231,  15  N.  W.  241.  And, 
generally,  see  Central  R.  R.  of  Georgia  v.  Ryals,  84  Ga.  420,  11  S.  E.  499. 
Railroad  switchmen  who,  in  violation  of  a  rule  of  the  company,  habitually 
"board  moving  switch  engines  from  the  middle  of  the  track  by  stepping  on 
the  footboard  of  the  engine  as  it  approaches,  assume  the  risks  ordinarily  inci- 
dent thereto,  but  do  not  assume  the  danger  of  injury  from  incompetency  of 
the  engineer.  Francis  v.  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R.  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  28  S. 
W.  842.  As  to  when  a  rule  is  brought  to  the  servant's  notice,  see  La  Croy  v. 
New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  132  N.  Y.  570,  30  N.  E.  391.     As  to  their  mis- 


^'h-    13]  ASSUMPTION    OF    RISK    BY    SERVANT.  ]0]9 

master,  the  rule  is  habitually  ignored,  the  master  may  be  liable."^ 
On  the  same  principle,  a  brakeman  may  assume  the  risk  occasioned 
by  the  running  of  a  train  at  a  rate  of  speed  greater  than  is  allowed 
by  an  ordinance,  if  such  violation  is  customary."^ 

SAME— EXTRAORDINARY  RISKS. 

284.  The  servant  cannot  recover  from  his  employer  for 
damages  consequent  upon  extraordinary  risks  which 
he  has  know^ingly  assumed. 

A  servant  cannot  recover  against  his  master  for  personal  injury 
resulting  from  manifestly  defective  and  dangerous  appliances  ^^^  or 

construction,  see  Harris'  Adm'r  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.,  88  Va.  560,  14  S.  E. 
535.  As  to  cases  in  wliicla  the  rule  does  not  apply,  see  Richmond  &  D.  R. 
Co.  v.  Mitchell,  92  Ga.  77,  18  S.  E.  290. 

111  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Nickels,  1  C.  C.  A.  625,  50  Fed.  718.  Nor  where 
directed  by  his  superior.  Hannah  v.  Connecticut  River  R.  Co.,  154  Mass. 
529,  28  N.  E.  682.  Nor  where  the  only  way  the  work  could  be  done  was  by 
violation  of  rule.  Memphis  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Graham,  94  Ala.  545,  10  South. 
283.  Where  a  rule  of  a  railway  company  had  been  habitually  disrt  yarded 
by  its  employes,  and  officers  of  the  company  had  witnessed  its  violation,  the 
question  of  whether  the  officers  had  knowledge  of  and  had  approved  of  its 
disregard  was  for  the  jury.  AVhite  v.  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  (Miss.» 
16  South.  248;  Newport  News  &  M.  V.  li.  Co.  v.  Campbell  (Ky.)  25  S.  XV. 
267;  Lowe  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (Iowa)  OU  N.  W.  519;  Richmontl 
&  D.  R.  Co.  V.  Hissong,  97  Ala.  187,  13  South.  209. 

112  Abbott  V.  McCadden,  81  Wis.  563,  51  N.  W.  1079;  Bengtson  v.  Chicago, 
St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  47  Minn.  486,  50  N.  W.  531.  And  his  contributory 
negligence  may  exist,  although  the  conductor  assented  to  the  violation  of  the 
rule.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Reesman,  9  C.  C.  A.  20,  GO  Fed.  370; 
Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Rush,  71  Miss.  987,  15  South.  133;  Lehigh  Val.  R. 
Co.  V.  Snyder,  56  N.  J.  Law,  326,  28  Atl.  376. 

113  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rogers,  6  C.  C.  A.  403,  57  Fed.  378;  Clark  v.  St. 
Paul  &  S.  C.  R.  Co.,  28  Minn.  128,  9  N.  W.  581;  Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L.  0.  R. 
Co.  V.  Allen,  47  111.  App.  465;  Rooney  v.  Sewull  &  Day  Cordage  Co.,  101  Mass. 
153,  36  N.  E.  789;  Hatter  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  60  Miss.  642,  13  South.  827. 
Cf.  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Minnick,  6  C.  C.  A.  387,  57  Fed.  362;  Bradshaw's 
Adm'r  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  (Ky.)  21  S.  AV.  346;  Wheeler  v.  Berry,  95 
Mich.  250,  54  N.  W.  876  (where  the  work  was  without  the  scope  of  employ- 
ment, and  plaintifC  protested).  Et  vide  Southern  Kan.  Ky.  Co.  v.  Moore, 
49  Kan.  616,  31  Pac.  138;  White  v.  Wittemann  Lith.  Co.,  131  N.  Y.  631,  .30 
N.  E.  236  (meddling  with  unguarded  machinery). 


ll'-'O  MASTER    AND    SERVAiNT.  [Ch.    l'> 

places/^*  especially  when  warned.  This  is  sometimes  put  on  the 
ground  of  waiver  and  sometimes  on  the  ground  of  contributory  neg- 
ligence.^^^  But  he  does  not  assume  such  extraordinary  risks  unless 
he  has  knowledge,  actual  or  constructive,  of  the  danger.^^"  If,  how- 
ever, he  voluntarily,  without  any  expressed  or  implied  direction 
from  his  employer,  undertakes  hazardous  work,  he  cannot  com- 
I^lain.^i'  Thus,  where  a  brakeman,  standing  in  front  of  cars  on  a. 
repair  track  originally  marked  "In  bad  order,"  but  at  the  time  with- 
out such  mark,  took  hold  of  the  brake  staff,  and  stepped  on  the 
brake  beam  to  get  out  of  the  way,  and  the  brake  staff  broke,  and  the 
brakeman  was  killed,  it  was  held  that  he  had  assumed  the  risk.^^® 
So  a  trackman,  whose  duty  it  is  to  watch  for  and  protect  himself 
against  wild  trains,  assumes  the  danger  of  a  collision  between  a 
wild  train  and  a  hand  car  which  he  is  pushing.^^' 

114  Smith  v.  WiDona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  42  Minn.  87,  43  N.  W.  968  (wliere  a 
bralvGman  was  notifiecl  of  a  dangerous  pile  of  stones,  he  was  held  to  be- 
unable  to  recover  damiige  on  being  knoclied  off  the  car  thereby).  Hammer- 
ing a  stetim  radiator  despite  warning.  Moeller  v.  Brewster,  131  N.  Y.  606, 
30  N.  E.  124.  A  watchman  of  a  building  known  to  be  dangerously  dilapidated 
assumes  the  risk.  Paland  v.  Chicago,  St.  L.  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.,  44  La.  Ann. 
1003,  11  South.  707.  So,  where  the  servant  willfully  encounters  ^nown  dan- 
gers. Knight  V.  Cooper,  36  W.  Va.  232,  14  S.  E.  999.  Et  vide  Haley  v.  Lum- 
ber Co.,  81  V^'is.  412,  51  N.  W.  326,  956  (wrecking  a  logging  train);  Lasky  v. 
Canadian  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  83  Me.  461,  22  Atl.  367. 

11=  Greene  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  31  Mum.  249,  17  N.  W.  378. 

116  Richland's  Iron  Co.  v.  Elkins,  90  Va.  249,  17  S.  E.  890.  If  defendant 
actually  inspected  the  road,  and  knew  of  defect  which  caused  his  injury,  he 
assumes  it.     Evansvllle  «&  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnes,  137  Ind.  306,  36  N.  E.  1092. 

117  Goff  V.  Chippewa  River  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  86  Wis.  237,  56  N.  W.  465.  As 
where  section  hand  works  where  no  one  can  give  him  notice  of  approaching 
train.     Rutherford  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.)  59  N.  W.  302. 

lis  Kelley  v.  Railway  Co.,  35  Minn.  490,  29  N.  W.  173;    Rodney  v.  St.  LoiJfe 
S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  28  S.  W.  887;    Rooney  v.  Carson,  161  Pa.  St.  26, 
Atl.  996.     And,  generally,  see  Dumas  v.  Stone,  65  Vt.  442,  25  Atl.  1097. 

119  Sullivan  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  161  Mass.  125,  36  N.  E.  751. 


^"'    -^""-J  ASSUMPTION    OF    RISK    BY    SERVANT. 


1021 


SAME— EXCEPTIONS. 

285.  But  the  principles   as  to  assumption  of  risk  do  not 
apply— 

(a)  Where  the  servant  may  know  of  the  defect  or  dan- 

ger, but  does  not  necessarily  or  reasonably  know 
of  or  appreciate  the  consequent  risk. 

(b)  Where  the  injured  servant  was,  without  proper  notice 

of  increased  risk,  put  to  a  service  outside  of  and  more 
dangerous  than  the  employment  for  which  he  was 
engaged.  This  exception  has  been  particularly  ap- 
plied to  the  employment  of  persons  of  immature 
age.'2" 

<c)  Where  the  master  has  clearly  promised  the  servant 
to  remove  the  peril,  unless  the  damage  be  so  im- 
mediate and  imminent  that  an  ordinarily  prudent 
man  would  not  continue  in  the  service;  and  not 
then 

(d)  Where  the   duty  to  continue  in  the  dangerous  serv- 

ice is   required   or  justified  by  an  emergency  ap- 
proved by  law. 

(e)  Where  the  assumption  of  risk  by  the  servant  cannot 

be  held  to  be  voluntary. 

Appreciation  of  Bixk. 

Knowledge  of  defect  or  imperfection  is  not  necessarily  knowledge 
of  risk.  The  servant  is  not  bound  to  inspect  the  risk  as  closely  as 
his  master.  He  has  a  right  to  presume  that  his  master  will  do  his 
duty.'^^  He  does  not  necessarily  assume  the  risk  incident  to  the 
use  of  unsafe  instrumenlfalities  because  he  knows  its  character  and 
condition.  It  is  necessary  also  that  he  understands,  or  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  common  observation  ought  to  have  known,  the  risk  to 
which  he  was  exposed  by  its  use.  Before  he  can  be  held  to  have 
assumed  the  risk,  it  must  appear  that  he  knew  all  the  facts  mate- 
rial to  the  risk,  and  appreciated  and  understood  it.^^^    Thus,  if  a 

120  Pierce,  R.  R.  379. 

121  Ante,  p.  1002,  note  o2. 

122  Steen  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  37  Minn.  310,  34  N.  W.  113;   Hnngei-fovd 


1022  MASTER    AND    f-KRVANT.  L^h.    IS 

servant  undertook  to  couple  a  baggage  car  having  a  Miller  coupler 
to  an  engine  with  an  ordinary  freight  coupler,  it  was  held  to  be  a 
question  of  fact  whether  such  servant  did  understand,  or  ought  to 
have  understood,  the  risks  as  well  as  the  peculiarities  of  the  insti'u- 
mentalities  with  which  he  worked."'  On  the  other  hand,  a  boy  who 
has  lived  near  the  sea  shore  all  his  life  is  held  to  know  and  appre- 
ciate that  there  might  be  danger  of  getting  entangled  in  the  loose 
end  of  a  taut  rope."*  Knowledge  of  imperfection  or  danger,  as 
well  as  appreciation  of  risk,  is  affected  by  the  experience  and  age 
of  the  parties.^^^     Appreciation  and  assumption  of  risk  are  ordi- 

V.  CUicago,  M.  &  St  P.  Ry.  Co.,  41  Minn.  444,  43  N.  W.  324.  But  a  brakeman 
who,  in  order  to  get  employment  as  such,  has  pretended  to  an  experience 
which  he  has  not,  and,  being  ordered  onto  a  flat  car  to  pull  the  pin  for  a  run- 
ning switch,  instead  of  lying  down  on  the  rear  end  of  the  car,  kneels  down, 
and  in  that  position  is  jerked  off  by  the  sudden  start  of  the  engine  after  the 
uncoupling,  has  no  cause  of  action  against  the  company.  Stanley  v.  Chicago 
&  W.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  101  Mich.  202,  59  N.  W.  393. 

123  Russell  V.  Minneapolis  &  St  L.  R.  Co.,  32  Minn.  230,  20  N.  W.  147; 
Reynolds  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  64  Vt.  66,  24  Atl.  134.  Under  many  circum- 
Btances,  however,  the  risk  of  making  unmatched  couplings  may  be  held,  as 
a  matter  of  law,  to  have  been  assumed  by  the  servant.  Kohn  v.  McNulta, 
147  U.  S.  238,  13  Sup.  Ct  298,  and  cases  cited.  Further,  see  Norfolk  &  W. 
R.  Co.  V.  McDonald's  Adm'r,  88  Va.  352,  13  S.  E.  706;  Thomas  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.,  ICfO  Mo.,  187,  18  S.  W.  980  (following  Hulett's  Case,  67  Mo.  239); 
Pittsburg  &  L.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Henly,  48  Ohio  St.  608,  29  N.  E.  575.  The  cases, 
however,  fully  sustain  the  proposition  that  a  person  cannot  be  said  to  take 
a  risk,  unless  he  knows,  not  only  the  condition  of  the  thing,  but  also  that  a 
danger  exists  in  such  condition.  Coombs  v.  New  Bedford  Cordage  Co.,  102 
Mass.  572-596;  Mellor  v.  Merchants'  Manuf'g  Co.,  150  Mass.  362,  23  N.  E. 
100;   Davidson  v.  Cornell,  132  N.  Y.  228,  30  N.  E.  573. 

124  Williams  v.  ChurchiU,  137  Mass.  243.  So,  where  plaintifC  uses  a  plat- 
form for  weeks  without  objection,  he  is  able  to  appreciate  the  risk  arising 
from  its  defective  width.  Kaare  v.  Troy  Steel  &  Iron  Co.,  139  N.  Y.  369,  34 
N.  E.  901.  Cf.  Prendible  v.  Connecticut  River  Manuf'g  Co.,  160  JXass.  131,  35 
N.  E.  675.  A  man  of  25  must  take  notice  of  the  law  of  gravitation,  and  as- 
sumes the  risk  of  moving  a  heavy  stone.  Walsh  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  27 
Minn.  367,  8  N.  W  145. 

12  5  Alcorn  v.  Chicago  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  108  Mo.  81,  18  S.  W.  188  (unblocked 
switch  rails);  Northern  Pac.  Coal  Co.  v.  Richmond,  7  C.  C.  A.  485,  58  Fed. 
756.  Cf.  Greenway  v.  Conroy,  160  Pa.  St.  185,  28  Atl.  692  (where  it  was  held 
that  a  minor  does  not  assume  a  risk),  with  Ogley  v.  Miles,  139  N.  Y.  458,  34 


t^h.    13]  ASSUMPTION    OF    RISK    BY    SERVANT.  1023 

narily  questions  of  fact  ^^^  for  the  jury,^"  and  suggestion  of  danger 
by  appearance  of  machinery  is  for  the  jury,  and  not  for  experts.^^* 
Other  Modifications. 

Similarly,  a  s.er\'ant  does  not  assume  a  risk  when  it  could  be  as- 
certained by  inspection,  and  he  has  no  chance  to  malie  the  neces- 
sary inspection.^^"  So  knowledge  of  the  risk  of  the  employment 
does  not  constitute  an  assumption  of  that  risk  unless  it  comes  in 
time  to  be  of  use  in  avoiding  danger.^ ^"  But  the  risk  must  be  a 
reasonable  one.  A  servant  does  not  assume  all  the  risks,  known 
and  unknown,  which  could  possibly  result  from  any  conceivable  act 
or  negligence  on  part  of  the  master,^"^  nor  unknown  risks  not  ordi- 

N.  E.  1050  (where  it  was  lield  that  he-  did).  And  cf.  Williamson  v.  S.  Marble 
Works,  26  Atl.  GOO,  with  Toledo,  St.  L.  &.  K.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Trimble,  8  Ind. 
App.  333,  35  N.  E.  716.  Et  vide  International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hinzie,  82 
Tex.  023,  18  S.  W.  GSl;  Evansville  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Henderson,  134  Ind.  630, 
33  N.  E.  1021;  Beckham  v.  Hillier,  47  N.  J.  Law,  12;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v. 
Congdon,  134  Ind.  220,  33  N.  E.  705.  And  see  ante,  p.  1002,  "Warainj;  to 
Inexperienced  and  Youthful  Employes,"  and  "Standard  of  Care,  Whether  Ab- 
solute." 

128  But  the  court  sometimes  takes  the  case  from  the  jury.  Ogley  v.  Miles, 
130  N.  Y.  458,  34  N.  E.  1050;  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Torrey,  58  Ark. 
217,  24  S.  W.  244. 

127  Clarke  v.  Holmes,  7  Hurl.  &,  N.  937;  Mellors  v.  Shaws,  1  Best  &  S.  437; 
Whart  Neg.  §  217;  Ingerman  v.  Moore,  90  Cal.  410,  27  Pac.  :.06;  Coombs  v. 
New  Bedford  Cordage  Co.,  102  Mass.  572;  Haley  v.  Case,  142  Mass.  316,  7 
N.  E.  877;  Ferren  v.  Old  Colony  B.  Co.,  143  Mass.  107,  9  N.  E.  608,  and  cases 
page  200,  143  Mass.,  and  page  008,  9  N.  E.;  Chopin  v.  Badger  Paper  Co.,  S3 
Wis.  1!J2,  53  N.  W.  452;  Coif  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  By.  Co.,  87  Wis.  273,  58 
N.  W.  408;  Craver  v.  Christian,  36  Minn.  413,  31  X.  W.  457;  McDonald  v. 
Chicago,  St.  P.,  JI.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  41  Jlinn.  430,  43  N.  W.  380;  Hungerford 
V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  By.  Co.,  41  Minn.  444,  43  N.  W.  324. 

128  Goodsell  V.  Taylor,  41  Minn.  207,  42  N.  W.  873.  The  jury  passes  on  the 
question  whether  the  plaintiff  was  justified  in  believing  that  defendant's 
servants  could  do  his  work  properly.  New  York  &  T.  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Anderson, 
1  C.  C.  A.  520,  50  Fed.  402. 

120  Cook  V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  34  Minn.  45,  24  N.  A\.  311.    Et  vide  ^ 
Consolidated  Coal  Co.  of  St.  Louis  v.  Haenni,  146  111.  614,  35  N.  E.  162;    Chi- 
cago, St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Frey,  131  Ind.  310,  2S  N,  E.  080. 

130  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  11  C.  C.  A.  260.  0:3  Fed.  407. 

131  Hall  V.  Chicago,  B.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  46  Minn.  4:!0,  49  N.  W.  230;  Cris- 
weU  V.  Pittsbui-gh,  St.  L.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.,  30  W.  Va.  708,  6  S.  E.  31. 


1024  MASTER    AND    SERVANT.  [Ch.    13 

narily  and  usually  incidental  to  the  class  of  operations  in  which  he 
is  engaged.^^^ 

Assumption  of  Risk  an  Affected  by  Original  Services. 

Most  of  the  cases  as  to  assumption  of  risk  refer  to  risks  assumed 
on  entering  the  service.  The  tendency  of  recent  decisions  is  to  hold 
that,  in  regard  to  dangers  growing  out  of  the  master's  negligence 
which  are  not  covered  by  the  implied  contract  between  the  master 
and  servant  when  the  service  was  undertaken,  it  is  a  question  of 
fact,  to  be  independently  decided,  whether  a  servant  who  works  on, 
appreciating  the  risk,  assumes  it  voluntarily,  or  endures  it  because 
he  feels  constrained  so  to  do.^^^  "If  a  servant  of  full  age  and  ordi- 
nary intelligence,  upon  being  required  by  his  master  to  perform  other 
duties  more  dangerous  and  complicated  than  those  embraced  in  his 
original  hiring,  undertakes  such  duties  knowing  their  dangerous 
character,  although  unwillingly  and  from  fear  of  losing  his  employ- 
ment, and  he  is  injured,  he  cannot  maintain  an  action  for  the  in- 
jury." ^^*     So  a  servant  who  voluntarily,  and  without  direction  from 

132  As  those  peculiar  to  the  operation  of  a  particular  mine,  Bergguist  v. 
Chandler  Iron  Co.,  40  Minn.  511,  52  N.  W.  136.  The  servant  does  not  assume 
the  risk  of  negligent  direction  of  work.  Schroeder  v.  CMcago  &  A.  R.  Co., 
108  Mo.  322,  18  S.  W.  1094.  Et  vide  Nail  v.  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co., 
129  Ind.  260,  2^  N.  E.  183,  611.  Where  the  evidence,  in  an  action  for  the 
death  of  a  workman  by  a  fall  from  a  defective  staging  in  a  grain 'elevator, 
sllo^^'ed  that  the  defect  was  a  knot  in  a  plank,  and  that  the  deceased  could 
not  possibly  have  seen  it,  by  reason  of  the  darkness,  no  contributory  negli- 
gence is  established.  Bright  v.  Bamett  &  Record  Co.,  88  Wis.  299,  60  N.  W. 
418.  In  an  action  by  ^n  employe  for  injuries  caused  by  the  fall  of  an  elevator, 
it  was  proper  to  allow  plaintiff  to  state  whether  he  had  ever  been  advised 
of  or  knew  the  condition  of  the  elevator,  as  to  its  being  safe  or  unsafe.  Mc- 
Gonigle  v.  Kane  (Colo.  Sup.)  38  P.  367.  A  fi-eight  car  was  left  standing  on 
a  side  track  without  sufficient  brakes  to  hold  it.  Started  by  its  weight,  or 
wind,  it  moved  down,  and  injm-ed  plaintifC.  This  was  held  to  be  a  natural 
peril  of  the  service.  Henry  v.  Wabash  West  Ry.  Co.,  109  Mo.  488,  19  S. 
W.  239. 

133  Fitzgerald  v.  Connecticut  River  Paper  Co.,  155  Mass.  155,  29  N.  E.  464; 
Mahoney  v.  Dore,  155  Mass.  513,  30  N.  E.  306;  Orman  v.  Manuix,  17  Colo. 
504,  30  Pac.  1037. 

i34Leary  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  139  Mass.  580,  2  N.  E.  115;  Hogan  v. 
Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  53  Fed.  519.  See  cases  collected  in  14  Am.  &  Eng.  Euc. 
Law,  p.  859,  note  1. 


Ch.    13]  ASSUMPTION    OF    RISK    BY    SERVANT.  1025 

the  master,  goes  into  hazardous  work  outside  of  his  contract,  as- 
sumes the  consequent  risk."" 

However,  in  Smith  v.  Baker  ^•"'  a  servant  continued  in  a  work 
which  exposed  him  to  danger  resulting  from  his  employer's  negli- 
gence, and  fully  understood  and  appreciated  by  him.  It  was  held 
that  he  did  not  assume  this  risk  by  his  implied  contract  when  he 
entered  into  the  service,  and  that  he  did  not,  as  a  matter  of  law,  as- 
sume it  by  merely  remaining  in  a  place  which  his  master's  fault  had 
made  dangerous. 

But,  while  the  American  cases  have  scarcely  gone  so  far  as  this, 
they  do  distinguish  between  the  danger  of  the  service  into  which 
the  servant  originally  entered  and  subsequent  work  which  he  may 
be  directed  to,  and  may  actually,  undertake.  The  implied  assump- 
tion of  risk  does  not  apply  to  work  outside  the  scope  of  original  em- 
ployment where  there  are  dangers  peculiar  to  it,  and  unfamiliar  to 
the  servant.^'^  And  it  is  a  universally  recognized  principle  that 
where  a  youthful  and  inexperienced  employed  is,  without  his  parents' 
consent,  put  to  work  more  difficult  and  more  dangerous  than 
that  for  which  he  is  employed,  the  risks  are  not  assumed."'  The 
parent  is  negligent  who  allows  his  child  to  be  employed  in  a  danger- 
ous place,  as  a  mine,  without  stipulating  for  employment  that  will 

13  5  Pittsburgh,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Adams,  105  Ind.  151,  5  N.  E.  1S7; 
Wormell  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  79  Me.  397-410,  10  Atl.  49;  Prentiss  v.  Kent 
Furniture  Manuf  g  Co.,  63  Micli.  478-^82,  30  N.  W.  109. 

138  [1891]  App.  Cas.  325;  Mahoney  v.  Dore,  155  Mass.  513,  30  N.  E.  366; 
O'Maley  v.  Soutli  Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  158  Mass.  136,  32  N.  B.  1119. 

137  Ft.  Smith  Oil  Co.  v.  Slover,  58  Ark.  168,  24  S.  W.  106;  Consolidated 
Coal  Co.  V.  Haenni,  48  111  App.  115,  afHrmed  146  111.  614,  35  N.  E.  1IJ2 
(where  a  blacksmith  was  suddenly  called  from  his  shop  to  assist  in  hoisting 
a  heavy  smokestack,  without  a  chance  to  inspect  hoisting  apparatus) ;  Pxjel- 
tger  V.  Scherpe  &  Koken  Architectural  Iron  Co.,  124  JIo.  87,  27  S.  W.  460, 
(where  the  question  was  whether  the  selection  of  lumber  for  scaffold  was  un- 
usual course  of  employment.  He  did  not  under  such  circumstances  assume 
the  negligence  of  a  fellow  servant  in  the  new  employment);  Lalor  v.  Chi- 
cago, B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  52  111.  401;  Michael  v.  Roanoke  Mach.  Works,  90  Xa. 
492,  19  S.  B.  261.  However,  if  the  servant  is  instructed  as  to  and  familiar 
with  th(9  dangers  and  use  of  the  outside  work  (as  of  a  saw),  he  assumes  the 
risk.     Wheeler  v.  Berry,  95  Mich.  250,  54  N.  W.  876. 

138  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Fort,  17  Wall.  5.j3;  Id.,  2  Dill.  250,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
4,952;    Northern  Pac.  Coal  Co.  v.  Richmond,  7  C.  C.  A.  485,  58  Fed.  756. 

LAW  OF  TOUTS— 65  ' 


1026  MASTER    AND    SERVANT.  [Ch.   IS 

not  expose  Mm  to  danger  disproportioned  to  Ms  years  and  expe- 
rience.^^" 

Promise  to  Remedy. 

If  the  servant,  on  discovering  the  danger,  complain  thereof  to  the 
master,  and  the  master  directs  the  servant  to  continue  his  employ- 
ment notwithstanding,  and  promises  to  remedy  the  danger,  the  serv- 
ant can  sue  for  damages  resulting  from  such  danger.^*"  The  lead- 
ing case  on  this  familiar  rule  is  Hough  v.  Kailway  Co.^*^  In  this- 
case  the  plaintiff  was  injured  by  an  accident  which  happened  because 
of  the  defect  in  the  whistle  which  allowed  steam  to  escape  over  Mm 
when  the  accident  occurred,  and  because  of  the  defective  condition 
of  the  cowcatcher.  The  plaintiff  did  not  know  of  the  defect  in  the 
whistle,  but  did  know  of  the  defective  condition  of  the  cowcatcher, 
and  had  complained  thereof  to  both  master  mechanic  and  foreman 
of  the  roundhouse.  They  had  promised  that  it  would  be  properly 
remedied.  The  court  accepts  as  well  established  the  English  and 
American  rule,  as  follows:  "If  the  servant  [of  such  company]  notes 
the  defects  in  machinery,  gives  notice  thereof  to  the  proper  officer, 
and  is  promised  that  they  shall  be  remedied,  his  subsequent  use  of 
it,  in  the  well-grounded  belief  that  it  will  be  put  in  proper  condition 
within  a  reasonable  time,  does  not  necessarily,  as  a  matter  of  law, 
make  him  guilty  of  contributory  negligence.  It  is  a  question  for  the 
jury  whether  in  relying  upon  such  promise,  and  using  the  machinery 
after  he  knew  its  defective  or  insufficient  condition,  he  was  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  due  care.  The  burden  of  proof  in  such  a  case  is  upon  the 
company  to  show  contributory  negligence." 

But  it  must  appear  that  the  master,  and  not  some  unauthorized 

13  9  Weaver  v.  Iselin,  161  Pa.  St.  386,  29  Atl.  49  (a  mine). 

140  This  principle  applies  to  appliances  and  place.  Hough  v.  Texas  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  100  U.  S.  213;  Greene  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  31  Minn.  248, 
17  N.  W.  378;  Wuotilla  v.  Duluth  Lumber  Co.,  37  Minn.  153,  33  N.  W.  551; 
Lyberg  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  39  Minn.  15,  38  N.  W.  632. 

141  100  U.  S.  213.  Et  vide  New  Jersey  &  N.  Y.  R.  Co.  v.  Young,  1  C.  C.  A. 
428,  49  Fed.  723;  Indianapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Watson,  114  Ind.  20-27, 
14  N.  E.  721,  and  15  X.  E.  824;  Chicago  Drop  Forge  &  Foundry  Co.  v.  Van 
Dam,  140  111.  337,  30  N.  E.  1024;  Schlitz  v.  Fabst  Brewings;  Co.  (Minn.)  59  N. 
W.  188. 


^"h-    li^]  ASSrMPTION    OF    RISK    BY    SERVANT.  1027 

person,  made  the  promise  to  repair,'*-  and  the  promise  must  be 
clear.^*^  There  is,  however,  a  limit  to  this  rule.  If  the  instru- 
mentalities of  place  are  so  defective  and  dangerous,  imminently  and 
immediately,  that  a  man  of  ordinary  prudence  would  have  refused 
to  continue  work,  the  servant  is  negligent.^** 

Juslificalioii  in  Law. 

But  the  servant  is  not  bound  to  give  up  his  employment  merely  be- 
cause his  master  directs  him  to  undertake  extraordinarily  hazardous 
work.  He  has  a  right  to  have  his  fears  allayed  by  judgment  of  his 
master,  involved  in  command.  Thus,  if  a  laborer  employed  to  un- 
load cars  is  directed  by  his  master  to  couple  cars,  and,  while  so  doing, 
has  his  hands  crushed,  he  can  recover.' *°  This  is  especially  true 
when  the  unusual  danger  is  not  apparent  to  a  mind  like  the  serv- 
ant's.'*" If,  however,  the  call  to  do  unusual  work  is  for  a  fore- 
man's personal  benefit,  the  company  is  not  liable.^  ^'^  A  fortiori,  in 
many  cases  the  public  interest  is  a  good  reason  for  the  obedience  on 
the  part  of  servants  to  the  direction  of  the  employer  to  under- 

142  Chesapeake  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  McDowell  (Ky.)  24  S.  W.  GOT;  Elimcke 
V.  Porter,  45  Minn.  338,  47  N.  W.  10G6. 

143  Wilson  V.  Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  37  Minn.  326,  33  N.  W.  008.  A  mere 
acknowledgment  of  defect,  with  comment  that  he  (the  master)  was  busy, 
is  not  a  promise  to  remedy.  Breig  v.  Chicago,  W.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  98  Mich. 
222,  57  N.  W.  lis.  But  see  Indianapolis  Union  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ott  (Ind.  App.) 
38  N.  E.  842;  Rothenberger  v.  Northwestern  Consol.  Milling  Co.  (Minu.)  r>U 
N.  W.  531.  Where  there  is  complaint  without  redress  within  a  reasonable 
time,  employe  cannot  recover.  Morbach  v.  Home  Min.  Co.,  53  Kan.  7:;i,  ;!T 
i'ac.  122.  But  mere  complaint  (e.  g.  of  an  unmanageable  horse)  is  not 
enough.     Mahan  v.  Clee,  87  Mich.  IGl,  40  N.  W.  55G. 

i4t  Greene  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Uy.  Co.,  31  Minn.  248,  17  N.  W.  3TS: 
Russell  V.  Tillotson,  140  Jlnss.  201,  4  X.  E.  231;  Indianapolis  Union  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Ott  (Ind.  App.)  35  N.  E.  517,  38  N.  E.  842. 

no  Lalor  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.,  52  111.  401.  Et  vide  Jackson  v.  Geor- 
gia R.  Co.,  77  Ga.  82.  But  cf.  Leary  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  139  Mass.  580. 
2  N.  E.  115,  and  Wormell  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  79  Me.  307-410,  10  All.  49. 
But  an  employe  who,  knowing  that  men  inside  a  box  ear,  unloading  ties, 
had  not  been  warned  of  his  approach,  attempted  to  pass  near  the  car  with- 
out cautioning  the  men,  and  was  struck  by  a  tie,  was  guilty  of  contribu- 
tory negligence,  though  his  orders  required  him  to  pass  the  car  and  to 
"hurry."     Thoman  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  60  N.  W.  612. 

140  Colorado  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  16  Colo.  219,  27  Pac.  701. 

147  Hurst  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R-  Co.,  49  Iowa,  76. 


10-'8  MASIER    AND    SERVANT.  [Ch.    13 

take  unusual  risk.  Thus,  in  Campbell  v.  Railroad  Co.^*'  a  hand  car 
was  run  ahead  of  a  train  past  due.  The  court  said:  "There  is,  of 
course,  more  than  ordinary  danger  in  operating  a  hand  car  upon  a 
track  where  a  train  is  past  due  from  either  direction.  Yet,  we  have 
no  doubt  it  is  sometimes  nece.ssary  that  this  should  be  done.  If  sec- 
tion hands  should  refrain  from  going  upon  the  road  at  such  times, 
the  road  would  be  uninspected  no  inconsiderable  portion  of  the  time. 
The  necessity  of  inspection  and  repairs  must  be  as  great  when  the 
trains  are  past  due  as  at  any  other  time.  Indeed,  it  must  often  be 
greater.  *  *  *  xhe  safety  of  passengers  requires  that  vigilance 
respecting  the  roadbed  should  not  be  relaxed  at  all  timjs  when 
trains  are  past  due." 

Asmmption  not  Properly  Voluntary. 

As  has  been  shown,  the  maxim  '^''olenti  non  fit  injuria"  does  not 
apply  where  there  is  no  real  exercise  of  option  in  conduct.  A  specific 
application  of  this  general  principle  is  made  to  the  risks  assumed  by 
a  servant.  If  a  seaman  is  by  statute  bound  to  obey  orders,  he  does 
not  assume  the  risks  incident  to  operating  an  uncovered  winch,  in 
compliance  with  the  command  of  his  superior  offlcer.^*'  So,  a  con- 
vict working  under  a  contract  does  not  assume  the  risks  of  a  danger- 
ous place,  even  if  those  rislts  be  known  to  him,  because  his  move- 
ments are  controlled  by  a  guard.  ^^^  On  the  same  principle,  if  the 
servant  is,  by  the  wrong  of  the  master,  placed  in  a  position  of  immi- 

14S  45  Iowa,  76.  Et  vide  Frandsen  v.  Chicago.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  36  Iowa, 
372;  Sc'hroeder  v.  Chicago  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  108  ilo.  322,  18  S.  W.  1004.  A  serv- 
ant may  rely  on  a  vice  principal's  promise  to  protect  him  notwithstanding  a 
violation  of  a  rule  where  there  is  an  emergency.  Moore  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  & 
P.  R.  Co.,  85  Mo.  588.  Cf.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Hammond, 
58  Ark.  324,  24  S.  W.  723.  And  see  Fox  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.  &  IC  C.  R.  Co., 
86  Iowa,  36S,  53  N.  W.  2.50;  East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bridges,  02 
Ga.  399,  17  S.  E.  645.  An  engineer  discovering  defects  after  commencement  of 
trip  is  not  necessarily  negligent  In  not  immediately  ahandoning  same.  For- 
dyce  V.  Edwards  (Avk.)  30  S.  W.  758.  Adhere  plaintiff,  a  brakeman  acting 
under  orders  from  his  superior,  attempted  to  couple  cars,  knowing  that  a  pas- 
senger train  was  soon  due,  and  that  unless  the  coupling  was  made  there  would 
be  danger  of  collision,  his  knowledge  of  defects  in  a  pilot  bar  used  in  coupling 
will  not  preclude  a  recovery  for  injuries  caused  thereby.  Strong  v.  Iowa  Cent. 
Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  62  N.  W.  799. 

lio  Eldridge  v.  Atlas  S.  S.  Co.,  134  N.  Y.  187,  .32  N.  E.  66. 

150  Chattahoochee  Brick  Co.  v.  Braswell,  92  Ga.  681,  18  S.  E.  1015. 


^^^-    i3]  ASSUMPTION    OF    RISK    BY    SERVANT.  1029 

nent  peril,  lie  is  not  guilty  of  contributory  negligence  if,  in  his  en- 
deavor to  escape  dangers  for  which  the  master  provided  no  escape, 
he  takes  the  means  to  preserve  his  life  vrhich  result  in  his  death."^ 


SAME— EISK  OF  FELLOW  SERVANTS. 

286.  "A  servant,  when  he  engages  to  serve  a  master,  un- 
dertakes, as  between  himself  and  his  master,  to  run 
all  the  ordinary  risks  of  the  service,  including  the 
risk  of  negligence  upon  the  part  of  a  fellow  servant 
when  he  is  acting  in  the  discharge  of  his  duty  as 
servant  of  him  who  is  the  common  master  to 
both,"  1*2  unless, 

(a)  The  master's  negligence  in  the  employment  of  such 

fellow^  servant,  or 

(b)  His  wrong  in  some  other  respect,  was  the  juridical 

cause  of  the  injury. 

The  rule  as  to  fellow  servants  is  of  modern  origin,  and  is  judge- 
made  law.  The  earliest  case  on  the  point  is  said  to  be  Priestly  v. 
Fowler  (1837)."'  This  is  regarded  as  not  strictly  a  fellow-servant 
case,  at  all.^°*  English  courts,  however,  consider  it  the  first  case.^°° 
The  rule  was  first  indisputably  enunciated  in  1841,  in  a  South  Car- 
olina case  (Murray  v.  Kailroad  Co.).^^*'     The  opinion,  however,  which 

iBi  This  was  applied  in  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Sliivell's  Adm'r  (Ky.) 
18  S.  W.  944,  to  this  set  of  facts.  Plaintiff's  intestate  was  endeavoring  to 
remove  driftwood  lodged  against  defendant's  temporary  bridge.  The  bridge 
was  in  imminent  danger  of  giving  way.  The  bridge  gave  way,  and  defend- 
ant, to  save  his  life,  swam  ashore.  Other  workmen  escaped  by  remaining 
on  part  of  the  drift  which  remained  stationary.  Plaintiff's  intestate  was 
drowned,  but  recovery  was  allowed.  And  see  Schmidt  v.  Montana  Cent.  Ry. 
Co.  (llout.)  38  Pac.  220. 

152  Tunney  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.  (1866)  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  291-206.  And  see  Lov- 
ell  V.  Howell  (1876)  1  C.  P.  Div.  161-167. 

153  3  Mees.  &  AV.  1.  In  1850  (Hutchinson  v. Railway  Co.,  5  Exch.  343)  the 
English  courts  adopted  the  rule  fully  and  completely.  See,  also,  Wigmore  v. 
Jay,  Id.  3.-)4. 

154  24  Am.  Law  Rev.  179. 

150  Griffiths  V.  Earl  of  Dudley,  9  Q.  B.  Div.  3.57-365. 
106  1  McMul.  (S.  O.)  385. 


lOoO  MASTER    AxNl)    SERVANT.  [Ch.    13 

really  establislie'd  the  doctrine,  was  that  of  Chief  Justice  Shaw  in 
Parwell  v.  Boston  &  W.  E.  Co.,  in  1842.^"  In  1858  the  Scottish 
courts  adopted  the  rule,  and  in  the  case  of  Bartonshill  Coal  Co.  v. 
Reid  '"  reported  in  full  Chief  Justice  Shaw's  masterly  judgment. 

Aduption  of  the  Rule. 

Tlie  rule  as  to  master  and  servant  thus  came  to  be  accepted  by 
the  English-speaking  people.  It  is  unknown,  however,  beyond  them.^'" 
The  doctrine  of  Farwell's  Case  has  never  been  judicially  denied  in 
Great  Britain.  Justice  Gray^""  has  called  attention  to  two  cases 
having  a  tendency  to  support  the  opposite  conclusion, — one  in  Ten- 
nessee,^"^ and  another  in  Wisconsin.^"^  The  latter  case  has  been 
dviuiuled.^''^  Other  courts  have  excepted  from  the  rule  certain 
<ases."*  Mr.  Justice  Brewer  says,  in  its  defense:  ^°^  ''The  princi- 
ples in  Farwell's  Case  may  not  be  obviously  and  unquestionably 
correct.  They  may  be,  ere  long,  entirely  overthrown.  But,  if  over- 
thrown, it  should  be  by  legislative  action,  and  not  by  judicial  de- 
cision. *  «  »  Farwell's  Case  may  be  limited  by  the  legislatures, 
but  its  general  principle  rests  on  reason  and  the  nature  of  things, 
and  will  remain.  I  cannot,  however,  doubt  the  soundness  of  the 
utterance  that  after  50  years  of  almost  universal  acceptance  it  has 
become  incorporated  into  our  general  law,  and  that  it  is  not  with- 
in the  rightful  competency  of  the  judicial  power  either  to  overthrow 
or  to  substantially  sustain  it."     The  federal  courts,  accordingly,  rec- 

107  4  Mete.  (Mass.)  49. 

10  8  3  Macq.  2m.  In  Wilson  v.  Meri-y  (1868)  L.  R.  1  H.  L.  Sc.  326,  the  rule  was 
oxtencled  to  injuries  caused  to  a  workman  by  a  foreman  occupying  a  position 
of  superintendent  in  the  same  department. 

iss  Pol.  Torts,  p.  85. 

100  Randall  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  109  U.  S.  478^84,  3  Sup.  Ct.  322. 

lei  Haynes  v.  East  Tennessee  &  G.  R.  Co.,  3  Cold.  222. 

10  2  Chamberlain  v.  Milwaukee  &  M.  R.  Co.  (1860)  11  Wis.  248. 

103  Jioseley  v.  Chamberlan,  18  Wis.  731;  Cooper  v.  Milwaukee  &  P.  Ry. 
Co..  23  Wis.  668. 

184  Gillenwater  v.  Madison  &  I.  R.  Co.,  5  Ind.  339;  Fitzpatrick  v.  New  Al- 
bany &  S.  R.  Co.,  7  Ind.  436;  Little  Miami  R.  Co.  v.  Stevens,  20  Ohio,  415; 
Cleveland,  C.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerry,  3  Ohio  St.  201. 

165  Howard  v.  Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co.,  26  Fed.  837.  A  collection  of  cases 
will  be  found  in  Randall  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  109  U.  S.  478-484,  3  Sup. 
Ct  322,  in  Mechem,  Ag.  §  667,  and  in  Wood,  JIast.  &  Serv.  §  427,  note  (>. 


^h.    13]  ASSUMPTION    OF    RISK    BY    SERVANT.  1031 

ognized  the  general  doctrine,  and,  when  construing  the  common  law 
of  a  particular  state  on  this  point  (in  the  absence  of  statute),  they 
regard  the  question  as  of  construction  of  general  contract  of  service, 
and  not  as  a  rule  of  property.  Therefore,  under  such  circum- 
stances, local  decisions  do  not  control.^"^ 

Reason  of  the  Rule. 

I'he  doctrine  of  the  assumption  by  the  servant  of  the  risk  of  the 
negligence  of  his  fellow  servant  is  justified  on  several  grounds. 

Thus,  it  is  urged  that  it  is  expedient  to  throw  the  risk  on  those 
who  can  best  guard  against  it,^"^  and  that  its  moral  effect  tends  to 
secure  the  exercise  of  a  greater  degree  of  care  and  caution  by  em- 
ployes. ^"^  However,  the  opposite  rule  would  tend  to  secure  greater 
diligence  on  the  part  of  the  employer  in  securing  the  employ^  against 
such  danger. 

It  is  more  generally,  and  in  addition,  assigned  as  a  reason,  that 
the  servant  enters  into  a  contract  with  reference  to,  and  impliedly 
assumes  the  risks  resulting  from,  the  negligence  of  his  fellow  serv- 
ants. ^"^  Ordinarily,  however,  there  is  no  actual  or  real  consent, 
either  expressed  or  implied,  on  the  part  of  the  servant,  to  such  risks. 
In  the  great  majority  of  cases,  he  is  likely  to  know  nothing  of  such 

166  Newport  News  &  M.  V.  Co.  v.  Howe,  3  C.  C.  A.  121,  52  Fed-.  3G2.  As  to 
Kentucky  rule  tliat  brakeman  and  engineer  are  not  fellow  servants,  see  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  Co.  V.  Brooks'  Adm'x,  83  Ky.  131.  And  see  Louisville  &  N.  11. 
Co.  V.  Bi-antley's  Adm'r  (Ky.)  28  S.  W.  477. 

167  This  was  urged,  inter  alia,  by  Shaw,  C.  .!.,  in  Farwell  v.  Boston  &  W. 
R.  Corp.,  4  Jletc.  (Mass.)  49.  It  is  contended  in  argument  by  defendant  in 
error  in  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Hambly,  154  U.  S.,  at  page  352,  14  Sup.  Ct.  iiS-!, 
that  this  was  not  a  good  reason  when  enunciated,  and.  when  applied  to  rail- 
road corporations  of  the  present  day,  it  is  entirely  unfounded  and  misleading. 

los  Sullivan  v.  Mississippi  &  M.  R.  Co.,  11  Iowa,  421. 

169  "Strangers  can  hold  the  master  liable  for  the  negligence  of  a  servant 
about  his  business.  But,  in  the  case  where  the  person  injured  is  himself  a 
servant  in  the  same  business,  he  is  not  in  the  same  position  as  a  stranger.  He 
has  of  his  free  will  entered  into  the  business,  and  made  it  his  own.  He  cann')t 
say  to  the  master,  'You  shall  so  conduct  your  business  as  not  to  injure  me  by 
want  of  due  care  and  caution  therein';  for  he  has  agreed  with  the  master  to 
serve  in  that  business,  and  his  claims  on  the  master  depend  on  the  contract  of 
sei-vice.  Why  should  it  be  an  implied  term  of  that  contract,  not  being  an 
express  one,  that  the  master  shall  indemnify  him  against  the  negligence  of  a 
fellow  servant  or  any  other  current  risk?     It  is  rather  to  be  implied  that  he 


1032  MASTER    AXD    SERVANT.  [Ch.    Vj 

lule,  and  is  surprised,  aftei-  damage  done,  to  learn  of  it.  The  rule, 
therefore,  cannot  be  said  to  be  justified  by  any  such,  implied  promise 
as  is  inferred  from  mere  purchase  and  delivery  of  goods,  to  pay  their 
reasonable  value.  The  rule  is  implied  into  the  contract  in  this 
sense:  That  a  contract  piactically  consists  of  three  things:  (a)  Its 
terms;  (b)  the  law  applicable  to  it,  in  existence,  inter  alia,  at  the 
lime  of  its  execution;  ^'"'  and  (c)  the  surrounding  circumstances,  in 
the  light  of  which  it  is  to  be  explained  and  applied.^^^  Accordingly, 
the  established  rule  of  law  as  to  the  assumption  of  the  risk  of  the 
negligence  of  a  fellow  servant  is  incorporated  into  the  contract, 
without  reference  to  the  knowledge  or  consent  of  the  parties,  just 
as  interest  is  added  to  a  bare  promise  to  pay. 

As  to  the  rule  itself,  thus  incorporated,  if  it  were  the  application 
to  the  relationship  of  master  and  servant  of  the  general  principle 
of  assumption  of  risk  by  all  persons,  mutatis  mutandis,  no  objection 
would  seem  reasonable.  Every  person  may  assume  risk,  and  pre- 
vent recovery  for  consequent  damages. 

A  servant  should  come  under  this  rule,  and  be  held  to  assume  cer- 
tain risks  peculiar  to  his  employment.  But  here  arises  the  diffi- 
culty, i.  e.  in  changing  the  general  doctrine  of  the  assumption  of 
risk  to  meet  changes  in  the  relationship.  The  risk  of  negligence  of 
a  fellow  sei'vant  might  have  been  at  one  time  fairly  classed  as  one 
of  the  ordinary  risks  of  the  service.  Employments  were  simple, 
and  not  hazardous.  Fellow  servants  were  comparatively  few  in 
number,  and,  as  a  rule,  well  known  in  the  community.  Cut  the  con- 
contracted  with  the  risk  before  his  eyes,  and  that  the  dangers  of  the  service, 
taken  all  round,  were  considered  in  fixing  the  rate  of  payment."  Pol.  Torts, 
85.  And  see  Pol.  Jur.  &  Ethics,  pp.  127,  128,  131,  133;  Lord  Cranworth,  in 
Bartonshill  Coal  Co.  v.  Eeid,  3  Macq.  382;  Cairns,  L.  C,  in  Wilson  v.  Merry, 
L.  B  1  H.  L.  Sc.  32G;  Priest,  D.  J.,  in  Martin  v.  Chicago  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  65  Fed. 
38  Justice  Field,  in  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Herbert,  116  U.  S.  642,  6  Sup. 
Ct.  590;  Justice  Harlan,  in  Hough  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  100  U.  S.  213;  Gib- 
son V.  Railroad  Co.,  46  Mo.  163. 

i-ro  Stahl  v.  Mitchell,  41  Minn.  325,  43  N.  W.  385. 

171  Thus,  a  custom  may  be  incorporated  into  a  contract.  Where  a  contract 
of  shipment  by  rail  does  not  define  what  shall  constitute  a  car  load,  a  general 
custom  among  railroad  men  and  shippers,  by  which  a  car  load  is  made  to  con- 
sist of  a  certain  number  of  pounds,  governs  the  contract.  Good  v.  Chicago, 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  60  N.  W.  631. 


Ch.    13]  ASSUMPTION    OF    EISK    BY    SERVANT.  1033 

servatism  of  the  courts  has  preserved  the  rule,  since  its  first  bold 
enunciation,  when  strict  logic  would  have  justified  its  modification 
and  adaptation  to  the  changes  in  the  risks  to  which  it  applies. 
Present  developments  of  steam  and  electricity;  the  wonderful  speed, 
the  enormous  weight,  and  marvelous  power  of  modem  machinery; 
the  great  number  of  employes;  the  impossibility  of  knowing  or  as- 
certaining their  characters;  the  inability  of  men  to  estimate  the 
dangers  to  which  they  are  exposed, — have  brought  it  to  pass  thnt 
the  rule  is  felt  to  work  great  injustice  and  unjustifiable  hardship. 
This  feeling  is  especially  justified  inasmuch  as  the  rights  of  the 
servant  seem  to  be  almost  the  only  ones  not  regulated  by  the  general 
law,  and  inasmuch  as  passengers,  for  example,  find  all  presumptions 
of  law  in  their  favor,  and  even  strangers  receive  fair  application  of 
general  rules.''^  In  some  measure,  the  courts  have  met  tliis  feeling 
by  treating  the  assumption  of  risk  as  a  question  of  fact,  to  be  de- 
termined by  the  jury,  and  by  allowing  the  jury  to  determine  the 
relationship  of  fellow  servant.^'^  However,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  in 
a  great  many  cases,  courts  decide  the  question  as  a  matter  of  law. 

In  order  that  the  fellow-servant  rule  should  apply,  it  is  necessary 
that  the  complainant  and  the  servant  whose  negligence  causes  the 
wrong  should  have  a  common  master.^'*    It  applies  only  where  the 

172  On  this  general  subject  Mr.  David  Gibbon  says:  "The  common  sense  of 
servants  rebels  against  this  law.  Witness  the  many  actions  they  have  brought. 
The  common  sense  of  masters  does  not  confirm  it.  When  a  servant  is  slain 
or  mutilated  in  a  master's  business,  assisting  to  make  his  fortune,  he  feels 
and  linows  that  a  claim  on  him  arises  different  in  nature  from  that  which  a 
sufCerer  by  a  calamity  has  upon  the  public.  Some  masters  make  compensa- 
tion as  a  matter  of  right;  others,  while  deploring  the  accident  and  not  admit- 
ting legal  liability,  are  willing  to  make  the  servant  a  present.  None  recom- 
mend the  applicant  to  seek  a  general  subscription,  or  mock  him  by  telliu;;  him 
that  the  wages  he  has  received  are  the  agreed  compensation  for  his  lr-«s."' 
Note  on  "Negligence"  in  Gale.  Easm.  429. 

17  3  Wenona  Coal  Co.  v.  Holmquist,  152  111.  581,  38  N.  E.  946;  Mexican  Nat. 
R.  Co.  V.  Finch  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  1028;  Northern  Pac.  Coal  Co.  v. 
Richmond,  7  C.  C.  A.  485,  58  Fed.  756;  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Middleton, 
142  111.  550,  32  N.  E.  453. 

174  Sullivan  v.  Tioga  R.  Co.,  112  N.  X.  643,  20  N.  E.  569;  Sanford  v.  Stanc^- 
ard  Oil  Co.,  118  N.  Y.  574,  24  N.  E.  313;  Johnson  v.  Netherlands  Am.  Steam 
Nav.  Co.,  132  N.  Y.  576-578,  30  N.  E.  505;  Devlin  v.  Smith,  89  N.  Y.  470; 
Catawlssa  R.  Co.  v.  Armstrong,  49  Pa.  St.  186;  Johnson  v.  Spear,  76  Mich. 
139,  42  N.  W.  1092. 


1034  MASTER    AND    SERVANT.  [Ch.    13 

servant  sues  his  own  master.^'"'  Therefore,  damages  to  a  servant 
for  injury  to  his  wife  produced  by  the  negligence  of  a  fellow  servant 
may  be  recovered  from  the  employer.^^" 

Where  a  servant  in  the  general  employ  of  one  master  is  by  him 
placed  temporarily  under  the  order  of  another,  to  do  the  latter's 
work,  the  servant  of  the  latter,  and  the  servant  so  placed  to  work 
with  him,  are  fellow  servants  in  that  work,  and  neither  master  is 
liable  for  the  damages  resulting  to  one  of  those  servants  from  the 
negligence  of  the  other  while  performing  the  same.^^^  The  rule  does 
not  apply  where  the  employment  is  the  same  but  the  masters  dif- 
ferent."*    And,  if  the  master  personally  assist  in  the  common  work, 

"0  Smith  V.  New  York  &  H.  R.  Co.,  19  N.  Y.  127-132;  Young  v.  New  York 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  30  Barb.  229;  Gerlach  v.  Edelmeyer,  88  N.  Y.  615;  Burke  v. 
Norwich  &  W.  R.  Co.,  34  Conn.  124.  Unless  the  person  sought  to  be  ren- 
<lered  liable  for  the  negligence  of  his  servant  can  show  that  the  person  so 
seeking  to  make  him  liable  was  held  in  his  service,  the  defense  of  common 
employment  is  not  to  him.  Johnson  v.  Lindsay  [1891]  App.  Cas.  371; 
Cameron  v.  Nystrom  [1893]  1  Reports,  362,  App.  Cas.  308.  Et  vide  Abra- 
ham V.  Reynolds,  5  Hurl.  &  N.  142;  Swainson  v.  Northeastern  Ry.  Co.,  3  Exch. 
Div.  341;  "Warburton  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  2  Exch.  30;  Farrant  v. 
Barnes,  11  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  553. 

17C  Campbell  v.  Harris,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  636,  23  S.  W.  35;  Gannon  v.  Housa- 
tonic  R.  R.,  112  Mass.  234.  And  see  Brown  v.  Sullivan,  71  Tex.  470,  10  S. 
W.   288. 

177  Cregan  v.  Marston,  126  N.  Y.  573,  27  N.  E.  952;  Coyle  v.  Pierrepont,  S'S 
Hun,  311;  Burke  v.  De  Castro  &  D.  S.  R.  Co.,  11  Hun,  354;  Winterbottom 
T.  Wright,  10  Mees.  &  W.  109;  Murray  v.  Currie,  L.  R.  6  C.  P.  24;  The 
Harold,  21  Fed.  428;  The  Islands,  28  Fed.  478;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Cox, 
21  111.  20;  Svenson  v.  Atlantic  Mail  S.  S.  Co.,  57  N.  Y.  108;  Abraham  v. 
Reynolds,  5  Hurl.  &  N.  142.  While  a  coal  train  of  defendant  railroad  com- 
pany, whose  tracks  ran  over  the  docks  of  a  coal  company,  was  delivering 
coal  to  the  latter  company,  a  brakeman  of  the  coal  company,  engaged  in 
coupling  cars  of  the  train,  was  injured  by  the  negligence  of  defendant's  en- 
gineer. Held,  that  such  engineer  was  not  a  fellow  employs  of  the  injured 
brakeman,  he  not  being  under  the  power  and  direction  of  the  coal  company, 
engaged  exclusively  in  doing  its  work  or  "lent"  to  it  for  the  occasion.  (Ewan 
V.  Lippincott,  47  N.  J.  Law,  192;  Johnson  v.  Boston,  118  Mass.  114;  Rourke 
V.  White  Moss  Colliery  Co.,  46  Law  J.  C.  P.  283,— distinguished.)  Central 
Railroad  of  New  Jersey  v.  Stoermer,  2  C.  C.  A.  360,  51  Fed.  518. 

178  Kelly  V.  Johnson,  128  Jlass.  530;  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Con- 
roy,  63  Miss.  562;  Phillips  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  64  Wis.  475,  25 
N.   W.   544.     As   where   servants   of   difCeient   masters   are   engaged   on   the 


^^]  ASSUMPTION    OF    KISK    BY    SERVANT.  lO'J^ 

he  is  liable  to  liis  employes  for  his  negligence.""  Wliere  one  per- 
son lends  his  servant  to  another  for  a  particular  employment,  the 
servant,  for  anything  done  in  that  particular  employment,  must  be 
dealt  with  as  a  servant  of  the  man  to  whom  he  is  lent,  although  he 
remains  the  general  servant  of  the  person  wlio  lent  him;  and,  if 
the  servant  receives  injuries  in  such  employment  from  the  negli- 
gence of  a  servant  of  the  person  to  whom  he  is  lent,  he  cannot  re- 
cover therefor.is"  The  rule  applies  to  volunteers.^"  A  person  who, 
in  the  transaction  of  common  interest,  assists  the  servant  of  another 
employer,  with  such  employer's  consent,  however,  has  been  held  en- 
titled to  recovery  for  the  hitter's  negligence.^^^  Servants  of  differ- 
ent connecting  lines  are  not  fellow  servants,  whatever  the  agreement 
between  those  connecting  lines  may  be."^     Servants  of  an  employer 

same  building.  Morgan  v.  Smitli,  159  Mass.  570,  35  N.  E.  101;  Burrill  v. 
Eddy,  IGO  Mass.  198,  35  N.  E.  4S:j.  And,  generally,  as  to  servants  of  dif- 
ferent masters,  see  Conlan  v.  New  Xork  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  71  Hun,  115, 
26  N.  Y.  Supp.  659;  Robertson  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  160  Mass.  191,  .•;.".  X. 
E.  775;  Union  Pae.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kelley,  4  Colo.  App.  325,  35  Pac.  92:!;  Alton 
Lime  &  Cement  Co.  v.  Calvey,  47  111.  App.  343.  A  driver  of  a  team  was  not 
a  fellow  servant  of  one  employed  on  city  work,  though  they  were  working 
to  a  common  end,  if,  in  backing  the  team,  he  was  not  under  the  control  and 
direction  of  the  city  foreman.  Reagan  v.  Casey,  160  Mass.  374,  36  N.  E.  5S; 
Gannon  v.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  112  Mass.  334;  Svenson  v.  Atlantic  Mail  S.  S. 
Co.,  33  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  Rep.  277,  affirmed  57  N.  Y.  108;  Devlin  v.  Smith, 
89  N.  Y.  470;  Harkins  v.  Standard  Sugar  Refinery,  122  Mass.  400;  .Tohu- 
son  V.  Spear,  76  Mich.  139,  42  N.  W.  1092;  Zeigler  v.  Danbury  &  N.  R.  Co., 
52  Conn.  543;  Lake  Superior  Iron  Co.  v.  Erickson,  39  Mich.  492;  Stetler  v. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  46  Wis.  497,  1  N.  W.  112. 

!■  9  Ash  worth  v.  Stanwix,  3  El.  &  El.  701;  Lorentz  v.  Robinson,  61  Md.  64; 
Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cummings,  106  U.  S.  700,  1  Sup.  Ct.  493. 

ISO  Hasty  v.  Sears,  157  Mass.  123,  31  N.  E.  759. 

181  Potter  V.  Faulkner,  31  Law  J.  Q.  B.  30;  Holmes  v.  Northeastern  Ry. 
Co.,  L.  R.  4  Exch.  254;  Millsaps  v.  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  60  Miss. 
423,  13  South.  696. 

182  Eason  v.  Sabine  &  E.  T.  Ry.  Co.,  65  Tex.  577;  Chica,go,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  AVest,  125  111.  320,  17  N.  E.  788. 

183  Sullivan  v.  Tioga  R.  Co.,  112  N.  Y.  643,  20  N.  E.  569;  Catawissa  R.  Co. 
V.  Armstrong,  49  Pa.  St.  186;  Sawyer  v.  Rutland  &  B.  R.  Co.,  27  A^t.  370; 
Stetler  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  46  Wis.  497,  1  N.  W.  112;  Smith  v.  New 
York  &  H.  R.  Co.,  19  N.  Y.  127;  Alerrill  v.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co.,  .14  Xt  200; 
Connolly  v.  Davidson,  15  Minn.  519  (Gil.  428);    Taylor  v.   Western   Pac.   R. 


10o6  MASTEK    AND    SEIiVANT.  [Ch.    13"- 

and  the  servants  of  his  independent  contractors  are  not  fellow  serv- 
ants,^*'' nor  are  servants  of  a  subcontractor  fellow  servants  of  the- 
contractor's  employer.^*' 

287.  The  English  courts  determine  the  relationship  of  fel- 
low servants  by  the  test  of  common  employment. 

The  English  cases  have  rejected  the  doctrine  of  vice  principal  or 
deputy  master.  Such  a  principle  was  apparently  assumed  in  Mur- 
phy V.  Smith/*"  but  has  been  abandoned.^*'  "I  cannot  say  that 
Thomas  (the  manager  of  the  mine)  was  here  anything  more  than  a 
vice  principal  or  manager,  and  he  was  therefore  a  fellow  servant." 
Mr.  Pollock  states  the  rule  as  to  common  employment  as  follows: 
"All  persons  engaged  imder  the  same  employer  for  the  purposes- 
of  the  same  business,  however  different  in  detail  those  purposes! 
uuiy  be,  are  fellow  servants.  The  kind  of  work  need  not  be  the- 
same;  the  employer  must  be.  They  need  not  be  engaged  in  the- 
same  department  of  service,  but  they  must  be  working  for  a  com- 
mon object."  ^**  Thus,  where  the  one  in  the  employment  of  a  rail- 
Co.,  45  Cal.  323;  Zeigler  v.  Danbury  &  N.  R.  Co.,  52  Conn.  343;  Gray  v.- 
Pliiladelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.,  24  Fed.  168. 

isiCougMry  v.  Globe  Woolen  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  124;  Haas  v.  Philadelphia  & 
S.  M.  S.  S.  Co.,  88  Pa.  St.  269;  Cunningham  v.  International  R.  Co.,  51  Tex. 
503;  Goodfellow  v.  Boston,  H.  &  E.  R.  Co.,  106  Mass.  461;  Lake  Superior 
Iron  Co.  V.  Erickson,  39  Mich.  492.  And  see  Svenson  v.  Atlantic  Mail  S.  S> 
Co.,  57  N.  Y.  108;  LouisviUe,  N.  O.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Conroy,  63  Miss.  562.  But 
see  Ewan  v.  Lippincott,  47  N.  J.  Law,  192;  Johnson  v.  City  of  Boston,  lis 
Mass.  114;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Cox,  21  IlL  20;  Charles  v.  Taylor,  3  C. 
P.  Dlv.  492. 

185  Wiggett  v.  Fox,  11  Bxch.  832;  Murray  v.  Currie,  L.  R.  6  O.  P.  24;  Cur- 
ley  V.  Harris,  11  Allen,  112. 

ISO  19  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  3G1. 

1S7  Smith,  Mast.  &  S.  257;  Wilson  v.  Merry,  L.  R.  1  H.  L.  Sc.  326;  Howells 
V.  Landore,  etc.,  Steel  Co.  (1874)  L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  62;  The  Petrel,  1  Pet.  651;. 
Thomp.  Xeg.  1026-1031. 

188  Pol.  Torts,  86-88.  Under  statute,  see  Dantzler  v.  De  Bardeleben  Coal 
&  Iron  Co.,  101  Ala.  309,  14  South.  10;  Jenkins  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co., 
39  S.  C.  507,  18  S.  E.  182;  Conley  v.  Portland,  78  Me.  217,  3  Atl.  658.  In 
25  Am.  Law  Keg.  676,  fellow  servants  are  defined  to  be  those  who  are  (1) 
employes  of  the  same  master,  (2)  under  the  same  control,  (3)  in  the  same- 
common  employment. 


Ch.    1.1]  AS3U-MPTI0N'    OF    RISK    BY    SERVAKT.  1037 

Avav  company  as  carpenter  to  do  any  carpenter's  work  for  tlie  gen- 
«eral  purposes  of  tlie  company  was  standing  on  the  scaffolding  at 
work  on  a  shed  close  to  the  line  of  the  railway,  when  some  porters 
in  the  service  of  the  company  'carelessly  shifted  an  engine  so  that 
it  struck  the  support  of  the  scaffolding,  thereby  throwing  the  car- 
penter down  and  injuring  liim,  the  company  was  held  not  liable.^*" 
The  test  is  exceedingly  unsatisfactory,  because  of  the  unavoidable 
•difficulty  of  determining  what  is  a  common  employment.  This 
varies  with  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  And  so  the  test  is  so 
broad  as  to  be  of  doubtful  value  in  practical  application.  It  almost 
leaves  every  case  to  be  decided  on  its  own  facts.  "The  difficulty 
"with  the  definition  is  that  it  needs  defining."  ^'° 

288.  The  American  cases"'  incline  to  adopt,  as  the  test  of 
•whether  the  plaintiff  and  another  servant  are  fel- 
lo-w  servants  of  the  same  master,  the  doctrine  of 
vice  principal. 

589.  A  vice  principal,  as  distinguished  from  a  fellow  serv- 
ant, is  one  to  -whom  the  master  has  delegated  some 
absolute  duty  o-wed  by  the  master  to  his  servants. 
For  the  negligence  of  such  vice  principal,  at  least 
so  long  as  he  is  engaged  in  the  performance  of  such 
duty,  the  master  is  responsible  to  other  servants. 

'Confusion  in  Opinion, 

There  is  probably  no  subject  connected  with  the  law  of  negligence 
Ihat  has  given  rise  to  more  variety  of  opinion  than  that  of  fellow 

180  Morgan  v.  Vale  of  Neath  Ry.  Co.,  5  Best;&  S.  570,  L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  149; 
:Swainson  v.  North  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  3  Exch.  Div.  341.  Et  vide  Catawissa 
R.  Co.  V.  Armstrong,  49  Pa.  St;  186;  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  127  111. 
•(i37,  21  N.  E.  203;  Joliet  Steel  Co.  v.  Shields,  134  111.  209,  2.5  N.  E.  509; 
Sloynihan  v.  Hills  Co.,  146  Mass.  586-594,  16  N.  E.  574;  Webb  v.  Denver 
&  R.  G.  R.  Co.,  7  Utah,  363,  26  Pac.  981;  Dixon  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.. 
109  Mo.  413.  19  S.  W.  412.  Et  vide  Griffiths  v.  AVolfram,  22  Minn.  185; 
'Osborne  v.  Morgan,  130  Mass.  102. 

190  Cooley,  Torts,  544,  note  1;  Thomp.  Neg.  1026-1031;  3  Wood,  R.  R. 
I  388;    Beach,  Contrib.  Neg.  §  324. 

101  Hawkins  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (N.  Y.  App.)  37  N.  E.  400; 
3Ionmouth  ilin.  &  Manuf  g  Co.  v.  Erling  (lU.  Sup.)  36  N.  E.  117.    And  see 


10.';.^  MASTER    AM)    .SEIIVANT.  [Ch.    13 

servants.  The  authorities  are  hopelessly  divided  upon  the  general 
subject,  as  well  as  upon  the  (Question  here  involved.  "It  is  useless 
to  attempt  an  analysis  of  the  cases  which  have  arisen  in  the  courts 
of  the  several  states,  since  they  are  wholly  irreconcilable  in  priu- 
ciple,  and  too  numerous  even  to  justify  citation."  ^"^  It  would  seem, 
however,  that  tliere  is  a  very  general  tendency  on  the  part  of 
American  cases  to  refuse  to  determine  the  relation  by  mere  refer- 

Balley,  Mast.  &  S.  cc.  12-18,  ■wherein  the  rules  adopted  in  various  states 
are  formulated. 

192  Mr.  Justice  Brown,  in  Northern  Pae.  K.  Co.  v.  Hambly,  154  U.  S.  340- 
355,  14  Sup.  Ct.  983.  The  confusion  on  the  subject  appears  fully  in  the 
cases  of  railroad  employes.  Among  the  recent  cases  in  which  such  persons 
have  been  held  to  be  fellow  seiTants  are  Rutledge  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.,  123  Mo.  121,  24  S.  W.  1(153,  affirmed  in  27  S.  W.  327  (switchman  and 
engineer);  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Charless,  2  C.  C.  A.  3S0,  51  Fed.  5G7, 
distinguished,  and  McKaig  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  42  Fed.  288,  approved, 
in  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark,  6  C.  C.  A.  281,  57  Fed.  125 
(telegraph  operator  and  fireman);  Kerlin  v.  Chicago,  P.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.,  50 
Fed.  185,  followed  in  Becker  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  57  Fed.  188  (con- 
ductor and  bralveman);  La  Pierre  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  Ry.  Co.,  99  Mich.  212, 
58  N.  W.  60  (Id.);  Campbell  v.  Cook,  86  Tex.  630,  26  S.  ^\.  480  (Id.);  South 
Florida  R.  Co.  v.  Price,  32  Fla.  46,  13  South.  638  (engineer,  brakeman,  and 
conductor);  .Tenkins  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  30  S.  C.  507,  18  S.  E.  182 
(fireman  and  conductor);  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Baugh,  149  XJ.  S.  308, 
13  Sup.  Ct.  914;  Jarman  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  Ry.  Co.,  98  Mich.  135,  57  N, 
W.  32  (fireman  and  conductor);  Schaible  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
07  Mich.  318,  56  N.  W.  565  (ti-ackman  and  trainman);  Ellington  v.  Beaver 
Dam  Lumber  Co..  93  Ga.  53,  19  S.  E.  21;  Watts  v.  Hart,  7  Wash.  178.  34 
Pac.  423,  771  (engineer,  fireman,  and  laborer);  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 
V.  Martin  (N.  JI.)  34  Pac.  536  (conductor,  engineer,  and  laborer);  Northern 
Pac.  R.  Co.  V.  Plambly,  154  XJ.  S.  349,  14  Sup.  Ct.  983  (conductor,  engineer, 
and  laborer);  Noi-them  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  8  C.  C.  A.  663,  59  Fed.  OO."! 
(conductor,  engineer,  and  laborer).  Among  the  recent  cases  in  which  such 
employes  have  been  held  not  tO'  be  fellow  seiwants,  see  McGill  v.  Southern 
Pac.  Co.  (Ariz.)  33  Pac.  821  (section  foreman  and  conductor);  Atchison,  T. 
&  S.  F.  R.  Co.  V.  Seeley,  54  Kan.  21,  37  Pac.  104  (brakeman  and  station 
agent);  Hankins  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  142  N.  Y.  416,  37  N.  E 
460  (train  dispatcher  and  fireman);  Little  Rock  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Barry,  58 
Ark.  198,  23  S.  W.  1097  (train  dispatcher  and  engineer);  Wooden  v.  Western 
N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  5  Misc.  Rep.  537,  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  977  (conductor  and 
brakeman);  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Spence,  93  Tenn.  173,  23  S.  W.  211; 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ross,  112  U.  S.  377,  5  Sup.  Ct.  184,  distin- 


Cll.    13]  ASSUMPTION    OF    RISK    BY    SERVANT.  103f> 

once  to  decisions  that  men  in  specified  relations  are  or  are  not  fel- 
low servants,  but  to  rest  the  determination  of  such  questions  upon 
the  philosophical  basis  of  performance  of  duty,  and  to  adopt  the 
doctrine  of  vice  principal  as  a  test  of  fellow  servant.^" 

Negntivdy  as  to   Who  is  a  Vice  Principal. 

Many  of  the  cases,  and  especially  the  earlier  ones,  undertook  to 
define  a  fellow  servant  by  contrasting  him  with  some  one  having 
superintendence  or  control;   that  is,  a  "superior  servant."^"*     The 

guished  in  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Baiigh,  suptu  (engineer  and  fireman); 
Core  V.  Ohio  R.  Co.,  38  ^^'.  Va.  456,  18  S.  E.  596  (engineer  and  bralieman); 
Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hawthorn,  147  111.  22G,  35  N.  E.  5.34, 
and  45  111.  App.  035  (fence  builder  and  engineer);  Haney  v.  Railway  Co., 
38  W.  Va.  .570,  38  S.  E.  748  (conductor,  signal  operator,  and  section  hand); 
Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ericson,  41  Neb.  1,  59  N.  W.  347  (section  man  and 
fireman).  And,  generally,  see  Schlereth  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  115  JIo. 
87,  21  S.  W.  niO;  Armstrong  v.  Railway  Co.,  8  Utah,  420,  32  Pac.  093; 
Evans  v.  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  70  Miss.  527,  12  South.  .581;  New 
York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Hyde,  5  C.  O.  A.  401,  .50  Fed.  188;  Evansville  &  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Henderson,  134  Ind.  030,  33  N.  K.  1021;  Peoria,  D.  &  E.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Rice,  144  111.  227,  33  N.  E.  951;  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Easton.  2  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  378,  21  S.  W.  57.5;  Charles  v.  Taylor,  3  C.  P.  Div.  492;  Randall 
V.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  109  IT.  S.  478,  3  Sup.  Ct.  322;  Miller  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  109  jNIo.  350,  19  S.  W.  58;  Daniel's  Adm'r  v.  Chesapeake  & 
O.  Ry.  Co.,  36  W.  Va.  397,  15  S.  E.  102. 

103  Greenway  v.  Conroy.  100  Pa.  St.  1&5,  28  Atl.  692;  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Kelley,  4  Colo.  App.  325,  35  Pac.  923;  Card  v.  Eddy  (Mo.  Sup.)  24  S.  W. 
746;  Flike  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  53  N.  Y.  549;  Crispin  v.  Babbitt,  81  N. 
Y.  516;  Gunter  v.  Graniteville  Manuf'g  Co.,  18  S.  C.  202;  Moon's  Adm'r  v. 
Richmond  &  A.  R.  Co.,  78  Va.  745;  Brown  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  31  Minn.  553,  18  N.  W.  834;  Hawkins  v.  Railroad  Co.,  31  N.  Y.  Law 
•T.  84,  quoting  the  Hai-vard  Law  Review  to  the  effect  that  the  doctrine  of 
vice  principal  has  been  accepted  by  the  courts  of  about  10  states,  and  by 
the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States.  The  position  of  the  supreme  court 
of  the  United  States  is  subsequently  considered. 

19*  An  assistant  road  master  in  control  of  a  gang  of  men,  and  with 
power  to  direct  their  work  and  discharge  any  of  them,  is  a  superior  serv- 
ant, for  whose  negligent  acts  the  master  is  liable.  Harrison  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  79  Mich.  409,  44  N.  W.  1034,  followed  in  Palmer  v.  Jlichigan  Cent.  R. 
Co.,  93  Mich.  303,  53  N.  \V.  397.  Et  vide  post,  p.  1043,  note  201;  Newport 
News  &  M.  V.  Co.  v.  Dentzel's  Adm'r,  91  Ky.  42,  14  S.  W.  958.  And  see  note 
by  James  M.  Kerr  to  Garrahy  v.  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R.  Co.,  25  Fed, 
258,  203. 


1040  MASTER    AND    SERVAXT.  [Ch.    13 

test  is,  however,  generally  abandoned,  and  it  is  generally  accepted 
that  difference  in  rank,  position,  or  control  does  not  determine 
whetlier  or  not  given  men  are  fellow  servants.^''^  Therefore,  u  sec- 
tion man  and  a  section  foreman  are  fellow  servants.^"" 

los  Hofnagle  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  55  N.  Y.  G08;  McCosker 
V.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  84  N.  Y.  77;  Allen,  J.,  in  Wright  v.  New  York  Cent. 
R.  Co.,  25  N.  Y.  562-505;  Hanna  v.  Granger  (R.  I.)  28  Atl.  659;  Atchison, 
T.  i.%  S.  F.  R.  Co.  V.  Martin  (N.  M.)  34  Pac.  536.  The  mere  fact  tiiat  an 
employe  occasionally  had  authority  to  require  other  employes  to  help  liim 
does  not  render  him  a  vice  principal  at  such  times,  though  they  were  then 
under  his  orders.    Hathaway  v.  Illinois  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  60  N.  AV.  G-jI. 

190  Olson  V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  38  Minn.  117,  35  N.  W.  866.  Fur- 
ther, as  to  a  foreman  as  a  fellow  servant,  see  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 
V.  Martin  (N.  M.)  34  Pac.  536;  Noyes  v.  Wood  (Cal.)  36  Pac.  766;  Larich  v. 
Moles  (R.  I.)  28  Atl.  661;  Fordyce  v.  Briney,  58  Ark.  206,  24  S.  ^Y.  250. 
But  cf.  Cheeney  v.  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.,  92  Ga.  726,  19  S.  E.  33;  Cleveland,  C, 
C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Brown,  6  C.  0.  A.  142,  56  Fed.  804;  Davis  v.  New 
York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.,  159  Mass.  532,  34  N.  E.  1070.  Cf.  last  case  with 
O'Brien  v.  Rideout,  101  Mass.  170.  36  N.  E.  792.  A  train  dispatcher,  em- 
ployed by  the  division  superintendent,  though  he  has  power  to  employ 
and  discharge  brakemen  and  flagmen,  and  has  general  charge  of  the  move- 
ment of  trains,  is  a  fellow  servant  of  an  engineer  who~is  also  subject  to 
the  instructions  of  the  division  superintendent.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hoover  (Md.)  29  Atl.  994.  Railroad  section  men  and  laborers  on  repair 
trains,  employed  by  the  same  master  for  the  same  general  purpose  of 
keeping  the  roadbed  and  track  in  order,  are  fellow  servants;  and  the  em- 
ployer is  not  liable  for  injuries  to  one,  caused  by  negligence  of  another, 
tnough  such  other  has  control  over  a  gang  of  men.  Thom  v.  Pittard,  10 
C.  C.  A.  352,  62  Fed.  232.  A  superintendent  may  be  a  fellow  servant. 
Howard  v.  Hood,  155  Mass.  391,  29  N.  E.  630.  A  truck  packer  and  a  fore- 
man of  a  roundhouse  are  fellow  servants,  though  the  former  was  subject 
to  the  orders  of  the  latter.  Gonsior  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  36 
Minn.  385,  31  N.  W.  515;  Wilson  v.  Merry,  L.  R.  1  H.  L.  Sc.  326;  O'Brien 
v.  Rideout,  161  Mass.  170,  36  N.  E.  792  (foreman  and  circular  saw);  Mc- 
Guerty  v.  Hale,  lai  Mass.  51,  36  N.  E.  682;  Dowd  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co., 
162  Mass.  lb.5,  38  N.  E.  440;  De  Marcho  v.  Builders'  Iron  Foundry  (R.  I.) 
28  Atl.  661  (employe  injured  by  foreman  throwing  box  on  iron  posts).  But 
see  Chicago  Anderson  Pressed-Brick  Co.  v.  Sobkowiak,  148  111.  573,  36  N. 
E.  572.  Where  a  laborer  on  a  work  train  is  injured  by  the  negligence  of 
one  who  is  both  conductor  of  the  train,  and  also  foreman  of  the  laborers,— 
having,  in  the  latter  capacity,  power  to  hire  and  discharge  the  laborers  at 
his  discretion,— the  question  whether  they  are  fellow  servants  is  for  tho 
jury.     (Baker,   3.,   dissenting.     Abend  v.   Railroad  Co.,   Ill   111.   202,   distin- 


Ch.    13j  ASSUMPTION    OF    filSK    BY    SEIiVANT.  1041 

It  is  quite  clear,  also,  that,  while  thus  a  vice  principal  is  not  de- 
termined by  rank,  position,  or  control,  neither  is  he  determined  by 
difference  in  employment.  It  is,  however,  by  no  means  a  necessary 
consequence  that  the  doctrine  of  vice  principal  should  exclude  the 
test  of  common  employment.^"  Such  exclusion  is  likely  to  work  great 
hardship,  and  to  mark  the  departure  as  to  master  and  servant  from 

suished.  52  111.  App.  556,  affirmed.)  Mobile  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  JIassey,  l."i2 
111.  144,  38  N.  E.  787.  A  review  of  the  law  as  to  the  liability  of  a  master 
for  the  negligence  of  a  fellow  servant,  as  applied  in  the  courts  of  Illi- 
nois, with  numerous  citations,  by  James  P.  Harrold,  39  Cent.  Law  J.  4(i7. 
A  braiieman  and  conductor  may  be  fellow  ser\'ants.  Campbell  v.  Cciok,  8  i 
Tex.  030,  2(j  S.  W.  480.  And,  generally,  see  Northern  Pac.  B.  Co.  v.  Peter- 
son, 2  C.  C.  A.  157,  51  Fed.  182-18.j;  The  Frank  &  Willie,  45  Fed.  494,  4!)5. 
and  cases  collected;  Kerlin  v.  Chicago,  P.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.,  50  Fed.  185; 
Hanna  v.  Granger  (R.  I.)  28  Atl.  659;  AVilson  v.  Meriy,  L.  R.  1  H.  L.  Sc.  320; 
Crispin  v.  Babbitt,  81  N.  Y.  516;  iXcCosker  v.  Long  Island  II.  Co.,  84  N.  1. 
77;  Brick  v.  Rochester,  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  211;  Loughlin  v.  People, 
105  N.  Y.  159,  11  N.  E.  371;  Hussey  v.  Coger,  112  X.  Y.  014,  2ij  X.  E.  r,r,ry, 
Cullen  V.  Norton,  126  N.  Y.  1.  20  N.  E.  905.  Foremen  and  persons  engaged 
in  superintendence  were  held  to  be  fellow  servants  among  recent  cases. 
City  of  Minneapolis  v.  Lundin,  7  C.  C.  A.  344,  58  Fed.  525;  Griffiths  v.  New- 
Jersey  &  N.  Y'.  R.  Co.,  5  Misc.  Rep.  320,  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  812;  New  Pittsburgh 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Peterson,  136  Ind.  398,  35  N.  E.  7;  Watts  v.  Hart,  7 
Wash.  178,  34  Pac.  423;  Harley  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  57  Fed.  144;  Balti- 
more &  O.  R.  Co.  V.  Baugh,  149  U.  S.  368,  13  Sup.  Ct.  914;  Kennedy  v.  Spring, 
160  Mass.  203,  35  N.  E.  779.  Held  not  to  be  fellow  servants:  Ft.  AVorth 
&D.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Peters  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  1077;  Cheeney  v.  Ocean 
S.  S.  Co.,  92  Ga.  726,  19  S.  E.  33;  Chicago  Anderson  Pressed-Brick  Co.  v.  Sob- 
kowiak,  148  111.  573,  36  N.  B.  572;  Libby,  ilcNeill  &  Libby  v.  Scherman,  14t! 
111.  540,  34  N.  E.  801;  Cleveland,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  0  C.  C.  A.  112,  50  Fed. 
804;  Davis  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.,  159  Mass.  532,  34  N.  E.  1070;  Pren- 
dible  V.  Connecticut  R.  Manuf'g  Co.,  160  Mass.  131,  35  N.  E.  675;  Ziutek  v. 
Stimson  Mill  Co.  (Wash.)  37  Pac.  340.  And,  generally,  see  Allen  v.  Goodwin, 
92  Tenn.  385,  21  S.  W.  760;  Moody  v.  Hamilton  Manuf'g  Co.,  159  Mass.  70, 
34  N.  E.  185;  Gilmore  v.  Oxford  Iron  &  Nail  Co.,  55  N.  J.  Law,  39,  25  Atl. 
707;  Bloyd  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  58  Ark.  60,  22  S.  W.  1089;  Hoosier 
Stone  Co.  v.  McCain,  133  Ind.  231,  31  N.  E.  950;  Roseback  v.  Aetna  Mills, 
158  ilass.  379,  33  N.  E.  577;  Kansas  City.  M.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Burton,  97  Ala. 
240,  12  South.  88.  As  to  the  rule  in  admiralty  torts,  see  The  Egyptian  Mon- 
arch, 30  Fed.  773;  The  Queen,  40  Fed.  694;  The  City  of  Alexandria,  17  Fed. 
390;  Grimsley  v.  Hankins,  46  Fed.  400;  The  City  of  Norwalk,  55  Fed.  98-102; 
The  Julia  Fowler,  49  Fed.  277. 
107  As  against  the  abolition  of  the  consociation  test,  see  Evans  v.  Carbon 

LAW  OF  TORTS— 66 


1042  MASTER    AND    SEUVANT.  [Cll.    13 


the  general  rule  of  law.''"'  The  tendency,  however,  would  seem  to 
be  to  hold  that  one  who  Is  not  a  vice  principal  is  a  fellow  servant.^"* 
On  this  general  subject  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  has 
said:  "To  hold  the  principal  liable  whenever  there  are  gradations 
of  rank  between  the  person  receiving  and  the  person  causing  the 
injury,  or  whenever  they  are  employed  in  different  departments  of 

Hill  Goal  Co.,  37  Fed.  437;  Nasliville  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Carroll,  6  Heisk.  347; 
Dixon  V.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  109  Mo.  413,  19  S.  W.  412;  Hobson  v.  New 
Mexico  &  A.  R.  Co.  (Ariz.)  11  Pac.  545;  Cliicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Moranda, 
93  111.  302. 

198  The  general  rule  of  law  as  to  assumption  of  risk  is  based  on  knowl- 
edge of  danger  on  the  part  of  some  one  who  then  voluntarily  assumes  the 
risk.  Ante,  p.  1014.  Indeed,  this  is  the  general  rule  as  to  servants  where  the 
ironclad  artificial  formula  as  to  fellow  servant  is  not  applied.  Post,  p.  1003. 
But,  if  the  test  of  vice  principal  be  adopted  and  defined  so  as  to  exclude  con- 
siderations as  to  common  employment,  a  servant  will  be  held  to  assume  neg- 
ligence of  another  of  whose  existence  he  is  not  aware.  It  is  hard  to  see 
how  any  actual  or  natural  assumption  of  risk  can  be  found  in  such  a  case 
as  Neal  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  (Minn.)  59  N.  W.  312.  This  has  been  rec- 
ognized by  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  quite  distinctly  in  North- 
ern Pac.  R.  Co.  V.  Hambly,  154  U.  S.  349,  14  Sup.  Ct.  983,  post,  p.  1049,  and 
indirectly  in  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Baugh,  149  U.  S.  368,  13  Sup.  Ct.  914, 
in  these  words:  "Thus,  between  the  law  department  of  a  railway  corporation 
and  the  operating  department  there  is  a  natural  and  distinct  separation,— 
one  which  makes  the  two  departments  like  two  independent  kinds  of  busi- 
ness, in  which  the  one  employer  and  master  is  engaged.  So  sometimes 
there  is  in  the  affairs  of  such  eorpoi-ations  what  may  be  .called  a  mauufac- 
tm-ing  or  repair  department,  and  another  strictly  operating  depai'tment; 
these  two  departments  ai'e  in  their  relations  to  each  other  as  distinct  and 
separate  as  though  the  work  of  each  was  carried  on  by  a  separate  corpora- 
tion." Queiy:  A  party  composed,  inter  alia,  of  a  clerk  in  the  law  depart- 
ment of  a  railway  and  of  invited  guest  left  Portland,  Or.,  for  the  Kast. 
After  they  started,  a  certain  switchman,  1,000  miles  to  the  East,  is  employed 
by  the  master  of  the  clerk.  Through  the  negligence  of  the  switchman  the 
entire  party  suffered  damage.  Can  that  clerk  be  held  to  have  consented  to 
the  risk  of  the  negligence  of  such  switchman?  Did  the  guest  assume  the 
risk? 

190  Ever  since  the  leading  and  pioneer  case  of  Farwell  v.  Boston  &  C. 
Ry.  Co.,  4  Mete.  (Mass.)  40,  the  overwhelming  majority  of  authorities  have 
repudiated  the  "same  department"  or  "consociation"  theory.  Neal  v.  North- 
ern Pac.  R.  Co.  (Minn.)  59  N.  W.  312.  Men  employed  by  a  railroad  company, 
under  the  direction  of  a  foreman,  in  blasting  and  quarrying  stone  along  the 
road,  and  the  lineman  employed  by  the  same  company,  under  the  direction 
of  the  superintendent  of  telegraphy,  in  repairing  the  telegraph  line,  which 


t^fa'    13]  ASSUMPTION    Ot     RISK    BY    SERVANT.  1043 

the  same  general  service,  would  result  in  frittering  away  the  whole 
doctrine  of  fellow  service."  ^"^ 

Performance  of  Duty  the  Test. 

Positively  one  employ^  becomes  vice  pi'incipal  of  another  only 
when  he  is  intrusted  with  the  performance  of  some  absolute  and 
personal  duty  of  the  master  himself.  These  duties  are  not  only 
absolute,  but  they  are  also  inalienable  and  nonassignable.  They 
may  be  devolved  on  others  by  the  master,  but  not  without  recourse 
to  him.  For  negligence  in  the  discharge  of  these  duties  he  is  liable. 
It  is  immaterial  whether  such  negligence  is  his  own  or  that  of  his 
servant.  In  this  sense  the  servant  is  the  alter  ego  of  the  master 
or  vice  principal. ^"^     The  master's  absolute   and  personal  duties 

was  broken  by  the  blasting-,  and  who  was  assisted,  when  necessaiy,  by  the 
quarrymen,  are  fellow  servants.  Id.  Generally,  as  to  the  adoption  of  the 
test  of  vice  principal  to  the  exclusion  of  the  doctrine  of  common  employ- 
ment, see  Brown  v.  Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  27  Minn.  162,  6  N.  W.  484;  Fos- 
ter v.  Minnesota  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  14  Minn.  300  (Gil.  277) ;  Collins  t.  St.  Paul 
&  S.  C.  R.  Co.,  30  Minn.  31,  14  N.  W.  60;  Brown  y.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L. 
B.  Co.,  31  Minn.  553,  18  N.  W.  834;  Chamberlain  v.  Milwaukee  &  M.  B.  R. 
Co.,  7  Wis.  425;  Moseley  v.  Chamberlain,  18  Wis.  700;  Cooper  v.  Milwaukee 
&  P.  D.  Ry.  Co.,  23  Wis.  608;  Howland  v.  Milwaukee,  L.  S.  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 
54  Wis.  220,  11  N.  W.  529;  Hoth  v.  Petei-s,  55  Wis.  405,  13  N.  AV.  210;  Dwyer 
v.  American  Exp.  Co.,  55  Wis.  453,  13  N.  W.  471;  Blazinski  v.  Perkins,  77 
Wis.  9,  45  N.  W.  947;  Johnson  v.  Ashland  Water  Co.,  77  Wis.  51,  4.5  N.  W. 
807;  Peschel  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  By.  Co.,  G2  Wis.  338,  21  X.  W.  20!); 
Chapman  v.  Erie  By.  Co.,  55  N.  Y.  579;  Dewey  v.  Detroit,  G.  H.  &  il.  By. 
Co.,  97  Mich.  329,  56  N.  W.  750;  Wilson  v.  Hudson  Biver  Water  Power  & 
Paper  Co.,  71  Hun,  292,  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  1072;  .Tenkius  v.  Richmond  &  D.  B. 
Co.,  39  S.  C.  507,  18  S.  B.  182;  Baltimore  &  O.  By.  Co.  v.  Baugh,  149  U.  S. 
368,  13  Sup.  Ct.  914;  Potter  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  B.  B.  Co.,  130  N.  Y. 
77,  32  N.  E.  603;  Stutz  v.  Armour,  84  Wis.  023,  54  N.  W.  1000;  Schaible  v. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  97  Mich.  318,  50  N.  W.  565. 

200  Brown,  J.,  in  Northern  Pac.  B.  Co.  v.  Hambly,  154  U.  S.  34',)  ::00,  14 
Sup.  Ct.  983. 

201  Dillon,  J.,  in  24  Am.  Law  Bev.  1S4.  Et  vide  .Tohiisou  v.  Boston  Tow- 
boat  Co.,  135  Mass.  209;  Sullivan  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  Bj-.  Co.,  97  Mo.  66, 
17  S.  W.  748;  Greenway  v.  Oonroy,  160  Pa.  St.  185,  28  Atl.  092;  Cincinnati, 
N.  O.  &  T.  P.  B.  Co.  V.  Clark,  6  C.  C.  A.  281,  57  Fed.  125;  Chicnt;o  Anderson 
Pressed-Brick  Co.  v.  Sobkowiak,  148  111.  573,  36  N.  B.  572;  New  Pittsburgh 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Peterson,  136  Ind.  398,  35  N.  B.  7;  McElligott  v.  Ban- 
dolph,  61  Conn.  157,  22  Atl.  1094;  Gabrielson  v.  Waydell,  135  N.  Y.  1,  31  N.  E. 
909;  Dube  v.  City  of  Lewiston,  S3  Me.  211,  22  Atl.  112;  Hussey  v.  Coger,  112 
N.  Y.  614,  20  N.  E.  556;    Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lundstrom,  16 


1044  MAbTEK    AND    SEKVANT.  [Ch.    13 

have  been  already  considered.  Breach  of  any  one  of  them  by  a 
servant  is  the  master's  wrong. 

Thus,  where  the  determination  of  the  sufficiency  of  appliances  for 
holding  a  railroad  train  in  descending  a  grade  was  left  to  the  con- 
ductor, the  decision  of  the  conductor  was  the  decision  of  the  rail- 
road company,  and  the  company  was  liable  for  the  death  of  a  brake- 
man  on  such  train,  caused  by  the  insufficiency  of  the  appliances 
used.-"^ 

Servants  who  are  charged  with  the  duty  of  supplying  safe  ma- 
chinery are  not  to  be  regarded  as  fellow  servants  with  those  who 
are  engaged  in  operating  it.^°^ 

The  negligence  of  the  superintendent  of  a  mine  in  failing  to  take 
proper  precaution  to  protect  the  workmen  from  the  fall  of  a  mass 
of  rock  from  an  overhanging  cliff  is  the  negligence  of  the  master, 
and  not  that  of  a  fellow  servant.-"*    So,  if  a  conductor  is  charged 

Neb.  2.-4,  20  N.  "W.  198;  Sioux  City  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  22  Neb.  775,  36  N. 
AV.  285.  Tlie  master  of  a  steamboat,  while  in  command  and  directing  her 
movements,  is  a  vice  principal  of  the  owner,  and  not  a  fellow  servant  of  the 
engineer.  (55  Fed.  08,  reversed.)  The  Car  Float  No.  10,  9  C.  C.  A.  521, 
61  Fed.  364;  McCullough  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.,  Id.;  New  York  & 
N.  Steamboat  Co.  v.  The  Transfer  No.  4,  Id.  The  train  dispatcher  of  a  di- 
vision, who,  in  directing  the  movements  of  two  trains  which  are  being  run 
entirely  on  special  orders,  makes  a  mistake,  whereby  the  trains  collide,  is  a 
vice  principal  as  to  the  fireman  on  the  engine  of  one  of  them,  who  is  in- 
jured thereby.  Hankins  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  142  N.  Y.  416,  37 
N.  E.  466. 

202  Wooden  v.  Western  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (Super.  Ct.  Buff.)  16  N.  Y.  Supp. 
840;  Pantzar  v.  Tilly  Fester  I.  il.  Co.,  99  N.  Y.  368,  2  N.  E.  24;  Chase,  Lead. 
Cas.  2-12;    Cadden  v.  American  Steel-Barge  Co.,  88  Wis.  409,  60  N.  W.  800. 

203  Ford  V.  Fitchburg  R.  R.,  110  Mass.  240;  Houston  v.  Brush  (Vt.)  29  Atl. 
380;  Nixon  v.  Selby  Smelting  Lead  Co.,  102  Cal.  458,  36  Pac.  803;  Hughlett 
V.  Ozark  Lumber  Co.,  53  JIo.  App.  87.  A  conductor  whose  duty  is  to  handle 
a  switch  is  a  vice  principal.     Mase  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  57  Fed.  283. 

■  204  Pantzar  v.  Tilly  Foster  Iron  Jlin.  Co.,  99  N.  Y.  o(JS,  2  N.  E.  24;  Northern 
Pac.  R.  Co.  V.  Herbert,  116  U.  S.  642,  6  Sup.  Ct.  590;  Hough  v.  Railway  Co., 
100  U.  S.  213;  Benzing  v.  Steinway,  101  N,  Y.  547,  5  N.  E.  449;  Sfringham  v. 
Hilton,  111  N.  Y.  188,  18  N.  E.  870;  Tuttle  v.  Detroit,  G.  H.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  122 
IJ.  S.  1S9,  7  Sup.  Ct.  1166;  Libby,  McNeill  &  Libby  v.  Scherman,  146  111.  540, 
34  N.  E.  801;  Hayden  v.  Smithville  Manuf'g  Co.,  29  Conn.  548;  Cole  Bros.  v. 
Woiid  (Ind.  App.)  36  N.  E.  1074;  Yeaton  v.  Boston  &  L.  R.  Corp.,  135  Mass 
418;  Washington  &•  G.  R.  Co.  v.  McDade.  135  U.  S.  554,  10  Sup.  Ct  1044; 
Rogers  V.  Ludlow  Manuf'g  Co..  144  Mass.  198,  11  N.  E.  77;   Buzzell  v.  Laconia 


Ch.    13]  ASSUMPTION    OF    KISK    BY    SERVANT.  1045 

with  the  care  and  management  of  switches,  he  is  not  a  fellow  serv- 
ant of  an  engineer  injured  by  a  switch  negligently  left  open-^^^ 

The  negligence  of  inspectors  is  not  the  negligence  of  a  fellow  serv- 
ant, but  of  a  vice  principal,  and  entitles  a  servant  injured  thereby 
to  recover  against  the  master.^"® 

The  duty  to  warn  of  special  danger,^"^  or  to  warn  and  instruct 
an  ignorant  employ^^"*  or  to  communicate  orders,^""  falls  on  a  vice 
principal,  and  not  on  a  fellow  servant 

Maniif'g  Co.,  48  Me.  113.  But  a  "filler"  in  a  coal  mine,  whose  duty  it  is  to  post 
and  prop  the  roof  of  the  mine,  is  a  fellow  servant  of  the  miner.  Consolidated 
('oal  &  aiin.  Co.  v.  Clay's  Adm'r  (Ohio  Sup.)  38  N.  E.  010.  And  a  mine  owner 
is  not  responsible  for  the  death  of  miners  caused  by  the  nesiligence  of  the  en- 
gineer of  the  hoist  engine,  in  mishoisting  the  cage  in  wliich  they  are  ascending 
the  shaft.  Mulhern  v.  Lehigh  Val.  Coal  Co.,  161  Pa.  St.  270,  28  Atl.  1087: 
O'Boyle  v.  Lehigh  Val.  Coal  Co.,  161  Pa.  St.  270,  28  Atl.  1088.  So,  if  a  fore- 
man were  negligent  in  ordering  his  men  to  go  on  shoveling  sand  under  a 
bank,  after  warning  that  it  was  dangerous,  such  negligence  was  that  of  a 
fellow  servant,  not  of  a  vice  principal.     Larich  v.  Moies  (R.  I.)  28  Atl.  661. 

205  Mase  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  57  Fed.  283.     And  see  Louisville  &  N. 
R.  Co.  V.  Ward,  10  C.  C.  A.  166,  61  Fed.  927. 

206  Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Kneirim,  48  111.  App.  243,  39  N.  E.  .■!24.  The 
negligence  of  defendant's  foreman  in  failing  to  notice  the  defect  in  ma- 
chinery when  it  came  from  the  manufacturer,  or  in  failing  afterwards  to  dis 
cover  the  defect,  is  the  negligence  of  a  servant  in  the  discharge  of  a  duty 
Mhich  the  master  owes  his  other  servants,  and  not  the  negligence  of  a  fel- 
low servant.  Houston  v.  Brush,  66  Vt.  331,  29  Atl.  380.  Duty  to  inspect  a 
coupling  link  (Little  Rock  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Moseley,  6  C.  C.  A.  22.j,  56  Fed. 
1009)  or  a  defective  wheel  of  an  engine  falls  on  the  vice  principal  (Coontz  v. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  121  Mo.  652,  26  S.  W.  661).  And,  generally,  see  Ohio. 
&  U.  R.  Co.  V.  Pearcy,  128  Ind.  197,  27  N.  E.  479;  Wooden  v.  Western  X. 
Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (Super.  Buff.)  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  840.  Generally,  a  car  inspector 
is  not  a  fellow  servant  with  the  car  operators.  Macy  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  K. 
Co.,  35  Minn.  200,  28  N.  W.  249.  Similarly,  the  man  whose  duty  it  is  to 
inspect  telegraph  poles  is  not  a  fellow  servant  of  a  lineman.  Kelly  v.  Erie 
Telegraph  &  Telephone  Co.,.  34  Jlinn.  321.  25  N.  W.  706.  But  see  Neutz  v. 
Jackson  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  (Ind.  Sup.)  38  N.  E.  324;  Bowers  v.  Connecti- 
cut River  R.  Co.,  162  Mass.  312.  38  N.  E.  508;  Headefiu  v.  Cooper  (City  Ct. 
Brook.)  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  763.  Contra,  Jarman  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  Ky.  Co.> 
08  Mich.  135,  57  N.  W.  32. 

207  Ft.  Smith  Oil  Co.  v.  Slover,  58  Ark.  168,  24  S.  W.  106. 

208  Lebbering  v.  Struthers,  Wells  &  Co..  157  Pa.  St.  312,  27  Atl.  720.     Cf. 
Bellows  V.  Pennsylvania  &  N.  Y.  Canal  &  R.  Co.,  157  Pa.  St.  51,  27  Atl.  685. 

209  Card  v.  Eddy  (Mo.  Sup.)  24  S.  W.  746.     Cf.  De  Marcho  v.  Builders'  Iron 
Foundry  (R.  I.)  28  Atl.  661,  and  McGucrty  v.  Hale,  161  Mass.  51.  36  N.  E.  682. 


1046  MASTER  AND  SERVANT.  [Ch.  13 

Where,  however,  the  general  work  includes  the  construction  or  prep- 
aration of  the  appliances  (as  where,  in  erecting  a  building,  the  em- 
ployes construct  a  scaffold),  they  are  fellow  servants  in  respect  to 
the  negligence  of  one  of  them  in  constructing  such  appliances,  as 
well  as  in  respect  to  the  negligence  of  such  a  one  in  doing  other 
work.  Here  the  master  is  said  not  to  have  undertaken  the  duty  of 
furnishing  or  adopting  the  appliances  by  which  the  work  is  to  be 
peif ormed.  This  duty  is  assumed  by  the  workmen  themselves,  and 
the  master  is  exempt  from  responsibility  if  suitable  materials  are 
furnished  and  suitable  workmen  are  employed  by  him.^^"  But  the 
cases  are  not  in  entire  harmony.^^^  If,  however,  the  master  was 
negligent  in  furnishing  suitable  material,  and  had  retained  the  di- 
rection and  chaige  of  the  staging  himself,  he  would  have  been  lia- 
ble.^^^  An  employ^  may  sometimes  act  as  a  vice  principal,  and 
sometimes  as  a  colaborer,^^^  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  servant  per- 
nio Kelley  v.  Norcross,  121  Mass.  508;  O'Keefe  v.  Brownell,  156  Mass.  131, 
30  N.  E.  479;  Prendible  v.  Connecticut  River  Manuf  g  Co..  160  Mass.  131,  35 
N.  E.  675;  Marsh  v.  Herman,  47  Minn,  537,  50  N.  W.  611;  Colton  v.  Richards, 
123  Mass.  484;  Killea  v.  Faxon,  125  Mass.  485;  Noyes  v.  Wood,  102  Cal.  389, 
36  Pac.  766;  Peschel  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  62  Wis.  338,  21  N.  W. 
269;  Filbert  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  121  N.  Y.  207-212,  23  N.  E.  1108; 
Gallagher  v.  Piper,  16  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  669;  Fraser  v.  Red  River  Lumber  Co.,  45 
Minn.  235,  47  N.  W  785;  Nixon  v.  Selby  Smelting  &  Lead  Co.,  102  Cal.  458, 
36  Pac.  -803.  Cf.  Ryan  v.  McCuUy,  123  Mo.  630,  27  S.  W.  533;  Kalleck  v. 
Deering,  161  Mass.  409,  37  N.  E.  450;  Loughlin  v.  State,  105  N.  Y.  159,  11  N. 
E.  371,  followed  in  Connolly  v.  Manrer  (Com.  PI.)  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  18. 

211  Sims  V.  American  Steel  Barge  Co.,  50  Minn.  68,  57  N.  W.  322;  Cadden  v. 
American  Steel  Barge  Co.,  88  Wis.  409,  60  N.  W.  800;  McNamara  v.  MacDon- 
ough,  102  Cal.  575,  36  Pac.  ^1. 

212  Arkerson  v.  Dennison,  117  Mass.  407. 

213  Lindvall  v.  Woods,  41  Minn.  212,  42  N.  W.  1020  (but  see  same  case,  44 
Fed.  855,  47  Fed.  195,  1  C.  C.  A.  37,  and  48  Fed.  62,  approved  in  Northern 
Pac.  R.  Co.  V.  Peterson,  2  C.  C.  A.  157,  51  Fed.  182-187);  Crispin  v.  Babbitt. 
81  N.  Y.  516;  Loughlin  v.  State,  105  N.  Y.  159,  11  N.  E.  371;  Quinn  v.  New 
Jersey  Lighterage  Co.,  23  Fed.  363;  Doughty  v.  Penobscot  L.  D.  Co.,  76  Me. 
143;  Benson  v.  Goodwin,  147  Mass.  237,  17  N.  E.  517.  But  see  Berea  Stone 
Co.  V.  Kraft,  31  Ohio  St.  287;  Gormley  v.  Vulcan  Iron  Works,  61  Mo.  492.  A 
foreman  in  chargie  of  a  gang  engaged  in  loading  rails,  and  actually  assisting 
therein,  is,  as  to  such  work,  a  fellow  sei-vant  of  the  other  members  of  the 
gang.  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  0.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Isom,  10  Ind.  App.  091,  38  N.  E.  423.  A 
foreman  actually  assisting  in  labor  is  a  fellow  seiTant  of  the  rest  of  the  gang. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rogers,  6  C.  O.  A.  403,  57  Fed.  378.     But  see  St.  Louis, 


^^l'-    13]  ASSUMPTION    OF    EISK    BY    SERVANT.  1047 

forming  the  duties  of  a  vice  principal  may  impose  on  the  master  and 
upon  himself  the  duties  and  liabilities  of  the  vice  principal.-" 

Whether,  in  a  given  case,  a  given  servant  is  a  fellow  servant  or 
a  plaintiff  or  a  vice  principal,  is  a  question  of  lavF,  and  not  one  of 
fact.""  In  determining  the  responsibility  of  the  master  under  such 
circumstances,  the  United  States  courts  are  governed  by  their  own 
decisions  on  the  question  as  a  matter  of  general  law,  and,  in  the 
absence  of  statutory  regulations  by  the  state  in  which  the  cause 
of  action  arises,  they  are  not  required  to  follow  the  decisions  of  the 
state  courts.^^" 

The  Doctrine  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 

In  the  celebrated  case  of  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ross,"' 
a  conductor,  with  supreme  power  and  sole  direction  over  his  train, 
caused  a  collision  by  gross  carelessness.  Under  the  circumstances 
he  was  held  not  to  be  a  fellow  servant  of  the  injured  engineer. 
This  case  was  commonly  regarded  as  inconsistent  with  the  general 
course  of  authority,  holding  that  neither  authoritj'  nor  control  of 
the  servant  (i.  e.  a  superior  servant),  nor  his  grade  in  the  employment, 
nor  department  of  services  were  tests  of  who  are  and  who  are  not 
fellow  servants.  The  court,  however,  did  not  hold  it  to  be  "uni- 
versally true  that  when  one  servant  has  control  over  another  they 
cease  to  be  fellow  servants  within  the  rule  of  the  master's  exemp- 
tion from  liability,  but  did  hold  that  an  instruction  couched  in  such 
general  language  was  not  erroneous  when  applied  to  the  case  of  a 

A.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Torrey,  58  Ark.  217,  24  S.  W.  2-14.  But  cf.  Sbumway  v. 
Walworth  &  N.  Manuf  g  Co.,  98  Micli.  411,  57  N.  W.  251. 

21-tLasky  v.  Canadian  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  83  Me.  461,  22  Atl.  .307. 

215  Johnson  v.  Boston  Towboat  Co.,  135  Mass.  20'J;  McGinty  v.  Athol 
Reservoir  Co.,  155  Mass.  183,  29  N.  E.  510, 

210  Gardner  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  150  U.  S.  349-358,  14  Sup.  Ct.  140; 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Baugh,  149  U.  S.  3G8,  13  Sup.  Ct.  914;  Lake  Shore 
&  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Prentice,  147  U.  S.  101,  13  Sup.  Ct.  2G1;  Myrick  v.  Michigan 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  107  U.  S.  102,  1  Sup.  Ct.  425;  Hough  v.  Railway  Co.,  100  U.  S. 
213;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Lockwood,  17  TS'all.  357;  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Peter- 
son, 2  C.  C.  A.  157,  51  Fed.  182. 

21T  112  U.  S.  377,  5  Sup.  Ct.  184.  And  see  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Cava- 
naugh,  2  C.  C.  A.  358,  51  Fed.  517,  Morgan  v.  Carbon  Hill  Coal  Co.,  6  Wash. 
577,  34  Pac.  152,  772;  Cowles  v.  Richmond  R.  Co.,  84  N.  C.  30D:  Chicago  & 
N.  AV.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Bayfield,  37  Mich.  205;  Whalen  v.  Centenary  Church,  62  Mo. 
326. 


1048  MASTER  AND  SERVANT.  [Ch.  13 

conductor  having  exclusive  control  of  a  train  in  relation  to  other 
employes  of  the  company  acting  under  him  on  the  same  train.  The 
conductor  was,  in  the  language  of  the  opinion,  clothed  with  the  con- 
trol and  management  of  a  distinct  department.  He  was  'a  super- 
intending officer.'  *  *  *  He  had  'the  superintendence  of  a  de- 
partment.' "  ^'°  A'  later  opinion  of  the  supreme  court  held  that  an 
engineer  and  fireman  are  fellow  servants.  In  this  the  courts  say 
that  the  rightful  test  for  determining  who  are  fellow  servants  is: 
"There  must  be  some  personal  wrong  on  the  part  of  the  master; 
some  breach  of  positive  duty  on  his  part.  If  he  discharges  all  that 
may  be  called  positive  duty,  and  is  himself  guilty  of  no  neglect,  it 
would  seem  as  though  he  was  absolved  from  all  responsibility,  and 
that  the  party  who  caused  the  injury  should  be  himself  alone  re- 
sponsible. *  *  *  The  question  turns  rather  on  the  character  of 
the  act  than  on  the  relations  of  the  employes  to  each  other.  If  the 
act  is  one  done  in  the  discharge  of  some  positive  duty  of  the  mas- 
ter to  the  servant,  then  negligence  in  the  act  is  the  negligence  of  the 
master;  but  if  it  be  not  one  in  the  discharge  of  such  positive  duty, 
then  there  should  be  some  personal  wrong  on  the  part  of  the  em- 
ployer before  he  is  held  liable  therefor."  ^^' 

This  later  decision  essentially  modifies  and  probably  overrules 
the  previous  decision  of  the  same  court  (Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ey.  Co. 
V.  Eoss) — for  this  court  never  in  terms  overrules  its  previous  deci- 
sions— in  holding  that  it  is  not  universally  true  that,  when  one  serv- 

218  Justice  Brewer,  in  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Baugh,  149  U.  S.  368-3S2, 
13  Sup.  Ct.  914. 

210  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Baugh,  149  U.  S.  368,  13  Sup.  Ct.  914,  920,  921. 
See  McGrath  v.  Rogers,  57  Fed.  378;  BIcGrath  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  9  C.  C. 
A.  133,  60  Fed.  555;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Ward,  10  C.  C.  A.  166,  61  Fed. 
927;  Harley  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  57  Fed.  144,  What  Cheer  Coal  Co.  v. 
Johnson,  6  C.  C.  A.  148,  56  Fed.  810,  distinguished;  Fiuley  v.  Richmond  & 
D.  R.  Co.,  59  Fed.  419;  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Needham,  11  C.  C.  A. 
56,  63  Fed.  107;  Canadian  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnston,  9  C.  C.  A.  587,  61  Fed.  73S; 
Martin  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  65  Fed.  384.  A  railroad  employe,  who  is  one 
of  a  gang  of  men  employed  to  remove  a  wreck,  cannot  recover  from  the  com- 
pany for  injuries  caused  by  the  negligence  of  the  wreck  master,  who  has 
charge  of  the  wrecking  car.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Baugh,  149  U.  S.  368, 
13  Sup.  Ct  914,  followed  in  McGrath  v.  Texas  &  P,  R.  Co.,  9  C.  0.  A.  133,  60 
Fed.  555. 


Ch.    13]  ASSUMPTION    OF    RISK    BY    SERVANT.  1049 

aut  has  control  over  another,  they  cease  to  be  fellow  servants."-" 
And  in  Gardner  v.  Michigan  Cent.  E.  Co."^  it  was  distinctly  recog- 
nized that  the  rule  exempting  the  master  from  liability  for  injuries 
caused  to  a  servant  by  a  fellow  servant  is  subject  to  the  exception 
that  the  master  is  bound  to  use  due  care  in  furnishing  safe  instru- 
mentalities for  performing  the  work,  and  is  liable  for  damages  occa- 
sioned by  a  neglect  or  omission  to  fulfill  this  obligation,  whether  it 
arises  from  his  own  want  of  care,  or  that  of  his  agent  to  whom  he 
intrusts  the  duty.  However,  in  Xorthern  Pac.  E.  Co.  v.  Hambly,^^- 
Brown,  J.,  selected  as  the  most  satisfactory  test  of  liability  this: 
If  the  departments  of  the  two  servants  are  so  far  separated  from 
each  other  that  the  possibility  of  coming  in  contact,  and  hence  of 
incurring  danger  from  the  negligent  performance  of  the  duties  of 
such  other  department,  could  not  be  said  to  be  within  the  contem- 
plation of  the  person  injured,  the  doctrine  of  fellow  servant  should 
not  apply.  It  would  thus  seem  that  the  supreme  court,  having 
originally  accepted  the  test  of  superior  servant,  has  finally  adopted 
the  test  of  a  vice  principal, °^^  without  excluding  common  employ- 
ment as  a  supplementary  test. 

220  112  U.  S.  377,  5  Sup.  Ct.  184;    20  Am.  Law  Rev.  129. 

221 150  U.  S.  349,  360,  14  Sup.  Ct.  140.  In  this  ease  Mr.  .Justice  Fuller  says: 
"We  regarded  this  doctrine  as  so  well  settled  that  in  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Cox,  14.5  U.  S.  593-607,  12  Sup.  Ct.  905,  we  contented  ourselves,  without  dis- 
cussion, with  a  reference  to  some  of  the  cases  in  this  court  upon  the  subject." 

222  151  u.  s.  349-355,  14  Sup.  Ct.  983.  This  case,  specifically,  held  that  a 
common  laborer  employed  by  the  company  owning  and  operating  a  railroad, 
and  working,  under  direction  of  a  section  foreman,  on  a  culyert  tJiereon,  is  a 
fellow  servant  with  the  engineer  and  conductor  of  a  passenger  ti-ain  on  the 
road,  in  such  sense  as  exempts  the  company  from  liability  for  an  injury  to 
him  through  negligence  of  such  conductor  and  engineer  in  operating  the  train. 
Cf.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Erickson,  41  Neb.  1,  59  N.  W.  347;.  Neal  v.  North- 
ern Pac.  R.  Co.  (Minn.)  59  N.  W.  312. 

223  See  Brewer,  C.  J.,  in  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Reesman,  9  C.  C.  A. 
20,  60  Fed.  370. 


1050  MASTKR    AND    SERVANT.  [Ch.    13 

290.  The  plaintiff  servant  does  not  assume  the  risk  of  the 
negligence  of  a  fello-w  servant  -where  the  master 
has  been  negligent  in  providing  an  improper  fello-wr 
servant,  unless  the  plaintiff  servant  can  be  held  to 
have  assumed  such  risk  upon  the  principles  gov- 
erning the  assumption  of  ordinary  risks,  exclusive 
of  the  risk  of  negligence  of  a  fellow  servant. 

The  servant  has  a  right  to  rely  upon  the  performance  of  the  abso- 
lute duties  of  the  master.  One  of  these  duties  is  to  furnish  proper 
and  sufficiently  numerous  fellow  servants.  If,  however,  the  master 
fails  in  the  performance  of  these  duties,  and,  notwithstanding  such 
failure,  a  servant  continues  to  worli,  for  example,  with  a  danger- 
ously incompetent  fellow  servant,^^*  or  an  insufficient  number  of 
them,^^^  he  assumes  the  risk  of  their  negligence,  subject  to  excep- 
tions governing  the  assumption  of  ordinary  risk.  But,  if  the  serv- 
ant be  placed  at  work  with  which  he  is  unfamiliar  and  different  from 
and  more  hazardous  than  the  service  for  which  he  is  employed,  he 
does  not  assume  the  risk  of  the  negligence  of  a  fellow  servant.^^" 

2  21  Riclimond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  92  Ga.  77,  18  S.  E.  290;  Southern 
liausas  Ry.  Co.  v.  Drake,  53  Kan.  1,  35  Pac.  825;  Eddy  v.  Rogers  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.)  27  S.  W.  295;  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lemon,  83  Tex.  143,  IS  S. 
W.  331;    Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Schroeder,  47  Kan.  315,  27  Pac.  905. 

225  Warmington  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  40  Mo.  App.  159;  Latremouale 
V.  Bennington  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  03  Vt.  330,  22  Atl.  050;  Hatt  v.  Nay,  144  ilass. 
180,  10  N.  E.  807;  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Worley,  92  Ga.  84,  ]8  S.  E.  301. 
Where  the  servant  injured  knew  of  the  incompetency  of  his  fellow  servant 
by  whose  negligence  he  was  injured,  and  continued  to  work  without  com- 
plaint, he  was  guilty  of  contributory  negligence.  Consolidated  Coal  &  Min. 
Co.  V.  Clay's  Adm'r  (Ohio  Sup.)  38  -V.  E.  010.  So  where  cars  are  defective 
and  train  force  deficient  in  number.  Long  v.  Coronado  R.  Co.,  90  Cal.  209, 
31  Pac.  170.  But  see  Williams  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  109  Mo.  475,  18  S. 
W.  1098.  A  master  is  liable  to  his  servant  for  injuries  resulting  from  the 
unsafe  condition  of  his  working  place,  although  that  condition  is  brought 
about  by  the  negligence  of  fellow  servants  to  the  injured  person,  acting  un- 
der the  master's  doing.  Northwestern  Fuel  Co.  v.  Danielson,  6  O.  C.  A.  636, 
57  Fed.  915. 

220  Here  plaintiff  (common  laborer  about  depot  grounds)  was  directed  by 
his  superintendent  to  couple  cars,  although  the  superintendent  knew  that  he 
was  unskilled  in  this  work.  He  was  injured  by  the  carelessness  of  an  en- 
gineer.    It  was  held— First,  that  the  direction  by  and  knowledge  of  the  super- 


t^h.    13]  ASSLT.MPTIOiN"    OF    RISK    BY    SERVANT.  10.)  1 

Nor  does  he  if  the  master  promise  to  subsequently  provide  a  safe 
fellow  servant."'  And  it  has  been  held  that  a  servant's  assump- 
tion of  risk  in  working  with  an  inexperienced  servant  waives  the 
negligence  of  the  company  in  furnishing  such  a  servant,  but  that 
the  waiver  does  not  extend  to  any  negligence  of  which  the  fellow 
servant  himself  may  be  guilty.  "If  he  fails  in  any  respect  to  come 
up  to  the  measure  of  diligence  which  under  the  circumstances  he 
ought  to  exercise,  consent  to  serve  with  him  would  not  cut  off  the 
right  to  recover  for  any  injury  occasioned  by  that  negligence."  ^^^ 

291.  The  servant  assumes  the  risk  of  the  negligence  of  his 
fello-w  servants,  and  not  that  of  his  master.  If  the 
injury  of  "wrhich  he  complains  is  caused  by  the  con- 
current negligence  of  both  the  master  and  a  felloAV 
servant,  he  is  entitled  to  recovery. 

The  rule  as  to  the  ex^ption  from  liability  of  the  master  for  in- 
jury to  a  servant  caused  by  the  negligence  of  a  fellow  servant  is 
frequently  said  to  apply  only  where  the  master  has  been  negligent 

intendent  was  that  of  his  master;  second,  that  whore  a  person  in  the  em- 
ployment of  another  in  the  performance  of  a  specific  line  of  duty  only  ordi- 
narily hazardous  is  commanded  by  a  fellow  servant,  whom  he  is  bound  to 
obey,  to  do  an  act  in  the  same  general  service,  but  different  from  the  sphere 
of  employment  in  which  he  had  engaged  to  serve,  and  exti-a  hazardous  in 
its  character,  in  respect  to  which  the  servant  making  the  requirement  knew 
that  he  was  miskilled  and  inexperienced,  and  in  so  doing  injury  results  from 
the  negligence  of  a  fellow  servant  employed  in  tlie  particular  line  in  which 
the  act  is  being  done,  the  employer  is  liable.  Lalor  v.  Chicago,  B,  &  Q.  it. 
Co.,  52  111.  401.  Et  vide  Campbell  &  Zell  Co.  v.  Roediger,  7S  ua.  001,  2S  Atl. 
001. 

227  Thus,  where  a  blacksmith's  helper  is  dangerously  incompetent,  and  the 
master  promises  a  safer  one,  the  blacksmith  is  not  guilty  of  contributory 
negligence  in  continuing  to  work  with  his  helper.  Wust  v.  Erie  City  Iron 
Works,  149  Pa.  St.  2G3,  2t  Atl.  291;  Laning  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  40 
N.  Y.  521.  Et  vide  doctrine  of  the  case  as  commented  on  in  Odell  v.  New 
York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  120  N.  Y.  323,  24  N.  E.  47S;  Schulz  v.  Chicago, 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.)  59  N.  W.  102;  McGovern  v.  CenU-al  Vt  R.  Co., 
123  N.  Y.  2S0,  25  N.  E.  373;  Whittaker  v.  President,  etc.,  of  Delaware  &  H. 
Canal  Co.,  126  N.  Y.  544,  27  N.  E.  1042. 

22  8  Applied  to  injm'ies  done  a  brakeman  by  an  incompetent  fireman  oper- 
ating an  engine  to  plaintiff's  knowledge,  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Morley, 


lOo'-i  MAtiTER    AND    SERVANT.  [Ch.    13 

in  the  selection  of  suck  caieless  or  otherwise  improper  fellow  serv- 
ants. This,  however,  is  too  narrow  a  statement  of  the  rule.  The 
true  principle  would  seem  to  be  that  this  is  only  one  of  a  class  of 
cases  where  the  wrong  both  of  the  master  and  of  a  fellow  servant 
combine  to  do  injury,  and  that,  whenever  the  master  has  been  guilty 
of  a  breach  of  duty  to  a  servant,  he  cannot  defend  himself  by  say- 
ing that  the  negligence  of  a  fellow  servant  also  contributed  to  the 
injury.^^''  Thus,  an  employer  is  liable  for  an  injury  to  an  employ^ 
caused  by  a  defective  machine,  even  though  the  negligence  of  a 
coemploy^  may  have  contributed  to  the  result.^^"     If,  however,  no 

02  Ga.  84,  18  S.  E.  301;  Francis  v.  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R.  Co.  (Jlo. 
Sup.)  28  S.  W.  842.  Cf.  Acme  Coal  Min.  Co.  v.  Mclver  (Colo.  App.)  ;>8 
Pac.  596. 

2  21)  Craver  v.  Christian,  36  Minn.  413,  31  N.  W.  457;  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co. 
v.  Cummings,  106  U.  S.  700,  1  Sup.  Ct.  493;  Stringham  v.  Stewart,  100  N.  X. 
516,  3  N.  E.  575;  Elmer  v.  Locke,  135  Mass.  575;  Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v. 
Laack,  143  111.  242,  32  N.  E.  285;  Browning  v.  Wabash  Western  Ry.  Co.,  124 
Mo.  55,  27  S.  W.  644. 

230  Young  V.  New  Jersey  &  N.  Y.  Ey.  Co.,  46  Fed.  160,  affirmed  1  C.  C.  A. 
428,  49  Fed.  723;  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cummings,  106  U.  S.  700,  1  Sup. 
Ct.  493;  Rogers  v.  Leyden,  127  Ind.  50-53,  26  N.  E.  210,  collecting  many 
cases;  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  George,  88  Va.  223,  13  S.  E.  429;  North- 
western Fuel  Co.  V.  Danielson,  6  C.  C.  A.  636,  57  Fed.  915-919;  Browning  v. 
Wabash  Western  Ry.  Co.,  124  Mo.  55,  27  S.  W.  644;  Steinke  v.  Diamond  Match 
Co.,  87  T^'is.  477,  58  N.  W.  S42;  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  1  C.  C. 
A.  25,  48  Fed.  57.  This  is  consistent  with  the  generally  accepted  view  of  con- 
current negligence.  Post,  p.  1053;  Franklin  v.  Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  37 
Minn.  409,  34  N.  W.  898;  Ransier  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  (18S4)  32 
Minn.  331,  20  N.  W.  332;  Gardner  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  150  U.  S.  84li, 
14  Sup.  Ct.  140;  Boden  v.  Demwolf,  56  Fed.  846;  Northwestern  Fuel  Co. 
V.  Danielson,  6  C.  C.  A.  636,  57  Fed.  915;  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Berkey,  136  Ind.  181,  35  N.  B.  3;  Delude  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  55 
Minn.  63,  56  N.  W.  461;  Morrisey  v.  Hughes,  65  Vt.  553,  27  Atl.  20-5; 
Browning  v.  Wabash  Western  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  24  S.  W.  731;  tJnion  Pac. 
R.  Co.  V.  Callaghan,  6  G.  C.  A.  205,  56  Fed.  9SS;  Clyde  v.  Richmond  &  D. 
R.  Co.,  59  Fed.  394;  Finley  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  59  Fed.  419.  If  the 
conductor  of  a  crew  allow  a  fireman  to  act  as  engineer,  whereby  plaintiff 
was  damaged,  the  company  cannot  escape  liability  on  the  ground  that  the 
brakeman  and  engineer  were  fellow  servants.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Thomas'  Adm'r  (Va.)  17  S.  E.  884,  and  authorities  cited  page  885;  Finley  v. 
Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  59  Fed.  419.     And  see  note  59  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  302, 


■Ch.    13]  ASSUMPTION    OF    KISK    BY    SERVANT.  lOo-'! 

negligence  can  be  really  traced  to  the  master,  as  where  a  fellow 
servant  selected  an  improper  instrument  when  he  could  have  had  a 
proper  one,  the  master  is  not  liable.-^^  But  the  concurrent  negli- 
gence which  may  entitle  a  servant  to  recover  notwithstanding  the 
negligence  of  a  fellow  servant  need  not  be  the  negligence  of  the 
master  in  person;  it  is  sufficient  if  it  be  the  negligence  of  a  vice 
principal  or  superior  servant  who  is  not  a  fellow  servant.^^^ 

292.  The  doctrine  of  fello"wr  servants  has  been  severely 
criticised^  and  has  been  generally  altered  by  stat- 
ute. 

The  reaction  of  the  rule  against  the  master  and  servant  appears 
less  distinctly  in  the  decisions  of  such  states  as  Ohio,  Kentucky, 

231  Since  tlie  brakeman  and  the  men  wbo  make  np  trains  are  fellow-serv- 
a.nts,  a  railroad  company  is  not  liable  for  an  injury  to  tlie  former  occasioned 
by  tlie  use  of  too  short  a  pin  in  coupling  cars,  when,  by  the  undisputed  evi- 
dence, a  pin  of  the  proper  length  could  have  been  easily  obtained  in  the  yard 
or  from  the  caboose  of  the  train.  Thyng  v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.,  156  Jtass.  i:!, 
30  N.  E.  169;  Hefferen  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  45  Minn.  471,  48  N.  W.  1, 
52(;,  followed  in  Eawley  v.  Colliau,  90  Mich.  31,  51  N.  W.  350.  But  the  cases 
would  not  seem  to  be  in  harmony  as  to  the  general  proposition.  Thus,  it  has 
been  held  that,  conceding  that  the  accident  was  the  result  of  the  joint  negli- 
gence of  decedent's  fellow  servants  and  the  failure  of  defendant  to  furnish 
a  proper  caboose,  plaintiff  could  not  recover  (Freeman,  J.,  dissenting).  Lutz 
v.  Atlantic  &  P.  R.  Co.  (N.  M.)  30  Pae.  912;  Hefferen  v.  Northern  Pac.  R. 
Co.,  45  Minn.  471,  48  N.  W.  1,  526,  followed  in  Rawley  v.  ColUau,  90  Mich.  31, 
51  N.  W.  350. 

232  Norfolk  &  W.  Ry.  v.  Phelps  (Va.)  19  S.  E.  052;  Northwestern  Fuel  Co.  v. 
Danielson,  6  C.  C.  A.  636,  57  Fed.  915;  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Clark,  6  C.  C.  A.  281,  57  Fed.  125. 

2  83  A  fair  type  of  such  criticism  is  the  celebrated  one  by  Mr.  David  Gib- 
bons. Note  to  Gale,  Easem.  429,  430.  "A  very  eminent  judge  has  observed 
that  Priestley  v.  Fowler,  3  Mees  &  W.  1,  introduced  a  new  chapter  into  the  law. 
Clarke  v.  Holmes  (1861)  7  Hurl.  &  N.  947.  The  actions  for  this  cause  fol- 
lowing Priestley  v.  Fowler  are  very  numerous,  and  all  brought  under  cir- 
cumstances of  great  discouragement.  They  have  not  arisen  out  of  the  decision 
in  that  case,  but  in  spite  of  it.  There  have  been  cases  by  the  high-pressure 
speed,  with  which  we  run  the  race  after  wealth  and  pleasure.  The  weaker, 
the  younger,  the  less  skillful  workmen  fall  by  the  way,  and  are  crushed  or 
torn  by  the  powerful  and  complicated  machinery  employed.    'Butchered  to 


1054  MASTER    AMJ    SERVANT.  [Ch.    13- 

and  Tennessee  than  in  its  repeal  or  modification  by  English  "*  and 
American  statutes."^  In  general,  these  statutes  exempt  employes 
of  railroad  companies  from  the  operation  of  the  rule  of  fellow  serv- 
ants.    The  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  has  sustained  a 

make  a  Roman  holid;iy,'  or,  wliat  is  much  the  same  thing,  to  make  a  good 
dividend  for  railway  shareholders,  and  enable  them  to  join  Cook's  iier- 
sonally  conducted  tours  to  the  Nile  and  the  Holy  Land." 

How  much  unfairer  and  more  illiberal  the  present  common-law  rule  as  to 
the  liability  of  the  master  to  the  servant  is  than  the  German  law  will  aiJ- 
pear  from  a  consideration  of  the  return  of  the  German  standard  of  liability  to 
something  corresponding  to  the  absolute  liability  of  the  early  Saxon.  Of  the 
law  of  June  7,  1871  (Haftpflichtgesetz),  concerning  the  liability  of  railroads, 
mines,  etc.,  for  employes  killed  or  injured  in  the  operation  of  railroads, 
mines,  etc.,  section  1  reads  as  follows,  viz.:  "If  a  man  is  killed  or  bod- 
ily injured  in  the  operation  of  a  railroad,  the  operating  management  is 
liable  for  the  damage,  unless  it  proves  that  the  accident  was  caused  by  the 
acts  of  God  (vis  major — force  majeure),  or  by  the  own  fault  of  the  killed  or 
injured  employe."  Section  2  is  as  follows:  "^\'hoever  operates  a  mine,  a 
quarry,  a  pit,  or  a  factory,  is  liable  for  any  carelessness  or  negligence  at- 
tributable to  himself,  his  manager,  representative,  agent,  or  any  person  em- 
ployed to  superintend  the  running  of  the  establishment  or  the  hands'  employed 
therein,  by  whi(  h  the  death  or  bodily  injury  of  a  person  is  caused."  By  the 
accident  insurance  law  dated  .July  6,  1884,  it  was  enacted  that  (section  1)  "all 
hands  employed  in  mines,  salines,  sponging,  and  cleaning  establishments, 
quarries,  pits,  wharfs,  buildings,  factories,  and  furnaces,  or  other  employes, 
whose  wages  or  salaries  do  not  exceed  the  amount  of  M.  2,000  per  year,  are 
insured  against  any  accident  which  may  occur  in  the  operation  of  the  same 
according  to  the  provisions  of  this  law.  The  same  applies,  too,  for  all  hands 
or  other  employes  engaged  by  any  bricklayer,  carpenter,  roofer,  mason,  well 
digger,  chimney  sweep,  in  his  business.  In  the  same  sense  are  to  be  con- 
sidered establishments  and  plants  ui'  which  steam  boilers  or  any  machinery 

231  A  review  of  the  English  cases  as  to  what  constitutes  a  workman  en- 
gaged in  manual  labor,  within  the  employer's  liability  act,  will  be  found  in 
28  Ir.  Law  T.  Rep.  Zoo. 

23  5  A  partial  collection  of  statutes  will  be  found  in  2  Harv.  Law  Rev.  212. 
Et  vide  Law  Q.  R.  (London)  April,  1890;  24  Am.  Law  Rev.  G3.  The  En- 
glish employer's  liability  acts  (e.  g.  1875,  :;8  &  39  Vict.;  1S80,  42  &  43  Vict.> 
are  essentially  enforced  in  Massachusetts  and  Alabama.  McCauley  v.  Nor- 
cross,  155  JIass.  584,  30  X.  E.  4G4;  Shinners  v.  Proprietors  of  Locks  &  Canals, 
154  Mass.  1G8,  28  N.  E.  10;  Downey  v.  Sawyer,  157  Mass.  418,  32  N.  E.  G31; 
Cashman  v.  Chase,  150  ilass.  342,  31  N.  E.  4. 


^''l-    I'i]  ASSUMPTION    OF    RISK    BY    SERVANT.  1055- 

Kansas  statute  of  this  character.^^*  In  some  states  acts  of  this 
kind  have  been  held  valid  only  so  far  as  concerns  those  employ^* 
engaged  in  the  peculiarly  hazardous  business  of  railroading.^^'  On 
the  other  hand  it  has  been  held  that  the  statute  ^Yas  not  limited 
to  any  class  of  employ^s.^^^     Unless  the  case  at  bar  is  shown  to  be 

is  made  use  of,  which  for  its  operation  relies  on  elementary  motive  power, 
snch  as  wind,  water,  steam,  gas,  hot  air,  etc.,  excepting  those  of  agricul- 
tural or  forestry  establishments  not  already  included  in  clause  1  as  second- 
ary plants,  as  well  as  such  machinery  which,  being  only  temporarily  used, 
does  not  constitute  a  part  of  a  permanent  plant  or  establishment."  Under  this 
system  of  insurance,  the  master  is  stimulated  to  use  and  devise  safety  ajipli- 
ances,  and  in  every  way  to  prevent  the  occurrence  of  accidents.  In  practice 
the  amount  recoverable  by  the  workman  is  not  so  considerable  as  to  otter 
any  temptation  to  suffer  bodily  injury  in  expectation  of  large  comi)ensation 
by  way  of  a  verdict.     The  result  has  been  a  marked  diminution  in  accidents. 

The  highly  complex,  confused,  uncertain,  and  unnatural  system  in  vogue  in 
America  has  the  opposite  effect.  The  expense  of  elaborate  legal  departments 
on  the  part  of  the  master,  the  contingent  fee  which  the  injured  person  usually 
pays  to  his  attorney,  are  items  of  expense  approximating  a  large  part  of 
the  cost  of  insurance.  The  possibility  of  large  verdicts  is  naturally  calcu- 
lated to  lead  to  the  employment  of  Illegitimate  meihods  on  the  part  of  counsel 
for  the  injured  person.  It  is  not  unnatural  that  fire  should  be  fought  ^^•itll 
fire.  The  result  is  an  elusive,  but  material,  demoralization  of  the  bar.  The 
workinguian,  smarting  under  a  sense  of  injustice,  secures  laws  (which  in 
morals,  if  not  in  law,  are  class  legislation)  against  railroad  companies.  A 
more  vicious  system  could  scai'cely  be  devised. 

23  6  Missouri  Tac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mackey,  127  U.  S.  203,  8  Sup.  Ct.  IIGI.  Et  vide 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stahlcy,  11  C.  C.  A.  88,  62  Fed.  303. 

2S7  McAwnich  v.  Mississippi  &  M.  R.  Co.,  20  Iowa,  338.  See  Deppe  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  36  Iowa,  52;  Pierce  v.  Railway  Co.,  73  Iowa,  140,  34  N.  W.  783; 
Smith  V.  Railway  Co.,  78  Iowa,  583,  43  N.  W.  543;  Frandsen  v.  Railway 
Co.,  36  Iowa,  372;  Butler  v.  Railroad  Co.,  87  Iowa,  206,  54  N.  W.  208;  Ma- 
lone  V.  Railway  Co.,  (>•')  Iowa,  417,  21  N.  W.  756;  Deppe  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 
R.  Co.,  36  Iowa,  52;  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Haley,  2.j  Kan.  35;  Union  I'ac. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Harris,  33  Kan.  416,  G  Pac.  571 ;  Herrick  v.  Jlinneapolis  &  St.  L.. 
Ry.  Co.,  31  ilinn.  11,  16  N.  W.  413;  Lavallee  v.  St.  Paul,  51.  &  M.  Ky.  Co., 
40  Minn.  240,  41  N.  AV.  974;  Johnson  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  43  Minn.  222, 
45  N.  W.  150;  Pearson  v.  Railway  Co.,  47  .Alinn.  9,  40  N.  W.  302;  Smith  v. 
St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  44  Minn.  17,  46  N.  W.  149;  Steftenson  v.  Railway  Co.,. 
45  Minn.  3.j5,  47  N.  W.  1068. 

238  Thompson  v.  Central  Railroad  &  Banking  Co.,  54  Ga.  509;  Georgia  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Ivoy,  73  Ga.  499;  Ditberner  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  47  Wis, 
138,  2  X.  W.  69. 


1056  MASTER    AND    SERVANT.  [Ch.    13 

within  the  scope  of  statutory  provision  the  common  law  rule  as  to  fel- 
low servants  still  prevails.^'" 

239  Gen.  St.  Kan.  18S9,  par.  1251,  provides  that  every  railroad  company, 
organized  or  doing  business  in  this  state,  shall  be  liable  for  all  damages 
done  to  any  employs  of  such  company,  in  consequence  of  any  negligence  of 
its  agents,  or  by  any  mismanagement  of  its  engineers  or  other  employes,  to 
any  person  sustaining  such  damages.  Held,  that  a  firm  composed  of  private 
persons,  not  being  a  railroad  corporation,  having  a  subcontract  to  construct 
a  part  of  a  railroad,  and  operating  trains  on  the  road  in  the  prosecution  of 
their  work,  and  having  servants  and  employes  at  -work  upon  the  road,  and 
in  charge  of  their  trains,  are  not  withm.  the  terms  of  this  statute.  Sess. 
Laws  1874  (paragraph  1251,  Gen.  St.  1889).  Beeson  v.  Buseubark,  44  Kan. 
669,  25  Pac.  48.  Stevens  v.  Railroad  Co.,  100  Gal.  554,  35  Pac.  165;  Gomp. 
Laws  Dak.  Ter.  §  3753;  Elliot  v.  Railway  Co.,  5  Dak.  523,  41  N.  W.  7.-i8, 
reviewing  many  cases.  A  valuable  note,  with  numerous  citations,  as  to  the 
rule  determining  the  question  of  who  are  fellow  servants,  by  Arthur  P.  Will, 
S  C.  C.  A.  668;  Connor  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  59  Mo.  285.  As  to 
Wisconsin  act,  see  Ballou  v.  Railway  Co.,  54  Wis.  257,  11  N.  W.  559.  Bt 
vide  Comp.  Laws  Wyo.  p.  512,  c.  97,  §  1;  Rev.  St.  Mont.  1879,  c.  471, 
■§  318;  Ashley  v.  Hart,  147  Mass.  573,  18  N.  B.  416.  Act  April  2,  1890  (87 
Ohio  Laws,  150),  §  3,  defining  the  relation  of  railroad  employes,  provides  that 
"ever J-  person  in  the  employ  of  such  company  having  charge  or  control  of 
•employes  in  any  separate  branch  or  department,  shall  be  held  to  be  the  supe- 
rior and  not  fellow  servant  of  employes  in  any  other  branch  or  department, 
who  have  no  power  to  direct,  or  control  in  the  branch  or  department  in  which 
they  are  employed."  Held,  that  the  engineer  of  one  train  is  not  a  fellow 
servant  of  a  brakeman  on  another  train  of  the  same  company.  Cincinnati, 
H.  &  D.  R.  Co.  V.  Margrat  (Ohio  Sup.)  37  N.  B.  11.  An  inspector  of  cars, 
having  other  inspectors  under  him,  by  virtue  of  this  act,  is  not  a  fellow  serv- 
ant of  a  brakeman.  Columbus,  H.  V.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Brick  (Ohio  Sup.)  37 
N.  E.  128.  A  common  laborer  working  under  the  direction  of  a  section  fore- 
man on  a  culvert  on  the  line  of  a  railroad  and  the  engineer  and  conductor  of 
a  passenger  train  on  the  road  are  employgs  engaged  "in  the  same  general 
t)usiness,"  within  Comp.  Laws  Dak.  Ter.  §  3753,  exempting  the  employer  from 
liability  for  losses  suffered  by  his  employe  in  consequence  of  negligence  of 
another  employed  in  the  same  general  business.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hambly,  154  U.  S.  349,  14  Sup.  Ct.  983.  Act  March  10,  1891,  §§  1,  2,  pro- 
viding that  all  persons  engaged  in  the  service  of  "any  railway  corporation'' 
who  are  intrusted  by  "such  corporation"  with  authority  over  any  other  em- 
ploye are  vice  principals  of  "such  corporation,"  and  not  fellow  servants  of 
such  employe;  and  that  all  persons  engaged  in  the  common  service  of  "such 
corporations,"  etc.,  neither  of  whom  is  intrusted  with  any  control  over  his 
fellow  employe,  are  fellow  servants,  etc.,— do  not  apply  to  the  employes  of  a 
receiver  of  a  railway  corporation.  Campbell  v.  Cook  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  24  S. 
W.  977,  reversed,  86  Tex.  630,  26  S.  W.  486. 


Ch.    14]  WHO    AEE    COMMON    CARHIKKS.  1057 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

COMMON  CARRIERS. 

293.  Who  are  Common  Carriers. 

29-1.  Carriers  of  Goods. 
29.-,.  Duties. 

296.  Carriers  of  Live  Stock. 

297.  Carriers  of  Baggage. 

298.  Carriers  of  Passengers, 

WHO  ARE  COMMON  CARRIERS. 

293.  A  common   carrier  is  one  •who  is  engaged  in  trans- 
portation for  hire  as  a  business.^ 

According  to  Mr.  Schouler,  the  essentials  of  the  common  carrier's 
relations  are  that  the  transportation  undertaken  must  have  been 
for  a  reward,  and  in  pursuance  of  some-  carrying  vocation  which  he 
exercised.^  Chief 'Justice  Gibson  is  authority  for  a  criticised  ^  posi- 
tion that,  even  though  the  employment  be  only  occasional  or  inci- 
dental, the  relationship  may  be  established.*  As  carriers  by 
land,  the  law  recognizes,  for  example,  express  companies,'  stage 
coaches,  or  omnibuses  as  to  baggage  carried,"  railways  ^  as  to  bag- 

t  Story,  Bailm.  (9tb  Ed.)  495. 

2  Scliouler,  Bailm.  §  343.  Wood,  J.,  in  The  Neaffle,  1  Abb.  (V.  S.)  4Go,  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  10,063,  thiulis  this  is  too  broad. 

3  Fish  V.  Chapman,  2  Kelly  (Ga.)  S'l.j;  Schouler,  Bailm.  §  347;  Ang.  Carr. 
70,  71;  Hutch.  Carr.  §  49.  But  a  carman  undertaking  casual  jobs  between 
uncertain  places  is  not  a  common  carrier.     Brind  v.  Dale,  8  Car.  &  V.  2iJ7. 

*  Gordon  v.  Hutchinson,  1  Watts  &  S.  285.  Et  vide  Chevallier  v.  Straham, 
2  Tex.  115;    Moses  v.  Norris,  4  N.  H.  304. 

5  Bank  of  Kentucky  v.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  93  IT.  S.  174;  Sweet  v.  Barney,  23 
N.  Y.  335;  McFadden  v.  Missouri  Pae.  Ry.  Co.,  92  Mo.  343,  4  S.  W.  689; 
Ayres  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  71  Wis.  372,  37  N.  W.  432;  Railway  Cu. 
V.  "V^'ynn,  88  Tenn.  320,  14  S.  W.  311. 

0  Stoix  Bailm.  §§  496-499;  Ang.  Carr.  §  77;  Parmelee  v.  McXulty,  19  111. 
556;   Yerner  v.  Sweitzer,  32  Pa.  St.  208. 

7  A  railroad  company  may  be  liable  as  a  carrier,  though  a  receiver  has 
been  appointed  for  it,  where  he  merely  received  a  portion  of  the  net  earnings 

LAW  OF  TORTS— 67 


]058  COMMON    CARRIKBS.  [Oh.    14 

gage,'  freight,"  and  passengers,"  sleeping-car  companies,^^  and 
street-car  companies.^ ^  As  common  carriers  by  water,  the  law 
recognizes,  for  example,  boats  in  general,^^  ferries,'*  rafts  or  flat 
boats,  ^^  steamboats,  and  merchant  ships.  ^^ 

It  seems  that  a  person  who  conveys  passengers  only  is  not  a  com- 
mon carrier,  and  that,  therefore,  as  to  passengers,  a  railway  com- 
pany is  not  a  common  carrier."  It  is  certainly  true  that  the  rule 
of  liability  as  to  passengers  differs  substantially  from  that  as  to 

of  that  and  other  roads  which  are  managed  together,  and  permits  it  to  be 
managed  by  its  otticers  and  employes  in  connection  with  those  of  the  other 
roads.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  155  U.  S.  333,  15  Sup.  Ct.  136;  Same 
V.   Stewart,  Id. 

8  Macrow  v.  Groat  Western  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  612,  618.  Bt  vide  2  Redf. 
U.  H.  §  171;  Hannibal  Ry.  Co.  v.  Swift,  12  Wall.  262.  But  it  would  seem  that 
a  (jab  proprietor  is  not  a  common  carrier  as  to  luggage  of  passengers.  Ross 
V.  Hill,  2  C.  B.  S77;    Powles  v.  Hider,  6  El.  &  Bl.  207. 

'"  As  to  live  stock,  McManus  v.  Lancashire  &  Y.  Ry.  Co.,  4  Hurl.  &  N.  327. 
Et  vide  post,  p.  1073. 

10  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashley,  14  C.  C.  A.  368,  67  Fed.  209;  St. 
Joseph  &  G.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Hedge  (-Neb.)  62  N.  W.  887;  Lewis  v.  Delaware  &  H. 
Canal  Co.  (X.  Y.)  40  N.  E.  248. 

1 1  A  sleeping-car  company  is  liable  for  money  stolen  from  a  passenger  by 
Ihe  porter  of  the  car  on  which  he  is  traveling.  Pullman  Palace-Car  Co.  v. 
Gavin,  93  'j'cnn.  53,  23  S.  AV.  70.  Et  vide  Pullman  Palace-Car  Co.  v.  Miirtln, 
92  Ga.  161,  18  S.  E.  364;  Kinsley  v  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.,  125  Mass.  54; 
Woodruff  Co.  V.  Doihl,  84  Ind.  474.  This,  however, 'is  by  .no  means  dear. 
I'uUman  I'alace-Car  Co.  v.  Smith,  73  111.  360;  Tracy  v.  Pullman  Palace  Car 
Co.,  07  Hf)-\v.  Prac.  154.  A  collection  of  authorities  on  the  liability  of  sloep- 
ing-car  companies  for  loss  of  valuables  by  passengers,  and  also  as  to  their 
liability  for  refusing  berths,  8  Am.  R.  &  Corp.  R.  434. 

12  Spellman  v.  Lincoln  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  36  Neb.  890,  55  N.  W.  270. 

13  Lever  Alkali  Co.  v.  Johnson,  L.  R.  7  Exch.  267,  L.  R.  9  Exch.  338. 

14  Wyckoff  V.  Queens  County  Ferry  Co.,  52  N.  Y.  32.  But  not  a  canal  com- 
pany maintaining  a  water  highway,  Exchange  Ins.  Co.  v.  President  of  Dela- 
ware &  H.  Canal  Co.,  10  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  180;  nor  a  towbridge,  Grigsby  v.  Chap- 
pell,  5  Rich.  (S.  C.)  443. 

15  Steele  v.  :\IcTyer,  31  Ala.  r;fi7. 

16  2  Kent,  (."omm.  .599;  Harrington  v.  M'Shane,  2  Watts  (Pa.)  443;  Benett 
V.  Peninsular  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  G  C.  B.  775;  Crouch  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
14  C.  B.  255. 

17 1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  §  2.34,  citing  Aston  v.  Heaven,  2  Esp.  533;  Christie  v. 
Griggs,  2  Camp.  70;  Sharpe  v.  Gray,  9  Bing.  459;  Blake  v.  Great  Western  R. 
Co.,  7  Hurl.  &  N.  987,  31  Law  J.  Exch.  346;   Readhead  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  L. 


Ch.    14]  COMMON    CARRIERS    OF    GOODS.  1059 

liability  for  freig^ht  or  baggage.  Slaves,  while  the  institution  of 
slavery  left  us  by  our  ancestry  continued  to  exist  in  the  United 
States,  came  more  under  the  title  of  live  stock  than  of  passengers.^* 

COMMON  CARRIERS    OF  GOODS. 

294.  Common  carriers  of  freight  for  hire,"  not  of  live 
stock,  are  absolutely  liable  as  insurers  for  goods  in- 
trusted to  them.  The  mere  happening  of  an  injuri- 
ous accident  to  such  goods,  or  their  nondelivery  to 
the  consignee,  raises  prima  facie  a  presumption  of 
negligence,  from  -ssrhich  the  carrier  may  escape  by 
sho^mng —  , 

(a)  That  the  case  is  -within  an  exemption  from  liability 

created  by  contract  and  allo-wed  by  la^wr,  or 

(b)  That  the  damage  -was  caused  by — 

(1)  The  act  of  God,  or  the  inherent  nature  of  -what 

is  carried. 

(2)  Public  enemies. 

(3)  The  conduct  of  the  shipper. 

(4)  The  act  or  mandate  of  public  authority. 

LialiJity  as  an  Insurer. 

A  common,  carrier  has  been  regarded  by  the  law  from  the  earliest 
time  as  an  insurer.^"     "And  this,"  said  Lord  Holt,^^  "is  a  politic  es- 

R.  4  Q.  B.  370;  Wright  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  S  Exch.  437,  42  Law  J.  Excli. 
89.  But  see  Bretherton  v.  Wood,  3  Brod.  &.  B.  54,  and  Carpue  v.  London  &  B. 
R.  Co.,  5  Q.  B.  747. 

1 8  American  note  to  Coggs  v.  Bernard,  1  Smitli,  Lead.  Cas.  (Stli  Ed.)  pt.  1,  p. 
4:54:.     Et  vide  Boyce  v.  Anderson,  2  Pet.  1.50. 

19  But  the  delivery  of  freight  to  a  can-ier,  and  its  acceptance,  and  trans- 
portation thereof  according  to  directions,  without  payment  or  promise  of  re- 
ward, make  the  carrier  liable  only  for  damage  caused  by  its  gross  negligence. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Gerson  (Ala.)  14  South.  873. 

2  0  Woodlief  v.  Curteis,  1  Rolle,  Abr.  2,  E,  pi.  5;  Coggs  v.  Bernard,  1  Smith, 
Lead.  Cas.  (Sth  Ed.)  2a8;  Dale  v.  Hall,  1  Wils.  281;  Forward  v.  Pittard,  1 
Term  R.  27;   Jones,  Bailm.  103;   Pozzi  v.  Shipton,  1  Perry  &  D.  4,  8  Adol.  & 


21  Coj;ss  V.  Bernard,  2  Ld.  Raym.  909,  1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  (Sth  Ed.)  pt.  1, 
§213. 


lOGO  lOMlIOX    CAKRIERS.  [Ch.    14 

1  ablisluuent,  coiil lived  by  the  policy  of  the  law  for  the  safety  of  all 
]!ersons  the  necessity  of  wliose  affairs  oblige  them  to  trust  these 
sorts  of  persons,  that  tliey  may  be  safe  in  their  ways  of  dealing; 
for  else  these  carriers  might  have  an  opportunity  of  undoing  all  per- 
sons that  had  any  dealings  with  them,  by  combining  with  thieves, 
etc. ;  and  yet  doing  it  in  such  a  clandestine  manner  as  would  not 
be  possible  to  be  discoveicd.  And  this  is  the  reason  the  law  is 
founded  upon  that  point." 

On  proof  of  delivery  to  a  canner  and  injury  to  the  goods  or  their 
nondelivery  to  the  consignee,  a  presumption  of  negligence  on  the 
part  of  the  carrier  arises.^- 

"As  a  general  rule,  and  in  the  absence  of  fraud  and  imposition,  a 
common  carrier  is  answerable  for  the  loss  of  a  package  of  goods, 
though  he  is  ignorant  of  its  contents,  and  though  its  contents  are 
ever  so  valuable,  if  he  does  not  make  a  special  acceptance.  This 
is  reasonable,  because  he  can  always  guard  himself  by  a  special 
acceptance,  or  by  insisting  on  being  informed  of  the  nature  and 
value  of  the  articles  before  receiving  them."  '^^  The  extent  to  which 
the  carrier  may  limit  this  liability  by  contract  has  already  been 
considered.^*  The  general  proposition  is  also  sometimes  modified 
by  statutory  provisions.^ ^ 

There  are  certain  recognized  perils  of  transportation,  and  for 
damage  caused  by  them  the  carrier  is  not  liable.  These  excepted 
perils  will  be  next  considered.  But  if  the  carrier  is- negligent,  as 
in  exposing  the  goods  to  these  perils,  his  negligence,  and  not  the 
peril,  is  the  juridical  cause  of  the  wrong;    and  it  seems  that  the 

El.  flU3,  1  Willm.,  W.  &  H.  0124;  Condict  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  54  N.  Y. 
500;  Story,  Bailm.  §  489.  But  special  carriers  are  not  insurers.  Allis  v. 
Voigt,  !X)  Micb.  12.'),  :A  X.  ^^'.  iy:.t. 

2  2  Buck  V.  Pennsylvania  K.  Co.,  150  Pa.  St.  170,  24  Atl.  078:  Diier.  Neg.  § 
122,  notes  3,  4.  GencTrtlly,  as  to  warehouseman,  see  Claflin  v.  Meyer,  75  N.  Y. 
2U0. 

=  -.  Hart  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  112  V.  S.  331-;!-l0,  5  Sup.  Ct.  151;  Raili-oad 
Co.  V.  Fraloff,  100  U.  S.  24;  Baldwin  v.  Liverpool  &  G.  W.  S.  S.  Co.,  74  N.  Y. 
125;  McCune  v.  Railroad  Co.,  .j2  Iowa,  r.ou,  3  \.  AV.  015;  Stewart  v.  Ripen,  38 
Wis.  3S4;    3  Sutli.  Dam.  t2d  Ed.)  §  SS5. 

24  Ante,  p.  208,  "Discliarse  of  Torts." 

i-iRev.  St  X'.  S.  ISTS,  §42S1. 


Ch.  14]  C(JM1I()N  CARRIERS  OF  GOODS.  1061 

burden  is  on  the  carrier,  not  only  to  bring  his  case  within  the  ex- 
cepted peril,  but  also  to  show  that  he  was  without  fault.^" 

Exceptions — Inherent  Nature. 

Natural  decay  or  deterioration  from  natural  causes  have  been 
classed  sometimes  as  apparent  exceptions  to  tlie  liability  of  the 
carrier,  and  sometimes  as  falling  within  the  category  of  the  act  of 
G-od.  "Men  are  too  apt  to  hear  God  in  the  thunder  and  storm,  and 
ignore  his  existence  in  the  still  small  voice  of  the  calm.  But  the 
acts  of  God  are  not  always  cataclysms,  and  'natural  decay"  may  as 
reasonably  be  classed  under  this  head  as 'tempests'  or  'lightnings.' "  -' 
Thus,  the  carrier  cannot  be  held  liable  for  diminution  of  liquids  by 
means  of  evaporations  during  the  journey.^*  But  to  include  too 
many  natural  effects  in  the  class  "act  of  God"  may  easily  become 
irreverent;  ^^  and  it  would  seem  otherwise  expedient  also  to  recog- 
nize inherent  nature  as  a  separate  class  of  exceptions.  Thus,  it 
has  been  held  that  if  stoves  shipped  are  unusually  brittle,  and  liliely 
to  break  on  mere  handling,  it  is  error  to  charge  that,  if  goods  were 
received  in  good  order  and  delivered  injured,  a  legal  presumption 
of  negligence  followed,  unless  it  can  be  shown  liow  the  injury  hap- 
pened.^" 

Same — Act  oj  God. 

The  "act  of  God"  is  a  phrase  concerning  which  there  has  been  a 
vast  amount  of  dispute.  It  seems,  however,  that  it  refers,  if  not 
necessarily  to  the  violence  of  nature,  at  least  to  the  act  of  nature, 
and  implies  the  entire  exclusion  of  all  human  agency,  whether  of 

2  6  Duer.  Neg.  §  110,  collecting  cases  on  both  sides  of  this  proposit.ou.  But 
see  Raili-oad  Co.  v.  Beeves,  10  A^'all.  176;  The  .T.  C.  Stevenson,  17  Fed.  540; 
Little  Rock  Ry.  Co.  v.  Corcoran,  40  Ark.  375.  The  cases  would  seem  to  be 
not  much  more  than  evenly  balanced  on  this  point 

2T  Wood's  Brown,  Carr.  184. 

2  8  Hudson  V.  Baxendale,  2  Hurl.  &  N.  575.  And  see  Hunnewell  v.  Taber,  2 
Spr.  1,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  6,880;  Farra  v.  Adams,  Bull.  N.  P.  OS);  Warden  v. 
Greer,  6  Watts  (Pa.)  424;  Nelson  v.  Woodruff,  1  Black,  156;  Clark  v.  Barnwell, 
12  How.  272;  Tysen  v.  Moore,  50  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  442. 

2  0  The  same  exception  here  involved  is  logically  applied  to  exempt  carriers 
of  live  stock  from  liability  for  inherent  vice  of  live  stock.  Accordingly,  to 
classify  inherent  nature  under  act  of  God  might  lead  to  treating  the  kick  of  a 
mule  as  having  a  divine  origin. 

30  Buck  V.  Pennsylvania  B.  Co.,  150  Pa.  St.  170,  24  Atl.  078. 


1062  COMMON    CARRIERS.  [Oh.    14 

•  aiiier  or  third  persons.^^  The  civil  law  employs,  as  a  correspond- 
ing term,  "vis  major."  ^^  Inevitable  accident  is  by  no  means  synony- 
mous, for  an  accident  due  to  human  force  or  fraud  might  be  pro- 
nounced inevitable,  while  the  act  of  God,  on  the  contrary,  means 
something  which  is  opposed  to  the  act  of  man.^'  A  gust  of  wind  is 
the  act  of  God;  ^*  so  is  the  freezing  up  of  canals  and  rivers,^^  bad 
weather  ^^  generally,  or  a  sudden  flood."  but  a  conflagration  is 
not.^*^  Perils  of  the  sea,  such  as  lightning  and  tempest,  seem  to 
have  a  broader  meaning  than  the  act  of  God  as  commonly  defined."" 

■ii  American  note  to  Coggs  v.  Bernard,  1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  (8th  Ed.)  pt.  1, 
p.  423;  2  Redf.  R.  R.  p.  l.jl,  note  8;  Hutch.  Carr.  §  171,  etc.;  Story,  Bailm. 
§§  489,  490,  511;  Schouler,  Bailm.  (2d  Ed.)  §  410;  2  Kent,  Comm.  597; 
Ang.  Carr.  §§  154,  155;  Hayes  v.  Kennedy,  41  Pa.  St.  378;  per  Lowrie,  C.  J., 
reviewing  cases,  McArthur  v.  Sears,  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  190;  Mershon  v.  Ho- 
bensack,  22  N.  J.  Law,  381;  Chevallier  v.  Straham,  2  Tex.  11.5-125;  Back- 
house v.  Sneed,  1  Murph.  (X.  C.)  173;  Smyrl  v.  Nivlon,  2  Bailey  (S.  O.)  421; 
Pallmer  v.  Wright,  Rice  (S.  C.)  107;  Williams  v.  Grant,  1  Conn.  487  (where 
a  Moliammedan  extension  of  the  phrase  "act  of  God"  is  given);  1  Smith, 
Lead.  Cas.  424.  It  was  here  held  that  a  hidden  roclc  in  the  sea  not  before 
known  to  navigators,  and  not  linown  to  master  of  vessel,  occasioning  a 
wreclv,  was  an  act  of  God. 

3  2  Whart.  Neg.  §§  122,  5G0. 

3  3  Schouler,  Bailm.  §  410,  citing  Forward  v.  Pittard.  1  Term  R.  27; 
Trent  Nav.  Co.  v.  Wood,  4  Doug.  280.  And  see  Wright,  J.,  in  Merritt  v. 
Earle,  29  N.  Y.  115. 

3  4  Amies  v.  Stevens,  1  Strauge,  128.  Cf.  Colt  v.  Mcilechan,  6  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
160. 

3-.  Bowman  v.  Teall,  23  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  306;  Harris  v.  Rand,  4  N.  H.  2.J9; 
Orosby  v.  Fitch,  12  Conn.  410. 

3«  Nugent  V.  Smith,  1  C.  P.  Div.  19,  423;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Reeves,  10  Wall. 
176;  Jlichaels  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  30  N.  Y.  564;  Morrison  v.  Davis, 
20  Pa.  St.  171.    As  a  snow  storm.  Vail  v.  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  63  Mo.  230. 

3T  Nashville  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  David,  6  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  261;  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Reeves,  10  WaU.  176;  Read  v.  Spaulding,  30  N.  Y.  630;  Wallace  v.  Clayton, 
42  Ga.  443. 

3  8  Forward  v.  Pittard,  1  Term  R.  27;  Gatliffe  v.  Bourne,  4  Bins.  N.  C. 
314;  American  Transp.  Co.  v.  Moore,  5  Mich.  368;  Hebler  v.  McCartney, 
31  Ala.  501;  Condict  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  54  N.  Y.  500;  Lamb  v.  Camden 
&  A.  R.  Co.,  46  N.  Y.  271. 

3  9  Elliott  V.  Rossell,  10  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  1-9;  Johnson  v.  Priar,  4  Yerg.  (Tenn.) 
48;   Gordon  v.  Buchanan,  5  Terg.  (Teuu.)  71,  78-82;   Hays  v.  Kennedy,  41  Pa. 


^'h.    14]  COMMON    CARRIERS    OF    GOODS.  1063 

Lossf's  by  fire  or  explosion  are  occasioned  by  causes  for  which  the 
carrioi-  is  responsible,  unless  except  in  cases  of  lightning  stroke,  or 
perhaps  of  spontaneous  combustion.*"  If,  however,  the  fault  or  neg- 
ligence of  the  carrier  is  the  cause  of  the  wrong,  although  the  act  of 
God  was  a  condition,  the  carrier  is  liable.  Thus,  if  a  carrier  ex- 
poses goods  to  a  dangerous  flood,  he  is  responsible  for  consequent 
injury.*^  There  is  much  confusion  in  the  cases  as  to  whether  the 
act  of  God  is  a  cause  or  a  condition  when  the  alleged  injury  would 
not  have  occurred  except  for  the  delay  of  the  carrier.*^ 

Same — Public  Enemies. 

Public  enemies  are  those  with  whom  the  state  is  at  open  war.*' 
Thus,  pirates  on  the  high  seas  are  the  enemies  of  the  state  and  of 
mankind.*  ^  The  confederate  insurgents  of  1861  and  the  hostile  tribes 
of  Indians  have  been  regarded  as  public  enemies  in  the  United 
States.*^  It  was  said  in  Coggs  v.  Barnard  *^  that  "though  the  force 
be  ever  so  great,  as  if  an  irresistible  multitude  should  rob  him, 
nevertheless,  he  [the  carrier]  is  chargeable."  The  rule  at  the  pres- 
ent time  would  seem  to  be,  however,  that  where  a  carrier  receives 

St.  378;  dissenting  opinion  of  Thompson,  J.,  in  3  Grant,  Cas.  (Pa.)  3.j7; 
B^riend  v.  Wood,  6  Grat.  (Va.)  189;  Merritt  v.  Earle,  31  Barb.  47;  Fergussou 
V.  Brent,  12  JId.  33.  Et  vide  American  note  to  Coggs  v.  Bernard,  1  Smith, 
Lead.  Cas.  pt.  1,  p.  -120  et  seq. 

*o  Schouler,  Bailm.  §  411. 

*i  Charleston  &  0.  S.  B.  Co.  v.  Bason,  1  Harp.  (S.  C.)  202;  Campbell  v. 
Morse,  Id.  408.  So  if  the  vessel  be  unseaworthy.  Bell  v.  Reed,  4  Bin.  (Pa.) 
127.  And,  generally,  as  to  deviation  from  usual  course,  see  Davis  v.  (Jar- 
rett,  6  Bing.  710;  Express  Co.  v.  Kountze,  8  Wall.  342;  Williams  v.  Grant, 
1  Conn.  487;   The  Delaware,  14  Wall.  579. 

4  2  A  full  discussion  of  these  cases  will  be  found  in  Hutch.  Carr.  c.  5. 

4  3  Story,  Bailm.  §  526.  Et  vide  Gage  v.  Tirrell,  9  Allen  (Mass.)  2iJ9.  An 
article  on  the  liability  of  carriers  for  the  robbery  of  railway  passengers,  with 
reference  to  the  recent  case  of  Cobb  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  [1S93]  1  Q.  B. 
459.    Justice  of  the  Peace,  reprinted  in  28  Ir.  Law  T.  459. 

4  4  Pickering  v.  Barclay,  2  RoUe,  Abr.  248,  Style,  132;  Barton  v.  Wolliford, 
Comb.  56. 

■to  Schouler,  Bailm.  §  418,  citing,  inter  alia,  JlcCranie  v.  Wood,  24  La.  Ann. 
406;  Philadelphia  R.  Co.  v.  Harper,  29  ild.  330;  Holladay  v.  Kennard,  12 
Wall.  254.  Et  vide  Southern  Exp.  Co.  v.  Wormack.  1  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  256;  U. 
S.  V.  Palmer,  3  Wheat.  610;    Thorington  v.  Smith,  8  Wall.  1. 

■lo  2  Ld.  Raym.  909-918. 


1064  COMMON    CARHIERS.  [Cll.    14 

frei,L;lit  for  sliipment,  and  its  employes  strike,  or  cease  to  worli  for 
tlie  company,  it  is  still  bound  to  forward  the  freight  within  a  rea- 
sonable time;  but  if  the  strilve  is  accompanied  by  violence  and  in- 
timidation, so  as  to  render  it  unsafe  to  forward  the  freight,  the  com- 
pany is  thereby  relieved  from  liability  for  the  delay,  especially  when 
the  resistance  made  by  the  strikers  is  of  such  a  character  as  could 
not  be  overcome  by  the  company  or  controlled  by  the  civil  au- 
thorities when  called  upon  by  it.*^  But  where  trainmen  allowed 
thieves  to  break  open  a  car  containing  whisky,  and  the  car  was 
overtalien  by  the  Johnstown  flood,  the  consequent  loss  did  not  arise 
from  unavoidable  accident  or  the  act  of  God,  nor  from  insurrection, 
public  enemy,  or  a  mob,  and  the  carrier  was  accordingly  held  lia- 
ble." 

<&'a7iie — Conduct  of  Shipper. 

The  plaintiff's  own  wrong  may  prevent  his  recovery  against  a  car- 
rier on  essentially  the  same  principle  which  would  disentitle  him  to 
recover  in  any  other  action  of  tort.  Thus,  if  damage  to  the  goods 
be  done  by  bad  packing,  he  cannot  recover.*^  But,  where  improper 
loading  may  be  negligence  on  the  part  of  consignor  which  is  attrib- 
utable to  his  consignee,  it  will  not  bar  recovery  if  such  improper 
loading  was  apparent  to  the  oi"dinary  observation  of  the  carrier's 
servants.^"  t^o,  if  the  shipper  of  live  stock  fails  to  comply  with  his 
contract  as  to  feeding  and  watering,  whereby  the  stock  was  injured, 
he  cannot  recover,  though  the  company  delayed  transportation.^^ 

i^  Haas  v.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  G.  R.  Co.,  81  Ga.  792,  7  S.  B.  629.  Et 
vide  Geismer  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  102  N.  Y.  563,  7  N.  E.  828.  Of. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Bennett,  G  Am.  &  Eng.  K.  Cas.  391;  Schouler, 
B:ulm.  §  419. 

*8  Lang  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  154  Pa.  St.  342,  26  Atl.  370.  Et  vide  Story, 
Bailm.  §  ."320,  and  cases  cited. 

49  Shriver  v.  Sioux  City,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  24  Jlinn.  506;  Goodman  v.  Oregon  R. 
&  Nav.  Co.,  22  Or.  14,  28  Pac.  894.  Recital  in  bill  of  lading  that  goods  are 
received  in  apparent  good  order  is  only  prima  facie  evidence  of  that  fact.  St. 
Louis,  A.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Neel,  56  Ark.  279,  19  S.  W.  963.  In  absence  of  evi- 
dence to  contrary,  presumption  is  that  goods  were  received  in  good  order. 
Henry  v.  Central  Railroad  &  Banking  Co.,  89  Ga.  815,  15  S.  E.  757.  Et  vide 
Goodman  v.  Oregon  R.  &  Nav.  Co .  22  Or.  14,  28  Pac.  894. 

60  ilcCarthy  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Ca    (Ala.)  14  South.  370. 

Bi  Boaz  V.  Central  R.  Co.,  87  Ga.  463,  13  S.  E.  711. 


Ch.  14]  cojijkjn  carriers  ob'  goods.  1065 

But  the  law  will  not  allow  a  carrier  to  connect  a  shipper  with  its 
own  wrong.  Express  contracts  limiting  liability  are  scrutinized 
with  care,  especially  since  "it  cannot  be  said  in  truth  that  a  volun- 
tary contract  was  made  where  the  terms  are  imposed  by  one  and 
the  other  has  no  power  to  repel  them."  ^^  And  what  is  not  allowed 
to  be  done  expressly  cannot  be  done  by  im])lication.  Accordingly, 
if  the  law  does  not  permit  contracts  against  negligence,  it  will  not 
allow  a  carrier  to  accomplish  the  same  result  by  giving  notice  of 
danger  or  defect,  and  escaping  because  shippers  were  notified  or 
knew  of  defects  or  dangers.^^  And  if  the  freighter  must  submit  to 
an  injurious  detention  of  his  property,  or  to  the  use  of  a  vehicle 
having  a  reasonable  defect,  from  which  but  slight  damage  could 
result  during  a  transit  in  a  reasonable  time,  his  election  to  use  the 
vehicle  is  not  such  negligence  as  to  exonerate  the  carrier  from  fur- 
ther damage  resulting  from  an  extraordinary  detention.''* 

Same — Public  Authority. 

The  common  carrier  is  not  liable  if  goods  be  taken  from  his  pos- 
session by  legal  proceedings  against  the  owner,  or  if,  without  his 
fault,  they  become  obnoxious  to  the  requirements  of  the  police  pow- 
ers of  the  state,  and  are  injured  or  destroyed  by  its  authority;  as 
where  they  are  infected  with  contagious  disease,  or  where  intoxi- 
cating liquors  intended  for  use  are  sold  in  violati4)n  of  the  laws  of 
the  state,  which  require  their  seizure  and  destruction."^  The  prin- 
ciple of  the  exception  is  that  the  carriers  are  not  obliged  to  violate 
the  law  of  the  jurisdiction  to  comply  with  its  contract.'^''  To  pro- 
tect the  carrier  in  such  cases,  however,  it  is  necessary  that  the  seiz- 

52  Kimball  v.  Rutland  &  Burlington  R  R.,  26  Vt.  247. 

B3  Welsh  v.  Pittsburgh,  Ft.  W.  &  C.  R.  Co.,  10  Ohio  St.  73  (where  the  loss 
of  cattle  arose  from  a  defective  door  or  fastening  on  the  cars  known  to  plain- 
tiff); Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Rainey,  19  Colo.  22.j,  34  Pac.  980  (it  is  not  negli- 
gence for  a  shipiDer  not  to  see  that  slats  are  so  far  apart  as  to  allow  horses  to 
put  feet  through  them).    Et  vide  PoweU  v.  Mills,  37  Miss.  091. 

54  McDaniel  v.  Chicago  &  X.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  24  Iowa,  412,  418;  Harris  v.  North- 
ern Indiana  R.    Co.,   20  X.  Y.   232. 

5  5  Atkinson  v.  Ritchie,  10  East,  530,  .534;  Williams,  J.,  iu  Railroad  Co.  r. 
O'Donnell,  49  Ohio  St.  489-500,  32  X.  E.  476.  Et  vide  Wells  v.  Maine  S.  S. 
Co.,  4  Cliff.  228,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  17,401;  Bliven  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  30  N.  X. 
403,  407. 

56  Wells  v.  Maine  S.  S.  Co.,  4  Cliff.  228,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  17,401. 


1066  COMMON    CARRIEKS.  fCh.    14 

*ure  be  made  within  the  procurement  or  connivance  of  the  carrier, 
and  that  the  proceeding  or  process  under  which  it  was  made  ap- 
pear to  be  valid,  and  that  the  carriers  give  prompt  notice  to  the 
owner. '*^ 

SAME— DUTIES. 

295.  Common  carriers  are  under  a  duty  to  the  public  for 
the  violation  of  w^hich  an  action  for  tort  may  be 
brought — 

(a)  To  receive, 

(b)  To  transport,  and 

(c)  To    deliver   to  the   proper   consignee    the    property 

shipped,  or  to  exercise  the  care  of  a  Avarehouseman 
in  preserving   it  on  failure  of  the  consignee  to  re- 
move after  notice. 
Acceptance. 

The  carrier's  liability  commences  with  the  complete  delivery  of 
the  goods  to  be  shipped  to  him.^*  When  the  property  actually 
reaches  his  control,  no  question  can  well  arise;  but  it  seems  that 
the  delivery  may  be  actual  or  constructive,  to  him  or  to  his  author- 
ized agents.'*"  The  delivery  is  properly  made  when  it  accords  with 
the  carrier's  rules,""  or  the  known  and  established  usages  of  the 
particular  trade  involved."^  "We  know  of  no  general  rule  of  law  which 
governs  the  delivery  of  a  bill  of  goods  under  a  bill  of  lading  when 
such  delivery  is  not  expressly  according  to  the  terms  of  the  bill  of 

s7  Railroad  Co.  v.  O'Donnell,  supra;  Gibons  v.  FarwoU,  63  Mich.  344,  20 
N.  W.  855;  KifC  v.  Old  Colony  Ry.  Co.,  117  Mass.  501;  Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Yohe,  51  Ind.  181. 

5S  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McFadden,  154  U.  S.  15.j,  14  Sup.  Ct.  990. 

5  3  Thus,  signing  a  bill  of  lading  by  the  ageut  of  cotton  yard  where  the 
goods  are  stored  is  good  delivery.  Beunitt  v.  The  Guiding  Star,  53  Fed.  936; 
Capehart  v.  Granite  Mills,  97  Ala.  ?,7y.>,  12  South.  44.  As  to  delivery  of  sup- 
plies entitling  to  maritime  lien,  see  The  Vigilancia,  58  Fed.  698;  Merriam  v. 
Hartford  &  N.  H.  R.  Co.,  20  Conn.  354;  AVhite  v.  AViunisimet  Co.,  7  Cush.  125; 
Armistead  Lumber  Co.  v.  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  R.  Co.  (Miss.)  11  South.  472. 

6  0  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Echols,  97  Ala.  550,  12  South.  304. 

61  Deming  v.  Merchants'  Cotton-Press  &  Storage  Co.,  00  Tenii.  306,  17  S.  W. 
89;  New  England  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Starn,  60  Conn.  369,  22  Atl.  953;  Michigan 
V.  Ward,  2  Mich.  543;  Evansville  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  y.  Keith,  8  Ind.  App.  57,  35  N. 
E.  296. 


^''^-    14]  COMMON    CARRIERS    OF    GOODS.  10()7 

lading,  except  that  it  must  be  a  delivery  according  to  the  practice 
and  custom  usually  observed  in  the  particular  place  of  delivery."  •'^ 
At  common  law,  an  action,  may  lie  for  an  unjustifiable  refusal  or 
delay  in  accepting  shipments  tendered/^  The  liability  of  a  com- 
mon carrier  for  the  refusal  to  receive  and  convey  is  subject  to  these 
qualifications,  viz.:  (1)  That  the  party  owning  the  chattel  should 
offer  for  hire;  (2)  that  the  common  carrier's  means  of  safe  convey- 
ance should  be  adequate;  (3)  that  such  carriage  should  be  in  the 
line  of  his  vocation."  Such  liability  is  often  determined  or  altered 
by  specific  contract."'  Where  delay  in  the  shipment  of  freight,  de- 
livered for  immediate  shipment,  is  due  to  the  failure  of  the  com- 
pany to  furnish  cars,  the  company  is  liable  on  its  destruction  by 
fire,  though  the  shipping  contract  requires  the  shippers  to  load  the 
freight. ""  It  has  also  been  materially  and  almost  universally  al- 
tered by  statute.  Thus,  under  the  interstate  commerce  act,  reasonably 
proper  and  equal  facilities  for  the  interchange  of  traffic  are  com- 
manded, but  without  requiring  the  carrier  to  give  the  use  of  its 
tracks  or  terminal  facilities  to  another  cari'ier  engaged  in  like  busi- 
ness."''  The  violation  of  this  portion  of  the  act  gives  rise  to  an 
action  as  for  a  tort."* 

0  2  Gatliffe  v.  Bourne,  4  Bing.  N.  C.  314-:j2',t  (Tindal,  C.  .J.);  Constable  v.  Na- 
tional S.  S.  Co.,  154  U.  S.  51,  63,  14  Sup.  Ct.  10lj2. 

0  3  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Goodridge,  149  U.  S.  080,  13  Sup.  Ct.  970;  Crouch 
V.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  14  C.  B.  '23r,;  Freeman  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co., 
32  Fla.  420,  13  South.  892,  and  authorities,  page  42-5,  32  Fla.,  and  page  S'J2,  i:'. 
South.;  New  Jersey  Steam  Nav.  Co.  v.  Merchant's  Bank,  6  How.  (U.  S.)  .•144; 
Cole  V.  Goodwin,  19  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  261. 

o<  Schouler,  Bailm.  c.  3,  §  372,  discussing  these  qualifications  at  length.  Et 
vide  Wood's  Brown,  Carr.  §§  71-74;    1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  237. 

05  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wright,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  402,  21  S.  W.  Si; 
Pittsburgh,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Racer.  5  Ind.  App.  209,  .31  X.  IC.  %:!.  A 
collection  of  authorities  on  the  rights  and  remedies  of  shippers  for  unjust  dis- 
crimination as  to  freight,  9  Am.  R.  t^-  Corp.  R.  619.  An  extensive  note,  willi 
numerous  citations,  as  to  some  phases  of  unjust  discrimination  and  undue 
preference  or  prejudice  under  the  common  law  and  the  statutes.  Id.  27.'S. 

08  London  &  L.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rome,  W.  &  ().  R.  Co.,  68  Hun,  .")'.)8.  2;!  X.  Y. 
Supp.  231,  affirmed  144  X.  Y.  2(Ki,  ;^9  X.  B.  79. 

8  7  Interstate  Commerce  Commi.ssiou  v.  Cincinnati,  X'.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  ."ii! 
Fed.  025;    Oregon  Short  Line  &  U.  X.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Northern  Pac   R.   Cd.,  51 
Fed.  465. 
,     08  Osborn  v.  Chicago  &  X.  W.  l^.  Co.,  4S  Fed.  41).     As  to  stnte  ri'guliition, 


10o8  COMMON    CARRIERS.  [Cll.    14 

TfditaiiDiiiiliiin. 

In  cairjiiig  the  goods  to  their  destination,  the  common  carrier  and 
his  servants  are  bound  to  transport  safely,  with  reasonable  dispatch, 
by  the  prescribed  or  customary  route.'"' 

The  carrier  is  held  to  the  liability  of  an  insurer  for  the  goods 
while  they  are  being  carried.^"  His  duty  applies  alike  to  proper 
loading,  adequate  propelling  force,  and  safe  and  suitable  vehicles.'^ 
If  no  time  be  stipulated,  he  is  bound  to  carry  within  a  reasonable 
time.'^  He  is  liable  in  damage  for  delay;"  and  neither  unusual 
pressure  of  business,'*  disobedience  of  employes,"  nor  avoidable 

see  Littlefield  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  158  Mass.  1,  32  N.  E.  850;  Galveston,  H.  & 
S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Schmidt  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  452;  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Adams  (Va.)  18  S.  B.  673. 

0  0  Scliouler,  Bailm.  §  403. 

fo  See  cases  collected  in  13  Lawy.  Rep.  Ann.  33.  The  reason  for  this  severe 
rule  of  policy  will  be  found  discussed  in  Schouler,  Bailm.  §§  40(i--408. 

'1  Sharp  v.  Grey,  9  Bing.  457;  Lyon  v.  Mells,  5  East,  428;  Hoosier  Stone 
Co.  V.  LouisviUe,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.,  131  Ind.  575,  31  N.  E.  365;  The  Northern 
Belle,  9  "SA'all.  526;  Tucker  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  10  Jlisc.  Rep.  35,  30  N.  Y. 
Supp.  811;  Branch  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  77  N.  o.  347;  Hunt  v.  Nutt 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  1031;  Schouler,  Bailm.  §  402.  A  water  carrier 
warrants  by  implication,  not  that  he  has  honestly  endeavored  to  make  his 
vessel  lit  and  safe  for  the  particular  freight  he  is  to  carry,  but  that  she  is  In 
fact  reasonably  fit.  Lyon  v.  Mells,  5  Bast,  428;  Kopitoff  v.  Wilson,  1  Q.  B. 
Div.  377;  Steel  v.  State  Line  S.  S.  Co.,  3  App.  72;  Stanton  v.  Richardson,  L. 
R.  9  C.  r.  390;    The  Northern  Belle,  9  Wall.  526. 

'2  Taylor  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  385;  Raphael  v.  Pick- 
ford,  5  Man.  &  G.  551;  Johnson  v.  East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  90  Ga. 
810,  17  S.  E.  121;  Beckwith  v.  Frisbie,  32  Yt.  559;  Lowe  v.  East  Tennessee, 
V.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  90  Ga.  85,  15  S.  E.  692;  Thomas  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  63  Fed.  200;  Hackett  v.  B.  C.  &  M.  R.  R.,  35  N.  H.  390;  Hawkins  v. 
Hoffman,  6  Hill,  586;  Black  v.  Baxendale,  1  Bxch.  410;  Hamlin  v.  Great 
Northern  Ry.  Co.,  1  Hurl.  &  N.  408.  As  to  what  is  reasonable  time  in  view  of 
all  the  circumstances,  see  Hughes  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.,  14  C.  B.  637; 
Nudd  V.  Wells,  11  Wis.  407;    Hand  v.  Baynes,  4Whart.  204. 

13  Davis  V.  Jacksonville  S.  E.  Line  (ilo.  Sup.)  23  S.  AV.  965. 

■a  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Touart,  97  Ala.  514,  11  South.  756;  Gulf,  C.  & 
S.  F.  K.  Co.  V.  il'Aulay  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W.  475;  Great  Western  R.  Co. 
v.  Hawkins,  18  Mich.  427;  Empire  Tea  Co.  v.  Wamsutta  Oil  Co.,  63  Pa.  St. 
14;  Toledo,  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Lockhart,  71  111.  627;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Hume  (Tex.  Sup.)  27  S.  W.  110. 

'5  Not  amounting  to  a  strike.  Central  Railroad  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Georgia 
Fruit  &  Vegetable  Exchange,  91  Ga.  389,  17  S.  B.  904. 


^^-    14]  COMJION    (3ARRIERS    OF    GOODS.  1069 

accident ''"  will  justify  delay  whereby  the  goods  are  damaged.' '  In- 
deed, the  cases  have  gone  so  far  as  to  hold  that  inevitable  accident 
is  no  excuse  for  failure  to  carry  within  time  agreed  upon.'"  Where 
delays  arise,  however,  preference  should  be  given  to  perishable  goods 
already  received.'" 

Delivery  to  Coimltjnee. 

The  carrier  is  not  liable  for  misdelivery  if  in  making  such  delivery 
he  has  followed  the  usual  course  of  business.''''  The  liability,  after 
it  has  attached,  does  not  cease  until  there  has  been  a  delivery  of 
goods  according  to  contract,  statute,  or  usage  of  business."  On 
arrival  at  the  destination,  the  carrier,  as  a  warehouseman,  is  bound 
to  keep  the  goods  with  ordinary  care,  and  to  deliver  them  on  de- 
mand, within  a  reasonable  time,  and  on  payment  of  reasonable  char- 
ges, and  to  have  an  agent  ready  to  deliver  them  at  reasonable  time. 
If,  through  breach  of  any  of  these  duties,  as  of  that  of  the  agent, 
the  property  is  destroyed  by  fire,  the  carrier  is  liable.  Under  such 
circumstances,  the  carrier  is  held,  not  to  the  liability  of  an  insurer, 

fa  Receivers  of  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Olive  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  23  S. 
W.  .52(_;. 

''^  Tlius,  a  railroad  company  is  liable  for  veuisau  spoiled,  Cautwell  v.  Pacific 
Exp.  Co.,  58  Ark.  4S7,  2~j  S.  W.  .503;  for  damage  done  to  gi'apes  by  delay,  Grin- 
neU  V.  Wisconsin  Cent.  Co.,  47  Minn.  r,v,'j,  50  N.  AY.  S'.Jl;  Gulf,  C.  Sc  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Hume  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  24  S.  W.  915;  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rassell 
(Tex.  Sup.)  18  S.  '\A'.  504. 

78  Harmony  v.  B)n,i,'liam,  12  X.  Y.  UU.     Et  vide  Hutch.  Carr.  §  319,  note  1. 

IB  Peet  V.  CbicaKO  tt  X.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  Wis.  624;  Great  Western  lly.  Co. 
V.  Burns,  60  111.  2S4.  In  Michigan  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Burrows,  33  Mich.  6,  pref- 
erence to  goods  for  the  relief  of  Chicago  tire  sufferers  was  justified.  Et  vide 
Marshall  v.  New  York  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  4.:.  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  .->02. 

80  Farmers'  &  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Champlain  Transp.  Co.,  23  Vt.  186;  Rich- 
mond V.  Steamboat  Co.,  87  X.  Y.  240;  Gibson  v.  (Julver,  17  Wend.  :!iJ5;  The 
Boston,  1  Low.  4i;4,  Fed.  C.ns.  Xo.  1,071;  The  Sultana  v.  Chapman,  5  Wis. 
4.54;  Dixon  v.  Dunham,  14  111.  :124;  Salmon  Falls  Co.  v.  The  Tangier,  1  Cliff. 
S96,  Fed.  Cas.  Xo.  l;:.74:;;  Gates  v.  ('liiea^;o,  I!.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  42  Xeb.  ZT'.).  iV> 
N.  W.  583.  Cf.  Savannah,  F.  &  W.  Ity.  Co.  v.  Sloat,  93  Ga.  803,  20  S.  E.  210; 
ante,  p.  7-34.  "Trover  and  Conversion  and  Ministerial  Duties." 

81  Kirk  V.  Chieago,  St.  P..  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.)  60  N.  W.  1084;  Farm- 
ers' &  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Champlain  Transp.  Co.,  18  Vt.  131-140;  Richardson 
V.  Goddard,  23  How.  39;  Chicago  &  R.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Warren,  16  111.  505;  Con- 
stable V.  National  S.  S.  Co.,  1.54  U.  S.  51.  14  Sup.  Ct.  1002. 


1070  COMMON    CARRIERS.  [Cll.    14 

as  a  common  carrier,  but  to  sucli  cure  as  a  wareliouseman  would 
take  of  his  own  property.*^  If  the  consignee  is  present  on  arrival 
of  froods,  he  must  take  them  away  at  a  reasonable  time;  if  not  pres- 
ent, lie  or  his  a^ent  living  at  the  place  of  destination  should  be  noti- 
fied.^'' If  the  goods  are  not  then  removed  within  a  reasonable  time, 
their  loss  falls  on  the  consignee,  provided  the  carrier  has  exercised 
the  care  of  a  warehouseman.*^  Tlius,  if  the  consignee  is  dead  or 
cannot  be  found,  the  carrier  should  store  them  at  the  owner's  risk 
and  expenses.*"  Failure  of  the  earner  to  deliver  to  the  proper  con- 
signee, after  reasonable  opportunity  to  determine  his  legal  rights,, 
creates  a  liability  for  damage  sustained  by  consignee.*" 

Damages. 

Where  property  delivered  to  a  common  carrier  for  shipment  is 
destroyed  while  in  transit,  the  measure  of  damages  is  the  market 

8  2  E.  O.  Stanard  Milling  Co.  v.  White  Line  Cent.  Transit  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.) 
26  S.  W.  704;  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Dodd  (Ark.)  27  S.  W.  227  (under 
contract);  East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  91  Tenn.  699-708,  20' 
S.  W.  312,  314;  Derosia  v.  Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  18  Minn.  133  (Gil.  119); 
Arthur  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  38  Minn.  9.j,  35  N.  W.  718  (under  contract). 

S3  As  to  statutory  requirements  of  notice,  see  Wilson  v.  California  Cent.  Ry. 
Co.,  9-1  Cal.  166,  29  Pac.  861.  If,  after  arrival,  in  violation  of  general  and 
uniform  custom,  the  carrier  fails  to  give  notice  of  arrival  of  goods,  and  they 
are  injured  by  the  act  of  God,  as  a  freshet,  the  carrier  is  liable  for  negligence. 
Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  White,  88  Ga.  805,  15  S.  E.  802. 

84  Basnight  v.  Railroad  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  592,  16  S.  E.  323;  Hasse  v.  American 
Exp.  Co.,  94  Mich.  133,  53  N.  W.  918;  Wald  v.  Railroad  Co.  (Ky.)  18  S.  W. 
850;  Moses  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  32  N.  H.  523;  Gregg  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
Co.,  147  111.  550,  35  N.  E.  343;  E.  O.  Stanard  Milling  Co.  v.  White  Line  Cent. 
Transit  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  26  S.  W.  704.  And  see  Constable  v.  National  S.  S.  Co., 
154  U.  S.  51,  14  Sup.  Ct.  1062,  discussing  contractual  limitations  on  lia- 
bility after  unloading,  discharge  at  other  than  usual  place,  and  notice  to 
consignee. 

85  Fisk  V.  Newton,  1  Denio,  45:  Rowland  v.  Miln,  2  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  150, 
153;  Crawford  v.  Clark,  15  111.  501;  Young  v.  Leary,  135  N.  Y.  569,  32 
N.  E.  607.  Leaving  a  car  of  wheat  on  a  side  track  threatened  by  risingv 
water  was  held  to  be  a  failure  to  exercise  ordinary  care,  and  the  owner  of 
the  wheat  recovered.  Baltimore  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Keedy,  75  Md.  320.  23  Atl. 
643.    Cf.  Charlotte,  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Wooten,  87  Ga.  203,  l:!  S.  E.  509. 

8  6  But  in  such  an  action  mere  brusqueuess  on  the  part  of  the  agent,  not 
amounting  to  insult,  is  not  a  ground  for  punitive  damages.  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
Co.  v.  Brookhaven  Mach.  Co.,  71  Miss.  003,  16  South.  252. 


t^ll-    H]  COMMON    CARRIERS    OF    GOODS.  1071 

value  of  the  property  at  its  place  of  destination,  at  the  time  it 
should  have  been  delivered  there." 

Siime — Connecting  Lines. 

Where  property  is  shipped  over  connecting  railroads,  express  or 
freight  lines,  and  is  injured  in  transit,  the  question  arises  to  to  the 
responsibility  of  the  carrier  who  originally  undertook  to  transport 
from  one  point  to  another,  the  intermediate  carrier,  independent  car 
company,  and  others.  Here  the  proper  parties  defendant  are  often 
determined  by  construction  of  the  contract  entered  into  in  each 
case.''^  They  may  be  joint  tort  feasors.^'  If  the  contract  provides 
expressly  or  impliedly,  by  bill  of  lading  or  receipt,  for  a  through 
transportation,  the  original  carrier  is  clearly  liable.""  There  is,  how- 
ever, much  difference  of  opinion  whether,  in  the  absence  of  any 
express  contract,  the  carrier  who  originally  received  the  goods  is 
liable  for  any  negligence  outside  of  his  own  immediate  line.  In 
Muschamp  v.  Lancaster  &  P.  J.  Ry.  Co.°^  it  was  determined  that, 
where  goods  are  delivered  to  be  carried  by  a  railway  company  from 
one  terminus  to  another,  the  jury  may  find  that  this  company  is 
ixnswerable  for  the  entire  transportation,  although  intermediate 
carriers  carried  the  goods  part  of  the  distance.  In  this  case,  there 
was  no  contract  apart  from  the  ordinary  booking,  and  no  proof  of 
partnership  between  the  original  and  the  connecting  company.  The 
English  rule  in  accordance  with  this  case  would  seem  to  be  that,  in 
the  absence  of  contract  modification,  a  can-ier  who  undertakes  to 

87  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  K.  Co.  v.  Lawler,  40  Neb.  3.50,  58  N.  W.  968;  Ala- 
bama &  V.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Searles,  71  Miss.  744,  16  Soutli.  :2."i."i. 

88  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Slioi-t,  2.->  S.  W.  142-147. 

Si)  Atlantic  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Laird,  7  C.  C.  A.  489,  58  Fed.  760.  As  to  carrying 
passengiers,  vide  Wisconsin  Cent  R.  Co.  v.  Ross,  142  111.  9,  31  N.  E.  412.  As 
to  lessees,  vide  Baxter  v.  Railway  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  22  S.  W.  1002;  Wabash 
R.  Co.  V.  Williamson,  3  Ind.  App.  190,  29  N.  E.  4.55.  Joint  and  through 
tariff  rates  do  not  make  carriers  liable  as  joint  tort  feasors.  AVehmaun  v. 
Minneapolis,  St.  P.  &  S.  S.  M.  Ry.  Co.  (Minn.)  .5!)  N.  W.  .540. 

00  Candee  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co..  21  Wis.  582;  Davis  v.  Jaclisonville  S. 
I>;.  Line  (Mo.  Sup.)  28  S.  W.  005;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Androscoggin  ilills,  22  Wall. 
5'.J4;  Central  Railroad  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Georgia  Fruit  &  A'egetable  Exchange 
(Jo.,  91  Ga.  389,  17  S.  E.  904;  Jennings  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  127  N.  Y.  438, 
2S  X.  E.  394. 

01  8  Mees.  &  AV.  421. 


1072  COMMON    CAKRIKRS.  [Cll.    14 

liansport  from  one  point  to  another  is  liable  for  the  negligence  of 
the  intemiediate  carrier."^  It  has  been  followed  "  and  denied  " 
by  many  American  cases.  The  intermediate  carrier  who  is  liable  for 
his  own  negligence  is  relieved  by  delivery  to  the  succeeding  carrier,"^ 
or  giving  the  next  carrier  notice  of  arrival  of  goods  and  a  reason- 
able time  for  it  to  receive  them.  It  is  not  liable  thereafter  for  the 
latter's  inability  to  receive.'^  Where  property  transported  by  suc- 
cessive carriers  has  been  injured  in  transit,  in  the  absence  of  evi- 
dence to  the  contrary,  the  injury  is  presumed  to  have  been  caused 
through  the  fault  of  the  last  carrier.  He  is  presumed  to  have  re- 
ceived goods  in  good  order. "''     The  right  of  the  owner  of  the  goods 

9  2  Bristol  &  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Collins,  7  H.  L.  Cas.  19-t.  As  to  passengers,  set'. 
Great  T^'estern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Blake,  7  Hurl.  &  N.  987. 

93  Nashua  Lock  Co.  v.  Worcester  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  48  N.  H.  339;  Illinois  Cent. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Frankenbergi,  54  111.  88;  Bank  of  Kentucky  v.  Adams  Exp.  Co., 
93  U.  S.  174;  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Combs,  70  Ga.  533.  Et  vide  cases  collected 
sections  147  and  148,  Hutch.  Carr.;  Jennings  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  127  >;. 
Y.  438,  28  N.  E.  394.  And  see  Tolman  v.  Abbot,  78  Wis.  192,  47  N.  W.  264; 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr,  68  Jliss.  14,  8  South.  330. 

Si  Nutting  V.  Connecticut  Ry.,  1  Gray  (Mass.)  502;  Burroughs  v.  Norwich 
&  W.  R.  Co.,  100  Mass.  26;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Forsyth,  01  Pa.  St.  81;  Irish 
V.  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  19  Minn.  376  (Gil.  323);  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Manufacturing  Co.,  16  Wall.  318. 

0=  Pratt  V.  Railway  Co.,  95  U.  S.  43;  Church  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co., 
1  Old.  44,  29  Pac.  530;  Wehmann  v.  Railway  Co.  (Minn.)  59  N.  W.  546.  As 
to  Avliat  is  apparently  improper  loading  of  a  car  delivered  by  one  carrier  to 
a  connecting  carrier,  see  McCarthy  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  (Ala.)  14  South. 
370.  As  to  liability  of  consolidated  roads,  see  State  v.  Baltimore  &  L.  R.  Co., 
77  Md.  489,  26  Atl.  865;  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Richardson,  53  Kan. 
157,  35  Pac.  1114;  Zealy  v.  Electric  Co.,  99  Ala.  570.  13  South.  118;  Cleve- 
land, C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Prewitt,  134  Ind.  557.  33  N-.  E.  367. 

so  Palmer  v.  Atchison.  T.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.,  101  Cal.  187.  35  Pac.  630. 

9  7  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Barnhart,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  601,  23  S.  W.  801,  and 
24  S.  W.  331.  And  see  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Breeding  (Tex.  App.)  16  S. 
W.  184;  Western  liy-  Co.  v.  Harwell,  '.J7  Ala.  341,  11  South.  781;  Central 
Railroad  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Bayer,  91  Ga.  115,  16  S.  E.  953;  Leo  v.  St.  Paul, 
M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  30  Minn.  438,  15  N.  W.  872;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
.Tones.  100  Ala.  203,  14  South.  114;  Forrester  v.  Railroad  Co.,  92  Ga.  (199,  19 
S.  E.  811;  Joseph  v.  Raih-oad  Co.,  88  Ga.  420,  14  S.  E.  591  (by  statute);  Faison 
V.  Alabama  &  V.  Ry.  Co.,  69  Miss.  569,  13  South.  37.  Liability  of  first  carrier 
as  to  goods  delivered  to  connecting  carrier,  ililler  t.  South  Carolina  R.  Co., 
33  S.  C.  359,  11  S.  E.  1093. 


Ch.    14]  CARBIERS    OF    LIVE    STOCK.  1073 

to  sue  either  the  original  carrier  or  the  intermediate  canner  by 
whose  fault  the  damage  was  caused  is  generally  recognized."^ 

CARRIERS  OF  LIVE  STOCK. 

S96.  A  carrier  of  live  stock  is  liable  for  the  performance 
of  duties  -wrhenever  a  carrier  of  other  freight  "wrould 
be.  His  liability  is  especially  contingent  upon  the 
inherent  vice,  disease,  or  condition  of  the  animals 
shipped. 

It  has  been  insisted  that  "the  carriage  of  live  stock  is  not,  'under 
the  custom  of  the  realm,'  the  proper  subject  of  a  common  carrier  at 
all.  Live  stock  can  in  no  proper  sense  be  called  goods  or  produce 
in  the  carriage  of  which  the  office  of  the  common  carrier  is  defined 
to  consist."  °^  It  seems,  however,  to  be  now  settled  that  the  car- 
riers of  live  animals  incur  the  responsibility  of  common  carriers  as 
to  such  freight;  but  due  regard  is  had  to  the  nature  of  the  thing 
transported.  Common  carriers  of  live  stock,  it  is  universally  rec- 
ognized, are  not  responsible  for  damages  to  live  stock  where  the 
damage  may  have  arisen  from  the  nature  or  condition  of  the  animals 
themselves,  which  diligent  care  could  not  have  prevented.  "The 
carrier  of  animals  by  a  mode  of  conveyance  opposed  to  their  habits 
and  instincts  has  no  such  means  of  securing  absolute  safety.  They 
may  die  of  fright,  or  by  refusing  to  eat ;  or  they  may,  notwithstand- 
ing every  precaution,  destroy  themselves  in  attempting  to  break 
away,  *  *  «•  or  they  may  kill  each  other.  »  »  *  Where, 
however,  the  cause  of  the  damage  *  *  *  is  in  connection  with 
the  condition  or  propensity  of  animals  undertaken  to  be  carried,  the 
ordinary  responsibilities  of  the  carrier  should  attach."  ^°"     There  is, 

98  Barter  v.  Wheeler,  49  N.  H.  9;  Anchor  Line  v.  Dater,  68  111.  3G9;  South- 
ern Exp.  Co.  V.  Hess,  53  Ala.  19;  Mosher  v.  Southern  Exp.  Co.,  OS  Ga.  o7; 
Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Twiss,  35  Neb.  267,  53  N.  W.  70.  Et  vide  St.  Louis, 
I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Henderson,  57  Ark.  402,  21  S.  W.  878;  Johnson  v.  East 
Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  90  Ga.  810,  17  S.  E.  121. 

BO  American  note  to  Coggs  v.  Bernard,  1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  pt.  1,  p.  451.  The 
English  cases  which  incline  to  this  view  will  be  found  collected,  and  together 
with  some  leading  American  cases  considered,  in  3  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law,  pp. 
1-3,  etc.      Et  vide  Hutch.  Carr.  §  221. 

10  0  Clark  v.  Rochester  &  S.  R.  Co.,  14  N.  Y.  571,  573;  Harris  v.  Northern  Ind. 

LAW  OF  TORTS — 68 


10(4  COMMON    CARKIKRS.  [Ch.    14 

of  course,  no  liability  on  part  of  earner  where  the  damage  complain- 
ed of  was  caused  by  the  wrong  of  the  shipper.^"^  Where,  however, 
the  carrier's  negligence  has  caused  damage,  he  is  responsible.  The 
carrier  is  bound  to  provide  safe  cars  and  appliances  with  reference 
to  the  ordinary  character  and  condition  of  the  animals.^""  It  is  no 
defense  that  the  car  alleged  to  be  defective  belongs  to  a  connecting 
carrier,^"'  or  to  an  independent  company,^"*  or  even  to  the  owner 
of  the  stoclv  shipped.^°=  While  the  duty  of  loading  and  unloading 
cattle  Is  commonly  determined  by  contract,^""  circumstances  may 

R.  Co.,  20  N.  Y.  232;  Michigan  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Myrick,  1  Sup.  Ct.  425;  IIU- 
nois  Cent  R.  Co.  v.  Scruggs,  09  Miss.  418,  13  South.  698;  Llndsley  v.  Chicago, 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  36  Minu.  539,  33  N.  W.  7;  Evans  v.  Fitehburg  R.  Co., 
Ill  Mass.  142;  Hance  v.  Pacific  Exp.  Co.,  48  Mo.  App.  179;  Moulton  v.  St. 
Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  31  Minn.  So,  16  N.  "\V.  497;  McCoy  v.  Keokuk  &  D.  M. 
R.  Co.,  44  Iowa,  424;  Morrison  v.  Philips,  44  Wis.  405.  Et  vide  cases  col- 
lected by  states,  3  Am.  &  Eng.  Enc.  Law,  7,  S.  As  to  burden  of  proof,  see 
Boehl  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  44  Minn.  191,  46  N.  W.  333.  Where  a 
carrier  seeks  to  escape  liability  for  injury  to  an  animal  delivered  to  it  for 
transportation  on  the  ground  that  the  injury  arose  from  the  viciousness,  uu- 
ruliness,  or  restiveness  of  the  animal,  it  must  also  be  shown  that  the  carriei" 
was  not  guilty  of  negligence.  Giblin  v.  National  Steamship  Co.  (Super.  N.  Y.) 
28  N.  Y.  Supp.  69. 

101  Thus,  the  burden  on  a  common  carrier  is  rebutted  by  showing  that  the 
owner  left  a  window  open,  whereby  animal  was  injured.  Huchinson  v.  Chi- 
cago, St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  37  Minn.  524,  35  N.  W.  433. 

10  2  A  car  furnished  by  a  railroad  company  for  the  transportation  of  horses 
and  mules,  which  is  liable  to  be  broken  from  slight  kicks  by  tlie  animals,  is 
not  reasonably  safe,  and  the  shipper  may  recover  for  injuries  to  the  animals 
caused  by  the  car  being  so  broken.  Betts  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co. 
(Iowa)  60  N.  W.  023;  Selby  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  Co.,  113  N.  C.  588,  18  S. 
E.  88;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Pratt,  22  WaU.  123;  Pratt  v.  Ogden'sburg  &  L.  O.  Ry. 
Co.,  102  Mass.  557;  McDaniel  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  24  Iowa,  412;  Har- 
ris V.  Northern  Ind.  11.  Co.,  20  N.  Y.  232.  The  question  of  construction  and 
condition  of  cars  may  be  for  the  jury.  Armstrong  v.  United  States  Exp.  Co., 
159  Pa.  St.  640,  28  Atl.  448.  Et  vide  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Grant,  99  Ala. 
325,  13  South.  599;  Searles  v.  Alabama  &  V.  Ry.  Co.,  69  Miss.  186,  13  South. 
815. 

103  Wallingford  v.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  Co.,  26  S.  C.  258,  2  S.  E.  19;  McAllister 
V.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  74  Mo.  351. 

104  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Dies,  91  Tenn.  177,  18  S.W.  266. 
100  Fordyce  v.  McB'lynn,  56  Ark.  424,  19  S.  W.  961. 

106  Squire  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  98  Mass.  239;  Bills  v.  New  York  Cent 
R.  Co.,  84  N.  Y.  5;    Benson  v.  Gray,  154  Mass.  391,  28  N.  E.  275. 


Ch.    14]  CARRIERS    OF    LIVE    STOCK.  1075 

impose  on  the  carrier  the  duty  of  unloading  and  setting  out  from 
the  car  exhausted  and  frightened  animals,  if  this  can  be  reasonably 
done.i"  This  is  an  application  of  the  larger  duty  on  the  part  of  the 
carrier  to  take  care  of  stock  while  in  his  possession,  with  due  refer- 
ence to  their  propensities,  necessities,  and  surrounding  circumstan- 
ces.^"' 

It  may  be  actionable  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  carrier  to  re- 
fuse to  allow  the  owner  of  cattle  to  take  them  out  of  the  cars  and 
to  water  them.^""  The  general  duty  as  to  providing  food,  water, 
and  exercise  is  commonly  determined  by  contract  ^"  or  statute.^^^ 
The  time  within  which  the  stock  is  to  be  delivered  and  the  respon- 
sibility for  delay  are  governed  by  the  ordinary  principles  determin- 
ing liability  for  delay  of  common  carriers.^^^ 

The  liability  of  a  carrier  for  loss  of  market  to  his  shipper  would 
seem  to  have  been  determined  in  some  cases,  as  to  measure  of  dam- 

107  Coupland  v.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  61  Conn.  531,  23  Atl.  870;  Johnson  v. 
Alabama  &  V.  Ry.  Co.,  69  Miss.  191,  11  South.  104;  Illinois  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Peterson,  68  Miss.  4&i,  10  South.  43. 

108  The  tendency  of  animals  to  escai^e:  Indianapolis,  P.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Al- 
len, 31  Ind.  394;  Stuart  v.  Crawley,  2  Starkie,  ^23;  Richardson  v.  Noi-th- 
eastern  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  75.  As  to  duty  to  prevent  burning  hay  or  sti-aw 
in  cattle  car,  see  McPadden  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  92  Mo.  343,  4  S.  W.  C89; 
Powell  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  32  Pa.  St.  414;  Holsapple  v.  Rome,  AV.  &  O. 
R.  Co.,  SG  N.  Y.  275. 

10  9  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gann  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  28  S.  W.  349  (contract); 
Harris  v.  Northern  Ind.  R.  Co.,  20  N.  Y.  232.  If  the  shipper  is  to  feed  and 
water  cattle,  delay  in  transpoi"tation  of  carrier  is  wrongful  if  denial  of  oppor- 
tunity to  feed  is  wrongful  in  view  of  delay.  Smith  v.  Michigan  Cent.  Ry. 
Co.,  100  Mich.  148,  58  N.  W.  657. 

110  Cf.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams,  42  111.  474,  with  South  &  N.  Ala.  R. 
Co.  V.  Henlein,  52  Ala.  606.  And  see  Ft.  Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Daggett 
(Tex.   Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  186. 

111  Thus,  interstate  carriers  are  forbidden  to  confine  animals  for  more  than 
28  hours  without  unloading.  Rev.  St.  U.  S.  §§  43S(J— 1388.  See  Newport  News 
&  M.  V.  Co.  V.  United  States,  9  C.  C.  A.  579,  CI  Fed.  488;  Hale  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
R,  Co.,  36  Neb.  266,  54  N.  W.  517.  The  care  of  contined  horse  on  a  plank  lloor 
after  arrival  at  destination  is  a  question  of  fact  to  be  determined  by  a  jury. 
Moses  V.  Port  Townsend  S.  R.  Co.,  5  Wash.  595,  32  Pac.  488. 

112  While  it  has  been  held  that  delay  will  make  a  carrier  liable  for  shrink- 
age of  cattle  in  weight  or  for  their  becoming  stale  (Douglas  v.  Hannibal  & 
St.  J.  R.  Co.,  53  Mo.  App.  473),  the  cases  are  not  agreed  on  the  point  (Ohio 


1076  COMMON-    CARRIERS.  [Oh.   14 

ages,  rather  by  the  law  of  contract  than  of  tort."^  But  the  true 
measure  of  damages  is  the  difference  between  the  marlcet  value  of 
the  cattle  in  the  condition  in  which  they  would  have  arrived  but 
for  the  negligence  of  defendant  and  their  market  value  in  the  condi- 
tion in  which  by  reason  of  such  negligence  they  did  arrive.^^* 

CARRIERS  or  BAGGAGE. 

297.  A  common  carrier  is  liable  as  such  for  baggage  only 
to  the  extent  of  ordinary  personal  effects  as  distin- 
gaished — 

(a)  From  merchandise,  and 

(b)  From  property  of  exceptional  value. 

The  common  carrier  is  liable  as  such  for  the  personal  baggage  of 
passengers  delivered  to  and  received  by  it  solely  for  transportation, 
and  not  for  storage,  although,  for  the  convenience  of  the  carrier,  the 
passenger  consents  to  some  delay  in  transportation.^  ^°  But  it  is 
liable  for  personal  baggage  only,  and  is  not  bound  to  ask  if  the  bag- 

&  M.  R.  Co.  V.  Dunbar,  20  111.  624).  Et  vide  Frazer  v.  Kansas  City,  St  J.  & 
0.  B.  R.  Co.,  48  Iowa,  571.  As  to  what  is  reasonable  time,  see  Illinois  Cent. 
R.  Co.  V.  Haj^ues,  64  Miss.  G04,  1  South.  7G5;  Alabama  &  V.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sparks, 
71  Miss.  757,  16  So.  263;  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Wentworth  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.)  28  S.  W.  277;  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Bryan  (Tex.  Civ.  App.) 
28  S.  W.  98;    Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Brinley  (Ky.)  29  S.  W.  305. 

113  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Lehman,  56  Md.  209;  ITorne  v.  Midland  R. 
Co.,  L.  R.  8  C.  P.  131;    Leonard  v.  Fitchbm-g  R.  R.,  143  Mass.  307,  9  N.  E.  GG7. 

114  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Estill,  147  U.  S.  591-617,  13  Sup.  Ct.  444, 
citing  Mobile  &  il  Ry.  Co.  v.  .lurey.  111  U.  S.  584,  4  Sup.  Ct.  556;  Smith  v. 
Griffith,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.)  333;  Sturges  v.  Bissell,  46  N.  Y.  462;  Cutting  v.  Grand 
Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  13  Allen  (Mass.)  381;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wilm  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.)  28  S.  W.  925;  M'Cune  v.  Railway  Co.,  52  Iowa,  600,  3  N.  W.  615; 
Jlissouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Fagan,  72  Tex.  127,  9  S.  W.  749;  Missouri  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Edwards,  78  Tex.  307,  14  S.  W.  607;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sim- 
mons (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  28  S.  W.  825;  Hutch.  Carr.  (2d  Ed.)  §§  221,  770a;  Hud- 
son V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  (Iowa)  60  N.  W.  608. 

115  Shaw  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  40  Minn.  144,  41  N.  W.  548.  Where  a 
common  carrier  claims  exemption  from  liability  for  loss  of  a  passenger's  bag- 
gage on  the  ground  that  it  resulted  from  the  act  of  God,  the  burden  is  on  it 
to  show  that  the  loss  was  caused  by  such  act.  Toledo,  St.  L.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co. 
V.  Tapp,  6  Ind.  App.  304,  33  N.  E.  462.     Where  a  passenger  purchased  a 


Ch.    14]  CARRIERS    OF    BAGGAGE.  1077 

gage  is  anything  else.  Hence,  if  a  valise  contain  merchandise,  and 
not  articles  of  "necessity  and  convenience  intended  and  designed  for 
personal  use,  instruction,  amusement,  and  protection,"  and  the  com- 
pany have  no  notice  thereof,  the  owner  cannot  recover  for  the  loss 
without  proof  of  gross  negligence.""  In  Humphreys  v.  Perry  "^  a 
traveling  salesman  for  a  jewelry  firm  paid  a  charge  for  overweight 
on  a  trunk  of  the  kind  which,  from  the  practice  of  sending  out 
agents  with  trunks  filled  with  jewelry,  had  come  to  be  known  as  a 
"jeweler's  trunk,"  which  trunk  contained  jewelry  and  personal  bag- 
gage. He  was  held  not  entitled  to  recover  for  the  loss  of  the  con- 
tents of  the  trunk.  The  carrier  had  no  knowledge  of  its  contents, 
actual  or  constructive,  and  was  not  bound  to  inquire  with  reference 
thereto.  It  would  seem  that  a  common  carrier  is  not  responsible 
for  money  included  in  the  baggage  of  a  passenger  beyond  the  amount 
which  a  prudent  person  would  deem  proper  and  necessary  for  travel- 
ing expenses  and  personal  use,  or  intended  for  other  persons,  unless 
the  loss  was  the  result  of  the  carrier's  gross  negligence.^^^  On  ar- 
rival at  destination,  the  carrier  becomes  a  bailee  for  hire,  and  is 

ticket  for  a  certain,  train,  and  had  liis  trunk  cheolved  20  minutes  before  ti'ain 
time,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  railroad  company  to  carry  the  trunli  on  the  same 
train  with  its  owner,  and  a  failure  to  do  so  was  negligence.     Id. 

lis  Stimpson  v.  Connecticut  River  R.  Co.,  98  Mass.  83;  Collins  v.  Boston  >Si 
M.  R.  Co.,  10  Cush.  (Mass.)  506;  Haines  v.  Cliicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  R.  Co., 
29  Minn.  160,  12  N.  W.  447;  Oakes  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  20  Or.  302.  2(; 
Pac.  230.  As  to  dogs,  see  Kansas  City,  M.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Higdon,  iJ4  Aia. 
286,  10  South.  282.  Jewelry  is  part  of  ladies'  luggage,  McGill  v.  Rowand, 
3  Pa.  St.  451;  so  a  watch  in  a  trunk,  Jones  v.  Voorhees,  10  Ohio,  145;  a  pis- 
tol, Davis  V.  Michigan,  S.  &  N.  I.  R.  Co.,  22  111.  281.  Contra,  Giles  v.  Faun- 
teroy,  13  Md.  12G.  And,  as  to  action  by  employer  of  drummer  for  loss  of 
sample  trunk,  see  Ft.  Worth  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.  B.  Rosenthal  Millinery  Co. 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.)  29  S.  W.  196. 

117  148  U.  S.  627,  13  Sup.  Ct.  711;  Southern  Kansas  Ry.  Co.  v.  Clark,  Si 
Kan.  398,  34  Pac.  1054;  Parmelee  v.  McNulty,  19  111.  55G:  Davis  v.  Michi- 
gan, S.  &  N.  I.  R.  Co.,  22  111.  281,  As  to  bond  required  before  shipment  of 
.I'ewelry  cases,  see  Weber  Co.  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  00 
N.  AV.  637. 

lis  Jordan  v.  Fall  River  R.  Co.,  5  Cush.  (Mass.)  69;  Johnson  v.  Stone,  11 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  420;  lUinois  Cent  R.  Co.  v.  Copeland,  24  111.  336;  Weed  v. 
Saratoga  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  534;  Camden  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Baldauf, 
16  Pa.  St.  68,  79;    Doyle  v.  Kiser,  6  Ind.  247. 


107S  COMMON  CAEKIKRS.  [Ch .  14 

liable  for  want  of  reasonable  care  of  baggage;""  and  if  it  fail  to 
provide  reasonable  facilities  for  the  removal  of  baggage,  in  conse- 
quence of  which  the  baggage  is  damaged  or  burned,  the  jury  may 
find  the  carrier  liable  for  negligence.^^"  The  baggage  check  is  in  the 
nature  of  a  receipt,  and  is  evidence  of  delivery,  ownership,  and  iden- 
tity of  baggage  in  good  order.^^^  On  its  surrender,  the  liability  of 
the  carrier  as  such  ceases.^^- 

CARRIERS  OF  PASSENGEES— LIABILITIES. 

298.  A  carrier  of  passengers  is  not  an  insurer;  but  proof 
of  damage  to  a  passenger  by  the  carrier  raises  a 
presumption  of  actionable  negligence  on  the  part 
of  the  carrier,  which  may  be  rebutted — 

(a)  By  bringing  the  case  ■within  exceptions  similar  to 

those  recognized  by  la-w  as  to  liability  of  common 
carriers  of  freight,  or 

(b)  By  showing  the  absence  of  negligence   on  carrier's 

part. 

Who  are  Passengers. ^^ 

Where  a  consideration  is  paid,  the  permission  to  ride  is  not  nec- 
essarily a  ticket;  "*  a  special  contract  is  sufficient."  =     If  a  railroad 

119  Kahn  v.  Atlantic  &  N.  C.  R.  Co.  (N.  0.)  20  S.  E.  169;  Nealand  v.  Bos- 
ton &  M.  K.  IX.,  161  Pa.  St.  67,  36  N.  E.  592.  A  short  note  on  the  liability  of 
sleeping-car  companies  for  loss  of  passenger's  baggage,  58  Am.  &  Eng.  Ry. 
Gas.  584. 

120  Geo.  F.  Dittman  Boot  &  Shoe  Co.  v.  Keokuk  &  N.  W.  Ky.  Co.  (Iowa) 
59  N.  W.  257. 

121  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hawkins,  39  111.  App.  406.  Union  De- 
pot Company  is  agent  of  connecting  roads  for  baggage  checking.  See  Ahl- 
beck  V.  St.  Faul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  39  Minn.  424,  40  N.  W.  364;  Hyman  v. 
Central  Vt.  R.  Co.,  66  Hun,  202,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  119. 

122  Mortland  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  81'  Hun,  473,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  1021. 

123  A  collection  of  recent  decisions  as  to  who  are  passengers,  58  Am.'& 
Eng.  Ry.  Cas.  12,  18. 

124  See  an  article  on  the  rights  of  a  passenger  traveling  on  a  railway  with- 
out a  ticket,  98  Law  T.  515,  538. 

126  Applied  to  circus  employes,  Robertson  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  156  Mass. 
525,  31  N.  B.  650. 


t)h.    14]  CARRIERS    OF    PASSENGERS.  1079 

company,  as  part  consideration  of  a  deed,  agreed  to  carry  grantor 
and  family,  but  issue  no  pass,  one  of  the  children  ejected  can  re- 
cover damages.12*  Where,  however,  a  ticket  is  purchased,  it  is  the 
contract;  and  its  terms,  within  the  limits  allowed  by  law  as  to  lim- 
itations on  liability  ^^^  for  negligence,  so  far  as  they  extend,  deter- 
mine the  rights  of  the  parties.^ ^"^     There  is  no  distinction  between 

12  a  Grimes  v.  Minneapolis,  L.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  37  Minn.  66,  33  N.  W.  33. 

12'  Ante,  p.  298.  Et  vide  Doyle  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  162  Mass.  66,  37  N. 
E.  770;  Meuer  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (S.  D.)  59  N.  W.  945;  Potter 
v.  The  Majestic,  9  0.  C.  A.  161,  60  Fed.  624;  O'Regan  v.  Cunard  S.  S.  Co., 
160  Mass.  356,  35  N.  E.  1070.  As  to  excursion  tickets,  see  Bowers  v.  Pitts- 
burgh, Ft.  W.  &  C.  R.  R.,  158  Pa.  St.  302,  27  Atl.  893;  Pittsburgh,  C,  C. 
&  St.  L.  R.  Co.  V.  Russ,  6  C.  C.  A.  597,  57  Fed.  822;  Randall  v.  New  Orleans 
&  N.  E.  R.  Co.,  45  La.  Ann.  778,  13  South.  166;  Central  Railroad  &  Bank- 
ing Co.  V.  Roberts,  91  Ga.  513,  IS  S.  E.  315;  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Parry, 
55  N.  J.  Law,  402,  27  Atl.  914.  A  few  citations  on  the  effect  of  conditions 
in  raili-oad  ticket,  58  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  60,  64,  08. 

128  Lechowitzer  v.  Hamburg  American  Packet  Co.,  8  Misc.  Rep.  213,  28 
N.  Y.  Supp.  577.  Hence,  if  mileage  book  prohibit  riding  on  freight,  no  sub- 
sequent advertisement  allowing  such  privilege  will  prevent  proper  ejectment. 
Dunlap  V.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  35  Minn.  203,  28  N.  W.  240.  Cf.  Boggess 
V.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  37  W.  Va.  297,  16  S.  E.  52.".  Signing,  stamping, 
and  Identification  of  holder  of  return  coupon  are  legal  and  proper  conditions 
if  no  deception  is  used  in  sale.  Abram  v.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  83  Tex. 
61,  18  S.  W.  321;  Wyman  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  34  Minn.  210,  25  N.  W. 
349;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Henry,  84  Tex.  678,  19  S.  W.  870.  And 
yet  the  general  doctrine  is  that  the  company  is  liable  for  mistake  of  conductor 
or  ticket  agent.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Winter's  Adm'r,  143  U.  S. 
60,  12  Sup.  Ct.  356;  Kansas  City,  B.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Riley,  68  Miss.  765, 
9  South.  443.  A  purchaser  of  a  second-class  ticket  is  bound  by  its  terms, 
whether  he  has  read  them  or  not;  and,  if  trains  do  not  connect,  a  railroad 
company  is  not  bound  to  transport  on  the  next  train,— a  limited  express. 
New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bennett.  6  U.  S.  App.  95,  1  C.  C.  A.  544. 
and  50  Fed.  496.    Et  vide  Humphries  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  70  Miss.  453, 

12  South.  155.  But  ordinary  ticket  does  not  entitle  to  seat  in  chair  car. 
St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hardy,  55  Ark.  134,  17  S.  W.  711.  Transfer 
check  is  good  only  for  lines  punched.  Pine  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  50  Minn. 
144,  52  N.  W.-392;    Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Patterson,  69  Miss.  421, 

13  South.  697.  As  to  tickets  issued  by  connecting  lines,  see  Rouser  v.  North 
Park  St.  Ry.  Co.,  97  Mich.  565,  56  N.  W.  937;  Humphries  v.  Illinois  Cent. 
R.  Co.,  70  Miss.  453,  12  South.  155;  Nichols  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  23  Ur. 
123,  31  Pac.  296;  Matthews  v.  Charleston  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  38  S.  C.  429.  17  S.  E. 
225;    Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Looney,  85  Tex.  158,  19  S.  W.  1039.     A 


lOSO  COMMON    CARRIERS.  [Cb.    14 

passengers  of  various  classes  on  passenger  trains  so  far  as  protec- 
tion against  personal  injury  is  concerned,  wliatever  the  difference 
as  to  rights  to  seats  may  be.^^°  Shippers  accompanying  live  stock/^" 
postal  clerks,^"  express  messengers,^^^  porters  on  palace  cars/" 
have  the  rights  of  passengers.^^* 

review  of  recent  decisions  as  to  interchangeable  mileage  tickets,  9  Am.  R.  & 
Corp.  R.  592. 

i2i>  Whart.  Neg.  §  G41,  citing  Indianapolis  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Horst,  93  U.  S. 
291;  Indianapolis,  B.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Beaver,  41  Ind.  493.  But  see  criti- 
cism in  Flint  &  P.  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Weir  (1877)  37  Micli.  111.  If  a  nassenger 
is  permitted  at  his  own  request  to  travel  on  a  freight  train,  he  assumes  only 
the  naturally  additional  risks,  not  including  condition  of  track.  Ohio  Tal. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Watson's  Adm'r,  93  Ky.  654,  21  S.  W.  244.  The  ticket  entitles  to 
a  seat,  and,  if  one  is  on  a  train  which  moves  before  inability  to  get  a  seat  is 
known,  one  is  not  a  trespasser,  and  can  be  put  out  only  at  a  regular  station, 
if  he  refuses  to  surrender  ticket.  Hardenbergh  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry,  Co., 
39  Minn.  3,  38  N.  W.  625.  From  a  passenger  who  rides  in  a  chair  car  the 
railway  company  may  demand  exti'a  compensation,  where  the  train  is  sup- 
plied with  ears  furnished  with  the  usual  appliances  for  the  accommodation  of 
passengers  entitled  to  first-class  passage.  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Hardy,  55  Ark.  134,  17  S.  W.  711.  A  collection  of  .athorities  as  to  discrim- 
ination in  transporting  white  and  colored  passengers,  58  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas. 
557. 

130  New  Orleans  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  9  C.  C.  A.  29,  60  Fed.  379; 
Receivers  of  International  &  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Armstrong,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
146,  23  S.  W.  236;  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Burnsed,  70  Miss.  437,  12  South. 
958.  Cf.  Meuer  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (S.  D.)  59  N.  W.  945; 
Orcutt  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  45  Minn.  368,  47  N.  W.  1068;  Olson  v.  St. 
Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  45  Minn.  536,  48  N.  W.  445;  Pitcher  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M. 
S.  R.  Co.,  61  Hun,  623,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  62;  Miller  v.  Cornwall  R.  R.,  154  Pa. 
St.  473,  26  Atl.  779;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Dickson,  143  111.  368,  32  N.  E. 
380  (42  111.  App.  363,  affirmed);  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cole  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.)  28  S.  W.  391. 

131  Mellor  V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  14  S.  W.  758;  Id.,  105  Mo. 
45.J,  16  S.  W.  849;  Arrowsmith  v.  Nashville  &  D.  R.  Co.,  57  Fed.  165;  Gulf, 
C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Meson,  79  Tex.  371,  15  S.  W.  280;  Cleveland,  C,  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Ketcham,  133  Ind.  346,  33  N.  E.  116. 

132  San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Adams,  6  Tex.  Civ.  App.- 102,  24  S.  W. 
839;  Fordyce  v.  Jackson,  50  Ark.  594,  20  S.  W.  528,  597;  Florida  South.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Hirst,  30  Fla.  1,  11  South.  506.  Et  vide  Blair  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  66  N. 
Y.  313;    Hammond  v.  North  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  6  Rich.  (S.  0.)  130. 

133  Jones  v.  St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  28  S.  W.  883. 

134  A  laborer  entitled  to  ride  is  not  a  trespasser.     Gradin  v.  St.  Paul  &  D. 


Ch.    14]  CARRIERS    OF    PASSENGERS.  1081 

Where,  however,  no  consideration  is  paid,  although  the  passen- 
ger may  be  actually  aboard  the  train  by  the  invitation  or  acquies- 
cence of  the  carrier's  employes,  the  carrier  does  not  owe  him  the 
duties  owed  to  a  passenger  for  the  violation  of  which  an  action  in 
tort  as  for  negligence  will  lie.^^^  A  passenger  about  to  board  a  car, 
and  partially  on  it,  is  a  passenger  who  can  recover  damages  for  the 
negligence  of  the  carrier;  ^^^  but  a  person  attempting  to  board  a 
moving  car,  signaled  by  him  to  stop,  may  be  entitled  to  only  such 

R.  Co.,  30  Minn.  217,  14  N.  W.  881.  Cf.  JlcVeety  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M,  Ry.  Co., 
45  Minn.  268,  47  N.  W.  809.  Plaintiff  giot  on  wrong  train,  and  followed  con- 
ductor's directions  in  retracing  steps.  He  fell  into  cattle  guards,  was  in- 
jured, but  conld  not  recover  because  a  trespasser.  Finnegan  v.  Chicago,  St 
P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  48  Minn.  378,  51  N.  W.  122.  Compare  Jones  v.  Chicago, 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Minn.  183,  43  N.  W.  1114.  Generally,  as  to  rights  of 
passengers,  see  Hall  v.  Memphis  &  C.  R.  Co.,  15  Fed.  69,  note  by  S.  D. 
Thompson. 

135  Woolsey  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  39  Neb.  798,  58  N.  W.  444;  Gardner 
v.  Waycross  Air-Line  R.  Co.  (Ga.)  19  S.  E.  557;  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Black,  87  Tex.  160,  27  S.  W.  118;  Wynn  v.  City  &  Suburban  Ry.  Co.,  91  Ga. 
344,  17  S.  E.  649;  EvilX'sville  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnes,  136  Ind.  300,  3G  N.  E. 
1092;  Atlanta  &  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Fuller,  92  Ga.  482,  17  S.  E.  G43,  644;  Everett 
V.  Oregon  S.  L.  &  U.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  9  Utah,  340,  34  Pac.  289.  Compare  Doyle 
V.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  162  Mass.  06,  37  N.  E.  770;  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R. 
Co.  V.  Snead,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  31,  23  S.  W.  277;  Fai'ber  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.,  116  Mo.  81,  22  S.  W.  631;  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Headland,  18 
Colo.  477,  33  Pac.  185.  But  see  Bryant  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  ,M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co., 
4  C.  C.  A.  146,  53  Fed.  997.  As  to  riding  on  a  freight  train,  see  Texas  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Black,  87  Tex.  60,  27  S.  W.  118;  Illinois  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Axley, 
47  111.  App.  307;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Newmeyer,  129  Ind.  401,  28  N.  E.  800. 
But  see  Smith  v.  Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.,  124  Ind.  391,  24  N.  E.  7rC 
A  newsboy  not  a  passenger  on  an  elevator.  See  Springer  v.  Byram,  137  Ind. 
15,  36  N.  E.  361. 

130  As  where  such  damage  is  caused  from  pushing  from  behind.  Smith  v. 
St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  32  Minn.  1,  18  N.  W.  827.  Similarly,  if  car  start  sud- 
denly and  throw  him.  Sahlgaard  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  48  Minn.  232,  51  N. 
W.  111.  And  see  Cohen  v.  West  Chicago  St.  Ry.  Co.,  9  C.  C.  A.  223,  60  Fed. 
698;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Popp  (Ky.)  27  S.  W.  992;  Walters  v.  Phila- 
delphia Traction  Co.,  161  Pa.  St.  36,  28  Atl.  941;  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v. 
Reed,  9  C.  C.  A.  219,  60  Fed.  694;  Xarnell  v.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M.  Ry. 
Co.,  113  Mo.  570,  21  S.  \\ .  1;  Mellquist  v.  The  Wasco,  53  Fed.  ."iiO;  Cogs- 
well V.  West  St.  &  N.  E.  El.  Ry.  Co.,  5  Wash.  46,  31  Pac.  411.  Proximity  of 
telegraph  pole.  North  Chicago  St.  Ry.  v.  Williams,  140  111.  275,  29  N.  E.  672. 


1082  COMMON   CARKirCRS.  [Ch.    14 

care  on  the  part  of  the  trainmen  as  is  due  to  any  person  in  the 
street.^''  Persons  escorting  passengers^"*  or  persons  bringing  meals 
on  cars  ^^°  are  not  entitled  to  the  performance  of  duties  due  to  pas- 
sengers, but  may  recover  for  damage  caused  by  negligence  under 
circumstances,  especially  where  there  is  willful  and  wanton  wrong. 
But  mere  trespassers,  as  a  boy  attempting  to  board  a  car  ^*°  without 
notice  to  employes,  or  a  person  stealing  a  ride  on  a  freight  train,"^ 
are  not  passengers,  and  the  carrier  owes  none  of  the  peculiar  duties 
of  a  common  carrier  to  such  persons.  And  an  employ^,  knowing 
the  risks  of  travel,  assumes  them,  and  cannot  recover  because  of 
damage  produced  by  the  danger  which  he  knew  or  ought  to  have 
known.^*''  In  the  absence  of  any  contrary  agreement,  a  person  who 
travels  on  a  pass  is  entitled  to  the  same  protection  as  to  life  or  limb 
as  a  passenger;  but  the  authorities  would  seem  to  be  in  hopeless 
confusion  as  to  the  effect  of  a  contract  limiting  or  removing  the  lia- 
bility of  the  carrier.  While,  perhaps,  the  general  rule  has  been 
said  to  be  that  no  agreement  that  a  free  passenger  shall  take  the 
risk  of  all  injury  can  exonerate  the  carrier  for  negligence,^*"  the 

13  7  Baltimore  Traction  Co.  v.  State,  78  Md.  409,  28  Atl.  397.  Cf.  Jollet  St. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Duggan,  45  111.  App.  450.  Even  a  ticket  holder  crossing  tracks 
outside  of  station,  apparently  to  catch  a  starting  train,  who  is  killed  by  an- 
other train,  is  not  a  passenger.  Webster  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  161  Mass.  298, 
37  N.  E.  1G5.  A  review  of  decisions  on  the  question  as  to  the  time  when  a 
person  who  has  started  to  take  passage  on  a  train  becomes  a  passenger, 
24  Lawy.  Rep.  Ann.  521. 

138  Houston  v.  Gate  City  St.  R.  Co.,  89  Ga.  272,  15  S.  E.  323;  Gillis  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  59  Pa.  St.  143;  Lawtcn  v.  Little  Rock  &  Ft.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  55  Ark. 
428,  18  S.  W.  543.  Et  vide  Doss  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.,  59  Mo.  27; 
Dowd  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  84  Wis.  105,  54  K.  W.  24;  Yarnell 
V.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  113  Mo.  570,  21  S.  AV.  1;  Gautret  v. 
Egerton,  L.  R.  2  C.  P.  371;  Holmes  v.  North  Eastern  R.  R.,  L.  R.  4  Exch. 
254;  Watkins  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  37  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  193;  Missomi,  K. 
&  T.  Ry.  Co.  T.  Miller  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  905. 

139  But  if  a  conductor  threatens  to  knock  off  from  a  train  in  motion  a  waiter 
who  brought  him  his  dinner,  and  the  waiter  jumps  and  is  injured,  the  com- 
pany is  liable.  Savannah,  F.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Watson,  89  Ga.  110,  14  S.  E. 
890. 

140  Pitcher  V.  People's  St.  Ry.,  154  Pa.  St.  5G0,  26  Atl.  559. 
1*1  Planz  V.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  157  Mass.  377,  32  N.  E.  356. 
1*2  Whart.  Neg.  §§  200-202,  605,  640. 

143  Philadelphia  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Derby,  14  How.  (U.  S.)  468;    Railroad  Co. 


Ch.    14]  CARKIEKS    OF    PASSENGEKS.  108.'> 

latest  opinion  holds  that  one  who  accepts  and  uses  a  free  pass  as 
a  pure  grati  i  ity  on  condition  that  he  will  assume  all  risk  of  personal 
injury  must  be  deemed  to  have  accepted  and  to  be  bound  by  it, 
whether  he  reads  it  or  not."* 

Degree  of  Cure  <md  Burden  of  Proof. 

A  carrier  of  passengers  is  not  an  insurer.^*'  Not  only  does  the  in- 
telligence and  volition  of  the  person  carried  create  a  difference  in 
the  degree  of  care  which  it  is  proper  to  demand  of  the  carrier,  corre- 
sponding to  the  allowance  for  the  inherent  vice  or  disease  of  live 
stock,  but  the  courts  also  recognize  that  one  result  of  making  car- 
riers of  passengers  insurers  would  have  been  either  the  refusal  of 
the  can-ier  to  undertake  passenger  trafiQc  or  their  refusal  of  it  except 
upon  special  contract  affecting  any  individual  case.^*"  A  carrier  is 
not  necessarily  guilty  of  negligence,  although  it  may  have  been  pos- 
sible to  have  prevented  the  damage;  ^"  but  he  is  bound  to  exercise, 
at  least,  such  diligence  as  a  good  specialist  in  such  business  is  ac- 
customed to  use,  and  this  must  rise  in  proportion  to  the  risk/**     In- 

V.  Lockwood,  17  Wall.  357;  Eailway  Co.  v.  Stephens,  95  U.  S.  GOo;  Jacobus 
V.  St.  Paul  &  C.  R.  Co.,  20  Minn.  125  (Gil.  110).  Et  vide  oases  collected 
Whart.  Neg.  §§  355,  641,  and  641a. 

144  Eogers  v.  Kennebec  Steamboat  Co.,  8C  Me.  2G1,  29  Atl.  1009;  12  N.  Y. 
I^aw  J.  SO,  reviewing  authorities  at  length;  Miildoon  v.  Seattle  City  Ry.  Co. 
<Wash.)  38  Pac.  995.  A  collection  of  conflicting  authorities  on  the  right  of  a 
common  carrier  to  exempt  himself  by  contract  from  the  consequences  of  his 
own  negligence  in  the  case  of  strictly  free  passengers,  by  Albert  B.  Davidson, 
S  N.  W.  Law  Rev.  191. 

145  White  V.  Boulton,  Peake,  113  (this  is  the  first  case  on  the  subject); 
Hubbard,  J.,  in  Ingalls  v.  Bills,  9  Mete.  (Mass.)  1.  lit  vide  Crofts  r.  Water- 
houso,  11  Moore,  133;  Bennett  v.  Button,  10  N.  H.  481;  lieadhead  v.  Mid- 
land Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  412,  L.  R,  4  Q.  B.  379. 

140  Schouler,  Bailm.  §  652.  A  note,  with  numerous  citations,  as  to  the  de- 
gree of  care  required  towards  passengers,  58  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  73,  90,  110, 
133,  194. 

147  Gilbert  v.  West  End  St.  Ry.  Co.,  100  Mass.  403,  30  N.  E.  60.  But  see 
Jackson  v.  Tollett,  2  Starkie,  37;  JIayhew  v.  Boyce,  1  Starkie,  423;  Card 
V.  New  York  &  H.  R.  Co.,  50  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  39;  Crofts  v.  Waterhouse,  3  Bing. 

319. 

14S  Whart.  Nog.  §§  027-637.  This  standard  is,  however,  severely  criticised. 
Carrico  v.  West  Virginia  Cent.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  35  W.  Va.  389,  14  S.  B.  12; 
Hutch.  Carr.  p.  403,  note  1. 


10S4  COMMON    CARRIERS.  [Ch.    14 

deed,  i  he  cases  generally  recognize  that  the  carrier  must  exercise  the 
utmost  care  under  the  circumstances,  short  of  a  warranty  of  the 
safety  of  the  passenger.^*" 

An  injury  to  a  passenger  while  on  a  carrier's  vehicle  is  prima  facie 
negligence,  whether  caused  by  defects  of  appliances,  errors  in  opera- 
tion, or  by  conduct  of  servants,  according  to  the  general/ °°  but  not 

140  Indianapolis  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Horst,  93  U.  S.  291;  Chicago  &  A.  K.  Co. 
V.  Byrnm,  153  111.  131,  38  N.  E.  578;  Chicago  P.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  145 
lU.  67,  33  N.  E.  960;  Spellman  v.  Lincoln  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  36  Neb.  890, 
55  N.  W.  270;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Higby  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  26  S.  W. 
737;  Douglas  v.  Sioux  City  St.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa)  58  N.  W.  1070;  BischofE  v. 
People's  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.  Sup.)  25  S.  W.  908;  Wilson  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co., 
26  Minn.  278,  3  N.  W.  333;  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Welch,  86  Tex. 
203,  24  S.  W.  391;  Taylor  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  50  Fed.  755;  Jackson  v.  Grand 
Ave.  Ry.  Co.,  118  Mo.  199,  24  S.  W.  192;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Striclilin 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.)  27  S.  W.  1093;  Christie  v.  Griggs,  2  Camp.  79;  Dunn  v. 
Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  58  Me.  187;  The  New  World  v.  King,  16  How.  469; 
Hutch.  Carr.  §  500  et  seq.  As  to  operation  of  horse-car  lines.  Noble  v.  St 
Joseph  &  B.  H.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  98  Mich.  249,  57  N.  W.  126;  Watson  v.  St  Paul 
City  St.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Minn.  46,  43  N.  W.  904.  An  instiiiction  that  a  carrier 
of  passengers  is  botmd  to  run  and  operate  its  cars  "with  the  highest  degree 
of  care  of  a  very  prudent  person,  in  view  of  all  the  facts  and  circumstances 
at  the  time  of  the  alleged  injui-y,"  does  not  require  too  high  a  degree  of  care. 
O'ConneU  v.  St.  Louis  Cable  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  106  Mo.  482,  17  S.  W.  494.  And, 
generally,  as  to  requirement  of  highest  measure  of  care  in  conduct  of  business 
by  common  carriers,  see  Willock  v.  Railroad  Co.,  106  Pa.  St.  184,  30  Atl. 
048;  Greenh.  Pub.  Pol.  513.  Cable  lines,  Watson  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ky.  Co. 
42  Minn.  46,  43  N.  W.  904.  Electric  lines,  Denver  Tramway  Co.  v.  Reid,  4 
Colo.  App.  53,  35  Pac.  269.  To  prevent  electric  shock  from  defective  insula- 
tion, Bm-t  V.  Douglas  Co.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  83  Wis.  229,  53  N.  W.  447.  Elevators, 
Mitchell  V.  Marker,  10  C.  C.  A.  306,  62  Fed.  139.  A  ferry,  McLean  v.  Bur- 
bank,  11  Minn.  277  (Gil.  189),  12  Minn.  530  (Gil.  438). 

10  0  Stokes  V.  Saltonstall,  13  Pet.  181;  38  Am.  ^  Eng.  R.  Cas.  294,  collecting 
cases.  New  Jersey  R.  Co.  v.  Pollard,  22  Wall.  341;  Kentucky  &  I.  Bridge 
Co.  V.  Quinkert,  2  Ind.  App.  244,  28  N.  E.  338;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Landauer,  39  Neb.  803,  58  N.  AV.  434;  St  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mitchell, 
57  Ark.  418,  21  S.  W.  883;  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Porter,  38  Neb  226,  56  N.  W. 
808  (under  statute);  Bush  v.  Barnett,  96  Cal.  202,  31  Pac.  2;  Spellman  v. 
Lincohi  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  36  Neb.  890,  55  N.  W.  270;  Skinner  v.  London, 
B.  &  S.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  5  Exch.  787;  Sullivan  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.,  30  Pa. 
St.  234;  New  Orleans,  J.  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  AUbritton,  38  Miss.  242.  Cf.  Carpue 
V.  London  &  B.  Ry.  Co.,  5  Q.  B.  747;  Cornman  v.  Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co., 
4  Hurl.  &  N.   781.    As  to  statutory  provisions,   Omaha  &  R.   V.  By.   Co.   v. 


Ch.    J  4]  CARRIERS    OF    PASSEXGEKS.  1085 

universal/"  opinion.  Tlius,  the  presumption  of  negligence  arises 
from  damage  produced  by  a  collision/^^  or  derailment,^ '^  or  an  acci- 
dent caused  by  a  train  coming  in  contact  with  a  land  slide.^=^*     If, 

Cliolette,  41  Neb.  578,  59  N.  W.  921;  Vail  v.  Broadway  R.  Co.,  6  Misc.  Rep. 
20,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  59.  But  see  Herstine  y.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  Co.,  151  Pa.  St. 
244,  25  Atl.  104.  To  leave  a  switch  out  of  place  is  per  se  ne.ijligence.  State 
V.  O'Brien,  32  X.  J.  Law,  1G9;    Reg.  v.  Pargeter,  3  Cos,  Cr.  Cas.  191. 

151  Railroad  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  11  Heisk.  (Terra.)  400;  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Bucli;elew,  3  Tex.  Civ.  App.  272,  22  S.  W.  994;    Georgia  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson, 

33  Ga.  110;  Mitchell  v.  Western  &  A.  R.  Co.,  30  Ga.  22;  lUinois  Cent.  R.  Co. 
T.  Cragin,  71  111.  177;  Deyo  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  34  N.  Y.  9;  Holbrook 
V.  Utica  &  S.  R.  Co.,  12  N.  Y.  23G;  Curtis  v.  Rochester  &  S.  R.  Cfo.,  IS  N.  Y. 
534.  That  plaintiff  (passenger)  must  show  freedom  from  contributory  negli- 
gence, see  Chamberlain  v.  Jlilwaulvee  &  M.  R.  Co.,  11  Wis.  238;  Bonce  v. 
Dubuque  St.  Ry.  Co.,  53  Iowa,  278,  5  N.  W.  177;,  Aurora  R.  Co.  v.  Grimes,  13 
111.  5&3. 

152  West  Chicago  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Martin,  47  111.  App.  610;  Kansas  City,  F. 
S.  &  M.  R.  Co.  V.  Stoner,  1  C.  C.  A.  231,  49  Fed.  209;  North  Baltimore  Pass. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Kas  Kell,  78  Md.  517,  28  Atl.  410;  I^ittle  Rock  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Har- 
lell,  58  Ark.  454,  25  S.  W.  117;  Fordyce  v.  Jackson,  56  Ark.  594,  20  S.  W.  528. 
597;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Long,  94  Ky.  410,  22  S.  AV.  747.  Collisions  of 
vessels,  The  Woodrop  Sims,  2  Dod.  83,  and  cases  collected  in  great  number 
In  note  2,  §  577,  Wood's  Browne,  Car.  p.  582.  From  the  bursting  of  a  boiler, 
Robinson  v.  New  York  Cent  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Blatchf.  338,  9  Fed.  877; 
Rose  V.  Stephens  &  C.  Transp.  Co.,  20  Blatchf.  411,  11  Fed.  438;  Illinois  Cent. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Phillips,  49  111.  234.  55  111.  194;  Caldwell  v.  New  Jersey  Steamboat 
€o.,  56  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  425;  or  of  a  lamp,  Wilkie  v.  Bolster,  3  e:  D.  Smith 
<N.  Y.)  327. 

153  Mexican  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lauricella,  87  Tex.  277,  28  S.  W.  277;  Spell- 
man  V.  Lincoln  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  36  Neb.  890,  55  N.  W.  270.  And  see  George 
y.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  34  Ark.  613;  Pittsburgh,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
V.  Williams,  74  Ind.  462.  Horses,  Christie  v.  Griggs,  2  Camp.  79;  Budd  v. 
United  Carriage  Co.,  25  Or.  314,  35  Pac.  660;  Gardner  v.  Detroit  St.  Ry.  Co., 
99  Mich.  182,  58  N.  W.  49;  Israel  v.  Clark,  4  Esp.  259;  cable-car  company. 
Clow  V.  Pittsburgh  Traction  Co.,  158  Pa.  St.  410,  27  Atl.  1004;  overturning 
of  a  car,  Denver,  S.  P.  &  P.  Ry.  v.  Woodward,  4  Colo.  1;  or  of  a  stage,  Boycc 
V.  California  Stage  Co.,  25  Cal.  460;  Payne  v.  Halstead,  44  111.  App.  97; 
Lemon  v.  Chanslor,  68  Mo.  340;   Wai-e  v.  Gay,  11  Pick.  (Mass.)  106. 

154  Gleeson  v.  Virginia  M.  R.  Co.,  140  U.  S.  435,  11  Sup.  Ct.  8.39,  oven-uling 
5  Mackey,  356.  So,  washing  away  an  embankment,  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Anderson,  94  Pa.  St.  351;   or  of  a  road,  Brehm  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co., 

34  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  256;  giving  way  of  bridge,  Kansas  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  ililler,  2 
Colo.  442.  Generally,  an  obstruction,  on  a  track.  Sullivan  v.  Philadelphia  & 
R.  R.  Co.,  30  Pa.  St.  34. 


10S6  COMMON    CARRIERS.  [Ch.    14 

liowcver,  the  injury  was  not  in  some  way  connected  with  the  appli- 
ances and  operation  of  the  carrier,  but  was  occasioned,  for  example, 
by  the  act  of  God,  the  injured  person  cannot  recover.  Therefore, 
Avhere  the  accident  was  caused  by  the  fall  of  a  rock  from  a  point 
more  than  300  feet  from  the  top  of  the  cut  of  a  railroad  track,  there 
was  no  presumption  of  negligence.""  A  fortiori,  one  cannot  recover 
when  he  himself  has  been  negligent,  and  his  negligence  is  shown  to 
have  been  the  proximate  cause  of  the  wrong.^^" 

Rides  and  Regulations. 

A  person  may  become  a  passenger  before  the  transportation  has 
actually  commenced."^  The  duty  of  the  carrier  commences  with 
the  approach,  and  ends  with  the  departure,  of  the  passenger.  The 
proposed  passenger  is  bound  to  obey  the  reasonable  rules  of  the  com- 
pany,^^'  including  the  rules  requiring  the  purchase  of  a  ticket  as 
evidence  of  right  of  passage.^^°  Therefore,  he  may,  under  the  com- 
pany rules,  be  refused  admittance  to  the  trainway,  unless  he  shows 

155  Fleming  v.  Pittsburgh,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  158  Pa.  St.  130,  27  Atl. 
858.  And  see  Andrews  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ky.  Co.,  8G  Iowa,  677,  53  N. 
W.  399;   Gleeson  v.  Virginia  M.  R.  Co.,  140  U.  S.  435,  11  Sup.  Ct.  859. 

158  Chicago,  B.  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Landauer,  39  Neb.  803.  58  N.  W.  434;  Illinois. 
Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Davidson,  12  C.  C.  A.  118,  64  Fed.  301.  A  collection  of  authori- 
ties on  contributory  negligence  by  passengers,  58  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  326, 
336,  358,  375,  393,  410. 

167  Rogers  V.  Kennebec  Steamboat  Co.,  86  Me.  261.  29  Atl.  1069;  Norfolk  & 
W.  R.  Co.  V.  Galliher,  89  Va.  639,  16  S.  E.  935.  But  a  person,  in  possession, 
of  a  ticket,  who,  while  running  from  the  street,  across  the  company's  tracks, 
outside  the  passenger  station,  apparently  to  catch  a  train  about  to  start,  is 
struck  and  killed  by  another  train,  has  not  become  a  passenger.  Webster  v. 
Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  161  Mass.  298,  37  N.  E.  165. 

158  Central  Railroad  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Strickland,  90  Ga.  562,  16  S.  E.  352;. 
Bancroft  v.  Boston  &  W.  R.  Co.,  97  Mass.  275;  Gonzales  v.  New  York  &  H. 
R.  Co.,  38  N.  Y.  440;  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Zebe,  33  Pa.  St.  318.  As  to. 
stopping  of  street  cars,  Jackson  v.  Grand  Ave.  Ry.  Co.,  118  Mo.  199,  24 
S.  W.  192.  But  passengers  may  ride  on  platforms  notwithstanding  contrary 
rule  if  the  car  is  crowded  and  there  Is  not  sufficient  room  for  passengers  in- 
side, and  the  care  to  be  exercised  by  the  carrier  has  reference  to  this  prin- 
ciple. Matz  V.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  52  Minn.  159,  53  N.  W.  1071;  Morris 
V.  Eighth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  68  Hun,  39,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  666;  Holland  v.  West  End 
St.  Ry.  Co.,  155  Mass.  387,  29  N.  E.  622;  Highland  Ave.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Dono- 
van, 94  Ala.  299,  10  South.  139. 

IBS  Van  Dusan  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  97  Mich.  439,  56  N.  W.  848;   Pouilin 


Ch.   H]  CAllRIERS    OF    PASSENGERS.  10-!7 

ticket;  anil,  if  he  passes  through  without  doing  so,  the  gateinan 
may  return  him,  using  no  unnecessary  force.  ^'"'  It  is  the  duty  of  the 
intending  passenger  to  inform  himself  as  to  regulations  of  the  car- 
rier, as  to  when,  where,  and  how  he  can  stop;  and  he  boards  the 
wrong  train  at  his  peril.^"^  However,  where  a  rule  to  go  to  the 
right  required  passengers,  in  leaving  the  cars,  to  go  down  steps,  and 
cross  what  had  become  a  stream  of  water,  and  then  go  under  a  bridge 
on  an  ungraded  street,  and  the  railroad  company  knew  of  the  habit 
of  passengers  in  disregarding  such  rule  or  notice,  and  crossing  the 
tracks,  as  did  the  plaintiff,  whereby  he  was  killed,  it  was  held  that 
there  was  no  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  to  cross  the  track 
by  the  underground  public  street,  and  that  he  was  not  guilty  of 
negligence  in  law  in  turning  to  the  left  on  leaving  the  car.^°^  Nor 
need  a  passenger  take  notice  of  a  rule  of  a  railroad  company  which 
contravenes  a  statute.^ °^ 

Before  Entrance  to  Car. 

The  carrier  is  bound  to  exercise  care  in  keeping  approaches  to  his 
stations  or  wharf  in  a  safe  and  suitable  condition  for  passengers  or 
licensees.^"*  If,  when  one  is  about  to  purchase  a  ticket,  he  contracts 
a  contagious  disease  from  the  ticket  seller,  knowledge  of  the  fact  of 

V.  Cauadian  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  3  C.  C.  A.  23,  52  Fed.  197.  As  to  rule  of  time  of 
paying  fare,  see  Nye  v.  Railroad  Co.,  97  Cal.  461,  32  Pac.  530. 

iflo  Dickerman  v.  St.  Paul  Union  Depot  Co.,  44  Minn.  433,  46  N.  W.  907; 
Northern  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v.  O'Conner,  76  Md.  207,  24  Atl.  449. 

101  Beaucbamp  v.  International  &  G.  N.  Ky.  Co.,  56  Tex.  239;  Texas  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Ludlam,  6  C.  C.  A.  454,  57  Fed.  481.  Et  vide  Oliio  &  M.  Ry.  Co. 
r.  Brown,  46  111.  App.  137;  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Flores  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.)  26  S.  W.  899.  Damages  can  be  recovered  by  error  in  representation  by 
ticket  seller  as  to  the  train  being  through  train,  without  change,  etc.  An- 
nouncement of  change  in  schedule  must  be  brought  home  to  plaintiff.  Dye 
v.  Virginia  Ry.,  19  Wash.  Law  Rep.  369. 

162  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Lowell,  l.jl  U.  S.  209,  14  Sup.  Ct.  281. 
Et  vide  Dublin,  W.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Slattei-y,  3  App.  Cas.  115.j. 

163  Robinson  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  105  Cal.  520,  38  Pac.  94. 

164  Gilmore  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.,  154  Pa.  St.  375,  25  Atl.  774; 
•Tohus  V.  Charlotte,  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.,  39  S.  C.  102,  17  S.  E.  698.  Thus,  the  plat- 
form should  be  properly  lighted,  Buenemann  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  32 
Minn.  390,  20  N.  AV.  379;  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Thornsberiy  (Tex. 
Sup.  I  17  S.  W.  521;  and  properly  prepared  for  alighting  by  passengers,  Falls 
V.  San  Francisco  &  N.  P.  R.  Co.,  97  Cal.  114,  31  Pac.  901;   Fullerton  v.  For- 


1088  COMMON    CARRIERS.  [Ch.   14 

disease  by  the  company  makes  it  liable.^' °  The  carrier  is  liable  for 
the  violence  of  his  servants;  as,  for  example,  a  baggage  clerk.^"" 
Refusal  to  carry  may  be  a  ground  of  action;  ^°^  but  the  duty  to  slop 
and  afford  a  safe  place  for  taking  on  passengers  applies  only  to 
customary  stopping  places.^^* 

In  Transit. 

The  duty  of  diligence  applies  not  only  as  to  safe  stations,  wharves, 
and  approaches,  but  also  to  providing,  maintaining,  and  inspecting 

rtyce,  121  Mo.  1,  25  S.  W.  587;  Johnson  v.  Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  11  Minn. 
296  (Gil.  204);  Uveller  v.  Sioux  City  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  27  Minn.  178,  6  N.  W. 
486.  Cf .  Bernhardt  v.  Western  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  159  Pa.  St.  360,  28  Atl.  140 
(where  a  passenger  stepped  on  a  bung  from  a  keg),  and  Poole  v.  Consolidated 
St.  Ry.  Co.,  100  Mich.  379,  59  N.  W.  390  (where  a  steep  bank  was  allowed  to 
remain  at  a  place  for  alighting  from  cars);  Fullerton  v.  Fordyce,  25  S.  W. 
587  (where  a  broken  plank  in  platform  was  allowed  to  be  unrepaired  for  four 
days).  As  to  duty  to  warn  passenger  of  danger  of  alighting  from  rear  plat- 
form, see  McDonald  v.  Illinois  Cent.  U.  Co.,  88  Iowa,  345,  55  N.  W.  102; 
York  V.  Canada  Atlantic  Steamship  Co.,  22  Can.  Sup.  Ct.  R.  167;  Mullen  v. 
Oregon,  S.  L.  &  U.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  22  Or.  430,  30  Pac.  222.  But  cf.  Seddon  v. 
Bickley,  153  Pa.  St.  271,  25  Atl.  1104;  an  inadequate  gate  for  cheap  excur- 
sions may  prove  an  expensive  luxury.  Taylor  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  50  Fed. 
755;  Falk  v.  New  York  &  S.  W.  R.  Co.,  56  N.  J.  Law,  380,  29  Atl.  157; 
Cazneau  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  161  Mass.  355,  37  N.  E.  311;  Race  v.  Union 
Ferry  Co.,  138  N.  Y.  644,  34  N.  E.  280;  East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Watson,  94  Ala.  034,  10  South.  228.  A  collection  of  authorities  as  to  the 
duties  and  obligations  of  railroad  companies  to  passengers  at  station,  58 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  182,  190. 

165  Long  V.  Chicago,  K.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  48  Kan.  28,  28  Pac.  977. 

160  Dean  v.  St.  Paul  Union  Depot  Co.,  41  Minn.  360,  43  N.  W.  54. 

167  Hamlin  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  1  Har.  &  N.  408,  26  Law  J.  Bxch. 
20;  Buckmaster  v.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  23  Law.  T.  (N.  S.)  471.  If  the 
ticket  holder  is  drunk,  he  may  properly  be  kept  off  a  train  in  motion,  but 
not  when  he  has  so  far  boarded  the  train  that  it  will  be  less  dangerous  to 
leave  him  alone.  Harrold  v.  Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  47  Minn.  17,  49  N.  W. 
389;  Louisville  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  92  Ala.  204,  9  South.  269.  And, 
further,  as  to  refusal  of  admission  to  cars,  see  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co. 
V.  McMonigal  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  2.j  S.  W.  341. 

168  The  fact  that  after  plaintiff  had  entered  the  train  the  conductor  treated 
him  as  a  passenger,  by  collecting  his  fare  from  the  next  station,  does  not 
iifCect  his  relation  to  the  company  at  the  time  of  the  injury.  Georgia  Pac. 
lly.  Co.  V.  Robinson,  68  Miss.  643,  10  South.  60.  Cf.  Evans  v.  Interstate 
Kapid-Trausit  Ry.  Co.,  106  Mo.  594,  17  S.  W.  489. 


Ch.    14]  CARRIERS    OF    PASSENGERS.  1089 

proper  roadways,  rolling  stock,  engines,  cars,  and  other  vehicles,  and, 
generally,  places,  appliances,  and  instrumentalities  used  in  the  car- 
riage of  passengers.^"" 

The  rule  as  to  use  of  improvements  and  devices  to  prevent  injury 
corresponds  to  the  duty  of  the  master  to  provide  suitable  appliances 
and  machinery  for  the  servant.""     The  carrier  is  bound  to  exercise 

169  The  Northem  Belle  v.  Robson,  9  Wall.  526  (inspection  of  barge).  Et  vide 
Eldridge  v.  Minneapolis  it  St.  I..  R.  Co.,  32  Minn.  2.J3.  20  X.  W.  151;  Sim- 
mons V.  New  Bedford,  V.  &  N.  S.  S.  Co.,  97  Mass.  361;  Meir  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 
Co.,  64  Pa.  St.  22.j;  Caveny  v.  Xeely  (S.  C.)  20  S.  E.  806.  As  to  defective  bridge, 
not  owned  by  defendant,  Burningham  v.  Rochester  City  &  B.  R.  Co.,  137  N.  1'. 
13,  32  N.  E.  995.  Of.  Grote  v.  Chester  &  H.  R.  Co.,  2  Exch.  2:,4.  As  to  road- 
bed, Cutf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Killebrew  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  20  S.  W.  1005, 
reversing  20  S.  W.  182  (Tex.  Sup.).  A  railroad  track  must  be  laid  and  main- 
tained in  safe  running  order  with  reference  to  the  strain  to  which  it  is  sub- 
jected. 2  Redf.  R.  R.  §  11)2;  AVithers  v.  North  Kent  R.  Co.,  2  Hurl.  &  N.  OC'J; 
Read  v.  Spaulding,  5  Bosw.  (X.  Y.)  395,  30  N.  V.  630;  O'Donnell  v.  Allegheny 
R.  Co.,  50  Pa.  St.  490,  59  Pa.  St.  239;  Tyrrell  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  Ill 
Mass.  546.  As  to  defects  in  doors  and  windows  of  cars  in  absence  of 
guards,  see  New  Orleans  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Schneider,  8  C.  C.  A.  .571,  60 
Fed.  210.  A  carrier  cannot  be  deemed  negligent  because  the  door  of  a 
passenger  car  was  not  all  glass  above  the  middle,  so  that  persons  could  see 
each  other  coming  to  the  door,  (iraeff  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.,  161  Pa. 
St.  230,  28  Atl.  1107.  Steps  ou  platfonns,  Matz  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  52 
ilinn.  159,  53  N.  W.  1071.  As  to  failure  to  close  gates  of  street  cars,  Augusta 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Glover,  92  Ga.  132,  18  S.  E.  406.  Derailment  caused  by  rotten  ties  is 
prima  facie  evidence  of  negligence.  Louisville,  X.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Miller 
(Ind.  Sup.)  37  X.  E.  343.  As  to  broken  rail,  see  Canadian  I'ac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Chalifoux,  22  Can.  Sup.  Ct.  R.  721.  Stanchion  on  ferryboat,  Louisville  &  J. 
Ferry  Co.  v.  Nolan,  34  N.  E.  710.  Failure  to  provide  safe  horses,  see  Knight 
V.  Pacific  Coast  Stage  Co.  (Cal.)  .34  Pac.  868.  But  full  20  minutes  for  dinner 
Is  not  part  of  its  equipment,  Texas  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  v.  JIullins  (Tex.  App.)  18 
S.  W.  790;  nor  is  an  alarm  clock  iu  form  of  a  conductor  or  a  bell  to  waken 
passengers  at  destination,  Nichols  v.  Chicago  &  W.  JI.  Ry.  Co.,  90  Mich.  203, 
51  X.  W.  364;  Gulf,  0.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ryan  (Tex.  App.)  18  S.  W.  866; 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  White  (Tex.  App.)  17  S.  W.  419-121;  Samuels  v.  Rich- 
mond &  D.  R.  Co.,  35  S.  C.  493,  14  S.  E.  943. 

iTC-Iackson  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  2  C.  P.  Div.  12."3;  CakUvell  v.  Xew 
Jersey  S.  S.  Co.,  47  X.  Y.' 282;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  29  Md.  2.12; 
Taylor  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  48  X.  H.  304;  Stoinweg  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  43  X. 
Y.  123;  Toledo,  P.  &  AV.  R.  Co.  v.  Conroy,  68  111.  ."lUO.  It  is  for  the  jury  to. 
determine  whether  reasonable  diligence  requires  that  a  street-railroad  com- 

LAW  OF  TOETS— 69 


1090  COMMON    CARRIERS.  [Ch.    14 

commensurate  care,  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances,  to  prevent 
damage  to  its  passengers  by  the  operation  of  its  means  of  convey- 
ances, and  in  avoiding  sudden  starts  and  stops,^"  danger  from 
curves,"-  or  a  dangerous  rate  of  speed.^''^  It  is  negligence  not  to  an- 
nounce, or  to  wrongly  announce,  stations,"*  but  not  to  neglect  to 

pany  sliould  place  guards  in  front  of  tlie  car  winrTows  in  order  to  prevent 
passengers  from  exposing  their  arms.    New  Orleans  &  C.  U.  Co.  v.  Schneider, 

5  C.  C.  A.  571,  CO  Fed.  210.  Whether  it  is  negligence  not  to  have  a  chain 
across  the  space  between  the  railings  on  the  rear  platform  of  a  passenger 
car  in  a  mixed  train  is  a  question  for  the  jury.  Newton  v.  Central  Ver- 
mont R.  Co.  (Sup.)  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  488. 

171  Starts  and  stops,  Holmes  v.  Allegheny  Traction  Co.,  153  Pa.  St.  152,  25 
Atl.  G40;  Yarnell  v.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  113  .Mo.  570,  21  S.  W. 
1;  North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Cook,  145  111.  -,',1,  33  N.  E.  958;  Bowdle  v. 
Railway  Co.  (Jlich.)  61  N.  W.  529;  Poole  v.  Georgia  Railroad  &  Banking 
Co.,  89  Ca.  320,  l.j  S.  E.  321;  Cassidy  v.  Atlantic  Ave.  R.  Co.,  9  Misc.  Rep. 
275,  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  724;  Hill  v.  West  End  St.  Ry.  Co.,  158  Mass.  458,  33  N.  E. 
.-S2:  (Uiicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Amol,  144  111.  261,  33  N.  E.  204.  As  to  street 
cars  where  passengers  are  alighting,  Cawfield  v.  Asheville  St.  Ry.  Co.,  Ill 
N.  C.  ."lUT,  16  S.  E.  703;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Landauer,  36  Neb.  642, 
54  N.  W.  976;  Robinson  v.  Northampton  St.  Ry.  Co.,  157  Mass.  224,  32  N. 
E.  1;  Conway  v.  Railroad  Co.,  46  La.  Ann.  1429,  16  South.  362;   Washington 

6  G.  R.  Co.  V.  Harmon's  Adm'r,  147  U.  S.  571,  13  Sup.  Ct.  557. 

172  Lynn  V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  103  Oal.  7,  36  Pac.  1018;  Francisco  v.  Troy 
&  L.  R.  Co.,  78  Hun,  13,  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  247;  Brusch  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry. 
Co.,  52  Minn.  512,  55  N.  W.  57.  Et  vide  Seymour  v.  Citizens'  Ry.  Co.,  114 
Mo.  266,  21  S.  W.  739;  Highland  Ave.  &  B.  R.  Go.  v.  Donovan,  94  Ala.  299, 
10  South.  139. 

IT-'  Andrews  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  86  Iowa,  677,  53  N.  W.  399; 
Chicago,  P.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  145  111.  67,  33  N.  E.  960;  Pennsylvania 
Co.  V.  Ne«meyer,  129  Ind.  401,  28  N.  E.  860;  Willmot  v.  Corrigan  Consol. 
St.  Ry.  Co..  106  Mo.  535,  17  S.  W.  490;  Mexican  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lauricella, 
87  Tex.  277,  28  S.  W.  277.  As  to  effect  of  municipal  ordinance,  Cogswell  v. 
Wi'St  St.  &  N.  E.  Electric  Ry.  Co.,  5  Wash.  46,  31  Pac.  411. 

17  1  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Hoagland,  78  Ind.  203.  Cf.  Railroad  Co.  v.  As- 
pL41e,  23  Pa.  St.  147.  Recovery  has  been  allowed  for  failure  of  sleeping-car 
company  to  awaken  passenger  at  destination.  Pullman  Palace-Car  Co.  v. 
Trimble  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  28  S.  W.  96.  Where  a  train  stops  between  sta- 
tions on  account  of  a  wreck,  and  the  passengers  leave  the  train  without  ob- 
jection from  the  conductor,  it  is  negligence  to  start  the  train  without  first 
giving  the  passengei-s  timely  warning  to  return.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Roundtree  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  989. 


Ch.  14]  CARRIERS  OF  PASSENGERS.  1091 

stale  that  the  train  will  stop  a  t  a  railroad  crossing  before  it  reaches 
the  next  station."^ 

While  a  railroad  company  may  not  be  bound  to  accept  as  a  pas- 
senger a  person  unable  to  take  care  of  himself,  it  is  liable  for  negli- 
gence in  exercising  proper  care  and  furnishing  sufficient  assistance 
to  such  person  after  it  has  Yoluntarily  received  him  as  a  passenger. 
This  is  a  logical  application  of  the  general  principle  that  care  has 
reference  to  the  passenger's  physical  and  mental  condition.""  This 
care  extends  even  to  a  person  manifestly  intoxicated.^ ^^ 

The  carrier  is  liable  for  the  torts  of  his  servants,  including  their 
negligence,  as  well  as  willful  or  wanton  wrongs.^ ^*     A  carrier  is  not 

i'5  Minock  v.  Detroit,  G.  H.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  07  Mich.  425,  50  N.  W.  780. 

i76Weightman  v.  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  70  Miss.  563,  12  South. 
586,  distinguishing  Sevier  v.  Vicksburg  &  M.  R.  Co..  61  Miss.  8;  Meyer  v. 
St.  Louis,  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  4  C.  0.  A.  221,  .54  Fed.  116;  Sawyer  v.  Dulany, 
30  Tex.  479;  Sheridan  v.  Brooklyn,  C.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  .36  X.  Y.  39;  Philadelphia 
C.  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Hassard,  75  Pa.  St.  367;  Allison  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  42 
Iowa,  274;  Jeffersonville,  M.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Riley,  39  Ind.  .508-584;  Indian- 
apolis, P.  &  C.  R.  Co.  V.  Pitzer,  109  Ind.  179,  0  N.  E.  310,  and  10  N.  E.  70; 
Croom  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  52  Jlinn.  296,  53  N.  W.  1128. 

1"  Fisher  v.  West  Tirginia  &  P.  R.  Co.  (W.  Va.)  19  S.  E.  578. 

I's  If  a  conductor  advise  a  passenger  to  leave  a  train  in  motion,  and  ho 
does  so,  to  his  injury,  the  company  is  liable.  Jones  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 
Ry.  Co.,  42  Minn.  183,  43  N.  W.  1114.  Et  vide  Irish  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.. 
4  Wash.  48,  29  Pac.  845;  Prothero  v.  Citizens'  St.  Ry.  Co.,  134  Ind.  431,  ?,:; 
N.  E.  765;  Galloway  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  87  Iowa,  458,  54  N.  '\^■. 
447;  Thomas  v.  Charlotte,  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.,  38  S.  C.  485.  17  S.  E.  226;  Leggett 
V.  Western  New  York  &  P.  R.  Co.,  143  Pa.  St.  39,  21  .\tl.  996.  Of.  Wilburn 
V.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.,  48  Mo.  App.  224.  So,  if  an  incompetent  en- 
gineer bursts  a  boiler,  the  company  is  liable.  Foy  v.  Davidson,  18  Minn.  52;; 
(Gil.  491);  or  where  a  grip  man  lost  control  of  a  cable  car.  Bishop  v.  St.  Paul 
City  Ry.  Co.,  48  Minn.  26,  50  N.  W.  927;  Spohn  v.  ilissouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  116 
JIo.  617,  22  S.  W.  690;  Citizens'  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Willoeby,  1.34  Ind.  563,  33  N.  E. 
<127;  Indianapolis  Union  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cooper,  6  Ind.  App.  202,  33  N.  E.  219; 
East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Fleetwood,  00  Ga.  23,  15  S.  E.  778.  Under 
nllegations  that  plaintiff  was  knocked  and  kicked  from  defendant's  railway 
train  by  its  conductor,  he  may  recover  on  proof  that  the  conductor  alarmed 
him  to  such  an  extent  that  he  jumped  off  the  train.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Williams,  10  C.  C.  A.  463,  62  Fed.  440.  A  carrier  is  not  liable  in  damages 
for  an  injury  caused  to  a  passenger  by  its  servant  under  circumstances 
which  free  the  servant  from  all  criminal  or  civil  responsibility.     New  Or- 


1092  COMMON    CARRIERS.  [Ch.    14 

necessarily  liable  for  the  torts  of  one  passenger  committed  on  an- 
other; but  if  the  servants  of  the  carrier  have  knowledge  that  there  is 
an  occasion  for  interference,  for  example,  to  afford  protection  against 
drunken  and  violent  men,  the  company  will  be  liable  in  damages 
for  failure  to  exercise  the  power  with  which  such  employ^  is  clothed 
by  law."" 

Termination  of  Linbility. 

A  carrier  owes  to  passengers  the  duty  of  allowing  a-  reasonable 
time  in  which  to  alight,  and  providing  a  safe  place  therefor.^*"  This 
duty  may  extend  to  assistance  to  a  passenger  in  alighting  because  of 

leans  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Jopes,  142  U.  S.  18,  12  Sup.  Ct.  109.  A  short  note  as 
to  what  constitutes  wrongful  expulsion  of  passengers  from  a  train,  58  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  467,  477,  491,  587.  544. 

179  Riehmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  .Tefferson,  89  Ga.  554,  16  S.  B.  69;  GraefE  v. 
Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  R.,  161  Pa.  St.  230,  28  Atl.  1107;  Wright  v.  Chicago,  B. 
&  Q.  R.  Co.,  4  Colo.  App.  102,  35  Pac.  196;  Thompson  v.  Manhattan  Ry. 
Co.,  75  Ilun,  548,  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  608;  Evansville  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Darting,  U 
Ind.  App.  375,  33  N.  E.  636;  Siva  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  115  Mo.  127,  21  S.  W. 
905;  Meyer  r.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.,  10  U.  S.  App.  677,  4  C.  C.  A.  221, 
and  54  Fed.  116;  Elllnger  v.  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R.  Co.,  153  Pa.  St.  213, 
25  Atl.  1132;  Pounder  v.  North  Eastern  Ry.  Co.  [1892]  1  Q.  B.  385.  As  to  injury 
by  insane  fellow  passenger,  see  Meyer  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co..  4  C.  C. 
A.  221,  54  Fed.  116.  Plaintiff,  a  boy  14  years  old,  Avas  a  passenger  on  one  of 
defendant's  street  cars.  The  car  was  crowded,  and  he  was  standing  on  the 
front  platform,  leaning  against  the  dasher.  He  either  fell  off,  or,  as  he 
claimed,  was  pushed  off  by  passengers  getting  off,  and  was  run  over.  Held, 
that  there  was  no  error  in  charging  that  defendant  was  not  liable  for  the 
conduct  of  the  passengers  unless  it  was  unusual  and  disorderly,  and  could 
have  been  prevented  by  the  persons  who  had  charge  of  the  car  at  the  time. 
Randall  v.  Frankford  &  S.  P.  C.  P.  R.  Co.,  139  Pa.  St.  464,  22  Atl.  639.  And 
see  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shields  {Tex.  Civ.  App.)  28  S.  W.  709,  to  the 
effect  that  whether  railroad  employes  were  negligent  in  not  going  to  the  as- 
sistance of  a  passenger  whose  clothes  caught  Are  from  alcohol  spilled  by  a 
fellow  passenger  is  a  question  for  the  jury.  And  see  Pittsburgh  &  C.  R.  Co. 
,'.  Pillow,  76  Pa.  St.  510. 

ISO  McSloop  V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  59  Fed.  431;  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co. 
V.  Smith,  92  Ala.  237,  9  South.  223;  Jackson  v.  Grand  Ave.  Ry.  Co.,  118  Mo. 
199,  24  S.  W.  192.  Et  vide  authorities  collected  in  58  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Gas. 
2.38,  244,  257.  And  as  to  liability  of  street-car  company  to  passengers  board- 
ing and  alighting  from  moving  cars,  see  58  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  198,  208,  222- 
•SMl    But  the  duty  does  not  extend  to  furniishiug  a  passenger  a  safe  path 


Ch.    J  4]  CARRIERS    OF    PASSENGERS.  1093 

physical  condition  ^'^  or  other  cireunistances.^^^  l!ut  it  does  not  re- 
quire protection  from  the  rush  of  alighting  passengers,  unless  there  be 
reasonable  danger  to  the  passenger,  or  he  is  in  some  measure  unable  to 
take  care  of  himself.^*^  The  duty  to  stop  a  train  at  its  destination, 
and  to  afford  reasonable  opportunity  to  alight,  follows  naturally;  ^'^^ 
and  if  one,  while  about  to  alight  at  such  place,  is  injured  by  a  prema- 
ture starting  of  the  train,  he  may  recover.^^"^  If,  however,  the  stop- 
ping point  be  not  the  customary  one,  it  will  depend  upon  circum- 

for  further  pi-ogi-ess  after  he  has  left  the  train  at  a  place  where  there  is  not 
a  regular  station.  Buckley  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  101  Mass.  2G,  36  N.  E.  583. 
Passengers  are  presumed  to  know  manifestly  obvious  dangers  in  places  where 
they  alight.  Bigelow  v.  West  End  St.  K.  Co.,  161  Mass.  393,  37  N.  E.  367. 
But  see  Ohio  &  M.  Ity.  Co.  v.  Stansberry,  132  Ind.  .533,  32  N.  E.  218. 

181  Jiadden  v.  Port  Royal  &  AV.  C.  Ry.  Co.  (S.  C.)  19  S.  E.  951. 

is:;  Toledo,  St.  L.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Wingate  (Ind.  Sup.)  37  N.  E.  274: 
Campbell  v.  Alston  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  23  S.  W.  33;  Groom  v.  Chicago,  JI.  &  St. 
P.  R.  Co.,  52  Minn.  296,  53  N.  W.  1128  (a  man  80  years  old). 

1S3  Jarmy  v.  Duluth  St.  R.  Co.,  ."5.5  ilinn.  271,  56  N.  W.  813. 

184  Caldwell  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  89  Ga.  5.j0,  1.5  S.  E.  678;  Thomas  v. 
Charlotte,  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.,  38  S.  C.  485,  17  S.  E.  226;  Sira  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  115 
.Mo.  127,  21  S.  W.  905;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Dancy,  97  Ala.  338,  11  South. 
796;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Lewis  (Ky.)  21  S.  W.  341;  East  Tennessee,  V.  & 
O.  Ry.  v.  Hyde,  89  Ga.  721,  15  S.  E.  621. 

185  Washington  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Harmon's  Adm'r,  147  U.  S.  571,  13  Sup. 
Ct  .557;  Robinson  v.  Northampton  St.  Ry.  Co.,  157  Mass.  224,  22  N.  E.  1; 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Landaner,  36  Neb.  642,  54  N.  W.  976;  Carr  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  98  Cal.  360,  33  Pac.  213;  Hill  v.  West  End  St.  Ry.  Co.,  158  Mass. 
458,  33  N.  E.  582;  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Arnol,  144  111.  261,  33  N.  B.  204 
(46  111.  App.  157,  affirmed);  Gilbert  v.  ATest  End  St.  Ry.  Co.,  160  Mass.  403, 
36  N.  E.  60;  Augusta  I^y.  Co.  v.  Glover,  92  Ga.  132,  18  S.  E.  406;  Onderdonk 
V.  New  York  &  S.  B.  Ry.  Co.,  74  Hun,  42,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  310;  Bernstein  v. 
DiT  Dock,  E.  B.  &  B.  R.  Co.,  72  Hun,  46,  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  669;  Tobin  v.  Omni- 
bus Cable  Co.  (Cal.)  34  Pac.  124;  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bryant  (Tex.  Oiv. 
App.)  26  S.  W.  167;  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  Id.  154;  Illinois  Cent. 
R.  Co.  V.  Taylor,  46  111.  App.  141;  Chicago  &  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bji-um,  48  111.  App. 
41;  AA'arbowlsky  v.  Ft.  Wayne  &  E.  Ry.  Co.,  86  Mich.  236,  48  N.  W.  1097. 
In  an  action  against  a  railroad  company  for  injuries  to  a  passenger  in  alight- 
ing from  a  train,  it  was  proper  to  show  that  a  brakeman  on  the  train  re- 
marked at  the  time  of  the  accident  that  -'it  beats  hell;  they  cannot  stop  long 
enough  to  let  people  get  off."  Omaha  &  R.  V.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chollette,  41  Neb. 
578,  59  N.  W.  921. 


1094  coMJioN  cakRiers.  [(-'li-  14 

stance  Avhether  or  not  such  person  assumed  the  risk  of  alighting  f lom 
the  car  while  in  motion.^*' 

186  Cf.  Bowie  V.  Greenville  St.  Ey.  Co.,  69  Miss.  196,  10  South.  574,  wliere 
plaintiff  was  not  ^ilty  of  contilbutory  negligence,  with  Barnett  v.  East  Ten- 
nessee, V.  &  G.  Ry.  Co..  87  Ga.  766,  13  S.  E.  904.  Et  vide  Kobinson  v.  North- 
ampton St  Ry.  Co.,  157  Mass.  :J24,  32  N.  E.  1. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED. 


VOLS.  1  AND  2. 


[Th3  figures  refer  to  the  pages.    Pages  1  to  652  are  comprised  in  volume  1 ;  the  res- 
idue in  volume  2.  J 


A 


Abbett  V.    Railway   Co.,   933. 
Abbott  V.  Abbott,  217,  403. 

V.  Chaffee,  738. 

V.  Heath,  392. 

V.  Kimball,   44. 

V.  McCaddeu,    1019. 

V.  Maxfie,    977. 

V.  Eailroad  Co.,  237. 

V.  7G  Land  &  Water  Co.,  743. 

V.  Treat,   582. 

V.  Wood,  682. 
Abel  V.  President,  etc.,   Delaware   & 

H.  Canal  Co..  1001. 
Abelos  V.  Bransfield,  462. 
Abend  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1040. 
Abercrombie  v.  Bradford,  711. 
Abernathy  v.  Wheeler,  735,  736. 
Abraham  v.  Reynolds,  1034. 
Abrahams  v.  California  Powder  Co., 
848. 

V.  Kidney,  452,  458. 
Abram  v.  Gulf,  C.  &   S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 

1079. 
Abrams  v.   Milwaukee,   L.   S.   &  W. 

Ry.  Co.,  301,  303. 
Abrath     v.    North-Eastern     Ry.    Co., 

168,  181,  513,  616,  620. 
Absor  V.  French,  678. 
Acheson  v.  Miller,  721. 
Ackerley  v.  Parkinson,  121. 
Ackert  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  969. 
Ackroyd  v.   Smith,  682. 
Acme  Coal  Min.  Co.  v.  Mclver,  1052. 
Acton  V.  Blundell,  90,  758. 
Adams   v.    Bank,    183. 

V.  Bicknell,   618. 


Adams  v.  Blankenstein,  710. 

V.  Coleridge,   542. 

V.  Corriston,  704. 

V.  Fletcher,  223,  224,  772. 

V.  Freeman,  43. 

V.  Gardner,  384. 

V.  Gillam,  628. 

V.  Iron  Cliffs  Co.,  955. 

V.  Kelly,   491. 

V.  Lawson,  479,  494. 

V.  McGlinchy,  712. 

T.  Main,   465. 

V.  Ohio  Falls  Car  Co.,  787. 

V.  Olin,  337. 

V.  Paige,   85. 

V.  Railroad    Co.,     104,     411,    693. 
791,  832,  886,  946,  967. 

V.  Rivers,  680,  081,  690. 

V.  Tapling,  315. 

V.  Waggoner,  203. 

V.  Young,    842. 
Adams   Express   Co.   v.   Harris,   300, 
305. 

V.  Stettaners,  303. 
Adamson,  Ex  parte,  41. 

V.  Jarvis,  ^5,  216. 
Addington  v.   Allen,   589. 
Addyston  Pipe  &  Steel  Co.  v.  Copple, 

320. 
Ades  V.  Levi,  354. 
Adler  v.  Fenton,  773. 

V.  Metropolitan    El.    R.    Co.,    787. 
Adm'r  of  Chambers  v.  Trust  Co.,  99. 
Ady  V.  Freeman,  366. 
Aerkfetz  v.  Humphreys,  884,  960. 
Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Boon,  78. 

V.  Reed,  578,   581,  599. 
Aetna  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Paul,  172. 


LAW  OF  TORTS 


(1095) 


]  09G  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  yages  1-G52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  ivsidiic] 


Aga   Kurboolie   Malioinecl    v.    Queen, 

Agars  V.  I^yslo,  718. 
Agincoiirt,   The.    149. 
Ahern  v.   Oregon  Telegraph  &  Tele- 
phone  Co.,   8G3. 

V.  Steele.   224.   79G,  797. 
Ahl  V.  Goodhart,  323. 
Ahlbeck  v.  St.  Paul,  JI.  &  M.  Ry.  Co., 

1078. 
Ahrens  v.  United  Growers  Co.,  310. 
Aiken  v.  Buck,  t)09,  071,  U72. 
Akerley  v.  Haines,  459. 
Akers  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry. 

Co.,  921. 
Akin  V.   Newell,  418. 
Akridge  v.   Atlanta  &  W.  P.   R.  Co., 

265,  829. 
Akron  V.  Chamberlain  Co.,  142. 
Alabama    Connellsville   Coal    &   Iron 

Co.  v.  Pitts,   lOOC. 
Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Carroll,  103. 

V.  Chapman,  374. 

V.  Dobbs,  989. 

V.  Fulghum,    104,    1002. 

V.  Harris,  255,  2G2. 

V.  Linn,  824,   882,  «)2.  94G,  947. 

V.  Little,   .301. 

v.  Tapia,  388. 

V.  Thomas,   300. 
Alabama  Slidland  Ry.  Co.  v.   Martin, 

228,  230. 
Alabama  &  T.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kidd.  719. 

725. 
Alabama  &  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Brooks,  .530. 

V.  Davis,  982. 

v.  Hanes,   391. 

v.  McAfee.    2G2. 

V.  Philips,  923. 

V.  Searles,    1071. 

V.  Sparks,  107(>. 

V.  Summers,    8G0. 

V.  Turnbull,   319. 
Alair   v.   Northern   Pac.    R.   Co.,   304. 

305. 
Alamaugo  v.  Supervisors,  126. 
Alaska   Tread  well   Gold    Min.    Co.    v. 

Whelan,  979,  1003. 
Albany  v.   Cunliff,   186. 
Albany    City    Sav.   Inst.    v.    Burdick, 

599. 
Albert  v.  State,  220.  3:;2. 


Alberts  v.   Bache,   1000. 

V.  Village  of  Vernon,  950. 
Albertson  v.  Keokuk  &  D.  M.  Ry.  Co., 

988. 
Albitz  V.  Railway  Co.,  42,  270. 
Albrecht  v.  Milwaukee  &  S.  R.  Co., 
318. 

v.  Walker,   395. 
Albright  v.  JIcTighe,  213,  214,  342. 
Albro  V.   .laquith,   281,   899. 
Alcorn  v.  Chicago  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  1022. 

V.  Hooker,  523. 

V.  Philadelphia,  181. 
Alden  v.  City  of  Minneapolis,  764. 

V.  Wright,   88,  600. 
Alder  V.  Buckley,  913. 
Alderdv.  Constable,  724. 
Aldine  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Barnard,  898. 
Aldred's  Case,  750,  751,  769,  772,  775. 
Aldrich  v.   City  of  Minneapolis,   7.S7, 
795. 

V.  Concord  &  M.  R.  R.,  949. 

V.  Howard,   777. 

V.  Monroe,   948. 

V.  Press  Printing  Co.,  109,  535. 

V.  Weeks,  425,  430. 

V.  Wetmore,  387.  783. 

V.  Wright,   152,   196. 
Aldworth  v.  City  of  Lynn,  898. 
Alexander  v.  Alexander,  5o:!. 

V.  Blodgett.  431,  43G. 

v.  City  of  Vicksburg,  174. 

V.  Fisher,  701,  702. 

V.  Hard,  670. 

V.  .Jenkins,  474.  488,  507.  508. 

V.  Kerr,   779. 

V.  Northeastern  Ry.  CO.,  523. 

V.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  10'!. 

V.  Relfe,  171. 

v.  Richmond    &    D.    R.    Co.,    928, 
070. 

v.  Southey,   728,  729. 

V.  Swackhamer,  717. 

v.  Town  of  New  Castle,  76. 

v.  U.  S.,  758. 
Alexandria  Min.   &  Exploring  Co.   v. 

Painter,  661. 
Alfred    Shrimpton    «&    Sons    v.    Phil- 
brick,   596. 
Alger  V.   Lowell,  165,  873. 

V.  Railroad   Co.,    142. 
Alhauscr  v.  Butler.  916. 


CASES    CITED. 


1097 


[Vol.  1  comprises  peges  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Aliston  V.   Nashville,   C.   &  St.   L.   R. 

Co.,  315. 
All  V.  Barnwell  Co.,  333. 
AUaback  v.  Utt,  743. 
Allan  V.  Colby,  676. 

V.  State,  907,  914. 
Allbutt  V.   General   Council  of   Med- 
ical  Education  &  Registration,  534. 
AUec  V.  Reeco,  122,  123. 
Allegheny   v.    Zimmerman,   66. 
Allen  V.  Addington,  576. 

V.  American  Bldg.  &  Loan  Ass'n, 
721. 

V.  Boston,  768. 

V.  Butman,    704. 

V.  City  of  Boston,  179. 

V.  City  of  Chippewa  Falls,   763. 

V.  (Jlark,  917. 

V.  Codman,    609,   617. 

V.  Crofoot,   526. 

V.  Fenton,'63S. 

V.  Fiske,  6S3. 

V.  Goodwin,   1041. 

V.  G.    ^^^    &    F.    Smith    Iron    Co., 
994. 

V.  Hallet,    l.jO. 

V.  Hitch,   398. 

V.  Kirk,   132,   640,  641. 

V.  Leonard,  428. 

V.  Merchants'  Bank,  134. 

V.  Milner,  315. 

V.  News  Pub.  Co.,  494. 

V.  Pioneer  Press  Co.,  521,  546. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  172,  254,  270.  370. 
980. 

V.  Rundle,  583. 

V.  San   Jose   Land   &   Water   Co., 
760. 

V.  .Sisson,  129. 

V.  State  S.  S.  Co.,  938. 

V.  Stephenson,  840. 

V.  Truesdell,   594. 

V.   Weber,  75.">. 

V.  Wheatley,    342. 

V.  Willard,   935. 

V.   \A'right,  427. 
Allen  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Bacon,  182. 
Alliger  v.  Brooklyn  Daily  Eagle,  475. 
AUis  V.  Columbian  University,  870. 

V.  Day,  391. 

V.  Leonard,  926. 

V.  Voigt,  lOGO. 


Allison  V.  Little,  324,  654. 

V.  Railroad     Co.,     381,     403,     848, 
1091. 
AUsop  V.  Allsop,  373,  497. 
Almond  v.  Nugent,  913. 
Almy  v.  Harris,  98,  349. 
Alpern  v.  Churchill,  939. 
Alston  V.  Scales,  84,  667. 
Althorf  V.  Wolfe,  266,  399,  992. 
AltnoAV  V.  Town  of  Sibley,  183. 
Alton  V.  Midland  R.  Co.,  905. 
Alton  L.  &  C.  Co.  V.  Calvey,  944,  1035, 
A.   L.  &  .J.  J.  Reynolds  Co.  v.  Third 

Ave.  R.  Co.,  979. 
Amann  v.  Damm,  540. 
Amato  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  941. 
Amelung  v.  Seekamp,  804. 
Amer  v.  Longstreth,  392. 
American    Bank    Note    Co.    v.     New 

York  El.  R.  Co.,  411. 
American  Exp.  Co.  v.  Patterson,  169. 

V.  Sands,  301. 
American   Furniture  Co.  v.   Town  of 

Batesville,  349,  799. 
American  Ins.   Co.  v.   Crawford,  270. 
American  Preservers'  Co.  v.  Drescher, 

001. 
American  Print  Works  v.   Lawrence, 

149,  678. 
American  Transp.  Co.  v.  Moore,  1062. 
American   Union  Tel.   Co.   v.   Midd'e- 

ton,  103,  660. 
American  Waterworks  Co.  v.  Dough- 
erty, 370,  055. 
Ameriscoggin    Bridge    Co.    v.    Bragg, 

686. 
Ames  V.  Union  R.  Co.,  450. 
Amick  V.  U'Hara,  33,  50,  150,  654,  822. 
Amies  v.   Stevens,  1002. 
Ammant  v.  Tm-npike  Road,  92. 
Amory  v.  Flyn,  050. 
Amoskeag   Manuf'g   Co',    v.    Goodale, 

82,   799. 
Amstein  v.  Gardner,  678. 
Amy  V.  Supervisors,  128,  137. 
Anliersate,    etc.,   Ry.    Co.    v.    Midland 

Ky.  Co.,  603. 
Anchor  Line  v.  Dater,  1073. 
Andalusian,  The,  S60. 
Anderson  v.  Arnold,  58. 
V.  Beck.  419. 
v.  Bernett,   503. 


1098  CASES    CIIED. 

[Vol.  1  comjjrises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Anderson  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co., 
942. 

V.  Chicago,  St.   P.,   M.   &  O.   Ry. 
Co.,  949. 

V.  Clark,  201. 

V.  Dickie,  797. 

V.  Dunn,  110. 

V.  Field,  318. 

V.  Gulneau,  992. 

V.  Harvey's  Heirs,  691. 

V.  How,  627,  631. 

V.  Manhattan  El.   R.  Co.,  837. 

V.  Millikin,   135. 

V.  Minnesota  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  993, 
1008. 

V.  Northern  Mill  Co.,  874,  1001. 

V.  Pacific  Ins.  Co.,  570. 

V.  Smith,   153. 

V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  309. 
Anderson  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Beal,  956. 
Anderson  L.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Ker- 

nodle,  411. 
Andrew  v.  Deshler,  .551-553. 
Andrews  v.  Boedecker,  266. 

V.  Chicago,   M.  &  St.   P.   Ry.   Co., 
1086,  1090. 

V.  Clark,  741. 

V.  Ft.  Worth  &  D.  C.  R.  Co.,  196. 

V.  Hartford  &  N.  H.  R.  Co.,  335. 

V.  Portland,  443. 

V.  School  Dist.,  326. 

V.  Vanduzer,   524. 
Angell  V.  Loomis,  562,  571,  577. 
Angevine  v.  Knox-Goodrich,   794. 
Angle  v.  Chicago,  St,  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry. 

Co.,  636,  638. 
Anglin  v.  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.,  1015. 
Angus  v.  CliflEord,  566,  568. 

V.  Lee,  837. 
Anheuser-Busch  Brewing  Ass'n  v.  Pe- 
terson, 148,  763. 
Ankeny  v.  Moffett,  216. 
Annapolis  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Gantt,  78. 
Anniston  Pipe- Works  v.  Dickey,  813, 

961. 
Anonymous,  98,  489,  542,  623,  726,  727. 
Anscomb  v.   Shore,  27. 
Anson  v.  Stuart,  495. 
Antclife  V.  June,  634. 
Anthony  v.  Haney,  677. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  669. 

V.  Slaid,  86,  380. 


Antle  V.  Sexton,  568,  570. 
Anvil  Mining  Co.  v.  Humble,  298. 
Appel  V.  Railway  Co.,  1017. 
Applebee  v.  Percy,  857. 
Appleton  V.  FuUerton,  82,  84. 
Appleton  Mill  Co.  v.  Warder,  723. 
Areedeckne  v.  Kelk,  750. 
Archbishop  v.  Robeson,  492. 
Archibald  v.  McLaren,  626. 
Ardesco  Oil  Co.  v.  Gilson,  232. 
Arey  v.  City  of  Newton,  973. 
Arizona    Lumber    &    Timber    Co.  v. 

Mooney.  1006. 
Arkansas  Tel.  Co,  v.  Ratteree,  864. 
Arkansas  Val.  Land  &  Cattle  Co,  v. 

Mann,  739. 
Arkdelphia  v.  Windham,  184. 
Arkerson  v.  Dennlson,  1046. 
Arkwright  v.  Gell,  759. 

v.  Newbold,  572. 
Arment  v.  Hensel,  698,  705. 
Armistead  v.  Chatters,  450. 
Ai-mistead  Lumber  Co.  v.  Louisville, 

N.  O.  &  T.  R.  Co.,  1066. 
Armitage  v.  Widoe,  43,  160. 
Armory  v.  Delamirie,  250,  711. 
Armstrong  v.   Cooley,  842.  843. 

V.  Forg,  1006. 

V.  Fresz,  354. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  307,  612,  945,  981, 
1039. 

V.  United     States   Exp.    Co..    299, 
301,    1074. 

V.  White,  597. 
Armstrong  Co.  v.  Carrion  Co..  216. 
Armytage  v.  Haley,  404. 
Arn  V.  City  of  Kansas,  764. 
Arnold  v.  Jewett,  500.  548. 

V.  Moses,  618. 

v.  Mundy,   659. 

V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,   191,  826. 
Arnott   v.   Standard   Ass'u,   510,   518, 

519. 
Arrington  v.  Larrabee,  686. 
Arrowsmith  v.  Le  Mesurier,  421. 

v.  Nashville  &  D.  R.  Co.,  1080. 
Arrow  Steamship  Co.  v.  Bennett,  505. 
Arthur  v.  Oakes,  358,  359,  638,  644. 

V.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  1070. 
Aitz  V.  Railroad  Co..  882,  920.  929. 
Arundel  v.  McCuUoch.  149. 

V.  Tregono,  610. 


CASKS    CITED. 


1099 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Asevado  v.  Orr,  619. 

Ashby  V.  White,   79,  81,  87,  94.   135, 

149,  366.  367,  772. 
Ashdown  v.  Manitoba  Free  Press  Co., 

521. 
Asher  v.  CabeU,  327. 
Ashfleld  V.  Edgell,  728. 
Ashley  v.  Hariison,  385,  387. 
V.  Hart,  1056. 

T.  Port  Huron.  176. 
V.  Taylor,   329. 
AshUn  V.  White.  587. 
Ashlock  V.  Vivell,  159. 
Ashmead  v.  Keynolds,  311. 
Ashmore  v.  Hardy,  609. 
Ashton  V.  Stock,  661,  671. 
Ashurst  V.  McKensie,  691. 
Ashworth  v.  Stanwix,  202,  1035. 
Askew  V.  Hale.  183. 
Aspegren  v.  Kota.s,  197. 
Asser  v.  French,  678. 
Assop  V.  Yates.  SCiiJ. 
Aston  V.  Heaven,   1058. 
Atchinson  v.  Peterson,  91. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  11.  Co.  v.  Bales, 
972. 

V.  Bryan,  1076. 

V.  Calvert,  988. 

V.  Click,  362. 

V.  Dill,  902. 

V.  Elder,  925.  926. 

V.  Feehan,   979. 

V.  Hague,  SS5,  923. 

V.  Headland,  1081. 

V.  Lawler,  301.  1071. 

V.  Long,   754.   755. 

V.  McClurg,   861. 

V.  McGinnis,  30;J. 

V.  Martin,  103S.   1040. 

V.  Midgett,  370. 

V.  Myers,  945,  995. 

V.  Parker,  949. 

V.  Reesman,  921,  922,  1019,  1049. 

V.  Richardson,  308,  1072. 

v.  Schroeder,   1050. 

V.  Seeley,  1038. 

V.  Smith,  198. 

V.  Stanford,  375,  382,  972. 

V.  Tanner,  729. 

V.  Weber,   197. 

V.  Wilson,  414.   1052. 

V.  Zeiler,  1013. 


Atchison    &    C.    R.   E.    v.    Washburn, 

305. 
Atchison  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Flinn,  197. 

V.  Garside.  140. 

Atkins  V.  Chilson.  704. 

V.  Moore,  714. 

V.  Perrin,  553. 

Atkinson  v.  City  of  Atlanta,  413. 

V.  Goodrich   Tiansp.   Co.,   78,  375, 

370. 
V.  Heer,  131. 
V.  Hewitt,  705. 
V.  Mott,   471. 
V.  Newcastle,  98. 
V.  New  Castle  &  G.  Water  Works 

Co.,  186.  919. 
V.  Ritchie,   1065. 
Atlanta  Journal  v.  Mayson,  522. 
Atlanta  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Jacobs,  471,  472. 

V.  Walker,   879. 
Atlanta    &    C.    Air-Line     By.    Co.    v. 

Gravitt,  890,  985. 
Atlanta  &  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Fuller.  1081. 

V.  Kimberly,   798. 
Atlanta  &  W.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  381, 

1006. 
Atlantic  &  F.   Ry.    Co.  v.    Kimberly 

232. 
Atlantic  &  G.   W.   Ry.   Co.  v.   Dunn, 

395. 
Atlantic  &  P.   R.   Co.   v.   Laird.   210 

903,  1071. 
Atlantic  &  W.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Hudson, 

887. 
Atlas,  The,  215. 

Atlas  Engine  Works  v.  Randall,  1006. 
Atlee  V.  Packet  Co.,  979. 
Attack  V.  Bra  m well,  USO. 
Attorney  General  v.  Bridge  Co.,  81. 
V.  Conservators,   777. 
V.  Council,    etc.,    of   Birmingham, 

777. 
V.  Evart  Booming  Co.,  745. 
V.  Great  Eastern  R.  Co.,  755. 
V.  Hunter,   804. 
v.    Lum,  351. 
V.  McDonald,  119. 
V.  Revere  Copper  Co.,  759. 
V.  Steward,   781. 
Attorney    General    for    Trinidad    and 

Tobago  V.  Eriche,  322. 
Attwood  V.  City  of  Bangor,  786,  79S. 


1100  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-C52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Attwood  V.  Mongt'r,  (iOli. 
At  water  v.  Baltimore,  174. 

V.  Tupper,  346,  721. 

V.  Whiteman,  602. 
Atwill  V.  Mackintosh,  HIT. 
Atwood  V.  Ernest.  733. 

V.  Monger,  603.  60.1.  (JOT. 
Auburn  &  C.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Douglass, 

56,  773. 
Auclimuty  v.  Ham,  856. 
Audubon  V.  Excelsior  Ins.  Co.,  326. 
Augusta   Evening   News   v.  Radford, 

494. 
Augusta  R.  Co.  v.  Andrews,  195. 

V.  Glover,  104,  807,  1089,  1093. 
AuUs  V.  Young,  362. 
Aultman  v.  Olson.  599. 
Aurora  v.  Love.  ISO,  764. 
Aurora  R.  Co.  v.  Grimes,  1085. 
Austin  V.  Appling,  293. 

V.  Bacon,  220. 

V.  Barrows,   638. 

V.  Carswell,   12. 

V.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  948. 

V.  Culpepper,  477. 

V.  Dowling,  423. 

V.  Hilliers,  404. 

V.  Holt,  658. 

V.  Mills,  322. 

V.  Vrooman,  122-124,  424. 
Austin  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Anderson, 
336. 

V.  Beatty,  819. 

V.  Saunders,  930. 
Australasia  Bank  v.  Harding,  321. 
Avery  v.  Chapman,  563. 

v.  Halsey,    216. 

V.  Ray,  445. 

V.  Wilson,    158. 
Avery  &  Sons  v.  Meek,  1016. 
Avey  V.   Galveston,  H.    &  S.   A.   Ry. 

Co.,    987,    988. 
Axford  v.  Mathews,  709. 
Axmann  v.  Lund,  552. 
Aycrigg's   Bx'rs   v.   New   York   &  E. 

Ry.,  258. 
Ayer  v.  Ashmead,  342,  343. 

V.  Bartlett,   711. 

V.  City  of  Norwich,  748,  766. 

V.  Colgrove,   460. 

V.  Western    Union   Tel.    Co.,    304, 
809. 


Ayers,  In  re,  111,  112. 
Aylesworth  v.  St.  John,  527. 
Ayres  v.   Chicago   &  N.  W.   Ry.   Co., 
1057. 
v.  Toulmin,  485,  510,   511. 
Ayre's  Case,  570. 


B 


Babb  V.  Curators  of  the  University 
of  Missouri,  808. 

V.  Mackey,  349. 
Babbage  v.  Powers,  233,  772,  8S6. 
Babcock  V.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  844. 

V.  New    Jersey    Stock   Yard    Co., 
804,  806. 

V.  Old  Colony  R.   Co.,  1008. 

V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  390. 
Babcock    &    Wilcox     Co.    v.    Pioneer 

Iron  Works,   344. 
Bachelder  v.  Chaves,  131. 

V.  "Heagan,  842,  843. 
Bacheller  v.  Pinkham,  289. 
Backhouse  v.  Bonomi,  87,  335,  338. 

V.  Sneed,  1062. 
Bacon  v.  City  of  Boston,  174,  790,  798. 

V.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  958. 

V.  Michigan    Cent.     R.     Co.,    479, 
540,  544. 

V.  Towne,  611,   618,  621. 
Baddeley  v.   Granville,   923. 
Badder  v.  Keefer,  450,  4.17,  460. 
Badger  v.  Phinney,  161,  163. 
Badgley  v.  Decker,  459. 

V.  Hedges,  526. 
Bagby  V.  Harris,  306. 
Bagley  v.   People,  783. 
Bagshaw  v.  Goward,  680. 
Baikie  v.  Chandless,  917. 
Bailey  v.  Adams,  723. 

V.  Birtles,    329. 

V.  Bussing,   216. 

V.  Cincinnati,    N.    O.    &   T.   P.    R. 
Co.,  977. 

V.  Dean,  551,  553. 

V.  Gas  Co.,   909. 

V.  Kimball,    952. 

V.  Lawrence  Co.,  183,  184. 

V.  Mayor,  136. 

V.  Moulthorp,    718. 

V.  O'Bannon,   457. 


CASES    CITED. 


1101 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;   vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Bailey  v.  Putillsliing  Co.,  510. 

V.  Rome,    W.    &    O.    R.    Co.,   951, 
1008. 

V.  Siegel   Gas  Fixture  Co.,   666. 

V.  Troy  &  B.  Ry.  Co.,  232,  234 

V.  Wiggins,   118. 
Bailie  v.  Merrill,  588. 
Baily  v.   Merrell,  597,  600. 
Bain  v.   Sandusky  Transp.   Co..  14. 
Bainard  v.  City  of  Newton,  75i;. 
Balrd  v.  Boehner,  311,  459,  400. 

V.  Gillett,  910. 

V.  Householder,  605. 

V.  Howard,    166,    724,    739. 

V.  Morford,   913. 

V.  Pettit,  261. 

V.  Shipman,  290. 

V.  Williamson,  757. 
Baken  v.  Boston,  808. 
Baker  v.  Barton,  443. 

V.  Beers,    715,    717. 

V.  Bolton,  327. 

V.  Braslin,  218. 

V.  Drake,  360,   741. 

V.  Frick,   408. 

V.  Hart,    532. 

V.  Holtpzaffell,    227. 

V.  Leka,  339. 

V.  Lever,  596. 

V.  Lewis,   680. 

V.  Lothrop,   727. 

V.  Lovett,  159. 

V.   MoiTis,  160. 

V.  Pennsylvania  Co..  •";;il. 

V.  Portland,  926. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  708,  72o,   989. 

V.   Sebright,  703. 

V.  Secor,   211. 

V.  State,  119. 

V.  Westmoreland   &    C.    Nat.    Gas 
Co.,  941. 

V.  Wheeler,    304. 

V.  Young,  217,  221. 
Baldwin   v.   Barney,   194. 

V.  Calkins,    37. 

V.  Casella,   S."i7. 

v.  Cole,  724,  726. 

V.  Flphinston,  480. 

V.  Ensign,  768. 

V.  Hayden,  443. 

V.  Hutchinson,    526. 

V.  Liverpool  &  G.  W.    S.   S.    Co.. 
1000. 


Baldwin  v.  Railway  Co.,  361,  389. 

V.  Weed,  133,   632. 
Bales  V.  Wingfleld,  83. 
Ball,  Ex  parte,  11. 

V.  Axten,  58. 

V.  Bennett,  217,  221. 

V.  Bruce,  454. 

V.  Horrigan,  422,   430,   G29. 

V.  Kehl,   759. 

V.  Liney,  728. 

V.  McGeoch,   311,  317. 

V.  Nye,  7.58,  768,  771,  840. 

V.  Palmer,  733. 

V.  Rawles,  620,  623,  627. 

V.  Ray,   778. 

V.  Town  of  Woodbine,  178. 
Ballard   v.   Carmichael,   672. 

V.  Dyson,  689. 

V.  Tomlinson,  90,   757,   853. 
Ballentine  v.  Poyner,  699. 

V.  Webb,  769,  805. 
Ballou  V.  Earle,  304,  305,  901. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  995,  1056. 
Balme  v.  Hutton,  710. 
Baltimore  Belt  R.  Co.  v.  Lee,  691. 
Baltimore  City  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kemp, 
381,  903. 

v.  McDonnell,  928,  989. 
Baltimore  Traction  Co.  v.  State,  1082. 

v.  Wallace,  198. 
Baltimore  &  C.   Ry.   Co.  v.   Reaney, 

101. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Barger,  262. 
270,   397. 

V.  Baugh,    1038,    1039,    1041-1043, 
1047,    1048. 

V.  Boteler,   381. 

V.  Brady,  309. 

V.  Dorsey,  846. 

V.  Kean,  371. 

V.  Keedy,  1070. 

V.  Kemp,    377. 

V.  JIali,  928. 

V.  O'Donnell,  720,  721.   726.  739. 

V.  Rambo,   944,   947. 

V.  Skeels,   300. 

V.  State,  261,  928,  982,  1089. 

V.  Sulphur  Springs  Dist.,  70. 
Baltimore  &  O.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Wal- 

born,  932. 
Baltimore  &  P.   R.  Co.  v.  Fifth  Bap- 
tist Church,  141,  143.  144,  170,  413, 
781.  791. 


1102 


CASES    CITED 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  resiilne.] 


Baltimore  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  'JTti. 

V.  Reaney,  76.  143. 

V.  State,  1017. 
Baltzer  v.  Chicago,  M.   &  N.  R.  Co., 

78,  402,  954,   067. 
Bamford   v.   Turnley,  749,  776,  778. 
Bancroft  v.  Boston  &  W.  R.  Co.,  1086. 

v.  City  of  Cambridge,  789. 
Bancroft-Whitney      Co.      v.      Pacific 

Coast  Steamship  Co.,  903. 
Bandell  v.   May,  617. 
Bangor  v.  Lansil,  763. 
Bangs   V.    Little,    150. 
Banister  v.  Wakeman,  119. 
Bank  v.   Bowdre,  522. 

V.  Brainerd  School  Dist,  182. 

V.  Fourth  Nat.  Bank,  134. 

V.  Goos,  83. 

v.  Owens,   85. 

V.  Strong,   527. 
Banking  House  v.  Brooks,  728. 
Bank    of    British    North   America   v. 

Strong,   606. 
Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Goos,  380. 
Bank   of    Kentucky  v.    Adams    Exp. 

Co.,  302,  1057,  1072. 
Bank  of  New  Soutli  Wales  v.  Owston, 

168,   280. 
Bank  of  State  of  Georgia  v.   Porter, 

691. 
Bank  of  United  States  v.  Daniel,  581. 
Banks  v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.,  990. 
Banner  Pub.  Co.  v.  State,  537. 
Banning  v.   Chicago,   R.  I.   «&  P.   Ry. 

Co.,  975. 
Bannister  v.  Hyde,  675. 
Bannon  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  951. 

V.  Lutz,  955,   1010,  1014. 
Banque  v.  Brown,  584. 
Barbarick  v.  Anderson,  669. 
Barbee  v.  Armistead,  466. 

V.  Reese,   165,  431. 
Barber  v.  Armistead,  466. 

V.  Lamb,  322. 

V.  Penley,  765. 

v.  Railway  Co.,  770,  892.  924. 

r.  Reese,  72. 

V.  Rollinson,  423,  604, 

V.  Scott,  604,  618,  620,  625. 
Barber    Asphalt    Pav.    Co.    v.    Odasz, 

949. 
Barbo  v.  Bassett,  956,  957. 
Barbour  v.   Stephenson,  4."35,  4.j9. 


Barclay  v.  Com.,  802. 

Barden  v.  City  of  Portage,  170,  T."i4. 

V.  Felch,  279. 
Bare  v.  Hoffman,  412,  413. 
Barfield  v.  Putzel,  78."'i.  804. 
Barham   v.  Nethersal,  510. 

v.  Turbeville,  161. 
Barhight  v.  Tammany,  (122.  625. 
Barholt  V.  Wright,  204,   445. 
Barhydt  v.  Valk,  418, 
Barker  v.  Braham,  420. 

v.  Railway  Co.,  470. 
Barker's  Estate,  In  re,  205. 
Barkley  v.  Wilcox,  760,  761. 
Barley  v.  AA'alford.   571. 
Barnard   v.   Bartlett,   675. 

V.  Coffin,   285. 

v.  Poor,    842,    843. 

V.  Shirley,  757. 
Barnardiston  v.  Chapman,  668. 
Barnard's  Case,  166, 
Barndt  v.  Frederick.  598.  600,  SOS. 
Barnes  v.  Allen,  465,  407,  472. 

V.  Brown,  858,  877. 

V.  Campbell,  535. 

V.  Chapin,  835. 

V.  Crawford,  498. 

V.  District  of  Columbia,   177,   isi. 
183. 

V.  Hathorn,   779. 

V.  Keene,  462. 

V.  McCrate,  528. 

V.  Cleans,  914. 

V.  Racine,  9. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  569,  581,  592.  597. 

V.  Viall,  342. 

V.  Ward,  196,   766,  885,  891. 
Barnett  v.  Allen,  490. 

V.  Barnett,  562, 

V.  Contra  Costa  Co.,  183,  1S4, 

V.  Earl  of  Guildford,  680.  687,  092. 

V.  East   Tennessee,    V.    &    (;,    liy. 
Co.,  1094. 

V.  Northeastern  R.   Co.,    1)37. 

V.  Reed,   632,   634. 

V.  Water-Power  Co.,  'M\\. 
Barney  v.   Hannibal  &  St.  J.   R.  Co., 
890. 

V.  Pinkham,  913. 
Barney  Dumping-Boat  Co.  v.  City  of 

New  York,  181. 
Barnowski  v.  Helsou,  839. 
Barnstable  v.  Thacher,  671. 


CASES    CITED. 


no;; 


[Vol.  1  eonii irises  pages  1-G.j2,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Barnum  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.   Ry. 
Oo.,  333. 

V.  Terliening,  819. 
Ban-  V.  City  of  Kansas,  178,  'Ml. 

V.  Essex  Trades  Council,  'io'J,  04G, 
648,  649. 

V.  Moore,   536. 

V.  Shaw,  631. 
Barrelett  v.   Bellgard,   742,  743. 
Barrett  v.   Long,  521. 
,  V.  Palmer,  103. 
*  V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  830. 

V.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  342,  400. 

V.  Village  of  Hammond,   174.   scs. 

V.  Warren,  722. 

V.  White,   128,  680. 
Barron  v.  City  of  Detroit,  178. 

V.  Mason,  621. 
Barrow  v.  Lewellin,  480. 
Barrowington's  Case,  141. 
Barrows  v.  Bell,  534. 

V.  Fox,   756. 
Barry  v.  Arnaud,  79. 

V.  Croskey,    585. 

V.  Edmunds,  393. 
Barter  v.  Wheeler,  1073. 
Barthe  v.  Larquie,  422. 
Barthold  v.  Philadelphia,  177,  179. 
Bartholomew  v.  Bushnell,  ri."i9. 

V.  Pierson,  564. 
Bartlett  v.   Boston  Gaslight   Co.,    2L'4. 
966,   972. 

V.  Christhilf,  526,  527. 

V.  Crozier,   127,    128. 

V.  Hawley,    614. 

V.  Siman,   796, 

V.  Wells,   164. 
Bartley  v.  Richtmeyer,  4.'"i2,  4.'i4. 

V.  Trorlicht,  381,  389. 
Barton  v.  Home  Ins.  Co..  7S. 

V.  Kavanaugh,  604,  019. 

V.  Pepin  County  Agricultural  Scr.. 
375. 

V.  Union  Cattle  Co.,  7.">(>.  si  17. 

V.  WoUiford,  1063. 
Baitonshill  Coal  Co.  v.  Ried,  275.  1030, 

1032. 
Barwell  v.   Brooks,   774. 
Barwick  v.  Bank,  268,  269. 

V.  English   .Toint-Stock    Bank,    Id'J, 
270. 
Bascom  v.  Dempsey,  6IJ6,  667. 


Biisebe  V.  Matthews,  610,  611,  618. 
Baseley  t.   Clarkson,  653. 
Basnight  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1070. 
Bass  V.  Railway  Co.,  45.  169,  2(i3.  274. 

395. 
Bassett   v.   Bassett,   468. 

V.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  968. 

V.  Connecticut   River   R.    Co.,   846. 

V.  Fish,    139. 

V.  Salisbury   Manuf'g   Co.,   758. 

V.  Shares,  362. 
Bassil  V.  Elmore,  489. 
Bast  V.  Leonard,  391. 
Baston  V.  Springfield,  870. 
Batchelor  v.  Fortescue,  891. 
Baten's  Case,  799,  800. 
Bates  v.  Clark,  111. 

V.  Pilling,    246. 

V.  Prelile,  o4(). 
Bateson   v.    Gosling,   346. 
Batterson  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  Ry.  Co., 

820. 
Battishill  v.  Humphreys,  '.1S6, 

V.  Reed,  411,   749. 
Battle  V.  McArthur.  316. 
Bauer   v.    Clay,   417,   420.   631. 
Bauerschmitz  v.  Bailey,  221. 
Baugh  v.  Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.,  809. 
Baughman  v.   Louisville,   B.   &   St.   L. 

R.   Co..   303.   306. 
Baum  V.  Holton,  580. 

V.  Mullen,  220,  222. 
Baumanu  v.  Jefferson.  728. 
Bavard  v.  Hoffman,  135. 
Baw  Y.  Essex  Trades  Council,  636. 
Baxter  v.  Bush,  l.j9. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  253,  1071. 

V.  Roberts,  1006,  1007. 

V.  Taylor.  84.  666.  779. 

V.  Troy  &  B.   R.  Co..  930. 

V.  Turnpike  Co.,  183,  .'SS.'!. 
Bayley  v.  Eastern  R.  Co..  944. 

V.  Manchester  Ry.  Co.,  2."j4. 

V.  Wolverhampton    Water    ^^'orks 
Co.,  isi;. 
Baylis  v.   Schwnlbach  Cycle  Co..  277. 

L!S(). 

B.  C.  Evans  Co.  v.  Reeves,  634. 
Beach  v.  Grain,  408. 

V.  Gaylord,    7U2. 

v.  Hancock,    10,   IM'-J,  432,   433. 

V.  liauney,    489. 


llOi  CASES    CITED. 

LVol.  1   ((imprises  pnye.i  l-(J5l!,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Beach  v.  Truilgain,  149. 

V.  Tuck,  :>V,2. 
Beal  V.  Robeson.  62.3. 
Beals  V.  Guernsey,  3(!3. 
Bean  v.  Western  X.  C.  R.  Co..  31S. 
Bearce  v.  Bowker,  722. 
Beaiduiore  v.  Tredwell,  780. 
Beard's  Adm'r  v.  Chesapeake  i*>:  O.  R. 

Co.,  990. 
Beardslee  v.  French,  690. 

V.  Richardson,  911. 
Beardsley  v.  Day,  42. 

V.  Minneapolis  St.  Ry.  Co.,  1009. 
Beatrice  Gas.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  410,  758. 
Beatson  v.  Skene,  529,  531,  541. 
Beaty  v.  Perkins,  676. 
Beauchamp  v.  luternational   &  G.  N. 
Ry.  Co.,  1087. 

V.  Saginaw  Mining  Co.,  848. 
Beaulieu  v.  Pinglam,  249. 
Beaumont  v.  Barrett,  116. 

V.  Greathead,   366. 
Beaumont    Lumber    Co.    v.    Ballard, 

682. 
Beavers  v.  Wimmer,  797. 
Bebee  v.  Steel,  418. 
Bebinger  v.   Sweet,  634. 
Becherer  v.  Stock,  523. 
Beck  V.  Carter.  886. 

V.  Dowell,    398. 

V.  German    Klinik,    913. 

T.  Stitzel,  503. 
Becke  v.  Missouri  Pac.   R.   Co.,   332, 

982. 
Becker  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  1038. 

V.  Janeniski,  978. 

V.  Janinski,  471,  909,  913. 

V.  Mason,  159,  457,  458. 

V.  Smith,   665. 
Beckett  V.  Cordley,  164. 
Beckham  v.  Hillier,  1023. 
Beckman  v.  Shouse,  301. 
Beckwith  v.  Elsey,  723. 

V.  Prisbie,  1088. 

V.  Philby,  427. 

V.  Shordike,  18. 
Becquet  v.  MacCarthy,  841. 
Becraft  v.  Grist,  591. 
Beddall  v.  Maitland,  442,  687. 
Bedell  v.  Bailey,  119. 
Bedford  v.  Bagshaur,  580. 


Bedingfield  v.  Onslow,  692. 
Beebe  v.  De  Baum,  418. 

V.  Wilkinson,  741. 
Beede  v.  Lamprey,  740. 
Beehler  v.  Daniels,  891. 
Beeler  v.  Jackson,  540. 
Beeman  v.  Buck,  559. 
Beers  v.  Arkansas,  112. 

V.  State,  110. 
Beeson  v.  Busenbark,  1056. 
Befay  v.  Wheeler,  693. 
Behn  v.  Burness,  563. 

V.  Kemble,  566. 
Behrens  v.  McKenzie,  158.' 
Beideman  t.  Atlantic  City  R.  Co..  790. 
Beihofer  v.  Loeffert.  622.  627. 
Beir  v.  Cooke,  793. 
Beisiegal  v.  Railroad  Co.,  933. 
Beisiegel  v.  New  York  Cent.   R.  Co., 

926. 
Belcher  v.  Costello,  578. 
Belden  v.  Chase,  860.  979. 
Belfast,  The,  v.  Boon,  581. 
Belger  v.  Dinsmore,  303,  310. 
Belknap  v.  Ball,  536. 
Bell  y.  Byerson,  317. 

V.  Hansley,  203. 

V.  Hoagland,  326. 

V.  Josselyn,  36,  289. 

V.  Keepers,  605. 

V.  Matthews,  611. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  140,  337. 

V.  Reed,  1063. 

V.  Senneff,  127. 

V.  Singer  Manuf'g  Co.,  353. 
Bellefontaine  Ry.  Go.  v.  Hunter,  930, 

!J32. 
Bellefontaine  &  I.  R.   Co.   v.   Snvder, 

985. 
Bellinger  v.  Craigue,  323,  914. 
Bellingham   Bay    S:  B.   C.   R.   Co.   v. 

Strand,  306. 
Bellows  V.  Pennsylvania  &  N.  Y.  Ca- 
nal &  R.  Co.,  1005,  1045. 

v.  Sackett,  779,  788. 
Belo  V.  Fuller,  504. 
Below  V.  Robbins,  710.  737. 
Belo  &  Co.  V.  Wren,  4S1. 
Belton  V.  Baxter,  877. 
Belt  R.  R.  &  Stock-Yard  Co.  v.  Mann, 
82.J. 


CASES    CITED.  1105 

[Vol.  1  compi-isos  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  thr  residue.] 


Belts  V.  Gibbons,  216. 

Belyea  v.  Minneapolis,  St.  P.  cfe  S.  S. 

M.  Ry.  Co.,  472. 
Bemeut  v.  May,  310. 
Bemis  v.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co.,  946. 

V.  Temple,  O.jO. 
Benedict  v.  Farlow.  707,  716. 
Benett  v.   Peninsular  &   O.   Ry.    Co., 

10.58. 
Beneway  v.  Thorp,  504,  519. 
Benfiekl  v.   \'acuum  Oil  Co..   lOUil. 
Bengtson  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O. 

Ry.  Co.,  1019. 
Benjamin  v.  Holyoke  St.  Ry.  Co.,  962. 

V.  Shea.  1.34. 

V.  Storr,   782,  787. 

V.  Wheeler,  5.j.  77o. 
Benkard  v.  Babcock,  408. 
Benner  v.  Atlantic  Dredging  Co.,  .V.l, 

111,  848. 
Bennett  v.  Allcott,  204,  452. 

V.  Barry,  534. 

V.  Bennett,   468,   471. 

r.  Clemence,  668. 

V.  Button,  1083. 

V.  Fifield,  212. 

V.  Judson,  565,  569. 

V.  Lockwood,  742. 

V.  Morris,  946. 

V.  New    York   Cent.    &   H.    R.   R. 
Co.,  928,  9&3,  987. 

V.  Railroad    Co.,     893.     895,    995, 
1002,  1006.  1018. 

V.  Smith,  466,  4(;7. 

V.  Thompson,  692. 

v.  Whitney,  129. 
Bennington  v.  Klein,  777. 
Bennitt  v.  The  Guiding  Star,  1066. 
Benolt  V.  Troy  &  L.  R.  Co..  857. 
Benson    v.    Baltimore    Traction    Co., 
889,  891.  897. 

V.  Goodwin,   1046. 

V.  Gray,  1074. 

V.  Remington,  4.j2,  453. 

V.  Suarez,  788,  840. 
Benson  Mining  &  Smelting  Co.  v.  Al- 

ta  Mining  &  Smelting  Co.,  740. 
Benton  v.  Be.ittie,  46,  720.  732. 

V.  Boston   City   Hospital,    187. 

V.  Pratt,  551,  636. 

V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  616. 

V.  AVard,  578. 

LAW  OF  TORTS— 70 


Benz  V.  Wiedenhoeft,  499. 
Kenzing  v.  Steinway.  1044. 
Berea  Stone  Co.  v.  Kraft,  1046. 
Berg  V.  Baldwin,  414. 

V.  (.'ity  of  Mihvaukee,  874. 
y.  Parsons,  2.j2. 
Berger  v.  Jacobs,  471. 

V.  Minneapolis  Gas-Light  Co.,  54, 

475,  834. 
Y.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  1005. 
Bergguist  v.  Chandler  Iron  Co.,  1024. 
Bergmann  v.  Jones.  493. 
Berheimer  v.  ilanhattan  R.  Co.,  807. 
Bernar  v.  Dunlap,  621. 
Bernhardt   v.    A\\'Stern    Pennsylvania 

R.  Co.,  1088. 
Bernier  v.  Russell,  135. 
Bernlna,  The,  981. 
Bernstein  v.  Dry  Dock,  E.  B.  &  B.  U. 

Co..  1093. 
Berrer  v.  Moorhead,  133. 
Berrigan   v.   New   York,  L.    E.   &  W. 

R.  Co.,   1001,   1017. 
Berriuffei-   v.    Great    Eastern    R.    Co., 

905. 
Berry  v.  Hamill,  656. 

V.  Town  of  Wauwatosa,  174. 
V.  Vreeland,  401. 
Berson  v.  Ewing,  600. 
Berthon  v.  Cartwri;,'ht,  467. 
Bertie  r.  Beaumont,  665. 

V.  Flagg.   227. 
Bertles  v.  Xunan,  463. 
Berwald  v.  Ray,  ];!0. 
Beseman  v.  Pennsylvani.-i  R.  Co.,  140, 

141,  368. 
Besenecker  v.  Sale,  333. 
Besozzi  V.  Harris,  S54. 
Bess  V.  Railway  Co.,  263. 
Best  V.  Hoeffner,  621. 
Bethel  v.  Otis,  221. 
Bethell  v.  Bethell,  565. 
Betts  V.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  IV   Ry.  Co., 
945,    1074. 
V.  De   Vitre,   247. 
Bex  V.  Kelse,  965. 
Beyersdorf  v.  Sump,  607,  613. 
B.  F.  Avery  &  Sons  v.  Meek,  1016. 
Bickford  v.  Richards,  910. 
Bicknall  v.  AA'aterman,  580. 
Bieknell  v.  Dorion.  613. 
Bidder  v.  Bridges,  315. 


1106 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-6D2,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Biddle  v.  Boud,  713,  715. 

Bidwell  V.  Rademaclier,  505. 

Biel  V.  Horner,  718. 

Bieling  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  177. 

Bielman  v.  Railroad  Co.,  777. 

Bienenstok  v.  Ammidown.  291,  293. 

Bierer  v.  Hurst,  353,  357,  692. 

Bigaoulette  v.  Paulet,  465. 

Bigelow  V.  Hartford  Bridge  Co.,  806. 

V.  Metropolitan  St   By.   Co.,   381. 

V.  Sicliles,  612,  618,  624. 

V.  Stearns,  122. 

V.  West  End  St.  R.  Co.,  1093. 
Bigelow  Co.  V.  Heintze,  731,  743. 
Billard  v.  Erhart,  787. 
Billings  v.  Breinig,  923,  929. 

V.  LafCerty,  118,  120. 

V.  Smelting   Co.,   320. 
Billows  v.  Moors,  891. 
Bills  v.  Belknap,  120,  689. 

v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  1074. 
Binford  v.  Johnston,  73,  852. 
Bingham  v.  Rogers,  301. 

V.  Salene,  685. 
Binks  v.  South  Yorkshire  R.  Co.,  186, 

888. 
Birch  V.  Conrow,  633,  634. 
Birchard  v.  Booth,  406,  446. 
Bird  T.  Astcock,  718. 

V.  Everard,  902. 

V.  Holbrook,  196,  768,  892. 

V.  Jones,  417,  419. 

V.  Kleiner,   597. 

V.  Smith,  315. 
Birdsell  v.  Shaliol,  342,  344. 
Birge  v.  Gardner,  196. 
Birkett   v.    Western    Union   Tel.    Co., 

304. 
Birmingham  Furnace  &  Manuf' g  Co. 

V.  Gross,  994. 
Birmingham  M.  B.  Co.  v.  Harris,  931. 

V.  Parsons,  97. 

V.  Wilmer,  942. 
Birmingham  Railway  &  Electric   Co. 

V.  Allen,  201,  993. 
Birnburg  v.  Schwab,  955. 
Bisbey  v.  Shaw,  52."5.  . 
Bischoff    V.    People's    Ry.    Co.,    964, 

1084. 
Biscoe  V.  Great  Eastern  R.  Co.,  144, 

789. 
Bishop  V.  Baker,  662,  709. 


Bishop  V.  Banks,  769. 

V.  Latimer,   523. 

V.  Montague,  43. 

V.  Railroad   Co.,   73,   378,   1091. 

V.  Ranney,  431.  > 

V.  Small,  578,  580. 

V.  Weber,  908. 

V.  Williamson,    138. 
Bishop  of  London  v.  Web,  703. 
Bissell  V.  Collins,  689. 

V.  Cornell,  523. 

V.  Hopkins,   304. 

V.  Press  Pub.  Co.,  532. 

V.  Torrey,  229. 
Bittle  V.  Camden  &  A.  R.  Co.,  829. 
Bittman  v.  Mize,  131. 
Bixby  V.  Brundige,  605. 

V.  Dunlap,  449,  636,  646. 

V.  Parsons,  282. 
Blzer  V.   Ottumwa  Hydraulic  Power 

Co.,  410. 
Bizzell  V.  Booker,  852. 
Black  V.  Aberdeen  &  W.  E.  R.  Co., 
846. 

V.  Baxendale,  1068. 

V.  Black,  589,  592,  593. 

V.  Goodrich  Transp.  Co.,  305. 

V.  Hunt,  496. 
Blackham  v.  Pugh,  541. 
Blackman  v.  Bryant,  490. 

y.  Gardner  Bridge,  381. 
BlacknaU  v.  Rowland,  597. 
Black's  Estate,  In  re,  157. 
Blackslee     Manuf'g     Co.     v.     E.     G. 

Blackslee's  Sons  Iron  Works,  759. 
Blackwell  v.  Landreth,  404,  548. 

V.  Lynchburg   &   D.    R.    Co.,   849, 
967. 
Blades  V.  Higgs,  659,  688. 
Blaen   Avon   Coal   Co.   v.   McCuUoh, 

57,  246,  653,  822. 
Blagg  V.  Sturt,  530. 
Blagge  V.  Ilsley,  452,  458. 
Blain  v.  Foster,  715. 
Blair  v.  Bartlett,  323. 

V.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  469,  472. 

V.  Deakin,  798. 

v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  1080. 

V.  Flack,  131. 

V.  Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.  Co.,  817. 
Blaisdell  v.  Leach,  40,  273. 

V.  Railroad,  682. 


CASES   CITED. 


1107 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Blake  v.  Blackley,  222. 

V.  Dick,  227. 

V.  Ferris,   210. 

V.  Great  Western  R.  Ck).,  1058. 

V.  Jerome,  677. 

V.  Lanyon,  4.j0. 

V.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  1000. 

V.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  330. 

V.  Thirst,  243. 
Blakely  v.  Le  Due,  30. 

V.  Smith,  211. 
Blakeman  v.  Blakeman,  511. 
Blakemore  v.  Railway  Co.,  909. 
Blakeslee  v.  Carroll,  538. 
Blakeston's  Case,  289. 
Blanehard  v.  Baker,  755. 

V.  Dow,  130. 

V.  Ely,  379. 

V.  Ilsley,  454. 

V.  Reyhm-n,  781. 
Blankenship  v.  Berry,  729. 
Blann  v.  Croclieron,  342. 
Blanton  v.  Dold,  937,  1016. 

V.  Wall,   559. 
Blatt  V.  McBarron,  195,  891. 
Blaymire  v.  Haley,  453. 
Blazinskl  v.  Perkins,  1043. 
Bleclier  v.  Costello,  579. 
Bleil  Y.  Street  Ry.  Co.,  69. 
Blenkiron  v.  Great  Central  Gas  Con- 
sumers' Co.,  849. 
Blesch  V.   Chicago   &  N.   W.  R.  Co., 

093. 
Blessington  v.  Boston,  233. 
Blin  V.  Campbell,  19. 
Blindell  v.  Hagan,  358. 
Bliss  V.  Hall,  769,  774,  804. 

V.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
316,  318,  320,  947. 
Bliven  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  1065. 
Blizzard  v.  Hays,  621. 
Block  V.  Ebner,  408. 

V.  Milwaukee    St.    Ry.    Co.,    375, 
804. 
Blocker  v.  Schoff,  547. 
Blodgett  V.  Boston,  177. 

V.  Stone,  79,  779. 
Blofield  V.  Payne,  82. 
Blondin  v.  Oolite  Qviarry  Co.,  996. 
Bloodgood  V.  Ayers,  7.o8. 
Bloodworth  v.  Gray,  509. 
Bloom  V.  Manhattan  El.  Ry.  Co.,  471. 


Bloomer  v.  Gray,  581,  598. 
V.  State,  435. 

Bloomington  v.   Chamberlain,  391. 

Blossom  V.  Dodd,  309. 

Blount  V.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  860. 

Bloyd  V.  St  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
1041. 

Blue  V.  Christ,  640. 

Bluedorn  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  899, 
933,  937,  942,  959. 

Blum  V.  Jones,  640. 

Blumhardt  v.  Rohr,  506,  513. 

Blundell  v.  Catterall,  690. 

Blunk  V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
624. 

Blunt  V.  McCormick,  412. 

Blyhl  V.  Village  of  Waterville,  180. 

Blyth  V.   Birmingham  Water  Works, 
35,  811. 
V.  Fladgate,  293,  917. 

Blythe  v.  Thompson,  425. 
V.  Topham,  888. 

Boaler  v.  Holder,  607,  618. 

Board  Com'rs  of  Jackson  Co.  v.  Nich- 
ols, 361. 

Boardman  v.  Acer,  342. 
V.  Hague,  127. 

Board  of  Chosen  Freeholders  of  Sus- 
sex Co.  V.  Strader,  183. 

Board  of  Com'rs  v.  Creviston,  943. 
V.  Daily,  185. 

Board  of  Com'rs  of  Boone  Co.  v. 
Mutchler,  68,  982. 

Board  of  Com'rs  of  Wabasha  Co.  v. 
Pearson,  339. 

Board  of  Health  v.  Lederer,  793. 
V.  Maginnis  Cotton  Mills,  783. 
V.  New  York  H.  M.  Co.,  806. 

Board  of  Health  &  Vital  Statistics  of 
Hudson  Co.  v.  New  York  Horse 
Manure  Co.,  7.84,  809. 

Board  of  Shelby  Co.  v.  Scearce,  330. 

Board  of  Trade  Tel.  Co.  v.  Bamett, 
690. 

Boaz  V.  Central  B.  Co.,  904,  1064. 
v.  Tate,  418,  605. 

Bocock  V.  Cochran,  123. 

Bode  V.  Lee,  715. 

Boden  v.  Demwolf,  414,  1052. 

Bodger  v.  Nicholls,  586. 

Bodley  v.  Reynolds,  384. 

Bod  well  V.  Swan,  525. 


1108  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  l-Go2,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Boecber  v.  Lutz,  152,   153. 

Boefer  v.  Slieridan,  698. 

Boeger  v.  Langenberg,  418,  608. 

Boehl  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 

1074. 
Boehmer   v.    Detroit   Free   Press    Co., 

48.5,  533. 
Boerth  V.  West  Side  R.  Co.,  885. 
Boetcher  v.  -Staples,  394,  399. 
Boettger  v.   Scherpe   &  Koken  Archi- 
tectural Iron  Co.,  1025. 
Bogert  V.  Burkhalter,  391. 
Boggess  V.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co., 
1079. 

V.  Metropolitan   St.    Ry.    Co.,   4U3, 
969. 
Bogk  V.  Gassert,  548. 
Bohan  V.   Port  Jervis  Gas   Light  Co., 
749,  767,  780,   787,  790,  849. 

V.  St.  Paul  &  D.  It.  Co.,  996. 
Bohen  v.  City  of  Waseca,  837. 
Bohn  V.   Hatch,   683. 

V.  Kemble,  .")G2. 
Bohn   JIanuf'g  Co.  v.   Erlckson,  1004, 
1014. 

V.  HoUis,  641,  649,  651. 
Bohrbough  v.   Barbour  Cotmty   Court, 

69. 
Bokee  v.  ^^'alker,  575. 
Bolan  V.  A^'illiainson,   138. 
Bolch  V.  Smith,  574,  SI  11-893,  895. 
Bolds  V.  Woods,  581. 
Boles  V.  Pinkerton,  443. 
Bolingbroke  v.  Board,  252-254. 

V.  Swindon,  250. 
Bolivar     Manuf'g     Co.     v.     Neponset 

Manuf'g  Co.,  804. 
Boiling  V.  Kirby,  717.  728. 

V.  Whittle,  677. 
Bollman  v.  Wamer,  .■'>.54. 
Bolman  v.  Overall,  472. 
Bolt  V.  Hauser,  546. 
Bolton  V.  Deane,  477. 

V.  McShane,  357. 

V.  Miller,    452,    460. 
Bonaker  v.  Evans,  167. 
Bonaparte  v.  Clagett,  720,  727. 
Bonas  V.   Steffens,   466. 
Bonce  v.  Dubuque  St.  Ry.  Co.,  1085. 
Bond  V.  Chnpin,  608. 

V.  Evansville  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.,  899. 

V.  :Mitchell,  707. 


Bond  V.  Smith,  943. 

V.  Ward,    132. 
Bonino  v.  Caledonio,  445. 
Bonnard  v.  Ferryman,  353. 
Bonnell  v.   Smith,  56,  772. 
Bonnelli  v.  Bowen,  694. 
Bonner  v.  Bryant,  242. 

V.  Wirth,  339. 
Bonney  v.  Smith,  718. 
Bonomi   r.   Backhouse,  101,   105,   751. 
Boobier  v.  Boobier,  723. 
Boody  V.   Keating,  12. 
Boogher  v.  Hough,  618. 

V.  Knapp,   533. 
Booher  v.  Goldsborough,  565. 
Booker  v.   State,  503. 
Boom  V.  Utica,  770. 
Boone  v.  Knox,  667. 
Boorman  v.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  305. 

V.  Brown,  6,  26. 
Boosey  v.  Wood,  521. 
Booth  V.  Kurrus,  119,  423,  424. 

V.  Lloyd,   136. 

V.  ^Mcrriam,  227. 

V.  Mister,   266. 

v.  Northrop,  559. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,   68,  763,  792,  848. 

V.  Ratte,  213. 

V.  Sherwood,    667,   672. 
Boots  V.  Washburn,  129. 
Borchardt  v.  Boom  Co.,  67. 
Borgher  v.  Life  Ass'n,  169. 
Bork  V.   Martin,  733. 
Borland  v.  Stokes,  713. 
Born  V.  Lotlin  &  R.  Powder  Co.,  804. 

V.  Rosenow,  518. 
Borough    of    Susquehanna    Depot    v. 

Simmons,  182. 
Bosch  V.  Railroad  Co.,  77. 
Boscowitz  V.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  303. 
Boson  V.  Sandford,  250. 
Bostick  V.  Rutherford,  621. 
Boston,  The,  1069. 

V.  Xeat,  669. 

V.  Simmons,  638,  639. 
Boston  Belting  Co.  v.  City  of  Boston, 

144,  772. 
Boston,  C.  &  M.  R.  v.  State,  330. 
Boston  Diatite  Co.  v.  Florence  Manuf'g 

Co.,  353. 
Boston  Ferrule  Co.  v.  Hills,  774,  788. 
Boston  R.  R.  Corp.  v.   Danna,   11. 


CASES   CITED. 


1109 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pagos  l-(iri2,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Boston  &  A.  II.  Co.  V.  Carney,  S48. 
Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Small,  128. 
Bostwick  V.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  (ili. 

V.  Lewis,   127. 
Boswortla  v.  Svvansy,  194. 
Bott  V.  rratt,   100,  020,   921,   926. 
Bottoms  V.  Seaboard  &  R.  R.  Co.,  087. 
Boucber  v.    Lawsou,   250,   2.jl. 
Bonknight   v.    Cliarlotte,    C.    &    A.    R. 

Co.,  941. 
Boulden  v.   Esley   Organ  Co.,   (i.j.j. 
Boulester  v.  Parsons,  962. 
Boulier  v.  Macauley,  449,  93G. 
Boulter  v.  Clark,  203. 
Boulton  V.  Shields,  553. 
Bourke  v.  Warren,  485. 
Bourn's  Case,  485. 
Boutte  V.   Emmer,  424. 
Bovard  v.   Kettering,   220. 
Bovee  v.  Danville,  72,  370. 
Bowden  v.  Lewis,  802. 
Bowditoh   V.   Baleliin,   427. 

V.  City   of   Boston,   149,   174. 
Bowdle   V.   Railway  Co.,   1090. 
Bowe  V.  Hunking,  227. 
Bowen  v.  Fenner,  728. 

y.  Hall,  447,  449,  iV.io. 

V.  Matheson,  643,  649. 

V.  Wendt,  757,  793. 
Bower  v.  Fenn,  564. 

V.  Hill,  82. 

V.  Peate,   23.j. 
Bowers   v.    Comiecticut  River   R.   Co., 
9.j4,   995,   1045. 

V.  Horen,  154. 

V.  Pittsburgh,  Ft.  W.  &  C.  R.  R., 
1079. 

y.  Thomas,  596. 
Bowes  V.   City,  69. 

Bowie  V.  Greenville  St.  Ry.  Co.,  1094. 
Bowler  V.   O'Connell,  242. 
Bowlin  V.  Nye,  718. 
Bowlsby  V.  Speer,  700,  762. 
Bowman  v.  Brown,  618. 

V.  Carithers,   591,   ."93. 

v.  Chicago,  St.  P.  &  K.  0.  Ry.  Co., 
3.14. 

V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  132. 

V.  Teall,   1062. 

V.  Woods,  912. 
Bowser  v.  Cox,  734. 
Bowyer  v.   Cook.  411.  658. 


Box  V.  Jubb,  836. 
Boyce  v.  Anderson,  1059. 

y.  Bayliffe,  380, 

V.  Brock  way,  50. 

V.  California  Stage  Co.,  1085. 
Itoyrl  V.  Brown,  379. 

y.  Burkett.   887,   '.Mm,  979. 

y.  Byrd,  452. 

V.  Conklin,   761. 

V.  Insurance  Patrol,  126. 

y.  ilendenhall,    620,    627. 

V.  Teague,   131. 
Boyden  v.  Burke,  389. 
Boyd's  Ex'rs  v.  Browne,  575. 
Boyer,  Appeal  of,  739. 

V.  Bishop,  13. 

V.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  953. 
Boykin  y.  iladdrej-,  417. 
Boylan  y.   Brown,   870. 
Boyle  V.  Brandon,  380,  458. 

V.  Case,  434. 
Boynton  v.  Rees,  66. 

V.  Shaw  Stocking  Co.,  5.50. 
Boyson   v.    Thorn,    56,    636. 
Brabham  v.  Supervisors,  183. 
Bracegirdle  v.  Oford,  393. 
Bracey  v.  Carter,  Ol.j. 
Bracken  v.  Cooper,  733. 

V.  Rushville  &  V.  G.  R.  Co.,  685. 
Brackett   v.   Griswold,   591,   640. 

y.  Lubke,   230. 
Bracy  v.  Kibbe,  454. 
Bradburn  v.  Great  Eastern  R.  Co.,  400. 
Bradbury  v.  Haines,  599. 

y.  Kingston    Coal    Co.,    1011. 
Bradford,   Ex  parte,   207. 

V.  Boley,  380. 

v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  893. 

v.  Manley,    -188. 

V.  NelU,   601. 
Bradlaugh  v.  Clarke,  98. 

V.  Gorsett,  529. 
Bradley  v.  Andrews,  851. 

y.  Borin,  391,  029. 

V.  Copley,   710. 

V.  Fisher,    119-121,    124. 

V.  Fuller.  88,  371. 

V.  Pierson,  646,  6.50. 

V.  Shaffer,  461. 
Bradner  v.  Faulkner,  631. 
Bradshaw  v.  Lancashire  Ry.  Co.,  329, 
406. 


1110  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Bradshaw  v.  Van  Winkle,  164. 
Bradshaw's  Adm'r  y.  Louisville  &  N. 

R.  Co.,  1019. 
Bradstreet  v.  Everson,  2.52,  285. 
Bradstreet  Co.  v.  Gill,  387,  497,  541. 
Bradwell  v.  Pittsburgh  &  W.  B.  Pass. 

Ry.  Co.,  873,  884,  972. 
Brady  v.  Detroit  Steel  &  Spring  Co., 
772. 
V.  Finn,   562,   5S1,   597. 
V.  Northwestern  Ins.  Co.,  78. 
V.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  937. 
V.  Weeks,  774. 
V.  Whitney,  342,   710. 
Braem  v.  Bank,  88. 
Bragg  V.  Laraway,  366,  690 
Brain  v.  Marfell,  758. 
Brainard  v.  Knapp,  273. 
Braithwaite  v.  Aiken,  28. 

V.  Skinner,  98,  348. 
Brakken  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry. 

Co.,  411,  412. 
Brammell  v.    Eastern  Kentucky   Ry. 

Co.,  202. 
Branaman  v.  Hinkle,  538. 
Branch  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 

1068. 
Brandreth  v.  Lance,  353. 
Branfoot,  The  William,  939. 
Brann  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co., 

1007,  1008. 
Branner  v.  Stormont,  914. 
Brannock  v.  Boulden,  210,  640. 

V.  Elmore,  228,  232,  234,  849,920, 
925. 
Brass  v.  Maitland,  90S. 
Braunn  v.  Keally,  314. 
Bray  v.   Gunn,  48. 
Brazier  v.  Banning,  404. 
Brazil  v.   Moran,  217,  221. 

V.  Peterson,  264,   277. 
Bream  v.   Brown,   334. 
Breckwoldt  v.  Morris,  674. 
Bredin  v.  Bredin,  640. 
Breedlove  v.  Bundy,  639. 
Breen  v.  Field,  126,  281,  289. 
Breese  v.  United  States  Tel.  Co.,  302. 
Brehm  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  939, 

1085. 
Brehme  v.  Dinsmore,  305. 
Breig  v.   Chicago,  W.  &  M.  Ry.  Co., 

1027. 


Breitenberger  v.  Schmidt,  638. 

Brember  v.  Jones,  878. 

Brendlinger  v.  New  Hanover  Tp.,  827. 

Brennan  v.   Schreiner,  234,   236,   848. 

Brent  v.  Kimball,  152,  367. 

Brentman  v.  Note,  554. 

Breon  v.  Henkle,  457. 

Breslin  v.  Peck,  343. 

Bretherton  v.  Wood,  903,  1059. 

Brett  V.  Watson,  475. 

Brettum  v.  Anthony,  510. 

Brewer  v.  Boston,  C.  &  F.  R.  Co.,  144. 

V.  Jacobs,  619. 

V.  New  York,  L.  B.  &  W.  R.  Co., 
303,  309. 

V.  Sparrow,  296. 

V.  Weakley,  537. 
Brewing  Co.  v.  Mieleuz,  952. 
Brewster  v.  Silliman,  721. 

V.  Van  Liew,  360. 

V.  Warner,   670. 
Brezee  v.  Powers,  765,  955. 
Brice  v.  Bauer,  857. 
Brick   V.    Bosworth,    960. 

V.  Rochester,  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.   Co., 
1041. 
Brickell  V.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R. 

B.  Co.,  983. 
Bricker  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co., 

890. 
Bridge  v.   Grand  Junction  Ry.    Co., 

980. 
Bridges  v.  Hawkesworth,  713. 

V.  North  London  R.  Co.,  942,  957, 
971. 

V.  Purcell,  684. 
Bridgland  v.   Shapler,  98. 
Briegel  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  179. 
Brierly  v.  Kendall,  737. 
Brigg  V.  Oliver,  939. 
Briggs  V.  Evans,  452. 

V.  Garrett,  478,  530,  535. 

V.  Klosse,  752. 

V.  Lightboats,   111. 

V.  Minneapolis  St.  Ry.  Co.,  72,  78. 

V.  Newport  News  &  M.    V.    Co., 
1005. 

V.  New   York    Cent.    R.    Co.,    726, 
845. 

V.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
930. 

V.  Taylor,   913. 


CASES    CITED. 


1111 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  toI.  2  the  residue.] 


Briggs  V.  Thompson,  665. 

Brigliam  v.  Bussey,  134. 

Bright  V.  Barnett  &  Record  Co.,  895, 

1024. 
Brightman  v.  Inhabitants  of  Bristol, 

802. 
Brill  V.  Eddy,  242,  263. 

V.  Flagler,   749,   707. 
Brinckerhoff  v.  Starkins,  659. 
Blind  V.   Dale,    1057. 
Brinkley  v.  Piatt,  639,   640. 
Brinsmead  v.  Harrison,  342,  344,  345. 
Brissac  v.  Lawrence,  138. 
Bristol  V.   Braidwood,  564. 

V.  Burt,  711,  717. 
Bristol  &  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Collins,  1072. 
Bristow  V.  Eastman,  159. 
British  JIutual  Banking  Co.  v.  Charn- 

wood  Forest  By.  Co.,  254,  269. 
British  &  A.  Mortg.  Co.  v.  TibbaUs, 

285. 
Broadbent  v.   Ramsbotham,  758,   761, 

762. 
Broadwell  v.  City  of  Kansas,  178. 
Brobst  V.  Ruff,  623. 
Broburg  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  178. 
Brock  V.   Dole,  3.">3. 

V.  Stimson,  128. 
Broder  v.  Saillard,  761,  775. 
Broderick  v.  Depot  Co.,  201. 

V.  James,  101,  483. 
Brokaw  v.  New  Jersey  B.  &  Ti-ansp. 

Co.,  288. 
Bromage    v.    Prosser,    512,    513,    518, 

555. 
Bromley  v.   Birmingham   Jlineral   R. 
Co.,   942. 

V.  Coxwell,  730. 

V.  Wallace,   465. 
Bronde  v.  Haven,  4. 
Bronson  v.  Bruce,  537. 

V.  Forty-Second  St.  Ry.   Co.,  403. 
Brook  V.  Rawl,  553. 
Brooke  v.  Bank,  380. 
Brooker  v.  CofBn,  503. 
Brookfield  v.  Brown,  666. 
Brooklyn  v.  Railway  Co.,  283. 
Brooks  V.  Bradford,  617,  622,  627. 

V.  Curtis,  235. 

V.  Harison,   503. 

V.  Hart,  878. 

V.  Haslam,  333. 


Brooks   V.   Kings   County   El.   R.   Co., 
837. 

V.  Mangan,  123,  426. 

V.  Matthews,  596. 

V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  1017. 

V.  Olmstead,  654. 

V.  Riding,   005. 

V.  Rogers,  227,  296,  709,   722,  738. 
740. 

V.  St.    John,    124. 

V.  Schwerin,  400,  472. 

V.  State,  914. 

V.  Stuart,  345. 
Brookville    &     C.     Turnpike    Co.     v. 

Pumphre.v,  185. 
Broomfleld  v.  Snoke,  496. 
Broschart  v.  Tuttle,  93G. 
Brosde  v.  Sanderson,  400. 
Brosnan  v.   Sweetser,  894. 
Brothers  v.  Morris,  55,  773. 
Brotherton  v.  Goldman,  73S. 
Broughton  v.  Jackson,  429. 

V.  McGrew,  508,  513,  543. 
Brouillette    v.    Connecticut   River    K. 

Co.,  '.154. 
Broult  V.  Hanson,  880. 
Brounstein  v.   Sahlein,  609. 

V.  "Wile,  625. 
Broussard  v.  Railway  Co..  379. 
Brow  V.  Railroad  Co..  229,  244. 
Brower  v.  Fisher^  154. 
Brown  v.  Allen,  213. 

v.  Barnes,  957. 

V.  Bowen,  754. 

V.  Boyce,  708. 

V.  Brooks,   151. 

V.  Buffalo  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co..  926. 

V.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  R.  Co., 
954. 

V.  Cambridge,  342. 

V.  Carpenter,   SOU. 

V.  Chadsey,    422,    423,    613,    630, 
631. 

V.  Chapman,  423.  606.  628. 
■  V.  Chicago,   M.   &    St.   P.   R.   Co., 
375-377,  382,  958. 

V.  City   of    Cape    Girardeau,    608, 
609. 

V.  Collins,  50,  880. 

V.  Congress  &  B.  St.  By.  Co..  810, 
935. 

V.  Cunningham,  755. 


1112  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  coniprisies  pages  1-652,  Inclusave;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Brown  v.  De  (iroff,  802. 
V.  Durham,  387,  497. 
T.  Ela,   "■_>.">. 
V.  French,.   875. 
V.  Glenn,  075. 

V.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  E.  Co.,  195. 
V.  Hawkos.  (;]5,  H'JO. 
V.  Hitchc-ock,  000. 
V.  Howard,  132,  150.  i:s2. 
V.  Kendall,  52.  .53,  OG. 
V.  Kingsley,  458. 
V.  Kirkbride,  32(). 
V.  Lakeman,   Oil. 
V.  Laurens  Co.,  U9. 
V.  Leach,  580,  599. 
V.  Leclerc,  S5'.). 
V.  Lynn,   19S. 
V.  McLeish,  233. 
V.  Marshall,  58,  73,  907,  978. 
V.  Master,  017. 
V.  Massachusetts,  522. 
T.  Miller,    738. 
V.  Minneapolis  &  St  L.   Ry.  Co., 

1039,  1043. 
V.  Morris,  625. 
V.  Mosher,  132. 
V.  Perkins,  663,  800. 
V.  Postal  Tel.  Co.,  302,  304. 
y.  liailroad  Co.,   72,   73,   142,   143, 

197. 
V.  Ramsay,  4.52. 
V.  Randall,  Ull. 
V.  Rice,  569. 
V.  Scarboro,  961. 
Y.  Seymour,  404. 
V.  Shaw,  712.  713. 
T.  Sherer,   987. 
V.  South     Kennebec     Agricultural 

See.  187. 
V.  Stackhouse,  676. 
V.  State,  414. 
V.  Sullivan,  1034. 
V.  Susquehanna  Boom   Co.,  927. 
V.  Swinford,  440. 
V.  Vannaman,  506,  540,  542. 
V.  Vinahaven,  188. 
V.  Ware,  712. 
T.  Watson,  368. 

V.  Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  1043. 
V.  Winona  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  762. 
V.  AA'ooton,   341,  342. 
V.  Wright,  45. 


Browne  v.  Dawson,  657,  688. 

V.  Providence,    H.    &    F.    R.    Co., 
078. 
Brownell  v.  Durkee,  443. 
Browning  v.  Cover,  733. 

V.  Goodrich   Transp.   Co.,   305. 

V.  Owen  Co.,  ISO. 

V.  Wabash  Western  Ry.  Co.,  1052. 
Brownlie  v.  Campbell,  565. 
Brownlow  v.   Metropolitan  Board   of 

Works,  145. 
Brown  Paper  Co.  v.  Dean,  287. 
Brown's  Adm'r   v.   Town   of  Guyan- 

dotte,  182. 
Bruce  v.  Bruce,  464. 

V.  Reed,  260. 
V.  Tyler,  029. 
Bruch  V.  Carter,  654. 
Bruff  V.  Mali,  908. 
Brumbridge  v.  Massey,  917. 
Brummit  v.  Furness,  842. 
Brunei!  v.  Cook,  352. 
Brunker  v.  Cummins,  944. 
Brunner  v.  American  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co., 
265,  279. 

V.  Downs,  119,  424. 
Brunsden  v.  Humphrey,  322,  406. 
Brunswick-Balke     Collender     Co.     v. 

Rees,  224. 
Brunswig  v.  White,  332. 
Brusch  V.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  362, 

1090. 
Brush  V.  Prosser,  517. 
Brushaber  v.  Stegemann,  421. 
Bryan  v.  Bates,  428. 
Bryant  v.  Carpet  Co.,  213. 

V.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co.,  946. 

V.  Chicago,   St.   P.,   M.    &   O.    Ey. 
Co.,  1081. 

V.  Herbert,  29. 

V.  Inhabitants  of  AVestbrook,  182. 

V.  Jackson,  157,  482. 

V.  Lefever,  750. 

V.  Rich,  172.  262.  263. 

V.  Town  of  Randolph,  129. 
Brymer  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  1012. 
Bryne  v.  Boadle,  838. 
Bryom  v.  Chapin,  704. 
Bryson  v.  St.  Helen,  323. 
Buchanan  v.  Barnes,  643. 

v.  Kerr,  043. 

V.  Railway  Co..  389. 


CASES    CITED.  1113 

[Vol.  1  comiirises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  tho  residue.] 


Buchanan  v.  Town  ot  Barre,  184. 
Buclier  V.  Cheshire  R.  Co.,  97. 

V.  Fitzburg  E.  Co.,  104. 
Buchtella  v.  Stepanek,  190,  595. 
Buck  V.  Power  Co.,  .S!i5,  987. 

V.  Railroad    Co.,    301,    462,    lOGO, 
1061. 
Buckbee  v.  Brown,  186. 
Buckel  V.   Suss,   469. 
Buckingham  v.  Elliot,  800. 

V.  Plymouth  Water  Co.,  746,  907. 
Buckland  v.  Johnson,  342,  346. 
Buckley  v.  Cunningham,  227. 
V.  Gross,  190.  427.  712.  715. 
V.  Gutta-Percha   &   Rubber   Man- 

uf'g  Co..  1004. 
V.  Old  Colony  R.  Co..  1093. 
Buckmaster  v.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co., 

1088. 
Buckner  v.  Spaulding,  524. 
Buckstaff  V.  Viall,  485,  494,  538. 
Budd  V.  United  Carriage  Co.,  1085. 
Buddenberg    v.    Charles    P.    Choteau 

Transp.  Co.,  873,  972. 
Buddington  v.  Shearer,  797. 

V.  Smith,  150. 
Budict  V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  993. 
Buel  y.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co..  967. 
BueU  V.  Chapin,  283. 
Buelow  V.  Chicago,  St.  P.  &  K.  C.  Ry. 

Co.,  964. 
Buenemann  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  il,  Ry. 

Co.,  1087. 
Buffalo  Lubricating  Oil  Co.  v.  Stand- 
ard Oil  Co.,  169,  639,  6.50. 
Buffum  V.  Harris,  758. 
Buford  T.  Caldwell,  569. 
Buhl  V.  Fort  Street  Union  Depot  Co., 

89. 
Buker  V.  Bowden,  670. 
Bull  V.  Knowlton,  725. 
BuUard  v.  Harrison,  150,  678. 
V.  Moor,  47. 
V.  Mulligan,  192. 
Bullis  V.  Xoble,  565. 
Bullitt  V.  Farrar,  564,  571. 
Bullock  V.  Babcock,  33,  160,  438. 

V.  Railroad  Co..  831. 
Bulpit  V.  Matthews,  677. 
Bunch  V.  Kennington,  350. 
Bunderson  v.  Railroad  Co.,  760,  762. 
Bundschuh  v.  Mayer,  220,  856. 


Bundy  v.  Maginess,  11. 
Bunnell  v.  Greathead,  4(j5,  466. 

V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  990. 

V.  Stern,  902. 
Bunten  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co., 

330,  702. 
Bunting  v.  Hogsett,  082. 
Burbank  v.    Bethel   Steam    Mill    Co., 
834,   02IJ. 

V.  Ross,  102. 
Burcky  v.  Town  of  Lake,  144, 
Burdett  v.  Abbott,  116,  674,  675. 
Burdick  v.  Cheadle,  909. 
Burdict  v.  Missouri  Pac.  By.  Co.,  104. 
Bm-ditt  V.  Hunt,  735. 

V.  Swenson,  783,  807. 
Burford  v.  Wible,  523. 
Burg  V.  Chicago,  B.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 

100,  886. 
Burger  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  860. 

V.   St.  Louis,  K.  &  N.  "VV.  R.   Co., 
829,  970. 
Burgess  v.  Bragaw,  269. 

Y.  GrafCam,  662. 

V.  Gray,  233. 

V,  Isherwood,    720. 

V.  Seligman,   07. 
Burgin  v.  Raplee,  324. 

V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  964. 
Burkam  v.  Railway  Co.,  791,  795. 
Burke,  In  re,  119. 

V.  Daley,  855. 

Y,  De  Castro  &  D.  S.  R.  Co.,  1034, 

Y.  Dillingham,  207, 

Y.  Melviu,  445. 

Y.  Railroad  Co.,  46,  270,  570,  950, 
1034. 

V.  Smith,  773. 

Y.  Witherbee,   1010. 
Burkett  v.  Griffith,  553. 
Burley  v.  Russell,  164. 
Burling  v.  Read,  676,  688,  800. 
Burlington  v.  Schwarzman,  81. 
Burlington    Gaslight    Co.    v.    Burling- 
ton, C.  R.  &  X.  Ry.  Co.,  689. 
Bui-lington  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wendt. 
926. 

Y.  Westover,  965. 
Burmah  Trading  Corp.  v.   Jlirza  Ma- 
homed Aally  Sherazee,  739. 
Burnap  v.  Albert,  609. 

V.  Marsh,  286. 


1114 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Burnard  v.  Haggis,  163. 
Burnell  v.  West  Side  R.  Co.,  1016. 
Humes  v.  Ward,  888. 
Burnett  v.  Bealmear,  352. 

V.  Gentry,  132. 

V.  Tak,  5.j1,  553. 
Bm'nham  v.  Cape  Vincent  Seed  Co., 
732. 

V.  Jackson,  912. 

V.  MoiTissey,  115. 

V.  Seaverns,  l(jO. 

V.  Stevens,  123. 

V.  Stone,  331. 

V.  Webster,  472. 
Buruiugham  v.  Rochester  City  &  B. 

R.  Co.,  1089. 
Bui-nley  v.  Cook,  692. 
Burns  v.  Dockrsty,  559,  569,  575,  577. 

V.  Jordan,  368. 

V.  Kirkpatrlck,  447,  464,   682. 

V.  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.,  1016. 

V.  Petlical,  281. 

V.  Sennett,   948. 
Bui'nside  v.  Tvs'itchell,  717. 
Buron  v.  Denman,  110,  127,  205. 
BuiT  V.  Wilson,  507. 
Burrill  v.  City  of , Augusta,  174. 

V.  Eddy,  1035. 
BuiToughes  V.  /sayne,   655,   706,    726, 

728,  734,  737./ 
Burroughs  v.  Eastman,  422. 

V.  Housatonic  B.  Co.,  769,  835. 

V.  Noi-wich  &  W.  R.  Co.,  1072. 

V.  Pacific  Guano  Co.,  596. 

V.  Saterlee,  759. 
Burrow  v.   President,   100. 
Burrowes  v.  Lock,  568,  570. 
Burrows  v.  March  Gas  &  Coke  Co., 
74,  850. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  957. 
Burt    V.   Advertiser    Newspaper    Co., 
474,  491,  537,  547. 

V.  Boston,  174. 

V.  Bowles,  581,  583. 

V.  Douglas   Co.   St.  Ry.  Co.,   1084. 

V.  Dutcher,  741. 

V.  McBain,  386,  470,  497. 
Burtch  v.   Nickerson,  551. 
Burtchell  v.  Hickisson,  891. 
Burton  v.  Burton,  503. 

V.  Davis,  839. 

V.  Fulton,  118,  639. 


Burton  V.  McClellan,  149. 

v.  O'Niell,  50.5,  615. 

v.  Scherpf,   683. 

V.  Smith,  841. 

V.  Syracuse,  176. 
Burwell  v.  Vance  Co.  Com'rs,  804,  806. 
Busch  V.  Wilcox,  271.  575. 

V.  Codd,  502,   5G3.  578. 
Bush  V.  Barnett,  1084. 

V.  Brainard,  196,  678. 

V.  Prosser,  400. 

V.  Sprague,  638. 

V.  Steinman,  232,  236. 
Bushel  V.  Miller,  708. 
Bussey  v.  Donaldson,  360. 
Bussian  v.  Milwaukee,  L.  S.  &  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  317,  319. 
Busteed  v.   Parsons,  422. 
Buster  v.  Newkirk,  659. 
Busterud  v.  Farrlngton,  571,  579.  60O. 
Butcher  v.  Butcher,  672,  686,  688. 

V.  Providence  Gas  Co.,  850. 
Butchers'    Union    Slaughter-House    & 
Live  Stock  Landing  Co.  v.  Crescent 
City  Live  Stock  Landing  &  Slaugh- 
ter-House Co.,  608. 
Butler  V.  Ashworth,  129. 

V.  Jones,  728. 

V.  Kent,  130. 

V.  McLellan,  150. 

V.  Potter,  424. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,   945,  1055. 

V.  Regents,  318. 

V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  318,  320. 

V.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  964. 

V.  Town  of  Malvern,  868. 

V.  Watkins,  169. 

V.  Wildman,  78. 

V.  Wrigjit,  404. 
Butman  v.  James,  357. 
Butner  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  900. 
Butterfleld  v.   Ashley,  449. 

v.  Forrester,   820,   973,   976,   977. 

V.  Oppenheimer,  674. 
Buttman  v.  Dennett,  902. 
Button  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co., 

241. 
Buttons  V.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  943. 
Buttrick  v.  Lowell,  45. 
Butts  V.  Phelps,  283. 
Butz  V.  Ihrie,  754. 
I  Buzzell  V.  Emerton,  425,  426. 


CASES    CITED. 


1115 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  toI.  2  the  residue.] 


Buzzell  V.  Laconia  Manuf'g  Co.,  1008, 

1044. 
Byam  v.  Collins,  513,  543. 
Bj'ard  v.  Holmes,  593. 
Byers  v.   Nashville,   C.  &  St.   L.   Ry. 

Co.,  315. 
Byford  v.  Girton,  221,  222,  (>lo. 
Byington  v.  Simpson,  2.j1. 
Byne  v.  Hatcher,  47. 

V.  Moore,  627. 
Byrd  v.  Hudson,  518. 
Byrket  v.  Monohon,   513. 
Byrne  v.  Boadle,  837,  939. 

V.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  ^L  R.  Co., 

244,  860. 
V.  Minneapolis    &    St.    L.    R.   Co., 

413. 
V.  New   York  Cent.   &   H.   E.    R. 

Co.,   890. 
V.  Stout,  730. 
V.  Wilson,  78. 
Bywell  Castle,  The,  875. 


C 


Cabell  V.  Arnold,  430. 

Cabot  V.  Christie,  564,  565. 

Cadden  v.  American  Steel-Barge  Co., 

994,  1044,   1046. 
Cade  V.  £ocum,  60S. 
Oadwallader  v.  Louis\'ille,  N.  A.  &  C. 

Ry.  Co..  930,  963. 
Cady  V.  Case,  602. 

CahlU  V.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,    892,   983. 
V.  Eastman,  475,  771,  834,  838,  840. 
V.  Layton,  891. 
Cahn  V.  Hewsey,  705. 

V.  Western    Union    Tel.    Co.,    899, 
900. 
Cahoon  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

828,  829. 
Cain  V.  Cain,  655. 
V.  Flood,  688. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  262. 
Cairncross  v.  Milage  of  Pewaukee,  69, 

747. 
Calms  V.  Bleeker,  730. 
Cairo  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Woolsey,  144. 
Calder  v.  Bull,  167. 
V.  Halket,  123. 


Caldwell  v.  Boone,  174, 

V.  Central  Park,  N.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co., 
367,  388. 

v.  Copeland,  753. 

V.  Farrell,  202. 

V.  Fenwick.  653. 

V.  Hunter,  915,   916. 

V.  New     Jersey     Steamboat     Co., 
1085,  1089. 

V.  Raymond,  511. 

V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  1093.  • 

V.  Robinson,  354. 

V.  Slade,   223,    224,   838. 

V.  Walters,  687. 

V.  Ward,  699,  705. 
Caledonian  Ry.  Co.  v.   Ogilvy,  786. 

V.  Walker's  Trustees,  785. 
Calhoun  v.   Gulf,   C;.   &  S.  F.   R.   Co., 

923. 
Galkmg  v.  Baldwin,  349. 
Calkins  v.  Barger,  843. 

V.  Summer,  528. 
Call  V.  Buttrick,  779. 
Callaham  v.  Railway,  237. 
Callahan  v.  Ingram,  392,  482.  512,  518, 
529,  539,  544,  545,  549. 

V.  Loughran,  227. 

V.  Searles,  423. 

V.  Warne,  853,  943,  952. 
Callan  v.   Wilson,  642. 
Callender  v.  Marsh,  89. 
Calumet  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  Martin, 

978. 
Calvert  v.  Rice,  699,  701,  706. 
Calye's  Case,  902. 

Gambles  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  861. 
Camden  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Baldauf,  309, 

1077. 
Cameron  v.  Bryan,  392,  400,  857. 

V.  New  York   Cent.   &   H.   R.   B. 
Co.,  999. 

V.  Nystrom,    994,    1034. 

V.  Pacific  Exp.   Co.,  279. 

V.  Union   Trunk   Line,   955. 

V.  A'andegrifC,  848. 
Camody  v.  Portlock,  720. 
Camp  V.  Whitman,  150. 
Campbell,  Appeal  of,  702. 

V.  Alston,  362,  1093. 

V.  Carter,  466. 

V.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  1028. 

V.  Cook,    300,    1038,    1041,    1056. 


1116  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  iuclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Campbell  v.  Cooper,  -150. 
V.  Cornelius,  401. 
V.  Goodwin,  955. 
V.  Harris,    1034. 

V.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  508. 
V.  Missouri  Pac.   R.   Co.,  845,  927, 

941. 
V.  Morse,  10U3. 

V.  Northern  Pac.  R.   Co.,  277,  914. 
T.  Perkins,   159. 
V.  Perry,  471. 
V.  Portland    Sugar    Co.,    290,    894, 

895. 
V.  Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.,  262.  ' 
V.  Race,  150,  678. 
V.  Seaman,  749,  767,  769,  775,  776, 

778,  804. 
V.  Spottiswoode,    534,   53G,    537. 
V.  Stakes,  159,  103. 
V.  Union    Ry.    Co.    of     New   York 

City,  883. 
V.  Warner,  947. 
V.  Wing,  389. 
V.  Wright,  725. 
1  ampbell    Printing-Press    &    Manuf g 

Co.  V.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  344. 
Campbell  &  Zell  Co.  v.  Roediger,  998, 

1051. 
Camp   Point   Manuf'g   Co.    v.    Ballon, 

1010. 
Canadian   Pac.    R.    Co.    v.    Chalifoux, 
1089. 
V.  Johnston,  1048. 
Canal  Co.  v.  Lee,  143. 
Candee  y.  Deere,  147. 

V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  1071. 
Candiff  v.   Railway  Co.,   277. 
Candy  v.  Globe  Rubber  Co.,  169. 
Canfield  v.  Gresham,  116. 
Cannam  v.  Farmer,  ](i4. 
Canning  v.  Williamstown,  308. 
Cannon  v.  Barry,  697. 
V.  AA'indsor,   106. 
Canot  V.  Hughes,  735. 
Canton  Cotton  Warehouse  Co.  v.  Potts, 

787,  805. 
Canton  Surgical  &  Dental  Chair  Co. 

T.  McLain,  507. 
Cantwell  v.  Pacific  Exp.  Co.,  1069. 
Cape  V.  Scott,  G77. 
Capehart  v.  Granite  Jlills,  1066. 
V.  Seaboard  &  R.  R.  Co., .309. 


Capel  V.  Child,  167. 

V.  Lyons,  202,  682. 
Capell  V.  Powell,  217. 
Capen  v.  Foster,  133. 
Capital   &   Counties   Bank  v.    Henty, 

498,  509,  513.  555. 
Card  V.  Case,  866. 

V.  Eddy,  942,  1039,  1045, 

V.  New  York  &  H.  R.  Co.,  1083. 
Carder  v.  Forehand,  460. 
Cardival  v.  Smith,  611. 
Carew   v.    Rutherford,   450,   643.   645, 

649. 
Carey  v.    Berkshire  Ry.  Co.,  327,  328. 

Y.  Rae,  «i7S. 

V.  Sheets,  608.  631. 
Car  Float,  No.  16,  The,  15,  1044. 
Cark  V.  Foot,  842. 
Carl  V.  The  Sheboygan  &  F.  du  L.  Ry. 

Co.,  412. 
Carletou   v.   Akron   Sewer   Pipe   Co., 
426. 

V.  Haywood,  217.   221,  222. 

V.  Redlngton,  082,  0N3. 

V.  Taylor,   632. 
Carli   V.   L'uion   Depot,   etc.,    Co.,  394, 

694. 
Carlslake  v.  Mapledoram,  509. 
Carlson    v.    Minnesota    Tribune    Co., 

485. 
Carlyon  v.  Levering,  91. 
Carman  v.  Steubenville  &  I.  Ry.  Co., 

143,  212,  236.  245. 
Carmichael  v.  Dolen,  438. 
Carney  v.  Brome,  363. 

V.  Hadley,  357,  358. 
Carpenter  v.  American  Bldg.  &  Loan 
Ass'n,  721. 

V.  Blake,  912,  913. 

V.  Cook,  96. 

V.  Corinth,  946. 

V.  Gold,  691. 

V.  McDavitt,  970. 

V.  Scott,  718. 

T.  Willey,  482,  540. 

V.  Wright,   562,   596. 
Carpentier  v.  Gardiner,  668. 

V.  Mendenhall,  732. 
Carpue  v.  London  &  B.  R.  Co.,  1059, 

1084. 
Carr  v.  Clarke,  4.52. 

V.  Clough,  727. 


CASES    CITED. 


1117 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusdve;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Carr  v.  Duckett,  oo.i.     ' 
V.  Easton,  471,  472. 
V.  Hood,   Ty.U,  ."i.3i;. 
V.  Northern    Libortics.    1 7'.}. 
V.  State,  437. 
V.  U.  S.,  111. 
Carraher    v.     San    Francisco    Bridge 

Co.,   S28,   829. 
Carratt  v.  Morley,  423,  UDo. 
Carraw  v.  Chapotel,  221. 
Oanico  v.  West  Virginia  Cent.   &  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  23.J,  236,  'J71,  072,  1083. 
Ciirriugton  v.   Lentz,  701. 

V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  961. 
V.  Taylor,   707. 
Carroll  v.  Bird,  543. 

V.  Jlinnesota  Val.  R.  Co.,  823,  'd'M. 
V.  Staten  Island  R.  Co.,  194. 
V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  904. 
V.  Wisconsin     Cent.    R.    Co.,    777, 
790. 
( 'arron  v.  Clark,  390. 
Carskaddon  v.  Mills,  887. 
Carson  v.  Dessau,  422. 

V.  Electric    Light    &    Power    Co., 

354. 
V.  Leathurs,  237. 
v.  Smith,  687. 
Carstairs  v.  Taylor,  S34,  836,  866. 
Carsten  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co..  380. 
Carter  v.  Allen.  128,  130. 
V.  Berlin  Mills,  241. 
V.  City  of  Rahway,  182. 
V.  Du  Pre,  741. 
V.  Glass,  .559. 
V.  Harden,  562. 
V.  Harlan,  683.  684. 
V.  Harrison,  135. 
V.  Howe  Mach.  Co.,  169. 
V.  Lehman,    709.  \ 

V.  Oil  Co.,  963. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,   192.   265,  382. 
V.  Towue,  75.  78,  852. 
V.  Wallace,  84. 
Cartwright  v.  Elliott,  616. 

V.  Gray,   769. 
Cary  v.  Holt.  669. 
Case  V.  Ayers,  568. 

V.  Cleveland,   C.  C.   &   St.   L.   Ry. 

Co.,  307. 
V.  Hart,  718. 
V.  Hobart,  842. 


Ca."e  V.   Mark,   (i."i(j. 

V.  Minot,  227,  794. 

V.  New    York    Cent.    &    H.    R.    R. 
Co.,  020. 
Casebeer  v.  Muwry,  779. 
Casement  v.  Brown,  230,  886. 
Casey    v.     Cincinnati     Typographical 
Union  Xo,   3.  640,   649. 

V.  City  of  Fitchburg,  055. 

V.  Hanrick,  633. 

V.  Hulgan,  519. 

V.  New    York    Cent.    &    H.    R.    R. 
Co.,   882. 
Cashill  V.  Wright.  817. 
Cashman  v.  Chase,  1054. 
Caspar  v.  Prosdame,  436,  44i;. 
Cass  V.  Boston  &  L.  1!.  Co.,  901. 

v.  New  Orleans  Times,  488. 

V.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  337. 
Cassady  v.   Magher,   166. 
Cassidy  v.  Atlantic  Ave.  R.  Co.,  1090. 

V.  Brooklyn  Daily  Eagle,  498. 
Gassier  v.  Pales,  604. 
Cassin  v.  Delaney,  218,  221. 
Castenholz  v.  Heller,  596. 
Castle  V.  Corn  Exch.  Bank,  726. 

V.  Duryee,   50,   852. 

V.  Houston,   522. 
V.  Smith,  745,  797. 
Castrique  v.   Behrens,   606,    607,   610. 
638. 

V.  Imrie,  322. 
Castro  V.  De  Uriarte,  418. 
Catawissa  R.  Co.  v.  Armsti-ong,  1033, 

1035,  1037. 
Gate  V.  Gate,  57,  376,  654,  663,  682. 
Catlett  V.  Young,  242,  961. 
Oatlin  V.  Valentine,  767,  709. 
Catterall  v.  Kenyon,  726. 
Gatteris  v.  Gowper,  669. 
Cattle  V.    Stockton   Waterworks    Co., 

373,  382,  556,  0:55 ,  636,  835. 
Gattlin  v.  Hills,  980. 
Gatts  V.  Ph.ilen,  161,  191. 
Gaughey  v.  Smith,  450. 
Gauley  v.  Pittsburgh,  G.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 

Co.,  985. 
Caulfleld  v.  Bullock,  135. 
Cavanagh  v.  Dinsmore,  278. 
V.  City  of  Boston,  603. 

V.  Durgin,  693. 
Caveny  v.  Neely,  1089. 


11-18  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusiye;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Caverly  v.  McOwens,  909. 

Cawfield    v.    Asheville    St.    Ry.    Co., 

1090. 
Cayford  v.  Wilbur.  911. 
Cayzer  v.  Taylor,  68,  817,  1006. 
Cazneau    v.   Fitchburg    R.    Co.,  964, 

1088. 
Cedar  Lake  Hotel  Co.  v.  Cedar  Creek 
Hydraulic  Co.,  691. 
V.  Cedar  Lake  Hydraulic  Co.,  336. 
Center  v.  Finney,  53. 
Central  Ohio  R.  Co.  v.  Lawrence,  919. 
Central  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v.   Ohatterson, 

393,  955. 
Central  R.   Co.  v.  Brewer,  168.  172, 
617. 
V.  Coleman,  S02.  955. 
V.  Combs,   1072. 
V.  De  Bray,  948. 
V.  Moore,    817. 
V.  Peacock,  276. 
V.  Smith,  171. 
Central   R.   R.   of  Georgia   v.    Ryals, 

1018. 
Central   Railroad   of  New  Jersey  y. 

Stoermer,  1034. 
Central   Raih'oad   &   Banking   Co.   v. 
Bayer,  1072. 
V.  Brunswick  &  W.  R.  Co..  929. 
V.  Bryant,  464. 
V.  Dottenheim,  381. 
V.  Georgia  Fruit  &  Vegetable  Ex- 
change, 1068,  1071. 
V.  Hasselkus,   307,  309. 
V.  Kitchens,   333. 
V.  Phillips,  872. 
V.  Pickett,   903. 
V.  Roberts,   1079. 
V.  Rylee,  987. 
V.  Strickland,   1080. 
Central   Transp.  Co.  v.  Pullman's  Pal- 
ace Car  Co.,  237,  933. 
Central  Trust  Co.  v.  East  Tennessee, 
V.  &  G.  R.  Co..  208. 
V.  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  207. 
V.  Texas  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  207. 
V.  Wabash,   St.  L.  &  P.   Ry.   Co., 
208,   797. 
Central  Vermont  R.  Co.  v.  Soper,  307, 

898. 
Certwell  v.  Hoyt,  454. 


Cerveny  v.  Clficago  Daily  News  Co., 

494,  495. 
Cesar  v.   Karutz.  853. 
C.  F.  Simmons  Medicine  Co.  v.  Mans- 
field Drug  Co.,  147. 
Chadbourne  v.   Straw,  665. 

V.  Zilsdorf,  358. 
Chadderdon  v.  Michigan  Cent  R.  Co., 

895. 
Chaddock  v.  Plummer,  852. 
Chadwick  y.  Hereapath,  521. 
Chaffee  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  956. 

V.  United  States,' 213. 
Chaffin  V.  Lynch,  522. 
Challiss  V.  Wylie,  284. 
Chalmers  v.  Smith,  698. 
Chamberlain  v.  Boyd,  382,  489. 

V.  Clayton,  126. 

V.  Enfield,  857. 

V.  Haglewood,  450. 

V.  Milwaukee  &  M.  R.  Co..  1030, 
1043,  1085. 

V.  Porter,  384. 
Chamberlaine  v.  Chester,  918. 
Chamberlin  v.  Fuller,  596. 

V.  Vance,  519. 
Chambers  v.  Baldwin,  6,  49,  636. 

V.  Bedell,  677. 

T.  Donaldson,  669,  686. 

V.  Robinson,  607. 

V.  Trust  Co.,   251. 
Champer  v.   State,  200. 
Champion  v.  Vincent,  366. 
Chance  v.  Warsaw  Water  Works,  766. 
Chandelor  v.  Lopus,  563,  580,  587. 
Chandler  v.  Com..  159. 

V.  Deaton.    160. 

V.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co., 
104. 

V.  Rieker,   733. 
Chandler  Elec.  Co.  v.  Fuller,  769,  835. 
Chapel  V.  Hull,  700. 

V.  Smith,  762. 
Chapell  V.  Schmidt,  156. 
Chapin  v.   Freeland,  723. 

V.  Walsh,   839. 
Chapman  v.  Brite,  205. 

V.  Copeland,  82. 

V.  Dodd,  613. 

V.  Erie   R.   Co.,   1000,   1043. 

V.  Lamphire,  506. 


CASES   CITED. 


1119 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


CJiiapman  v.  New  Haven  R.  Co.,  981. 
V.  Pickersgill,   85,   607,   609. 
V.  State,  9,   50,   113,  433. 
V.  Telegraph   Co.,   369. 
V.  Woods,  611. 
Charkieh,  The,  110. 
Charlebols  v.   Gogebic  &  M.  R.   Co., 

228. 
Charles  v.  Taylor,  1036,  1039. 
Charleston  &  C.  S.  B.  Co.  v.  Bason, 

1063. 
Charlotte  v.   Pembroke   Iron  Works, 

786.' 
Charlotte,  O.  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Wooten, 

1070. 
Charlton  v.  Watton,  532,  533. 
Chase  v.  Blalsdell,  714. 
V.  Broughton,  579. 
V.  City  of  Portland,  178. 
V.  Heaney,  133,  911. 
V.  Silverstone,  758. 
V.  Whitlock,  496. 
Chase  Co.   Nat.   Bank  v.   Thompson, 

352. 
Ohasemore    v.    Richards,    35,    54,    90, 

557,  758. 
Chataigne  v.  Bergeron,  50. 
Chatfield  v.  Commerford,  539. 
Chatfield  v.   Wilson,   56,  758,  760. 
Chatham  v.   Bradford,   134. 
Chatham  Furnace  Co.  v.  Moffatt,  569. 
Chattahoochee  Brick  Co.  v.  Brasvrell, 

167,   195,  214,  1028. 
Chattanooga,  R.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Palm- 
er, 903. 
Chauvet  v.  Hill,  759. 
Cheatham  v.  Red  River  Line,  415. 

V.  Shearon,   771.  847. 
Cheboygan     Lumber     Co.     v.     Delta 

Transp.  Co.,  840. 
Cheeney   v.    Ocean    S.    S.   Co.,    1040, 

1041. 
Cheesebro  v.   Powers,   553. 
Cheesman  v.  Exall,  713. 
Cheetham  v.  Hampson,  224,  228. 
Cheever  v.  Pearson,  686. 
Chellis  V.  Chapman,  455. 
Chelsey  v.  Thompson,  497. 
Chenery  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  881,  886. 
Cheney  v.  Middlesex  Co.,  1005. 
V.  Powell,  211,  581,  582,  592. 
v.  White,  253. 


Cheney  v.  Woodruff,  253. 
Chenowith   v.    Dickinson,   901. 
Cherry  v.  Stein,  750. 
Chesapeake,    O.   &    S.    W.    R.    Co.    v. 
Higgins,  334,  404. 

v.  McDowell,  1017,  1027. 
Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Hafner's 
Adm'r,   1017. 

v.  Hickey,   069. 

V.  Yost,   824. 
Chesley  v.   King,   57,   60,  557,  758. 
Chester  v.  Comstock,  563. 
Chestnut  Hill  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Martin, 

349. 
Chevallier  v.   Straham,   1057,  1062. 
Chicago   V.   Bixby,   279. 

V.  Elzeman,    381. 

V.  Jones,  397. 

V.  Joney,    181. 

V.  Ivelly,  180,  397. 

V.  Langlass,  397. 

V.  McGiven,  178. 

V.  Martin,  394,   397. 

V.  O'Brenan,  384. 

V.  Kobbins,  145,  236,   922. 
Chicago  Anderson   Pressed-Brick   Co. 
V.    Reinneger,    1004^1006. 

V.  Sobkowiak,   1040,  1041,  1043. 
Chicago,  B.  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Landauer. 

1086. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Bell,  314. 

V.  Bryan,  396. 

V.  Chicago,  Ft.  M.  &  D.  Ry.  Co., 
354. 

V.  City  of  Quincy,  783. 

V.  Dennell,  928. 

V.  Dickson,  264,  471,  825,  1080. 

V.  Dunn,  471. 

V.  Grablin,   860,   872. 

V.  Gregory,  978. 

V.  Hale,  384. 

V.  Harwood,  883,  929. 

V.  Hazzard,  957. 

V.  Hines,  370. 

V.  Kriski,    615. 

V.  Landauer,  964,  1084,  1090,  1093. 

V.  Oleson,  932,  955. 

V.  Stumps,  1010. 

V.  Warner,  978. 

V.  Wells,  930. 

V.  Wilgus,   955. 

V.  Wymore,  313,  314,  955. 


1120  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Chicago  Oity  Ry.  Co.  v.  McLaughlin, 
860. 
V.  McMahon,  253. 
V.  Mogk,  277. 
V.  Robinson,  986. 
V.  "Wilcox,  Kil,  986,  987. 
Chicago   Drop  Forge  &  Foundry   Co. 

V.  Van  Dam,  1026. 
Chicago,  F.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Sanche,  410. 
Chicago,   K.  &  X.   R.  Co.   v.  Brown, 

979. 
Chicago,   K.    &   W.    R.    Co.   v.   Bock- 
oven,   .Sol. 
V.  Fisher,  SGI. 
V.  Willits,   093. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Car- 
penter, 881. 
V.  Elliott,    374. 
V.  Lovs^ell,  1087. 
V.  Ross,  192,  1038,  1047,  1048. 
V.  West,  258,  1035. 
Chicago,  r.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Lewis, 

!>.->(  I,  1084,  1090. 
Chicago  R.  Co.  v.  Shea,  66. 
Chicago,  R.  I.   &  P.  R.   Co.   v.   Caul- 
fleld,  370,  882. 
V.  Doyle,  317. 
V.  Houston,  884. 
V.  Lewis,  312,  318. 
V.  Llnney,  993,  1012. 
V.  Lonergan,  1010. 
V.  McBride,  382. 
V.  Sharp,  882. 
V.  Shepherd,   664. 
V.  Stahley,  98,  l(i55. 
V.  Sutton.  68,  210. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  iS:  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hitt, 

370. 
(Chicago,    St    L.   &   X.    O.    R.    Co.    v. 
Abels,  306. 
V.  Pounds,  330. 
Chicago,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnes, 
63. 
V.  Butler.  884. 
V.  Frey,  1023. 
V.  Fry,  1002,  1011. 
V.  Spilker,  875,  !)2:!,  983. 
V.  Williams,  63,  846. 
Chicago,   St.  P.,  M.   &  O.   Ry.  Co.  v. 
Elliott,  67. 
V.  Gilbert,  845,  847. 
V.  Lundstrom,  1043. 


Chicago,  St.  P.  iV:  K.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  An- 
derson, 875. 
Chicago,   St.   P.    &  K.    C.    Ry.    Co.   v. 

Pierce.  321. 
Chicago,  T.  &  M.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Titter- 

ington,  340. 
Chicago,  W.  &  V.  Coal  Co.  v.  Glass, 
771,  847. 

V.  Peterson,  317. 
Chicago  &  A.  R.   Co.  v.  Aruol,   1090, 
10!X!. 

V.  Byrum,  1084,  1093. 

v.  Flagg,  371. 

v.  Gregory,  161. 

V.  Kelly,  1037. 

V.  Kerr,  1010. 

V.  Pennell.   374. 

V.  Randolph,   957. 

V.  Wilcon,  IVM. 
Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Hedges,  932. 

V.  Hlnes,  990. 

V.  Kneirim,   993,   1045. 

V.  Roberts,   967. 
Chicago  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Bai-nes,  361. 

V.  Branyan,  957.   990,  991,  1008. 

V.  Flexman,  262. 

V.  House,  847. 

V.  Kern,  362. 

V.  Loeb,   793. 

V.  Ludington,  72,  846. 

V.  Smith,  362. 
Chicago  &  I.  Coal  R.   Co.  v.  McDan- 

iels,  943. 
Chicago  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  JlcCahill,  846. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Bayfield. 
253,  1047. 

V.  Chapman,  301. 

V.  Dunleavy,  825. 

V.  Moranda,  1042. 

V.  Prescott,  69. 

V.  Williams,  168,  371. 
(Chicago  &   R.   I.    R.    Co.   v.   Warren, 

1069. 
Chicago  &  W.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Slee,  664. 
Chick  V.  Railway  Co.,  327. 
Chlckering  v.  Robinson,  118. 
Chidester  v.  Consolidated  Ditch  Co., 

65,  70. 
Child  V.  Affleck,  543,  54J 

V.  Boston,  179,  180. 

V.  Boston   &    F.    H.    Iron    Works, 
.342. 


CASES    CITED. 


1121 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Child  V.  Hearn,  981,  984. 
Childers  v.  San  Jos6  Mercury  Printing 
&  Pub.  Co.,  504,  517. 

V.  Wooler,  560. 
Childs  V.  Bank,  168. 

V.  Merrill,  561,  579,  601. 

V.  New  York,   O.   &  W.   Ky.   Co., 
970. 

y.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  862. 
Child's  Estate,  In  re,  205. 
Chiles  V.  Drake,  394. 
Chils  V.  Gronlund,  214. 
Chilton  V.  City  of  Carbondale,  871. 
Chinery  v.  ViaU,  737. 
Chinn  v.  Morris,  421. 
Chiatovich  v.  Davis,  756. 
Chipley  v.  Atkinson,  646. 
Chipman  v.  Bates,  676. 

V.  Emeric,  414. 

V.  Palmer,   212,   797,   798. 
Chisholm  v.  Gadsen,  575. 

V.  Georgia,  110,  112. 

V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  928. 

V.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  197. 
Chislm  V.  Gadsden,  85. 
Choen  v.  Porter,  220. 
Chopin  V.  Badger  Paper  Co.,  1023. 
Chrisman  v.  Bruce,  135. 

V.  Carney,  418. 
Christensen  v.  Union  Trunk  Line,  831. 
Christian  v.  Columbus  &  R.  Ry.  Co., 
263. 

T.  Illinois  Cent  R.  Co..  !»(jl,  966. 
Christiansborg,  The,  102. 
Christie  v.  Davey,  773. 

V.  Griggs,  1058,  1084,  1085. 
Christopherson  v.  Bare,  203. 
Chrysler  v.  Canaday,  571. 
Church  V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co., 
.  1072. 

V.  Mumford,  18. 
("hurchill  v.  Baumann,  200. 

V.  Holt,  215,  216. 

V.  Hulbert,  196. 

V.  Hunt,  496. 

V.  Lewis,  468. 

V.  Pacific  Imp.  Co.,  o:-7. 

V.  Siggers,  606,  634. 
Cincinnati.   H.   &  D.   R.   Co.   v.  Mar- 

grat,  1056. 
Cincinnati,  H.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Butler, 
932. 

LAW  OP  TORTS — 71 


!  Cincinnati,  H.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Eaton,  377. 

(JincinLati    Inclined    Plane   K,    Co.    v. 

City    &    Suburban   Telegraph   Ass'n. 

805. 

Cincinnati,   I.,   St.  L.   &  C.   R.    Co.   v. 

Smock,  844. 
Cincinnati,  M.  O.  &  T.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Bar- 
ker, 72,  847. 
V.  Clark,   1043,  1053. 
V.  Mealer,   1003,   1005,   1006,   1017. 
Cincinnati  &  Z.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  198, 

946. 
Cipperly  v.  Rhodes,  89. 
Citizens'  Loan  Fund  &  f5av.  Ass'n  v. 

Friedley,  916. 
Citizens'  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Lowe,  885. 
Citizens'  St.  R.  Co.   of  Indianapolis  v. 
Stoddard,  '.iss,  989. 
V.  Willoeby,  2G2,  903,  1091. 
City   Council  of   Augusta  v.   Barnum, 
792. 
V.  Burum,   086. 
V.  Hudson,  179. 
V.  Lombard,  050. 
City  Council  of  City  of  Cliarleston  v. 

Werner,  784. 
City  Council  of  Sheffield  v.  Harris,  181. 
City  of  Abilene  v.  Cowperthwait,  177. 
City    of   Albany   v.    Watervliet   Turn- 
pike &  R.  Co.,  72. 
City   of  Alexandria,   The,   1041. 
City  of  Allegheny  v.  Zimmerman,  7S5. 
City  of  Americus  v.  Chapman,  175. 
City  of  Anderson  v.  East,  839. 
City  of  Atchinson  v.  King,  406. 
City  of  Aurora  v.  Dale.  871. 
City  of  Austin  v.  Colgate,  868. 
City  of  Beardstown  v.  Smith,  978. 
City   of  Beatrice  v.    Reid,   238. 
City  of  Birmingham  v.  Tayloe,  178. 
City  of  Bloomington  t.   Chicago,  144. 
City  of  Brussels,  The,  329. 
City  of  Champaign  v.  Melunis,  170. 

V.  White,  873. 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Babcock,  345,  346. 
V.  Ffiwler,  86S,  809. 
V.  Laflin,  753. 
V.  Langlass,  180. 
V.  Leseth,  402. 
Y.  JlcCarthy,  868. 
V.  JIajor,  334. 
V.  O'Brennan,  224. 


1122 


■  CASES   CITED. 


[Vol.   1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  tbe  residue.] 


City  of  Chicago  v.   Powers,  950. 
City  of  Columbus  v.  Sims,  177,  3S1. 

V.  Strassner,  472. 
City  of  Conyers  v.  Smith,  807. 
City  of  Covington  v.  Geylor,  751,  752. 
City  of  Dallas  v.  Young,  105. 
City  of  Delphi  v.  Evans,  C89. 
('ity  of  Deuiopolis,    v.    Webb,    807. 
City  of  Denver  v.  Capelli,  179. 

v.  Peterson,  962. 

V.  Soloman,  221. 
City  of  Detroit  v.  Blackeby,  176. 

V.  Putnam,   174. 
City  of  Duluth  v.  Mallett,  2SG. 
City  of  Durango  v.  Luttrell,  145. 
City  of  Elgin  v.  GofC,  337. 

v.  .Toslyn,  898. 
City  of  El  Paso  v.  Dolan,  178. 
City  of  Eureka  v.  Merrifield,  327. 
City  of   Evausville  v.   Decker,   179. 
City  of  Ft.  Wayne  v.  Duryee,  390. 

V.  Hamilton,  25. 
City  of  Franklin  v.  Harter,  S73. 
City  of  Fresao  v.  Fresno  Canal  &  Irr. 

Co.,   775,  802. 
City  of  Friend  v.  IngersoU,  391. 
City  of  Galesburg  v.  Rahn,  970. 
City  of  Galveston  v.  Posnainsky,  173. 
■City  of  Grand  Rapids  v.  Weiden,  778, 

799,   806. 
City  of   Greencastle  v.   Hazelett,  758, 

793. 
City  of  Hannibal  v.  Richards,  79S. 
•City  of  Hillsboro  v.   Ivey,  177,  798. 
City  of  Joliet  v.  Conway,  381. 

Y.  Harwood,  849. 

V.  Seward,  849. 

V.  Shufeldt,  67. 
City   of   Kansas   City  v.    Brady,    179, 
181. 

V.  McAleer,   784. 

V.  Planning,    402. 

V.  Slangstrom,   211,  213. 
( "ity  of  Lanark  v.  Dougherty,  979. 
City  of  Lincoln  v.  Staley,  917. 
C:ity  of  Logansport  v.  Dick,  849. 
City  of  London  Brewery  Co.  v.   Ten- 

nant,  750. 
City  of  Lowell  v.  Glidden,  798,  837. 

V.  Spaulding,  224. 
City  of  McDonough  v.  Gilman.  797. 
City  of  McGregor  v.  Boyle,  802. 


City  of  Minneapolis  v.  Lundlin,  1041. 
City  of  MoundsvlUe  v.  Ohio  River  R. 

Co.,  807. 
City  of  Murphysboro  v.  Woolsey,  986. 
City  of  Nashvill^v.  Sutherland,  361. 
City  of  Xavasota  v.  Pearce,  177. 
City  of  New  Castle  v.  Raney,  775,  803. 
City   of   New    Orleans  v.    Abbagnato, 

175. 
City  of  New  York  v.  Brady,  323.' 
City  of  North  Vernon  t.  Voegler,  178, 

180,  336,  764. 
City  of  Norwalk,  The,  15,  213,  1041. 
City  of  Norwich  v.  Breed,  888. 
City  of  Omaha  v.  Ayer,  942. 
City  of   Orlando   v.   Pragg,    177,    180, 

798,   802. 
City  of  Pekin  v.  McMahon,  829,  985. 
City  of  Peoria  t.  Simpson,  224. 
City  of  Peru  v.  Brown,  180. 
City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Gavagnin,  179. 

V.  Gilmartin,  179. 
City  of  Pontiac  v.  Carter,  89,  175. 
City  of  Portland  v.  Taylor,  471. 
City  of  Richmond  v.  Long,  137. 
City   of   Rochester   v.    Campbell,    100, 
919. 
V.  Simpson,  783. 
City  of  Rock  Island  v.  Deis,  471. 
City  of  St.   Paul  v.  GilfiUan,   789. 

v.  Kuby,  988. 
City  of   Sherman  v.   Langham,   798. 
City  of  Sterling  v.  Schiffmacher,  238. 
City  of  Streator  v.  Hamilton,  949. 
City  of  Terre  Haute  v.  Hudnut,  379, 

810,  911. 
City  of  TifHn  v.  McCormack,  236. 
City  of  Vicksburg  v.  Herman,  142. 
City  of  Wilmington  v.  Vandegrlft,  174. 
City  of  Wyandotte  v.  Agan,  472. 
City  &  Suburban  Ry.   Co.  v.  Moores, 

228,  231,  234. 
Clafiin  T.  Carpenter,  685,  686. 
V.  Flack,  589. 
V.  Gurney,  727. 
V.  Meyer,  1060. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  719. 
Clampit  V.  Chicago,  St.  P.  &  K.  0.  R. 

Co.,  892. 
Clapp  V.  Thomas,  325. 
Clapper  v.  Kells,  227. 

V.  Town  of  Waterford,  129,  949. 


CASES    CITED. 


1123 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Clare  v.  Bank,  939. 
Clarence  v.  Marshall,  297. 
Clarendon   Land,   Inv.    &  Agency  Co. 

V.  McClelland,  .S.jS. 
Clark  V.  Abbott,  31.5. 

v.  Adair,   183. 

V.  Anderson,  508. 

V.  Bardman,  398. 

V.  Barnard,   111. 

T.  Barnwell,    1061. 

V.  Bates,  693. 

V.  Brown,    474. 

V.  Carlton,    G64. 

V.  Chamberlin,  712. 

V.  Chambers,  74,  850,  886,  887,  977. 

V.  City  of  Syracuse,  789. 

V.  Costello,  713. 

V.  Crego,  733. 

V.  Downing,  435. 

V.  Draper,  711. 

V.  Dyer,  339. 

V.  Famous    Shoe   &   Clothing   Co., 
150. 

V.  Fitch,  4.52-454. 

V.  Fry,   233. 

V.  Glidden,  686. 

V.  .TefCersonville,   M.   &   I.   R.   Co., 
002. 

V.  Keliher,  152. 

V.  Lake  St.  Clair  &  N.  U.   R.  Ice 
Co.,  802. 

V.  Lawrence,  703,  805. 

V.  Levering,  280. 

V.  Marshall,  911. 

V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  915. 

V.  Molyneux,  516,  539. 

V.  Newsam,  215. 

V.  New  York,  P.  &  B.  R.  Co.,  332, 
333. 

V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  755. 

V.  Ralls,   590,   598. 

V.  Rochester   &  S.  R.   Co.,  1073. 

V.  St.  Paul  &  S.  C.  R.  Co.,  1019. 

V.  Sargeant,  095. 

V.  Smith,  606. 

V.  Spence,  0:]7. 

V.  Spicer,  123. 

V.  Starin,  42.3. 

V.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  Co.,  831, 
!174. 

V.  Wilson,  075. 


Clark  V.  Woods,  130. 
Clarke  v.  Anderson,  740. 

V.  Holmes,  1023,  1053. 

V.  Holridge,  123. 

V.  Milligan,  40,  273. 

V.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  928. 

V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  967. 

V.  Postan,  013. 
Clarkson  v.  Lawson,  523. 
Clason  V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  928. 
Clausen  v.  Meister,  340. 
Clay  V.  Gage,  728. 

v.  People,  491. 

V.  Postal  Tel.  Co.,  803. 

V.  Roberts,  501. 

v.  Wood,  879. 
Clayards  v.  Dethick,  903,  967,  972. 
Clayton  v.  Scott,  425. 
Cleary    v.    Municipal    Electric    Light 

Co.,  318,  320. 
Clegg  V.  Dearden,  409. 

V.  Waterbury,  611. 
Cleland  v.  Thornton,  35,  843. 
Clem  v.  Holmes,  459. 

V.  Newcastle  &  D.  R.  Co.,  581. 
Clemence   v.    Steere,   098,  700,  701. 
Clemens  v.  Speed,  90,  793. 
Clement  v.  Chivis,  492. 

V.  Lewis,  523. 

V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  310. 
Clement  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Wood,  754. 
Clements  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.,  314. 

V.  Louisiana  Electric  Light  Co., 
820.  803,  870,  929,  943,  963, 
971. 

V.  Odorless  Excavating  Appara- 
tus Co.,  608. 

V.  Ohrlj^   613. 
Clementson  v.  Minnesota  Tribune  Co., 

521. 
Clendening  v.  Ohl,  692. 
Clendon  v.  Dinneford,  725. 
Cleveland  v.  Bangor  St.  Ry.,  145,  863. 

V.  Citizens'  Gas-Light  Co.,  775, 
780,  S(J5. 

V.  King,  177. 

V.  New  Jersey  Steamboat  Co.,  948. 

V.  Spier,  200,  850,  092. 

V.  Tittle.  131. 
Cleveland,  C,  C.  &  I.  R.  Co.  y.  Elliott, 
929. 


1124  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  Inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Cleveland,  C,  C.  &  I.  K.  Co.  v.  Har- 
rington, !123. 
Cleveland,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Abney,  926. 

V.  Ahrens,  930. 

V.  Brown,  997,  1040,  1041. 

v.  De  Bolt,  940. 

V.  Keely,  986. 

V.  Ketcliam,  1080. 

V.  Prewitt,  1072. 

V.  Ricliey,  930. 

V.  Sloan,  900. 

V.  Stephenson,    896. 

V.  Tartt,  890. 

V.  Walter,  994. 

V.  Zider,  875. 
Cleveland,  C.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Craw- 
ford, 883. 

V.  Kerry,  1030. 
Cleveland   Rolling   Mill  Co.   v.    Corrl- 

gan,  161. 
Cleveland  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Speer,  143. 
Clifford  V.  Atlantic  Cotton  Mills,  225, 
838. 

V.  Cochrane,  491. 

V.  Dam,  226,  766. 

V.  Richardson,  946. 
ClifCton  V.  Granger,  460. 
Clifton  V.  Bury,  661. 

V.  Hooper,  83. 
Clifton  Iron  Co.  v.  Dye,  804. 
Cline  V.  Templeton,  204. 
Clinton  v.  Myers,  55. 

V.  York,  452,  453. 
Cloon  r.  Gerry,  618 
Clopp  V.  Meai-,  894. 
Clopton  V.  Cozart,  592. 
Closson  V.  Staples,  609,  628. 
Clothier  v.  Webster,  186. 
Clough  V.  Tenney,  18. 
Cloughessey    v.    City    of    Waterliury, 

178. 
Clouser  v.  Clapper,  465. 
Cloutier  v.  Grafton  &  U.  R.  Co.,  960. 
Clow  V.  Chapman,  468. 

V.  Pittsbm'gh   Traction   Co.,    1085. 

V.  Plummer,  733. 

V.  Wright,  418. 
Clowes  V.  Staffordshire  Potteries  Wa- 
terworks Co.,  800. 
Clugston  V.  GaiTetson,  504. 
Clulow  V.  McClelland,  182. 


Clutterbucli  v.  Chaffers,  483. 
Clyde  V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  1052. 
Clyma  v.  Kennedy,  422,  439. 
Clymer,  Lessee  of,  v.  Dawkins,  668. 
Coal  Creek  Jlin.  Co.  v.  Davis,  1017. 
Coates  V.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  Ry. 

Co.,  944.  948. 
Cobb  V.  Columbia  &  G.  Railway  Co., 
264,  397. 

V.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co..  1063. 

V.  Wright,  599. 
Cobbett  V.  Grey,  431. 
Cochran  v.  Ammon,  460. 

V.  Miller,  913. 

V.  Toher,  419,  429. 
Cochrane  v.  Little,  916. 
Cochrane's  Case,  463. 
Cockayne  v.  Hodgkissou,  542. 
Cockburn  v.  Erewash  C.  Co.,  186. 
Cockroft  V.  Smith.  442. 
Cocks  V.  Nash,  345. 
Codd  V.  Cabe,  427. 
Codding  v.  Wood,  315. 
Codman  v.  Evans,  779. 

v.  Freeman,  664. 
Coe  v.  English,  656. 
Coem-  d'Alene  C.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Miners' 

Union,  357.  358,  643.  649. 
Coffey  V.  Bank,  738. 
Coffin  V.  Coffin,  115,  529. 

V.  Inhabitants  of  Palmer,  955. 

y.  Loper,  705. 

V.  Varila,  370,  423. 
Cofield  V.  McCabe,  276,  277. 
Cogdell  V.  Yett.  58. 
Coggill  V.  Millburn  Land  Co.,  704. 
Coggs  V.  Barnard,  812,  816,  1063. 

V.  Bernard,  7,  18,  26,  36,  91,  861. 
'    901,  1059,  1062,  1063,  1073. 
Coggswell  V.  Bohn,  621. 
Cogswell    V.    Railrofld    Co.,    402,    789, 

lOSl,  1090. 
Cohen  v.  Hoff,  119. 

V.  Huskisson,  428. 

V.  Morgan,  613. 

V.  Railway  Co..  252,  1081. 
Cohoon  V    Chicago.   B.   &  O.    R.   Co., 

920. 
Coker  v.  Birge,  780. 
Colburn  v.  Patmore,  190. 
Colby  V.  McGee,  513. 

V.  Reynolds,  492.  509. 


CASES    CITED. 


1125 


[Vol.   1  comprises  pages  l-(;52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Cole  V.  Bradbury,  TS'J. 

V.  Buckle,  408. 

v.  Cassidy,  564.  570. 

V.  Curtis,  613. 

Y.  Fisher,  50,  656. 

V.  Goodwin,  10G7. 

V.  Kegler,  802. 

V.  Logan,  756. 

V.  Nashville,  39. 

V.  Neustadter,  502,  512. 

V.  Stewart,  667. 

V.  Turner,  434. 

V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  307. 
Cole  Bros.  v.  Wood,  1044. 
Colegrove  v.  Railroad  Co..  211. 
Coleman  v.  Allen.  616. 

V.  Chadwick,  753. 

V.  Pearce,  269,  714. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  288. 

V.  Riches,  252. 

V.  State,  113. 

V.  White,  465. 
Coles  V.  Clark,  734,  735. 

V.  Kennedy,  575,  577. 

V.  Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co- 
SOS,   309. 

V.  Thompson,  522,  543. 
Coif  V.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry. 

Co.,  881,  958.  1023. 
Colgrove  v.  Railroad  Co.,  213. 

V.  Smith,  233,  234. 
Collamer  v.  Page,  123. 
Collard  v.  Dela^Yare,  L.-  &  W.  B.  Co., 
342. 

V.  Gay,  622. 

V.  Marshall,  353. 
Collen  V.  Wright,  586. 
CoUer  V.  Lower,  631. 
CoUett  V.  London  &  N.  R.  Co..  905. 
Collins  V.  Brackett,  425. 

V.  Chartiers    Val.    Gas    Co.,    230, 
746,  758,  777,  814. 

V.  City  of  Keokuk.  354.  355. 

V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  179. 

V.  Council  -Bluffs,  406. 

V.  Ciimmins,  996. 

V.  Cronin,  639. 

V.  Dispatch  Pub.  Co.,  476,  496. 

V.  Dodge,  391. 

V.  Evans,  566. 

V.  Hutchinson,  132,  133. 

V.  Middle  Level  Com'rs,  74,  78. 


Collins  V.  Railway  Co.,  242,  824,  966, 
1043,  1077. 
V.  Whitehead,  553. 

Collins  Co.  V.  Marcy,  685. 

Collis  V.  Selden.  909. 

Colly er  v.  Collyer,  504. 

Colman  v.  State,  111. 

Colorado  Consolidated  Land  &  Water 
Co.  T.  Hartman,  361. 
v.  Morris,  672. 

Colorado  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  O'Brien.  1027. 

Colrick  V.  Swinburne,  758.  808. 

Colt  V.  McMecham,  1062. 
V.  Sixth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  952. 

Colter  V.  Lower,  605,  630. 

Colton  V.  Onderdonk,  848. 
V.  Richards,  1046. 

Columbia  Electric  Co.  v.  Dixon,  580. 

Columbia  Mill  Co.  v.  Alcorn,  147. 
v.  National   Bank   of    Commerce, 
42. 

Columbia    &    P.   S.  R.  Co.  v.  Haw- 
thorne, 949. 

Columbus  V.  Dahn,  764. 

Columbus  Gas  Light  &  Coke  Co.  v. 
Freeland,  759,  781.  814. 

Columbus,    H.    V.    &   T.    Ry.    Co.    v. 
Erick,  869.  lOOS,  1056. 

Columbus  &  H.   Coal  &  Iron   Co.   v. 
Tucker,  773. 

Colvill  v.  Langdon,  445,  471. 

Colvin  V.  Corwin,  404. 

v.  Peabody,  243,  851,  963. 

Comaskey  v.  Railway  Co.,  391. 

Come  V.  Knowles,  417. 

Comer  v.  Knowles,  421,  430,  631. 

Comfort  V.  Creelman,  724. 

Commercial  Bank  v.  Varnum,  134. 

Comminge  v.  Stevenson,  405,  767,  709, 
797,  809,  847. 

Commissioners'  Court  of   Butler  Co. 
V.  ilcCann,  454. 

Commissioners   of   General  Land  Of- 
fice V.  Smith,  124. 

Commissioners    of    Hamilton   Co.   v. 
Mighels,  182. 

Commissioners      of     Kensington     v. 
Wood,  767. 

Commissioners  of  Marion  Co.  v.  Clark, 
952. 

Commissioners  of  Niles   Tp.   v.   Mar- 
tin, 183. 


1126 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Commonwealth  v.  Allen,  783. 
V.  Andrews,  111. 
V.  Blanding,  481. 
V.  Carlisle,    619. 
V.  Chace,  659. 
V.  Clark,  441. 
V.  Colburg,  203. 
V.  Cole,  764. 
V.  Collberg,  444. 
V.  Crousbore,  784. 
V.  Deacon,  428. 
V.  Dlcken,  773. 
V.  Donahue,  441. 
V.  Eyre,  432. 
V.  Haines,  134. 
V.  Harris,  770. 
V.  Hawkins,  438. 
V.  Hunt,  642. 
V.  Hurley,   663. 
V.  McAfee,  463. 
V.  McClure,  513. 
V.  McKie,  434,  433. 
V.  McManus,  931. 
y.  Magnolia     Villa    Land   &   Imp. 

Co.,  392. 
V.  Mechanics'  Ins.  Co.,  582. 
V.  Miller,  783. 
V.  Morgan,  475. 
V.  Oakes,  770. 
y.  O'Malley,  439. 
T.  Parker,   200. 
V.  Perry,  783. 
V.  Pierce,  438,  874. 
V.  Pittson  Ferry  Bridge  Co.,  783. 
y.  Powers,   263. 
y.  Roberts,  783. 
V.  St.  Patrick.?,  148. 
V.  Shelton,  648. 
V.  Slattery,   11. 
V.  Snelling,  511. 
V.  Spratt,  770. 
y.  Stacey,   541. 
V.  Stratton,   437. 
y.  Thompson,   912,    913. 
y.  Tobin,  674. 
y.  Union   League  of  Philadelphia, 

149. 
y.  Upton,   774. 
V.  Webb,  9. 
V.  White,   9. 
y.  Wolf,  767. 
y.  York.  513. 


Compau  y.  Compau,  783. 
Compton  y.  Richards,  7.50. 
Comstock  V.   Hopkins,  345. 

y.  Matthews,   14. 
Conant  v.  Jones,  756. 
Conboy  y.  Dickinson,  751,  752. 
Concord  Bank  v.  Gregg,  169. 
Concord   Manuf'g    Co.    v.    Robertson, 

755. 
Condict  V.  Grand  Ti'unk  R.  Co.,  1060, 

1062. 
Condoures    v.    Imperial    Turkish    To- 
bacco &  Cigarette  Co.',  353. 
Cone  y.  Ivinson,  707,  710,  731,  732. 
Cones  V.  Board,  184. 
Congdon  y.  Howe  Scale  Co.,  400,  948. 
Conger  y.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co., 

262. 
Congrave   y.    Southern   Pac.   R.    Co., 

332. 
Congreye  y.  Morgan,  766. 

V.  Smith,  226,  246,  766,  772. 
Conhocton  Stone  Road  v.  Buffalo,  N. 

Y.  &  E.  R.  Co.,  774,  797. 
Conklln  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R. 
R.  Co.,  859. 
y.  Old  Colony,  689. 
y.  Thompson,  160.  851. 
Conkling  t.  Pacific  Imp.  Co.,  755. 
Conlan  y.  Railroad  Co.,  895,  1035. 

V.  Roemer,  578. 
Conley  y.  Portland,  1036. 
Conlon  y.  Oregon,  S.  L.  &  U.  N.  Ry. 

Co.,  994. 
Connah  y.  Hale,  728. 
Connecticut  y.  May,  152. 
Connecticut    Mut.    Life    Ins.    Co.    v. 
New  York  &  N.  H.  R.  Co.,  327,  328. 
Conner  v.   Dundee   Chemical  Works, 
313. 
V.  Woodfill,   746,   762. 
Connery  y.  JIanning,  620,  622. 
Connolly  v.   Boston,  194. 

y.  Dayidson,  206,  851,  1035. 
y.  JIaurer,  1046. 
y.  Paillon,  1006. 
Connor  v.   Chicago,   R.   I.   &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,   1056. 
y.  Hall,   795,   802. 
Connors  v.  Durite  JIauuf'g  Co.,  937, 
1009. 
y.  GriUey,  873. 


CASES    CITED.  1127 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Connors  v.  Heniiessy.  232. 

V.  Morton,  875,  999,  1017. 
Connoss  v.   Meir,  707. 
Conrad  .  v.  Arrowhead    Hot    Springs 
Hotel  Co.,  766. 
V.  Ithica,   176. 
V.  Lane,  164. 
Conroe  v.  Birdsall,  165. 

V.  Conroe,   549. 
Conrow  v.  Little,  323. 
Conroy  v.  Pittsburg  Times,  514,  550. 
Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v.  Bruce,  241, 
997. 
V.  Scheller,  1006. 
Consolidated  Coal  Co.  of  St.  Louis  v. 

Haenni,  1023,  1025. 
Consolidated    Coal    &    Min.     Co.    y. 
Clay's  Adm'r,  921,   996,   1045,  1050. 
Consolidated  Ice  Mach.  Co.  v.  Keller, 

72,   212,   214,   260. 
Consolidated     Roller     Mill     Co.     v. 

Coombs,  344. 
Constable  v.  National  S.  S.  Co.,  2U'.i. 

1067,  1069,  1070. 
Constant  v.   Lehman,  302. 
Continental    Const.    &     Imp.    Co.    v. 

Vinal,  610. 
Continental  Imp.  Co.  v.  Stead,  885. 
Continental  Ins.  Co.  v.  Insurance  Co. 

of  Pennsylvania,  42,   271. 
Continental    Xat.    Bank    v.    Bowdre, 

506. 
Contrast  Union  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stone, 

62. 
Converse  v.  Brainerd,  65. 
Conway  v.  Carpenter,  441. 
V.  Grant,  855. 
V.  Nickle,  401. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  1090. 
V.  Reed,  159. 
Conwell  V.  Voorhees,  138. 
Cook  V.  Beal,  442. 
V.  Beale,  404. 
V.  Churchman,   638. 
V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  178. 
V.  Gourdin,   65. 
V.  Howard,    669. 
V.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  253. 
V.  Johnston,  920,  925. 
V.  Palmer,   139. 
V.  Patterson,  712. 
V.  Pridgen,  686. 


Cook  V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.Rj\  Co.,1023. 

V.  Stearns,  683,  685. 

V.  Walley,  13. 

V.  Wood,  460. 
Cooke  V.  Bangs,  120,  122,  123,  527. 

V.  Forbes,  781,  787. 

V.  Jennor,  .34.5. 

V.  Waring,   858. 

V.  Wildes,   520,   542. 
Cool   V.    Crommet,    C78. 
Coolbroth  v.  Maine  Cent,  R.  Co.,  862. 
Coolidge  v;  Goddard,  594. 
Coombs  V.  New  Bedford  Cordage  Co., 

899,  1022.  1023. 
Coomes  v.  Houghton,  47. 
Coontz  V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  389, 

1007,  1008,  1045. 
Cooper,   In  re,  119. 

V.  Berry,  297. 

V.  Booth,  606. 

v.  Chitty,    722. 

T.  Cooper,  41. 

v.  Crabtree,  82,  666. 

v.  Davis,   704. 

V.  Dolvin,  779. 

V.  Greely,  511. 

V.  Hart,  623.  624. 

V.  Landon,   18. 

V.  Lovering,   578,    580. 

V.  McKenna,    126,    434. 

V.  Phipps,  526. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  331,  769,  895,  949. 
1030,   1043. 

T.  Randall,  769,  779,  781,  794,  840. 

v.  Reynolds,  116. 

v.  Schlesinger,  569. 

v.  Stephenson,   917. 

v.  Stone,   536. 

V.  Sun     Printing     &     Publishing 
Ass'n,  393.  396,  475. 

v.  Utterbach,   623. 

V.  Waldron,  952. 

V.  Witham,  218. 
Cope  V.  Hampton  Co.,  07,  931. 
Copley   V.    Grover    &    Baker    Sewing 

Mach.  Co..  169. 
Coppinger  v.  Bradley,  421. 
Corbett  v.  Twenty-Third  St.  Ry.  Co., 

331. 
Corby  v.  Hill,  574,  892,  895. 
Corcoran  v.  Concord  &  M.  R.  Co.,  241. 

V.  Harran,  446. 


1128 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Corcoran  v.  Village  of  Peekskill,  949. 
Corilell  V.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R. 

R.   Co.,  943. 
Core  V.  Ohio  R.  Co.,  1039. 
Cork  V.  Blossom,  54,  475,  835,  840. 
Corliss   V.  Dunning,   405. 

V.  E.    W.    Walker    Co.,    94,    356. 
Cornelius  v.  Hambay,  394,  4G5. 

V.  Hultman,   41U. 
Cornell  y.  Barnes,  136. 

v.  Cook,  404. 
Corn  Exchange  Bank  v.  Farmers'  Nat. 

Bank,  285. 
Cornfoot  v.  Fowke,  252.  267,  268,  558, 

587. 
Corning  v.  Corning,  58. 

V.  Troy  Factory,  90. 
Cornman  v.  Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co., 

891,  893,  1084. 
Cornwell  v.  Parke,  553. 
Correll  v.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  Ry. 

Co.,  924. 
Corrigan  v.  Union  Sugar  Refinery,  940. 
Corsair,  The,  328,  415. 
Cortland  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Crosky,  589. 
Corwin  v.  Walton,  395. 
Cory  V.  Chicago,  B.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co., 
316. 

V.  Gertcken,  165. 

T.  Silcox,  82. 
Cosair,  The,  368. 
Cosand  v.  Lee,  511. 
Cosgrave  v.  The  Trade  Auxiliary  Co., 

533. 
Cosgrove  v.  Ogden,  253,  260. 

V.  Pitman,  998. 
Costigan  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  341. 
Cosulich  V.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  848,  850. 
Cote  V.  Murphy,  642,  643. 
Cotteral  v.  Cummins,  18. 
Cotterell  v.  Jones,  606-608,  638. 
Cotterill  y.  Starkey,  828,  879. 
Cotton  v.  .Tames,  606. 

y.  Wood,  35,  878,  935,  936. 
Cottrell  y.  Cottrell,  629. 
Cottrill  y.   Chicago,   M.   &   St.  P.   Ry. 
Co.,  969. 

V.  Krum,  596-598. 
CotuUa  y.  Kerr,  481,  507. 
Cotzhausen  v.   Simmons,   570. 
Couch  y.  Steel,  186,  918. 
Coughey  y.  Smith,  449. 


Coughtry  v.   Globe   Woolen   Co.,   895, 

1036. 
Cougle  V.  McKee,  997. 
Coulter  V.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  968. 

y.  Pine  Tp.,  889. 
Coulterville    &    Y.    Tm-npike    Co.    y. 

State,  111. 
County   Board   of  Education  y.   State 

Board  of  Education,  337. 
County  Com'rs  y.  Baker,  185. 

v.  Duvall,  138. 

y.  Gibson,    184. 
Coupland  v.   Hardingham,   765,   891. 

y.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  305,  1075. 
Courtis  y.  Cane,  735. 
Courtney  y.  Baker,  278. 

y.  Mannhein,  499. 
Cousins  y.  Railway  Co.,  362,  391. 
Couts  v.  Neer,  70,  839. 
Covanhovan  y.  Hart,  55. 
Coverdale  v.   Charlton,  671. 
Coward  y.  Baddeley,  438. 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  300,  304. 
Cowden  y.  Wright,  459. 
Cowen  V.   Simpson,  591. 
Cowles  y.  Richmond  R.  Co.,  1047. 
Cowley  y.  Davidson,  366. 

y.  Smyth,  560. 
Cowling  y.  Higginson,  688. 
Cox  y.  Burbidge,  768,  854,   855,   932. 

y.  Cooper,  501. 

y.  Glue,  667,  753. 

y.  Hart,  656. 

y.  Highley,  565. 

y.  Keahey,  255. 

V.  Lee,  496. 

v.  Leech,  915. 

y.  Munsey,  450. 

y.  Taylor,  609. 
Coxhead  y.  Richards,  531,  541. 
Coyle  v.  Pierrepont,  1034. 
Crabtree  y.  Robinson,  677. 
Craft  y.  Boite,  506. 

y.  Parker,  907. 
Crafter   y.    Metropolitan   R.    Co.,   893, 

933. 
Craft  Refrigerating  Mach.  Co.  y.  Quin 

nipiac  Brewing  Co.,  27,  898. 
Cragie  v.  Hadley,  169,  565. 
Craig  y.  Board,  914. 

'  y.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  999. 

y.  Cook,  393,  401. 


CASES    CITED.  1129 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Craig  V.  Gilbreth,  669. 

V.  Hamilton,  594. 

V.  Plumkett,  785. 

V.  Pueblo  Press  Pub.  Co.,  4S-t. 
Craigln  v.  Lovell,  103. 
Oralser  v.  Railway  Co.,  258,  262. 
Cramer  v.  Burlington,  165. 

V.  City  of  Burlington,  949. 

V.  Kester,  357. 

V.  Openstein,  131. 
Crampton  v.  Valido  ilarble  Co.,  727. 
Cranch  v.  White,  287. 
Crandell  v.  Goodrich  Transp.  Co.,  935. 
Crane  v.  Buchmann,  622. 

V.  Elder,  579. 

V.  Waters,  534-336. 
Crane  Elevator  Co.  v.  Lippert,  73,  894, 

954. 
Cranford  v.  Tyrrell,  770,  777,  78G. 
Crate  v.  Dacora,  545. 
Crater  v.  Binninger,  375. 
Cratty  v.   Bangor,  194. 
Craven  v.  Rodenhausen,  777. 

y.  Smith,  995,  1015. 
Craver  v.  Christian,  326.  1023,  1052. 
Crawford  v.  Andrews,  81. 

V.  Bynum,  669. 

V.  Clark,  1070. 

V.  Doggett,  221. 

V.  Parsons,  808. 

V.  Rambo,  761. 
Crawley  v.  Timberlake,  699. 
Crawson  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co., 

369. 
Credit  v.  Brown,  153. 
Creed  v.  Hai'tman,  214,  233,  238. 

V.  Kendall,  989. 
Cregan  v.  Marston,  1034. 
Cregin  v.  Brooklyn  Crosstown  R.  Co., 

330. 
Creighton  v.  Evans,  82. 
Cremer  v.  Humberton,  249. 
Crenshaw  v.  UUman,  228,  234,  238. 
Crescent  City  Live-Stock  Landing  & 
Slaughterhouse     Co.     v.     Butchers' 
Union  Slaughterhouse  &  Live-Stock 
Landing  Co.,  618. 
Cressey  v.  Parks,  360. 
Criner  v.  Pike,  669. 
Crispin  v.  Babbitt,  1039,  1041,  1016. 
Cristman  v.  Cristmau,  539,  542. 


Criswell   v.    Pittsbm-gh,    St.    L.   &   C. 

Ry.  Co.,  1023. 
Crittal  V.  Horner,  509. 
Croasdale  v.  Bright,  499. 
Crocker  v.  Carson,  675. 

V.  Hopps,  707. 

V.  Mann,  677. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  253. 
Crocket  v.  Beatj',  723. 
Croft  V.  Alison,  253. 

V.  Richai'dson,  353. 
Crofts  V.  Waterhouse,  1083. 
Crommelin  v.  Coxe,  794,  797. 
Cromwell  v.  County  of  Sac,  323. 
Cromwell's  Case,  486. 
Cronfelt  v.  Arrol,  392. 
Cronkhite  v.  Cronkhite,  683. 
Crooker  v.  Benton,  739. 

V.  Bragg,  82. 
Croom  V.  Chicago,  il.  &  St  P.  R.  Co., 

1091,  1093. 
Cropp  V.  Tilney,  477,  491. 
Crosby  v.  Clark,  714. 

V.  Fitch,  65,  1062. 

v.  Humphreys,  446. 

V.  Murphy,  917. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  141. 
Crosland  v.  Pottsville  Borough,  800. 
Cross  y.  Andrews,  155,  156,  158. 

V.  Barber,  726. 

V  California    St.    Cable    Ry.    Co., 
940. 

V.  Guthery,  327,  471. 

V.  Lake  Shore  &  M.   S.  Ry.  Co., 
946. 

V.  Mayor  of  Morrlstown,  793. 

V.  Rutledge,  401. 

V.  U.  S.,  414. 
Crosse  v.  Kent,  156. 
Crossley  v.  Lightowler,  769,  792. 

V.  Tomey,  777. 
Grossman  v.  Rubber  Co.,  346. 
Crosson  v.  Olson,  131. 
Crouch  V.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

1058,  1067. 
Crow  V.  Manning,  221,  222,  338,  363, 

379. 
Crowell  V.  Gleason,  634. 

V.  Jackson,  577. 
Crowhurst  v.Amersham  Burial  Board, 
833,  853. 


1130 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Crowley  v.  Page,  937. 
V.  Panama  Ky.,  330. 
V.  Sti-ouse,  S78,  968. 
Cro^vn  V.  Brown,  563. 
V.  Carriger,  578. 
V.  Leonard,  692. 
V.  Orr,  1016. 
Crowther  v.  Farrer,  314. 
Cniess  V.  Fessler,  571. 
Cmikshank  v.  Gordon,  505,  545. 
Crumble   v.    Wallsend    Local    Board, 

408. 
Ci-ump  V.  Lambert,  7.S0,  781,  787. 
Crumpley  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co., 

924,  942. 
Cruselle  v.  Pugli,  634. 
Cubit  V.  O'Dett,  55. 
Cubitt  v.  Porter,  668. 
Cudlip  v.  Rundall,  840. 
Cutf  V.  Kewark  li.  Co.,  228,  232,  236, 

238,  769. 
Culbane  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R. 

R.  Co.,  952. 
CuUen  V.  Norton,  1041. 

V.  Trustees,  286. 
Oulliford  v.  Gadd,  585. 
Culver  v.  Rhodes,  733. 
Cumberland  v.  Hitchings,  411. 

V.  Willison,  142. 
Cumberland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  United 
Electi-lc  Ry.  Co.,  89,   100,  747,   832, 
804,  865. 
Cumberland  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  186. 

V.  Myers,  243. 
Cumberland    &    O.    Canal    Corp.    v. 

Hitchings,  410-412. 
Cuming  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co.,  459, 

461. 
Cumisky  v.  City  of  Kenosha,  178,  871. 
Cummings   v.   National   Furnace   Co., 
939. 
V.  AVyman,  733. 
Cunard  Steamship  Co.  v.  Carey,  994. 
Cundy  v.  Lindsay,  654. 
Cunningham  v.  Brown,  56,  127. 

V.  East  River  Electric  Light  Co., 

418. 
V.  Fitzgerald,  691. 
V.  Hall,  817. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  Ill,  160,  232,  1036. 
V.  Seattle     Electric     Railway     & 
Power  Co.,  423. 


Cunnington  v.  Railway  Co.,  377,  573. 
Curlewis  v.  Lam-ie.  674. 
Curley  v.  Harris,  1030. 
Curr  V.  Hundley,  751. 
Cm-ran  v.  Arkansas,  111. 

V.  Galen,  646. 

V.  Weiss,  965. 
Currier  v.  Bilger,  316. 

V.  Poor,  601. 
Curry  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  198. 

v.  Walter,   532. 
Curtain  v.   Somerset,  909. 
Curtice  y.  Thompson,  797. 
Curtin  v.  Patton,  165. 
Curtis  v.  Carson,  442. 

V.  Dinneer,   263. 

V.  Eastern  Ry.,  763. 

V.  Galvin,   665. 

V.  Groat,  662. 

V.  Hubbard,  674.  075. 

V.  Janzen,  40,  273. 

V.  Kiley,  224,  229,  233. 

V.  Mussey,  475,  513. 

V.  Paggett,  692. 

V.  Rochester  &  S.  R.  Co.,  370,  935, 
1085. 

V.  Schossler,  854. 
Curtiss  V.  Ayrault,  759. 

V.  Colby,  134. 

V.  Fairbanks,   127. 

V.  Howell,  594. 

V.  Livingston,    696. 

V.  Rochester  &  S.  R.  Co.,  406. 
Cushing  V.  Adams,  145. 
Cushman  v.  Ryan,  150,  446. 
Cuthbert  v.   Galloway,  621. 
Cutler  V.  Smith,  681,  694. 
Cutter  V.  Fanning,  732. 

V.  HoAve,  632. 
Cutting    V.    Grand    Ti-unk    Ry.    Co., 
1076. 

V.  Seabury,  327. 
Cutts  V.  Spring,  670. 
Czarniecki,  Appeal  of,   769. 
Czezewzka     v.     Bentim-Bellefontaine 
Ry.  Co.,  885,  946,  975. 


D 

Dade  Coal  Co.  v.  Haslett,  166. 
Daggett  V.  Adams,  81. 
V.  Davis,  726. 


CASES    CITED. 


1131 


[Vol.  1  comprises  images  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Dahlberg  v.  Minneapolis  St.  Ry.  Co., 

957. 
Dahlsti-om  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R. 

Co.,  924. 
Dailey  v.  Houston,  217. 
Daily  v.   Van   Bentliuysen,   488. 
Dain  v.  WyekofiC,  454,  4.j5. 
Dalay  v.   Savage,   224,   796. 
Dale  V.  Hall,  <M3.  1059. 

V.   HaiTis,  539,   544. 

V.  RadclifEe,  426. 
Dalheim  v.  Lemon,  167. 
Dallas  Rapid-Ti'ansit  Ry.  Co.  v.  El- 
liott, 921. 
Dalton  V.  Angus,  235,   752. 
Dalyell  v.  Tyrer,  229,  238. 
Dambmann  v.   Schulting,  596. 
Dame   v.  Dame,   718. 
Damon  v.   Moore,  455. 

v.  Scituate,  192,  878,  879,  925. 
Damont  v.  Railroad  Co.,  957. 
Damport   v.    Sympson,   127. 
Dana   v.    Valentine,   804,    808. 
Danaher  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  798. 
Danby   v.    Beardsley,    613. 
Dand  v.  Kingscote,  688. 

v.    Sexton,   662. 
Daniel  v.   Metropolitan   R.   Co.,  832, 
935. 

V.  New  York  News  Pub.  Co.,  387, 
497,  543. 

V.   Swearengen,  448. 
Daniels  v.    Balantine,   375. 

V.   Fielding,   604. 

V.  Hallenbeck,  400. 

V.   Keokuk  Waterworks,   776. 

V.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.,  830. 

v..  Pond,  665. 

V.  Potter.  765. 
Daniel's   Adm'r  v.    Chesapeake   &   O. 

Ry.   Co,  1039. 
Danihee  v.  Hyatt,  664. 
Danleavy  v.   Stockwell,  399. 
Danner  v.  South  Carolina  R.  Co.,  822. 
Dansey  v.  Richardson,  902. 
Dantzler   v.    De   Bardeleben   Coal   & 

Iron  Co.,  1036. 
Danziger  v.  Silverthau,  704. 
Darcantel  v.   Refrigerating   Co.,   783. 
Darden  v.  Callaghan,  715. 
Dare  v.  Heatheote,  688. 
Dark  v.  Johnston,  684. 


Darley  Main  Colliery  Co.  v.  Jlitchell, 

36,   408,  411. 
Darling  v.  Bangor,  179. 

V.    New    York,    P.    &    B.    R.    Co.. 
1006. 

y.    Passadumkeag     Log    Driving 
Co.,  983. 

v.  Stanwood,  285. 

v.  Westmoreland,  951. 
Darlington  v.  Mayor.   175. 
Darnell  v.  Sallee,  612,  617. 
Dartnall  v.  Howard,  917. 
Dashwood  v.  Magniac,  701. 
Daughtry  v.  Warren,  776. 
Davenport  v.  Anderson,  361. 

V.  Pi-ince,  338. 

V.  Receiver  of  A.  &  0.  R.  Co.,  208. 
Daves  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  281. 
Davey  v.   London   &   S.   W.   Ry.   Co., 

956. 
David  V.  Park,  596,  815. 
David  Bradley  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Eagle 

Manuf'g  Co.,  323. 
Davidson  v.  Abbott,   452,  454,  459. 

V.  Burke,  313. 

V.  Cornell,  1022. 

V.   Goodall,   454. 

V.   Nichols,   908,   909. 
Davies  v.  Mann,  820,  973,  977. 

V.  Nicholas,  729. 

V.  Salomon,  489. 

V.   Snead.  530. 

v.  Williams,  070,  80O,  801. 
Davis,  The,  111. 
Davis  V.  Barger,  282. 

V.  Black,  79. 

V.  Buffum,  723,  727. 

V.  Burrell,  688. 

V.  Cardue,  353. 

V.  Carey,  504. 

V.  Central      Congregational     Soc, 
.S07. 

V.  Clark,  696,  704. 

V.  Clinton  Water  Works  Co.,  919 

V.   Davis,   592,  594,   601. 

V.  Duncan,  533,  535. 

v.  Elmore,  072. 

V.  Fuller,  82. 

v.   Gardiner,   490. 

V.    Garrett,    37(),    1063. 

y.   Gilliam,   699,  702. 

V.  Guarnieri,  58,  332,  908,  960. 


1132 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Davis  V.  Hawkins,  3-10. 

V.  Houghtelin,  279. 

V.  Jacksonville  S.   E.   Line,   1068, 
1071. 

V.  Jenkins,  581,  596. 

V.  Lemoille     County     Plank-Road 
Co.,  185. 

V.  Lewis,  506,  548. 

V.  Lottich,  733. 

V.  Marxliausen,  475,   513,  540. 

V.  Montgomery,  177. 

V.  New   York,  1041. 

V.  Nicholas,  729. 

V.  Nichols,  331. 

V.  Noake,  613. 

V.  Nuzum,  570. 

V.  Railroad     Co.,     299,     884,     924, 
1040,  1077. 

V.  Reeves,  542. 

V.  Russell,  422. 

V.  Sawyer,  780. 

V.  Shepstone,  536,  537. 

V.  Sladden,  505. 

V.  Somerville,  194. 

V.  State,   543. 

T.  Stone,  032. 

v.  Sullivan,  761. 

V.  Town  of  Seymour,  856. 

V.  Vernon,  287. 

V.  Winslow,  783. 

V.  Wood,  317. 

T.  Young,  338. 
Davison  v.  Duncan,  533. 

v.  Wilson,  688. 
Daw  V.  Eley,  532. 

V.  Swaine,  603. 
Dawe  V.  Flint,  &  P.  M.  R.  Co..  884. 

V.  Morris,   24,    88,    583,    584,   594, 
600. 
Dawkins  v.  Antrobus,  148. 

V.  Lord  Paulet,  529. 

V.  Lord   Rokehy,  119,  527,  530. 

V.  Prince   Edward    of    Saxe-Wei- 
niar,  119,  527. 
Dawling  v.  Wenman,  127. 
Dawson  v.  McCleary,  073. 

V.  Schloss,  617. 

V.  State,  166. 

V.  Tremaine,  704. 

V.  Vansandau,  613. 
Day  V.  Bream,  483. 

V.  Brownsrigg,  87. 


Day  V.  Edwards,  19. 

V.  H.  C.  Akeley  Lumber  Co.,  845, 
876,  949. 

V.  Highland  St.  Ry.  Co.,  194,  973. 

V.  Milford,  837. 

V.  Woodworth,  382,  392,  743. 
Dayton  v.    New   York,    L.    E.    &   W. 
R.  Co.,  922. 

V.  Pease,  287. 
Deacon  v.  Greenfield,  45. 
Dean,  In  re,  92. 

V.  Branthwaite,  247. 

V.  Brock,  290. 

V.  Hogg,  442. 

V.  Nelson,  167. 

V.  Newhall,  345. 

V.  Peel,  451,  453. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  219,  220,  242,  921. 

V.  Randolph,  849. 

V.  Raplee,  435,  445. 

V.  St.  Paul  Union  Depot  Co.,  262, 
1088. 

V.  State,  444. 

V.  Taylor,  442. 
Deane  v.  Clayton,  768,  829,  886. 
Deans  v.  Railroad  Co.,  831. 
Dearborn  v.  Dearborn,  18. 
Dearboum  v.  Union  Nat.  Bank.  727. 
De  Armond  v.  Armstrong,  485. 
De  Bolt  V.  Railway  Co..  896. 
Debs,  In  re,  359. 
De  Camp  v.  Railway  Co.,  255. 
Decatur  v.  Fisher,  397. 
Decatur  G.   L.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Howell, 

410. 
Deck  v.  Dyson,  857. 
Decker  v.  City  of  Scranton,  178. 

v.  Gammon,  855. 

V.  Hardin,  575. 

V.  Mathews,  739. 
De  Courcey  v.  Cox.  122,  124. 
De  Crespigny  v.  Wellesley,  548. 
Deeds  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co., 

975. 
Deeley  v.  Dwight,  716. 
Deering  v.  Austin,   735. 
Deford  v.  Miller,  492. 
De  Forest  v.  Jewett.  332. 
De  Forrest  v.  Wright,  231. 
Defries  v.  Davis,  161. 
Degg  V.   Midland   Ry.   Co..   281,  991. 
Degnan  v.  Ransom,  912. 


CASES    CITED.  113c 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  incKisive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


De  Graw  v.  Elmore,  25. 

De  Gray  v.  Aiken,  891. 

De  Harm  v.   Mexican  Nat.   Ry.  Co., 

104. 
De  Haven  v.  Helvie,  457.  460. 
DeM-ing  v.  Comstock,  938,  940. 
DeiM  V,  Ottenvllle,  255. 
Delacroix  v.   Thevenot,  480,   481. 
Delaney  v.  Kaetel,  486. 
Delaware,  The,  1063. 
Delaware  Ins.  Co.  v.  Croasdale,  480, 

522. 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashley, 
1058. 
V.  Converse,  933,  953.  956. 
V.  Hefferan,  884. 
V.  Salmon,  72,  846. 
V.  Shelton,  882. 
Delaware  R.   Co.   v.   Commonwealth, 

186. 
Delaware    River    Iron    Ship-Building 

Co.  V.  Nuttall,  1003. 
Delaware   &  A.   Tel.    &  Tel.   Co.   v. 

State,  302. 
Delaware  &  R.  Canal  Co.  v.  Lee,  100, 
143,  186. 
V.  Wright,   336,   412. 
Da  Lee  v.  Blackburn,  568. 
Delemater  v.  Russell,  476. 
Delie   v.    Chicago   &   N.    W.    R.    Co., 

405.     ■ 
Delisser  v.  Towne.  607. 
Dells  V.  StoUenwerk,  279. 
Delude  V.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  1052. 
Delz  V.  Winfree,  146,  646,  648,  650. 
Delzell  V.   Indianapolis  «&  C.  R.   Co., 

185. 
De  Mahy  v.  Morgan's  L.  &  T.  R.  R. 

&  S.  S.  Co..  989. 
De  Marcho  v.  Builders'  Iron  Foundry, 

1040,  1045. 
Demarest  v.   Hardham,   749,   777. 

v.,  Keefe,  769. 
De  May  v.  Roberts,  85,  94,  147. 
De  Medina  v.  Grove,  513,  604. 
Demick  v.  Chapman,  669. 
Deming    v.    Merchants'    Cotton-Press 

&  Storage  Co.,  63,  1066. 
Demming  v.  Darling,  580. 
Dempsey  v.  Chambers,  43,  47. 
V.  City   of  Rome,  175. 
V.  Lepp,  609. 


Den  V.  Kenney,  701. 
Den  Bleyker  v.   Gaston,  262. 
Denby  v.   Wilier,   142. 
Dench  v.  Walker,  730. 
Denmann  v.  Railway  Co.,  370. 
Dennehey  v.  Woodsum,  629. 
Denning  v.  Darling,  507. 

V.  Gould,  997. 
Dennis  v.  Clarke,  461. 
V.  Eckhardt,   767,   769. 
V.  Han-is,  979. 

V.  Johnson,  481,  508,   525,  545. 
Denny  v.  Railroad  Co.,  63,  375. 
Densmore  v.  Cowan,  165. 
Denson  v.  Ham,  131. 
Dent  V.  Auction  Mart  Co.,  750. 

V.  Chiles,  728. 
Denton   v.    Great    Northern    Ry.    Co., 

269. 
Denver,  S.  P.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wood- 
ward, 330,  1085. 
Denver   Tramway   Co.    v.   Reid,    831, 

1084. 
Denver,  T.  &  Ft.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Dotson, 

361. 
Denver  &  B.  P.  Rapid-Transit  Co.   v. 

Dwyer,  055,  975. 
Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  De  Graff, 
846. 
V.  Harris,  172,  196,  384,  396,  687. 
V.  Morton,  846,  965. 
V.  Ryan,  942. 
Deo  V.  Van  Valkenburgh,  417. 
De  Pew  V.  Robinson,  505. 
Depierris  v.  JIattern,  805. 
Deppe  V.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  B.  Co., 

1055. 
Derby's  Adm'r  v.  Kentucky  Cent.  K. 

Co.,  823. 
Derecourt  v.  Oorbishley,  427. 
De  Roo  v.  Foster,  164. 
Derosa  v.  Hamilton,  345. 
Derosia  v.  Winona  &  St   P.   R.  Co., 

1070. 
Derry  v.  Flitner,  378. 

V.  Peek,  566-569,  578. 
De  S.  V.  De  S.,  431,  433. 
Des  Jardins  v.   Thunder   Bay   River 

Boom  Co.,  673. 
Desmond  v.  Brown,  479. 
De  Steiger  v.  Railroad  Co.,  303. 
Detroit  v.  Blackeby,  184. 


1134  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Deti'oit  V.  Osborne,  176. 

V.  Putnam,  176,  185. 
Detroit  Daily  Post  Co.  v.  McArthur, 

396. 
Detroit  &  C.  Co.  v.  McArthur,  169. 
Detroit  &  JI.  K.  Co.  v.  Van  Steinburg, 

810,  822,  933. 
Dettra  v.  Kestner,  270. 
Devare  v.  United  States,  082. 
Devereux  v.   Barclay,   35,   718,   719. 
Devery  v.  Grand  Canal  Co.,  338. 
Deville  v.  Railroad  Co.,  257. 
DevUn  v.  Gallagher,  926. 

V.  Smith,  894,  895,  1033,  1035. 

V.  Snellenburg,  061. 
De  W^ahl  v.  Braune,  IGO. 
Dewell  V.  Moxon,  719. 

V.  Sanders,  775,  854. 
Dewey  v.  Detroit,  175. 

V.  Detroit  G.   H.    &   M.   Ky.   Co., 
1012,  1015,  1043. 

V.  Leonard,  842. 
Dewire  v.  Bailey,  870. 
Dexter  v.  Alfred,  674. 

V.  Cole,  661. 

V.  Hari'ison,  484,  485. 

T.  Riverside  &  O.  Mills,  690,  758. 

V.  Spear,  360,  494,  513,  514. 
Dexterville  Manuf'g  &  Boom   Co.  v. 

Case,  208. 
De  Yampert  v.  Johnson,  131. 
Deyo  V.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  1085. 
Dhein  v.  Beuscher,  669,  671. 
Dicas  v.  Lord  Brougham,  119. 
Dick  V.  Railroad  Co.,  951. 
Dickermau  v.   St.  Paul  Union  Depot 

Co.,  1087. 
Dickey  v.  Franklin  Bank,  725. 

V.  Maine  Tel.  Co.,  145. 
Dickins  v.   New   York  Cent.   R.   Co., 

334. 
Dickinson  v.  Barber,  157,  159,  482. 

V.  Boyle,  70,  389.  003. 

V.  Grand  Junction- Canal  Co.,  758. 

V.  Hart,  379. 

V.  Merchants'   Elevator  Co.,  710. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  334. 

v.  Worcester,  760. 
Dickinson's  Case,  963. 
Dicks  V.  Brooks,  551,  552,  .153. 
Dickson  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co., 
220. 


Dickson  v.  Dickson,  630. 

V.  Omaha  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  921, 

922. 
V.  Eeuter's  Tel.  Co.,  568,  566,  567, 

900. 
V.  State,  482. 
V.  Waldron,  243,  263. 
Dieboldt  v.  United  States  Baking  Co., 

996. 
Diehl  V.  Friester,  417. 
Dierks  v.  Commissioners,  783,  784. 
Dietrich  v.  Ely,  399. 
Dietus  V.  Fuss,  726,  727. 
Dill  v.  McCloskey,  411. 
Dillard  v.  OolUns,  512,  524. 
Dilley  v.  Wilkes  Barre  &  K.  P.   Ry. 

Co.,  787. 
■Dillingham  v.  Crank,  206,  211,  B64. 

v.  Teeling,  893. 
Dillon  v.  Acme  Oil  Co.,  758. 
v.  Bumham,  164. 
v.  Connecticut  R.  R.  Co.,  197. 
V.  Washington  Gas  Light  Co.,  186. 
Di  Marcho  v.  Builders'  Iron  Foundry, 

943. 
Dimmitt  v.  Railway  Co.,  242. 
Dimock  v.  U.  S.  Nat.  Bank,  741. 
Dingle  v.  Hare,  586. 
Directors,  etc.,  v.  Jackson,  931. 
Directors,  etc.,  of  Central  Co.  v.  Kisch, 

580,  596. 
Directors,    etc.,    of    Swindon   Water- 
works Co.  V.  Proprietors  of  Wilts  & 
B.  Canal-Nav.  Co.,  755. 
Distler  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  964. 
District  of  Columbia  v.  W.  G.  Co.,  850. 

v.  Woodbury,  177. 
Ditberner  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  1055. 
Ditcham  v.  Bond,  450. 
Dittman  t.  Repp,  805,  806. 
Dittman  Boot  &  Shoe  Co.  v.  Keokuk 

&  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  1078. 
Dixon  V.  Allen,  549. 

V.  Bell,  266,  406,  852,  907,  932. 

V.  Clow,  79.  677. 

V.  Duke,  564. 

V.  Dunham,  1069. 

V.  Holden,  3.53. 

V.  Parsons,  544. 

V.  Pluns,  837,  9-39,  963. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  320,  1037,  1042. 


CASKS    CITED.  1135 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Dixon  V.  Smitb,  542. 

V.  White  Sewing  Mach.  Co.,  050, 
662. 
Doane  v.  Anderson,  029. 
Dobbin  v.  Cordiner,  220. 
Dobbins  v.  Brown,  850,  943. 
Dobell  V.   Stevens,  578,  597. 
Dobson  V.  Cothran,  461. 
V.  Thornistone,  500. 
Dockerty  v.  Hutson,  856. 
Dr.  Groenvelt's  Case,  912. 
Dodge  v.  Colby,  103,  552,  553. 

V.  County  Commissioners,  142,  143, 

351. 
V.  Davis,  696,  700. 
V.  Essex  Co.,  140. 
V.  Granger,  174. 
Doe  V.  Bridges,  98. 

V.  Roe,  468. 
Doedt  V.  Wiswell,  331. 
Doellner  v.  Tynan,  148. 
Doerlng  v.  State,  428. 
Doggett  V.  Emerson,  570. 

V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co..  375,  972. 
Doherty  v.  Allman,  704. 

V.  Inhabitants  of  Braintree,    179, 

187. 
V.  Lord,  389. 
Dolahanty  v.  Lucey,  660. 
Dolbeer  v.  Livingston,  40,  273. 
Dole  V.  Erskine,  203,  442. 
V.  Insurance  Co.,  76. 
V.  Lyon,  .'48. 
Dollard  v.  Roberts,  462,  870. 
Dolloff  V.  Curran,  319. 

V.  Inhabitants  of  Ayer,  174. 
Dolloway  v.  Turrill,  518. 
Dolph  V.  Ferris,  855. 
Donaghue  v.  GafCy,  371,  522. 
Donahoe  r.  Richards,  118,  120,  401. 
V.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
150,  170. 
Donald  v.   Chicago,   B.  &  Q.  R.   Co., 
314. 
V.  Suckling,  725. 
Donaldson  v.  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  962. 
Donford  v.  Ellys,  687. 
Donlin  v.  McQuade,  729. 
Donnegan  v.  Erhardt,  922. 
DonneU  v.  Jones,  349,  380,  392. 
Donnelly  v.  Tripp,  181. 


Donoghue  v.  Hayes,  482. 
Donohue  v.  Woodbury,  315. 
Donovan  v.  Laing,  244. 

V.  McAlpin,  127,  136,  13a 

V.  Oakland     &    B.     Rapid-Transit 
Co.,  233,  235. 
Dooley  v.  Citj-  of  Meriden,  178. 

V.  Mobile  &  O.   K.  Co.,  197. 

V.  17,500  Head  of  Sheep,  4,  212. 
Dooling  V.  Budget  Pub.  Co.,  5.J4. 
Doolittle  V.  Shaw,  730. 
Dooly  V.  Stringham,  702. 
Dooner  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co., 

301,  945,  993,  995. 
Doran  v.  Eaton,  578,  593,  600. 

V.  Flood,  922. 
Dorchester  &  JI.  Bank  v.  New  Eng- 
land Bank,  285. 
Dorgau  v.  Telegraph  Co.,  899. 
Dorman  v.  Ames,  405,  9.50. 
DorneU  v.  .lones,  629. 
Dorr  V.  Beck,  362. 
Dorris  y.  Sullivan,  690. 
Dorsey  v.   Moore,  699,  701,  702. 
Dosdall  V.  Olmsted  Co.,  184. 
Doss  V.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.,  1082. 
Dotly  V.  Campbell,  579. 
Doty  V.  Chicago,  St.  P.  &  K.   C.  Ry. 

Co.,  319. 
Dougan   v.    Champlain    Transp.    Co., 

949,  1010. 
Dougherty  v.  Railroad  Co.,  957. 

V.  Stepp,  060-662. 
Doughty  V.  Penobscot  L.  D.  Co.,  1046. 
Douglas  V.  Douglas,  495. 

V.  Hannibal  ct  St.  J.  R.  Co.,  1075. 

V.  Shumway,  085. 

V.  Sioux  City  St.  Ry.  Co.,  1084. 
Douglass  V.  Kraft,  7.'!!). 

V.  State.  f!75. 

T.  Stephens,  255,  278. 
Dovaston  x.  Payne,  08!l. 
Dow  V.  King,  .'!46. 

V.  Memphis  ^:  L.  R.  Co.,  207,  208, 
Dowd  V.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  1040. 

V.  Chicago,   M.   &   St.   P.  Ry.   Co., 
10S2. 
Dowdell  V.  King,  384,  405. 
Dowdy  V.  Georgia  R.  Co.,  944. 
Dowell  V.  Guthrie,  201,  851,  935. 
Dowling  V.  Allen,   1004. 
Downer  v.  Lent,  123. 


1136  CASES,  CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Downey  v.  Pittsburg,  A.  &  M.  Trac- 
tion Co.,  942. 
V.  Sawyer,  lOOG,  1054. 
Downinjr  v.    City   of   Oskaloosa,   744, 

.ste. 

Y.  Diaz,  Ojii. 

V.  JIcFadclen,  120. 

V.  Mason  Co.,  183. 
Downs  V.  Finnegan,  27,  708. 

V.  Hawley,  524. 
Downshire  v.  Sandys,  703. 
Dox  V.  Postmaster  General,  110. 
Doyle  V.  Chicago,  St.  P.  &  K.  C.  Ry. 
Co.,  858. 

V.  Fitchbui-g    R.    Co.,    300,    1079, 
1081. 

V.  Jessup.  452. 

V.  Kiser,  1U77. 

V.  Lord,  227. 

V.  Railway.  Co.,  227,  244,  411,  830, 
831,  948,  1015. 
Dozier  v.  Pilot,  715. 
Dralie,  Ex  parte,  344. 

V.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  761. 

V.  Gilmore,  334. 

V.  Grant,  594. 

V.  Kiely,  73,  377,  382. 

V.  Lowell,  766,  837. 

V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  190. 

V.  Shorter,  718. 

V.  State,  522. 

V.  WeUs,  683. 
Draper  v.  Fulkes,  218,  731. 
Drax  V.  Scroope,  917. 
Dressel  v.  Shippman,  482,  485,  545. 
Dresser  v.  Blair,  446. 
Drew  V.  Cole,  762. 

V.  Hicks,  792. 

V.  New  River  Co.,  145,  186. 

V.  Peer,  247,   263. 
Drewell  v.  Towler,  690. 
Dreyfus  v.  Aul,  612. 
Drieh  v.  Davenport,  4(30. 
Driggs  v.  Burton,  634. 
Drinlihorn  v.  Bubel,  440,  442. 
Drinkwater  v.  Dinsmore,  381,  .399. 

V.  Saiible,  802. 
Driscoll  V.  City  of  Taimton,  298. 

V.  Com.,   914. 

Y.  Market  St  Cable  R.  Co.,  929. 
Drohan  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co., 
311. 


Drown  v.  Allen,  549. 

V.  Smith,  701,  702. 
Drummond  v.  Piffou,  606. 
Drymala  v.  Thompson,  993. 
Dubach  v.  Hannibal  &  St  J.  R.  Co., 

787. 
Dube  V.  City  of  Lewiston,  1043. 
Duberley  v.  Gunning,  486. 
Dublin,  W.  &  W.  R.   Co.  v.  Slaitery, 

884,  942,  956,  967,  971,  1087. 
Dubois  V.  Beaver,  668. 
Du  Bois  V.  Decker,  909,  914,  978. 
Dubois  v.  Keats,  608. 

V.  Sistare,   707. 
Du  Bois  Borough  v.  Baker,  471. 
Dubose  V.  Marx,  214. 
Du  Bost  V.  BeiTesford,  398. 
Duck  V.  Mayeu,  345,  346. 
Duckett  V.  Pool,  449. 
Dudley  v.  Brigys.  554. 

V.  Mayhew,  97. 

V.  Westcott,  985. 
Dueber   Watch-Case  Manuf'g  Co.   v. 

E.  Howard  Watch  Co.,  648. 
Duff  V.  Hutchinson,  315,  320. 

v.  Williams,  597. 
Duffield  V.  Rosenzweig,  656. 
Duffies  V.  Duffies,  468. 
Duf  our  v.  Anderson,  670. 
Dugan  V.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry. 

Co.,  942. 
Dugan  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  925. 
Duggan  V.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.,  262,  279, 
368,  423. 

V.  Wright,  707,  715,  726,  728. 
Duinneen  v.  Rich,  683. 
Duke  V.  Harmer,  522. 

V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  399. 

v.  Vincent,  679. 
Duke  of  Brunswick  v.  Harmer,  481. 

V.  King  of  Hanover,  114. 
Dumas  v.  Stone,  1020. 
Dumesnil  v.   Dupont,  802,  804. 
Dumont  v.  Kellogg,  82. 

v.  Smith,  383. 
Dun  v.   City   Nat.   Bank   of  Birming- 
ham, 269,  271,  285,  303. 

v.  Hall,  264,  475. 
Dunbar  v.  Railway  Co.,  308. 

V.  Tlrey,  310. 
Duncan  v.  Com.,  200. 

V.  Flndlater,  138. 


CASES    CITED. 


1137 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Duncan  v.  Griswold,  553,  612,  625. 

V.  Hayes,  781. 

V.  Markley,  413. 

V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  924. 

V.  Spear,  713. 

V.  Thwaites,  532. 
Duncombe  v.  Felt,  701,  703. 
Dundee   Mortgage   &  Trust   Inv.    Co. 

V.  Hughes,  133,  905. 
Dunham  v.  Powers,  526. 

V.  RacklifC,  951. 
Dunham   Towing  &  Wrecking   Co.   v. 

Dandelin,  968. 
Dunklee  v.  Goodenough,  323. 
Dunlap  V.  Glidden,  56,  127. 

V.  Hedges,  703. 

V.  Knapp,  127,  128. 

V.  Linton,  338,  454. 

V.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  1079. 

V.  Snyder,  800. 
Dunleavy  v.  Stockwell,  843. 
Dunlop  V.  Munroe,  137,  138. 
Dunman  v.  Bigg,  543. 

V.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  754. 
Dunn  V.  Birmingham  Canal  Nav.  Co., 

V.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  R.  Co., 
402. 

V.  City  of  Austin,  805. 

V.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  1084. 

V.  Hartford,  etc.,  Co.,  46. 

V.  Mellon,  128,  136. 
Dunning  v.  Austin,  726. 

V.  Bird,  152,  153. 
Dun.sbaeh  v.  Hollister,  801. 
Dunseath  v.  Pittsburg,  A.  &  M.  Trac- 
tion Cc,  800. 
Dunsee  v.  Norden,  488. 
Dunstan  v.  Higgins,  322. 
DuDSton  V.  Paterson,  426. 
Dunton  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.,  586. 
Dupee  V.  Lentine,  445. 
Durand  v.  Borough  of  Ansonia,  140. 
Durant   v.    Lexington   Coal   Min.   Co., 

822,   923,  926. 
Durgin  v.  Kcnnett,  853,  923. 
Duryea  v.  Smith,  681. 
Dusenbury  v.  Kielly,  36. 
Dushane  v.  Benedict,  399. 
Dustin  V.  CoA\diy,  688. 
Dusy  V.  Helm,  12.3. 
PuthiG  V.  Town  of  Washburn,  175. 

LAW  OF  TOUTS — 72 


Dutro  V.  Wilson,  703. 
Dutton  V.  Gerrish,  227. 
Duval  V.  Davy,  549. 

V.  Hunt.  941. 
Duvall  V.  Peach,  246. 

v.  Waters,  705. 
Dwight   V.    Germania    Life    In.<!.    Co., 

952. 
Dwinelle  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  It.  R. 

R.  Co.,  241,  244,  279. 
Dwyer  v.  American  Exp.  Co.,  1043. 

T.  Railroad  Co.,  400,  415. 
Dyckman  v.  Valiente,  733. 
Dye  v.  Leatherdale,  680. 

V.  Vh-ginia  Ry.,  1087. 
Dyer  v.  Morris,  511. 
Dygert  v.  Bradley,   53. 

V.  Schenck,  765,  771,  792. 
Dynamite  Case,  867. 


E 


Eagan  v.  Murray,  4.57. 
Eagar  v.  Dyott,  608. 
Eager  v.  Grimwood,  459. 
Eagle  Packet  Co.  v.  De  Fries,  318. 
Eaglesfield  v.    llarqiiis  of   Londonder- 
ry, 289,  582. 
Eagleton  v.  Gutteridge,  675. 
Eakin  v.  Brown,  226. 
Eames  v.  Prentice,  662. 

V.  Whittaker,  539. 
Eanes  v.  State,  428. 
Earing  v.  Lansingh,  878. 
Earl  V.  Crouch,  839. 

v.  De  Hart,  802. 
Earle  v.  Holderness,  743. 
Earn  V.  City  of  Chicago,  C89. 
Earl  of  Bristol  v.  Wilsmore,  72S. 
Earl    of    Buckinghamshire    v.    Drury, 

164. 
Earl  of  Dartmouth  v.  Spittle,  671. 
Elnrl  of  Leicester  v.  Walter,  548. 
Earl  of  Lonsdale  v.  Nelson,  746,  800. 
Earl  of  Manchester  v.  Vale,  407. 
Enrl  of  Noithampton's  Case,  483. 
Earl  of  Ripou  v.  Hobart,  804. 
Earp  V.  Lee,  802. 
Eason  V.  Westbrook,  639. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  991,  992,  1035. 
Eastern  Counties  Ry.  v.  Broom,  45. 


1138  CASES    CITKD. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Eastin  v.  Bank  of  Stockton,  609. 
Eastman   v.    Amoskeag   Manuf'g   Co., 
789,  797. 

V.  Commissioueis,   352. 

V.  Grant,  344. 

V.  Meredith,   177,  182. 

V.  Rice,  677. 

V.  Richmond  Highway  Board,  G90. 
Easton  v.  Railroad  Co.,  208,  791. 
Easton  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Central  R.  Co., 

756. 
East  Rivei   Gaslight  Co.   v.   Donnelly, 

118. 
East  St.   Louis  Connecting  Ry.  Co.  v. 

O'Hara,  824,  802,  929. 
East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.    Ry.   Co.  v. 
Aiken,  978. 

V.  Bridges,  1028. 

V.  Fleetwood,  402,  1091. 

V.  Hall,  72. 

v.  Hesters,    72. 

V.  Hyde,  1093. 

V.  Kane,  242,  203,  948. 

V.  Kelly,  1070. 

V.  Lilly,  334. 

V.  Lockhart,   378. 

V.  Markens,  982. 

V.  Perkins,  994. 

V.  Sellers,  807. 

V.  Turvaville,    1006. 

V.  Watson,  1088. 
East  Tennessee  &  W.  N.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Collins,  908. 

V.  Winters,   16.".,   873. 
Eastwood  V.  Holmes,  484. 
Eaton  V.  Ayery,  588. 

V.  Hill,  163. 

V.  .Tohns,    496. 

V.  Lyman,    366. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  68,   233,  234,  237, 
791. 

V.   Sims,    3.j2. 

V.  Winnie,  571.   5!)U,  597. 
Eberly  v.  Rupp,  608. 
Eby  V.  Lebanon  Co.,  2,30. 
Eccles  V.  Radam,  519. 

V.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co..  319. 
Echols,  Ex  parte,  351. 
Eckensberger  v.  Amend,  878. 
Eckerson  v.   Orippen,   683. 
Eckert  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1.50,  201,  967. 


Eddy  V.  Adams,  1012. 

V.  Lafayette,   206,    364,   844,   846. 

V.  Powell,   860. 

V.  Prentice,  993,   995. 

V.  Rogers,   1050. 

V.  Wallace,  381. 
Edelmann  v.  Transfer  Co.,  45. 
Eden  v.  Lexington  &  F.  R.  Co..  327. 
Edgar  v.   McCutchen,  511. 
Edgerly  v.  Wbalan,  727,  735. 
Edgerton  v.  Huff,  755. 

V.  New   York   &   H.    R.    Co..    939. 
Edgington  v.    Fitzmaurice,   580,   589. 
Edison   Electric    Light   Co.   v.    Buck- 
eye Electric  Co..  355. 
Edmondson  v.   City  of  Moberly,  789. 

V.  Machell,  449,  450,  452,  454. 

V.  Xuttal,  743. 

V.  Railroad  Co..  237. 
Edsall  V.   Brooks.  533. 
Edwards  v.  Clay,  337. 

V.  Common-Council  of  Village  of 
Three  Rivers,  72,  361,  868, 
947. 

V.  Davis,   349. 

V.  Ferguson,   120. 

v.  Halinder,  688. 

V.  Kansas  City  Times,  522. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  45,  1*38,  169,  224, 
254,  279,  880. 

V.  San  Jose  Print.  &  Pub.  Soc., 
503,  507,   548. 

V.  Society,  537. 

V.  Sonoma  Valley   Bank,  707: 

V.  Woodbury,  338. 

V.  Wooton,   482. 
Eells  V.   St.   Louis,   K.    &   N.  W.   Ry. 

Co.,   303. 
E.  G.  Blackslee  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  E.  G. 

Blackslee's  Sons  Iron  Works,  759. 
Eggleston  V.   Railroad   Co.,   681,  683. 
Eggman  v.  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  R. 

Co.,  886. 
Egyptian  Monarch,  The,  1041. 
Ehmcke  v.  Porter,  1027. 
Ehrgott  v.  City  of  New  York,  181,  374, 

377,  378,  381. 
Ehrisman  v.  Railway  Co.,  883. 
Ehrman,  The  Virginia,  214. 
Ehrman  v.  Railroad  Co..  403. 
Eichert  v.  Scbaffer,  321. 


CASES    CITKD. 


1139 


[Vol.   1  coiupi-isi.'.s  pages  l-(;52.  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Eighmy  v.   Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,   !»14. 
Eilenberger   v.    Protective    Mut.    Eire 

Ins.   Co.,  270. 
Eisenhart  v.  Ordean,  392. 
Ekins  V.   Tresham,  578. 
Elder  v.  Bemis,  118. 

V.  Lykens  Val.   Coal  Co.,  66. 
Eldridge  v.   Adams,   735. 

V.  Atlas  Steamship   Co.,  1028. 

T.  ^Minneapolis   &    St.    L.    R.    Co., 
1089. 
Electric   Ry.   Co.   v.    Sheltou,   864. 
Elerick  v.   Raid,   579. 
Elgin  V.  Kimball,  178.  179. 
Ells  V.  Barlow.  G02. 
Elkington  v.  Holland,  917. 
Elkins  V.    Boston   &  A.    R.   Co.,    872. 
882. 
V.  McKean,  90S. 
Ellegard  v.  Ackland,  260. 
Ellet  V.   St.  Louis,  etc.,  Co.,  70. 
ElUnger  v.  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R. 

Co.,  1092. 
Ellington    v.    Beaver    Dam    Lumlicr 
Co.,   1038. 

T.  Ellington,   452— 1.j4,   4.j6,  4.57. 

V.  Taylor,  484. 
Elliot  V.  Brown,  442. 

V.  Railway  Co..  l(i."i(). 
EUiotson  V.  Feetliara,  7(!7.  774, 
Elliott   V.   Allen,    213,   429. 

V.  Hall,  895. 

V.  Hayden,  342,  721. 

V.  .Taekson,   297. 

V.  Nieklin,    4.jS. 

V.  I'hiladelpliia,   174. 

V.  Porter,   342. 

V.  I'ray,  895. 

T.  Railway  Co.,  9."i6,  9.-.S.  9(!6. 

Y.  Rosaell,  1062. 

V.  Van  Buren,  935. 
Ellis  V.  American  Tel.  Co.,  302. 

T.  Buzzell,   522,   935. 

V.  Clemens,   754. 

Y.  Cleveland,  200. 

T.  Gas  Co.,  2:.!8. 

V.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  884. 

V.  Iowa  City,   140. 

V.  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R. 
Co.,  794. 

V.  Loftus   Iron  Co.,   855. 

y.   .Vewbrough,   21*5,   595. 


Ellis  V.  Sheffield  Gas  Consumers'  Co., 
186,  233. 

V.  Turner,    251. 

V.  W^hitehead,  486,  519,  520. 

V.  Wire,  740. 

V.  Wren,  691. 
Ellis'  Estate,  In  re.  322. 
Ellison  V.  Barker,  592. 

V.  Commissioners,  804,  805. 
Elmer  v.  Locke,  1052. 
Elsee  v.    Smith,   606,   609,  613. 
I'ilwell  V.  Martin,  165. 
lOlwes  V.  Maw.  702. 
Ely  V.  Davis,  (i25. 

V.  Ehle,    665. 

V.  Parsons,  138,  139. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  949. 

V.  Supervisors,  802. 

V.  Thompson,   425. 
Elyton  Land  Co.  v.  Mingea,  983. 
Embrey  v.   Owen,  79,   85,   755. 
I<]niorson  v.  Cochran,   608,  624. 
Emery  v.  Chesley,  421. 

v.  Ginnan,  612,  634. 

v.  Gowen,  452,  453. 

V.  Hapgood,  42p. 

v.  Lowell,    170. 

V.  Minneapolis     Industrial     Expo- 
sition,  837,  890,   955 

v.  Raleigh,  746. 
Bmei-y's  Case,  115. 
lOmma  Cotton-Seed   Oil  Co.   v.    Hale, 

1017. 
Emmens  v.  Pottle,  482. 
Emmerson  v.  Marvel,  511. 
Emmett  v.   Lyne,  420. 
Emory  v.  Hazard  Powder  Co.,  807. 
Empire  Tea  Co.  v.  Wamsutta  Oil  Co.. 

1068. 
lOmry    v.    Roanoke    Nav.    &    Water- 

Power  Co.,  3,  066,  824,  826,  849. 
Enders  v.  Beck,  220. 
Endsley  v.  .lohns,  590.  596. 
Enfield  v.  Colburn,  591. 
Engel  V.   Eureka  Club.  232,  234,  235. 

V.  Scott    &   H.    Lumber   Co..    712. 

v.  Smith,  970. 
Engelhardt  v.   State,  437. 
I'jugland  V.  Bourke,  523. 

V.  Cowley,   706,   719.  723,   727. 
Engleken  v.   Hilgcr,  166. 
English  V.   Major,  621. 


1140 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  incUisive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


English  V.  Powell,  733. 

V.  Progress  Electric  Light  &  Mo- 
tor Co.,  807. 
Engstrom  v.   Sherburne,   638. 
Enos  V.  Enos,  519,  520,  549. 
Bnright  v.  Toledo,  A.  A.  &  N.  M.  Ry. 

Co.,  192. 
Bnsley  v.  Nashville,  694. 
Ensley  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chewulng,  824. 
Entick  V.  Carrington,  660,  662. 
Entrick  v.  Carrington,  124. 
E.   O.    Stanard  Milling  Co.   v.  White 

Line   Cent.    Transit   Co.,   299,   1070. 
Episcopal    Academy   v.    Philadelphia, 

188. 
Epstein  V.  Meyer  Bros.  Drug  Co.,  710. 
Erber  v.  Dun,  499.  541. 
Brhardt  v.  Board,  691. 
Erickson  v.  Bennet,  597. 

V.  Duluth  &  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  930. 
V.  Fisher,  596. 

V.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  1001. 
ICrie  V.  Schwingle,  188. 
Erie  City  Iron  Works  v.  Barber,  169. 
Erie  City  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Schuster, 

170,  988. 
Erie  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.   Grimes,  975, 

979. 
Ernst  V.  Hudson  E.  R.  Co.,  929. 
Erving  v.  City  of  Ne-w  York,  118. 
Erwin  v.  Dezell,  505. 
V.  Olmstead,  668. 
Eshleman  v.  Martic  Tp.,  762. 
Eskridge's  Ex'rs  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  O. 

&  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  824. 
Eslava  V.  .Tones,  130. 
Esmay  v.  Fanning,  726. 
Esrey  v.   Southern  Pac.   Co.,   339. 
V.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  197. 
Essex   County  Electric  Co.  v.   Kelly, 

lOlG. 
Esson  V.  Wattier,  787. 
Estell  V.   Myers,   594. 
Estelle  V.  Village  of  Lake  Crystal,  184. 
Estey  V.  Smith,  55,  773. 
Estill  V.   Fort,  222. 
Esty  V.  Baker,  665. 
V.  Wilmot,  632. 
Etchison  v.  Pergerson,  516,  521,  539. 
Eten  V.  Luyster,  50,  37(>,  377. 
Etter  V.  O'Niel.   132. 
Euler  V.   Sullivan,  777. 


Evaiis  V.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  931. 
V.  Carbon  Hill  Coal  Co.,  1041. 
V.  Chamberlain,  990,  1009. 
V.  City  of  Huntington,  402. 
V.  Collins,  566. 
V.  Edmonds,  563. 
V.  Elliott,  680. 
v.  Fertilizing  Co.,   805. 
V.  Harries,  387. 
V.  Mason,  730. 
V.  I'hiladelphia  Club,  149. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  296,  790,  791,  797, 

881,  1039,  1074,  1088. 
V.  Reading     Chemical     Fertilizing 

Co.,  806. 
V.  Waite,  203. 
V.  Walton,  450,  451. 
Evans  Co.  v.  Reeves,  (Jo4. 
Evansville    &   C.    Ry.    Co.    v.    Keith, 
1066. 
V.  Wolf,  988. 
Evansville   &    I.    R.    Co.    v.    Darting, 

1092. 
Evansville   &   R.    R.    Co.   v.   Barnes, 
1008,  1020,  1081. 
V.  Henderson,  1023,   1039. 
V.    Maddux,   261. 
Evansville  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Claspell, 
241,  242. 
V.  Griffin,  890.   894. 
V.  Holcomb,  391. 
V.  Krapf,  860.  942. 
V.  McKee.  253. 
V.  Talbot,  629. 
Evarts  v.   Kiehl,  527. 

V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  198, 
975. 
Evelyn  v.  Raddish,  704. 
Evening  .Journal  Ass'n  v.  McDermott, 

169. 
Everett    v.    City    of    Council    Bluffs, 
177,  789, 
V.  Coffin,  734. 

V.  Henderson,   42.j,   426,  606,   630, 
V.  Oregon,  S.  L,  &  V.  N,  Ry.  Co., 
890,  1081. 
Evers  V.  Long  Island  City.  176. 
Every  v.   Smith,  690. 
Evison  V.   Chicago,    St.    I'.,   M.   &  O. 

R,  Co,.  925. 
Eviston  V.  Cramer,  169,  395,  536,  537. 
Ewald  V.  Chicago  &  X,  Ry,  Co,,  261, 


CASES    CITKD.  1141 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;   vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Bwan   V.   Lippincott,   1034,  1036. 
Ewbank  v.   Nutting,  739. 
Bwell  V.   Greenwood,   74.'j. 
Bwing  V.  Ainger,  500. 
V.  Blount,  739. 
T.  Rourke,  692. 
Excelsior    Brick    Co.     v.     Yillase    of 

Haverstraw,  '.^')7. 
Excelsior  Electric  Co.  v.   Sweet,   946, 

954. 
Exchange    Ins.    Co.    v.    President    of 

Delaware  &  H.  Canal   Co.,  1058. 
Exchange   Nat.    Bank   v.    Third   Nat. 

Bank,   284,   285. 
Express    Co.    y.    Caldwell,    302,    306, 
.307. 
V.   Copeland,  535. 
V.  Kountze,   1063. 
V.  Smith,  65. 
Eyre  v.   Garlick,   477. 

T.  Jordan,  228. 
Byres  v.   Seds'pwicke,   127. 
Eysaman  v.  Small,  099. 


Fabens  t.   Bank,  2S."i. 
Fadden   v.   Satterleo,    338. 
Fagan   v.   Knox,   019. 

V.  Scott.   081. 
Fahn  v.  Reichart,  842. 
Fahr  V.   Manhattan  Ry.   Co.,  9G4. 
Fahy  v.   Fargo,   283. 
Falrchild    v.     Dunbar    Furnace    Co., 
695. 
T.  Railway  Co.,  308. 
Fairlmrst   v.    Liverpool   Ass'u,    218. 
Faisim    v.    Alabama    &    V.    Ry.    Co.,' 

1072. 
Fake  v.   Addicks,   857. 
Falk  V.   Fletcher,  739. 

T.   Railroad  Co.,  964,   1088. 
V.   U.   S.   112. 
Falkner  v.  Wright,  1062. 
Fallon  V.  Manning,  714. 
Falloon  v.   Schilling,  772. 
Falls  V.    San   Francisco  &  N.  r.   R. 

Co.,    1087. 
Panning  v.  Ohace,  504. 
Fanson  v.  Linsley,  41.  297. 
Farabow  v.  Green,  698. 


Farber  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  2(52, 

1081. 
Farebrother  v.  Ansley,  286. 
Fargis  v.  Walton,  683. 
Fargo  Gas  &  Coke  ('o.  v.  Fargo  Gas 

&  Electric  Co.,  581. 
Faribault  v.  Sater,  597. 
Fans  V.  Hoberg,  894. 
Farley  v.  Picard,  962. 
Farly  v.  Danks,  606,  607. 
Farmer,  The,  v.  McCraw,  820. 
Farmer  v.  Crosby,  36G,  628,  634. 

V.   Sir  Robert  Darling,   623. 
Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Green 
Bay,  W.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  208. 
V.   Kan.sas  City,   W.   &  N.  W.  R. 

Co.,  207. 
V.  Northern  Pac.   R.  Co.,  93,  358, 

642-644. 
V.   Walworth,   47. 
V.  Winona  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  207. 
Farmers'     Stoek-Breeding     Ass'n     v. 

Scott,   563,   569,   592. 
Farmers'     &     Mechanics'     Bank     v. 
Butchers'    &    Drovers'    Bank, 
253. 
V.  Champlain    Trausp.     Co.,    -300, 
1069. 
Farnham  v.  Pierce,  126. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  301,  306. 
Farnsworth   v.   Lowery,   708,   720. 
Farnum  v.  Concord,  183. 
Farr  v.  Hunt,  743. 
ITarra  v.  Adams,  1061. 
Farrand  v.  Aldrich,  497,  549,  550. 

V.  Marshall,  751. 
Farrant  v.  Barnes,  573,  866,  892,  908, 

1034. 
Farrar  v.  Beswick,  733. 

V.  Brackett,  615,  625,   629. 
V.  Bridges,  584. 
V.   Rollins,  718. 
Farrell  v.  Freidlander,  292. 

V.  Waterbury  Horse   R.   Co.,   811. 
Farrer  v.  Close,  644. 
Fai-well  V.  Boston  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  1012. 
V.    Boston    &    W.    R.    Corp.,    27.^, 
1030,  1031. 
Fassett,  In  re,  14. 
Fatnall  v.  Courtney,  432. 
Faulk  V.  Central  R.  &  B.  Co.,  971. 
Fausler  v.  Parsons,   135. 


1142  CASKS    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Fawcet  V.  Beavres,  449. 

Fay  V.  Davidson,  293,  851,  1091. 

V.  Minneapolis  t&  St.   K   Ry.   Co., 
995,  1001,  1018. 

V.  Pacific  Imp.  Co.,  902. 

V.  Parker,  395. 

V.  Prentice,  84,  779. 

V.  Whitman,  777,  778. 
Feather  v.  City  of  Reading,  970. 
Featherston  v.  President,  etc.,  of  Nev?- 

burgh  &  C.  Turnpike  Road,  323. 
Featherstonhaugh  v.  Johnston,  727. 
Feely  v.  Jones,  523. 

V.    Pearson    Cordage    Co..    1017. 
Feeney  v.   Bartoldo,  353,  805. 
Feize  v.  Thompson,  'jtj6. 
Felch  V.  Allen,  1011. 
Felcher  v.  McMillan,  728,  737. 
Felkner  v.  Scarlet,  4.54. 
Fell  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  82?,  823. 
Feller  v.  Hodgdon,  88. 
Pelt  V.  Amidon,  204. 

V.  Vicksburg,  S.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  702. 
Peltham  v.  Cartwright,  US.-i. 
Felton  V.  Dean,  232. 
Pennell  v.  Seguin  St  Ry.  Co.,  921. 
Fenneman  v.  Holden,  873,   979. 
Fennings  v.  Lord  Grenvllle,  733. 
Pent  V.  Railroad  Co.,  72,  77,  78,  374, 

376. 
Fenton  v.   Dublin  Steam  Packet   Co., 
229,  230. 

V.  Sewing-Mach.   Co.,   169. 
Fen  wick  v.  Bowling,  5G2. 

V.  Grimes,  583,  5S4. 
Feoffees  of  Heriot's  Hospital  v.  Ross, 

188. 
Peray  v.  Foote,  488. 
Fergason  v.  Railvvfay  Co.,  407. 
Ferguson  r.  Arnow,  617. 

v.  Erodljs.  219,  220,  222. 

T.  ColumbiLS  &  R.  R.  Co.,  980. 

V.  Earl  of  Kinnoull,  124,  125. 

V.  Firmenich   Manuf'g   Co.,   797. 

V.  Miller,  650. 

V.  Neilson,  220,  222,  256,  905. 
Peigusson  v.  Brent,  1063. 
Pemald  v.  Chase,  723. 
Fernsler  v.  Moyer,  452,  454. 
Fero  V.  Railroad  Co.,  965. 

v.  Ruscoe,  524. 
Ferren  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  871,  1023. 


PeiTin  V.  Symonds,  662. 
Ferris  v.  Wellborn,  754. 
Fertich  v.  Michener,  429. 
Fertilizing  Co.  v.  Hyde  Park,  769,  774, 

77i;. 
Pctte  V.  Lane,  724. 
Fetter  v.  Beale,  325,  405. 
Pick  V.  Railway  Co.,  253. 
Fidelity  Title  &  Trust  Co.  v.  People's 

Natural  Gas  Co.,  315, 
Pidler  v.  Delavan,  523. 
Field  V.  Albemarle  Co.,  182. 

V.  Barling,  807. 

v.  Colson,  386,  491,  503. 

V.  Davis,  950. 

V.  Sims,  322. 
Fields  V.  Curd,  502. 

V.  Grenils,  440. 

V.  Stokley,  802. 

V.  Williams,  663,  670,  693. 
Fifth  Ave.  Bank  v.  Forty-Second  St. 

&  G.  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  172. 
Fifth  Nat.  Bank  v.  New  York  El.  R. 

Co.,  410. 
Filbert  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co., 

1040. 
Pilbuin  v.  People's  Palace  &  Aquar- 
ium Co.,  .854. 
Filer  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  957. 

V.  Smith,   422,  429. 
Filkins  v.  People,  441. 
Filliter  v.  Phippard,  841. 
Filson  V.  Crawford.  777. 
Finance     Co.     of     Pennsylvania     t. 

Charlestown,  C.  &  C.  R.  Co.,  207. 
Finch  V.  Board  of  Education,  182. 

V.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.,  688. 
Findlay  v.  McAllister,  638. 
*      V.  Smith,  700,  702. 

V.  AVestern  Union  Tel.  Co.,  304. 
Findley  v.  City  of  Salem,  178. 
Fine   Art   Soc.   v.    Union   Bank,    719, 

722,  724. 
Flnley  v.  Cudd,  738. 

v.  Gutter  Co.,  425. 

T.  Richmond    &    D.    R.    Co.,    993, 
1009,  1048,  1052. 
Finn  v.  City  of  Adrian,  390. 

v.  Prink,  605,  62'.. 

v.  Western  Ry.  Corp.,  715. 
Pinnegan   v.   PaU.   River   Gas   Works 
Co.,  849. 


CASES    CITED. 


i]4;j 


[Vol.  1  c;omi)rises  pagss  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


F'innegan  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O. 

Ry.  Co.,  958,  1081. 
Finney  v.  Harding,  738. 
Fire  Ins.  Patrol  v.  Boyd,  187,  188. 
Firemen's  Ins.  Co.  of  Mobile  v.  Coch- 
ran, 722. 
Firestone  v.  Rice,  418. 

V.  Werner,   575. 
First   Baptist  Church  v.   Schenectady 
&  T.  R.  Co.,  767. 

V.  Syms,  354. 
First  Nat.  Banis  v.  Brown,  707. 

V.  Clements,  134. 

V.  Deal,  59G. 

V.  Fourth  Nat.   Bank,  134. 

V.  Indianapolis      Piano      Manuf'g 
Co.,  343. 

V.  Kickbusch,  727. 

V.  Lynch,  364. 

V.  North,   600. 

V.  Northern  R.  Co.,  717, 

V.  Villegra,  751. 

V.  Wilbm',   715. 
First    Presbyterian    Congregation    of 

Easton  v.  Smith,  182. 
Firth   V,    Bowling   Iron   Co.,    65,    8.53, 
923. 

V.  Veeder,   658. 
Fischer  v.  Bonner,  844. 

V.  Langbein,  425. 
Fish  V.  Chapman,  1057. 

V.  Cleland,  581. 

V.  Dodge,  129,  749,  767,  796. 

y.  Ferris,   163. 

V.  Folley,  408. 

V.  Kelly,  905. 
Fishback  v.  Miller,  589. 
Fish  Brother's  Wagon  Co.  v.  LaBelle 
Wagon  Works,  147.  • 

Fisher  v.  Boston,  150,  181. 

V.  Bristow,  13,  609,  610. 

V.  Forester,  <)21. 

V.  McGirr,  425. 

V.  Mellen,  564,  o<i5. 

V.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  191. 

V.  Niccols,  914. 

V.  Prince,  743. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  873,  964,  1091. 

V.  Rankin,  233. 

V.  Rochester,  690. 

V.  Steward,   659. 

V.  Thirkell,  224,  226. 


Fishkill  Sav.  Inst.  v.  National  Bank, 

169,  170. 
Fisk  v.  Newton,  1070. 
Fist  V.  Fist,  321. 
Fitch  V.  Lemmon,  .">23. 

V.  New  York,  P.  &  B.  R.  Co.,  664. 
Fitler  v.  Fossard,  44. 
Fitter  v.  Veal,  30,  409. 
Fitts  V.  Cream  City  R.  Co.,  948. 

V.  Hajl,  161,  164. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Connecticut  River  Paper 
Co.,  201,  871,  1024. 

V.  Fitzgerald,  434. 

V.  Fitzgerald    &     Mailory     Const 
Co.,  168. 

V.  Northcote,  444. 

V.  Quann,  219,  220. 

V.  Rediield,  .o05. 

V.  St  Paul,  M.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  985. 

V.  Town  of  Weston,  873. 
Fitz  .lohn  v.  Mackinder,  40,  608,  613. 
Fitzpatrick  v.  Railroad  Co.,  366,  1030. 

V.  Slocum,    136. 
Fitzsimnions  v.  City  of  Taunton,  997. 

V.  Railroad   Co.,   260,   265. 
Fivaz  V.  Nicholls.  190,  607. 
Fixen  v.  Blake,  (102. 
Flaherty  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.,  213,  216. 

V.  Moran,  773. 
Flanagan  v.  Newman,  3.52. 

V.  Raikoad  Co.,  389,  945. 
Flanders  v.   Chicago,   St.  P.,  M.   &  O. 
R.  Co.,  402,  948,  998. 

V.  Colby,  6.54. 

V.  Thomas,  737. 
Fleckenstein    v.    Dry-Dock,    E.    B.    & 

B.  R.  Co.,  861. 
Fleeming  v.  Orr,  856. 
Fleener  v.  State,  11. 
Fleet  V.   Hollenkemp,  908. 
Fleischner  r.  Cable  Co..  .302,  304,  899. 

T.  Citizens'  Real-Estate  &  Inv.  Co., 
Si)6. 
Fleming  v.  McDonald,  342. 

V.  Railroad   Co.,   7.54,  7.56,  1086. 
Flemington  v.   Smithers,  459. 
Flemming  v.  Ball.  1.50. 

V.  Smith,  160. 
Flenniken  v.  Marshall,  173. 
Flesh  Y.  Lindsay,  222. 
Fletcher,  Ex  parte,  657. 


1144  CASES    CITED. 

L\'ol.   1   compri^'i.'S   L-^Kus  1-052,   inclusive;   vol.   2  the  refidue.] 


Fletcher  v.  Cole,  195. 

V.  Evans,  681. 

V.  Fletcher,  429,  728. 

V.  Livingston,  673. 

V.  People,  441. 

^.  Kylands,  771,   833,  850. 

V.  Smith,  833. 
Flickiuger  v.  Shaw,  686. 
Flight  V.  Thomas,  804. 
Plike  V.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co., .1039. 
Flinn  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  844,  845. 

V.  State,  33. 
Flint  V.  Norwich  &  N.  Y.  Transp.  Co., 
278. 

V.  Russell,  777. 
Flint  &  P.  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Weir,  1080. 
Flitcraft  v.  Jeuks,  516. 
Flockton  V.  Hall,  314. 
Flood  V.  Van  Wormer,  354. 
Flora  V.  Russell,  423,  614,  617,  622. 
Florida  v.  Morrison,  560. 
Florida   South.    R.   Co.   v.   Hirst,   961, 

1080. 
Flower  v.  Adam,  977. 

V.  Pennsylvania  R.   Co.,  991. 
Floyd  v.  Barker,  117,  527. 

V.  Brown,  346. 

v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.   Co.,  90S. 
Fluker  v.  Railroad  Co.,  449,  450. 
Flummerfelt  v.  Flummerfelt,  319. 
Flynn  v.  Campbell,  242. 

V.  Canton  Co.,  99,  919,  920,  928. 

V.  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  Si;(J. 

V.  Hatton,  985. 
Foakes.v.  Beer,  311,  315. 
Foetman  v.  Rottier,  611. 
Fogarty  v.  Finley,  134. 

V.  Junction  City  Pressed-Briek  Co., 
749,  769. 
Fogel  V.  Schmalz,  220,  222. 
Fogg  V.   Boston   &  L.    R.    Corp.,    169. 
258,  264,  395. 

V.  Griffin,  169. 

V.  Nevada,  C.  O.  Ry.  Co.,  745,  794. 
Foley  V.  Electric  Light  Co.,  1010. 

V.  New    York   Cent.    &    H.    R.    R. 
Co.,  985. 

V.  Pettee   Mach.  Works,   1002. 
Folger  V.  Washburn,  622. 
FoUman  v.  City  of  Mankato,  982. 
FoUott  V.  Edwards.   727. 


Folsom  V.   Apple   River    Log   Driving 

Co.,  406,  808. 
Folson  V.  Underbill,  39(J. 
Fonda  v.  Van  Home,  133. 
Fonville  v.  McNease,  483. 
Foot  V.  Card,  468. 

V.  New  Haven  &  N.  Co.,  683. 
Foote  v.  Merrill,  694. 
Forbes  v.  Board  of  Health,  174. 

V.  Hagman.  622. 

V.  King,  490,  501. 

V.  Petty,  311. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  717. 
Force  V.  Gregory,  912. 

V.  Warren,   540. 
Ford  V.  Beech,  311,  345. 

V.  Cheever,  416. 

V.  Chicago,    R.    I.   &   P.    Ry.,   993, 
998,   1018. 

V.  Fitchburg  R.   R.,  1044. 

V.  Jletropolitau  R.   Co.,   785. 

V.  Jlonroe,  327. 

V.  Parker,  138. 

V.  School  Dist,  187. 

V.  Taggart,  152,  154. 

V.  Town  of  Braintrue,  180. 
Forde  v.  Skinner,  393,  437. 
Fordyce  v.  Briney,  1040. 

V.  Culver,  402. 

V.  Edwards,  1028. 

V.  Jackson,  1080,  1085. 

V.  McFlynn,  1074. 

V.  Nix,  903. 

V.  Russell,  796,  797. 

V.  Withers,  381. 
Forehand  v.  Jones,  728. 
Foreman  v.  Weil,  40,  273. 
Formwalt  v.  Hylton,  426. 
Forrest  v.  Hanson,  496. 
Forrester  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1072. 
Forsdlck  v.  Collins,  727. 
Forsyth  v.  City  of  Atlanta,  177. 

v.  Hooper,  230. 
Ft.  Dearborn  Lodge  v.  Klein,  687. 
Portheringham    v.    Adams    Exp.    Co., 

420. 
Ft.  Smith  Oil  Co.  v.  Slover,  1025,  1045. 
Fortune  v.  Trainor,  264,  277,  279. 
Ft.  Worth  &  D.   C.   Ry.  Co.  y.  Dag- 
gett, 1075. 

V.  Greathouse,  306. 

V.  McNulty,  336. 


CASES    CITED.  1145 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue] 


Ft.  Worth  &  D.  O.  Ky.  Oo.,  v.  Measles, 
830. 

V.  Peters,  1041. 
Ft  Worth  &  N.  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Smith, 
253,  669. 

V.  Wallace,  955. 
Ft.   Worth  &  R.   G.  Ky.   Co.  v.  I.   B. 

Rosenthal  Millinery  Co.,  1077. 
Forward  v.  Pittard,  1059,  1062. 
Fosburg  V.  Phillips  Fuel  Co.,  996. 
Fosdick  V.  Schall,  207. 
Foshay  V.  Town  of  Glen  Haven,  748, 

760. 
Foster  v.  Bank,  255,  258,  263,  900. 

V.  Boston,  774. 

V.  Charles,  563. 

V.  Gorton,  711. 

v.  Metz,  138. 

V.  Mining  Co.,  709. 

V.  Minnesota  Cent.   Ry.  Co.,   1043. 

V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  998. 

V.  Perkins,  664. 

V.  Rheinhart,   139. 

V.  Rockwell,  48. 

V.  Scripps,  536. 
Fothergill  v.  Ijovegrove,  730. 
Fouldes  V.  Willoughby,  062,  717,  720, 

723,  735. 
Foulger  v.  Newcomb,  50<i. 
Fournet  v.  Steamship  Co.,  470. 
Foward  v.  Adams,  507. 
Fowle  V.  New  Haven  &  N.  Co.,  410. 
Fowler,  The  Julia,  1041. 
Fowler  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  817. 

V.  Chic•h(^ster,   170,    217,   219,   220, 

V.  Dowduey,  502. 

V.  Oilman,   737. 

V.  Hollins,  735,  730. 

T.  Holmes,  277. 

V.  Homer,  539,  543. 

V.  Jenkins,  56. 

V.  Lindsay,  85. 

V.  McCann,   590,   592. 

V.  Saks,  235. 

V.  Sergeant,  914. 

v.  Smith,  315. 
Fowles  V.  Bowen,  480,  530,  544. 
Fox  V.  Broderiek,  475. 

V.  Gaunt,   427. 

V.  Harding,  667. 

V.  Jones,  917. 


Pox  V.  Railway  Co.,  141,  391,  1028. 

V.  Stevens,  459. 

V.  Thibault,  134. 
Foxworthy  v.  City  of  Hastings,  176. 
Frace  v.  Railroad  Co.,  72. 
Fralich  v.  Despar,  3.j7. 
France  v.  Gaudet,  384,  742. 
P"'rance's  Adm'r  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R. 

Co.,  831. 
Francis  v.  Cockrell,  280,  895. 

V.  Haywood,  090. 

V.  Kansas  City.  St.  J.  &  C    B.  K. 
Co.,  1018,  1052. 

V.  Schoellkopf,  367,  769,  779,  808, 
809. 

V.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  304,  307,  369. 
Francisco  v.  Aguiri-e,  132. 

V.  State,  634, 

V.  Troy  &  L.  R.  Co.,  1090. 
Frandsen  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co., 

1028,  1055. 
Prank  v.  New  Orleans  &  0.  R.  Co., 
779. 

V.  Tatum,  392,  721. 
Prank  and  Willie,  The,  943,  1041. 
Franke  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  224. 
Frankhouser  v.  Cannon,  132,  211. 
Franklin  v.  Brown,  578. 

V.  Prey,  416. 

v.  MeCorkle,   452,   457,   459. 

V.  Winona  &  St.  P.  B.  Co.,  10.j2. 
]■  rauklin  Coal  Co.  v.  McMillan,  700. 
1^'ranklin's  Adm'r,  Appeal  of,  221. 
Fi-aser  v.  Freeman,  255,  333. 

V.  Red  River  Lumber  Co.,  1046. 

V.  Tupper,  946. 
Fiatini  V.  Caslani,  466. 
Fray  v.  Blackburn,  117,  119. 
Frazer  v.  Berkeley,  445. 

V.  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R. 
Co.,  1076. 
Frazier  v.  Brown,  55,  56,  557,  758,  701. 

V.  Caruthers,  688. 

V.  JlcCloskey,  519,  547. 

V.  Nortinus,  677. 

V.  Turner,  418,  425. 
Fredericks  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  830 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  205-207. 
Predericksen  v.   Singer  Manuf'g  Co., 

434,  445. 
Preeberg  v.    St.    Paul   Plow    Works, 
944,  1014. 


1146 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comiirisee  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Freed  v.  Cameron,  894. 
Preedley  v.  French,  317. 
Freeman  v.  Boland,  159,  163,  781. 

V.  Cornwall,  120. 

V.  Dempsey,  372. 

V.  Grant,  724. 

V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  10G7. 

V.  McDaniel,  593. 

V.  Uanklns,  664. 

V.  Sanderson,  483. 

V.  Scurlock,  735. 

V.  Venner,  368. 
Fr^ethy  v.  Freethy,  463. 
Freke  v.  Calmady,  697. 
Fremont,  E.  &  M.  V.  R.  O.  v.  Pound- 
er, 928. 
French  v.  Bancroft  419. 

V.  City  of  Boston,  185. 

V.  Connecticut  River  Lumber  Co., 
808. 

V.  Cresswell,  260. 

V.  Deane,  465,  466. 

V.  Detroit  Free  Press,  482. 

V.  Ginsburg,  352. 

V.  Vining,  577,  5S6,  908. 

V.  Yix,  2oG. 

V.  Ware,  439,  440. 

V.  Western  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  921. 

V.  Wilkinson,  S.j8. 
Prenzel   v.  Miller,  565. 
Fresh  v.  Cutter,  543,  544. 
Fresno  Milling  Co.  v.  Fresno  Canal  & 

Irrigation  Co.,  326. 
Freudenstein  v.  Heine,  412. 
Frlck  V.  Larned,  30. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  198. 
Frlck  Co.  V.  Falk,  970. 
Frielander  v.  Railway  Co.,  269. 
Friend  v.  Hamill,   135. 

V.  Wood,   1063. 
Friesenhahn  v.  Bushnell,  283. 
Frith  V.  City  of  Dubuque,  412. 
Fritts  V.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co., 

s:iS. 
Frilz  V.  Railroad  Co.,  142. 
IfrizzeU  v.  Duffer,  139. 
Fi-obisher  v.  Fifth  Ave.  Transp.  Co., 

964. 
Frohreich  v.  Gammon,  372,  599. 
Frome  v.  Dennis,  717. 
Fromm  v.  Ide,  898,  970. 
Frost  V.  Angler,  571. 


Frost  V.  Berkeley  Phosphate  Co.,  771, 
772. 

V.  Domestic    Sewing    Mach.    Co., 
168. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  830,  946. 
Fruitport   Tp.    v.    Muskegon    Circuit 

Judge,  664. 
Fry  V.  Bennett,  511. 

V.  Branch  Bank  at  Mobile,  687. 

V.  County  of  Albemarle,  183. 

V.  Estes,  625. 

V.  Leslie,  159,  456,  459,  460. 

V.  Railroad   Co.,  370. 
Frye  v.  Derstler,  466. 

V.  Moor,  835. 
Fryer  v.  Kinnersley,  544. 
Fugate  V.  Millar,  622,  624,  625. 
Fulkerson  v.  Murdock,  392. 
Fulks  V.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  942. 
FuUam   V.   Rose,  220. 

V.  Stearns,  367,  675. 
Fuller  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  E.  R.  Ass'n, 
313. 

V.  Bean,  669. 

V.  City  of  Jackson,  390. 

V.  Edings,  349. 

V.  Hodgdon,  593. 

V.  Jamestown  St.  Ry.  Co.,  860. 

V.  Jewett,  1007. 

V.  Kemp,  315. 

V.  Madison  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  318. 

V.  O'Neall,  337. 

v.  Wilson,  566. 
FuUerton  v.  Fordyce,  1087,  1088. 
Fulsome  v.  Concord.  406. 
Fulton  V.  Hanna,  351. 

V.  Hood,  578,   590. 

V.  Lydecker,  728. 
Fulton  Bag  &  Cotton  Mills  v.  Wilson, 

302. 
Fulton  Co.    St.  R.   Co.  v.  McConnell, 

229. 
Funk  V.  Amor,  618. 

V.  Evening  Post  Pub.  Co.,  366. 
Furley  y.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 

858. 
Furlong  V.  Banta,  324. 
Furman  v.  Van  Sise,  452,  453. 
Furnas  v.  Friday,  565. 
Furpln  V.  Itemy,  604. 
FuiTy  V.  O'Connor,  588. 
Fuschs  V.  Schmidt,  99. 
FusiU  V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  924. 


CASES    CITED.  1147 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


G 


Gaar  v.  Selden,   '>2H. 
Gabriel  v.  Dresser,  314. 
Gabrielson  v.  Waydell,  255,  1043. 
Gadsden  &  A.  U.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Causler, 

192. 
Gage  V.  Hampton,  687. 

V.  Lewis,  583,  584. 

V.  Smith,  701. 

V.  Tirrell,  1063. 
Gafjjs  V.  Vetter,  840,  843. 
(iahan  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  369. 
Gaines   v.   Bard,   242. 

V.  Belding,  504. 

V.  Green  Pond  Iron  Min.  Co,  700. 
Gainesville,  H.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall, 
141. 

V.  Lacy,  363. 
(iains  V.  Engel,  337. 
(Jainsville   Nat.   Bank   v.    Bamberger, 

588. 
Gaitber  v.  Advertiser  Co.,  501,  5(W. 
Galbos  V.  Girard,  110. 
Galbraith  v.  Fleming,  200,  2fJ3. 
Gale  V.  Lisbon,  972. 

V.  Parrott,  449. 
Galena  &  C.  Union  R.  Co.  v.  Jacobs, 
978. 

V.  Dill,  929. 
Galla.wr  v.  Brunei,  584. 
(}allasher  v.  Bowie,  470. 

V.  Dodge,  56. 

v.  Humpbery,  35. 

V.   Kemmerer,  212,  345. 

V.  Piper,  1046. 

V.  Stoddard,  612. 
Galliard  v.  Laxton,  427. 
Galligan  v.  Kelly,  538. 
G;Uloway  v.  Bird,  352. 

V.  Chicago,   M.  &  St.   P.   Ry.  Co., 
893. 

V.  Chicago,  R.  L  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  811, 
1091. 
Galpin  v.  Railroad  Co.,  142,  769. 
Galveston,    H.    &    S.    A.    Ry.    Co.   v. 
Arispe,   998. 

v.  Balkam,  930. 

V.  Ball,  307. 

v.  Cook,   332. 

V.  Croskell,   211,   946. 

T.  Daniels.  994. 


Galveston,    H.    &   S.    A.    Ry.    Co.    v. 
Dromgoole,  363. 

V.  Gormley,  1010. 

V.  McMonigal,  260,  1088. 

V.  Rheiner,  669,  845. 

V.  Roemer,   30. 

V.  Schmidt,  1068. 

V.  Short,   1071. 

V.  Silegman,  307,  362. 

V.  Snead,  1081. 

V.  Tait,  763. 

V.  Templeton,  389,  1007. 

V.  Thornsben-y,  979,  1087. 

V.  Walter,  920. 

V.  Wesch,  402. 

V.  Williams,   362. 
Galveston  Oil  Co.  v.   Morton,   897. 
Galvin  v.  Bacon,  682. 

V.  Gualala  MiU  Co.,  81:!,  940,  941. 

V.  Mac  Mining  &  Milling  Co.,  27. 

V.  Mayor,  764. 

V.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  963,  998. 

V.  Parker,   721,   856. 
Galway   v.   Meti-opolitan  El.   Ry.   Co., 

411. 
Gambert  v.  Hart,  916. 
Gammill  v.  Johnson,  596. 
Gandy  v.  Jubber,  226,  796. 
Gannon  v.  Hargadon,  760. 

V.  Housatonic  R.  R.,  1034,  lO.io. 
Ganvreau  v.  Superior  Pub.  Co.,  .505. 
Garabaldi  v.  Wright,  708. 
Gardin  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  1080. 
Gardiner  v.   Thibodeau,  669. 
Gardmal  v.  McWilliams,  527. 
Gardner  v.  Brown,  3."i2. 

V.  Dering,  701. 

v.  Deti-oit  St.  Ry.  Co.,  1085. 

V.  Grace,  161. 

V.  Heartt,  814. 

V.  Kellogg,  456. 

V.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  322,  953, 
1047,  1049,  1052. 

V.  Self,  524. 

V.  Slade,  544. 

V.  Smith,  237. 

V.  Stroever,  745,  787,  807. 

V.  Trenary,  ."1)0. 

V.  Ward,  13."i. 

V.  Waycross  Air-Line  R.  Co..  1081. 
Garfield  v.  Douglass,  118. 
(rargi-ave  v.  Smith,  080. 


1148  CASES    CITKO. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusdve;  toI.  2  the  rysidue.] 


Garing  v.  Frasw,  127,  638,  639. 
Garison  v.  Burden,  465. 
Garland,  Ex  parte,  106. 

V.  Carlisle,  735. 

V.  Towne,  765,  8S8. 
Garlinghouse  v.  Jacobs,   128,   129. 
Garnett  v.  Ferraad,  119. 
Garnier  v.  Bernard,  622. 

V.  Porter,  843. 
Garr  v.  Selden,  528. 
Garrahy  t.  Kansas  City,  St.  .7.  &  C. 

B.  R.  Co.,  1039. 
Garret  v.  Taylor,  645. 
Garretson  v.  Becker,  371,  455. 
Garrett  v.   Chicago  &  N.  W.   R.  Co., 
943. 

V.  Manneihmer,  615,  620. 

V.  Western    Union    Tel.    Co.,    900, 
971. 
Garretz  v.  Duenclsel,  2G0. 
Garrison  v.  Barnes,  856. 

V.  Graybill,  202. 
Garteiser  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry. 

Co.,  982. 
Gasligiit  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Vesti-y  of  St 

Mary  Abbott's,  140,  840,  844. 
Gassett  v.  Gilbert,  513. 
Gates  V.  Blincoe,  800,  801. 

V.  Bm-lington,  C.  B.  &  N.  R.  Co., 
192. 

V.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  1069. 

V.  Fleischer,  913. 

V.  Lounsbury,  442. 

V.  Meredith,  157,  166,  482. 

V.  Miles,  156. 

V.  Neal,  135. 

V.  Preston,  323. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  77,  963,  1010. 

V.  Rifle  Boom  Co.,  716. 

V.  Young,  127. 
Gateward's  Case,  689. 
Gathercole  v.  Miall,  382. 
GatlifEe  v.  Bourne,  1062,  1067. 
Gaunce  v.  Backhouse,  640. 
Gaunt  V.  Fynney,  781. 

V.  Taylor,  164. 
Gauti-et    V.    Bgerton,    574,    891,    892, 

3082. 
Gavelt  V.    Manchester   &   L.    R.    Co., 

957. 
Gay  V.  Essex  Electi-ic  St.  R.  Co.,  830. 

V.  State,  783. 


Gay  V.  Winter,  333. 

Gaylard  v.  Morris,  662. 

G.  B.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Eagles,  840. 

Geddes  v.  Pennington,  594. 

Gedney  v.  Kingsley,  913. 

Gee  V.  Railroad  Co.,  832,  971. 

Geer  v.  Darrow,  230. 

Geisehnan  v.  Scott.  970. 

Geisler  v.  Brown,  504. 

Geismer  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry. 

Co.,  1064. 
Gellet  V.  Roberts,  726. 
Gelzenleuchter  v.  Niemeyer,  425,  605. 
Genesee  Co.   Sav.   Bank  v.   Michigan 

Barge  Co..  588. 
Genevey  v.  Edwards,  623. 
Genncr  v.  Sparks,  420,  421. 
Gent  V.  Lynch,  553. 
Gentleman  v.   Soule.  081. 
Gentry  v.   Kelley,  741. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  362,  391. 
Genung  v.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co., 

846. 
George  v.  Fisk,  70,  692. 

V.  Gobey,  253.  260. 

V.  Goddard,  534. 

T.  Haverhill,  381. 

V.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.   Ry.  Co., 
1085. 

V.  Skivington,   586,   905,   907,  908. 

V.  Tait,  317. 

V.  Wabash   Western   R.    Co.,   412. 
Geo.  F.  Dittman  Boot  &  Shoe  Co.  v. 

Keokuk  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  1078. 
Georgetown    B.     &     L.    Ry.     Co.    v. 

Doyle,  143,  144. 
George  &  Richard,  The,  78,  334. 
Georgia  v.  Jessiip,  111. 
Georgia    Midland    &    G.    R.     Co.    v. 

Evans,  941. 
Georgia  Pac.   R.   Co.   v.   Dooley,   303. 

V.  Lee,  824. 

V.  Propst,  1000. 

V.  Robinson,   1088. 
Georgia  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  1085. 

V.  Ivey,  1055. 
Georgia   Railroad   &   Banking   Go.   v. 
Daniel,  871. 

V.  Middlebrooks,  931. 

V.  Oaks,  330. 

V.  Parks,   031. 

V.  Rhodes,  967. 


CASES    CITED.  1149 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Georgia  Railroad   &   Banking  Co.   v. 

Wood,  263. 
Gerard  v.  Dickenson.  552,  553. 

V.  Lewis,  773. 
Geraty   v.    Stern,   263. 
Gerdes  v.  Foundry  Co.,  177,  389,  950. 
Gerhard  v.  Bates.  376,  378. 
Gerlaeh  v.  Edelmeyer,  1034. 
German  v.  Clark,  692. 
German  Bank  of  Memphis  v.  United 

States,  112. 
Getchell  v.   Hill,  913. 

V.  Lindley,  913. 
Gheen  v.  Johnson,  285. 
Gibbons  v.  Pepper,  66. 

V.  United  States.  110,  112. 

V.  Wilkes-Barre  e^i  S.  St.  Ry.  Co., 
861,  968. 
Gibbs  V.  Ames,  605. 

V.  Chase,  661,  717,  721. 

V.  Hannibal,  335. 

V.  Randlett,  418. 

V.  Williams,  761,  763. 
Giblin   v.   McMullen,   818. 

V.  National    Steamship   Co.,    1074. 
Gibney  v.  State,  969. 
Giboney  v.  German  Ins.  Co.,  314. 
Gibons  v.  Farwell,   1066. 
Gibson  v.  Chaters,  606. 

V.  Cincinnati  Enquirer,   519. 

V.  Culver,  1069. 

V.  Donk,  780. 

V.  Fischer,  808. 

V.  Inglis,  186. 

V.  Leonard,  891,   921,   930. 

V.  Railroad     Co.,     312,     334,     686. 
870,  957,  995,  1006,  1017,  1032. 

V.  St.   Louis,   A.  &  M.  Ass'n,  686. 
Gibson  Consol.  Mining  &  Milling  Co. 

V.    Sharp,  415,  1018. 
Giddens  v.   Boiling,   688. 
Gicsc   V.  Schultz.  4r)9. 
Gifford  V.   Hulett,   T7T. 

V.  Wisjgins,  123,  42G. 
Gilbert  v.  Burtenshaw,  401. 

V.  Ciystal    Fountain    Lodge,    170. 

V.  Flint  &  P.  M.  Ry.,  828. 

V.  Kennedy,   693. 

V.  Niigle,  895. 

V.  Tcck,  721,  731. 

V.   PeMplc,  527,  528. 

V.   Savannah,  G.  &  N.  A.  Ry.  Co., 


Gilbert  v.  Stone,  205. 

V.  West    End    St.    Ry.    Co.,    1083, 
1093. 

V.  Williams,  917. 
Gilbertson  v.  Fuller,  623,  627. 
Gilchrist  v.  McKee,  549. 

v.  Van  Dyke,  691,  692. 
Gilding  v.   Eyre,  606. 
Gile  V.  Stevens,  367. 
Giles  V.  Faunteroy,  1077. 

V.  Simonds,  683,   684. 

V.  State,  479. 

V.  Walker,   749. 
Gilford  V.  Babies'  Hospital,  767. 
Gill  V.  Homrighausen,  1017. 

V.  Weston,    716. 
Gillard  v.  Brittan,   382. 
Gillen water  v.  Madison  &  I.  R.   Co., 

1030. 
Gille.spie  v.  Beecher,  442. 

v.  City  of  Lincoln,  174. 

V.  Palmer,  135. 
Gillet  V.  Mason,  659. 
Gillian  v.   Railway  Co.,  277. 
Gillingham  v.  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.,  423. 
Gillis  V.  Railroad  Co..  897,  10S2. 

V.  Western    Union    Tel.    Co.,    307. 
Gillison   v.    City    of    Charleston,    764. 
Gillon  V.  Boddington,  335. 
Gilman  v.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.,  1008. 

V.  Lowell,  483. 

V.  Noyes,   63,  374. 
Gilmore  v.  Cape  Fear  &  Y.  V.  R.  Co., 
885. 

v.  Federal  St.   &  P.  V.  Pass.   Ry. 
Co.,  861,  880. 

V.  Newton,  726. 

V.  Oxford  Iron  &  Nail   Co.,   1041. 

V.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.,  1087. 

V.  Ross,    926. 
Gilpin  V.   Fowler,  540. 
Gilson  V.  Collins,  289. 

V.  Fisk,  708. 

V.  Spear,  102,  164. 

V.  Wood,  669,  712. 
Ginna  v.  Railroad  Co.,  73. 
Giovanni    v.    City    of    Philadelphia, 

170. 
Girard  v.  Bissell,  914. 

V.  City  of  Kalamazoo,  946. 

v.  Moore,  397,  628. 

V.  St.    Louis    Car- Wheel    Co.,    317, 
318,  320. 


1150  CASES    CITKD. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  p.iges  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Girault  v.  A.  P.  Hotaling  Co.,  273. 

Givens  v.  City  of  Paris,  17-1. 

(Jizler  V.  Witzel,  195. 

GlacUelter  v.  Walker,  82. 

Gladman  v.  .Tohnson,  857. 

Gladwell    v.    Sle,i,'sall,    9ir,.    910,    911, 

914. 
Glaessner  v.  Anheuser-Busch  Brewing 

Ass'n,  787. 
Glascock  V.   Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  863. 
Glasgow  V.  Owen,  622. 
Glasier  v.  Town  of  Hebron,  129. 
Glaspell  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  002. 
Glaspie  v.  Keator,  321,  569,  579. 
cJlass  V.  Bennett,  467. 

V.   Fritz,  754. 
Glasscock  v.  Bridges,  622. 
Glassey  v.  Hestonville  Ry.  Co.,  985. 
(ilatz  V.  Thein,  511. 
(rlavin  V.  Hospital,  187. 
Glazebrook   v.   West  End   St.   R.  Co., 

861. 
Gleason  v.  Gary,  T7it. 
Gleeson   v.    Virginia    Midland    R.    Co., 

70,  235,  939,  1085,  1086. 
(ilendon  Iron  Co.  v.  Uhler,  773. 
Glenn  v.  Kays,  679. 
(41enville  v.  Railroad  Co.,  391. 
Glickauf  v.  llaurer,  227. 
Gloucester  Grammar  School  Case,  90. 
Glover  v.  Railroad  Co.,  380. 

V.  Townshend,  579. 
Glovinsky  v.  Cunard  S.  S.  Co.,  362. 
Glyn  V.   East  &  W.  India  Dock   Co., 

705. 
Glynn  v.  Houston,  242. 
Goddard  v.  Harpswell,  181. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  45,   170,  172,  262, 
288,  369,  396. 
Godefroy  v.  Dalton,  915. 

V.  Jay,  915. 
Godfrey  v.  City  of  Alton,  764. 

V.  Souiat.  022,  628. 
Godley  v.  Haggerty,  226. 
Godsell  V.  Taylor,  945. 
Godshalk  v.  Metzgar,  533. 
Goetcheus  v.  Matthewson,  13.5. 
Goetz  V.  Borough  of  Butler,  181. 
GofC  V.  Kitts,  659. 

V.  Oberteuffer,  685. 

T.  Railroad  Co.,  254.  279,  1020. 
Ooffln  V.  Donnelly,  527. 


Going  V.  Dinwiddle,  418. 
Gold  V.  Bissel,  421,  425. 
Goldberg  v.  Dobberton,  479. 
Golden  v.  Newbrand,  243,  277. 
Golden  Gate  Mill  &  Min.  Co.  v.  .Tosh- 

ua  Hendy  Mach.  Works,  0(i9. 
Golderman  v.  Stearns,  509. 
Goldey  v.  RaiU-oad  Co.,  301. 
Golding  V.  Hall,  342. 
Goldsborough  v.  Darst,  216. 
Goldsniid  v.  Tumbridge  Imp.  Oom'rs, 

804. 
Goldsmith's  Adm'r  v.  Joy,  445,  440. 
Goldstein  v.  Foss,  541. 
Goll  V.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  837. 
Gomez  v.  Joyce,  504. 
Gonsoir  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.   L.  Ry. 

Co.,  1040. 
Gonzales  v.  City  of  Galvfeston,  78. 

V.  Cobliner,  608. 

V.  New  York  &  H.  R.  Co.,  1086. 
Gooch  V.  Association,  188. 
Good  V.  Altoona  City,  758. 

V.  Chicago,    R.    I.    &    P.    Ry.    Co., 
1032. 

V.  Good,  464. 

V.  Mylin,  808. 

V.  Towns,  334. 
Goodale  v.  Tuttle,  763. 
Goodall  V.  Crofton,  804. 
Goodenow  v.  Snyder,  297. 
Goodes  V.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  998. 
Goodfellow   V.    Boston,    H.    &    E.    It. 
Co.,  1036. 

V.  City  of  New  York,  177. 
Gooding  v.  Underwood,  292. 
Goodlander   Mill   Co.   v.   Standard   Oil 

Co.,  61.  73,  909,  965. 
Goodman  v.  Kennell,  252. 

V.  Oregon  R.  &  Nav.  Co.,  1064. 
Goodno  y.  Oshkosh,  391,  400. 
Goodnow    V.    Walpole    &    G.    Eim-ry 

Mills,  1010. 
Goodrich  v.  Davis,  485. 
Goodrum  v.  State,  436. 
Goodsell  V.  Taylor,  902,  1023. 
Goodspeed    v.    East    Haddam    Bank, 

169. 
Goodwin  v.  Home,  584. 

V.  Potter,  352. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  871. 

V.  Trust  Co.,  509. 


(.ASliS    CITED.  1151 

[Vol.   1  comprises   pages  1-652,   inclusive;   toI.  2  the  residue.] 


Goodwyn  t.  Cheveley,  HTT,  678. 
Gortlen  v.  Siefert,  t>2<;. 
Gordon  v.  Bruner,  27. 

V.  Buchanan,  1062. 

V.  Butler,  578. 

V.  Cummings,  894. 

V.  Farrar,   118. 

V.  Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.  Co.,  846. 

V.  Harper,  710,  711,  713. 

V.  Hutchinson,  1057. 

V.  Parmelee,  580,  599. 

V.   Rolt,  247,  252. 

V.  Spencer,  199,  522. 

V.  Stockdale,  717. 
Gordy  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1001. 
Gorham   v.   Gross,   233,  234,   475,   834, 
840. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  381. 
Gorman  v.  McArdle,  967. 
Gormely  v.  Gymnastic  Ass'u  of  South 

Side,  581. 
Gormley  v.  Railway  Co.,  261. 

V.  Vulcan  Iron  Works,   1046. 
Gorris  v.   Scott,  99. 
Gorton  v.  Erie  R.  Co..  883,  930. 
Gotobed   v.    Wool,   351. 
Gott  V.  Pietsefer,  5:56. 

V.  Pulsifer,  518,  535. 
Gough  V.  Dorsey,  119. 

V.  Goldsmith.  480. 
Gould  V.  Barratt.  628. 

V.  Blodgett,  727. 

V.  Hammond,  118,  120. 

V.  ilcKenna,  412,  749. 

V.   Northern  Pac.  R.  Co..  846. 

V.  Slater  Woolen  Co.,  908. 

V.  Wise.  40,  273. 
Goulding  v.  Horbury,  205. 
Gourdier  v.   Cormack,  233. 
Govaskl  V.   Downey,   614,   623. 
(iijve  V.  Blethen,  507. 

V.  Farmers'  Ins.  Co.,  821,  823. 

V.    Watson,    730. 
Governor  of  British  Cast  Plate  Manu- 
facturers V.   Meredith,   142. 
Govett  V.  Radnidge,  696. 
Govin   V.   De   Jliranda.  325. 
Gowen  v.  Harley,  206. 
Grable  v.  Margrave,  4."j9,  460. 
Grace  v.  Dempsey,  430. 
V.  McArthur,  545. 
V.  Mitchell,  425. 


Grace  v.  Teague,  111,  443. 

Graeff  v.    Philadelphia   &  R.   R.   Co., 

1089,  1092. 
Graetz  v.   McKenzie,  849,  968. 
Graf  V.  Railway  Co.,  88.'i. 
Graft  V.  Baltimore  &  O.   R.  Co.,  314. 
Graham  v.   Boston  &  A.   R.  Co.,  993. 

V.  City  of  Albert  I.ea.  176. 

V.  Gautier.  913. 

V.  HoUinger,  563,  .")<i6. 

V.   McReynolds,   4."i6. 

V.  Meyer,  291. 

Y.  Peat,  609,  670. 

V.  Smith,  458. 
Grainger  v.  Hill,  421,  632. 
Grainnis  v.  Branden,  913. 
Gramm  v.  Boener,  870,  914. 
Grand   Island    Banking   Co.    v.    First 

Nat.  Bank,  655. 
Grand  Junction  Canal  Co.  v.  Shugar 

759. 
Grandona  v.  Lovdal.  800. 
Grand  Rapids  v.  Wyman,  176. 
Grand  Rapids  B.    Co.  v.   Jarvis,  808. 
Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.  Co.    v.  Cox,  967. 

V.  Heisel,  410. 

V.   Huntley,  820,   944. 
Grand  Trunk  Ry.  v.  Cummings,  10.!."i 
1052. 

v.  Ives,  819,  926,  927,  953,  974. 

v.  Latham,  283. 
Granser  v.  Pulaski  Co.,  183. 
Grannis  v.   Chicago,    St.   P.   &  K.    C. 

Ry.   Co..  990. 
Grant  v.  City  of  Erie.  :;:>,  175. 

V.  City  of  Fitchburg,  989. 

V.  Moseley,  12,  50. 

V.  Moser,  428. 

V.  Schmidt,  794. 

V.  Secretary,  529. 
Gratiot  v.  Missouri  Pac.   R.  Co.,  929. 
Gravel  v.  Clough,  737. 
Graver  v.   Sholl,  82. 
Gravus  v.  Dawson,   Oil. 

V.   Railroad  Co.,   .305. 

v.   Shattuck,   801. 

V.  Smith.  709. 

V.  Thomas,  886. 
Gmw  V.  Patterson,  715. 
Gray  v.  Ayers,  799. 

V.  Ayres,  195,   802. 

V.  Baker,  505,  509. 


1152 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inchisiTe;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Gray  v.  Boston  Gaslisht  Co.,  216,  84(i. 

V.   Billiard.  390. 

V.  Dui'land,  454. 

V.  EUzroth,  549. 

V.  Elzroth,  548. 

V.  Harris,  834. 

V.  McWilliams,  762. 

V.  Manufacturing  Co.,  583. 

V.   Merriam,  901. 

V.  Pentland,  516,   530. 

V.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.,  1036. 

V.  Pullen,  98,  235. 

V.  Robinson,  352. 

V.  State,  351. 
Great  Falls  Co.  v.Worster,  608. 
Greathouse  v.  Summerfield,  420,  421. 
Greatrex  v.  Hayward,   759,   761. 
Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  v.  Blake,  1072. 
Great    Western    Ry.    Co.    v.    Burns, 
1069. 

V.  Hawarth,  965. 

V.  Hawkins,  1068. 
Greeley  v.  Federal  St.  &  P.  V.  Pass. 
Ry.,  861. 

V.   Maine  Cent.  R.   Co..  760. 
Green  v.  Barney,  362. 

V.  Bartrom,  428. 

V.  Button,  553,  554,  556,  635. 

V.  City  &  Suburban  Ry.  Co.,  185. 

V.  Cochran,  609. 

V.    Dunn.   728. 

V.  Elgie,  423. 

V.  Goddard,  657,  660. 

V.  Hammock,  688. 

V.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  327,  328. 

V.  Lake,  803. 

V.  London   General  Omnibus   Co., 
108. 

V.   Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  R.   Co., 
966. 

V.  Omnibus  Co.,  169,  170. 

V.  Palmer.  707. 

V.  Russell,  728. 

V.   Sperry,  159,   163. 

V.  Thompson,  331. 

V.  Weaver,  82. 
Green  Bay  &  M.  Canal   Co.  v.  Kau- 

kauna  Water-Povcer  Co.,  T.'iR. 
Greene  v.  Cole,  697. 

V.  Inhabitants  of  Milford,  784. 

V.  Linton,  831. 


Greene  v.   Minneapolis  &  St.   L.   Ry. 

Co.,  1020,  1026,  1027. 
Greenebaum  v.  Taylor,  362,  707,  741. 
Greening  v.  Wilkinson,  739. 
Greenland  v.  Chaplin,  373,  376. 
Greenleaf  v.   Egan,  282,  283. 

V.  Francis,  557,  758. 
Greenslade  v.  Halliday,   801. 
Greenway  v.  Conroy,   192,  872,   1022, 
1039,  1043. 

V.  Fisher,  735. 
Greenvroorl  v.  Cobbey,  530. 

V.  Coffey,  508. 

V.  Greenwood,  4.52. 

V.  Town  of  Westport,  14,  178,  184. 
Greer  v.  Tripp,  733. 
Gregg  V.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  1070. 

V.  Wyman,  102. 
Gregory  v.  Brooks,  118,  120. 

V.  Bush,  761. 

V.  Duke  of  Brunswick,  639,  645. 

V.  Fichtner,  338,  728. 

V.  Gregory,  007. 

V.  Hill,  442. 

V.  Layton,  843. 

V.  Piper,  247,  661,  663. 

V.  Thomas,  621. 

V.  Woodworth,   943. 
Gregory's  Adm'r  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co., 

260. 
Gresham  v.   Island   City   Sav.    Bank, 

741. 
Gribble  v.  Pioneer  Press  Co.,  508,  520. 
Grider   v.   Talley.   124. 
Gridley  v.  City  of  Bloomington,  224. 
Gridner,  In  re,  667. 
Griebel  v.  Rochester  Print  Co.,  475. 
Grier  v.  Sampson,  879. 
GrifCe  v.  McClung,  342. 
GrifBn  v.  Auburn,  807. 

V.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  936. 

V.  Chubb,  619. 

V.  Coleman,   427. 

V.  Diller,  .j99. 

V.  Farrier,  571,  597. 

V.  Glen  Manuf'g  Co.,  1004. 

V.  Mayor,  175. 

V.  Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  1003. 

V.  Overman  Wheel  Co.,  943. 

V.  Shreveport  &  A.  R.   Co.,  145. 
Grifflng  v.  Difer,  639. 


OASES  citp:d.  1153 

[Vol.  1  comprises  poges  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Griffing  v.   Diller,   245,  581,  591,  592. 
Griffith  V.  Clift,  880. 

V.  Frazier,  123. 

V.  McCullum,  799,  802. 
Griffiths  V.  Earl  of  Dudley,  314,  1029. 

V.  New    Jersey   &   N.    Y.    R.    Co., 
1041. 

V.  Teetgen,  451-4.53. 

V.  Wolfram,  281,  1037. 
Grlgg  V.  Day,  739. 
Griggs  V.  Fleckenstein,  70,  809,  956. 
Grigsby  v.  Chappell,  185,  1058. 

V.  Clear    Lake    Waterworks    Co., 
801. 
Grill  V.   General  Iron  S.  C.  Co.,  817, 

819. 
Grim  v.  Robinson,  R74,  682. 
Grimes  v.  Eddy,,  858. 

V.  Minneapolis  L.   &  M.   Ry.   Co., 
1079. 
Grim  Shaw  v.  Belcher,  686. 
Grimsley  v.  Hankins,  334,  851,   1041. 
Grinell  v.  AVells,  449,  4.j3,  459. 
Grimiell  v.   Western  Union  Tel.   Co., 
302. 

V.  Wisconsin  Cent.   Co.,  1009. 
Grisby  v.  Clear  Lake  Water  Co.,  797, 

801. 
Griswold  v.  Bay  City,  689. 

V.  Boley,  133. 

V.  Gebbie,  570. 

V.  Haven,  44,  269. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  300,  301. 

V.  Sundback,  352. 
Groetcheus  v.  JIathewson,  135. 
Groff  V.  Ankenbrandt,  801. 

V.  Rohrer,  560, 
Grogan  v.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  301,  303. 

V.  Broadway  Foundry  Co.,  797. 
Gronendyke  v.  Cramer,  682. 
Groner  v.  Delawai'e,  etc..  Canal  Co., 

883. 
Gross  V.  Miller,   194. 

V.  Pennsylvania  P.  &    B.  R.  Co., 
342. 
Grossenbach    v.    City    of    Mihvankee, 

178. 
Grosso  V.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co., 

328. 
Grostlck  V.  Railroad  Co.,  884. 
Grote  V.  Chester  &  H.  R.  Co.,  1089. 
Grotton  v.  Glidden,  203. 

LAW  OP  TOETS — 73 


Grouch  V.  Hazlehurst  Lumber  Co.,  45. 
Grout    V.    Cottrell.    G25. 
Grove  v.  Brandenburg,  127. 

V.  Ft.  Wayne,  765. 

V.  Nevil,  164. 

V.  Van  Duyn,  123. 
Grubbs'  Appeal,  700. 
Grube  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  174. 
Grudger  v.  Western  N.  C.  R.  Co.,  144. 
Grumon  v.    Raymond,   123,   124,   425. 

42G. 
Grunberg  v.  Grant,  132. 
Grand  v.  Van  Vleck,  210,  694. 
Gruner  v.  Westin.  G72. 
Grunwald  v.  Freese,  311. 
Grymes  v.  Boweren,  702. 

V.  Shack,  6.59. 
Guelich  v.  National  State  Bank,  285. 
Guenther  v.  Railroad  Co.,  198,  871. 
Guernsey  v.  Cook,  287. 
Guest  V.  Reynolds,  89,  749. 

V.  Warren,  324,  630. 
Guffen  V.  Reynolds,  222. 
Guggenheim's  Case,  963. 
Guiding  Star,  The,  1066. 
Guilford  v.  Kendall,  656. 
Guillaume  v.  Hamburg  &  A.   Packet 

Co.,  719. 
Guille  V.  Swan,  50,  71,  74,  661. 
Guinney  v.  Hand,  278,  279. 
Guirney  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co., 

1007. 
Guldager  v.  Rockwell,  316. 
Gulf,   C.   &  S.  F.   R.  Co.  V.   Calhoun, 
363. 

V.  Campbell,  191. 

V.  Cole,  1080. 

V.  Cusenberry,  mi,  671-673,  847. 

V.  Danshank,  972. 

V.  Dohl,  1016. 

V.  Donahoo,  763. 

V.  Dorsey,  995. 

V.  Dunlap,   363. 

V.  Dunman,  363. 

V.  Elliott.  307. 

V.  Ellis,  953. 

V.  Bvansich,  948. 

V.  Gann,    1075. 

V.  Gilbert,  363. 

V.  Haskell,  936,  947. 

V.  Henry,  1079. 

V.  Higby,  1084. 


11. ■')4 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprisps  imges  l-(i."2,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  V.  Uiiiiie,  :!07, 
1008,  1009. 

V.  Humphries,  710. 

V.  .Tackson,  997,  1017. 

V.  .T<ames,  022.  02!!. 

v.  .Tohnson,  ]!)S,  07(1.  712,  S4.";. 

V.  .Tones,  301. 

V.  Killebrew,  1089. 

V.  Kirkbrido,  4.j.  2G.j. 

V.  Kizziah,  9"i7. 

V.  Ijooney,  1070. 

V.  JI'Aulay,  lOOS. 

V.  McFadden,  170. 

V.  McNeill,  1012. 

V.  Matthews,   302. 

V.  Meson,   1080. 

V.  Jlontgomerj',    870. 

V.  Pendery,  800. 

V.  Redeker,  402. 

V.  Reed,  45,  .'iO.-),  782. 

V.  Rossing,  302. 

V.  Roimdtree,  1090. 

V.  Rowland,  928. 

V.  Ryan,  1089. 

V.  Shields,  1092. 

V.  Simmons,  107G. 

V.  Simonton,  921. 

V.  Smith,  948. 

V.  Steele,  747. 

V.  Stricklin,  1084. 

V.  Tennant,  .308. 

V.  Thompson,  308. 

V.  Trott,  309. 

V.  Vaughn,  .308. 

V.  Vieno,  402. 

V.  Welch,  882. 

y.  Wilbanks,  .308. 

V.  Wilm,  1076. 

v.  Wilson,  244. 

V.  Winton,  313. 

V.  Wright,  1067. 
Gulledge  v.  White,  058. 
Giirnz  V.  Chicago,  St.  P.  &  M.  Ry.  Co., 

90T. 
Gunderson  v.   Northwestern  Elevator 
Co.,  988. 

V.  Richardson,   191. 
Gunn  V.  Harris,  670. 

V.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  987,  989. 
Gunsolus  V.  Lormer,  665,  666,  687. 
Gunter  v.  Astor,  (;45. 

V.  GraniteviUe  Manuf  g  Co.,  1039. 


Gimther  y.  Ullrich,  270. 
Gunton  v.  Nurse,  728. 
Gurley  v.  Armstead,  736. 

y.  City  of  New  Orleans,  916. 

y.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  380,  ;i90, 
800,  881,  892. 

y.  People,  317. 
Giu'nsey  v.  Lovell,  428. 
Guth  V.  Lubach,  504. 
Guthrie  y.  Jones,  717,  723. 
Gutsole  V.  Mathers,  477,  5.11. 
Guy  V.  Fisher  &  Burnett  Lumber  Co., 

.324. 
Gwaltney  y.  Land  Co.,  361. 
Gwinnell  v.  Eamer,  225,  226,  229. 
Gwynn  v.  Duffleld,  907. 

y.  South  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  169. 


Haag  y.  Board  of  County  Com'rs,  177, 

180. 
Haas  v.  Choussard,  82. 

V.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  G.  R.  Co., 

1064. 
V.  Missionary    Soc.    of   the    M(j,st 
Holy  Redeemer,  126,  187,  188. 
y.  Philadelphia  &  S.  M.  S.  S.  Co., 
1036. 
Hackett  v.  B.  C.  &  M.  R.  R.,  1008. 
v.  Hackett,  13. 

y.  Providence  Tel.   Pub.   Co.,  504. 
Haddow  v.  Roxburgh,  281. 
Haden  v.  Clarke,  471,  887. 
y.  Railroad  Co.,  966. 
V.  Sioux  City  &  P.  R.  Co.,  198,  361. 
Hadley  v.  Baxendale,  372. 
V.  Cross,  847. 
V.  Ileywood,  465,  466. 
v.  Taylor,  766. 
Hadon  y.  Brown,  802. 
Hachl  v.  Wabash  Co..  279. 
Haenni  y.  Bleisch,  5S.'i. 
Haesley  y.  Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co., 

830. 
Hagan  v.   Providence   &   W.   R.   Co., 

395. 
Hagebush  v.  Ragland,  221. 
Hagee  v.  Grossman,  592. 
Hagen  v.  Chicago,  D.  &  C.  G.  T.  J. 
Ry.  Co.,  846,  955. 


CASES   CITKD. 


1155 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Hager  v.  Danlorth,  4A:'>. 

V.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  928,  949. 
Haggart  v.  Stolilin,  785. 
Haggerty  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  334. 

V.  Thomson,  801. 

V.  Wilber,   OT.j. 
Has-ue  V.  Wheeler,  186. 
Hahl  V.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  263. 
Hahu  V.  Cooper,  4'>3. 

V.  Schmidt,  613,  623. 
Hahnke  v.  Frederich,  857. 
Haight  V.  Badgeley,  119. 

V.  Cornell,  .")31. 

V.  Hayt,  570. 
Halles  V.  Marks,  428. 
Haile's  Ciu-ator  v.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 

377,  3S0. 
Haines  y.  Campbell,  512. 

V.  Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co., 
1077. 

V.   Schiiltz,  .•!96. 
Haire  v.  Miller.  337. 

V.  Reese.  914. 

V.  Wilson,  475. 
Hairston  v.  State,  435. 
Haldeman  v.  Bruckhardt.  758. 
Hale  V.  Clark,  676,  (>S0. 

V.  Continental   Life  Ins.   Co.,   .58.3. 

V.  Lawrence,  149. 

V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  1075. 

V.  Philbrick,  596. 
Haley  v.  Case,  1023. 

V.  Chicago  North  Western  Ry.  Co., 
333. 

V.  Jump  River  Lumber  Co.,  228. 

V.  Lumber  Co.,  1020. 
Hall,  In  re,  175. 

V.  Booth,  427. 

V.  Chicago,   B.   &  N.   R.   Co.,   402, 
818,   820.   1023. 

V.  Corcoran,  163,  730. 

V.  Fearnley,  66. 

V.  Hollander,  461. 
■  V.  Incorporated  Town  of  ^ilanson, 
176,  472,  963. 

V.  .Johnson,  594. 

V.  Kintz,  353. 

V.  Mayor  of  Bristol,  79. 

V.  Memphis  &  C.  R.  Co.,  1081. 

V.  Ripley,  925. 

V.  Rogers,  425. 

y.  Smith,  126,  128,  138. 


Hall  v.  Suydam,  621. 

y.  Thayer,  119. 

T.  Thompson,  593. 
Hallam  v.  Post  Pub.  Co.,  396,  513,  537, 

547,  549. 
Halleck  v.  Mixer,  27. 
Halley,  The,  102. 

v.  Gregg,   482,   491,   548. 
Halliday  v.  Holgate,  725. 
Halligan  v.  Chicago  &  C.  Ry.  Co.,  666. 
Hallock  V.  Kinney,  45r). 
Halsell  V.  Musgraves,  269. 
Halsey  v.  Brotherhood,  552,  553. 

V.  Rapid  Transit  St.  Ry.  Co.,  689. 

V.  Stillman,  504,  519. 

V.  Woodruff,  214. 
Halsted's  Bx'rs  v.  Colvin,  269. 
Haluptzok  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co., 

45,  243. 
Ham  v.  Canal  Co.,  896. 

Y.  City  of  New  York,  181. 

V.  Newburgh,  D.  &  C.  R.  Co.,  928. 
Hambleton  v.  "S'eere,  85,  411. 
Hambly  v.  Trott,  41,  329. 
Hamer  v.  Hathaway,  739. 
Hamilburgh  v.  Shepard,  610,  612. 
HamUton  v.  Eno,  497,  530,  536,  537. 

V.  Fond  du  Lac,  137. 

V.  Home  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  295. 

v.  Jones,  330,  331. 

V.  Lomax.  159,  204,  453,   454. 

v.  Plainwell  Water-Power  Co.,  IS. 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  140,  172,  790. 

V.  Rich   Hill   Coal  Min.   Co.,   1014. 

V.  Ward.  81. 

V.  Whitridge,  777. 

V.  The  William  Branfort.  403. 
Hamilton  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Mighels,  183, 

188. 
Hamlin  v.  Abell,  .564,  601. 

V.  Great   Northern   Ry.    Co.,    106S. 
1088. 

V.  Mack,  676. 
Hamm  v.  Drew,  738. 
Hammack    v.    White,    8-5.5,    880,    911, 

935. 
Hammatt  v.  Emerson,  565. 
Hammersmith  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Brnnd. 

141. 
Hammon  v.  Fisher,  663. 
Hammond  v.  Hightower,  440,  674. 

V.  Hopkins,  598. 


1156 


CASES   CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Hammond  v.  Melton,  8.")4. 

V.  Northeastern  Ry.  Co.,  1080. 
Hammond  Co.  v.  Johnson,  995. 
Hampton  v.  Brown,  665. 
Hanaw  v.  Jackson  Patriot  Co.,  508. 
Hance  v.  Pacific  Exp.  Co.,  1074. 

V.  Tittabawassee    Boom    Co.,    714. 
Hanchett  v.  Ives,  132,  670. 
Hancke  v.  Hooper,  870,  913. 
Hancock  v.  Baker,  675. 
Hand  v.  Baynes,  1008. 
Handlam  v.  McManus,  753. 
Handy  v.  Foley,  222,  731. 
V.  Johnson,  431,  433. 
v.  Waldron,  571,  579. 
Hanewacker  v.  Ferman,  392. 
Haney  v.  Pittsburgh,  A.   &  M.  Trac- 
tion Co.,  861. 
v.  Railway  Co.,  967,  1039. 
Haney   Manuf'g   Co.   v.   Perkins,   292, 

494,  497. 
Hankins  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R. 
Co.,  1038,  1044. 
V.  Watkins,  821,  852,  945,  949. 
Hanley  v.  16  Horses  and  13  Head  of 

Cattle,  4. 
Hanlon  v.  Ingram,  15i,  843. 

V.  South  Boston  H.  R.  Co.,  925. 
V.  Union    Pac.    R.    Co.,    336,    664, 
671. 
Hanly  v.  Watterson,  353,  357,  691. 
Hanmer  v.  Wilsey,  669. 
Hanna  v.  Flint,  719. 

V.  Granger,  1040,  1041.  . 
V.  Jeffersonville  Ry.,  335. 
Hannah  v.  Connecticut  River  R.   Co., 

1019. 
Hannam  v.  Mockett,  350,  676,  854. 
Hannem  v.  Pence,  747,  834,  838,  840. 
Hannibal  Bridge  Co.  v.  Schaubacher, 

399. 
Hannibal  R.  Co.  v.  Swift,  903,  1058. 
Hannon  v.  Mockett,  676. 
Hans  V.  Louisiana,  113. 
Hanscom  v.  Drullard,  596,  600. 
Hansen   v.   Chicago,   M.   &   St.    P.   R. 

Co.,  831,  929. 
Hansford  v.  Payne,  907. 
Hansley  t.  Jamesville  &  W.  R.  Co., 

394. 
Hanson  v.  Edgerly,  593. 


Hanson  v.  Globe  Newspaper  Co.,  264, 
474,  475,  485,  498. 

V.  Tarbox,  715. 
Hardcastle  v.  South  Yorkshire  R.  Co., 

888,  891. 
Hardenberg  v.  Railroad  Co.,  401,  402, 

1080. 
Harder  v.  Harder,  694. 
Hardin  v.  Baptist  Church,  149. 
Harding  v.  Bodman,  127. 

V.  Brooks,  549. 

v.  City  of  Boston,  230. 

V.  Larned,  155,  160. 

V.  Sandy,  677,  688. 

V.  Townshend,  399. 

V.  Weld,  155,  160. 
Hardman  r.  Bellhouse,  314. 

V.  Wilcox,  190,  731. 
Hardy  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  179. 

V.  Munroe,  714. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  242,  369. 

V.  Ryle,  36. 

V.  Williamson,  491. 
Hare  v.  Mclntire,  281,  849,  921. 
Hargan  v.  Purdy,  508,  914. 
Hargrave  v.  Le  Breton,  518. 
Hargreaves  v.  Deacon,  831,  891. 

V.  Kimberly,  793. 
Hargro  v.  Hodgdon,  785,  803. 
Harker  v.  Birkbeck,  669. 

V.  Dement,  713. 
Harkins  v.  Car  Co.,  415. 

V.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.   Co.,  334. 

V.  Standard  Sugar  Refinery,   103.">. 
Harlammert  v.  Moody's  Adm'r,  30. 
Harley  v.  Car  Manuf'g  Co.,  945,  995. 

V.  Louisville    &   N.    E.    Co.,    1041. 
1048. 

v.  Merrill  Brick  Co.,  212,  744,  749, 
769,   795,   798,   802,   807. 
Harman  v.  Tappenden,  86,  173. 
Harmon  v.  Harmon,  681. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  410,  412. 

v.  Tappenden,  135. 
Harmony  v.  Bingham,  1069. 
Harned  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  307. 
Harnett  v.  Maitland,  697. 
Harold,  The,  238,  1034. 
Harper  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  176. 

v.  Godsell,  733. 

V.  Harper,  539. 


CASES    CITED. 


1157 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Harper  v.  LufEkin,  452. 
V.  MEwaukee,  177. 
V.  PiDkston,  486. 
Harrell  v.  Kea,  340. 
Harriman  v.  Railway  Co.,  265,  830. 

T.  Stowe,  287. 
Harrington  v.  Commissioners,  120. 

V.  M'Shane,  1058. 

V.  People,  441. 

V.  Tremblay,  713. 

V.  Ward,  130. 
Harris  v.  Baker,  138. 

V.  Butler,  453. 

V.  Cameron,  375,  852,  907. 

V.  Carson,  129. 

V.  De  Pinna,  89. 

V.  Fisher,  856. 

V.  Gillingham,  682,  683. 

V.  James,  212,  226,  24^. 

V.  McJlm-ray,  581. 

V.  McNamara,  228. 

V.  Nichols,  255. 

V.  Nickerson,  587. 

V.  Railroad   Co.,  260,   1065,  1073- 
1075. 

T.  Rand,  1002. 

V.  Reynolds,  315. 

V.  Rosenberg,  211. 

T.  Ryding,  753. 

V.  Shebek,    1005. 

V.  Simon,  848,  S19. 

T.  Smith,  665. 

V.  Tenney,  132.  211. 

y.  Warre,  613. 

V.  Whitcomb,  135. 
Harris'  Adm'r  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co., 

1019. 
Hanis'  Case,  9C3. 
Harrison  v.  Adamson,  693. 

V.  Berkeley,  86,  376,  377. 

V.  Bush,  529,  530. 

V.  Manship,  510. 

V.  Marshall,  200. 

V.  Price,  401. 

V.  Raihroad  Co.,  ISU,  861,  103'.i. 

V.  Rector,     etc.,     of     St.     ilark's 
Church,  781. 

V.  Redden,  371. 

V.  Southwark  &  V.  Water  Co.,  778. 

V.  State,  914. 
Harriss  v.  Sneeden,  5j3. 


Harrold  v.  Winona  &  St   P.  R.  Co., 

loss. 

Harrop  v.  Herst,  82. 

V.  Hirst,  385,  387,  784. 
narrower  y.  Ritson,  802. 
Plarseim  v.  Cohen,  164. 
Hart,  In  re,  205. 

V.  Aldridge,  450. 

V.  Basset,  784. 

V.  Baxter,  527. 

V.  Board,  784,  799. 

y.  City  of  Albany,  349,  802,  804. 

y.  Cole,  223,  894. 

V.  Byans,  809. 

V.  Flynn,  419. 

V.  Frame,  916. 

V.  Gumimch,  529. 

y.  Hudson  Riyer  Bridge  Co.,  944, 
948. 

y.  Mayor,  765. 

y.  Mental,  222. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  243,  303,  305,  949, 
1060. 

V.  Skinner,  730. 

V.  U.  S.,  110. 
.V.  Wall,   501,   .553. 
"v.  West  Side  R.  Co.,  860. 
Harter  v.  Wescott,  354. 
Hartfield  v.  Roper,  85,  984. 
Hartford  v.  Brady,  678. 

V.  Talcott,  919. 
Hartford  Ins.  Co.  v.  Matthews,  563. 
Hartford  Iron  Min.   Co.   v.   Cambria 

Min.  Co.,  738. 
Hartley  v.  Herring,  386. 

V.  Moxham,  723. 
Hartlieb  v.  McLane's  Adm'r,  132. 
Hartman  v.  Greenhow,  111. 

V.  Pittsburg    Incline    Plane    Co., 
363. 
Hartnall  v.  Ryde  Com'rs,  98. 
Hartshorn  y.  Chaddock,  754. 

V.  Day,  317. 
Hartwell  v.  Camman,  753. 

V.  Kelly,  677. 

V.  Northern  Pac.  Exp.   Co.,  305. 
Harty  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  921. 
Hartz  V.  Railroad  Co.,  411. 
Harvey  v.  Brydges,  6SS. 

V.  De  Woody,  768,  801. 

r.  Dunlop,  53,  437. 


1158  CASES    CITED. 

[\'ol.   1  comiiriscs   pnscs   l-l!r>2,   iuclusi\e;   vol.  2  the  i-esidue.] 


Harvey  v.  Harvey,  675,  7U0. 

V.  Large,  olio. 

V.  Jlayne,  443. 

y.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
1000. 

V.  Ryan,  91. 

V.  Terre  Haute,  &  I.  R.  Co.,  305. 

V.  YouBg,  578,  580. 
Harwood  v.  Thouipkins,  5(j. 
Haskell    County    Bank    v.    Bank    of 

Santa  F6,  354. 
Haskins  v.  Lums^len,  548. 

V.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
809,  1009. 

V.  Royster,  448,  636,  046. 
Hass  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co., 

967. 
Hasse  v.  American  Exp.  Co.,  1070. 
Hassenyer  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co., 

874. 
Hastings  v.  Crunckleton,  7iiii,  7(1.:. 

V.  Lusk,  528. 
Hasty  V.  Sears,  1035. 
Hatch  V.  Cohen,  611. 

V.  Donnell,  660,  662. 

V.  Fuller,  369,  459. 

V.  Hatch,  698. 

V.  Matthews,  503. 

V.  Vermont  Cent.   R.   Co.,  140. 
Hatchard  v.  Mege,  329,  552. 
Hatcher  v.  Hampton,  692. 
Hatfield  v.  Central  Ry.  Co.,  412. 

V.  Refer  &  Newell.  984. 
Hathaway  v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.,  R. 
Co.,  933,  951. 

V.  Illinois  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  994,  999, 
1040. 

V.  Toledo,  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  984. 
Hathorn  v.  Congress  Spring  Co.,  522. 

V.  Richmond,  913. 
Hatt  V.  Evening  News  Ass'n,  387,  494, 
495. 

V.  Nay,  1050. 
Hatter  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  1019. 
Hatton  V.  Holmes,  134. 
Hauch  V.  Hernandez,  843. 
Hauck   V.    Tidewater    Pipe-Line    Co., 

757,  771,  792. 
Haugen  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co., 

847. 
Haugh's  Appeal,  7(jS,  771. 
Haven  v.  Foster,  582. 


Haven  v.  Meal,  578. 
Havens  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  874. 
Haverly  v.  Elliott,  739. 
Haverstick  v.  Sipe,  75a. 
Hawes  v.  Knowles,  382,  395. 
Hawk  V.  Evans,  527. 

V.  Ridgway,  421. 

v.  Thorn,  27. 
Hawke'sley  y.  Bradshaw,  521. 
Hawkeye  Lumber  (Jo.  v.  Diddy,  131. 
Hawkins  v.  Appleby,  732. 

V.  <Japron,  738. 

V.  Hoffman,  718,  1008. 

V.  Manston,  422,  423. 

V.  Raih-oad  Co.,  1037,  1039. 

V.  Taylor,  131. 
Hawley  v.  Butler,  427. 

V.  City  of  Atlantic,  KM. 

V.  Clowes,  705. 

V.  Tesch,  292. 
Hawn  V.  Banghart,  457,  45:),  400. 
Haworth  v.  Montgomery,  914. 
Hawthorne  v.  Sicgel,  093. 
Hawver  v.  Bell,  715. 

V.  Whaleu,  228,   235,   236. 
Hay  V.  Cohoes  Co.,  2S8,  772,  848,  850. 

V.  Reid,  536,  547,  548. 

V.  Weber,  751,  784,   785,   787,  804. 
Haycraft  v.  Creasy,  55,  150,  563,  565, 

587. 
Hayden  v.  Jlissouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co., 
884. 

V.  Shed,  607. 

V.  Smithville   ilanuf'g    Co.,    1015, 
1044. 

V.  Woods,  221. 
Hayes  v.  Ball,  498. 

V.  Bush  &  D.  Manuf'g  Co.,  liX)l. 

V.  Gallagher,  145.  939. 

V.  Hyde  Park,  09. 

V.  Kenued.v,  1002. 

V.  ilussachusetts    Mut.    Life    Ins. 
Co..  739. 

V.  Miller,  256. 

V.  Blitchell,  419. 

V.  Norcross,  904. 

V.  Philadelphia  iV:  R.  Coal  &  Iron 
Co.,   805. 

V.  Porter,  13(i. 

V.  Press  Co.,  5.33. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  100,  185,  317,  319, 
919,  920,  922,  926,  930,  935. 


CASES    CITED.  1159 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Hayes  v.  Todd,  544. 

Hayman     v.     Governors     of     Rugby 

Scliool,  148. 
Hayn  v.  Culliford,  20. 
Hayne  v.  Rhodes,  918. 
Hayner  v.  Cowden,  508. 
Haynes   v.   East  Tennessee  &  G.    R. 
Co.,  1030. 

V.  Erk,  402,  lOOC. 

V.  Nowlin,  468. 

V.  Raleigh  Gas  Co.,  850,  864,  971. 

V.  Sinclair,  460. 

V.  State,  439. 

V.  Thomas,  33. 
Hays  V.  Askew,  809. 

V.  Blizzard,  611. 

V.  Gainesville  St.  Ry.  Co.,  817. 

V.  Gallagher,  039. 

V.  Kennedy,   1062. 

V.  Millar,  951. 

V.  People,  431. 
Haj-^ard  v.  Knapp,  045. 

V.  Seaward,  729. 
Plazard  v.  Harding,  634. 

V.  Irwin,  565,  571,  578. 
Hazard    Powder    Co.    v.    Volger,    724, 

925. 
Hazel  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
301,    305.. 

V.  People's  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  936. 
Hazeltine  v.  Case,  413. 

V.  Edgmaud,  74'.). 
Hazelton  v.  AVeek,  57,  655,  682. 
Hazen  v.  Boston  &  51.  R.  Co.,  144. 
Hazlehurst  v.  Brunswick  Lumber  Co., 

1016. 
Plazlett  V.  Burge,  ."'i84. 
Hazzard  v.  Flury,  017. 

V.  Israel,  139. 
Heacock  v.  Sherman,  186. 
Head  v.  Brisc(}e,  217. 

V.  I'ortpr,  HI. 
Hoadefin  v.  Cooper,  1045. 
Heald  v.  Carey,  73(1,  734. 

V.  MacGowan,  742. 
Healy  v.  Visalia  &  T.  R.  Co.,  301,  944. 

V.  Woodruff,    756. 
Heaney  v.  Butte  &  M.  Commercial  Co., 
092. 

V.  Long  Island  R.  Co..  884. 
Hearn  v.  Bittorman,  728. 
Hearne  v.  Stowell,  ~h'>3. 


Heartt  v.  Kruger,  7.'32. 
Heath  v.  Doyle,  311. 

v.  Randall.  (;S4,  (;S5. 
Heaven  v.   Pender,   S!).",   905,   906. 
Hebler  v.   Mc(Jartney,  1002. 
Heckle  v.    Lurvey,   218,   222. 
Hector  v.  Boston  Electric  Light  Co., 

804,  891,  929. 
Hedden  v.  Grittin,  5.j9. 
Hedges  v.  Tagg,  451^.");!. 
Hedin   v.   City   &  Subm'ban   Ry.    Co., 
195. 
V.  Institute,  580. 
Heeg  V.  Licht,  771,  847. 
Heeney  v.  Si>rague,  97,  919. 
Heenrich  v.  Pullman  Paiace-Car  Co., 

2.-,8. 
Hccrmance    v.    .Tames,    466. 

V.  Veruoy,  077. 
Hefferen  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  994. 

1(153. 
Helfi'on  v.  Rice,  2(i0. 
Hegan  v.  Railway  Co.,  971. 
Hegerich  v.  Keddie,  .331,  334. 
Heidenheimer  v.  Loring,  4.'!. 
Heigel  v.  AVicUita   Co.,   182. 
Heil   V.   Glanding,   31>4. 
Heiligmann  v.   Rose,  694. 
Heilman  v.  Shauldiu,  522. 
Heinekamp  v.  Beaty,  739. 
Heinrich  Bjorn.  The,  110. 
Ileinrichs  v.  Krechner.  453. 
Heirn  v.  JlcCaughau,  471,  903,  904. 
Heizer  v.  Kingsland  &  Douglass  Man- 

ufg  Co.,  908. 
Hellams  v.    Swltzer,   794. 
Heller,  In  re,  1.55. 

V.  Charleston  Pliosphate  Co.,  316. 
Helling    v.    United    Order    of   Honor, 

32(.». 
Helm  V.  O'Rourke,  990. 
Helmke  v.  Stetier,  1003. 
Helton  V.  Railway  Co.,  103. 
Heltouville  JIanufg  Co.  v.  Fields,  990. 
Hemann  v.  \V.  V.  Tel.  Co.,  .307. 
Hembling  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  69, 

SOS. 
Hemiuwa.y  v.  Heminwaj-,  441. 
Hemmens  v.  Nelson,  490. 
Hemmer  v.  Cooper,  578. 
Plemmwell  v.  Drixbury,  002. 
Hempfing  v.  Burr,  735. 


1160 


CASES   CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  l-t;"i2,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Hempstead  v.   Cargill,  339. 
Hendershott  v.  City  of  Ottumwa,  178. 
Henderson  v.  Broomhead,  527. 

V.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  6'J4. 

V.  Fox,    54.J. 

V.  Hale,  494. 

V.  Henderson,  408. 

V.  Henshall,  5S0,  591,  597. 

V.  McReynolds,  408,  430. 

V.  Midland    Co.,    108. 

V.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.,  844. 

V.  St.  Paul  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  404,  860. 

V.  Smith,  134. 

V.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  414. 
Hendrick  v.  McCrary,  4ol>. 
Hendricken  v.  Bleadows,  894. 
Hendricks  v.  Evans,  73!  >. 
Hendrickson  v.  Kingsliurry,  395. 

V.  SulUvan,  503. 
Hendriks  v.  Montagu,  551. 
Henke  v.  McCord,  123,  136. 
Henkle  v.  Schaub,  493. 
Henly  v.  Mayoi-,  '.). 
Hennessey  v.   City  of   New  Bedford, 

170. 
Hennessy  v.  City  of  Boston,  954,  997. 
Hennies  v.  Vogel,  471. 
Henry  v.  Central  Railroad   &   Bank- 
ing Co.,  10G4. 

V.  Dennis,  829. 

V.  Klopfer,  470,  472,  880. 

V.  Pittsburgh,  142. 

V.  Railway   Co.,    18,   374-^376,   378, 
880,  1024. 

V.   Trustees,   804. 
Henry  Bill  Pub.  Co.   v.  Durgin,  71C, 

738. 
Hensal  v.  Wright,  703. 
Henshaw  v.  Noble,  287. 
Henwood  v.  Harrison,   534,  535,   537. 
Hepburn  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  238. 

V.  Sewell,  721. 
Hepfel  V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co., 

198,   987. 
Herbert  v.  Lukens,  917. 

V.   Rainey,   808. 
Hergenrather  v.   Spielman,  611. 
Herin  v.  McCaughan,  904. 
Herlot's  Hospital  v.   Ross,  124. 
Hermans  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  E. 

R.  Co..  887. 
Hern  v.  Nichols,  2.50,  269. 


Heme  v.   Bembow,  697. 
Heron  v.  Huglies,  55. 
Herre  v.   City   of   Lebanon,  68. 
Herreshoff  v.   Tripp,   337. 
Herrick  v.  Gary,  S.jS. 

V.    Minneapolis   &   St.    L.    R.   Co., 
103,  1055. 
Herring  v.  Boyle,  421. 
Herron  v.  Hughes,  86,  G38,  723. 
Hersey  v.  Chapin,  664.     ^ 

V.  Walsh,  739. 
Hershey  v.  O'Neil,  263. 
Herstine  v.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  Co.,  1085. 
Hertzog  v.  Hertzog,  20. 
Herzog  t.  Graham,  630,  631. 
Hess  V.  Lapton,  196. 

V.  Sparks,  504. 
Hesse  v.  Knippel,  913. 
Hestonville  Pass.   R.   Co.  v.   Connell, 

197. 
Hetfleld  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  683,  085. 
Hetherington  v.  Sterry,  513. 
Hett  V.  Pun  Pong,  917. 
Hewett  V.  Swift,   168,  253,  289. 
Hewey  v.  Nourse,  843. 
Hewison  v.  City  of  New  Haven,  766, 

838. 
Plewit  V.  Mason,  509. 
Hewitt  V.  Eisenbart,  391,  912. 

V.  Newburger,  418,  422,  426. 

V.  Pioneer  Press  Co.,  547. 

V.  Prime,  452,  458. 
Hewlett  V.  Cruchley,  621. 

V.  George,  430,   463. 
Hexamer  v.  Webb,  232. 
Hexter  v.   Bast,   559,   570. 
Hey  V.  Moorhouse,   686. 
Heydon's  Case,  342. 
Heyler  v.  New  York  News  Co.,  513. 
Heywood  v.  Tillson,  56,   645,  647. 
Hibbard  v.  Ryan,  608,  614. 

V.   Thompson,  972. 

V.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  367. 
Hibbard,   Spencer,   Bartlett  &  Co.   v. 

Ryan,  526. 
Hibernia    Bldg.    Ass'n    v.    McGrath, 

901. 
Hichcock  v.  Burgett,  970. 
Hickenbotton  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W. 

R.   Co.,  860. 
Hickey  v.  Baird,  866. 

v.  Morrell.  579. 


CASES    CITED. 


1161 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-662,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Hickey  v.  Railroad  Co.,  800,  956. 

V.  Taaffe,  1002. 
Hickham  v.  Hicliham,  340. 
Hicks  V.   Citizens'  Ry.  Co.,  861. 

V.  Dom,  801. 

V.  Downling,  840. 

V.  Faulkner,  615,  616,  625. 

V.   Herring,   412. 

T.   Stevens,   596. 
Hicks'  Case,  482. 
Hiett  V.  Shull,  154. 
Higgen's  Case,  321. 
Higginbotham  v.   Com.,   113. 
Higgins,  In  re,  643,  649. 

V.  Butcher,  327. 

V.  Dewey,  78,  376,  842,  843. 

V.   McCabe,  911. 

V.   Minagban,   440. 

V.  Walkem,  512. 

V.   Western   Union  Tel.   Co.,   233, 
244. 

V.  Whitney,  721. 
Higginson  v.  York,  654. 
Higgs  V.  Maynard,  940. 
High  V.   Berret,   602. 

T.   Carolina   Cent.   R.   Co.,  831., 
Highland  Ave.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Dono- 
van,  1086.  1090. 

V.  MacMox,  823. 

V.  Walters,  201. 

V.  Winn.  S2.j. 
Highman  v.   Vanosdol,  406,  467. 
Higley  v.  Gilmer,  950. 
Hilbery  v.   Hatton,  57,   722. 
Hildebrand  v.   McCrum,  418,  419. 
Hiles  v.  Case,  208. 
Hill  v.  Bqais,  586,  858,  908. 

V.   Bartholomevs^,  660,   691. 

V.  Board,  178. 

V.  Boston,  H.  I.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  305. 

V.   Charlotte.  175. 

V.  City   of  Boston,    178,    183,    185, 
187. 

V.  City  of  New  York,  784,  790,  805. 

V.  Covell.  727. 

V.  Davis.  27. 

V.   Durham  House  Drainage  Co., 
531,  543. 

V.  Goodchild,  214. 

V.  Gray,  575. 

V.  Hayes,  735,  736. 


Hill  V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  930. 

V.  Miles,  528. 

V.  Jlorey.  206. 

V.  Perrott.  27. 

V.  Portland  &  R.  R.  Co.,  948,  950. 

V.  Pride.  122. 

V.  Scott.   880. 

V.  Sheehan,  266. 

V.    Smith,    673. 

V.  Snyder,  951. 

V.  Taylor,  419,  421,  430, 

V.   United   States,   112. 

V.  Ward,  551,  553. 

V.  Warren.   977. 

V.   West    End    St.   Ry.    Co.,   1090, 
1093. 

V.  Winsor,  374,  376,  886. 
Hillard  v.  Richardson,  46,  232. 
Hilliard  v.  Goold,  443. 
Hillman  v.   Wilcox,   559. 
Hills  V.  Snell,  718. 

Hillyard  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  887. 
Hilman  v.  Newington,  213. 
Hilmes  v.   Stroebel,   210,   211. 
Hilton  V.  Earl,  777. 

V.   Eckersley,   643. 

V.  Granville,  753. 
Hinchman  v.  Patterson  Horse  R.  Co., 
789,  808. 

V.  Weeks,  588,  589. 
Hinckle  v.  State,  462. 
Hinckley  v.  Baxter,  717. 

V.   Emerson,   152,  153. 

V.  Krug,  917,  959. 
Hindman  v.   Rizor,   760. 
Hinds  V.  Barton,  844,  845. 

V.  Harbou,  281. 

V.  Jones.  217. 

V.  Keith.  944. 

V.  Overacker,  281. 
Hines   v.   Lockport,    129. 

V.  New  York  Cent   &  H.  R.   R. 
Co.,  923,  928,  1014. 
Hinkle   v.   Minneapolis  &   St.   L.   Ry. 
Co.,  313.  315. 

V.    Richmond   &   D.    R.    Co.,    831, 
881,   887. 
Hinks  V.  Hinks.  661. 
Hinson  v.  Powell,  624,  625. 
Hinton  v.  Dibbins,  819. 
Hiutz  V.  Graupner,  518,  549. 


116:> 


CASES    CITEDi 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-G52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Hiort  V.  Bott,  U.j4,  7WU,  719. 

V.    London    &    Noi'thwestern    Ry. 
Co.,  743. 
Hirst  V.  Railroad  Co.,  83. 
Hitch  V.   Lambright,   118. 
Hitchcock  V.  Burget,  913. 

V.  T'urnbuU,  391. 
Hitte   V.    Republican    Valley   R.    Co., 

280. 
Hix  V.  State,  513. 
Hixon  V.  Lowell,  766. 
Hoadley  v.  Northern  Trausp.  Co.,  61, 

378. 
Hoag  V.  Railroad  Co.,  61,  72,  371. 
Hoar  V.  Wood,  526.  527. 
Hoard  v.  Peck,  86,  467. 
Hoare     v.     Metropolitan     Board     of 
Works,  690. 

V.  Silverlock,    501.    533. 
Hobart  v.  Hagget,  654. 
Hobble  V.  Jennison,  344. 
Hobbit  V.  London  &  X.  W.   Ry.  Co., 

256,  766. 
Hobbs  V.  Electric  Light  Co.,  313. 

V.  Rail-way  Co.,   260,   377. 

V.  Ray,  42.5,  631. 
Hobson  V.  New  Mexico  &  A.  R.  Co., 
971,   1042. 

V.  Perry,  152,  154. 

V.  Todd,  82. 
Hoby  V.  Built,  915. 
Hochsti'asser  v.  Jliu-tin,  784.  798. 
Hocksteller  v.   Dubuque   &  S.    C.    R. 

Co.,  844. 
Hodges  V.  Bales,  457. 

V.  Hodges,   412. 

V.  Percival,  949. 

V.  A^'eltberger,  .50. 
Hodgins  v.   Minneapolis,   St.  P.  &  S. 

S.  M.  R.   Co.,  926. 
Hodgkin  v.  Ennor,  750. 
Hodgkinson  v.  Ennor,  771. 
Hodgson  V.  Scarlett,  526,  52S. 
Hodsman  v.  Grissel,  161. 
HodsoU  V.  Stallebrass,  36,  85. 
Hodson  V.  Goodale,  742. 
Hoey  V    Feltou,  378. 
Hoffeditz  v.   Mining  Co.,  200. 
Hoffman  t.  Carew,  734. 

V.  Harrington,  688. 

V.  Kemerer,  460. 

V.  Livingston,  48. 


Hoffman  v.   Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co., 
361,  946. 

V.  New    York   Cent.   &   H.    R.    R. 
Co.,  262. 

V.  Tuolumne  Water  Co..  819,  867, 
872. 

V.  Whaleman,   222. 
Hofnagle  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R. 

R.  Co..  1040. 
Hogan  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co..  803. 

V.  Cregan,   459. 

V.  Hogan,  297. 

V.  Manhattan  R.  Co..  837. 

V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co..  1024. 

V.  Sutton,   537. 

V.  Tyler,  883. 

V.  Wolf,  338. 
Hogenson  v.  St.  Paul,  M.   &  M.   Ry. 

Co.,  763. 
Hogg  V.  Ward.  427,  429. 
Hoggatt  V.  Bigley,  120. 
Hogle  V.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R. 

Co.,  969. 
Holbrock  v.  Utica  &  S.  R.  Co.,  1085. 
Holbrook  v.  Connor,  578. 

v.  Railway   Co.,  939. 

V.  Wright,   726,   731. 
Holcomb  V.  Danby,  194. 

V.  Noble,  570. 
Holdane  v.  Trustees  of  Cold  Spring, 

764. 
Holden  v.  Liverpool  New  Gas  &  Coke 
Co.,  224,  849,  850. 

V.  Merritt,  613,  615,  622,  623. 
Holdom  V.  Ayer,  563,  592,  594. 
Holdrldge  v.   Lee.  707. 
Hole  V.  Barlow,  776. 

V.  Sittingbourne  R.   Co.,  234,  236. 
Holiday  v.   St.  Leonard.   138. 
Holladay  v.   Kennard,   66,   1063. 
Holland  v.  Bartch.  859. 

V.  Sparks,  886. 

v.  West  End.  St.  Uy.  Co.,  1086. 
HoUenbeck  v.   City  of  Jlarshalltown, 
944. 

V.  Winnebago   Co.,    183. 
HoUey  v.  Mix,  133,  428,  632,  634. 
Holliday  v.  Morgan,  588. 

V.  St.  Leonard,  187. 
HoUingsworth  v.  Atkins,  225,  634. 
Hollins   V.   Fowler,   10,   50,   654,   717, 
734. 


CASES    CITED. 


116S 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Hollis  V.   Harris,  40,  273. 

V.  Meux,   526,   52.S. 
Hollister  v.   Xowlen,  309. 
Holly  V.  Bennett,  837,  839. 

V.  Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  849. 
V.  Carson,  418. 
Holman  v.  Herscher,  6u.j. 
Holmberg   v.    Johnson,   r,!i,s,    704,   705. 
Holmes    v.    Allegheny    Traction    Co., 
1090. 
v.  Atchison,    T.    i:    S.    F.    R.    Co., 

824. 
V.  Blyler,   420.   4:;!0. 
V.  Corthell,  765. 
V.  Doaue,   G02. 
V.  Drew,  891,   892,  894. 
V.  Holmes,  468. 
T.  Horger,  623. 
V.  Jones,  518. 
V.  Mather,  19,  53,  .54,  66,  437,  475, 

855,  877,  SSI),  982. 
V.   Northeastern   lly.   Co.,  280,   893, 

992,  1035.   10S2. 
V.  Peck,  91G. 
V.  Seely,   666. 
y.  South.  Pac.  Coast  Ry.  Co.,  948, 

975. 
V.   Wilson,   411,   412,   658. 
Holsapple  v.   Rome,  AV.  &  O.  R.  Co., 

1075. 
Holsman  v.   Boiling  Spring  Bleaching 

Co.,  769. 
Hoist  V.  Stewart,  5ij2,  594,  595,  597. 
Holston  T.  Boyle,  386.  .521. 
Holsworth's   Case,    TIN. 
Holt  y.  Scholefleld,  502. 

V.  Spokane  ^t  P.   Ry.  Co.,  949. 
Holton  V.   Xoble,   382. 
Holtum  V.  Lotum,  392. 
Holtz  V.  Dick,  220,  467. 
Holtzman  v.  Hoy,  914. 
Holum   V.   Chicago,   M.   &  St.   P.  Ry. 

Co.,   996. 
Homan  v.  Franklin  Co.,  379,  391. 

\-.  Stanley,    145. 
Homer  y.  Battyn,  421. 
y.  Englehardt,  508. 
V.  Thwing,    159,    163,   730. 
Honey  v.  Railway  Co..  220,  472,  983. 
Honcywood  v.  Honeywood,  701. 
Honnewell  v.   Duxbury,  586. 


Hood  V.  Blair,  131. 
V.  Palm,   101. 
V.  Sudderth,  353,  456,  457. 
Hooker  v.  Miller,  196,  829,  886. 

V.  New     Haven     &    Northampton 
Co.,  186. 
Hooper  v.  Armstrong,  388. 

V.  Vernon,  617. 
Hoosac  Tunnel  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  119. 
Hoosier    Stone    Co.    v.    Louisville,    N. 
A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co..  10G8. 
V.  McCain,  993,  1041. 
V.  Malott,  691. 
Hoots  V.  Graham.  688. 
Hoover  v.  Barkhoof.  137. 
Hoowe  T.  Kreling,  710. 
Hope  V.  Evered,  600. 
Hopf    V.    United    States    Baking    Co.. 

297. 
Hopkins  v.  Atlantic  &  St.  L.   U.   Co., 
395. 
V.  Baltimore  &  P.  R.  Co.,  794. 
V.  Cooper,  579. 
y.  Crowe,  422,  423. 
V.  Hawkeye  Ins.  Co.,  270. 
V.  Hersey,  721. 
V.  O'Neil,  559. 

V.  Western  Pacific  R.  Co.,  37,  412. 
808. 
Hopkins  Bridge  Co.   v.  Burnett,   963, 

1016. 
Hopkinson    v.     Knapp    &    Spaulding 

Co.,  969,  1004. 
Hopner  v.  McGowan,  419. 
Hopper  V.  Reeve,  435,  438. 
Hopwood  y.  Thorn,  490. 
Horan  v.  Railway  Co.,  193,  936. 
Horbach  v.   ilarsh,  340. 
Horgan  v.  Pacific  Mills,  312. 
Horn  V.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  928, 
930. 
y.  Jliller,  746,  759. 
V.  Sims,    610,    617.    625. 
Hornbein  v.   Blachard,   836. 
Hornby  v.   Eddy,   206. 
Home  V.  Midland  R.  Co.,  1076. 
V.  Pudil,   124. 
V.  Sullivan,  629. 
Horner  v.  Lawrence,  290. 
V.  Marshall,   157. 
V.  Stillwell,  792. 


1164 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Horner  v.  U.  S.,  359. 

V.  Whitechapel  District  Board  of 
Works,  98. 
Hornketh  v.   Barr,   18.  452,  453,  459. 
Horn's  Adm'x  v.   Baltimore  &  O.   R. 

Co.,  942. 
Horrigan   v.    Inhabitants   of   Clarks- 
burg, 973. 
Horsfall  v.  Thomas.  590,  908. 
Horsley  v.  Moss,  345. 
Horton  v.  Newell,  181. 

V.  New   York   Cent.    &   H.    R.   R. 
Co.,  325. 
Hosley  v.  Brooks,  460. 
Hosner  v.  De  Young,  113. 
Hossfeldt  V.  Dill,  723. 
Hotchkiss  V.  Hunt,  722. 
V.  Porter,  517. 
V.  Third  Nat.  Bank,  576. 
Hoth  V.  Peters,   1043. 
Houfe  V.   Town  of  Fulton,  69,  983. 
Hougan   v.   Milwaukee   &  St.   P.   Ry. 

Co.,  758. 
Hough  V.  Railway  Co.,  941,  1026,  1032, 

1044,   1047. 
Houghtaling  v.  Kilderhouse,  550. 
Houghton  Y.  Butler,  723. 
Houlden  v.  Smith,  123,  527. 
Houldsworth     v.     City     of     Glasgow 

Bank,  169,  173,  270, 
Hounsell  v.   Smith.  893. 

V.  Smyth,  888. 
House  V.  Board,  185. 
V.     Brooks,  728. 
V.  Fort,  559. 
V.  Metcalf,   766,  950. 
V.  Meyer,  941. 
V.  Phelan,  710. 
Houseman   v.  Association,  133. 

V.  Girard     Mut.     Bldg.     &     Loan 
Ass'n,  905. 
Houston  V.  Brash,  869,  938,  945,  991, 
1008,   1013,  1044,  1045. 
V.  Gate  City  St.  R.  Co.,  1082. 
V.  Laffee,    683. 
V.  Musgrove,  326. 
V.  Traphagen,  381. 
Houston,  C.  A.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Boiling, 

895. 
Houston   City  St.   R.  Co.  v.  Richart, 
391,    947. 


Houston  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  t.  Meador, 
233,  235,  246. 

V.  Miller,   462. 

V.  Parker,  765. 
Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Cowser, 
948. 

V.  Tierney,  312. 
Houx  V.  Seat,  684. 
Hover  v.  Barkhoof,  128,  129. 
Hovey  v.  Mayo,  689. 

V.  Rubber  Co.,   553. 
Howard  v.  City  of  Worcester,  178, 187. 

V.  Denver  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co.,  1030. 

V.  Grover,  913. 

V.  Hood,    1040. 

V.  Seattle  Nat.  Bank,  707, 
Howe  V.  Andrews,  755. 

V.  Cooke,  19. 

V.  Farrar,   190. 

V.  Newmarch,  255,  2.56. 

V.  Ohmai-t,  894.  897. 

V.  Oldham,   443. 

V.  Oyer,   674. 

V.  Searing,    683. 

V.  Young,  101. 
Howell  V.  Caryl,  674. 

V.  Jackson,  428. 

V.  King,  689. 

V.  Young,   917. 
Howells   V.    Landore,    Siemens   Steel 

Co.,  1036. 
Howe  Machine  Co.  v.  Souder,  169. 
Hower  v.  Ulrich,  46,  276. 
Howk  V.   Minnick,   11. 
Howland  v.  Day,  439,  444. 

V.  Flood,  538. 

V.  George  F.  Blake  Manuf'g  Co,, 
482,   522,  540. 

V.  Inhabitants  of  Maynard,  180. 

V.  Manufacturing   Co.,   199. 

V.  Jlilwaukee,  L.  S.  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 
1043. 

V.  Vincent,  196,  888. 
Howser  v.  Cumberland  &  P.  R.  Co., 

940. 
Hoye  V.  Brush,  426. 
Hoyer  v.  Village  of  North  Tonawanda, 

869. 
Hoyt  V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  950. 

V.  Cline,  754, 

V.  Gelston,  669. 


CASES   CITED. 


1165 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Hoyt  V.  Jeffers,  78. 

V.  Macon,    609. 
H.  S.  Hopkins  Bridge  Co.  v.  Burnett, 

1016. 
Hubbard  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  882, 
928. 

V.  Hunt,  210. 

V.    Mace,   674. 

V.  Preston,    152. 

V.  Switzer,  138. 

V.  Town,   750. 

V.  Town  of  Mason  City,  165,  873. 
Hubbell  V.  City  of  Viroqua,  708. 

V.  Meigs,  579. 
Huber  v.  Wilson,  563. 
Hubert  v.  Groves,  786. 
Huchel  V.  Pittsburgh  &  L.  B.  R.  Co., 

389. 
Hucbting  v.  Engel,  159,  160. 
Huckenstine's  Aiipeal,  7(19,  776,  783. 
Huckins  v.  Kapf,  742. 
Huckle   V.   Money,    401. 
Huddleston  v.  .Tobnson,  701,  716. 

V.  West  Bcllevue,  214. 
Huddlestons'  Adm'r  v.  CuiTin,  723. 
Hudkins  v.  Haskins,  204,  455. 
Hudmon  v.  Du  Bose,  736. 
Hudson  V.  Archer,  368. 

V.  Baxendale,  1061. 

V.  Burk,   809. 

V.  Houser,  880. 

V.  Nicholson,   411. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  300,  937,  1076. 

V.  State,  450. 
Hudson  River  Tel.  Co.  v.  Watervliet 

Turnpike  &  R.  Co.,  770,  86i,  865. 
Huerzeler  v.   Central  Cross  Town  R. 

Co.,  989. 
Huey  V.  Gahlenbeck,  939. 
Huff  V.  Ames,  872,  988. 

v.  Watkins,  449. 
Huffman  v.  Hughlett,  346. 
Huggins  v.  Watford.   297. 
Hughbanks  v.  Boston  Inv.  Co.,  229. 
Hughes  V.  Anderson,  762,  763. 

V.  City  of  Lawrence,  178. 

V.  Coors,    726. 

v.  Heiser,  785. 

V.  Maefie,  160. 

V.  Monroe  Co.,  184. 

V.  Percival,  235. 


Hughes  V.  Railroad  Co.,  233,  237,  999, 
1004,  1068. 

V.  Stevens,  658. 
Hughlett  V.  Ozark  Lumber  Co.,  1044. 
Hugo,  The,  299,  301. 
Hulbert  v.  City  of  Topeka,  330. 
Hulett  V.  Swift,  902. 
Hulett's  Case,  1022. 
Huling  V.  Henderson,  393,  653,  682. 

V.  Huling,  467,  408. 
Hull  V.   Bartlett,  443. 

V.  Davidson,  738. 

V.  Fields,  569. 
Hull's  Case,  474. 
Hulme  v.  Shreve,  82. 
Hulse  V.  Brantley,  658,  670. 

v.  New  York,  O.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  837. 

V.  Tollman,  439. 
Humboldt    Lumber    Manuf'rs    Ass'n, 

In  re,  415. 
Hume  V.  JIarshall,  543. 

V.  Oldacre,   212. 

V.  Tufts,  190. 
Humes  v.  Proctor,  414,  695. 
Hummiston  v.  Smith,  559. 
Humpfner  v.  D.   M.  Osborne  &  Co., 

718. 
Humphrey  v.  Douglass,  56,  160. 

v.  King,  135. 

•v.  iMerriam,  561,  562,  569,  592. 

V.  Prudential  Ins.  Co.,  614. 
Humphreys  v.  Cousins,  90. 

V.  Jlears,  138. 

V.  Pen-y,  1077. 
Humphries  v.  Brogden,  751,  7.53. 

V.  Cousins,  833. 

V.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  1079. 
Humphrys  v.  Stanfeild,  509. 
Hunckel  v.  Voneiff,  526,  528. 
Hungerford  v.  Chicago,   M.  &  St.  P. 

Ry.  Co.,  1021,  102;_!. 
Huning  v.  Chavez,  695. 
Hunnestone  v.  Smith,  297. 
Hunnewell  v.  Taber,  1061. 
Hunt  V.  Algar,  533. 

V.  Bates,  342. 

V.  City  of  Boonville,  180. 

V.  Coggln,  773. 

v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  544. 

v.  Iowa  Cent  K.  Co.,  339,  389. 

V.  Nutt,  1068. 


1166  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  resiijiie.] 


Hunt  V.  Simonds,  56. 
Hunter  v.  Blount,  913. 

V.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  R.  Co., 
337. 

V.  City  of  Mexico,  391. 

V.  Columbia,  N.  &  L.  R.  Co.,  SK. 

V.  Cooperstown   &   S.    V.    R.    Co., 
956. 

V.  Cronkhite,  710. 

T.  Farren,  316,  661. 

V.  Mathis,  120. 
Hunter's  Estate,  In  re,  30. 
Huntington,  I.  &  C.  Turnpike  Co.  v. 

Brown,  98. 
Huntington  &  B.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  English, 

741. 
Huntoon  v.   Hazelton,  449. 
Huot  V.  Wise,  466. 
Hupfer  V.  Rosenfeld,  513. 
Hurd  T.  Fleming,  190. 
Hurdman  v.  Northeastern  Ry.,  7U1. 
Hm-lbut  T.  Boaz,  616,  622. 
Hm'lehy  v.  Martine,  429,  430. 
Hurley  v.  Jones,  654. 
Hurrell  v.  Ellis,  98. 
Hurst  V.  Gwennap,  722. 

r.  Railroad  Co.,  261,  1027. 

V.  Taylor,  887. 
Hurwitz  V.  Hurwitz,  88. 
Husdon  V.  Northern  Pac.  K.  Co.,  107(i. 
Huson  V.  Dale,  547. 
Hussey  v.  Coger,  1041,  1043. 

V.  King,  855. 
Huston  V.  Plato,  559. 
Hutcheson  v.  Peck,  466,  467. 
Hutchings  v.  Castle,  707. 
Hutchins  v.  Brackett,  138. 

V.  Hutchins.  88,  556,  602,  638,  773. 

V.  Smith,  769. 
Hutchinson  v.  Boston  G.  L.  Co.,  821, 
849. 

V.  City  of  Ypsilanti,  178. 

V.  Granger,  383. 

V.  Horn,  454. 

V.  Hutchinson,  352. 

V.  Lewis,  526. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  288,  289,  305,  332, 
911,  1029,  1074. 
Hutchison  v.  Birch.  675. 
Hutton  Y.  Eyre,  345. 
Huxley  v.  Besg,  392. 


Hyatt  V.  Adams,  ;!2.S,  470,  471. 

V.  Allen,  351. 

V.  State,  111. 
Hyde  v.  Brush,  135. 

V.  Cooper,  46. 

V.  Graham,  683. 

V.  Greuch,  611. 

V.  .Jamaica,  185. 

V.  MeCabe,  528. 

V.  Noble,  682. 

V.  Stone,  364. 

V.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  330. 
Hyde  Park  v.  Gay,  98,  149,  882,  925. 
Hydraulic  Eugineering  Co.  v.  McHaf- 

fle,  372. 
Hyfield  v.  Brass  Furnace  Co.,  629. 
Hyland  v.  Transfer  Co.,-  791. 
Hyman  v.  Cent.  At.  R.  Co.,  1078. 

y.  Helm,   102. 
Hyne  v.  United  States,  112. 


laquinta  v.  Citizens'  Traction  Co.,  802. 
Ide  V.  Bremer  Co.  Bank,  285. 

V.  Gray,  88. 
Her  V.  Baker,  727,  741. 
IlifC  V.  School  Directors,  805. 
Illege  V.  Goodwin,  74. 
lllidge  T.  Goodwin,  59,  2(iti.  880. 
lUingswo'rth  v.  Boston  Electi-ic  Light 

Co.,  929. 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams,  1075. 

V.  Allen,  2O0. 

V.  Axley,  1081. 

V.  Beard,  802. 

V.  Bowles,  90:j,  1008.  1010. 

V.  Brookhaven  ilach.  Co.,  1070. 

V.  Copeland,  1077. 

V.  Cox,  1034,  1036. 

V.  Cragin,  165,  873,  943,  1085. 

V.  Davidson,  1086. 

V.  Dick,  978. 

V.  Downey,  255. 

V.  Foley,  953. 

V.  Frankenberg,  1072. 

V.  Godfrey,  192. 

V.  Hammer,  396,  397. 

V.  Handy,  244. 

V.  Haynes,  1070. 


CASES    CITED. 


1167 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  l-Co2,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr,  1072. 
V.  King,  229,  423. 
V.  Larson,  885. 
V.  Latham,  2G2. 
V.  Lee,  890. 
V.  Miller,  761. 
V.  Mills,  844. 
V.  Nowicki,  943. 
V.  Peterson,   1075. 
V.  PWUips,  8,51,  10,S5. 
V.  Scruggs,  1074. 
V.  Spenee,  1038. 
V.  Taylor,  1093. 
V.  Turner,  955. 
V.  Varnadore,  930. 
V.  Welch,  317,  318. 
Illinois    River    Paper    Co.    v.    Albert, 

1012. 
-Illinois    &    St.    L.    R.    &   Coal    Co.    v. 
Cobb,  658. 
V.  Ogle,  393. 
Ilott  V.  Wilkes,  200,  768. 
Ilwaeo   R.    &   NaT.    Co.    v.    Hendrick, 

830. 
Imperial  Rolling  Mill  Co.  v.  First  Nat. 

Bank  of  Cleburne,  633. 
Improvement  Co.  v.   Munsou,  951. 
Inchbalfl  v.  Robinson,  777. 
Independent   Bldg.    &   Loan    As.s'u    v. 

Real  Estate  Title  Co.,  269. 
Inderlied  v.  Whaley,  673,  682. 
Indermaur  v.  Dames,  892,  893. 
Indiana,  B.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Burdge, 
825. 
V.  Greene,  932. 
V.  Hammock,  932. 
V.  Koons,,  408. 
Indiana  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Millican,  333. 
Indianapolis  v.  Gaston,  400. 
Indianapolis,  B.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Beav- 
er. lOSO. 
V.  Smith,  763. 
Indianapolis.    D.    &    W.    Ry.    Co.    v. 

Forsythe,  300,  904. 
Indianapolis   Journal    Newspaper    Co. 

V.  Pugh,  495,  496,  549. 
Indianapolis,  P.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Allen, 
1075. 
V.  Bush,  564. 
V.  Pitzer,  197.  1091. 
Indianapolis  R.  Co.  v.  Caldwell.  33. 


Indianapolis  Union  Ry.  Co.  v.   Boett- 
cher,  822,  825,  828. 
V.  Cooper,  2(;2,  1091. 
V.  Ott,  1027. 
Indianapolis    Water   Co.    v.    American 

Strawboard  Co..  744,   806. 
Indianapolis  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  lleru- 
don,  719. 
V.  tlorst,  1080,  1084. 
V.  Staples,  368. 
V.  Watson,  1026. 
Indiana  Stone  Co.  v.  Stewart,  975. 
Ingalls  V.  Bills,  1083. 
V.  Bulkley,  729. 
V.  Miller,  598. 
V.  Xewhall,  608. 
Ingerman  v.  Moore,  1023, 
IngersoU  v.  Jones,  453,  454,  459. 
Ingle  V.  Bell,  42S. 
Ingraham  v.  Bunnell,  804. 
Ingram  v.  Lawson,  47:!. 
Iu.2;\versen  v.  Rankin,  226.  795. 
Inhabitants   of   Brodkfield  v.   "S^'aiker, 

835. 
Inhabitants  of  Lowell  v.  Boston  &  L. 

R.  Co.,  186. 
Inhabitants  of  Melrose  v.  Cutter,   354. 
Inhabitants  of  Shrewsbury  v.   Smith, 

835. 
Inhabitants  of  Township  of  Hamilton 

V.  Wainwright,  764. 
Inhabitants    of   Township   of   Raritan 

V.  Port  Reading  R.  Co.,  804. 
Inhabitants  of  Westfield  v.  Mayo,  283. 
Inhabitants  of  West  Orange  v.  Field, 

764. 
Inland    &    Seaboard    Coasting    Co.    v. 

Tolson,  939,  941,  974. 
Inman  v.    Elberton  Air   Line    R.    Co., 

845. 
Inness  v.  Wylie,  149. 
Innis  V.  Cedar  Rapids,  L  F,  &  N.  W. 

Ry.  Co.,  744,  7S4, 
Insurance  Co,  v.  Brame,  327. 
V.  Eg.gleston,  ."iSo. 
V.  Jlowry.  ~iS-i. 
V.  Tweed,  77. 
Insurance  Cos.  v.  Carriers'  Cos.,  193, 
International  &  G.   N.   R.   Co.   v.  An- 
derson, 306. 
y.  Brazzil,  320.       » 


1168  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


International  &  G.  N.  R.  Go.  v.  De 
Bajligethy,  890. 

V.  Dimmitt  Co.  Pasture  Co.,  363. 

V.  Floras,  108T. 

V.  Greenwood,  544. 

V.  Hall,  895. 

V.  Hinzie,  312,  1005,  1023. 

V.  Jliller,  245,  397. 

V.  Neff,  883. 

V.  Ryan,  261. 

V.  Terry,  377. 

V.  Thornton,  308. 

V.  "\^'elcll,  1084. 

V.  Wentworth,  1076. 
Interstate    Commerce    Commission    v. 
Cincinnati^  N.   O.   &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
1067. 
Investigating  Commission,  In  re,  115. 
Ireland  v.  Elliott,  445. 

V.  McGarvish,  508. 

V.  Osvcego  Plank-Road  Co.,  185. 
Ireson  v.  Pearman,  915,  917. 
Irion  V.  Lewis,  118. 
Irish  V.  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
1072. 

V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  1091. 
Irish-American  Bank  v.  Bader,  507. 
Iron    Age   Pub.    Co.    v.    Crudup,    494, 

504. 
Iron  Mountain  R.  Co.  v.  Bingham,  140. 
Irons  v.  Field,  509. 
Irvin  v.'  Fowler,  145. 

V.  Wood,  797. 
Irvine  v.  Wood,  145,  214,  766,  796. 
Irwin  V.  Uearman,  454,  455. 

V.  Dixion,  804. 

V.  Janesville  Cotton  Mills,  754. 
Isaacs  V.  Barber,  756. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  171,  255,  262. 
Isabel  V.  Railroad  Co.,  198. 
Isack  V.   Clarke,  712. 
Isbell  V.  New  York  &  N.  H.  R.  Co.. 

198. 
Ise.ir  V.  Burstein,  363. 
Iseley  v.  Lovejoy,  106. 
Isham  v.  Parker,  916. 
Islands,  The,  1034. 
Israel  v.  Brooks,  621. 

V.  Clark,  1085. 
Ivay  V.  Hedges,  891. 
Iveson  V.  Moore,  386,  784,  785. 


Jacaoby  v.  Laussatt,  725. 
Jackel  V.  Reiman.  693,  694. 
Jackman  v.  Arlington  Mills,  761. 
Jacks  v.  Lollis,  801. 
Jackson  v.  Allen,  584. 

v.  Babcock,  682. 

V.  Bell,  389,  622,  626. 

V.  Brownson,  699,  702. 

V.  Castle,  102,  765. 

V.  City  of  Greenville,  177. 

V.  Collins,  596. 

V.  Courtenay,  442. 

V.  Hopperton,  516. 

V.  King,  156. 

V.  Kirby,  217. 

V.  Linnington,  625. 

V.  Parkhurst,  665. 

V.  Phillips,  188. 

V.  Pittsburg  Times,  535,  538. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  73,  168,  255.  333, 
354,  355,  1027,  1084,  KiSii. 
1089,  1092. 

V.  Shaw,  920. 

V.  Smithson,  854,  866. 

V.  Stanfield,  379,  646,  651. 

V.  State,  449,  450. 

V.  Todd,  692. 

V.  Tollett,  1083. 

V.  AVisconsin  Tel.  Co.,  66.,  3T4,  828. 
Jacksonville  Journal  Co.   v.    Beymer. 

483,  486,  505,  509. 
Jacksonville,   T.   &   K.    W.    R.   Co.   v. 
Galvin,  1015. 

V.  Garrison.  401. 

V.   Jones.   941. 

V.  Peninsular  Land,  Transp.  & 
Manuf'g   Co.,   361. 

V.  Prior.  928. 
Jacksonville  &  S.  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  South- 
worth,  817,  824. 
Jackson   &    Sharpe    Co.    v.    Philadel- 
phia, etc.,  R.  Co.,  686. 
Jacob  V.  Lorenz,  354. 
Jacobs  V.  Day,  311. 

v.   Frederick,  340. 

V.  Hoover,  436,   446. 

V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  979. 

V.  Schmaltz,  512. 

V.  Seward,  668,  732. 


CASES    CITED. 


1169 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  'I  the  residue.] 


Jacobs'  Case,  078. 

Jacobsmeyer  v.   Poggemoeller,   S.jG. 

Jacobsolin  v.  Blake,  680. 

Jacobson  v.   Siddal,  46u. 

Jacobus  V.  St.  Paul  &  C.  R.  Co.,  301, 

072,  1083. 
Jacoby  v.  Ockerbausen,  S.jG. 
Jacquay  v.  Hartzell,  GO-' 
Jaffray  v.  Davis,  315. 
Jaggard  v.  Winslow,  081. 
Jagger  v.  Bank,  876. 
James  v.  Boston,  539. 

V.  Campbell,  58. 

V.    Christie.   327. 

V.  David,  314. 

V.  Dixon,  692. 

V.  Hayward,  7(55. 

V.  Hodsden,  589. 

V.  James,  63. 

V.   Miles,   688. 

V.  Missouri  Pae.  Ry.  Co..  803. 

V.  Rutlech,  485. 

V.  Worcester,  GG7. 
Jameson  v.  Kent,  352. 
Jamieson  v.  Millemann,  683. 
Jamison  v.  Weaver,  017. 
.Jamison  &  Co.'s  Estate,  In  re,  73'.>. 
Janesville  v.  Milwaukee  &  M.  R.  Co., 

143. 
J' Anson  v.    Stuart,    525. 
Janvrin  v.   Curtis,  216. 
Jaques  v.  Stewart,  741. 
Jaquinta    v.    Citizens'    Traction    Co., 

955. 
Jarman  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  Ry.  Co.. 

1038,   1045. 
Jarmy  v.   Duluth,   1003. 
Jarvis  v.  Dean,  801. 

V.  Rodgers,  738. 
Jasper  Trust  Co.  v.  Kansas  City,  M. 

&  B.  R.  Co.,  271. 
Jay  V.  Almy,  150. 

V.  Whitefield,  768. 
Jaynes  v.  Jaynes,  94,  468. 
,T.  C.  Stevenson,  The,  1061. 
Jean  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  801. 
Jeansch  v.  Lewis,  052. 
Jefcoat  v.  Knotts,  668. 
Jefferies  v.  Duncombe,  477. 

V.  Laurie,  121. 
Jefferis  v.  Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  Ry. 
Co.,  065. 

LAW  OF  TOUTS — 74 


Jefferson  v.  Hale,  707,  738. 
Jefferson  School  Tp.  of  Green  Co.  v. 

School  Town  of  Washington,  o."..S. 
Jeffersonville  v.  Ferry  Co.,  186. 
Jeffersonville,  M.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Rile:s-, 

77.  378,  381,  382,  1001. 
Jeffersonville    R.    Co.    v.    Hendricks, 
I).". 

V.  Rogers,  172. 

V.  Swift.  057. 
Jeffery  v.  Biglow,  814. 
Jeffrey  v.  Railway  Co.,  048. 
Jeffries  V.  Ankeny,   135. 

V.    Great   Western    Ry.    Co.,    660, 
713. 

V.  MeXamara,  425. 

V.  Williams,  101. 
Jeffs  V.  Railway  Co.,  78. 
Jellett  V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  JI.  Ry.  Co., 

715. 
Jencks  v.  Kenny,  752. 
Jenings  v.  Florence,   632. 
Jenkins  v.  Ballantyne,  784. 

V.  Clyde  Coal  Co.,  318. 

V.  Fowler,  33,  40,  56,  645,  773. 

V.  French,  330. 

V.   Lykes,   683,  684. 

V.  McConico,  730. 

V.  Mitchell.  352. 

V.  Railroad    Co.,    882,    1036,    1038, 
1043. 

V.  Turner,  854. 

V.  Waldron,  135. 

V.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  Co.,  761. 
.Tenks  v.  Williams,  5G,  7.50.  7G5,  773. 
.lenne  v.  Gilbert,  578. 

V.   Sutton.  851. 
Jenney  Electric  Light  &  Power  Co.  v. 

Murphy,    1016. 
Jennings  v.  D.  G.  Burton  Co.,  .S5(>. 

V.  Dolan,  342. 

V.  Florence,  606. 

V.  Fundeburg,  50,  G54. 

V.   Gibson,   G55. 

V.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  309,  883, 
1071,  1072. 

V.  Loring,  366. 

V.  Rundall,  159,  163. 

V.   Thompson,  425. 
Jennings  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  Beale,  354, 

.357. 
Jenoure  v.  Delmege,  517,  530. 


1170 


CASES    CITKD. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pnyi's  1-1152,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Jenson   v.   (^"hieago,    St.    P.,   JI.   <fe   O. 

Ry.   Co.,  !i2!i. 
Jerome  v.  Ross,  C91. 
Jerome  &  Kniglit's  Cases,  127. 
Jervis  v.   Jolleffe,   730. 
.lesporsou  v.  I'liilips,  8-12. 
Jesst'ii  V.  Sweigoft,  SHT. 
Jesser  v.  GifEord,  Si,  (J60. 
Jessup  V.  Osceola  Co..  9-'>(». 

V.  WMteliead,  t>22. 
Jetter  v.  New  York  &  H.  R.  Co.,  02G. 
Jewell  y.  Colby,  l.">.'i,  l.ji). 

V.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  2-t:!. 
Jewett  V.  Carter,  270,  5(J9. 

V.  Whitney,  .3(17. 
Jex  V.  Jacob,  408. 
Joannes  v.  Bennett,  3.j9. 

V.  Burt,  507. 
Job  T.  Potton,  C68. 
Joel  V.  Morrison,  278. 
Johanson  v.  Howells,  85.j. 
.John  V.  Bacon,  ISO. 
.lolm  Mouat  Luml)er  Co.   v.  Wilmm'c. 

.843. 
Johns  V.   Charlotte,   C.   &  A.   R.   Co., 
1087. 

. .  Press  Pub.  Co.,  5i'.2. 
John   Shillito   Company,   The,    v.    Mc- 

Clung,  111. 
Johnson  v.  Armour,  279. 

V.  Ashland  lAimber  Co.,  707. 

V.  Ashland  Water  Co.,  104:!. 

V.  Boston,  1034. 

V.  Boston  Towboat  Co.,  1043,  1047. 

V.  Bouton,  418,  031. 

V.  Bradstreet,   541. 

V.  Carrere,  44. 

V.  City  of  Boston,  1036. 

V.  Couillard,  727. 

V.  Davis,  639,  040. 

V.  District  of  Columbia,  180. 

V.  Emerson,  606. 

V.  Evans,  ~h"t. 

V.  EaiT,  717.  723. 

V.  Friar,  10112. 

V.  Girdwood,  2(i2.  325,  619,  631. 

V.  Hitchcock,  552. 

V.  Hovey,  1016. 

V.  Irasburgh,   194. 

V.  Johnson,  322. 

V.  King,  608. 


Johnson  v.  Lake  Superior  Terminal  & 
Transfer  Co.,  886,  892. 

V.  Leigh,  675. 

V.  Lewis,  797. 

V.  Lindsay,  1034. 

V.  Long,  411. 

V.  Merry  Mount  Granite  Co.,  311. 

V.  Miller,  211,  620-622,  640. 

V.  Morton,  425. 

V.  Netherlands  Am.  Steam  Nav. 
Co.,  1033. 

V.  Northwestern  Tel.  Exch.  Co., 
70. 

v.  Osborn,  710. 

V.  Ott,  2.3S. 

V.  Patterson,  152,  154,  829. 

V.  People,  785. 

V.  Pie,  161,  164. 

V    Porter,  767.  ' 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  19,  29,  104,  194, 
198,  260,  307,  314,  739,  762, 
860,  944,  967,  982,  983,  989, 
1018,  1055,  1068,  1073,  1075, 
1088. 

V.  Reed,  610,  632. 

V.  Richardson,  903. 

V.  St.  Louis  Dispatch  Co.,  169. 

V.  Skillman,  683,  684. 

V.  Small,  878. 

V.  Spear,  1033,  10;:5. 

V.   State,  432,  444.  025. 

V.  Stear,  715,  737. 

V.  Stone,  1077. 

V.  Tilson,  079. 
Johnson's  Adm'x  v.  Richmond  &  D.  U. 

Co.,  300,  302. 
Johnson's  Case,  112. 
.Johnson's  Estate,  In  re,  166. 
Johnston  v.  Barber,  265. 

V.  Bent,  563. 

V.  Canadian  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  037. 

V.  Disbrow,  459,  465,   47(i. 

V.  District  of  Columbia,  120,  179. 

V.  iluorman,  527. 

V.  Morrison,  482. 

V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  307. 
.Johnstone  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co., 
305,  309,  904. 

y.  Sutton,  604,  630. 
Johnston's  Estate,  In  re,  205. 
John  AV.  LoveU  Co.  v.  Houghton,  540. 


CASES    CITED.  1171 

[Vol.   1   comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;   vol.   2  the  residue.] 


Joice  V.  Taylor,  570. 
Joiner  v.  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.,  425,  612. 
Joliet  Steel  Co.  v.  Shields.   997,  1037. 
Joliet  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Call,  192. 

V.  Duggan,  KiSl'. 
Jolifte  V.  Baker,  ijt>.'),  566. 

r.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.,  754. 
Jolly's  Adm'x  v.   City  of  Hawesville, 

174. 
Jonasen  v.  Kennedy,  617. 
Jones  V.  Alabama  &  V.  Ry.  Co.,  311, 
318. 

r.  Andover,  194. 

V.  Angell,  914. 

V.  Association,   270. 

V.  Baker,  'm. 

V.  Bird,  145,  874. 

V.  Blocker,  450,  636. 

V.  Boyce,  73,  78. 

V.  Brooklyn   Heights  R.    Co.,   885. 

V.  Brown,  118,  120. 

V.  Chapman,  672. 

V.  ('happen,  697.  793. 

V.  <:)hicago,   M.   &  St.   P.  Ry.   Co., 
958,  1081,  1091. 

T.  Cobb.  742. 

V.  Fay,  874,  913. 

r.  Fostiniog   R.   Co.,   59,  836,   841, 
844. 

V.  Forehand,  .520,  528. 

V.   Fort,  72(i. 

V.  Fortune,  441. 

r.  Gale,  195,  20;!. 

V.  George,   78. 

V.  (Greeley,  49(;,  545. 

V.  Gregg,  297. 

V.  Gwynn,  607,  <;2;:!,  628. 

T.  Hart,  250. 

v.  Heme,  503. 

V.  Herron,  674. 

V.  Hodgkins,  718. 

T.  Housatonlc  R.  Co.,  760. 

V.  Hunt,   726. 

V.  Iron    Co.,    242. 

V.  Jenkins,  613,  (i25.  628. 

V.  Jones,  617,  676,  688,  800. 

V.  Kellogg,   713,   724. 

v.  Lamon,  132,  211,  628. 

T.  ?iIcCaddin,  127. 

V.  ilcGovern,   533. 

T.  :\Io:\rininiy,  236. 

V.  Malvern  Lumber  Co.,  942,  1010. 


Jones  V.  Millsaps,  22.:>. 

V.  Nichols,  613,  888. 

V.  Perry,  857. 

V.  Powell,   768.   775. 

V.  Rahilly,   707. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  141. 

V.  Rlehmond,  678. 

V.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.,  140. 

V.  St.    Louis   S.   W.   Ry.  Co.,   300. 
1080. 

V.  Sawkins,  314. 

V.  Stanley,  636. 

V.  Stanton,  733. 

V.  Thomas,  539. 

V.  Town  of  Chester,  856. 

V.  Townsend,  537. 

V.  Voorhees,  1077. 

V.  Wabash  Ry.,  702. 

V.  Werden,  124. 

V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  899. 

V.  AVilliams,  797,  801. 
Jonsson   v.    Lindstrom,   708. 
Jordan  v.  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.,  614, 
624,  625. 

V.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  il.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.. 
998. 

V.  City  of  Asheville,  942. 

V.  Fall  River  R.  Co.,  1077. 

V.  Gi'eer,   735, 

V.  Hanson,  123. 

V.  Pickett.  594. 

V.  Surghnor,  668. 
Jorden  v.  Jloney,  580,  583. 
.Tordin  v.  Crump,  200,  768,  891. 
.Tordon  v.  Hayne,  126. 
•Torgensen  v.  Jlinister,  etc.,  335. 

V.  Tait.  726. 
Jorgenson  v.  Squire,  792. 
Joseph  V.  Cavander,  452. 

V.  Henderson,  664. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  1072. 
.loslin  V.  (Jrand  Rapids  Ice  Co.,  278. 
.losselyn.  v.  McAllister,  286,  427. 
Joy  V.  Jlorgan,  917. 

V.  St.  Louis.  764. 
Joyce  V.  Martin,  225,  226,  796. 

V.  Parkhurst,  429. 
Joyner  y.  Roberts,  134. 
J.  S.  Keator  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  Croix 

Broom  Corp.,  140. 
Juchter  v.  Boehm,  634.  682. 
Judd  V.  Fargo,  766. 


1172  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-G51i.  inclnsijc;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Jude  V.  Woodburn,  579. 
Judge  V.  Cox,  857. 
Judson  V.  Cook,  43. 

V.  Corcoran,    209. 

V.  ReardoD,  420,  615. 

V.  AVestern  Ry.,  310. 
Julia  Fowler,  Tlie,  1041. 
Julienne   v.    Mayor,   etc.,   of   City   of 

Jackson,  175. 
Jung  V.  Neraz,  707. 
Junior  v.    Missouri   Electric   Light   & 

Powei-  Co.,  1016. 
Jutte  V.  Keystone  Bridge  Co.,  143,  886. 


K 


Kaare  v.  Troy  Steel  &  Iron  Co.,  994, 

1017,   1022. 
Ifahl  V.  Love,  128. 
Kahle  v.  Hobein,  843. 
Kahn  v.  Atlantic  &  N.  C.  R.  Co.,  1078. 
Kaillen    v.    North.    Western    Bedding 

Co.,  1003. 
Kaje  V.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  By. 

Co..  786. 
Kalckoff  V.  Zoehrlaut,  721. 
Kalembach  v.  Michigan  Cent.  B.  Co., 

390,  403. 
Kalleck  v.  Deering,  1046. 
Kallman  v.   United  States  Exp.    Co., 

305. 
Kane  v.  Hutchison,  724. 
V.  Mulvany,   527. 
.    V.  Baihvay  Co.,  933. 
Kankakee  El.  By.  Co.  v.  Whittemore, 

864. 
Kankakee  &  S.  E.  Co.  v.  Horan,  754. 
Kansas  City,  B.  &  M.  B.  Co.  v.  Biley, 

1079. 
Kansas  Cit.y,  Ft.   S.  &  M.   R.  Co.  v. 
Berry,    890. 
V.  Cook,  761. 
V.  Hammond,  1001,  102S. 
V.  Kirksey,  920,  953,  954,  'X,7. 
V.  Stoner,  1085. 
Kansas  City,  M.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Bur- 
ton, 869,  948,  993,  1041. 
V.  Cantrell,  30. 
V.  Crocker,  59,  821,  822,  941. 
V.  Hisdon,  1077. 
V.  Phillips,  242,  396. 


Kansas  City,  M.  it  B.  R.  Co.  v.  San- 
ders, 168,  170,  39G. 

V.  Webb.  993. 
Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R.  Co.  v. 

Simpson,  300,  303. 
Kansas  City  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Riley,  761. 
Kansas   City   &   P.   R.   Co.    v.   Ryan, 

1011. 
Kansas  P.ic.   R.   Co.  v.  Mihhnan,  37, 
105,  409,  410. 

V.  Miller,  1085. 

V.  Peavey,   302. 
Karasich  v.  Hasbrouck,  400. 
Karst  V.  St.  Paul,  S.  &  T.  F.  Ry.  Co., 

361. 
Kaspari  v.  Marsh,  839. 
Kaucher  v.  Blinn,  509. 
Kavanagh  v.  Barber,  464,  794 
Kavanaiigh  v.  Janesville,  472. 

V.  Taylor,  211,   732. 
Kay  V.  Fredrigal,  52.5. 

V.  Jansen,  477,  481. 

V.  Thompson,  913. 
Kean  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co..  72. 

V.  Coleman,  218. 
Keaue  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  681. 

V.  Reynolds,  676. 
Kearney  v.  Clutton,  734,  736,  737. 

V.  Fitzgerald,  166. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  837,  939. 
Keates  v.  Lord  Cadogan,'577. 
Keating  v.  Cincinnati,  178. 

V.  Price,  560. 

V.  Springer,  750. 
Keator  v.  St.  John,  324. 
Keator  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  Croix  Broom 

Corp.  140. 
Keats  V.  Hugo,  750. 
Keay  v.  Goodwin,  667. 

V.  New  Orleans  Canal  &  Banking 
Co.,  808. 
Keck  V.  Sandford,  878. 
Kedne  v.  Boycott,  450. 
Keeble  v.  Hickeringill,  19,  645,  767. 
Keefe  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.   Ry.    Co., 

966,  975. 
Keegan  v.  Hayden,  214. 
Keeler  v.  Eastman,  700-702. 
Keen  v.  Coleman,  165. 
Keenan  v.  Hayden,  857. 
Keene  v.  Tribune  Ass'n,  508,  615. 
Keenen  v.  Southworth,  137. 


CASES    CITED. 


1173 


[Yol.  1  comprises  pages  1-C52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Kefee  V.  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  K.  Co., 

830. 
Kehler  v.   Schwenk,   872,   1010. 
Kehrig  v.  Peters,  2.53. 
Keiley     v.     Mechanics'     &     Traders' 

Bank,  741. 
Keiper  v.  Klein,  750. 
Keiser  v.  Mahanoy  City  Gas  Co.,  143, 

747,  780,  SOS,  8.j(>, 
Keit  V.  Wyman.  639. 
Keith  V.  Howard,  128,  135. 

V.  Johnson,  674. 
Kelk  V.  Pearson,  7.">0,  807. 
Kellar  v.  Bullington,  3.j7. 
Keller   v.   Donnelly,   4.j2,  454. 

V.  Gaskill,   873,  943,   1005. 

Y.  Orr,  59G. 

V.  Robinson,  352. 

V.  Sioux   City    &   St.    P.    Ry.    Co., 
1088. 
Keiley  v.  Dunning,  762. 

V.  Keiley,   389,   400. 

v.  Mayberi-y  Tp.,  470.  472. 

V.  Norcross,  1046. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  414,  415,  1020. 
Kellogg  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 
78. 

V.  Village  of  Janesvilie,  184. 
Kelly  V    Bennett,  705. 

V.  Blackstone,  871. 

T.  Chicago,   M.  &  St.  P.   Ry.   Co., 
650. 

V.  Gould,    572. 

V.  Johnson,  1034. 

Y.  Sherlock,  535. 

V.  Southern    Minnesota    Ry.    Co., 
892. 

V.  Telegraph     &     Telephone     Co., 
1045. 

V.  Tilton,  774. 

V.  Tinling,  535. 

V.  Ypsllanti    Dress-Stay    Manuf'g 
Co.,  344. 
Kelsey  v.  Griswold,  337,  727. 

T.Jewett,  331. 
Kemp  y.  Burt,  917. 

V.  Cook,  161. 

V.  Neville,  117. 

V.  Railroad  Co..  200. 

r.  Seely,  069. 
Kendall  v.  Brown,  914. 

V.  Draije,  438. 


Kendall  v.   Stone,  552-554. 

V.  United  States,   128. 

V.  Wilson,   596. 
Kendillon  v.  Maltby,  527. 
Kendrick     v.     Central     Railroad     & 
Banking  Co..  944. 

V.  Hopkins,  482. 

T.  McCrary,  452,  459. 
Kennedy  v.  Barnett,  634. 

V.  Bunier,  335. 

V.  Chicago,    M.   &   St.    P.    R.    Co., 
1008. 

V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  928. 

V.  Favor,  428. 

V.  Hilliard,  520. 

V.  Holladay,    611. 

V.  McClain,  283. 

T.  McKay,  269. 

T.  Panama,  N.  Z.  &  A.  R.  M.  Co., 
169. 

V.  Press  Co.,  550. 

V.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co.,  403. 

V.  Shea.  452.  453,  457. 

V.  Smith,  131. 

V.  Spring,  875,  950,  999,  1041. 

V.  Sugar  Co.,   370. 
Kenner  v.   Harding,   596. 
Kennett  v.  Peters,  709. 
Kenney  v.  Railroad  Co..  363. 

V.  Ranney,   720. 
Kennon  v.  Gilmer.  370.  857. 
Kent  Y.  Bongartz,  530. 

v.  Cole,  412. 

V.  Courage,  613. 

v.  :Miles,  418,  425. 

Y.  Town  of  Lincoln,  950. 
Kentucky    Cent.    R.    Co.    y.    Barrow, 
846. 

Y.  Gastineau's  Adm'r,  824. 

Y.  Smith,  862,  979. 
Kentucky   &   I.    Bridge   Co.    v.    Hall, 
345. 

v.  Quinkert,  1084. 
Kenyon  y.  Cameron.  545. 

Y.  Hart,   661. 

Y.  Olney,  738. 

v.  Western    Union    Tel.    Co.,    366, 
368. 

V.  Woodruff,  342,  721. 
Kepler  v.  Jessupp,  916. 
KerlDS  Y.  Oliver,  539. 
Kerby  y.  Railway  Co..  301. 


]174 


CASES    CITED. 


[^'ol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Kerlin  v.  Cliicugo,  P.  &  St.  L.  K.  Co., 

1038,  1041. 
Kern  v.  Myll,  227,  794. 

T.  Wilson,  713. 
Kernel'  v.  Boardman,  707. 
Kerns  v.  Hagenbuchle,  459. 
Kerr  v.  West  Shore  R.  Co.,  754. 

V.  AVorkman,  G15. 
Kerrigan  v.  West  End  St.   Ry.   Co., 

861. 
Kerwhaker  v.  Cleveland.  C.  &  C.  R., 

194. 
Kessler  v.  Letts,  773. 

V.  Lockwood,  857. 
Kester    v.    We.^tern    "Union    Tel.    Co., 

369. 
Kestner  v.  Pittsburgh  &  B.   Traction 

Co.,  861. 
Ketcham   v.    Newman,   235.   236,   24.j, 

686. 
Keyes  v.  Railway  Co.,  371. 
Key  worth  v.  Hill,  218,  731. 
Khron  v.  Brock,  235.  810. 
Kidd  V.  Dennison,  700,  702. 

V.  Horry,  353. 

v.  Ward,  486.  520. 
Kidder  v.  Boom  Co.,  349. 

V.  Dunstable,  98,  926. 

V.  Parkhurst,   527. 
Kidney  v.  Stoddard,  576,  577. 
Kiefer  v.  Rogers,  571,  596,  597. 
Kieffier  v.  Borough,  69. 
Kiene  v.  Ruff.  482. 
Kiffi  v.  Old  Colony  Ry.  Co.,  1066. 

V.  Youmans,   55.  441.  445. 
Kilbourn  v.  Thompson,  116. 
Kilburu  v.  Rice,  640. 

V.  Thompson,  403. 
Kiley  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  302. 
Kilham  v.  Ward,  135. 
Killea  v.  Faxon,  1046. 
Killebrew  v.  Carlisle.  629. 
Kilpatrick  v.  R.Qilroad  Co.,  323. 

V.  Richardson,   847. 
Kimball  v.  Bates,  617. 

y.  Billings,  280,  720. 

V.  Cushman,  241. 

V.  Harman,  55,  638-640. 

V.  Holmes,  395. 

V.  Rutland  &  B.  R.  Co.,  903,  1065. 

V.  Yates,  683. 
Kimber  v.  Press  Ass'n,  533. 


Kimberly  &  Clark  Co.  v.  Hewitt,  755. 

Kimel  v.  Kimel,  779. 

Kinard  v.  Columbia,  N.  &  L.  R.  Co., 

97. 
Kincaid  v.  Hardin  Co.,  1S2,  185. 
Kine  v.  Sewell,  540. 
King  V.  Baker,  687. 

V.  Clerk,  475.  485. 

v.  Fisher,  532. 

v.  Ford,  8.51. 

v.  Harvey,  507. 

v.  Hoare,  342. 

V.  Hoot,  512. 

V.  Johnston,  418,  605,  631,   634. 

V.  Jcnes,  638. 

V.  Kline,  152. 

V.  Lloyd,  767. 

V.  Jliller,  701. 

V.  Patterson,  530.  540,  541. 

V.  Pease,  141,  844. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  233,  844,  908. 

V.  Spurr,  241. 

V.  Thompson,  748,  7G5.   880. 

V.  United  States,  339. 

y.  Ward,  031. 

V.  Waring,  199,  522,  544,  546. 

V.  Watson,  173. 
Kingory  v.  United  States,  740. 
Kingsbury  v.  Bradstreet  Co.,  541. 

y.  Tharp,  738. 
Kingston  v.  Booth,  249. 
Kinkier  y.  Jurlca,  579. 
Kinmouth  y.  MoDougall,  980. 
XCinnaird    y.    Standard    Oil    Co.,    757, 

771,  840. 
Kinney  v.  City  of  Troy,  178. 

V.  Ferguson,  658. 

V.  Folkerts,  963. 

V.  Hosea,  509. 

V.  Laughenour,  454. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  300. 
Kinser  v.  Dewitt,  673. 
Kinsler  v.  Clarke,  705. 
Kinsley  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co., 

1058. 
Kinyon  v.  Palmer,  536. 
Kir  by  y.   Boylston  Market  Ass'n,   99, 
919. 

y.  Railway  Co.,  301. 

y.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  307. 
ICircher  v.  JIurray,  656,  673. 
Kirchner  y.  Detroit  City  Ry.  Co.,  957. 


CASES    CITED. 


117; 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  -  the  residue.] 


Kirchner  v.  New  Home  Sewins  ilacli. 

Co.,  315,  320. 
Kirli  V.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry. 
Co.,  1069. 

V.  Gregory,  051,  661. 

V.  Todd,  329. 

V.  Village  of  Homer,  869. 
Kirkeys  v.  Craudall,  283. 
Kirkley  v.  Lacey,  132. 
Kirkman  v.  Phillips,  347. 
Kirkpatrick  v.  Eagle  Lodge,  539. 

V.  Reeves,  570. 
Klrkwood  v.  Finegan,  773. 
Kirland  v.  State,  435. 
Kirst  V.  Railroad  Co.,  939. 
Kirtley  v.  Railway  Co.,  105,  973. 
Kissecker  v.  M-onn,  408,  682. 
Kister  v.  Insurance  Co.,  270. 
Kitchen  v.  Campbell,  321. 

V.  Greenabaum,  191. 

V.  JleCloskey,   131,   i;c,2,   072. 
Kivett  V.  JXcKelthan,  086. 
Klanowski's  Case,  963. 
Klander  v.  McCJrath,  211. 
Klein  v.  Receiver,  377. 

V.  Thompson,  391,  400. 
Kleinest  v.  Kunhardt,  1017. 
Kleinwort,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Cornplow,  etc., 

de  Paris,  735. 
Klenberg  v.  Russell,  854. 
Klepsch  V.   Donald,  849. 
Klinck  V.  (Jolby,  530,  542. 
Kline  v.  Railroad  Co.,  288. 
laix  V.  NIeman,  332. 
Klopfer  V.  Bromme,  458. 
KlumiDh  V.  Dunn,  549. 
Knabe  v.  Levelle,  750. 
Knaphelde  v.  Eastman,  834. 
Knapp  V.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.,  408. 

V.  Roche,  400. 
Knappen  v.  Freeman,  223. 
Kneeland  v.  American  Loan  &  Trust 

Co.,  208. 
Knell  V.  Briscoe,  118. 
Knickerbacker  v.   Colver,  343. 
Knickerbocker    Ice   Co.    v.    De    Hass, 

854,  857. 
Knight    V.    Albemarle    &    R.    R.    Co., 
754,  005. 

V.  Albert,  196. 

V.  Cooper,  035,  1018,  1020. 


Knight  V.   Fox,  238,  243. 

V.  Gaultney,  568. 

V.  Goodyear's  India  Rubber  Glove 
Jlanuf'g  Co.,  781. 

V.  International  &  G.  N.   Ry.   Co., 
418,  425,  426,  618,   626. 

T.  Legh,  665. 

V.  Luce,  253,  286. 

V.  Nelson,  44,  312. 

V.  Pacific  Coast  Stage  Co.,  1089. 

v.  Sackett   &   Wilhelms   Llth.   Co., 
714. 

V.  Wilcox,  450,  452,   458. 
Knights  V.  Quarles,  320,  017. 
Knipper  v.  Blumenthal.  710. 
Knisely  v.  Hire,  694. 
Knott   V.    ^^'agner,    58,    05,    203,    8.52, 

023. 
Knottuerus  v.  North  Park  St.  Ry.  Co., 

040. 
Knowles  v.  Steele,  403. 
Knowlton  v.  Bartlett,  139. 

V.  Holt,  220. 

V.  Keeuau,  583. 

V.  Milwaukee  City  Ry.,  194. 
Knox  V.  Flack,  100. 

V.  Hall   Steam-Power  Co.,   963. 

V.  Hunolt,  12, 

V.  Metropolitan  El.  Ry.  Co.,  405. 

V.  Yow,  340. 
KnoxvIUe,  C.  G.  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Aculf, 

312,  320. 
Knupfle    V.    Knickerbocker    Ice    Co., 

920,  924-926. 
Kobs  V.  City  of  Minneapolis,  764. 
Koch  V.  Branch,  735. 
Koehler  v.  Railway  Co.,  882. 
Koelsch  V.  Philadelphia  Co.,  73,  850. 
Koester  v.  Cowan,  694. 
Kohler  Mauuf'g  Co.  v.  Beeshore,  355, 
Kohlsaat  v.  Crate,  607. 
Kohn  v.  Lovett,  891. 

V.  McNulta,  005,  1022. 

V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  716. 
Kolb  V.  Bankhead,  694. 
KoUock  V.  City  of  Madison,  174,  177, 

2:!S. 
Kolsti   V.    Minneapolis    &    St.    L,    Ry, 

Co.,  830,  04^, 
Kolzem  v,  Broadway  &  S,  Ave.  R.  Co., 
270. 


117G 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Koous  V.  Railroad  Co.,  1010. 

Ivopitofe  V.  ^^'iIson,  10G8. 

Ivorctke  v.  Irwiu,  18U. 

Korra(l.\-  v.   Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry. 

Co.,  !>::(),  ui;::!. 
Korte  v.  St.  Paul  Trust  Co.,  142. 
Kcsminsky  v.  Goldberg,  221. 
Ivothenberthal  v.  City  of  Salem  Co., 

74.5. 
Kowing  V.  Maiily,  21S.  219. 
Kramer  v.  Lott,  OO-'i,  r,:i4. 

V.  Stock,  C<J8,  028. 
Kranz  v.  Ix)ng  Island  Ry.  Co.,  289. 
Krause  v.  Spiegel,  G0.5,  008. 
Kreag  v.  Anthus,  401. 
Krebs  v.  Thomas,  418. 
lireger  v.  Osboru,  44,  44M. 

V.  Township  'of  Bismarck,  181. 
Kreider  v.  Lancaster,  E.  &  M.  Turn- 
pike Co.,  185,  967. 
Kreiser  v.  Scolield,  417. 
ICreiter  v.  Nichols,  2.13. 
Kremcr  v.  Railway  Co.,  083,  684. 
Kress  v.  State,  118. 
Ivreuziger  v.  Chicago  <&  N.  W.  R.  Co., 

78. 
Krevit  v.  Meyer,  088. 
Krewson  v.  Cloud,  50."). 
V.  Purdom,  712,  713. 
Krey  v.  Schlussner,  895. 
Kriesel  v.  Eddy,  131. 
Krii3pner  v.  Biebl,  S42. 
Kroener  v.   Chicago,   M.  &   St.   P.  R. 

Co.,  403. 
Kroessin  v.  Keller,  408. 
Krom  V.  Schoonmaker,  150,  158. 
Ivronschnable  v.  Knoblauch.  707. 
Kvug  V.   Borough  of  St.  ilary's,  144, 

1S2,  7.14. 
Krulovitz  V.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  168. 
Krum  v.  Anthony,  969. 
Kruse  v.  Seeger  &  Guernsey   Co.,  715. 
Kudik  V.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  Co.,  1002. 
Kuehn  y.  City  of  Milwaukee,  786. 
Kuhn  V.  Brownfield,  914. 

v.  .Jewett,  72,  78. 
Kujek  V.  Goldman,  404. 
Kullman  v.  Greenebaum,  367. 
Kumier  v.  .lunctiou  R.  Co.,  332. 
KurK  ct  Huttenloeher  Ice  Co.  v.   ilil- 

waulvee  &  N.  R.  Co.,  844,  845,  847. 
Kyle  V.  Caravello,  707. 


Lack  y.  Seward,  879. 

Lackat  v.  Lutz,  277,  897. 

Lackland  v.   North  Jlissouri  Ry.   Co., 

412. 
La  Croy  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R. 

Co.,  1018. 
Lacy  y.  Pixler,  Kil. 
Ladd  V.  Jloore,  728. 

V.  New  Bedford  Ry.  Co.,  1011. 

V.  Osborne,  357. 

V.  Pigott,  596. 
Lade  v.  Shephard,  090. 
La  Duke  v.  Township  of  Exeter,  09, 

362,  390,  407. 
Lafayette   Co.  Bank  v.   Metcalf,   727, 

735. 
Laffln  r.  Buffalo  &   S.   W.   Ry.  Co., 

1011. 
Lafitte  V.  New   Orleans,   C.   &  L.   R. 

Co.,  278. 
Laflin  v.  Willard,  84. 
Laflln  &  Rand  Powder  Co.  v.  Tear- 

ney,  747,  771 ,  784,  848. 
Lafone  v.  Smith,  521. 
Lahey  v.  Railroad  Co.,  882. 
Laidlaw  v.  Sage,  151. 
Laidler  v.  Elliott,  910. 
Laing  v.  City  of  Americus,  783. 

V.  Colder,  301. 

V.  Nelson,  497,  517,  519,  070. 

V.  Whaley,  750. 
Lake  V.  King,  527. 

V.  Milliken,  748. 
I>ake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark,  847. 

v.  Fishback,  899. 

V.  Griffln,  943. 

V.  Kennedy,  083. 

v.  McHenry,   1008. 

V.  Michener,  080. 

v.  Middlecoff,  845. 

V.  Middleton,  1033. 

V.  Mugg,   1018. 

V.  Young,  358. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Bangs, 
957. 

V.  Bennett,  1064. 

V.  Bodemer,  59,  822,  061. 

V.  Fitzpatrick,  1008. 

V.  Hundt,  859. 

V.  Hutching,  144. 


CASES    CITED.  1177 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Laval- 
ley,  1001. 
V.  McCormiek,  1010. 
V.  Mcintosh,  08,  i)S3. 
V.  Miller,  983. 
V.  Prentice,  169,  172,  196,  262,  395, 

396,  104T. 
V.  Stupak,  1000. 
Lake  Superior  Iron  Co.  v.   Erickson, 

10H.5,  1036. 
Lake  Superior  Ship-Canal,  Railway  & 

Iron  Co.  V.  Cunningham,  110. 
Lakin  v.  Ames,  681. 
Lakkie  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry. 
■      Co.,  787. 
La  Lievre  v.  Gould,  578. 
Lally  V.  Cantwell,  450,  636. 

V.  Emery,  518. 
Lalor  V.  Byrne,  623. 

V.  Chicago,  B.   &  Q.  R.  Co.,  1025, 
1027,   1051. 
Lamare  v.  Dixon,  560. 
Lamb  v.  Burnett,  444. 
V.  Camden,  1062. 
V.  Harbaugh,  223. 
V.  Sloan,  843. 
V.  Stone,  SO,  88,  371. 
V.  Taylor,  452. 
r.  Walker,  36,  335,  405,  408. 
Lambert  v.  Alcorn,  762. 
V.  Bessey,  40. 
V.  Robinson,  684. 
V.  Sti-oother,  656. 
Lamberton  v.  Dunham,  565. 
Lambeth  v.  Warner,  699. 
Lamborn  v.  Watson,  246. 
Lame  v.  Atlantic  Works,  376. 
Lamm    v.    Port    Deposit    Homestead 

Ass'n,  169,  246,  269. 
Lamming  v.  Galusha,  354,  747,  772. 
Lampet  v.   Starkey,  681. 
Lauiphear  v.  Buckingham,  334. 
Lamphere  v.  Clark,  523. 
Lamphier  v.  Phipos,  912. 
Lampkins   v.    Vicksburg,    S.   &  P.   R. 

Co.,  316. 
Lampman  v.  Milks,  752. 
Lancashire  Wagon   Co.  v.   Fitzhugh, 

724. 
Lancaster  Ave.  Imp.   Co.  v.  Rhoads, 

235,  237. 
Lancaster  Bank  v.  Moore,  155. 


Lancia  v.  McDermott,  878. 
Landfeldt  v.  JIcGrath,  746. 
Landon  v.  Humphrey,  913,  914. 

V.  Hutton.  313. 
Landrum  v.  Wells,  362,  418,  422,  439. 
Lane  v.  Applegate,  521. 

v.  Atlantic  ^^'orks,  69,  74.  78,  266, 

374,  376,  378,  920,  925. 
V.  Black,  44. 

V.  Boston  &  A.  R.  R.,  819. 
V.  Cotton,  128,  137,  291. 
V.  Miller.  686. 
V.    Sir  R.   Colton,  287. ' 
V.  Thompson,  692. 
Lang  V.   New    York,   L.   E.   &  W.   R. 
Co.,  279. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  264,  1064. 
I^angan,  In  re,  205. 
Langdell,  The.  377. 
Langdon  v.  Doud,  5S4. 
V.    Templeton,   670. 
Lange  v.  Benedict,  119,  123,  527,  635. 
Langenberg  v.  Decker,   117. 
Langford  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  611. 

V.  .Tones,   013. 
LanghofC  v.   Railroad  Co.,  971. 
Langley  v.  Railroad  Co.,  237. 
Langridge  v.  Levy,  3S2,  580,  814,  907. 
Lanier  v.  Alison,  705. 
Lanigan  v.    New  York  Gas   Co.,  849. 
Laning   v.    NeAV    York   Cent.   R.    Co., 

lOol. 
Lankins  v.   Terwilliger,   150. 
Lannen  v.  Albany  Gaslight  Co.,  850, 

972. 
Lanpher  v.  Dewell,  124. 
Lansing  v.   Smith,  780. 
V.  Stone,  53,  935. 
V.  Toolan,   180. 
Lapham  v.  Noble,  506. 
La  Pierre  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  R.  Co., 

095,   1011,  1038. 
Lapsley   v.   Union   Pac.    R.   Co.,    859, 

862. 
Lare  v.  Westmoreland  Specialty  Co., 

602. 
Larich  v.  :Moies,  1003,  1040,  1045. 
Larimer   County    Ditch   Co.    v.    Zim- 

mei-man,  941. 
Larimer  &  L.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Larimer 

St.  Ry.  Co.,  803. 
La  Riviere  v.  Pemberton,  980, 


1178  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Larkin  v.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  Ry. 
Co.,  '.>82. 
V.  Noonan,  .j28. 
Larkins  v.  Lamping,  762. 
Larmore    v.    Crown    Point    Iron    Co., 

891,  897. 
Larned  v.  Buffinton,  549. 
Larrabee   v.    Minnesota  Tribune   Co., 
507,  519,  547. 
V.  Sewall,  926. 
Larson  v.  Chase,  13,  368. 
V.  Furlong,  801. 

V.   Metropolitan   St.   Ry.   Co.,   22s, 
230. 
Lary  v.  Cleveland,  C,  C.  &  I.  R.  Co., 

195,  197. 
Lasala  v.  Holbrook,  751. 
Lasere  v.  Rochereau,  HJT. 
Lasky    v.    Canadian    Pac.    Ry.    Co., 

1020,  1047. 
Lassiter  v.  Ward,  5.">0. 
Last  Chance  Water  Ditch  Co.  v.  Heil- 

bron,  760. 
Latch  v.  Rumner  Ry.   Co.,  266. 
Latham  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  692. 
Lathrop  V.  Adams,   168. 

V.  Haley,  691. 
Latimer   v.    Western    Morning    News 

Co.,  537. 
Latremouille  v.  Bennington  &  R.  Ry. 

Co.,  937,  999,  1050. 
Latter  v.  Braddell,  202. 
Lattimer  v.  Davis,  762. 
Lattin  v.  Gillette,  338. 
Laubheim  v.  De  Koninglyke  N.  S.  Co., 

188,  914. 
Laugford  v.  United  States,  110. 
Laugher  v.  Pointer,  229,  251. 
Laughton    v.    Bishop    of    Sodor,    531, 

540. 
Launock  v.  Brown,  675. 
Lauster  v.  Chicago,  M.   &  St.   P.  Ry. 

Co.,  943. 
Lauzon  v.  Oharroux,  006,  610,  629. 
Lavallee  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  R.  Co., 

1055. 
Lavenson  v.  Standard  Soap  Co.,  353. 
Laverty  v.  Snethen,  714. 

V.  Vanarsdale,  639. 
Lavery  v.  Crooke,  458^00. 

V.  Turley,  314. 
Lavina  v.  State,  419. 


Law  V.  Grant,  270. 

V.  Harwood,  387. 
Lawless  v.  Anglo-Egyptian  Cotton  it 
Oil   Co.,  169,   542. 

V.  Connecticut  River  R,  Co.,  870. 
Lawrence  v.  Oleary,  618. 

V,  ( Jayetty,  083. 

V.  Hagerman,  349,  628, 

V.  Investment  Co.,  40,  273. 

V.  .lenkins,  840. 

V.  Newberrj',  474,  485. 

V.  New  York,   P.   &  B.   Ry.,   303, 
309. 

V.  Obee.  661. 

V.  Shipman,  228. 

V,   Spence,  204,  458. 
Lawson  v.  Buzines,  421. 

V.  City  of  Seattle,  174. 

V,  Coiiaway,  912. 

v.  Price,  808. 

V.  State,  432. 

V.  Truesdale,  1016. 
Lawton  v.  Kittridge,   564. 

V.   Little  Rock  &  Ft.    S,    Ry,   Co., 
1082. 

V.  Steele,  100,  789. 

V.  Ward,   689. 
Lawyer  v.  Fritcher,  455,  459,  461. 
Lax  V.  City  of  Darlington,  964,  967. 
Lay  V.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  161,  813,  872. 

V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  871. 
Dazard     v.     Merchants'     &     Jliners' 

Transp.   Co.,  391. 
Leach's  Ex'r  v.  Prebster,  33. 
League  v.  Journeay,  769, 
Leahey  v.  March,  621,  626. 
Leahy  v.  Davis,  393. 
Leaird  v.  Davis,  622, 
Leame  v.  Bray,  50,  155,  656. 
Learned  v.  Castle,  68,  779. 
Learoyd  v.  Godfrey,  891,  892. 
Leary  v.   Boston  &  A,   B,   Co,.   1024, 

1027. 
Lease  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  314. 
Leavenworth  Lodge  No.   2  y.   Byers, 

752, 
Leavenworth,  L.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Rice, 

930. 
Leavenworth,    N.    &    S.    Ry.    Co.    v. 

Curtan,  144. 
Leavitt  v.  Gushee,  639. 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  829,  930. 


CASES    CITED. 


1179 


[Vol.  1  co'iiiirises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Leavitt  v.  Sizer,  270,  271.  .">(;4. 
Lebanon  Liglit,  Heat  ifc  Power  Co.  v. 

Leap,  23(j,  9G2. 
Lebbering  v.   Struthers,  999,   lOJto. 
Lebby  v.  ALrens,  589. 
Leber  v.    ilinneapolis   &   N.   W.    Ry. 

Co.,  296. 
Lechowitzer    v.    Hamburg    American 

Packet  Co.,   1079. 
Leckey  v.  Bloser,  460. 
Leckonfleld  v.   Lonsdale,   792. 
Le  Clair  v.  First  Division  St.  P.  &  P. 

R.  Co.,  993. 
Le  Clear  v.  Perkins,  (il.j,  021,  625. 
Ledbetter  v.  Davis,  589.  596. 
Lederman    v.    Pennsylvania    R.    Co., 

862,  949,  989. 
Ledgerwood  v.   City  of  Webster,  17.j. 
Ledig  V.  Germania  Brewing  Co.,  8.j9. 
Lee  V.  Bayes,  72S. 
V.  Briggs,  379. 
Y.  Chicago,    R.    I.    &   P.    Uy,    Co., 

928,  '..120. 
V.  Cooley,   460. 
V.  Hefley,  159. 
V.  Hodges,  4.j2. 
V.  Kendall,   640. 

V.  Lancashire    &    Y.    R.    Co.,    316. 
V.  McKay,  731. 
V.  McLeod,   686. 
V.  Nelms,  278. 
V.  Ryley,  855. 
V.  Stevenson,   684. 
V.  Town  of  Mound  Station,  687. 
V.  Troy    Citizens'    Gas  Light    Co., 

943. 
V.  Vacuum  Oil  Co.,  848. 
V.  Watson,   355. 
v.  West,  450. 

V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  88. 
V.  White,  52(5. 
V.  Woolsey,   445. 
Lee  Chuck  v.  Quang  Wo  Chong,  734. 
Lee    Coal    &    Ry.    Co.    v.    Chambliss, 

993. 
Lees  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  li.  Co.,  928. 
Leeson  v.  General  Council,  914. 
Leete  v.  Pilgrim  Congregational  Soc, 

780. 
Leever  v.  Hamill,   611. 
Le  Fanu  v.  Malcomson.  484. 
Legallee   v.   Blaisdell,   604. 


Leggett  V.   Western  Xew   York   &  P. 

R.  Co.,  1091. 
Leggott   V.    Great   Northern   Ry.    Co.. 

329,  334. 
Leham   v.    Shackleford,   581. 
Lehigh  Val.  R.  Co.  v.  Snyder,  1019. 
Lehigh  Zinc  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Xew  Jer- 
sey Zinc  &  Iron  Co.,  709. 
Leiclitweiss    v.    Treskow,    159. 
Leigh  V.  Jack,  671. 

v.  Omaha  ,St.  Ry.  Co.,  1003. 

V.  Webb,  423,   606,  613. 
Leighton  v.  Sargeant,  911,  912. 
Leistritz    v.    American    Zylonite    Co., 

1005. 
Leitner  v.  Strickland,  707. 
Leland  v.  Goodfellow,  598. 

V.  Hathorn,   661. 

T.  Tousey,   687. 
Lemaitre  v.  Davis,  752. 
Lemay  v.  Chamberlain,  540. 
Lembeck  v.   Xye.  691. 
Lemon  v.   Chansler,  1085. 

V.  Pullman    Palace   Car   Co.,   244. 
395. 

V.  Webb,  679. 
Lendberg    v.    Brotherton    Iron    Min. 

Co.,  9.j7. 
Lenox  v.  Grant,  118. 
Leo  V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  1072. 
Leonard  v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.,  1076. 

V.  Pope,  470. 

V.  Stickney,   723. 

V.  Telegraph  Co.,  302. 

V.  Tidd,  736. 
Leoncini  v.  Post.  714,  741. 
Lepnick  v.  Gaddis,  886. 
Leslie  v.  Pounds,  225,  229. 
Lessee  of  Clymer  v.  Dawkins,  668. 
Lessee  of  Jloore  v.  Doherty,  605. 
Lester  v.  Corley,  518. 

V.  Town  of  Pittsford,  944. 

v.  "\^'estern  Union  Tel.  Co.,  307. 

V.  Young,  701. 
Lettis  V.  Horning,  854. 
Leucker  v.  Steileu,  458,  459. 
Leuthold  v.  Fairchild,  287. 
Lever  Alkali  Co.  v.  Johnson,  1058. 
Leveson  v.  Kirke,  283. 
Levi  V.  Brooks,  253,  256. 

V.  Milne,  485. 
Levy  V.  McCann,  544. 


1180  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Levy  V.  Railway  Co.,  368. 

V.  Samuel,  750. 

V.  Southern  Exp.  Co.,  306. 
Leward  v.  Basely,  440. 
Lewis,  Ex  parte,  690. 

V.  Atlanta,  472. 

v.  Avery,  423. 

V.  Beckler,  731. 

V.  Chapman,  543. 

V.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  1058. 

V.  Dwinell,  913. 

V.  Few,  533. 

V.  Hawley,  506. 

V.  Hoover,  433. 

V.  Jewell,  589,  596. 

V.  Jones,  581. 

V.  Levy,  527.  532. 

V.  Littlefield,  159,  163. 

V.  McNatt,   685. 

V.  Metcalf,  714. 

V.  Ocean    Nav.    &    Pier   Co.,    715, 
717,  73S. 

V.  Railway  Co..  69.  306.  377. 

v.  Read,  44,  46. 

V.  Seifert,  1000, 

V.  State,  111. 

V.  Taylor,  615. 

V.  Walter,  548. 
Lewless  v.  Detroit,  G.  H.  &  M.  R.  Co., 

320. 
Lewton  v.  Hower,  618,  627. 
Lexington  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Kidd,  709, 

711.  ' 
Lexow  V.  Julian,  581,  584. 
Leydecker  v.  Brintnall,  894. 
Leyenberger  v.  Paul,  619. 
Libby  v.  Berry,  463. 

V.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  827. 
Libby,  McNeill  &  Libby  v.  Scherman, 

1041,  1044. 
Lichtenhein  v.   Boston   &   P.    R.   Co., 

901. 
Liddle  v.  Hodges,  518. 
Liddy  v.  Railway,  971. 
Lieb  V.  Shelby  Iron  Co.,  42.1. 
Ijiebstadter  v.   Federgreen,   435,    441, 

442. 
Liermann  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  968. 
Lightly  V.  Clouston,  27,  297. 
Liles  V.  Gaster,  526. 
Lilienthal  v.  Campbell,  120. 


Lilley  v.  Roney,  526-528. 

Lillstrom    v.    Northern   Pac.    R.    Co., 

892. 
Lilly  V.  Menke,  699. 
Limming  v.  Barnett,  296. 
Limpus  V.   London   General   Omnibus 

Co.,  2.-)4. 
Linck  V.  Scheffell,  857. 
Lincoln  v.  Buckmaster,  822. 

V.  City  of  Boston,  175,  178,  798. 

V.  City  of  Detroit,  178,  772. 

V.  Hapgood,  135. 

V.  Judd,  340. 

V.  Ragsdale,  591,  592. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  380. 
Lincoln  Rapid  Transit  Co.  v.  Nichols, 

861,  967. 
Lind  V.  Beck,  929. 
Lindauer  v.  Younglove,  269. 
Lindholm  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  390,  868. 
Lindon  v.  Hooper,  27. 
Lindsay  v.  Mulqueen,  559. 
Lindsay  Petroleum   Co.  v.  Hurd,  578. 
Lindsay  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  750. 
Lindsley  v.  Railway  Co.,  945,  1074. 
Lindvall  v.  Woods,  326,  1046. 
Lineoski    v.     Susquehanna    Coal    Co., 

997. 
Linford  v.  Lake,  445. 
I>ingwood  V.  Stowmarket  Co.,  807. 
Linington  v.  Strcng,  319,  596,  599. 
Link  V.  Jarvis,  25. 

V.  Philadelphia  &  R.   R.  Co.,  862, 
964. 

V.  Sheldon,  913. 
Linnehan  v.  Rollins,  229,  241. 

V.  Sampson,  855,  969. 
Linscott  V.  Trask,  712. 
Llnsley  v.  Bushnell,  808. 
Linton  Coal  Min.  Co.  v.  Persons,  997. 
Lipe  V.  Blackwelder,  152,  153. 

V.  Eisenlerd,  452,  453,  455. 
Lippincott  v.  Lasher,  777. 
Lipprant  v.  Lipprant,  511. 
Liptrot  V.  Holmes,  719. 
Lister  v.  Perryman,  428. 
Litchfield  v.  Hutchinson,  562,  569,  571. 
Litchfield  Coal  Co.  v.  Taylor,  92i;. 
Little  V.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  305. 

V.  Haekett,  981. 

V.  Pomeroy,  526. 

V.  Stanback,  82. 


CASES    CITED. 


1181 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Little  V.   Superior  Rapid  Transit  Co., 

861,  975. 
Littlefield  v.  Fitchbuvg  R.  Co.,  IOCS. 
Littlehale  v.  Osgood,  78,  362. 
Little  Miami  R.  Co.  v.  Stevens,  1030. 

V.  Wetmore,  277. 
Little  Rock,   M.   R.   &  T.   Ry.   Co.   v. 

Leverett,  1014. 
Little  Roclc  Ry.  Co.  v.  Corcoran,  lOGl. 

V.  Pankhurst,  165. 
Little  Rock  &  F.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chap- 
man, 101. 
V.  Cravens,  309. 
V.  Eubanks,  303. 
Little   Rock   &   M.    R.    Co.   v.    Barry, 
362,  391,  1038. 
V.  Harrell,  860,  982,  1085. 
V.  Moseley,  1045. 
Little  Rock  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Finley, 

677. 
Little's  Case,  963. 
Little  Schuylkill  Nav.  R.  &  C.  Co.  v. 

Richards'  Adm'r,  212,  345. 
Littlewood  v.  City  of  New  Yorl;:,  333. 
Lively,  The,  379. 

Livermore  v.  Batchelder,  152,  153. 
V.  Herschell,  640. 
v.  NoTthrup,  679. 
Liverpool  Household  Stores  Ass'n,  In 

re,  816. 
Liverpool  Adelphi  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Fair- 
hurst,  164. 
Liverpool  &  G.  W.  Steam  Co.  v.  Phe- 

nix  Ins.  Co.,  300. 
Livezey  v.  Philadelphia,  70. 

V.  Schmidt,  760. 
Livingston  v.  Adams,  835. 
V.  Bishop,  342-344,  400. 
V.  Burroughs,  430. 
v.  Cos,  25,  20,  68. 
v.  McDonald,  761. 
V.  Platner,  414. 
V.  Reynolds,  700,  702, 
v.  Tanner,  665. 
V.  Webster,  687. 
Lloyd  V.  Ogleby,  879. 
V.  Sandilands,  674. 
League  v.  Railroad,  333. 
Lobdell  V.  Baker,  575. 

V.  Stowell,  733. 
Loberg  v.  Town  of  Amherst,  868,  8G9. 


Local   Rapid    Transit   Co.   v.   Nichols, 

145. 
Lock  y.  Ashton,  423,  429. 
Lockbridge  v.  Foster,  570. 
Locke  V.  Bradstreet  Co.,  540,  541. 

y.  State,  111. 
Lockett  V.  Ft.  Worth  &  R.  G.  Ry.  Co., 

793,  794. 
Lockwood  V.  Bartlett.  292.  731. 

V.  Beard,   629.  ' 

V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  926. 
Loeb  V.  Flash,  739. 

V.  Mann,  352. 
Loeber  v.  Roberts,  843. 
Loeffel  V.   Pohlman,  717. 
Loeschman  v.  JIachin,  715. 
Loewenberg  v.  Rosenthal,  G54. 
Loewer  y.  Harris,  577,  601,  602. 
Loflin  V.  Willard,  81. 
Lofton  V.  Vogles,  12. 
Loftus  V.  Inhabitants  of  North  Adams. 

972. 
Logan  V.  Austin,  203. 

V.  CafCery,  404. 

V.  Logan,  468,  471. 

V.  Murray,  454. 
Loibl  V.  Breidenbach,  475. 
Loker  v.  Damon,  960. 
Lombar   v.    Village   of   East   Tawas. 

949. 
Lomerson  v.  Johnston,  573. 
Lommeland  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry. 

Co.,   808. 
Londegan  v.  Hammer,  119. 
London  Ass'n  v.   London  Committee, 

785. 
London,  B.  &   S.   C.   Ry.   Co.  v.  Tru- 
man, 141,  791. 
London    &    County    Banking    Co.    v. 

London  &  River  Plate  Bank,  657. 
London  &  L.  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  v.  Rome, 

W.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  1067. 
London  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Bradley, 

144. 
Long  v.  Buchanan,  686. 

V.  Chicago,  K.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  1088. 

V.  Coronado  R.  Co.,  1050. 

y.  Long,   135. 

V.  Minneapolis,  9. 

V.  Moon,   228.   2:!3. 

V.  Morrison,  470,  914 


1182  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Long  V.  Township  of  Milford,  978. 

V.  Woodman,  578,  583. 
Longendyke  v.  Lougendyke,  463. 
Longmeid  v.  Holliday,  40,  586. 
Longmore  v.  Great  AVestern  Ry.  Co., 

893. 
Longshore    Printing    &    Pub.    Co.    v. 

Howell,  358. 
Look  V.  Dean,  429. 

V.  Litchfield,  908. 
Loomis  V.  Deets,  460. 

V.  O'Neal,  297. 
Loop  V.  Litchfield,  908,  909. 
Lord  V.  Goddard,  566. 

V.  Thomas,  322. 

V.  Tiffany,  343. 
Lords  Bailiffs  v.  Corporation  of  Trin- 
ity House.  63,  71. 
Lorentz  v.  Robinson,   1035. 
Lorillard  v.  Town  of  Monroe,  183. 
Lorimer  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  942, 

996. 
Loring  v.  Mulcahy,  735. 
Lorrence  v.  Smith,  190. 
Los  Angeles  Cemeterj^  Ass'n  v.  City 

of  Los  Angeles,  180. 
Losee  v.  Buchanan,  51,  147,  834,  83."i, 
850,  908. 

V.  Clute,  851,  908. 
Lostutter  v.  City  of  Aurora,  798. 
Lothrop  V.  Adams,  547. 

V.  Thayer,  S42. 
Lottman  v.  Barnett,  287. 
Loubat  V.   Leroy,  148. 
Loubz  Y.  Hafner,  766. 
Loucks  V.   Chicago   M.   &   St.   P.   Ry. 

Co.,  968. 
Loudon  V.  Warfield,  705. 
Loughlln  V.  People,  1041. 

V.  State,  1046. 
Loughran  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  707. 
Louisiana  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  2], 
Louisiana  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tweed,  78. 
Louisville,  C.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mahouy. 
979. 

V.  Sullivan,  107. 
Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L.  Consol.  R.  Co. 
V.  Allen,   1019. 

V.  Berry,  945. 

V.  Clarke,  335. 

V.  Banning,  1003. 

V.  Hawthorn,   1039. 


Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L,  Consol.  R.  Co. 
v.  Lee,  97. 

V.  Utz,  869. 
Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ader, 
825. 

V.  Berkey,  1052. 

V.  Breedlove,  998. 

V.  Brlnley,   1076. 

V.  Bryan,   825. 

V.  Creek,  983. 

V.  Davis,  68,  825. 

V.  Falvey,  377. 

V.  Prawley,  194,  1004. 

V.  Herr,  311. 

V.  Holsapple,  947. 

V.  Isom,  1046. 

V.  .Johnson,  978. 

V.  Miller,  370,  947,  1089. 

V.  Nitsche,  71,  842,  846. 

V.  Ousler,  929. 

V.  Red,  971. 

V.  Schmidt,  828. 

V.  Sears,  954,  986,  987. 

V.  Shanks,  989. 

V.  Stanger,  2G.j,  829. 

V.  Widman,  307. 

V.  ^Vood,  378. 
Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Con- 
roy,  1034,  1036. 

V.  Douglass,   244,  277. 

V.  Durfree,  377. 

V.  French,  928. 

V.  Hlrsch,  8S(!,  985. 

V.  Patterson,  1079. 

V.  Williams,  871. 
Louisville  Safety- Vault  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  330,  822,  961. 
Louisville,  St.  L.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Nea- 

fus,  24. 
Louisville  &  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Allen,  869. 
Louisville   &  J.   B^erry   Co.   v.   Nolan, 

1089. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Banks,  994, 
1017. 

V.  Barker,  821. 

V.  Barkhouse,  719. 

V.  Boland,  1006. 

V.  Bonhayo,   751. 

V.  Brantley's  Adm'r,  1031. 

V.  Brooks'  Adm'x,  1031. 

V.  Coniff's  Adm'r,  823,  961. 

V.  Copas,  943. 


CASES    CITED. 


1183 


[\'ol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  li  tlie  residue.] 


Louisville  &  N.  R.  Go.  v.  Dancy,  1093. 

y.  Davis,   999. 

V.  Dies,  1074. 

Y.  Earl's  Adm'x,  869. 

v.  East  Tennessee,   V.   &  G.   Ky. 
Co.,  193,  881. 

V.  Echols,   lOCG. 

v.  Foley,  403. 

V.  Gerson,  1059. 

V.  Grant,  301,  1074. 

V.  Greer,  393. 

V.  Hairston,  895. 

V.  Howard,  926. 

T.  Hurt,  825. 

V.  Johnson,  1088. 

V.  Jones,  1072. 

V.  Kellem's  Adm'x,  198. 

v.  Kelly,  1012,  1013,  1015,  1023. 

V.  Law,  403. 

V.  Lawson,   708. 

V.  Lewis,  1093. 

V.  Long-,   401,   1085. 

V.  McCoy,  817,  822. 

V.  Markee,  941,  956,  961. 

V.  Mitchell,  816,  859. 

V.  Xorthington,  73. 

V.  Orr,  232,  302,  795,  1002. 

V.  Owen,  301,  303,  306. 

V.  Pearson,  193,  949,  957,  072. 

V.  Popp,  1081. 

V.  Rains,  967. 

Y.  Schmetzer,  870,   886. 

V.  Sherrod,  305,  823. 

Y.  Shivell's  Adm'r,  1029. 

v.  Sowell,  303. 

v.  Survant,  403. 

Y.  Taylor,  840. 

v.  Touart,  904,  106S. 

Y.  Ward,  193,  9(15,   1045,  1048. 

V.  Webb,  929. 

Y.  Williams.  995. 

V.  Willis,  462. 

v.  Wynn,  303. 
Love  V.  Masouer,  460. 

V.  Moynehan,  195. 
Lovejoy  v.  Dolan,  878. 

Y.  Murray,  44,  214,  342,  721. 
Loveland  v.  Gardner,  887. 
Loveless  v.  Fowler,  725. 
Lovell  V.  Howell,  1029. 

v.  Martin.   727. 
Lovell  Co.  V.  Houghton,  540. 


Lovett  Y.  Weller,  553. 
Lovier  v.  Gilpin,  604. 
Low  V.  Elwell,  687. 

Y.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  801. 
Lowden  v.  Goodrick,  302. 
Lowe  Y.  Guard,  887. 

Y.  Herald  Co.,  504,  525. 

Y.  Railway    Co.,    277,    1001,    1003, 
1019,  1068. 

Y.  Wartman,  610. 
Lunel  Y.  Boston,  185. 
Lowell  V.  Wynian,  175. 
Lowery  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  376. 

V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  374. 
Lowremore  v.  Berry,  713. 
Lowry  v.  Vedder,  506,  540,  541. 
Lows  V.  Tellford,  688. 
Loyd  V.  City  of  Columbus,  180. 
Lucas  V.  Flinn,  395,  496. 

v.  Hunt,  625. 

Y.  Mason,  242,  428. 

Y.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  396. 

V.  Xockells,  773. 

Y,  Pittjnan,   6.55. 
Luck  Y.  Zapp.  132. 
Lueke  y.  Assembly,  645. 
Lucy   Y.    Metropolitan    Life   Ins.   Co., 

608. 
Ludgater  v.  Love,  245,  208. 
Ludington  v.   Peck,  610. 
Ludowiski  v.  Polish  Roman  C.  St.  S. 

K.  Ben.  Soc,  149. 
Ludwig  V.  Pillsbury,  957. 
Lueck   Y.   Heisler,  393,  605,  613,   617, 

623,  631. 
Luedtke  v.  Jeffery,  880. 
Lufkin  Y.  Zane,  226,  796. 
Luke  Y.  Calhoun  Co.,  334. 

Y.  Wheat  :\Iin.   Co.,  055. 
Lull  Y.  Improvement  Co.,  798. 
Lumby  y.  AUday,  400,  505. 
Lumley  v.  Gye,  57,  382,  447.  449,  635, 

6.36,  645. 
Lund  v.  Inhabitants  of  Tyngsborough, 
7S,  944. 

V.  New  Bedford,  82. 
Lunsford  v.  Dietrich,  61.5,  625. 

V.  Walker,  391. 
Lunt  V.  Philbrick,  204. 
Lurch  V.  Holder,  970. 
Lurssen  v.  Lloyd,  778,  794. 
Luse  V.  Oaks,  219,  220. 


118t 


CASKS    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  l-Col!,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Lusk  V.  Belote,  902. 

I-usted  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

318. 
Lutterell  v.  Reynell,  11. 
Luttrell  V.  Hazen,  G'A,  CIG. 
Lutz  V.  Atlantic  &  P.  R.  Co.,  10."i3. 
Lyberg  v.  Northtrn  Pac.  R.  Co.,  1026. 
Lybe's  Appeal,  758. 
Lychfield  Coal  Co.  v.  Taylor,   822. 
Lyde  v.  Barnard,  26. 
Lydian  Monarch,  The,  306. 
Lyenberger  v.  Paul,  614. 
Lyle  V.  Clason,  480. 
Lyman  v.  Boston  &  W.  R.  Co.,  846. 
V.  Edgerton,   134. 
V.  Hale,   690. 
Lynam  v.  Gowing,  526. 
Lynch  v.  Allyn,  1003. 

V.  City  of  New  York,  179,  764. 

V.  Commonwealth,  917. 

V.  Davis,  470. 

V.  Brie  City,  963. 

V.  Febiger,  540. 

V.  Hubbard,  868. 

V.  Knight,  368,  373-375,  468,  489- 

491. 
V.  Lerche,  401. 
V.  McNally,  962. 

V.  Mercantile  Trust  Co.,  270,   569. 
V.  Nurdin,  74,  161,  196,  266,  872. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  69,  169,  278,  418, 

419,  880,  884,  987,  988. 
V.  Smith,  872. 

V.  Village  of  New  Rochelle,  879. 
Lynde  v.    Columbus,    C.   &  I.    C.   Ry. 

Co.,  323. 
Lyndsay  v.  Connecticut  &  P.   R.   Co., 

935. 
Lynn  v.  Adams,  128. 
V.  Bruce,  314. 
V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  1000. 
Lyon  V.  Fairbanks,  688. 

V.  Fishmonger's  Co.,  786. 
V.  Gormley,  724. 
V.  Mells,  1068. 
Lyons  v.  Adams,  127. 
V.  Briggs,  579. 
V.  Child,  192. 
V.  Martin,  250,  253. 
V.  Rosenthal,  939. 
V.  Third  Ave.  Ry.  Co.,  331. 
Lysle,  The  Tom,  875. 


Lysney  v.  Selby,  588. 
Lythgoe  v.  Vermon,  296. 
Lyttle  V.   Chicago  &  W.   M.   Ry.   Co., 
995. 


M 


BXcAdoo  V.  Railroad  Co.,  817,  819,  822, 

831,  961. 
McAleer  v.  Horsey,  !595. 
McAllaster  v.  Bailey,  132. 
McAllister  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  1074. 
V.  Detroit  Free  Press,  482,  500,  533. 
McAlpin  V.  Powell,  197. 
McAndrews  v.   Collerd,  771,  778,  792, 

848. 
McArthur  v.  Cornwall,  693. 

V.  Green  Bay  &  Mississippi  Canal 

Co.,  194. 
V.  Searb,  70,  1062. 
Macarthy  v.   Younge,  892. 
McAulay  v.  Birkhead,  460. 
McAvoy  V.  Wright,  214. 
McAwnich  v.  Mississippi  &  M.  IX.  Co., 

1055. 
McBee  v.  Fulton,  532. 
McBride  v.  Board  of  Com'rs,  699,  705. 
McBroom  v.  Thompson,  686. 
McCabe  v.   Brown,  40. 

V.  State,  434. 
McCafferty  v.   Railway  Co.,  228,  236. 
McCaffrey    v.    Twenty-Third    St.    Ry. 

Co.,  858. 
McCaffrey's  Appeal,  776,  777. 
McCall  V.  Cohen,  123. 
V.  Forsyth,  28,  902. 
McCalla  v.  Clark,  738. 

V.  Multnomah  Co.,  185. 
McCall's  Adm'r  v.  Capehart,  660,  661. 
McOallum   v.   Germantown,   774. 

V.  Lambie,  484. 
McCamus   v.    Citizens'    Gaslight    Co., 

145. 
McCandless  v.  McWha,  912. 

V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  927. 
McCann  v.  Eddy,  308. 

V.  Wolff,  57. 
McCaraher  v.   Com.,  133. 
McCardle  v.  McGinley,  609. 
JlcCarn  v.  International  &  G.   N.   R. 
Co.,  308. 


CASES    CITKD. 


1185 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  '2  the  residue.] 


McCarrolI  v.  Stafford,  718. 
McCarthey  v.   City  of   Syracuse,  234. 
JlcCarthy   v.   Boston   &   L.   R.    Corp., 
451. 
V.  De  Annit,  215,  42S,  021. 
V.  Guild,   449. 
v.  Holman,  659. 

V.  Louisville   &  N.   R.   Co.,   1072. 
V.  Portland,  177. 
V.  York  Co.  Sav.  Bank,  7',)i;. 
McCarty  v.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.   Co., 
307. 
V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.   Co.,   1004. 
McCaslin  v.  Lake  Shore  &  JI.  S.  Ry. 

Co.,  958. 
MeCauley  v.  Elrod,  504,  .545. 
V.  Ijogan,  (;5. 
V.  Norcross,   837,   1054. 
McCaull  V.  Bruner,  859. 
McCawley  v.  Railway  Co.,  300. 
McClafferty  v.  Philp,  620,  621. 
JlcClain  v.  Incorporated  Town  of  Gar- 
den Grove,  69. 
M'Clallen  v.  Adams,  202. 
McClaugherty  v.  Cooper,  522,  523. 
McCleary  v.  Frantz,  852,  055. 
McClellan   v.   St.   Paul,  M.   &  M.   Ry. 
Co.,  68,  670. 
V.  Scott,   571,   598. 
v.  Wyatt,  738. 
McCIeneghan  v.  Reid,  519,  520. 
McCloskey  v.  Powell,  670. 

V.  Ryder,  695. 
McClue  V.  Klein,  437. 
JlcCluns  V.   Dearborne,  255,  200,   275. 
McClure  v.  Miller,  455. 
McClurg  V.  Ross,  492. 
McComber  v.   Nichols,  766. 
McCombie  v.  Davies,  711,  722-724,  734. 
JlcConigle  v.  Kane,  1024. 
McGonnell  v.  Bostlemann,  765. 
V.  Hughes,   559. 
V.  Kibbe,    398. 
V.  Ory,  552. 
McCool  V.  Lucas  Coal  Co.,   1005. 
McCoombs  v.  Tuttle,  481. 
McCord  V.  High,  128,   825. 

V.  Mining  Co.,   700,  701,  706. 
V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  271. 
McCormick  v.  Kelly,  591. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  727,  729,  738,  92.S. 
V.  Sisson,  612. 

LAW  OP  TORTS — 75 


McCormick  v.  Washington  Tp.,  1S2. 
JlcComiick    Harvesting    Much.   Co.   v. 

Burandt,  994,  1010. 
McCosker  v.  Long  Island  II.  Co.,  1040, 

1041. 
McCoy  V.  Danley,  413. 

V.  Keokuk  &  D.  M.  R.  Co.,  1074. 
V.  Milwaukee  St.  Ry.  Co.,  388,  301, 

400. 
V.  Trucks,  4,57,  458,   460. 
McCranie  v.  AA'ood,  1063. 
McCrea    v.    JIuskegon    Circuit    Jud^'e, 

353. 
McCreary  v.  Jones,  322. 
McCrew  v.  Stone,  375. 
McCruden  v.   Rochester  Ry.   Co.,   095. 
McCue  V.  Klein,  203. 

v.  National    Starch    Manuf'g    Co., 
1005,  10i6. 
McCullen  v.  Scott,  581. 
McCuUough  V.  City  of  Denver,  602. 
V.  Floyd,  352. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  15,  94,  983,  1044. 
McCully  V.  Clarke,  935. 
McCune    v.    Railroad    Co.,    303,    1060, 

1076. 
McDaneld  v.  Logi,  887. 
McDaniel  v.  Baca,  5.53. 
V.  Needham,  430. 
V.  Railway  Co.,  243,   10(55,   1074. 
V.  Tebbetts,  118,  120. 
McDaniels  v.  Cutler,  663. 

V.  Walker,  85,  189. 
MacDonald,  In  re,  504. 
McDonald  v.  City  of  Red  Win^',  149. 
V.  Mallory,  14. 
V.  Massachusetts     (Jon.     Hospital, 

187,  914. 
V.  Montana  Wood  Co.,  6!:t. 
V.  Neilson,  133. 
V.  Press  Pub.  Co.,  510. 
V.  Railway  Co.,  893,  923,  930,  901, 

1008.  1023,  loss. 
V.  Snelling,  58,  71,  .378. 
McDonnald  v.  Walter,  4(J4. 
McDonough  v.  Oilman,  22ij. 

V.  Lanpher,  820. 
McDougald  v.  Cowan,  150. 
M'Dougall  V.  Claridgc,  -542. 
Macdougall  v.  Knight,  530,  .533. 
BIcDowell  V.  The  France,  402. 
V.  Railway  Co.,  327. 


IISG 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pagps  l-(;o2,  iiichisiye;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Mc-Duff   V.    Detroit  Evening  Joiu-nal 

Co.,  491. 
SlelOacliwan  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co., 
308. 
V.  Western  Transp.  Co.,  '>'.)-. 
McElfrf'sli    V.    Kirliendall,    i;i!>,    220, 

McElligott  V.  Randolpli,  W43. 
MfVAwee  v.  Blaclvwell,  .').")o. 
JIcEatee  v.  Steamboat  Co.,  719. 
McEwen  v.  Siiannon,  292. 
Marcy  v.  Childress,  CIO. 
McFadden  v.  Lynn,  273. 

V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ity.  Co.,  3(i:i,  10.j7, 

107.5. 
r.  Rausch,  S09. 
T.  Schill,  213,  603. 
V.  Scliroeder,  708. 
McFadzen  v.  Olivant,  450. 
JIcEarland  v.   Swihart,  S87. 
JlcFerrau  v.  Taylor,  ,"569,  570. 
McEetei-s  V.  Pierson,  069. 
jMcGahan  v.  Indianapolis  Natural  Ga« 

Co.,  78. 
McGahey  v.  Virginia,  111. 
McGarrahan  v.  Lavers,  422. 
JIcGarry  v.  New  York  &  H.   R.   Co., 

857. 
McGary  v.  Lafayette,  ISO,  181. 
lIcGee  Y.  Fox,  754. 
McGee  Irrigating   Ditch   Co.   v.   Hud- 
son, 750. 
McGettigan  v.  Potts.  751,  8(JS, 
McGhee  v.  Shafer,  342. 
McGibbons  v.  Wilder,  571.  597. 
McGlll  V.  Railway  Co.,  883,  923. 
V.  Rowland,  1077. 
V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  1038. 
McGinn  v.  Tobey,  596. 
McGinnis  v.  Erie  Co..  336. 
McGinty  v.  Athol  Reservoir  Co.,  1047. 
McGivern  v.  Wilson,  955. 
McGlynn  v.  Railway  Co.,  320. 
IMcGoldrick  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H. 

R.  R.  Co.,  853. 
ilcGonigle  v.  Kane,  945,  1024. 
McGovern  v.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co..  lii'.l. 
V.  New  York  Cent  &  H.  K.  R.  Co., 
327. 
McGowan   v.    Missouri  Pac.   Ry.    Co., 

801. 
McGrath  v.  Merwiu,  192,  194. 


McGrath  v.  Railway  Co.,  882,  926,  976. 
1017,  1018,  1048. 
V.  Rogers,  1048. 
V.  Walker,  223,  224. 
Mctiregor  v.  Brown,  701,  702. 

V.  Thwaites,  533. 
McGrew  v.  Stone,  9,  65. 
McGuerty    v.    Hale,    949,    999,    1016 

1040,  1045. 
McGuire  v.  Bloomingdale,  148,  807. 
V.  Goodwin,  620. 
V.  Grant,  751. 

V.  Vicksburg,  S.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  890, 
989. 
JleGuirk  V.  Shattuck,  1015. 
McHo.se  V.  Earnshaw,  602. 
Mcllvain  v.  Porter,  696. 
Mclntire  v.  Levering,  621. 

V.  Roberts,  888. 
Mclntire   St.   Ry.   Co.  v.  Bolton,   991, 

992. 
Mcintosh  V.  Lown,  408. 
Mclntyre  v.  Green,  682. 

V.  Sholty,  155,  156,  159. 
Mclntyre  Tp.  v.  Walsh,  20. 
McKaig  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  10.38. 
McKamy  v.  Cooper,  164. 
Mackay  v.  Commercial  Bank,  169,  209. 
McKay  v.  State,  9,  433. 
McKean  v.  Railroad  Co.,  975. 
MeKee  v.  Chicago,  R.  L  &  P.  R.  Co., 
1011. 
v.  Ingalls,  165,  166,  504. 
V.  President,  etc.,  of  Delaware  & 

H.  Canal  Co.,  754. 
v.  State,  598. 
MeKeel  v.  Bass,  205. 
McKeen  v.  Morse,  310. 
McKenna  v.  Baessler,  73.  152,  154. 
McKennon  v.  VoUmar,  570. 
McKensie  v.    Missouri   Pac.    Ry.   Co., 

612. 
McKenzie  v.  Denver  Times  Pub.  Co., 
505. 
T.  McLeod,   841,  842. 
McKeown  v.  Johnson,  217. 
McKillop  V.  Duluth  St.   By.  Co.,  145, 

861. 
Mackin    v.    Alaska    Refrigerator    Co., 

1005. 
McKiuley  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
202. 


CASES    CITED. 


1187 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  resiilue.] 


McKinnon  v.  VoUmar,  270. 
McLaion  v.  Wllliston,  lOOG. 
:McLaughlin  v.  Armfield,  921. 

V.  Charles,  526. 

V.  ("orry,  ;_'.S1. 

Y.  Cowlej',  -ji'ij,  528. 

V.  Investment  Co.,  359. 

V.  Kemp,  220. 

V.  I'ryor,  982. 

Y.  Waite,  710. 
ilcLean  v.  Burbank,  1084. 

Y.  New  York  Press  Co.,  475,  503. 

Y.  Warring,  494,  522. 
ilcLendon  v.  State,  131,  425. 
McLennan  y.  Lemen,  'M'2,  735. 
McLennon  v.  Richardson,  428. 
ilcLeod  V.  Jones,  677. 

Y.  Tutt,  559. 

Y.  Waliley,  536. 
McLimans  v.  City  of  Lancaster,  174. 
McLoughlin  v.  New  York  Lighterage 

Transp.  Co.,  229,  232. 
McMahon  y.  City  of  New  York,  334. 

Y.  Davidson,  70,  851. 

V.  Hallock.  495. 

V.  Kelly,   880. 

Y.  Railroad  Co.,  369,  988. 
:\I'Jlanus  V.  Crickett,  253,  255,  277. 

Y.  Lancashire  &  Y.   Ry.   Co.,   301, 
1058. 
Mcilcnomy  v.  Baud,  806,  807. 
McMillan  v,   Ferrell,  691. 
McMillen  v.   Michigan  S.   &  N.  I.  R. 

Co.,   309,   310. 
Mcilillin  v.  Staples,  773. 
McMinn  v.   Pittsburgh,   X.   &  C.   Ry. 

Co.,  200,  202. 
MeJIullen  v.  Hoyt,  229. 
JlcMurtry  v.  Louisville,   N.   O.   i:   T. 

R.   Co..  942. 
M'Naghten's  Case,  10. 
McXail  v.  Ziegler,  714. 
McXair  v.   Toler,   167. 

Y.  Wilcox,  711. 
JlcXally  V.  Colwell.   843. 

v.  Oldham,   533. 
:\IcXamara  v.   Logan,   1015. 

v.  MacDonough,   1046. 

V.  New   York    Cent.    &   H.    R.    R. 
Co.,  928. 
McXamee  v.  Minke,   608. 
McXaughton    v.    Quay,    523. 


McXay  v.   Stratton,  420,   429. 

McNeely  v.  Hyde,  320. 

McNeil  V.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R 

Co.,  1017. 
McNerney   v.   Reading   City,   99,   7t;."i. 

889,  920. 
McNevins  v.   Lowe,  912,  914. 
McNulta  v.  Ralston,  144. 
Jlacomber  v.  Nichols,  79,   826,  828. 
Maeonnehey  v.  State,  166. 
Macon  &  W.  R.  Co,  v.  Holt,  718. 
McPherson  v.  Daniels,  513,  548. 
V.  Runyon,   609,   629. 
V.  St.   Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.   Ry.   Co., 

827. 
V.  Seguine,    667. 
Y.  State,  441. 
McPheters  v.  Page,  286,  717,  719, 
McQueen  v.  Fulgham,  219,  220. 
McRickard  v.   Flint,  920,   926. 
Macrow    v.    Great    Western    R.    Co., 

1058, 
McSloop   V,    Richmond  &   D,    R,   Co,, 

1092, 
McSorley  v.  Faulkner,  20. 
McTavish  v.   Carroll,    693. 
McVeety  v,  St,  Paul,  M.  &  Jl.  R.  Co., 

191,  195.  1081, 
McVeigh  v.  United  States,  167. 
McWilliams  v,   Morgan,    693, 
Mary  V.  St,  Paul  &  D,  R,  Co,,  1045, 
iladden  v.  Missouri  Pac,  R.  Co,,  944, 
v.  Port  Royal  &  W.   C.   Ry,   Co,, 
1093. 
Madison  v,  Pennsylvania  R,  Co.,  624. 
Madras  Ry.  y.  Zemindar,  91,  834,  835, 

S44,  860,  867. 
Madson  v.  Alderson,  583, 
Maenner  v.  Carroll,  891. 
Maesk   v.   Smith,   ,545. 
Magee  v.  Railway  Co.,  966. 
Maggi  Y.  Cutts,  857. 
Magnay  v.  Burt,  607. 
Magner  v.  Truesdale,  883,  884, 
Magnin  v.  Dinsmore,  300,  309. 
Magor  Y.  Chadwick,  750. 
Maguinay  v.  Saudek,  4.54. 
Maguire   v.    Hughes,    124. 

V,  Middlesex   Ry,   Co,,   102, 
Mahaffey  v,   Byers,   617,   627. 
Mahan  v.   Brown,   56,    645,   750,   773, 

779, 


1188 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.   1   comprises  pages  l-(i."il!.   inolu.iive:   vol.   2  the  residue.] 


Mahau  v.  Clee.  1027. 

Mahcr  v.  Aslimead,   41S,  CO.j. 

V.  Winona  i:  St.  V.  R.  Co.,  .^75. 
ilahon  V.  Burns,  22!). 
Mahoney  v.  Dore,  201,  1024,  102.:.. 

V.  Libbey,  840. 

V.  New  York   Cent.    &   H.    R.   R. 
Co.,  1010. 
llahurin  v.  Harding,  559,  502. 
Jlaier  v.  Randolph,  252. 
Main  v.  Main,  463. 
Mairs     v.     Manhattan     Real     Estate 

Ass'n,  654.  835. 
Maitland  v.  Goldney,  548. 
Majestic,  The,  308,  1079. 
Malachy  v.  Soper,  550,  554. 
Malcolmson  y.  Scott,  428. 
Malcom  v.  Spoor,  632. 
Maleverer  v.  Spinke,  149. 
Mali  V.  Lord,  251,  263,  278. 
Maliniemi  v.   Gronlund,   429. 
Mallaeh  v.  Ridley,  258,  263. 
Mallalieu  v.  Laugher,  706,  722,  723. 
Mallet  V.  Uncle  Sam  Co.,  91. 
Mallory  v.  Cowart,  716. 

V.  Ferguson,    133. 

V.  Hanauer  Oil  Works,  32. 

V.  Pioneer  Press  Co.,  499,  535. 
Malloy  V.  Railway  Co.,  185. 
Malone  v.  Haweley,  1003. 

T.  Knowlton,  855. 

V.  Marriott,  704. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  389,  1055. 

V.  Stewart,  495. 
Maloney  v.  Traverse,  785. 
Malsky  v.   Schumacker,   324. 
Maltbie  v.  Bolting,  234. 
Managers    of   the   Metropolitan    Asy- 
lum Dist.  V.  Hill,  140,  789,  790. 
Manby  v.  Scott,  104. 

V.  Witt,  544. 
Manchester  S.  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown, 

300,  305. 
Maness  v.  Henry,  311,  313. 
Maney  v.   Chicago,   B.   &  Q.    R.   Co., 

925. 
Mangam  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  985. 

V.  Peck,  220. 
Mangan  v.  Atterton,  160,  872,  977,  984. 
Mangel  v.  O'Neill,  400. 
Manger  v.  Shipman,  854. 
Manget  v.   O'Niell,  494. 


Jlanhattan    Life    Ins.    Co.    v.    Forty- 
Second  St.  &  G.   St.  F.  R.   Co..  172. 
Manley  v.  Field,  451. 

V.  St.  Helen's  Canal  Co.,  18il. 
Manlove  v.  A'ick,   607. 
Mann  v.  Barrett,  452. 

V.  City  of  Rich  Hill,  469.  472. 

V.  Stock- Yard  Co.,   874,   s,S3. 

V.  Wieand,  332. 
Mann  Boudoir  Car  Co.  v.  Dupre,  72. 
Manning  v.  Brown,  688. 

V.  Clement,   525. 

V.  Johnson,   164. 

V.  Mitchell,  418. 

V.  Monaghan,  704. 

V.  Shriver,  714. 

V.  State  of  Nicaragua,   114. 
Mantel  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.. 

945. 
Manufacturers'    Accident    Indemnity 

Co.  V.  Dorgan,  947. 
Manvell  v.  Thomson,  454,  4.5S. 
Manwell   v.   Burlington,    C.   R.   &    X. 

Ry.  Co.,  928. 
Manzoni  v.  Douglas,  880. 
Mapstrick  v.  Ramge,  646. 
Marble  v.  Chapin,  479. 
Marbourg  v.    Smith,   609. 
Marceau  v.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.,  32.'>. 
March  v.  Walker,  439. 
Marcy  v.   Fries,  779. 

V.  Howard,  667.    , 

V.  Merchants'  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  78. 
Marentille  v.  Oliver,  435. 
MarfiU  V.   South  Wales  Ry.   Co.,  882. 

935. 
Margetson  v.  Wright,  588. 
Marguet  v.  La  Duke,  854. 
Maria,  The,  Case  of,  231. 
Marie,  The,  114. 
Marine  Bank  v.  Rushmore,  285. 
Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 

S.  Ry.  Co.,  783. 
Marion  v.  Railroad  Co.,  255,  275. 
Marion  County  Com'rs  v.  Riggs,   18;;. 
Marion  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Shaffer,  964. 
Mark  v.  Hastings,  615,  623. 

V.  Hyatt,  607. 
Markel  v.  Moudy,  582. 
Markham  v.   Jaudon,   741. 
Markley  v.  Whitman,  202. 
Marks  v.  Baker,  513,  530,  535,  541,  547. 


CASli:S    CITED. 


liS9 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-Cu2,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


ilarks  V.  Hastings,  292. 

V.  Jaffa,  356. 

V.  Rochester   Ry.    Co.,  992. 

V.  Sullivan,  139,  420,  669. 

V.  Townsend,  42.5,  618,  631. 

V.  Wright,  716,  731. 
Mark's  Adm'r  v.  Railroad  Co.,  8S3. 
Marlowe  v.  Rogers,  733,  738. 
ilarlsbary  v.  State,  444. 
Marpesia,  The,  860. 
Marr  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  933. 
Mars  V.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  266. 
ilarsan  v.  French,  777,  70(;. 
ilarsh  V.   Benton  Co.,  819. 

V.  Billings,  5.j1. 

V.  Colby,  659. 

V.  Ellsworth,   526,    028. 

Y.  Falker,  563,  579. 

V.  Hand,  663,  855. 

V.  Herman,  1046. 

V.  Loader,  427; 

V.  McNider,  75.5. 

V.  Whitmore,  916. 
-MarshaU  v.  Betner,  605. 

V.  Blackshire,  153. 

T.  Oilman,  323. 

Y.  Hellei-,  421. 

y.  Oakes,  221,  222. 

V.  Peters,  753. 

V.  Railroad  Co..  334,  899,  1069. 

V.  Schricker,  3G3. 

V.  Welwood,  847,  850,  908. 

V.  Widdicomb  Furniture  Co.,  996. 
Mai'shalsea  Case,  123. 
Marston  r.  Bigelow,  315. 
:\rartin.  Ex  parte,  803. 

T.  City  of  Brooklyn,  136. 

y.  Deetz,  379. 

y.  Gilham,  697. 

y.  Hill,  564. 

Y,  Hillen,  731. 

V.  Houghton,  681. 

y.  Jordan,  594. 

V.  Kennedy,  213. 

y.  Marshall,  124. 

y.  Martin,  12. 

y.  Payne,  451-454. 

y.  Pittman,  669. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  63,   72,   144,  314, 
362,  844,  845,  847,  1032,  1048. 

V.  Rector,  670. 

V.  Richards,  263. 


Martin  v.  Robson,  220. 

y.  Temperly,  231. 

V.  Towle,  949. 

V.  Wallace,  190. 

y.  AVestern  Union  Tel.  Co.,  33."'>. 

y.  Wood,  402. 

y.  Wrought  Iron  Range  Co.,  995. 
Martinez  y,   Gerber.  450. 
Jlartinowsky  y.  City  of  Hannibal,  797. 
JIarts  V.  State,  434. 
Maryin  y.  Brewster  Iron  Jlin.  Co.,  753. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  72. 
Maryin  Safe  Co.  v.  Ward,  906. 
Mai-x  V.  Press  Pub.  Co.,  520,  525. 
Mary.  The,  150. 

Maiy  Lee  Coal  &  Ry.  Co.  v.   Cham- 
bliss,  993. 
Mary's  Case,  84,  385. 
Marzptti  y.  Williams,  20,  82,  83. 
Mase  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.   Co.,   1044, 

1045. 
Maskell  y.  Barker,  607. 
Mason,  In  re,  115. 

y.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co., 
890. 

y.  Ellsworth,  381 

V.  Ervine,  875. 

V.  Keeling,  8.53.  854. 

V.  Lewis,  952. 

V.  Mason,  464,  525. 

y.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  948. 

V.  Paynter,  79. 

V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  1018. 

V.  Shawneetown,  920. 

V.  Spartanburg   Co.,   69. 

V.  Stratton,  495. 

V.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  .330. 
Masson  v.  Bovet,  570. 
Massoth  V.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co.. 

926. 
Massuere  v.  Dickens,  405. 
Masters  v.  Burgess,  543. 
Masterson  y.  Mt.  A'ernon,  .381. 
Matchett  v.  Cincinnati,  W.  ..V:  il.  Ity. 

Co.,  1016. 
Mateer  y.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  318. 
Mathews  y.  Bliss,  500. 

V.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  470. 

y.  Cowan,  16.5. 

V.  Densmore,  137. 

V.  London  Street   Tramways  Co., 
68. 


1190 


OASES    CITED. 


L\'ul.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  -  the  residue.] 


Mathews  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co., 
84(1,  027. 

V.  Terry,   I.jO. 
Matliis  V.  Carpenter,  131. 
JXatlock  V.  Reppy,  295,  592. 
Matteson  v.  Railroad  Co.,  377. 

V.   Strong,  902. 
Matthews  v.  Charleston  &  S.  Ry.  Co., 
1079. 

V.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  R.,  881. 

V.  Smith's  Exp.  Co.,  670. 

V.  West     London     Water    Works 
Co.,   186. 
Mattice  v.  Wilcox,  506,  508,  .j37. 
Mattimore  v.  City  of  Erie,  97.3,  978. 
Mattise   v.    Consumers'    Ice    Manufg 

Co.,  234,  985,  1014. 
Matts  V.  Borba,  511. 
Maty  V.   Lord,   255. 
Matz  V.  St.   Paul   City  Ry.   Co..   972. 

1080,.  1089. 
Mau  V.  Morse,  963. 
Mauerman  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  il.  &  S.  Ry. 

Co.,  462. 
Maulsby  v.  Reifsnider,  520. 
Maund  v.  Monmouthshire  Canal  Co., 

168. 
Maunsell  v.  Hort,  408. 
Maxey  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  892, 

929. 
Maxfield  v.   Schwartz,  598,  599. 
Maxmilian  v.  City  of  Now  York,  188. 
Max  Morris,  The,  961,  979. 
Maxwell  V.  Bay  City  Bridge  Co.,  684. 

V.  Palmerton,    153. 

V.  Pike,  134. 
May  V.  Burdett,  59,  853,  854. 

V.  Jones,  477. 

V.  Newman,  353. 

V.  Smith,   1005. 
Maye  v.  Yappen,  654. 
Mayer  v.  Journeymen  Stone  Cutters' 
Ass'n,  353,   643. 

v.  Kilpatrick,   731. 

V.  Thompson-Hutchison  Bldg.  Co., 
241.  243. 

V.  Walter,  607,   608,   612,  632-634. 
Mayes  v.  Manning,  733. 
Mayliew  v.  Boyce,  1083. 

V.  Burns,  679. 

V.  Herrick,  733. 

V.  Phnenix  Ins.  Co.,  581. 


Mayhew  v.  Suttle,  665. 
Maynard  v.  Beardsley,  445. 

Y.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  195,  197. 
V.  Fireman's  Ins.  Co.,  169. 
Mayne  v.  Fletcher,  475. 
Maynell  v.  Saltmarsh,  784. 
Mayo  y.  Spartanburg,  U.  &  C.  R.  <>i., 
673. 
V.  Springfield,  178,  666. 
Mayor  of  Albany  v.  Cunliff,  18f>. 
Mayor    of    Cumberland    v.    Willi.son, 

177. 
Mayor  of  London  v.  Cox,  130. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Americus  v.  Eldrid?e. 

179. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Baltimore  v.  Marriott. 
747,    783,    961. 
V.  War.   999. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Colchester  v.  Brooke, 

076. 
Mayor,   etc.,    of   Nashville   v.    Suther- 
land, 176,  296. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  New  York  v.   Bailev, 
243. 
Y.  Lord,   410. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Rahway  v.  Carter,  170. 
Mayrant  v.   Richardson,   507. 
Maysville  St.  R.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Marvin, 

334. 
Maysville  &  B.  S.  R.  Co.  v.   Pelham, 

672. 
Mayton  v.  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.,  991. 
Mead  v.  Bunn,  596,  597. 
Meader  v.  Stone,  430,  665. 
Meagher  v.  Cooperstown  &  C.   V.  R. 
Co.,  989. 
V.  DriscoU,  371,  781. 
Mears  v.  Dole,  840. 
Mechanics'  &  Traders'  Bank  of  Buf- 
falo v.  Farmers'  &  Mechanics'  Nat. 
Bank  of  Buffalo,  715. 
Mechesney  v.  Unity  Tp.  Co.,  74.  77. 
Medary  v.    Cathers,   225. 
Medbury  v.  Watson,   579,  585. 
Medford  v.  Levy,  807. 
Jleegan  v.  McKay,  855. 
Jleehan  v.  Edwards,  667,  672. 

V.  Morewood,    263. 
Meek  v.   Pennsylvania   Ry.   Co.,   919, 

926. 
Meeks  v.  Railroad  Co.,  198,  984. 
v.  Willard,  072. 


CASES    CITED. 


1191 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  l-tJ.j2,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Meese  v.  City  of  Fond  du  Lae,  472. 
Mehrhof  Bros.   Brick  Manuf  k  Co.  t. 

Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  708. 
Mehroff  v.   Mehroff,   468. 
Meier  v.  Morgan,  839. 

V.  Shrunk,  855,   857. 
Meigs  V.  Lister,  769,  776,  778. 
Meiuers  v.  Frederick  Miller  Brewing 

Co.,  336,  793,  803. 
Meir  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  1089. 
Meisch  v.  Rochester  Electric  R.   Co., 

861. 
Meister  v.  Lang,  746. 
Meixell  v.  Kirkpatrick,  741. 

V.  Morgan,    7(12. 
Meka  v.   Brown,   317. 
Mell  V.  Barner,  617. 
Mellen  v.   Morrill,   765. 
Meller  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  1080. 
Mellor  V.  Baddeley,  618. 

V.  Leather.    655. 

V.  Merchants'   Manuf'g   Co.,   1022. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  244,  389,  1080. 

V.  Spateman,  82,  84. 
Mellors  v.  Shaws,  1023. 
Mellquist  v.  The  Wasco,  1081. 
Mellwitz  V.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  389. 
Melrose  v.   Cutter,  354. 
Melsheimer  v.  Sullivan,  856. 
Melville  v.  Gary,  600. 
Melvin  v.   Chancy,   604. 
Membery  v.   Great  Western  Ry.   Co., 

201. 
Memphis  Bell  Tel.  Co.  v.  Hunt,  143, 

863. 
Memphis  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  926. 

v.  Graham,  1019. 

V.  Reeves,  (15. 

v.  Whitfield,    377. 
Memphis  &  O.   R.   Co.  v.  Hicks,  143. 

144. 
JMcndenhall  v.  Klinck,  682. 
JXeneely  v.   Meneely,  147. 
ilPDger  V.  Lauer,  S2.'5,  878,  968. 
Menham  v.   Edmonson,  44. 
Mennie  v.  Blake,  352,  655,  (>(i2,  734. 
Meutel  V.  Hippely,  612,  622. 
Mercer  v.    Corbin,   33,   432,    4:J8.   813, 
859.   877. 

V.  Walmsley,   452. 
Merchants'  Bank  v.  State  Bank,  171. 


Jlerchauts'    Cotton   Press    &    Storage 
Co.  V.  Insurance  Co.  of  North  Amer- 
ica. 193. 
Merchants'    Dispatch  Transp.    Co.    v. 

Furthmann,    309. 
Merchants'    Nat.    Banli    v.    National 

Bank  of  the  Commonwealth,  21. 
Merchants'  &  Planters'  Bank  v.  Mey- 
er, 715.  734. 
Mercier  v.  Jlercier,  951. 
Meredith  v.  Reed,  817-810. 

V.  Woodward,    915. 
Mergenthaler  v.  Kirby,  105. 
Merguire  v.  O'Donnel'l.   580,   602. 
Merivale  v.  Carson,   537. 
Meriwether  v.  Asbeck,'6G0. 
Merkle  v.  Bennington  Tp.,  333. 
Merriam  v.   Cunningham,   164. 

V.  Hartford  &  N.  H.  R.  Co.,  106(5. 
V.  Texas    Sittings    Pub.    Co.,    .Tj(j. 
Merrick  v.  Hill.  325. 
Morrill  v.  Central  Vt.  R.   Co.,  1035. 
V.  Eastern   R.  Co.,   042. 
V.  Pepperdino,   166. 
V.  St.   Louis,   220. 
Merritt  v.  Earle,  003,   1062,  1003. 
V.  McNally,    136. 

V.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  It.  Co., 
964. 
Merry   v.    Green,    190. 
Merrymau  v.  Chicago  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  987. 
Merryweather  v.  Nixam,  32,  21:!. 
Mersey  Docks  &  Harbour  Board  Co. 

V.   Gibbs,   174,  185,   186. 
Mershon  v.   Hobensack,   002,  1062. 
Mertz   V.   DetAveller,    048. 
Meservey  v.  Lockett,  879. 
ilesser  v.  Smyth,  594. 
Mcssick  V.  Midland  R.  Co.,  685. 
Metallic   Compression   Casting  Co.   v. 

Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  149. 
Metcalf  V.  Baker,  406. 

V.  City  of  Watertown,  336. 
V.  State,  444. 
V.  Williams,  47. 
Metcalfe    v.    Cunard    Steamship    Co., 

S07. 
Mctropolitou  Ass'n  v.  Petch,  794. 
Metropolitan    Asylum    Dist.    v.    Hill, 
150,  844. 


1192 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-(J52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Melropolitau  Board  of  Works  v.  Mc- 
Carthy, 7.S(J. 
Metropolitan  K.  Co.  v.  .Tackson,  957. 
Metropolitan   St.    K.    Co.    v.   .Tohnsou, 
.•;G2,  470,  472,  881,  !>2!l, 

V.  Powell,  982. 
Meuer  v.  Chicago,  M.  iV-  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 

1079,  lOSO. 
Meu.K  V.  Cobley,  697. 
Mewhirter  y.  Hatten,  4G9,  470,  472. 
Mexican   Cent.    R.   Co.    v.   Laiu'icella, 

1085,  1000. 
Mexican  Nat.  R.   Co.  v.  Crum,  895. 

V.  Finch,  1033. 

V.  Mussette,  930. 
Meyer  v.  King,  333,  987. 

V.  Orynslii,  738. 

V.  Railroad    Co.,    3(i:'>,    94(;,    1091, 
1092. 
Meyeringh  v.  Wendt,  20«. 
Meyers  v.  Lebanon  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  270. 
Meyrose  v.  Adams,  551,  553. 
Michael  v.  Alestree,  249,  877. 

V.  Roanoke    Maeh.    Works,    1003, 
1025. 
MichaeUs  v.  Michaelis,  393. 
Michaels  v.   New  York  Cent.   R.   Co., 

0.J,  1002. 
Michaelson  v.   Denison,  150. 
ilichalke  v.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry. 

Co.,  403. 
Michaud  v.  Eisenmenger,  591,  593. 
Michel  V.  Dunkle,  405. 
Micbelson  v.  Lavin,  505. 
Michigan  v.  AA'ard,  100(5. 
Michigan   Cent.    R.    Co.    v.    Burrows, 
820,  1009. 

V.  Coleman,  408,  470,  819,  948. 

v.  Dolan,  820. 

V.  Dunham,  317. 

v.  Gilbert,  944. 

V.  Myrick,   1074. 

V.  Smithson,  995,  1002. 
Michigan  Mut.  Life  In.s.  Co.  v.  Cronk, 

055. 
Middlesex  Co.  v.  McCue,  746,  708. 
Middlestadt  v.  Morrison,  878. 
Middleton  v.  Fowler,  250,  253. 

v.  Pritchard,   753. 
Jlidford  V.  Hardison,  COS. 
Midland  Ins.  Co.  v.  Smith,  557. 
Midland  R.  Co.  v.  Fisher,  899. 


Mieleuz  v.  Quasdorf,  479,  480. 
;\Iietzsch  v.  Berkhont.  307. 
Jlilard  v.  Hobick,  104. 
Milburne  v.  Byrne,  449. 
Miles  V.  Bradford,  351. 

V.  ('ity  of  Worcester,  177,  746,  798, 
S:!9. 

V.  Harrington,  493. 

V.  Van  Horn,  511. 

V.  Weston,  629. 
ililford  V.  Commonwealth,  20. 
Mill  V.  Hawker,  173. 
Millar  v.  Thompson,  454. 
Millard  v.  McDonald  Lumber  Co.,  710. 

V.  Truax,  446. 
iMiller  v.  Baker,  661,  717. 

V.  Barber,  583. 

V.  Blue,  777,  780. 

V.  Bi;ooks,  522. 

V.  Brown,  608,  621. 

V.  Burket,  692. 

V.  Butler,  481,  491. 

V.  Covert,  404. 

V.  Ourtiss,  575. 

V.  David,  500. 

V.  Grice,  430. 

V.  Highland  Ditch  Co.,  212. 

v.  Holland,  667. 

V.  Holsteine,  488. 

V.  Hope,  527. 

v.  Horton,  858. 

v.  Hyde,  721. 

V.  Lamery,  191,  732. 

V.  Lynch,  353,  357,  001.  092. 

V.  McDonald,  523. 

v.  Martin,  843. 

V.  Mutzabaugh,  666. 

V.  North  Fredericksburgh,  336. 

V.  Parish,  503. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  72,  224,  237,  2.54, 
314,  335,  684,  844.  884,  939^ 
947.  1039.   1072,  1080. 

V.  Sawbridge,  599. 

V.  Staples,   246,  291. 

V.  Sweitzer,   221,    222. 

V.  Thompson,  717. 

V.  United  States,  167. 

V.  Waddingham,  698.  704,  703. 
Jliller  Piano  Co.  v.  Parker,  724. 
Miller's  Case,  509,  963. 
Millhouse  v.  Railway  Co.,  921. 
Milligan,  Ex  parte,  56. 


CASES    CITED. 


1193 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Milligan  v.  Wedge,  i:31,  238. 
Milliken  v.  Barrow,  167. 

V.  Hathawaj',  734. 
Mills  V.  Ball,  719. 

V.  Bi'ltton,   725. 

V.  Brooklyn,  179,  180. 

V.  Graham,  159,  Ki;!. 

V.  Hall,  792. 

V.  Mills,  603. 

V.  New  York  &  H.  R.  Co.,  708. 

V.  United  States,  18. 
Millsaps  V.  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  Ry. 

Co.,  1035. 
Milner  v.   Milner,   667. 
Miltenberger  v.  Railway  Co.,  207. 
Milwaukee  Ry.  Co.  v.  Arms,  817,  822. 
Milwaukee  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Adlam,  144. 
Milwaukee  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Kellogg,  77, 

374,  944. 
Milwaukee   &   M.    R.   Co.    v.    Finney, 

397. 
Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Arms, 
81V. 

V.  Kellogg,   71,   77,   78,  374,  944. 
Mims   V.    Mt.    Hermon    Boys'    School, 

171. 
Minaghan  v.  State,  440. 
Minard  v.  Meade,  129. 
Miner  v.  Connecticut  R.   R.   Co.,  870. 

T.  Gilmour,  755. 
Ming  V.  Woolfolk,  589,  592. 
Minister  v.  Citizens'  Ry.  Co.,   983. 
Minke  v.  Hofeman,  805. 
Minneapolis  Mill  Co.  v.  Minneapolis  & 

St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  686. 
Minock  v.   Detroit,   G.    H.    &  M.   Ry. 

Co..  1091. 
Minor  v.  Wright,  760. 
Minors  v.   Leeford,  502. 
Minter  v.  Swain,  86. 
Mires  v.  Solebay,  718. 
Mirkil  v.   Morgan,  79S,  805,  806. 
Mississinewa  Mln.  Co.  v.  Patton,  SoO. 
Mississippi    Home    Ins.    Co.    v.    Louis- 
ville. N.  O.  &  T.  R.  Co.,  144,  845. 
Mississippi  Mills  v.  Meyer,  719. 
Mississippi  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Ward,  804. 
Mississippi  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Archibald, 

754. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Fulmore, 
667. 

v.  Miller,  1082. 


Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Go.   v.  Palmer, 
861. 

V.  Reynolds,  363. 

V.  Walker,  1008. 

V.  Woods,  958,  1012. 
Missouri  L.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Zeitinger,  072. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnes,  306. 

V.  Baxter,  996. 

V.  Behee.  540,  544. 

V.  Brazzil,  311. 

V.  Breeding,  1072. 

V.  Cullers,  63. 

V.  Edwards,  1076. 

V.  Fagan,  1076. 

V.  Hackett,  881. 

V.  Haley,  1055. 

V.  Heidenheimer,  727. 

V.  Hennessey,  949. 

V.  International    Marine    Ins.    Co., 
301. 

V.  McElyea.  1013. 

V.  JIcFadden,  1066. 

V.  Mackey,  1055. 

V.  Moseley,  68,  953,  958,  971,  976. 

V.  Peay,  401. 

V.  Richmond,  544. 

V.  Russell,   1069. 

V.  Texas  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  982. 

V.  Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  206. 

V.  Twiss,  1073. 
Mitchell  T.   Bradstreet   Co.,   387,   500, 
506,  531,  541. 

V.  Bridger,  669. 

V.  City  of  Rome.  366. 

V.  Corbin,  132,  133. 

V.  Crassweller,  256,  278,  1009. 

V.  Darley  ilain   Colliery  Co.,   105, 
335,  338,  339,  405,  411. 

V.  Davies,  362,  629. 

V.  Donahey,  270. 

V.  Foster,  123. 

V.  Harmony,   111,  205. 

V.  Jenkins,  004,  615,  623,  625,  626. 

V.  Knott,  98. 

V.  Malone,  418.  426. 

V.  Marker,  902,  1084. 

V.  Milholland,  493,  513. 

V.  Mining  Co.,  698. 

V.  Mitchell,  431,  681. 

V.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co., 
195.  933. 

V.  Rochester  Ry.  Co.,  72. 


irj4 


CASKS    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Mitchell  V.  Rockland,  181,  185,  188. 

V.  Sharon,  504,  500. 

V.  South  Western  R.  Co.,  608. 

V.  State,  432,  630. 

V.  Tacoma  Ry.   &  Jlotor  Co.,  872. 

V.  Tarbutt,  214. 

V.  United  States,   112. 

V.  Wall,  625. 

V.  Western  &  A.  R.  Co.,  1085. 
Mix  V.  JlcCoy,  106. 
Mixter  v.  Imperial  Coal  Co.,  950. 
M.  Moxham,  The,  102. 
Mobile  Ins.  Co.  v.  Columbia  &  G.  R. 

Co.,  846. 
Mobile  &  B.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Holborn,  201. 
Mobile  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashcraft,  907. 

V.  Jurey,  363,  1076. 
Mobile  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  George,  1017. 

V.  Godfrey,  936. 

V.  Hopkins,  301. 

V.  Massey,  1041, 

V.  Seals,  263. 
Modisett  V.  McPike,  466,  407. 
Moe  V.  Job,  842. 

V.  Smiley,  331. 
Moebus  V.  Herrmann,  883. 
Moeckley  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 

928. 
Moeller  v.  Brewster,  1020. 
Moelleriug  v.  Evans,  751. 
Moens  v.  Heyworth,  572. 
Moffat  V.  United  States,  110. 
MofEatt  V.   Fisher,   618. 
Mogul  Steamship  Co.  v.  McGregor,  35, 

146,  555,  641,  642,  646-649. 
Mohney  v.  Cook,  194. 
Mohr  V.  Gault,  66,  799. 
Mohry  v.  Hoffman,  452. 
Moline  Plow  Co.  v.  Webb,  336. 
MoUie  Gibson  Consolidated  Mining  & 

Milling  Co.  v.  Sharp,  415,  1018. 
Molloy  V.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  617. 
Molm  V.  Barton,  723. 
Monaghan  v.  Cox,  023. 
Monckton  v.  Pashley,  407. 
Monell  V.  Colden,  85. 
Money  v.  Lower  View   Coal  Co.,  863. 
Monk  V.  Town  of  New  Utrecht,  129, 

165,  873. 
Monks  V.  Monks,  509,  510. 
Monmouth  Min.  &  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Erl- 
ing,  103T. 


Monohan  v.   Triumph   Artificial   Limb 

Co.,  132. 
Monongahela  City  v.  Fischer,  975. 
Monroe  v.  Collins,  135. 
Monson  v.  Madame  Tussaud,  350. 
Montague  v.  Flockton,  358. 
Montgomery  v.  Booming  Co.,  822,  825, 
843. 

V.  Gilmer,  176. 

V.  Knox,  540. 
Montgomery  Co.  Bank  v.  Albany  City 

Bank,  285. 
Montgomery's    Ex'rs   v.   Alabama    G. 

S.  R.  Co..  895. 
Montgomery  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Slailette, 
379. 

V.  Stewart,  957. 
Montreal     River    Lumber  Co.   v.   Mi- 
hills,    564,  570. 
Montriou  v.  Jeffreys,  915. 
Moody  V.  Deutsch,  632.  634. 

V.  Hamilton  Manuf'g  Co.,  1041. 

V.  JlcClelland,  751. 

V.  Steggles,  690. 

V.  Ward,  852. 

V.  Whitney,  740. 
Moon  V.  Avery,  671. 

V.  Raphael,  385. 

V.  Wineman,  206. 
Mooney  v.  Chase,  421. 

v.  Connecticut  R.  Lumber  Co.,  936, 
1008. 

V.  Davis,  588. 

v.  Maynard,  677. 

V.  Miller,  580. 

V.  Trow     Directory     Printing     & 
Bookbinding  Co.,  879. 
Moon's  Adm'r  v.  Richmond  &   A.   R. 

Co.,  1039. 
Moore  v.  Adam,  380,  885. 

V.  Ames,   527. 

V.  Appleton,  216,  246,  1007. 

V.  Baker,  710. 

V.  Bradford,  914. 

V.  .Browne,  796. 

T.  City  of  Minneapolis,  808. 

V.  Cross,   583. 

V.  Drayton,  825. 

V.  Durgin,  428. 

V.  Eastman,   163. 

V.  Ferrell,  691. 

V.  Floyd,  81. 


CASES    CITED.  1195 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-G.52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Moore  v.  Francis,  507. 

V.  Gadsden,  919,  926. 

V.  Haviland,  946. 

V.  Hill,  722,  7.^7. 

V.  Jackson,  745. 

V.  King,  739. 

V.  Langdon,  796,   808. 

V.  Lima  Nat.  Bank,  354. 

V.  Manufacturers'  Nat.  Bank,  528. 

V.  Mason,  6G5. 

V.  Metropolitan   Nat.    Bank,   269. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  253,  023,  627,  1028. 

V.  Robinson,  665. 

V.  Sanborne,  255^  278. 

V.  Smith,  693. 

V.  Steel   Co.,   332. 

V.  Stevenson,  517. 

V.  Thompson,  418,  421,  427,  520. 

V.  Williams,  337. 
Moore,  Lessee  of,  v.  Doherty,  665. 
Moores  v.  Union,  646. 
Mootry  v.  Town  of  Danbury,  798. 
Morain  v.  Devlin,  158. 
Moran  v.  Dawes,  450. 

V.  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  1001. 

V.  Inhabitants    of    Town    of     Pal- 
mer, 889. 

V.  Portland     Steam     Packet     Co., 
715. 

V.  Smell,  56. 
Morange  v.  Mix,   133. 
Morasse  v.  Brochu,  505,  519. 
Morbach    v.    Home    Min.    Co.,    1003, 

1027. 
Morch  V.  Raubitschek,  325. 
Morehouse  v.  Northrop,  44. 
Moreland  v.  Boston  &  P.  R.  U.,  840. 
Morely  v.  Dunbar,  408. 
Moreton  v.  Hardern,  210,  292 
Moray  v.  Fitzgerald,  678. 

v."  .Aliller,  582. 

V.  Morning    Journal    Ass'n,    483, 
549. 

V.  Town  of  Xewfane,   183. 
Morford  v.  AVoodworth,  809. 
Morgan  v.  Bliss,  55. 

V.  Bowes,   769,   S48. 

V.  Carbon  tlill  Coal  Co.,  1047. 

V.  Chester,  342. 

V.  City  of  Des  :\Ioines,  174. 

V.  Cox.  •'lO,  .sl3,  852. 

V.  Curley,  3(59.  3S2. 


ilorgan  v.  Dawes,  4.54. 

V.  Dudley,  135. 

V.  Durfee,  333. 

V.  Freemont  Co.,  69. 

V.  Gregg,  741. 

V.  Halberstadt,  498,  499. 

V.  Hughes,  610. 

V.  Iron  Co..  1001. 

V.  Llngen,  496,  507. 

V.  Railroad   Co.,  402,  764,  1037. 

V.  Ross,  459. 

V.  Smith,    229,   242,   448,    1035. 

V.  Tener,  252,  285,  340. 

V.  Varick,  661. 
Morganstein  v.  Nejedlo,  '439. 
Moriarity  v.  Bartlett,  331. 
Moriarty  v.  Ashworth,  698,  705. 
Morier  v.  St.  Paul.  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co 

261. 
Moris  v.  Moris,  593. 
Morish  v.  Mountain,  707. 
Morison's  Case.  9. 
Moritz  V.  Garnhart,  454. 
Morland  v.  Atchinson,  582. 
Morley  v.  Chase,  428. 

V.  Gaisford,   247. 
Morning  Journal  Ass'n  v.  Rutherford, 

396,  475,  538. 
Morrill  v.  Madden,  599. 

V.  Moulton,  720. 
Morris,  The  Max,  961,  979. 
Morris  v.  Chicago,   B.   &  Q.   Ry.  Co., 
975. 

V.  Eighth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  1086. 

V.  Piatt,  53.  67,  151. 

V.  Robinson,   344. 

V.  Ryerson,  410,  411. 

V.  Strobel   iV:  AA'ilken   Co..  837. 

V.  Tuthill,    645. 
Morris  Canal  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Ryer- 
son, 797. 
Morris  Co.  v.  Burgess,  851. 
Morrisey  v.  Hughes,  1052. 
Morrison  v.  Belcher,  535. 

y.  Davis,  63.  375,  1062. 

v.  Kelly,  619. 

V.  Koch,  582,  584. 

V.  Lawrence,  180. 

V.  McDonald,  118. 

V.  Jlarquardt,  802. 

V.   Philips,  1074. 

V.  P^ress  Pub.  Co..  .543. 


1196 


CASES   citf-;d. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-G52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Morrison's  Case,  9. 
Morrissey  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co., 
148. 

V.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  197. 
Morris  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Newark  Pass. 
Ry.  Co.,  689. 

V.  Prudden,  777,  794. 
Morrow  v.  Railway  Co.,  72. 
Morrow    Shoe    Manuf'g    Co.    v.    Ne\Y 

England  Shoe  Co.,  735. 
Morse  v.  Borough  of  Fair  Haven,  774. 

V.  Boston  &  L.  R.  Co.,  921. 

V.  Crawford,  155,  731. 

V.  Minneapolis   &  St.   L.   Ry.   Co., 
949,  950. 

V.  Slue,  286. 

V.  Town  of  Richmond.   766. 
Mortin  v.  Shoppee,  431.  435,  436. 
Mortland   v.    Philadelphia    &    R.    Ry. 

Co.,  1078. 
Morton  v.   Comptroller,  124. 

V.  Crane,  118. 

V.  Frankfort,  952. 

V.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  169. 

V.  Solambo  Copper  Min.  Co.,  91. 

V.  Young,   618. 
Mose  V.  Hastings  &•  St.  L.   Gas  Co., 

850. 
Moseley  v.  Chamberlain,  1030,  1043. 
Moses  V.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  1070. 

V.  Dubois,  420. 

V.  Johnson,  698.  701,  702. 

V.  Norris,  1057. 

V.  Port  Townsend  S.  R.  Co.,  1075. 

T.  State,  771. 
Mosher  v.  Southern  Exp.  Co.,  1073. 
Mosier  v.  Beale,  470,  471. 

V.  Caldwell,  759. 

V.  Stoll,  .510. 
Moss  V.  City  Council  of  Augusta,  175. 

V.  City  of  St.  Paul,  220. 

V.  Cummings,  128. 

V.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  141. 

V.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  1000. 
Jlostyn  V.  Fabrigas,  103. 
Mott  V.  Cherryvale  Water  &  Manuf'g 
Co.,  919. 

V.  Comstock,  500. 

V.  Consumers'  Ice  Co.,  278. 

V.  Ewing,   7.JO. 

V.  Schoolbred,  79.">. 
Mouat  Jjumber  Co.  v.  Wilmore,  S43. 


Moulton  V.  Beecher,  611. 

V.  Inhabitants  of  Sandford,  968. 

V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  303, 
1074. 

V.  Sanford,  70. 
Mount  V.  Derrick,  729. 
Mt.  Adams  &  Eden  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Do- 

herty,  860. 
Mou.se's  Case,  149,  150. 
Mower  v.  Leicester,   184. 
Mowry  v.  Chase,  419. 

V.  Wood,  739,  743. 
Moxham,  The  M.,  102. 
Moyer  v.  Moyer,  549. 
MoynaUan  v.  Wheeler,  663,  855. 
Jloynilian  v.  AUyn,  805. 

V.  Hills  Co.,  1008,  1037. 
M.  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Barnes,  306. 
Mucci  V.  Houghton,  913. 
Muckle  V.  Rochester  R.  Co.,  390. 
Mueller  v.  Fruen,  792. 

V.  Kuhn,  065,  666. 
Muggridge  v.  Bveleth,  190. 
Muhl's  Adm'r  t.   Michigan   Southern 

R.  Co.,  334. 
Muirhead  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co., 

995,  1011. 
Mulber  v.  Old  Colony  Ry.,  319. 
Mulchey  v.  Methodist  Religious  Soc., 

895. 
Muldoon  V.  Rickey,  608. 

V.  Seattle  City  Ry.  Co.,  296,  1083. 
Muldowney  v.   Illinois   Cent.   R.   Co., 

863. 
Mulford  V.  Clewell,  468. 
Mulgrave  v.  Ogden,  719,  726. 
Mulhern  v.   Lehigh  Valley   Coal  Co., 

999,  1045. 
Mullen  V.  Brown,  630. 

V.  City  of  Owosso,  965,  983. 

V.  Old  Colony  Ry.,  320. 

V.  Oregon,  S.  L.  &  U.  N.  Ry.  Co., 
1088. 

V.  St.  John,  837,  839,  840,  939. 

V.  Strieker,  750. 
MuUer  v.  Dell,  337. 

V.  McKesson,  857. 
Mullett  v.  Mason,  586,  858. 
Mulligan  v.  Cole,  509. 

V.  New  York  &  R.  B.  By.  Co.,  258, 
279. 
Mullln  V.  Northern  Mill  Co.,  992. 


CASES    CITED. 


1197 


[Vol.  1  conipri&es  pages  l-Go2,  inclusive;  vol.   2  the  residue.] 


JIullin  V.  Spangenbeig,  2ti0. 

Mulliner  v.  Florence,  738. 

Mulvehall  v.  Milhvard,  452-154.  ■ 

Mulvehlll  V.  Bates,  278. 

Mumby  v.  Bowdeu,  227. 

Mumford  v.  Oxford,  W.  &  W.  Ky.  Co., 

794. 
Muncie  Pulp  Co.  v.  Jones,  097. 
Muncie  St.  Ry.  Co,    v.  Maynard,  862. 
Hunger  v.  City  of  Waterloo,  950. 

V.  Hess,  165,  718. 
Munnerlyn  v.  Augusta  Sav.  Bank,  337. 
Munns  v.  Dupont,  626. 
Munos  V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  336. 
Munro  v.   Pacific   Coast   Dredging   & 

Reclamation  Co.,  332,  S4S. 
Munroe  v.  Luke,  668. 

V.  Stickney,  82,  366,  779. 
ilunster  v.  Lamb,  526,  527. 
JIurdock  V.  AValker,  73,  978. 
,  ilurdoclt    Parlor-Grate    Co.    v.    Com- 
monwealth, 20,   110,   112. 
Murgatroyd  v.  Robinson,  792. 
Muriel  v.  Tracey,  603. 
Murphey  v.  City  of  Wilmington,  704. 

V.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  869. 
Murphy  v.  Deane,  973. 

V.  Fond  du  Lac,  002. 

V.  Hays,  937. 

V.  Hobbs,   395. 

V.  Kron,  425,  427. 

V.  Lincoln,  691,  692. 

V.  Lowell,  849. 

V.  Martin,  425,  605,  630. 

V.  Nelson,  507,  527. 

V.  New   York,   etc.,    Ry.    Co.,   394. 

V.  Redler,   G28. 

V.  Smith,  1030. 

V.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  809,  993. 

V.  Walters,  423. 
Murray  v.  Cun-ie,  1034,  1036. 

V.  Friensberg,  418,  429. 

V.  Gast  Lithographic  &  Engraving 
Co.,  35G,  401. 

V.  Hall,  668. 

V.  Hay,  794. 

Y.  Mace,  033,  663,  693. 

V.  JIcGarigle,  650. 

T.  JlcShane,  768. 

V.  Man,  562. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  185,  1029. 
Murrey  v.  Kelso,  614. 


Muri-y  V.  Young,  S5lj,  857. 
Murtaugh  t.  St.  Louis,  188. 
Muscatine  W.  R.  v.  Horton,  118. 
Musch  V.  Burkhart,  800. 
Muschamp  v.  Lancaster  &  P.  J.  Ry. 

Co.,  1071. 
Musgrove  v.  Newell,  615,  623. 
Muskegon  Booming  Co.  v.  Hendricks, 

709. 
ilustard  v.  Wohlford,  164. 
ilutrie  V.  Binney,  102. 
JIutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bigler,  353. 
Myer  v.  Amidon,  563. 

V.  King,  385. 
Myers  v.  Center,  340. 

V.  Dean,  860. 

v.  Pludson  Iron  Co.,  1008. 

V.  Malcolm,  847. 

V.  Parker,  854. 

V.  San  Francisco,  397. 
Mynard  v.   Syracuse,   B.   &  N.  Y.   R 

Co.,  300. 
Myrick  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  1047. 
Myron  v.  Union  R.  Co.,  314. 


N 


Nachtman  v.  Hammer,  616,  620. 
Nagle  V.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  830. 

V.  Nicholson,  694. 
Nail  V.  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co., 

1024. 
Xalley  v.  Hartford  Carpet  Co.,  049. 
Naser  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  285. 
Nash  V.  Jewett,  104. 
V.  Lucus,  675,   677. 
v.  Minnesota   Title   Ins.    &   Trust 

Co.,  578. 
V.  Sulliyan,  709. 
V.  Trust  Co.,  569,  580,  586. 
V.  Whitney,  135. 
Nashua  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  Worcester 

&  N.  R.  Co.,  216,  973,  975,  977. 
Nashua  Lock  Co.  v.  Worcester  &  N. 

Ry.  Co.,  1072. 
Nashville  &  C.  E.  Co.  v.  Carroll,  1042. 

r.  Starnes,  205.  307. 
Nashville  &   C.  R.   R.   Co.  v.   David, 

1062. 
National  Bank  v.  Graham,  171. 
V.  Sprague,  472. 


1198 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  incUisive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


National  Docks  &  N.  J.  J.  C.  lly.  Co. 

V.  Pennsylvania  E.  Co.,  355. 
National  Endowment  Co.,  In  re,  359. 
National  Exch.   Banli  v.  Beal,   2-Ci. 
National  Exchange  Co.  v.  Drew,  169, 

245. 
National  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Minch,  44. 
National   Syrup   Co.   v.   Carlson,   318. 
National  Tel.  Co.  v.  Baker,  864. 
National  Transit  Co.  v.  Weston,  706. 
National  Trust  Co.  v.  Gleason,  41. 
Natoma  Water  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Clark- 

in,  691. 
Naunian's  Appeal,  221. 
Naumberg  v.  Young,  227. 
Navasota  v.  Pearce,  184. 
Nave  V.  Alabama  G.  S.  R.   Co.,  197, 
942. 

V.  Fiack,  195. 
Neaffie,  The,  1057. 
Neal  V.  Gillett,  977. 

V.  Joyner,  428. 

V.  Northern    Pac.     R.     Co.,     1042, 
1049. 
Nealand  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.,  1078. 
NeaU  V.  Gillett,  161. 

V.  Hart,  418. 
Nealon  v.  Frisbie,  495. 
Neanow  V.  Uttech,  193. 
Nebenzahl  v.  Townsend,  418,  6.30,  631. 
Neeb  v.  Hope,  515. 
Needham  v.  King,  843. 
Neel  V.  Neel,  706. 
Nefe  V.  Inhabitants  of  Wellesley,  179. 

V.  Landis,  163. 

V.  New   York   Cent.    &  H.    R.    R. 
Co.,  928. 

V.  Paddock,   765. 
Negley  v.  Cowell,  694. 

V.  Farrow,  537. 
Negus  V.  Becker,  235. 
Nehr  v.  State,  768,  857. 
Neil  V.  Fords,  531. 
Neiler  v.  Kelly,  741,  743. 
Neimitz  v.  Conrad,  42:3,  426. 
Nelson  v.  Danielson,  607. 

V.  Duluth,  S.  S.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  884. 

V.  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  Co., 
324,  334. 

V.  Iverson,   736. 

V.  Liverpool     Brewery     Co.,     225, 
229. 


Nelson  v.  Luling,  592. 
v.  Merriam,   718. 
V.'  Milligan,  807. 
V.  Musgrave,  •j24. 
V.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  921. 
V.  State,  914. 
V.  Stocker,   165. 
V.  Wallace,   486,   547. 
V.  Woodi'uff,   1061. 
Nesbit  V.  St.  Paul  Lumber  Co.,  74(). 

V.  Town  of  Garner,  983. 
Nestelle  V.  Northern  Pac.  Co.,  336. 
Netherland-American  Steam  Nav.  Co. 

V.  Hollander,  363,  461. 
Nettles  v.  Somervell,  505.  .506,  523, 
Nettleton  v.  Sikes,  684,  685. 
Netzer  v.  City  of  Crookston,  176. 
Neubauer   v.    Northern    Pac.    R.    Co., 

945. 
Neufeld  v.  Rodeminski,  617. 
Neumeister  v.  Dubuque,  472. 
Neutz  v.   .Tackson   Hill   Coal   &   Coke 

Co.,  1045. 
Nevada  Bank  v.  Portland  Nat.  Bank, 

172,   579,  580. 
Nevada    Bank    of    San    Francisco    v. 

Portland  Nat   Bank,   587. 
Neveu  v.  Sears,  265. 
Nevin  v.  Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.,  903. 
Nevitt  v.  Gillespie,  705. 
New  Albany  Forge  &  Rolling  Mill  y. 

Cooper,  228. 
New  Albany  R.  Co.  v.  Peterson,  758. 
Newall  V.  Jenkins,  639. 
Newark  Aqueduct  Board   v.    City   of 

Passaic,  81,  795,  805. 
Newark  Coal  Co.  v.  Upson.  607,  60S, 

611. 
Newark  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Block,  955. 
Newbern  Gaslight  Co.  v.  Lewis  Mer- 
cer Const.  Co.,  353. 
Newbold  v.  Bradstreet,  506. 
New    Brunswick    Ry.    Co.    v.    Cony- 

beare,  558,  584. 
Newby  v.  Gunn,  428. 
Newcomb    v.    Boston   Protective    De- 
partment, 64,  77,  102,  145,  193,  925. 
Newoomen  v.   Coulsori,  688. 
Newdoll  V.  Young,  831. 
Newell  V.  Chapman,  600,  602. 
V.  City  of  New  York,  317. 
V.  Cowan,  11. 


CASES    CITED. 


1199 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  l-6o2,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


A^ewell  V.  How,  506. 
V.  Whitcher,  436. 
New  England  Manuf'g  Co.   v.   Stain, 

10(iG. 
Ne\Yliall  V.  Kingsbuiy,  714. 
Newhard  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  S2(;, 

02S. 
New  Haven  v.  Sargent,  690. 
New  Holland  Turnpike  Co.   v.  Farm- 
ers' Ins.  Co.,  336. 
New   Jersey   Express   (O.    v.    Nichols, 

381,  406. 
New   Jersey   R.    Co.    v.    Pollard.    '.>67, 

1(J84. 
New  Jersey  Steam   Xav.   Co.   v.   Mer- 
chants' Bank,  lOGT. 
New  .Tersey  &  N.  Y.  R.  Co.  v.  Young, 

1020. 
Newkirk  v.   Dalton,  12. 

V.  Sabler,   676. 
Newman  v.  Davis,  613. 

y.  Earl  of  Hardwicke,  122. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  85,  3.33.  429,  984, 

986,  987. 
V.  Stuckey,   212. 
New  Orleans  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Louis- 
iana   Light    &    Heat    Producing    & 
Manuf'g  Co.,  775. 
New  Orleans,  J.  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  All- 
britton,   1084. 
V.  Harrison,  901. 
V.  Hurst,  19,  903,  904. 
New  Orleans  :\[.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Han- 

ning,  229,  895. 
New  Orleans  Ry.  v.  Hm-st,  396. 
New   Orleans,    St.   L.   &  C.   R.   Go.   v. 
Bourke,  262. 
V.  Burke,  395. 
New  Orleans  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Schnei- 
der, 400,  964,  1089,  1090. 
New  Orleans  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Jopes, 
1091. 
T.  Thomas,  1080. 
New  Pittsburgh  Coal  &  Coke  Co.   v. 

Peterson,  1041,  1043. 
Newport  News  &  M.  "\'.  Co.   v.  Howe, 
197,  97.-..  1031. 
r.  United  States,   lO".".. 
Newport    News    &    M.    \.    R.    Co.    v. 
Campbell,  1010. 
V.  Dentzel's  Adm'r,  .^24.  1039. 
New  River  Co.  v.  Johnson.  758,  791 


Xewson  T.  Anderson,  661. 
V.  Pender,  781. 
V.  Railroad    Co..    971. 
Newton   v.   Central   Vermont   R.    Co., 
1090. 
V.  Harland,   688. 
V.  Locklin,  428. 
New  World,  The,  v.  King,  813,  lOS-J. 
New   York   Catholic  Protectory,   Mat- 
ter of.  689. 
New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Lockwood, 

818. 
New  York   Cent.    &  H.   R.  R.   Co.   v. 
City  of  Rochester,  176.  704.  795,  807. 
New    York,    C.    &    St.    L.    R.    Co.    v. 
Mushrush,  893,  942. 
V.  Zumbaugh,    928. 
New   York  El.    R.    Co.    v.   Fifth   Nat. 

Bank,   791. 
New  York  Filter  Co.  v.  Schwarzwald- 

e;,  357. 
New  York  Guaranty  Co.   v.   Gleason. 

41. 
New   York,    L.    E.    &    W.    R.    Co.    v. 
Bennett.    262.   1079. 
V.  Estill,    363,    378,    1076. 
V.  Leaman,   923. 
V.  Madison,   941. 
V.  Steinbrenner,  983. 
T.  AVinter's    Adm'rs,    1079. 
New  York  Lighterage  &  Trausp.  Co. 

T.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co..  64. 
New  York  P.   &  D.  Establishment  v. 

Fitch,  692. 
New    York    Rubber    Co.    v.    Rothery, 

756. 
New   York  &   B.   Sawmill  &  Lumber 

Co.   v.   City  of  Brooklyn,   181. 
New  York  &  C.   Ry.  Co.  v.  Schuyler. 

171. 
New  York  .V;  M.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Winans. 

237. 
New   York  &  N.  E.   R.   Co.   v.   Hvile. 

1039. 
New  Y'ork  &  X.  H.  R.  Co.  v.   Schuy- 
ler, 169. 
New  Y'ork  &   N.   J.  Tel.    Co.  v.   East 

Orange.  863. 
New  York  &  N.  Steamboat  Co.  v.  The 

Transfer  No.  4.  l.-|.  1044. 
New  York  &  T.  Land  Co.  v.  Gardner, 
673. 


1200 


CASES   CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pnges  1-G52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


New  York  &  T.  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Anderson, 

1023. 
New  York  &  W.  P.  Tel.   Co.  v.  Dry- 
burg,  287,  304,  900,  910. 
Xey  v.  Mumme,  733. 
Nichall  V.  Allen,  185. 
Nichol  V.   Martyn,   450. 
Nicholas  V.  New  York  Cent   Ry.  Co.. 

309. 
Niebolds  v.   Crystal  Plate-Glass  Co., 

401,   1015. 
Nicholl  V.  Glennie,  213. 
Niclaolls  V.  Bastard,  712. 
Nichols  V.  Boston,  797. 

V.  Chicago  &  W.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  1089. 

V.  City  of  Duluth,  7.j2. 

V.  City  of  Minneapolis,  174. 

V.  City  of  St.   Paul,  176. 

V.  Marsland,    836. 

V.  Newsom,  717. 

V.  Nowling,    216. 

V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  1079. 

V.  Winfrey,   333. 
Nicholson  v.  Getchell,  802. 

V.  Mounsey,   138,  252. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  404,  896. 

V.  Revill,  345. 
Nickerson  v.   Nickerson,   463. 

V.  Wheeler,    216. 
Nicklase  v.  Morrison,  704,  740. 
Nickleson    v.    Stryker,   452. 
Nicklin  v.  Williams,  335. 
Nicol  V.  Illinois  Cent.  E.  Co.,  688. 
Nicoll  V.  East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  R. 

Co.,   904. 
Nield  V.  London  &  N.  W.  R.'Co.,  186. 
Nieto  V.  Clark,  262. 
Niggli  V.   B'oehry,  311. 
Nigh  V.  Keifer,  627. 
Niles  V.   Edwards,   725. 
Nims  V.   Mt.    Hermon   Boys'    School, 

47,   188. 
Nisbet  V.  Patton,  732. 
Nisley  v.  Harrisburg.  P.,  Mt.  J.   &  L. 

R.   Co.,   689. 
Nissen  v.   Cramer,   526. 
Nitro-Glycerine  Case,  53,  66,  437,  811, 

867. 
Nitro-Phosphate   &    O.   C.   M.   Co.    v. 
London  &  St.  K.  Docks  Co.,  70,  840, 
844. 


Nixon    V.    Selby    Smelting   Lead    Co., 
1044,  1046. 

V.  Tynemouth    Union   Rural    San- 
itary Authority,  798. 

V.  Whitsett,  726. 
Nobelsville  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cause,  2(ju. 
Noble  V.  Adams,  728. 

V.  Manufacturing    Co.,    360. 

V.  St.  Joseph  &  B.  H.  St.  Ry.  Co., 
947,  1084. 
Noel  V.  Kaiper,  157. 
Noice  V.  Brown,  450. 
Nolan  V.  Jones,   163. 

V.  Manton,   297. 

V.  Nolan,   221. 
Nones  v.  Northouse,  406. 
Noonan  v.  City  of  Albany,  170,  T'A. 
Norbury  v.  Kitchin,   705. 
Norcross   v.   Otis    Bros.,    56,   S.j.   fins. 
633. 

V.  Thomas,   746. 

V.  Thoms,    745,   768. 
Nordheimer  v.   Alexander,  839. 
Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  V.  Adams,  loiw. 

V.  Briggs,  1018. 

V.  Burge,  817. 

V.  Draper,   362. 

V.  Galliher,   242,   424,   1086. 

V.  Groseclose's   Adm'r,  986. 

V.  Hoover,  869,  998,  1040. 

V.  McDonald's  Adm'r,   1022. 

V.  Phelps,    1053. 

V.  Thomas'  Adm'r,  999,  1052. 

V.  Ward,  997. 
Norling  v.  Allee,  828,  839. 
Norrell  y.  Vogel,  621,  622. 
Norrls  v.  Baker,  800. 

V.  Casel,  439. 

V.  Corkill,  220. 

V.  Litchfield,  191,   192,  879. 

V.  Norrls,  466. 

V.  Saxton,   878. 
Morristown  v.  Moyer,  400,  705. 
North  V.  Shearn,  89. 

V.  Smith,  878. 
Northam  v.  Bowden,  712,  715. 
Northampton    Co.    v.    Lafayette    Col- 
lege, 188. 
Northampton's    Case,    548. 
North    Baltimore    Pass.    K^.    Co.    y. 
Arnreich,  885. 


CASES    CITED. 


1201 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


North  Baltimore  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kas 

Kell,  1085. 
North  Birmingham  St.  R.  CVi.  v.  Cal- 

derwood,  975. 
North  British  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lloyd,  576. 
North  Carolina   v.  Temple,   113. 
North  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v.   Gast- 

ka,  25.S. 
North     Chicaso     RoUing-Mill    Co.    v. 

Johnson,  948,  978. 
North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Cook,  1090. 
V.  Cotton,  384. 
V.  Eldridgc,  904. 
V.  Hudson,  950. 
V.  Williams,  1081. 
Northtete  V.  Smith.  677. 
Northeastern   R.   Co.  v.   Barnett,  937. 

V.  Wanless,  573,  971. 
Northern  Belle,   The,   1068. 

V.  Robson,  1089. 
Northern   Cent.    R.   Co.   v.   O'Connor, 
1087. 
V.  State,  977. 
Northern  Pac.  Coal  Co.  v.  Richmond, 

1022,   1025.  1033. 
Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Austin,  884. 
V.  Babcock,  103. 
V.  Cavanaugh,  193,  1047. 
V.  Charless,  993,  1001,  1038. 
V.  Everett,  953.  1015. 
V.  Hambly,  1031,  1038,  1042.  1043, 

1049,    1056. 
V.  Herbert,    260,    999,    1007,    1009, 

1032,  1044. 
V.  Hussey,   354. 

V.  Lewis,  71,  670,  712,  S4.j,  926. 
V.  Mortenson,  954. 
V.  Nickels,  1001,  1019. 
V.  Peterson,  1041.  1046,  1047. 
V.   Smith,  1038. 
V.  Sullivan,  925-927. 
v.  Teeter,  954. 
V.  Whalen,  744.  785,  794. 
Northern  Transp.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  89, 

142,  143. 
Northington  v.  Faber,  714. 
North   Pennsylvania   R.   Co.   v.   Kirk. 
944. 
V.  Mahoney,  213. 
V.  Rehman,  723,  854. 
Northrop  v.  Hill,  340. 
Northrup  v.  Foot,  190. 

T.AW  OP  TORTS — 76 


Northrup  v.  ML(;ill,  360. 

V.  Trask,    7ii. 
North    Side    St    Ry.    Co.   v.    Tippins, 

936. 
Northwestern  Fertilizing  Co.  v.  Hyde 

Park,  140. 
Northwestern   Fuel   Co.   v.  Danielsoa, 

1050,   1052,   1053, 
Northwestern    Mut.    Life   Ins.    Co.    '- 

Elliott,  190. 
Northwestern   Transp.   Co.   v.   Boston 

Marine  Ins.  Co..  73,  77. 
Nortin  v.  Warner,  401, 
Norton  Y.  Ittner,  8ii2 

V.  Livingston,   499.   520. 
r.  Norton,  322,  324,   664 
V.  Scholefield,   708, 
V.  Sewall,  907. 
V.  AViswell,   331. 
Norwalk   Gas    Light   Co.   v.   Eorousb 

of  Norwalk,  229,  232,  233,  235. 
Norwood  V.  Raleigh  &  G.  R.  Co.,  8Sl, 

871,   884.  886. 
Nottlng  HiU,  The.  742 
Nounnan  v.  Sutter  County  Land  Co. 

592,  594. 
Nourse  v.  Packard,  :_;T0, 
Nowak  V.  Waller,  423. 
Nowlan  v.  Cain,  569, 
Noxon  V.  Hill,  124, 
Noyes  v.  Belding.  132. 
V.  Boscawen,  OSli. 
V.  Smith,  870,  1015. 
V.  Stillman,  797. 
V.  Ward,  704, 
V.  Wood,    1040,    ](I40, 
Xudd  V.  Wolls,  lues 
Nugent  V.  Levee  Com'rs,  126. 
V.  Smith,  66,  10(i2, 
V.  Vanderveer,  333. 
Null    V.    White   Water    Valley    Cai.ai 

Co.,   349. 
Nunnelly  v.  Southern  Iron  Co.,  173. 
Nussbaum  v.  Heilbron,  286. 
Nutt   V.    Southern    Pac.    R.   Co.,   9-!'j, 

1010. 
Nuttall  V.  Bracewell,  759. 
Nutter  V.  Ricketts.  719. 
Nutting  V.  Connecticut  Ry.  Co.,  10T2 
Nye  V.  ilerriam,  592,  593. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  1087. 
Nysewander  v.  Lowman,  898. 


1202  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


o 


Oakes  V.  Hill,  VAo. 

Y.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  1077. 

V.  Wood,  4.34. 
Oakland  City  A.  &  I.  See.  v.  Bingham, 

253.  274,  279. 
Oakland  R.  Co.  y.  Fieldinjj,  185,  186. 
Oakley  Mills  y.  Neese,  781. 
Obei-felder  v.  Kavanaugh,  707. 
Oberlander  v.  Spiess,  5G3. 
Obernatte  v.  Johnson,  629. 
O'Boyle  v.  Lehigh  Val.  Coal  Co.,  t>99, 

1045. 
O'Brien  v.  Barry,  610. 

v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  764. 

V.  Clement,  485,  521. 

V.  Cunard  Steamship  Co.,  914. 

V.  Loomis,  825. 

V.  Miller,  SSp. 

V.  People,  16G. 

T.  Railway  Co.,  320. 

V.  Rideout,  1040. 
O'Callaghan  v.  Bode,  894. 
Ocean  Grove  v.  Asbury  Park,  758. 
Ocean  Grove  C.  M.  Ass'n  v.  Commis-, 

sioners,  90. 
Ocean  Steamship  Co.  v.  Williams,  418. 
Ochscenheim  v.  Shapley,  265. 
( )'Connell  v.  Reg.,  638. 

v.  St.  Louis  Cable  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 
1084. 
O'Conner  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  831. 
O'Connor  v.  Andrews.  226,  839. 

V.  New  York  &  Y.  Land  Imp.  Co., 
399. 

V.  Sill,  501,  534. 
Odd   Fellows'   Savings   Bank  t.   Tur- 

man,   664,  673. 
Odell  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1017,  1051. 

y.  Schroeder,  174. 
(Jdiorne  v.  Bacon,  496. 

V.  Lyford,  668. 
Odlin  V.   Stetson,  911. 
Odom  V.  Weathersbee.  733. 
O'Donnell  v.  Allegheny  Valley  R.  Co., 
994,  1089. 

V.  Duluth,  S.  S.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  893. 

V.  Segar,  89. 
O'DriscoU  v.  Faxon,  869. 
Oellerich  v.  Hayes,  994. 
Ogden  v.  Olaycomb,  195,  196. 


Ogden  v.  Gibons,  398. 

V.  Turner,   502. 
Ogg  V.  Lansing,  188. 
Ogley  V.  Miles,  1022.  1023. 
O'Hagan  v.  Dillon,  3  05. 
O'Hare  v.  Jones,  167.  105. 
Ohio  Gas  Fuel  Co.  v.  Andrews,  186. 
Ohio  R.   Co.  v.  Sims,  264. 
Ohio  Val.  R.  Co.  v.  Watson's  Adm'r, 

951,  1080. 
Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  V.  Brown.  1087. 

V.  Dickerson,  399. 

V.  Dunbar,   1075. 

V.  Dunn,  999. 

V.  Heaton,  1009. 

V.  Hecht,  72. 

V.  Hill,  362,  884. 

V.  McDaneld,  862. 

V.  Neutzel,  339. 

V.  Pearcy,  990,  1045. 

V.  Selby,  300. 

y.  Simms,   893. 

V.  Stansberry,  1093. 

V.  Thillman,  412,  754. 

V.  Trapp,  667. 

V.  Wachter,  410.  791. 

V.  Yohe,  1066. 
Ohio  &  M.  R.  W.  Co.,  v.  Collam,  932, 

933,  1009. 
Ohlweiler  v.  Lohmann,  935. 
Oil  V.   Rowley,  677. 
Oil  City  Fuel  Supply  Co.  v.  Boundy, 

975. 
O'Keefe  v.  Brownell,  1046. 

V.  Chicago  R.  Co.,  979. 

V.  Railroad,  962. 
Old  Colony  R.  Co.  v.  Slavens,  216. 
Old  Dominion  S.  S.  Co.  v.  McKenna, 

649. 
Olds  y.  Chicago  Board  of  Trade,  717, 

729. 
Olesen  v.  City  of  Plattsmouth,  194. 
Olln  V.  Lockwood,  352. 
O'Linda  v.  Lothrop,  689. 
Oliphant  v.  Brearley,  381. 
Olive  v.  Van  Patten,  646,  650. 
Oliver  v.  Lavalle,  369. 

V.  Loftln,  800. 
v.  McClellan,  159. 

y.  Pate,  526. 

V.  Perkins,  24,  390. 

V.  Town,  72. 


CASES    CITED. 


1203 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue  ] 


Olmstead  v.  Doland,  418. 

V.  Ricli,  659. 

Olsen  V.  Upsahl,  682. 

Olson  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 

880. 

Y.  Neal,  618. 

v.  Orton,  598. 

V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  1040. 
V.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  1080. 
V.  Sharpless,  362. 
V.  Tvete,  608,  629. 
Omaha  Auction  &  Storage  Co.  v.  Rog- 
ers, 715,  717,  724. 
Omaha  Coal,  Coke  &  Lime  Co.  v.  Fay, 

388. 
Omaha  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cameron,  885. 

V.  Duvall,  861,  885. 
Omaha  &  N.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Janecek,  141. 
Omaha  &  R.  V.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Brady,  828, 
920,  955. 
V.  Cholette,  1084,  1093. 
v.  Clark,  828. 
V.  Clarke,  828. 
v.  Morgan,  211,  872,  955. 
v.  iloschel,  337. 
V.  Rybnrn,  361. 
O'Maley  v.  South  Boston  Gaslight  Co., 

201,  1025. 
O'Malley  v.  Dorn,  879. 

V.  St.  Paul,  Jl.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.,  830, 
948. 
O'Mellia  v.  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C. 

B.  R.  Co.,  1014. 
Onderdonk  v.  New  York  &  S.  B.  Ry. 

Co.,  1093. 
O'Neal  V.  Chicago  &  I.  C.  R.  Co.,  1015, 

1010. 
O'Neil  V.  Detroit,  176. 

V.  Dry-Dock,  E.   B.   &  B.    R.   Co., 

861. 
V.  Duluth,  S.  S.  &  A.  Ry.  Co.,  892. 
V.  liake  Superior  Iron  Co.,  318. 
V.  Town  of  Bast  Windsor,  879. 
crNeill  V.  .Johnson,  379,  609. 
Oneto  V.  Restano,  I'jO. 
Onslow  V.  Home,  488. 
Opdyke  v.  Weed,  512. 
Oppenheim  v.  Russell,  719. 
Oppenheimer   v.   Manhattan   Ey.    Co., 
424,  618. 
V.  United  States  Exp.  Co.,  305. 


Oppenlander  v.   Left-Hand  Ditch  Co., 

7."i0. 
Opsahl  V.  ,Tudd,  194. 
Orange  v.  Brown,  902. 
Orchard  Place  Land  Co.  v.  Brady,  754. 
Orcutt  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  1080. 
Ordway  v.  Ferrin,  680. 
Oreamuno  v.  Uncle  Sam  Co.,  91. 
O'Regan  v.  Cunard  S.  S.  Co.,  1079. 
Oregon  Ry.  Co.  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav. 

Co.,  565. 
Oregon  Ry.   &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Oregonian 

Ry.  Co.,  237. 
Oregon  Short  Line  &  U.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  1007. 
O'Reilly  v.  Shadle,  730. 
Orman  v.  Mannix,  1024. 
Orme  v.  Richmond,  170. 
Ormrod  v.  Huth,  566,  587, 
Ormsby  v.  Budd,  564. 

V.  Douglass,  541. 

V.  Union  Pac.  R.   Co.,  305. 
Orndorff  v.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  303. 
O'Rourke  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co., 
975. 

V.  -City-^f-Sioux  FaUs,  173. 
Orr  V.  Box,  131. 

V.  Garabold,  878. 

V.  Quimby,  136. 
Orsor  V.  Metropolitan  Cross  Town  R. 

Co.,  363. 
Orth  V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.   Ry.   Co., 

937. 
Orway  v.  Ferin,  128. 
Osborn  v.   Chicago  &   N.   W.   R.   Co., 
1067. 

V.  Francis,  4.53. 

V.  Potter,  708,  725,  726. 

V.  Veitch,  432,  434,  442. 
Osborne  r.  Gillett,  327,  328,  449,  450. 

V.  Knox  &  L.  R.  Co.,  991. 

V.  London  &  N.  AV.  R.  Co.,  373. 

V.  JIcMasters,    100,    274,    333,   907, 
924,  1013. 

V.  Morgan,  281,  290,  1037. 
Osburn  v.  Lovell,  414. 
Oscanyan  v.  Arms  Co.,  299. 
Osgood  V.  Bradley,  135. 

v.  Lewis,  559. 
O'Shaugnessy  v.  Baxter,  136. 

V.  Morning   Journal  Ass'n,   494. 


1204  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


O'Sbaugnessy  v.  New  Yark  Recorder 

Co.,  404,  507. 
O'Sliea  V.  Kirker,  342. 
Oskaloosa  College  v.   Western  Union 

Fuel  Co.,  693. 
Ostatag  V.  Taylor,  688. 
Osten  V.  Jerome,  762. 
Ostrom  V.  Calkins,  506. 
O'Sullivan   t.    New   York   El.   R.    Co., 

794. 
Oswald  V.  JIcGebee,  596. 
Oswalt  V.   Smith,  660. 
Ottawa    Gas   Light    &    Coke    Co.    v. 

Graham,  759,  814. 
Otterback  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  U.J5. 
Oullletts  V.  Overman  Wheel  Co.,  944. 
Over  V.  Schiffling,  548. 
Overby  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co., 

946,  975. 
Overbye  v.  JIcGee,  133. 
Overend  v.  Gm-ney,  329. 
Overland  Mail  &  Exp.  Co.  v.  Carroll, 

305. 
Overton  v.  Freeman,  238. 

V.  Rogers,  296. 
Owen  V.  Field,  683. 
V.  Foster,  667,  668. 
v.  Hyde,  702. 
Owens  V.  Ernst,  1006. 
V.  Lewis,  200. 
V.  Owens,  190. 

V.  People's  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  882. 
Owings  V.  Jones,  226,  796,  922,  928. 
Ownes  V.  Railroad  Co.,  943. 
Owsley  V.  Montgomery  R.  Co.,  168. 
Oxford  V.  Peter,  250,  258. 
Oxford  Lake  Line  Co.  v.  Stedham,  828. 
Oxley  v.  Railway  Co.,  904. 

V.  Watts,  680. 
Ozark  Land  Co.  v.  Leonard,  658. 


1* 


Pace  v.  Aubrey,  615. 

V.  Potter,  660. 
Pacific  Exp.  Co.  v.  Dunn,  669. 

V.  Foley,  304,  305. 

V.  Smith,  361. 

V.  Wallace,  306. 
Pacific  Ry.  Commission,  In  re,  115. 
Pacific  Tel.  Co.  v.  Underwood,  307. 


Pack  V.  City  of  New  York,  238. 
Packard  v.  Getman,  718,  727. 
Packer  v.  Heaton,  91. 
Paddock  v.  Somes,  392,  413,  762,  807. 

V.  Watts,  617,  621. 
Padelford  v.  Padelford,  702. 
Padmore  v.  Lawrence,  526,  539. 

V.  Piltz,   444. 
Page  V.  Branch,  703. 

V.  Bucksport,  69. 

V.  Gushing,  133,  632. 

V.  Fowler,  741. 

V.  Freeman,  342. 

V.  Mille  Lacs  Lumber  Co.,  786. 

V.  Parker,  55,  578,  640. 

V.  Robinson,  007. 

V.  Wiple,  606,  624. 
Paget  V.  Birkbeck,  212. 
Paige  V.  Roeding,  243. 
Paine  v.  Chandler,  759. 

V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  682. 

V.  Sherwood,  372. 
Paine  Lumber  Co.  v.  United  States, 

754. 
Painter  v.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  229. 

V.  Ives,  605,  631. 
Paiuton   v.    Northern  Cent.   Ry.   Co., 

994. 
Paland  v.  Chicago,  St.  L.  &  N.  O.  R. 

Co.,  1020. 
Palfrey  v.  Portland,  S.  &  P.  R.  Co., 

327. 
Palmer  v.  Adams,  523. 

v.  Atchison,    T.    &   S.    F.   R.   Co., 
1072. 

V.  Bates,  269. 

v.  Bell,  594,  595,  599. 

V.  Broder,  202,  621,  624. 

V.  Chicago,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  824. 

V.  Gallup,  81. 

V.  Hummerston,  199,  522. 

V.  McMaster,  132,  137. 

V.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  1039. 

V.  New  York  Cent.  &H.  R.  R.  Co., 
332. 

V.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  928. 

V.  Shenkel,  674. 

V.  Sutton,  522. 

V.  York  Bank,  414. 
Palmeri  v.   Manhattan  Ry.   Co.,  258, 

262,   279. 
Panama  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  723. 


CASES    CITED.  1205 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Pancost  V.  Bumell,  471. 

Pangburn  v.  Bull,  609. 

Pannell  v.  Nashville,  F.  &  S.  R.  Co., 

860. 
Pantam  v.  Isham,  840. 
Panton  v.  Holland,  55,  56,  89,  825. 

V.  People,   434. 
Pantzar  v.  Tilly  Foster  Iron  Jlin.  Co., 

1044. 
Pappa  V.  Rose,  118. 
Pareells  v.  City  of  Auburn,  9t;.'j. 
Paris  V.  Levy,  527,  529. 
Parish  v.  Kaspare,  683. 

V.  Williams,  859. 
Park  V.  Detroit  Free  Press  Co.,  521, 
533,  546. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  412. 
Parke  v.  City  of  Seattle,  751. 

V.  Kilham,  768. 
Parker  v.  Adams,  878,  977. 

V.  Barnard,  891,  922,  925. 

v.  Burgess,  383,   390,  391. 

V.  Catholic  Bishop,  792. 

V.  Elliott,  458. 

V.  Farley,  611,  618. 

V.  First  Ave.  Hotel  Co.,  750. 

V.  Firat  Nat.  Bank,  710. 

V.  Foote,  T.jO. 

V.  Goden,  719. 

V.  Grisvcold,  82,  84,  662. 

V.  Hotchkiss,  669. 

V.  Huntington,   611,    618,    637-639, 
649. 

V.  Knox,  898. 

V.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.   Co., 
392,  928. 

V.  Lombard,  736. 

T.  Meek,  454. 

V.  Moulton,  599. 

V.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.,  1009. 

V.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  942. 

V.  Portland  Pub.  Co.,  897. 

V.  Proprietors  of   Locks  and   Ca- 
nals, 732. 

V.  Rolls,  916. 

V.  Smith,  750. 

V.  Union  Woolen  Co.,  781. 

v.  Winnipiseogee  Lake  Cotton  & 
Woollen  Co.,  804. 
Parkes  v.  Prescott,  246,  251,  382,  491. 
Park  Hotel  Co.  v.  Loekhart,  1012. 
Parkhurst  v.  Ketchum,  474. 


Parks  V.  Newburyport,  763. 

V.  Rose,  951. 
Parlement  Beige,  The,  114. 
Parmeloe  v.  Loomis,  721. 

V.  McNulty,  1057,  1077. 
Parmiter  v.  Coupland,  .532,  536. 
Parmlee  v.  Adolph,  590. 
Parnaby  v.  Lancaster  Canal  Co.,  17(1, 

179,  185,  186. 
Parrat  v.  Carpenter,  490. 
Parjish   v.   Pensacola  &  A.    Ry.   Co., 

1000. 
Parrot  v.  Wells,  817,  872. 
Pm-rott  V.  Hartsfield,  1.32,  153. 

V.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  809. 

V.  New  Orleans  &  N.  E.    R.   Co., 
869. 
Parry  v.  Smith,  S.jO,  905. 
Parsons  v.  Brown,  688. 

V.  New   York    Cent.   &   H.   R.   R. 
Co.,  885. 

V.  Surgey,  534. 

V.  Sutton,  742. 

V.  Tuolumne    County    Water    Co., 
802. 

V.  Winchell,  395. 
Partlow  V.  Haggarty,  774. 
Pasley  v.  Freeman,  26,  40,  85,  558,  563. 

579,  587. 
Pasquini  v.  Lowry,  839.  ► 

Passenger  Ry.  v.  Young,  262. 
Pastene  v.  Adams,  206. 
Pastor  V.  Regan,  420. 
Patchell  V.  .faqua,  404. 
Pater  v.  Baker,  551-553. 
Patnode  v.  Warren  Cotton  Mills,  242. 
Patrick  v.  Colerick,  677,  685. 
Patten  v.  Belo,  549. 

V.  Gurney,  213. 

V.  Libbey,  384. 

V.  Rea,  252,  278. 

V.  Wiggen,  912,  913. 
Patterson  v.  Detroit,   L.  &  L.   N.   R. 
Co.,  922. 

V.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.,  412. 

V.  Hayden,  456,  460. 

V.  Marine  Nat.  Bank,  83. 

V.  Nutter,  444. 

V.  Pennsylvania    Reform    School, 
187. 

V.  Prior,  41. 

V.  Thompson,  452. 


1206 


CASi;S    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Patterson  v.  Tovvnsend,  862. 

V.  Westervelt,  81. 

V.  Wilkinson,  510. 

V.  Wriglit,  582,  583. 
Pattison  v.  Jones,  531,  543. 
Patureau  v.  McArdle,  700. 
Patzack  v.  Von  Gericliten,  123. 
Paul  V.  Prazier,  204. 

V.  Hazelton,  (iOO. 

V.  Hummel,  159. 

V.  Slason,  367. 

V.  Summei'hayes,  679. 
Paule  Y.  Florence  Jlin.  Co.,  1017. 
Pauley    v.    Steam-Gauge    &    Lantern 

Co.,  843,  921. 
Paull  V.  Halferty,  552. 
Pavitt  V.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  Co.,  300,  903. 
Pavlovski  v.  Thornton,  471,  479,  486. 
Pawson  V.  Watson,  503. 
Paxton  T.  Boyer,  53,  151. 
Payne  v.  Allen,  150. 

V.  Donegan,    609. 

V.  Halstead,    1085. 

V.  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R. 
Co.,  754. 

V.  Newcomb,  253. 

V.  Western  &  A.  R.   Co.,   5G,  146, 
169,  638,  043,   649. 
Payson  v.  Casewell,  618. 
Peabody  v.  Hayt,  18. 
Peacock  v.  Terry,  190. 
Peak  V.  Frost,  578. 

V.  Lemon,  222. 
Pearce  v.  Brower,  530. 

T.  Lemaitre,  519. 

V.  Needham,  423,  430. 
Pearl  v.  Walter,  591,  598. 
Pearman  v.  Peai'man,  463. 
Pearsall  v.   Western  Union  Tel.   Co., 

310. 
Pearsoll  v.  Chapin,  207. 
Pearson  v.  Cox,  374. 

V.  Lemaitre,  520. 

v.  Railway  Co.,  1055. 

V.  Sketton,  216. 

V.  Zehr,  694,  858. 
Pease  v.  Smith,  717. 
Peck  V.  Chouteau,  613. 

V.  Cooper,  246. ' 

V.  Elder,  794,  808. 

V.  Hutchinson,  912. 

V.  Lockridge,  733. 


Peck  V.  Martin,  913,  014. 
V.  Small,  629. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  2.13. 
Peekham  v.  Henderson,  800. 
Peddicord  v.  Kile,  688. 
Pcderson   v.   Seattle   Consol.   St.   Ry. 

Co.,  311,  318,  320. 
Pedley  v.  Jlorris,  528. 
Pedrick  v.  Porter,  578,  582. 
Peebles  v.  Patapsco  Guano  Co.,  169. 

V.  Railway,  737. 
Peek  y.  Derry,  569,  5S7,  589. 

V.  Gurney,  16,  563,  577,  579,  586. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  300,  301. 
Peoples  V.   New  Brunswick  &  A.   R. 

Co.,  202. 
Peet  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
929. 

V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  1069. 
Peigne  v.   Sutclife,  159,  163. 
Peil  V.  Reinhart,  224. 
Pekin  v.  Newell,  ISO. 
Pelton  y.  Schmidt,  891,  896. 
Peltz  V.  Eichele,  300. 
Pence  v.  Arbuckle,  42,  269. 

V.  Dozier,  204,  453.  454. 
Pendlebury  v.   Greenlialgh,  233. 
Penfield  v.  Sage,  740. 
Penn  v.  Preston,  672. 

y.  Ward,  434,  444. 
Pennington  v.  Meeks,  513. 

y.  Streight,  124. 

V.  Todd,  189. 

V.  Yell,  917. 
Pennoyer  y.  Allen,  749,  769,  775. 

V.  City  of  Saginaw,  764. 

y.  MeConnaughy,   113. 

y.  WiUis,  917. 
Pennsylvania  Coal  Co.  v.  Sanderson, 

757,  835. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St 
P.  R.  Co.,  338. 

y.  Congdon,  73,  1023. 

V.  Conlan,  945. 

y.  Davis,  331. 

V.  Dolan,   25,  313,  314. 

V.  EUett,  237. 

y.  Graham,  369. 

V.  Hensil,  920,  924. 

V.  Hoagland,  1090. 

V.  Horton,   924. 

v.  KUgore,   957. 


CASES    CITED.  1207 

[Vol.  1  comprisGS  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Langendorf,  969. 

V.  Marion,  400. 

V.  Myers,  822,  831. 

V.  Newmeyer,   998,   1081,   1090. 

V.  O'Shaughnessy,  819. 

V.  Philadelphia,  G.   &  N.  E.   Co., 
741. 

V.  Roney,  150,  969. 

V.  Roy,  241,  941. 

V.  Sears,  994. 

V.  Stoelke,  882,  944. 

V.  Toomey,  255. 

V.  Weddle,  169,  260. 
Pennsylvania  R.   Co.  v.  Angel,  143. 

V.  Aspell,  957. 

V.  Bell,  333. 

V.  Boyer,  99. 

V.  Dale,  406. 

V.  Ervin,  99. 

V.  Goodenough,  472. 

V.  Graham,  186. 

V.  Hope,  77,  375. 

V.  Horst,  951. 

V.  Jones,  1058. 

V.  Kerr,  72,  375. 

V.  Lippencott,  141,  143,  757. 

T.  Marchant,   757. 

V.  MUler,  301. 

V.  Ogier,  817,  971. 

V.  Parry,  1079. 

V.  Patterson,  186. 

V.  Price,  890. 

V.  Raiordon,  301. 

V.  Reed,  1081. 

V.  Smith,  825. 

V.  Stanley,  142. 

V.  Stewart,  1058. 

V.  Thompson,  144. 

V.  Vandiver,  108,  262. 

V.  Washburn,  970. 

V.  Zebe,  462,  1086. 
Pennsylvania  S.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Walsh, 

145. 
Pennsylvania  Tel.  Co.  v.  Vernau,  145. 
Penrose  v.  Curren,  103. 

V.  Nixon,  807. 
Penruddock's  Case.  412.  797. 
Pensacola  Gas  Co.  v.  Pebley,  756. 
Penton  v.  Brovyn,  675. 
People  V.  Bartels,  134. 

V.  Bell,   135. 


People    V.    Board    of    Assessors    of 
Brooklyn,  351. 

V.  Board  of  Health,  784,  789,  801. 

V.  Butler,  134. 

V.  Clark,   45tJ. 

V.  Oouner,  9. 

V.  Cunningham,  793. 

V.  Dann,  441. 

r.  Detroit     White     Lead     Works, 
744,  748,  709,  778,  799,  805. 

V.  Foss,  440. 

V.  Gleason,   118. 

V.  Kenyon,  ?.2~>. 

V.  Leland,  31!.j. 

V.  Lilley,  0,  433. 

V.  Maher,  793. 

V.  Mining  Co.,  81. 

V.  Morehouse,  9. 

V.  Musical  Mutual  Protective  Un- 
ion, 148. 

V.  Nevfton,  784. 

V.  New  York  Gas  Light  Co.,  186. 

V.  New  York  Law  School,  149. 

V.  Pearl,   443. 

V.  Pease,  135. 

V.  Queens  Co.  Com'rs,  184. 

V.  Roby,  253. 

V.  Rosenberg,  783. 

V.  Ryan,  9. 

V.  San  Francisco,   581. 

V.  State  Board  of  Canvassers,  135, 
351. 

V.  Vanderbilt,  349. 

Y.  Walsen,  11. 

V.  Willett,  903. 

V.  Winter,  463. 

V.  Wood,  898. 

V.  Yslas,  432. 
Peoples  V.  Yoakum,  206. 
People's  Ice  Co.  v.  Steamer  Excelsior, 

406. 
Peoria  v.  Simpson,  214. 
Peoria,  D.  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Ateu,  241. 

V.  Hardwick,  1010. 

V.  Rice,  967,  1039. 
Peppcorn    v.    City    of    Black    River 

Falls,  400. 
Perason  v.  Skelton,  216. 
Percival  v.  Harres,  579.  640. 

V.  Ilickey,  14,  17,  19. 
Peregoy  v.  Wheeler,  788. 


1J08 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  p;  ges  1-652,  inclusive;  toI.  2  the  residue.] 


Farez  v.  Rabaud,  22S. 

Pergerson  v.  Etchison,  .316. 

Porine  v.  Grand  Lodge,  A.  0.  U.  W., 

:iO. 
Ferionowsky  v.  Freeman,  913. 
Ppi-kins  V.  Ladd,  718. 

V.  Lockwood,  315. 

7.  Mari-s,  738. 

s'.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.,  395. 

7.  Mitchell,  115,  .107. 

7.  Railway  Co.,  45.  819. 

7.  Rogg,   643. 

7.  Smith,  286,  719,  735. 

7.  Stein,  58. 

V.  Vaughan,  398,  445. 
Perkinson  v.  Gilford,  329. 
Perley  v.  Eastern  R.  Co..  78.  843. 
Perminter  v.  Kelly,  286. 
Perring  v.  Harris,  79. 
Perrins  v.  Devendorf,  878. 
Perry  v.  Bangs,  921. 

Y.  Hamilton,   705. 

T.  House  of  Refuge,  126. 

7.  Lovejoy,  466. 

7.  Porter,  522. 

7.  Smith,  843. 

7.  Sulier,  623. 

T.  Sutley,  429. 
Person  v.  Wilson,  733. 
PeiTivian  G.  Co.  v.  Bockwoldt,  102. 
Peschel  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  1043,  1046. 
Pessini  v.  Wilkins,  331. 
Peteler  Portable  Ry.   Manuf'g  Co.  v. 
Northwestern      Adamant      Manuf'g 
Co.,  944. 
Feterkin  v.  Martin,  858. 
Platers  V.  Bourneau,  550. 

V.  Lake,  460,  465. 

T.  Land,  124. 

7.  Peters,  463. 

7.  Stanway,  421. 
Peterson  v.  HafEuer,  58,  159,  438. 

7.  Knoble,  253. 

7.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  861. 

7.  Toner,  607. 
Petit  V.  Mercer,  349. 
Petre  v.  Heneage,  730. 
Petrel,  The.  1036. 

P  -trie  V.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  Co..  817, 
^24. 


Petrie  v.  Lamont,  210. 

X.  Williams,  717,  738. 
Petsch  V.  Dispatch  Printing  Co.,  48.">, 

510. 
Pettibone  v.  Simpson,  489. 
Pettingill  v.  Rideout,  11. 
Pettit  V.  Addington,  392. 

V.  Cowherd,  658. 
PfeifCer  v.  Brown,  763. 
Pflngst  V.  Senn,  805,  806. 
Pfltzinger  v.  Dubs,  495. 
Phelin  v.  Kenderdine,  371,  455,  450, 
Phelon  T.  Stiles,  256. 
Phelps  V.  Delmore,  724,  731. 

V.  Nowlen,  56,  557,  645,  758,  773. 

V.  Smith,  564. 

V.  Stearns,  127,  128. 

V.  Wait,  289. 

V.  Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co..  950. 
Philadelphia  v.  Masonic  Home,  188. 
Philadelphia   Co.   v.    Central   Traction 

Co.,  283. 
Philadelphia  C.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hassard, 

1091. 
Philadelphia  R.  Co.  v.  Harper,  1063. 
Philadelphia  Traction  Co.  v.  Lightcap, 

829. 
Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Bran- 
nen,  260. 

V.  Hogeland,  982,  983. 

V.  Keenan,  994. 

V.  Larkin,  442. 

V.  Lehman,  1076. 

V.  Philadelphia  &  H.  de  G.  Steam 
Towboat  Co.,  14,  98,  194. 

V.  Quigley,  169. 

V.  Stibbing,  935. 
Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson, 
1085. 

V.  Boyer,  919. 

V.  Derby,  168,  259,  279,  903,  1082. 

V.  Ervin,  919. 

V.  Hendrickson,  965. 

V.  Hummell,  195. 

V.  Smith,  747.  796.  961. 
Philips  V.  Hoyle,  459. 
Phillip  Best  Brewing  Co.  v.  Pillsbury 

&  Hurlbut  Elevator  Co.,  725. 
Phillippi  V.  Wolff,  472. 
Phillips  V.  Barnet,  217,  463. 

V.  Berryman,  324. 


CASES    CITf^D.  12Uy 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Phillips  V.  Brigham,  725. 

V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.   Co., 
1034. 

V.  Clagett,  311. 

v.  Covell,  G91. 

V.  Dewald,  SSo. 

V.  Dickerson,  3f.S,  37U,  377. 

V.  Eyre,  11.  102. 

V.  Fadden,  42S. 

V.  HaU,  662. 

V.  Hoefer,  506. 

V.  Homfray,  329. 

V    Iloyle,  369.  4.">9. 

V.  Humfray,  2'JT. 

T.  .Tansen,  480,  603. 

T.  Kelly,  195. 

V.  Library  Co.,  886. 

V.  London  &  S.  W.  R.  Co..  404. 

T.  Terry,  412. 

V.  Village  of  Kalamazoo,  61S. 

V.  Wilpers,  196. 
Philo  V.  Butterfield,  2.j3. 
Philp  V.  Squire,  449,  4i;7. 
Philpot  V.  Kelley,  725,  727,  7;;0. 
Philpott  V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.,  334. 
Phinizy  v.   City  Council   of  Augusta, 

772,  840. 
Phipl  V.  Sauire,  449. 
Phoenix  v.  Cln.rk,  704.  ' 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Erie  &  W.  Trausp. 

Co.,  300. 
Phoenix  Pot  Works  v.   Pittsburgh  & 

L.  E.  R.  Co.,  301. 
Picard  v.  McCormack,  oSO. 
Pickard  v.  Collins.  767.  779. 

V.  Smith,  235,  895. 
Pickens  v.   Dieeker,  250,  256. 
Pickering   v.   Barclay,    1063. 

V.  Busk,    2G'.i. 

V.  Dawsou,  575. 

T.  Rudd,  661. 

T.  Truste,  743. 
Pickert  v.  Rugg,  741. 
Pickett,   Ex  parte,  351. 

V.  Pearson,  48. 

T.  Wallace,  121. 
Pidcock  V.  Harrington,  359. 
Piedmont  Manuf 'g  Co.  v.  Columbia  & 

G.  R.  Co..  306. 
Piedmont  &  0.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McKenzie, 
70,  827. 


Piepgras  r.  Edmunds,  674. 
Pierce  v.  Cunard  Steamship  Co.,  973, 
975. 

V.  Ellis,    534. 

V.  GetcheU,   135. 

V.  Hilton,   326. 

V.  Hosmer,  676. 

V.  Jackson,  131,  132. 

Y.  Michel,  68. 

V.  Railway  Co.,    lO.jo. 

V.  Thompson,   613. 

V.  Vandyke,  G82. 

V.  Wilson,  596. 

Y.  Winsor,    872, 
Pierey  v.  Averill,  129. 
Pierre  v.  Fernald,   750. 
Pierson  v.  Glean,  797. 

V.  Post,   659. 
Piette  V.  Bavarian  Brewing  Co.,  228. 
Piggott  V.  Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co., 

950. 
Pike  V.  Eddy,  858. 

V.  Grand-Trunk  Ky.  Co.,  77. 

V.  Hanson,  421. 

v.  Megoun,  120,    135. 

V.  Van  Wormer,  509. 
Pilcher  v.  Hart,  777. 

V.  Levino,  579. 

V.  Rawlins,    655. 
Piles  V.  Hughes,  939. 
Pill  V.    Brooklyn  Heights   R.  Co.,  363. 
Pillott  V.  Wilkinson,  G.">5,  728,  730. 
Pillow  V.  Bushnell,  445. 
Pillsbury  v.  Moore,   797. 
Pinchin  v.  London  &  B.  Ry.  Co.,  661. 
Pindar  v.  Wadsworth,  82,  366. 
Pine  V.   St.  Paul  City  Ry.   Co.,  1079. 
Pine  Blutf  Water  &  Light  Co.  v.  Der- 

reuisseaux.   887. 
Pingree  v.  Coffin,  111. 
Pinkerton  v.    Gilbert,   423. 

V.  Verberg,  429. 
Pinkston  v.  Arrington,  917. 
Piunel's  Case,  315. 
Pinney  t.   Berry,  390,  412. 
Piollet  V.   Simmers,   194,   828,   936. 
Piper  V.  Cambria  Iron  Co.,  963. 

V.  Minneapolis  St.  Ry.  Co.,  968. 

V.  Pearson,   122,  123. 

V.  Pueblo  City  Ry.  Co.,  861. 

T.  Woolman,  322,  508,  539. 


1210  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-052,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  rosiilue.] 


Pippin  V.   Sheppard,  910. 
Pitcher  v.  Lake  Shore  &  il.  S.  R.  Co., 
1080. 

V.  People's  St.  Ky.,  1082. 
Pitfoi'd   V.    AnnstroDg,   441. 
Pitlock   T.  Wells,   727. 
Pitt  V.   Donovan,  552,  553. 

V.  Yalden,   915. 
Pittard   v.    Oliver,   479. 
Pittsburg,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.   Co.  v. 

Burton,  883,  884. 
Pittsburg,   Ft.   W.   &   G.   Ky.   Co.   v. 

Powers,   1001. 
Pittsburgh  v.  Grier,  27,  70,  186. 
Pittsburgh,  C,  C.  it  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Henderson,   279. 

V.  Judd,   831. 

v.  Racer,   1067. 

v.  Russ,  396,  1079. 
Pittsburgh,    C.   &    St.   L.    Ry.   Co.    v. 
Adams,   1025. 

V.  Bennett,   943. 

V.  Kirk,  253,  260. 

V.  Nelson,  847. 

V.  Shields,    170. 

V.  Spencer,  564. 

V.  Williams,  1085. 

V.  Yundt,  882. 
Pittsburgh,   Ft.  W.   &  G.   Ry.   Co.   v. 
Cheevers,   787. 

V.  Maurer.   279. 

V.  Vining's  Adm'r,  984. 
Pittsburgh  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Pillow,  1092. 
Pittsburg  &  L.   E.   R.  Co.   v.   Heulv, 

1022. 
Pixley  V.  Reed,  611. 
Place  V.  Minster,  638. 

V.  Taylor,  124. 
Planck  V.  Anderson,  83. 
Planz  V.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  196, 198, 

263,  1082. 
Piatt  V.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry. 
Co..  870. 

V.  Niles.  418. 

V.  Tuttle,  709,  723. 
Platte  &  D.  Canal  &  Milling  Co.   v. 

Dowell,  924,  988. 
Platz  V.  Cohoes,  194. 
Playford  v.  United  Kingdom  Electric 

Tel.   Co.,   900. 
Pleasants   v.   Fant,   951. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  371. 


Plevin  V.   Heushall,  743. 
Plucknett   v.  Tippey,    416. 
Pluckwell  Y.   Wilson,   879. 
Plumb  v.  Ives,  398. 
Plumer  v.  Harper,  796,  797. 

v.  Smith,  12. 
Plumleigh  v.  Dawson,   82. 
Plummer  v.   Dill,   891,   894,    896,  897. 

v.  Webb,  327,  450. 
Plymouth,   The,  15. 
Plympton  v.  Dunn,  559. 

V.  Hall,  30. 
Pocock  r.   Moore,  421. 
Poepers  v.  Railway  Co.,  72. 
Poeppers    v.    Missouri,    K.    &    T.    R. 

Co.,  375. 
Poindexter  v.  Greenhow,  111. 

V.  Henderson,    705. 
Pokrok  Zapadu  Pub.   Co.  v.  Zizkovs- 

ky,  503,  513,  525,  536. 
Poland   V.    Brownell,    594. 
Polhill  v.  Walter,  562,  563. 
Poling  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  244,  893. 
Pollard  v.  Lyon,  490. 

V.  Photogi-aphic  Co.,  147. 
PoUasky  v.  Minchener,  540,  541. 
PoUett  v.  Long,  835. 
PoUey  v.  Lenox  Iron  Works,  735. 
Pollock  V.  Gantt,  388. 

v.  Pollock,  461. 
Polock  V.  Pioche,  70. 
Pomeroy  v.  Benton,  597. 
Pomfret  v.  Ricroft,  678,  690. 
Pomfrey     v.     Village     of      Saratoga 

Springs,  129. 
Pontiac  v.   Cortes,   85. 
Pontifex  v.  Midland  R.  Go.,  29,  903. 
Poole   v.    Consolidated    St.    Ry.    Co., 
1088. 

v.  Georgia    Railroad    &    Banking 
Co.,  1090. 

V.  (.^ist,  292. 

V.  Huskinson,  689. 
Pooler  V.   Reed,   443. 
Poor  V.    Poor,   463. 

V.  Sears,   225.   980. 
Pope  v.  Benster,  361. 

V.  Boyle,  224. 

v.  Pollock,   607,   609. 

V.  United  States,  112. 
Popham  V.  Pickburn,  533,  537. 
Popplewell  T.  Pierce,  866. 


CASES  citp:d. 


1211 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Porter  v.  Dunn,   472, 

V.  Fletcher,  D9G-598. 

V.  Hikletirand,  902. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  263,  337,  405. 

V.  Thomas,    56,    287. 

V.  Waters-Allen  Foundry  &  Jliich. 
Co.,   167. 
Forth  V.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  S03,  S(i4. 
Portman  v.  City  of  Decorah,  97.5. 
Portuense.  The,  300. 
Posnett  V.  Marble,  512,  540. 
Post  V.  Stockwell,  214. 

V.  United  States  Exp.  Co.,  878. 
Postlewaite  v.  Postlewaite,  469. 
Post   Pub.    Co.   V.   Hallam,    396,    498, 
518,  536.   549. 

r.  Moloney,   502,   536-538. 
Pott  V.  Altemus,  357. 
Potter  V.   Cassleton,   176. 

v'.  Faulker,  992. 

V.  Faulkner,  1035. 

V.  Gjertsen,  606. 

V.  Lambie,  604,  670. 

V.  The  Majestic,  308,  1079. 

V.  Mellen,  367. 

V.  Metropolitan  Dist.  Ry.  Co.,  329. 

V.  Moran,  878. 

V.  New    York   Cent.    &   H.    R.    R. 
Co.,  1043. 

V.  Warner,   914,  970. 
Potts  V.  Dutton,  917. 

V.  Imlay,   607,  608,  633. 

V.  Quaker  City  El.  R.  Co.,  689. 
Pottstown    Gas   Co.    v.    Murphy,    756, 

757,  759,  814. 
Potulni  V.  Saunders,  2.j3,  414. 
Pouilin  V.  Canadian  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  262. 
Poulin  V.  Canadian  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  1080. 
Poulton  V.  Railway  Co.,  2.j3,  2.54,  279. 
Pounder  V.  North  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  1092. 
Pow  V.  Beckner,  428. 
Powell  V.  Bentley  &  Gerwig  Furniture 
Co.,  805. 

V.  Butler,  759. 

V.  Chesire,  701. 

V.  Fall,  141,  791,  841.  S44,  866. 

V.  Fletcher,  593. 

V.  Gagnon,  724. 

V.  Hoyland,  205. 

V.  Hurt,  206. 

V.  Hyland,  728. 

V.  Mills,  1065. 


Powell  V.  Railroad  Co.,  301,  336,  698, 
704,  805,  806,  1075. 

V.  Rees,  41,  329. 

V.  Sattler,  731. 

V.  Sims,  7.j0. 

V.  Virginia  Const.  Co.,  228. 
Powell  Duffryn  Steam  Coal  Co.  v.  Taft" 

Vale  Ry,  Co.,  358. 
Power  V.  Baker,  214,  342,  343. 

V.  Borough  of  Ridgway,  182. 

V.  Klein,  691. 
Powers,  In  re..  428. 

V.  Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  849. 

V.  City  of  Boston,  177,  870. 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  175. 

V.  Council  Bluffs,  336,  410. 

V.  Fowler,  572,  592-595. 

V.  Harlow,  830,  895. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  872,  1010. 
Powles  V.  Hider,  241,  1058. 
Powys  V.  Blagrave,  697,  704. 
Pozzi  V.  Shipton,  1059, 
Praeger  v.  Bristol  &  E.  R.  Co.,  971. 
Pratt  V.  Andrews,  550. 

V.  Brown,  424,  425. 

V.  Gardner,  118. 

V.  Philbrook,  590,  592. 

V.  Pioneer  Press  Co..  .536. 

V.  Press  Co.,  400,  500,  508. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  1072,  1074. 
Pratt  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Brawley,  988. 
Pray  v.  Jersey  City,  185. 
Prendergast  v.  Dispatch  Printing  Co,, 

510. 
Prendible V.Connecticut  River  Manuf'g 

Co.  945,  997,  1022,  1041,  1046. 
Prentice  v.  Village  of  Wellsville,  848. 
Prentiss  v.   Kent  Furniture  Manuf'g 
Co.,  863,  1025. 

v.  Shaw,  446. 
Prerogative,  Case  of,  149. 
Presby  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.,  828. 
Prescott  V.  Duquesne,  186. 

V,  Tousey,  480. 

V,  Wright,  718, 
Prescott  cfe  A.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rees,  079, 
President,  etc,  of  City  of  Cincinnati  r. 

White,  764. 
President,   etc.,  of  Franklin   Bank  v, 

Harris.  741. 
President,  etc.,  of  Yale  College  v.  San- 
ger, 113. 


1212 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pagvs  l-Go2,  inolusiYe;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Presnall  v.  Raley,  654. 

Press  Co.  v.  Stewart,  522,  534. 

Press  Pub.  Co.  v.  McDonald,  396,  500, 

.118,  549. 
Preston  v.  Chicago  &  W.  M.  Ry.  Co., 
998. 

V.  Grant,  315. 

V.  Mercer,  663. 

V.  Prather,  819,  901. 

V.  Smith,  705. 
Pretty  v.  Bickmore,  225,  226,  229. 
Prewitt  V.  Eddy,  870. 
Price  v.  Baldauf,  357. 

V.  Barker,  346. 

V.  Conway,  512. 

V.  Crofts,  603. 

V.  Graham,  418. 

V.  Grantz,  368. 

V.  Harris,  214. 

V.  Hewitt,  164. 

V.  Lawson,  756. 

V.  Oakfield  Highland  Creamery  Co., 
805. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  922. 

V.  Seele}^  427. 

V.  Wliiteley,  405. 
Prickett  v.  Greatrex,  56. 
Prideaux  v.  City  of  Mineral  Point,  983. 
Priestly  v.  Fowler,  1029,  1053. 
Prime  v.  Eastwood,  497. 
Primrose  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  302,  304. 
Prince  v.  Case,  684. 

V.  City  of  Lynn,  176. 

V.  I.  G.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  191. 
Prindle  v.  Haight,  445. 
Pringle  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 

990. 
Printup  V.  Patton,  186,  211,  212,  945. 
Pritchard  v.  Hewitt.  403. 
Proctor  V.  Adams,  678. 

V.  Cole,  707. 

V.  Harris.  765. 

V.  ilcCord,  592. 

V.  Webster,  530. 
Proprietor  of  Maine  Wharf  v.  Proprie- 
tors of  Custom  House  Wharf,  806. 
Proprietors,  etc.,  of  Merrimack  River 

V.  Lowell,  176. 
Proprietors,   etc.,   of   Quincy  Canal   v. 

Newcomb,  9. 
Prosser  v.  Callis,  496,  508,  510. 
Prothro  v.  Citizens'  St.  Ry.  Co.,  1091. 


P  rough  V.  Entriken,  619. 
Providence  v.  Clapp,  177. 
Providence  Ins.  Co.  v.  Morse,  300. 
Prudential  Assm-.   Co.   v.   Aetna    Life 
Ins.  Co.,  582. 

V.  Knott,  353. 
Prue  V.  New  York,  P.  &  B.  R.  Co.,  78. 
Pruner  v.  Pendleton,  769. 
Pryce  V.  Belcher,  88. 
Pugh  V.  Calloway,  707. 

V.  Griffiths,  675. 
Pullen  V.  Glidden,  615,  621. 
Pulling  V.  Great  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  329. 
Pullman  v.  Barker,  377. 

V.  Hill,  481,  482,  530. 
Pullman  Palace-Car  Co.  v.  Bales,  470. 

V.  Gavin,  244,  1058. 

v.  Laack,  68,  1004,  1006,  1052. 

V.  Lowe,  902. 

V.  Martin,  1058. 

V.  Mathews,  244. 

V.  Smith,  1058. 

V.  Trimble,  1090. 
Pulteney  v.  Shelton,  353. 
Pumpelly  v.  Green  Bay,  143,  177. 
Pundeman  v.  St.   Charles  Co.,  182. 
Purcell  V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  393. 

v.  St.  Paul  Ry.  Co.,  72. 

V.  Sowler,  533. 
Purdy  V.  Rome,  W.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  303. 
Pursell  V.  Horn,  437. 

V.  Horne,  434. 
Purtell  V.  Jordan,  862. 
Purton  V.  Honnor,  60S. 
Purves  V.  Landell,  916,  917. 
Putnam  v.  Payne,  153. 

V.  Wyley,  190,  664. 
Putney  v.  Day,  683. 
Pye  V.  Faxon,  234. 
Pyne  v.  Dor.  710. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  883. 


Q 


Quackenbush  v.  Wisconsin  &  M.   R. 

Co.,  922. 
Quarman  v.  Burnett,  230,  236. 
Quartz   Hill   Consol.    G.   Min.    Co.    v. 

Eyre,  606-608. 
Queen,  The,  1041. 
Queen  v.  Bradford  Nay.  Co.,  844. 


CASES    CITKD. 


i2ia 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Queen  v.  Brewster,  792. 

V.  Commissioners  of  the  Land  Tax 

for  Barnwell,  351. 
V.  Cooper,  491. 
Y.  Kenrlck,  (U'J. 
V.   Lesley.  427. 
Queen  of  I'acitli;,  The,  003. 
Quested  v.   Xewburyport  &  A.  H.  R. 

Co.,  237. 
Quick  V.  Miller,  221. 

V.  Minnesota  Iron  Co.,  1017. 
Qullty  V.  Battle,  220,  222,  8.16. 
Quin  V.  Moore,  3C6,  907,  008. 
Quinby  v.  Slipper,  354. 

V.  Tribune  Co.,  399,  545,  54R. 
Quincy  Horse  Ry.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Gnuse, 

8G2. 
Quinn  v.  Complete  Electric  Const.  Co., 
243. 
V.  Donovan,  914. 
V.  Gross,  338. 
V.  Hcisel,  427,  428. 
V.  New     Jersey     Lighterage     Co., 

1046. 
V.  New  York,  N.  H.  i&  H.  R.  Co., 

333. 
V.  Power,  253,  260,  278,  279. 
V.  Scott,  530,  547. 
V.  Van  Pelt,  361. 
Quirk   V.    St.    Louis    United   Elevator 
Co.,  875. 
V.  Thomas,  189. 


R 


Uaasch  v.  Dodge  Co.,  185. 

Rabe  v.  Hanna,  466. 

Race  V.  Union  Ferry  Co.,  1088. 

RadcllfC  V.  Evans,  387. 

Radclife's  Ex'rs  v.  Brooklyn,  89,  141- 

143,  777. 
Radenburst  v.  Coate,  775. 
Radley    v.    London    &    Northwestern 

Ry.  Co.,  074,  976,  977. 
Radway  v.  Briggs,  186. 
Ragon  V.  Railway  Co.,  993,  1017. 
Ragsdale  v.  Williams,  718. 
Hail  V.  Potts,  135. 
Itailroad  Co.  v.  Alabama,  112. 
V.  Androscoggin  Mills,  1071. 
V.  Aspelle,  1090. 


Railroad  Go.  v.   Forsyth,   1U72. 

V.  Fort,  1008,  1004. 

V.  Fraloff,   1060. 

V.  (.Jladmon,  101,  Ml'. 

V.  Greenwood,  040. 

T.  Lockwood,  300,  308,  1047,  1082. 

V.  Manufacturing  Co.,  1072. 

T.  ilitchell,  1085. 

Y.  O'Donnell,  1065,  1006. 

V.  Pratt,  1074. 

Y.  Qnigley,  396. 

V.  Reese,  20.8. 

V.   Reeves,  (;:i,  1061,  1062. 

V.  Stort,  830. 

T.  Stout,  872. 

V.  Walker,  930. 
Railsback  t.  President,  etc.,  of  Wayne 
County  Turnpike  Co.,  1003. 

Y.  Railsback,  408. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hicks,  831, 

V.  Hopkins,  235,  837. 

V.  Hutchins,  738. 

V.  Richardson,  845. 

V.  Ryan,   168. 

V.  Shields,  205. 

V.  Spangler,  302. 

Y.  Stephens,  1083. 

Y.  Valleley,  333. 

V.  Wilcox,  985. 

V.  AA^ynn,  1057. 
Rainbow  v.  Benson,  530. 
Rainey  v.  Herbert,  794. 

V.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
920,  925,  926. 
Rains  v.  Simpson,  123. 
Raley  v.  Williams,  'M'l. 
Ramsdell  v.  Tama  Water  Power  Co.. 

3.54. 
Ramsden  v.  Railway,  168,  260. 
Ramsey  v.  Cheek,  60. 
Randall   v.    Baltimore    &   O.    R.    Co., 
1030,  1039. 

V.  Brigham,  121,  123,  527. 

V.  Buffington,  89. 

V.  Cleveland,  703. 

V.  Evening  News  Ass'n,  512,  519. 

V.  Frankford  &  S.  P.  C.  P.  R.  Co., 
1092. 

V.  Hamilton,  526,  528,  532. 

V.  Hazelton,  88,  602. 

V.  New  Orleans  &  N.  B.  R.  Co., 
1079. 


1214 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Randall  v.  Persons,  352. 

V.  Roper,  586. 

V.  Sanderson,  750. 
Randleson  v.  Murray,  243. 
Randolph  v.  O'Riordon,  879,  983. 

V.  Town  of  Bloomfield,  808. 
Ranger  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  169. 
Rank  V.  Rank,  71:2. 
Rankin  v.  Crane,  617-619,  627. 
Ranlett  v.  Blodgett,  133. 
Ranney  v.  People,  583. 
Ransier  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry. 

Co.,  1052. 
Ransom  v.  State,  190. 
Ranson  v.  Kitner,  50. 

V.  McCurley,  505,  519,  520. 
Raphael  v.  Pickford,  1068. 
Rapho  Tp.  V.  Moore,  185. 
Rapier  v.  London  Tramways  Co.,  144, 

791. 
Rapson  v.  Curbitt,  238,  241. 
Rascher  v.  East  Detroit  &  G.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  886,  940. 
Ratcliffe  V.  Burton,  674,  075. 

V.  Evans,  486,  497,  508. 
Rathbone  v.  Railway  Co.,  300,  305. 
Rathke  v.  Gardner,   762. 
Ratte  V.  Dawson,  831. 
Ran,  Appeal  of,  292. 
Ranch  v.  Lloyd,  194. 
Ravenga  v.  Mackintosh,  619,  621, 
Rawbotham  v.  Jones,  794. 
Jlawley  v.  Colliau,  994,  1053. 
Rawlings  v.  Till,  434,  438. 
Rawson  v.  Harger,  578. 
Rawston  v.  Taylor,  761. 
Ray  V.  Law,  608. 

V.  Tubbs,  159,  163. 
Raymond  v.  Andrews,  687. 

V.  Belles,  118. 

V.  Hodgson,   962. 
Rayner  v.  Mitchell,  278. 

V.  Nugent,  683. 
Raynsford  v.  Phelps,  129,  136. 
Rea  V.  Harrington,  497. 

V.  Tucker,  204,  401,  460,  466. 
Read  v.  Bishop,  13. 

V.  Boston  C&  A.  R.  Co.,  194. 

V.  Coker,  431,  432,  442. 

V.  Hudson,  506. 

V.  Jeffries,  297. 

V.  Morse,  842. 


Read  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  843. 

V.  Spaulding,  66,  1062,  1089. 
Reade  v.  Sweetzer,  536. 
Readhead  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.,  1058. 

1083. 
Reading  v.  Commonwealth,  791. 

V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  469. 

v.  Royston,  672. 
Reading  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Ritchie,  933. 
Reagan  v.  Casey,  232,  241,  1035. 
Reams  v.  Paneoast,  200. 
Reardon  v.  Jlissouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co..  871. 

V.  Thompson,  890,  891. 
Re'arick  v.  Wilcox,  537. 
Receivers  of  Houston  &  T.  C.  Ry.  Co. 

V.   Stewart,   260,  205. 
Receivers  of  International  &  G.  N.  Ry. 

Co.  V.  Armsti'ong,  945,  1080. 
Receivers  of  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co. 

V.  Olive,  1069. 
Rector  v.  Clark,  125. 

V.  Smith,  526,  527. 
Reddie  v.  Scoolt,  204. 
Redding  v.  Godwin,  602. 

V.  Wright,  579,  506-598. 
Redemtorlst,  The,  v.  Wenig,  693. 
Redgrave  v.  Hurd,  593,  599,  815.    . 
Redigan  v.  Boston  &  M.  B.  Co.,  893, 

897. 
Redman  v.  Forman,  758. 

V.  Stowers,  625. 
Redmond  v.  Petei-son,  30. 
Red    River    Line   v.    Cheatham,    875, 

1016. 
Redway  v.  McAndrew,  606,  607. 

V.  Moore,  745,  786. 
Reed  v.  Chilson,  322. 

V.  City  of  Birmingham,  337,  783, 
793. 

V.  City  of  Madison,  174,  176,  872. 

V.  Conway,  118,  128. 

V.  Covington  &  C.  Bridge  Co.,  964. 

V.  Edwards,  856. 

V.  Harper,  166. 

V.  Home  Savings  Bank,  168,  169. 

V.  Inhabitants   of  Northfield,  774. 

V.  McRill,  707,  733. 

v.  Northrup,  283. 

V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  972. 

V.  Reed,  468. 

V.  State,  432. 

V.  Taylor,  607. 


CASES    CITED,  1215 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-G52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Reeder  v.  Puidy,  468,  688,  692. 
Reeder   Bros.    Shoe   Co.   v.   Frylinski, 

352. 
Reedie  v.  Railway  Co.,  230,  236. 
Reens  v.  Mail  &  Exp.  Pub.  Co.,  241, 

878,  883. 
Reese  v.  Hershey,  1006,  1010. 
Reese    River    Silver    Jlining    Co.    v. 

Smith,  564, 
Reeve  v.  Dennett,  580,  591. 

V.  Fox,  717. 
Reeves  v.  State,  10,  59. 
Reg.   V.    Brangan,   619. 

V.  Coghlan,  501. 

V.  Cotesworth,   437. 

V.  Delamere,  186. 

V.  Desmond,  474. 

V.  Elliott  Leigh  &  Co.,  770. 

V.  .Tackson,  463. 

V.  JIcDonald,  164. 

V.  Metropolitan  Board  of  Works, 
791. 

V.  Pargeter,  1085. 

V.  Pamell,  638,  642. 

V.  Peck,  042. 

V.  Pratt,  690. 

V.  Riley,  661. 

V.  St.  George,  433. 

y.  United  Kingdom   Electric  Tel. 
Co.,    745,    770,    863. 
Regan,  v.  Luthy,  699. 
Regina  v.  Ashwell,  657. 
Regnier  v.  Cabot,  547. 
Rehm  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  956. 
Reich  V.  Union  Ry.  Co.,  949. 
Reiehel  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R. 

Co.,  1000. 
Reiehla  v.  Gruensfelder,  1011. 
Reid  V.  Cowduroy,  595. 

V.  Evansville  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.,  63. 

V.  Fairbanks,  739,  742. 

v.  Gifleord,  794. 

V.  Hood,  117. 

v.  Humber,  287. 

V.  McLendon,  553. 
Reifsnyder  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.,  861,  892,  946. 
Reilly  v.  Campbell,  1008,  1010. 

V.  Philadelphia,  181. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  198. 

V.  Thompson,  671. 


Reiiihardt  v.  Mentasti,  775. 
Reinke  v.  Bentley,  370. 
Reinmiller  v.  Skidmore,  682. 
Reisan  v.  Mott,  614,  629. 
Reiser  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  1000. 
Reisert  v.  Williams,  1005. 
Reiss,  Succession  of.  447. 

V.  Xew  York  Steam  Co.,  850. 
Reitan  v.  Goebel,  505. 
Relyea  v.   Kansas   City,   Ft.   S.   &  G. 

R.  Co.,  1000. 
Rembaugh  v.  Phipps,  717. 
Renck  v.  McGregor,  428. 
Reniham  v.  Wright,  13,  315. 
Renner  v.  Canfleld,  370,  907. 

V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  957. 
Renwick  v.  Morris,  349,  799. 
Republican  Pub.  Co.  v.  Conroy,  545. 

V.  Miner,  482,  504,  548. 

V.  Mosman,  497,  .347. 
Rerick  v.  Kern,  686. 
Respublica  v.  Sparhawk,  149,  150. 
Restell  V.  Steward,  525. 
Reston  v.  Pomfreict.  490. 
Retan  v.  Railway  Co.,  882. 
Revis  V.  Smith,  527. 
Rex  V.  Abingdon,  475. 

V.  Burton,  474. 

V.  Carlile,  533. 

V.  Commissioners     of    Sewers    of 
Pagham,  6. 

V.  Creevey,  539. 

V.  Doherty,  606,  611. 

V.  Gallard,  770. 

V.  Gutch,  475. 

V.  Kent,  185,  186. 

V.  Labouchere,  524. 

V.  Lindsey,  185. 

V.  Long,    913. 

V.  Mawbey,  565. 

V.  Paine,  475. 

V.  Pease,  791. 

V.  Pedly,  411,  796. 

V.  Rosewell,  676.  800. 

V.  Seward,  642. 

V.  Skinner,  520,  527. 

V.  Smith,  88,   7U7. 

V.  Walter,  475, 

V.  Watson,  169. 

V.  White,  787. 

V.  Wilcox,  769. 


1216 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Rexroth  v.  Coon,  191,  660. 
Reynolds  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  1000, 
1022. 

V.  Ohui'cli,  42G. 

V.  City  of  Niagara  Falls,  391. 

V.  Clarke,  19,  063,  761. 

V.  Everett,  358. 

V.  Franklin,  360,  597. 

V.  Graves,  913. 

V.  Haywood,  629. 

V.  Horton,  05.5. 

V.  Kennedy,  OlS. 

V.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 
943. 

V.  Robinson,  472. 

V.  St.  Paul  Trust  Co.,  738. 
■      V.  Shuler,  661,  721. 
Reynolds  Co.  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  979. 
Reyser  v.  Railway  Co.,  198. 
Rliea  V.  Railroad  Co.,  143,  790. 
Rheem  v.  Naugatuck  Wheel  Co.,  575. 
Rhines  v.  Evans,  917. 

V.  Royalton,  378. 
Rhoads  v.  Davidheiser,  702. 
Rhoda  V.  Annis^  270,  594.  599. 
Rhode  V.  Chicago  &  N.   W.  Ry.   Co., 

SSL 
Rhodes  v.  City  of  Cleveland,  764. 

V.  Dickinson,  714,  717. 

V.  Dunbar,  769,  778,  779,  804,  806. 

V.  Otis,   686. 

V.  Rodgers,  325,  399,  439. 

V.  Walsh,  115. 

V.  Whitehead,   800. 
Ricards  v.  Wedemeyer,  716. 
Rlcci  v.  Mueller,  220. 
Ric.  de  D.  V.  Richards,  769. 
Rice  v.  Boyer,  161,  163,  104. 

V.  Coolidge,  85,  128,  ."SS.  528. 

V.  Manley,  26,  551,  630. 

V.  Mexican  Nat.  R.  Co..  471. 

V.  Moorehouse,  773. 

V.  Rice,  371,  468. 

v.  Yocum,  727. 
Rich  V.  Basterfield,  226,  245,  776,  796. 

V.  Bell,  81,  367. 

V.  Mclnery,  418,  423. 

V.  New   York   Cent.    &   H.    R.    R. 
Co.,  6,  24,  88,  95,  814. 

V.  Pilkington,  214. 
Richard  v.  Boland,  617. 
Richards  v.  Dower,  692. 


Richards  v.   Kouffh,   65. 

V.  Torbett,  701. 

V.  Wardwell,  733. 
Richard's  Appeal,  777. 
Richardson  v.  Anthony,  677. 

V.  Atchison.  730. 

V.  Carbon  Hill  Coal  Co.,  915. 

V.  Coal  Co..  iss. 

V.  Goddard,  1009. 

T.  .Tankofsky,  674. 

V.  iletropolitan  Ry.  Co.,  977. 

V.  New   York    Cent.    &    H.    R.    R. 
Co..  859. 

V.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  1075. 

V.  Northrup,  406. 

V.  Rond,   661. 

V.  Richardson,  732. 

V.   Silvester,  587. 

V.  Smith,  707. 

V.  Xan  Voorhies,  441. 

v.  A'an  Voorhis,  434. 

V.  A'ermont  Cent.  R.  Co.,  140,  143. 
7.">1. 
Richels  v.  State,  9. 
Richland's    Iron    Co.    v.    Elkins,    990 

1020. 
Richmond  v.  Chicago  &  W.  M.  R.  Co., 
924. 

V.  Fisk.  431,  432. 

V.  Fiske,  436. 

V.  Long's  Adm'r,  188. 

V.  Steamboat  Co..  1069. 
Richmond  Gas  Co.  v.  Baker,  943. 
Tilichmond's  Case,  963. 
Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Blvins,  963. 

V.  Brown,  193,  972. 

V.  Burnsed,  1080. 

V.  Butler,  311. 

V.  Dickey,  998. 

V.  Dudley,  957,  1018. 

V.  Elliott,  380,  909. 

V.  Farmer,  825,  968. 

V.  Finley,  903. 

V.  George,  1052. 

V.  Greenwood,  170,  396,  860. 

V.  Hissong,  941,  1001,  1019. 

V.  Howard,  817. 

V.  JefCerson,  402,  1092. 

V.  Jones,  302,  995. 

V.  Mitchell,  1019,  1050. 

V.  Payne,  303,  305. 

V.  Powers,  951,  953. 


CASES  cjti;d.  I2l7 

[Vol.   1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  resiilu-j.J 


Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Rush,  1010. 

Y.  Smith,  1092. 

V.  Vance,  824. 

V.  AA'alker,  313. 

V.  M'hite,  1070. 

V.  Williams,  1001,  lOlS. 

V.  ^■\'ol■le.y,  1050,  1051. 

V.  Yeamans,  82U,  861. 
Itichstain    v.    Washington    Mills    Co., 

1005. 
Kiehter  v.  Harper,  822,  825,  965. 

V.  Me.ver,  3"J0. 
Ricker  v.  Freeman,  19,  434. 
Ricket  V.    Metropolitan  Ry.    Co.,    141, 
785. 

V.  Stanley,  52:!. 
Riddle  v.  Brown,  682. 

V.  McGinnis,  401,  452,  456. 

V.  Proprietors  of  Locks  &  Canals, 
170,  182,  187. 

V.  Village  of  Westfield,  868. 
Ridenhour  v.  Kansas  City   Cable   Ry. 

Co.,  874. 
Rideout  v.  Milwaukee,  L.  S.  &  W.  R. 

Co.,  407. 
Rider  v.  Kelso,  596. 

V.  Rulison,  506. 
Ridgely  v.  Bond.  190. 
Riding  v.  Smith,  387,  551.  554. 
Riedel  v.  Moran,  Fltzsimmons  &  Co., 

230,  231. 
Riegelman  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  801. 
Riepe  v.  Elting,  879,  880. 
Rigby  V.  Bennett,  752. 
Rigdon  v.  Alleghany  Lumber  Co.,  990. 
Rigg  V.  Boston,  R.  B.  &  L.  R.  Co.,  884. 

V.  Earl  of  Lonsdale,  659. 
Riggin  V.  Brown,  127. 
Riggs  V.  Palmer,  190. 
Rightmire  v.  Sheppard,  654. 
Rigmaidon's  Case,  474. 
Rlgney  v.  Tacoma  Light  &  Water  Co., 

760,  779. 
Riley  v.  Lee,  496. 

Rilly  V.  Boston  Water  Power  Co.,  727. 
Ring  V.  Wheeler,  528. 
Ringle  y.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.,  311. 
Rio  Gi'ande  Western  R.  Co.  v.  Cham- 
berlin,  927. 

V.  Rubenstein,  379. 

V.  Vaughn,  927. 
Ripley  v.  Case,  271. 

LAW  OF  TORTS — 77 


Ripley  v.  Yale,  665,  (ic.ii. 
Rippy  V.   State,  1.53. 
Rlscb  V.  Von  Lilllenthal,  500. 
Risien  y.  Bro\vn,  (iSd. 
Rist  V.  Faux.  452. 
Ritchey  y.  West,  913,  914. 
Ritchie  v.  Sexton,  531. 

V.  Stenius,  499. 

Y.  AValler,  278. 
Rive  Y.  Boyer,  164. 
Riversdale  Park  Cu.  v.  Westcott,  690. 
Riverside  Water  Co.  v.  Gage,  760. 
River  Weir  Com'rs  v.  Adamson,  141. 
Rives  V.  Wood,  621,  622. 
Roach  V.  Caldbeek,  398,  446. 

v.  Garvan.  485. 
Roadcap  v.  Sipe,  222. 
Roades  v.  Larson,  403. 
Roath  v.  Driscoll,  557,  758. 
Robb  v.  Carnegie  Bros.  &  Co.,  757,  7S0, 

786,  808. 
Robbins  v.  Barton,  579,  592. 

V.  Chicago  City,  232. 

V.  Mount,  160. 

V.  Robbins,  612,  027. 

V.  Sawyer,  662. 

V.  Swift,  130. 
Robel  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co  , 

956. 
Robelling  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  692. 
Roberge  v.  Winne,  346. 
Roberson  v.  Kirby,  843. 

v.  Reiter.  352. 
Robert  Marys'  Case,  450. 
Roberts  v.   City  of   Detroit,   174,   176. 
470,  472. 

V.  Connelly,  452. 

V.  Graham,  3S'!. 

V.  Lamb,  525. 

Y.  Levy,  914. 

V.  Mason,  395. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  322. 

V.  Read,  335. 

v.  Roberts,  489. 

V.  Rose,  801,  802. 

Y.  Tayler,  442. 

V.  AVyatt,  712. 
Robertson  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  955, 
1035. 

v.  Gourley,  733. 

v.  Hunt,  717,  7.11. 

V.  Hunter,  316. 


■^J8 


CASI.S    CITKD. 


[Vol.  1  oomprisos  pages  1-1152,  iuclusivo:  toJ.  2  tlie  residue.] 


Robertson  v.  New  York  &  E.  R.  Co.,  I'Jl. 

V.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  li)78. 

V.  Parks,  ."i79,  583,  584,  038. 

V.  Sicliel,  138. 

V.   Woolfy,  887. 
Robeson  v.  French,  191. 
Robins  V.  Hope,  .590. 
Ifobinson,  Ex  parte,  121. 

V.  Baugli,  778. 

V.  Bird.  735. 

V.  Bland,  410. 

V.  Clianiberlain,  129. 

V.  Cone.  8:;7,  978,  98G. 

V.  Crescent  City  Mill  &  Transp.  Co., 
GS9. 

V.  Exempt  Fire  Co.  of  San  Fran- 
cisco, 947. 

V.  .Tones,  481. 

V.  li^inie,  702. 

V.  Lewis,   721. 

V.  Marino,  856,  857. 

V.  Parks,   040. 

V.  Powers,  456. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  402,  859,  951,  9G8, 
983,   1085,   1090,   1093,   1094. 

V.  Richards,  655. 

V.  Rohr,   130. 

V.  Simpson,  370. 

V.  Smith,   777. 

V.  Southern  Pac.   Co.,   1087. 

V.  State,  433. 

V.  Vaughton.  211. 

V.  Webb.   233. 
Robison  v.  Rupert,  446. 
Roblin  V.  Kansas  City,  St.  ,T.  &  C.  B. 

R.  Co.,  998. 
Robshaw  v.   Smith,   531. 
Rochester  White-Lead   Co.   v.  City  of 

Rochester,    124,    135,    176. 
Rockey's  Estate,  319. 
Rockwell  V.  Brown,  484. 
Rockwood   V.    Robinson,    067. 

V.  Wilson,  144. 
Roddy  V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  8.59, 

909. 
Rodgers  v.  Central  Pac.  B.  Co.,  70. 

V.  Lees,  195. 

V.  McXamara,  98. 
Rodney  y.   St.   Louis  S.   W.   Ry.   Co., 

993,  1020. 
Rodnej'  Hunt  Mach.  Co.   v.  Stewai't, 
714,  717. 


Rodriguez  v.   Tadmire,  621. 

Roe  V.  Birkenhead,  L.  &  C.  .T.  R.  (^o.. 

45. 
Roemcr  v.  Striker,  235,  848. 
Roesner    v.    Herrmann,    303. 
Roettinger  v.   U.   S.,   112. 
Rogalm  V.  Foundi-y  Co.,  2.53.   277. 
Rogan  V.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  300. 
Rogers  v.   Brenton,  91. 

V.  Brewster,  033. 

V.  Brooks,   060. 

V.  Buckingham,  253. 

V.  City   of   Spokane,   314. 

V.  Clifton,   199,   522. 

V.  Coal   River   Boom     &    Driving 
Co.,  412. 

V.  Cox,   685. 

V.  Duhart,  669. 

V.  Elliott,  781. 

V.  Evarts,  640. 

V.  Hanfield,  769,  807. 

V.  Huie,  718. 

V.  Kennebec   Steamboat   Co..  301, 
1083,  1086. 

V.  Leyden,   956,   1052. 

V.  Ludlow  Manuf'g  Co.,  1044. 

V.  McDowell,  132. 

V.  Marlboro  Co.,  131. 

V.  Miller.   191,   732. 

V.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  SOS 

V.  Overton,  281. 

V.  Rajendro  Dutt,  87,   146. 

V.  Sinsheimer,    752. 

V.  Spence,  6.57. 

V.  Stewart,  797. 

V.  Taintor,  147. 

V.  Wilson,   430. 
Rohan  v.  Sawin,  428. 
Rohe  V.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  885. 
Rohrschneider  v.  Knickerbocker  Life 

Ins.   Co.,  583. 
Rolin   V.    Steward,   83. 
Rolland  v.  Batchelder,  480. 
Rolle  V.  Whyte,  792. 
Roller  V.  Blair,  505. 
Rollins  V.  Board  of  Com'rs.,  040. 

V.  Chalmers,  459. 

V.  Hicks,  .552. 
Rollins  Inv.  Co.  v.  George,  181. 
Romaine  v.  Van  Allen,  741. 
Rome  R.  Co.  v.  Barnett,  331. 
Rommel  v.  Schambacher,  204. 


CASES    CITED.  1219 

[Vol.   1  comprises  piiges   l-(i."'i2,   inclusive;   vol.   2  the  ivsiiluc] 


Co., 


;i<i:i. 


Uomney     Marsh     v.     Trinity     House 

Corp.,  70.  78. 
Romona    Oolitic    Stone    Co.    v.    Tate, 

9(i;:!, 
Rooney  v.    Carson,    1020. 

V.  KSewaU  &  Day  Cordage  Co.,  992, 
OOr,.  1019. 
Roope  V.  D'Avigdor,  11. 
Root  V.    King,   ."122. 

V.  New  York  iV:  X.  E.  R.  Co.,  302. 

V.  Stevenson,  163. 
Rose  V.  Groves,  379,  787. 

v.    ■Miles,   78(i. 

V.  Stei)hens     .t     C.     Transp.    Co., 
1085. 

V.  Wilson,  428. 
Roseback  v.  Aetna  Mills,  1041. 
Roseberry  v.   State.   450. 
Roseman   v.   Canovan,   589,  593. 
Rosen  v.   Stein,  418. 
Rosenan  v.  Syring,  727,  7.'!s. 
Rosenbaum  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R 

19.5,  201. 
Rosenberg   v.    Hart,    C12,    Oi;;. 
Rosenfeld  v.  Peoria  &  ft.  Ry.  Co 

305. 
Rosenfleld  v.  Arrol.  935,  04.;,  950. 

V.  Newman.   227. 
Rosenkrans  v.  Barker,  021,  094. 
Rosenkranz  v.  Haas,  429. 

V.  Railway   Co..   .-SSI,   988. 
Rosenthal  v.  Circuit  Judge,  351,   632. 

V.  Davenport,   134. 

V.  McMann,  707. 

V.  Taylor,  808. 
Rosewater  v.  Hoffman,   504. 
Rosewell  v.  Prior.   22(!.  411,  795. 
Rosowell  V.   Pryer,  228. 
Ross  V.   Butler,  781,  805. 

V.  Clinton,  7G3. 

V.  Fedden,  830. 

V.  Hill.   1058. 

V.  Hixon,  012,  618. 

V.  Hobson,   570. 

V.  Johnson,    718. 

V.  Kansas  City,  380. 

V.  Leggett,  4."j0. 

V.  Madison,   181. 

V.  Malone,    742. 

V.  Weber,  404. 
Rosser  v.  Randolph,  800. 


Co., 


797. 


Kos.siter  v.  Minnesota  Bradnev-Smitli 

Paper  Co..  Oil. 
Rossnian  v.  Adams.   702,   705. 
Rosum  v.  Hodges,  727.   741. 
Roth  V.    Smith,   430. 
Rothenberger    v.    X(5rthwestern    Con- 
sol.   Milling  Co.,   1027. 
Rothes  V.  AVaterworks  Com'rs,  142. 
Rothmiller    v.    Stein,    570. 
Rott  V.  AA'agner,   133. 
Roughan  v.   Boston   &  L.   Block  Co., 

995. 
Rounds  v.  Railway  Co..   252,  250 
Uouvke   V.   White    .Moss   ('ulliery 

22s,    1034. 
Rouse  v.  Chicago  &  K.  I.  R.  Co, 

V.  Martin,  Sii5. 
Ronser   v.    North    Park    St.    Ry.    Co., 

1079. 
Roux   V.    Blodgett    &    Davis    Lumber 

Co.,  9.55. 
Rowand  v.  Bellinger,  392, 
Rowe  V.  Roach,  551. 

v.  Smith.  222. 
Rowell  V.  Railway  Co..  840. 

V.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  .-JOO. 
Rowen  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  Ry. 

Co.,   979. 
Rowland  v.  ililn,  1070. 
Rowley  v.    Rice,   032. 
Rowning    v.    (Joodchild.    98,    128. 
Roy  V.  Goings,  019,  022. 
Royal  Aquarium,  etc.,  Soc.  v.  Parkm- 

son,   520,  .528,  527. 
Royce  v.  Maloney,  522. 
Roye  V.  Lent,  913. 
Royse  v.  May.  414. 
Royston,    Case  of,   202. 
Rozell  V.  City  of  Anderson,  179. 
Rubens  v.  Robertson.  138. 
Rueker  v.   Smoke,  .390. 
Rudd  v.  Darling,  119,  423. 

V.  Rounds.    400. 
Ruddock  V.  Lowe.  013.  914. 
Rude  V.   Nass.  540,  54:i. 
Ruffner  v.  Williams,  418. 
Riigan  V.  Sabin,  3.37. 
Ruggles  V.  Ivesure,  (i82,  (i.SO. 
Rumpel  V.  Railway  Co.,  SSl. 
Rumsey   v.  Railroad  Co.,   411. 
Ruudell  V.  Kalbfus,  639. 


1220  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comiirisos  pages  1-Gu2,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Ruug  T.  Slioneberger,  783,  793. 
Runge  V.  Brown,  .302. 

V.  Franklin,  •")2G,  527. 
Ruolis  v.  Backer,  .327. 
Rusliin  V.  Tharpe,  724,  729. 
Rusliwortli  V.  Smith,  206. 

V.  Taylor,  727. 
Russ  V.  Steamboat  War  Eagle,  406. 
Russel  V.  ralmer,  909. 
Russell  V.  Bancroft,  798. 
V.  Bradley,  628. 
V.  Brown,  -til.  412. 
V.  Butterflcld,  715. 
V.  Chambers,  452,  460. 
V.  Grimes,  131. 
V.  Inhabitants,  183. 
V.  McCaU,  347,  738. 
V.  Men  of  Devon,  188. 
V.  Merchants'  Bank  of  Lake  City, 

700. 
V.  Palmer,  916. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  261,  1018,  1022. 
V.  Reagan,  843. 
V.  Shenton,  220. 
V.  Sunbury,  330,  331. 
V.  Tillotson,  862,  1013,  1027. 
V.  Walker,  132. 
V.  Willette,  712. 
Russell  &  Co.  V.  Polk  County  Abstract 

Co.,  2.3,  338. 
irussen  V.  Lucas,  421. 
Ruter  V.  Foy,  677,  961. 
Rutherford   v.    Chicago,   M.    &  St.   P. 
Ry.  Co.,  1020. 
V.  Holmes,  122. 
Rutland  Electric  Light  Co.  v.  Marble 

Electric  Light  Co.,  354. 
Rutland  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bank,  743. 
Rutledge    v.    Missouri    Pac.    Ry.    Co., 

930,  1002,  1017,  1038. 
Ryalls  V.  Leader,  527. 

V.  Mechanic-s'   Mills,   1008. 
Ryan  v.  Brewing  Co.,  646. 
v.  Copes,  780,  789,  803. 
V.  Fowler,  1015. 
v.  Fralick,  433. 
V.  I^uisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  Ry.  Co., 

04:!. 
V.  McCully,  1046. 
V.  New  York  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  74. 
V.  New  York  Co.,  72. 
V.  Schilcock,  675. 


Ryan  v.  Town  of  Bristol,  943,  947,  95.3. 

Kybee  v.  State,  783. 

Ryburn  v.  Moore,  426. 

Rychlicki  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  413. 

706. 
Ryder  v.  WombweU,  956. 
Ryerson  v.  Ryerson,  464. 
Rylands  v.  Fletcher,  51,  59,  107,  140, 

249,  475,  769,  815,  833-836,  838,  842, 

852,  8(i4. 
Ryman  v.  Gerlach,  715. 
Ryppon  V.  Bowles,  796. 

s 

Sabln  V.  Railroad  Co.,  142,  143. 
Sabine  &  E.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Ewing,  402, 

947. 
Sadler  v.  Henlock,  228,  231. 

v.  South  Staffordshire  &  B.  D.  S. 
T.  Co.,  141,  791,  841. 
Safford  v.  Grout,  589. 
Sage  V.  Laurain,  128. 

V.  Rail  wax  Co.,  207. 
Sager  v.   Portsmouth,    S.   &  P.   &  E. 

R.  Co.,  309. 
Sagers  v.  Nuckolls,  242,  250,  253,  292. 
Saginaw  Union   St.   By.  v.   Michigan 

Cent.  R.  Co.,  693. 
Saguinn  v.  Siedentopf,  581,  597. 
Sahlgaard   v.    St.   Paul  City  Ry.   Co., 

958.  lOSl. 
St.  Anthony  Falls  Water-Power  Co.  v. 

Eastman,  834,  956. 
St.  Clair  St.  Ry.  Co.  y.  Eadle,  983. 
St.    Croix    Land    &    Lumber    Co.    v. 

Ritchie,   693. 
St   Helen's   Smelting  Co.   v.   Tipping, 

74S,  760,  779,  804. 
St.  James  Church  v.  Arrington,  804. 
St.   .Tames   Military  Academy  v.   Gai- 

ser,  508,  510. 
St.  .Tobn  V.  American  Mut.  Fire  Ins. 
Co.,  78. 
V.  Ividd,  91. 
St.  Johns  tV'  H.  R.  Co.  v.  ShaUey,  230, 

237. 
St.  .Joseph  &  G.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Hedge, 
1058. 
V.  Palmer,  301. 
St.   Louis,  A.   &  C.   R.   Co.  v.  Dalby, 

168. 


CASKS    CITED. 


1221 


[Vol.   1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


St.     Louis,    A.    &    T.    H.     E.     Co.    v. 
Ciaunch,   412. 
V.  Coi-gan,  'J!J!i. 
V.  Hawkins,  1078. 
V.  Holuian,  lOlS. 
St.  Louis,   A.   &  T.  II.  Co.  v.  Hardy, 
1U71J,   1(180. 
V.  Knott,  2;!2. 
V.  Lemon,  10.^0. 
V.  McKinsey,   78,   842. 
y.  Neel,   1004. 
V.  Robbins,  803. 
V.  Torrey,    10U3,    1023,    1046. 
V.  Triplett,  2(j.-|,  997,  1003. 
V.  Welch,  261. 
St.  Louis  Bridge  Co.  v.  ililler,  963. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ity.  Co.  v.  Biggs, 
339,  670. 
V.  Commercial  TJnion  Ins.  Co.,  63, 

64. 
V.  Davis,  1005,  1006. 
V.  Goolsby,  858. 

V.  Hackett,  242.  2.18,  262,  263,  998. 
V.  Henderson,  1073. 
V.  Higgins,   1000. 
V.  Ledbetter,  823. 
V.  Maddry,   976. 
V.  Needliam,   334,   415,   1048. 
V.  Rexroad,   98(1. 
V.  Robbins,   9[)3. 
V.  Taylor,  670. 
V.  Weakly,  3(t5. 
V.  Yarborougb,  3::o. 
St.   Louis    S.    W.    R.    Co.    v.   Dobbins, 
370. 
V.  Henson,   470. 
V.  Jagerman,  1012. 
V.  Johnson,   964. 
V.  Moss,   325. 
V,  Thomas,    377. 
St.  Louis  Stock  Yards  v.  Wiggins  Fer- 
ry Co.,  686. 
St.  I^uis,  V.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Bell, 

829. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Dodd,  1070. 
v.  Farr,  363,  937,  946. 
V.  Herrin,  831. 
v.  Jones,  845. 
V.  Mitchell,  1084. 
V.  Richardson,  846. 
V.  Sageley,  930. 
V-  Valirus,  1004. 


St.  Louis  &  S.  F.R.  Co.  V.  ^^'eaver,  942. 

St.  Martin  v.  Desnoyer,  5(J4. 

St.  Nicholas  Bank  v.  State  Nat.  Bank, 

284. 
St.  Paul  Distilling  Co.  v.  Pratt,   640, 

641. 
SI:.   Paul,  S.   &  T.   F.  R.   Co.  v.   Sage, 

.•'.40. 
St.  Paul  Water  Co.  v.  Ware,  234. 
St.  Peter  v.  Denison,  177. 
Salem   Stone   &   Lime   Co.    v.   GrifHn, 
993,  1004. 
V.  Tepps,  1009. 
Salimonic  Mining  &  Gas  Co.  v.  Wag- 
ner, 673. 
Salina  Creek  Irr.   Co.  v.  Salina  Stock 

Co.,  756. 
Salisbury  v.  Green,  677. 

V.  Herchenroder,  65.  67,  70,  925. 
V.  Union    &    Advertiser    Co.,    532, 
533. 
Salladay  v.  Town,  72. 
Salmon  Falls  Co.  v.  The  Tangier,  1069. 
Salter  v.  Howard,  4.50,  (336. 
Salt  Lake  City  v.  Hollister,  168,  172. 
Salt  River  Canal  Co.  v.  Hickey,  362. 
Salt   Springs   Nat.    Bank   v.  Wheeler, 

717,  730. 
Salvin  v.  Coal  Co.,  87,  776,  780. 
Sammell  v.  Wright,  247. 
Sammius  v.  Wilhelm,  888. 
Sammuel  v.  Judin,   18. 
Sampson  v.  Hoddinott.  85,  759. 
V.  Smith,   150. 
V.  United  States.  112. 
Samuels  v   Evening  JIail  Ass'n,  169. 
V.  Richmond    &    D.    R.    Co.,    397, 
1089. 
San  Antonio  &  A.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams, 
1080. 
v.  Corley,  .•!70,  470. 
V.  Kniffin,   302. 
V.  Cakes,  846. 
V.  Parr,  947. 
V.  Peterson,  923. 
Sanborn  v.  Detroit,  B.  C.  it  A.  R.  Co., 
802. 
V.  Hamilton,  717.    " 
Sandback  v.  Thomas,  628. 
Sandborn  v.  Neilson,  465,  466. 

v.  Sturtevant,  682. 
.Sanders  v.  Getchell,   135. 


1222 


CASK-    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  l-i;ri2.  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  nsiduo.J 


S:inders  v.  Palmer,  ij2.j,  (i-'ij. 

T.  Keed,  GUT. 
Sandeisiju  y.  i 'aldwell.  -'A-. 

y.  Haverstick,   I'-i'.!. 

V.  I'ennsylvania     Coal     Co.,     776, 
i  ( 7. 
Sandford  v.  Handy,  ."378. 
.Saiidlfer  \.  Lynn,  241,  802,  929. 
Saudh  V.  Child.  2.S0. 
Sanford    \.    American   Dist.  Tel.    Cn.. 
244. 

V.  Eiijhth  Ave.  Ry.,  2.>j. 

V.  I'eck.  :i.^S. 

V.  Rowley,  .012,  ."^IS,  549. 

V.  .Standard  Oil  Co.,  103:j. 
•Sangei'  v.  Dun,  31.S. 

V.  Wood,  i!2;j. 
Sansinf.'  v.  Risingev.  070. 
JSappenfield    v.   Main   St.   &  A.   P.    R. 

Co..  1012. 
Saratoga  Co.  v.  Deyoe,  092. 
Sarch  v.  Blackburn,  IS. 
Sargent  v.  ( 'urnes.  439. 

V.  rteunison,  4.'i;_!. 

v.  Mathewson,  4.50. 

V.  'Jown  of  Gilford,  182. 
Sai-les  V.   Sarles.  701,  702. 
Saucer  v.  Keller,  OS.j. 
Saulsliury  v.  A'illage,  17(5. 
.Saunders  v.  Baxter,  .332. 

v.  Clark,  91. 

V.  Edwards,  :;.39. 

V.  McClintock.   .jSS,   ."SO. 

V.  Perkins,   1.32. 
Saussy  v.  Railroad  Co.,  S4:!. 
Sauter  v.  New  York  Cent,  &  H.  R.  R. 

Co.,  .382. 
Savacool  v.  Bough  ton,  131. 
Savage  v.   Brewer,  032,  034. 

V.  Kvermau,  31. "J. 

V.  Perkins,    729. 

v.  Stevens,  .'309,  .571.  .599. 
Savannah  v.  Spears,  179. 
Savannah,  F.  &  AV.  Ry.  Co.  v.  How- 
ard, ;i8i. 

V.  Slater,  8.58,  941. 

V.  Sloat,   1009. 

V.  ^V'atson,   1082. 
Savannah  &  O.  Canal  Co.  v.  Bourquin, 
412. 

V.  Suburban  &  W.  E.  Ry.  Co.,  3-54. 


Savannah    &   W.    It.    Co.   v.    PhillipH, 

228,  Zi'-i,  2.38. 
Savil  V.  Roberts.  02S. 
Savile  v.  .Jardine,  490. 

V.  Roberts,  003,  0;i8. 
SavUl  V.  Roberts,  101,  6(J8. 
Savings  Bank  v.  Ward,  133,  905,  <.xn. 

909,  911. 
Savings  Bank  of  St.  Paul  v.  Arthier, 

-:»2.:>. 

Savoie  v.  Scanlan.  499. 
Sawyer  v.    Bennett,    525,    547. 

V.  Corse,  138. 

V.  Davis,  790. 

V.  Dulauy,   1091. 

V.  Goodwin,  917. 

V.  Nelson,  353. 

V.  I'rickett,  578,  584. 

V.  Robertson,    707,   710. 

V.  Rutland  &  B.  R.  Co.,  903.  1035. 

V.  Sauer,  402. 
Sa.\by  V.  Manchester,  S.  &  L.  Ry.  Co., 

220. 
Saxeby  v.  Wynne,  735. 
Saxon  V.  Castle,  624. 
Sayboard  v.  AVilbur,  911. 
Sayers  v.  Hoskinson,  700. 
Saylor  v.   Smith,  186. 
Sayre  v.  State,  113. 
Scales   v.   Ordinary  of  Chattahoochee 

Co.,  183. 
Scammon  v.   Chicago,  232. 

T.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  305. 
Scanlon  v.  Suter,  185. 

V.  Wedger,  201.   851. 
Scarborough  v.  Railway  Co.,  228,  238. 
Scarlett  v.  Norwood,  450. 
Scarll  v.  Dixon,   543. 
Schacherl   v.    St.   Paul   City    Ry.    Co.. 

958. 
Schachne  v.  Barnett,  840. 
Schaefer  v.   ilarthaler,   800. 

V.  Osterbrink,  100,   274. 

V.  Silverstein,  065,  666. 
Schaeffer  v.  Jackson  Township,  69. 
SchafEner  v.  Ehrman,  83,  403. 
Schaible  v.   Lake  Shore  &  il.   S.  Ry. 

Co.,  882,  1038,  1043. 
Scharenbrolch    v.     St.     Cloud     Fiber- 
Ware  Co.,   1017. 
Schattgen  v.  Holnback,  605,  020. 


CASES    CITED. 


1223 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-C52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Scbaul)  Y.    Hailroad  Co.,  41i. 
Scheei'  v.   Keown,  42(;. 
Scheffel  v.  Weiler,  671. 
Schefter  v.  Railroad  Co.,  o74. 
•Scheffler  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry. 

Co.,  1<JS,  3;!.j. 
Srheibel   v.   Fairbairn,  UOO. 
Schelter  v.  York,  150. 
Sehenck  v.   Sehenek,  480. 
Sclienk  y.  Stron.u',  103. 
Schild  Y.  Lesier,   500. 
Schillinger  y.  Town  of  Verona,  69. 

V.   Tnited  States,  112. 
Schimpf  V.  Sliter,  384,  879. 
Schindler  y.   Jlilwaukee,   L.    S.   i^v:   W. 

Ry.  Co.,  817,  800,  978. 
Schlaff  Y.  Railroad  Co.,  946,  950. 
Schlenks    v.    Central    Pac.    Ry.    Co., 

980. 
Sclileretli    y.    Missouri    Pac.    Ry.    Co.. 

024,  1039. 
Sclilichting  v.  AVint.ien,  335. 
Sehlitz  V.  Pabst  Brewing  Co.,   1026. 
Schlltz  Brewing   Co.   y.   Compton,   37, 

410,  809. 
Schlossberg   v.    Lahr.   160. 
Schmeer  y.  Gaslight  Co.  of  Syracuse, 

,S49,  ,S5(1. 
Sclnneider  y.  ilcLane,  428. 
Scliinid  Y.  Humphrey,  194. 
Schmidt  y.  Cook,  796,  987. 

Y.  Garfield  Nat.  Bank,  707.  724. 

Y.  Hughes,   628. 

Y.  Kansas  City  Distilling  Co..  160. 

V.  Keehn,  220. 

Y.  Montana  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  1029. 

Y.   St.   Louis,   I.   JI.   &   S.    Ry.   Co.. 

370. 
Y.  Steinway  &.H.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  882. 
V.  Witherick,    499. 
Schmit  V.  Mitchell.  4.50. 
Schmitt  V.  Drouet,  134. 
Schmitz  V.   St.   Louis,  I.  M.   L*t  S.   Rv. 

Co.,  402,   987. 
Schmolze  y.  Chicago,  M.  &   St.  P.  R. 

Co.,  831,  903. 
Sclmebly  y.  Schnebly,  7o2. 
Schneider  v.  Heath.  575. 
Sehnitzlus  y.  Bailey,  762. 
Sehnur  v.   Citizens'  Traction  Co.,  987. 
Schofleld  Y.  Railway  Co.,  932. 
School  Dist.  Y.  Bragdon,  160. 


School  Dist.  V.  Neil,  802. 
Schoomaker  y.  Gilmore,  14. 
Sehorn  v.  Berry,  466. 
Schriver  y.  Village  of  .Tohnstown,  3G2. 
Schroeder   y.    Chicago    &    A.    R.    Co., 
1024,    1(128. 

Y.  Michigan  Car  Co.,  995. 
Schroyer  v.  Lynch,  138. 
Schuchardt  v.  Aliens,  559. 
Schular  y.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  241, 
Schultz  v.  Bower,  752,  808. 

v.  Byers,  751,  752. 

V.  Chicago  &  N.   W.  R.   Co.,  317, 
318,  907. 

V.  Frank,  656. 

V.  .Johnson,  1015. 

v.  Schultz,  40:!. 
Schulz   v.    Railway   Co.,   1001,  1051. 
Sehulze  v.  .Talonick,  511. 
Schulze-Berge  y.  The   Guildhall,   299. 
Schumacher  v.  St.  Louis,  180. 
Schumaker  v.   Mather,   593,   594,   600. 

V.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  377,  970. 
Schumann  v.  Torbett,  607. 
Schuneman  v.  Palmer,  467. 
Schuyler  v.  Curtis,  94,  147,  3.53,  356. 

Y.  Pjtchburg  R.  Co.,  928. 
Schuylkill    Nav.    Co.    v.    McDonough, 

186. 
Schwabacker  v.  Riddle,  563,  568,  594, 

600. 
Schwartz  v.  Brahm,  878. 

V.  Davis,  366,  628. 

v.  MoCloskey,  072. 
Schwarz  v.  .ludd,  333. 
Sehweider  v.  Lang,  315. 
Schwenck  v.  Naylor,  815. 
Schwenke  v.  Union  Depot  &  R.  Co  , 

443. 
Scidmore  v.  Jlilwaukee,  L.  S.  &  \V. 
Ry.  Co..  1017. 

v.  Smith,  449. 
Scircle  v.  Neeves,  428. 
Scofield  v.  Kreiser,  720. 
Scofield  Rolling-Mill  Co.  v.  State,  169. 
Seott  V.  Bay,  840,  848. 

V.  Fletcher,    621. 

V.  Hodges,  714. 

V.  Hunter,  70. 

v.  London  &  St.  K.  Dock  Co.,  891, 
939,  940. 

v.  JIanchester,  179. 


1224  CASES    CITED. 

I  Vol.   1   comprises  pages  l-(j.j2,   iuclusivt';   vol.   2  the  residue.] 


Scott  V.  Neely,  35(j. 

V.  Pope,  S!». 

V.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  K.  Co.,  414. 

V.  Sampson,   548. 

v.  Seymour,  102. 

V.  Shepherd,    18,    71,    74,    76,   131, 
851. 

V.  Stausfleld,   122,   52(j,   .",27. 

Y.  Watson,  1,j9,  160. 

V.  Yazoo  &  M.  V.  Ey.  Co.,  861. 
Scotten  V.  Pegan,  134. 
Scottish  il.  &  L.  Inv.  Co.  v.  McBroom, 

253. 
Seovill  V.  McMahon,  784. 
Scranton  v.  Catterson,  178. 
Scribner  v.  Beach,  434. 

Y.  Clark,  223. 
Scripps  V.  Poster,  537. 
Scroggin  y.  Wood,  501,  578. 
Scudder  v.  Crossan,  913. 
Seaboard    Manuf'g   Co.    y.    Woodson, 

381,  '.Ji)3,  994. 
Seabury  y.  Am  Ende,  370. 
Seaeord  v.  People,  783. 
Seager  v.  Singerland,  458. 
Seale  y.   Shepherd,   656. 
Seaman  y.  Browning,  249. 

Y.  Netherclift,  526,  528. 

V.  Xew  York,  186. 
Seare  v.  Prentice,  2G,  816,  912. 
Searing  v.   Saratoga,  200. 
Searle  v.  Sawyer,  704,  710. 
Searles  v.  Alabama  &  V.  Ry.  Co.,  1074. 

V.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  935. 

V.  Scarlett,  533. 
Searls  y.  Viets,  420. 
Sears  y.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  931. 

V.  Hicklin,  570. 

V.  Lyons,  392. 

V.  Seattle  Consolidated  St.  R.  Co., 
402,  947. 
Seaver  y.  Adams,  468. 
Sebastian  v.  Cheney,  622,  623. 
Secor  Y.  Plarris,  508. 
Secord  y.  Railway  Co.,  188. 
Sedalia  Gaslight  Co.  v.  Mercer,  140. 
Seddon  v.  Blckley,  1088. 
Seefeld  y.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co., 

803. 
Seekins  v.  Goodale,  130. 
Seeley  y.  Brush,  82. 
Seely  v.  Alden,  410,  694,  809. 


Seely  y.  Blair.  537. 

Seeman  y.  Peeney,  392. 

Seerj'  v.  Mall,  504. 

Seidensparger  v.   Spear,   684. 

Seifled  v.  Hays,  794. 

Seither  v.  Philadelphia  Traction  Co., 

345. 
Selby  Y.  Xettlefold,  678. 

V.  Wilmington  &  W.  E.  Co.,  306, 
307,  1074. 
Selden  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co., 

682. 
Seldon  v.  Myers,  318. 
Selleck  v.  J.  Langden  Co.,  402. 

V.  Lake   Shore   &   M.    S.    Ry.   Co., 
78,  82a 
Sellick  V.  Hall,  797. 
Selma  &  Jl.  R.  Co.  v.  Knapp,  808. 
Semayne's  Case,  674,  675. 
Semple  v.  Mayor  of  "\^icksburg,  179. 
Seneca  Road  Co.  v.  Auburn  &  R.  R. 

Co.,  19,  366. 
Sentenis  v.  Ladew,  103. 
Serapjs,  The,  869. 
Seroka  v.  Kaltenburg,  219. 
Serwe  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  29. 
Sesler  v.  Montgomery,  480. 
Sessengut  v.  Posey,  234. 
Sessions  v.  Johnson,  342. 
Severance  v.  Judkins,  127. 
Severingshaus  y.   Beckman,  504,   639. 
Severn  v.  Keppel,  726. 
Sevier  y.  Birmingham  S.  &  T.  R.  Co., 
242. 

V.  Vicksburg  &  M.  R.  Co.,  1001. 
Sewall  V.  Catlin,  506. 

Y.  City  of  St.  Paul,  181. 
Seward  y.  ^'era  Cruz,  330. 
Seybolt  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R. 

Co.,  935,  938. 
Seymore  y.  Ives,  741. 
Seymour  v.  Citizens'  Ry.  Co.,  lOOO. 

V.  Greenwood,  247,  253. 

V.  Peters,  712. 
Shaber  v.   Railway  Co.,   882. 
Shackelford  v.  Hargreaves,  352. 
Shadden  v.  McElwee,  528,  529. 
Shadier  v.  Blair  Co.,  185. 
Shadwell  v.  Plutchinsou,  411,  412,  703. 
ShaefCer  y.  Sheppard,  472. 
Shaffer  v.  Lee,  408. 
Shaffer  v.  Evans,  944. 


CASES    CITED. 


122.3 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  l-(j."i2.  iuolusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Shane  v.  Kansas  City,  St.  .T.  &  C.  B. 

Ry.  Co.,  761. 
Shankenbei-y  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ry. 

Co.,  :i(js. 
Shanks  v.  Whitney,  580,  002. 
Shanley  v.  W'eU^,  4-J.S. 
Shannon  v.  .Tones,  Gii2. 

V.  Shannon,  3.j2. 
Shapcott  V.  MuKford,  661. 
Sharon  v.  Wooklrick,  680. 
ShaiiJ  V.  Bonner,  822. 

V.  Gray,  342. 

V.  Grey.  1068. 

V.  Powell,  64,  372,  373. 

V.  Ross,  132. 
Sharpe  v.  Gray.  1058. 

V.  Johnstone,  619. 

V.  Stephenson,  .")24. 

V.  Williams,  :ii',. 
Sharrod  v.  Railway  Co.,  247,  252. 
Shattuc  V.  McArthur,  525. 
Shattuck  V.  Hamnion.  401,  460.  4(JG. 
Shaw  V.  Berry,  002. 

V.  Chicago,    R.    I.    &    P.    Ry.    Co., 
310. 

V.  Coffin,  29,  105,  297.  ' 

V.  Hoffman,  384. 

V.  McCreaiy,  220. 

V.  New  York,  144. 

Y.  Northern  Pac.   Ry.   Co.,  1070. 

V.  Philadelphia,   933. 

V.  Webber,  320. 
Shay  Y.  Thompson,  203,  445. 
Shea  T.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  884. 

V.  Inhabitants   of   Milford,   708. 

V.  Milford,  720. 

V.  Reems,  25(j. 

V.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  801,  SS:j, 
Sheahan  y.  Collins,  525. 

V.  National  S.  S.  Co.,  017. 
Sheanon  v.  Pacific  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co., 

319. 
Sheckell  v.  Jackson,  536. 
Sheedy   v.   Chicago,   M.   &  St.   P.   R. 

Co.,  1008. 
Sheehan  v.  Edgar,  390. 

V.  Flynn,  763. 

V.  Sturges,  444. 
Sheeley  v.  Cokley,  523. 
Sheets  v.  Chicago  &  I.  Coal  Co.,  'M.l 
ShefCer  v.  Railroad  Co..  377.  380. 


Sheffield    v.    Central    Union    Tel.    Co., 

145,  863. 
Sheffill  V.  Van  Deusen,  479.  483. 
Sheldon  v.  Carpenter,  604. 

Y.  Davidson,    577,    578,    582.    584, 
500,   592. 

V.  Sheldon,  85. 

V.  Sherman,  60. 
Shelley  y.  Burr,  249. 
Shepard  v.  Creamer,  838,  950. 

Y.  Hill,  769,  777. 

V.  Pratt,    738. 
Sheperd  v.    Wakeman,   551. 
Shejjhard  v.  Shephard.  699. 
Shepheard  y.  Whitaker,  475,  479,  499. 
Shepherd  v.  Lincoln,  139. 
Sheple  v.  Page,  55. 
Shepijard  v.   Taylor,  4. 
Sherbourne  v.  Yuba  Co.,  188. 
Sheridan  v.   Brooklyn  Ry.,  332,  1091. 

V.  Charlick,  278. 

V.  New  Quay  Co.,  I'M. 
Slieriff,  Bigelow  Co.  v.  Heintze,  738. 
Sherley  y.  Billings,  172,  262,  203. 
Sherlock  y.  AUins,  15. 
Sherman  v.  Charlestown,  461. 

Y.  Dutch,  693. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  411,  996. 

V.  Wells,  65. 
SherrlU  v.  Connor,  330,  607,  609,  704. 
Sherry  v.  Perkins,  353,  635,  649. 
Sherwood  v.   Hall,  440. 

V.  Tltman,  465. 
Shewalter  y.  Bergman,  458,  460. 
Shields  y.  Yonge,  327,  328. 
swells  V.  Blackburn,  816. 
Shigley  v.   Snyde,  524. 
Shillito  Company  v.  McClung,  111. 
Shine  Y.  Wilcox,  699. 
Shinners   v.    Proprietors   of   Ijoiks    &. 

Canals,  949,   1054. 
Shipley  v.  Fifty  Associates,   838. 
Shippen  y.  Bowen,  53. 
Shipps  V.  Atkinson,  360. 
Shippy  V.  Village  of  Au  Sable,  98(i. 
Shipwick  V.  Blanchard,  718. 
Shires  y.  Fonda,  J.  &  G.  R.  Co.,  883. 
Shirk  Y.  Shultz,  164. 
Shirlely  y.  Railway  Co.,  777. 
Shirley  y.  Crabb,  083. 
Shlvei-y  v.  Streei)er,  777. 


1226  CASES    CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprisos  pages  l-(!52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue] 


Shock  V.  XlcCliesue3',  519. 
iSlioemakei-  v.  Nesbit,  12(1. 

V.  South  Bend  Spark-Arrester  Co., 
357. 
iShoeufeld  v.  Fleisher,  2S3. 
Shoner  v.  Penusylvanin  Co.,  it.'i;. 
Short  V.  Symmes,  443. 
Shoi'ter  v.  People,  434. 
Shotwell  V.  Dodge,  7.")(i,  809. 
.Shrewsbury  v.  Bawtlitz,  414. 

V.  Blount,   506. 
Shrieve  v.  Stokes,  751. 
Shrimpton  &   Sons  v.   Philbrick,   590. 
Shriver    v.    Sioux   City,    etc.,    R.    Co., 

1004. 
Shropshire  v.  Kennedy,  584. 
Shufeldt  V.  Barlass,  132. 
Shuffler  v.  Turner.  33S. 
Shumacher  v.  St.  Louis  it  S.  F.  K.  Co., 

817,  823,  824. 
Shunnvay  v.  "Walworth  &  N.  Manuf'g 

Co.,  1047. 
•Shurtleff  V.  Parker,  542. 

V.  Stevens,  .■539,  342. 
Shute  V.  Town  of  Princeton,  182. 
Sias  V.  Village  of  Reed  City,  870. 
Sibley  v.  Aldrich,  902. 

V.  Lay,  520. 
Sickles  V.  Xew  Jerse.y  Ice  Co.,  924. 
Siddall  V.  Pacific  Jlills,  1004. 
Sidener  v.  Russell,   014. 
Sieber  v.  Amunson,  313. 
Siegrist  v.  Arnot,  200. 
Siemers  v.  Eisen,  920,  924. 
Sieveklng  v.  Litzler,  579.  .'184. 
Sikes  V.  .Johnson,  160. 
Sillars  v.  Collier,  537. 
Sllsbury  v.  McCoon,  740. 
Silsby  V.  Michigan  Car   Co.,  379,  877. 
Silva  V.  Garcia,  701. 
Silver  V.  Martin,  287. 
Silvey  v.  Lindsey,  135. 
Simkins  v.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  Co.,  817. 
;Simmer  v.  City  of  St.  PjiuI,  379. 
Simmonds  v.  Holmes,  l.j3. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  72. 
.Simmons  v.  Brown,  221,  808. 

V.  East  Tennessee,  V.  &  G.  R.  Co., 
967,  969. 

V.  Everson,  212,  332,  747,  797,  798, 
839. 

V.  Holster,  513.  547. 


Simmons  v.  Jenkins,  o-j2. 

v.   Lillystoue,  720.   730. 

V.  McConnell's  Adm'r.  849. 

v.  Mitchell,  502. 

V.  Xew  Bedford,  V.  &  N.  S.  S.  Co., 
1089. 

V.  St.  Paul  &  C.   Ky.  Co..  944. 

V.  Simmons,   408. 
Simmons'   Adm'r   v.    Louisville   &    N. 

R.  Co.,  824. 
Simmons    Medicine    Co.   v.    Mansfield 

Drug  Co..   147. 
Sim  ins  v.  Eiland,  503. 

V.  Greer,  098. 

v.  South  Carolina  R.  Co.,  874. 
Simons  v.  Buruham,  506,  507,  518,  519, 
547. 

V.  Busby,  4.58,  4.59. 

V,  Monier,  243. 
Simpson  v.  Dufour,  070. 

V.  Grayson,   452,  453,  400. 

v.  Griggs,  850. 

v.  Hartopp,  330. 

v.   Hinson,  738. 

v.  .Mercer,   210. 

V.  New  York  Rubber  Co..  923. 

V.   Savage,  666,  794. 

V.  Wright,  083. 
Sims    V.    American    .Steel    Barge    Co., 
1040. 

V.  Bverhardt,  104. 
Sinclair  v.  Eldred,  628. 

V.  Slawson,  134. 
Slndlinger    v.    City    of    Kansas    City, 

177. 
Siner  v.  Stearne,  252,  2,85. 
Singer  v.  Bender,  18. 
Singer  Co.  v.  King,  720. 
Singer  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Domestic  Sew- 
ing Mach.   Co.,  3.53. 

V.  (Jreenleaf,  296,  722. 

v.  lloldfodt,  305. 

V.  Loog,   551. 

V.  Rahm,  228,  229,  2(iO. 

V.  Stillman,  721. 
Sing  Lee,  Ex  parte.  784. 
Siunette  v.  Hoddick,  739. 
Sinsheimer  v.  United  Garment  Work- 
ers of  America,  357. 
Siordet  v.  Hall,  05. 
Sioux  City  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  1044. 

V.  Stout,  953,  980. 


CASICS    CITED. 


1227 


[Vol.  1  comprises  psges  l-(jri2,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue] 


Slou)!;  City  &  I*.  R.  Oo.  v.  Walker,  2,si. 
Sioux    Nat.     Bank    v.   Xoil'olk    Slate 

Bank,   380. 
Sipple  V.  State,  111.  113. 
Sua  V.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  1002,  1003. 
Sir  John  Bourn's  Case,  485. 
Sir  John  Can  v.  Hood,  '>'M,  530. 
Sir  Wilham  Bolton  v.  Deane,  477. 
:Sisk  V.  Crump,  101,  880,  887. 
Sisson  V.  Johnson,  3.j8. 
Sisson,  Crocker  &  Co.  v.  Johnson,  o.j4. 
Six  Carpenters'  Case,  36,  128,  G7(i.  080, 

081. 
Skaaraas   v.   Finnegan,    280. 
Skelton    v.    Feuton   Electric   Light    & 
Power  Co.,  2:!2.  7V».l. 

V.  London  ^^i  N.  AV.  R.  Co..  832. 
Skenner  v.  Pinney,  738. 
Skinner  v.  Grant,  524. 

V.  Guuton,  101,  003,  038,  030. 

V.  London,  B.  &  S.  C.  R.  Co.,  030, 
10S4. 
Skjeggerud  v.  Railway  Co.,  903. 
Skoglund  V.   Minneapolis  St.  Ry.  Co., 

409,   472. 
Skull  V.  Glenister,  088. 
Slater  v.  Kimbo,  007,  (;20. 

Y.  Mersereau,    212-214. 
Slatteu   V.    Des    Moines     R.    Co.,    140, 

143. 
:Slattery  v.   O'Connell,  988. 
Slaughter  v.  Gerson.  599. 

V.  Metropolitan    St.    Ry.    Co.,    831. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  380. 
Slaughter-House  Case,  775. 
Slauter  v.  Favorite,  564. 
Slayton  v.   Fremont,   E.    &   M.    V.   R. 

Co.,    205,    207,    830. 
Sleath  V.  Wilson,  252. 
;Sleight  v.  Leavenworth,  035. 

V.  Ogle,  430. 
Slight  V.  Gutzlaff,  220,  797. 
Slim  V.  Croueher,  10,  565,  508. 
iSloan  V.  New  York  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  472. 

V.  Schomaker,  o;!l. 
Sloouni  V.  Putnam.  743. 
Sloggy  V.  Dilworth,  413,  797. 
:SmalI  v.  Banfield,  0,32. 

V.  Howard,  914. 
Smart  v.  Blauchard,  485.  530. 
.Smethurst  v.  Barton  Square  lud.  Cong. 
Church,   378,  838. 


l^methurst  v.  Congregational   Church, 

840. 
Smith  V.  Adams,  008. 

V.  Alabama,  02. 

V.  Ashley,  518. 

^•.   Bagwell,  370. 

V.  Baker,  1025. 

V.  Bank,  727. 

V.  Bates.  7;!8. 

V.  Benson,  080. 

V.  Bivens,  358. 

V.  Board  of    County  Com'rs,  182- 
184. 

V.  Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  849. 

V.  Botens,  418. 

V.  Briggs,  700. 

V.  Buchecker,  524. 

V.  Burrus,   530,  537,   008,  609,   015, 
010,  618,  025. 

V.  Carlson,  578. 

V.  Chadwiek,  573,  500,  593,  GOO. 

V.  City  Council  of  Alexandria,  7(i4. 

V.  (.:ity  of  Atlanta,  413. 

V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  950. 

V.  CMty  of  Bella,  17S. 

V.  City  of  Rochester,  180,  808. 

V.  Coe,  485.  499. 

V.  Colby,  735. 

V.  Cologan,  47. 

V.  Condry,  379. 

V.  Conway,  972. 

V.  Cook,  855. 

V.  Davenport,  100. 

V.  District  Township  of  Knox,  127. 

V.  Donohue.  854,  856,  919. 

V.  Drew,  349. 

v.  Faxon,  701. 

V.  Felt,  082. 

V.  Foran,  21(>. 

V.  Force,  707,  710. 

V.  Prompton,  840. 

V.  Gaslight  Co.,  939. 

V.  Goodman,  382. 

V.  Gould,  128,  137. 

V.  Green,  373,  378. 

V.  Griffith,  1070. 

V.  Hall,  025. 

V.  Higgins,  533. 

V.  Hintrager.  OOS. 

V.  Holmes,  i;!:;.  si4,  911. 

V.  Howard,  528. 

V.  Hughes,  500. 


]228 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1   comprises  pages  1-G52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Smith  V.  lugersoU-Sergeant  Roclv  Diill 
Co.,  14S,  805. 

V.  Ingram,  (J(iL'. 

V.  .Tensen,  727. 

V.  Johnson,  .")ij. 

V.  .Jones,  404,  417. 

V.  Judkins,  V.VA. 

V.  Kenrick,  ."i.~i7,  7.17. 

V.  King,  ()20,  (■>23. 

V.  Ivron,  IGO. 

V.  Land  Corporation,  si 5. 

V.  Lawrence,  247. 

V.  Ijowis,  ]27. 

V.  Library  Board  ot  City  of  ilin- 
neapolis,  001. 

V.  Lloyd,  U(;i. 

V.  Lockwood,  349. 

V.  London  &  .St.  K.  Docks  Co.,  ISO. 

V.  Lykr,  4GG. 

V.  Mabou,  (124. 

V.  lIcAdam,  849. 

V.  McConathy,  709. 

V.  McDaniel,  Ul.j. 

V.  MacDonald,  018. 

V.  McDowell,  74."i,  706. 

V.  JIarrable,  577. 

V.  JIasten,  401,  458,  466. 

V.  MattliCAVs,  .520. 

V.  Mattingly.  007,  698,  704. 

V.  Meiser,  698. 

V.  Milles,  672. 

V.  Morse,  773. 

V.  Newsam,  432^34. 

V.  New  York,  179. 

V.  NicoUs,  321. 

V.  Packet  Co.,  277. 

V.  Pelah,  8.j7. 

V.  Peoiile,  (H9. 

V.  Pettingill,  092. 

V.  Philadelphia,  179. 

V.  Phillips,  774. 

V.  Putnam,  787. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  71, 78, 165, 104,  202, 
265,  266,  314,  330.  369,  371,  373, 
384,  389,  394,  401,  406,  408, 110, 
759,  791,  811,  819,  836,  845,  84(;, 
851,  860,  861,  930,  940,  942,  051, 
953,  908,  988,  1020,  1034,  1035, 
1055,  1075,  1081. 

V.  Reynolds.  253. 

V.  Richard,  454. 

V.  Richards,  569,  581. 


Sniitli  Y.  Rodecap,  60. 

V.  Ryan.  704. 

V.  The  SeratJis,  869. 

V.  Simon,  2(J3. 

V.  Smith,   404,   51.H.    542.    596,    009, 
601,  694. 

V.  Spitz,  279. 

V.  Spooner,  553. 

V.  State,  200,  420,  432. 

V.  Steamship  Co.,  318. 

V.  Stewart,  495. 

V.  Sun  Printing  &  I>ub.  Ass'n,  475. 
493,  513. 

V.  Sutton,  522. 

V.  Thackerah,  79,  751. 

v.  Thayer,  759. 

V.  Washington,  t^. 

V.  "Webster,  275,  279,  654. 

V.  "\^'eeks,  632. 

V.  Whiting,  360. 

V.  Whit+ier,  402,  807. 

V.  Wood,    199,    481,    522.   546,    714, 
717. 

V.  Young,  727. 
Smithers  v.  Harrison,  524. 
Smiths  V.  McConathy,  82,  749. 
Smith's  Case,  509. 
Smothers  v.  Hanks,  912,  913. 
Smyrl  v.  Nivlon,  1002. 
Smyth  V.  Bangor,  178. 

V.  Carter,  702,  704. 
Snapp  V.  Roclie,  342. 
Snashall  v.  Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.,  312, 

470. 
Sneeden  v.  Harris,  610,  613. 
Sneesby  v.  Lancashire,  etc.,  Co.,  78. 
Snell  V.  Thorp,  714. 
Snider  v.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  305. 

V.  City  of  St.  Paul,  174,  178. 
Snow  V.  AUev,  297. 

V.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  893. 

V.  Judson,  550. 

V.  Parsons,  91. 

V.  Wheeler,  643. 

V.  Whitehead,  757. 
Snowden  v.  Wilas,  686. 
Snyder  v.  Andrews,  481. 

V.  Cabell,  770,  794. 

V.  Fulton,  5.34. 

V.  Hopkins,  705. 

V.  Patterson,  856. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  197,  2.55. 


CASES    CITED. 


1229. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pag:es  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Suyder  v.  Suyder,  13,  1.54. 

Sobieski  v.  St.  Paul  L»t  D.  R.  Co.,  31.^, 

956,  1001. 
Sodowsky  v.  M'Faland,  900. 
Solinsky  v.  Lincoln  Sav.  Bank,  07."), 
Sollund  V.  John.son,  5G3. 
Solms  V.  Lias,  384,  809. 
Soloman  v.  ^^'ass,  217. 
Solomon  v.   Master,   etc.,   of  Vintners' 
Co.,  7.-i2. 

V.  Traver,  698. 
Solomons  v.  Dawes,  728. 
Soltau  V.  De  Hold,  745,  780,  781,  803. 
Solverson  v.  Peterson,  494,  495. 
SomeiTllle  v.  Hawkins,  517,  544. 
Sommer  v.  Wilt,  034. 
Sorenson  v.  Davis,  668. 

V.  Dundas,   421. 
Sosat  V.  State,  152. 
Souter  V.  Codman,  441. 
South  V.  Deniston,  454. 
Southam  v.  Allen,  506. 
Southard  v.  Minneapolis,  St.  P.  &  S. 

S.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  308. 
South  Carolina  R.  Co.  v.  JXoore,   783. 
Southcombe  v.  Armstrong,  .545. 
Southcote  V,  Stanley,  35,  22G,  280,  892, 

894,  896,  897. 
South   Covington  &   C.    S.  Ry.   Co.   v. 

Gest,  SCO. 
Southeast  &  St.  L.  R.   Co.  v.  Stotlar, 

883. 
Southern  v.  How,  249. 
Southern  Bell  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Con- 
stantino, 143,  679. 
Southern   Development   Co.    v.    Silva, 

578. 
Southerne  v.  Howe,  245,  575. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Brown,  825. 

v.  Hess,  1073. 

V.  Hunnicutt,  307. 

V.  Moon,  306. 

V.  Newby,  309. 

V.  Seide,  306. 

V.  Wormack,  1063. 
Southern    Kansas   Ry.    Co.    v.    Clark, 
1077. 

V.  Drake,  1050. 

V.  Moore,  1019. 
Southern   Pac.    Co.    v.   Amnions,    370, 
377. 

V.  Hamilton.  242,  424. 


Southern   Pac.    Co.   v.    Kennedy,   2.5.), 
263. 

V.  Seley,  963,  996. 

V.  Tomlinson,    942. 
Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Oak- 
land, .3.53. 

v.  Dufour,  75(j. 

V.  Latlerty,  2(;(;,  992,  lOoO. 
South    Florida    R.    Co.   v.    Price,   914, 

1038. 
South  Royalton  Bank  v.  Suffolk  Bank, 

56,  146,  772. 
South  Western  Ry.  Co.  v.  Panlk,  330. 
Southwestern  Tel  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Crank, 
211. 

v.  Robinson,  70.  863. 
Southwick  V.  Stevens,  507. 
Southworth  v.  Lathrop,  185. 
South  &  N.  A.  R.  Co.  V.  Henlein,  1075. 
Sowles  V.  Moore,  62,  755,  SSd 
Spackman    v.    Foster,    722,    724,    727, 

735. 
Spades  v.  Murray,  680. 
Spaids  V.  Barrett,  349,  528. 
Spaight  V.  McGovern,  153. 
Spalts  V.  Poundstone',  479,  480. 
Spalding  v.  Oakes'  Adm'r,,  774. 
Spall  V.  JIassey,  477. 
Spargur  v.  Heard,  690,  754. 

V.  Romine,  322. 
Sparhawk    v.    Union    Passenger    Ry. 

Co.,  749,  707. 
Sparks  v.  Heritage,  707. 
Spaulding  v.  Overmire,  137. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  841,  845,  846. 

V.  W.    X.   Flynt  Granite   Co.,   967, 
095. 
Spealman  v.  Jlissouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  414. 
Spear  v.   Cummings,  461. 

V.  Sweeney,  393,  44(). 

V.  Tidball,  :'.23. 
Speed  V.  Hollingsworth,  3G1,  .581. 
Speight  V.  Oliviera,  452,  453. 
Speir  V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  178. 
Spellman    v.    Lincoln   Rapid    Transit 

Co.,  10.58,  1084,  10,S5. 
Spence  v.  Schultz,  236,  238. 
Spencer  v.  Campbell,  847,  851. 

V.  M'Gowen,  677. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  3S4.  846.  847.  929, 
975. 
Spensley  v.  Lancashire  Ins.  Co.,  443. 


i2;i0 


CASES    CITED. 


LVol.  1  comprises  imises  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Sperb    V.    Metropolitan    El.    Ry.    Co., 

141. 
Spioe  V.  Stoinruek,  031. 
Spicer  v.  Railroad  Co.,,  377,  4(Mi. 

Y.  South  Boston  Iron  Co.,  1011. 
Spill  V.  Maule,  .j30. 

Spillane  v.  Jlissonri  Pac.  Ry.  Co..  '.>S7. 
Spitze  V.  Railroad  Co.,  314,  ol."i. 
Splittorf  V.  State,  113. 
SpofCord  V.  Harlow,  102,  !)2(;,  '.)72. 
Spohn  V.  Jlissonri  Pac.  Ry.  Co..  10;jl. 
Spokane  Truck  &  Dray  Co.  v.  Hoefer, 

.Sll),  887. 
Spooner  v.  Delaware.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co., 
9G0. 

V.  Holmes,  734,  730. 

V.  Manchester,  717,  720. 
Spoor  V.  Spooner,  420. 
Spotorno  v.  Ifourichon,  487. 
Spotts  V.  Wabash  West.  Ry.  Co.,  SCO. 
Sprague  v.  Baker,  lllO. 

V.  Gibson,  617. 

V.  Locke,  3.o4. 

V.  Raihoad  Co.,  677. 
Spraigens  v.  Houghton,  135. 
Spraights  v.  Hawley,  720. 
Sprang   v.    New    York    Cent.    R.    Co., 

1001. 
Spray  v.  Amraerman,  153. 
Springer  v.  Byram,  1081. 

V.  Gi'ooni,   727. 
Springfield  v.  Spence,  170. 
Springfield   Engine   &   Thresliing   Co. 

V.  Green,  614. 
Springfield   Fire   &   Marine   Ins.    Co., 

V.  "N'illage  of  Keeseville,  919. 
Sproat  V.  Directors  of  Poor,  187,  850. 
Sproul   V.   Henimingway,   228.   241. 

V.  Pillsbury,  480. 
Spurr  V.  Railroad  Co.,  345. 
Spurrier  v.  Front  St.   Cable  Ry.  Co., 

879,  942. 
Squier  v.  Gould,  391. 
Squiers  v.  Neenah,  137. 
Squire  v.  Campbell,  583. 

V.  Hollenbeck,   009. 

V.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  1074. 
Staal's  Case,  963. 
Staat  V.   Evans,   207. 
Staco  V.  Grifiith,   .543. 
Stackman   v.    Chicago   &  N.    W.    Ry. 
Co.,  007. 


Stackpole  v.  Railway  Co.,   720. 
Stacy  V.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.,  62. 

v.  :\Iilwaukee.    L.    S.    &    W.    Ry. 
Co.,  844,  845. 
Stadtfeld  v.  Henlsman.  0(55. 
Stafford  v.    Azbell,    732,   898. 

V.  City  of  Oskaloosa,  381. 

V.  Morning     Journal     Ass'n,    494,. 
550. 
Stahl  V.   Grover,   609. 

V.  Mitchell,  1032. 
Stainton  v.   AVoolrycli,  759,  814. 
Stall  V.   A^'ilbur,  707. 
Stanard   Milling    Co.    v.    White    JAue- 

Cent.  Transit   Co.,   299,   1070. 
Stancill   v.   Calvert,   687. 
Standard    Life    &    Ace.    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Jones,  105. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Tierney,  848,  945. 
Standish  v.  Babcock,  725. 
Stanfield  v.   Phillips,   398,   629. 
Stanhope  v.  SwafiEord,  2iJ2. 
Stanley  v.  Chicago  &  W.  M.  Ry.  Co., 
1022. 

v.  Gaylord,    055,   082,   70S,   722. 

V.  McGauran,  599. 

V.  Powell,   53,  54,  437,   475. 

r.  Union   Depot   R.    Co.,   68,    375, 
977. 

V.  AVebb,  532,  533. 
Stannard  v.  UlUthorne,  917. 
Stansbury  v.   Fogle,   613. 
Stanton  v.  Hart,  611. 

V.  Hennessey,  324. 

V.  Louisville,    etc.,    I{.   Co.,    69. 

V.  Metropolitan  R.   Co.,    194. 

V.  Richardson,  1068. 
Staple  V.   Heydon,  764. 

V.  Spring,  809. 
Staples  V.  Schmid,  253,  263,  279,  395. 

V.  Smith,   605. 
Stark   V.    Chetwood,    5.53,    5.54. 
Staikie  v.  Richmond,  3.54. 
Starling  v.  Turner,  135. 
Starnes  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  305. 
Starr  v.   Bennett,  581. 

V.  Jackson,   665,  692. 
Starry  v.  Korab,  584. 
State  y.  Adams,  55. 

V.  Andrews,  629,  634. 

V.  Armfield,  674. 

V.  Armstrong,  481. 


CASES    CITED. 


l-i.-JL 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pagos  1-6.52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


State 

V.  Babcock,  214. 

State 

V. 

Ball,  777. 

V. 

V. 

Beck,  200. 

V. 

V. 

Beckner,   (J74. 

V. 

V. 

Beidetta.    783. 

V. 

V. 

Bertheol,   770. 

V. 

V. 

Board  of  Education,   1.^0. 

V. 

V 

Board    of    Health    of    City    of 

V. 

Newark,    783. 

V. 

V. 

Boyce,  332. 

V. 

V. 

Bryson,  153. 

V. 

V. 

Buchanan,   (i49. 

V. 

V. 

Buckley,    770. 

V. 

V. 

Burnham,   ll.'i,   640. 

V. 

V. 

Burroughs,  .503. 

V. 

V. 

Burwell,  441. 

V. 

V. 

Buswell.    914. 

V. 

V. 

Carey,  914. 

V. 

V. 

Chase,  3.51. 

V. 

V. 

Cherry,  433. 

V. 

V. 

Church,  434,  435. 

V. 

V. 

City    of   Mobile,   7G5,   804,    80.-.. 

V. 

V. 

Clyne,   513. 

V. 

V. 

Cooper,  204. 

V. 

V. 

Copp,  118. 

V. 

V. 

Cox.  410. 

V. 

V. 

Crawford,  806. 

V. 

\'. 

Croteau,  031. 

V. 

V. 

Crow.  432,  433. 

y. 

V. 

Daltou,   i;!2. 

V. 

V. 

Daniels,   135. 

V. 

^ . 

Davis,  433. 

V. 

V. 

Do  Witt,  049. 

V. 

V. 

Dixon,    430. 

V. 

V. 

Donaldson.  049. 

V. 

V. 

Dooley,   G77. 

V. 

Earnhardt.    784. 

V. 

V. 

Farley,  785. 

V. 

V. 

Fleming,   785. 

V. 

V. 

Fox,  378,  580,   814,  8.58,  90S. 

V. 

V. 

Glidden,   042,   649. 

V. 

\. 

Godfrey,   9,   433. 

V. 

V. 

Gordon,  135. 

V. 

V. 

Graham,    770. 

V. 

V. 

Gramelspaeher,  699. 

V. 

V. 

Haines,   769. 

V. 

V. 

Hamton,  432. 

V. 

V. 

Harris,   21,    129. 

V. 

V. 

Hastings,    118,    120. 

V. 

V. 

Hathaway,  914. 

V. 

V. 

Hill.    130. 

V. 

V. 

Holman,   793. 

V. 

V.  Hoover,  449. 
Hope,   738,  730. 
Home,   435. 
Hunter,  418,  426,  428. 
Johnson.   124. 
Jones,    444,    914. 
Jungling,  302,  034. 
Kellogg,   914. 
Linkhaw,  707. 
Lonsdale,   .541. 
Lunsford,  421. 
McEuturff,   785. 
Mclntire,   481. 
Magee,  5S:!. 
ilartin,  435. 
Mason,  473,  475. 
Mayberry,  637. 
Merritt,  432. 
Meyer,  134,  (JOS. 
Middleham,  441. 
Millard,   770. 
Moore,  768. 
Morgan,    435. 
Mosher,  914. 
Myers,   438. 
Neeley,  431,  435. 
Neidt,   783. 
Norton,   049. 
O'Brien,  10S5. 
Olympic  Club,  203. 
Osborn,   491. 
Peacock,  441. 
Powell,  770. 
Prather,   584. 

Railway  Co..  77.  300,  313,  314. 
333,   337,   043,  077,  083,  1072. 
Eawlea,   435. 
Remhoff,  85(;. 
Rhodes,  463. 
Robe.  770. 
Sauer,  973. 
Saunders,  785. 
Schmitt,   537. 
Schoonover,   414. 
Sears.   9. 
Shepard,  9. 

Sheriff  of  Ramsey  Co.,  789. 
Shipman,    435. 
Shoemaker,  480. 
Smith,  9,  245,  433,  676. 
Stanley,   785. 
Stevens,  414. 


1-32  CASES    CITED 

[Vol.  1  coniprisi'.s  pages  l-(iril',   imhisivo;  vol.  '2  tlie  residue.] 


State  V.  Stewart,  (M2,  V,4'.). 

V.  Supervisors,  li'8. 

V.  Suttle,   754. 

V.  Tall,   11. 

Y.  Tittman,   099. 

V.  Toole,    770. 

V.  Torinus,   4o,   111. 

V.  Township    Committee    of    Nep- 
tune, S07. 

V.  Trask,  764. 

V.  Tweod.v.   439. 

v.  United  States,   112. 

V.  A';inderbilt,  444. 

V.  Van  Doran,  914. 

V.  Walford,  130. 

T.  Wilkinson,   784. 

V.  Wolever,  119,  121. 

V.  AVolf.  783. 
State  Auditor  v.    Atchison,   T.   &    S. 

F.   R.   Co.,   120. 
State  of  Virginia,  The,  3(t3. 
State  Steamship,   In  re,   103. 
Staton  V.   Norfolk  &  C.   R.   Co.,  747, 

703. 
Staub  V.   Benthuysen,  481. 
Steamship  Co.  v.  .TolifCe,  21. 
Stearns  v.  Atlantic  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 
846. 

V.  Marsh,  738. 

V.  Miller,  122. 

V.  Sampson,  50,  430. 
Stearns'    Ex'r   v.   City   of   Richmond, 

751. 
Stedman   v.    Smith,    668. 
Steel  V.   Kurtz,   334. 

V.  Metcalf.    392. 

V.  Southeastern  Ry.  Co.,  230,  232, 
23a. 

V.  State  Line  S.  S.  Co.,  1068. 

V.  Williams,   631. 
Steele   v.    Brannan.    533. 

V.  Burkhardt,  192,  193,  025. 

V.  Crabtree,   131. 

V,  McTyet,  1058. 

V.  Marsicano,   736. 

V.  President  Western  Inland  Lock 
Nav.   Co.,   186. 

V.  Schricker,    713. 

V.  Southwick,   489,    506. 
Steen  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  1021. 
Steffen  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
936. 


Stelleuson  v.  Railway  Co.,  1055. 

Stein  V.   Burden,  82. 

Steinam  v.   Bell,   8'.i8. 

Steinbach  v.  Hill,  307. 

Steiner  v.  Clisby,  28. 

Steinhauser  v.   Spraul,   220,  281,   991, 

995,  1010. 
Steinke  v.  Bentley,  412,  744,  797. 

V.  Diamond  Match  Co.,  11152. 
Steinmetz  v.   Kelly,  439,  901. 
Steinweg  v.   Erie  R.  Co.,  1089. 
Stellwagen   \.   City  of   "Winona,   809. 
SteiDhens  y.   Benson,  086. 

V.  Elwall,  286,  719. 

V.   Myers,   431. 
Stephenson  v.   Brown,   0.54. 

V.  Flagg.   302. 

V.  Hall.  401. 

V.  Hart,  719. 

Y.  Little,  190. 

Y.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  205,  907. 

V.  Wilson,  656. 
Sterger  v.  Van  Sicklen,  224,  225,  891, 

897. 
Sterling  v.  Jackson,  079. 

Y.  Warden,  084,  686,  688. 
Stem  Y.  Katz,  496. 
Sternwald  v.   Siegel,  074. 
Stetler  v.  Chicago  &  N.   W.  Ry.  Co., 

1035. 
Stetson  Y.  Faxon,  705,  808. 

Y.  Riggs,   592.   000. 
Stevens  Y.  Able,  297. 

Y.  Allen,    504,   570,    580,    592,   597. 

v.  Armstrong,   241. 

v.  Austin,  728. 

Y.  Curtis,   718. 

Y.  Dudly,  377. 

V.  Eanes.  732. 

Y.  Elwall.   735. 

v.  Fassett,   021. 

Y.  Hlnshelwood,  279. 

v.  Jeacocke,  0.5!),  919. 

V.  Kelley,  57,  557. 

Y.  Metropolitan  Ins.  Co.,  619. 

Y.  Nichols,  891. 

T.  Pantlind,  227. 

v.  Railroad     Co.,     168,     616,     998, 
10.50. 

Y.  Walker,  916. 
Stevenson,  The  J.  C,  1061. 
Stevenson  v,  Belknap,  457. 


CASES    CITED.  J  2o'o 

[^'ol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusii-e;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Stevenson  v.  l''itzgerald,  709. 

V.  Gelstborpe,  'Ji;j. 

V.  Newnliam,  773. 

V.  Smith,  384. 

V.  Valentine,  732. 

T.  Watson,  US. 
Stevens  Point  Boom  Co.  v.  Reilly,  75-4. 
Steward  v.  Gromett,  606,  Oil. 

V.   young,    551-.j.j3. 
Stewart  v.  Balderston,  297. 

V.  Benninger,  677. 

V.  Bright,  711,  741. 

V.  Broolilyn  Ily.  Co.,  262. 

V.  Chadwiek,   753. 

V.  Cincinnati,  W.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  892. 

V.  City  of  Clinton,  704. 

V.  Cooley,  117. 

V.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.,  319. 

V.  Hall,  528. 

V.  Harvard  College,  1011. 

V.  Lovell,  512. 

V.  Martin,  342. 

V.  Minnesota     Tribune     Co.,     493, 
501,  311. 

V.  Ohio   River   R.    Co.,  936,    1014. 

V.  Paruell,  283. 

V.  Pierce,  495. 

V.  Raab,  914. 

T.  Ripon,  370,  381,  lOGO. 

V.  Sonneborn,  620,  626. 

V.  Southard,  86,  118. 

V.  Stearns,   572,  590,   597. 

V.  Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  Co.,  334. 

V.  Thompson,  605. 

V.  Tribune  Co.,  540. 

V.  Wilson,  485,  499. 

V.  Wyoming    Cattle    Ranch    Co., 
576. 
Stickney  v.  Bronson,  401. 

V.  Jourdan.  602. 

T.  Town,  69. 
Stiff  V.  Fisher,  362. 
Stiles  V.  Cardiff  Steam  Nav.  Co.,  170. 

V.  Geesey,  973. 

V.  Laird,  799. 

V.  Tilford,  459. 
Stilling  V.  Town  of  Thorp,  174. 
Stillson  V.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co., 

985. 
Stillwell  V.  Farrell,  721,  730. 
Stilwell  V.  Barter,  523. 
Stimer  v.  Bryant,  623. 

LAW  OF  TOHTS— 78 


Stimmel  v.  Brown,  751,  809. 
Stimpson  v.  Connecticut  River  R.  Co., 

1077. 
Stimson  v.  Farnham,  81,  83. 
Stitt  V.  Little,  563,  591. 
Stitzell  V.   Reynold.?,  510. 
Stix  V.   liadler,  564. 
Stock  V.  City  of  Boston.  898. 
Stockdale    v.    Hansard,    85,    115,    520, 
532. 

V.  Onwhyn,  190. 
Stocking  V.  Howard,  605,  <;21. 
Stockley  v.   Hornidge,   015. 
Stockton  V.  Frey,  315,  732. 
Stockwell     V.     Townshijp     Board     of 
White  Lake,  119. 

V.  United  Sfates,  291. 
Stoddard  v.  Inhabitants  of   Winches- 
ter, 181. 

V.  Village    of     Saratoga    Springs, 
176,  180,  708. 
Stofflet  V.  Stofflet,  379. 
Stokes  V.  Burney,  293. 

V.  Saltonstall,  967,  1084. 

V.  Stokes,   494. 
Stoltz  V.  Kretschmar,  606. 
Stone  V.  Bumpus,  91. 

V.  Cartwright,  285. 

V.  Cheshire  R.  Corp.,  230. 

V.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.. 
393. 

V.  Chicago  &  W.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  310. 

T.  City  of  New  York,  410. 

V.  Denny,  563-565. 

V.  Dickinson,  214,  342. 

V.  Dry-Dock,   E.  B.   &  B.   R.   Co., 
161,  943. 

V.  Evans,  470. 

V.  Graves,  117,  118. 

V.  Groton  B.  &  M.  Co.,  104. 

V.  Hills,  278. 

V.  Hunt,  751. 

v.  Knapp,  081. 

V.  State,  112,  133,  836. 

V.  Stevens,  605. 

V.  Town  of  Poland,  950. 

V.  Weiller,  317. 
Stoolfoos  V.  Jenkins,  105. 
Storer  v.  Eaton,  283. 

V.  Gowen,  819. 
Storey  v.  Ashton,  278. 

V.  Challands,  542. 


12?A  CASES    CITED. 

[A  i>l.   1    comprises  pdRes  1-G52,  inclusivo;   vol.   2  the  residue.] 


Storey  v.  Wallace,  3-16. 
Storrs  V.  Barker,  582. 

V.  City  of  Utica,  234. 

V.  Feick,  CDS. 
Story  V.  Challard,  540. 

V.  Downey,   220. 

V.  Odin,   tJGl,   750. 
Stoi-y  &  I.  Commercial  Co.  v.   Story, 

710.  7o2. 
Stoudeumire  v.   De  Bardelabeu,    7():J. 
Stoudt  V.   Shepherd,  450,  457,  460. 
Stough  V.   State,  913. 
Stoughton  V.  JIauufacturers'   Natural 

Gas  Co.,  967. 
Stout  V.  McAdams,  754. 

V.  Wren,  200. 
Stovall  V.   Smith,  304. 
Stowe  V.   Heywood,  395,  460,  407. 
Stowell  V.  Lincoln,  90,  307. 
Strahlendorf  v.  Rosentahl,  1007. 
Straight  v.  Burn,  750. 
Strand  v.  Chicago  &  W.  M.  Ry.  Co., 

958. 
Strang  v.  Ryau,  91. 

V.  Whitehead,  029. 
Strange  v.  Powell,  414. 
Stratton  v.   Central  City   H.   R.    Co.. 
935. 

V.  Lockhart,  615,  621. 
Straub  v.  Eddy,  926. 
Straus  V.  Barnett,  807. 
Strauss  v.  Dundon,  633. 
Street  v.  Gugell,  749. 

V.  Tugwell,  707. 
Street  R.  Co.  v.  Nolthenius,  944. 
Streiff  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  176. 
Strickfaden  v.   Zipprick,   118. 
Strickland  t.  Barrett,  735. 

V.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.,  066. 
Strickler  v.  Midland  R.  Co.,  337. 
Striegel  V.  Moore,  50. 
Stringer  v.  Frost,  877. 
Stringham  v.  Hilton,  1011.  1044. 

V.  Stewart,  1052. 
Strodder   v.    Stone   Jlonntain   Granite 

Co.,  320. 
Strode  v.  Clement,  510,  531. 
Stroebel  v.   N^'hitney,  505. 
Strohl  T.  Levan,  100. 
Strong  V.  Campbell,  130. 

V.  Iowa  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  1028. 

V.  Strong,  32;!. 


Strong's  Estate,  In  re,  205. 
Strouse  v.  Leipf ,  220,  221,  850. 
Strout  V.  Goocli,  421. 

V.  Millbridge,  754. 

y.  Packard,  040. 
Struck  V.   Chicago,    M.    &  St.    P.    Ity. 

Co.,  883,  884. 
Strudley  v.  Railway  Co.,  871. 
Strutzel  V.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  198, 

988. 
Stryker  v.  Crane,  858. 
Stuart  V.  Bell,  513,  530. 

V.  Crawley,  1075. 

V.  Phelps,  718. 
Stubbs  V.  Beene,  916. 
Stuber  v.  McEntee,  312,  955. 
Stubley  v.  Railroad  Co.,  883,  9:!3. 
Studwell  V.   Shapter,  165. 
StufHebeam  v.  Montgomery,  751,  787 
Stumer  v.  Pitchman,  504. 
Stump  V.  McNau-y,  800. 
Stumps  V.  Kelley,  18. 
Sturam  v.  Hummell,  465. 
Sturges  V.  Bridgman,  792. 

V.  Keith,  718. 

V.  Society,  232-234. 

V.  Warren,  694. 
Sturgis  V.  Kountz,  71. 
Sturgiss  V.  Bissell,  1076. 
Stm-man  v.  Stone,  707. 
Sturtevant  v.  Root,  510. 
Stutz  v.  Armom',  1043. 

V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  370. 
Stuyvesant  v.  Wilcox,  441. 
Suarez  v.  Railway  Co.,  141. 
Submarine  Tel.  Co.  v.  Dickson,  376. 

v.  Dixson,  280. 
Sufifern  v.  Butler,  318. 
Sullivan  v.  City  of  Syracuse,  930. 

v.  Huese,  91. 

V.  Louisville  Bridge  Co.,  979. 

V.  Murphy,  50,  105. 

V.  O'Hara,  696,  703. 

V.  Rabb,  092. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  190,  327,  :!!)5,  449, 
892,  939,  953,  1020,  1031,  1033, 
1035,  1043,  1084,  1085. 

V.  Scriptm-e,  880. 

V.  ShankUn,   124. 

V.  Sullivan,  482. 

V.  ^^'aters,  897. 

V.  Zeiner,  752,  753. 


CASES    ClTliD. 


12a:. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  i-esidue.J 


Sultaiia,  The,  v.   Chapman,  10Gi>. 
Summ'erfleld  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  360. 
Summersett  v.  Jarvis,  205. 
Suubury  lus.  Co.  v.  Humble,  27u. 
SiinUeiiiu  v.  Bradstreet,  531,  ."J4l. 
Sunman  v.  Brewin,  521. 
Surocco  V.  Geary,  149. 
Susquehanna  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Malone, 

7Gt),  T71,  777,  778,  787. 
Sutherland  v.  Ingalls,  210,  240,  255. 
SutiJhen    v.    Town    of    North    Hemp- 
stead, 177. 
Sutton  V.  Buck,  712. 
V.  Clarke,  138,  142. 
V.  Huffman,  452. 
V.  Johnstone,  529,  (il5,  023. 
V.  ilcConnell,   619,   023. 
V.  Moody,  059. 
V.  Morgan,  590. 
V.  Smith,   199. 

V.  Town   of   Wauwatosa,   77,   194. 
Sutton  &  Ash  V.  Curd,  88. 
Suydam  v.  Jenkins,  741. 
V.  Jloffat,  .">28. 
V.  Moore,  243. 
Svenson   v.   Atlantic    Mail   S.    S.    Co., 

1034-1036. 
Swaboda's  Case,  9.55. 
Swadley  y.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  950, 

993. 
Swain  v.  Fom-teenth  St.  R.  Co.,  861. 
Swaine  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  804. 
Swainson   v.   Railway   Co.,   281,  1034, 

1037. 
Swan,  In  re,  785. 

V.  Tappan,  5.53. 
Swann  v.  Rary,  52.). 
Swanson  v.  City  of  Lafayette,  1003. 

V.  French,  938. 
Swantz  V.  Pillow,  717. 
Swart  V.  Rickard,  425. 
Sweat   V.   Boston  &  A.   R.   Co.,  1009, 

1011. 
Sweeney  v.  Baker,  537. 

V.  Berlin  &  J.  Env.  Co.,  995. 
V.  Lomme,  133. 
Sweeny  v.  Barrett,  891,  89;!. 

V.  Old   Colony    iV   N.    R.    Co.,   195. 

800,  892. 

V.  Torrcnce,  038. 

Sweet  V.  Barney,  1057. 

V.  Sprague,  801. 


SweetUind  v.  Stetson,  609. 
Sweetzer  v.  Boston  iV:  M.  R.  Co.,  200. 
Sweu.s«uard  v.  Davis,  Oil. 
Swenson  v.  Kleinschmidt,  71(j. 
Swett  V.  Cutts,  758,  760. 
Swift  V.  < 'liamberlain,  610. 

V.  Dickcrman,  493,  497. 

V.  .James,   707. 
Swinarton  v.  Le  Boutillier,  263. 
Swindell  v.  Houck,  025,  029. 
Swinfen  v.  Chelmsford,  915. 
Swintin  v.  Lowry,  380. 
Swire  v.  Francis,  209. 
Syeds  v.  Hay,  714. 
Sykes  v.  Dixson,  450. 
Sylvester  v.  Jerome,  357,  705. 

V.  Maag,  856. 
Syme  v.  Richmond  &  D.  li.  Co.,  831. 
Symonds  v.  Hall,  133. 


Taaffe  v.  Downs,  120. 
Tabart  v.  Tipper,  473. 
Tabert  v.  Cooley,  620. 
Tabler  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.   R.   Co., 

1011. 
Taft  V.   New  York,   P.   &  B.    R.   Co., 

078,  929. 
Tagg  T.  McGeorge,  1005. 
Taggard  v.  Innes,  155. 
Tain  tor  v.  Mayor  of  Morristown,  6.12. 
Tait  V.  Thomas,  414. 
Talbot  V.  New  York  &  H.  R.  Co.,  691. 
Talbott  V.  King,  784,  806. 
Talley  v.  Courter,  969. 
Tallon  V.  Tallon,  206. 
Tally  V.  Ayers,  50,  822. 
Talmage  v.  Smith,  438. 
Talty  V.  City  of  Atlantic,  831. 
Tanco   V.   Booth,   293. 
Tangier,  The,  1069. 
Tangney  v.  J.  B.  ^^'ilson  &  Co.,  lOoS. 
Tanner   v.    Trustees,   etc.,   of   Albion, 

777. 
Tunner"s  E.Y'r  v.   Itailroad  Co.,   944. 
Tapling  v.  Jones.   88,   94.   750. 
Tupp  v.  Lee,  502. 
Ta])paii  V.  I'owers,  640. 
Tapscott  V.  Lycin,  206. 
Tarlton  v.  M'Ga^^ley,  379. 


1236 


CASES    CITED. 


[■\'ol.  1  eoiiiijrisos  piiges  l-(ir>i;,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Tarpley  v.  Blaby,  477,  Si-"). 

Tarry  v.  Asliton,  235,  .174,  771,  S-tO,  939. 

V.  Brown,  6(i9. 
Tasbrough  v.  Day,  387. 
Tasker  v.  Stanley,  4(i(),  407. 
Tate  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  17G. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  802. 

V.  Watts,  (J02. 
Tatnall  y.  Courtuey,  307,  44.'5. 
Tatton  y.  Wade,  20,  590. 
Taylor  v.  Abbott,  7.jG. 

V.  Ashton,  50-5,  500. 

V.  Bidwell,  5-5,  127. 

V.  Bowers,  713. 

V.  Bradley,  400. 

V.  Cburcli,  541. 

y.  City  of  Cumberland,  70S. 

y.  Clemenson,  123. 

V.  Cole,- 602. 

V.  Coolidge,  430. 

V.  Doremus,  118. 

A-.  Ellington,  504. 

V.  Felder,  099,  738. 

T.  Fickas,  758. 

V.  Meckenstein,  590. 

y.  Cionnan,  917. 

V.  (ireen,   22'2. 

y.  Guest,  503. 

V.  Hawkins,  516,  540. 

V.  Hayes,  070. 

y.  Holman,  825. 

V.  Jones,  081. 

V.  Kneeland,  511,  513. 

V.  Larkin,  326. 

y.  Lyon,  727. 

V.  Moore,  130,  132. 

V.  Newman,  152. 

y.  Peckliam,  838. 

V.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  1084.  1088. 

y.  Perkins,  509. 

v.  Plymoutb,  150. 

V.  Pope,  735. 

y.  Railroad    Co.,    170,    019,    1035, 
1008,  1089. 

V.  Rainbow,   -50. 

V.  Saurmau,  597. 

V.  Shelkett,  459. 

Y.  Smitb,  27. 

V.  Stendall,  841. 

T.  Strong,  428. 

V.  Whitehead,  678. 


Taylor,  B.  &  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Jlontgom- 

ery,  300. 
Taylor  Co.  v.  Stanley,  040. 
Taylor's   Adm'r   v.    South    Covington 

&  C.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  195. 
Taylor's  Case,  007. 
Teagaiden  v.  Hetfield,  365,  38-5. 
Teague  y.  Irwin,  580. 
Teall  y.  Felton,  l.".s. 
Tear  v.  Freebody,  727. 
Teanaey  v.  Smith,  129,  704. 
Tebbutt  V.  Bristol  &  Exeter  Ry.  Co., 

280. 
Tefft  V.  Wilcox,  913,  914. 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  Texas,  302. 
Temperton   v.   Russell,  035,   038,  045, 

640. 
Temple  v.  Mead,  1.35. 

V.  Turner,  4. 
Templemore  v.  Moore,  694. 
Templeton  v.  Linn  Co.,  183. 
Tenant  v.  Goldwin,  39,  663. 
Tenck  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.,  169. 
Tenhopen  v.  Walker,  152,  395. 
Tennessee  C,  L  &  R.  Co.  v.  Hayes, 
242. 

V.  Herndon,  1011. 
Tennessee  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  351. 
Tenney  v.  Bank,  737. 

V.  Harvey,  422,  430. 

V.  Tuttle,  951. 
Terre  Haute  Ry.  Co.  v.  Clem,  949. 
Terre  Haute  St.  Ry.   Co.  v.   Tappen- 

beck,  942. 
Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Buck,  72, 
73. 

V.  Graham,  825. 

V.  Jackson,  262. 

V.  Sehaefer,  899. 
Terre  Haute  &  L.   R.  Co.  v.   WaJsh, 

361,  846,  945. 
Terrell,  y.  Bennett,  563. 
Terry  v.  Allen,  705. 

V.  Fellows,  526. 

V.  Hutchinson,  452,  459. 

v.  Munger,  323,  346,  347,  721. 
Terwilliger  v.  Wands,  497. 
Texarkaua  Gas  &  Electric  Light  Co.  v. 

Orr,  392,  955,  966. 
Texas  Trunk  R.  Co.  v.  Mullins,  1089. 
Texas  &  N.  O.  B.  Co.  v.  Echols,  1002. 


CASES    CITED.  12o7 

LVol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusi^T;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Hare,  860. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams, -308. 

V.  Bailey,  157,  362. 

V.  Barnhart,  1072. 

V.  Best,  893. 

V.  Black,  1081. 

V.  Bloom,  171. 

V.  Brick,  4.j4,  462,  1005. 

V.  Bryant,  929,  1003. 

V.  Buckelow,  lOS.j. 

V.  Cox.  104,  953,  1040. 

V.  Crow,  311. 

V.  Curry,  389. 

V.  Doherty,  216. 

V.  Easton,  1039. 

V.  Fletcher,  986. 

V.  Gains,  847. 

V.  Gay,  206. 

V.  Gorman,  819. 

V.  Hall,  987. 

V.  Holm,  402. 

V.  Interstate  Transp.  Co.,  355. 

V.  Johnson,  171. 

V.  Ludlam,  377,  1087. 

V.  McDowell,  362. 

V.  Mangum,  224. 

V.  Minuick,  1019. 

Y.  Mitchell,  1093. 

V.  Jlorin,  462. 

V.  Mother,  197,  2G2. 

V.  Nelson,  100,  324. 

V.  iS^olan,  884. 

V.  O'Donnell,  198,  462. 
^       V.  Patton,  994,  1010. 

V.  Roberts,  831. 

V.  Robertson,  334,  993. 

V.  Rogers,  1015,  1019,  104G. 

Y.  Scoville,  256,  264. 

V.  Torrey,  664. 

Y.  Volk,  394,  871,  941. 

V.  Watkins,  886. 

V.  "SA'hite,  1006,  1089. 

V.  Williams,  276,  277,  1091. 
Thafker  v.  Hawk,  135. 

V.  Howells,  672. 
Thaekrah  v.  Haas,  320. 
Thain  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  1003,  1005. 
Thames  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Housatonic 

R.  Co.,  2.53. 
Thatcher  y.  Central  Traction  Co.,  71, 
862,  955. 

V.  Jlorris,  722. 


Thayer  v.  Boston,  181. 

V.  Brooks,  413. 

Y.  Flint  &  P.  M.  R.  Co.,  928. 

V.  .Manley,  737. 

Y.  Sherlock,  398,  694. 
Theroux  y.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  336. 
Thibault  v.  Sessions,  504,  505,  519,  523, 

546,  549. 
Thimmelthorp's  Case,  495. 
Thisler  v.  Miller,  325. 
Thistle  Y.  ITnion  F.  &  Ry.  Co.,  4oS. 
Thoburn  v.  Campbell,  843. 
Tlioenliu  v.  Campbell,   73. 
Tholen  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.   Co.,  946, 

954. 
Thom  V.  Bigland,  502,  561J,  57;!. 

Y.  Plttard,  1040. 
Thoraan  v.  Chicago  &  X.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

1027. 
Ttiomas  v.  Blasdale,  408,  504. 

Y,  Brady,  190, 

Y.  Chm-ton,   119,   527, 

Y,  City  of  Findley,  174. 

Y,  Croswell,  533. 

Y,  Dickinson,  (>U2. 

Y,  Hatch,  668. 

V,  James,  692, 

Y,  Joslin,  323. 

Y.  Pickering,  668. 

Y.  Quartermaine,  201,  923,  976. 

T.  Queen,  110. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  104,  207,  300,  310, 
358,  635,  649,  859,  970,  005, 
1022,  1068,  1091,  1093, 

v.  Rumsey,  342,  400,  478,  484. 

Y,  Smith,  503,  617. 

Y.  Sorrell,  684, 

Y.  Telegraph  Co.,  939. 

V,  ■\^'erreme.Yer,  213, 

T.  A\'estern  Union  Tsl,  Co  ,  145,  870. 

V.  Winchester,  853,  908. 
Thomasson  v.  Agnew,  55. 
Thompson  v.  Albright,  663. 

Y.  Beacon  Val.  Rubber  Co.,  620. 

Y.  Bell,  269. 

V.  Burhans,  658. 

Y,  Central  Railroad  &  Banking  Co,, 
1055. 

Y.  Clendening,  460. 

V.  Crocker,  781, 

V.  Dickinson,  917. 

V.  Dodge,  877. 


1238 


CASES    CITED. 


[\o\.  1  comi)rises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Tliompson  v.  Engle,  01)2. 

y.  <xatlin,  007. 

V.  Gibson,  410,  795. 

V.  (Jiegory,  36. 

V.  Halbert,  342. 

V.  .Ijiclison,  130. 

V.  .Johnston  Bros.  Co.,  994. 

V.  hacy.  901. 

v.  I.ibby,  206. 

V.  I^umley,  ()29. 

V.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  1092. 

V.  National  Exp.  Co.,  878. 

V.  Pennsylvania  R.   Co.,    141,  144. 

V.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co..  581. 

V.  Pioneer  Press  Co.,  ."ilO,  522. 

V.  Price,   611,    020,    620. 

V.  Richardson,    617. 

V.  RosBj  728. 

V.  Ross,  4.")2. 

V.  State,  131. 

V.  Whipple,  121,  211,  424. 

V.  White,  553. 

V.  Young,  204. 
Thompson-Hutchison     Bldg.     Co.     v. 

Mayer,  241.  243. 
Tliompson's  Case,  115,  110. 
Thomson  v.   Gortner,  717. 
Thorburn  v.  Smith,  255. 
Thoresen  v.   La   Crosse   City  R.   Co., 

861,  879. 
Thorington  v.   Smitli,   lOU'J. 
Thorley  v.  Lord  Kerry.  491,  492,  522. 
Thorley's  Cattle-Food  Co.  v.  Massam, 

551. 
Thorn  v.  Blanehard,  52S. 

v.  Maurer,  (j(;7. 
Thorne  v.  Moser,  481. 

V.  Tilbury,    713. 
Thornton  v.  Marshall,  614. 

V.  Roll,   692. 

V.  Thornton,  56. 
Thorogood  v.  Bryan,  9S0-982,  984. 

V.  Robinson,  708,  72S. 
Thoroughgood's  Case.  599. 
Thorp  Y.  Burling,  280. 

V.  Minor,  278,  880. 
Thorpe  v.  Brumfitt,  798. 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  942. 

V.  New   York   Cent.    &   H.    K.    R. 
Co.,  241. 
Thouron  v.  Railway  Co.,  134. 
Thrall  v.  Knapp,  445. 


Threefoot  v.  Nuckols,  620. 
Thurber  v.  Sprague,  315. 
Thurst   V.    West,    721. 
Thurston  v.  Blanehard,  728. 

V.  Hancock,  79,  90,  751. 

V.  Martin,  401. 

v.  Prentiss,  349. 

V.  Wright,  015. 
Thyng  v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.,  994,  1053. 
Tibbetts  v.  Knox,  236. 
Tice  V.  Munn,  377. 
Tidd  V    Overell,  337. 
Tidman  v.  Ainslie,  548. 
Tierney  v.   Chicago  &  N.  W.   R.  Co., 

887. 
Tiffin  V.  McCormack,  840. 
TifEt  V.  Tifft.  100. 
Tift  V.  Jones,  185. 
Tightmeyer  v.  Mongold,  41,  297. 
Tillett  V.  Lynchburg  &  D.  K.  Co.,  904. 

V.  Ward,  678,  855. 
Tillinghast  v.  McLeod.  542,  545. 
Tillman  v.  Fletcher,  132. 
Tillotson  V.  Cheetham,  455,  460,  484. 
Timlin  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  225,  226. 
Timm  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  999. 
Timmis  v.  Wade,  591. 
Timothy  v.   Simpson,  427.  441. 
Tindley  v.   Sr.iem,  187. 
Tingle  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry.,  104. 
Tinker  v.  New  York,  O.  &  W.  K.  Co., 
279. 

V.  Pool,  718. 
Tisdale  v.  Kingman,  610,  629. 
Tissot   V.    Great    Southern    Telegraph 

&  Telephone  Co.,  143,  863. 
Titus  V.   Bradford,   B.   &  K.    R.   Co 

332. 
Tobey  V.  Smith,  221,  222,  731. 
Tobias  V.   Harland,  553. 

V.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  802,  904. 
Tobin  V.  Deal,  654,  718. 

V.  Kirk,  15. 

V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  987,  989. 

V.  Omnibus   Cable   Co.,   975.   loo.'l. 

V.  Western    Union    Tel.    Co.,    304, 
910. 
Tcdd  V.  Cochell,  872. 

V.  Dun,   540. 

V.  Flight,  226.  229. 

V.  Hawkins,  542. 

V.  Jackson,  609,  688. 


CASES    CITED. 


1239 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue] 


Todd  V.  Railway  Co.,  361,  379. 

V.  Rowley,  857. 
Tognini  v.   Kyle,  655. 
Tolchester   Beach   Imp.   Co.   v.    Stein- 

meier,  243.  424. 
Toledo,  A.  A.  &  N.   M.   Ry.  t.  Penn- 
sylvania Co.,  358.  643.  646.  649. 
Toledo,    P.   &   W.    R.   Co.   v.    Coiiroy, 

1089. 
Toledo,  St.  L.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Bai- 
ley, 851.  875. 

V.  Burgan,  898. 

V.  Conroy,   237. 

V.  Cosand,  899. 

V.  Crittenden,  828.  983. 

V.  Cupp,  928. 

V.  Fenstemaker,    899. 

V.  Fly,  928. 

V.  Hauck,  895. 

V.  Loop,    679. 

V.  Tapp,  1076. 

V.  Trimble,   1023. 

V.  Wingate,  964,  1093.    • 
Toledo,  W.   &  W.   Ry.   Co.   v.   Beggs, 
191. 

V.  Brooks,  191. 

V.  Grable,   984. 

V.  Harmon,  264. 

V.  Lockhart.  1068. 

V.  Maxtield,  96.5. 

V.  (J'Connor,  9G7. 
Tolman  v.   Abbot,  1072. 

V.  Syracuse,   B.    &   N.    Y.    R.    Co., 
943. 
^J?ombs  V.   Painter,  431,  4o3. 
Tome  V.   Dubois,   710. 
Tomle  V.  Hampton,  97S. 
Tomliuson  v.  Derby,  400. 

V.  Town,   389. 

V.  Warner,   607. 
Tom  Lysle,  The.  875. 
Tompkins  v.  Riiilroad  Co.,  345. 

V.  Sands,  124. 
Tompson  v.  Dashwood.  4S2. 

V.  Mussey,  62S. 
Tonawanda  R.  Co.   v.   Muiiger,   195. 
Tonciuy  v.  Dodge  Co.,  134. 
Tone  v.  Wilson,  560. 
Tongue   v.   Xutwell,   687. 
Tonnesen  v.  Ross,  998. 
Toogood   r.    Spyring,    530. 
Toole  V.  Beckett,  227. 


Toomey  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co., 
617. 

V.  Donovan,   910. 

V.  Railway   Co.,   402,   893. 
Tootle   V.   Clifton,    779. 
Topeka  Water  Supply  Co.  v.  City  of 

Potwin,  189,  795,  806. 
Torre  v.   Summers,  459. 
Torrence  v.  Third  Nat.  Bank,  103. 
Torriano  v.  Young,  097. 
Torrey  v.  Field,  523. 
Totel  V.  Bonuefoy,  6S3. 
Totten  V.  Burhans,  564,  571,  579,  601. 
Tottenham  v.  Byrne,  671. 
Toudy  V.  Norfolk,  etc.,   Ry.   Co.,  920. 
Tounsell  v.   Smythe,  891. 
Tourtellot   v.    Rosebrook,    843. 
Tousignant  v.  Iron   Co.,   242. 
Tousley  v.   Board  of  Education,  71G. 
Towanda   Coal   Co.   v.    Heeman,    256, 

280. 
Towle  V.  Lovet,  739. 

V.  Pacific  Imp.   Co.,  875. 
Town  V.   Carins,  783. 

V.  Hazen,   708. 
Towne   V.    Lewis,    729. 

V.  Nashua  &  L.  R.  R.,  678. 

V.  Rice,   692. 

V.  AViley,   159,   163. 
Towner  •  v.    Missouri    &    P.    R.    Co., 

963. 
Town  of  Albion  v.  Hetrick.  944. 
Town  of  Andrews  v.  Sellers,  352. 
Town  of  Burlington  v.   Schwarzmaii, 

807. 
Town  of  Fowler  v.  Linquist,  402,  '.m;:!. 

965. 
Town  of  Gosport  v.  Evans,  870. 
Town   of   Marion  v.   Skillman,   691. 
Town  of  Martinsville  v.  Shirley,  76.'!. 
Town  of   Sullivan  v.    Phillips,   794. 
Town  of  Troy  v.  Cheshire  R.  R.,  693. 
Town  of  Wilton  v.  Town  of  Weston, 

17.->. 
Towiisend  v.  Briggs,  402,  430. 

V.  Cowles,    581. 

v.  Hughes,  36,  403. 

V.  Rich.   900. 

V.  Wathen,    373,   829. 
Townshend  v.  Gray,  913.  914. 
Township  of  Buckeye  v.   Clark,   297, 
898. 


1240  CASES    CITED, 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  l-(i52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Townslilp  of  Hutchinson  v.  Fllk,  689, 
802. 

Toj-  V.  United  States  Cartridge  Co., 
1008. 

Toye  V.  McMahon,  488. 

Tozer  v.   Child,  135. 

Tracy  v.  Cloyd,  138. 

V.  Pullman  Palace-Car   Co.,   1058. 

Trafford  v.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  334. 

Traill  v.  Baring,  560. 

Ti-ambly  v.    Ricard,*  318. 

Trammel  v.   Russellville,  426. 

Trammell  v.  Ramage,  392. 

Trask  V.    Shot-well,   195,   332. 

Trauerman  v.  Lippencott,  094. 

Travelers'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Melick,  375. 

Travis  v.  Barger,  458. 

V.  Standard  Life  &  Ace.  Ins.  Co., 
423. 

Traylor  v.  Evertson,  404. 
v.  Horrall,  723. 
V.  Hughes,  724. 

Treadwell  v.  Whittier,  902,  938. 

Treanor  v.   Jlanhattan  Ry.   Co.,  837. 

Treasurer  v.  Cleary,   113. 

Tremain  v.   Cohoes  Co.,   772. 

Trent  Nav.  Co.  v.  Wood,  1062. 

Ti'esca  r.  Maddox,  488. 

Trevilian  v.  Pyne,  669. 

Tribble   v.    Laird,  710. 

Tribette  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  845. 

Trice  v.   Cockran,  559. 

Trigg  v.  Railway  Co.,  370,  377. 

Trimble  v.   Anderson,   494. 

Trinity  County   Lumber  Co.  v.   Den- 
ham.   1011. 

Trinity  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lane,  228. 

Tripp  V.   Thomas,  628. 

Triscony   v.    Orr,    707. 

Troe  V.   Larson,   354. 

Trogden  v.  Henn,  196. 

Trotman  v.   Dunn,   528. 

Trowbridge  v.   Brookline,   758. 

Trowbridge's     Adm'r      v.      Danville 
Street-Car  Co.,   860,  907,   909. 

Troy  V.  Cheshire  R.  Co.,  410,  412,  693. 

Troy   &  G.  R.  R.  v.  Commonwealth, 
111. 

Truax  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry. 
Co.,  891. 

Trueman  v.  Railway  Co..  789. 

Truesdell  v.   Combs,   122,   631. 


Truman  v.  London  B.  &  S.  C.  R.  Co., 

144. 
Trumbull   v.    Gibbons,   480. 
Truntle  v.   North   Star  Woolen   Mills 

Co.,  1006. 
Trusdell  v.  Combs,  124. 
Trussell  v.   Scarlett,   540,   541. 
Trust  Co.  V.  Sedg\^'ick,  218. 
Trustee  of  Hopkins  Academy  v.  Dick- 
inson, 759. 
Trustees   of  First   Baptist   Church   v. 

Utica  &  S.   R.   Co.,  781. 
Trustees  of   the   Village  of  Delhi   v. 

Youmans,   5.j7,   758. 
Tryon  v.  Whitmarsh,  575. 
Tubervil  v.  Stamp,  769. 
Tuberville   v.    Savage,   432. 

v.  Stamp,  250,  254, 

Y.  Stampe,  840,  841. 
Tuck  V.  Downing,  578,  592. 
Tucker  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  933, 
953,  958. 

V.  Bradley,   133. 

Y.  Cannon,  60,   612,  617. 

Y.  Drake,  89. 

V.  Illinois  Cent.  R.   Co.,  839,   840. 

V.  Jerris,  44. 

V.  Moreland,   164. 

V.  Newman,   410,   666,   779. 

V.  Pennsylvania    R.    Co.,    1068. 

V.  White,    563. 
Tufe  V.  AA'arman,  973,  976. 
Tullay  V.  Reed,  442. 
Tulley  V.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  884. 
Tullidge  T.  Wade,  393,  455,  458. 
Tunbridge  Wells  Dipper  Case,  82,  662. 
Tunney  v.  Midland  Ry.,  261,  1029. 
Tunnicliffe  v.  Bay  Cities  Consol.   Ry. 

Co.,  380. 
Turberville  v.  Stampe,  840. 
Turley  v.  Thomas,  877. 

v.  Tucker,  190. 
Turner  v.   Craighead,  857. 

V.  Cross,  200,  207. 

v.  Esles,  467. 

V.  Estes,  466. 

V.  Haar,  65. 

V.  Hawkins,  661. 

V.  Hitchcock,  342. 

V.  Meymott,  688. 

V.  Page,  131. 

V.  Phoenix  Ins.   Co.,  43. 


CASES    CITKD. 


i:^il 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Turner  v.  Raili-oad  Co.,  189,  895,  927. 

V.  Tliomijson,    750. 

V.  Turner,  GOG,   G38. 

V.  Walker,  021. 
Turner's  Case,  150. 
Turnipseed  v.  Hudson,  ."iSl. 
Turupike  Co.  v.  Brown,  "J8. 
Turnpike  Koad  v.  Cbampney,  129. 
Turpen  v.  Booth,  117,  120. 
Turpin  v.  Remy,  G30. 
TuiTlU  V.  Dolloway,  498. 
Turton   v.    New    York   Recorder,   512, 

540. 
Tuttle  V.  Church,  7G9,  778. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  409,  470,  472,  993. 
1044. 
Tweed's  Case,  136. 
Twlgg  V.  Ryland,  856. 
Twilley  v.  Perkins,  422,  632. 
Twombly  v.  Leach,  470,  913. 

V.  Monroe,  688. 
Twopenny  v.  Young,  .j45. 
Twycross  v.  Grant,  329. 
Tykeson  v.  Bowman,  625. 
Tyler,  In  re,  113. 

V.  Ricamore,  71. 

V.  Savage,  172. 

V.  Western    Union    Tel.    Co.,    302, 
369. 
Tyler,  Ullman  &  Co.  v.  Western  Un- 
ion Tel.  Co.,  307. 
Tynherg  v.  Cohen,  62S. 
Tyner  v.  Cory,  152,  154. 

V.  People's  Gas  Co.,  7G9. 
Tyrell  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  1089. 
Tyrringham's  Case,  676. 
Tysen  v.  Moore,  1061. 
Tyson  v.  Booth,  390. 

V.  Ranney,  001. 


U 


Udell  V.  Atherton,  268-270. 

Uggla  V.  West  End  St.  Ry.  Co.,  837, 

864. 
Uhe  V.  Railway  Co.,  363. 
Ulery  v.  .Jones,  659. 
ITline  V.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R. 

Co.,  412. 
Ulrick  V.  Dakota  Ixian  &  Trust  Co., 

751. 


Underwood  v.  Green,  789. 
V.  Hewson,   50. 
V.  Parks,  525. 
V.  Scott,  914. 
V.  Smith,   35. 
Union  Cent.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Scheidler, 

559. 
Union  Coal  Co.   v.   City   of  La  Salle, 

689. 
Union  Pae.   D.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 362. 
Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Artist,  188,  316, 
914. 
V.  Askew,  846. 
V.  Callaghan,  68,  78,  1052. 
V.  De  Busk,  927. 
v.  Erickson,    997,    1039,    1049. 
V.  Fort,  1025. 
V.  Gilland,  936. 
V.  Goodridge,    1067. 
V.  Harris,  1055. 
V.  James,  869,   1009. 
V.  Jarvi,  997,  1012. 
V.  Keller,  845. 
V.  Kelley,  297,  1035,  1039. 
V.  Lapsley,   982. 
V.  McDonald,    830,    872,    921,    922, 

930,  933,  958,  988. 
V.  Mertes,   871. 
V.  Nichols,  191. 
V.  Novak,  78,  1000. 
V.  O'Brien,  1018. 
V.  Porter,  927,  1084. 
V.  Rainey,    1065. 
V.  Rassmussen,   92G. 
V.  Reese,  399. 
V.  Tracy,  941. 
Union    Railway     &    Transit    Co.     v. 

Shacklett,  342. 
Union  Stock  Yards  Co.  of  Omaha  v. 

Larson,  1009. 
Union  Stove  &  Mach.  Works  v.   Cas- 
well, 131. 
Union  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stone,  211,  868. 
Union   Terminal   R.   Co.   v.    Board   of 

Railroad  Com'rs,  355. 
Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Illinois  M.  Ry.  Co., 
207. 
V.  Souther,  207. 
Union  Water  Co.  v.  Kean,  354. 
United  Coppftr  Mining  &  Smelting  Co. 
V.  Franks,  670. 


1242 


CASES   CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  piiges  1-G52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


United  El.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shelton,  211. 
Uuited    Laud    Co.    v.    Great    Eastern 

Ry.,  688. 
United    Society    t.    Underwood,    342, 

346. 
United  States  v.  Alden,  150. 

V.  Appleton,  601. 

V.  Baxter,   46,  2'Jl,  308,  740. 

V.  Clarke,  110. 

V.  Clune,   358. 

V.  Debs,  358,  l-io. 

V.  Elliott,  358. 

T.  Harper,  10,  50. 

V.  Ivirkpatrick,  110. 

V.  Lee,  110,  112,  113. 

v.  McDonald,  359. 

v.  Mock.  740. 

V.  Myers,  435. 

V.  Xorth    Bloomfield    Gravel    Min. 
Co.,  700. 

V.  l^almer,  IOC.:!. 

V.  Patterson,  049. 

V.  Perkins,  740. 

V.  Saul,  847. 

Y.  Taintor,  59. 

V.  Texas,  113. 

V.  Trumbull,  114. 

V.  Windgate,  740. 

V.  Workingmen's        AmalgamatGd 
Council.  049. 

V.  Workingmen's  Ass'n,  049. 

V.  Yukers,  901. 
Uuited  States  Express  Co.  v.  Backman, 

306. 
United     States     Illuminating     Co.     v. 

Grant,  783,  801. 
United  States  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wright,  583. 
United  States  Ti-ust  Co.  of  New  York 

V.  O'Brien,  354. 
Unitus  V.  The  Dresden,  893. 
University  v.  Finch,  1(!7. 

V.  Tucker,  696,  700. 
Updegrove   v.  Pennsylvania  S.   V.   R. 
Co.,  143,  200,  316. 

V.  Zummerman,  525. 
Upham  v.  City  of  Salem,  178. 

v.  Marsh,  089. 
Upjohn  V.  Board,  747. 
Upton  v.  Hume,  503,  519,  537,  547. 

V.  Levy,  591,  592.  OOu. 

V.  Tribilcock.  582.       • 

V.  Upton,  509,  510. 


Uptou  V.  Vail,  036. 

tlransky  v.   Dry-Dock,  E.  B.  &  B.  K. 

Co.,  471,  472. 
Usell  v.  Hales,  532. 
Utley  V.  Burns.  914. 


Vail  V.  Broadway  R.  Co.,  1085. 
V.  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  1002. 
V.  Strong,  559. 
Valentine  v.  Duff,  736. 

V.  Kwilecki,  131. 
Vallance  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  882, 

028,  931. 
-S'allery  v.  State,  538,  546. 
■\'allo  V.  United  States  Exp.  Co.,  151. 
Van  Aernam  v.  McCune,  169. 
Van  Ankin  v.  Westtall,  525. 
Xan  Arnam  v.  Ayers,  468. 
Van  Bergen  v.  Van  Bergen,  802. 
Van  Bibber  v.  Hilton,  756. 
^'ance  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  169. 
Vanderbuilt  v.  Richmond  Turnpike  Co., 

255. 
Vanderburgh  v.  Bassett,  710. 

V.  Truax,  71,  74,  76. 
Vandersliee  v.  Newton,  809. 
Van  Derveer  v.  Sutphin,  519,  547. 
Vandervelden  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 

Co.,  317.  319,  320. 
Vanderwiele  v.  Taylor,  835. 
Van  Deusen  v.  Young,  694,  702,  703. 
Van  De  Vere  v.  Kansas  City,  783. 
Vandewater  v.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R. 

Co.,  882,  925. 
^^andiver  v.  PoUak,  210. 
A'.an  Dusan  v.  Grand  Ti-unk  Ry.   Co., 

1080. 
A^anduzor  v.  Linderman,  624. 
Van  Dyke  v.  Cincinnati,  99,  010. 
Vane  v.  Barnard,  703. 
Van  Epps  v.  Harrison,  578. 
Vanesse  v.  Catsburgh  Coal  Co.,  097. 
Van  Hoosear  v.  Town  of  Wilton,  175. 
A'an  Hoozier  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  ,T.  R. 

Co.,  410,  412. 
Vanhorn  v.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  Rv. 

Co.,  107. 
Van  Horn  v.  Van  Horn,  336,  339,  47;!. 

540,  637,  639,  645,  646,  651. 


CASES    CITED. 


124,] 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-G52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Yanleei-  v.  Earle,  .j.")9. 
Van  Leuveu  v.   Lyke,  (JiiO,  003,  8.j5. 
Vann  v.  McCreaiy,  C22. 
Viiiineman  v.  Powers,  222. 
A^aii  Norden  v.  Robinson,  747. 
Van  Olinda  v.  Hall,  4(:8. 
A'an  Pelt  v.  Chattanooga,  R.  &  0.  R. 
Co.,  30. 

V.  Davenport,  170,  180. 

V.  McGraw,  704. 
Van  Rensselaer  v.   Dole,  480,  504. 
Van  Slyk  v.  Trempealeau,  etc.,  Co.,  119. 
A'an  Slyke  v.  Insurance  Co.,  123. 
"San  Steenbergh  v.  Bigelow,  120. 
\'an  Steinburg's  Case,  903. 
\an  Tassell  v.  Hosijital,  188. 
A'an  Tuyl  v.  Riner,  553. 
\an  Vacter  v.   McKillip,  405. 
Vau  Valkenburg  v.  Thayer,  723. 
^■;lu  Vechten  v.  Hopkins,  510. 
\'an  Velsor  v.  Seeberger,  001. 
Van  Wagonen's  Will,  In  re,  119. 
Van  Wegeuen  v.  Cooney.  800. 
Van  Winkle  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R. 
Co.,  1010. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  895. 
A'an  Wyck  v.  Aspinwall,  530. 
A'ary  v.  Thompson,  700. 
Vaspor  V.  Edwards,  077. 
A'asse  V.  Smith,  159,  102,  103. 
Vaughan  v.  Menlove,  85,  709,  841,  842. 

V.  Taff  Vale  R.  Co.,  78,  141,   143, 
791,  830,  844. 

V.  Watt,  728. 
Vaughn  v.  Congdon,  122,  42(i,  520. 
A'easey  v.  Doton,  599. 
Vedder  v.  Vedder,  410. 
Veghte  V.  Raritan,  etc.,  Co.,  080. 
Velsian  v.  Lewis,  727. 
Venables  v.  Smith,  241,  278. 
Veneman  v.  Jones,  422. 
Vennum  v.  Huston,  013,  014,  025. 
Verder  v.  Ellsworth,  801. 
Vere  v.  Lord  Cawdor,  350. 
Verhein  v.  Schultz,  320. 
A'eiholf  V.  ■\'anhouwenlengen,  405. 
Vermont  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Baxter,  237. 
Verner  v.  Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.,  197, 
825,  890. 

V.  Sweitzer,  309,  1057. 
Vernol  v.  Vernol,  592. 


A'erplanck  v.  Van  Buren,  038. 

Verry  v.  Watkins,  459. 

Vertress  v.  Newport  News  &  JI.  V.  R. 

Co.,  190. 
Vertue  v.  Beasley,  080. 
Vicars  v.  AVilcocks,  70,  374,  377,  385, 

490,  5.54. 
Vick  V.  Railway  Co.,  201. 
Vickers  v.  Stonemau.  480,  510,  521. 
Victor  V.  Pennsyhania  R.  R.,  904. 
Victor  Coal  Co.  v.  JIuir,  990,  997. 
Victorian  Ry.  Com'rs  v.  Coultas,  308. 
Victor  Min.  Co.  v.  Morning  Star  Min. 

Co.,  752. 
A^dalat  v.  City  of  New  Orleans,  000. 
Viele  V.  Gray,  533. 
Vigilancia,  The,  1000. 
Village  of  Carterville  v.  Cook,  OS. 
Village  of  Clayton  v.  Brooks,  871. 
Village  of  D wight  v.  Hayes,  083,  800. 
Village  of  Gibson  v.  Johnson,  178. 
A'illage  of   Oak  Harbor   v.    Kallager, 

178. 
Village  of  Pine  City  v.  Munch,  791. 
Village  of  Sheridan  v.  Hibbard,  381. 
Villers  v.  Monsley,  490. 
Vinas    v.    Merchants'    Mut.    Ins.    Co., 

109. 
Vincent  v.  Steinehour,  813. 
Vine  V.  Saunders,  217,  222. 
Vinton  v.   Schwab,  933. 
Virdin  v.  Stockbridge,  317. 
Virginia  v.  Tennessee,  113. 
Virginia  Ehrman,  The,  214. 
Virginia  M.  R.  Co.  v.  White,  19S. 
Virginia  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Sayers,  :!i)5. 
Virgo  v.  Virgo,  325. 
Mttum  v.  Gilman,  ;j:;(). 
\'ocht  v.  Kuklencc,  220. 
Voegeli  v.  Pickle  Co.,  25.3. 
Voell  V.   Kelly,  319. 
Vogel  V.  City  of  New  York,  2;!0. 
v.  Gruaz,  520,  530. 
Y.  McAulifCe,  245. 
Volkmar  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  S'V.). 
Voltz  V.  Blackmar,  440. 
Von  Hoffman  v.  Kendall,  095. 
A'oorhis  v.  Olmstead,  2  i9. 
Vosbm'g  v.  Putney,  72,  370,  4:;8,  047. 
Vosbm-gh  v.  Moak,  082. 
Voss  V.  Bassett,  738. 


1244 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Vessel  v.^Cole,  452,  453. 
Vossen  v.  Dautel,  15u. 
Vi-eeland  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.,  969. 

W 

Wabash  Printing  &  Pub.  Co.  v.  Crum- 

line,  518,  519. 
Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  302. 
V.  Ferris,  928. 
V.  Savage,  390. 
V.  Williamson,  1071. 
Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Far- 
ver,  232. 
V.  Locke,  48,  G5,  66.  817,  886,  931, 
1010. 
Wabash   Western   Ry.    Co.    t.    Fried- 
man, 389,  402. 
Wacek  v.  Frink,  133,  898. 
Wachsmutla  v.  Martini,  563,  568,  572. 
Y.  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank,  168,  423, 
425. 
Wachtel   v.    Noah   Widows   &   O.    B. 

Soc,  148. 
AA'ade  t.  Leroy,  384. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  363. 
V.  Tatton,  26. 
V.  Thayer,  263. 
Wadsworth  y.  Goree,  353,  705. 

Y.  Tillotson,  7,54. 
Wadswortb  Board  of  A^'orks  v.  Unit- 
ed Tel.  Co.,  661. 
Waffle  v.  New  York  Cent.  Ry.,  763. 
Waggoner  v.  Jermaine,  745,  796. 
Wagner  v.  H.  W.  .Tayne  Chemical  Co., 
1017. 
Y.  Jacoby,  404. 
V.  Saline    Co.    Progress    Printing 

Co.,  486. 
V.  Swift's  Iron  &  Steel  Works,  206. 
Wagoner  y.  Wagoner,  3.54. 
Wagstaff  Y.  Schippel,  631. 
Wahle  Y.  Relnbach,  768. 
Wainford  v.  Heyl,  217. 
Waite  Y.  Northeastern  Ry.  Co.,  984. 
Waixel  y.  Harrison,  851. 
Wakefield  v.  Duke  of  Buccleuch,  753. 
V.  Newell,  764. 
Y.  Newport,  182. 
Wakelin  v.  London  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co., 
936,  942,  956,  960. 


Wakely  y.  Hart,  428.    . 
Wakeman  y.  Dalley,  590. 

Y.  Robinson,  18,  66,  <i.j4,  878. 
Wakley  y.  Cooke,  523. 
Walbert  y.  Trexler,  992. 
Wald  Y.  Raih-oad  Co.,  1070. 
Waldron  y.  Waldron,  468. 
Waldrup  v.  Almand,  132. 
Wales  V.  Miner,  465,  406. 
Walford   y.    Herald  Printing   &   Pub. 

Co.,  524. 
Walker  y.   Anglo-American  Mortg.   & 
Trust  Co.,  594. 

Y.  Brewster,  777. 

Y.  Chester  Co.,  !>4:J. 

v.  City  of  Vicksburg,  976. 

Y.  Croniu,  450,  635,  643,  645,  647. 

Y.  Cruikshank,  604,  625. 

V.  Davis,  150. 

Y.  Emerson,   691. 

V.  Erie  R.  Co.,  406. 

V.  Fitts,  200. 

V.  Goe,  186. 

Y.  Hallock,  120. 

V.  Hannibal  &  St.  .L  R.  Co.,  211. 

Y.  Hawley,   501,  536. 

Y.  Hoeffner,  482. 

Y.  Johnson,  253. 

V.  People,  10. 

v.  Pogue,  340. 

Y.  Redlngton  Lumber  Co.,  870. 

Y.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co.,  32 J. 

Y.  Second  Ave.  Ry.  Co.,  402. 

Y.  Southeastern  R.  Co.,  169,  254. 

Y.  Town  of  ReidsYille,  870. 

Y.  Tribune  Co.,  ."107. 

Y.  Trust  Co.,  293. 

v.  Wetherbee,  151,  730. 

V.  Winstanley,  891,  897. 

V.  Wonderllck,  132. 
Walkley  v.  Bostwick,  552. 
Wall,  Ex  parte,  121. 

V.  Des  Moines  &  N.  W.   Ry.   Co., 
926. 

V.  Pittsburg  Harbor  Co.,  693. 

v.  State.  441. 

Y.  Toomey,   600. 

Y.  Trumbull,  118,  120. 
Wallace  y.  Canaday,  901. 

Y.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co.,  869. 

V.  Chicago,   St.    P.,   M.   &   O.    Ry. 
Co.,  500. 


CASES    CITED. 


124." 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Wallace  v.  City  &,  Suburban  Ry.  Co., 
193. 
V.  Clark,  4G0. 
V.  Clayton,   10G2. 
V.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  Co.,  75i. 
\.  Fletcher,  7U2. 
V.  Goodall,  CM. 
V.  Hallovvell,  002. 
V.  Morss,  161. 
V.  New  York,  .'JOT. 
V.  Itodgers,  491. 
Wallartl  v.  Worthman,  654. 
Waller  v.  Bowling,  728. 
V.  Loch,  531. 
V.  Parker,  205. 
Wallingford  v.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  Co., 

1074. 
Wain  V.  Beaver,  917. 

V.  Wain,   315. 
Walpole  v.   Carlisle,  917. 
Walsh  V.  City  of  New  York,  127. 
V.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  830. 
V.  Hall,  596,  598. 
V.  Morse,  564. 

V.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.,  104. 
V.  Peet  Valve  Co.,  looc. 
V.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  1022. 
V.  Sayre,  913. 
V.  Trustees,  126,  127,  138. 
v.  Whiteley,  995. 
Walsham  v.  Stainton,  638. 
Walter  v.  Sample,  621. 

V.  Selfe,  767,  769,  780.  781. 
Walters  v.  Philadelphia  Traction  Co., 

1081. 
Waltham  v.  Hulgar,  249. 
Walton  V.  Booth.  907. 

V.  Bryn  Mawr  Hotel  Co.,  839. 
V.  Perkins,   554. 
V.  Pollock,  673. 
V.  United  States.  112. 
Wampach  v.  Railway  Co.,  367. 
Wanamaker  v.  City  of  Rochester,  937. 
Wandell  v.  Edwards,  459. 
Wansbrough  v.   Maton,  723. 
Wanzer  v.   Self.   320. 
Warbowisky  v.  Ft.   Wayne  &  E.  Ry. 

Co.,   1093. 
Warburton  v.  Great  Western  liy.  Co., 

1034. 
Ward  V.  Atlantic  &  P.  Tel.  Co.,  18G. 
V.  Blackwood,  381. 
V.  Blake  Jlanuf'g  Co.,  548. 


Waid  V.  Carp  River  Iron  Co.,  704. 
V.  Couatser,  lo.j-157,  159. 
V.  County  of  Hartford,  1S3. 
V.  Dean,  497,  548. 
V.  Freeman,   118. 
V.  Hobbs,  9.  578,  580. 
V.  Ltmeen,  568. 
V.  McCauley,  004. 
V.  Neal,  750. 

V.  New  England  Fibre  Co..   241. 
V.  Railway  Co.,  192,  092,  842,  802, 

.SS2,  883,  947,  972. 
V.  State,   449. 
V.  Taylor,  004 
V.  Warner,  093. 
T.  White,  446. 
Warden  v.  Fosdick  &  Davis.  85. 
Warden  v.  Greer,  1061. 

V.  Sweeney,  366. 
Warder  v.  Bowen.  589. 
Warder,    Bushnell  &   Glessner   Co.   v 

Whitish,   596. 
Ward's  Adm'r  v.  Chesapeake  &.  O.  R. 

Co.,  954,  957. 
Ware  v.  Brown,  905. 
V.  Gay,  1085. 
v.  Johnson,  658. 
V.  St.  Paul  Water  Co..  232. 
Warmington  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.   F. 

Ry.  Co..  1050. 
Warmouth  v.  Cramer,  4S2. 
Warn  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R. 

Co.,  1001,   1009. 
Warner  v.   Chamberlain,   370.  856. 
V.  Clark,  387.  488,  543. 
V.  Iriswold,  292.    • 
V.  Miller,  468. 
V.  Moran,  221. 
V.  Paine,  528. 

V.  Press  Publishing  Co.,  518. 
V.  Riddiford,  421. 
Waraick  v.  Baker,  707. 
Warnock  v.  Mitchell,  478,  480^82. 
Warren  v.  Banning,  206. 
V.  Cavanaugh,  804. 
V.  Dwyer,  707. 
.V.  Englehart,  334. 
V.  State,  432. 
V.  Warren,  94,  468. 
V.  Westrup,  214.  215. 
Warren      Bank     v.      Suffolk      Bank, 

285. 
Wartman  v.  Swindell,  GO,  306. 


1246 


CASES    flTED. 


[Vol.  1  fomprises  piiges  1-052,  iuelusire;  vol.  2  the  rpsiiliio.] 


Wasco,   Tlie,   1081. 
Washburn  v.  Cooke,  .")43. 

V.  Cutter,  709. 

V.  Insurance  Co.,  323. 

V.  Meudenliall,  707. 
Washington  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co., 

S72. 
Washington  C.   &  A.   Turnpilce  Case, 

!(44. 
Washington  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Gladmon, 
959. 

V.  Harmon's  Acim'r,  380,  953,  lOOo. 
1093. 

V.  McDade,    9."i3,    9.19,    995,    1010. 
1044. 

V.  Tobriner,  942. 
Wasner  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co., 

920. 
Wason,  Ex  parte,  529. 

V.  AValter,  529,  532. 
\^'ass  V.  Stephens,  617. 
Wasserman  v.  Louisville  Sl  N.  R.  Co., 

(113. 
Wasson  v.  Mitchell,  120,  138. 
AA'ater  Co.  v.  Ware,  186,  232. 
Waterman  v.  Jlatteson,  704. 

r.  Railroad  Co.,   381.  942. 
Waters  v.  City  of  Newark,  782. 

V.  Greenleaf-.Tohnson  Lumber   Co.. 
230,  301,  393. 

V.  Pioneer  Fuel  Co.,  228. 
Waters-Pierce  Oil  Co.  v.  Cook,  78(i. 
Watkin  v.  Hall.  548. 
Watkiu.s  V.  Couuty  Court,  183. 

V.  Great  Western  R.  Co..  1082. 

V.  Peck,   759. 

V.  Wooley,  729. 
Watling  V.  Oastler,  280. 
Watson  V.  Bauer,  935. 

V.  Bodell,    323. 

V.  Christie,  446. 

V.  Coburn,  721. 

V.  Freeman,  609. 

V.  Goodno,  714. 

V.  Hunter,  353. 

V.  Lisbon  Bridge  Co.,  185. 

V.  McCarthy,  509. 

V.  Moore,  474. 

V.  Muirhead,  916,  017. 

V.  Poulson,  562. 

V.  Railroad  Co..  103,  324,  861,  S  12 
046,  968,  1084. 


Watson  V.  Reynolds,  553. 

V.  Van   JIpIo;',   82, 

V.  Watson,  457.  010. 
Watters  v.   Sinoot,  524. 
Watterson  v.   Saldumbehere,  '■'>'< i. 
Watts  V.  Hart,  991,  1010,   103S.   1041. 

V.  Kelson,   ('88. 

V.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co..  362,  754. 
Wattupa  Reservoir  Co.  v.  City  of  Fall 

River,  691. 
Waverley  Timber  &   Iron   Co.   v.    St. 

Louis  Cooperage  Co.,  720. 
Way  V.  Foster,  192. 

V.  Townsend,   118,   124. 
Waycross  Lumber  Co.  v.  Guy,  943. 
Waymouth  v.   Chicago  &  N.  W.   Ry.. 

Co.,  741. 
Wayne  County  Turnnike  Co.  v.   Ber- 
ry, 185. 
Wead  V.  St.  Johnsbury  &  L.  C.  R.  Co.,. 

763. 
Wealland  v.  Palmer,  857. 
Weare  v.  Fitchburg,  176. 
Weatherhead  v.   Armitage,  495. 
Weatherston     v.    Hawkins,    199,    522,^ 

546. 
Weaver  v.   Bush,  660. 

V.  Devendorf,    117-120. 

v,  Hendrick,   512. 

V.  Iselin,  274,  462,  102^. 

V.  Lloyd,  523. 

V.  Ritter,  490. 

V.  Ward,  33,  50,  66,  155,  150,  438, 
654,  852. 

V.  Wible,  733. 
Webb  V.  Beavan,  502,  678. 

V.  Bird,  750. 

V.  Fox,  711. 

v.  Portland  Manuf'g  Co.,   79,  704, 
755,  806. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  841,  1037. 
Webber  v.  Davis,  717. 

V.  Nicholls,   62S. 

V.  Quaw,  653. 

V.  Vincent,  545. 
Weber  v.  Couch,  315. 
Weber  Co.   v.   Chicago,   St.  P.,   JI,  & 

<->.  Ry.  Co.,  1077. 
^A'ebster  v.  Bailey,  589,  593. 

V.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  1082,  108a 

V.  Fowler,  022. 

V.  Hudson  liiver  R.  Co.,  OS. 


OASES    CITED.  124^ 

[Vol.   1  comiirises  pages  1-652,   inclusive;   vol.   2  the  residue.] 


Webster  v.  Watts,  428. 

V.  Webster,  701. 
Weckeily  v.  Geyer,  135. 
Weeklei-  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  171. 
Wedgewood  v.  Baily,  104. 
AVeed  v.  Ballston,  120. 

V.  Saratoga  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  1077. 
Weedon  v.  Timbrel!,  465,  4()lj. 
A\'eet  v.  Brockport,  177. 

V.  Trustees,  177,  184. 
A\'elimann  v.  Railway  Co.,  308,  1071, 

1072. 
Weick  V.  Lander.  78,  375. 
Weideman   v.    Tacoma   Ry.   &   Motor 

Co.,   839. 
Weidner  v.  Rankin,  3.35. 
Weiglitman  v.  Louisville,  N.  <J.  &  T. 

Ry.  Co.,  1091. 
Weil  V.  Altenhofen,  496. 

V.  Israel,  527,  621,  631. 

v.  Schultz,  778. 
Weiller  v.  Penn-sylvania  R.   Cci.,  .'^.fHi. 
Weintz  v.  Kramer,  134. 
Weir  V.  Bell,  270,  561,  567. 

V.  Plymouth  Borougb,  301. 
Weiser  v.  McDowell,  336. 
Meiss  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co..  93.'). 
Weissner  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ity.  Co.,  988. 
AA'eitner  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co., 

186. 
Woleh  V.  Bowen,  96. 

V.  Cheek,  612. 

V.  Durand,  33,  50. 

V.  Jugenheimer,  935. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  301. 

V.  Tribune  Pub.  Co.,  484. 

V.  Ware,  406. 

V.  Wesson,  192,  972. 

V.  Whittemore,  i;5(;. 
Weld  V.  Brooks,  689. 

V.  Gas  Light  Co.,  186,  772. 

V.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  AV.  K.  Co., 
471. 

V.  Oliver,  733. 

V.  Proprietors  of  Side  Booms,  170. 
Weldon  V.  De  Bathe,  219. 
Welfare  v.  London  &  B.  Ry.  Co.,  22fi, 

■S3'),  940. 
Welker  v.  Butler,  497. 
Welles  V.  Northern  Cent.  Ry.  Co..  921. 
Wellington   v.   Downer  Kerosene  Oil 
Co.,  378,  577,  847. 


Wellington  v.  Jackson,  47. 

V.  Moore,  362. 

V.  Small,  88,  639,  649. 

V.  Wentworth,  723. 
Wellman  v.  English,  133. 

V.  Sun  Print.  &  Pub.  Co..  486. 
Wells  v.  Abrahams,  11. 

V.  Kelsey,  729. 

y.  Maine    Steamship    Co.,    10G5. 

v.  New  Haven  &  N.  Co.,  405. 

V.  Ody,  750. 

V.  Washington  Market  Co.,  424. 

V.  A^'atling,  82. 
AVelsh  V.   Bell,   662 

V.  Cheek,  604. 

V.  Lawrence,  878. 

V.  Parrish,  228,  241. 

V.  Pittsburgh,  Ft.  W.  &  C.  R.  Co., 
1065. 

V.  AVilson,  131,  674. 
Welter  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  176. 
AVelty  V.  Indianapolis  &  V.  R.  Co.,  165^ 

873. 
Welz  V.  Rhodius,  .584. 
AVendell  v.  Baxter,  186. 

V.  .lohnson,  662. 
Wondtlandt  v.   Cavanaugh,  412,   744. 
AA'enman  v.  Ash,  480. 
AA'ennhak  v.  Morgan,  480. 
Wenona  Coal  Co.  v.  Holmquist,  1033. 
Wentworth  v.  .Tefferson,  192. 
Werner  v.  Flies,  694. 
Wert  V.  Strouse,  452. 
Werth  V.  City  of  Springfield,  178. 
Wertz  V.  AY.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  304. 
AA'esley  v.  Railway  Co.,  883. 
AVessels  v.  Beeman,  712,  73S. 
AA'esson   v.   AVashbum    Iron   Cn,,   779^ 

782,  787,  8(18. 
AVest    V.    City    of    Eau    Claire,    178 
960. 

V.  Emei-y,  .5.59. 

V.  Forest,  3.S2. 

V.  Hanrahan,  499. 

V.  Hayes,  610. 

V.  Moore,  159,  104. 

r.  Nibbs,  680. 

V.  Railway,  237,  Mil. 

V.  Shockley,  44. 

V.  Smallwood,  42.'!.   CiOo, 

y.  \\'entworth.  739. 

V.   \\'right,  565. 


1248 


CASES    CITED. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-G52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Westaway  v.  Chicago,  St.  P..  M.  &  O. 

E.V.  Co..  881. 
Westbourne  v.  Barwith,  412. 

V.  Mordant,  412. 
West   Branch  Boom   Co.   v.   Pennsyl- 
vania Joint  Lumber  &  Land  Co.,  927. 
West  Chester  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.   Miles, 

371. 
West  Chicago  St  Ry.  Co.  v.  Martin, 

1085. 
Westcott  V.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co.,  333. 
V.  Fargo,  30.3. 
V.  Sharp,  27,  207. 
West   Cumberland  Iron   Co.  v.   Ken- 
yon,  834. 
TS'esterfield  v.  Levis,  207. 
Western  Bank  of  Scotland  v.  Addle, 

168,  169,  269,  558,  '566. 
Western  College  v.  Cleveland,  175. 
Western     Counties     Manure     Co.     v. 

Lawes  Jlaniire  Co.,  550,  552. 
Western  Counties  Ry.  Co.  v.  AVindsor 

&  A.  R.  Co.,  141. 
Western    Granite    &    Marble    Co.  v. 

Knickerbocker,  750. 
Western  Manure  Co.  v.  Lawes  Chem- 
ical Co.,  85. 
Western  Ry.  Co.  y.  Harwell,  307,  1072. 
Western   Ry.   of  Alabama   v.   Mutch, 

192. 
Western  Stone  Co.  v.  Whalen,  999. 
Western  Transp.  Co.  v.  Newhall,  303. 
AA'estern   Union   Tel.   Co.   v.  Arwine, 
309. 
V.  Bates,  900. 
V.  Crall,  307. 
V.  E.vser,  14.5. 
V.  Fore,  000. 
V.  Hall,  370,  900. 
v.  James,  300,  307. 
V.  Kelly,  223. 
v.  Linn,  302,  309. 
v.  Longwill,  307. 
v.  Lowrey,  304. 
V.  Lyman,  304. 
v.  McGill,  334. 
V.  Moyle,  337. 
V.  Finer,  307! 
v.  Satterfield,  247. 
V.  Stevenson,  301. 
V.  Timmons,   900. 
V.  Watson,  379. 


Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Wood,  309, 

900. 
AA'e.stern  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Roberson.  97, 

901. 
Westervelt  v.  Demarest,  582. 
Westfield  Gas  &  Milling  Co.  v.  Aber- 

nathey,  212. 
West  Jersey  R.  Co.  v.  Camden,  G.  & 

^y.  Ry.  Co.,  780. 
Westlake  v.   Westlake,  468. 
West  London  Com.  Bank    v.   Kitson, 

582. 
West  Point  Iron  Co.  v.  Reymert,  692. 
West  Side  Bank  v.  Meehan,  353. 
Westwood  v.  Cowne,  386,  387,  392. 
AVetherbee  v.  Green,  395,   740. 
Wetmore  v.   Mellinger,   COS. 

V.  Ti-acy,  800. 
Weymouth  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ky. 

Co..  713. 
Whalen  v.  Baker,  464. 

v.  Centenary   Church,    1047. 

-V.  Citizens'    Gas    Co.,   954. 
Whalley  v.  Lancashire  Ry.,  703. 

V.  Pepper,   604,  025. 
Wharf  V.  Roberts,  597. 
Wharton  v.  Stevens,  754,  702. 
What    Cheer    Coal     Co.    v.    Johnson, 

1048. 
Whatling  v.  Nash,  602.  ' 

Whatman  v.  Pearson,   258,   200,   261, 

278. 
Wheatland  v.  Pryor,  285. 
Wheatley  v.   Baugh,   557,   758. 

V.  Chrisman,    753,    754. 
Wheatly  y.   Patrick,  243. 
Wheaton  v.  Beecher,   522,  537. 

V.  Peters,  92. 
Wheelahan  v.  Traction  Co.,  883. 
Wheeler  v.  Baars,  270,  59G. 

V.  Berry,  1019,  1025. 

V.  Gavin,   426. 

Y.  Hanson,   618,   628,  629. 

V.  Lawson,   713. 

V.  New    York    Cent.   &   H.    R.    R. 
Co.,  844. 

V.  Oceanic   Steam   Nav.   Co.,    903. 

V.  Pereles,   738. 

v.  Wheeler,   733. 

V.  Whiting,  428,  441. 
Wheeler  &  W.  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Boyce, 
403. 


CASES    CITED.  1249 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Wheelei-  &  W.  Manufg  Co.  v.  Heil,  2iu. 

V.  Jacobs,   159,  163. 
Wheelock  v.  Wheelwright,  730. 
Whelan  v.  Now  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R. 

Co..   028. 
WliGtmore  v.   Tracy,  801. 
Whigham  v.  Davis,  354. 
Whilton  V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  97. 
Whipple  V.  Cumberland  Manuf'g  Co., 
401. 

V.  Fuller,  609,  628. 

V.  Walpole,  397. 
Whirley   v.  Whiteman,   830. 
Whitaker    v.    Cawthorne,    684. 

V.  President,  etc.,  of  Delaware  & 
H.   Canal  Co.,  1051. 
Whitcher  v.  Hall,  366. 
Whitcomb  v.  Joslyn,  164. 
Whitcomb's  Case,  115. 
White  V.  Ballou,  944. 

V.  Barnes,  203. 

V.  Bayley,  665. 

V.  Boulton,  1083. 

V.  Campbell,  353. 

V.  Carr,  622. 

V.  Carroll,  56,  528. 

V.  City  of  San  Antonio,  175. 

V.  Commissioners,  183. 

V.  County  of  Bond,  l!i3. 

V.  Cutler,  702. 

V.  Dresser,  781. 

V.  Duggan,  513. 

v.  El  well,    685. 

V.  Fort,   12. 

V.  Garden,  725. 

V.  Gregory,  457,  460. 

V.  Inhabitants  of  Phlllipston,  284. 

V.  Jameson,  226. 

V.  Kellogg,  443. 

V.  Kennon.  991. 

V.  McQueen,  429. 

V.  Maxey,  333. 

V.  Morse,   119. 

V.  Mosely,  379. 

V.  Mowbray,   600. 

V.  Murtland,  452,  458,  460. 

V.  Nellis,  453,  458. 

V.  Nicholls,  491,  512,  513,  530,  54;!. 

V.  Phelps,  733. 

V.  Philbrick,  342,  721. 

V.  Phillips,   280. 

LAW  OP  TORTS — 79 


White  V.  Railway  Co.,   l!j:!,  313,  683, 
904,  906,  1019. 

V.  Ross,    466,    467. 

V.  Shradski,  613. 

V.  Washington,   910. 

V.  Woster;i   Union  Tel.  Co..  809. 

V.  Winnismmet    Co.,  !)77,   10. ill. 

V.  Wittemann     Lith.     Co.,     1004, 
1019. 
Whiteford  v.   Henthom,    607. 
Whitehead   v.    Greetham,    917. 

V.  Hellen,   37. 
Whitehouse  v.  Fellowes,  37,  145,  335, 
338. 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  142,  143. 
Whiteley  v.  Adams,  531,  543. 
AVhitenack   v.   Philadelphia   &   R.    R. 

Co.,  795.   796. 
Whiteside  v.  United  States,  110. 
Whitewater  Valley  Canal  Co.  v.  Com- 

egys,  705. 
Whitfield  V.  Lord  Le  Despencer,  137. 

V.  South  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  169. 
Whitford  v.   Panama  R.   Co.,   330. 
Whitliam  v.  Kershaw,  16,  361. 
Whiting  V.  Hill,  591,  592. 

V.  Johnson,    605. 
Whitlock  V.  Con)mon\vealth,  914. 

V.  Consumers'  Gas  TVust  Co.,  691. 
Whitman  v.  Merrill,  672. 
Whitmore  v.   BischofC,   411. 
Whitney  v.  Backus,  211,  680. 

V.  Bartholomew,  777,  778. 

y.  Clifford,  935. 

V.  Dutch,  160. 

V.  Elmer,  452. 

V.  Hitchcock,  459. 

V.  Martine,  917. 

V.  Peckham,  618. 

V.  Preston,  132,  724. 

V.  Slauson,   727. 

V.  Union  Ry.  Co.,  795. 
Whittaker  v.  Bradley,  .505. 

V.  City  of  Helena,  982. 

V.  Collins,  23,  24,  29.  293. 
Whittemore  v.    Oil   Co.,   346. 

V.  Thomas,   856. 
Whittier  v.    Collins,    297. 
Whittiker  v.  Forbes,   103. 
Whittington  v.  Boxall,   669.. 

V.  Gladwin,    506. 


1250 


CASES    OITED. 


[Vol.  1   comprises  pages  1-Oo2,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Wliitson  V.  May,  (>08. 
Wliitworth   V.   Dai-bisliire,  898. 

V.  Hall,   (■>()(■),   (ilO. 
Whyte  V.  Rysden.  2. 
^^'iclltrecllt  v.  Fasnacht,  243. 
Wickei'sham  v.  Oir.  CKd. 
Wickes  V.  Clutterbuck,  122. 
Widiig  V.  Dyer,  503. 
Wieman  v.  JMabee,  r>2'.t,  T>:H). 
Wier  V.  Allen,  .j;"i(J. 
Wier's  Appeal,  775,  778. 
Wiffin  V.  Kinard,  438. 
Wiggett  V.  l("ox,  281,  1036. 
Wiggin  V.  Coffin,  401. 
Wiggins  V.  Hatliaway,  138. 

V.  United  States,  45. 
Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  v.  Obicago  &  A.  R. 

Co.,  30:!. 
Wigmore  v.  Jay,  1029. 
Wigsell  V.  School,  16. 
Wilbrahani  v.  Snow,  712. 
Wilbui'  V.  Turner,  211,  680. 
Wilburn  v.  St.   Louis,   I.   M.   &  S.   R. 

Co.,  1091. 
Wilcox  V.  Gate,  297. 

V.  McCoy,  858. 

V.  Moon,  480,  481,  510,   512. 

V.  Plummer's  Ex'rs,  :','■','.). 

V.  Railroad   Co.,  371,  !I2!». 
Wild  V.  City  of  Paterson,  174. 
Wilde  V.  Gibson,  .5G(>. 

V.  Hexter,  743. 

V.  Waters,  078. 
Wildee  v.  McKee,  638. 
Wilder  v.  DeCou,  564. 

V.  Holden,   021. 

V.  Hubbell,  290. 

V.  Stanley,   09,  74. 
AVilds  V,  Bogan,  4.j9. 

V.  Layton,  700. 
Wild's  Adm'r  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co., 

951. 
Wiley  V.  Keokuk.  430. 

V.  Logan,  283. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  72. 
Wilford  V.  Berkley,  401. 
Wilkes  V.  Hungerford,  9. 

V.  Jackson,  342. 
Wilkie  V.  Bolster,  1085. 
Wilkins  v.  Burton,  667. 

V.  Earle,  902. 
Wilkinson  v.  Connell,  664. 


Wilkinson  v.   Detroit  Steel  &  Spring 
Works,  234,  839. 

V.  Haygarth,  668. 

V.  King,  722,  724. 

V.  Kirby,  687. 

V.  Verity,  338. 

V.  Wilkinson,  702. 
Will  V.  West  Side  R.  Co.,  832,  801. 
Williamson    v.    Sheldon    Marble    Co., 

1023. 
Willans  v.  Taylor,  623. 
Willard  v.  Holmes,  402,  (i09,  017. 

V.  Mellor,  473,  480. 

V.  Swansen,  978. 
Willdigg  V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  937. 
Willetts  V.  Railroad  Co.,  157. 
Willey  V.  Carpenter,  203,  444. 

V.  Hunter,  808. 

V.  Laraway,  667,  673,  699. 
Willi  V.  Lucas,  211. 
William  Branfoot,  The,  403,  939. 
Williams  v.  Archer,  721. 

V.  Cameron,    155. 

V.  Car  Co.,  277. 

V.  Chicago  Herald  Co.,  496. 

V.  Churchill,   1022. 

V.  City,  870. 

V.  Clough,   866,   10U3. 

V.  Davenport,    508. 

V.  Davis,  600. 

V.  Deen,  720. 

V.  Dickenson,   11,   640. 

V.  East  India  Co.,   778. 

V.  Edmunds,    192. 

V.  Esling,  82,  662,  689. 

V.  Fresno  Canal  &  Irrigation  Co., 
234. 

V.  Fulmar,  756. 

V.  Geese,  709. 

V.  Gibbs,  915. 

V.  Gilman,  949. 

V.  Grant,   1002,    1063. 

V.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  435. 

V.  Grcncott,  280. 

V.  Hays,  155,  157. 

V.  Holdredge,   509. 

Y.  Industrial  School,  188. 

V.  James,   688. 

V.  Jones,    251,   254,   420,    421,   438, 
841,   842. 

Y.  Kerr,  583. 

V.  Ladew,  758. 


CASES   CITED.  1251 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-Uoi!,  iiiclusivo;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


Williiiiii-;  V.  Le  Bar,  ST.j. 

V.  McFadden,  ."iOo. 

V.  MeGrade,  071. 

V.  ilcXeely,   ;>">(;. 

V.  Mercer,   132. 

V.  Midgett,   887. 

V.  Missouri  Pac.   Ky.  Co.,  lOoO. 

V.  Jlorland.  8."). 

V.  ilorris,  (J78. 

V.  Morrison,  686. 

V.   Mostyn,  83,  367. 

V.  Planters'  Ins.  Co.,  Hi'J. 

V.   Powell,  632. 

V.  Richards,  878. 

V.   St.  Louis  &  S.  F.   Ry.  C<i.,  336. 

v.  Sheldon,  212.   082. 

V.   Smith,  4'.»!t.   .-,:!:!,  717,   72'J. 

V.   Spencer,  674,   (i77. 

V.  Taylor,  611. 

A-.  The  Welhaven,  114. 

V.  Wood,  379. 
Williams'  Case,  'J63. 
Williamson  v.  Brandenberg,  370. 

V.  Fischer,   (;S2. 

V.  Freer,  481. 

V.  Louisville   Industrial   School   of 
Reform,  12(1. 

V.  Oleson,  761. 

V.  Tobey,  79"). 

V.  Woten,  .581. 
Williamsport  &  Almira  R.  Co.  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 113. 
Williard  v.  Williard,  702. 
Willingham  v.  King,  166. 
AVillis  V.  Adams.  714.  716. 

V.  City  of  Perry,  747.  7."i9.  941. 
Willitts  V.   Chicago,   B.    ^vt   K.   C.  Ry. 

Co.,  O.^O. 
Willmerton  v.  Sample,  6i:!, 
AVillmett  v    Harmer.  .523. 
Willmot   V.   Corrigan   Consol.    St.    Ry. 

Co.  1(19(1. 
Willock  V.   I'ennsylvauia   R.   Co.,   .'!()( i, 

301,  1084. 
Willsou  V.   JIcEvoy,  306. 
Willy  V.  Mtilledy,  921. 
Wilmarth  v.  Babcock,  400. 
Wilmont  v.  Howard,  913. 
Wilms  V.  Jess,  7.53. 
Wilsey  v.  Callanan,  807.  848. 
Wilson  V.   Beighler,  .523. 
V.  Brett,  817. 
V.  Bumstead,  335. 


Wilson  V.  Chaltant,  686. 

V.  ('ity  of  New  York,  135,   176. 

V.  City  of  Troy.  238. 

V.  Clark,  241. 

V.  Dondurant,  354. 

V.  Dubois,  554. 

V.  Dunville,   9(I8. 

V.  Edmonds.   7(MJ. 

V.  Finch-PIatton,    577. 

V.  Pitch,  536,  537. 

V.  Garrard,  160. 

v.  Great   South.   Tel.   &   Tel.    Co., 
145. 

V.  Haley   Live-Stock   Co.,   25,   604, 
670. 

V.  Hoffman,  709,  720. 

V.  Hudson  River  Water  Power  & 
Paper  Co..  1043. 

V.  Jefferson  Co.,  185. 

V.  McLaughlin,  718. 

V.  Maltby,   704. 

V.  Marks,  522. 

V.  The  Mary.  15(j. 

V.  Mathews,  741. 

V.  Merry,    1030,    1032,   1036,    1040, 
1041. 

V.  New  Bedford,  840. 

V.  Noonan,  491. 

V.  Peto,  285. 

V.  Peverly,   139. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  97,  261,   683,  861, 
881,  929,  947,  1027,  1070,  1084. 

V.  Rastall,  367. 

V.  Reedy,  944. 

V.  Russ,   916. 

V.  Shepier,    459, 

V.  Smith,  19. 

V.  Sproul,  452. 

V.  Stephenson,  518. 

V.  Sullivan,   527. 

V.  Tucker,  917. 

V.  Tumman,   43.  44. 

V.  Waddell,   834. 

V.  White,  233. 

V.  Young,  131,  406. 
Wilt  V.  Weish,  28,   163. 
Wiltse  V.  Town  of  Tilden,  3.33. 
Wilts  &  B.   C.   Nav.   Co.   v.    Swindon 

Waterworks    Co.,  806. 
Wimberly  v.  Thompson,  127. 
Wimbledon  v.  Dixon,  688. 
Wimer  v.  Allbaugh,  482. 

V.  Simmons,  756. 


1252 


CASES    CITKD. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  l-lioi,  inclusive;  vol.  2  tlie  residue.] 


Wlmer  v.  Smith,  592,  593. 
Winbigler  v.  Los  Angeles,  184. 
Winborn  v.  Mitchell,  132. 
Winch  V.  Conservators,  186. 
Winchell  v.  Argus  Co.,  494. 
Winchester  v.  County  Com'rs,  322. 
Winder  v.  Caldwell,  399 
Windham  v.  Wither,  343. 
Windram  v.  French,  586,  591. 
Windsmore  v.  Greenbank,  85. 
Windsor  v.  McVeigh,  167. 
Winemiller  v.  Thrash,  628. 
Wines   v.    Rio    Grande   W.    Ry.    Co., 

928. 
Winey  v.  Chicago,   M.  &  St.   P.   Ry. 

Co.,  964. 
Wing  Chong  v.  Los  Angeles,  175. 
Wink  V.  Weiler,  261. 
Winn  V.  Hobson,  428. 

V.  Rutland,  179. 
Winnebiddie  v.  Porterfield,  620. 
Winnegar's  Adm'r  v.  Central  Passen- 
ger Ry.  Co.,  329. 
Winner  v.  Lathrop,  913. 

V.  Oakland  Tp.,  472. 
Winpenny  v.  Philadelphia,  186. 
Winship  v.  Neale,  190. 
Winslow  v.  Beal,  18. 
Winsmore  v.  Greenbank,  85,  86,  466, 

467. 
Winston  v.  Young,  579,  594,  595. 
Winter  v.  Bandel,  589. 

V.  Henn,  460. 
Winterbottom  v.  Lord  Derby,  786. 

V.  Wright,  281.  895.  905,  1034. 
Winterbourne  v.  Morgan,  411,  681. 
Winterburn  v.  Brooks,  444. 

V.  Chambers,  668. 
Winters    v.    Kansas    City    Cable    Ry. 

Co.,  986. 
Wintringham  v.  Hayes,  900. 

V.  Lafoy,  662. 
Wirner  v.  AUbaugh.  483. 
Wirt  V.  Dinan.   222. 
Wisconsin  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.   Ross,  210, 

213,  293,  1071. 
Wise  V.  Ackerman,  820,  950,  994. 

V.  Jefiferis,  133,  079. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  277.  280. 
Wissler  v.  Walsh.  856. 
Wiswell  V.   Doyle.  980.  988. 
Witham  v.  Portland,  175. 
Withan  v.  Thomas,  617. 


Witherley  v.  Regent's  Canal  Co.,  ISG. 
Withers  v.  Henley,  418. 

V.  North  Kent  R.  Co.,   lOSD. 
Witman  v.   Felton.   731. 
Witt  V.  St.  Paul  &  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  G6U- 
Witte  V.  Dieffenbaeh.  859. 
Wittingham  v.  Owen,  729. 
Woessner  v.  'Wells,  633. 
Wohlenberg  v.  Melchert,  402. 
Wohlfahrt  v.  Beckert,  907,  924. 
Wolcott  V.  Melick,  803,  804. 
Wolf  V.  Bauereis,  471,  472. 

V.  Perryman,  422,  429. 

V.  Shepherd,  724. 

V.  Western    Union    Tel.    Co.,    30(L 
310. 

V.  Wolf,  468. 
Wolfe   V.   Erie   Tel.   &  Tel.   Co.,   14.-.. 
863. 

V.  Pearson,  48,  142. 

V.  Pugh,  269,  270,  639. 
Wolff  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Wilson,  02. 
Womack  v.  fudikar,  604,  622. 
Womersley  v.  Church,  757. 
Wood  V.  And,  756. 

V.  Bi-axton,  691. 

V.  Clapp,  912.   913. 

V.  Cobb,  241. 

V.  Graves,   133,   634. 

V.    Lane,  421. 

V.  Leadbitter,  683,  684. 

V.  McGrath,  804.  805. 

V.  Mannley,  685. 

V.  Mathews,  465,  466. 

v.  Noack,  733,  738. 

V.  Panfburn,  484. 

V.  Philips,   331. 

V.  Railway  Co..  255.  408.  604,  C93. 
842,  944. 

V.  Sutor,  605. 

V.  Wand,  759. 

V.  Wodd,  149. 

V.  Young,  337. 
Woodard  v.  City  of  Boscobel,  381. 
Woodbum  v.  Railway  Co.,  300. 
Woodbury  v.  Short,  759. 

v.  Thompson,  489. 
Wooden  v.  Western  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  Co., 

1038,  1044,  1045. 
Wooden-Ware   Co.  v.   United    States,. 

398,  720,  740. 
Woodes  V.  Jordan,  717. 
Woodhouse  v.  Walker,  697. 


CASKS  CITED.  12.53 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


A^^oodhull  V.  City  of  New  York,  181. 
Woodin  V.  Wentwortb,  808. 
Wooding  T.  Oxley,  428. 
M'oodlief  V.  Curteis,  1059. 
Woodling  V.  Knickerbocker,  293,  .326, 

4!>!.t,   511. 
Woodman  y.  Hubbard,  103,  102. 

V.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  233. 

V.  Tufts,  84. 
Woodmansie  v.  Logan,  608. 
Woodrop  Sims,  The,  1085. 
WoodrufC  V.  Bowen,  839,  891,  921. 

V.  Bradstreet  Co.,  499,  510,  541. 

V.  Cook,  707. 

V.  Halsey,   664,   682. 
Woodruff  Co.  V.  Delhi,  1058. 
Woods  V.  Colfax,  183. 

V.  Finnell,  609. 

V.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.,  950. 

V.  Pangburn,  342,  484. 

V.  Wiman,  481,  539. 
Woodward  v.  Aborn,  65,  759,  814. 

V.  Barnes,  218. 

V.  Glidden,  400,  430. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  333. 

V.  Seeley,  686. 

V.  Suydam,  48. 

T.  Washburn,  419,  6.30. 
Woodworth  v.  Mills,  610,  611,  619. 
Woolenslagle  v.  Runals.  600. 
Wooley  V.  Batte,  216. 

V.  Carter,  694. 

T.  Grand  St.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  950. 
Woolf  V.  Clialker,  153. 
Woolley  V.  Scovell,  73. 
Woolsey  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co., 
lOSl. 

V.  Trustees,  471. 
Woolwine's  Adm'r  v.  Chesapeake  &  O. 

R.  Co.,  894,  897. 
Woolworth  V.  Mills,  621. 
'W'ooster  V.  Sherwood,  726. 
Word  V.  Vance,  161,  164. 
Work  v.  Bennett,  738. 

V.  McCoy,  640. 
Workman  v.  City  of  New  York,  174. 
World  Pub.  Co.  v.  Mullen,  498,  504. 
Worley  y.  Spurgeon,  253. 
Wormell  v.  Maine  Cent  R.  Co.,  817, 

1025,  1027. 
Wormsdorf  v.  Detroit  City  Ry.  Co.,  68. 
Worrilow   v.    Upper    Chichester    Tp., 
69,  888. 


Worth  Y.  Gilling,  8.54,  857. 
Worthen  v.  RaiU-oad  Co.,  4i)2. 
Worthington  y.  Mencer,  30,  874. 

Y.  Scribner,  530. 

Y.  Wade,  886. 
Wray  v.  Milestone,  314. 
Wren  y.  Weild,  552,  553. 
Wrench  y.  Samenfeld,  617. 
AVren's  Adm'r  y.  '  Louisville,  St  L.  & 

T.   Ry.  Co.,  871. 
AVright  Y.  City  of  Ft.  Howard,  944. 

Y.  City  of  St.  Cloud,  827,  870,  963. 

Y.  Clark,  58,  813. 

Y.  Compton,  214. 

Y.  Defrees,  115,  130. 

Y.  Eaton,  47,  286. 

Y.  Freeman,  366. 

Y.  Hardy,  945. 

v.  Kerr,  217. 

Y.  Lathrop,  342. 

V.  Leonard,  164,  217. 

Y.  Lothrop,  526,  529,  842. 

Y.  Mtdvaney,  378. 

Y.  Omnibus  Co.,  322. 

Y.  Pearson,  856. 

Y.  Railroad  Co.,  847,  883,  985,  992. 
1040,  1059,  1092. 

Y.  Ramscot,  662. 

Y.  Robotham,  733. 

Y.  Skinner,  740. 

V.  Tileston,  323. 

Y.  Wilcox,  210,  252,  255,  653. 

Y.  Williams,  702. 

Y.  Wilson,  419. 

V.  Woodgate,  517,  542,  543. 

V.  Wright,  322. 
Wuotilla  Y.  Duluth  Lumber  Co.,  1026. 
AVust  Y.  Erie  City  Iron  A\^orks,  10,  51. 
Wustland  v.  Potterfield,  669. 
Wyatt  Y.  Buell,  527. 

V.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.,  971. 

V.  Harrison,  751. 

Y.  White,  606. 
A^'yckoff  Y.  Queens  County  Ferry  Co., 

1058. 
AA'yld  Y.  Pickford,  839. 
Wylie  Y.  Birch,  &3. 

V.  Blwood,  777,  783. 

V.  Grundysen,  708. 
Wyllie  V.  Palmer,  243,  258,  908. 
Wyman  y.  Leavitt,  368,  369. 

Y.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  1079. 
Wymore  v.  Mahaska  Co.,  986,  987. 


12.3i  CASES   CITED. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


^^',vnclham  v.  Wycombe,  204. 

\\'ynkoop  v.  M'ynkoop,  13. 

Wynn  v.  City  &  Suburban  Ry.  Co.,  987, 

1081. 
\Yynne  v.  Parsons,  493,  517,  519. 


Yabn  v.  City  of  Ottumwa,  947. 

Yale  V.  Seeley,  686. 

Yale  Gas  Stove  Co.  v.  Wilcox,  173. 

Yandes  v.  Wright,  753. 

Yarborough  v.  Bank  of  England,  Kis. 

V.  Weaver,  025. 
Yarmouth  v.  France,  199,  201. 
Yamell  v.  Kansas  City,  Ft.  S.  &  M.  Ry. 

Co.,  1081,  1082,  1090. 
Yates  v.  Camsew,  722. 

V.  Jack,  89,  749. 

V.  Joyce,  85. 

V.  Lansing,  125,  527. 

V.  Milwaukee,  177,  789. 

V.  Squires,  258,  261. 

V.  Town  of  West  Grafton,  692. 

V.  Whyte.  400. 
Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Fulton,  314. 
Yeager  v.  Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.  Ry. 
Co.,  1003. 

V.  Wallace,  728. 
Yeaman    v.    Noblesville    Foundry    & 

Mach.  Co.,  1005. 
Yeates  v.  Allin,  688. 

V.  Reed,  157,  482,  493. 
Yeaton  v.  Boston  &  L.  R.  Corp.,  1044. 
Yellowly  v.  Gower,  697. 
Yelton  V.  Railroad  Co.,  312. 
Y'erex  v.  Eineder,  761. 
Y'ertore  v.  Wiswell,  331. 
Yocum  V.  Zahner,  414. 
Yopst  V.  Yopst,  472. 
Yordy  v.  Marshall  Co.,  182. 
York  V.  Canada  Atlantic  Steamship  Co., 
1088. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  862,  963. 
York  &  North  Midland  R.  Co.  v.  Queen, 

92. 
Youl  V.  Harbottle,  719. 
Yoimg  V.  Atlantic  Ave.  Ry.  Co.,  885. 

V.  Bankier  Distillery  Co.,  757. 

V.  City  of  Charleston,  184. 

V.  Clegg,  479,  480. 


Young  V.  Commissioners,  126,  128,  V64. 

V.  Davis,  98. 

V.  Harvey,  886. 

V.  Hichens,  645,  659. 

V.  Johnson,  550. 

\.  Kuhn,  506. 

V.  Leary,  901,  1070. 

V.  Macrae,  550,  552. 

V.  Marshall,  27. 

V.  Mason,  913. 

V.  Miller,  503. 

V.  New  Jersey  &   N.   Y.    Ry.    Co., 
1052. 

V.  New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  1034. 

V.  Ransom,  13. 

V.  South  Boston  Ice  Co.,  258. 

V.  Spencer,  84,  367. 

V.  Vaughn,  654. 

V.  Waterworks  Co.,  3.52. 

V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  306. 

V.  Young,  469,  594. 
Youree  v.  Hamilton,  526. 
Yundt  V.  Hartrunft,  465. 


Zabriskie  v.  Smith,  563. 
Zachary  v.  Pace,  728. 
Zealy  v.  Electric  Co.,  1072. 
Zebley  v.   Storey,  614. 
Zeigler  v.  Powell,  629. 

V.  Danbui-y  &  N.  R.  Co.,  1035,  1036. 
Zeitinger  v.  Hackworth,  664. 
Zelinsky  v.  Price,  131. 
Zell  V.  Dunkle,  26,  901. 
Zeller  v.  Martin,  211,  422. 
Zellerback  v.  Allenberg,  640. 
Zeminder  Case,  140. 
Zerflng  v.  Mourer,  458. 
Zettel  V.  City  of  West  Bend,  784,  787. 
Zier  V.  Hofflin,  499,  511,  541. 
Zimmer  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  It. 

Co.,  305,  300. 
Zinn  V.  Rice,  607,  611,  629,  633,  6:!4. 
Zintek  v.  Stimson  Mill  Co.,  1041. 
Zottman  v.  San  Francisco,  43. 
Zouch  V.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  30.">. 
Zuccarello  v.  Nashville  &  C.  R.  Co.,  185. 
Zuckerman  v.  Sonnenscbein,  513,  526, 

540. 
Zulkee  v.  Wing,  284. 
Zumwalt  V.  Dickey,  337. 


GENERAL    INDEX. 

VOLS.    1  AND   2. 


[The  figures  refer  to  the  pages.    Pages  1  to  B5:i  are  comprised  in  volume  1;  the  res- 
idue in  volumes.] 


A 

ABATEHEXT. 

of  acfiou  on  death  of  wrongdoer,  331. 
of  nuisance,  by  act  of  parties,  700-802. 
b.y  action,  802. 

ABSTRACT  CLERKS, 

liability  for  official  acts,  133. 

ABUSE  OF  LICENSE  OR  PROCESS, 
trespass  ab  initio,  G79-6S1. 
action  for,  632-034. 

ACCEPTANCE, 

duty  of  carriers  to  accept  goods,  1000,  1067. 

ACCIUKXT, 

liability  for,  64-67. 

ACTIONS, 

forms  of,  at  common  law,  16-19. 
ex  delicto,  17. 
ex  contractu,  17. 
cause  of  action  as  to  time,  104. 
cause  of,  determined  by  state  of  facts  existing  at  commencement  of  suit. 

104. 
variations  in  the  normal  right  to  sue,  109-208. 
privilege  of  actor  or  general  exemption,  109. 
public  acts,  acts  of  state,  110-114. 
exemption  of  legislators,   114^110. 
exemption  of  judicial  officers,  110-125. 
exemption  of  executive  officers,  12.J-139. 

liability  for  wrongs  of  subordinates,  137-139. 
private  acts,  139-154. 

exercise  of  statutory  rights,   140-145. 
exercise  of  ordinary  rights,  145-148. 

LAW  OF  TOKTS  (1355) 


1250  INDEX. 

[A"ol.  1  comprises  pages  l-nri2,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

ACTIONS— Continued, 

disciplinary  powers,  148,   149. 

rights  of  neccs.sitj-,  149,  1.50. 

right  of  private  defense,  l.jl-l.")3. 
exemptions  based  on  status,  154-189. 

insane  persons,  154-158. 

infants,  158-165. 

drunkards,  1()5,  160. 

convicts  and  alien  enemies,  166,  167. 

prijvate  corporations,  167-173. 

municipal  and  quasi  municipal  corporations,  173-184. 

corporations  not  municipal  engaged  in  public  works,  184-189. 
exemptions  based  on  conduct  of  plaintiff,  189-204. 
for  continuing  torts,  407-413. 
by  master  for  injuries  to  servant,  448-450. 
for  malicious  abuse  of  process,  032-634. 
for  malicious  interference  with  contract,  634-630. 
for  nuisance,  782-788. 
to  abate  nuisance,  802. 

ACTIO  PERSONALIS  CUM  PERSONA  MORITUR, 
apiJlication  of  maxim,  327,  328. 

ACT  OF  GOD, 

liability  of  carrier  for  goods  destroyed  by,  1061. 
in  general,  04,  05,  70,  S36. 

ACTS  OF   STATE, 

exemption  of  state  from  liability  for,  110-114. 

AD.JECT1VE  LAW  OP  TORTS, 

torts  and  crimes  distinguished,  8-11. 

in  what  courts  torts  are  cognizable,  12-16. 

administration  of  law  of  torts  in  courts  of  common  law,  10-30. 

ADMINISTRATORS, 

see  "Executors  and  Administrators." 

ADMIRALTY  COURTS, 

torts  not  cognizable  in,  14. 

ADULTERY, 

action  by  husband,  464-^00. 

ADVERTISEMENT, 

privilege  of,  libel  and  slander,  541. 

ADVICE  OF  COUNSEL, 

as  a  defense  to  malicious  prosecution,  621-023. 


INDEX.  1257 

[Vol.   1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

AGENT, 

of  legislature,  liability,  114. 

liability  of  corporation  for  act  of  agent,  171-173. 

liability  of  municipal  corporations  for  acts  of,  181. 

liability  to  principal  for  torts  of  subagent,  284. 

liability  for  misfeasance,  malfeasance,  and  nonfeasance,  280-291. 

AGGRAVATION  OF  DAJIAGBS, 

in  libel  and  slander  by  malice,  517-520. 

AGREEMENT, 

discharge  or  limitation  of  liability  by,  298-320. 
before  damage,  validity,  298-309. 
after  damage,  310-320. 
form,    310. 
AIR, 

interference  with  liglit  and  air,  749,  750. 

ALIEN  ENEMIES, 

right  to  sue,  1G6,  167. 

ANGUISH, 

nental  suffering  as  element  of  damage,  368,  369. 

ANIMALS, 

right  to  kill  trespassing,  152. 

liability  for  damage  caused  by,  853-858. 

carriers  of  live  stock,  liabilities,  1073-1076. 

infected,  liability,  857.    ■ 

ferse  naturae,  659. 

ARBITRATORS, 

exemption  from  liability,  118,  119. 

ARCHITECT, 

defamation  of,  508. 

ARREST, 

false  imprisonment,  424-429. 

ASHBY  V.  WHITE. 

injuria  imports  damnum,  79-87. 

ASPORTATION, 

as  element  of  conversion,  723,  724. 

ASSAT.TLT  AND  BATTERY, 
assault  defined,  431. 

apparent  means  of  effecting  attempt,  433. 
battery  defined,  434. 
force  and  intent,  435-438. 


1258  INDEX. 

|\'ol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

ASSAULT  AND  BATTERY— Contiuued, 
deceit  sometimes  equivalent  to  force,  4:'.7. 
defenses,  438-446. 

justification,  self-defense,  439-440. 

defense  of  family,  servants,  and  friends,  440. 

defense  of  property,  441. 

commensurate  defense,  442. 

authoiity.  44o.  444. 

mitigation,  provocation,  444-446. 
leave  and  license,  444— 146. 

AS.SUMFSIT, 

ex  delicto  character  of  origin,  18. 
waiver  of  tort  and  suit  in,  27,  296,  297. 
effect  on  other  joint  tort  feasors,  346. 
conversion,   737. 

ASSUMPTION  OF  RISK, 
in  general,  869. 
by  setvant,  1013. 

ordinaiy  risk,  1014-1019. 
extraordinary  risks,  1019.  1020. 
appreciation  of  risk,  1021. 
exceptions,  1021-1029. 
other  modifications,  1023. 
as  affected  by  original  services,  1024,  1025. 
promise  to  remedy,  1020. 
justification  in  la^Y,  1027. 
assumption  not  properly  voluntary,  1028. 
risk  of  fellow  servant,  adoption  of  rule,  1030. 
question  for  jury,  1033. 
test  of  common  employment,  1036. 
doctrine  of  vice  principal,  1037. 
confusion  in  opinion,  1037-1039. 
negatively  who  are  vice  principals,  1037-1043. 
performance  of  duty  the  test,  1043-1047. 
doctrine  of  the  United  States  supreme  court,  1047-1049. 
of  fellow  sen'ants  and  vice  principals,  1047-1049. 
negligence  of  master  in  selecting  fellow  sei-vants,  1050. 
concurrent  negligence  of  master  and  fellow  servant,  1051. 
statutory  changes,  1053-1056. 

ATTORNEYS  AT   LAW, 

liability  for  negligence,  915-917. 

immunity  from  liability  for  libel  and  slander,  526. 


INDEX.  1  ^59 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclnsivL;  toI.  2  the  residue.] 

AUCTIONEEIiS, 

liability  in  conversion,  734. 

AUTIIOftlTY. 

no  liability  for  authorized  acts,  139-154. 

acts  autliorized  by  statute,  140-145. 

exercise  of  ordinary  rights,  145-154. 
scope  of  servant's  authority  as  test  of  master's  liability,  2.52-257. 
justification  for  assault,  443,  444. 
of  law  as  defense  to  trespass,  673-679. 
to  maintain  nuisance,  TSS-793. 
goods  taken  by  public  authority,  liabilitj'  of  carriers,  1065. 

AVOIDABLE  CONSEQUENCES, 

avoiding  threatened  danger  before  damage  is  done,  966-908. 
avoiding  unnecessary  damage  after  injury,  969. 
no  duty  to  anticipate  negligence,  970. 
of  negligence,  English  rule,  973. 
American  rule,  974. 

B 

BAGGAUE, 

carriers  of,  see  "Carriers." 

BAILMENT, 

liabUity  of  infant  bailees,  162,  163. 
liability  for  negligence,  900,  901. 

BANKS, 

liability  for  negligence  of  correspondent,  284,  285. 

BARRISTER, 

see  "Attornej's  at  Law." 

BATTERY, 

see  "Assault  and  Battery." 

BELIEF. 

probable  cause,  libel  and  slander,  .")46. 

BICYCLES, 

law  of  the  road,  negligence,  877. 

BLASTING, 

liability  for  negligence  in,  848. 

BOARD  OF  HEALTH, 

liability  of  municipal  corporation  for  acts  of,  174. 

BOXING  MATCHES, 

assault  and  battery,  203. 


12G0  iM,i;x. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-C52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

BOYCOTTS. 

see  "Conspiracy." 

BRIDGES, 

liability  for  defects,  f!9,  notes. 

BROKER, 

liability  for  conversion,  734. 

BURDEN   OF  PROOF, 

of  negligence  of  carriers  of  passengers,  1083-1086. 
of  contributory  negligence,  911. 

c 

CANDIDATE, 

defeat  as  special  damage  for  defamation,  386. 
defamation  of,  comment,  oS'>. 

CAPACITY, 

due  care  according  to,  871-875. 

CARE, 

immaterial  in  nuisance,  771. 

degrees  of,  negligence,  816. 

has  reference  to  the  course  and  constitution  of  inanimate  and  animate 

nature,  827-832. 
in  the  use  of  property,  832-837. 

may  have  reference  to  knowledge  of  the  danger,  8<57-S71. 
dependent  on  capacity  of  persons,  871-875. 
to  be  exercised  at  railroad  crossings,  881-88.5. 

master's  duty  not  to  expose  servant  to  unnecessary  risks,  990-1009. 
master  not  an  insurer  of  servant  against  injury,  1010-1013. 
requisite  in  providing  fellov?  servants,  1013. 
degree  of  care  of  carriers  of  passengers,  1083-1086. 
before  entrance  to  car,  1087. 

CARRIERS, 

common  carrier  defined,  1057. 
stipulations  limiting  liability,  299-302. 
liability  for  negligence,  902. 
of  goods,  1059-1073. 

liability  as  insurers,  1059-1001. 

exceptions,  inherent  nature,  1061. 

act  of  God,  1061. 

public  enemies,  1063. 

conduct  of  shipper,  1064. 

public  authority,  1065. 


INDEX.  1261 

[A'ol.  1  ooiTiprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

i 

CA  RRIERS— Continued, 
duties,  1066-1073. 

acceptance  of  goods,  1066,  1067. 
transportation  of  goods,  1008. 
delivery  to  consignee,  1069. 
damages  for  nondelivery  of  goods,  1070. 
connecting  lines,  1071. 
of  live  stock,  1073-1076. 
of  baggage,  1076-1078. 
of  passengers,  1078-1094. 
not  insurers,  1078. 
who  are  passengers,  1078-1081. 
degree  of  care  and  burden  of  proof,  10S3-1086. 
rules  and  regulations,  1086. 
before  entrance  to  car,  1087. 
care  in  transit,  1088. 
termination  of  liability,  1092. 
CASE, 

origin  of  actions  on  the,  17-19. 
CATTLE, 

liability  for  trespass  by,  854. 
infectious  anim.als,  858. 
CATTLE  GUARDS, 

negligence,  failure  to  maintain,  928. 
CAUSA  CAUSANS, 

liability,  dependent  on  responsibility  for,  62. 

CAUSE, 

liability  dependent  on  connection  as,  61. 

what  is,  02. 

condition  not  a  cause,  63. 

need  not  be  sole  cause,  68. 

effect  of  intervening  cause,  70. 

conduct  is  legal  cause  when  damage  results  as  a  natural  and  probable 
consequence,  74. 

conspicuous  antecedent,  76. 

last  human  wrongdoer,  76. 

question  of  fact,  77. 

plaintiff's  own  wrongdoing  as,  191-194. 

violation  of  statutory  duties,  connection  as  cause  of  harm,  929. 

contributors'  negligence,  connection  as  cause  of  harm,  971-977. 
CAUSE  OF  ACTION, 

detennined  by  facts  existing  at  commencement  of  suit,  104. 


1-62  INDEX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  iuclusive;  Tol.  2  the  n'sidiie.] 

CAVEAT  EMPTOR, 

application  of  maxim.  580. 
see,  also,  "Deceit." 

CHARACTER, 

evidence  of  character  inadmissible  to  show  negligence.  9.51. 

CHARITIES, 

liability  of  public  charities  for  torts,  187. 

CHASTITY, 

imputation  on,  libel  and  slander,  490,  .j0.j. 

CHILDREN, 

what  care  expected  from,  871-875. 

CHURCH, 

libel  and  slander,  privilege  of  meetings  or  council,  539. 

CIVIL  DAMAGE  ACTS, 

measure  of  damages,  410. 

CIVIL  PROCEEDINGS, 

as  basis  for  malicious  prosecution,  604. 

CLERK  OF  COURT, 

liability  for  official  acts,  134. 

CLUB, 

disciplinary  authority,  148. 

COGGS  V.  BERNARD. 

degrees  of  negligence,  816. 

COLLECTOR  OF  CUSTOMS, 
see  "Officers." 

COMMAND, 

liability  by  reason  of,  38. 

general  or  special,  as  test  of  master's  liability,  248  251. 

COMMENT, 

libel  and  slander,  right  of  fair,  534. 

COMMISSIONERS  OF  HIGH^\'AYS, 
see  "Executive  Officers";    "Officers." 

COilMON   CARRIERS, 
see  "Carriers." 

COMMON-LAV^  DUTIES, 
classification,  91. 

COMMON-LAA^'  REilEDIES, 
for  torts,  350^16. 


INDKX.  1263 

[\'ol.  1  comprises  pages  1-002,  inclusive;   vol.  -  the  residue.] 

<:'OMMOX  RIGHTS, 

no  liability  for  exercise  of,  15-1. 

COJXPAltATI^'E  NE(JLIGEN('E. 
see    "Negligence.' 
doctrine  is  not  generally  recognized,  978. 

COMI'EXSATIOX, 
see  "Damages."  ' 

(JOXCEUT   IN   ACTION, 

liability  dependent  on,  209-216. 

iJONDITIOX. 

not  a  cause,  C3. 

C(  )XDUOT, 

see,  also,  "Continuing  Torts." 
actionable  because  of  injurious  consequences,  100. 
liability  for  lawful  and  unlawful,  100-10.">. 
unlawful  conduct,  101. 

wrongfulness  determined  by  lex  loci,  not  lex  fori,  102. 
continuing  or  completed,  36. 
act  or  omission,  35. 

COXFIDEXTIAL  COMMUXICATIONS. 
conditional  privilege,  530. 

COXXKCTIOX  AS  CAUSE, 
see  "Cause." 

COXSKXT, 

as  defense  to  tort,  31,  199-204. 

of  owner  or  occupant  as  defense  to  trespass,  681-686. 
liability  by  reason  of,  38. 
to  liability  by  state,  111. 
limited  by  parties,  202. 
limited  by.  law,  203. 
waiver  of  liability  by,  29.')-297. 

COXSEQUENTIAL  DAMAGES, 
see  "Damages." 

COXSIDEKATION, 

for  discharge  of  liability  after  damage,  313-315. 

CONSriRACY. 
defined,  637. 

injuiy  the  gist  of  the  action,  638. 
use  and  effect  of  charge  of  conspiracy,  639,  (i40. 


1^64  INDEX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  iuclusive;  vol.  2  the  iciidue.] 

CONSPIRACY— Continued, 

strikes  and  boycotts,  6il-652. 

the  combination,  641-645. 

the  malicious  intent,  645. 

damage  to  complainant,  046. 
principles  applied,  648. 

CONSTABLES, 

see  "Sheriffs." 
liability  for  official  acts,  130-133. 

CONTAGIOUS  DISEASES.  * 

transmission  by  glandered  horses,  857. 
imputation  of,  libel  and  slander,  509. 

CONTINUING  TORTS, 

continuing  and  completed  wrongs,  36. 
action  for  damages,  407-413, 

CONTRACTOR, 

see  "Independent  Contractor." 

CONTRACTS, 

enforcement  of  contract  rights  at  common  law,  19. 

torts  growing  out  of,  22-24. 

sued  ex  delicto,  25. 

quasi  contract,  enforcement  of  obligation,  20. 

sued  ex  contractu  or  ex  delicto,  26. 
negligence  or  misfeasance  in  execution,  95. 
ex  delicto  action  against  infant  for  breach,  161-l(j5. 
in  discharge  or  limitation  of  liability,  298-320. 

before  damage  to,  298-309. 

after  damage,  309-321. 
malicious  interference  with,  634r-636. 
negligence  in  performance  of  duties  imposed  by,  897-918. 
action  for  negligent  breach  by  parties  and  privies,  904-906. 
limitation  of  liability  for  negligence,  effect  on  third  persons,  900-910. 
action  by  third  person  for  negligence,  900-910. 
negligence  in  performance  includes  want  of  competent  skill,  910. 
limiting  liability  of  carriers  of  passengers,  1082. 

CONTRIBUTION, 

between  joint  tort  feasors,  215,  216. 

CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE, 
no  defense  to  deceit,  595-600. 
burden  of  proving,  941. 
as  a  defense,  959-962. 


INDEX.  1265 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

CONTKIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE— Continued, 
analogous  to  defendant's  negligence,  960. 
no  defense  to  willful  wrong,  961. 
no  defense  to  nuisance,  961. 
may  bar  recovery  in  fraud,  961. 
exposure  to  danger,  962. 
elements  of,  962-977. 

no  duty  to  anticipate  negligence,  970. 

connection  as  cause,  971-977. 

avoidable  consequences,  English  rule,  973. 

American  rule,  974. 
avoiding  threatened  danger  before  damage  is  done,  966-968. 
avoiding  unnecessary  damage  after  injury,  969. 
comparative  negligence,  978. ' 
vicarious  negligence,  980-989. 
of  custodian  of  child,  984,  985. 

assumption  of  extraordinary  risks  by  servant,  1019,  1020, 
CONVERSION, 
'  see  "Trover  and  Conversion." 

CONVICTS, 

right  to  sue,  166,  167. 
CORAM  NON  JUDICE, 

liability  of  judicial  officers,  123. 

CORPORAL  PUNISHMENT, 

right  to  inflict,  149. 
CORPORATIONS, 

liability  of  private  corporations  for  torts,  167-173. 

liability  for  exemplary  damages,  169. 

liability  for  acts  ultra  vires,  170,  171. 

scope  of  agent's  or  servant's  authority,  171-173. 

liability  of  municipal  and  quasi  municipal  coiTorations  for  torts,  173-184. 

maintaining  public  charity,  liability  for  torts,  187. 

CORPORATORS, 

liability  not  cumulative,  172. 
CORPSE, 

rights  in  relation  to,  13. 
COUNSEL, 

advice  of,  as  a  defense  to  malicious  prosecution,  621-623. 

immunity  from  liability,  libel  and  slander,  526. 
COURSE  OF  EMPLOYMENT, 

general  meaning  of,  258,  259. 

LAW  OP  TORTS— 80 


1266  INDEX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  l-Co2,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

COTJRTS, 

province  of  court  and  jury,  see  "Jui-y." 

in  which  torts  are  cognizable,  12-16. 
COVERTURE, 

as  a  defense  to  actions  In  form  ex  delicto,  218. 
CRIME, 

distinguished  from  tort,  8-11. 

imputation  of,  slanderous  per  se,  .502. 
CRIMINAL  CONVERSATION, 

action  by  husband,  464. 

action  by  wife  for  corresponding  wrong,  467. 

CRITICISM, 

conditional  privilege  of,  libel  and  slander,  .'J34. 

CUSTOM  AND  USAGE, 

due  care  with  reference  to,  875,  87G. 
evidence  of,  to  show  negligence,  947,  948. 

CUSTOMER, 

duties  owed  to,  negligence,  893. 

liability  of  master  to,  for  injuries  by  servant,  2G3. 


D 

DAMAGES, 

necessity  of  proving,  78-84. 

when  presumed,  81. 

actual  damage,  83. 

for  moral  wrongs,  not  recoverable,  86. 

must  be  caused  by  responsible  human  agent,  80. 

must  conform  to  legal  standards,  except  where  presumed,  86. 

for  acts  of  executive  officers,  125-139. 

incident  to  authorized  act  cannot  be  recovered,  139-154. 

liability  of  municipal  corporations,  182. 
compensation,  not  restitution,  the  proper  test,  360. 
classification,  360. 
compensatory  damages,  360-oS2: 

direct  and  consequential  damages,  .364. 

when  damages  are  presumed,  366. 

when  damages  are  not  presumed,  367. 

for  mental  suffleriug,  368. 

proximate  and  remote,  371-382. 

what  are  proximate  consequences,  372-382. 


INDEX.  1267 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

DAMAGES— Continued, 

illustrations  of  remote  damages,  378-380. 
illustration  of  damages  not  remote,  380-382. 
pleading,  383-392. 

general  damages,  what  are,  383. 

general  damages  need  not  be  pleaded,  388-392. 

special  damages,  what  are,  383-388. 

special  damages  must  be  specially  pleaded,  388-392. 
exemplary  damages,  392-398. 

who  liable,  395-397. 

joint  tort  feasors,  213,  214. 

corporations,  169. 

municipal  and  quasi  municipal  corporations,  180. 

recovery  by  parent  for  seduction  of  child,  455. 

province  of  court  and  jury,  397,  398. 
mitigated  damages,  398-400. 

for  false  imprisonment,  430. 
excessive  damages,  400-403. 
inadequate  damages,  403,  404. 
entirety  of  demand,  404-^13. ' 
severable  damages,  406,  407. 
continuing  torts,  407-413. 
statutory  changes,  413-416. 

extent  of  recovery,  413-4:16. 

death  by  wrongful  act,  414,  415. 

civil  damage  acts,  416. 
as  the  gist  in  libel  and  slander,  486,  487. 

mental  suffering  as  an  element  of,  497. 

aggravation  by  malice,  517-519. 
special  damages.  In  action  for  slander  of  title,  553,  554. 
as  the  gist  of  actions  for  deceit,  600-602. 
as  the  gist  of  an  action  for  malicious  prosecution,  027-629. 
aggravated  by  conspiracy,  637. 
in  action  for  conspiracy,  646. 
for  trespass,  690-695. 
for  waste,  703,  704. 
in  trover,  737-743. 
the  gist  of  nuisance,  778-781. 
measure  for  nuisance,  808,  809. 
the  gist  of  action  for  negligence,  959. 
for  goods  lost  by  carrier,  1070. 

connecting  lines,  1071. 


1268  INDEX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

DAMNUM  ABSQUE  INJURIA, 
see  "Nuisance." 
explained,  86-90. 
no  liability  for  authorized  acts,  139-154. 

DANGER, 

concealed,  duty  to  licensee  or  volunteer,  890. 
voluntary  exposure  to,  contributory  negligence,  962, 

DANGEROUS  THINGS, 

instrumentalities,  liability  by  reason  of,  38,  832. 

DEATH, 

discharge  of  tort  by,  326-335. 

abatement  of  action  on  death  of  wrongdoer,  331. 

DEATH  BY  WRONGFUL  ACT, 
Lord  Campbell's  act,  330. 
action  for,  330-335. 
damages,  414,  415. 

DECEIT, 

sometimes  equivalent  to  force  in  assault  and  battery,  437. 

what  is  actionable  deceit,  558. 

the  wrongful  conduct  of  defendant,  560-588. 

the  false  representation,  561. 

false  statements  with  knowledge,  563. 

f^lse  statement  without  knowledge,  but  with  negligence,  565-569. 

express  misrepresentations,  570-573. 

implied  misrepresentations,  573-575. 

assertion  of  falsehood  or  suppression  of  truth,  575-C77. 

expression  of  opinion,  577-581. 

representation  of  law,  581,  582. 

promises,  582-584. 

inducing  acts  on  plaintiff's  behalf,  585. 

inducing  acts  with  respect  to  other  specified  persons,  587. 

inducing  acts  with  respect  to  party  making  statement,  587,  588. 
conduct  of  plaintiff,  589-600. 

connection  as  cause  of  damage,  589,  590. 

plaintiff  must  have  been  deceived,  590,  591. 

reliance  on  representations,  591-594. 

materiality  of  representations,  504. 

conduct  of  plaintiff  as  a  bar  to  relief,  595. 

contributoi-y  negligence,  595. 
resulting  damage,  600-602. 


INDEX,  1269 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

DE  FACTO  JUDICIAL  OFFICERS, 
exemption  from  liability,  119. 

DEFAMATION, 

see  "Libel  and  Slander";  "Slander  of  Title." 

formerly  cognizable  in  ecclesiastical  courts,  13. 
DEFECTS, 

master's  liability  for  latent  defects,  850. 
DEFENDANT, 

normal  rule  as  to,  32. 
DEFENSE, 

right  of  private  defense,  151-154. 

DE  JUKE  JUDICIAL  OFFICERS, 

exemption  from  liability,  119. 
DELIVERY, 

of  goods  by  carrier  to  consignee,  1069. 
DETINUE, 

as  remedy  for  tort,  352. 

remedy  for  conversion,  737. 

DISABILITY, 

care  with  reference  to,  871. 
effect  on  liability,  154. 

DISCHARGE, , 

of  liability  for  torts,  294r-347. 

by  voluntary  act  of  party,  294-320. 
by  vraiver,  295-297. 
by  agreement,  298-320. 

before  damage,  liberty  of  contract,  298-309. 
after  damage,  310-320. 
form  of  agreement,  310. 
parties,  311. 
consideration,  313-315. 
intent  to  discharge  wrong  in  issue,  315. 
by  notice,  308. 
by  operation  of  law,  321-324. 
by  judgment,  321-326. 
by  death,  326-335. 
by  statutes  of  limitation,  335-310. 
by  compliance  with  statutory  requirements,  340. 
of  joint  torts,  341-347. 
by  judgment,  341-344. 
by  release,  344-346. 
by  waiver,  346,  347. 


1270  mDEX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

DISCIPLINARY  POWERS, 

no  liability  for  exercise  of,  148. 
DISCRETION. 

of  judicial  officer,  116. 

of  municipal  corporations,  173. 

DISTRESS, 

damage  feasant,  676. 
in  general,  3.50. 

DITCHES, 

see  "Surface  Water." 

DIVISIBILITY  OF  DAMAGES, 

damages  must  be  recovered  in  single  suit,  404. 

DIVORCE  COURTS, 

torts  not  cognizable  in,  12. 
DOG, 

as  a  dangerous  instrumentality,  152. 

DOMESTIC  RELATIONS, 

the  family  at  common  law,  447,  448. 
injuries  in  family  relations,  447^72. 

DRAINS, 

see  "Surface  Water." 
DRIVER, 

care  to  be  exercised  by,  877. 

responsibility  of  master  to  third  persons  for  wrongs  of,  277. 

vicarious  negligence,  980. 

DRIVING  CASES, 

conversion,  730.  note  410;   720,  note  354. 

DRUNKARDS, 

liability  for  torts,  165,  166. 

DURESS, 

liability  for  torts  committed  under,  205,  note, 
persons  under  duress,  205. 

DUTIES, 

statutory  duties,  95-100. 

owed  by  master  to  servant,  990-1009. 

owed  by  common  carriers  of  goods,  1066-1073. 

violation  of,  resulting  in  damage,  is  a  tort,  78. 

remedies  for  violation  of,  85. 

common  law,  contract,  and  statutory  duties,  90-100. 

to  respect  property  and  possession,  653  r,.j9. 


INDEX.  1271 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusire;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

DWELLING, 

every  man's  house  his  castle,  674. 

E 

EASEMENT, 

as  defense  to  trespass,  688. 

right  to  maintain  a  nuisance,  774,  775. 

EAVESDROPPING, 
is  a  nuisance,  770. 

ECCLESIASTICAL  COURTS, 
torts  not  cognizable  in,  13. 
defamation  and  malicious  prosecution  formerly  cognizable  in,  13. 

ELECTION  OFFICERS, 

see  "Judicial  Oflicers";   "Officers." 

ELECTION  OF  REMEDIES, 

tort  or  contract  against  infant,  26,  162. 
election  to  sue  infant  in  assumpsit,  165. 
tort  or  contract  against  married  woman,  26. 

ELECTRICITY, 

liability  for  damage  by,  863-865. 

EMERGENCY, 

care  to  be  exercised  under,  874. 

EMPLOYER  AND  EMPLOYE, 
see  "Master  and  Servant." 

ENTIRETY  OF  DEMAND, 

of  damage  for  tort  must  be  recovered  in  single  suit,  404. 

EQUITABLE  REMEDIES, 
injunction,  383. 
receivers,  359. 

EQUITY, 

torts  not  cognizable  in  courts  of,  15. 
concun-ent  jurisdiction  over  fraud,  16. 

ESTOPPEL, 

liability  because  of,  40. 
waiver  of  liability  by,  295-297. 

EVERY  MAN'S  HOUSE  HIS  CASTLE, 
application  of  maxim,  674. 


1-7-  INDKX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

EVIDENCE, 

of  conversion,  722. 

of  negligence,  burden  of  proof,  934-941. 

contract  or  undertaking,  937. 

res  ipsa  loquitur,  938. 

expert  and  opinion  evidence,  943-947. 

evidence  as  to  custom,  947-949. 

relevancy,  949. 

of  character  inadmissible  to  show  negligence,  951. 

weight  of  and  failure  of  proof,  952. 
of  negligence  of  carriers  of  passengers,  1083-1086. 

EXCAVATIONS, 

dangerous,  near  highways,  877. 

EX  CONTRACTU, 
actions,  16. 

EX  DELICTO, 

actions,  16. 

EX  DOLO  MALO  ACTIO  NON  ORITUR, 
application  of  maxim,  189. 

EXECUTION  OP  PROCESS, 

as  justification  for  trespass,  674. 

EXECUTIVE  OFFICERS, 

see,  also,  "Judicial  Officers";    "Officers." 
exemption  from  liability,  125-139. 
liability  for  violation  of  purely  public  duties,  126. 
liability  for  violation  of  private  duties,  128. 
liability  for  special  injury,  130. 
liability  for  unauthorized  acts,  136. 

EXECUTORS  AND  ADMINISTRATORS, 
liability  for  torts,  205,  206,  note. 

EXEMPLARY  DAMAGES, 
see  "Damages." 

EXEMPTION, 

general  exemption  from  suit,  109. 
from  liability,  public  acts,  110. 

of  state  in  general,  110. 

liability  by  consent,  111. 

of  the  United  States,  112. 

of  the  various  states,  112. 

of  foreign  states,  113. 


INDEX.  127'6 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

EXEMPTION— Continued, 

of  legislators,  114^116. 

of  agents  or  servants  of  legislature,  114r-116. 

of  judicial  officers,  116-12.5. 

of  executive  officers,  125-139. 

private  acts,  139-154. 

based  on  status,  154. 

insane  persons,  154—158. 

drunkards,  165. 

private  corporations,  167-173. 

municipal  and  quasi  municipal  corporations,  173-184. 

corporations  not  municipal,  engaged  in  public  worlis,  184^189. 
based  on  conduct  of  plaintiff,  189-204. 

vsTongdoing,  189-199. 

consent,  199-204. 

EXPERT  EVIDENCE, 
of  negligence,  943-947. 

EXPLOSIVES, 

considered  as  nuisances,  847,  note  151. 
liability  for  negligence,  S47-852. 

EXPRESS  MALICE, 
see  "Malice." 

EX  TURPI  CAUSA  ACTIO  NON  ORITUR, 
application  of  maxim,  189. 

F 

FALSE  IMPRISONMENT, 
defined,  417. 

distinction  from  malicious  prosecution,  630  032. 
legality  of  restraint,  417-419. 
sufficiency  of  restraint,  419-421. 
who  liable,  421-424. 
defenses,  424-430. 

justification,  by  .iudicial  v^^arrant,  424-427. 

without  warrant,  427^29. 
mitigation,  absence  of  malice,  430. 

FALSE   REPRESENTATIONS, 
see  "Deceit." 

FAMILY. 

at  common  law,  447. 

injuries  in  family  relations,  447-472. 


l'2i"4  INDEX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

FELLOW  SERVANTS, 

master's  duty  to  provide  suitable  aud  sufflcieut  fellow  servants,  998-1000. 
assumptiou  of  risk  of,  1029. 
adoption  of  the  rule,  1031. 
reason  of  the  rule,  1031. 
who  are,  province  of  juiy,  1033. 

test  of  common  employment,  1036. 
doctrine  of  vice  principal,  1037-1049, 
confusion  in  opinion,  1037-1039. 
performance  of  duty  the  test,  1037-1043. 
negatively  as  to  who  are  vice  principals,  1039-1043. 
doctrine  of  the  United  States  supreme  court,  1047-1049. 
negligence  in  selecting,  1050. 
concurrent  negligence  of  master  and,  1051. 
statutory  changes,  1053-1056. 

FELONY, 

trespass  merged  in,  11. 

FEME  COVERT, 

see  "Husband  and  Wife." 

FENCES, 

liability  for  failure  to  maintain,  96,  note  380;  922,  note  474. 

FERAE  NATURAE, 
see  "Animals.'' 

FERRY, 

false  imprisonment  on,  420. 
I'lRE, 

liability  for  fire  started  in  self-defense,  153. 

liability  for  negligence,  840-846. 

FIRE  DEPARTMENT, 

liability  of  city  for  acts  of,  174. 
FIREWORKS, 

explosion,  volenti  non  fit  injuria,  851. 
FORCIBLE  ENTRY, 

trespass,  660. 
FOREIGN  LANGUAGE, 

defamation  in,  not  actionable  unless  understood,  482, 

FOREIGN  POWERS, 

exemption  from  liability,  110. 

FORNICATION, 

charge  of,  libel  aud  slander,  49.",  504. 


INDEX.  1275 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

FRAUD, 

see,  also,  "Deceit." 
liability  of  infants  for,  163-165. 

liability  of  executors  and  administrators  for,  206,  note, 
liability  of  principal  for  fraud  of  agent,  267-271. 
liability  of  master  for  fraud  of  servant,  267-271. 
in  obtaining  release  of  liability,  316-320. 

(3 

GAS, 

as  dangerous  instrumentality,  liability,  848. 
negligence  with  respect  to,  848. 

GATES, 

liability  for  negligence  at  railroad  crossing,  custom  and  usage,  881. 
GERMANIC  LAW, 

early  conceptions,  247. 

recent  statutes,  1053,  note  233. 

GLANDERS, 

infected  liorses,  liability,  908. 

GOOD  FAITH. 

privileged  communications,  530. 

GRADING, 

liability  of  municipal  corporations  for  damage  by,  142,  89,  note  348. 
GRANT, 

distinguished  from  license,  682. 

license  coupled  with  an  interest,  trespass,  684. 
GUARANTY, 

action  in  tort  to  evade  statute  of  frauds.  Lord  Tonterden's  act,  26. 
GUARDIAN, 

infant  must  sue  by,  30. 
GUEST, 

liability  of  innkeepers,  901,  note  400. 

care  with  reference  to,  893. 

GUILLE  v.  SWAN, 

connection  as  cause,  50. 

GUN, 

Langridge  v.  Levy,  907. 
GUNPOWDER, 

liability  for  explosion,  negligence,  or  nuisance,  847,  note  151. 

liability  as  for  nuisance  and  for  negligence,  847. 


1276  INDEX, 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


HARBORING  WIFE, 

see  "Husband  and  Wife." 

HEALTH. 

nuisance  afCecting,  766. 

HEEDLESSNESS, 
see  "Negligence." 

HIGHWAYS, 

nuisance  on,  764-766. 

care  to  be  exercised  at  level  railroad  crossings,  881-885. 

negligent  interference  with,  885. 

customary  use,  888. 

HORSE, 

as  instrumentality  of  harm,  855. 
glandered,  858,  note  203. 
liability  for  frightening,  care,  828. 
trespass  by,  854. 

HOST, 

see  "Guest." 

HUSBAND  AND  WIFE, 

liability  for  torts  of  wife,  .216-218. 
statutory  provisions,  effect,  218-223. 

torts  committed  by  wife,  219-222. 

torts  as  between  husband  and  wife,  223. 

torts  committed  against  wife,  223. 
actions  between,  463. 

action  by  wife  for  seduction,  etc.,  of  husband,  467,  468. 
action  for  interference  with  domestic  rights,  464r^72. 
action  for  alienation  of  wife's  affections,  466. 
action  by  husband  for  miscellaneous  wrongs,  467. 
Injuries  to  wife,  double  cause  of  action,  469-472. 

parties  plaintiff,  470-472. 

I 

IDENTIFICATION, 

theory  of  master's  liability  for  torts  of  servant,  245-247. 
not  exclusive  test  of  master's  liability,  271,  272. 

IMPLIED  AUTHORITY, 
see  "Authority." 


INDEX.  1277 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

IMPLIED  MALICE, 
see  "Malice." 

INCORPOREAL  RIGHTS, 

interference  with  nuisance,  749. 

INDEMNITY, 

to  master  by  servant,  283. 

INDEPENDENT  CONTRACTOR, 
defined,  228. 

when  employer  is  liable  for  torts  by,  231-233. 
Interference  with  work,  232,  233. 
negligence  in  selection,  232,  233. 

liability  where  thing  contracted  to  be  done  is  tortious,  233. 
liability  for  breach  of  absolute  duty,  234,  238. 
liability  for  acts  of  subcontractors,  238. 

INFANTS, 

liability  for  torts,  158-165. 
negligence  of,  871. 

INFECTED  ANIMALS, 
liabiUty,  857. 

INFECTIOUS  DISEASES, 

liability  of  owner  of  infected  animal.  908,  note  422. 

INJUNCTION, 

against  torts,  353. 

conspiracy  entitles  to  injunction,  637. 

against  trespass,  690-G95. 

against  waste,  704^700. 

against  nuisance,  803-807. 

IN  JURE  NON  REMOTA  CAUSA  SED  PROXIMA  SPECTATUR, 
application  of  maxim,  01,  372. 

INJURIA  SINE  DAJIXO, 
explained,  79-81. 

INNKEEPERS, 

liability,  901,  note  400. 

INNUENDO, 

office  of,  libel  and  slander,  510. 

IN  PARI  DELICTO, 

application  of  maxim,  960. 


1278  INDKX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

INSANE  PERSONS, 

liability  for  torts,  15-i-158. 
liability  for  negligence,  871-875. 

actual  damages  recoverable  against  insane  persons,  158. 
INSPECTION, 

of  appliances  by  master,  1007-1009. 
INSTRUMENTALITIES, 
liability  because  of,  39. 

liability  by  reason  of  conduct  of  servants,  261. 
liability  by  reason  of  conduct  of  strangers  or  volunteers,  265. 
assumption  of  risk,  1015-1017. 
duty  of  master  to  furnish  suitable,  993. 
care  of  master  in  providing  safe  Instrumentalities,  1011. 
INSURANCE, 

master  does  not  insure  servant  from  injury,  1010-1013. 
liability  of  common  carriers  as  insurers,  1059-1061. 
exception,  inherent  nature,  1061. 
act  of  God,  1061. 
public  enemies,  1063. 
conduct  of  shipper,  1064. 
public  authority,  1065. 
carriers  of  passengers  not  insurers,  1078. 

INTENTION, 

as  element  of  tort,  9,  10. 

not  resulting  In  wrongful  conduct  Is  not  actionable,  55-57. 

to  do  wrong  not  essential  to  liability,  57-59. 

to  do  wrong  is  malice,  59. 
INTEREST  REIPUBLICAE   UT   SIT  FINIS   LITIUM, 

application  of  maxim,  321. 
INVITATION  TO  ALIGHT, 

negligence  and  contributory  negligence,  964. 
INVITED  PERSONS, 

liability  to,  for  negligence,  893. 

JOINT  TORT  FEASORS, 
who  are,  209-213. 
liability,  213-216. 
contribution  between,  215,  216. 

JOINT  TORTS, 

discharge  of,  341-347. 


INDEX.  127 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

JUDGE, 

see  "Judicial  Officers." 
JUDGMENT, 

discharge  of  tort  by,  321-326. 
reason,  321. 

identity  of  parties  and  cause  of  action,  323,  324. 
final  judgment  on  the  merits,  32.5. 
discharge  of  joint  tort  by,  341-344. 

against  one  joint  tort  feasor  without  satisfaction   does   not  vest   proi 
erty,  343. 

JUDICIAL   OFFICERS, 

see  "Executive  Officers";    "Officers." 
exemption  from  liability,  116-125. 
liability  for  acts  in  excess  of  jurisdiction,  121. 
liability  for  acts  in  the  absence  of  jurisdiction,  123. 
exemption  as  to  ministerial  acts,  124. 

JURISDICTION, 

defined  and  explained,  116,  117. 

JURORS, 

exemption  from  suit,  120. 

JURY,  PROVINCE  OF, 

in  malicious  prosecution,  626. 
negligence,  analysis  of  functions,  932. 

negligence  ordinarily  question  fur,  031. 

negligent  violation  of  statutory  duty,  'J24. 
assumption  of  risk  by  servant,  1033. 
fellovy  servants,  who  are,  1033. 

JUS  TERTII, 

defense  in  trespass,  669. 

JUSTICES  OF  THE  PEACE, 
see  "Judicial  Officers." 

JUSTIFICATION, 

of  false  Imprisonment,  424^29. 

with  warrant,  424-427. 

without  warrant,  427^29. 
of  assault  and  battery,  439-444. 
of  trespass,  673-690. 

K 

KNOWLEDGE, 

of  danger  as  an  element  of  contributory  negligence,  965. 


1-SO  INDEX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

L 

LABORERS,  STATUTE  OF, 
liability  under,  447. 

LABOR  ORGANIZATION, 
conspiracy,  637. 

LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 
liability  for  torts,  223-227. 

contract  to  repair,  225. 

letting  premises  in  ruinous  condition  or  state  of  nuisance,  225,  220. 

authorizing  wrongs,  225,  226. 
liability  of  landlord  to  tenant,  227. 

LAW  OF  THE  ROAD, 
see  "Negligence." 

LAWYERS, 

liability  for  negligence,  915-917. 

LEAVE  AND  LICENSE, 
eteect  on  liability,  199-204. 
mitigate  damages  for  assault,  444-446. 

LECTURES, 

injunction  against,  publication  of  garbled  copies,  357. 

LETTERS, 

as  publication  of  defamation,  480. 

LEVEL-CROSSING  CASES, 

injuries  at  railroad  crossings,  8S1. 

LEX  FORI  AND  LEX  LOCI, 

wrongfulness  of  conduct,  dependent  on  lex  loci,  102. 

LIABILITY, 

for  torts,  how  attaches,  37-48. 
by  personal  commission,  37. 
by  consent  or  command,  38. 
by  relationship,  38. 
because  of  instrumentalities,  39. 
by  conduct  operating  as  an  estoppel,  40. 
by  ratification,  43-48. 
theory  on  which  liability  attaches,  48-54. 

acts  done  at  peril  with  reference  to  harm,  48-51. 
acts  done  willfully  with  reference  to  harm,  48. 
acts  done  negligently  with  reference  to  harm,  48. 


INDEX.  ]2S1 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

LIABILITY— Continued, 

mental  attitude  of  tort  feasor,  54-61. 

mere  intention  or  malice  not  resulting  in  wrongful  conduct  not  action- 
able,  55-57. 

intention  to  do  wrong  not  essential,  57-59. 
dependent  on  connection  as  cause,  61. 
dependent  on  being  causa  causans  or  proximate  cause,  62. 
effect  of  intervening  cause,  70. 
extends  to  natural  and  probable  consequence,  74. 
what  is  actionable  conduct,  86-90. 
for  violation  of  common-law  duties,  90-94. 
for  lawful  and  unlawful  conduct,  100-105. 
in  use  and  management  of  property,  101. 
determined  by  lex  loci,  not  lex  fori,  102. 
for  tort,  essential  elements,  106. 
for  public  acts,  110-114. 
of  legislators,  114-116. 
exemption  of  judicial  officers,  116-125. 
of  executive  officers,  125-139. 

for  wrongs  of  subordinates,  137-139. 
for  private  authorized  acts,  139-154. 
excess  or  abuse  of  authority,  143-145. 
for  acts  of  necessity,  140. 
for  acts  of  defense,  151-154. 
of  insane  persons  for  torts,  154-158. 
exemptions  based  on  status,  154-189. 

of  drunkards,  165. 

of  private  corporations,  167-173. 

of  municipal  and  quasi  municipal  corporations,  173-184. 

of  involuntary  quasi  corporations,  182-184. 

corporations  not  municipal  engaged  in  public  works,  184-189. 
exemptions  based  on  conduct  of  plaintiff,  189-204. 

wrongdoing  by  plaintiff,  189-198. 

consent,  199-204. 
of  executors  and  administrators  for  torts,  205,  note, 
of  persons  under  duress  for  torts,  205,  note, 
of  receivers  for  torts,  206-208,  note, 
for  torts  committed  by  or  with  others,  200-293. 
concert  in  action,  209-216. 
dependent  on  relationship,  216-293. 

husband  and  wife  for  torts,  216-223. 

landlord  and  tenant,  223-227. 

LAW  OF  TORTS — 81 


1282  INDEX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pagps  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

LI  A  BIIJTY— ( 'ontiuued, 

independent  contractor,   22S-238. 
master  and  servant,  2.30-291. 
of  lorincipal  for  misrepresentation  bj'  agent,  2117-200,  note, 
of  master  to  servant,  280. 
of  servant  to  sei-vant,  280,  281. 
of  servant  to  master,  282-2S.">. 
of  servant  to  third  persons,  2S(;-2'.)1. 
of  partners  for  torts  of  copartner,  201-293. 
for  torts,  discharge  and  limitation,  294-320. 
discharge  by  waiver,  295-297. 
b.y  compliance  with  statutory  requirements,  340. 
by  agreement,  310-320. 
discharge  or  limitation  by  operation  of  law,  321-341. 

discharge  by  death,  32(5-335. 
of  master  for  injuries  to  servant,  990. 
of  common  carrier  of  goods,  1059-1073. 
as  insurers,  1059-1061. 

exceptions,  inherent  nature,  lOGl. 
act  of  God,  lOGl. 
public  enemies,  10G3. 
conduct  of  shipper,  1064. 
public  authority,  1065. 
of  carriers  of  live  stock,  1073-1076. 
of  carriers  of  baggage,  1070-1078. 
of  carriers  of  passengers,  1078-1094. 
termination,   1092. 
LIBEL  AND  SI-ANDER, 
defamation   defined,   473. 

libel,  slander,  and  malicious  prosecution  distinguished,  476-470. 
publication,  476-^86. 

what  constitutes,  479^83. 
the  giving  out,  479^82. 
the  taking  in  by  third  persons,  482,  483. 
republication,  483,  484. 
repetition,  48.^,   484. 
application    to    plaintiff,    484-486. 
personal  application,  484^86. 
disparaging  sense,  486. 
damages  as  the  gist  of,  486-497. 
Louisiana  rule,  487. 

presumption  in  actions  for  slander,  488-492. 
special    injury,    nominal    damages,    489. 


INDEX.  1283 

[Vol.   I  comprisos  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

LIBEL  AND  SLANDER— Continued, 
pecnniary  loss,  489. 

proximate  or  remote  damages,  490-402. 
presumption  of  damages  in  action  for  libel.  49.3^97. 
words  libelous  per  se,  493. 

words  libelous,  but  not  slanderous  per  se,  494-496. 
special  injurj-  in  libel,  49(). 

mental  suffering  as  an  element  of  damage,  497. 
words  slanderous  per  se,  498. 
construction  of  language  used,  49S-.J00. 
function  of  court  and  jury,  4!)9,  500. 
signification  of  words,  5UO-512. 
innocent   words.   501. 

words  defamatory  per  se,  imputing  a  crime,  50250."). 
words  in.iurious  to  calling,  .")().j-509. 
words  imputing  contagious  diseases,   509. 
words  tending  to  disherison,  509. 
ambiguous  words,  509,  511. 
malice.  512-520. 

presumption  of,  513-516. 
malice  which  must  be  proved,  510-520. 
actual  malice,  517-520. 
defenses,    520-550. 

statutory  defenses,   520. 
common-law  defenses,  521-550. 
justification,    truth,   521-525. 
privilege,   525-544. 

absolute  privilege,  official  communications,  529. 

judge,   536-549. 
qualified  privilege,  530. 
fair  report,  531. 
reports  of  public  meetings,  .533. 
fair  comment  and  criticism  on  books.   534. 
fair  comment  a  criticism  on  public  men,  534-538. 
reports  of  judicial  proceedings,  535. 
master    and    servant,    453. 
public   duty,    538. 
fraternal  organizations,  539. 
commercial  communications,  540. 
privilege  of  advertiser,  541. 
communications  in  confidential  relations,  542. 
mitigation,   544-5.30. 
provocation,   545. 


1284  INDF.X. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  toI.  2  the  residue.] 

LIBEL  AND  SLANDER-Continued, 

common-law  retraction,   546. 

honest  belief  and  rumors  may  mitigate  damages,  546. 
plaintiff's  character  and  position,  548-550. 
injunction  against  libel,  353. 
running  of  statute   of  limitations,   330. 
retraction,  6  &  7  Vict.  9,  520,  521. 
see,  also,  "Slander  of  Title." 
LIBERUM  TENEMENTUM, 

plea  of,  in  trespass,  6S6-688. 
LICENSE, 

abuse  of,  trespass  ab  initio,  679-6S1. 
LICENSE  AND  INVITATION, 

due  care  with  reference  to,  875,  876. 
LIGHT  AND  AIR, 

obstruction  of,  easement,  749,  750. 

LIMITATION, 

of  liability  for  torts,  294-347. 

by  voluntary  act  of  party,  294-320. 

by  agreement  before  damage,  liberty  of  contract,  298-309. 
by  notice,  308. 
by  operation  of  law,  321-341. 
by  statute,  335-340. 

by  compliance  with  statutory  requirements,  340. 
of  liability  of  carriers  of  passengers,  1082. 
LIMITATION    OF   ACTIONS, 

in  tort,  335-340. 
LIVE  STOCK, 

carriers  of,  see  "Carriers." 
LOCAL  ACTIONS, 

see  "Actions." 
LORD  CAMPBELL'S  ACT, 

9  &  10  Vict.,  death  by  wrongful  act,  330. 

LUNATICS, 

see  "Insane  Persons." 

M 

MACHINERY, 

see  "Ways,  Works,  and  Machinery." 

MALFEASANCE, 

distinction  between  malfeasance,  misfeasance,'  and  nonfeasance,  36.. 
liability  of  servant  for,  286. 


INDEX.  1285 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-G52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

MALICE, 

not  resulting  in  wrongful  conduct,  not  actionable,  55-57. 
willful  violation  of  right,  59. 
malicious  wrongs  in  general,  555-55S. 
classification  of  malicious  wrongs,  556. 

deceit,   malicious  prosecution,  malicious   abuse  of  process,   malicious 
interference  with  contract,  conspiracy,  555-558. 
in  libel  and  slander,  512-520. 
in  action  for  slander  of  title,  552. 
in  malicious  prosecution,  614-616. 

absence  of,  mitigates  damages  for  false  imprisonment,  430. 
in  conspiracy,  645. 

MALICIOUS  ABUSE  OF  PROCESS, 
when  action  lies,  632-634. 

MALICIOUS  INTERFERENCE  WITH   CONTRACT, 
action  for,  634-636. 

MALICIOUS  PROSECUTION, 

formerly  cognizable  in  ecclesiastical  courts,  13. 
defined,   195. 

distinguished  from  libel  and  slander,  476-479. 
distinguished  from  false  imprisonment,  030-632. 
is  defamation  through  courts  of  justice,  477. 
essential  elements,  603-632. 

the  judicial  proceeding,  604^610. 

what  judicial  proceedings  are  sufficient,  605-610. 
termination  of  proceeding,  ClO-612. 

success  of  plaintiff,  610-612. 
parties  to  proceeding,  612-614. 
malice  and  want  of  probable  cause,  614^626. 
malice,  614r-616. 
probable  cause,  616,  617. 

inference  from  conviction,  acquittal,  or  dismissal,  618. 
effect  of  honest  belief,  619-621. 
advice  of  counsel,  621-623. 

concurrence  of  malice  and  want  of  probable  cause,  623-625. 
province  of  court  and  jury,  626. 
damages  are  the  gist  of  the  action,  627-629. 

MANDAMUS, 

as  remedy  for  torts,  354. 

MARRIED  WOMEN, 

see  "Husband  and  Wife." 


1 286  INDEX. 

[Vol.  1  coiQiirises  pages  1-052,  inclusive;   vol.  2  the  residue.] 

MASTER  AXD  SERVANT, 

liability  of  corporations  for  acts  of  servant,  171-17.'!. 
executive  officers,  liability  for  wrongs  of  subordinates,  137-130. 
existence  of  relationship,  241-244. 
master's  liability  to  third  persons,  239-2S0. 
liability  dependent  on  relation  of,  239-291. 
respondeat  superior,  240-244. 
consent,  torts  authorized  or  adopted,  245,  246. 

injurious  conduct  commanded,  24(3,  247. 
theory  of  identification,  24.J-247. 
early  Germanic  theory  of  master's  liability,  247. 
particular  command,  test  of  liability,   248-250. 
general  command,  test  of  liability,  250,  251. 
scope  of  authority  as  a  test  of  liability,  251-257. 
scope  of  authority  includes  command  test,  252. 
includes  excessive  or  mistaken  execution  of  authority,  252,  253. 
master's  benefit,  254. 
motive  of  servant,  254. 

includes  liability  for  forbidden  conduct,  255. 
course  of  employment  as  a  test  of  liability,  2.57-270. 
includes  scope  of  employment,  258. 
authority  of  master  not  the  test  of  liability,  259. 
hours  of  employment  not  an  unfailing  or  conclusive  test  of  liability, 
260. 
duty  owed  by  a  master  to  third  persons,  261-271. 

dangerous  Instrumentalities,  264. 
liability  in  cases  of  fraud,  267-271. 
reason  of  master's  liability  to  third  persons,  271-276. 
duty  to  third  persons,  273,  274. 

master  the  Insurer  against  torts,  but  not  against  damage,  274, 

275, 
connection  as  cause,  275. 
liability  for  independent  torts  of  servant,  275-280. 
master's  liability  to  servant.  280. 
servant's  liability  to  servant,  280,  281. 
servant's  liability  to  master,  282-285. 
liability  of  servant  for  torts  of  subagent,  281. 
servant's  liability  to  third  persons,  286-291. 

servant's  liability  for  misfeasance  and  malfeasance,  286. 
servant's  liability  for  nonfeasance,  2S7. 
stipulations  limiting  liability,  :!i)2. 

action  by  master  for  interference  with  relationship,  448-450. 
for  what  wrong  action  lies,  449. 


INDEX.  1287 

[Vol.  1  comprises  yyages  1-052,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  rcsidue.J 

MASTER  AND  SEE  V ANT— Continued, 
form  of  action.  450. 
liability  for  negligence,  809. 
master's  liability  for  injuries  to  servant.  990. 
master's  duties  to  servant,  990-1009. 

duties  are  peculiar  to  relationship,  991. 

master  owes  duties  to  servant  only  when  servant  is  acting  within 

scope  of  his  employment,  992. 
master's  liability  for  injuries  caused  by  stranger  or  volunteer,  992, 
providing  safe  place  for  work,  993. 
providing    fellow    servants,    998-1000. 
promulgating  rules,  1001,  1002. 

warning  and  instructing  as  to  incidental  dangers,  1002-1006. 
warning  and  Instructing  as  to  extraneous  dangers,  1007. 
inspection,  supervision,  and  enforcement,  1007-1009. 
master  not  an  insurer  of  servants,  1010-1013. 
care  in  providing  instrumentalities,  1011,  1012. 
care  requisite  in  providing  fellow  servants,  1013. 
assumption  of  risk  by  servant,  1013. 

knowledge  and  appreciation  of  risk,  1014-1019. 
instrumentalities,    1015. 
place,  1017. 
violation  of  rule,  1018. 
extraordinary  risks,  1019. 
appreciation  of  risk,    L021. 
exceptions,   1021-1029. 
other  modifications,   1023. 
as  affected  by  original  services,  1024,  1025. 
promise  to  remedy,   1026. 
justification  in  law,  1027. 
assumption  not  properly  voluntary,  1028. 
risk  of  fellow  servant,  1029. 
adoption  of  the  rule,  1030. 
reason   of  rule.   1<  131-1036. 
test  of  common  employment,  1036. 
doctrine  of  vice  principals,  1037. 
confusion  in  opinion,  1037-1039. 
negafivi'ly   wlio  are,   1037-1043. 
performance  of  duty  the  test,  1043-1047. 
doctrine  of  the  United  States  supreme  court,  1047-1049. 
negligence   in   selecting   fellow   ser-\ants,    lO-'iO. 
concurrent  negligence  of  master  and  servant,  1051. 
statutory    changes,    1053-10.jG. 
liability  of  carriers  of  passengers,  1001. 


1288  INDEX. 

fVol.  1  comprises  pnges  1-652,  inclusive:  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

MEATS, 

liability  for  damage  by  poisoned  meats,  907,  90S. 
xMENS  REA, 

effect  of  mental  element  in  torts,  34. 

defendant's  mental  attitude  the  gist  of  deceit,  5G0. 

mental  element  of  negligence,  820. 

MENTAL  SUFXfERING, 
damages  for,  368-371. 
as  element  of  damage  In  action  for  defamation,  497. 

MINISTERIAL  ACTS, 
what  are,  124. 

MINISTERIAL  DUTIES, 
defined,  116. 
conversion,  734. 

MINISTERIAL    OFFICERS, 

see  "Judicial  Officers";   "Officers";    "Executive  Officers." 

MISFEASANCE, 

distinction  between  misfeasance,  malfeasance,  and  nonfeasance,  36. 
liability  of  servant  for,  286. 

MISREPRESENTATIONS, 
see  "Deceit." 
made  by  agents,  267. 
rescission  of  release  obtained  by,  318. 

MISTAKE, 

no  excuse  for  interference  with  property  or  possession,  653. 

MITIGATION, 

of  damages,  see  "Damages." 

of  damages  for  false  imprisonment,  430. 

absence  of  malice  mitigates  damages  for  libel  or  slander,  544. 

in  libel  and  slander  by  absence  of  malice,  517-520. 

of  damages  for  malicious  prosecution,  advice  of  counsel,  621. 

of  damages  in  assault  and  battery,  leave,  license,  and  provocation,  444. 

MONKEY, 

liability  for  injuries  by,  854. 

MOTIVE, 

immaterial  in  nuisance,  772-774. 
see  "Mens  Rea." 

MUNICIPAL  AND  QUASI  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS, 
liability  for  torts,  173-184. 
liability  for  exemplary  damages,  180. 


INDEX.  1289 

[Vol.  1  comprises  p.iges  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

N 

NAME, 

right  to  trade-name,  146. 

NATURAL  AND  PROBABLE  CONSEQUENCES, 
what  are,  74,  78,  372. 

NECESSITY, 
rights  of,   149. 

NEGLIGENCE, 

of  common  carrier,  see  "Carriers." 
definition,  810,  note, 
a  distinct  wrong,  813. 
essential  elements,  810. 
care,  degrees,  816. 

mental  element,  820. 
inadvertence  essential  to  negligence,  821. 

willful  and  wanton  negligence,  823. 
duty,    825. 

common-law  duty  to  exercise  care,  827-897. 
inanimate  nature,  827. 
animal  nature,  828. 
human  nature,  829. 
with  respect  tQ  property,  832-8G7. 
accumulations  of  water,  833-835. 
exceptions  to  rule  in  Rylands  v.  Fletcher,  835,  836. 
things  of  weight,  836,  837. 
fire,  840. 

explosives,    847-852. 
poisons,   852. 
animals,  853-858. 

things  dangerous  because  put  in  motion,  858-863. 
electricity,  863-865. 
summary,   865. 
due  care  may  have  reference  to  knowledge  of  the  danger,  867- 

871. 
care  with  reference  to  capacity,  871-875. 
custom  and  usage,  875,  876. 
license  and  invitation,  875,  876. 
care  in  respect  to  highways,  877-879. 

ordinary  and  extraordinary  use,  877-879. 

law  of  the  road,  877-879. 

conduct  of  railroad  companies,  881,  882. 


1290  INDEX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652.  iuclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

NEGLIGENCE-Continued, 

onre  at  railroad  crossings,  881-885. 
conduct  of  travelers,.  882-885. 
interference  with  highways,  885-889. 
customary  use  of  highways,  888. 
care  owing  to  trespassers  on  real  estate,  889,  890. 
care  owing  to  volunteers  and  licensees  on  real  estate,  890-893. 
care  owing  to  invited  persons,  893-895. 
test  of  mutuality,  896,  897. 
contiact  duties,  897-918. 
master  and  servant,  899. 
telegraph  companies,  899,  900. 
bailments,  900,  901. 
carriers,  902. 

parties  and  privies,  904-906. 
damage  caused  by  dangerous  things,  906-909. 
damage  in  course  of  negligent  performance  of  contract,  906-910. 
effect  of  contract  limitation  on  liability  to  third  persons,  906-910. 
includes    competent    sliill,    910. 
medical  men,  911-914. 
lawyers,  91.5-917. 
statutoi-y  duties,  918-931. 
public  duties,  918. 

must  be  a  negligent  violation  of  statutory  requirement,  918. 
plaintifC    must   be    within    class   for    whose    benefit    duty    was 

created,  918. 
proximate  damage  must  result,  919. 
private  duties,  920. 
question  for  jury,  924-929. 
connection  as  cause  of  harm,  929. 
province  of  court  and  jury,  931. 
analysis  of  functions,   932-934. 

ordinarily  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury,  but  sometimes  question  of 
law  for  the  court,  951, 
burden   of  proof,   934^-941. 

contract  or  undertaking,  937. 
res  ipsa  loquitur,  938. 
contributory  negligence,  941. 
statutory  changes,  941. 
evidence,  expert  and  opinion  evidence,  943-947. 
evidence  as  to  custom,  947-949. 
evidence  must  be  relevant,  949. 
weight  of  evidence  and  failure  of  proof,  952. 


I.NDKX.  1291 

rVol.  1   connii-isos  pagos  1-052,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  ret-idue.] 

XECJLIGEXCE— Coutinued, 
damages  the  gist,  059. 
contributory   negligence,    950-989. 

analogous  to  defendant's  negligence,  960. 
exposure  to  danger,  962. 

elements  of  contributory  negligence,  962-977. 
avoiding  threatened  danger  before  damage  is  done,  966. 
avoiding  unnecessary  damage  after  injury,  969. 
no  duty  to  anticipate  negligence,  970. 
connection  as   cause,   971-977. 
avoidable  consequences,  973,  974. 
English  rule,  973. 
American  rule,  974. 
comparative   negligence,  978. 
vicarious  negligence,  980-989. 

custodian   of   child,    984-989. 
no  defense  to  deceit,  595-600. 
of  parent  in  action  for  injury  to  child.  988,  989. 
master's  liability  for  injuries  to  servant,  990. 

master  cannot  escape  liability  by  prescribing  rules,  1002. 
assumption  of  risk  by  servant,  1013. 
of  carriers  of  passengers,  burden  of  proof,  1083. 
liability  where  other  causes  contribute,  67. 
negligent  injury  of  vifrongdoer,  liability,  197,  198. 
right  to  contract  against  liability  for,  .300. 
immaterial  on  question  of  nuisance,  771. 
distinguished  from  nuisance,  747. 

NEMO  DEBET  BIS  VEXAKI  PRO  EADEM  CAUSA, 
application  of  maxim,  321. 

NITROGLYCEKIXE, 

liability  for  explosion,  S47. 

NOISES, 

as  nuisance,  780. 

XOMIXAL    DAMAGES, 
see  "Damages." 
presumed  to  follow  the  invasion  of  simple  rights,  366. 

XOXFEASAXCE, 

distinction  between  nonfeasance,  misfeasance,   and  malfeasance,  36. 
liability  of  servant  for,  287. 

NOXSUIT, 

in  negligence  cases,   951-958. 


1292  iNuKX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-C52.  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

NOTARY  PUBLIC, 

liability  for  official  acts,  134. 

NOTICE, 

limitation  of  liability  by,  308. 

NUISANCE, 
defined,  744. 

distinguished  from  a  purpresture,  745. 
distinguished  from  trespass,  74.5. 
distinguished  from  negligence,  747. 
damnum  absque  injuria,  747. 
rights  invaded,  74S-767. 
injury  to  corporeal  property,  748. 

injury  to  easement  of  light  and  air,  749-751. 

support,  751-753. 

interference  with   water  rights,  753. 

interference  with  percolating,  subterranean,  and  artificial  waters,  757- 
759. 

interference  with  surface  water,  760-763. 
on  highways,  764-766. 

interference  with  health,  comfort,  and  convenience,  766,  767. 
use  of  property,  768-770. 
personal  comfort,  770. 
care  immaterial,  771. 
motive  immaterial,  772-774. 

plaintiff  not  disentitled  by  having  come  to  the  nuisance,  774. 
circumstances  considered  in  determining  what  is,  775-  778. 
damages  the  gist  of  the  wrong,  778-781. 
substantial  interference  with  comfort,  780. 
kinds  of  nuisances,  782-793. 

public,  private,  and  mixed  nuisances,  782,  783. 

kinds  of  nuisances  for  which  private  action  lies,  782,  783. 

private  action  for  public  nuisance,  784-787. 

a  continuing  nuisance,  788. 

legalized  nuisance,  788. 

private  nuisances,  788. 

authorized  by  statute,  789,  792. 
authorized  by  common  law,  792,  793. 
parties  to  proceedings  against,  793-798. 

parties  plaintiff,   793-795. 

parties  defendant,  795-798. 
remedies,   799-809. 

abatement  by  act  of  parties,  799-802. 


INDEX.  129S 

[Vol.   1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

NUISANCE— Continued, 

abatement  by  action,  80:;. 
equitable   remedies,  803-807. 

injunction  against,  353. 
damages,  808,  809. 
liability  of  municipal  corporations,  176,  177. 
letting  premises  in  state  of,  liability  of  landlord,  225,  226. 
keeping  explosives,  847. 
poisons,  852. 

o 

OBLIGATION, 

common-law  obligations,  19. 

OBSTRUCTION, 

of  highway,  885. 

OFFENSIVE  ODORS, 
as  nuisance,  769. 

OFFICERS, 

see  "Judicial  Officers";    "Executive  Officers." 
exemption  from  liability  of  judicial  officers,  116-125. 
exemption  from  liability  of  de  jure  and  de  facto  officers,  119. 
liability  of  judicial  officers  for  acts  in  excess  of  jurisdiction,  121,  122. 
exemption  of  executive  officers  from  liability,  125-139. 
liability  for  wrongs  of  subordinates,  137-139. 

nonministerlal  officers,  137. 

ministerial  officers,  139. 
liability  of  municipal  corporations  for  unauthorized  acts  of,  181. 

OPINION, 

expression  of  does  not  constitute  deceit,  577-.jSl. 

OPINION   EVIDENCE, 
of  negligence,  943-947. 

OPTION, 

essential  element  of  consent,  200. 

ORDINANCES, 

duties  Imposed  by,  99. 

OUSTER, 

by  one  cotenant,  conversion,  732. 
trespass,  667. 

OYSTERS, 

right  to  possession,  659,  note  33. 


1294  INDEX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-C52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 


P 

PAINTINGS, 

"Beauty  and  the  Beast,"  mitigation  of  damage.=i,  393. 
PARENT  AND  CHILD, 

action  for  injuries  to  child,  451-463. 

party  plaintiff  determined  by  right  to  services,  453,  454. 

damages  for  seduction,  458-460. 
exemplary  damages,  455. 

recovery  by  parent  for  seduction  of  child,  45S. 

other  injuries  to  children,  460-462. 

statutory  changes  lu  right  to  sue,  456. 

action  by  child  against  parent,  462,  463. 

Imputing  negligence  of  custodian  to  child,  984-089. 

PARTIES, 

to  agreement  after  damage  in  discharge  of  liability,  311-313. 

plaintiffs  in  actions  for  injuries  to  wife,  470. 

in  action  for  malicious  prosecution,  612-614. 

in  trover  and  conversion,  731. 

to  proceedings  against  nuisance,   793-798. 

PARTNERS, 

liability  for  torts  of  copartner,  291-293. 

PASS, 

passenger  traveling  on,  1082. 

PASSENGERS, 
see   "Carriers." 

PAWN, 

conversion  of,  714. 

PENALTIES, 

as  affecting  statutory  duties  owed  to  private  parties,  98. 
PERCOLATING  WATER, 

interference  with,  a  nuisance,  757. 
PER  QUOD  ACTIONS. 

action  by  parent  for  injury  to  child,  4.50. 
^      for  defilement  of  wife,  464-466. 

for  alienation  of  wife's  affections,  406. 

PETROLEUM, 

liability  for  explosion,  850,  note  162. 

PHOTOGRAPHS, 

injunction  against  publication,  357. 


IKDEX.  1295 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

PHYSICIANS  AND   SUItGEOXS, 
liability  for  negligence,  911-!ili. 

PILOTS, 

liability  for  mistake  of  judgment,  87.j. 

PLAINTIFFS, 

normal  rule  as  to,  30. 

PLEADING, 

general  and  special  damages,  38:!.  .'!!)2. 
in  trover  and  conversion,  706,  note  296. 

POISONS, 

liability  for  negligence,  S.j2.  906. 

POLICEMEN, 

liability  of  city  for  acts  of,  171:. 

POSSESSION, 

wrongs  to,  G.j3  et  seq. 
duty  to  respect,  653-659. 
nature  of,  657,  658. 
objects  of,   658-660. 

real  and  personal  property,  658,  659. 

things  tevsc  naturae,  659,   600. 
constructive  possession,  what  is,  672. 
to  maintain  trespass,  663-673. 
sufficient  to  maintain  trover,  710-716. 

POSTAL  CARDS, 

as  publication  of  libel,  481. 

POST-OFFICE  AUTHORITIES, 

liability  for  wrongs  of  subordinates,  137. 

PRESCRIPTIVE  RIGHT, 
to  maintain  nuisances,  750. 

PRESUMPTION, 

of  damage  in  actions  for  slander,  4S8-192. 

of  damage  in  actions  for  libel,  493—197. 

of  negligence,  burdeu  of  proof,  934-941. 

of  negligence  of  carriers  of  passengers,  1083-1086. 

PRINCIPAL  AND  AGENT, 

see  "Ma.ster  and  Servant." 
liability  in  cases  of  fraud,  267-271. 

PRINTING, 

as  publication  of  libel.  480. 


^  296  INDEX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  poges  1-052,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

TRIYACY, 

right  to,  147. 

PRIVATE  DEFENSE. 

see  "Self-Defense." 
PRIVILEGE, 

as  a  defense  to  libel  and  slander,  525-544. 

PRIZE  FIGHTING, 

liability  of  principals  for  assault  and  battery,  203. 
PROBABLE  CAUSE, 

in  malicious  prosecution,  616-619. 

PROBATE  COURTS, 
see  "Courts." 
torts  not  cognizable  in,  13. 

PROCESS, 

malicious  abuse  of,  632-634. 

as  defense  to   trespass,   673-676. 

PROPERTY, 

wrongs  to,  653. 

duty  to  respect,  653-657. 

use  of,  constituting  nuisance,  768-770. 

PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY, 
see  "Jury." 

PROVOCATION, 

effect  to  mitigate  damages,  398,  399. 
in  assault  and  battery,  444-446. 

PROXIMATE  AND  REMOTE  CAUSE, 
see  "Cause";   "Damages." 
defined,  61. 
deceit,  connection  as,  589. 

PUBLIC  ACTS, 
acts  of  state,  110. 

PUBLICATION, 

of  defamation,  476-^86. 

PUBLIC  BUILDINGS, 

liability  of  city  for  negligence,  178. 
PUBLIC  OFFICERS, 

see  "Officers." 

PUBLIC  PARKS, 

liability  of  city  in  connection  with,  174. 


iM)i:.\-.  1297 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

PURPRESTUllE, 

distinguished  from  nuisance,  745. 

Q 

QUASI  CONTRACT, 

enforcement  of  obligation,  20. 

sued  ex  contractu  or  ex  delicto,  26. 
QUASI   .JUDICIAL   OFFICERS, 

exemption  from  liability,  116-125. 

QUASI    MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS, 
liability  for  torts,  182-184. 

QUASI   TORTS, 

torts  growing  out  of  contracts,  22-24. 
actions  ex  contractu  or  ex  delicto,  27,  28. 

QUI  FACIT  PER  ALIUM  FACIT  PER  SE. 
application  of  maxim,  245,  256,  271. 


R 
RAILROAD   CROSSINGS, 

care  to  be  exercised  at,  881-885. 
RAILROAD  PASS, 

passenger  traveling  on,  1082. 
RAT, 

duty  to  insure  safety,  exceptions,  Carstairs  v.  Taylor,  830. 
RATIFICATION, 

act  must  be  in  interest  of  person  ratified,  43,  44. 

liability  by,   43-48. 

must  be  witb  full  knowledge  and  intent,  44^6. 

is  equivalent  to  antecedent  authority,  40—1:8. 

is  total  not  partial,  46-48. 

does  not  discharge  liability  of  tort  feasor  to  third  persons,  46-48. 

liability  for  false  imprisonment  by,  421. 

REASONABLE  CAUSE, 
see  "Probable  Cause." 

RECAPTION, 

right  of,  as  a  defense  to  trespass,  677. 

RECEIVERS, 

liability  for  torts,  20(J-:i08. 

LAW  OF  TORTS — 82 


1298 


INDEX. 


[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  iiirlusire;  vol.  2  the  ri^sidue.] 

RECKLESSNESS,  HEEDLESSNESS,  AND  WANTONNESS, 
see  "Negligence." 

REGISTER  OF  DEEDS, 
see  "Officers." 
liability  for  official  acts,  133. 

RELATIONSHIP, 

liability  by  virtue  of,  38. 
liability  dependent  on,  216-293. 

husband  and  wife,  216-223. 

landlord  and  tenant,  223-227. 

independent    contractor,    228-238. 

master  and  servant,  239-291. 

liability  of  partners,  291-293. 
liability  for  false  imprisonment  by,  421. 
of  master  and  servant,  duties  peculiar  to,  991. 

RELEASE, 

of  liability,  rescission  for  fraud,  310-320. 
of  liability  after  damage,  310-320. 
of  joint  tort,  344,  345. 
REMEDIES, 

for  torts,  11,  348-416. 

common-law   remedies,   25. 
judicial  remedies,  351-416. 

action  for  damages,  300-416. 
extrajudicial  remedies,  350. 
statutory  remedies,  348,  349. 
for  violation  of  duty,  78. 
no  right  without  a  remedy,  85. 
for  violation  of  statute  duties,  9.J-100. 
for  wrongs  to  possession  and  property,  653-659. 
for  waste,  703-706. 
for  conversion,   737-743. 
for .  nuisance,  799-809. 
REMOTE  CAUSE, 

see   "Cause." 
RENDERING  ESTABLISHMENT, 

as  nuisance,  770. 
REPETITION, 

of  defamation,  see  "Libel  and  Slander." 

HEPLEVIN, 

remedy  for  conversion,  737. 


mvEX.  1299 

r^'ol.  1  comprises  pages  1-05;:,  inulusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

REPORTS, 

privilege  of,  see  "Libel  and  Slander." 

REPRESENTATION, 
see  "Deceit." 

RESCISSION, 

of  release  obtained  by  fraud,  316-320. 

RES  IPSA  LOQUITUR. 

application  of  maxim,  938. 

RES  JUDICATA, 

disclaarge  of  tort  by  former  judgment,  322. 

respondi:at  superior, 

application,  240-24.->,  256. 
RETREAT, 

no  duty  to  when  assaulted,  439. 
REVERSIONARY  INTEREST. 

title  to  maintain  trespass,  060. 

RIGHTS. 

common-law  classification  of,  93. 

RIOT, 

exemption  of  common  carrier  from  liability  because  of,  1003. 

RISK, 

see  "Assumption  of  Risk." 

RISKS  OF  EMPLOTMENT, 

assumption  by  servant,  1013-1056. 
ROAD  SUPERVISORS, 

see  "Oillcers." 

RULES, 

duty  of  master  to  prescribe  rules,  1001,  1002. 

violation  by  servant,  assumption  of  risk,  1018. 

of  carriers  of  passengers,  1080. 

of  master,  1001. 
RYLANDS  V.  FLETCHER, 

liability  for  dangerous  instrumentality,  833. 


S 


SAFETY, 

duty  of  insuring,  833,  838. 

SCANDALUJI  MAGNATUM, 
action  for,  47S,  note  11. 


1300  INDKX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-G52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

SCHOOLMASTER, 

disciplinary  powers,  148. 

SCIENTER, 

as  an  element  of  tort,  54. 

due  care  depends  upon  knowledge,  867. 

SCOPE  OF  BJIPLOYilENT, 

hours  of  labor  as  a  test,  992. 

master's  liability  to  servant  only  when  acting  within,  992. 
SEDUCTION, 

defined,  456. 

right  of  child  to  recover  against  her  seducer,  454. 

by  woman  seduced,  457. 

recovery  by  parent,  458. 

damages,  458-460. 

of  wife,  action  by  husband,  464-466. 

SELF-DEFENSE, 

liability  for  fire  started  in,  153. 

as  justification  for  assault  and  battery,  439^43. 

SELF-HELP, 

as  remedy  for  trespass,  690-695. 

SETTLEMENT, 
see  "Discharge." 

SHERIFFS, 

liability  for  oflicial  acts,  130-133. 

SIC  UTERE  TUO  UT  ALIENUM  NON  LAEDAS, 
application  of  maxim,  101,  832. 

SKILL, 

requirement  in  particular  undertaking,  910. 

SLANDER, 

see  "Libel  and  Slander." 

SLANDER  OF  TITLE, 
defined,  473. 

falsity  of  statement,  -j.jI. 
malice,  552. 
special  damages,  5.53,  554. 

SLAUGHTERHOUSES, 
as  nuisance.  777. 

SMOKE, 

as  nuisance,  769. 


INDEX.  1301 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

SPECIAL  DAMAGE, 

see  "Damage." 
SPRING  GUNS, 

as  nuisance,  708.  note  129. 
SQUIB  CASE, 

Scott  V.  Shephard,  71. 
STATUS, 

variations  in  i-iglit  to  sue  based  on,  151-189. 

place  in  law  of  torts,  31. 
STATUTE, 

no  liability  for  exercise  of  statutory  rights,  140-145. 

violation  of  statutory  duty,  connection  as  cause  of  harm,  929. 

statutory  changes  as  to  burdeu  of  proving  negligence,  941. 
STATUTES  AXD  ORDINANCES, 

duties  imposed  by,  9.J-100. 
STATUTES  OF  LIMITATION, 

discharge  of  tort  by,  335-340. 
STATUTORY  DUTIES, 

statutes,  liability  for  negligent  violation,  918-930. 
STATUTORY    REMEDIES, 

for  l(jrts,  348,  349. 
STOCK, 

carriers  of  live  stock,  liabilities,  1073-1076. 

STREETS, 

liability  of  municipal  corporation  for  defect,  175. 
STRIKES  AND  BOYCOTTS, 
see  "ConsiJiracy." 
principles  applied,  648-0.52. 
SUBSTANTIVE  LAW  OF  TORTS, 
the  person  injured,  30-32. 
tort  feasor,  32-34. 

normal  liability,   32-34. 
wrongful  conduct,  34-37. 
mental  element,  34. 
acts  or  omissions,  35. 
theory  on  which  liability  attaches,  48-54. 
theory  of  absolute  liability,  49-51. 
theory  of  culpability,  51-54. 
true  theory  of  liability,  53,  54. 
mental  attitude  of  tort  feasor,  54-61. 
damage  and  duty,  78-84. 


1302  INDEX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

SUNDAY, 

dtimages  suffered  on,  when  recoverable,  193. 
SUPPORT, 

riglit  to  lateral  support,  Tol. 
SURFACE  WATER, 

interference  with,  760-763. 

T 

TANNERIES, 

as  nuisance,  769,  note  138. 

TAX  COLLECTORS, 
see  "Officers." 

TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES, 

stipulations  limiting  liability,  302. 
liability  for  negligence,  899,  900. 

TELLTALES, 
negligence,  928. 

TENANTS  IN  COJIMON, 
liability  for  trespass,  667. 
liability  for  conversion,  732. 

TENTERDEN'S  ACT,  LARD, 
warranty,  25,  587. 

THEATER, 

rights  of  holder  of  tickets,  683. 

THE  KING  CAN  DO  NO  WRONG, 
application  of  maxim.  110. 

THREATS, 

do  not  constitute  an  assault,  432. 

TIMBER, 

destruction  of,  as  waste,  701. 

measure  of  damages  for  conversion,  739. 

TIME-TABLE, 

right  to  rely  on,  deceit,  580,  597. 

TITLE, 

to  maintain  conversion,  710. 
to  maintain  trespass,  663. 

TORT, 

definition,  1. 

definition  by  reference  to  remedy,  1. 


IKDKX .  1 303 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  iuclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

TOUT— Continued, 

definition  by  reference  to  nature  of  right,  3. 

definition  by  Mr.  Pollock,  106. 

other  definitions,  o. 

general  nature,  1-108. 

adjei  five  and  substantive  law  of,  6. 

distinguished  from  crime,  8-11. 

Intention  as  element  of,  9,  10. 

lomedies,   11. 

cognizable  only  In  courts  of  common  law,  12-16. 

administration  in  courts  of  common  law,  lG-30. 

enforcement  of  obligation  of  at  common  law,  21. 

growing  out  of  contracts,  22-24. 

quasi  torts,  22-24. 

sued  ex  contractu,  27. 

exemption  from  liability  for  torts,  general  and  special,  32-34. 

how  liability  attaches,  37^8. 

lueory  on  which  liability  attaches,  48-o4. 

elements  essential  to  recovery  in,  106. 

classification  of,  107. 

committed  by  or  with  others,  liability,  200-293. 
relationship,  210-293. 
continuing  tprts,  407-413. 

TRADE-MARKS, 

what  to  be  protected,  146,  147. 

TRADES  UNIONS, 
conspiracy,  637. 

TRANSITORY  ACTION, 
see  "Action." 

TREE, 

projecting,  liability  as  for  trespass  or  nuisance,  748. 

TRESPASS, 

definition  and  nature,  660-663. 

when  lies,  17. 

possession  to  maintain,  663-673. 

as  between  landlord  and  tenant,  605-668. 

actual  possession,  668. 

possession  may  be  without  title,  669,  670. 

possession  must  be  exclusive,  671. 

possession  must  be  had  animo  possidendi,  671. 

possession  at  time  of  wrong,  not  of  action,  671,  672. 


1304  INDEX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-G52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

TRESPASS-Continued, 

possession  to  maintain  constructive  possession,  (J72,  073. 
defenses,  (>7;i-C00. 

authority  of  law,  legal  process,  G73-G7(j. 
without  Icfial  process,  C7G-G79. 
abuse  of  license,  trespass  ab  Initio,  679,  G80. 
consent  of  owned  or  occupant,  G81-G8G. 
liberum  teneinentum,  686-690. 
easement  or  special  property,  688-G90. 
remedies.  G90-C95. 

injunction  against,  353. 
distinguished  from  waste,  696. 
distinguished  from  nuisance,  745. 
on  the  case,  origin  of  action,  18. 

TRESPASSERS, 

liability  to,  for  negligence,  890. 

TROVER  AND  CONVERSION, 
conversion  defined,  706. 
origin  of  action,  18. 
when  action  lies,  70G-710. 
title  to  maintain,  710-716. 
the  unauthorized  act,  71G-730. 

violation  of  absolute  duty,  719,  720. 

subsequent  dealings  with  property,  720-722. 

conversion  exists  when  property  is  wrongfully  taken,  722,  723. 

conversion  exists  A^'hen  property  is  wrongfully  parted  with,  724.  725. 

conversion  exists  when  property  is  wrongfully  retained,  725-729. 

conversion  exists  when  property  Is  wrongfully  destroyed,  729,  730. 
parties,  731. 

joint  owners,  732-734. 
ministerial  duties.  734-736. 
remedie^'s,  737-743. 

compensatory  damages,  737-742. 

special  damages,  742. 

nominal  damages,  742. 

exemplary  damages,  743. 
distinguished  from  waste,  696. 
liability  of  executors  and  administrators  for,  205,  note. 

TRUTH, 

as  justilication,  libel  and  slander,  521. 


INDEX.  1305 

[Vol.  1  c-oEiijrises  pages  1-G52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

u 

UBI  JUS  IBI  UEMEDIUil, 

the  normal  right  of  redress,  30. 
application  of  maxim,  85. 

ULTRA  VIRES, 

liability  of  corporations,  170,  171. 

liability  of  municipal  corporations  for  acts  ultra  vires,  180. 

UNDUE  INFLUENCE, 

rescission  of  release  obtained  by,  319. 

V 

VAPORS, 

as  nuisance,  747.  707. 

VENEREAL  DISEASE, 

charge  of,  actionable  per  se,  509. 

VERDICT, 

excessive  and  inadeauate,  400. 

VICARI<.»US  NEGLIGENCE, 

when  a  bar  to  recovery,  980-989. 

imputing  negligence  of  custodian  of  child,  nS4-989. 

contributory  negligence  of  parent  in  action  for  injury  to  child,  088,  989. 

VICE  PRINCIPALS, 
who  are,  1037. 

negatively  who  are,  1037-1043. 
doctrine  of,  1037-1049. 

fellow  servants,  1037. 

confusion  In  opinion,  1037-1039. 

performance  of  duty  the  test,  1043-1047. 

doctrine  of  the  United  States  supreme  court,  1047-1049. 
concurrent  negligence  with  fellow  servant,  1053. 

VINDICTIVE  DAMAGES, 
see  "Damages." 

AIS  MAJOR, 

see  "Act  of  God." 
liability  for  damage  caused  by,  04,  05,  70,  lOGl. 

VOLENTI  NUN  FIT  INJURIA, 
explained,  199-204. 
assumption  of  risk,  1028. 
application  of  maxim,  199,  200. 


1S06  INDEX. 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-652,  inclusivt;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

VOLUNTEERS  AND  LICENSEES, 
liabilit.v  to,  for  negligence,  80U-S03. 
no  dutj'  owed  by  master  to  volunteers,  991. 

VOTER, 

injuria  imports  damnum,  Ashby  v.  White,  919. 

W 

WAIVER. 

of  liability  for  tort,  295-297. 

of  tort  and  suit  in  assumpsit,  296,  297. 

of  joint  torts,  346,  347.      , 

WANTONNESS, 

liability  for  wanton  injuries,  195. 
wanton  negligence,  see  "Negligence." 

WARNING, 

instructing  employes  as  to  danger,  see  "Master  and  Servant." 

WARRANT, 

justification  under,  for  false  imprisonment,  424^27. 
justification  for  false  imprisonment  without,  427-429. 

WARRANTY, 

Lord  Tenterden's  act,  25.  587. 

WASTE, 

definition,  695. 

distinguished  from  trespass  and  conversion,  696. 

kinds  of  waste,  697. 

permissive  or  commissive  waste,  697-702. 

legal  or  equitable  waste,  703. 
remedies,  703-706. 

damages,  703,  704. 

injunction  against,  353,  704^706. 

WATER, 

interference  with  water  rights  a  nuisance.  753-759. 

interference  with  percolating,  subterranean,  and  artificial  waters,  757-759. 

interference  with  surface  water,  760-763. 

WATER  COMPANY, 
Atliinson's  Case,  919. 

WAY, 

see  "Highway." 

WAYS,  WORKS,  AND  MACHINERY, 

duties  of  master  to  provide  suitable,  993. 


INDEX.  130i 

[Vol.  1  comprises  pages  1-C52,  inclusive;  vol.  2  the  residue.] 

WILLFULNESS, 
in  general,  48. 
willful  negligence,  823. 

WIND, 

act  of  God,  negligence  of  common  carrier,  1002. 

WINDOWS, 

see  "Light  and  Air";  "Privacy." 

WITNESS, 

exemption  from  suit,  127. 

WRITS, 

as  defense  for  false  imprisonment,  421. 
as  defense  for  trespass,  677. 
at  common  law,  16. 

WRONGDOING, 

of  plaintiff  as  defense  to  tort,  32. 


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SECOND  EDITION. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Chapter  I. 

OF  NEGOTIABILITY  SO  PAR  AS  IT  RE- 
LATES TO  BILLS  AND  NOTES :  Covering 
the  origin,  purpose  and  indicia  of  negotiabil- 
ity, distinction  between  negotiability  and  as- 
signability, and  payment  by  negotiable  instru- 
ment. 

Chapter  II. 

OF  NEGOTIABLE  BILLS  AND  NOTES,  AND 
THEIR  FORMAL  AND  ESSENTIAL  REQ- 
UISITES :  Covering  definition,  form,  and  es- 
sentials, the  order,  the  promise,  specification 
of  parties,  capacity  of  parties,  delivery,  date, 
value  received,  and  days  of  grace. 

Chapter  III. 

ACCEPTANCE  OF  BILLS  OF  EXCHANGE: 
Covering  the  various  kinds  of  acceptance,  and 
the  rules  relating  tbereto. 

Chapter  IV. 

INDORSEMENT:  Defining  and  explaining  the 
various  kinds  of  indorsements,  and  showing 
their  requisites  and  effect. 

Chapter   V. 

OP  THE  NATURE  OP  THE  LIABILITIES  OP 
THE  PARTIES:  Covering  liability  of  mak- 
er, acceptor,  drawer,  indorser,  rights  and  lia- 
bilities of  accommodation  and  accommodated 
pai'ties,  estoppel  and  warranties,  and  damages 
for  breach. 


Chapter  VI. 

TRANSFER:  Covering  definition,  validity,  and 
various  methods  of  transfer,  and  status  of 
overdue  paper. 


Chapter  VII. 

DEFENSES  AS  AGAINST  PURCHASER  FOR 
VALUE  WITHOUT  NOTICE:  Covering  the 
subject  generally  and  fully. 


Chapter  VIII. 

THE  PURCHASER  FOR  VALUE  WITHOUT 
NOTICE:  Explaining  who  are,  and  discuss- 
ing consideration,  good  faith,  notice,  overdue 
paper,  presumption,  and  burden  of  proof,  etc. 


Chapter  IX. 

OP  PRESENTMENT  AND  NOTICE  OF  DIS- 
HONOR: Covering  presentment  for  accept- 
ance and  for  payment,  dishonor,  protest,  no- 
tice of  dishonor,  waiver,  etc. 


Chapter   X. 

CHECKS:    Covering  generally  the  law  relating 
to  checks. 


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CHAPTER  I. 

DEFINITION  OF  CRIME:    The  nature  of  crime 
and  ground  of  punishment. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  X. 

OFFENSES    AGAINST    THE    HABITATION: 
Covering  arson  and  burglary. 


CHAPTER  II. 

CRIMINAL  LAW :  How  the  criminal  law  is  pre- 
scribed; the  common  law:  statutes,  and  the 
powers  of  state  and  federal  legislatures. 

CHAPTER  III. 

CLASSIFICATION  OF  CRIMES :  As  treason.fel- 
onles,  misdemeanors,  etc. ;  merger  of  offenses. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  MENTAL  ELEMENT  IN  CRIME:  Con- 
sidering the  will,  intention,  motive,  and  crim- 
inal intention  or  malice. 

CHAPTER  V. 

PERSONS  CAPABLE  OF  COMMITTING  CRIME: 
Covering  also  exemption  from  responsibility, 
and  discussing  infancy,  insanity,  drunkenness, 
ignorance  or  mistake  of  law  or  of  fact,  provo- 
cation, necessity  and  compulsion,  married  wo- 
men and  corporations. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

PARTIES  CONCERNED:  Covering  effect  of 
joining  in  criminal  purpose,  principles  in  first 
and  second  degrees,  accessories  before  and 
after  the  fact,  terms  "aider  and  abettor"  and 
"accomplice. " 

CHAPTER  VH. 

THE  OVERT  ACT :  Covering  also  attempts,  so- 
licitation and  conspiracy. 

CHAPTER  Vm. 

OFFENSES  AGAINST  THE  PERSON ;  Cover- 
ing homicide,  murder,  and  manslaughter,  with 
consideration  of  the  different  degrees,  acci- 
dent, self-defense,  etc. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

OFFENSES  AGAINST  THE  PERSON  (Contin- 
ued) :  Covering  abortion,  mayhem,  rape,  sod- 
omy, seductioil,  assaults,  false  imprisonment, 
kidnapping,  abduction. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

OFFENSES  AGAINST  PROPERTY:  Covering 
larceny,  embezzlement,  cheating  at  common 
law  and  by  false  pretenses,  robbery,  receiving 
stolen  goods,  malicious  mischief,  forgery,  etc. 

CHAPTER  XII. 

OFFENSES  AGAINST  THE  PUBLIC  HEALTH^ 
MORALS,  ETC. :  Covering  nuisances  in  gen- 
eral, bigamy,  polygamy,  adultery,  fornication, 
lewdness,  etc. 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

OFFENSES  AGAINST  PUBLIC  JUSTICE  AND- 
AUTHORITY:  Covering  barretry,  obstruct- 
ing justice,  embracery,  prison  breach,  mispri- 
sion of  felony,  compounding  crime,  perjury,, 
bribery,  misconduct  in  ofB.ce,  etc. 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

OFFENSES  AGAINST  THE  PUBLIC  PEACE: 
Covering  dueling,  unlawful  assembly,  riot, 
affray,  forcible  entry  and  detainer,  libels  on 
private  persons,  etc. 

CHAPTER  XV. 

OFFENSES  AGAINST  THE  GOVERNMENT: 
Covering  treason  and  misprision  of  treason. 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

OFFENSES  AGAINST  THE  LAW  OF  NA- 
TIONS:    As  piracy. 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

JURISDICTION:    Covering  territorial  limits  of 
states  and  United  States,  jurisdiction  as  detej^ 
mined  by  locality,  federal  courts  and  the  com 
mon  law,  jurisdiction  conferred  by  congress, 
persons  subject  te  our  laws,  etc. 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

FORMER  JEOPARDY:    In  general. 


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CHAPTER  I. 

CONTRACT  IN  GENERAL:  Covering  its  deH- 
nitioD,  nature,  and  requisites,  and  discussing 
agreement,  obligation,  promise,  void,  voidable, 
and  unenforceable  agreements,  and  the  essen- 
tials ol  contract,  etc. 

CHAPTER  n. 

OFFER  AND  ACCEPTANCE:  Covering  Im- 
plied contracts,  necessity  for  communication 
and  acceptance,  character,  mode,  place,  time, 
and  effect  of  acceptance,  revocation,  and  lapse 
of  offer,  eta 

CHAPTER  m. 

CLASSIFICATION  OP  CONTRACTS:  Cover- 
ing contracts  of  record  and  contracts  under 
seal,  and  tbeir  characteristics. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

REQUIREMENT  OF  WRITING:  Covering  also 
statute  of  frauds,  and  discussing  promise  by 
executor,  promise  to  answer  for  another, 
agreements  in  consideration  of  marriage  and 
in  relation  to  land,  and  agreements  not  to  be 
performed  within  a  year,  sufQciency  of  memo- 
randum, etc. 

CHAPTER  V. 

CONSIDERATION:  Covering  the  necessity  for 
consideration,  its  adequacy,  reality,  and  legal- 
ity, failure  of  consideration,  etc. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

CAPACITY  OP  PARTIES:  Covering  political 
and  professional  status,  infants,  insane  and 
drunken  persons,  married  women,  and  corpo- 
rations. 


CHAPTER  Vn. 

REALITY  OF  CONSENT:  Covering  mistake, 
misrepresentation,  fraud,  duress,  and  undue 
influence. 

CHAPTER  Vin. 

LEGALITY  OP  OBJECT:  Covering  unlawful 
agreements  in  general,  agreements  in  viola- 
tion of  positive  law  and  those  contrary  tOT3ub- 
lie  policy,  effect  of  illegality,  conflict  of  laws, 
etc. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

OPERATION  OP  CONTRACT:  Covering  the 
limits  of  the  contractual  relation,  assignment 
of  contracts,  whether  by  act  of  parties  or  by 
operation  of  law,  joint  and  several  contracts, 
etc. 

CHAPTER  X. 

INTERPRETATION  OP  CONTRACT:  Covei^ 
ing  the  rules  relating  to  evidence,  proof  of 
document,  rules  of  construction,  penalties  and 
liquidated  damages,  etc. 

CHAPTER  XI. 

DISCHARGE    OP  CONTRACT:    Covering  dis- . 
charge  by  agreement,  by   performance,   by 
breach,  by  impossibility  of  performance,  by 
operation  of  law,  etc.,  and  remedies  on  breach 
of  contract. 

CHAPTER  XII. 

AGENCY;    Covering  the  creation  of  the  relation, 
its   effect   and    determination,  the   capacity,  ■ 
rights,  and  liabilities  of  the  parties,  eta 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

QUASI  CONTRACT:  Covering  obligations  cre- 
ated by  law  upon  which  an  action  ex  contractu 
will  lie  without  proof  of  contract  In  fact,  in- 
cluding judgments,  obligations  imposed  \tf 
statute,  acts  of  parties,  etc. 


1  VOL.,  932  PAGES,  83.75   DELIVERED. 


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SECOND  EDITION. 


TABLE   OF  CONTENTS. 


Chapter  I. 

FORMS  OF  ACTION:  Covering  the  nature  and 
classification  of  actions,  real,  personal,  and 
mixed  actions,  assumpsit,  special  and  general, 
debt,  covenant,  account  or  account  rendered. 

Chapter  II. 

FORMS  OP  ACTION  (Continued):  Covering 
trespass,  trover,  case,  detinue,  replevin,  eject- 
ment, writ  of  entry,  forcible  entry  and  detain- 
er, etc. 

Chapter  III. 

THE  PARTIES  TO  ACTIONS:  Covering  actions 
in  form  ex  contractu  and  ex  delicto,  and  the 
consequences  of  misjoinder  or  nonjoinder  of 
parties  plaintiff  or  defendant. 

Chapter  IV. 

THE  PROCEEDINGS  IN  AN  ACTION:  Cover- 
ing process,  the  summons,  writ  of  attachment, 
appearance,  the  declaration,  demurrer,  and  va- 
rious pleas,  amendments,  etc.,  the  verdict,  and 
proceedings  after  the  verdict,  the  judgment, 
and  proceedings  thereafter  to  the  writ  of  exe- 
cution. 

Chapter  V. 

THE  DECLARATION:  Statement  of  cause  of 
action  in  general;  form  of  declaration;  es- 
sential averments  of  declaration  in  special  as- 
sumpsit or  on  common  counts,  in  debt,  cove- 
nant, account,  case,  detinue,  trover,  trespass, 
replevin,  ejectment,  and  trespass  for  mesne 
profits  after  ejectment. 

Chapter  VI. 

THE  PRODUCTION  OF  THE  ISSUE:  Discuss- 
ing the  rules,  and  covering  the  demurrer,  the 
pleadings,  the  traverse,  forms  of  the  general 
issue  and  of  the  special  traverse,  protesta- 
tions, exceptions,  issues  in  fact  and  law,  etc. 


Chapter  VII. 

MATERIALITY  IN  PLEADING:    Covering  the 
general  rule,  variance,  limitation  of  traverse, 


etc. 


Chapter  VIII. 


SINGLENESS  OR  UNIT Y  IN  PLEADING :  Cov- 
ering the  rules  in  general,  duplicity,  immate- 
rial matter,  inducement,  protestation,  conse- 
quences of  duplicity  and  of  misjoinder,  plea 
and  demurrer,  etc. 

Chapter   IX. 

CERTAINTY  IN  PLEADING:  Covering  the 
venue,  time,  quantity,  quality,  and  value, 
names  of  persons,  showing  title  and  author- 
ity, with  subordinate  rules,  and  special  re- 
quirements in  different  stages. 

Chapter  X. 

CONSISTENCY  AND  SIMPLICITY  IN  PLEAD- 
ING :  Covering  insensibility,  repugnancy,  am- 
biguity, argumentative  pleadings,  pleadings 
in  alternative,  positive  statements,  legal  effect, 
conformance  to  precedent,  commencement  and 
conclusion. 

Chapter   XI. 

DIRECTNESS  AND  BREVITY  IN  PLEADING: 
Covering  the  rules  generally,  departure,  pleas 
amounting  to  general  issue,  surplusage,  etc. 

Chapter  XII. 

MISCELLANEOUS  RULES:  Covering  con- 
formance to  process,  alleging  damages  and 
production  of  suit,  order  of  pleading,  defense, 
plea  in  abatement,  dilatory  pleas,  etc. 

APPENDIX:     Forms. 


.  This  book  embodies  such  of  the  rules  and  principles  of  Common-Law  Pleading  as  are  still 
bcognized  and  applied  in  this  country.  A  knowledge  of  the  common-law  system  is  of  advantage,  if 
indeed,  it  is  not  essential,  to  a  thorough  understanding  of  both  code  and  equity  pleading. 

ONE  VOLUME,  615  PAGES,  $3.75,  DELIVERED. 


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on  Judgments,  Tax  Titles,  etc 


TABLE     OF    CONTENTS. 


Chapter  I. 

DEFINITIONS  AND  GENERAL  PRINCIPLES: 
Considering  the  meaning  of  "Constitutional" 
and  "  Unconstitutional ;  "  written  and  unwrit- 
ten constitutions,  bills  of  rights,  right  of  revo- 
lution, political  and  personal  responsibilities, 
etc. 

Chapter  II. 

THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  STATES: 
Considering  the  nature  of  the  American 
Union,  sovereignty  and  rights  of  the  states 
and  of  the  people,  form  of  government,  the 
Federal  Constitution,  etc. 

Chapter  HI. 

ESTABLISHMENT  AND  AMENDMENT  OF 
CONSTITUTIONS :  Containing  an  historical 
introduction,  and  considering  the  establish- 
ment and  amendment  of  the  Federal  Uonstitu- 
tioQ  and  of  State  Constitutions. 

Chapter  IV. 

CONSTRUCTION  AND  INTERPRETATION  OF 
CONSTITUTIONS:  Considering  the  ofQce 
and  duty  of  the  judiciary  in  this  direction. 

Chapter  V. 

THE  THREE  DEPARTMENTS  OP  GOVERN- 
MENT:  Considering  the  division,  limitations 
on  the  departments,  political  and  judicial 
questions,  etc. 

Chapter  VI. 

-THE  FEDERAL  EXECUTIVE:  Considering 
the  election,  qualifications,  impeachment, 
oompen,satiGn  and  independence  of  the  Presi- 
dent, his  oath  of  ofa.ce,  veto  power,  pardoning 
and  military  power,  and  treaty-making  power; 
vacancy  in  office,  the  cabinet,  appointments 
to  ofBce,  presidential  messages,  diplomatic  re- 
lations, authority  to  convene  and  adjourn  cor- 
gress,  execute  the  laws,  etc. 

Chapter  VH. 

TEDERAL  JURISDICTION:  Considering  the 
jurisdiction,  powers  and  procedure  of  Federal 
courts,  removal  of  causes,  the  United  States 
and  the  states  as  parties,  etc. 

Chapter  VTH. 

THE  POWERS  OF  CONGRESS:  Considering 
the  constitution,  organization  and  government 
of  congress,  its  powers,  and  the  limitations 
thereon. 

Chapter  IX. 

INTERSTATE  LAW,  as  determined  by  the  Con- 
stitution :  Considering  its  general  principles, 
the  privileges  of  citizens,  interstate  extradi- 
tion, public  acts  and  judicial  proceediiigs,  ecu. 

Chapter   X. 

REPUBLICAN  GOVERNMENT  GUARANTIED. 


Chapter   XI. 

EXECUTIVE  PO  W  ER  IN  THE  STATES. 
Chapter   XII. 

JUDICIAL  POWERS  IN  THE  STATES:  Con- 
sidering the  system  of  courts,  judges,  juris- 
diction, process  and  procedure. 

Chapter   XIII. 

LEGISLATIVE  POWER  IN  THE  STATES :  Con- 
sidering the  organization  and  government  of 
legislature,  limitation  and  delegation  of  legis- 
lative powers,  enactment  of  laws,  etc 

Chapter  XIV. 

THE  POLICE  POWER:  Considering  the  police 
power  as  vested  in  congress  and  in  the  states, 
and  its  scope  and  limitations. 

Chapter  XV. 

THE  POWER  OF  TAXATION:  Considering 
the  purposes  of  taxation,  independence  of 
Federal  and  State  governments,  limitations  on 
power,  taxation  and  representation,  etc. 

Chapter  XVI. 

THE  RIGHT  OF  EMINENT  DOMAIN:  Defini- 
tion and  nature  of  the  power,  constitutional 
provisions,  authority  to  exercise,  public  pur- 
pose, appropriation  to  new  uses,  etc. 

Chapter  XVII. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS:  The  nature, 
control,  powers,  officers  and  by-laws  of  mu- 
nicipal corporations,  etc. 

Chapter  XVIH. 

CIVIL  EIGHTS,  AND  THEIR  PROTECTION 
BY  THE  CONSTITUTION:  Considering 
rights  in  general,  liberty,  due  process  ol  law, 
vested  rights,  trial  by  jury,  etc. 

Chapter  XIX. 

POLITICAL  AND  PUBLIC  RIGHTS:  Consider- 
ing citizenship,  right  of  suffrage,  freedom  of 
speech,  right  of  assembly  and  petition,  etc. 

Chapter  XX. 

CONSTITUTIONAL  GUARANTIES  IN  CRIM- 
INAL CASES:  Considering  trial  by  jury, 
rights  of  accused,  jeopardy,  bail,  ex  post  facto 
laws,  habeas  corpus,  etc. 

Chapter  XXI. 

LAWS  IMPAIRING  THE  OBLIGATION  OF 
CONTRACTS:  Considering  the  obligation 
and  the  impairment  of  the  contract,  power  of 
legislature  to  contract,  remedies  on  contracts, 
etc. 

Chapter  XXH. 

RETROACTIVE  LAWS:  Considering  the  validitj 
of  retroactive  statutes,  curative  statutes,  eta 


1   VOL.,  646   PAGES.   S3. 75.   DELIVERED. 

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TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


Chapter   I. 

NATURE  AND  DEFINITION  OP  EQUITY. 

Cliapter  H. 

PRINCIPLES  DEFINING  AND  LIMITING  JU- 
RISDICTION: Considering  jurisdiction  over 
crimes,  adequate  legal  remedy,  complete  re- 
lief, and  multiplicity  of  suits. 

Chapter  III. 

THE  MAXIMS  OP  EQUITY:  Definition  and 
classification  of  maxims;  the  enabling  and  re- 
strictive maxims. 

Chapter   IV. 

THE  DOCTRINES  OP  EQUITY;  Considering 
estoppel,  election,  satisfaction,  performance, 
and  conversion. 

Chapter   V. 

THE  DOCTRINES  OP  EQUITY  (Continded)  : 
Considering  conftiotiug  rights  of  purchasers, 
assignees,  notice,  bona  fide  purchasers,  priori- 
ties, eta 

Chapter  VI. 

THE  DOCTRINES  OP  EQUITY  (Continued): 
Considering  penalties  and  forfeitures,  liqui- 
dated damages. 

Chapter  VII. 

GaOUNDS  FOR  EQUITABLE  RELIEF:  Con- 
sidering accident,  mistake,  fraud,  etc. 


Chapter   VIII. 

PROPERTY  IN  EQUITY— TRUSTS:  Covering 
definition,  history,  and  classification  of  trusts, 
charitable  trusts,  duties  and  liabilities  of  trus- 
tees, remedies  of  cestui  que  trust,  etc. 

Chapter  IX. 

PROPERTY  IN  EQUITY  —  MORTGAGES, 
LIENS,  AJSTD  ASSIGNMENTS. 

Chapter   X. 

EQUITABLE  REMEDIES :  Covering  accounting, 
contribution,  exoneration,  subrogation,  and 
marshaling. 

Chapter   XI. 

EQUITABLE  REMEDIES  (Continued);  Cov- 
ering partition  and  settlement  of  boundaries. 

Chapter   XII. 

EQUITABLE  REMEDIES  (Continued):  Cov- 
ering specific  performance,  and  considering 
enforceable  contracts,  grounds  for  refusing  re- 
lief, etc. 

Chapter  XIII. 

EQUITABLE  REMEDIES  (Continued)  ;  Cov- 
ering injunctions,  and'cotisidering  their  juris- 
dictional principles,  classes  of  cases  where 
remedy  may  be  used,  etc. 

Chapter   XIV. 

REFORMATION,  CANCELLATION,  AND 
QUIETING  TITLE. 

Chapter   XV. 

ANCILLARY  REMEDIES :  Covering  discovery, 
bills  to  perpetuate  testimony,  interpleader, 
receivers,  etc. 


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TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Chapter  I. 

JURISDICTION :  Covering  courts  of  criminal  ju- 
risdiction and  venue. 

Cbapter   II. 

APPREHENSION  OF  PERSONS  AND  PROP- 
ERTY :  Covering  arrest  in  general,  warrants, 
extradition,  searches  and  seizures  of  property, 
and  taking  property  from  prisoner. 

Chapter  III. 

PRELIMINARY  EXAMINATION,  BAIL,  AND 
COMMITMENT:  Covering  right  to  release  on 
bail,  habaas  corpus,  the  recognizance,  release 
of  sureties,  etc. 

Chapter  IV. 

MODE  OP  ACCUSATION:  Covering  the  indict- 
ment and  presentment,  information,  coroner's 
inquisition,  time  of  prosecution,  and  nolle 
prosequi,  etc.      •; 

Chapter   V. 

PLEADING  — THE  ACCUSATION:  Covering 
form  ot  indictment  in  general,  the  commence- 
ment, and  the  statement  of  offense  and  descrip- 
tion of  defendant. 

Chapter   VI. 

PLEADING— THE  ACCUSATION  (Continued): 
Covering  allesation  of  intent,  knowledge,  etc. ; 
technical  terms;  second  or  third  offense;  set- 
ting forth  writings;  description  of  property 
and  persons ;  ownership. 

Chapter   VII. 

PLEADING— THE  ACCUSATION  (Continued): 
Covering  statement  of  time  and  place. 


Chapter  VIII. 

PLEADING— THE  ACCUSATION  (Continued): 
Covering  indictments  on  statutes. 

Chapter  IX. 

PLEADING- THE  ACCUSATION  (Continued): 
Covering  duplicity,  joinder  of  counts  and  par- 
ties, election,  conclusion  of  indictment,  amend- 
ment, aider  by  verdict,  etc. 

Chapter   X. 

PLEADING  AND  PROOF:  Covering  variance 
and  conviction  of  minor  and  higher  offense. 

Chapter   XI. 

MOTION  TO  QUASH:  Covering  also  arraign- 
ment, demurrer,  and  pleas  of  defendant. 

Chapter   XII. 

TRIAL  AND  VERDICT:  Covering  time  and  place- 
of  trial,  custody  and  presence  of  defendant, 
bill  of  particulars,  the  counsel,  judge  and  jury, 
arguments  and  instructions,  etc. 

Chapter   XIII. 

PROCEEDINGS  AFTER  VERDICT:  Covering 
motion  in  arrest  of  judgment,  sentence,  new 
trial,  writ  of  error,  etc. 

Chapter   XIV. 

EVIDENCE:  Covering  facts  in  issue,  motive, 
res  gestae,  other  crimes,  declarations,  confes-^ 
sions,  character,  burden  of  proof,  witnesses, 
etc. 

Chapter   XV. 

HABEAS  CORPUS. 


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TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Chapter  I. 

FORMATION  OF  THE  CONTRACT:  Covering 
the  capacity  of  parties,  who  may  sell,  the  thing 
sold,  mutual  assent,  form,  and  price. 

Chapter  II. 

FORMATION  OP  THE  CONTRACT  (Continued)  : 
Covering  the  statute  of  frauds. 

Chapter  III. 

EFFECT  OF  THE  CONTRACT  IN  PASSING 
THE  PROPERTY:  Covering  sales  of  specific 
chattels,— unconditional  sales,  conditional  sales, 
sale  on  trial  or  approval,  and  sale  or  return. 

Chapter   IV. 

EFFECT  OP  THE  CONTRACT  IN  PASSING 
THE  PROPERTY  (Continued) :  Covering  sales 
of  chattels  not  specific,  appropriation  of  property 
to  the  contract,  reservation  of  right  of  disposal, 
etc. 

Chapter   V. 

JIISTAKE,  FAILURE  OP  CONSIDERATION, 
AND  FRAUD :  Showing  the  effect  of  mistake, 
failure  of  consideration,  and  fraud  generally, 
frauds  on  creditors,  the  delivery  necessary  as 
against  creditors  and  purchasers,  etc. 


Chapter   VI. 

ILLEGALITY:  Covering  sales  prohibited  by  the 
common  law,  by  public  policy,  and  by  statute; 
the  effect  of  illegality,  and  the  conflict  of  laws. 

Chapter  VII. 

CONDITIONS  AND  WARRANTIES:  Covering 
conditions  and  war  ranties  generally. 

Chapter  VIII. 

PERFORMANCE:  Covering  fully  delivery,  the 
buyer's  right  of  examination,  acceptance,  and 
payment. 


Chapter  IX. 

RIGHTS  OF  UNPAID  SELLER  AGAINST  THE 
GOODS;  Covering  the  seller's  lien,  stoppage 
in  transitu,  and  the  right  of  resale. 


Chapter   X. 

ACTION  FOR  BREACH  OF  THE  CONTRACT: 
Covering  the  various  remedies  of  the  seller  and 
of  the  buyer. 


\  Volume.    356  Pages.    $3.75,  Delivered. 


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TABLE  OF   CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

Covering  the  deflnition,  source,  and  nature  of  In- 
ternational Law. 

Chapter  I. 

PERSONS  IN  INTERNATIONAL  LAW:  Cov- 
ering states,  their  loss  of  identity,  various  unions 
of  states,  de  facto  states,  belligerency  and  recog- 
nition thereof,  and  eQ,uaUty  of  states. 

Chapter   II. 

THE  COMMENCEMENT  OF  STATES— FUNDA- 
MENTAL RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES:  Covering 
the  commencement  and  recognition  of  new 
states,  effect  of  change  of  sovereignty,  the  fun- 
damental rights  and  duties  of  states,  etc. 

Chapter   III. 

TERRITORIAL  PROPERTY  OF  A  STATE: 
Covering  modes  of  acquiring  property,  boun- 
daries, territorial  waters,  etc. 

Chapter   IV. 

TERRITORIAL  JURISDICTION:  Covering  ex- 
territoriality, sovereigns  and  diplomatic  agents 
and  their  immunities,  vessels,  right  of  asylum, 
alienage,  responsibility  for  mob  violence,  extras 
dition,  jurisdiction  beyond  state  limits,  etc. 

Chapter   V. 

JURISDICTION  ON  THE  HIGH  SEAS  AND 
UNOCCUPIED  PLACES:  Covering  nature  of 
jurisdiction,  jurisdiction  over  merchant  ships, 
piracy,  privateers,  letters  of  marque,  slave 
trade,  etc. 

Chapter   VI. 

THE  AGENTS  OF  A  STATE  IN  INTERNA- 
TIONAL RELATIONS ;  Covering  public  diplo- 
matic agents  and  consuls,  and  matters  relating 
to  them. 

Chapter   VII. 
INTERVENTION :    Covering  the  subject  gener- 
ally. 

Chapter   VIII. 

NATIONALITY:  Covering  citizenship,  allegi- 
ance, expatriation,  naturalization,  etc. 

Chapter   IX. 

TREATIES:    Covering  the  subject  generally. 
Chapter   X. 

AMICABLE  SETTLEMENT  OP  DISPUTES: 
Covering  mediation,  arbitration,  retorsion,  re- 
prisals, embargo,  pacific  blockade,  etc. 

Chapter   XI. 

INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  WAR: 
Covering  the  subject  of  war  generally,  includ- 
ing the  kinds,  causes,  and  objects  of  war. 

Chapter   XII. 

EFFECTS  OF  WAR— AS  TO  PERSONS:  Cov- 
ering the  relations  of  enemies,  noncombatants, 
privateers,  prisoners  of  war,  and  the  subjects  of 
ransom,  parole,  etc. 


Chapter  XIII. 

EFFECTS  OF  WAR  — AS  TO  PROPERTY : 
Covering  contributions,  requisitions,  foraging, 
booty,  ransom,  and  other  questions  in  regard 
to  property. 

Chapter   XIV. 

POSTLIMINIUM:  The  right  and  ita  limitations 
defined  and  explained. 

Chapter  XV. 

MILITARY  OCCUPATION:  Covering  the  defi- 
nition, extent,  and  effect  of  occupation,  and  the 
duties  of  an  occupant. 

Chapter  XVI. 

MEANS  OP  CARRYING  ON  HOSTILITIES: 
Covering  the  instruments  and  means  of  war, 
spies,  etc. 

Chapter   XVTI. 

ENEMY  CHARACTER:  Covering  enemies  gen- 
erally, domicile,  houses  of  trade,  property  and 
transfer  thereof,  etc. 

Chapter  XVIII. 

NON-HOSTILE  RELATIONS:  Covering  com- 
mercia  belli,  flags  of  truce,  passports,  safe-con- 
ducts, truces  or  armistices,  cartels,  etc. 

Chapter   XIX. 

TERMINATION  OP  WAR:  Covering  the  meth- 
ods of  termination,  uti  possidetis,  treaties  of 
peace,  conquest,  etc. 

Chapter   XX. 

OF  NEUTRALITY  IN  GENERAL:  NeutraUty 
defined  and  explained. 

Chapter   XXI. 

THE  LAW  OF  NEUTRALITY  BETWEEN  BEL- 
LIGERENT AND  NEUTRAL  STATES;     Gov-  ' 
ering  the  rights,  duties,  and  liabilities  of  neutral 
states. 

Chapter   XXII. 
CONTRABAND :    Covering  the  subject  generally. 

Chapter  XXIII. 
BLOCKADE :    Covering  the  subject  generally. 

Chapter  XXIV. 
VISIT    AND    SEARCH,  AND    RIGHT    OF  AN- 
GARY:   Covering  those  subjects  generally. 

APPENDIX. 

Giving  in  full,  as  in  no  other  single  work,  the  In- 
structions for  the  Government  of  Armies  of  the 
United  States  in  the  Field  (Lieber) ;  Papers  Car- 
ried, or  that  Ought  to  be  Carried,  by  Vessels  in 
Evidence  of  their  Nationality;  The  Declaration 
of  Paris;  The  Declaration  of  St.  Petersburg; 
The  Geneva  Convention  for  the  Amelioration  of 
the  Condition  of  the  Sick  and  Wounded  of  Ar- 

■  mies  in  the  Field ;  The  Laws  of  War  on  Land, 
(Recommended  for  Adoption  by  the  Institute  of 
International  Law  at  Oxford,  Sept.  9, 1880) ;  and 
The  Brussels  Conference. 


1   VOLUME.    500  PAGEiS.      $3.75.   DELIVERED. 

WEST   PUBLISHING  CO.,  St.  Pauu  Minn. 

(10) 


snaofsesi  By  tne  pi'oeessoi'S' 


iQtotfon  on  (giifs  Anb  (Uotes. 

Students  in  the  law  of  negotiable  paper  are  recommended  to  use  this  volume 
in  connection  with  their  text-books  as  a  means  of  review.  The  two  hundred  and 
seven  general  propositions  or  summaries  of  the  law,  in  heavy-faced  type,  scattered 
through  the  volume,  are  far  preferable  for  this  purpose  to  any  of  the  so-called 
abridgements  or  quiz  books. — Prof.  Austin  Abbott,  on  the  bulletin  board  of  the 
N.  Y.  University  Law  School. 

CfM&  on  Cximiwxf  ^m. 

I  have  used  Clark's  Criminal  Law  for  class  work  during  the  past  year,  and  find 
it  very  well  adapted  for  the  purpose.  For  an  elementary  book  it  is  sufficiently  ex- 
tensive, its  statements  are  clear,  and  its  mode  of  arrangement  and  printing  render  it 
easy  to  use  both  by  the  pupil  and  the  instructor.  My  class  have  seemed  much 
pleased  with  the  book,  and  their  success  in  its  study  has  been  very  gratifying  to  me, 
and  constitutes  one  of  the  best  recommendations  which  the  work  of  the  author  and 
publisher  could  receive. — Prof.  William  C.  Robinson,  Law  Dept.,  Yale  University. 

Cfdrft  on  Contracts. 

It  is  the  most  admirably  arranged  work  on  Contracts  that  has  yet  appeared. 
It  will  be  of  great  service  in  the  lecture  room. — Prof.  W.  P.  Willey,  West  Virginia 
University. 

^Uptnc^n  on  Common  feat»  (jpfeabing. 

Mr.  Shipman's  treatment  and  head-note  arrangement  meet  my  idea  exactly. — 
Prof.  E.  F.  Johnson,  University  of  Michigan  Law  Dept. 

<§(<xc&  on  Conatttutiondf  feaw. 

A  very  hasty  examination  indicates  that  the  book  covers  the  ground  in  such  a 
way  as  to  be  of  value  to  students,  and  I  shall  recommend  it  among  others  to  my 
class. — Prof.  Emlin  McClain,  Iowa  State  University. 

S^it  on  <B<;|uitg. 

I  have  examined  Fetter  on  Equity,  and  can  state  unreservedly  that  it  more 
than  realizes  my  expectations.  It  is  a  work  of  real  merit.  It  sets  forth  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  Equity  Jurisprudence  in  a  manner  so  logical  in  arrangement, 
perspicuous  in  statement  and  accurate  in  treatment  as  to  deserve  special  recogni- 
tion and  appreciative  comment  — Prof.  Wm.  Hoynes,  University  of  Notre  Dame. 

Cfdtfe  on  Ctimindf  (procebute. 

I  cordially  and  earnestly  commend  the  work  as  one  of  unquestionable  excel- 
lence and  as  a  book  which  should  not  only  be  in  the  hands  of  every  student,  but  also 
at  the  elbow  of  every  practitioner. — C.  O.  Bishop,  Lecturer  on  Criminal  Law,  St. 
Louis  Law  School. 

Ciffcing  on  ^afes. 

I  have  just  completed  an  examination  of  "Tiffany  on  Sales"  and  find  it  to  br 
an  excellent  and  useful  book  well  adapted  to  the  use  of  students  wherever  a  text- 
book forms  the  basis  of  instruction.  The  statements  of  law  are  ,uade  with  unusual 
clearness  and  accuracy. — Blewett  Lee,  Prof,  of  Law,  Northwestern  University. 

(11) 


This  series  is  to  comprise  concise  treatises  on  all  the  principal  subjects  or  the 
law.  The  books  are  made  on  the  same  general  plan,  in  which  certain  special  and 
original  features  are  made  prominent.      These  are  : 

1.  ^  aucctnct  rfdfetnent  of  fedbing  ptiuipitB  h  Bfdcftjfetter  t^ft, 

2.  (^  mote  e^enbeb  commentary,  tirxci^iiinz  t^e  ipx\m'pk&. 

3.  ^otee  dnb  aut^otifieB. 

They  are  handsomely  printed,  with  a  liberal  use  of  black-letter  type,  published 
in  regular  octavo  form,  bound  in  the  best  law  sheep,  and  sold  at  the  uniform  price  of 

$3^T5  per  t?ofume,  mcfubing  befit>erf  ♦ 

(Ttoti?  (Redbg: 

(Uotfon  ott  QBiffe  dnb  (UoteB  (2b  (Bb.). 

Cfatft  on  Crimindf  £at». 

Cfiitfe  on  Contracts. 

^^iptnan  on  €ommon;Eiat»  (jpfeabin^  (2b  Sb.)., 

QBfacft  on  Conetitutionaf  featv. 

Setter  on  ^c^^xt^, 

Cfarft  on  Criminaf  (procebure. 

Ciffang  on  ^afee. 

<Bifenn  on  Jnternattonaf  few. 

^dggarb  on  Cort«.    (,2  t>of5.) 

(UeaTfg  QRedbjj: 


^3tl>man  on  ^xxxi'^  Qpfeabing. 

^mit^  on  (Sfementdrg  feaw. 

Ok(]Keft)eg  on  (Bt>tbence. 

QSfdcfe  on  Construction  MCd  3nteri)retdt{on  of  feaw. 

^o^nBon  on  (B;rtrdorbin*rg  QRtemebteB. 

3n  (pre^jaratton: 

^ftn^6ooftB  of  f^  fefttw  of  Cotporftfione,  ^arfnete^i}),  Q^atfinenfe,  ^gencg, 
(^btnimefrafion,  Carrtere,  S^^eraf  ^oce^ure,  3n6urancc,  ^ersonaf  ^ojjertg, 
WiffB,  ^ftfenfe,  ^riuafe  Dnfemafionaf  &at»,  ©amageB,  (goman  featw,  €obe 
^feft^ing,  (geaf  ^©ijertg,  ©omeefic  (Rcfafione. 

—      — df^er  ewfijccfg  in  prejjatftfion  to  6e  announceb  fafer. 
OTcBt  OfJuBWns  Comi)dn8.  §t  Qpauf,  (tttinn. 

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