m Pub. Cft.
- y. City
((nrn^U ICam irljool ICihtatg
Cornell University Library
KF4119.V95
The law of the public school system of t
3 1924 019 905 102
Cornell University
Library
The original of tiiis book is in
the Cornell University Library.
There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.
http://www.archive.org/cletails/cu31924019905102
THE I/AW OF THE
PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM
OF THE
UNITED STATES
THE LAW OF THE
PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM
OF THE
UNITED STATES
BY
HAEVEY COETLANDT- VOOEHEES
OF THE BOSTON BAB
AUTHOR OP " THE LAW OP AEEBST IN CIVIL AND CBIMINAL
ACTIONS," EDITOR OP " STIMBON'S LAW DICTIONAET,"
BEYISED EDITION
BOSTON
LITTLE, BEOWN, AND COMPANY
1916
Copyright, 1916,
By BLabvet Cobtlandt VooBEEEa.
All rights reserved
KotiDocitr press
Set up and electrotyped by J. S. Gushing Co., Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.
Fresswoik by S. J. Parkbill & Co., Boston, Mass., U.S.A.
TO THE
HONORABLE JOHN WALSH
WHOSE EXAMPLE AND LEGAL ATTAINMEXTS HAVE
BEEN AN INSPIRATION TO THE AUTHOR
AND MANY OTHERS THIS BOOK IS
GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED
PREFACE
OtJB national greatness, and the permanence of our
American government, are to a great extent founded in
our system of public schools. In these schools pupils
learn patriotism and obedience to constituted authority
to an extent untaught and unpracticed in many homes.
The acquirement of knowledge is offered in a system
which only enormous funds and the painstaking endeav-
ors of selected instructors could make possible. As the
State furnishes so it benefits. The child of today is the
statesman of tomorrow. Competence is so general that
no man is considered unreplaceable.
But the State does not make scholars. It only offers
the means of acquiring scholarship. The years of nur-
ture by our government have created an almost unanimous
desire for a college education, whereas in the earlier days
the main educational desire was often expressed as an
ability to "read, write and cipher." Parents have seen
the folly of superficiality and are determined that their
children shall be thorough.
Improvement in educational matters has been gradual,
but aggressive. Compulsory attendance, guarded by at-
tendance or truant officers, is a modern feature, but has
vii
PREFACE
been so widely adopted that now but two States of our
Union are without such law. There should be none. It
is to be regretted, however, that some States, although
adopting a compulsory attendance law of great possi-
bilities for the uplift of the citizens and effective dimin-
-'' ishment of illiteracy, have almost nullified the possible
beneficial effect by the adoption of provisos which render
the laws almost nugatory. Gradual improvement of the
effectiveness of these laws is hoped for.
The aggressiveness with which our school system has
grown has naturally met with opposition. Constitutional
and statutory rights are jealously maintained. The re-
sult has been an enormous amount of litigation in school
matters, and it is the purpose of this work to make an
orderly presentation of the judicial precedents for the con-
venient reference of those interested. A few references
have been made to decisions of school tribunals where
either the facts are peculiar, or no decision to the same
effect has been found in the reported cases. No apology
is offered for the presentation of such decisions. The
judicial pronouncement is that such decisions have the
conclusive quality of "a judgment pronounced in a legally
created court of limited jurisdiction."^ The inaccessi-
bility alone of such decisions would seem to make this
presentation desirable.
In the various States are several hundred thousand
school oiBcers^ who, in their official duties, are called
upon to decide the legality of expulsion or suspension of
pupils, the employing and dismissal of teachers, and to
1 Thompson v. Board of Education, 57 N, J.L. 628; 31 Atl. 168.
2 Alabama alone has about eleven thousand district school
trustees.
viii
PREFACE
make many contracts relating to school affairs and prop-
erty. Slight inadvertence, indiscretion, or lack of knowl-
edge may make them personally liable. They should
know their rights and liabilities. To them, and to the
members of the legal profession who are to care for such
litigation it is hoped that the efforts of the Author will
be found helpful.
HARVEY COETLANDT VOORHEES.
Boston, July 1, 1916.
IX
CONTENTS
Table of Cases xvii
CHAPTER I
General Principles, §§ 1-14 1-21
§ 1. Duty of Educating 1
§ 2. Power to Establish Public Schools ... 2
§ 3. Constitutional Provisions 2
§4. What is a School? 6
§ 5. What is a Public School? 7
§6. What is Education? 9
§ 7. Father's Duty to Educate 10
§ 8. Mother's Duty to Educate 11
§ 9. Pecuniary Ability of Parent 13
§ 10. Child was without Remedy 13
§ 11. Parent may Direct Studies ..... 14
§ 12. Non-Compulsory System 15
§ 13. Compulsory Education 15
§ 14. Excuses for Non-Attendance .... 19
CHAPTER n
Of School Districts, §§ 15-27 22-58
§ 15. Status of School Districts 22
§ 16. Districts De Facto 25
§ 17. Formation and Organization of Districts . . 27
§ 18. Petitions for Establishment or Alteration of
Districts 28
§ 19. Boundaries of Districts 29
§ 20. Alteration and Abolition of Districts ... 31
§ 21. Powers and Management of Districts ... 36
§22. District Meetings 39
xi
CONTENTS
i 23. Warning or Notice of Meetings .
i 24. Electors and Votes of District Meetings
i 25. Records and Minutes ....
I 26. District Claims and Actions
i 27. District Torts
PASS
43
48
50
51
55
CHAPTER m
Of School Pkoperty, §§ 28-40
§ 28. Power to Provide Land and Buildings
§ 29. Acquiring Site ....
§ 80. Erecting Schoolhouses .
§ 31. Mechanics' Liens ....
§ 32. Contractors' Bonds
§ 33. Alteration, Repairs and Maintenance
§ 34. Exclusiveness of Use .
§ 35. Personal Property ....
§ 36. Apparatus and Appendages .
§ 37. Isolated Territory ....
§ 38. OfEenses against School Property
§ 39. Saloons and Intoxicants
§ 40. Conveyances of School Property .
59-85
59
62
64
67
68
71
73
77
78
80
81
81
83
CHAPTER IV
Of School Officers, §§ 41-61 86-135
§ 41. State Superintendent 86
§ 42. County Superintendent 90
§ 43. School Directors 94
§ 44. Must Act as Unit 100
§ 45. Discretion and Good Faith 101
§ 46. Qualifying of Officers 108
§ 47. Vacating and Removal 104
§ 48. Officers De Facto, De Jure and Intruders . . 107
§ 49. Usurpation of Duties 113
§ 50. Meetings of School Directors .... 113
§ 51. Notice of Meetings 114
§ 52. Records 115
§ 53. Voting H6
§ 54. Making Contracts 117
§ 55. Bids and Bidders 123
xii
CONTENTS
§ 56. Implied Contracts
§ 57. Modification of Conti-acts
§ 58. Ratification of Contracts
§ 59. Acts Ultra Vires ....
§ 60. Duties and Liability of Treasurer
§ 61. Employing Counsel
PAGE
125
127
127
131
132
135
CHAPTER V
Of School Teachers, §§ 62-71
§ 62. Duties of Teachers
§ 63. Qualifications. — Certificates
§ 64. Contract of Employment
§ 65. Compensation
§ 66. Powers
§67. Religious Garb .
§ 68. Bible Reading and Religious Worship
§ 69. Discharge, Removal and Suspension
§ 70. Right to Chastise Pupils
§ 71. Right to Expel Pupils .
136-176
136
138
143
151
153
154
155
159
166
174
CHAPTER VI
Of Pupils, §§ 72-83 -177-212
177
179
181
182
183
183
185
195
199
200
201
209
§72.
§73.
§74.
§75.
§76.
§77.
§78.
§79.
§80.
§81.
§82.
§83.
Rights and Duties
Admission
School Age
I^on-Residents ....
Tuition Fees
Control of Pupils . .
Exclusion, Suspension and Expulsion
Health Regulations. — Vaccination
Reinstatement ....
Diplomas
Separate Schools .
Transportation ....
CHAPTER Vn
Rules and Regulations, §§ 84-97 .
§ 84. Power of Adoption
§ 85. Manner of Establishing
xiii
213-228
213
214
CONTENTS
§ 86. Reasonableness and Validity
§ 87. Carrying Fuel
§ 88. Rhetorical Exercises and Dialogues .
§ 89. Compositions and Debates .
§ 90. Tardiness
§ 91. Detention
§ 92. Secret Societies
§ 93. Football Playing
§ 94. Pupils to Go Directly Home after School
§ 95. Conduct outside of School .
§ 96. Truancy. — Attendance Officers .
§ 97. Incidental Fees . . .
215
216
217
218
220
220
221
223
224
225
226
227
CHAPTER Vm
Of Books and Studies, §§ 98-106
§ 98. Prescribing Studies
§ 99. Adoption of Books
§ 100. Uniformity of Books .
§ 101. Text-Book Commissions
§ 102. Bids for Supplying Books
§ 103. Free Books .
§ 104. Publishers' Contracts .
§ 105. Publishers' Bonds
§ 106. Studies Prescribed or Prohibited by Parent
229-243
229
230
232
235
236
237
238
240
242
CHAPTER IX
Of School Funds, §§ 107-116 244-258
§ 107. Sources of Funds 244
§ 108. Borrowing Money 245
§ 109. Promissory Notes 246
§ 110. Custodian and Depositary 247
§ 111. Certificates of Indebtedness. — Warrants . . 248
§ 112. Apportionment of Funds 251
§ 113. Misapplication of Funds 253
§ 114. Loans of Funds 255
§ 115. Lack of Funds 256
§ 116. School Bonds 257
xiv
CONTENTS
CHAPTER X
Op School Taxes, §§ 117-130 .
§ 117. Power to Levy
§ 118. Meeting to Authorize Levy
§ 119. Purposes of Levy
§ 120. Amount of Levy .
§ 121. Manner of Levying
§ 122. Apportionment of Taxes
§ 123. What Property is Taxable
§ 124. Certificate of Levy
§ 125. Assessing of Taxes
§ 126. Constitutionality of Levy
§ 127. Illegal Levy
§ 128. Collection of Taxes .
§ 129. Exemption from Taxation
§ 130. Delinquent Taxes. — Execution and Sale
PAGE
259-279
259
260
262
264
264
265
266
268
269
272
273
275
277
278
CHAPTER XI
Synopses of Principal Statutes, §§ 131-179 . . 280-385
§ 131. General Statement 280
§ 132. Alabama 281
§ 133. Arizona 283
§ 134. Arkansas 285
§ 135. California 287
§136. Colorado 291
§ 137. Connecticut 293
§ 138. Delaware 296
§ 139. Florida 298
§ 140. Georgia 300
§141. Idaho . . . 301
§ 142. Illinois 303
§ 143. Indiana 305
§ 144. Iowa 307
§ 145. Kansas 310
§ 146. Kentucky 313
§ 147. Louisiana 315
§ 148. Maine 316
§ 149. Maryland ' . 319
§ 150. Massachusetts 321
XV
CONTENTS
§ 151. Michigan 324
§ 152. Minnesota 327
§ 153. Mississippi 330
§ 154. Missouri 331
§ 155. Montana 333
§156. Nebraska 336
§ 157. Nevada 338
§ 158. New Hampshire 340
§ 159. New Jersey 342
§ 160. New Mexico 344
§ 161. New York 346
§ 162. North Carolina 349
§ 163. North Dakota 351
§ 164. Ohio 353
§ 165. Oklahoma 355
§ 166. Oregon 356
§ 167. Pennsylvania 359
§ 168. Rhode Island 361
§ 169. South Carolina '. 363
§ 170. South Dakota 365
§ 171. Tennessee 367
§ 172. Texas 369
§ 173. Utah 371
§ 174. Vermont 373
§ 175. Virginia 376
§ 176. Washington 378
§ 177. West Virginia 381
§ 178. Wisconsin 382
§ 179. Wyoming 384
Index 387
XVI
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
A
Abbott V. Ghase, 75 Me. 83 83
Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226 195
Ackerman v. VaU, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 297 264
Adams v. Crooks, 7 Gray (Mass.) 411 31
V. Hyde, 27 Vt. 221 264, 269
V. Sleeper, 64 Vt. 544 46
V. State, 82 111. 132 95, 96, 253
». Tator, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 384 109
Addison v. Bowie, 2 Bland (Md.) 606 11
Aetna Indemnity Co. v. Comer, 136 Ga. 24 67
A. H. Andrews Co. v. Delight, &c., 95 Ark. 26 . . 22, 95, 249
Aiken v. School District, &c., 27 Kan. 129 148
Albertville v. Rains, 107 Ala. 691 244
Alden v. RounsviUe, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 218 30
Alderman v. School Directors, 91 111. 179 .. . 26, 38, 54, 81
Allen V. Bertram, 70 Iowa 434 29
V. Gleason, 4 Day (Conn.) 376 278
V. School District, &c., 15 Pick. (Mass.) 35 38
V. Strickland, 100 N. C. 225 43
Alvord V. Chester, 180 Mass. 20 114, 177, 196
American Heating, &c., v. Board, &c., 81 N. J. L. 423 . . . 100
American, &c., v. Board, &c., 131 Wis. 220 116
Anderson v. Board, &c., 122 Mo. 61 124
Andrews v. Curtis, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 678 126
V. School District, &c., 37 Minn. 96 128
Anniston City Land Co. v. State, 185 Ala. 482 ..... 277
Armstrong v. School Directors, &c., 160 111. App. 430 . . . 101
V. School District, 19 Mo. App. 462 162
V. School District, &c., 28 Mo. App. 169 122
V. Union, &c., 28 Kan. 345 160
Ashuelot National Bank v. School District, 56 Fed. 197 . . 257
Associated Schools, &c., v. School District, &c., 122 Minn. 254 229
xvii
TABLE OP CASES
[References are to pages.]
Attorney General v. Bickford, 77 N. H. 433 90
V. Burnham, 61 N. H. 594 94
Auditor General v. McArthur, 87 Mich. 457 272
Austin V. Board, &c., 68 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 538 64
Auten V. Board, &c., 83 Ark. 431 197
Avery v. U. S., 104 Fed. 711 83
Axt V. Jackson, «&c., 90 Ind. 101 97, 249, 250
B
Bacon v. School District, 97 Mass. 421 275
Baker v. Bryan, 64 Iowa 561 69
V. Ghambles, 4 Greene (la.) 428 37
V. School District, &c., 46 Vt. 189 65
Ballentine v. Pulaski, 83 Tenn. 633 260
Baltimore v. Keyser, 72 Md. 106 124
Baltimore, &c., v. State, &c., 26 Md. 505 231, 233
Bancroft v. Thayer, 5 Sawy. (U. S. C. C.) 502 230
Bank v. Bramerd, &c., 49 Minn. 106 37, 57
Bank of Gallatin v. Baber, 74 Tenn, 273 53
Bank, &c., v. Guttschlick, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 19 119
Barnard v. Matherly, 84 Mo. App. 140 183
V. Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19 192
Barnes, Appeal of, 6 R. I. 591 76
Barnes v. Barnes, 6 Vt. 388 27
V. Ovitt, 47 Vt. 316 36
Barngrover v. Maack, 46 Mo. App. 407 140
Barnhart v. Bodenhammer, 31 Mo. 319 139
Barr v. Deniston, 19 N. H. 170 142
Barre v. School District, &c., 69 Vt. 374 35
Barrett M'f'g Co. v. Board, &c., 133 La. 1022 67
Barry v. McCollom, 81 Conn. 293 93
Bartlett D. Kinsley, 15 Conn. 327 40,41,47,276
Bassett v. Fish, 75 N. Y. 303 22, 57, 58
V. Porter, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 487 27
Bates V. Bates, 74 Ga. 105 153
V. Weymouth, 9 Gray (Mass.) 433 267
Baxter v. Davis, 58 Greg. 109 95
Bay State Live Stock Co. v. Bing, 51 Neb. 570 27
Bays V. State, 6 Neb. 167 165
Bean v. Prudential, &c., 38 Vt. 177 62
Beard's Estate, 1 Pa. Co. Ct. 283 11
xviii
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
Beardsley v. Brown, 71 111. App. 199 68
Beaty v. Randall, 79 Mo. App. 226 216
Beck V. Board, &c., 76 Ohio St. 587 116
Bedell v. Barnes, 17 Hun (N. Y.) 353 279
Bedford v. Bedford, 136 lU. 354 11
Bellmeyer v. Marshalltown, 44 Iowa 564 .... 77, 122, 259
Bellows V. District, &c., 70 Iowa 320 60, 128
Bender v. Streabich, 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 609 75
V. Streabich, 182 Pa. St. 251 39
Benjamin v. Hull, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 437 .... 37, 62, 245
Bennett v. Burch, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 141 252
Berea CoUege v. Com., 211 U. S. 45, 53 L. ed. 81 .... 205
Berger M'f'g. Co. v. Crites, 178 Mo. App. 218 66
Bertonneau v. Directors, 3 Woods (U. S. C. C.) 177 ... 203
Besondy, In re, 32 Minn. 385 11, 13
Bigelow V. Randolph, 14 Gray (Mass.) 541 55, 56
Biggs V. Mt. Vernon, 45 Ind. App. 572 149
Billard v. Board, &c., 69 Kan. 63 156
Binde v. Klinge, 30 Mo. App. 285 199
Bishop V. Rowley, 165 Mass. 460 191, 194
Bissell V. Davidson, 65 Conn. 183 ....... . 195, 196
Black V. Early, 208 Mo. 281 26
V. Graham, 238 Pa. 381 181
Blaisdell v. School District, &c., 72 Vt. 63 249
Blake v. Mayor, &c., 19 Q. B. D. 79 9
V. Sturtevant, 12 N. H. 567 37, 245
Blanchard v. Blackstone, 102 Mass. 343 119
V. Burns, 110 Ark. 515 69, 70
V. School District, 29 Vt. 433 139, 140
Blandon v. Moses, 29 Hun (N. Y.) 606 141
Bloomington, &c., v. National School, &c., 107 Ind. 43 . . 96, 97
Bloomsburg, &c.. In re, 4 Pa. Co. Ct. 411 103
Blue V. Beach, 155 Ind. 121 197
Blufi Creek v. Hardinbrook, et al, 40 Iowa 130 .. . 133, 134
Board, &c., v. Andrews, 51 Ohio St. 199 79
«;. Atwood, 74 N. J. L. 638 209
V. Billings, 15 Fla. 686 91
«. Board, &c., 50 Ohio St. 439 183
t>. Board, &c., 30 W. Va. 424 35,37
V. Bolton, 85 lU. App. 92 182
V. Burton, 30 Ohio Cir. Ct. 411 150
V. Cain, 28 W. Va. 758 276
xix
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
Board, &c., v. Carolan, 182 111. 119 128
V. Detroit, 30 Mich. 505 24
V. Detroit, 80 Mich. 548 238
«;. Fudge, 4 Ga. App. 637 245,246
V. Grant, 107 Mich. 151 70
V. Greenbaum, 39 lU. 609 99, 125
V. Harrodsburg, &c., 9 Ky. L. Rep. 605 244
y. Helston, 32 111. App. 300 199
V. JeweE, 44 Minn. 427 133, 134
V. McComb, 92 U. S. 531 66
V. Mapes, 14 N. Y. St. R. 593 62
V. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 229
V. Moore, 17 Minn. 412 257
V. Purse, 101 Ga. 422 12, 188
V. School District, 56 Ark. 354 277
«). State, 26 Okla. 366 25
V. Tafoya, 6 N. M. 292 244
V. Trustees, &c., 18 Ky. L. Rep. 103 .244
w. Volk, 72 Ohio St. 469 56
V. Waugh, 105 Miss. 623 223
V. Welch, 51 Kan. 806 10, 257
Bogaard v. Plain View, 93 Iowa 269 61
Bolivar County v. Coleman, 71 Miss. 832 84
Bolton V. Board, &c., 1 lU. App. 193 258
Bopp V. Clark, 165 Iowa 697 144
Bourbon, &c., v. Peridns, 21 Kan. 531 79
Bourland v. Snyder, 224 111. 478 28
Bowen v. King, 34 Vt. 156 27, 55
Boyd V. Mill Creek, &c., 114 Ind. 210 249
V. State, 88 Ala. 169 167, 170
Bozeman, In re, 42 Kan. 456 79
Bradfield v. Avery, 16 Idaho, 769 93
Bradford v. Board, &c., 18 Cal. App. 19 222, 223
Braley v. Dickinson, 48 Vt. 599 41
BramweU v. Guheen, 3 Idaho 347 265
Branaman v. Hinkle, 137 Ind. 496 94
Brasch v. Western, &c., 80 Ark. 425 279
Brewer v. Pahner, 13 Mich. 104 35
Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116 266
Briggs V. Johnson Co., 4 DiU. (U. S. C. C.) 148 .... 233
Briggs V. School District, &c., 21 Wis. 348 34
Brock V. Bruce, 59 Vt. 313 270
XX
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.}
Broussard ». Verret, 43 La. An. 929 115, 127
Brown v. Chesterville, 63 Me. 241 142
V. Lunt, 37 Me. 423 108
». Owen, 75 Miss. 319 143
ti. School District, &c., 1 Kan. App. 530 148
». School District, &c., 64 N. H. 303 128
Bryan v. Fractional, &c., Ill Mich. 67 142
Bryant v. Goodwin, 9 Ohio 471 270
V. Whisenant, 167 Ala. 325 227
Buchanan v. School District, 25 Mo. App. 85 37
Buckley's Admir v. Howard, 35 Tex. 565 11
BuU V. Read, 13 Grat. (Va.) 78 259, 273
Bundy v. State, 95 Ark. 460 98
Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa 562 220, 223
Buren v. Albertson, 54 N. J. L. 72 93
Burgess v. Pue, 2 GiU (Md.) 254 Ill
V. School District, 100 Mass. 132 52
Burkhead v. Independent, &c., 107 Iowa 29 .... 144, 149
Burnett v. School Inspectors, 97 Mich. 103 33
Bumham v. Rogers, 167 Mo. 17 54
Burpee v. Burton, 45 Wis. 150 176, 186
Burton v. Fulton, 49 Pa. St. 151 164
V. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1342 .... 240
Bush V. Shipman, 5 111. 186 22, 251
Butcher v. Charles, 95 Tenn. 532 145, 160
Butler, &c., In re, 158 Pa. St. 159 113
Butler V. Haines, 79 Ind. 575 140, 141
V. Joint School District, &c., 155 Wis. 626 114
V. Shirley, &c., 15 Pa. Co. Gt. 291 231
V. State, 89 Ga. 821 82
V. Windsor, 155 Wis. 626 101, 144
Butterfield v. School District, &c., 61 Me. 583 .... 33, 44
Byrne v. School District, &c., 139 Iowa 618 150
Byrne & Read v. Board, &c., 140 Ky. 531 100
G
Cairo, &c., v. Mathews, 152 111. 153 268
CaldweU v. Bauer, 179 Ind. 146 85
V. School District, &c., 55 Fed. 372 148
Caldwell County v. Harbert, 68 Tex. 321 153
Call y. Chadboume, 46 Me. 206 26
xxi
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
Campana v. Galderhead, 17 Mont. 548 231
Campbell v. Indianapolis, 155 Ind. 186 37
Capital Bank v. School District, &c., 1 N. D. 479 . . • • 132
V. School District, &c., 63 Fed. 938 132
Carey v. Thompson, 66 Vt. 665 210
Carpenter v. Independent, &c., 95 Iowa 300 62
Carson v. State, 27 Ind. 465 37
Cartersville v. Baker, 73 Ga. 686 66
Carver v. School District, &c., 113 Mich. 524 163
Cary v. State, 76 Ala. 78 108
Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364 100
Cascade, &c., v. Lewis, &c., 43 Pa. St. 318 120, 183
Case «. State, 69 Ind. 46 109
Cashen v. School District, 50 Vt. 30 151
Castleton v. Langdon, 19 Vt. 210 84
Castro «. Board, &c., 38 W. Va. 707 148
Chadwick v. Crapsey, 35 N. Y. 196 264
Chamberlain v. Board, &c., 58 N. J. L. 347 257
V. Board, &c., 57 N. J. L. 605 48, 80
Chandler v. Board, &c., 104 Mich, 292 123
Chapin v. School District, 30 N. H. 25 40
Chaplin w. Hffl, 24 Vt. 528 74, 76, 81
Chase v. Hathaway, 14 Mass. 222 105
V. Merrimac Bank, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 564 54
V. Stephenson, 71 lU. 383 204
Charlestown, &c., v. Hay, 74 Ind. 127 151, 152
Chegary v. New York City, 13 N. Y. 220 277
Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People, 163 lU. 616 262
Chicago, &c., Ry. Co. v. People, 184 111. 240 268
Chicago, &c., v. Langlade, &c., 56 Wis. 614 109
Chicago, &c., V. People, 155 111. 276 268
Childrey v. Rady, 77 Va. 518 377
ChHes V. Todd, 43 Ky. 126 49
Chrisman v. Brookhaven, 70 Miss. 477 202, 204
Christ V. Brownsville Tp., 10 Ind. 461 245
Church V. Bullock, 109 S. W. (Tex.) 115 158
Churchill v. Board, &c., 28 Ky. L. Rep. 162 276
City of Hastings v. Thome, 8 Neb. 160 244
City School, &c., v. Hickman, 47 Ind. App. 500 146
Clapton V. Taylor, 49 Mo. App. 117 124
Clark V. Board, &c., 24 Iowa 266 205, 209
V. Great Barrington, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 260 153
xxii
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
Clark V. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462 233, 234, 237
V. Nicholasville, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 974 56
V. School Directors, 78 lU. 474 126, 248
V. School District, 29 Vt. 217 149
Clark School Township v. Home Insurance Co., 20 Ind. App. 543 38
Clarke v. Milwaukee County, 53 Wis. 65 92
V. School District, 84 Ark. 516 51
V. School District, &c., 3 R. I. 199 240
Clavering v. Ellison, 7 H. L. Cas. 713 12
Claybrook v. Owensboro, 16 Fed. 297 202
Cleveland v. Amy, 88 Mich. 374 148
Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. People, 208 HI. 9 . . . 264
Cochran v. Garrabrant, 32 N. J. L. 444 269
Coflin V. Portland, 16 Oreg. 77 84
Cole V. Black River FaUs, 57 Wis. 110 109
Collins, Ex parte, 49 Ala. 69 52
CoUins V. Henderson, 11 Bush (Ky.) 74 7
V. School District, 52 Me. 522 26
Colt V. Eves, 12 Conn. 253 46
V. Roberts, 28 Conn. 330 59
Colton V. Beardsley, 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 29 263
Com. V. Bush, 131 Ky. 384 Ill
V. Collins, 75 Ky. 386 239
V. Comly, 3 Pa. St. 372 133, 134
V. Dedham, 16 Mass. 141 2
V. Directors, &c., 164 Pa. St. 607 180
V. Everson, 140 Mass. 434 82
V. Gardner, 23 Pa. St. 417 27
V. Ginn, 111 Ky. 110 233, 241
V. Hammer, 9 Pa. Dist. 251 17, 21
V. Hartman, 17 Pa. St. 118 233, 259
V. Herr, 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 454 96
V. Interstate, &c., Ry., 187 Mass. 436 211, 219
V. Jenks, 154 Pa. St. 368 108
V. Jones, 142 Mass. 573 28
V. Louisville, &c., 17 Ky. L. Rep. 991 837
V. Morrisey, 86 Pa. St. 416 216
V. Randall, 4 Gray (Mass.) 36 107
V. Risser, 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 196 117
V. Roberts, 159 Mass. 372 10
V. Rowe, 218 Pa. St. 168 191
V. School Board, &c., 109 Va. 346 76
xxiii
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
Com. V. Seed, 5 Pa. L. Jour. 78 170, 173
V. Smith, 24 Pa. Co. Ct. 129 20
V. Williamson, 30 Leg. Int. (Pa.) 406 103
Commissioners v. Lineberger, 3 Mont. 231 134
Compulsory Attendance Law, In re, 25 Pa. Co. Ct. 503 . . 17
Cone V. Forest, 126 Mass. 97 276
Cones V. Benton, &c., 137 Ind. 404 57
Conley v. School Du'ectors, 32 Pa. St. 194 31, 96
Connoquenessiag, &c., In re, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 425 61
Connor v. Board, &c., 10 Minn. 439 22, 32
Converse v. Porter, 45 N. H. 385 62
Cook V. Board, &c., 266 111. 164 10
V. Neely, 143 Mo. App. 632 166, 167
V. North McGregor, 40 Iowa 444 123
V. State, 90 Tenn. 407 10
V. White, &c., 33 Ky. L. Rep. 926 100
Cooke V. School District, &c., 12 Colo. 453 34, 252
Cooper, Ex parte, 3 Tex. App. 489 244
Cooper V. State, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 324 167
Corn V. Board, &c., 39 111. App. 446 151, 152
Cory V. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 3, 4, 202, 209
Cost V. Shinault, 113 Ark. 19 77
CottreU, Appeal of, 10 R. I. 615 87
Coulter V. School Inspectors, 59 Mich. 391 44
Cousens v. School District, &c., 67 Me. 280 60
Crabb v. School District, &c., 93 Mo. App. 254 139
Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601, 25 L. ed. 1070 ... 257
Crandall v. Trustees, &c., 51 N. J. L. 138 49
Crawford v. District, &c., 68 Oreg. 388 95, 96, 203
CrawsfordsvUle v. Hays, 42 Ind. 200 159, 160
Creager v. School District, &c., 62 Mich. 101 79
V. Wright, &c., 67 Mich. 262 80
Crosby v. School District, &c., 35 Vt. 623 137
Cross V. Board, &c., 33 Ky. L. Rep. 472 102, 218
V. School Directors, 24 111. App. 191 148
V. Walton, &c., 129 Ky. 35 199
Crowell, &c., v. First Nat'l Bk. 163 S. W. (Tex.) 339 .. . 54
Currie v. School District, &c., 35 Minn. 163 65
Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1 230, 231
Curttright v. Independent, &c.. Ill Iowa 20 165
Cushing V. Friendship, 89 Me. 525 226
V. Newburyport, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 508 259, 260
xxiv
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
D
Dallas V. Fosdick, 40 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 240 6
Dameron v. Bayless, 14 Ariz. 180 206
Daneiihoffer"«. State, 69 Ind. 295 169
Darter v. Board, &c., 161 111. App. 284 163
Dartmouth Savings Bank v. School District, &c., 6 Dak. 332 "33
Davies v. Holland, 43 Ark. 425 46
Davis V. Barnstable, 154 Mass. 224 245
V. Board, &c., 38 W. Va. 382 132
V. Boget, 50 Iowa 11 76
V. Boston, 133 Mass. 103 193
V. Chihnark, 199 Mass. 112 80
V. Harrison, 140 Ky. 520 142, 145
V. Rapp, 43 N. J. L. 594 40
V. School District, &c., 24 Me. 349 73, 128, 129
V. Steuben, &c., 19 Ind. App. 694 249
V. United States, 23 Ct. CI. 329 117
Dawes v. Howard, 4 Mass. 97 11
Dawson v. Dawson, 12 Iowa 512 14
Dees V. Board, &c., 146 Mich. 64 150
Deming v. State, 23 Ind. 416 256
Derry, &c.. In re, 2 Pear. (Pa.) 24 61, 105
Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 484 173, 184
Des Moines, &c., v. Plane, 163 Iowa 18 67
Dewey v. Union, &c., 43 Mich. 480 147, 151
De WoK V. Watterson, 35 Hun (N. Y.) Ill 112
Dickinson «;. Linn, 36 Pa. St. 431 255
District, &c., v. Meyers, 83 Iowa 688 78
V. Morton, 37 Iowa 550 133
Dodd V. State, 94 Ark. 297 166
Dolan V. School District, 80 Wis. 155 122
Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 103, 158, 221, 230
Donovan v. McAlpin, 85 N. Y. 185 57
DooUttle V. Doolittle, 31 Barb. (N.Y.) 312 275
Dorner v. School District, 137 Wis. 147 254
Dorton v. Heam, 67 Mo. 301 75
Douglas V. Campbell, 89 Ark. 254 192, 194
V. Com., 108 Pa. St. 559 125
Dove V. Independent, &c., 41 Iowa 689 205
Doyle V. School Directors, 36 lU. App. 653 . . . 138, 140, 165
Draper v. Public Instruction Commissioners, 66 N. J. L. 54 . 164
XXV
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
Drew V. Madison, 146 Iowa 721 255
Dritt V. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286 190, 216, 225, 226
Drum V. MiUer, 135 N. C. 204 173
Dublin, &c.. In re, 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 464 103
Dubuque, &o., v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa 555 112, 129
Duffield V. WiUiamsport, 162 Pa. St. 476 195
DuUam v. WiUson, 53 Mich. 392 105
DuU's Estate, 1 Leg. Op. (Pa.) 125 15
Dunten v. State, 172 Ind. 59 210
Dyberry, &c., v. Mercer, 115 Pa. St. 559 143
Dyer v. School District, 61 Vt. 96 270
E
Eakin v. Chapman, 44 Okla., 51 274
Earl of Thanet v. Gartham, 8 J. B. Moore 368 151
East Carroll Parish, &c., v. Union Parish, &c., 36 La. An.
806 255
Eastman v. District, &c., 21 Iowa 590 159
Easton v. Calendar, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 90 86
Eaton & Co. v. Royal, 36 Wash. 435 239
Edalgo V. So. Ry. Co., 129 Ga. 258 272
Edinboro Normal School v. Cooper, 150 Pa. St. 78 . . . . 160
Edmburgh, &c., v. MitcheU, 1 S. D. 593 127
Edmundson v. Independent School District, 98 Iowa 639 . . 37
Edson V. Hayden, 18 Wis. 627 152
Edwards v. Trustees, 30 111. App. 528 255
Effingham. t;. Hamilton, 68 Miss. 523 235
V. Olson, 48 Kan. 565 233
Eickhoff V. SedaUa, &c., 106 Mo. App. 541 11
Eighth School District v. Copeland, 2 Gray (Mass.) 414 . . 60
EUis V. School District, 11 Gray (Mass.) 487 274
Ehnore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548 92, 138, 141, 216
Elsberry v. Seay, 83 Ala. 614 9
Emery v. MariaviUe, 56 Me. 315 249
Englehardt v. Yung's Heirs, 76 Ala. 534 11, 13
Erie, &c., v. Fuess, 98 Pa. St. 600 57
Ernst V. West Covington, 116 Ky. 850 56
Erwin V. St. Joseph, &c., 12 Fed. 680 257
Eubank v. Boughton, 98 Va. 499 208
Everett v. Independent School District, 109 Fed. 697 .. . 37
Everts v. District, &c., 77 Iowa 37 128
xxvi
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
F
Fairchild v. Board, &c., 107 Cal. 92 160
Farmers, &c., v. School District, &c., 6 Dak. 255 62
Famum's Petition, 51 N. H. 376 37
FarreU v. Board, &c., 67 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 187 97
V. School District, 98 Mich. 43 163, 165
V. State, 32 Ala. 557 83
Farrier v. State, 48 N. J. L. 613 109
Faulk V. McCartney, 42 Kan. 695 122
Favorite v. Board, &c., 235 111. 314 222
Fay V. Jumel, 35 La. An. 368 90
Feathergill v. State, 33 Ind. App. 683 227
Ferguson v. True, 66 Ky. 255 149, 154
Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444 159, 213
Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. 472 . . 213, 214, 215, 220, 221, 223
Field V. Com., 32 Pa. St. 478 86, 89, 105
V. Robinson, 198 Pa. St. 638 195
V. School District, &c., 83 Kan. 186 89
Finch V. Toledo, &c., 36 Ohio St. 37 57, 58
Fine v. Stewart, 48 S. W. (Tenn.) 371 249
First Nat'l Bk. v. Bourne, 131 S. W. (Mo.) 896 248
V. Rush, &c., 81 Pa. St. 307 249
V. Whisenhunt, 94 Ark. 583, 22, 131, 249, 251
First School District v. Ufford, 52 Conn. 44 44
Fisher v. Board, &c., 44 La. An. 184 250
V. School District, &c., 4 Cush. (Mass.) 494 . . . . 60, 131
Fiske V. Huntington, 179 Mass. 571 263
Fitch V. Smith, 57 N. J. L. 526 93, 148
Flanary v. Barrett, 146 Ky. 712 152
Fleishel v. Hightower, 62 Ga. 324 66
Fletcher v. Lincolnville, 20 Me. 439 40
Fluty V. School District, &c., 49 Ark. 94 121
Flynn v. Barnes, 156 Ky. 498 139
Folk V. Milwaukee, 108 Wis. 359 56
Folsom V. School Directors, 91 111. 402 37, 257
Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. (U. S.) 393 184
Ford V. KendaU, &c., 121 Pa. St. 543 56, 57, 233
Foster v. Boston, 127 Mass. 290 72
V. Reynolds, 66 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 133 99
Fowler v. Brooks, 188 Mass. 64 113
Fox «. People, 84 111. App. 270 173
xxvii
TABLE OF CASES
■[References are to pages.]
Fractional School District, &c., v. Metcalf, 93 Mich. 497 . . 44
Franklin, &c.. In re, 1 Pa. Com. PL 128 29
FranMin, &c., v. Board, &c., 75 Mo. 408 112
Frazier v. School District, 24 Mo. App. 250 162
Freel v. Crawfordsville, 142 Ind. 27 56, 57
Freeman v. Bourne, 170 Mass. 289 35, 91
French v. Davidson, 143 Cal. 658 195
Fry V. Athol, 4 Gush. (Mass.) 250 30
Ft. Smith, &c., v. Howe, 62 Ark. 481 277
Fullam V. Brookfield, 9 Allen (Mass.) 1 119
Fuller w. Fuller, 23 Fla. 236 11
Fulton V. Jenks, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 126 278
G
Gaddis v. School District, 92 Neb. 701 25
Gardmer, Appeal of, 4 R. I. 602 88
Garrett v. McAdams, &c., — Tex. Civ. App. — 68
Gaskill t). Dudley, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 546 54
Gates V. Beckwith, 2 Ohio Dec. 394 272
V. Renfroe, 7 La. An. 569 15
V. School District, 53 Ark. 468 148
Gear v. Gray, 37 N. E. (Ind.) 1059 147
Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Pa. St. 224 115, 278
Gehling v. School District, &c., 10 Neb. 239 132
Genessee, &c., v. McDonald, 98 Pa. St. 444 112
Gentle v. School Inspectors, 73 Mich. 40 44
George v. Second School District, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 497 . 36, 74, 272
Gerke v. PurceU, 25 Ohio St. 229 278
Gibbons v. Southwest School District, 4 AUen (Mass.) 508 . 60
Gibson v. School District, &c., 36 Mich. 404 79
Gildersleeve v. Board, &c., 17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 201 ... . 106
Giles V. School District, &c., 31 N. H. 304 . . . . 38, 40, 106
Gillan v. Board, &c., 88 Wis. 7 162, 165
GiUey v. GiUey, 79 Me. 292 15
GUman v. Bassett, 33 Conn. 298 36, 37, 60
Gmn & Co. v. Schoolbook Board, &c., 62 W. Va. 428 .. . 239
Gleese, In re, 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. 473 160
Glidden v. Hopkins, 47 HI. 525 129, 248
Glidden, &c., v. School District, &c., 143 Wis. 617 .. . 77, 127
Good V. Howard, 174 Ind. 358 25
Goodwin v. Perkins, 39 Vt. 598 Ill
xxviii
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
Goody V. Ck)lchester, &c., 15 Eng. L. & E. 596 129
Goodyear v. School District, 17 Oreg. 6l7 147
Goose River Bank v. Willow Lake, &c., 1 N. D. 26 . 142, 250
Gordon v. Gomes, 47 N. Y. 608 266
Gott V. Berea GoUege, 156 Ky. 376 184, 226
Gould V. Board, &c., 34 Hun (N. Y.) 16 24, 37
Goulding v. Peabody, 170 Mass. 483 35
Grady v. Landram, 111 Ky. 100 120
Grahn v. State, 6 Ohio N. P. 182 "7 . 21
Gravel Hill School District v. Old Farm School District,
55 Gonn. 244 44
Graves v. Jasper, &c., 2 S. D. 414 64
V. Joint School Inspectors, &c., 102 Mich. 634 45
Gray u. Board, &c., 231 111. 63 249,276
V. Sheldon, 8 Vt. 402 30
Graziani v. Burton, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 180 241
V. Com., 30 Ky. L. Rep. 119 241
Gregory v. SmaU, 39 Ohio St. 346 164
Greenbanks v. Boutwell, 43 Vt. 207 37
Green Bay Lumber Co. v. Odebolt, 125 Iowa 227 ... . 68
Greenlee v. Newton, &e., 104 N. E. (Ind.) 610 180
Green Mountain, &c., v. Savage, 15 Mont. 189 55
Griggs V. School District, &c., 87 Ark. 93 143
Griswold v. Hepburn, 63 Ky. 20 5
Grove v. Board, &c., 20 111. 532 27
Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 224 219
Gmm V. Tacket, 67 Ga. 725 109
H
Hackett v. Brooksville, &c., 120 Ky. 608 156
Hadley v. Chamberlin, 11 Vt. 618 51
Haile v. Young, 74 Tenn. 501 92
Haines v. School District, &c., 41 Me. 246 274
Hale V. Risley, 69 Mich. 599 142
Hall V. School District, &c., 24 Mo. App. 213 ... . 151, 152
HaUeck v. Boylston, 117 Mass. 469 271
HaUiday v. Hildebrandt, 97 Iowa 177 258
Hall's Free School v. Home, 80 Va. 470 9
Ham V. New York, 70 N. Y. 459 57
Hamilton, Matter of, 148 N. Y. 310 268
Hamilton v. San Diego County, 108 Cal. 273 26, 54
xxix
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages,]
Hamlin v. Kassafer, 15 Oreg. 456 108, 110
Hammond v. Hyde Park, 195 Mass. 29 196, 197
Hamtramck v. Holihan, 46 Mich. 127 73
Hance v. Fairhurst, 47 J. P. 53 13
Hancock v. Hazzard, 12 Gush. (Mass.) 112 134
Hand v. Deady, 79 Hun (N. Y.) 75 Ill
Hanna v. Wright, 116 Iowa 275 115
Hansen v. Holstein, 155 Iowa 264 247
Hare v. Board, &c., 113 N. C. 9 207
Harkness v. Hutcherson, 90 Tex. 383 164
Harley v. Liademann, 129 Wis. 514 194
Harmony, &c., v. Osborne, 9 Ind. 458 39
Harrington v. School District, &c., 30 Vt. 155 .... 23, 135
Harris v. Salem, 72 N. H. 424 56, 211
V. School District, &c., 28 N. H. 58 51
Hart V. School District, &c., 2 Lane. L. Rev. (Pa.) 346 . . 158
Hartford v. School District, 45 Conn. 462 277
HartweU v. Littleton, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 229 .... 233, 238
Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23 22, 25, 95
Hatfield, &c.. In re, 2 Walk. (Pa.) 169 29
Hatfield v. Knight, 112 Ark. 83 66
Haverhill v. Gale, 103 Mass. 104 182
Haycroft v. Grigsby, 80 Mo. App. 354 174
Hayward v. School District, &c., 2 Gush. (Mass.) 419 . . 130
Hazen v. Lerche, 47 Mich. 626 148
V. Township Board, 48 Mich.- 188 150
Heal V. Jefferson Tp., 15 Ind. 431 245
Heard v. Calhoun, &c., 45 Mo. App. 660 257, 258
V. School Directors, 45 Pa. St. 93 33, 104
Heath & Co. v. Board, &c., 133 Mich. 681 235
V. Com., 129 Ky. 835 242
Heck ». State, 44 Ohio St. 536 . . ." 82
Heidler, In re, 122 Pa. St. 653 29
Heizer v. Yohn, 37 Ind. 415 24
Heller v. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309 23, 24
Hemme v. School District, &c., 30 Kan. 377 79
Hendricks y. Bobo, 12 La. An. 620 . 247
Hennon, Ex parte, 38 U. S. 230 105
Henricks v. State, 151 Ind. 454 33
Herald v. Board, &c., 65 W. Va. 765 77
Heritage v. Dodge, 64 N. H. 297 173
Herold v. Parish Board, &c., — La. — 156
XXX
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
Herrington v. District, &c., 47 Iowa 11 100
V. Liston, 47 Iowa 11 123
Hess V. Dodge, 82 Neb. 35 64
Higbie v. New York, &c., 122 N. Y. App. Div. 483 ... . 66
Higgins V. Read, 8 Iowa 298 48, 50, 51, 275
Hightower v. Slaton, 54 Ga. 108 153
Hill V. Boston, 122 Mass. 344 56, 73
Hilliard v. Austin, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 141 279
Hillsborough v. Deering, 4 N. H. 86 15
Hinkle's Lessee v. Shadden, 32 Tenn. 46 244
Hines v. MuUins, 25 Ga. 696 11
Hoag V. Durfey, 1 Aik. (Vt.) 286 51
Hobbs V. Germany, 94 Miss. 469 226
-Hodgkin v. Fry, 33 Ark. 716 41, 46
Hodgkins v. Rockport, 105 Mass. 475 193, 196, 213
Holbrook v. Faulkner, 55 N. H. 311 41
Holden v. Board, &c., 85 N. J. L. 370 66
V. Shrewsbury, &c., 38 Vt. 529 159
Holland v. Davies, 36 Ark. 446 40
HoUoway v. School District, &c., 62 Mich. 153 . . 122, 145, 151
Hoknan v. School District, &c., 34 Vt. 270 139
V. Trustees, &c., 77 Mich. 605 190, 191, 199
Holt V. Watson, 71 Ark. 90 ... 287
Honey Creek, &c., v. Barnes, 119 Ind. 213 126, 238
Hood V. Lynn, 1 Allen (Mass.) 103 46
Hoole V. Kinkead, 16 Nev. 217 124
Hooper v. Goodwin, 48 Me. 80 110
Hopley V. Benton, 39 Okl. 223 251
Home V. School District, &c., 75 N. H. 411 149
Homung v. State, 116 Ind. 458 89
Horton v. Mobile, &c., 43 Ala. 598 260
V. Ocheyedan, 49 Iowa 231 52
Hotchkiss V. Plunkett, 60 Conn. 230 51
Houghton V. Davenport, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 435 48
House V. Trustees, &c., 83 111. 368 135
Houston V. RusseU, 52 Vt. 110 275
Hovey v. State, 119 Ind. 395 234
Howard v. Forester, 109 Ky. 336 33
V. Trustees, &e., 31 Ky. L. Rep. 399 274
V. Worcester, 153 Mass. 426 56, 57
Howell «. State, 71 Ga. 224 82
Hudspeth v. Wallis, 54 Ark. 134 29
xxxi
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.J
Hufford V. Conover, 139 Ind. 151 91
Hughes V. Board, &c., 13 Ohio 336 62
V. GoodeU, 3 Pittsb. R. 264 76
V. School Directors, 8 Luz. Leg. Reg. (Pa.) 284 .... 123
Hunt V. Hapley, 120 Iowa 695 248
V. School District, &c., 14 Vt. 300 40
Hurd V. Walters, 48 Ind. 148 75
Hurlburt v. Boxford, 171 Mass. 501 54
Huse V. Lowell, 10 Allen (Mass.) 149 117
Hutchins v. Durham, 137 N. C. 68 197
V. School District, &c., 128 Mich. 177 146
Hutchinson v. Skinner, 21 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 729 ... . 155
Hutton V. State, 23 Tex. App. 386 173, 184
Hysong v. Gallitzin, &c., 164 Pa. St. 629 39, 155
I
Independent, &c., v. McClure, 136 Iowa 122 63
Inghs V. State, 61 Ind. 212 133
Interstate, &c., v. Philadelphia, 164 Pa. St. 477 124
Irvin V. Gregory, 86 Ga. 605 44, 182
Ivison V. School Com'rs, 39 Fed. 735 233
J
Jackson v. Independent, &c., 110 Iowa 313 163
V. Mason, 145 Mich. 338 17
V. Shera, 8 Ind. App. 330 122, 144
Jackson, &;c., v. Hadley, 59 Ind. 534 238
Jackson School v. Grimes, 24 Ind. App. 331 151
Jackman v. Sahsbury, 5 Gray (Mass.) 413 270
Jacobson v. Board, &c., 64 Atl. (N. J.) 609 125
Jacques v. Litle, 61 Kan. 300 105, 112
Jameson v. Board, &c., 74 W. Va. 389 105
Jarvis v. Robertson, 126 Ind. 281 53
V. Shelby, &c., 62 Ind. 257 24
Jay V. School District, &c., 24 Mont. 219 149
Jeffries v. Board, &c., 135 Ky. 488 101
Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94 2, 6, 8
V. Doughty, &c., 39 Me. 220 65
Jewell V. Abington, 2 Allen (Mass.) 592 137
Jewett V. Matteson, 148 Ky. 820 104
xxxii
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
Johnson v. Board, &c., 166 N. C. 468 208
V. Connelly, 88 Kan. 861 143
«. De Hart, 72 Ky. 640 89
V. Dole, 3 N. H. 328 272
w. Dole, 4 N. H. 478 22
V. Dye, 142 Mo. App. 424 120
V. Ginn, 105 Ky. 654 233, 241
V. Sanders, 131 Ky. 537 100
V. School, &c., 117 Iowa 319 128
Johnson, Ac, v. Citizens Bank, 81 Ind. 515 78
Johnson Pub. Co. v. Blease, 91 S. C. 55 237
V. Com., 30 Ky. L. Rep. 148 241
Joint School District, &c., v. School District, &c., 92 Wis. 608 34
V. Wolfe, 12 Wis. 685 86
JoUet V. Werner, 166 111. 34 201
Jones V. Board, &c., 88 Mich. 371 231, 235
V. Cody, 132 Mich. 13 225, 226
V. Fitchburg, 211 Mass. 66 192
V. Hungerford, 4 Gill & J. (Md.) 402 81
V. Nebraska City, 1 Neb. 176 165
V. School District, &c., 8 Kan. 362 146
V. School District, &c., 110 Mich. 363 128
V. Surprise, 64 N. H. 243 117
Jordan v. School District, &c., 38 Me. 164 ... . 40, 41, 126
Joyner v. School District, &c., 3 Cush. (Mass.) 567 ... . 274
Judd V. Thompson, 125 Mass. 553 271
K
Kaine t). Com., 101 Pa. St. 490 , . 205
Kane v. School District, &c., 52 Wis. 502 128, 250
Kane & Co. v. School District, &c., 5 Kan. App. 260 . . . 101
Katz V. Board, &c., 162 N. Y. App. Div. 132 57
Keatmg v. Neary, 9 Kulp (Pa.) 421 161
Keeler v. Frost, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 400 100
V. Hewitt, 109 CaL 146 143, 201
KeUison v. School District, &c., 20 Mont. 153 ... 161, 162
Kellogg V. School District, &c., 13 Okla. 285 249
Kennedy v. Board, &c., 82 Cal. 483 160
Kenyon v. Clark, 2 R. I. 67 54
Keokuk, &c., v. People, 161IU. 132 269
Kerr v. Wooley, 3 Utah 456 273
xxxiii
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
Kester ».. School District, &c., 48 Wash. 486 ...... 142
Keweenaw Association v. School District, &c., 98 Mich. 437 . 54
Keyser v. District, &c., 35 N. H. 477 59, 60
Kidder v. Chellis, 59 N. H. 473 142
Kiefer v. Troy,. &c., 102 Ind. 279 256
Kimball v. School District, 23 Wash. 520 140
V. School District, &c., 28 Vt. 8 60
King V. Corporation of Bedford Level, 6 East. 356 .... 107
V. Jefferson, &c., 71 Mo. 628 227
». State, 74 Tex. Cr. App. 658 81
Kingsbury v. Centre School District, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 90 . 100
Kingsley v. Plum, &c., 2 Pa. St. 28 52
Kmnare v. Chicago, 171 111. 332 56
Kinney v. Howard, 133 Iowa 94 89, 121
Kinsey v. State, 98 Ind. 351 11
Kinzer v. Directors, &c., 129 Iowa 441 184, 223
Kirchner t). Board, &c., 141 Iowa 43 262
Kirkpatrick v. Independent, &c., 53 Iowa 585 164
Kline v. School Dkectors, 2 Lane. L. Rev. (Pa.) 321 ... 105
KUne, &c.. In re, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 546 105
Knabe v. Board, &c., 67 Mich. 262 77, 96
Knowles v. Board, &c., 33 Kan. 692 24
V. School District, &c., 63 Me. 261 38
Knowlton v. Logansport, 75 Ind. 103 253
Knox V. Board, &c., 45 Kan. 152 205
Kuenster v. Board, &c., 134 HI. 165 138
Kuhn w. Board, &c., 4 W. Va. 499 27
V. Thompson, 168 Mich. 511 30
L
Labatt v. New Orleans, 38 La. An. 289 250
Lagow V. Hill, 143 lU. App. 523 99
Lake Farm v. Kalamazoo, 179 Mich. 171 181
Lake View, &c., v. People, 87 III. 303 214
Lamaster v. Wilkerson, 143 Ky. 226 100
Lander v. School District, 33 Me. 239 41, 246
V. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 167, 170, 174
Landis w, School District, 57 N. J, L. 509 259
Lane v. Weymouth, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 462 54
V. Woodbury, &c., 58 Iowa 462 57
Lawrence v. Trauer, 136 lU. 474 115
xxxiv
TABLE OF CASES
[ [References are to pages.]
Learock v. Putnam, 111 Mass. 499 178, 193
Le Couteulx v. Buffalo, 33 N. Y. 333 9, 37, 84
Leddy v. Board, &c., 160 111. App. 187 166
Lee V. Huff, 61 Ark. 494 141
V. Mitchell, 108 Ark. 1 115
V. Parry, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 125 100
V. York, &c., 163 Ind. 339 146
Leeper v. State, 103 Term. 500 231, 233
Lefevre v. Besterling, 137 S. W. (Tex.) 1159 113
Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546 206
Leighton v. Ossipee, &c., 66 N. H. 548 39
Leland v. School District, &c., 77 Minn. 469 146
Lessard v. Revere, 171 Mass. 294 67
Lewis V. Bateman, 26 Utah 434 77
Libby v. Douglass, 175 Mass. 128 147, 151
Linskie v. Kerr, 34 S. W. (Tex.) 765 11
Little V. Little, 131 Mass. 367 260, 267, 268
V. Merrill, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 543 47
Littlewort v. Davis, 50 Miss. 403 22, 255
Lockhart v. Troy, 48 Ala. 579 109
Locker ». Keiler, 110 Iowa 707 37
London School Board v. Jackson, 7 Q. B. D. 502 .... 13
Louisiana, &c., v. State Board, 120 La. 471 270
Lower AUen, &c., v. Shiremanstown, &c., 91 Pa. St. 182 . . 252
Luchini v. PoUce Jury, 126 La. 972 97
Lyndall v. High School Committee, 19 Pa. Super. Ct. 232 . 166
Lyon V. Adamson, 7 Iowa 509 118
235
M
McCarton v. City of New York, 149 N. Y. App. Div. 516
McCaskill v. Bower, 126 Ga. 341 ... .
McCloskey v. School District, &c., 134 Mich.
McClure v. Tipton, 79 Mo. App. 80 . . .
McCoUum V. Adams, 110 S. W. (Tex.) 526
McCormac v. Robeson Coimty, 90 N. C. 441
McCormick v. Burt, 95 111. 263
McCoy V. Curtice, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 17 . .
McCraw v. Williams, 33 Gratt. 510 .. .
McCrea v. Pine Township, &c., 145 Pa. St. 550
McCully V. Board, &c., 63 N. J. L. 18 ,
McCutchen v. Windsor, 55 Mo. 149 . ,
58
181
139
56
88
32
103, 190, 216
. 100, 107
. . . Ill
... 162
... 35
163, 164, 165
XXXV
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
McFarland v. Goins, 96 Miss. 67 203
McGiUivray v. Joint School District, &c., 112 Wis. 354 38, 120, 128
McGinn v. WiUey, 6 Cal. App. Ill 146
McGinnis v. Board, &c., 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1289 95
McGlone v. Zornes, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 965 106
McGrail v. Kalamazoo. 94 Mich. 52 72
McKay v. Barnett, 21 Utah 239 147
McKerma v. Kimball, 145 Mass. 555 57, 73
McKinney v. Board, &c., 144 Ky. 85 258
McLean v. White, 216 Mass. 62 121
McLellan v. St. Louis PubUc Schools, 15 Mo. App. 362 . . 159
McLoud V. Selby, 10 Conn. 390 54
McMiUan v. School Committee, 107 N. C. 609 209
McNees v. McGiU, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 632 262
V. School, &c., 133 Iowa 120 237
McNeil V. Boston, 178 Mass. 326 56
McNish V. State, 74 Neb. 261 183
McPheeters v. Wright, 110 Ind. 519 256
McShane v. School District, 70 Mo. App. 624 146
McSween v. Board, &c., 129 S. W. (Tex.) 206 198
Mackenzie v. School, &c., 72 Ind. 189 118
Maher v. State, 32 Neb. 354 43
Malloy V. Board, &c., 102 Cal. 642 98
Malone's Estate, 7n re, 21 S. C. 435 9
Maloy V. Madget, 47 Ind. 241 244
Mann v. Best, 62 Mo. 491 255
V. State, 116 Ind. 383 256
Marchant v. Langworthy, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 646 44, 47
Marion v. Board, &c., 97 Cal. 606 145
Marion M. R. Co. v. Alexander, 63 Kan. 72 260
Markey v. School District, &c., 58 Neb. 479 .. . 101, 120, 128
Marshall v. Donovan, 10 Bush (Ky.) 681 3, 5
Marx, In re, 5 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 224 11
Mason v. School District, &c., 20 Vt. 487 47
Mathews v. Board, &c., 127 Mich. 530 196
Matteson v. Rosendale, 37 Wis. 254 275
Maxcy v. Oshkosh, 144 Wis. 238 25, 183
Maxon v. School, &c., 5 Wash. 142 22, 71
Maynard, Merrill & Co. v. Chowning, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1340 . 240
Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen (Mass.) 508 7
MerriU v. Emery, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 507 10
Merritt v. Farris, 22 111. 303 47, 62, 272
xxxvi
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages]
Mest V. School District, &c., 2 Woodw. (Pa.) 257 ... . 97
Metcalf V. State, 21 Tex. App. 174 214
V. Williams, 104 U. S. 93 118
Meyer v. School District, &c.,.4 S. D. 420 250
Miahle v. Fournet, 13 La. An. 607 112
Milford V. Powner, 126 Ind. 528 144
V. Zeigler, 1 Lid. App. 138 122, 149
MiUard v. Board, &c., 19 111. App. 48 38
Mills V. Collins, 67 Iowa 164 122
V. Meyers, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 971 242
V. School Directors, &c., 154 111. App. 119 209
Mingo V. Colored Common School, &c., 113 Ky. 475 . . . 144
Minnetonka, &c., v. Board, &c., 41 Okla. 541 67
Mitchell V. Brown, 18 N. H. 315 49
Mitchelltree, &c., v. Carnahan, 42 Ind. App. 473 .... 251
Montenegro-Riehm Music Co. v. Board, &c., 147 Ky. 720 . 96
Montgomery v. State, 35 Neb. 655 148
MonticeUo Bank v. CoflSn's Grove, &c., 51 Iowa 350 ... 79
Moore v. Independent, &c., 55 Iowa 654 97
V. Monroe, 64 Iowa 367 158
V. Newfield, 4 Me. 44 45
Morbeck v. State, 28 Ind. 86 134
Morehead v. Cartwright, 122 Mo. App. 257 208
Morganton, &c., v. Morganton, &c., 150 N. G. 680 .... 67
MorreU, &c., v. Com., 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1383 262
Morris «. School District, 63 Ark. 149 58
V. School District, 12 Me. 293 126
Morrison v. Lawrence, 181 Mass. 127 194
V. Lawrence, 186 Mass. 459 191
V. McFarland, 51 Ind. 206 164
Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 58 243
Morrow County v. Hendryx, 14 Oreg. 397 34
Morse v. Ashley, 193 Mass. 294 50, 103
Morton v. Lee, 28 Kan. 286 109
Morville v. Fowle, 144 Mass. 109 100
Moultonborough v. Tuttle, 26 N. H. 470 137
Mount Hermon Boys School v. Gill, 145 Mass. 139, 146 . . 10
Mount Pleasant, &c.. In re, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 588 ... . 28, 29
Mouser v. Spaulding, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1071 28
Mowbry v. Mowbry, 64 HI. 383 11, 13
Mulhem v. McDavitt, 16 Gray (Mass.) 404 11, 13
Mulligan v. School District, &c., 241 Pa. St. 204 23
xxxvii
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
MuUins V. Belcher, 142 Ky. 673 207
MunfordviUe, &c., v. Board, &o., 155 Ky. 382 208
Muskegon v. Wright, 176 Mich. 6 181
Muzzy V. Shattick, et al., 1 Denio (N. Y.) 233 133
Myer t). Crispell, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 54 43,264
Myers Pub. Co. v. White River, &c., 28 Ind. App. 91 . . . 229
N
National, &c., v. Board, &c., 159 U. S. 262 Ill
V. Independent, &c., 39 Iowa 490 249
V. Huntington, 81 Conn. 632 67
Nelson W. Homer, 48 La. An. 258 260
Nessle v. Hun, 1 Ohio N. P. 140 158
Neville v. School Directors, 36 111. 71 140
V. School Directors, 77 111. 628 140
Newark, &c.. In re, 70 Atl. (N. J.) 881 181
Newcomb v. Rockport, 183 Mass. 74 80
Newell V. School Directors, 68 111. 514 249
New Orleans v. Sahnen Brick, &c., Co., 135 La. 828 ... 277
New Providence v. McEachron, 35 N. J. L. 528 134
Nichols V. School Du'ectors, 93 111. 61 39, 76
Niles V. Orange Training School, 63 N. J. L. 528 201
N. 0. Nelson Co. v. Stephenson, — Tex. Civ. App. — . . 68, 69
Northrop v. Richmond, 105 Va. 335 212
North Troy, &c., v. Troy, 80 Vt. 16 30
Norton v. Lakeside, &c., 97 Ark. 71 29
V. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425 109
V. Tmmouth, &c., 37 Vt. 521 98
Nowell V. Wright, 3 Allen (Mass.) 166 73
Nye V. Marion, 7 Gray (Mass.) 244 30
O
Oakes v. School District, &c., 98 Mo. App. 163 150
O'Bannon v. Cole, 220 Mo. 697 20, 198
O'Connor v. Francis, 42 N. Y. App. Div. 375 140
O'Connor v. Hendrick, 184 N. Y. 421 155
Offut V. Bourgeois, 16 La. An. 163 146, 151
Ogden V. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379 96, 107
Ohio Township School Du-ectors, In re, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 392 . 60
Olive V. School District, &c., 86 Neb. 135 48
xxxviii
TABLE OP CASES
[Eeferenoes are to pages.]
Olney School District v. Christy, 81 111. App. 304 .... 160
Opinion of Justices, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 580 180
Opinion of Justices, 68 Me. 582 244
Orrick, &c., V. Dorton, 125 Mo. 439 54
Osbom V. Allen, 26 N. J. L. 388 13
V. Russell, 64 Kan. 507 195
Ottawa, &c., V. Tinnon, 26 Kan. 1 205
Owen V. Hay, 107 Ind., 351 137
«. mil, 67 Mich. 43 69
Owens V. O'Brien, 78 Va. 116 104
P
Pace V. Jefferson, &c., 20 111. 644 278
Pacific M'f'g Co. V. School District, &c., 6 Wash. 121 .. . 71
Padelford v. Eagle Grove, 117 Iowa 616 72
Page V. Hardin, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 648 105
V. Township, &c., 59 Mo. 264 122
Park V. Independent, &c., 65 Iowa 209 87, 164
Parker v. Boston, 175 Mass. 501 71
V. School District, 5 Lea (Tenn.) 525 154, 159
V. Titcomb, 82 Me. 180 32
Parks V. West, 108 S. W. (Tex.) 466 261
Parman v. School Inspectors, 49 Mich. 63 44
Parody v. School District, 15 Iowa 514 ' 63
Pasadena School District v. City of Pasadena, 166 Cal. 7 . . 23
Pass, &c., V. Hollywood, &c., 156 Cal. 416 32
Passage v. Board, &e., 19 Mich. 330 47
Patrick v. Hetcher, 149 Ky. 193 106
Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509 136, 167
Pearce v. Olney, 5. R. I. 269 11
Pearsall v. Woods, 50 S. W (Tex.) 959 143
Peay v. Talbot, 39 Tex. 335 265
Peck V. Claflin, 105 Mass. 420 10
V. Smith, 41 Conn. 442 185
Peers v. Board, &c., 72 111. 508 96
Pennsylvania. &c., v. Board, &c., 20 W. Va. 360 . . . 100, 122
t). AUen, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 487 46
?;. Allen, 155 lU. 402 29
«. Beach, 77 ni. 52 109
People V. Board, &c., 49 Cal. 684 231
V. Board, &c., 127 111. 613 205
xxxix
TABLE OP CASES
[References are to pages.]
People V. Board, &c., 175 IE. 9 231
V. Board, &c., 177 lU. 572 195, 197
V. Board, &c., 234 lU. 422 199
V. Board, &c., 245 lU. 334 158
V. Board, &c., 255 111. 568 22
V. Board, &c., 18 Mich. 400 202, 205, 209
V. Board, &c., 212 N. Y. 463 166
V. Board, &c., 160 N. Y. App. Div. 557 166
V. Board, &c., 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 400 6, 9
V. Board, &c., 48 Hun (N. Y.) 618 41
V. Board, &c., 69 Hun (N. Y.) 212 161
V. Board, &c., 82 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 684 166
V. Caruttiers, &c., 102 Cal. 184 257
V. Castro, 39 Cal. 65 261
V. City of Quincy, 101 111. 308 204
V. Collins, 34 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 336 87
V. Copeland, &c., 55 Cal. 331 230
V. Crissey, 45 Hun (N. Y.) 19 8
V. Crossley, 261 lU. 78 94
V. Dorsheimer, 55 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 118 124
V. Draper, 63 Hun (N. Y.) 389 86, 104
V. Dupuyt, 71 lU. 651 22
V. Easton, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 159 202
V. Eckler, 19 Hun (N. Y.) 609 87
V. Ekerold, 211 N. Y. 386 20, 198
V. Frost, 32 lU. App. 242 115
V. GaUagher, 93 N. Y. 438 202, 206
w. Hendrickson, 125N. Y.App. Div. 256 . . . 17,19,181
V. Hooper, 13 Hun (N. Y.) 639 33
V. Hyde, 89 N. Y. 11 161
V. IngUs, 161 lU. 256 86
V. Keechler, 194 lU. 235 33
V. King's, &c., 42 Hun (N. Y.) 456 124
V. Mayer, &c., 4 N. Y. 419 265
V. Mays, 17 111. App. 361 91
V. Medical Soc, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 570 213
V. N. Y. Law School, 68 Hun (N. Y.) 118 201
V. Oakland, &c., 55 Cal. 331 230
V. Olmstead, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 9 242
V. Peoria, &c., 216 111. 221 120
, V. Peters, 4 Neb. 254 121, 122
V. Quincy, &c., 101 111. 308 233
xl
TABLE OP CASES
[References are to pages.]
People V. Roche, 124 111. 9 84
V. School Board, 161 N. Y. 598 203
V. Sisson, 98 111. 335 257, 263
V. Skinner, 74 N. Y. App. Div. 58 86
V. Skinner, 159 N. Y. 162 87
V. Smith, 149 HI. 549 100
V. Stone, 78 Mich. 635 89
V. Strawn, 265 lU. 292 29, 31
V. Toledo, &c., 229 111. 327 274
V. Toledo, &c., 231 111. 414 262
V. Van Siclen, 43 Hun (N. Y.) 537 98
w. Welsh, 225 lU. 364 98
V. Wheaton College, 40 111. 186 222
V. Wright, 34 Mich. 371 275
Perkins v. Newark, &c., 161 Fed. 767 131
V. School District, &c., 61 Mo. App. 512 152
V. Wolf, 17 Iowa 228 142
Perot V. Philadelphia, 11 Phila. 181 97
Perrizo v. Kesler, 93 Mich. 280 33, 35
Perry v. Dover, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 206 30, 40, 48
Perryman v. Bethune, 89 Mo. 158 44
Peters v. Warren Township, 98 Mich. 54 36, 41, 47
Petersilea v. Stone, 119 Mass. 465 .... 107, 108, 109, 110
Pickering v. De Rochemont, 66 N. H. 377 40
Pierce v. Carpenter, 10 Vt. 480 30
V. Union, &c., 46 N. J. L. 76 205
Pittsburg V. Sterrett, &c., 204 Pa. St. 635 277
Place V. District, &c., 56 Iowa 573 143
Plumbing Supply Co. v. Board, &c., 32 S. D. 270 .... 69
Plummer & Davis v. School District, &c., 92 Ark. 236 . . . 67
Plymouth v. Painter, 17 Conn. 585 110
Pollard V. School District, &c., 65 111. App. 104 139
Polzin V. Rand, McNaUy & Co., 250 lU. 561 238
Pond V. Negus, 3 Mass. 230 49, 269, 272
Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151 14
Potts V. Breen, 167 111. 67 197
Powell V. Board, &c., 97 111. 375 6, 8, 233, 259
Powers V. Sanford, 39 Me. 183 274
Presley v. Davis, 7 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 105 11
Presque Isle County v. Thompson, 61 Fed. 914 55
Price V. Barrett, &c., 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 395 61, 103
Prideaux v. Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513 72
xli
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
Princeton v. Gebhart, 61 Ind. 187 24
Providence Banli v. Billings, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 514 266
Pruitt V. Armstrong, 56 Ala. 306 153
Public Instruction Com'rs v. Fell, 52 N. J. Eq. 689 ... . 24
Puget Sound, &c., v. School District, &c., 12 Wash. 118 . . 70
Putnam v. Irvington, 69 Ind. 80 142
Q
Queeny v. Higgins, 136 Iowa 573 210
Quigley v. State, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 638 17, 19, 21
Quinn v. Nolan, 7 Ohio Dec. 585 167
R
Rand v. Wilder, 11 Gush. (Mass.) 294 276
Rand, McNaUy & Co. v. Com., 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1168 . . . 240
V. Hartranft, 32 Wash. 378 239
V. Royal, 36 Wash. 420 239
Randolph v. Sanders, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 331 147
Ratchff V. Paris, 6 Neb. 539 91
Rawson v. Spencer, 113 Mass. 40 35, 233
Raybould v. Hardy, 7 Utah 368 32
Ray County v. Bentley, 49 Mo. 236 256
R. Connor Co. v. Olson, 136 Wis. 13 69
Rebenack, In re, 62 Mo. App. 8 195
Redfield v. School District, &c., 48 Wash. 85 68
Reed v. Acton, 117 Mass. 384 41, 43
V. Northfield, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 94 72
Reeves v. Ryder, 91 Kan. 639 43
Reg. V. Hopley, 2 Fos. & F. 202 167
Regan v. School District, &c., 44 Wash. 523 43
Regents, &c., v. Detroit, &c., 12 Mich. 138 119
Reid V. Edina, &c., 73 Mo. 295 63
Reubelt v. Noblesville, 106 Ind. 478 148
Reynolds v. Board, &c., 66 Kan. 672 203
V. Little Falls, &c., 33 N. Y. App. Div. 88 227
V. Moore, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 35 54
Reynolds, &c., v. McCabe, 72 Tex. 57 27
Rhobidas v. Concord, 70 N. H. 90 211
Rice V. Board, ifec, 90 Atl. (R. I.) 419 83
V. McClelland, 58 Mo. 116 27, 55
xlii
TABLE OF CASES
[Keferences are to pages.]
Richards v. Raymond, 92 111. 612 233
V. School, &c., 132 Iowa 612 101, 131
Richardson v. McReynolds, 114 Mo. 641 . . 37, 49, 246, 257
V. School District, 38 Vt. 602 160, 162
V. Sheldon, 1 Finn. (Wis.) 624 51
Richter v. Cordes, 100 Mich. 378 9
Rideout v. School District, 1 Allen (Mass.) 232 ... . 41, 45
Riggs V. Horde, 25 Tex. Supp. 456 149
Ring V. Grout, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 341 Ill
Roach V. St. Louis, &c., 77 Mo. 484 6
V. St. Louis, &c., 7 Mo. App. 567 229
Robbins v. School District, 10 Minn. 340 246
Roberson v. OUver, 189 Ala. 82 7, 227, 228
Roberts v. Boston, 5 Gush. (Mass.) 198 206
V. Louisville, &c., 16 Ky. L. Rep. 181 61
Robie V. Sedgwick, 4 Abb. Dec. (N. Y.) 73 27
Robinson v. Dodge, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 351 264
V. Howard, 84 N. G. 151 233
V. School, &c., 96 111. App. 604 159
Rochford v. School District, &c., 19 S. D. 435 251
Rock Island, &c.. Go., v. EUiott, 59 Kan. 42 56
Rockland Gounty v. Grear, 57 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 472 . . . 131
Rodemer v. Mitchell, 90 Tenn. 65 32
Rodgers v. Independent School District, 100 Iowa 317 ... 39
Roeser v. Gartland, 75 Mich. 143 34, 94
Roland v. Reading, &c., 161 Pa. St. 102 97, 127
Rolfe V. Gooper, 20 Me. 154 140
Rose V. Bath, 10 Ind. 18 273
Roth V. MarshaU, 158 Pa. St. 272 39
Rowell V. School District, 59 Vt. 658 94, 126
Rowles V. Board, &c., 76 Kan. 361 203
Rowzee v. Pierce, 75 Miss. 846 63
Royce, Appeal of, 1 Walk. (Pa.) 215 95
Royse, &c., v. Reinhardt, 159 S. W. (Tex.) 1010 23
Rudy V. School District, &c., 30 Mo. App. 113 137
Rulison V. Post, 79 lU. 567 14, 199
Rumble v. Barker, 27 Ind. App. 69 160
Rumford District v. Wood, 13 Mass. 192 24
Ruohs V. Backer, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 395 10
Russell y. Dodds, 37 Vt. 497 , . . 74, 75
V. Lynnfield, 116 Mass. 365 115, 214
V. State, 13 Neb. 68 148
xliii
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
Rutledge v. McCue, 10 Kulp (Pa.) 57 96
Ryan v. Humphries, 150 Pac. (Okla.) 1106 .... 101, 148
V. School, &c., 27 Minn. 433 142
S
Samuel Benedict School v. Bradford, 111 Ga. 801 .... 218
Sanborn v. Neal, 4 Minn. 126 ... '. 107, 118
V. School District, &c., 12 Minn. 17 131
San Diego v. Daner, 97 Cal. 442 24
Sanford v. Prentice, 28 Wis. 358 49
Saranac, &c., v. Roberts, 208 N. Y. 288 266
Sayre v. Tompkins, 23 Mo. 443 27, 272
Schofield V. School District, 27 Conn. 499 75
V. Watkins, 22 111. 66 27, 100, 272
School, &c., V. Powner, 126 Ind. 528 94
V. Ziegler, 1 Ind. App. 138 112
School Board, &c., v. Board, &c., 146 Mich. 393 28
V. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1 243
School Commissioners v. Adams, 43 Md. 349 137
School Directors, &c., Appeal of, 121 Pa. St. 293 .... 105
School Directors v. Bkch, 93 111. App. 499 159
V. Breen, 60 lU. 201 197
V. Crews, 23 lU. App. 367 151
V. First National Bank, 3 111. App. 349 137
V. Fogleman, 76 lU. 189 125
V. Hart, 4 lU. App. 224 148
V. Hudson, 88 111. 563 144, 159
V. Jennings, 10 111. App. 643 148
V. McBride, 22 Pa. St. 215 116, 122
V. Miller, 54 111. 338 119, 247
V. People, 186 lU. 331 38, 99
V. People, 90 III. App. 670 39
V. Reddick, 77 lU. 628 140
V. School Du-ectors, 135 111. 464 34
V. Sprague, 78 111. App. 390 115
School District; &c., v. Aetna, &c., 62 Me. 330 85
V. Aldrich, 13 N. H. 139 30
V. AUen, 83 Ark. 491 115, 146
V. Arnold, 21 Wis. 657 38, 75, 81
V. BaUey, 12 Me. 254 37, 274
V. Bennett, 52 Ark. 511 104, 121
xliv
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
School District, &c., v. Brown, 2 Kan. App. 309 .... 64
V. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498 7
«. Carr, 55 N. H. 452 45
V. Carson, 9 Colo. App. 6 164
V. Carson, 10 Kan. 238 248
V. Castell, 105 Ark. 106 114
V. Coleman, 39 Neb. 391 34
«. Cowee, 9 Neb. 53 Ill
V. Cuming County, 81 Neb. 606 273
V. Currier, 45 N. H. 573 97
V. Dean, 17 Mich. 223 27
V. Edwards, 46 Wis. 150 244
V. Gage, 39 Mich. 484 153
V. Garrison, 90 Ark. 335 106, 110, 120
V. Gibbs, 52 Kan. 564 34
V. Goodwin, 81 Ark. 143 131
V. Graham, — Okla. — 67
V. Greenfield, 64 N. H. 84 35
V. Hale, 15 Colo. 367 160, 162, 163
V. Jackson, 110 Ark. 262 101, 145
V. Kimmel, 31 lU. App. 537 163
y. Lambert, 28 Oreg. 209 252
V. Lincoln County, 9 S. D. 291 33
V. Lombard, 2 DiU. (U. S. C. C.) 493 249
V. Lord, 44 Me. 374 45
V. Maury, 53 Ark. 471 159
V. Morse, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 191 148
V. OeUien, 209 Mo. 464 49
V. Perkins, 21 Kan. 536 79
». Pollard, 55 N. H. 503 180
V. School District, &c., 63 Ark. 543 29, 31, 33
V. School District, &c., 45 Kan. 543 54
t;. School District, &c., 55 Neb. 716 33,34
t;. Sheldon, 26 Okla. 229 120
«. Shucks, 49 Colo. 526 160
V. Smith, 67 Vt. 566 41
V. State, 29 Kan. 57 26
V. Stone, 14 Colo. App. 211 145, 160
V. Stough, 4 Neb. 357 59, 132, 249, 250
r. Sullivan, 48 Kan. 624 129
V. Swain, 29 Kan. 152 79
t). Swayze, 29 Kan. 211 79
xlv
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
School District, &c., w. Tapley, 1 Allen (Mass.) 49 ... 35
V. Thompson, 5 Minn. 280 246
V. Village, &c., 13 Idaho 471 245
V. Western Tube Co., 5 Wyo. 185 132, 249
y. WilUams, 38 Ark. 454 56
V. Wolf, 78 Kan. 805 36
V. Yerrington, 108 Mich. 414 182
V. Young, 152 Mo. App. 304 26
V. Young, 163 Mo. App. 526 25
V. Zediker, 4 Okla. 599 27, 32
School Trustees v. People, 87 111. 303 235
Schouweiler v. AUen, 17 N. D. 510 64
Schrimf v. Settegast, 36 Tex. 296 11
Schultes V. Eberly, 82 Ala. 242 23
Schwitzer v. Board, &c., 79 N. J. L. 342 124
Scott V. Joint School District, 51 Wis. 554 162
V. Pendley, 114 Ky. 606 114
V. School District, 46 Vt. 452 137, 140, 154, 163
V. School District, &c., 67 Vt. 150 46, 147
V. Strobach, 49 Ala. 477 113
Seabury v. Rowland, 15 R. I. 446 41
Seaman v. Baughman, 82 Iowa 216 263
Searsmont v. FarweU, 3 Me. 450 160
Seeger v. Mueller, 133 111. 86 96
Sewell V. Board, &c., 29 Ohio St. 89 216
Seymour v. School District, 63 Conn. 504 153
Shakespear v. Smith, 77 Cal. 638 117, 249
Sharp V. Smith, 32 lU. App. 336 118
Sharp's Adm'r v. CoUins, 74 Mo. 266 256
Shaw V. Lockett, 14 Colo. App. 413 266
Sheehan v. Sturges, 53 Conn. 481 214
Sheffield, &c., v. Andress, 56 Ind. 157 247
Shelby County CouncU v. State, 155 Ind. 216 238
Sheldon v. Central School District, 25 Conn. 224 59
Sherman v. Charlestown, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 160 . . . . 193, 226
Sherlock v. Winnetka, 68 111. 530 96, 257
Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt. 439 46
Shinn v. Ripley, &c., 39 W. Va. 497 257
Shipley v. Hacheney, 34 Oreg. 302 23
Shoudy V. School Directors, 32 111. 290 52
SUver V. Cummings, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 181 149
Simmons v. People, 119 111. 617 94
xlvi
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
Sin^eton o. Austin, 27 Tex. Giv. App. 88 151
Sioux Gity v. Pratt, 17 Iowa 16 93
Slattery v. School, &c., 43 Ind. App. 58 ^ . . 96
Smith, Appeal of , 4 R. I. 590 87
V. Board, &c., 182 HI. App. 342 195
V. Bohler, 72 Ga. 546 269, 273
V. Bourbon County, 127 U. S. 105 66
V. Cheshire, 13 Gray (Mass.) 318 249
V. Dillingham, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 25 49
V. Jefierson, &c., 10 Colo. 17 91, 92
V. Proctor, 130 N. Y. 319 257, 258
V. Reppard, 69 W. Va. 211 104
V. School District, &c., 40 Iowa 518 205
V. School District, &c., 89 Kan. 225 151
V. School District, 69 Mich. 589 140, 151
V. Simmons, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 503 273
Snavely v. School Directors, 1 Lane. L. Rev. (Pa.) 9 . . . 61
Sorenson v. Christiansen, 72 Wash. 16 62
South School District v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn. 227 . . 41, 42, 47, 51
Spalding Lumber Go. v. Brown, 171 111. 487 67
Sparta, &e., v. Mendell, 138 Ind. 188 163
Spear v. Gummings, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 224 137, 193
Spedden v. Board, &c., 74 W. Va. 181 178
Spencer v. Joint School District, &c., 15 Kan. 259 ... 39, 75
Spiller V. Wobum, 12 Allen (Mass.) 127 158, 196
Spring V. Wright, 63 lU. 90 97
Spring VaUey, &c., v. People, 157 lU. 543 269
Sproul f. Smith, 40 N. J. L. 314 52
Stackhouse v. Glark, 52 N. J. L. 291 49
Staffon V. Lyon, 110 Mich. 260 69
Stallard v. White, 82 Ind. 278 37
Stanhope v. School Directors, 42 111. App. 570 138
Stanton v. Board, &c., 70 N. J. L. 336 261
Staples V. Somerville, 176 Mass. 237 67
Starbird v. School District, 51 Me. 101 40, 45, 274
State ». Albertson, 54 N. J. L. 72 86
V. Alford, 68 N. C. 322 170
V. Bacon, 31 S. C. 120 37
V. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324 16, 19
V. Blain, 36 Ohio St. 429 152
«. Blegan, 26 S. D. 106 Ill
V. Blossom, 19 Nev. 312 112
xlvii
TABLE OF CASES
-> [References aie to pagea.]
State!)., Board, 122 Term. 161 102
V. Board, &c., 94 Md. 334 56
V. Board, &c., 18 Nev. 173 , . . . 231, 235
V. Board, &c., 7 Ohio Dec. 129 207
V. Board, &c., 1 Ohio N. P. 151 159
V. Board, &c., 76 Ohio St. 297 197
V. Board, &c., 35 Ohio St. 368 231, 235
V. Board, &c., 21 Utah 401 195
V. Board, &c., 63 Wis. 234 199, 217
V. Board, &c., 96 Wis. 95 183
V. Bremond, 38 Tex. 116 260, 272
V. Brown, 112 Minn. 370 -.195
V. Browning, 28 N. J. L. 556 33, 269
V. Burchfield, 80 Tenn. 30 150
V. Burge, 95 Wis. 390 196, 197
V. Burton, 45 Wis. 150 153, 172, 213
V. CarroU, 38 Conn. 449 107, 108, 109
V. Central Pac. R. Co., 21 Nev. 75 ... , 54
V. Clifton, 113 Wis. 107 33
V. Cole, 51 N. J. L. 277 263
V. Columbus Board, &c., 35 Ohio St. 368 233
J). Compton, 28 Neb. 485 33,45
V. Cones, 15 Neb. 444 41
V. Connort, 69 Wash. 361 16, 20, 198
V. Cooper, 35 Mo. App. 532 82
V. Cross, 38 Kan. 696 117
V. Crumbaugh, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 521 91
V. Cunningham, 82 Wis. 39 90
V. Custer, 11 Ind. 210 66, 86
V. Daniel, 52 S. C. 201 86
V. Deshler, 25 N. J. L. 177 33
V. Dierberger, 90 Mo. 369 109
J). DiUey, 95 Neb. 527 75
V. Directors, &c., 10 Ohio St. 448 180
V. District Board, &c., 76 Wis. 177 158, 159
V. District Board, &c., 135 Wis. 619 101, 184, 185, 199, 214, 225
V. Donahay, 30 N. J. L. 404 54
V. Dovey, 19 Nev. 396 9
V. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342 202, 203, 209
V. Duggan, 15 R. I. 403 202
V. Edwards, 151 Mo. 472 202
V. Fagan, 42 Conn. 32 94
xlviii
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
State V. Fairchild, 87 Kan. 781 235
V. Farrell, 83 Iowa 661 244
V. Fertig, 70 Iowa 272 79
V. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63 184, 199, 243
V. Forkner, 70 Ind. 241 244
V. Freed, 10 Ohio Cir. Ct. 294 96
V. Gager, 26 Conn. 607 6
V. Gang, 10 N. D. 331 33
V. Gordon, 231 Mo. 547 22
V. Graham, 60 Wis. 395 44
V. Gray, 93 Ind. 303 204
V. Grimes, 7 Wash. 270 22
V. Grimshaw, 1 S. W. (Mo.) 363 33
V. Grosvenor, 19 Neb. 494 139
V. Grubb, 85 Ind. 213 209
V. HaU, 74 N. H. 61 17, 19, 210
V. Harmon, 31 Ohio St. 250 234
V. Harper, 6 Ohio St. 607 133
V. Hatch, 82 Conn. 122 98
V. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St. 98 234
V. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462 231
V. Hehns, 136 Ind. 122 120
V. Henderson, 145 Mo. 329 30, 31
V. HiU, 152 Mo. 234 33
V. Independent, &c., 46 Iowa 425 31
V. Innes, 89 Kan. 168 235
V. Jackson, 168 Ind. 384 210
V. Jackson, 71 N. H. 552 16, 17, 19
V. Joint School District, 65 Wis. 631 182
V. Julian, 93 Ind. 292 253
V. Kessler, 136 Mo. App. 236 113
V. Kih-oy, 86 Ind. 118 89
V. La Grave, 23 Nev. 88 90
V. Lincohi Medical CoUege, 81 Neb. 533 201
V. Lockett, 54 Mo. App. 202 40, 46
V. Leonard, 3 Tenn. Ch. 177 100, 105
y. Lynch, 8 Ohio 347 104
V. McBride, 31 Nev. 57 113
V. McCaffery, 69 Vt. 85 17, 19, 21
V. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 202
V. McKee, 20 Oreg. 120 51
V. McLaughlin, 15 Kan. 228 53
xlix
TABLE OP CASES
[References arfe to pages.]
State V. MacDonald, 25 Wash. 122 17
V. Marion County Com'rs, 85 Ind. 489 244
V. Matson, 97 Neb. 746 90
V. Mayview, &c., 65 Mo. 587 31
V. Melcher, 87 Neb. 359 249
V. Mitchell, 50 Kan. 289 105
V. Mizner, 50 Iowa 145 168, 171, 173, 242
V. Moore, 74 Mo. 413 134
V. Moore, 45 Neb. 12 257
V. Mostad, 28 N. D. 244 211
V. Murray, 28 Wis. 96 113
V. Nevin, 19 Nev. 162 134
V. O'Brien, 2 Root (Conn.) 516 81
V. Ogan, 159 Ind. 119 24
V. Osborne, 24 Mo. App. 309 225
V. Palmer, 18 Neb. 644 34
V. Pendergrass, 19 N. C. (2 Dev. & B. L.) 365 . 167, 168, 172
V. Peterman, 32 Ind. App. 665 16, 20, 198
V. Powell, 67 Mo. 395 134
V. Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54 22
V. Rauscher, 69 Tenn. 96 82
V. Richter, 23 Minn. 81 82
V. Ryan, 41 Utah 327 26
V. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853 159
V. School District, &c., 42 Minn. 357 33
V. School District, &c., 54 Minn. 213 26, 27
V. School District, &c., 90 Mo. 395 34
V. School District, &c., 15 Mont. 133 257
V. School District, &c., 22 Neb. 48 100
V. School- District, &c., 42 Neb. 499 26
V. School District, 10 Neb. 544 257
V. School District, 13 Neb. 82 257
V. School District, 13 Neb. 466 257
V. School District, 16 Neb. 182 258
V. School District, 31 Neb. 552 242
V. Shorrock, 55 Wash. 208 196, 198
t). Smith, 49 Neb. 755 164
V. Springfield, &c., 74 Mo. 21 233
V. Staley, 90 Kan. 624 44
V. State Board, &c., 18 Nev. 173 230
w. Stewart, 90 Kan. 778 104
V. St. Louis, 90 Mo. 19 105
1
TABLE OP CASES
[References are to pages.]
State j;. Stockwell, 23 N. D. 70 90
V. StovaU, 103 N. C. 416 82
V. Superior Court, 69 Wash. 189 48
V. Thayer, 74 Wis. 48 87
V. Tiedemann, 69 Mo. 515 127
V. Treasurer, &c., 22 Ohio St. 144 100
V. Trumf, 50 Wis. 103 113
V. Tumey, 31 Ohio Cir. Ct. 222 20, 197, 198
V. University of Wisconsin, 54 Wis. 159 227
V. Vanderbilt, 116 Ind. 11 168
V. Vanosdal, 131 Ind. 388 89
V. Weber, 108 Ind. 31 213, 243
«. White, 82 Ind. 278 215
V. Whitford, 54 Wis. 150 86, 87
V. WUcox, 17 Neb. 219 244
V. WiUiams, 27 Vt. 755 Ill
V. Wnson, 65 Kan. 237 22
V. Wolfrom, 25 Wis. 468 263
V. Woolem, 39 Iowa 380 41
V. Wright, 17 Ohio St. 32 33
V. York, &c., 13 Neb. 57 124
V. Zimmerman, 86 Minn. 353 195
State Bank, &c., v. Keinberger, 140 Wis. 517 121
State Board of Health v. Board, &c., 13 Cal. App. 514 . . . 196
State Treasurer v. SomerviUe, &c., 28 N. J. L. 26 .... 79
Stephens v. School District, &c., 6 Oreg. 353 264
Steinson v. Board, &c., 165 N. Y. 431 162
Stevens v. Fassett, 27 Me. 266 167, 178
V. Newcomb, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 437 26
V. School District, &c., 30 Mich. 63 55
Stevenson v. District Township, 35 Iowa 462 .. . 37, 59, 130
V. Hanyen, 1 Lack. Leg. N. (Pa.) 99 158
V. School, &c., 87 lU. 255 142, 148
Stewart v. Johnson, 3 Harr. (Del.) 335 273
V. Southard, 17 Ohio St. 402 103
V. Thornton, 75 Va. 215 52
St. Joseph's Church v. Assessors, &c., 12 R. I. 19 .... 278
St. Louis, &c., V. People, 224 lU. 155 262, 274
V. St. Louis, 26 Mo. 468 277
V. Woods, 77 Mo. 197 69
St. Louis, &c., R. Co. V. People, 177 111. 78 268
Stockdale v. Wayland, &c., 47 Mich. 226 49, 52
u
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
Stockwell V. state, 101 Ind. 1 253
Stone V. Fritts, 169 Ind. 361 25, 143
V. School District, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 592 40, 45
Stoneham v. Richardson, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 62 36
Storer v. Hobbs, 52 Me. 154 , 60
Stoughton, Third School District in, v. Atherton, 12 Mete.
(Mass.) 105 23, 37, 40, 51
Stovall V. Johnson, 17 Ala. 14 14
Streator v. Chrisman, 182 lU. 215 . 71
Stroud V. Stevens Point, 37 Wis. 367 22, 24
Stroup V. Beer, 25 Pa. Co. Ct. 1 143
Stuart V. Board, &c., 161 Cal. 210 137
V. Kalamazoo, 30 Mich. 69 97, 233
Stuessy v. Louisville, 156 Ky. 523 48
Stull V. Reber, 215 Pa. St. 156 195
Sugar V. Monroe, 108 La. 677 77
SuUivan v. Boston, 126 Mass. 540 55, 56, 57
V. School District, &c., 39 Kan. 347 60, 129
Sutton, &c., V. Cole, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 232 245
V. MontpeUer, 28 Ind. App. 315 277
Swartwood v. Walbridge, 57 Hun (N. Y.) 33 . . . . 162, 164
Sweitzer v. Fisher, — Iowa — 201
T
Tanner v. Nelson, 25 Utah 226 237
V. Skinner, 11 Bush (Ky.) 120 15
V. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578 93
Tape V. Hurley, 66 Cal. 473 216
Taylor v. Matthews, 10 Ga. App. 852 135
V. Petersburgh, 33 Ind. App. 675 146
V. School District, &c., 60 Mo. App. 372 126, 154
V. Wayne, &c., 25 Iowa 447 128
Teeple v. State, 171 Ind. 268 30, 53
TempUn v. District, &c., 36 Iowa 411 135
Thu'd Ward School District v. City Board, &c., 23 La. An. 152 235
Thomas v. Gibson, 11 Vt. 607 27, 55
Tifft V. Buffalo, 82 N. Y. 204 84
Tingley v. Vaughan, 17 111. App. 347 159
Tippecanoe County v. State, 92 Ind. 353 244
Toledo V. Board of Education, 48 Ohio St. 83 277
Tompkins v. Tompkins' Ex'rs, 18 N. J. Eq. 303 11
lii
TABLE OP CASES
[Beferences are to pages.]
Thompson v. Beaver, 63 111. 353 213
». Board, 30 III. 99 134
V. Board, &c., 57 N. J. L. 628 viii, 86, 87
V. Dorsey, 4 Md. Ch. 149 11
». Gibbs, 97 Tenn. 489 160
Toole Bld'g Ass'n v. Toole, &c., 42 Utah 596 65
Thomburgh v. School District, &c., 175 Mo. 12 . . . 120, 258
Torrey v. Millbury, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 64 46
Towle V. Brown, 110 Ind. 599 34, 252
Town of Centreville v. Miller, 51 Iowa 712 82
Townsend v. Trustees, &c., 41 N. J. L. 312 .... 106, 148
Trafton v. Alfred, 15 Me. 258 274
Trainer v. Wolfe, 140 Pa. St. 279 128
Trammel v. Bradley, 37 Ark. 374 82
Tripp V. School, &c., 50 Wis. 657 159
True V. Melvin, 43 N. H. 503 60, 62
Trumbo v. People, 75 111. 561 26
TrumbuU v. White, 5 HUl (N. Y.) 46 264
Trustees, &c., v. Braner, 71 HI. 546 84
V. Brooks, 163 Ky. 200 28, 101
V. Garvey, 80 Ky. 159 261, 262
V. Jamison, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 719 73
V. Kuhn, 261 IE. 190 63
». Lewis, 35 N. J. L. 377 49
V. Ormsby County Com'rs, 1 Nev. 334 244
V. Osborne, 9 Ind. 458 76
V. People, 87 111. 303 199
V. Rautenberg, 88 111. 219 247
V. Trenton, 30 N. J. Eq. 667 268, 277
Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 113 Ill
V. McKay, 131 Mo. App. 728 49, 64
V. Wentworth, 35 Me. 393 28
Tufts V. State, 119 Ind. 232 116
Turner v. Baker, 30 Ark. 186 149
Tumey v. Bridgeport, 55 Conn. 412 65, 129, 132
Tyler v. Tualatin Academy, 14 Oreg. 485 151
U
Underwood v. Wood, 93 Ky. 177 254
Union, &c.. In re, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 547 107
V. First Nat'l Bank, 102 Ind. 464 97
Uii
TABLE OF CASES
[Keferences are to pages.]
Union, &e., v. Sterricker, 86 lU. 595 138, 139
Union County v. Robinson, 27 Ark. 116- 202
Union School District, &c., v. Crawfordsville, &c., 102 Ind. 473 96
Upton V. Ck)unty of Clinton, 52 Iowa 311 ....... 96
U. S. II. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730 202, 207
V. Dashiel, 4 WaU. (U. S.) 182 134
V. Prescott, 3 How. (U. S.) 587 133
Utica V. MiUer, 62 Ind. 230 53
V
Van Dolsen v. Board, &c., 162 N. Y. 446 38
Van Dyke v. School District, &c., 43 Wash. 235 164
Vanvactor v. State, 113 Ind. 276 169, 170
Vaughan v. School District, &c., 27 Oreg. 57 37, 51
Venable v. School, &c., 149 N. C. 120 102
Viemeister v. White, 179 N. Y. 235 195
W
Wabash R. Co. v. People, 187 111. 289 262
Wadsworth v. School District, &c., 7 Wash. 485 ... . 70, 71
Wagner v. Royal, 36 Wash. 427 239
Wait V. Ray, 67^N. Y. 36 144
Waldron v. Lee, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 323 269, 270
Walker, 7n re ,179 Pa. St. 24 38
Walker v. Miner, 32 Vt. 769 94
Wall V. Oyster, 36 D. C. App. 50 207
Wallace v. School District, 50 Neb. 171 160, 161
V. Young, 44 Ky. 155 81
WaUis w. Smith, 29 Ark. 354 277
Walters, In re, 84 Hun (N. Y.) 457 195
Wapello County v. Bingham, 10 Iowa 39 ....... 109
Ward V. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 178, 192, 202, 206, 209
V. School District, 10 Neb. 293 134
Warren v. Stetson, 30 Me. 231 83
Warren County v. Patterson, 56 lU. Ill 83
Washington, &c., In re, 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 509 103
Washington, &c., v. School, &c., 77 Md. 283 Ill
Waterbury v. Harvey, 56 Vt. 556 148
Water Supply Co. v. Albuquerque City, 9 N. M. 441 . . . 24
Waters v. Daines, 4 Vt. 601 272
Uv
TABLE OF CASES
[Befeiencea are to pages.]
Watkins v. Huff, 94 Tex. 631 87
Watson V. Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561 191, 196
Wayland t). Hughes, 43 Wash. 441 184,221,222
Weatherly v. Chattanooga, 48 S. W. (Tenn.) 136 .... 114
Webb V. Jackson, 141 Ga. 55 253
Weeks v. Batchelder, 41 Vt. 317 30, 41
Weir Furnace Co. v. Seymour, 99 Iowa 115 121
Weitz V. Independent, &c., 78 Iowa 37 65, 123
Welch V. Brown, 30 Vt. 586 138
Wells V. Board, &c., 78 Mich. 260 69, 70
V. People, 71 lU. 532 141
V. School District, &c., 41 Vt. 354 138
West V. Wright, 98 Ind. 335 256
West, &c., f. Merrills, 12 Conn. 437 263
Western, &c., v. Board, &c., 39 Okla. 716 67
Western Pub. House v. District, &c., 84 Iowa 101 ... . 128
«. Murdick, 4 S. D. 207 119
Westland Pub. Co. v. Royal, 36 Wash. 399 229
Wharton v. School Directors, 42 Pa. 358 22
Wheeler v. Alton, &c., 66 N. H. 540 97
Whipple V. Dow, 2 Mass. 415 11
White V. Archibald, 8 Atl. (Pa.) 443 112
f. KeUogg, 119 Ind. 320 165,
V. Wohlenberg, 113 Iowa 236 160
Whitehead v. Pittman, 165 N. C. 89 93, 100
Whitmire v. State, 47 S. W. (Tex.) 293 33
Whitmore v. Hogan, 22 Me. 564 35, 85
Whitney v. Lowell, 151 Mass. 212 71
V. Stowe, 111 Mass. 368 41
Whittaker v. Salem, 216 Mass. 483 255
Wiest V. School District, &c., 68 Oreg. 474 99
Wilcox Lumber Co. v. School District, 106 Minn. 208 .. . 69
Wilkins, &c.. In re, 70 Pa. St. 108 30
WiUard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 202 43, 278
Willard's App., 4 R. I. 601 105
Williams v. Board, &c., 81 Kan. 593 101
V. Board, &c., 79 Kan. 202 206
V. Board, &c., 45 W. Va. 199 203
V. Bradford, 158 N. C. 36 203
V. Directors, &c., Wright (Ohio) 579 207
V. Larkin, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 114 263
r. MacDougaU, 39 Cal. 80 10
Iv
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to pages.]
Williams v. Markland, 15 Ind. App. 669 69
V. School District, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 75 51
WiUis V. Owen, 43 Tex. 41 273
Wilson y. Board, &c., 233 lU. 464 101,222,223
V. Board, &c., 12 S. D. 535 37
V. Brown, 145 S. W. (Tex.) 639 26
V. E. Bridgeport, &c., 36 Conn. 280 148
V. Hite, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1199 254
V. School District, &c., 40 Minn. 13 34
V. Waltersville, &c., 44 Conn. 157 47
V. Waltersville, &c., 46 Conn. 400 121
V. Wichita Co., 67 Tex. 647 134
Wing V. Click, 56 Iowa 473 119
Winona v. School District, &c., 40 Minn. 13 34
Withiagton v. Eveleth, 7 Kck. (Mass.) 106 30
Witter V. Mission, &c., 121 Cal. 350 277
Wixon V. Newport, 13 R. I. 454 56, 67
Wolfe V. Bronson, 115 Mo. 271 236
Wood V. Calaveras County, 164 Cal. 398 25, 30
V. Cutter, 138 Mass. 149 116
V. Farmer, 69 Iowa 533 87
V. Independent, &c., 44 Iowa 27 57
V. Medfield, 123 Mass. 545 96, 161, 162
V. School District, &c., 28 R. I. 299 276
Woodbury v. Knox, 74 Me. 462 144, 152
Woodcock V. Bolster, 35 Vt. 632 274
Woodside v. Wagg, 71 Me. 207 109
Wooster v. Sunderland, 27 Cal. App. 51 192
Worthington v. Oak, &c., 100 Iowa 39 163
Wright V. Kinney, 123 N. C. 618 249
V. North School District, 53 Conn. 576 41, 47
V. Rosenbloom, 52 N. Y. App. Div. 579 96
Wulff V. Wakefield, 221 Mass. 427 192
Wysinger v. Cruikshank, 82 Cal. 588 ....... . 205, 216
Y
Yale V. School District, 59 Conn. 489 17, 180, 280
Yeager v. Gibson County, 95 Ind. 427 .. , 92
Yorty V. Fame, 62 Wis. 154 109
Yost V. Games, 78 Tenn. 576 252
Youmans v. Board, &c., 13 Ohio Cir. Ct. 207 139
Ivi
TABLE OF CASES
(Beferences are to pages.]
Young V. Board, &c., 54 Minn. 385 128
V. King, 3 R. I. 196 279
Younger v. Judah, 111 Mo. 303 202
Younts V. Union County, 151 N. C. 582 48
Z
Zucht V. San Antonio, &c., 170 S. W. (Tex.) 840 199
Ivii
THE LAW OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM
OF THE UNITED STATES
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
§ 1. Duty of Educating.
The moral duty of parents to educate their children
as well as possible has been strongly and persuasively
inculcated by writers on natural law ; ' and Solon was
so deeply impressed with the force of the obhgation,
that he even excused the children of Athens from main-
taining their parents, if they had neglected to train
their children up to some art or profession.^
The education of children in a manner suitable to
their station and calUng is a branch of parental duty, of
imperfect obligation generally in the eye of the muni-
cipal law, but of very great importance to the welfare of
the state. Without some preparation made in youth
for the sequel of life, children of all conditions would
probably become idle and vicious when they grow up,
'Puffendorf, b. 4, Ch. 11, sec. 5; Paley's Moral Philosophy,
224, 225; 2 Kent's Com., 195, 196.
2 Plutarch's Life of Solon.
1
§ 1] GENERAL PRINCIPLES [Ch. I
either for want of good instruction and habits, and the
means of subsistence, or from want of rational and use-
ful occupation. A parent who sends his child into the
world uneducated, and without skill in any art or
science, does a great injury to mankind, as well as to
his own family; for he defrauds the community of a
useful citizen, and bequeaths to it a nuisance.
The duty of educating children was a fundamental
one with the early settlers of New England, and Massa-
chusetts was the first of the colonies to estabUsh legal
provisions for the fulfilment of this obligation, the orig-
inal act having been passed in 1647.^ In the develop-
* See Shurtleff's Records of Massachusetts Bay, V. II., 203;
Winthrop's History of New England, V. II., 215; Jenkins v. An-
dover, 103 Mass. 94.
In Massachusetts by the statute of 1789, Chapter 19, a grammar
school was required to be maintained by every town having two
hundred families or householders, for the use and benefit of all the
inhabitants of the town. And so zealously was the right to educa-
tion guarded that at the Circuit Court of Common Pleas, April
term, 1817, the following indictment was returned by the grand
jury:
"The jurors, &c., on their oath present, that the town of Dedham
in said county of Norfolk, at said Dedham, on the 26th day of April,
1816, and from that time, to the 26th day of April, 1817, did contain,
and still doth contain two hundred f amUies and upwards ; and that
said town of Dedham, at said Dedham, did, during aU the time from
said 26th of April, 1816, to said 26th of April, 1817, neglect, and stiU
does neglect the procuring and supporting of a grammar school-
master, of good morals, well instructed in the Latin, Greek, and
English languages, to instruct children and youth in said languages ;
which is in subversion of that diffusion of knowledge, and in hindrance
of that promotion of education, which the principles of a free govern-
ment require, and which the constitution of the commonwealth
enjoins ; against the peace and dignity of said commonwealth, and
the form of the statute in such case made and provided." Com. v.
Dedham, 16 Mass. 141.
2
Ch. I] CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS [§ 3
ment of this plan of public education we find at the
time of the Revolution, two Grammar Schools and
three Writing Schools in the City of Boston ; ^ and
thus was formed the nucleus of the pubUc school system
in the United States. In England there was no ade-
quate provision for pubUc elementary education until
the Elementary Education Act of 1870, which made
provision for such a system in England and Wales.
§ 2. Power to Establish Public Schools,
The power of the several States to establish and
maintain systems of common schools, to raise money
for that purpose by taxation, and to govern, control,
and regulate such schools when estabUshed, is a power
not delegated to the Federal government, nor prohibited
by its constitution to the several States, therefore such
power is reserved to the States respectively or to the
people.* Consequently the public school system of a
State usually originates imder the constitution of that
particular State.*
§ 3. Constitutional Provisions.
Many of the States have provided for the main-
tenance of pubUc schools, in constitutional provisions.*
1 Snow's History of Boston, 350 ; Amer. Jour, of Educ, 1826, 210.
The earliest trace of our system of free schools is to be found on the
Boston records under the date of April 13, 1635, where it is stated to
have been "agreed upon that our brother, Philemon Purmont, shall
be intreated to become schoolmaster, for the teaching and nurturing
of children with us." Snow's History of Boston, supra cit.
2 Marshall v. Donovan, 10 Bush (Ky.) 681.
3 Cory V. Carter, 48 Ind. 327.
* Ala., Art. 4, sec. 33 ; Ark., Art. 14 ; Cal., Art. 9, sec. 5 ; Colo.,
Art. 9, sec. 2; Del, Art. 10, sec. 1; Conn., Art. 8, sec. 2; Fla.,
3
§ 3] GENERAL PRINCIPLB8 [Ch. I
Some of the State constitutions declare that the people
have a right to education, which it is the duty of the
State to guard and maintain,^ " without distinction of
race, color,^ caste * or sex.* " Under a State consti-
tution requiring the conamon school system to be uni-
formly open to all, such uniformity exists when all
schools of the same grade have the same system of
studies and discipline, and require uniform qualifica-
tions for admission.^
In Massachusetts, the constitution provides:*
" Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused
generally among the body of the people, being neces-
sary for the preservation of their rights and hberties;
Art. 12, sec. 1 ; Ga., Art. 8, sec. 1 ; Ida., Art. 9, sec. 1 ; 111., Art. 8,
sec. 1 ; Ind. Art. 8, sec. 1 ; la., Art. 9, div. 1, sec. 12 ; Kan., Art. 6,
sec. 2; Ky., Art. 11, sec. 1 ; La., Acts 1880, sec. 224; Me., Art. 8,
sec. 1 ; Md., Art. 8 ; Mass., Part 2, Ch. 5, sec. 2 ; Mich., Art. 13,
sec. 4 ; Minn. Art. 8, sec. 2 ; Miss., Art. 8, sec. 1, 5-8 ; Mo., Art. 11,
sec. 1 ; Mont., Art. 11, sec. 1 ; Neb., Art. 8, sec. 6 ; Nev., Art. 11,
sec. 2 ; N. H., part 2, Art. 83 ; N. J., Art. 4, sec. 7 ; N. Y., Art. 9,
sec. 1 ; N. C, Art. 1, sec. 27, Art. 9, sec. 2 ; N. D. 147 ; Ohio, Art. 1,
sec. 7, Art. 6, sec. 1 and 2 ; Okla., Art. 13, sec. 1 ; Ore., Art. 8, sec. 3 ;
Pa., Art. 10, sec. 1 ; R. I., Art. 12, sec. 1, 2, 4 ; S. C, Art. 10, sec. 3,
11; S. D., Art. 8, sec. 1, Art. 22, sec. 1; Tenn., Art. 11, sec. 12;
Tex., Art. 7, sec. 1 ; Utah, Art. 3, sec. 4, Art. 10, sec. 1 ; Vt., Ch. 2,
Art. 41 ; Va., Art. 8, sec. 3, 7, 8 ; Wash., Art. 9, sec. 1, Art. 26, sec. 1,
Art. 27, sec. 1 ; W. Va., Art. 12, sec. 1 ; Wis., Art. 10, sec. 3 ; Wyo.,
Art. 7, sec. 1. The provisions in constitutions of Montana, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming are irre-
vocable without the consent of the United States ; see U. S. Statutes
of 1889, Ch. 180.
» N. C, Art. 1, sec. 27 ; Wash., Art. 9, sec. 1 ; Wyo., Art. 1,
sec. 23.
^ Colo., Art. 9, sec. 8 ; Ida., Art. 9, sec. 6 ; Wash., Art. 9, sec. 1 ;
Wyo., Art. 7, sec. 10. ^ Wash., Art. 9, sec. 1.
* Ida., Art. 9, sec. 6 ; Wyo., Art. 7, sec. 10.
5 Cory V. Carter, 48 Ind. 327. « Ch. 5, sec. 2.
4
Ch. I] CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS [§ 3
and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and
advantages of education in the various parts of the
country, and among the different orders of the people,
it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all
future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the
interests of Hterature and the sciences, and all semi-
naries of them ; especially the university at Cambridge,
pubhc schools and grammar schools in the towns ; to
encourage private societies and public institutions,
rewards and immimities, for the promotion of agri-
culture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures,
and a natural history of the country; to countenance
and inculcate the principles of humanity and general
benevolence, public and private charity, industry and
frugaUty, honesty and pimctuality in their dealings,
sincerity, good humor, and all social affections and
generous sentiments, among the people."
The Constitution of the United States does not
mention the right or duty of education, and it there-
fore would seem beyond the power of the Federal
government to prescribe, hmit or regulate the common
schools of the several States.^ And although a treaty
to that effect would be vaUd in favor of a foreign power,
it would not be binding upon the States, except as a
consequence of the war power.^
In New York, there is no constitutional right to
education, the right being founded entirely upon
legislation, and as such is subject to such limitations
1 Marshall v. Donovan, 10 Biish (Ky.) 681 ; Griswold v. Hepburn,
63 Ky. 20 ; Tucker's Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power, 21,
380. ^ Stimson's Const, b. Ill, sec. 50.
5
§ 4] GENERAL PRINCIPLES [Ch. I
as the legislature in its wisdom, may from time to time
see fit to make.^
§ 4. What is a School?
A school is an institution of learning of a lower
grade than a college or a university. It is a place of
primary instruction.^ The terms " pubUc schools "
and " common schools " are synonymous,' but such
terminology is not limited to a school of the lowest
grade. It includes all schools from the primary to
the high schools, but it does not include one founded
by a charitable bequest which vests the order
and superintendence of it in a board of trustees,* or
those devoted exclusively to teaching advanced pu-
pils in the classics, and in all of the higher branches
of study usually included in the curriculum of the
colleges.^
To constitute a school there must be a teacher and
pupils. And so it has been held that a meeting of
persons assembled for the purpose of singing together
for their common improvement in the art of singing,
but without a teacher, is not a school within the sta-
tutory meaning,* but that a singing school, with a
teacher and pupils is within the meaning of the statute.'
1 DaUas v. Fosdick, 40 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 240.
2 Bouv. L. Diet.
^ Roach V. St. Louis, &c., 77 Mo. 484 ; People v. Board, &c.,
13 Barb. (N. Y.) 410.
* Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94, 97.
* PoweU V. Board, &c., 97 lU. 378.
« State V. Gager, 26 Conn. 607, 28 Conn. 232.
' Ihid.
6
Ch. I] WHAT IS A PUBLIC SCHOOL? [§ 5
§ 5. What is a Public School?
A public or conunon school has been defined as one
that is common and free to all children of proper age
and capacity, and which is subject to, and under the
control of, the qualified voters of a school district.^
It has been held, however, that it is not inconsistent
with a free pubUc school system that school boards
may fix a reasonable incidental fee for heating and
fighting as a condition precedent to a pupil entering a
pubhc school.^
The characteristic features of public schools in the
United States are: They are supported by general
taxation, are open to all free of tuition expense, and
are under the immediate control and superintendence
of agents appointed by the voters of each town and
city,^ or district.
In point of taxation the term " public schools " can-
not be confined to those supported exclusively by
mimicipal taxation. In Massachusetts, town schools
have been for many years in part supported by legis-
lative grants out of the school fund of the common-
wealth, as recognized by the eighteenth article of
amendments to the constitution. Nor can the term
be limited to schools supported wholly by the pubhc,
for the original statute of 1647 provided for the sup-
port of the schoolmaster, at the discretion of the
selectmen, by a contribution from the parents of the
1 School District, &c., v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 99 Pac. 28.
2 Roberson v. Oliver, 189 Ala., 82, 66 So., 645.
^ Merrick v. Amherst, 12 AUen (Mass.) 508 ; Collins v. Henderson,
11 Bush (Ky.) 74.
7
§5] GENERAL PRINCIPLES [Ch. I
scholars, or the masters of such as were under appren-
ticeship, instead of by a uniform tax upon all the
inhabitants of the towns; and they may, in later
times, derive support from voluntary contributions.
These are the schools to which the eighteenth article
of amendments to the constitution of Massachusetts
apphes; schools which towns are required to main-
tain, or authorized to maintain, though not required
to do so, as a part of our system of common education,
and which are open and free to all the children and
youth of the town in which they are situated, who are
of proper age or quaUfications to attend them.
This class of schools does not include private schools
which are supported and managed by individuals;
nor colleges or academies organized and maintained
under special charters for promoting the higher branches
of learning, and not especially intended for, nor Umited
to, the inhabitants of a particular locaUty.^
A common school is one that begins with the rudi-
mental elements of an education, as contradistinguished
from academies and universities that begin with the
higher branches of education.^ And the term " public
schools " as generally used is not Umited to schools of
the lowest grade but may include high schools as well.'
A normal school is also, in an enlarged sense, a public
school.^
The fact that a tuition fee is charged will not ipso
* Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 97.
« Powell V. Board, &c., 97 111. 378.
' Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 97.
« People V. Crissey, 45 Hun (N. Y.) 19.
8
Ch. I] WHAT IS EDUCATION? [§ 6
facto take a school out of its class as a public school.^
But schools controlled by an incorporated board of
trustees are not public schools ; ^ nor is a school kept
by a society,* or open only to poor orphan children,
although controlled by a city.^
Even though the land on which a schoolhouse
stands is owned by the Catholic Church, and is located
in a district where the people are of that faith, and
which faith is taught in the school without objection,
and the Church funds are contributed to the salary
of the teachers, if the school receives its share of the
school fund, district meetings are annually held, teach-
ers hired and paid by the school board, and the busi-
ness of the school conducted in the usual manner of
school districts, such school is a district school and not
a parochial school.^
§ 6. What is Education?
Education is a broad and comprehensive term. It
has been defined as the process of developing and train-
ing the powers and capabiUties of human beings. It
is the bringing up, physically or mentally, of a child,
or the preparation of a person, by some due course of
training, for a professional or business life, or other
» Blake v. Mayor, kc, 19 Q. B. D. 79 ; Le Couteulx v. Buffalo,
33 N. Y. 333.
2 Hall's Free School v. Home, 80 Va. 470 ; Elsberry v. Seay,
83 Ala. 614, 3 So. 804.
3 People V. Board, &c., 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 400.
* In re Malone's Estate, 21 S. C. 435; State v. Dovey, 19 Nev.
396, 12 Pac. 910.
6 Richter v. Cordes, 100 Mich. 278, 58 N. W. 1110.
9
§7] GENEEAL PRINCIPLES [Ch. I
calling.! ii jjja,y be directed particularly to either
the mental, moral, or physical powers and faculties,
but in its broadest and best sense it refers to them all.^
It is not necessary that an " English " education be
limited to the study of the English language. An
education acquired through the medium of the Eng-
lish language, even though embracing Latin and Ger-
man, is an English education.^ And a " good common
school education " includes a high school education.*
§ 7. Father's Duty to Educate.
It is the common-law rule that education is a duty
owed by the parent to the child. But, while the duty
rested upon the parent to educate his child, the law
would not attempt to force him to discharge this duty,
and the child, so far as education was concerned, was
completely at the mercy of the parent. Therefore,
at common law the child had no right to demand an
education at the hands of the parent, and this is the
state of the law generally in the United States unless
there is a State law, either constitutional or statutory,
which is held to alter or abolish it.
Where under a State law a father is bound to edu-
1 Clavering v. Ellison, 7 H. L. Cas. 713 ; State ex rel. Henderson
V. Lesueur, 99 Mo. 552, 13 S. W. 237.
2 Williams v. MacDougall, 39 Cal. 80; Mount Harmon Boys
School w. Gill, 145 Mass. 139, 146, 13 N. E. 354; Peck v. Claflin,
105 Mass. 420 ; Merrill v. Emery, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 507 ; Ruohs v.
Backer, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 395 ; Cook v. State, 90 Tenn. 407, 16 S.
W. 471. For essays on legal education see Jones' Index to Legal
Periodicals.
3 Board, &c., v. Welch, 51 Kan. 806, 33 Pac. 654.
* Cook V. Board, &c., 266 lU. 164, 107 N. E. 327.
10
Ch. I] MOTHER'S DUTY TO EDUCATE [§ 8
cate his children he must do so out of his own estate,
even if the children have ample separate resources/
or even if his child has a separate estate of which he
is guardian his duty is, nevertheless, to educate the
child out of his own estate.^ A father who is bound
to educate his minor child by reason of a State law
is bound to pay a reasonable sum to another person
who does it for him with his knowledge and consent.^
Usually a person who stands in loco parentis is bound
to educate a child to whom he stands in such relation.*
And while a stepfather, merely by virtue of the mar-
riage does not acquire such relation, he does acquire
it if he assumes the parental relation and holds the
children out to the world as members of his own family.^
§ 8. Mother's Duty to Educate.
While the obUgation is upon the father to educate
the child, and does not, in the hfetime of the father,
in any manner rest upon the mother, still there is an
1 Englehardt v. Yung's Heirs, 76 Ala. 534 ; Fuller v. Fuller,
23 Fla. 236, 2 So. 426; Hines v. Mullins, 25 Ga. 696; Bedford v.
Bedford, 136 111. 354, 26 N. E. 662 ; Addison v. Bowie, 2 Bland
(Md.) 606; Whipple v. Dow, 2 Mass. 415; Dawes v. Howard,
4 Mass. 97 ; Pearce v. Olney, 5 R. I. 269 ; Presley v. Davis, 7 Rich.
Eq. (S. C.) 105 ; Linskiew.Kerr, 34S. W. (Tex.) 765; Contra: In re
Marx, 5 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 224.
^ Kinsey v. State, 98 Ind. 351 ; Tompkins v. Tompkins' Ex'rs,
18 N. J. Eq. 303 ; Buckley's Adm'r v. Howard, 35 Tex. 565.
^ Thompson v. Dorsey, 4 Md. Ch. 149.
* Schrimf v. Settegast, 36 Tex. 296.
^ Mowbry v. Mowbry, 64 111. 383 ; Mulhern v. McDavitt, 16
Gray (Mass.) 404; In re Besondy, 32 Minn. 385, 20 N. W. 366;
Eickhoff V. Sedalia, &c., 106 Mo. App. 541, 80 S. W. 966 ; Beard's
Estate, 1 Pa. Co. Ct. 283.
11
§ 8] GENERAL PRINCIPLES [Ch. I
obligation growing out of the relation of husband and
wife, and parent and child, resting upon the wife and
mother, demanding her co-operation with the hus-
band in everything that is necessary for the welfare
of the child. If the father is, by a good reason, required
to abstain from conduct which would injiu-e, and
possibly destroy, the entire benefits of the public
school system, the mother, for like reasons, must be
required to desist, and her conduct may be a good
reason for causing both the child and the father to
lose the benefits of the school fund.^
In a case where the child is free from fault, and the
father is obedient to the law, it does look extremely
hard that the willful misconduct of the mother should
thus bring distress upon two innocent persons; but
it is better that they should suffer, than that an institu-
tion in operation for the public good should be entirely
subverted and destroyed, as would certainly be the
result if the mother of every child in attendance on
the schools were permitted whenever disposed to enter
the schoolroom and upbraid the teacher in the presence
of the pupils, or do other acts subversive of discipline
and good order.^
Although the mother, during the time the father
holds the position as head of the family, must refrain
from such acts as tend to destroy discipline in the
public schools, she does not occupy such a position
of custody and control of the child that an attendance
order made on the father of a child can on the death
1 Board, &c.,v. Purse, 101 Ga. 422, 28 S. E. 896.
2 Ibid.
12
Ch. I] CHILD WAS WITHOUT REMEDY [§ 10
of the father be enforced against the mother,^ although
a mother who has the care and custody of a child may
be convicted for neglecting to cause the child to attend
school.^ A widowed mother is not chargeable, how-
ever, for the education of her child where ample pro-
vision is otherwise made for its support.*
§ 9. Pecuniary Ability of Parent.
At common law the child's right to an education
was dependent not only upon the will but upon the
pecuniary abiUty of the parent. Even where elaborate
pubUc school systems have been estabhshed, thereby
removing dependency upon the pecuniary ability of
the parent, the right of a child to an education is still
dependent on the will of the parent unless the rule of
the common law has been abrogated either by con-
stitutional or statutory enactment. If the parent
is willing but has not the means to carry out this will,
the child must go without an education.
§ 10. Child was Without Remedy.
The child was completely at the mercy of the parent
in his attendance at school, in that he was remediless,
for while the common law recognized the duty of
educating a child as one of great importance, there
was no remedy whatever provided for the child in
case this duty was not discharged by the parent.
1 Hance v. Fairhurst, 47 J. P. 53, 51 L. J. M. C. 139.
2 London School Board v. Jackson, 7 Q. B. D. 502 ; Mowbry v.
Mowbry, 64 HI. 383 ; Mulhem v. McDavitt, 16 Gray (Mass.) 404.
^ Mowbry v. Mowbry, 64 111., 383 ; Englehardt v. Yung's Heirs,
76 Ala. 534 ; In re Besondy, 32 Minn. 385, 20 N. W. 366 ; Osbom v.
Allen, 26 N. J. L. 388.
13
§ 11] GENEEAL PRINCIPLES [Ch. I
The child, at the will of the parent, could be allowed
to grow up in ignorance and become more than a use-
less member of society, and for this great wrong,
brought about by the neglect of his parents, the com-
mon law provided no remedy. Not only was no remedy
given to the child, but no punishment was inflicted
upon the parent for the failure to educate. In attempt-
ing to give a reason for this defect in the common law.
Sir WilUam Blackstone says : " Perhaps they thought
it punishment enough to leave the parent, who neglects
the instruction of his family, to labor under those
griefs and inconveniences which his family, so imin-
st^ucted, will be sure to bring upon him." ^
§ 11. Parent may Direct Studies.
All parents and guardians being under the responsi-
biUty of preparing children intrusted to their care and
nurture for the discharge of their duties in after life,
law-givers in all free countries, and, with few excep-
tions, in despotic governments have deemed it wise
to leave the education and nurture of the children
to the reasonable direction of the parent or guardian.
This is, and has ever been, the spirit of our free in-
stitutions. The State has provided the means, and
brought them within the reach of all, to acquire the
benefits of a common school education, but leaves it
to parents and guardians reasonably to determine the
extent to which they will render it available to the
children under their charge.*
1 1 Bl. Com. 781.
2 Rulison V. Post, 79 111. 567; Stovall v. Johnson, 17 Ala. 14;
Dawson v. Dawson, 12 Iowa 512 ; Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151,
14
Ch. I] COMPULSORY EDUCATION [§ 13
§ 12. Non-Compulsory System.
The law providing for a non-compulsory public
school system was not intended to create any new
right in or give any new remedy to a child, it being
settled that the presence of the child in school dependp
absolutely upon the consent and will of the parent ;
and school authorities are justified in dealing with
the child in the hght of this fact. Under such system
it is simply the purpose of the State to aid the parent
in discharging a duty by furnishing a fund to pay the
expenses incident to discharging such duty.
Under a conamon school system which does not make
education compulsory, the entire law, from the con-
stitutional provision to the vaUd rule of the local school
board, is that the right to attend school is not inher-
ent in the child, but that it is the purpose of the law
simply to provide a place where parents may discharge
the obhgation which they owe to their children to give
them an education.
§ 13. Compulsory Education.
To discharge more thoroughly the obligation of the
State to educate its citizens, statutes to enforce edu-
cation have been enacted in every State except Georgia
and Mississippi. It is competent for the legislature
to compel parents to perform the natural duty of
education owed to their children, and therefore com-
44 N. W. 295; Tanner v. Skinner, 11 Bush (Ky.) 120; Gates v.
Renfroe, 7 La. An. 569; Gilley v. GiUey, 79 Me. 292, 9 Atl. 623;
Hillsborough v. Deering, 4 N. H. 86 ; Bull's Estate, 1 Leg. Op.
(Pa.) 125. See also, Ch. 8, sec. 106, infra.
15
§ 13] GENERAL PRINCIPLES [Ch. I
pulsory attendance laws are not necessarily unconstitu-
tional as an invasion of a parent's rights and domin-
ion.^ But private tuition at home may be a suflBcient
substitute for attendance at school under such com-
pulsory system.^
The great object of statutes enforcing education
is that all children shall be educated, — •" not that they
shall be educated in any particular way. To this end
public schools are established, so that all children
may be sent to them unless other sufficient means of
education are provided for them. If a child has in
any manner already acquired the branches of learn-
ing required by law to be taught in the pubhc schools,
the law does not compel any further instruction. If
he has not acquired them, the law requires that he be
instructed in them for the specified time each year.
Sending a child to a private day school approved by
the school committee is enough to comply with the
requirements of the law, without further inquiry.
But if the person having a child under his control,
iastead of sending him to a public school or to a private
day school approved by the school committee, prefers
to have him instructed otherwise, it will be incumbent
on him to show that the child has been instructed for
the specified period in the required branches of learn-
ing, unless the child has already acquired them. This
permits private instruction by tutor, governess or
1 State V. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N. E. 730 ; State v. Jackson,
71 N. H. 552, 53 Atl. 1021.
^ State V. Peterman, 32 Ind. App. 665, 70 N. E. 550. Contra:
State V. Connort, 69 Wash. 361, 124 Pac. 910.
16
Ch. I] COMPULSORY EDUCATION [§ 13
parents, provided it is given in good faith and is
sufficient in extent.^
The statutes enacted making attendance at school
compulsory usually provide that parents or persons
having custody or control of children between cer-
tain ages shall compel them to attend school for a
certain period diiring each school year.^ And this
requirement under some statutes permits the neces-
sary attendance at private or other schools/ subject,
however, to a reasonable excuse for non-attendance.
If such a person has a child under his control and
neglects or refuses, without sufficient excuse, to cause
the child to attend school for the prescribed period of
time, a punishment is provided for such dehnquency.*
Many jurisdictions have made special provisions
for children employed in labor, usually providing that
such children shall attend school a certain number of
hours each week imtil they shall have attained a certain
age and a prescribed proficiency in their studies.^
1 Com. V. Roberts, 159 Mass. 372, 34 N. E. 402; State v. McCaf-
fery,. 69 Vt. 85, 37 Atl. 234.
2 Yale V. School District, 59 Conn. 489, 22 Atl. 295; Com. v.
Roberts, 159 Mass. 372, 34 N. E. 402 ; Jackson v. Mason, 145 Mich.
338, 108 N. W. 697 ; State v. Hall, 74 N. H. 61, 64 Atl. 1102 ; People
V. Hendrickson, 125 N. Y. App. Div. 256, 109 N. Y. S. 403 ; In re
Compulsory Attendance Law, 25 Pa. Co. Ct. 503 ; State v. McCaf-
fery, 69 Vt. 85, 37 Atl. 234; State v. MacDonald, 25 Wash. 122,
64 Pac. 912.
» Quigley v. State, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 638.
* Com. V. Roberts, 159 Mass. 372, 34 N. E. 402 ; State v. Jackson,
71 N. H. 552, 53 Atl. 1021 ; State v. McCaffery, 69 Vt. 85, 37 Atl.
234; Com. v. Hammer, 9 Pa. Dist. 251; State v. MacDonald,
25 Wash. 122, 64 Pac. 912.
^ The Revised Laws of Massachusetts, Ch. 44, sec. 1, as amended
by the acts of 1915, Ch. 81, sec. 1, provide that : "Every child be-
17
§ 13] GENERAL PRINCIPLES [Ch. I
Compulsory education laws are not xmconstitutional
as an invasion of the natural right of the parent to
govern and control his child, for the reason that it is
competent for the legislature to compel parents to
tween seven and fourteen years of age, every child under sixteen
years of age who does not possess such abiUty to read, write and spell
in the English language as is required for the completion of the fourth
grade of the public schools of the city or town in which he resides,
and every child under sixteen years of age who has not received an
employment certificate as provided in this act and is not engaged in
some regular emplojrment or business for at least six hours per day
or has not the written permission of the superintendent of schools
of the city or town in which he resides to engage in profitable em-
ployment at home, shall attend a pubhc day school in said city or
town or some other day school approved by the school committee,
during the entire time the pubhc schools are in session, subject to
such exceptions as are provided for in sections four, five and six of
this chapter and in section three of chapter forty-two of the Revised
Laws, as amended by chapter four hundred and thirty-three of the
acts of the year nineteen hundred and two, and by chapter five
hundred and thirty-seven of the acts of the year nineteen hundred
and eleven ; but such attendance shall not be required of a child
whose physical or mental condition is such as to render attendance
inexpedient or impracticable, or who is being otherwise instructed
in a manner approved in advance by the superintendent of schools
or the school committee. The superintendent of schools, or teachers
in so far as authorized by said superintendent or by the school
committee, may excuse cases of necessary absence for other causes
not exceeding seven day sessions or fourteen half-day sessions in
any period of six montl^. For the purposes of this section, school
committees shall approve a private school only when the instruction
in all the studies required by law is in the English language, and when
they are satisfied that such instruction equals in thoroughness and
efficiency, and in the progress made therein, the instruction in the
public schools in the same city or town ; but they shall not refuse
to approve a private school on account of the reUgious teaching
therein."
Sec. 2 of this act as amended, provides that : "Every person
having under his control a chUd as described in section one shall
cause him to attend school as therein required, and, if he fails for
seven day sessions or fourteen half-day sessions within any period of
18
V
Ch. I] EXCUSES FOR NON-ATTENDANCE [§ 14
perform the natural duty of education owed to their
children.^
§ 14. Excuses for Non-Attendance.
It has been held, however, that a child is excused
from attending pubhc school when he Uves at such a
distance from the schoolhouse that it is unreasonable
for him to walk, unless a conveyance is provided by
the school authorities,^ or where the child is not of
sufficient physical or mental condition to attend school,^
or where there is some other reasonable excuse for
non-attendance. And tmder some statutes the com-
pulsory education law is not operative where there is
not sufficient seating capacity to seat children com-
pelled to attend,* or where the absences are only occa-
sional and temporary.®
six months while such control obtains, to cause such child so to
attend school, he shall, upon complaint by an attendance officer and
conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than twenty
dollars, and no physical or mental condition which is capable of
correction, or which renders the chUd a fit subject for special instruc-
tion at public charge in institutions other than pubhc day schools,
shall avail as defence under the provisions of this or the preceding
section, unless it shall be made to appear that the defendant has
employed aU reasonable measures for the correction of the condition
and the suitable instruction of the chUd.
Whoever induces or attempts to induce a child to absent himself
unlawfully from school, or employs or harbors a child while school is
in session, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more
than fifty doUars."
1 State V. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N. E. 730 ; State v. Jackson,
71 N. H. 552, 53 Atl. 1021.
2 State V. Hall, 74 N. H. 61, 64 Atl. 1102.
' State V. Jackson, 71 N. H. 552, 53 Atl. 1021 ; People v. Hendrick-
son, 125 N. Y. App. Div. 256, 109 N. Y. S. 403 ; State v. McCaffery,
69 Vt. 85, 37 Atl. 234. * Quigley v. State, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 638.
s State V. Jackson, 71 N. H. 552, 53 Atl. 1021.
19
§ 14] GENERAL PRINCIPLES [Ch. I
Such compulsory education statutes are penal ones,
and as such must be strictly construed.^ Consequently
where the statute requires all principals or other
persons in charge of schools to refuse admission of
any child to the schools under their charge or super-
vision except upon a certificate signed by a physician
setting forth that such child has been successfully
vaccinated, or that it has previously had small-pox,
the only effect of the law is to deprive the child of
pubUc school privileges imless the law in this respect
has been complied with. It is a matter of choice by
the parent or guardian to comply or not with the law
as to vaccination as he may choose. And if he chooses
not to have the child vaccinated, and by reason thereof
the child sent to school in good faith is excluded there-
from, the parent is not amenable to the compulsory
attendance law. Such vaccination law does not make
vaccination compulsory but leaves it optional with
the parent. The compulsory attendance law is a
penal one and must be strictly construed ; the parent
in sending the child to school compUed with that law.^
But it has been held that the parent under such condi-
tions must provide competent educational facilities
for his child elsewhere to avoid the consequences of
the compulsory attendance law,' and that private
instruction at home is not sufficient.*
» Com. V. Smith, 24 Pa. Co. Ct. 129.
2 Com. V. Smith, 24 Pa. Co. Ct. 129 ; O'Bamion v. Cole, 220 Mo.
697, 119 S. W. 424; State v. Turney, 31 Ohio Cir. Ct. 222.
' People V. Ekerold, 211 N. Y. 386, 105 N. E. 670.
* State V. Connort, 69 Wash. 361, 124 Pac. 910. Contra: State
». Peterman, 32 Ind. App. 665, 70 N.E. 550.
20
Ch. I] EXCUSES FOR NON-ATTENDANCE [§-14
An offender against the compulsory education law
must be tried within the bounds of the school district
where the offense occurred,^ and before a proper court
or officers having jurisdiction of the offense,^ and upon
proper complaint.^ And the defendant will not be
permitted to have a jmy trial upon the reasonableness
of his excuse for keeping a child out of school where
the statute has made the school board the sole judge
of the sufficiency of such excuses, and the defendant
has neglected to appear and present such excuses to
the school board when notffied to do so.^
1 Grahn v. State, 6 Ohio N. P. 182.
2 Quigley v. State, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 638.
* State V. McCa£fery, 69 Vt. 85, 37 Atl. 234.
* Com. V. Hammer, 9 Pa. Dist. 251.
21
CHAPTER II
OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS
§ 16. Status of School Districts.
School districts are not bodies politic, nor have they
the general powers of corporations but may be consid-
ered as quasi corporations.^ And the law respecting
corporations does not generally apply to these aggre-
gate bodies, which are usually created by statute,
although a school district is sometimes held to be a
municipal corporation within the contemplation of
certain constitutional or statutory provisions.^
» First Nat'l Bk. v. Whisenhunt, 94 Ark. 583, 127 S. W. 968;
A. H. Andrews Co. v. Delight, &c., 95 Ark. 26, 128 S. W. 361 ;
Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 81 Atl. 1013; People v. Board, &c.,
255 111. 568, 99 N. E. 659 ; State v. Gordon, 231 Mo. 547, 133 S. W.
44 ; Dillon on Munic. Corp., 5th ed., § 34.
2 State V. Wilson, 65 Kan. 237, 69 Pac. 172 ; State v. Grimes, 7
Wash. 270, 34 Pac. 836 ; Bush v. Shipman, 5 111. 186 ; State v.
Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54 ; People v. Dupuyt, 71 111. 651 ; Wharton v.
School Directors, 42 Pa. 358; Littlewort v. Davis, 50 Miss. 403;
Stroud V. Stevens Point, 37 Wis. 367 ; Johnson v. Dole, 4 N. H. 478 ;
Connor v. Board, &c., 10 Minn. 439. But see Bassett v. Fish,
75 N. Y. 303 ; Maxon v. School, &c., 5 Wash. 142, 32 Pac. 110.
School districts are quasi corporations in Arkansas (by statute),
Kansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey (but is a muni-
cipaUty as to mechanics' hens), New York (except for certain consti-
tutional provisions), and Pennsylvania. They are municipal cor-
porations in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa (as to issuing bonds, but not as to
receiving Uquor taxes), Kentucky (as to incurriag excessive debt),
Michigan (as to exemption in negUgence cases). Dillon on Munic.
Corp., 5th ed., § 36.
22
Ch. II] STATUS OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS [§ 15
School districts as quasi corporations do not rank
high in the attributes of corporate existence. They are
purely auxiliaries of the State, and owe their creation
to general statutes which confer upon them all the
powers they possess, prescribe all the duties they owe,
and impose aU HabiUties to which they are subject.
They do not act imder charters as do municipal cor-
porations,^ and are of the most Umited powers known
to the law,^ having only such powers as are given to
them by the statutes under which they are created,'
together with the imphed powers necessary to execute
the express powers.* They are formed for the single
purpose of maintaining public schools, and their cor-
porate power and scope extends only to such matters
as are necessary to enable them properly to answer
that end.^ Being corporations they can act only in
their corporate .ca.pacity, and bind themselves only
by acts authorized by legal votes adopted at a regu-
larly called district meeting.®
Although school districts do not have all the common
law powers and duties of corporations, they have
limited powers coextensive with the duties imposed
upon them by statute or usage. And in this light
they have sufficient corporate powers to maintain an
1 Heller v. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309 ; Schultes v. Eberly, 82 Ala.
242, 2 So. 345; Shipley v. Hacheney, 34 Oreg. 302, 55 Pac. 971;
Dillon on Munic. Corp., 5th ed., § 36.
^ Pasadena School District v. City of Pasadena, 166 Cal. 7,
134 Pac. 985.
' Mulligan v. School District, &c., 241 Pa. St. 204, 88 Atl. 362.
* Royse, &c., v. Reinhardt, 159 S. W. (Tex.) 1010.
* Harrington v. School District, &c., 30 Vt. 155.
* Stoughton V. Atherton, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 105.
23
§15] OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
action on a contract to build a schoolhouse and lease
land/ or to employ counsel to defend an action brought
against the district.^
The legislature sometimes provides that a muni-
cipal and school corporation shall exist in the same
territory. In such cases the two corporations are
distinct, and the school corporation may be bound for
labor and materials furnished in the building of a
schoolhouse for such corporation.'
Although, by statute, a school district is usually
entirely distinct from a municipaUty having the same
limits and boundaries,^ it may, by the express terms
of the statute, be made a part of the municipal govern-
ment.* If not so made, the municipaUty can make
no vahd contract pertaining to the property of the
school district.^
In Connecticut such districts are not corporations
separate from the town or city, nor independent cor-
porations themselves for all purposes of common
school education, but are subject to the ordinances
of towns within the limits of which they exist,
» Rumford District v. Wood, 13 Mass. 192.
2 Gould V. Board, &c., 34 Hun (N. Y.) 16.
* Princeton v. Gebhart, 61 Ind. 187 ; Public Instruction Com'rs
ti. FeU, 52 N. J. Eq. 689, 29 Atl. 816; DiUon on Munic. Corp., 5th
ed., § 36.
* State V. Ogan, 159 Ind. 119, 63 N. E. 227 ; Knowles v. Board, &c.,
33 Kan. 692, 7 Pac. 561 ; Heller v. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309 ; Water
Supply Co. V. Albuquerque City, 9 N. M. 441, 54 Pac. 969 ; Heizer
». Yolin, 37 Ind. 415 ; San Diego v. Daner, 97 Gal. 442, 32 Pac. 561 ;
Board, &c., v. Detroit, 30 Mich. 505.
* Stroud V. Stevens Point, 37 Wis. 367.
8 Jarvis v. Shelby, &c., 62 Ind. 257.
24
Ch. II] DISTRICTS DE FACTO [§ 16
and may be formed, altered or dissolved by such
towns.^
The system of the free public schools is a matter of
general State concern, rather than a mere municipal
affair,^ and the establishment and regulation of public
schools rests primarily in the legislature.^ In ascer-
taining the wiU of the legislature all statutes of the
State relating to public schools must be construed
together.*
In some States the local management of the public
schools of the larger cities has been placed in a board
of education while the smaller villages are managed
under a democratic form by an elected school com-
mittee.^ And in the larger cities where the division
is by wards, the schools of such wards are district
schools.*
§ 16. Districts De Facto.
Where school districts have exercised and continue
to exercise governmental functions imder color of
law and legal right on the theory that they have been
regularly formed, they are districts de facto and their
legal existence caimot be questioned in collateral pro-
ceedings,^ but may be attacked only in a proceeding
brought in the name of, or under authority of the
1 Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 81 Atl. 1013.
2 Board, &c., v. State, 26 Okla. 366, 109 Pac. 563.
« Stone V. Fritts, 169 Ind. 361, 82 N. E. 792.
* Good V. Howard, 174 Ind. 358, 92 N. E. 115.
6 Gaddis v. School District, 92 Neb. 701, 139 N. W. 280.
« Maxcy v. Oshkosh, 144 Wis. 238, 128 N. W. 899.
^School District, &c., v. Young, 163 Mo. App. 526, 143 S. W.
1197; Wood v. Calveras County, 164 Cal. 398, 129 Pac. 283.
25
§16] OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
State, by one having a special interest affected by its
existence,^ on an information in the nature of quo
warranto.^
A school district de facto has a sufficient legal exist-
ence to enable it to collect,' and retain tax moneys
collected by it,* maintain an action of trespass for
breaking into a schoolhouse,^ issue bonds,^ and take
property for taxes,^ without alleging or proving its
existence de jure.
The statutes of many States provide that every
school district shall be presumed to have been legally
organized when it shall have exercised the franchises
and privileges of a district for a term of one year,*
and such statutes are conclusive only against irregu-
larities and informalities which are technical in their
character, and which do not go to the merits of the
case, but they do not raise a legal presumption of legal
organization which is conclusive against fraud. ^ The
presumption estabhshed under such statute does not
merely shift the burden of proof to the party impeach-
1 Wilson V. Brown, 145 S. W. (Tex.) 639 ; State v. Ryan, 41 Utah
327, 125 Pac. 666 ; School District, &c., v. Young, 152 Mo. App. 304,
133 S. W. 143.
2 Black V. Early, 208 Mo. 281, 106 S. W. 1014.
3 Trumbo v. People, 75 111. 561.
* Hamilton v. San Diego County, 108 Cal. 273, 41 Pac. 305.
^ Alderman v. School Directors, 91 111. 179.
* School District, &c., v. State, 29 Kan. 57.
^ Stevens v. Newcomb, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 437.
8 State V. School District, &c., 54 Mmn. 213, 55 N. W. 1122;
Call V. Chadbourne, 46 Me. 206; Collins v. School District, 52
Me. 522 ; State v. School District, &c., 42 Neb. 499, 60 N. W.
912.
* Call V. Chadbourne, suyra dt.
26
Ch. II] ORGANIZATION OF DISTRICTS [§ 17
ing the incorporation, but is in the nature of a statute
of limitation.^
In absence of such statute the existence of a school
district for a considerable length of time, creates a
presumption of its legality,^ but a short existence raises
no such presiunption.^
Reputation is sufficient to prove the existence and
organization of a school district where there is no
record.* AU that is necessary in such case is to show
that there is a district long known and recognized as
such.
§ 17. Formation and Organization of Districts.
The legislature, even without the consent of the
inhabitants, has the primary authority to lay off terri-
tory into school districts,* and this power may be dele-
gated to a subordinate body or official.^ And the
control of the legislature over the pubhc school system
is so plenary that in its discretion, a school district
may comprise a part of a county, an entire county,
or several coimties or parts thereof, and may delegate
1 State V. School District, &c., 54 Minn. 213, 55 N. W. 1122.
* Bowen v. King, 34 Vt. 156 ; Robie v. Sedgwick, 4 Abb. Dec.
(N. Y.) 73; Rice v. McClelland, 58 Mo. 116; Bassett v. Porter,
4 Gush. (Mass). 487.
* Thomas v. Gibson, 11 Vt. 607.
* Barnes v. Barnes, 6 Vt. 388.
6 Schofield V. Watkins, 22 HI. 66 ; School District, &c., v. Dean,
17 Mich. 223 ; Com. v. Gardner, 23 Pa. St. 417 ; School District v.
Zediker, 4 Okla. 599, 47 Pac. 482; Kuhn v. Board &c., 4 W. Va.
499.
* Grove v. Board, &c., 20 lU. 532 ; Re3molds, &c., v. McCabe,
72 Tex. 57, 12 S. W. 165 ; Bay State Live Stock Co. v. Bing, 51 Neb.
570, 71 N. W. 311.
27
§ 18] OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
to subordinate school officers the power of changing
existing districts.^
In some States a school district may be formed only
by vote of the town, and a district otherwise formed
does not possess corporate powers, nor can it authorize
the assessment of taxes for any purpose.^
Independent school districts are against the policy
of the law, and will not be erected where the effect
is to separate the wealthier and poorer classes of a
district to the detriment of the latter except in cases
of extreme necessity.^
Statutory authority to dividie or consohdate school
districts implies power to create new districts out of
established ones,^ and the act of establishing a school
district is not consummated until entered on the public
official record.^ After an organization a writ of
certiorari will not issue to set aside the organization
of a school district where it would be a palpable injus-
tice.^
§ 18. Petitions for Establishment or Alteration of
Districts.
School districts are sometimes formed at the request
of the electors of the territory expressed in the form of
a signed petition, and such signers of a petition for
the organization of a school district have a right to
1 Trustees, &c., v. Brooks, 163 Ky. 200, 173 S. W. 305.
2 Tucker v. Wentworth, 35 Me. 393.
' In re Mt. Pleasant, &c., 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 588.
* Bourland v. Snyder, 224 lU. 478, 79 N. E. 568.
^ Mouser v. Spaulding, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1071, 96 S. W. 882.
« School Board, &c., v. Board, &c., 146 Mich. 393, 109 N. W. 664.
28
Ch. m BOUNDARIES OF DISTRICTS [§ 19
withdraw their names therefrom before any action
is taken on such petition.'
A petition for the establishment of an independent
school district, or for the alteration of established dis-
tricts must set forth every fact made by statute indis-
pensable to such establishment or alteration.^ It
should also state that the lands sought to be annexed
are adjoining,^ and if natural or other adequate ob-
stacles demand a redistricting, such obstacles should
be stated in the petition.*
Where upon a petition in matters of redistricting
the statute requires the signatures of a majority of the
inhabitants, it must be a majority in each district to
be affected by the proposed change, and a majority of
the inhabitants of the collective districts is not suffi-
cient.*
§ 19. Boundaries of Districts.
The legislature has power to create, or change the
boundaries of a school district without the consent
of the persons who reside in the territory affected.^
The boundaries of a school district can be on geo-
graphical lines only, and may not be on personal limita-
» People V. Strawn, 265 111. 292, 106 N. E. 840; School District,
&c., V. School District, &c., 63 Ark. 543, 39 S. W. 850. See also,
§ 19, infra.
2 In re Mt. Pleasant, &c., 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 588.
3 In re Heidler, 122 Pa. St. 653, 16 Atl. 97.
^In re Hatfield, &c., 2 Walk. (Pa.) 169; In re Franklin, &c.,
IPa. Com. PL 128.
* Sayre v. Tompkins, 23 Mo. 443 ; Allen v. Bertram, 70 Iowa 434,
30 N. W. 684. But see. People v. Allen, 155 III. 402, 40 N. E. 350 ;
Hudspeth v. Wallis, 54 Ark. 134, 15 S. W. 184.
6 Norton v. Lakeside, &c., 97 Ark. 71, 133 S. W. 184.
29
§ 19] OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
tion.^ Not only must the division be a geographical
one, but it must include all the inhabitants of the town,^
But it is not necessary that the geographical lines be
continuous ; ' and it has been held that where a dis-
trict is laid out by such lines, and then certain indi-
viduals, with their polls and estates, are added thereto,
this operates as a permanent annexation of those indi-
viduals and their real estates to the district, and does
not violate the rule which requires districts to be estab-
lished by geographical limits.* If the town vote to
set off a person by giving his name but without so
setting off his estate as well, such vote is invalid.*
As a quasi corporation a school district is separate,
and a distinct legal entity from a town of the same
geographical Umits,® as also is a city school district
distinct from the city.'^ And the making of a city
officer an ex officio officer of a school corporation hav-
ing the same geographical limits as the city does not
merge the distinct corporations.®
Extending or changing the limits of a city or town
does not of itself enlarge a school district which corre-
1 Withington v. Eveleth, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 106 ; School District,
&c., V. Aldrich, 13 N. H. 139 ; Pierce v. Carpenter, 10 Vt. 480.
2 Perry v. Dover, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 206 ; Fry v. Athol, 4 Cush.
(Mass.) 250; In re Wilkins, &c., 70 Pa. St. 108.
3 Weeks v. Batchelder, 41 Vt. 317.
* Alden v. Rounseville, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 218.
8 Nye V. Marion, 7 Gray (Mass.) 244 ; Gray v. Sheldon, 8 Vt. 402.
« North Troy, &c., v. Troy, 80 Vt. 16, 66 Atl. 1033 ; Teeple v.
State, 171 Ind. 268, 86 N. E. 49.
^ Wood V. Calveras County, 164 Cal. 398, 129 Pac. 283 ; State v.
Henderson, 145 Mo. 329, 46 S. W. 1076.
8 Kuhn V. Thompson, 168 Mich. 511, 134 N. W. 722.
30
Ch. II] ABOLITION OF DISTRICTS [§20
sponded geographically with the former limits of the
city or town.^ Such corresponding extension of the
school district could be authorized only by legislative
act. 2
When a petition to change school boimdaries is
pending in a county court, a signer thereof upon show-
ing that he signed it under a mistake of fact, produced
by misrepresentations, should be allowed upon appli-
cation, to remove his name from such petition.^
The mere act, by a town, of putting up and estab-
Ushing bounds of existing school districts is not a dis-
tricting anew.* And a board of school directors have
no power to bind themselves and their successors by
contract that the boimdaries of a school district shall
not be changed.®
§ 20. Alteration and Abolition of Districts.
The legislative power over school districts is plen-
ary, subject to any constitutional limitations that
may exist, and in the exercise of such power, the
legislature may divide, change or aboUsh them at
pleasm-e. And as a part of that power it may make
provision for the division of the property and the
apportionment of the debts of the old corporation,
when a portion of its territory and public property
» State V. Henderson, 145 Mo. 329, 46 S. W. 1076 ; State v. Inde-
pendent, &c., 46 Iowa 425.
2 State V. Mayview, &c., 65 Mo. 587.
' School District, &c., v. School District, &c., 63 Ark. 543, 39
S. W. 850. See also, People v. Strawn, 265 111. 292, 106 N. E. 840.
* Adams v. Crooks, 7 Gray (Mass.) 411.
^ Conley v. School Directors, 32 Pa. St. 194.
31
§ 20] OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
are transferred to the jurisdiction of another corpora-
tion. But in the absence of such provision, the rule
of the common law obtains, and that rule leaves the
property where it is found, and the debt upon the
original debtor.^
School districts as qtiasi corporations, are under
control of the legislature. They may be changed and
divided at the legislative will, and property may be
thus transferred from one organization to another.^
The legislature may alter the boundaries of an exist-
ing school district without consulting the inhabitants,'
and the power of alteration of a school district may
be delegated to a subordinate body.*
Where the nature of a statute is such as to establish
a new system for the government of public schools,
and purports to be complete in itself, and is different
from that which previously existed, the pre-existing
law on the subject is repealed and the new statute
entirely governs the public school system. If in such
superseding law no provision for the alteration of estab-
lished school districts is made, then no power exists
for such alteration.^
In most of the States the division or changing of the
limits of a district can be done only with the consent
of a majority of the legal voters of the districts to be
1 Pass, &c., V. Hollywood, &c., 156 Cal. 416, 105 Pac. 122.
2 Connor v. Board, &c., 10 Minn. 439.
'Parker v. Titcomb, 82 Me. 180, 19 Atl. 162; McCormac v.
Robeson County, 90 N. C. 441 ; Raybould v. Hardy, 7 Utah 368,
26 Pac. 982.
* School District, &c., v. Zediker, 4 Okla. 599, 47 Pac. 482.
6 Rodemer v. Mitchell, 90 Tenn. 65, 15 S. W. 1067.
32
Ch. H] ABOLITION OF DISTRICTS [§20
affected by the change or the territory to be converted
into the new district,^ and in some States it is necessary
that a petition be presented by a designated number
of voters of the districts to be affected.^ Many juris-
dictions have statutes requiring that notice be given
of the time and place of the meeting at which a pro-
posed alteration is to be made.^
In their discretion and under statutory authority
a school board may order a temporary consolidation
of schools in a district, and when the exercise of such
discretion is reasonable the courts will not interfere.^
And if the statute provides that where streams of
water make it impracticable for children to attend
school in their own district, the County Superintendent
shall have authority, and it shall be his duty, when
requested by the parents of such children, to attach
to adjoining districts such territory as he may deem
» People V. Keechler, 194 111. 235, 62 N. E. 525 ; Burnett v. School
Inspectors, 97 Mich. 103, 56 N. W. 234 ; State v. Grimshaw, 1 S. W.
(Mo.) 363 ; State v. Compton, 28 Neb. 485, 44 N. W. 660 ; State v.
Deahler, 25 N. J. L. 177 ; Whitmire v. State, 47 S. W. (Tex.) 293.
2 School District, &c., v. School District, &c., 63 Ark. 543, 39 S. W.
850 ; Dartmouth Savings Bank v. School District, &c., 6 Dak. 332 ;
People V. Keechler, 194 111. 235, 62 N. E. 525 ; Henricks v. State,
151 Ind. 454, 50 N. E. 559, 51 N. E. 933 ; Perrizo v. Kesler, 93 Mich.
280, 53 N. W. 391 ; State v. School District, 42 Minn. 357, 44 N. W.
120 ; State v. Hill, 152 Mo. 234, 53 S. W. 1062 ; School District, &e.,
V. School District &c., 55 Neb. 716, 76 N. W. 420; State v. Gang,
10 N. D. 331, 87 N, W. 5 ; State v. Wright, 17 Ohio St. 32 ; School
District, &c., V. LincoLi County, 9 S. D. 291, 68 N. W. 746.
'Howard v. Forester, 109 Ky. 336, 59 S. W. 10; Butterfield
V. School District, &c., 61 Me. 583 ; State v. Browning, 28 N. J. L.
556 ; People v. Hooper, 13 Hun (N. Y.) 639 ; State v. Clifton, 113
Wis. 107, 88 N. W. 1019.
* Heard v. School Directors, 45 Pa. St. 93.
33
§20] OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
necessary for the purpose of giving said children school
privileges, the County Superintendent has authority
to make such temporary alteration of districts as will
accomphsh its purpose, and his decision may not be
collaterally attacked.^ But such authority does not
authorize a change in boundaries of districts with-
out notice.^ Where the officials making the altera-
tion acted within their jurisdiction, the remedy by
which the legahty of an alteration of a school district
may be tested is on information in the nature of quo
warranto against the proper officers; and the legality
cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding.'
If the territory of a school district is changed, the
original organization will retain all of its property
unless some statutory provision is made to the con-
trary,* and no apportionment of funds may be made
in the absence of a statute providing for such appor-
tionment.*
Upon organizing new districts out of an old one in
1 State V. Palmer, 18 Neb. 644, 26 N. W. 469.
2 School District, &c., v. Coleman, 39 Neb. 391, 58 N. W. 146.
' School Directors v. School Directors, 135 111. 464, 28 N. E. 49;
State V. Palmer, 18 Neb. 644, 26 N. W. 469 ; School District, &c., v.
Gibbs, 52 Kan. 564, 35 Pac. 222 ; Roeser v. Gartland, 75 Mich. 143,
42 N. W. 687.
School District, &c., v. School District, &c., 55 Neb. 716, 76 N. W.
420.
* Winona v. School District, &c., 40 Minn. 13, 41 N. W. 539;
Briggs V. School District, &c., 21 Wis. 348.
5 Cooke V. School District, &c., 12 Colo. 453, 21 Pac. 496 ; State
V. School District, &c., 90 Mo. 395, 2 S. W. 420 ; Morrow County v.
Hendryx, 14 Ore. 397, 12 Pac. 806 ; Joint School District, &c., v.
School District, &c., 92 Wis. 608, 66 N. W. 794. But see, Towle v.
Brown, 110 Ind. 599, 10 N. E. 628.
34
Ch. II] ABOLITION OF DISTRICTS [§ 20
the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary,
a new district takes the property which happens to
fall within its limits,^ and new districts also assume the
UabiUty of the old districts.* Statutes providing for
a transfer of Uabilities to a new schqol district have
been held constitutional.*
Where the statute authorizes the combining of
several school districts for their common good, and
provides that the several school committees shall
combine into one joint committee which shall be the
agents for each of the towns entering into the aUiance,
the power of employing and dismissing a teacher rests
with the joint committee, and the non-concurrence
of a part of the joint committee which stands as the
school committee of one of the towns, will not relieve
that town from liability for the lawful acts of the joint
committee.^
When a schoolhouse is erected by a district, the
legal title vests in the district. But the district may
be considered as holding the property in trust for the
town or its inhabitants. And when the town abohshes
one district and creates another, the property immedi-
ately vests in the new district, as property holden in
* School District, &c., v. Tapley, 1 Allen (Mass.) 49 ; Whitmore
V. Hogan, 22 Me. 564; Board, &c., v. Board, &c., 30 W. Va. 424,
4 S. E. 640; Goulding v. Peabody, 170 Mass. 483, 49 N. E. 752;
Barre v. School District, &c., 69 Vt. 374, 37 Atl. 1111.
^ Brewer v. Palmer, 13 Mich. 104 ; School District, &c., v. Green-
field, 64 N. H. 84, 6 Atl. 484; McCully v. Board, &c., 63 N. J. L.
18, 42 Atl. 776.
8 Perrizo v. Kesler, 93 Mich. 280, 53 N. W. 391 ; Rawson v.
Spencer, 113 Mass. 40.
* Freeman v. Bourne, 170 Mass. 289, 49 X. E. 435.
35
§ 211 OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
trust passes from one trustee to another, when one
dies, resigns, or is removed, and another is appointed
in his stead. If any time elapsed between the aboli-
tion of one district and the estabUshment of another,
the legal title of the property might be said to vest
in the cestui que trust or to he in abeyance. But such
a case can hardly be supposed to exist, for the formation
of the new districts is the annihilation of the old ones.
The same act of the town accomplishes both objects
simultaneously. Whenever therefore a town forms
new districts, by aboUshing the old ones, the legal
title to the existing schoolhouse vests in those of the
new districts within whose territory they happen to fall.'
Upon a separation of the district in which a school
officer resides, so that his place of residence is no longer
in the district which he theretofore represented, his
office becomes immediately vacant and may be filled
by appointment.^ And where two districts are united
into one, and the name of one of the districts thus
consohdated is given to the consolidated district, such
district is a new one.'
§ 21. Powers and Management of Districts.
A school district usually has the power to purchase,
hire, or build schoolhouses, and to determine the
amount of money necessary to be used for that pur-
pose, as well as the power to raise the necessary funds,^
' Stoneham District v. Richardson, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 62.
" School District v. Wolf, 78 Kan. 805, 98 Pac. 237.
^ Barnes v. Ovitt, 47 Vt. 316.
* Oilman v. Bassett, 33 Conn. 298 ; George v. Second School
District, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 497 ; Peters v. Warren Township, 98 Mich.
36
Ch.II] management of districts [§21
and for the purpose of providing funds for building
purposes a school district has the power to issue bonds.^
In some States, however, bonds cannot be issued, but
the funds may be raised by taxation,^ and, if the elec-
tors of the district fail to act, the board of directors
has the power to determine the amount to be raised.'
A school district can exercise no powers other than
those conferred by statute, or necessarily implied in
connection therewith,* although school districts are
usually empowered to make contracts in relation to
school matters,^ such powers being always subject
to the constitutional and statutory limitations." They
are also usually vested with the power of holding
property for school purposes.^
Where it is necessary to hire a house or special room
for school purposes, the school ofl&cers have the power
54, 56 N. W. 1051 ; Blake v. Sturtevant, 12 N. H. 567 ; Benjamin v.
HuU, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 437 ; Greenbanks v. BoutweU, 43- Vt. 207.
1 Vaughan v. School District, &c., 27 Ore. 57, 39 Pac. 393 ; Fol-
som V. School Directors, 91 111. 402.
2 Richardson v. McReynolds, 114 Mo. 641, 21 S. W. 901.
* Stevenson v. District Township, 35 Iowa 462 ; Oilman v.
Bassett, 33 Conn. 298 ; Blake v. Sturtevant, 12 N. H. 567.
* School District, &c., v. Bailey, 12 Me. 254; Third School
District v. Atherton, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 105 ; Bank v. Brainerd, &c.,
49 Minn. 106, 51 N. W. 814 ; Buchanan v. School District, 25 Mo.
App. 85 ; Famum's Petition, 51 N. H. 376 ; Gould v. Board, &c., 34
Hun (N. Y.) 16; State v. Bacon, 31 S. C. 120, 9 S. E. 765; Board,
&c., V. Board, &e., 30 W. Va. 424, 4 S. E. 640.
^ Baker v. Chambles, 4 Greene (la.) 428.
« Everett v. Independent School District, 109 Fed. 697 ; Camp-
bell V. Indianapolis, 155 Ind. 186, 57 N. E. 920; Edmundson v.
Independent School District, 98 Iowa 639, 67 N. W. 671 ; Wilson v.
Board, &c., 12 S. D. 535, 81 N. W. 952.
^ Carson v. State, 27 Ind. 465; Le Couteulx v. Buffalo, 33 N. Y.
335 ; Locker v. KeUer, 110 Iowa, 707, 80 N. W. 433,
37
§ 21] OP SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
to do SO,* and, if the school directors fail to provide
a suitable room or building for school purposes, manda-
mus will lie to compel them to do so.^ In some States
it is provided that the power of providing schoolhouses
is vested in school officers instead of in the electors ; '
but it is held that school boards or their agents have
no power to exceed the amount of appropriations
or a prescribed amount, and that, if they do so,
the district will not be bound beyond the amount
limited.*
By statute it is generally made the duty of the dis-
trict board of directors, or some other officials, to take
control of and manage the property used for school
purposes in the district. Incidental to these duties
they have the authority to bring suit for any injury
to the school property.^ Another incident of the
trustees is that they may invest a reasonable amount
in insurance,® and have the authority to contract for
repairs.'
It has been held that school directors may not au-
1 Scripture v. Burns, 59 Iowa 70, 12 N. W. 760 ; Allen v. School
District, &c., 15 Pick. (Mass.) 35 ; Millard v. Board, &c., 19 111.
App. 48.
2 School Directors v. People, 186 lU. 331, 57 N. E. 780.
3 In re Walker, 179 Pa. St. 24, 36 Atl. 148.
* Wilson V. School District, &c., 32 N. H. 118; McGillivray v.
Joint School District, &c., 112 Wis. 354, 88 N. W. 310.
^ Alderman v. School Directors, 91 HI. 179 ; School District, &c.,
V. Arnold, 21 Wis. 657.
^ Clark School Township v. Home Insurance Co., 20 Ind. App.
543, 51 N. E. 107.
' Knowles v. School District, &c., 63 Me. 261 ; Giles v. School
District, &c., 31 N. H. 304; Van Dolsen v. Board, &c., 162 N. Y.
446, 56 N. E. 990.
38
Ch. II] DISTRICT MEETINGS [§22
thorize the use of school property for other than school
purposes, such as religious meetings,^ although statutes
permitting directors to authorize the use of school
property for reUgious purposes have been held con-
stitutional.^ It has also been held that there is no
authority to use school property for pohtical or social
gatherings,^ or for public meetings to discuss matters
of general interest. And not even a majority of the
taxpayers of a district, against the objection of another
taxpayer of the district, can authorize such use by
formal vote or otherwise.* But in Indiana it has
been held that township trustees may use school prop-
erty for any township purposes, including the holding
of elections.^
In some States authority to select a site upon which
to erect a school building is left to the voters of the
particular district,^ while in other States certain officials
specified by statute are given the power to make the
selection.''
§ 22. District Meetings.
School district meetings are called in accordance
with the provisions governing the procedure of warn-
1 Hysong v. Gallitzin, &c., 164 Pa. St. 629, 30 Atl. 482.
2 Nichols V. School Directors, 93 111. 61.
* Spencer v. Joint School District, &c., 15 Kan. 259.
* Bender v. Streabich, 182 Pa. St. 251, 37 Atl. 853 ; Spencer v.
Joint School District, &c., 15 Kan. 259.
* Harmony, &c., v. Osborne, 9 Ind. 458.
8 Leighton v. Ossipee, &c., 66 N. H. 548, 31 Atl. 899 ; School
Directors v. People, 90 III. App. 670.
^ Rodgers v. Independent School District, 100 Iowa 317, 69 N. W.
544; Roth v. MarshaU, 158 Pa. St. 272, 27 Atl. 945.
39
§ 22] OP SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
ing and calling usually provided by statute,* and the
power to warn for meeting is distinct from the power
to call.^
Where the clerk is empowered to call annual meet-
ings of a school district, he cannot, by reason of this
limitation upon his authority, call any meetings other
than such annual meetings.' If the statutes authorize
a third person to call a meeting of a school district
when the designated officers fail to act, such officer
may also act when the designated officers have illegally
called a meeting,* and proceedings of a meeting illegally
held may be ratified at a subsequent legal meeting.^
Where the statute provides for a meeting to be called
upon application of a designated number of voters,
the apphcation must be strictly made in accordance
with the statutes.
It is usually provided by statute that the officer
calling the meeting shall give notice of the time, place
and purpose of the meeting, and unless the statute
be strictly followed the proceedings of the meeting
will be invalid.^ Where the time and place of a meet-
ing is designated by statute, it is not necessary to state
* Fletcher v. Lincolnville, 20 Me. 439 ; Starbird v. School District,
51 Me. 101 ; Giles v. School District, 31 N. H. 304 ; State v. Lockett,
54 Mo. App. 202 ; Holland v. Davies, 36 Ark. 446.
2 Stone V. School District, 8 Gush. (Mass.) 592.
8 Third School District v. Atherton, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 105.
* Pickering v. De Rochemont, 66 N. H. 377, 23 Atl. 88.
^ Jordan v. School District, &c., 38 Me. 164.
^ Bartlett v. Kinsley, 15 Gonn. 327 ; Fletcher v. Lincolnville,
20 Me. 439 ; Perry v. Dover, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 206 ; Davis v. Rapp,
43 N. J. L. 594 ; Hunt v. School District, &c., 14 Vt. 300 ; Ghapin v.
School District, 30 N. H. 25.
40
Ch. II] DISTRICT MEETINGS [§22
it in the notice,' and a date on the notice is not essen-
tial.^ If the statute requires that a notice of the meet-
ing specify the object for which the meeting is called,
no other matters not connected therewith may be law-
fully acted upon.* But the object of the meeting may
be unnecessary in the notice of an annual meeting.*
And where a notice of the purposes for which a meet-
ing is called is necessary it must be clearly expressed.^
The meeting should be opened within a reasonable time
after the hour specified in the notice, and, where it is
alleged that the meeting was not properly called, the
one making the allegation has the burden of proving
it."
It is necessary that a meeting of the inhabitants of
a school district should be opened within a reasonable
time after the hour specified. What would be a reason-
able time depends in some measure, upon the circum-
stances of each particular case. If the delay is for
the mere purpose of enabling all the inhabitants to
assemble, and without prejudice to any one, it would
I Hodgldn V. Fry, 33 Ark. 716 ; State v. Edwards, 151 Mo. 472,
52 S. W. 373.
* Braley v. Dickinson, 48 Vt. 599 ; Jordan v. School District,
&c., 38 Me. 164 ; Hideout v. School District, 1 Allen (Mass.) 232.
« Wright V. North School District, 53 Conn. 576, 5 Atl. 708;
Lander v. School District, 33 Me. 239 ; Whitney v. Stowe, 111 Mass.
368; Holbrook v. Faulkner, 55 N. H. 311 ; School District, &c., v.
Smith, 67 Vt. 566, 32 Atl. 484,
* Seabury v. Howland, 15 R. I. 446, 8 Atl. 341.
' Bartlett v. Kingsley, 15 Conn. 327; Reed v. Acton, 117 Mass.
384 ; Peters v. Warren, &c., 98 Mich. 54, 56 N, W. 1051 ; People v.
Board, &c.,?48 Hun (N. Y.) 618, 1 N. Y. S. 593 ; Weeks v. Batchelder,
41 Vt. 317!
' South School District v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn. 227.
41
§ 22] OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
be outrageously unjust to hold their proceedings illegal.
But on the other hand if the delay were such as to
create a general belief that no meeting would be holden,
and thereby induce the greater body of the inhabitants
to disperse, and a few were afterward to open the
meeting and pass votes which could not have been
passed except for the delay, it would be unjust to
hold them legal and binding. Therefore it has been
held that a delay of one hour and five minutes, not
shown unreasonable, is of itself not sufficient to
invaUdate the proceedings of such meeting, although
it was further shown that a few persons had gone
away for the very purpose of preventing the meeting
from acting.^
A school district meeting should be characterized
by fair play, frankness and Uberahty, and not savor
too much of the factional caucus, to justify its judicial
sanction. Where the electors of a school district
met at three o'clock, organized forty minutes later,
proceeded to vote, and thirty minutes after organizing,
adjourned, the president declared the polls closed.
Then twenty minutes thereafter while all the people
composing the meeting were present in the voting place,
with the president in the chair and the secretary in
his place, two quaUfied electors appeared and tendered
their votes which were refused on the ground that the
polls had closed. The court held that these votes
should have been received and counted.^
Where the statute provides that the annual school
1 South School District v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn. 227.
2 State V. Woolem, 39 Iowa 380.
42
Ch. II] NOTICE OR WARNING OF MEETINGS [§23
meeting of each district shall be held on a certain date
it is mandatory, and it must be held on that date ; other-
wise any election of officers will be illegal.' But it
is not necessary that officers be elected within the
bounds of the district, if the meeting held outside of
the district is otherwise unobjectionable.^
Where the notice of a special school meeting speci-
fies the hour at which it will begin, and the meeting
is opened promptly at the time specified, the business
transacted therein will not be invahd because the meet-
ing was adjourned within a half hour.^ And where
parhamentary rules are not strictly followed in the
adjom-nment of a school district meeting, the adjourn-
ment is not thereby invahdated where all electors
present acquiesced.*
In the case of a meeting adjourned to a fixed time,
any matters may be acted on that might have been
legally acted on at the preceding meeting, providing
no intervening rights of third parties have become
vested in the meantime.^
§ 23. Warning or Notice of Meetings.
A notice, when required by statute, is generally
held not binding unless given as the law directs or
allows.* And the notice, required by statute, of a
1 State V. Cones, 15 Neb. 444, 19 N. W. 682; WiUard v. Pike,
59 Vt. 202, 9 Atl. 907.
2 Myer v. CrispeU, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 54.
3 Regan v. School District, &c., 44 Wash. 523, 87 Pac. 828.
* Reeves v. Ryder, 91 Kan. 639, 138 Pac. 592.
5 Reed v. Acton, 117 Mass. 384; Maher v. State, 32 Neb. 354, 49
N. W. 436, 441.
« AUen V. Strickland, 100 N. C. 225, 6 S. E. 780.
43
§23] OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
school district election is essential to the vahdity
of such election ; ^ although in New York, the statute
requiring notice of school meetings is held to be direc-
tory only, and the want of notice unless wilfully or
fraudulently omitted, does not render its meeting in-
vahd, nor the proceedings void.^
It is usually provided by statute that when a new
school district is to be formed, notice thereof is to be
given the inhabitants of the district by posting, or by
pubUcation.^ In the issuance of such notiee mere
informahties are not jurisdictional defects, nor is the
fact that the notice covers territory not actually taken.^
But misinformation as to the date, such as publishing
the meeting for the 11th of August, while the meet-
ing was actually held the 8th of August, makes the
matter jurisdictional and the entire proceedings in-
valid.^ And the requirement of notice is jiirisdictional,
therefore if no notice be given, even though a consent
be filed by a majority of the citizens of the district
affected, the proceedings are invaUd because the
minority always have a right to be heard, ^ The pub-
' State V. Staley, 90 Kan. 624, 135 Pac. 602.
2 Marchant v. Langworthy, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 646; Contra: Gentle v.
School Inspectors, 73 Mich. 40, 40 N. W. 928.
^Butterfield v. School District, &c., 61 Me. 583; First School
District v. Ufford, 52 Conn. 44; Gravel Hill School District v. Old
Farm School District, 55 Conn. 244, 10 Atl. 689 ; Irvin v. Gregory,
86 Ga. 605, 13 S. E. 120 ; Fractional School District, &c., v. Metcalf,
93 Mich. 497, 53 N. W. 627 ; Ferryman v. Bethune, 89 Mo. 158,
1 S. W. 231 ; State v. Graham, 60 Wis. 395, 19 N. W. 359.
* Parman v. School Inspectors, 49 Mich. 63, 12 N. W. 910.
^ Coulter V. School Inspectors, 59 Mich. 391, 26 N. W. 649.
* Gentle v. School Inspectors, 73 Mich. 40, 40 N. W. 928.
44
Ch. II] NOTICE OR WARNING OP MEETINGS [§ 23
lication or posting of the notice is also jurisdictional ; '
but it has been, held that appearance at a meeting
called to act upon a petition for redistricting, is a
waiver of notice and irregularity in the issuance of it.^
Where a mode is provided for the calling of meet-
ings, that mode must be strictly followed, and it is
not sufficient to show that a meeting was in fact held
and attended by aU inhabitants who were quaUfied to
attend.' And where different parties call and hold
legal meetings, the first legally held has precedence.*
Where the statute provides that if the official who
primarily has the duty to call a meeting, neglects or
refuses to do so,- then some other specified officials
have that duty, such neglect or refusal must exist
and be shown to make valid the proceedings of a meet-
ing called by the officials secondarily having that
duty.^
Authority to warn meetings does not include author-
ity to call meetings ; ® and a meeting called to see if
the district will prescribe the mode of calling all futm-e
meetings of the district, will not authorize the vote
of the meetiQg on a mode of warning future meetings.''
A statute providing that all warnings for school dis-
trict meetings shall, before the same are posted, be
» Graves v. Joint School Inspectors, &c., 102 Mich. 634, 61 N. W.
60 ; State v. Compton, 28 Neb. 485, 44 N. W. 660.
2 School District, &c., v. Garr, 55 N. H. 452.
' Moore v. Newfield, 4 Me. 44 ; School District, &c., v. Lord,
44 Me. 374.
* School District, &c., v. Lord, 44 Me. 374.
8 Starbird v. School District, &c., 51 Me. 101.
« Stone V. School District, &c., 8 Gush. (Mass.) 592.
^ Rideout v. School District, Ac, 1 Allen (Mass.) 232.
45
§ 23] OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
recorded by the town clerk of such school district,
is merely directory, and a neglect upon the part of a
clerk to comply with it does not vitiate the proceed-
ings of the meeting if otherwise regular.^
Where the statute requires that the time and place
of a warned meeting shall be specified in the warning,
if the time for holding the meeting is omitted in such
warniug the proceedings of such meeting are invalid.^
And where the warning of a district meeting is required
by the statute to state the business to be transacted,
the omission thereof from the warning is not rendered
vahd by the fact that for nine years previously such
omission had been made,* inasmuch as the powers
of a school district being wholly statutory they cannot
be enlarged nor diminished by proof of usage,* and
abuses of power and violation of rights derive no
sanction from time or usage.^
Where the time for holding annual meetings is
fixed by statute, it is not necessary to state the time
in the notice; the place of holding such meetings is
sufficient.® And such notice requires the signatures
of only a majority of the directors ; ^ but a minority
is not sufficient.^
1 Adams v. Sleeper, 64 Vt. 544, 24 Atl. 990 ; People v. Allen,
6 Wend. (N. Y.) 487; Torrey v. Millbury, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 64;
Colt V. Eves, 12 Conn. 253.
^ Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt. 439.
« Scott V. School District, &c., 67 Vt. 150, 31 Atl. 145.
* Dillon on Munic. Corp., 5th ed., § 240.
' Hood V. Lynn, 1 Allen (Mass.) 103.
^ Hodgkin v. Fry, 33 Ark. 716.
' Davies v. Holland, 43 Ark. 425.
8 State i;. Lockett, 54 Mo. App. 202.
46
Ch. II] NOTICE OR WARNING OF MEETINGS [§ 23
Special meetings of school districts should have the
object so expressed in the calling, warrant or notice
that the inhabitants of the district may fairly under-
stand the purpose for which they are convened.^ And
the mere omission of a punctuation mark will not
invalidate a notice otherwise clear. ^ A vote on a
matter of business not referred to in the notice of a
special meeting is not valid,^ and a certified copy of
such vote is inadmissible in evidence.^ A notice to
meet for the purpose of obtaining information about
an assessment of property in the district, will not
include the appointment or employment of counsel.^
Where at an annual meeting the time and place of
the next annual meeting is then fixed, it is not necessary
to give notice of the time and place of such next meet-
ing, and a meeting held at such time and place with-
out notice will be valid/
In computing the length of time during which notice
of a meeting of a school district was given, the same
rule wiU be applied as in the case of service of process,
in that either the day on which the notice was posted
or the day on which the meeting was held will be
counted.^ When a special election is held in the same
1 South School District v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn. 227 ; Peters v.
Warren Township, 98 Mich. 54, 56 N. W. 1051 ; Bartlett v. Kinsley,
15 Conn. 327.
2 Merritt v. Farris, 22 LI. 303.
3 Passage v. Board, &c., 19 Mich. 330; Little v. Merrill, 10 Pick.
(Mass.) 543.
* Wilson V. WaltersviUe, &c., 44 Conn. 157.
s Wright V. North School District, 53 Conn. 576, 5 Atl. 708.
6 Marchant v. Langworthy, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 646.
' Mason v. School District, &c., 20 Vt. 487.
47
8 24] OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
schoolhouse of a district where the previous two special
elections were held, the validity of such election is
not impaired by the fact that the notice thereof did
not specify the place at which it would be held.^ And
the return of an officer that he had warned the inhabi-
tants of the town is sufficient without stating the
manner in which he warned them.^
§ 24. Electors and Votes of District Meeting.
The electors of a school district are usually the tax-
payers of either poll or estate taxes or both. And
one who is merely a payer of poll tax is of equal stand-
ing with those who pay taxes on property. If the
statute provides that women shall be eligible to vote
on all school measures and questions, they are entitled
to vote on the issue of bonds for school purposes.*
Unless otherwise provided by statute, the voting
at a school district meeting may be by ballot,* and a
record of the proceedings of school district meetings
must be kept by proper officers and in the form pre-
scribed by statute.^ And even where a statute pro-
vides that a vote of a school district to acquire lands
for school purposes shall be by ballot, such require-
ment is directory only, and a vote taken by showing
of hands is legal.*
» Younts V. Union County, 151 N. C. 582, 66 S. E. 575.
* Houghton V. Davenport, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 435, overruling Perry
p. Dover, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 206.
3 Stuessy ». LouisviQe, 156 Ky. 523, 161 S. W. 564; Olive v.
School District, &o., 86 Neb. 135, 125 N. W. 141.
* Chamberlain v. Board, &c., 57 N. J. L:605, 31 Atl. 1033.
^ Higgins V. Reed, 8 Iowa 298.
« State V. Superior Court, 69 Wash. 189, 124 Pac. 484.
48
Ch. Ill ELECTORS AND VOTES OF MEETING [§ 24
If the vote of a school district be fairly taken upon
proper notice, it is not invalid for the reason that only
a minority of the school commissioners is present in
compliance with a statute imposing upon them the
duty of supervising the voting.^
A required majority of voters of a school district
means a majority vote of the quaUfied voters present
and voting at a district meeting, and does not mean
a majority of all quahfied voters in the district.^
If a vote to levy a tax is decided adversely at a
district meeting, a special meeting may be called to
act thereon at which meeting favorable action may be
legally taken.^ And a school district may at a legal
meeting held before the assessment is called, rescind
their Vote to levy a tax passed at a previous meeting.^
But after a tax has been assessed and committed to
the collector, and he has commenced the collection
of it, the vote to levy may not be reconsidered.^ And
an act requiring a two-thirds vote to pass it, cannot
be rescinded by a bare majority.^
Where the statute provides that the school direc-
tors shall have the general charge and superintendence
» Chiles V. Todd, 43 Ky. 126.
« Richardson v. McReynolds, 114 Mo. 641, 21 S. W. 901 ; Tucker
V. McKay, 131 Mo. App. 728, 111 S. W. 867 ; Crandall v. Trustees,
&c., 51 N. J. L. 138, 16 Atl. 194; Sanford v. Prentice, 28 Wis. 358.
But see. School District, &c., v. Oellien, 209 Mo. 464, 108 S. W. 529.
' Trustees, &c., v. Lewis, 35 N. J. L. 377 ; Stackhouse v. Clark,
52 N. J. L. 291, 19 Atl. 462.
* Pond V. Negus, 3 Mass. 230.
8 Mitchell V. Brown, 18 N. H. 315 ; Smith v. Dillingham, 4 Barb.
(N. Y.) 25.
6 Stockdale v. Wayland, &c., 47 Mich. 226, 10 N. W. 349.
49
§25] OP SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
of all the public schools, they act as pubUc officers
entrusted with certain powers and are charged with
corresponding duties. They are not merely agents
of the town in which the school is located, and may
disregard any vote of the inhabitants relating to their
duties. So where school directors in good faith and
in the exercise of good judgment, closed a school,
there being other adequate schools for public instruc-
tion, a vote of the town to reopen the closed school
may be disregarded by the school directors.^
§ 26. Records and Minutes.
Where the statute makes it the duty of the secre-
tary of the school district to keep all records of the
proceedings of the board and district meetings in sepa-
rate books, to be kept for that purpose, such require-
ments are not mandatory, but are merely directory.
And although prudence would dictate that the records
be so kept, the fact that the direction of the statute
was not followed, but the records were kept on loose
sheets, variant in size, will not make the proceedings
void.^
Under a statutory requirement that the ayes and
nays be recorded, it is not necessary to so record an
unanimous vote, but it is sufficient to record the vote
as unanimous.* And where the statute requires the
clerk of a school district to act as secretary of a school
meeting, the will of the meeting cannot be frustrated
» Morse v. Ashley, 193 Mass. 294, 79 N. E. 481.
2 Higgins V. Reed, 8 Iowa 298.
* Genessee, &c., v. McDonald, 98 Pa. St. 444.
50
Ch. II] DISTRICT CLAIMS AND ACTIONS [§ 26
by the clerk's refusal to act as secretary, but a secre-
tary pro tern may be appointed whose entries will be
evidence of the proceedings of the meeting.^
A clerk of a school district has a right to amend the
minutes so that they will conform to the proceedings,^
but he has not, after he is out of oflSce and his successor
occupies the oflSce, the right to amend the records of
the district,' nor can the records be amended, on trial of
a cause, so as to make them agree with the decision of
a court.^
The original records of a school district are evidence
of its proceedings,^ but where the original records
have been lost the contents may be proved in accordance
with the usual rules of evidence.®
§ 26. District Claims and Actions.
A school district, by statute made a corporation,
may sue in any court of the State having competent
jurisdiction. '^ But school directors have no implied
authority to prosecute or defend actions out of the
school fimds,^ and a vote of a district for its prudential
committee to " look into the rights of the district "
1 State V. McKee, 20 Oreg. 120, 25 Pac. 292.
2 Vaughn v. School District, &c., 27 Oreg. 57, 39 Pac. 393 ; Harris
V. School District, &c., 28 N. H. 58 ; Hoag v. Durfey, 1 Aik. (Vt.)
286.
3 Third School District v. Atherton, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 105.
" Hadley v. ChamberHn, 11 Vt. 618.
5 South School District v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn. 227 ; Williams v.
School District, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 75 ; Richardson v. Sheldon, 1 Pinn.
(Wis.) 624. * Higgins v. Reed, 8 Iowa 298.
^ Clarke v. School District, 84 Ark. 516, 106 S. W. 677,
8 Hotchkiss V. Pluakett, 60 Conn. 230, 22 Atl. 535.
51
§ 26] OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
does not imply authority to prosecute an action.^
Such authority, unless given by statute, can be given
only by an affirmative vote of the electors of a district
at a legally called meeting.
A school district at its annual meeting may by the
lawful vote of its electors recognize and pay equitable
claims, although they are not strictly legal demands.^
And if the law makes a demand necessary, before
bringing suit or taking other steps to collect the claim,
it is not necessary where the school directors have
voted not to pay a claim that has not yet been pre-
sented to them. No demand is then necessary before
taking such other action as the law gives the claimant.'
Where a school board is made a body corporate, a
suit to recover in favor of the corporation must be
brought in its corporate name.* Likewise a suit to
recover a claim against the district must be brought
against it in its corporate name, and not against the
individuals comprising the board of trustees, although
describing them as trustees.'
A civil and a school township are in some States
distinct corporations even though represented by the
same individual officers, and bounded by the same
geographical lines, therefore in such States an action
not showing against which township it is brought,
» Burgess v. School District,' 100 Mass. 132.
2 Stockdale v. Wayland, &c., 47 Mich. 226, 10 N. W. 349.
* Horton v. Ocheyedan, 49 Iowa 231.
* Stewart v. Thornton, 75 Va. 215 ; Kingsley v. Plum, &c., 2
Pa. St. 28.
' Sproul V. Smith, 40 N. J. L. 314 ; See also. Ex parte Collins,
49 Ala. 69; Shoudy v. School Directors, 32 111. 290.
52
Ch. II] DISTRICT CLAIMS AND ACTIONS [§ 26
must be dismissed.^ And where the civil and school
townships are distinct, an action against the " trustee
of the township " is conclusively presumed to be against
the trustee of the civil township and not of the school
township.^
Although an injunction generally lies to restrain
pubhc corporations from committing threatened acts
in violation of law, and their duty, it has been held
that an injunction in the name of the State, on the
relation of the Attorney General will not he to restrain
the collection of taxes levied by a school district to
pay void bonds theretofore issued. The reason upon
which the decision was grounded being that the State,
as such, had no interest in the subject matter, and that
each taxpayer could protect himself, or all could unite,
to prevent a multiplicity of suits, in a single bill to
restrain the collection of the illegal tax.'
The statute of limitations may be reUed on as a
defense in an action against a school district,* but a
school district, by vote of its electors, may do acts
which amount to a promise to pay, and thereby take
a debt of the district out of the operation of the statute
of limitations.
If there is within the borders of a town a free school
of equal grade with a high school although not within
the control of the committee on public schools, and
» Jarvis v. Robertson, 126 Ind. 281, 26 N. E. 182 ; Utica x. Miller,
62 Ind. 230.
2 Teeple v. State, 171 Ind. 268, 86 N. E. 49.
' State V. McLaughlin, 15 Kan. 228.
* Bank of Gallatin v. Baber, 74 Tenn. 273.
53
§ 26] OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
not supported in any way by the town in which it is
located, and was never approved by the State Board
of Education, an inhabitant of that town cannot re-
cover from the town the cost of tuition in the high
school of another town.^
Individual members of a school district made a body
corporate, have no right to appear and be heard in
defense of an action against the district ; * but an
execution against the inhabitants of a school district
may, in some States, be levied on the property of an
individual member of the district, and may be so
levied, in the first instance, even if there be corporate
property of the district, which can be taken and ap-
plied towards satisfaction of such execution.' In this
respect a school district is analogous to towns/ But
in Texas a judgment against a school district cannot
be enforced by execution, mandamus being the proper
remedy.*
The regularity and formation of a school district
cannot be attacked in a collateral suit.® And where a
school district has been in continued existence for a
» Hurlburt v. Boxford, 171 Mass. 501, 50 N. E. 1043.
2 Lane v. Weymouth, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 462.
' GaskiU v. Dudley, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 646.
* McLoud V. Selby, 10 Conn. 390 ; Chase v. Merrimac Bank,
19 Pick. (Mass.) 564. But see, Kenyon v. Clark, 2 R. I. 67.
5 CroweU, &c., v. First Nat'l Bk., 163 S. W. (Tex.) 339.
* School District, &c., v. School District, &c., 45 Kan. 543,
26 Pac. 43 ; State v. Donahay, 30 N. J. L. 404 ; Reynolds v. Moore,
9 Wend. (N. Y.) 35 ; Keweenaw Association v. School District, &c.,
98 Mich. 437, 57 N. W. 404; Burnham w. Rogers, 167 Mo. 17,
66 S. W. 970 ; State v. Central Pac. R. Co., 21 Nev. 75, 25 Pac. 296 ;
Hamilton v. San Diego County, 108 Cal. 273, 41 Pac. 305 ; Alderman
V. School Directors, 91 111. 179. But see, Orrick, &c., v. Dorton,
54
Ch. II] DISTRICT TORTS [§ 27
number of years with the acquiescence of the inhabit-
ants therein the legality of its formation will be pre-
smned without resort to record.^
§ 27. District Torts.
A private action cannot be maintained against a
town or other quasi corporation for a neglect of cor-
porate duty, unless such action be given by statute.
This rule of law, however, is of hmited appUcation.
It is applied, in case of towns, only to the neglect or
omission of a town to perform those duties which are
imposed on all towns, without their corporate assent,
and exclusively for public purposes; and not to the
neglect of those obligations which a town incurs, when
a special duty is imposed on it, with its consent, express
or impUed, or a special authority is conferred on it,
at its request. Consequently a town, which has
assmned the duties of school districts, is not liable for
an injury sustained by a scholar attending the public
school, from a dangerous excavation in the schoolhouse
yard, owing to the negligence of the town officers.^
A municipal corporation, in absence of an express
statute, is liable for negligent injm-y to persons; but
a quasi corporation being Uable only when made so
by statute, such corporate bodies as school districts,
125 Mo. 439, 28 S. W. 765 ; Green Mountain, &c., v. Savage, 15
Mont. 189, 38 Pac. 940 ; Thomas v. Gibson, 11 Vt. 607.
1 Stevens v. School District, &c., 30 Mich. 63 ; Rice v. McClelland,
58 Mo. 116 ; Bowen v. King, 34 Vt. 156 ; Presque Isle County v.
Thompson, 61 Fed. 914.
2 Bigelow V. Randolph, 14 Gray (Mass.) 541 ; SuUivan v. Boston,
126 Mass. 540.
55
§ 27] OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
boards of education and other quasi corporations, are
not impliedly liable for the wrongful acts and negUgence
of its officers or agents in maintaining and repairing
school buildings.^
School boards are involuntary quasi corporations
for the exercise of governmental functions, and in
absence of an express statute imposing Uability for
negUgence are not liable for acts of negUgence.^ And
a school district is not hable for conversion by its direc-
tors,^ nor for neghgence in providing an unsafe convey-
ance for use in the transportation of pupils.*
A school district organized as a quasi corporation,
and solely for the public benefit, although capable of
suing and being sued is not hable for the trespasses,
negUgence, and other torts committed by its officers
unless made so by statute.^ They have no funds out
of which to pay damages, nor have they the power to
raise money by taxation or otherwise to apply to such
1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., 5th ed., §§ 38, 1658; HiU v. Boston,
122 Mass. 344; Kinnare v. Chicago, 171 111. 332, 49 N. E. 536;
McNeil V. Boston, 178 Mass. 326, 59 N. E. 810; Ernst v. West
Covington, 116 Ky. 850, 76 S. W. 1089; Bigelow v. Randolph,
14 Gray (Mass.) 541 ; Clark v. Nicholasville, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 974,
87 S. W. 300; Sullivan v. Boston, 126 Mass. 540; Howard v.
Worcester, 153 Mass. 426, 27 N. E. 11 ; Wixon v. Newport, 13 R. I.
454 ; Folk v. Milwaukee, 108 Wis. 359, 84 N. W. 420. But see,
Higbie v. New York, &c., 122 N. Y. App. Div. 483, 107 N. Y. S. 168.
2 Kinnare v. Chicago, 171 111. 332, 49 N. E. 536 ; Rock Island, &c.,
Co. V. EUiott, 59 Kan. 42, 51 Pac. 494 ; State v. Board, &e., 94 Md.
334, 51 Atl. 289 ; Board, &c., v. Volk, 72 Ohio St. 469, 74 N. E. 646.
' McClure v. Tipton, 79 Mo. App. 80.
* Harris v. Salem, 72 N. H. 424, 57 Atl. 332.
^ School District, &c., v. Williams, 38 Ark. 454 ; Freel v. Craw-
fordsviUe, 142 Ind. 27, 41 N. E. 312; Ford v. Kendall, &c., 121 Pa.
St. 543, 15 Atl. 812.
56
Ch. II] DISTRICT TORTS [§ 27
purposes. Their non-liability is the same as that of
townships and counties.^
A school district is not liable for the injury of a
pupil by reason of the janitor throwing kerosene oil
on a fire ; ^ injury to a pupil by a falling column while
repairs were being made ; ^ injury to a teacher from
a defective floor,* or other injuries caused by defective
condition of premises/ or by the negUgence of em-
ployees.* So where a school district was sued for an
injiu'y to a pupil caused by two small stumps on the
playgroimd which caught his foot and resulted in such
injury that an amputation of the leg was necessary,
the negligence in allowing the stumps to remain there
was held to be that of pubhc officers in relation to a
pubhc duty, and therefore the district was not liable.'
And the same conclusion was reached in a case where
a school committee was sued for damages resulting to
a party on a highway caused by the falling of a tree
being cut down by proper persons employed to fell
it on. the school lot; ^ also in a case where a pupil was
* Freel v. Gravrfordsville, supra cit.; Finch v. Toledo, &c., 36
Ohio St. 37 ; Cones v. Benton, &c., 137 Ind. 404, 37 N. E. 272.
2 Ford V. Kendall, &c., 121 Pa. St. 543, 15 Atl. 812.
3 Erie, &c., v. Fuess, 98 Pa. St. 600.
* Bassett v. Fish, 75 N. Y. 303.
6 Bank «;. Brainerd, &c., 49 Minn. 106, 51 N. W. 814 ; Sullivan v.
Boston, 126 Mass. 540; Lane v. Woodbury, &c., 58 Iowa 462,
12 N. W. 478 ; Wixon v. Newport, 13 R. I. 454 ; Ham v. New York,
70 N. Y. 459; Katz v. Board, &c., 162 N. Y. App. Div. 132, 147
N. Y. S. 327.
* Howard v. Worcester, 153 Mass. 426, 27 N. E. 11 ; Donovan v.
McAlpin, 85 N. Y. 185 ; Wood v. Independent, &c., 44 Iowa 27.
' Bank v. Brainerd, &c., 49 Minn. 106, 51 N. W. 814.
9 McKenna v. KimbaU, 145 Mass. 555, 14 N. E. 789.
57
§ 27] OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS [Ch. II
injured by falling into an open well on the play-
ground.^
But where the board of education selects one of its
members as an agent charged with the separate and
distinct duty of keeping a schoolhouse in repair, he
is individually liable for an injury caused by his failure
to do so.^
Where the statute provides that an action of tort
may be maintained against a school district, such
district is liable in an action for damages caused to a
pupil by the overturning of a receptacle of boiling
water negligently kept upon a register in the middle
of the schoolroom, the injured pupil being rightfully
in attendance at the school, even though the duty to
use care be a governmental one.' And school authori-
ties are liable for maintaining a flag pole in an unsafe
condition on a pubUc school building.^
A school district may maintain an action for tres-
pass to land dedicated for school purposes.®
» Finch V. Toledo, &c., 36 Ohio St. 37.
2 Bassett v. Fish, 75 N. Y. 303.
3 Redfield v. School District, &c., 48 Wash. 85, 92 Pac. 770.
^ McCarton v. City of New York, 149 N. Y. App. Div. 516, 133
N. Y. S. 939.
« Morris v. School District, 63 Ark. 149, 37 S. W. 569;
58
CHAPTER III
OF SCHOOL PROPERTY
§ 28. Power to Provide Land and Buildings.
A schoolhouse is a house appropriated for the use
of a school or schools, or for instruction/ and the power
to provide schoolhouses, as well as the power to de-
termine the amount necessary to defray the expenses
incident thereto, is primarily in the school district
or the school trustees.^ And any agents of a town,
having power to make contracts for the erection of a
schoolhouse, have power to ratify such a contract.^
When a district has power to erect a building for
school purposes, it is usual to exercise the authority
through the school directors or through a committee
specially appointed for that purpose, and such com-
mittee when legally appointed to erect, purchase, or
repair a schoolhouse are pubUc officers, and the act
of the majority is the act of the whole.^
If a contract for the erection of a schoolhouse, by
reason of an informality, is voidable, the contract
1 Webster's Diet.
2 Colt V. Roberts, 28 Conn. 330 ; Sheldon v. Central School Dis-
trict, 25 Conn. 224 ; School District, &c., v. Stough, 4 Neb. 357.
' Stevenson v. District, &c., 35 Iowa 462.
* Keyser v. District, &c., 35 N. H. 477.
69
§ 28] OP SCHOOL PROPERTY [Ch. m
may be ratified, and the acceptance and use of the
building by the district will operate as a ratification,
and render the district liable to the contractor for the
cost of the building.^
If the owner of land desired for school purposes gives
an unquaUfied refusal to sell the land at a reasonable
price, the land may be taken by right of eminent
domain without the consent of owner if damages are
tendered to him.^ But this power may not be exercised
without notice to the owner of the land.'
If the district neglect or refuse to act in providing
rooms for school purposes, the school committee are
authorized to provide rooms and employ teachers at
the expense of the district.*
Where the school directors provide schoolhouses
that are comfortable and safe, although they are
unsightly, cheap, unfit for permanent use, and hard to
keep in repair, they are not removable for neglect of
duty.'
If schoolhouses in sparsely populated districts are
so located by the school directors that the longest
distance required to be traveled by any scholars is
shghtly more than two miles, the exercise of their dis-
» Keyser v. District, &c., 35 N. H. 477 ; Fisher v. School District,
&c., 4 Gush. (Mass.) 494 ; Bellows v. District, &c., 70 Iowa 320,
30 N. W. 582 ; Kimball v. School District, &c., 28 Vt. 8 ; Sullivan v.
School District, &c., 39 Kan. 347, 18 Pac. 287.
^ Cousens v. School District, &c., 67 Me. 280 ; Storer v. Hobbs,
52 Me. 154 ; Gibbons v. Southwest School District, 4 Allen (Mass.)
508 ; True v. Melvin, 43 N. H. 503.
' Eighth School District v. Gopeland, 2 Gray (Mass.) 414.
* Gihnan v. Bassett, 33 Conn. 298.
' In re Ohio Township School Directors, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 392.
60
Ch. Ill] POWER TO PROVIDE [§ 28
cretion in so doing is not cause for their removal ex-
cept on eAddence showing want of good faith in their
acts.^
Where the school board takes official action as to the
number of schoolhouses necessary for a district, but fail
to provide a sufficient nxunber of buildings for school
pxirposes, they cannot be removed from office for neglect
of duty, such matters being within their discretion.^
Nor will the court remove school directors for neglect
to build new schoolhouses, where the expense would be
great, and the township is already deieply in debt.'
But a refusal to consider a request of citizens for en-
larged school accommodations where they are clearly
needed is a sufficient cause for removal.^
The school authorities in their discretion may ex-
change buildings between white and colored schools,
and the effect on property values in the neighborhood
cannot qualify their right to exercise their discretion.^
And where the statute authorizes the board of directors
to obtain at the expense of the district such highways
as may be necessary to secure access to a schoolhouse,
the authority is not limited to those instances where
there is no highway already existing from which access
may be had.*
Authority to purchase a site and erect a schoolhouse
thereon, may incidentally include the authority to pay a
1 Price V. Barrett, &c., 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 395.
^ Snavely v. School Directors, 1 Lane. L. Rev. (Pa.) 9.
3 In re Deny, &c., 2 Pear. (Pa.) 24.
* In re Connoquenessing, &c., 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 425.
B Roberts v. LouisviUe, &c., 16 Ky. L. Rep. 181, 26 S. W. 814.
« Bogaard v. Plain View, 93 Iowa, 269, 61 N. W. 859.
61
§ 29] OF SCHOOL PROPERTY [Ch. Ill
broker's cominission in the purchase of the site.^ And
it is within the powers of a school district to purchase
land on which to construct a playground for the children
of that district, even though such course includes the
erecting of a gymnasium.^
§ 29. Acquiring Site.
School districts are usually empowered by statute
to determine the location of their schoolhouses, and if
the inhabitants cannot agree then some other specified
body is to take the deciding action.^ But if the statute
provides that a location must be designated by the in-
habitants in a district meeting, the power of selection
cannot be delegated.* And in some States the initial
power of selection is in a special body.^ The location
of a schoolhouse being subject to the will of the major-
ity, may be changed as often as desired in absence of a
prohibiting statute.*
Where the location of a schoolhouse has been chosen,
it will not be invalidated by failure of the town clerk
to make due record of the matter,'' or in making a
mistake in the recording thereof.^ And where a school
district has no authority to acquire land and hold it
» Board, &c., v. Mapes, 14 N. Y. St. R. 593.
2 Sorenson v. Christiansen, 72 Wash. 16, 129 Pac. 577.
3 Bean v. Prudential, &c., 38 Vt. 177.
* Benjamin v. Hull, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 437 ; Farmers, &c., v.
School District, &c., 6 Dak. 255, 42 N. W. 767.
^ Hughes V. Board, &c., 13 Ohio 336; Carpenter v. Independent,
&c., 95 Iowa 300, 63 N. W. 708.
^ True V. Melvin, 43 N. H. 503.
^ Converse v. Porter, 45 N. H. 385.
8 Merritt v. Farris, 22 lU. 303.
62
Ch. Ill] ACQUIRING SITE [§ 29
for any purpose other than for a schoolhouse site, the
school directors cannot bind the district to pay for land
acquired for such other purposes. And if the school
directors purchase land for such other purposes, and
because of the reversal of their action by the County
Superintendent the title never vests in the district it
is not bound to tender a reconveyance in order to main-
tain an action to recover the price from the vendor.
And the vendor of such land is charged with notice of the
limitation of the authority conferred by the statute
upon such directors.^
Where a question of selecting a particular school-
house site is defeated at an election and no other site is
selected, the question of selecting the same site may be
considered at a new election.^
A pubHc park is laid out for aesthetic considerations,
and therefore there is no right unless given by statute
to erect a schoolhouse thereon,^ although it hag been
held that such building may be erected on a pubHc
square.^
In matters affecting the pubUc, the plaintiff must
show by his petition that he will suffer some special dam-
age not common to the pubHc or he cannot maintain
an appUcation for a writ of injunction. Therefore an
injunction to restrain a school board from removing
a schoolhouse to another location will not be granted if
no special damage to the plaintiff is alleged.' But where
1 Independent, &c., v. McClure, 136 Iowa 122, 113 N. W. 554.
2 Trastees, &c., v. Kuhn, 261 lU. 190, 103 N. E. 553.
3 Rowzee v. Pierce, 75 Miss. 846, 23 So. 307.
* Raid V. Edina, &c., 73 Mo. 295.
5 Parody v. School District, 15 Iowa 514, 19 N. W. 633.
63
§30] OF SCHOOL PROPERTY [Ch. Ill
the statute provides that a schoolhouse can be removed
from that locality only upon an aflfirmative vote of the
electors of the district, its removal will be enjoined
without that vote.^ And in an action to enjoin a school
district from changing the site of a schoolhouse, the
plaintiff must allege that he is a resident taxpayer and
voter in the district.^
§ 30. Erecting Schoolhouses.
The trustees of a school district can bind the district
by a contract to build a new schoolhouse, only when
authorized to do so by a vote of the electors of the dis-
trict.' And the officers of a school district have no dis-
cretion as to building a schoolhouse, when the district
electors, at a regular meeting, have voted to issue bonds
and from the proceeds build a schoolhouse. Such
vote is an instruction which must be obeyed.* But the
vote of the electors of a district at a meeting called
without legal notice, that decides for the building of a
schoolhouse, gives no authority to issue bonds or
award contracts for that purpose.^
The performance of a contract by a board of directors
to employ a member of the board as superintendent of
the construction of a school building for a compensation
may be enjoined by a taxpayer of the district without
1 Graves v. Jasper, &c., 2 S. D. 414, 50 N. W. 904.
2 Hess V. Dodge, 82 Neb. 35, 116 N. W. 863. See also. Tucker v.
McKay, 131 Mo. App. 728, 111 S. W. 867.
3 School District, &c., v. Brown, 2 Kan. App. 309, 43 Pac.
102.
* Schouweiler v. Allen, 17 N. D. 510, 117 N. W. 866.
8 Austin V. Board, &c., 68 Misc. Rep. 538, 125 JST. Y. S. 222.
64
Ch. Ill] ERECTING SCHOOLHOUSES [§ 30
showing fraud, inasmuch as such contract is void,
and any compensation paid therefor should be
returned to the district.' But a building committee
appointed by the district may appoint one of their
niunber to superintend the erection of the building
for a compensation, and in absence of fraud, such per-
son may recover from the district in his own name the
amount of his claitn.^
In contracting with a committee selected to erect
a schoolhouse, the party is boimd to take notice of
the amount which the committee were authorized to
spend and of the price to be paid.^ But it has
been held that where a building committee are ap-
pointed by a district to superintend the erection of
a schoolhouse they are agents of the district, and
the contractor in erecting the bmlding has a right
to rely upon the pointing out of the location by the
committee, regardless of the recorded vote of the dis-
trict specifjdng a different location of which they had
no knowledg^.^
A suit to restrain the carrying out of an illegal con-
tract by the district board of education for the erection
of a school building, may be maintained by a corpora-
tion which is a taxpayer.^
If a school board is authorized to construct a school
building in the first instance, they may make a new
1 Weit V. Independent, &c., 78 Iowa 37, 42 N. W. 577 ; Currie v.
School District, &c., 35 Minn. 163, 27 N. W. 922.
2 Jenkins v. Doughty, &c., 39 Me. 220.
' Tumey v. Bridgeport, 55 Conn. 412, 12 Atl. 520.
^ Baker v. School District, &c., 46 Vt. 189.
s Toole Bld'g. Ass'n v. Toole, &c., 42 Utah 596, 134 Pac. 558.
65
§ 30] OF SCHOOL PROPERTY [Ch. Ill
contract to finish a building where the first contractor
has abandoned it and gone into bankruptcy, and the
board of estimates should again sanction the expendi-
ture.^
A stipulation in a contract to erect a school building
that the architect's decision shall be final binds both
parties in the absence of fraud, gross mistake, or bad
faith.2
In some cases mandamus and injunction are correla-
tive remedies,^ but their general functions are distinct.^
Thus it has been held that injunction and not mandamus
is the proper remedy to prevent the erecting, by the
trustees, of a schoolhouse on a site selected in violation
of law. But mandamus was held the proper remedy to
compel the trustees to carry out the decision of the
superior school officer in relation to establishing a
schoolhouse for the district.^
In Georgia a mimicipal corporation, under its general
powers, may build a schoolhouse, without express
authority, unless its charter forbids.®
A schoolhouse is not Hable to levy and sale on
execution; nor if it bums down, can the insurance
money, be garnished by a creditor.^
1 Holden v. Board, &c., 85 N. J. L. 370, 91 Atl. 990.
2 Hatfield v. KAight, 112 Ark. 83, 164 8. W. 1137 ; Berger M'f'g.
Co. V. Crites, 178 Mo. App. 218, 165 S. W. 1163.
3 Board, &c., v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531,: 23 L. ed. 623.
* Smith V. Bourbon County, 127 U. S. 105, 32 L. ed. 73, 8 S. Ct.
1043.
5 DiUon on Munic. Corp. 5th ed., § 1482 n. ; State v. Custer, 11
Ind. 210.
« Cartersville v. Baker, 73 Ga. 686.
' rieishel v. Hightower, 62 Ga. 324.
66
Ch. Ill] MECHANICS' LIENS [| 31
§ 31. Mechanics' Liens.
A mechanic's hen cannot he against a building which
has been erected by a city for school purposes/ unless
it is expressly authorized by statute.^
Pubhc pohcy forbids the extension of mechanics'
hens to such pubhc buildings as schoolhouses, and where
a mechanic's hen is generally created by statute it
cannot be enforced against pubhc school property,' in-
asmuch as pubhc property is not subject to such hen
except when expressly made so by statute.^ A statute
providing for the creation and enforcement of a
mechanic's hen on " any building " does not authorize
a hen on a public school building.^
Where a statutory hen is given to all persons em-
ployed upon or fm-nishing materials toward the per-
formance of any public work or " public improvement,"
a schoolhouse is a pubhc improvement within the mean-
ing of such statute.^ And where the statute provides
that workmen and materialmen of a contractor for a
public improvement shall have a lien on the money due
the contractor from the municipality, such law applies
1 Staples V. Somerville, 176 Mass. 237, 57 N. E. 380 ; Lessard v.
Revere, 171 Mass. 294, 50 N. E. 533.
2 Western, &c., v. Board, &c., 39 Okla, 716, 136 Pac. 595; Des
Moines, &c., v. Plane, 163 Iowa 18, 143 N. W. 866 ; School District,
&c., V. Graham, — Okla., — 146 Pac. 213 ; Aetna Indemnity Co. v.
Comer, 136 Ga. 24, 70 S. E. 676 ; Plummer & Davis v. School Dis-
trict, &c., 92 Ark. 236, 118 S. W. 1011 ; Morganton, &c., v. Morgan-
ton, &c., 150 N. C. 680, 64 S. E. 764.
3 Minnetonka, &c., v. Board, &c., 41 Okla. 541, 139 Pac. 284.
* Barrett M'f g Co. v. Board, &c., 133 La. 1022, 63 So. 505.
5 National, &c., v. Huntington, 81 Conn. 632, 71 Atl. 911.
8 Spalding Lumber Co. v. Brown, 171 111. 487, 49 N. E. 725.
67
§32] OF SCHOOL PROPERTY [Ch. Ill
to a school board which for this purpose is a munici-
pahty, and to a school building which is a public im-
provement.^
§ 32. Contractors' Bonds.
The law regarding the rights and habilities in re-
spect to the bonds taken from contractors, and con-
ditioned to complete a school building free from
mechanics' hens, or free from indebtedness, is not uni-
form as viewed in the decisions of the various courts.
Much seems to depend upon the wording of the bond.
Thus in Texas it has been held that even without being
authorized by statute, the school authorities may re-
quire a contractor to give a bond for the payment of aU
debts incurred, and a laborer or materialman may sue
thereon in his own name.^ "While in the same State it
has also been held that inasmuch as a materialman
could not acquire a hen on a pubHc building he is not
entitled to sue on a bond given by a contractor con-
ditioned to complete the building free from mechanics'
hens. And a school district made a party to such suit
has no right to be reimbursed for attorney's fees ex-
pended in defending such suit.'
If the statute requires that school trustees, before
entering upon a contract for the erection of any school
building, shall exact a bond conditioned for the payment
by the contractor as shall become due, all indebtedness
iBeardsley v. Brown, 71 HI. App. 199. But see, Green Bay
Lumber Co. v. Odebolt, 125 Iowa 227, 101 N. W. 84.
2 N. 0. Nelson Co. v. Stephenson, — Tex. Civ. App., — 168 S.
W. 61.
3 Garrett v. McAdams, &c., — Tex. Civ. App., — 163 S. W. 320.
68
Ch. Ill] CONTRACTORS' BONDS [§ 32
which may accrue to any person on account of labor or
material furnished in the erection of such buildings,
their functions are ministerial. But whether ministerial
or judicial, their failure to take such bond makes
them individually hable for damages to the material-
man or laborer, individually, injured by such failure,^
and neither notice nor demand is necessary to the cause
of action.^ Even if the statute does not require that
such bond be taken, a trustee is not inhibited from
exacting it.' And if such bond be given and the
materialman not duly paid, he has a right of action on
the bond.*
But if a materialman or laborer, knowing that such
required bond has not been given, undertakes to furnish
material or labor relying upon the credit of the con-
tractor who subsequently becomes insolvent, he is
estopped to claim damages from the trustees for failure
to exact the bond.^ And it has been held that where
the statute requires pubUc officers to take from a
contractor for pubUc improvements, a bond con-
ditioned to pay all indebtedness for labor and materials,
1 Owen V. ffiU, 67 Mich. 43, 34 N. W. 649 ; Wells v. Board, &c., 78
Mich. 260, 44 N. W. 267 ; Wilcox Lumber Co. v. School District,
106 Minn. 208, 118 N. W. 794. Contra: Plumbing Supply Co. v.
Board, &c., 32 S. D. 270, 142 N. W. 1131 ; Blanchard v. Burns, 110
Ark. 515, 162 S. W. 63.
2 Staffon V. Lyon, 110 Mich. 260, 68 N. W. 151.
'Williams v. Markland, 15 Ind. App. 669, 44 N. E. 562; St.
Louis, &c., V. Woods, 77 Mo. 197.
* N. 0. Nelson Co. v. Stephenson, — Tex. Civ. App., — 168 S. W.
61 ; Baker v. Biyan, 64 Iowa 561, 21 N. W. 83; R. Com).or Co. v.
Olson, 136 Wis. 13, 115 N. W. 811.
6 Owen V. HiU, 67 Mich. 43, 34 N. W. 649.
69
§ 32] OF SCHOOL PROPERTY [Ch. Ill
one furnishing labor or materials after failure to take
such bond is chargeable with notice that none had
been taken, and consequently the school directors
who should have taken such bond are not individually
liable to one furnishing such labor or materials by
reason of their failure to take such bond; nor is the
district Uable,^
If the trustees by reason of their failure to exact a
required bond designed to protect materialmen and
laborers, are compelled to pay such indebtedness by
reason of their failure, the amount of such indebtedness
paid by them may be claimed by set-off in an action
brought by the contractor for the contract price.^
If such bond is executed as required by statute, ex-
cept that it was payable to the board of education in-
stead of the State, and although it contained a condi-
tion to save the board harmless from such claims, such
persons having claims for labor or materials may re-
cover on the bond.^ And if the bond taken is condi-
tioned for the performance of the work and that the
contractor shall furnish the material used, and is not
conditioned " to pay " the materialmen, it affords
no protection to the district against an action for ma-
terials furnished the contractor.*
Where the statute requires the tribunal transacting
the business of " any municipal corporation " to take a
1 Blancliard v. Burns, 110 Ark. 515, 162 S. W. 63.
2 Wells V. Board, &c., 78 Mich. 260, 44 N. W. 267.
3 Board, &c., v. Grant, 107 Mich, 151, 64 N. W. 1050; Wads-
worth V. School District, &c., 7 Wash. 485, 35 Pac. 371.
* Puget Sound, &c., v. School District, &c., 12 Wash. 118, 40
Pac. 608.
70
Ch. Ill] REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE [§ 33
bond to protect against claims of materialmen and
laborers, school districts are held, for this purpose, to be
municipal corporations.^ And such statute is not in
conflict with a constitutional provision which provides
for a general and uniform system of public schools, and
appUcation of revenue from the common school fund.*
Where such required bond is not taken and an action
is brought against the contractor, the judgment secured
therein does not bar an action against the school district
if the statute does not require that the district be made
a party to such suit.^
The object of filing bonds by such contractors is not
to give theLbond validity, but to give notice to interested
persons. Therefore filing the bond after the materials
have been furnished does not prejudice the plaintiff,
if it actually was filed, and the plaintiff had notice
thereof before bringing suit.'*
§ 33. Alteration, Repairs and Maintenance.
Towns and cities are obliged to keep school property
in a safe condition, and are liable for any injury caused
by the unsafe condition of the premises, provided they
have knowledge of the defect, or are negligently ignorant
of it.* This knowledge or notice which is necessary
to impose Uabihty, may be presumed as a matter of
1 Maxon v. School District, &c., 5 Wash. 142, 32 Pac. 110.
2 Pacific M'f'g Co. V. School District, &c., 6 Wash. 121, 33 Pac. 68.
' Pacific M'f'g Co. V. School District, &c., supra cit.
* Wadsworth v. School District, &c., 7 Wash. 485, 35 Pac. 371.
5 Streator v. Chrisman, 182 lU. 215, 54 N. E. 997 ; Whitney v.
LoweU, 151 Mass. 212, 24 N. E. 47 ; Parker v. Boston, 175 Mass.
501, 56N. E. 569.,
71
§ 33] OF SCHOOL PROPERTY [Ch. Ill
law when the danger is great and manifest/ or it may
be inferred from the notoriety of the defect.^
But notice to the janitor of a schoolhouse, who is law-
fully appointed by the school committee, that a highway
is in a defective and unsafe condition, — for example, the
uncovered condition of a coal hole, — is not notice to the
city. Such oflBcial is not a public official whose duties
are to attend to municipal affairs, being appointed by
and under the exclusive control of the school committee,
and not under any control whatever by the city. What-
ever may be their duties in regard to the care of school-
houses committed to their charge, they have none in
regard to the repair or condition of the pubhc ways.^
A school committee is a board of pubhc officers whose
principal duties are prescribed by statute, and in the
execution of these duties the members do not act as
agents of the town, but as public ofl&cers in the perform-
ance of pubhc duties. Besides having the general
charge and superintendence of all the pubhc schools of
the town the statute usually delegates to them the care
of schoolhouses, which includes the grounds on which
the schoolhouses are erected. In pursuance of such
duties the committee may lawfully order a tree on the
grounds to be cut down, and if they are not in them-
selves negligent, they are not responsible for the negli-
gence of the person employed to do the work. The
' Prideaux v. Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513 ; McGrail v. Kalamazoo,
94 Mich. 52, 53 N. W. 955.
2 Reed v. Northfield, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 94; Padelford v. Eagle
Grove, 117 Iowa 616, 91 N. W. 899.
3 Foster v. Boston, 127 Mass. 290.
72
Ch. Ill] EXCLUSIVENESS OF USE [§ 34
doctrine of respondeat svperior is founded on the sup-
posed benefit to the master, of the act of the servant,
and does not apply to a public officer emplojdng agents
in the discharge of a public duty.^
Where the statute empowers the County Superin-
tendent with authority to condemn dilapidated school
buildings, and makes it the duty of the trustees to
repair the old building or erect a new one when notified
by the superintendent of the condemnation, the tax-
payers of the district cannot question the decision of
the County Superintendent and the trustees as to the
necessity of a new building. And the trustees may act
before they see the order of condemnation.^
A township school director who is required by statute
to keep in due order and condition the necessary
schoolhouse furniture, it being further provided that
his expenses shall subsequently be audited and paid,
is not entitled to have the money advanced to him
before the work is done.^ And an agent authorized by
a vote of a school district to expend a specified percent
of the school fimds for the repair of a schoolhouse, is
not thereby authorized to expend a greater amount al-
though actually needed to properly repair the building.*
§ 34. Exclusiveness of Use.
It is not necessary that a schoolhouse be erected ex-
clusively for pubhc school purposes. And it has been
1 McKenna v. Kimball, 145 Mass. 555, 14 N. E. 789 ; Nowell v.
Wright, 3 Allen (Mass.) 166 ; HiU v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344.
2 Trustees, &c., v. Jamison, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 719, 15 S. W. 1.
3 Hamtramck v. Holihan, 46 Mich. 127, 8 N. W. 720.
* Davis V. School District, &c., 24 Me. 349.
73
§ 34] OF SCHOOL PROPERTY [Ch. Ill
held that a school district by an agreement with a
builder that he should erect for a certain sum a school-
house, and build a public hall over the same to be his
property, he allowing the district to have the use of
the hall for various purposes connected with the school,
did not exceed its power.^
The purpose for which school districts are required
to build schoolhouses, is to accommodate schools which
are supported by the district, and which they are re-
quired by law to maintain. But the general object
of all these requirements of the law is the education of
children.^ Hence it has been held that a private school
not supported by a tax on the district, might by con-
sent of the district be held in the schoolhouse, that such
a school was for the furtherance of the general object
and design of such erections, and so no unlawful use
of the house, and that the committee to whom by law
the general care of the house is given, had no legal right
to prevent the house being used for that purpose. If
the district might properly and legally allow the house
to be used for such purpose, in the absence of any
dissent by the district, the committee in charge might
do the same, and give permission to use the house for
the same object, and especially if it was generally ap-
proved by the voters and taxpayers of the district.'
A district may not part with the use and power of
control over the schoolhouse permanently, nor for any
such length of time as to prevent the building from being
1 George v. Second School District, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 497.
2 RusseU V. Dodds, 37 Vt. 497.
3 Chaplin v. HiU, 24 Vt. 528.
74
Ch. Ill] EXCLUSIVENESS OF USE [§ 34
used for the purpose of a district school, for which it
was specially erected. But they may part with it for
such limited period as will not interfere with their
legitimate and proper use of it as a district schoolhouse.
Therefore it was held that if a committee agree to let
a party have the district schoolhouse for a private school
during a vacation, and the party enter into the use
thereof, the committee cannot revoke the agreement
without just cause, nor can the want of authority to
make the agreement be alleged in defense to an action
by the lessee for exclusion therefrom.^
The only remedy given a taxpayer against the illegal
use of school property is that of injunction, and this
remedy will be granted though the injury he complains
of be very shght. If the schoolhouse, without authority
of statute, is used for rehgious purposes, even though
by vote of the district, such use is illegal against the
protest of a single taxpayer, and an injunction will be
granted upon application of such taxpayer.^ But a
schoolhouse is not constituted a place of worship by
holding Sunday school or religious meetings therein
not exceeding four times a year and then not interfering
with the schoolwork.^
The legislatiu-e may grant to religious societies the
temporary and incidental use of schoolhouses for reli-
gious meetings and Sunday schools, and such statute
1 RusseU V. Dodds, 37 Vt. 497.
2 Schofield V. School District, 27 Conn. 499 ; Hurd v. Walters,
48 Ind. 148 ; Spencer v. School District, 15 Kan. 259 ; Bender v.
Streabich, 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 609; Dorton v. Hearn, 67 Mo. 301;
School District, &c., v. Arnold, 21 Wis. 657.
' State V. Dilley, 95 Neb. 527, 145 N. W. 999.
75
§ 34] OF SCHOOL PROPERTY [Ch. Ill
does not violate the constitutional provision that no
one shall be compelled to support a place of worship,
and that no preference shall be given by law to any
reUgious denomination, or mode of worship.^ And the
district has the right to use a schooUiouse for any dis-
trict purposes ; ^ or for educational purposes collateral
to the main purpose, such as lectures, debates, or by
permitting a private teacher of vocal music to give
instruction in his art in the district schoolhouse, out of
school hours, his pupils paying him a compensation
therefor.'
Against trespassers the school authorities have con-
trol of the school buildings and land to the extent of
excluding therefrom any person who enters to disturb
the peace or interferes with the legitimate purposes of the
school. But they have no right arbitrarily to exclude
any one of their own caprice, or to exclude any decorous
person from a school entertainment to which the public
are invited.^ The right to the school property is in
the district, and while the school authorities, by impli-
cation, have the right to occupy the schoolhouse when
used for school purposes, they do not have exclusive
control as against the public, that is, the inhabitants
of the district, unless it is given to them by statute.'
Provided such use does not interfere with the school
or injure the building, a secret society may legally con-
* Nichols V. School Directors, 93 111. 61 ; Davis v. Boget, 50 Iowa
11.
^ Trustees, &c., v. Osborne, 9 Ind. 458.
' Appeal of Barnes, 6 R. I. 591.
* Hughes V. Goodell, 3 Pittsb. R. 264.
8 Chaplin v. Hill, 24 Vt. 528.
76
Ch. Ill] PERSONAL PROPERTY [§ 35
tract for the use of a public school building, especially
if such contract is approved by the electors of the dis-
trict.^ But a schoolhouse may not be used for private
dances which involve the removal of the desks there-
from ; ^ nor used as a theatre, or for the performance
of theatricals as a business.^ And a school board having
only such powers as are given by statute, cannot lease
a school lot for production of oil and gas.*
§ 35. Personal Property.
The care and keeping of the schoolhouse, books, ap-
paratus and other property of the district, is usually
given by statute to the school board, and being given by
statute to the school board does not confer upon them
the right to purchase new property; and especially
not a safe in which to keep their records which are of
small value. ^ But where the board of directors have
authority to provide for the teaching of music, the
authority is impUed to purchase a musical instrument
for that piupose.® Where the statute places the entire
control of the district schools in the hands of the
directors, a subdirector has no authority to forbid the
use of apparatus supplied by the directors in the schools
within his care on the ground that its purchase was
1 Cost V. Shinault, 113 Ark. 19, 166 S. W. 740.
2 Lewis V. Bateman, 26 Utah 434, 73 Pac. 509.
3 Sugar V. Monroe, 108 La. 677, 32 So. 961.
* Herald v. Board, &c., 65 W. Va. 765, 65 S. B. 102.
6 GUdden, &c., v. School District, &c., 143 Wis. 617, 128 N. W.
285.
* Bellmeyer v. Marshalltown, 44 Iowa 564 ; Knabe v. Board, &c.,
67 Mich. 262, 34 N. W. 568.
77
§ 36] OF SCHOOL PROPERTY [Ch. Ill
illegal, and the apparatusjworthless. And an injunction
will lie to restrain such subdirector from preventing
the use of the apparatus.^
Where a trustee has authority to bind his district
by a contract for the purchase of school furniture, the
fact that unnecessary articles are bought under a fraudu-
lent contract, will not reUeve the district from UabiUty
without a rescission of the contract by offering to return
the articles so bought.^
To " select " means to choose or pick out, and
" provide " means to furnish or supply. Consequently
where the statute provides that the board of education
shall " select " textbooks, fumitme, and educational
appliances for the schools, and that the school board of
a district shall " provide " schoolhouses with proper
furniture and appUances, there is no conflict of duty,
and the school board has no authority to provide school
furniture other than that selected by the board of
education.^
§ 36. Apparatus and Appendages.
As used in the limitation of the power of a school
board to purchase for school use, the term " apparatus "
means an equipment of things provided and adopted
as a means to some end, and includes any complex
instrument or appliance for a specific action or opera-
tion, such as a mechanism so constructed as when
operated to represent the relative motions of the earth
» District, &c., v. Meyers, 83 Iowa 688, 49 N. W. 1042.
^ Johnson, &c., v. Citizens Bank, 81 Ind. 515.
' Com. V. School Board, &c., 109 Va. 346, 63 S. E. 1081.
78
Ch. Ill] APPARATUS AND APPENDAGES [§ 36
and moon with respect to each other and the sun, and
explain the various phenomena caused by such motions,
and other related subjects.^
An " appendage " is something added to another
thing either as an accessory to, or a subordinate part
of,^ even though not necessary to it.' In general it
may be said that the term, as used in connection with
schoolhouses, apphes to things connected with the
building, or designed to render it suitable for use as a
schoolhouse,* and has been held to include a well,^
fence,® a mathematical chart, ^ lightning rods,^ brooms,
pails, cups, fuel, and outhouses.®
The purchase of " necessary appendages " for the
schoolhouse as authorized by statute, does not include
a stereoscope and stereoscopic views. ^° Nor are school
charts exhibiting and illustrating matters to be taught
to the pupils, to be classed as such." But a mathemati-
cal chart may be deemed either apparatus or appendage.^^
1 Board, &c., v. Andrews, 51 Ohio St. 199, 37 N. E. 260.
« State Treasurer v. Somerville, &c., 28 N. J. L. 26.
' State V. Fertig, 70 Iowa 272, 30 N. W. 633 ; In re Bozeman, 42
Kan. 456, 22 Pac. 628.
* School District, &c., v. Perkins, 21 Kan. 536.
6 Hemme v. School District, &c., 30 Kan. 377, 1 Pac. 104.
« Creager v. School District, &c., 62 Mich. 101, 28 N. W. 794.
' School District v. Swayze, 29 Kan. 211. A mathematical chart
was also held as "apparatus" in School District v. Swain, 29 Kan.
152. Contra: Gibson v. School District, &c., 36 Mich. 404.
8 Monticello Bank v. Coffin's Grove, &c., 51 Iowa 350, 1 N. W.
592.
^ Creager v. School District, supra cit.; Hemme v. School Dis-
trict, supra cit.
1" Bourbon, &c., v. Perkins, 21 Kan. 531.
" Gibson v. School District, &c., 36 Mich. 404.
12 School District v. Swayze, 29 Kan. 211.
79
§ 37] OF SCHOOL PROPERTY [Ch. Ill
And a fence surrounding the schoolhouse site is to be
classed as a necessary appendage.^
The grading and fencing of a schoolhouse site, pro-
viding water to supply the school even to the extent of
digging a well, and the equipping of the schoolhouse
with school furniture, are all a legitimate part of the
construction of a schoolhouse, and the proper equip-
ment of school property as authorized by a vote to
purchase a site and erect a schoolhouse thereon.^ But
whether a well may properly be supplied uader a
statutory provision that the district board shall provide
the necessary appendages for the schoolhouse during
the time a school is taught therein, is a question of fact
for a jury to decide.^
§ 37. Isolated Territory.
The obligation of a town to furnish the means for
educating its inhabitants does not require the building
of a schoolhouse in isolated territory. Consequently a
town is not bound to build and maintain a schoolhouse
on a small island within its territorial Umits on which
-a few persons live having children of school age.^ And
an inhabitant of an island having but one child of lawful
school age, cannot enforce the estabhshment of a school
upon such island, there being a sufficient number of
public schools on the mainland, although the State
law requires children of such age to attend school.^
1 Creagerw. Wright, &c., 67 Mich. 262, 34 N. W. 568.
2 Chamberlain v. Board, &c., 57 N. J. L. 605, 31 Atl. 1033.
' Hemme v. School District, &c., 30 Kan. 377, 1 Pac. 104.
* Newcomb v. Rockport, 183 Mass. 74, 66 N. E. 587.
5 Davis V. Chihnark, 199 Mass. 112, 85 N. E. 107.
80
Ch. Ill] SALOONS AND INTOXICANTS [§ 39
§ 38. Offenses Against School Property.
To burn a schoolhouse cannot be arson at common
law,' but is within a statute making arson extend to
the burning of any tobaccohouse, warehouse, storehouse
or " any other house or houses whatsoever", ^ and is
also made arson by a statute providing that the wilful
biirning of any mill, or " other outhouse not parcel of
any dwelling house " iu that a schoolhouse is within
this description.*
An action of trespass may be maintained by school
directors who are in actual occupancy of a schoolhouse,
although the trustees of schools hold the legal title.*
But such action may not be maintained by the inhabit-
ants of the district, inasmuch as they have no estate
in the property of the district.^ And where an expelled
pupil enters a schoolroom and refuses to leave when
requested by the teacher, such pupil is guilty of " loiter-
ing " on public school grounds under a statute making
such loitering an offense.^
§ 39. Saloons and Intoxicants.
Under a law prohibiting the licensing of a saloon with-
in four hundred feet of a school building on the same
street, the measurement is to be taken from the nearest
point of each building to the other, whether they are
* Wallace v. Young, 44 Ky. 155.
^Ibid.
' Jones V. Hungerford, 4 Gill & J. (Md.) 402. See also, State v.
O'Brien, 2 Root (Conn.) 516.
* Alderman v. School Directors, 91 111. 179 ; School District v.
Arnold, 21 Wis. 657.
5 Chaplin v. HiU, 24 Vt. 528.
« King V. State, — Tex. Cr. App., — 169 S. W. 675.
81
§ 39] OF SCHOOL PROPERTY [Ch. Ill
close to the street or some distance away from it, and
even though but one room in the building is used for
such sale, as is the usual arrangement in a hotel building.^
And an entrance from the street on which the school is
located to the place where the intoxicants are sold on
another street may bring such place within the law.^
A statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating Uquors
in certain specified locaUties, is not unconstitutional
because its application is not general.* And therefore
the statute may authorize a court to make an order pro-
hibiting the sale or giving away of hquor within three
miles of a schoolhouse on petition of a majority of the
adult residents within such limit.*
If a statute prohibits the sale of intoxicating liquor
to " any student of the State University, or of any
school, college or academy", such prohibition is not
confined to minors.^ And if the statute prohibits such
sales to " any minor person, pupil, or student, while
attending school", it appHes only to minors who are
pupils or students in some public school, seminary,
academy, or other institution of learning within the
State. ^ For this purpose a writing school to be con-
tinued for twenty days only, is a " school " covered
1 Com. V. Jones, 142 Mass. 573, 8 N. E. 603.
2 Com. V. Everson, 140 Mass. 434, 5 N. E. 155.
3 Howell V. State, 71 Ga. 224; Town of CentreviUe v. MiUer, 51
Iowa 712, 2 N. W. 527 ; State v. StovaU, 103 N. C. 416, 8 S. E. 900;
Heck V. State, 44 Ohio St. 536, 9 N. E. 305 ; State v. Rauscher, 69
Tenn. 96.
* Trammel v. BracQey, 37 Ark. 374 ; Butler v. State, 89 Ga. 821,
15 S. E. 763.
= State V. Cooper, 35 Mo. App. 532.
« State V. Richter, 23 Minn. 81.
82
Ch. Ill] CONVEYANCE OF SCHOOL PROPERTY [§ 40
by the statute.^ And a parochial school under proper
authorities is within the meaning of a statute excluding
the sale of intoxicating liquors within two hundred
feet of a school.^
§ 40. Conveyance of School Property.
A deed executed in good faith by the acting treasurer
of the ministerial and school fund of a town, authorized
by an order of the actiag trustees will pass a good title
although the record does not show that the treasurer
and trustees are officers de jure as well as de facto.^
But a deed executed by the treasurer of a town, as such,
and by a majority of the selectmen of the town, as such,
is not vaUd where the statute makes the selectmen,
town clerk, and treasurer, for the time being, of every
town in the State a body corporate, and trustees for
the ministerial and school funds, with power to convey
lands belonging to such funds.*
If a deed merely specifies the use or purpose for which
the land is granted to the city, as " for school purposes ",
the purpose expressed does not quahf y the estate taken,
but simply regulates and defines the use for which the
land granted shall be held. The specification of the
purpose is not construed as a condition subsequent, and
the property upon a discontiuuance of the use, does not
revert to the grantor or his heirs. ^ And where a deed
1 FarreU v. State, 32 Ala. 557.
2 Rice V. Board, &c., 90 Atl. (R. I.) 419.
' Abbott V. Chase, 75 Me. 83.
* Warren v. Stetson, 30 Me. 231.
6 Dillon on Munic. Corp., 5th ed., § 979 ; Avery v. U. S., 104 Fed.
711 ; Warren County v. Patterson, 56 111. Ill ; Stephens v. Murray,
83
§ 40] OF SCHOOL PROPERTY [Ch. Ill
conveying real estate specifies that it is to be used for
school purposes, the real estate itself must be so used,
and cannot be converted into naoney to be used for
school purposes.^ As public corporations may be the
object of private bounty, a conveyance of land to a
town for a schooUiouse site is based upon a sufficient
consideration.^
A lease of school lands by a board of supervisors,
under a statute which authorizes such lease upon petition
of a majority of the resident heads of families, is void
unless the records of the board show that such petition
was made, inasmuch as such conferred jurisdiction
is limited.^
Where the statute provides that in cities beyond a
certain population no sale of school lands shall be made
except by the city council, upon the written request of
the board of education, such matter fies within the dis-
cretion of the board, and a court has no right to make
an order to the mayor and comptroller to execute a
deed and take a mortgage to the city.^
The authority of a school district to sell its property
is to sell for money, and not to barter it. Any other
form of sale than for money would be contrary to pubfic
poficy. Consequently a contract to purchase school
property if awarded a contract for a school building is
132 Mo. 468, 34 S. W. 56 ; Tifft v. Buffalo, 82 N. Y. 204; Coffin v.
Portland, 16 Greg. 77, 17 Pac. 580.
1 Trastees, &c., v. Braner, 71 lU. 546.
* Dillon on Munic. Corp., 5th ed., § 981 ; Castleton v. Langdon,
19 Vt. 210; Le Couteulx v. Buffalo, 33 N. Y. 333.
' Bolivar County v. Coleman, 71 Miss. 832, 15 So. 107.
* People V. Roche, 124 lU. 9, 14 N. E. 701.
84
Ch. Ill] CONVEYANCE OF SCHOOL PROPERTY [§ 40
invalid.' But where a schoolhouse has become unfit
for the use of the district, it may be sold by the school
district,^ and where a committee is authorized by vote
of the district, to sell the schoolhouse, it must be sold
for cash, a sale on credit being void unless later ratified
by the district.^ If a sale of a school building is
rescinded by the district, on the ground of fraud, the
amount paid by the intending purchaser must be
refunded.*
1 CaldweU v. Bauer, 179 Ind. 146, 99 N. E. 117.
2 Whitmore v. Hogan, 22 Me. 564.
' School District, &c., v. Aetna, &c., 62 Me. 330.
*Ilnd.
85
CHAPTER IV
OF SCHOOL OFFICERS
§ 41. State Superintendent.
The State Superintendent, or School Commissioner
in many States has general supervision and control of
schools, school officials, and school funds.^ This
supervisory power usually includes the power of re-
moval of officials,^ and to hear and determine appeals
from subordinate officers.' But the power to deter-
mine appeals may not be delegated to an assistant.*
Where the legislature, in the enactment of school
laws, has created a series of tribunals within the school
officials with powers to settle disputes arising in
school matters, and giving appellate jurisdiction within
such tribunals to the State Superintendent, his decision
thereon has the conclusive quaUty of a judgment
pronounced in a legally created court of hmited jxnis-
1 People V. Inglis, 161 111. 256, 43 N. E. 1103; Thompson v.
Board, &c., 57 N. J. L. 628, 31 Atl. 168 ; People v. Skinner, 74 N. Y.
App. Div. 58, 77 N. Y. S. 36 ; State v. Daniel, 52 S. C. 201, 29 S. E.
633. « See § 47, infra.
' Field V. Com., 32 Pa. St. 478 ; People v. Draper, 63 Hun (N. Y.)
389, 18 N. Y. S. 282 ; State v. Custer, 11 Ind. 210 ; State v. Albert-
son, 54 N. J. L. 72, 22 Atl. 1083 ; Easton v. Calendar, 11 Wend.
(N. Y.) 90 ; State v. WMtford, 54 Wis. 150, 11 N. W. 424.
^ Joint School District, &c., v. WoKe, 12 Wis. 685.
86
Ch. IV] STATE SUPERINTENDENT [§ 41
diction acting within the bounds of its authority, and
accordingly upon its merits is not reviewable,^ although
it may be open to appeal on a question of law.''
A State Superintendent cannot reverse acts of dis-
cretion. And when the statute gives appellate powers
to a school commissioner to hear and determine appeals
from the decisions or doings of school committees, dis-
trict meetings, trustees, and others, taken to him by
persons aggrieved by such decisions or doings, he
acquires from such statute no power to reverse the
majority decision of the school committee as to the
location of a schoolhouse about to be built when such
decision involves no violation of right. A grievance
supposes a wrong growing out of some infraction of law,
1 Thompson v. Board, &c., 57 N. J. L. 628, 31 Atl. 168 ; Park v.
Independent, &c., 65 Iowa 209, 21 N. W. 567 ; Wood v. Farmer,
69 Iowa 533, 29 N. W. 440 ; People v. Collins, 34 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
336; People v. Eckler, 19 Hun (N. Y.) 609; State v. Whitford, 54
Wis. 150, 11 N. W. 424; Appeal of Smith, 4 R. I. 690.
2 Watkins v. Huff, 94 Tex. 631, 64 S. W. 682 ; State v. Thayer,
74 Wis. 48, 41 N. W. 1014; People v. Skinner, 159 N. Y. 162, 53
N. E. 806. There is no distinction in point of conclusiveness be-
tween the decisions of a special tribunal such as a State Superin-
tendent and the judgments of a court of record. The sole difference
is in the presumption of jurisdiction that inheres in general courts
alone. If the right of the special tribvmal to pass on the matter in
controversy between the parties be established, its determinations
are conclusive upon the parties until reversed by some appellate
court. As a general rule, w'henever any person is given authority to
hear and determine any question, such determination is, in effect, a
judgment having all the properties of a judgment pronounced in
a legally created court of limited jurisdiction acting within the
boimds of its authority ; Thompson v. Board, &c., 57 N. J. L. 628,
31 Atl. 168. When the law admits of different constructions it is
weU settled that the usage under it and the practical construction of
it for a series of years, is entitled to great weight, and sometimes
may be decisive ; Appeal of Cottrell, 10 R. I. 615.
87
§ 41] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
of which the aggrieved party has a right to complain,
and the statute instead of throwing the discussion and
decision of such complaints before the ordinary legal
tribunals, gives an appeal to the commissioner or super-
intendent of pubUc schools in order to prevent tedious
litigation, scandal and expense. The commissioner is,
from a legal viewpoint, a visitor of the public schools
of the State, whose speedy and noiseless method of
settling disputes arising between the different ofl&cers
and members of the school body is designed to preserve
that peace and harmony so essential to its well-being.
He may decide questions involving a wrong done, but
cannot reverse acts of discretion. Any other construc-
tion of this appellate power would throw every dis-
cretionary power vested by law in the school officials
into his hands, since upon appeal he would be authorized
to revise and control their exercise of such discretion.^
Where appeal to the Superintendent of Public In-
struction is provided as a remedy for one who is ag-
grieved by a decision of the trustees to abolish a school
and consohdate with another, such appeal is a neces-
sary one, even though it cannot be taken in time to
secure the benefit of the school fund, inasmuch as an
injunction might issue to prevent use of the funds
pending the appeal.^ And where the statute provides
that one aggrieved by the action of a school board may
appeal to the County Superintendent, and from him
to the Superintendent of PubHc Instruction, such ap-
peal is the proper course for one aggrieved at the action
1 Appeal of Gardiner, 4 R. I. 602.
" McCoUum V. Adams, 110 S. W. (Tex.) 526.
88
Ch. IV] STATE SUPERINTENDENT [§ 41
of the school board in relocating a schoolhouse, and an
injunction will not be granted.^
Although the State Superintendent of Schools has
the power to remove from office a County Superintend-
ent for neglect of duty, incompetency, or immoraUty,
there must be charges filed, notice given, opportunity
for presenting a defense, and a hearing must be
given. 2
Where the statute does not specify a method of
voting, the election of a State Superintendent may be
either viva voce or by ballot.^ And where the school
trustees meet on the day specified by statute for the
purpose of electing a superintendent, and continue in
session and to ballot until he is elected, the fact that he
is not elected until after midnight will not render the
election invaUd.^
It is against public poUcy, and consequently illegal,
for a member of a board of trustees to vote for himself
for the position of Superintendent of Schools.^ And
inasmuch as the result of the ballot expresses the elec-
tion, it is not necessary that an elected official be de-
clared elected.^
A school superintendent need only receive a majority
of the votes cast, and it is not necessary that he receive
1 Kinney v. Howard, 133 Iowa 94, 110 N. W. 282 ; Field v. School
District, &c., 83 Kan. 186, 109 Pac. 775.
' Field V. Com., 32 Pa. St. 478. See also, § 47, infra.
* Johnson v. De Hart, 72 Ky. 640 ; State v. Kihoy, 86 Ind.
118.
* State V. Vanosdal, 131. Ind. 388, 31 N. E. 79.
5 Homung v. State, 116 Ind. 458, 19 N. E. 151.
« People V. Stone, 78 Mich. 635, 44 N. W. 333.
89
§42] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
a favorable vote of a majority of all directors present
at the meeting.^
Where the statute allows " actual traveling ex-
penses " to a superintendent of public instruction while
making his official visits to schools in his charge, hotel
bills incurred by him are not a part of such expenses.^
And when the compensation of a State Superintendent
of public instruction is fixed by statute not to exceed
a specified amount, with another fixed sum for his
traveling expenses, and still another fixed sum for clerk
hire, such officer has no right to appropriate all these
sums without incurring the expenses as contemplated.'
A statute giving the State Superintendent authority to
disburse a fund for clerical assistance in the examina-
tion of teachers' papers does not by such authority
make him the owner of the fund.'*
Where the statute requires that suits instituted by
the Superintendent of Education shall be through the
Attorney General or proper district attorney, a suit
brought by him through a private attorney will be dis-
missed.^ '
§ 42. County Superintendent.
A County Superintendent of public instruction can
exercise only such powers as are specially granted by
statute or are necessarily implied to carry them into
1 Attorney General v. Bickford, 77 N. H. 433, 92 Atl. 835. But
see, State v. Matson, 97 Neb. 746, 151 N. W. 304.
2 State V. La Grave, 23 Nev. 88, 42 Pac. 797.
' State V. Cunningham, 82 Wis. 39, 51 N. W. 1133.
* State V. StockweU, 23 N. D. 70, 134 N. W. 767.
8 Fay V. Jumel, 35 La. An. 368.
90
Ch. IV] COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT [§ 42
effect.^ The record of his proceedings must show that
he has jurisdiction or his acts will be void. He has
no authority to purchase and pay for lands for school
purposes without special authority.^ And if a County
Superintendent is no longer able or fit to perform the
duties of his position, he may be dismissed.^ Not merely
good character, but good reputation is essential to the
greatest usefulness in such a position as that of superin-
tendent of schools. Therefore one against whom an
indictment for a crime involving moral turpitude has
been returned may be dismissed for the good of the
schools even though the accused is not found guilty
on the indictment.*
Where by statute the County Superintendent is al-
lowed certain fees in connection with duties performed
in his office in Ueu of a salary, a large discretion is vested
in him as to the duties to be performed, and neither the
county commissioners nor the courts have a right to
interfere except upon abuse of his discretion or in case
of errors apparent from inspection or estabUshed by
proof.* Among such items held proper charges are :
official correspondence with teachers, school officers
and others pertaining to school affairs ; holding teachers'
examinations; examining into a complaint that a
teacher would not allow certain children to attend
1 Ratcliff V. Faris, 6 Neb. 539.
2 Board, &c., v. Billings, 15 Fla. 686.
' Hufford V. Conover, 139 Ind. 151, 38 N. E. 328 ; People v. Mays,
17 lU. App. 361; State v. Crumbaugh, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 521,
63 S. W. 925 ; Freeman v. Bourne, 170 Mass. 289, 49 N. E. 435.
* Freeman v. Bourne, 170 Mass. 289, 49 N. E. 435.
6 Smith V. Jefferson, &c., 10 Col. 17, 13 Pac. 917.
91
§ 42] OF SCHOOL OFnCERS [Ch. IV
school; and visits to the State Superintendent;^ but
not for rendering reports to the bureau of statistics.^
And where the statute provides that the County
Superintendent shall receive such pay for his services
as may be allowed him by the county court the matter is
one of unUmited discretion for the court, whether it
fixed the salary in advance, or left the allowance to be
determined after the duties were performed; and the
decision of the court is final.' Where the legislature has
fixed the salary of a County Superintendent at a speci-
fied sum, and the board after his election fixes it at a
smaller sum he may receive the small sum, giving a
receipt therefor, and still not be estopped from recover-
ing the balance of his salary.*
The County Superintendent belongs to the executive
department of the government; he acts in neither a
judicial nor quasi-judicial capacity in Ucensing persons
to teach, and he has a discretion on the subject of
licensing teachers, which is so far analogous to judicial
discretion that he is protected from any claim for
damages on account of any mistake in his decisions, or
error in judgment, either in granting or withholding a
Ucense. Yet he is Uable in damages for mahciously
withholding a license to teach from an applicant
lawfully entitled to receive the same, and he will be
held to have acted maliciously where he acts either
from wilful and wicked or from corrupt motives.^
1 Smith V. Jefferson, &c., 10 Col. 17, 13 Pac. 917.
^ Yeager v. Gibson County, 95 Ind. 427.
3 Haile v. Young, 74 Tenn. 501.
* Clarke v. MUwaukee County, 53 Wis. 65, 9 N. W. 782.
6 Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548, 4 N. E. 197.
92
Ch. IV] COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT [§ 42
Where a County Superintendent writes to the State
Superintendent that an appUcant for a certificate to
teach is not of good moral character, he is in no better
position than any other citizen who is interested in the
welfare of the public school system. Such statement
made in good faith, based on reasonable information,
and not actuated by express maUce, is privileged.^
The acceptance by a town commissioner of the office
of County Superintendent operates ipso facto to vacate
the office of commissioner, and he is not thereafter either
a de jure or de facto holder of that office.^ And where
the statute provides that certain qualifications are
necessary to make a person eligible to an office, such as
that of County Superintendent, one who does not
possess such qualifications at the time of election, but
possesses them at the time of his induction into office,
is sufficiently quahfied.'
Where the statute allows an appeal from the school
board to the County Superintendent it does not give
him judicial powers.* That officer can only give opinion
and advice. He cannot decide the controversy so as
to bind the parties, it being the power of the State
Superintendent to try disputed matters and judicially
decide them.^
A County Superintendent is not liable for his official
1 Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578, 128 S. W. 878 ; Barry v.
McCoUom, 81 Conn. 293, 70 Atl. 1035.
2 WUtehead v. Pittman, 165 N. C. 89, 80 S. E. 976.
' Bradfield v. Avery, 16 Idaho 769, 102 Pac. 687.
* Sioux City v. Pratt, 17 Iowa 16.
6 Buren v. Albertson, 54 N. J. L. 72, 22 Atl. 1083 ; Fitch v. Smith,
57 N. J. L. 526, 34 Atl. 1058. See also, § 41, supra.
93
§ 43] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
acts, unless they were wanton and malicious, where
he has a discretion in their performance.*
§ 43. School Directors.2
If the law requires the election of a school board
within thirty days after the organization of a district,
such law in the absence of fraud is directory only.'
And at an election of school trustees, if certain irregulari-
ties occur, such as changing the location of the polUng
place, which are not shown to have changed the result,
the election will not thereby be invalidated.*
The statutory provision that school officers shall be
elected by ballot is mandatory ; but where at a regular
meeting such officers are unanimously elected by
viva voce vote, no other person claiming to have been
elected, have qualified and assumed the office, they will
not be ousted by proceedings quo warranto.^ And the
officers of a school district hold their offices until their
successors are elected or appointed.^
New members of a school board enter upon their
duties as soon as the term of their predecessors expire,
1 Branaman v. HinHe, 137 Ind. 496, 37 N. E. 546.
2 The terms "School Directors", "School Board", "Board of
-Education", "School Committee", "School Trustees", and other
terms of local usage as applied to the persons, collectively, in whom
the legislature has placed the management of public schools, as
used herein, are synonymous.
3 People V. Crossley, 261 111. 78, 103 N. E. 537.
* Simmons v. People, 119 111. 617, 9 N. E. 220.
6 Roeser v. Gartland, 75 Mich. 143, 42 N. W. 687.
« Walker v. Miner, 32 Vt. 769 ; Rowell v. School District, 59 Vt.
658, 10 Atl. 754; Attorney General v. Burnham, 61 N. H. 594;
School, &c., V. Powner, 126 Ind. 528, 26 N. E. 484 ; State v. Fagan,
42 Conn. 32.
94
Ch. IV] SCHOOL DIRECTORS [§ 43
and they are then entitled to participate in the organiz-
ing of the new board.^ In deciding their terms of office
the casting of lots to determine their respective terms,
by trustees of a school district legally elected and
qualified, is not illegal.^
Even in the same State it is sometimes provided that
larger school districts elect a board of education, while
the smaller ones are governed by the district com-
mittees.'
School directors, or trustees, their powers and duties
having been derived exclusively from statute, can
exercise no powers other than those expressly granted,
or such as are clearly implied from such granted powers.*
If they exercise powers and functions which the statute
does not confer upon them, they are responsible for all
losses that may ensue.^ Being pubUc officers they are
subject to the same rules as other pubfic officers in
respect to their impUed powers ; and such powers will be
imphed only when the exercise thereof is necessary
to the performance of other duties imposed upon them
by the statute.^
All persons dealing with school officers are presumed
to have full knowledge of the limitations of the powers
of such officers to bind their corporations, and the limit
of the powers of a school board must be recognized by
1 Appeal of Royce, 1 Walk. (Pa.) 215.
2 McGinnis v. Board, &c., 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1289, 108 S. W. 289.
» Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 81 Atl. 1013.
* Crawford v. District, &c., 68 Oreg. 388, 137 Pac. 217; Baxter
V. Davis, 58 Oreg. 109, 112 Pac. 410.
6 Adams v. State, 82 111. 132.
« A. H. Andrews Co. v. DeUght, &c., 95 Ark. 26, 128 S. W. 361.
95
§ 43] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Oh. IV
those contracting with them.^ Persons dealing with a
school board are also chargeable with notice of a valid
by-law adopted by them.^
In so far as directors and trustees act within their
authority, their contracts are binding.' But school
(directors have no right to bind either themselves or
their successors by any contract which shall reUeve
them from the official duty and responsibility which
they owe to the people whom they represent.*
A board of school directors are public officers whose
duties are defined by statute.^ Being of statutory
creation they are only entitled to such compensation
for the performance of their prescribed duties as are
fixed by statute.® Therefore, a board of directors
have no authority to employ one of their number to
oversee the completion of a schoolhouse abandoned by
the contractor, and bind the district for payment, nor
1 Slattery v. School, &c., 43 Ind. App. 58, 86 N. E. 860; State
V. Freed, 10 Ohio Cir. Ct. 294.
2 Montenegro-Riehm Music Co. v. Board, &c., 147 Ky. 720, 145
S. W. 740.
^ Bloomington, &c., v. National School, &c., 107 Ind. 43, 7 N. E.
760 ; State v. Freed, 10 Ohio Cir. Ct. 294 ; Rutledge v. McCue,
10 Kulp (Pa.) 57 ; Adams v. State, 82 111. 132 ; Knabe v. Board, &c.,
67 Mich. 262, 34 N. W. 568.
* Wood V. Medfield, 123 Mass. 545; Peers v. Board, &c., 72 III.
508; Seeger v. Mueller, 133 lU. 86, 24 N. E. 513; Union School
District, &c., V. Crawfordsville, &c., 102 Ind. 473, 2 N. E. 194;
Wright V. Rosenbloom, 52 N. Y. App. Div. 579, 66 N. Y. S. 165;
Honaker v. Board, &c., 42 W. Va. 170, 24 S. E. 544; Conley v.
School Directors, 32 Pa. St. 194 ; Crawford v. District, &c., 68 Oreg.
388, 137 Pac. 217.
« Ogden V. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379 ; Sherlock v. Winnetka, 68 111.
530.
« Upton V. County of Clinton, 52 Iowa 311, 3 N. W. 81.
96
Ch. IV] SCHOOL DIRECTORS [§ 43
can such trustee recover from the district for such ser-
vices rendered.^ And the powers given to the school
officers by statute cannot be taken from them by a
vote of the district, as for example, the power to provide
board for the teachers.^
A school trustee in the discharge of his duties is a
special agent whose powers are hmited, and it is in-
cumbent upon those who undertake to deal with him in
that capacity, to ascertain whether he is acting within
his authority.^ But a school trustee is more than an
agent of the district he represents. He is a pubhc
officer and holds fiduciary relations with his district.*
Where the law gives the district board full control
over the schools of the district, the power to appoint a
superintendent of schools is incident thereto.^ But
power to appoint a superintendent of music is not to be
implied.*
School boards have no authority to offer rewards for
detection and punishment of crime. ^ And, in absence
of statutory authority, a school board has no authority
to discipline its employees by the imposition of a fine.^
1 Moore v. Independent, &c., 55 Iowa 654, 8 N. W. 631.
« School District, &c., v. Currier, 45 N. H. 573.
» Union, &c., V. First Nat'l Bank, 102 Ind. 464, 2 N. E. 194;
Bloomington, &c., v. National, &c., 107 Ind. 43, 7 N. E. 760 ; Mest
V. School District, &c., 2 Woodw. (Pa.) 257 ; Roland v. Reading,
&c., 161 Pa. St. 102, 28 Atl. 995. But see, Wheeler v. Alton, &c.,
66 N. H. 540, 23 Atl. 89.
* Axt V. Jackson, &c., 90 Ind. 101 ; Wheeler v. Alton, &c., 66
N. H. 540, 23 Atl. 89.
8 Stuart V. Kalamazoo, 30 Mich. 69 ; Spring v. Wright, 63 111. 90.
s Perot V. Philadelphia, 11 Phila. 181.
^ Luchini v. PoUce Jury, 126 La. 972, 53 So. 68.
8 FarreU v. Board, &c., 67 Misc. Rep. 187, 122 N. Y. S. 289.
97
§43] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
School directors may become criminally liable, as where
two or more members of a school board agree together
to exact from a school teacher a sum of money in con-
sideration of a contract of employment to teach in a
public school ; and guch agreeing together is xmlawful
and constitutes the crime of conspiracy.^
Where the city charter confers upon the board of
education the power to enact rules for the conduct of
their proceedings, no authority is thereby given to
change a rule of the charter.^ And where a statute of
a State is in conflict with a by-law of a board of educa-
tion, the statute prevails.' But the provisions of a
city charter, providing that vacancies shall be filled
by the council of the city, and which consolidates the
city and town, controls over the provisions of a general
statute which provides that vacancies pertaining to
public Schools shall be filled by the school committee.*
And a school board acting under a special charter,
upon a repeal thereof, cannot constitute a de' facto
board under another act.^
A disputed claim may be compromised by the pru-
dential committee as the general financial agent of the
district.^ He may also furnish wood to the district
on his own account and collect a reasonable price for it.'
If a district without a schoolhouse vote not to build
1 Bundy v. State, 95 Ark. 460, 130 S. W. 522.
2 Malloy V. Board, &c., 102 Cal. 642, 36 Pac. 948.
' People V. Van Siclen, 43 Hun (N. Y.) 537.
* State V. Hatch, 82 Conn. 122, 72 Atl. 575.
6 People V. Welsh, 225 111. 364, 80 N. E. 313.
« Norton v. Tinmouth, &c., 37 Vt. 521.
' lUd.
98
Ch. IV] SCHOOL DIRECTORS [§ 43
one, such vote does not discharge the school directors
from their duty to estabUsh and maintain a free public
school in such district.^ And where a legislative act
imposes a fine upon a board of directors who fail to
perform certain duties, such act is not to be construed
so as to impose a penalty on a director who has done
his duty.^
A board of education may appoint a member as an
agent to secure a lease of land for school purposes.*
And the appointment of an agent by an incorporated
State Board of Education need not be under seal.^
Any liability created by the wrongful action of a
school board, by statute made a body corporate, is
against the corporation and not against the individual
members.^ But where the school directors, or clerk of
the board, conimit a tort in entering upon the school
records the reason for dismissing a teacher, the district
is not liable therefor.®
To enjoin school directors at the suit of a mere tax-
payer it must be shown that an injury to his property
rights has been sustained or threatened; otherwise
an injunction will not lie.'^
A school officer may not at the same time hold more
than one public office, and the offices of postmaster and
school trustee being incompatible, consequently can-
1 School Directors v. People, 186 111. 331, 57 N. E. 780.
2 Com. V. Herr, 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 454.
3 Board, &c., v. Harvey, 70 "W. Va. 480, 74 S. E. 507.
* Board, &c., v. Greenbaum, 39 111. 609.
B Foster v. Reynolds, 66 Misc. Rep. 133, 123 N. Y. S. 273.
« Wiest V. School District, &c., 68 Oreg. 474, 137 Pac. 749.
^ Lagow V. Hill, 143 lU. App. 523, 87 N. E. 369.
99
§44] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
not be held by the same person,^ and the acceptance of
an incompatible ofl&ce operates ipso facto to vacate the
office theretofore held.^
§ 44. Must Act as Unit.
A school board, by statute made a body corporate,
must act as a unit, in the manner prescribed by statute
or common law, as a board convened for the transac-
tion of business, by a majority vote,' and an act of the
minority is not sufficient.^ But a maj ority may lawfully
do official acts, especially after a refusal of a minority
to act with them ; ^ although a majority of the board
acting separately and as individuals cannot so act as
to make a contract on behalf of the board, nor direct
the issuance of an order to pay it.^
Where the statute provides for the joint action of two
officials, neither of them may act alone. '^ But a quorum
1 Johnson v. Sanders, 131 Ky. 537, 115 8. W. 772.
2 Whitehead v. Pittman, 165 N. C. 89, 80 S. E. 976.
' Harrington v. District, &c., 47 Iowa 11 ; State v. Leonard, 3
Tenn. Ch. 177 ; Lee v. Parry, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 125 ; Keeler v. Frost,
22 Barb. (N. Y.) 400; American Heating, &c., v. Board, &c., 81
N. J. L. 423, 79 Atl. 313 ; Cook v. White, &c., 33 Ky. L. Rep. 926,
111 S. W. 686 ; Byrne & Read v. Board, &c., 140 Ky. 531, 131 S. W.
260; Lamaster v. Wilkerson, 143 Ky. 226, 136 S. W. 217.
* People V. Smith, 149 111. 549, 36 N. E. 971 ; State v. Treasurer,
&c., 22 Ohio St. 144.
* Kingsbury v. Centre School District, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 90;
Schofield V. Watkins, 22 111. 66 ; McCoy v. Curtice, 9 Wend. (N. Y.)
17.
' State V. Treasurer, &c., 22 Ohio St. 144 ; Pennsylvania, &c., v.
Board, &o., 20 W. Va. 360; Honaker v. Board, &c., 42 W. Va. 170,
24 S. E. 544; Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 25 N. E. 92;
Morville v. Fowle, 144 Mass. 109, 10 N. E. 766.
" State V. School District, &c., 22 Neb. 48, 33 N. W. 480.
100
Ch. IV] DISCRETION AND GOOD FAITH [§ 45
of a board may take any action that the whole board
might take, unless the statute otherwise provides.^
A school district is not bound by the acts of an indi-
vidual member of the board who does not act by
authority of the board.^ And a contract by five of the
nine members of a school board who act independently
of each other is not binding on the district unless rati-
fied ; ^ they can bind the district only when they con-
vene and act together as a board/ Nor do casual
conversations among the members of a school board
bind the district. Binding action can be taken only at
a regular or special meeting.^ Although if all are pre-
sent they may take official action even though the meet-
ing is not formally called.®
§ 46. Discretion and Good Faith.
In the performance of the duties imposed by law upon
school directors they must exercise judgment and discre-
tion. This discretion will not be disturbed by the
courts, and rehef will be given only when their action
is capricious, arbitrary or shows bad faith tantamount
to fraud. '^
» Trustees, &c., v. Brooks, 163 Ky. 200, 173 S. W. 305.
^Markey v. School District, &c., 58 Neb. 479, 78 N. W. 932;
Kane & Co. v. School District, &c., 5 Kan. App. 260, 47 Pac. 561.
* Richards v. School, &c., 132 Iowa 612, 109 N. W. 1093.
* School District, &c., v. Jackson, 110 Ark. 262, 161 S. W. 153;
Ryan v. Humphries, 150 Pac. (Okla.) 1106.
^ Armstrong v. School Directors, &c., 160 lU. App. 430.
8 Butler V. Windsor, 155 Wis. 626, 145 N. W. 180.
^ Williams v. Board, &c., 81 Kan. 593, 106 Pac. 36 ; Wilson v.
Board, &c., 233 lU. 464, 84 N. E. 697 ; Jeffries v. Board, &c., 135
Ky. 488, 122 S. W. 813 ; State v. District, &c., 135 Wis. 619, 116
101
§ 45] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
What rules and regulations will best promote the
interests of the schools under their immediate control,
and what branches shall be taught, and what text-
books shall be used, are matters usually left to the
determination of the directors, and must be settled by
them from the best lights they can obtain from any
source, keeping always in view the highest good of the
whole schools. Good order can only be obtained by
enforcing discipline, and that power is largely com-
mitted to the directors. They have the power of sus-
pension and expulsion, and they may exercise that
power as a means of discipHne for the causes men-
tioned in the statute, or implied from the powers given
them.
The expulsion or suspension of a pupil from the bene-
fits and privileges of the school for what is considered
incorrigibly bad conduct, implies deliberation and de-
cision on the part of the directors, or as it is sometimes
expressed, they act judicially in a matter involving dis-
cretion in relation to the duties of their office. And
a declaration against the directors of a public school
for improperly exercising their duties is subject to, a
demurrer if it does not state that they acted either
wantonly or maliciously.
This rule is certainly a reasonable one. A mere mis-
take in judgment, either as to their, duties under the
law, or as to the facts submitted to them, ought not to
subject such officers to an action. They may judge
N. W. 232; State v. Board, &c., 122 Tenn. 161, 121 S. W. 499;
Cross V. Board, &c., 33 Ky. L. Rep. 472, 110 S. W. 346; Venable v.
School, &c., 149 N. C. 120, 62 S. E. 902.
102
Ch. IV] QUALIFYING OF OFFICERS [§ 46
wrongly, and so may a court or other tribunal, but the
party complaining can have no action when such officers
act in good faith and in the Une of what they honestly
think is their duty. Any other rule might work great
hardship to honest men, who, with the best of motives
have faithfully endeavored to perform the duties of
these inferior offices. It is not enough to aver the action
of such officer erroneous, but it must be averred and
proved that such action was taken in bad faith, either
wantonly or maUciously.^ And the decision of a school
committee to close a school for reason of the small
attendance wiU prima facie be presumed done in good
faith, and their judgment correct.^
The discretion of school directors in the management
of public schools will not be interfered with by the
courts when their acts are legal,^ but their illegal acts
will be restrained by the courts as they would restrain
any other official wrong-doing.* The courts may also
act when a school board is evenly divided on a matter
and are therefore unable to act.*
§ 46. Qualifying of Officers.
Where the statute provides that school directors
in order to qualify shall subscribe the oath of office
and file it with the clerk, the statute is mandatory and
1 McCormick v. Burt, 95 111. 263 ; Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me.
389 ; Price v. Barrett, &c., 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 395 ; Stewart v. Southard,
17 Ohio St. 402.
2 Morse v. Ashley, 193 Mass. 294, 79 N. E. 481.
' Com. V. Jenks, 154 Pa. St. 368, 26 Atl. 371 ; In re Dublin, &c.,
14 Pa. Co. Ct. 464 ; In re Washington, &c., 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 509.
* Com. V. Williamson, 30 Leg. Int. (Pa.) 406.
^ In re Bloomsburg, &c., 4 Pa. Co. Ct. 411.
103
§ 47] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
an oral oath is not a compliance therewith;^ and the
qualifying of a school officer may include the taking of
oath and the giving of a required bond.^ Failure to
qualify, or to take and subscribe the oath of office
within the time prescribed by law vacates the office.^
When the day specified by statute as the day on which
an officer must qualify falls on a legal hoUday, such
officer qualifying on the next day following is an officer
de jure.^
§ 47. Vacating and Removal.
The power to remove insubordinate and negligent
school officers is sometimes given by statute and may be
exercised for proper cause.^ The refusal of a trustee
to discontinue a proceeding against a local board when
ordered to do so by the superintendent whose decision
was conclusive, has been declared willful disobedience
and proper cause for removal. ® And where the directors
of a subdistrict were ordered by the board of education
to sell the old schoolhouse and site, and purchase a
new site, instead of complying with the order, proceeded
to build a new schoolhouse on the old site it was held
a degree of insubordination which justified their re-
moval.''
But the power of removal cannot be exercised against
1 School District, &c., v. Bennett, 52 Ark. 511, 13 S. W. 132.
2 State V. Stewart, 90 Kan. 778, 135 Pac. 1182.
8 Owens V. O'Brien, 78 Va. 116 ; Smith v. Reppard, 69 W. Va. 211,
71 S. E. 115.
* Jewett V. Matteson, 148 Ky. 820, 147 S. W. 924.
^ Heard v. School Du-ectors, 45 Pa. St. 93.
« People V. Draper, 63 Hun (N. Y.) 389, 18 N. Y. S. 282.
^ State V. Lynch, 8 Ohio 347.
104
Ch. IV] VACATING AND REMOVAL [§ 47
an official who refuses to do an act which rests within
his own discretion, as where the school directors refuse
to erect a new school building, the erection of which is
within their discretion.^
The failure of a school board to organize because no
one can get a majority vote for president is neglect of
duty and just cause for removal,^ and so is the failure of
a board to appoint the usual and necessary number of
teachers because they cannot agree as to the salary.^
Although a school board may be removed for im-
proper acts or omissions in their official capacity, they
may not be removed for acts done in an individual
capacity and not as a board formally convened.*
And an officer duly elected, and who has entered into
the duties of his office, cannot be removed from, nor
deprived of his office without notice and hearing be-
fore a proper tribunal,^ although where an office is
appointive, or where the power of removal is given by
statute, an officer may be removed at any time without
notice or hearing.*
Failure of a school officer to perform ministerial or
clerical duties in entering upon the records the election
1 In re Deny, &c., 1 Leg. Gaz. (Pa.) 59 ; Kline v. School Direc- '
tors, 2 Lane. L. Rev. (Pa.) 321.
2 In re Kline, &c., 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 546.
' Appeal of School Directors, &c., 121 Pa. St. 293, 15 Atl. 548.
* State V. Leonard, 3 Tenn. Ch. 177.
5 Jacques v. Litle, 51 Kan. 300, 33 Pac. 106 ; Field v. Com., 32
Pa. St. 478 ; Ex parte Hennon, 38 U. S. 230, 10 L. ed. 138 ; Page v.
Hardin, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 648; State v. St. Louis, 90 Mo. 19; Wil-
lard's App., 4 R. 1. 601 ; Chase v. Hathaway, 14 Mass. 222 ; Dullam
V. Willson, 53 Mich. 392, 19 N. W. 112.
« State V. Mitchell, 50 Kan. 289, 33 Pac. 104.
105
§ 47] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
and qualification of one duly elected to the school board
will not deprive the one so elected of his office,^ and a
resignation will not be inferred from failure to perform
the duties of the oflUce,^ nor is the office vacated by an
unaccepted resignation.*
It is usually provided by statute that the removal of
a school trustee from the county makes his office
vacant/ but a school director who temporarily moves
out of a district for a few months, with intention of
returning, leaving his property within the district,
does not thereby vacate his office although his neglect
of duties pertaining thereto are penalized by statute.
Such officer may abandon his office by resignation,
removal from the district, non-user, or neglect of
duty, but any of such acts or omissions must be com-
plete, and of a permanent nature, and the circum-
stances must absolutely indicate the refinquishment
of office; otherwise there must be a judicial determi-
nation of the vacancy of the office before it can be so
considered.^
A member of a school board by absence from the
State for a period of six months does not thereby vacate
his office.^ But a school director who removes from the
district with intent not to return, thereby vacates his
office, and the remaining two members may make a
1 McGlone v. Zornes, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 965, 107 S. W. 329.
2 Giles V. School District, &c., 31 N. H. 304.
' Townsend v. Trustees, &c., 41 N. J. L. 312.
^ Giles V. School District, &c., 31 N. H. 304; Gildersleeve v.
Board, &c., 17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 201.
6 School District, &c., v. Garrison, 90 Ark. 335, 119 S. W. 275.
« Patrick v. Fletcher, 149 Ky. 193, 148 S. W. 16.
106
Ch. IV] OFFICERS DE FACTO AND DE JURE [§ 48
lawful contract without notifying the absent member
of the meeting.^
For misfeasance, that is, the improper doing of an
act which might be otherwise done lawfully, the school
directors may not be removed from office.^
§ 48. Officers De Facto, De Jure and Intruders.
A pubUc officer, such as a member of a school board,^
may be an officer de jure, or an officer de facto, or both,
or a mere intruder.
An officer de facto may be defined as one who has the
reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, and
yet is not a good officer in point of law.*
A very comprehensive definition of an officer de facto
has been given as follows : " An officer de facto is one
whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law,
upon principles of policy and justice, wiU hold valid
so far as they involve the interests of the pubhc and
third persons, where the duties of the office were
exercised :
" First, without a known appointment or election,
but under such circumstances of reputation or acqui-
escence as were calculated to induce people, without
inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing
him to be the officer he assumed to be.
1 Marr v. School District, &c., 107 Ark. 305, 154 S. W. 944.
2 In re Union, &c., 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 547.
' Ogden V. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379 ; Sanborn v. Neal, 4 Minn.
126 ; Com. v. Morrisey, 86 Pa. St. 416 ; McCoy v. Curtice, 9 Wend.
(N. Y.) 17.
* King V. Corporation of Bedford Level, 6 East 356 ; Petersilea
V. Stone, 119 Mass. 465; State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449.
107
§ 48] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
" Second, under color of a known and valid appoint-
ment or election, but where the officer has failed to
conform to some precedent requirement or condition,
as to take an oath, give a bond or the Uke.
" Third, under color of a known election or appoint-
ment, void because the officer was not ehgible, or be-
cause there was a want of power in the electing or ap-
pointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity
in its exercise, such ineligibiUty, want of power or defect
being unknown to the public.
" Fourth, under color of an election, or appointment
by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law,
before the same is adjudged to be such." '
The early cases held that to constitute one an officer
de facto it was necessary that his claim to office must
have been under some form or color of election or ap-
pointment. But color of election or appointment is
not now considered as an essential element so far as
the rights of third persons are concerned.^ But it is
necessary, in order to constitute one an officer de
facto and distinguish him from an usurper or a mere
intruder, that he hold his office under color of right.
This color of right may consist in an election or appoint-
ment, or in holding over after the expiration of his term
of office, or in acquiescence by the public in the acts of
such officer for such a length of time as to raise the pre-
sumption of colorable right by election or appointment.'
1 State V. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449.
^ PetersUea v. Stone, 119 Mass. 465 ; Brown v. Lunt, 37 Me. 423 ;
Cary v. State, 76 Ala. 78.
* Hamlin v. Kassafer, 15 Oreg. 456, 15 Pac. 778.
108
Ch. IV] OFFICERS DE FACTO AND DB JURE [§48
Consequently by acquiescence a mere intruder may
become an officer de facto ; so also one elected under an
unconstitutional statute to a valid office ; ' or at an
election of which proper notice was not given ; ^ or
who was not eUgible to the office ; ' or accepted an in-
compatible office, and thereby his previously held
office was forfeited ; * or did not give a bond as pre-
scribed by law ; ^ or when the bond given was de-
fective ; ^ or when his bond was not duly filed ; ^ or
when he held over after expiration of his term ; * or
removed from the district ; ^ or was appointed when he
should have been elected." It should be noted however
that no one can be an officer either de jure or de facto
if the office which he holds was created by an un-
constitutional statute. Such holder of office is a mere
usurper. ^^
The doings of an officer de facto, as affecting third
persons who have an interest in the thing done, and the
public, are vaUd, and must be respected until he is
1 Cole V. Black River Falls, 57 Wis. 110, 14 N. W. 906; State v.
Carroll, 38 Conn. 449.
2 Yorty V. Paine, 62 Wis. 154, 22 N. W. 137.
3 Farrier j;. State, 48 N. J. L. 613, 7 Atl. 881 ; Lockhart v. Troy,
48 Ala. 579.
* Woodside v. Wagg, 71 Me. 207.
* Gunn V. Tacket, 67 Ga. 725.
« Adams v. Tator, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 384.
^ State V. Dierberger, 90 Mo. 369, 2 S. W. 286.
spetersilea v. Stone, 119 Mass. 465; People v. Beach, 77 111.
52 ; Morton v. Lee, 28 Kan. 286 ; Wapello County v. Bigham, 10
Iowa 39.
' Case V. State, 69 Ind. 46.
1" Chicago, &c., v. Langlade, &e., 56 Wis. 614, 14 N. W. 844.
» Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425, 30 L. ed. 178, 6 S. Ct.
1121.
109
§ 48] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
ousted from office by quo warranto, but the acts of an
usurper are wholly void.^
An officer de jure is one who has the lawful right to
the office, but who has either been ousted from or
never actually taken possession of it. When the officer
de jure is also the officer de facto, the lawful title and
possession are united, and no other person can be an
officer de facto for that office.^
Within the scope of his authority the acts of an officer
de jure are valid for all purposes. Not so with an
officer de facto ; his acts are only recognized in the law
to be vaUd and effectual so far as they affect the public
and third persons. As to these his acts are as vaUd as
if he were an officer de jure. The reason of the rule is
apparent. It would be as unjust as unreasonable to
require every individual doing business with such
officer to investigate and determine at his peril the title
of such officer. Third persons, from the nature of the
case, cannot always investigate such right even so far
as to say that the holder of an office has color of title
to it by virtue of some appointment or election. If
he is seen to be pubhcly exercising the authorities of
the office, and if they find that this exercise is generally
acquiesced in, they are entitled to treat him as such
officer, and if they deal with him as such, he should not
be subjected to the danger of having his acts collater-
ally attacked.' It, moreover, is against the policy of
^ Plymouth v. Painter, 17 Conn. 585.
2 Hamlin v. Kassafer, 15 Oreg. 456, 15 Pac. 778.
^Petersilea v. Stone, 119 Mass. 467; School District, &c., v.
Garrison, 90 Ark. 335, 119 S. W. 275.
110
Ch. IV] OFFICERS DE FACTO AND DE JURE [§ 48
the law to allow a suit between private individuals to
determine the title to an oflfice. Such judgment could
only bind the parties, and would be of no effect as
against the pubhc.
A mere usurper or intruder is one who has intruded
upon the office and acts without color of title or right,
and whose acts are utterly void.^
The official acts of a de facto county superintendent
are vahd so long as he is permitted to exercise the func-
tions of that office.^ And any school officer acting as
such will be presumed to be rightfully in office,^ es-
pecially when he is shown to have been acting under
color of election ; * and evidence that the general re-
putation in the district is that he is not an officer de
jure is not admissible.^
The acts of a school officer de facto, who has a color-
able right to office,® are generally vaUd.^ Bonds issued
by a de facto board of education are vahd in the hands
of a bona fide holder for value,^ and a de facto school board
may make a contract with a teacher that will bind the
I'Hooper v. Goodwin, 48 Me. 80; Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 113 ;
McCraw v. Wiiliams, 33 Gratt. 510; Com. v. Bush, 131 Ky. 384,
115 S. W. 249.
2 State V. Blegen, 26 S. D. 106, 128 N. W. 488.
'Burgess v. Pue, 2 GiU (Md.) 254; State v. Williams, 27 Vt.
755.
*"Ring V. Grout, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 341.
0 Hand v. Deady, 79 Hun (N. Y.) 75, 29 N. Y. S. 633 ; Washing-
ton, &c., V. School, &c., 77 Md. 283, 260 Atl. 115.
^ School District, &c., v. Cowee, 9 Neb. 53, 2 N. W. 235 ; Goodwin
V. Perkins, 39 Vt. 598.
8 National, &c., v. Board, &c., 159 U. S. 262, 40 L. ed. 147, 15
S. Gt. 1041.
Ill
§ 48] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
district.* And any contract which a board of education
has power to make, they have power to ratify when
made by officers de facto who have acted under an
invaUd law.^
The right of de facto school directors to perform the
duties of their office can be questioned only by the
State in a proceeding brought for that piirpose at the
instance of the attorney general or county attorney,'
and a treasurer cannot refuse to pay warrants drawn by
a de facto school board on the ground that they hold
office illegally.* And where there are two school boards
each claiming the office, and the board de jure notifies
persons not to contract with the other board, those
who do so contract cannot recover from the district.'
The right of suffrage and the capacity to hold office,
unless otherwise expressly declared, must coexist.
Therefore, unless so provided by statute, an aUen or
one who is not a qualified elector is ineligible to hold an
elective office. This rule of law is founded upon the
acknowledged principle which lies at the very founda-
tion of all independent popular governments, — that
the government is instituted by the citizens for their
Uberty and protection, and that it is to be administered,
and its powers and functions exercised by them and
> School, &c., V. Ziegler, 1 Ind. App. 138, 27 N. E. 303; DeWoK
V. Watterson, 35 Hun (N. Y.) 111.
^ Dubuque, &c., v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa 555.
^ Franklin, &c., v. Board, &c., 75 Mo. 408 ; Jacques v. Litle, 51
Kan. 300, 33 Pac. 106.
* Miahle v. Fournet, 13 La. An. 607.
' Genessee, &c., v. McDonald, 98 Pa. St. 444 ; State v. Blossom,
19 Nev. 312, 10 Pac. 430 ; White v. Archibald, 8 Atl. (Pa.) 443.
112
Ch. IV] MEETINGS OF SCHOOL DIRECTORS [§ 50
through their agencies. And this is the rule although
constitution and statutes do not expressly so ordain.^
§ 49. Usurpation of Duties.
Where the mayor and city council usurp the duties
of the school directors, the right of the alleged usurpa-
tion must be settled by quo warranto or other action
but cannot be tried by mandamus.^ And a superintend-
ent of the pubhc schools is entitled to an injunction
to restrain persons usurping an office from remov-
ing him from his position to which he is legally entitled,
or in other ways interfering with him in the discharge
of his duties.^
Where a school board of six members divide them-
selves into two equal factions, and each attempts to
organize and usiu^) the powers of the board, no organ-
ization is effected, and the entire board may be
removed.*
§ 50. Meetings of School Directors.
The authority of school trustees is limited to the legis-
lative authority conferred, * and therefore they can
perform only such functions as are prescribed by statute,
or are fairly imphed therefrom. Consequently a vote
taken at a meeting held outside the district is void.®
1 Scott V. Strobach, 49 Ala. 477 ; State v. Murray, 28 Wis. 96 ;
State V. Trumpf, 50 Wis. 103, 5 N. W. 876.
2 Fowler v. Brooks, 188 Mass. 64, 74 N. E. 291.
» Lefevre v. Besterling, 137 S. W. (Tex.) 1159.
« In re Butler, &c., 158 Pa. St. 159, 27 Atl. 849.
5 State V. McBride, 31 Nev. 57, 99 Pac. 705.
6 State V. Kessler, 136 Mo. App. 236, 117 S., W. 85.
113
§ 51] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
But where all members of a school board are present,
they may take official action, though the meeting is
not formally called.^
Where the statute requires the secretary of a school
committee to keep a permanent record book in which
all votes, orders, and proceedings of the committee
shall be recorded, it is a mere direction to the secretary
and does not have the effect of rendering invalid such
regulations adopted by the committee as are not re-
corded therein.^ And a rule of a school board is waived
when such board take unanimous action inconsistent
therewith.^
§ 51. Notice of Meetings.
Even though there is a general understanding between
the members of a school board that in the absence of
one member the others could act without prior notice
to the absent member, a contract entered into at a
meeting where one member was absent and had had no
notice, is void.* And the fact that a member of a school
board has said that he is opposed to certain action,
does not make it unnecessary to give him notice of a
meeting upon which such action is to be officially
taken. ^
Where an honest and reasonable effort has been made
to notify an absent school director of a meeting of the
1 Butler V. Joint School District, &c., 155 Wis. 626, 145 N. W. 180.
See also, §§ 43, 44, supra.
2 Alvord V. Chester, 180 Mass. 20, 61 N. E. 263.
3 Weatherly v. Chattanooga, 48 S. W. (Tenn.) 136.
* School District v. Castell, 105 Ark. 106, 150 S. W. 407.
5 Scott V. Pendley, 114 Ky. 606, 71 S. W. 647.
114
Ch. IV] RECORDS [§ 52
board, which effort was futile, the remaining two mem-
bers of the board may lawfully act.^ Nor will the fact
that the statute provides that no official business shall
be transacted by a board of school directors, except
at a regular or special meeting, invalidate action taken
by them when all members are present even without
notice of a meeting.^ And if all school directors are
present at a meeting and participate therein, it is im-
material that they had no notice of the meeting.'
§ 52. Records.
A school board should keep a written record of its
proceedings.^ But it is not necessary that every act
in regard to the management of each school be author-
ized or confirmed by formal vote, or that all rules and
orders required for the discipline and good conduct of
the schools shall be matter of record with the conamittee.
It would be practically impossible sufficiently to provide
for all matters by a system of rules, however carefully
prepared and promulgated. Much must necessarily
be left to the individual members of the committee, and
to teachers of the several schools ; ^ so where notice of
the discontinuance of a school is given to the persons
interested its validity is not affected by the omission
^ School Directors v. Sprague, 78 111. App. 390.
2 Lawrence v. Trauer, 136 lU. 474, 27 N. E. 197.
' School District, &c., v. Allen, 83 Ark. 491, 104 S. W. 172 ;
People V. Frost, 32 111. App. 242 ; Lee v. Mitchell, 108 Ark. 1, 156
S. W. 450 ; Hanna v. Wright, 116 Iowa 275, 89 N. W. 1108.
* Broussard v. Verret, 43 La. An. 929, 9 So. 905 ; Gearhart v.
Dixon, 1 Pa. St. 224.
^ Russell V. Lynnfield, 116 Mass. 365.
115
§ 53] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
of the trustee at the time of making his order to enter
it of record.^
Although the acts of a board of school directors should
be recorded, if not recorded they are so far valid that
those who contract with them cannot repudiate the con-
tract merely because the matter was not recorded.^ And
where the minutes of a board of education show that a
meeting was held pursuant to a rule fixing time and place
and defining a quorum, it will be presumed that a meet-
ing was so called and held.^
One who has been clerk of a school board, cannot
after the expiration of his term of ofiice, correct the
minutes of a meeting of the board as a public ofiicer, nor
as such correct his ofl&cial entries in the public records.*
§ 53. Voting.
Where the vote of a town requires the school directors
to appoint a superintendent of schools, they may, after
electing the superintendent by ballot, reconsider the
vote at the same meeting before conununicating it to
the person appointed, and at another meeting elect
another person to fill the position, without any contract
arising with the party whose election was reconsidered.^
Although the more important duties of the school
directors must be delegated by a formal vote, it is not
necessary that subordinate matters must be so voted.
This would be impracticable. So one who is authorized
1 Tufts V. State, 119 Ind. -232, 21 N. E. 892.
2 School Directors, &c., v. McBride, 22 Pa. St. 215.
5 American, &c., v. Board, &c., 131 Wis. 220, 110 N. W. 403.
* Beck V. Board, &c., 76 Ohio St. 587, 81 N. E. 1180.
6 Wood V. Cutter, 138 Mass. 149.
116
Ch. IV] MAKING CONTRACTS [§ 54
by the school directors to take charge of a school may,
without a formal vote of the school directors, employ
one to keep order at the door and such contract is bind-
ing upon the city.^
§ 54. Making Contracts.
As members of boards of education and other pubUc
officers are guardians of the pubhc welfare, they must
allow no transaction growing out of their official posi-
tion or services to inure to their personal benefit ; and
from such transactions the law will not imply a con-
tract.'' When a contract grows out of and is connected
with an illegal act, it will npt be enforced.^ Therefore
an order by two of the trustees of a school district, one
of whom is personally interested in it, and therefore
incompetent to act, is void for want of the sanction of
a competent majority of the board, whether the in-
terested trustee has acted fairly or not.*
And where one of the commissioners of a board of
education, when notified of the time and place of the
meeting of the board for the purpose of passing on a
proposed contract, refused to go on account of the loss
he would sustain by closing his place of business, and
the agent of the party seeking the contract with the
board offered and paid to him two and a half dollars
in money to reimburse him for his loss to be thus in-
curred, telling him at the same time that the payment
1 Huse t;. Lowell, 10 Allen (Mass.) 149.
2 Davis V. United States, 23 Ct. 01. 329.
3 Jones V. Surprise, 64 N. H. 243, 9 Atl. 384; State v. Cross, 38
Kan. 696, 17 Pac. 190.
* Shakespear v. Smith, 77 Cal. 638, 20 Pac. 294.
117
§ 54] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
was not to influence his decision in any way, and the
commissioner attended the meeting and voted for the
contract, that transaction renders his vote and conse-
quently the contract invaUd.^ Such action amounts
to an unlawful influence which has the effect of bribery
so far as to render void any action taken by the aid of
such member, and the act is against public policy.
A written contract signed by the trustees of a school
district must show that they have signed in their repre-
sentative capacity; otherwise they will be personally
liable, and the district will not be bound. If a trustee
merely adds to the signature of his name the words
" trustee " or " school director ", this appendix is
regarded as merely descriptio personae, and he binds
himself instead of the district he represents. Such
words do not in themselves make third persons charge-
able with notice of any representative relation of the
signer.^ So where the written contract for the building of
a schoolhouse on its face shows no intent to make it the
contract of the district, or that the trustees were acting
on behalf of the district, but was signed with the names
of the school directors with their description as such they
were held individually liable.^ But if in the body of the
instrument they are designated as trustees of the public
schools of the district, it is the contract of the district.*
And if the contract makes no reference to the school
1 Honaker v. Board, &c., 42 W. Va. 170, 24 S. E. 544.
2 Metcalf V. Williams, 104 U. S. 93, 26 L. ed. 667.
3 Sharp V. Smith, 32 111. App. 336.
* Mackenzie v. School, &c., 72 Ind. 189 ; Sanborn v. Neal, 4
Minn. 126 ; Lyon v. Adamson, 7 Iowa 509.
118
Ch. IV] MAKING CONTRACTS [§ 54
district berag bound, but is signed by two persons with
tlje appendices " president school board ", ai^ " secre-
tary school board," the contract reciting " We agree to
pay," although the heading contains the name of the
State, county and township, It is the contract of the
two persons who signed it.^ Where in the body of an
instrument, the obligation created purports to be a
personal one ; although it is signed by the parties as
trustees, the language of the body is controlling, and
they are personally liable.^
Where duly appointed officers or agents of a corpora-
tion acting within the scope of their authority, execute
an instrument in behalf of the corporation, signing their
own names and aflfixing their own seals, such seals are
of no efifect, and the instrimaent is the simple contract
of the corporation, binding the corporation and not the
individuals signing it, where the instrument as a whole
shows an intent to act for the corporation, and does not
show an intent to create a personal liability.'
. Where school directors, not authorized by vote of the
people as required by statute, sign a promissory note
with their individual names they are personally liable
notwithstanding the note was given for school purposes.*
But where a school director signs a note and adds to
his signature " Trustee of S. Township " the note is
1 Wing V. GUck, 56 Iowa 473, 9 N. W. 384.
2 Western Publishing House v. Murdick, 4 S. D. 207, 56 N. W. 120.
' Dillon on Munic. Corp., 5th ed., § 785 ; Regents, &c., v. Detroit,
&c., 12 Mich. 138 ; Blanchard v. Blackstone, 102 Mass. 343 ; Bank,
&c., V. Guttschlick, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 19. But see, FuUam v. Brook-
field, 9 Allen (Mass.) 1.
* School Directors v. MUler, 54 111. 338.
119
§54] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
that of the township and the trustee is not personally
bound.^
Where school directors contract a debt in excess of
the statutory or constitutional debt limit, such debt
is vaUd up to such limit,^ especially when- fully per-
formed by the contractor.^
The provisions of the statutes must always be com-
plied with in making contracts, otherwise no legal lia-
bility is created.* And in order to bind the district
by a contract, a school board must act as a board, and
not as individual members.^
The directors of a school district may enter into a
contract for the district, the performance of which will
begin after the expiration of the term of office of some
of the directors, and such contract may be made by
two directors when there are but two on the board.®
But a school district has no authority to incur a debt
and issue a warrant therefor, payable in the future.'
And one dealing with a school board is presumed to have
knowledge of the limited authority.*
Without authority of statute a school board cannot
make a contract for school supplies which provides
any other place of payment than the school treasury,
> State V. Helms, 136 Ind. 122, 35 N. E. 893.
2 People V. Peoria, &c., 216 lU. 221, 74 N. E. 734. But see,
Grady v. Landram, 111 Ky. 100, 63 S. W. 284.
3 McGillivray v. Joint School District, 112 Wis. 354, 88 N. W. 310.
* Cascade, &c., v. Lewis, &c., 43 Pa. St. 318.
5 School District, &c., v. Shelton, 26 Okla, 229, 109 Pac. 67 ;
Johnson v. Dye, 142 Mo. App. 424, 127 S. W. 413.
« School District, &c., v. Garrison, 90 Ark. 335, 119 S. W. 275.
' Markey v. School District, &c., 58 Neb. 479, 78 N. W. 932.
8 Thornburgh v. School District, &c., 175 Mo. 12, 75 S. W. 81.
120
Ch. IV] MAKING CONTRACTS [§ 54
nor which contains a provision that necessary attorney's
fees be paid by the district.^
Where the statute makes it the duty of a school board
to select the site, adopt the plans, and contract for
the building of a schoolhouse, that duty cannot be dele-
gated.2 And the approval of the mayor to a contract
of a school committee, resting in his discretion, will not
be coerced by a mandamus.^
Where school directors make an illegal contract, and
illegally sign an order in payment therefor, they be-
come individually liable under the contract.*
Where the statute fixes a certain time and place for
transacting the annual business of a school district, and
it is not held on that day, a contract made in pursuance
of a vote taken at such meeting on a different day is
void, and no action can be maintained against a party
who breaks a contract to build a schoolhouse, made in
pursuance of such vote.® And a contract made by a
majority of the school directors at a meeting held at a
time other than that fixed for regular meetings, and of
which the minority had no notice is not binding on
the district.® But if all members of the board are noti-
fied to be present a contract made by the majority is
valid, ^ if authorized at a regular meeting,* and the ab-
1 Weir Furnace Co. v. Seymour, 99 Iowa 115, 68 N. W. 584.
2 Kinney v. Howard, 133 Iowa 94, 110 N. W. 282.
' McLean v. White, 216 Mass. 62, 102 N. E. 929.
* State Bank, &c., v. Keinberger, 140 Wis. 517, 122 N. W. 1132.
s Fluty V. School District, &c., 49 Ark. 94, 4 S. W. 278.
« School District, &c., v. Bennett, 52 Ark. 511, 13 S. W. 132.
' Wilson V. Waltersville, &c., 46 Conn. 400 ; People v. Peters,
4 Neb. 254.
8 Andrews v. School District, &c., 37 Minn. 96, 33 N. W. 217.
121
§ 54] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
sent member previously authorized, or subsequently
gave, his assent.^
A contract legally made is not rendered invalid be-
cause no record is made of the action of the board.^
And members of the school board should contract only
when duly convened at a board meeting, and sitting in
consultation, and a contract signed by them separately
without consultation, cannot be enforced, especially
when they were induced to sign by false and fraudulent
statements.'
A contract with a school district need not be in writ-
ing unless the statute requires it.* And where the
statute requires that a contract be in writing it is not
necessary that the contract be put into writing at the
session of the board at which it is made, it being sufficient
if it be reduced to writing and signed after the board
has adjourned.^
Although the statute requires contracts with teachers
to be in writing, if a teacher orally contracts with the
directors to teach a period of nine months, and after
teaching seven months and receiving pay therefor is
discharged, the acceptance by the district of such part
1 People V. Peters, 4 Neb. 254. But see, Pennsylvania, &c., v.
Board, &c., 20 W. Va. 360.
^ Bellmeyer v. Marshalltown, 44 Iowa, 564 ; Page v. Townsliip, &c.,
59 Mo. 264; School Directors, &c., v. McBride, 22 Pa. St. 215.
3 Mills V. Collins, 67 Iowa 164, 25 N. W. 109.
* Jackson, &c., v. Shefti, 8 Ind. App. 330, 35 N. E. 842.
5 Faulk V. McCartney,\42 Kan. 695, 22 Pac. 712; Milford v.
Zeigler, 1 Ind. App. 138, 27 N. E. 303 ; Holloway v. School Dis-
trict &c., 62 Mich. 153, 28 SN. W. 764; Armstrong v. School Dis-
trict, &c., 28 Mo. App. 169 ;■, Dolan v. School District, 80 Wis. 155,
49 N. W. 960.
122
Ch. IV] BIDS AND BIDDERS [§ 55
performance will be a ratification of the contract, and
the district will be Uable for the whole amount.^ But
an oral contract with a teacher, made without authority
to make even a written contract, will not be ratified
by a part performance when the board from the
beginning repudiated the entire contract, having so
voted, and instructed the secretary to so notify the
teacher.2
§ 55. Bids and Bidders.
Before entering into a contract with a person who
agrees to fiu-nish suppUes or erect a school building,
it is not necessary for the school officials to advertise
for bids, unless they are required by statute to do so.^
And where proposals are advertised for, in compliance
with the statute which does not require that a contract
be awarded to the lowest bidder, and the school board
advertises that it reserves the right to reject any or all
bids, in the absence of fraud on the part of the board
an injunction will not he to prevent them awarding the
contract to one who was not the lowest bidder.* If
the statute requires that a contract be let to the lowest
responsible bidder, and that bonds with sufficient
sureties shall be required, the school directors have no
authority to contract with one who is not the lowest
bidder, and who does not furnish the required bond.
Acceptance of such bid does not constitute a contract.*
1 Cook V. North McGregor, 40 Iowa 444.
^ Herrington v. Listen, 47 Iowa 11.
' Hughes V. School Directors, 8 Luz. Leg. Reg. (Pa.) 284.
* Chandler v. Board, &c., 104 Mich. 292, 62 N. W. 370.
5 Weitz V. Independent, &c., 79 Iowa 423, 44 N. W. 696.
123
§ 55] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
Although it is a rule of a school board to let contracts
to lowest bidders, in the absence of a statute so requir-
ing, they are not obUged to do so, and where their
advertisement states that they reserve the right to
reject any or all bids, one making the lowest bid has
no right of action against the board who rejects the
bid and awards the contract to another, even if the re-
jection is from caprice or favoritism. ^ But where a
board of awarding officers act contrary to law, or
fraudulently, the rights of the lowest bidder will be pro-
tected.^ And where there is but one bidder on a con-
tract, he cannot claim that he was the lowest bidder.^
The provision that a contract will be awarded to the
" lowest responsible bidder", does not refer alone to
pecuniary responsibiUty. Such responsibiUty to be
considered covers judgment, skill, abihty, integrity,
capacity to perform and financial responsibiUty.*
Therefore one who had previously defrauded the city
may be held objectionable.^
Whether a bidder on a contract is responsible is a
matter to be decided by the body authorized to accept
bids, with bona fide discretion and after investigation.®
And where the statute requires a board of education to
1 Anderson v. Board, &c., 122 Mo. 61, 27 S. W. 610.
2 Baltimore v. Keyser, 72 Md. 106, 19 Atl. 706; State v. York,
&e., 13 Neb. 57, 12 N. W. 816.
' People V. King's, &c., 42 Hun (N. Y.) 456.
* KeUy V. Chicago, 62 111. 279 ; Hoole v. Kinkead, 16 Nev. 217;
Interstate, &c., v. Philadelphia, 164 Pa. St. 477, 30 Atl. 383 ; People
V. Dorsheimer, 55 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 118 ; Clapton v. Taylor, 49
Mo. App. 117.
^ Douglass V. Com., 108 Pa. St. 559.
« Schwitzer v. Board, &c., 79 N. J. L. 342, 75 Atl. 447.
124
Ch. IV] IMPLIED CONTRACTS [§ 56
award a contract to the lowest responsible bidder, the
board cannot decide adversely as to the responsibiUty
of such bidder without giving him notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard. ^
§ 56. Implied Contracts.
Where a board of education, by statute made a
body corporate, appoints a committee to contract for
erection of a schoolhouse, which is done and the building
accepted by the board, there is an implied contract to
pay for the building, and it cannot be avoided merely
because the appointment of the committee was not
under seal.^ But where the school directors build a
schoolhouse without a vote of the electors of their dis-
trict, their acceptance of the building and conducting
of a school therein does not make their act a legal one
nor create an implied contract to pay, and the tax-
payers are not bound to pay a tax levied for the pay-
ment therefor.'
The receipt and use of goods unlawfully purchased by
school officials, does not create an imphed contract to
pay by which the district is bound. As, where the
statute provides that school directors may appropriate
to the purchase of Ubraries and apparatus any surplus
funds after all necessary school expenses are paid, they
having no authority to purchase such articles on credit,
such purchases are void. Even if the goods are re-
ceived and used the district is not bound to pay for
1 Jacobson v. Board, &c., 64 Atl. (N. J.) 609.
2 Board, &c., v. Greenbaum, 39 111. 609.
* School Directors, &c., v. Fogleman, 76 111. 189.
125
§ 56] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
them, and the only remedy of the seller is to claim the
property itself.^
However, if a schoolhouse is built under a contract
repudiated by the district after the district had agreed
to build a schoolhouse, raised money for that purpose,
and chosen a building committee who with the in-
habitants see the work progress without objection,
the district is bound by an implied contract to pay the
reasonable value of the building.^ But where a building
committee is illegally chosen, as it would be if the
district meetings were illegally called, their superin-
tending of the erection of the building does not bind the
district nor raise an imphed contract to pay.'
Where a district and its legally existing officers,
entitled to interfere, stand by in silence while regular
service is being rendered for the district by one having
the color of right, and the service is such as the district
would have been bound to pay for, the district is
liable on an implied contract, and it is no defense that
the officer contracting is merely an officer de facto and
not an officer de jure.*
Where the statute requires that such contracts as
employing a janitor shall be in writing, and a parol
contract is made for such services, no recovery can be
had on an implied contract.^
1 Clark V. School Directors, 78 111. 474 ; Andrews v. Curtis, 2
Tex. Civ. App. 678, 22 S. W. 72; Honey Creek, &c., v. Barnes, 119
Ind. 213, 21 N. E. 747.
2 Morris v. School District, &c., 12 Me. 293.
3 Jordan v. School District, &c., 38 Me. 164.
^ Rowell V. School District, 59 Vt. 658, 10 Atl. 754.
5 Taylor v. School District, &c., 60 Mo. App. 372.
126
Ch. IV] RATIFICATION OF CONTRACTS [§ 58
§ 57. Modification of Contracts.
Where the statute requires contracts of the school
board to be in writing, an oral modification of such
contract by the president of the board is of no effect.^
Nor has the president of a board any special right to
modify an existing contract on behalf of the board.
Such right exists only when given by the board or by
statute, and such act is valid only when approved by
the board.2 A provision inserted by the president of
the board of directors, in a written contract, with-
out the authority of the board, is not binding upon the
board or district.''
Where a school board in pursuance of a vote of the
district authorizing them to erect a schoolhouse, the
cost not to exceed a specified amount, lets a contract
for the erection of a building for a lesser amount, they
may, without further grant of authority contract to
expend more money in connection therewith up to the
specified amount voted by the district.*
§ 68. Ratification of Contracts.
Authority to do an act is a condition precedent to
ratification of the act, therefore a school committee
cannot ratify a purchase which they have no authority
to make.* And where a contract is made by a board
without authority it is void and incapable of ratification
' Broussard v. Verret, 43 La. An. 929, 9 So. 905.
2 State V. Tiedemann, 69 Mo. 515.
3 Roland v. Reading, &c., 161 Pa. St. 102, 28 Atl. 995.
* Edinburgh, &c., v. MitcheU, 1 S. D. 593, 48 N. W. 131.
5 Glidden, &c., v. School District, &c., 143 Wis. 617, 128 N. W.
285.
127
§ 58] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
by the voters of a school district except upon the con-
ditions primarily necessary to a valid contract.^ If
the district might have authorized the contract in the
first instance, it may ratify such contracts as are merely
not made in conformity with law.^
And a ratification may be by accepting benefits,^
but not where the acceptance cannot well be avoided/
nor where there was no opportunity for the district to
reject the benefits/ nor where they had no knowledge
of the price to be charged, or amount involved.^
Although a board of directors exceed its powers in
making a contract, its action may be ratified by the
electors voting to authorize them to settle a disputed
claim growing out of it.'' But where the contract
sued on is declared the contract of the directors per-
sonally, the district cannot ratify it as that would make
a contract other than the one declared on.^ And a
contract for building a schoolhouse, which is void as
'Markey v. School District, &c., 58 Neb. 479, 78 N. W. 932;
Taylor v. Wayne, &c., 25 Iowa 447 ; Brown v. School District, &c.,
64 N. H. 303, 10 Atl. 119.
2 Board v. Carolan, 182 lU. 119, 55 N. E. 58; Trainer v. Wolfe,
140 Pa. St. 279, 21 Atl. 391 ; McGillivray v. School District, &c.,
112 Wis. 354, 88 N. W. 210.
' Andrews v. School District, &c., 37 Minn. 96, 33 N. W. 217 ;
Bellows V. District, &c., 70 Iowa 320, 30 N. W. 582 ; Johnson v.
School, &c., 117 Iowa 319, 90 N. W. 713 ; Jones v. School District,
&c., 110 Mich. 363, 68 N. W. 222.
* Davis V. School District, &c., 24 Me. 349.
5 Young V. Board, &c., 54,Minn. 385, 55 N. W. 1112.
« Kane v. School District, &c., 52 Wis. 502, 9 N. W. 459 ; Wilson
V. School District, &c., 32 N. H. 118.
' Everts v. District, &c., 77 Iowa 37, 41 N. W. 478.
8 Western Pub. House v. District, &c., 84 Iowa 101, 50 N. W.
551.
128
Ch. IV] RATIFICATION OF CONTRACTS [§ 58
not made by a lawful number of directors, may be rati-
fied by such a number of the board as the law requires
to make the original contract or by the school district.^
But the use of a schoolhouse by a district is not a ratifi-
cation of unauthorized repairs upon it.^
It is competent for a board of education to legaUze
and confirm acts of de facto oflicers acting under a school
law which has been declared invalid, if the ratifying
officers themselves have authority to perform such
acts. If a corporation ratify an unauthorized act by
an agent, then, as in the case of natural persons, the
ratification is equal to a prior authority; and an act
done before may be adopted after the incorporation, so
as to be equally binding and conclusive. As a natural
person may adopt and take the benefit of an act in
relation to property in which at the time of its oc-
currence he had no interest whatever, but in which he
subsequently acquires an interest, so may a corporation
on contracts made prior to its existence act in ratifica-
tion.* But a subsequent board of directors cannot
ratify an illegal act of a preceding board ; * and un-
authorized expenditures in the construction of a school-
house are not ratified by the taking possession and use of
it, so as to make the district hable therefor.^ But a
board of directors, by acts in respect thereto, may
iSuUivan v. School District, &c., 39 Kan. 347, 18 Pac. 287;
School District, &c., v. Sullivan, 48 Kan. 624, 29 Pac. 1141.
2 Davis V. School District, &c., 24 Me. 349.
' Dubuque, &c., v. City of Dubuque, 13 Iowa 655 ; Goody v.
Colchester, (fee, 15 Eng. L. & E, 596.
4 Glidden v. Hopkins, 47 lU. 525.
* Tumey v. Bridgeport, 55 Conn. 412, 12 Atl. 520.
129
§58] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
ratify a contract informally entered into and which
they have power to make.^
Where the inhabitants of a district having voted
to build a schoolhouse and appointed a committee for
that purpose, the committee made a contract with an
individual to build the house ; subsequently the district
voted to rescind their vote relative to the building of
a house, and appointed a committee to notify the con-
tractor of such vote being passed, and to forbid him
from proceeding to execute the contract; the com-
mittee gave the contractor notice accordingly, and
he thereupon notified the committee that he should
abandon the contract unless they became personally
responsible to him; the committee then made their
bond to the contractor by which they bound themselves
individually to pay for the house, and the contractor
proceeded and built the house according to his contract,
and the committee paid him therefor out of their own
funds. In an action by the committee against the
district for the money so paid it was held that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to recover, although
the prudential committee of the district had caused
the house so built to be used for the purposes of a school
for the district, such occupancy and use did not con-
stitute a ratification.^ But where a district appointed
a committee of three to act in building a schoolhouse,
one declining to participate the other two performed
the work, it was held that the subsequent use and
occupancy constituted a ratification of the acts of the
1 Stevenson v. District, &c., 35 Iowa 462.
^ Hayward v. School District, &c., 2 Gush. (Mass.) 419.
130
Ch. IV] ACTS ULTRA VIRES [§ 59
two members of the committee.^ And an imauthorized
act in spending money in excess of an authorized
amount may be ratified by a district at a district
meeting.^
Where the statute provides that certain contracts
with a school district can be legally made only when
authorized by vote of the electors of the district, a
contract not so made under which goods are furnished
and used will not be ratified by such use of the goods.^
But the use for six years, of supplies furnished a school
district on an invahd contract, with full knowledge of
the facts, and with no offer to return such suppHes
until sued for the purchase price, is a ratification of the
contract.*
When a contract is rendered invalid by the fact that
no legal notice was given of the directors meeting at
which the contract was made, the contract being one
withiu scope of the authority of the school directors,
was subject to ratification at a meeting legally held.^
§ 59. Acts Ultra Vires.
If a school board exceeds its authority by contracting
for an expenditure greater than that authorized, such act
is ultra vires.^ And a school board cannot bind the
district by drawing, accepting and issuing orders
» Fisher v. School District, &c., 4 Cush. (Mass.) 494.
2 Sanborn v. School District, &c., 12 Minn. 17.
3 First Nat'l Bk. v. Whisenhunt, 94 Ark. 583, 127 S. W. 968.
* Richards v. School, &c., 132 Iowa 612, 109 N. W. 1093.
s School District v. Goodwin, 81 Ark. 143, 98 S. W. 696.
8 Perkins v. Newark, &c., 161 Fed. 767 ; Rockland County v.
Grear, 57 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 472.
131
§60] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Ch. IV
against a proposed building fund which, although duly-
voted, has not yet been raised.^ Nor can the board
bind the district in excess of the amount they have
voted.^
Subject to restrictions imposed by statute, it is com-
petent for the qualified electors of a district, when law-
fully assembled, to decide upon what sort of a school-
house should be built, and also the extent of the
expenditure thereupon ; and having done so, that de-
cision cannot legally be interfered with by the school
board. If in the opinion of the board, changes or an
increased expenditure be deemed advisable, a meeting
of the electors should be called, and their direction in
the matter obtained. Where the board, without au-
thority given by the electors, or by statute, contract a
debt for which they have no authority, a recovery
cannot be had against the district.'
§ 60. Duties and Liability of Treasurer.
It is usually the duty of a treasurer of a school board
to hold all moneys of the district, and to pay them out
only upon vouchers signed by the proper officers. He
is usually required in his bond to not merely exercise
due care and diligence in the discharge of his duty,
but to perform it absolutely, without conditions or
1 School District v. Stough, 4 Neb. 357 ; Davis v. Board, &c., 38
W. Va. 382, 18 S. E. 588.
2 Capital Bank v. School District, &c., 63 Fed. 938 ; Capital
Bank v. School District, &c., 1 N. D. 479, 48 N. W. 363 ; Turney v.
Bridgeport, 55 Conn. 412, 12 Atl. 520 ; Wilson v. School District, &c.,
32 N. H. 118 ; School District, &c., v. Western Tube Co., 5 Wyo.
185, 38 Pac. 922.
8 Gehling v. School District, &c., 10 Neb. 239, 4 N. W. 1023.
132
Ch. IV] DUTIES OF TREASURER [§ 60
exceptions, and he will not be relieved from his contract
by showing any degree of diligence or care which falls
short of absolute compliance with the terms of his con-
tract as shown in his bond.^ Against a bond to this
effect a treasurer is liable for money stolen from him,
and the directors of a school district have no power,
in absence of a consideration, to release him from
liability on any debt which he may owe to the dis-
trict.^ And it has been decided that depositing funds
in a solvent bank even by the advice of State and
County Superintendents and Coimty Board, if loss
results, is no defense to a depositor.^
There is some conflict in the decisions as to the re-
sponsibility of public officers and their sureties for the
loss of pubhc moneys without negligence or fault on
the part of the officers. While in some cases the rule
of responsibility of bailees for hire has been applied,
exonerating officers who have been found guiltless of
negUgence, this measure of responsibility is not generally
accepted. The great weight of authority in this
country will sustain the general propositions, with re-
spect to the Uability of such officers and their siu-eties
for the loss of pubUc moneys, that where the statute,
in direct terms or from its general tenor, imposes the
duty to pay over pubhc moneys received and held
1 U. S. V. Prescott, 3 How. (U. S.) 578 ; Muzzy v. Shattick, el al,
1 Denio (N. Y.) 233; Com. v. Comly, 3 Pa. St. 372; State v.
Harper, 6 Ohio St. 607.
2 District, &c., V. Morton, 37 Iowa 550 ; Bluff Creek v. Hardin-
brook, et al., 40 Iowa 130; Board, &c., v. Jewell, 44 Minn. 427, 46
N. W. 914.
« Inglis V. State, 61 Ind. 212.
133
§ 60] OF SCHOOL OFFICERS [Gh. IV
as such, and no condition limiting that obligation is
discoverable in the statute, the obligation thus imposed
upon and assumed by the officer will be deemed to be
absolute, and the plea that the money has been stolen
or lost without his fault does not constitute a defense
to an action for its recovery ; that the rule of responsi-
bility of bailees for hire is not applicable in such cases ;
that where the condition of the bond is, that the officer
wiU faithfully discharge the duties of the office, and
where the statute, as before stated, imposes the duty
of payment or accountability for the money, without
condition, the obligors in the bonds are subject to the
same degree of responsibility; and that the reasons
upon which these propositions rest are to be found both
in the unquaUfied terms of the contract, and in con-
sideration of public policy.' And even where the
treasurer of a school dis|;rict without fault on his part,
deposits school funds in a bank which becomes in-
solvent, he becomes Uable for the amount on his official
bond.^
A treasurer of a school district is also responsible
for his own negligence as where a note made payable
'U. S. V. Dashiel, 4 WaU. (U. S.) 182; Hancock v. Hazzard, 12
Cush. (Mass.) 112; New Providence v. McEacKron, 35 N. J. L.
528; Com. v. Comly, 3 Pa. St. 372; Thompson v. Board, 30 111.
99 ; Morbeck v. State, 28 Ind. 86 ; Ward v. School District, 10 Neb.
293, 4 N. W. 1001 ; WUson v. Wichita Co., 67 Tex. 647, 4 S. W. 67 ;
State V. Nevin, 19 Nev. 162, 7 Pac. 650 ; State v. Moore, 74 Mo. 413 ;
Commissioners v. Lineberger, 3 Mont. 231 ; Board, &c., v. Jewell,
44 Minn. 427, 46 N. W. 914 ; Bluff Creek v. Hardinbrook, et al,
40 Iowa 130.
2 State V. Powell, 67 Mo. 395 ; Ward v. School District, 10 Neb.
293, 4 N. W. 1001.
134
Ch. IVl EMPLOYING COUNSEL [§ 61
to the school fund is not presented by the township
treasurer to the maker thereof within the time fixed
by law, and the sureties are released, the treasurer be-
comes liable on his bond for the amount if the maker
fails to pay.^
§ 61. Employing Counsel.
Where the statute authorizes a school board or
officer to employ counsel in suits brought by or against
the district, it does not thereby authorize such em-
ployment in a case of appeal from the decision of a
board of directors to a County or State Superintendent.^
Without vote of the district to that effect, and in
absence of a statute so authorizing, an officer of a
school district has no authority to employ counsel in
the name of the district to defend a suit against an
officer of the district in which the district may be
interested. And the fact that the officers of the dis-
trict, and the voters of the district generally, knew of
the pendency and progress of the suit has no legal
tendency to show any acquiescence in, or adoption of,
the employment of the counsel.^
But it has been held that school funds may be used
by school directors in the employment of an attorney
to aid in preserving and protecting school rights.*
1 House V. Trustees, &c., 83 lU. 368.
2 Templin v. District, &c., 36 Iowa 411.
^ Harrington v. School District, &c., 30 Vt. 155.
* Taylor v. Matthews, 10 Ga. App. 852, 75 S. E. 166.
135
CHAPTER V
OF SCHOOL TEACHERS
§ 62. Duties of Teachers.
A school teacher, or schoolmaster, is one employed
in teaching a school,' and a teacher's duties are to
teach pupils what has been undertaken, having a
special care over their morals.
The acquiring of learning is not the only object of
our pubUc schools. To become good citizens, children
must be taught self-restraint, obedience and other
virtues. Free political institutions are possible only
where the great body of the people are moral, intelli-
gent and habituated to self-control and to obedience
to lawful authority. The permanency of such in-
stitutions depends largely upon the efficient instruc-
tion and training of children in these virtues. It is
to secure this permanency that the State provides
schools and teachers. School teachers, therefore, have
important duties and functions. Much depends on
their ability, skill and faithfulness. They must train,
as well as instruct, their pupils.^
1 Bouv. L. Diet.
^ Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509, 7 Atl. 273.
136
Ch. V] DUTIES OF TEACHERS [§ 62
The duty of a teacher to instruct the pupils in' his
school is founded on his contract with the school direc-
tors, and, there being no privity of contract between
the parents of pupils sent to a public school and the
teacher, a teacher of such school is not Uable to
any action by a parent for refusing to instruct his
children.^
To facihtate the performance of the duties of teachers,
reasonable rules may be made by the school authori-
ties ; and the rule of a board of education that the
teachers and other school employees shall reside within
the city and county during their term of employment
is a reasonable one.^
Where the statute requires that a teacher shall
make a report of text-books used, attendance of pupils,
branches taught or other details, to the superintending
committee, lawful payment for the services of the
teacher cannot be made until such report is made.^
And the school committee have no power to waive
the rendering of a report that is absolutely required
imder the statute.* But reports for the time sued for
need not be made when there is nothing to report
for the reason that during that time the school was
closed by the directors.^
1 Spear v. Cummings, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 224.
2 Stuart V. Board, &c., 161 Cal. 210, 118 Pac. 712.
' Moultonborough v. Tuttle, 26 N. H. 470 ; School Commissioners
V. Adams, 43 Md. 349 ; School Directors v. First National Bank,
3 lU. App. 349 ; Owen v. Hay, 107 Ind. 351, 8 N.' E. 220. But
see, Crosby v. School District, &c., 35 Vt. 623 ; Scott v. School
District, 46 Vt. 452.
* Jewell V. Abington, 2 Allen (Mass.) 592.
« Rudy V. School District, &c., 30 Mo. App. 113.
137
§ 63] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
§ 63. Qualifications. — Certificates.
In nearly all States a teacher in a public school
before entering upon the duties as a pubUc school
teacher must obtain from the proper ofiicial a certifi-
cate of quaUfication to perform such duties ; ^ and
where the statute makes this requirement it is manda-
tory and cannot be waived.^ If the statute does not
require the teacher's certificate to state upon its face
that an examination was had, or what it consisted of,
it is sufficient for the certificate to state that the person
to whom it is issued is quahfied to teach the branches
enumerated.' Where no form is prescribed in the
statute, it is sufficient for the proper official to certify
that the party was examined and approved by him
on a given day.*
There is no legal distinction between the granting
of a license to teach and the act of issuing a certificate
of that fact. The terms are convertible, and the
" licensing " implies the issuing to an applicant of a
written permission to teach in the public schools.^
Where the original certificate expires by statutory
Umitation, no second examination of a teacher is
necessary before the granting of a renewal certificate.®
And even where there is a statutory limitation on a
teacher's certificate which requires the further ap-
' Stanhope v. School Directors, 42 111. App. 570.
^Kuenster v. Board, &c., 134 lU. 165, 24 N. E. 609; Welch v.
Brown, 30 Vt. 586.
' Union, &c., v. Sterricker, 86 111. 595.
* WeUs V. School District, &c., 41 Vt. 354.
s Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548, 4 N. E. 197.
« Doyle V. School Directors, 36 111. App. 653. '
138
Ch. V] QUALIFICATIONS — CERTIFICATES [§63
proval of the proper ofl&cial to be endorsed thereon,
it has been held that an oral approval and declaration
of competency of the teacher on part of the proper
official is a sufficient compliance with the spirit of the
law.^
The certificate of a school teacher is in the nature
of a commission and cannot be attacked collaterally,
especially in absence of fraud.^ And where the board
of examiners arbitrarily refuse to grant a certificate
to a teacher, a mandamus will lie to compel such
granting as a ministerial act, but where the board
has reasonable grounds for refusing such certificate
its discretion will not be controlled.^
If a teacher holds a vaUd certificate at the time of
making a valid contract to teach and after entering
upon the duties of teaching the certificate expires,
recovery may be had on the contract for services per-
formed, both before and after the expiration of the
certificate.* And if a teacher has not the necessary
certificate at the time of making a contract to teach,
it is sufficient if he procures it before entering upon
his duties, unless the statute makes the holding of
such certificate a condition precedent to the right
to make such contract.^ And it has been held that
1 Bamhart v. Bodenhammer, 31 Mo. 319.
2 Union, &c., v. Sterricker, 86 111. 595 ; State v. Grosvenor, 19
Neb. 494, 27 N. W. 728; Blanchard v. School District. 29 Vt. 433.
3 Flynn v. Barnes, 156 Ky. 498, 161 S. W. 523.
* Holman v. School District, &c., 34 Vt. 270.
5 Pollard V. School District, &c., 65 111. App. 104; Crabb v.
School District, &c., 93 Mo. App. 254 ; Youmans v. Board, &c., 13
Ohio Cir. Ct. 207. Contra, by statute : McCloskey v. School Dis-
139
§ 63] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
even where the statute provides that any contract
for teaching school shall be null and void if the teacher
fails to obtain a certificate of quaUfication before the
commencement of school, the conducting of the school
by the teacher with the consent and approbation of
the prudential committee, after the teacher had ob-
tained a certificate of qualification, was equivalent
to making a new contract to commence then upon the
same terms as the original contract.^
The production of a certificate of qualification is a
prerequisite to legal employment, and therefore, if
the proper officers wantonly refuse to examine the
applicant, he has no authority to teach and recover
compensation for his services without the required
certificate, and a school warrant issued to an unlicensed
teacher is invalid. If a town wishes to avail itself
of the want of the required certificate as a defense,
it has the burden to show the want of such certificate.''
A certificate of qualification is held to be prima facie
evidence of that qualification ; ' therefore the owner of
a certificate is not subject to attack in an action for
compensation for services as a school teacher,* unless
it be on the grounds of fraud or collusion.^
trict, &c., 134 Mich. 235, 96 N. W. 18 ; O'Connor v. Francis, 42
N. Y. App. Div. 375, 59 N. Y. S. 28.
1 Scott V. School District, &c., 46 Vt. 452; Smith v. School Dis-
trict, 69 Mich. 589, 37 N. W. 567. But see, Butler v. Haines, 79
Ind. 575. 2 lioife v. Cooper, 20 Me. 154.
^ Neville v. School Directors, 36 111. 71 ; School Directors v.
Reddick, 77 111. 628; Barngrover v. Maack, 46 Mo. App. 407;
Blanchard v. School District, 29 Vt. 433.
* Doyle V. School Directors, 36 111. App. 653.
6 Kimball v. School District, 23 Wash. 520, 63 Pac. 213.
140
Ch. VI QUALIFICATIONS —CERTIFICATES [§63
A teacher's certificate of qualification, legally ob-
tained, is prima facie evidence of qualification to
perform the duties of a teacher. The law does
not require the highest grade of talent or other
quahfications in a teacher, but only fair average
abiUty, and the usual appHcation to the discharge of
duties, in order that the contract be fulfilled. And
if the directors dismiss a teacher for incompetency
or neglect of duty, it devolves upon them to prove the
charge.^
A school officer is never hable for a mistake in
judgment, but will be liable for willfully-wrong and
malicious acts, for example, in the wrongful with-
holding of a certificate,^ or for the wrongful revo-
cation of a certificate.' In all acts of school officers
mahce must be shown or an action will not lie, it
being not sufficient that the mistake be merely an
erroneous act; but, where the statute requires that
the teacher shall be summoned for examination
upon preferred charges before his license may be
revoked, the revocation without such notice will be
actionable.*
An unlicensed teacher generally cannot recover
for services rendered under a contract for employ-
ment in a pubhc school as a teacher inasmuch as
such contracts are generally void.^ But the authority
1 Neville v. School Directors, 77 111. 628.
2 Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548, 4 N. E. 197.
3 Lee V. Huff, 61 Ark. 494, 33 S. W. 846.
* Lee V. Huff, 61 Ark. 494, 33 S. W. 846.
6 Wells V. People, 71 111. 532; Butler v. Haines, 79 Ind. 575;
Blandon v. Moses, 29 Hun (N. Y.) 606. The contract being void,
141
§ 63] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
of an unlicensed teacher is not to be questioned by
pupils or parents.^
If a judgment is recovered against a school district
in favor of an unlicensed teacher for compensation
for services as a teacher, the payment thereof may
be restrained by injunction at the suit of any person
interested as a taxpayer.^ But a County Superin-
tendent has no power as such to sue out an injunction
for this purpose.* It has been held, however, that
the employment of an unqualified teacher is a necessity
and that the school board is authorized to employ one
who has not a proper certificate, if the board is satis-
fied that the teacher is otherwise qualified, and to pay
such teacher out of the money belonging to the district/
An action by a school teacher for wages claimed to
be due, may be maintained only when the teacher
shows that he is licensed to teach as provided by law.^
And a teacher who accepts a license to teach does so
with the implied acceptance of all conditions imposed
by statute, and the most that a teacher can ask upon
a revocation of a license is that the proceedings shall
no recovery caA be had thereon ; Stevenson v. School, &c., 87 111.
255 ; Putnam v. Irvington, 69 Ind. 80 ; Brown v. Chesterville, 63
Me. 241; Bryan v. Fractional, &c., Ill Mich. 67, 69 N. W. 74;
Ryan v. School, &c., 27 Minn. 433, 8 N. W. 146 ; Barr v. Deniston,
19 N. H. 170 ; Goose River Bank v. Willow Lake, &c., 1 N. D. 26 ;
Davis V. Harrison, 140 Ky. 520, 131 S. W. 272.
1 Kidder v. CheUis, 59 N. H. 473.
2 Barr v. Deniston, 19 N. H. 170.
3 Perkins v. Wolf, 17 Iowa 228.
4 Hale V. Risley, 69 Mich. 599, 37 N. W. 570.
6 Kester v. School District, &c., 48 Wash. 486, 93 Pac. 907 ; Davis
V. Harrison, 140 Ky. 520, 131 S. W. 272. -
142
Ch. V] CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT [§ 64
conform to law. In the revocation of such Ucense
the bias and want of judicial capacity of the County
Superintendent is no ground for interference by the
courts.^
Where the statute provides that County Superin-
tendents may endorse unexpired teachers' certificates
issued in other counties the duty to do so is impera-
tive.^ And a writ of mandamus may be used to compel
an ofl&cial to examine an appUcant,' and to compel
the issuance of a certificate/ and also to compel recog-
nition of a teacher/ and to compel the employment
of a duly licensed teacher.^
§ 64. Contract of Emplojmient.
In contracting for the employment of a teacher it
is, of course, necessary that all statutory regulations
as to formation of contracts be followed,' and where a
written contract with a teacher is required under the
statute, no other form of contract is legal.^ School
officers acting officially and within their jm-isdiction
bind the quasi corporation of which they are represent-
atives; and their legal contracts concerning matters
within the duties of their office may be enforced against
1 Stone V. Fritts, 169 Ind. 361, 82 N. E. 792.
2 Johnson v. Connelly, 88 Kan. 861, 129 Pac. 1192.
3 Stroup V. Beer, 25 Pa. Co. Ct. 1.
* KeUer v. Hewitt, 109 Cal. 146, 41 Pac. 871.
6 Pearsall v. Woods, 50 S. W. (Tex.) 959.
« Brown v. Owen, 75 Miss. 319, 23 So. 35.
^ Place V. District, &c., 56 Iowa 573, 9 N. W. 917 ; Dyberry, &c.,
V. Mercer, 115 Pa. St. 559, 9 Atl. 64.
8 Griggs V. School District, &c., 87 Ark. 93, 112 S. W. 215.
143
§ 64] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
their successors.* The contracts of a de facto officer
are valid even though he is not an officer de jure.^
Where the rules and regulations of the district fix
the time the schools are to be opened and such rules
and regulations are made a part of the contract, the
contract will not be invalid because it does not state
the time the school is to be taught.' And where the
statute names the first four grades as the primary
grades, a teacher cannot be required, under a contract
to teach the primary department, to teach higher
grades although the classes be sent to the primary
room for that purpose.*
The contract of a teacher being for his personal
services, he is not at liberty to employ a substitute
in the performance of his contract.^ And the hiring
of a school teacher at a lesser wage than is provided
by a minimum wage law is a crime ; and such law is
not unconstitutional.^
Where school directors employ a teacher in the
manner prescribed by law and the officers violate, an
executory contract with the teacher, which is made
within their authority, the school district will be
liable even if no benefit has been received by the
district under the contract.^ And an invalid contract
1 Wait V. Ray, 67 N. Y. 36.
2 Milford V. Powner, 126 Ind. 528, 26 N. E. 484; Woodbury v.
Knox, 74 Me. 462.
3 Burkhead v. Independent, &c., 107 Iowa 29, 77 N. W. 491.
* Butler V. Windsor, 155 Wis. 626, 145 N. W. 180.
« School Directors v. Hudson, 88 111. 563.
« Bopp V. Clark, 165 Iowa 697, 147 N. W. 172.
'Jackson, &c., v. Shera, 8 Ind. App. 330, 35 N. E. 842 ; Mingo
V. Colored Common School, &c., 113 Ky. 475, 68 S. W. 483.
144
Ch. V] CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT [§ 64
of emplojhnent may be ratified by the knowledge
and conduct of school directors.'^
Where the term of service is legally specified iathe
contract, a teacher cannot claim employment for a
longer period.^ But where a teacher is employed
from a specific date and the duration of the period
is not specified, he will be entitled to continue during
the school year subject to any condition of the contract.'
It being the duty of a school board to prepare a
proper form of contract with a teacher, it is no defense
to a mandamus brought against the chairman of such
board to compel him to sign such contract that the
contract was not in proper form.*
It is the business of school districts to keep up pubUc
schools, and it is the duty of officers to provide teachers,
and to make contracts with them. It is their duty
to know under what conditions a teacher, whom they
know to be teaching, claims to act. And a board by
abstaining from holding meetings, and from doing
its duty, cannot set up its own wrong in defense of
an honest claim. Therefore a contract with a teacher
need not be signed by the school board simultaneously,
in order to make vaUd a contract upon which services
have been rendered; and a contract valid upon its
face, actually carried out with the acquiescence of all
concerned, cannot be subsequently repudiated. * So
1 School District, &c., v. Jackson, 110 Ark. 262, 161 S. W. 153.
2 Marion v. Board, &c., 97 Cal. 606, 32 Pac. 643.
» Butcher v. Charles, 95 Tenn. 532, 32 S. W. 631.
* Davis V. Harrison, 140 Ky. 520, 131 S. W. 272.
8 Holloway v. School District, &c., 62 Mich. 153, 28 N. W. 764;
School District v. Stone, 14 Colo. App. 211, 59 Pac. 885.
145
§ 64] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
a contract signed by a teacher subsequent to the
meeting at which the directors met together and
participated in the selection' of the teacher and decided
upon the wages and time of employment, is valid.^
But where the trustees separately agree to employ a
teacher, and subsequently as a board assembled, vote
to repudiate the agreement, the teacher is without
redress inasmuch as the contract was void and against
pubUc poUcy.^
Where the statute requires that a teacher's contract
shall be in writing, a teacher cannot recover on a
quantum meruit for services rendered on an oral con-
tract.^ Such statute is mandatory,* but requirement
of a dupUcate contract is directory only.^ And an
oral contract to continue teaching school after the
expiration of a required written contract is unenforce-
able, and no recovery can be had for services rendered
upon such oral contract.®
Where, however, the contract is not required to be
in writing a teacher who is lawfully employed in
absence of a contract, is entitled to receive the reason-
able value of the service rendered upon a quantum
meruit.'' And if one, without authority, enter upon
1 School District, &c., v. Men, 83 Ark. 491, 104 S. W. 172.-
2 McGinn v. WiUey, 6 Gal. App. Ill, 91 Pac. 423.
3 Lee V. York, &c., 163 Ind, 339, 71 N. E. 956 ; Leland v. School
District, &c., 77 Minn. 469, 80 N. W. 364; City School, &c., ».
Hickman, 47 Ind. App. 500, 94 N. E. 828.
* Taylor v. Petersburgh, 33 Ind. App. 675, 72 N. E. 159.
5 McShane v. School District, 70 Mo. App. 624.
« Hutchins v. School District, &c., 128 Mich. 177, 87 N. W. 80.
' Offut V. Bourgeois, 16 La. An. 163 ; Jones v. School District,
&c., 8 Kan. 362.
146
Ch. V] CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT [§ 64
the duties as teacher in a public school, and the dis-
trict accepts the services, drawing its portion of the
pubhc school money by reason of the services of the
teacher, the teacher may recover for ,the services
rendered upon a quantum meruit}
An act of God which renders performance of a con-
tract impossible, will excuse from habihty thereon.
But presence of a contagious disease does not render
impossible the teaching of a school, to those who are
not afflicted thereby. And if a teacher remains ready
to perform the contract, the suspension of the school
for such reason, does not preclude the right to com-
pensation during such period of suspension.^ But if
the contract is to teach for a given period unless the
school is discontinued by order of the board, the clos-
ing of the schools during the period of an epidemic,
precludes the right to compensation during such period,
although a recovery may be had on the other portions of
the contract period both before and after the epidemic.^
Where the statute provides that the committee
shall " appoint and agree with a teacher to instruct
the school " the district cannot control the committee
by a vote to employ a female teacher, as such vote
would be advisory only. And if the committee, not-
withstanding such vote, hires a male teacher, giving
him an order for instructing the school, the district
1 Scott V. School District, 67 Vt. 150, 31 Atl. 145.
^Libby v. Douglas, 175 Mass. 128, 55 N. E. 808; McKay v.
Barnett, 21 Utah 239, 60 Pac. 1100 ; Dewey v. Union, &c., 43 Mich.
480, 5 N. W. 646 ; Gear v. Gray, 37 N. E. (Ind.) 1059 ; Randolph v.
Sanders, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 331, 54 S. W. 621.
' Goodyear v. School District, 17 Oreg. 517, 21 Pac. 664.
147
§ 64] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
is bound to pay it ; and if it does not do so and several
years later elects the teacher treasurer of the district,
he may pay himself the amount due.^
A teacher cannot be lawfully employed by two mem-
bers of the district board without the concurrence of
the third member when the statute expressly requires
the convening of the board for the transaction of
business.^ But such contract by two members of
the board with the consent of the third member is
binding on the district.^
Unless there is a Umitation in the statute, a school
district can employ a teacher or superintendent of
schools for two scholastic years, even though the
term of office of some members of the board does not
extend through that period.* But they may not
contract for an unreasonable time beyond the current
school year.^ Nor so as to divest futiu-e boards of
the power to select the teachers they shall desire.^
' Waterbury v. Harvey, 56 Vt. 556.
2 Hazen v. Lerche, 47 Mich. 626, 11 N. W. 413; Ryan v. Hum-
phries, 150 Pac. (Olda.) 1106; Aiken v. School District, &c., 27
Kan. 129; School Directors, &c., v. Jennings, 10 111. App. 643;
Townsend v. Trustees, &c., 41 N. J. L. 312 ; Dennison v. Padden, 89
Pa. St. 395; Castro v. Board, &c., 38 W. Va. 707, 18 S. E. 923.
But see, Russell v. State, 13 Neb. 68, 12 N. W. 829 ; Montgomery
V. State, 35 Neb. 655, 53 N. W. 568.
' Brown v. School District, &c., 1 Kan. App. 530, 40 Pac. 826.
* Caldwell v. School District, &c., 55 Fed. 372 ; Cleveland v.
Amy, 88 Mich. 374, 50 N. W. 293 ; Gates v. School District, 53 Ark.
468, 14 S. W. 656; School District v. Morse, 8 Cush. (Mass.)
191; Wilson v. E. Bridgeport, &c., 36 Conn. 280; Reubelt v.
NoblesviUe, 106 Ind. 478, 7 N. E. 206.
^ Stevenson v. School Directors, 87 111. 255.
* School Directors v. Hart, 4 111. App. 224 ; Cross v. School Direc-
tors, 24 111. App. 191 ; Fitch v. Smith, 57 N. J. L. 526, 34 Atl. 1058.
148
Ch. V] CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT [§ 64
But in Iowa it has been held that a contract extending
beyond one school year is invahd ; ^ and in any event
a contract is not vaUd for any period beyond that
specified by statute.^
The contract of a teacher to teach a school for a
given term of several months at a given rate per
month is an entire contract,' and if the teacher leaves
before the term is finished, without sufficient cause,
there can be no recovery for services up to the time
of leaving.*
A school board has no impUed authority to fix the
hving or boarding place of a teacher, in making a
contract to teach, and iucorporate such as a condition
of the contract.^
In contracting with a teacher, the teacher in accept-
ing the engagement to teach, impUedly agrees that
he has the requisite learning, and the capacity to im-
part it to the pupils.®
If a trustee of a school district is employed by the
other two trustees to teach the district school, his
office as trustee becomes vacant upon accepting and
entering upon his duties as teacher, the duties of the
two offices being incompatible.'^ But it has been held
But see, Milford v. Zeigler, 1 Ind. App. 138, 27 N. E. 303 ; Silver v.
Cummings, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 181. '
1 Burkhead v. Independent, &c., 107 Iowa 29, 77 N. W. 491.
2 Jay V. School District, &c., 24 Mont. 219, 61 Pac. 250.
' Turner v. Baker, 30 Ark. 186.
* Clark V. School District, 29 Vt. 217. Contra: Riggs v. Horde,
25Tex.Supp. 456.
8 Home V. School District, &c., 75 N. H. 411, 75 Atl. 431.
« Biggs V. Mt. Vernon, 45 Ind. App. 572, 90 N. E. 105.
^ Ferguson v. True, 66 Ky. 255.
149
§ 64] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
that a moderator of a district may employ her husband
to teach the district school at a contract price that is
greater than would be necessary to secure a better
teacher, and still not be hable to removal from office,^
and that a school director may employ his minor
daughter as a teacher.*
If a school board, without power to dismiss a regularly
quahfied teacher who is under contract to teach for a
specified time, should attempt to do so, and the teacher
should accept such unauthorized dismissal, such ac-
ceptance is a voluntary abandonment of the con-
tract which precludes a recovery for the unfinished
term.^
If a pubUc school teacher contracts to give up an
advantage given by statute, such contract is void as
against public policy.* And where the contract with
a teacher provides for dismissal on thirty days' notice,
such notice given before the services are begun is
effective and vaUd.* And the marriage of a female
school teacher is not good groimd for the abro-
gation of the contract under which she has agreed to
teach.®
The rules as to the measure of damages in the breach
of a contract to teach a pubhc school, are the same as
in case of the breach of ordinary contracts.''
1 Hazen v. Township Board, 48 Mich. 188, 12 N. W. 43.
2 State V. Burchfield, 80 Tenn. 30.
» Oakes v. School District, &c., 98 Mo. App. 163, 71 S. W. 1060.
* Board, &c., v. Burton, 30 Ohio Cir. Ct. 411.
5 Dees V. Board, &c., 146 Mich. 64, 109 N. W. 39.
« Jameson v. Board, &c., 74 W. Va. 389, 81 S. E. 1126.
^ Byrne v. School District, &c., 139 Iowa 618, 117 N. W. 983.
150
Ch. V] COMPENSATION [§ 65
§ 65. Compensation.
A teacher who performs the duties called for in the
contract or by the provision of the statute, is entitled
to compensation by those who contract for the em-
ployment.^ If the compensation is expressed in the
contract, then that is the compensation to be paid,
but, if no compensation is fixed, either by statute or
contract, the teacher may recover on a quantum meruit
for services actually rendered,^ and, in arriving at the
quantum meruit, evidence as to the compensation paid
during the previous year is not admissible.'
Unless specifically provided by the contract, no
deduction can be made from the compensation agreed
upon, by reason of closing the school on account of
an epidemic,* or by the destruction of the school
building,^ or on account of diminution of pupils,® or
for legal holidays,^ so long at least as the teacher
keeps himself in readiness to perform his duties.^
Unless the contract so provides, a school teacher is
1 Earl of Thanet v. Gartham, 8 J. B. Moore, 368.
2 Offut V. Bourgeois, 16 La. An. 163 ; Tyler v. Tualatin Academy,
14 Oreg. 485, 13 Pac. 329.
3 Jackson School v. Grimes, 24 Ind. App. 331. 56 N. E. 724.
* Dewey v. Union School District, 43 Mich. 480, 5 N. W. 646 ;
Libby v. Douglas, 175 Mass. 128, 55 N. E. 808 ; Smith v. School
District, &c., 89 Kan. 225, 131 Pac. 557.
6 School Directors v. Crews, 23 lU. App. 367 ; Smith v. School
District, 69 Mich. 589, 37 N. W. 567 ; Cashen v. School District, 50
Vt. 30 ; Charlestown, &c., v. Hay, 74 Ind. 127 ; Corn v. Board, &c.,
39 111. App. 446. Contra: Hall v. School District, &c., 24 Mo. App.
213.
« Singleton v. Austin, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 88 ; 65 S. W. 686.
^ HoUoway v. School District, &c., 62 Mich. 153, 28 N. W. 764.
8 Libby v. Douglas, 175 Mass. 128, 55 N. E. 808.
151
§ 65] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
not to be deprived of the agreed compensation by-
reason of the burning of the schoolhouse. The direc-
tors may furnish another building or room in which
the school may be continued, and if they do not, or
are unable to do so, the liability for the salary still
exists.^ And a school teacher appointed by a de
facto school agent may recover for his services.^
But an unlicensed teacher cannot recover compen-
sation.^
When it is not against the rules of the school board,
and is made necessary by the crowded condition of
the school, a teacher may assign a proficient scholar
to hear classes, and a school board has no legal right
to withhold the teacher's wages because of so doing.'*
And the wrongful exclusion of a pupil, by a teacher
iji a public school, does not defeat the right of a teacher
to his agreed compensation.^
A treasurer of a school district, having funds be-
longing to the district which have been appropriated
to the payment of a teacher's salary, becomes per-
sonally hable to the teacher if he refuses to pay a
proper order on demand for the amount specified.®
And if the trustees of a school district fail to raise the
funds to pay the salary of a teacher with whom they
1 Corn V. Board, &c., 39 111. App. 446 ; Charlestown, &c., v.
Hay, 74 Ind. 127. Cohtra: Hall v. School District, &c., 24 Mo.
App. 213.
2 Woodbury v. Knox, 74 Me. 462.
8 Flanary v. Barrett, 146 Ky. 712, 143 S. W. 38.
* Perkins v. School District, &c., 61 Mo. App. 512.
6 State V. Blain, 36 Ohio St. 429.
6 Edson V. Hayden, 18 Wis. 627.
152
Ch. V] POWERS [§ 66
have contracted, they are personally liable for the
amount.^
Where an obUgation rests upon a county or town to
pay for the services of a teacher, the placing of the
money for that purpose with the proper custodian of
the fund does not discharge the obligation.^ And the
salary of a pubhc school teacher is not attachable by
trustee process while it is in the hands of city officials
whose duty it is to pay it.'
§ 66. Powers.
The teacher has, in a proper case, the inherent power
to suspend a pupil from the privileges of his school,
unless he has been deprived of the power by the af-
firmative action of the proper board.*
The teacher could not perform the duties of his em-
ployment without maintaining proper and necessary
disciphne in the school, and it is his right, and might
be his duty, to expel the pupil to save the rest of the
school from being injured by his presence. It is not
the duty of the teacher to teach the school without
maintaining proper and necessary disciphne in it, and
if the committee insist that the pupil should be there,
when the teacher could not have him there, and have
the disciphne too, it was equivalent to insisting that
1 Ferguson v. True, 66 Ky. 255.
2 CaldweU County v. Harbert, 68 Tex. 321, 4 S. W. 607 ; Clark v.
Great Barrington, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 260.
' Hightower v. Slaton, 54 Ga. 108 ; Pruitt v. Armstrong, 56 Ala.
306 ; School District, &c., v. Gage, 39 Mich. 484. But see, Seymour
V. School District, 53 Conn. 502, 3 Atl. 552; Bates v. Bates, 74 Ga.
105.
* State V. Burton, 45 Wis. 154.
153
§ 67] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
the teacher could teach the school without discipline,
which he was not bound to do. So it was held that
the committee had no legal right to discharge the
teacher for the reason that he had expelled a pupil
against the wishes of the directors and without their
consent.!
A teacher has no authority to contract for the sweep-
ing and keeping of fires in a schoolhouse, although the
district board refused to do so, and the service was
actually necessary.^
§ 67. Religious Garb.
It has been held that the employment of teachers
in the pubhc schools, representatives of a rehgious
order, who wear in school a distinctive sectarian garb
of their order is not a violation of the law or an abuse
of discretion on the part of the school authorities
which the courts could control, and that this situation
was not changed by the fact that the teachers con-
tributed all their earnings beyond their support to the
treasury of their order for religious purposes. This
case arose by a suit for an injunction to restrain the
school board from continuing the employment of
such teachers, and there had been no rule by the school
authorities against the wearing of such garb and em-
blems by the teachers.
The action brought, however, was rather an attempt
by individual citizens to override the judgment and
1 Scott V. School District, 46 Vt. 452 ; Parker v. School District,
5 Lea (Tenn.) 525.
" Taylor v. School District, 60 Mo. App. 372.
154
Ch. V] RELIGIOUS WORSHIP [§ 68
discretion of the school board on the ground that
they were violating the provisions of the State con-
stitution guaranteeing equal rights of conscience and
prohibiting preference by law to religious establish-
ments or modes of worship, and the use of public
money for sectarian schools. The court, however,
sustained the lawfulness of the employment of such
teachers for the reason that in the matter was involved
solely the exercise of discretion by the school board
in their performance of the official duty, for which
they alone were responsible, and that this discretion
when it does not transgress the law is not reviewable
by any court.^
It has been held, however, that a superintendent of
pubUc instruction may prohibit a teacher from wearing
a distinctly religious garb while teaching in the pubHc
schools that are under his charge, and such regulation
is reasonable and valid."
§ 68. Bible Reading and Religious Worship.
The reading of the Bible, repeating the Lord's
Prayer, and singing reUgious songs in pubUe schools,
have been protested against as promoting sectarian
ptu*poses, making the pubUc schools places of worship,
and for such reasons unconstitutional ; and when such
matters have been brought before various courts,
quite divergent views have been held, some courts
holding that such Bible reading at all is unconstitu-
1 Hysong v. Gallitzin, &c., 164 Pa. St. 629, 30 Atl. 482 ; Hutchin-
son V. Skinner, 21 Misc. Rep. 729, 49 N. Y. S. 360.
2 O'Connor v. Hendrick, 184 N. Y. 421, 77 N. E. 612.
155
§68] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
tional, others that even the Protestant version is not
legally objectionable to any sect; and in one case it
was held that the reading of the Bible could be pro-
hibited on the protest of a Jew, but not when objected
to by a Catholic.^ The great weight of opinion, how-
ever, seems to be that such reading of the Bible,
repeating of the Lord's Prayer, and singing of rehgious
songs are lawful when done without comment, excus-
ing from participation such children whose parents or
guardians so request.^
It would not be competent for a school committee
to pass an order or regulation requiring pupils to con-
form to any religious rite or observance, or to go
through with any religious forms or ceremonies which
werfe inconsistent with or contrary to their religious
convictions or conscientious scruples. Such a requisi-
tion would be a violation of the constitutional provi-
sion that no one shall be hurt or molested in his
person, liberty or estate for worshipping God in the
manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of
his own conscience. So an order or regulation of
the school committee which would require a pupil
to join in a religious rite or ceremony contrary to
his or her religious opinions, or those of a parent
or guardian, would be clearly unreasonable and
invalid.
But under a statute requiring that the reading of
the Bible in public schools shall be without written
1 Herold v. Parish Board, &c., — La. — , 68 So. 116.
2 Billard v. Board, &c., 69 Kan. 53, 76 Pac. 422 ; Haokett v.
BrooksviUe, &c., 120 Ky. 608, 87 S. W. 792.
156
Ch. V] RELIGIOUS WORSHIP [§ 68
note or oral comment, and providing that no pupil
shall be called upon to read any particular version,
whose parent or guardian shall declare that such
pupil has conscientious scruples against allowing him
to read therefrom, a lawful order may be made by
the school committee that the schools in their district
shall be opened each morning with reading from the
Bible, and prayer, and that during the prayer each
pupil shall bow the head, unless the parents request
that the pupil shall be excused from doing so ; and
they may lawfully exclude from the school a pupil
who refuses to comply with such order, and whose
parents refuse to request that the pupil shall be ex-
cused from so doing.
No more appropriate method could be adopted of
keeping in the minds of both teachers and pupils that
one of the chief objects of education is to impress on
the minds of children and youth committed to the
care and instruction of the public schools, the prin-
ciples of piety and justice, and a sacred regard for the
truth. Such rule does not prescribe an act which is
necessarily one of devotion or religious ceremony, but
goes no further than to require the observance of quiet
and decorum during the religious service with which
the school is opened. It does not compel a pupil to
join in the prayer, but only to assume an attitude
which is calculated to prevent interruption, by avoid-
ing all communication with others during the service.
And such regulation does not require a pupil to comply
with that part of it prescribing the position of the
head diuing prayer, if the parent requested a child
157
§ 68] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
to be excused from it.^ And it has been held that
under a statute providing that the Bible shall not be
excluded from any school of the State, nor that any
pupil shall be required to read it, contrary to the
wishes of his parent or guardian, an injunction will not
be granted to restrain the reading or repeating there-
from, on a suit brought by a taxpayer whose children
are not required to be present during such exercises.^
In Texas it has been held that exercises in the public
schools consisting of the reading of non-sectarian ex-
tracts from the Bible, by the teacher without comment,
and repeating the Lord's Prayer, and the singing of
appropriate songs in which the pupils are invited but
not required to join does not make the schools places
of worship.^ And in Maine it was held that even
where the committee required that the Protestant
version of the Bible should be read in the schools by
scholars able to read, it was not only constitutional
but binding upon all members of the school, although
composed of various sects.* But in Illinois and some
other States the reading of the Bible in the public
schools is held unconstitutional as promoting a sec-
tarian purpose.^
1 Spiller V. Wobum, 12 Allen (Mass.) 127. But see, Stevenson v.
Hanyen, 1 Lack. Leg. N. (Pa.) 99.
2 Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa 367, 20 N. W. 475 ; Hart v. School
District, &c., 2 Lane. L. Rev. (Pa.) 346. See also, Nessle v. Hum,
1 Ohio N. P. 140. Contra : State v. District Board, &c., 76 Wis. 177,
44 N. W. 967.
3 Church V. Bullock, 109 S. W. (Tex.) 115.
* Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379.
5 People V. Board, &c., 245 111. 334, 92 N. E. 251. See exhaustive
and scholarly essay by Henry Schofield, Professor of Law in North-
158
Ch. V] removal and suspension [§ 69
A pupil may be excluded for absence from school
without leave, even if done through a sense of religious
obUgation, and at the behest of his parents. And
such an exclusion is not a violation of the constitutional
provision preserving the right to worship God according
to the dictates of one's own conscience without being
abridged in the enjoyment of civil rights.^
§ 69. Discharge, Removal and Suspension.
A teacher, even if employed under a valid contract,
may nevertheless be discharged for a good and sufficient
cause,^ such as for incompetency,^ neglect of duty,*
immoral conduct,^ failure to manage and govern the
school,® refusal to obey the valid orders of the board
of directors,^ lack of discretion and desirable temper,^
tardiness in going to school,^ or other sufl&cient cause.
western University, in Vol. VI. Illinois Law Review, 17-91, entitled
" Religious Liberty and Bible Reading in the lUinois Public Schools ",
in which this case is adversely considered in detail. State v. Scheve,
65 Neb. 853, 91 N. W. 846; State v. District, &c., 76 Wis. 177, 44
N. W. 967.
1 Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444, in which case see excellent dis-
cussion of constitutional principles involved.
2 Robinson v. School, &c., 96 lU. App. 604 ; Tripp v. School, &c.,
50 Wis. 657, 7 N. W. 840.
3 Crawf ordsville v. Hays, 42 Ind. 200.
* School District v. Maury, 53 Ark. 471, 14 S. W- 669 ; School
Directors v. Hudson, 88 111. 563 ; Holden v. Shrewsbury, &c., 38 Vt.
529.
6 School District v. Maury, 53 Ark. 471, 14 S. W. 669 ; McLeUan
V. St. Louis Public Schools, 15 Mo. App. 362 ; State v. Board, &c.,
1 Ohio N. P. 151 ; Tingley v. Vaughn, 17 lU. App. 347.
° Eastman v. District, &c., 21 Iowa 590.
^ Parker v. School District, 5 Lea (Tenn.) 525.
* Robinson v. School Directors, 96 HI. App. 604.
9 School Directors v. Bkch, 93 111. App. 499.
159
§69] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
But the board has no power to discharge a teacher
before the expiration of the term of his contract with-
out good cause/ nor have they the power to transfer
a teacher from a higher to a lower grade.^ Assigning
a teacher to a lower grade is a " removal ", and just
as much so as a dismissal would be.^
The right to discharge a teacher at the pleasure of a
school board may be reserved in the contract with
the teacher, and is sometimes provided by statute,
but in order to make the exercise of this right a valid
one the cause for discharge must be legally sufficient.*
It has been held, however, that such a reservation of
right to discharge is against public policy and conse-
quently invalid.^ Where the statute provides that a
teacher can be discharged only for good cause shown,
there must be an accusation, notice, and evidence
before the board in its official capacity, and an op-
portunity given the teacher to be heard before dis-
missal.® But if the teacher makes an appearance at
1 School District v. Hale, 15 Colo. 367, 25 Pac, 308 ; Crawfords-
vUle V. Hays, 42 Ind. 200 ; Searsmont v. FarweU, 3 Me. 450 ; Wallace
V. School District, 50 Neb. 171, 69 N. W. 772.
2 Kennedy v. Board, &c., 82 Cal. 483, 22 Pac. 1042.
' Kennedy v. Board, &c., 82 Cal. 483, 22 Pac. 1042 ; Fau'child v.
Board, &c., 107 Cal. 92, 40 Pac. 26 ; In re Gleese, 50 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 473.
* Olney School District v. Christy, 81 111. App. 304 ; Armstrong v.
Union, &c., 28 Kan. 345 ; Richardson v. School District, 38 Vt. 602.
5 Thompson v. Gibbs, 97 Tenn. 489, 37 S. W. 277.
« School District, &c., v. Stone, 14. Colo. App. 211, 59 Pac. 885;
School District, &c., v. Shuck, 49 Colo. 526, 113 Pac. 511 ; Rumble v.
Barker, 27 Ind. App. 69, 60 N. E. 956 ; White v. Wohlenberg, 113
Iowa 236, 84 N. W. 1026 ; Edinboro Normal School v. Cooper, 150
Pa. St. 78, 24 Atl. 348; Butcher v. Charles, 95 Tenn. 532, 32 S. W.
631.
160
Ch. V] REMOVAL AND SUSPENSION [§ 69
the hearing, the want of notice of such hearing has
been held to be waived.^
In dismissing a teacher for due cause the affirmative
vote of the majority of the school board is necessary,^
although the statutes may require a greater aflSrmative
vote, for example, three-fourths of the number.^ And
an entry on the records of the meeting of the names of
the persons voting has been held essential.^
For reasons of public policy the legislature may pro-
vide that the school committee may dismiss from em-
ployment any teacher whenever they think proper,
and such teacher shall receive no compensation for
services rendered after such dismissal. And under
such statute a teacher engaged by the school com-
mittee for a fixed time, and at a stated salary, may be
discharged by the committee, and no action can be
maintained against the town for salary for the re-
mainder of the contracted time of employment.^
The power to dismiss teachers is generally expressed
in the statutes, which vary in different jurisdictions,
but they must always be strictly followed. If there
is no statutory provision regarding the removal of
teachers, that right rests with those who have power to
employ them.*
Where a school teacher is engaged for a specific
1 Kellison v. School District, &c., 20 Mont. 153, 50 Pac. 421.
2 Keating v. Neary, 9 Kulp (Pa.) 421.
3 People V. Board, &c., 69 Hun (N. Y.) 212, 23 N. Y. S. 473.
* Com. V. Risser, 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 196.
8 Wood V. Medfield, 123 Mass. 545.
« WaUace v. School District, 50 Neb. 171, 69 N. W. 772 ; People
V. Hyde, 89 N. Y. 11.
161
§ 69] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
term and is discharged without cause before the ter-
mination of the specific term, compensation for the
period covered by the unlawful discharge may be
recovered in an action for a breach of the contract.^
This right of a teacher to recover for an unlawful dis-
charge may be defeated by a new agreement, as where
the teacher accepts a half month's salary and volun-
tarily gives up the school.^ But where a teacher is
dismissed for sufiicient cause and is afterwards for
good cause reinstated, he cannot recover for services
rendered in the meantime,' and a denial of a writ of
mandamus will not bar subsequent action.*
Where a teacher is validly removed for cause, his
right to receive further salary is terminated by the no-
tice which he receives,^ and where the statute specifies
the causes for which the board of school directors
has power to discharge a teacher, a discharge in ac-
cordance therewith is final and conclusive, and no
recovery can be had for breach of contract unless
the board acted corruptly and in bad faith and in
clear abuse of its powers.^
A teacher wrongfully dismissed by a school board
is not required to accept other employment of a differ-
1 School District, &c., v. Hale, 15 Colo. 367, 25 Pac. 308 ; Arm-
strong V. School District, 19 Mo. App. 462 ; Swartwood v. Walbridge,
57 Hun (N. Y.) 33, 10 N. Y. S. 862; Richardson v. School District,
38 Vt. 602 ; Scott v. Joint School District, 51 Wis. 554, 8 N. W. 398.
2 Frazier v. School District, 24 Mo. App. 250.
' Kellison v. School District, 20 Mont. 153, 50 Pac. 421.
* Steinson v. Board, &c., 165 N. Y. 431, 59 N. E. 300.
6 Wood V. Medfield, 123 Mass. 545 ; Gillan v. Board, &c., 88
Wis. 7, 58 N. W. 1042.
« McCrea v. Pine Township, &c., 145 Pa. St. 550, 22 Atl. 1040.
162
Ch. V] REMOVAL AND SUSPENSION [§ 69
ent character or grade,^ nor to accept an offer upon
terms not in accordance with the original contract,"
and the measure of damages, ordinarily the amount
of the agreed wages,' is not lessened by refusal to ac-
cept an offer not equal in terms to that of the broken
contract.^
If a teacher under contract to teach one year is
discharged without cause before the expiration of
that period, and finds it impossible to secure another
position for the remaining part of such period, a re-
covery may be had for the remaining part of the
contract period at the full contract price. ^ The burden
of showing that a discharged teacher might have se-
cured other similar employment, and thereby have
reduced the damages, is upon the district.^ And when
a teacher holding a Ucense to teach is discharged for
incompetency, the burden is on the school authorities
to establish the truth of the charge. A recital of the
facts constituting such incompetency contained in the
order of removal estops them from showing different
or other facts or causes.'^
Where the statute gives a right of an appeal to the
County or State Superintendent in case of wrongful
dismissal by the school board, a teacher cannot main-
1 Farrell v. School District, 98 Mich. 43, 56 N. W. 1053.
2 Sparta, &c., v. Mendell, 138 Ind. 188, 37 N. E. 604.
' School District, &c., v. Hale, 15 Colo. 367, 25 Pac. 308 ; School
District V. Kimmel, 31 111. App. 537; McCutchen v. Windsor, 55
Mo. 149 ; Scott v. School District, &c., 46 Vt. 452.
* Jackson v. Independent, &c., 110 Iowa 313, 81 N. W. 596.
5 Wortihington v. Oak, &c., 100 Iowa 39, 69 N. W. 258.
« Carver v. School District, &c., 113 Mich. 524, 71 N. W. 859.
^ Darter v. Board, &c., 161 111. App. 284.
163
§ 69] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
tain an action against the school board for a breach
of contract unless he has taken steps toward reinstate-
ment as a teacher by such appeal.^
A public school teacher is not a public officer, and
the contract of a teacher is one of employment, and,
inasmuch as in case of wrongful discharge an adequate
remedy at law lies in damages for the breach of the
contract, a writ of mandamus will not be issued ; ^
nor will a writ of injunction by or against a board of
trustees for violation of its contract in discharging a
teacher and substituting another in his place, either
on the part of the teacher or on the part of the tax-
payers and patrons of the school.^ And where a
teacher is employed by a school board, he is barred
from having his discharge reviewed in any tribunal
except that created by statute.* If the school board
acts fairly within the scope of its duty, members of the
board are not personally liable for damages unless they
exceed their authority and act maliciously or wantonly.^
A tendered resignation of a school teacher will not
amount to an abandonment of the contract until the
resignation is accepted, and the teacher has a right
1 Park V. Independent, &c., 65 Iowa 209, 21 N. W. 567 ; Kirk-
patrick v. Independent, &c., 53 Iowa 585, 5 N. W. 750 ; Harkness v.
Hutcherson, 90 Tex. 383, 38 S. W. 1120; Van Dyke v. School Dis-
trict, &c., 43 Wash. 235, 86 Pac. 402.
estate V. Smith, 49 Neb. 755, 69 N. W. 114; Swartwood v.
Walbridge, 57 Hun (N. Y.) 34, 10 N. Y. S. 862.
3 School District, &c., v. Carson, 9 Colo. App. 6, 46 Pac. 846.
* Draper v. Public Instruction Commissioners, 66 N. J. L. 54, 48
Atl. 556.
* Morrison v. McFarland, 51 Ind. 206 ; Gregory v. Small, 39 Ohio
St. 346 ; Burton v. Fulton, 49 Pa. St. 151 ; McCutchen v. Windsor,
55 Mo. 153.
164
Ch. V] REMOVAL AND SUSPENSION [§ 69
to \^^thd^aw a resignation at any time before it is
acted upon by the school board.^ And a teacher
having a proper certificate, and who has contracted
to teach, cannot be dismissed for incompetency before
any serAdces have been rendered.^
Where the statute provides that teachers may be
dismissed at the pleasure of the board, a contract
made for a definite period of service is presumed to
be made in view of that statutory provision, and a
teacher employed under such contract may, never-
theless, be dismissed at pleasure of the board.^ But
in absence of such statutory provision a school teacher
employed for a term, and dismissed at the end of the
first week's employment, and without good cause, is
entitled to damages.*
Where a teacher refuses to consent to a vacation
ordered by the board of directors during the term for
which the teacher was employed, but which was not
specified in the contract to teach, and the directors
forcibly seized and ejected the teacher from the school-
house in the enforcement of such vacation, the direc-
tors were found guilty of assault and battery.® And
where school officers forcibly and illegally dispossessed
the teacher of the schooLhouse, they were held indi-
vidually hable for damages.®
1 Curttright V. Independent, &c., Ill Iowa 20, 82 N. W. 444.
2 Farrell v. School District, &c., 98 Mich. 43, 56 N. W. 1053.
3 GiUan v. Board, &c., 88 Wis. 7, 58 N. W. 1042; Bays v. State,
6 Neb. 167 ; Jones v. Nebraska City, 1 Neb. 176.
* Doyle V. School Directors, 36 111. App. 653.
6 White V. KeUogg, 119 Ind. 320, 21 N. E. 901.
« McCutchen v. Windsor, 55 Mo. 149.
165
§ 70] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
Where neither statute nor contract provides that
marriage of a female teacher shall be a cause for re-
moval there is no right to remove such teacher for
reason of her marriage.^ But the absence of a married
woman teacher from her employxaent by reason of
maternity might be of such length as to support a
charge of neglect of duty and authorize her removal,
although a mere absence for such reason would not.^
The dismissal of a married female teacher for neglect
of duty, by reason of her absence for three months
for reason of maternity, will not be reviewed on man-
damus?
School directors have the power to suspend a teacher
for non-compUance with an order that all teachers
shall be vaccinated.* And a teacher who refuses to
admit a pupil, dismissed by her, until the conduct of
the pupil may be inquired into, is guilty of insub-
ordination and may be discharged therefor.^
§ 70. Right to Chastise Pupils.
A teacher may, for proper cause, reasonably and
moderately chastise a pupil, ° especially for conduct
tending to demoralize other pupils and to interfere
with the proper management of the school.' But
where a teacher punishes a pupil in a cruel manner.
1 People V. Board, &c., 82 Misc. Eep. 684. 144 N. Y. S. 87.
2 People V. Board, &c., 160 N. Y. App. Div. 557, 145 N. Y. S. 853.
3 People V. Board, &c., 212 N. Y. 463, 106 N. E. 307.
* Lyndall v. High School Committee, 19 Pa. Super. Ct. 232.
6 Leddy v. Board', &c., 160 lU. App. 187.
« Cook V. Neely, 143 Mo. App. 632, 128 S. W. 233.
^ Dodd V. State, 94 Ark. 297, 126 S. W. 834.
166
Ch. V] RIGHT TO CHASTISE PUPILS [§ 70
and a parent incited thereby assaults the teacher,
such punishment may be shown in mitigation of
exemplary damages although not justifying the as-
sault.^
The corporal punishment that a school teacher may
inflict on a pupil is such that the general judgment of
reasonable men would not pronounce it excessive.^
A school teacher, for the purpose of correction, repre-
sents the parent, and has the parental authority in
this regard delegated to him.^ But a parent cannot
expressly delegate any authority which he does not
himself possess, as, for example, to administer excessive
punishment. The power of the school teacher, also,
has a natural Umitation, as the love and affection of
the parent which would temper the chastisement
cannot be delegated, and consequently the power is
more liable to abuse as thus delegated.*
The teacher, being charged with a part of the parents'
duties to train up and qualify children for becoming
useful and virtuous members of society, is by law
invested with the parents' power to administer moder-
ate correction when it shall be just and necessary in
order to control stubbornness, quicken diligence, and
reform bad habits,^ but chastisement of a pupil for
breaking an unreasonable rule renders the teacher
1 Cook V. Neely, 143 Mo. App. 632, 128 S. W. 233.
2 Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509, 7 Atl. 273.
' Reg. V. Hopley, 2 Fos. & F. 202 ; 1 Bl. Com. 453 ; Stevens v.
Fassett, 27 Me. 266; Boyd v. State, 88 Ala. 169, 7 So. 268; Quinn
V. Nolan, 7 Ohio Dec. 585 ; Cooper v. State, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 324.
* Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114.
6 State V. Pendergrass, 19 N. C. (2 Dev. & B. L.) 365.
167
§ 70] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
liable in an action of assault and battery.^ Likewise,
in exercising control over a child in matters outside
of the jurisdiction of the teacher,^ or when the cause
for the chastisement is unknown to the pupil.^
It is commonly said that a teacher has the same
right to chastise his pupil that a parent has to punish
his child. But that is true only in a limited sense.
The teacher has no general right of chastisement for
all offenses, as has the parent. The teacher's right
in that respect is restricted to the hmits of his juris-
diction and responsibility as a teacher. But within
those limits, a teacher may exact a compliance with
all reasonable demands, and may, in a kind and reason-
able spirit, inflict corporal punishment upon a pupil
for disobedience or other conduct detrimental to the
welfare of the school. This punishment should not
be either cruel or excessive, and ought always to be
apportioned to the gravity of the offense and within
the bounds of moderation.
The law has not undertaken to prescribe stated
punishments for particular offenses, but has contented
itself with the general grant of the power of moderate
correction, and has confined the graduation of punish-
ments, within the limits of this grant, to the discretion
of the teacher.* Therefore when complaint is made,
the calm and honest judgment of the teacher as to
what the situation required should have weight, as
1 State V. Vanderbilt, 116 Ind. 11, 18 N. E. 266.
2 Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 58.
' State V. Mizner, 50 Iowa 145.
* State V. Pendergrass, 19 N. C. (2 Dev. & L.) 365.
168
Ch. V] RIGHT TO CHASTISE PUPILS [§ 70
in the case of a parent under similar circumstances,
and where no improper weapon has been employed,
the presumption will be, until the contrary is made to
appear, that what was done was rightly done. Sub-
ject to these general rules, the teacher's right to inflict,
and the duty of inflicting corporal punishment upon
a pupil, and the reasonableness of such a punishment
when imposed, must be judged of by the varying cir-
cumstances of each particular case.^
The better doctrine of the adjudged cases, therefore,
is, that the teacher is within reasonable bounds the
substitute for the parent, exercising his delegated
authority. He is vested with the power to administer
moderate correction, with a proper instrument, in
cases of misconduct, which ought to have some refer-
ence to the character of the offense, the sex, age, size,
and physical strength of the pupil. When the teacher
keeps within this circumscribed sphere of his authority
the degree of correction must be left to his discretion,
as it is to that of the parent, under like circumstances.
Within this Umit he has the authority to determine
the gravity or heinousness of the offense, and to mete
out to the offender the punishment which he thinks
his conduct justly merits, and hence the parent or
1 1 Bishop Cr. L. sec. 886 ; Vanvactor v. State, 113 Ind. 276,
15 N. E. 341 ; Danenhoffer v. State, 69 Ind. 295. The punishment
of a pupil with undue severity, or with an improper instrument such
as a hickory stick, three-fourths of an inch in diameter at one end
and one-half an inch at the other and fifteen or eighteen inches long,
used in striking the palm of the hand of a pupil from eight to twelve
strokes, by which the boy's hand was disabled for some days, is
unwarrantable and may serve in some degree to indicate the animus
of the teacher ; Decision of Supt. of Iowa, June 6, 1874.
169
§ 70] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
teacher is often said, fro hac vice, to exercise judicial
functions.^
To support a charge of assault and battery against
a teacher for improper chastisement, it is necessary
to show that the act complained of was intentionally
committed. But the intent may be inferred from the
unreasonableness of the method adopted, or in the
excessive force employed, and the burden of proving
such unreasonableness or excess rests upon the prosecu-
tion. In such a case, in addition to the general pre-
sumption of his innocence, the teacher has also the
presumption of having done his duty, in support of
his defense.^
The legitimate object of chastisement is to inflict
punishment by the pain which it causes as well as by
the degradation which it impHes. It does not, there-
fore, necessarily follow because pain is produced, or
some abrasion of the skin results from the effect of a
switch, that a chastisement was either cruel or ex-
cessive. And a mere error of judgment, where the
motive is proper, will not make a case of assault and
battery.^
The legal objects and purposes of punishment in
school are threefold : first, reformation, and the highest
good of the pupil ; second, the enforcement and main-
tenance of correct discipline in the school ; and, third,
as an example to like evil-doers. And in no case can
1 Boyd V. State, 88 Ala. 169, 7 So. 268.
^ Com. V. Randall, 4 Gray (Mass.) 36 ; Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt.
114 ; State v. Alford, 68 N. C. 322 ; Com. v. Seed, 5 Pa. L. Jour. 78.
8 Vanvactor v. State, 113 Ind. 276, 15 N. E. 341.
170
Ch. V] RIGHT TO CHASTISE PUPILS [§ 70
the punisliment be justifiable unless it is inflicted for
some definite offense or offenses which the pupil has
committed, and the pupil, as a reasonable being under-
stands or should understand from what occurred, for
what the punishment is inflicted.^
A teacher is liable if, in correcting or disciplining a
pupil, he acts maliciously or inflicts a permanent in-
jury, but he has the authority to correct his pupil
when he is disobedient or inattentive to his duties,
and any act ddne in the exercise of this authority
and not prompted by malice is not actionable, though
it may cause permanent injury, unless a person of
ordinary prudence could reasonably foresee that a
permanent injury of some kind would naturally or
probably result from the act.
There is a distinction between the case of an injury
inflicted in the performance of a lawful act and one in
which the act causing the injury is in itself unlawful
or is, at least, a willful wrong. In the latter case the
defendant is liable for any consequence that may flow
from his act as the proximate cause thereof, whether
he could foresee or anticipate it or not ; but when the
act is lawful, the UabiUty depends not upon the par-
ticular consequence or result that may flow from it,
but upon the ability of a prudent man, in the exercise
of ordinary care, to foresee that injury or damage will
naturally or probably be the result of his act. In the
one case he is presumed to intend the consequence of
his unlawful act, but in the other, while the act is
* State V. Mizner, 50 Iowa 145.
171
§ 70] OF BCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
lawful, it must be performed in a careful manner,
otherwise it becomes unlawful, if a prudent man in
the exercise of proper care can foresee that it will
naturally or probably cause injury to another, though
it is not necessary that the evil result should be, in
form foreseen. The commission of an act specifically
forbidden by law, or the omission or failure to perform
any duty specifically imposed by law, is generally
equivalent to an act done with intent to cause wrong-
ful injury.
It is not easy to state with precision the power which
the law grants to schoolmasters and teachers, with
respect to the correction of their pupils. It is analogous
to that which belongs to parents, and the authority
of the teacher is regarded as a delegation of parental
authority. One of the most sacred duties of parents
is to train up and quahfy their children for becoming
useful and virtuous members of society. This duty
cannot be performed without the ability to command
obedience, to control stubbornness, to quicken dili-
gence, and to reform bad habits, and to enable the
teacher to exercise this salutary sway, he is armed
with the power to administer moderate correction
when he shall believe it to be just and necessary.
The teacher as the substitute for the parent, is charged
in part with the performance of his duties, and in the
exercise of these delegated duties is invested with his
power.^
If a teacher attempts, even without malice, to cor-
1 State V. Pendergrass, 19 N. C. (2 Dev. & B. L.) 365; State v.
Burton, 45 Wis. 150.
172
Ch. V] RIGHT TO CHASTISE PUPILS [§ 70
rect a pupil in a wrongful manner, he is liable for any
permanent injury inflicted whether or not he was able
to foresee that the particular injury would be the
natural and probable consequence of his act. But
he is not hable for permanent injury inflicted without
maUce, in proper method of correction, where a per-
manent injury cannot be reasonably foreseen as a
result of the act. And, where a teacher, to attract the
attention of a pupil, threw a pencil at him to the injury
of an eye, it was held that the teacher would be Uable
if he did not act with ordinary care.^
But it is not necessary that a permanent injury be
inflicted, to render the teacher civilly and criminally
liable for excessive and immoderate punishment.
Thus, any punishment with a rod, which leaves marks
or welts on the person of the pupil for two months,
or for a much shorter period thereafter, is immoderate
and excessive.^ A teacher may moderately chastise a
pupil for infraction of a rule prohibiting quarrelUng
and fighting, although the act was done away from the
school grounds, and outside of school hours.^
There is no doubt a well-founded and growing
sentiment against the infliction of corporal punish-
ment in the pubUc schools. Humanity is against it
except in extreme cases, and the tendency of the
courts seems to be that if a teacher immoderately
• Drum V. Miller, 135 N. C. 204, 47 S. E. 421.
^ State V. Mizner, 50 Iowa 145. Compare, Fox v. People, 84 111.
App. 270; Heritage v. Dodge, 64 N. H. 297, 9 Atl. 722; Com. v.
Seed, 5 Pa. L. Jour. 78.
8 Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 484 ; Hutton v. State, 23 Tex. App. 386,
5 S.W. 122.
173
§ 71] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
and unreasonably punishes a pupil he is liable for the
injury inflicted regardless of the motive which prompted
the chastisement, — that is to say, the non-existence
of malice is not material.^ Many school committees
now prohibit corporal punishment in any form, and by
statute in New Jersey the infliction of corporal punish-
ment is entirely prohibited.^
§ 71. Right to Expel Pupil.
The teacher has a right to suspend or expel a pupil
from a public school, unless deprived of that power
by the afl[irmative action of the school board. While
the principal or teacher in charge of a public school
is subordinate to the school board, or board of educa-
tion of his district or city, and must enforce rules
and regulations adopted by the board for the govern-
ment of the school, and execute all its lawful orders
in that behalf, he does not derive all his power and
authority in the school, and over his pupils, from the
affirmative action of the board. He stands, for the
time being, in loco parentis to his pupils, and because
of that relation he must necessarily exercise authority
over them in many things concerning which the board
may have remained silent.
In the school, as in the family, there exists on the
part of the pupils the obligations of obedience to law-
ful commands, subordination, civil deportment, respect
for the rights of other pupils, and fidelity to duty.
1 Haycraft v. Grigsby, 80 Mo. App. 354. Compare, Lander v.
Seaver, 32 Vt. 114.
2 3 N. J. Stats, p. 3049, sec. 202.
174
Ch. Y] right to expel pupil [§ 71
These obligations are inherent in any proper school
system, and constitute, so to speak, the common law
of the school. Every pupil is presumed to know this
law, and is subject to it, whether it has or has not been
re-enacted by the district board in the form of written
rules and regulations. Indeed, it would seem impos-
sible to frame rules which would cover all cases t)f
insubordination and all acts of vicious tendency which
the teacher is liable to encounter daily and hourly.
The teacher is responsible for the discipUne of his
school, and for the progress, conduct and deportment
of his pupils, and it is his imperative duty to maintain
good order, and to require of his pupils a faithful per-
formance of their duties. If he fails to do so he is
unfit for his position. To enable him to discharge
these duties effectually, he must necessarily have the
power to enforce prompt obedience to his lawful com-
mands, and for this reason the law gives him the power,
in proper cases, to inflict corporal punishment on re-
fractory pupils.
But there are cases of misconduct for which such
punishment is an inadequate remedy. In general,
no doubt a teacher should report a case of that kind
to the proper board for its action in the first instance
if no delay will necessarily result from that course
prejudicial to the best interests of the school. But
the conduct of the recusant pupil may be such that
his presence in the school for a day, or an hour, may
be disastrous to the discipline of the school and even
to the morals of the other pupils. In such a case it
seems absolutely essential to the welfare of the school
175
§ 71] OF SCHOOL TEACHERS [Ch. V
that the teacher should have the power to suspend the
offender at once from the privileges of the school, and
he must necessarily decide for himself whether the
case requires that remedy. If he suspends the pupil
he should promptly report his action, with his reasons
therefor, to the proper board.
It will seldom be necessary for the teacher in charge
of a district school to exercise this power of suspen-
sion or expulsion, because usually he can communicate
readily with the district board, and obtain the direc-
tion and order of the board in the matter. But where
the government of a public school is vested in a board
of education, with a more numerous membership than
district boards, and which holds stated meetings for
the transaction of business, the faciUties for speedy
communication with the board may be greatly de-
creased and more time must usually elapse before the
board can act upon a complaint of the teacher. In those
schools the occasions which require the action of the
teacher in the first instance will occur more frequently
than in the district schools where the board is more
easily accessible ; but the rule is the same irrespective
of the accessibility of the controlling board.^
1 Burpee v. Burton, 45 Wis. 150.
176
CHAPTER VI
OF PUPILS
§ 72. Rights and Duties.
Although at common law the child had no legal
right to an education,^ modem statutes in the nature
of compulsory education laws give to every child a
right to attend the public schools.
This right, however, is not an unqualified right but
is subject to such reasonable regulations as to numbers
and qualifications of pupils to be admitted to the
respective schools, and as to other school matters, as
the school authorities shall from time to time pre-
scribe.*
Where the statute of the State, enacted in obedience
to the special command of the constitution, provides
that the legislatm-e shall provide a system of public
schools, by which a school shall be kept up and sup-
ported in each district, the advantage or benefit thereby
vouchsafed to each child is one derived and secured to
it under the highest sanction of positive law, and is a
right just as distinctive as a vested right in property,
and as such is entitled to protection by all the guarantees
by which other legal rights are protected and secured
• See § 7, supra.
« Alvord V. Chester, 180 Mass. 20, 61 N. E. 263.
177
§ 72] OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
to the possessor.^ But the privilege accorded by the
law of a State to the youth of the State, of attending
the public schools maintained at the expense of the
State, is not a privilege or immunity appertaining to a
citizen of the United States as such ; and it necessarily
follows that no person can demand admission as a
pupil to any such school because of the mere status
of citizenship.^
The exclusion of a child from a school gives no right
of action against the school committee, inasmuch as
such officers are not ordinarily accountable to in-
dividuals for the manner in which they exercise their
pubUc functions, unless some private right is violated,
which the individual holds as property, separately
from the community at large. The right to attend
school is not such, but is a political right belonging
to such aggrieved party as a member of the com-
munity, and in common with all others of the same
community.^
The use of pupils of a pubUc school as subjects of
practice in teaching by the better qualified students
as teachers under supervision of regular teachers has
been held not an invasion of the pupils' legal rights,*
and pupils over twenty-one years of age who are
regularly accepted pupils in a public school are imder
the same restrictions and liabilities as if they were
under that age.^
1 Ward V. Flood, 48 Cal. 36.
2 Ibid.
^ Learock v. Putnam, 111 Mass. 499.
* Spedden v. Board, &c., 74 W. Va. 181, 81 S. E. 724.
s Stevens v. Fassett, 27 Me. 266.
178
Ch. VI] ADMISSION [§ 73
§ 73. Admission.
The authorities of the public schools under the law
owe a duty to the public to admit and keep within the
schools all children who come within the lawfully
prescribed rules and whose parents or guardians see
fit to enter them. When, therefore, such school
authorities willfuUy, wantonly, and maUciously re-
fuse to admit such children, a public wrong is com-
mitted, which may be remedied, so far as the public
is concerned, by indictment for malpractice, or other
appropriate remedy. Out of this breach of duty
damage arises to the parent, as well as to the child.
The parent, therefore, has the right to appeal to the
courts to compel the child to be admitted or reinstated,
as the case may be, and also to appeal to the courts
by his action for damages for the amount which he
would be required to expend in the education of his child.
The child would also have a right against the individ-
uals thus wantonly and maliciously depriving him of any
benefit which is secured to him by the law in the event
the parent sees proper to enter him in the school.^
When the law requires one to do an act for the benefit
of another, or to forbear the doing of that which may
injure another, though no action be given in express
terms, upon the accrual of damage the party may
recover. It follows, therefore, that when a parent
enters his child in the public schools, the law requires
that the authorities of the school shall do each and
every act required by the law which will be for the
* Broom's Common Law, 9th London ed., 757-759.
179
§ 731 OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
benefit of the child, and also that the authorities shall
refrain from doing any act which will injure the child.
If the school authorities wantonly and maliciously
refuse to discharge the duty thus imposed upon them,
the child will have a right of action against the in-
dividuals who commit the wrongful act.
Enumeration is not necessary to attach children to
a school district inasmuch as it is residence and not
enumeration which fixes the attachment.^ And per-
sons residing on lands purchased by or ceded to the
United States for navy yards, forts, and arsenals,
and where there is no other reservation of jurisdiction
to the State than that of a right to serve civil and
criminal process on such lands, are not entitled to
the benefit of the conamon schools for their children,
in the towns in which such lands are situated.^
Where the managers of a charitable institution are
provided by the State with funds for the education of
children who become inmates, if they neglect to provide
educational facilities the inmates are not entitled to
free admission to the schools of the district in which
the institution is located.^ But the minor children
of paupers, supported at the county poor farm, have
the right of admission into the public schools of the
district in which the poor farm is located ; * although
» Greenlee v. Newton, &c., 104 N. E. (Ind.) 610. A child is
entitled to school privileges in a district if he is residing there;
Yale V. School District, 59 Conn. 491, 22 Atl. 295.
^ Opinion of Justices, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 580.
' Com. V. Directors, &c., 164 Pa. St. 607, 30 Atl. 509; State v.
Directors, &c., 10 Ohio St. 448.
^ School District v. PoUard, 55 N. H. 503.
180
Ch. VI] SCHOOL AGE [§ 74
children kept in a private institution chartered for
their support and education, and exempt from taxa-
tion, are not entitled to admission into the district
schools in which the institution exists.^
Where an orphan child is placed by a charitable
society to board in the family of a resident of a school
district, and the child is treated as a member of that
family, such child is a resident of the school district
and as such is entitled to the school privileges of other
residents.^ And if orphan children or children of a
non-resident, of lawful school age, are residing within
a school district in the care of relatives or strangers
who care for them and control them, such children
are entitled to attend the public schools of that dis-
trict.^
If a pupil is refused readmission into a public school,
mandamus and not injunction is the proper remedy to
prociire reinstatement.*
§ 74. School Age.
A constitutional provision requiring the legislature
to provide for the instruction of children between the
ages of five and eighteen years, is not such a limitation
as win prevent the legislature from providing for the
instruction of children between the ages of five and
twenty years.*
> Lake Farm v. Kalamazoo, 179 Mich. 171, 146 N. W. 115.
2 People V. Hendrickson, 125 N. Y. App. Div. 256, 109 N. Y. S.
403.
3 Muskegon v. Wright, 176 Mich. 6, 141 N. W. 866. But see.
Black V. Graham, 238 Pa. St. 381, 86 Atl. 266.
4 McCaskill v. Bower, 126 Ga. 341, 54 S. E. 942.
6 In re Newark, &c., 70 Atl. (N. J.) 881.
181
§ 75] OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
A rule, the effect of which is to exclude from school
a child who becomes of school age a few days after
the beginning of the fall term, until the beginning of
the following spring term, is not reasonable.^
§ 75. Non-Residents.
A constitutional provision that district Schools
shall be free and without charges for tuition, to all
between certain ages, applies only to the children of
each particular district.^
Where the statute provides that the local board
may admit non-resident pupils to the pubUc schools of
their district, on such terms as they may prescribe,
the board has no right to admit such non-resident
pupils at a less rate per scholar than the inhabitants
of the district pay by taxation for their children, and
have no right to admit them at all to the exclusion of
resident children who otherwise would attend.' And
where a rate is jEtxed by recorded resolution of the
school board, for the tuition of a non-resident pupil,
it is not necessary to the liabihty of a parent that
he be notified of such resolution.*
Where a district has no right to receive into its
schools the children whose parent or guardian resides
in another State, a contract for the txiition of such
children made between the authorities and parents or
guardians of such children cannot be enforced.^
> Board, &c., v. Bolton, 85 111. App. 92.
^ State V. Joint School District, 65 Wis. 631, 27 N. W. 829.
3 Irvln V. Gregory, 86 Ga. 605, 13 S. E. 120.
* School District v. Yerrington, 108 Mich. 414, 66 N. W. 324.
8 Haverhill v. Gale, 103 Mass. 104.
182
Ch. VI] CONTROL OP PUPILS [§ 77
A previous arrangement is necessary to support the
claim of one district against another for tuition given
to children of that district where the statute authorizes
the board of education to make such contracts, mere
acquiescence not being sufficient.^
§ 76. Tuition Fees.
A tuition fee may be exacted from those who are
over the school age, and also from non-residents who
attend a public school, but a fee may not be exacted
from residents entitled to attend the public schools,
for manual training given as a part of the curriculum
therein.^
Temporary residence within a school district during
the scholastic year, for the primary purpose of attend-
ing the public school therein, debars one from receiving
free tuition.' But a foster parent has a right to have
his child, who has not been legally adopted, attend
the public schools of the district in which he lives with-
out cost for tuition.*
§ 77. Control of Pupils.
The power of school authorities over pupils, except
for the parents' right of control, extends to all acts
detrimental to the best interests of the school, whether
committed in school hours or after the pupils return
1 Board, &c., v. Board, &c., 50 Ohio St. 439, 38 N. E. 23 ; Cascade,
&c., V. Lewis, &c., 43 Pa. St. 318.
2 Maxcy v. Oshkosh, 144 Wis. 238, 128 N. W. 899.
3 State V. Board, &c., 96 Wis. 95, 71 N. W. 123 ; Barnard v.
Matherly, 84 Mo. App. 140.
^ McNish V. State, 74 Neb. 261, 104 N. W. 186.
183
§ 77] OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
home.^ And while school authorities shotild be up-
held in their control and regulation .of the school
system, their authority is not unlimited but must be
exercised to further the best interests of the pupils
with due regard to the natural and legal rights of par-
ents.^
Under the doctrine of parens patrice the State, as
sovereign, has the power of guardianship over persons
under disabilities.' For this reason, the school direc-
tors, as representatives of the government, have
broader powers of control over minor pupils, they
being not sui juris, than courts have over persons
who are sui juris in case of contempt of court com-
mitted outside the presence of the court and not in
reference to a case pending therein. {So we find it
held that the school authorities have the power to
suspend a pupil for an offense committed outside of
school hours and not in the presence of the teacher,
which has a direct and immediate tendency to in-
fluence the conduct of other pupils while in the school-
room, to set at naught the proper discipUne of the school,
to impair the authority of the teachers and to bring
them into ridicule and contempt,* as, for example, the
publication in a local newspaper of a poem satirizing
iQott V. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S. W. 204; State v.
District Board, &c., 135 Wis. 619, 116 N. W. 232.
2 State V. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N. W. 1039.
' Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. (U. S.) 393, 15 L. ed. 80.
* State V. District Board, &c., 135 Wis. 619, 116 N. W. 232, 67
Cent. L. J. 214, in note to which see an interesting discussion of this
case ; Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485 ; Hutton w.'State, 23 Tex. App.
386, 5 S. W. 122; Wayland v. Hughes, 43 Wash. 441, 86 Pac. 642;
Kinzer v. Directors, &c., 129 Iowa 441, 105 N. W. 686.
184
Ch. VI] SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION [§ 78
the regulations of the school. And the suspension of
pupils for such cause until they shall apologize is not
an abuse of the discretion of the school authorities.^
Such power is essential to the preservation of order,
decency, decorum,, and good government in the public
schools.
A member of a district school committee has a
right to eject from the schoolhouse a pupil who uses
profane language and refuses to desist therefrom when
requested, if no unnecessary force is used to that end.^
§ 78. Exclusion, Suspension and Expulsion.
A child at common law was at the mercy of an
arbitrary parent whether he should be placed at
school or not, and so he is at the mercy of an arbitrary
parent who may so conduct himself as to deprive the
child of the benefits to be derived from education. A
child who is entered at a public school must be required
to conduct himself so as not to interfere with the dis-
cipline of the school, and, if this duty is encumbent
upon the child, it would seem that for a stronger
reason a similar duty rests upon the parent who is
the real beneficiary of the system.
Public education which fails to instil in the youth-
ful mind and heart obedience to authority, both public
and private, would be more of a curse than a blessing,
and the parent who in the schoolroom, or in the vicinity
of the school, in the presence of the children so acts
as to create the impression that the true way of life
» State V. District Board, &c., 135 Wis. 619, 116 N. W. 232.
2 Peck V. Smith, 41 Conn. 442.
185
§ 78] OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
is lawlessness and utter disregard of the rights of other
people should not only receive the punishment which
the statutes of the State might inflict upon him, but
should also be deprived of the benefit of the fund
which is provided to pay the expenses which natural
and moral duty would otherwise require him to bear.
But this misconduct on the part of the parent
does not apply to matters extraneous to the discipline
and w.elfare of the school and of the pupils, and, as
the right of the child to attend a public school is de-
pendent on the good conduct of the parent as well as
of the child, both must submit to the reasonable
rules and regulations of the school, and the parent
must so condact himself as not to destroy the influence
and authority of the school management over the
children whenever he comes in contact with the school
authorities, whether commissioners, officers, or teachers,
under such circumstances that his conduct would be
likely to influence the conduct of his children.
The schoolmaster has always stood in loco parentis ^
for certain purposes, and, notwithstanding the change
from private schools into public schools, the school-
master of the present is and ought to be in the place
of a parent in a great many particulars. It is there-
fore a duty which the parent owes not only to the
master but to the pupil himself that he who stands
in the parents' shoes should not be impeded in dis-
charging a duty which the parent has voluntarily
placed upon him. Therefore, it necessarily follows
1 Burfee V. Burton, 45 Wis. 150.
186
Ch. VI] SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION [§ 78
that when the parent has taken advantage of the
school fund to discharge the burden which he would
otherwise have to carry himself, and has placed his
child under the control of the schoolmaster thus pro-
vided, any misconduct on his part which would inter-
fere with the master in discharging the duty which he
owes to such child would result under the present
system, as it always did under the old system, in the
exclusion of the child from the benefits to be derived
from the services of the master.
As the State, for the purpose of aiding a parent in
discharging a duty, fiirnishes a fund to pay the expenses
incident to the education of his child, it is the right of
the State, through its constituted authorities, to re-
quire of the parent that he shall do nothing inconsistent
with the peace, good order, and authority of the system
which is provided for his benefit.
Therefore, when a parent goes to a schoolroom of a
lawfully estabUshed public school and in the presence
of his or her children and other pupils pubhcly calls
and questions the justice or correctness of a decision
made by the teacher in a matter of discipline relating
to such children, uses abusive and insulting language
to such teacher, and acts in such a manner as to in-
terrupt the exercises of the school, and conducts him-
self or herself in such manner as to bring the teacher
and the discipUne of the school into contempt in the
eyes of the pupils, it is not only lawful but it is the
duty of the authorities of the school in the protection
of the teacher whom they have placed on duty, as
well as to sustain the character and discipline of the
187
§ 78] OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
school, to exclude from the schoolroom the children
of such parent, although those thus excluded had not
been guilty of a violation of any rule of the school,'
To justify an exclusion or suspension of a child,
it is not absolutely essential that there should be a
promulgated rule which has been in terms violated,
either by the child or by the parent, for, if the act
complained of is such that in itself it would be sub-
versive of the good order and discipline in the school,
then the mere failure of the school board to declare
that imauthorized which every intelligent man must
know could not be allowed, would not prevent the
school board from dealing with the person who was
guilty of such an act. If, however, the act in itself
be harmless but may be harmful on account of the
peculiar conditions siuroimding the school and its
authorities, then there should be a prescribed rule
before the act could be complained of as one which
would forfeit the right to patronize the school.
It requires no argument to sustain the proposition
that an act of disorder in the schoolroom calculated
to bring into contempt the authority of the school,
as well as the individual in charge for the time being,
should be met with such punishment as would be
calculated to impress the pupils with the importance
of obedience and respect to constituted authority.
Children are too much disposed naturally to look
with contempt upon authority, especially when repre-
sented by a schoolmaster, and parents should be re-
' Board, &c., v. Purse, 101 Ga. 422, 28 S. E. 896.
188
Ch. VI] SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION [§ 78
strained from encouraging this tendency so dangerous
in its nature to private and public welfare.
It is generally conceded that in such a case prosecu-
tion under the criminal laws of the State would be
justified and proper. This would satisfy the public
wrong growing out of a violation of the penal laws ;
but another, and it may not be unwise to say a greater,
wrong has been done than the mere infraction of the
criminal law, and the only adequate remedy for such
a wrong is one which will cause the parents to under-
stand that that which is given to them for their benefit
primarily, and for the benefit of their children second-
arily, will be withdrawn from them and their children
whenever they do an act which in its effect will be
prejudicial to the system which is maintained for
their benefit.
A teacher has the right to require a pupil to answer
questions which tend to eHcit facts concerning his
condujct in school, and a pupil is answerable for acts
which tend to produce merriment in the school or to
degrade the teacher. A teacher may accordingly sus-
pend a pupil from school for refusing to answer a
question concerning his conduct.*
Where a child is excluded unlawfully from a public
school the right of action against the public officers
is exclusively in the parent when the public officers
act without maliciousness or wantonness, but if the
act of the pubHc officers in excluding the child is done
wantonly or maliciously, the child will have right of
* Decision of Supt. of Iowa, June 8, 1874.
189
§ 78] OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
action against such officers.^ A pupil cannot be sus-
pended from the benefits of a pubhc school for an
injury to property, unless the injury was caused will-
fully or maUciously. An injury done by accident, or
mere negUgence, is not a sufficient cause for such
discipUne.
It is not necessary that a pupil shall be guilty of a
criminal act before he can be suspended or expelled
from the school. It is a sufficient cause for such dis-
cipline if he be guilty of some grossly willful or mahcious
act, of detriment to the school. If the act is merely
careless or negligent it is not a sufficient cause for
such summary punishment. It must be a gross act
and not some petty or trivial offense against the rules,
or the pupil must have been persistent in disobedience
of the proper and reasonable rules and regulations of
the school.
As a punishment for a careless act, even though
negligent, if it is not willful or mahcious, the right of
suspension or expulsion from the school does not exist.^
It is neither desirable nor permissible that a child
may be excluded from the public schools because by a
careless or neghgent act, without malice or willfulness,
it has injured or broken school property to such an
extent that it is beyond its power, or that of its parent
or guardian, to make compensation for it. This
would be the effect of the rule if carried out, in many
cases, and might deprive poor children who are care-
less, as all children are careless, of the right to a common
1 McCormiek v. Burt, 95 III. 263 ; Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286.
" Holman v. Trustees, &c., 77 Mich. 605, 43 N. W. 996.
190
Ch. VI] SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION [§ 78
school education which the laws and pohcy of our
government have guaranteed to them so well that the
parent or guardian is punished if he neglects or refuses
to give the children under his charge the benefit of the
pubUc schools. And a writ of mandamus will he
against the school committee to compel them to rein-
state a pupil suspended or expelled by their order,
for accidentally breaking a window which he refuses
to replace, there being no averment that it was done
maliciously or willfully.^
It is unlawful to exclude a pupil from a pubhc school
for alleged misconduct without giving the pupil an
opportunity which he applies for, to be heard upon the
facts involved in the alleged misconduct, and an action
will lie against the town for the injury, notwithstanding
the fact that the court found he was disrespectful to
his teacher. 2
The power of exclusion is not a merely arbitrary
power, to be exercised without ascertaining the facts.
It is settled in the management of the pubHc schools,
that when a school committee acts in good faith while
exercising the plenary powers conferred upon them
by statute, and order the permanent exclusion of a
pupil therefrom, no suit can be maintained by him
because of their action.' And a principal of a public
1 Holman v. Trustees, &c., 77 Mich. 605, 43 N. W. 996.
2 Bishop V. Rowley, 165 Mass. 460, 43 N. E. 191.
' Morrison v. Lawrence, 186 Mass. 459, 72 N. E. 91 ; Watson v.
Cambridge, 157 Mass. 563, 32 N. E. 864; Bishop v. Rowley, 165
Mass. 460-462, 43 N. E. 191. By statute in Massachusetts such an
order is not considered final, and the pupU, if his parent or guardian
desires, must be granted a hearing; otherwise such exclusion
191
§ 78] OP PUPILS [Ch. VI
school may refuse admission to a child whose educa-
tion is insuflBcient to comply with the requirements
of the lowest grade of that school.^
When the real ground for exclusion from a particular
school or grade is failure of the pupil to maintain a
proper standard of scholarship and there is offered
to the pupil opportunity to attend another school
adapted to his abiUty and accompUshments, there is
no illegal exclusion. And when the real ground for
exclusion is not misconduct there is no obligation on
the part of the school committee to grant a hearing.
Failure to attain a given standard of excellence is
not misconduct in itself.^ And a pupil may be ex-
pelled for refusing to attend a class where his work
is revised by another student acting as assistant to a
teacher.'
A pupil who has been drunk and disorderly in viola-
tion of an ordinance of a town, may be suspended
from a pubhc school, although the offense was not
committed in or about the school or school grounds.*
And where a pupil at a pupils' meeting criticises the
school authorities, he may be expelled.^
Where a teacher refused to receive two boys in
school who appeared on a warm day without collars
and with the neckbands of their shirts turned under,
becomes unlawful. Mass. Rev. Laws. ch. 44, sec. 8; see also,
Jones V. Fitchburg, 211 Mass. 66, 97 N. E. 612.
1 Ward V. Flood, 48 Cal. 36.
2 Barnard v. Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N. E. 1095.
' Wulff V. Wakefield, 221 Mass. 427, 109 N. E. 358.
* Douglas V. Campbell, 89 Ark. 254, 116 S. W. 211.
^ Wooster v. Sunderland, — Cal. App., — , 148 Pac. 959.
192
Ch. VI] SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION [§ 78
the State Board of Education held that such exclusion
was improper.^
Under a statute which provides that " a child un-
lawfully excluded from any public school shall recover
damages therefor in an action of tort, to be brought
in the name of such child by his guardian or next
friend against the city or town by which such school
is supported " no cause of action arises unless the
exclusion is by the proper authorities who represent
the city or town.^
A teacher has no authority to exclude a child from
school, unless the act is in an emergency or under the
order of the school committee. The law vests in the
school committee the charge and superintendence of
the schools, and they alone have the right to exclude
any child from school. If a teacher sends a child
home from school, without evidence of authority to
do so by the school committee, an appeal to the school
committee and confirmation by them is necessary to
perfect a right of action.^ And when a teacher sends
a child home as a punishment, it is not an exclusion
from the school for which the parent may sue the city
or town. To adopt such a rule as law would lead
to vexatious litigation and impair the discipline and
usefulness of the schools.*
Where a school board illegally orders a change in
1 N. J. State Board of Education, Feb. 5, 1916.
2 Davis V. Boston, 133 Mass. 103.
^Ibid.
* Spear v. Cummings, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 224 ; Sherman v. Charles-
town, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 160 ; Hodgkins v. Rockport, 105 Mass. 475 ;
Learock v. Putnam, 111 Mass. 499 ; Davis v. Boston, 133 Mass. 103.
193
§ 78] OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
text-books, a pupil not complying with a regulation
pertaining thereto cannot be legally excluded from
the school and if excluded may obtain reinstatement
by mandamus.^ And if a parent sustains some direct
pecuniary injury by reason of an unlawful suspension
of his child from a public school, he may maintain
an action for damages therefor ; otherwise his remedy
is by mandamus to compel reinstatement.''
A statutory right to an opportunity for an expelled
pupil to be heard before the school committee, means
a full opportunity unrestricted by procedure that
will amount to coercion of witnesses, or suppression
of relevant evidence. But if a school committee acts
in good faith in determining the facts in a particular
case, its decision cannot be revised by the courts.'
If a hearing in regard to the exclusion of a pupil is in
good faith, it need not be conducted with the formality
of a trial in court, and a material mistake innocently
made by a school committee in conducting a hearing
will not make the exclusion unlawful. And where
legislation gives a remedy to a child " unlawfully
excluded " from a public school, the city or town
becomes Uable for the possible arbitrary and willfully
unjust action of a school committee in excluding a
child from school.^
When a pupil has been expelled from a public school,
a court will not review the decision of the school
1 Harley v. Lmdemann, 129 Wis. 514, 109 N. W. 570.
2 Douglas V. Campbell, 89 Ark. 254, 116 S. W. 211.
' Bishop V. Rowley, 165 Mass. 460, 43 N. E. 191.
* Morrison v. Lavyrence, 181 Mass. 127, 63 N. E. 400.
194
Ch. VI] VACCINATION [§ 79
authorities unless fraud, corruption or gross injustice
is shown.^
§ 79. Health Regulations. — Vaccination.
In the enforcement of health regulations the school
authorities may employ a suitable person to ascertain
the health of pupils in attendance at a pubHc school.^
And a school board has the power to adopt reasonable
health regulations for the benefit of the pupils and the
general public. To that end they may exclude from
the schools those who do not comply with a regulation
reqviiring a certificate of vaccination as a condition of
attendance.^ This statement of the law, however,
does not hold the power to compel vaccination, but
merely the right to prohibit attendance until the regu-
lation relating to vaccination is complied with.
A board of health may make a valid resolution that
pupils not producing evidence of successful vaccination
shall be excluded from the public schools.* Such law
is a vaUd exercise of the police power of the State, °
» Smith V. Board, &c., 182 111. App. 342.
« State V. Brown, 112 Minn. 370, 128 N. W. 294.
'Duffield V. Williamsport, 162 Pa. St. 476, 29 Atl. 742; In re
Rebenack, 62 Mo. App. 8 ; Abeel v. Clark, 84 Gal. 226, 24 Pac. 383 ;
BisseU V. Davidson, 65 Conn. 185, 32 Atl. 348; In re Walters, 84
Hun (N. Y.) 457, 32 N. Y. S. 322.
* People V. Board, &c., 177 HI. 572, 52 N. E. 850 ; State v. Zimmer-
man, 86 Minn. 353, 90 N. W. 783 ; Viemeister v. White, 179 N. Y.
235, 72 N. E. 97; Field v. Robinson, 198 Pa. St. 638, 48 Atl. 873;
StuU V. Reber, 215 Pa. St. 156, 64 Atl. 419. But see, Osborn v.
Russell, 64 Kan. 507, 68 Pac. 60.
6 French v. Davidson, 143 Cal. 658, 77 Pac. 663 ; Stull v. Reber,
215 Pa. St. 156, 64 Atl. 419 ; State v. Board, &c., 21 Utah 401, 60
Pac. 1013. Contra, on ground that there must be statutory author-
195
§ 79] OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
and is mandatory, not merely directory, nor is it re-
pealed by a compulsory education act.^
When the statute requires vaccination as a condition
precedent to attendance at a public school a school
committee has a right to make a rule that all pupils
not vaccinated shall be excluded from the pubUc
schools, even though there is no case of smallpox in
the town and no epidemic threatened.^
An exception to a statute requiring successful vac-
cination as a condition precedent to admission into
the pubUc schools is to be presumed in favor of a child
who by either mental or physical reasons is not a fit
subject for vaccination.' But it has been held that
the decision of the school committee of a city or town,
acting in good faith in the management of the schools,
upon matters of fact directly affecting the good order
and discipUne of the schools, is final so far as it relates
to the rights of pupils to enjoy the privileges of the
school.* So where the statute provides that " a child
who has not been vaccinated shall not be admitted to
a pubhc school except upon presentation of a certifi-
cate signed by a regular practising physician that
he is not a fit subject for vaccination " the school
ity : State v. Burdge, 95 Wis. 390, 70 N. W. 347 ; Mathews v. Board,
&c., 127 Mich. 630, 86 N. W. 1036.
1 State Board of Health v. Board, &c., 13 Cal. App. 514, 110 Pac.
137.
2 Bissell V. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 32 Atl. 348.
3 State V. Shorrock, 55 Wash. 208, 104 Pac. 214.
* Hammond v. Hyde Park, 195 Mass. 29, 80 N. E. 650; Watson
V. Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561, 32 N. E. 864 ; Hodgkins v. Rockport,
105 Mass. 475 ; Spiller v. Woburn, 12 Allen (Mass.) 127 ; Alvord v.
Chester, 180 Mass. 20, 61 N. E. 263.
196
Ch. VI] VACCINATION [§ 79
committee consistently therewith may expel from school
during an epidemic of smallpox and until the crisis has
passed, a child presenting such certificate, who under
normal conditions would be entitled to attend the
public school, provided such expulsion is done in good
faith.i
The rule of a school board requiring that an applicant
for admission shall show a reputable physician's certifi-
cate of successful vaccination as a condition precedent
to admission is not unreasonable,^ nor is it unconstitu-
tional.^ In the absence of direct and specific legisla-
tion,* it has been held that without an immediate,
present necessity, occasioned by a reasonable, well-
founded belief that smallpox is prevalent in the com-
munity, or is approaching that vicinity, school directors
have no right to make a rule excluding pupils from the
public schools for failure to be vaccinated.^ And it
has been held that without authority of statute pupils
may not be excluded for non-vaccination unless an
epidemic is actually pending.^
Where the school authorities make a rule excluding
from the schools all children who have not been vac-
1 Hammond v. Hyde Park, 195 Mass. 29, 80 N. E. 650.
2 Auten w. Board, &c., 83 Ark. 431, 104. S- W. 130.
3 State V. Board, &c., 76 Ohio St. 297, 81 N. E. 568.
* State V. Tumey, 31 Ohio Cir. Ct. 222.
s School Directors v. Breen, 60 111. App. 201.
« State V. Turney, 31 Ohio Cir. Ct. 222. May exclude when
epidemic is threatened : Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N. E. 89 ;
Hutchins v. Durham, 137 N. C. 68, 49 S. E. 46. May not exclude
unless epidemic is threatened : Potts v. Breen, 167 111. 67, 47 N. E.
81; People v. Board, &c., 177 HI. 572, 52 N. E. 850; State v.
Burdge, 95 Wis. 390, 70 N. W. 343.
197
§ 79] OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
cinated, a parent who refuses to allow his child to be
vaccinated and is therefore unable to send the child
to school, is not guilty of a violation of a compulsory
attendance law.^ But it has been held that a com-
pulsory education law may not be avoided by refusing
to comply with a rule requiring vaccination as a con-
dition precedent to attending a public school, unless
such child is sent to some other school.^ And private
instruction at home is insufl&cient.^
Where the statute provides that persons in charge
of the public schools shall refuse admission to children
except upon certificates that they have been success-
fully vaccinated, or have had smallpox, mandamus
will not he to compel school directors to exclude a
child who has not complied therewith, inasmuch as
that duty is imposed upon the superintendents, prin-
cipals, and teachers who have charge of the schools.*
An order of a school board, excluding from the
public schools those pupils who, not having been
vaccinated, refuse to be vaccinated, does not deprive
them of liberty without due process of law, nor is such
an unreasonable search and seizure.' And the passage
of an ordinance making vaccination a condition prece-
dent to the right of education is not within the general
1 O'Bannon v. Cole, 220 Mo. 697, 119 S. W. 424; State v. Shor-
rock, 55 Wash. 208, 104 Pac. 214 ; State v. Turney, 31 Ohio Cir. Ct.
222
2" People V. Ekerold, 211 N. Y. 386, 105 N. E. 670.
' State V. Connort, 69 Wash. 361, 124 Pac. 910. But see, State
V. Peterman, 32 Ind. App. 665, 70 N.E. 550.
* Com. V. Rowe, 218 Pa. St. 168, 67 Atl. 56.
6 McSween v. Board, &c., 129 S. W. (Tex.) 206.
198
Ch. VI] REINSTATEMENT [§ 80
police powers of a city authorizing the passing of
ordinances for the promotion of health and suppression
of disease.^ Nor is a vaccination rule invalid because
it does not specify when it will expire.^
§ 80. Reinstatement.
A pupil who is improperly excluded from the public
schools sustains an injury which the law will redress.
But gross vulgarity and profanity on the part of a
pupil before the school committee may cause him to
forfeit his right to reinstatement.^
Where application is made for reinstatement of a
pupil in a school, the application is usually made in
the name and behalf of the parent or guardian.* And
where a p^-rent's reasonable request that a child be
excused from taking a certain study is improperly
denied, and the child is suspended or expelled for re-
fusal to take such study, a mandamus will lie to compel
reinstatement.^
A school board cannot require a pupil to pay a sum
of money as a condition precedent to reinstatement
in the pubhc schools after suspension or expulsion
therefrom for misconduct.^
1 People V. Board, &c., 234 111. 422, 84 N. E. 1046.
2 Zucht V. San Antonio, &c., 170 S. W. (Tex.) 840.
' Board, &c., v. Helston, 32 lU. App. 300 ; State v. District Board,
&c., 135 Wis. 619, 116 N. W. 232 ; Cross v. Walton, &c., 129 Ky. 35,
llOS. W. 346.
* Rulison V. Post, 79 111. 567 ; State v. Board, &c., 63 Wis. 234,
23 N. W. 102 ; Holman v. Trustees, &c., 77 Mich. 605, 43 N. W.
996 ; Binde v. Klinge, 30 Mo. App. 285 ; Trustees v. People, 87 lU.
303.
6 State V. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N. W. 1039.
« State V. District Board, &c., 135 Wis. 619, 116 N. W. 232.
199
§81] OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
An order expelling a pupil must be from an existing
school, and inasmuch as the pupil's relationship with
the school is severed when the school year has closed
and vacation has begun there exists on the part of the
school authorities no right, for want of jurisdiction, to
expel a pupil after the termination of the school year
and during the vacation season.*
§ 81. Diplomas.
A graduate is one who has honorably passed through
the prescribed course of study and received a certificate
or diploma to that effect. Mere permission to one to
take part in the ceremonials of graduation with the
understanding that it was to save him and his family
from humiliation, does not entitle him to a cer-
tificate of graduation. And it is the certificate, not
the taking part in a pubhc performance, which at-
tests the fact that he has passed the prescribed course
of study and is otherwise qualified according to the
rules of the school. If the school board with knowl-
edge that one has not passed the prescribed course,
should, out of favoritism, grant him a certificate,
it might be canceled. So also if issued through
mistake.
A pupil might be graduated without taking part in
any ceremonies, but he cannot be a graduate, no
matter what the ceremonies, unless he passed his
examinations and received his diploma. The granting
of a certificate is the one act in the ceremonies of
graduation which has a legal effect. The symbolic
1 Decision of Supt. of Iowa, March 18, 1899.
200
Ch. VI] SEPARATE SCHOOLS [§ 82
delivery of a diploma by the presentation of a dummy
is of no legal effect.^
But if a student's record has been determined to be
satisfactory, and the duty of giving a certificate has
become merely ministerial, he is entitled to a mandamus
to compel the school authorities to graduate him.^
The determination of the pupil's record, however,
rests in the discretion of the school board, and a man-
damus will not he to control the exercise of such dis-
cretionary power.^
The graduating exercises of a school are not a part
of the course of study therein, and a school board
has no authority to refuse to issue a diploma to a
pupil, who has properly and honorably completed
the prescribed course of study, because he fails to
prepare a valedictory address for the purpose of gradua-
tion exercises.*
§ 82. Separate Schools.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion provides that no State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws, and this Amendment has a direct bearing on the
power of school authorities in their treatment of
1 Sweitzer v. Fisher, — Iowa, — , 154 N. W. 465. See also, Joliet
V. Werner, 166 111. 34, 46 N. E. 780.
2 Keller v. Hewitt, 109 Cal. 146, 41 Pac. 871 ; State v. Lincoln
Medical CoUege, 81 Neb. 533, 116 N. W. 294.
3 People V. N. Y. Law School, 68 Hun (N. Y.) 118, 22 N. Y. S.
663 ; Niles v. Orange Training School, 63 N. J. L. 528, 42 Atl. 846.
* Decision of State Com'r of N. J., May 27, 1912.
201
§ 82] OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
colored pupils. This constitutional provision has been
held to give the colored people rights of equaUty with
those of the white race, but does not guarantee to the
colored race a community of rights.^ Therefore, a
State has the right to establish and maintain separate
schools for colored pupils, provided such schools are
on a plane of equality with those maintained for
pupils of the white race,^ although it would be a denial
to them of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment if they were excluded
entirely from the public schools.^
The constitutionaUty of laws providing for separate
schools for colored pupils does not arise under the
" privileges or immunities " clause of the Constitution
of the United States, but does arise under the clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting any State
from the denial " to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Therefore, if the
legislature of a State chooses to provide separate schools
for colored pupils, it may do so provided such colored
schools afford advantages in all respects substantially
equal to those furnished by the schools for white
1 Younger v. Judah, 111 Mo. 303, 19 S. W. 1109; People v.
Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438.
2 U. S. V. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730 ; Union County v. Robinson, 27
Ark. 116 ; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 56 ; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 ;
People V. Board, &c., 18 Mich. 400; Chrisman v. Brookhaven, 70
Miss. 477, 12 So. 458; Younger v. Judah, HI Mo. 303, 19 S. W.
1109; State v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342; People v. Easton, 13 Abb. Pr.
N. S. (N. Y.) 159 ; State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198.
3 Claybrook v. Owensboro, 16 Fed. 297 ; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal.
50 ; People v. Board, &c., 18 Mich. 400 ; State v. Duggan, 15 R. I.
403, 6 Atl. 787.
202
Ch. VI] SEPARATE SCHOOLS [§ 82
pupils.^ Separate schools are not unconstitutional for
lack of unifonnity,^ but a discrimination in the length
of the school year between white and colored schools
is illegal as against pubhc policy.'
Where the constitution provides that in the estab-
Ushment of separate schools there shall be no dis-
crimination or prejudice of either race, a statute is
unconstitutional if it provides for a uniform tax for the
purpose of erecting a school building exclusively for white
pupils.* And a legislative act authorizing a county to
estabUsh an agricultural high school for the instruction
of its white youth, such high school to be supported by
a tax on all taxable property therein, is unconstitutional
in that its necessary effect is to abridge the priv-
ileges or immunities of the colored taxpayers in such
county, or deny them equal protection of the laws.^
In the absence of statutory authority, a child by
reason of its color may not be excluded from any
public school.® And an act to entirely exclude negroes
from the pubUc schools is unconstitutional.^ In the
absence of statute so permitting, a school board cannot
estabUsh separate schools for Indian children and
compel them to attend such separate schools.*
1 Bertonneau v. Directors, 3 Woods (U. S. C. C.) 177.
2 Reynolds v. Board, &c., 66 Kan. 672, 72 Pac. 274; People v.
School Board, 161 N. Y. 598, 56 N. E. 81.
3 WilUams v. Board, &c., 45 W. Va. 199, 31 S. E. 985.
* WUliams v. Bradford, 158 N. C. 36, 73 S. E. 154.
» McFarland v. Goins, 96 Miss. 67, 50 So. 493.
« Rowles V. Board, i&c, 76 Kan. 361, 91 Pac. 88.
' State V. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342.
8 Crawford v. District School Board, &c., 68 Oreg. 388, 137 Pac.
217.
203
§ 82] OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
The authority to establish separate schools for colored
pupils does not give school directors the power to es-
tablish and maintain a separate school solely to instruct
three or four colored children in the district when
there are accommodations for them in the schoolhouse
with the other pupils of the district. And such pro-
ceeding may be enjoined at the suit of any taxpayer
of the district to prevent such misuse of the pubUc
funds.^
Separate colored schools can be authorized only by
the State, and in absence of legislative enactment a
city board of education has no right to establish such
separate schools, and exclude colored children from
other schools.^ And the power to establish separate
schools as given to school officers by statute, cannot be
controlled by the courts.^
If a constitutional provision requires the legislature
to establish and maintain a uniform system of free
public schools it is still legal to provide for the estab-
lishment outside of that system of a school exclusively
for white children, and the issuance of bonds by the
town in which it is located for the payment therefor
is valid.^
Where the statute prohibits the teaching of whites
and negroes in the same school, such law is constitu-
tional as applied to a corporation as to which the
State has reserved the power to alter, amend or repeal
1 Chase v. Stephenson, 71 111. 383.
2 People V. City of Quincy, 101 111. 308.
' State V. Gray, 93 Ind. 303.
* Chrisman v. Brookhaven, 70 Miss. 477, 12 So. 458.
204
Ch. VI] SEPARATE SCHOOLS [§ 82
its charter, and does not violate the constitution in
denying due process of law, nor in any other way.^
Where the statute provides that no child shall be
excluded from any public school on account of religion,
nationality or color, the exclusion of a mulatto child
from a school established for white children is illegal
even though separate schools are provided for colored
children.^ And an illegal rule to exclude colored chil-
dren, even where separate colored schools are estab-
lished, cannot be enforced.^
Under the Constitution and laws of Iowa school
authorities have no right to deny a pupil admission
to any school for reason of its color.* And in that
State a colored pupil cannot be compelled to attend
a separate school for colored children ; ^ nor can such
pupils be excluded from any public schools in Kansas
or Michigan.^
Separate schools were abolished in Pennsylvania by
the Act of June 8, 1881, so that under that act the
school directors have no authority to exclude a colored
child from a common school established by them ex-
clusively for white children, and assign him to a branch
school for colored children established by them in a
nearby building/
1 Berea CoUege v. Com., 211 U. S. 45, 53 L. ed. 81, 29 S. Ct. 33.
2 Pierce v. Union, &c., 46 N. J. L. 76 ; People v. Board, &c., 127
111. 613, 21 N. E. 187 ; Dove v. Independent School, &c., 41 Iowa 689.
2 Wysinger v. Cruikshank, 82 Cal. 588, 23 Pac. 54.
* Clark V. Board, &c., 24 Iowa 266.
^ Smith V. School District, &c., 40 Iowa 518.
* Ottawa, &c., V. Tinnon, 26 Kan. 1 ; Knox v. Board, &c., 45
Kan. 152, 25 Pac. 616 ; People v. Board, &c., 18 Mich. 400.
' Kaine v. Com., 101 Pa. St. 490.
205
§ 82] OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
And it is no objection that the establishment and
maintenance of separate schools for colored children
requires them to go further to reach the school than
if they were to go to the school established for white
children.^ The power of general superintendence vests
a plenary authority in the school directors to arrange,
classify and distribute pupils in such a manner as they
think best, provided such rules are reasonable, in a
manner which they think best adapted to their general
proficiency and welfare. If it is thought expedient,
they may assign a colored child to a separate colored
school, even though such school be a greater distance
from its home, provided the greater distance is not
unreasonable. ^
In establishing a separate school for colored children
it is not objectionable that they are compelled to go
a greater distance than white children similarly situ-
ated, or that they are required to cross a railroad
track.^ But where the location of a separate school
for colored children is such that access to it is beset
with such dangers to life and limb that children ought
not to be required to attend it, there is a denial to
such children of equal educational facilities.''
If a separate school for colored pupils is so remote
that to attend compels a pupil to go an unreasonable
and oppressive distance, then exclusion from a nearer
1 Ward V. Flood, 48 Cal. 52; Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546,
15 S. W. 765; People v. Gallaglier, 93 N. Y. 451.
2 Roberts v. Boston, 5 Gush. (Mass.) 198.
* Dameron v. Bayless, 14 Ariz. 180, 126 Pac. 273.
* Williams v. Board, &c., 79 Kan. 202, 99 Pac. 216.
206
Ch. VI] SEPARATE SCHOOLS [§ 82
school is imlawful.^ But it has been held that where
a city maintains separate schools, according to law,
for white and colored children, and owing to the smaller
number of colored children their schools are fewer,
the fact that some of the colored children have to
walk a distance of four miles to reach a colored school
passing on the way schools of the same grade for
white children, does not make the distance unreason-
able.^
In deciding whether a pupil is white or colored, evi-
dence that such pupil attended a white school in the
State in which he formerly lived, is admissible if that
State had a separate school law. So also is the fact
that such pupil was generally regarded as a white
child, as well as the extent of his association with
either the white or colored race.
A child is colored, although born of a white mother
if the father is half white and half negro.' But the
children of a white mother and a father three-fourths
white are to be classed as white.* A child having
one-sixteenth negro blood is a colored child and as
such may be excluded from a school estabUshed ex-
clusively for white children.^ And a child having one-
eighth to one-sixteenth negro blood is a colored child,
although his appearance is entirely that of the Cau-
casian race.® Under statute it has been held that
1 U. S. V. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730.
2 State V. Board, &c., 7 Ohio Dec. 129.
8 Hare v. Board, &c., 113 N. C. 9, 18 S. E. 55.
* Williams v. Directors, &c., Wright (Ohio) 579.
B MuIIins V. Belcher, 142 Ky. 673, 134 S. W. 1151.
6 Wall V. Oyster, 36 D. C. App. 50.
207
§ 82] OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
" colored ", as applied to separate schools, means negro
blood of even the smallest degree.^
The question of whether a child is white or colored
is to be determined by the board of school trustees
with the right of appeal to the County Superintendent
of schools,^ where such right of appeal is given by
statute.
Under laws providing for the establishing of sepa-
rate schools for negroes and whites, taxation must also
be laid on these lines, and negroes cannot be taxed to
support white schools, nor can whites be taxed to
support colored schools. Therefore, it is not improper
to deny colored voters the right to vote on the issuance
of bonds to establish a white school.'
A school conmiittee need not comply with an order
of the board of education to admit a colored pupil to a
school established for white children, and from which
the law excludes negroes.*
Where the statute provides that the school board
shall in each year take an enumeration of the persons
of school age within a district, and that when such
eniuneration shows a specified number of colored
children therein, shall establish separate schools for
such colored children, mandamus to compel the es-
tablishment of such schools will be awarded.^ Man-
damus is the proper remedy to enforce admission to a
1 Johnson v. Board, &c., 166 N. C. 468, 82 S. E. 832.
2 Eubank v. Boughton, 98 Va. 499, 36 S. E. 529.
5 Munfordville, &c., v. Board, &c., 155 Ky. 382, 159 S. W.
954.
^McMiUan v. School Committee, 107 N. C. 609, 12 S. E. 330.
6 Morehead v. Gartwright, 122 Mo. App. 257, 99 S. W. 48.
208
Ch. VI] TRANSPORTATION [§ 83
school,^ but mandamus will be refused if the complaint
to compel a township trustee to estabUsh a separate
school for colored children does not show that there
is a suitable number of such children to render such
organization practicable.^
§ 83. Transportation.
The failure of the board of education to provide
transportation for children living remote from the
schoolhouse is not a failure to provide suitable school
facihties and accommodations for all children residing
in the district desiring to attend the public schools
therein ; especially when the furnishing of transporta-
tion to children living remote from schoolhouses is
permissive to the board of education and not manda-
tory upon them.* The duty to provide school facilities
and accommodations, does not imply the duty of provid-
ing free transportation of pupils living remote from
the schoolhouse.^ And in absence of a statute so
providing, school directors have no power to hire the
transportation of pupils.^
Where the statute provides that the directors may
use part of the school money in the transportation of
scholars to and from school, it rests in the discretion
of the board as to whether it shall be used, and unless
1 Clark V. Board, &e., 24 Iowa 266 ; People v. Board, &c., 18 Mich.
400; State v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36; Cory
V. Carter, 48 Ind. 327.
2 State V. Grubb, 85 Ind. 213.
3 Board, &c., v. Atwood, 74 N. J. L. 638, 65 Atl. 999.
5 Mills V. School Directors, &c., 154 111. App. 119.
209
§ 83] OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
there is an intentional discrimination mandamus will
not lie to compel such transportation.^ And where the
statute authorizes the school board to arrange for
transportation of school children in certain cases, and
the necessity for which rests in their discretion, the
remedy for failure to provide such transportation is
by appeal to the County Superintendent, and mandamus
will not Ue.^
Where compulsory attendance at a pubUc school,
and conveyance for pupils Uving beyond a certain
distance from the schoolhouse thereto, are both pro-
vided for by statute, the parent or guardian of a pupil
living beyond such specified distance is not amenable
to the compulsory attendance law when the convey-
ance is not provided.^
If no estimate of expenses for transportation of
pupils is included in the tax levy, and there are conse-
quently no funds on hand for that purpose, it is a good
defense on the part of a school trustee against whom
proceedings are brought to compel such transporta-
tion.^ And if a school trustee, with the concurrence
of an advisory board, levies a tax to provide free
transportation of a pupil, his successor in office is not
obliged to furnish such free transportation unless the
statute places upon him the legal duty to do so.®
In furnishing free transportation under a statute
1 Carey v. Thompson, 66 Vt. 665, 30 Atl. 5.
2 Queeny v. Higgins, 136 Iowa 573, 114 N. W. 51.
3 State V. Hall, 74 N. H. 61, 64 Atl. 1102.
^ Dunten v. State, 172 Ind. 59, 87 N. E. 733.
6 State V. Jackson, 168 Ind. 384, 81 N. E. 62.
210
Ch. VI] TRANSPORTATION [§ 83
requiring it for all pupils living more than two and
one-half miles from a schooUiouse, a requirement that
boys from ten to nineteen years of age cross a frozen
river and walk a distance of one-third of a mile to
meet a conveyance is not an abuse of the discretion
vested in a school board.^
The right of transportation of a pupil to a public
school is a pubUc right,^ and as such gives no right of
action against a municipaUty infringing it,* in absence
of a statute creating hability. Therefore, at common
law, a school district is not Uable for injuries to a pupil
which are resultant from improper means of transpor-
tation negUgently provided for his accommodation at
the expense of the public*
A statute requiring railway companies to carry
pupils of the public schools to and from schools at
rates not exceeding half the regular fare charged for
the transportation of other passengers between the
same points, is constitutional, it being a police regu-
lation in the interest of education.^ But if it plainly
appeared that the enforcement of such law would
cause expense to street railway companies, which
they would have to bear, or put it upon other classes
of passengers in the form of increased fares to make
good the loss from carrying school children at half
rates, there would be a taking of property without due
1 State V. Mostad, 28 N. D. 244, 148 N. W. 831.
2 Rhobidas v. Concord, 70 N. H. 90, 47 Atl. 82.
3 Harris v. Salem, 72 N. H. 424, 57 Atl. 332.
5 Com. V. Interstate, &c. Ry., 187 Mass. 436, 73 N. E. 530.
211
§83] OF PUPILS [Ch. VI
process of law, through unconstitutional discrimination.
In estimating the cost of carrying such school children,
the legislature may properly consider the size of such
children, and the hours at which they travel, as well
as the probable increase in travel on the cars by reason
of such reduced rates.^ And a condition in a grant of
franchise requiring a street railroad company to carry
pupils in any school at reduced rates, was held reason-
able and valid, and was construed to include students
attending a business college, also students attending a
regular college.*
1 Com. V. Interstate, &c. Ry., 187 Mass. 436, 73 N. E. 530.
' Northrop v. Richmond, 105 Va. 335, 53 S. E. 962.
212
CHAPTER VII
RULES AND REGULATIONS
§ 84. Power of Adoption.
School boards and other educational authorities of the
State have the power to adopt appropriate rules and
regulations for the government of the schools under
their control, and when so adopted, such rules and
regulations are analogous to by-laws and ordinances,
and are tested by the same general principles.^ And
the general power to take charge of the educational
affairs of a district, or prescribed territory, includes the
power to make all reasonable rules and regulations for
the discipline, government and management of the
schools within the district or territory.^
Although the trustees of public schools have statutory
authority to direct what branches should be taught, and
to adopt and enforce all necessary rules and regulations
for the management and government of schools, it has
been held that where a candidate for admission passed
a satisfactory examination in everything but grammar,
there was no right to refuse him admission on that ac-
1 State V. Webber, 108 Ind. 31, 8 N. E. 708 ; Fertich v. Michener,
111 Ind. 472, 11 N. E. 605.
2 State V. Burton, 45 Wis. 150; Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt, 444;
Hodgkins v. Rockport, 105 Mass. 475 ; People v. Medical Soc, 24
Barb. (N. Y.) 570; Thompson v. Beaver, 63 lU. 353.
213
§ 85] RULES AND REGULATIONS [Ch. VII
count, and that mandamus would lie to compel his
admission to study the other branches.^
§ 85. Maimer of Establishing.
The power to make rules does not imply that all the
rules, orders and regulations lur the discipline, govern-
ment and management of the schools shall be made a
matter of record by the school board, or that every act,
order or direction affecting the conduct of such schools
shall be authorized or confirmed by a formal vote.
Nor is it necessary that any prohibitive rule exist in
order to justify punishment for flagrant misconduct.
No system of rules however carefully prepared can
provide for every possible emergency or meet every
requirement. In consequence, much must necessarily
be left to the individual members of the school boards,
and to the superintendents of, and the teachers in the
several schools.^ It follows that any reasonable rule
adopted by a superintendent, or a teacher merely,
not inconsistent with some statute or some other rule
prescribed by higher authority, is binding upon the
pupils.^ And a teacher may take a pistol from a pupil
who has carried it to school, using all necessary force
in doing so.* A pupil ihay also be punished although
no rule has been promulgated.^
1 Lake View, &c., v. People, 87 111. 303.
i* Russell V. Lynnfield, 116 Mass. 365.
' Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. 472, 11 N. E. 605. In the absence
of rules prescribed by the school board or other proper authority
the teacher may make all necessary and proper rules for the regula-
tion of the school ; Sheehan v. Sturges, 53 Conn. 481, 2 Atl. 841.
* Metcalf V. State, 21 Tex. App. 174, 17 S. W. 142.
B State V. District Board, &c., 135 Wis. 619, 116 N. W. 232.
214
Ch. VII] REASONABLENESS AND VALIDITY [§ 86
§ 86. Reasonableness and Validity.
Whether a by-law or other kindred regulation is
reasonable or valid, is a question of law for the decision
of the court, and hence not a question of fact for the
dptermination of the iyry.^
No rule, however reasonable it may be in its general
appUcation, ought to be enforced when, to enforce it
will inj9.ict actual and unnecessary suffering upon a
pupU. Rules are often adopted inflicting a penalty
for absence from school without proper or some pre-
scribed leave, and such rules have always been held
to be reasonable and sometimes necessary school regu-
lations, and yet such rules could not be lawfully en-
forced agaiust a pupil detained from school by sick-
ness, a violent storm, a death in the family, or any
physical disability to attend.^ A school regulation
must therefore be not only reasonable in itself, but
its enforcement must also be reasonable in the light
of existing circumstances.
In prescribing a salute to the flag as a ceremony at
the opening exercises of a school there exists on the
part of a board of education no authority to make a
rule that a pledge be repeated by the pupils to the
effect, " I pledge allegiance to my flag, and to the
Republic for which it stands, one nation indivisible,
with Uberty and justice to all", inasmuch as such
pledge is one of allegiance to the United States and
cannot be legally enforced against the children of
1 State V. White, 82 Ind. 278 ; Ferticli v. Micliener, 111 Ind. 472,
11 N. E. 605.
* Fertich v. Michener, supra cit.
215
§ 87] RULES AND REGULATIONS [Ch. VII
those who are not citizens of the United States but
who have a right to attend the public schools, and a
refusal to repeat such pledge is no ground for suspension. ^
The board of education has power to make, estab-
lish and enforce all necessary and proper rules and
regulations not contrary to law, and if a teacher obeys
the command of the board in enforcing a rule that is
contrary to the law of the State, it cannot be justified.^
But a teacher would not be responsible for a mere
mistake of judgment. To make a teacher hable it
must be shoAvn that the act complained of was wanton,
willful or malicious.*
If a pupil purposely runs against another pupil
and injures him so that it is necessary for the injured
pupil to go home, it is right and proper upon the part
of the teacher to require the pupil causing the injury
to accompany the injured pupil to his home, even if
such requirement is intended as a punishment. And
expulsion of the pupil for failure to comply with this
requirement will not be considered good ground for
the issuance of a writ of mandamus to require his
reinstatement.*
§ 87. Carrying Fuel.
Much discretion must necessarily be left to school
boards as to the nature of rules prescribed, yet it can-
1 Decision of State Com'r of N. J., Nov. 8, 1912.
2 Tape V. Hurley, 66 Gal. 473, 6 Pac. 129 ; Wysingerw. Cruikshank,
82 Cal. 588, 23 Pac. 54.
» Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548, 4 N. E. 197 ; McCormick v.
Burt, 95 111. 263; Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286.
* Beaty v. RandaU, 79 Mo. App. 226.
216
Ch. VII] RHETORICAL EXERCISES [§ 88
not fairly be claimed that the boards are uncontrolled
in the exercise of their discretion and judgment upon
the subject. The rules and regulations made must
be reasonable and proper, and needful for the govern-
ment, good order, and efficiency of the school, such
as will best advance the pupils in their studies, tend to
their education and mental improvement, and promote
their interest and weKare.
But the rules and regulations must relate to these
objects. The boards are not at liberty to adopt rules
relating to other subjects according to their humor or
fancy, and make a disobedience of such a rule by a
pupil cause for his suspension or expulsion. There-
fore it was held that a rule or regulation requiring a
pupil to bring up wood for use in the school room
was one which the board had no right to make and
enforce.^
§ 88. Rhetorical Exercises and Dialogues.
Where a rule adopted by the school authorities
required that a pupil at a stated time should be pre-
pared with a rhetorical exercise, and that unless
he be excused on account of sickness or other reason-
able cause should present such exercise under penalty
of suspension, it was held that such a rule was a reason-
able one. Neither the teacher enforcing such rule
nor the board of education is liable in damages there-
for.2
A pupil may be suspended for willful refusal to take
1 State V. Board, &c., 63 Wis. 234, 23 N. W. 102.
2 SeweU V. Board, &c., 29 Ohio St. 89.
217
§ 89] RULES AND REGULATIONS [Ch. VII
part in a dialogue in annual commencement exercises,
when such refusal amounts to insubordination.^
§ 89. Compositions and Debates.
The authorities of a public school have full power
to make it a part of the school course to write composi-
tions, and enter into debates, and to make rules requir-
ing that all pupils shall participate therein. And the
matter of selecting topics for such compositions and
debates rests entirely with the school authorities who
have the power of determining whether the topic
selected by them is suitable to the attainments and
age of the pupil, and the courts will not interfere when
they have exercised their discretion.^
If a pupil is assigned a topic on which to prepare a
composition, and does not do so, but reads one pre-
pared by his father, and which contains matter dis-
respectful to the teacher, two offenses are committed;
and the school authorities have the right to condone
the offense of reading such improper composition pre-
pared by the father, and still punish the pupil for
failure to perform the task assigned. If this punish-
ment consist of the assignment of a similar task for
future performance and the pupil refuses to prepare
such composition, he may be disciplined by expulsion,
suspension, or other proper punishment.^
Teaching by means of requiring written composi-
tions is not inconsistent with a statute that requires
» Cross V. Board, &c., 33 Ky. L. Rep. 472, 110 S. W. 346.
2 Samuel Benedict School v. Bradford, 111 Ga. 801, 36 S. E. 920.
^Ibid.
218
Ch. VII] COMPOSITIONS AND DEBATES [§ 89
" each organized town to keep and support one or
more schools, provided with competent teachers, of
good morals, for the instruction of the young in orthog-
raphy, reading, writing, EngUsh grammar, geography,
arithmetic, history of the United States, and good be-
havior." It is obvious that Enghsh composition may
fairly be regarded as an allowable mode of teaching
many of these branches. Writing requires the join-
ing of letters into words, and of words into sentences,
with the use of capitals, punctuation and correct
EngUsh. Grammar is taught more effectively by writ-
ing than by any other method. Orthography signifies
literally writing correctly, and composition is the only
mode of securing correct orthography in a mode to be
of practical utility. So too geography, history and
the other branches mentioned in the statute are by writ-
ing most effectually fixed in the memory of the pupil.
And so in regard to instruction in the specified
branches of common school education, the writing of
EngUsh composition in different forms may be regarded
as an aUowable mode of teaching the majority of them.
The requirement by a teacher that the pupils in gram-
mar shall write EngUsh compositions, is a reasonable
one, and if a pupil, in absence of a request from his
parent that he may be excused from so doing, refuse
to comply with such a requirement, he may for such
refusal, be expelled from a pubUc school. And such
requirement would also be reasonable and proper in
regard to many of the other studies prescribed by the
statute.^
» Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 224.
219
§ 90] RULES AND REGULATIONS [Ch. VII
§ 90. Tardiness.
Tardiness is a recognized offense against the good
order and proper management of all schools.^ A
tardy pupil may be required to remain in some part
of the building for the short period of time required
to complete the opening exercises of a school, provided
the place of enforced waiting is made comfortable
and healthful for the pupil, and in accordance with the
rule that due regard must be had to the health, com-
fort, age and mental as well as physical condition of
the pupil, and to the circumstances attending each
particular emergency.^ Cold weather may require
a modification of a rule that under moderate tempera-
ture would be reasonable; and against pupils known
to have some physical or mental infirmity, a modifica-
tion or relaxation in the strict enforcement of a rule
may be necessary.
§ 91. Detention.
The detention or keeping in of pupils for a short
time after the other members of j;he class have been
dismissed, or the school has closed, as a penalty for
some misconduct, shortcoming or mere omission, has
been very generally adopted by the schools, especially
those of the lower grade, and it is now one of the
recognized methods of enforcing discipUne and promot-
ing the progress of the pupils in the common schools.
It is a mild and non-aggressive method of imposing a
penalty, and inflicts no disgrace upon the pupil. The
^ Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa 562.
2 Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. 472, 11 N. E. 605.
220
Ch. VII] SECRET SOCIETIES [§ 92
additional time thus spent by the pupil in study pre-
sumably inures to his benefit.
However mistaken a teacher may be as to the justice
or propriety of imposing such a penalty at any partic-
ular time, it has none of the elements of false imprison-
ment about it, unless imposed from wanton, willful
or malicious motives. In the absence of such motives,
such a mistake amounts only to an error of judgment
in an attempt to enforce discipUne in the school for
which an action will not lie.^ And any pubUc officer,
such as a school officer, acting in good faith, is not
Uable for errors in judgment.^
§ 92. Secret Societies.
For connection with secret societies pupils may not
be debarred from attending pubHc schools.^ But
school directors may adopt rules debarring members
of fraternities organized against their will, from partic-
ipating in certain privileges connected with member-
ship in school, such as participating in graduation
exercises, joining the cadet corps, orchestra, debating
societies, glee clubs, and other school organizations,
even though the parents of the pupils consented to
their joining such fraternities.* This has been held
a reasonable rule on the ground that such membership
tends to foster insubordination to school authorities,
and tends to lower the scholarship of the pupils.
1 Fertich v. Michener, supra cit.
2 Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379.
3 StaUard v. White, 82 Ind. 278.
* Wayland v. Board, &c., 43 Wash. 441, 86 Pac. 642.
221
§ 92] RULES AND REGULATIONS [Ch. VII
The first Greek letter society in a secondary school
was Alpha Phi, a hterary society, which became part
of a fraternity in 1876. Subsequently secret societies
sprang into existence in high schools in the United
States to a great extent. Many educators have come
to beUeve that whatever good might be claimed for
such societies among mature college students, was not
shared by such societies formed among students of
the lower grades of schools whose characters are to a
greater extent unformed.
It has been said that such societies tend to engender
an undemocratic spirit of caste, to promote chques,
and to foster contempt for school authority. To curb
what is said to be their evil effects iu secondary schools,
rules and regulations have been adopted by many
school authorities, and statutes have been enacted
in several States including California, Ohio, Indiana,
Maine, Minnesota, Kansas and Vermont, either abso-
lutely forbidding them or placing them under control.
Cases arising on the statutes and local regulations
have come before the courts of several States, and it
has been uniformly held that reasonable rules adopted
by school authorities to prevent the establishment and
development of these secret societies in preparatory
schools, are valid.^
It is reasonable for a board of education to adopt a
rule requiring teachers to refuse to give public recogni-
1 Bradford v. Board, &c., 18 Cal. App. 19, 121 Pac. 929 ; Wayland.
V. Board, &c., 43 Wash. 441, 86 Pac. 642; Wilson v. Board, &c.,
233 111. 464, 84 N. E. 697 ; Favorite v: Board, &c., 235 111. 314, 85
N. E. 402 ; People v. Wheaton College, 40 111. 186.
222
Ch. VII] FOOTBALL PLAYING [§ 93
tion to Greek letter societies, or allow meetings of such
societies to be held in the school buildings, or permit
the name of the school to be used in connection with
such societies, or allow the members to represent the
school in any Uterary or athletic contests, or iu any
other public capacity.^
A statute prohibiting secret societies and fraterni-
ties in public schools, or educational institutions sup-
ported whoUy or in part by the State, is not uncon-
stitutional as infringing privileges and immunities of
citizens.^
§ 93. Football Playing.
The school directors may make a rule, " Resolved,
that the Board of Directors disfavor football on account
of injuries to life and limb, and for that reason will not
permit football or practice under the auspices of the
high school, or on the school grounds ", and if a pupil
violates the rule, even away from the school grounds,
and on a hoUday, by participating in a game on a team
advertised as representing the school, he may be sus-
pended or expelled.* This is on the broad ground that
if the effects of acts done out of school hoiu"s reach
within the school room during school hours, and are
detrimental to good order and the best interests of
the pupils, it is evident that such acts may be for-
bidden.*
1 Wason V. Board, &c., 233 111. 464, 84 N. E. 697.
2 Bradford v. Board, &c., 18 Cal. App. 19, 121 Pac. 929; Board,
&c., V. Waugh, 105 Miss. 623, 62 So. 827.
3 Kinzer v. Directors, &c., 129 Iowa 441, 105 N. W. 686.
* Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa 562.
223
§ 94] RULES AND REGULATIONS [Ch. VII
§ 94. PupUs to Go Directly Home After School.
A board of education under statutory authority to
pass rules relative to anything whatever that may
advance the interests of education, good government,
and prosperity of the public schools, and the welfare
of the public concerning them, may require pupils
to go directly home when dismissed from school
and a tradesman has no right of action for a loss of
patronage resulting from the enforcement of such
order.
It is not only the legal right, but the moral duty of
the school authorities, to require children to go directly
from school to their homes. All parents who have a
proper regard for the welfare of their children desire
it. The State makes it compulsory upon parents to
send their children to school, and punishes them for a
failure to do so. The least that the State can in reason
do, is to throw every safeguard possible around the
children who, in obedience to the law are attending
school. The dangers to which children are exposed
upon the streets of cities are matters of common knowl-
edge. Humanity and the welfare of the country demand
that a most watchful safeguard should, as far as possible
accompany the children, when required or allowed to
be on the streets. Parents have a right to understand
that their children will be promptly sent home after
school, and to believe that something unusual has
happened when they do not retiu-n in time. In no
other way can parents and teachers act in harmony
1 Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. 472, 11 N. E. 605.
224
Ch. VII] CONDUCT OUTSIDE OP SCHOOL [§ 95
to protect children from bad influences, bad companion-
ship, and bad morals.^
§ 95. Conduct Outside of School.
The directors of a school district are not authorized
to prescribe a rule which undertakes to regulate the
conduct of the children within the district who have
a right to attend the school, after they are dismissed
from it and remitted to the custody or care of the
parent or guardian, except as to matters directly affect-
ing the discipUne of the school.^ They have the
unquestioned right to make needful rules for the
control of the pupils while at school and under the
charge of the person who teaches it, and it would be
the duty of the teacher to enforce such rules when
made. While in the teacher's charge, the parent
would have no right to invade the schoolroom and
interfere with him in its management. On the other
hand, when the pupU is released and sent back to his
home, neither the teacher nor directors have the
authority to follow him thither, and govern his con-
duct while imder the parental eye in matters not affect-
ing the discipline of the school. Therefore, a rule
requiring that no pupU shall attend social parties
during the school term, and expulsion for violation of
such rule by a pupil having permission of his parents,
is imreasonable and unlawful.'
The control of the pupUs by the school authorities
1 Jones V. Cody, 132 Mich. 13, 92 N. W. 495.
» State V. District Board, &c., 135 Wis. 619, 116 N. W. 232.
' Dritt V. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286 ; State v. Osborne, 24 Mo. App.
309.
225
§ 96] RULES AND REGULATIONS [Ch. VII
after school hours, obtains until the pupUs are at home
in the custody of their parents/ and there it ceases
except as to matters having a direct tendency to affect
the discipUne of the school.^ The school directors
have no right to enact rules which invade the rights
of the parents. And where a pupil by the permission
of his parents violates such rule and is expelled, such
expulsion is illegal.^ But if the exclusion was without
malice on the part of the directors, they are not per-
sonally liable therefor.'* And school authorities have
no right to adopt a rule requiring all pupils of the
school to remain in their homes and study during cer-
tain designated hours in the evening.^
§ 96. Truancy. — Attendance Officers.
At common law truancy was not an offense, and is
now an offense only when made so by statute, ordi-
nance or by-law.® Although truancy as an offense is
committed wholly beyond the precincts of the school,
no example is more contaminating, no malconduct
more subversive of discipline, and an incorrigible
truant may be expelled, not as a punishment merely,
but as a protection to others from injurious example
and influence.''
A rule that " any pupil absent six half days in four
1 Jones V. Cody, 132 Mich. 13, 92 N. W. 495.
2 Gott V. Berea CoUege, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S. W. 204.
3 Dritt V. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286.
* Ibid.
5 Hobbs V. Germany, 94 Miss. 469, 49 So. 515.
^ Gushing v. Friendship, 89 Me. 525, 36 Atl. 1001.
' Sherman v. Gharlestown, 8 Gush. (Mass.) 160.
226
Ch. VII] INCIDENTAL FEES [§ 97
consecutive weeks, without satisfactory excuse, shall
be suspended from school " is a valid rule, and clearly
within the power of the board of directors to adopt
under a statute providing tliat " the board shall have
the power to make all needful rules and regulations for
the organization, grading, and government of the
schools in their district." ^
If an attendance officer, appointed by a board of
education pvirsuant to a statute, wrongfully arrests
a pupil, the board is not liable, inasmuch as the doc-
trine of respondeat superior does not apply to their
relations.^
An attendance or truant officer is a public officer
and therefore boimd to qualify by taking the oath.*
§ 97. Incidental Fees.
Although a characteristic feature of public schools
is that they are free of expense, it has been held that
a reasonable incidental fee may be imposed upon pupils
to pay for heat, in absence of a statute creating a
fund for that purpose. And any pupil failing to comply
with such rule may be excluded from the school.*
But the discretion as to incidental fees must be
reasonably exercised, and a school board will not be
permitted to exact a tuition fee from a pupil of a public
1 King V. Jefferson, &c., 71 Mo. 628.
2 Reynolds v. Little FaUs, &c., 33 N. Y. App. Div. 88, 53 N. Y. S.
75.
» FeathergiU v. State, 33 Ind. App. 683, 72 N. E. 181.
* Bryant v. Whisenant, 167 Ala. 325, 52 So. 525. There is a well
defined distinction between tuition and reasonable incidental fees ;
States. University of Wisconsin, 54 Wis. 159, 11 N. W. 472; Rober-
son V. Oliver, 189 Ala. 82, 66 So. 645.
227
g 97] RULES AND REGULATIONS [Ch. VII
school under the guise of a mere incidental fee. So
where an excessive fee was sought to be exacted from
pupils for the purpose of providing supplies, and the
balance if any to be paid to teachers in order that the
term of the school might be prolonged, it was held to
be a tuition fee and consequently illegal.^
» Roberson v. Oliver, 189 Ala. 82, 66 So. 645.
228
CHAPTER VIII
OF BOOKS AND STUDIES
§ 98. Prescribing Studies.
The legislature, in its plenary control of the public
school system, may prescribe a reasonable course of
studies for the public schools, but the courts may not
do so.^ And the legislature has the power ia estab-
lishing and controlling the public school system to
extend it beyond the common branches so as to include
pubhc instruction in agriculture and home economics.^
Although school trustees have the power to prescribe
the teaching of music in the public schools,* they have
not the power to establish a course of study inconsistent
with that adopted by the State Board of Education.^
When the legislature has placed the management of
public schools under the exclusive control of directors,
trustees, and boards of education, the courts have no
rightful authority to interfere by directing what instruc-
tion shall be given, or what books shall be used therein.^
1 Roach V. St. Louis, &c., 7 Mo. App. 567.
2 Associated Schools, &c., v. School District, &,c., 122 Minn. 254,
142 N. W. 325.
3 Myers Pub. Co. v. White River, &c., 28Ind. App. 91, 62 N. E. 66.
* Westland Pub. Co. v. Royal, 36 Wash. 399, 78 Pac. 1096.
B Board, &c., v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211.
229
1 99] OF BOOKS AND STUDIES [Ch. VIII
And the courts may not interfere even though the
committee should select books of a dangerous and
immoral tendency.^
§ 99. Adoption of Books.
The statutes of many States provide that local
authorities shall adopt books for use in the public
schools, and each board, whether of a city, township,
or county is local as to the territory of its jurisdic-
tion. Therefore the board in a city is local as to
the city; the board of a township is local as to the
township ; and the board of a county is local as to
the county; and where portions of a county are
subject to local boards for such portions, the county
board is local as to the remaining portions of the
county.^
A State may even purchase books and compel the
patrons of the school to buy the books from its officers,'
and a State may also provide by statute that a desig-
nated person shall have the exclusive privilege of
furnishing all text-books needed for the use of the
public schools.^ And it is within the power of the
legislature to require the adoption and use of the books
of a designated publisher.' In fact, where the consti-
tution of a State does not prohibit, the State legis-
lature has power to establish a uniform series of
1 Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379.
2 People V. Oakland, &c., 55 Cal. 331.
' Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1.
* Bancroft v. Thayer, 5 Sawy. (U. S. C. C.) 502.
6 State V. State Board, &c., 18 Nev. 173, 1 Pac. 844; People v.
Copeland, &c., 55 Cal. 331.
230
Ch. VIII] ADOPTION OF BOOKS [§ 99
text-books for use in the public schools.' And the
statutes may authorize the changing of text-books
with restrictions as to the number of changes to be
made within a given time.^
Where the statute provides that six months'
notice of a proposed change of text-books shall be
given by the State Board of Education, such no-
tice must be given by authority of the board, and
it is not sufl&cient that the notice be given in the
newspapers as a matter of news.' And where the
statute prescribes that the school board, when desir-
ous of adopting text-books for use in the schools
of the district for the ensuing year, shall call the
teachers for that year to be present at a meeting for
the purpose of advice and consultation, such direc-
tion is mandatory, and therefore the adoption of
such text-books before the teachers are selected is
invalid.*
Where the legislature fails to prescribe a uniform
series of text-books and has not given special authority
to any officer or board to do so, the trustees of the
school district have the right to prescribe a rule desig-
nating certain text-books for use in the pubUc schools
of their district.^
» State V. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462, 23 N. E. 946 ; Baltimore, &c., v.
State, &c., 26 Md. 505 ; Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1 ; Leeper v.
State, 103 Tenn. 500, 53 S. W. 962.
2 People V. Board, &c., 175 lU. 9, 51 N. E. 633 ; Jones v. Board, &c.,
88 Mich. 371, 50 N. W. 309 ; State v. Board, &c., 18 Nev. 173, 1 Pac.
844 ; State v. Board, &c., 35 Ohio St. 368.
' People V. Board, &c., 49 Cal. 684.
* Butler V. Shirley, &c., 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 291.
^ Campana v. Calderhead, 17 Mont. 548, 44 Pac. 83.
231
§ 100] OF BOOKS AND STUDIES [Ch. VIII'
§ 100. Uniformity of Books.
Where the Constitution of a State makes it the duty
of the legislature " to provide by law for a general
and uniform system of common schools ", the selecting
and establishing of a uniform standard of text-books,
and the regulation of the mode of obtaining and dis-
tributing such books is a matter for legislative action,
and does not impinge in the slightest degree upon the
rights of local self-government. The right of local
self-government is an inherent, and not a derivative,
one. Individualized, it is the right which a man pos-
sesses in virtue of his character as a freeman. It is
not bestowed by legislatures, nor derived from statutes.
But the courts which have carried to its utmost extent
the doctrine of local self-government have never so
much as intimated that it exists as to a matter over
which the constitution has given the law-making
power supreme control; nor have they gone beyond
the line which separates matters of purely local con-
cern from those of State control.
Essentially and intrinsically, the schools in which
are educated and trained the children who are to
become the rulers of the Commonwealth are matters
of State, and not of local jurisdiction. In such matters
the State is a unit and the legislatiire the soiu-ce of
power. The authority over schools and school affairs
is not necessarily a distributive 1 one to be exercised
by local instrumentalities, but, on the contrary, it
is a central power residing in the legislature of the
State. It is for the law-making power to determine
whether the authority shall be exercised by a State
232
Oh. VIII] uniformity OF BOOKS [§ 100
Board of Education, or distributed to county, town-
ship or city organizations throughout the State. With
that determination the judiciary can no more rightfully
interfere than can the legislature with a decree or judg-
ment pronounced by a judicial tribunal. The decision
is as conclusive and inviolable in the one case as in
the other, and an interference with the legislative judg-
ment would be a breach of the Constitution which
no principle would justify nor any precedent excuse.'
As the power over schools is a legislative one, it is
not exhausted by exercise. The legislature, having
tried one plan, is not precluded from trying another.
It has a choice of methods and may change its plans
as often as it deems necessary or expedient, and for
mistakes or abuses it is answerable to the people, but
not to the courts. It is clear, therefore, that even
if it were true that the legislature had, uniformly in-
trusted the management of school affairs to local or-
ganizations, it would not authorize the conclusion that
it might not change the system. To deny the power
1 State V. Springfield, &c., 74 Mo. 21 ; State v. Columbus Board,
&c., 35 Ohio St., 368; Baltimore School Com'rs v. State Board,
&c., 26 Md. 505 ; Robinson v. Howard, 84 N. C. 151 ; Stuart v.
Kalamazoo, &c., 30 Mich. 69 ; Ford v. Kendall, &e., 121 Pa. St.
543, 15 Atl. 812; People v. Quincy, &c., 101 111. 308; Richards v.
Raymond, 92 111. 612 ; Powell v. Board, &c., 97 111. 375 ; Briggs v.
Johnson Co., 4 Dill. (U. S. C. C.) 148 ; Rawson v. Spencer, 113 Mass.
40; Com. v. Hartman, 17 Pa. St. 118; Clark v. Haworth, 122 Ind.
462, 23 N. E. 946; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed.,
261, note 1 ; Leeper v. State, 103 Tenn. 500, 53 S. W. 962 ; Ivison v.
School Com'rs, 39 Fed. 735; Effingham v. Olson, 48 Kan. 565, 30
Pac. 16; Johnson v. Ginn, 105 Ky. 654, 49 S. W. 470; Com. v.
Ginn, 111 Ky. 110, 63 S. W. 467; Hartwell v. Littleton, 13 Pick.
(Mass.) 229.
233
§ 100] OF BOOKS AND STUDIES [Ch. VIII
to change is to aflBrm that progress is impossible and
that we must move forever " in the dim foot-steps of
antiquity." But the legislative power moves in a
constant stream and is not exhausted by its exercise
in any number of instances, however great.^
It is impossible to conceive of the existence of a
uniform system of common schools without power
lodged somewhere to make it uniform, and even in
the absence of express constitutional provisions, that
power must necessarily reside in the legislature. If
it does reside there, then that body must have, as an
incident of the principal power, the authority to pre-
scribe the course of study and the system of instruc-
tion that shall be pursued and adopted, as well as the
books which shall be used. This general doctrine
is well entrenched by authority.^
Where the statute requires the adoption of " a uni-
form series " of text-books in the public schools, this
term applies to the entire series of text-books adopted,
and the term " uniformity " does not mean that all
the text-books of one author in grammar, arithmetic
or other study for the different grades of scholars
must be used. Boards of education are at liberty,
under a " uniformity " law, to adopt the book of one
author for use in all the primary departments, and the
book of another author on the same subject in all
grammar or higher departments. All that the law
1 Clark V. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462, 23 N. E. 946.
^Ibid.; Hovey v. State, 119 Ind. 395, 21 N. E. 21; State v.
Hawkins, 44 OMo St. 98, 5 N. E. 228; State v. Harmon, 31 Ohio
St. 250.
234
Ch. VIII] TEXT-BOOK COMMISSIONS [§ 101
requires is that they shall be uniform in the same
grade.'
§ 101. Text-Book Commissions.
In some States the statutes have created a school
book or text-book commission, with view of establish-
ing uniform text-books throughout the State. Al-
though such uniformity tends to lower the cost of
school books, and is consequently desirable, the prin-
cipal mischief sought to be avoided by such statutes
was the lack of uniformity in the books in the same
grades of the public schools, which necessitated the
purchase of new books for school children when a
family moved from one district to another.
The purpose of such statutes is not to be thwarted
by the local adoption of " reference " books to be used
in connection with books adopted by the Text-Book
Commission; and a first reader cannot be used as a
reference book by a child learning to read in another.^
Where the statute provides for a school book com-
mission with power to select text-books and to make
contracts for supplying such books to the pupils, the
legislature has the power to delegate the power of
adopting or changing text-books to the State board,
local board, or committee.^ And the appointment
1 Heath & Co. v. Board, &c., 133 Mich. 681, 95 N. W. 746 ; State
V. Fairchild, 87 Kan. 781, 125 Pac. 40.
2 State V. Innes, 89 Kan. 168, 130 Pac. 677.
» School Trustees v. People, 87 111. 303 ; Third Ward School Dis-
trict V. City Board, &c., 23 La. An. 152 ; Jones v. Board, &c., 88
Mich. 371, 50 N. W. 309 ; EflBmgham v. Hamilton, 68 Miss. 523, 10
So. 39; State v. Board, &c., 18 Nev. 173, 1 Pac. 844; State v.
Board, &c., 35 Ohio St. 368.
235
§ 102] OF BOOKS AND STUDIES [Ch. VIII
of a school book cominission, whose duties are to select
text-books and make contracts for supplying the
pupils therewith, is not a supervision of instruction.^
§ 102. Bids for Supplying Books.
Having the authority to provide uniformity in text-
books, the legislature may not only prescribe regu-
lations for using such books, but it may also declare
how the books shall be obtained and distributed. If
it may do this, then it may provide that they shall be
obtained through the mediima of a contract awarded
to the best or lowest bidder, since, if it be true, as it
unquestionably is, that the power is legislative, it
must also be true that the legislature has an unrestricted
discretion and an unfettered choice of methods.
If the legislature exercises its right to make a choice
of methods by enacting that the books for the schools
shall be furnished by the person making the most
acceptable bid, the courts cannot interfere, because
the power exercised is a purely legislative one, and
within the legislative domain courts are forbidden to
enter. There is no escape from this conclusion save
by a denial of legislative independence, and an asser-
tion of the right of judicial surveillance and control.
A legislative act providing for the furnishing of
books for the public schools is passed for the purpose
of benefiting the public and therefore cannot be declared
invalid as requiring public officers to perform duties
which incidentally confer a benefit upon individual
book dealers. Such an act does not contravene con-
1 WoKe V. Bronson, 115 Mo. 271, 21 S. W. 1125.
236
Ch. VIII] FREE BOOKS [§ 103
stitutional provisions against monopolies because it
designates certain books as a standard , and requires
that books furnished be equal in merit to those named
and adopted, and permits the selection of copyrighted
books requiring that the exclusive contract for furnish-
ing them be awarded to the best and lowest bidder
where there is no exclusion of persons from bidding
but allows the competition to be by open bidding.'
Where the statute provides that in receiving bids
. for the furnishing of school books a convention shall be
called for that purpose which " shall meet and publicly
open and read the proposals", such provision is directory
only and a failure to literally comply therewith is not
material, but a substantial compliance is sufficient.^
Where the board of directors are empowered by
statute to adopt and purchase text-books, after ad-
vertising for bids thereon and awarding the contract
to the lowest responsible bidder, the awarding of such
contract without advertising is illegal, not only as to
the contract but also as to the text-books selected.^
Where the successful bidder for the supply of school
books fails to deliver a contract which he has executed,
the board of education is authorized to make a new
contract under the advertisement for bids.*
§ 103. Free Books.
In the absence of special legislation, a school board
has not the power to purchase and fiu-nish free text-
1 Clark V. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462, 23 N. E. 946.
2 Tanner v. Nelson, 25 Utah 226, 70 Pac. 984.
» McNees v. School, &c., 133 Iowa 120, 110 N. W. 736.
* Johnson Pub. Co. v. Blease, 91 S. C. 55, 74 S. E. 36.
237
§ 104] OF BOOKS AND STUDIES [Ch. VIII
books.^ But the legislature by statute may prescribe
that the books shall be furnished free of cost to parent
or pupU.^
Where the statute provides that the school committee
of each town shall procure class books at the expense
of the town to be paid for out of the town treasury,
the committee may either get the books on credit of
the town, or may themselves buy them at advanta-
geous prices and thereby make themselves creditors of
the town in like amount. In such cases the rule that
an agent to purchase cannot himself be the seller does
not apply.'
§ 104. Publishers' Contracts.
The legislature has the power to compel publishers
of school books to license their books as a condition
precedent to their sale for use in the public schools.
That body may also fix a price on the text-books to be
used, and such law is not unconstitutional, as the pub-
lishers may refuse to contract in compliance with such
statute, even if the result be the closing of the pubUc
schools.^
When a State Board of Education has, in connection
with the adoption of a series of text-books, contracted
with the publisher for the use of such books for a period
of five years in certain grades in the public schools,
1 Jacksoij, &c., V. Hadley, 59 Ind. 534 ; Honey Creek, &c., v.
Barnes, 119 Ind. 213, 21 N. E. 747.
2 Board, &c., v. Detroit, 80 Mich. 548, 45 N. W. 585; Shelby
County Council v. State, 155 Ind. 216, 57 N. E. 712.
' Hartwell v. Littleton, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 229.
* Polzin V. Rand, McNaUy & Co., 250 111. 561, 95 N. E. 623.
238
Ch. VIII] PUBLISHERS' CONTRACTS [§ 104
the legislature has no power to impair the obligation
of the contract ; and the fact that the books adopted
were found too advanced for the grade in which they
were to be used is no excuse for the breach of such
contract.^ And if such adopted book is not used at
all for one of the years of such contract, a mandamus
will lie to compel its use.^ But not if unused for a
portion of a year of the contract.^ And where such
contract provides for changes in and additions to such
books required to be furnished by such contract, it
is not competent in defense of a breach thereof, to
say that such altered book is not the book adopted.*
Where such contract is in conformance to law, made
between the State Board of Education and the pub-
lisher, boards of school directors, not being parties to
such contract, are not entitled to question their legality
in an action brought against them to compel a compU-
ance therewith.^ And the fact that a school book
board changed books without sufficient vote, is not
sufficient ground for a publisher, having a five year
contract to furnish books, to compel such board to
renew its contract for another period of five years. ^
An offer to supply a State with certain books, when
accepted by a vote of the legislature becomes a valid
contract.^
1 Rand, McNally & Co. v. Hartranft, 32 Wash. 378, 73 Pac. 401.
2 Eaton & Co. v. Royal, 36 Wash. 435, 78 Pac. 1093.
8 Wagner v. Royal, 36 Wash. 428, 78 Pac. 1094.
* Ibid.
5 Rand, McNally & Co. v. Royal, 36 Wash. 420, 78 Pac. 1103.
« Ginn & Co. v. Schoolbook Board, &c., 62 W. Va. 428, 59 S. E. 177.
^ Com. V. Collins, 75 Ky. 386.
239
§ 105] OF BOOKS AND STUDIES [Ch. VIII
§ 105. Publishers' Bonds.
In some States the statute reqmres that a publisher
who contracts to furnish certain school books shall
give a bond so conditioned as to prevent the sale
of such books at a lower price in other States, and
that the books shall be equal to the samples furn-
ished. The exacting of such bond and the inflicting
of the penalty for breach thereof by a publisher
of school books, is not imconstitutional as depriving
such pubUsher of his property without due process of
law.^
Where school book pubUshers give such bond and
are made defendants in an action for the breach thereof,
it is not material whether the school board of the county
in which the breach occurred, took an oath of ofiice,
or whether the County Superintendent caused the
books to be adopted in the common schools of the
county after the breach occurred.^ And only one
recovery may be had on the same bond.'
In an action upon such bond, for failure to furnish
books equal to the samples furnished, it is proper for
the publisher's representative to testify that book
binderies, including that of his own company, occasion-
ally sent out imperfect books.^
1 Rand, McNally & Co. v. Com., 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1168, 108 S. W.
892.
2 Maynard, Merrill & Co. v. Chowning, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1340, 105
S. W. 114.
^ Burton v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1342, 105
S. W. 115.
* Rand, McNally & Co. v. Com., 32 Ky. L. Rep. 441, 106 S. W.
238, 108 S. W. 892.
240
Ch, VIII] PUBLISHERS' BONDS [§ 105
Where the statute requires a bond from a book
publisher conditioned that the books adopted shall
be sold as cheaply as in other localities or States, a
surety on such bond is not liable for his principal's
violation of the agreement as to books adopted prior
to the execution of the bond.^ It is no defense to an
action for the breach of condition in such bond, that
conditions in the contracting State were not similar
to those obtaining in other States ; ^ and a plea of no
consideration for such bond is of no merit.^
It is not necessary in an action on such bond for
the plaintiff to show that the books offered for sale in
another State were the same in paper, binding, tjrpog-
raphy, and other respects, as the sample copy filed
with the bond in compliance with the statute.* And
in an action brought for the breach of such condition in
such bond, the proof of a contract to sell such books at a
lower rate is sufficient without showing any actual sales. ^
The adoption of any book not set out in the bond is
void,^ and selhng at a lesser price in another State is
a breach of such bond.'' And under a statute which
provides that an act required to be done by three or
more persons shall be deemed the act of all when done
by a majority of them, such bond is valid when ap-
proved by two of them.^ A breach of such bond can
1 Graziani v. Com., 30 Ky. L. Rep. 119, 97 S. W. 409.
2 Johnson Pub. Co. v. Com., 30 Ky. L. Rep. 148, 97 S. W. 749.
s Graziani v. Burton, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 180, 97 S. W. 800.
* Ibid. « Ibid.
« Johnson v. Ginn, 105 Ky. 654, 49 S. W. 470.
' Com. V. Ginn, 111 Ky. 110, 63 S. W. 467.
241
§ 106] OF BOOKS AND STUDIES [Ch. VIII
occur only from sales, or contract to sell, made by the
publisher, and not from sales made by others without
participation therein by such publisher. ^
Where the statute authorizes the County Superin-
tendent to sue for the forfeiture of a bond, collect
the judgment and pay the money into the county
treasury, he cannot accept in satisfaction less than
the whole amount of the judgment; and his act in
accepting a note for a lesser amount and entering a
satisfaction of the judgment is void.^
§ 106. Studies Prescribed or Prohibited by Parent.
If a pupU attends school it must be presumed he
submits himself to the rules, and must attend to all
studies that are required of him, under penalty of
expulsion. But, in the absence of a statute making
education compulsory, the teacher may not punish
a pupil for not doing something the parent has requested
the pupil be excused from doing.^ A parent may direct
his child, attending a pubhc school, to study only
certain subjects taught in the school. And if a teacher,
having notice of such direction, required the child
to study other subjects and whips him for not doing
so, it is an unlawful assault.
The right of the parent reasonably to prescribe the
subjects which the child is to study is paramount,*
and from the mere fact that the parent sends his child
1 Mills V. Meyers, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 971, 70 S. W. 412.
2 Heath & Co. v. Com., 129 Ky. 835, 113 S. W. 69.
' State V. Mizner, 50 Iowa 145.
* People V. Olmstead, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 9 ; State v. School Dis-
trict, 31 Neb. 552, 48 N. W. 393.
242
Ch. Villi STUDIES PRESCRIBED BY PARENT [§ 106
to a public school may not be implied that he surrenders
all control over the direction of the child's studies.
The parent's right to make a reasonable selection of
the studies which he desires his child to pursue, is
superior to that of the school authorities, and such
selection if reasonable must be respected by them.^
And the right of a parent to make a reasonable selec-
tion of studies for his child is not limited to any par-
ticular grade or school.^
The desires of the parent, however, must be within
reason and not exercised arbitrarily. Of course, such
prescribing of studies could not be reasonable if the
gradation or classification of the school were interfered
with.^ And a parent has no right unreasonably and
arbitrarily to demand that his child shall be excused
from pursuing a certain study in a public school.
Notwithstanding such wishes of the parent, the child
may be excluded from a public school for refusal to
comply with the orders of the school board that pupils
shall devote a certain^ period in the study and practice
of music, and provide themselves with certain books
therefor.*
1 School Board, &e., v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1, 103 Pac. 578.
* State V. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N. W. 1039.
' Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59.
* State V. Webber, 108 Ind. 31, 8 N. E. 708.
243
CHAPTER IX
OF SCHOOL FUNDS
§ 107. Sources of Ftmds.
The methods by which school funds are acquired
are many and varied. In different States the sources
of such revenue include : unclaimed money and valu-
ables found on dead bodies/ the money arising from
the sale of estrays,^ forfeited bail money,* a portion
of the comity taxes on property,* escheated property,'
dog taxes, ^ hquor license revenue,'' poll tax,^ funds
not needed for the original purpose,' fines and for-
feitm-es arising under penal laws,^" railroad tax,^^ and
general taxation.^^
1 State V. Marion County Com'rs, 85 Ind. 489.
* Tippecanoe County v. State, 92 Ind. 353.
' State V. FarreU, 83 Iowa 661, 49 N. W. 1038.
* Trustees, &c., v. Ormsby County Com'rs, 1 Nev. 334.
" Hinkle's Lessee v. Shadden, 32 Tenn. 46.
^ Ex parte Cooper, 3 Tex. App. 489 ; Maloy v. Madget, 47 Ind.
241.
' State V. Forkner, 70 Ind. 241 ; City of Hastings v. Thome, 8
Neb. 160; State v. Wilcox, 17 Neb. 219, 22 N. W. 458; Board, &c.,
V. Tafoya, 6 N. M. 292, 27 Pac. 616.
» Albertville v. Rains, 107 Ala. 691, 18 So. 255.
9 School District v. Edwards, 46 Wis. 150, 49 N. W. 968.
1" Board, &c., v. Harrodsburg, &c., 9 Ky. L. Rep. 605, 7 S. W. 312.
" Board, &c., v. Trustees, &c., 18 Ky. L. Rep. 103, 35 S. W. 549.
^ Opinion of Justices, 68 Me. 582.
244
Ch. IX] borrowing money [§ 108
And a gift to a town to apply the income to the
support of the pubUc schools in said town in such a
way as the town shall judge best, is a gift for a charitable
use, which the town may properly take,^ as also may a
parish.^
Where the statute provides that one-half of all
moneys received by city or village from a specified
source, shall be paid over to the trustees of the school
district within the corporate hmits of such city or
village, the fact that such school district comprises a
larger territory than that of such city or village is
no excuse for failure to make such payment.^ ,
Although the power is given, in the first instance,
to each school district, by vote, to raise money to
build or repair schoolhouses for the use of the district,
and to locate the same, it is a power which the school
district cannot delegate,* but which jurisdiction, on
their um"easonable neglect or refusal, devolves on the
selectmen of the town as agents of the municipality.^
§ 108. Borrowing Money.
The power given by statute to a school board to
make all arrangements necessary to the efficient opera-
tion of the public schools does not authorize the borrow-
ing of money.® The statute, however, may specifically
» Davis V. Barnstable, 154 Mass. 224, 28 N. E. 165.
* Sutton, &c., V. Cole, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 232.
* School District, &c., v. Village, &c., 13 Idaho 471, 90 Pac. 735.
« Benjamin v. HuU, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 437.
B Blake v. Sturi;evant, 12 N. H. 567 ; Christ v. Brownsville Tp.,
10 Ind. 461 ; Heal v. Jefferson Tp., 15 Ind. 431.
« Board, &c., v. Fudge, 4 Ga, App. 637, 62 S. E. 154.
245
§ 109] OF SCHOOL FUNDS [Ch. IX
authorize a school district to borrow money, but if
the statute provides that money for a specific purpose
shall be raised by taxation, it cannot lawfully be
raised by borrowing and issuing bonds.^
A vote to borrow money, passed at a district meeting
illegally held, creates no hability by which the district
may be held to repay money borrowed in pursuance
of such vote.2 Money borrowed by a school board is
not a part of the common school fxmd, and on a bond
given by a school commissioner conditioned for the
faithful discharge of the duties required of him by
virtue of his office, the sureties are not liable for his
improper disbtu-sement of such money.'
§ 109. Promissory Notes.
In some States it is held that a quasi corporation
may bind itself by a negotiable promissory note or
bill of exchange for any debt contracted in the course
of its legitimate business, for any expenses incurred
in any matter or thing which it is authorized to do,
or any matter which is not foreign to the purposes
of its creation; and when, by statute, an additional
power is given to raise money by taxation, this pre-
existing power to bind itself is not thereby taken
away.*
But in Illinois it has been held that a school board
cannot make a valid promissory note which will bind
» Richardson v. McReynolds, 114 Mo. 641, 21 S. W. 901.
* Lander v. School District, &c., 33 Me. 239.
' Board, &c., v. Fudge, 4 Ga. App. 637, 62 S. E. 154.
* Clarke v. School District, &c., 3 R. I. 199 ; School District ».
Thompson, 5 Minn. 280 ; Robbins v. School District, 10 Minn. 340.
246
Ch. IX] CUSTODIAN AND DEPOSITARY [§ 110
the district, without a vote of the electors. "^ And in
Indiana it has been held that although they have the
power to make a lawful promissory note such note is
not subject to the conditions of the law merchant.^
Where a school district has authority to incur a debt,
the directors have authority to make a promissory
note in payment thereof, as in payment for work
done on a school building.*
The words " School Trustees " after the signatures
of the makers of a note are descriptio personarum, and
the note is not that of the school corporation.*
§ 110. Custodian and Depositary.
The treasiu-er of a school district, who is proper
custodian of the district funds, may demand from
the collector any funds already collected, and on de-
fault of payment may bring suit to recover.^
In Iowa it has been held that a school district treas-
urer who selects a bank as a depositary of school
funds, in good faith and without neghgence, is, in
case of loss, not guilty of a breach of his official bond.^
But the general rule is that he is absolutely responsible.^
Where the statute provides that the treasurer of a
school district shall " hold " all moneys belonging to
the district it does not mean that such treasurer shall
1 School Directors v. Miller, 54 111. 338.
2 Sheffield, &c., v. Andress, 56 Ind. 157.
* Trustees, &c., v. Rautenberg, 88 111. 219.
^ Hendricks v. Bobo, 12 La. An. 620. See also, § 60, supra.
6 Hansen v. Holstein, 155 Iowa 264, 135 N. W. 1090.
^ See § 60, supra.
247
§ 111] OF SCHOOL FUNDS [Ch. IX
at all times keep the moneys in his physical possession
but allows him to deposit the money in a reputable
and solvent bank to his credit as treasurer.^ And
where a school board through caprice, favoritism and
arbitrary action, award the funds to a depositary
which is the lowest bidder, this is a ministerial act, or
executive function, against which a mandamus will lie
to compel such board to award the school funds to the
highest bidder.^
§ 111. Certificates of Indebtedness. — Warrants.
The power to draw orders, sometimes termed war-
rants, or certificates of indebtedness, upon the school
fund, is a personal trust which cannot be delegated,
therefore such orders must be executed in person by
each of the directors and the execution thereof cannot
be delegated by the board to one of their number.
And where the statute requires that such order shall
show on its face the purpose for which the order was
drawn, the provision is mandatory, and if not so drawn
the order is void ; nor can it be made valid by the
action of that or any succeeding board.' Likewise,
when the statute prescribes a form for orders to be
drawn upon the treasurer it must be followed.*
The indorsee of a school order is in no better position
than the payee, and takes it subject to all its infirmi-
ties, such as ultra vires, and want or failure of con-
1 Hunt V. Hapley, 120 Iowa 695, 95 N. W. 205. But see, School
District, &c., v. Carson, 10 Kan. 238.
2 First Nat'I Bk. v. Bourne, 131 S. W. (Mo.) 896.
3 GUdden v. Hopkins, 47 lU. 525.
* Clark V. School Directors, &c., 78 111. 474.
248
Ch. IX] CERTIFICATES OF INDEBTEDNESS [§ 111
sideration. Such order has in this respect none of the
elements of commercial paper, and a school district
is not estopped, even as against a bona fide holder for
value, to avail itself of any defense which it would
have had in an action brought by the payee.^
School warrants do not possess the qualities of nego-
tiable paper, and the purchaser takes them subject to
all equities existing against the original holder,^ and
they are not so negotiable that they are governed
by the law of bills and notes.' There can be no inno-
cent holder of a school warrant issued contrary to
law.'* And in absence of statute so providing, a school
warrant does not bear interest.^
In an action brought by an indorsee of a school order
where a school district board had entered into a con-
tract for the erection of a schoolhouse, and issued
orders in payment thereof before any work was done,
and had not been authorized to do so by a vote of the
electors of the district, and the schoolhouse was not
^ School District v. Stough, 4 Neb. 357 ; School District v. Lom-
bard, 2 Dill. (U. S. C. C.) 493 ; Emery v. Mariaville, 56 Me. 315 ;
Smith V. Cheshire, 13 Gray (Mass.) 318; Axt v. Jackson, &c., 90
Ind. 101 ; Shakespear v. Smith, 77 Cal. 638, 20 Pac. 294 ; Newell v.
School Directors, 68 111. 514 ; Boyd w. Mill Creek, &c., 114 Ind. 210,
16 N. E. 511; National, &c., v. Independent, &c., 39 Iowa 490;
First Nat'l Bank v. Rush, &c., 81 Pa. St. 307 ; School District, &c.,
V. Western, &c., 5 Wyo. 185, 38 Pac. 922.
2 State V. Melcher, 87 Neb. 359, 127 N. W. 241.
8 Gray v. Board, &c., 231 lU. 63, 83 N. E. 95; Davis v. Steuben,
&e., 19 Ind. App. 694, 50 N. E. 1 ; Wright v. Kinney, 123 N. C. 618,
31 S. E. 874; Kellogg v. School District, &c., 13 Okla. 285, 74 Pac.
110; Fine v. Stewart, 48 S. W. (Tenn.) 371. But see, BlaisdeU v.
School District, &c., 72 Vt. 63, 47 Atl. 173.
^ First Nat'l Bk. v. Whisenhunt, 94 Ark. 583, 127 S. W. 968.
« A. H. Andrews Co. v. Delight, &c., 95 Ark. 26, 128 S. W. 361.
249
§ 111] OF SCHOOL FUNDS [Ch. IX
erected, although the directors had seciired from the
contractor a bond for the faithful performance of the
contract, the district was not Uable on such orders
thus illegally issued.
A school board has no authority to draw orders
except on funds in the treastuy, held for the purposes
for which the orders are drawn, and an order drawn
on a fund which has merely been proposed by vote of
the district, but not raised by taxation, is illegal.
Credit of a district cannot be pledged unless authorized
by statute.^ And the statements, acts, conduct, or
promises of the officers of a school district cannot
operate to estop the district from pleading want of
authority, or of consideration, as a defense to a suit
on a certificate of indebtedness.^
A school order, or warrant, regular upon its face,
is 'prima facie binding and legal. Its apparent validity
may be impeached by showing that the officers were
not properly authorized, but that is matter of defense.'
There is no privity of contract between a city and
the holders of school warrants who are exclusively
creditors of the school board, the school directors
not being the same corporate body as the city, even
though the geographical limits of district and city
are identical.'*
1 School District v. Stough, 4 Neb. 357 ; Kane v. School District,
&c., 52 Wis. 502, 9 N. W. 459.
" Axt V. Jackson, &c., 90 Ind. 101 ; Goose River, &c., v. Willow
Lake, &c., 1 N. D. 26, 44 N. W. 1002.
' Meyer v. School District, &c., 4 S. D. 420, 57 N. W. 68.
^ Labatt v. New Orleans, 38 La. An. 289 ; Fisher v. Board, &c.,
44 La. An. 184, 10 So. 494.
250
Ch. IX] APPORTIONMENT OF FUNDS [§ 112
Where an oral contract is made for goods, the issuance
of a school township warrant in payment therefor
does not create a written contract into which the oral
contract is merged.^ Such warrant alone creates
no UabiUty against the township, and to sustain an
action based thereon, it must be shown what it
was given for, and that a legal liabiUty was thereby
created.^
School warrants need not bear the corporate seal,
it being sufficient that they are signed by the president
and countersigned by the clerk of the board.' And
where school warrants show on their face that they are
obligations of the district, and not of the directors,
although illegally issued, they do not make the direc-
tors personally Uable/
A school warrant issued in violation of the statute
is void.^ And the power of the legislature is such
that it may provide that school debts may be paid in
biUs of the State bank of the State. ^
§ 112. Apportiomnent of Funds.
The making of an estimate, as required by statute,
of the proportion of the general school fund which
may be distributed during the then current year among
the districts of the county which shall belong to each
district, does not by the mere making of such estimate
1 Mitchelltree, &c., v. Camahan, 42 Ind. App. 473, 84 N. E. 520.
2 lUd.
« Hopley V. Benton, 39 Okl. 223, 132 Pao. 808.
* First Nat'l Bk. v. Whisenhunt, 94 Ark. 583, 127 S. W. 968.
6 Rochford v. School District, &c., 19 S. D. 435, 103 N. W. 763.
« Bush V. Shipman, 5 111. 190.
251
§ 112] OP SCHOOL FUNDS [Ch. IX
vest in the several districts the ownership of their
respective shares.*
School moneys in the hands of the commissioners of
common schools is not subject to control by the superin-
tendent of those schools, therefore when no appeal or
other proceeding is pending before him he has no
authority to direct the commissioners of a town to
retain in their hands subject to his future order the
money about to be apportioned according to law to a
school district for a teacher's salary.*
A County Treasurer may question the right of a
County Superintendent to issue an order apportioning
school funds when the drawing of such an order is
merely a ministerial act.' But a State Comptroller
cannot be compelled by a teacher to apportion a school
as required by law.*
Upon the division of a school district into separate
school districts, the school fund is to be apportioned
to each, based on school enumeration.^ And a school
district formed out of an older one is entitled to share
'pro rata in the State appropriation for school purposes
for the current year.®
Where a county, in pursuance of the terms of a
statute, has been divided into school districts, and
the voters have authorized the levy of an educational
tax to supplement .the State funds, the apportionment
1 Cooke V. School District, &c., 12 Colo. 453, 21 Pac. 496, 719.
2 Bennett v. Burch, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 141.
' School District, &c., v. Lambert, 28 Oreg. 209, 42 Pac. 221.
* Yost V. Gaines, 78 Tenn. 576.
5 Towle V. Brown, 110 Ind. 599, 10 N. E. 628.
* Lower Allen, &c., v. Shiremanstown, &c., 91 Pa. St. 182.
252
Ch. IX] MISAPPLICATION OP PIINDS [§ 113
of the fund by the county board of education may be
made on the basis of school attendance.^
§ 113. Misapplication of Funds.
When the statute prescribes terms upon which
school directors may borrow money for certain enumer-
ated purposes, it is their duty to pay it over to the
treasurer at once, he being the only proper custodian
of such funds, and if they place the funds with any
other person it is at their own risk.^ Such payment to
one not authorized to receive it is a conversion, for
which an action without demand may be brought
against one making such illegal payment.* But the
improper disbursement of ftmds by one member of a
school board who is acting as treasurer does not make
the other members of the board liable unless they
participate in such illegal disbm-sement.'*
A member of a school corporation has a right to
invoke the interference of a court of equity to prac-
tically coerce a reluctant corporation to enforce its
legal rights against its oflBcers and their confederates,
but equitable considerations will guide or control in
granting or withholding rehef. The com-t will not
coerce the enforcement of a strict legal right, however
clear, if thereby injustice and inequity will be done.
Consequently, when the plaintiff and all other tax-
payers of a school district have been cognizant of the
1 Webb V. Jackson, 141 Ga. 55, 80 S. E. 274.
2 Adams v. State, 82 lU. 132.
' Knowlton v. Logansport, 75 Ind. 103.
* State V. Julian, 93 Ind. 292.
253
§ 113] OF SCHOOL FUNDS [Ch. IX
manner of conducting a school in that it was charac-
terized by sectarian instruction, and that the electors
of the district had been informed each year that the
public school fimd had been expended for that pur-
pose, and, without protest from any, at each meeting
directed hke expenditures for the ensuing year, and
on the faith of such acquiescence, believing that the
taxpayers approved, the school district officers parted
with the money, the plaintiff cannot equitably ask that
such officers be compelled to repay such moneys as
were so expended.^
A superintendent may be enjoined from paying any
part of the school fund to teachers in a private school,^
even if directed by an imconstitutional act of the
legislature. And teachers in a public school who
have not yet finished their term of employment may
maintain an equitable action against such misap-
plication of the fund from which they are to be
paid. The legislature has no power to divide a school
fund merely because the public school building is not
large enough to accommodate all the children in the
district.^
If a County Superintendent wrongfully pays into
the State treasury moneys of the school fund due to a
person under a contract, he becomes personally liable
to such person for the amount.* And if money be
illegally paid by the State authorities to a school
1 Dorner v. School District, 137 Wis. 147, 118 N. W. 353.
2 Underwood v. Wood, 93 Ky. 177, 19 S. W. 405.
3 lUd.
* Wilson V. Hite, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1199, 54 S. W. 726.
254
Ch. IX] LOANS OP FUNDS [§ 114
board not entitled to it, the injured school board to
which it rightfully belongs may recover such funds
from the other school board. And even if such funds
have been invested in property to which it can be
traced the property may be recovered.^
Misapplication of funds by school directors, as in
payment of a teacher for services during a period when
he was not employed in the service of the district,
makes them personally liable to the district for the
misapplied funds.^ And a school board has no au-
thority to use funds for any purpose other than that
for which it was voted by the electors of the district.*
Nor can a school committee vote public funds for
private uses no matter how meritorious may be the
purpose.*
§ 114. Loans of Funds.
A loan of public school money should be made in
the manner prescribed by law, but a note or mortgage
taken for such loan if not in accordance with law is
not thereby invalid,^ although it is such a. misapplica-
tion of the fund that it will make the trustees per-
sonally Uable.^ And if the statute requires that loans
from the school fund be secured by a mortgage on
imincumbered real estate, a mortgage given therefor
1 East Carroll Parish, &c., v. Union Parish, &c., 36 La. An. 806.
2 Dickinson v. Linn, 36 Pa. St. 431.
' Drew V. Madison, 146 Iowa 721, 125 N. W. 815.
* WHttaker v. Salem, 216 Mass. 483, 104 N. E. 359.
^Littlewort v. Davis, 50 Miss. 403; Edwards v. Trustees, 30
111. App. 528; Mann v. Best, 62 Mo. 491.
* Littlewort v. Davis, 50 Miss. 403.
255
§ 115] OF SCHOOL FUNDS [Ch. IX
is not invalid for the reason that the land was incum-
bered.^ The recording of a school fund mortgage is
not necessary to give notice to parties claiming through
the mortgagor,^ when the statute provides that mort-
gages taken for loans of the school fund shall be con-
sidered to be of record from the date thereof, and
shall have priority over all mortgages and conveyances
not previously recorded.^
A Staite cannot be guilty of laches through its agent's
neglect in the management of school funds, therefore
a surety for a loan of money from the school funds can
have no relief in a claim of such laches.*
The statute in force at the time of sale of land mort-
gaged to secure a loan from school funds, governs the
sale thereof.*
§ 115. Lack of Funds.
If a school trustee finds that the district lacks funds
to pay a legally hired teacher, he may advance the
necessary fimds and look to the corporation for reim-
bursement.® But a school board cannot incur any
debt to be paid out of the school money of any subse-
quent year,' and a court of equity has jurisdiction of a
suit by and on behalf of a resident taxpayer of the
1 Sharp's Adm'r v. Collins, 74 Mo. 266 ; Deming v. State, 23 Ind.
416.
2 Stockwell V. State, 101 Ind. 1 ; West v. Wright, 98 Ind. 335.
» Mann v. State, 116 Ind. 383, 19 N. E. 181.
* Ray County v. Bentley, 49 Mo. 236.
6 McPheeters v. Wright, 110 Ind. 519, 10 N. E. 634.
« Kiefer v. Troy, &c., 102 Ind. 279, 1 N. E. 560.
' Honaker v. Board, &c., 42 W. Va. 170, 24 S. E. 544.
256
Ch. IX] SCHOOL BONDS [§ 116
school district brought to set aside and hold for naught
such contract made by a board of education.^
§ 116. School Bonds.
When authorized by statute, school districts may
issue bonds for such purposes as are authorized by the
statute.^ And it has been held that the power to
issue bonds is impUed from a statute authorizing
school districts to borrow money,* but that does not
seem to be the general law.*
When the power to issue school bonds is given by
statute it is usually upon condition that a vote of the
electors of the district is necessary to authorize the issue
and define the purposes therefor.^ And if the meeting
is not legally called, the bonds issued in pursuance of a
vote are invalid even in the hands of a bona fide pur-
chaser for value,® imless every voter of the district is
present at the meeting.'^ By a majority vote necessary
» Shinn v. Ripley, &c., 39 W. Va. 497, 20 S. E. 604; Crampton
V. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601, 25 L. ed. 1070; Dillon Munic. Corp.,
5th ed., § 1579, et seq.
2 Chamberlain v. Board, &c., 58 N. J. L. 347, 33 Atl. 923 ; Sher-
lock V. Winnetka, 68 111. 530 ; State v. Moore, 45 Neb. 12, 63 N. W.
130; Erwin v. St. Joseph, &c., 12 Fed. 680; Board, &c., v. Welch,
51 Kan. 792, 33 Pac. 654.
' State V. School District, 13 Neb. 82.
* Ashuelot National Bank v. School District, 56 Fed. 197 ; Folsom
V. School Directors, &c., 91 111. 402.
6 People V. Caruthers, &c., 102 Cal. 184, 36 Pac. 396; People v.
Sisson, 98 111. 335 ; Board, &c., v. Moore, 17 Minn. 412 ; Heard v.
Calhoun, &c., 45 Mo. App. 660; Richardson v. McReynolds, 114
Mo. 641, 21 S. W. 901 ; State v. School District, «fec., 15 Mont. 133,
38 Pac. 462; Smith v. Proctor, 130 N. Y. 319, 29 N. E. 312.
« State V. School District, &c., 10 Neb. 544, 7 N. W. 315.
' State V. School District, &c., 13 Neb. 466, 14 N. W. 382,
257
§ 116] OF SCHOOL FUNDS [Ch. IX
to the issue of bonds is meant a majority of those vot-
ing, and not a majority of all voters present at a meet-
ing.^ If a school bond in the hands of an innocent
bona fide purchaser recites that it was issued according
to law and by vote, the district is estopped to deny
the vote.^ But if it recites that it was issued for a
specific purpose as authorized by statute, and the
statute does not so authorize, the vaUdity may be
denied by the district.^
A purchaser of a school bond is charged with notice
at his peril, of the constitutional limitations on the
power of the district to become indebted.* And in an
action on a school bond the plaintiff must prove that
all the steps necessary to confer the authority to issue
have been taken, whether or not the bond recites
that these steps were taken. ^
In Kentucky it has been held that the issuance of
school bonds in excess of the amount allowed by law,
if otherwise legal, is void only as to the excess.^ But
in Missouri it has been held that where a school dis-
trict issues bonds in excess of the debt limit they are
wholly void, and cannot be held good for an amount
within the debt limit.'
1 Smith V. Proctor, 130 N. Y. 319, 29 N. E. 312.
2 Bolton V. Board, &c., 1 111. App. 193.
3 State V. School District, &c., 16 Neb. 182, 20 N. W. 209.
* Halliday v. Hildebrandt, 97 Iowa 177, 66 N. W. 89.
8 Heard v. Calhoun, &c., 45 Mo. App. 660.
« McKinney v. Board, &c., 144 Ky. 85, 137 S. W. 839.
" Thornburgh v. School District, &c., 175 Mo. 12, 75 S. W. 81.
258
CHAPTER X
OF SCHOOL TAXES
§ 117. Power to Levy.
It is the imperative duty of the State to bring a
sound education within reach of all the inhabitants,
and the extent of this duty is a question of public
pohcy, not for the courts, but for the people, or the
legislature, to decide.^
If the legislature prescribes an amount that towns
are compelled to provide under a penalty for the sup-
port of the public schools such provision is not a
definition or limit of the public schools which they
have authority to provide for by taxation, but the
provision is to be taken in connection with the broader
power given to towns to grant and vote money as they
shall judge necessary for the support of schools, and
also with the whole course of policy and of legislation
on the same subject. In this view a towh has power
to raise money by taxation for the support of a pubUc
school designed to teach higher branches than is pro-
vided for in the statutes.^
1 Com. V. Hartman, 17 Pa. St. 118; Powell v. Board, &c., 97 111.
375 ; Belltneyer v. School District, 44 Iowa 564.
2 Gushing v. Newburyport, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 508 ; Bull v. Read,
13 Grat. (Va.) 78; Landis v. School District, 57 N. J. L. 509, 31
Atl. 1017.
259
§ 118] OF SCHOOL TAXES [Ch. X
A school district may levy a tax only when clearly
authorized by statute to do so. If there is fair doubt
as to the existence of the right it must be denied.'
And where the statute repeals all laws on the subject
of taxation, " except those enacted for municipal
purposes ", it does not repeal an act providing a system
of taxation for such schools, inasmuch as it is enacted
for such municipal purposes.^
A school district is a body corporate, upon which
certain limited powers are conferred by statute. And
the legal voters within limits may at a lawful meeting
raise money for erecting and repairing schoolhouses,
and for purchasing hbraries, school apparatus, fuel,
furniture and other articles necessary for the use of
schools.' And a town may provide town schools be-
yond those required by statute, and if such schools are
in good faith for the common and general benefit of
the inhabitants, the town may levy taxes for the sup-
port of them.*
§ 118. Meeting to Authorize Levy.
A special tax for school purposes can only be levied
after the question has been submitted to the qualified
electors of the school district in the manner pointed
out by the statute. And in an action to recover such
taxes it is not suflficient to allege in general terms that
1 Marion M. R. Co. v. Alexander, 63 Kan. 72, 64 Pac. 978.
2 Horton v. Mobile, &c., 43 Ala. 598 ; Ballentine v. Pulaski, 83
Tenn. 633 ; State v. Bremond, 38 Tex. 116. But see. Nelson v.
Homer, 48 La. An. 258, 19 So. 271.
' Little V. Little, 131 Mass. 367.
* Gushing v. Newburyport, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 508.
260
Ch. X] MEETING TO AUTHORIZE LEVY [§ 118
the tax was duly levied, and that the levy and all
proceedings prior and subsequent thereto, were made
and had under and in pursuance of a vote and election
theretofor had and held by the qualified electors of
the district, in pursuance of law. There is no power
to levy a school tax, except on a vote of the electors,
had in a , prescribed method ; and the holding of
such an election is a jurisdictional fact, lying at the
foundation of the proceedings. It is a fact on
which the defendant is entitled to take issue, and if
denied must be proved. It is, therefore, necessary
to aver it with precision, and in such manner as to
admit of a direct issue upon the facts averred.^ And
in an action to collect an unpaid school tax voted
by the district, where the defense is that the elec-
tion was void, the burden of so proving is on the
taxpayer.^
Where at an annual meeting of a school district a
vote to levy a tax has been decided adversely, a special
meeting of the electors of the school district may be
held to again take action on the same subject.^ And
where the statute provides that after a vote to levy
no school tax, no election for that purpose shall be
ordered until after the expiration of one year, an order
for an election within the year is valid providing the
election is not held within the year.*
1 People V. Castro. 39 Cal. 65 ; Com. v. Louisville, &c., 17 Ky. L.
Rep. 991, 33 S. W. 204.
^ Trustees, &c., v. Garvey, 80 Ky. 159.
« Stanton v. Board, &c., 70 N. J. L. 336, 57 Atl. 1133.
* Parks V. West, 108 S. W. (Tex.) 466.
261
§ 119] OF SCHOOL TAXES [Ch. X
The electors of a school district are not entitled to
vote on the question of rescinding a former vote that
a schoolhouse tax be levied, where the tax has been
certified, levied, and partly paid.^
A tax voted by a majority of the electors of a school
district is not made void by a mere irregularity in
holding the election.^ Such statutes as prescribe the
method of ascertaining the will of the people in matters
pertaining to taxes for school purposes, should be
interpreted with great liberahty in view of the great
pubUc purposes to be accomphshed, and mere irregulari-
ties should be disregarded.'
§ 119. Purposes of Levy.
A school tax may be levied only for educational or
building purposes.* And if a tax levy is void for failure
to specify the purposes thereof, a valid levy may be
subsequently made.^
A tax for heating and repairing purposes is a tax
for school or educational purposes, and not for building
purposes.* And a tax levied for " building purposes "
to pay the expenses for repairs, grading and tiUng
around a schoolhouse are improper. Such expenses
should be met by a tax for " school purposes."^
In laying a tax for a school district a general state-
1 Kirchner v. Board, &c., 141 Iowa 43, 118 N. W. 51.
^ Trustees, &c., v. Garvey, 80 Ky. 159.
8 McNees v. McGill, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 632.
* St. Louis, &c., V. People, 224 lU. 155, 79 N. E. 664.
6 MorreU, &c., v. Com., 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1383, 108 S. W. 926.
« Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People, 163 lU. 616, 45 N. E. 123;
Wabash R. Co. v. People, 187 lU. 289, 58 N. E. 254.
' People V. Toledo, &c., 231 lU. 514, 83 N. E. 193.
262
Ch. X] PURPOSES OF LEVY [§ 119
ment of the purposes, such as " for defraying the ex-
penses of the district, as reported by our committee "
is sufficiently specific, and the particular object for
which the tax is laid need not be specified.^
So long as the possession of land purchased for school
purposes remains in the possession of the district, the
collection of a tax levied for the purchase thereof can-
not be resisted on the ground that the title to the land
is defective.^ And a tax may be legally voted for the
construction of a new schoolhouse before the site is
procured.^
A constitutional provision that " All moneys raised
by taxation in the towns and cities for the support of
pubUc schools, and all moneys which may be appropri-
ated by the State for the support of common schools
shall be applied to, and expended in, no other schools
than those which are conducted according to law,
under the order and superintendence of the authorities
of the town or city in which the money is to be ex-
pended ", means the town or city in which the school
is, where tuition is given, and where payment for it
is to be made, rather than the town or city that makes
the payment.*
The collection of a legally levied school tax cannot
be enjoined on the ground that it is proposed to apply
' West, &o., V. Merrills, 12 Conn. 437; State v. Wolfrom, 25 Wis.
468. But see, State v. Cole, 51 N. J. L. 277, 18 Atl. 52.
2 People V. Sisson, 98 lU. 335.
' Williams v. Larkin, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 114 ; Colton v. Beardsley,
38 Barb. (N. Y.) 29 ; Seaman v. Baughman, 82 Iowa 216, 47 N. W.
1091.
* Fiske V. Huntington, 179 Mass. 571, 61 N. E. 260.
263
§ 121] OF SCHOOL TAXES [Ch. X
the tax to a purpose other than that for which it was
levied.*
§ 120. Amotint of Levy.
The vote of the electors of a district authorizing
the levy of a tax, must specify a definite amount to
be raised, and not leave that to be determined by the
trustees.^ Where, however, the amount of four hun-
dred dollars was voted to be raised by tax to defray
the expenses of building a new schoolhouse, and another
vote authorized the trustees to sell the old school-
house, appropriate the avails toward the erection of
the new building, and raise the balance by tax, it was
held that no discretionary power was conferred upon
the trustees in respect to the amount of the tax, and
that they were authorized to collect the balance of
the sum specified after deducting the avails of the
sale of the old schoolhouse.'
§ 121. Manner of Lev3ing.
The manner of levying taxes for school purposes is
the same, and on the same species of property, as
those for town, county, and State purposes. There-
fore a corporation within a school district is taxable
to the full amount of its capital stock in absence of a
claim for reduction.*
1 Cleveland G. G. & St. L. Ry. Go. v. People, 208 lU. 9, 69 N. E.
832.
2 Robinson v. Dodge, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 351. But see, Adams v.
Hyde, 27 Vt. 221.
3 Trumbull v. White, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 46. See also, Ackerman v.
VaU, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 297 ; Myer v. Crispell, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 54.
^ Chadwick v. Grapsey, 35 N. Y. 196 ; Stephens v. School Dis-
trict, &c., 6 Oreg. 353.
264
Ch. X] APPORTIONMENT OF TAXES [§ 122
And where the school directors are authorized to
levy a tax for school purposes, they may levy such
tax annually although the statute does not expressly
so provide.^
Where the statute provides for the levying of a special
tax all the requirements of the statute in regard to the
making of such levy must be strictly followed.''
§ 122. Apportiomnent of Taxes.
The principle on which taxation is founded is that
the taxpayer is supposed to receive just compensation
in the benefits conferred by government, and in the
proper application of the tax, and that in the exercise
of the taxing power the legislature ought, as nearly as
practicable, to apportion the tax according to the
benefit which each taxpayer is supposed to receive
from the object upon which the tax is expended. But
the power of apportiomnent is included in the power
to impose taxes, and is vested in the legislature ; and
in the absence of any constitutional restraint, the
exercise by it of such power of apportiomnent cannot
be reviewed by the courts.^
The constitutions of some States have special pro-
visions designed to guard against an inequitable exer-
cise of the power of apportionment and to secure
equahty in the distribution of the public burdens.
Where such provisions are violated they are cognizable
» Peay v. Talbot, 39 Tex. 335.
^ Cooley on Taxation, 334 ; Bramwell v. Guheen, 3 Idaho 347,
29 Pac. 110.
8 People V. Mayer, &c., 4 N. Y. 419.
265
§ 123] OF SCHOOL TAXES [Ch. X
by the courts. In New York, however, the legislature
is subject to no such restraints and therefore may
unrestrainedly determine how such taxes shall be
apportioned.^
In apportioning taxation for educational piuposes,
equality of distribution must be the aim of the law,
without bestowing special favors upon privileged classes.
The benefits to the public to be considered as a whole
as received in taxation are direct benefits.^ But the
benefits may not be direct to each individual. By
taxation we may receive a benefit in security of per-
son, property, reputation or other social benefits. In
school taxation the taxpayer may not receive a behefit
in the instruction of his own children, for he may
have none, yet he receives it in the general improve-
ment of the intellectual and social conditions of his
neighborhood, rendering his property more secure, and
in the form of advantages in doing business or having
labor performed more intelUgently.
§ 123. What Property is Taxable.
The assessment of taxes for school purposes, laid
upon real estate, must be confined to land within the
school district.* And where a parcel of land on which
a school tax is levied lies partly within and partly with-
out the district, the entire parcel cannot be sold for
non-payment of the taxes levied upon it.^
1 Providence Bank v. BUlings, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 514, 7 L. ed. 939;
Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116 ; Gordon v. Comes, 47 N. Y. 608.
2 Gordon v. Comes, 47 N. Y. 608.
' Saranac, &c., v. Roberts, 208 N. Y. 288, 101 N. E. 898.
^ Shaw V. Lockett, 14 Colo. App. 413, 60 Pac. 363.
266
Ch. X] WHAT PROPERTY IS TAXABLE [§ 123
A school district tax can only be assessed upon the
personal property which is lawfully included in the
valuation of the town as belonging to its inhabitants.^
And where the statute provides that " every inhabitant
of the district shall be taxed in the district in which
he lives, for all his personal estate ", these words are
not to be taken literally, as all his personal property
of every kind whatever, but are to be construed
with reference to other provisions of the statutes, as
subject to all lawful exemptions, and as including
only the personal estate hable to be taxed for mu-
nicipal purposes in the' town where the district is
situated.^
The statutes of the United States provide that the
shares of stock in a national bank may be included in
the valuation of the personal property of the owner
in assessing taxes imposed by the State within which
the bank is situated ; and that the legislature of each
State may determine the manner and place of taxing
such shares, subject only to the restrictions that the
taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed
upon other capital, and that the shares of non-residents
shall be taxed where the bank is situated.^ Where the
State Legislature has provided for such taxation by
enacting that such stock " shall be assessed to the
owners thereof in the cities or towns where such banks
are located, and not elsewhere, in the assessment of
all State, county, and town taxes imposed and levied
1 Little V. Little, 131 Mass. 367.
^ Ibid.; Bates v. Weymouth, 9 Gray (Mass.) 433.
3 U. S. Rev. Stats. § 5219.
267
§ 124] OF SCHOOL TAXES [Ch. X
in such place by the authority of law, whether such
owner is a resident of said city or not " the stock of a
national bank, owned by an inhabitant of a school
district in a town other than the one in which the bank
is located, cannot be taxed to assist in the building of
a schoolhouse in the district in which the owner of
the stock Uves, the bank not being located within the
same district.^
General statutes upon the subject of taxing property
refer to private property, and not to that owned by
the State, nor to that of municipalities held for public
use.^ But the State if it sees fit may subject to taxa-
tion the property owned by its municipal divisions in
common with other property.*
§ 124. Certificate of Levy.
A school tax must be based on a lawful certificate
or it is void. And accordingly such tax is void if
the certificate is not made until aftOT the meeting of
the board at which the tax is voted, and is signed by
the directors at different times and places.^ But it
has been held that a school tax levied by a board of
education is not made invalid by the fact that in sign-
ing the certificates thereof the board attached the
word " Directors " to their names. ^ And a certificate
» Little V. Little, 131 Mass. 367.
" Dnion Munic. Corp., 5th ed., § 1396.
* Trustees, &c., v. Trenton, 30 N. J. Eq. 667 ; Matter of Hamil-
ton, 148 N. Y. 310, 42 N. E. 717.
^St. Louis, &c., R. Co. V. People, 177 lU. 78, 52 N. E. 364;
Chicago, &c., Ry. Co. v. People, 184 lU. 240, 56 N. E. 367.
« Catto, &c., V. Mathews, 152 111. 153, 38 N. E. 623. See also,
Chicago, &c., v. People, 155 III. 276, 40 N. E. 602.
268
Ch. X] ASSESSING OP TAXES [§ 125
improperly signed may be amended by leave of
com't.^
But if the purposes for which a tax is voted are not
shown in the vote of a district meeting, the trustees
are not authorized to make a certificate to the assessors.
A defective certificate cannot be held to be a mere
irregularity. That paper confers upon the assessors
an authority to levy the taxes, and its substantial
correctness is essential to the vaUdity of the assessment
based upon it.^
§ 125. Assessing of Taxes.
Where the statute does not provide a method of
valuation it is proper to assess upon the valuation of
property taken in reference to the town taxes for the
same year.* And a legitimate method of assessing an
educational tax is to take the returns of the county
tax receiver, and assess the percentage named by
the board of education upon the property therein
returned.*
It is not necessary to withhold the assessment of a
tax until the very day the money is required for use,
in order to avoid making an illegal assessment for
future expenses which are unascertained, even though
the rule exists that the tax shall not be assessed until
the money is required. Such taxes may be assessed
> Spring VaUey, &c., v. People, 157 lU. 543, 41 N. E. 874 ; Keokuk,
&c., V. People, 161 111. 132, 43 N. E. 691.
'^ State V. Browning, 28 N. J. L. 556 ; Cochran v. Garrabrant,
32 N. J. L. 444 ; Pond v. Negus, 3 Mass. 230.
' Waldron v. Lee, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 323 ; Adams v. Hyde, 27 Vt. 221.
« Smith V. Bohler, 72 Ga. 546.
269
§ 125] OF SCHOOL TAXES [Ch. X
long enough beforehand to have the money at hand
when needed.^
Where the statute provides that the board of educa-
tion may assess upon a subdistrict such portion of the
cost of a new schoolhouse as they shall deem just,
they may in their discretion assess upon the subdis-
trict the entire cost thereof.^
The debt of a school tax is fixed by the assessment.
Therefore, if after a tax has been voted and assessed
on the inhabitants of a school district, part of the
district is set off into another district, the inhabitants
of the set off part remain liable to pay the tax.' But
if the part of the district is set off before the assess-
ment, even though the tax had theretofore been laid
and expenses incurred in behalf of the purpose for
which it was assessed, the inhabitants of the set off
part are not subject to the assessment.* And a school
tax is not a special assessment.^
If the record of a town meeting fails to show that a
vote to re-establish the school district system was a
" two-thirds vote " as required by the statute, the
vote is invalid, and if not so announced by the modera-
tor no subsequent amendment by the clerk of "the
meeting can cure the defect. The clerk of a town is a
sworn officer having custody of the records, and is
presumed to know the facts, and if he states what is
1 Brock V. Bruce, 59 Vt. 313, 10 Atl. 93.
^ Bryant v. Goodwin, 9 Ohio 471.
' Waldron v. Lee, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 323 ; Dyer v. School District,
61 Vt. 96, 17 Atl. 788.
^ Jackman v. SaUsbury, 5 Gray (Mass.) 413.
^ Louisiana, &c., v. State Board, 120 La. 471, 45 So. 394.
270
Ch. X] ASSESSING OF TAXES [§ 125
not true, may be punished for fraudulent conduct in
his office. But he cannot, by inserting in his records
any statements of facts or opinions which are not
properly matters of record, make such statements
evidence for or against the town. There is no doubt,
however, that a clerk having continued in office, has
a right to amend his record by adding any votes or
other transactions of the meeting accidentally omitted,
and which are properly matters of record.^ But he
should record votes only as declared by the moderator,
and cannot properly insert in the record any different
declaration founded upon his private count or judgment
of the number of voters upon each side.
Consequently, it was held that if a school district
was not established according to law, the assessors will
be liable in an action of tort, for issuing a warrant in
the collection of a school district tax assessed by them,
although one acting as clerk of the district certified
to them that the tax had been voted by the district.^
Where the statute directs the assessors to assess the
tax within thirty days after the certificate, and does
not contain negative words restraining them from
making the assessment after that period has elapsed,
such provision is directory only and must not be con-
sidered as a Umitation on their authority, and they
may make the assessment thereafter. And if an
assessment and warrant are illegal, they may be re-
voked, and a new warrant issued either by the present
board of assessors or their successors unless the statute
1 Halleck v. Boylston, 117 Mass. 469.
" Judd V. Thompson, 125 Mass. 553.
271
§ 126] OF SCHOOL TAXES [Ch. X
provides that the assessment must be made by the
assessors in office when the vote was passed, and for
this purpose the clerk may make a second certificate.^
The omission of assessors to tax particular property,
through misinformation, mistake of fact, or error of
judgment does not render the whole tax void.^ But a
school tax assessed on only part of a school district is void.'
The legislature has the power to legaUze irregularities
in the assessment of school taxes.'*
§ 126. Constitutionality of Levy.
Although the scheme of taxation of district schools
differs from that of taxation of county schools within
the same State, it is not a violation of the txniformity
required by the constitution.^
A tax law should contain proper and requisite pre-
cautionary legal sanctions and securities, adjust the
amount of tax to the necessities of the district, allow
appeals for the taxpayers for equalization of assess-
ments, and require those who levy the tax to take
oath of fidelity and give bonds for the faithful per-
formance of their duties. And a tax law not measuring
up to these qualifications is unconstitutional and void.
No tax is legal which is not for some necessary or at
least useful purpose ; no tax is legal where the amount
1 Pond V. Negus, 3 Mass. 230 ; Waters v. Daines, 4 Vt. 601 ;
Johnson v. Dole, 3 N. H. 328. See also, Gates v. Beckwith, 2 Ohio
Dec. 394.
^ George v. School District, &c., 6 Mete. (Mass.) 497 ; Merritt »,
Farris, 22 111. 303 ; State v. Bremond, 38 Tex. 116.
8 Auditor General v. McArthur, 87 Mich. 457, 49 N. W. 592.
* Schofield V. Watkins, 22 lU. 66.
^Edalgo V. So. Ry. Co., 129 Ga. 258, 58 S. E. 846.
272
Ch. X] ILLEGAL LEVY [§ 127
arbitrarily exceeds the pxirpose of its creation; no
tax is legal which is not equally and impartially laid
on the taxpayers; no tax is legal which is not eco-
nomical, honest, and responsible in its administration ;
and no tax law is vahd in so far as it fails to secure
these conditions to the taxpayer in particular and to
the pubUc in general.^
Where the statute authorizes the grant of power of
taxation to the county authorities or mimicipal cor-
porations it may be given to a county board of educa-
tion if it is a body corporate.^ And if the statute
authorizes a school tax to be laid by a vote of the
majority of the electors of a district it is not uncon-
stitutional as a delegation of the legislative power,
even though citizens not residents of the district may
thereby be taxed.^
A local tax levied to provide higher grades of studies
in the common schools than would be afforded by the
common school fund alone, is not for that reason un-
constitutional.* And a tax levied under an unconstitu-
tional act and voluntarily paid by the taxpayers, gives
a county no vested right in the fund created thereby.^
§ 127. Illegal Levy.
Where the school trustees illegally levy a tax, the
collection thereof may be enjoined by the taxpayers
1 Kerr v. Wooley, 3 Utah 456, 24 Pac. 831.
2 Smith V. Bohler, 72 Ga. 546; Bull v. Read, 13 Grat. (Va.) 78.
But see, Willis v. Owen, 43 Tex. 41.
3 Steward v. Johnson, 3 Harr. (Del.) 335 ; Rose?;. Bath, 10 Ind. 18.
4 Smith V. Simmons, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 503, 110 S. W. 336.
5 School District, &c., v. Cuming County, 81 Neb. 606, 116 N. W.
522.
273
§ 127] OF SCHOOL TAXES [Ch. X
from whom it is sought to be coerced; and the fact
that such tax had been paid for two years without
complaint does not amount to an estoppel.^ A tax
levied to pay warrants issued in excess of the amount
limited by the constitution, is void.^ So also is void
a tax levied on property outside of the district.'
And if one elected sole prudential committee of a
school district who is by law inehgible to that office,
as for the reason of being an unnaturaUzed foreigner,
his assessment of a tax voted by the district is void,
as such officer cannot be considered even an officer
de facto.*
A levy by a school district for building purposes,
before the building has been authorized by a vote of
the electors of the district, is illegal/ And an action
cannot be maintained against a school district for the
assessment and collection of an illegal school tax which
was voted beyond the authority of its corporate powers.
But whoever presumes to carry into effect such illegal
vote does so at his peril unless exempted by statute
from personal liabihty.^ Although property or money
taken under such illegal assessment may be recovered.'
1 Howard v. Trastees, &c., 31 Ky. L. Rep. 399, 102 S. W.
318
2 People V. Toledo, &c., 229 lU. 327, 82 N. E. 420.
' Eakin v. Chapman, — Okla. — ,143 Pac. 21.
* Woodcock V. Bolster, 35 Vt. 632.
5 St. Louis, &c., V. People, 224 lU. 155, 79 N. E. 664.
« School District v. Bailey, 12 Me. 254; Trafton v. Alfred, 15
Me. 258; Powers v. Sanford, 39 Me. 183.
' Powers V. Sanford, supra cit.; Starbird v. School District, &c.,
51 Me. 101 ; Haines v. School District, &c., 41 Me. 246 ; Joyner v.
School District, &c., 3 Gush. (Mass.) 567 ; Ellis v. School District,
274
Ch. X] COLLECTION OF TAXES [§ 128
§ 128. Collection of Taxes.
If the warrant issued to the collector of taxes shall
be lost, it may be supplied by a new one, and the
right and power of the collector is none the less clear
and effective than if the old one were still in existence
and produced. Nor is the authority to the person in
office at the time of its issue alone, but it protects his
successor in office as well. And though no second
warrant should issue, yet if the officer can show that
one was issued, and estabhsh its loss, he may protect
himself by proving its contents.^ And where a warrant
is signed by two trustees of a school district it is "prima
fade vaUd, inasmuch as the presence of the third
trustee at the time of issuing will be presumed.^
When a collector of a school district sues or is sued,
and justifies his acts as done in his official capacity,
he must show a compUance with all requirements of
the law necessary to constitute him a legally quahfied
officer, — that is an officer de jure. Therefore where
the statute provides that a collector who is elected by
the district to fill a Vacancy in that office, shall be
sworn before the clerk of the district shall deliver to
him the uncollected tax biUs of his predecessor, it is
incumbent upon him in order to estabhsh, in a suit,
his right to receive taxes to show that he has taken
the official oath,^
11 Gray (Mass.) 487; Bacon v. School District, 97 Mass. 421;
People t). Wright, 34 Mich. 371; Matteson v. Rosendale, 37 Wis.
254.
1 Higgins V. Reed, 8 Iowa 298.
2 Doolittle V. Doolittle, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 312.
* Houston V. Russell, 52 Vt. 110.
275
§ 128] OF SCHOOL TAXES [Ch. X
A collector of school taxes may not pay over the
funds in his hands to his successor in office without
an order from the proper authority. If he does so the
sureties on his bond are Uable.' And in absence of a
vote of the district authorizing expenses for printing, a
tax collector has no authority to incur such expenses for
the district. ^ Nor can he recover from the district the ex-
penses of a bond given by him, but not required by law.^
If a collector of taxes knowingly sells more of dis-
trained property than is necessary to satisfy a school
district tax and all legal charges, he is Uable in tort
to the owner of the property thus sold in excess.*
Where school district trustees wrongfully collect
taxes on property unlawfully taxed, they are under
an imphed obhgation to return it,' and if necessary
the district should vote to levy a tax for that purpose.*
Mere irregularities in the procedure of levjdng a
tax, by officers authorized to make the levy, is not
sufficient grounds for an injunction to issue restrain-
ing the collection thereof.'' Nor is it necessary to the
vaUdity of a vote laying a school tax, that the time of
payment be specified, inasmuch as the tax, being legally
imposed, is payable on demand or within a reasonable
time.*
1 Board, &c., v. Gain, 28 W. Va. 758.
2 Wood V. School District, &c., 28 R. I. 299, 67 Atl. 65.
s lUd.
* Cone V. Forest, 126 Mass. 97.
8 ChurchiU v. Board, &c., 28 Ky. L. Rep. 162, 89 S. W. 122.
« Rand v. Wilder, 11 Gush. (Mass.) 294.
» Gray v. Board, &c., 231 lU. 63, 83 N. E. 95.
8 Bartlett v. Kinsley, 15 Conn. 327.
276
Ch. X] EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION [§ 129
School orders or warrants are receivable in payment
of the school tax of the district in which they are issued,
although county orders are not so receivable. But
school orders are not receivable for county taxes.^
§ 129. Exemption from Taxation.
School property in common with other property
owned by a municipaUty for'pubUc purposes is not
taxable except when the statute so provides.^ And
although a special assessment is not taxation, statutes
exempting pubUc schools from taxation by impUca-
tion exclude such assessments.'
In determining what school property is exempt from
taxation under exempting statutes, use and not owner-
ship governs.^ And a lot and building used for school
purposes, but incidentally used for other purposes as a
lodging and boarding house is not exempt from taxation.^
Where the statute provides that all public property shall
be exempt from taxation, a public school fund is exempt.*
1 Wallis V. Smith, 29 Ark. 354.
2 Dillon on Munic. Corp., 5tli ed., § 1396 ; Board, &c., v. School
District, 56 Ark. 354, 19 S. W. 969; Trustees, &c., v. Trenton, 30
N. J. Eq. 667.
* DiUon on Munic. Corp., 5th ed., § 1446 ; St. Louis, &c., v.
St. Louis, 26 Mo. 468. But see, Hartford v. School District, 45 Conn.
462; Board, &c., v. School District, 56 Ark. 354, 19 S. W. 969;
Toledo V. Board of Education, 48 Ohio St. 83, 26 N. E. 403 ; Pitts-
burg V. Sterrett, &c., 204 Pa. St. 635, 54 Atl. 463 ; Witter v. Mission,
&c., 121 Cal. 350, 53 Pac. 905; Sutton v. Montpelier, 28 Ind. App.
315, 62 N. E. 710.
* Dillon on Munic. Corp., 5th ed., § 1401 ; Ft. Smith, &c., v.
Howe, 62 Ark. 481, 37 S. W. 717 ; Chegary v. New York City, 13
N. Y. 220.
5 Anniston City Land Co. v. State, 185 Ala. 482, 64 So. 110.
^ New Orleans v. Sahnen Brick, &c.; Co., 135 La. 828, 66 So. 237.
277
§ 130] OF SCHOOL TAXES [Ch. X
A public schoolhouse to be exempt from taxation
must be under the immediate control of the school
directors.^ By " public schoolhouses ", in an act ex-
empting from taxation, is meant such schoolhouses
as belong to the pubUc and are designed for schools
established and conducted under pubUc authority.^
§ 130. Delinquent Taxes. — Execution and Sale.
Collectors of taxes have the powers, and must
proceed generally in the same manner to collect, as
ofl&cers having executions. They are bound to take
property in preference to the body if tendered; they
are bound to take property if tendered, even after a
levy on the person, and this is on the fundamental
principle of law that personal Uberty should not be
unnecessarily restrained.' But if the debtor, for whose
benefit the rule exists, neglects to offer property, or
refuses to deUver it when demanded on the declared
ground that the proceedings are illegal, he waives the
privilege the law has given him and the officer is ex-
cusable if he levies on his body."*
A collector of school taxes after a demand and
refusal to pay a delinquent tax, may under proper
authority, levy upon and sell the property of the
dehnquent taxpayer in satisfaction thereof.' And
1 Pace V. Jefferson, &c., 20 111. 644.
2 Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229 ; WiUard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 202,
9 Atl. 907; St. Joseph's Church v. Assessors, &c., 12 R. 1. 19.
' Voorhees on Arrest, 2d ed., § 6.
* Allen V. Gleason, 4 Day (Conn.) 376. See also, Fulton v.
Jenks, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 126.
« Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Pa. St. 224.
278
Ch. X] DELINQUENT TAXES [§ 130
where the statute makes it the duty of the district
collector to collect the tax and pay it over to the
treasurer or his successor in office, payment to any
other person is invalid. To the collector is deUvered
the tax bill and warrant for the purpose of collection.
He gives bonds for the proper performance of that
duty, if a bond is required, and must collect and pay
the tax to the treasurer as specified. Failing to do
this he may be sued or prosecuted for his default.
Therefore he may levy and sell property of the delin-
quent although the tax has been previously paid to
the treasurer of the district.^
The vahdity of a school tax is not so affected by
failure of the officers who called the meeting to take
the oath prescribed by statute, as to render invalid a
sale for the non-payment of such taxes.^
A collector of school taxes by a levy according to
law, upon property for the payment of a tax, acquires
a special property therein, upon which he may main-
tain an action against one removing it, even though
the collector may have left the property with the
owner under an agreement.^ And if he sell property
taken upon execution in any manner other than that
authorized by statute, he becomes a trespasser, and
the sale is void.*
1 Young V. King, 3 R. I. 196.
2 Brasch v. Western, &c., 80 Ark. 425, 97 S. W. 445.
3 HiUiard v. Austin, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 141.
* Bedell v. Barnes, 17 Hun (N. Y.) 353.
279
CHAPTER XI
SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES
§ 131. General Statement.
To be better enabled to understand the law of public
schools as laid down in thejudicial decisions of the
several States it is well to have a general view of at
least the more important statutes of the jurisdiction
whose decisions are to be considered. Herein is shown
brief synopses of the statutes of the several jurisdic-
tions, covering the more important points of statutory
law pertaining to public schools, compiled from the
statutes of each State. Statutes designed to promote
education are to receive a liberal construction.^
The terminology used in the designation of school
districts is not entirely uniform. The term " joint
school districts " usually refers to those districts formed
from territory lying in two or more counties.^ Dis-
tricts formed from two or more townships may be
termed " fractional districts." ^ The larger cities or
towns usually constitute " separate " or " indepen-
dent " ^ districts into which two or more districts are
1 Yale V. School District, 59 Conn. 492, 22 Atl. 295.
' As in Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, Nevada, and Oklahoma.
' As in Michigan.
* As in North Dakota, South Dakota, and Texas.
280
Ch, XII ALABAMA [§ 132
sometimes consolidated, and may be governed by city
charters and boards of education.^ Districts are usually
" consolidated " for economic reasons, thereby securing
higher grade of instruction, or dispensing with teachers
for very few pupils.
As used herein, " School Term " means the entire
scholastic year, and " Separate Schools ", unless other-
wise specified means separate for white and colored
pupils.
§ 132. Alabama.
Board of Education of five members controls in some
cities, and in municipalities where there is none the
mayor and board of aldermen perform the duties
of trustees. Women are eligible to serve on such
boards.
Compulsory Attendance of a mild type will be required
after October 1, 1917, of children between eight and
fifteen, at least eighty days during each scholastic year ;
but boards of education may reduce the period to not
less than sixty days for any individual school. Ex-
ceptions are made of those who have completed seven
grades, and of those who live two and one-half miles
or more from school, where transportation is not pro-
vided. It is further provided that a teacher, with
approval of the attendance ofl&cer may excuse in ex-
treme cases of emergency or domestic necessity. Ex-
ceptions are also made of those mentally or physically
incapacitated, or in extreme poverty. Attendance may
be at a private or parochial school.
' As in California.
281
§ 132] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
County Boards of Education consist of County-
Superintendent and four county trustees elected by
the several chairmen of district trustees. Select
treasurer of school funds and perform other duties.
Women are eligible to serve on the board.
County Superintendent is elected in each county.
Must take oath and give bond. Is chief executive
officer of County Board of Education.
Districts as formerly established on township lines are
abolished and district lines may be changed, or new
district created by vote of the County Board of Educa-
tion. Incorporated cities and towns are separate
school districts. A district may lie in two or more
counties.
District Trustees, three in number, are elected in each
district. They enumerate children, care for school
property, nominate teachers to the County Board of
Education who make the contract, visit schools and
make quarterly reports to County Superintendent.
Employment Certificates may be issued to children
under sixteen, but such children shall attend school
for at least eight weeks in each year.
School Age is between seven and twenty-one.
Separate Schools are provided, and it is unlawful
to unite in one school white and colored children.
State Board of Examiners composed of State Superin-
tendent and two others, prepare questions for county
examinations of teachers.
State Superintendent of Education exercises general
supervision over educational interests of the State.
Reports to Governor.
282
Ch. XI] ARIZONA [§ 133
Teachers must hold certificates. Render monthly
reports pending which compensation is withheld. Must
be at least seventeen.
Text-Book Commission consists of Governor, State
Superintendent, and nine others, one from each con-
gressional district. They select and adopt a uniform
series of text-books for a period of five years. Partisan
or sectaxian books prohibited. By a three-fourths
vote a book may be dropped at end of any school year
during the continuance of the contract, and another
adopted. Contracting publisher shall give bond which
shall not be exhausted by a single recovery.
§ 133. Arizona.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight and
sixteen, except when employed between fourteen and
sixteen on a permit issued by school trustees, or
excused by trustees as receiving competent instruction
at home, or at private or parochial school, or for mental
or physical incapacity, or having completed grammar
school course, or for other satisfactory reasons.
Corporal Punishment is permitted.
County Superintendent apportions money to districts ;
presides over teachers' institutes ; conducts examina-
tions of teachers ; appoints trustees of school districts in
case of vacancy.
Districts shall be named by number and county, in
which name the trustees may sue and be sued, and hold
and convey property for the district.
Electors may be either sex of certain qualifications
who are parents or guardians of minor children, or who
283
§ 133] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
have paid a State or county tax other than poll, road or
school tax during the preceding year; and women
whose husbands have paid such tax may vote.
Employment Certificates may be issued to those
between fourteen and sixteen.
School Term is six months.
School Age is between six and twenty-one.
School Trustees, three in number, prescribe and
enforce rules, manage and control school property,
purchase furniture and equipment, expel pupils for
cause, exclude from primary grades those under six,
and exclude sectarian books.
Separate Schools are provided by district trustees, in
which pupils of the African race are segregated from
those of the white race.
State Board of Education consists of Governor, State
Superintendent of Public Instruction, president of
University, principals of normal schools ex officio, a
city Superintendent of Schools, a principal of a high
school, and a County Superintendent, to be appointed
by the Governor. State Superintendent acts as
secretary.
State Board of Examiners consists of Superintendent
of Public Instruction and two persons appointed by
him. Adopt rules and regulations to govern examina-
tion of teachers for certificates, prepare questions and
forward them to county superintendents.
State Superintendent of Public Instruction superin-
tends the public schools at an annual salary of three
thousand dollars, and actual expenses not to exceed
one thousand dollars annually.
284
Ch. XI] ARKANSAS [§ 134
Teachers must hold certificates and present them to
the County Superintendent before assuming charge
of a school. They are of five classes : second grade,
primary, first grade, life, and special. Must attend
teachers' institute called by County Superintendent not
more than once each year. Suspend pupils for cause.
Keep register. When dismissed may appeal to County
Superintendent. Pension of six hundred dollars annu-
ally is paid after twenty-five years service.
Text-Books shall be uniform and not changed during
five years from adoption, and not more than one in
any grade in one year. Certain books are loaned
free to pupils or they may piu-chase them at cost.
Publishers furnishing books on contract shall give
bond. ~
Transportation may be furnished by vote of district,
to children Uving a greater distance than one mile
from school.
§ 134. Arkansas.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight
and sixteen at some day school, public, private,
parochial or parish, at least one-half of the entire time
the pubhc school is in session. Regular daily instruc-
tion at home may be substituted. Children between
sixteen and twenty likewise must attend unless regu-
larly and lawfully employed. Excused for extreme
destitution, mental or physical incapacity, living
two and one-half miles from school, or when labor is
necessary to support of family, or when having finished
seven grades.
285
§ 134] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
County Examiners grant licenses to teachers upon
examination.
County Superintendent may be elected in any county,
and where so elected shall as County Examiner hold
quarterly examinations of applicants for teachers'
licenses, using questions furnished by State Superin-
tendent. Must hold a five-days' institute.
Districts may be consolidated and may exist in two
or more counties. They are bodies corporate.
School Age is between six and twenty-one. Older
persons may be permitted to attend.
School Directors, three in number for each district, are
elected. ConsoUdated districts have six. They make
provisions for separate schools for white and colored
children ; promote interests of education ; care for
school property ; hire teachers who are licensed, making
the contract in duplicate. May suspend pupils, but
not beyond current term.
State Board of Education composed of State Superin-
tendent and one member from each congressional dis-
trict appointed by Governor. Have management of
school funds. Grant charters to institutions of learn-
ing, have supervision of the public schools.
State Superintendent under supervision of State
Board may issue teachers' licenses based upon teachers'
certificates of other States.
Teachers must have license when school begins,
granted by State Superintendent or County Examiner,
and are required to render monthly reports to County
Superintendent, pending which the last month's salary
is retained. Are required to attend institutes. Must
•286
Ch. XI] CALIFORNIA [§ 135
not be related to school directors, unless petitioned by
two-thirds of patrons of school. Directors may be
enjoined from entering into such contract with third
cousin of a director.^ Shall not permit use of sectarian
books.
TextnBooks for destitute children may be paid for
out of school funds. Uniformity in counties may be
voted by electors of districts. As adopted by school
directors cannot be changed in three years unless
upon petition of electors.
Truancy is guarded against by attendance oflBcers
who have power to arrest truants without warrant and
place them in school.
§ 135. California.
Boards of Education are elected in cities. Powers
and duties are same as school trustees, {q.v.).
City Boards of Examination consisting of city, or city
and coimty, Superintendent and four other members.
Examine appUcants for elementary school certificates
good in city or county.
Compulsory Attendance between eight and fifteen.
Excused for mental or physical incapacity, or where
receiving competent instruction at home or elsewhere,
or between fourteen and fifteen if holding employment
certificate, or where no pubha school is located within
two miles, or having completed required course.
County Board of Education consisting of County
Superintendent and four other members appointed by
» See Holt v. Watson, 71 Ark. 90, 71 S. W. 262.
287
§ 135] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
county supervisors. Examine applicants for teachers'
certificates ; issue diplomas to graduates ; adopt books
and apparatus.
County Superintendent superintends schools of the
county. Apportions school money to each district.
For failing to visit a school at least once each year ten
dollars is deducted from his salary. Presides over
teachers' institute held in his county. Issues tem-
porary teachers' certificates. Must keep record of his
acts. Approves or rejects plans of schoolhouses ex-
cept in cities having a Board of Education.
Districts must be designated by names without use
of numbers, and in that name trustees may sue and
be sued. All school districts are declared incorporated.
May be governed by city charter and Board of Educa-
tion.
Employment Certificates may be issued to a child of
fourteen who has completed grammar school course, or
where family needs the earnings. Between twelve
and fourteen may work on vacation certificate.
Evening Schools shall be open to all over fourteen and
to adults, also to children imder fourteen holding em-
ployment certificate.
Hazing is a misdemeanor.
Parental Schools may be established for children
between eight and fifteen who are habitual truants, or
are insubordinate and disorderly, or irregular in attend-
ance.
School Age is six to twenty-one, and adults are ad-
mitted on vote of board. Admitted in kindergartens
at four, and in deaf school at three years.
288
Ch. XI] CALIFORNIA [§ 135
School Term is six months.
School Trustees consisting of three members are
elected by ballot in each common school district, but
are appointed by Comity Superintendent in case of
vacancy. No person is ineligible on account of sex.
Powers and duties mainly are : To prescribe and enforce
rules ; manage and control school property ; pay all
moneys collected into the county treasury; purchase
school furniture, including organs and pianos; grant
use of school buildings for public, literary, scientific,
recreational or educational meetings, or for discussion
of matters of general interest, provided such use does not
interfere with school use, and no grant is for longer
term than one year, and then revocable by grantors;
upon vote of district, build schoolhouses; purchase or
sell school lots ; employ principal for each school ;
employ teachers, janitors and other employees ; sus-
pend or expel pupils; exclude sectarian publications.
The district attorney is legal adviser to school officers.
Secret Societies are prohibited, with certain excep-
tions.
Separate Schools may be established for Indian chil-
dren and those of Chinese or Mongohan descent, and
when estabhshed such children must not be admitted
into any other school.
State Board of Education of seven members appointed
by Governor. State Superintendent of Public Instruc-
tion is secretary and executive officer of the board. The
Board determines all questions of policy, which are to
be executed by the Superintendent. Principal powers
and duties are : To adopt rules and regulations to
289
§135] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
govern itself, subordinates and schools ; appoint three
assistant superintendents of public instruction to be
known as (1) commissioner of elementary schools,
(2) commissioner of secondary schools, (3) commissioner
of industrial and vocational education; grant life
diplomas to certain qualified teachers, and revoke
them for cause ; compile and manufacture text-books,
or contract for them, and enforce uniform use of them.
State Superintendent of Public Instruction superin-
tends the schools of the State. Reports to Governor.
Apportions school fund. Visits schools with traveling
expenses not to exceed eighteen hundred dollars
annually. Has power to annually call a convention of
city and county Superintendents.
Teachers are benefited by a retirement fund open to
teachers who have served thirty years, fifteen of which
in this State, ten of which immediately precede retire-
ment. Amount of retirement salary is five hundred
dollars annually. Must hold certificates. May sus-
pend pupils. Must keep a school register. Must be
at least eighteen years of age.
Text-Books of uniformity for elementary schools are
made by the State, ^ at the State printing office, and
furnished free of charge to the pupils. This is a con-
stitutional provision.
Transportation may be provided.
Truancy is guarded against by attendance officer
who may be appointed by local board, with assistants.
They, or any peace officer, or school officer, may arrest
' See also Kansas.
290
Ch. XI] COLORADO [§ 136
during school hours, without warrant, any child
between eight and fifteen, found away from home and
reported by a school authority as a truant, and deliver
such child to his parent, guardian or teacher.
Vaccination certificates must be filed with person in
charge of school, except that parent or guardian op-
posed may file a statement in place of certificate.
When smallpox is present all unvaccinated children
shall be excluded.
§ 136. Colorado.
Compulsory Attendance of children in all school dis-
tricts between eight and sixteen at a public, private or
parochial school for entire public school yearly session.
Exceptions are those over fourteen who have com-
pleted eighth grade, or whose help is necessary to sup-
port of itself or parent, or for good cause shown. Suffi-
cient instruction at home may be substitute.
County Superintendents are elected in each county
for two years. Have supervision over schools in
county. Examine accounts of district officers. Re-
port to State Superintendent. Administer oaths to
school officials. Fill vacancies in boards of school
directors. Appeal Ues from their decisions to State
Board of Education.
Hazing is prohibited as misdemeanor punishable by
fine.
Pupils residing remotely from a school may attend
nearer in another district if sufficient room.
School Age is between six and twenty-one. Adults
may be admitted.
291
§ 136] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
School Directors five in number in larger districts, and
three in smaller districts are elected. They employ
and discharge teachers, mechanics and laborers ; fix
course of study, exercises and kind of text-books to be
used ; enforce rules and regulations of State Superin-
tendent ; supply school furniture ; suspend and expel
pupils for cause ; furnish free books to indigent children.
Appeal lies from their decision to County Superin-
tendent.
School Districts are bodies corporate. May exercise
eminent domain.
School Term not less than six months, except that for
climatic reasons in altitude of eight thousand or more
feet the term may be not less than four months.
Secret Societies except such as are sanctioned by school
directors are prohibited, and pupils may be suspended,
dismissed, or restricted for violation.
State Board of Education composed of the Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction as president. Secretary
of State, and Attorney General, who grant State di-
plomas to teachers who have taught two years, thus
superseding the necessity of examinations. They shall
not prescribe text-books.^
State Board of Examiners composed of State Superin-
tendent as president, and eight others appointed by
State Board of Education, examine appHcants for State
diplomas, and issue without examination to graduates
of certain State colleges, and to those who have taught
for certain periods.
' Const. Art. 9. sec. 16.
292
Ch. XI] CONNECTICUT [§ 137
State Superintendent is elected at State election for
two years. Decides all points of construction of
school law, subject to appeal to courts. Prepares
questions for Coxmty Superintendents. Has general
supervision of County Superintendents and all public
schools.
Teachers' minimum salary is fifty dollars a month.
Must have license before commencing to teach. Keep
daily registers, and last month's salary is withheld pend-
ing fihng thereof with secretary of district at close of
term.
Transportation is furnished to pupils living one rmle or
more from consoUdated schools.
Truant Officers may be appointed in certain districts.
They notify parent or guardian of truancy, and the
parent or guardian is proceeded against for allowing
the truancy if continued.
Text-Books shall be uniform in each district, and not
changed in four years unless price is advanced, quality
lowered, or supply stopped. Free to pupils when so
voted by district,
§ 137. Connecticut.
Compulsory Attendance from seven to sixteen unless
child is elsewhere receiving regularly, thorough in-
struction dming school hours and terms in the same
studies in private school where a register is kept. May
be subject to transportation being furnished in extreme
cases.
Districts are corporations. No State aid unless
schoolhouse is provided. By two-thirds vote of those
293
§ 137] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
present at legal district meeting may allow school-
house to be used for other purposes when not in use
for school purposes.
Electors include registered women who are entitled
to vote at election of school officers, or upon any
matter relating to education, to schools, or to pubUc
libraries.
Employment of Children over fourteen and under
sixteen permitted on certificate.
Evening Schools must be maintained in towns or
districts of ten thousand or more inhabitants. Open
to those over fourteen. Smaller towns may maintain
evening schools.
School Age is compulsory from seven to sixteen,
without discrimination on account of race or color, but
between fourteen and sixteen may be lawfully employed
at home or elsewhere if schooling is sufficient. Chil-
dren from five to seven are permitted to attend, and
over four on vote of committee may attend. Towns
or districts may establish kindergartens open to chil-
dren over three.
School Committee of the town, or school visitors, pre-
scribe rules, also text-books (subject to control of State
Board of Education), and approve plans for school-
houses.
School Officers are not disqualified by reason of sex.
School Terms are for at least thirty-six weeks.
State Board of Education of seven members, of which
three are a quorum, has general supervision and control.
May direct books to be used, not to be changed within
five years. Shall prescribe forms of registers. Shall
294
Ch. XI] CONNECTICUT [§ 137
hold meetings of teachers and school officers for pur-
poses of instruction with expenses not to exceed four
thousand dollars annually. Shall report annually to
the Governor.
Teachers are employed by school visitors, or school
committees under direction of towns, and by boards
of education. Certificate is necessary.
Text-Books and other supplies may be provided by
towns and loaned to pupils free of charge, and electors
shall upon petition of twenty legal voters decide whether
free text-books shall be supplied. Indigent pupils
are to be suppUed free.
Town Management school committee has powers of
district committees and board of school visitors.
Shall maintain good common schools of the different
grades. Shall appoint chairman and secretary. Shall
appoint one or more school visitors or a Superintendent
to exercise supervision. Shall have care and manage-
ment of property. Shall determine number and quali-
fications of pupils to be admitted. Shall employ
teachers for no longer period than one year. Shall
designate schools to be attended, and provide for all
qualified children of school age. May provide for trans-
portation; and arrange with committee of adjoining
towns for instruction therein when more convenient.
Shall report in detail to annual town meeting.
Trade Schools may be established for instruction in
distinct trades, useful occupations, and avocations.
Truancy is governed by local regulations, and where
so governed each town or city must appoint three or
more attendance officers. Male truants may be ar-
295
§ 138] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
rested. Female truants may be arrested on warrants
issued upon request of parent or guardian.
Vacation Certificates shall be granted to physically
fit children between fourteen and sixteen, permitting
employment during vacation.
Vaccination may be required before a child is per-
mitted to attend school.
Vocational Guidance is subject to local control, and a
local vocational counsellor may be employed.
§ las. Delaware.
Compulsory Attendance is required of children be-
tween seven and fourteen at least five months aimually,
unless reduced to three months by vote of district. If
nearest school is two miles distant the law does not
operate unless a conveyance is provided. Private
school, tutor, or other instruction may be substituted
upon approval by County Superintendent. Attend-
ance may be excused by school committee and County
Superintendent for iirgent reasons.
Commissioner of Education appointed by Governor at
annual salary of two thousand dollars. His duties are
prescribed by the State Board of Education.
County School Commission in each county, consisting
of three members appointed by Governor, exercises
local supervision, investigates and reports to State
Board. Hears complaints subject to appeal to State
Board.
County Superintendent has general superintendence
of all schools in his county. Conducts examinations
of teachers and issues certificates. Holds teachers'
296
Ch. XI] DELAWARE [§ 138
institute once a year, of three days' session, for which
is annually appropriated one hundred and fifty dollars.
Districts are numbered in continuation of the school
districts of the same county. May borrow money.
Electors are every male having right to vote for State
representative and who has paid his school tax for the
preceding year; and every female above twenty-one,
having paid such tax. White or colored voters may not
vote in meetings called for other race.
School Age is six or over, and over four in kinder-
gartens.
School Term at least one hundred and forty days.
School Committee of clerk and two commissioners
provide schoolhouses and care for them; employ
teachers and dismiss them for cause; have general
supervision of schools. Boards of education control
in cities.
Separate Schools are provided for white and colored
children.
State Board of Education of seven members, having
general supervision and control of both white and
colored schools. They hear and determine all appeals
from other ofl&cials. Commissioner of Education is
secretary. Make rules and enforce them.
Teachers must have certificates, to be awarded after
passing an examination, except normal or college
graduates in discretion of County Superintendent once
only, may be granted without examination. Must
render quarterly reports before receiving salary. Must
render annual report to State Board. Must attend
teachers' institute,
297
§ 1391 SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
Text-Books are loaned to pupils free of charge.
Those who desire may purchase books at cost.
Truancy is guarded against by attendance officers
who may be employed in each district, and may arrest
without warrant and place in school those who fail to
attend school as required.
Vaccination may be provided free of charge.
§ 139. Florida.
Compulsory Attendance is optional with district or
county on three-fifths vote; such attendance if
adopted to apply to children between eight and
fourteen for at least eighty days in each year.
Attendance at private or church school keeping
record and making report may be substituted. Ex-
emptions are for mental or physical infirmities; res-
idence two miles from school, where transportation
is not provided; extreme poverty; necessary tempo-
rary absence.
County Board of Public Instruction of three members,
no two of whom reside in same district. Are corpora-
tions. Hold lands for school purposes. Locate and
maintain schools. Select sites. Build and repair
schoolhouses. Employ teachers. Report to State
Superintendent. Prescribe studies. May not contract
with members except for school sites.
County Superintendent acts as secretary of County
Board. Visits schools. Selects supervisors. Decides
questions subject to appeal to County Board.
Examines teachers and issues certificates.
School Age is between six and twenty-one.
298
Ch. XI] FLORIDA [§ 139
School District may be a city, town, or division of a
county.
School Term is determined by the County Board, but
must be not less than four months in each year.
School Trustees of special-tax districts are body cor-
porate. May hold property, sue and be sued.
Separate Schools are required by the constitution.
State Board of Education required by constitution
consists of Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney
General, State Treasurer, and State Superintendent
of Public Instruction. Is a body corporate. Direct
and manage funds ; hold school lands ; decide appeals
from State Superintendent; remove subordinate
officials ; have general supervision of school matters.
State Superintendent of Public Instruction with term
of four years is required by the constitution.
Teachers must hold certificates, which are of seven
grades : third grade, second grade, first grade, primary,
special, State and fife certificates. Have supervision
over pupils and schoolhouses, suspend pupils for not
more than ten days. Render monthly reports. Mis-
demeanor to teach in school of other race.
Text-Books are to be uniform as adopted by the
State Text-Book Commission who advertise for bids
and make contracts with publishers to run for five
years. Publishers are to furnish bonds. Books are
free to poor children.
Truancy may be guarded against by attendance
officers, who serve notice of the non-attendance upon
the parent or guardian, who is to be prosecuted if
delinquency is continued.
299
§ 140] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
§ 140. Georgia.
Bible cannot be excluded from public schools.
County Board of Education is composed of five free-
holders selected by the grand jury of each county.
County School Commissioner is ex officio secretary.
Contract with teachers. May appoint three trustees
for a sub-school district if advisable. Appeal Ues
to State Superintendent. May borrow money for
teachers' salaries.
County Superintendent elected by county voters, to-
gether with County Board of Education makes rules to
govern schools. Acts as secretary of board. Superin-
tends examinations of teachers, and suspends them for
cause, subject to appeal to County Board, thence to
State Superintendent, thence to State Board. Is agent
of the County Board.
Employment Certificates are issued to children over
twelve and under fourteen and one-half years.
School Age is between six and eighteen.
School Districts are each county, and are managed by
the County Board of Education who may lay off sub-
school districts in each of which they shall establish
one white and one colored school where population is
sufficient.
School Term at least five months, is regulated by
County Boards of Education.
School Trustees three in number may be appointed
in a sub-school district by the County Board of Educa-
tion. They recommend teachers to County Board.
Supervise schools, and school property.
Separate Schools are to be provided.
300
Ch. XI] IDAHO [§ 141
State Board of Education composed of six members,
the Governor, State Superintendent of Schools, and
four others appointed by Governor subject to confirma-
tion by Senate. Provide rules and regulations for
supervision of all schools. Select list of text-books,
which can be changed only every five years, unless
pecuUar conditions demand change. Final decision
on appeal from State Superintendent. Provide for
examination of teachers. Act as State School-Book
Commission.
State Superintendent of Schools elected by people.
General superinteiadence of the business relating to
common schools. Reports annually to legislature.
Acts as secretary and executive agent of State Board of
Education. Appoints three State School Supervisors.
Text-Books must be uniform. School-Book Commis-
sion advertises for bids, and contracting publisher
gives bond.
Teachers must be licensed. Report at end of term.
Attend County Institute. Contract is an entire con-
tract.
Transportation may be provided for pupils living
three miles or more from schoolhouse.
Vaccination is regulated by County Boards of Educa-
tion, and in larger cities by Boards of Public Education.
They may require all pupils to be vaccinated as a
prerequisite to admission.
§ 141. Idaho.
Compulsory Education required between eight and
eighteen in a pubUc, private or parochial school, unless
301
§ 141] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
child is over fourteen and has completed eighth grade,
or where its help is necessary to support of itself or
parent, or is excused for good cause shown to superin-
tendent of district or county, from whose decision
final appeal lies to local probate court.
County Superintendent is elected by people. Super-
vises pubhc schools of county except certain larger
ones. Holds teachers' examinations. Appoints trus-
tees in new districts, and fills vacancies in older ones.
Holds teachers' institutes.
District Trustees consisting of three members are
elected by ballot in each district. They employ
teachers on written contract and discharge them for
cause with hearing. Have charge of school property.
Provide furniture and janitor service. Must not vote
for relative of his own or immediate family as teacher.
May employ attorney. Independent districts have
six trustees.
School Age is between six and twenty-one. In
kindergartens between three and six.
School Districts are bodies corporate, and although not
municipal corporations may contract same as municipal
corporations. They are created or changed on peti-
tion. Within any county may be consolidated and are
then termed " independent school districts." If con-
sohdated from two or more counties are termed " joint
school districts."
School Term is not less than seven months in districts
having not more than seventy-five pupils, nor less than
nine months in those having more than that number.
State Board of Educdtion consists of five members,
302
Ch. XI] ILLINOIS [§ 142
appointed by Governor, and State Superintendent
ex officio. They appoint Commissioner of Education.
Is final court of appeal in all educational controversies.
Exercises general supervision over public schools. Pre-
scribes minimum course of studies. Has supervision
of text-books. Controls certification of teachers.
State Superintendent of Public Instruction is elected
by people. Confers with subordinate officials on school
matters. Is executive oflBcer'of State Board.
Teachers must be employed on written contract, and
exhibit certificate to trustees before signing contract.
Must keep register and report. May suspend pupils
and report to trustees, thence appeal Ues to County
Superintendent. Must attend institute.
Transportation may be provided in consolidated dis-
tricts.
§ 142. Illinois.
Boards of Education control in districts of not fewer
than one thousand inhabitants and not more than one
hundred thousand, not governed by special acts. Have
powers of school directors, with other special powers.
Membership varies from seven to fifteen. In cities of
more than one himdred thousand consists of twenty-
one members.
Compulsory Attendance is required between seven and
sixteen in some pubhc or private school for at least
six months, unless instructed elsewhere, or mentally or
physically incapacitated, or between fourteen and
sixteen excused when necessarily and lawfully em-
ployed during school hours.
303
§ 142] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
County Superintendents are elected by people. Grant
certificates. Generally superintend. Conduct teachers'
institutes. Hold examinations.
Electors may be women, who are eligible to school office.
Employment Certificates are granted to certain chil-
dren between fourteen and sixteen.
Parental Schools for truants are established in cities
of one hundred thousand or more, and may be estab-
lished in cities between twenty-five thousand and one
hundred thousand.
School Age is between six and twenty-one. In
kindergartens from four to six. Exclusion of colored
children, or keeping them from a public school by in-
timidation for reason of color, is a crime.
School Directors three in number are elected in
school districts of less than one thousand population,
and not governed by any special acts. Have general
supervision of schools. Appoint teachers and fix
salaries. Enforce uniformity of text-books, not to be
changed oftener than once in four years. Suspend and
expel pupils. Grant temporary use of schoolhouses,
when not occupied for school, for religious meetings,
Sunday schools, evening schools and literary societies,
and for other proper meetings. Establish schools for
the deaf between three and twenty-one.
School Districts are each congressional township and
are bodies corporate.
School Term is not less than six nor more than nine
months.
School Trustees three in number are elected by the
people in each district. May receive gifts for school
304
Ch. XI] INDIANA [§ 143
purposes; sell abandoned schoolhouses ; change boun-
daries ; form new districts.
Superintendent of Public Instruction elected by people
supervises all public schools. Is legal adviser of
school officers. Hears appeals from County Superin-
tendents. Grants and suspends teachers' certificates.
Teachers must have certificates and be at least
eighteen years of age. Pension funds are established.
Keep registers, and report.
TeoctnBooks are loaned free to indigent children.
Must be uniform and not changed oftener than once
in four years.
Truant Officers may arrest any truant child of school
age, not lawfully employed, and place with teacher.
§ 143. Indiana.
Bible shall not be excluded from the pubUc schools.
Compulsory Attendance is required between seven
and fourteen in a public, private, or parochial school ;
or between eight and sixteen if blind or deaf.
County Board of Education consists of County Super-
intendent, the trustees of the township, and chairman
of the school trustees of each town and city. They
consider the general wants and needs of schools and
property.
County Superintendent takes oath and furnishes bond.
Has general superintendence of the schools in his
county. Visits schools. Conducts teachers' institutes.
Gives decisions in controversies. Examines teachers.
Appeal except on certain local matters lies to State
Superintendent.
305
§ 143] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
Night Schools may be established in cities of three
thousand or more, open to all persons between fom-teen
and thirty who are employed during the day.
Secret Societies are unlawful in any elementary or
high school under penalty of suspension or expulsion.
School Commissioners of five members have control of
schools in cities of one hundred thousand or more in-
habitants. Women are eligible to serve on such boards.
School Districts are each civil township, and each
incorporated town or city. Are bodies corporate.
School Term is at least six months.
School Trustees may be of either sex, over twenty-
one, either married or single. Board consists of three
members. In larger cities they are elected by the
common council. Have general charge of educational
affairs ; employ teachers ; estabhsh and locate schools.
Separate Schools for colored pupils may be provided:^
but unless provided shall be admitted to schools with
white children.
State Board of Education shall consist of Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction, presidents of Purdue
University, State University, and State Normal School,
Superintendents of Schools of three largest cities, and
six others. Grant State certificates to teachers. Are
text-book commission. Advertise for bids, books to
be supplied for five years. Township trustees furnish
books free to indigent children. Books shall be uni-
formly used.
Staie Superintendent is elected by the people. ' Shall
visit each county at least once and examine auditor's
books and records, meet with officers and teachers.
306
Ch. XI] IOWA [§ 144
Teachers must be licensed by State Board of Educa-
tion, State Superintendent, or County Superintendents.
Trustees shall not employ any teacher whom a majority
of the electors at a school meeting decide they do not
wish employed. All contracts with teachers shall be in
writing. Must render reports. Pension funds are estab-
hshed in cities over one hundred thousand. Institutes
are held once each month, which must be attended.
Text-Books are selected by State Board of Education
who are also a text-book commission. Bids shall be
advertised for. All books shall be uniform.
Transportation shall be provided, in case of dis-
continued schools, for all pupils between six and
twelve who Uve between one and two miles from the
school to which they are transferred, and for all pupils
living more than two miles from such school.
Truancy is controlled by County Boards of Education
as truancy boards, who appoint one truant officer
who reports truancy to the parent or guardian, and if
the truancy continued proceeds against them. Cities
or towns of five thousand or more enumerated school
children may be considered by the county board of
truancy as a separate district for the application of the
truancy act. Cities of ten to twenty thousand children
shall have two truant officers and larger cities have
more such officers.
§ 144. Iowa.
Bible shall not be excluded from the public schools,
nor shall any child be required to read it contrary to
wishes of parent or guardian.
307
§ 144] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
Board of Educational Examiners consisting of the
Superintendent of Public Instruction, president of the
University, principal of the Normal School, and two
persons, one a woman, to be appointed by the Governor.
Conduct examinations of teachers. Issue State cer-
tificates and diplomas.
Compulsory Attendance is required between seven and
sixteen if in proper mental and physical condition, at
some public, private or parochial school, or elsewhere
under a competent teacher, unless such child Uves more
than two miles from any school and transportation is
not provided, or if regularly employed if over fourteen,
or has education equal to eighth grade, or who is ex-
cused by order of court, or while receiving religious
instruction.
County Superintendent may be of either sex. Visits
schools. County Attorney is his official adviser.
Examines applicants for teachers' certificates. Sees
that law is enforced. Appeal Ues to hini from school
directors in many matters, and from his decision to
State Superintendent, but he may not render judg-
ment for money.
County Board of Education consists of County
Superintendent, County Auditor, and Board of Super-
visors. Provide for submitting to electors question
of uniformity of books. Select text-books when uni-
formity law is adopted. County Attorney is their
legal adviser.
Electors may be male or female.
Secret Societies are prohibited except such as are
sanctioned by the directors of the schools. Penalty
308
Ch. XI] IOWA [§ 144
is suspension, dismissal, or curtailment of privileges in
school honors.
School Age is between five and twenty-one. Over
twenty-one may be admitted upon contract for tuition.
School Directors for each township composed of one
director from each sub-district, but if township is not
divided into sub-districts the number elected shall be
three. In independent districts the board consists
of five. Have management and exclusive control of
school affairs. Women are ehgible. Contract in writ-
ing with teachers.
School Districts are corporations, and as nearly as
possible the boundaries of civil and school townships
shall coincide. Sub-districts are not corporations.
When a new civil township is formed it shall also con-
stitute a school township. Townships may be divided
into sub-districts.
Superintendent of Public Instruction is appointed by
Governor, with consent of Senate, to serve four years.
Has general supervision and control of public schools
not under control of State Board of Education. In-
spects and recommends. Examines and determines
appeals. Appoints county institutes. Prepares and
suppUes questions for examinations of applicants for
teachers' certificates and pupils completing eighth
grade of rural schools.
Teachers must hold certificates. Keep registers,
and report. May temporarily dismiss pupils.
Text-Books are free to indigent pupils, and to the
pupils of any district so voting. Adopted by directors
of each school corporation to be sold to pupils at cost,
309
§ 145] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
no contract necessary for any particular period. Bids
must be advertised for, and contracting publisher
must give bond. Uniformity law does not apply to
cities or towns.
Transportation may be provided in certain cases,
especially in consolidated districts.
Truant Officers are appointed in school corporations
of over twenty thousand population. Arrest truant
children without a warrant and place them in school.
In smaller towns the marshal or other police officer
may be employed as a truant officer.
§ 145. Kansas.
Board of County Examiners composed of County
Superintendent and two others, in each county, examine
persons proposing to teach.
Board of Education of six members are elected in larger
cities. They shall elect a Superintendent of Schools
who shall have charge and control of the schools of
the city. They may open school buildings for use of
night schools, and various educational societies. They
are bodies corporate and may exercise eminent domain.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight and
fifteen years, in a pubUc, private, denominational, or
parochial school, provided that employed children of
fourteen may attend but eight weeks in one year.
Temporary absence between eight and fourteen may be
excused in cases of emergency or domestic necessity.
County Superintendent is elected. Takes oath and
gives bond. Visits schools. Fills vacancies in school
district board.
310
Ch. XI] KANSAS [§ 145
Electors are male or female residents of the district
for thirty days, who are not disqualified.
School Age is between five and twenty-one. In
kindergartens between four and six.
School Districts are parts of a county. A " depopu-
lated school district " means one having fewer than
five legal voters, and fewer than seven persons between
the ages of five and twenty-one; if less than twelve
but more than seven children of such age, the district
is termed " partially depopulated." All districts are
bodies corporate. " Joint districts " are those con-
sohdated from districts lying in two or more coun-
ties.
School District Officers are a director, clerk, and
treasurer who constitute the district board. They are
a board of directors only when sitting as such. Have
care of district property. May open schoolhouse for
use of reUgious, political, hterary, scientific, mechanical,
or agricultural societies, or societies for suppression of.
crime. Hire teachers. Supervise schools. Furnish
registers and see that they are properly kept.
School Term not less than three nor more than ten
months.
Secret Societies as a high school organization are
prohibited under penalty of expulsion.
Separate Schools may be maintained, but no dis-
crimination on account of color may be made in high
schools except in Kansas City.
State Board of Education consists of State Superin-
tendent, chancellor of State University, president of
State Agricultural College, president of State Normal
311
§ 145] SYNOPSES OP PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
School, and three others appointed by the Governor.
Prescribes studies. Issues teachers' certificates.
State School Book Commission of seven members
shall print, publish or provide for the publication of a
complete series of school text-books for use in the public
schools.
State Superintendent supervises and manages edu-
cational interests of the State. Appoints an assistant
State Superintendent. Renders opinions to County
Superintendents upon written statements of fact.
Teachers must have certificates which, when issued
by State Board of Education, are good throughout the
State. Salary may not be paid unless certificate is
registered. Are required monthly to report truants
before receiving salary. Retirement fund in larger
cities for those of thirty years' service. Contract must
be in writing.
Text-Books as far as possible are to be published by
the State. Free to pupils upon vote of district. Books
not published by the State are to be contracted for
on bids, such books not to be changed in five years.
Transportation of pupils Uving two or more mUes
from school in consoMdated districts shall be provided in
a safe and enclosed conveyance. May be provided
for pupils in any district, living two and one-haK or
more miles from school, in properly heated conveyance.
Truant Officers are nominated by the County Superin-
tendents, and appointed by the board of county com-
missioners. Each county constitutes one or more
truant districts. In larger cities they are appointed by
the local board of education. They give written notice
312
Ch. XI] KENTUCKY [§ 146
of truancy to the parent or guardian and if truancy does
not cease the parent, guardian or other person having
control of the child is proceeded against under charge
of misdemeanor. County Attorneys in country dis-
tricts, and City Attorneys in city districts shall prosecute
such actions.
Tuition Fees may be assessed when in any district
the pubhc money is not sufficient to keep the schools
open during the term voted at the district meeting.
§ 146. Kentucky.
County Board of Education consists of chairmen of
each division together with County Superintendent.
Advertise for text-book bids and award contracts.
County Superintendent elected by people, together
with two others examine teachers. Must attend in-
stitute. Decides school matters subject to appeal to
State Superintendent.
Compulsory Attendance is required between seven
and twelve in some public, private or parochial school.
Home tuition subject to examination may be a substi-
tute. Excused for mental or physical infirmity.
Educational Commission of eleven members have
general duty of recommending improvements in the
school system.
Electors may be women.
School Age is between six and twenty.
School Districts are counties, or such part of a county
not controlled by a city school. Are sub-divided into
educational divisions, each of which is again divided
mto sub-districts.
313
§ 146] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
Schoolhouses may be used for public gatherings when
the schools are not in session.
School Term is at least six months.
School Trustees are elected, one from each sub-district,
and all trustees elected within each educational division
constitute a division board. Each trustee recommends
needs of sub-district to division board. The board
is a body corporate. Have power to suspend pupils
upon written complaint from teacher.
Separate Schools are established and required by con-
stitution.
State Board of Education consists of the Superinten-
dent of Public Instruction, Secretary of State, and
Attorney General. Is body corporate. Makes rules
and regulations for schools. Decides appeals from
State Superintendent.
State Board of Examiners consists of Superintendent
of PubUc Instruction and two others. Examine ap-
pUcants for educational positions.
Superintendent of Public Instruction is elected by the
people. Decides appeals from County Superintendents.
Acts on State Board of Examiners.
Teachers contract in writing and in duphcate with
division board. Must have certificate. Keep records
and report. Have power to suspend pupils, reporting
in writing to chairman of board of trustees. Must
attend institute.
Tex1>-Books are free to iiidigent children. Text-
book commissions advertise for bids, and contract-
ing publisher shall furnish bond. Uniform series is
adopted.
314
Ch. XI] LOUISIANA [§ 147
§ 147. Louisiana.
Compulsory Attendance in the parish of Orleans of
children between eight and fourteen in a public, private,
denominational or parochial day school. Excused by
attendance officer of parish for physical or mental
infirmity, or being instructed at home in the common
school branches, or where school acconunodations within
-twenty city blocks are inadequate. Children between
fourteen and sixteen not lawfully and regularly engaged
in some useful employment six hours a day are also
subject to the act. Other districts have the option
to adopt compulsory attendance, except that cities of
over twenty-five thousand inhabitants have it for at
least four months each year.
Parish Superintendent is ex officio secretary to board
of directors of the parish, except in New Orleans. Visits
each school district in his parish. Holds teachers'
institute monthly or bimonthly except in New Orleans.
School Age is between six and eighteen, but in kinder-
gartens between four and six.
School Directors are elected one for each poUce juror
in each police jiu-y ward in each parish. They are
bodies corporate. Shall visit and examine schools and
advise with trustees. Select teachers and fix their
salaries. District Attorney shall act as counsel, ex-
cept city attorney in New Orleans. Have authority
to collect fifty cents per annum from parent or guard-
ian of each child to provide fuel and comforts, not
more than one dollar and fifty cents to be collected in
each instance.
Separate Schools are required by the constitution.
315
§ 148] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
State Board of Public Education consists of Governor,
Superintendent of Public Education, Attorney General,
and one citizen appointed from each congressional
district. Are body corporate. Governor is ex officio
president and State Superintendent is secretary. Pre-
pare rules and regulations for schools. Enforce uni-
formity of text-books which shall not be changed in
six years.
Superintendent of Public Education is elected by the
people. Has general supervision of all school boards
of the parishes. Visits parishes. Examines teachers.
Teachers must attend institute. Serve under written
contract. Must have certificate or diploma. Must
render monthly report before receiving salary. Have
retirement fund in parish of Orleans.
Text-Books are free to indigent pupils.
Vaccination as a condition precedent to admission is
required. Certificates of successful vaccination, or of
three unsuccessful attempts which are good for one year,
are required every five years.
§ 148. Maine.
Compulsory Attendance between seven and fifteen,
unless receiving approved instruction elsewhere, and be-
tween fifteen and seventeen when education is deficient.
Districts are abolished except that those organized
with special powers still exist with limited corporate
powers. Towns take place of other former districts.
Persons between five and twenty-one living at any
marine station may attend any pubhc school in the
State without charge.
316
Ch. XI] MAINE [§ 148
Evening Schools may be established by any town,
admitting persons of any age, teaching only elementary
branches, under direction of superintending school
committee, except that drawing may be taught to
persons over fifteen.
Manual Training Schools may be maintained by
cities and towns under supervision of the superintending
school committee, admitting persons between six and
twenty-one years of age. They may include domestic
science, agriculture, mechanic arts, and the trades.
School Age is between five and twenty-one, with
compulsory attendance between seven and fifteen.
School Buildings not to be defaced or injured under
penalty of double damages. Obscene defacing sub-
ject to fine of not more than ten dollars.
School Term is not less than thirty weeks annually.
Secret Societies as school organizations are under
ban, and no pupil shall be a member of such under
penalty of expulsion.
State Superintendent is appointed by Governor and
Council. Has general supervision of all schools.
Prescribes studies to be taught in common schools,
but local committee may add thereto. Has examina-
tion of applicants for certificates.
Superintendent of Schools in each town is ex officio
secretary of superintending school committee, and
performs such duties as they shall direct, keeps records,
acts as financial agent, employs teachers subject to
approval of the committee.
Superintending School Committee of three, chosen
by ballot at the annual town meeting, women being
317
§ 148] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
eligible, may suspend for one year any school of too
few pupils. May provide conveyances for pupils
when necessary, or in lieu thereof pay the board of
pupils near schools. Approve plans of schoolhouses,
subject to approval by State Superintendent and
State Board of Health. Make rules and regulations,
have management of schools, custody and care of
property, elect Superintendent of Schools, select text-
books, discharge teachers for cause after notice and
investigation, expel pupils and restore them.
Teachers to the number of thirty or more may form
association for mutual improvement and hold conven-
tions at least once a year, one thousand dollars being
appropriated for that purpose. Certificates are neces-
sary. Either sex at sixty having taught thirty-five
years, receives pension of two hundred and fifty dollars
annually; if having taught thirty years the pension
is two hundred dollars annually; if having taught
twenty-five years the pension is one hundred and fifty
dollars annually. For this purpose twenty-five thou-
sand dollars are appropriated annually.
Text-Books, apparatus and appUances shall be pro-
vided by towns and loaned to pupils free of charge.
Books not to be changed in five years unless by vote
of town. No second-hand books to be purchased for
any school. Parents and guardians may buy books
for separate use. Books shall be uniform in each
town.
Truant Officers, one or more, are elected annually
by the superintending school committee. May arrest
truants and take them to school on notification of
318
Ch. XI] MARYLAND [§ 149
teacher. Towns may make by-laws concerning tru-
ancy.
Vaccination may be required in discretion of super-
intending school committee, and under penalty of
exclusion.
§ 149. Maryland.
Compulsory Attendance is required in the City of
Baltimore, between eight and fourteen at some day
school regularly, unless receiving equivalent instruc-
tion elsewhere, unless mentally or physically incapaci-
tated. Also required between fourteen and sixteen
unless regularly and lawfully employed. For failure
to comply person having control of child may be found
guilty of misdemeanor. Same law is optional in other
parts of State. Age for deaf and bhnd children is
between six and sixteen.
County School Commissioners are appointed by Gov-
ernor. Six members in larger counties and three in
smaller counties. Are bodies corporate. Have super-
vision and control of all pubUc schools in their county.
Build and repair schoolhouses. Purchase and dis-
tribute text-books.
' County Superintendent examines teachers. Acts as
secretary and treasiu-er of County School Commissioners.
Holds examinations for applicants for teachers' certi-
ficates. Presides at institute.
School Age is between six and twenty-one for whites,
six and twenty for colored children.
School Districts are portions of a county.
School Term is ten months if possible.
319
§ 149] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
School Trustees three in number are appointed by
County School Commissioners. Have care of school-
houses and lands. May suspend or expel pupils sub-
ject to appeal to County School Commissioners whose
decision is final.
Separate Schools are established.
State Board of Education consisting of Governor,
State Superintendent and six members, appointed by
Governor with consent of Senate, have general care
and supervision of public education. Decide contro-
versies, and their decision is final. Remove County
Superintendents.
Superintendent of Public Education is appointed or
removed by Governor. "Informs himseK and State
Board on condition of education in State. Diffuses
information. Conserves interests and promotes effi-
ciency. Conducts correspondence of State Board.
Teachers must hold certificates and take oath.
Keep records and render reports quarterly before
receiving salary. At age of sixty may be placed on
" teachers' retired Hst ", and receive a pension of two
hundred dollars annually if without means of support.
Must be nineteen if male, eighteen if female. Must
attend institute. Care for condition of school rooms.
Must render reports, pending which salary is with-
held.
Text-Books are purchased upon competitive bidding,
and are free to indigent pupils. Also may be free to
others. May be privately purchased.
Transportation may be furnished to pupils in consoli-
dated schools.
320
Ch. XI] MASSACHUSETTS [§ 150
Truancy is guarded against in the City of Baltimore
by attendance officers male or female, not exceeding
•nineteen in all. May be appointed in any other coun-
ties if desired. May arrest any truant without a
warrant and deliver to parent, guardian or teacher.
If habitual truant shall bring into juvenile court.
Vaccination is a condition precedent to admission
into a pubUc school.
§ ISCT. Massachusetts.
Athletic Associations of pupils, bearing name of
school, are under control of School Committee.
Bible shall be read daily without written note or
oral conunent. Pupils may be excused therefrom on
written request of parent or guardian.
Compulsory Attendance between seven and fourteen,
and under sixteen where education is deficient. Exemp-
tions are of those who are physically or mentally in-
capacitated, or those otherwise instructed in a manner
approved in advance by the Superintendent of Schools,
or School Committee. If over sixteen and under
twenty-one with deficient education, must attend
evening school if the town maintains one.
Correspondence Courses are estabUshed by the de-
partment of University Extension, agriculture being
excluded. Twenty-five thousand dollars is annual
appropriation.
Districts as such are abolished and towns or cities
control. They shall provide and maintain a sufficient
number of schoolhouses under penalty. The location
is to be determined in town meeting.
321
§ 150] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
Electors include women who are qualified.
Employment Certificates are issued to children be-
tween fourteen and sixteen.
Evening Schools may be maintained in any town, and
shall be maintained in every city or town issuing twenty
or more employment certificates. Persons over four-
teen admitted. Evening high schools shall be main-
tained in cities of fifty thousand or more inhabitants upon
petition of fifty or more persons who desire to attend.
Exclusion if permanent, and for misconduct, entitles
pupil to a hearing.
Free Lunches may be provided for pupils by any
city or town, or a charge not exceeding the cost may
be made therefor, if so voted by a majority at the
municipal election, upon petition of five per cent of
the voters.
Manual Training as part of the school system shall
be maintained in every city or town of twenty thousand
or more inhabitants.
Nautical Schools may be maintained by towns.
School Age as to those under seven rests with local
committee. Maximum age is governed by compulsory
attendance laws.
School Committees of each town shall have general
charge of all pubUc schools. Select and contract
with teachers, may personally examine them or accept
normal school diplomas. May dismiss teachers. Shall
prescribe courses of studies and books to be used.
Shall employ Superintendent of Schools separately,
or in joint committee for union of schools. Shall cause
registers to be kept. Women are eUgible to the office.
322
Ch. XI] MASSACHUSETTS 'I§ 150
Schoolhouses except in the city of Boston, may be
used for other education, recreation, social, civic,
philanthropic and similar purposes, providing such use
does not interfere with school purposes.
School Term of at least thirty-two weeks in general,
but smaller towns with consent of Board of Education
may hold twenty-eight weeks.
State Board of Education consisting of nine persons
appointed by Governor and Council consoUdated with
Commission of Industrial Education. No compensa-
tion. Shall appoint Commissioner of Education to have
supervision of all educational work, with two deputies.
He suggests improvements and collects information.
Teachers to the number of twenty-five, of three
contiguous towns, may have teachers' institute. Three
thousand dollars, appropriated annually. Shall, before
opening school, obtain from school committee a cer-
tificate in duphcate. Shall faithfully keep registers,
and two weeks' salary preceding end of term are with-
held pending return of report. Retirement system
of pension and annuities is established. At sixty
may be, and at seventy shall be retired.
Text-Books and other supplies are purchased by
school committee at expense of the town, and loaned
to pupils free of charge. Tools and cooking materials
are also supplied free where such instruction is given.
Text-Books for private ownership may be sold at not
more than cost. Changes may be made in text-books
by two-thirds vote of the school committee.
Transportation of pupils may be provided. Street
or elevated railways, except the Boston Elevated
323
§ 151] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
Railway Co., may charge not to exceed one-half regular
fare.
Truancy is guarded against by truant ofl&cers. The
school committee of every city and town shall appoint
and fix the compensation of one or more truant officers,
who may be either male or female. They shall not
be paid by fees. Shall apprehend without a warrant
and take to school any child under twenty-one who is
employed in violation of law.
Vacation Schools may be maintained by cities or
towns. Attendance not compulsory.
Vaccination is required as a condition precedent to
admission unless excused by physician's certificate.
Vocational Schools for teaching industries, agricul-
tural, and household arts may be established by towns
or districts with State aid.
§ 151. Michigan.
Boards of Education consisting of five members
elected at large control single or township district.
Fill vacancies in Board until next election. Purchase
school sites. Vote taxes for teachers' wages. Have
custody of school property. Specify studies. Select
and adopt text-books. Have general care of schools.
Suspend or expel pupils.
Compulsory Attendance is required between seven
and sixteen in public, private or parochial school,
unless the eighth grade work has been completed and
the child is lawfully employed, or physically unable
to attend. Over fourteen may be excused if services
are necessary to support of parents ; or if attending
324
Ch. XI] MICHIGAN [§ 151
confirmation classes between twelve and fourteen, not
to exceed five months in each year; or if under nine
and lives two and one-half or more miles from school
and transportation is not provided. Deaf children
must attend between seven and eighteen in special
school. Permit must be secured before employing
children under sixteen.
County Superintendent is termed County Commis-
sioner of Schools. Records granting of certificates.
Visits schools. Counsels with teachers and school
boards. Calls meeting of school officers of county
at least once a year for consultation.
Electors may be male or female of certain qualifi-
cations.
School Age is over five. Between four and seven in
kindergartens. No separate schools allowed for colored
children.
School Board consists of three officers ; a moderator,
director and treasurer, elected by district. Must be
taxpayers. Purchase sites and build schoolhouses.
Hire teachers on written contract. Have care of
schoolhouses. Shall open schoolhouse, when not in
use, for public meetings unless district votes otherwise.
Make rules for schools and property. Suspend or
expel pupUs for cause.
School Commissioner (see County Superintendent).
School Districts are townships or portions of town-
ships and are bodies corporate. Fractional districts
are those formed from two or more townships. When
comprising entire township is termed single school
district, and is then controlled by Board of Education
325
§ 151] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
of five members. In upper peninsula a single school
district may be divided into sub-districts. Certain
large cities are also single school districts.
School Examiners consist of County School Com-
missioner and one other. Examine applicants for
teachers' certificates. Questions are furnished under
seal by State Superintendent. Appeal from decisions
lies to probate court.
School Term is nine months in districts having four
hundred or more children of school age ; eight months
in those having between thirty and four hundred,
and at least five months in aU other districts or share
in school fund is forfeited.
Secret Societies are prohibited under penalty of such
punishment as the Board shall deem expedient.
State Board of Education consists of four members
who are elected by the people. Has general super-
vision of normal schools. Is body corporate.
Superintendent of Public Instruction is elected by
the people. Shall have general supervision of pubUc
instruction. Is member and secretary of State Board
of Education. Visits the educational institutions.
Sees that Boards of Education and school districts
observe the law. Reports annually to Governor.
Prepares course of studies for district schools.
Teachers must be over eighteen and have certificates.
Keep record and report. Attend institute. Retire-
ment fund is provided.
Text-Books are selected by School Board, not to be
changed in five years. Free to indigent children.
May be free and loaned under vote of district. May
326
Ch. XI] MINNESOTA [§ 152
be privately owned by purchase in free districts.
Contracting publisher shall file copies of books and
give bond.
Truancy is guarded against by county truant officer
appointed by County Commissioners of Schools, and
detailed members of poHce force of cities. Boards
of Education in graded school and upper peninsula
districts may appoint. Parents or guardians not
complying with attendance law shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Vaccination is not provided for by legislation, and
as a condition precedent to attendance cannot be
enforced under decisions.
§ 152. Minnesota.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight
and sixteen in public or private school. May be ex-
cused for satisfactory reasons. Persons having charge
of truant child may be prosecuted for misdemeanor
in not complying with attendance laws. Employment
certificates may be issued to children between four-
teen and sixteen.
Corporal Punishment properly administered is not
unlawful.
County Board of Education consisting of chairman
of County Commissioners, County Superintendent of
Schools, and County Treasiurer, has charge of unor-
ganized territory to provide for education of children
therein. Furnish school facilities to all children of
school age therein.
County Superintendent is elected by the county
327
§ 152] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
electors. Visits and instructs schools. Conducts
teachers' institutes.
Electors in school matters may be women, who may
also hold school office.
School Age is between five and twenty-one, but by
vote of district those under six may be excluded.
School Board in common districts consists of three:
a chairman, clerk, and treasurer, elected by the dis-
trict. In independent districts consists of six directors,
who choose their own officers. Boards fill vacancies
until next election. They have general charge of
the business of the district, schoolhouses, and inter-
ests of schools. Employ teachers. Visit schools.
Make rules. Prosecute and defend actions. Mem-
bers are peace officers in common and consoUdated
districts. Boards in independent districts may estab-
lish evening public schools, establish kindergartens
open to children between four and six. Suspend or
dismiss pupils for cause.
School Districts are common, special, and inde-
pendent, all of which are public corporations. Com-
mon are numbered consecutively in each county.
Joint districts are those situated in two or more coun-
ties.
School Term in common schools is at least eight
months ; smaller schools not less than five nor more
than ten months.
Secret Societies unless sanctioned by directors are
prohibited.
Superintendent of Education appointed by Governor
with advice and consent of Senate has general super-
328
Ch. XI] MINNESOTA [§ 152
vision of all public schools. Has deputy and three
other assistants, a rural school commissioner, and a
supervisor of school libraries.
Teachers must hold certificates. Must attend in-
stitutes. Shall not be related by blood or marriage
to the employing director except on unanimous vote
of Board. Contract must be in writing. Must keep
registers and report. Have insurance and retirement
fund.
Text-Books in districts are provided upon vote of
district, or when Directors deem it advisable they may
contract for and purchase them, and provide for free
use thereof, or sale at cost. Such adoptions or con-
tracts shall be good for not less than three nor more
than five years, during which time the books shall
not be changed. Publishers before offering shall file
copies and give bond.
Transportation may be provided in consolidated
districts, or board may be provided for pupils. Also
in other districts transportation may be provided for
all pupils Uving more than one-half mile from school.
Shall provide in October to April inclusive transporta-
tion for all pupils in joint districts Uving two miles
or more from school, of ages between six and sixteen.
Truancy is guarded against by truant officers who
may be appointed by the Board in any district. May
arrest truant child and take to school. May receive sal-
ary but no fees. Prosecutions are by County Attorneys.
Vaccination may not be compelled, and, except
diu-ing epidemics, children may not be excluded from
the pubhc schools for non-vaccination.
329
§ 153] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
§ 153. Mississippi.
Board of Education is created by constitution, to
consist of Secretary of State, Attorney General and
Superintendent of Public Instruction. Decide appeals
finally. General charge of educational interests.
County Board of Examiners consist of County Super-
intendent and two teachers appointed by him. Ex-
amine applicants for teachers' certificates.
County School Boards consist of one member from
each supervisors' district. Fix boundaries and locate
schoolhouses.
County Superintendents are appointed by Board of
Education unless legislature makes the office elective.
Employ teachers recommended by local trustees.
Fix salaries of teachers and contract with them. Visit
schools. Each County Superintendent is ex officio
president of the local County School Board.
School Age is between five and twenty-one.
School Districts are separate for white and colored
people. In counties not laid off by townships they
shall be defined by streams, lines of farms, and other-
wise.
School Term is at least four months, but at least
seven months in separate districts.
School Trustees are three in number in regular dis-
tricts, five in separate districts which are larger ones.
Select teachers. May suspend or expel pupils for cause.
Separate Schools are required by the constitution.
State Board of Examiners consists of three teachers
appointed by State Superintendent. Prepare exam-
ination questions for teachers, and grade the papers.
330
Ch. XI] MISSOURI [§ 154
Superintendent of Public Instruction is elected by
the people. Has general supervision of conunon schools
and educational interests. Renders opinions when
requested by County Superintendents.
Teachers must be licensed, and at least seventeen
years of age. Contract must be in dupUcate. Keep
registers and report. May suspend pupils.
TextrBooh Commission consists of eight educators
appointed by Governor, one from each congressional
district, and State Superintendent. Select and adopt
uniform series of text-books not to be changed for five
years. Advertise for bids and make contracts. Con-
tracting publisher shall give bond.
Transportation may be provided in consolidated
districts.
§ 154. Missouri.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight
and fourteen in some pubUc, private, parochial or
parish day school. Also between fourteen and six-
teen unless regidarly and laAArfuUy employed. Private
instruction at home may be a substitute. Tem-
porarily excused for destitution, or for mental or phys-
ical infLrmity. Employment certificates are issued
to children between fourteen and sixteen.
County Superintendent is elected by voters of county.
Has general supervision of county schools except in
city, town and village school districts employing a
local Superintendent. Visits schools. Examines teach-
ers and grants certificates. With two teachers forms
text-book commission in some counties.
331
§ 154] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
County Text-Book Commission adopts from State-
list a uniform series not to be changed in five years.
Contracting publisher shall file copies with State
Superintendent, pay fiUng fee and give bond.
District Board of three members elected by district
govern and control district. Employ teachers but
have no power to dismiss them. Visit schools. Con-
sult with teachers and exercise general supervision.
Districts having two hundred or more children may
organize into a town or city district as a body corporate.
Such districts have six directors. Women are not
eligible to the office of Director.
Night Schools may be established by Boards of Edu-
cation in larger cities.
School Age is between six and twenty, but if funds
are sufficient those between five and six and over
twenty may be admitted.
School Term is eight months.
Separate Schools must be established for white and
colored children.
State Superintendent is elected by the people. Super-
vises educational funds. Examines teachers and grants
certificates.
State Board of Education consists of State Superin-
tendent, Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney
General. Exercise general supervision over educa-
tional interests.
Teachers must have certificates before beginning
employment. Must keep registers and report, pend-
ing which last month's salary is withheld.
Text-Books may be free to indigent children, and
332
Ch. XI] MONTANA [§ 155
free to all children in any district upon vote of elec-
tors.
Transportation must be provided pupils resid-
ing two and one-half miles or more from school,
and upon two-thirds vote of district may be pro-
vided for those hving more than one-half mile from
school.
Truancy is guarded against in districts of one thou-
sand or more population by attendance officers who may
arrest without warrant any truants and place them in
school. Parents, guardians or other persons having
control of such children may be prosecuted for mis-
demeanor if truancy continues.
§ 155. Montana.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight
and fourteen in a pubhc, private or parochial school
at least sixteen weeks each year. Excused for infirmity,
or when properly instructed at home, or when attend-
ance would be a hardship. Also appUes between
fourteen and sixteen unless lawfully and regularly
employed on certificate. Parents or guardians not
complying with attendance laws may be convicted of
a misdemeanor.
Corporal Punishment may be inflicted, but except
in case of open defiance the parent or guardian must
first be notified. Such punishment must be without
undue anger, and in presence of teacher and principal
if there be one.
County Board of Examiners consists of County
Superintendent, and two others who are or have
333
§ 155] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
been teachers. Examine applicants and issue cer-
tificates.
County Superintendent may be of either sex. Elected
by county electors. Has general superintendence of
county schools. Visits schools and advises. Presides
at institutes. Acts as truant officer in some districts.
Decides controversies subject to appeal to State Super-
intendent. County Attorney is legal adviser.
School Age is between six and twenty-one, in kin-
dergartens three to six.
School Districts are of three classes : first class with
population of eight thousand or more; second class
between one thousand and eight thousand; third
class less than one thousand. First class have seven
trustees, second class five, third class three. All
are bodies corporate. Joint districts are those lying
in two or more counties.
School Term is at least three months in isolated
sections.
School Trustees may be of either sex and are elected
by district. (For number, see School Districts.) Have
custody of school property. May estabhsh night
schools. Prescribe and enforce rules for schools.
Employ and discharge teachers. Build and remove
schoolhouses. Suspend or expel pupils. Provide
books, clothing and medical aid for indigent pupils.
Visit schools. County Attorney is legal adviser.
Secret Societies are prohibited unless sanctioned by
the trustees. Penalty is suspension, expulsion, or
curtailment of school honors.
State Board of Education consists of eleven members
334
Ch. XI] MONTANA [§ 155
including ex officio the Governor, State Superintendent,
and Attorney General. Have special charge of the
higher State educational institutions.
State Board of Examiners have supervision and con-
trol of expenditures for higher State educational
institutions.
State Text-Book Commission consists of seven mem-
bers ; contract for text-books, and exact bond from
pubhsher.
Superintendent of Public Instruction is elected by the
people. Has general supervision of the pubUc schools.
Prepares courses of study. Renders decisions to
County Superintendents. Prepares examination ques-
tions for examination of teachers. Advertises for bids
on text-books.
Teachers shall hold certificates, and contract in
writing and in duplicate. Must be at least eighteen.
May suspend pupils for cause. Keep registers and
report. Must attend institute. Have retirement
fund.
Text-Books may be free upon vote of district, in
which event privilege of purchase at cost for private
ownership shaU be accorded.
Transportation is provided to other schools when
district school is closed.
Truancy is guarded against by truant ofiicers who
shall be appointed in districts of the first and second
class (see School Districts), and may be appointed in
those of third class, but if not appointed County
Superintendent shall act as such. May arrest truants
and place them in school.
335
§ 156] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
§ 156. Nebraska.
Compulsory Attendance is required between seven
and fifteen, for at least twelve weeks in the smaller
districts, and between seven and sixteen in city or
metropolitan districts. The attendance is to be in a
public, private or parochial school, unless instructed
at home or elsewhere. Excused if regularly and law-
fully employed if fourteen, or mentally or physically
incapacitated, or Hves more than two mUes from school
and free transportation is not provided. If blind or
deaf must attend between seven and eighteen.
County Rural School Districts are confined to coun-
ties of less than seven thousand population. Are
bodies corporate and in charge of a Board of Education
consisting of five members elected at large. They
establish a uniform system of public schools, main-
tain and manage them. May borrow money and
issue bonds.
County Superintendent is elected by county electors.
Visits schools. Forms new districts and changes
boundaries. Examines candidates for teachers' cer-
tificates.
District Officers consist of a moderator, director, and
treasurer elected by district. The moderator shall
preside at meetings of the district. The director
with concurrence of one other member hires teachers.
Board has general management and makes rule? for
schools. May suspend pupils. Districts of more
than one hundred and fifty children of school age may
elect a district board of six trustees upon vote of
electors.
336
Ch. XI] NEBRASKA [§ 156
Electors may be either male or female of specified
qualifications.
School Age is between five and twenty-one.
School Districts are portions of a county and are
bodies corporate. Large cities are separate districts.
(See County Rural School Districts.)
School Term is at least four months in districts hav-
ing less than twenty pupils, not less than seven moliths
in districts having between twenty and seventy-five
pupils, and not less than nine months in larger dis-
tricts.
Secret Societies are absolutely prohibited as school
organizations. Penalty is suspension or expulsion.
State Superintendent organizes teachers' institutes.
Visits schools. Decides questions of school law. Pre-
pares questions for examination of teachers.
Teachers must have certificates. Must attend in-
stitutes. Make monthly report to director.
Text-Books are purchased for the district by the
local School Board, and are not necessarily adopted for
a particular period. They are loaned to pupils free
of charge.
Truancy is guarded against by truant ofl&cers ap-
pointed by Boards of Education in the larger districts,
who may apprehend and take home or to school any
truant child. Parents or guardians may be convicted
of a misdemeanor if the truancy continues.
Transportation in a safe, inclosed, and heated con-
veyance shall be provided in consolidated districts, for
all pupils hving two miles or more from school. May
be provided in any district by two-thirds vote.
337
§ 157] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
§ 157. Nevada.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight
and sixteen in a public or private school or at home.
Excused for mental or physical infirmity, completion
eighth grade, or when the child's labor is necessary
to support itself or parent, or when distance from
school is deemed too great by the Deputy Superintend-
ent. Children entitled to attend schools estabhshed
by the United States, and where the expense of tuition,
board and clothing of the pupils therein are borne
by the United States, compulsory attendance therein
is required of all children between eight and eighteen
who are eligible to attend such school. If the United
States does not furnish free transportation alt-children
living more than ten miles from such schools are excused
from attendance.
Educational Districts are four in number, comprising
one or more counties in each, and in each of which
a Deputy Superintendent has charge of supervision.
They are appointed by the State Board of Education.
They visit schools and advise teachers. Conduct
examinations for teachers' certificates.
• Electors are of either sex.
School Age is between six and eighteen, in kinder-
gartens between four and six.
School Districts are every village, town, or incor-
porated city. Those employing ten or more teachers
are of the first class, smaller are of second class. Joint
districts are parts of two or more counties.
School Term is at least six months, or at least eight
months if funds are sufficient.
338
Ch. XI] NEVADA [§ 157
School Trustees are five in larger districts and three
in districts of less than fifteen hundred school children.
Are body corporate and are elected by district. Upon
votes of heads of famihes may build, purchase, rent,
buy or sell schoolhouses, change locations, manage
and control school property. Employ teachers. Sus-
pend pupils. Visit schools. Women are eligible.
District Attorney is legal adviser.
State Board of Education consists of Governor as
president, Superintendent of Public Instruction as
secretary, and president of the University. Prescribe
and enforce the courses of study. Grant certificates
and life diplomas to teachers. Prepare questions for
teachers' examinations.
Superintendent of Public Instruction is elected by the
people. Visits schools, conducts institutes, advises
with teachers.
Teachers must have certificates and take oath. Con-
tract is to be in writing. Shall attend institute.
Retirement fund is established. Shall not suspend
or expel any pupil under fourteen.
Text-Book Commission consists of State Board of
Education and four others appointed by the Governor,
Receive bids and award contracts for text-books.
Contracting pubUsher shall give bond.
Text-Books are loaned to pupils free of charge.
Transportation may be provided.
Truancy is defined as absence from school more than
three days without valid excuse. Notice is then sent
to parent or guardian who for subsequent offense may
be convicted of misdemeanor. Boards of trustees
339
§ 158] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
may appoint attendance officers who may arrest with-
out a warrant any truant child and dehver to teacher,
parent, guardian or other person in control of child.
§ 158. New Hampshire.
Compulsory Attendance is required of all children
between eight and fourteen years of age, and also be-
tween fourteen and sixteen where education is deficient,
unless excused by the School Board for infirmity, or
for receiving equal instruction in a private school, ap-
proved by the district school board, for an equal period.
Districts legally organized are corporations. May
borrow money upon promissory notes or bonds.
May fix salaries of School Board and truant officers.
May raise money to purchase wagons for transporta-
tion of pupils. May contract with literary institu-
tion for furnishing tuition. May maintain joint schools
with other districts. May not fix length of school
year, salaries of teachers, nor estabUsh, locate or dis-
continue common schools. Officers are moderator,
clerk and school board of three persons, treasurer, and
one or more auditors and other necessary officers and
agents.
Electors in district school meetings are male or female
who are qualified, and have three months' residence.
Employment of Children over fourteen and under
sixteen permitted on certificate.
Evening Schools shall be estabUshed upon petition of
five per cent, of the legal voters of any city or town
of more than five thousand inhabitants. Are under
supervision of local school board.
340
Ch. XI] NEW HAMPSHIRE [§158
School Age is from six to sixteen, with compulsory
attendance between eight and fourteen.
School Board shall select and hire teachers, provide
schools, and may provide conveyances for pupils.
May dismiss teachers after hearing granted. May
prescribe regulations for schools. Shall furnish blank
registers to teachers. May grant use of schoolhouse
for writing or singing school, and for reUgious and other
meetings not to conflict with school use.
School Terms are to be such as will best subserve
the interests of education.
State Superintendent at annual salary not to exceed
four thousand dollars. Three deputies, one of whom
shall be a woman, are appointed at annual salary not
to exceed twenty-five hundred dollars. Shall hold
examinations for teachers, at annual cost not to exceed
three hundred dollars. Shall recommend text-books
to school boards.
Teachers must have certificates, which may be issued
without examination to those who have served three
school years. Must keep register and return to school
board, pending which twenty dollars of wages are
withheld. Pension for any retired female teacher
at fifty-five years, who has served thirty years as
teacher in this, or any State. Male teachers pensioned
at sixty years having taught thirty-five years. Either
sex having taught fifteen years prior to age fixed, are
pensioned pro rata. ,
Text-Books and other supphes shall be loaned free
of charge to pupils at expense of city or town, and
furnish at cost such as are desired for private owner-
341
§ 159] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
ship. They must not be paid for out of school money,
but selectmen must assess extra for them.
Truancy is guarded against by truant officers ap-
pointed by the local school board, and have authority
without a warrant to take and place in school any
children violating compulsory attendance law. Such
officers cannot be paid out of school money. Districts
may make legal by-laws concerning habitual truants.
Vaccination required of all children attending public,
private or parochial schools unless they hold certificate
of local board of health that they are unfit subjects, or
have had smallpox.
§ 159. New Jersey.
Bible reading and repeating Lord's Prayer shall be
the Umit of reUgious exercises.
Boards of Education consist of five members in dis-
tricts with population of less than forty-five thousand,
and nine members in larger ones, but number may be
reduced to five or three upon vote of district. Have
control and management of school property, and hold
title to it. Make rules for schools. May borrow
money on notes. Employ and dismiss principals,
teachers, janitors, mechanics and laborers. Suspend
or expel pupils. Provide text-books and necessary
school supphes.
Commissioner of Education is appointed by Governor.
Salary ten thousand dollars per annum. Appoints
four Assistant Commissioners at salaries of four thou-
sand five hundred dollars each. One shall act in his
place in his absence, one shall act as supervisor of
342
Ch. XI] NEW JEESEY [§ 169
secondary education, one as supervisor of elementary-
education, and one as supervisor of industrial educa-
tion. Designates one to hear controversies on school
law. Has supervision of all public schools of the
State.
Compulsory Attendance is required between seven
and sixteen in a day school, unless receiving equivalent
instruction elsewhere. Above fourteen may be granted
an " age and schooling certificate." Parent, guardian
or other person having custody and control of a child
between seven and sixteen failing to comply with
attendance law shall be deemed a disorderly person
and be subject to fine or imprisonment or both.
Corporal Punishment is forbidden by statute.
County Superintendents are appointed by Commis-
sioner of Education. Exercise supervision over schools
of county except city schools having a Superintendent.
Visit schools.
Evening Schools may be established in any district,
open to persons over twelve. In such schools for
foreign-born open to those over fourteen.
School Age is between five and twenty, also older
persons if Board of Education so provides. No exclusion
on account of religion, nationality or color. Age in
kindergartens is between four and seven.
School Districts are each township, city, incorporated
town and borough. They are bodies corporate.
School Term is not less than nine months.
State Board of Education consists of eight members
no two of whom shall be residents of the same county,
appointed by the Governor. Has control of the higher
343
§ 160] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
State educational institutions and general supervision
of educational matters. Decides appeals from Com-
missioner of Education. Reports to legislature.
State Board of Examiners consists of Commissioner
of Education, principals of State normal schools, a
County Superintendent, and a City Superintendent of
schools. Hold examinations and grant certificates.
Teachers must hold certificates and be at least
eighteen. Keep register. May suspend pupils. Par-
ticipate in pension or retirement fund after thirty-
five years' service under certain conditions, also for
shorter service.
Text-Books shall be furnished free of cost.
Transportation may be provided for pupils living
remote from school.
Truancy is guarded against by attendance officers
in each district who shall take each truant to teacher,
parent or guardian.
Vaccination may be required of teachers and pupils
unless certificate of unfitness be furnished.
§ 160. New Mexico.
Boards of Education of five members have charge
of school affairs in each incorporated city, town or
village. Control schools and school property. Are
bodies corporate. May hire City or District Superin-
tendents.
Compulsory Attendance is required between seven
and fourteen in some public, private or denominational
school, unless residing more than three miles from
school or physically incapacitated. Failure may sub-
344
Ch. XI] NEW MEXICO [§ 160
ject parent or guardian to fine or imprisonment. Age
for the deaf and mute is between eight and twenty-one.
Age for the bUnd is between five and twenty-one.
County Superintendent is elected by the county
electors. Takes oath and gives bond. Has jurisdic-
tion over all county public schools except in cities.
Visits schools. Supervises methods. Consults with
directors. Enforces compliance with law.
Electors may be women unless woman suffrage is
suspended by a majority petition of the district.
School Age is between five and twenty-one.
School Directors are three in number. They control
rural districts which are other than those of incorpo-
rated cities, towns and villages.
School Districts are bodies corporate. They are
either municipal or rural.
School Term is not less than seven nor more than
nine months in rural districts, and not less than nine
months in municipal districts.
State Board of Education consists of Governor, State
Superintendent and five others appointed by Governor.
Grant, renew, and revoke teachers' certificates, adopt
text-books and uniform course of study, exercise
general control over public schools. May contract
with pubUshers for text-books.
Superintendent of Public Instruction of either sex is
elected by the people. Holds teachers' institutes each
year for at least two weeks. Has general supervision
of public education. Shall give written opinions to
County Superintendents upon school questions, upon
which he may advise with the Attorney General.
345
§ 161] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
Teachers must hold certificates. Must furnish physi-
cian's certificate of freedom from tuberculosis. Keep
records and make report.
Text-Books are loaned free to indigent children.
Vaccination is a condition precedent to attend-
ance.
§ 161. New York.
Boards of Education of three to nine members control
in union free school districts or cities. Are bodies
corporate. Duties are practically same as School
Trustees, (q.v.). May maintain night schools free to all
residents, and kindergartens free to resident children
between four and six.
Central Rural Districts may be laid out in any terri-
tory exclusive of city school districts. Transportation
of pupils may be provided.
Compulsory Attendance in districts of five thousand
or more population employing a Superintendent of
Schools, is required of those in proper physical and
mental condition, between seven and fourteen, and
between fourteen and sixteen unless regularly and law-
fully employed on a certificate. In other districts
the compulsory age is between eight and fourteen,
and between fourteen and sixteen unless regularly and
lawfully employed. This law includes blind children.
Employed boys of deficient education, between four-
teen and sixteen must attend night school. Equivalent
instruction elsewhere than in public school may be
substitute. Parent or guardian of truant may be
prosecuted for misdemeanor.
346
Ch. XI] NEW YORK [§ 161
Commissioner of Education is chief executive oflScer
of State system of education and Board of Regents.
Salary is seven thousand five hundred dollars annually.
Has general supervision of schools. Advises school
officers. May issue teachers' certificates. Prescribes
regulations for examination of teachers subject to
approval of Regents. Appoints institutes.
District Superintendents are elected by board of
school directors; if they fail to elect within specified
time the county judge shall appoint. May be of
either sex and must become a resident of the county.
Sees that boundaries of district are properly described,
and corrects them. Assembles teachers for conference.
Advises trustees. Examines and licenses teachers, and
examines charges against them. Appeal lies to Com-
missioner of Education.
Indian Children between six and sixteen are subject
to compulsory attendance law, and parent or guardian
subject to penalty for non-attendance of children.
Industrial Schools may be estabhshed in any city
by the officer or officers having charge of the public
schools.
Nautical School is established at New York city.
School Age is between five and twenty-one.
School Directors are two in number elected for each
town. Those within a supervising district together
constitute a board of school directors.
School Districts are parts of commissioner districts.
They are cities, union free school districts, common
school districts, central rural districts, and school
neighborhoods.
347
§ 161] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
School Neighborhoods are territories adjoining other
States in which the children are authorized to attend
the schools of such other States.
School Term is fixed by trustees, but shall be at
least one hundred and sixty days of actual school.
School Trustees shall be from one to three trustees
as the district determines. Union free school districts
have from three to nine as the district determines.
Both are bodies corporate. Purchase or lease sites,
provide rooms, apparatus and supplies. Have custody
and keeping of schoolhouses, sites and appurtenances.
Contract with teachers, fix compensation and school
term. Establish rules, prescribe courses of studies.
Separate Schools may be established for colored
children upon vote, but no person shall be refused
admission into or be excluded from any public school
on account of race or color. Shall be established for
Indian children on reservations.
Supervisory Districts are those covering the territory
embraced in school commissioner districts outside of
cities, and of school districts of five thousand or more
population, which employ a Superintendent.
Teachers must be at least eighteen, licensed, and
have contract in writing. Shall not be related by
blood or marriage to employing trustees or Board of
Education except on two-thirds vote of district. Re-
tirement fund is established.
Temporary School Districts may be established out-
side of cities and union districts. They apply to sec-
tions of temporary habitation such as camps. Open
free to children and adults.
348
Ch. XI] NORTH CAROLINA [§ 162
Text-Books are designated in cities and union free
school districts by Boards of Education, and in common
school districts at an annual school meeting by two-
thirds vote of legal voters present and voting. Such
designations are for five years unless superseded by
three-fourths vote. Are free in union school districts
upon majority vote.
Truancy is guarded against by attendance officers
appointed by school authorities in each city, union
free school district, or common school district. Town
boards also appoint such officers. They may arrest
without warrant any truant child between seven and
sixteen and deliver to teacher, or in case of habitual
truants to a police magistrate.
§ 162. North Carolma.
Compulsory Attendance for deaf children is five
school terms of nine months, between eight and fif-
teen. Is required of other children between eight
and twelve for four months of each term, in a pub-
lic, private or church school which renders such
reports as are required of the public schools.
Age for compulsory attendance may be extended in
any county. Exemptions are for mental or phys-
ical incapacity, or where the child resides two and
' one-half or more miles from school, or where for
extreme poverty the child's labor is necessary to
the support of itself or parents, or where poverty
deprives the child of books and clothes. Children be-
tween twelve and thirteen may be employed on
certificates.
349
§ 162] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
County Board of Education is composed of three
members appointed by the legislature. Has corporate
powers. Controls the time that schools may be in
session. Builds and repairs schoolhouses. Makes rules
for schools.
County Superintendent is elected by the County
Board. Visits schools. Is ex officio secretary of
County Board. Holds township teachers' meetings.
School Age is between six and twenty-one.
School Districts are divisions of townships, or may
be formed out of contiguous portions of counties.
School Committee for township or district is composed
of three. Have care of school property. Employ and
dismiss teachers upon charges, notice and hearing.
Women are eUgible to serve on committees of rural
and graded schools.
School Term is at least six months.
Separate Schools are provided for white, colored, and
Indian children. However remote the strain, children
of negro blood shall not be classed as white.
State Board of Education consists of Governor as
president. Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State,
Treasurer, Auditor, Superintendent of Public Instruc-
tion as secretary, and Attorney General. Has cor-
porate powers. Makes rules for schools.
Superintendent of Public Instruction directs operation
of school system and enforces the law. Pubhshes
school law. Is secretary of text-book commission and
officer in many educational institutions.
Teachers are elected by the school committee and
approved by the County Superintendent. They must
350
Ch. XI] NORTH DAKOTA [§ 163
be at least eighteen and hold certificates. Keep records
and report. Attend institute every two years. Dis-
miss pupils who are immoral, or who willfully and per-
sistently violate rules.
Transportation may be provided in consoUdated
districts.
Truancy is guarded against by attendance ofl&cers
appointed by County Board of Education for each town-
ship. After notice and failure to render satisfactory
excuse the parent or guardian of a truant child may be
prosecuted and fined, and for non-payment thereof
may be imprisoned.
§ 163. North Dakota.
Bible shall not be considered sectarian nor excluded.
Teacher may read from it. Pupils shall not be re-;
quired to read it, nor to be present when read, contrary
to wishes of parent or guardian.
Boards of Education consisting of five members
have management of school affairs in special districts.
Must keep school open not less than seven nor more
than ten months each year.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight and
fifteen in public, private or parochial school. Feeble-
minded, blind, and deaf between seven and twenty-
one. Excused if no school within two and one-half
miles unless transportation is provided, or if child's
help is necessary to support of family, or physically
or mentally incapacitated, or has already acquired the
taught branches. Parents, guardians or other person
having charge of truants may be convicted of a mis-
351
§ 163] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
demeanor. Children between fourteen and sixteen
may be employed on certificate.
County Superintendent is elected by voters of each
county. Has general superintendence of schools in
his county. Visits schools. Holds annual meeting of
school officers. Decides controversies.
School Age is between six and twenty-one, in kinder-
gartens from four to six.
School Directors are three in number. Have general
charge, direction and management of the schools, and
property. Make rules. Suspend or expel pupils.
Employ teachers but except by unanimous vote not
those related by blood or marriage to a director.
School Districts are bodies corporate and consist of
not less than' one congressional township, or one civil
township. Any city, or incorporated or platted town
or village may constitute a special school district Iq
which a Board of Education of five members shall have
management. Independent school districts are those
of larger cities, with a director from each ward.
State Board of Education is composed of president of
University, president of Agricultural College, State
Superintendent of Public Instruction, State Inspector of
Graded and Rural Schools, State High School Inspector,
State Normal School president, and an industrial school
president, a County Superintendent and a citizen.
Superintendent of Public Instruction is elected by the
people, has general supervision of schools. Prescribes
course of study. Advises County Superintendents.
Teachers must hold certificates and shall not receive
less than forty-five dollars per month. Keep register
352
Ch. XI] OHIO [§ 164
and reports. Attend institutes. May suspend pupils
for not more than five days. Have insm-ance and re-
tirement fund.
Texir-Books may be loaned free to pupils or sold at
cost. Shall not be adopted for more than three years.
Contracted for by school board or Board of Education
of every district. Contracting pubUshers shall file
copies and bond.
Transportation may be provided in any district,
and shall be provided in consolidated districts.
§ 164. Ohio.
Boards of Education of districts vary from two to
seven members, who fmnish necessary schoolhouses
and grounds and keep them in repair. May open
schoolhouses for educational meetings or any other
lawful purpose not interfering with schools. Prescribe
courses of study. Have control of all pubUc schools
in district. Fix salaries of teachers.
City Board of Examiners of three members, for each
city school district is appointed by Board of Education.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight
and fourteen and from fourteen to sixteen unless
regularly employed, in a public, private or parochial
school for at least twenty-eight weeks. Excused for
mental or physical infirmity, or for receiving competent
instruction at home. Employment certificates are
issued between fourteen and sixteen.
County Board of Examiners of three are appointed
by judge of probate. Hold pubhc meetings for ex-
amination for teachers' certificates.
353
§ 164] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
Evening Schools shall be established in any district
upon petition of twenty-five youths of school age.
School Age is between six and twenty-one.
School Districts are mainly city, village, and town-
ship ; and all others are special.
School Term is at least twenty-eight weeks.
Secret Societies are prohibited under penalty of
fine of ten to twenty-five dollars for membership
therein.
State Board of Examiners consists of five persons,
not more than three of the same political party. Issue
life certificates to teachers.
State Commissioner of Common Schools is elected
biennially. Supervises school fund. Distributes laws.
Reports to Governor.
Teachers may be appointed for one to four years.
Exercise care for school property, strive to guard
health of pupils. Have retirement fund.
Text-Books are adopted for five years. May be
loaned free of charge by the Board of any district.
Transportation must be provided when schools of
sub-districts are suspended. May be provided in
special school districts, also in village school dis-
tricts.
Truancy is guarded against by truant officers who
may take into custody any truant and place him in
school. Parents or guardians may be prosecuted for
permitting truancy.
Vaccination is within control of the Board of each
district, and may be made a condition precedent to
attendance.
354
Ch. XI] OKLAHOMA [§ 165
§ 165. Oklahoma.
Boards of Education control in independent districts,
one member being elected from each ward, except in
cities of over fifty thousand two are elected from each
ward provided the wards do not exceed five. Women
may serve.
Boards of Examiners in each county composed of
County Superintendent and two others, examine ap-
plicants and issue teachers' certificates.
Common School Districts are corporations. Joint
districts are those lying in two or more counties.
Independent districts are the larger cities and towns.
Are bodies corporate.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight
and sixteen, of all children and wards unless physically
or mentally incapacitated, at least sixty-six per cent
of the school days, in a pubUc, private, or other school.
Parents or guardians not observing this law may be
prosecuted. Employment certificates may be issued to
children under sixteen. Deaf children between seven
and twenty-one must attend school for deaf.
County Superintendent supervises the public schools
of the county. Visits schools. Forms districts.
District Boards consist of three, a director, clerk,
and member, elected by the voters of the district.
Purchase or lease sites. Have care of schoolhouse and
property. Contract with teachers in writing, and they
shall not be related to any member of the Board. Pro-
vide school supplies.
School Term is not less than three months, and is
of such length as may be voted by the district.
355
§ 166] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
Secret Societies are prohibited under penalty of sus-
pension or expulsion.
Separate Schools are provided for colored children,
declared to be those who possess any quantum of negro
blood. It is illegal to attend any school established for
a different race.
State Board of Education consists of seven members
including the State Superintendent and six others
appointed by Governor. Have supervision of the
higher State educational institutions. Supervise pubhc
schools.
State Superintendent has supervision and manage-
ment of the educational interests. Gives written opin-
ion upon request of City or County Superintendent.
Issues teachers' certificates to graduates of high schools
and agricultural schools which are good for two years.
Prepares questions for County Board of Examiners.
Teachers shall have certificates. May suspend pupil
during current quarter, and such pupil has right of
appeal to Board of Directors.
TextrBooks are free to indigent children.
Text-Book Commission consists of Governor and six
others. Select books and supplies. Advertise for bids.
Contracting pubUsher gives bond. May pubUsh books.
§ 166. Oregon.
Compulsory Attendance is required of children be-
tween nine and fifteen in a pubhc school. Excused
for similar attendance in private or parochial school;
if physically incapacitated; if between nine and ten
and Hves more than one and one-half miles from
356
Ch. XI] OREGON [§ 166
school; if being properly taught at home. Parents
or persons in parental relation are prosecuted for non-
compliance with this law, and the penalty is fine or
imprisonment.
County Superintendent is elected by voters of each
county. Reports to State Superintendent. Hears and
determines appeals from teachers and district officers,
subject to appeal to Superintendent of PubUc Instruc-
tion. Holds teachers' institutes. Attends County
Superintendents' convention called by Superintendent
of PubUc Instruction. District Attorney is legal
adviser.
District School Board varying from three to five
members visits and inspects schools. May exclude
refractory pupils during current term. Furnish fuel
and suppUes. Upon vote of electors may select sites,
remove schooUiouses, buy and sell property both real
and personal. Contract with teachers who shaU not
be related to a member within third degree by either
blood or marriage, except upon unanimous concurrence
of Board. May dismiss teachers for cause. May allow
school-houses to be used for certain other purposes.
Electors may be of either sex.
Evening Schools may be established in districts of the
second class (see School Districts), without restrictions
as to age or citizenship.
School Age is between six and twenty-one, in kinder-
gartens over four.
School Districts are divisions of counties. Those
with one thousand or more children of school age are
first class; between two hundred and one thousand
357
§ 166] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
second class; less than two hundred are third class.
All are bodies corporate.
School Term is at least six months.
Secret Societies are unlawful and those who become
members may be suspended or expelled.
State Board of Education consists of Governor, Secre-
tary of State, and Superintendent of PubUc Instruc-
tion. Authorizes series of text-books recommended
by text-book commission. Prepares course of study.
Prescribes rules for schools.
State Board of Examiners appointed by State Super-
intendent consists of as many teachers as he may deem
necessary. Examine applicants and grade them.
Superintendent of Public Instruction is elected by the
people. Exercises general supervision of school officers
and affairs. Visits counties. Attends county in-
stitutes. Keeps statistics. Acts as secretary of State
Board of Education. Decides cases on appeal. Re-
ports to legislature. Issues certificates.
Teachers must hold certificates and be at least eigh-
teen. Keep register and make report pending which
last month's salary is withheld. Have retirement fund.
Text-Book Commission of five appointed by Gover-
nor, consider and adopt text-books.
Text-Books by vote of district or report of clerk may
be loaned to indigent children.
Transportation upon vote of district shall be of pupils
residing more than two miles from school, or may pay
board near by if not more expensive. And may fur-
nish other transportation of pupils within two miles in
their discretion.
358
Ch. XI] PENNSYLVANIA [§ 167
Truancy is guarded against by truant ofl&cers who
investigate and send notice to parent or guardian.
Vaccination may be required by district board.
§ 167. Pennsylvania.
Bible shall be read, at least ten verses every day,
without comment.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight
and sixteen in a day school. May be excused for
mental, physical or urgent reasons. Employment
certificates may be issued to children between fourteen
and sixteen. Parents or guardians may be found
guilty of misdemeanor for not compljang.
County Superintendent is elected every four years by
School Directors of county. Visits schools. Inspects
grounds and buildings. Has one or more assistants if
he has charge of more than two hundred teachers.
Holds institutes.
School Age is between six and twenty-one, without
distinction of race or color.
School Directors for first class districts known as
Board of Education, are fifteen in number appointed
by the court of common pleas. Second class, nine
elected at large. Third class, seven elected at large.
Fourth class, five elected at large. Each Board may
appoint a soHcitor. Make rules and regulations.
Exercise general supervision. Provide grounds and
buildings.
School Districts are each city, incorporated town,
borough, or township, and are constituted separate
school districts. Those of five hundred thousand or
359
§ 167] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
more population are termed of the first class ; between
thirty thousand and five hundred thousand are of the
second class ; between five thousand and thirty thou-
sand are of the third class and of less than five thousand
are of the fourth class. All are bodies corporate.
School Visitors are elected, seven from each ward,
in districts of the first class. Visit pubhe elementary
schools. Suggest to directors. Report in writing to
Board of Education every three months.
State Board of Education of six members is appointed
by Governor. State Superintendent is ex officio a
member and president thereof. Report and recommend
to legislature.
Superintendent of Public Instruction has supervision
of all pubMc schools. Reports annually to legislature.
Gives advice and information. Appoints two deputies.
Prescribes minimum course of study. Gives decisions
on school law.
Teachers must have certificates and be at least
eighteen. Contracts in districts of second, third, and
fourth class, shall be in writing and in duplicate. If
related to member of Board must receive votes of
three-fourths of all members of Board. Minimum
salary is forty dollars per month. Must attend insti-
tute. Have retirement fund.
Text-Books are supplied by school directors free of cost.
Transportation may be provided in any district,
and shall be provided in any district of the fourth
class when a school is closed and pupil resides one and
one-half or more miles from the school to which he is
assigned.
360
Ch. XI] RHODE ISLAND [§ 168
Tntancy is guarded against by attendance officers
who shall be appointed in districts of first, second, and
third class, and may be appointed in fourth class.
May arrest truants without warrant, notify parent or
guardian, and place in school.
Vaccination is a condition precedent to admission.
§ 168. Rhode Island.
Commissioner of Public Schools is elected by State
Board of Education.
Compulsory Attendance of every child who has com-
pleted seven years of Ufe and has not completed fifteen
years of hfe unless he has completed the eight years oi
prescribed studies, or shall have completed fourteen
years of Ufe and been granted an employment certifi-
cate. Private schools or approved private instruction
may be substituted. May be excused for cause.
Districts are aboHshed except that corporate powers
and Uabilities of any heretofore existing shall contiaue
and remain so far as necessary. (See Towns.)
Employment Certificates are issued to children between
fourteen and sixteen.
Evening Schools may be estabhshed by towns.
Exclusion shall not be on account of race or color,
nor for being over fifteen.
School Committee of three residents of each town
who need not be electors. They shall elect a Superin-
tendent of Schools, choose chairman and clerk either
of whom may sign papers, locate schoolhouses, arrange
for pupils to attend in adjoining towns, suspend pupils,
select teachers and dismiss them upon notice and hear-
361
§ 168] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
ing. Appeal may be had from their decision to the
Commissioner who may, and if requested shall, lay
the facts before one of the justices of the supreme
court whose decision shall be final. Rules may prohibit
appeals for trifling causes. Parties may agree that
decision of the Commissioner shall be final.
School Term for at least thirty-six weeks.
State Board of Education consisting of Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, as members ex officio, and one
member from each county (five) except Providence
county which shall have two other members are elected
by the legislature. They shall elect a Commissioner
of Public Schools who shall be secretary of the Board.
The Governor is president. They shall prescribe all
rules and regulations. Private schools shall report to
them. Provide for the instruction of adult blind
residents at their homes. The Board receives no com-
pensation but expenses are paid.
Teachers shall have certificates which may be an-
nulled after notice and hearing. Shall keep registers.
Institutes are held under direction of Commissioner
with annual appropriation of five hundred dollars.
Annual salary shall be not less than four hundred
dollars. Must hold fire drills or rapid dismissals at
least once each month. Pensioned after thirty-five
years' service, of which twenty-five shall have been'
within State, fifteen of which shall have been im-
mediately preceding retirement, amounting to sum
equal to one-half salary of five years next preced-
ing, but in no case more than five hundred dollars
annually.
362
Ch. XI] SOUTH CAROLINA [§ 169
Text-Books as far as practicable shall be uniform,
supplied by each town and loaned to pupils free of
charge, no change of books to be made in three years
unless by consent of Board of Education,
Towns shall estabhsh and maintain public schools.
Two or more towns aggregating sixty or less schools
may unite to employ joint Superintendent. All Super-
intendents shall have certificates from State Board of
Education.
Transportation may be provided.
Truancy is guarded against by one or more truant
officers appointed by each town.
Vaccination is required, and no pupil may attend
without certificate of vaccination or non-fitness therefor.
§ 169. South Carolina.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight
and fourteen, and between fourteen and sixteen unless
regularly employed, in a public school, or in some
private or church school keeping record and rendering
reports. Excused for mental or physical incapacity,
or where child resides two and one-half miles or more
from school and transportation is not furnished, or for
extreme poverty, or for good and sufficient reasons.
Parents or guardians may be found guilty of misde-
meanor for non-compUance, and subject to fine and
imprisonment for non-payment thereof. This law is
not operative in any district until the electors so vote.
County Board of Education consists of County Super-
intendent and two others appointed by State Board of
Education. Examines applicants for teachers' certifi-
363
§ 169] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
cates and issues them. Are advisory board to County
Superintendent.
County Superintendents are elected in each county.
Visits schools and recommends improvements.
School Age is between six and twenty-one, in kinder-
gartens from four to six.
School Districts are divisions of counties, formed or
changed by County Board of Education. Are bodies
corporate. City of Charleston consists of six districts
in charge of Board of School Commissioners.
School Term is fixed by district trustees and must be
at least three months each year.
School Trustees of three in number are appointed by
the County Board of Education for each district. Have
local management and control. Visit schools. Em-
ploy and discharge teachers. Suspend or dismiss
pupils. Provide schoolhouses. Manage school prop-
erty.
Separate Schools are required by the constitution.
State Board of Education consists of Governor as
chairman, State Superintendent as secretary and seven
others appointed by the Governor, one from each con-
gressional district. Regulate examination of teachers,
adopt rules for their own regulation and of the public
schools, prescribe courses of study, and uniform text-
books, contract with publishers who shall give a bond.
Superintendent of Education is elected by the people.
Has general supervision of pubUc schools and funds
therefor.
Teachers must have certificates. Keep register and
report to clerk of trustees. Must not be related to a
364
Ch. XI] SOUTH DAKOTA [§ 170
trustee except on written approval of County Board,
and written request of majority of pupils' parents.
Text-Books are loaned free to indigent children and
provided at cost to others. Are contracted for by
State Board of Education, not to be changed in five
years except when authorized by legislature.
Vaccination is a condition precedent to admission
if local law requires vaccination.
§ 170. South Dakota.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight
and sixteen in some pubUc or private day school until
eighth grade is finished. Excused if competent in-
struction is given elsewhere, or if mentally or physically
incapacitated, or if in the opinion of court or judge
enforcement of law would not be humane. Persons
in parental relation may be fined for allowing tru-
ancy.
County Board of Education advertises for bids and
select text-books.
County Superintendent is elected by county voters
and has supervision of public schools of the county.
Visits schools. Holds district institutes. Advises with
school ofl&cials.
District School Board consisting of a chairman, clerk,
and treasurer are elected by voters of district. Have
general charge, direction and management of schools
and property. Employ teachers.
School Districts are usually townships, and are
bodies corporate. Cities and towns are independent
districts.
365
§ 170] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
State Board of Regents of Education of five members
appointed by Governor, have charge of educational
interests of State.
Superintendent of Public Instruction supervises county
schools,-high schools, City and County Superintendents.
Holds convention of County Superintendents. Renders
written opinions when requested by a County Superin-
tendent. Examines applicants and issues certificates.
May appoint a deputy.
Teachers must have certificates, and contract in writ-
ing and in duplicate. Statute makes many duties part
of contract whether expressed therein or not. Keep
register and make report.
Text-Books are contracted for for five years. Free to
pupils upon petition of a majority of electors of a
district.
Transportation of pupils hving more than two and
one-half and less than three miles from school is pro-
vided for by allowing parent ten cents per day for each
pupil ; three to four miles, twenty cents ; four to five
miles, thirty cents; more than five miles, forty cents
per day for each pupil. Such allowance not to exceed
that for two pupils, and is for actual attendance.
Transportation or board is provided for children in
unorganized territory to enable them to attend in an
organized district. In consolidated districts may be
provided for children living more than two miles from
school.
Truancy is guarded against in cities and towns com-
prising independent districts, by truant officers ap-
pointed by the local Board of Education. In other
366
Ch. XI] TENNESSEE ,, [§ 171
districts the County Superintendent is ex officio a
truant officer.
§ 171. Tennessee.
Bible to the extent of at least ten verses must be
read every day without comment. Pupils are excused
from being present at such reading upon written re-
quest of parents.
Boards of Education of six members may be appointed
in any municipal corporation by the mayor and alder-
men, or the mayor and aldermen may estabUsh and
maintain a system of high graded schools. Women
are eligible to serve thereon.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight and
fourteen, and between sixteen and eighteen unless
regularly employed, in some public, private or parochial
school at least eighty consecutive days unless school
term is less, then for full term, in each year. In larger
cities longer attendance may be required. Excused for
extreme poverty, or mental or physical incapacity, or
when child Uves more than two miles from school and
transportation is not furnished. Parent or guardian
may be convicted of misdemeanor for non-compliance.
County Board of Education consists of five, one elected
by county court from each school district and the
others if any, at large. County Superintendent fills
vacancies, and acts as secretary. They select teachers,
fix thek" salaries, erect and repair schoolhouses. Locate
schools. Visit schools. Dismiss teachers for cause.
Buy, transfer, sell, care for, manage and control school
property. May exercise eminent domain.
367
§ 171] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
County Superintendent is elected by county court and
may be of either sex. Supervises public schools.
Visits schools. Acts as secretary of County Board of
Education.
District Advisory Board of three in each civil dis-
trict elected by voters of district. Supervise schools
and property. Recommend and report to County
Board. Suspend and dismiss pupils subject to appeal
to County Board.
School Age is between six and twenty-one.
School Districts consist of five in each county, if so
many exist.
Separate Schools must be maintained.
State Board of Education consists of nine members
appointed by Governor, he being president ex officio,
with State Superintendent secretary and treasurer ex
officio. Report to legislature. Supervise normal col-
lege and schools, keeping them separate for white and
colored pupils.
State Superintendent is nominated by the Governor
and confirmed by the Senate. Is secretary and treas-
urer of State Board of Education. Collects and dis-
tributes information relating to public schools. Visits
and inspects schools. Prescribes mode of examining
and Ucensing teachers. Issues certificates to teachers.
Reports to Governor.
Teachers must have certificates and be at least
eighteen. Certificates will not be issued to persons
addicted to the use of intoxicants, opiates, or cigarettes.
Must keep records and make report. Must have con-
tract in writing and in duplicate. May suspend pupils
368
Ch. XI] TEXAS [§ 172
subject to decision of County Board. Must attend
institute.
Text-Books are free to indigent children.
Text-Book Commission consists of Governor, State
Superintendent, and three others appointed by Gover-
nor. Select and adopt a uniform series of text-books,
not to be changed in five years. Sub-commission of
five teachers or Superintendents examine books and
recommend to Commission who advertise for bids.
Contracting pubUsher shall give bond, not to be ex-
hausted by a single recovery.
Transportation may be furnished in consoUdated
districts.
Truancy is guarded against by attendance officers.
Every city maintaining a separate system having a
scholastic population of five thousand or more, shall,
by the Board of Education, elect one or more such
officers. If less than five thousand may elect. Also
may elect in counties. They serve notice of truancy
on parent or guardian, and may arrest without a war-
rant a truant child and place in school.
§ 172. Texas.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight
and fourteen in a pubUc, private or parochial school,
vmless properly instructed at home, or unless child
is mentally or physically incapacitated, or lives more
than two and one-half males from nearest school
for same race, with no free transportation provided,
or if more than twelve and services are necessary
to support of parent or guardian. Parents or
369
§ 172] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
guardians may be fined for non-observance of this
law.
County School Trustees five in number, elected by the
county voters, have general management and control
of the public free schools in each county. Classify
schools. Prescribe course of study.
County Superintendent is elected in all coimties having
three thousand scholastic population, and in those of
lesser number upon petition of voters. Has im-
mediate supervision of educational matters. Conducts
County Institute. Apportions funds. Approves con-
tracts and vouchers.
School Age is between seven and twenty-one, but
others may be admitted by the trustees in their dis-
cretion. Kindergartens between four and seven.
School Districts are parts of counties. May be con-
solidated to secure high school advantages. Cities,
towns and villages may be independent districts with
seven trustees.
School Trustees three in number are elected by voters
of district. Are bodies corporate. Contract for build-
ings. Manage and control public schools. Employ
and dismiss teachers who may appeal to County Super-
intendent. Independent districts have seven trustees.
Separate Schools must be maintained.
State Board of Education consists of Governor as
president. Secretary of State as secretary, and Comp-
troller. Apportions school funds. Makes rules and
regulations.
State Superintendent of Public Instruction is elected
by the people. Administers school law. Superintends
370
Ch. XI] UTAH [§ 173
business relating to public schools. Hears and de-
termines appeals subject to review by State Board of
Education.
Teachers must have certificate, be not less than six-
teen, and not be related to any member of the School
Board by affinity within second degree, or by consan-
guinity within third degree. Keep registers and make
reports.
Text-Books are selected by State Text-Book Board
of eleven members, and adopted for six years. Free
books are at option of each district.
Truancy is guarded against by attendance officers
who may be elected by school trustees. They warn
parents or guardians of truants.
Transportation must be provided for children between
seven and seventeen living more than three miles from
school.
§ 173. Utah.
Boards of Education of each county school district
of the first class shall consist of five members, one
elected from each representative precinct. Estimate
funds needed. Such Boards in larger cities of first
and second class are from each ward.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight
and sixteen in pubUc, district or private school, at least
twenty weeks in each year, and in cities at least thirty
weeks. Excused for proper instruction at home; de-
ficient mental or physical condition ; not living within
two and one-half miles of school ; services being neces-
sary to support of mother or invalid father. Parent
371
§ 173] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
or guardian willfully failing to comply may be convicted
of misdemeanor.
County Superintendent is elected by county voters.
Has superintendence of all district schools except in
cities of first and second class. Supervises boundaries.
Visits schools. Decides controversies. Holds teachers'
institutes. Conducts teachers' examinations.
School Age is between six and eighteen in district
schools.
School Districts are counties, each of which constitutes
a county school district of the first class, but in special
instances of larger population more than one such dis-
trict may exist in the same county. Each district is
divided into five representative precincts. Such dis-
tricts use books adopted by the State Text-Book Com-
mission. All districts are public corporations.
School Term is fixed by district trustees.
School Trustees, three in number are elected by voters
of district. Have general charge, direction, and
management of schools, and care, custody, and control
of property. Employ and dismiss teachers. May
suspend pupils.
State Board of Education consists of State Superin-
tendent of PubUc Instruction, president of University,
president of Agricultural College, and six other persons
appointed by Governor without reference to residence,
occupation, party affiliation, religion or sex. Have
general control and supervision of pubhc school system.
Promote libraries and gymnasiums. Conduct examina-
tions for teachers in county school districts of the first
class.
372
Ch. XI] VERMONT [§ 174
State Superintendent of Public Instruction is elected
by the people, and is charged with administration of
the public school system. Visits schools. Advises
with oflB.cers. Gives written answers to questions on
school law. Reports to legislature.
State Text-Book Commission consists of State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction, president of University,
president of Agricultural College, principal of Normal
School, and five resident citizens appointed by
Governor, three of whom shall be Superintendents of
Schools. Adopt text-books for all district and high
schools except in cities of first and second class. Adopt
books not to be changed in five years.
Teachers must have certificates. Must contract in
writing. Keep register and report. Attend institutes.
May suspend pupils for not more than five days. Have
retirement fund.
TextnBooks are free of cost, and by constitu-
tional provision may not be prescribed by either
legislature or State Board of Education. In cities
of first and second class are selected by Board of Edu-
cation for five years. Contracting publisher shall give
bond.
§ 174. Vermont.
Commissioner of Education is appointed for indefinite
term, and is secretary of the State Board of Education
by whom he is appointed. He shall make full reports
to the Board and make recommendations. He shall
appoint State supervisors. His decision on residence of
a pupil is final.
373
§ 174] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
Compulsory Attendance is required of children between
eight and sixteen unless mentally or physically unable
to attend, or are otherwise furnished with the same
education, or legally excused in writing by the Superin-
tendent. May be excused at fifteen. Indigent chil-
dren are supplied with the necessary clothing. School
Board may employ a teacher to instruct disabled chil-
dren at home.
Discipline may include corporal punishment.
Districts as divisions of towns are abolished, and
a town constitutes a district, except such districts as
are incorporated by special acts. Towns may borrow
money.
Electors on matters pertaining to schools and school
officers are of either sex, and either sex may hold offices
relating to school affairs. But women are not subject
to poll taxes.
Evening Schools may be maintained by towns for
persons above compulsory school age.
School Age is between six and eighteen, compulsory
between eight and sixteen, but older pupils may attend.
"Between " means from day of beginning of age first
specified to day preceding beginning of age last specified.
Kindergartens may be estabUshed by towns, open to
children under six.
School Directors in towns of more than four thousand
inhabitants are elected on a separate ballot in a
separate ballot box. A Board consists of three citi-
zens of the town. They have care of the school
property of the town, and management of its schools,
make regulations, determine number and lo(Jation of
374
Ch. XI] VERMONT [§ 174
schools, employ teachers and fix their compensation,
examine claims and draw orders therefor stating the
purpose for which they are drawn. They are liable
to the town for illegal payments. They appoint a
clerk.
School Property is in charge of the town.
School Year shall be for at least thirty-fom* weeks.
Secret Societies are regulated and pupils may not join
or soUcit other pupils to join any secret fraternity, club
or society, except such as are sanctioned by the Com-
missioner of Education and Superintendent ; but tem-
perance, religious and moral societies are excepted.
Violations are punished by suspension, dismissal or
deprivation of graduation and school honors.
State Board of Education consisting of five persons
appointed by Governor, receive four dollars per day
for actual time spent, and necessary expenses. Their
main duties are : to employ a trained and skillful execu-
tive oflacer called the Commissioner of Education, and
fix his salary. Through the Commissioner they pre-
pare imiform courses of study, see that laws are en-
forced, supervise expenditures, inform the people as
to educational conditions, make rules and regulations
to guide subordinates, report to legislature. They shall
appoint a sufficient number of Superintendents and des-
ignate the schools they are to supervise. But a town
or incorporated district having twenty-five or more
schools may appoint own Superintendent at a salary
of not less than fifteen hundred dollars.
Rural Schools are such as have not more than two
teachers.
375
§ 175] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
Teachers shall keep registers to be delivered at end
of each term, and no order is to be drawn for the last
month's salary of the term until the register is ap-
proved. Certificate is required and contract is void
unless certificate is obtained before opening school.
No compensation shall be less than eight dollars per
week. Contracts shall be in writing and in triplicate.
Towns may vote to pension teachers who have taught
thirty years, limited to one-half the salary formerly
received. State also provides a retirement fund.
Text-Books, appliances and supplies are provided
by the town, and with exceptions, are selected by the
Board of School Directors, subject to approval of
the Superintendent.
Transportation may be furnished to pupils, or the
pupils' board paid nearby. Appeal may be had to
the Commissioner whose decision is final.
Truancy is guarded against by the truant officer of
the town. He may stop a child between eight and
sixteen and take him to school. Complaints are made
to the grand juror of the town.
Vocational Courses are supplied in high schools.
§ 175. Virginia.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight and
twelve for at least twelve weeks in each school year.
Excused for weakness of body or mind, or if child can
read and write, or is attending a private school, or Uves
more than two miles from school, or more than one
mile from a free school wagon route. This act shall
not prevail in any district until adopted by the voters.
376
Ch. XI] VIRGINIA [§ 175
County School Board consists of the Division Superin-
tendent together with the school trustees of the county.
Are body corporate. Estimate expenses. Apportion
county fund.
District Board of School Trustees are three in number,
appointed by school trustee electoral board. Are body
corporate. Explain, enforce and observe school laws.
Employ teachers and dismiss them. Suspend and expel
pupils. Visit schools. Divide school districts into
sub-districts. Must take oath.^ Make rules for
schools, including going to and coming from school.
Division Superintendents are appointed by State
Board of Education. Powers and duties are fixed by
the State Board of Education.
School Age is between seven and twenty, but children
of six may be admitted if sufficiently mature, and others
between twenty and twenty-five may be admitted on
prepayment of tuition.
School Districts are each " magisterial " district unless
State Board provides otherwise. Towns of more than
five hundred inhabitants may, if council so elects,
constitute a single school district.
Separate Schools must be maintained.
State Board of Education is corporation. Consists
of Governor, Attorney General, Superintendent of
Public Instruction, and other experienced educators.
They divide the State into school divisions. Provide
for examinations of teachers. Select text-books. De-
cide appeals from decisions of State Superintendent.
1 Failure to do so creates a vacancy; Childrey v. Rady, 77
Va. 518.
377
§ 176] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
Sub-District Directors explain and enforce laws.
Examine claims. Contract with teachers for supple-
mental salaries. Determine supplementary school
session.
Superintendent of Public Instruction is elected by
people. Is ex officio president of State Board of Edu-
cation, by whom his duties shall be described.
Teachers must hold certificates. Keep register and
deliver it to clerk of School Board at close of term.
Contract in writing. May suspend pupils.
Text-Books are contracted for by the State Board of
Education not to exceed a term of seven years. Con-
tracting pubhsher files bond. Free to indigent children.
Vaccination is required of teachers and pupils who
within ten days after entering a pubHc school shall
furnish a physician's certificate either of successful
vaccination or that such person is an unfit subject. In
case of epidemic immediate vaccination may be ordered.
§ 176. Washington.
Compulsory Attendance, in a public or private school,
is required between eight and fifteen and between fifteen
and sixteen unless regularly and lawfully employed.
Excused for physical or mental incapacity, or for having
acquired proficiency in eight grades, or for some other
reason. Where the United States, or State of Washing-
ton shall erect a school wherein the expense of tuition,
lodging, food and clothing is borne by the United
States, or State of Washington, compulsory attendance
therein is required between five and eighteen for nine
months each year, or during the annual term unless ex-
378
Ch. XI] WASHINGTON [§ 176
cused as above noted, or transportation is not furnished
if residing more than ten miles from school.
County Boards of Education appointed by County-
Superintendent, consist of five members including
County Superintendent who shall be ex officio chairman.
All shall hold teachers' certificates. Grade manu-
scripts. Adopt text-books for five years, in districts
of second division, which are those not maintaining a
four years' high school. Adopt rules for schools.
County Superintendent is elected by voters of county.
Supervises and visits schools of county. Corrects boun-
daries. Apportions school fund. Examines teachers.
Conducts institute.
Electors may be of either sex.
School Age is between six and twenty-one. In
kindergartens between four and six.
School Districts are each county. Are bodies cor-
porate.
School Directors elected by voters of district consist
of five members in districts of the first class, and three
in those of second and third class. Employ teachers
and fix their salaries on contracts that are printed or
written and in duplicate. Enforce rules and course of
study. Rent, repair, furnish and insure schooUiouses
and employ janitors, laborers, and mechanics. Sus-
pend and expel pupils. Provide free text-books and
supphes in their discretion. Provide and pay for
transportation of pupils Uving more than two miles
from school in their discretion. Authorize schoolrooms
to be used for other educational, reUgious, poUtical,
and scientific purposes.
379
§ 176] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
School Term is at least six months.
State Board of Education consists of Superintendent
of Public Instruction, president of the University,
president of State College, principal of a normal school,
and three holders of life diplomas. Care for higher
educational requirements, prepare courses of study
for secondary schools, prescribe rules for common
schools, prepare questions for teachers' examinations,
and for those completing grammar school course.
Superintendent of Public Instruction is elected by the
people. Has general supervision of schools. Reports
to Governor. Is ex officio president of State Board of
Education. Holds annual conventions of County
Superintendents. Issues certificates. Decides appeals
from County Superintendents.
Teachers must be at least eighteen and have certifi-
cates. Report to County Superintendent. Keep
register. May suspend pupils. Must attend insti-
tutes.
Text-Books (see County Boards of Education; Text-
Book Commission).
Text-Book Commission of each school district of first
division, which are those maintaining a four years' high
school, select text-books for three years.
Truancy is guarded against by attendance officers
appointed by Board of Directors in city districts. In
all other districts the County Superintendent acts as
attendance officer, and may appoint assistants. May
take truant child into custody and to parent or guardian
or to school.
Vaccination may be compulsory in city schools.
380
Ch. XI] WEST VIRGINIA [§ 177
§ 177. West Virginia.
Boards of Education consisting of a president and two
School Commissioners are elected for each district by
the voters of the district. In certain larger districts
the Board consists of five. Must take oath. Are body
corporate. Have general control of schools.
Compulsory Attendance is required between eight and
fifteen for twenty-four weeks, in a pubhc school yearly.
Excused for attendance elsewhere, or if no school
within two miles of child's home. Employment cer-
tificates may be issued between fourteen and sixteen.
County Superintendent is elected by the voters in
each county. Visits schools. Examines buildings.
Conducts examinations of teachers.
School Age is between six and twenty-one. Also
any other person may be admitted by permission of
trustees or Board upon payment of tuit'ion.
School Districts are divisions of a county, three to
ten in each. They are each "magisterial" district, and
are divided into sub-districts.
School Term is at least six months.
School Trustees, three in number, are appointed for
each sub-district by the Board of Education in each
district. Employ on written contract, teachers who do
not hold certain relationship to any director. Visit and
inspect schools. May allow schoolhouses to be used for
certain other purposes.
Separate Schools shall be maintained.
State Board of Education consists of State Superin-
tendent, and five others appointed by him. No two
from the same congressional district, and not more than
381
§ 178] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
three from the same poUtical party. Prescribe courses
of study and perform other duties prescribed by law.
State School-Booh Commission consists of State Super-
intendent and eight others appointed by Governor,
Receive bids and make contracts for text-books, not
to be changed in five years. Contracting publisher
shall give bond.
State Superintendent- of Free Schools elected by the
people has general supervision of schools, County and
City Superintendents. Gives decisions on school law.
Teachers must be at least eighteen and hold certifi-
cates. May suspend pupils. Keep register and report.
Attend institute.
Text-Books may be free, in discretion of the Board of
Education of any district.
Transportation may be provided.
Truancy is guarded against by truant officers who give
notice to parent or guardian, and make complaint
before justice of the peace for non-observance. Parent
or guardian may be convicted of misdemeanor.
§ 178. Wisconsin.
Boards of Education for larger cities consist of seven
members known as Commissioners. EstabUsh high,
district, primary, night and kindergarten schools and
have general supervision of them.
Compulsory Attendance is required between seven
and fourteen, and between fourteen and sixteen unless
regularly employed, in some public, parochial, or private
school. Excused for mental or physical infirmity, or
if living more than two miles from school, if transporta-
382
Ch. XI] WISCONSIN [§ 178
tion is not provided, or for proper and equivalent in-
struction elsewhere. Parents or guardians not com-
plying may be fined or imprisoned.
County Boards of Education consist of five members,
but may consist of three, elected where majority of
districts vote for free text-books. All must have had
experience as teachers. Select and adopt a uniform
series of text-books not to be changed in five years.
Contracting pubhsher shall file copies and give
bond.
County Superintendent may be of either sex.
Examines and licenses teachers. Visits districts. Con-
ducts institute. Reports to State Superintendent.
District Board are director, treasurer and clerk elected
by voters of district. Have care of schoolhouses and
other property. May authorize use of schoolhouses
for pubHc meetings, and entertainments. Suspend
and expel pupils. Make rules. Adopt text-books not
to be changed in three years. Visit schools.
Electors may be of either sex.
School Age is between four and twenty, but District
Board may admit free between twenty and thirty.
School Districts are made by Town Boards, and unless
aboUshed is township system. Are bodies corporate.
State Superintendent of Public Instruction elected by
the people has general supervision of the common
schools. Reports to Governor. Supervises teachers'
institutes. Performs all other duties imposed by
law. Decides appeals.
Teachers must have certificates. Keep register and
report. Have insurance and retirement fund.
383
§ 179] SYNOPSES OF PRINCIPAL STATUTES [Ch. XI
Text-Books may be free in any district upon vote of
district, and in any county upon vote of majority of
districts. (See County Boards of Education.)
Transportation is provided in consolidated districts
for pupils living more than two miles from school. May
be provided in other districts.
Truancy is guarded against by truant ofl&cers ap-
pointed in larger cities by local Board of Education. In
towns and villages sheriffs, undersheriffs, and deputies
are truant ofl&cers.
§ 179. Wyoming.
Compulsory Attendance is required between seven
and fourteen in a public, private or parochial school.
Exceptions may be made of invaUds, pupils to whom
the enforcement of the act might prove a hardship,
pupils who for legal reasons have been excluded and no
provision made for schooUng.
County Superintendent reports to State Superintend-
ent. Acts with County Commissioners in dividing
county into school districts. Visits schools. Recom-
mends dismissal of incompetent teachers to school dis-
trict trustees. Holds institutes.
Electors may be of either sex.
School Age is between six and twenty-one. In kinder-
gartens between four and six.
School Districts are parts of a county and are bodies
corporate.
School Trustees, three in number, are elected by voters
of district. In districts of one thousand or more popu-
lation the number may be increased to six. Make all
384
Ch. XI] WYOMING [§ 179
contracts necessary to carry out vote of district. Em-
ploy teachers. May remove scholars.
Separate Schools may be provided when there are
fifteen or more colored children in each district.
State Board of Examiners of three appointed by
State Superintendent prepare examination questions to
be sent to County Superintendents. Examine papers
and make rules regarding granting of certificates.
Superintendent of Public Instruction has general su-
pervision of district schools. Prepares courses of study.
Reports to Governor and to legislature. Conducts
teachers' institute. Makes rules and regulations.
Teachers cannot receive compensation unless holding
certificates. Keep register and make report.
Text-Booksvasiy be contracted for by School Directors,
such contract not to be for more than five years. Con-
tracting pubUsher must file bond. Are loaned to pupils
free of charge. Pupils may purchase at cost.
Truancy is guarded against by sheriffs, deputy
sheriffs, and truant officers if there be any. Give notice
to parent or guardian and if notice is not comphed
with make complaint to justice of the peace who may
convict of misdemeanor.
385
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
A
ACTIONS. See also School District ; Funds.
maintainable by school district, 15, 26.
employment of counsel to defend, against district, 15.
authority to bring, for injuries to property, 21.
prosecuting and defending, out of school funds, 26.
must be brought in corporate name, 26.
where civil and school townships are distinct, 26.
statute of limitations as a defense, 26.
no right to appear as individuals in, against district, 26.
for certain torts, maintainable only by statute, 27.
for trespass to land, 27.
averment of bad faith necessary in some, 45.
by teacher for salary, license to be shown, 63.
ADMISSION,
may be refused to child of insufficient education, 78.
of pupU who passes all studies but one, 84.
AGENT. See also Boaed of Education.
financial, may compromise claim, 43.
ALIENS,
not entitled to hold elective office, 48.
APPARATUS,
forbidding use of, 35.
meaning of term, 36.
APPEALS,
State Superintendent empowered to hear, 41.
power to hear may not be delegated, 41.
legal effect of judgment of State tribunal to hear, 41.
APPENDAGE,
meaning of term, 36.
what may be classed as an, 36.
387
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
ARCHITECT,
decision of, as final, 30.
ARREST. See Attendance Oppicees ; Tax.
ATTENDANCE OFFICERS. See also Tbuanct.
wrongful arrest by, board not liable, 96.
are public officers, 96.
are bound to take oath, 96.
ATTORNEY'S FEES. See also Counsel.
, school district not to be allowed, for defending groundless suit, 32.
B
BANKRUPTCY,
of building contractor, school board may finish building aban-
doned by, 30.
BIBLE,
reading of, 68.
BIDDER,
contract may sometimes be awarded to one not lowest, 55.
bond from, when required is necessary, 55.
only one, cannot claim to be lowest, 55.
rights of lowest, will be protected against fraud, 55.
what is meant by "lowest responsible," 55.
responsibility of, to be determined by body who accepts bids, 55.
responsibility of, must be subject of hearing before rejection, 55.
BIDS. See also Text-books ; Biddeb.
unless required by statute, need not advertise for, 55.
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
may not enact rules inconsistent with statute or city charter, 43.
may appoint agent to secure land, 43.
agent's appointment by, need not be under seal, 43.
de facto, may issue valid bonds, 48.
may ratify some acts by de facto officers, 48.
BONDS. See also Contractobs' Bonds; .Publishebs' Bonds;
Biddeb; Boabd op Education.
power to issue, for building purposes, 21, 116.
power to issue, as implied from power to borrow, 116.
failure to file, or defective, may make de facto officer, 48.
board of education de facto may issue valid, 48.
vahdity of, 116.
vote to issue, 116.
purchaser of, charged with notice, 116.
issued in excess, how far void, 116.
388
INDEX
[References are to aectiona.]
BOOKS. See Text-books.
BORROWING MONEY,
not authorized by general authority, 108.
vote on, at illegal meeting creates no liability, 108.
when, it must be turned over to treasurer, 113.
BOUNDARIES OF DISTRICTS,
legislative power to change, 19.
must be on geographical lines, 19.
may not be on personal limitation, 19.
continuous lines of, not necessary, 19.
must set off both poll and estate, 19.
petition to change, 18, 19.
reestabUshment of, is not redistricting, 19.
contract not to change, may not be made, 19.
change of, not authorized by authority to consolidate districts
temporarily, 20.
BROKER,
commission of, in purchase of site, 28. ,
BUILDING COMMITTEE,
may be appointed to erect, purchase or repair, 28.
are public officers, 28.
can act by majority, 28.
BURNING,
of schoolhouse as affecting compensation of teacher, 65.
C
CASTE,
constitutional provisions regarding, 3.
CERTIFICATES. See Teacher ; Diploma.
CERTIORARI,
to set aside organization of district, 17.
CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS,
right of children in, to attend school, 73.
CHARTER,
of city may prevail over a general statute, 43.
special, for school board does not constitute de facto board under
another act, 43.
rules must not be inconsistent with, 43.
CHILD. See also Compulsory Attendance.
could not demand education from parent, 7, 78.
separate estate of, not to be used for education, 7.
must be educated out of parent's estate, 7.
389
INDEX
[Beferences are to sections.]
CHILD — Continued.
person in loco parentis may be bound to educate, 7.
at common law was at mercy of parent, 10, 78.
at common law had no remedy, 10.
right to attend school is not inherent in, 12.
employed in labor, statutes may specially provide for, 13.
CITIZENSHIP,
ch^d cannot demand admission on status of citizenship, 72.
CLAIM,
equitable, may be voted to be paid at district meeting, 26.
vote not to pay, makes demand mmecessary, 26.
of materialmen paid by district may be set off against contrac-
tor, 32.
may be compromised by financial agent, 43.
vote of district to pay disputed, may ratify contract, 58.
CLEEK. See also Records.
of district refusing to act, 25.
while in office has right to amend records, 25.
has no right to amend when out of oflSce, 25.
COLOR,
constitutional provisions regarding, 3.
COLORED PUPILS. See also Negeoes; Separate Schools.
who are, 82.
who determines who are, 82.
mandamMs to compel establishing of schools for, 82.
order to admit, to white schools may be disregarded, 82.
COLOR OF RIGHT,
what constitutes, 48.
COMMISSIONER. See State Superintendent.
COMMON SCHOOLS. See Public Schools.
COMPENSATION. See also Teacher.
of unUcensed teacher, 63.
of unlicensed teacher, judgment for, 63.
of licensed teacher, 65.
on quantum meruit, 65.,
no deduction to be made from, for closing school, 65.
not affected by assigning scholars as assistant teachers, 65.
not affected by wrongful exclusion of pupil, 65.
COMPOSITIONS,
requiring pupils to participate in, 89.
selecting topics for, 89.
punishment for not preparing, 89.
390
INDEX
(References are to sections.]
COMPOSITIONS — Continued.
teaching by means of, 89.
COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE,
laws are constitutional, 13.
home tuition may be substitute for, 13.
home tuition may not be substitute for, 14.
laws, object of, 13.
private day school may be substitute for, 13, 14.
statutes, provisions of, 13.
statutes, are penal, 14.
laws, where and how offender against must be tried, 14.
laws, give child right to education, 72.
CONNECTICUT,
status of school districts in, 15.
CONSOLIDATION,
of schools, temporary, under statute, 20.
of school committees with districts, 20.
of district, old name given to new creates new district, 20.
of district, object of, 131.
CONSTITUTION,
of Massachusetts requires encouragement of education, 3.
of Massachusetts, eighteenth article of amendments to, 5.
of United States does not provide for education, 3.
CONSTITUTIONAL,
compulsory attendance laws are, 13.
minimum wage laws are, 64.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
for maintenance of public schools, 3.
no, in New York creating right to education, 3.
CONTAGIOUS DISEASE,
as affecting teacher's contract, 64.
CONTRACT. See also Contracts.
not to be repudiated because not recorded, 52.
does not arise where vote selecting superintendent is reconsidered
before being communicated, 53.
with one to keep order at door does not need formal vote by
directors, 53.
ability of teacher required under, 63.
teacher's, of employment, 64.
executory, with teacher broken, district liable, 64.
CONTRACTS. See aZso Publishers' Contracts ; Bids; Biddbk.
maJdng of, 54.
391
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
CONTRACTS — Continued.
must not inure to personal benefit of public officers, 54.
in making, a majority of disinterested directors must act, 54.
directors in making, must act without financial inducement, 54.
must be signed by directors in representative capacity, 54.
signature descriptio persona makes a personal obligation, 54.
if body of instrument shows signers are directors, descriptio per-
sance rule does not obtain, 54.
in making, for corporation personal seals are of no effect, 54.
in excess of debt limit, 54.
statutory provisions must be followed in making, 54.
in making, directors must act as board, 54.
may be valid although performance begins after signer's term of
office, 64.
when, may be made by two, 54.
must specify no other place than school treasury as place of pay-
ment, 54.
cannot provide for payment of attorney's fees, 54.
statutory duty to make, cannot be delegated, 54.
approval of, resting in discretion, 54.
illegal, create personal Uability, 54.
if time and place of meeting is fixed by statute, made at other
time and place is not valid, 54.
no action maintainable against party breaking illegal, 54.
made at meeting of which notice was not given to some directors
is not valid, 54.
by majority is vaUd if all directors had notice, 54.
assent of absent member to, 54.
need not be entered on records, 54.
signed by members separately without consultation, 54.
induced by false statements, 54.
need not be in writing unless statute requires it, 54.
may be reduced to writing after adjournment, 54.
with teachers to be in writing, part performance may be ratifi-
cation, 54.
unauthorized and repudiated, cannot be ratified, 54.
oral modification of, required to be in writing, 57.
modification of, 57.
president of board has no special right to modify, 57.
ratification of, 58.
only those, within authority to make may be ratified, 58.
void, cannot be ratified, 58.
392
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
CONTRACTS — Continued.
ratification of, may be by accepting benefits, 58.
ratification of, may be by voting of district to settle disputed
claim, 58.
personal, cannot be ratified by board or district, 58.
beyond authority of board, may be ratified by district, 58.
void because made by minority, may be ratified by majority, 58.
board may ratify, of de facto officers, 58.
made prior to existence of corporation may be ratified by it, 58.
subsequent board cannot ratify illegal, of preceding board, 58.
use for long time may ratify illegal, 58.
made at illegally held meeting may be ratified, 58.
vltra vires, 59.
in excess of amount voted by district, 59.
CONTRACTORS' BONDS,
statute requiring, is constitutional, 32.
may be exacted at common law, 32.
conditioned to pay aU debts incurred, 32.
conditioned to finish building free from mechanics' liens is gener-
ally void, 32.
school directors' functions in exacting, are ministerial, 32.
failure to take, as required by statute, makes trustees liable, 32.
materialman has right of action on, 32.
materialman may be estopped to claim damages, 32.
defects in, 32.
school district may be municipal corporation as to, 32.
required but not taken, effect of failiire, 32.
object of filing, is to give notice, 32.
filing, after materials are furnished, 32.
CONVERSION,
by directors, district not liable, 27.
CONVEYANCE. See also Tsanspobtation.
of school property, 40.
valid deed of, 40.
execution of deed of, 40.
"for school purposes," 40.
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT,
right of teacher to inflict, 70, 71.
CORPORATION,
of town and school district may be distinct, 15, 19.
may enjoin illegal contract to buUd schoolhouse, 30.
is taxable to full amount of capital stock, 121.
393
INDEX V
[References are to sections.]
COUNSEL. See also Attorney's Fees.
employing, 61.
employment of, for defense, 15.
COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT,
belongs to executive department, 42.
decision of, to consolidate schools temporarily, not subject to
collateral attack, 20.
is liable to damages for malicious act, 42.
powers of, 42.
duties of, 42.
records of, must show jurisdiction, 42.
dismissal of, 42.
fees of, 42.
discretion of, 42.
salary fixed by statute, 42.
privileged communications of, 42.
slander or libel by, 42.
acceptance of office of, vacates any office formerly held, 42.
qualifications of, 42.
appeal to, 42.
acts of de facto, 48.
COURTS,
cannot interfere with legislative control, 100, 102.
D
DEBATES,
requiring pupils to participate in, 89.
DEBTS,
of old district, how divided, 20.
statutes transferring, to new district held constitutional, 20.
contracted iu excess of limit, 54.
contracted without authority, 59.
of school may be payable iu bills of State bank, 111.
DEED. See also Conveyance.
"for school purposes," real estate itself must be so used, 40.
consideration in a, 40.
DE FACTO. See Officeb; School Districts.
DE JURE. See Officeb; School Districts.
DEMAND,
unnecessary when district has voted not to pay claim, 26.
DETENTION,
as a punishment, 91.
394
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
DIALOGUES,
requiring pupils to participate in, 88.
DIPLOMA,
issued illegally or through mistake, 81.
deUvery of a dummy, is of no legal effect, 81.
refusal to deUver, for failure to prepare valediction, 81.
DISTRICT MEETINGS,
how warned and called, 22, 23.
power to warn and call, are distinct, 22, 23.
proceedings of illegal, may be ratified at legal, 22.
appUcation for call of, 22.
notice of time, place, and purpose, requirements of, 22, 23.
notice must be as law directs, 23.
may act only upon matters specified in notice, 22, 23.
effect of vote on matters not specified in notice, 23.
opening of, must be reasonably prompt, 22.
must be conducted fairly, 22.
statutory date of holding annual, is mandatory, 22.
may be held outside of district, 22.
notice of place may be unnecessary, 23.
adjournment of, may be soon after convening, 22.
adjournment of, need not be in parliamentary form, 22.
power of acting at adjourned, 22.
mode provided for calling must be followed, 23.
called and held by rival factions, 23.
duty to call, 23.
neglect or refusal to call, 23.
statute requiring recording of warning is directory only, 23.
if negative vote is taken at, special meeting may be called on
same matter, 24.
DISTRICTS. See School Disteicts.
E
EDUCATION. See also Chiu).
common school, what is, 6.
definition of, 6.
early, in Massachusetts, 1.
EngUsh, what is, 6.
in England, 1.
father's duty to give, 7.
mother's duty to give, 8.
395
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
EDUCATION — Continued.
parent's moral duty to provide, 1.
child had no right to demand, 7, 78.
State law may compel father to give child, 7.
father may be compelled to give, out of his own estate, 7.
admission refused to child of insufficient, 78.
ELECTION,
not necessary that elected official be so declared, 41.
is by majority of votes cast, 41.
ELECTORS,
who are, 24.
women may be, 24.
EMINENT DOMAIN,
power to take land by, 28.
notice to owner of land, 28.
ENUMERATION,
not necessary to attach children to district, 73.
EPIDEMIC. See also Contagious Disease.
of smallpox threatened, exclusion of unvaccinated pupils, 79.
during, unfit subject for vaccination may be excluded, 79.
EXCLUSION. See also Pupils.
of persons from schoolhouse, 34.
EXCUSES,
for non-attendance of pupU, 14.
EXECUTION. See also Tax.
in some States levied on private property, 26.
EXPENSES,
to be subsequently paid are not to be paid in advance, 33.
"actual traveling expenses" do not include hotel bills, 41.
FATHER. See also Parent; Motheb; Child.
duty of, to educate child, 7.
must educate out of own estate, 7.
may be compelled to pay another who educates child, 7.
FEDERAL,
government cannot regulate public schools, 3.
FEES. See Tuition Fees; Attobney's Fees.
for heating and lighting not inconsistent with public schools, 5, 97.
tuition, may not be inconsistent with public schools, 5.
incidental, for fuel, 97.
396
rNDBX
[References are to sectioos.]
FLAG,
salute to, and pledge, 86.
FOOTBALL PLAYING,
regulation of, 93.
FRATERNITIES. See Secret Societies.
FUNDS,
used to prosecute and defend actions, 26.
no apportionment of, when district is changed unless by statute,
20.
power to provide, 21, 107.
sources of, 107.
gifts to, 107.
duty of town to pay to, of school district of larger limits, 107.
power to raise, caraiot be delegated, 107.
borrowing of money for, 108.
borrowed money not part of common school, 108.
borrowed money not covered by bond to protect, 108.
custodian and depositary of, 100, 113.
used to employ counsel, 61.
where to be deposited, 110.
mandamus to compel award of, to best bidder, 110.
apportionment of, 112.
apportionment of, when district is divided, 112.
ownership of, not vested by apportionment, 112.
in hands of commissioners not controllable by superintendent,
112.
control of officials in matters of apportionment, 112.
misapplication of, 113.
payment of, to unauthorized person is conversion, 113.
misapplication by one director does not make others liable, 113.
may not be paid to teachers in private school, 113.
power of legislature over school, 113.
wrongfully paid by officer creates personal UabiUty, 113.
illegally paid out may be recovered, 113.
no authority to use, for purposes not voted by district, 113.
public, cannot be voted for private use, 113.
loans of, 114.
loans of, how made, 114.
loans of, may create personal liability, 114.
mortgages and notes taken on loan of, 114.
recording mortgages for loan of, 114.
negligence in management of, 114.
397
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
FUNDS — Continued.
lack of, 115.
trustee may advance, 115.
debts cannot be incurred against future, 115.
may be exempt from taxation, 129.
G
GOVERNMENT LANDS,
rights of children on, to attend school, 73.
GRADUATE,
definition of a, 81.
GRADUATION,
mandamus may compel, 81.
exercises are not a part of course of study, 81.
GYMNASIUM,
authority to purchase land for, 28.
HEALTH REGULATIONS. See ako Vaccination.
enforcement of, 79.
power to adopt, 79.
HEARING. See also Teachee; Biddee.
must be given pupU expelled for misconduct, 78.
nature of right of, 78.
decision of committee on, not reviewable, 78.
need not be with formality of a trial, 78.
HIGH SCHOOL,
is a public schpol, 5.
HIGHWAYS,
may be secured when necessary, 28.
HOTEL BILLS. See Expenses.
IMPLIED CONTRACT,
acceptance of results may create, 56.
acceptance of illegal act does not create, 56.
may be created by standing by in silence, 56.
cannot arise by parol where writing is required, 56.
398
INDEX
[Heferenoes are to sections.]
INDIANS,
separate schools for, may be authorized by statute, 82.
INDICTMENT,
of town for not maintaining required school, 1 n.
INJUNCTION,
may lie against school district, 26.
will not lie to restrain collection of tax, 26.
plaintiff's petition for, must show special damage threatened, 29,
43.
to prevent removal of schoolhouse, 29.
plaintiff's petition for, must show that he is taxpayer and voter,
29.
to prevent Dlegal use of schoolhouse, 34.
may issue to prevent use of funds pending appeal, 41.
wiU not be granted when appeal is provided, 41.
threatened injury to property rights is necessary to sustain, 43.
may he against judgment to pay unhcensed teacher, 63.
will not be issued in case of unlawful discharge of teacher, 69.
INSURANCE,
school trustees may provide, 21.
paid for burned schoolhouse not gamishable, 30.
INTOXICANTS,
statutes against sale of, to students, 39.
sale of, prohibited in specified locaUties is constitutional, 39.
INTRUDER. See Usubper.
IOWA,
exclusion of colored children from schools in, 82.
K
KANSAS,
exclusion of colored children from schools in, 82.
KNOWLEDGE,
of defective condition, 33.
of defective condition, may be inferred or presumed, 33.
L
LAND,
acquired for playground and gymnasium, 28.
acquired without authority and for unauthorized purposes, 29.
reconveyance of, where title never vested, 29.
vendor of, charged with notice of vendee's authority, 29.
399
INDEX
[References axe to sections.]
LEASE,
of school lands, 40.
LEGISLATURE,
may compel parent to educate child, 13.
has primary control of public schools, 15.
construction of acts of, 15.
has primary authority to organize districts, 17.
may delegate power to organize districts, 17.
may delegate power to alter districts, 20.
control of, over districts is plenary, 17, 20.
power of, to alter and aboUsh districts, 20.
having tried one plan may change and try another, 100.
power not exhausted by exercise, 100.
courts cannot interfere when control is in, 100, 102.
LIBEL. See Privileged Communications.
LOCAL,
authorities, who are, 99.
control of schools, 100.
LOCATION. See also Site.
of schoolhouse, authority to select, 29.
may be changed as often as desired, 29.
injunction to prevent change of, must show special damage
threatened, 29.
LOCO PARENTIS,
teacher stands in, 71, 78.
M
MAJORITY,
of voters, what is meant by, 24, 41.
of names on petition, 18.
vote, what is meant by, 116.
MALICE,
must be shown in actions involving discretion of school officers,
63.
MANDAMUS,
will he to compel directors to provide schoolhouse, 21, 30.
may lie to enforce judgment, 26.
as correlative with injunction, 30.
may not be used to control discretion in approving contract, 54.
may compel issuance of teacher's certificate, 63.
may compel examination of teacher, 63.
400
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
MANDAMUS — Continued.
may compel recognition of teacher, 63.
may compel employment of licensed teacher, 63.
may compel reinstatement of pupil, 78, 80.
will not lie in case of unlawful discharge of teacher, 69.
to compel establishment of colored school, 82.
MATERIALMEN. See Claim; Contractoes' Bonds.
MECHANICS' LIEN,
only express statute can authorize, on schoolhouse, 31.
pubHc poUcy forbids, on schoolhouse, 31.
as to, a schoolhouse is a "public improvement", 31.
may He on money due contractor, 31.
MEETINGS OF SCHOOL DIRECTORS. See also Distbict
Meetings.
held outside of district are void, 50.
with aU members present may act even if not called, 50, 51.
statutory requirement to keep records of, is directory only, 50.
notice of, 51.
MICHIGAN,
exclusion of colored children from schools in, 82.
MINIMUM WAGE. See Constitutional.
MISCONDUCT,
failure of pupil to maintain given standard is not, 78.
MISTAKE,
of school oflBcer, mahce to be shown in, 63.
MORTGAGE,
securing loan of school fimds, 114.
sale under, 114.
MOTHER. iSee also Fathee; Parent; Child.
duty of, to educate child, 8.
of pupil must refrain from acts destructive of discipline, 8.
has not fuU custody of child during lifetime of father, 8.
attendance order on father cannot be subsequently enforced
against, 8.
when widowed, may not be chargeable for child's education, 8.
may be convicted for neglect, 8.
MUNICIPALITY,
usually distinct from school district of same boundaries, 15, 19.
cannot usually contract for school district, 15.
MUSIC,
power to provide teaching of, implies power to purchase piano,
35.
401
INDEX
[References are to aeotions.]
MUSIC — Continued.
may be prescribed as a study, 98.
request of parent that child be excused from lessons in, 106.
exclusion of child for refusal to study, 106.
N
NEGLIGENCE,
school directors free from, not responsible for agent's, 33.
NEGROES. See also Sepaeate Schools.
rights of, in pubhc schools, 82.
cannot be excluded entirely from public schools, 82.
cannot be taxed for white schools, 82.
NON-RESIDENTS,
orphan children boarding in district as, 73.
not entitled to free tuition, 76, 76.
may not be admitted at less rate than residents pay by taxation,
75.
may not be admitted to exclusion of residents, 75.
may not be necessary to notify of amount to be charged to, 75.
contract to admit may be invahd for want of authority, 75.
contract between districts may be necessary before admitting,
75.
NOTICE. See also Notice of Distbict Meeting; Bonds;
CoNTHACTs; Eminent Domain.
of defective premises, 33.
waiver of, by discharged teacher, 69.
NOTICE OF DISTRICT MEETING,
must be as law directs, 23.
to form new district, 23.
is jurisdictional, requirement of, 23.
is jurisdictional, posting of, 23.
may or may not be waived by appearance, 23.
need not state time fixed by statute, 23.
requires signatures of majority of directors, 23.
must express object clearly unless annual, 22, 23.
fixed at annual meeting need not be specified subsequently, 23.
computing time of, 23.
0
OATH,
to be taken by attendance officers, 96.
402
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
OFFICE,
of school officer becomes vacant when residence is set off from
district, 20.
incompatible, may not be held, 43.
acceptance of, ipso facto vacates former, 43.
of trustee and teacher are incompatible, 64.
OFFICER. See also Public Officers.
residence of, set out of district vacates office, 20.
sufficiency of return of, in stating service of warning, 23.
de facto, de jure and intruders, 48.
definition of, de facto, 48.
definition of, de jure, 48.
color of election or appointment of, 48.
color of right is essential to de facto, 48.
cannot be de facto, under unconstitutional statute, 48.
who may be, de facto, 48.
acts of, de facto are generally valid, 48.
acts of, de facto may be ratffied, 58.
acts of, de jure are valid, 48.
distinction between acts of, de facto and de jure, 48.
evidence of reputation that one is not, de jure is not admissible,
48.
elective, must be a qualified voter, 48.
school, not Uable for error in judgment, 91.
PARENT. See also Father; Mother.
may reasonably direct child's study, 11.
right of, not invaded by compulsory attendance laws, 13,
may so act as to deprive child of admission, 78.
teacher stands in place of, 71, 78.
when, may maintain action for exclusion, 78.
PARENT'S POVERTY,
may excuse neglect of child's education, 9.
PENNSYLVANIA,
abolishment of separate schools in, 82.
PERSONAL INJURIES,
district not liable for negligent, 27.
towns and cities may be Uable for, 33.
PERSONAL PROPERTY,
care of, 35.
403
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
PERSONAL PROPERTY — Continued.
duty to care for, does not give power to purchase, 35.
purchase of unnecessary articles of, 35.
rescission of contract for, 35.
PETITION,
for estabUshment or alteration of districts, 18.
right to withdraw name from, 18, 19.
what, must set forth, 18.
requirement as to majority of names on, 18.
may be necessary to change district, 20.
PHYSICIAN. See Health Regulations.
PISTOL,
teacher may take, away from pupil, 85.
PLAYGROUND,
authority to purchase land for, 28.
POWERS,
of school districts are created by statute, 15.
of school districts are very limited, 15.
and management of districts, 21.
not enlarged nor diminished by usage, 23.
to provide land and buildings, 28.
PRESIDENT,
of board of school directors has no special authority to contract,
57.
has no special right to modify contract, 57.
PRESUMPTION,
as to legahty of de facto districts, 16, 26.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS,
respecting teacher, 42.
PROMISSORY NOTES,
unauthorized, bind signers and not district, 54.
authority of qiiasi corporation to give, 109.
vote of electors may be necessary to, 109.
of districts, not subject to law merchant, 109.
signatures of directors, 109.
PROPERTY,
of old district, how divided, 20.
"PROVIDE,"
meaning of term, 35.
distiuguished from "select," 35.
PRUDENTIAL COMMITTEE,
may compromise claims, 43.
404
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
PRUDENTIAL COMMITTEE — Continued.
is general financial agent, 43.
may furnish fuel to district, 43.
PUBLIC OFFICER,
after term of office, cannot amend records, 52.
responsibility of, for loss of public moneys, 60.
school teacher is not, 69.
attendance officer is, 96.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
and "common schools" are sjmonsnmous, 4.
definition of, 5.
early, in Boston, 1.
characteristic features of, 5.
Federal government has no power over, 2, 3.
public support as affecting the term, 5.
power to establish, 2.
what are, 4, 5.
taxation as affecting the term, 5.
high schools are, 5.
normal schools are, 5.
and parochial schools distinguished, 5.
non-compulsory system of, 12.
compulsory system of, 13.
are matter of State and not municipal concern, 15.
regulation of, is primarily in legislature, 15.
of city wards are district schools, 15.
statute establishing new system for, 20.
are matters of State concern, 100.
authority of State over, 100.
PUBLISHERS' BONDS,
conditioned to secure standard quaUty and price, 105,
action on, 105.
only one recovery to be had on, 105.
imperfect books supplied, 105.
surety on, not Hable for prior breach,- 105.
pleas in actions for breach of, 105.
burden of proof in actions on, 105.
adoption of book not set out in, -105.
approval of, 105.
breach of, not made by sales of third parties, 105.
acceptance of smaller sum in satisfaction of judgment obtained
on, 105.
405
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
PUBLISHERS' BONDS — Continued.
may be subject to license, 104.
obligation of, may not be impaired by legislature, 104.
not to be broken because books too advanced, 104.
use of books adopted under, may be compelled by mandamus, 104.
defense of altered books on, 104.
legality of, not to be questioned by third party, 104.
as affected by illegal change, 104.
is made when offer is accepted by the legislature, 104.
imperfect books supplied on, 105.
PUNISHMENT,
of pupU, object of, 70.
of pupil, malice in, 70.
PUPILS,
teacher's report of attendance of, 62.
right of teacher to suspend or expel, 71.
authority of teacher over, is not limited to rules, 71.
rights and duties of, 72.
cannot demand admission on status of citizenship, 72.
right of, to attend school is not a property right, 72.
over twenty-one are subject to rules, 72.
admission of, 73.
illegal refusal to admit, 73.
duties of school authorities toward, 73.
refused admission, mandamus is proper remedy, 73.
control of, 77.
control of, extends to out-of-school acts detrimental to welfare of
school, 77.
control of, is subject to rights of parent, 77.
pubhshing poem satirizing regulations of school may be sus-
pended, 77.
profane, may be ejected from schoolhouse, 77.
exclusion, suspension and expulsion of, 77.
may be excluded for acts of parent, 78.
may be excluded though no rule violated, 78.
may be excluded for refusing to answer question concerning his
conduct, 78.
unlawfully excluded, have right of action when exclusion. is
malicious, otherwise not, 78.
unlawful exclusion of, gives parent right of action, 78.
not to be suspended for accidental injury to property, 78.
not to be suspended for trivial offense, 78.
406
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
PUPILS — Continued.
may be suspended for malicious act, but not for accidental or
negligent act, 78.
may be suspended for persistent disobedience, 78.
expelled for careless act must be reinstated, 78.
expelled, must have opportunity to be heard, 78.
exclusion of, is not arbitrary power, 78.
exclusion of, for failure to maintain scholarship, 78.
exclusion of, for refusing to allow another pupil to revise work, 78.
exclusion of, for drunkenness outside of school, 78.
exclusion of, for criticising school authorities, 78.
exclusion of, for negUgee attire, 78.
exclusion of, for failure to comply with illegal order, 78.
exclusion of, for failure to present certificate of vaccination, 79.
exclusion of, for refusal to take study which parent requests he
be excused from, 80.
exclusion of, rests in school committee, 78.
exclusion of, by teacher, 78.
no action for exclusion of, unless done by one in authority, 78.
action against town for unlawful exclusion of, 78.
sent home as a punishment is not an exclusion, 78.
reinstatement of, 80.
gross vulgarity of, forfeits right to reinstatement, 80.
application for reinstatement of, 80.
cannot be compelled to pay a sum of money as a condition pre-
cedent to reinstatement, 80.
cannot be expelled during vacation, 80.
graduation of, 81.
record of, rests in discretion of committee, 81.
whether white or colored, 82.
transportation of, 83.
expulsion of, for failure to pay incidental fees, 97.
pimishment of, for failure to take study prohibited by parent, 106.
PURCHASE,
unlawful, does not create implied contract, 56.
unlawful, seller's remedy in case of, 56.
Q
QUANTUM MERUIT,
no recovery by teacher on, when contract made orally and statute
requires writing, 64.
407
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
QUANTUM MERUIT — Continued.
if statute does not require writing, may recover on, 64.
when recovery on, may be had, 65.
R
RATIFICATION. See also Contracts ; Board of Education.
power of, of contract to buUd schoolhouse, 28.
acts may operate as, 28.
of contract required to be in writing, 54.
RECONSIDERATION,
of vote may be had at special meeting called on same matter, 24.
of two- thirds vote cannot be by bare majority, 24.
RECONVEYANCE,
unnecessary to recovery of purchase price where title never
vested, 29.
RECORDS. See also Contracts ; Clerk.
reputation may be proof of legality of district when there are
no, 16.
entering upon, consummates -formation of district, 17.
of district meetings must be kept, 24.
statutory requirement as to form not mandatory, 25.
statutory requirements of ayes and nays does not apply to unani-
mous vote, 25.
entries by secretary pro tern, 25.
not to be amended to agree with court decision, 25.
original, are evidence, 25.
contents of last, may be proved, 25.
of County Superintendent, 42.
statutory requirement for school board to keep, is directory, 50.
should be kept, 52.
all acts not necessarily recorded, 52.
past official cannot correct, 52.
contract not entered on, not invalidated, 54.
names of directors voting to dismiss teacher should be on, 69.
failing to show two-thirds vote as required by statute, 125.
correcting of, of town, 125.
of votes to be only as declared, 125.
REINSTATEMENT. See Pupils.
RELIGIOUS,
worship, 68.
songs, singing of, 68.
408
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
RELIGIOUS — Continued.
rite or ceremony, rule compelling pupils to join in is invalid, 68.
obligation, expulsion of pupil for absence through sense of, 68.
RELIGIOUS GARB,
wearing of, by teachers, 67.
RELIGIOUS PURPOSES,
use of schoolhouse for, 34.
REMOVAL,
of officer, requires charges, notice and hearing, 41.
REPAIRS,
school trustees may contract for, 21.
expense for, to be subsequently paid is not payable in advance, 33.
authority to expend specified amount for, does not authorize
greater expense, 33.
REPORTS,
of teachers, 62.
REPUTATION,
as supplying proof of legality of district, 16.
RHETORICAL EXERCISES,
requiring pupils to participate in, 88.
RULES AND REGULATIONS,.
power of adoption, 84.
prescribed by teacher, 85.
of school board waived by inconsistent action, 50.
must not be inconsistent with statute or charter, 43.
authority of teacher over pupUs not limited to, 71.
bind parents as well as pupils, 78.
against matters harmful per se not necessary, 78, 85.
are necessary against matters harmless per se, 78, 85.
as to vaccination, 79.
how tested, 84.
implied power to make, 84.
manner of establishing, 85.
need not be of record or formal vote, 85.
need not be promulgated, 85.
reasonableness and validity of, 86.
application of, must be adapted to each individual, 86.
against absence from school, 86.
enforcing, in violation of law cannot be justified, 86.
compelling pupil injuring another to accompany him home, 86.
must be needful to school government, 87.
school board's discretion on, subject to control, 87.
409
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
RULES AND REGULATIONS — Conimwed.
invading rights of parents, 95.
on rhetorical exercises and dialogues, 88.
on compositions and debates, 89.
on tardiness, 90.
on detention, 91.
on secret societies, 92.
on football playing, 93.
on acts out of school hours, 93, 95.
on pupils going directly home after school, 94,
on conduct outside of school, 95.
on attending social parties, 95.
on evening study, 95.
on truancy, 96.
on carrying fuel, 87.
on salute to flag and pledge, 86.
SALE,
of school lands must be for money, and sometimes for cash, 40.
of building rescinded for fraud, 40.
SALOONS,
licensing of, near schools, 39.
SCHOOL. See also Consolidation.
what is a, 4.
must have teacher and pupUs, 4.
cannot recover for tuition in unapproved, 26.
need not always be estabUshed in isolated territory, 37.
closing of, for small attendance, 45.
debt may be payable in bills of State bank, 111.
SCHOOL AGE,
constitutional provision as to, may not be a limitation, 74.
child very near school age may be admitted, 74.
SCHOOL COMMITTEES. See also School Dieectobs.
acts of joint, when districts have consolidated, 20.
may provide rooms and employ teachers when district fails to
act, 28.
are public oflBicers, 24, 33.
SCHOOL DIRECTORS. See also School Committee; Pbu-
DBNTiAL Committee; Board op Education;. Meetings;
Consolidation.
equivalent terms used, 43 n.
410
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
SCHOOL DIRECTORS — Continved
are public officers, 24, 33, 43.
are not merely agents, 24, 33.
may disregard vote of town, 24.
providing safe but unsightly schoolhouses are not removable for
neglect of duty, 28.
removal of, for improperly locating schoolhouse, 28.
removal of, for failure to provide sufficient schoolhouses, 28.
removal of, for failure to consider request of citizens, 28.
removal of, for failure to build new schoolhouses, 28.
powers of, 43, 50.
election of, within thirty days imder statute is directory, 43.
irregularities in election of, 43.
statutory requirement of ballot is mandatory, 43.
unanimous vote may be viva voce, 43.
tenure of office of, 43.
beginning of term of new members of, 43.
new members help organize new board, 43.
easting lots to decide term of office, 43.
responsibility of, for acts beyond authority, 43.
implied powers of, 43.
knowledge of persons dealing with, 43.
limitations of, presumed to be known, 43.
by-law adopted by, presumed to be known, 43.
may not contract away responsibility, 43.
entitled only to statutory compensation, 43.
may not employ a member at district expense, 43.
statutory power cannot be taken away by vote of district, 43.
sometimes classed- as special agents, 43.
hold fiduciary relations with district, 43.
power of, to appoint superintendent, 43.
no implied power to appoint superintendent of music, 43.
no implied power to offer rewards for detection of crime, 43.
no implied power to fine employees, 43.
may become criminally liable, 43.
have no right to exact sum from teacher for giving emplojTnent, 43.
in want of schoolhouse must maintain a school, 43.
performing duty not punishable for neglect of another, 43.
wrongful action creates liability agaiast corporation, 43.
cannot hold incompatible offices, 43.
must act together, 44.
must act in manner prescribed by law, 44.
411
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
SCHOOL DIRECTORS — Continued.
must act as a board convened, 44.
must act by a majority vote, 44.
act of minority is not suflScient, 44.
if minority of, refuse to act, 44.
majority may act, 44.
majority may not act separately, 44.
quorum of board may act, 44.
individual member acting without the board's authority cannot
bind, 44.
individual acts may be ratified, 44. ,
casual conversations among, 44.
binding action is taken only at a meeting, 44.
may act if present although not formally called, 44.
must exercise judgment and discretion, 45.
discretion of, will not be disturbed by court, 45.
may make rules, prescribe studies, and select text-books, 45.
may enforce discipline, 45.
may suspend and expel, 45.
what declaration against, must state, 45.
discretion in illegal acts will be restrained, 45.
when evenly divided, court will act, 45.
qualifying of, 46.
failure to qualify, 46.
when qualifying day is a legal holiday, 46.
removal of, 47.
vacating office, 47.
insubordination of, 47.
failure of, to organize, 47.
failure of, to appoint teachers, 47.
notice and hearing may be necessary to removal, 47.
no removal of, for individual acts, 47.
failure to record election of, 47.
unaccepted resignation does not vacate, 47.
resignation not to be inferred, 47.
removal of, from district, 47.
how office of, may be abandoned, 47.
judicial determination of vacancy may be necessary, 47.
not removable for misfeasance, 47.
as officers de facto, de jure and intruders, 48.
de facto, may make valid contract, 48.
right of, de facto cannot be questioned collaterally, 48.
412
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
SCHOOL DIRECTORS — Continued.
two boards of, each claiming office, 48.
de jure, may prevent contract with, de facto, 48.
dividing into two equal factions may be removed, 49.
rules of, are waived by inconsistent action, 50.
one dealing with, presumed to have knowledge of their limited
authority, 54.
must contract as irnit, 54.
by acts may ratify contract informally entered into, 58.
cannot bind district in excess of amount voted, 59.
cannot issue orders against future funds, 54, 59.
have no power to waive report required by statute, 62.
violating contract with teacher, district hable, 64.
may ratify invahd contract with teacher by conduct, 64.
under duty to prepare contract cannot object to form, 64.
duty to know what conditions teacher claims to act under, 64.
cannot set up own wrong in defense to claim, 64.
statute requiring, to contract with teacher, district vote thereon
may be disregarded, 64.
two members of, independent of third cannot lawfully employ
teacher, 64.
cannot contract so as to divest future boards of rights, 64.
neglect of, to raise funds for teachers' salary creates personal
liability, 65.
acting within scope of duties liable oiJy for wanton or malicious
acts, 69.
no right of action against, for exclusion of child, 72.
illegal refusal of, to admit pupil, 73.
illegal acts of good faith by, in excluding pupUs, 78.
SCHOOL DISTRICTS. See also Boundaries or Districts;
Consolidation.
meaning of joint, fractional, separate, and independent, 131.
status of, 15.
are quasi corporations, 15.
are municipal corporations for some purposes, 15.
are created by general statutes, 15.
do not act under charters, 15.
can act only in corporate capacity, 15.
are boimd by what acts, 15.
not usually part of mimicipal government, 15.
status of, in Connecticut, 15.
as separate from town of same limits, 15, 19, 26.
413
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
SCHOOL DISTRICTS — Continued.
de facto, 16.
de facto, cannot be collaterally attacked, 16, 26.
who may attack de facto, 16.
powers of de facto, 16.
presumption as to de facto, 16.
formation and organization of, 17.
independent, are against policy of law, 17.
erected to separate wealthier and poorer classes, 17.
act of establishing, when consummated, 17.
hmits of, not changed by enlargement of town, 19.
power to alter, 20.
legality of alteration, 20.
hold property in trust for town, 20.
powers and management of, 21.
non-liability of, in tort, 27.
will not be bound for unauthorized purchase of land, 29.
action of trespass not maintainable by inhabitants of, 38.
vote of, on statutory requirement is advisory only, 64.
credit of, not to be pledged except by statute. 111.
may be compelled to enforce its legal rights, 113.
two-thirds vote to reestablish to be shown on record, 125.
SCHOOLHOUSE. See also Building Committee.
title is in district, 20.
title passes to new district when formed, 20.
power to provide, 21, 28.
in Indiana may be used for any township purpose, 21.
not to be used for other than school purposes, 21.
authority to select site for, 21, 29.
in repair of, district not Hable for tort, 27.
what is a, 28.
power to determine cost of, 28.
power to contract for, 28, 30.
distance of two miles to walk to, not unreasonable, 28.
removal of directors for failure to provide, 28.
of separate schools may be exchanged, 28.
legal vote of district to buUd, is mandatory, 30.
authority to erect, 30.
abandoned by contractor may be finished by directors, 30.
contract with director to superintend erection of, is void, 30.
building committee may employ a member to superintend erec-
tion of, 30.
414
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
SCHOOLHOUSE — Continued.
duty to care for, 33.
expense authorized in building, must be taken note of by con-
tractor, 30.
contractor may rely upon location pointed out by committee, 30.
committee to build, are agents of district, 30.
illegal contract to build, may be enjoined, 30.
injunction to prevent erection of, 30.
mandamus to compel erection of, 30.
no express authority to build, is necessary in Georgia, 30.
not liable to levy on execution, 30.
insurance money on, not gamishable, 30.
condemnation of dilapidated, 33.
may not be used for other than district or educational purposes,
33.
need not be erected for school purposes only, 34.
district may not part with control of, for great length of time, 34.
exclusions of persons from, 34.
not necessary to build, in isolated territory, 37.
appendages to, 36.
burning of, not arson at common law, 38.
burning of, is arson usually by statute, 38.
action of trespass to, may be maintained by school directors, 38.
not maintainable by inhabitants, 38.
offenses against, 38.
contract to buy, if awarded contract for new, is iUegal, 40.
when unfit may be sold, 40.
State Superintendent cannot reverse action of school directors
deciding to build, 41.
want of, does not relieve directors from maintaining school, 43.
acceptance of, implies contract to pay for it, 56.
illegaUy built, no right to levy tax for, 56.
illegally built, acceptance does not create implied contract, 56.
amount voted by district to build, not appropriated in letting
contract may be used later, 57.
unauthorized repairs on, not ratified by use, 58.
unauthorized expenditures in construction of, not ratified by use,
58.
occupancy and use of, may not be ratification, 58.
expenditure for, in excess of authorized amount may be ratified,
58.
electors decide what sort of, shall be built, 59.
415
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
SCHOOLHOUSE — Continued.
increased expenditures for, should be authorized by vote of dis-
trict, 59.
burning of, as affecting teacher's compensation, 65.
may be exempt from taxation, 129.
SCHOOL PROPERTY,
may not be used for other purposes except by statute, 21.
duty to keep, in safe condition, 33.
right to, 34.
control of, 34.
not to be used for certain purposes, 34.
offenses agaiast, 38.
loitering on, 38.
SCHOOL WARRANTS,
power to draw, cannot be delegated. 111.
drawn by de facto officers cannot be denied payment, 48.
may not be issued payable in future, 54, 59, 111.
issued to unlicensed teacher is void, 63.
statute prescribing purposes to be shown on fact, 111.
statute prescribing form is mandatory. 111.
indorsee of. 111.
are not subject to law merchant. 111.
defenses against, 111.
do not bear^ interest unless statute so provides. 111.
district not liable on, UlegaUy issued, 111.
want of authority as a defense, 111.
are prima facie valid. 111.
no privity of contract between holders of, and city where district
is separate. 111.
issuance of, does not merge oral contract into written. 111.
alone create no legal liability. 111.
need not bear corporate seal, 111.
directors not Uable where, on face show obligation of district, 111.
in violation of statute is void. 111.
receivable in pajrment of school tax, 128.
SEAL,
appointment of committee not under, no ground to avoid contract
with them, 56.
SECRET SOCIETIES,
regulation of, 92.
punishment for joining, 92.
growth of, 92.
416
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
SECRET SOCIETIES — Cow^wMed.
objections to, 92.
statutes against, not necessarily unconstitutional, 92.
SECTARIAN PURPOSES,
reading of Bible and singing as promoting, 68.
"SELECT,"
meaning of term, 35.
distinguished from "provide," 35.
SEPARATE SCHOOLS,
schoolhouses of, may be exchanged, 28.
constitutionality in establishing, 82.
must be uniform, 82.
must have equal school year, 82.
for Indians, 82.
established for three or four pupils is misuse of public funds, 82.
can be established only by authority of statute, 82.
power to establish, cannot be controlled by courts, 82.
colored children cannot be entirely excluded from, 82.
colored children compelled to travel further to reach, 82.
colored children compelled to cross railroad track to reach, 82.
access to, beset with dangers, 82.
SEX,
constitutional provisions regarding, 3.
SINGING,
of reUgious songs, 68.
SITE. See also Location.
authority to select, 21, 29.
authority to purchase, may include broker's fee, 28.
selection of, sometimes may not be delegated, 29.
may be changed as often as desired, 29.
record of action in choosing, 29.
land acquired for purposes other than, 29.
selection of, defeated, may be voted at new meeting, 29.
pubUc park may not be, 29.
pubUc square may be, 29.
injunction against changing, must show special damage threat-
ened, 29.
pointed out by committee may be relied upon by contractor of
building, 30.
duty to select may not be delegated, 54.
SLANDER. See Privileged Communications.
SPECLA.L ASSESSMENT. .See Taxation.
417
INDEX
[Eeferences are to sections.]
STATE SUPERINTENDENT,
may have control of schools, officials and funds, 41,
usually has power of removal, 41.
cannot reverse acts of discretion, 41.
scope of powers of, on appeal, 41.
appeal to, provided by statute is necessary proceeding, 41,
injunction not granted when appeal is provided, 41.
election of, manner of voting and electing, 41.
trustee may not vote for himself for, 41.
statutory appropriations to, do not give personal right to funds, 41,
suit by, through private attorney, 41.
judicially decides, 42.
appeal to, by discharged teacher, 69.
STATUTE,
city charter may prevail over a general, 43.
rules of school authorities must not be inconsistent with, 43.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,
as a defense, 26.
acts amounting to promise to pay, 26.
STATUTES,
all, are to be construed together, 15.
are to receive Uberal construction, 131.
creating presumption as to de facto districts, 16,
authority of, to alter districts, 17.
estabhshing new school system, 20.
powers of school districts derived from, 21.
synopses of principal, of each State, 131,
Alabama, 132.
Arizona, 133.
Arkansas, 134.
California, 135,
Colorado, 136.
Connecticut, 137.
Delaware, 138.
Florida, 139.
Georgia, 140.
Idaho, 141.
Illinois, 142.
Indiana, 143,
Iowa, 144.
Kansas, -145.
Kentucky, 146.
418
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
STATUTES — Continued.
Louisiana, 147.
Maine, 148.
Maryland, 149.
Massachusetts, 150.
Michigan, 151.
Minnesota, 152.
Mississippi, 153.
Missouri, 154.
Montana, 155.
Nebraska, 156.
Nevada, 157.
New Hampshire, 158.
New Jersey, 159.
New Mexico, 160.
New York, 161.
North Carolina, 162.
North Dakota, 163.
Ohio, 164.
Oklahoma, 165.
Oregon, 166.
Pennsylvania, 167.
Rhode Island, 168.
South Carolina, 169.
South Dakota, 170.
Tennessee, 171.
Texas, 172.
Utah, 173.
Vermont, 174.
Virginia, 175.
Washington, 176.
West Virgmia, 177.
Wisconsin, 178.
Wyoming, 179.
STEP-FATHER,
may be compelled to educate step-child, 7.
STUDIES,
teacher's report of branches of, 62.
pupil is entitled to admission if he passes aU but one, 84.
prescribed by legislature, 98.
prescribed by directors inconsistent with State Board of Educa-
tion, 98.
419
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
STUDIES — Continmd.
courts may not interfere with course of study, 98.
prescribed or prohibited by parent, 106.
right of parent to direct child's, 106.
SUPERINTENDENT. See State Superintendent.
TARDINESS,
punishment for, 90.
TAX,
power to levy, 117.
adverse vote to levy, taken at district meeting may be recon-
sidered at special meeting, 24, 118.
vote to lay, may be reconsidered before assessment, 24.
injunction will not lie to restrain collection of, 26.
remedy against collection of Ulegal, 26.
to pay for schoolhouse Ulegally erected may be resisted, 56.
imiform, to pay for school building exclusively for whites, 82.
may be laid for higher branches of study than described in statute,
117.
if any doubt of right to, cannot be levied, 117.
meeting to authorize levy of, 118.
burden of proof of illegal, is on taxpayer, 118.
when certified, levied and partly paid, vote may not be rescinded,
118.
voted at irregular meeting, 118.
purposes of, 119, 124.
purposes of, must be shown in vote, 124.
valid levy may be made after void one, 119.
classification of purposes of, 119.
on land in possession is valid, even if title is defective, 119.
voted for schoolhouse before site is procured, 119.
collection of, not to be enjoined because it may be improperly
used, 119.
vote to levy, must specify amount, 120.
manner of levying, 121.
against corporation, 121.
may be levied annually, 121.
in levying, statute must be strictly followed, 121.
apportionment of, 122.
apportionment of, power of, is in legislature, 122.
420
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
TAX — Contimied.
benefits of, 122.
may be laid upon what property, 123.
on land must be within district, 123.
how assessed on personal property, 123.
on stock of national bank, 123.
on municipal property, 123.
certificate of levy, 124.
certificate of levy, signing of, 124.
certificate of levy, defective, 124.
certificate of levy, must be correct, 124.
certificate of levy, second may be made, 125.
assessing of, 125.
method of valuation, 125.
time of assessing, 125.
assessed for future expenses, 125.
discretion in assessing portion of, 125.
debt of, is fixed by assessment, 125.
districts changed after, assessment, 125.
for schools is not a special assessment, 125.
assessment of, may be made after period prescribed by statute,
125.
omission to, particular property, 125.
assessed on part of school district, 125.
irregularities in, legalized by legislature, 125.
constitutionality of, 126.
what, law should contain, 126.
power to, granted to municipal authorities, 126.
levied for higher grades of study, 126.
levied under unconstitutional act, 126.
illegal levy of, 127.
levied to pay excess warrants, 127.
on property outside of district is void, 127.
levied by one not officer de facto, 127.
levied before building authorized, 127.
assessment and collection of, beyond authority gives no right of
action against district, 127.
illegal vote to, carried into effect creates personal UabUity, 127.
property or money taken for illegal, may be recovered, 127.
collection of, 128.
collection of, same as executions, 130.
collector of, must be officer de jure to maintain action, 128.
421
INDEX
[Beferences are to sections.]
TAX — Continued.
collector of, paying over to successor, 128.
collector of, incurring expenses in office, 128.
collector of, must not sell excess of distrained property, 128.
collector of, levy by, 130.
wrongfully collected to be returned, 128.
irregularities in levy of, 128.
time of payment of, 128.
may be paid ia school warrants, 128.
delinquent, 130.
delinquent, execution and sale for, 130.
how collected, 130.
to whom paid, 130.
validity of, 130.
collector of, acquires special property in thing levied upon, 130.
collector may become trespasser, 130.
TAXATION,
of white and colored people must be uniform, 82.
borrowing not to be substituted for, 108.
repeal of laws on, 117.
benefits of, 122.
exemption of property from, 129.
exemption of property, use not ownership governs, 129.
special assessment is not, 129.
TAX WARRANT,
assessors liable for issuing illegal, 125.
if illegal may be revoked, 125.
lost, new one may issue, 128.
lost, proving contents of, 128.
signed by two trustees prima facie valid, 128.
TEACHER. See also Compensation, Injunction.
contract with, required in writing, part performance as ratifi-
cation, 54.
unauthorized contract with, not ratified by part performance, 54.
definition of, 62.
duties of, 62.
duties are founded on contract, 62.
not Uable to parent for refusal to instruct, 62.
rule that, shaU reside in city, 62.
reports of, 62.
reports of, payment of salary dependent on, 62.
reports of, no power to waive, 62.
422
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
TEACHER — Continued.
certificate, is accepted under conditions of statutes, 63.
certificate, bias in revocation of, 63.
certificate, endorsement of, 63.
certificate, examination of applicant for, may be compelled, 63.
certificate, issuance of, may be compelled, 63.
certificates, 63.
certificates and licenses are controvertible terms, 63.
certificates, form and nature of, 63.
certificates, expiration of, 63.
certificates, approval of, 63.
certificates, refusal to grant, 42, 63.
certificates, refusal to examine for, 63.
certificates, burden of showing want of, 63.
certificates, is evidence of qualification, 63.
certificates, wrongful withholding or revocation, 63.
certificates, notice may be necessary to revocation of, 63.
must show license to teach in action brought for wages, 63.
authority of unlicensed, not to be questioned by parents of
pupils, 63.
contract of unlicensed, 63.
dismissed for incompetency, 63.
average ability only is required, 63.
compensation of unlicensed, 63.
employment of unlicensed, may be necessary, 63.
recognition of, and employment of, may be compelled, 63.
contract of emplojrment, 64.
contract to be in writing, 64.
contract may be enforced against successors in school board, 64.
contract by de facto officer, 64.
contract, rules and regulations may be part of, 64.
contract to teach primary grade, not to be required to teach
higher grades, 64.
contract is for personal services, not for substitute, 64.
contract for less than minimum-wage law is crime, 64.
contract invalid, may be ratified by conduct, 64.
contract specifying term of service, longer period cannot be
claimed, 64.
contract beginning at specific date runs through year if not
limited, 64.
contract, form of, to be prepared by directors, 64.
contract need not be signed by directors simultaneously, 64.
423
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
TEACHER — Continued.
contract valid upon face cannot be repudiated, 64.
contract signed by, subsequent to meeting, 64.
contract separately agreed to may be repudiated, 64.
contract made orally when statute requires writing, no recovery
on quantum meruit, 64.
contract, statute requiring written is mandatory, 64.
contract, statute requiring duplicate is directory, 64.
contract, oral, after term of written, is unenforceable, 64.
contract, oral, ia absence of statute requiring written, recovery
may be on quantum meruit, 64.
contract, in absence of, services accepted are to be paid for on
quantum meruit, 64.
contract, act of God rendering performance impossible excuses
from liability, 64.
contract, contagious disease as affecting, 64.
contract made by two members of committee, 64.
contract extending beyond term of office of directors, 64.
contract extending beyond one school year, 64.
contract to teach given period, payable monthly, is entire con-
tract, 64.
contract, no recovery when entire contract is broken, 64.
contract, fixing living or boarding place in, 64.
contract implies that, guarantees learning and capacity to impart
it, 64.
contract made by trustees with a member of board, 64.
contract made by moderator with her husband, 64.
contract made by director with his minor daughter, 64.
contract is abandoned by acceptance of imauthorized dismissal,
64.
contract giving up statutory advantage is void, 64.
contract, notice of dismissal given before services are begun, 64.
contract, marriage is not breach of, 64.
contract, measure of damages in breach of, 64.
compensation of, 65.
appointed by de facto officer or agent may recover compensation,
65.
assigning scholars as, 65.
salary, refusal of treasurer to pay, 65.
salary, neglect of directors to save money for, 65.
salary, placing of money therefor with custodian does not
amount to pasrment, 65.
424
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
TEACHER — Continued.
salary, not attachable while in possession of municipal officers, 65.
powers of, 66.
suspension and expulsion by, 66.
discharge of, for expelling pupil, 66.
has no authority to contract for janitor service, 66.
prohibiting the wearing of religious garb by, 67.
discharge, removal and suspension of, 69.
assigning of, to lower grade is a removal, 69.
right to discharge at pleasure, 69.
notice and hearing of discharged, may be necessary, 69.
vote of majority is necessary to dismissal of, 69.
no action for salary of, after dismissal by authority of statute, 69.
who has right to dismiss, 69.
action for salary after illegal dismissal of, 69.
dismissed for cause and afterward reinstated no action for salary
for interim, 69.
right of dismissed, to salary is terminated by the notice, 69.
unlawful discharge of, right of action defeated by new agreement,
69.
discharge of, for statutory cause, 69.
wrongfully dismissed, not obliged to accept different employ-
ment, 69.
measure of damages of discharged, 69.
burden of proof in discharge of, 69.
necessary appeal to superintendent by discharged, 69.
is not pubHc officer, 69.
mandamus will not He in case of unlawful discharge of, 69.
injunction wiU not be granted in case of unlawful discharge of,
69.
discharge of, is reviewable only in statutory tribunal, 69.
resignation of, 69.
cannot be dismissed for incompetency before services rendered,
69.
contract of, for definite period, under statute may be dismissed
at pleasure, 69.
dismissed when contract is for deffiaite period, 69.
refusal of, to consent to unspecified vacation, 69.
assault and battery on, 69.
forcibly dispossessed of schoolhouse, 69.
marriage of female, no cause for removal, 69.
maternity of, absence for, 69.
425
INDEX
[Refeiences are to sections.]
TEACHER — Cmtinued.
refusal of, to be vaccinated, 69.
refusal of, to admit dismissed pupil, 69.
right of, to chastise pupil, 70.
assault by parent on, for chastising pupil, 70.
charged with assault and battery on pupil, 70.
injury by, inflicted on pupU, 70.
right of, to expel pupil, 71, 78.
right of, to expel pupil, in emergency, 78.
stands in loco parentis, 71, 78.
use of pupils as, 72.
parent insulting and abusing, to interruption of school, 78.
TEXT-BOOKS,
teacher's report of, used, 62.
exclusion of pupil for failure to comply with illegal order per-
taining to, 78.
adoptions of, 99.
of dangerous and immoral tendency selected by comroittee not
controllable by courts, 98.
purchased by State and sold to pupils, 99.
control of sale of, 99.
of designated publisher, 99.
imiform series of, 99.
authorizing change of, 99.
notice of change of, 99.
caUing teachers together for advice on, 99.
right of trustees to prescribe, 99.
uniformity of, prescribed by legislature, 100.
uniformity of, what is, 100.
commissions, 101.
object of text-book commissions, 101.
reference books used in connection with, 101.
bids for supplying, 102.
power of legislature to contract for, 102.
conventions called to receive bids for, 102.
awarding of contract for, without advertising, 102.
deUvery of contract for, by bidder, 102.
free, 103.
committee may purchase on personal credit, 103.
pubUshers' contracts for, 104.
publishers of, may be licensed, 104.
price on, may be fixed by legislature, 104.
426
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
TEXT-BOOK COMMISSIONS. See also Text^books.
appointment of, not a supervision of instruction, 101.
wiU of, not to be thwarted by local adoptions, 101.
TORT,
actions for, against districts, 27.
district not liable for injury by excavation, 27.
district not liable for certain acts of negligence, 27.
district not liable for conversion by directors, 27.
district not liable for unsafe conveyance, 27.
district not liable for burning of pupil, 27.
district not liable for injury by falling column, 27.
district not liable for defective premises, 27.
agent of district may be liable for, 27.
liability for, may be created by statute, 27.
by wrongful entry on records, 43.
TRANSPORTATION,
district not liable for providing unsafe, 27.
of pupils, 83.
duty of furnishing, 83.
remedy for failure to provide, 83.
compulsory attendance law as affected by failure to' provide,
83.
funds to establish, 83.
requiring pupils to meet conveyance, 83.
right of, is a public right, 83.
school district not liable for injuries in negligently provided, 83.
of pupils on railways at half fare, 83.
TREASURER,
of school board, duties of, 60.
of school board, bond of, 60.
of school board, generally absolutely responsible, 60, 110.
of school board, may be liable for money stolen from him, 60.
of school board, directors may not release, from debt if no con-
sideration, 60.
of school board, may be liable for funds deposited in bank which
fails, 60, 110.
of school board, is liable for own negligence, 60.
of district may pay himseK legal claim rejected by district, 64.
refusing to pay teacher's salary becomes liable, 65.
is proper custodian of funds, 110, 113.
may bring suit against collector for withheld funds, 110.
shall "hold" money, meaning of term, 110.
427
INDEX
[Eeferences are to sections.]
TREATY,
regulating schools by, 3.
TRESPASS,
exclusion of those who, 34.
TRUANCY. See also Attendance Officebs.
not an offense at common law, 96.
expulsion for, 96.
TUITION,
cannot recover for, in unauthorized school, 26.
TUITION FEES,
may not be inconsistent with public schools, 5.
may not be exacted for manual training, 76.
may not be exacted from resident foster chUd, 76.
may be exacted from those over age, 76.
may be exacted from non-residents, 76.
may be exacted from temporary residents, 76.
U
ULTRA VIBES,
acts, 59.
UNIFORMITY,
in school system as open to aU, 3.
what is, in school system, 3.
what is, in text-books, 100.
USAGE,
powers cannot be enlarged nor diminished by, 23.
does not sanction abuse of powers, 23.
USE,
of school property, 34.
of goods illegally purchased does not ratify, 58.
of goods for long time may ratify illegal purchase, 58.
USURPER. See also Officer.
officer elected under unconstitutional statute is"; 48.
acts of, are void, 48.
by acquiescence may become officer de facto, 48.
definition of, 48.
right of, to be settled by quo warranto, 49.
acts of, may be enjoined, 49.
V
VACANCIES,
conflict of statute and city charter as to fiUing, 43.
428
INDEX
[References are to sections.]
VACCINATION,
effect of statute requiring, 14.
of pupU may rest in option of parent, 14.
laws as conflicting with compulsory attendance laws, 14, 79.
certificate of, as condition of attendance, 79.
board of health regulations concerning, 79.
laws concerning, as exercise of police power, 79.
laws concerning, not repealed by compulsory education acts, 79.
unfit subject for, 79.
unfit subject for, may be excluded during epidemic, 79.
rule requiring, is not unreasonable or unconstitutional, 79.
in absence of statute requiring, rule is invalid unless epidemic is
pending, 79.
avoiding compulsory attendance law by refusing, 79.
what officers have duty of excluding pupils, 79.
rules, when valid, 79.
VOTE,
to organize school district, 17.
of district may be reconsidered at special meeting, 24.
two-thirds, cannot be reconsidered by bare majority, 24.
of town may be disregarded by school directors, 24.
electing superintendent may be reconsidered, 53.
formal, is not necessary with school directors in subordinate
matters, 53.
what is meant by majority, 116.
VOTING,
method of, 24.
W
WARNING. See District Meetings.
WARRANT. /See School Wabhant; Tax Waeeant.
429
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