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A freatise on the law of municipal corpo
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((nrnpU Slam ^rJyool ICtbraty
A TREATISE
ON
THE LAW OF
1
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
IN THE
UNITED STATES. ,,.:
BY \;y^, \
CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN,
Author of " Real Property," " Limitations of Police Powei-," etc. and
Professor of Law in the University of the City of New York.
New York and Albany:
BANKS & BROTHERS, LAW PUBLISHERS.
18^4.
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year One Thousand Eight
Hundred and Ninety-four,
Bt CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN,
in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.
V
PREFACE.
«
The writing of a preface to a work like the present
is rather a perfunctory performance, where the author
and the merits and peculiar features of his work are
known. The reader and critic will find, by an exami-
nation of these pages, that the present volume, like the
other works of the author, is designed to present with-
in the confines of one volume a succinct and clear state-
ment of the law of Municipal Corporations, by an inclu-
sion of everything material, and exclusiofi of everything
immaterial, to the clear comprehension of the general
principles and rules of law, bearing upon, or involved
in, the subject. v
The author desires to make a public acknowledg-
ment of his indebtedness to Mr. H. C. Underbill, LL. B.
of Brooklyn, N. Y., for his active and efficient assistance
in the preparation of the manuscript for the press.
C. G. T.
University of tlie City of New Tork,
January, 1894.
vi TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Section 31. Proof of corporate existence.
32. Power to repeal and amend city charter, effect of exercise of
such power.
33. Special power when repealed by general laws.
34. Implied repeal of general laws by special laws.
CHAPTER IV.
Dissolution of Municipal Corporations.
Section 37. How dissolved in England.
38. How dissolved in the United States.
39. Forfeiture of corporate existence.
40. Effect of dissolution of corporation.
41. Eights of creditors on a dissolution of a municipal corpora-
tion.
42. The rights of creditors where a second corporation has been
established in its place.
43. Effect of dissolution of corporation in general, where no other
corporation has been substituted therefor.
44. Revival by a new charter.
CHAPTER V.
Corporate iN^anie, Seal and Boundaries.
Section 47. Corporate name, how obtained.
48. Change of corporate name — Name acquired by reputation.
49. Effect of misnomer in general.
50. Use of corporate name in suits.
51. Requirement of a corporate seal.
52. Seal, how proved.
53. Boundaries, how defined.
54. Corporate boundaries by reference to streams and highways.
55. Enlargement of boundaries — Annexation of territory.
56. What territory may be annexed — Farm lands.
57. Effect of extension of city boundaries.
58. Effect of annexation of one town to another.
59. Effect of division of one town into two.
60. Legislative power to apportion property and debts in cases of
annexation and division.
61. Procedure in cases of annexation — When annexation legal.
62. Exercise of power beyond city limits, only one corporation
' over same area.
63. Division of municipal territory into wards.
CHAPTER VI.
Municipal Elections and Officers.
Section 65. Time and place of holding elections.
66. Qualifications of voters — Residence.
67. Who are municipal officers ?
68. Legislative control over officers.
TABLE OF CONTENTS. VU
Section 69. Qualification for municipal office — ^Women when eligible.
70. Civil service examinations.
71. Preference for veterans.
72. Official bonds.
73. Official oaths.
74. Disqualifications on account of prior official position.
75. Appointments to office.
76. Exercise of the appointing power.
77. Legality of appointment presumed.
78. Acceptance of office.
79. Compensation.
80. Assignment of salary.
81. Holding over after expiration of term of office.
82. Vacancies.
83. Removals when for cause.
84. Proceedings to remove for cause.
85. Illegal removals — Right to salary.
86. Resignations — Incompatible officers — Change of residence.
87. General povrers and duties of officers.
88. De facto officers.
89. Police officials — Power to arrest.
90. The mayor — Nature of his duties and powers.
91. Liability of the officer to the corporation.
92. Municijial liability for official acts.
93. Jurisdiction of courts over elections.
CHAPTER VII.
Mnnicipal Councils, Meetings, Records and Courts.
Section 95. Notice of corporate meetings — New England town meet-
ings— Ad j ournment.
96. Town councils — Pi'esiding officers.
97. Regular, special and adjourned meetings.
98. Methods of proceeding — Ayes and noes.
99. Quorum of the council — Joint bodies — Action of the ma-
jority binding.
100. Municipal business must be transacted by the council as a
body — Meetings.
101. Municipal courts at common law.
102. Municipal courts — Power to establish.
103. Competency of corporators as jurors, judges and witnesses.
104. Summary proceedings — Jury trials.
105. Review by Superior Court — Jury trials.
106. Custody of municipal records— Power to amend.
107. Municipal records as evidence — ^Admissions.
108. Admissibility of parol evidence to explain municipal records,
CHAPTER VIII.
Charter Powers, their Nature, Construction and Limitations.
Section 110. Classification and construction of charter powers.
viii TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Section 111. Imperative and discretionary powers distinguished.
112. Discretionary powers.
113. Delegated powers cannot be delegated.
114. Usage in construing powers — Prescription.
115. The indemnity for officials acting in good faith.
116. The police power of municipal corporations— Its scope and
limitations.
116 a. Territorial limits of police regulations.
117 The municipal power to legislate upon subjects covered by
State statutes.
118. Sanitary regulations — Slaughter houses— Cemeteries— Un-
wholesome provisions.
119. Sanitary regulations continued — Contagious diseases — Re-
moval of refuse — Water supply.
120. The regulation and abatement of nuisances in general.
121. Regulation of harbor and navigable waters.
122. Eegulation of occupations and amusements.
123. Licenses, when a police regulation, and when a tax.
124. License power of municipal corporation construed.
125. Licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors.
126. Supervision and care of paupers, vagrants, indigent, insane
and sick persons.
127. Inspection of goods and other commodities.
128. Establisliment and regulation of public markets.
129. Impounding of animals — Ordinances respecting dogs.
130. Prevention of fires — ^Fire limits — Purchase of fire apjiaratus.
131. Regulation of buildings and their construction.
132. Eegulation of private wharves.
133. Public wharves.
134. Ferries and ferriage.
135. Regulations providing for the public welfai'e, peace and
safety.
135 a. Regulations of railroads within city limits.
136. Power to appropriate funds for lobbying purposes.
137. Power to borrow money.
138. Payment of bounties.
139. Celebrations and entertainments.'
140. Rewards.
141. Erecting, furnishing and repairing public bviildings.
142. Compromises and arbitrations.
143. Power of municipality to sue and be sued.
144. Power to create private monopolies.
144 a. Power to create and operate municipal monopolies — Mur
nicipal ownership of gas, electric light and waterworks .
CHAPTER IX.
Ordinances.
Sectiow 145. Definition — Ordinances and resolutions distinguished.
146. Power to pass ordinances.
TABLE OF CONTENTS. IX
Section 147. Delegation of power of legislation — OfBcial non-liability.
148. Method of enactment — Mode, time and proof of publication
— Mayor's approval.
149. Ordinances must be enacted in good faith.
150. Ordinances must be lawful and reasonable.
151. Ordinances must not be oppressive.
152. Ordinances must be impartial and general.
153. Those on whom ordinances are binding — Notice — Evidence.
154. Power to enforce ordinances by fines or imprisonment.
155. Forfeiture.
156. Procedure to enforce ordinances — Arrest.
157. Action in name of corporation.
158. Pleading ordinances.
159. Validity of ordinances, a question of law.
160. Evidence — Defence — Construction of ordinances.
161. Repealing ordinances.
162. Eatification of invalid ordinances by Legislature.
CHAPTER X.
Municipal Contracts.
Sectioit. 163. Inherent or implied power to contract.
164. Implied contracts.
165. Mode of contracting, writing or seal when necessary — Stat-
ute of Frauds.
166. Municipal contracts with its agents.
167. Form of contracts made by municipal agents.
168. Non-liability of public ofiBcial acting within his authority.
169. Authority of municipal officials to contract — Ultra vires.
170. Ratification, what constitutes.
171. Contracts for public works — Contractor's bond — ^Payment.
172. Advertising and letting to lowest bidder — Patented articles.
173. Bids — Sealed proposals — Taxpayer's remedy — ^Fraud in bid-
ding.
174. Annulment of contracts — Corporate control of work.
175. Contracts for water supply.
176. Contracts with attorneys at law.
CHAPTER XI.
Municipal Securities.
Section 177. Municipal warrants — Negotiability — Form and effect — Pre-
sentment— Payment.
178. Warrants payable out of a particular fund.
179. Presentment of warrants — ^Indorsement — Actions by and
against whom.
180. When actions may be brought — ^Defences — Statute of Limi-
tations.
181. Municipal scrip — Illegal obligations as circulating medium.
182. Implied power to borrow money and to emit negotiable
paper.
X TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Section 183. Power to issue negotiable securities.
184. Public purposes— Aid to railroad.
185. Construction, completion and location of road as affecting
the validity of bonds issued in its aid.
186. Subscriptions for stock— Conditions precedent.
187. Legislative power to compel the issue of bonds for public
purposes.
187 a. Curative statutes valididating irregular subscriptions and
invalid securities.
188. Bonds issued in aid of private purposes — Constitutional pro-
hibitions.
189. Consent of taxpayers or voters as a condition precedent to
issue of municipal bonds.
189 a. Limitations upon municipal indebtedness.
190. The municipal coupon bond — Its nature and definition.
190 a. Execution of the municipal bond — By what officials must
it be signed.
191. Negotiability of coupon bonds— Eights of holder of the
same.
191 a. To whom payable— Transfer by indorsement or delivery.
191 6. Eegistration of municipal securities by State officials.
192. Presentment of coupons for payment.
192 a. The time of payment.
192 b. Interest and exchange on bond and coupon.
193. Actions on bonds and coupons.
193 a. "When consideration paid to corporation for invalid bond
may be recovered.
194. Legislative control of remedies to enforce payment of mu-
nicipal debts.
194 a. Remedies for enforcement of municipal indebtedness.
195. Defences to bonds — Conflict of decisions.
195 a. Burden of proof.
196. Doctrine of estoppel, as applicable to hona flde holders — ■
Effect of i-ecitals in the bonds.
197. Renewal and funding.
198. Disposal and sale of bonds.
199. Statute of Limitations.
CHAPTER XIL
Kight of Mnnicipal Corporations to own aud control Property.
Section 200. Eight of municipal corporations to acquire property.
201. Real estate beyond corporate limits.
202. Donations of land to a municipal corporation.
203. Power of municipal corporations to serve as trustee of a
charitable use.
204. Devises and grants for objects foreign to corporate purposes.
205. Gifts or grants to unincorporated communities.
206. Interference by State courts in performance of trusts by mu-
nicipal corporations.
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XI
Section 207. Invalid grants to municipal corporations, how invalidated.
208. Povrer of alienation.
209. Povrer to mortgage.
210. Povrer to lease corporate property.
211. Requisites of conveyances by municipal corporations.
212. Sale of corporate property on execution — Liability for debts,
CHAPTER XIII.
Dedication of Property to Public Use.
Section 214. General statement.
215. . General requisites of statutory dedications.
216. Extent of statutory dedication.
217. General requisites of common law dedication.
218. Wlio may dedicate.
219. Intention to dedicate, how established.
220. Presumption of intention from long user.
221. Platting and sale of lots as evidence of intention.
222. A dedication irrevocable, when accepted.
223. Effect of acceptance.
224. Extent of common law dedication, as respects donor's titla
223. Public right to alluvium and accretions.
226. Dedication to use as public square.
227. Dedication to other public uses.
228. Effect of misuser or abandonment of dedicated lands.
229. Alienation of dedicated lands.
CHAPTER XIV.
Eminent Domain.
Section 230. Eminent domain defined.
231. Constitutional limitations.
232. Exercise of power regulated by Legislature.
233. Delegation of power to municipal corporations.
234. What is a public purpose.
234 a. Power to take lands for a private road.
235. Power to take land for ornamental purposes.
236. Power to take lands for purpose of draining them.
237. Power to take land beyond city limits.
238. What property may be taken.
239. What constitutes a taking.
240. Exercise of eminent domain by municipal corporations.
241. Conditions precedent to the exercise of the power.
242. Effect of discontinuance of proceedings.
243. Compensation required.
244. Who entitled to receive compensation.
245. Who assesses the damages.
246. The measure of value or damages.
247. When payment should be made.
248. Apportionment of damages among lots benefited.
249. Revisory proceeding — Certiorari.
250. Effect of accepting damages.
Xll TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XV.
Municipal Taxation and Local Assessments.
Section 253. Taxation defined and distinguished from eminent domain
and police power.
254. Taxation authorized only for public purposes.
255. Municipal authority to levy taxes whence derived.
256. Municipal power to tax, when implied.
257. Legislature may change the taxing power of municipalities
at will.
258. Federal limitations in the exercise of the power of taxation.
259. Constitutional provisions as to requirements of uniformity
and equaUty.
259 a. Uniformity and equality in local assessments.
260. Road tax and compulsory labor on the same.
260 a. Poll tax, constitutional.
261. Power to tax professions, trades and callings.
262. Power to levy retrospective taxes.
263. Municipality cannot delegate its authority.
264. Power of taxation a continuing one.
265. Power of taxation cannot be varied or enlarged by city or-
dinances.
266. Limitation of tax rate cannot be exceeded.
267. Construction and reconcilement of general laws with special
charter provisions.
268. What can be taxed.
269. Discrimination between real and personal property, when
permissible.
270. Exemption from taxes, when permitted.
271. Public property not taxable.
272. What property is within municipality for purposes of taxa-
tion.
273. Taxation of banks, railways and other corporations.
274. Taxation of incorporeal heraditaments.
275. Choses in action when taxable.
276. Taxation of agricultural land.
277. Local assessments for sewers.
278. Notice to and assent of abutters to assessments.
279. Power of Legislature to dispense with notice.
280. Reassessments.
281. Adjoining owner's relation to contract— His liability.
282. Methods of collection.
283. Lien of taxes.
284. Statute of Limitations.
CHAPTER XVL
Streets, Bridges and Turnpikes.
Section 286. Definition of street.
287. AUeys.
288. Conflict of jurisdiction over streets.
TABLE OP COKTENTS. XIU
Section 289. Delegation of legislative power over streets.
290. Construction of charter powers over streets.
291. Power to pave construed.
292. Power to improve, pave and grade continuous.
293. Eights of the municipality in soil of the streets, in general.
294. Eight of municipality in soil of the streets for construction
of sewers and cisterns.
295. Pipes in streets, for gas and other purposes.
296. Power to grant an exclusive franchise to lay pipes and to use
streets for other semi-private purposes.
297. Poles for the hanging of telegraph and other wires — Abut-
ters' right to compensation.
298. Openings in and vaults under sidewalks.
299. Municipal regulation of street travel and traffic.
300. Street obstructions.
301. Legislative control of streets — Eights of abutting owners
therein.
302. Legislative power over the construction of railroads. Its
delegation to cities ; construction of grant.
303. Eights of abutting owners, how affected by construction of
steam railroads along the street.
304. Abutting owners, how affected by surface street railways.
305. Elevated street railways in relation to abutting owners.
306. Municipal control over the construction and operation of rail-
roads in streets.
306 a. Electric and cable cars on street railways.
307. Eemedies of abutters — Measure of damages.
308. Vacation of streets by Legislature — ^Delegation of power to
municipal corporations.
309. Proceedings to vacate.
310. Burden and means of proving vacation and abandonment.
311. Compensation to abutters on vacation.
312. Statute of Limitations, as applicable to the public easement
in street — ^Equitable estoppel.
313. Definition, character and construction of public bridges.
314. Legislative and municipal powers over bridges.
314 a. Kational control over construction and maintenance of
bridges.
315. County liability for maintenance and repair of public bridges.
316. Eights and duties of municipal corporations in building, re^
building and maintaining bridges.
317. Private bridges on or intersecting highways.
318. Turnpikes.
319. Extent of municipal power over turnpike.
320. Incidents of toll.
321. Tlie law of the road.
xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XVII.
Liability of Municipal Corporations for Torts.
Section 324. Implied liability of municipal corporations.
325. QMasi-municipal corporations not liable for breach of official
duty.
326. Liability of municipal corporations for illegal taxes, fines
and licenses.
326 a. Payment must be compulsory.
327. Municipal corporations not liable for nonperformance of dis-
cretionary duties.
327 a. Failure to abate nuisances.
327 h. Liability for negligent supply of water.
828. Liability for manner in which discretionary powers are ex-
ercised.
329. Consequential damages — Changes in the grade of streets —
Improvements.
330. Constitutional and statutory provisions, guaranteeing com-
pensation for property damaged — Eemedy.
331. Municipal corporations not liable for failure to enforce ordi-
nances.
331 a. Liability for mistake as to corporate powers.
332. Municipality not liable for neglect or misconduct of health
officers.
333. Municipality not liable for torts of police officials.
333 o. Liability for torts of firemen.
334. Liability for property destroyed by mobs and rioters.
335. Destruction of buildings to prevent a conflagration.
335 a. Destruction of property under military and sanitary regu-
lations.
336. Receipt of consideration, as a ground of liability for negli-
gence.
336 «. Liability as an owner of property.
337. How may negligence be proven.
338. Negligence of municipal servants — ^What must be proven —
Torts ultra vires.
338 a. Who is a municipal officeT or agent.
339. Liability for the condition of highways and streets — Munic-
ipal and g«asi-municipal corporations distinguished.
340. Statutory liability for neglect in maintenance and repair of
highways — Construction.
341. QMasi-municipal corporation, when liable for specific duties.
342. Municipal liability for injury from defective streets — Horses
taking fright.
343. Bailings or barriers, signs and lights, to guard excavations,
areas, and basements.
344. Accidents caused by ice and snow.
344 a. Negligence in lighting streets.
345. Falling of weighty things in highways.
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XV
Section 346. Right to go outside the traveled path — Estoppel to deny ex-
istence of highway — Sidewalks.
347. Liability for work given out on contract — Liability for torts
of contractors.
348. Liability for torts of abutters — Liability of abutters for the
same.
349. Liability for neglect in performance of ministerial duties.
350. Defects and obstructions created by municipal corporations.
350 a. Necessity for, and evidence admissible, to show notice, in
order to charge corporation with negligence.
351. Proximate cause.
352. Contributory negligence.
352 a. Damages in suits for negligence.
353. Bridges.
354. Water courses.
354 a. Surface water.
.355. Drains and sewers.
CHAPTEE XVIII.
Mandamns and Quo Warranto.
Section 359. Nature of mandamus and wherein it differs from injunction.
360. Mandamus against municipal corporations.
361. Mandamus and quo warranto distinguished.
362. Distinction between discretionary and mandatory powers,
as limiting the right to mandamus.
363. Who may apply for the writ.
364. Prior judgment, when not necessary.
365. Practice — Effect of laches.
366. Framing the writ and order to show cause.
367. Importance of a correct direction and proper service of the
alternative writ.
368. Beturn to the alternative writ.
369. Peremptory wi'it, when allowed — Means of enforcing obedi-
ence.
370. Final judgment — Effect of resignation or death of officials.
371. Mandamus, as applicable to municipal elections and to elec-
tive officers.
372. Mandamus, as applicable to removal and suspension of offi-
cials.
373. Mandamus, as applicable to custodians of public records and
of public funds.
374. Mandamus against school officers.
875. Mandamus in aid of the rights of municipal creditors.
376. Mandamus to compel levy of a special tax for specific object
377. Mandamus, as applicable to municipal improvements.
378. Nature of quo warranto.
379. By whom proceedings are instituted.
380. Practice and procedure — Power discretionary.
Xvi TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Section 381. How far remedy by quo warranto is superseded by special
statutory proceedings for the control of contested elections .
382. User on part of usurper necessary.
383. The burden of proof.
384. Quo warranto proceedings to secure the forfeiture of a mu-
nicipal charter.
385. Quo warranto to test the legal existence of municipal cor-
porations.
386. Effect of judgment in quo warranto.
387. Effect of judgment, when not rendered during official term.
CHAPTER XIX.
Bemedies against Mnnicipal Corporations in General.
Section 391. Equitable remedies.
392. Necessity for equitable remedies — Code of Procedure — Pre-
liminary injuction.
393. Equitable jurisdiction over municipal officials.
394. Municipal corporations as trustees.
395. Taxpayers' suits in equity.
396. Injunction to restrain damages to private property — ^Multi-
plicity of suits.
397. Injunction to restrain the collection of taxes.
398. Scope of certiorari.
399. What may be examined under writ of certiorari.
400. Indictment.
401. Writ of prohibition.
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Aaron v. Broiles, (64 Tex. 316) 327,
328
Abbett V. Johnson Co., (114 Ind. 61)
353
Abbott V. Hermon, (7 Me. 118) 170
Abbott V. Mills, (3 Vt. 521) 219
Abbott V. K. C, etc., E. R. Co., (83
Mo. 271) 354 a
Abbott V. Cottage City, (143 Mass.
521) 217
Abby V. Billups, (35 Miss. 618) 51
Abel V. Pembroke, (61 N". H. 357)
140
Aberdeen v. Blackmar, (6 Hill, 324)
348
Aberdeen v. Sykes, (59 Miss. 236) 196
Aberdeen v. Sanderson, (8 Sm. & M.
670) 13
Abernethy v. Van Buren, (52 Mich.
353) 353
Abilene v. Hendricks, (36 Kan. 6)
350 &
Abraham v. Gt. Northern, etc., (16
Q. B. 386) 314
Academy v. Aberdeen, (21 Miss. 645)
13
Acker v. Anderson, (20 S. C. 495) 353
Ackley School Dist. v. Hall, (113 U.
S. 135) 28, 183
Adam v. Wright, (84 Pa. 720) 33
Adams ». Bay City, (44 N. W. E. 138)
294
Adams v. Emerson, (6 Pick. 58) 293
Adams v. Farnsworth, (15 Gray, 423)
164
Adams v. Lancashire & Y. R'y Co.,
(L. E. 4 C. P. 739) 352
Adams v. Lindell, (5 Mo. Ap. 197) 28
Adams v. Mack, (3 N. H. 493) 107
Adams v. Mayor, (29 Ga. 56) 125, 150
Adams v. Memphis & L. R. R. E.
Co., (2 Coldw., Tenn. 645) 209
Adams v. Newfane, (8 Vt. 271) 249
Adams v. Natick, (13 Allen, 429) 343
Adams v. Ohio Falls Car Co., (31 N.
E. E., Ind. 92, 57) 226
Adams v. E. R., (2 Coldw. 645) 182
Adams c. Rome, (50 Ga. 765) 209
ii
Adams v. Somerville, (2 Head,
Tenn. 363) 267
Adams v. Walker, (34 Conn. 466) 354 a
Adams v. Whittlesey, (3 Conn. 560)
169
Addis V. Pittsb., (85 Pa. St. 379) 172,
281
Addy V. Janesville, 70 Wis. 401) 355
Adger ». Mayor, (2 Spear, 719) 300
Adler v. Whitbeck, (9 N. E. Rep.,
Ohio, 672) 123
Adler ». Metro. E. R. Co, (33 N. E. R.,
935; 138 N.T. 173)301
Ad ley v. Reeves, (2 M. & S. 61) 154,
155, 156 '
Adolph V. Central etc. Co., (65 N. Y.
554) 302, 321
Advertiser etc. v. Detroit, (43 Mich.
116) 87
^tna L. I. Co. v. Nexson, (84 Ind.
.347) 352 a
JEtna Mills v. Waltham, (126 Mass.
122) 338.
^tna L. I. Co. v. Middleport, (124
U. S. 534) 195 c
African Society v. Varick, (13 Johns.
38) 47, 49
Agaw^am N. Bk. v. South Hadley,
(128 Mass. 503) 195 d
Agnew V. Brail, (124 111. 312) 142, 163
Agnew V. Coruima, (55 Mich. 428)
351
Ah Fov, Ex parte, (57 Cal. 92) 123
Ahrens v. Fiedler, (43 N. J. L. 400)
363
Aiken Ave., In re, (11 Pa. Co. Ct. R.
228) 228, 278
Aiken v. Railroad Co., (20 N. Y. 370)
134
Aiken T. C. v. Lythgoe, (7 Rich. Law,
4.35) 219
Airy Street, Re, (113 Pa. St. 281) 28
Akron o. Chamberlain Co., (34 O.
State, 328) 292
Alam V. Boyd, (87 Pa. St. 477) 167
Ala. M. R. Co. V. Newton, (Ala. 92,
10 So. R. 89) 245
Alabama S. R. Co. v. Railroad, (87
Ala. 154) 314.
xvii
xvm
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Alabama State Bar Assn., Ex parte,
(Ala. 91, 18 So. E. 768) 363
Albany v. Cunliff, (2 ST. Y. 165) 169,
338
Albany North R. R. v. Brownell, (24
N. T. 345) 301
Albany City Nat. Bk. v. Albany, (92
N. T. 363) 70
Albany Street, In re, (11 Wend. 149)
259 a
Albany etc. Co. v. Brownell, (24 N.
Y. 345) 391
Albertine v. Huntsville, (60 Ala. 486)
3506
Albian v. Hedrick, (90 Ind. 545) 352
Albnow V. Sibley, (30 Minn. 186) 339
Albright v. Council, (9 Rich., S. C.
399) 163 - *
Albrittin v. Huntsville,(60 Ala. 486) 32
Albuquerque v. Beres, (13 S. Ct. 143;
147 U. S. 87) 397
Alcorn v. Philadelphia, (112 Pa. St.
494) 264, 338 a
Alcorn v. Horner, (38 Miss. 652) 259 a
Alden v. Minneapolis, (24 Minn. 254)
354 a, 329
Alderman v. Finley, (5 Eng., 10 Ark.
423) (1850) 30, 31
Aldrich v. Gorham, (77 Me. 287) 342,
351
Aldrich v. Howard, (7 R. I. 87) 120
Aldrich v. Tripp, (11 R. I. 141; 23
Am. Rep. 434) 92, 336
Aldridge v. Railroad Company, (2
Stew. & Port. 199; 23 Am. Dec.
307) 232
Alexander v. Alexandria, (5 Cranch,
2)33
Alexander v. Baltimore, (5 Gill, Md.
383, 39.3) 255
Alexander v. Bennett, (60 N. Y. 204)
104
Alexander ». Helber, (35 Mo. 334)
282
Alexander v. Kerr, (2 Rawle, 83) 120
Alexander v. Milw., (16 Wis. 247)
292, 329
Alexander v. McDowell, (67 N. C.
330) 365
Alexander v. Railroad Co., (3 Strob.
S. C. Law, 594) 133
Alexander v. State, (16 Ala. 661) 400
Alexander v. Tolleston Club of Chi-
cago, (110 111. 65) 207
Alexander ». Vicksburg, (68 Miss.
564) 92 .
Alger V. Easton, (119 Mass. 77) 92
Alger ». Lowell, (3 Allen, 402) 343,
352
Allen V. Boston, (Mass. 93, 34 N. E.
R. 519) 299
Allen V. Burlington, (45 Vt. 202) 326 o
Allen V. Chippewa Falls, (52 Wis.
530) 353, 354 a
Allen 1). Dallas, etc., Co., (3 Woods,
316) 195 c
Allen V. Decatur, (24 111. 332) 338
Allen V. Galveston, (51 Tex. 302) 165,
259 a, 290.
Allen V. Hancock, (16 Vt. 230) 352
Allen V. Jay, (60 Me. 124, 11 Am.
Rep. 185) 254
Allen V. Jersey City, (N. J. 91, 22
Atl. R. 257)
Allen V. Jones, (47 Ind. 442) 240
Allen V. McKean, (1 Sumn. 276) 2. 85
Allen ». Louisiana, (103 U. S. 580) 189,
195 d
Allen V. Sea, etc., Assn., (9 C. B. 574)
177
Allen V. Vincennes, (25 Ind. 531) 310
Allen V. Willard, (57 Pa. St. 374) 347,
352
Allen Co. v. Clinton, (Ind. 93, 32
ST. E. R. 735) 325
Allegheny v. Campbell, (107 Pa. St.
530) 132, 336 a
Allegheny v. Ohio & Pa. R. R. Co.,
(26 Pa. St. 355) 289
Allegheny City ». McClurkin, (14 Pa.
St. 81) 169
AUe. Co. V. Van Campen, (3 Wend.
49)<72
Allegheny Co. v. Broadwaters, (69
Md. 533) 352
AUentown Bor. v. Saeger, (20 Pa. St.
421) 326 a
AUentown Sch. Dis. v. Derr, (115 Pa.
St. 439) 192 6
Allentown v. Grim, (109 Pa. St. 113^
148
Allentown v. W. U. Tel. Co., (23 Pa.
St. 1070) 123
Alletson v. Chichester, (L. R. C. P.
319) 351
AUine v. LaMars, (71 Iowa, 654) 344,
352
Allisons. R. W. Co., (9 Bush, 247)
395
All Saints Church v. Lovett, (1 Hall,
N. Y. 191) 48
Almy V. Churcli, (26 Atl. R. 58, R. I.
93) 312
Althen v. Kelley, (32 Minn. 280) 293
AHgelt V. San Antonio, (81 Tex. 436)
169
Alton u. Hope, (68 111. 167) 354a
Alton V. 111. Transp. Co., (12 HI. 60)
229, 312
Alton V. Kirsch, (68 HI. 261) 156
Alton V. MuUedy, (21 HI. 76) 113,
164
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XIX
References are to Sections.
Alpero V. San Francisco, (32 Fed.
Rep. 503) 392
Alvord». Syracuse Sav. Bk., (9 K. Y.
599) 196
Amboy v. Sleeper, (31 111. 499) 117
Ambrose v. Buffalo, (20 N. Y. S. 129;
29 Abb. N. C. 140) 396
Amer. B. N. Co. v. N. Y. E. R. R.,
(13 N. Y. S. 626) 248
American Bk. Note v. Railway Co.,
(59 N. Y. Super. Ct. 175) 3H6
American Ins. Co. v. Oakley, (9 Paige
N. Y., 496) 51, 164
Amer. F. Go. v. Board, (43 Fed. R.
609) 259
Am. L. I. Co. V. Bruce, (105 U. S. 328)
196
Am. Nic. Pav. Co. v. Elizabeth City,
(4 Fisher Pat. Cases, 189, 197) 338
Amer. Trint Wks. v. Lawrence, (23
N. J. L. 595) 335
Amer. R. F. Co. v. Haven, (101 Mass.
398) 373
Am. Union Exp. Co. v. St. Joseph,
(66 Mo. 675) 261
Amery v. City, (72 Iowa, 401) 279
Araey v. Allegheny City, (24 How.
364) 148
Amey v. Allegheny City, (24 How.
364) 254
Ames ». Dorset, (23 Atl. R. 857) 354
Ames V. Duryea, (6 Lans. 155) 66
Ames V. Kansas. (11 U. S. 449) 380
Ames V. P. H. L. Co., (11 Mich.) 139
Ames B. Lake Superior & Miss. R. R.
Co., (21 Minn. 241) 245
Amite City v. Clements, (24 La. An.
27) 2, 8
Amoskeag Co. v. Goodale, (62 N. H.
BH) TA2
Amperse v. Kal. Counc, (59 Mich.
78) 362
Amperse ». Kalamazoo, (75 Mich. 228,
42 N. W. R. 821) 327
Amy V. Des Moines, (11 Wall. 136)
349
.Vmv V. Galena, (7 Fed. Rep. 163) 14
Amy V. Watertown, (130 U. S. 302) 86
Amyx V. Taber, (23 Cal. 370) 129-
Anderson v. Anderson, (42 Vt. 350)
66
Anderson v. Bain, (22 N. E. R. 323)
330
Anderson v. Boone Co., (61 Mich.
489) 354
Andersons. Comrs., (12 Ohio St. 365)
108
Anderson v. Donnell, (7 S. E. R. 523)
30, 158
Anderson v. East, (117 Ind. 126, 129)
327, 345
Anderson v. Kerns Draining Co., (14
Ind. 199) 234
Anderson v. Mayfield, (Ky. 92, 19 S.
W. R. 598) 12, 255, 270
Anderson v. O'Connor, (98 Ind. 168)
145
Anderson v. O'Donnell, (7 S. E. R.
524) 104
Anderson v. Pemberton, (89 Mo. 61)
241, 232
Anderson v. Santa Anna, (116 U. S.
364) 17, 195
Anderson v. St. Louis, (47 Mo. 484)
241, 249.
Anderson v. State, (23 Miss. 459) 270
Anderson Co. v. Beal, (113 lb. 227)
216
Anderson Co. v. Houston etc. Co., (52
Tex. 228) 216
Andover b. Gould, (6 Mass. 40) 330
Andrews ». Dyer, (81 Me. 104) 49
Andrews v. Estes, (11 Me. 267) 167
Andrews v. Ins. Co., (37 Me. 256) 146
Andrews b. King, (77 Me. 224) 84
Andrews v. Portland, (79 Me. 484)
79, 85
Andrews v. Pratt, (44 Cal. 309) 79,
208
Annapolis v. Harwood, (32 Md. 471)
282
Annapolis v. State, (30 Md. 212) 28
Anne Arundel Co. o. Duckett, (20
Md. 467) 327 a, 349
Anthony Street, In re, (20 Wend. N.
Y. 618) 242
Anthony b. Adams, (1 Met. 284) 4, 92,
338
Antones v. Eslava's Heirs, (9 Port.
Ala. 527) 217
Antoni ». Greenhow, (107 U. S. 766)
283
Apple V. Crawford Co., (105 Pa. St.
300) 79
Appleby v. K. York, (41 N. Y. 481)
362
Appleby v. Mayor, (15 How., N. Y.
Pr. 428) 172
Ansley v. Wilson, (50 Ga. 418) 282
Arbegust v. Louisville, (2 Bush, Ky.
271) 56
Archer b. Stelinas, (93 Cal. 43) 215
Areata v. Jfrcata R. R. Co., (92 Cal.
639) 302, 303
Arents v. Commonwealth, (18 Gratt.
776) 190, 192
Argente v. San Francisco, (16 Cal.
255) 282
Argus Co. V. Mayor etc., (55 N. Y.
495) 165
Arimond v. Green Bay Co., (31 Wis.
316) 238, 355
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
Beterences are to Sections.
Arkadelphia v. Windham,. (49 Ark.
139) 339
Arkadelphia L. Co. v. Arkadelphia,
(19 S. W. Kep. 1053) 134, 261
Arkansas E. P. Co. v. Sarrells, (Ark.
88, 8 S. W. R. 683) 217, 229
Arlington v. Barnet, (15 Vt. 745) 288
Armfield v. Salen, (19 N. T. S. 44)
51
Ai-ms V. Knoxville, (32 Dl. Ap. 604)
328
Armstrong v. Ackley, (71 Iowa, 76)
350 ft
Armington v. Barnet, (15 Vt. 745) 233
Armstrong v. St. Louis, (69 Mo. 309)
249
Armstrong v. Brunswick, (79 Mo.
319) 325, 327 a
Armstrong v. Toler, (11 Wheat. 258)
352
Armstrong Co. v. Clarion Co., (66 Pa.
St. 318) 164
Armsworth v. S. E. Ky. Co., (11 Jur.
758) 352 a
Am V. Kansas City, (15 Fed. Hep.
336) 355
Arnold v. Cambridge, (106 Mass. 352)
397
Arnold v. Cov. & Cine. Br. Co., (1
Duvall, Ky. 372) 245
Arnold v. Decatur, (29 Midi. 11) 232
Arnold v. Hawkins, (95 Mo. 569, 8
S. W. E. 718) 266
Arnold v. Heniy Co., (81 Ga. 730) 315,
353
Arnold v. Shields, (n Dana, Ky. 18)
250, 401
Amot V. McClure, (4 Denio, N. Y.
45) 250
Amoult V. New Orleans, (11 La. An.
54) 28, 55
Arouheimer v. Stokley, (11 Phila.
283) 130
Aroma v. Auditor, (15 Fed. Kep. 843)
190 a
Arapahoe v. Albie, (38 N. W. R.
737) 31
Arapahoe Co. v. Crotty, (9 Colo. 138)
362
Airowsmith v. New Orleans, (24 La.
An. 194) 217
Arundel v. McCulloch, (10 Mass. 70)
314
Askew V. Hale Co., (54 Ala. 639) 3,
339 353
Ash V. People, (11 Mich. 347) 124,
128
AshbeiTy v. W. Senaca, (58 Hun, 602)
335
Ashbrook v. Com., (1 Bush, 139) 118
Asher v. Texas, (128 U. S. 129) 258
Asheville Com'rs v. Means, (7 Ired.
L., N. C. 406) 256
Ashley's Case, (4 Abb. Pr. Rep. 35) 96
Ashley v. CaUiope, (71 Iowa, 466) 62
Ashley v. Port Hm-on, (35 Mich. 296)
355
Ashley v. Reynolds, (2 Strahan, 916)
326 a
Ashton ». Rochester, (14 N. Y. S.
855) 162
Ashton V. Rochester, (10 N. E. R.
965, 133 N. Y. 187) 278
Aspinwall o. Daviss, (22 How. 364)
12, 14
Assessors, etc., v. Commissioners, (3
Brews. Pa. 333) 348
Assessor v. State, (21 N. J. L. 557)
273
Astor V. N. Y. Arcade Ry. Co., (113
N. Y. 93) 28, 302
Asylum ». New York, (12 N. E. R.
279, 104 N. Y. 381) 268
Atchison «. Bartholon, (4 Kan. 124)27
Atchison v. Butcher, (3 Kan. 104) 17
Atchison v. Challis, (9 Kan. 603) 328
Atchison v. Jansen, (21 Kan. 560)
339
Atchison v. King, (9 Kan. 550) 148,
351, 352 a
Atchison v. Lucas, (83 Ky. 451) 69
Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Maquilkin,
(12 Kan. 301) 17, 53, 55, 61
Atchison, etc., Co. v. Miss. R. R. Co.,
(31 Kan. 660) 302
Atchison, etc., Co. v. Nare, (17 Pac.
R. 587) 396
Athern v. District, (33 Iowa, 105) 108
Atliens V. Hemerick, (Ga. 93, 16 S.
E. E. 72) 165
Atkins V. Phillips, (Fla. 91, 8 So. R.
429) 99, 123
Atkins V. Randolph, (31 Vt. 336) 14,
15, 18
Atkinson v. Mott, (102 Ind. 431) 129
Atkinson, etc., Co. v. Phillips Co.,
(25 Kan. 261) 185
Atlantic An. E. R. Co., In re, (32 N.
E. R. 771, 136 N. Y. 292) 302
Atlanta v. Gate R. Co., (Ga. 88, 4 S.
E. R. 209) .306
Atlanta v. Gate City, etc., (71 Ga.
106) 301
Atlanta v. Green, (67 Ga. 386) 330
Atlanta v. Perdue, (53 Ga. 607) 346
Atlanta v. Wilson, (60 Ga. 473) 343,
352
Atl. & Pac. R. E. Co. v. Cleino, (2
Dillon, 175) 270
Atlantic City Waterworks v. Atlan-
tic City, (39 X. J. Eq. 367) 144, 163,
296.
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXI
References are to Sections.
Ail. etc. Tel. Co. v. Chicago etc. R.
E. Co., (7 Blss. 158) 297
Attala Co. B'rd v. Grant, (17 Miss.
77) 369
Attaway v. Cartersville, (58 Ga. 740)
333
Attorney General v. Aspinwall, (2
My. & C. 613) 393
Attorney General v. Barstow, (4 Wis
749) 67, 371
Attorney General v. Boston, (142
Mass. 300) 290
Attorney General v. Boston, (123
Mass. 469) 359, 363, 3(55, 384, 392
Attorney General v. Brown, (24 N.
J.. Eq. 89) 120
Attorney General v. Bowman, (2 B.
& P. 532) 104
Attorney General v. Bradley, (36
Mich. "447) 28
Attorney General v. Bridge Co. (20
6i-ant, U. C. 34) 353
Attorney General v. Cohoes, (6 Paige,
133) 396
Attorney General v. Corporation of
Worcester, (2 Phillips, 3) 48
Attorney General ». Corporation of
Leicester, (9 Beav. Eng. 546) 48
Attorney General v. Corporation of
Poole, (4 M. & Cr. 17) 105'
Attorney General v. Detroit, (29
Mich. 108) 18
Attorney General v. Detroit, (26
Mich. 263) 165, 394
Attorney General v. Detroit, (55
Mich. 181; 5 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas.
497) 165
Attorney General v. Ean Claire, (37
AVis. 400) 254, 396.
Attorney General v. Ely, (4 Wis. 420)
65
Attorney General v. Foote, (11 Wis.
14) 383
Attorney General v. Gas Co., (19
Bag. L. & Eq. 639) 120
Atty. Gen. i'. Goodrich, (5 Grant,
Can. 402) 308
Attorney Gen. v. Hackney Local Bd.
(L. K, 20 Eq. 626) 355
Atty. Gen. v. Hatch, (60 Mich. 229) 8
Atty. General v. Heelis, (2 Sim. &
Stu. 67) 393
Atty. Genl. v. Hud. Riv. R. R., (9 J^.
J. Eq. 526) 314
Atty. Gen. ». Johnson, (2 Wils. Ch.)
391
Atty. Gen. v. Kerr, (2 Beav. 420) 49
Atty. Gen. v. Lawrence, (11 Mass.
90) 371
A-ttorney General v. Leeds, (L. R. 5
Ch. App. 5^3) 35.5
Attorney Genl. v. Litchfield, (13
Simons, 547) 393
Atty. Gen. v. Lock, ( 3 Atk. 164) 110
Atty. Gen. v. Lombard, etc., (1 W. N.
C, Pa. 491) 300
Attorney General ». Mid. Kent etc.,
(L. R. 3 Ch. 100) 353
Atty. Gen. v. Mayor of Rye, (7 Taunt.,
Eng. 546) 49, 50
Atty. Gen. v. Mayor of Norwich, (2
M. & C. 406) 115
Atty. Gen, v. Mayor, (3 Duer, 119) 113
Atty. Gen. v. Mayor, (128 Mass. 312)
371
Atty. Gen. v. Metro. R. R. Co., (125
Mass. 515) 304
Atty. Gen. v. Morris etc. Co., (20 X.
J. Eq. 530) 302
Atty. General v. Myers, (58 Hun, 218)
360
Attorney General v. Norwich, (13
Simons, 225) 393
Atty. General v. Parker, (3 Atk. 576)
67
Attorney Genl. ■». Poole, (4 Mylne
& C. 613) 393
Atty. Gen. ». Preston, 56 lb. 177) 87
Attorney Gen. v. Salem, (103 Mass.
138) 384
Atty. Gen. v. Tarr, (148 Mass. 309) 223
Atty. Gen. v. Toronto, (14 Grant's
Ch., Can. 073) 302
Atty. Gen. v. Trombly, (50 N. W. R.
744; 89 Mich. 50) 18
Atty. Gen. v. Siddon, (1 C. & J. 220)
104
Attoi-ney General ». Shewsbury, (6
Beav. 220) 37
Atty. Genl. v. Walworth L. & P. Co.,
(Mass. 90, 31 N. E. R. 482) 396
Attorney Gen. v. Winnebago L. <fe
F. R. PI. R. Co., (11 Wis. 42) 265
Atty. Gen. v. Worcester, (2 Philips,
3) 47, 49
Atwater v. Canandaigua, (124 N. Y.
602) 92
Auburn Theol. Sem. v. Childs, (4
Paige, N. T. Ch. 418) 202
Auburn v. Goodwin, (21 N. E. R.
212) 215
Auburn v. Paul, (24 Atl. R. 817; 84
Me. 212) 279
Auditor v. Cochrane, (9 Bush, 7) 79
Auditor v. Davies, (2 Pike, 494) 5
Auditor v. Maier, (54 N. W. R. 640)
270 279
Auditor v. Stiles, (83 Mich. 460) 28
Augusta, etc.. In re, (12 Up. Can. Q.
B. 522) 316, 363
Augusta V. Dunbar, (50 Ga. 387, 392)
(1873).
XXll
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Augusta V. Augusta Bank, (56 Me.
176) 1916
Augusta V. Hafers, (59 Ga. 151) 343
Augustas. Hudson, (88 Ga. 599; 15
S. E. R. 678) 324
Augusta V. Leadbetter, (16 Me. 45)
143
Augusta E. Perkins, (8 B. Mon., Ky.
437) 208, 221
Augusta V. Sweeny, (44 Ga. 463) 79
Augusta Bank ». Augusta, (49 Me.
500) 254
Augusta Council i. Dunbar, (50 Ga.
387) 271
Augusta etc. Co. r. Randall, (4 S. E.
K. 674) 259
Augusta Factory v. Counsel, (83 Ga.
734; 10 S. E. K. 359) 397
Aurora v. Bitner, (100 Ind. 396) 350o
Aurora v. Colshire, (55 Ind. 584) 346
Aurora r. Dale, (90 111. 46) 352
Aurora v. Fox, (78 Ind. 1) 108, 293
Aurora v. Hillman, (90 111. 61) 3506
Aurora v. Love, (93 111. 521) 355
Aurora v. Puffer, (56 HI. 270) 327
Aurora v. West, (9 Ind. 74) 2, 8
Austin r. Allen, (6 Wis. 134) 108
Austin c. Austin Gasi. & C. Co., (69
Tex. 180) 259 a, 270
Austin V. Carter, (1 Mass. 231) 349
Austin V. Coggeshall, (12 K. I. 329)
139
Austin r. French, (7 Met. 126) 72
Austin V. Gas Co., (Tex. 88, 7 S. W.
E. 200) 270
Austin V. Gulf, Col. & Santa Fe R.
K., (45 Tex. 234) 259 a
Austin V. Murray, (16 Pick, 121) 118,
121, 158
Austin V. Seattle, (2 Wash. St. 667)
259 a
Austin V. Walton, (68 Tex. 507) 158
Avery v. Tyringham, (3 Mass. 277) 83
Avoyo V. !New York, (54 How. Pr.
Rep. 245) 336
Ayer v. Xorwich, (39 Conn. 376) 342
Ayers v. Turnp. Co., (4 Halst. 33) 320
Ayers v. Appeal, (122 Pa. St. 366) 2ii
Ayers i-. Penn. E. Co., (20 Atl. E. 54)
224
Ayies V. Hammondsport, (29 X. E.
R. 2(35 ; 130 X. Y. 665) 344
Ayres v. Pa. R. R. Co., (48 X. J. L.
44 (1856); s. c, 57 Am. Rep. 538)
228
B.
B. & H. Ferry Co. v. Davis, (48 Iowa,
133) 134, 144
B. Mercer Bor. Road, (14 Serg. & R.
447) 288
B. & O. R. Co. V. Walker, (45 Ohio,
577; 16 N. E. E. 475) 317
Bab B. Clerk, (F. Moore, 411) 154
Babbage v. Powers, (29 IST. E. R. 132 ;
130 N. Y. 281) 299
Babcock V. Beaver Creek, (31 N. W.
R. 423) 326 a
Babcock V. Buffalo, (56 N. Y. 268) 120
Babcock v. Fond du Lac, (58 Wis.
230) 326 a
Babcock v. Goodrich, (47 Cal. 488)
167, 177, 375
Babcock ». GuiKord, (47 Vt. 519) 350 6
Babson t. Eockport, (101 Mass. 93)
340
Baby c. Baby, 5 W. C. Q. B. 510) 169
Backman v. Charlestown, (42 S. C.
125) 164, 170
Backus V. Deti-oit, (49 Mich. 110) 132,
133 217
Bacon v. Boston, (28 X. E. E. 9) 355
Bacon v. Boston, (3 Cush. 174) 340
Bacon v. Eobertson, (18 How., V. S.
480) 37, 40
Bacon r. York, (26 Me. 491) 371
Badger r. Boston, (130 Mass. 170) 248
Badger v. United States, (93 U. S.
599; s. c, 6 Biss. 308) 370
Badkins r. Robinson, (53 Ga. 613) 128
Bailey r. Xew York, (3 HiU, 531, 539)
11, 92, 336 a, 350 a
Bailey v. Xew York, (2 Denio, 433)
332, 338 a.
Bailey r. R. R. Co., (4 Harr. (Del.)
389) 301, 308
Bailey t>. Spring Lake, (61 Wis. 227)
351
Bailey v. Wobui-n, (126 Mass. 416)
234, 338
Bailey v. Culver, (12 Mo. App. 175)
287
Bailey v. Fairfield, (Brayt., Yt. 126)
352 a
Bailyville v. Lowell, (20 Mass. 178)
142
Bain v. Mitchell, (82 Ala. 304) 90, 102
Baird b. Bank of Wash., (11 Serg. &
R. 411) 207
Baird v. Rice, (63 Pa. St. 489) 226,
301, 308
Bagely r. People, (43 Mich. 355) 287
Bagg B. Detroit, (5 Mich. 336, 346)
395
Baker r. Big Rapids, (31 X. W. R.
810) 326 a
Baker v. Boston, (12 Pick. 184) 120,
299, 338
Baker b. Chambles, (4 G. Greene,
Iowa 428) 167
Baker v. Cincinnati, (11 Ohio St. 534)
259 a, 261, 326 a
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXlll.
References are to Sections.
Baker v. Cushman, (127 Mass. 103) 98
Baker ». Gartside, (86 Pa. St. 498) 281
Baker v. Johnson, (41 Me. 15) 3.59,
360
Baker c. Jobnston, (21 Mich. 319) 165,
217, 221, 226
Baker v. Pittsburgh, (4 Pa. St. 49) 79
Baker v. Portland, (58 Me. 199) 352
Baker v. Pt. Huron Police Coins.,
(62 Mich. 327) 75 '
Baker v. Seattle, (2 Wash. St. 576)
16, 178, 187 a, 189
Baker v. State, (80 Wis. 416) 18
Baker ». State, (27 Ind. 485) 327 a
Baker v. St. Louis, (75 Mo. 671) 224
Baker v. Steamboat Milwaukee (14
Iowa, 214) 102
Baker v. Tehr, (97 Pa. St. 70) 321
Baker v. Vanderberg, (Mo. 89, 12 S.
W. R. 462) 220
Baker v. Windham, (13 Me. 74) 115
Balch V. Essex Co. Com'rs, (103 Mass.
106) 235, 241
Baldwin v. Bangor, (36 Me. 518) 249
Baldwin v. Foss, (71 Iowa, 389) 327
Baldwin v. Hastings, (83 Mich. 639)
276
Baldwin Co. v. Liquor Dealers, (42
Ga. 325) 125
Baldwin v. Montgomery Council, (53
Ala. 437) 268
Baldwins. Newark, (38 N. J. 158) 194
Baldwin r. Phila., (99 Pa. St. 164) 79
Baldwin v. Shine, (Ky. 87, 2 S. W.
R. 164) 262, 397
Baldwin v. Turnpike, (40 Conn. 238)
351
Baleman v. City of Covington, (1 S.
W. 361) 133
Balfe V. Bell, (40 Ind. 337) 270
Balfe V. Lamraers, (109 Ind. 347) 282,
397
Ball V. Armstrong, (10 Ind. 181) 348
Ball V. Winchester, (32 N. H. 435)
325
Ball B. Woodbine, (61 Iowa, 83.) 92,
327 a, 331
Ballard v. Davis, (31 Miss. 525) 99
Ballard v. Harrison, (4 M. & W. 392)
346
Ballard Pews Co. v. Mandel, (2 Mac-
Arthur, D. C. 351) 87
Baltimore v. Black, (56 Md. 333) 242
Baltimore v. Board of Police, (15 Md.
376) 8, 89
Baltimore v. Branmam, (14 Md. 227)
346
Baltimore v. Chase, (2 Gill & J., Md.
376) 282
Baltimore ». Clunet, (23 Md. 449) 159
Baltimore v. Gill, (31 Md. 575) 395
Baltimore v. Green Mt. Cem. Prop.
(7 Md. 517) 270
Baltimore b. Hook, (62 Md. 371) 241
Baltimore v. Holmes, (39 Md. 243) 352
Baltimore v. Horn, (26 Md. 194) 17,
250
Baltimore ». Howard, (6 Har. & J.
(Md.) 383) 282
Baltimore v. Hussey, (Md. 88, 9 Alt.
19) 262
Baltimore v. Johnson, (62 Md. 225)
281
Baltimore v. Lefferman, (4 Gill, Md.
425) 326 a
Baltimore v. Musgrave, (48 Md. 272)
242
Baltimore v. O'Neill, (63 Md. 336)
338 a
Baltimore v. Pennington, (15 Md.
12) 347
Baltimore v. Poultney, (25 Md. 18)
99, 100
Baltimore v. R. R. Co., (21 Md. 275)
393
Baltimore v. Radeke, (49 Md. 217)
120, 152
Baltimore v. Ray mo, (13 Atl. Rep.
383) 281
Baltimore v. Reynolds, (20 Mo. 1)
165, 169
Baltimore?). Scharf, (54Md.499) 113,
279
Baltimore v. State, (15 Md. 376) 270
Baltimore ». St. Agnes Hospital, (48
Md. 419) 247
Baltimore b. White, (2 Gill, 444) 133,
220
Baltimore & O. R. R. Co. v. Marshall
County, (3 W. Va. 319) 270
Baltimore & O. R. R. Co. v. District,
(3 MaoArthur, 122) 284
Baltimore & O. R. R. Co. v. County
of Jefferson, (29 Fed. Rep. 305) 28
Baltimore & Susq. R. R. Co. v. Nes-
bit, (10 How., U. S. 395) 242
Baltimore O. & C. R. Co. v. Ketring,
(23 N. E. R. 527, 122 Ind. 5) 259 a
Baltimore C. P. Ry. Co. v. McDon-
nell, (43 Md. 534) 136
Baltimore U. P. R. Co. v. Baltimore,
(71 Md. 405) 302
Baltimore, etc., Co. v. Bateman, (68
Md. 389) 342
Baltimore, etc., Co. b. Baltzell, (23
Alt. R. 74) 241
Baltimore, etc., v. Fifth Bap. Ch.,
(108 U. S. 317) 301
Baltimore, etc., Co. v. Kemp, (01
Md. 74) 352 a
Baltimore, etc., Co. v. Mali, (66 MA.
53) 306
XXIV
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
Baltimore, etc., Co. v. Magender,
(34 Md. 79) 354
Baltimore etc. R. E. Co. v. Magruder,
(3.5 Md. 79, 6 Am. Rep. 310) 238
Baltimore etc. R. 9. Co. v. Pitts-
burgh etc. Co., (17 W. Va. 812) 238
Bamford v. Turnley, (113 Eng. C. L.
66) 120
Bamber v. Rochester, (26 Hun, 587)
92
Banbury's Case, (10 Mod. 346) 37
Bancroft v. Cambridge, (126 Mass.
438) 116
Bancroft v. Dumas, (21 Vt. 456) 123
Bancroft v. Lynnfield, (18 Pick. 566)
115
Bangor v. Gotling, (35 Me. 73) 283
Bangor v. Lausil, (51 Me. 521) 354 a,
355
Bangs V. Dunn, (66 Cal. 72) 80
Bangs V. Snow, (1 Mass. 181) 110
Bangor S. Bk. v. Stillwater, (49 Fed.
R. 721) 164, 181, 183
Banguss b. Atlanta, (12 S. W. R. 750;
74 Tex. 029) 346
Bank v. Bergen Co., (115 U. S. 334)
196
Bank v. Brainerd, (51 N. W. 814,
Minn. 92) 3
Bank v. Bridge, (30 N. J. L. 112) 32
Bank v. Brown, (26 N. Y. 467) 24
Bank v. Charlotteville etc. Co. (5 S.
C. 156) 165
Bank v. Daudridge, (12 Wlieat. 64)
108
Bank ». Davis, (1 McCarter Ch.- N.
J., 286) 33
Bank v. Dibrell, (3 Sneed, 379) 80
Bank v. Franklin Co., (65 Mo. 105)
179
Bank v. Farmington, (41 K. H. 32)
179
Bank v. Gottschalk, (14 Pet. 19) 167
Bank v. Grenada, (48 F. 278) 192
Bank v. JLockwood, (2 Harring., Del.
8)42
Bank v. Meredith, (44 Mo. 500) 397
Bank v. Patterson, (7 Cranch, 299)
164, 165
Bank v. Petway,- (3 Humph., Tenn.
522) 81
Bank v. Poitiaux, (3 Rand., Va. 136)
207
Bank v. Kew Orleans, (12 La. An.
421) 326 a
Bank v. Niagara, (6 Cow. 196) 380
Bank v. Nilcs, (1 Doug. Mich., 401)
207
Bank v. Seton, (1 Peters, 299) 98
Bank v. Statesville, (84 N. C. 169)
170, 190 a
Bank v. Supervisors, (5 Denio, 517)
115
See Bank v. Wilkes-Barre, (24 Atl.
11, Pa. 92) 272
Bank etc. v. Railroad Co., (30 Vt.
159) 51
Bank etc. v. St. Joseph, (31 Fed.
Rep. 216) 195 d
Bankhead v. Brown, (25 Iowa, 540)
234 a, 235
Bank of Chenango v. Brown, (26 N.
T. 467) 161
Bank of Chillicothe ». Mayor, (7 Ohio,
pt. 2, 31) 110, 182
Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, (7
Cranch, 299) 51
Bank of Commerce v. Grenada, (44
Fed. Rep. 262) 196
Bank of Commerce v. New York
City, (2 Black, 620) 258
Bank of Commonwealtli v. New
York, (43 N. Y. 184) 326 a
Bank of Ga. v. Savannali, (Dudley,
130) 273
Bank of Ind. v. Madison, (3 Ind. 43)
273
Bank of Ireland u. Evans, (32 Eng.
Law & Eq. 23) 51
Bank of La. v. City of N. O., (5 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 555) 191
Bank of Middlesex v. Rutland R. Co.,
(30 Vt. 159) 51
Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome,
(19 N. Y. 24) 191
Bank of Rome v. Rome, (18 N. Y. 38)
24
Bannagan v. District, (2 Mackey 285)
355
Banton v. Wilson, (4 Tex. 400) 371
Barben v. Pol. Jury, (15 La. An. 559)
314
Barber Surgeons v. Pelson, (2 Lev.
252) 158
Barber v. Jackson Co., (40 111. App.
42) 326 a
Barber v. Roxbury, (U Allen, 318)
340, 342 a
Barber v. Sag. City, (34 Mich. 52) 87
Barbierc. Connelly, (118 U. S. 27) 121
Barbour v. Camden, (51 Me. 608) 139
Barbour b. Ellsworth, (67 Me. 294)
332
Barbour Co. v. Horn, (48 Ala. 566)
.352 a
Barbour Co. v. Brinson, (36 Ala. 362)
325
Barbour Co. v. Horn, (48 Ala. 566) 325
Barclay v. Brabston, (49 N. J. L. 629)
399
Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, (6 Pet.
498) 217, 218, 219, 220, 221
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXV
References are to Sections.
Bardwell v. Jamaica, (15 Vt. 438) 313
Barker v. Peo., (3 Cow. 686) 83
Barker v. Savage, (45 N. Y. 19) 346
Barker v. State, (18 Ohio, 514) 56,
270, 276
Barker v. Worcester, (139 Mass. 74)
340
■Barkley v. Levee Com'rs, (93 U. S.
258) 42, 67, 81
Barlow v. Newman, (2 W. Bl. 959) 131
Barnard v. District, (20 Ct. of 01. 257)
171
Barnert v. Paterson, (48 N. J. L. 395)
99
Barnes v. Bakersfield, (57 Vt. 375) 79
Barnes v. Barnes, (5 Vt. 388) 31
Barnes v. Oliicopee, (138 Mass. 67)
343
Barnura v. Concord, (2 N. H. 392) 340
Barnes 1). District, (91 U. S. 551) 324,
328,336 a, 339, 345, 349
Barnes v. Dyer, (56 Vt. 469) 259 a
Barnes v. lull's, (138 Mass. 67) 343
Barnes v. Lacon, (84 111. 461) 195 d'
Barnes v. Newton, (46 Iowa, 567) 346
Barnes v. Suddard, (117 111. 237) 207
Barnes v. Phila., (3 Phila. 409) 92
Barnes v. Ward, (9 C. B. 392) 348
Barnes v. Williams, (13 S. W. R. 845)
79
Barnett v. Johnson, (15 N. J. Eq.
481) 303
Barnett v. Mayor, (48 N. Y. 395) 176
Barnett v. New Orleans, (13 La. An.
105) 200
Barney v. Baltimore, (1 Hughes C. C.
118) 133, 225
Barney v. Dewey, (12 Johns. 225) 348
Barney v. Lowell, (98 Mass. 570) 92,
338, 338 a
Barling v. West, (29 Wis. 307; 9 Am.
Hep. 576) 124, 146
Bartch v. Cutler (Utah, 1890, 24
Pac. Rep. 526) 79
Barthol v. Meader, (72 Iowa, 125) 186
Bartons. Syracuse, (36 N. Y. 54) 3506,
355
Barton v. Union Cattle Co., (44 N. W.
R. 454) 396
Bartram v. Cen. C. Co., (25 Cal. 283)
320
Barr v. Denisten, (19 N. H. 170, 180)
397
Barr » City, (Ifi S. W. R. 483, Kan.
91)3506
Barr v. Oscaloosa, (45 Iowa, 275) 311
Bjirre v. Greenwich, (1 Pick. 120) 69
Barret v. Henderson, (4 Bush, 255)
2(57, 268
Barrett v. New Orleans, (33 La. An.
542) 362
Ban-ett v. New Oris., (38 La. An. 101)
79
Barrett v. County Court, (44 Mo. 197)
191
Barrett v. Seward, (22 Vt. 176) 69
Barron v. Baltimore, (2 Am. Jour.
103) 355
Barron v. Detroit, (94 Mich. 601) 324,
328
Barrow B. Nashville & C. Turnp. Co.,
(9 Humph. 304) 207
Barrow v. Wilson, (39 La. An. 403)
211
Barry v. St. Louis, (17 Mo. 121
Barry v. Lo.well, (8 Allen, 127) 328,
355
Bartemeyer ». Iowa, (18 Wall. 129)
121
Barter v. Com., (3 Pa., P. & W. 253)
104, 117, 156, 339
Barteson v. Minneapolis, (33 Minn.
468) 241
Bartle v. Des Moines, (38 Iowa, 414)
189 a
Bartlet v. State, (13 Kan. 99) 278
Bartlett v. Kittery, (68 Me. 357) 352
Bartlett v. U. S. (25 Ct. CI. 389) 79
Bartlett v. Hooksett, (48 N. H. 18)
342
Bartlett v. Amherstbergh, (14 W. C.
Q. 152) 164
Basto V. Himrod, (8 N. T. 483) 24
Barton ti. Gadsden, (79 Ala. 495) 161
Barton v. Montpelier, (30 Vt. 650)
344, 346
Barton v. New Orleans, (16 La. An.
317) 118, 79
Barton v. Sch. Dist. (Idaho 92, 29
.iPac. R. 43) 32
Barton v. Syracuse, (36 N. Y. 54) 349
Bass V. Columbus, (30 Ga. 845) 187 a
Bass V. Fontleroy, (U Tex. 698) 11,
12, 13
Bass B. Fort Wayne, (121 Ind. 389;
23 N. E. R. 259) 282, 3.54
Bass etc. Co. v. Parks Co., (115 Ind.
234) 169
Bassett v. Fish, (73 N. Y. 310) 338
Bassett v. Den, (17 N. J. L. 432) 73
Bassett v. Porter, (4 Cush. 487) 31
Bassett v. St. Joseph, (53 Mo. 290)
346
Bassford, In re, (50 N. Y. 509) 148
Bastable v. Syracuse, (72 N. Y. 64)
355
Bateman v. Ashton, (3 H. & N. 322)
163, 169
Bateman v. Covington, (Ky. 91, 74
S. W. B. 361) 169
Bateman v. McGowan, (1 Met., Ky
533) 105
XXVI
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Befereuces are to Sections.
83;
Bates Co. ». Winters, (97 U. S,
s. c, 112 U. S. 325) 186, 195 d
Bates V. Bassett, (60 Vt. 530) 210
Bates ». Gerber, (82 Cal., 22 Pac. E.
1115) 192
Bates V. Mobile, (46 Ala. 158) 272
Bates V. Plymouth, (14 Gray, 163)
363, 373
Bates D. Porter, (15 Pac. Rep. 732)
178, 194
Bates j;. Rutland, (62 Vt. 178; 20 Atl.
278) 92
Bates V. Westborougli, Mass. 90, (23
N. E. R. 1070) 355
Bath Co. 0. Amy, (13 Wall. 244) 184
Barthold c. Philadelphia, (26 Atl. E.
304; 154 Pa. St. 109) 324, 328,
336 a
Baton Rouge v. Bearing, (15 La. An.
208) 102
Battersby v. New York, (7 Daly, 16)
344
Battle V. Mobile, (9 Ala. 234) (1846)
255, 264
Battles V. Landenslager, 84 Pa. St.
446) 195 b
Batty V. Duxbery, (24 Vt. 155) 313
Baugan v. Mann, (59 111. 492) 218
Bauman v. Campan, (58 Mich. 444)
327
Baumgard v. New Orleans, (9 La. An.
119) 338
Baumgartner v. Hasty, (100 Ind. 575)
23, 130
Baxter v. Com., (3 Pa., Pen. & W.
253) 155
Baxter v. Providence, (12 R. I. 310)
354 a
Baxter v. Seattle, (3 Wash. St. 3qg)
146
Baxter v. Winooski, (22 Vt. 123) 325
Bayer B. Franklin Co., (51 Mo. 205)
177
Bayerque v. San Fraacisco, (1 McAll.
175) 135
Bayha v. Webster Co., (18 Neb. 131)
79
Bavha v. Taylor, (36 Mo. App. 427)
294
Bayley v. Taber, (5 Mass. 285) 190 a
192 6
Bayly v. Mayor, (3 Hill, 538) 325
Bayliss v. Peterson, (15 Iowa, 279)
167
Bea B. Seeman, (W. Va. 92, 15 S. E.
R. 173,) 399
Beach v. Elmira, (58 Hun, 606) 326 a
355
Beach v. Frankeuberger, (4 W. Va.
712) 348
Beach ». Haynes, (12 Vt. 15) 208
Beach v. Parmenter, (28 Pa. St. 196)
321
Beachy v. Lamkin, (1 Idaho, 48) 368
370
Beaufort v. Duncan, (1 Jones, N. C.
Law, 234) 200, 211
Beaumont b. Wilkes-Barre, (Pa. 90)
(21 Atl. 888) 259 a
Beal V. McVicker, (8 Mo. App. 202)
80
Beals ». Providence Rubber Co., (11
R. L 381) 270
Beals V. Evans, (10 Cal. 459) 179
Bean v. Jay, (23 Me. 117) 95, 142
Bean v. AUentown, (Pa. 90, 23 Atl.
R. 1062) 324, 328
Beard v. Decatur, (64 Tex. 7) 79
Beardsley v. Hartford, (50 Conn. 529)
343
Beardsley v. Smith, (16 Conn. 375)
212, 315, 375
Beardsleec. French, (7 Conn. 125) 312
Beasley v. Beckley, (28 W. Va. 81)
399
Beatty v. Gilmore, (16 Pa. St. 463)
347, 352
Beatty v. Knowles, (4 Pet., U. S.
152, 157) 30, 31, 256
Beatty v. Titus. (47 N. J. L. 89) 314
Beaver v. Manchester L. J., (26 Q. B.
311) 313
Beaver County v. Armstrong, (6
Wright 63) 192 b
Beaver County v. Armstrong, (44 Pa.
St. 63) 190
Beaver Creek v. Hastings, (32 Mich.
528) 95, 97
Beaver Dam v. Frings, (17 Wis. 398)
200
Bechtel v. Carslake, (3 Stockton Ch.
500) 396
Bechtel B. Village of Edgewater, (45
Hun, N. Y. 245) 54
Beck ». Carter, (68 N. Y. 283) 338, 34S
Becker v. St. Charles, (37 Mo. 13) 223
Becker ». Washington, (7 S. W. R.
291, Mo. 88) 148
Becket v. Midi. By. Co., (L. R. 3 C.
P. 82) 330
Beckett v. Midland R. Co., (1 L. R.
C. P. C. 241 ; on appeal, 3 C. P. C. 82)
231
Beckman v. Railroad Company, (3
Paige 45 ; 22 An. Dec. 679) 232
Beckwell v. Amador Co., (30 Cal. 237)
79
Beckwith v. Racine, (7 Biss. 142) 81
Bedford v. Taunton, (9 Allen, 207)
92
Bedford etc. v. Anderson, (45 Pa. St,
388) 359
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xxvu
References are to Sections.
Bedford Union Poor Guard v. Bed-
ford Impr. Commissioners, (7
Exoh. 777) 259 a
Bedlo-w V. M. Y. Floating D. D. Co.,
(112 N. Y. 63) 132
Beebe v. Robinson, (52 Ala. 67) 67,
362
Beebe v. State, (26 Ind. 301) 121
Beecher v. Cheshire, (125 Mass. 555)
195
Beecher v. Derby etc. Co., (24 Conn.
491) 352 a
Beecher v. People, (38 Mich. 289)
287
Beekraan, In re, (31 How. Pr. 16) 99
Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady
R. R. Co., (3 Paige, 73, 22 Am.
Dec. G79) 233, 247
Beers v. Arkansas, (20 How. U. S.
527) 5
Beers v. Beers, (4 Conn. 535) 105, 245
Beers v. Houghton, (9 Pet. 329) 194
Beers v. Pinney, (12 Wend. 309) 348
Bees man v. Peoria, (16 111. 484) 102
Begein v. Anderson, (28 Ind. 79) 62,
118
Belcher v. Farrar, (8 Allen, 325) 118
Belchers S. R. Co. v. St. Louis Grain
Elev., (13 S. W. R. 822, Mo. '90)
133, 210
Belfast etc. Co. v. Brooks, (60 Me.
568) 189
Belknap v. Rheinhart, (2 Wend. 375)
169
Bell V. Americus, (3 S. E. R. 612) 190
Bell V. Burlington, (68 Iowa, 296) 223
Bell V. City of York, (31 Neb. 842)
344
Bell V. Foutch, (21 Iowa, 119) 288,
■iV>
Bell V. Gouge, (23 N. J. L. 624) 200
Bell & Manvers, (2 U. C. C. P. 507)
115
Bell V. McClintock, (9 Watts, 119) 353
Bell V. Pierce, (51 N. Y. 12) 272
Bell V. Platteville, (71 Wis. 139) 108,
210
Bell V. Prouty, (43 Vt. 279) 234 a
Bell V. Sun Printing Co., (42 N". Y. 566)
48
Bell V. West Point, (51 Miss. 262) 349
Bellaire Gob. Co. v. Findlay, (5 Ohio
Cir. Ct. 418) 86, 166
Bellamy ». Atlanta, (75 Ga. 167) 350 a
Bell County v. Alexander, (22 Tex.
350) 203, 204
Bellefontaine Ry. Co. o. Himter, (33
Ind. 335) 352
Belleville v. Stookev, (23 111. 44) 215
Belleville S. Bk. v. Winslow, (30 Fed.
Rep. 488) 180
Bellinger v. N". Y. Central R. R. Co.,
(23 N. Y. 42) 239
Bellmyer v. Marshalltown, (44 Iowa,
564) 165
Bellows v. Bank etc., (2 Mason C. C.
43)43
Bell Point v. Pence, (17 S. W. R. 197)
254
Belo V. Forsythe Co., (76 N. C. 489)
196
Belt Line S. R. Co. v. Crabtree, (2
Tex. Ap. C. C, § 662) 330
Bend v. Kenosha, (17 Wis. 284) 397
Benbow v. Iowa City, (7 Wall. 313)
368
Bender v. Dungan, (99 Mo. 126) 282.
Bender v. Nashua, (17 N. H. 477) 239
Benedict v. Denton, (Walk. Ch. 336)
52
Benedicts. Goit, (3 Barb. 459) 286,
329
Benjamin v. Wheeler, (8 Gray, 409,
412) 330
Beuoist V. St. Louis, (19 Mo. 179) 56
Benoit d. Conway, (10 Allen, 528) 114
BenoitD. Wayne Co., (20 Mich. 176)85
Bennett v. Berminghain, (31 Pa. St.
15) 124, 260, 272, 300
Bennett ». Buffalo, (17 N. Y. 383)283,
326 a
Bennett v. Fifield, (13 R. I. 139) 342
Bennett v. Fisher, (26 Iowa, 497) 250
Bennett v. Lovell, (12 R. I. 160) 342
Bennett v. McCaffrey, (28 Mo. App.
220) 373
Bennett v. New Orleans, (14 La. An.
120) 92, 314, 338 a
Bennett v. People, (30 111. 389) 124
Bennington v. Park, (50 Vt. 178) 196
Bennington K. Smitli, (29 Vt. 254)288
Bensinger v. District, (0 Mackey, 285)
279
Benson v. Carmel, (8 Me. 110) 177
Benson v. Mayor, (10 Barb. 223) 134
Benson v. Mayor, (24 Barb. 248) 184
Benson v. Monroe, (7 Cush. 125) 326,
327
Benson v. Waukesha, (41 N. W. R.
1017) 328, 342
Bentley v. County, (25 Minn. 259)
164, 281
Bentley v. Phelps, (27 Barb. 524) 78,
79, 85
Benton v. City Hospital, (140 Mass.
13) 324, 332
Benton v. Hamilton, (11 N. E. R. 238,
110 Ind. 294) 328
Benton v. Jackson, (2 Johns. Ch.
325) 25
Benton v. Milwaukee, 50 Wis. 368)
265
XXVlll
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References ai'e to Sections.
Bentz V. Armstrong, (8 Watts & S.
40) 355
Benwaie v. Pine Valley, (53 Wis.
52Y)3506
Bereldin v. Baltimore, (15 Md. 18)
278
Bergen v. Clarkson, (1 Halst, 352) 97
Bergen v. State, (32 N. J. L. 490) 161
Bergman v. Cleveland, (40 Ohio St.
651) 125
Bergman v. St. Louis etc. Co., (Mo.
90, 1 S. W. 384) 146
Berks Co. etc. o. Myers, (6 Serg. &
Rawle, 12) 49, 50
Berlin v. Gorhara, (84 N. H. 266) 2,
• 24
Berlin B. Co. v. Wagner, (57 Hun,
346) 15
Berliner v. Waterloo, (14 Wis. 378)
216
Berraingham v. Rumsey, (63 Ala.
352) 130
Bernarrtin v. No. Dnfferrin, (19 Can.
S. C. E. 581) 51, 165
Bernards v. Morrison, (133 U. S. 523)
196
Bernards v. Stebbins, (109 U. S. 341)
192 ()
Bernlieimer v. Kilpatrick, (53 Hun,
316) 131
Bertholf v. O'Reilly, (74 N. Y. 509)
121
Berryraan v. Pt. Bur well Co., (24 U.
C. Q. B. 34) 121
Bethura v. Turner, (1 Me. Ill) 225
Betts V. District, (20 Ct. of CI. 445)
171
Betts V. Warren, (5 Harr. 4) 397
Betts V. Williamsburg, (18 Pa. St. 26)
248
Bever v. North, (107 Ind. 544) 348
Beveridge v. Livingstone, (54 Cal. 54)
174
Beverly c. Barlow, (10 U. C. C. P.
178) 49
Bibb Co. V. Dorsey, (Ga. 93, 15 S. E.
R. 687) 325
Bibb Co. Ct. V. Orr, (12 Ga. 137) 180
Bibel V. People, (67 111. 175) 113
Biddle ». Hussman, (23 Mo. 597) 244
Biddle o. Willard, (10 Ind. 63) 82
Bieling r. Brooklyn, (24 N. E. R.
389, 120 X. T. 98) 345
Biencourt v. Parker, (27 Tex. 558) 86
Bier v. Garrell, (30 W. Va. 95) 79
Bigelow V. Hillman, (37 Me. 58) 98,
101
Bigelow 15. P. Amboy, (1 Dutch. 297)
108, 291
Bigelow V. Randolph, (17 Gray, 541)
3300,338
Bigelow V. Weston, (3 Pick. 267)
342
Bigelow V. West Wis. Ry. Co., (27
Wis. 478) 245
Bigg V. London, (L. R. 15 Eq. 376)
330
Biggs V. Board of Com'rs, (Ind. 93,
34 K. E. R. 500) 326
Biggs V. McBride, (17 Or. 640) 361
Big Rapids v. Comstock, (65 Mich.
78, s. c, 31 N. W. Rep. 811) 312
Bilbie v. Lumley, (2 East, 469) 327
Billard v. Erhart, (35 Kau. 611) 120,
396
Billings V. Mayor, (68 N. Y. 413) 79
Billings 1). O'Brien, (45 How. Pr. 392)
80
Bills V. Goshen, (117 Ind. 221) 150
Bingham v. Stewart, (13 Minu. 106)
167
Binghamptonc. Ry. Co., Cf., (61 Hun,
479) 14, 306
Binks V. Yorkshire etc. Co., (3 B. &
S. 244) 348
Binssee v. Wood, (37 N. Y. 530) 348
Bircklev v. Boston, (20 Fed. Rep. 207)
212
Bird V. Wasco, (3 Or. 282) 79
Birdsall v. Clark, (73 N. Y. 73) 113
Birdsall v. Russell, (29 N. Y. 220)
192 6, 195 b
Birmingham v. Anderson, (40 Pa. St.
506) 219
Birmingham v. Klein, (89 Ala. 461)
259 a
Birmingham v. R. R. Co., (Ala. 93,
13 So. 841) 150, 300.
Birmingham v. Rumsey, (63 Ala. 352)
212
Birmingham <fe P. M. St. Ry. v. Bir-
mingham St. Ry. Co., (79 Ala. 465)
144
Birmingham etc. Co. v. Birm. Co.,
(79 Ala. 465) 302
Bishop V. Banks, (33 Conn. 121) 120
Bishop B. Cone, (3 N. H. 513) 106
Bishop V. Macon, (7 Ga. 200) 335
Bishop V. Centralia, (49 Wis.
346, 353
Bishop V. Moormap, (98 Ind. 1) 391
Bishop V. Schuylkill, (8 Atl. Rep.
449) 330 a
Bishop's Residence v. Hudson, (9
Mo. 07, 4 S. W. R. 435) 270
Bissell V. Collins, (28 Mich. 277) 293
Bissell B. Jett'ersonville, (27 How.
287) 17, 108, 287
Bissell V. Kankakee, (64 111. 249) 188
Bissell V. N. Y. Central R. R. Co.,
(23 N. Y. 61) 224
Bissell I). R. R., (22 N. Y. 268) 104
TABLE or CASES CITED.
XXIX
References are to Sections.
Bishero. Richard, (9 Ohio S^, 495)
313
Bissell V. Saxton, (77 N. Y. 191) 72
Bixby V. Gass, (54 Mich. 551) 898
Black V. Baltimore, (50 Md. 236) 242
Black V. Boyd, (155 Pa. St. 163) 397
Black I). Cohen, (32 Ga. 021) 187 a, 196
Black V. O'Haia, (5 Atl. Rep. 598) 312
Black 1). Phila. etc. Co., (58 Pa. St.
249) 302
Black V. Seal, (6 Houst. 541) 258
Black V. Sherwood, (6 S. E. R. 484)
271
Black V. Thomson, (107 U. S. 162)
338 a
Black 1). Ross, (37 Mo. App. 250) 393
Blackburn v. Walpole, (10 Pick. 543)
95
Blackman r. Halves, (72 Ind. 515)
234 a
Blackman v. Houston, (2 So. 193) 271
Blackman v. Lehman, (03 Ala. 519)
183, 191
Blackmar v. Royal I. Co., (17 N. E.
R. 580) 261
Blackstone v. Taf t, (4 Gray, 250) 59
Blackstone v. White, (41 Pa. St. 330)
31
Blackwell v. Same, (38 Up. Can. Q.
B. 172) 352
Bladen v. Phila., (60 Pa. St. 464) 79
Blair v. Cumrig, (111 U. S. 373) 184
188
Blair o. Forehand, (100 Mass. 136) 129
Blair c. Pelham, (118 Mass. 420) 3505
Blaisdell v. Portland, (39 Me. 113)
343
Blake v. Ferris, (5 N. Y. 48) 347
Blake ». Lowell, (143 Mass. 296) 3506
Blake v. Midland Ry. Co., (18 Q. B.
93) 353
Blake v. Newfield, (68 Me. 365) 343
Blake v. Portsmouth, (39 N. H. 435)
111
Blake v. Rich, (34 N. H. 282) 238
Blake ». Sturtevant, (12 N. H. 567) 88
Blake v. U. S., (103 U. S. 227) 83
Blake c. Walker, (23 S. C. 517) 110
Blakely u. Devine, (36 Minn. 53) 355
Blakeiey v. Troy, (18 Hun, 167) 344
Blakie ». Staples, (13 Grant, 67) 393
Blanc V. Murray, (36 La. An. 162) 120
Blanc 1). New Orleans, (1 Martin, La.
O. S. 65) 268
Blanchard: ». Bissell, (11 Ohio St. 96)
53, 56, 145, 331
Blanchard v. Blackstone, (102 Mass.
343) 167
Blanchard ». Kansas City, (16 Fed.
Rep. 444) 330
Blanding v. Burr, (13 Cal. 843) 258
Blanton v. McDowell Co., (101 N. C.
532) 197
Bleecker v. Ballou, (3 Wend. 263) 270
Blessington v. Boston, (26 N. E. R.
1113) 350
Bleu V. Bear Riv. etc. Co., (81 Am.
Dec. 1.32) 170
Bliss V. Ball, (99 Mass. 597) 224
Bliss B. Brooklyn, (4 Fisher Pat. Cases
596) 338
Bliss J). Hosmer, (15 Ohio, 44) 238
Bliss V. Kraus, (16 Ohio St. 155) 118
Bliss B. Lawrence, (58 N. Y. 442) 8J
Bliss V. So. Hadley, (145 Mass. 91)
340
Black D. Jacksonville, (36 111. 301) 148
Blodgett V. Boston, (8 Allen, 237) 23 j,
340
Blodgett V. Royalton, (17 Vt. 40) 223
Bloodgood ». Mohawk & H. R. R. R.
Co., (18 Wend. 9) 236, 247
Bloomfield v. Char. O. Bk., (121 V.
S. 121) 4, 93, 375
Bloomfield v. Trimble, (54 Iowa, 399)
134
Bloomfield etc. Co. v. Calkins, (62 N.
Y. 386) 287, 295, 302, 306
Bloomington v. Bay, (42 111. 503) 325
377
Bloomington B. Blodgett, (24111. App.
650) 397
Bloomington v. Brokaw, (77 111. 194)
354 a
Bloomington b. Chamberlain, (104
111.268)3506
Bloomington ». Perdue, (99 111. 329)
189 a
Bloomington b. Pollock, (31 N. E. R.
146) 330
Bloomington v. Richardson, (38 111.
60) 134
Bloomington Assn. v. People, (28 K.
E. R. 1076) 270, 271
Bloomsburg S. & E. L. Co. v. Gard-
ner, (17 Atl. R. 521) 352
Blount 1). Janes ville, (31 Wis. 640) 113
Blucher v. Milsted, (31 Tex. 621) 66
BlufEton V. Mathews, (92 Ind. 213) 351
Blufftonc. Studabaker, (106 Ind. 129)
130
Blurab V. City of Kansas, (84 Mo. 112)
347
Blunt V. Hay, (4 Sandf. Ch. 363) 120
Bluffton B. Silver, (63 Ind. 262) 401.
Bly !). Whitehall, (24 N. E. R. 943)
346, 352
Blythe v. Birmingham, (11 Exch.
781) 353
Board, In re, (48 Fed. R. 350) 40
Board v. Bacon, (96 Ind. 31) 353
Board v. Barnett, (107 111. 507) 287
XXX
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Board v. Bish, (Col. 93, 33 Pac. 184)
325
Board v. Bolton, 104 111. 220, 189 a
Board v. Brown, (89 Ind. 48, 52) 313
Board v. Citizens etc. Co., (47 Ind.
40Y) 169
Board v. Chipps, (Ind. 92, 29 N. E. R.
1002) 353
Board v. Com'rs, (107 N. C. 110) 12
Board v. Creirston, (32 N. E. li. 735)
317
Board v. Currituck Co., (107 N. C.
110) 256
Board v. Davies, (24 Pac. R. 540) 23
Board v. Davises, (1 Wash. St. 290) 2
Board v. Dav, (19 Ind. 450) 182
Board v. Deprez, (87 Ind. 509) 353
Board c. Dombke, (94 Ind. 72) 350 6,
353 6
Board v. Fuller, (111 Ind. 410) 338 a
Board v. Fulton, (111 N. Y. 410) 282
Board v. Gantt, (Md. 9, 21 Atl. E.
548) 359
Board v. Heister, (37 N. Y. 672) 18,
301
Board v. Johnson, (Miss. 90, 7 So.
390) 282
Board v. Johnson, (Ind. 91, 26 K. E.
R. 821) 79
Board v. Legg, (110 Ind. 479) 353
Board v. Levee Com'rs, (66 Miss.
248) 244
Board v. Mitchelltown, (Ind. 92, 30
N. E. E. 937) 315
Board v. McGurrin, (6 Daly, 349) 87,
126
Board v. IST. Y. H. M. Co., (15 Atl. R.
1098) 396
Board v. Pearson, (120 Ind. 426) 353
Board v. R. & V. Grav. Road Co., (87
Ind. 502) 313
Board v. School District, (Ark. 90, 19
S. W. E. 969) 270, 271
Board v. Sisson, (2 Ind. App. 311)
353
Board ». State, (61 Ind. 379) 374
Board v. Thompson, (106 Ind. 534)
316
Board v. Wilgus, (22 Pac. R. 615) 215
Board v. Wis. etc. Co., (45 Wis. 543)
186
Board v. Washington Tp., (23 N. E.
Rep. 257) 315, 353
Board of Aid. of Denver v. Darrow,
(22 Pac. Rep. 784) 398
Board of Com'rs v. Beirly, (23 IST. E.
R. 672, 122 Ind. 46) 314
Board of Com'rs v. Bank, (30 Pac.
22) 282
Board of Com'rs v. Brod., (29 N. E.
E. 430) 353
Board of Com'rs v. Shielde, (62 Mo.
247) 26
Board of Com'rs v. Templeton, (51
Ind. 266) 397
Board of Education v. Fonda, (77 N.
Y. 350) 72
^oard of Education of Barlor Dist.
V. Board etc. of Valley Dist., (30
W. Va. 424) 59, 60, 67, 531
Board of Health of Buena Vista v.
East Saginaw, (45 Mich. 257) 59
Board of Trade Tel. Co. v. Barnett,
(107 111. 507) 297, 330
Board of Trustees v. Schroeder, (58
111. 353) 154
Board etc. v. Sti-ader, (18 N. J. L.
108) 313
Board etc. ». ^^eidenberge^, (78 111.
58) 212
Board etc. of Chickasaw Co. v. Board
etc. of Sumner Co., (58 Miss. 619)
55
Bock V. State, (50 Ind. 281) 320
Bodine v. Trenton, (36 N. J. L. 198)
113
Bodman v. American Tract Society,
(9 Allen, 447) 49
Boduri v. Fennell, (1 Wils. 233) 157
Bodwic 0. Fennell, (1 Wils. 233) 156
Boehm v. Baltimore, (61 Md. 259)
118, 338 o
Bogart V. Lamotte, (44 N. W. R. 612)
189
Bogert V. Indianapolis, (13 Ind. 134)
118
Bogert V. Elizabeth, (27 N. J. Eq.
568) 259 a
Bohan v. Avoca, (154 Pa. St. 404) 324
Bohan v. Pt. Jervis G. L. Co., (25 N.
E. R. 246) 120
Bohen v. Waseca, (32 Minn. 176) 345
Bohlman v. Green Bay & L. P. R. R.
Co., (30 Wis. 105) 247
Boland v. City, (32 Mo. App. 8) 352
Bolles V. Brimaeld, (120 U. S. 759)
17, 187 a, 216
Bolter V. Kew Orleans, (10 La. An.
321) 156
Bolton V. Board, (1 Bradw. 193) 196
Bolton V. San Antonio, (21 S. W. R.
64,) 395
Bolton K. Colder, (1 Watts, 360) 321
Bond V. Wool, (107 N. C. 139) 396
Bond V. Newark, (19 X. J. Eq. 376)
281
Bonham v. Xeedles, (103 U. S. 648)
196
Bonham v. Taylor, (16 S. W. E. 555)
13, 200
Bonine v. Richmond, (76 Mo. 437)
350a
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXXI
References are to Sections.
Bonner 5. City of New Orleans, (2
Woods 0. C. 135) 191 b, 192
Bonner v. State, (7 Ga. 473) 361, 371
Bonomi v. Backhouse, (9 H. L. 0.
513) 329
Book V. Earl, (87 Mo. 246) 189 a
Booker v. Young, (12 Gratt. 303) 100
Boom V. Utica, (U Barb. 104) 119, 169
Booraem v. North Hudson County
Ey. Co., (39 N. J. Eq. 465) 223
Boorman v. Santa Barbara, (65 Cal.
313) 279
Booth D. Woodbury, (32 Conn. 118)
139
Booth V. Shreveport, (29 La. An. 581)
165
Booth V. State, (4 Conn. 65) 130
Boothroyd, In re, (15 M. & W. 1) 154,
156
Bordages v. Higgins, (20 S. W. K.
726) 270, 282, 283
Bordentown etc. v. Camden etc., (2
Harr. 314) 301
Boring v. Williams, (17 Ala. 510) 104
Borough of Norristown Ry. Co., (23
Atl. R. 1060) 306
Borough of West Philadelphia, (5 W.
& S. 281) 56
Borough of Little Meadows, (28 Pa.
St. 256) 56
Borough of Blooming Valley, (56
Pa. 66) 56
Borrowman v. Mitchell, (2 Up. Can.
Q. B. 135) 224
Boston I). Baldwin, (139 Mass. 315)
103
Boston V. Crowley, (38 Fed. 202) 314,
353
Boston V. liecraw, (17 How. 426) 218
Boston V. Middlesex etc. Co., (1 Al-
len, 324) 354
Boston I). Bobbins, (126 Mass. 384) 243
Boston V. Shaw, (1 Met. 130) 330
Boston V. Simmons, (150 Mass. 461)
92
Boston !). Richardson, (13 Allen, 160)
2l'4, 295, 302
Boston V. Worthington, (10 Gray,
496) 348
Boston V. No. Staf. E. Co., (5 De G.
& S. 584) 120
Boston & S. Glass Co. b. Boston, (4
. Met. 181) 326 a
Boston Beer Co. 11. Massachusetts,
(97 U. S. 25) 121
Boston Belting Co. v. Boston, (149
Mass. 44) 355
Boston. C. & M. R. R. Co. v. Gilraore,
(37 N. H. 410) 273
Boston etc. v. Boston R. R., (23 Pick.
360) 314
Boston etc. Co. v. Folsom, (46 N. H.
64) 279
Boston etc. v. Boston, (140 Mass. 87)
290
Boston etc. Co. v Cambridge, (34 N.
E. R. 382) 317
Boston Glass Manuf. v. Langdon,
(24 Pick. 49) 37
Boston I. Co. V. Pomfret, (20 Conn.
590) 106
Boston Seamen's Fr. Soc. v. Boston,
(116 Mass. 181) 144, 248, 259 a
Boston Soc. of Red. Fathers v. Bos-
ton, (129 Maas. 178) 270
Boston Mill Dam v. Newman, (12
Pick. 467) 233, 235
Boston Mfg. "Co. v. Com., (12 N. E.
E. 362, 144 Mass. 598) 258, 326
Boston Overseers of the Poor o.
Sears, (22 Pick. 122) 205
Boston Roll. Mills i\ Cambridge,
(117 Mass. 396) 120, 121
Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston
& W. R. R. Co., (23 Pick. 360) 238
302
Boss V. Hewitt, (15 Wis. 260) 191,
195 d
Boss V. Hewett, (20 Wis. 460) 183
Bosworth V. Budgen, (7 Mod. 461)
101
Bosworth V. New Orl., (26 La. 464)
79, 101
Bosworth V. Swansey, (10 Metcf. 363)
352
Bott V. Pratt, (33 Minn. 323) 152
Boucher v. Haven, (40 Conn. 456)
3506
Boughman v. Clarksburgh, (10 W.
Va. 394) 396
Boughton J). Carter, (18 Johns. 405)
238
Boulder v. Niles, (9 Colo. 415) 339,
349
Bouldin v. Baltimore, (15 Md. 18)
125, 278, 397
Boundary, In re, (23 iLtl. R. 1041) 53
Bound V. Wise. etc. Co., (45 Wis.
543) 189 a
Bouton V. Supervisors, (5 C. L. J.
105) 212
Boutle 1). Emmet, (9 So. 921) 91
Bowditch V. Boston, (101 U. S. 16)
333, 335
Bowdoinham v. Richmond, (6 Greenl.
112) 60
Bowles V. Landaff, (59 N. H. 164)
147
Bowley «. Walker, (8 Allen, 21) 309
Bowlin V. Furman, (28 Mo. 427) 208
Bowling Green v. Carson, (10 BusJi,
64) 128
xxxu
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
Bow 15. AUentown, (34 N. H. 351, 372)
25, 31, 32, 206
Bowen v. Greensboro, (4 S. E. R.
159) 189
Bowen v. Huntington, (14 S. E. E.
217, 35 W. Va. 682) 348
Bowen v. Mayor, (79 Ga. 709) 189
Bowen v. Detroit Ry., (54 Mich. 496,
52 Am. Rep. 822) 306
Bower v. State Bank, (5 Ark. 234)
47, 49
Bowers b. Bowers, (26 Pa. St. 74) 67
Bowers ». Supplee, (11 Phila. 223) 87
Bowman v. Boston, (5 Cusli. 1) 223
Bowns B. May, (24 N. E. R. 947, 120
K. Y. 357) 326 a
Boyd V. Chambers, (78 Ky. 140) 102
Boyd B. Kenuelly, (9 Vroom, 146)
195 5
Boyd V. Conklin, (64 Mich. 583) 354 a
Boyd B. Insurance Patrol, (113 Pa.
St. 169) 325
Boyd V. Selma, (11 So. 393) 326 a 397
Boyer v. State, (16 Ind. 451) 220
Boyer b. Reading, (24 Atl. R. 1070)
282, 291, 292
Boykin v. State, (11 So. R. 66) 31
Boyland b. New York, (1 Sandf. 27)
Boyle V. Brooklyn, (71 K. Y. 1) 278,
391
Boyle B. Phila. etc., (54 Pa. St. 314) 320
Boylston b. Mason, (102 Mass. 541)
348
Boylston Mai-ket Association v. Bos-
ton, (113 Mass. 523) 245
Boyter b. Dodsworth, (6 T. E. 681)
85
Bozant v. Campbell, (9 Rob. 411) 119,
152
Brabham v. Hindo Co., (54 Miss. 363)
325
Brace b. jST. Y. Cen., (27 N. Y. 271)
286
Brackenridge B. Fitchburg, (145 Mass.
160) 340, 352 •
Brackett v. Blake, (7 Met. 335) 80
Braconier v. Packard, (136 Mass. 50)
363
Bracy v. Smith, (64 Miss. 17) 83
Bradbury b. "Walton, (21 S. W. R.
869) 311
Bradf. b. Just, (33 Ga. 332) 67
Bradford b. Chicago, (25 111. 411)
326 a, 327
Braddy b. Milledgeville, (74 Ga. 516)
299 '
Bradley v. Brown, (32 Up. Can. Q. B.
46) 352
Bradley v. X. Y. etc. R. R. Co., (21
Conn. 294) 234 a
Bradley b. State, (22 Tex. App. 330)
330
Bradley v. Franklin Co., (65 Mo. 638)
187 a
Bradnox's Case, (1 Vent. 196) 158
Bradshaw b. Omaha, (1 Neb. 16) 259
276
Bradwell b. Illinois, (16 Wall. 130) 69
Bradwell v. Pittsburgh & W. E. R.
Co., (139 Pa. St. 404)352
Brady v. Bartlett, (56 Cal. 350) 173
Brady v. Howe, (50 Miss. 607) 74, 82
Brady B. Lowell, (3 Cush. 121) .339
Brady v. Mayor, (1 Barb. 584) 142
Bradley 1). N. Y. & N. H. E. E. Co.,
(21 Conn. 294) 23:^
Brady u. N. W. Ins. Co., (11 Mich.
425, 440) 130
Brady v. New York, (20 N. Y. 312)
169
Brady v. West, (50 Miss. 68) 18
Braham b. San Jose, (24 Cal. 585) 209
Braintree b. Battles, (6 Vt. 395) 31
Brainard v. N. Y. & H. E. E. Co., (25
N. Y. 496) 190
Brakken b. Minneapolis & St. L. Ey.
Co., (29 Minn. 41) 224
Braun v. Chicago, (110 111. 186) 261
Brayton b. Fall River, (112 Mass. 218)
121
Bray b. Wallingford, (20 Conn. 416,
419) 325
Branahau v. Hotel Co., (39 Ohio St.
333) 301
Brander b. Chesterfield, (5 Call. 548)
316, 363
Brandon v. Avery, (29 N. Y. 469) 102
Brandrifl: v. Harrison Co., (55 Iowa,
164) 397
Branham b. San Jose, 24 Cal. 585,
602) 169 ■
Branson b. Philadelphia, (47 Pa. St.
329) 294
Breaux v. Bridge, (30 La. An. 1105)
148
Breckenridge ». Fitchburg, (145 Mass.
160) 352
Breckinridge v. State, (27 Tex. App.
513) 83
Breed v. Cunningham, (2 Cal. 368)
Breevort b. Detroit, (24 Mich. 322) 172
Breeze b. Haley, (10 Colo. 5, 13 Pac.
R. 913) 397
Brehm b. New York, (104 N. Y. 586)
Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., (67
Tex. 542) 110, 124, 144
Brenham v. (Jerm. Am. Bk., (12 S
Ct. 559, 144 U. S. 173, lb. 12, S. Ct!
975, 144 U. S. 549) 183, 188
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXXIU
Beferences are to Sections.
Brennan v. Biadsliaw, (53 Tex. 330)
361
Brennan v. Laohat, (14 Daly, 197)
131
Brennan D.Weatherford, (53 Tex. 330)
.52
Brennan v. Bradsliaw, (53 Tex. 330)
38
Breninger v. Belvedere, (44 N. J. L.
350) 146, 158
Brewer v. Springfield, (97 Mass. 152)
397
Brewls v. Duluth, (3 McCrary, 219) 59
Brewster v. Davenport, (51 Iowa,
427) 355
Brewster v. Hyde, (7 N". H. 206) 95
Brewster b. Harwich, (4 Mass. 278)
58, in
Brewster v. Syracuse, (19 N. T. 116)
16, 187
Brevoorti). Detroit, (24 Mich. 322)
281
Brevoort ». Detroit, (24 Mich. 322)
397
Brick Pres. Ch. v. Mayor etc. N. Y.,
(5 Cow. 540) 113, 118
Bridge v. Grand junction Ky. Co.,
(3 M. & W. 244) 352
Bridge ». Hampton, (47 N^. H. 161)
279
Bridge Co. v. U. S., (105 U. S. 470)
314
Bridge Co. v. City of East St. Louis,
(121 111. 238, 12 N. E. R. 723) 268
Bridge Corp. v. Lowell, (15 Gray 106)
318
Bridges v. Griffin, (33 Ga. 113) 261
Bridges v. No. London Ry. Co., (L.
R. 6 Q. B. 377) 352
Bridges v. Shallcross, (6 W. Va. 562)
76
Bridgen v. Bannerman, (8 Jones, 53)
249
Bridgeport v. New York & New Ha^
ven R. R. Co., (36 Conn. 258; s. c,
4 Am. Rep. 63) 259
Bridgeport v. R. R. Co., (15 Conn.
475) 17, 110, 169
Bridgfo'rd v. Tuscumbia, (4 Woods,
611) 108, 130.
Briegel e. Philadelphia, (19 Atl. Rep.
10, 38) 336 a
Brieswick v. Brunswick, (51 Ga. 639)
155
Briggs V. Boat, (7 Allen, 287) 127
Briggs V. Guilford, (8 Vt. 264) 352
Briggs V. Oliver, (4 H. & N. 403) 337
Briggs V. Lewiston etc. Co., (79 Me.
363) 304
Briggs V. Whipple, (6 Vt. 95) 30, 31,
115, 176
/- iii
Bright V. Super's, (18 Johns. 242) 79
Brightman v. Bristol, (65 Me. 426)
120
Brightman b. Kirner, (22 Wis. 54)
271
Brimmer v. Boston, (102 Mass. IP)
113, 302
Brinck v. Collier, (56 Mo. 160) 223
Brinkmeyer v. Evans, (29 Ind. 187)
338 a
Brine b. Gt. West. Ry., (110 Eng.
Com. L. 402) 329, 354 o
Briscoe v. Bank, (11 Pet. 257) 5
Briscoe v. Drought, (11 Ir. C. L. R.
250) 354
Bristol, In re, (3 Q. B. Div. 10) 360
Bristol V. New Chester, (3 N. H. 524)
23, 24, 60, 67
Bristol V. Ontario, (69 Conn. 472)
49
British C. R. Co. v. Meredith, (4 D.
& E. T. R. 794) 329
Brittan v. Newland, (2 Dev. & Bat.
N. C. 363) 50
Britton b. Cummington, (107 Mass.
347) 343
Britton b. Mayor etc., (21 How. Pr.
251) 113
Britton v. Philadelphia, (32 Pa. St.
387) 283
Britton v. Platte City, (2 Dillon C.
0. 1) 375
Britton v. Steber, (62 Mo. 370) 18
Broadway b. McAtee, (8 Cusn. 508)
282
Broadway etc. Co. v. New York, (49
Hun, 126) 306
Broadwell v. Chapin, (2 111. App.
511) 169
Broadwell b. City, (75 Mo. 213) 329
Broburg v. Des Moines (63 Iowa, 523)
344
Brocaw v. Gibson Co., (73 Ind. 543)
186
Brock V. Hisben, (40 Wis. 674) 377
Brock District b. Bowen, (7 Up. Can.
Q. B. 471) 49
Brockman b. Creston, (44 N. W. R.
822) 393, 395
Broder v. Saillard,(3 B. & D. 62) 120
Brodhead v. Milwaukee, (19 Wis. 624)
139, 188
Brodnax b. Groom, (64 N. C. 244) 392
Brody ». Weeks, (3 Barb. 157) 120
Brokaw v. Terre Haute, (97 Ind. 176)
242
Brensom b. Kinsie, (1 How. 316) 14,
194
Bronson c. Newberry,(2 Dougl. 38)194
Bronson b. Southbury, (37 Conn. 199)
352
XXXIV
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Broodwell v. Kansas City, (75 Mo.
213, 42 Am. Rep. 409) 92
Brook D. Horton, (68 Cal. 554) 309
Brookline v. Westminster, (4 Vt. 224)
54
Brookly v. Dreslin, (57 N. Y. 591)
113, 123
Brooklyn v. B. City R. R. Co., (47 N.
T. 475) 302, 306, 348
Brooklyn v. Meserole, (26 Wend. 132)
391
Brooklyn B. Nodine, (26 Hun, 512) 300
Brooklyn v. N. Y. Ferry Co., (87 N.
Y. 204) 133
Brooklyn v. Scholes, (31 Hun, 110) 78
Brooklyn v. Smitli, (104 111. 429) 42
Brooklyn v. Toynbee, (31 Barb. 282)
117
Brooklyn El. Ry. Co., In re, (11 N. Y.
S. 161, 57 Hun, 590) 10
Brooklyn & Newton R. R. Co. b. Co-
ney Island R. R. Co., (35 Barb. 364)
238
Brooklyn C. R. R. Co. v. Brooklyn
City R. R. Co., (32 Barb. 364) 10,
238
Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Arm-
strong, (45 N. Y. 234, 240) 14, 226
Brooklyn S. T. Co. v. Brooklyn, (78
N. Y. 524) 396
Brooklyn etc. Co. v. Brooklyn City
R. R. Co., (32 Barb. 358) 302
Brooklyn v. Metcalf, (32 N. Y. 591)
191
Brooks V. Baltimore, (48 Md. 265)
2.59 a
Brooks V. Fisher, (21 Pac. R. 652, 79
Cal. 173) 3
Brooks V. Hart, (14 N. H. 307) 321
Brooks v. Memgan, (86 Mich. 576)
121, 256
Brooks V. Mitchell, (9 M. & W. 15)
183
Brooks V. Riding, (46 Ind. 15) 312
Brooks V. Satterlee, (49 Cal. 289) 172
Brooks ». Topeka, (34 Kan. 277) 219
Brookville v. Arthurs, (18 Atl. R.
1076) 348
Brookville v. Gagle, (73 Ind. 117) 156
Broome v. N. Y. & N. J. Tel. Co.,
(42 N. J. L. 141, 7 Atl. Rep. 851)
297, 396
Brophy v. Hyatt, (10 Col. 223,) 129
Bropliyu. Landman, (28 Ohio St. 542)
265, 278
Brophy v. Perth Amboy, (44 N. J. L.
217) 156
Broughton v. Pensacola, (93 U. S.
266) 32, 40, 41
Brouwer v. Appleby, (1 Sandf. 158)
24, 31
BroTver v. New York, (3 Barb. 254)
336 a
Brown, Ex parte, (48 Fed. R. 435)
258
Brown b. Beatty, (34 Miss. 227) 243
Brown ». Beatty, (34 Miss. 227) 247,
249
Brown v. Belleville, (30 Up. Can. Q.
B. 373) 164
Brown b. Bon Homme Co., (46 N. W.
Rep. 173) 190 a, 196
Brown b. Boulder, (18 Tex. 431) 66
Brown b. Brown, (7 Oreg. 285) 202
Brown b. Cayuga, etc. R. R. Co., (12
N. Y. 486) 239
Brown b. Chi. etc. Co., (101 Mo. 484)
244
Brown b. Crego, (29 Iowa, 321) 359
Brown b. Davies, (3 T. R. 80) 191
Brown b. District, (127 U. S. 579) 99
Brown b. Daplessis, (14 La. An. 842)
295 ,
Brown b. Fitchburg, (128 Mass. 282)
277
Brown b. Gates, (15 W. Va. 131) 212,
364, 375.
Brown v. Hunn, (27 Conn. 382) 130
Brown b. Insurance Co.,( 3 La. An.
177) 38
Brown b. Jefferson, (16 Iowa, 339)
352
Brown v. Jenks, (32 Pac. R. 701) 282
Brown b. Jerome, (102 111. 371) 102
Brown b. Johnson Co., (1 Green, 486)
180
Brown b. Lindsay, (35 Up. Can. Q. B.
509) 164, 166
Brown b. Lowell, (8 Met. 172) 292,
330
Brown v. Lutz, (54 N. W. R. 526) 148,
150
Brown v. Manning, (6 Ohio, 298) 194,
215, 219, 221, 226, 228
Brown b. Mayor, (63 N. Y. 239) 170,
280
Brown b. Mayor, (57 Mo. 156) 342
Brown v. McCollum, (76 Iowa, 479)
65
Brown b. Memphis, (97 U. S. 300) 1.")
Brown b. Milliksn, (42 Kan. 769) 196
Brown b. Muzzy, (117 Ind. 2.58) 120
Brown b. Nicholson, (5 C. B. N. S.
468) 156
Brown v. Painter, (44 Iowa, 368) 326
Brown b. Port Pleasant, (15 S. E. R.
209) 192, 196
Brown v. Pittsburgh, (16 Atl. R. 43)
270
Brown b. Prov. R. R. Co., (5 Gray,
35) 354
Brown b. Purdy, (6 N. Y. S. 143) 119
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXXV
References are to Sections.
Brown v. Rome etc. Co., (86 Ala. 206)
279
Brown v. Ruse, (69 Tex. 589) 360
Brown v. Sarnla, (11 Up. Can. Q. B.
87) 355
Brown v. Turner, (70 N. C. 93) 67, 271
Brown v. Vinaliiaven, (65 Me. 402)
116
Brown ». "Watson, (47 Me. 161) 352 a
Brown v. Werner, (40 Md. 15) 347
Brown v. Wlnterport, (79 Me. 305)
95, 170
Brownell v. Greenwich, 114 N. Y.
518) 192
Browning v. Owen Co., (44 lud. 11,
13) 316, 338
Browning v. Camden & W. R. & Tr.
Co., (3 H. W. Green, Ch. 47) 249
Brown's Adrar. v. Guyandotte, (34
W. Va. 299, 12 S. E. R. 707) 333
Brownville v. Cook, (4 Neb. 101) 117
Brownsville v. Loague, (129 U. S.
493) 376
Bruce v. Cromar, (22 Up. Can. Q. B.
321) 49
Bruce v. Dickey, (116 111. 527) 170,
176
Bruker v. Covington, (69 Ind. 33) 352
Brumagim v. Tillinghast, (18 Gal.
265) 326 a
Brumbaugh v. Philadelphia, (154 Pa.
St. 109) 324
Brunei ». Brunei, L. R. (12 Eq. 298) 66
Bruner v. Bryan. (50 Ala. 523) 85
Brunswick v. Fahm, (60 Ga. 109) 79,
85
Brunswick ». Litchfield, (2 Me. 28) 15
Brush E. L. Co. v. Jones, (5 Ohio Cir.
Ct. R. 340) 296
Brusso V. Buffalo, (90 N. T. 679) 342,
346 S53
Bryan v. Bates, (15 HI. 87) 155
Bryan u. Cattell, (15 Iowa, 538) 86,
363
Bryan v. Page, (51 Tex. 532) 104
Bryans v. Almond, (87 Ga. 564) 300
Bryant v. Randolph, (6 N. Y. S. 438)
352
Bryant v. St. Paul, 33 Minn. 289) 92,
332,338 a
Bryant's Lessee v. McCandless, (7
Ohio, pt. 2, 135) 217
Bryson v. Phila., (47 Pa. St. 329) 117
Bryson v. Spaulding, (20 Kan. 427)
365
Bubb 1). Lycoming, (134 Pa. St. 112) 79
Buchanan v. Alexander, (4 How. 20)
80
Buchanan v. Curtis, (25 Wis. 99) 219
Buchanan v. Duluth, (42 N. W. R.
204) 365
Buchanan t. Litchfield, (102 U. S.
278) 189 a
Buck V. Biddeford, (84 Me. 433) 346,
3506
Buck 0. Lockport, (6 Lans. 251) 375
Buckbee d. Brown, (21 Wend. 110)
132,336 a
Buckland ». Conway, (16 Mass. 396)
142
Buckley v. Bviggs, (30 Mo. 452) 165
Buckley v. English, (129 111. 646) 282
Buckley v. New Bedford, (29 N. E.
R. 201) 328
Bucknali v. Story, (36 Cal. 67) 256
Bucknell v. Story, (36 Cal. 67) 282
Buckner v. Augusta, (1 A. K. Marsh,
9) 229
Buckner v. Hart, (52 Fed. 835) 302
Buell ». Ball, (20 Iowa, 282) 56, 61
Buell 1). Buckingham, (16 Iowa, 284)
99, 100
Buell r. State, (45 Ark. 336) 122
Buffalo, In re (15 N. Y. S. 858) 238
Buffalo, In re (78 N. Y. 362) 241
Buffalo B. Bettinger, (76 N. Y. 393)
142, 143
Buffalo V. Chadcayne, (31 N. E. Rep.
443) 130
Buffalo v. Hallaway, (7 N. Y. 493) 347
Buffalo V. Harling, (52 N. W. R. 931)
215, 300
Buffalo ij. Webster, (10 Wend. 100)
159
Buffalo & N. Y. R. R. Co. v. Brain-
ard, (9N. Y. 100) 234 a
Buffalo etc. Co. ». New York etc. R.
Co., (10 Ab. N. C. 107) 121
Buff. etc. R. Co. V. Falconer, (103
U. S. 821) 188
Buffalo T. Co. V. Buffalo, (58 N. Y.
639) 338
Buford ». State, (72 Tex. 182) 8, 24,
32
Buhren v. D. D. E. etc. Co., (53 Hun,
571) 321
Bulger V. Eden, (82 Me. 352) 92
Bulick V. Connely, (42 Ind. 134) 174
Bulkley b. Eckert, (3 Pa. St. 368) 80
Bull V. Read, (13 Gratt. 78, 98) 78,
255
Bull B. Sims, (23 N. Y. 570) 177, 178
BuUard v. Shirley, (27 N. E. R. 766)
204
Bullock V. Curry, (2 Met. 171) 201
Bullock V. Durham, (19 N. Y. S. 635)
353
Bullock V. Glomple, (45 111. 218) 155
Bullock V. New York, (99 N. Y. 654)
352
Burapass ti. Taggart, (26 A'-k. 398,
7 Am. Rep. 623) 258
XXX VI
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Keferences are to Sections.
Bunch V. Edenton, (90 K. C. 431) 348
Buncombe T. Co. v. Baxter, (lOIred.
222) 318
Bunu ». People, (32 111. App. 410) 79
Bunn V. Peo., (45 111. 397) 67
Burbach v. Schweinler, (56 Wis. 386)
221
Burbank v. Fay, (65 N. T. 57, 71) 312
Burch V. Hardwick, (35 Gratt. 34) 18,
89, 333
Burcbfield v. New Orleans, (7 So.
Eep. 448) 172
Burckholter v. McCormellsville, (20
Ohio St. 308) 123, 125
Burden v. Stein, (27 Ala. 104) 234
Burditt V. Twenson, (17 Tex. 489) 120
Bureau Co. t. Railroad Co., (44 111.
229) 259
Burferning v. Chi. etc. Co., (48 N.
W. E. 444) 29
Burford v. Grand Rapids, (58 Mich.
98) 331
Burgess v. Jefferson City, (21 La.
An. 143) 172
Burgess v. Koontz, (64 Md. 134) 88
Burges v. Mabin, (70 Iowa, 633) 186
Burgess v. Pue, (2 Gill, 11) 255
Burleigh v. Rochester, 5 Fed. Rep.
667) 183, 190 a
Burgess v. Seligman, (107 U. S. 20)
195
Burgess of Darby, (21 Atl. R. 394,
140 Pa. St. 250) 59
Burham v. Ohio etc. Co., (23 TST. E.
R. 799) 330
Burke, In re, (62 N. Y. 224) 264, 296
Burke v. Edgar, (67 Cal. 182) 79
Burke v. Miss. R. Ry. Co., (29 Mo.
App. 370) 3.54 a
Burlington v. B. & M. R. R. Co., (41
Iowa, 134) 282, 283
Burlington D. Burl. Ey. Co., (49 Iowa,
144) 302
Burlington v. Commonwealth, (41
Pa. St. 63) 220
Burlington v. Est. Law, (43 K J. L.
13) 161
Burlington v. Dennison, (42 N. J. L.
165) 98, 130
Burlington v. Gilbert, (31 Iowa, 356)
278
Burlington v. Keller, (18 Iowa, 59)
125, 154
Burlington v. Leebrick, (43 Iowa,
252) 53
Burlington u. Palmer, (67 Iowa, 681)
281
Burlington v. Plank Rd., (11 Iowa,
75) 165
Burlington v. Quick, (47 Iowa, 226)
282
Burl. & Mo. R. R. R. Co. v. Spear-
man, (12 Iowa, 112) 259 a, 273, 291
Burlington etc. Co. v. Reinhaokle,
(15 Neb. 279) 302
Burlington R. Co. v. Clay Co., (13
Neb. 367) 177
Burl. W. Co. V. Woodward, (49 Iowa,
58) 189 a
Burmeister, In re, (76 N. Y. 174) 148,
264
Burnet v. Auditor, (12 Ohio, 54) 360
Burnett, In re, (35 La. An. 461) 154
Burnett, In re, (30 Ala. 461) 125
Burnett v. Buffalo, (17 N. Y. 383) 241,
256
Burnett v. Harrington, (7 S. W. R.
812) 217
Burnett v. Portage Co. etc., (12 Ohio
St. 57) 375
Burnett v. Sacramento, (12 Cal. 76)
259 a, 278
Burnham v. Butler, (31 N. Y. 480) 321
Burnham v. Brown, (23 Me. 400) 183
Burns b. Baltimore, (48 Md. 198) 259a
Burns v. Bradford, (137 Pa. St. 361)
350 a
Burns v. Bender, (36 Mich. 139) 363
Burns v. Clarion Co., (62 Pa. St. 351)
2,8
Burns v. La Grange, (17 Tex. 415) 102,
104, 398
Burns v. Milw. & Miss. R. R. Co., (9
Wis. 450) 250
Burns v. Toronto, (42 Up. Can. Q. B.
560) 346
Burnes v. Atchison, (2 Kan. 454) 23,
24, 256, 397
Burr 1). Chariton Co., (2McCray, 604)
196
Burr V. Leicester, (121 Mass. 241)
292, 293
Burr V. Newcastle, (49 lud. 322) 290
Burr V. Plymouth, (48 Conn. 460)
344, 352
Burrell Tp. v. Uncapher, (117 Pa. St.
353) 343
Burrill v. Augusta, (78 Me. 118) 92
Burrill v. Boston, (2 Cliff C. C. 590)
164, 165
Burritt v. New Haven, (42 Conn. 172)
306
Burroughs v. Norton Co., (29 Kan.
196) 79
Burrton v. Harvey etc. Bank, (28
Kan. 390) 177
Burson v. Huntington, (21 Mich. 415)
258
Burton v. Chattanooga, (7 Lea, 739)
355
Burt V. Brigham, (117 Mass. 307, 459)
232
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXXVll
References are to Sections.
Burt 13. Lima etc. Co., (21 TST. Y. S.
482) 302
Bush V. Oarbondale, (87 111. 74) 112
Bush B. Dubuque, (69 Iowa, 233) 120
Bush V. Johnson, (23 Pa. St. 209) 220
Bush V. Portland, (23 Pao. E. 667)
354 a
Bush V. Shipman, (4 Scam. 190) 8
Bush V. Whitney, (1 Chip. 369) 208,
210
Bushville v. Adams, (107 Ind. 475) 342
Bussier v. Pray, (7 S. & R. 447) 79
Butcher u. Camden, (29 N. J. Eq. 478)
79
Butchers Bk. v. Bullock, (3 B. & P.
434) 154
Butcher's Co. v. Bullock, (3 Bos. &
P. 434, 437) 159
Butchers Un. S. House v. Cres. City
L. S. Landing, (111 U. S. 746) 118
Butler, In re, (127 N. Y. 463) 247
Butler 0. Bangor, (67 Me. 385) 345,
347
Butler V. Charlestown, (7 Gray, 12)
114, 165, 167
Butler V. Chicago, (56 111. 341) 279
Butler V. Dunham, (27 111. 474) 184,
191, 196
Butler V. Edgewater, (6 N. Y. S. 174)
354 354 d
Butler V. Hunter, (7 H. & N. 826) 347
Butler V. Milwaukee, (15 Wis. 498)
176
Butler V. Nevin, (88 111. 575) 165, 265
Butler V. Palmer, (1 Hill, 335) 11
Butler V. Penn., (10 How. 402) 79
Butler V. Regents, (32 Wis. 124) 67
Butler 13. Passaic, (44 N. J. L. 171) 145
Butler 13. Ravine R. Sewer Comm'rs,
(39 N. J. L. 665) 242
Butler V. Thomasville, (74 Ga. 570)
391
Butler 13. Toledo, (5 Ohio St. 225) 280
Butler's Appeal, (73 Pa. St. 448) 255
Butman v. Fowler, (17 Ohio, 101) 288
Butolph 13. Blust, (5 Lans. 84) 155
Butterfield v. Boston, (20 N. E. Rep.
113) 353
Butternut i3. O'Malley, (50 Wis. 333)
59
Butterworth 13. Bartlett, (50 Ind. 537)
311
Butterworth v. U. S., (112 U. S. 50)
359
Button V. Frink, (51 Conn. 342) 338
Buttriok r. Lowell, (1 Allen, 172, 19
Am. Dec. 721) 9, 116, 170, 338a
Butts 1). Wood, (37 N. Y. 317) 166
Butz 13. Muscatine, (8 Wall. 578) 14
Byerly v. Anamosa, (44 N. W. 359)
3.52
Byers 13. Olney, (16 lU. 35) 104, 125,
156
Byrne v. Covington, (21 S. W. R.
1050) 192
Byrnes, In re, (57 Hun, 590) 17, 187 a
Byrnes v. Cohoes, (67 N. Y. 204) 92,
355
Byrnes 13. Minn. etc. Co., (38 Minn.
212) 354
c.
Cabot 13. Britt, (36 Vt. 349) 108
Cadmus 13. Farr, (47 N. J. L. 208) 99
Cahaba 13. Burnett, (34 Ala. 400) 326 a
Cahill 13. Insurance Co., (2 Doug.
Mich. 124) 31
Cahokia S. Trustees v. Rantenberg,
(88 111. 219) 167
Caiaker v. Mathews, (25 Ga. 571) 80
Cain 13. Syracuse, (95 N. Y. 83) 120,
327 a
Cairncross 1). Pewaukee, (Mo. 91, 47
N. W. R. 13) 350 a
Cairo 13. Allen, (3 111. App. 398) 212
Cairo 13. Bross, (101 111. 475) 124
Cairo etc. 13. People, (92 III. 170) 301
Cairo v. Campbell, (116 111. 305) 360
Cairo etc. Co. 13. Sparta, (77 111. 505)
14, 187 a, 192
Cairo & F. R. R. Co. 13. Trout, (32
Ark. 17) 243, 245
Cagwin 13. Hancock, (84 N. Y. 532) 196
Calder v. Smalley, (66 Iowa, 219) 348
Calder 13. Kurby, (5 Gray, 597) 125
Caldwell o. Rupert, (10 Bush, 182)
256
Caldwell 13. Burke Co. Jus., (4 Jones
Eq. N. C. 323) 255
Caldwell ». Boone, (51 Iowa, 687) 333
Caldwell 0. Alton, (33 111. 416) 110,
128
Caldwell ». Wright, (25 111. Ap. 74)
142
Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Ogilvie, (2
Macq. 229) 330
Calhoun 13. Fletcher, (63 Ala. 574) 150
Calhoun Co. 13. Galbralth, (99 U. S.
214) 188, 191 b
California etc. Co. 13. Butte Co., (18
Cal. 671) 186
California 13. Cen. etc. Co., (8 S. Ct.
1073) 258
Calking 13. Baldwin, (4 Wend. N. Y.
667) 243, 247
Calkins 13. Hartford, (33 Conn. 57) 342
Call 13. Chadbourne, (46 Me. 206) 24
Call 13. Hagger, (8 Mass. 430) 184
Callahan 13. State, (2 Stew. & P. Ala.
379) 84
Callahan b. New York, (66 N. Y. 656)
102
XXXVIH
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
Callahan v. Hallett, (1 Caines, 104) 79
Callahan v. Burlington, (23 Iowa,
562) 347
Callam v. Saginaw, (50 Mich. 7) 16,
141
Callan v. Wilson, (127 U. S. 540) 104
Callanan v. Oilman, (107 U. S. 360)
300
Callanan ji. Wayne Co., (73 Iowa, 709,
36 N. W. R. 654) 271
Callen v. Wilson, (127 U. S. 540) 245
Callen v. Junction City, (41 Kans.
466) 55
Callendar v. Marsh, (1 Pick. 432) 292
313
Call Pub. Co. V. Lincoln, (29 Neb.
149) 165, 166 .
Calloway v. Milledgeville, (48 Ga.
309) 32Q
Calwell V. Boone, (51 Iowa, 687) 92,
331
Cambridge University v. Crofts, (10
Mod. 208) 50
Cambridge v. Charlestown etc., (7
Met. 70) 317
Cambridge v. Middlesex, (125 Mass.
519) 330
Camden v. Allen, (26 N. J. L. 398)
183
Camden v. Block, (65 Ala. 236) 105
Camden v. Mulford, (26 N. J. L. 49)
249, 278, 398
Cameron, In re, v. East Missouri, (13
Up. Can. Q. B. 190) 154
Camp V. Knox Co., (3 Lea, 199) 177
Camp V. Minneapolis, (33 Minn. 461)
59
Campan v. Detroit, (14 Mich. 276)
245, 249
Campan v. Board, (Mich. 91, 49 N.
W. K. 39) 308
Campeni). Langley, (39 Mich. 451) 129
Campbell v. Bear Elver Co., (35 Cal.
679) 353
Campbell v. City of Kenosha, (5 Wall.
194) 254
Campbell v. Evans, (45 Mass. 356) 129
Campbell v. Fairhaven, (54 Vt. 336)
350 a
Campbell v. Karr, (26 III. App. 305)
219
Campbell v. Kansas, (Mo. 90, 13 S.
W. E. 897) 221
Campbell V. Kenosha, (5 Wall. 194)
170
Campbell ». Lunsford, (83 Ala. 512,
3 S. E. 522) 348
Campbell v. Laclede Gasl. Co., (84
Mo. 352) 225
Campbell v. Montgomery, (53 Ala.
527)92, 327 a
Campbell v. Polk Co., (3 Iowa, 467)
178
Campbell v. Seaman, (63 N. T. 568)
120
Campbell v. St. Louis, (71 Mo. 106) 87
Campbell v. Stillwater, (32 Minn. 308)
342, 347
Campbell Co. Court v. Newport, (12
B. Mon. Ky. 538) 221, 228
Canaan v. Derush, (47 N. H. 212) 51,
164
Canal etc. Co. v. C. C. E. Co., (41 La.
An. 561) 302
Canal Street, In re, (11 Wend. 155)
242
Canal Street, In re, (E. I. 93, 25 Atl.
E. 975) 8
Canal, In re, v. Walker Street, (12 N.
T. 406) 105
Cane v. Brigham, (39 Me. 39) 183
Canning v. Williamstown, (1 Cush.
451) 352 a
Cannon v. New Orleans, (20 Wall.
577) 133
Cannon v. Janirer, (3 Houst. 27) 363
Canova v. State, (18 Fla. 512) 368
Cantril v. Sainer, (59 Iowa, 26) 148
Canto, Ex parte, (21 Tex. App. 61)
128
Capdevielle, In re, (33 L. J. Exch.
306) 66
Cape Girardeau ». Eilev, (72 Mo. 220)
150
Cape Girardeau v. Hill, (118 U. S. 68)
194
Cane May etc. Co. v. Cape May, (35
N. J. Eq. 419) 161
Capmartin v. Pol. Jury, (19 La. An.
448) 177
Card V. Ellsworth, (65 Me. 547) 342
Cardwell v. Bridge Co., (113 Mass.
205) 314
Carey's Appeal, (75 Pa. St. 201) 66
Carey ». Eae, (58 Cal. 168) 346
Carey v. East Saginaw, (44 N. W.
Eep. 168) 165, 171
Carleton v. Washington, (38 Kan.
728) 130
Carleton v. Peo., (10 Mich. 250) 88, 96
Carlett v. Leavenworth, (27 Kan. 673)
352
Carli V. Stillwater, etc., (28 Minn.
373) 302
Carlis, In re, (11 B. L 638) 74
Carlisle v. Brisbane, (113 Pa. St. 544)
343, 350
Carlton, In re, (16 Hun, 497) 98
Carlton v. Washington, (28 Kan. 390)
183
Carlyle v. Clinton, (30 N. E. E. 782)
278
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XXXIX
References are to Sections.
Carlyle v. Sharp, (51 111. 71) 79
Carlyle W. L. & P. Co. v. Carlyle, (31
111. App. 325) 169, 296
Carman v. Steub.etc. Co., (4 Ohio St.
939) 347
Carncross v. Lykes, (22 Fla. 587)
282
earning v. Lowerse, (6 Johns. Ch.
439) 396
Caro ». Metro. Ry. Co., (46 N. Y.
Super. Ct. 138) 305
Carolina S. B. Co. v. Railroad, (30 S.
C. 539) 314
Carolus ». New York, (0 Bosw. 15)
352
Carondelet v. McPherson, (20 Mo.
192) 229
Carondelet C. N. Co. b. New Orleans,
(10 So. Rep. 87) 12
Carpenter's Case, (2 Pars. 537) 65
Carpenter v. Bristol, (21 Pick. 258;
see, ante, § 249) 377
Carpenter v. Cohoes, (81 N. Y. 21)
339, 353
Carpenter ». Jennings et al., (77 111.
250,) 248
Carpenter u. Oswego, etc., (24 N. Y.
655) 302
Carpenter v. Peo., (8 Colo. 116) 74
Carpenter v. Snelling, (97 Mass. 452)
258
Carr v. Conyers, (10 S. E. R. 630, 84
Ga. 287) 158
Carr ». Dooley, (122 Mass. 257) 110
Carr v. LeFevre, (27 Pa. St. 413) 191,
193
Carr ». McCampbell, (61 lud. 9) 106
Carr v. Northern Liberties, (35 Pa.
St. 324) :)28, 329
Carr ». Phillips, (39 Mich. 319) 87
Carr v. St. Louis, (9 Mo. 102) 102
Carrick jj. Johnston, (26 Up. Can. Q.
B. 65) 346
Carrie ». Carrie, (42 Mich. 509) 399
Carrier v. Shawangunk, (10 Fed. Rep.
220) 216
Cai-riger v. Morristown, 1 Lea, 116,
Tenn.) 56, 276
Carrington v. St. Louis, (89 Mo. 208)
332
Carroll v. Lynchburg, (6 S. E. R. 133)
130
Carroll «. Mitchell, (37 "W. Va. 130)
282
Carroll u. Silbenthaler, (37 Cal. 193)
79
Carroll v. Tishaningo etc., (28 Miss.
38) 128, 325, 365
Carroll v. Tuscaloosa, (12 Ala. 173)
123, 398
Carroll v. Wall, (35 Kan. 36) 96
Carroll Co. u. Smith, (111 U. S. 556)
195, 195 d, 196
Carroll Co. v. United States, (18 Wall.
71) 177, 195, 377
CarroUton K. R. Co. v. Winthrop, (5
La. An. 36) 200
Carrolltown ». Clark, (21 111. App.
74)96
Carron v. Martin, (26 N. J. L. 594)
165 278 398 •
Carro'ther's v. Board, (16 W. Va. 527)
397
Carruthers v. Harnett, (Tex. 91, 2 S.
W. R. 523) 395
Carson ». Blazer, (2 Binn. 475, 4 Am.
Dec. 463) 239
Carson v. Central etc. Co., (35 Cal.
325) 303
Carson ». Hartford, (48 Conn. 68) 248
Carter v. Bos. & Prov. R. R. Co., (139
Mass. 525) 313
Carter v. Chicago, (57 111. 283) 396
Carter v. Dow, (16 Wis. 298) 129
Carter ». Durango, (27 Pao. R. 1057,
16 Colo. 534) 83.
Carter d. Kalloch, (56 Ind. 335) 172
Carter ». Monticello, (68 Iowa, 178)
350 a
Carter v. Propes, (104 Mass. 236) 15,
187, 314
Carters. Sympson, (8 B. Mon. 155) 78
Carter County v. Sinton, (120 U. S.
517) 28
Cartersville v. Baker, (73 Ga. 686) 141
Cartersville v. Cook, (22 N. E. JR. 14,
129 111. 152) 346
Cartersville n. Lanham, (67 Ga. 753)
129
Cartersville v. Lyon, (69 Ga. 577) 103
Cartersville Imp. Gas & W. Co. b.
Cartersville, (16 S. E. R. 25, Ga. 93)
165
Cartersville W. Co. u. Cartersville,
(Ga. 92, 16 S. E. R. 70) 270
Carthage v. Rhoads, (14 S. W. 181) 129
Cartwright ». Belmont, (58 Wis. 370)
346
Cartright v. Crow, (44 Mo. Ap. 563)
32
Cary Libi'ary ». Bliss, (151 Mass. 364)
9, 10
Cary v. Pekin, (88 111. 154) 56, 276
Case ».' Blood, (71 Iowa, 632) 374
Case c. Fowler, (65 Ind. 29) 172
Case V. Johnscm, (91 Ind. 477) 166
Case ». Hall, (21 111. 632) 129
Case V. Mobile, (80 Ala. 538) 30, 158
Case V. Bellows, (31 N. H. 501) 106
Case V. Dillon, (2 Ohio St. 607) 189 a
Cases of Phila. & Trenton R. R., (6
Whart. 25) 302
xl
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Eeferences are to Sections.
Case of State Tax on Foreign-held
Bonds, (15 Wall. 300) 258
Cash V. Whitworth, (13 La. 401) 234
Caskey v. Greensb., (78 Ind. 233) 72
Cass Co. V. Gilletf, (100 U. S. 585)
186, 188
Cass Co. V. Johnston, (95 U. S. 360)
189, 196
Cass County v. Banks, (44 Mich. 467)
222 223
Cassidy v. Stookbridge, (21 Vt. 391)
352
Cassidy v. Angell, (12 R. I. 447) 337
Castle. V. Wintah, (2 Wyam. 126) 79
Castleberry v. Atlanta, (74 Ga. 164)
329
Castor V. Uxbridge, (39 Up. Can. Q.
B. 113) 342, 351
Caspary v. Portland, (19 Or. 496,
24 P. 1036) 92
Caswell V. St. Mary's PI. R. Co., (28
Up. Can. Q. B. 247, 254) 342
Catling V. Carteret, (92 N. C. 536) 282
Cator B. Lenisham Dlst., (5 B. & S.
115) 355
Cattail V. Ireson, (E. B. & E, 91) 104
Catterlin u. Frankfort, (79 Ind. 547)
348
Cavanagh v. Boston, (139 Mass. 426)
120, 338
Caverly ». Lowell, (1 Allen, 289) 79
Cawley v. Peo., (95 111. 249) 72
Cedar Rapids etc. Co. v. Whelan, (64
Iowa, 694) 279
Cedar Rapids, (Iowa, 92, 51 N". W. K.
1142) 232
Cemetery v. Com'rs, (152 Mass. 408)
267
Cemetery Asso. v. Railroad, (121 111.
199) 120
Centenary M. B. Ch. v. Parker, (43
Jif. J. L. 307, 12 Atl. R. 142) 49
Centervllle v. Woods, (57 Ind. 192)
348, 351
Central d. Wilcoxen, (3 Col. 566) 179
Central v. Sears, (2 Col. 588) 145
Cen. Branch Un. P. R. Co. v. Smith,
(23 Kan. 745) 188
Central Br. etc. Co. v. Pate, (21 Kan.
539) 352
Cen. Bridge v. Lowell, (15 Gray, 106)
87, 100, 144
Central City Horse R'y Co. v. Fort
Clark etc. R'y Co., (87 111. 523) 144,
802
Central Branch etc. Co. ». Andrews,
(26 Kan. 702) 330
Centraliav. Krouse, (64 111. 19) 350 a,
352
Central Land Co. v. Providence, (15
R. I. 246) 221
Central Park Com'rs, (61 Barb. 40)
308
Central R. R. Co. v. Hetfield, (29 N.
Y. 206) 302
Cent. Pa. Tel. & Supply Co. B.Wilkes-
Barre & W. S. R. Co., (11 Pa. Co.
Ct. 417) 306 a
Center v. Finnev, (17 Barb. 94) 321
Centre Street Vac, Re (115 Pa. St.
247, 259 a
Cerro Gordo v. Rawlings, (25 K. E.
R. 1006) 123
Chad 13. Tilsed. (5 J. B. Moore) 114.
Chaddock v. Wilbraham, (5 C. B. 645)
156
Chadwick v. Colfax, (51 Iowa, 70) 212
Chadwick v. Melvin, (68 Pa. St. 333)
65
Chaffee's Appeal, (56 Mich. 244) 243
Chaffee v. Granger, (6 Mich. 51) 163
Chagrin F. Co. v. Cane, (2 Ohio St.
419)
Chahoon's Case, (29 Graft. 822) 102
Chalkley v. Riclimond, (88 Va. 402,
14 S. E. R. 339) 328
Chamberlain v. Cleveland, (34 Ohio
St. 551) 259 a
Chamberlain v. Dover, (13 Me. 466)
95, 106, 108
Chamberlain v. Eliz. S. Cordage Co.,
(41 N. J. Eq. 43) 302
Chamberlain v. Evansville, (76 Ind.
542) 106, 145
Champaign v. Harmon, (98 111. 491)
282
Chamberlain v. Warburton, (1 Utah,
267) 359
Chamberlain v. Wheatland, (7 N. Y.
S. 190) 352
Chamberlain v. West End of London
& C. P. R. Co., (110 E. C. L. R. 604)
231
Chambers Co. ». Clews, (21 Wall. 317)
186, 195 a
Chambers v. St. Louis, (29 Mo. 543)
13, 200, 201, 203, 207
Chambers v. Green, (L. E. 20 Eq.
552) 363
Champaign v. Harmon, (98 111. 491)
200
Champaign v. Patterson, (50 111. 62)
349
Champion v. Board, (5 Dak. 416) 398
Chance ». Temple, (1 Iowa, 179) 365
Chancy v. State, (118 Ind. 494) 283
Chandler v. Attica, (18 Fed. Rep. 299)
197
Chandler u. Boston, (112 Mass. 200) 56
Chandler v. Bradish, (23 Vt. 416) 81
Chandler v. Bay St. Louis, (57 Miss.
526) 177
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
xli
Chandler v. Reynolds, (19 Kan. 249)
67
Chapman «. Douglas Co., (107 U. S.
848) 164
Chapmail v. Gates, (54 N". T. 132) 247
Chapman v. Lowell, (4 Cush. 378) 87,
174
Chapman v. Rochester, (110 N. Y.
273) 120
Chapin u. Brown, (15 R. I. 579) 221
Chapln B. School District in Win-
chester, (35 N. H. 445) 49
Chapin ». Sullivan etc., (39 jST. H. 564)
293
Chapin v. Vt. & Mass. R. R. Co., (8
Gray, 575) 191
Chapin v. Worcester, (124 Mass. 464)
248
Chaplin v. Wheatland, (128 111. 264)
355
Chares v. State, (3 W. Va. 567) 83
Chariton v. Barber, (54 Iowa, 360, 37
Am. Kep. 209) 122
Chariton v. HoUiday, (60 Iowa, 391)
148
Charity Hos. v. Stickney (3 La. An.
550) 123, 259 a
Charles v. Mayor, etc., (27 N. J. L.
203) 84
Charles v. Hoboken, (3 Dutch. 203) 99
Charles Riv. etc. v. Warren, 11 Peters,
422) 320
Charleston v. Chur, (2 Bailey, S. C.
164) 158
Charleston v. Oliver, (16 S. C. 47) 156
Charleston v. Werner, (S. C. 93, 17 S.
E. R. 33) 253
Charleston o. Reed, (27 W. Va. 681)
130
Charleston Council v. St. Philip's
Church, (1 McMul. 139) 267
Charleston Councils. Condy, (4 Rich.
L. 254) 207
Charleston etc. Co. v. Comstock, (W.
Va. 92, 15 S. E. R. 69) 246
Charleston etc. Co. v. Comstock, (Va.
92, 15 S. E. R. 69) 241
Cf. Charlestown etc. Co. ». Comstock,
(W. Va. 92, 15 S. E. R. 69) 245
Charlestown v. Com'rs, (109 Mass.
270) 398
Charlton v. Allegheny, (1 Grant Cas.
208) 329
Chase v. City of Oshkosh, (Wis. 92,
51 N. W. R. 560) 300
Chase v. Cleveland, (44 Ohio St. 505)
344
Chase v. Lowell, (7 Gray, 33) 79
Chase v. Lowell, (24 N. E. R. 212)
3506
Chase v. Mer. Bk., (19 Pick. 564) 375 I
Chastain v. Town Council, (29 Ga.
333) 125
Cheany v. Hooser, (9 B. Mon. 330) 2,
55, 56
Cheesborough, In re, (17 Hun,-]^. Y.
561) 236
Cheetham v. Hampson, (4 D. & E. T.
R. 318) 348.
Chelmsford Co. v. Demarest, 7 Gray,
Mass. 1) 72
Chemung Bk. v. Sup'rs, (5 Den. 517)
177, 190 a
Cheney, In re, (27 Pao. R. 436, 90
Cal. 617) 117, 134
Chenv v. Shelbyville, (19 Ind. 84) 124
Cheny v. Board, (52 N. J. L. 544) 232
Cherokee v. Sioux City & I. P. Town
Lot Co., (52 Iowa, 279) 241
Cherokee Co. v. Wilson, (109 U. S.
621) 368
Cherokee Co. v. Chew, (44 Kan. 162)
79
Chesapeake & O. Ey. Co. v. MuUins,
(22 S. W. 558) 279
Chesapeake, etc. Canal Co. v. Balti-
more, etc. R. R. Co., (4 Gill. & J. 5)
238
Cheshire Co. etc. v. Stevens, (10 N.
H. 133) 320
Chess V. Birmingham, (1 Grant, Pa.
Cas. 438) 260
Chessborough, In re, (17 Hun, 561)
120
Chestnutwood v. Hood, (68 111. 132)
395
Chicago V. Bixby, (84 111. 82) 344
Chicago V. Baer, (41 111. 306) 259 a
Chicago V. Bartree, (100 111. 57) 123
Chicago V. Colby, (20 111. 614) 270
Chicago B. Dalle, (115 111. 386) 350 b
Chicago V. Deomody, (61 111. 431) 92
Chicago V. Edwards, (58 111. 252) 79
Chicago V. Fowler, (60 111. 322) 350 b
Chicago V. Gage, (95 111. 593) 72
Chicago V. Gallagher, (44111. 295) 328,
343
Chicago V. Hueuesbein, (85 111. 594)
354
Chicago V. Hislop, (61 111. 86) 343
Chicago V. Hoy, (75 111. 530) 342
Chicago V. Hesing, (83 111. 204) 343
Chicago B. Halsey, (25 111. 595,) 212
Chicago V. Johnson, (53 111. 91) 350 b
Chicago V. Johnson, (98 111. 618) 219
Chicago V. Joney, (60 111. 383) 92
Chicago V. Keefe, 114 111. 222) 340
Chicago V. Kelly, (69 111. 475) 352 a
Chicago V. Langlass, (52 111. 256) 346,
3.52 o
Chicago v. Larned, (34 111. 203) 244,
248
xlii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Seferences are to Sections.
Chicago V. Lafliu, (49 111. 172) 120
Chicago 0. Major, (18 111. .<549) 352 a
Chicago V. McLean. (24 N. E. 527) 352
Chicago V. McCarthy, (75 111. 602)
346, 3506
Chicago V. McGiven, (78 111. 347) 344
Chicago V. Megraw, (75 111. 566, 570)
338
Chicago V. McGiven, (78 111. 347) 336 a
Chicago V. Martin, (49 111. 241) 352 a
Chicago V. Murphy, (84111. 224) 350 a
Chicago V. Middlebrook, (32 N. E. K.
457, 111. 93) 312,
Chicago V. McGraw, (75 HI. 566) 92,
329
Chicago V. O'Brennan, (65 111. 560)
336 a, 348
Chicago V. People, (56 111. 327) 192
Chicago V. Quimby, (38 111. 274,) 127,
154
Chicago B. Eumpf., (45 111. 90) 124,
134
Chicago V. Robbins, (2 Black, 418)
301 347 377
Chicago V. Schmidt, (107 111. 186)
351
Chicago V. Shober etc., (6 111. App.
560) 92
Chicago V. Sexton, (115 111. 230) 189 a
Chicago B. Taylor, (125 U. S. 161)
231, 330
Chicago V. Wheeler, (25 111. 478) 242
Chicago V. Wright, (32 111. 192) 282
Chicago V. Wright, (69 111. 328) 18,
217, 222
Chicago V. Union Building Assn.,
(102 111. 379, 399) 392, 396
Chicago & A. E. K. Co. b. Adler, (56
111. 344) 8
Chicago V. Alton Ky. Co., (67 111. 11)
136
Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co. v. Quincy,
(28 N. E. R. 1069) 302
Chicago, B. & Q. E. E. Co. b. County
of Otoe, (16 Wall. 667) 254
Chicago, B. & Q. E. R. Co. b. Banker,
(44 111. 26) 215
Chicago, D. & V. E. R. Co. b. St.
Anne, (101 111. 151) 186
Chicago Dock Co. b. Garrity, (115
111. 155) 33
Chicago etc. Cor. v. Aldrich, (111. 90,
24 N. E. E. 763) 246
Chicago etc. Co. v. Aurora, (99 111.
205) 186, 192 6
Chicago etc. Co. v. Becker, (3 Fed.
Rep. 883) 150
Chicago etc. Co. b. Bates, (18 S. W.
R. 1133) 245
Chicago etc. Co. b. Blume, (111. 91,
27 N E. E. 601) 246
Chicago etc. R. R. Co. b. Boone Co.,
(44 111. 240) 259
Chicago etc. Co. b. Chicago, (28 X.
E. E. 756) 308
Chicago etc. b. Chicago, (121 111. 176)
303, 306
Chicago etc. Co. ». Chicago, (111. 92,
29 ISr. E. R. 1109) 238
Chicago etc. N. W. Co. b. Dey, (35
Fed. Eep. 896) 150
Chicago etc. Co. b. Dunbar, (100 111.
110) 303
Chicago etc. b. Elgin, (91 111. 251) 312
Chicago etc. Co. v. ElUthorpe, (Iowa
90, 43 N". W. E. 277) 215
Chicago etc. Co. b. Elliott, (Mo. 92,
18 S. W. R. 901) 245
Chicago etc. v. Basley, (26 Pac. R.
731) 244
Chicago etc. Co. v. Eaton, (26 K. E.
E. 575) 246
Chicago etc. Co. v. Francis, (70 111.
238) 330
Chicago etc. Co. b. Grierson, (29
Pac. 1082) 241
Chicago etc. Co. v. Haggerty, (67 111.
113) 136
Chicago etc. R. R. Co. b. Lake, (71
111. 333) 232, 233
Chicago etc. Co. b. Morrow, (Kan.,
22 Pac. E. 413) 354
Chicago etc. Co. b. Missouri, (7 S.
Ct. 693, 120 U. S. 569) 270
Chicago etc. R. R. Co. b. Newton,
(36 Iowa, 299) 308, 306
Chicago etc. Co. b. Nix, (111. 91, 27
N. E. 81) 246
Chicago etc. Co. b. Sawyer, (69 111.
285) 353
Chicago etc. E. R. Co. b. Stein, (75
111. 41) 239
Chicago etc. Co. v. Ubanks, (18 S.
W. R. 1134) 245
Chicago etc. Co. b. Quincy, (27 N.
E. E. 232) 350
Chicago Lake Ft. Case, (33 Fed.
Eep. 730) 132
Chicago Packing etc. Co. v. Chicago,
(88 111. 221) 62, 152
Chicago E. I. & E. R. Co. b. Joliet,
(79 111. 39) 160
Chicago E. Co. b. Pinokney, (74 111.
277) 189
Chi. K. & W. R. Co. B. Harris, (Kan.
92, 30 Pac. R. 456) 365
Chick B. Newberry, (27 S. C. 419) 339
Chickasaw Co. v. Clay Co., (62 Miss.
325, 11 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 16)
67 » ±- /
Chickesaw Co. b. Sumner Co., (58
Miss. 619) 59
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
xliii
References are to Sections.
Chicot Co. V. Kruse, (47 Ark. 80) 376
Chioopee Bank v. Chapin, 1(8 Mete.
Mass. 40) 19.j c
Chldsey v. Canton, (17 Conn. 475) 3.53
Child V. Hudson Bay Co., (2 P. Wms.
207) 146
Child V. Bemus, (R. I. 21 Atl. Rep.
539) 124'
Child V. Boston, (4 Allen, 41) 314
Chilton V. Railroad, (16 M. & W. 212)
154
Chilvers v. People, (11 Mich. 43) 134
Chilton V. Brooks, (69 Md. 584, 28
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 32) 57
Chippewa Co. v. Aud. Gen., (32 N. W.
R. 651) 270
Chittenden Co. b. Shanks, (Ky.89, 11
S. W. R. 468) 183
China ». Southwiok, (12 Me. 238) 353
Chinn v. Trustees, (82 111. 236) 365
Chisolm V. Montgomery, (2 Woods,
584) 196
Christ V. Polk Co., (48 Iowa, 302) 87
Christensen, Ex parte, (85Cal.208) 150
Christopher e. Mayor, (13 Barb. 567)
172
Christy's Adm. v. St. Louis, (20 Mo.
143) 326 a
Chronic v. Pugh, (111. 91, 27 N. E. R.
415) 236
Chumasero v. Potts, (2 Mont. 242) 365
Church V. Town of Knightstown, (35
Ind. 177) 61
Church Case, (5 Robt. 649) 95
Church V. City of New York, (55 N".
Y. Super. 160) 270
Church V. Cherryfield, (33 Me. 460)
342
Churchill v. Walker, (68 Ga. 681)
32, 380
Churchman D. Indianopolis, (110 Ind.
259) 265
Chute V. State, (19 Minn. 271) 300
Cicero v. Clifford, (53 Ind. 191) 193
Cicotte V. Church, (rift Mich. 552) 51
Circleville v. Jfeuding, (41 Ohio St.
465) 347
Cincinnati v. Bryson, (15 Ohio, 625)
123
Cincinnati v. Buckingham, (10 Ohio,
257) 124, 128, 155, 250
Cincinnati v. Bryson, (15 Oliio, 625,)
256
Cincinnati «. Cameron, (33 Ohio St.
336) 12, 171
Cincinnati v. Coombs, (16 Ohio, 181)
241
Cincin. v. Evans, (5 Ohio St. 594)
312
Cincinnati v. McMilken, (6 Ohio Ct.
R. 188) 255
Cincinnati v. Penny, (21 Ohio St. 499)
294, 329
Cincinnati v. Rice, (15 Ohio, 225) 134
Cincin. v. Sloane, (31 Ohio St. 1) 83
Cincinnati v. Stone, (5 Ohio St. 38)
347
Cincinnati ». White's Lessee, (6 Pet.
435) 215, 219, 220, 226, 311
Cincinnati v. Mt. Auburn Cable R'y
Co., (28 W'kly L. Bui. 276) 302
Cincinnati Col. v. State, (19 Ohio, 92,
110) 270
Cincinnati etc. v. Clinton Co., (1 Ohio
St. 77) 375
Cincinnati etc. Co. v. Cooper, (22 N.
E. R. 340) 352
Cine. etc. Co. v. Curamingsville, (14
Ohio St. 523) 302
Cincinnati Inc. Plane Ry. Co. v. City
& S. Tel. Ass'n, (Ohio '92, 27 N. E.
890) 306 a
Cincinnati's Lessee v. Hamilton Co.
Com'rs, (7 Ohio, part 1, 88) 215,
217, 219
Cincinnati Mut. Health Ass'n v. Ro-
senthal, (55 111. 85) 258
Cisco V. Roberts, (36 K. T. 292) 133
Citizens v. Sands, (Mich. 93, 55 N. W.
452) '297
Citizens etc. Co. v. Camden H. R. R.
Co., (33 N. J. Eq. 267) 304
Citizens Gas Co. ». El wood, (114 Ind.
332) 145, 152
Citizens Co. v. Jones, (34 Fed. Rep.
579) 144, 302
Citizens St. R. Co. ». Memphis, (5:!
Fed. 715) 290, 301
Citizens W. Co. v. Bridgeport Hyd.
Co., (55 Conn. 1) 17, 144, 296
City V. Alexander, (23 Mo. 483) 184
City V. Blaokemore, (17 Ind. 318) 106
City V. College, (Mo. 92, 20 S. W. R.
35) 270
City V. Cunningham, (47 N. W. R.
930) -350
City V. Jewish Hospital, (30 W. N. C.
25) 270
City V. Fowler, (34 Ind. 140) 281
City V. Given, (60 Pa. St. 136) 85
City V. Moore, (113 Pa. St. 597) 282
City V. Murphy, (3 S. E. Rep. 326)
326
City V. Morris Canal, (12 N. J. Eq.
547, 561) 312
City V. Rule, (93 Pa. St. 15) 259 a
City V. Sears, (2 Col. 588) 79
City V. Suburban Ry. Co. of Savan-
nah, (77 Ga. TAl) 136
City V. Tiffany, (22 N. T. S. 604) 259 a
City Bank of Dallas v. Vogel, (51
Tex. 354) 273
xliv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Keferences are to Sections.
City Bank B.Albany, (92 N. Y. 363) 170
City Com'rs v. Benjamin, (2 Strob.
508, S. 0.) 150
City Council v. Alirens, (4 Strobb,
241, S. C.) 124
City Council v. Corleis, (2 Bailey,
189, S. C.) 160
City Council v. Dunn, (1 McCord, S.
C. 333) 159
City Council v. Feldman, (3 Rich. S.
C. Law, 385) 160
City Council r>. Goldsmith, (12 Rich.
S. C. Law, 470) 123
City Council d. Hudson, (15 S. E. R.
878, 88 Ga. 599) 336 a
City Council ». Church, (4 Strobh.
306) 18
City Council ». King, (4 McCord. S.
C. 487) 48, 103
City Council v. Louisville etc. Co.,
(4 So. Rep. 626) 130
City Council v. Moorehead, (2 Rich.
S. C. Law, 430) 51, 52
City Council v. Plank Rd. Co., (31
Ala. 76) 169
City Council v. Rogers, (2 McCord,
495) 127
City Council ». Schmidt, (11 Rich.
S. C. Law, 343) 160
• City Council v. Seeba, (4 Strobh.
Law S. C. 319) 158
City Council v. Payne, (2 Nott &
McC. 475) 116
City Council v. Pepper, (1 Rich. S.
C. Law, 364) 103
City Com. of Charleston v. Benjar
min, (2 Strobh. S. C. Law, 508) 134
City F. I. Co. V. Corliss, (21 Wend.
367) 335
City Gas & M. Co. v. Elwood, (114
Ind. 332) 296
City etc. v. Goldsmith, (2 Speers S.
C. 435) 150
City etc. Co. v. Savannah, (77 Ga.
731) 306
City Nat. Bk. v. Paducah, (9 S. W.
R. 218, Ky. 87) 258
City of Bloomington v. Pollock, (31
N. E. R. 146) 292
City of Anderson v. East, (117 Ind.
126) 331
City of Buffalo v. Schleifer, (21 N.
Y. S. 913) 153
City of Covington v. Southgate, (15
B. Mon. 491) 259
City of Delphi v. Bowen, (61 Ind. 29) 53
City of Galesburg ». Hawkinson, (75
lU. 152) 53
City of Gloversville v. Johnston G. &
K. R. Co., (21 N. Y. S. 146, 66 Hun,
627) 396
City of Jacksonville v. Ledwith,
(Fla.,'7 So. R. 885) 128
City of Kansas v. Johnson, (78 Mo.
661) 267
City of Louisville v. Louisville Gas
Co. (22 S. W. R. 550, Ky. 93) 281
Cf. City of Muscatine v. Chicago R.
I. & P. Ry. Co., (55 jSr. W. R. 100,
Iowa, 93) 282
City of Nevada v. Morris, (43 Mo.
App. 586) 113
City of New York, In re, (63 Hun,
632) 241
City of Olympia ». Mann, (1 Wash.
St. 389) 130
City of Pittsburgh, In re, (138 Pa.
St. 401, 27 W. N. C. 457) 259 a
City of Passaic, In re, (23 Atl. R.
517, N. J. 92) 87
City of Pensacola v. Louisville etc.
R. Co., (21 Fla. 492) 55
City of Rock Island v. Huesing, (25
111. App. 600, 21 N. E. R. 558) 395
City of St. Louis v. Spiegel, (2 S.
W. R. 839, 40 Mo. 587) 261
City of Springfield ». Knott, (49 Mo.
App. 412) 278
City of Wilkes-Barre's App., (116 Pa.
St. 246, 9 Atl. R. 308) 267
City R. R. Co. v. City R. R. Co., (20
N. J. Eq. 61) 304
Claiborne Street, In re, (4 La. An. 7)
240
Claiborne Co. v. Brooks, (111 U. S.
400, 406) 177, 184
Claflin V. Hopkins, (4 Gray, 502) 139,
397
Clapp V. Board of Pol., (72 N. Y.
415) 83
Clapp V. City of Spokane, (53 Fed.
515) 294, 393
Clapp V. Hartford, (35 Conn. 66) 30
Clapp V. Town, (3 N. Y. State Rep.)
317
Clarendon v. Phila., (13 Phila. 54) 75
Clark B. Adair, (79 Mo. 526) 325
Clark V. Board, (24 Iowa, 366) 374
Clark V. Barrington, (41 N. H. 44) 352
Clark B. Boston etc. Co., (N. H., 31
Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 548) 136
Clark B. Corinth, (41 Vt. 449) 340
Clark V. Crane, (57 Cal. 629) 360
Clark B. Com., (4 Pick. 125) 321
Clark B. Com., (14 Bush, 166) 288
Clark B. Cape May, (50 N. J. L. 558) 83
Clark B. Cuckfleld Union, (11 Eng.
L. & Eq. 442) 165
Clark B. District, (3 Mackey, 79) 344
Clark B. Davenport, (14 Iowa, 494)
266
Clark B. Butcher, (9 Cow. 674) 326 a
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
xlv
Clark V. Des Moines, (19 Iowa, 199)
17Y, 178
Clark V. Janesville, (10 Wis. 136) 148,
191
Clark V. Denten, (1 B. & A. 92) 114
Clark V. Easton, (146 Mass. 43) 338 a
Clark V. Fry, (8 Ohio St. 358, 374)
300, 347
Clark V. Iowa City, (20 Wall. U. S.
583) 180,190, 192, 193 6
.Clark B. Lincoln Co., (20 Pac. K.
576) 379
Clark V. Lookport, (49 Barb. 580)
349, 352
Clark V. Louisville W. Co., (Ky. 91,
14 S. W. R. 502) 271
Clark Co. v. Lawrence, (63 HI. 32)
Clark 13. Lincoln Co., (25 Am. & Eng.
Car. Cas. 211) 325
Clark 13. Lebrew, (9 B. & C. 52) 114
Clark V. Leathers, (5 S. W. R. 576)
255, 270
Clark V. McKenzie, (7 Bush, 523) 371
Clark V. Mayor etc. of N. Y., (3
Barb. 290) 92
Clark i). Mobile Com'rs, (36 Ala. 621)
80
Clark V. No. Muskegon, (50 N. W. E.
254, 88 Mich. 808) 80
Clark !3. People, (15 111. 213) 383
Clark V. Polk Co., (19 Iowa, 248)
169, 190 a
Clark V. Pratt, (55 Me. 546) 87
Clark 13. Pratt, (47 Me. 55) 211
Clark V. Peckham, (10 R. I. 35) 121
Clark V. Richmond, (88 Va. 355) 339,
.343
Clark V. Richmond, (5 S. E. E. 869)
352
Clark V. Syracuse, (13 Barb. 32) 896
Clark V. Saybrook, (21 Conn. 318) 329
Clark V. School Dist., (3 R. I. 199)
179, 182
Clark V. South Bend, (85 Ind. 276)
130, 146
Clark V. Syracuse, (13 Barb. 32) 720
Clark V. Utica, (18 Barb. N. Y. 451)
245
Clark 13. Wilmington, (5 Harr. 243)
329, .3.54 a
Clark V. Washington, (12 Wheat. 524)
165
Clark Co. 13. Paris, (11 B. Mon. 143,
154) 364
Clark Co. v. Paris etc. Co., (11 B.
Mon. 143) 186
Clarke's Fees, In re, (25 Hun, 593) 79
Clarke v. Bank, (5 Eng., 10 Ark. 516)
30,31
Clarke i3. Birmingham etc. Co., (41
Pa. St. 147) 353
Clarke d. Board, (27 111. 310) 65
Clarke v. Farmers' etc. Co., (15
Wend. 256) 51
Clarke B. Janesville, (10 Wis. 136) 190
Clarke «. Potter Co., (1 Barr, Pa. 163)
50
Clarke v. Providence, (15 Atl. E. 763)
201, 208, 225, 226
Clarke 13. Rochester, (24 Barb. 481)
244
Clarke 13. Rogers, (81 Ky. 43) 231
Clarke Co. Comm'rsis. State, (61 Ind.
75) 368
Claughey 13. Hancock Co., (46 111.
856) 118
Clay, In re, (22 N. Y. S. 112) 278
Clayards 13. Dethick, ( 12 Q. B. 439)
352
Clayburgh ». Chicago, ( 25 111. 535)
92, 336 a, 349
Clay County 13. McAleer, (115 U. S.
616) 266
Clayton v. Caroy, (4 Md. 26) 871
Clayton 13. Laf argue, (23 Ark. 187)
397
Clayton 13. Heidelberg, (17 Miss. 623)
401
Clayton 13. Mc Williams, (49 Miss.
311) 180
Cleary 13. Trenton, (50 N. J. L. 381) 83 .
Clee 1). Sandars, (42 N. W. R. 154,
Mich. 89) 483
Cleghorn v. Postlethwaite, (43 111.
428) 279
Clemeuce v. Auburn, (66 N. Y. 834)
327
Clemens 13. Mayor, (16 Md. 208) 282
Clerk 13. Tucket, (3 Lev. 281) 155
Cleveland 1;. Board, (55 Barb.*288)
397
Cleveland 13. King, (132 U. S. 295)
347, 350!;
Cleveland 13. Jersey City, (39 N. J. L.
629) 359
Cleveland v. St. Paul, (18 Minn. 279)
3.50 a
Cleveland 13. Spier, ( 16 Q. B. N. S.
399) 337
Cleveland 13. Wick, (18 Ohio St. 303)
248
Cleveland etc. Co. «. Wynant, (114
Ind. 525) 342
Cleveland, P. & A. R. R. Co. 13. Penn-
sylvania, (15 Wall. 800) 245, 258
Clifford 13. Dam, (81 K. Y. 52) 300,
348
Clifford 13. Tyman, (61 IST. H. 508)
321
Clift 13. State, (Ind. 93, 38 N. E. R.
211) 800
Clifton 13. Cook, (7 Ala. 114) 65
xlvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Cline V. Cornwall, (21 Grant, Can.
142) 300 •
Clinton v. Cedar etc. Co., (24 Iowa,
455, 480) 2, 301, 302, 303, 306
Clinton v. Henry Co., (Mo. 93, 22 S.
W. R. 494) 270, 282
Clinton v. Phillips, (58 111. 102) 150
Clinton v. Strong, (9 Johns. 370) 326 a
Clinton Bridge, (10 Wall. U. S. 454)
313
Clintonville v. Keeting, (4 Denio,
341) 33, 125
Clough V. Hart. (8 Kan. 487) 176
Cloughessy v. Waterbury, (51 Conn.
405) 344, 350 &
Clowes V. Staffordshire, (L. E. 8
Chapp. 125) 396 .
Cluggish V. Rogers, (13 Ind. 538) 90
Clulow V. McClelland, (151 Pa. St.
583) 317
Coach Co. B. Camden H. E. E. Co.,
(33 N. J. Eq. 267) 302
Coal Ridge etc. Co. v. Jennings, (127
Pa. St. 397, 17 Atl. E. 986) 259
Coast etc. Co. v. Savannah, (30 Fed.
Eep. 646) 306
Coast Line etc. Co. v. Cohen, (50 Ga.
451) 302, 396
Coats V. Dubuque, (68 Iowa, 550) 291
. Coates V. Canaan, (51 Vt. 131) 344,
348, 352
Cobb V. Boston, (122 Mass. 181) 116
Cobb V. Dalton, (53 Ga. 426) 324
Cobb V. Hague, (13 S. E. R. 633, 87
Ga. 450) 393
CobbettB. Slowman, (9Exch. 633) 104
Cobb V. Kingman, (15 Mass. 197) 59
Cobb V. Portland, (55 Me. 381) 777
Cobb V. Standi.sh, (14 Me. 477) 352
Coburu V. Ellenwood, (4 N. H. 99)
211
Coe V. Eailroad Co., (10 Ohio St. 372)
273
Coe V. Caledonia & M. Ey. Co., (27
Minn. 197) 186
Coe V. Wise, (5 B. & S. 440, 475) 121,
336 a
Coe V. Lake Co., (37 N. H. 254) 396
Cochran v. McCleary, (22 Iowa, 75)
38, 96, 361, 379
Cockburn v. Bank, (13 La. An. 389)
106
Cockerel v. Cholmondely, (1 Euss. &
Myl. 418) 192 6
Coffin V. Cohn, (7 Cush. 355) 129
Coffin V. Nantucket, (5 Cush. 269)
113, 355
Coffin V. Plymouth, (49 Me. 173) 107
Coffin B. Portland, (11 Sawy. C. C. E.
600) 228
Coffin V. State, (7 Ind. 157) 79
Coggeshall et al., New Eochelle Trs.
V. Pelton, (7 Johns. Ch. 292) 202,
204
Coghlan v. Ottawa, (1 App. Can. E.
54) 355
Cogswell V. N. Y., N. H. & H. E. E.
Co., (103 N. T. 10) 120, 329
Coggswell V. Lexington, (4 Cush.
307) 342
Cohen v. New York, (113 N. T. 532)
300, 331
Cohen v. Wigfall, (8 Rich. Law, 237,)
66
Cohn V. Parcels, (72 Cal. 367) 226
Cohoes V. D. & H. Can. Co., (31 N.
E. E. 887) 218, 220
Coit V. Elliott, (28 Ark. 204) 365
Coit V. Lyons, (33 Conn. 109) 83
Coit V. State, (28 Ark. 417) 84
Colbeck V. Beford. (21 Up. Can. Q.
B. 276) 340, 347, 3506
Colburn v. Chattanooga, (17 Am. L.
E. N. S. 191) 395
Cold Spring etc. v. Tolland, (9 Cush.
492) 54
Cold water v. Tucker, (36 Mich. 474) 54
Cole V. Cheshire, (1 Gray, 441) 66
Cole V. Drew, (44 Vt. 49) 291
Cole V. Kegler, (64 Iowa, 59) 120
Cole u. Le Grange, (113 U. S. 1, 7
Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 379) 188
Cole V. Muscatine, (14 Iowa, 296) 327,
330
Cole V. Medina, (27 Barb. 218) 349
Cole V. Nashville, (4 Sneed, 162) :131 a
Coleman v. Chester, (14 S. C. 286)
338 a
Coleman v. Flint etc. (64 Mich. 160)
312
Coleman u. Marion Co.. (50 Cal. 493)
186
Coleman u. Martin, (50 Cal. 493) 185
Coleman v. San Rafael Turnpike Co.,
(49 Cal. 517) 200
Coleman v. Sec. Ave. E. E., (38 N. T.
201) 302
Coleman v. Thurmond, (56 Tex. 514)
312
Coles V. Trustees, (10 Wend. 658) 100
Coles V. Madison Co., (Breese, 111.
120) 8
Coles Co. ». Allison, (23 111. 437) 65,
160
Col. Co. V. Bryson, (13 Fla. 281 ) 369
Collier v. U. S., (22 Ct. of CI. 125) 79
Collieries v. Gibb, (L. E. 5 Ch. Div.
713) 301
Collector v. Dendinger, (38 La. An.
261) 110
Collector v. Hubbard, (12 Wall, 1, 12)
164,326
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
xlvii
References are to Sections.
Collector v. Board, (47 N. W. E. 227,
83 Mich. 367) 360
Collins V. Camden, (27 N. J. Eq. 293)
397
Collins V. Council Bluffs, (32 Iowa,
324) 344, 352 a
Collins V. Davis, (.59 Iowa, 256) 398
Collins V. Dorchester, (6 Cush. 396)
107, 342
Collins V. Hatch, (18 Ohio, 523) 120,
150
Collins V. Holyoke, (146 Mass. 298)
98, 277
Collins ». Hall, (Ga. 93, 17 S. E. -E.
622) 150
Collins V. Louisville, (2 B. Mon. Ky.
134) 122, 256, 265
Collins V. Macon, (69 G-a. 542) 219,
338
Collins V. New Albany, (59 Ind. 396)
55, 56
Collins V. Philadelphia, (93 Pa. St.
272) 328, 335
Collins V. State, (8 Ind. 344) 18, 82
CoUiusville ». Scanland, (58 111. 221)
129
Collins V. Swindle, (6 Grant. 282) 166
Collins I). Savannah, (77 Ga. 745) 327
Collins V. Tracy, (36 Tex. 546) 83
Collins V. Welch, (58 Iowa, 72) 142
Colonial Bank v. Eich. Bank of Yar-
mouth, (11 App. Gas. 84) 327
Colstrum v. Minn. etc. E. E. Co., (33
Minn. 516)39 6
Colton V. Hanohet, (13 111. 615) 315
Colton V. Phillips, (56 N. H. 220) 86
Colton V. Price, (50 Ala. 424) 85
Colton 1). Eossi, (9 Cal. 595) 247
Columbia v. Harrison, (2 Const. E.
S. C. 213) 156, 160
Columbia o. Hunt, (5 Eich. L., S. G.
550) 154, 256
Columbia Co. Com'rs v. King, (13
Fla. 451) 364, 370, 375
Columbia D. B. Co. v. Geisse, (35 N.
J. L. 558) 231
Columbus V. Dahn, (36 Ind. 330) 217,
219, 221
Columbus V. Jaques, (30 Ga. 506) 226,
391
Columbus V. Sohl, (44 O. State, 479)
278
Columbus V. Story, (35 Ind. 97) 265
Columbus V. Street E. E. Co., (45
Ohio St. 98) 144, 274
Columbus V. Woolen Mills, (33 Ind.
435) 355
Columbus City v. Cutcomp, (61 Iowa,
672) 125
Columbus etc. Co. v. Wright, (15 S. E.
R. 293) 272
Columbus G. Co. v. Columbus, (Ohio,
93, 33 N. E. E. 292) 290, 292, 293, 324
Col. etc. Co. V. Humphrey, (26 Pac.
E. 165) 245
Columbus V. Col. etc. Co., (45 Ohio,
98) 306
Columbus V. Columbus, (Wis. '92, 52
N. W. E. 425) 2, 18
Columbus & W. Ey. Co. v. Witherow,
(82 Ala. 190) 224
Colville V. Judy, (73 Mo. 651) 279
Colwell V. Peden, (3 Watts, Pa. 327,
328) 326 a
Commonwealth, Appeal of, (9 Atl.
524, Pa. 87) 327
Com. V. Adams, (114 Mass. 323) 352
Com. V. Alden, (143 Mass. 113) 120
Com. V. Alger, (7 Cush. 53) 82, 132,
135, 244
Com. V. Allen, (128 Mass. 308) 378,
380, 381
Commonwealth v. Allegheny Coun-
ty, (37 Pa. St. 277, 290) 191 b, 212,
365, 368
Commonwealth v. Alb urge r, (1
Whart. Pa. 469) 219
Com. V. Arrison, (15 S. & E. 130)
96
Com. V. Arnold, (3 Litt. 309, Ky.) 84
Com. V. Arrott S. P. M. Co., (22 Atl.
E. 243) 270
Com'rs V. Aspinwall, (24 How. IT. S.
376) 369
Com. V. Athearn, (3 Mass. 285) 373
Com. D. Bank, (28 Pa. St. 389) 379
Com'rs V. Baxter, (35 Pa. St. 263) 105
Com. V. Barry, (Hard. 229, Ky.) 83
CommonwealtlL v. Belden, (13 Met.
10, Mass.) 223
Com. V. Bean, (Thach. 85, Mass.
Crim. Gas.) 158
Com. V. Blaisdell, (107 Mass. 234) 300
Com. V. Borden, (til Pa. St. 272) 156
Com. V. Boston, (97 Mass. 555) 286,
297
Com. V. Brenham, (22 N. E. E. 628)
855
Com. V. Breunan, (103 Mass. 70) 125
Com. !). Brooks, (90 Mass. 439) 123,
209
Com. V. Browden, (Thach. Cr. Gas.
9) 102
Com. V. Bumm, (10 Phila. 162) 380
Com. V. Cambridge, (7 Mass. 158) 309
Com. V. Capp, (48 Pa. St. 53) 301
Com. V. Gen. IBridge Corp., (12 Gush.
244) 313
Com. V. Cen. Pass. etc. Co., (52
Wend. 506) 378
Com. V. Chambei's, (1 J. J. Marsh
160) 83
xlviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Commonwealth v. Chaplin, (Pick.
199, 16 Am. Dec. 386) 239
Commonwealth v. Charlestown, (1
Pick. 180, Mass.) 240
Com'is V. Chase, (6 Cush. 248) 107,
129
Commonwealth u. Cole, (26 Pa. St.
187) 220
Commonwealth v. Commissioners,
{o Kawle, 75) 65
Commonwealth v. Cluley, (56 Pa. St.
270) 380
Cora. V. Crogan, (Pa. '93, 26 Atl. E.
697) 76
Com. V. Crowell, (30 N. E. K. 1015)
258
Commonwealth v. Gary Improve-
ment Co., (98 Mass. 19, 22) 258
Com. V. Cutter, (29 N. E. Kep. 1146)
119, 134, 158
Commonwealth v. Cullen, (1 Harris
133, Pa.) 38
Com. V. Dallas, (3 Teates, 300) 162
Com. V. Davis, (140 Mass. 485) 154,
148
Com'rs V. Day, (19 Ind. 450) 179
Com. V. Deerfield, (6 Allen, 449) 313
Com. V. Denworth, (145 Pa. St. 172,
22 Atl. E. 820) 18
Com. V. Dow, (10 Met. 382, Mass.) 125
Com. V. Duff, (87 Ky. 586) 34
Com. V. Eichenburg, (21 Atl. Eep.
258) 123
Com. V. Ellis, (11 Mass. 465) 398
Commonwealth v. Emigration Sav.
Bank, (98 Mass. 12) 192 b
Com'rs V. Emery, (11 Cush. 406) 104
Com. V. Evans, (74 Pa. St. 124) 67
Com. V. Erie etc. Co., (27 Pa. St. 339)
302
Com. V. Fenton, (139 Mass. 195) 299
Com'rs t). Frankfort, (Ky. '92, 17S. W.
287) 802
Com. V. Gamble, (62 Pa. St. 343) 67
Com. V. Gardner, (133 Pa. St. 284)
123
Com. D. Gay, (5 Pick. 44) 155
Com. V. German Soc, (15 Pa. St. 251)
85
Com. V. Germania Ins. Co., (Pa. '91,
22 Atl. E. 240) 259.
Com. V. Genther, (17 S. & E. 135) '91
Com. V. Gillespie, (23 Atl. E. 393)
399
Com. 0. Gill, (3 Whart. 228) 383
Com. V. Goodrich, (13 Allen, 545) 118,
152
Com. 0. Guardians, etc., (6 S. & E.
469, Pa.) 83
Com. V. Hanley, (7 Pa. St. 513) 82
Com. V. Hastings, (9 Met. 259) 89
Com. V. Hawkes, (123 Mass. 525) 8 ;
102
Com. V. Harris, (101 Mass. 29) 120
Com. V. Henry, (49 Pa. St. 530) 363,
377
Com. V. Hopkinsville, (7 B. Mon. 38)
400
Commonwealth v. Industrial Assn.,
"(98 Mass. 12) 190
Com. o. Jones, (10 Bush, 725) 83
Com. V. Jones, (12 Pa. .St. 365) 69,
380
Commonwealth v. Johnson, (2 Binn.
275, Pa.) 360
Commonwealth v. Judges, (8 Pa. St.
391) 24
Com. V. King, (13 Met. 115, Mass.)
300
Com. V. Kinperts, (12 Pa. Co. Ct. E.
463) 400
Commonwealth v. Lancaster, (5
Watts. 152, Pa.) 375
Com'rs 13. Leech, (44 Pa. St. 332) 105,
381
Com. V. Leight, (1 B. Mon. 107) 90
Commonwealth v. Look, (108 Mass.
452) 239
Commonwealth v. Lowell Gasl. Co.,
(12 Allen 75, Mass.) 274
Commonwealth v. Lyndall, (2 Brew.
425, Pa.) 368
Com. V. Mathews, (122 Mass. 60) 123
Com. V. Maury, (82 Va. 882) 261
Com. V. McPeek, (Ky. '91, 20 S. W.
E. 220) 83
Com. V. McCafferty, (145 Mass. 384)
301
Com. V. McWilliams, (11 Pa. St. 61)
184
Com. V. McClosky, (2Eawle, 369, Pa.)
105, 381
Commonweath v. McCarter, (98 Pa.
St. 607) 380
Com. V. MacFerron, (25 Atl. E. 556) 8
Cora. V. McKibben, (14 S. W. E. 572)
270
Com'rs B. Meeser, (44 Pa. St. 341) 105,
379
Commonwealth v. Milton, (12 B. Mon.
212, Ky.) 258
Com. V. Moorhead, (118 Pa. St. 344,
12 Atl. E. 424) 223
Com. V. New Bedford, (2 Gray, 229)
400
Com. V. Ife-wburyport, (103 Mass. 129)
400
Com'rs V. N. Y. etc. Co., (Pa. '90, 22
Atl. 212) 259
Com. V. Odenweller, (Mass. '92, 30 N.
E. 1022) 158
Com. V. Patch, (97 Mass. 221} 129
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
xlix
References are to Sections.
Commonwealth v. Pa. Canal Co., (66
Pa. St. 41, 5 Am. Rep. 329) 238
Commonwealth ». Painter, (10 Pa.
St. 214) 24
Com. V. Page, (Mass. '92, 29 N. E.
R. .512) 300
Com. V. Parker, (9 Mete. 263) 331 a
Com. V. Parks, (9 Phila. 481, Pa.)
363
Com. V. Parks, (30 N. E. Rep. 1'74)
134
Com. V. Passmore, (1 Serg. & R. 217)
300
Com. V. Patch, (97 Mass. 221) 121
Com. V. Peo., (99 111. 587) 377
Com. V. Perkins, (43 Pa. St, 400) 212,
375
Com. V. Pindar, (11 Met., Mass. 539)
104
Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, (34
Pa. St. 496) 182, 183, 266, 359, 362
364, 368
Com. V. Pittsburgh, (41 Pa. St. 278)
183
Com. V. Pittsburgh, (88 Pa. St. 66)
375
Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh etc. E.
R. Co., (58 Pa. St. 26) 302
Com. V. Pittston F. B. Co., (Pa. '92,
24 Atl. 87) 314
Com. V. Philada. Co., (5 Rawle, 75)
361
Com. V. Phila. Comrs., (5 Binn., Pa.,
534) 76
Com. V. Philadelphia, (27 Pa. St. 497)
326
Com. 1). Plaisted, (19 N. E. 224, 148
Mass. 375) 18
Commonwealth v. Quarter Sessions,
(8 Pa. St. 395) 24
Com. V. Read, (1 Gray, 475) 102, 103,
120
Com. V. Reynolds, (137 Pa. St. 389)
26
Com. V. Reynolds, (8 Pa. Co. Ct. E.
568) 28
Commonwealth v. Riohter, (1 Pa. St.
467) 239
Com. V. Roark, (8 Cush. 210) 104
Com. V. Robertson, (5 Cush. 438) 150
Com. V. Robinson, (5 Cush. 438, 442)
158
Com. ». Eodes, (5 Mon., Ky., 318) 360
Com. V. Rosencrans, (9 Pa. Co. Ct.
399) 123
Commonwealth b. Roxbury, (9 Gray,
510) 40
Com. V. Roy, (140 Mass. 432) 146
Com. ». R. E. Co., (27 Pa. St. 339)
290
Com. V. Rush, (14 Pa. St. 186) 129
iv
Cora. V. Ryan, (5 Mass. 90) 103
Commonwealth v. Shumau's Adm.,
(18 Pa. St. 34.3) 250
Com. u. Shepp, (10 Phila. 518) 380
Com. V. Shaw, (1 Pitts., Pa. 492) 104
Com. B. Shaver, (3 W. & S. .338) 83
Com. V. Slifer, (25 Pa. St. 23) 83
Com. V. Smead, (11 Mass. 264) 380
Cora. V. Smith, (132 Mass. 289) 65
Com. V. St. Patricks etc., (2 Binn.
441)83
Com. I). Stodder, (2 Cush. 262) 124
Com. ■». Sutherland, (3 So. R. 145) 83
Com. V. Taunton, (7 Allen, 309) 314
Commonwealth ». Taylor, (36 Pa. St.
263) 369
Com. V. Temple, (14 Gray, 69) 321
Com. V. Tewksbury, (11 Met. ,551) 116
Com. V. Turner, (1 Cush. 493) 125,
145, 140
Com. V. Upton, (6 Gray, 473) 120
Com. V. Vt. & Mass. R. R. Co., (4
Gray, 22) 400
Com. V. Wilmington, (105 Mass. 599)
343
Commonwealth ». Wilder, (127 Mass.
1)207
Com', v. Williams, (79 Ky. 42) 83
Com. ». Wilkinson, (16 Pick. 175) 318
Com. V. Wellsboro etc. Co., (35 Pa.
St. 152) 391
Com. V. Wetzel, (84 Ky. 537, 2 S. W.
R. 123) 34
Com. V. Westborough, (3 Mass. 406)
309
Com. V. Woelpei', (3 Ser. <fe Rawle,
Pa. 20) 61
Com. V. Wolbert, (6 Binn. 292) 72
Com. ■». Worcester, (3 Pick. 462) 32,
150, 158, 299
Commonwealth v. Wood, (10 Pa. St.
93) 215
Commonwealth ». Woods, (4 Pa. St.
113) 248
Comer v. Folsom, (13 Minn. 219) 139
Commercial Nat. Bank v. lola, (2
Dillon, C. C. E. 353) 27, 183
Commercial Bank v. Hughes, (17
Wend. 94) 179
Commercial Nat. Bk. v. Portland,
(Or. '93, 33 Pac. R. 532) 172
Com'rs V. Bryson, (13 Ela. 281) 397
Com'rs V. Bowie, (34 Ala. 4(il) 247
Com'rs V. Com., (72 Pa. St. 24) 377
Com'rs c. Com'rs of Harvey Co., (26
Kan. 181) 28, 67
Com'rs V. Chandler, (96 U. S. 205) 184
Com'rs V. Chitwood, (8 Ind. .504) 108
Com'rs I). Day, (19 Ind. 450) 179
Com'rs r. Dick, (5 Daly, 391) 120
Com'rs V. Duckett, (20 Mo. 468) 9
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences arc to Sections.
Com'rs V. Frost, (4 Daly, 353) 121
Com'rs V. Gas Co., (12 Pa. St. 318)
150, 159
Com'rs etc. v. Gibson, (36 Md. 229) 325
Com'rs V. Hicks, (2 Ind. 527) 30
Com'rs V. Huff, (91 Ind. 333) 312.
Com'rs V. Harper, (38 111. 104) 279
Com'rs V. Harris, (7 Jones, Law, 281)
154
Com'rs V. Hearn, (59 Ala. 371) 98, 106
Com'rs V. Harris, (7 Jones, 281) 117
Com'rs V. Keller, (6 Kansas, 518) 177
Com'rs V. Leckey, (6 S. & E., Pa. 166)
99
Com'rs etc. v. Martin, (4 Mich. 557)
325
Com'rs V. Mich. etc.'Co., (Mich. '92,
51 N. W. E. 447) 238
Com'rs V. Newby, 31 111. App. 378)
241, 249
Com'rs V. Northern Lib. Co., (12 Pa.
St. 318) 120
Com'rs V. Nichols, (14 Ohio St. 260)
1916
Com'rs V. Pidgeon, (23 Hun, 346) 120
Com'rs V. Powe, (6 Jones L. 134) 118
Com'rs V. Beynolds, (44 Ind. 509) 166
Com'rs V. Taylor, (2 Bay, S. C. 282)
312
Com'rs V. Templeton, (51 Ind. 266)
173
Com'rs u. Town, (19 111. App. 259)
398
Com'rs V. Westchester, (9 Pa. Co. Ct.
Eep. 542) 306 o
Com'rs etc. v. Withers, (29 Miss. 21)
244
Com'rs etc. v. N. C. Gas Co., (12 Pa.
St. 318) 301
Com'rs of Assessment, In re, (18
Albany Law J. 1P9) 301
Com'rs of Elizabeth, In re, (49 N. J.
L. 20) 28
Com'rs of Howard v. Legg, (110 Ind.
479) 352
Com'rs of Manor v. Clark, (94 U. S.
279) 191
Com'rs of Ottawa v. Nelson, (19 Kan.
234) 67, 259
Com'rs of Parks, In re, (53 Hun, 556)
223
Com'rs of Pilots v. Clark, (33 N. Y.
251) 133
Com'rs of Shawnee Co. v. Carter, (2
Kan. 115) 55
Com'rs of Wash. Park, Albany, In re,
(56 N. T. 144) 242
Com'rs of Wilm. v. Eoby, (8 Ire. Law
250) 152
Conboy ». Iowa City, (2 Iowa, 90)
105, 148, 158
Concord v. Boscawen, (17 ff. H. 465)
201
Concord v. Concord etc. Co., (18 Atl.
E. 87) 302
Concord v. Portsmouth Sav. Bk., (92
U. S. 625) 12, 14, 188
Concord v. Eobinson, (121 U. S. 165)
184, 196.
Concordia Cem. Assn. v. Minn. etc.
Co., (12 N. E. E. 536, 121 111. 199)
246
Concord Com'rs v. Patterson, (8
Jones L., N. C. 182) 261.
Condon v. Jersey City, (43 N. J. L.
412) 165
Condron v. New Orleans, (43 La. An.
1202) 87
Cone V. Hartford, (28 Conn. 363, 375)
248, 259 a, 294
Conery v. N. O. W. W. Co., (7 So. E.
8, 41 La. An. 910) 113, 165, 174
Conery v. New Orleans W. W. Co.,
(39 La. An. 770) 395
Conestoga etc. Co. v. Lancaster, (151
Pa. St. 543) 319.
Congdon v. Norwich, (37 Conn. 414)
344
Cong. Society o. Sperry, (16 Conn.
200) 95
Congreve v. Morgan, (5 Duer, 495)
342
Congreve v. Smith, (18 N. Y. 79) 348
Conhocton etc. Co. v. Buffalo etc. Co.,
(3 Hun, 523) 354
Conklinc. Keokuk, (73 Iowa, 343) 330
Conkling v. Springfield, (24 N. E. 67,
124 111. 420) 326 a
Conlin v. Aldrich, (98 Mass. 557) 371
Camden v. Clerke, (Hobart, Eug. 32)
49
Connelly u. Griswold, (7 Iowa, 416)
245, 249
Conuett V. Chicago, (29 N. E. E. 280;
114 111. 233) 86
Conn. V. Breed, (4 Pick. 460) 314
Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cleveland,
etc. E. E. Co., (41 Barb. 9) 191,
192 6
Conner v. Albany, (1 Blackf . 43) 134
Conner v. Bent, (1 Mo. 235) 12
Conner u. Mayoi-, (2 Sandf. 355) 78
Conner v. Mayor, (5 N. Y. 285) 79
Conner v. Morris, (23 Cal. 447) 177
Conner ». Prest. etc., (1 Blackf. 42)
286
Conniffi v. San Francisco, (67 Cal. 45)
338
Connors v. Mayor etc., (11 Hun, 439)
328
Conover v. Devlin, (15 How. Pr. 477)
88
TABLE 01^ CASES CITED.
Bcferences are to Sections.
Conrad v. Smith, (32 Mich. 429) 396
Conrad v. Ithaca, (16 N. Y. 158) 349
Conservatoi's v. Ash, (10 Barn. &
Cres. 349) 25
Consolidated Association v, Avegno,
(28 La. 552) 191
Consumers' G. T. Co. v. Harless, (Ind.
92, 29 N. E. R. 1062) 242
Converse v. Fort Scott, (92 U. S. 503)
186
Conway, In re, (62 N. Y. 504) 148
Conway v. Beaumont, 61 Tex. 10) 324
Conway ». Cutting, (51 N. H. 407) 80
Conwell V. Emeric, (2 Ind. 35) 239,
335
Conwell V. State, (107 Ind. 571) 106
Cook V. A.namosa, (66 Iowa, 427)
3.36 a, 850 f;
Cook V. Boston, (9 Allen, 393) 326
Cook V. Burlington, (30 Iowa, 94)
221, 222
Cook V. Candee, (52 Ala. 109) 360
Cook ». Charlestown, (98 Mass. 80)
342
Cook V. Crandall, (Utah 91, 26 P. E.
927) 276
Cook V. Gregg, (40 111. 439) 129
Cook !). Harris, (61 N. Y. 448) 215, 217
Cook V. Hillsdale, (7 Mich. 115) 221
Cook V. Lowe, (25 111. Ap.) 177
Cook V. Macon, (64 Ga. 460) 333
Cook V. Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 270) 325
Cook V. Mock, (40 Kan. 472) 65
Cook V. Portland,(20 Or. 580) 27, 259 a
Cook ». Racine, (49 Wis. 244) 397
Cook V. South Park Com'rs, (61 111.
115) 246, 248
Cook Co. V. McCrea, (93 111. 236) 110
Cooke V. Tanner, (40 Conn. 378) 305
Cooke V. School Dist., (21 Pac. R.
496, 12 Colo. 453) 59
Cooley V. Essex Co., (27 jST. J. L. 415)
339
Cooley 1). Granville, (10 Cush. 57) 110
Cooley V. Westhrook, (57 Me. 181)
351
Coohdge V. Learned, (8 Pick. 505) 225
Coolidges. Brookline, (114 Mass. 592)
136
Coombs V. Purrington, (42 Me. 332)
346
Coonly V. Albanv, (30 K E. R. 382,
132 N. Y. 145) "ise
Cooper, Ex parte, (3 Tex. App. 489)
129
Cooper, In re, (28 Hun, 515) 129
Cooper I). Alden, (Harrlng. Ch. Mich.
72) 226
Cooper I). Atlanta, (53 Ga. 638) 338
Cooper V. Dallas, (Tex. 18 S. W. R.
565) 292, 330
Cooper V. Detroit, (42 Mich. 5S4) 129,
.308
Cooper V. Lampeter, (8 Watts, 128) 99 .
Cooper c. Mills Co., (69 Iowa, 350) 341
Cooper V. Phibbs, (L. R. 2 li. "L. 149)
327
Cooper v. Sullivan Co., (65 Mo. 542)
186
Copes V. Charleston, (10 Rich. S. C.
L. 502) 118, 187 a
Copes V. Mathews, (18 Miss. 398) 109
Cope V. State, (126 Ind. 51) 300
Copp V. jSTeal, (7 jST. H. 275) 211
Corbett u. Bradley, (7 Nev. 106) 349
Corbiu J). America Mills, (27 Conn.
274) 347
Corcoran v. Peekskill, (108 N. Y. 151)
351
Cordell v. New York etc. Co., (75 N.
Y. 330) 352
Cordille v. Frizell, (1 Nev. 130) 81, 82
Corey ». Chicago etc. Co., (100 Mo.
282) 242
Corfield v. Coryell, (4 Wash. C. C.
380) 121, 258
Corley v. Hill, (4 C. B. N. S. 556) 342
Corliss, In re, (11 R. I. 638) 67
Cormaok v. Wolcott, (17 Am. & Eiig.
Corp. Cases, 309) 373
Cornell v. People, (107 111. 372) 2
Cornell v. Guilford, (1 Denio, 510)
139, 164
Cornell v. Barnes, (1 Denio, 35) 72
Cornell College v. Iowa County, (32
Iowa, 395
Corning v. Green, (23 Barb. 33) 28
Cornish v. Pease, (19 Me. 184) 95
Cornish B. Toronto St. R'y Co., (23
Up. Can. C. P. 355) 352
Cornman v. Eastern Counties R. Co.,
(4 H. & N. 781) 351
Corpus Christi v. Woessnei', (58
Texas, 462) 189 a
Corp. of Rochester v. Lee, (15 Sim.
Eng. 376) 49
Corrigan v. Gage, (68 Mo. 541) 150
Corsicana v. Carr, (75 Tex. 207) 110
Corsicana v. White, (57 Tex. 382) 92
CortB. State, (28 Ark. 417) 83
Corvallis v. Carlile, (10 Dreg. 139) 110
Corinth v. Locke, (20 Atl. R. 809, 62
Vt. 411) 200
Cory V. Freeholders, (44 N. J. L. 445)
170
Cosby V. Owensboro etc., (10 Bush,
288) 302
Costello V. Landwehr, (28 Wis. 522)
314, 337
Costello V. Conshohocken, (8 Pa.) 355
Costars. Brush, (25 Wend. 628) 113
134
Hi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Coster V. N". J. R. R. Co., (22 N. Y.)
239
Coster B. New York, (43 X. T. 399) 308
Cotes V. Davenport, (9 Iowa, 227) 92
Cotter c. Doty, (5 Ohio, 393, 398) 155
Cottomi). Griest, (1 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 474 n) 302
Cotton V. Com., (6 Fla. 610) 184
Cotter V. Doty, (5 Ohio, 393) 154
Cotton B. Hamilton & T. Ry. Co.,
(14 Up. Can. Q. B. 87) 247
Cotton V. Wood, (8 C. B. N. S. 568)
.352
Cottonwood V. Smith, (36 Kan. 401)
134
Cougot V. New Orleans, (16 La. An.
21) 128
Coulson V. Portland, (Deady, 481)
189 a 326 a
Coulsen v. Harris, (43 Miss. 728) 397
Coulter V. Robertson, (24 Miss. 278)
40
Council V. Ahrens, (4 Strobh. L. 241)
125
Council V. Creraonini, (36 La. An.
247) 152
Council V. Pepper, (1 Rich. L. 364)
124, 299
Council Bluffs v. Stewart, (51 Iowa,
385) 189 a
Council Bluffs v. Waterman, (53 N.
W. R. 289) 79
County V. Hackett, (1 Wall. 83) 191
County I). People, (s Neb. 136) 15
County i). State, (11 111. 202) 12
County V. Simmons, (10 111. 516) 107
County V. Wise, (18 Atl. R. 31) 341
County Com'rs v. Cox, (6 Ind. 403)
37,40
County Court v. County Court, (2
Bush, 93) 67
County Court v. Griswold, (58 Mo.
175) 18, 50, 234
County of Erie u. Erie, (113 Pa. St.
360) 271 '
County of Kent v. Grand Rapids, (61
Mich. 144) 228
County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 TJ.
S. 691) 259 a
County of St. Clair v. Peo., (85 111.
396) 377
County of Scotland v. Thomas, 94 U.
S. 682) 186
County of Wilson v. National Bank,
(103 U. S. 776) 191 b
Cousins B. State, (50 Ala. 113. 20 Am.
Rep. 290) 261
Couts B. Neer, (70 Tex. 468) 348
Covington b. Beyle, 6 Bush, 204) 106,
259 a
Covington ». Bryant, (7 Bush, 248) 348
Covington b. Casey, (3 Bush, 698) 278
Covington v. East St. Louis, (78 111.
548) 55, 147, 152
Covington v. Ludlow, (1 Met. 295)
106
Covington b. Nelson, (35 Ind. 532) 397
Covington b. Rockingham, (93 N. C.
134) 397
Covington etc. Co. b. Sandford, (20
S. W. 1031) 320
Covington etc. Co. b. Covington, 9
Bush, 127) 113
Covington G. L. Co. b. Covington,
(17 S. W. 808) 256, 274
Covington & M. R. Co. b. Athens, (11
S. E. R. 663) 110
Cowan's Case, (1 Overt. 311) 288
Cowdin ». Huff, (10 Ind. 83) 79
Cowert, Ex parte, (9 So. R. 225) 28
Cowen B. West Troy, (43 Barb. 48)
150
Cowen B. Mayor, (3 Hun, 632) 79
Cowles B. Brittain, (2 Hawks, 204)
258
Cowley V. Rushville, (60 Ind. 327) 125
Cowley B. Sunderland, (6 H. & N.
565) 336 o, 338 a
Cox B. Burlington, (43 Iowa, 612) 79 '
Cox V. Louisville, N. A. & C. B. R.
Co., (48 Ind. 178) 224, 302, 303
Cox B. New York, (102 N. Y. 519) 79
Cox B. State, (3 Blackf. 193) 314
Cox B. St. Louis, (11 Mo. 431) 158
Cox B. Westchester Tp. Co., (33 Barb.
414) 352
Coy B. Lyons, (17 Iowa, 1) 194 a, 3^3,
375
Coyne v. Rennie, (32 Pac. R. 578) 79
Crabtree v. Baker, (75 Ala. 71) 355
Craig B. Andes, (93 N. Y. 405) 189
Craig B. Chicot, (40 Ark. 233) 177
Craig B. Dimmock, (47 111. 308) 258
Craig B. Leitensdorfer, (123 U. S. 209)
359
Craig B. People, (47 111. 487) 396
Craig V. Philadelphia, (89 Pa. St. 265)
259 o.
Craig B. People, (47 111. 487) 318
Craig B. Richmond, (1 Phila. 33) 177
Craig B. Sedalia, (63 Mo. 417) 346,
352
Craige b. Lewin, (3 Curt. 435) 66
Craft B. Lofinck, (34 Kan. 365, 11
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 21) 60, 67
Craftes o. Metro. Ry. Co., (L. R. 1.
C. P. 300) 351
Cramer v. Burlington, (42 Iowa, 315)
352
Crarapton b. Zabriskie, (101 U. S
601) 183
Crandall b. Araadar, (20 Cal. 72) 375
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
liii
Crane v. Des Moines, (47 Iowa, 105)
79
Crane v. Fond du Lac, (16 Wis. 196)
212
Crane v. Janesville, (20 Wis. 305)
265
Crangle v. Harrisburg, (1 Pa. 132)
247
Crandall v. Amador, (20 Cal. 72) 359
Cranston v. Augusta, (61 G-a. 572)
129
Craw V. Tolono, (96 111. 255) 282
Crawford ». Burrell Tp., (53 Pa. St.
219) 270
Crawford v. Carson, (35 Ark. 565)
359
Crawford ». Delaware, (7 Ohio St.
459) 239, 292, 329
Crawford u. Dunbar, (52 Cal. 36) 75
Crawford i5. Louisville, etc., Co., (39
Ind. 192) 186
Crawford v. Mobile & G. E. Co., (67
Ga. 405) 226
Crawford v. Spenney, (21 111. 288)
140
Crawford v. Township, (24 Mich.
248) 83
Crawford ». Topeka, (32 Pac. E. 476)
150, 300
Crawford b. Valley E. E. Co., (25
Gratt. 467) 106
Crawford v. Wilson, (7 Ark. 219) 177
Crawley b. Mershor, (61 Ga. 284) 375
Crawford Co. b. Wilson, (7 Ark. 219)
179
Crawfordsville v. Bond, (96 lud. 236)
354
Crawfordsville v. Smith, (79 Ind.
308) 342
Crawfordsville v. Braden, (28 K. E.
E. 849) 144 a, 146
Crawshaw v. Eoxbury, (7 Gray, 374)
140, 170
Craven b. Eodeuhausen, (21 Atl. Eep.
774) 120
Creighton v. Piper, (14 Ind. 182) 74
Creighton v. San Francisco, (42 Cal.
446) 8
Creighton b. Scott, (14 Ohio St. 438)
291
Crepps B. Durden, (Cowp. 640) 154
Crescent G. Co. v. New Orleans, etc.,
(27 La. An. 148) 296
Crescent b. Anderson, (114 Pa. St.
643) 352
Crete v. Cliilds, (11 Neb. 252) 352 a
Crimson v. Deck, (51 X. W. 55) 396
Crittenden Co. v. Crump, (25 Ark.
234) 79
Criveaud b. St. Louis Cable & W. Ey.
Co., (33 Mo. App. 458) 306a
Crockett v. Boston, (5 Cush. 182)
222
Crocker b. Collins, (15 S. E. E. 951)
311, 312
Croft B. Bennington, etc., Co., (23
Atl. E. 922) 243
Cromarty c. Boston, (127 Mass. 329)
342
Crommett v. Pearson, (18 Me. 344)
108
Cromwell ». Conn. Brown Stone Q.
Co., (50 Conn. 470) 229
Cronin b. Delavan, (50 Wis. 375) 346
Crook 1). People, (106 111. 237) 383
Crosby d. New London, etc., Co..
(26 Conn. 121) 195 b
Crosby v. Warren, (1 Eich. 385)
Cross B. Mayor, (18 N. J. Eq. 305)
312
Cross B. Morristown, (3 C. E. Green,
305) 33, 143, 170, 265
Crossett v. Janesville, (28 Wis. 420)
329, 338
Crosstown Ey. Co., In re, (22 N. T.
S. 818, 68 Hun, 236) 303
Crow V. Oxford Tp., (119 U. S. 215)
19 b, 196
Crowder v. Sullivan, (28 N. E. E. 94)
31, 165
Crowell B. Hopkinton, (45 N. H. 9)
139
Crowell B. Sonomo Co., (25 Cal. 313)
325, 375
Grower v. Ewers, (39 111. App. 34)
354 a
Ci-owning v. Barnett, (30 Ark. 560)
283
Crowley u. Davis, (63 Cal. 460) 396
Crowley v. Copley, (2 La. An. 329)
259 a
Crowther v. Yonkers, (15 N. Y. S.
588) 330
Croxall B. Sherrerd, (5 Wall. 268) 187
CrugerB. Hudson E. E. E. Co., (12
N. Y. 190) 221, 34.5
Cruikshanks v. Charlestown Council,
(1 McCord 360) 248, 263
Crydon Hospital v. Farley, (6 Taunt.)
49
Crutchfleld v. Warrensberg, (30 Mo.
App. 456) 165
Ci-ystal B. Des Moines, (65 Iowa, 502)
343
Cudden b. Eastriok, (1 Salk. 143, 192,
6 Mod. 124) 154
Cuff B. Newark, (35 N. J. L. 17) 347
Culbertsen v. So. Belle, (1 Newb.
461) 120
Culbertson v. Fulton, (127 111. 30)
189 a
Cullen, In re, (33 Hun, 534) 16
liv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
CuUen V. Carthage, (103 Ind. 196)
115, 163, 176
CuUom V. DuUoff, (94 111. 330) 79
Culver V. Garbe, (43 N. W. B. 237)
354
Culver V. Jersey City, (45 N. J. L.
256) 259 a
Culver V. Streator, (22 N. E. Eep.
810) 92, 129, 333
Cumberland v. Willison, (50 Ind. 138)
92, 329, 336 a, 354
Cumberland etc. Co. v. Barren Co.,
(10 Bush, 604) 186
Cumberland etc. Co. v. Washington
Co., (10 Bush, 564) 186
Cumberland etc. K. R. App., (62 Pa.
St. 218) 396
Cummings v. Brooklyn, (11 Paige,
596) 248, 281
Cummings v. Missouri, (4 Wall. 277)
73,83
Cummings v. National Bk., (101 U.
S. 153) 259, 397
Cummings v. Perham, (1 Met. 555)
129
Cummings v. Saux, (30 La. An. 207)
166
Cummings c. St. Louis, (2 S. W. E.
130, 90 Mo. 259) 208, 216, 396
Cummins ». Seymour, (79 Ind. 491)
286, 328
Cummins v. City, (79 Ind. 491) 338
Cunard S. S. Co. v. Voores, (50 N. T.
Super. 253) 132
Cunningham v. Almonte, (21 Up.
Can. C. P. 459) 161
Cunningham v. Squires, (2 W. Va.
422) 105, 398
Cunningham v. St. Louis, (96 Mo.
53)344
Curling v. Thornton, (2 Add. 219) 66
Curran v. Arkansas, (15 How. 312) 40
Currant v. Shattuck, (24 Cal. 427)
247
Currier v. Marietta etc. E. E. Co.,
■ (11 Ohio St. 228) 232
Curry v. Bank, (8 Porter, 361) 51
Curry v. District Townshij) etc., (62
Iowa, 102) 2
Curry d. Jones, (4 Del. Oh. 559) 397
Curry v. Mannington, (23 W. Va. 14)
342
Curry ». Mt. Sterling, (Vj 111. 320)
240, 241
Curry v. Savannah, (64 Ga. 290) 212
Curtis V. Butler Co., (24 How. 435)
99, 254
Curtis V. Hope, (19 Conn. 154) 223
Curtis V. Keesler, (14 Barb. 521) 215
Curtis V. Eochester etc. Co., (18 N.
Y. 534) 352 a
Curtis V. Whipple, (24 Wis. 350) 183,
188
Cusick V. Norwich, (40 Conn. 376)
293,3506
Cushing !). Adams, (18 Pick. 110)-300'
Cushing o. Boston, (128 Mass. 330;
300
Cushing V. Frankfort, (57 Me. 541)
84, 88
Cushing V. The John Prazer, (21
How. U. S. 184) 133
Cushman v. Carver, (19 Minn. 295)
198
Cushman v. Highland Ditch Co., (33
Pac. 344) 396
Cushman v. Smith, (34 Me. 247) 243
Cutcomp B. Utt, (60 Iowa, 156) 148
Cuthbert v. Com., (9 S. E. 185) 261
Cutler V. Mason Co., (56 Miss. 115)
195
Cutting, In re, (94 V. S. 14) 360
Cutting V. Stone, (7 Vt. 471) 53
Cuyler v. Eochester, (12 Wend. 165)
92 338
Czar'niecki's App., (11 Atl. E. 660)
120, 396
D.
Dailey v. New Haven, (60 Conn. 314)
202, 394
Dailey v. State, (8 Blackf. 329) 74, 86
Daily v. E. E., (80 Ga. 793, 7 S. E. B.
146) 303
Daily v. St. Paul, (7 Minn. 390) 18
Daily v. Worcester, (131 Mass. 452)
343
Daly V. Morgan, (69 Md. 460, 23 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 434) 55, 259
Daly V. E. E. Co., (80 Ga. 793, 7 S. E.
E. 146) 302
Dale V. Webster Co., (41 N. W. Eep.
1)353
Dallam v. Oliver, (3 Gill, 445) 283
Dalrymple v. Whitingham, (26 Vt.
345) 177
Dalton V. Com. Council, (50 Mich.
129) 3506
Dalton V. S. E. Ey. Co., (4 C. B. N.
O. 296) 352
Dalton V. Northampton, (19 N. H.
362) 245
Dalzell G. & L. Co. v. Findlay, (5
Ohio Cir. Ct. E. 418) 86, 166
Dameron v. Irwin, (8 Ire. L. 421) 169
Damon ». Grauby, (2 Pick. 355) 100
Damon ». Soituate, (20 An. Eep. 315)
352
Damour v. Lyons, (44 Iowa, 276) 302
338 a
Damp V. Dane, (29 Wis. 419) 279
Dana, In re, (7 Benedict, 1) 105
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Iv
References are to Sections.
Dana v. Jackson St Wharf Co., (31
Cal. 118) 200
Dana v. San Francisco, (19 Cal.) 486
177
Danaher v. Brooklyn, (51 Hun, 563)
92
Danbury & N. R. R. Co. v. Norwalk,
(37 Conn. 109) 349
Dane v. Derby, (34 Me. 95) 368
Danforth v. Schoharie T. Co., (12
Johns. 227) 51, 164
Danks v. Quackenbush, (1 K. T. 129)
194
Daniel v. Memphis, (11 Humph. 582)
1.3, 32
Daniel v. New Orleans, (29 La. An. 1)
278
Daniel v. Richmond Trs., (78 Ky. 542)
258
Daniels ». Burford, (10 Up. Can. Q.
B. 478) 145, 393
Daniels v. Denver, (2 Col. 669) 355
Daniels v. Lebanon, (58 N. H. 284)
352
Daniels v. Railroad Co., (35 Iowa,
129) 243
Daniels v. Clegg, (28 Mich. 31) 322
Daniels v. Wilson, (27 Wis. 492) 226
Daniellv v. Gabanis, (52 Ga. Ill) 17,
182
D'Antignac v. Augusta, (31 Ga. 700)
265
Danerhower v. District, (7 Mackey,
99) 239 a
Danville v. Shelton, (76 Va. 325) 110,
148
Danville v. Sutherlin, (20 Gratt. 255)
177, 180
Dargan v. Boston, (12 Allen 223) 105
Dargan v. Mobile, (31 Ala. 469) 92, 333
Dargan v. Waddell, (9 Ii-e. 244) 120
Darling v. Baltimore, (51 Md. 1) 212
Darling v. Gunn, (50 111. 424) 279
Darling b. St. Paul, (19 Minn. 389) 113
Darling v. Westmoreland, (52 N. H.
401)342,3506
Darlington v. Mayor, (31 N. Y. 164)
2, 8, 11, 336 a
Dannalier v. Brooklyn, (51 Hun, 563)
336 a
Darly v. Worcester, (131 Mass. 452)
343
Dartmouth Col. v. Woodward, (4
Wlieat. 636) 1, 11
Darrow ti. People, (8 Colo. 417) 69
Darst 0. Griffin, (48 N. W. R. 819) 12,
239 a
Dasey v. Skinner, (11 N. T. S. 821,
57 Hun, 593) 255
Dashiell v. Baltimore, (45 Md. 615)
265
Dashner v. Mills Co., (55 N. W. R,
468) 325
Dassler, In re, (35 Kan. 678, 12 Pac.
R. 678) 290
Datton V. Albion, (50 Mich. 129) 350 a
Daugherty v. Thompson, (9 S. W. R.
99) 271
Davenport v. Dodge, (105 U. S. 237)
375
Davenport v. Hallowell, (10 Me. 317)
167
Davenport v. Hannibal, (18 S. W. R.
1122) 344 a
Davenport v. Kleinschmidt, (6 Mont.
502, 13 Pac. 249) 395
Davenport v. Lord, (9 Wall. 409) 368
Davenports. Mayor etc. of N. T., (67
N. Y. 456) 74, 86
Davenport v. Miss. & Mo. R. R. Co.,
(16 Iowa, 348) 267, 273
Davenport v. Peoria Ins. Co., (17
Iowa, 276) 212
Davenport v. Richmond, (81 Va. 636)
134
Davenport v. Ruckman, (37 N. Y. 568)
349, 352
Davenport Co. v. Davenport, (13
Iowa, 229) 104
Davenport G. L. etc. Co., (13 Iowa,
229) 189 a
Davidson v. Boston & Maine R. R.
Co., (3 Cush. 91) 239.
Davidson v. New Oris., (96 IT. S. 134)
259 a, 279
Davidson v. Ramsey, (18 Minn. 482)
183
Davidson v. Woodruft, (68 Ala. 356)
105
Davidson Col. v. Chambers' Execu-
tors, (3 Jones Eq. 253) 207
Davie v. Huebner, (45 Iowa, 575) 310
Davies ». Burns, (5 Allen, 349) 79
Davies v. New York, (48 N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 194) 87
Davies ». Saginaw Co., (89 Mich. 295)
18
Daviess Co. v. Dickinson (117 U. S.
657) 189 a, 196
Daviess Co. v. Howard, (13 Bush, 102)
190 a
Davis V. American Soc, (76 N. Y.
362) 396
Davis V. Anita, (73 Iowa, 325) 150
Davis V. Bangor, (42 Me. 522) 300, 400
Davis V. Berger, (54 Mich. 692) 73
Davis V. City of Clinton, (50 Iowa,
585) 298
Davis V. Clinton, (20 Alb. L. Jour. 56)
294
Davis V. Crawfordsville, (119 Ind. 1)
354 a, .355
Ivi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Befcrcnces are to Sections.
Davis V. Dudley, (4 Allen, 557) 342
Davis V. Des Moines, (75 Iowa, 500)
189 a
Davis V. Dubuque, (20 Iowa, 448) 56
Davis V. East Tenn. V. & G. R. Co.,
(87 Ga. 605, 13 S. E. R. 567) 303
Davis V. Hill, (41 N. H. 329) 343
Davis V. Jackson, (61 Mich. 530) 165
Davis V. Lake Shore etc. Co., (114
Ind. 364, 16 IST. E. E. 639) 397
Davis V. Los Angeles, (24 Pac. K. 771,
86 Cal. 37) 259 a
Davis V. Litchfield, (33 K. E. E. 888)
259 a
Davis V. Mayor, (14 N. Y. 506) 113
Davis V. Mayor, (61 Mich. 530) 170
Davis V. Montgomery, (51 Ala. 139)
331
Davis 13. Morier, (2 Call. 303) 327
Davis V. New York, (14 N. Y. 506,
532) 302
Davis V. New York, (1 Duer, 451) 369
Davis V. Nichols, (39 111. App. 610)
240
Davis V. Patten, (41 Kan. 480) 75
Davis V. Portland W. Com'rs, (14
Oreg. 98) 2
Davis V. Eamsey Co., (18 Minn. 482)
184
Davis V. Read, (65 N. Y. 560) 113, 263
Davis V. Richardson, (45 Miss. 499, 7
Am. Rep. 632) 258
Davis V. Rood, (65 N. Y. 566) 263
Davis V. R. R. Co., (87 Ga. 605) 302
Davis V. Sabita, (63 Pa. St. 90) 221
Davis V. Sawyer, (133 Mass. 289) 120
Davis V. Sch. Dis. No. 2, (24 Me. 349)
170
Davis V. State, (7 Md. 151) 28
Davis V. State, (4 Stew. & P. 83) 117
Davis V. Yuba Co., (75 Cal. 452) 192 6
Davis V. Woolnough, (9 Iowa, 104)
28, 102
Davlin v. New York, (63 N. Y. 8) 28
Davy V. Levy, (39 La. 551) 347
Dawes v. Hawkins, (4 Law T. N. S.
288) 224, 318
Dawson v. Croisan, (23 Pac. R. 257,
_ 18 Ore. 431) 397
uawson V. Fred'k Co., (2 H. & M.
132) 360
Dawson v. Huttner, (43 Ga. 133) 335
Dawson Co. v. McNaraar, (10 Neb.
276, 4 N. W. R. 991) 184
Day V. Austin, (22 S. VV. R. 757) 190
Day V. Green, (4 Oush. 438, 439) 99,
113
Day V. Kent, (1 Oreg. 123) 65
Dayton v. Lynes, (30 Conn. 351) 67
Day V. Mt. Pleasant, (70 Iowa, 193)
343
Day V. Milford, (5 Allen, 98) 345
Dayton v. Pease, (4 Ohio St. 80) 327,
350, 354
Dayton v. Quigley, (29 N. J. Eq. 77)
150
Dayton v. Rutland, (84 111. 279) 223,
313
Dean v. Charlton, (23 Wis. 590) 172
Dean v. Gleason, (16 Wis. 1, 15) 270
Dean «. Sullivan E. E. Co., (22 N. H.
316) 238
Deane v. Eandolph, (132 Mass. 475)
338
Deane v. Todd, (22 Mo. 90) 112
Deansville Cemetery Association, In
re, (66 N. Y. 569, 23 Am. Eep. 86)
232
Debolt V. Cincinnati, (7 Ohio St. 237)
79
Decatur v. Fisher, (53 111. 407) 352 a
Decatur'i). Vermillion, (77 111. 315) 79
Decatur Co. v. Humphreys, (47 Ga.
565) 232
Dechert v. Com., (113 Pa. St. 229) 363
Decorah v. Bullis, (25 Iowa, 15, 18) 88
Decorah ». Dunston, (38 Iowa, 96)
123
DeCordova v. Galveston, (4 Tex. 470)
180
Deeds v. Sanborn, (26 Iowa, 419) 276
Deeflir u. Bowen, (61 Ind. 29) 397
Deeham v. Johnson, (141 Mass. 23)
363
Dehairl v. Morford, (30 Pac. E. 593)
279
Deiman v. Fort Madison, (30 Iowa,
542) 56, 276
Deitz V. City, (1 Col. 323) 22, 125, 158
Delacy v. N. Eiver N. Co., (1 Hawks,
274) 372
Delalianty v. Warner, (75 Ex. 185)
393
Delafreed v. Illinois, (2 Hill, 159) 5
Delafield v. State, (2 Hill, 159) 169
Delaney v. Salina, (34 Kan. 53) 202
DeLaney, Ex parte, (43 Cal. 478) 134
Delaplaine v. C. & N. W. Ey. Co.,
(42 Wis. 214) 132
Delaware Co. v. Atkins, (24 N. E. R.
319) 397
Del. Co. V. GrifEen, (17 Iowa, 166) 79
Delaware Co. v. Ry. Co., (10 Pa. Co.
Ct. 326) 273
Delaware Railroad Tax, (18 Wall.
206) 270
Delgado v. Chavez, (11 S. Ct. 874,
140 U". S. 586) 359
Delger w. St. Paul, (14 Fed. R. 567)
339, 349
Dehnonico v. New York, (1 Sandf.
222) 355
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Ivii
References are to Sections.
Delphi V. Lowery, (74 Ind. 520) 343,
3506
Delta Lumber Co. v. Board, (40 N.
W. R. 1) 314
Demaresti). New York, (74 N. Y. 161)
2
Demarest v. Wickham, (03 jST. Y. 334)
371
Demaltos v. New Whatcom, (29 Pac.
K. 933) 60
Demers v. Daniels,- (39 N. W. E. 98)
220
Doming v. James, (72 111. 78) 397
Demopolis r. Webb, (6 So. Rep. 408)
215, 218, 391
Dempsey v. Burlington, (66 Iowa,
687) 148
Den V. Vreelanrtt, (2 Halst. 352) 52
Denby r. Wilier, (59 Wis. 240) 349
Denning v. Eoome, (6 Wend. 651)
98, 107
Dennis v. Maynard, (15 111. 477) 12
Dennison v. Kansas City, (95 Mo.
416) 278, 279
Denniston v. Clark, (125 Mass. 216)
293
Denton v. Jackson, (2 Johns. Ch. 320)
201, 206
Denver v. Bayer, (7 Col. 113) 330, 338
Denver v. Capelli, (4 Col. 25) 328
Denver v. Clements, (3 Col. 484) 219,
286
Denver v. Deane, (10 Col. 375) 342,
350 6
Denver v. Dunsmore, (7 Colo. 328) 349
Denver v. Knowles, (30 Pac. E. 1041)
259 a
Denver o. Mullen, (7 Cpl. 345) 120
Denver v. Rhodes, (9 Col. 554) 294,
349
Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor, (10
Col. 403) 289, 330
Denver etc. Co. v. Church, (28 Pac.
R. 468) 272
Denver etc. Co. o. Denver C. Ry. Co.,
(2 Col. 673) 302
Denver & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Church,
(28 Pac. R. 468) 273
De Pere i\ Town of Bellevue, (31
Wis. 120, 11 Am. Rep. 602) 59
De Ponthieu «. Pennyfatlier, (5 Taunt.
634) 309
De Puy V. City of Wabash, (32 N. E.
R. 1016) 282
Derby v. Allina;. (40 Conn. 410) 194
Deringey v. Ottawa, (15 Ont. 712) 329
Dermont v. Detroit, (4 Mich. 435) 355
DeEochburne v. Com., (12 Minn. 78)
399
DeRussey »: Davis, (13 La. An. 468)
110
Des Moines v. Cassady, (21 Iowa,
570) 283
Des Moines ». Chicago, R. I. & P. R.
R. Co., (41 Iowa, 569) 144
Des Moines v. Gilchrist, (67 Iowa,
210) 130
Des Moines v. Hall, (24 Iowa, 234)
194, 215, 224
Des Moines v. Layman, (21 Iowa,
158) 245
Des Moines v. The Chicago, R. I. &
P. R. R. Co., (41 Iowa, 569) 274
Des Moines etc. Co. v. Des Moines,
(44 Iowa, 505) 296
Des Moines St. R. Co. b. Ry. Co., (33
N. W. R. 610) 302
Des Moines Street R. R. Co. o. Des
Moines Broad-gaiige St. Ry. Co.,
(73 Iowa, 513) 144
Desmond v. Jefferson, (19 Fed. Rep.
483) 110, 182
Desmond d. McCarthy, (17 Iowa, 525)
106
Despard v. Pleasants Co., (23 W. Va.
318) 174
DesPlaines v. Poyer, (123 111. 348)
120, 396
De Soto V. Brown, (44 Mo. 148) 117,
156
Detroit v. Blakely, (21 Mich. 84) 327
Detroit v. Beckman, (34 Mich. 125)
325, 327 a, 329
Detroit v. Blakeby, (21 Mich. 84) 339
Detroit u. Corey, (9 Mich. 165) 9, 143,
35",
Detroit v. Davis, (1 Doug. 106) 165
Detroit v. Detroit etc., (37 Mich. 558)
301
Detroit v. Det. & E. PI. R. Co., (12
Mich. 333) 301
Detroit v. Det. R. Co., (43 N. W. Rep.
447) 261
Detroit v. Det. & Milw. R. R. Co., (23
Mich. 173) 215, 218, 219, 220, 221
Detroit v. Ft. Wayne etc. Co., (54 N.
W. R. 958) 302
Detroit v. Hosmer, (44 N. W. Rep.
622) 172, 173
Detroit c. Howell P. R. R. Co., (43
Mich. 140) U
Detroit c. Jackson, (1 Doug. 106) 165
Detroit v. Jopp, (52 Mich. 458) 282
Detroit v. Martin, (34 Mich. 170) 326 a
Detroit v. Plank Rd. Co., (12 Mich.
333) 319
Detroit v. Redfield, (19 Mich. 376)
79
Detroit City R'y v. Mills, (48 N. W.
100) 306 a
Detroit etc. Co. u. Mahoney, (36 N
W. Rep. 69) 320
Iviii
TABLE OF OASES CITED.
Eeferences are to Sections.
Detroit F. P. Co. v. State, (47 Mich.
135) 67
Detroit Home v. Detroit, (76 Mich.
521) 14
Detroit Y. M. Soc. v. Detroit, (3
Mich. 172) 270
De Turk o. Com., (129 Pa. St. 151) 75
De Vass v. Kiolimon<l, (18 Gratt. 338)
9, 183, 191 6
Deveaux v. Detroit, (Harring. Ch.
98) 312
Devereaux i;. City of Brownsville,
(29 Fed. Rep. 742) 42
Deverill i-. Grand Tr. Ry. Co., (25
Up. Can. Q. B. 517) 351
Devers «. York, (150 Pa. St. 208, 30
W. N. C. 390j 10, 162
Devlin v. New York, (131 N. Y. 123)
244
Devore's Appeal, (56 Pa. St. 163) 53,
61
Devoy v. New York, (39 Barb. 169) 79
Dew V. Parsons, (18 Eng. Com. L. 87)
326 a
Dewey, Ex parte, (11 Pick. 265) 69
Dewey v. Detroit, (15 Mich. 311) 349
Dewey v. Garvey, (130 Mass. 89) 80
Dewey v. Niagara Co. Sup., (62 N. Y.
294) 326
Dewhurst v. Allegheny City, (95 Pa.
St. 437) 28
Dewitt V. Elmira Transfer Co., (134
N. Y. 495) 312
De Witt V. Ithaca, (15 Hun, 568) 194
Dexter b. Canton, (79 Me. 463) 317
Dexter v. Tree, (117 111. 535) 221, 287
Dey V. Jersey City, (19 N. J. Eq. 412)
99, 100, 148
Diamond v. Cain, (21 La. An. 309) 18
Diamond v. Lawrence Co., (37 Pa.
St. 353) 195 b
Diamond M. Co. v. New Haven, (55
Conn. 510) 328
Diamond M. Co. r. Powers, (51 Mich.
145) 374
Dibble v. New Haven, (56 Conn. 199)
173, 175
Dickenson v. Fitohburg, (13 Gray,
546) 245
Dickey ii. Tennison. (27 Mo. 373) 234 a
Dickey v. Tel. Co., (46 Me. 483) 300
Dickinson v. New York, (92 N. Y.
584) 312
Dickinson u. Worcester, (7 Allen, 18)
355
Dickinson v. Worcester, (138 Mass.
555) 264
Dickinson v. Poughkeepsie, (74 N.
Y. 65) 164, 172
Dickinson Co. v. Hogan, (39 Kans.
606, 18 Pac. Rep. 611) 279
Dickson v. Hill, (75 Ga. 360) 371
Dickson v. Hollister, (123 Pa. St. 421,
16 Atl. R. 484) 352 a
Dickson J). Racine, (61 Wis. 545) 259 a
Dickson v. Hollister, (123 Pa. St. 421)
348
Diehm v. Cincinnati, (15 Ohio St.
305) 92
Dill V. Roberts, (30 Wis. 178) 280
Dill V. Wareham, (7 Mete. 438) 4, 169
Dillard v. Webb, (55 Ala. 468) 113
Dilley v. Wilkes-Barre etc. Co., (12
Pa. Co. Ct. R. 270) 301
Dillingham v. Snow, (5 Mass. 547) 31
Dillon V. Syracuse, (9 N. Y. Sup. 98)
174
Dingley v. Boston, (100 Mass. 544)
116, 120, 236
Dingman v. People, (51 111. 277) 113
District v. Armes, (107 U. S. 519)
3.506
District v. Bait. & P. R. R. R. Co., (1
Mackey, 314) 348
District o. Cornell, (130 U. S. 655)
177
District o. Gas Co., (20 D. C. 39) 295
District?). McElligott, (117 U. S. 621)
352
District v. Saville, (1 McArthur, 581)
121
District v. Waggaman, (4 Mackey,
328) 158
District b. Wash. & Ct. R. Co., (1
Mackey, 361) 284
District b. Woodbury, (136 U. S. 450)
350 6
Dively v. Ced. Falls, (27 Iowa, 227)
164, 177
Diveney v. Elmira, (51 N. Y. 506) 103,
339, 352
Divine b. Harvey, (7 B. Mon. 439) 80
Dixon V. Mayes, (13 Pac. 471) 276
Dixon Co. V. Field, (111 U. S. 83)
191 6, 196, 216
Dixon Co. V. Halstead, (23 Neb. 297,
37 N. W. R. 621) 258
Dixon V. Board of Woi-ks, (L. R. 7
Q. B. D. 418) 329
Dix V. Dummerston, (19 Vt. 263) 142
Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie
Co., (16 Pet. 435) 258
Dobbs r. StaufEer, (24 Kan. 12) 365
Dobson B. .Ilohenadel, (30 W. N. C.
54) 215, 221
Dock V. Garrity, (115 111. 155) 132
Doe V. Attica, (7 Ind. 641) 226
Doe V. Jones, (11 Ala. 63) 217, 225
Dodd V. Hartford, (25 Conn. 232) 112,
397
Doe B. Manchester, B. & -R. Ry. Co.,
(14 M. & W. 687) 243
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
lix
Doe etc. v. Norton, (11 M. & W. 913)
48
Doe I'. Wash'n Co., (30 Minn. 392) 79
Dodd V. Hartford, (2.5 Conn. 232) 391
Dodd t. Miller, (14 Ind. 433) 5
Dodge V. Essex Co. Com'rs, (3 Met.
380) 243, 247, 377
Dodge c. Granger, (24 Atl. E. 100) 92
Dodge V. Gridley, (10 Ohio, 173) 152
Dodge t). More, (37 Iowa, 388) 271
Dodge Co. V. Chandler, (96 U. S. 205)
184
Dodson V. Ft. Smith, (33 Ark. 508) 55
Dodson V. Moch, (4 Dev. & B. L. 14H)
13 a, 129
Doherty v. Braintree, (20 N. E. R.
106, 148 Mass. 495) 353
Dolan V. Mavor, (68 N. Y. 279) 79, 85
Dolan V. New York, (62 jST. Y. 472)
278
Doll !). State, (45 Ohio St. 445) 166
Dollar Savings Bank v. United States,
(19 Wall. 227) 282
Dolores No. 2 Land & Canal Co. v.
Hartman, (29 Pac. R. 378) 242
Domestic T. & T. Co. u. Newark, (49
N. J. L. 344) 297
Donald <;. Rehrer, (22 Fla. 198) 393
Donaldson c. Boston, (16 Gray, 508)
3506
Donch V. Board Com'rs of Lake Co.,
(30 N. E. R. 204) 326
Donnelly v. Teasdale, (21 Fla. 652) 85
Donnaher v. State, (8 Sm. & M. 649)
290
Donnelly v. Deckei-, (58 Wis. 461) 294
Donohue v. Will Co., (100 111. 94) 83,
399
Donohue v. Kendall, (50 N. Y. Super.
386) 131
Donovan n. County, (60 Conn. 339) 24
Donovan c. New York, (33 N. Y.291)
169
Donovan t. Vickshurg, (23 Miss. 247)
155
Donsraan v. Milwaukee, (1 Pinn. 81)
58
Doolittle B. Bryan, (14 How. U. S.
563) 87
Dooley v. Kansas City, (82 Mo. 444)
338
Dooly V. Sullivan, (112 Ind. 451) 347,
350 a
Dooly Block v. S. L. T. Co., (33 Pac.
R. 229) 302
Dorchester v. Wentworth, (31 N. H.
451) 249, 398
Doiey V. Boston, (146 Mass. 336) 98,
277
Dorgan v. Boston, (13 Allen, 223) 248
Dormau v. Ames, (12 Minn. 451) 3-53
Dormon v. Jacksonville, (13 Fla. 589)
292, 330
Dorrity v. Eapp, (72 N. Y. 307) 131
Dorsey, In re, (7 Port. Ala. 293) 83
Dorsey v. Ansley, (72 Ga. 460) 380
Dorsey v. Smith, (28 Cal. 21) 79
Dorsey v. Racine, (60 Wis. 292) 3506
Dorsey Co. v. Whitehead, (47 Ark.
205) 169
Doster v. Atlanta, (72 Ga. 233) 92
Dougherty «. Austine, (94 Cal. 601)
18
Dougherty v. Supervisors, (12 Pa.
Co. Ct. R. 304) 315
Dougherty v. R. R. Co., (21 N. J. L.
442) 241
Doughty V. Hope, (3 Denio, 249) 250
Douglas, In re, (3 Q. B. 825) 120
Douglas, In re, (46 N. Y. 42) 148
Douglas B. Com., (2 Rawle, 262)
130
Douglas V. Com'rs, (108 Pa. St. 559)
360, 362
Douglas 11. Essex Co., (38 N. J. L.
214) 75
Douglas V. Harrison, (9 W. Va. 162)
391
Douglas V. Placerville, (18 Cal. 643)
397
Douglas V. Town of Harrisville, (9
W. Va. 162) 53
Douglas V. Timme, (49 N. W. R. 266)
79
Douglas V. Virginia City, (5 Nev.
147) 163, 182
Douglas Co. V. Pike Co., (101 U. S.
677) 216
Douglas Co. V. Walbridge, (38 Wis.
179) 186
Douglass V. Branch Bank etc., (19
Ala. 659) 49
Douglass V. State, (31 Ind. 429) 85
Dounaher v. State, (8 S. & M. 649)
136
Dovenyi). Elmira, (51 N. Y. 506) 3506
Dover v. Fox, (9 B. Mon. 200) 226
Dover v. Twombly, (42 N. H. 59) 72
Dow V. Bullock, (13 Gray, 136) 81
Dow i>. Humbert, (91 U. S. 294) 194 a,
396
Dowen v. Team, (6 Rich, 398) 312
Dowlan v. Sibley, (36 Minn. 430) 2
Dowling V. Altsohul, (33 Pac. R. 495)
279
Downer v. Boston, (7 Gush. 277) 277
Downing «. Indiana etc. Co., (129 Ind.
443) 8, 9
Downing v. Marshall, (23 N. Y. 366)
200, 202
Downing v. Rugar, (21 Wend. 178) 97 .
99
Ir
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Dows V. Town of Elrawood, (34 Fed.
Kep. 114) 28
Dows V. Chicago, (11 Wall. 108) 397
Doyle V. Wragg, (1 F. & F. 7) 352
Doyle ». Austin, (47 Cal. 353) 271
Doyle V. Continental Ins. Co., (94 TJ.
S. 535) 258
Doyle V. Raleigh, (89 N. C. 133) 67
Drain Commissioners v. Baxter, (57
Mich. 127) 62
Drake v. Lowell, (13 Mete. 292) 345
Drake v. Mayor etc., (7 Lans. 340) 87
Drake v. Phillips, (40 HI. 388) 356,
397
Draper v. Springport, (104 U. S. 501)
165, 191 6, 193 b
Dreher v. Fitohburg, (22 Wis. 675)
342
Dressel v. Keokuk, (47 Iowa, 597) 155
Dressell v. Kingston, (32 Hun, 533)
347
Drevon v. Drevon, (34 L. J. Ch. 129)
66
Drew V. Sutton, (55 Vt. 58) 343, 346
Drexel v. Lake, (127 111. 54) 355
Driess v. Frederick, (11 S. W. K. 493)
352 a
Driggs V. Philips, (103 N. Y. 77) 310
Drisko v. Columbia, (75 Me. 73) 95
Driver v. Western Union R. R. Co.,
(32 Wis. 569, 14 Am. Rep. 726) 246
Dronberger D. Reed, (11 Ind. 420) 247
Drott V. Riverside, (4 Ohio Cir. Ct.
312) 79
Drucker v. Manhattan Ry. Co., (106
N. Y. 157, 16 J. & S. 429) 305
Dry Dock E. B. & B. R. Co. v. New
York, (47 Hun, 231) 302
Duanesburg d. Jenkins, (40 Barb.
579) 184
Dubach v. H. & St. Jo., etc. Co., (89
Mo. 483) 208, 302, 396
Dubois V. Augusta, (Dudly, 30) 119
Dubois V. Canal Co., (4 Wend. 285)
167
Dubois V. Kingston, (102 N. Y. 219)
336 a, 342, 352
Duboistown v. Roch. Brew. Co., (9
Pa. Co. Ct. R. 442) 123
Dubuque v. Benson, (23 Iowa, 248)
210, 224
Dubuque v. 111. Cent. R. R. Co., (39
Iowa, 56) 273
Dubuque v. Maloney, (9 Iowa, 450)
120, 217, 221, 224, 294
Dubuque v. Korthwestern L. Ins.
C(i., (29 Iowa, 9) 268
Dubuque v. Rebman, (1 Iowa, 444)
105
Dubuque v. Wooten, (25 Iowa, 571^
279 ' '
Dubuque F. Col. v. Township etc.,
(13 Iowa, 555) 170.
Dubrio v. Voss, (19 La. Ann. 210) 83
Ducat V. Chicago, (48 111. 172) 258
Ducheneau v. Ireland, (13 Pac. 87)
401
Duckworth v. New Albany, (25 Ind.
283) 134
Ducksworth v. Johnson, (4 H. & N.
653) 352 a
Dudley v. Bolles, (00 Wend. 465) 321
Dudley v. Frankfort, (12 B. Mon.
610) 290. 312, 396
Dudley v. Gilmore, (35 Kan. 555) 397
Dudley v. Westen, (1 Met. 477) 107
Duerr v. Board, (26 Atl. R. 144) 83,
84
Duffield v. Detroit, (15 Mich. 474) 249
Duify V. Dubuque, (63 Iowa, 171) 343,
345
Duffy V. Hobson, (40 Cal. 240) 258
Duffy V. Upton, (113 Mass. 544) 337
Dugau V. Baltimore, (1 Gill & J. 499)
282
Dugan V. Bridge Co., (27 Pa. St. 303)
314
Dugan V. Mayor, (5 Gill & J. 375) 133
Dugan V. United States, (3 Wheat.
172) 167
Dugro, In re, (50 N. Y. 513) 172
Duke !). Brown, (96 N. C. 127) 195 d
Duke V. Rome, (20 Ga. 633) 327, 331 a
Duke of Buccleuch v. Metro. Board,
(L. R. 5 H. L. C. 418) 330
DuUauty v. Town of Vaughn, (45 N.
W. Rep. 1128) 170
Dullea V. Taylor, (35 Up. Can. Q. B.
395) 354
Duluth B. Mallet, (43 Minn. 204) 120
Duluth V. St. Paul etc. Co., (51 N. W.
R. 1163) 221
Duluth V. Krupp, (49 N. W. Rep. 235)
123
Dumesnil v. Dupont, (18 B. Mon.
800) 120
Dummer v. Jersey City, (20 N. J. L.
80) 217, 227
Dunbar v. Boston, (112 Mass. 75) 92
Dunbar v. Frazer, (78 Ala. 538) 362
Dunbar v. Soule, (129 Mass. 284) 202
Duncan v. Cen. P. Ry. Co., (4 S. W.
R. 228) 397
Duncan v. Louisville, (8 Bush. 98)
242, 337
Duncan v. Niles, (32 111. 532) 169
Duncan v. State, (10 So. 815) 25, 31,
314
Duncombe v. Ft. Dodge, (38 Iowa,
281) 165, 171
Dundas v. Lansing, (42 N. W. R.
1011) 3506
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Ixi
References are to Sections.
Dunham v. Chicago, (55 111. 357) 270
Dunham v. Rochester, (,') Cow. 462)
124, 150
Dunkin v. Troy, (61 Barb. 437) 844
Dunlap V. Gallatin Co., (15 111. 9)
282
Dunlap V. Snyder, (17 Barb. 561) 129
Dunn V. Charleston, (Harper, Law,
189) 235, 238
Dunn V. Great Falls, (31 Pac. R. 1017)
297
Dunn V. Rector etc. of St. Andrews
Church, (14 Johns. 118) 51
Dunnell v. Newell, (2 A. 766, 15 R. I.
233) 326 a
Dunnell Mfg. Co. v. Pawtucket, (7
Gray, 277) 327
Dunnovan v. Green, (57 111. 63) 195
Dunsmore's App., (52 Pa. St. 374) 8,
104
Dupage Co. v. Jenks, (65 111. 275)397
Dupree v. Brunswick, (85 Ga. 727)
130
Duroch's App., (62 Pa. St. 491) 2, 8
Durango v. Pennington, (8 Cal. 257)
165, 170
Durant b. Jersey City, (25 N. J. L.
309) 279
Durant v. Kauffman, (34 Iowa, 194)
56, 259
Durant o. Palmer, (5 Dutch. 544) 348
Durant v. Iowa Co., (Woolw. 69)
189 a
Durgin v. Dyer, (68 Me. 143) 127
Durgin v. Lowell, (3 Allen, 398) 220
Durham v. Hussraau, (55 N. W. 11)
312
Durkee b. Kenosha, (59 AVis. 122) 92
Durkee v. Jamesville, (2S Wis. 464)
256, 347
DurrB. Howard, (21 Ark. 211) 104
Durr B. Howard, (6 Ark. 461) 104
Dusenbury o. M. U. T. Co., (Abb.
New Cas. 440) 297
Dusenbury b. Mayor, (25 N. J. Eq.
295) 397
Dutchess Mfg. Co. v. Davis, (14
Johns. 238) 48, 49
Dutton B. Aurora, (114 111. 138) 119
Dutton B. Board, (41 Miss. 236) 339
Dutton B. Strong, (1 Black, 23) 132
Dwight V. Springfield, (4 Gray, 107)
249, 398, 399
Dwight Printing Co. v. Boston, (122
Mass. 583) 237
Dwyer b. Brenham, (65 Tex. 526) 110
Dyckman b. New York, (5 N. Y. 434)
241
Dyer b. Bayne, (54 Mich. 87) 76
Dyer b. Brogan, (70 Cal. 136) 108
Dyer b. Chase, (52 Cal. 440) 291
Dyer b. Covington, (10 Pa. St. 200)
177
Dygert b. Schenck, (23 Wend. 446)
313, 315, 328, 348
E.
Eager, In re, (46 N. T. 190) 172
Eagle V. Beard, (33 Ark. 497) 67
Eames v. New Engl. Worsted Co.,
(11 Met. 570) 248
Eames b. Northumberland, (44 N. H.
67) 311
Eames b. Savage, (77 Me. 212) 375
Eakia b. Brown, (1 E. D. Smith, 44)
348
Earing b. Lansing, (7 Wend. 185) 321
Earl Beauchamp b. Winn, (L. R. 6 H.
L. 2J3) 327
Earl of Ripon b. Hobart, (3 Mylne &
K. 169) 120
Earle v. New Brunswick, (38 N. J.
L. 47) 218
Barley's App., (103 Pa. St. 273) 169
Earnhart b. Lebanon, (5 Ohio Cir. Ct.
R. 578) 162
Earp B. Earl, (71 111. 193) 120
East & West India Docks Co. c.
Gattke, (3 MacN. & G. 155) 231
East Ave. Bapt. Church, In re, (11
N. Y. S. 113, 57 Hun, 590) 17, 187 a
East Ang. E'ways Co. v. East Co. Ry.
Co., (11 C. B. 775) 169
Easterly v. Goodwin, (35 Conn. 279)
66
Eastern Ry. v. Portsmouth, (62 N. H.
344) 303
E. Dallas b. State, (73 Tex. 370) 380
East Dannas b. State, (73 Tex. 371) 55
East Hartford b. Hartf. R. Co. (10
How. 511) 12
East Kingston b. Towle, (48 N. H.
57) 129
Easton S. E. & W. E. Ry. Co. Appeal,
(25 W. N. C. 493) 302
E. Lincoln b. Davenport, (94 IT. S.
801) 186, 196
East Livermore b. Fai'mington, (74
Me. 154) 66
Eastman v. Meredith, (36 N. H. 280)
132, 314, 325, 332, 355
Eastman b. Clackamas Co., (34 Fed.
Rep. 139) 339
Easton Road, (8 Eawle, 195) 288
Easton b. Neff, (102 Pa. St. 474) 327
Easton's Case, (12 A. &. E. 645) 104
East Riv. etc. Co. v. Donnelly, (93 N.
Y. 557) 173
East Portland b. Multnomah Co., (6
Ore. 62) 259
East Riv. Bridge etc., In re, (26 Hun,
490) 305
Ixii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
East St. Louis v. Flanlgan, (26 111.
App. 449) 13, 189 a
East St. Louis v. Gas Co., (98111. 415)
104
East St. Louis v. Giblin, (3 111. App.
219) 347
East St. Louis v. Klug, (3 111. App.
90) 347
E. St. Louis V. Launtz, (20 111. App.
644) 87
East St. Louis v. St. John, (47 111.
463) 240
East St. Louis w. Trustees, (102 111.
489) 123
East St. Louis v. Underwood, (105
111. 308) 2ii()
East St. Louis v. Wehrung, (46 111.
392) 113, 125
East St. Louis v. Zebley, (110 U. S.
321) 260
East St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Eisen-
trant, (24 N. E. K. 760) 354
East St. Louis etc. Co. v. East St.
Louis, (31 m. App. 398) 161
East Stroudsburg, In re, (9 Pa. Co.
Ct. 529) 48
Eaton V. Boston etc. E. R. Co., (51
N. H. 504) 233, 239, 353
Eaton V. Burke, (22 Atl. R. 452) 34,
361, 363
Eaton V. Manitowoc Co., (44 Wis. 489)
3, 282
Eaton V. Monroe. (63 Mich. 525) 171
Eaton E. R. R. Co., (51 N. H. 504,
529) 292, 329
Eaton V. State, (7 Blackf. 65) 380
Eaton & H. R. R. Co. v. Hunt, (20
Ind. 457) 191 b
Eaves, In re, (30 Fed. Rep. 21) 83
Ebey b. Ebey, (1 Wash. Ter. 185) 244
Eckhard u. Donahue, (9 Daly, 214)
283
Eckstein, In re, (24 Atl. R. 63, 30.
W. N. C. 59) 86
Edenton o. Wool, (65 N. C. 379) 102
Edenville v. C. M. & P. R. Co., (77
Iowa, 69) 218
Edgerly v. Concord, (59 N. H. 78)
338 a
Edgerton i-. Green Cove Springs, (19
Ela. 140) 248, 259 a
Edgerton v. Municipality, (1 La. An.
435) 375
Edgewood, In re, (18 Atl. R. 646) 24
Edge wood W. Co. v. Troy W. Co., (7
Pa. Co. Ct. R. 476) 238
Edings c. Seabrook, (12 Rich. L. 504)
239
Edmonds v. Herbrandson, (50 N. W.
R. 970) 26
Edmunds v. Gookins, (20 Ind. 477) 55
Edmundston i-. Pittsburgh etc. Co.
(Ill Pa. St. 316) 347
Edwards b. Kearzey, (96 U. S. 595)
194
Edwards b. U. S., (103 U. S. 471) 78,
86, 370
Edwards v. Watertown, (61 How. Pr.
463) 93, 113
Eflfingham v. Hamilton, (68 Miss.
523) 374
Ege ». Koontz, (3 Pa. St. 109) 327
Egington, In re, (2 E. & B. 717) 104
Egleston b. City Council, (1 Mill.
Const. 45) 102
Egypt Street, (2 Grant, 455) 33
Egyptian Levee Company v. Hardin,
(27 Mo. 495) 248
Ehrgott V. Mayor etc. of New York,
(96 >r. Y. 264, 6 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cas. 31, 48 Am. Rep. 622) 57, 3386,
351, 352 a
Eichels b. Evansville St. Ry. Co., (78
Ind. 261) 33, 144, 304
Eichenlaub v. St. Joseph, (21 S. W.
R. 8) 146
Eidemiller r. Wyandotte City, (2
Dillon C. C. 376) 249
Eifert o. Central Covington, (15 S.
W. R. 180) 276
Eilert b. Oshkosh, (14 Wis. 576) 265
Elam V. State, (75 Ind. 518) 81, 82
Elder b. Dwight Mfg. Co., (4 Gray,
201) 104
Eldora v. Burlingame, (62 Iowa, 32)
108
Eldridge b. Smith, (34 Vt. 484) 235
Elgin B. Beckwith, (119 111. 367) 225
Elgin B. Eaton, (83 111. 537) 330
Elgin 0. Kimball, (90 111. 356) 355
Elgin V. PofE, (38 111. Ap. 362) 92
Eliasou B. Coleman, (86 IST. C. 235) 67
Elizabeth b. Combs, (10 Bush, 382)
311
Elizabeth b. Force, (29 N. J. Eq. 591)
192 &, 195 6
Elizabethtown c. Leffler, (23 111. 90)
158
Elizabethtown etc. Co. v. Thompson,
(79 Ky. 52) 803
Elizabeth L. etc. Co. e. Combs, (10
Bush. 382) 352 a
Elkins V. Athearn, (1 Hill, 50) 363
Elkliart v. Ritter, (66 Ind. 136) 352 a
Elkhart b. Weckwire, (22 N. E. E.
342) 348, 355
EUerman o. McXains, (30 La. An. 65)
12, 13
Ellet V. St. Louis etc. Co., (76 Mo.
518) 353
EUebric Ry. Co. b. Grand Rapids, (84
Mich. 257) 302
TABLE or CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
Ixiii
Elliott V. Falrhaven etc. R. R. Co.,
(32 Conn. 579, 58t)) 238, 304
Elliott V. Oil City, (18 Atl. R. 553)
355
Elliott V. Oliver, (29 Pac. R. 1) 368
Elliott V. Pliila., (f Pliila. 128) 92,
312
Elliott V. Williamson, (11 Lea, 38)
312
Ellis V. Bristol, (2 Gray, 370) 373
Ellis !). Iowa City, 29 Iowa, 229) 354 a,
355
Ellis V. Peru, (23 111. Ap. 35) 352
Ellis V. Sheffield etc., (23 L. J. Q. B.
42) 295
Ellis V. State, (5 Ind. 77) 5
Ellis V. State, (4 Ind. 1) 07
Ellis V. State, (21 S. W. R. 66) 312
Ellis B. Ry. Co., (77 Wis. 114) 184
Ellison V. Lindford, (28 Pao. R. 744)
276
Ellison t). Aldermen of Raleigh, (89
N. C. 125) 361, 371
EUsworth 0. Lord, (42 N. W. R. 389,
40 Minn. 337) 217, 220
Ellsworth V. Nelson, (46 N. W. R.
740) 29
Ellsworth !). Rossiter, (26 Pac. 274)
165
Ell. Co. V. Kitchen, (14 Bush, 289) 364
Ellyson, In re, (20 Gratt. 10) 401
Elma V. Carney, (30 Pac. R. 732) 283
Elmendorf v. Covert, (1 Hill, 674)
398
Elmendorf c. Mayor, (25 Wend. 693)
54, 98
Elmwood V. Marcy, (92 U. S. 289)
187 a
Elsterc. Springfield, (301^. E. R. 274)
292, 329
Elrod ». Bernadotte, (53 111. 368) 212,
375
Elstonj). Crawfordsville, (20 Ind. 272)
61
Elwell V. Prop'rs etc., (3 H. of L.
Cases, 812) 312
Elwell !). Greenwood, (26 Iowa, 377)
396
Ely V. Parsons, (55 Conn. 83) 220
Ely V. Rochester, (26 Barb. 133) 141
Ely V. Supervisors, (36 N. Y. 297) 122
. Elyton Ld. Co. v. Ayres, (62 Ala. 413)
397
Episcopal C. So. v. Epis. Church, (1
Pick. 372) 170
Erd V. Paul, (22 Minn. 446) 3506, 351
El' Paso V. Causey, (1 111. Ap. 531)
336 a
Embury v. Conner, (3 N". Y. 511) 240
Emerich «. Indianapolis, (118 Ind.
279) 62
Emerson v. Saltmarsh, (7 A. & E.
266) 259 a
Emerson v. Babcock, (66 Iowa, 257)
300
Emery v. Lowell, (104 Mass. 13) 326 a,
355
Emery v. Mariaville, (56 Me. 315)
177, 179
Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., (28
Cal. 345) 248, 256, 271, 281
Emery v. Washington, (1 Brayton,
128) 223
Emigrant Co. v. Wright Co., (97 U.
S. 339) 166
Emmelmaun v. Indianapolis, (108
Ind. 530) 343
Emmerton v. Mathews, (7 H. & N.
586) 127
Emmett, In re, (65 How. Pr. 266)
84
Emmert v. Belong, (16 La. An. 317)
92
Emmons ». Lewiston, (24 N. E. R.
58) 123
Empire L. & B. Ass'n i>. City of At-
lanta, (77 Ga. 496) 396
Emporia v. Gilchrist, (15 Pao. 532,
37 Kan. 621) 327
Emporia v. Norton, (16 Kan. 236) 17,
148
Emporia v. Smith, (22 Pac. R. 616) 8,
55
Emporia v. Sohmidling, (7 Am. Eng.
Cor. Cas. 86) 342
Emporia v. Soden, (25 Kan. 588) 239,
396
Emporia v. Volner, (12 Kan. 622) 105
Enfield Bridge Co. v. Hartford, (17
Conn. 40) 313
Enfield v. Jordan, (119 U. S. 680) 3
England v. New York Publishing
Co., (8 Daly, 375) 48
English V. People, (96 111. 566) 256
English V. Smock, (34 Ind. llo) 391
Enrighti). Atlanta, (78 Ga. 288) 3506
Erie's App.,( 91 Pa. St. 398) 189
Erie v. Caulkins, (85 Pa. St. 24) 92,
343
Erie v. Erie Canal Co., (59 Pa. St.
174) 2, '8, 15, 136, 319
Erie v. Flint, (8 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 482) 2
Erie v. Reed's Ex., (113 Pa. St. 468)
255, 392
Erie v. Sohwingle, (22 Pa. St. 384)
352
Erie v. Magill, (101 Pa. St. 616) 352
Erie Co. v. Butler, (120 Pa. St. 374)
281 '
Erie Co. v. Jones, (119 N. Y. 337) 79
Erie County v. E. Water Com'rs,
(113 Pa. St. 368) 271
Ixiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Ernst V. Kunkle, (5 Ohio St. 520)
259 a
Escanaba v. Chicago, (107 U. S. 678)
314
Eschback v. Pitts, (6 Md. 71) 282,
283, 284
Eslava v. Jones, (83 Ala. 139) 338
Essex J). Assessors, (26 N. E. K. 431)
271
Essex V. Day, (52 Conn. 483) 196
Essex Pub. Rd. Board v. Skinkle,
(140 U. S. 334) 8, 32
Estes D. Owen, (90 Mo. 113) 291, 293
Estelle V. Lake Crystal, (27 Minn.
243) 331 a, 346, 352
Estep V. Keokuk Co., (18 Iowa, 199)
169
Estey V. Starr, (56 Vt. 690) 98
Estey V. Westminster, (97 Mass. 324)
170
Etherington v. Wilson, (L. K. 1 Ch.
Div. 160) 66
Etherington v. P. P. etc. E. E. Co.,
(88 ST. Y. 641) 352 a
Eudora v. Miller, (30 Kan. 494) 314,
353
Eufaula v. McNab, (67 Ala. 588) 110,
188
Eufaula v. Simmons, (86 Ala. 515)
354 a
Eureka Basin, In re, (96 If. T. 42)
188
Eureka v. Davis, (21 Kan. 578) 125
Eureka v. Armstrong, (22 P. Rep.
828) 221, 310
Eustace v. Johns, (38 Cal. 3) 346, 348
Evans v. Adams, (122 Ind. 362) 352
Evans d. Evansville, (37 Ind. 229) 219
Evans v. Erie Co., (66 Pa. St. 222)
312
Evans v. Jus., (3 Hayw. 26) 83
Evans v. Job, (8 Nev. 322) 26
Evans b. Miss. etc. Co., (64 Mo. 453)
396
Evans v. North Side etc. Co., (26 Fed.
Rep. 718) 353
Evans v. People, (28 N. E. R. 1111)
278
Evans v. Populus, (22 La. Ann. 121)
79
Evans v. Trenton, (24 N. J. L. 764) 79
Evans v. Utica, (69 N. T. 166) 352
Evanstou b. Gunn, (99 U. S. 660) 324,
349 '
Evansville v. Decker, (84 lud. 325,
328) 353
Evansville v. Evans, (37 Ind. 229) 217
Evansville v. Evansville, (15 Ind. 395)
177 '
Evansville v. Hall, (14 Ind. 27) 272
Evansville i). Martin, (41 Ind. 145) 120
Evansville v. Paige, (23 Ind. 525) 56,
220
Evansville v. Phistere, (34 Ind. 36)
397
Evansville v. State, (118 Ind. 426) 18,
256
Evansville etc. Co. v. Crist, (116 Ind.
453) 352
Evansville etc. Co. v. Evansville, (15
Ind. 395) 196
Evansville & C. R. R. Co. v. Miller,
(30 Ind. 209) 245
Everett v. Baily, (24 Atl. R. 700, 150
Pa. St. 152) 313
Everett v. Council Bluffs, (46 Iowa,
6) 120
Everett v. Marquette, (53 Mich. 450)
120
Everson v. Syracuse, (100 N. T. 577)
338
Evertsen v. Nat. Bank of Newport,
(11 N. Y. S. C. 694) 190
Every v. Smith, (26 L. J. Excb. 344)
224
Ewbanks v. Ashley, (36 111. 177) 148,
156
Ewing V. Dallas Co., (19 S. W. R. 380)
40
Ewing V. Hoblitzelle, (85 Mo. 73) 302
Ewing V. Filley, (43 Pa. St. 384) 65,
104
Ewing V. St. Louis, (5 Wall. 413, 419)
397, 398
Ewing V. State, (16 S. W. R. 872) 54
Exchange Alley, In re, (4 La. An. 4)
240
Exchange Bank of Columbus v.
Hines, (3 Ohio St. 1) 269
Exeter v. Starre, (2 Show. 159) 158
Excelsior Brick Co. v. Haverstraw,
(62 Hun, 620) 308
Eyerly v. Jasper Co., (72 Iowa, 149)
375
Eyerman v. Provenchere, (15 Mo.
App. 256) 171
Eyerman v. Blaksley, (78 Mo. 145)
248
Eyerman v. Blaksley, (78 Mo. 145)
259 a
Eyler v. County Com'rs, (49 Md. 257)
347
Eyraan v. People, (6 111. 8) 400
F.
Faber v. St. Paul etc. Co., (29 Minn.
465) 136
Fair v. Philadelphia, (88 Pa. St. 309)
327 a, 354 (i
Fair v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., (21
L. T. n: S. 327) 352 a
Fairchild v. Bascom, (35 Vt. 398) 309
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Ixv
References are to Sections.
Fail-child ». Ogdensburg etc. Co., (15
N. T. 338) 177
Fairchild v. R. Co., (15 N. Y. 387) 179
Fail-child v. Wall, (29 Pac R. 60, 93
Cal. 401) 281
Fairfield v. People, (94 111. 244) 262
Fail-field v. RatclifE, (20 Iowa, 396)
256
Faiiiawn Coal Co. v. Scranton, (23
Atl. R. 1069, 148 Pa. St. 231) 328
Falconer v. BufC. etc. Co., (69 N. Y.
491) 186
Fall Eiv. etc. v. Old Col. R. R., (5
Allen, 221) 814
Falls V. Cairo, (58 111. 408) 826 a
Falmer v. Nuckolls Co., (6 Neb. 204)
395
Fanning v. Gregoire, (16 How. 524)
134
Faribault v. Misener, (20 Minn. 396)
260 a
Fai-ibauelt v. Wilson, (34 Minn. 254)
153
Fai-ist etc.Co. C.Bridgeport, (60 Conn.
278) 235
Farmers etc. v. Coventry, (10 Johns.
389) 320
Farmers L. & I. Co. v. Galesburg,
(133 U. S. 156) 174
Farmers M. Co. v. R.R.Co., (10 Pa. Co.
Ct. R. 25) 232
Farmers M. Co. v. R. R. Co., (21 Atl.
902, 28 W. N. C. Ill) 247
Farmington etc. Co. v. Commission-
ei-s, (112 Mass. 206) 279
Farmington R. W. P. Co. v. Comrs.,
(112 Mass. 206) 399
Farnham v. Sherry, (74 Wis. 568, 37
N. W. R. 577) 271
Farnumu. Concord, (2N. Y. 392) 325,
352 ■
Famsworth v. Boston, (121 Mass.
173) 368
Farnsworth v. Pawtucket, (13 R. I.
82) 169
Farrar v. Greene, (32 Me. 574) 352
Farrar v. St. Louis, (80 Mo. 379) 279
Farfell v. Bridgeport, (45 Conn. 191)
07, 85, 89
Farrell v. King, (41 Conn. 448) 106
Farrell v. Winchester Ave., (61 Conn.
127, 23 Atl. 757) 306 a
Farrelly v. Cincinnati, (2 Disney, 516)
852 a
Farrington v. Tennessee, (95 IT. S.
679) 273
Farris v. Dudley, (78 Ala. 124) 354 a
Farquar v. Roseburg, (21 Pac. Rep.
1103) 349
Farwell v. Cambridge, (11 Gray, 413)
245
Farwell v. Chicago, (71 Illinois 269)
298
Farwell e. Hathaway, (22 N. E. R.
849) 267
Farwell v. Smith, (1 Harr. 133) 158
Fash V. Third etc. Co., (1 Daly, 105)
302
Faulkner v. Home, (29 N. E. R. 645)
•49
Fauntleroy v. Hannibal, (1 Dillon,
C. C. 118) 31
Faust v. Huntington, (91 Ind. 498)
220
Fay, In re, (15 Pick. 243) 184
Fay B. Weber, (48 N. W. R. 859) 39 6
Fay V. Wood, (32 N. W. R. 614) 263
Fayette v. Shafrath, (25 Mo. 445) 104
Fayette Co. ». Peoples Bank, (47
Ohio St. 503) 259 a
Feiten v. Milwaukee, (47 Wis. 494)
242
Feldman v. Charleston, (23 S. C. 57)
188
Fellows V. Walker, (89 Fed. R. 657)
26, 392
Fellows 1). Fayette Soh. Dis., (39 Me.
559) 326 a
Fellowes v. New Haven, (44 Conn.
240) 329
Feltmakers v. Davis, (1 Bos. & P. 98,
100) 149, 157
Feltham v. England, (L. R. 2 Q. B.
3.3) 337
Felton V. Addison, (101 Ind. 58) 279
Fennimore v. New Orleans, (20 La
An. 124) 836 a
Fenton ». Scott, (17 Or. 189) 65
Fenwick v. Sears, (2 Cranch. 150) 77
Fesh V. Com., (4 Dana, 522) 102
Fession v. Landrey, (24 N. E. R. 96)
221
Ferguson v. Chittenden, (6 Ark. 479)
99
Ferguson v. Davis Co., (57 Iowa, 601)
853
Ferguson v. Landran, (5 Bush, 230)
254
Ferguson b. Selma, (43 Ala. 398) 118,
120
Fernald v. Boston, (12 Cush. 574)
830
Ferris v. Bramble, (5 Ohio St. 109)
234 a
Ferris v. Wellborn, (64 Miss. 29) 896
Ferry u. Ferry, (2 Cush. 92) 199
Ferry Co. v. Boston, (101 Mass. 350)
360
Fertilizer Co. ». Hyde Park, (97 U.
S. 659) 129
Fetterly ». Municipality etc., (14 U.
C. Q. B. 433) 164
Ixvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
Ficklen v. Taxing District, (145 U. S.
1, 12 S. Ct. 810) 258
Fidelity etc. Co. v. Shenandoah etc.
Co., (32 W. Va. 244) 53
Field V. Can-, (59 111. 198) 215, 221
Field V. Chipley, (79 Ky. 260) 80
Field D. Commonwealth, (32 Pa. St.
478) 83, 85
Field V. Des Moines, (39 Iowa, 57?)
335, 338
Field ». Girard Col., (54 Pa. St. 233) 75
Field B. West Orange, (36 N. J. Eq.
118) 354 a
Fields 1;. Stockley, (99 Pa. St. 306)
335
Fifth St., In re, (17 Wend. 667) 329
Fifteenth Ward, Ee, (11 Phila. 466)
63
Filby V. Combe, (2 M. &W. 677) 129,
130
Files V. State, (3 S. W. K. 817, 48 Ark.
529) 270
Finch V. Temaha Co. Sup., (29 Cal.
453) 269
Fink V. Milwaukee, (17 Wis. 26) 155
Fink ». Missouri etc. Co., (82 Mo.
283) 347
Fink V. Newark, (40 N. J. L. 11) 247
Finley v. Philadelphia, (32 Pa. St.
381) 272
Finnell v. Kates, (19 Ohio St. 405)
279
Finney v. Oshkosh, (18 Wis. 220) 265
Finnegan v. Fernandina, (15 Fla. 379)
282
Fire Dept. v. Chanman, (10 Daly,
377) 131
Fire Dept. v. Hill, (14 N. Y. S. 158)
13
Fire Dept. v. Kip, (10 Wend. 266) 23,
31
Fire Dept. v. Stetson, (14 Daly, 125,
6 N. y. St. R. 255) 131
Fire Dept. v. Sturtevant, (33 Hun,
407) 131
Fire Dept. v. Wendell, (13 Daly, 430)
lol
Fire Dept. v. Wright, (3 E. D. Smith,
478) 258
First Bap. Church v. Utica etc., (6
Barb. 313) 301
First Eccl. Soo. of H. v. Hartford,
(38 Conn. 274) 326
First Municipality o. McDonough, (2
Robinson, 244) 182
First N. Bk. v. Arlington, (16 Blatch.
57) 190 a
First Nat. Bk. v. Americus, (68 Ga.
119) 326 a
First Nat. Bk. v. Cook, (77 111. 622)
397
First Nat. Bk. v. County Com'rs, (14
Minn. 79) 191
First Nat. Bk. v. Lindsay, (43 Fed.
R. 619) 259 a
First Nat. Bk. v. Mt. Tabor, (52 Vt.
87) 191, 193
First Nat. Bk. etc. v. Nat. Ex. Bank,
(92 U. S. 122) 143
First Nat. Bk. v. Salem etc. Co., (39
Fed. R. 89) 51
First Nat. Bk. of Louisville ». Com-
monwealth, (9 Wall. 353) 258
Fish V. Dodge, (4 Den. 311) 120
Fish V. Kelly, (17 C. B. N. S. 194) 338
Fish V. Rochester, (6 Paige, 268) 293
Fisli 11. Weatherwax, (2 Johns. Cas.
217) .371
Fisher v. Beard, (32 Iowa, 346) 217,
221
Fislier b. Boston, (104 Mass. 87) 92,
130, 332, 335, 338 a
Fisher v. .Charlestown, (17 W. Va.
595, 17 lb. 682) 375
Fislier v. Harrisburg, (2 Grant Cas.
291) 154, 294
Fisher v. McGirr, (1 Gray, 1) 122
Fisher v. Rochester, (6 Lans. 223) 293
Fisher v. Sch. Dis. No. 17, (4 Cush.
494) 99, 170
Fisher v. San Diego, (24 Pac. 1000,
86 Cal. 158) 54
Fisher v. Thirkell, (21 Mich. 1) 298
Fisk V. Chester, (8 Gray, 506) 66
Fisk V. Havana, (88 111. 208) 219
Fisk B. Jefferson Par. etc., (11617.8.
131) 79, 377
Fiske, Ex parte, (72 Cal. 125) 130, 148
Fiske B. Hazard, (7 R. I. 4.38) 139
Fiske B. Chicago etc. E. E. Co., (13
Barb. 472) 66
Fitch V. Creighton, (24 How. 159) 283
Fitch V. Pinckard, (5 111. 78) 110, 159,
265
Fitchburg etc. Co. b. Grand etc. Co.,
(1 Allen, 552) 302
Fitz u. Boston, (4 Cush. 365) 342
Fitzpatrick v. Slooum, (89 N. Y. 358)
92
Fitzgerald v. Berlin, (64 Wis. 203)346
Fitzgerald b. Berlin, (51 Wis. 81) 343
Fitzgerald v. Weston, (32 Wis. 354)
352
Fitzsimmons v. B'klyn, (102 N. Y.
536) 79
Fitzsimmons v. Brooklyn, (102 N. Y.
536) 85
Flack ». Fry, (32 W. Va. 364) 62
Flagg B. Elmira, (33 Mo. 440) 192 6
Flagg B. Hudson, (142 Mass. 280) SSI
Flagg B. Palmyra, (33 Mo. 440) 196,
364, 376
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Keferences are to Sections.
Ixvii
Flagg ». St. Charles, (27 La. An. 319)
177
Flagg V. Worcester, (13 Gray, 601)
328, 355
Flanagan v. Plainfield, (44 N. J. L.
118) 121
Flatbusli Av., In re, (1 Barb. 286)
259 a
Flatbush, In re, (60 N. Y. 398) 15
Fleckner v. U. S. Bank, (8 Wheat.
338, 357) 165
Fleming, In re, (4 Hill, 581) 359
Fleming b. Shenandoah, (71 Iowa,
456) 352 a
Fleming v. Guthrie, (3 Law Rep. An.
53) 360
Fleming v. Manchester, (44 L. J. N.
S. 617) 328
Fleming ». Mershom, (37 Iowa, 413)
397
Fletcher v. Auburn etc. Co., (25
Wend. 462) 302
Fletcher v. Oliver, (25 Ark. 289) 259
Fletcher v. Oshkosh, (18 Wis. 229)
265
Fletcher ». Peck, (6 Cranch, 135) 10
Fleuellen v. Proetzel, (15 S. W. R.
1043) 32
Flick, In re, (6 Gulp, 329) 224
Flint v. Russell, (5 Dill. 151) 120
Flori B. St. Louis, (69 Mo. 341) 325
336 a
Flower, In re, (29 IST. E. R. 463) 16
Floyd V. Cora'rs, (14 Ga. 358) 102,
104, 156
Floyd V. Turner, (23 Tex. 293) 243
Floyd Acceptances, (7 Wall. 667) 177
Floyd Co. V. Day, (19 Ind. 450) 179,
180
Flynn v. Boston, (26 N. E. B. 868) 54
Flynn u. Canton, (40 Md. 312) 324,
327, 346
Flynn ». Com'rs, (22 N. E. R. 1100)
316
Flynn ». Detroit, (53 N. W. R. 815,
93 Mich. 590) 312, 314
Flynn ». Taylor, (28 N. E. R. 418, 127
N. Y. 596, aff'g 6 N. Y. S. 96) 396
Fogg V. Nahant, (98 Mass. 578) 342
Foley J). Haverhill, (144 Mass. 352)
326
Folinsbee v. Amstex-dam, (21 N. Y.
S. 42) 292
Follman u. Mankato, (45 Minn. 457)
355
FoUmer ». Nuckolls Co., (6 Neb. 204)
173
FoUweiler ». Lutz, (112 Pa. St. 107)
66
Folsom V. Underhill, (36 Vt. 580) 223,
352
Folsom V. Sch. Dis., (91 HI. 404) 182
Folsom, In re, (56 N. Y. 60) 264
Folts V. Huntley, (7 Wend. 210) 244
Foltz B. Kerlin, (105 Ind. 221) 74
Foot V. Bronson, (4 Lansing, 47) 355
Foote t). Hancock, (15 Blatchf. 343)
195 c, 199
Foote V. Cincinnati, (11 Ohio, 408)
24,244
Forbush v. Norwich, (38 Conn. 225) 92
Force v. Batavia, (61 111. 99) 65
Ford B. Board etc., (81 Cal. 19) 83
Ford B. Clough, (8 Me. 334) 142, 302
Ford B. Cartersville, (84 Ga. 213) 266
Ford B. Har. Comrs., (81 Cal. 19) 79
Ford B. No. Des Moines, (45 N. W. R.
1031) 24
Ford B. Thrailkill, (84 Ga. 169) 146
Ford B. Umatilla Co., (16 Pac. Rep.
33) 353
Ford B. Williams, (13 N. Y. 577, 585)
167
Foreman b. Canterbury, (L. R. 6 Q.
B. 214) 342
Fork Ridge etc. Assn. b. Redd, (10
S. E. R. 405, 33 W. Va. 262) 232
Forney b. Calhoun Co., (86 Ala. 463)
215, 218
Forney b. Calhoun Co., (84 Ala. 215,
4 So. 153) 216
Forristal v. Milwaukee, (57 Wis. 628)
174
ForsterB. Scott, (17 N. Y. S. 479) 243
Forsyth b. Kreuter, (100 Ind. 27) 278
Forsyth b. Atlanta, (45 Ga. 152) 327 a
Porsythe v. Hooper, (11 Allen, 419)
347
Fort Dodge b. More, (37 Iowa, 388)
271
Fort Dodge b. Minn. R. R. Co., (54
N. W. R. 243) 317
Ft. Edward etc. ». Payne, (17 Barb.
567) 318
Fortin b. East Hampton, (145 Mass.
196) 344
Fort Scott ». Hickman, (112 U. S.
150) 199
Fort Smith v. Dodson, (46 Ark. 296)
155
Fort Smith v. McKibhen, (41 Ark. 45)
312
Fort St. etc. Co. b. Jones, (83 Mich.
415) 241
Fort Wayne v. Breeze, (23 N. E. 1038)
352
Fort Wayne b. Combs, (107 Ind. 75)
353
Fort Wayne b. DeWitt, (47 Ind. 396)
312 a
Fort Wayne b. Jackson, (7 Blackf
36)50
Ixviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Fort Wayne v. Lake Shore & M. S.
Ky. Co., (32 N. E. R. 215) 208
Fort Wayne v. Eosenthal, (75 Ind.
156) 166
Fort Wayne v. Shaaf, (106 Ind. 66)
259 a, 397
Fort Worth v. Davis, (57 Tex. 225)
265
Fort Worth etc. Co. v. Downie, (82
Tex. 383) 246
Fort Worth v. Howard, (22 S. W. E.
1059) 330
Fort Worth v. Crawford, (74 Tex. 404)
120, 327 a
FosdiokB. Hempstead, (125 N. Y. 581,
26 N. E. K. 801) 203
Fosdick V. Perryville, (14 Ohio St.
472) 188
Foshay v. Glen Haven, (25 Wis. 288)
342
Fosters. Boston, (127 Mass. 290) 350 b
Foster v. Coleman, (10 Cal. 27«) 177
Foster v. Findlay, (5 Ohio Cir. Ct.
455) 86
Foster v. Goddard, (40 Me. 64) 321
Foster v. Juniata B. Co., (4 Har. 393)
■353
Foster v. Kansas, (112 U. S. 201) 83,
121
Foster v. Kenosha, (12 Wis. 615) 195
Foster v. Koads, (19 Johns. 191) 153
Foster v. Scarf, (15 Oliio St. 535) 65
Foster v. St. Louis, (71 Mo. 157) 254 a
Foster v. Shaw, (7 Serg. & Kawle,
163) 52
Foster ■». Swope, (41 Mo. App. 137)
352
Fountain v. Warren Co., (27 N". E. R.
125) 15
Fourth Av., In re, (4 Wend. 452) 359 a
Fowle V. Alexandria, (3 Pet. 398) 32,
331
Fowler, In re, (53 K. T. 60) 232, 233
Fowler v. Atkinson, (6 Minn. 579) 167
Fowler v. Pierce, (2 Cal. 165) 368
Fox V. Catherine etc. Co., (12 Pa. Co.
Ct. 180) 302
Fox V. Glastenbury, (29 Conn. 204)
352
Fox V. Hart, (11 Ohio, 414) 312
Fox V. Lansingburgh, (59 Hun, 617)
326 a, 350 6
Pox V. McDonald, (13 So. R. 416) 74
Fox ». Northern Liberties, (3 Watts
& S. 103) 338
Fox V. Rockford, (38 111. 451) 288
Fox V. Sackett, (10 Allen, 535) 352
Fox V. Shipman, (19 Mich. 218) 177
Fox I). State, (5 How. 410) 117
Fox's Will, (52 N. Y. 530, 94 U. S.
315) 202
Frammer v. Richmond, (31 Gratt.
646) 123
Francis v. Blair, (96 Mo. 515) 18
Francis v. Cockrell, (5 Q. B. 184) 121
Francis v. Troy, (74 N. Y. 338) 164
Franey v. Miller, (11 Pa. St. 434) 215
Frank, In re, (52 Cal. 606) 110, 150,
159
Frank v. San Fran., (21 Cal. 668) 375
Frankford etc. v. Philadelphia, (58
Pa. St. 119) 302
Frankfort v. Anghe, ( 15 W. E. Rep.
802) 158
Frankfort B. Co. v. Williams, (9 Da-
na, 403) 317
Frankfort Bridge Co v. Frankfort,
(18 B. Mon. 41) 51, 164
Frankfort etc. Co. v. Philadelphia,
(58 Pa. St. 119) 123
Franklin v. S. E. Ry. Co., (3 H. & N.
211) 352 a
Franklin B. Fisk, (13 Allen, 211) 354 a
Franklin v. Winopa etc. Co., (37
Minn. 409) 351
Franklin Co. Ct. v. Dep. Bank, (9 S.
W. R. 212) 268
Franklin Co. Gram. Sch. v. Baily, (62
Vt. 467) 9
Franklin Co. Comm'rs v. Lathrop,
(9 Kan. 453) 215
Franklin's Trust, (24 Atl. 626) 203
Franklin Wlif. Co. v. Portland, (67
Me. 46) 355
Franklyn v. Portland, (67 Me. 46)
300
Franklyn, Succession of, (7 La. Ann.
395) 66
Frankner v. Aurora, (85 Ind. 130) 331
Franz v. Railroad Co., (55 Iowa, 107)
238, 303
Frautz ». Jacob, (11 S. W. 654) 188
Frazee, In re, (63 Mich. 396) 152, 154
159
Frazier b. Warfield, (73 Md. 279) 114
Freburg v. Davenpoi-t, (63 Iowa, 119)
329
Freeh v. Philadelphia, ( 39 Md. 574)
338
Frederick v. Augusta, (5 Ga. 561) 17,
134, 101
Frederick v. Goshen, (20 Md. 436) 395
Frederick Co. v. Winchester, (57
S. E. Rep. 884) 216, 226, 229
Freedman v. Sigel, ( 10 Blatclif. 327)
258
Freeholders v. Barber, ( 2 Halst. 64)
124
Freeholders D. Towns, (20 N. Y. State
Rep. 394) 310
Freeholders v. Strader, ( 18 K. J. L.
lOS) 325
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Ixix
References are to Sections.
Freeland v. Hastings, (10 Allen, 570)
138, 254.
Freeman v. Phlla., (13 Pliila. 154) 92
Fieemansburg v. Rogers, (8 Atl. 872)
292
Freeport v. Isbell, (83 III. 440) 344 a
Fi-eeport v. Marks, ( 59 Pa. St. 253)
149
Fremont v. Boling, ( 11 Cal. 380) 397
Fremont etc. Co. v. Holt Co., (45
N. W. R. 163) 326
Fremont v. Marley, (25 Keb. 138) 355
Fremont etc. v. Sherwin, (6 Neb. 48)
184
French ». Auburn, (62 Me. 452) 164
French v. Boston, (129 Mass. 592) 353
French v. Brunswick, (21 Me. 29) 346
French v. Quincy, (3 Allen, 9) 202,
203
French v. Springwells H. Comm'rs,
(12 Mich. 267) 249
French v. White, (24 Conn. 174) 234
Frend v. Dennett, (4 C. B. 576) 165
Fresno v. Canal & Irr. Co., (32 Pac.
943) 300
Fretwell v. Troy, (18 Kan. 271) 123
Frevert v. Finrock, (31 Ohio St. 621)
391
Frick V. St. Lonis etc. Co., ( 75 Mo.
595) 136
Friday v. Floyd, (63 HI. 50) 129
Friesner v. Charlotte, ( 52 N. W. 18)
24
Frigally v. Memphis, (6 Coldw. 382)
104
Frio V. Earnest, (16 S. W. 1036) 325
Fritsch v. Allegheny, (91 Pa. St. 226)
342
Fritz V. First Div. etc. Co., (22 Minn.
404) 129
Fritz V. Hobson, ( L. R. 14 Ch. Div.
542) 120, 307
Fritz ». Kansas City, (84 Mo. 632)
325, 327, 346
Frolickstein v. Mobile, (40 Ala. 725)
134
Frommer v. Richmond, ( 31 Gratt.
646) 124
Front «. Belmont, (6 Allen, 152) 136
Front St. Cable Ry. Co. v. Johnston,
(25 Pac. R. 1084) 212
Frost v. Flick, (1 Dakota, 131) 397
Frost V. Leatherman, (55 Mich. 33)
265
Frost V. Waltham, (12 Allen, 85) 352
Frostburg v. Duffy, ( 70 Md. 47) 355
Frostburg v. Hitchins, ( 16 Atl. R.
380) 355
Fi-y V. Albemarle Co., (9S. E. R. 1004)
325
Fry V. Comrs., (82 N. C. 304) 375
Fry, In re, (3 Mackey, 135) 105
Fry's Election, (71 Pa. St. 302) 66
Fullam V. Brookfleld, (9 Allen, 1)
165, 167
Fuller V. Atlanta, (66 Ga. 80) 329
Fuller V. Chicago, (89 111. 282) 189 a
Fuller V. Edings, (11 Rich. Law, 739)
133, 239
Fuller V. Groton, (14 Gray, 340) 115
Fuller, In re, (25 Ark. 261) 363
Fulliam v. Muscatine, (30 N. W. R.
861) 346, 352
Fulsome v. Concord, (46 Vt. 135) 351
Fulton V. Lincoln, (9 Neb. 358) 165,
265
Fulton V. Mehrenfield, (8 Ohio St.
440) 215
Fulton V. Riverton, ( 42 Minn. 395 )
196
Fulton Co. V. Miss. etc. Co., (21 111.
338) 189
Fulton Co. V. Rickel, ( 106 Ind. 501 )
325, 353
Fulweiler v. St. Louis, ( 61 Mo. 479 )
103
Funk's Admrs. ». Waynesboro, (10
Atl. R. 427) 242
Furraan v. Nichol, (8 Wall. 44) 14
Furnell v. St. Paul, (20 Minn. 117)
342, 346, 350 b.
<3r.
GabeU v. Houston, (29 Tex. 335) 134
Gaddis v. Richmond, (92 Ind. 119)
196
Gaffney v. Brown, (150 Mass. 479) 352
Gaffney v. Gough, (36 Cal. 104) 282
Gage V. Chicago, (32 N. E. R. 264) 278
Gage V. Chicago, (2 111. App. 332) 87
Gage V. Evans, (90 111. 569) 397
Gage V. Graham, (57 111. 144)
Gage V. Hornelsville, (41 N. Y. 87) 87
Gage V. Nichols, (135 111. 128) 187 a,
256
Gahagan v. Boston etc. Co., (1 Allen,
187) 306
Gainbur v. Mayoret, (4 Sand. 109) 83
Gaines v. Hot Spr. Co., (39 Ark. 262)
312
Galbes ». Girard, (46 Fed. R. 500) 5
Galbraith v. Luttiech, (573 111. 209)
108, 310
Galbraith v. Olivet, (3 Pitts. 79) 120
Galbreath v. Armour, (4 Bell App.
Cas. 374) 302
Galbreath v. Newton, (30 Mo. Ap.
380) 278
Gale V. Kalamazoo, (23 Mich. 344)
113, 124
Gale V. Mayor, (8 Hun, 370) 87
Galena v. Amy, (5 Wall. 705) 14
Ixs
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Eeferences are to Sections.
Galena v. Corinth, (48 111. 42,S) 163
Galesburg v. Hawkinson, (75 111. 152)
53
Gall V. Cincinnati, (18 Ohio St. 563)
128
Gallegher v. St. Paul, (28 Fed. Rep.
305) 346
Gallowaj v. Corbett, (52 Mich. 460)
399
Galoway v. London, (1 H. L. 34) 392
Galtin v. Tarborough, (78 N. C. 119)
259
Galveston v. Barbour, (62 Tex. 172)
336 o, 352 a
Galveston c. Devlin, (19 S. W. K. 395)
86
Galveston v. Heard, (54 Tex. 420)
259 a, 281
Galveston ». Loomis, (54 Tex. 517)
163, 189 a
Galveston v. Menard, (23 Tex. 349)
312
Galveston v. Morton, (53 Texas, 409)
170
Galveston v. Posnainsky, (62 Tex.
118) 324, 351
Galveston v. Williams, (6 South
West. Eep. 860) 221
Galveston City Co. v. Galveston, (56
Tex. 486) 326 a
Galveston etc. Co. v. Fuller, (63 Tex.
467) 330
Galveston Wharf Co. v. Galveston,
(63 Tex. 14) 133, 271
Gamble v. St. Louis, (12 Mo. 617)
220
Gannon v. Hagadon, (10 Allen, 106)
354 a
Gant's App., (23 Pitts. Leg. J. 219)
308
Garden City v. Abbott, (34 Kan. 283)
146, 300
Gardenier v. Sup., (17 St. Eep. 983)
362
Gardiner Cotton & W. F. Co. b. Gar-
diner, (5 Me. 133) 272
Gardner v. Haney, (86 Ind. 17) 374
Gardner v. Johnston (12 Atl. Kep.
888) 223
Gardner v. INewburg, (2 Johns. Ch.
162) 234, 396
Gardner v. Ogden, (22 JT. Y. 332) 166
Gardner v. State, (21 N. J. L. 557)
267
Garmer v. St. Louis, (37 Mo. 554) 79
Gargan v. Railroad, (12 S. W. R. 259)
311
Garland v. Gaines, (2 S. W. R. 460)
326
Garland v. Towne, (55 N. H. 55) 300,
348
Garlinghouse v. Jacobs, (4 N. T. 161)
325
Garlington v. Copeland, (10 S. E. K.
616) 282
Garratt v. Canandaigua, (61 Hun,
623) 328
Garrett v. St. Louis, (25 Mo. 505)
259 a, 271
Garrison v. Chicago, (7 Biss. 480)
144 a, 295
Garrison v. New York, (21 Wall. 196)
242
Garrittee v. Baltimore, (23 Md. 422)
121
Gartsede v. East St. Louis, (43 111.
47) 392
Garvin r. Daussman, (16 N. E. R. 826)
279
Garvin v. Gorman, (63 Mich. 221) 399
Garvin v. Wells, (8 Iowa, 286) 158
Garvin v. Wiswell, (83 111. 215) 177,
179
Garviss v. Daussman, (114 Ind. 429)
279
Gas Co. -0. Des Moines, (44 Iowa, 508
147
Gas Co. ». Norwich City Gas Co., (25
Conn. 19) 295
Gaskins v. Allen, (73 Ga. 746) 344 a
Gass V. Greenville, (4 Sneed. 62) 127
Gass V. State, (34 Ind. 424) 381
Gassett v. Andover, (21 Vt. 342) 51
Gatch V. Des Moines, (63 Iowa, 718)
259 a
Gates V. Del. Co. (12 Iowa, 405) 86
Gates V. Hancock, (23 N. H. 528) 165
Gaunt V. Fynuey, (L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 8)
120
Gause v. BuUard, (16 La. An. 197) 283
Gause v. Clarksville, (1 McCrary, 78)
164, 182, 196
Gay V. Bradstreet, (39 Me. 580) 249
Gay V. Cadby, (L. R. 2 C. P. Div. 391)
129, 130
Gay V. Cambridge, (128 Mass. 887)
336 a, .3506
Gay V. Gilmore, (76 Ga. 725) 359
Gay !). Mut. Union Tel. Co., (12 Mo.
App. 485, 494) 297
Gearhart v. Dixon, (1 Pa. St. 224) 108,
265
Geary v. Kansas, (61 Mo. 378) 87
Gebhardt v. Reeves, (75 111. 301) 215,
228
Geddis v. Parrish, (21 Pac. R. 314)
354
Gedge v. Commonwealth, (0 Bush,
61) 223
Gee V. Metro. R'y Co., (L. R. 8 Q. B,
177) 352
Gee V. Wilden, (Lut. 1320, 1324) 156
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
Ixxi
Gehrig's Est., In re, (27 N. E. K. 784)
202
Geiger v. Filor, (8 Fla. 325) 133, 302
Gelpcke v. Dubuque, (1 Wall. 20)
192 b, 254
Geneseo v. Harper, (38 111. 103) 398
Geneva v. Cole, (61 111. 397) 282
Genoa v. Woodruff, (92 U. S. 502) 192,
192 6
Genois v. St. Paul, (35 Minn. 330)
292, 329
Gentile v. State, (29 Ind. 409) 26
George v. Oxford, (16 Kan. 72) 05, 189
Georgia etc. Co. v. Archer, (87 Ga.
237) 247
Georgia etc. Co. v. State, (15 S. E. R.
293) 273
Gerberling v. Wunnenberg, (51 Iowa,
125) 220
Gerhard v. Seekonk Com'rs, (o Atl.
Kep. 199) 311
Gerken v. Sibley Co., (39 Mun. 433) 79
Germania v. State, (7 Md. 1) 123, 261
German Sch. v. Dubuque, (64 Iowa,
736) 328
Gerry c. Stone, (1 Allen, 519) 139
Getchell v. Benton, (47 N. W. K. 468)
184, 188, 220
Gettysburg, Ke, (90 Pa. St. 355) 63
Gibbons v. Ogden, (9 Wheat. 1) 314
Gibbons v. K. E. Co., (36 Ala. 410)
184
Gibbons v. Sheppard, (65 Pa. St. 20)
398
Gibbs V. Beaufort, (20 S. C. 213) 92,
328
Gibbs V. Hampden, (19 Pick. 298) 371
Gibbs V. Liverpool, (3 H. & N. 164)
121
Giblin v. Mclntire, (2 Utah, 384)
352 a
Gibsen v. Baily, (9 N. H. 168) 106
Gibson v. Borough, (22 Pittsb. Leg.
64) 300
Gibson v. Coraopolis, (22 Pitts. L. J.
64) 300
Gibson v. Owens, (21 S. W. E. 1107)
279
Giesy v. Cincinnati etc. E. E. Co., (4
Ohio St. 308) 238
Giffen v. Olathe, (24 Pac. E. 470) 221
Gifford V. Hulett, (19 Atl. E. 230) 120
•Gifford V. White Plains, (25 Hun,
606) 170
Gilbert p. R. E., In re, (70 N. T.
361) 144, 305
Gilbert v. Luce, (11 Barb. 91) 86
Gilbert ». Marshall, (18 B. Mon. 427)
79
Gilbert v. New Haven, (40 Conn. 162)
108
Gilbert v. Eoxbury, (100 Mass. 185)
344
Gilbert v. W. C. V. M. etc. E. E. Co.,
(33 Gratt. 599) 190, 192 b
Gilbrough ». Norfolk Co., (1 Hughes,
410) 191, 195 b, 195 d
Gilchrist's Appeal, (109 Pa. St. 600) 54
Gilchrist v. Garden, (26 Up. Can. C.
P. 1) 345
Gilder v. Brenham, (67 Tex. 345) 219,
221, 223
Gildersleeve v. Alexander, (2 Speer,
298) 66
Gildersleeve v. Board, (17 App. Pr.
201) 99
Giles V. Sch. Dis., (31 N. H. 304) 69
Gilfeather v. Council Bluffs, (69
Iowa, 310) 354 a
Gilham v. Wells, (21 Alb. Law Jour.
319, 64 Ga. 192) 125
Gilkerson v. Fred'k Jus., (13 Gratt.
577) 259 a
Gillespie's App., (30 W. N. C. 337) ;
203
Gillespie v. Dubuque, (1 Wall. 175)
184
Gillespie v. Lincoln, (52 N. W. E.
811) 92
Gillespie v. Mayor, (6 Daly, 286) 79
Gillespie etc. Co. v. St. Louis, etc.,
(6 Mo. App. 554) 353
GlUett V. Logan Co., (67 111. 256) 98,
113
Gillette o. Hartford, (31 Conn. 351)
56, 259
Gillinwater v. Miss. etc. E. E. Co.,
(13 111. 1, 4) 232
Gillison v. Charlestown, (16 W. Va.
282) 355
Gilluly V. Madison, (63 Wis. 518) 349,
355
Gilman v. Deerfield, (15 Gray, 577)
352
Gilman v. Laconia, (55 N. H. 130)
354, 355
Gilman v. Milwaukee, (61 Wis. 588)
110
Gilman v. Milwaukee, (55 Wis. 328)
229
Gilman v. Sheboygan, (2 Black, 510)
14) 253
Gilman ». Waterville, (59 Me. 491)
326
Gilmartin v. Mayor, (55 Barb. 239)
345
Gilmer v. Atlanta, (77 Ga. 688) 350 &
Gilmer v. Gilmer, (32 Ga. 685) 66
Gilmer v. Lime Point, (18 Cal. 229)
233
Gilmore v. Driscoll, (122 Mass. 199)
329
Ixxii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Gilmore v. Hentig, (32 Kan. 156) 277
Gilmore v. Holt, (4 Pick. 258) 129
Gilmore v. Fox, (10 Kan. 509) 397
Gilmore v. Lewis, (12 Ohio, 281) 79
Gilmore v. Norton, (10 Kan. 491)
27
Gilmore v. Utica, (131 N. Y. 26) 281
Gilson V. Board, (27 N. E. B,. 235)
259, 259 a
Ginochio v. State, (18 S. W. 82) 125
Girard v. Bissell, (45 Kan. 56) 123
Girard v. New Orleans, (2 La. An.
897) 201
Girard v. PhiladelpMa, (7 Wall. 1) 21,
41
Glaesner v. Auheuser etc. Co., (13 S.
W. K. 707) 396
Glantz V. So. Bend, (106 Ind. 305)
842, 350
Glass V. Ashburg, (49 Cal. 571) 128
Glass V. Fritz, (23 Atl. R. 1050) 354 a
Glass V. White, (5 Sneed, 475) 267
Glasscock v. Lyons, (20 Ind. 1) 79, 85
Glasgow !). Bowse, (43 Mo. 479) 261
Glasgow J). St. Louis, (17 S. W. R.
743) 308, 311
Gleucoe v. Peo., (78 111. 382) 65, 362,
368
Glenn v. Baltimore, (5 G. & J. 429)
120
Glenn v. Lynn, (89 Ala. 608) 28
Glenn v. Shannon, (12 P. C. 570) 327
Gllck V. Bro. K. R. Co., (19 D. 0. 412)
302
Glover «. Mayor etc. of N. T., (7 Hun,
232) 92
Gloversville v. Howell, (70 N. T. 287)
24, 153
Glynn v. Baker, (1 East, 510) 191
Godchaux v. Carpenter, (19 Nev. 415)
241
Goddard v. Harpswell, (24 Atl. 958,
84 Me. 499) 338
Goddard, In re, (16 Pick. 504) 33,
155, 156
Goddard v. Jacksonville, (15 111. 588)
125
Goddin v. Crump, (8 Leigh, 120) 255
Godfrey v. Alton, (12 111. 29) 215
Godfrey v. Claflin, (21 Pick. 1) 327
Goetler d. State, (45 Ark. 454) 117
Goettman v. Mayor etc. of N. Y., (6
Hun, 132) 78, 86
Goldi). Philadelphia, (115 Pa. St. 184)
342
Goldsboro v. Moffett, (49 Fed. R. 213)
165
Goldsohmidt b. New Orleans, (5 La.
An. 436) 177, 190 a
Goldsmith v. New Orleans, (31 La.
646) 125
Goldsworthy v. Linden, (43 N. W.
R. 656) 3506
Goldthwaite v. East Bridgewater, (5-
Gray, 61) 342
Goldwaite v. Montgomery Council,
(50 Ala. 486) 158, 261
Goooh V. Gregory, (65 N. C. 142) 212
Goodale v. Fennell, (27 Ohio St. 426)
14
Goodale v. Tuttle, (29 N. Y. 459) 354 a
Goodell, In re, (14 Johns. 325) 373
Goodell V. Baker, (8 Cowen, 286) 95
Goodenow v. Butterick, (7 Mass. 140,
142) 32
Goodfellow V. New York, (100 N. Y.
15) 342
Goodhue v. Beloit, (21 Wis. 636) 59
Gondier v. Cormack, (2 E. D. Smith,
204) 347
Goodln V. Des Moines, (55 Iowa, 67)
343
Goodloe B. Cincinnati, (4 Ohio, 500)
329
Goodnough v. Oshkosh, (24 Wis. 549)
3506
Goodnough v. Powell, (32 Pac. K.
396) 397
Goodnow V. Com'rs, (11 Minn. 31) 177
Goodnow V. Ramseyles, (11 Minn. 31)
177
Goodrich v. Detroit, (12 Mich. 279)
163
Goodrich o. Brown, (30 Iowa, 291)
104
Goodrich v. Chicago, (20111. 445) 327,
327 a
Goodsen ». Des Moines, (66 Iowa,
255) 350 a
Goodspeed v. Fuller, (46 Me. 141) 327
Goodtitle v. Alker, (1 Burr. 133) 224
Goodwin b. Des Moines, (55 Iowa,
617) 348
Goodwin v. McGehee, (15 Ala. 2331
209 ,
Goodwin v. Roberts, (L. R. 1 App.
Cas. 476) 183
Goodwyu and Railway Co., In re, (13
U. C. C. P. 254) 49
Goognis V. Bos. & A. E. Co., (30 N.
E. R. 71) 238
Gordon v. Baltimore, (5 Gill, 231) 270
Gordon Co. v. Harris, (81 Ga. 220) 79
Gordon ». Preston, (1 Watts, 385) 209'
Gordon B. Richmond, (18 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cases, 251) 349, 352
Gorgier v. Melville, (3 B. & C. 45)
183, 191
Gorhara, In re, (43 How. Pr. 263) 189
Gorham v. Campbell, (2 Cal. 135) 65
Gorhara b. Cooperstown, (59 N. Y.
660) 312
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Ixxiii
References are to Sections.
Gorliam v. Springfield, (21 Me. 61)
24, 55, 67
Goring V. McTaggart; (92 Ind. 200)
282
Gorman v. Low, (2 Edw. Ch. 324) 1.55
Gormley v. Clark, (134 TJ. S. 338) 221
Gormley v. Day, 28 N. E. K. 693, 114
111. 195) 359.
Goshen v. Gravy, (58 Ind. 268) 134
Goshen v. Croxton, (34 Ind. 239) 156
Goshen v. Kern, (63 Ind. 468) 123
Goshen v. Meyers, (119 Ind. 196) 313,
353
Goshen v. Stonington, (4 Conn. 209)
67
Goss V. Vermontville etc., (44 Mich.
319) 368
Goshorn v. Smith, (92 Pa. St. 435) 337
Gosling V. Veley, (19 L. J. Q. B. 135)
145
Gosman v. State, (106 Ind. 203) 81, 82
Gosport V. Evans, (112 Ind. 133) 352
Gosselin v. Chicago, (103 111. 623) 215
Gottschalk v. Becher, (49 N. W. E.
715, 32 Neb. 653) 57
Gould V. Atlanta, (60 Ga. 164) 338
Gould V. Baltimore, (58 Md. 46, 59
lb. 378) 265
Gould ». Booth, (66 N. T. 62) 325
Gould V. Gapper, (5 East, 345) 401
Gourley v. Hankins, (2 Iowa, 75) 88,
211
Gould B. Hudson K. etc. Co., (6 N.
y. 522) 132
Gould V. Paris, (68 Tex. 511) 189 a
Gould V. Rochester, (105 N". Y. 46) 54
Goulden v. Scranton, (15 Atl. R. 483)
354 a
Gould ». Sterling, (23 N. Y. 458) 183
Goulds. Taylor Orphan Asylum, (46
Wis. 106)200
Gould V. Topeka, (32 Kan. 485) 328
Governor v. Justice of Clark Co., (19
Ga. 97) 325
Governor v. McEwen, (5 Humph.
241) 2, 8
Gov. St. Ry. Co. v. Hanlon, (53 Ala.
70) 321
Goyne v. Ashley Co., (31 Ark. 552)
177
Grady v. Walsner, (46 Ala. 381) 120
Graff 0. Baltimore, (10 Md. 544) 242
Grafftyc. Bushville, (187 Ind. 502)
258
Graf ten ». Till wood, (32 Pac. R. 1026)
169
Grafton Bk. v. Doe, (19 Vt. 463) 199
Graham v. Carondolet, (33 Mo. 262)
96
Graham v. Conger, (4 S. W. R. 327)
259 a
Graham v. Greenville, (67 Tex. 62)
55 59
Graham k. State, (1 Ark. 171) 102
Gramlish v. Wurst, (86 Pa. St. 74) 348
Granby v. Thurston, (23 Conn. 416)
4, 54, 67
Grand v. Detroit, (51 N. W. E. 999)
362
Grand Chute v. Winegar, (15 "Wall.
373) 186. 195
Grand Is. etc. Co. v. West, (45 N. W.
E. 242) 166
Grand Rapids v. Bateman, (53 N. W.
R. 6) 117
Grand Rapids v. Blakely, (40 Mich.
367) 326
Grand Rapids v. Hughes, (15 Mich.
54) 105, 154
Grand Rapids v. Wyman, (46 Mich.
516)3506
Grand Eapids v. Grand Eapids & Ind.
E. E. Co., (58 Mich. 641) 241
Grand Eapids Booming Co. v. Jarvis,
(30 Mich. 308) 239
Grand Eapids etc. E. R. Co., (38
Mich. 62, 47 Mich. 393) 304, 305
Grand Rapids etc. v. Grand Rapids
etc., (20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
270) 296
Grand Eapids etc. Co. v. Gray, (38
Mich. 461) 102
Grand Rapids etc. Co. v. Van Drille,
(24 Mich. 409) 279
Grand Rapids Electric etc. Co. v.
Grand Rapids Edison etc. Co., (33
Fed. Rep. 659) 144, 289, 395
Grand Rap. Sch. Euruiture Co. .
Grand Eapids, (52 N. W. E. 1028)
259 a
Grandville v. Jenison, (86 Mich. 567,
49 N. W. 544) 215
Grand Surrey Canal Co. ». Hall, (1
M. & Gr. 392) 218, 312
Granger v. Avery, (64 Me. 292) 54
Granger v. Pulaski Co., (26 Ark. 37)
325, 333
Grans v. Davenport, (18 Iowa, 179)
132
Grants. Brooklyn, (41 Barb. 381) 355
Grant v. Cooke, (7 D. C. 165) 195
Grant b. Davenport, (36 Iowa, 396)
174, 395
Grant v. Detroit, (51 N. W. E. 997)
362
Grant v. Dalliber, (11 Conn. 234) 60
Grant v. Erie. (69 Pa. St. 420) 328, 355
Grant v. Huston, (16 S. W. K. 680)
209
Grant v. Lake Co., (17 Or. 453) 192
Grannis v. Cherokee Township, (47
Fed. E. 427) 187 a
Ixxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
Grant v. Stillwater, (35 Minn. i'4-
300
Grant Co. v. Bradford, (72 Ind. 455)
140
Grantham v. State, (14 S. E. K. 892)
12, 125
Grassick v. Toronto, (30 U. C. Q. B.
306) 339
Graves v. Cole, (3 Dak. 301) 363
Graves v. Gas Co., (83 Iowa, 74) 396
Graves v. Colby, (9 Ad. & Bl. 356) 157
Graves v. Otis, (2 Hill, 466) 87, 239,
292, 329
Graves v. Shattuck, (35 N. H. 257)
300
Gray v. Bayward, (5 Del. Ch. 499) 396
Gray v. Board, (139 Mass. 328) 277,
294
Gray v. Brooklyn, (2 Abb. App. Cas.
267) 92
Gray v. Brooklyn, (10 Abb. Pr. K.
186) 2, 8
Gray v. Emporia, (23 Pac. K. 944, 43
Kan. 704) 345
Gray v. Harris, (107 Mass. 492) 317
Gray v. Iowa L. Co., (26 la. 387) 301,
308
Gray v. Latham, (84 Ala. 546) 180
Gray v. Mount, (45 Iowa, 591) 189
Gray v. Pullen, (32 L. J. Kep. Q. 169)
347
Gray v. Sheldon, (8 Vt. 402) 53, 54
Gray v. State, (2 Hairing. 76) 102
Grayville v. Whitaker, (85 111. 439) 315
Great Falls Ice Co. v. District, (19 D.
C. 327) 17, 398
Greathouse v. Dunn, (60 Cal. 311) 87
Great West. Ry. Co. etc.. In re, (23
Up. Can. C. P. 28) 161
Greeley v. Jacksonville, (17 Fla. 174)
161
Greeley v. Maine Cent. R. R. Co., (53
Me. 200) 354 a
Greeley v. People, (60 111. 19) 184
Green v. Burke, .(23 Wend. 490) 88
Green v. Canaan, (29 Conn. 157) 218
Green v. Cape May, (41 N. J. L. 45)
110
Green v. Dandy, (12 Vt. 338) 344
Green v. Durham, (1 Burr. 131) 96
Green v. Dyersburg, (2 Flip. 477) 192
Greens. Eastern Ry. Co., (53N.W. R.
808) 301
Greer v. East Haddam, (51 Conn.
547) 106
Green ». Fresno, (30 Pac. R. 544) 18
Green v. Hogan, (27 N. E. R. 413) 203
Green v. Hoi way, (101 Mass. 243, 3
Am. Rep. 339) 258
Green v. Hotaling, (44 K. J. L. 347)
271
Green v. Indianapolis, (52 Ind. 490)
28, 107
Green v. Mayor etc., (5 Alb. Pr. R.
503) 2
Green o. Marks, (25 111. 221) 212
Green v. Oaks, (17 111. 249) 220
Green v. Orf ord, (15 Ont. 506) 171
Green?). Pittsburgh etc. Co., (8 Watts
6 S. 85) 302
Green v. Rutherford, (1 Ves. 462) 203
Green v. Reading, (9 Watts, 382) 292,
329
Green v. Savannah, (6 Ga. 1) 104, 116,
120
Green v. State, (5 Ohio, 136) 108
Green v. Swift, (47 Cal. 536) 329
Green v. Ward, (82 Va. 324) 256, 265
Green B. & M. Co. v. Outagamie Co.,
(45 N. W. R. 536) 26
Green Bay v. Beames, (50 Wis. 204)
98, 146
Greencastle Township v. Black, (3
Ind. 587) 61
Green Co. v. Conness, (109 U. S. 104)
187, 195
Green u. Eubanks, (80 Ala. 204) 325
Greene c. Hudson Co., (44 N. J. L.
388) 86
Greene Co. v. Daniel, (102 U. S. 187)
375
Greenfield v. Moore, (33 Ind. 597)
364, 375
Greenough v. Wakefield, (127 Mass.
275) 139
Greensboro v. Ehrenreich, (80 Ala.
579) 150
Greensboro v. MuUins, (13 Ala. 341)
117, 124
Greensburg v. Laird, (8 Pa. Co. Ct.
R. 608) 8
Greensburg Bor. v. Young, (53 Pa.
St. 280) 259 a
Green Township, (9 Watts & S. 22) 38
Greenville v. Mason, (53 N. H. 515) 59
Greenville W. Works v. Greenville,
7 So. Rep. 409) 110, 163
Greenwood v. Freight Co., (105 N. S.
13) 10
Greenwood v. Louisville, (13 Bush,
226) 333
Greenwood v. Westport, (53 P. 824)
324, 336 a
Greer v. Covington, (83 Ky. 410) 282
Greer v. New York, (3 Rob. 406) 335
Greggs V. Foote, (4 Allen, 195) 247,
338 a
Gregor v. Allen, (33 La. An. 870) 86
Gregory v. Adams, (14 Gray, 242) 340,
353
Gregory e. Bridgeport, (41 Conn. 76)
113, 163
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Ixxv
Keferences are to Sections.
Gregory v. Knight, (50 Mich. 61) 312
Gregory v. Lincoln, (13 Neb. 352) 221
Gregsteno. Chicago, (34 K. E. E. 426),
299
Grenada Co. v. Brogden, (112 U. S.
261) 187 a
Gribble v. Sioux City, (38 Iowa, 390)
352
Gridley v. Barker, (1 B. & P. 236) 99
Gridley v. Bloomington, (68 111. 50)
298, 348
Grierson v. Ontario, (3 Up. Can. Q.
B. 623) 148
Griffin's Appeal, (109 Pa. St. 150) 220
Griffin v. House, (18 Johns. 397) 320
Griffin «. Johnson, (10 S. E. K. 719,
84 Ga. 279)3506
GritBn v. Mayor, (3 N. Y. 456) 327
Griffin v. Macon Co., (36 Fed. Eep.
885) 199
Griffin v. Powell, (64 Ga. 625) 299
Griffin v. Kanney, (35 Conn. 239) 258
Griffin v. Wilcox, (21 Ind. 370) 184
Griffiths V. Harries, (2 M. & W. 335)
156
Grigsby v. Bowles, (79 Tex. 13) 360
Grim ». Weisenbeig, (57 Pa. St. 433)
139, 326
Grimes v. Blake, (16 Ind. 160) 327
Grimes v. Hamilton Co., (37 Iowa,
290) 142
Grimes v. Keene, (52 N. H. 330) 107,
336
Gi-imley v. Santa Clara Co., (68 Cal.
575) 326
Grimmet v. Askew, (48 Ark. 171) 177
Grimshaw. Grand Trunk Ey. Co., (19
Up. Can. Q. B. 493) 243, 247
Grinnel v. Adams, (34 Ohio St. 44)
279
Griswold v. Bay City, (35 Mich. 452)
294
Grogan v. Broadway F. Co., (87 Mo.
321) 345
Grogan 1). San Francisco, (18 Cal. 590)
2, 170, 211
Gross V. Kenfield, (57 Cal. 626) 79
Gross ». Lampasas, (11 S. W. 1086)
'355
Grossenbach v. Milwaukee, (65 Wis.
31) 346
Grotou V. Haines, (36 K H. 388) 354
Grove v. Fort Wayne, (45 Ind. 429)
300, 345
Grove v. Kansas City, (75 Mo. 672)
343
Grovenvelt v. Burwell, (1 Ld. Eayra.
454, 469) 398
Grube v. Nichols, (36 111. 93) 219, 220
Grube v. St. Paul, (34 Minn. 420)
92
Grube v. Mo. Pacite, (11 S. W. Eep.
736) 290
Grumbine v. Washington, (2 McAr-
thur (578) 333, 338 a
Guardians v. Vestry of St. Leonard
Shoreditch, (L. E. 2 Q. B. Div. 145)
130
Gubaske v. New York, (12 Daly, 182)
3506
Gueble v. Epply, (28 Pac. E. 89) 24
Gude V. Mankato, (30 Minn.) 3506
Guerin v. Eeese, (33 Cal. 292) 283
Guernsey v. Burlington, (4 Dill. 372)
184
Guerrero, In re, (69 Cal. 88) 125, 148
Guest V. Brooklyn, (69 N. Y. 506)
249, 259 a, 391
Guest V. Lower M. W. Co., (21 Atl.
E. 1001) 212
Guier v. O'Daniel, (1 Binn. 349) 66
Guilder v. Otsego, (20 Minn. 74) 15,
187
Guilfont V. Parish, (28 La. An. 413)
177
Guilford v. Chenango Co., (13 N. Y.
143) 187
Guillard v. Analine, (10 Martine, 479)
87
Guillotte V. New Orleans, (12 La. An.
432) 127
Gulick V. New, (14 Ind. 93) 102
Gulf City St. Ey. Co. v. Galveston,
(69 Tex. 660, 7 S. W. E. 520) 306
Gulf C. & S. E. Co. V. Eiordan, ( 22
S. W. E. 519) 113
Gulf City Ey. Co. v. Galveston City
Ey. Co., (65 Tex. 502) 144
Gulf etc. Co. V. Gascamp, ( 69 Tex.
545) 352, 353
Gun V. Hubbard, (97 Mo. 311) 65
Gunn V. Barry, (15 Wall. 610, 623) 186
Gunnarssohn v. Sterling, (92 111. 669)
123
Gunning Gravel Co. v. New Orleans,
(13 So. 182) 292
Gurnee v. Chicago, (40111. 165 ) 87,
264, 291
Gurnsey v. Edwards, ( 26 N. H. 224)
108
Guthrie v. New Haven, (31 Conn. 308)
223, 288
Guthrie v. Territory, (31 Pac. E. 190)
22
Gutsweller ». People, (14 111. 142) 2, 8
Gutta Per. v. Starkley, (11 Phila.
219) 172
Guy V. Baltimore, (100 U. S. 434)
258
Gwinnell v. Earner, ( 10 L. E. C. P.
658) 348
Gwynn v. Homan, (15 Ind. 201) 219
Ixxvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
TT.
Haag ». Vanderburgh Co., (60 Ind.
611) 92, 338
Haas V. Chicago R. etc. Co., (41 Wis.
44) 136
Haherman b. Baker, (128 N. Y. 253)
229
Haokensack Water Co. v. Hoboken,
(lY Atl. 307) 144 a
Hackettstown ». Swackhammer, (37
N. J. L. 191) 177
Haddock's Case, (T. Kaym. 435) 101
Hadley v. Mayor, (33 N. Y. 603) 79,
85, 381
Hadley v. Taylor, L. E. (1 C. P. 53)
348
Hadsell v. Hancock, (3 Gray, 526)
95, 115
Haefling v. San Antonio, (20 S. W.
Rep. 85) 123, 262
Haflord v. New Bedford, (16 Gray,
297) 92, 327 a, 335
Hagan b. Campbell, (8 Port. 9) 132
Hager v. Burlington, (42 Iowa, 661)
265
Hagerstown v. Dechert, (32 Md. 369)
102
Hagood V. Clark Co., (20 Ga. 845) 325
Hague V. Phila., (48 Pa. St. 527) 165,
169
Haight V. Grist, (64'Sr. S. 739) 258
Haight V. Keokuk, (4 Iowa, 199) 133,
225
Haight V. Love, (39 N. Y. 14) 82
Haight V. New York, (24 Fed. Rep.
93) 332, 338 a
Haines v. Readfleld, (41 Me. 256) 326 a
Haines v. Sch. Dis.,(41 Me. 246) 95
Ilairstou v. Hairston, (27 Miss. 704)
68
Hake v. Henderson, (4 Dev. 1) 78
Ha) but V. Forrest City, (34 Ark. 246)
165
Haldaue v. Eckford, L. R. (8 Eq.
Cas. 631) 66
Hale V. Houghteu, (8 Mich. 458) 119,
144 a, 163
Hale V. Johnson, (80 111. 185) 347
Hale V. Kenosha, (29 Wis. 599) 269
Hale V. Wilkinson, (21 Gratt. 75) 258
llaliburton v. Frankford, (14 Mass.
214) 214
Halifax b. City Ry. Co., (1 Russ. Ch.
Eq. 319) 306
Hall, In re, (50 Conn. 131) 69
Hall V. Baker, (27 Am. & Eng. Cor.
Cas. 208) 142
Hall D. Baltimore, (56 Md. 187) 221
Hall V. Beveridge, (81 111. 128) 79
Hall V. Bristol, (L. R. 2 C. P. 322)
231, 329, 330
Hall V. Bunte, (20 Ind. 804) 283
Hall V. Burlingham, (88 Mich. 438)
29
Hall B. Cockrell, (28 Ala. 507) 169
Hall B. Chippewa Falls, (47 Wis. 267)
265
Hall B. Grantham etc., (13 M. & W.
114) 320
Hall B. Jackson Co., (95 111. 353) 177
Hall B. Lowell, (10 Cush. 260) 351
Hall B. Manchester, (40 JST. H. 410)
342, 344
Hall V. Marysville, (19 Cal. 391) 271
Hall V. Somerswarth, (39 N. H. 511)
360
Hallahan v. Herbert, (11 Ab. Pr. N.
S. 326) 283
Halleck b. Boyleston, (117 Mass. 469)
106
Hallenback v. Hahn, (2 Neb. 377) 184
Hallenbeck v. Winnebago Co., (95
111. 148) 353
Hallett B. Bassett, (100 Mass. 167) 66
Hallgrene v. Campbell, (82 Mich.
255) 88
HalpiuB. Campbell, (71 Mo. 493) 259 a
Halpin v. Kansas City, (76 Mo. 335)
343 348 349
Ham'B. New York, (70 N. Y. 459)
338 a
Ham V. Salem, (10 Mass. 350) 234
Ham B. Wisconsin R. Co., (61 Iowa,
716, 329
Hambleton v. Town of Dexter, (89
Mo. 188) 39
Hamden ». New Haven etc. Co., (27
Conn. 158) 306
Hamden v. Rice, (24 Conn. 350) 202
Hamerick v. Rouse, (17 Ga. 56) 392
Hamersley v. New York, (56 N. Y.
533) 241
Hamlin b. Dingman, (5 Lans. 61) 88
Hamilton B. Boston, (4 Allen, 475) 340
Hamilton v. Carthage, (24 111. 22)
160
Hamilton v. Columbus, (52 Ga. 435)
349
Hamilton v. Chicago etc. Co., (15 N.
E. R. 854) 223, 229
Hamilton v. Chicago etc., (124 111.
241) 287
Hamilton v. Dubuque, (50 Iowa, 213)
326
Hamilton v. Ft. Wayne, (73 Ind. 1)
259 a, 279
Hamilton v. Garrett, (62 Tex. 602)
338 a
Hamilton B. McNeil, (13 Gratt. 389)
53, 54
Hamilton b. New Castle etc. Co., (9
Ind. 859) 165, 169, 211
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Ixxvii
Hamilton v. Shelbyville, (33 N. E. E.
1007) 169
Hamilton ». State, (3 Tex. App. 643)
117
Hamilton v. State, (3 Ind. 452) 363,
373
Hamilton v. State, (113 Ind. 179, 15
N. E. Kep. 258) 316
Hamilton v. Vicksburg etc., (34 La.
An. 970) 314
Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, (7 Ohio St.
109) 3, 325
Hamilton Gaslight & Coke Co. v.
City of Hamilton, (37 Fed. Eep.
832) 144 a
Hammar ». Covington, (3 Met. 494)
362, 377
Haramarskold v. Bull, (11 Rich. L.
493) 169
Hammerslough v. Kansas City, (57
Mo. 219) 249
Hamraett v. Philadelphia, (65 Pa. St.
146, 3 Am. Kep. 615) 259 a
Hammond b. Hames, (25 Md. 541) 24,
123
Hammond v. McLachlan, (1 Sandf.
323) 224
Hampshire ». Franklin, (16 Mass. 76)
11, 60
Hampson v. Taylor, (15 E. I. 83) 351
Hampstead ». Underhill, (20 Ark.
337) 368
HH.mpstead v. Des Moines, (63 Iowa,
36) 330
Hancock v. Bowman, (49 Cal. 413) 283
Hancock v. Chicot Co., (32 Ark. 575)
195
Hand, In re, (52 Hun, 206) 220
Handt!. Newton, (92 IST. Y. 88) 211
Hand v. Tippecanoe, (26 Ind. 179) 79
Handel v. Elliott, (60 Tex. 145) 283
Handy v. Collins, (60 Md. 229) 265
Handy v. New Orleans, (39 La. An.
107) 395
Hanes v. N. C. E. E. Co., (109 N. C.
490) 243
Hanger v. Des Moines, (52 Iowa, 193)
110, 140
Hankins v. CuUoway, (88 111. 485) 73
Hanlon v. Keokuk, (7 Iowa, 477) 352
Ilannen v. Sfe Louis, (62 Mo. 313)
338 a
Hanner v. Grizzard, (89 N. C. 115) 69
Hanney v. Kansas City, (94 Mo. 334)
351
Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, (15
Wall. 547) 249
Hannibal v. Draper, (15 Mo. 634) 221,
227
Hannibal v. Fauntleroy, (105 U. S.
408) 189, 196
Hannibal v. Hannibal & St. J. etc.,
(48 Mo. 480) 290
Hannibal v. Winchell, (57 Mo. 172)
290, 396
Hannon v. Agnew, (98 N. Y. 439) 333
Hannon v. Grizzard, (96 N. C. 293) 79
Hannon v. Halifax, (89 N. C. 123) 361
Hannon v. St. Louis Co., (62 Mo. 313)
336 a
Hanscome v. Omaha, (11 Neb. 37)
397
Hansen v. Vernon, (27 Iowa, 28) 253,
254
Hansmeister v. Porter, (21 Fed. Rep.
335) 391
Hanson v. Eastman, (21 Minn. 209)
222, 286
Hanson i>. Hunter, (53 N. "W. E. 84)
110, 297
Hanson v. Vernon, (27 Iowa, 28) 183
Harard v. Drainage Co., (51 111. 17)
15
Harbaugh v. Monmouth, (74 111. 371)
125
Harbeck v. Toledo, (11 Ohio St. 219)
240, 241
Harbeck v. Vanderbilt, (20 N. Y. 398)
190 a
Harbormaster v. Southerland, (47
Ala. 511) 133
Hardcastle v. So. Yorkshire Ey. Co.,
(6 H. & N. 72) 348
Harding v. Goodlett, (3 Yerg. 40) 232
Harding v. Hale, (61 111. 192) 219, 220
Harding v. Eockford etc. Co., (65 111.
90) 65, 195 a
Harding v. Eockford etc. Co., (65111.
90) 189
Harding v. Stamford Water Co., (41
Conn. 87) 239, 354
Hardenbrook v. Ligonier, (95 Ind.
70) 160
Hardy v. Brooklyn, (90 N. Y. 435)
328
Hardy v. Keens, (52 N. H. 570) 324,
340, 345
Hardy v. N. C. etc. Co., (74 N. C.
734) 317
Hardy v. Waltham, (3 Meto. 103) 130
Hargreaves v. Taylor, (3 Best & S.
613) 327 a
Hargro v. Hodgdon, (26 Pac. 1100)
217
Harker v. Anderson, (21 Wend. 375)
179
Harker v. Mayor, (17 Wend. 199) 158
Harlem G. Co. v. Mayor etc., (33 N.
Y. 389) 172
Harlem ». City, (3 Mete. 494) 316
Harlow v. Humiston, (6 Cow. 189)
328
ixxvm
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Harmon v. Chicago, (110 111. 400) 120
Harmon v. Lynchburg, (33 Gratt. 37)
335 a
Harmon v. Omaha, (17 Neb. 548) 330
Harmon c. St. Louis Co., (62 Mo.
313) 3
Harmon v. W. & G. K. Co., (7 Mackey,
255) 352
Haruell v. Curtis, (1 E. B. Smith, 78)
321
Harner v. Columbus etc. Co., (29
Wkly. L. Bui. 387) 303
Harness v. Chesapeake & C. Canal
Co., (1 Md. Ch. Dec. 248) 249
Harney v. Indianapolis, (32 lud. 244)
395
Harper's Ap., (109 Pa. St. 9) 281
Harper v. Elberton, (23 Ga. 566) 268
Harper v. Milwaukee, (30 Wis. 365)
336 a, 346, 347
Harpswell b. Phipps, (29 Me. 313) 107
Harpurt v. Wils., (1 Mod. 47) 320
Harrawer v. Eitson, (37 111. 301) 300
Harriman v. Boston, (114 Mass. 241)
350 6
Harrington v. Berkshire Co. Com'rs,
(22 Pick. 263) 242
Harrington v. Buffalo, (24 IST. E. R.
186) 344
Harrington v. Lansingburgh, (110 N.
Y. 145) 347
Harrington v. Miles, (11 Kan. 480)
129
Harrington v. Plainview, (27 Minn.
224) 186, 395
Harrington v. St. Paul etc. Co., (17
Minn. 215) 302
Harrington v. Ward, (9 Mass. 251)
338
Harris v. Atlanta, (62 Ga. 290) 92, 333
Harris v. Barber, (9 S. Ct. 314, 129 U.
S. 366) 399 .
Harris v. Board, (32 N. E. E. 92) 341,
353
Harris b. Elliott, (10 Pet. 25) 228
Harris v. Intendant, (28 Ala. 577) 125
Harris v. Intendant, (3 Ala. 137) 110
Harris i;. Nesbit, (24 Ala. 398) 134,
384
Harris b. Newbury, (128 Mass. 321)
343
Harris b. People, (59 N. Y. 599) 28
Harris v. School Hist., (28 N. H. 58)
106, 170
Harris v. Schuylkill etc. Co., (21 Atl.
R. 590, 28 W. N. C. 44) 246
Harris b. Wakeman, (Sav. 254) 158
Harris b. Whitcomb, (4 Gray, 433)
108
Harris b. Mobbs, (L. R. 3 Ex. D. 268)
300
Harris County ». Taylor, (58 Tex.
690) 219
Harrisburg b. Sayler, (87 Pa. St. 216)
347
Harrisburg b. Segelbaum, (151 Pa.
St. 172, 24 Atl. R. 1070) 291
Harrisburgh b. Seek, (104 Pa. St. 53)
33
Harrisburg b". Taylor, (87 Pa. St. 216)
92
Harrison b. Baltimore, (1 Gill. 264)
119, 332
Harrison v. Bridgton, (16 Mass. 16)
13, 67
Harrison b. Brooks, (20 Ga. 537) 120
Harrison B. Electric Co., (48 N. W. R.
1005) 395
Harrison b. Good, (L. R. 11 Eq. 338)
120
Harrison b. Hernsheim, (28 La. An.
881) 57
Harrison b. James, (2 Chitty, 347)
320
Harrison b. Milwaukee, (49 Wis. 247)
265, 326 a
Harrison v. New Haven, (34 Conn.
136) 342
Harrison b. N. O. Ry. Co., (.34 La.
An. 452) 302
Harrison b. Parker, (6 East, 154) 224
Harrison v. Seal, (5 So. E. 622) 215,
221
Harrison b. State, (9 Mo. 526) 134
Harrison b. St. Marks Church, (12
Phila. 259) 120
Harrison b. Vicksburg, (11 Miss. 581)
255, 258
Harrold v. Simcoe, (16 U. C. C. R.
43) 339
Harrow b. State, (1 Greene, 439) 300
Harshman b. Bates Co., (92 U. S. 569)
186
Hart V. Bloomfield Tp., Trs., (15 Ind.
226) 220
Hart o. Brooklyn, (36 Barb. 226)
3.50 a
Hart B. Buckner, (54 Fed. Rep. 925)
396
Hart B. Burnett, (15 Gal. 580) 229
Hart B. Cedar Rapids, (63 Wis. 634)
342
Hart V. Hudson Riv. R. R. Co., (80
N. Y. 622) 337
Hart !;. Mayor, etc., (9 Wend. 571)
120
Hart B. Mayor, (6 Wend. 571) 154
Hart V. New Orleans, (12 Fed. Rep.
292) 212
Hart B. Red Cedar, (63 Wis. 634) 852
Harter ». Kenochan, (103 U. S. 562)
186
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Keferences are to Sections.
Ixxix
Hartford ». Bennett, (10 Ohio St.
441)78
Hartford v. Talcott, (48 Conn. 525)
S48
Hartford v. "West Middle Sch. Dist.,
(45 Conn. 462) 270
Hartford Bk. v. Hart, (3 Day. 493)
107
Hartford Co. v. Baker, (17 Pick. 432)
320
Hartington v. Luge, (50 N. W. R.
957) 56
Hartley, In re, (31 L. J. M. 232) 127
Hartley o. Keokuk, etc. Co., (52 N.
W. R. 352) 249
Hartshorn b. Potroff, (89 111. 509) 250
Hartshorn v. Schoff, (58 N. H. 197)
99
Hartwell v. Littleton, (13 Pick. 229)
106
Harvard College v. Boston, (104 Mass.
470) 270
Harvard College v. Gore, (5 Pick.
370) 66
Harvard Col. v. Stearns, (15 Gray, 1)
396
Harvey v. Lackawanna etc. R. R. Co.,
47 Pa. St. 428) 239
Harvey v. Olney, (42 111. 336) 326 a
Harvey v. Kansas etc. Co., (48 Kan.
228) 249
Harvey v. Rush Co., (32 Kan. 159) 79
Harvey v. Thomas, (10 Watts, 63)
2.34 a
Harvey b. "W. P. S. Co., (1 Doug. 193)
179
Harward v. St. Clair & M. Levee &
Dr. Co., (51 111. 130) 254
Harwood v. Lowell, (4 Cush. 310)
352 a
Harwood v. Marshall, (9 Md. 83) 361
Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, (21 Wis.
217) 14, 15, 165, 375
Hascard v. Somany, (Freem. 504) 211
Hasey v. White Pig B. S. Co., (1
Doug. 193) 177
Haskell v. Burlington, (30 Iowa, 232)
282
Haskell v. New Bedford, (108 Mass.
208) 120, 244, 855
Haskins «. Super's, (51 Miss. 506)
377
Hassen v. Rochester, (65 N. Y. 516)
270, 397
Hastings v. Columbus, (42 Ohio St.
585) 148
Haswell v. New York, (81 N. Y. 255)
79
Hatch 0. Barr, (1 Ham. 390) 167
Hatch V. Bufealo, (38 N. Y. 276) 249
Hatch V. Mann, (15 Wend. 44) 79
Hatch V. Vermont Cent. R. R. Co.,
(25 Vt. 49) 239
Hates V. Jones, (1 Ired. L. 129) 365
Hatton V. Chatham, (24 111. App. 622)
287
Hanghey-B. Hart, (62 Iowa, 96) 348
Havemeyer v. Iowa Co., (3 Wall. 294)
184, 216, 254
Havemeyer v. Min. Point, (32 Wis.
396) 368
Haven v. Asylum, (13 N. H. 532) 107
Haven v. Grand Junction E. K. Co.,
(109 Mass. 88) 190
Haven v. Lowell, (5 Met., 35) 99
Haverhill B. Groveland, (25 N. E. 976)
15
Havird, In re, (24 Pac. Rep. 542) 79
Hawe B. Plainfiold, (37 N. J. L. 145)
102
Hawes v. Fox Lake, (33 Wis. 438) 348
Hawk V. Bonn, (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R.
452) 897
Hawkhurst u. New York, (48 Hun,
588) 353
Hawkins ». Carroll Co., (50 Miss. 785)
186
Hawkins v. Com'rs, (14 Ind. 521) 373
Hawkins v. Hawke Co. Com'rs, (14
Ind. 521) 360
Hawkins v. Jonesboro, (68 Ga. 527)
15
Hawkins v. Kercheval, (10 Lea, 535)
83
Hawkins v. Rochester, (1 Wend. 54)
242
Hawkins v. Saunders, (45 Mich. 491)
300
Hawkins v. The Justices, (12 Lea,
351) 279
Hawks V. Charlemont, (107 Mass.
414) 838
Hawley v. Baltimore, (33 Md. 270)
221
Hawley v. Harrall, (19 Conn. 142)
250, 290
Hawley b. Sheldon, (24 Atl. R. 717)
354
Hawthorne v. East Portland, (13
Oreg. 271) 265
Hawthorn v. St. Louis, (11 Mo. 59)
80
Hay B. Alexandria etc. Co., (20 Fed.
Rep. 15) 169
Hayden v. Attleborough, (7 Gray,
338) 223, 346
Hayden v. Madison, (7 Me. 76) 170
Hayden v. Noyes, (5 Conn. 391) 95,
121
Hayes v. Appleton, (24 Wis. 544) 110
Hayes v. Cambridge, (136 Mass. 402)
344
Ixxx
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Haynes ». Cape May, (50 N". J. L. 55)
154
Hayes v. Hyde Park, (27 N. E. 522)
352
Hayes v. Mich. etc. Co., (Ill U. S.
228) 306
Hayes v. Oshkosh, (33 Wis. 314) 335
Hayes v. Taylor, 52 N. W. R. llti) 311
Hayes v. West Bay City, (51 N. W.
R. 1067) 347
Hayes v. White, (66 Me. 305) 373
Hayf ord v. Belfast, (69 Me. 63) 326
Haynes, In re, (22 Alt. R. 923) 29
Haynes v. Burlington, (38 Vt. 350)
238
Haynes v. Cape May, (50 N. J. L. 55)
158
Haynes ». Cape May, (52 N. J. L. 180)
110
Haynes v. Covington, (21 Miss. 408)
169
Haynes v. Duluth, (47 Minn. 458)
246
Haynes ». State, (3 Humph. 480) 79
Haynes v. Thomas, (7 Ind. 38) 217,
311
Hays V. State, (8 Ind. 425) 215
Hays V. Pac. Mail St. Co., (17 How.
596) 272
Hays V. Risher, (32 Pa. St. 169) 233
Hayward v. Davidson, (41 Ind. 214)
207
Hayvrard v. Mayor, (8 Barb. 492) 318
Hayward v. Sch. Dis. No. 13, (2 Gush.
419) 170
Haywood v. Bleecker, (11 Johns. 432)
78
Haywood ». Mayor, (12 Ga. 404) 146,
150
Hayzlett v. Mt. Vernon, (33 Iowa,
229) 270
Hazen v. Strong, (2 Vt. 427) 118
Hazleliurst v. Freeman, (52 Ga. 245)
303
Hazzard ii. Heacock, (39 Ind. 172)
282
Heacock v. Sherman, (14 Wend. 58)
313, 315
Head v. Ins. Co., (2 Cranch, 127) 165
Healey v. New Haven, (49 Conn. 394)
331
Health Dept. v. Knoll, (70 N. Y.
530) 118
Health Dept. v. Purdon, (99 N. Y.
237) 120
Health Dept. v. Van Cott, (51 N. T.
413) 87
Healy v. New York, (3 Hun, 708)
352
Hearsey v. Pruyn, (7 Johnson, 179)
320
Heath, In re, (3 Hill, 42) 105, 381
Heatli 1). Des Moines etc. Co., 61 la.
11) 302
Hebard v. Ashland Co., (55 Wis. 145)
189 a
Heblich v. Judge, (10 S. W. R. 465)
362
Hebron R'd v. Harvey, (90 Ind. 192,
46 Am. Rep. 199) 294
Hecker v. Mayor, (18 Abb. Pr. 369)
92
Hecker v. N. Y. Balance Dock Co.,
(24 Barb. 215) 133
Heckerman v. Hummell, (19 Pa. St.
64) 300
Hecock V. Van Dusen, (45 W. W. R.
343) 266
Hedges v. Dam., (72 Col. 520) 91
Hedges b. Dixon Co., (37 Fed. Rep.
304) 189 a
Hedges v. Madison, (6 111. 306) 315,
325
Hedley v. Franklin Co., (4 Blackf.
116) 86
Heegel b. Wichita, (19 Kan. 562) 353
Heeney v. Sprague, (11 R. I. 456) 147,
324, 346, 348
Hegan v. Eighth Av. etc. Co., 15 N.
Y. 380) 321
Heft V. Payne, (31 Pac. 874) 282
Heidelberg v. Horst, (62 Pa. St. 301)
167
Heigel v. Wichita, (19 S. W. R. 562)
315
Heilbrou, Ex parte, (65 Cal. 609) 118
Heine v. Levee Com'rs, (19 Wall. 660)
194 a, 256
Heiple v. East Portland, (13 Oreg. 97)
286, 288
Heirs of Hollimau v. Peebles, (1 Tex.
673) 66
Heise v. Town Council, (6 Rich. 404)
154, 155
Heise v. Columbia, (6 Rich. 404) 155
Heiser v. New York, (104 N. Y. 68)
330
Heiskill v. Baltimore, (65 Md. 125) 90
Heitz B. St. Louis, (19 S. W. 735) 215,
221
Heizer b. Yohn, (37 Ind. 415) 57
Helana b. Lowell, (3 Allen, 407) 147,
152
Helena v. Thompson, (29 Ark. 569)
328, 354
Hellen v. Noe, (3 Ired. 493) 120, 155
Heller v. Alvarado, (20 S. W. R. 1003)
159
Heller b. Stremmel, (52 Mo. 309) 74
Heller b. Mayor, (53 Mo. 159) 92
Heman v. Payne, (27 Mo. App. 481)
294
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
Ixxxi
References are to Sections.
Hammer v. Hustace, (51 Hun, 457)
111
Hemphill v. Boston, (8 Cush. 105) 223
Hempstead v. Howard, (51 Ark. 344)
59
Henbaok c. State, (53 Ala. 523, 25
Am. Rep. 650) 123
Hendee v. Pinkerton, (14 Allen, 381)
51
Hendersliatt o. Ottumwa, (46 Iowa,
658) 329
Henderson v. Baltimore, (8 Md. 352)
256, 265, 278
Henderson v. Central etc. Co., (20
Am. & Eng. Ey. Cas. 542^ 302
Henderson v. Covington, (14 Bush,
312) 324
Henderson v. Davis, (106 N. C. 88)
29, 65
Henderson v. Lambert, (8 Bush, 607)
56, 276
Henderson v. Minneapolis, (32 Minn.
219) 354 a
Henderson v. Marietta, (64 Ga. 286)
165
Henderson v. McCullough, (12 S. W.
E. 932) 270
Hendersonville v. McMinn, (82 N. C.
532) 158
Hendrick's App., (103 Pa. St. 358)
330
Henkel v. Detroit, (40 Mich. 249) 120,
286, 327
Henks u. Minneapolis, (42 Minn. 530)
344
Henley v. Lyme Eegis, (5 Bing. 91, 3
Mo. & P. 298, 3 B. & Ad. 77, 2 CI.
& Ein. 331, 8 Bligh N. R. 690, 1
Bing. X C. 222, 1 Scott, 29) 336 a
Hennel v. Board, (132 Ind. 32, 31 N.
E. R. 462) 326
Hennepin County Com'rs v. Dayton,
(17 Minn. 260) 226
Henner, In re, (13 Pet. 230) 85
Hennessy v. New Bedford, (26 N. E.
R. 999) 328
Hennessy v. St. Paul, (37 Fed. Rep.
565) 120, 131
Hennepin Co. v. Bartelson, (34 N.
W. R. 222) 289
Hennepin Co. v. Jones, (18 Minn.
199) 79
Hennington v. Lansingburgh, (36
Hun, 598) 92
Hensoldt v. Petersburgh, (63111. Ill)
150
Henry v. Chester, (15 Vt. 460) 256
Henry «. Dubuque & Pacific R. R.
Co., (2 Iowa, 288) 238
Henry v. Dubuque & Pac. R. E. Co.,
(10 Iowa, 540) 249
vi
Henry v. Pittsburgh etc., Co., (8
Watts & S. 85) 329
Henry v. Thomas, (119 Mass. 583) 278
Henry v. Underwood, (1 Dana, 247)
232
Henshaw v. Hunting, (1 Gray, 203)
225 310 312
Hentz V. L. I. etc. Co., (13 Barb. 646)
306
Hercules Sr. W. v. Elgin etc. Co., (30
N. E. R. 1050) 246
Herd v. Cist, (12 S. W. R. 466) 72
Hering v. Scott, (107 111. 600) 309
Heriots Hospital Feoffees v. Ross,
(12 Clark & P. 507) 332
Heme v. Gaston, (2 E. & E. 66) 104
Herring v. District, (3 Mackey, 572)
329, 355
Hei-rington v. Lansingburgh, (110
N. T. 545) 347
Herschberger o. Pittsburgh, (115 Pa.
St. 78) 283
Hersev ». Milw. Co. Sup., (16 Wis.
185)" 270, 397
HershofE v. Beverly, (43 N. J. L. 139)
102
Herzo v. San Francisco, (33 Cal. 140)
164
Heselton v. Harmon, (14 Atl. R. 286)
221
Hesketh v. Braddock, (3 Burr. 1858)
101, 156
Hess V. Baltimore etc. Co., (52 Md.
242, 36 Am. Rep. 371) 304
Hetheringtoni). Sterry, (28 Kan. 429)
86
Hewes v. Rice, (40 Cal. 255) 265, 279,
326
Hewison v. New Haven, (37 Conn.
475) 324, 345, 349
Hewitt's Appeal, (88 Pa. St. 55) 55,
56, 259
Hewitt V. Judge, (34 N. W. E. 248)
399
Hey V. Philadelphia, (81 Pa. St. 44)
342, 343
Heyleman, Ex parte, (92 Cal. 492)
288
Heyneman o. Blake, (19 Cal. 579)
245
Heyward v. Mayor, (7 N. Y. 324) 200,
202, 244
Heywood v. Buffalo, (14 N. Y. 534)
297 391
Hubbard v. People, (4 Mich. 126) 122
Hickerson v. Mexico, (58 Mo. 61) 219
Hicklin v. McLear, (18 Or. 126) 221
Hickman's Case, (4 Harr. 580) 234 a
Hickman v. O'Neill, (10 Cal. 294) 102
Hickok 0. Hine, (23 Ohio St. 523)
314
Ixxxii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Hiokoki). Plattsburgh, (15 Barb. 421)
92 328
Hiokok V. Shelburne, (4 Vt. 409) 107
Hickock V. Trustee, (16 N. T. 161)
325
Hickoxc. Cleveland, (8 Ohio, 543)
329
Hicks V. Dorn, (42 N". T. 41) 329
Hielscher i'. Minneapolis, (49 N. W.
E. 287) 311 .
Hiestand v. ]Sr. O., (14 La. An. 330)
79, 110
Higbee v. Camden etc. Co., (20 N. J.
Eq. 435) 396
Higert v. Greencastle, (43 Ind. 574)
344, 346
Higgins V. Cliicago, (18 111. 276) 242,
377
Higgins 15. Princeton, (4 Halst. Ch.
309, 320) 129
Higginson v. Nahant, (11 Allen, 530)
235
Highgate v. State, (7 Atl. K 898) 270
Highland Turnpike v. McKean, (11
Johns. 154) 31
Hight V. Monroe Co., (68 Ind. 576) 163
Hightower v. Slaton, (54 Ga. 108) 80
Higley ». Bunce, (10 Conn. 567) 148
Hilbish ». Catherman, (64 Pa. St. 154)
138, 139
Hildreth v. Lowell, (11 Gray, 560) 92,
234, 279, 338
Hildreth's Heirs v. Mclntire, (1 J. J.
Marsh, 206) 96
Hill V. Boston, (122 Mass. 344) 324,
336 a, 344
Hill V. Boylan, (40 Miss. 618) 67
Hill V. Charlotte, (72 N. C. 55) 328,
331
Hill V. Dalton, (72 Ga. 314) 102
Hill V. Decatur, (22 Ga. 203) 123, 125,
153
Hill V. Kahoka, (35 Fed. Eep. 321) 31
39
Hill V. Higdon, (5 Ohio St. 243) 259 a
Hill ». La Crosse E. E. Co., (11 Wis.
214) 273
Hill u. Laurens Co., (13 S. E. R. 318)
325
Hill V. Lexington, (18 Mo. 401) 119
Hill V. Mayor, (72 Ga. 314) 104
■ Hill V. Peekskill, (101 N. Y. 490) 197
Hill ,;. Supervisors, (12 N. Y. 52) 315
Hill V. Soott, (32 Fed. Eep. 716) 369
Hill V. St. Louis, (59 Mo. 412) 329
Hill V. Warrell, (49 N. W. E. 479, 87
Mich. 135) 272
Hill B. Worcester, (4 Gray, 414) 377
Hillegas v. Hilley, (5 Pa. St. 97) 120
Billiard v. Eichardson, (3 Gray, 349)
Hillsboro v. Ivey, (20 S. W. E. 1012,
1 Tex. Civ. App. 653) 324, 327, 336 a
Hilsdorf v. St. Louis, (45 Mo. 94) 338 a
Hilsorp V. St. Louis, (45 Mo. 94) 92
Himmelman v. Byrne, (41 Cal. 500)
281
Himmelman B. Cahn, (49 Cal. 285) 172
Himmelman v. Cofran, (36 Cal. 411)
280
Himmelman v. Danos, (35 Cal. 441)
265
Himmelman v. Oliver, (34 Cal. 246)
265
Himmelman v. Spanagel, (39 Cal.
389) 281
Hinchman v. Detroit, (9 Mich. 103)
308
Hinchman v. Paterson etc. Co., (17
N. J. Eq. 75) 302, 303, 304
Hinckley v. Penobscot, (42 Me. 89) 352
Hinckley t/. Somerset, (145 Mass. 326)
342
Hinckley v. IJnion Pac. E. E., (129
Mass. 52) 191
Hincks v. Milwaukee, (46 Wis. 569)
347
Hindman's Appeal, (85 Pa. St. 406) 66
Hine v. Keokuk, (42 Iowa, 636) 302,
306
Hine v. New Haven, (40 Conn. 478)
130
Hiner v. Fond du Lac, (71 Wis. 74) 339,
3506
Hiues V. Charlotte, (12 Mich. 278) 331
Hines v. Leavenworth, (3 Kan. 186)
259 a
Hines v. Lockwood, (41 How. Pr.
435) 291
Hinze v. People, (92 111. 406) 78
Hirsh V. State, (21 N. Y. 785) 123
Hitchcock V. Galveston, (96 U. S.
341) 164, 169, 263, 278
Hitchins v. Frostburg, (68 Md. 100)
349, 355
Hite V. Goodman, (1 D. & B. Eq. 364)
169
Hittinger v. Boston, (139 Mass. 17)
272
Hitz, Ex parte, (111 U. S. 766) 398
Hixon V. Lowell, (13 Gray, 59) 339,
340, 345
Hixon V. Oneida Co., (52 N. W. E.
445) 188
Hoadley's Admrs. v. San Francisco,
(124 U. S. 639) 208
Hoag V. Durfey, (1 Aiken, 286) 106
Hoag V. Greenwich, (133 N. Y. 152)
192
Hoag V. Lake Shore & Mich. S. E.
Co., (85 Pa. St. 293) 351
Hoag 1). Lamont, (60 N. Y. 96) 104
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Ixxxiii
Hoagland v. Culvert, (20 N. J. L. 387)
73
Hoagland v. Delaware, (17 1^. J. Eq.
107) 397
Hoagland v. Sacramento, (52 Cal.
142) 16
Hoard b. Des Moines, (62 Iowa, 326)
354 a
Hobnrt v. Detroit, (7 Mich. 246) 172,
397
Hobart v. Supervisors, (17 Cal. 23) 24
Hobbs V. Lowell, (19 Pick. 415) 223
Hoboken v. Gear, (3 Dutch. 265) 148
Hoboken d. Penn. K. K. Co., (124 U.
S. 656) 132, 225
Hoboken Land & Imp. Co. ». Hobo-
ken, (36 N. J. Law, 540) 194, 225,
308
Hobson V. Monteith, (15 Oreg. 251)
221, 224
Hobson V. Philadelphia, (155 Pa. St.
131) 300
Hodge's Appeal, (84 Pa. St. 359) 190
Hodges V. Baltimore etc. Co., (58
Md. 603) 302
Hodges V. Buffalo, (2 Denio, 110) 110,
139, 141, 169, 338
Hodges !). Runyon, (30 Mo. 491) 167
Hodges B. Schuler, (22 N. T. 114) 179
Hodgmau v. Chicago etc. Co., (23
Minn. 153) 185, 186, 395
Hodgraan b. St. Paul etc. Co., (20
Minn. 48) 185
Hodgson B. De Beauchesne, (12
Moore, P. C. 285) 66
Hodgson B. Dexter, (1 Cranch, 345)
80
Hoeft B. Seaman, (46 How. Pr. 24)
132
Hoelil v. Muscatine, ( 57 Iowa, 444)
354
Hoey B. Gilroy, (129 N. Y. 132) 300,
327
Hoffman b. Jersey City, (34 IN. J. L.
172) 127
Hoffman ». Van Nostrand, (42 Barb.
174) 43, 49
Hofman b. Jer. City, (34 ]Sr. J. L. 172)
75
Hogan B. Ingle, (2 Cranch, 355) 284
Hogg B. Zanesville, (5 Ohio, 410\eU
Hohman b. Chicago, (29]Sr. E. R. 671)
329 •
Hoke V. Field, (10 Bush, 144) 76
Hoke B. Henderson, (4 Dev. 1) 67, 86
Hoke B. Perdue, (62 Cal. 545) 397
Holberg b. Macon, (55 Miss. 112) 398
Holbrook u. Dickinson, (46 111. 285)
282
Holdane b. Cold Springs Trs., (21 N.
Y. 474) 222
Holdswarth b. Dartmouth, (11 A. &
E. 490) 115
HoUaday o. Marsh, (3 Wend. 142) 153
Holland b. Baltimore, (11 Md. 186)
33, 278, 397
Holland b. Bartch, (22 N. E. E. 83)
321
Holland b. San Francisco, (7 Cal. 361)
13
Hollenbeck b. Marshalltown, (62 la.
21) 104
Hollenbeck v. Winnebago Co., (9 III.
148) 325
HoUiday b. People, (10 111. 216) 8, 12
Holliday b. St. Leonardo Par., (11 C.
B. 192) 355
Hollingsworth ». City of Detroit, (3
McLean, 472) 192 6
Hollingsworths b. Com'rs, ( 54 N. W.
R. 70) 325
Hollingsworth b. Tensas, ( 17 Fed.
Rep. 109) 116, 247
Hollister v. Sherman, (63 Cal. 38)
397
HoUoway v. Delano, (28 A. N. C. 190)
224
Holloway b. Southmayd, (18 N. Y. S.
707) 224
Hollo well Bank v. Hamlin, (14 Mass.
178) 107
HoUwedel, Ex parte, (74 Mo. 395) 104
Holton B. State, (28 Pla. 303) 29
Holtzhauser b. Newport, (22 S. W. R.
752) 267
Holmes v. Fihlenburg, (54 111. 203)
102
Holmes v. Jersey City, (12 N. J. Eq.
299) 223, 248, 259 a
Holmes b. Wilson, (10 A. & E. 503)
120
Holmquist, Ex parte, (27 Pao. R.
1099) 150
Holyoke b. Grand Trunk etc. Co., (48
N.H. 541) 352 a
Homan b. Stanley, (66 Pa. St. 464)
348
Home Ins. Co. v. Council, (93 TJ. S.
116) 12
Homer b. Blackburn, (27 La. An. 544)
134
Homersham b. Woly etc., (4 Eng.
Law & Eq. 426) 165
Hon. B. State, (89 Ind. 249) 288
Honea b. Monroe, (63 Miss. 171) 364
Hood's Estate, (21 Pa. St. 106) 66
Hood V. Lynn, (1 Allen, 103) 139
Hooker v. New Haven, (14 Conn. 146)
239 292
Hool B. U. S., (1 Cranch, 98) 92
Hoole B. Attorney General, (22 Al-u
190) 190, 218, 220
Ixxxiv
TABLE OF CASES CI'I'ED.
References are to Sections.
Hooper v. Bridgewater, (102 Mass.
512) 234
Hooper v. Ely, (46 Mo. 505) 395
Hooper v. Goodwin, (48 Me. 79) 88
Hope M. Co., In re, (1 Sawy. 710) 283
Hope B. Barnett, (78 Gal. 9) 220
Hope V. Deaderick, (8 Humpli. 1) 255
Hopeston v. Eads, (32 111. App. 75)
326 a
Hopkins v. MahofEy, (11 Serg. &
Rawle, 126) 167
Hopkins v. Mason, (61 Barb. 469^ 279
Hopkins v. Mayor of Swansea, (4 M.
& W. 621) 145, 152
Hopkins v. Whitesides, (1 Head, 31)
42
Hoppikus V. Com'rs, (16 Cal. 249)
189 a
Horrasel ». Smyth, (7 C. B. 729) 348
Horn V. Atl. etc. Co., (35 N. H. 169)
302
Horn V. Baltimore, (30 Md. 218) 169
Horn V. People, (26 Mich. 224) 133
Hornbeck v. Westbrook, (9 Johns.
73) 204
Hornblower v. Duden, (35 Cal. 664)
176
Horner v. Coffey, (25 Miss. 434) 212
Horner ». Coffey, (25 Miss. 434) 375
Horney v. Sloan, (1 Smith, 136) 152
Horton v. Grand Haven, (24 Mich.
465) 245
Horton v. Ipswich, (12 Gush. 488)
344, 352
Horton V. Mayor, (4 Lea, 39, 40 Am.
Reps. 1) 294
Horton v. Mobile School Cora'rs, (43
Ala. 596) 28
Horton v. Nashville, (4 Lea, 47) 328,
355
Horton v. Newell, (23 Atl. R. 610) 92
Horton o. Thompson, (71 N. Y. 513)
170
Horton v. Watson, (23 Kan. 229) 75
Hotchin v. Kent, (8 Mich. 526) 170
Hot Springs etc. Co. v. Williamson,
(45 Ark. 429) 330
Houfe V. Fulton, (29 Wis. 296) 342,
343
Houfe V. Town, (34 Wis. 608) 313
Hough V. Cook County Land Co., (73
111. 23) 207
Houghton V. People, (55 N. Y. 398)
190 a
House V. Greensburg, (93 Ind. 533)
30, 31, 53, 309
House V. Montgomery Co., (60 Ind.
580) 353
House Bill, In re, (21 Pac. R. 484, 12
Colo. 289) 8, 32
House Bill, In re, (48 N. W. 275) 26
Householder v. Kansas City, (83 Mo.
488) 330
Houseman ». Com., (100 Pa. St. 222)
67, 83
Houston, In re, (47 Fed. 539) 258
Houston B. Clay Co., (18 Ind. 396) 169
Houston B. H. B. & M. Ry. Co., (19
S. W. Rep. 786) 306 a
Houston B. Houston City Ry. Co.,
(19 S. W. R. 127) 302
Houston B. Izaaks, (68 Tex. 116) 347,
3506
Houston 0. Ry. Co., (19 S. W. R. 127)
14
Houston etc. Co. v. Odam, (53 Tex.
343) 303
Hove V. Alexandria, (1 Cranch, 98)
329
HoveldeuB. Kansas, etc. Co., (79 Mo.
632) 302, 303
Hover ». Barkhoof, (44 N. Y. 113)
325
Hovey b. Mayo, (43 Me. 322) 292, 336
Howard's Case, (Hutt. 87) 37
Howard v. Bridgewater, (16 Pick.
189) 400
Howard b. Chiu-ch, (18 Md. 451) 248
259 a
Howard u. Ingersoll, (13 How. 427
354
Howard b. Lee, (3 Sandf. Ch. 281)
120
Howard b. Pritchett, (85 Ind. 68) 353
Howard v. Providence, (6 R. I. 514)
245
Howard b. Rogers, (4 Harr. & J. 278)
221
Howard b. Shields, (16 Ohio St. 184)
65
Howard v. Shoemaker, (35 Ind. Ill)
86, 102
Howard b. Shaw, (126 HI. 53) 279
Howard v. Worcester, (27 N. E. R. 11)
328
Howard S. Ins. b. Newark, (18 Atl.
R. 672) 280
Howe, In re, (1 Paige 214) 204
Howell B. Bristol, (8 Bush, 493) 248,
259 a
Howe B. Boston, (7 Gush. 273) 326
Hoyyell b. Buffalo, (15 N. Y. 512) 72,
259, 326
Hd^e 0. Com'rs, (47 Pa. St. 361) 316
Howe B. Crawford, (47 Pa. St. 361)
362, 363
Howe B. Freeman, (14 Gray, 566) 273
Howe B. Keeler, (27 Conn. 538) 17 c
Howe B. Lowell, (101 Mass. 99) 350 a
351
Howe B. New Orleans, (12 La. An,
481) 327 a, 331, 345, 348
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
Ixxxv
Howe V. Norris, (12 Allen, 82) 127
Howe V. Plainfield, (37 N. J. L. 145)
24, 104, 117
Howe u. Plainfield, (41 N. H. 135)
350 a
Howell V. City of Tacoraa, (3 Wash.
St. 711) 278
Howell V. Peoria, (90 111. 104) 395
Howell V. Phila., (38 Pa. St. 471) 282
Atl. K. 862) 375
Hower's App., (127 Pa. St. 134; 17
Howland v. Luce, (16 Johns. 135) 86
Howland v. Maynard, (34 N. E. E.
515) 338
Howland v. Maynard, (34 N. E. K.
595) 324
Hoyle V. New Orleans, etc. Co., (23
La. An. 535) 302
Hoyle V. P. & M. K. K., (54 N. T.
314) 273
Hoyt V. East Saginaw, (19 Mich. 39)
148, 259 a, 277
Hoyt V. Hudson, (27 Wis. 656) 354,
354 a
Hoyt V. Thompson, (19 N. T. 207,
218) 170
Hubbard v. Concord, (35 X H. 52)
342, 346, 350 a
Hubbard ». Lyndon, (28 Wis. 674)
177, 190 a
Hubbard b. Mason City, (60 Iowa,
400) 352
Hubbard u. Medford, (25 Pac. Kep.
640) 130
Hubbard i>. Preston, (51 N. W. Kep.
209) 129
Hubbard v. Windsor, (15 Mich. 146)
95
Hubbell V. Viroqua, (67 Wis. 343)
327 328
Hubbell V. Yonkers, (104 N. Y. 434)
328, 336 a, 343
Huber v. Baugh, (43 Iowa, 514) 155
Ruber v. Gazley, (18 Ohio, 18) 221
Hubert v. People, (49 N. Y. 132) 28
Huddleson v. Kuffin, (6 Ohio St. 604)
75, 155
Huddleston v. West Belleview, (111
Pa. St. 110) 355
Hudler v. Golden, (36 N. Y. 447) 283
Hud man v. Slaughter, (70 Ala. 546)
363
Hudson V. Bridgeport, (25 Conn. 426)
241
Hudson c. Geary, (4R L 485) 134
Hudson V. Denver, (20 Pac. R. 329,
12 Colo. 157) 83
Hudson B.Thorne, (7 Paige, 261) 120,
158.
Hudson V. Vareis, (34 N. W. E. 503)
396
Hudson V. Winslow, (35 N. J. L. 437)
196
Hudson T. Co. v. Jersey City, (49 N.
J. L. 303) 297
Hudson etc. Co. v. Seymour, (35 N. J.
L. 47) 18
Hudson Co. v. State, (24 N. J. L. 718)
24
Hudson E. T. Co. v. Watervliet T. &
E. Co., (61 Hun, 140) 306 a
Huesing v. Eock Island, (128 111. 465)
118, 127
Huff v. Cook, (44 Iowa, 639) 69
Huff V. Lafayette, (108 Ind. 14) 61
Huffman b. Greenwood, (23 Kan.
281) 79
Huffman v. San Joaquin Co., (21 Cal.
426) 315
Hugg V. Camden, (20 N. J. Eq. 6)
176
Hughes V. Beggs, (16 N. E. Rep. 817)
309
Hughes V. Court, (42 N. W. R. 984,
75 Mich. 574) 84
Hughes V. Milligan, (22 Pac. E. 313)
26
Hughes V. Orange Co. Assn., 56 Hun,
396) 348
Hughes B. Worcester, (2 E. I. 493)
301
Hulbert ». Mason, (29 Ohio St. 562)
61
Huletti). Hulett, (37 Vt. 518) 66
HullB. County, (12 Iowa, 142) 177
Hull B. Kansas City, (54 Mo. 601) 342
Hull B. Sup'rs, (19 Johns. 259) 362,
363
Hullman b. Honcomp, (5 Ohio St. 237)
361 379
Humboldt b. Long, (92 V. S. 642) 183,
196
Humboldt Co. b. Dinsmore, (75 Cal.
604) 279
Hume B. Mayor, (74 N. Y. 264) 300,
345
Hume ». New York, (47 N. Y. 639)
350 a
Humes b. Knoxville, (1 Humph. 403)
292 329
HummelFs Case, (9 Watts, 416) 67
Hummer b. Hummer, (3 Greene, 42)
105, 381
Hummill b. Boston, (106 Mass. 350)
397
Humphrey, In re, ( 10 Wend. 612) 99
Humphrey b. Baltimore, (47 Md. 145)
242
Humphreys B. County, (56 Pa. St.
204) 352
Humphreys Co. b. McAdoo, (7 Heisk,
585) 194 a
Ixxxvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Hunkerline's App., (70 Pa. St. 102)
396
Hunneman v. Fire Dis., (37 Vt. 40)
130
Hunnecutt v. State, (12 S. W. E. 106)
361
Hunt V. Armbruster, (17 N. J. Eq.
208) 131
Hunt V. Booneville, (65 Mo. 620) 92,
338, 352 a
Hunt V. Chicago, (98 HI. 147) 221
Hunt V. Hamilton, (25 Kan. 82) 67
Hunt V. Lambertville, (45 K J. L.
279) 145
Hunt«. Mayor, (109 N. T. 134) 342
Hunt V. New York, (109 N. Y. 134)
331a
Hunt V. Pownal, (9 Vt. 411) 342, 351
Hunt I). Kousmaniere, (1 Pet. 15) 327
Hunt V. School District, (14 Vt. 300)
95
Hunt V. Utica, (18 N. Y. 442) 241
Hunt V. Wimbledon Loc. Board, (4
Ont. Kep. C. P. D. 48) 165
Hunter v. Chandler, (45 Mo. 452) 79,
85
Hunter v. Cobb, (1 Bush, 239) 258
Hunter v. Farren, (127 Mass. 381) 120
Hunter v. Newport, (5 E. I. 325) 232
Hunter v. Sandy Hill Trs., (6 Hill,
407) 217
Hunter v. Windsor, (24 Vt. 327) 338 a
Huntington v. Boyle, (9 Ind. 296) 164
Huntington v. Cheesbro, (57 Ind. 74)
123
Huntington v. Union Pac. Ey. Co.,
(2 Sawy. 503) 397
Huntley 1). Luscombe, (2 B. & P. 530)
104
Hurford v. Omaha, (4 Neb. 336) 110,
Hurden v. Stein, (27 Ala. 104) 234
Hurla B. Kansas City, (27 Pac. 143,
46 Kan. 738) 56, 276
Hurlbut V. Litchfield, (1 Eoot, 520)
333
Hurley v. Miss. & Eum Eiver B. Co.,
(34 Minn. 143) 215, 221
Huron v. McCall, (46 Micb. 565) 110
Huron D. C. v. London D. C, (Up.
Can. Q. B. 302) 143
Huss, In re, (27 N. E. E. 784) 203
Hussen v. Eochester, (65 N. Y. 516)
248
Hussey u. Smith, (99 U. S. 24) 88
Hussner v. B'klyn etc. Co., (114 N.
Y. 433) 306
Hatchings v. Scott, (4 Halst. 218)
102, 104
Hutchins ». Priestly, (61 Mich. 252)
352
Hutchinson v. Pratt, (11 Vt. 402, 423)
226
Hutchinson v. Pratt, (11 Vermont
402)106
Hutchinson v. Priestly, (25 Va. 226)
330
Huthsing v. Bosuquet, (3 McCrary,
152) 140
Hutson V. New York, (9 N. Y. 163)
328 345
Hutten V. Camden, (39 N. J. L. 122)
118
Hutton B. Windsor, (34 Up. Can. Q.
B. 487) 352
Hurn, Ex parte, (9 So. E. 615) 360
Hyatt V. Bates, (35 Barb. 308) 891
Hyatt V. Eondout, (44 Barb. 385) 327,
353
Hyde v. Franklin, (27 Vt. 185) 177,
179,190 a
Hyde v. Jamaica, (27 Vt. 443) 223,
340
Hyde v. State, (52 Miss. 655) 81
Hydes v. Joyce, (4 Bush, 464) 113,
263
Hyde Park v. Borden, (94 111. 26) 256
Hyde Park v. Carton, (132 lU. 100)
279
Hyde Park v. Chicago, (124 HI. 156)
391
Hyde Park v. Com'th, (12 N. E. K.
238) 162
Hymes v. Aydelott, (26 Ind. 431) 176,
245
Idaho Springs v. Woodward, (10 Col.
104) 338
Illinois V. Hlinois Central E. E. Co.,
(33 Fed. Eep. 730) 132, 225
111. & Mich. Canal Trs. v. Chicago,
(12 111. 403) 240
111. & Mich. Canal Trs. v. Havens, (11
111. 554) 217
Illinois Cen. E. E. Co. v. Com'rs of
East Lake Fork Drainage Dist., (21
N. E. E. 925) 259 a
Illinois Cen. E. E. Co. v. Hutchinson,
(47 111. 408) 352
Illinois Cen. E. E. Co. v. Miller, (10
So. E. 61, 68 Miss. 760) 354 a
Illinois etc. Co. v. Chicago, (28 N. E.
E. 740) 249
111. etc. E. & C. Co. V. St. Louis etc.
Co., (2 Dill. 70) 113, 133
Illinois Ins. Co. v. Littlefield, 67)
111. 368) 217, 219, 223
Imlay v. Union Branch E. R. Co., (26
Conn. 249) 238, 302
Inchbold v. Eobinson, (L. R. 4 Ch.
App. 388) 120
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Ixxxvii
Betcrences are to Sections.
Independence v. Moore, (32 Mo. 392)
117
Indiana v. Woram, (6 Hill, 33) 5
Indiana Central Ry. Co. v. Oakes, (20
Ind. 9) 243
Indianapolis v. Cook, (99 Ind. 10) 342
Indianapolis ». Cross, (7 Ind. 9) 217,
219, 288
Indianapolis v. Emraelman, (108 Ind.
530) 340
Indianapolis v. Gas Co., (66 Ind. 39G)
32, 110, 169, 295
Indianapolis v. Hartley, (67 111. 439)
311
Indianapolis v. Home, (59 Ind. 215) 12
Indianapolis v. Huegle, (18 N. E. R.
172) 117
Indianapolis v. Imberry, (17 Ind. 175)
230, 265, 286
Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, (101 Ind.
200) 224
Indianapolis v. Lawyer, (38 Ind. 348)
263, 354
Indianapolis v. McClure, (2 Ind. 147)
319, 353
Indianapolis v. Murphy, (91 Ind. 382)
287
Indianapolis v. Patterson, (14 !N'. E.
R. 551) 56
Indianapolis v. Scott, (72 Ind. 196)
345, 3506
Indianapolis c. State, (37 Ind. 489)
819
Indianapolis v. Sturm, (39 Ind. 159) 61
Indianapolis v. Vajen, (111 Ind. 240,
12 N. E. R. 311) .326
Indianapolis v. Wasson, (74 Ind. 133)
87
Indianapolis & B. R. R. Co. v. In-
dianapolis, (12 Ind. 620) 219, 229
Indianapolis etc. Co. v. Calvert, (110
Ind. 535) 396
Ind. etc. Co. v. Kercheval, (16 Ind.
84) 302
Ind. etc. Co. v. Lawrenceburg, (34
Ind. 304) 303, 306
Indianapolis etc. v. Ross, (47 Ind. 23)
312
Indianapolis etc. v. State, (37 Ind^
489) 308
Ind. Central R. R. Co. v. Hunter, (8
Ind. 74) 245
Indianapolis, P. & C. R. R. Co. v.
Ross, (47 Ind. 25) 270
Indianapolis R. R. Co. c. Smith, (52
Ind. 428) 305
Ind. R. R. Co. V. Connelly, (10 Ohio,
St. 165) 253
Indianola v. Jones, (29 Iowa, 282) 165
Industrial School v. Whitehead, (2
Beasley, N. J. 290) 32
Inge V. Police Jury, (14 La. An. 117)
234
Ingerson v. Berry, (14 Ohio, 315) 87,
371
Ingham Co. Sup., (20 Mich. 95) 308
Ingle V. Jones, (43 Iowa, 280) 30, 32
Inglis V. Railway Co., (16 Eng. Law
& Eq. 55) 106, 148
Ingraham v. Chicago etc. Co., (46
Iowa, 366) 303
Inhabitants of Hampshire v. Inhabi-
tants of Franklin, (16 Mass. 36) 59
Inhabitants v. String, (5 Halst. 323)
47
Inhabitants v. Weir, (9 Ind. 224) 169,
177
Inhabitants v. Wood, (13 Mass. 193)
25
Inhabitants of Upper Alio way's
Creek v. String, (10 N. J. L. 323) 49
Insane Asylum v. Higgins, (15 111. 185)
50
Insurance Co. o. Baltimore, (23 Md.
296) 363
Insurance Co. v. Sandars, (36 N. H.
352) 97
Insurance Co. v. Sortwell, (8 Allen,
217) 97
IntendantB. Chandler, (6 Ala. 899)
110
Inter. & G. N. Ry. ». State, (73 Tex.
356) 380
International Bk. v. Bradley, (19 N.
Y. 245) 102
International etc. Co. v. Halloran,
(53 Tex. 46) 353
Inter. Nat. Bk. v. Franklin, (65 Mo.
105) 180
Iowa City i'. Foster, (10 Iowa, 189) 79
Iowa Col. Trs. v. Davenport, (7 Iowa,
213) 249
Ireland v. Rochester, (51 Barb. 414)
171
Irish V. Webster, (5 Greenl. 171) 167
Iron R. R. Co. v. Ironton, (19 Ohio
St. 299) 133, 232
Ironton v. Kelley, (38 Ohio St. 50) 92,
347, 350 a
Irvin V. IST. O. St. L. & C. R. R. Co.,
(94 111. 112) 272
Irvine v. Wood, (51 N. T. 224) 298, "
348
Irving B. Devors, (65 Mo. 625) 148
Irving !). Ford, (32 N. W. R. 601) 327
Irwin, In re, (16 N". Y. S. 606, 62Hun,
619) 354
Irwin V. Bradford, (22 Up. Can. C. P.
421) 342
Irwin ». Dixion, (9 Hqw. 10) 218, 219
Irwin B. Great So. Telephone Co.
(37 La. An. 63) 297, 301
Ixxxviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
Irwin V. Mariposa, (22 U. C. C. P. 367)
115
Irwin V. Mobile, (57 Ala. 6) 259 a, 278
Isomu. Railroad Co., (3S Miss. 300)
245
Ison V. Manley, (76 Ga. 804) 120, 301
Ivihsou V. Hance, (1 Wyora. Ter. 270)
182
Ivory V. Deerpark, (116 N. Y. 476) 346
Ivy ». Lusk, (11 La. An. 486) 82
Jacks V. Helena, (41 Ark. 213) 185
Jackson v. Belleview, (30 Wis. 250)
342
Jackson v. Bowman, (39 Miss. 671)
169
Jackson v. Brush, (77 111. 59) 395
Jackson v. Cory, (8 Johns. 385) 205
Jackson v. Hartwell, (8 Johns. 422)
203, 204
Jackson v. Hathaway, (15 Johns. 447)
224, 298
Jackson v. Humphrey, (1 Johns. 498)
87
Jackson v. Hyde, (28 U. C. Q. B. 294)
337
Jackson ». Leroy, (5 Cow. 397) 206
Jackson v. Morris, (1 Denio, 199) 129
Jackson v. People, (9 Midi. Ill) 102,
105, 398
Jackson v. Pike, (9 Cow. 61) 203
Jackson v. Pratt, (10 Johns. 381) 52
Jackson v. Rutland etc. R. R. Co.,
(25 Vt. 150) 238
Jackson v. Vicksburg etc. R. R. M.
Co., (2 Woods C. C. 141) 192 6
Jackson v. Walsh, (23 Atl. R. 778) 8
Jackson v. T. & G. K. R. Co., (2 Am.
Law Reg. 585) 193
Jackson Co. v. Applewhite, (62 Ind.
464) 163
Jackson Co. Horse Ry. Co. v. Inter-
State Rapid Transit Co., (24 Fed.
Rep. 306) 144
Jackson County v. Hall, (55 HI. 444)
193 6
Jacksonport v. Watson, (33 Ark. 704)
395
Jacksonville v. Allen, (25 111. Ap. 54)
75,84
Jacksonville v. Mtna, F. Eng. Co., (20
Fla. 100) 130
Jacksonville v. Doan, (33 N. E. R.
878") 324
Jacksonville v. Drew, (19 Fla. 106)
347
Jacksonville ». Holland, (19 111. 271)
156
Jacksonville v. Jacks. Ry. Co., (67
111. 540) 215, 229
Jacksonville v. L'Engle, (20 Fla. 344)
55
Jacksonville o. Lambert, (62 HI. 519)
355
Jacksonville v. Ledwith, (7 So. R.
885) 256, 274
Jacksonville v. McConnel, (12 111.
138) 270
Jacksonville etc.^R. Co. v. Virden,
(104 111. 339) 189
Jacobs, In re, (98 N. T. 98) 121
Jacobs V. Bangor, (16 Me. 187) 352
Jacobs 1). Hamilton Co., (4 Fisher
Pat. Cas. 81) 3, 338
Jacquith v. Richardson, (8 Mete. 213)
321
Jager v. Adams, (123 Mass. 26) 348
James, Ex parte, (L. R. 9 Ch. 609)
327
James v. Darlington, (36 N. W. Rep.
835) 309
James v. Jefferson, (66 Tex. 578) 81
James ». Johnson, (6 Johns. Ch. 423)
190 a
James u. Pine Bluff, (49 Ark. 199; 4
S. W. Rep. 760) 289
James v. Portage City, (5 N. W. R.
31) 346
James u. San Francisco, (6 Cal. 528)
352
James Admr. v. Harrodsburg, (3 S.
W. R. 135) 327, 328
Jameson v. People, (16 111. 257) 31,
51
James River etc. v. Anderson, (12
Leigh, 276) 301, 306
Jamison b. Springfield, (53 Mo. 224)
243
Jane v. Alley, (64 Miss. 446) 87
Janesville v. Markoe, (18 Wis. 350)
144
Janey's Executors v. Latene, (4
Leigh, 327) 205
Jansen v. Atchison, (16 Kan. 358)
346, 348, 349
January v. Johnson Co., (3DiIl. C. C.
392) 192 b
Jarman v. Patterson, (7 Mon. 647)
155
Jarrolt v. Moberly, (103 U. S. 508)
188
Jarvis v. Dean, (3 Bing. 447) 217
Jarvis v. Mayor etc. of New York, (2
N. Y. Leg. Obs. 396) 85
Jay's Case, (1 Vent. 302) 84
Jeffers v. Jeffers, (107 N. Y. 650) 354
Jefferson v. Courtmire, (9 Mo. 693)
117
Jefferson v. McCarty, (74 Mo. 55)282
Jefferson v. Mt. Vernon, (33 N. E.
R. 1091) 255
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
Ixxxix
Jefferson b. St. Louis Co., (21 S. W.
R. 217) 316
Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, (1
Black, 436) 270
Jefferson Co. v. ArrigM, (51 Miss.
68) 365
Jefferson Co. v. City of Mt. Vernon,
(33 N. E. E. 1091) 282
Jef. Co. V. Cowan, (54 Mo. 234) 278
Jefferson Co. v. Slagle, (66 Pa. St.
202) 99
Jefferson Co. v. St. Louis Co., (21 S.
W. 217) 317
Jefferson City v. Opel, (49 Mo. 190)
270
Jefferson City G. L. Co. v. New Or-
leans, (41 La. An. 91) 58
Jeffersonville v. Ferryboat, (35 Ind.
19) 133
Jeffersonville v. Meyers, (2 Ind. App.
532) 330
Jeffersonville v. O' Conner, (37 Ind.
95) 310
Jeffersonville v. Patterson, (32 Ind.
140) 87 .
Jeffersonville v. The J. Shallcross,
(35 Ind. 19) 164
Jeffreys v. Gurr, (2 B. & Add. 841)
25
Jeffries v. Harington, (11 Colo. 191)
69
Jeffries v. Lawrence, (42 Iowa, 498)
186, 256
Jelliff V. Newark, (48 N. J. L. 101)
264
Jenkins v. Andover, (103 Mass. 94,
104) 188, 254, 392
Jenkins D. Cheyenne, (1 Wy. Ter. 287)
156
Jenkins v. Putnam, (12 N. E. E. 613)
111
Jenkins v. Thomasville, (35 Ga. 145)
102
Jenkins v. Wilm. & W. K. Co., (110
N. C. 438) 354 a
Jenksn. Lima Twp., (17 Ind. 326)
326 a
Jenks V. Williaras, (115 Mass. 217) 300
Jenney v. Brooklyn, (120 N. Y. 164)
328, 336 a
Jennings o. Tisbury, (5 Gray, 73) 223
Jennings v. Van Schaick, (108 N. Y.
530) 348
Jennings Co. Com'rs v. Verbarg, (63
Ind. 107) 173
Jensen v. Supervisors (47 Wis. 298)
15
Jerome v. Kio Grande, (18 Fed. E.
873) 375, 396
Jerome v. Eoss, (7 Johns. Ch. 315)
238
Jersey City v. Canal Co., (12 N. J.
Eq. 227) 397
Jersey City v. Dummer, (Spencer,
106) 225
Jersey City v. Hudson, (13 N. J. Eq.
420) 120
Jersey City v. Lembeck, (31 N. J. Eq.
255) 391
Jersey City v. Morris Canal & B. Co.,
(1 Beasley, 547) 225
Jersey City v. N. J. Cen. E. E., (40
N. J. Eq. 417, 2 Atl. Eep. 262) 301,
308
Jersey City». O'Callaghan, (41 N. J.
L. 349) 327
Jersey City ». E. E. Co., (20 N. J. Eq.
360) 2, 33
Jersey City v. Eiker, (38 N. J. L. 225)
326 a
Jersey City ». State, (1 Vroom, 521)
319
Jersey City ». State, (30 N. J. L. 521)
98, 223, 308
Jersey City etc. Co. v. J. C. Bergen «
etc. Co., (21 N. J. Eq. 550) 302
Jessen v. Sweigert, (66 Cal. 182) 348
Jett V. Eiohmond, (78 Ind. 316) 117
Jewett ». New Haven, (38 Conn. 368)
92
Jex V. New York, (103 N. Y. 536) 391
Jochem v. Eobinson, (66 Wis. 638)
348
John and Cherry Streets, In re, (19
Wend. 659) 308
Johnes v. State, (4 Ohio St. 493) 368
Johnson, In re, (73 Cal. 228) 122
Johnson v. Almeda County, (4 Cal.
106) 247
Johnson v. Americus, (46 Ga. 80) 103
Johnson v. Atlantic etc. E. E. Co., (35
N. H. 569) 238, 354
Johnson v. Barclay, (1 Harr. N. J. 1)
104
Johnson v. Canal St. Ey. Co., (27 La.
An. 53) 321
Johnson o. Chi. St. P. M. & Q. Ey.
Co., (50 N. W. 771) 354a
Johnson v. City of Parkersburg, (16
W. Va. 402) 239
Johnson v. County of Stark, (24 111.
75) 191, 1916, 192 6
Johnson v. District, (118 U. S. 19)
328, 355
Johnson v. Drummond, (20 Graft.
419) 272
Johnson v. Duer, (21 S. W. E. 800)
259 a.
Johnson v. Enfield, (42 N. H. 197)
342
Johnson v. Freeport, etc. Co., (Ill
111. 413) 232
xc
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Johnson v. Hud. R. E. Co., (6 Duer,
634) 352 a
Johnson v. Indianapolis, (16 Ind. 227)
47
Johnson b. Irasburgh, (47 Vt. 28) 352
Johnson v. Joliet & C. R. E. Co., (23
111. 202) 241
Johnson v. Lexington, (14 B. Men.
648) 261
Johnson v. Milwaukee, (40 Wis. 315)
2.59 a
Johnson ». Milwaukee, (46 Wis. 568)
346,3.50 6
Johnson v. Oregon City, (2 Oreg.
327) 275
Johnson ». Parkersburgh, (16 W. Va.
402) 330
Johnson v. Philadelphia, (60 Pa. St.
445) 123
Johnson v. Eeardon, (16 Minn. 431)
155
Johnson v. Simonton, (43 Cal. 242)
147
» Johnson v. Small, (5 B. Mon. 25) 321
Johnson v. Thayer, (94 U. S. 631)
185
Johnson v. Wilcox, (19 Atl. R. 939)
352
Johnson v. Wilson, (2 N. H. 202) 78
Johnson v. Winfield, (29 Pac. R. 559,
48 Kan. 129) 158
Johnson Co. v. January, (94 U. S.
202) 196
Jolinston V. Becker Co. Com'rs, (27
Minn. 64, 6 N. W. R. 411) 266
Johnston v. Charleston, (1 Bay, 441)
65
Johnston v. District, (118 U. S. 19)
354
Johnston v. Macon, (62 Ga. 645) 263
Johnston v. Simonton, (43 Cal. 242)
118
Johnston v. Prov. etc. Co., (10 R. I.
365) 306
Johnston u. Wilson, (2 K H. 202) 76,
77, 82
Joliet ». Harwood, (86 111. 110) 347
Joliet 0. Seward, (99 111. 267) 350 a
Joliet V. Verley, (35 111. 58) 319, .353
Joliet V. Walker, (7 111. App., 267)
350 6
Jones V. Andover, (9 Pick. 146) 95
Jones V. Borough of Bangor, (144 Pa.
St. 688, 29 W. N. C. 245) 330
Jones V. Boston, (104 Mass. 75) 259 a,
345, 392 ' . '
Joues V. Chamberlain, (16 N'. E. R
72) 255
Jones V. Cincinnati, (18 Ohio, 318,
323) 256
Jones V. Clifford, (3 Ch. Div. 779) 327
Jones V. Estate of Keep, (19 Wis. 369)
258
Jones V. Grant Co., (14 Wis. 518) 79
Jones V. Hmibut, (13 Neb. 125) 189 o
Jones V. Ins. Co., (2 Daly, 307) 147
Jones V. Keith, (37 Tex. 394) 313
Jones V. Jefferson, (66 Tex. 576) 86,
370
Jones V. Minneapolis, (31 Minn. 230)
3506
Jones V. Miracle, (21 S. W. R. 241)
282
Jones V. New Haven, (34 Conn. 1) 9,
325 339 345.
Jones V. Nichols, (46 Ark. 207) 348
Jones V. Powell, (Palm. 537) 120
Jones V. Richmond, (18 Gratt. 517)
163, 333
Jones V. Bobbins, (8 Gray, 329) 105
Jones V. Schulmyer, (39 Ind. 119) 283
Jones V. Soulard, (24 How. 41) 54
Jones V. Stanstead, S. & 0. E. E. Co.,
(L. E. 4 P. C. App. 98, 120) 243, 247
Jones V. Waltham, (4 Cush. 499) 343
Jonesboro v. Cairo, etc. E. E. (110
U. S. 192) 28
Jonesboro v. McKee, (2 Yerg, 167)
282
Jonnston v. Super's, (19 Johns. 272)
377
Jordan c. Hannibal, (87 Mo. 673) 353
Jordan ». Helwig, (1 Wilson, 447)
131
Jordan v. School District, (38 Me.
164) 95, 107
Joyce V. Parkhurst, (22 N. E. E. 899,
150 Mass. 243) 75
Joyce V. Woods, (78 Ky. 386) 120, 272
Joyner v. Third Sch. Dis., (3 Cush.
567) 326
Judd V. Claremont, (23 Atl. E. 427)
351
Judge V. Meriden, (38 Conn. 90) 338 a
Judkins v. Hill, (50 N. H. 140) 65
Judsou V. Bridgeport, (25 Conn. 426)
232
Jugman v. Chicago, (78 HI. 405) 118
Juker V. Commonwealth, (20 Pa. St.
484) 65
Julia Bldg. Assn. v. Bell Tel. Co., (88
Mo. 258) 297
Junction City v. Webb, (23 Pac. R.
1073) 162
Junction R. E. Co. ». Philadelphia,
(88 Pa. St. 424) 259 a
Junkins v. Union Sch. Dis., (39 Me.
220) 99, 167
Just B. Township, (42 Mich. 573) 364
Justices V. G. & W. Co., (9 Ga. 475)
320
Justice B. Orr, (12 Ga. 137) 179
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XCl
Eeferenees are to Sections.
K.
Kaime v. Barter, (73 Mo. 316) 218
Kaiser b. Weise, (86 Pa. St. 366) 276
Kalbrier ». Leonard, (34 Ind. 497) 56,
276
Kane v. Baltimore, (15 Md. 240) 234,
241
Kane v. Fond du Lac, (40 Wis. 495)
142
Kane v. State, (17 Atl. E. 557, 70 Md.
546) 399
Kankakee v. Linden, (38 111. App.
6o7) 328
Kankakee v. People, (24111. App. 410)
316
Kankakee v. Potter, (119 111. 327) 278
Kansas v. Swope, (79 Mo. 446) 110
Kansas ». Topeka, (31 Kan. 452) 125
Kansas City v. Clark, (68 Mo. 588) 161
Kansas City v. Flanagan, (69 Mo. 22)
165
Kansas City v. Payne, (71 Mo. 159)
282
Kansas Cityj). Kichards, (34 Mo. App.
521) 294
Kansas City etc. Co. ■». Alderman,
(47 Mo. 349) 185
Kansas City B. & I. Co., In re, (35
Kan. 557) 315
Kansas etc. Co. v. Burge, (40 Kan.
736) 47
Kansas etc. Co. v. Miller, (2 Col. 442)
353
Kansas etc. Co. v. Payne, (49 Fed. E.
114, 4 U. S. App. 77) 247, 249
Kansas M. L. Ins. Co. v. Hill, (33
Pac. 300) 397
Kan. Pac. E. E. Co. v. Wyandotte
Co., (16 Kan. 587) 326 a
Kappes V. Appel, (14 Bradw. 179) 348
Karst V. St. Paul etc. Co., (22 Minn.
118) 292, 329
Karwisch b. Atlanta, (44 Ga. 404) 134
Kathraan b. New Orleans, (11 La.
An. 145) 28
Katzenberger v. Aberdeen, (121 U.
S. 172) 17
Kaufle V. Delaney, (25 W. Va. 410) 62
Kavanagh v. Brooklyn, (38 Barb. 232)
328, 349
Kavanagh b. Mobile etc. E. E. Co., (4
S. E. Eep. 113) 396
Kavanaugh v. State, (41 Ala. 399) 67
Kay V. Kerk, (24 Atl. E. 326) 354
Kayser o. Trustees etc. of Brenen,
(16 Mo. 88) 53
Kean b. Asch, (27 N. J. Eq. 57) 397
Keane b. Waterford, (29 N. E. E. 130.
130 N. Y. 188) 344
Kearney b. Ballentine, (23 Atl. E.
821) 241
Kearney b. London B. & S. C. Ey.
Co., (L. E. 5 Q. B. 411) 342
Kearney b. L. B. & S. C. E. W. Co.,
(40 L. J. Q. B. 2>5; 317
Kearney b. Metro. E. E. Co., (129 N.
Y. 76) 244
Keasey v. Bricker, (60 Pa. St. 9) 365
Keasy b. Louisville, (4 Dana, 154) 329
Keating b. Kansas City, (84 Mo. 415)
169, 327
Keavrhacker v. Cleveland etc. E. E.
Co., (3 Ohio St. 172) 301
Keenan b. Goodwin, (24 Atl. 148) 87
Keenau b. Perry, (24 Tex. 253) 83
Keeney b. Jersey City, (47 N. J. L.
449) 165, 170
Keeler b. Milledge, (24 N. J. L. 142)
87
Keese ». Denver, (10 Colo. 112) 278
Keckely b. Com'rs, (4 McCord, 257)
153
Kehrer v. Eichmond, (81 Va. 745)
354 a
Keith B. Brockton, (136 Mass. 119) 344
Keith B. Easton, (2 Allen, 552) 342,
346
Keith B. Philadelphia, (27 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 93) 56
Keith B. Setter, (25 Kans. 100) 66
Keithsburg b. Frick, (34 111. 405) 170
Keizer b. Lovett, (85 Ind. 240) 396
Keller B. Corpus Christi, (50 Tex.
614) 116, 239
Keller b. Hicks, (22 Cal. 460) 179
Keller b. Hyde, (20 Cal. 593) 177
Keller b. Savage, (17 Me. 444) 106, 108
Keller b. State, (11 Md. 525) 258
Keller v. State, (31 Iowa, 493) 261
Kelley v. Edwards, (99 Cal. 460) 371
Kelley v. Mayor etc., (4 Hill N. Y.
265) 177
Kelley b. Mayor etc. of N. Y.,(4 E. D.
Smith, 291) 92
Kelley b. McCorraick, (28 Mass. 318)
192 i.
Kellinger b. Forty Sec. etc. Co., (50
N. Y. 206) 302
Kellogg B. Ely, (15 Ohio St. 64) 278,
.327
Kellogg B. Hickman, (12 Colo. 256) 66
Kellogg B. Janesville, (34 Minn. 132)
339
Kellogg B. Northampton, (4 Gray,
65) 342, 346
Kellogg B. Oshkosh, (14 Wis. 678) 66
Kellogg B. Thompson, (66 N. Y. 88)
294, 312, 354
Kelly's Case, (8 Gratt. 8) 223
Kellv V. Baltimore, (53 Md. 134) 395
Kelly B. Chicago, (62 111. 279) 173,
395
xcu
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
Kelly V. Columbus, (41 Ohio St. 263)
348
Kelly u. Doody, (22 N. E. E. 1084, 116
ISr. Y. 575) 352
Kelly V. Mayor, (4 Hill, 263) 165, 178
Kelly V. Mayor etc. of N. Y., (11 N.
Y. 432) 92
Kelly V. Meeks, (87 Mo. 396) 53, 55
Kelly ». Milau, (21 Fed. Rep. 842)110
Kelly D. Milwaukee, (18 Wis. 83) 328
Kelly B. New York, (11 N". Y. 432) 347
Kelly V. Pittsburgh, (85 Pa. St. 170,
104 XJ. S. 78) 259, 276
Kelly V. Wimberly, (61 Miss. 548) 368
Kelly etc. v. Lawrence F. Co., (22 N.
E. Rep. 639) 310
Kelsey v. Glover, (15 Vt; 708) 342
Kemble's App., (19 Atl. R. 946) 397
Kemmerer v. State, (7 Neb. 133) 365
Kemper v. Campbell, (26 Pac. 53)
329
Kemper ». Cincin. etc., (11 Ohio. 392)
320
Kemper v. Louisville, (14 Bush, 87)
103, 329, 354
Kenaday 5). Lawrence, (128 Mass. 318)
350 &
Kendall v. Albia, (73 Iowa, 241) 352 a
Kendall v. Boston, (118 Mass. 234)
337
Kendall v. Camden, (47 N. J. L. 64)
381
Kendall v. Clinton, (53 Mass. 526) 79
Kendall v. County, (12 111. App. 210)
316
Kendall v. King, (84 Eng. C. L. 483)
182
Kendall v. Post, (8 Oreg. 141) 245, 293
Kendall p. Stokes, (3 How. 109) 91,
359, 363
Kendall b. U. S., (12 Pet. 584) 375
Kennard v. Burton, (25 Me. 39) 321
Kennard v. Louisiana, (92 U. S. 480)
83
Kennard Cass Co., U. S. C. C, (3
Dillon C. C. 147) 193
Kennedy b. Board, (2 Pa. St. 367) 120
Kennedy v. Covington, (8 Dana, 61)
133
Kennedy v. Mayor, (73 N. Y. 365)
336 a, 343
Kennedy v. Newman, (1 Sandf. 187)
250
Kennedy v. Phelp, (10 La. An. 227)
120
Kennedy v. Sacramento, (19 Fed. 580)
375
Kennedy v. Sowden, (1 McMullen,
328) 152, 154
Kennedy v. Washington, (3 Cranch
C. C. 595) 393
Kennett's Petition, (24 N. H. 135)
239
Kennon v. Gilmer, (131 TT. S. 22) 352 a
Kenosha v. Lamson, (9 Wall. 478)
1916
Kensington Com'rs v. Wood, (10 Pa.
St. 93) 329, 354 a
Kent V. Dickinson, (25 Gratt. 817)
360
Kent B. Cheyenne, (2 Wyom. 6) 328
Kent V. Kentland, (62 Ind. 291) 259
Kent V. Lincoln, (32 Vt. 591) 350
Kent B. Worthington Brd., (L. R. 10
Q. B. 118) 336 a
Kentucky v. Denison, (24 How. 66)
5, 8, 359
Kentucky Seminary b. Wallace, (15 B.
Mon. 35) 47, 49
Kenzie v. Chicago, (2 Scam. 188) 51
Keogh V. Wilmington, (4 Del. Ch.
491) 173, 362
Keokuk v. Keokuk, I. S. Dis., (53
Iowa, 352) 346
Keokuk v. Keokuk P. Co., (45 Iowa,
196, 206) 133
Keokuk b. Merriam, (44 Iowa, 432)
373
Keough V. Board, (31 N. E. R. 587)
361
Keough B. Holyoke, (31 N. E. E. 387)
66
Kepner v. Com., (40 Pa. St. 124) 96,
145
Kepple V. Keokuk, (61 Iowa, 653) 292
Kern o. Isgrigg, (31 N. E. K. 455)
396
Kerr v. Dougherty, (79 N. Y. 327) 202
Kerr v. Josliu, (66 Hun, 629) 396
Kerr b. Preston, L. R. (6 Ch. Div. 463)
335
Kerr b. South Park Com'rs, (117 U.
S. 379) 246, 248
Kerr ». Trego, (47 Pa. St. 292) 87, 96
Kerr v. W. S. R. Co., (27 N. E. 833)
238
Ketchum b. BuHalo, (14 N. Y. 356)
128, 182, 200
Ketchum v. Duncan, (96 U. S. 671)
190
Ketchum v. Newman, (116 N. Y. 422)
131
Kettering b. Jacksonville, (50 111. 39)
160, 302
Kettle B. Tremont, (1 Neb. 329) 308
Keyes v. Tait, (19 Iowa, 123) 220
Keys V. Marion Co., (41 Cal. 252) 308
Keys B. Marcellus, (50 Mich. 439)
343, 346
Keys V. Westford, (17 Pick. 277) 110
Keyser v. Sch. Dis., (35 N. H. 477)
170
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XCIU
References are to Sections.
Keyser v. McKissan, (2 Eawle, 139)
88
Keystone Cas. Appeal, (7 Atl. E. 579)
259
Kibele ». PhiladelpWa, (105 Pa. St.
41) 350 rt
Kidd V. Pearson, (128 U. S. 1) 121
Kidder v. Peoria, (29 111. 77) 2J:1
Kiernan, In re, (62 N. Y. 457) 278
Kies V. Erie, (19 Atl. E. 942, 26 W.
K. C. 112) 92
Kile V. Yellowhead, (80 111. 208) 250
Kiley ». Cranar, (51 Mo. 541) 106
Kiley v. Kansas City, (87 Mo. 103)
825, 327 a, 349
Kilgus V. Trustees, (22 S. W. E. 750)
270
Killon V. Herman, (43 Kan. 37) 81
Kimbe v. White W. V. Canal Co., (1
111. 285) 243
Kimball v. Chappell, (27 Abb. N. C.
437)49
Kimball b. Homan, (42 N. W. K. 167)
311
Kimball v. Kenosha, (4 Wis. 321) 308
Kimball ». Lamprey, (19 N. H. 215)
95, 373
Kimball v. Marshall, (44 N. H. 465)
99
Kimball ». Kockland, (71 Me. 137)
247
Kimball v. Rosendale, (42 Wis. 407)
187 a
Kimble v. White W. V. Canal Co.,
(1 Ind. 285) 247
Kimere v. State, (129 Ind. 589) 371
Kincaid's App., (66 Pa. St. 412) 118
Kincaid ». Hardin Co. , (53 Iowa, 430)
325, 375
Kine ». Defenbaugh, (64 111. 291) 245
King 1). Ashwell, (12 East, 22) 161
King V. Benton Co., (10 Greg. 512)
279
King V. Bower, (1 Barn. & Cr. 492)
99
King V. Buller, (8 East. 389) 99
King i;. Butler, (15 Johns. 281) 168
King V. Davenport, (98 111. 505) 130-
King V. Dimpsey, (2 T. E. 96) 154
King V. Doolittle, (1 Head, 77) 327
King «. Eord, (70 Ga. 628) 129, 130
King V. Glassop, (4 B. & A. 616) 156
King V. Grant, (1 Barn. & Adol. 104)
32
King B. Hawkins, (16 Pac. Eep. 434)
80
King ». Hungerford Market Co., (4
B. & Al. 427) 243
King V. Hunter, (65 N. C. 203) 67
King I'. Hyde, (21 L. J. May. Cas. 94)
156
King ». Johnson, (8 Q. B. 102) 156
King B. Mahaska, (75 Iowa, 329) 170
King V. Mayor, (1 Str. 385) 97
King XI. Mayor, (12 T. E. 182) 85
King V. MoLure, (84 N. C. 153) 82
King V. Moore, (3 B. & Ad. 184) 120
King V. N. Y. Cent. & H. E. E. E.
Co., (66 N. Y. 181) 347
King V. Norris, (1 Ld. Eaym. 337) 48
King u. Oshkosh, (44 N. W. E. 745,
75 Wis. 517) 324, 349
Kip D. Paterson, (2 Dutch. 298) 156
King V. Portland, (31 Pac. E. 482)
278
King V. Portland, (2 Oreg. 146) 259 a
King V. Priest, (6 T. E. 538) 154
King V. Reed, (43 N. J. L. 186) 277
King V. Sadler, (4 C. & P. 218) 120
King 13. Seale, (8 East, 568) 154
King V. Sev. & Wye. E. E., (2 B. &
Aid. 646) 363
King ». Smith, (5 M. & S. 133) 154
King V. Symonds, (1 East, 189) 154
King V. Thompson, (2 T. E. 18) 156
King V. Thompson, (87 Pa. St. 365)
325
King V. Williams, (2 Maule & Sel.
141) 99
King V. Wyatt, (2 Ld. Eaym. 1478)
154
Kingland v. Clark, (24 Mo. 24) 244
Kingman ». Brockton, (26 K. E. E.
968) 13, 184, 200
Kingman ». Plymouth Co. Com'rs,
(6 Cush. 306) 249
Kingsburg «. Dedham, (13 Allen, 186)
342
Kingsbury B. Sch. Dis., (12 Mete. 99)
95, 99, 100, 167
Kingsland v. New York, (110 IST. \.
569) 132, 133
Kingsley v. Brooklyn, (78 N. Y. 200)
171
Kings Co. E. E. E. Co., In re, (105
X. Y. 97) 305
Kinmundy u. Mayham, (72 111. 462)
110
Kinney v. Troy, (108 N. Y. 567) 344
Kinney v. Zimpleman, (36 Tex. 554)
255
Kinsey v. Kellogg, (65 Cal. Ill) 79
Kinsley v. Chicago, (124 111. 359) 124
Kinsley v. Monougaliela Co., (31 W.
Va. 464) 174
Kinsley ». Norris, (60 N. H. 131) 170
Kinzie v. Chicago, (2 Scam. 188) 51
Kirby v. Boylston Ass'n, (14 Gray,
249) 346, 348
Kirby v. Citizens St. Ey. Co., (48 Md.
168) 294
Kirby v. Shaw, (19 Pa. St. 258) 259 a
xeiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Keferences are to Sections.
Kirk V. King, (3 Pa. 436) 203
Kirk !). Nowill, (1 Terra, K. 118, 124)
154, 155
Kirkbride b. Lafayette Co., (108 U.
S. 208) 185
Kirkeri). Cincinnati, (27 JST.E. R. 898)
88
Kirkhara o. Russell, (76 Va. 956) 110,
150
Kirkpatrick v. Knapp, (28 Mo. App.
427) 348
Kirkwood u. Be Soto, (87 Cal. 894)
79
Kirkwood v. Newbury, (122 N. T.
571) 15
Kirtland v. Macon, (66 Ga. 385) 301
Kisler v. Cameron, (39 Ind. 488) 371
Kistnerj). Indianapolis, (100 Ind. 210)
327 a
Kittanning Coal Co. v. Common-
wealtli, (78 Pa. St. 100) 259
Kittle V. Pfeiffer, (22 Cal. 490) 221
Klamrath v. Albany, (53 Hun, 206) 98
Klatt V. Milwaukee, (53 "Wis. 196) 343
Klein v. Dallas, (8 S. W. Rep. 90) 339,
351
Klein v. N. O., (99 U. S. 149) 212
Klein v. Smitli Co., (54 Miss. 254)
365, 375
Klein v. Warren Co., (54 Miss. 254)
365, 375
Kling !). City, (27 Mo. App. 231) 346
Klinger v. Bickel, (117 Pa. St. 326)
130
Klinkeuer b. Sell. Dis., (11 Pa. St.
444) 217
Knapp V. Hoboken, (39 N. J. L. 394)
182
Knapp V. Mayor etc., (39 N. J. L.
394) 177
Knapp V. Swaney, (56 Mich. 345) 171
Knarr, In re, (127 Pa. St. 554, 18 Atl.
R. 639) 362
Kuaust, In re, (101 N. Y. 188) 28
Kneedler v. Norristown, (100 Pa. St.
468) 150
Kneeland b. Furlong, (20 Wis. 437)
173
Kneeland v. Milwaukee, (15 Wis.
454) 270
Kneeland v. Pittsburgh, (11 Atl. R.
657) 261
Kniper v. Louisville, (7 Bush, 599)
110
Knight V. CarroUton R. R. Co., (9
La. An. 284) S02
Knight B. Ferris, (6 Houst. 293) 308
Knight B. Haight, (57 Cal. 169) 87
Knight B. Town of Ashland, (61 Wis.
233) 59, 67, 176
Knight V. Wells, (1 Lut. 519) 40
Knight B. Wells, (1 Lord Ryan, Eng..
80) 49
Knoedler v. NorristowD, (100 Pa. St.
368) 130
Knolbloch v. Chicago etc. Co., (31
Minn. 402) 136
Knoblock b. R. R. Co., (31 Minn. 402)
290, 306
Knorr v. Miller, (5 Ohio Cir. Ct. R.
609) 302, 395
Knowles v. Crampton, (11 Atl. Rep.
593) 321
Knowles b. Yates, (31 Cal. 82) 65
Knowlton b. Pittsfield, (62 N. H. 5.35)
346
Knowlton v. Plantation No. 4, (14
Me. 20) 170
Knowlton ». Rock Co. Sup., (9 Wis.
410) 269
Knox V. New York, (55 Barb. 404)
396
Knox ». Metro. R. R. Co., 58 Hun,
517) 249
Knox B. Peterson, (21 Wis. 247) 282
Knox Co. V. Goggin, (16 S. W. R. 684)
209
Knox Co. V. Aspinwall, (24 How. 376)
369
Knox Co. ». McComb, (19 Ohio St.
320) § 208
Knoxville b. Bell, (12 Lea, 157) 347
Knoxville v. Bird, (12 La. 121) 130
Knoxville v. King, (7 Lea, 441) 152
Knoxville b. R. R., (50 N. W. R. 61)
154
Koch V. Bridges, (45 Miss. 247) 349
Koch V. North Ave. R'y Co., (23
Atl. Rep. 463) 306 a
Koch B. R'y Co., (23 Atl. R. 463) 302
Koehler b. Black R. Falls Iron Co.,
(2 Black, 715) 51
KoenigB. Arcadia, (43 N. W. 734) 353
Koester v. Ottumwa, (34 Iowa, 41)
343
Kohlhapp B. W. Roxbury, (120 Mass.
596) 108
Konrad b. Rogers, (70 Wis. 492) 208
KoonecB. Russell, (103 N. C. 179) 14
Koons V. Lucas, (52 Iowa, 177) 292
Kooutz V. Burgess, (64 Md. 134) 88
Kopf V. Utler, (101 Pa. St. 27) 312
Koppikus V. Commissioners, (16 Cal.
248) 245
Korn V. Met. Ry. Co., (59 Hun, 505)
244
Koshkonong v. Burton, (104 TJ. S.
668) 192 6, 312
Kosmak b. New York, (117 N. Y.
361) 294
Kosemisko v. Slamberg, (9 So. R. 297)
119
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
XCV
!^eferences are to Sections.
Kountze v. Omaha, (5 Dillon, 443)
56, 276
Kramer v. Cleveland Co., (5 Ohio St.
140) 232
Kranz v. Baltimore, (64 Md. 491) 355
Kreigh v. Chicago, (80 111. 407) 289
Kretsoh v. Helme, (45 Ind. 438) 172
Krickle v. Com., (1 B. Mon. 361) 1.58
Kroop V. Forman, (31 Mich. 144) 232,
279
Kucheman v. Chicago etc. Co., (46
Iowa, 366) 302, 303
Kuhn V. Chicago, (30 111. App. 203)
159
Kumler v. Silsbee, (88 Ohio St. 445)
301
Kundinger v. Saginaw, (59 Mich. 355)
103, 241
Kiinklei). Franklin, (13 Minn. 127) 139
Kunz V. Troy, (104 JST. T. 344) 347,
349, 3506
Kupfer V. So. Parish, (12 Mass. 185)
99
Kyle V. Board, (94 Ind. 115) 316
Kyle V. Malin, (8 Ind. 34) 110, 256, 278
Kynaston v. Shrewsbury, (2 Stra.
1051) 95
Kyne v. Wilmington etc. Co., (14 Atl.
K. 922) 303
Labette Co. Com'rs v. Moulton, (112
U. S. 217) 368, 375
Laboiirdette v. Municipality, (2 La.
An. 527) 100
Labrie v. Manchester, (59 N. H. 120)
87
La Clef ». Concordia, (41 Kan. 423,
21 Pac. E. 272) 92
Lacon v. Page, (48 111. 499) 346, 349
Lacour v. New York, (3 Duer, 406)
327, 336 a, 355
Ladd ».■ Dickey, (84 Me. 190) 282
Ladd V. Foster, (31 Fed. E. 827) 121
Ladd V. French, (6 N. Y. Sup. 56)
293
Ladd V. Sale, (57 N". H. 210) 80
Ladd V. Spencer, (31 Pac. E. 374) 279
Lade v. Shepherd (2 Stra. 1004) 217,
224
Ladies Dec. Art Club, (25 W. N. C.
75) 120
Lafargo v. Magee, (6 Cal. 285) 177
Lafayette ». Fowler, (84 Ind. 140) 113,
397
Lafayette v. Bush, (19 Ind. 326) 247
Lafayette v. Jenners, (10 Ind. 79) 288
Lafayette v. Nagle, (113 Ind. 425) 330
Lafayette v. Spencer,, (14 Ind. 399)
329
Lafayette v. State, (69 Ind. 218) 75
Lafayette v. Timberlake, (88 Ind. 330)
327, 331
Lafayette v. Wortman, (107 Ind. 404)
329
Lafayette & I. E. E. Co. v. Smith, (6
Ind. 249) 243, 247
Lafayette etc. E. E. v. Geiger, (34 Ind.
185) 24
Lailin v. Tearney, (23 N. E. E. 389)
120
LaGrange v. Cutler, (6 Ind. 354) 79
LaGrange v. Treas., (24 Mich. 468)
108
Lahr's Case, (104 N. Y. 268) 297,305.
306
Laird v. De Soto, (22 Fed. Eep. 421)
32,42
Lake v. Williamsburgh, (4 Den. 520)
178, 281
Lake Co. v. Eollins, (130 U. S. 662,
26 Am. Eng. Cor. Cas. 465) 177
Lake etc. Water Co. v. Contra Costa
Co., (67 Cal. 669) 234
Lake Erie etc. Co. v. Michener, (117
Ind. 465) 39 6
Lake Erie W. & St. L. E, E. Co. v.
Heath, (9 Ind. 558) 245
Lake Sliore etc. Co. v. Cincinnati etc.
Co., (116 Ind. 578) 279
Lake Shore etc. E. E. Co. v. Chicago
etc. E. E. Co., (97111. 506) 144, 238,
302
Lake Shore etc. Co. v. Chicago, (33
N. E. E. 602) 279
Lake Shore & M. S. E. E. Co. v. Chi-
cago, (56 111. 454) 263
Lake Shore & M. S. E. Co. v. Dunkirk,
(20 N". Y. S. 596) 282
Lake View v. Lebahn, (9 K. E. E.
269, 120 111. 92) 215, 221
Lake View v. Letz, (44 111. 81) 118
Lake View v. Eose Hill Cem. Co.,
(70 111. 192) 118
Lake View v. Tate, (130 111. 247) 136
Lakin v. Ames, (10 Cush. 198) 67
Lamar u. Wilkius, (28 Ark. 34) 360
Lamar County ». Clements, (49 Tex.
847) 218
Lamb v. Lane, (4 Ohio St. 167) 245
Lamb v. Lynd, (44 Pa. St. 336) 105,
371
Lamb b. People, (113 111. 137) 96
Lamb v. Shays, (14 Iowa, 567) 212
Lamb v. St. Louis & W. Ey. Co., (33
Mo. App. 489) 306 a
Lambar v. St. Louis, (15 Mo. 610)
354 a
Lamborn v. Dickinson Co., (97 U. S.
181) 327
Lamculle etc. Co. v. Fairfield, (51 Vt,
257) 195 d
XCVl
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Keferences are to Section^.
Lamm v. Port Deposit etc., (49 Md.
233) 170
Lamoille v. Fairfield, (51 Vt. 257)
195 a
Lamsden v. Cross, (10 W's. 282 259 a
Lamville etc. Co. v. Fairfield, (51 Vt.
. 257) 195
Lancaster v. Clayton, (o S. W. K.
864) 256, 270
Lancaster v. Fulton, (24 W. N. C.
401) 79
Lancaster v. Rush, (52 N. W. K. 837)
276
Lan. Can. Co. v. Parnably, (11 A. &
E. 223) 324, 349
Lane. Co. v. Fulton, (18 Atl. Rep.
384) 79
Lancy v. Bryant, (30 Me. 466) 107
Land v. Coffman, (50 Mo. 243) 207
Landee v. S. I. R. Co., (53 N. Y. 450)
102
Lander v. Sell. Dis., (33 Me. 239) 95
Land Grant etc. Co. v. Davis Co., (6
Kan. 256) 186
Landis v. Vineland, (23 Atl. R. 357)
150
Landon v. Lund, (38 N. W. Rep. 699)
348
Lane, Ex parte, (76 Cal. 587, 18 Pac.
Rep. 677) 158
Lane v. Boston, (125 Mass. 519) 330
Lane v. Embden, (72 Me. 354) 190 a,
216
Lane v. Kennedy, (13 Ohio St. 42, 49)
312
Lane v. Saginaw, (53 Mich. 442) 241
Lane v. Schamp, (20 N. J. Eq. 82)
196, 392
Lane Co. d. Oregon, (7 Wall. 80) 282
Lang V. Board, (22 N. E. R. 667) 79
Lang V. Smith, (7 Bing. 284) 191
Langam v. Atchison, (35 Kan. 318)
145, 352
Langdon v. Castleton, (30 Vt. 285)
176
Laugdon v. Mayor, (93 N. Y. 129) 10
Langsdale t. Bonton, (12 Ind. 467)
108
Langsdale v. Nicklans, (38 Ind. 289)
283
Langston v. S. C. R. R., (2 S. C. 248)
192, 192 6
Langworthy v. Dubuque, (13 Iowa,
86) 61
Lanier v. Macon, (59 Ga. 187) 261
Lans. V. County Treas., (1 Dillon C.
C. 522) 194, 369
Lansing v. Toolan, (37 Mich. 152)
343, 350 '
Lansing v. Van Garder, (24 Mich.
456) 171
Lapham ». Curtis, (5 Vt. 371) 353
Lapleine v. Morgan etc. Co., (40 La.
An. 661) 352a
La Plume v. Gardner, (23 Atl. R. 899)
29
Larimie Co. ». Albany Co., (92 TJ. S.
307) 2, 8, 55
Laredo v. Macdonnell, (52 Tex. 511)
170
Largen v. State, (13 S. W. R. 161, 76
Tex. 323) 38
Larkin v. Burl. C. R. & Ry. Co., (52
N. W. R. 480) 136, 146
Larkin v. Saginaw Co., (11 Mich. 88)
328
Larmon v. District, (5 Mackey, 330)
350 a
Larned v. Briscoe, (29 N. W. R. 22,
62 Mich. 393) 87, 92, 329
Larsen v. Grand Forks, (3 Dak. 307)
339, 345
La Salle Co. v. Simons, (10 111. 513)
326 a
La Salle etc. Co. v. Donoghue, (127
111: 27) 259
Latlirop V. Bank, (8 Dana, 114) 51
Lathrop v. Cent. la., (69 Iowa, 105)
108, 310
Lathrop v. Sunderland, (23 Atl. R.
619) 31
Lanensteia v. Fond du Lac, (28 Wis.
336) 113, 200
Laughlin v. Washington, (63 Iowa,
652) 223, 226
Launder v. Chicago, (111 111. 291) 124
Launtz v. People, (113 111. 137) 100
Lauteryung, In re, (48 N. T. Super.
308) 118
Lavalle v. People, (68 HI. 252) 380
Laver v. McGlachlin, (28 AVis. 364) 88
Law V. Dodd, (1 Ex. 845) 129
Law B. Johnston, (118 Ind. 261) 279
Law V. Pettengill, (12 N. H. 340) 106
Lawden, In re, (89 N. Y. 548) 277
Lawe V. Kaukauna, (70 Wis. 306, 35
N. W. Rep. 561) 218
Lawler v. Boom Co., (56 Me. 443)329
Lawless v. Troy, (63 Hun, 632) 344
Lawrence, In re, (69 Col. 608) 125
Lawrence v. Jeff. Par. Pol. Jury, (35
La. An. 601) 218
Lawrence v. Killam, (11 Kan. 499)
163, 291 ;
Lawrence v. Mt. Vernon, (35 Me. 100) i
342
Lawrence ». Nahant, (136 Mass. 477)
294
Lawrenoeburg v. Wurst, (16 Ind. 337)
Lawrence etc. Co. i-. Williams, (35
Ohio St. 168) 302
Lawrence Co. v. K. W. E,
(32 Pa. St. 144) 198
Lawrence Co. App., (67 Pa. St. 87)
198
Lawson v. Seattle, (33 Pac. 347) 324
Lawthorne, Ex parte, (18 Gratt. 85)
82
Lawton v. Comm'rs, (3 Caines, 179)
105
Laycock v. Baton Eouge, (35 La. An.
475) 165, 189 a
Layton ». New Orleans, (12 La. An.
515) 15, 60
Lea V. Hernandez, (10 Tex. 137) 38
Lea B. State, (10 Lea, 478) 42
Leach I!. CargiU, (60 Mo. 316) 265,
278
Leake v. Philadelphia, (24 Atl. 351)
306
Leame v. Bray, (3 East, 593) 321
Learned v. Burlington, (2 Am. Law
Reg. 394) 266
Lease v. Howard, (14 Johns. 479) 284
Leat V. Tilson, (72 Cal. 404) 279
Leathers v. Aiken, (9 Fed. Rep. 679)
133
Leavenworth v. Booth, (15 Kans. 627)
123, 258
Leavenworth v. Barnes, (94 IT. S. 70)
196
Leav. V. Kinney, (99 U. S. 623) 86,
370
Leavenworth v. Norton, (1 Kan. 432)
256
Leavenworth v. Rankin, (2 Kan. 357)
281
Leavenworth etc. R. R. Co. v. Platte
Co., (42 Mo. 171) 189
Leav. Co. v. Sellew, (99 U. S. 624)
86
Leavit v. Cambridge, (120 Mass. 157)
120
Leavitt v. Eastman, (77 Me. 117) 108
Leazure v. Hillegas, (7 Serg. & Rawle,
313) 207
Lebanon o. Heath, (47 N. H. 353) 51
Lebanon ». O. & M. R. R. Co., (77
111. 5.S9) 397
Lebanon v. Warren Co. Com'rs, (9
Ohio, 80) 219, 226
LeClaire v. Springfield, (49 111. 476)
347
LeClef V. Concordia, (21 Pac. Eep.
272) 324
LeClerq v. Gallipolis, (7 Ohio, pt. 1,
218) 226, 308, 396
LeCouteulx v. Buffalo, (33 N. Y. 333)
200
Ledbetter v. State, (10 Ala. 241) 84
LeDuc V. Hastings, (38 N. W. E. 803)
254, 270
vii
TABLE OP CASES CITED
References are to Sections.
E. Co.,
XCVll
Ledwich v. McKim, (53 N. Y. 307)
191 b, 195 6
Lee V. Lake, (14 Mich. 12) 217, 21g,
219
Lee V. Mound Station, (118 111. 304)
226
Lee V. Minneapolis, (24 Minn. 13)
329, 354 a
Lee V. Pembroke etc. Co., (57 Me. 481)
354
Lee V. Sandy Hill, (40 N. Y. 442) 338
Lee V. Templeton, (13 Gray, 476) 326
Lee V. Thomas, (49 Mo. 112) 56
Lee V. Wallis, (1 Kenyon, 295) 154,
155
Lee V. Yarborough, (85 Ala. 590) 315
Lee Co. Sup. ■o. Eogers, (7 Wall. 175)
14, 254, 369
Leeds, In re, (53 N. Y. 400) 172
Leeds v. Eichmond, (102 Ind. 372)
289, 294, 338, 347
Leeds & Co. v. Hardy, (11 So. 1) 282
Leemau v. Hinton, (1 Dur. 37) 83
Leeper v. South Bend, (106 Ind. 375)
276
Lees V. Drainage Com'rs, (24 111.
App. 487) 398
Lees V. Manchester, (11 East, 645) 320
Leete v. Pilgrim etc. Ch., (14 Mo.
App. 590) 120
Lefever v. Detroit, (2 Mich. 586) 282
Legg V. Annapolis, (42 Md. 203) 359,
368
Legrand v. Sidney College, (5 Munf.
324) 51
Lehigh v. Hoffart, (116 Pa. St. 119)
325, 353
Lehigh Bridge Co. ». Lehigh, (4
Eawle, 24) 353
Lehigh C. Co. v. Chicago, 26 Fed.
Eep. 415) 330
Lehigh Valley Coal Co. o. Chicago,
(26 Fed. Eep. 415) 245
Lehigh Valley v. Trone, (28 Pa. St.
206) 132
Lehigh W. Co. App., (102 Pa. St. 515)
113
Lehman u. Brooklyn, (29 Barb. 234)
337, 352 a
Lehman v. Eobinson, (59 Ala. 219)
279
Lehn «. San Francisco, (66 Cal. 76)
328, 355
Leecht v. Burlington, (34 N. W. E.
494) 270
Leiter v. Pike, (127 111. 287) 244
Leland «.' Portland, (2 Oreg. 46) 218
Leloup V. Port of Mobile, (127 U. S.
640) 258
Leman v. New York, (5 Bosw. 414)
338
XCVIU
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Keferences are to Sections.
Lemington v. Blodgett, (37 Vt. 215)
164
Lemon v. Hayden, (13 Wis. 159) 222
Lemon v. Peyton, (64 Miss. 161) 24
Lenawee Co. Bk. v. Adrian, (33 N.
W. K. 304) 397
Lennig v. Ocean City Assoc, 41 N.
J. Eq. 24) 227
Lennon v. N. Y., (55 N. T. 361) 17,
250, 280, 301
Leonard o. Brooklyn, (71 N. T. 498)
212
Leonard v. Canton, (35 Miss. 189) 169
326 a
Leonardo Herr v. Baton Eouge, (4
So. 240) 200, 218, 225
Le Pointe v. O'Malley, (47 Mis. 332)
59
Leroux v. Bay Circ. J., (45 Mich. 416)
365
Les Bois v. Bramell, (4 How. 449)
229
Lesley v. White, (1 Speers L. 31) 164
325
Leslie v. Lewiston, (62 Me. 488) 340
Leslie v. St. Louis, (47 Mo. 474) 241,
249
Leslie v. White, (1 Spears, 31) 51
Letch B. Wells, (48 N. T. 586) 195 d
Levasser v. Washbui-n, (11 Gratt. 572)
312
Levasseur v. Havestraw, (63 Hun,
627) 344
Levering v. Mayor, (7 Humph. 553) 52
Levyi). Mayor, (1 Sandf. 465) 327 a,
331
Levy V. Salt Lake City, (3 Utah, 63)
110, 336
Lewellen v. Lockhardts, (21 Gratt.
570) 123
Lewenthal v. Kew York, (5 Lans.
532) 349
Lewis V. Atlanta, (77 Ga. 756) 345, 348
Lewis V. Atlas etc. Ins. Co., (61 Mo.
534) 352 a
Lewis V. Barbour Co., (105 U. S. 739)
1916, 195 d
Lewis V. Bourdon Co., (12 Kan. 186)
189
Lewis V. Elizabeth, (25 N. J. Eq. 298)
Lewis V. Frankfort, (79 Ind. 446) 391
92
Lewis V. Marion, (14 Ohio St. 515)
362
Lewis V. Marshall, (16 Kan. 102) 371
Lewis V. Mayor, (9 C. B. N. S. 401)
176
Lewis V. Oliver, (4 Abb. Pr. Rep. 121)
86
Lewis V. Eochester, (9 C. B. X. S.
401) 176
Lewis V. San Antonio, (7 Tex. 288)
220
Lewis V. Seattle, (32 Pac. K. 794) 246,
255
Lewis V. Sherman Co., (1 McCrary,
377) 196
Lewis V. Sherman Co., (5 Fed. Eep.
269) 184
Lewis V. Shreveport, (108 U. S. 282)
170
Lewis ». United States, (Morris, 199)
124
Lewis V. Washington, (5 Gratt. 265)
235
Lewiston V. Proctor, (27 111. 414) 156
375
Lexington Ave., In re, (63 Hun, 629)
278
Lexington v. Butler, (15 Wall. 296)
193 6
Lexington v. Long, (31 Mo. 369) 103
Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, (9
Dana, 513) 259 a
Lexington v. MuUiken, (7 Gray, 280)
360, 375
Lexington v. Sargent, (64 Miss. 621)
398
Lexington etc. Co. v. Applegate, (8
Dana, 289) 302, 303
Libbey v. Ellsworth, (32 Pac. R. 228)
281
Liberty Bell, (23 Fed. E. 843) 395
Liberty v. Hmd, (74 Me. 101) 92
Liddell, Ex parte, (29 Pac. E. 251,
93 Cal. 633) 29
Life Assoc, of Am. v. St. Louis Co.
Assessors, (49 Mo. 512) 270
Liffin V. Beverly, (145 Mass. 549) 350 6
Ligare v. Chicago, (23 N. E. E. 934)
121
Lilly V. Taylor, (88 N. C. 489) 212, 375
Lima v. L. Cem. Ass'n, (42 Ohio St.
128) 283
Limestone Co. v. Eather, (48 Ala.
433) 186, 364, 375
Linck 1). Litchfield, (31 N. E. E. 123)
47, 278
Lincoln v. Boston, (148 Mass. 578)
331 o
Lincoln v. Chapin, (132 Mass. 470) 91
Lincoln ». Smith, (45 N. W. E. 41)
344, 346
Lincoln v. Stockton, (75 Me. 141) 169
Lincoln ». Warren, (23 N. Pac. Kep.
45)309
Lincoln v. Worcester Co., (8 Cush.
55) 326
Lincoln v. Yeoman, (51 N. W. E. 844)
83
Lincoln Ave. Co. v. Daum, (79 111.
299) 320
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
Jleferences are to Sections.
XCIX
Lindliolm v. St. Paul, (19 Minn. 245)
346
Lindsay v. Chicago, (115 111. 120) 148
Lindsay v. Omaha, (46 N. W. R. 627)
308
Lindsey v. Sackett, (20 Tex. 516) 82,
361
Lindsley v. Tiickett, (20 Tex. 516) 371
Linega v. Rittenhouse, (94 111. 208)
381
Lining v. Charlston Council,' (1 Mc-
Cord, 345) 268
Linnehan v. Rollins, (137 Mass. 123)
347
Linton b. Athens, (53 Ga. 588) 56
Lippilman v. Cincinnati, (40 Cir. Ct.
357) 113
Llppincott V. Lasher, (44 N. J. Eq.
120) 299
Lipps V. Philada., (38 Pa. St. 503) 277
Liquidators etc. ■». Coleman, (L. K.
6 E. &. S. App. C. 189) 166
Liquidators v. Municipality, (6 La.
An. 21) 14, 194
List V. Wheeling, (7 W. Va. 501) 184,
188
Litch V. Wentworth, (71 111. 146) 397
Litchfield v. Ballon, (114 U. S. 190)
189 a
Litchfield ». Vernon, (41 N. Y. 123)
301
Little V. Cogswell, (25 Pac. R. 727) 32
Little t!. Madison, (49 Wis. 605) 92,
333
Little V. Madison, (42 Wis. 643) 300,
331a
Little V. Merrill, (10 Pick. 543) 95
Little V. Union Township, (40 N. J.
L. 397) 15
Littlefield v. Maxwell, (31 Me. 134)
225
Little Miami etc. R. R. Co. v. Dray-
ton, (23 Ohio St. 510) 238, 302
Little Miami R. R. Co. v. CoUett, (6
Ohio St. 182) 245 .
Little Rock v. Bank, (98 U. S. 308)
183
Little Rock v. Barton, (33 Ark. 436)
261
Little Bock ». Parish, (36 Ark. 166)
53
Little Bock v. State Bk., (3 Eng. 227)
190 a
Little Rock v. Willis, (27 Ark. 572)
349
Little Rock v. Woodruff, (14 N. E.
E. 18) 246
Littler v. Lincoln, (1Q6 111. 353) 217,
222
Littler ». McCord, (38 111. Ap. 147)
282
Littleton v. Richardson, (34 N. H.
179, 187) 348
Livaudais v. Municipality, (5 La. An.
8)221
Livezey v. Philadelphia, (64 Pa. St.
106) 353
Livingston v. Albany, (41 Ga. 21) 269
Livingston v. Mayor, (8 Wend. 85)
221, 248, 286
Livingston v. McDonald, (21 Iowa,
160) 355
Livingston v. Paducah, (80 Ky. 656)
259 a
Livingston v. Peppin, (31 Ala. 542)
119, 163, 174
Livingston Co. v. Welder, (64 111.
427) 395
Liverpool etc. Co. v. Board, (11 So.
R. 91) 272
Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
(10 Wall. 566) 258
Lloyd V. New York, (5 N. Y. 369)
2, 8, 92, 324, 350, 355
Lloyd V. Silver Bow Co., (28 Pac. R.
453) 18, 79
Loan V. Boston, (106 Mass. 450) 340,
346
Loan Assn. v. Topeka, (20 Wall. 655)
194 a
Locke V. Cen. City, (4 Colo. 65) 79
Locke V. Rochester, (5 Lansing, 11) 98
Lockett V. Ft. Worth Co., (78 Tex.
211) 120
Lockhart v. Craig St. Ry. Co., (139
Pa. St. 419, 21 Atl. Rep. 26) 306 a
Lockhart v. Troy, (48 Ala. 581) 17, 28
Lockwood V. Kew York, (2 Hilton,
66) 347
Lockwood ». N. Y. & N. H. R. R.
Co., (37 Conn. 391) 225
Lockwood V. St. Louis, (24 Mo. 20)
248, 259 a, 271, 397
Lockwood V. Weston, (23 Atl. R. 9)
273
Lodi V. State, (18 Atl. R. 749) 27
Loeser v. Leebman, (14 N. Y. S. 569)
396
Loeser v. Redd, (14 Bush, 18) 259 a
Loewer v. Sedalia, (77 Mo. 431) 352
Loftus, In re, (61 Hun, 627) 365
Logan V. Buck, (3 Utah, 301) 110
Logan V. Pyne, (43 Iowa, 524) 110,
134, 144
Logan V. Western Co., (87 Ga. 533)
27
Logan Co. v. Lincoln, (81 lU. 156)
160, 312
Logansport v. Blackmore, (17 Ind.
318) 165
Logansport ». Dunn, (8 Ind. 378)
219, 221
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Befereuces are to Sections.
Logansport v. Crockett, (64 Ind. 319)
98, 106, 161
Logansport v. Deck, (70 Ind. 64)
347
Logansport v. Dicle, (70 Ind. 65) 92
Logansport o. Dykeman, (116 Ind. 15)
165, 189 a
Logansport v. Humphrey, (84 Ind.
487) 65
Logansport v. Justice, (74 Ind. 378)
350 6
Logansport v. La Rosa, (99 Ind. 117,
8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 512) 61
Logansport v. Wright, (25 Ind. 512)
325, 355
Loker ». Brookline, (13 Pick. 343,
348) 169, 344
Lombard v. East Towas, (48 N. W.
E. 947), 3.50 d
Lomber v. Mayor etc. (7 Alb. Pr. E.
248) 2, 8
London v. Barnard, (22 Conn. 552)
110
London v. Headen, (76 K C. 72) 78
London v. Lynn, (1 H. Bl. 206) 369
London v. Wood, (12 Mod. 686) 101,
154
Londonderry v. Andover, (28 Vt.
416) 31
Londonderry v. Derry, (8 N. H. 320)
67
Long V. Battle Creek, (39 Mich. 323)
108, 222
Long V. Duluth, (51 N. W. Eep. 913)
144.
Long V. Fuller, (68 Pa. St. 170) 234
Long V. Harrisburg, (126 Pa. St. 143,
19 Atl. E. 89) 246
Long B. Talley, (91 Mo. 595) 106
Long V. Taxing District, (7 Lea, 134)
121
Long Island E. E. Co. v. Brooklyn,
(8N.Y. 8.805)303
Longmore v. G. W. E. Co., (35 L. J.
C. P. 135) 121
Longworth v. Cincinnati, (34 Ohio,
St. 101) 248
Longworth v. Cincinnati, (48 Ohio
St. 637) 247
Longworth's Ex'rs v. Evansville, (32
Ind. 322) 26
Look, In re, (1 Con. Sur. 403) 49
Lord V. Anoka, (36 Minn. 176) 95, 97
Lord V. Bigelow, (6 Vt. 465) 25
Lord V. Orconto, (47 Wis. 386) 113
Lord V. Parker, (83 Me. 530) 282
Lord Colchester v. Kewney, (L. E. 1
Exch. 368) 270
Lorillard v. Monroe, (11 N. Y. 392)
67,325,338 a
Loring v. Small, (50 Iowa, 271) 212
Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Water
Co., (61 Cal. 65) 261
Los Angeles v. So. Pac. E. E. Co., (67
Cal. 433) 144, 274
Los Angeles etc. v. Los Angeles, (30
Pac. E. 523) 229
Los Angeles G. Co. ». Toberman,
(61 Cal. 199) 165
Lot V. Eoss, (38 Ala. 156) 256, 265,
267
Lotz V. Eead. I. Co., (10 Pa. Co. Ct.
E. 497) 224
Louis V. Allen (13 Mo. 400) 55
Louis V. Brown Tp., (109 TJ. S. 162)
195 d
Louis V. Shreveport, (3 Woods, 205)
187 a
Louisen v. Hauee, (1 Wyo. 570) 397
Louisiana v. Hardin, (11 Mo. 551)
90
Louisiana v. New Orleans, (102 U. S.
203) 194
Louisiana v. Pilsbury, (105 U. S. 301)
161, 258
Louisiana v. St. Martin's Par., (Ill
U. S. 716) 364
Louisiana v. Wood, (102 U. S. 294)
164, 193 6
LouisianaBk. ». N. O. Co., (3 La. An.
294) 110
Louisiana ex rel. v. St. Martins etc.,
(Ill U. S. 716) 375
Louisville i'. Bank, (3 B. Mon. 144)
133
Louisville v. Commonwealth, (1 Du-
vall, 285) 21, 200, 212, 271
Louisville v. Henning, (1 Bush, 381)
261, 327
Louisville v. Hyatt, (2 B. Mon. 177)
278
Louisville v. Kean, (18 B. Mon. 9)
362, 368, 370
Louisville v. Liebfried, (17 S. W. R.
870) 229
Louisville v. McKenrey, (7 Bush, 651)
106, 108
Louisville v. Murphy, (18 Eng. Cor.
Cas. 421) 176
Louisville v. EoUing Mill, (3 Bush,
416) 292
Louisville v. Shreveport, (27 La. An.
623) 186
Louisville b. University, (15 B. Mon.
642) 9, 11, 13
Louisville b. Webster, (108 111. 414)
130
Louisville v. Wible, (84 Ky. 290) 113
Louisville etc. Co. v. Asher, (15 S.
W. E. 517) 246
Louisville etc. Co. b. Barrett, (16 S.
W. R. 278) 246
TABLK OF CASES CITED.
Keferences are to Sections.
ci
Louisville etc. Co. ». Com., (12 S. W.
E. 1064) 326 a
Louisville etc. Co. ». Davidson Co.,
(1 Smead, 637) 186
Louisville etc. Co. v. Falvey, (104 Ind.
409) 352 a
Louisville etc. Co. v. Ingram, (14 S.
W. R. 534) 246
Louisville etc. Co. x>. Louisville, (8
Bush, 415) 294, 302
Louisville etc. Co. ». Shanks, (94 Ind.
598) 352 a
Louisville etc. Co. v. Snider, (20 N.
W. R. 284) 352 a
Louisville etc. Co. ». State, (3'Head,
523) 400
Louisville etc. v. Thompson, (10*7
Ind. 442) 317, 353
Louisville etc. Co. v. Wood, (113 Ind.
544) 352 a
Louisville & P. Canal Co. v. Com-
monwealth, (7 B. Mon. 160) 270
Louisville & N. A. etc. v. State, (25
Ind. 177) 359
Louisville & N. R. Co. ». Orr, (15 S.
W. R. 8) 120
Louisville & N". W. R. Co. v. Bullett
Co., (17 S. W. R. 632) 187a
Louisville Br. Co. m. Louisville, (81
Ky. 189) 42, 56, 272
Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas
Co., (115 U. S. 683) 144
Louisville N. A. & Chic. Ry. Co. ».
Shires, (108 111. 617) 31
Louisville N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v.
State, (122 Ind. 443) 259 a
Loughbridge v. Harris, (42 Ga. 500)
232
Loughran u. Des Moines, (72 Iowa,
772) 354
Loute B. Allegheny Co., (10 Pitts. L.
J. 24) 375
Love V. Balhr, (47 Cal. 364) 79
Love ». Jer. City, (40 N. J. L. 456) 79
Love u. Schenck, (12 Ired. 304) 12, 67
Lovejoy v. Dolan, (10 Cush. 495)
Lovejoy v. Whipple, (18 Vt. 379) 190 a
Lovengarth d. Bloomington, (71 111.
238) 352
Lovett !). Steam Sawmill Asso., (6
Paige, 54) 211
Lovingston v. Wider, (53 111. 302) 255
Low 1-. Commissioners, (R. M. Charlt.
302) 76, 156
Low B. Lewis, (46 Cal. 549) 271
Lowe ». Howard County, (94 Ind.
553) 212
Lowe B. Omaha, (50 K. W. R. 760)
330
Lowell B. Boston, (111 Mass. 463)
188, 254, 294
Lowell B. Boston etc. Corp., (23 Pick,
24) 306, 347
Lowell B. French, (6 Cush. 223) 282
Lowell B. Prop'rs, (104 Mass. 18) 313
Lowell B. Spalding, (4 Cush. 277) 348
Lowell B. Watertown, (58 Mich. 568)
352
Lowell B. Wentworth, (6 Cush. 221)
279, 281
Lowell B. Wheelock, (11 Cush. 391)
108, 281
Lowell B. Wyman, (12 Cush. 273, 276)
335
Lowenstein v. Myers, (20 N. T. S.
761) 118
Lower Maoungie b. Merkhoffer, (71
Pa. St. 276) 343
Lowery b. Delphi, (55 Ind. 250) 353
Lownsdale b. Portland, (Deady, 1,
39) 218
Lowry v. Rainwater, (70 Mo. 152) 122
Loyd ». Columbus, (15 S. E. E. 818)
338
Lucas B. Board, (44 Ind. 524) 12
Lucas Co. B. Hunt, (5 Ohio St. 488)
169
Lucas B. Lat. Com'rs, (11 G. & J.
506) 123
Lucas B. McGlashau, (20 Up. Can. Q.
B. 81) 104
Lucas B. New York, (21 Barb. 245)
352 a
Lucas B. Shepherd, (16 Ind. 368) 86
Lucas B. Tippecanoe Co., (44 Ins.
524) 2, 8
Luce B. Board, (153 Mass. 108) 361
Luck Eipon, (52 Wis. 196) 352 a
Ludlow B. Cine. So. Ry. Trs., (78 Ky.
357)270
Luehrmau b. Shelby Co. etc., (2 Lea,
425) 8, 12, 90
Luke B. Brooklyn, (43 Barb. 54) 54
Luling B. Eacine, (1 Biss. 314) 195
Lum B. Bowie, (18 S. W. E. 142) 24,
256
Lumbard b. Aldrich, (8 N. H. 31) 107
Lumber Co. b. Brooklyn, (71 N. Y.
580) 92
Lumsden v. Milwaukee, (8 Wis. 485)
245
Lund u. New Bedford, (121 Mass.
286) 232
Lundborn b. Mainstee, (93 Mich. 170)
397
Lunkenheuner b. Comp., (23 W. L.
Bull. 433) 110, 115 .
Lusk B. Perkins, (48 Ai-k. 238) 179
Lultterloh b. Cedar Key, (17 Tex.
489) 120
LutterlohB. Cumberland Co.
Comm'rs, (65 N. C. 403) 369
cu
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferenees are to Sections.
Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., (9 Cush.
171) 354
Luther w. Worcester, (97 Mass. 268)
344
Luzerne Co. v. Trimmer, (95 Pa. St.
97)79
Lycoming jj. Union, (15 Pa. St. 166)
16, 60
Lyde v. County, (16 Wall. 6) 190 a
Lyell ». Lapeer Co., (6 McLean, 446)
180
Lyman v. Amherst, (107 Mass. 339)
352
Lyman v. Burlington, (22 Vt. 131)
249
Lyman v. Hampshire, (140 Mass.
311)3506
Lynam o. White, (2 Aiken, 255) 338 a
Lynch v. Lafland, (4 Colder, 96) 82
Lynch v. New York, (76 N". T. 60)
294, 328, 342, 354 o, 355
Lynch v. People, (16 Mich. 472) 158,
195 d
Lynch ». E. E. Co., (57 Wis. 480)
395
Lynchburg v. Norfolk & N. W. E. E.
Co., (SO Va. 237) 261
Lynchburg v. Slaughter, (75 Va. 57)
195 d
Lynde v. Co., (16 Wall. 6) 195
Lyndon v. Stadbridge, (2 H. & N. 45)
130
Lynn v, Cumberland, (26 Atl. E.
1001) 72
Lyon V. Adamson, (7 Iowa, 509) 167
Lyon V. Alley, (130 U. S. 177) 283
Lyon V. Cambridge, 136 Mass. 409)
344a
Lyon V. Com., (3 Bibb. 430) 69
Lyon V. Fishmongers Co., (L. E. 1
App. Cas. 662) 132
Lyon V. Grand Eapids, (30 Mich. 253)
87
Lyon V. Irish, (58 Mich. 518) 169
Lyon V. Jerome, (15 Wend. 569) 233,
238
Lyon J). Eeceiver of Taxes, (52 Mich.
271) 326 a
Lyons Highway Comm'rs v. People,
(38 111. 347) 368
Lyons v. Desotelle, (124 Mass. 387)
352
Lyth V. Buffalo, (48 Hun, 175) 87,
113, 148
M.
Maas B. Miss., K. & T. Ey. Co., (11
Hun, 8) 195 6
Mabey v. Tarver, (1 Hump. 94) 123
Macbeath v. Haldimond, (1 D. & E
Term, 172) 168
Macei). Com'rs, (99 N. 0. 65, 5 S. E.
E. 740) 397
Macey v. Titcombe, (19 Ind. 135) 172
MacDonald v. Mayor, (32 Hun, 89)
67
Mackey v. Vicksburgh, (64 Miss. 777)
336 a
Mackinnon v. Person, (25 Eng. L. &
Eq. 457) 315
Macklot V. Davenport, (17 Iowa, 379)
381
MacNaughton ■». Elkhart, (85 Ind.
384) 348
Macomber v. Duane, (2 Allen, 541)
80
Macomber v. Godfrey, (108 Mass.
219) 354
Macomber v. Taunton, (100 Mass.
255) 331 a
Macon ». Dasher, (16 S. E. R. 75)
208, 211
Macon v. First Nat. Bank, (59 Ga.
648) 263
Macon v. Franklin, (12 Ga. 239) 217,
218
Macon v. Huff, (60 Ga. 221) 166
Macon v. Jones, (67 Ga. 489) 272
Macon v. M. Sav. Bank. (60 Ga. 133)
263, 273
Macon v. Patty, (57 Miss. 386) 282
Macon v. Shaw, (16 Ga. 172) 398
Macon Co. t. Huidekoper, (99 U. S.
592) 194 a
Macon Co. v. People, (121 111. 616)
316
Macon etc. Co. v. Eiggs, (13 S. E. R.
312) 238
Macoy i>. Curtis, (14 S. C. 367) 81
Maddox v. Graham, (2 Met. 56) 365,
368
Maddox v. Randolph, (65 Ga. 216)
350 6
Maddrey v. Cox, (73 Tex. 538) 55
Maddux v. Newport, (14 S. W. E.
957) 259 a
Madison ». Harbor Board, (25 Atl.
R. 337) 328
Madison v. Hatcher, (8 Blackf. 341)
117
Madison v. Kelso, (32 Ind. 79) 79, 83
Madison v. Korbley, (32 Ind. 74) 83
Madison v. Smith, (83 Ind. 502) 175,
195 a, 349, 363
Madison Co. v. Priestley, (42 Fed.
817) 189
Madison v. Whitney, (81 Ind. 261)
272
Magarity v. Wilmington, (5 Hous.
530) 354 a
Magee v. Calaveras Co., (10 Cal. 376)
362, 363
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
cm
Magee v. Commonwealth, (46 Pa. St.
358) 259 a
Maggie P., (25 Fed. Kep. 202) 163
Magie v. Stoddard, (25 Conn. 565) 86
Magill V. KaufEman, (4 S. & E. 317)
51, 164
Magneau v. Fremont, (47 N. W. R.
280) 255
Magrath v. Brock. Twp., (13 Up. Can.
Q. B. 629) 250
Maguire v. Hughes, (13 La. An. 281)
90
Maguire v. Smock, (42 Ind. 1) 278
Mahady v. Busher etc. Co., (91 N. T.
148) 297, 300
Mahany v. Scholly, (84 Pa. St. 136)
341
Mahan, In re, (20 Hun, 301) 172
Maher v. Chicago, (38 111.266)51, 169
Mahogany v. "Ward, (17 Atl. K. 860)
321
Mahon v. Columbus, (58 Miss. 310)
210
Mahoney ». Metro. Ky. Co., (104
Mass. 73) 352
Mahoney d. The Bank of the State,
(4 Ark. 620) 25
Main v. McCarthy, (15 111. 442) 155
Makemson v. Kaufman, (35 Ohio St.
444) 397
Malchus V. Highlands Dist., (4 Bush,
547) 259 a
Maleverer v. Spink, (1 Dyer, 36 b) 335
Mallory v. Austin, (7 Barb. 626) 320
Mallory v. Hibernia etc. Co., (21 Pac.
R. 525) 348
Mallory v. Griffey, (85 Pa. St. 275)
287
Mallory v. Mallett, (6 Jones Eq. 345)
42
Mallory v. Super's, (2 Cowen, 531) 79
MaUoy v. Bennett, (15 Fed. Rep. 371)
352 a
Malone's Est., (21 S. C. 188) 2
Malone v. Murphy, (2 Kan. 250) 104
Maltus V. Shields, (2 Mete. 553) 56,
276
Manaska v. Ingalls, (16 Iowa, 81) 72
Manchester v. Hartford, (30 Conn.
118) 346
Manchester?;. Smyth, (18 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. 474) 130
Manderschid v. Dubuque, (20 Iowa,
73) 219, 346
Mangan ». Atterbury, (lEx. 239)382
Manhattan R. Co., In re, (162 N. Y.
301) 172
Manhattan Co. v. Van Keuren, (23
N. J. E. 251) 120
Manistee L. Co. v. Springfield, (52 N^.
W. E. 468) 326
Mankato v. Arnold, (36 Minn. 62)
104
Manley v. Atchison, (9 Kan. 358) 92
Manley v. Emlen, (46 Kan. 655, 27
Pac. 844) 279
Mann v. Pentz, (2 Sandf. Ch. 257) 52
Manners v. Haverhill, (135 Mass. 165)
338
Manning v. Fifth Parish, (6 Pick. 16)
108
Manning v. Lowell, (130 Mass. 21)
355
Manning v. Woodstock, (22 Atl. R.
42, 59 Conn. 224) 350 a
Manny, In re, (14 How. 24) 360
Manrose v. Parker, (90 111. 581) 220
Mansfield v. Moore, (21 111. App. 326)
346
Manuel ». Cumberland, (98 N. C. 9)
339
Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, (14
Johns. 238) 48
Manufacturer's Ins. Co. v. Loud, (99
Mass. 146) 258
Manus v. Givens, (7 Leigh, 689) 360
Manzy v. Hardy, (13 Neb. 36) 327
Mappa V. Los Angeles, (61 Cal. 309)
172
Marble v. Worcester, (4 Gray, 395)
342, 343
March v. Com., (12 B. Mon. 25) 117,
146
March v. Portsmouth etc. Co., (19
N. H. 372) 238, 354
Marden v. Portsmouth, (59 N. H. 18)
79
Marden v. Potter, (7 C. B., N. S. 641)
104
Marietta v. Fearing, (4 Ohio, 427) 2,
129
Marine Ins. Co. v. Railroad, (41 Fed.
E. 643) 210
Mariner v. Mackey, (25 Kan. 669) 212
Marion v. Chandler, (6 Ala. 800) 398
Marion t;. Skillman, (26 N. E. R. 676)
329
Marion Co. v. Clark, (94 U. S. 278)
195 a
Marion Co. v. Louisville Co., (15 S.
W. R. 1061) 17
Marion Co. ». Riggs, (24 Kan. 255)
325
Maris v. Mason, (37 Texas, 447) 232
Market v. St. Louis, (56 Mo. 189) 346,
3506
Market etc. Co. v. Ceu. etc. Co., (51
Cal. 583) 302
Markle ». Akron, (14 Ohio, 586) 104
Markle v. Borough, (21 Atl. R. 794)
326 a, 335
Markle v. Wright, (13 Ind. 548) 379
eiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Marley v. Gt. "Western Ry. Co., (16
Up. Can. Q. B. 504) 352 a
Marmet v. State, (45 Ohio St. 63, 12
ST. E. E. 463) 261
Marriage v. Lawrence, (3 B. & Aid.)
107
Marriott v. Hampton, (2 Esp. 546)
326, 326 a
Marseilles v. Howland, (124 111. 551)
287.
Marsh v. Brooklyn, (59 IS". T. 280) 249
Marsh v. Fulton Co., (10 "Wall. 676)
170, 195 d
Marsh v. Little Valley, (64 N. Y. 112)
375
Marshall ii. Anderson, (78 Mo. 85) 218
Marshall v. Cook, (38 IH. 44) 65
Marshall v. Guion, (11 N. T. 461) 132
Marshall v. Kerns, (2 Swan. 68) 65,
371
Marshall D. Silliman, (61 111.218) 187 a
189, 395
Marshall i-. Smith, (L. R. 8 C. P. 416)
154
Marshall v. Vicksburg, (15 "Wall. 146)
270
Marshall v. Vultee, (1 E. D. Smith,
294) 132
Marshall Co. v. Cook, (38 111. 44) 195
Marshall Co. «. Jackson Co., (36 Ala.
613) 350 6
Marshall Co. v. Schenck, (5 "Wall.
772) 170, 183
Marshalltown v. Blum, (58 Iowa, 184)
258
Marshalltown v. Forney, (61 Iowa,
578) 308
Martel v. E. St. Louis, (94 111. 67, 21
Alb. L. J. 195) 160
Martin ». Aston, (60 Cal. 65) 62
Martin v. Br. Bank, (15 Ala. 587) 207
Martin v. Brooklyn, (1 Hill, 541) 169,
242, 355
Martin v. Carron, (26 N. J. L. 228)
259 a
Martin v. Dix, (52 Miss. 3) 56, 259,
276
Martin v. Dix, (52 Miss. 53) 2, 8
Martin ». Evansville, (32 Ind. 85) 225
Martin v. Gleason, (139 Mass. 183)
234
Martin v. Hewit, (44 Ala. 418) 283
Martin v. Hilb, (14 S. W. R. 94) 294
Martin v. Ingham, (36 Kan. 641) 303
Martin v. Lemon, (26 Conn. 192) 99
Martin v. Maher, (1 Hill, 545) 164
Martin v. Mayor, (1 Hill. 545) 9, 113,
169
Martin v. O'Brien, (.34 Miss. 21) 133
Martin v. Rosedale, (J9 K. E. K. 410)
121, 258
Martin v. Town, (56 Hun, 510) 397
Martin v. Tripp, (51 Me. 184) 360
Martindale v. Palmer, (52 Ind. 411)
90, 159
Martini, Ex parte, (23 Fla. 843) 155
Martinsville v. Shirley, (84 Ind. 546)
329
Marvin v. New Bedford, (33 N. E.
E. 605) 324
Marx V. Croisan, (17 Ore. 393) 47
Masen v. Ellsworth, (32 Me. 271) 3505
Mason v. Ellsworth, (32 Me. 271) 352 a
Mason v. Pearson, (9 How. 248) 111,
349
Mason v. Haile, (12 "Wheat. 370) 194
Mason v. Lancaster, (4 Bush, 406) 261
Mason v. London, (3 Baxt. 94) 61
Mason v. Minturn, (4 W. Va. 302) 363
Mason v. Spencer, (35 Kan. 512) 277
Mason City etc. Co. v. Mason, (23 W.
Ya. 211) 396
Mass. -B. Harpeth, (7 Heisk. 283) 182-
Massey v. Columbus, (75 Ga. 658) 352
Massing v. Ames, (37 "Wis. 645) 265
Massoth V. Delaware etc. Co., (6 N.
T. 524) 136
Masters v. Portland, (83 Pac. R. 540)
259 a
Masters v. Troy, (50 Hun, 485) 3506
Masters v. "Warren, (27 Conn. 293)
3.52 a
Masterson v. Mt. Vernon, (58 N. Y.
391) 92, 331a, 355
Masterson v. Short, (7 Eobt. 241) 299
Maher v. Chicago, (38 111. 66) 164
Mathews v. Inhabitants, (134 Mass.
355) 142
Mathews v. Kelsey, (58 Me. 56) 300
Mathewson v. Grand Rapids, (50 N
"W. E. 651, 88 Mich. 558) 165, 169
Mathias v. Mason, (33 N. W. E. 312)
398
Matthews v. Alexandria, (68 Mo. 115)
113, 207, 208, 209, 263
Matthews v. Mayor etc. of X. Y., (1
Sandf. 132) 92
Matlock V. Glover, (63 Tex. 231) 327
Mattenly v. Disti-ict, (97 U. S. 687) 17
Matter of Application of Department
of Public Parks, (86 N. Y. 439) 28
Matthiessen etc. v. Jersey City, (26
N. J. Eq. 247) 21"8, 290
Matthis V. Cameron, (62 Mo. 504) 177
Matts 0. Hawkins, (5 Taunt. 20) 131
Mattingly v. District, (97 U. S. 687)
161
Mattlnsie v. N. Y. El. R. Co., (17 N.
Y. S. 536) 242
Mau V. Liddle, (15 Nev. 271) 868
Manch Chunk v. Kline, (100 Pa. St
119) 344
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
CV
Beferences are to Sections.
Maugh V. Milwaukee, (32 Wis. 200)
337
Maultby ». Leavenworth, (28 Kan.
745) 352
Mauldin v. City Council of Green-
ville, (33 S. C. 1) 144a
Maupin v. Franklin Co., (67 Mo. 327)
165
Maxey v. Loyal, (38 Ga. 531) 194
Maximilian v. New York, (62 N. T.
160) 9, 324, 338 a
Maxwell v. Bay Bridge Co., (41 Mich.
453) 314
Maxwell ». Bryne, (36 Ind. 120) 120
Maxwell v. Palmerton, (21 Wend.
407) 129
Maxwell v. San Luis Obispo, (71 Cal.
466, 12 Pac. 484) 326 a
Maxwell v. Stanislaus, (46 N. T. 100)
172
May V. Detroit, (2 Mich. K. P. Kep.
23.5) 172
May B. Juneau Co., (30 Fed. Eep.
241) 338
May V. Mercer Co., (30 Fed. Kep.
247) 338
May B. Sch. Dist., (22 Neb. 205) 312
Mayer v. New York, (63 N. Y. 455)
327
Mayfield v. Moore, (53 111. 428) 79
Mayhew v. Gay Head, (13 Allen, 129)
106, 108
Mayo V. Cincinnati, (1 Ohio St. 268,
272) 123
Mayo 1). James, (12 Gratt. 17) 250
Mayor v. Allaire, (14 Ala. 400) 117
Mayor d. Baily, (2 Denio, 433) 92
Mayor v. Beasley, (1 Humph. 232)
150
Mayor v. Brown, (54 Ga. 229) 85
Mayor v. City i3ank of Macon, (58
Ga. 584) 195 d
Mayor v. Cornell, (6 Coldw. 412) 312
Mayor v. Eden Musee, (102 N. Y.
593) 124
Mayor v. Gear, (27 N. J. L. 265) 79
Mayor v. Henly, (2 CI. & Fin. 331)
324
Mayor ». Hopkins, (13 La. An. 326)
11
Mayor v. Horn, (2 Harr. 190) 72
Mayor v. Horner, (Cowp. 102) 31
Mayor v. Hyatt, (3 E. D. Smith, 156)
127
Mayor v. Inman, (57 Ga. 370) 183
Mayor v. .Johns Hopkins' Hosp., (56
Md. 1) 279
Mayor v. Keyser, (19 Atl. R. 706) 165,
172, 173
Mayor ». Lombard, (57 Miss. 125)
183
Mayor v. Lord, (17 Wend. 285) 335
Mayor v. Magnon, (4 Martin, 1) 312
Mayor v. Markham, (23 Ga. 402) 391
Mayor v. Morgan, (7 Mart. N. S. 1)
363
Mayor v. Muzzy, (33 Mich. 61) 79
Mayor v. New York, (63 N. Y. 455)
281
Mayor v. N. Y. & S. I. Ferry Co., (40
N. Y. Super. 232) 134
Mayor v. Ohio etc. Co., (26 Pa. St.
355) 302
Mayor v. Park Com'rs, (44 Mich.
602) 234, 237
Mayor v. Pendleton, (15 Md. 12) 342
Mayor v. Phelps, (27 Ala. 55) 154
Mayor v. Randolph, (4 W. & S. 514)
329
Mayor v. Roberts, (34 Ind. 471) 377
Mayor v. Sands, (105 N. Y. 210) 89
Mayor v. Simpson, (2 Q. B. 73) 100
Mayor v. Sonneborn, (113 N. Y. 423)
132
Mayor v. State, (15 Md. 376) 67
Mayor v. Stone, (20 Wend. 139) 335
Mayors. Sheffield, (4 Wall. 189) 313,
324, 342
Mayor v. Thorne, (7 Paige, 261) 130
Mayor v. Wright, (2 Port. 230) 107
Mayor v. Wright, (6 Yerg. 497) 225
Mayor and Burgesses etc., (10 Coke,
120) 49
Mayor v. Winfield, (8 Humph. 707)
150
Mayor etc. v. Colgate, (12 N. Y. 146)
28
Mayor etc. v. Crawford, (111 N. Y.
638) 71
Mayor etc. v. Cunliff, (2 N. Y. 165) 92
Mayor etc. v. Lasser, (9 Humph. 757)
92
Mayor etc. Milledgeville v. Cooley,
(55 Ga. 17) 349
Mayor etc. v. Nichols, (4 Hill, 209)
127, 150
Mayor etc. v. Ordrenan, (12 Johns,
152) 154, 155
Mayor etc. v. Potomac Ins. Co., (58
Tenn. 296) 192, 193
Mayor etc. v. Rouse, (8 Ala. 515) 117
Mayor etc. v. Root, (8 Md. 95) 80
Mayor etc. v. Rowland, (26 Ala. 498)
80
Mayor etc. v. Shaw, (16 Ga. 172) 83,
85
Mayor etc. v. State Bk., (8 Ai-k. 227)
87
Mayor etc. v. Tenth Nat. Bank, (111
N. Y. 446) 16
Mayor etc. v. Tows., (5 Sneed, 186)
18
CVl
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Mayor etc. v. Tucker, (1 Daly, 107)
87
Mayor etc. of Griffin ». City Bank,
(58 Ga. 584) 191
Mayor etc. of Lyme v. Henley, (2 CI.
& F. 331) 37
Mayor etc. of Washington ». Meigs, (1
McArthur, 53) 129
Mayor etc. of Baltimore v. State, (15
Md. 376) 59
Mayor etc. of Helena v. Thompson,
29 Ark. 569) 92
Mayor of Athens v. Georgia R. R.,
(72 Ga. 800) 153
Mayor of Hoboken ». Harrison, (30
N. J. L. 73) 75
Mayor of London v. Lynn Regis, (1
H. Bl. 206) 156
Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, (Cowper,
86) 349
Mayor of Memphis v. Lasser, (9
Humph. 757) 325, 349
Mayor of Nashville v. Hogan, (9 Bax-
ter, 495) 175
Mayor of Nashville v. Ray, (19 Wall.
478) 177, 182
Mayor of N. T. v. Hyatt, (3 E. D.
Smith, 156) 117
Mayor of N. T. u. Williams, (16 N. T.
502) 131
Mayor of Rome ». Dodd, (58 Ga. 239)
349
Mayor of Savannah v. Waldner, (49
Ga. 316) 325
Mayor of St. Martinsville v. Mary
Lewis, (32 La. An. 1293) 133
Mayrhofer v. Board, (26 Pac. R. 646)
212
Mays V. Cincinnati, (1 Ohio St. 268)
124, 256, 326 a
Maysville v. Shultz, (3 Dana, id) 32
Maywood Co. v. Maywood, (29 N. E.
R. 704, 118 111. 61) 215, 226, 294
Mazet V. Pittsburgh, (137 Pa. St. 548)
395
MoAlar K. Woodruff, (33 N. J. L. 213)
104
McAlister v. Albany, (18 Oreg. 426)
350
McAlister v. Clark, (33 Conn. 91) 122
McAUiley v. Horton, (75 Ala. 491)
399
McAndrews ». CoUard, (42 N. J. L.
189) 120
McAi-thur !). Nelson, (81 Ky. 67) 67
McArthur v. Saginaw, (58 Mich. 357)
327, 339
McAuliffe V. New Bedford, (27 N. E.
R. 517) 84
McAvoy I). Mayor, (54 How. Pr. 245)
336 a
McBean ». Chandler, (9 Heisk. 349)
299
McBean v. Martin, (31 Pac. R. 5) 282
McBean v. Redick, (31 Pac. R. 7)
282
McBean ». San Bernardino, (31 Pac.
R. 49) 165
McBride v. Gr. Rap., (47 Mich. 236)
79
McBrien v. Grand Rapids, (56 Mich.
95) 165, 360
McCafferty v. McCabe, (4 Abb. P. R.
87) 397
McCafferty v. Spuyten Duyvil etc.
Co., (61 N. Y. 178) 347
McCaffrey v. Smith, (41 Hun, 117)
299
McCall V. Hancock, (10 Fed. Rep. 80)
196
McCalla ». Multnomah Co., (3 Oreg.
424) 353
McCallie v. Mayor of Chattanooga,
(3 Head, 318) 53, 55
McCann v. Sierra County, (7 Cal. 121)
247
MoCann v. State, (62 Ala. 138) 319
McCannie v. Mayor etc. of Chatta-
nooga, (3 Head, 317) 57
McCartee v. Orphan Asylum Society,
(9 Cow. 427) 200, 202
McCartle v. Bates, (29 Ohio St. 419)
100
McCarthy v. Boston, (135 Mass. 197)
324,338 a
McCarthy v. Commonw., (110 Pa. St.
243) 25
McCarthy v. Deming, (51 Conn. 422)
105
McCarthy v. Portland, (67 Me. 167)
342
McCarthy v. St. Paul, (22 Minn. 527)
330
McCarthy c. Syracuse, (46 N. Y. 194)
349,3.50 a
McCany v. Bauer, (3 Kans. 237) 92
McCash B. Burlington, (33 N. W. R.
346, 72 Iowa, 26) 292
McCaughey v. Pi-ovidence, (12 R. I.
449)328, 336 a
McCearly v. Lemeunier, (40 La. An.
253) 217
McChesney v. Hyde Park, (28 N. E.
R. 1102) 259 a
McClay v. Lincoln, (49 N. W. R. 282)
56
McClean v. State, (49 N. J. L. 471)
120
McCloskey v. Krelling, (18 Pac. 433)
146
McClung V. Silliman, (6 Wheat. 601;
375
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
cvu
McClure v. Oxford Township, (94 IT.
S. 429) 191
McClure v. Redwig, (28 Minn. 186)
245 355
McCluskey v. Cromwell, (11 N. Y.
598) 72
McComas v. Krug, (81 Ind. 327) 83
McConike v. State, (17 Fla. 238) 371
McConnell v. Dewey, (5 Neb. 385) 325
McConnell v. Hammond, (16 Kan.
228) 188
McConupU V. Lexington Trs., (12
Wheat. 582) 217
McConnell v. Simpson, (36 Fed. Rep.
750) 177
McConrill jj. Jersey City, (39 N. J. L.
38) 102
McCord V. Hugh, (24 Iowa, 336) 349
McCord B. Oakland, (27 Pac. 803, 64
Cal. 134) 392
McCord V. Pike, (12 N. E. R. 259)
395
McCord V. Tiger, (6Biss. 409) 121
McCormack v. Brooklyn, (108 N. Y.
49) 243, 249
McCormick v. Bay City, (23 Mich.
457) 98, 106
McCormick v. City, (18 IST. Y. S. 272,
63 Hun, 632) 324
McCormick v. Calhoun, (80 S. C. 03)
150
McCormick v. Lafayette, (1 Ind. 48)
247
McCormick v. Patchin, (53 Mo. 33,
14 Am. Rep. 440) 264, 291
McCormick v. People, (28 N. E. 1106)
18
McCormick u. Washington Tp., (112
Pa. St. 185) 317, 353
McCormick v. W. Duluth, (50 N. W.
R. 128, 47 Minn. 272) 26
McCowan v. Whiteside, (31 Ind. 235)
396
McCoy V. Brant, (53 Cal. 247) 165, 169
McCoy 1). Phila. etc. Co., (5 Del. 599)
136
McCracken v. Markesan, (45 N. W.
R. 323) 352
McCracken v. San Francisco, (16 Cal.
591) 99, 165, 170
McCrowell v. Bristol, (5 Lea, 685)
120, 331, 400
McCrowell v. Bristol, (16 S. E. R.
807) 113, 282
McCroy v. Griswold, (7 Iowa, 248)
249
McCulloch V. State, (11 Ind. 424) 149
MoCullough V. Brooklyn, (23 Wend.
459) 359
Mc(^u]lough V. Maryland, (4 Wheat.
316) 22
McCullough V. Mayor etc., (23 Wend.
458) 92, 178
McCullough J). San Francisco Bd. of
Ed., (51 Cal. 418) 226
McCullough V. Talladega etc., (46
Ala. 376) 165 ■
McCutcheon v. Homer, (43 Md. 483)
327 a
McDade v. Chester City, (117 Pa. St.
414) 327, 328
McDaniel v. Columbus, (13 S. E. R.
745, 87 Ga. 440) 249
McDeraiott v. Met. Pol. Brd.,(5 Abb.
Pr. 422) 89
McDermott v. Miller, (45 N. J. L.
253) 371
McDiarmid v. Fitch, (27 Ark. 100)
371
McDonald v. Ashland, (47 K. W. R.
434) 350 b
McDonald v. Corporation etc., (29
Up. Can. C. P. 249) 353
McDonald v. International & Gt. N.
Co., (00 Tex. 590) 134
McDonald!). Mayor, (68 N. Y. 23)
165
McDonald v. New York, (68 N. Y.
23) 164
McDonald v. Newark, (42 N. J. E.
136) 129, 396
McDonald v. Redwing, (13 Minn. 38)
335
McDonald v. Rehrer, (22 Fla. 198)
393
McDonald v. Schell, (6 Serg. & R.
240) 105
McDonald v. Schneider, (27 Mo. 405)
210
McDonald v. Philadelphia, (12 Pa.
Co. C. & R. 672) 324
McDonough v. Virginia City, (6 Nev.
90) 327, 349
McDougall V. Boston, (134 Mass. 149)
350 6
McDougall V. Salem, (110 Mass. 21)
353
McDuffie V. Cook, (65 Ala. 430) 362
McElroy v. Albany, (05 Ga. 387) 92,
333
McElroy v. Kansas City, (21 Fed.
Rep. 257) 330
McEwen v. Gilker, (38 Ind. 233) 172
McEwen v. Taylor, (4 G. Greene, 532)
134, 144
McFarlanj). Triton Ins. Co., (4Denio,
392) 106
McFarland v. Butler, (8 Minn. 116)
194
McFarland v. Orange etc. Co., (13 N.
J. Eq. 17) 302
MiFarlane o. Kerr, (10 Bosw. 249) 312
CVIU
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
McFarnahan v. Pike, (91 Cal. 540)
312
McGafEagau v. Boston, (149 Mass.
289) 3506
McGai-ry v. IST. T. Co., (7 Kobt. 464)
87
MoGarty v. Deming, (51 Conn. 422)
105
McGaiy v. Lafayette, (12 Eob. 668)
338, 352 a
McGee's App., (140 Pa. St. 570) 308
McGee's Appeal, (114 Pa. St. 470,
478) 28, 312
McGee v. Avondale, (7 Ohio Cir. Ct.
K. 246) 282
McGee b. Penn. E. E.. (114 Pa. St.
470) 308
McGee v. Salem, (149 Mass. 238) 12
McGee u. State, (103 lud. 444) 86
McGee v. State, (49 N. W. E. 220)
361
McGeehee v. Mathis, (21 Ark. 40)
248, 259 a
McGehee v. Columbus, (69 Ga. 581)
326 a
McGehee v. Woodville, (59 Miss.
648) 219
McGill V. District, (4 Mackey, 70)
348
McGinness v. New York, (26 Hun,
142) 142
McGinty v. Keokuk, (66 Iowa, 725)
352
McGonigle v. Allegheny, (44 Pa. St.
118) 259 a
McGrath v. Chicago, (24 111. App.
19) 146
McGrath v. Newton, (29 Kan. 364)
261
McGraw v. Whitson, (69 Iowa, 348)
98, 148
McGregor v. Baloh, (14 Vt. 428) 74
McGregor v. Boyle, (34 Iowa, 268)
327
McGrew v. Stewart, (32 Pac. E. 896)
290
McGuinness v. Mayor, (52 How. Pr.
450) 336 o
McGuinness i'. Westchester, (66 Hun,
256) 325
McGuire, In re, (50 Hun, 203) 71
McGuire v. Eapid City, (43 N. W.
Eep. 706) 174
McHardy c. Corporation etc., (1 App.
C. 629; 39 Q. B. 546) 316
McHenry v. Township, (31 N. W.
Rep. 602) 362
McHey v. Hyde Park, (37 Fed. E.
389) 220
Mclnerney v. Denver, (29 Pac. E.
516) 18, 117, 146, 150
Mclnerney v. Eeading, (150 Pa. St
611) 324
Mclnerney v. Eeed, (23 Iowa, 410)
263, 282
Mclnerney v. St. Joseph, (45 Mo. 291)
354 o
Mclnstry ». Tanner, (9 Johns. 185)
88
Mclntire c. Sch. Trustees, (3 111. App.
77)72
SEcIntire b. State, (5 Blackf. 384) 245
Mclntire v. Wood, (7 Cransh, 504)
375
Mclver v. Clarke, (10 So. E. 581) 261
McKay v. Buffalo, (74 N. T. 619) 333
McKay v. Detroit etc., (2 Mich. 138)
319
McKay v. D. & E. E. E., (2 Mich.
139) 318
McKee v. Anderson Council, (Eice
L. 24) 326
MoKee t. Bidwell, (74 Pa. St. 218)
352
McKee v. Brown, (La. An. 306) 278
MoKee v. Canal Co., (125 N. T. 353)
247
McKee ». MoKee, (8 B. Mon. 433) 155
McKee v. Perchment, (69 Pa. St. 342)
219
McKee v. St. Louis, (17 Mo. 184) 217,
219
McKee v. Yernon Co., (3 Dill. 210)
196, 197
McKeesport etc. Co. u. Lyle, (131
Pa. St. 437, 18 Atl. E. 1111) 238
McKeigue v. Janesville, (68 Wis. 50)
352, 352 a
MoKellar v. Detroit, (57 Mich. 158)
344 a
McKenna v. Boston, (131 Mass. 142)
220
McKenna v. Lancaster Dist. E.
Comm'rs, (Harper Law, 381) 221
McKenzie v. Northiield, (30 Minn.
456) 352
McKeou V. Lee, (51 N. T. 300) 120
McKevitt V. Hoboken, (45 N. J. L.
482) 292
MoKibbiu v. Port Smith, (35 Ark.
352) 120, 130
McKinley v.. Freeh., (29 N. J. Eq.
164) 313
McKinnon v. Penson, (25 Eng. L. &
E. 457) 324
McKnight v. Parish of Grant, (30 La.
An. 361) 212
McLane v. Sharp, (2 Harr. 481) 321
McLarren v. Spalding, (2 Cal. 510)
244
McLaughlin v. Corry, (77 Pa. St. 109)
344
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Eeferences arc to Sections.
cix
McLaughlin v. Municipality, (5 La.
An. 604) 92, 242
McLaughlin v. Stevens, (18 Ohio, 94)
117, 221
McLaury v. McGregor, (.54 Iowa, 717)
352
McLean v. Great Western Ey. Co.,
(33 Up. Can. Q. B. 198) 242, 247
McLeod V. Scott, (26 Pac. R. 1061)
359
McMahan v. Savannah, (66 Ga. 217) 66
McMasters v. Commonwealth, (3
Watts, 292) 248, 259 a
McMeekin v. State, (9 Ark. 553) 80
McMilleu V. Boyles, (6 Iowa, 304) 17,
161, 187 a
McMullen v. City Council, (1 Bay,
46) 154
McMurray v. Baltimore, (54 Md. 104)
225
McNally v. Cohoes, (27 N. E. E. 1043)
350 a
McNamara ». Clintonville, (62 Wis.
207) 352
McNamara v. Estes, (22 Iowa, 246)
291
MclSTeal etc. Co. v. Bullock, (38 Fed.
R. 565) 212
McNerney v. Reading, (150 Pa. St.
611) 300
McNiel V. Borland, (23 Cal. 144) 102
McPhee v. Venable, (77 Ga. 772) 282
McPherson v. Chebause, (28 N. E. R.
404, 114111. 46) 117
McPherson v. Foster, (48 Iowa, 48)
189 o, 376
McPherson b. Nichols, (29 Pac. R.
679) 165
McPike V. Pen, (51 Mo. App. 63) 397
McRae v. O'Lain, (1 McMuUen's R.
328) 129
McReynolds v. Kansas etc. Co., (34
Mo. App. 581) 246
McShane v. Moberly, (79 Mo. 41) 218
McSpedon ». New York, (7 Bosw.
601) 164
McVeany v. Mayor, (80 N. T. 185) 79,
381
McVerry v. Boyd, (26 Pac. 885) 329
McVichie b. Knight, (51 N. W. R.
1094) 190
McVicker v. Cone, (21 Or. 353) 31
McWilliams v. Morgan, (61 III. 89)
227
Meacham v. Fitchburgh R. R. Co., (4
Cush. 291) 245
Mead, In re, (74 N. Y. 216) 280, 301
Mead v. Acton, (139 Mass. 341) 136,
138
Mead v. Boxborough, (11 Cush. 362)
Mead v. Dreas, (36 Mich. 416) 83
Mead v. New Haven, (40 Conn. 72)
338 a
Meadsville v. Dickson, (24 W. N. C.
451) 283
Meagher v. Story Co., (5 Nev. 244)
79, 85, 102
Mealing v. Augusta, (Dud. 221) 401
Meares b. Cora'rs, (9 Ired. L. 73) 325,
329, 349
Mears v. Wilmington, (9 Ired. L. 73,
82) 354 a, 355
Mechan v. Hudson, (46 N. J. L. 276)
79
Mechanics Bk. v. Bk. of Columbia,
(o Wlieat. 326) 167
Mechanics Bk. v. Granger, (20 Atl. R.
202) 325
Mechanics' Bank v. Kansas City, (73
Mo. 555) 397
Medical Ins. v. Patterson, (5 Denio.
618) 25
Medina b. Perkins, (48 Mich. 67) 350 6
351
Medway Cotton Manufacturing Co.
V. Adams, (10 Mass. 360) 47, 49
Meech b. Buffalo, (29 N. Y. 210) 148
Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, (15 Wend.
397) 108, 120
Megowan b. Com., (2 Mete. 3) 134
Meier v. Portland, (19 Pac. R. 610)
217
Meigs B. Lister, (23 N. J. Eq., 320)
120
Meinzer v. Racine, (68 Wis. 241, 70
lb. 561) 329
Meissner v. Toledo, (31 Ohio St. 387)
259 a
MelleuB. West. R. R. Co., (4 Gray,
501) 355
Mellinger b. Houston, (68 Tex. 37)
283
Mellon V. Lansing, (19 Blatchf. 512,
11 Fed. Rep. 829) 185
Mells V. Gleason, (11 Wis. 470) 182
Melvin b. Lisenby, (72 111. 63) 190 a
Memphis v. Adams, (9 Heisk. 518)
52, 110
Memphis v. Brown, (97 U. S. 203, 300)
362, 365
Memphis v. Hernando Ins. Co., (6
Baxter, 527) 255
Memphis v. Kimbarough, (12 Heisk.
133) 336 a
Memphis v. Laski, (9 Heisk. 511) 80
Memphis v. Mem. W. Co., (5 Heisk.
528) 175
Memphis v. O' Conner, (53 Mo. 468)
158
Memphis v. United States, (97 U. S.
293, 97 lb. 284) 362
ex
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Memphis ». Woodford, (12 Heisk. 499)
79, 85
Memphis etc. Co. v. Memphis, (4
Coldw. 406) 302
Memphis etc. Co. v. State, (11 S. W.
E. 946) 306
Memphis Ketc. Co. v. Thompson, (24
Kan. 170) 186
Memphis etc. r. Williamson, (9 Heisk.
314) 296
Memphis & C. R. R. Co. v. Payne,
37 Miss. 700) 243
Memphis & St. L. Packet Co. v. Gri'ey,
(9 Bush, 137) 221
Mendenhall v. Burton, (22 P. 558) 29,
31
Mer. Eep. Co., In re, (115 ^^. T. 176)
48
Mercer v. Corbin, (117 Ind. 450) 300
Mercer v. Jackson, (54 III. 39) 347
Mercer v. Pittsburgh etc. Co., (36 Pa.
St. 99) 290, 302
Mercer v. Railroad Co., (36 Pa. St. 99)
11, 240
Mercer Co. v. Hacket, (1 Wall. 83)
191 6, 196, 254
Mercliants Bank v. Little Rock, (5
Dill. 299, 98 U. S. 308) 181
Merch. Bk. v. Xew York, (97 N. T.
355) 171
Merchant's etc. Bank v. Bergen Co.,
(115 U. S. 384) 190 a
Meridian v. Phillips, (4 So. R. 119)
2T1
Merretti,-. Portchester, (71 N. T. 309)
265
Merriam, In re, (84 N. T. 596) 281
Merriam c. Moody, (25 Iowa, 163)
110, 282
Merriam v. New Orleans, (14 La. An.
318) 122, 123, 159, 261
Merriam v. Yuba Co., (72 Cal. 577,
14 Pac. R. 137) 397
Merrick v. Amherst, (12 Allen, 500)
259, 259 a
Merrick r. Baltimore, (43 Md. 219)
242
Merrifield v. Worcester, (110 Mass.
216) 328, 355
Merrill v. Abbott, (62 Ind. 549) 278
Merrill v. Burbank, (23 Me. 538) 211
Merrill v. Claremont, (58 X. H. 468)
351
Merrill v. Hampden, (26 Me. 234)
342
Merrill v. Humphrey, (24 Mich. 170)
397
Merrill v. Monticello, (138 X. S. 673)
182, 183
Merrill v. Plainfield, (45 X. H. 126)
395, 397
Merrill b. Portland, (4 ClifE. C. C. R.
138) 329, 351
Merrill v. Toledo, (6 Ohio Cir. Ct.
430) 27
MeiTiraack E. S. Bk. v. Lowell, (152
Mass. 556) 327 b
Merrimac Riv. Can. Prop. v. Lowell,
(7 Gray, 223) 335
Meriwether B. Garrett, (102 U. S. 472)
2,39
Merri wether v. 11. S., (22 Court of
Claims, 332) 41, 79
Mersey Docks c. Gibbs, Samec. Pen-
haUow, (L, E. 1 H. L. Cases, 93, 1
H. & ]Sr. 439) 132, 324, 350 a
Mersey Dock Cases, (11 H. Lds.
Cases, 687) 336
Mertz V. Cook, (108 N. Y. 505) 196
Merwiu v. Chicago, (45 111. 133) 80
Merz v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., (88 Mo. 672)
136, 306
Merz r. Missouri P. R. Co., (1 S. W.
R. 382) 153
Mich. Cen. R. R. v. Coleman, (28
Mich. 440) 338
Messenger v. Buffalo, (21 N. Y. 196)
165
Metcalf V. Hetheringtou, (11 Ex. 257)
121
Metcalf V. Seattle, (25 P. 1010, 1 Wash.
St. 305) 189
Metcalf V. St. Louis, (11 Mo. 103) 153
Methodist Church, In re, (66 K Y.
395) 256
Methodist Church v. Baltimore, (6
Gill, 391) 148, 240
Meth. E. Church v. Ellis, (38 Ind. 3)
270
Meth. E. Church v. Hoboken, (33 X.
J. L. 13) 221, 222, 229
Meth. E. Church ». Wyandotte, (31
Kan. 721) 329
Metro. Asylum v. Hill, (L. R. 6 App.
Cas. 193)329
Metro. Board v. Hiester, (37 N. Y.
661) 118
Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Bar-
rie, (34 N. Y. 657) 125
MeU-o. City R. R. v. Chicago, (96 111.
62) 120
Meti-o. etc. Co., In re, (19 N. E. E. 645)
302
Metro. E. R., In re, (12 N. Y. S. 502)
241, 244
Metro. S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, (16 S.
E. 49) 107
Metzger v. Attica R. Co., (79 N. Y.
171) 189
Meuser v. Risdon, (36 Cal. 239) 113
Meyer i-. Bridgeton, (37 N. J. L. 160)
158
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
CXI
Meyer v. Brown, (65 Gal. 583) 375
Meyer v. BuiTitt, (60 Conn. 117) 282
Meyer v. Carolan, (9 Tex. 250) 362
Meyer ». City of Muscatine, (i Wall.
384) 183, 184, 254
Meyer v. Fromm, (108 Ind. 208) 148
Meyer ». Graham, (50 N. W. R. 763)
314
Meyer v. Johnson, (53 Ala. 241) 274
Meyer o. Porter, (65 Cal. 67) 39
Meyers v. Chicago etc. Co., (57 Iowa,
555) 136, 150, 306
Meylert's Executor v. Sullivan Co.,
(19 Pa. St. 181) 326 a
Mexell V. Morgan, (24 Atl. 216) 354 a
Miami Co. v. Blake, (21 Ind. 32) 79
Michael v. St. Louis, (20 S. W. R.
666, 112 Mo. 610) 897
Michigan v. Ballance, (24 K. E. E.
117) 346
Michigan City v. Boeckling, (23 N. E.
R. 518, 122 Ind. 39) 110, 324, 342.
Michigan City ». Roberts, (34 Ind.
471) 362, 363
Michigan Ld. etc. Co. v. Republic, (32
N. W. R. 882) 326
Michigan Vav. Co. v. Detroit, (Mich.
201) 360
Middlesex etc. Co. v. Wakefield, (103
Mass. 261) 302
Middlesex H. & M. Soc. v. Davis, 3
Mete. 138) 47
Middlesex R. R. Co. v. Charlestown,
(8 Allen, 330) 274
Middleton v. Mullica, (112 N. Y. 433)
190 a
Middleton Bank v. Dubuque, (15
Iowa, 394) 209, 211
Middleton U.Wharton, (41 Minn. 266)
221
Middletown Village, In re, (82 N. T.
196) 234
Mifflin 1). Railroad Co., (16 Pa. St. 182)
302
Milakers v. Foster, (6 Oregon, 378)
318
Milan v. Tenn. etc. Co., (11 Lea, 329)
195 d
Millburne ». Cedar Rapids etc. E. E.
Co., (12 Iowa, 246) 238, 303
Miles V. Albany, (7 Atl. 601) 255
Miles V. Boregh, (3 Gale & D. 119)
106
Miles V. Chamberlain, (17 Wis. 446)
129
Miles V. Charleton, (29 Wis. 400) 28
Miles V. Duncan, (6 B. & C. 671) 326 a
Milford V. Holbrook, (9 Allen, 17) 348
Miles V. Kern, (29 Pao. R. 720) 158
Milford V. Milford W. Co., (124 Pa.
St. 610, 17 Atl. R. 185) 166
Milford V. Mil. Water Co., (124 Pa.
St. 610) 170
Milford etc. Co. v. Brush, (10 Ohio,
111) 49
Milhan v. Sharp, (17 N". T. 611) 10,
396
Military Parade Ground, In re, (60
N. Y. 319) 242
Mill V. Mc Williams, (50 Ala. 427) 375
Mill Dam Foundry v. Hovey, (21
Pick. 417) 51
Miller, In re, (44 Mo. App. 125) 156
Miller v. Berlen, (13 Blatchf. 245)
195 d
Miller v. Bridgewater, (29 N. J. L.
54) 377
Miller v. Burch, (32 Tex. 208) 120
Miller v. English, (1 Zabr. 317) 65
Miller v. Ford, (4 Rich. L. 376) 169
Miller v. Iron Co., (29 Mo. 122) 325
Miller v. Lerch, (1 Wall. Jr. 210) 203
Miller v. Manstow, (20 Atl. 6) 354
Miller v. Mc Williams, (50 Ala. 427)
212
Miller v. Mc Williams, (50 Ala. 427)
375
Miller v. Mobile, (47 Ala. 163) 247,
249, 278 ,
Miller v. Milw., (14 Wis. 642) 163
Miller ». Morristown, (42 N. J. Eq.
62) 249
Miller v. O'Reilly, (84 Ind. 168) 156
Miller v. Prairie du Chien R. R., (34
Wis. 533) 314
Miller v. Sacramento, (25 Cal. 98)
Miller v. Savannah Fire Co., (26 Ga.
678) 130
Miller v. Sch. Trustees, (88 111. 26)
398
Miller v. Schenck, (43 N. W. R. 225)
215, 311
Miller v. St. Paul, (38 Minn. 134) 345
Miller v. State, (106 Ind. 415) 87
Miller v. Stewart, (9 Wheat. 702) 72
Miller v. Thompson, (3 Man. & Gr.
576) 177
Miller v. Windham, (23 Atl. R. 1132,
30 W. >r. C. 85) 354
Millerton v. Frederick, (114 Pa. St.
435) 189 a, 195 d
Milliken v. Council, (54 Tex. 388) 83,
122
Milliken v. Weatherford, (54 Tex.
388) 121
Millikin «. Bloomington, (72 Ind.
161) 55
MiUs i). Brevoort, (77 Mich. 210) 360
,Mills V. Brooklyn, (32 N. Y. 489) 328,
329 355
Mills '«. Charleton, (29 Wis. 411) 1415,
254
cxu
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Keferences are to Sections.
Mills V. Detroit, (54 IST. W. E. 897)
278
Mills V. Gleason, (11 Wis. 470) 99
Millville Borough, In re, (10 Pa. Co.
Ct. R. 321) 2
Mills V. Jefferson, (20 Wis. 50) 192
Mills 11. Thornton, (26 111. 300) 272
Mills V. Williams, (11 Ired. 558) 2
Mills Co. Bk. t. Mills Co., (67 Iowa,
697) 180
Milne v. Davidson, (5 Martin, 586)
152
Milne v. Mayor etc., (13 La. 69) 53
Milner's Admx. v. Pensacola, (2
Woods, 632) 32
Milnes v. Duncan, (6 B. &C. 671)327
Milnes v. Huddersfield, (L. R. Q. B.
Div. 124) 325, 336
Milwaukee v. Davis, (6 Wis. 377) 350,
352
Milwaukee v. Kaefler, (116 U. S. 219)
397
Milwaukee)). Milw. etc. Co., (7Wis.
85) 302
Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Hubbard, (27
Wis. 51) 391, 397
Milwaukee I. School v. Schubel (29
Wis. 444) 398
Mims V. West, (38 Ga. 18) 195 d
Minden v. Silverstein, (36 La. An
912) 125
Miners Bank v. U. S., (5 How. 213)
380
Miners D. Co. v. Zellerbaoh, (37 Cal.
543) 169
Minhinnah v. Haines, (29 N. J. L.
388) 377
Minick v. Troy, (83 N". Y. 514, 516)
350 b, 352
Minkler v. State, (14 Neb. 181) 83
Minor c. Bank, (1 Pet. 46) 91
Minot B. W. Roxbury, (112 Mass. 1) 4
Minter v. Durham, (13 Or. 470) 282
Minton ». Larue, (27 How. 475) 110
Minton v. Larue, (23 How. 435) 134
Jlinneapolis v. Wilkin, (30 Minn. 140,
L'84) 245, 246
Jlinn. G. L. Co. v. Minneapolis, (30
X. AV. R. 450, 36 Minn. 159) 113
Minn. Vail. Co. v. Doran, (17 Minn.
188) 354
Minn. Linseed Oil Co. v. Palmer, (20
Minn. 468, 475) 256, 391
Mirande, Ex parte, (73 Cal. 365) 97,
121
Missouri etc. Co. d. Com'rs, (12 Kan.
482) 165
Blissouri etc. Co. v. Fort Scott, (15'
Kan. 435) 185
Missouri etc. Co. v. Wilson, (45 Mo.
App. 1) 244
Missouri etc. Co. v. Wyandotte, (23
Pac. R. 950) 146
Mitchell V. Boardman, (10 Atl. Kep.
452) 365
Mitchell V. Franklin & C. Tump. Co.,
(3 Humph. 456) 243, 247
Mitchell V. Illinois etc. Coal Co., (68
111. 286) 232
Mitchell V. Lemon, (34 Md. 176) 155
Mitchell i: Malone, (77 Ga. 301) 87
Mitchell V. Milwaukee, (18 Wis. 92)
172, 397
Mitchell ». Rockland, (41 Me. 363)
116, 169, 325, 332, 338
Mitchell V. United States, (21 Wall.
350) 66
Mitchell V. Williams, (27 Ind. 62) 129
Mitchellville v. Polk Co. Sup., (54
Iowa, 554) 271
Mithoff V. Can-oUton, (12 La. An.
185) 234
Mize V. Glenn, (38 Mo. Ap. 98) 354
Moale 1-. Baltimore, (5 Md. 314) 221,
244
Moar V. Harvey, (128 Mass. 219) 66
Moars v. Smedley, (6 Johns. Ch. 28)
391
Moberry ». Jeffersonville, (38 Ind.
198) 265
Mobile V. Baldwin, (57 A]a. 61) 397
Mobile V. Guille, (3 Ala. 140) 127
Mobile V. Jones, (42 Ala. 630) 155
Mobile V. Mood, (53 Ala.) 133
Mobile V. Richardson, (1 Stew. &
Port. 12) 243, 245, 247
Mobile ». Watson, (116 IT. S. 289, 13
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 337) 2, 14,
42, 59
Mobile etc. Co. v. Peebles, (47 Ala.
317) 397
Mobile & S. H. R. R. Co. v. Kenner-
ly, (74 Ala. 566) 270
Mobile M. I. Co. v. Cleveland, (76
Ala. 321) 362
Mobile St. Bk. v. Oktibeha Co., (24
Fed. Rep. 110) 196
Mock V. Muncie, (32 N. E. R. 718)
259 a
Moffatt V. Henderson, (18 J. & S.
211) 283
Moffit V. Asheirlle, (103 N. C. 237) 92
Mohan v. Jackson, (52 Ind. 590) 75
Mohawk & H. R. R. Co. v. Clute, (4
Paige, 384) 273
Mohawk B. Co. v. TJtica E. E., (t!
Paige, 554) 314
Moises I). Thornton, (8 Term R. 303)
52
Moliter v. Sheldon, (37 Kan. 246) 224
Mollandiau. Union Pac. Co., (14Fed.
Eep. 394) 330
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
CXUl
References are to Sections.
Momenoe ». Kendall, (14 N. App.
229) 352
Monaghan v. Phila., (28 Pa. St. 207)
375
Monaghan ». Sch. Dist.,(38Wis. 101)
108, 310
Monies ». Lynn, (119 Mass. 273) 3506
Monk V. Xew Utrecht, (104 N. Y. 561)
328, 352
Monmouth v. Sullivan, (8 111. App.
50) 343
Monongahela u. Fischer, (111 Pa. St.
9) .346
Monongahela B. Mono. El. L. Co., (12
Pa. Co. Ct. K. 529) 301
Monongahela B. Co. v. Bevard, (11
Atl. R. 575) 353
Monongahela B. Co. v. Pittsburgh
etc., (114 Pa. St. 478) 317
Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
Coons, (6 Watts & S. 101) 239
Monroe v. Gerspach, (14 Mich. 41)
118
Monroe v. Hoffman, (29 La. Ann.
651) 75, 130
Monroe v. Meuer, (35 La. An. 1192)
104
Monroe v. State, (63 Miss. 135) 371
Montague v. Horton, (12 Wis. 597) 178
Montana etc. Co. r. R. R. Co., (12
Pac. R. 916) 249
Montolair v. Railroad Co., (18 Atl.
R. 242, 45 N. J. E. 436) 2
Montolair v. Ramsdell, (107 U. S. 147)
28, 196
Monterey v. Berkshire, (7 Cush. 394)
398
Monterev ». Berkshire Co. Com'rs,
(7 Cush. 394) 249
Montgomery v. Bridge Co., (110 Pa.
St. 54) 246
Montgomery v. Hughes, (65 Ala.
201) 32
Montgomery u. Locke, (11 Pac. R. 874)
354
Montgomery v. Scott, (34 Wis. 338)
337
Montgomery v. Townsend, (80 Ala.
489, 2 So. 155) 245, 292
Montgomery v. Wright, (72 Ala. 411)
352
Montgomery v. Wyman, (22 N. E. R.
845, 130 111. 17) 270
Montgomery Council v. Gilmer, (33
Ala. 116) 355
Montgomery Council v. Townsend,
(80 Ala. 489) 330
Montgomery Co. v. Elston, (32 Ind.
27) 258
Montgomery C. C. v. M. W. P. R.
Co., (1 Ala. 76) 169
viii
Montgomery Gas Light Co. v. City
Council, (6 So. 113, 87 Ala. 245) 393
Monticello v. Fox, (28 N. E. R. 1025,
3 Ind. Ap. 481) 327
Montpelier v. East Montpelier, (29
Vt. 12) 12, 206
Montrose v. State, (61 Miss. 429) 102
Moody V. Mayor, (43 Barb. 282) 336 a
Moon V. Ionia, (46 N. W. R. 25) 346
Mooney v. Kenneth, (19 Mo. 551) 158
Moor 1). Cornville, (13 Me. 293) 170
Moore v. Abbott, (32 Me. 46) 342
Moore v. Albany, (98 N. Y. 396) 329
Moore v. Albert, (32 Me. 46) 352
Moore v. Allen, (98 N. Y. 396, 13 Am.
& Eng. Cor. Cas. 262) 170
Moore v. Atlanta, (70 Ga. 611) 392
Moore v. Bailey. (8 Mo. App. 156)
279
Moore v. Chicago, (60 111. 243) 263
Moore b. Chicago etc. Co., (75 Iowa,
263) 354
Moore v. Gadsden, (87 N. Y. 84) 348
Moore v. Graves, (3 N. H. 308) 69
Moore v. Fayetteville Comm'rs, (80
N. C. 154) 261
Moore B. Kenockee Tp., (42 N. W. R.
944) 353
Moore v. Little Rock, (42 Ark. 66)
218, 2S1
Moore v. Mayor, (73 N. Y. 238) 148,
164
Moore v. Moore, (47 N. Y. 467) 258
Moore v. Newfield, (4 Greenl. 44) 95,
108
Moore v. New York, (4 Sandf. 450,
8 N. Y. 110) 244
Moore v. New York, (8 N. Y. 110) 218
Moore v. New York, (73 N. Y. 238)
169
Moore ». People, (14 How. 13) 117
Moore v. Platteville, (47 N. W. R.
1055) 326 a
Moore V. Quirk, (105 Mass. 49) 258
Moore ». Richmond, (8 S. E. R. 387)
339, 352
Moore & Sanford, (24 N. E. R. 423)
232
Moore v. State, (16 Ala. 411) 117
Moore v. State, (48 Miss. 147) 117
Moore v. State, (11 La. 35) 129
Moore v. St. Paul, (51 N. W. R. 219)
256
Moore v. Taylor, (29 W. N. C. 495)
270
Moore V. Walla Walla, (2 Wash. 184)
120
Moose V. Carson, (104 N. C. 431, 10
S. E. 689) 244
Mootry v. Danbury, (45 Conn. 450)
120,854 a
CXIV
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Moran v. Long Island City, (101 N.
T. 439) 33
Moran ». Miami, (2 Black, 722, 732)
183, 190
Moran ». New Orleans, (112 IT. S. 69)
150
Moreland v. Mitchell Co., (40 Iowa,
394) 313, 315, 353
Moreland v. Wliitford, (54 Wis. 150)
399
Morey v. Brown, (42 N. H. 373) 129
Morey v. Fitzgerald, (56 Vt. 487) 342,
346
Morey ». Newfane, (8 Barb. 645) 2
Morford v. Barnes, (8 Yerg. 444) 105,
245
Morford v. linger, (8 Iowa, 82) 28, 55
Morgan's Ap., (25 W. N". C. 532) 396
Morgan v. Atlanta, (77 Ga. 662) 32
Morgan v. Chicago & A. K. R. Co.,
(96 U. S. 716) 217
Morgan v. Cree, (46 Vt. 773, 14 Am.
Kep. 640) 270
Morgan v. District, (10 Ct. of CI. 156)
177
Morgan v. Hallowell, (57 Me. 375)
339
Morgan v. King, (35 N. T. 454) 245
Morgan ». Menzies, (60 Cal. 341) 164
Morgan v. Muldoon, (82 Ind.«847) 348
Morgans Parham, (16 Wall. 471) 272
Morgan t. Quackeubush, (22 Barb.
74) 65
Morgan Co. v. Thomas, (76 111. 120)
186
Morganthaler v. Cities, (4 Ohio Cir.
Ct. 495) 369
Morin v. Multonah Co., (22 Pao. 490)
325
Morley v. Carpenter, (22 Mo. App.
240) 291
Morley v. Power, (5 Lea, 691) 364,
371, 374
Morrell v. Sylvester, (1 Greenl. 248)
72
Morrill v. State, (38 Wis. 428, 20 Am.
Rep. 12) 261
Morris v. Baltimore, (5 Md. 248) 326 a
Morris v. Bowen, (Wright, 749) 287
Morris V. Chicago, (11 111. 650) 240
Morris v. City of Rome, (10 Ga. 532)
134
Morris v. Council Bluffs, (67 Iowa,
343) 329, 354 a
Morris v. Dixfield, (30 Me. 157, 160)
170 '
Morris v. Lone Star, (5 S. W. R. 519)
268, 270
Morris v. Nashville, (6 Lea, 337) 61
Morris u. Newark, (26 Atl. R. 82) 71
Morris ». People, (3 Denio, 381) 115
Morris v. Staps, (Hob. 211) 158
Morris v. State, (62 Tex. 728) 2, 14
Morris v. State, (65 Tex. 53) 38
Morris v. State, (84 Ala. 446, 4 So. R,
628) 49
Morris Banking & Canal Co. v. Lewis,
(1 Beasl. 323) 191 b
Morris Canal etc. Co. v. Fisher, (1
Stock. 667) 191
Morris Canal & B. Co. v. Central K.
B. Co., (16 J^. J. Eq. 419) 225
Morris Canal Co. v. Ryei-son, (27 N.
J. L. 457) 353
Morris etc. v. Fagin, (22 N. J. Eq.
430) 300
Morris etc. Co. •». Newark, (10 N. J.
Eq. 352, 357) 302
Morris etc. Co. v. Prudden, (20 N. J.
Eq. 530) 396
Morrison v. Hankson, (87 111. 587)
212, 375
Morrison v. Hershire, (32 Iowa, 271)
259 a, 397
Morrison v. Jacoby, (14 N. E. R. 546,
114 Ind. 84) .397
Morrison v. Lawrence, (98 Mass. 219)
92, 98, 108, 338
Morrison v. McDonald, (21 Me. 550)
90, 102
Morristown v. Mayor, (67 Pa. St. 355)
345
Morrow v. Surber, (97 Mo. 155) 177
Morrow ». Weed, (4 Iowa, 77) 279
Morrow Co. v. Hendryx, (14 Oreg.
397) 67
Morse v. Belfast, (77 Me. 44) 346
Morse v. Boston, (109 Mass. 446) 344
Morse ». New York, (73 N. Y. 238)
338
Morse v. Richmond, (41 Vt. 435) 342
Morse u. Sweenie, (15 Bradw. 486)
331
Morse v. Westport, (110 Mo. 502, 19
S. W. R. 831) 292
Morse v. Zeize, (34 Minn. 55) 219
Mortimer u. McCollan, (6 M. & W. 67)
107
Mortimer v. Metro. El. E. Co., (29 N.
E. R. 5, 129 N. Y. 81) 244
Morton v. Lee, (28 Kan. 287) 88
Morton v. Power, (33 Minn. 521) 175
Morton v. Smith, (48 Wis. 265) 348
Morton etc. v. Wysong, (51 Ind. 4) 320
Morvillei). Tract Soc, (123 Mass. 129)
164
Moser v. Mayor, (21 Hun, 163) 67
Moses B. Kearney, (31 Ark. 261) 363
Moses V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. R. Co.,
(21 111. 516) 302, 303, 329
Moses V. St. Louis Dock Co., (84 Mo.
242) 241
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
cx-v
Mosey v. Troy, (61 Barb. 580) 351
Moshei- V. Sch. Dis., (44 Iowa, 122)
16, 189 o
Moss V. Cummiiifrs, (44 Mich. 359, 22
Alb. L. ,T. 376) 326
Mott V. Hioks, (1 Cow. 513, 13 Am.
Rep. 550) 51, 164, 168
Mott V. Reynolds, (27 Vt. 206) 106
Mott V. Schoolbred, (L. R. 20 Eq. 22)
300
Motz 1). Detroit, (18 Mich. 495) 259 a
Moulton V. Evansville, (25 Fed. Rep.
382) 196
Moulton V. Sanford, (51 Me. 127) 342
Moultrie v. Rockingham etc. Bk. (92
U. S. 631) 186
Moundsville v. Fountain, (27 W. Va.
182) 104, 125
Moundsville v. Velton, (13 S. E. R.
373) 31
Mt. Carmel v. Wabash Co., (50 111.
69) 125
Mt. Clair v. Remsdell, (107 V. S. 147)
28
Mt. Desert ». Monmouth, (72 Me. 348)
60
Mt. Pleasant v. Breeze, (11 Iowa, 399)
146
Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, (100 U. S.
514) 42
Mt. Moriah Cem., (81 Pa. St. 235) 363
Mt. Morris Sq., In re, (2 Hill, 20) 98
Mt. Morris v. Williams, (38 111. Ap.'
401) 192
Mt. "Vernon b. Hovey, (52 Ind. 563)
184
Mt. Vernon v. Patton, (94 111. 65) 176
Mt. Washington Road Co., Re, (35
jST. H. 134) 235
Mowatt V. Wright, (1 Wend. 355)
326 a
Mower v. Leicester, (9 Mass. 247)
315
Mowery v. Salisbury, (82 N. C. 175)
129
Mowry ». Providence, (10 R. I. 52)
208, 312, 396
Moyamensing ». Long, (1 Pa. 143)
300
Mudge I). Williamsport, (78 Pa. St.
158) 87
Muhler v. Kansas, (123 U. S. 623)
121, 231
Muhlenbrink v. Com'rs, (42 N. J. L.
364) 123
Mulhall 15. Quinn, (1 Gray, 105) 80
Mullarkey v. Cedar Falls, (19 Iowa,
21) 113
Mullegan v. Ellis, (12 Abb. Pr. 259)
120
MuUen v. Rutland, (55 Vt. 77) 343
Mullen V. St. John, (57 N. Y. 567)
337, 342, 348
Muller V. District, (5 Mackey, 286)
352 a
Muller V. Mayor etc., (63 K. T. 355)
87
Mulligan v. Smith, (59 Cal. 206) 232,
241, 278
MuUikin v. Bloomington, (27 Ind.
161) 56, 61
Mumma v. Potomac Co., (8 Pet.
2S5) 10, 40
Munger v. Marshalltown, (56 Iowa,
210) 339, 352
Munger v. Tonawanda R. R. Co., (4
N. Y. 349) 239
Munic. V. Bank, (5 Rob. 151) 270
Municipality v. Commissioners, (1
Rob. 279) 32
Municipality v. Cutting, (4 La. An.
335) 128, 146
Municipality v. Dubois, (10 La. An.
56) 123
Municipality v. Kirk, (5 La. An. 34)
225
Municipality b. Levee, S. C. P. Co.,
(7 La. An. 270) 222, 242 ■
Municipality b. McDonough, (2 Rob.
244) 200
Municipality v. Palfrey, (7 La. An.
497) 221
Municipality b. Pance, (6 La. An.
515) 282
Municipality v. Pease, (2 La. An.
538) 133
Municipality v. Theater Co., (2 Rob.
La. 209) 17
Municipality No. 2 v. Com. Bank of
N. O., (5 Rob. 151) 267
Municipalitv No. 2 b. Dubois, (10
La. An. 56) 261
Municipality No. 2 b. Duncan, (2 La.
An. 182) 269
Municipality No. 2 b. Dunn, (10 La.
An. 57) 259 a
Munio. No. 2 b. Guillotte, (14 La.
An. 297) 281
Municipality No. 2 v. N. O. & Car.
R. R. Co., (10 Rob. 187) 267, 270
Municipality No. 1 v. La. State
Bank, (5 La. An. 394) 273
Municipality No. 3 B. Johnson, (La.
An. 20) 268
Municipality No. 2 v. Orleans Cot.
Press Co., (6 Rob. 411) 266
Municipality No. 1 v. Wheeler, (IC
La. An. 745) 262
Municipality No. 2 v. White, (9 La.
An. 446) 261
Municipality No. 3 v. Ursuline Nuns^
(2 La. An. 611) 276
CXVl
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Keferences are to Sections.
Munk V. "Watertown, (67 Hun, 261)
324
Munn V. Pittsburgh, (40 Pa. St. 364)
355
Muiiro V. Munro, (7 01. & F. 842) 66
Munsell v. Temple, (8 111. 96) 124
Munsou V. Board, (8 So. 914, 43 La.
An. 33) 259 a
Munson v. Lyons, (12 Blatchf. 539)
196
Munson v. New York, (3 Fed. Rep.
338) 338
Muntum v. Larue, (23 How. 435) 144
Murdock v. Academy, (12 Pick, 244)
84
Murdock o. Chaffee, (7 So. E. 519)
282
Murdock v. District, (22 Ct. of Claims,
464) 171
Murdock v. Memphis, (10 Wall. 590)
32
Murdock v. Woodson, (2 Dillon C. C.
188) 26, 28
Murdock etc. Co. v. Com., (152 Mass.
28)5
Murphy, In re, (7 Cow. 153) 65
Murphy t). Brooklyn, (23 N. E. K. 887)
338
Murphy v. Chicago, (29 HI. 279) 113,
239, 302, 329
Murphy v. East Portland, (42 Fed.
308) 393, 395
Murphy w. Gloucester, (105 Mass.
470) 342, 343
Murphy v. Harrison, (29 Ark. 340)
397
Murphy v. Indianapolis, (83 Ind. 76)
346
Murphy v. Louisville, (9 Bush, 189)
2, 8, 164, 170
Murphy v. Lowell, (124 Mass. 564)
336, 347
Murphy o. McShane, (52 Md. 217)
348
Murphy b. People, (2 Cow. 815) 104
Murphy v. People, (120 111. 234) 254
Murphy v. Wilmington, (6 Houst.
108) 277
Murphy's Boro. v. Baker, (34 HI.
App. 659) 350 b
Murray v. Charleston, (96 U. S. 432)
258, 278
Murray v. Menefee, (20 Ark. 561) 239
Murray v. Sardner, (2 Wall. 110) 195 d
Murray v. Sharp, (1 Bosw. 539) 132,
239
Murray v. Tucker, (10 Bush, 249) 256,
263
Murray v. Virginia, (91 HI. 558) 55
Murtagh v. St. Louis, (44 Mo. 479)
332
Muscatine v. Keokuk N. L. etc. Co,
(45 Iowa, 185) 326 a
Muscatine v. Packet Co., (45 Iowa,
185) 326 a
Muscatine v. R. R. Co., (1 Dillon C.
C. R. 536) 14
Muscatine v. Steck, (7 Iowa, 505) 102
Muscatine Turnverein v. Fiinck, (18
Iowa, 469) 38
Musgrove v. St. Louis Ch., (10 La.
An. 431) 118
Muskegon!). Dow, (54 N. W. R. 170) 8
Musselman v. Manly, (42 Ind. 462) 93
106
Musser v. Johnson, (42 Mo. 74) 52
Mutual Ben. L. I. Co. v. Elizabeth,
(42 N. J. L. 235) 196
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Supervisors, (32
Barb. 322) 397
Mut. Sav. Inst. v. Eustin, (46 Mo.
200, 203) 327
Mut. Un. Tel. Co. ». Chicago, (16
Fed. Rep. 309) 297
Myall V. St. Paul, (30 Minn. 294) 391
Myers v. Bank, (20 Ohio, 283) 22
Myers v. Com., (1 Atl. 264, 110 Pa.
8t. 217) 315
Myers r. Croft, (13 Wall. 291) 207
Myers v. Irwin, (2 Serg. & Rawle,
368) 25
Myers v. People, (26 111. 173) 102, 104
Myers v. Simms, (4 Iowa, 500) 249
Myers v. Snyder, (Bright, 489) 347
Myers ti. St. Louis, (82 Mo. 367) 132
Mygatt V. Green Bay, (1 Biss. 292)
195 d
Mytton V. Duck, (26 Up. Can. Q. B.
61) 215
N.
Nagle V. Augusta, (5 Ga. 546) 290
Nalle 1). Austin, (21 S. W. R. 375) 8
Napa V. Easterby, (18 Pac. R. 353)
148
Napa V. E. Co. v. Napa Co., (30 Cal.
435) 186, 362
Napman i-. People, (19 Mich. 352)
124, 158
Narden c. Mount, (78 Ky. 86) 155
Narraent v. Charlotte Co., (85 N. C.
387) 196
Narragausett, In re, (16 Atl. E. 907)
65
Nash V. Lowry, (37 Minn. 261) 287,
302
Nash V. St. Paul, (11 Minn. 174) 170,
172
Nashville v. Bank of Tenn., (1 Swan,
269) 271
Nashville v. Brown, (9 Heisk. 1) 347
Nashville v. Ray, (19 Wall. 468) 177
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
CXVU
References are to Sections.
Nashville v. Smith, (6 S. W. R. 273)
271
Nashville v. Thomas, (5 Coldvsr. 600)
255, 273
Nashville v. Weiser, (54 111. 245) 279
Nason v. Boston, (14 Allen, 508) 344
Nassau Street, Re, (11 Johns. 77) 270
Natal V. State, (11 S. Ct. 636, 139 U.
S. 621) 128
National Bank v. Grenada, (44 Fed.
262) 189, 190, 198
Nat. Bank v. Kirby, (108 Mass. 497)
191
Nat. Exch. Bank v. Hartford etc. R.
R. Co., (8 R. I. 375) 190, 191, 192 6,
193
National etc. Co. v. State, (21 Atl. R.
570) 238
Natl. Lumber Co. v. City of Wymore,
(46 N. W. Rep. 622) 180
Natl. Bank of Commerce v. Town of
Grenada, (44 Fed. Rep. 262) 189
Nat. St. Bank v. Marshall, (39 Iowa,
490) 190
National Waterworks v. Kansas City,
(28 Fed. Rep. 921) 144, 296
Natoma W. & M. Co. v. Clarkin, (14
Cal. 544) 207
Nauman v. Board, (41 N. W. R. 267)
18
Navasota v. Pearce, (46 Tex. 525) 325
Nave V. Flack, (90 lud. 205) 352
Naylor b. Galesburg, (56 111. 285) 161
Neal V. Commonwealth, (17 Serg. &
R. 67) 54, 62
Neal B. Pittsburgh & C. R. R. Co.,
(2 Grant Cases, 137) 241
Neale v. Overseers, (5 "Watts, 538) 73,
88
Neales v. State, (10 Mo. 498) 104
Nealis v. Hayward, (48 Ind. 19) 290
Neares. Mt. Auburn R. Co., (29 Wkly.
L. Bui. 171) 303
Nebraska City v. Campbell, (2 Black.
590) 352 a
Nebraska City v. Lampkin, (6 Neb.
27) 329
Nebraska City b. Rathbone, (20 Neb.
288) 344 a
Needham v. Thresher, (49 Cal. 393)
360
Neely v. Yorkville, (10 S. C. 141) 169,
190 a
Neenan v. Donoghue, (50 Mo. 593)
174
Neenan v. Smith, (60 Mo. 292) 281,
282
Neff V. Mooresville, (66 Ind. 279) 317
NefE B. Wellesley, (148 Mass. 487, 20
N. E. Ill) 352
NeifEer v. Bank. (1 Head, 162) 165
Neilson v. Newark, (49 N. J. L. 246)
58, 67
Nelson v. Edwards, (55 Tex. 389) 362
Nelson v. Godfrey, (12 111. 22) 348
Nelson v. Gridley, (12 111. 22, 23) 298
Nelson b. La Porte, (33 Ind. 258) 256,
295, 296
Nelson b. St. Martins Parish, (111 U.
S. 716) 14, 161
Nelson b. Mayor, (5 Hun, 190) 87
Nelson «. Milford, (7 Pick. 18) 115
Nelson b. New York, (5 N. Y. Sup.
688) 173
Nesbit B. Riverside, (12 S. Ct. 144, U.
S. 610) 192
Nesbit B. Trumbo, (39 111. 110) 234 a
Neshkoro v. Nest, (55 N. W. R. 176)
300, 396
Nette B. N. Y. El. R. Co., (20 N. Y.
S. 844) 39 6
Neuse v. Cora'rs, (6 Jones L. 204) 368
Nevada v. Hampton, (13 Nev. 441) 16
Nev. Sell. Dist. b. Shoecroft, (88 Cal.
372) 26
Nevert b. Boston, (120 Mass. 338) 335
Nevies b. Peoria, (41 111. 502) 113, 328
354 a
New Albany v. Connelly, (7 Ind. 32)
279
New Albany b. Meekin, (3 Ind. 481)
272
New Albany b. Ray, (29 N. E. R. 611,
3 Ind. Ap. 481) 328
New Albany b. Sweeney, (13 Ind.
245) 282
New Albany Bk. v. Danville, (60 Ind.
504) 182
New Albany etc. Co. v. O'Dally, (13
Ind. 353) 302
New Albany & S. R. R. Co. b. Con-
nolly, (7 Ind. 32) 238, 243
Newark v. Del. etc. R. R. Co., (42 N.
J. Eq. 196) 301, 308
Newark b. Elliott, (5 Ohio St. 113)
208
Newark v. Murphy, (40 N. J. L. 145)
155
Newark Aq. Bd. b. Passaic, (45 N. J.
Eq. 393) 120
Newark Bank v. Assessors, (30 N. J.
L. 22) 32
Newark etc. Co. v. Newark, (23 N. J.
Eq. 515) 302
Newaygo b. Echtinan, (45 N. W. R.
1010) 266
New Bedford & F. Street Ry. Co. v.
Acushnet Street Ry. Co., (143 Mass.
200) 33
New Bedford & F. etc. Co. b. Acush-
net St. Rv. Co., (9 N. E. R. 536)
302
OXTlll
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
New Boston v. Dumbarton, (12 N.
H. 409, .412) 31
New Brighton o. IT. Pres. Church,
(96 Pa. St. 331) 330
Newby v. Free, (72 Iowa, 379) 374
Newby v. Platte County, (25 Mo. 258)
245
Newcomer v. Keedy, (2 Md. 19) 284
New Decatur v. Berry, (90 Ala. 432)
118, 169
Newell V. Minn. etc. Ey. Co., (35
Minn. 112) 144, 302
Newell V. Smith, (53 Conn. 72) 327
Newert v. Boston, (120 Mass. 338)
338 a
Newgass v. City of New Orleans, (42
La. An. 165) 177
Newgass v. New Orleans, (7 So. E.
565) 183
New Gass b. E. Co., (15 S. W. 188) 247
New Hayen v. Fairhaveu etc. Co., (38
Conn. 422) 259 a, 306
New Haven v. New Haven & D. E.
Co., (25 Atl. E. 316) 164
New Haven v. Eailroad, (38 Conn.
422) 283
New Haven v. Whitney, (36 Conn.
373) 291
New Haven etc. Co. v. Chatham, (42
Conn. 465) 106, 196
Newiugton v. Jacobs, (25 Law T. N.
S. 800, L. E. 7 Q. B. 53) 224
New Jersey v. Fire Com'rs, (34 N. J.
Eq. 117) 169
New Jersey v. Yard, (95 IT. S. 112)
32
New Loudon o. Brainard, (22 Conn.
552) 395
Newliu V. Davis, (77 Pa. St. 317) 343
Newman v. Emporia, (32 Kan. 456)
145, 265
Newman v. Metro, etc. Co., (118 N.
Y. 618) 246
Newman v. Scott etc., (1 Heisk. 787)
375 '
Newmeyer v. M. & M. Co., (52 Mo.
81) 395
New Orleans v. Boudro, (14 La. An.
303) 158
New Orleans v. Brooks, (36 La. An.
64) 97, 148
New Orleans v. Cazelar, (27 La. An.
156) 56
New Orleans v. Clark, (95 IT. S. 644)
60, 187, 295
New Orleans v. Cora. Bank of N. O
(10 La. An. 735) 261, 273
New Orleans v. Costello, (14 La. An.
37) 102, 154
New Orleans v. Davidson, (30 La. An.
541) 282
New Orleans v. Fimerty, (27 La,
Am. 681) 79
New Orleans v. Graihle, (9 La. An.
561) 282
New Orleans v. Gravier, (11 Martin,
620) 300
New Orleans v. Home Ins. Co., (23
La. An. 61) 212
New Orleans v. Hoyle, (23 La. An.
740) 2
New Orleans v. Kaufmaan, (20 La.
An. 283) 259 a
New Orleans v. Louisiana Co., (140
U. S. 654) 212
New Orleans v. Meoli. & T. Bank,
(15 La. An. 107) 273
New Orleans v. Michoud, (10 La.
An. 763) 56
New Orleans v. Miller, (7 La. An.
651) 117
New Orleans v. McDonald, 53 Miss.
240) 184
New London v. Montville, (1 Eoot,
184) 67
New Orleans v. Morris, (105 U. S.
600) 212
New Orleans v. N. O. W. W. Co.,
(142 U. S. 79) 8, 15
New Orleans v. N. O. etc. Co., (40
La. An. 587) 303
New Orleans v. N. O. W. Co., (142
TJ. S. 79) 15
New Orleans u. Pliillippi, (9 La. An.
44) 120, 146
New Orleans v. Poutz, (14 La. An.
853) 17, 161
New Orleans v. Staiger, (11 La. An.
68) 261
New Orleans o. St. Anna's Asylum,
(31 La. An. 292) 270
New Orleans v. Shepherd, (10 La.
Ann. 268) 66
New Orleans v. Souther Bank, (11
La. An. 41) 170, 261, 273
New Orleans v. Stafford, (27 La. An.
417) 128
New Orleans v. St. Louis Church,
11 La. An. 244) 163
New Orleans v. Turpin, (13 La. An.
56) 123
New Orleans v. Wilmot, (31 La. An.
65) 133
New Orleans v. Wire, (20 La. An.
500) 282
Ne.w Orleans v. United States, (49
Fed. Eep. 40, 2 U. S. App. 125)
194
New Orleans v. U. S., (10 Pet. 662,
737) 133, 217, 220, 225, 226, 229
New Orleans Draining Co., In re, (11
La. An. 338) 236, 249
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
CXIX
Beferences are to Sections.
New Orleans etc. Co. v. Delamore, !
(114 U. S. 501) 302
New Orleans etc. v. Hart, (40 La.
An. 474) 290
New Orleans etc. Co. c. Second Mun.,
(1 La. An. 128) 302
New Orleans etc. R. R. Co. v, G-ay,
(32 La. An. 471) 238
New Orleans El. Ry. Co. v. New Or-
leans, (39 La. An. 127) 148
New Orleans etc. Co. v. New Orleans,
(143 U. S. 192) 270
New Orleans etc. R. R. Co. v. South-
ern etc. Tel. Co., (.53 Ala. 211) 238
N. O. Gas Co. ». Louisiana etc.,
(115 U. S. 650) 296, 395
New Orleans M. & T. R. R. Co. v.
Southern & Atl. Tel. Co., (53 Ala.
211) 297
New Orleans R. R. Co. v. New Or-
leans R. Co., (26 La. An. 478) 2, 9,
11
New Orleans Waterworks ». Rivers,
(115 V. S. 674) 144, 295.
Newport v. Berry, (19 S. W. R. 238)
272
Newport v. Newport Light Co., (84
Ky. 167) 144, 296
Newport v. R'way Co., (89 Ky. 29) 270
Newport v. So. Gov. etc. Co., (11 S.
W. Eep. 964) 303
Newport!). Taylor's Ex., (16 B. Mon.
699) 221, 225
Newport Trustees, (16 Sim. 346) 25
Newport etc. Co. v. Eoote, (9 Bush,
264) 329
New Providence v. Halsey, (117 U.
S. 33(i) 143, 183, 196
Newsorae i'. Cocke, (44 Miss. 352) 83
Newton v. Belger, (143 Mass. 598)
131, 150
Newton v. Devlin, (134 Mass. 490) 171
Newtonville v. Gulp, (38 Ohio St. 13)
85
Newville Rd., (8 Watts, 172) 288
New York v. Broadway & 8. A. R.
R. Co., (17 Hun, 242) 274, 306
New Yorku. B. S. & L. Co. v. B'k'lyn,
(71 N. Y. 580) 336 a
New York v. Bailey, (2 Denio, 433)
237, 336 a, 354
New York v. Cusliman, (10 Johns.
96) 270
New York v. Hart, (95 N. Y. 443, 452)
225
New York v. Kent, (5 N. Y. S. 567)
210, 211
New York v. Pentz, (24 Wend. 668)
335
New York »; Sec. Ave. R. Co., (32
N. Y. 261) 113
New York v. Sheffield, (4 Wall. 189)
350 a
New York v. Stuyvesant, (17 N. Y.
34) 221
New York v. Third Av. E. Co., (117
N. Y. 404, 646) 302
N. Y. Cable Ry., In re, (109 N. Y. 32)
305
N. Y. Dist. Ry. Case, In re, (107 N.
Y. 42) 297
N. Y. El. R. R. Co., In re, (70 N. Y.
327, 41 Hun, 502) 144, 303
New York etc. Bridge, In re, (72 N.
Y. 527) 28
N. Y. & B. Lumber Co. v. Brooklyn,
(71 N. Y. 580) 92, 338 a
N. Y. Bal. D. D. v. Mayor, (8 Hun,
247) 126
N. Y. Central etc. R. R. Co. v. Met.
Gas. Co., (63 N. Y. 326) 233
New York Conference v. Clarkson,
(4 Halst. Ch. 541) 47, 49
New York etc. Co. v. Brooklyn, (71
N. Y. 580) 324
N. Y. etc. R. Co. o. State, (13 Atl. R.
1) 317
New York etc. Co. v. Waterbury, (55
Conn. 19) 148
New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co. b.
Yard, (43 N. J. L. 121) 225
N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. <,■. New
Britain, (49 Conn. 40) 270
New York & New Haven R. R. Co.
V. New Haven, (42 Conn. 279) 259 a
N. Y. P. E. School, In re, (47 N. Y.
556) 281
Niagara etc. Co., In re, (40 Hun, 94)
232
Niagara Falls Susp. Br. Co. v. Bach-
man, (66 N. Y. 261) 218, 219
Niantic Sav. Bank v. Douglas, (5 111.
579) 190 a
Niblett V. Nashville, (12 Heisk. 684)
349
Nicholls V. Gt. Western R'y Co., (27
Up. Can. Q. B. 382) 332
Nichols, In re, (6 Abb. New Cas.
474) 84
Nichols, In re, (57 How. 395) 83
Nichols V. Athens, (68 Me. 413) 342
Nichols V. Bridgeport, (23 Conn. 189,
208) 108, 232, 241, 248, 259 a
Nichols B. McLean, (101 N. Y. 526)
79,85
Nichols i>. Minneapolis, (2 Am. &
Eng. Cor. Cas. 562) 350 a
Nioliols !). State, (89 Ind. 298) 400
Nicholson v. Guardians L. R., (1 Q.
B. 320) 164
Nicholson P. Co. v. Painter, (35 Cah
. 699) 165, 172
cxx
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Keferenccs are to Sections.
Nickerson ». Boston, (131 Mass. 306)
120
Nicol V. Magee, (9 Humpb. 252) 184
Nicol V. Mayor, (9 Humph. 252) 2, 8,
9, 163
Nicoliu V. Lowrey, (49 N. J. L. 391)
119, 150
Nicoll, Re, (4 Hun, 340) 374
SricoUi). N. Y. & E. R. R. Co., (12 N.
Y. 121) 202, 203
NicoU V. N. Y. & E. R. E. Co., (12 N.
Y. 121) 200
Niles W. W. Co. !). Niles, (59 Mich.
311) 9, 165
Nims 1). Troy, (59 N. Y. 500) 355
Nims li. Boone Co., (66 Iowa, 272)
313
Ninth Nat. Bk. v. Knox Co., (37 Fed.
Rep. 75) 196
Nixon V. Biloxi, (5 So. R. 621) 220
Noble V. BuUis, (23 Iowa, 559) 327
Noble «. Richmond, (31 Grat. 271)
325, 339, 345, 349
Noble V. St. Albans, (5'! Vt. 522) 355
Noblesville T. Co. v. Baker, (4
Humph. 315) 318
Nodine v. Union, (13 Oreg. 587) 158
Noeling v. Allee, (10 N. Y. S. 97) 348
Nolan D. King, (97 N. Y. 565) 348
Nolan V. New Oris., (10 La. An. lOB)
83, 85
Nolin «. Franklin, (4 Yerg. 163) 120
Noonan v. Smith, (50 Mo. 525) 259 a
Noonan v. Stillwater, (33 Minn. 198)
347
Norfleet v. Cromwell, (70 N. C. 634,
16 Am. Rep. 787) 236
Norfolk City v. Ellis, (26 Gratt. 224)
259 a
Normaud v. Comm'rs, (8 Neb. 18) 395
Norris v. Baltimore, (44 Md. 598) 242
Norris v. Litchfield, (35 N. H. 918)
352
Norris v. Mayor etc. of Smythville,
(1 Swan, 104) 53, 57
Norris 13. People, (3 Denio, 331) 28
Norris v. Staps, (Hob. 211) 149
Norris v. Trustees, (7 Gill & Jolms. 7)
15
Norris v. Vt. Cent. R. R. Co., (28 Vt.
99) 239
Norristown v. Fitzpatrick, (94 Pa.
St. 621) 327, 331, 331 a, 333
Norristown v. Mayor, (67 Pa. St. 355)
345
Northampton Co. v. Eastern etc. Ey.
(23 Atl. R. 895) 12
Northampton Co. v. Lafayette Col-
lege, (18 Atl. Rep. 516) 14
No. Bait. Pass. Ry. Co. v. Baltimore,
(23 Atl. 470) 302
North & S. S. R. Co. v. Spullock, (88
Ga. 283) 398
No. Beach & M. R. R. Co.'s Appeal,
(32 Cal. 499) 274
North Chicago v. Lake View, (105 111.
207) 120
Northoott V. Smith, (4 Ohio Cir. Ct.
565) 129
N. C. R. R. Co. V. Carolina Cent. K.
R. Co., (83 N. C. 489) 144, 238, 302
North Chi. C. R. Co. v. Lake View,
(105 111. 207) 302
No. Central Ry. Co. v. Jackson, (7
Wall. 262) 258
No. Cen. R. R. v. Baltimore, (46 Md.
425) 306
Northeastern etc. Co. v. Payne, (8
Rich. L. 177) 303
Northern B. etc. v. London etc. (6
M. & W. 428) 318
Northern Cen. R. R. v. State, (31 Ind.
357) 352
Northern etc. Co. v. Baltimore, (21
Md. 93) 302, 303
Northern Indiana!). Mllliken, (7 Ohio
St. 382) 102
No. Ind. R. R. Co. d. Connelly, (10
Oliio St. 159, 164) 259 a, 273
Northern Liberties ». St. John's
Church, (13 Pa. St. 104) 270
North. Liberties Comrs. v. Gas Co.,
(12 Pa. St. 318) 308
Northern T. Co. v. Chicago, (99 U. S.
635) 329, 290
Northern Pac. L. & M. Co. v. East
Portland, (12 Pac. R. 4, 14 Oregon,
3)164
North. Pa. R. R. Co. v. Adams, (54
Pa. St. 97) 192
Northern P. Ry. Co. v. Roberts, (42
Fed. 734) 184
North Pac. Ry. Co. v. Spokane, (52
Fed. 428) 396
North Pac. etc. v. East Portland, (14
Oreg. 3) 290, 339
No. Pac. R. Co. V. Territory, (142 U.
S. 49) 363
Northern Pacific Terminal Co. v.
Portland, (14 Oreg. 24) 241
North Hempstead ». Hempstead, (2
Wend. 109) 59, 67, 201, 204, 205
North Manheim v. Arnold, (19 Pa.
St. 380) 342
North Mo. R. R. Co. v. Maguire, (49
Mo. 490) 16, 255
North Missouri R. R. Co. v. Lackland,
(25 Mo. 515) 233
No. Penn. Ry. v. Stone, (3 Phila. 421)
306
Northrop v. Graves, (19 Conn. 548)
327
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
exxi
North Springfield v. Springfield, (29
N. E. R. 849) 59
North Third Ave., In re, (3 N. T. S.
fi41) 221
North Vernon v. Voegeler, (103 N. T.
L. 314) 301, 330
Northwestern Univ. v. People, (80
111. 333) 270
Northyarmouth v. Skillings, (45 Me.
133) 13
Norton «. Brownsville, (129 U. S. 479)
188
Norton v. Dyersburg, (127 U. S. 160)
195 a
Norton v. Mansfield, (16 Mass. 48) 4
Norton v. Peck, (3 Wis. 714) 3
Norton v. Shelby Co., (118 U. S. 425)
88, 96, 195 d, 196
Norwich v. Story, (25 Conn. 44) 288
Nottingham, In re, (1 O'M. & H. 245)
65
Nowell V. Mayor, (9 Exch. 457) 182
Nowles V. Jasper Co., (86 Ind. 179) 79
Nowlin V. State, (49 Ala. 41) 400
Noyce v. Jones, (25 Neb. 643) 211
Noyes v. City, (116 Mass. 87) 398
Noyes o. Mason, (5 N. W. R. 595) 110
Noyes v. Morristown, (1 Vt. 357) 352
Noyes v. Ward, (19 Conn. 250) 215
Nugent V. Putnam, (19 Wall. 241)
186
Nugent V. State, (18 Ala. 521) 102
o.
Oakey v. New Orleans, (1 La. 1) 269
Oakham v. Holbook, (11 Cush. 299)
353
Oakland v. Carpenter, (13 Cal. 540)
99
Gates V. Hudson, (5 Eng. L. & Eq.
469) 326 a
Oatmau v. Taylor, (29 Wis. 657) 177
O'Brien v. St. Paul, (25 Minn. 331)
239, 354 a 355
'O'Conner v. Pittsburgh, (18 Pa. St.
187) 329
O'Connor v. Memphis, (6 Lea, 730)
42
O'Connor v. New York, (16 Daly, 88)
344
O'Connor v. Otenabee, (35 Up. Can.
Q. B. 73) 346
Oconto Co. V. Hall, (47 Wis. 208) 99
Odell V. Schroeder, (58 111. 353) 92,
331, 333
O'Dooherly v. Archer, (9 Tex. 295)
105
Odlin V. Woodruff, (12 So. Rep. 227)
397
O'Donnelli). Bailey, 24 Miss. 386)255,
273
O'Donnelli). Philadelphia, (2Brewst.
481) 177
O'Donovan v. Wilkins, (24 Fla. 281)
118
Oelet V. Newport Board of Aid., 14
R. I. 295) 220
O'Ferrall v. Colby, (2 Minn. 180) 371
Ogburn v. Connor, (46 Cal. 346) 354 a
Ogden 1). Daviess Co., (102 U. S. 634)
184
Ogden V. McLaughlin, (16 Pac. Rep.
72) 122
Ogden V. Raymond, (22 Conn. 379)
67, 169
Ogden V. Saunders, (12 Wheat. 213)
194
Odgen o. St. Joseph, (3 S. W. R. 25,
90 Mo. 522) 268
Ogg V. Lansing, (35 Iowa, 495) 327 a
332
O'Hale V. Sacramento, (48 Cal. 212)
347
O'Hara v. King, (52 111. 303) 373
O'Hara^. New Orleans, (30 La. An.
165) 169
O'Hara v. Portland, (3 Oreg. 525) 2,
8
O'Hare v. Dubuque, (22 Iowa, 144)
56
Ohio V. Com'rs, (7 Ohio St. 280) 184
Ohio V. Frank, (103 U. S. 697) 192
Ohio etc. Co. v. Bridgeport, (43 111.
Ap. 89) 317
Ohio Riv. R. Co. v. Gibbons, (12 S.
E. R. 1093) 396
Ohio Riv. R. Co. v. Ward, (35 W. Va.
481) 247, 249
Ohio Val. I. Wks. v. Moundsville, (11
W. Va. 1) 188, 365
Oil City V. Boiler Works, (25 Atl. R.
549, 152 Pa. St. 348) 294
Oil City I). Oil City B. Works, (25
Atl. R. 549) 282
Oil City V. Trust Co., (11 Pa. Co. Ct.
R. 350) 123
O'Kane v. Treat, (25 111. 458) 288
O'Keefe, In re, (19 N. Y. S. 676) 154
O'Laughlin v. Dubuque, (42 Iowa,
589) 346
Olcott V. Supervisors, (16 Wall. 678)
27, 216
Old Colony R. Co. v. Fall River, (147
Mass. 455) 398
Old Colony R. R. Co. v. Miller, (125
Mass. 1) 247
Old South Soc. V. Boston, (127 Mass.
378) 270
O'Lean v. Steyner, (135 N. Y. 341)
300
O'Leary v. Board, (44 N. W. R. 608)
92
cxxu
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Befercnces are to Sections.
O'Leary ». Mankato, (21 Minn. 65)
343
O'Leary v: Sloo, (7 La. An. 25) 291
O'Lindaj). Lathrop, (21 Pick. 292) 298
Olipliant V. Com'rs, (18 Kan. 386)
108
Oliver v. Council, (69 Ga. 165) 83
Oliver v. Memphis etc. Co., (30 Ark.
128) 397
Oliver v. No. Pao. Ky. Co., (3 Ore. 84)
352 a
Oliver v. Worcester, (102 Mass. 489)
9, 143, 314, 324, 332, 330 a
Olmstead v. Camp, (33 Conn. 551)
232
Olmstead v. Dennis, (77 N. T. 378)
86
Olmstead v. Mayor, (42 N. T. Super.
Ct. 289) 67
OIney v. Harvey, (50 111. 453) 32, 212
Olney v. Pearce, (1 R. I. 292) 73
OIney v. Riley, (39 111. App. 401) 324,
Olney v. Wickes, (18 Johns. 122) 168
Olp V. Leddick (59 Hun, 627) 142
Olson V. St. Paul, (38 Minn. 419) 355
Olwer V. Omaha, (3 Dillon, 368) 56
Omaha v. Hammond, (94 U. S. 98)
174
Omaha v. Jensen, (52 N. W. R. 833)
347
Omaha v. Olmstead, (5 Keb. 446) 103,
349
Omaha v. So. Omaha, (47 N. W. R.
1113) 53, 55
Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Brown, (46
ISr. W. K. 39) 354
Omaha Col. v. Rush, (22 Neb. 449, 35
N". W. R. 222) 271
Omaha H. R. Co. v. Cable Tramway
Co., (30 Fed. Rep. 324) 302, 306 a
O' Malay v. Freeport, (96 Pa. St. 24)
121, 127
O'Mally V. McGinn, (52 Wis. 353) 107
O'Meara v. Mayor, (1 Daly, 425) 92
Omslaer v. Phila. Co., (31 F. R. 354)
121
Oneida Bank v. Ontario Bank, (21
N. T. 495) 164, 169, 193 b
O'Neill V. Deerfleld, (86 Mich. 610)
353
O'Neill V. Hudson County, (41 N. J.
L. 161) 242
O'Neill V. New Orleans, (30 La. An.
220) 325, 342, 346, 349
O'Neill V. Register, (23 Atl. R. 960)
84
O'Neill V. West Branch, (45 N. W. R.
1023) 346
Onondaga Co. v. Briggs, (2 Denio, 26)
326 a
Onset St. E. Co. v. Com'rs, (154
Mass. 395) 311
Onstott V. Murray, (22 Iowa, 466)
219
Ontario Bank v. Bunnel:., (10 Wend.
186) 267, 274
Opelousas v. Andrus, (37 La. An. 639)
148
Opening of 163d St., In re, (61 Hun,
365) 243
Orange & A. R. R. Co. v. Alexan-
dria, (17 Gratt. 176) 267
Orcutt V. Kitley B. Co., (53 Me. 500)
317
O'Reilley v. Kingston, (114 N. T.
439) 259 a, 342
Oregon ». Pyle, (1 Oreg. 149) 79
Oregon & W. M. S. Bk. ■». Jordan,
(17 Pac. R. 621) 397
Orford Union Cong. Soc. v. West
Cong. Soc, (55 N. H. 463) 203
Orme v. Richmond, (78 Va. 86) 336 a
343
O'Rourke v. Sioux Falls, (54 N. W.
R. 1044) 324, 327 a
Oroville etc. ». Plumas Co. Sups., (37
Cal. 354) 186, 365
Orphan Asylum's Appeal, (111 Pa.
St. 135) 264
Orr V. Baker, (4 Ind. 86) 270
Orr V. O'Brien, (77 Iowa, 253) 314
Osage V. Larkins, (19 Pac. B. 658)
223, 287
Osborn v. Danvers, (6 Pick. 98) 326
Osborn v. Hart, (24 Wis. 89, 1 Am.
Rep. 161) 234 a
Osborn v. Hide, (68 Miss. 45) 187 a
Osborn v. Sutton, (108 U. S. 44G)
338 a
Osborne v. Adams Co., (106 U. S.
181) 188
Osborne v. Detroit, (32 Fed. E. 36)
350 i;
Osborne ». Mobile, (16 Wall. 479) 255,.
258
Osborne v. Nicholson, (13 Wall. 662)
184
Osborne v. Tunis, (25 N. J. L. 633)
211
Osgood V. Clark, (6 Fost. 307) 53
Osgood V. Green, (33 N. H. 318) 129
Osgood V. Manhattan Co., (3 Cow.
612) 107
Oshkosh r. State, (50 Wis. 425) 399
Oswald V. Grenet, (15 Tex. 118) 221
Oswego V. Osw. Canal Co., (6 N. Y.
257) 221, 223, 305
Otoe Co. V. Baldwin, (111 U. S. 1) 17,
28
Ottawa V. Carey, (108 U. S. 110) 110,
188
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
CXXUl
References are to Sections.
Otta\ra v. Chicago etc., (25 111. 42)
279
Ottawa V. County, (12 111. 339) 33
Ottawa County v. Nelson, (19 Kan.
234) 259 «, 261
Ottawa V. People, (48 HI. 233) 362,
363, 377
Ottawa V. Eohrburgh, (21 Pao. E.
1061)309
Ottawa V. Seely, (65 111. 434) 352 a
Ottawa V. Spencer, (36 111. 211) 259 a
Ottawa V. Spruce, (40 111. 211) 248
Ottawa V. Walker, (21 111. 605) 288
Ottawa D. C. v. Law, (6 Can. Q. B.
546) 143
Ottumwa 1). Chinn, (75 Iowa, 405) 120
Ottumwa V. Parks, (43 Iowa, 119) 348
Ouachita Pack. Co. v. Aiken, (121 U.
S. 444) 133
Ould V. Richmond, (23 Gratt. 464)
261, 268
Owasso ». Itichfield, (45 N. W. E.
129) 232, 240, 241
Owen B. Brockschmidt, (54 Mo. 285)
352 a
Owen V. Smith, (31 Barb. 641) 41, 42
Owensboro v. Callaghan, (17 S. W.
E. 278) 280
Owiugs i). Speed, (5 Wheat. 420) 31
Overacre v. Garrett, (5 Lans. 156) 72
Overseers v. New Berlin etc., (18
Johns. 382) 60, 169
Overseers v. Sears, (22 Pick. 122) 25
Overton Bridge Co. v. Tayloi-, (51 N.
W. E. 240) 212
Pacific D. Seifert, (79 Mo. 210) 159
Pac. Bridge v. Clackamas, (4 Fed. E.
217) 15
Pac. Ex. Co. V. Seibert, (142 U. S.
339) 259
Pacific E. R. Co. t'. Cass County, (53
Mo. 17) 270
Pacific E. E. Go. v. Chrystal, (25 Mo.
544) 245
Pao. E. E. Co. V. Leavenworth, (1
Dillon, 393) 301, 302, 303
Pacific Eailroad ». Lincoln Co., (1
Dillon C. C. 314) 22
Pacific E. E. Co. ». Seely, (45 Mo.
212) 200
Pac. E. E. Co. V. Wyandotte Co., (16
Kan. 587) 326 a
Pack V. New York, (3 N. Y. 222)
347
Packard b. Bovina, (24 Wis. 382) 180
Packard v. JefEerson Co., (2 Col. 338)
195 a
Packard v. New Bedford, (9 Allen,
200) 340
Packard v. Packard, (16 Pick. 191)
346
Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, (105 U.
S. 559) 133
Packet Co. v. Peoria, etc., (38 111.
467) 314
Packet Co. v. St. Louis, (100 U. S.
423) 133
Packet Co. v. St. Paul, (3 DiU. 454)
133
Paddocks v. Syraonds, (11 Barb. 112)
177, 180
Paducah etc. Co. v. Cone, (80 Ky.
147) 306
Page V. Baltimore, (34 Ind. 558) 134
Page V. Belvln, (14 S. E. E. 843) 292,
830
Page V. Bucksport, (64 Me. 51) 352
Page V. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ey. Co.,
(70 111. 324) 245
Page V. Chicago, (60 111. 441) 263
Page V. Clopton, (30 Gratt. 415) 360
Page V. Hardin, (8 B. Mon. 648) 85,
86
Page ». Heineberg, (40 Vt. 81) 200
Page B. Staples, (13 E. I. 306) 87
Page B. State, (11 Ala. 849) 125
Page B. St. Louis, (20 Mo. 136) 270
Page B. Sumpter, (53 Wis. 652) 352 a
Paine, In re, (1 Hill, 665, 667) 372
Paine v. Boston, (124 Mass. 486) 147
Paine b. Delhi, (116 N. Y. 224) 391
Paine b. Spratley, (5 Kan. 525) 110,
270, 282
Painter B. Pittsburgh, (46 Pa. St.
213) 92, 347
Palatine b. Kruger, (12 N. E. E. 75,
121 lU. 72) 293
Palfrey b. Boston, (101 Mass. 329)
258
Pall B. Peo., (50 111. 432) 86
Pallister v. Mayor, (67 Eng. C. L.
744) 182
Palmer b. Andover, (56 Mass. 600)
351, 352
Palmer b. Carroll, (24 N. H. 314) 91
Palmer v. Lincoln, (5 Neb. 136) 347
Palmer b. Mayor, (2 Sandf. 318) 79
Palmer b. Silverthorn, (32 Pa. St. 65)
300
Palmer ». Stacy, (44 Iowa, 44) 365
Palmer v. St. Albans, (60 Vt. 427)
336 a, 350
Palmer ». Strumpf, (29 Ind. 329)
259 a, 319
Palmer b. Waddell, (22 Kan. 352)
354, 396
Palmyra ». Morton, (25 Mo. 593) 153,
241, 259 a, 279
Panton Turnpike Co. b. Bishop, (11
Vt. 198) 320
CXXIV
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Paolo etc. Co. v. Anderson Co., (16
Kan. 332) 186
Papworth v. Milw., (64 Wis. 389) 298
Para Eub. Shoe Co. v. Boston, (139
Mass. 155) 354
Paralee v. Camden, (49 Ark. 165) 122
Parcel ». Barnes, (25 Ark. 261) 190 a
Pardridge v. Hyde Park, (23 N. E.
K. 345, 131 111. 537) 162
Paret v. Bayonne, (39 K. J. L. 559)
142
Paris V. Graham, (33 Md. 94) 1.50
Parish v. Eden, (62 Wis. 372) 350 6
Parish v. Golden, (35 N. Y. 462) 106
Parish v. Levy, (4 So. K. 309) 268
Paris)! V. Keed, (2 Wash. St. 491) 365
Parish v. Stearns, (21 Pick. 156) 373
Parish of Plaquemines v. Fulhouze,
(30 La. An. 64) 207
Park Bank v. Vv'atson, (42 N. Y. 490)
195 c
Parke Co. Com'rs v. O'Conner, (86
Ind. 531) 212
Parker, In re, (120 U. S. 746) 359
Parker ». Bos. & M. R. R, (3 Cush.
107) 313
Parker v. Catholic Bishop, (34 N. E.
R. 473) 308, 311
Parker ». Commonwealth, (6 Pa. St.
607) 24
Parker ». Dak. Co., (4 Minn. 59) 79
Parker v. Greene, (2 B. & S. 299) 104
Parker v. Gt. West. Ky. Co., (7 M. &
G. 253) 326 a
Parker v. Hubbard, (64 Ala. 203) 371
Parker v. Lowell, (11 Gray, 353) 354
Parker v. Macou, (39 Ga. 729) 120
Parker v. Milldam Co., (20 Me. 353)
239
Parker o. Portland, (54 Mich. 308)
363
Parker v. Saratoga Co., (106 N. Y.
392) 139
Parker v. Smith, (3 HI. App. 366) 185
Parker v. Truesdale, (55 JST. Y. 901)
317
Parker v. Union W. Wks., (42 Conn.
309) 120
Parker v. Williamsburgh, (13 How.
Pr. 250) 176
Parkersburgh v. Brown, (106 U. S.
582) 194 a, 375
Parkersburgh v. Brown, (106 U. S.
487) 188, 194 a, 375
Parkhill v. Brighton, (61 Iowa, 103)
352
Parkhurst ». Salem, (32 Pac. 304) 302
Parks V. Boston, (8 Pick. 218) 244,
249
Parks V. Newburyport, (16 Gray, 29)
354,354 a
Parmlee v. Chicago, (60 111. 267) 195
Parnaby v. Lan. Can. Co., (11 A. &
E. 223) 121
Parr ». Attorney Gen'l, (8 CI. & F.
409) 105, 393
Parr v. Greenbush, (42 Hun, 232) 163
Parrott v. Bridgeport, (44 Conn. 180)
360
Parsons, In re, (54 N. Y. Super Ct.
451) 79
Parsons v. Atlanta Univ. Trs., (14 Ga.
529) 223, 396
Parsons v. Bethnal Green, (7 L. T.
211) 355
Parsons v. Goshen, (11 Pick. 396) 4,
169
Parsons v. Jackson, (99 U. S. 434) 191,
192 6
Parsons v. Lindsay, (26 Kan. 426)
352 a
Parsons v. Monmouth, (70 Me. 262)
164
Parsons v. Northampton, (154 Mass.
410) 256
Parvis v. Phila. etc. Co., (17 Atl. 702)
352
Pasadena v. Simpson, (91 Cal. 238)
234
Pasadena v. Stimson, (27 Pac. R. 604)
31
Passaic Bridge Cases, (3 Wall. 782)
314
Paterson v. Society etc. (24 N. J. L.
385) 2, 62, 270, 277
Paterson etc. Co. v. Paterson, (24 N.
J. Eq. 158) 302
Paterson Ry. v. Grundy, (26 Atl. 788)
302, .303
Patoka V. Hopkins, (30 N. E. R. 896)
354 a
Patter v. Castleton, (53 Vt. 435) 346
Patterson v. Boston, (20 Pick. 159)
244
Patterson D. Caldwell, (1 Mete. 93)
88
Patterson ». Ind. etc. Co., (56 Ind.
20) 320
Patterson ». Miss. & E. R. Boom Co.,
(3 Dillon, 465) 231
Patterson v. Yubaco, (13 Cal. 175)
189 a
Patton V. Cresswell, (21 N. E. 663)308
Patton V. Springfield, (99 Mass. 627)
277
Patton V. Stephens, (14 Bush, 324)
140
Patton V. Vaughan, (39 Ark. 211) 83
Paul V. Coulter, (12 Minn. 41) 128
Paul V. Detroit, (32 Mich. 108) 286
Paul V. GilflUan, (36 Minn. 298) 120
Paul V. Kenosha, (22 Wis. 266) 164
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
CXXV
References are to Sections.
Paulsen v. Portland, (13 S. Ct. 750)
278
Pavey v. Utter, (132 111. 489) 33
Pawlet V. Clark, (9 Crancli, 292) 217
Pawton T. Co. ». Bishop, (11 Vt. 198)
318
Paxson. D. Sweet, (1 J. S. Green, 200)
156, 158, 259 a
Payne v. Brecon, (3 H. & N. 579) 51
Payne v. English, (21 Pao. 952, 79 Cal.
540) 893, 39f)
Payne v. Mayor etc., (3 Hurl. F. 372)
182
Payne v. MoKinley, (54 Cal. 532) 396
Peabody v. Flint, (6 Allen, 52) 379
Peachey v. Somerset, (1 Str. 447)
155
Peacock v. Harris, (10 East, 104) 320
Pearce v. Madison etc. Co. (21 How.
441) 169
Pearl Street, In re, (111 Pa. St. 565)
221
Pearsall v. Eaton, (42 N". W. Kep. 77)
311
Pearsall ». Eaton Co., (15 N. W. Rep.
522) 279
Pearsall v. Post, (20 Wend. Ill, 117,
22 Wend. 425, 433) 225, 226
Pearson ». Zable, (78 Ky. 170) 92, 347
Pease v. Cornish, (19 Me. 191) 178
Peay v. Little Rock, (32 Ark. 31) 248,
259 a
Peck V. Austin, (2 Tex. 152) 129, 331
Peck V. Bellnap, (55 Hun, 91) 71
Peck V. Board, (90 Cal. 384) 369
Peck 13. Cooper, (112 111. 192) 328
Peck ». Jones, (70 Pa. St. 85) 244
Peck V. Prov. Steam Engine Co., (8
R. I. 358) 216
Peck V. Rochester, (3 K. T. Supp.
872) 71
Peck«. Sherwood, (56 N. T. 614) 259 a
Peddioord b. B. etc. Co., (84 Md. 463)
303
Pedrick v. Baily, (12 Gray, 161) 87
Peete v. Morgan, (19 Wall. 581) 138
Pegram v. Cleve. Co. Comm'rs, (65
N. C. 114) 370
Pekin v. Newell, (26 HI. 320) 328, 338
Pekin v. Reynolds, (31 111. 529, 82 Am.
Dec. 244) 179, 192
Pelham v. Pickersgill, (1 Term Rep.
660) 320
Pelican v. Rock Falls, (51 N. W. R.
871) 60
Pell V. Newark, (40 N. J. L. 71) 302
Pella V. Scholte, (24 Iowa, 283) 217,
312
Pembina etc. Co. v. Pennsylvania, (8
S. Ct. 737) 259
Pendergast v. Peru, (20 111. 51) 148
Pendleton v. Bank of Kentucky, (1
Mon. 177) 49
Peninsular Ry. Co. v. Howard, (20
Mich. 18) 245
Peninsular etc. Co. v. Crystal Falls,
(60 Mich. 510) 217, 220
Penn Hall, In re, (5 Pa. St. 204) 104
Pennie, In re, (108 N. Y. 364) 281
Penniman's Case, (103 U. S. 714)
194
Pennington c. Baehr, (48 Cal. 565)
190 a
Pennington v. Taniere, (12 Q. B.
1011) 165
Pennington v. Willard, (1 R. I. 93)
219
Pennook v. Coe, (23 How. 130) 190
Pennoyer d. McConnaugliey, (140 U.
S. 1)5
Pennoyer v. Saginaw, (8 Mich. 534)
354 a
Pennsylvania v. Bridge Co., (13 How.
518) 396
Pennsylvania Co. v. Rathget, (32
Ohio St. 66) 344
Pennsylvania Co. v. Stagemeier, (118
Ind. 305) 136, 331
Pennsylvania Co. v. Varnan, (15 Atl.
R. 624) 352
Pennsylvania Dist. Election, (2 Par.
526) 65
Penn. etc. Co. v. Riblet, (66 Pa. St.
164) 802
Pennsylvania Globe G. L. Co. v.
Scranton, (97 Pa. St. 538) 148
Penna. R. Co. v. Angel, (41 N. J. Eq.
316, 7 Atl. Rep. 432) 301
Penn. Ry. Co. v. Ayres, (14 Atl. R.
901) 216
Penn. R. Co. v. Braddock El. Ry. Co.,
(81 W. N. C. 311) 317
Pa. etc. Co. V. Danbridge, (8 Gill &
J. 248, 310) 169
Penn. R. R. v. Duquesne Bor., (46 Pa.
St. 228) 288
Pa. R. R. V. Lippincott, (116 Pa. St.
472) 330
Pa. R. R. Co. V. Marchant, (19 Pa. St.
541) 330
Penn. R. R. Co. v. McCloskey, (23
Pa. St. 526) 352 a
Penna. R. R. Co; v. Mish, (4 Cent.
Rep. 279) 301
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. N. Y. etc.
R. R. Co., (23 N. J. Eq. 157) 239
Penn. R. Co. b. Phila. B. L. R. Co.,
10 Pa. Co. Ct. 625) 302
Penn. R. R. Co. v. Pittsburgh Gr.
Elev. Co., (50 Pa. St. 499) 224
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Porter, (29
Pa. St. 165) 241
CXXVl
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
X'ennsylvania E. R. Co. v. St. Loius,
A. & T. H. K R. Co., (118 U. S.
290) 210
Pa. E. R. Co. V. Slv., (65 Pa. St. 210)
320
Penn. R. R. Co. v. Schuylkill Co.,
(166 Pa. St. 55, 8 Atl. R. 914) .306
Penn. Tp. v. Perry Co., (78 Pa. St.
457) 314
Penny Pot Landing Case, (16 Pa. St.
79)'225, 312
Penobscot v. Lawson, (16 Me. 224) 2
Penoyeri). Saginaw, (8 Mich. 534) 120
Penrose v. Erie Canal Co., (56 Pa. St.
46) 184
Pensacola v. Louisville etc. R. Co.,
(21 Fla. 492) 56, 61
Pensacola & A. Ry. Co. v. State, (5
S. Kep. 833, 25 Fla. 310) 150
Pentz V. iEtna Ins. Co., (9 Paige, 568)
335
Peona etc. Co. v. People, (31 N. E.
R. 113) 87, 263
People V. Abbott, (45 Hun, 293) 375
People V. Adams, (9 Wend. 333) 98,
107
People ». Albany M. Col., (62 How.
Pr. 220) 83
People V. Albany Co. Suprs., (12
Johns. 414) 363
Peo. V. Alb. R. R., (24 ST. Y. 261, 269)
359
People V. Albany, (11 Wend. 539, 543)
132
People V. Albertson, (55 N. Y. 50) 18
People V. Allen, (52 N. Y. 538) 189
People !). Allen, (6 Wend. 486) 76
People V. Angle, (109 N. Y. 564) 71
People V. Assessors, (1 Hill, 620) 5
People B. Assessors, (111 N. Y. 505)
14
People V. Attorney General, (22 Barb.
114) 363
People V. Auditors, (75 N. Y. 317)
339
People V. Austin, (11 Col. 134) 177
People V. Bagley, (85 Gal. 343) 42
People V. Baine, (6 Cal. 509) 82
People V. Baker, (35 Barb. 105) 368
People D. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.
Co., 117 N. Y. 150) 133
People I). Bancroft, (29 Pao. R. 112) 39
People V. Bank, (1 Doug. 282) 110
People V. Baraga, (39 Mich. 534) 169
People V. Barnard, (110 K. Y. 548)
172 '
People V. Barnes, (114 N. Y. 317) 375
People V. Bartlett, (6 Wend. 422) 82
People V. Batchelor, (22 N. Y. 129) 97
People V. Batchellor, (53 N. Y. 1281
187 '
People V. Bedell, (2 Hill, 196) 75, 76
People V. Benev. Soc, (24 How. Pr
215) 84
People V. Benfield, (80 Mich. 265) 72
People V. Bennett, (29 Mich. 451, 18
Am. Rep. 107) 56
People V. Benson, (34 Barb. 24) 144,
295
People V. Blssell, (49 Cal. 407) 82
People V. Blackhurst, (25 Abb. N. 0.
230) 359
People V. Blake, (60 Cal. 497) 220
People V. Bloomington, (63 111. 207)
362, 368
People B. Bloomington, (38 111. App.
125) 360
People 1). Board, (18 Mich. 400) 374
People V. Board, (33 Barb. 344) 118
People B. Board etc., (72 N. Y. 445)
83
People V. Board, (9 Hun, 222) 83
People V. Board, (99 ST. Y. 676) 99
People I). Board, (5 N. Y. S. 392) 362
People V. Boiird, (20 iST. Y. S. 1) 359
People B. Board, (55 Hun, 445) 83, 84
People V. Board, (62 Hun, 632) 365
People B. Board, (69 Hun, 95) 294
People V. Board etc., (127 111. 613)
374
People V. Board of Canvassers, (129
N". Y. 360) 360
People V. Board of Education, (15 N.
Y. S. 308) 359
People V. Board of Police, (19 N. Y.
188) 363
People ». Bond, (10 Cal. 563) 14
People V. Boston etc. Co., (70 N. Y.
569) 302
People V. Bradley, (36 Mich. 447) 55,
56
People 13. Breen, (18 Mich. 247) 368
People B. Brenhan, (3 Cal. 477) 65
People V. Brennan, (18 Abb. Pr. 100)
174
People V. Brennan, (1 Abb. Pr. N. I.
184) 79
People V. Briggs, (114 N. Y. 56) 155
People B. Briggs, (50 N. Y. 553) 9, 28
People B. Brighton, (20 Mich. 67) 241,
279
People V. Broadway Wharf Co., (31
Cal. 33) 200
People V. Brooklyn, (77 N. Y. 503) 86
People V. Brooklyn, (71 N. Y. 495)
278
People B. Brooklyn, (23 Barb. 404)
377
People ». Brooklyn, (4 N. Y. 419)
259 a, 270, 283
People B. Brooklyn, (1 Wend. 318)
242
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
CXXVU
References are to Sections.
People V. Brooklyn, (65 N. T. 349)
306
People V. Brooklyn Assessors, (111
N. Y. 505) 271
People B. Brooklyn Council, (77 N.
Y. 503) 363
People V. Brown, (2 Utah, 462) 117
People V. Bryan, (68 N. Y. 71) 121
People V. Buchanan, (1 Idaho, 681)
158
People I). Burlington, (20 Mich. 57)
249
People V. Burnside, (3 Lans. 74) 83
People ». Cain, (47 N. W. E. 484, 84
Mich. 223) 83
People V. Calhoun Co., (36 Mich. 10)
79
People V. Campbell, (50 N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 82) 84
People V. Canaday, (73 N. Car. 193,
21 Am. Eep. 465) 63
People V. Canal Appraisers, (13 Wend.
355) 239
People V. Canal Board, (55 N. Y. 390)
393
People V. Canby, (55 111. 33) 75
People V. Canty, (55 111. 33) 255
People V. Carnell, (47 Barb. 329) 106
People V. Carpenter, (24 N. Y. 86) 53,
379
People V. Carrique, (2 Hill, 93) 86
People V. Carroll, (42 Hun, 438) 83
People V. Case, (19 N. Y. S. 625) 363
People V. Cass Co. Com'rs, (77 111.
438) 363
People V. Cassiday, (2 Lansing, 294)
274
People I). Cazneau, (20 Gal. 503) 76
People V. Central Pac. K. K. Co., (43
Cal. 398) 258
People V. Central P. R. K. Co., (83
Cal. 393) 282
People V. Champion, (16 Johns. 61)
368, 377
People I). Chenango Co., (11 N". Y.
563) 359
People V. Chicago etc., (67 111. 118)
306, 317
People V. Chicago, (118 111. 520) 288
People V. Chicago, (51 111. 17) 18
People V. Civ. Ser. Bd., (41 Hun, 287)
71
People V. Civ. Ser. Bd., (17 Abb. N.
C. 64) 87
People V. Clark, (47 Cal. 456) 263
People V. Clark, (70 N. Y. 518) 385
People V. Clark Co., (50 111. 213) 375
People B. Clarke, (50 111. 213) 360
People V. Cline, (63 111. 394) 196
People V. Clingan, (5 Cal. 389) 77
People D. CofEey, (131 N. Y. 569) 374
People V. Coleman, (133 N. Y. 279)
273
People V. Collins, (3 Mich. 347) 161
People V. Collins, (19 Wend. 56) 363,
370, 377
People V. Com. Coun., (34 Mich. 201)
375
People V. Com. Council, (85 Cal. 369,
24 Pac. R. 727) 360
People V. Com. Counc, (78 N. Y. 39)
362
People V. Com., (45 Barb. 473) 377
People V. Com'rs, (37 IST. Y. 360)
318
People V. Com'rs, (49 IT. Y. Super.
Ct. 369) 83
People V. Com'rs etc., (106 N. Y. 64)
84
People V. Com'rs, (4 N. Y. S. 41) 274
People V. Com'rs, (6 Colo. 202).368
People B. Com'rs, (11 How. Pr. 89)
368
People V. Com'rs, (4 Wall. 244) 258
People V. Com'rs, (4 Neb. 150; 313
People V. Couually, (4 Abb. Pr. N. S.
375) 87
People V. Connolly, (2 Abb. Pr. N. S.
315) 375
People V. Cook, (14 Barb. 259) 65
People V. Cooper, (57 How. Pr. 416)
83
People V. Coon, (25 Cal. 635) 12, 14
People V. Corner, (59 Hun, 299) 5
People V. Cregier, (28 N. E. Rep. 812)
125
People V. Crissey, (91 N. Y. 613) 65,
82
People V. Croton Aqueduct Bd., (26
Barb. 240) 173, 377
People I). Cummlngs, (72 IST. Y. 433)
363
People V. Cunningham, (1 Denlo,
524) 300
People V. Curley, (5 Col. 412) 18, 102
People V. Curtis, (1 Idaho N. S. 753)
82
People V. Davidson, (21 Pac. Rep.
538, 79 Cal. 166) 220, 318
People V. Dayton, (55 N. Y. 367) 16
People u. Detroit, (37 Mich. 195) 301,
319
People ». Detroit, (41 Mich. 224) 172
People V. Detroit, (18 Mich. 338) 381
People V. Detroit, (28 Mich. 228, 15
Am. Rep. 202) 170, 218
People I). Doe, (36 Cal. 220) 271
People V. Doolittle, (44 Hun, 293) 84
People V. Draper, (15 N. Y. 543) 18,
89
People V. Drolin, (33 N. Y. 269) 79
People V. Duane, (55 Hun, 315) 75
CXXVUl
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
People V. Duane, (121 N. Y. 367) 86
People 15. Dulany, (96 111. 203) 360
People V. Dunlap, (66 N. T. 162) 87
People V. Dui-stor, (3 N. Y. Sup. 522)
71
People V. Dutchess etc. Co., (58 N.
Y. 152) 306, 369
People V. Bast Sag., (33 Mich. 164)
87
People V. Eddy, (43 Cal. 333) 270
People V. Edmonds, (15 Barb. 529)
359, 360
People V. El Dorado, (11 Cal. 170)
177
People ». Erwin, (4 Den. 129) 122
People V. Evans, (18 111. 361) 102
People D. Everett, (1 Cal. N. Y. 8)
369
People V. Fairbury, (51 111. 149) 371,
87
People V. Farnhara, (35 111. 562) 31,
32 53
People V. Field, (58 N. Y. 491) 9, 11
People V. Fire Com'rs, (49 N. Y. Su-
per. 369) 87
People V. Fire Com'rs, (73 N. Y. 437)
83
People V. Fire Com'rs, (77 IST. Y. 15.3)
84
People ». Fitzsimmons, (68 N. Y.
514) 76
People V. Flagg, (16 Barb. 503) 87
People V. Flagg, (17 N. Y. 584) 172
People V. Flagg, (46 N. Y. 401) 15
People V. Fletcher, (55 N. y. 525) 383
People V. Fleming, (10 Colo. 553) 15
People V. Flynn, (62 ]Sr. Y. 375) 83
People ». Ft. Wayne etc. Co., (92
Mich. 522) 302
People V. Fort Street etc. Co., (41
Mich. 413) 306
People V. French, (51 N. Y. 345) 71
People D. French, (32 Hun, 112, 60
How. Pr. 377) 83
People V. French, (63 Hun, 633) 83
People V. French, (13 N. Y. S. E.
584) 111
People V. French, (12 Abb. N. Cas.
156) 365
People V. French, (24 Hun, 263) 55,
371
People ». Fowler, (63 Hun, 627) 300
People V. Fulda, (52 Hun, 65) 123
People V. Gartlaud, (42 K. W. R. 687)
385
People V. Gates, (43 N. Y. 40) 258
People V. Gilbert, (18 Johns. 227)312
People V. Gilmore, (5 Gilra. 242) 359
People V. Gilon, (24 N. E. R. 944) 279
People?). Gilroy, (22 N. Y. S. 271,
67 Hun, 323) 295
People V. Goetling, (133 N. Y. 569)
361
People V. Gold Run D. Min. Co., (56
Am. Kep. 80) 121
People V. Gray, (23 Cal. 125) 179
People V. Green, (58 N^. Y. 295) 86
People V. Green, (5 Daly, 254, 58 N.
Y. 295) 86
People V. Greene Co., (12 Barb. 222)
368
People V. Griswold, (2 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 351) 311
People V. Hagadorn, (10 X. E. E. 891,
104 N. Y. 516) 263
People V. Hall, (80 ST. Y. 117) 105, 381
People V. Hammill, (22 Am. & Eng.
Cor. Cas. 39) 189 a
People V. Hanifan, (96 HI. 420) 86
People V. Hanrahan, (75 Mich. 611)
122
People V. Hannan, (56 Hun, 469) 84
People V. ^arper, (91 111. 357) 127
People V. Harper, (18 N. Y. S. 896)
365
People V. Harris, (4 Cal. 9) 141
People V. Hartwell, (12 Mich. 508)
380
People V. Harvey, (58 Cal. 337) 65
People V. Haws, (34 Barb. 69) 79
People !). Hayden, (10 N. Y. Supp.
794) 83
People V. Hayden, (6 Hill, 359) 247
People V. Hayden, (133 N. Y. 198)
83
People V. Hayt, (66 N. Y. 607) 368
People V. Head, (25 111. 287) 371
People V. Henshaw, (61 Barb. 409)
189
People V. Henshaw, (18 Pac. R. 413)
34
People V. Herbel, (96 111. 384) 218
People V. Higgius, (15 111. 110) 83
People V. Higgins, (3 Mich. 233) 65
People V. Highland Park, (50 N. W.
R. 660, 88 Mich. 653) 18, 86
People V. Hill, (7 Cal. 79) 15, 83
People V. Hilliard, (29 111. 413) 368,
371
People V. Hills, (35 N. Y. 449) 28
People V. Hillsdale, (2 Johns. 190)
384
People V. Holden, (28 Cal. 123) 381
People V. Holihan, (29 Mich. 116) 55
People V. Holmes, (2 Wend. 281) 72
People V. Hopson, (1 Denio, 574) 88
People V. Horn Sil. Nl. Co., (11 N. E.
R. 155) 259
People V. Hurlbut, (24 Mich. 44) 9,
255
People V. Hyde Park, (117 111. 462)
376
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
CXXIX
References are to Sections.
People V. Ingei-soll, (58 jST. Y. 1) 9,
11, 12
People V. Inspectors, (4 Mich. 187)
359, 363
People V. Irwin, (4 Den. 129) 122
People V. Jackson, (92 111. 444) 376
People V. Jackson, (8 Midi. 110) 117
People V. Jackson, (7 Mich. 432) 222,
300
People V. Jaehne, (103 N. Y. 182) 34
People V. James, (16 Hun, 426) 299
People V. Jobs, (7 Colo. 589) 67
People V. Johnson, (39 Am. Rep. 63)
177, 375
People V. Johnson, (6 Cal. 499) 189 a
People V. Jones, (6 Mich. 176) 215,
223
People V. Jordan, (90 N. Y. 53) 83
People V. Judge, (40 Mich. 64) 278
People B. Judges, (4 Cow. 73) 368
People V. Justices, (74 N. Y. 406) 104
People V. Keeling, (4 Col. 129) 65
People V. Kelly, (5 Ab. X. C. 383) 15
People V. Kelsey, (34 Cal. 470) 255
People V. Kerr, (27 N". Y. 188) 303
People V. Kilduff, (55 111. 402) 361
People V. Kildufi:, (15 HI- 492) 381
People 13. Kimball, (4 Mich. 95) 245
People B. Kingston etc., (23 Wend.
193) 320
People V. Klumpke, (41 Gal. 263) 221
People B. Kniskern, (54 N. Y. 52) 241
People V. Lacorabe, (99 N. Y. 43) 96
People V. Lacombe, (34 Hun, 409) 82
People B. Lamblier, (5 Denio, 9, 19)
221
People B. Langdon, (40 Mich. 673) 67
People B. Langham, (20 Barb. 302)
371
People B. La Salle, (84 111. 303) 362
People B. Lathrop, (24 Mich. 235) 170
Peoples. Launtz, (113 111. 137) 76
People V. Law, (34 Barb. 494) 303
People ». Lawrence, (6 Hill, 244) 115
People B. Leonard, (73 Cal. 230) 74
People B. Lewis, (7 Johns. 73) 91
People B. Lippincott, (67 111. 333) 79
People B. Logan Co., (63 111. 374) 368
People B. Logan Co., (45 111. 162) 186
People B. Loomis, (8 Wend. 396) 65
People B. Lord, (9 Mich. 227) 81
People V. Lowber, (7 Abb. Pr. 158)
394
People B. Lowell, (9 Met. 144) 377
People B. Lowndes, (130 N. Y. 455)
258
People B. Love, (19 Cal. 676) 47, 49
People B. Lynch, (51 Cal. 15) 16, 17,
18,259 a
Peo. V. Maher, (19 N. Y. Sup. 759)
368
ix
People B. Mahoney (13 Mich. 481) 18
People B. Mallory, (46 How. Pr. 281)
133
Peo. V. Man. Gas Co., (45 Barb. 136)
363
People B. Manhattan Ey. Co., (22
Abb. N. C. 393) 377
Peo. !). Manistee, (40 Mich. 585) 79
People B. Martin, (5 N. Y. 27) 95, 97
People B. Martin, (131 N. Y. 196) 362
People B. Mathewson, (47 Cal. 442)
65
People B. Matteson, (17 111. 167) 65,
361
People B. Mauran, (5 Denio, 389) 202
People B. May, (9 Col. 404, 411) 189 a
People B. Maynard, (15 Mich. 463,
470) 29, 31
People V. Mavor, (2 Hill, 9) 105
Peo. B. Mayor etc. (19 Hun, 441) 84
People B. Mayor, (82 N. Y. 491) 83
People B. Mayor etc., (4 Comst. 419)
16
People B. Mayor etc., (7 How. Pr. E.
81) 158
People B. Mayor etc. of Brooklyn, (4
N. Y. 419) 259 a
Peo. V. McCall, (65 How. Pr. 442) 56
People B. McClare, (25 N. E. E. 1047,
123 ISr. Y. 512) 84
People B. McClintock, (45 Cal. 11)
119
People B. McCreery, (34 Cal. 432) 270
People B. McDonald, (69 N. Y. 362)
280
People o. McKinney, (52 N. Y. 374)
18
Peo. B. McKinney, (10 Mich. 54) 67
People B. McLean, (16 N. Y. S. 401)
362
People B. McLean, (62 Hun, 42) 86
People B. McLean, (57 Hun, 587, 141,
58 Hun, 603, 59 Hun, 623, 58 Hun,
604) 83
People B. McLean, (21 K. Y. Sup.
625) 83
People V. MoEoberts, (62 111. 38) 245
People B. Mead, (24 N. Y. 124) 191 6
People V. Metro. Pol. Brd. (26 N. Y.
216) 368
People B. Miller, (24 Mich. 458) 85
Peo. B. Mich. Univ. Eeg., (4 Mich. 98)
363
Peo. V. Miller, (24 Mich. 458) 85
People B. Minck, (21 N. Y. 639) 107
People B. Mitchell, (35 N. Y. 551) 187 a
People B. Moline, (14 N. E. E. 32) 271
Peo. B. Molineaux, (53 Barb. 9) 76
People B. Moore, (50 Hun, 356) 217
People B. Morgan, (90 111. 558) 18
People B. Morgan, (55 N. Y. 587) 185
exxx
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
People V. Morris, (13 Wend. 325) 2,
18, 23, 32
People V. Morse, (43 Cal. 534) 14
People V. Mott, (1 How. Pr. K. 247)
106
People V. MulhoUand, (19 Hun, 548,
82 N. T. 324) 118, 123
People V. Murray, (73 ST. Y. 535) 42,
86
Peo. V. Murray, (70 N. Y. 521) 67, 76
Peo. V. Murray, (57 Mich. 396) 107,
148
People V. Mut. Gaslight Co., (38
Mich. 154) 384
People V. Myers, (32 N. E. R. 241) 279
People V. Nearing, (27 N. Y. 306) 234
People V. Nevada, (6 Col. 14.3) 53
People V. Newton, (112 N. Y. 396)
302, 360
People V. N. & S. etc., (86 N. Y. 1)
317
People V. N. Y. Pol. Board, (107 N.
Y. 235) 360
People ». New York, (3 Johns. Cas.
79) 371
People V. New York, (1 Hill, 362) 167
People V. New York, (9 Abb. Pr. 253)
394
People V. New York, (82 N. Y. 491)
83
People ». N. Y. Gas L. Co., (64 Barb.
55) 120
People V. N. Y. Sup., (32 N. Y. 473)
360
People V. N. Y. Tax Com'rs, (82 N.
Y. 462) 274
People V. N. Y. Tax Com'rs, (95 N.
Y. 554) 270
People V. Nichols, (68 N. C. 429) 67
People D. Nicliols, (79 N. Y. 582) 84
People V. Nichols, (58 How. Pr. 200)
84
People V. Nolan, (102 N. Y. 539) 85
People V. No. Ch. Ey. Co., (88 111.
537) 380
People V. North, (72 N. Y. 124) 65,
381
People V. Nostrand, (46 N. Y. 375)
67, 86, 88
People V. Nyland, (41 Cal. 129) 102
People V. Oakland, (92 Cal. 611) 385
People V. O'Brien, (111 N. Y. 1) 10,
11, 37, 302
People ». Ogdensburgh, (48 N. Y.
390) 272, 275
People V. Ohio Grove, (51 111. 192) 186
People ». O'Keefe, (21 Pao. E. 539,
79 Cal. 171) 221
People V. O'Neil, (109 N. Y. 251) 33
People V. Paoheco, (27 Cal. 175) 189 a
People ». Page, (23 Pac, E. 761) 33
People V. Palmer, (52 N. Y. 83) 99
People i). Parker, (3 Neb. 409) 86
People V. Parks, (58 Cal. 624) 188
People V. Pearson, (3 Scam. 274) 368
People V. Phillips, (1 Denio, 388) 66
People V. Pinckney, (32 N. Y. 377)
67, 75
People V. Pol. Com'rs,( 98 N. Y. 332)
84
People V. Pol. Com'rs, (31 Hun, 209)
84
•People V. Pol. Justice, (7 Mich. 458)
105
People V. Porter, (87 N. Y. 68) 18
People V. Porter, (6 Cal. 26) 86
People V. Potter, (35 Cal. 110) 30
People V. Power, (25 111. 187) 12
People B. Piatt, (115 N. Y. 159) 69
People V. Pratt, (50 Cal. 561) 12
People V. President, (9 Wend. 351)
24,31
People V. Provines, (34 Cal. 520) 102
People V. Pueblo Co., (2 Colo. 360)
186
People V. Purviance, (12 111. Ap. 216)
371
People V. Kailroad, (12 Mich. 389) 110
People V. Ransom, (2 N. Y. 490) 368
People V. Eansom, (56 Barb. 514) 87
People ». Eeed, (22 Pac. E. 474, 81
Cal. 70) 221
People V. Eeed, (20 Pac. R. 708) 219
People V. Eeed, (19 N. Y. S. 528) 273
People V. Reirt, (11 Colo. 138) 76, 81
People V. Registrar, (20 N. E. R. 611)
371
People B. Rensselaer etc., (15 Wend.
113) 314
People B. Reynolds, (10 HI. 1) 24
People V. Eich. Co. Sup., (28 N. Y.
112) 369
People V. Richardson, (4 Cow. 101,
122, 133) 378
People V. Eiordan, (41 N. W. R. 482)
361, 378
People V. Riverside, (11 Pac. 759, 70
Cal. 461) 24
People B. Eobb, (27 N. E. E. 267) 83
People V. Eobb, (6 N. Y. S. 831) 84
People B. Rochester, (21 Barb. 656)
278
People V. Eochester, (45 Hun, 102)
127
People V. Eochester, (5 Lans. 142)
280
People V. Eontey, (21 N. Y. St. Eep.
173, 4 N. Y. Supp. 235) 123
People V. Rosenberg, (138 N. Y. 410)
301
People V. Runkel, (9 John. 147) 49,
81,88
TABI-E OF CASES CITED.
CXXXI
Beferences are to Sections.
People ». Ryan, (27 N. E. E. 1095)
270
People V. Salem, (20 Mich. 477) 244
253
People V. Salmon, (51 111. 17) 15, 271
People 1). Salmon, (38 Miss. «52) 24
People V. Salomon, (46 111. 415) 359,
371
People V. Salomon, (51 111. 37) 255
People V. San F. Sups., (27 Gal. 655)
191
People V. San Francisco, (36 Cal. 594)
363
People V. San Luis, etc., (56 Cal. 561)
377
People V. Sara. R. R. Co., (15 Wend.
130) 314
People V. Sargent, (8 Cow. 139) 122
People V. Sassovich, (29 Cal. 480) 88
People V. Sawyer, (52 N. Y. 296) 189
People V. Schermerhorn, (19 Barb.
540, 555) 206
People V. Seaman, (5 Denio, 409) 65
People V. Sen. Com. Pleas, (2 Wend.
264) 365
People V. Shearer, (30 Cal. 645) 271
People V. Sheffield, (47 Hun, 481) 69
People V. Shepherd, (36 N. T. 285)
18
People ». Slaughter, (2 .Doug. 834)
104
People V. Smith, (77 N. Y. 347) 364
People «. Smith, (21 TST. Y. 595) 23,
232, 240
People V. Solomon, (51 lU. 37) 28
People V. Spring Valley, (129 111. 169)
385
People V. Squire, (145 U. S. 175) 16
People V. Squire, (107 N. Y. 593) 297,
319
People V. Stacks, (33 Hun, 384) 84
People V. State, (19 Mich. 392) 363
People v. Herman, (10 N. Y. S. 787)
249
Peoples V. Stephens, (71 N. Y. 557)
173
People V. Stephens, (62 Cal. 209) 295
People V. Stevens, (5 Hill, 616) 65, 88
360
People V. Stevens, (51 How. Pr. 103)
75
People V. St. Louis & S. F. Ey., (47
Hun, 543) 369
People V. Stout, (23 Barb. 349) 24
People V. Stowell, (9 Abb. N. C. 456)
76
People V. Stratton, (28 Cal. 382) 67
People V. Stuart, (97 111. 123) 245
People V. Sturtevant, (9 N. Y. 263)
10
People V. Super's, (12 Wend. 257) 79
People V. Super's El Dorado Co., (11
Cal. 175) 190 a
People V. Supervisors, (27 Cal. 655)
165
People V. Super's, (47 Cal. 205) 371
People V. Supervisors, (38 Mich. 421)
375
People V. Supervisors of Saginaw,
(26 Mich. 22) 254
People V. Supervisor, (1 Hill, 362) 79
People V. Supervisors, (4 Barb. 64)
377
People V. Supervisors, (70 N. Y. 228)
16
People V. Supervisoi's, (11 Abb. Pr.
R. 114) 349
People V. Swift, (31 Cal. 26) 170
People V. Taylor, (45 Barb. 129) 371
People ex rel., etc. v. Tazewell Coun-
ty, (22 111. 151) 192 6
People V. Thacher, (55 N. Y. 525)
361
People V. Therrien, (80 Mich. 187)
84
People V, Thompson, (16 Wendell,
655) 378, 382
People «. Thompson, (94 N. Y. 451) 84
People V. Throop, (12 Wend. 183) 150
People D. Tieman, (30 Barb. 193) 85
People V. Town of Oran, (121 111.
650) 67
People V. Tracy, (1 Denio, 617) 363
People V. Troy etc., (37 How. Pr.
437) 359
People V. Trustees, (7 N. Sup. 125)
371
People V. Trustees of Schools, (86
111. 613) 59, 360
People V. Vail, (20 Wend. 12) 361
People V. Van Cleve, (1 Mich. 362)
371
People V. Vanderbilt, (26 N. Y. 287)
11, 300, 301, 396
People V. Van Flyck, (4 Cow. 297)
361
People V. Van Home, (18 Wend. 518)
82
People 1). Van Nort, (64 Barb. 205)
172
People V. Vantassel, (40 N. W. R.
847) 375
People V. Wagner, (49 N. W. 609, 86
Mich. 594) 123, 146
People V. Waite, (70 111. 25) 378, 380
People V. Walker, (23 Barb. 304) 99
People V. Walker, (9 Mich. 328) 106
People V. Wajlace, (4 N. Y. Supr. Ct.
438) 279
People ». Warfleld, (20 111. 163) 24
People V. Warren, (14 HI. Ap.
176
cxxxu
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
People V. Waterford etc. Co., (3 Abb.
580) 328
People V. Waterford etc. Co., (2
Keyes, 327) 328
People V. Waynesville, (88 111. 469)
186
People V. Weber, (89 111. 347) 75, 165,
281
People V. Weissenbach, (60 N. Y.
385) 126
People V. Wemple, (129 N. T. 558)
273
People V. Wemple, (30 ST. E. R. 1002,
133 N. Y. 607) 326 a
People V. Wharf Co., (31 Gal. 34) 133
People V. Whitcomb, (55 lU. 172) 381,
391
People V. White, (24 Wend. 520, 540)
88, 96
People V. Wliite, (59 Barb. 666) 106
People V. Whitlock, (92 N. Y. 191) 83
People V. Whitman, (10 Cal. 38) 75
People B. Whittemore, (4 Mich. 27)
365
People V. Whyler, (41 Cal. 351) 270
People V. Wiaut, (48 111. 263) 24, 189
People V. Wilber, (15 N. Y. S. 435) 28
People V. Willsea, (60 N. Y. 507) 28
People V. Wilson, (15 HI. 389) 102
People V. Wilson, (62 Hun, 618) 300
People B. Wilson, (72 N. C. 155) 82
People V. Witherell, (14 Mich. 48) 82,
105
People V. Wood, (7 Cal. 579) 14
People B. Wood, (35 Barb. 653) 360
People B. Wood, (71 N. Y. 371) 178
People V. Woodruff, (32 N. Y. 355) 76
People V. Works, (7 Wend. 486) 153
People B. Worth, (58 Hun, 455) 124
People V. Wren, (4 Scam. 275) 2, 8,
24,37
People V. United States, (93 HI. 30,
34 Am. Kep. 155) 258
People V. Yates Co., (40 HI. 126) 368
People B. Young, (38 HI. 490) 68
People's Gaslight Co. v. Jersey City.
(40 N. J. L. 297) 144
People ex rel. v. City of Butte, (4
Mont. 174) 22, 23
People ex rel. Com'rs v. Detroit, (28
Mich. 228) 15
People ex rel. McLean v. Hagg, (46
N. Y. 401) 259 a
People ex rel. Mills v. Jones, (7 Col.
475) 33
People Jfat. Bk. v. Pomona, (28 P.
1089, 48 Kan. 55) 188, 189
People E. K. b. Memphis E. R, (10
Wall. 38) 113, 165, .302
Peoria v. Johnson, (56 111. 52) 310.
391
Peoria v. Kidder, (26 lU. 351) 248,
259 a
Peoria B. Ass'n v. Loomis, (20 111.
235) 352 a
Pepper, In re, (11 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 257)
49
Pepper v. City, (114 Pa St. 96) 342
Pequinot v. Detroit, (16 Fed. E. 211)
346
Perdue^. Chinquaconsy, (25 Up. Can.
Q. B. 61) 355
Perdue v. Ellis, (18 Ga. 586) 125, 280
Perin v. Carey, (24 How. 465) 200
Ferine v. Forbush, (32 Pac. 226) 281
Perkins b. Corbin, (45 Ala. 103) 79
Perkins b. Fayette, (68 Me. 152) 351
Perkins v. Inhabitants, (68 Me. 152)
346
Perkins v. Eailroad, (44 K H. 223)
107
Perkins v. Slack, (86 Pa. St. 283) 16
Perkins v. Washington Ins. Co., (4
Cow. 645) 51
Perkins v. Weston, (3 Gush. 540) 373
Perkinson v. St. Louis, (4 Mo. App.
322) 165
Perley b. Georgetown, (7 Gray, 464)
338
Perot V. Mann, (12 Phila. 353) 79
Perrin b. N. Y. etc., (36 N. Y. 120)
221, 286
Perrine v. Farr, (22 N. J. L. 356) 278
Perrine v. Twp., (48 Mich. 641) 377
Perry b. Cheboygan, (55 Mich. 250)
79,87
Perry v. Little Book, (32 Ark. 31)
259 a
PeiTy V. New Orleans etc. Co., (55
Ala. 413) 220, 224, 301, 302
Perry v. Ontario, (23 U. C. Q. B. 391)
164
Perry v. Superior City, (23 Wis. 64)
169
Perry v. Wilson, (7 Mass. 395) 232
Perry v. Washburn, (20 Cal. 318) 282
Perry b. Worcester, (6 Gray, 544) 92,
353, 354
Perry Co. v. Conway Co., (12 S. W.
Eep. 887) 60
Ferryman b. Greenville, (51 Ala. 510)
32
Peru B. Bearss, (55 Ind. 576) 61
Peru V. French, (55 HI. 818) 352 a
Peru V. Gleason, (91 Ind. 566) 113,
327
Peru & I. E. E. Co. v. Hanna, (68 Ind.
562) 259 0
Peru Iron Co., In re, (7 Cow. 540,
552) 200
Pesterfleld v. Vickers, (3 Golden, 205)
150, 337
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
CXXXIU
Peter v. Blue, (40 Kan. 727) 380
Peters v. Fergus Falls, (35 Minn. 549)
355
Peters v. Lindsborg, (40 Kan. 654,
20 Pac. 490) 92, 324
Peters v. London, (2 Up. Can. Q. B.
543) 154
Peters v. Lynchburg, (76 Va. 927)
256
Peters v. Mayor, (8 Hun, 405) 92
Peters v. State, (9 Ga. 109) 325
Petersburg v. Metzger, (21 111. 205)
110, 154
Petersburgh v. Applegrath, (28 Gratt.
321) 325, 336 a
Petersburg!! v. Mappin, (14 111. 193)
142
Petersiler v. Stone, (119 Mass. 465) 88
Peterson ». Mayor etc. of N. Y., (17
N. Y. 449) 51, 128, 144, 164, 165
Petition of Concord, (50 N". H. 530)
311
Petition of Mt. Washington Road Co.,
(35 N. H. 134) 233, 245
Pettengill v. Yonkers, (22 N. E. R.
1095, 116 N. Y. 558) 324
Pettigrew i\ Evansville, (25 Wis. 223)
238, 239, 354, 3o4 a
Pettis V. Johnson, (56 Ind. 139) 120
Petty V. Tooker, (21 N. Y. 267) 66
Petz V. Detroit, (54 N. W. 644) 327
Peyser v. Metro. El. R. R., (13 Daly,
122) 305
Peyser ». New York, (70 N. Y. 497)
326, 327
Pfan ». Reynolds, (53 111. 212) 350
Pfeffevlee v. Lyon, (39 Kan. 432) 329
Pfister 13. State, (82 Ind. 382) 362
Phelan v. New York, (119 N. Y. 86)
174
Phelps e. Hawley, (3 Lans. 164) 315
Phelps B. Lewiston, (15 Blatchf. 131)
195
Phelps V. Mankato, (23 Minn. 276)
346
Phelps V. New York, (112 N. Y. 216)
172, 263, 326 a
Philbrick v. P14,oe, (55 N. W. R. 345)
300
Philadelphia v. Ball, (10 Pa. Co. Ct.
R. 92) 292
Philadelphia v. Coulston, (13 Phila.
182) 131
Philadelphia Cit. Pass. Ry. Co., (10
Pa. Co. Ct. 16) 302
Philadelpliia v. Dibeler, (147 Pa. St.
243, 23 Atl. R. 567) 292
Philadelphia v. Dyer, (41 Pa. St. 463)
243
Philadelphia v. Eastwick, (35 Pa. St.
75) 259 a
Philadelphia v. Ehret, (153 Pa. St. 1)
292
Philadelphia ». Elliott, (3 Rawle, 170)
203
Philadelphia v. Flanigan, (47 Pa. St.
21) 169
Philadelphia ». Fox, (64 Pa. St. 169)
206
Philadelphia v. Freid, (58 Pa. St. 320)
2,8
Philadelpliia b. Germantown Pass.
R. Co., (10 Phila. 165) 234
Phila. V. Given, (60 Pa. St. 136) 85
Philada. v. Greble, (38 Pa. St. 339)
283
Philadelphia v. Jewell, (21 Atl. R.
239, 140 Pa. St. 9) 169
Philadelphia v. Lombard etc. Co., (3
Grant, 403) 302
Philadelphia v. Miller. (49 Pa. St.
440) 279
Philadelphia ». Mon. Co., (147 Pa.
St. 243, 23 Atl. R. 400) 292
Philadelphia v. Penu. Hospital, (22
Atl. R. 744, 143 Pa. St. 367) 270
Phila. V. Phila. etc., (58 Pa. St. 253)
208, 312
Philada. v. Randolph, (4 W. & S. 514)
292, 329, 354
Philadelphia v. Ry. Co., (28 W. N. C.
106) 28
Philadelphia ». Ridge Av. etc. Co.,
(143 Pa. St. 444) 302
Philadelphia v. Phila., W. & B. R. R.
Co., (.33 Pa. St. 41) 259 o
Philadelphia v. Rule, (93 Pa. St. 15)
259 a
Philadelphia v. Smith, (23 W. N. C.
, 242)350 6
Philadelphia v. Thomas, (25 Atl. R.
888) 279
Philada. v. Tryon, (35 Pa. St. 401)
259 a, 277, 283
Philadelphia v. Wistar, (35 Pa. St.
427) 278, 283
Philadelphia etc. Co., Appeal of, (15
Atl. R. 476) 317
Philada. etc. Co. v. Bowers, (4Houst.
506) 136
Philadelphia etc. Co. v. Hummell,
(44 Pa. St. 375) 337
Philada. et<!. Co. v. Philadelphia, (47
Pa. St. 325) 303
Philada. etc. Co. v. Philadelphia, (11
Pa. 358) 306
Phila. & Tren. R. R. Case, (6 Whart.
25) 301
Phila. <fe W. R. R. Co. v. Maryland,
(10 How. 393) 270 '
Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Ship-
ley, (19 Atl. R. 1) 279
L-XXXIV
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
Phila., W. & B. R. E. Co. ». Tax
Gt. of Bait., (50 Md. 397) 273
Philip Street, In re, (10 La. An. 313)
240
Philles V. Hiles, (42 Wis. 527) 259
Phillips, In re, (60 N. T. 16) 148, 291
Phillips V. Albany, (28 Wis. 340) 184
Phillips V. Allen, (41 Pa. St. 481) 127,
130
Phillips?). Bloomington, (1 G. Greene,
498) 134
Phillips V. Coffee, (17 111. 154) 51
Phillips V. Huntington, (14 S. E. K.
17, 35 W. Va. 406) 290
Phillips 1). South Park Com'rs, (119
111. 626) 247
Phillips V. Teoumseh, (5 Neb. 305)
125
Phillips V. Wiekam, (1 Paige Ch. 590)
38, 150
Phillips V. Willow, (70 Wis. 6) 350 b
Phillips Exeter Acad. Trs. b. Exeter,
(58 N. H. 306) 270
Phoenixville, Re, (109 Pa. St. 44) 28
Phoenixville u. Phoenix Iron Co., (45
Pa. St. 135) 313
Physicians v. Salmon, (3 Salk. 102)
47, 48, 49
Pickering v. Shotwell, (10 Pa. 27)
203
Pickett V. Hastings, (47 Cal. 269) 229
Pickles V. Dry Dock Co., (64 Pa. St.
169) 2
Pierce v. Bartram, (Cowp. 269) 152
Pierce ». Boston, (3 Met. 520) 282
Pierce v. Cambridge, (2 Cush. 611)
270
Pierce v. Carpenter, (10 Vt. 480) 53
Pierce v. Chamberlain, (82 Mo. 618)
219
Pierce v. Eddy, (152 Mass. 594) 272
Pierce v. Kimball, (9 Me. 54) 127
Pierce v. New Bedford, (129 Mass.
534) 331
Pierce v. Roberts, (17 Atl. E. 275, 57
Conn. 31) 215
Pierce v. Smith, (29 Pac. 565) 29,
395
Pierce v. Somerworth, (ION. H. 369)
47
Pieri v. Shieldsboro, (42 Miss. 493)
120, 396
Pierpoint v. Harrisville, (9 W. Va.
215) 217
Pierson ». Reynolds, (49 Mich. 224)
59
Pigeon V. Recorder's Ct, (17 Can. S.
0. R. 495) 123
Piggott V. Lilly, (27 N. W. Rep. 3)
321
Pike V. Magoun, (44 Mo. 491) 147
Pike V. Middletown, (12 N. H. 278)
115, 176
Pike Co. Com'rs v. State, (11 111. 202)
363
Pilie V. New Orleans, (19 La. An.
274) 79
Pillsbury v. Augusta, (79 Me. 71) 308
Pillsbury v. Springfield, (16 N. H.
565) 242
Pim. V. Mun. Cor. of Ontario, Ont.
Rep. (9 C. P. D. 304) 164, 171
Pimental c. San Francisco, (21 Cal.
351) 99
Pine City v. Munich, (44 N. W. R.
197, 42 Minn. 342) 120, 301
PioUet v. Simmers, (106 Pa. St. 95)
342
Piper V. Chappell, (14 M. & W. 624)
154, 156, 158
Piper V. Moultou, (72 Me. 155) 203
Piper 1). Singer, (4 Serg. & R. 354)
271
Pisca. B. Co. V. New Hampshire, (7
N. H. 59) 238, 313
Pitts V. Opelika, (79 Ala. 527) 148
Pittsburgh's Appeal, (118 Pa. St. 458)
56
Pittsburgh's App., (123 Pa. St. 374)
14
Pittsburgh v. Clarksville, (58 N. H.
291) 316
Pittsburgh v. Cluley, (74 Pa. St. 262)
108
Pittsburgh v. Craft, (1 Pitts. 158) 49
Pittsburgh v. Grier, (22 Pa. St. 54)
132, 314, 336 a
Pittsburgh d. Hart, (89 Pa. St. 389)
343
Pittsburgh v. Scott, (1 Pa. St. 309)
301
Pittsburgh v. Trimble, (46 Mo. App.
459) 117
Pittsburgh v. Walter, (69 Pa. St. 365)
278
Pittsburgh v. Woods, (44 Pa. St. 113)
259 a
Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. All. V. R. Co.,
(23 Atl. 313, 29 W. N. C. 227) 238
Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. Birmingham
Bor., (51 Pa. St. 41) 302
Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. Gilleland, (56
Pa. St. 445) 353
Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. Oliver, (19 Atl.
R. 47, 131 Pa. St. 408) 244,
Pittsburgh etc. v. Pittsburgh, (80 Pa.
St. 72) 201
Pittsburgh R. E. ?;. Cheevers, (44
111. App. 118) 301
Placerville v. Wilcox, (35 Cal. 21) 265
Plainfield v. Plainfield, (30 N. W. R.
672) 256
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
CXXXV
Beferences are to Sections.
Plank Road Co. v. Thomas, (8 Harris,
91) 317
Planters' Assn. v. Avigno, (28 La.
An. 552) 195 6
Planters etc. v. Hanes, (52 Miss. 469)
87
Plantation No. 9 ». Bean, (40 Me. 218)
53
Pleasant v. Kost, (29 111. 490) 54
Piatt V. Chicago etc., (31 IST. W. R.
883) 289
Piatt V. Rice, (10 Watts, 352) 270
Piatt V. R. R. Co., (31 jST. W. K. 883)
308, 327
Platte etc. Co. v. Donell, (30 Pac. R.
68)8
Platter v. Seymour, (86 Ind. 323) 329,
338
Platter v. Elkhart Co., (103 Ind. 300)
149
Platteville etc. Co. v. Galena, (43
Wis. 493) 186
Plattsburgh v. Eiley, (42 Mo. App.
18) 56 ■
Plattsburgh v. Trimble, (46 Mo. Ap.
459) 117
Plattsmouth o. Fitzgerald, (10 Neb.
401) 198
Plattsmouth ». Mitchell, (20 Neb.
228)346, 350 (.
Platz V. Cohoes, (89 N. Y. 219) 352
Pleuler v. State, (11 Neb. 547) 123
Plimpton V. Somerset, (33 Vt. 283)
104, 156
Plitt ». Cox, (43 Pa. 486) 239
Plum V. Kansas City, (101 Mo. 525)
248
Plum V. Mor. Cen. & B. Co., (10 N.
J. Eq. 256) 292, 329
Plumb V. Grand Rapids, (45 N. W.
R. 1024) 226
Plymouth ». Jackson, (15 Pa. St. 44)
8,67
Plymouth o. Pettijohn, (4 Dev. 591)
153, 258
Pocopson Road, (16 Pa. St. 15) 234 a
Poillon V. Brooklyn, (101 N. Y. 432)
110
Polack V. Trustees, (48 Cal. 490) 309,
311
Police Com'rs c. Louisville, (3 Bush,
597) 18, 89
Police Jury tj. Britton, (15 Wall. 572)
177, 183
Police Jury ». McCormack, (32 La.
An. 624) 229
Police Jury o. Shreveport, (5 La. An.
661) 12
Polinsky v. People, (73 N. Y. 35) 118
Polk Co. Savings Bk. b. State, (69
Iowa, 24) 164
Pollard V. Hagan, (3 How. 212) 133
Pollard V. Woburn, (104 Mass. 84)
352
Pollock ». Lawrence, (P. L. J. 373) 368
Pollock's Adm. v. Louisville, (13
Bush, 221) 92, 333, 338 a
Pomeroy «. Mills, (3 Vt. 279) 226
Pomeroy Salt Co. v. Davis, Treas.,
(21 Ohio St. 555) 272
Pomfret v. Sicroft, (1 Saunders, 323)
346
Pomfrey v. Village of Saratoga
Springs, (104 N. Y. 459) 256, 344,
.350 6
Pompton V. Cooper Union, (101 U.
S. 196) 17, 187
Ponca c. Crawford, (23 Neb. 662) 342,
352
Pond V. Metro. El. R. R. Co., (42
Hun, 567) 305
Pond V. Negus, (3 Mass. 230) 98
Pond V. Parrott, (42 Conn. 1:5) 359
Pontiac v. Oxford, (29 Mich. (i9) 106
Poutiao V. Carter, (32 Mich. 164) 113,
329
Pool V. Boston, (5 Cush. 219) 140
Pool V. Trexler, (76 N. C. 297) 294
Poole V. Bentley, (12 East, 108) 210
Pooler B. Reed, (73 Me. 129) 86
Pope V. Com'rs, (12 Rich. Law, 407)
288
Pope V. Headon, (5 Ala. 433) 282
Pope B. Union, (18 N. J. Eq. 282) 221,
223
Poppen V. Holmes, (44 111. 362) 155
Porter v. Androscoggin etc. E. Co.,
(37 Me. 349) 51
Porter v. Blakely, (1 Root, 440) 50
Porter ». City of Janes ville, (3 Fed,
Rep. 619) 191 6
Porter v. Midi. etc. Co., (25 N. E. R.
536, 125 Ind. 476) 247
Porter v. Pillsbury, (11 How. Pr.
240) 67
Porter v. Railroad Co., (37 Me. 349)
51
Porter b. State, (78 Tex. 591) 359
Port Gibson b. Moore, (13 Sm. &
Marsh, 157) 43
Port Huron b. Chadwick, (52 Mich.
320) 194
Port Huron etc. Co. v. Callinan, (61
Mich. 12) 245
Portland v. Kamm, (10 Oreg. 383)
248
Portland b. Lee Sam, (7 Oreg. 397)
248
Portland v. O'Neill, (1 Oreg. 218)
124, 261
Portland b. Schmidt, (13 Oreg. 17)
110
CXXXVl
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Portland v. Smith, (13 Oreg. 17) 125
Portland v. White, (3 Oreg. 126) 226
Portland etc. Co. v. Boston etc. Co.,
(65 Me. 122)302
' Portland etc. Co. v. Hartford, (58
Me. 23) 195 a
Portland etc. Co. v. Horsford, (58
Me. 23) 186
Portland etc. K. R. v. Portland, (14
Oreg. 188) 2, 11, 13, 308
Portland L. etc. Co. v. East Portland,
(22 Pac. Rep. 536) 163
Portland Sav. Bk. v. EvansvUle, (25
Fed. Rep. 389) 197
Portsmouth Bk. v. Springfield, (4
Fed. Rep. 276) 196
Portsmouth etc. Co. v. Watson, (10
Mass. 91) 30
Port Townsend v. Sheehan, (33 Pac.
R. 429) 256
Pt. Wardens v. Ship, (14 La. An. 289)
133
Portwood V. Baskett, (1 So. Rep.
105) 123
Poi-twood !). Montgomery, (52 Miss.
523) 360
Posey V. Mobile Co., (50 Ala. 6) 79
Post V. Boston, (141 Mass. 189) 351
Post V. Pearsall, (22 Wend. 425) 217
Postal etc. Co. v. Ala. etc. Co., (9 So.
555) 245
Potomac S. Co. v. Upper Pot. etc.
Co., (109 U. S. 672) 132, 225
Pottawatomie Co. Com'rs v. Sulli-
van, (17 Kan. 58) 194
Potter V. Castleton, (53 Vt. 435) 352
Potter 1). Douglas, (87 Mo. 239) 189 a
Potter V. Greenwich, (26 Hun, 326)
192
Potts V. Quaker City El. Ry. Co., (12
Pa. Co. Ct. R. 593, 2 Pa. Dis. Ct.
R. 200) 396
Poughkeepsie v. Wilksie, (36 Hun,
270) 79
Poulters Co. v. Phillips, (6 Bing. N.
C. 314) 158
Poultney v. Lafayette, (12 Peters,
472) 363
Poultney v. Wells, (1 Ark. 180) 13
Pound V. Chippewa Co. Sup., (43
Wis. 65) 265
Pound V. Turck, (95 U. S. 450) 314
Powell V. Gilman, (38 III. App. 611)
215
Powell V. Madison, (107 lud. 106)
189 a
Powell V. Parkersburg, (28 W. Va.
698) 33, 56
Powell V. St. Joseph, (31 Mo. 347)
291
Powell V. Suprs., (14 S. E. R. 543) 29
Powell !). Wilson, (16 Tex. 59) 75
Powers, In re, (25 Vt. 261) 104
Powers V. Council Bluffs, (50 Iowa,
197) 338 a, 350 6
Powers V. Sanford, (39 Me. 18.3) 326 a
Powers V. Sup. Ct., (23 Ga. 65) 184
Powers V. Wood Co., (8 Ohio St. 286)
56
Powers V. Tonkers, (114 N. T. 145)
174
Powschiek v. Ross, (9 Iowa, 511) 108
Powsheik d. Duraut, (9 Wall. 736)
368
Prather v. Lexington, (13 B. Mon.
559) 333
Pratt V. Amherst, (140 Mass. 167) 342
Pratt B. Brown, (3 Wis. 603) 233
Pratt V. Hillman, (4 B. & C. 269) 131
Pratt V. Litchfield, (25 Atl. R. 461,
62 Conn. 112) 146
Pratt V. People, (29 111. 54) 65
Pratt V. Roseland, (24 Atl. R. 1037)
396
Pratt V. Short, (53 How. Pr. 506)
169
Pratt V. Stratford, (14 Ont. 260) 329
Pratt i). Swanton, (15 Vt. 147) 170
Pratt B. Weymouth, (147 Mass. 245)
338 a
Pray v. Jersey City, (32 N. J. L. 394)
339
Pray v. Northern Liberties, (31 Pa.
St. 69) 270
Preacher's Aid Society v. Rich, (45
Me. 552) 49
Preble v. Portland, (45 Me. 241) 98,
249
Prell B. McDonald, (7 Kan. 426) 31, 70
Prentiss ». Davis, (22 Atl. R. 246, 33
Me. 364) 24
Prescott V. Duquesne Bor., (48 Pa.
St. 118) 132, 359
Prescott V. Gonser, (34 Iowa, 175)51,
365
Prescott V. Waterloo, (26 Fed. Rep.
592) 327
President b. Dusouchett, (2 lud. 587)
352
President etc. v. Indianapolis, (12
Ind. 620) 212, 227
President v. Thomas, (20 111. 197) 38
Pressel b. Bice, (21 Atl. R. 813) 90
Preston ». Bacon, (4 Conn. 471) 79
Preston b. Boston, (12 Pick. 7) 326,
326 a
Preston b. Hull, (23 Gratt. 613) 191 6
Preston v. Roberts, (12 Bush, 570)
259 a
Preston v. Rudd, (84 Ky. 150) 259 o
Preston v. U. S., (37 Fed. Rep. 417)
86
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
cxxxvu
Prettyman o. Tazewell County, (19
111. 406) 192 6
Price V. Breckenridge, (92 Mo. 378)
219, 224
Price V. Hunter, (34 Fed. R. 355)
259
Price V. Meth. E. Church, (4 Ohio,
514) 228
Price V. Plainfleld, (40 N. J. L. 608)
226
Price V. Railroad Co., (13 Ind. 58)
99
Price V. Riverside Co., (56 Cal. 431)
363
Price V. Thompson, (38 Mo. 363) 216,
226, 228, 229
Prideaux v. Mineral Pt., (43 Wis.
513) 337
Priestly ». Foulds, (2 Scott, N. R. 205,
225) 37
Priet V. Reis, (28 Pao. Rep. 798, 93
Cal. 85) 178
Prieto V. Duncan, (22 111. 26) 66
Prime, In re, (18 N. T. S. 603) 272
Prime v. 23d St. Ry. Co., (1 Abb. N.
C. 63, 71) 306
Primm o. Belleville, (59 111. 142) 254,
265
Prince v. City of Boston, (19 N. E.
R. 218, 148 Mass. 370) 18
Prince v. Lynn, (149 Mass. 193) 92
Prince v. Quincy, (105 111. 138) 189 a
Prince v. Quincy, (128 111. 443) 192
Prince V. Skillen, (71 Me. 361) 67, 79
Prince George's Co. Comm'rs v. Bla-
densburg, (51 Md. 465) 55
Princeton v. Vireling, (40 Ind. 340)
326 a
Princeville v. Auten, (77 111. 325) 108,
219 226
Prindle v. Fletcher, (39 Vt. 257) 350 o
Pritchard v. Atchinson, (3 N. H. 335)
279
Pritchard v. Keeper, (53 111. 117) 92
Pritchard ». Stevens, (6 Dum. & E.
522) 129
Pritchett v. Board, (61 Ind. 210) 341
Pritchett v. Peo., (1 Gilm. 529) 88
Pritz, In re, (9 Iowa, 30) 26
Proctor V. Andover, (42 N. H. 348)
235
Proprietors v. Horton, (6 Hill. 501)
24,31
Proprietors ». Ipswich, (26 N. E. R.
239) 200, 211
Proprietors v. Slack, (7 Cush. 226)
106, 373
Proprietors «. Taylor, (6 N. H. 499)
320
Proprietors etc. v. Hoboken L. I. Co.,
(13 K. J. Eq. 503) 325
Proprietors etc. ». Nashua & Lowell
R. R. Co., (10 Cush. 388) 238, 239,
354
Prosser v. Ottumwa, (47 Iowa, 509)
352 a
Protestant etc. Sch., In re, (58 Barb.
161, 40 How. Pr. 19) 173
Prot. Epis. Church v. Anamosa, (76
Iowa, 538) 329
Protzmanc. ludianopolis etc. Co., (9
Ind. 467, 13 Ind. 353, 9 Ind. 557) 303
Providence v. Clapp, (17 How. 161)
324, 342, 344
Providence u. Miller, (11 R. I. 272)
167
Providence Bank v. Billings, (4 Pet.
514) 270
Providence etc. Co. v. Worcester, (29
N. E. R. 56) 246
Prov. & Wor. R. R. Co. v. Wright, (2
R. I. 459) 274
Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber, (2 R.
I. 15) 274
Prov. Inst. V. Jersey City, (113 U. S.
506) 283
Prov. Inst, for Sav. v. Allen, (37 N.
J. Eq. 36) 259 a
Prowell V. Powkes, (5 Baxt. 649) 83
Pruden v. Grant Co., (12 Ore. 308) 324
Pruyn v. Milwaukee, (18 Wis. 367)
177
Public School Trustees v. Taylor, (30
N. J. Eq. 618) 33
Pub. Schools V. St. Louis, (26 Mo.
468) 270
Pueblo V. Robinson, (21 Pac. R. 899,
12 Colo. 593) 283
Pueblo etc. Co. v. Rudd, (5 Col. 273)
106
Puffer 1). Orange, (122 Mass. 389) 343
Pulaski Co. v. Reeve, (42 Ark. 55) 3
Pulaski V. Gilmore, (21 Fed. Rep.
870) 188
Pullman v. Mayor, (54 Barb. 169) 163
Pullman etc. Co. v. Com., (141 TJ. S.
18) 259
Pumpelly v. Green Bay, (13 Wall.
166) 329, 355
Pumphrey v. Mayor, (47 Md. 145) 377
Purcell V. Bear Creek, (38 111. App.
499) 263
Purdeman v. St. Charles, (19 G. W.
R. 733) 315. 353
Purdy V. People, (4 Hill, 384) 2, 8, 28
Purdy V. Lansing, (128 U. S. 557, 20
Blatchf. 278, 286) 185
Purple V. Greenfield, (138 Mass. 1)
350 6
Pursley v. Hays, (17 Iowa, 310) 250
Pusey V. Allegheny, (98 Pa. St. 522)
330
CXXXVIU
TABLE or OASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Putnam v. Fife Lake, (45 Mich. 125)
282
Putnam ». Grand Eapids, (58 Mich.
417) 144 a
Putnam v. Johnson, (10 Mass. 488)
66
Putnam ». Langley, (133 Mass. 204)
371
Putnam b. Payne, (13 Johns. 312)
129
Putnam Co. v. Allen, (1 Ohio St. 322)
375
Pye V. Petersen, (45 Tex. 812) 110,
120, 130
Pym V. Gt. Northern Ry. Co., (15
Up. Can. Q. B. 631) 352 a
Q-
Queen v. Barrett, (1 Salk. 383) 156
Queen v. Cridland, (7 E. & B. 853)
156
Queen ». Epsom Union Guard, (8 L.
T. K. N. S. 383) 340
Queen v. Fitzgerald, (39 Up. Can.- Q.
B. 297) 346
Queen v. Gas Co., (2 Ellis & L. 651)
302
Queen v. Haldimond etc., (7 Up. Can.
L. J. 266) 363
Queen v. Jarvis, (3 F. & P. 108) 127
Queen v. Justices, (8 Ad. & El. 173)
65
Queen v. Oldham Bor., (L. K. 3 Q. B.
C. 474) 270
Queen v. Osier, (32 Up. Can. Q. B.
324) 145
Queen v. Plunkett, (21 Up. Can. Q.
B. 536) 224
Queen v. U. K. Tel. Co., (3 F. & F.
74) 346
Queen v. Wallesey etc., (L. R. 4 Q.
B. 351) 330
Queensburg v. Culver, (19 Wall. 82)
184, 194 a, 198
Quick !). River Forrest, (22 N. E. R.
816, 130 111. 323) 279
Quin V. Moore, (15 N". T. 432) 353
Quincy «. Barker, (81 III. 300) 344
Quinoy v. Bull, (106 111. 337) 295
Quincy v. Cooke, (107 U. S. 549)
187 a '
Quincy v. G. B. & Q. R. R., (92 111.
21) 312
Quincy v. Jackson, (113 U. S. 332)
194 a, 266
Quincy v. Janes, (76 111. 231) 113
Quincy v. Jones, (76 111. 231, 244) 286,
312 ' / .
Quincy v. O'Brien, (24 111. App. 591^
8, 129 '
Quincy v. Warfleld, (25 111. 317) 177
Quinette v. St. Louis, (76 Mo. 402)
146
Quinn v. Com., (20Gratt. 31) 88
Quinn v. Paterson, (27 N". J. L. 35)
92, 319, 329
Quinton v. Burton, (61 Iowa, 471)
316
Quoug Wo, In re, (7 Sawyer, 526) 121
R.
Raab v. Maryland, (7 Md. 483) 54
Rabassa v. New Orleans, (3 Martin,
O. S. 218) 268
Rackham v. Bluck, (9 Q. B. 691) 104
Radolift' V. Mayor, (53 Am. Dec. 366)
292
RadclifE's Ex. v. Brooklyn, (4 N. T.
195) 239, 329
Rader v. District, (36 N. J. L. 273) 2
Radich v. Hutcbins, (95 U. S. 210)
326 a
Radway c. Brjggs, (37 N. Y. 256)
132,336 a
Rafferty, In re, (1 Wash. St. 882) 28
Rafter c. Tagliabue, (29 Abb. N. C.
1) 396
Ragan v. McCoy, (29 Mo. 356) 217
Ragatz V. Dubuque, (4 Iowa, 343)
245
Railway v. Carter, (26 Atl. R. 96) 324
Railway Com'rs v. Rahway, (49 N.
J. L. 384) 364
Railroad Co. v. Alexandria, (17 Gratt
176) 33
R. E. Co. V. Athens, (11 S. E. R. 663)
165
Railroad Co. v. Chenoa, (43 111. 200)
31,32
Railway v. Cleneay, (13 Ind. 161) 190
Railroad Co. v. Combs, (10 Bush,
382) 302
Railroad J). Davidson Co., (1 Sneed,
692) 24
Railroad Co. v. Decatur, (18 N. E. R.
315, 126 111. 92) 270
Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, (105 U. S.
166) 12
R. R. Co. ■!;. Engle, (76 111. 317) 148
R. R. V. Evansville, (15 Ind. 395) 183
Railroad Co. v. Gregory, (15 111. 21)
28
R. R. Co. V. HoUoren, (53 Texas, 46)
317
Railway Co. v. Minnesota, (134 U. S.
418) 150
Railroad Co. v. Morgan County, (14
111. 163) 273
Railroad Co. ». Otoe Co., (1 Dill. 338)
196
Railroad Co. v. Plumas County, (37
Cal. r,o4) 32
TABLE OK CASES CITED.
CXXXIX
Keferences are to Sections.
Kailroad Co. v. Eenwiok, (102 U. S.
180) 132, 239
Railway Co. v. Railway Co., (9 Exoh.
55)52
R. R. Co. V. Quinoy, (28 N. E. R.
1069) 294
E. E. Co. V. Schurmeier, (1 Wall.
272) 132
Railroad Co. v. Spearman, (12 Iowa,
112) 55
Railroad Co. v. Winthrop, (5 La. An.
36) 133
Eailway Co. v. Sprague, (103 U. S.
762) 191
Raisoh v. Board, (22 Pao. R. 890) 375
Rakowsky v. Dulutli, (44 Minn. 188)
292, 329
Raleigh v. Peace, (110 N. C. 32) 259 a
Ealeigh v. Sorrell, (1 Jones Law, 49)
96, 127
Ealeigli etc. R. R. Co. v. Davis, (2
Dev. & Bat. 451) 283
Ramnay, In re, (83 Eng. C. L. 174)
85
Ramsay ». Church, (45 Minn. 229) 270
Ramsey v. Clerk, (52 Mich. 344) 371
Ramsey v. Rushville, (81 Ind. 394)
352
Rand v. Dovey, (83 Pa. St. 280) 165
Rand v. Wilder, (11 Cush. 294) 95
Randall v. State, (16 Wis. 340) 83
Randall v. Van Vechter, (19 Johns.
60) 51, 164
Randolph v. Gawley, (47 Cal. 458) 263
Randolph v. Pope Co., (19 111. App.
100) 83
Randolph v. Post, (93 U. S. 502) 186,
188, 191 6
Randolph v. Yellowstone Kit, (3 So.
E. 706) 258
Eankin v. Baird, (Breese, 123) 12
Eankin v. Great Western Ry. Co., (4
Up. Can. C. P. 463) 243, 247
Eankin ». Henderson, (7 S. W. E. 174)
255, 261
Ranney v. Baeder, (50 Mo. 600) 189
Eansom v. Boal, (29 Iowa, 68) 208,
229
Ransom v. Kitner, (31 III. App. 241)
129
Eansom v. Mayor, (24 Barb. 226) 176
Raphe v. Moore, (68 Pa. St. 404) 350 a,
353
Rastrick v. Gt. Western Ry. Co., (27
Up. Can. Q. B. 396) 352
Rathbun ». Acker, (18 Barb. 393), 256,
265
RatljfE V. County Co., (10 S. E. E. 28)
325
Eatterman v. Exp. Co., (32 N. E. E.
754, 49 Ohio St. 698) 326
Eatterman v. W. U. T. Co., (8 S. Ct.
1127) 258
Eauch V. City, (22 Pa. Rep. 22) 326
Raulett V. Lowell, (126 Mass. 431) 355
Rausen v. New York, (1 Fisher Pat.
Cases, 254) 338
Ravenna v. Penn. Co., (45 Ohio St.
118) 110
Ravenswood v. Flemings, (22 W. Va.
52) 133
Ray V. Manchester, (46 N. H. 59) 340
Ray V. Wilson, (10 So. E. 613) 368
Ray Co. v. Vansycle, (96 U. S. 675)
186, 188
Raymond ». Kiseberg, (54 N. W. R.
612) 300
Raymond v. Lowell, (6 Cush. 52) 340,
346, 352 a
Raymond u. Madison Co., (5 Mont.
103) 79
Raymond v. Sheboygan, (70 Wis. 318)
348
Rayner v. State, (52 Md. 568) 399
Eea V. Smith, (2 Handy, 193) 79
Eead v. Belfast, (20 Me. 246) 352 a
Eead v. Camden, (24 Atl. E. 549) 150,
308, 398
Eead v. Cambridge, (126 Mass. 427)
120
Read v. Pen-ett, (L. R. 1 Ex. Div.
349) 301
Reading v. Com., (11 Pa. St. 196) 9,
11, 301, 377
Reading v. Keppleman, (61 Pa. St.
233) 32, 113, 329
Reading v. Savage, (126 Pa. St. 198)
25
Ready v. Tuskaloosa, (6 Ala. 327) 92,
333
Rector v. State, (6 Ark. 187) 104
Eeddall v. Bryan, (14 Md. 444) 234
Eeddiok v. Amelia, (1 Mo. 5) ^2
Eedlick v. Doll, (54 N. Y. 236) 191 6
Eedmond v. Tarboro, (10 S. E. 845)
268
Eed Star Steamship Co. v. Jersey
City, (45 N. J. L. 246) 152
Eeed v. Bainbridge, (1 Southard, 351)
111
Eeed v. Belfast, (20 Me. 248) 340
Eeed v. Deerfield, (8 Allen, 522) 352
Eeed v. New York, (97 N. Y. 620)
3506
Re'ed v. Northfleld, (13 Pick. 94) 342,
350 6
Reedie v. London etc. Co., (4 Exch.
244) 347
Rees V. Chicago, (38 111. 322) 219, 250
Rees V. Watertown, (19 Wall. 481) 359
Reeves v. Toronto, (21 Up. Can. Q.
B. 160) 355
cxl
TABLE or CASES CITED.
Keferences are to Sections.
Eeeves v. Wood County Treasurer,
(8 Ohio St 333, 345) 104, 234, 236
Regent's Canal Iron Works Co., In
re, (3 Ch. Div. 43) 190
Regents ». Detroit, (12 Mich. 138)
167
Regents of University v. Williams,
(9 Gill & Johns. 365) 15, 37
Regiua v. Berraingham, (9 Car. & P.
469) 400
Regina v. Bewdley, (1 P. Wras. 207)
37 43
Reg.' V. Bridgewater, (2 P. & D. 558)
115
Reg. V. Charlesworth, (16 Q. B. 1012)
295
Reg. V. Chorley, (12 Q. B. 515) 120
Reg. V. Davis, (24 Up. Can. C. P. 575)
300
Reg. V. Derbyshire, (2 Q. B. 745) 313
Regina v. E. & W. Dock, (22 Eng. L.
& E. 113) 318
Reg. V. Gloucestershire, (1 Car. & M.
506) 313
Regina v. Great etc. Ry. Co., (9 Q. B.
315) 400
Reg. V. Howard, (4 Ont. 377) 131
Regina v. Inhabitants, (14 Eng. L. &
E. 116) 353
Reg. 0. Inhabitants, (6 Mod. 307) 313,
815
Reg. 1). Leeds, (4 Q. B. 796) 115
Reg. V. Lincoln, (8 Ad. & E. 65) 313
Reg. I). Litchfield, (4 Q. B. 893) 182
Reg. B. Longton G. Co., (29 L. J. M.
C. 118) 295
Reg. V. Matters, (10 Cox, 6) 120
Regina b. Nott, (4 Q. B. 773) 400
Reg. V. Paramore, (10 Ad. & El. 286)
100
Regina v. Roberts, (36 Law Times
Rep. 690) 77
Reg. V. Rogers, (2 Ld. Raym. (778
101
Reg. V. Rogers, (2 Ld. Raym. (778
101
Reg. V. Sheffield etc. (22 Eng. L. &
Eq. 518) 295
Regina ». Stevenson, (3 F. & F. 106)
127
Reg. V. Train, (9 Cox Cr. Cas. 180)
295, 302
Reg. V. Turwesten, (1 Eng. L. & Eq.
317) 400
Reg. 1). Toronto etc. Co., (24 Q. B.
454) 306
Reg. V. U. K. El. Tel. Co., (9 Cox Cr.
Cas. 174) 297
Regina v. Watts, (1 Salk. 357) 300
Reg. V. Wyoomber, L. R. (2 Q. B. 310)
317
Reg. V. York, (2 Queens B. 850) 100
Reginald v. Pike, ( 1 Ontario, 43) 299
Rehberg v. Mayor, (91 N. Y. 137) 331
350 6
Reich V. State, (53 Ga. 73) 117
Reid, In re, (50 Ala. 439) 361
Reid V. Atlanta, (73 Ga. 523) 355
Reid V. Edina Bd. of Ed., (73 Mo.
295) 221
Reif V. Paige, (55 Wis. 496) 79
Reilly v. Mayor, (111 N. Y. 473) 173
Reilly u. Philadelphia, (60 Pa. St. 467)
165, 278, 347
Reilly v. Racine, (51 Wis. 526) 218,
223 310
Reimer's App., (100 Pa. St. 182) 131
Reining v. Buffalo, (102 N. Y. 308)
350 a
Reinhard v. New York, (2 Daly, 243)
350 6
Reitenbaagh ». Chester Valley R. E.
Co., (21 Pa. St. 100) 2.32, 241
Remington v. Harrison Co. Ct., (12
Bush, 148) 142
Remy v. New Orleans, (15 La. An.
657) 120
Remy v. Municipality, (11 La. An.
148) 200
Rensselaer etc. R. R. Co. c. Davis,
(43 N. Y. 137) 200
Renthrop v. Bourg, (4 Martin, 97) 229
Renwick v. Hall, (84 111. 162) 385
Reock V. Newark, (33 N. J. L. 129)
327, 330
Republican V. etc. Co. v. Chase Co.,
(51 N. W. R. 132) 272
Requa v. Rochester, (45 N. Y. 129)
233, 350 a, 352
Respublioa o. Duquet, (2 Yeates, 493)
130
Respublica v. Sparhawk, (1 Dallas,
237) 335
Revenue Law, In re, (48 N. W. R.
813) 270
Rex V. Abingdon, (1 Lord Raymond,
560) 368
Rex V. Amery, (2 Bro. P. C. 336) 62
Rex V. Amory, (2 Term R. 515) 37
Rex V. Atkyns, (3 Mod. 23) 100
Rex V. Axbridge, (Cowper, 523) 372
Rex V. Barker, (3 Burr. 1265) 359
Rex V. Bellringer, (4 Term R. 823)
100
Rex V. Bristol, (1 D. & R. 389) 372
Rex V. Carlisle, (6 Carr. & P. 636)
300
Rex V. Chalke, (6 Comb. 397) 83
Rex V. Chester, (1 M. & S. 101) 114
Rex V. Com'rs, (1 B. & A. 232) 115
Rex V. Com'rs, (2 Kee. 43) 105
Rex ». Cross, (3 Campb. 226) 300
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
cxl)
Keferences are to Sections.
Rex V. Debenham, (2 B. & Aid. 187)
107
Rex V. Desjardlns Canal, (27 Q. B.
Ontario, 374) 313
Rex V. Devonshire, (1 B. & C. 609)
100
Rex V. Doncaster, (1 Str. 738) 97
Rex !). Dorcaster, (2 Ld. Baym. 1566)
84
Rex V. Gabarian, (11 East, 87) 100
Rex ». Grant, (1 B. & A. Ill) 114
Kex V. Great Broughton, (5 Burr,
2700) 339
Rex V. Greet, (8 B. & C. 363) 100
Rex V. Grimes, (5 Burr, 2601) 84, 95
Rex K. Grosvenor, (7 Mod. 199) 37
Rex V. Hardwick, (11 East, 578) 107
Rex V. Harris, (1 B. & Ad. 936, 20 E.
C. L. 509) 86
Rex B. Havering, (5 B. & Aid. 291)
101
Rex 0. Headlev, (7 B. & C. 496) 100
Hex V. Hill, (4 B. & C. 441) 95
Rex V. Hughes, (5 B. & C. 886, 12 E.
C. L. 399) 86
Rex V. Ingram, (1 W. Bl. 50) 106
Rex V. Ipswich, (2 Ld. Raym. 1240)
84
Rex V. Inhabitants, (2 East, 342) 313
Rex B. Inhabitants, (14 East, 319) 317
Rex 1). Inhabitants, (12 East, 192) 315
Rex V. Jones, (6 East, 230) 300
Rex V. Jones, (12 Ad. & E. 684) 309
Rex V. Justices, (23 L. M. J. 113) 309
Rex V. Kent, (2 M. & S. 513) 313,315
Rex V. Kent, (13 East, 220) 37
Rex ». Kerrison, (3 M. & S. 526) 317
Rex V. Kingston, (8 Mod. 210) 365
Rex V. Lancashire, (2 B. & Ad. 813)
313
Rex V. Lane, (2 Ld. Raym. 1304) 86
Rex V. Langhorne, (4 Ad. & El. 538)
95
Rex V. Liverpool, (2 Burr, 734) 95
Rex V. Liverpool, (2 Burr, 735) 97
Jiex V. Lloyd, (4 Esp. 200) 120
Rex B. London, (2 D. & E. T. R. 181)
372
Rex 11. Maidstone, (3 Burr. 1837) 149
Rex V. May, (4 B. & C. 843) 100
Rex V. Mayor etc. Hastings, (5 B. &
Aid. 692) 101
Rex V. Mayor etc. Wells, (4 Dowl.
P. C. 562) 101
Rex V. Mayor, (2 Cowp. 523) 85
Rex B . Mayor of Hastings, (5 B. &
Aid. 692) 100
Rex B. Mayor of Chester, (1 M. & 8.
101) 111
Rex B. Miller, (6 TermR. 277) 37, 100
Rex V. Mitchell, (10 East, 611) 106
Rex B. Merely, (2 Burr, 1040) 105
Rex 1-. Morris, (4 East. 26) 100
Rex !). Mothersell, (1 Stra. 93) 156
Rex B. Neil, (2 C. & P. 485) 120
Rex B. Nicholson, (1 Str. 299) 37
Rex V. No. Curry, (4 B. & C. 961)
106
Rex B. Osborne, (4 East, 326) 37
Rex B. Oxfordshire, (1 Barn. & Ad.
300) 313
Rex V. Oxfordshire, (16 East, 223)
400
Rex B. Passmore, (3 Term R. 247) 40,
62
Rex V. Patterson, (4 B. & Ad. 9, 24
E. C. L. 11) 86
Rex V. Ponsonby, (1 Vesey, 1) 382
Rex V. Richardson, (8 T. R. 634) 287
Rex B. Richardson, (1 Burr, 517) 83
Rex B. Richmond, (6 T. B. 560) 106
Rex B. Russell, (6 Barn. & C. 566) 300
Rex B. Sal way, (9 B. & C. 424) 114
Rex V. Sargent, (5 T. R. 466) 106
Rex B. Saunders, (3 East, 119) 37, 40
Rex B. Shelly, (3 T. R. 142) 106
Rex B. Smart, (4 Burr, 2143) 100
Rex B. Smart, (Cowp. 59) 100
Rex B. Southampton, (14 Eng. L.
Eq. 116) 313
Rex V. Staffordshire, (16 East, 223)
400
Rex B. St. George, (3 Campb. 222) 339
Rex B. Surrey, (2 Campb. 455) 315
Rex B. Tizzard, (9 B. & C. 418, 17 E.
C. L. 411) 86
Rex B. Theodorick, (8 East, 545) 95
Rex B. Tregony, (8 Mod. 129) 37
Rex B. Ward, (4 Ad. & E. 405) 300
Rex V. Wells, (4 Burr, 1999) 83
Rex B. West Love, (3 B. & C. 685) 368
Rex B. W. Riding, (5 Burr, 2594) 315
Rex B. West Riding, (2 East, 342) 813,
353
Rex B. Westwood, (4 B. & A. 786) 114
Rex B. White, (5 Burr, 333) 120
Rex B. Williams, (1 Burr, 402) 9B
Rexford b. Knight, (11 N. Y. 308) 239,
243
Reynolds b. Albany, (8 Barb. 597) 141
Reynolds b. Baldwin, (1 La. An. 162)
379
Reynolds b. Harris, (27 Weekly Law
Bui. 229) 130
Reynolds v. Los Angeles, (64 Cal.
372) 399
Reynolds v. New Salem, (6 Met. 340)
95
Reynolds v. Shreveport, (13 La. An.
426) 291, 329
Reynolds i>. Stark Co., (5 Ohio, 204)
cxlii
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Reynold's Heirs u. Stark County
Oom'rs etc., (6 Ohio, 204) 200, 208,
226
Rhea v. Newport etc. Co., (50 Fed.
16) 314 a
Rhine ». McKinney, (53 Tex. 354) 240,
245
Ehineheck E. R, In re, (67 N. Y. 242)
242
Rhines v. Clark, (51 Pa. St. 96) 104
Ribordy v. Pellachond, (28 111. App.
303) 354 a
Eice V. Des Moines, (40 Iowa, 638)
189 a, 350 a, 352
Rice V. Evansvjlle, (108 Ind. 7) 354,
355
Eice V. Foster, (4 Harring. 479) 161
Eice V. Montpelier, (19 Vt. 470) 342,
352
Eice V. Newport etc. Co., (32 W. Va.
164)48
Rice V. Smith, (9 Iowa, 570) 371
Eice V. State, (3 Kan. 141) 104, 117
Rice V. Wellman, (5 Ohio Cir. Ct.
E. 334) 236
Eice B. & F. Co. v. Worcester, (130
Mass. 575) 363
Rice etc. v. Worcester, (130 Mass.
575) 377
Eich V. Errol, (51 N. H. 350) 190 a
Eich V. Mentz Tp., (134 U. S. 632, 18
Fed. Eep. 52) 189
Eich V. Minneapolis, (35 N. W. R. 2)
293
Richards v. Clarksburg, (30 W. Va.
491) 100, 110
Richards v. Com'rs, (120 Mass. 401)
377
Richards v. Daggett, (4 Mass. 539)
59, 67
Richards v. Oshkosh, (51 N. W. 256)
344
Richards ». Supervisors, (69 Iowa,
612) 190
Eichardson b. Com'rs, (9 So. E. 351)
234
Eichai-dson v. Heydenfeldt, (46 Cal.
68) 263
Richardson v. Eoyalton & W. T. -Co.,
(6 Vt. 496) 353
Richardson v. Scott etc. Co., (22 Cal.
150) 167
Eichardson v. Vermont Central R.
E. Co., (25 Vt. 465) 239
Richland Co. v. Lawrence Co., (12
111. 8) 2, 8, 59, 67
Richmau v. Muscatine Co., (77 Iowa,
513) 26, 278
Richmond v. Courtney, (32 Gratt.
792) 352 a
Richmond v. Daniel, (14 Gratt. 387)256
Richmond v. Davis, (103 Ind. 449) 395
Richmond v. Dudley, (129 Ind. 112)
121, 130, 146
Richmond v. Henrico, (83 Va. 204)
119
Richmond u. Long, (17 Gratt. 375) 9,
92, 324, 336 a
Richmond v. McGirr, (78 Ind. 192) 110
Richmond v. Mulholland, (116 Ind.
173) 352
Richmond v. Munic, (8 Up. Can. Q.
B. 567) 169
Richmond v. Richmond R. Co., (21
Gratt. 604) 2, 8, 270
Richmond etc. Co. v. Middletown,
(59 jST. Y. 228) 113, 295, 296
Richmond etc. Co. v. Richmond, (96
U. S. 521) 136, 302, 303
Richmond etc. Co. v. Reidsville, (101
N. C. 404) 261, 326 a
Richmond R. R. Co. v. Louisa. R. E.
Co., (13 How. 71) 238, 302
Richmond & A. R. R. Co. v. Lvncli-
burg, (81 Va. 473) 259 a
Ricket V. Metrop. Ey. C. L. R., (2 H.
L. 175) 307, 330
Ricketts v. Mayor, (67 How. Pr. 320)67
Ricketts v. Spraker, (77 Ind. 371) 379
Riddle v. Bedf. Co., (7 S. & E. 386)
73, 79, 85, 88
Riddle v. Locks and Canals, (7 Mass.
169) 37
Riddle v. Merrimac etc. Prop., (7
Mass. 169) 325, 339
Rideout b. Sch. Dist., (1 Allen, 232)
95
Eidgeway ». West, (60 Ind. 371) 120
Ridley v. Dougherty, (42 N. W. E. 78)
371
Ridley b. Lamb, (10 Up. Can. Q. B.
254) 300
Riggs V. Brewer, (64 Ala. 282) 79
Riggs V. Detroit Bd. of Ed., (27 Mich.
262) 226, 308
Riggs V. Johnson City, (6 Wall. 166)
369
Riker b. Leo, (115 N. Y. 93) 49
Riley v. Kansas City, (31 Mo. App.
439) 79, 85
Riley v. Rochester, (9 N. Y. 64) 201
Rindge b. Colrain, (11 Gray, 157) 352
Ring !). Cohoes, (77 N. Y. 83)325,342
Eiug V. Johnson County, (6 Iowa,
265) 51, 192 6
Ringling b. Kohn, (4 Mo. App. 63)
191
Ripley B. Gelston, (9 Johns. 201) 326 a
Ripon B. Bittel, (30 Wis. 614) 350 !>,
352 a
Ripon V. Joint Sch.Dis., (17 Wis. 83)
327
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
cxliii
Risley v. St. Louis, (34 Mo. 404) 279
Rison V. Farr, (24 Ark. 161) 184
Ititcliie V. Boynton, (114 Mass. 431)
127
Ritchie v. Franklin Co., (22 Wall. 6'()
187 0
Rittenhouse v. Mayor etc., (25 M. &
C. 336) 174
River Rendering Co. v. Behr, (77 Mo.
91) 120, 150
Rivers v. Augusta, (67 Ga. 376, 23 Alb.
L. J. 17) 331
Rives V. Wood, (15 S. W. R. 131) 320
Road Case, (17 Pa. St. 71, 75) 98
Road in Bethlehem Twp., In re, (10
Atl. R. 122) 399
Road in Milton, (40 Pa. St. 400) 288
Roake v. Am. Tel. & T. Co., (41 N.
J. Eq. 35) 297
Roanoke City v. Berkowitz, (80 Va.
616) 245
Roanoke G-. Co. v. Roanoke, (14 S. E.
R. 665) 292, 296, 328
Roaring Brook, In re, (21 Atl. R. 412,
28 W. N. C. 141) 249
Robb V. Indianapolis, (38 lud. 49) 152
Kobbins v. Chicago, (4 Wall. 657) 348
Kobbins v. Johns, (15 C. B. N. S. 221,
243) 348
Robbins v. Milw. & H. R. R. Co., (6
Wis. 636) 245
Robert v. Saddler, (104 N. Y. 229, 58
Am. Rep. 498) 293
Roberts, Ex parte, (11 S. W. R. 782)
288
Roberts v. BoUes, (101 U. S. 123) 191 b
Roberts ». Brown Co. Com'rs, (21
Kan. 247) 245
Roberts v. Chicago, (26 411. 249) 113,
239, 329
Roberts v. Easton, (19 Ohio St. 78)
302
Roberts v. Davidson, (83 Ky. 279)
371
Roberts ». Rivers, (27 III. 242) 371
Roberts v. Williams, (13 Ark. 555)
279, 398
Robertson b. Breedlove, (61 Tex. 316)
395
Robertson v. Campbell, (13 F. C. 61)
120
Robertson v. Grove, (4 Oreg. 8) 87
Robertson v. Lambertville, (38 N. J.
L. 69) 158
Robertson ». Wabash etc. Co., (84
Mo. 119) 306
Robie V. Sedgwick, (35 Barb. 319)
31
Robinson's Case, (131 Mass. 376) 69-
Robinson, Ex parte, (12 Nev. 263)
259
Robinson, Ex parte, (17 S. W. R.
1057) 120
Robinson v. Benton Co., (49 Ark. 49)
90, 102
Robinson v. Burlington, (50 Iowa,
240) 327
Robinson v. Butte Co. Sup., (43 Cal.
353) 362
Robinson v. Chamberlain, (34 N. Y.
389) 325
Robinson v. Dodge, (18 Johns. 351)
263
Robinson v. Dunn, (77 Cal. 473) 79
Robinson v. Evansville, (87 Ind. 334)
92
Robinson v. Greenville, (42 Ohio St.
625) 331 a
Robinson v. Jones, (14 Fla. 256) 379
Robinson v. Lane, (19 Ga. 337) 42
Robinson u. Leavitt, (7 N. H. 100)
190 a
Robinson v. Mayor, (1 Humph. 156)
125
Robinson v. Rohr, (73 Wis. 436) 92,
328
Robinson v. St. Louis, (28 Mo. 488)
130, 163
Robinson v. Shanks, (20 N. B. R. 713,
118 Ind. 125) 354
Robinson v. Swope, (12 Bush, 21)
234 a
Robinson v. White, (26 Ark. 139) 79
Roby V. Chicago, (64 111. 447) 160
Rochdale Can. Co. v. Radcliffe, (18
Q. B. 287) 312
Rochefort v. Attleboro, (27 N. E. R.
1013)3506
Rochester v. Collins, (12 Barb. 559)
118
Rochester v. Erickson (46 Barb. 92)
396
Rochester v. Lee, (15 Sim. 376) 47
Rochester u. Montgomery, (72 N. Y.
65) 348
Rochester v. Randall, (105 Mass. 295)
72
Rochester v. Rush, (80 N. Y. 302) 271
Rochester Water Co., In re, (66 N.
Y. 413) 144 a, 238 a
Rochester W. Lead Co. v. Rochester,
(3N. Y. 462) 325, 336 a, 355
Rock Creek v. Strong, (96 U. S. 271)
196
Rockford v. Tripp, (83 111. 247) 342,
343
Rockford v. Hilderbrand, (61 111. 155)
346
Rockford d. Russell, (9 111. App. 229)
342
Rockingham Sav. Bk. v. Portsmouth,
(52 N. H. 17) 397
cxliv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Eeferences are to Sections.
Rock Island etc. c. U. S., (4 Wall.
435) 349, 382, 3?4
Rock Island ». Cuinely, (26 111. App.
173) 29
Rockwell V. Nearing-, (33 N. T. 302)
129
Rodemaoher v. Milw. etc. Co., (41
Iowa, 297) 302
Roe V. City, (100 Mo. 190, 13 S. W.
R. 404) 346
Roffignac Street, In re, (4 Rob. 357)
242
Rogers, In re, (7 Cow. 526) 97, 99,
369
Rogers Ave., In re, (22 N. Y. S. 27,
29 A. N. C. 361) 259 a
Rogers v. JJuffalo, (123 N. Y. 173) 71
Rogers v. Burlington, (3 Wall. 362)
184
Rogers v. Greenbush, (58 Me. 390)
326
Rogers v. Jacobs, (11 S. W. R. 513)
65
Rogers v. Jones, (1 Wend. 227) 127
Rogers v. Lee Co., (1 Dillon, 529) 177
Rogers v. People, (68 111. 154) 375
Rogers v. People, (9 Col. 450) 117
Rogers v. Shirley, (74 Me. 144) 350 6
Rohmeiser v. Bannon, (22 S. W. R.
27)308, 311
Rolfs, In re, (30 Kan. 758) 104
Roll V. Augusta, (32 Ga. 328) 113, 329
Roll V. Indianapolis, (52 Ind. 547) 328
Rome V. Addison, (34 N. H. 306) 239
Rome B. Anderson, (89 Tenn. 259) 53
Rome B. Cabot, (28 Ga. 50) 119
Rome V. Jenkins, (30 Ga. 154) 218,
243, 247
Rome V. McWilliams, (67 Ga. 106)
261, 266
Rome V. Omberg, (28 Ga. 46) 292,
329
Romeo v. Cbapman, (2 Mich. 179) 50
Roodhouse c. Jennings, (29 111. Ap.
50) 165, 177
Rooney v. Randolph, (128 Mass. 580)
344, 350 6
Roosevelt v. Goddard, (52 Barb. 533)
133
Roosevelt Hosp. v. New York, (84
N. Y. 108) 270
Root ». Shields, (Woolw. C. 0. 340)
25
Roper V. McWhorter, (77 Va. 214)
134, 208, 393
Ropin V. Laurinburg, (90 N. C. 427)
Rosborough v. Boardman, (67 Cal.
116) 82
Rose V. Bostyer, (22 Pac. Rep. 393)
310 '
Rose V. City of Bridgeport, (17 Conn.
243) 190
Rose V. Hardee, (98 N. C. 44) 32
Rose V. St. Charles, (49 Mo. 509) 103
Rose V. Turnpike Co., (3 Watts, 46)
38
Rosenbaum, In re, (6 N. Y. Sup. Ct.
184) 281
Rosenbaum v. Bauer, (120 U. S. 461)
359
Ross V. Georgia etc. Co., (12 S. E. E.
101) 247
Ross V. Lane, (3 S. & M. 695) 360
Ross V. Madison, (1 Ind. 281) 108
Ross V. Phila., (115 Pa. St. 222) 92
Ross B. Stackhouse, (114 Ind. 200)
173
Ross V. Thompson, (78 Ind. 90, 96)
396
Rothermel v. Meyerle, (136 Pa. St.
250, 26 W. N. C. 422) 259
Rothschild b. Carney, (9 B. C. 391)
191
Rothschild b. Darien, (69 Ga. 503)
146
Rouede b. Jersey City, (18 Fed. Rep.
719) 195 d
Rounds B. Mumford, (2 R. I. 154)
292, 329
Rounds B. Stratford, (26 Up. Can. C.
B. 11) 342
Rounds B. Stetson, (45 Me. 596) 129
Rountree b. Galveston, (42 Tex. 613)
259
Rowans Exr. b. Portland, (8 B. Mon.
253) 133, 225
Rowe B. Kern, (72 Cal. 353) 79
Rowe B. Portsmouth, (56 N. H. 291)
325, 355 *
Rowell B. Williams, (29 Iowa, 210)
338 a
Rowland b. Gallatin, (75 Mo. 184) 92,
338
Rowland b. Kalamazoo, (49 Mich.
553) 336 a
Rowland ». Mayor etc., (83 N. Y. 372)
67
Rdwley v. London etc. Co., (L. K. 8
Ex. 221) 352 a
Rowlsby B. Speer, (31 K. J. L. 351)
354 a
Royal St., In re, (16 La. An. 393)
278
Royster b. Granville, (98 N. C. 148)
177
Roxbury v. Boston etc. Co., (6 Gush.
424) 302
Rozell B. Anderson, (91 Ind. 591)
355
Rozell B. Andrews, (103 N. Y. 150)
220
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
Keferences are to Sections.
cxlv
Rubey v. Shain, (54 Mo. 207) 185,
397
Eucker v. Supervisor, (7 W. Va. 661)
79
Rudolphe v. New Orleans, (11 La.
An. 242) 332
Eudsill V. State, (40 Ind. 485) 377
KufE V. Phillips, (50 Ga. 130) 120
Ruggles V. Collier, (43 Mo. 359) 113
Ruggles V. Fond du Lao, (53 Wis.
436) 326 a
Ruggles V. Nantucket, (11 Cush. 433)
239, 335
Ruggles V. Nevada, (63 Iowa, 185)
350 6
Ruhlman v. Commonwealth, (5 Binn.
26) 249
Ruland v. South Newmarket, (59 N.
H. 291) 220
Rule V. Tait, (38 Kan. 765) 79
Ruraball v. Metropolitan Bank, (2 Q.
B. Div. 194) 191
Rumsey v. Campton, (16 N. H. 567)
66, 69
Rundle ». Baltimore, (28 Md. 356) 399
Bundle v. Del. etc. Can. Co., (1 Wall.
Jr. 275) 2
Rung V. Thoneber, (2 Watts, 23) 312
Runnels v. State, (Walk. 146) 83
Runyan 13. Coster's Lessee, (14 Pet.
122) 201
Runyon v. Bordine, (2 J. S. Green,
472) 300
Ruohs o. Athens, (18 S. W. R. 400)8
Rushtown V. Burke, (43 N. W. R.
815) 326
Riishville ». Adams, (107 Ind. 124)
342
Rushville v. Town, (32 111. App. 320)
33
Rushville G. Co. v. Rushville, (23 N.
E. R. 72, 121 Ind. 206) 99, 123
Russ V. Mayor etc., (12 N. Y. Leg.
Obs. 38) 152
Russell V. Canastota, (98 N. Y. 496)
346
Russell V. Chicago, (22 111. 182) 76
Russell V. Columbia, (74 Mo. 480)
331 a, 349, 350
Russell V. Mayor etc. of N. Y., (2
Denio, 461) 239
Russell V. Muldraugh, (13 Bush, 307)
320
Russell V. New Haven, (51 Conn.
259) 268
Russell V. New York, (2 Denio, 461)
335, 338 a
Russell V. Tate, (13 S. W. R. 130, 52
Ark. 541) 393
Russell V. Wellington, (31 N. E. R.
630) 65
Russellville, Ex parte, (11 So. Rep.
18) 125
Rutherford's Case, (72 Pa. St. 82, 13
Am. Rep. 655) 236
Rutherford v. Halley, (105 N. Y.
632) 355
Rutherford v. Hamilton, (97 Mo. 543)
97, 259 a
Rutherford v. Taylor, (38 Mo. 315)
216, 229
Rutland v. Dayton, (60 111. 58) 306
Rutland E. L. Co. v. Marble, (26 Atl.
R. 635) 297
Ruttle V. Covington, (10 S. W. Rep.
644) 306
Rust V. Lowe, (6 Mass. 90) 238
Ryan v. Coldwater, (26 Pac. R. 675)
164
Rvan V. Copes, (11 Rich. 217) 120
Ryan v. Curi-an, (64 Ind. 345) 347
Ryan v. Hoffman, (26 Ohio St. 109)
377
Ryan v. Reynolds, (53 111. 212) 348
Ryan v. Wilson, (87 N. Y. 471) 348
Ryce V. Osage, (55 N. W. R. 532) 165,
169
Ryohlicke v. St. Louis, (11 S. W. R.
1001) 355
Ryohlicke v. St. Louis, (98 Mo. 491)
354 a
Ryder «. Railroad Co., (13111.523) 31
Ryerson v. Brown, (35 Mich. 333)
232
S.
Saak 1). Philadelphia, (1 Pa. Leg. Gaz.
Rep. 259) 98
Sackett, etc. Streets, In re, (74 N. Y.
95) 259 a, 301
Sackett v. New Albany, (88 Ind. 473)
175, 395
Sacramento v. Crocker, (16 Cal. 119)
261
Sacramento v. Kirk, (7 Cal. 449) 165
Sadler, In re, (21 Atl. 978) 56
Sadler ». Evans, (4 Burr, 1984) 85
Sadler!). Laugham, (34 Ala. 311) 234 a
Sage V. Brooklyn, (89 N. Y. 189) 247
Saginaw Gasl. Co. v. Saginaw, (28
Fed. Rep. 529) 144, 144 a
St. Charles v. Meyer, (58 Mo. 86) 117
St. Charles v. Nolle, (51 Mo. 122) 152,
300
St. Charles v. O'Malley, (18 111. 407)
148
St. Charles v. Stewart, (49 Mo. 132)
87 ,
St. Clair Co. etc. v. Illinois, (96 U. S.
63) 318
St. Edward's Col. v. Morrison, (82
Tex. 1) 270
cxlvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Keferences are to Sections.
St. Helena v. Burton, (35 La. An.
521) 72
St. John 15. Mayor, (6 Duer, 315) 128
St. Jobnt). MoFarlan, (33 Mich. 72)130
St John !). New York, (3 Bosw. 483)
129, 300
St. Johnsbnry ». Thompson, (59 Vt.
300) 110, 124
St. Joseph V. O'Donoghue, (31 Mo.
345) 259 a
St. Joseph V. Owen, (19 S. "W. E. 713)
259 d 2*77
St. Joseph V. Rogers, (16 Wall. 666)
184, 187 a
St. Joseph etc. Co. v. Buchanan Co.,
(39 Mo. 485) 186
St. Joseph etc. E. E. Co. v. Callender,
(18 Kan. 496) 232
St. Joseph etc. Co. v. Cudmore, (15
S. W. R. 535) 245
St. Joseph etc. Co. v. Sliambaugh,
(106 Mo. 557) 241, 245
St. Joseph Township v. Eogers, (16
Wall. 644) 24
St. Louis V. Alexander, (23 Mo. 483)
24, 32, 148, 254
St. Louis V. Allen, (13 Mo. 400) 53, 55,
56, 276
St. Louis V. Armstrong, (56 Mo. 298)
170
St. Louis V. Bank, (49 Mo. 574) 147
St. Louis V. Bentz, (11 Mo. 61) 117
St. Louis V. Boffinger, (19 Mo. 13, 15)
147
St. Louis V. Brewing Co., (9 S. W. E.
910, 96 Mo. 497) 397
St. Louis V. Cafferata, (24 Mo. 94) 117,
134
St. Louis V. Clemens, (36 Mo. 467)
113, 278, 281
St. Louis V. Consolidation Coal Co.,
(20 S. W. E. 699) 259
St. Louis V. Davidson, (102 Mo. 149)
126
St. Louis V. Fitz, (53 Mo. 582) 158
St. Louis V. Foster, (52 Mo. 513) 148
St. Louis V. Franks, (78 Mo. 41) 243
St. Louis D. Gas Co., (5 Mo. App. 484)
164
St. Louis V. Green, (7 Mo. App. 468)
368
St. Louis J). Grove, (46 Mo. 574) 124
St. Louis V. Gurno, (12 Mo. 414) 292
St. Louis V. Jackson, (25 Mo. 37) 128
Salamanca v. Wilson, (109 U. S. 671)
370 '
Salem v. East. E. Co., (98 Mass. 431)
. 120
Salem v. GoUer, (76 Ind. 291) 352
Ssfliim Lyceum v. Salem, (27 N. E. E.
67a) 270
Salem M. Soc. v. Salem, (29 N. E. R
584) 270
Salem W. Co. v. Salem, (5 Oreg. 30)
189 a
Salina v. Prosper, (27 Kan. 544) 350 0
Saline Co. v. Anderson, (20 Kan. 298)
79, 85
Saline v. Wilson, (61 Mo. 237) 177
Salisbury v. Hercbenroder,(106 Mass.
548) 300, 345
Salisbury v. Philada., (44 Pa. St. .303)
164
Sailer v. Brown, (67 Mich. 422) 398
Salmon v. Haynes, (50 N. J. L. 97) 98
Salter v. Beed, (15 Pa. St. 260) 283
Salt Lake City v. Hollister, (118 U.
S. 256) 169, 338
Salt Lake City v. Wagner, (2 Utah,
400) 125
Saltenstall v. Baulker, (8 Gray, 195)
120
Salvin v. No. Brance. C. Co., (L. R. 8
Ch. Ap. 467) 120
Sammelson v. Cleveland etc. Co., (49
Mich. 164) 347
Sammis v. King, (40 Conn. 298) 79,
85
Sammons v. Holloway, (21 Mich. 162)
258
Sampson v. Justice, (5 Gratt. 241) 223
Sams 1). Toronto, (9 U. C. Q. B. 181)
49
Samuel v. Nashville, (3 Sneed, 298)
226
San Antonio v. Lewis, (15 Tex. 388)
108, 165, 229
San Antonio v. Meharty, (96 U. S.
315) 191 6, 196
San Antonio v. Stumburg, (7 S. W.
E. 754) 226
San Benito Co. v. E. E. Co., (19 Pac.
E. 827, 77 Cal. 518) 268
Sanborn v. Minneapolis, (35 Minn.
314) 217
Sanborn v. Scb. Dist., (12 Minn. 17)
310
Sanbomton v. Tilton, (55 IST. H. 603)
67
Sanders v. Eeiske, (1 Dak. 151) 348,
352
Sanders v. Provisional Municipality,
(24 Pla. 226) 55
Sanderson v. Balston, (20 La. Ann.
312) 66
Sandford v. Boyd, (2 Cranoh, 79) 67
San Diego v. Granniss, (77 Cal. 510)
53
Sands v. Edmunds, (116 U. S. 58S)
373
Sands v. Eichmond, (31 Gratt. 571)
259 a
TABI.K OF CASES CITED.
cxlvii
References are to Sections.
Sandford v. Augusta, (32 Kan. 536)
340, 352 a
Sandford v. Prentice, (28 Mo. 358)
189
Sandwich v. Dolan, (24 N. E. R. 526)
352
San Francisco ». Calderwood, (31 Cal.
585) 200, 218
San Francisco v. Canavan, (42 Cal.
541) 220
San Francisco v. Certain Real Estate,
(42 Cal. 517) 17
San Francisco v. Hazen, (5 Cal. 169)
99
San Francisco v. HoUiday, (76 Cal.
18) 219
San Francisco v. Itzell, (80 Cal. 57)
308
San Francisco v. McGinn, (67 Cal.
110) 268
San Francisco etc. v. Oakland, (43
Cal. 502) 172
San Fran. Gas Co. b. San Francisco,
(9 Cal. 452) 170
Sangamon County v. Springfield, (63
111. 66) 8, 67, 164
Sanger ». Kennebec Co., (25 Me. 291)
363
Sanger v. Rice, (43 Kan. 580) 282
San Jose v. Reed, (65 Cal. 241) 246
San Jose v. San J. & S. C. R. R. Co.,
(53 Cal. 476) 261
San Jose etc. Co. ». Mayne, (83 Cal.
563, 23 Pac. R. 522) 246
San Leandro v. Le Breton, (72 Cal.
170) 226
San Luis Obispo v. Haskin, (91 Cal.
549) 189
San Luis Obispo v. Pettit, (87 Cal.
499) 255
San Mateo Co. ■». So. Pac. etc., (8
Sawyer, 238) 279
Sansom ». Mercer, (68 Tex. 488) 362
Santa Cruz ». Enright, (30 Pac. R.
197) 232
Santa Rosa v. Coulter, (50 Cal. 537)
56
Santee ». Allegheny, (10 Pitts. Leg.
J. 241) 194 a
Santo B. State, (2 Iowa, 165) 161
Sappington v. Scott, (14 Md. 40) 82
Sargent u. Cornish, (54 X. H. 18) 202
Sargent 0. Lynn, (138 Mass. 599) 350 b
Satterlee v. Matthewson, (2 Pet. 380)
187
Satterlee v. San Francisco, (23 Cal.
214) 211
Sauerhering ». Iron Ridge etc. Co.,
(25 Wis. 447) 189
gaulet V. New Orleans, (10 La. An.
81) 217, 22X
Saulsburg v. Ithaca, (94 N. Y. 27) 327,
346
Sault St. Marie Co. v. Dusen, (40
Mich. 429) 170
Saunders ». Lawrence, (141 Mass.
380) 75
Saunders v. McLin, (1 Ired. L. 572)
267
Saunders v. Municipality, ( 24 Fla.
226) 15
Saunders v. Owen, (2 Salkeld, 247)
76
Sauter v. N. T. Cent. etc. Co., (66 N.
Y. 50) 352 a
Savage v. Bangor, (40 Me. 176) 344
Savage v. Gulliver, (4 Mass. 178) 398
Savage M. Pickard, (514 Lea, 46) 79, 85
Savannah v. Charton, (36 Ga. 460)
123
Savannah ti. Cullens, (38 Ga. 334)
336 a
Savannah v. Dickey, (33 Mo. App.
522) 29
Savannah v. Donnelly, (71 Ga. 258)
331 o, 350
Savannah v. Feeley, (66 Ga. 31) 326 a
Savannah v. Hartridge, (8 Ga. 23) 122
Savannah v. Hussey, (21 Ga. 80) 102
107
Savannah D. Jesup, (106 U. S. 563)
267
Savannah v. Spears, (66 Ga. 304) 355
Savannah b. State, (4 Ga. 26) 314
Savannah b. Steamboat Co. of Ga., (R.
M. Charlt. R. 242) 217
Savannah b. Waldner, (49 Ga. 324)
345
Savannah etc. Co. b. Shields, (33 Ga.
601) 302
Savannah etc. b. Savannah, (45 Ga.
602) 302, 304, 306
Savannah & Memphis R. R. Co. v.
Lancaster, (62 Ala. 563) 191
Savings Ass. B. Topeka, (3 Dillon C.
C. R. 376) 27
Savings Bank b. Davis, (8 Conn. 191)
165
Savings Fd. So. v. Philadelphia, (31
Pa. St. 175) 2, 8
Sawmill Run Bridge, (85 Pa. St. 247)
259 a
Sawyer, In re, (124 U. S. 300) 96, 361,
393
Sawyer b. Alton, (4 111. 130) 260
Sawyer b. Concordia, (12 Fed. Rep.
754) 14, 187
Sawyer b. Davis, (136 Mass. 239) 301
Sawyer b. Corse, (17 Gratt. 230): 67,
92
Sawyers. Northfield, (7 Cush, 490)
315, 400
cxlviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Saxton B. Beach, (50 Mo. 488) 28
Saxton V. St. Joseph, (60 Mo. 153)
96, 164,336 a
Sayles v. Davis, (22 Wis. 225) 258
Saylor v. Harrisburg, (87 Pa. St. 216)
338 a
Sayre ». Phillips, (24 Atl. Kep. 76)
121, 256
Scammou v. Chicago, (25 111. 424)
256, 279, 347
Scammon v. Scammon, (28 N. H. 429)
106
Scanlon v. New York, (12 Daly, 81)
350 6
Scarborough, Ex parte, (12 S. E. K.
666) 361
SohaefBer v. Sandusky, (33 Ohio St.
246) 344
SohafEer v. Cadwallader, (36 Pa. St.
126) 375
Schaidt v. Bland, (66 Md. 141) 396
Schattner v. Sanderf ur, ( j3 Mo. 162)
327
Schehr v. Board, (83 Mich. 367) 361
Scheimer v. Price, (65 Mich. 638) 217
Schell V. L. M. Rurasey M. Co., (39
Mo. App. 264) 165
Schell V. Plumb, (55 N. T. 592) 352 a
Schell City v. Rumsey, (39 Mo. Ap.
264) 165
Sohenck v. Play, (1 Woolw. 175) 99
Schenectady v. Furman, (15 N. T.
S. 724, 61 Hun, 171) 354
Schenectady B. Ti-ustees, (21 N. T. S.
147, 66 Hun, 179) 259 a, 292
Schenley v. Commonwealth, (36 Pa.
St. 29) 17
Schlass V. Hewlett, (81 Ala. 266) 79
Sohlieder v. Dielman, (10 So. R. 934)
10,40
Schlomberg, Ex parte, (11 So. E. 721)
24
Schmidt, Ex parte, (24 S. C. 367) 104
Schmidt v. Steans, (34 Minn. 112)
170
Schneider v. City, (40 N. W. R. 329)
329
Schneider v. Jacob, 5 South West.
Rep. 350) 221
Schneider v. Miss. Pac. Ry. Co., (29
Mo. App. 68) 354 a
Sohnitzins v. Bailey, (22 Atl. E. 409)
354
Schomer v. Rochester, (15 Abb. K.
C. 57) 353
School Com. V. Dean, (2 Stew. &
Port. 190) 25
School Dist., In re, (10 Pa. Co. Ct.,
588)3
k Sch. Dist. V. Atherton, (12 Met. 105)
81, 95, 106
School Dist. V. Blakeslee, (13 Conn.
227) 48, 95, 106
School Dist. 15. Fogleman, (76111. 189)
177
School Dist. V. Ins. Co., (103 U. S.
707) 27
School Dist. B. Lord, (44 Me. 374) 106
School Dist. V. Richardson, (23 Pick.
62) 67
School Dist. V. Stough, (4 Neb. 357)
177
School Dist. etc. v. Tapley, 1 Allen,
49) 288
School Dist. B. Williams, (38 Ark.
454) 92
School Dist. B. Xenia Bank, (19 Neb.
89) 190 a
School Dist. No. 4 b. Gage, (39 Mich.
484) 80
Schooliield v. Lynchburg, (78 Va.
366) 256
School I. of Monticello b. Kendall,
(72 Ind. 208) 167
School Trs. r,. People, (63 111.299)255
Schoonraaker b. Ref. Prot. Dutch
Church, (5 How. 265) 2
Sohonholii b. Jackson, (97 Mo. 151,
IDS. W.-R. 618)352
Schrever v. Livingston, (9 Mo. 196)
365
Schriber b. Langdale, (66 Wis. 616)
38, 67
Schuchards v. People, (99 HI. 501) 69
Schuchardt n. New York, (53 N. Y.
202) 248
Sohultes B. Eberley, (2 So. R. 345) 255
Schultze B. Milwaukee, (49 Wis. 2bi)
331
Schumacher u. Taberman, (56 Cal.
.508) 17, 18
Schumm v. Seymour, (24 N. J. Eq.
143) 100, 173, 397
Schurmeier v. St. Paul etc. R. R. Co.,
(10 Minn. 82) 215, 302
Schuster b. State, (48 Ala. 199) 117
Schuylkill Co. b. City Gas Co., (23
Atl. 1055) 273
Schwartz b. Flatboats, (14 La. An.
243) 263
Schwartz u. Oshkosh, (55 Wis. 490)
148
Schwarz b. Barry, (51 N. W. R. 279)
86
Schweitzer b. Liberty, (82 Mo. 309)
125
Scioto etc. B. Lawrence, (38 Ohio St.
41) 302, 396
Scofield B. Lansing, (17 Mich. 437)
263
Scott V. Alexander, (23 S. C. 120) 395
Scott B. Chicago, (1 Biss. 510) 353
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
cxlix
Scott V. Davenport, (34 Iowa, 208)
189 a
Scott V. Firth, (4 P. & F. 349) 120
Scott !). Hansheer, (94 Ind. 1) 186
Scott V. Manchester, (2 H. & N. 204)
336
Scott V. Mayor, (37 Eng. L. & E. 495)
324
Scott V. Mayor, (1 H. & W. 59) 92
Scott V. Montgomery, (95 Pa. St. 444)
343
Scott B. People, (33 N. E. R. 180) 279
Scott ». Phila., (81 Pa. St. 80) 279
Scott V. Shreveport, (20 Fed. Rep.
714) 110
Scotland Co. v. Hill, (132 V. S. 107)'
186, 195 c
Scott Tp. V. Montgomery, (95 Pa. St.
444) 352 a
Scovill V. Cleveland, (1 Ohio St. 126,
135) 32, 69, 248, 259 a
Scovill V. Geddings, (7 Ohio, part 2,
211, 329
Scranton etc.. In re, (113 Pa. St. 176)
18
Scranton v. Catterson, (94 Pa. St.
202) 336 a
Scranton v. Hills, (102 Pa. St. 378)
348
Scranton r>. Patterson, (94 Pa. St. 202)
3506
Scranton v. Steele Co., (154 Pa. St.
171) 396
Scudderi). Hinshaw, (33 N. E. R. 791)
300
Scudderi). Trenton Del. Falls Co., (1
Saxt. 694) 232, 240
Scully and O'Leary, In re, (11 Chi.
Leg. News, 27) 104
Seagraves v. Alton, (13 111. 366) 164
Seale v. Mitchell, (5 Cal. 403) 102
Searles ». Chattaheochee Co., (41 Ga.
225) 325
Seaman v. New York, (80 N. Y. 239)
328, 336 a
Seaman v. Patten, (2 Gaines, 312) 9
Seamen's Hospital v. Liverpool, (4
Ex. 180) 156
Searcy v. Yarnell, (1 S. W. R. 319, 47
Ark. 269) 164
Searles v. Abraham, (73 Iowa, 507)
395
Sears t). West, (1 Murph. 291) 123,
261
Seattle v. Buzby, (2 Wash. Ter. 25)
347
Seattle v. Doran, (32 Pac. R. 105) 282
Seattle v. Yerter, (1 Wash. Ter. 576)
282
Seattle etc. Co. v. State, (5 Wash. St.
807) 398
Sebert ». Alpena, (43 N. W. R. 1098)
324
Second Av. M. E. Church, In re, (66
N. Y. 395) 270
Second Nat. B/k. v. Lansing, (1 Mich.
181) 177
Secord v. Gt. Western Ry. Co. (15 U.
C. Q. B. 631) 352 a
Secretary of the Int. v. McGarraham,
(9 Wall. 298, 313) 370
Sedgwick Co. v. Bunker, (16 Kan.
498) 60, 67
Sedgwick Co. v. Dailey, (11 Kan.
631) 15, 28, 67
Seebold v. Shitler, (34 Pa. St. 133)
201
Seele v. Deering, (79 Me. 343) 338
Seeley ». Litchfield, (49 Conn. 134)
344, 346
Seely ». Pittsburgh, (82 Pa. St. 360,
22 Am. Rep. 760) 56
Seers et. al. v. West, (1 Murphy, 291)
123
Seibert v. Lewis, (122 U. S. 284) 14,
369
Seifert v. Brooklyn, (101 N. Y. 136)
328, 355
Seiple V. Elyobeth, (27 N. J. L. 407)
111
Selby V. Portland, (14 Oreg. 243) 79
Selden v. Jacksonville, (10 So. 457,
28 Fla. 558) 292, 329
Selleck v. Com. Council, (40 Conn.
359) 105, 381
Seller u. Phillips, (37 111. App. 74)
261
Sellers v. Corwallis, (5 Oreg. 237) 90
Selliman v. Railroad Co., (27 Gratt.
119) 191 b
Selma etc., Ex parte, (45 Ala. 696)
194 a, 377
Salma v. Perkins, (68 Ala. 145) 32,
339
Selma v. Selma Press & W. Co., (67
Ala. 430) 268
Semmes v. Columbus, (19 Ga. 471)
163
Semple v. Mayor etc., (62 Miss. 63)
92, 355
Seneca Falls v. Zalinski, (8 Hun, 571)
348
Seneca R. Co. v. Auburn etc., (5 Hill,
170) 318
Serrill v. Philadelphia, (32 Pa. St.
355) 56, 259, 276
Serrot v. Omaha, (1 Dil. C. C. li. 312)
350 a
Sessions v. Boyken, (78 Ala. 328) 360
Sessions v. Crunkleton, (20 Ohio St.
349) 259 a
Severin v. Eddy, (52 111. 189) 348
cl
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Sewall V. Sewall, (122 Mass. 156) 66
Sewall ». St. Paul, (20 Minn. 511) 92,
256, 259 a, 279, 326, 338, 347
Sewer Street, (8 Pa. Co. Ct. B. 22 i)
290
Sewickley Bor. v. Sholes, (118 Pa. St.
165) 271
Sexton 1). Chicago, (107 111. 323) 173
Sexton V. St. Joseph, (60 Mo. 153)
92
Sexton V. Zett, (44 N. T. 430) 348
Seybel ». Kat. Currency Bank, (54 N.
Y. 288) 191
Seybert ». Pittsburgh, (1 Wall. 372)
183, 254
Seymour i>. Cummins, (119 Ind. 148)
354, 355
Seymour v. Tacoma, (32 Pac. K. 1077)
150
Shackford v. Newington, (46 ST. H.
415) 139
Shauklin v. Madison Co., (21 Ohio
St. 575) 142
Shadier v. Blair, (136 Pa. St. 488) 15
Shaffer «. Welch, (34 Kans. 595) 279
Shaffner v. St. Louis, (31 Mo. 264)
240
Shanley v. Brooklyn, (30 Hun, 396)
67
Shannon v. Bruner. (36 Fed. Rep.
147) 80
Shannon v. O'Boyle (51 Ind. 565) 208
Sharp, In re, (56 N. Y. 257) 278
Sharp V. Duuavau, (17 B. Mon. 223)
56, 276
Sharp B. Johnson, (4 Hill, 92) 270,
278, 282
Sharp V. Mayor, (40 Barb. 256) 78, 92
Sharp V. Spier, (4 Hill, 76) 241, 256
Sharpless v. West Chester, (1 Grant,
Cas. 257) 245
Sharpless v. Mayor, (21 Pa. St. 147)
184
Sharon Iron Company b. Erie, (41 Pa.
St. 341) 208
Sharrett's Road, (8 Pa. St. 92) 286
Shartle v. Minneapolis, (17 Minn. 308)
223, 352 a
Shattuck 1). Woods, (1 Pick. 175) 79
Shaubut V. St. Paul etc., (21 Minn.
502) 301
Shaver ». Starrett, (4 Ohio St. 494)
245
Shaw V. Allegheny, (7 Atl. 770) 326 a
Shaw t>. Charlestown, (3 Allen, 538)
247
Shaw V. Crocker, (42 Cal. 435) 329
Shaw V. Kennedy, (Term R. 158) 155
Shaw V. Mayor etc., (21 Ga. 280, 25
Ga. 590) 372
Shaw V. Mayor, (19 Ga. 468) 85
Shaw V. Norfolk etc. Co., (5 Giay,
180) 187
Shaw 1). Pickett, (26 Vt. 486) 282
Shaw V. Pima Co., (18 Pac. E. 272)
79
Shaw V. Sun Prairie, (74 Wis. 105)
350 6
Shaw V. Trenton, (49 N. J. L. 339)
172
Shaw V. Waterbury, (46 Conn. 263)
350 6
Shawangunk Kill Br., In re, (100 N.
Y. 642) 220
Shawnee Co. v. Carter, (2 Kan. 115)
177
Shawnee Co. v. Topeka, (.39 Kan. 197.
18 Pac. 161) 314, 315, 353
Shawueetown v. Mason, (82 HI. 337)
330
Shay, In re, (15 N. Y. 488) 365
Shea i). Lowell, (8 Allen, 136) 344
Shea V. Milford, (145 Mass. 528) 99
Shea V. Ottumwa, (67 Iowa, 39) 220
Shea V. Potrero, (44 Cal. 414) 302, 321
Sheboygan v. Parker, (3 Wall. 93)67
Shed V. Hawthorne, (3 Neb. 179)
396
Sheehan v. Edgar, (58 N. Y. 631) 352 a
Sheehan v. Gleasou, (46 Mo. 100) 263
Sheehan J). Good Sam. Hosp., (50 Mo.
155) 270
Sheehy ». Jersey City, (78 Mo. 107)
330
Sheehy v. Kan. City etc. Co., (94 Mo.
574) 330
Sheel I'. Appleton, (49 Wis. 125) 330 a
Sheffield ». Andress, (56 Ind. 157)
182
Sheffield v. Watson, (3 Caines, 60)
169
Sheffield Sell. Townsp. v. Andress,
(56 Ind. 157) 165
Shehau v. Gleason, (46 Mo. 100) 113
Shelby ». Daggett, (22 N. E. R. 497)
350 6
Shelby Co. v. Deprez, (87 Ind. 509)
92, 360
Shelby Co. v. Cumberland & C. K.
R. Co., (8 Bush, 299) 12
Sheldon v. Kalamazoo, (24 Mich.
383) 92, 338
Sheldon v. W. U. T. Co., (51 Hun,
091) 352
Sheley J). Detroit, (45 Mich. 431) 264
Shell house v. State, (110 Ind. 509,
513) 219
Shelly V. St. Charles Co., (30 Fed.
Rep. 603) 375
Shelton v. Birmingham, (62 Conn.
456) 330
Shelton D. Mobile, (30 Ala. 540) 290
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
cli
Sliepard ». People, (40 Mich. 487)
120
Shepardsou v. Colerain, (13 Met. 55)
346
Sheperdson v. Gillett, (31 N. E. R.
788) 397
Shephard v. Lawrence, (141 Mass.
479) 79
Sherbourne v. Fisk, (8 Cusli. 264) 91
Sherbourne ». Tuba Co., (21 Cal. 113)
92, 325, 332
Sheridan v. Fitchburg, (131 Mass.
523) 281
Sherlock jj. Bainbridge, (41 Ind. 35)
132
Sherlock u. Winuetka, (59 111. 389)
87, 395
Sherman v. Brick, (32 Cal. 241) 234 a
Sherman c. Carr, (8 li. I. 431) 115
Sherman v. Clark, (4 Nev. 138) 359
Sherman u. Kane, (86 N. Y. 57) 220
Sherman v. Cartright, (52 Barb. 567)
342
Sherman v. Langham, (30 Ara.<S; Eng.
Cor. Cas. 539) 120
Sherman v. Langham, (13 S. W. K.
1042) 336 a
Sherman v. McKeon, (38 N. Y. 266)
224
Sherman v. Seaman, (2 Bosw. 127) 131
Sherman v. Williams, (19 S. W. R.
606) 212
Sherman v. Williams, (14 S. W. E.
130) 346
Sherrard v. Lafayette Co., (3 Dillon,
236) 196
Sherry v. Gilmore, (58 Wis. 324) 61
Sherwin v. Bugbee, (16 Vt. 439) 31,
114
Sherwood ». District, (3 Mackey, 276)
342, 350 &
Sherwood v. Hamilton, (37 U. C. Q.
B. 410) 337, 342, 351
S)ierwood ». Judd, (3 Bradf. 167) 60
Sherwood v. Judge, (41 N. W. 234,
40 Minn. 22) 354
Shields v. Justices, (2 Colo. 60) 279
Shillito V. Thompson, (L. K. 1 Q. B.
Dw. 12) 127
Shinkle v. Covington, (1 Buch. 617)
336 a, 396
Shipman v. Fifty Asso., (106 Mass.
194) 348
Shipman v. Forbes, (32 Pac. R. 599)
283
Shiras ». OUinger, (50 Iowa, 571) 120
Shirk V. Pulaski, (4 Dill. 209) 177
Shirley v. Lunenberg, (11 Mass. 379)
104
Shirts ». Noblesville, (24 N. E. E. 169,
122 Ind. 580) 177
Shoalwater v. Armstrong, (9 Humph.
217) 267
Shoemaker ». Egerton, (18 L. Times,
N. S. 389) 317
Shoemaker v. Goshen, (14 Ohio St.
569) 195, 196
Shoemaker b. Grant Co., (36 Ind. 175)
326 a
Short, In re, (47 Kan. 250) 29
Short V. Roch. etc. Co., (8 Atl. R. 596)
246
Shotwell ». Moore, (45 Ohio St. 632,
16 N. E. R. 470) 258, 261
Shrader, In re, (33 Cal. 279) 118
Shreveport ». Dremie, (6 So. R. 656)
218, 219, 220
Shreveport v. Koos, (35 La. An. 1010)
122
Shreveport ». Walpole, (22 La. An.
526) 312
Shrewsbury v. Brown, (25 Vt. 197)
164
Shrewsbury v. Smith, (12 Cush. 177)
353
Shroder v>. City Council, (2 Const. R.
726) 102, 104
Shuman v. City of Ft. Wayne, (26 ]Sr.
E. Rep. 560, 124
ShurtlefE v. Wisoasset, (74 Me. 130)
196
Shuter v. Philadelphia, (3 Phila. 228)
336 a
Sic, In re, (73 Cal. 142) 104, 117
Sidener v. Norristown etc. Co., (23
Ind. 623) 396
Sidway v. Com'rs, (120 111. 456) 79
Siebert v. Boston, (31 N. E. 734, 139
Mass. 313) 344
Siebert v. Lewis, (122 U. S. 284) 194
Siefert v. Brooklyn, (101 N. Y. 136)
329
Siez-ra ». Dona Ana, (21 Pac. R. 83)
60
Sikes V. Hatfield, (13 Gray, 347) 167
Sikes V. Ransom, (6 Johnson, 279)
359
Sill V. Corning, (15 N. Y. 297) 59, 67
Silliman v. Hudson Riv. B Co., (4
Blatchf. 74) 391
Silliman v. Wing, (7 Hill, 159) 326 a
Silsby V. Dunville, (8 Ont. App. 524)
164
Silsby Mfg. Co. v. AUentown, (26
Atl. R. 646) 171
Silver v. Tobin, (28 Fed. 545) 133
Silver Lake Bk. v. North, (4 Johns.
Ch. 373) 161
Silverthorne v. Warren R. R., (33 N.
J. L. 372) 360
Simeon Leland in Bankruptcy, (6
Ben. 175) 190
clii
TABLE OF .CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Simmer v. St. Paul, (23 Minn. 408)
325, 349
Simmons v. Camden, (26 Ark. 276)
292
Simmons v. Cornell, (1 K. I. 519) 312
Simmons v. Gardner, (6 K. I. 255)
279
Simmons v. State, (12 Mo. 268) 123,
261
Simmons v. Toledo, (5 OMo Cir. Ct.
E. 124) 395
Simmons u. Winters, (26 Pao. K. 7)
354
Simmonds, Ex parte, (16 Q. B. Div.
' 308)327
Simmonds ». Holmes, (23 Atl. Kep.
702) 129
Simons v. Camden, (26 Ark. 276) 329
Simploti). Chicago etc., (16Fed. Kep.
350) 303, 312
Simpson v. Kansas City, (20 S. W.
R. 38) 232
Simpson ». Mecklinburg Co., (84 N.
C. 158) 189
Simpson v. Savings Rank, (56 N. H.
466) 194
Sims V. Butler Co., (49 Ala. 110) 339
Sims V. Estate Co., (14 L. T. N. S.
• 55) 131
Sims V. Frankfort, (79 Ind. 446) 312
Singer, Appeal of, (18 Atl. Rep. 931)
53
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Elizabeth, (42 N.
J. L. 249) 192
Singer M. Co. v. Wright, (33 Fed. R.
121) 259
Singleton v. East. Counties R. R., (7
C. B. N. S. 287) 337
Singleton v. School District, (10 S.
W. E. 793) 217
Sinnott ». Ry. Co., (50 N. W. R. 1097)
302
Sinton 13. Ashbury, (41 Cal. 525) 240,
301
Sinton v. Carter Co., (23 Fed. Rep.
535) 2
Sioux C. & R. R. R. Co. v. Stout, (17
Wall. 657) 352
Sioux City R. R. Co. v. Sioux City,
(43 N. W. 224) 12
Sioux Co. V. Osceola Co., (45 Iowa,
168) 190
Sipe V. Murphy, (31 N. E. R. 884)
150
Sirocco V. Geary, (3 Cal. 69) 239
Sisto Li Protti, Ex parte, (68 Cal.
635) 124
Sixthar R. R. Co. v. Kerr, (72 N. Y.
330) 10
Skate V. Harris, (89 Ind. 363) 338
Skeen v. Lynch, (1 Rob. 186) 217
Skinner v. Harrison, (18 Jf. E. K.
529) 203
Skinner v. Hartford Bridge Co., (2!»
Conn. 523) 239, 292
Skinner v. Henderson, (7 So. R. 464)
315
Skinner v. Hutton, (33 Mo. 347) 62,
260
Skjeggerud v. Minn. etc. Co., (33
Minn. 56) 352
Slack V. Lawrence, (19 Atl. R. 663)
355
Slack V. W. R. R. Co., (13 B. Mon.
13) 184
Slackhouse v. Lafayette, (26 Ind. 17)
342
Slater v. Wood, (9 Bosw. 1) 87
Slatten v. Des Moines etc. Co., (29
Iowa, 148) 302
Slattery, In re, (3 Ark. 484) 102
Slaughter's Case, (13 Gratt. 767) 258
Slaughter v. People, (2 Doug. 334)-
102
Slee V. Bloom, (5 Johns. Ch. 366) 81
Sleeper v. BuUen, (6 Kans. 300) 397
Slessraau v. Crozier, (80 Ind. 487) 155
Sloan V. Beebe, (24 Kan. 343) 281
Sloan V. Pac. R. R. Co., (61 Mo. 24)
136
Sloan V. State, (8 Blackf. 361) 2, 32
Sloane v. McConahy, (4 Ohio, 157)
204
Sloane v. Peo. El. Ry. Co., (7 Ohio
Cir. Ct. R. 84) 303
Snell, In re, (30 N. C. Q. B. 81) 127,
154
Snell V. Belleville, (30 U. C. Q. B. 81)
299
Snell V. Insurance Co., (98 U. S. 85)
327
Snider v. St. Paul, (53 N. W. R. 763)
324
Snook V. Georgia Co., (9 S. E. K.
1104) 2
Snow V. Adams, (1 Cush. 443) 342
Snow V. Fitchburg, (136 Mass. 183)
277
SnowB. Housatonic R. R. Co., (8 Al-
len, 441) 352
Snyder v. Cabell, (29 W. Va. 48) 120
Snyder v Crossan, (50 IS". W. 678) 258
Snyder v. Foster, (77 Iowa, 638) 314
Snyder v. North Lawrence, (8 Kans.
82) 124, 144
Snyder v. Pa. R. R. Co., (55 Pa. St.
340) 303
Snyder v. President, (6 Ind. 237) 292
Snyder v. Rockport, (6 Ind. 237) 133,
329
Snyder v. St. Paul, (53 N. W. R.763)
324
tABLE OF CASES CITED.
eliii
References are to Sections.
Small !). Danville, (51 Me. 359) 9,
338 a
Smalley v. Blackburn Ry. Co., (2 II.
& N. 158) 243
Smalley v. Burlington, (63 Vt. 443)
270, 273
Smalley v. Yates, (36 Kan. 519) 360
Sniallyt). Appleton, (43 N. W. R. 826)
350 b
Smeltzer v. White, (92 U. S. 390) 51,
179
Smith, In re, (52 N. T. 526) 148, 264
Smith V. Aberdeen, (25 Miss. 458)
248, 254, 259 a
Smith I). Adrian, (1 Mich. 495) 67
Smith V. Albany, (61 N. T. 444) 166
Smith V. Alexandria, (33 Gratt. 208)
329
Smith V. Atlanta, (75 Ga. 110) 355
Smith V. Barrett, (1 Siderf. 162) 208
Smith V. Board of Carlton Co., (46
• Fed. 340) 325
Smith V. Bourbon Co., (127 U. S. 105)
359
Smith V. Brown, (59 Cal. 672) 83
Smith 1). Gen. etc. T. Co., (2 Ohio
Giro. Ct. 259) 297
Smith V. Cheshire, (13 Gray, 308) 114,
177
Smith V. Clark Co., (.54 Mo. 58) 189,
196, 254
Smith V. Croukhite, (8 Ind. 134) 72
Smith 0. Dedham, (144 Mass. 177)
189 a
Smith V. Deweese, (41 Tex. 594) 87
Smith V. Dyer, (1 Cull. 562) 86
Smith B. Dygert, (12 Barb. 613) 321
Smith B. Elliott, (9 Pa. St. 345) 120
Smith B. Engle, (44 la. 265) 279
Smith B. Flora, (64 111. 93) 217
Smith V. Floyd Co., (85 6a. 420) 246
Smith V. Gardner, (12 Oreg. 221) 220
Smith B. Gates, (21 Pick. 55) 129
Smith B. Gould, (61 Wis. 31) 355
Smith V. Heath, (102 111. 130) 218
Smith B. Helmer, (7 Barb. 416) 28
Smith V. Heuston, (6 Ohio, 101) 226
Smith 1). Huntington, (3 N. H. 76)
129
Smith B. Inge, (80 Ala. 283) 220
Smith V. Kernochen, (7 How. 198) 34
Smith B. Knoxville, (3 Head, 245)
150
Smith 0. Labare, (15 Pac. E. 577, 37
Kan. 480) 246
Smith B. Law, (21 N. Y. 296) 97
Smith V. Lawrence, (12 Mich. 431)
108, 310
Smith V. Lawrence, (49 N. W. 7) 360
Smith I). Leavenworth, (15 Kan. 81)
336 a
Smith V. Leavenworth, (15 Kan. 81)
350 6
Smith B. Lock, (18 Mich. 56) 221
Smith V. Madison, (7 Ind. 86) 124
Smith V. Magourich, (44 Ga. 163) 395
Smith V. Margrave, (2 App. Cases,
781, 43 L. J. Ex. 70) 353
Smith B. Mayor, (88 Tenn. 464) 144 a
Smith B. Mayor, (66 N. Y. 295) 336 a
Smith B. Mayor, (67 Barb. 223) 67
Smith V. Mayor, (21 How. Pr. 1) 172
Smith V. Mayor, (10 IST. Y. 504) 173
Smith V. Mayor, (13 Cal. 531) 176
Smith V. Mayor etc. of Saginaw, (45
N". W. Rep. 964) 55, 56, 58, 61
Smith B. Metro, etc. Co., (12 How.
Pr. 187) 295
Smith V. McCarthy, (56 Pa. St. 359)
24, 55
Smith B. McNair, (19 Kan. 330) 191 6
Smith V. Milwaukee, (18 Wis. 63)
265, 354 a
Smith c. Moore, (90 Ind. 294) 67, 78
Smith B. Morse, (2 Cal. 524) 113
Smith B. Navasota, (72 Tex. 422) 217,
220. 396
Smith V. New York, (4 N. Y. S. 449)
283
Smith V. New York, (37 N. Y. 518)
67, 79, 85
Smith I). New York, (66 N. Y. 295)
850 a, 354, 354 a
Smith V. Newbern, (70 N. C. 14) 110
Smith V. Newburgh, (77 N. Y. 130)
77, 1.65
Smith V. Oconomowoc, (49 Wis. 694)
391
Smith V. People, (29 N. E. E. 676) 8
Smith V. Philadelphia, (13 Phila. 177)
142
Smith V. Philadelphia, (81 Pa. St. 38)
336 a
Smith B. Phillips, (8 Phila. 10) 120
Smith V. Portland, (30 Fed. Rep. 734)
221
Smith V. Rah way, (33 N. J. L. Ill)
361
Smith V. Railroad, (67 III. 191) 360
Smith V. Readiield, (27 Me. 145) 326 a
Smith B. Rochester, (76 N. Y. 506) 92,
335, 338
Smith V. Rome, (19 Ga. 89) 293
Smith B. Ryan, (8 N. Y. S. 853) 348
Smith 0. San Antonio, (17 Tex. 643)
104
Smith B. Seeley, (12 Wall. 35) 207
Smith u. Sherrv, (54 Wis. 114) 56, 61
Smith ». Sherwood, (62 Mich. 159)
.3506
Smith V. Short, (40 Ala. 385) 258
Smith B. Skagit Co., (45 Fed. R. 725) 54
cliv
TABLE OF CASKS CITED.
References are to Sections.
Smith B. Smith, (3 Desaus. 557) 37
Smith V. Smith (2 Pick. 621) 352
Smith V. Smith, (1 Bailey, 70) 79
Smith 1-. St. Joseph, (42 Mo. App.
392) 350 6
Smith V. State, (23 N. J. L. 712) 219,
220, 300
Smith V. Stephan, (66 Md. 381) 163
Smith V. Tallahassee Bi-anch of Cen-
tral Planks Koad Co., (30 Ala. 650)
47, 48, 49
Smith V. Tallapoosa Co., (2 Woods,
574) 195
Smith V. Tecumseh JSTat. Bk., (17
Mich. 479) 326
Smith u. Toledo, (24 Ohio St. 126) 326
Smith V. Warden, (19 Pa. St. 426) 250
Smith V. Washington (20 How. 135)
113, 239
Smith V. Wencell, (7 Cush. 498) 346
Smith V. Wheeler, (58 Iowa, 659) 327
Smith V. Wildes, (143 Mass. 556) 352
Smith V. Wilmington, (98 N. C. 343)
189
Smith V. Whitney, (116 U. S. 167) 401
Smoot V. Wetumpka, (24 Ala. 121) 32
Smyth i;. Bangor, (72 Me. 249) 344
Society v. Diers, (10 Abb. Pr. K. S.
216) 124
Society v. Van Dyke, (2 Whart. 309)
84
Society etc. v. Com., (52 Pa. St. 125)
368
Society etc. v. Town of Pawlet, (4
Pet. 480) 25, 31, 32
Society etc. v. Young, (2 N. fi. 310)
48
Society for Sav. v. New London, (29
Conn. 174) 189, 193, 196
Society of Savings o. Conite, (6 Wall.
594) 258
Boilers v. Sollers, (26 Atl. 188) 312
Solomon, Ex parte, (91 Cal. 440) 150
Solomon v. Fleming, (51 N. W. K.
304) 395
Solomon v. Hughes, (24 Kan. 211)
32,98
Solomon v. Osceola, (43 N. W. K.
990, 77 Mich. 365) 325
Solon J). Williamsburg Sav. Bk., (112
N". T. 122) 192 b
Solon V. Williamsburg Bk., (114 N.
T. 122) 51
Somerville v. Dickerman, (127 Mass.
272) 245
Somerville & E. R. R. Co. v. Dough-
ty, (22 N. J. L. 495) 246
Sommers v. Johnson, (4 Vt. .278, 24
Am. Dec. 604) 194
Soon Hing v. Crowley, (118 U. S.
703) 121
Soper V. Henry Co., (26 Iowa, 264)
325, 339, 349
Soulard v. St. Louis, (36 Mo. 546) 338
Soule V. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., (24
Conn. 575) 352 a
Soule V. Gr. Tr. Ry. Co., (21 Up. Can.
C. P. 308) 342
South Bend v. Gushing, (24 N. E. R,
114) 267
South Bend v. Notre Dame Univ.,
69 Ind. 344) 270
So. Brooklyn R. R. & T. Co., In re,
(50 Hun, 405) 305
So. Car. R. R. Co. v. Steiner, (44 Ga.
546) 302
So. Cov. etc. Ry. Co. v. Berry, (18 S.
W. Rep. 1026) 136
Southerland v. Goldsborough, (96 N.
C. 49) 189
Southern etc. Co. v. Towner, (26 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 667) 185
Southgate v. Covington, (15 B. Men.
491) 276
Southampton v. Mecox Co., (116 N.
Y. 1) 11
Southampton etc. Co. v. Local Board,
(8 El. & Bl. 812) 324
South Hampton v. Fowler, (52 N. H.
225) 67
Southingtou First Cong. Soc. v. At-
water, (23 Conn. 34) 204
South Wash. etc. Co. v. Morrow, (11
S. W. R. 348) 274
South Newmarket Methodist Semi-
nary Trustees v. Peaslee, (15 N. H.
317) 204
South Pac. etc. Co. v. Reed, (41 Cal.
256) 302
South Park Com'rs v. Williams, (51
111. 57) 234
South wark etc. v. Phila., (47 Pa. St.
314) 301
Soutliwell V. Detroit, (42 N. W. 118)
349
Southwestern R. R. Co. v. Southern
etc. T. Co., (46 Ga. 43, 12 Am. Rep.
585) 297
Southworth v. Railroad Co., (2 Mich.
287) 28
South Yorkshire Ry. Co. v. Great
Northern Ry. Co., (9 Ex. 55) 51
Soutler V. Madison, (15 Wis. 30) 14
Sower V. Philadelphia, (35 Pa. St.
231) 243
Sowles V. Soule, (59 Vt. 131) 326 a
Spaight V. McGovern, (16 R. I. 658)
129
Spain, In re, (47 Fed. R. 208) 258
Spalding ». Hill, (7 S. W. R. 27) 261
Spalding v. Lowell, (23 Pick. 71) HO,
169
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
clv
References are to Sections.
Spangler «. Jacoby, (14 111. 297) 98
Spanish Fork City v. Mortensen, (24
Pao. E. 620) 123
Sparhawk d. Salem, (1 Mass. 30) 343
Spaulding v. Andover, (54 N. H. 38)
12
Spaulding v. Peabody, (26 N. E. Rep.
144 a
Spears v. Mayor, ("72 N. Y. 442) 111
Specht V. Detroit, (20 Mich. 168) 241
Speed V. Cooke, (57 Ala. 209) 365
Speed V. Crawford, (3 Met. 207) 18
Speer v. School Directors of Blaii'-
ville, (50 Pa. St. 150) 138, 254"
Speers v. Athens, (85 Ga. 49) 255,
259 a
Spencer v. Hartford etc. Co., (10 R.
I. 14) 353
Spencer v. Merchant, (125 U. S. 345)
279
Spencer v. People, (68 111. 510) 254
Spengler v. Trowbridge, (62 Mass.
46) 110
Sperry v. AUina, (17 Or. 481) 393
Sperry v. Harr, (32 Iowa, 184) 139
Spiceland v. Allier, (98 Ind. 467) 350
Spicer v. Chicago etc. Co., (29 Wis.
580) 352 a
Spicer v. County Com'rs, (126 Ind.
369) 325
Spiegel u. Gausberg, (44 Ind. 418) 287,
309
Spier, In re, (115 N. T. 380) 315
Spier, In re, (3 N. T. S. 438) 54
Spilman v. Parkersburg, (14 S. E. E.
279, 35 W. Va. 605) 192
Spirit Aph. v. Randolph, (58 Vt. 192)
360
Spitler 1). Young, (63 Mo. 42) 155
Spitzer v. Blanchard, (46 K W. R.
400, 82 Mich. 234) 165
Spokane Ry. Co. v. City of Spokane,
(5 Wash. St. 634) 290, 294
Spoouer v. Holmes, (102 Mass. 503)
190, 191
Sprague v. Norway, (31 Cal. 173) 65
Sprague v. Worcester, (13 Gray, 193)
239, 329, 354
Spray v. Thompson, (9 Iowa, 40) 249
Spring V. Hyde Park, (137 Mass. 554)
92
Spring V. Russell, (3 Watts, 294) 232,
254
Springer v. Bowdoinham, (7 Me. 442)
342, 350 i
Springer v. Clay Co., (35 Iowa, 243)
51
Springfield v. Com'rs, (10 Pick. 59)
868
Springfield v. Conn. River R. R. Co.,
(4 Cush. 71) 302, 314
Springfield v. Edwards, (84 111. 626)
189 a
Springfield v. Fullmer, (27 Pac. Rep.
577) 119,144 a
Springfield v. Green, (120 111. 269)
259 a, 287
Springfield v. Hampden, (10 Pick.
59) 368
Springfield v. Le Claire, (49 111. 47)
3506
Springfield v. Spence, (40 Ohio St.
665) 354 a
Springfield v. Walker, (42 Ohio St.
543) 142
Springfield etc. v. Hall, (98 111. 371) 87
Spring, etc. Co. v. Drinkhouse, (92
Cal. 528) 232
Springfield Co. v. Lane Co., (5 Oreg.
265) 170
Springport v. Teutonia Sav. Bk., (84
N. Y. 403) 189
Spr. Val. etc. v. Ashbury, (52 Cal.
126) 87
Spring Val. etc. Co. v. Drinkhouse,
(28 Pac. R. 681, 92 Cal. 528) 238
Spring Valley Water Works v. San
Mateo Water Works, (64 Cal. 123)
234
Springwells v. Wayne Co. Treasurer,
(58 Mich. 240) 57
Sproul V. Lawrence, (33 Ala. 674) 72
Squire v. Cartwright, (22 N. Y. S.
899) 171
Squires v. Chillicothe, (89 Mo. 226)
350 a, 350 f)
Staates v. Washington, (45 N. J. L.
318) 97
Stacy V. Vt. Cent. R. R. Co., (27 Vt.
39) 232
Stadler v. Detroit, (13 Mich. 346) 85
Stadler v. Roth, (59 Mo. 400) 106
Stafford v. Albany, (7 Johns. 541) 242
Stafford v. Osftaloosa, (64 Iowa, 251)
352 a
Stafford v. Providence, (10 R. I. 567)
246
Staffordsliire v. Prop'rs etc. Law
Rep., (1 E. & I. Appeals, 254) 312
Stahl V. Brown, (84 Ky. 324) 394
Stainton v. Metro. Board of Works,
(23 Beav. 225) 355
Stanchfield v. Newton, (142 Mass.
110)354, 354 a
Staudiford, In re, (5 Mackey, 549) 148
Stanfield v. State, (18 S. W. R. 577)
18,79
Stanford v. Worn, (27 Cal. 171) 232
Stanley v. Davenport, (54 Iowa, 463)
304, 338, 342
Stanton v. A. & C. R. R. Co., (2
Woods C. C. 523) 190
clvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Stanton v. Camp, (4 Barb. 274) 167
Stanton v. Springfield, (12 Allen, 566)
344 351
Staple V. Spring, (10 Mass. 72) 248
Starin v. Genoa, (23 N. T. 454) 183
Stark V. Portsmouth, (52 N. H. 221)
343
Starkey v. Minneapolis, (19 Minn.
203) 104
Starr v. Burlington, (45 Iowa, 87)
147, 265
Starr v. Camden & Atlantic R. E. Co.,
(24 N. Y. 592) 302
Starr v. Trustees, (6 "Wend. 564) 105
Starr D.Wilm. Counc, (3Har. 294) 90
State V. Adams, (19 Nev. 370) 365
State V. Adams, (90 Tenn. 722) 18
State V. Addison, (2 S. C. 499) 270
State V. Adkins, (42 Kan. 203) 216,
219
State V. 2Etna L. Ins. Co., (117 Ind.
251) 283
State V. Allen, (21 Ind. 516) 86
State V. Alt. (26 Mo. App. 673) 83
State V. Anderson, (8 Baxt. 249) 364
State V. Anderson, (18 Atl. K. 584)
375
State V. Anderson, (45 Ohio St. 196)
67, 378, 380
SUie 13. Andr., (36 Mo. 70) 371
State V. Anwerda, (40 Iowa, 151) 120
State V. Appleby, (25 S. C. 100) 365
State V. Archibald, (43 Mmn. 328) 363
State V. Atkinson, (107 K C. 317) 2
State V. Atkinson, (24 Vt. 448) 203,
300
State B. Atlantic City, (5 N. J. L. 99)
319
State D. Atlantic C. C, (34 N. J. L.
99) 113, 148, 259 a, 302
State V. Auditor, (36 Mo. 70) 371
State V. Axtell, (41 K. J. L. 117) 270
State V. Babcock, (19 Neb. 230) 184,
1916
State V. Babcock, (31 K. W. R. 8, 20
Neb. 522) 190
State 1). Babcock, (22 Neb. 614) 182
State V. Babcock, (24 Neb. 640) 189 a
State V. Babcock, (25 Neb. 709) 8, 24
State V. Babcock, (41 N. W. R. 654,
25 Neb. 709) 24
State 1). Bacon, (6 Neb. 286) 373
State V. Baily, (7 Iowa, 390) 363, 365,
368, 371
State V. Baird, (15 S. W. R. 98, 79
Tex. 63) 56
State V. Baker, (10 So. R. 405) 158
State V. Ball, (59 Mo. 321) 120
State V. Bank, (2 Houst. 99) 270
State V. Barbour, (53 Conn. 76) 65,
75. 95
State V. Barksdale, (5 Humph. 154)
400
State V. Barlow, (48 Mo. 17) 172
State V. Barnes, (33 Pac. R. 621) 72
State V. Barton, (36 Minn. 145) 311
State V. Baton Rouge, (34 La. An.
1197) 362
State V. Bayonne, (35 N. J. L. 335)
145
State V. Bavonne, (22 Atl. R. 1006) 63
State ». Bayonne, (26 Atl. R. 81) 139
State V. Bean, (91 N. C. 554) 121
State B. Beaufort, (17 S. E. E. 355)
254
State V. Becker, (31 N. W. R. 1018) 18
State V. Bell, (5 Port. 365) 120
State V. Bell, (45 N. W. R. 615, 43
Minn. 344) 270
State V. Bell, (34 Ohio St. 194) 113
State V. Benedict, (15 Minn. 198) 18
State V. Berdetta,' (73 Ind. 185, 193)
300
State V. Bergen, (33 N. J. L. 39) 148
State V. Berry, (12 Iowa, 58) 278
State V. Bill, (13 Ired. L. 373) 400
State ». Binder, (38 Mo. 350) 9a, 146
State V. Blanchard, (6 La. Ann. 572)
69
State 1). Bloxham, (7 So. Rep. 873) 79
State V. Board, (20 Atl. R. 755) 364
State V. Board, (18 Atl. Rep. 571) 371)
State V. Board, (80 Ind. 478) 313
State 13. Board, (51 N. J. L. 240) 67
State 13. Board etc., (26 Ohio St. 24) 83
State 13. Board etc., (27 Ohio St. 96)
375
State 13. Board, (42 Ohio St. 374) 173
State 13. Board, (25 Pac. R. 440) 359
State V. Board, (Heirs 13. Newark) (6
Atl. R. 659, 49 N. J. L. 170) 84
State 13. Board etc. of Atchison Co.,
(24 Pac. Rep. 87) 57
State 13. Board of Canvassers, (13 Fla.
55) 368
State 13. Boden, (16 Atl. Rep. 58) 371
State 1). Bogard, (27 IJ. E. R. 1113) 18
State V. Boise, (2 Fairf. 474) 167
State 13. Bonnell, (21 N. E. Rep. 1101)
155
State 13. Botkin, (71 Iowa, 87) 122
State V. Boyd. (19 Nev. 356) 79
State 13. Bradbury, (40 Me. 154) 223
State 13. Bramwell, (18 Pac. R. 952)
316
State 13. Brandt, (41 Iowa, 493) 67
State 13. Branin, (3 Zabr. 484) 2, 33
State 13. Brewer, (59 Ala. 130) 79
State 13. Briggs, (15 R. I. 425, 7 Atl.
404) 263
St. Louis etc. v. BeUville, (122 III
376) 287
TABLE OF CASKS CITED.
clvii
Eeferences are to Sections.
State V. Bright, (38 La. An. 1) 154
State V. Brinkerhoff, (66 Tex. 45) 86
State V. Britain, (89 N. C. 574) 117,
150
State V. Brown, (109 N. C. 802) 299,
300
State V. Brown, (53 N. J. L. 162, 20
Atl. 772) 276
State J). Brown, (31 N. J. L. 356) 385
State V. Brown, (27 N. J. L. 18) 200
State V. Bi-own, (5 K. I. 1) 86
State V. Bryoe, (7 Ohio, pt. 2, 82) 83,
84, 361
State V. Bryson, (44 Ohio St. 457) 75
State !). BuHalo, (6 Neb. 455) 375
State V. Burbank, (22 La. An. 318)
375
State V. Burlington, (36 Vt. 521) 400
State V. Burlington, (45 Iowa, 87) 278
State V. Butler, (8 S. W. K. 586) 270
State !). Butz, (9 S. C. 156) 86
State V. Cahaba Co., (30 Ala. 66) 384
State V. Cainan, (94 N. C. 880) 158
State V. Camden, (35 N. J. L. 217) 378
State V. Camden, (19 Atl. Rep. 539)
158
State V. Campton, (2 N. H. 513) 315,
353
State V. Canavan, (30 Pac. K. 1079,
17 Nev. 422) 18
State V. Canterbury, (12 Ark. 321) 23
State V. Canterbury, (8 Fost. 195)
54, 313, 316
State V. Cantieny, (34 Minn. 1) 154
State V. Cape Girardeau Co. (19 S.
W. E. 23) 860
State w. Carbondale, (29 Iowa, 254)
385
State V. Cardoza, (5 C. 297) 365
State ». Carney, (3 Kan. 88) 371
State V. Carpenter, (22 Atl. K. 497,
60 Conn. 97) 104, 158
State V. Carr, (28 N. E. R. 88) 79
State V. Carroll, (38 Conn. 471) 79,
85
State ». Carroll, (24 Atl. R. 106) 65
State V. Carson, (33 Pao. R. 428) 267
State V. Carver, (S Strob. 217) 223
State i). Cassidy, (22 Minn. 312) 123,
258
State V. Catlin, (3 Vt. 530) 217, 219
State V. Central Pac. R. R. Co., (9
Nev. 79) 269
State V. Central Pac. R. E. Co., (10
Nev. 47) 269
State V. Chamberlain, (24 Atl. E. 479)
270
State V. Chamber of Com., (20 Wis.
63)91
State V. Chapman, (44 Conn. 495) 76,
State V. Charles, (16 Minn. 474) 117
State V. Charleston, (12 Rich. 702)
293
State V. Charleston, (2SpeersL. 719)
261, 267, 272
State V. Charleston Com., (1 Mill,
Const. R. 36) 385
State 1). Charleston Coun. , (10 Rich.
L. 240) 258
State V. Charleston Council, (5 Rich.
L. 501) 267
State V. Chatburn, (63 Iowa, 659) 83
State V. Christ Ch. P. R. Com'rs, (1
Mill, Const. 55) 401
State V. Cincinnati, (20 Ohio St. 18) 27
State V. Cin. G. & G. Co., (18 Ohio
St. 262) 144, 149, 295, 296, 300, 305
State ». Cities, (26 N. E. E. 1052) 365
State !). City, (22 Atl. R. 1052) 243
State V. City Clerk, (7 Ohio St. 355)
161
State V. City Council, (4 Rich. Law,
286) 133
State !). City of Elizabeth, (24 Atl.
495) 308
State V. Clark, (1 Dutch. 54) 33, 117
State V. Clark, (3 Kev. 566) 86
State 0. Clark, (28 IST. H. 176) 153
State V. Clarke, (54 Mo. 17) 117, 158
State V. Clay Co., (46 Mo. 231) 375
State 0. Clayton, (34 Mo. App. 563)
373
State V. Clegg, (27 Conn. 593) 104
State V. Cleveland, (3 R. I. 117) 154
State V. Clinton, (8 Atl. 296) 271
State V. Clinton Comrs., (6 Ohio St.
280, 287,) 364
State V. Cobb, (64 Ala. 127) 195 d
State V. Cockrell, (2 Rich. 6) 249, 398
State V. Collins, (17 Atl. Rep. 131) 300
State V. Columbia, (16 S. C. 412) 401
State V, Commissioners, (37 Ohio St.
526) 195 d
State V. Com'rs, (13 Neb. 57) 173
State V. Com'rs, (6 Ohio St. 280) 364
State V. Com'rs of Duval Co., (23
Pla. 483) 28, 288
State V. Common Council, (6 Atl. R.
578, 49 N. J. L. 177) 83
State V. Com. Council, (55 N. W. R.
118) 84
State V. Compton, (2 N. H. 513) 313
State V. Conlin, (27 Vt. 318) 104
State V. Cook, (57 111. 205) 79
State V. Cooke, (54 Tex. 482) 82
State V. Cooper, (101 N. C. 684) 47,
48
State V. Copeland, (3 R. I. 33) 263
State V. Cornwall, (27 Ind. 62) 129
State V. Con-igan etc. Co., (85 Mo-
263) 144, 302
ijlviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Keferences are to Sections.
State ». County Court, (50 Mo. 317)
26
State V. County Co., (11 S. E. R. 72,
33 W. Va. 589) 316
State V. County Jud., (5 Iowa, 380)
360
State V. Co. Jud., (7 Iowa, 186) 371
State V. Covington, (29 Ohio St. 102)
18
State V. Cowan, (29 Mo. 330) 117, 118
State V. Crawford, (36 N. J. L. 394)
265
Smith V. Croom, (7 Fla. 81) 66
State V. Crow, (20 Ark. 209) 18
State V. Crummey, (17 Minn. 72) 117
State V. Culver, (65 Mo. 607) 310
State V. Cummings, (17 Neb. 311) 371
State V. Curry, (33 K. E. R. 685) 76
State 13. Cutes, (26 N.~E. R. 1052) 364
State ». Davenport, (12 Iowa, 335)
364
State V. Daviess Co., (64 Mo. 30) 186
State V. Davis, (48 N. J. L. 112) 399
State V. Davis, (44 Mo. 129) 67
State V. Davis Co., (64 Mo. 30) 185
State V. Dayton etc., (10 Nev. 155)
318
State V. Debar, (58 Mo. 395) 117
State V. Debnam, (98 N. C. 712) 134
State v.. Debuclet, (23 La. An. 267)
177
State V. Decasinova, (1 Tex. 401) 66
State V. De Gress, (53 Tex. 387) 74,
86
State V. Delesdenier, (7 Tex. 76) 5
State B. Deliesseline, (1 McCord, 52)
99, 378
State V. Demaree, (80 lud. 519) 313,
353, 362, 377
State V. Denny, (29 Pac. R. 991) 2, 18
State V. Derbes, (11 La. An. 50) 75
State V. Dillon, (125 Ind. 65) 75
State B. Directors etc., (5 Ohio St.
234) 173
State B. District Court, (41 Minn. 42)
398
State V. Dodge Co., (56 Wis. 70) 399
State V. Doherty, (25 La. An. 119) 83
State B. Doherty, (29 Pac. Rep. 855)
125
State v. Donnelly, (20 Nev. 214) 260 a
State B. Douglas, (10 Oreg. 185) 79, 320
State B. Dover, (10 N. H. 394) 400
State V. Dowling, (50 Mo. 134) 398
State B. Draper, (45 Mo. 355) 86
State B. Duff, (49 N. W. R. 23) 318
State V. Dugan, (19 S. W. R. 195) 24
State B. Earle, (42 N. J. L. 94) 375
State B. Earnhart, (107 N. C. 789 )120
State V. Eastman, (109 N. C. 785) 300
State V. E. St. Louis, (85 111. 377) 301
State B. Eau Claire, (40 Wis. 533) 314
State B. Eddy, (25 Pac. R. 1032) 359,
363
State B. Elizabeth, (17 Atl. R. 91) 279
State B. Elizabeth, (26 Atl. R. 939)
290
State V. Elizabeth, (30 N. J. L. 365)
291
State B. Elizabeth, (37 K. J. 432) 143,
221
State V. Elizabeth, (50 N. J. L. 347)
398
State B. Elizabeth, Treas., (42 N. J.
L. 79, 42 N. J. L. 94) 375
State B. Elkington, (30 jST. J. L. 335)
368, 370
State B. EUwood, (11 Wis. 17) 368
State V. Elvins, (32 N. J. L. 362) 28
State B. Endom, (23 La. An. 663) 259
State B. Engelman, (106 Mo. 628) 243
State B. Engle, (26 N. E. R. 1077) 359,
363
State B. Essex Co., (23 N. J. L. 214)
362, 377
State B. Estabrook, (6 Ala. 653) 125,
255
State B. Evans, (33 S. C. 184) 5
State B. Fagan, (42 Conn. 32) 81
State B. Falconer, (44 Ala. 696) 363
State V. Faribald, (11 So. R. 36) 113
State B. Farr, (47 N. J. L. 208) 96
State B. Feibleman, (28 Ark. 424) 86
State B. Ferguson, (31 N. J. L. 120)
77, 78, 86
State V. Field, (17 Mo. 529) 18
State B. Field, (37 Mo. App. 83) 369,
373
State B. Findlay, (10 Ohio, 51) 72
State B. Finn, (98 Mo. 532) 72
State B. Fiske, (9 R. L 94) 113
State B. Fitts, (49 Ala. 402) 86
State ». Fitzgerald, (44 Mo. 425) 105,
381
state B. Flannagan, (67 Ind. 140) 318
State B. Flood, (26 Mo. Ap. 500) 171
State B. Fond du Lac, (42 Wis. 298)
241
State B. Forest Co., (43 N". W. R. 551)
8
State B. Forest Co., (74 Wis. 610)55
State B. Foster, (2 Hulst. 101) 98
State B. Fournet, (13 So. R. 185) 401
State B. Francis, (95 Mo. 44) 362
State B. Franklin, (40 Kan. 410) 62
State B. Frazier, (98 Mo. 426) 361, 379
State B. Freeman, (38 N. H. 426) 122,
134
State B. Freeport, (43 Me. 198) 314
State B. French, (14 S. E. R. 383, 109
N. C. 722) 258
State B. Frost, (4 Harring. 558) 06
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
clix
Kelerences are to Sections.
State V. Fuller, (34 N. J. 227) 21,
259 a, 319
State V. Fuller, (9 S. W. K. 583) 29,
31
State V. Fulmer, (27 Pac. R. 577) 201
State V. Funk, (17 Iowa, 365) 105
State V. Gaffney, (34 N. J. L. 133)
271
State V. Grail. Co. Commissioners, (1
111. 25) 372
State V. Gardner, (43 Ala. 234) 67
State V. Garlock, (14 Iowa, 444) 125
State V. Garroutte, (67 Mo. 455) 186
State V. Gaslight Co., (25 Mo. App.
44)361
State V. Gates, (35 Minn. 385) 79, 105,
368 381
State '». Gayhart, (51 N. W. R. 746)
365
State V. George, (23 Fla. 585) 69
State V. Georgia Co., (17 S. E. R. 10)
282
State V. Gilmanton, (14 N. H. 467)
54
State V. Gleason, (12 Fla. 190) 383
State V. Gloucester, (40 N. J. Law.
30i) 313
State «. Goff, (15 R. I. 505) 86
State V. Goldstucker, (40 Wis. 124)
18
State?). Gorham, (37 Me. 451) 813,
400
State V. Gorton, (33 Min. 345) 69
State V. Gouldey, (18 Atl. R. 695) 18
State V. Governor, (1 Dutch. 331) 381
State D. Graham, (26 La. An. 568) 86
State V. Graves, (19 Md. 351) 113,
161, 359
State V. Gray, (22 Atl. Rep. 675) 125
State V. Gray, (23 Keb. 365) 96
State V. Green, (14 N. E. R. 352) 258
State V. Greeu, (37 Ohio St. 227) 99
State V. Greeu Co., (54 Mo. 540) 186
State I). Griffey, (5 Neb. 161) 65
State V. Grimes, (52 N. W. E. 42)
117, 118
State B. Gummersall, (24 N. J. L. 529)
380
State V. Guttenberg Council, (39 N.
J. L. 600) 256, 259 a, 360, 375
State V. H. & St. J. E. E. Co., 75 Mo.
208
State V. Haben, (22 Wis. 660) 368
State V. Hadiey, (64 N. H. 473) 82
State V. Haight, (30 N. J. Law, 448)
31,78
State V. Haines, (80 Me. 65) 120
State V. Halifax Com'rs, (4 Dev. L.
345) 260, 349
State V. Hammonton, (38 N. J. L. 430)
116
State V. Hampton, (2 N. H. 22) 318
State V. Hand, (31 N. J. L. 547) 278
State V. Ilannon, (38 Kan. 593) 364
State 11. Hardey, (18 Pac. Rep. 942)
60, 189
State V. Harlam, (25 Neb. 33) 371
State V. Harris, (23 Eng. & Am. Cor.
Gas. 43, 47) 189
State V. Harris, (52 N. W. Rep. 387)
125
State V. Harris, (10 Iowa, 441) 125
State V. Harris, (89 Ind. 363) 338
State V. Harrison, (113 Ind. 440) 81,
82
State V. Harrison, (116 Ind. 300) 74
State V. Harrub, (10 So. R. 752) 29
State V. Harsh, (6 Black. 346) 400
State V. Harshaw, (73 Wis. 211, 40 N.
W. R. 641) 59
State B. Hart, (34 Me. 36) 120
State V. Hartford & N. H. R. R. Co.,
(29 Conn. 538) 363
State V. Hastings, (15 Wis. 78) 80
State V. Hauser, (63 Ind. 555) 108, 113
State V. Hawkius, (44 Ohio St. 98)
83
State J). Haworth, (23 N. E. R. 946)
338, 374
State V. Hay, (29 Me. 547) 122
State V. Hayes, (61 N. H. 314) 153
State V. Hayne, (4 S. C. 403) 122
State V. Haynes, (30 Me. 65) 120
State V: Haynes, (72 Mo. 377) 100
State V. Heath, (20 La. An. 172, 96
Am. Dec. 390) 176
State w. Hedlund, (16 Neb. 566) 32
State B. Heege, (40 Mo. App. 650)
359, 360
State B. Heidenhain, (7 So. R. ) 159
State B. Helfrid, (2 N. & McC. 233)
162
State B. Henderson, (38 Ohio St. 644)
148
State B. Hennepin Co., (33 Minn. 235)
98, 255
State V. Henry Co., (31 Ohio St. 211)
377
State V. Henshaw, (76 Cal. 436) 102
State B. Heppenheimer, (23 Atl. R.
664) 241, 243, 245
State B. Herndon, (23 Fla. 287) 380
State V. Herod, (29 Iowa, 128) 124,
144, 274, 302
State B. Hersey, (56 Iowa, 404) 72
State B. Hibbard, (3 Ohio, 32) 123
State V. Hill, (10 Ind. 219) 215
State V. Hill, (32 Minn. 275) 360
State V. Hine, (59 Conn. 50) 18
State B. Hixon, (41 Mo. 210) 83
State B. Hoagland, (16 Atl. R. 166)
18, 287
clx
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Keferences are to Sections.
State ». Hoblitzelle, (85 Me. 620) 373
State V. Hoboken, (.SO N. J. L. 225)
319
State V. Hoboken, (33 N. J. L. 205)
802
State V. Hoboken, (36 N. J. L. 291)
259 a
State D. Hoboken, (41 N. J. L. 71)
123
State V. Hoboken, (9 Vroom, 110) 148
State V. Hodgdon,i(41 Tt. 139) 258
State V. Holden, (19 Neb. 249)371
State V. Holman, (40 Minn. 369) 311
State V. Hopkins, (10 Ohio St. 509) 81
State i;. Howe, (28 Neb. 618) 33, 371
State V. Howe, (28 Ohio St. 588) 81, 82
State V. Hoyt, (2 Oregon, 246) 86, 98
State V. Hudson (29 N". J. L. 104) 75,
278
State V. Hudson, (30 N. J. L. 137) 400
State V. Hudson, (34 N. J. L. 531)
278
State J). Hudson City, (27 N. J. L.
214) 241, 400
State V. Huggins, (Harper, 94) 99,
100
State V. Huggins, (47 Ind. 586) 308
State V. Hull, (17 Minn. 429) 365
State V. Humphries, (74 Tex. 466) 83
State V. Hundelhausen, (26 Wis. 432)
2,8
State 0. Hunt, (54 N. H. 431) 82
State 1). Hunter, (38 Kan. 578) 18
State V. Hutt, (2 Ark. 282) 86
State V. Hyde, (12 Ind. 20) 18
State V. HI. etc. Co., (33 Fed. K. 730)
201
State V. Jackson, (33 N. J. 450) 258
State V. Jackson Co., (19 Fla. 17) 375
State V. Jackson (;o., (102 Mo. 531)28
State V. Jacksonville, (10 So. 590) 302,
300
State V. Jacksonville, (22 Fla. 21) 375
State V. Jacobs, (17 Ohio, 143) 88, 380
State V. Jefferson, (22 La. An. 611)
362
State V. Jenkins, (46 Wis. 616) 380
State V. Jennings, (27 Ark. 419) 2
State V. Jennings, (56 Wis. 113) 359
State V. Jennings, (48 Wis. 549) 365
State V. Jersey City, (1 Dutch. 536)
85, 132
State V. Jersey City, (3 Dutch. 493)
98, 99, 145
State V. Jersey City, (5 Dutch. 170) 33
State V. Jersey City, (25 Atl. E. 272)
278
State V. Jersey City, (35 N. J. Eq.
404) 100
State V. Jersey City, (24 N. J. L. 662)
241, 265
State V. Jersey City, (25 N. J. L. 309)
241, 265
State V. Jersey City, (25 N. J. L. 536)
83
State V. Jersey City, (26 N. J. L. 444)
245, 319
State ». Jersey City, (28 N. J. L.500)
291
State V. Jersey City, (30 N. J. L. 93)
148
State V. Jersey City, (30 N. J. L. 148)
145
State V. Jersey City, (34 N. J. L. 31)
133
State V. Jersey City, (40 N. J. L. 483)
220,259 a
State 1). Jersey City, (41 K J. L. 135)
142
State V. Jersey City, (47 N. J. L. 449)
170
State V. John, (81 Mo. 13) 371
States V. Johns, (3 Oreg. 533) 82
States V. Jolinson, (1 Kan. 178) 26
State V. Johnson Co., (12 Iowa, 237)
308
States V. Jones, (19 Ind. 356) 65, 82,
86
State V. Jones, (1 Ired. 129) 368, 369
State V. Jones, (18 Tex. 874) 288
State V. Judge Cir. Ct., (13 Ala. 805)
371
State B. Judges, (53 K W. R. 800)
259 a, 292
State V. Kansas City, (89 Mo. 34)
249, 399
State V. Kantler, (33 Minn. 69) 97
State V. Kaster, (35 Iowa, 221) 120
State V. Kaufman, (45 Mo. App. 656)
125
State V. Kearney, (25 Neb. 262) 130,
363
State V. Keenan, (57 Conn. 286)
State V. Kelly, (34 N. J. L. 75) 32
State V. Kelly, (5 Vroom, 75) 32
State V. Kelsey, (44 N. J. L. 1) 79
State V. Kempff, (69 Wis. 470) 105
State B. Kenny, (45 N. J. L. 251) 76
State V. Keokuk, (9 Iowa, 438) 377
State V. Kiiclili, (54 N. W. E. 1069) 83
State v. Kilroy, (86 Ind. 118) 69
State V. King, (29 Kan. 607) 368
State 0. Kirk, (44 Ind. 401) 67, 74, 75,
State V.
State V.
State V.
State V.
State V.
State V.
18,26
State V. Kramer, (96 Mo. 75) 362
Kirk, (53 Ark. 337) 33
Kirkland, (29 Md. 85) 360
Kirkley, (20 Md. 85) 373
Kirkwood, (29 Md. 85) 359
Kirly, (29 Md. 85) 338
Kolsem, (29 N. E. R. 595) 2
TABLE or CASES CITED.
clxi
Beferences are to Sections.
State V. Krollman, (38 N. J. L. 323)
270
State B. Lafferty, (5 Harring. 491) 155
State V. Lake, (8 Nev. 276) 318
State V. Lake City, (25 Minn. 404) 59,
07
State V. Lamoureux, (30 Pac. Rep.
243)9
State V. Lane, (18 R. I. 620) 88
State V. Langsten, (88 N. C. 692) 134
State V. La Vaque, (49 N. W. R. 525,
47 Minn. 106) 29
State V. Laverack, (34 K. J. 201) 238
State M. Lawrence Bdg. Co., (22 Kan.
438) 318
State D. Leatherman, (38 Ark. 81) 29
State V. Leary, (21 La. An. 538) 18
State V. Ledford, (3 Mo. 102) 117
State V. Lee, (4 Crim. Law Mag. 79)
331
State V. Lee, (29 Minn. 445) 104
State V. Leffingwell, (54 Mo. 458) 234
State V. Lehre, (7 Rich. 234, 322) 365
State V. Leigliton, (22 Atl. R. 380, 83
Me. 419) 314 a
State V. Lemay, (13 Ark. 405) 400
State V. Lewis, (10 Ohio St. 46) 362
State V. Liberty, (22 Ohio St. 144) 177
State V. Lieber, (11 Iowa, 407) 128
State V. Lindsay, (34 Ark. 372) 117
State V. Liverpool L. & G. Co., (4
So. R. 504) 259
State V. Lockwood, (43 "Wis. 463) 104
State V. Logue, (73 Wis. 598) 215
State V. Luce, (6 Cent. R. 862) 120
State V. Ludwig, (21 Minn. 202) 117
State 13. Lusk, (48 Mo. 242) 82, 86
State V. Lyle, (100 N. C. 497) 247
State V. Lyon, (32 N. J. L. 360) 270
State V. Lyons, (31 Iowa, 432) 384
State V. Macon Co., (68 Mo. 29) 376
State V. Madison, (7 Wis. 688) 182,
183, 200
State V. Maine, (27 Conn. 641) 318
State V. Manitowoc, (52 Wis. 432) 359
State V. Mansfield, (41 Mo. 470) 104
State V. Mansfield Com'rs, (23 If. J.
L. 510) 200
State V. Marble, (4 Ired. L. 318) 217
State B. Marion Co., (21 Kan. 413) 165
State V. Marlow, (15 Ohio St. 114)
105, 381
State V. Marshall Co., (7 Iowa, 186)
363
State v. Marston, (6 Kan. 524) 371
State V. Martin, (43 N. W. R. 244)
142
State V. Mass., (2 Jones Law, 66) 104
State V. Matheney, (7 Kan. 327) 82
State p. Mayberry, (3 Strob. 144) 77
State V. Maynard, (14 111. 419) 102
xi
state r. Mayo, (8 So. R. 52, 42 La. An.
637) 359
State V. Mayor, (24 Ala. 701) 32
State B. Mayor etc., (R. M. Charlt.
250) 2
State B. Mayor, (11 Humph. 217) 30
State V. Mayor, (15 Lea, 697) 79, 120
State V. Mayor, (29 Md. 85, 111) 169
State B. Mayor, (37 Mo. 272) 189
State V. Mayor, (43 N. J. L. 542) 371
State V. Mayor, (4 Neb. 260) 86
State B. Mayor, (5 Port. 279) 110
State V. Mayor Charleston, (12 Rich.
Law, 480) 102
State V. Mayor of Lincoln, (4 Neb.
260) 86
State V. Mayor of St. Joseph, (37 Mo.
270) 189
State V. Maysville, (12 S. C. 76) 256
State V. McArthur, (13 Wis. 383) 104
State V. McCabe, (43 N. W. R. 322,
74 Wis. 481) 219
State V. :5d:cCauley, (15 Cal. 430) 189 a
State B. McCrillin, (4 Kan. 250) 194 a,
359
State V. McCuUough, (3 Nev. 202) 371
State V. MoGarry, (21 Wis. 496) '83
State V. McGowan, (89 Mo. 156) 360
State V. McNeely, (24 La. Ann! 19)
76,82
State V. McReynolds, (61 Mo. 203) 55,
276, 385
State V. Meadows, (1 Kan. 90) 371
State V. Meehan, (45 N. J. L. 189) 82
State ». Mellor, (67 Mo. 604) 12
State V. Merrill, (37 Me. 329) 134
State V. Merritt, (35 Conn. 314) 300
State V. Merry, (3 Mo. 278) 32
State V. Michellon, (2 N. J. L. 405)
76
State V. Miller, (41 La. An. 53) 159
State V. Milwaukee, (20 Wis. 87) 212,
364
State V. Milwaukee, (22 Wis. 397) 363,
368
State V. Milwaukee, (25 Wis. 122) 14,
194
State 0. Milwaukee, (29 Wis. 454) 296
State V. Milwaukee, (45 Wis. 579) 378
State V. Milwaukee Co., 21 Wis. 433)
86
Stat« V. Milwaukee Council, (20 Wis.
87) 375
State V. Milwaukee Gas Co., (29 Wis.
454, 9 Am. Rep. 598) 144, 296
State V. Minneapolis, (32 Minn. 501)
232
State V. Minn. etc. Ry. Co., (39 N.
W. R. 153, 38 Minn. 246) 317
State V. Mobile, (5 Porter, 279) 120,
226, 300
clxii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
State V. MofEatt, (5 Ohio, 358, 362)
371
State ». Moniteau Co. Ct., (45 Mo.
App. 387) 125, 398
State V. Montgomery, (25 La. An.
138) 67, 75
State ». Moore, (16 S. W. K. 937) 24
State V. Morgan, (48 N. W. 814) 259
State V. Moriarity, (74 Ind. 104) 286
State V. Morris, (43 Iowa, 192) 377
State V. Morris Com. Pleas, (36 N. J.
L. 72) 24
State V. Morris etc. Co., (23 N. J. L.
360) 300
State V. Morristown, (33 N. J. L. 57)
33, 146, 288, 290
State V. Morse, (50 N. H. 9) 278
State ». Mortland, (52 N. J. E. 521)
28
State V. Mott, (61 Md. 297) 120
State V. Moultrieville, (Rice, Law,
158) 154
State V. Mount, (21 La. An. 755) 360,
375
State V. Mt. Pleasant, (16 Wis. 613)
267, 362
State V. Mullica, (17 Atl. K. 941) 27
State V. Munic. Ct. etc., (32 Minn.
329) 146
State V. Mungenraaier, (24 Iowa, 87)
120
State V. Murfreesboro, (11 Humph.
217) 400
State V. Nashville, (15 Lea, 697) 146
State V. Nashville Univ., (4 Hump.
157) 200
State V. Natal, (39 La. An. 439) 42
State V. Natal, (6 So. E. 722) 110, 201
State V. Natl. Dock Co., (26 Atl. E.
145) 290
State V. Neidt, (19 Atl. E. 318) 120
State V. Newark, (3 Dutch. 491) 111
State V. Newark, (25 N. J. L. 399)
391
State V. Newark, (27 N. J. L. 185) 270
State V. Newark, (27 N. J. L. 198) 86
State 1). Newark, (34 N. J. L. 236) 28
State V. Newark, (36 N. J. L. 478)
270
State V. Newark, (37 N. J. L.) 415
259 a, 277
State V. Newark, (40 N. J. L. 358) 27
State V. Newark, (11 Atl. It. 147, 49
N. J. L. 344) 257
State V. Newark, (23 Atl. E. 129) 234
State u. Newberry Council, (12 Kicli.
L. 339) 270
State V. New Boston, (11 N. H. 413)
223
State V. New Brunswick, (1 N. J. L.
395) 319
State V. New Brunswick, (30 N. J. L.
395) 259 a, 286
State V. Newman, (91 Mo. 445) 360,
371
State V. New Orleans, (15 La. An.
354) 259
State B. New Orleans, (30 La. An.
129) 362, 375
State V. New Orleans, (35 La. 68) 368
State V. N. O. C. & L. E. Co., (7 So.
E. 606, 42 La. 550) 306
State V. Newport etc. Co., (18 Atl. E,
161) 302
State V. New Wbatrom, (3 Wash. St.
7)29
State V. Nichols, (79 N. T. 182) 83
State V. Noble, (118 Ind. 350) 18
State V. Norwalk Co., (10 Conn. 157)
320
State V. Noyes, (30 N. H. 279) 120,
255
State V. Ocean, (48 N. J. L. 70) 364
State V. O'Conner, (22 Atl. 1091) 18
State V. Old Town Bridge Corp., (85
Me. 17) 314
State V. Omaha, (14 Neb. 265) 300,
360
State V. Orange, (31 N. J. L. 131) 362
State V. Orange, (32 N. J. L. 49) 278
State B. Orange, (50 N. J. L. 347) 398
State V. Osawkee, (14 Kan. 418) 183,
188, 254
State V. Osborne, (24 Mo. App. 309)
374
State V. Otoe, (6 Neb. 129) 278
State V. Pacific, (61 Mo. 155) 177, 363
State V. Palmer, (10 Neb. 203) 361
State V. Palmer, (18 Neb. 644) 371
State V. Palmer, (4 N. W. Eep. 966)
32
State V. Paris Ey. Co., (55 Tex. 76)
159
State V. Parker, (25 Minn. 215) 38a
State V. Parker, (32 N. J. L. 426) 270
State V. Parker, (26 Vt. 362) 263
State V. Parkinson, (5 Nev. 17) 189 o
State 1). Passaic, (37 N. J. L. 65, m)
259 a
State ». Passaic, (41 N. J. L. 90) 278
State V. Passaic, (42 N. J. L. 524)319
State V. Passaic Turnp., 27 N. J. L.
217) 319
State V. Paterson, (36 N. J. L. 159)
279
State V. Paterson, (37 N. J. L. 380)
259 o
State V. Patterson, (40 N. J. L. 186)
176
State V. Patterson, (20 AU. E. 828) U
State 1). Patterson, (34 N. J. L. 163)
113
TABLE OF OASES CITED.
clxiii
Beferences are to Sections.
■State V. Patterson, (38 N. J. L. 190)
372
State 1). Peele, (124 Ind. 515) 76
State V. Peele, (124 Ind. 515) 82
State V. Perkins, (24 N. J. L. 409)
■ 102
State V. Perranet, (41 La. An. 179)
399
State V. Perry Co., (5 Oliio St. 497, 502)
395
State V. Perth Amboy, (29 N. J. L.
259) 279
State B. Perth Araboy, (38 N. J. L.
425) 265
State V. Pettis, (7 Rich. Law, 390)
312
State V. Pidgeon, (8 Blackf. 132) 82
State V. Pillsbury, (30 La. An. 705)
177
State V. Pilot, (21 La. An. 336) 371
State V. Plaiufield, (38 N. J. L. 95)
241, 265, 279, 280
State V. Piatt, (4 Harr. 154) 67
State V. Plunkett, (3 Harr. 5) 117, 123,
125
State ». Poland, (50 N. J. Law, 367)
398
State V. Pol. Com'rs, (88 Mo. 144) 83
State V. Police Jury, (111 U. S. 716)
194
State V. Pollard, (6 E. I. 290) 117
State V. Portland, (74 Me. 268) 400
State V. Powell, (97 N. C. 417) 104
State V. Priester, (45 IST. W. R. 712,
43 Minn. 373) 99
State ». Putnam, (35 Iowa, 561) 67
State V. Quimby, (17 Atl. 952) 65
State V. Rahway, (33 N. J. L. 110)
363 365 371
State 'b. Rahway, (39 N". J. L. 646) 25,
92
State V. Railroad Co., (3 How. 534)
155
State V. Raine, (47 Ohio St. 447, 25
X. E. R. 54) 79, 359, 360
State V. Rainey, (74 Mo. 229) 369
State V. Ralls etc., (45 Mo. 58) 82
State V. Ramsey Co. Dist. Ct., (33
Minn. 295) 259 a
State ». Raymond, (27 N. H. 388) 400
State 0. Recorder, (12 So. R. 880) 271
State i). Register, (59 Md. 283) 83
State V. Reynolds, (61 Mo. 203) 56
State V. Rice, (2 S. E. R. 180) 154
State ». Richland, (20 Ohio St. 362)
139
State V. Ricker, (32 N. H. 179) 104
State B. Rightor, (44 La. An. 298) 399,
401
State V. Robbins, (54 N. J. L. 566)
State ». Roberts, (11 Gill & J. 506)
256
State V. Roberts, (12 N. J. L. 114) 87
State V. Rodman, (43 Mo. 256) 361
State V. Roggen, (22 Keb. 118) 189,
1916
State V. Rolle, (30 La. Ann. 991) 259,
261
State V. Row, (46 N. W. R. 872) 79
State V. Rowe, (2 Atl. R. 179) 253
State V. Saline Co., (48 Mo. 390) 186,
394
State V. Savage, (89 Ala. 1) 83
State V. Schaack, (28 Minn. 358) 365
State V. Schleramer, (42 La. An. 1166)
118
State B. Schlier, (3 Heisk. 281) 261
States. Schnierle, (5 Rich. L. 299)
380
State B. School Directors, (74 Mo. 21)
374
State B. Sch. Dist., (10 Neb. 544) 186
State B. Schuohardt, (7 So. 67) 130,
146
State B. Schumaker, (27 La. An. 332)
83
State B. Schweiokardt, (19 S. W. R.
47) 9, 11, 226
State B. Scott, (17 Mo. 521) 24
State V. Scott, (15 Neb. 147) 375
State B. Seay, (64 Mo. 89) 81, 82
State B. Sellers, (7 Rich. Law, 368) 77
State B. Sevarance, (55 Mo. 378) 33,
159, 269, 282
State V. Seymour, (35 N. J. L. 47)
232
State V. Shakespeare, (6 So. Rep. 592)
371
State B. Shakespeare, (41 La. An. 156)
359
State B. Shakespeare, (43 La. An. 92)
361
State B. Sharkey, (52 N. W. E. 24) 110
State V. Shaw, (29 Pac. 1028) 29
State B. Shaw, (23 La. An. 790) 363
State B. Shelbyville, (4 Sneed, 176)
400
State B. Sherman, (20 Mo. 265) 123
State B. Sherwood, (42 Mo. 179) 85
State ». Simon, (22 Atl. 120) 26
State B. Sims, (16 S. C. 486) 134
State B. Skrine, (3 Brev. 516) 78
State B. Slick, (86 Ind. 501) 365
State B. Smith, (15 S. "W. R. 614) 361
State V. Smith, (22 Minn. 218) 97, 148.
371
State B. Smith, (87 Mo. 158) 81
State V. Smith, (52 N. W. R. 700) 18,
84
State B. Smith, (11 Atl. E. 321) 254
State V. Smithson, (106 Mo. 149) 258
clxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
State V. Snodgrass, (98 Ind, 546) 189,
375
State 1-. Society, (54 K J. L. 260) 400
State V. Somers, (53 N. W. 146) 83
State V. Sommers, (96 K. C. 467) 75
State V. So. S. S. Co., (13 La. An.
497) 282
State V. Somnier, (33 La. An. 237) 75
State V. Springfield, (6 Ind. 83) 13
State V. Staley (38 Ind. 259) 362
State V. Stanley, (14 Ind. 409) 250
State V. Starkey, (52 N. W. K. 24) 79
State V. Starling, (13 S. Car. 262) 364
State V. State Board of Assessors,
(22 Atl. E. 1085) 282
State V. Steele, (57 Tex. 200) 66, 79
State V. Stevens, (46 N. J. L. 344) 83
State V. Stevenson, (109 N". C. 730) 258
State !). Stewart, (5 Strob.) 249, 398
State V. Story Co., (17 Nev. 96) 29
State V. St. Johns, (47 Minn. 315) 399
State V. St. Louis Co. Ct., (34 Mo.
546) 8, 116, 325
State i;. St. Louis, (62 Mo. 244) 249
State V. St. Louis, (90 Mo. 19) 83
State !). Supervisors, (29 Wis. 79) 360
State V. Super's, (39 Wis. 264) 368
State V. Super's,X41 Wis. 28) 313, 377
State V. Super's, (67 Wis. 274) 368
State V. Swearingen, (12 Ga. 23) 69
State V. Swift, (1 Hill, 360) 249, 398
State V. Swift, (11 Nev. 128) 18
State V. Swislier, (17 Tex. 441) 263
State V. Tappan, (29 Wis. 664) 14, 15,
139
State V. Taxing District of Shelby
Co., (16 Lea, 240) 42
State V. Taylor, (12 Ohio St. 130) 74
State V. Taylor, (39 Md. 338) 282
State V. Teasdale, (21 Fla. 652) 83
State V. Ten Eyck, (18 N. J. L. 373)
398
State V. Tennant, (110 N. C. 609) 130
State V. Thoraaston and Rockland,
(74 Me. 198) 54
State V. Thompson, (36 Mo. 70) 361
State V. Tiedeman, (69 Mo. 306) 212
State V. Tippecanoe Co., (30 N. E. E.
892) 362
State V. Titus, (47 N. J. L. 89) 360
State V. Tolan, (33 N. J. L. 195) 378
State V. Toledo, (26 N. E. K. 1061)
27 32 256
State V. Topeka, (36 Kan. 76) 104, 117
State V. Town of Columbia, (20 S.
W. Hep. 90) 144 a
State V. Town of Winter Park, (25
Fla. 371) 62
State V. Township, (23 Atl. E. 666)
32
State V. Tracy, (51 N. W. E. 613) 385
State V. Traders Bank, (6 So. E. 582
41 La. An. 329) 259, 261
State V. Trammel, (11 S. W. Eep
748) 179, 254
State V. Trask, (6 Vt. 355) 226
State V. Trenton, (18 Atl. E. 116) 113
State V. Trenton, (20 Atl. E. 1076)
136, 302
State V. Trenton, (23 Atl. "E. 281)
398
States. Trenton, (26 Atl. E. 83) 259a
State V. Trenton, (7 Vroom, 198) 33,
118, 145, 158
State V. Trenton, (35 K. J. L. 485) 73
State V. Trenton, (42 N. J. L. 72) 87
State V. Trenton, (49 N. J. L. 339)
173
State V. Trenton, (51 N. J. L. 498)
113
State V. Troth, (5 Troom, 376) 32
State V. Trustees etc., (5 Ind. 77) 37,
40
State V. Trustees, (61 Mo. 155) 375
State V. Trustees, (4 Nev. 400) 363
State V. Tryon, (39 Conn. 183) 117,
147
State V. Union, (33 IST. J. L. 350) 28,
161
State V. Union & Planters Bank, (19
S. W. E. 758) 273
State V. Valle, (41 Mo. 29) 18, 67, 74
State 0. Van Buskirk, (40 N. J. L.
463) 82
State V. Van Home, (7 Ohio St. 327)
185, 195, 196
State V. Viokers, (51 N. J. L. 180,)
379
State V. Volkman, (20 La. An. 585)
259 a
State V. Van Wickle, (1 Dutch. 73)
107
State V. Walkely, (2 Nott & McCord,
410) 249, 250
State V. Wall, (47 Ohio St. 499) 2
State V. Walters, (64 Ind. 226) 320
State V. Walton, (62 Me. 106) 67
State ». Ware, (13 Oreg. 380) 363
State V. Warren, (32 N. J. L. 439)260
State V. Washburn, (17 Wis. 658) 81,
82
State V. Watertown Council, (9 Wis.
254) 372
State V. Waxahachie, (81 Tex. 626)
56
State V. Weatherby, (17 Neb. 553) 78
State 1). Weatherby, (45 Mo. 17) 385
State V. Webster, (107 N. C. 962) 122
State V. Welch, (36 Conn. 215) 134,
150
State V. Welch, (21 Minn. 22) 159
State V. Wells, (46 Iowa, 663) 103
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
clxv
References are to Sections.
State V. Western etc., (9.5 N. C. 602)
318
State V. Weston, (4 Neb. 234) 74
State V. Westport, (22 S. W. 888) 61
State V. Whitingham, (7 Vt. 390) 400
State V. Wilcox, (45 Mo. 458) 24
State V. Wilkinson, (2 Vt. 480) 219,
220, 226, 286
State V. Williams, (69 Ala. 311) 359
State V. Williams, (99 Mo. 291) 69
State V. Williams, (11 S. C. 288) 122
State V. Williams, (38 N. W. K. 31)
371
State V. Wilm. Coun., (8 Harring.
294) 102, 363, 381
State V. Wilson, (42 Me. 9) 223
State B. Wilson, (29 Ohio, 347) 67
State V. Wilson, (71 Tex. 291) 177
State B. Wilson, (17 Wis. 087) 377
State B. Winkelmeier, (35 Mo. 103) 24
State 1). Wisten, (62 Mo. 592) 122
State 1). Witlirow, (108 Mo. 1) 401
State B. Wood, (51 Ark. 205) 72
State V. Wood, (9 Bosw. 15) 90
State V. Wood Co., (40 N. W. R. 381)
315
State V. Wood Co., (72 Mo. 629) 377
State B. Woodruff, (37 N. J. L. 139)
270
State B. Woodward, (23 Vt. 92) 202,
208, 219, 220, 300
State B. Wright, (23 Atl. 116) 18, 364
State B. Yopp, (97 N. C. 477)289,299,
300
State V. York Co., (8 Neb. 92) 365
State B. Young, (3 Kan. 445) 102, 125
State B. Young, (30 S. C. 399) 32, 33
State B. Zeigler, (32 N. J. L. 262) 102,
154, 156
State Bank b. Knoop, (16 How. 369) 8
State Bank b. Madison, (3 Ind. 43)
267
State Bk. etc. v. Heney, (40 Minn.
145) 171
State Brd. v. Aberdeen, (56 Miss.
518) 51, 144
State Board b. Cit. S. E. Co., (47 Ind.
407) 164
State Center b. Barenstein, (66 Iowa,
2.59) 123
State etc. v. Co. Judge, (2 Iowa, 280)
28
State etc. b. Mobile, (24 Ala. 701) 32
St.ite ex rel. Bridge Co. b. Columbia,
(27 S. C. 137) 42
State ex rel. Choteau v. LefiSngwell,
54 Mo. 458) 28
State ex rel. Havemeyer b. Min. Pt.
Sup., (22 Wise. 396) 368
State ex rel. Jameson b. Denny, (118
Ind. 382) 255
State ex rel. Marobland b. New
Orleans, (37 La. An, 13) 14
State ex rel. Block b. Cobb, (64 Ala.
158) 191
State ex rel. Soutter b. Madison
Council, (15 Wis. 80) 368
State ex rel. Thorn b. New Orleans,
(37 La. An. 528) 14
State ex rel. Troll v. Hudson, (78 Mo.
302) 123
State Hist. Assoc, b. Lincoln, (14
Neb. 336) 221
Staton B. Norfolk & C. R. Co., (19 S.
E. 11. 933, 109 N. C. 387) 354 a
Steamship Co. b. Joffiffe, (2 Wall.
450) 133
Steamship Co. b. Pt. Wardens, (6
Wall. 81) 133
Stearns b. Richmond, (14 S. E. R.
847) 292, 330
Stearns Co. v. St. Cloud, (36 Minn.
425) 120
Stebbins b. Jennings, (10 Pick. 172)
25
Stebbins v. Keene, (60 Mich. 214) 353
Stebbins b. Mayor, (18 Pac. Rep. 745)
104
Stecker b. East Saginaw, (22 Mich.
104) 98, 106
Stedman b. San Francisco, (63 Cal.
193) 333, 336
Steele b. Boston, (128 Mass. 588) 331
Steele b. Burkhardt, (104 Mass. 59) 352
Steele v. Davis Co., (2 G. Greene,
469) 178, 179
Steele b. Martin, (6 Kan. 430) 381
Steele b. Newton, (41 Kan. 512) 55
Steele b. Sullivan, (70 Ala. 589) 220
Steers ». Brooklyn, (101 N. Y. 51) 225
Stein B. Bienville W. S. Co., (34 Fed.
Rep. 145) 144, 296
Stein B. Burden, (24 Ala. 180) 288
Stein B. Mobile, (24 Ala. 591) 184, 274
Steincke b. Bentley, (34 N. E. R. 97)
301
Steines v. Franklin Co., (48 Mo. 167)
111, 196, 327
Steirsmyer v. St. Louis, (3 Mo. App.
256) 855
Stephani b. Brown, (40 111. 428) 348
Stephens b. Macon, (88 Mo. 345) 331 a,
8506
Stephens v. Peo., (89 111. 837) 65
Stephenson b. Chattanooga, (20 Fed.
Rep. 586) 221, 224
Stephenson b. Manny, (56 111. 160)
826 a
Stephenson Co. Sup. b. Manny, (56
111. 100) 326
Sterling's App., (Ill Pa. St. 35,2 Atl.
Rep. 105) 287, 295
clxvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Seferences are to Sections.
Sterling v. Thomas, (60 111. 264) 337
Stern v. Peo., (96 111. 475) 72
Sterrett v. Houston, (14 Tex. 153)
336 a
Stetson V. Faxon, (19 Pick. 147, 158)
354
Stetson ». Kempton, (13 Mass. 272) 4,
110, 139, 167, 169, 326
Steubenville v. Gulp, (38 Ohio St. 18)
79
Stevens v. Rutland etc. Co., (29 Vt.
546) 395
Stevens v. Boxford, (10 Allen, 93) 343
Stevens v. Bufialo & jST. Y. C. R. R.
Co., (31 Barb. 590) 273
Stevens v. Eden etc., (12 Vt. 688) 108
Stevens ». Middlesex Canal, (12 Mass.
466) 233
Stevens v. Patterson etc. R. R. Co.,
(34 ST. J. 532) 225, 239
Stevens v. Shannon, (6 Ohio Cir. Ct.
R. 142) 229
Stevens Pt. Boom Co. v. Reilly, (46
Wis. 237) 314
Stevenson v. Mayor etc., (20 Fed.
Rep. 586) 308
Stevenson v. PhoenixviUe, (1 Ches.
Co. Rep. 113) 327 a
Stevenson v. Sum. Towns, (35 Iowa,
462) 364
Steward v. Jefferson, (3 Harr. 335)
255
Stewart u. Baltimore, (7Md. 500) 245,
247
Stewart v. Benninger, (138 Pa. St.
437) 129
Stewart H. Cambridge (125 Mass. 102)
165
Stewart v. Clinton, (79 Mo. 603) 354 a
Stewart v. Com., (10 Watts. 307) 130
Stewart v. Council Bluffs, (58 Iowa,
642) 110
Stewart v. Davis, (3 Murph. 244) 270
Stewart v. Frick, (94 N. C. 487) 220
Stewart v. Hartman, (46 Ind. 331)
234 a
Stewart v. Hinds Co. B. of Police etc.,
(25 Miss. 479) 241
Stewart v. Kalamazoo, (30 Mich. 69)
397
Stewart v. Lansing, (104 U. S. 505)
193 6
Stewart D. Lexington, (79 Mo. 603) 329
Stewart v. Mayor, (7 Md. 501) 104,
105
Stewart v. New Orleans, (9 La. An.
461) 92, 332, 333
Stewart v. Perkins, (19 S. W. R. 789)
215
Stewart v. Polk Co., (30 Iowa, 9) 253
Stewart v. Rich, (1 Gaines, 182) 320
Stewart v. Stewart, (6 CI. & Fin. 911) '
326 a
Stewart ti. Woodstock, (15 Up. Can.
Q. B. 427) 344
Stier V. Oskaloosa, (41 Iowa, 353) 30,
31 352
Stiflaer V. Delaware Co., (27 N. E. E. '
641) 79
Stiles V. Curtis, (4 Day, 328) 224
Still V. Lansinburgh, (16 Barb. 107)
208, 211
Stilling V. Thorpe, (54 Wis. 538) 344,
346
Stilts V. Indianapolis, (55 Ind. 515)
18, 55, 61, 259, 397
Stimson v. Gardiner, (42 Me. 248)
340, 343
Stirling Gas Co. ij. Higgins, (25 N. E.
R. 660) 259
Stock V. Boston, (149 Mass. 410) 92,
336, 355
Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge, (12
Mass. 400) 31
Stockdale v. Wayland, (47 Mich. 226)
189 a
Stocking V. State, (7 Ind. 326) 82
Stockman v. Brooks, (27 Pac. R. 746)
29, 373
Stockton V. Chicago, (26 N. E. R.
1095) 246
Stocktons V. Newark, (42 N. J. Eq. 531)
229
Stockton V. Powell, (10 So. R. 688)51
Stockton V. Whitmore, (50 Cal. 554)
232
Stockwell V. Genesee Co., (16 Mich.
221) 79
Stoddard v. Gilman, (22 Vt. 568) 98
Stoddard v. Saratoga, (27 N. E. R.
1030) 355
Stoddard v. Winchester, (32 N. E. R.
948)92, 350 a
Stokes V. Corporation of N. Y., (14
Wend. 87) 158
Stokes V. Mayor etc. , (14 Wend. 8 /)127
Stokes V. Tift, (64 Ga. 312) 317
Stone V. Attleborough, (140 Mass.
328) 346
Stone V. Boston, (2 Met. 2
Stone V. Brooks, (35 Cal. 489) 221
Stone ». Gharlestown, (114 Mass. 214)
55, 58
Stone V. Cheshire etc. Corp., 19 N.
H. 427) 347
Stone V. Commercial Ry. Co., (4 M.
& C. 122) 243
Stone V. Godfrey, (5 De G. M. & G.
76) 327
Stone V. Huggins, (28 Vt. 617) 169
Stone V. Mayor etc. of New York.,
(25 Wend. 157) 239
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
clxvii
Keferences are to Sections.
Stone ». Mobile, (57 Ala. 61) 256, 397
Stone V. New York, (25 Wend. 157,
167) 398
Stone V. Oconomowoc, (71 Wis. 155)
210
Stone V. Sch. District, (8 Cush. 592)
95
Stone V. Small, (54 Vt. 498) 75, 373
Stone V. Trust Co., (116 U. S. 307) 150
Stoneburgh v. Brighton, (5 Upper
Can. L. J. 38) 169
Storer v. Cincinnati, (4 Oliio Cir. Ct.
279) 278, 397
Storer v. Washington, (Peck, 334) 85
Stormfeltz v. Manor Turn. Co., (13
Pa. St. 555) 301, 318
Storrs ». Utica, (17 N. Y. 104) 347,
350
Stott V. Franey, (20 Or. 410) 166
Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, (129 U. S.
141) 289
Stroub V. Railway Co., (59 N. Y.
Super. Ct. 505) 396
Stoudinger v. Newark, (28 N. J. Eq.
74) 294
St. Louis V. Laclede etc. Co., (9 S. W.
R. 581) 218
St. Louis V. Laughlin, (49 Mo. 559)
255
St. Louis V. Lemp, (93 Mo. 477) 201,
225
St. Louis V. Life Ins. Co., (17 S. W.
R. 637) 348
St. Louis i;. McCoy, (18 Mo. 238) 118
St. Louis V. Meier, (77 Mo. 13) 194
St. Louis u. Mentz, (18 S. W. R. 30)
242
St. Louis V. Merton, (6 Mo. 476) 210
St. Louis V. Miss. etc. Co., (13 Mo.
App. 524) 302
St. Louis I). Ranken, (9 S. W. K. 910,
96 Mo. 497) 397
St. Louis V. Russell, (9 Mo. 507) 55,
56, 60, 282
St. Louis V. Shields, (52 Mo. 351) 12,
18, 28, 29, 133
St. Louis V. St. L. R. R. Co., (50
Mo. 94) 274
St. Louis 1). Shands, (20 Mo. 149) 127
St. Louis V. Shoenbusch, (95 Mo. 618)
134
St. Louis V. Smith, (10 Mo. 438) 158
St. Louis I). Sparks, (10 Mo. 118) 368
St. Louis 13. Speiftel, (90 Mo. 587) 272
St. Louis V. Steinberg, (4 Mo. App.
453) 261
St. Louis V. Sternberg, (69 Mo. 289)
261
St. Louis V. Vert, (84 Mo. 204) 156
St. Louis V. Weber, (44 Mo. 547) 128,
150, 158
St. Louis V. W. U. T. Co., (149 U. S.
465) 297, 301
St. Louis V. Wiggins Ferry Co., (11
Wall. 423, 272
St. Louis V. Witbans, (90 Mo. 646) 95
St. Louis V. Woodruff, (71 Mo. 92)
124, 300
St. Louis Br. Co. v. East St. Louis,
(121 111. 238) 42, 272
St, Louis Bridge Co. v. People, (123
111. 226) 294
St. Louis Co. Court v. Griswold, (58
Mo. 175) 232
St. Louis etc. Co. v. Dunn, (78 111.
197) 136
St. Louis etc. Co. v. Haller, (82 111.
208) 303
St. Louis etc. Co. v. Mathias, (50 Ind.
65) 136
St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. v. Teters, (68
111. 144) 232
St. Louis Hospital ». Williams, (19
Mo. 609) 49
St. Louis R. Co. V. So. Ry. Co., (15 S.
W. R. 1013) 302
St. Marks Church v. Brunswick, (78
Ga. 541, 3 S. E. R. 561) 270
St. Mary's Industrial School v.
Brown, (45 Md. 310) 254
St. Paul V. Bumes, (38 Minn. 176)
118
St. Pauls. Butler, (39 Minn. 459) 171
St. Paul V. Colter, (12 Minn. 41) 158
St. Paul V. Dow, (37 Minn. 20) 131
St. Paul V. Seitz, (3 Minn. 297) 347
St. Paul V. Smith, (27 Minn. 164) 123,
299
St. Paul V. Troyer, (3 Minn. 291) 125
St. Paul V. Trueger, (25 Minn. 248)
124
St. Paul & Pac. R. R. Co. v. St. Paul,
(21 Minn. 526) 259 a
St. Paul, Minneapolis & M. Ry. Co.
I). Minneapolis, (35 Minn. 141) 241
St. Paul W. Co. V. Ware, (16 Wall.
566) 347
St. Peter v. Baur, (19 Minn. 327) 102
St. Peter's Church v. Scott Co.
Com'rs, (12 Minn. 395) 270
St. Vincents etc. v. Troy, (76 N. Y.
108) 312
Strahl, In re, (16 Iowa, 369) 105, 381
Strand, lu re, (21 Pac. R. 654) 8
Strasser v. N. Y., L. & W. R. Co.,
(128 N. Y. 157, 623) 302
Stratford etc. Co., In re, (38 Up. Can.
Q. B. 112) 185
Stratman, In re, (39 Cal. 517) 102
Stratton v. Herrick, (9 Johns. 356)
320
Stratton v. Oulton, (28 Cal. 44) 85
clxviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Eeferences are to Sections.
Straub v. Pittsburgh, (138 Pa. St.
356) 26
Stratton v. Staples, (59 Me. 94) 337,
348
Strauss v. Eagle Ins. Co., (5 Ohio St.
59) 163
Strauss v. Pontiac, (40 111. 301) 62,
125
Street v. Holyoke, (105 Mass. 82)344
Street v. Kew Orleans, (32 La. An.
577) 335
Street Case, (1 La. An. 412) 97
Street Railway v. Cumminsville, (14
Ohio St. 523) 238, 304
Streubel v. Milwaukee, (12 Wis. 67)
283
Strickland v. K. K. Co., (27 Miss. 209)
184
Strickler v. Midi. Ey., (125 Ind. 412,
25 N. E. E. 455) 247
Striken). Kelly, (3 Denio, 322) 98,
148, 250
Strohme v. Iowa City, (47 Iowa, 42)
395
Strong V. Campbell, (11 Barb. 135)
338
Strong V. Darling, (9 Ohio, 201) 215
Strong V. District, (1 Maokey, 265)
170
Strong V. District, (4 Mackey, 242, 9
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 568) 100
Strong V. Steven's Point, (62 Wis.
255) 352
Strosser v. Fort Wayne, (100 Ind.
443, 451, 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
636, 643) 53, 55, 61, 62
Stroud V. Philada., (61 Pa. St. 255)
248, 277
Stroudsburg v. Brown, (11 Pa. Co.
Ct. E. 272) 47
Stroudsburg «. Wilkes-Barre E. E.
Co., (12 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 395) 302
Strouse v. Whittlesy, (41 Conn. 559)
321, 3.37
Struthers v. Dunkirk etc., (87 Pa. St.
282) 302, 303
Stuart V. Cambridge, (125 Mass. 102)
109, 281
Stuart V. Havens, (17 Neb. 211) 348
Stuart V. Lansing, (104 U. S. 505)
195 d
Stuart V. Machiasport, (48 Me. 477)
352 .
Stuart V. Palmer, (74 N. Y. 183) 279
Stuart B. Stuart, (6 01. & Fin. 968)
327
Stubbs V. Lee, (64 Me. 195) 86
Studley v. Oshkosh, (45 Wis. 380)
350 6
Sturgeon v. Daviess Co. Com'rs, (65
Ind. 302) 209
Sturges V. Crowninshield, (4 Wheat.
122) 194
Sturtevant v. Alton, (3 McLean, 393)
163, 169
Stuyvesant v. Woodruff, (21 N. J. L.
145) 219
Suarez ». Man E. Co., (15 N. T. S.
224) 248
Submarine Tel. Co. v. Dickson, (15 C.
B. N. S. 759)3506
Succession of Teaulet, (28 La. An.
42)55
Succession of Vance, (2 So. E. 54) 203
Sudbury v. Stearns, (21 Pick. 148)
106
SufBeld V. Hathaway, (44 Conn. .521)
119, 287, 392
Suffolk V. Parker, (79 Va. 660) 120,
336 a
Suffolk Sav. Bank v: Boston, (149
Mass. 364) 195 c, 195 d
Sullivan v. Gilroy, (55 Hun, 285) 71
Sullivan v. Holyoke, (135 Mass. 92)
324, 338 a
Sullivan v. Leadville, (11 Colo. 483)
98, 165
Sullivan v. McCammou, (51 Ind. 264)
326 a
Sullivan v. Kew Tork, (53 N. T. 652)
28
Sullivan ». Phillips, (11 N. E. E. 310)
3.55, 392, 396
Sullivan v. Eoyer, (72 Cal. 248) 301
Sullivan v. Sch. Dis., (39 Kan. 347)
170
Sullivan v. Walton, (20 Fla. 552) 197
Summers v. Daviess Co., (103 Ind.
262) 92, 324, 332
Summerville v. Pressley, (11 S. E. K.
545) 118
Sumner v. Dorchester First Parish,
(4 Pick. 361) 326
Sumner v. Peebles, (22 Pac. E. 221,
5 Wash. St. 471) 312
Sumter v. Deschamps, (4 S. C. 297)
127
Sunbury etc. v. Cooper, (7 Am. Law
Eeg. 158) 149
Sunderland v. Martin, (112 Ind. 411)
396
Super's V. Bates, (17 N. Y. 242) 169
Supervisors v. People, (110 111. 511)
362
Supr's V. V. S., (4 Wall. 435) 362
Supervisors of Doddridge v. Stout,
(9 W. Va. 703) 232
Supervisors of Mercer County t>.
Hubbard, (45 111. 139) 1916
Supervisors of Portage Co. v. Wis.
Cent. E. E. Co., (121 Mass. 467) 254
Surrocco v. Geary, (3 Cal. 69) 335
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
Eeterences are to Sections.
clxix
Susquehanna v. Simmons, (112 Pa.
St. 884) 331 a
Susquehanna Bk. v. Broome Co., (25
N. Y. 312) 391
Susquehanna De Bor. v. Simmons,
(79 Ind. 491) 347
Sussex ». Strader (18 N. J. L. 108)
325, 400
Sutton V. Clavk, (1 Marsh. 429) 328
Sutton V. Clarke, (6 Taunton, 28) 329
Sutton B. Cole, (3 Mass. 239) 200
Sutton V. Wauwatosa, (29 Wis. 21,
28) 352
Sutton First Parish v. Cole, (3 Pick.
232) 202
Sutton's Heirs v. Louisville, (5 Dana,
28) 245
Sutton's Hosp. Case, (10 Eep. 31) 149
Sutton V. Carroll Co. Pol. Bd., (41
Miss. 236) 331, 333
Suydam v. Grand St. etc. Co., (41
Barb. 375) 321
Swails V. State, (4 Ind. 516) 30
Swain v. Comstock, (18 "Wis. 463) 31,
32
Swamp Land Dist. v. Haggin, (64
Cal. 204) 256
Swan V. Chi. etc. Co., (38 Mo. App.
588) 232
Swan ». Cumberland, (8 Gill, 150)
249, 398
Swan V. Gray, (44 Miss. 393) 365
Swan V. Williams, (3 Mich. 427) 233,
241
Swann, Ex parte, (96 Mo. 44) 24
Swann v. Buck, (40 Miss. 268) 79
Swan Point Cemetery v. Tripp, (14
R. I. 199) 270
Swatz V. Flatboats, (14 La. An. 243).
133
Sweeney v. Mayor etc., (5 Daly, 274)
67
Sweeney v. Pt. Burwell H. Co., (17
U. C. C. P. 574) 121
Sweeney v. Spooner, (3 B. & S. 329)
104
Sweet V. Com'rs, (16 Minn. 107) 177
Sweet V. Hulbert, (51 Barb. 312) 183,
184
Sweetzer v. Mead, (5 Mich. 107) 167
Swett V. Cutts, (50 N. H. 439) 354 a
Swift V. Mayor, (83 N". Y. 528) 172
Swift I). Newport, (7 Bush, 37) 56,
259, 276
Swift V. New York, (83 N. Y. 528)
143, 338 a
Swift B. Topeka, (43 Kan. 671) 153
Swift V. Wayne Co., (64 Mich. 479)
398
Swift V. Williamsburg, (24 Barb. 427)
338
Sycamore Alley, In re, (9 Pa. Co. Ct.
E. 61) 259 a
Sykes v. Columbus, (55 Miss. 115)
196, 376
Sykes v. Pawlet, (43 Vt. 446) 346
Symonds v. Clay Co. Sup., (71 111.
355) 325, 375
Syracuse etc. Co. v. People, (66 Barb.
25) 120
Syracuse etc. Co. v. Rome etc. Co.,
(22 N. Y. S. 321) 396
Syracuse W. Co. v. Syracuse, (2 N.
Y. State Eep. 364) 296
Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse, (116
N. Y. 167) 144
T.
Taber ». Grafmiller, (109 Ind. 206)
264, 276, 290
Tackaberry v. Keokuk, (32 Iowa,
155) 267
Tacoma v. Lillis, (31 Pac. E. 321) 79
Tacoma L. Co. v. Pierce Co., (1
Wash. St. 482) 256
Taft B. Pittsford, (28 Vt. 286) 169
Taggart v. Com., (21 Pa. St. 527)
120
Taggart b. Detroit, (38 N. W. E. 714)
84
Taggart v. Newport St. E. Co., (19
Atl. Eep. 326) 306 a
Tainter v. Worcester, (123 Mass. 311)
327 a
Taintor v. Mayor, (19 N. J. Eq. 46)
396
Talbert v. Hudson, (16 Gray, 417)
236, 254
Talbot V. Dent, (9 B. Mon. 526) 24,
184
Talbot u. E. Machias, (76 Me. 416)
79
Talbot B. Iberville, (24 La. An. 135)
189 a
Talbot V. Queen Anne Co., (50 Md.
245) 3
Talbott V. Grace, (30 Ind. 389) 220
Talbott B. King, (9 S. E. R. 48, 32 W.
Va. 6) 220
Talbott V. Eichmond & D. E. E. Co.,
(31 Gratt. 685, 22 Alb. L. J. 57)
219
Talbott B. Taunton, (140 Mass. 552)
342
Talby v. Freedraan's Trust Co., (1
MacArthur, 522) 177
Tallahassee b. Fortune, (3 Fla. 19)
349
Tallant v. Bermingham, (39 Iowa,
543) 278, 326
Tallapoosa v. Tarver, (21 Ala. 661)
369
clxx
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Tallman v. Janesville, (17 Wis. 71)
?62
Tamis v. King, (40 Conn. 298) 106
Tanner v. Albron, (.5 Hill, 121) 122
Tappan v. Gray, (9 Paige, 507) 81,
82
Tarbush i). Norwich, (38 Conn. 225)
92
Tarlton, In re, (2 Ala. 35) 249
Tarry ». Ashton, (1 Q. B. Div. 314) 300
Tarver «. Tallapoosa Cora'rs Ct., (17
Ala. 527) 368
Tash V. Adams, (10 Gush. 252) 139,
897
Tate V. Ohio etc. E. K. Co., (7 Ind.
479) 302, 306
Tatem v. Wright, (3 Zabr. 429) 258
Tatum !). Trenton, (85 Ga. 468, 11 S.
E. K. 705) 326
Tawney v. Lynn & Ely Ky. Co., (16
L. J. N. S. Eq. 282) 243
Taxpayers of Greene, In re, (38 How.
Pr. 515) 189
Taxpayers Assn. v. Kirkpatrick, (7-
Atl. K. 625) 259
Tayler v. Pine Bluff, (34 Ark. 603)
124
Taylor, Ex parte, (58 Miss. 473) 258
Taylor v. Americus, (39 Ga. 59) 105
Taylor v. Austin, (32 Minn. 247) 355
Taylor v. Beebe, (3 Bob. 262) 132
Taylor v. Board, (31 Pa. St. 73) 326 a
Taylor ». Brooks, (5 Cal. 332) 177
Taylor v. Caesar, (11 Up. Can. Q. B.
461) 66
Taylor v. Carondelet, (22 Mo. 105,
112) 155
Taylor v. Chandler, (9 Heisk. 349)
259 a
Taylor v. Constable, (13 N. Y. 597)
353
Taylor 13. Cumberland, (64 Md. 68)
331
Taylor v. Davis Co., (40 Iowa, 295)
314, 315, .353
Taylor v. Donner, (31 Cal. 480) 256
Taylor v. Douglas, (2 Douglas, 744^
748) 346
Taylor v. Port Wayne, (47 lud. 281)
385
Taylor v. Greenhalgh, (L. E. 9 Q. B.
487) 350
Taylor v. Griswold, (5 Day, 22) 121,
146
Taylor v. Henry, (2 Pick. 397) 95, 108
Taylor v. Lambertville, (43 N. J. Eq.
107) 165
Taylor v. Lambertville, (43 N. J. Eq.
107) 145
Taylor v. Metro. E. Ey. Co., (55 Su-
per Ct. 555) 305, 307
Taylor v. Mt. Vernon, (58 Hun, 384)
348
Taylor v. Newberne, (2 Jones Eq.
141) 24, 255
Taylor v. Palmer, (31 Cal. 240) 165,
271 326
Taylor v. People, (66 111. 322) 326
Taylor v. Palmer, (31 Cal. 241) 148
Taylor v. Phillips, (35 W. Va. 554)
215, 221
Taylor ». Plymouth, (8 Meto. 462)
335
Taylor v. Porter, (4 Hill, 140) 234 a
Taylor v. Robinson, (72 Tex. 364) 12
Taylor v. K. E. Co., (53 N. W. E. 855,
83 Wis. 645) 300
Taylor v. St. Louis, (14 Mo. 20) 113,
292, 329
Taylor v. Taylor, (10 Minn. 112) 65,
371
Taylor v. Yonkers, (105 N. Y. 202, 11
N. E. E. 642) 344
Teall V. Syracuse, (120 N. Y. 184) 92
Tebo V. Brooklyn, (31 N. E. E. 984)
54
Tecumseh ». Phillips, (5 Neb. 305) 28
Temperance Hall Assn. v. Giles, (83
N. J. L. 260) 343, 348
Temple v. Sumner, (51 Miss. 13) 123
Templin v. Iowa City, (14 Iowa, 59)
354 a
Ten Eyck v. Canal Co., (18 N. J. L.
200) 354
Tennant v. Ai-cker, (48 N. W. E. 577)
360
Tennant v. Crocker, (48 N. W. E. 577)
359
Tenn. etc. Co. v. Adams, (3 Head,
• 596) 302
Tenn. etc. Co. ». Moore, (36 Ala. 371)
375
Tenney v. East Warren Lumber Co.,
(43 N. H. 343) 51
Tenth Nat. Bk. v. Mayor, (80 N. T.
660) 126
Terhune v. Mayor, (88 N. Y. 47) 92,
130
Terre Haute v. Beach, (96 lud. 143)
280
Terre Haute v. Lake, (43 Ind. 480)
165
Terre Haute v. Turner, (36 Ind. 522)
265
Terre Haute & I. E. E. Co. v. Scott,
(74 Ind. 29) 218
Terre Haute E. E. Co. b. Buck, (96
Ind. .346) 352 a
Terrell)). Dissaint, (71 Tex. 770) 189 a
Terrett ». Taylor, (9 Cranch, 43) 205
Terrell v. Wheeler, (123 N. Y. 76)
259 a
TABLE OF CASES CITED:"
clxxi
Beferences are to Sections.
Ten-ill v. Blooriifield, (21 S. W. R.
1041) 290, 312, 327
Terrill v. Dessalnt, (9 S. W. 593) 192
Tei-rett o. Taylor, (9 Cranch, 52) 11
Territory v. Armstrong, (6 Dak. 226)
385
Territory v. B. Co., (20 Am. & Eng.
Cor. Cases, 44) 371
Territory v. Carson, (7 Mont. 412) 79
Territory v. Com'rs, (8 Mont. 396) 60
Territory ». Dakota, (2 Dak. 155) 122
Territory v. McPherson, (50 N. W.
R. 351, 6 Dak. 27) 125
Territory v. Potts, (3 Mont. 354) 365
Territory v. Woodbury, (44 JST. W. R.
1077) 375
Terry v. Bank, (18 Wis. 87) 14
Terry v. Wisconsin M. & F. Ins., (18
Wis. 87) 194
Teshi). Comw., (4 Dana, 522) 102
Teter v. W. V. C. & P. Ry. Co., (14
S. E. R. 146, 35 S. W. R. 438) 238
Texas etc. Co. v. Rosedale, (64 Tex.
80) 304
Tharnton v. Grant, (10 R. I. 477) 132
Thayer v. Boston, (19 Pick. 511) 92,
220, 338
The Craigendoran, (31 Fed. Rep. 87)
133
The Francesca T., (9 Ben. 34) 133
The Geneva, (16 Fed. Rep. 874) 133
The King v. Croke, (Cowp. 29) 49
The Lizzie E., (30 Fed. Rep. 876) 133
The Modoc, (26 Fed. Rep. 718) 353
The Queen v. Bailiffs of Ipswich, (2
Ld. Raym. 1232) 48
The Queen v. The Registrar of Joint
Stock Cos., (10 Q. B. 839) 48
The Queen v. Baruhart, (7 Up. Can.
L. J. 126) 100
The Queen v. Wood, (5 E. & B. 49)
130
The Virginia Rulon, (13 Blatchf. 519)
133
Theall v. Yonkers, (21 Hun, 265) 92
Theilan v. Porter, (14 Lea, 622) 120
Theobald v. Louisville, (40 Alb. L. J.
335) 302
Thicknesse v. Canal Co., (4 M. & W.
472) 37
Third Ave. R'y Co., In re, (24 N. E.
Rep. 651) 306 a
Third Ave. etc. Co. v. New Tork,
(54 N. T. 159) 396
Third Municipality of N. O. v. Ursu-
line Nuns, (2 La. An. 611) 56
Third Nat. Bk. v. Seneca Falls, (15
Fed. Rep. 783) 196
Tliirty-second Street, In re, (19Wend.
128) 221
Thomas, Ex parte, (71 Cal. 204) 258
Thomas v. Ashland, (12 Ohio St. 124)
104, 116
Thomas v. Burnes, (23 Miss. 550) 76
Thomas v. Dakin, (22 Wend. 9) 25
Thomas v. Gain, (35 Mich. 155) 259 a,
277
Thomas ». Grafton, (34 W. Va. 282)
92
Thomas v. Hot Springs, (34 Ark. 553)
122
Thomas v. Leland, (24 Wend. 65) 16,
187
Thomas v. Morgan Co., (39 111. 490)
1916
Thomas v. Mt. Vernon, (9 Ohio, 290)
102, 103, 125
Thomas v. Owens, (4 Mo. 188) 81
Thomas v. Richmond, (12 Wall. 349)
146, 164
Thomas v. West Jersey R. R. Co.,
(101 U. S. 70) 210
Thomas v. Winchester, (57 Am. Dec.
455) 351
Thomason v. Ashworth, (73 Cal. 73)
34
Thompson v. Abbott, (61 Mo. 176)'58
Thompson v. Allen Co., (115 U. S.
550) 42, 359
Thompson v. Bridgewater, (7 Pick.
188) 352
Thompson v. Carroll, (22 How. 422)
146, 265
Thompsons. Chicago etc. Co., (19 S.
W. R. 77) 243, 244
Thompson v. Commonwealth, (81
Pa. St. 314) 184
Thompson v. Floyd, (2 Jones, L. 313)
255
Thompson v. Gibson, (7 M. & W.
455) 120
Thompson v. Inliabitants, (5 Gray,
110) 353
Thompson v. Judge, (9 Ala. 338)
371
Thompson v. Mathews, (2 Edw. Ch.
202) 318
Thompson v. Moran, (44 Mich. 602)
201
Thompson v. Pacific Co., (9 Wall.
579) 22
Thompson v. Park Com'rs, (44 Mich.
602) 187
Thompson v. People, (23 Wend. 537)
380
Thompson v. Perrine, (103 TJ. S. 806)
195 iZ
Thompson v. Peru, (29 Ind. 305) 189
Thompson v. Polk Co., (38 Minn.
130) 328
Thompson v. Pittston, (59 Me. 545)
139
clxxii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Thompson v. Quincy, (83 Midi. 1Y3)
350 6
Thompson ». Soliermerhorn, (6 !N".
Y. 92) 110, 113
Thompson v. Sunderland etc., (L. R.
2 Ex. Div. 420) 295
Thompson v. Tlie Mayor, (11 N. Y.
115) 132
Thompson v. U. S., (103 U. S. 480)
86, 368
Thompson Houston Electric Co. v.
Newton, (42 Fed. Eep. 723) 144 a,
189
Tliomson v. Lee Co., (3 Wall. 320)
110, 254
Thomson v. Union Pac. B. R. Co., (9
Wall. 579) 258
Thorndike v. Boston, (1 Met. 245)
66
Thorpe v. Brumfitt, (L. R. 8 Ch. Ap.
650) 300
Thorpe v. Rutland etc. Co., (27 Vt.
140) 302
Threadgill v. Ansen, (99 N. C. 352)
325, 339
Thunder Bay etc. Co. v. Speedily,
(31 Mich. 332) 239
Thurston v. St. Joseph, (51 Mo. 510)
355
Tickno, In re, (88 Cal. 294) 146
Tice V. Bay City, (84 Mich. 461) 326 a,
350 6
Tice V. Munn, (94 N. Y. 621) 352 a
Tide Water v. Archer, (9 Gill & J.
479) 73
Tidewater Co. v. Costar, (18 N. J.
Eq. 518) 232, 259
Tie Loy, In re, (26 Fed. Eep. 611)
121
Tiedt V. Carstevsen, (61 Iowa, 334)
398
Tierney b. Brown, (65 Miss. 563) 97
Tierney v. Dodge, (9 Minn. 166) 25,
102, 104
Tiffin V. McCormack, (34 Ohio St.
638) 347
Tift V. Towns, (53 Ga. 47) 353
Tifet V. Buffalo, 82 N. Y. 205) 17
Tighe J). Lowell, (119 Mass. 472) 340
Tile V. Mayfleld, (19 S. W. R. 598) 12
Tilford V. Olathe, (44 Kan. 721) 56
Tillman v. People, (12 Mich. 401) 222
Tillotsen v. East Saginaw, (54 N. W.
R. 182) 8
Tilson V. Newman, (23 Vt. 421) 67
Times v. State. (26 Ala. 165) 104
Tiudley v. Salem, (137 Mass. 171) 329,
339
Tinges v. Baltimore, (51 Md. 600) 221
Tingue v. Rochester, (101 N. Y. 294)
397
Tinicum Fishing Co. u. Carter, (61
Pa. St. 21) 239
Tinker v. Russell, (14 Pick, 279) 327
Tinkhara v. Town of Stockbridge
(24 Atl. 761, 64 Vt. 480) 313 '
Tinsdale v. Norton, (8 Mete. 388)
346
Tinsman v. R. R. Co., (2 Dutch. 148)
2,8
Tippecanoe v. Cox, (6 Ind. 403) 169
Tipping V. St. Helens Sm. Co., (11
H. L. Cas. 642) 120
Tipton V. Norman, (72 Mo. 380) 148
Tipton Co. V. Rogers L. & M. Works,
(103 U. S. 523) 254
Titler v. Iowa Co., (48 Iowa, 90) 3.53
Titus V. Northbridge, (97 Mass. 258)
342
Titusville v. Brennan, (143 Pa. St.
642, 28 W. N. C. 534) 258
Tobitt V. Louisville, (4 S. W. 345) 276
Todd V. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. K.
E. Co., (19 Ohio St. 514) 227
Todd V. Troy, (61 N. Y. 506) 344,
350 a
Toledo A. A. etc. Co. v. Pennsyl.
Co., (54 Fed. 730) 396
Toledo Com. S. E. Co. v. Toledo Elec.
St. Ry. Co., (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 362)
148
Toledo etc. Co. v. Detroit etc. Co.,
(62 Mich. 564, 578) 241
Toledo etc. Co. v. Jacksonville, (67
111. 37) 306
Toledo etc. Co. w. Toledo etc. Co.,
(26 Wkly. L. Bui. 172) 241
Toledo etc. Co. v. Toledo El. S. R.
Co., (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 362) 232
Toledo P. & W. etc. v. Chenon, (43
111. 209) 290
Tomlin ». Dubuque etc. R. R. Co.,
(32 Iowa, 106) 239
Tomlin v. R. R. Co., (32 Iowa, 106)
132
Tomlinson v. Branch, (15 Wall. 460)
270
Toms V. Whitby, (35 Up. Can. Q. B.
195) 343, 351
Tonawanda R. R. Co. v. Munger, (5
Denio, 255) 301
Tone c. Columbus, (39 Ohio St. 281)
278
Tone V. New York, (70 N. T. 157)
338 a
Toomey v. London etc. Co., (3 C. B.
N. S. 146) 351
Topeka v. Gage, (24 Pac. 82) 397
Topeka v. Gillett, (32 Kan. 431) 61
Topeka v. Huntoon, (26 Pac. E. 488)
277
Topeka v. Sells, (29 Pac. 604) 292
TABLE OF CASE8 CITED.
Eeferences are to Sections.
clxxiii
Topsliam v. Lewiston, (74 Me. 236)
66
Topsham v. Blondell, (82 Me. 152)
282
Topsham v. Rogers, (42 Vt. 189) 170
Torbitt V. Louisville, (4 S. W. R. 345)
326
Torrey v. Scranton, (19 Atl. R. 351)
355
Toronto v. Bowes, (4 Grant, 504) 166
Torrey v. Milbury, (21 Pick. 64) 95
Totterdell v. Glazby, (2 Wils. 226)
157
Touchard v. Toucliard, (5 Gal. 306) 9
Tourtellot v. Rosebrook, (11 Metcf.
460) 338
Towanda Bridge, In re, (91 Pa. St.
216) 144, 238, 302
Tower v. Rutland, (56 Vt. 28) 223
Tower v. Tower, (18 Pick. 262) 129
Tower v. Welker, (53 N. W. R. 289)
86
Town V. Blaeberry, (29 111. 137) 250
Town V. Culver, (19 Wall. 84) 190
Town V. Williamson, (91 Ind. 541)
279
Town Board, In re, (7 N. Y. Supp.
165) 362
Town Council v. Harbors, (6 Rich.
L. 96) 123
Town of Cicero v. Williamson, (91
Ind. 541) 56
Town of Eagle v. Kohn, (83 111. 292)
1916
Town of Guilford v. Supervisors of
Chenango Co., (13 N. Y. 143) 60
Town of Mount Pleasant v. Beck-
with, (100 tr. S. 514) 58
Town of Monticello v. Banks, (2 S.
W. R. 852, 48 Ark. 251) 255
Town of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee,
(12 Wis. 93) 57
Town of Prairie v. Lloyd, (97 111. 179)
196
Town of Boxbury v. R. R. Co., (14
Atl. 92) 317
Town of Solon v. Williamsburg Sav.
Bk., (35 Hun, 1) 189
Town of Suffield jj. Town of East
Granby, (52 Conn. 175) 53
Town of Toledo v. Edens, (59 Iowa,
352) 57
Towns V. HaiTis, (13 Tex. 507) 67
Towns B. Tallahassee, (11 Fla. 190)
124
Townsend v. Des Moines, (42 Iowa,
657) 350 a
Townsend v. Hoyle, (20 Conn. 1) 240,
288
Townsend v. Lamb, (14 Neb. 324)
186
Townsend v. Manistee, (88 Mich.
408, 50 N. W. R. 321) 279
Townsend v. Susquehanna T. Co., (6
Johns. 90) 328
Township v. Rankin, (70 Iowa, 65)
142
Tp. of Norway v. Clear Lake, (11
Iowa, 506) 164
Toyhales Case, (Cro. Car. 310) 120
Tracey v. People, (6 Colo. 151) 98
Trafton v. Alfred, (15 Me. 258) 91
Train v. Boston Dis. Co., (144 Mass.
523) 118
Trammel v. State, (9 So. R. 815, 93
Ala. 388) 47
Trammell v. Russellville, (34 Ark.
105) 92, 327, 338
Trans, v. Skinner, (40 W. W. Rep.
234) 377
Trans. Co. v. Chicago, (99 U. S. 635)
287, 301
Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.
S. 635) 239
Trans. Co. v. Parkersburg, (107 U.
S. 691) 133
Trainer v. Lawrence, (36 111. App. 90)
249
Traphagen v. Jersey City, 29 N. J.
Eq. 206) 294
Trask v. Maguire, (18 Wall. 206) 270
Travelers v. Oswego, (55 Fed. R. 361)
196
Treadway v. Schnauber, (1 Dak. Ter.
236) 169
Treadwell v. Com'rs, (11 Ohio St.
190) 3, 216
Treadwell v. New York, (1 Daly, 123)
336 a
Treat v. Middletown, (8 Conn. 243)
363, 377
Treise v. St. Paul, (36 Minn. 526) 342,
346
Trenton R. B. Case, (6 Whart. 225)
308
Trescott v. Waterloo, (26 Fed. Rep.
592) 338
Trester o. Mo. P. R. Co., (49 N. W.
R. 1110) 241
Trevin v. Lewis, (4 M. & C. 249) 393
Troy B. Atchison etc Co., (13 Kan.
70) 108
Trimble B. Buoyrus, (3 Bates, 419)
117
Trimble B. Sterling, (12 S. W. R. 1066)
267
Trinity & S. R. Co. v. Lane, (79 Tex.
643) 339, 363, 373
Tripler b. New York, (63 Hun, 630)
326
Tripp V. Frazier, (4 Har. & Johns.
446) 203
clxxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.'
Keferences are to Sections.
Troy 1). Mutual Bank, (20 N. Y. 387)
267
Trott V. Warren, (11 Me. 227) 170
Trowbridge v. Haran, (78 N. Y. 439)
397
Trowbridge v. Newark, (46 N. J. L.
140) 75
Troxall ». Vinton, (77 Iowa, 90) 3506
Troy V. Troy K. R. Co., (49 N. Y. 657)
348
Troy V. Winters, (2 Hun, 63) 130
Troy etc. v. Com., (127 N". Y. 43) 80
Truax v. Pool, (46 Iowa, 256) 56, 57
Truehelus v. City Council, (1 Nott &
McCord, 227) 17
True V. Davis, (22 N. E. 410) 55
True V. Melvin, (43 N. H. 503) 365
Truesdale v. Peoria C. S. Co., (101
111. 561) 396
Truman v. Walgam, (2 Wils. 296) 320
Trumbull v. White, (5 Hill, 46) 263
Trustees v. Campbell, (16 Ohio St.
11)50
Trustees v. Cherry, (8 Ohio St. 564)
24, 165
Trustees v. Hill, (6 Cow. 23) 88
Trustees v. Hoboken, (33 N. J. L. 13)
216
Trustees v. Keeting, (2 Denio, 341)125
Trustees v. Kinner, (13 Bush, 334)
377
Trustees v. McCounell, (12- 111. 138)
275
Trustees v. Mllw. etc. Co., (45 N. W.
R. 1086) 302
Trustees v. Moody, (62 Ala. 389) 165
Trustees v. Parks, (10 Me. 141) 25
Trustees v. Peaslee, (15 N. H. 317) 48
Trustees v. People, (121 111. 552) 374
Trustees v. Reneau, (2 Swan,) 50
Trustees v. School, (12 N. R. 243) 225
Trustees u. Shotwell, (45 N. J. Eq.
106) 283
Trustees v. Tatman, (13 111. 30) 2
Trustees v. Winston, (5 S. & Port. 17)
15
Trustees etc. v. Johnson, (2 Cart.
219) 377
Trustees etc. of Princeton v. Manck,
(35 Ind. 51) 61
Trustees of Academy v Erie, (31 Pa.
St. 515) 32, 148
Trustees of First Ev. Church v.
Walsh, (57 111. 370) 217, 222
Tubbesing v. Burlington, (68 Iowa,
691) 276
Tuckahoe Canal Co. b. Railroad R.
R. Co., (11 Leigh, 42) 124, 144, 238
Tucker u. Eldred, (6 R. I. 404) 293
Tucker v. Fairbanks, (98 Mass. 101)
167
Tucker v. Justices, (13 Ire. 434) 98
169
Tucker v. Virginia City, (4 Nev. 20)
118
Tucker v. Virginia City, (4 Keb. 20)
164
Tuff V. Warman, (2 Q. B. N. S. 740)
352
Tugman v. Chicago, (78 111. 405) 152
Tuley V. State, (1 Ind. 500) 81
TuUytown, In re, (11 Pa. Co. Ct R.
97) 24
Turley v. Thomas, (8 Carr. & P. 103)
321
Turner, In re, (5 Ohio, 542) 359, 363
Turner k. Althaus, (6 Neb. 54) 30
Turner ». Cruzen, (70 Iowa, 202) 169
Turner ». Dartmouth, (13 Allen, 291)
354 a
Turner v. Forsyth, (3 S. E. R. 649, 78
Ga. 683) 401
Turner v. Holland, (33 N. W. R. 383)
224, 225
Turner v. Indianapolis, (96 Ind. 51)
350
Turner v. Maryland, (107 U. S. 38)
127
Turner v. Newbergh, (109 N. Y. 301)
347
Turner v. Nye, (154 Mass. 579) 232
Turnerj). People'sFerry Co., (21 Fed.
Rep. 91) 219
Turner v. Woodbury, (57 Iowa, 440)
325
Turney v. Bridgeport, (55 Com. 412)
171
Turnpike Co., Ex parte, (62 Ala. 93)
399
Turnp. Co. v. Atkinson,(l Sneed. 426)
318
Turnp. Co. v. Campbell, (2 Humph.
467) 320
Turnpike Co. v. Cincinnati, (4 Am.
L. Reo. 325) 57
Turnpike Com'rs v. Louisville etc.
Co., (1 S. W. R. 671) 282
Turnp. Co. b. McKean, (11 Johns.
154) 107
Turnp. Co. v. Vandusen, (10 Vt. 199)
320
Turpin V. Com'rs., (7 Ind. 172) 79
Tutill V. West Ham L. Bd., (L. B. 8
C. P. 447) 346
Tuttle, Ex parte, (91 Cal. 589) 117
Tuttle V. Everett, (15 Miss. 27) .326
Tuttle V. Jackson, (6 Wend. 224) 87
Tuttle B. Weston, (59 Wis. 151) 142
Tyler b. Beacher, (44 Vt. 648) 188,
234 a
Tyler b. Columbia, (6 Ohio Cir. Ct
R. 224) 146
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
fieferences are to Sections.
clxxv
Tyler v. Hudson, (147 Mass. 609) 234
Tyler v. Sturdy, (108 Mass. 196) 194
Tyler v. Tyler, (2 Root, 4J9) 69
Tyng V. Boston, (133 Mass. 372) 87
Tyrone Twp. School Directors v.
Denkleberger, (6 Pa. 31) 203
Tyrrell v. Wheeler, (123 N. Y. 76) 12,
255
Tyson v. Halifax Sell. Dls., (51 Pa.
St. 9) 139, 254
Twenty-ninth Street, In re, (1 Hill,
189) 221
Twilley v. Perkins, (26 Atl. E. 286)
300
Twiss V. Pt. Huron, (63 Mich. 528)
173
u.
Udall V. Trustees, (19 Johns. 179) 54
Uhl V. Taxing District, (6 Lea, 610)
42
Uhrig V. St. Louis, (44 Mo. 458) 259 a
Uline V. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., (101
N". Y. 98, 4 N. E. E. 536) 307
Ulman v. Baltimore, (20 Atl. R. 141)
279
Ulrich 13. St. Louis, (112 Mo. 138) 324
Umatilla Ir. Co. v. Barnhart, (30Pac.
R. 37) 238
Underhill v. Essex, (23 Atl. Rep. 617)
9, 14
Underbill v. Manhattan Ry. Co., (27
Abb. N. C. 478, 21 Civ. Pro. R.441)
243
Underhill v. Smith, (Chip. 81) 282
Underhill v. Sonora, (17 Cal. 172) 199
Underwood v. Brockman, (4 Dana,
309) 327
Underwood v. Green, (42 N. Y. 140)
118, 120
Underwood D. Stuyresant, (19 Johns.
186) 221
Underwood v. White, (27 Ark. 382)
361
Union v. Knox Co., (90 Tenn. 541)
53
Union Bank v. Hill, (3 Cold. 325) 258
Union Bank of Tenn. v. State, (9
Yerg. 490) 255
Union Co. v. Peckham, (12 Atl. Eep.
130) 221
Union Coal Co. v. La Salle, (26 J^T. E.
Rep. 506) 143
Union College, In re, (29 N. E. R.
460, 129 N. Y. 308) 16
Union Depot Co. v. Brunswick, (31
Minn. 297) 132
Union etc. Co. v. Proctor, (12 Colo.
194) 12
Union etc. Co. v. Slee, (12 N. E. E.
543, 33 N. E. R. 222) 243
Union Nat. Bank v. New York, (51
N. Y. 638) 326
Union Nat. Bk. v. Matthews, (98 U.
S. 628) 207
Union Pac. R. R. v. Cheyenne, (113
U. S. 516, 525) 397
Union Pac. R. Co. i'. Com'rs, (4 Neb.
450) 184
Union Pac. R. Co. b. Davis Co., (6
Kan. 256) 12, 14, 186
Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Dodge Co.,
(98 U. S. 541) 326(1
Union Pao. R. R. Co. v. Hall, (91 U.
S. 343) 314, 359, 363
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Kansas City,
(42 Kan. 497) 56
Union Pao. R. Co. v. Lincoln Co., (3
Dill. 300) 195 a, 196
Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Lincoln Co.,
(1 Dillon C. C. R. 314) 258
Union Pac. R. E. Co. v. Peniston, (18
Wall. 5) 258
Union P. E. Co. v. Eyan, (2 Wyo. 408)
110
Union Pass. Ry. Co. v. Philadelphia,
(101 U. S. 528) 274
Uniontown v. Com., (34 Pa. St. 293,
296) 377
Union Township ». G-ibboney, (94
Pa. St. 534) 3
Union Trust Co. v. Monticello etc.
E. E. Co., (63 N. Y. 314) 190
United States v. Thorpe, (2 Bond, 340)
66
United Br. Church v. Vanducan, (37
Wis. 54) 99
United States, Ee, (96 N. Y. 227) 247
United States v. Arredondo, (6 Pe-
ters, 691) 279
U. S. B. B. & O. E. Co., (17 Wall. 322)
375
United States v. B. & O., (17 Wall.
332) 2, 9, 187
U. S. V. Bank, (1 Cranoh. 7) 360
United States b. Boutwell, (17 Wall.
604) 368
U. S. V. Bixby, (9 Fed. Rep. 78) 69
U. S. V. Bloomgart, (2 Ben. 356) 67
United States v. Boyoe, (2 McLean,
352) 167
U. S. V. Boyd, (5 How. 50) 72
U. S. V. Brindle, (110 U. S. 688) 79
U. S. B. Brooklyn, (8 Fed. Rep. 473)365
United States «. Chicago, (7 How.
185) 215, 221
U. S. B. Cicero, (41 Fed. 8) 266
United States b. City Bank of Col-
umbus, (21 How. 356) 195 d
U. S. V. Clark Co., (96 U. S. 212) 376
United States b. Clark Co., (95 U. S.
769) 194 tt
clxxvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Kefcrences are to Sections.
United States v. County Court, (3
Fed. Eep. 1) 14
United States v. Dulutli, (1 Dillon C.
C. 469) 133
U. S. V. Engeman, (46 Fed. 898) 245,
247
United States v. Fillebrown, (7 Pet.
28) 108
U. S. V. Ft. Scott, (99 U. S. 152) 368
United States b. Hall, (7 Mackey, 14)
359, 363
United States v. Hams, (1 Sum. 21)
232
U. S. V. Hartwell, (6 Wall. 358) 67
U. S. V. Hoar, (2 Mason, 134) 312
United States ». Holly, (3 Cranch,
656) 117
U. S. u. Humason, (6 Sawy. 199) 72
U. S. V. JefEerson Co., (1 McCrary,
356) 186
U. S. V. Johnson Co., (5 Dill. 208)
195
United States v. K. & H. B. Co., (45
Fed. Kep. 414) 314 a
U. S. 13. Kirkpatrick, (9 Wheat. 735)
312
United States v. Knox Co., (2 Mc-
Crary C. C. 625) 194 a
U. S. Kuhn, (4 Cranch, C. C. 401) 108,
310
United States v. Lawrence, (3 Dall.
42) 360
U. S. V. LeBaron, (19 How. 73, 4
Wall. 642) 72
U. S. V. Lincoln, (5 Dill. C. C. 184,
194 and cases cited) 376
U. S. V. Linn, (15 Pet. 290) 72
U. S. V. Maurice, (2 Brock. 103) 67
United States v. Memphis, (97 U. S.
292, 23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 454)
55, 56
United States v. Miller Co., (4 Dill.
2.33) 177, 376
U. S. V. Mitchell, (109 U. S. 146) 79
U. S. V. New Orleans, (17 Fed. Rep.
483) 375
r. S. I). Xew Orleans, (98 U. S. 341)
256, 376
U. S. i;. Oswego Twp., (28 Fed. R. .55)
375
U. S. 11. Ottawa, (28 Fed. E. 407) 360,
375
U. S. V. Pacific Railroad, (120 U. S.
227) 335 a
U. S. V. Reed, (56 Mo. 565) 232
U. S. V. Ripley, (7 Pet. 18) 79
U. S. V. Silverman, (4 Dillon C. C.
224) 369
U. S. V. Smith, (124U. S. 525) 67
U. S. V. Union Pae. R. R. Co., (4 Dil-
lon, 479, 91 U. S. 343) 183, 368
U. S. V. Vernon Co. Court, (3 Dillon
281) 877
U. S. V. Windom, (137 U. S. 636) 359
U. S. V. Wright, (l McLean, 509 86
U. S. D. Co. V. Chicago, (112 111. 19)
123
U. S. Ex. Co. V. Hess, (3 N. Y. S. 777)
393
U. S. 111. Co. I). Grant, (55 Hun, 222)
301
University v. Indiana, (14 How. 268)
22
University v. Walden, (15 Ala. 655)
79
Updegraff v. Crans, (47 Pa. St. 103)
393
Updike V. Campbell, (4 E. D. Smith
570) 122
Upper Coos R. Co. v. Parsons, (19
Atl. R. 10) 245
Upton V. U. S., (19 Ct. of CI. 46) 79
Urquhart v. Ogdensburg, (91 N. T.
67) 327, 346, 355
Utica Water Co. v. Utica, (31 Hun,
431) 189 o
V.
Vac. Center St., In re, (115 Pa. St
247) 282
Vacation of Howard St., (28 W. N.
C. 159) 259 a
Vacation of Henry St., In re, (123
Pa. St. 646) 24
Vail V. Beach, (10 Kan. 214) 270
Vail D. Morris etc. Co., (21 N. J. L.
189) 279
Vaile V. Independence, (22 S. W. K.
695) 169
Vale Mills v. Nashua, (63 N. H. 136)
355
Valentine v. St. Paul, (34 Minn. 446)
327
Valparaiso v. Donovan, (44 N. W. R.
449) 346
Valpax-aiso v. Gardner, (97 Ind. 1) 175
395
Valpey v. Manley, (1 C. B. 592) 326 a
Vanaokers Case, (1 Ld. Eaym. 496)
78
Van Allen v. Assessors, (3 Wall. 873)
258
Van Antwerp, In re, (56 N. T. 261)
28, 259 a, 280
Vanarsdall v. State, (65 lud. 176) 209
Van Baalen v. People, (40 Mich. 458)
123
Van Buren v. Wells, (14 S. W. B. 38)
117, 134, 1.58
Vance v. Bank, (1 Blackf. 80) 22, 30
Vance v. Franklin, (30 N. E. K. 149)
353
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
clxxvij
References are to Sections.
Vance v. Little Rock, (30 Ark. 435)
15, 376
Vancouver, In re, (2 Sawyer, 381) 121
Vandalia v. Huss, (41 111. App. 517)
324
Vandalia v. Ropp, (39 111. App. 344)
324, 328
Van Daren v. New York, (9 Paige,
388) 397
Vanderbilt v. 4<iams, (7 Cow. 349)
116, 130
Vanderlip v. Q-rand Eapids, (41 N.
W. R. 677) 329, 396
Vanderslice v. Pliiladelphia, (103 Pa.
St. 102) 92
Vanderweile v. Taylor, (65 N. Y.
341) 354
Vaudeventer v. Long Island City,
(10 N. Y. S. 801, 57 Hun, 590) 187 a
Vandevere ». Kansas City, (17 S. W.
R. 695) 249
Vandiue, In re, (6 Pick. 187) 119, 158
Van Dyke v. Cincinnati, (1 Disney,
532) 120, 350 a
Van Eppes v. Mobile, (25 Ala. 460)
325
Van Hastop v. Madison City, (1 Wall.
291) 114, 189, 254
Van Hoffman v. Quincy, (4 Wall. 535)
283
Van Hook v. Selma, (70 Ala. 361) 62,
123
Van Ness v. WasMngton, (4 Pet. 232)
229
Van Orsdale v. Hazard, (3 Hill, 243)86
Vanover v. Terrell etc. Co., (27 Ga.
354) 397
Van Pelt u. Davenport, (42 Iowa,
308) 288, 328, 338 a, 354
Van Rensselaer v. Kidd, (4 Barb. 17)
397
Vansant v. Roberts, (3 Md. 119) 49
Van Sicklen v. Burlington, (127 Vt.
70) 130
Van Swarton v. Com., (24 Pa. St. 131)
104
Vantilburgh v. Shann, (24 N. J. L.
740) 279 ,
VanValkenberghv. Mayor, (43 Barb.
109) 92
Van Valkentourgh u. Milwaukee, (30
Wis. 338) 221
Van Wert Bd. of Ed. v. Edson, (18
Ohio St. 221) 228, 229
Varden u. Mount, (78 Ky. 86) 129
Varick v. New York, (4 Johns. Ch.
53, 392
Vamer v. Martin, (21 W. Va. 534)
235
Vamer v. Nobleborough, (2 Me. 126)
179
xii
Varney v. Manchester, (58 N. H. 430)
340
Varnham v. Council Bluffs, (52 Iowa,
698) 352 a
Vars V. Grand Trunk etc. Co., (23
Up. Can. C. P. 143) 300
Vason V. Augusta, (38 Ga. 542) 102,
117
Vassault v. Austin, (36 Cal. 691) 102
Vaughau v. Jolmson, (77 Va. 300) SI
Vaughn v. English, (8 Cal. 3i)) 67
Vaun V. Pipkin, (77 N. C. 408) 67
Vawter v. Eranklin Col. (53 Ind. 88)
106
Veale v. Boston, (135 Mass. 187) 346
Veany v. Mayor, (80 N. Y. 185) 381
Veazie v. China, (50 Me. 518) 111
Veazie v. Penob. R. R. Co., (49 Me.
119) 348
Vedder v. Vedder, (1 Den. 257) 120
Veeder v. Lima, (19 Wis. 280) 186
Veeder v. Little Falls, (100 N. Y. 343)
353
Velte V. U. S., (45 N. W. E. 110) 354
Veneman v. Jones, (118 Ind. 41) 299
Venice u. Murdock, (92 U. S. 494) 196
Verdery v. Summerville, (82 Ga. 138)
259
Vermilyea v. Adams Ex. Co., (21
Wall. 138) 195 c
Vernon Soc. v. Hills, (6 Cow. 23) 81
Verplauck v. Mayor, (2 Edw. 220) 132
Versailles v. Versailles Co., (10 S.
W. Rep. 280) 319
Vestal V. Little Rock, (15 S. W. 891)
56
Vick 0. Rochester, (46 Hun, 607) 396
Vick V. Vicksburg, (1 How. 379) 217
Vicksburg v. Hennessy, (54 Miss.
392) 349, 352
Vicksburg ». Marshall, (59 Miss. 563)
221
Vicksburg v. McLean, (6 So. R. 774)
345
Victory v. Baker, (67 N. Y. 366) 348
Vidalat v. New Orleans, (10 So. R.
175, 43 La. An. 1121) 128
Village V. Brooks, (31 111. App. 62)
350 6
Village I). Howland, (124 111. 547) 353
Village of Franklin v. CroU, (31 Ohio
St. 647) 61
Villere v. Butman, (23 La. An. 515) 66
Viual V. Dorchester, (7 Gray, 421) 340
Vincennes v. Richards, (23 Ind. 381)
239, 329
Vincennes University v. Indiana, (14
How. 268) 37, 38, 40
Vincent v. Nantucket, (12 Cush. 103)
4, 110, 169
Vincett o. Cook, (4 Hun, 318) 300
clxxviii
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Beferences are to Sections.
Vintners ». Passey, (1 Burr, 237) 75
Vionet ». Municipality, (4 La. An. 42)
119
Virginia v. Chesapeake & Oliio Canal
Co., (32 Md. 501) 191, 192 6
Virginia v. Hall, (96 111. 278) 282
Virginia & Tenn. R. E. Co. v. Wash-
ington Co., (30 Gratt. 471) 256
Virginia City v. Mining Co., (2 Nev.
86) 31, 32
Virginia etc. Co. o. Lyon Co., (6Nev.
68) 185
Visalia v. Jacobs, (65 Cal. 434) 220
Vogel V. Little Rock, (19 S. W. E. 13,
55 Ark. 609) 36, 59
Vogel V. New York, (92 N. T. 10) 327,
347
Vogt V. Mayor etc., (4 Am. & Eng.
Cor. Cas., 329) 120
Voght V. Buffalo, (133 N. T. 463) 278,
279
Von Hoffman ». Quincy, (4 Wall. 535)
14, 194, 256
Von Phul V. Hammer, (29 Iowa, 222)
26
Von Steen v. Beatrice, (54 N. W. E.
677) 271, 278
Vorrath v. Hobokon, (49If. J. L. 285)
339
Vosper V. New York, (49 N. T. Su-
perior, 296) 345
Vreeland v. Jersey City, (37 N. J.
Eq. 574) 283
Wabash v. Pearson, (22 N. E. R. 134)
315, 353
Wabash & E. Canal v. Beers, (2 Black.
448) 283
Wabash etc. Co. v. Spears, (16 Ind.
441) 354
Wabaunsee Co. v. Muhlenbaoker, (18
Kan. 129) 126
Wabaunsee Co. Com'rs ». Walker, (8
Kan. 431) 326 a
Waco V. Powell, (32 Tex. 258) 129
Waddell v. New York, (8 Barb. 95)
329
Waddington v. St. Louis, (14 Mo.
190) 133
Wade V. Brantford, (19 Up. Can. Q.
B. 207) 338
Wade V. Leroy, (20 How. 34) 352 a
Wade B. Newbern, (77 N. C. 460) 165
Wade ». Richmond, (18 Gratt. 583)
53, 55, 395
Wadleigh v. Oilman, (12 Me. 403) 130
Waggoner ». Jermaine, (7 Hill, 357)
Wager v. Troy Union etc. R. R. Co.,
(25 N. Y. 526) 224, 302, 303
Wagner v. City of Rock Island, (.34
N. E. R. 545) 152
Wakefield v. Brown, (38 Minn. 361
37 N. W. R. 788) 49
Wakefield v. Newell, (12 E. I. 75) 329
Wakefield v. Newport, (60 N. H. 374)
92, 338
Wakefield v. Pawtucket, (12 E. 1. 75)
354 a
Wakeman v. Wilbur, (4 N. Y. S. 9.38)
217
Walcott V. Mayor, (5 Mich. 249) 365
Walcott V. People, (17 Mich. 68) 261
Walcott D. Swampscott, (1 Allen, 101)
92,338 a
Walcott V. Walcott, (19 Vt. 37, 39)99
Walden v. Dudley, (49 Mo. 421) 56,
270
Walduer v. Savannah, (49 6a. 316)
347
Waldo V. Wallace, (12 Ind. 569) 102,
117
Waldraven v. Memphis, (4 Cold. 431)
79
Waldron v. Lee, (5 Pick. 323) 67
Waldron v. Haverhill, (10 N. E. K.
481) 92,329,336 a, 338
Walker v. Aurora, (29 N. E. R. 741)
279
Walker v. Cook, (129 Mass. 578) 79
Walker v. Cincin., (21 Ohio, 14) 67
Walker c. District, (12 Cent. Kep.
408) 326
Walker v. District, (6 Mackey, 352)
279
Walker v. Eastern Counties By. Co.,
(6 Hare, 544) 243
Walker v. Ferrill, (58 Ga. 512) 81
Walker v. Kansas City, (99 Mo. 647)
316
Walker v. Mad River & L. R. E. Co.,
(8 Ohio, 38) 249
Walker ». St. Louis, (15 Mo. 574) 326a
Walker 0. Springfield, (94 111. 364)258
Walker v. Wasco Co., (19 Pac. E. 81)
324
Walker v. Whitehead, (16 Wall. 314)
283
Walkleyi). Muscatine, (6 Wall. 481)
364
Wall, In re, (48 Cal. 279) 153
Wall V. Monroe, (103 U. S. 74) 177
Wall V. Highland, (72 Wis. 435)3506
Wallace v. Ames, (10 Phila. 356) 120
Wallace v. Fee, (50 N. Y. 694) 228
Wallace v. Peeley, (88 N. Y. 646) 111
Wallace v. Loomis, (97 U. S. 147) 1926
Wallace v. Mayor etc., (29 Cal. 180)
176
Wallace v. Menaoha, (48 Wis. 79) 92,
333
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
clxxix
Wallace v. Muscatine, (4 Greene, 373)
Wallace v. San Jose, (29 Oal. 180) 169,
189 a
Wallace e. Shelton, (14 La. An. 498)
248
Wallace v. Trustees, (84 N. C. 164)
32
Wallaok v. Society etc., (67 N. T. 23)
124
Waller v. Dubuque, (69 Iowa, 541) 92
Walling V. Mayor etc., (5 La. An. 660)
92
Walling V. Shreveport, (5 La. An.
660) 338
Wain V. Philadelphia, (99 Pa. St. 330)
148
Walnut Str., In re, (10 Pa. Co. Ct. R.
173) 256, 259 a
Walnut Township b. Jordan, (38 Kan.
562) 48, 55
Walnut V. Wade, (103 U. S. 695) 191,
193
Walsford v. Weiden, (23 Kan. 601)
362
Walsh V. Mathews, (29 Cal. 123) 283
Walsh V. Mayor, (113 N". Y. 143) 173
Walsh V. Mayor, (41 Hun, 299) 92
Walsh V. New York, (107 N. Y. 220)
338 CL
Walter v. Caywood, (31 N. Y. 51) 318
Walter v. Columbia City, (61 Ind. 24)
125
Walter v. Seefe, (15 Jur. 416) 120
Walters v. Duke, (31 La. Ann. 668)
259
Waltham v. Kemper, (55 111. 346) 325
Walton V. Develing, (61 111. 201) 379
Walworth Bank v. F. L. & I. Co.,
(16 Wis. 629) 99
Walwyn v. St. Quentin, (1 Bos. & P.
652) 177
Wamesit Power Co. c. Allen, (120
Mass. 352) 232
Wamesit P. Co. v. Lowell etc. Co.,
(139 Mass. 173) 243
Wammaok v. Halloway, (2 Ala. 31)
381
Wapella v. Davis, (39 111. App. 592)
260
Wapello V. Bigham, (10 Iowa, 39) 81
Ward, In re, (52 N. Y. 395) 259 o
Ward V. Andrews, (3 Mo. App. 275)
337
Ward V. Chum, (18 Gratt. 801) 190 a
Ward ti. Great West etc. Co., (13 Q.
B. 315) 353
Ward ». Hartf. Co., (12 Conn. 404)
80, 325
Ward V. Jefferson City, (24 Wis. 342)
340, 350 a
Ward V. Little Rook, (41 Ark. 526)
120
Ward V. Maryland, (12 Wall. [U. S.]
418) 258
Ward V. Morris, (4 H. & McH. 340)
258
Ward V. North Haven, (43 Conn. 148)
342 343
Ward' V. Peck, {49 N. J. L. 42) 236,
329
Warden v. Fond du Lac, (14 Wis.
618) 397
Ware v. Miller, (9 S. C. 13) 194
Waring v. Mobile, (24 Ala. 701) 67
Warner v. Holyoke, (112 Mass. 362)
310, 348
Warner u. Knox, (50 Wis. 429) 291
Warner v. Mower, (11 Vt. 385) 97
Warner v. Myers, (3 Oreg. 218) 361,
371
Warner B. New York etc. Co., (4 N.
Y. 465) 352
Warner b. People, (7 Hill, 81) 79
Warner b. Trenton, (24 N. J. L. 764)
79
Warnocki). Lafayette, (4 La. An. 419)
99
Warren v. Charlestown, (2 Gray, 104)
24 55 56
Warren 'b. Chicago, (118 111. 329) 175
Warren b. Henly, (31 Iowa, 31) 259 a,
291
Warren v. Grand Haven, (30 Mich.
24) 277
Warren u. Holyoke, (112 Mass. 362)
343
Warren v. Lyons City, (22 Iowa, 351)
228, 229, 301, 308
Warren v. Paul, (22 Ind. 276) 258
Warren v. St. Paul etc. R. R. Co., (18
Minn. 384) 233
Warren v. Wisconsin etc. R. R. Co.,
(6 Biss. C. C. 425) 231
Warren Bor. v. Geer, (117 Pa. St. 207)
258
Warren Co. v. Kern, (51 Miss. 807)
177
Warren Co. ». Marcy, (97 U. S. 96)
195 c?, 197
Warren Co. v. State, (15 Ind. 250)
373
Warren Co. Sup. v. Patterson, (56 lU.
Ill) 208
Warrensburg v. Miller, (77 Mo. 56)
265
Warsaw v. Dunlap, (112 Ind. 576)
331a
Warson v. Hastings, (22 Minn. 437)
65
Wartman, In re, (2 N. Y. Supp. 324,
22 Abb. N. C. 137) 71
clxxx
Wartman v. Philadelphia,
202, 210) 129
Warwick v. Mayo, (15 Gratt. 528) 90,
105, 250
Washburn v. City of Bloomington,
(32 111. App. 245) 138
Washburn v. Lyons, 32 Pac. R. 310)
148, 281
Washburn ». Oshkosh, (60 Wish. 453)
276
Washburn v. Oshkosh, (60 Wis. 453)
53,55
AVashburn College v. Shawnee Co.
Com'rs, (8 Kan. 344) 270
Washburn etc. Co. v. Worcester, (116
Mass. 458) 121
Washer v. BuUett Co., (110 U. S. 558)
313, 315
Washington v. Hammond, (76 X. C.
33) 117
Washington v. Nashville, (1 Swan,
177) 299
Washington «. State, (13 Ark. 752)
255
Washington Avenue, (69 Pa. St. 353,
8 Ara. Kep. 255) 56, 248, 254
Wash. Bridge Co. v. State, (18 Conn.
58) 314
Washn. Co. Sup. v. Durant, (9 Wall.
415) 364, 369
Washington & G. Ey. Co. ■». Glad-
mon, (15 Wall. 401) 352 a
Washington Univ. ». Green, (1 Md.
Ch. 97) 359
Wasson v. Com'rs, (27 Wkly. L. Bui.
134) 188, 254
Water v. Veteran, (6 N. Y. S. 607)
352
Waterbury v. Laredo, (60 Tex. 510)
134, 392
Waterbury Sav. Bk. v. Lawler, (46
Conn. 242) 397
Water Co. v. San Diego, (59 Cal. 517)
170
Waterloo v. Union Mill, (72 Iowa,
437) 312
Waters v. Leech, (3 Ark. 110) 150
Watei-town v. Cowen, (4 Paige Ch.
510) 226, 305
Watertown v. Mayo, (109 Mass. 315)
118
Watkins v. County Co., (30 W. Va.
657) 379
Watkins ». Lynch, (71 Cal. 21, 11
Pac. K. 808) 224, 310
Watkins v. Milwaukee, (52 Wis. 98)
259 a
Watkins v. Preston Co., (30 W. Va.
657) 325
Watkins v. Walker Co., (18 Tex. 585)
238
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Pa. St.
Watkins v. Zwietusch, (47 Wis. 315)
259 a
Watson V. Bennett, (12 Barb. 196) 165
Watson V. Farrell, (34 W. Va. 406) 390
Watson V. Kingston, (43 Hun, 367)
328
Watson V. Kingston, (114 K. T. 88)
355
Watson V. N. Y. Central K. R. Co.
(47 N. Y. 157) 194, 283
Watson B. Pamlico Co. Com'rs, (82
N. Car. 17) 58
Watson V. Proprietors, (14 Me. 201)
313, 353
Watson V. R. R. Co., (48 N. W. E.
1129) 247
Watson V. South Kingston, (5 K. I.
562) 232, 240
Watson V. Sutherland, (5 Wall. 74)
391
Watson V. Turnbull, (34 La. An. 856)
132
Watterson v. Allegheny etc. Co., (74
Pa. St. 208) 354
Wattles V. Lapeer, (40 Mich. 624)266,
326
Watts V. Scott, (1 Dev. 291) 158
Waugh V. Leech, (28 111. 488) 217,288
Waukesha ». Village, (53 N. W. R.
675) 290
Waukesha etc. Co. v. Waukesha, (83
Wis. 475) 161, 300, 396
Waupun V. Moore, (34 Wis. 450) 130
Wauslead etc. v. Hill, (13 C. B. 479)
120
Waverly Borough, In re, (12 Pa. Co.
Ct. R. 669) 315
Waverly Waterworks Co., In re, (16
Hun, 57) 242
Waxahachie v. Brown, (67 Tex. 519)
189 a
Wayde ». Carr, (2 Dow. & Ry. 255)
321
Wayland v. Middlesex Co. Com'rs, (4
Gray, 500) 234
Wayne v. Bosworth, (91 Ind. 210) 320
Wayne Co. v. Benoit, (20 Mich. 176)
79, 85
Wayne Co. v. Detroit, (17 Mich. 390)
156, 164
Wa-yne Co. etc. v. Berry, (5 Ind. 286)
317
Wayrass v. Youmans, (85 Ga. 708)86
Weaver v. Defendorf, (3 Denio, 117)
147, 398
Weaver v. Sells, (10 Kan. 609) 283
Weber v. Lee Co., (6 Wall. 210) 369
Weber v. San Francisco, (1 Cal. 455)
327 397
Webb 1). Demopolis, (13 So. R. 289)
297, 299, 312
TABLE OP CASES CITED.
clxxxi
Beferences are to Sections.
Webb B. Mayor etc., (64 How. Pr. K.
10) 11
Webb V. Moler, (8 Ohio, 5.52) 228
Webb V. Neal, (5 Allen, 575) 203
Webb V. Pt. Bruce Harb. Co., (19 U.
C. Q. B. 626) 121
Weber v. Harbor Com'rs, (18 Wall.
57) 133
Weber v. Johnson, (37 Mo. App. 601)
146
Weber u. Traubel, (95 111. 427) 266
AVeber v. Zimmerman, (23 Md. 45)
369
Webster ». Harwinton, (32 Conn. 131)
4, 395
Webster v. Kansas City, (64 Mo. 493)
85
AVebster Co. ». Taylor, (19 Iowa, 117)
180
Weed ». Ballston Spa, (76 N. T. 329)
3.506
Weed V. Beach (50 How. Pr. 470) 173
AVeekler v. Chicago, (01 111. 142) 248
Weeks v. Forraan, (16 jST. J. L. 237)
87
Weeks ». Milwaukee, (10 Wis. 242)
259, 264, 269, 270
Weeks v. Shirley, (33 Me. 271) 352 a
Weeks v. Texarkaner, (50 Ark. 81) 79
Wehn B. Gage Co., (5 STeb. 494) 3, 325
Weick I). Lander, (75 111. 93) 351
Weightman v. Washington, (1 Black,
39) 9, 324, 328
Weiuickie v. R. K. Co., (61 Hun, 619)
279, 308
AVeir ». St. Paul S. & T. F. E. R. Co.,
(18 Minn. 155) 245
Weisbod v. Railroad Co., (18 Wis. 43)
217, 220, 228
Weisner v. Douglas, (64 N. T. 91) 184,
188, 254-
Weisenberg v. Appleton, (26 Wis. 56)
3506
Weisenberg v. Winnecoune, (56 Wis.
667) 339
Weiss V. Bethlehem, (136 Pa. St. 294)
247
AVeith V. City of Wilmington, (68 K.
C, 341) 191
AVelch V. Boston, (126 Mass. 442) 116
Welch 0. Bowen, (108 Ind. 552) 161
Welch V. Hotchkiss, (39 Conn. 140)
123 130 131
Welch V. Rutland, (56 Vt. 228) 92
Welch V. St. Genevieve, (1 Dillon,
C. C. 180) 37, 39, 96
Welch V. Wetzel Co., (1 S. E. Rep.
337) 398
Weld V. Bosfon, (126 Mass. 166) 66
Welker ». Potter, (18 Ohio St. 85)
265
Well V. Record, (24 N. J. Eq. 169) 110,
118
Wellaud v. Buffalo & L. H. Ry. Co.,
(30 Up. Can. Q. B. 147, 31 Up. Can.
Q. B. 539) 243, 247
Wellcome v. Leeds, (51 Me. 818) 306
Weller v. McCormick, (47 N. J. L.
397) 346, 348
Weller v. St. Paul, (42 N. W. R. 392)
339
Welles V. Battelle, (11 Mass. 477) 106
Wellington v. Gregson, (31 Kan. 90)
346
Wellington v. Wellington, (26 Pac.
Rep. 415) 9
•AVellington v. Wilson, (14 Up. Can.
C. P. 304) 339
Wellman v. Board, (47 N. W. R. 1099,
84 Mich. 558) 83
Wellman v. Detroit Police Board, (51
N. W. R. 1070) 84
Well^v. Atlanta, (43 Ga. 67) 163, 174
Wells V. Burbank, (17 N. H. 393) 25
Wells V. Burnham, (20 Wis. 112) 278
Wells V. Mason, (23 W. Va. 456) 360
Wells B. McLaughlin, (17 Ohio, 99)
288
Wells B. Pototoe Co. Sup., (102 U. S.
625) 184
Wells B. Somerset etc. E. R. Co., (47
Me. 345) 238
Wells Co. Road, In re, (7 Ohio St.
16, 343) 245
Welsford b. Weidlein, (23 Kan. 601)
125 278
Welsh B. Rutland, (56 Vt."228) 828
Welsh V. St. Louis, (72 Mo. 71) 847,
349
Welsh B. St. Paul etc. R. R. Co., (25
Minn. 320) 192 6
Welsh B. Wilson, (101 N. Y. 254) 300
Welter b. St. Paul, (40 Minn. 460, 42
N. W. 392) 92
Welton B. Missouri, (91 U. S. 275) 258
Wendell v. Pratt, (12 Allen, 464) 353
Wendell b. Mayor, (4 Keyes, 261) 355
Wendell b. Troy, (39 Barb. 329) 336 a,
349
Wentworth b. Hamilton, (34 U. C. Q.
B. 585) 104
Worth B. Springfield, (78 111. 107) 830
Wertheimer v. Boonville, (29 Mo. 254)
105
Wessman b. Brooklyn, (16 N. T. S.
97) 328
West B. Bancroft, (82 Vt. 367) 294
West B. Blake, (4 Blackf. 234) 30, 24C
West V. Brockport, (16 N. T. 161) 9
West V. Greenville, (39 Ala. 69) 120
West V. Samson, (44 Ga.) 184
West B. Taylor, (16 Ore. 165) 354
clxxxii
TABLE OJF CASES CITED.
Keferences are to Sections.
West Boylston v. Sterling, (17 Pick.
126) 60
Westbrook v. Bearing, (63 Me. 231)
136
West Carroll Parish v. Gaddis, (34
La. An. 928) 59, 229
West Clii. Park Com'rs v McMuUen,
(25 N. E. R. 676) 200
Westchester u. Appee, (35 Pa. St.
284) 347
West Chester Gas Co. v. Chester
County, (30 Pa. St. 232) 274
Westerhaven v. Clive, (5 Ohio St.
136) 108
Western Col. v. Cleveland, (12 Ohio
St. 375) 9, 335, 349
West Cov. V. Freking, (8 Bush, 121)
221
Western Md. R. R. Co. v. Owings, (15
Md. 199) 249
Western Pav. & Sup. Co. v. Citizen
Ry. Co., (26 N. E. R. 188) 306
Western Ry. v. Ala. G. T. R. Co., (11
So. 483) 396
Western R. Co. Young, (7 S. B. R.
912) 30, 158
Western Sav. Soc. w. Philadelphia,
(31 Pa. St. 175) 14, 163, 336 a
Western Un. Co. v. Locke, (107 Ind.
9) 399
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mass.
Atty. Gen., (125 U. S..530) 258
Western Union Tel. Co. v. New York,
(38 Fed.) 297
Western Union Tel. Co. o. Philadel-
phia, (12 Atl. Rep. 144) 123, 306 a
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Rich, (19
Kan. 517) 297
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Scircle, (102
m. 227) 320
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas,
(105 U. S. 460) 258
Westfall V. Hunter, (8 Ind. 174) 219
Westaeld v. Mayo, (122 Mass. 100)
348
Westlake v. St. Louis, (77 Mo. 47)
326 a
Weston V. Charleston, (2 Pet. 449)
258
Weston V. Foster, (7 Met. 297) 238
Weston V. Syracuse, (17 N. Y. 110)
189 a
West Orange v. Field, (37 N. J. E.
600) 329, 355
West Phila. etc. Co. v. City of Phila-
delphia, (10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 70) 306
West River Bridge v. Dix, (6 How.
507) 144, 240, 235, 238
Wetherell v. Devine, (116 111. 631) 255
Wetmore B. B'kjyn Gas Co., (42 N.
Y. 384) 132
Wetmore v. Institution, (3 N. Y. S.
179) 49
Wetumpka v. Winter, (29 Ala. 660)
184
Wetumpka v. Wetumpka Wharf Co.,
(63 Ala. 611) 32
Wewell V. Cincin., (45 Ohio St. 407)
277
Weyauwega v. Ayling, (99 U. S. 112)
190 a
Weymau v. Jefferson, (61 Mo. 55)
113, 329
Weymouth etc. Fire Dis. v. Com'rs,
(108 Mass. 142) 18
Whalen v. La Crosse, (16 Wis. 270)
265
Whalen v. Macomb, (76 111. 49) 37
Wharf Case, (3 Bland Ch. 383) 133
Wheadon v. Olds, (20 Wend. 174) 327
Wheatley v. Covington, (11 Bush, 18)
79, 110
Wlieaton v. Hadley, (23 K. E. E.422)
350 6
Wheeler v. Chicago, (57 HI. 415) 265
Wheeler ». Cincinnati, (19 Ohio St
19) 92, 335
Wheeler v. Philadelphia, (77 Pa. St
338) 197
Wheeler v. Plymouth, (116 Ind. 158)
331
Wheeler v. Rochester & S. E. K. Co..
(12 Barb. 227) 273
Wheeler v. Troy, (20 K H. 77) 325
Wheeler v. Westport, (30 Wis. 392)
252
Wheeler v. Worcester, (10 Allen, 591)
355
Wheeling v. Black, (25 W. Va. 266)
81, 158, 103
Wheeling v. Campbell, (12 W. Va.36)
312
Wheeling P. & C. Transp. Co. v.
Wheeling, (99 U. S. 270) 272
Wheeloek, In re, (3 N. Y. S. 890) 32
Wheelock v. Noonan, (198 N. T. 179)
307
Wheelock d. Peo., (84 111. 551) 79
Wheelock v. Young, (4 Wend. 647)
238
Whelan v. ST. Y. etc. R. K. Co., (38
Fed. Rep. 15) 331
Whelan v. N. Y. etc. Co., (38 Fed.
Rep. 15) 352 a
Whelen's App., (108 Pa. St. 162) 198
Whetton v. (;layton, (111 Ind. 360)
310
Whicher v. Somerville, (138 Mass.
454) 313
Whipple V. Fair Haven, (21 Atl. 533)
355
Whistont). Frankhn, (34 Ind. 392) 158
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
clxxxiii
References are to Sections.
Whitaker v. West Boylston, (97 Mass.
273) 352
Whitbeok v. Merc. Bank, (8 S. Ct.
1121, 127 U. S. 193) 258
Whitbeck ». Minch, (48 Ohio St. 210,
31]Sr. E. K. 743) 326 a
Whitby V. Harrison, (18 Up. Can. Q.
B. 603) 49
White, Ex parte, (67 Cal. 102) 131
White V. Baily, (10 Mich. 155) 309
White V. Bayoune, (49 N. J. L. 311)
150
White V. Bond Co., (58 111. 297) 325,
339, 349
White V. Charleston, (2 Hill, 571) 325,
335
White ». Chowan Co., (90 K. C. 437)
325 353
White 1). Conley, (52 Am. Rep. 154,
157) 351
White V. Cower, (4 Paige, 510) 221
White V. Flannigan, (1 Md. 525) 221
White B. Fuller, (39 Vt. 193) 13, 15
White V. Godfrey, (97 Mass. 472)
224
White ». Hindley etc., (L. E. 10 Q.
B. 219) 336 a
White V. Kent, (11 Ohio St. 550) 116,
128, 290
White V. Lang, (128 Mass. 598) 352
White V. Levant, (78 Me. 568) 79
White V. Lincoln, (5 Neb. 505) 28
White B. Mayor etc., (2 Swan. 364)
113, 150, 152
AVhite V. Mayor of New York, (4 E.
D. Smith, 563) 85
White V. McKeesport, (101 Pa. St.
394) 330
White B. N. O., (15 La. An. 667) 87,
281
White V. People, (94 111. 604) 259 a
White B. Phillipston, (10 Metcf. 108)
338
White V. Polk Co., (9 Kan. 307) 79
White B. Quincy, (97 Mass. 430) 313,
317
White V. State, (44 Ala. 409) 67
White V. Stevens, (34 N. W. R. 255)
268, 326
White V. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co.,
(44 Mo. App. 540) 136
White 13. Tallman, (2 Dutch. 67) 129,
loo
White V. Vermont etc. R. R., (21
How. 575) 183, 191, 191 6
White V. Williamson, (17 S. B. R. 604)
396
White B. Yazoo City, (27 Miss. 357)
113,327,329,331a
Whitefieldi). Longest, (6 Ire. L. § 268)
129
Whitehead b. Jessup, (53 Fed. 707)
314
WhitehouscB. Fellowes, (IOC. B. 779
329
White Ld. Works b. Rochester, (3 N.
Y. 467) 92
WhitelyB. Lansing, (27 Mich. 131) 28C
Whiteman's Ex'rs v. Wilmington etc.
R. R. Co., (2 Harr. 514) 233
White River Turnpike b. Central R.
R. Co., (21 Vt. 590) 233, 238
Whiteside v. People, (26 Wend. 634)
99
Whitfield V. Meridian, (6 So. R. 244)
346
Whitfield B. Paris, (19 S. W. R. 566)
92
Whitford b. Laidler, (94 N. Y. 145)
165
Whithorn b. Thomas, (7 M. & Ct. 1)
106
Whiting V. Boston, (106 Mass. 89) 242,
392
Whiting B. Quackenbush, (54 Cal.
306) 259 a
Whiting B. West Point, (14 S. E. R.
698) 270
Whitlock B. West, (26 Conn. 406) 15S
Whitman v. Groveland, (131 Mass.
553) 344
WhitmorcB. Tarrytowu, (16 N. Y. S.
740, 62 Hun, 619) 330
Whitney, In re, (3 N. Y. S. 838) 363
Whitney v. Boston, (106 Mass. 89) 397
Whitney b. Clifford, (46 Wis. 138) 347
Whitney b. Lowell, (24 N. E. R. 47)
350 a
Whitney b. Milwaukee, (57 Wis. 639)
346
Whitney b. New Haven, (20 Atl. R.
666) 327
Whitney b. Port Huron, (88 Mich.
268) 148, 326 a
Whitney b. Town of Ticonderoga,
(27 N. E. R. 403) 325
Whitsett B. Union Depot etc., (10
Colo. 243) 308
Whitson B. Franklin, (34 Ind. 392)
136, 290
Whittaker b. Hartford etc. R. R. Co.,
(8 R. I. 47) 192
Whittier b. Portland etc. Co., (38
Me. 26) 329
Whittier b. Varney, (10 N. H. 291)
106
Whittingham v. Bowen, (22 Vt. 317)
234 a
Whitworth v. Puchett, (2 Gratt. 527)
279
Wickliffe v. Lexington, (11 B. Mon.
155) 221
elxxxiv
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Wickliffe vi Magunder, (13 S. W. R.
523) 221
Wicks V. Dewitt, (54 Iowa, 130) 828,
355
Wickwire v. Angola, (30 N. E. E.
917) 348
Wider o. East St. Louis, (55 111. 133)
255
Wier V. Bush, (4 Litt. 433) 81
Wiesman v. Brigham, (83 Wis. 550,
53 N. W. 911) 326
Wiggins V. Chicago, (63 HI. 372) 123
Wiggins V. McCleary, (49 N. Y. 346)
221
Wilbrand v. Eighth Ave. R. R. Co.,
(3 Bosw. 314) 302
Wilcocks, In re, (7 Cow. 402) 99, 100
Wilcox V. Chicago, (107 111. 334) 92
Wilcox V. Deer Lodge Co., (2 Mont.
T. 574) 184
Wilcox V. Hemming, (58 Wis. 144)
129, 155
Wilcox V. Smith, (5 Wend. 231) 88
Wild V. Deig, (43 Ind. 455) 108, 234 a,
235
Wild V. Paterson, (47 N. J. L. 406)
92, 339
Wilde V. New Orleans, (12 La. An.
15) 93, 338
Wilder v. Be Core, (26 Minn. 10) 390
Wiles V. Hoss, (114 Ind. 371) 165, 254
Wiley V. Allegheny, (118 Pa. St. 490)
132
Wiley V. BlufEton, (111 Ind. 152) 33,
53
Wiley V. Elwood, (25 N. E. E. 570) 120
Wiley V. Flournoy, (30 Ark. 609) 397
Wiley u. Owens, (39 Ind. 429) 123,
261
Wiley V. Parmer, (14 Ala. 627) 258
Wilhelm u. Cedar Co., (50 Iowa, 254)
170
Wilkes-Barre v. Burgunder, (7 Kulp.
63) 300
Wilkes-Barre D. & S. Banks. Wilkes-
Barre, (24 Atl. E. Ill) 273
Wilkin V. Houston, (30 Pac. 23) 327
Wilkin V. St. Paul <fe Pac. E. E. Co.,
(16 Minn. 271) 241
Wilkins v. Detroit, (46 Mich. 120)
172, 264
Wilkins v. Eutland, (25 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cases, 49) 336 a
Wilkinsburgh v. Home, (131 Pa. St.
109, 18 Atl. E. 937) 253
Wilkinson v. Albany, (28 N. H. 9)
118
Wilkinson v. Detroit etc. Co., (41 N".
W. R. 490) 348
Wilkinson v. Prov. Bk., (3 R. I. 22)
359
Wilkinson v. Van Orman, (70 Iowa
230) 189 a
Willard v. Anisteck, (58 Wis. 5a5)
395
Willard v. Presbuiy, (14 Wall. 676)
259 a
Willard v. Killingworth, (8 Conn
247) 95, 110, 121
Willard v. Pike, (59 Vt. 202) 271
Willard v. Newbury, (22 Vt. 458) 99,
110, 342
Will Co. Sup. V. People, (110 111. 511)
254
Willett V. Belville, (11 Lea, 1) 53
Willey V. Allegheny, (118 Pa. St.
490) 336 a
Willflange v. McCoUum, (83 Ky. 361)
373
William and Anthony Streets, In re,
(19 Wend. 678) 246
Williams v. Augusta, (4 Ga. 509) 104
Williams v. Beardsley, (2 Ind. 59)
314
Williams v. Boughner, (0 Coldw.
486) 83
Williams v. Cammack, (27 Miss. 209,
224) 259 a
Williams v. City R'y Co., (29 N. E.
• Eep. 408, 41 Fed. Eep. 556) 306 a
Williams v. Clayton, (21 Pa. Kep.
398) 79
Williams v. Clayton, (21 Pac. Eep.
398) 85
Williams v. Clinton, (28 Conn. 264)
343
Williams v. Com'rs, (35 Me. 345) 36C
Williams v. Davidson, (43 Tex. 33)
110
Williams v. Detroit, (2 Mich. 565) 248
253, 256, 259 a, 261
Williams v. Duanesburg, (66 N. T.
129) 254
Williams v. Dunkirk, (3 Lan. 44) 92.
Williams v. First Presb. Soc. in Cine ,
(1 Ohio St. 478) 215, 228
Williams v. Hynes, (55 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 86) 301
Williams v. Gloucester, (19 N. E. K.
348, 148 Mass. 256) 83
Williams v. Grand Rapids, (59 Mich.
51) 327
Williams v. Grand Rapids, (33 Alb.
L. J. 237) 342
Williams v. Louisiana, (103 U. S. 637)
189 a
Williams v. Lunenberg, (21 Pick. 75)
95, 270
Williams v. Mayor, (105 N. Y. 419)
132
Williams v. Nashville, (15 S. W. K,
364) 57
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
clxxxv
References are to Sections.
Williams v. New Orleans M. & T. E.
R. Co., (60 Miss. 689) 247
Williams v. N. Y. Can. etc. Co., (16
N. T. 97) 302, 303
Williams v. N. T. & N. H. K. R. Co.,
(39 Conn. 509) 218
Williams v. Newport, (12 Bush, 438)
79
Williams v. People, (132 111. 574) 187 a
Williams v. Peyton's Lessee, (4
Wheat. 77) 169
Williams v. Roberts, (88 111. 11) 196
Williams v. SafEord, (7 Barb. 309) 346
Williams v. Sch. Dist., (21 Pick. 75)
88, 106, 234
Williams v. Smith, (22 Wis. 600) 396
Williams v. Stern, (38 Ind. 39) 66
Williams v. Wilcox, (3 N. & P. 606)
121
Williamson v. Cass County, (84 111.
361) 245
Williamson v. Com., (4 B. Mon. 146)
102, 156
Williamson v. Keokuk, (44 Iowa, 88)
28, 195 d, 376
Williamsons N. J. So. R.R. Co., (29
N. J. Eq. 311) 273
Williamson v. New Albany etc. R. R.
Co.,( 9 Am. Ry. Times, 37, U. S.
C. C.) 192 b
Williamsport v. Com., (84 Pa. St.
487) 163, 183, 277
Williamsport v. Com., (90 Pa. St.
498) 360
Williamsport s. Com., (74 Pa. St. 488)
182
Williamsport v. Kent, (14 Ind. 306)
265
Williamsport v. Richter, (81 Pa. St.
508) 89
Williamsport Co. v. P. & E. R. Co.,
(27 W. N. C. 576, 21 Atl. 645) 242
Willimantic Society u.Scliool Society,
(14 Conn. 457) 67
WilMs V. Legris, (45 111. 289) 155
Willis !). Legris, (45 111. 280) 129
Willoughby v. Jenks, (20 Wend. 96)
221, 224
Willy V. Mulledy, (78 N. Y. 310) 131
Wilmington B. Rody, (Sired. L. 250)
255
Wilmington v. Yopp, (71 N. Y. C.
76) 259 a
Wilmington etc. Co. v. Alsbrook,
(110 N. C. 137) 272
Wilmington S. S. Co. v. Haas, (25
Atl. C. 85, 151 Pa. St. 131, 31 W.
N. 79) 399
Wilmot V. Barber, (15 Ch. D. 96) 327
Wilson, In re, (32 Minn, 145> 125
Wilson, In re, (19 D. C.) 341 258
Wilson V. Allegheny, (79 Pa. St. 272)
286
Wilson V. Berkstresser, (45 Mo. 283)
377
Wilson V. Burks, (51 Ga. 862) 399
Wilson V. Charlestown, (8 Allen, 177)
372
Wilson B. City of Trenton, (53 N. J.
L. 645) 278, 279
Wilson V. Dullam, (53 Mich. 392)
83
Wilson V. Duncan, (38 N. W. 371)
354 a
Wilson V. Granby, (47 Conn. 59) 352
Wilson V. Hardesby, (1 Md. Ch. 66)
187
Wilson V. Inloes, (11 Gill & J. 351)
133
Wilson V. King, (3 Litt. 457) 86
Wilson V. Marsh, (34 Vt. 352) 349
Wilson 1). New York, (1 Denio, 595)
327, 328, 329, 354 o
Wilson I). People, (90 111. 186) 83
Wilson V. Poole, (33 Ind. 443) 281
Wilson V. Rockland etc. Co., (2 Harr.
67) 321
Wilson V. Sanitary Dist., (27 N. E. R.
203) 27
Wilson V. Sch. Dist., (32 N. H. 118)
170
Wilson J). Seattle, (2 Wash. St. 543,
27 Pac. R. 474) 279, 398
Wilson !3. Sexton, (27 Iowa, 15) 219
Wilson V. Shreveport, (29 La. An. 673)
87
Wilson u. Susquehanna T. Co., (21
Barb. 68) 328
Wilson V. Wheeling, (19 W. Va. 324)
347, 352 a
Wilson Co.-D. First Nat. Bank, (103
IJ. S. 770) 185
Winamac v. Huddleston, (31 N. E. R.
561) 190
Winbiger v. Los Angeles, (45 Cal. 36)
325
Winch V. Conservators, (L. R. 7 C. P.
471) 121
Winchester v. Capron, (63 N. H. 605)
308
Winckler v. Gt. Western Ry. Co., (18
Up. Can. C. P. 250) 352
Windham v. Commissioners, (26 Me.
406) 279
Windsor v. Field, (1 Conn. 279) 279
Windman v. Vinoennes, (58 Ind. 480)
61
Winkler v. Halsted, (36 Mo. App. 25)
395
Winn V. Lowell, (1 Allen, 177) 352
Winn V. Macon, (21 Ga. 275) 17
Winn B. Rutland, (52 Vt. 481) 355
clxxxvi
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
Winn D.Shaw, (25 Pac. R. 244, 968;
87 Oal. 631) 395
Winne v. Albany, (61 Hun, 620) 344
Winnebago etc. Co. v. E. K. Co., (51
N". W. K. 576) 241
Winnegar v. Eowe, (1 Cow. 258) 78
Winnepiseagee Co. v. Gilford, (10
Atl. 849, 64 N. H. 337) 268
Winnetka b. Trouty, (107 111. 218) 217
Winnsboro v. Smart, (11 Ricb. L. 551)
128
Winona v. Huff, (11 Minn. 119) 215
Winona v. St. Peter Ey. Co., (31
Minn. 472) 96
Winona & St. P. E. Co. v. Water-
town, (44 N. W. E. 1072) 267
Winooki v. Gokey, (48 Vt. 282) 110
Winpenny v. Philadelphia, (65 Pa.
St. 135) 132
Winship v. Enfield, (42 N. H. 197)
342, 352
Winslow ». Mason, (113 Mass. 411)
396
Winslow V. Perquimas Co., (64 N. C.
218) 212, 364
Winston v. Tenn. R. Co., (IBaxt. 60)
185
Winston u. Westfeldt, (23 Ala. 760)
195 (Z
Winter c. Montgomery, (65 Ala. 404)
269, 270, 290, 326, 396
Wintergreen Alley, In re, (11 Pa. Co.
Ct. R. 126) 24
Wintz V. Board, (28 W. Va. 227) 362
Winzer v. Burlington, (68 Iowa, 279)
56
Wisby ». Bonte, (19 Ohio St. 238) 215
Wisconsin v. Duluth, (2 Dillon C. C.
406)5
Wisconsin etc. v. Manson, (43 Wis.
255) 814
Wise. etc. V. Taylor Co., (52 Wis. 37)
189 a
Wiser v. Blackly, (1 John. Ch. 607)
192 6
Wistar v. Philadelpliia, (111 Pa. St.
604) 264
Wiswall V. Hall, (3 Paige Ch. 313) 133
Witham v. Osburn, (4 Ore. 318, 18
Am. Rep. 287) 234a
Withan v. Portland, (72 Me. 539) 343
Witheril v. Mosher, (9 Hun, 412) 130
Witlierley v. Regents Canal Co., (12
C. B. X S. 2) 352
Withers v. Korth Kent, (3 H. & N.
969) 353
Witt V. Armstrong, (6 S. W. R. 226)
271
Witt V. Mayor, (5 Robt. 248) 92
Woflenden v. Board, (1 Ariz. 237, 25
Pac. R. 647) 359
Wolf, Ex parte, (14 Neb. 24) 97, 161
Wolf V. Beard, (123 HI. 585) 327
Wolf V. Brass, (72 Tex. 133) 221
Wolf V. Keokuk, (48 Iowa, 129) 87,
259 a
Wolf V. Lansing, (53 Mich. 367) 125
Wolf V. McHargue, (10 S. W. R. 809)
259 a
Wolf V. Philada., (105 Pa. St. 25)282
Wolfe V. Gov. & Lex. R. R. Co., (15
B. Mon. 404) 302, 303
Wolfe V. Erie R. T. Co., (33 Fed. Rep.
320) 306 a
Wolfe V. Sullivan, (32 N. E. R. 1017)
311 312
Wolff V. New Orleans, (103 U. S. 358)
14, 258
Wong V. Astoria, (13 Oreg. 538) 122
Wood V. Andes, (11 Hun, 543) 352
Wood V. Bank, (9 Cow. 194) 24, 31
Wood V. Bangs, (46 N. W. E. 586, 1
Dak. 179) 395
Wood V. Board of Election, (58 Cal.
561) 32
Wood V. Hammond, (17 Atl. E. 324)
49
Wood 1-. Jefferson Co. Bk., (9 Cow.
205) 107
Wood II. Lenawee, (84 Mich. 521, 47
X. W. R. 1103) 363
Wood V. Lynn, (1 Allen, 108) 169
Wood V. Louisiana, (102 U. S. 294,
see § 193 a) 192
Wood V. Mitchell, (44 Iowa, 27) 347
Wood V. National Water Works Co.,
(33 Kan. 590) 215
Wood V. Nicolson, (43 Kan. 461) 283
Wood V. Oxford, (97 N. C. 227) 2
Wood V. State, (47 Ark. 488) 32
Wood V. Tipton, (7 Baxt. 112) 325
Wood V. Ward, (3 Exch. 748) 354
Wood V. Waterville, (5 Mass. 294) 164
Woodbridge v. Deti-oit, (8 Mich. 274)
261
Woodbridge v. Hall, (47 N. J. L.
388) 169
Woodbury v. Grimes, (1 Colo. 100)
194
Woodcock V. Calcio, (66 Me. 234) 92
WoodfiU V. Town of Greensburgh,
(18 Ind. 203) 61
Woodfolk V. Nashville & C. B. K.
Co., (2 Swan, 422) 245
Woodruff V. Douglas Co., (17 Ore.
314) 215
Woodruff V. Eureka, (19 S. W. R. 15,
55 Ark. 618) 56, 61
Woodruff t. Imperial etc. (90 N. Y.
521) 79
Woodruff V. Neal, (28 Conn. 167)301,
354
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
clxxxvii
References are to Sections.
Woodruff V. N. Y. & N. E. R. E., (20
Atl. E. 17) 368
Woodrufe V. Okalona, (57 Miss. 806)
192 b, 196
WoodrufE ». Parham, (8 Wall. 139)
258
Woodruff ». E. E. Co., (20 Atl. E. 17)
303
Woodrufi V. State, (3 Ark. 285) 79
Woodruff V. Trapwall, (10 How.
206) 14
Woods B. Armstrong, (34 Ala. 160)
127
Woods V. Colfax Co., (10 Neb. 552)
325
Woods V. Henry, (55 Mo. 560) 55
Woods V. Lawrence Co., (1 Black,
360) 185, 191 6, 198
Woods V. Pineville, (23 Pac. Eep.
880) 158
Woods V. Tipton, (27 N. E. E. 611)
352
Woods V. Varnum, (83 Cal. 46) 83,
84,85
Woodson V. Skinner, (22 Mo. 13)
229 301 •
Woodstock V. Gallup, (28 Vt. 587)
535
Woodward v. Calhoun Co., (2 Cent.
Law Jour. 396) 189, 191 5
Woodward v. Com., (7 S. W. E. 613)
259
Woodward v. Eeynolds, (19 Atl. 511)
190
Woodworth v. St. Paul etc. R. E. Co.,
(18 Fed. Rep. 282) 66
Woodyer v. Hadden, (5 Taunt. 126)
220
Wookey v. Pole, (4 B. & Aid. 1) 191
Wookler v. Chicago, (61 111. 142) 241
Wooley V. Watkins, (22 Pac. R. 102)
34
Wooldridge v. Mayor, (49 How. Pr.
67) 130
Woolrich ». Forrest, (1 Pa. 115) 47
Woolsey, In re, (95 N. Y. 135) 18
WoolseyB. Trustees, (01 Hun, 136)
344
Woonsocket etc. Co. v. Sherman, (8
R. I. 564) 185
Worcester v. Canal Props., (16 Pick.
541) 3.50 a
Worcester v. Eaton, (13 Mass. 371,
378) 202
Worcester Co. v. Worcester, (116
Mass. 193, 17 Am. Rep. 159) 271
Worden v. New Bedford, (131 Mass.
23, 41 Am. Rep. 185) 92, 336 a
Work V. State, (2 Ohio St. 296) 104
Workman v. Mifflin, (30 Pa. St. 362)
244
Works V. Junction R. Co., (5 McLean,
425) 120
Worley v. Columbia, (88 Mo. 106) 92,
333, 338
Worly V. Harris, (82 Ind. 493) 31
Wormwood v. Waltham, (144 Mass.
184)3506
Worrell v. Munn, (1 Seld. 229) 167
Worth V. Fayetteville Comm'rs,
(Winst. Eq. 70) 261, 275
Worthen v. Grayson Co. Ct., (13 Bush,
53) 79
Worthley v. Steen, (43 N. J. L. 542)
32, 361, 378
Worthington v. Boston, (41 Fed. Eep.
23) 172
Worthington v. Covington, (82 Ky.
265) 165
Wragg V. Penn. Tp., (94 111. 11) 219
Wray v. Ellis, (1 E, & E. 276) 156
Wray v. Toke, (12 Q. B. 492) 154
Wreford ». People, (14 Mich. 41) 118
Wreu V. Indianapolis, (96 Ind. 206)
368
Wren ». Luzerne Co., (9 Pa. Co. Ct.
22) 79
Wright, In re, (29 Hun, 357) 300
Wright V. Bishop, (88 111. 302) 395
Wriglit !). Boston, (9 Cush. 233) 259 a,
277
Wright V. Chanahan, (51 Hun, 262)
396
Wright V. Chicago, (27 111. App. 200)
146
Wright V. Defrees, (8 Ind. 398) 149
Wright V. Holbrook, (52 N. H. 120)
336 a, 347
Wright V. Linn, (9 Pa. 433) 203
Wright V. M. E. Church, (1 Hoff. Ch.
225) 202
Wright V. Noell, (16 Kan. 601) 69
Wright V. Saunders, (65 Barb. 214)
300
Wright V. Tacoma. (3 Wash. Ter. 410)
397
Wright V. Templeton, (132 Mass. 49)
352
Wright V. Victoria, (4 Tex. 375) 218
Wright V. Wilmington, (52 N. C. 156)
327, 355
Wrinn v. Jones, (111 Mass. 350) 821
Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v. tltica,
J17 Fed. Eep. 316) 243
Wyandotte v. C'arrigau, (35 Kan. 21)
302
Wyandotte v. Seitz, (21 Kan. 649) 339
Wyandotte v. White, (13 Kan. 191)
350 6
Wyandotte v. Zeitz, (21 Kan. 649) 163
Wyandotte & K. C. Co. v. Wyan. Co.
Comm'rs, (10 Kan. 331) 363
clxxxviii TABLE or cases cited
References are to Sections.
Wood, (5 Kan
Wyandotte City
603) 27
Wyandotte Co. Com'rs v. First Presb.
Ch., (30 Kan. 620) 219
Wyatt V. Harrison, (3 B. &. A. 871)
329
WycJcoff V. Scofield, (53 TST. Y. Super.
Ct. 237) 131
Wyer v. Lorocque, (33 Pac. 547) 282
Wylie V. Wausin, (48 Wis. 506) 352 a
Wyman v. New York, (11 Wend. 487)
221, 305
Wynne-?). Wright, (IDev. &B. L. 19)
122, 258
X.
Xiques v. Bujac, (7 La. An. 498) 221
Yale V. Hampden, (18 Pick. 357) 350 a
Yanish v. St. Paul, (52 N. W. R. 925)
327
Yards Case, (10 Pa. Ct. C. R. 41) 87
Yarmoutli v. Eaton, (3 Burr, 1402)
320
Yarmouth v. Ko.' Yarmouth, (.34 Me.
411)2
Yarnell v. Los Angeles, (87 Cal. 603,
25 Pac. 767) 395
Yarnold v. Lawrence, (15 Kan. 126)
172, 281
Yatemau v. Crandall, (11 La. An. 220)
259 a
Yates V. Judd, (18 Wis. 118) 221, 225,
286
Yates V. Milwaukee, (10 Wall. 497)
120
Yates B. Warrentown, (84 Va. 337)
300
Yeager v. Tippecanoe, (81 Ind. 46)
353
Yearance v. S. L. City, (24 Pac. E.
254) 346
Yeaw V. Williams, (15 R. I. 20) 342
Yesler v. Seattle, (1 Wash. St. 308)
189
Yick Wo V. Hopkins, (118 TJ. S. 356)
121
Yocum V. Hotel, (18 Abb. N. C. 340)
120
Yolo V. Barney, (79 Cal. 375) 218
Yonkey v. State, (27 Ind. 36) 66
Yorrty v. Marshall Co., (53 N. E. R.
298) 317
York V. Forseht, (23 Pa. St. 391) 117,
140
York V. Spellman, (19 Neb. 357) 350
York County ». Small, (1 W. & S.
315) 81
Yost's Report, (17 Pa. St. 524) 250
Young V. Bank, (4 Cranch, 384) 30
Young V. Buckingham, (5 Ohio, 489)
100
Young V. Camden Co., (19 Mo. 309)
177
Young V. Charleston, (20 S. C. 116)
339
Young V. City, (27 Mo. App. 201)
355
Young ». Clarendon, (132 TJ. S. 340)
190
Young V. Clarendon Tp., (26 Fed.
Rep. 895) 199
Young V. Clarendon, (132 TJ. S. 340)
375
Young V. Com'rs, (25 N. E. R. 689)
355
Young c. Com'rs, (2 N. & McC. 537)
325
Young V. Be Putron, (37 Fed. K. 46)
211
Young V. Edgefield, (2 Nott & McC.
537) 325
Young V. Kansas, (27 Mo. App. 101)
355
Young V. Leedom, (67 Pa. St. 351)
354 a
Young V. MoKenzie, (3 Ga. 31) 234 a
Young V. New Haven, (39 Conn. 435)
842
Young V. Thomas, (17 Fla. 169) 123
Young V. Yarmouth, (9 Gray, 386)
297
Youngs V. Hall, (9 Nev- 212) 12
YoungbloodB. Sexton, (132 Mich. 406)
123
Young Twp. V. Sutter, (18 Atl. K.
610) 342
z.
Zabel V. Louisville Bap. Orp. Home,
(17 S. W. R. 212) 270
Zabriskie v. Jersey City, (13 N. J.
Eq. 314) 120
Zabriskie v. Railroad Co., (23 How.
381) 24, 254
Zanesville ii. Richai-ds, (5 Ohio St.)
256
Zanone v. Mound City, (103 111. 552|
125
Zeigler v. Hopkins, (117 TJ. S. 683)
278
Zernes v. Chosen Freeholders, (52 X
J. L. 553) 825
Zetther v. Atlanta, (66 Ga. 195) 343,
352
Ziegler v. Chapin, (27 N. E. R. 471)
169
Ziggler V. Menges, (22 N. E. Eep.
722) 293
Zimmerman c. Conemaugh Tp., (2
Cent. Rep. 861, 5 Atl. Rep. 45) 353
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
References are to Sections.
clxxxix
Zimmerman ». Kearney, (50 N. W.
1126) 247, 249
Zine Co. ». La Salle, (117 111. 411) 215
Zollicofer v. Havemeyer, (4 Thomp.
& C. 478) 92
Zwietusoh v. Milwaukee, (55 Wis.
369) 259 a
Zylstra v. Charleston, (1 Bay, 382)
102, 154
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
CHAPTER I.
COEPOKATIONS DEFINED, CLASSIFIED AND DISTINGUISHED.
Section.
1 — Corporations defined.
2 — Public and private corporar
tions distinguished.
3 — ^Public and municipal corpora-
tions distinguished.
Section.
4 — The New England town.
5 — The state and federal govern-
ment as a quasi corpora-
tion.
§ 1. Corporation defined. — A corporation is, according to
most authorities, defined to be a legal personalit}'', created by
law into a body corporate for the purpose of carrying on some
joint effort, which but for such creation of the legal personal-
ity could not be attained with the same facility by the ordinary
co-operation of individuals. The general element of distinction
between co-operations, in' the nature of partnership and joint
stock companies, on the one hand, and corporations on the
other, is the fact that a legal personality stands between the
co-operators and parties dealing with them, as the possessor of
the joint rights and the obligor of the joint liabilities in which
they are mutually interested. This legal personality, thus cre-
ated, remains unchanged and immutable throughout the entire
period of time during which it was intended to exist, unaffect-
ed by the constant change of the individuals, who composed
the stockholders, and who are recognized in the corporation.
This element of stability in the corporation itself is the chief
value of incorporation.
Chief Justice Marshall's description of a corporation has
been frequently cited and quoted, and .the happiness of his
language makes it alwa3'^s of value in this connection. He
describes a corporation as follows : — " A corporation is an ar-
tificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in con-
templation of law. Being the mere creature of the law, it
1 1
MUNICIPAIi COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. I.
possesses only those properties which the charter of its crea-
tion confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very
existence. These are such as are supposed to be best calcu-
lated to effect the object for which it is created. Among the
most important are immortality (in the legal sense that it may
be made capable of indefinite duration), and, if the expression
may be allowed, individuality, — properties by which a perpet-
ual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and
may act as a single, individual. They enable a corporation to
mianage its own affairs, and to hold property without the per-
plexing intricacy, the hazardous and endless necessity, of per-
petual convej^ances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand
tp hand. It is chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of
men, in succession, with these qualities and capacities that cor-
porations were invented and are in use. By these means a per-
petual succession of individuals are capable of acting for the
promotion of the particular object like one immortal being." ^
The ordinarj' description of a corporation, as in Chief Justice
Marshall's definition, as a legal person has been more than once
criticised as chimerical and unfounded ; ^ but it seems to me that
the objection to such a description of a corporation will be alto-
gether removed, if instead of legal person we read legal person-
ality. For while no person has been created by the act of
incorporation, distinct and separate from the incorporators, yet
there can be no doubt that the persons who compose the cor-
poration have by the act of incorporation had given to their
union a distinct legal personality, which the law does recognize
as having a legal existence, separate and apart from the legal
status of the members of such corporation.
§ 2. Pulblic and private corporations distinguished — The
' iBartmoutli College v. Woodward,
4W]ieat 636; 4 Black. Com. 37; 7
"Vin. Abr. 358, 368. Blackstone de-
scribes the peculiar feature of incor-
poration as the ability to continue
rinchang.ed by the kaleidoscopic
changes in th« persons composing
the corporation. "All of the indi-
vidual members," present and fu-
ture, " are but one person in law, —
a 'person that never dies, in like man-
' .-. 2
ner as the river Thames is still the
same river, though the parts which
compose it are changing every in-
stant." 1 Black. Com. 468; Broprie-
tors, etc. V. Inhabitants of Ipswich,
(Mass. 91) 26 N. E. K. 239; see also
Heller V. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309; State
V. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458, 471; Down-
ing v. Board, 129 Ind. 43; Mills v.
Williams, 11 Ired. L. 558.
2 Morawetz Private Corp. § 1, 227.
CH. I.J COllPORATIONS CLASSIFIED AND DISTINGUISHED. § 2
fundamental division of corporations is into public and private.
Before distinguishing the two, it may be well to observe, that
the terms public and private are used in the comparative sense,
in describing the character of the interest created by the act of
incorporation in the parties composing such corporation, and
also the character of the parties who do compose it. In one
sense, it may be said that all corporations are public, inasmuch
as no actual incorporation is ever made without presumptively
considering the incidental promotion of the public welfare or
the public good. The very act of incorporation, even of a
strictly private corporation, is alleged to rest for its justification
upon the public good, which is promoted in the creation of it,
it matters not how strictly private the interests in such corpo-
ration may be. But this is not tlie sense in which the terms
public and private are employed in this connection. Here, as
already stated, they distinguish corporations from each other,
in the first instance, by the difference in the character of the
persons who compose the corporation and the nature of the
rights created by such incorporation.^ A private corporation
is one which is created for the purpose of enabling private per-
sons in their private capacity to attain some end which cannot
be conveniently attained without incorporation, and for their
own benefit ; although in connection with such private benefit
there may be, and usually is likewise some public benefit flow-
ing from the proposed incorporation. In the case of private
corporations, the consent of the incorporators is necessary to
its creation, but when assented to, according to the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in the Dartmouth
College case, a contract is created between the legislature rep-
resenting the government, and the incorporators, which is pro-
tected by the provisions of the constitution of the United
States, which declares that " no state shall pass any law impair-
ing the obligation of a contract ; " and that therefore such con-
tract can in no wise be interfered with or repealed by subsequent
legislation, unless the power to so interfere with the franchise
thus created is expressly reserved, except in the exercise of the
right of eminent domain.^
1 Guest V. Water Co., (Pa. 91) 21
Atl. K. 1001; Downing v. Board, 129
Ind. 443.
2 Dartmouth Col. v. Woodward, 4
Wheat. 518. See Tiedeman, Privata
Corporations.
3
§2
MTTSaCIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. I.
Public corporations, on the other hand, include municipal
corporations, and are not the result of any contract between
the incorporators and the state, and are not created for the
purpose of vesting in the incorporators, as private individuals,
any peculiar rights or privileges. The object is invariably
and solely the provision for the satisfaction of some pecuhar
want, and the rendition of some peculiar service to the commu-
nity, which is included within the so called public corporation.
The public corporation is created for the purpose of receiving
a share in the management or conduct of the local government,
or in the undertaking of measures that are needed for the pro-
motion of the public welfare or the satisfaction of public wants.
And while the state may, and in the case of municipal cor-
porations usually does, obtain the consent of the community,
which is to be included within the proposed public corporation,
yet such consent is not necessary, and the corporation may be
imposed upon such people against their will. There is no
compact or contract between the incorporators and the govern-
ment, which "falls within the protection of the constitutional
provisions, prohibiting the passing of laws by the State impair-
ing the obligation of a contract. On the contrary, the charters
of public corporations are subject in very large measure to the
almost unrestricted control of the legislature, and may be mod-
ified, enlarged or diminished, as to powers and extent of terri-
tory, according to the pleasure of the legislature.^ This, of
1 Columbus V. Columbus, (Wis. 92)
52 ]Sr. W. K. 425; Peuobscot B. Cor.
V. Lawson, 16 Me. 224; Yarmoutli v.
North Yarmouth, 34 lb. 411; State v.
Kolsen, (Ind. 92) 29 N. E. R. 595;
Mei ri wether V. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472;
Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266;
Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. St. 320;
Savings Society v. Philadelphia, 31
lb. 175, 185;Sintouv. Carter, 23 Fed.
E. 535; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa.
St. 169; State v. Atkinson, 107 IST. C.
317 ; State v. Denny, (Wash. 92)£9 Pac.
K. 991 ; North Yarmouth v. Skillings,
45 Me. 133; Pickles v. Dry Dock Co.,
38 La. An. 412; Grogan v. San Fran-
cisco, 18 Cal. 590; Girard v. Philadel-
phia, 7 Wall. 1 ; Richmond v. Rich-
4
mond etc. Co., 21 Gratt. (Va.) 604;
United States v. Railroad Co., 17
Wall. 322; Darlington v. Mayor, 31
N. Y. 164; In re MillvilleBor.,10Pa.
Co. Ct. R. 321; Philadelphia v. Fox,
64 Pa. St. 169; Cheaney v. Hooser,
9 B. Mon. 330; Mobile v. Watson,
116 U. S. 289; Patterson v. Society
etc., 24 N. J. L. 385; Jersey City
V. Railroad Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 360;
Allen V. McKean, 1 Sumner, 276;
Dartmouth Col. v. Woodward, 4
Wheat. 518; Erie v. Flint, 8 Pa. Co.
Ct. R. 482; State v. Wall, 47 Ohio St.
499; Board v. Davises, 1 Wash. St.
290; In re Malone's Estate, 21 S. C.
435 ; Morris v. State, 62 Tex. 728, 174;
Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; Dayid
CH. I.] COKPORATIONS CLASSIFIED AND DISTINGUISHED. § 3
course, is only a general statement in regard to the legislative
control of public corporations, which will be more fully and
more explicitly explained in the next chapter.^
§ 3. Public and municipal corporations distinguished. —
The term public corporation is used here and properly as a term
of generic signification, and may be classed as synonymous with
V. Portland Water Comm'rs, 14 0reg.
98; Portland & W. Y. R. R. Co. v.
Portland, 14 Oreg. 188; Nicliol v.
Mayor, etc., 9 Humph. 252; CTrelgli-
ton V. San Francisco, 42 Cal. 446;
Lutz V. Crawfordsville, 109 Ind. 466;
Wood V. Oxford, 97 N. C. 227; Lucas
V.Tippecanoe Co., 44 Ind. 524; Snook
V. Georgia Co., (Ga. 88) 9 S. E. R.
1104; Demarest v. New York, 74 N.
T. 161; Cornell V. People, 107 III. .372;
Burns v. Clarion County, 62 Pa. St.
351 ; Durach's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 491 ;
Clinton v. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa, 455 ;
San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal.
541 ; New Orleans v. Hoyle, 23 La.
An. 740; Amite City v. Clements, 24
La. An. 27; 21 Am. Law Review, 14;
Jersey City v. Railroad Co., 20 N. J.
Eq. 360; State v. Fuller, 5 Vroom (34
N. J. L.) 227; Patterson v. Society,
etc., 4 Zabr. (24 N. J. L.) 385; Mont-
clair V. Railroad Co., 18 Atl. R. 242;
45 N. J. E. 436; Lloyd v. Mayor etc.
of New York, 5 N. Y. (1 Seld.) 369;
Lowber v. Same, 7 Abb. Pr. R. 248;
Green v. Same, 5 Abb. Pr. R. 503;
Rundle v. Del. etc. Canal Co., 1 Wall.
Jr. 275; s. c, 14 How. 80; Tinsman
V. Railroad Co., 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 148;
Brooks v. Fisher, 21 Pac. R. 652; 79
Cal. 173; Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74;
Plymouth v. Jackson, 15 Pa. St. 44;
Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Du-
vall (Ky.) 295; People v. Morris, 13
Wend. 325; Armstrong v. Coram., 4
Blackf. (Ind.) 208; Murphy v. Louis-
ville, 9 Bush (Ky.) 189; O'Hara v.
Portland, 3 Oreg. 425; Purdyv. Peo-
ple, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 385; Morey v. New-
fane, 8 Barb. 645 ; State, etc. v. St.
Louis Co. Ct., 34 Mo. 546; Gray v.
6
Brooklyn, 10 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. Rep.,
N. s. 186; State v. Hundelhausen, 26
Wis. 432; Sangamon Co. v. Spring-
field, 63 111. 66; State v. Mayor, R. M.
Charlt. (Ga.) 250; Richmond County
V. Lawrence, 12 111. 8; Tinsman v.
Railroad Company, 2 Dutch. (N. J.)
148; Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427;
School Dist., In re, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R.
588 (92 Pa.) ; see, also. People v. Wren,
4 Scam. (111.) 273 ; Martin v. Dix, 52
Miss. 53; Bush v. Shipman, 4 Scam.
(5 111.) 190; Holliday v. People, 5 Gilm.
(10 111.) 216; State v. Brannin, 3 Zabr.
(23 N. J. L.) 485 ; Rader v. Road Dist.,
7 Vroom (36 N. J. L.) 273; Coles v.
Madison County, Breese (111.) 120;
C. & A. R. R. Co. V. Adler, 56 111.
.344; People v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228;
s. c, 15 Am. Rep. 202; New Orleans,
etc. Co. V. New Orleans, 26 La. An.
517; Laramie County v. Albany
County, 92 TJ. S. 307; State Bank v.
Knoop, 16 How. (U. S.) 369; Duns-
more' s Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374; Peo-
ple V. Hill, 7 Cal. 97; United States
V. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,
17 Wall. 322; State v. St. Louis Coun-
ty Court, 34 Mo. 540; Hagerstown v.
Schuer, 37 Md. 180; Barnes v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540; State
V. Jennings, 27 Ark. 419; People v.
Tweed, 63 N. Y. 202; Langworthy
V. Dubuque, 16 Iowa, 271; Blessing
V. Galveston, 42 Tex. 641. Notwith-
standing this lengthy list of cita-
tions^itis not exhaustive ; this prop-
osition of constitutional law has
been confirmed by every court in
the country, and needs no further
corroboration.
^ See post, chap. ii.
§ 3 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. I.
civil corporation. It is also, however improperly, used as
synonymous with municipal corporations.^ But there is uiit
questionably a just ground for distinguishing between munici-
pal corporations on the one hand, and other public corporations
on the other. The municipal corporation is, as its name implies,
an incorporation, or body politic, created by the act of .law as
an instrument of government over a particular community, and
over the people located there. A municipal corporation is, in
the first instance, charged with the exercise of all the powers
and the performance of all the duties which are strictly local or
municipal in their nature, and which are of peculiar interest to
the local community. They are incorporated for the purpose
of giving to such a community the peculiar facilities, for carry-
ing'on or conducting its local affairs, which a private corpora-
tion acquires by incorporation over the voluntary union or
combination of individuals.^ We may, therefore, define a mu-
nicipal corporation, in its historical and strict sense, to be the
incorporation, by the authority of the government, of the inhabi-
tants of a particular place or district, and authorizing them in
their corporate capacity to exercise subordinate specified powers
of legislation and regulation, with respect to their local and
internal concerns. This power of local government is the dis-
tinctive purpose and the distinguishing feature of a municipal
corporation proper.^ As thus defined, the municipal corporation
is to be distinguished from other public corporations, like coun-
ties on the one hand, and school districts on the other. The mu-
nicipal corporation is to be distinguished from counties and other
subdivisions of the state, in that the county is not a legal person-
alit)' in whose hands is intrusted a share of the administration
of the government, but simply a territorial subdivision of the
state government and subject to the essential control of such
state government, in the administration of all of its affairs.
Thus, for example, a court will declare that a county is not lia-
ble, independentlj' of modern statutory modifications, in dam-
ages to one who has suffered an injury from the wrongful official
conduct of the county officers. Even independently of any
1 Curry v. District Township, 62
Iowa. 102; Dowlan v. County of Sib-
ley, 36 Minn. 430; Downing V. Board,
129 Ind. 443.
6
2 2 Bouv. Diet. 21 ; People v. Mor-
ris, 13 Wend. 325.
" Dillon's Commentaries on the
Law of Municipal Corporations, §20,
CH. I.] CORPORATIONS CLASSIFIED AHD DISTIKGTTISHED. § 3
special statutory provision, the municipal corporation is held
liable.^ In one case, a distinction has been made between coun-
ties and other subdivisions of the state government, and the
municipal corporation strictly so called, on the ground that
the municipal corporation proper rests upon the consent of the
incorporators : " Municipal corporations proper are called into
existence either at the direct solicitation or by the free consent
of the persons composing them, for the promotion of their own
local and private advantage and convenience." On the other
hand, " Counties are at most but local organizations, which, for
the purposes of civil administration, are invested with a few
functions characteristic of a corporate existence. They are
local subdivisions of the state, created by the sovereign power
of the state, of its own sovereign -wiU, without the particular
solicitation, consent, or concurrent action of the people who
inhabit them. The former (municipal) organization is asked
for, or at least assented to, by the people it embraces ; the lat-
ter organization (counties) is superimposed by a sovereign and
paramount authority." ^ But, as has already been explained, the
municipal corporation does not always rest upon such consent ;
and may be created in the face of the opposition of the people
occupying the territory, which is included within its limits^
Unquestionably, it is the fact, that, ordinarily, municipal cor-
porations are formed, only when the people living in the com-
munity desire such incorporation. And this is particularly the
case, where cities and towns secure incorporation under general
laws, instead of by special charter. But the main distinction,
and the only reliable one, between public corporations, like
counties, and municipal corporations proper, is the absence in
the one case of an incorporation and its presence in the other.
Indeed, counties are not properly denominated corporations.
They are at the most only quasi coi'porations, with considerable
emphasis on the prefix.
I Flora V. Naney, 31 111. App. 493;
Ilamllton v. Mlghels, 7 Ohio St. 109;
Pulaski Co. v. Reeve, 42 Ark. 55;
Wehn V. Gage Co., 5 Neb. 494; Mo-
Donald V. Ashland, (Wis. 92) 47 N.
W. E. 434; Tread well v. Com'rs, 11
Ohio St. 190; Soper Co. v. Henry Co.,
26 Iowa, 264; Haniford v. Kansas
City, 103 Mo. 172; Askew v. Hale Co.,
54 Ala. 139; State v. Leffingwell, 54
Mo. 458; see post, §§314, 315.
2 Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio
St. 109; See also Tolbot v. Queeti
Anne Co.,50Md. 245.
7
§ 3 MtTNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. I.
On the other hand, municipal corporations may be distinguish-
ed from school districts and other like corporations, in the fact
that the act of incorporation, in the latter cases, only involves
the creation of corporations with limited powers. The school
district in most of the states is incorporated, and is given some
of the powers and characteristics of corporations in general;
but inasmuch as the ordinary powers of a corporation are not
given to such incorporations, they are called quasi corporations,
for the purpose of indicating the limited character of the body
corporate. School districts have only the public powers which
are expressly granted to them in the statutes under which they
are created. On account of the limited character of the poji^ers
of these so-called quasi corporations, it is necessary to distin-
guish them from municipal corporations. It is also for this
reason that, as a general rule, school districts are not included
within the provisions of statutes, which provide for the control
of municipal corporations.^
There is still another distinction between municipal corpora-
tions and these quasi corporations, in regard to their Hability
to persons injured by the negligence of the officers. Thus, a
school district is held to be free from liability for the trespass
committed by its officers.^ But in the case of a municipal cor-
poration, the courts have held that the individuals, who com-
pose the community within the jurisdiction of the municipal
corporation, enter into and become parties to all the acts of the
municipal government, or of the officers of such municipal cor-
poration, and are liable to all parties who may be injured or
wronged by the wrongful acts of these officers. The same ele-
ment is found to enter into the characterization of the private
corporation.^ Indeed, in respect to more than one feature of
the municipal corporation, it may be declared to have both a
public and a private character ; and in respect to some rights
and some privileges, such corporation does have the protection
against legislative interference, as in the case of rights of prop-
1 In re School District, 10 Pa. Co.
Ct. R. 588 (Pa. 92); School District v.
Williams, 38 Ark. 454; Norton v.
Peck, 3 Wis. 714; Eaton v. Mani-
towoc, 44 Wis. 489.
2 Bank v. Brainerd, (Minn. 92)51
K. W. K. 814; Enfield v. Jordan, 119
8
U. S. 680; Martin v. People, 87 111.
524.
3 Union Township v. Gibboney, 94
Pa. St. 534; Heller v. Stremmel, 52
Mo. 309; Hannon v. St. Louis County,
62 Mo. 313, 316; State v. Leffingwell,
54 lb. 458, 471.
CH. I.] CORPORATIONS CLASSiAeD AND DISTINGUISHED. § 4
erty, which the private corporation fully enjoys.^ In con(!lu-
sion, it may be stated that the distinctions, which have just
been made between counties and other subdivisions of the
state, and municipal corporations on the one hand, and be-
tween quasi corporations, like school districts, and municipal
corporations, on the other, generally remain in force, unaffected
by statutory modification ; but tliey may be, and in fact are
often materially changed by the provisions of state statutes.
Thus, for example, in determining whether a county is liable
in damages for the wrongful acts of its officials, the general
rule is abolished in some of the states, and the counter rule
established by statute, as in the state of Pennsylvania. But
in so much as these characteristics of the municipal corpora-
tion are given by statute to counties and other territorial
subdivisions of a state, these subdivisions of the state are essen-
tially converted by such legislation into municipal corporations,
and would therefore fall strictly within the provisions of this
book. It is really a confusion of ideas and principles to give
the name of corporation to a county or other territorial sub-
division of the state, which is not in any sense a municipal
corporation.
§ 4. The New England town. — In this connection a special
reference should be made, for the purpose of distinguishing
them from municipal corporations in general, to the New Eng-
land town, which is a peculiar institution of government, pai--
taking somewhat of the characteristics of counties and other
subdivisions of the state government, and, at the same time,
having some of the charactei'istics of the municipal corporation.
As it originally obtained, the New England town differs very
little in its legal character from the county. But in the course
of the development of public affairs in New England, statutes
have been passed, regulating the character of the New England
town, and giving to such town certain powers and duties, ap-
proximating in many ways to the character of an incorporated
city. But, still, the New England towns are not strictly mu-
nicipal corporations even under the regulating statutes ; thej'
are more like the school districts, resembling them in the fact
that their powers are limited, and that they do not possess all
1 People V. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; s. c, 15 Am. Eep. 202, ch. ii. sees. 11-15.
9
§ 4 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [ch. I.
the powers which are generally vested in a municipal corpora-
tion, or incorporated cities.^
Of course, there are peculiar characteristics of the New
England town, such as the town meeting, which distinguish
such a town from municipal corporations in general, but that
feature is not a legal distinction, and therefore no attempt is
made here to give an explanation of it. In concluding this
reference to the New England town, a quotation will be added
from an opinion of Chief Justice Perley of the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire : " It is to be observed that municipal cor-
porations in England are broadly distinguished in many impor-
tant respects from towns in this and the other New England
states. There is no uniformity in the powers and duties of
English municipal corporations. They were not created and
established under any general public law, but the powers and
duties of each municipality depended upon its own individ-
ual grant or prescription. Their corporate franchises were
held of the crown by the tenure of performing the conditions
upon which they had been granted, and were liable to forfeit-
ure for breaches of the condition. They indeed answered cer-
tain public purposes, as private corporations do which have
public duties to perform, and some of them exercised politi-
cal rights. But they are not like towns (with us), general
political and territorial divisions of the county, with uniform
powers and duties, defined and varied, from time to time, by
general legislation. Towns (in New England) do not hold
their powers ordinarily under any grant from the government
to the individual corporation ; or by virtue of any contract
with the government, or upon any condition express or implied.
They give assent in their corporate capacity to the laws which
1 " Towns in Connecticut, as in tlie
other New England states, difEer
from trading companies, and even
from municipal corporations else-
where. They are teri-itorial corpo-
rations, into which the state is di-
vided by the legislature, from time
to time, at its discretion, for po-
litical purposes and the convenient
administration of government; they
have those powers only which have
10
been expressly conferred upon them
by statute, or which are necessai'y
for conducting municipal affairs;
and all the Inhabitants of the town
are members of the quasi corpora-
tion." Per Gray, J., Bloomfield v.
Charter Oak Bank, 121 U. S. 121;
citing 1 Swift's System, 116, 117;
Granby v. Thurston, 23 Conn. 4)6^
Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn. 131;
Dillon, Mun. Corp., sees. 28-30.
CH. I.] COEPOEATIONS CLASStFIED AND DISTINGUISHED. § 5
impose their public duties or fix their territorial limits." And
referring to the case then before the court, the chief justice
added : " In all that is material to the present inquiry, munici-
pal corporations in England bear much less resemblance to
towns in this country than to private corporations which are
charged with the performance of public duties ; and for these
reasons, the English authorities on the subject are but remotely
applicable to the present case." ^
§ 5. The state and federal goyernment as a quasi corpora-
tion.— ^It is undeniable that the government of a state is a body
politic, inasmuch as it constitutes the representative of an oi--
ganic body or community. It has some of the characteristics
of a corporation, such as the right to make contracts, but under
the provision of the eleventh amendment of the constitution of
the United States, a state cannot be sued without its consent ; ^
and although it is becoming a very common custom for states,
as well as the United States, to provide for suits against them-
selves often in a specially constituted court ; yet the permission,
thus granted to others to institute suits against such a state,
may itself be withdrawn at the pleasure of the state.*^ But the
state is, however, so far treated by the courts as a body politic
or quasi corporation, as that such state may sue as plaintiff in
all courts, both state and federal.* So, also, may suits be in-
stituted between states ; but in that case the Supreme Court of
the United States has alone original jurisdiction.^ In this same
limited sense, the governor may be treated as a quasi corpora-
I Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H.
284, 290; see Hill v. Boston, 122
Mass. 344; Dill v. Warebam, 3 Met.
438; Norton v. Mansfield, 16 Mass.
48; Stetson v. Kempton, 13 lb. 272;
Miuot V. West Eoxbury, 112 lb. 1;
17 Am. Rep. 52; Vincent v. Nan-
tucket, 12 Cush. 105 ; Parsons v. Go-
shen, 11 Pick. 396; Anthony v.
Adams, .1 Met. 284; Granby v. Thurs-
ton, 23 Conn. 416; Bloomfield v.
Bank, 121 U. S. 121.
2Galbes v. Girard, 46 Fed. R. 500;
People V. Garner, 59 Hun, 299; Pen-
neyer v. McCounaughey, 140 IT. S.
1; Briscoe v. Bank, 11 Pet. 257, 321;
see article by A. H. Wintersteen in
30 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 1.
« People V. Garner, 59 Hun, 299;
Beers v. ArkansaSj 20 How. 527; Ken-
tucky V. Dennison, 24 lb. 66; State v.
Trustees, 5 Ind. 77; Dodd v. Miller,
14 lb. 433; Wisconsin v. Duluth, 2
Dillon 0. C. 406.
*Murdock v. Com., 152 Mass. 28;
State V. Evans, 33 S. C. 184; Indiana
V. Woram, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 33; People
V. Assessors, 1 Hill (N. T.) 620; State
V. Delesdenier, 7 Tex. 76.
' Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How.
66; Wisconsin v. Duluth, 2 Dillon
C. C. 406.
11
§ 5 MU2SriCIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [cH. I.
tion sole, and become party as such to contracts made with
him in his official capacity, for the benefit of others, as where
bonds have been made payable to him for the benefit of other
parties.^
1 Governor v. Allen, 8 Humph. 176; Governor v. Plummer, 2 Humph 500
12
CHAPTER II.
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVEE MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS,
HOW FAR LIMITED.
Section.
8 — General statement as to legisla-
tive power.
9 — Legislative power not unlimit-
ed, public and private char-
acter of municipal corpora-
tions distinguished.
10 — ^Effect of repeal or dissolution.
11 — Legislative power over prop-
erty of municipal corpora-
tions.
12 — Legislative power over reve-
nues, including penalties and
franchises.
Section.
13 — ^Legislative power over prop-
erty held in trust.
14 — Legislative power over munic-
ipal contracts.
15 — Compulsory contracts.
16— Compulsory satisfaction of
non-legal claims against
cities.
IT — Ratifying void local assess-
ments.
18 — Legislative control of offices
and officers in municipal cor-
porations.
§ 8. General statement as to legislative power — In a pre-
vious paragraph, it has been explained, as one of the principal
distinctions between public and private corporations, that the
charter of a private corporation constitutes a contract between
the state and the incorporators, which is protected by the consti-
tutional provision which prohibits the passing of laws by states
impairing the obligation of a contract.^ Where, as in the case
of a public or municipal corporation, the charter or act of in-
corporation is not such a contract between the state and the
community which has thus been created, as that it would fall
within the protection of this constitutional provision, such char-
ter and charter rights remain still subject to the unlimited con-
trol of the state government ; and may be repealed, enlarged, or
diminished, as to the scope of its powers and its rights, or of
its territory^ without the consent of the parties who compose
the community .2 And the extent of this legislative control over
1 See ante, sec. 2.
2 New Orleans v. New Orleans W.
W. Co., 142 U. S. 79; State v. Kolsem,
29 N. E. 595; Smith v. People, 29 N.
E. 676; In re Strand, 21 Pac. K. 654;
State v. Babcock, 25 Neb. 709 ; Quin-
cy V. O'Brien, 24 111. App. 591 ; Essex
Pub. Road v. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 334;
Maddrey v. Cox, 73 Tex. 538; In re
Canal St., (R. I. 93) 25 Atl. R. 975;
Richmond v. Ry. Co., 21 Gratt. 604;
Muskegon v. Dow, (Mich. 93) 54 N. W.
R. 170; Com. v. MaoFerron, (Pa. 93)
25 Atl. R. 556; Tillotson v. East Sagi-
13
§9
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. n.
public or municipal corporations is in no wise affected by the
fact, that the charter of the municipal corporation is created by
the same legislative act which creates a private corporation.^
§ 9. Legislative power not xinliinited — Public and private
character of municipal corporations distinguished.— Not-
withstanding the general proposition, and popular belief, that a
municipal corporation is subject to the uncontrolled and unhm-
ited exercise of power by the state, that is not the case. A
municipal corporation certainly occupies a very different posi-
tion from the private corporation, in respect to the power of the
legislative control over such corporation, at least in regard to a
large part of its powers. But in order to determine how far
the state government may interfere with the municipal corpora-
tion, either as to its existence as a body corporate, or as to its
naw, 54 N. W. R. 162; Murphy v. Lou-
isville, 9 Bush. 189; Lloyd v. Mayor,
etc. of New York, 5 N. T. 369; People
V. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; State Bank
V. Knoop, 16 How. (0. S.) 369; State
V. Mayor, 24 Ala. TOl; State v. Mayor,
E. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 250; Duusmore's
Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374; Sangamon
Co. V. Springfield, 63111. 66; Darling-
ton V. Mayor etc. of New York, 31
N. Y. 164; Savings Fund Society v.
Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. ITS, 185;
Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 VA. St. 169;
Lowber v. N. Y., 7 Abb. Pr. E. 248;
Green v. N. Y., 5 Abb. Pr. E. 503;
Gleason v. Cleveland, (Ohio 93) 31
N. E. 802; Buford v. State, 72 Tex.
182; In re House Bill, 12 Colo. 289;
Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74; Plymouth
V. Jackson, 15 Pa. St. 44; Louisville
V. Com., 1 Duvall (Ky.) 295; Empo-
ria V. Smith, 22 Pac. E. 616 (Kan.
88) ; Davies v. Los Angeles, 86 Cal.
37; Greensburg v. Laird, 8 Pa. Co.
Gt. 608; O'Hara v. Portland, 3 Greg.
525; Gray v. Brooklyn, 10 Abb. (N.
Y.) Pr. Eep., sr. s. 186; Nalle v. Aus-
tin, (Tex. 93) 21 S. W. E. 375; Platte
Co. V. Do well, 30 Pac. E. 68; Jack-
sou V. Walsh, (Md. 92) 23 Atl. E.
778; Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645; j
14
Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. St. 320;
Erie v. Canal, 59 Pa. St. 174; Smith
v. People, 29 N. E. E. 676; New Or-
leans V. Hoyle, 23 La. An. 740; Amite
City V. Clements, 24 La. An. 27; State
V. Forrest Co., 43 N. W. E. 551; Com.
V. Brenham, 22 N. E. E. 628; Tins-
man V. Eailroad Company, 2 Dutch.
(N. J.) 148; Atty. Gen. v. Hatch, 60
Mich. 229; Ruohs v. Athens, (Tenn.
92) 18 S. W. E. 400; Downing v,
Indiana etc. Co., 129 Ind. 443; C.
& A. E. E. Co. V. Adler, 56 111. 344;
Eichland Co. v. Lawrence, 12 111. 8;
State etc. v. St. Louis County Court,
34 Mo. 546; Purdy v. People, 4 Hill
(N. Y.) 385; Creighton v. San Fran-
cisco, 42 Cal. 446; Lucas v. Tippe^
canoe Co., 44 Ind. 524; Burns v.
Clarion County, 62 Pa. St. 351; see
also Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 58; Peo-
ple V. Wren, 4 Scam. (111.) 273; New
Orleans etc. Co. v. NeMr Orleans, 26
La. An. 517; People v. Detroit, 28
Mich. 228; Coles v. Madison, Breese
(HI.) 120.
^Patterson v. Society etc., 24 N.
J. L. 885 ; see Baltimore v. Board of
Police, 15 Md. 376; Luehrman v.
Taxing District, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 425.
CH. IT.]
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL.
§9
lights, a closer investigation is required into the actual condi-
tion of things which lead up to the incorporation of a munici-
pality. What the legislator does in the way of the creation of
a body corporate, is certainly subject to change and modifica-
tion by the same power which creates it. But what the legis-
lator does not create by such act of incorporation, and which
exists independently of the legislative action, is something
which the legislator by no act can dispose of or destroy. The
legislator does not create the community which is incorporated
by the legislative act, he simply gives to a community already
existent a legal personality, which it cannot have independently
of such legislative act. This legal personality is the sole crea-
tion of the legislator. Under the decisions of the courts hereto-
fbre cited, there can be no question that this act of incorporation
of a city or town may at anjj^ time be repealed, or the corpora-
tion dissolved. But wliat is the effect of a repeal of a munici-
pal charter upon the substantial possession and rights of the
municipality or community is an altogether different question.
Subject to some criticism and objection on the part of a few
authorities,^ a limitation upon the legislative power of control
has been adopted by the current decisions, which is made to
rest upon the recognized dual character of a municipal corpo-
ration. If a municipal corporation had in every particular tlie
same public character, which belongs to the township or county,
and it constituted simply a subdivision of the state government,
as such counties and townships do, no distinction would be
possible between these classes of governmental organizations
and the municipal corporation. But the existence of a munic-
ipal corporation is called forth by the peculiar needs of a com-
pactly settled community, and the development, under the
peculiar conditions of such community, of local rights and in-
1 Darlington v. Mayor, etc., 31 K.
T. 164 (1865); Philadelphia v. Fox,
64 Pa. St. 160, 180, 181, per Shars-
wood, J., who giving the judgment
of the court says: "A municipal
corporation is merely an agency of
government fully subject to the con-
trol of the legislature, who may en-
large or diminish its territorial ex-
tent, or its functions, may change
or modify its internal arrangement,
or destroy its very existence, with
the mere breath of arbitrai'y discre-
tion. . . The sovereign may con-
tinue its (the city's) corporate exist-
ence, and yet assume and resume
the appointments of all of its offi-
cers and agents into its own hands;
for the power which can create and
destroy can modify and change."
15
§ 9 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. II.
terests, in which the state at large has no special concern, and
which are of strictly local value.^ On the other hand, the mu-
nicipality is likewise vested with the right, and the duty is im-
posed upon it, of carrying on the local administration of public
powers, which otherwise would be intrusted to the county or
town organization. Its public duties can be performed quite as
readily bj' a local organization which is not incorporated; and
tlie powers are conferred upon the municipal corporation simply
as a matter of public convenience, and not as one of necessity.
In fact, the incorporation of a city or town is called forth by the
local needs of the community, and its existence depends upon
such incorporation to satisfy such local wants. " The propo-
sition which asserts the amplitude of legislative control over
municipal corporations, when confined, as it should be, to such
corporations as agencies of the state iu its government, is entirely
sound. They are not created exclusively for that purpose, but
have other objects and purposes peculiarly local, and in which
the state at large, except in conferring the power and regulat-
ing its exercise, is legally no more concerned than it is in the
individual and private concerns of its several citizens. Indeed,
it would be easy to show that it is not from the standpoint of
state interest, but from that of local interest, that the necessity of
incorporating cities and villages most distinctly appears. State
duties of a local nature can for the most part be very well per-
formed through the usual township and count)' organizations.
It is because, where an urban population is collected, many
things are necessary for their comfort and protection which are
not needed in the country, that the state is then called upon to
confer large powers and to make the localitj' a subordinate com-
monwealth." ^ In regard to the powers and property which are
vested in a municipal corporation in its public character, as a
branch of the state government, there can be no limit to the
control of such corporation by the state. But where the muni-
cipal corporation, as it always does, by virtue of its existence
as a legal personality, acquires the rights of property of a pri-
vate character for the benefit of the community which has been
1 For example Public Parks : State
V. Sohweickardt, 19 S. W. E. 47.
2 Opinion of Judge Cooley in Peo-
ple V. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228. See al-
16
so Underbill v. Essex, (Vt.) 23 Afl.
Rep. 617; State v. Lainoureux, 30
Pac. Rep. 243.
CH. n.]
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL.
§10
incorporatedj and in the enjoyment of which the state at large
is not concerned, these propriety rights constitute in the con-
stitutional sense vested rights, if not of the municipal corpora-
tion itself, yet of the communit}' which has been incorporated,
which cannot be diverted or taken away by legislative action.
In respect to these semi-private rights the legislative control
is not unlimited.^
§ 10. Effect of repeal or dissolution. — In order to properly
appreciate the difficulty and importance of this distinction be-
tween the public and private character of a municipal corpora-
tion, reference should be made to the effect of a repeal or
dissolution of the charter of a municipal corporation. That the
state may repeal or otherwise materially change the charter of
the municipal corporation, there can be no question. Not only
is it possible for the state or law-making power to simply mod-
ify or change the charter by enlargement or diminution of the
powers or the territory of the corporation ; but it may also
destroy the corporation altogether, substitute another in its
place, or provide for the government of the community in
some other way than by a municipal corporation. The United
1 Downing v. Indianapolis, etc.,
Co., 151 Mass. 364; Gary Library v.
Bliss,- 151 Mass. 364; Wellington v.
Wellington, 26 Pac. Rep. 415 ; Louis-
ville V. Commonwealtli, 1 Duvall
(Ky.) 295; Weigbtman v. Wasbing-
ton, 1 Black. (U. S.) 39; Franklin Co.
Gram. Scb. v. Bailey, 62 Vt. 467;
Reading v. Commonwealth, 11 Pa.
St. 196; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y.
553, 560; People v. Field, 58 N. Y.
491; People v. Ingersoll, 58 K Y. 1;
Nichol V. Nashville, 9 Humph. 252 ;
Small T. Danville, 51 Me. 359; West
Sav. Fund Soc. v. Philadelphia, 31
Pa. St. 1*75; lb. 185; Bailey v. Mayor,
etc., of New York, 3 Hill, 531; Rich-
mond V. Long's Admr., 17 Gratt.
(Va.) 375; De Voss v. Richmond, 18
Gratt. 338; s. c, 7 Am. Law Reg.,
N. s. 589; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich.
44; 8. c, 9 Am. Rep. 103; People v.
Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; s. c, 15 Am.
2
Rep. 202; Martin v. Mayor, etc., 1
Hill, 545; Buttrick v. Lowell, 1 Al-
len, 172; Oliver v. Worcester, 102
Mass. 489; Askwetb v. Hale Co., 54
Ala. 639; Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich.
165, 184; New Orleans, etc., R. R.
Co. V. New Orleans, 26 La. An. 478,
517; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn.
1 ; United States v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Company, 17 Wall. 332; In
re Malone's Estate, 21 S. C. 435; Niles.
Water Works v. Niles, 59 Mich. 311;
Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio
St. 375 ; State v. Scbweeokart, 19 S.
W. R. 47; Weet v. Brockport, 16 N.
Y. 161; Louisville v. University of
Louisville, 15 B. Mon. 642; Toucbard
V. Touohard, 5 Cal. 306; Gas Co. v.
San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453; Commis-
sioners V. Duckett, 20 Md. 468; Cum-
mings V. City of St. Louis, 2 S. W. R.
130; 90 Mo. 259; Scranton v. White,
23 Atl. R. 1043; 30 W. N. C. 74.
17
10
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. n.
States government has exercised this power for many years
past in regard to the city of Washington, the capital of the
country. But, as just stated, the legislature, or law-making
power simply creates this legal personality which we call the
municipal corporation ; but it neither creates nor can destroy
the community which goes to make up the city or town, and
which continues to exist independently of all legislative ac-
tion whatever. The legislature of New York has done nothing
by enactment to create the metropolis which occupies the Island
of Manhattan ; and, on the other hand, it can do nothing to de-
stroy such a community, even though the present government
may be taken away altogether. Now, in order to appreciate
the effect of a repeal or dissolution of a municipal charter, ref-
erence by analogy should be made to the effect of a repeal or
dissolution of a private corporation, where the power to repeal
such charter or dissolve the corporation has been reserved by
special provision in the chartej', or by the general laws under
vvrhich private corpoi-ations are made. The doctrine is well es-
tablished in regard to private corporations, that when the power
to repeal the private charter has been reserved, the power of
the legislature over such private corporation- thus reserved is
nevertheless not unlimited. While the corporation, as a legal
entity, depends for its continued existence upon the legislative
discretion ; yet where the power of dissolution of such corpora-
tion is exercised by the state legislature, the dissolution of such
corporation cannot in any way affect or impair the property or
rights of property which the incorporators have created under
their charter, or the rights of its creditors.^ And the same rule
has been applied to the rights of property of private corpora-
tions, which have been cieated through valid municipal grants.^
The explanation of these cases is, that the individuals who com-
1 Downing v. Indiana etc. Co., 129
Ind. 443; Mumma v. Potomac, 8 Pet.
285; People v. O'Brien Rec, 111 N.
Y. 1 ; Schlieder v. Dielman, 10 So. E.
934; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Crancli, 135;
Detroit v. Plank Eoad, 43 Mich. 140;
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700;
Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 lb.
13.
"In re Brooklyn El. Ky. Co., 11 N.
18
T. S. 161; 57 Hun, 590; Sixth etc.
Co. V. Kerr, 72 N. Y. 330; R. E. Co.
V. Delaware, 114 U. S. 501; People
V. O'Brien, supra ; Langdon v. Mayor,
93 N. Y. 129; Davis v. Mayor, 14 lb.
506; Mayor v. Second Ave. E. E. Co.,
32 lb. 261; Milhau v. Sharp, 327 lb.
611; Western Pas. Co. v. E. E. Co.,
26 N. E. R. 188; Gary Libr. v. Bliss,
151 Mass. 364.
CH. 11.] LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. § 11
pose the private corporation became the successors to all the
rights, which the private corporation acquires upon the dissolu-
tion of such corporation. And no other theory can be properly
applied to the rights of a municipal corporation, upon the dis-
solution of such municipal corporation. ^
§ 11. Legislative power over property of municipal corpo-
rations.— In application of the distinction, heretofore made, be-
tween the public and private character of a municipal corporation,
and the corresponding rights of the same, one is prepared to
meet witli the statement, that the legislature, as the trustee or
representative of the public in general, has, or may assume,
full control over the public property and the public rights of a
municipal corporation. But without qualification, that state-
ment cannot be taken without some possibility of error. It has,
thus, for example, been held that the state may authorize a
railroad company to occupy the street of a city, without the
consent of such city, or without payment of any compensation
to the city .2 But such power is only one of control and regu-
lation of the uses of such property, and the state cannot by any
act divest the city of the use of its pi'operty or transfer such
property to some nonmunicipal use.^ But, in view of the dis-
tinction between public and private rights of municipal corpora-
tions, nothing can be done in the way of taking the private
property of the citj'-, for public use, without payment of com-
pensation.* And, except in the case of the appropriation of
private propei'ty of the said municipal corporation to public
' Brooklyn R. K. Co. v. Brooklyn
City R R. Co., .32 Barb. 264; Mayor
etc. V. Second Ave. R. K. Co., 32 N.
Y. 261; New Orleans W. W. Co. v.
Rivers, 115 U. S. 674.
^Post, §302.
8 State V. Schweickart, 19 S. W. R.
41; State v. Wallace, 52 N. W. R.
213; Darlington v. Mayor, 31 N. Y.
164, 193, 205 ; People v. Ingersoll, 58
N. Y. 1; People v. O'Brien, 111 lb.
1; N. O. "W. W. Co. V. Rivers, 115 U.
S. 674; Sinking Fund Cases, lb. 700;
Detroit v. Howell P. R. Co., 43 Mich.
140.
* Southampton v. Mecox Co., 116
N. Y. 1; Mayor etc. v. Hopkins,
13 La. An. 326; New Orleans etc.
Co. v. New Orleans, 26 lb. 517; lb.
478; Mercer v. Railroad Co., 36 Pa.
St. 99; People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y.
188; Louisville v. University of Lou-
isville, 15 B. Mon. 642; Portland etc.
Co. V. Portland, 14 Oreg. 188; Dar-
lington v. Mayor, 31 N. Y. 164; Clin-
ton V. R. R. Co., 24 Iowa, 455; Rey-
nolds V. Stark Co., 5 Ohio, 204; 5 Ohio
St. 113; Wellington v. Township,
(Kan. 90) 26 Pao. R. 415; Reading v.
Commonwealth, 11 Pa. St. 196; Cum-
mings V. City of St. Louis, 2 S. W.
R. 180; 90 Mo. 250; Mount Hope
Cemetery v. Boston, (Mass. 93) 33
N. E. R. 695.
19
§12
MUXICIPAL COKPORATrONS.
[oh. [I.
use, ill the exercise of the right of eminent domain, there can
never be any application or appropriation of such property to
any other but a municipal use. Thus, for example, lands
which have been acquired by a municipal corporation, by gift
or purchase, are not subject to legislative appropriation. ^ And
even in the regulation of the use of the property, the power of
the legislator is not unlimited. Thus, it has been held in New-
York, that real estate which the city of New York owns in fee
simple, is no more subject to legislative control than similar
property rights of private individuals. And that an act of the
legislature, which orders the destruction of a leservoir of the
city, and the conversion of the ground upon which the reservoir
is located into a park, without the consent of the city thereto,
is an unlawful exercise of legislative authority, and cannot be
pecmitted, except in accordance with the right of eminent
domain ; and, therefore, full compensation must be made to the
city for such an appropriation of its property.^
§ 12. Legislative power over revenues, including penal-
ties and franchises. — But a distinction is to be made between
the property rights of a municipal corporation, either public or
private, and the provisions made by state laws for the collec-
tion of revenue by the corporation. While the propert}',
which a municipal corporation acquires in the exercise of its
I State V. Patterson, (IST. J. 90) 20
Atl. R. 828; State V. Suhweickert, 19
S. W. K. 47; People v. Vanderbilt, 26
N. Y. 324; Richmond Co. v. Law-
rence, 12 111. 1; Bass v. Fontleroy,
11 Tex. 698-708; Hampshire v.
Franklin, 16 Mass. 76; Gary v. Bliss,
151 Mass. 564.
^ Webb V. Mayor etc. of 'Sev York,
64 How. Pr. Rep. 10. "I perceive,"
said Macomber, J., "no difiference
between the tenure of property thus
held by the city and the proprietary
rights of natural persons or private
corporations. The privilege, how-
ever, is peculiar in this state to the
city of New York. Nor is this prop-
erty, with other real estate owned by
the city, held in trustfor any person;
nor is it stamped with any mere po-
20
litical trust of which the city may be
deprived, and thus its claim to the
right to the possession, of the prop-
erty destroyed. The title to the land
rests somewhere, and, as has been
shown above, so far as the records
extend, no one claims it except the
city itself." The com-t did not hold
that the protection here conceded to
municipal property in New York city
was not granted elsewhere. See also
Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat.
694; Terret v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 52;
People V. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; Peo-
ple V. Fields, 58 N. Y. 591; Bailey v.
Mayor, 3 Hill, 531; People v. Inger-
soll, 58 N. Y. 1; Cincinnati S. & C.
R. Co. V. Village of Belle Centre,
(Ohio, 9) 27 N. E. Rep. 464.
CH. II.]
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL.
§12
corporate powers, is protected from legislative iaterference as
vested rights ; yet in provisions of the law for the revenue of
the city, in vk^hatever form such provision may take, the city
has no vested rights ; and the legislature may at any time, as
far as the municipal corporation itself is concerned,- change and
modify, or altogether take away the particular source of reve-
nue.^ The legislature's power over the revenue of the city is
in no wise affected by the fact, that a particular purpose is
mentioned for which the revenue in question has to be appro-
priated. Thus, for example, the legislature may repeal the
power it gives to cities to grant licenses for the sale of intoxi-
cating liquors, notwithstanding the fact that the money, col-
lected from such licenses, is to be donated to the support of
the paupers of the town.^ So, also, may the legislature 'repeal
a law, which gives to a municipal corporation the power to
levy and collect wharfage from the private wharfs within its
territorial limits, although there is no power in the legislature
to divert or remit the proceeds accruing to the city from any
wharf, which it may have created in the exercise of a franchise
granted to it for the establishment of wharfs.'. On the other
hand, a franchise granted to a town to establish a ferry or a
wharf, as long as it has not been exercised in the establishment
or creation of either of them, does not constitute a vested right
which will come within the protection of the constitutional pro-
vision. Such executory rights or franchises may be repealed
1 Taylor v. Robinson, 72 Tex. 364;
Anderson v. Mayfield, 19 S. W. Rep.
598; Tile v. Mayfield, 19 lb. 598; Mo-
Gee V. Salem, 149 Mass. 238; Board
V. Com'rs, 107 N". C. 110; Northamp-
ton Co. T. Eastern etc. Ry. Co., 23
Atl. Rep. 895; Lucas v. Board, etc.,
44 Ind. 524; Indianapolis v. Indian-
apolis, etc., 59 Ind. 215; Tyrrell v.
Wheeler, 123 K. Y. 76; Toungs v.
Hall, 9 Nev. 212; People v. IngersoU,
58 ISr. T. 1; Darst v. Griffin, (Neb. 90)
48 N. "W. R. 819 ; Essex Board v. Skin-
kle, 140 U. S. 334; Caroudelet Co. v.
New Orleans, 10 So. R. 871; County
V. State, 11 111. 202; County v. Coun-
ty, 12 111. 1 ; People v. Pratt, 129 N.
Y. 68; Love v. Schenck, 12 Ired.
Law, 304; People v. Melds, 58 N. Y.
491; Home Ins. Co. v. City Council,
93 U. S. 116.
2 People V. Meyer, 5 N. Y. S. 69;
Mendocino Co. v. Bank, 24 Pac. R.
1002; 86 Cal.-255; People v. Super-
visors, 50 Cal. 361; Grantham v.
State, 14 S. E. Rep. 892; Richland
Co. V. Lawrence Co., 12 111. 1; Peo-
ple V. Power, 25 111. 187; Richmond
V. Richmond, etc., Railroad Co., 21
Gratt. (Va.) 604; Spaulding v. Ando-
ver, 54 N. H. 38; Home Ins. Co. v.
City Council, 93 U. S. 116; Sangamon
Co. V. Springfield, 63 111. 71; Gutz-
weller v. People, 14 111. 142.
= St. Louis V. Shields, 52 Mo. 351.
21
§12
MUNICIPAL COBPOBATJONS.
[CH. n.
by the legislature.^ So, also, where a legislative grant directs a
donation of lands to a city for certain public purpose, as long as
such grant has not been performed or acted upon by the munic-
ipal corporation, it is not a contract which is inviolable; but it
is an unexecuted donation, which may at any time be repealed
by the legislature, prior to the actual purchase or transfer of
such land to the city.^ So, likewise, an authority, which is giv-
en to a municipal corporation, or to a county, to take the stock
of railroad corporations and issue bonds thei'fefor, upon the as-
sent of the majority of the voters, does not constitute such a
binding contract that the legislature cannot repeal such a law
and prevent such a subscription of stock and issue of bonds,
before an affirmative vote has been taken by the people of the
county or town, or the subscription has been agreed to be
made.^
It has also been held that laws, providing for the acquisition
by a municipal corporation or county of penalties for the vio-
lation of law or the breach of a contract, do not constitute
in any way a vested right in such county or town, which
cannot be repealed or taken away, before the enforcement
of such penalties, by legislative action. Thus, for example,
in Maryland, a railroad company agreed to locate its road
through three towns named, subject to a pi'ovision, that if it
failed to perform that obligation it should forfeit '$1,000,000 to
the state of Maryland for the use of Washington county. It
was held that a legislative act, which repealed that portion of
the charter which imposed this penalty in favor of Washington
county, took away from Washington county its right to enforce
such penalty, and released the railroad company from its per-
' East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge
Co., 10 How. 511; s. c, 16 Conn. 149;
17 Conn. 79; Sioux City R. R. Co. v.
Sioux City, 43 N. W. R. 224; New
Orleans v. Wolmot, 31 La. An. 65;
EUerman v. McNains, 30 La. An. 65 ;
Darlington v. Mayor, 31 N. Y. 164,
202; Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105
U. S. 166; Trustees v. Tatman, 13 111.
30; Police Jury v. Shreveport, 5 La.
An. 661.
2 Richland Co. v. Lawrence Co., 12
111. 1; People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N. Y.
22
287; Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass.
76; Bass v. Fontleroy, 26 N. Y. 287.
8 State V. Meller, 67 Mo. 604; Shelby
Co. V. Cumberland & C. R. R. Co., 8
Bush (Ky.) 299; People v. Coon, 25
Cal. 635 ; Union Pacific Railroad Co.
V. Davis County, 6 Kan. 256; C. 0.
R. R. Co. V. Barren Co., 10 Bush (Ky.)
604; Concord v. Portsmouth Bank,
92 U. S. 625 ; Aspinwall v. County of
Jo Daviess, 22 How. 364; Baltimore
& D. P. Railroad Co. v. Pumphrey,
(Md. 1891) 21 Atl. Rep. 559.
CH. II.]
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL.
§13
formance. The general rule is, that fines and penalties which
are directed to be paid to public corporations in general are not
vested rights of such corporation ; but the law may at any time
be repealed, or the fines and penalties released by the legislature,
without the consent of the municipal corporation.^ It has also
been held that the same result is attained, where the executive
officer exercises his power and releases the fines or penalties,
■ which have been imposed by the courts for the commission of
some crime.^
§ 13. Legislative power over property held in trust. — The
fact, that a municipal corporation is charged with the adminis-
tration of a trust for a public charity, or one involving private
interests and rights, will not of itself be any obstacle in the
way of any limitation or abolition of a municipal corporation,
if such administration by the corporation is deemed to be for
the public benefit. When the corporation has been dissolved,
the Court of'Chancery will assume the execution of the public
trust,-and appoijnt new trustees, to take charge of such property
and carry the trust into effect. This is not only the case, where
a corporation has been destroyed, or its municipal character
materially modified ; but, also, whenever there is any fear of mal-
administration of the trust, or whenever the interest of the trust
and its beneficiaries requires a change of trustees.^ Not only
has the Court of Chancery this extraordinary power in cases of
great danger of loss, and for the protection of the interests of
the beneficiaries ; but even in other cases it has been held that
the legislature has the power to divest a municipal corporation
of its control of a public charity or trust, and to place it in a
different body of trustees. This was done in a case of great
public interest, where the legislature of Pennsylvania under-
' State V. Railroad Company, 12
Gill & Johns. (Md.) 399; 3 How. (U.
S.) 534; Union etc. Co. v. Proctor, 12
Colo. 194; Ex parte Christensen, 24
Pac. R. 747; 85 Cal. 208; Rankin v.
Baird, Breeze (111.) 123; C. & A. R.
R. Co. V. Adler, 56 111. 344; Conner
V. Bent, 1 Mo. 235; Coles v. Madison
County, Breese (111.) 115; HoUiday
V. People, 5 Gilm. (10 111.) 216.
2 Portland W. V. R. Co. v. Portland,
12 Pac. R. 265; 14 Greg. 188: HoUi-
day V. People, 5 Gilm. (10 111.) 216.
s Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S.
472, 528; Montpelier v. East Mont-
pelier, 29 Vt. 12; EUerman v. Mc-
Mains, 30 La. An. 190; Girard v.
Phila., 7 "Wall. 1; Philadelphia v.
Pox, 64 Pa. St. 169; Cincinnati v.
Cameron, 33 Ohio St. 336; Luchrman
V. Tax Dist., 2 Lea, Teuu. 425.
23
§ 13 MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS. [CH. n.
took to deprive the city of Philadelphia, of the right to adminis-
ter the charitable trust which was confided to its care under the
will of Girard and others, and to transfer the administration of
these trusts to a corporate body, called the " Directors of City
Trusts," who were to be appointed by certain state judges. It
was held that this was a lawful exercise of legislative author-
ity .^ But this power of the legislature has been denied in one
case, in the Supreme Court of Maine, where certain lands were
held as the property of a town, and the legislature authorized
the sale of such lands and the investment of the proceeds of
sale, as a fund in the hands of certain trustees to devote to
buildings for the use of the public schools. A subsequent act
of the legislature authorized the town to selecft a new board of
trustees, and directed the original board to deliver over to the
new board all the trust property held by it. The legislature
held that, in accordance with the principle laid down in the
Dartmouth College Case, such interference with the trust prop-
erty was unconstitutional and void.^ The distinction is made
in the Pennsylvania case between private trustees being charg-
ed with the performance of a charitable trust, and the adminis-
tration of such a trust being vested in the municipal corporation.
In the first case, the legislature has no power of interference,
except to prevent maladministration of the trust; but in the
second case, the interference bj' the legislature is subject to no
limitation in respect to the change of administrators.^
But the legislature did not in this case attempt to divert the
trust funds and apply them to purposes foreign to the provisions
of the trust ; and it is extremely doubtful whether the legisla-
ture would in any case have the power to make such a diversion
of trust funds. Such a power has been denied to the legisla-
ture in two cases.* In the New Hampshire case, the trust fund
for the support of public schools was given to the town of M.,
1 Philadelphia v. Fox, 94 Pa. St.
169; Penn. Const. 1874, art. 3, §20.
2 Trustees v. Bradbury, 11 Me. 118;
see also to same effect, Gary v. Bliss,
151 Mass. 384; 25 N. E. R. 92; Yar-
mouth V. N. Yarm., 34 Me. 411 ; Nor-
ris V. Academy, 79 Johns. (Md.) 7;
Louisville v. University, 15 B. Mon.
24
642; Bass v. Pontleroy, 11 Tex. 698.
*This power of control over city
trusts has since been taken avpay
from the legislature by a subsequent
constitutional provision. Const. Pa.
1874, art. 3, sec. 20.
* State V. Springfield, 6 Ind. 83;
Greenville v. Mason, 53 N. H. 515.
CH. n.]
LEGISLATIVE CONTEOL.
§14
on the express condition that the fund should be applied solely
to the support of the public schools in the town of M. At a
subsequent period, the town of G. was created by the legisla-
ture out of a part of the territory and inhabitants of M. ; and the
statute which created this new corporation provided, that this
trust fund should be divided between the original town of M.
and the new town of G. in the proportion of seven to M. and
thirteen to G. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held
that the legislature had no power to direct the appropriation
of the trust fund in question to any other purpose than that
which was prescribed by the donor. And, in the exercise of the
legislative power of cutting down the territory of the town of
M., it had no power to transfer any proportionate share of the
trust fund to the new corporation, which had been formed out
of a part of the territory' of M. It has, however, been held in
Maine, that where a public corporation holds property in trust
for the use of its inhabitants, the legislature can, upon the di-
vision of such corporation into two or more towns, provide
that the original town shall continue to hold such property in
trust for the inhabitants of both towns.^ Certainly, the munic-
ipal corporation has no power, in the absence of legislative
authority', to make any other use of the trust fund, but for the
purpose provided for in the trust.'^
" § 14. Legislative power over municipal contracts. — The
contract of a municipal corporation certainly constitutes a
species of private property of such corporation, and would,
therefore, under the general rule of discrimination between the
public and private character of a municipal corporation, be pro-
tected from legislative interference. And a contract between
two municipal corporations would apparently be as much pro-
tected from legislative interference or abridgment, as contracts
made by the municipal corporation with a private person or a
1 Nortli Yarmoutli v. Skillings, 45
Me. 133.
2 Aberdeen v. Sanderson, 8 Sm. &
M. 670; Gary v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364;
White V. Fuller, 39 Vt. 193; Mont-
pelier v. East Montpelier, 27 Vt. 704;
29 Vt. 12; Chambers v. St. Louis, 29
Mo. 543; Holland v. San Francisco,
7 Cal. 301; Daniel v. Memphis, 11
Humph. (Tenn.) 582; Trustees of
Academy v. Aberdeen, 13 Sm. & M.
645; Kingman V. Brockton, (Mass. 90)
26 K E. K. 968; Bonham v. Taylor,
(Tex. 90) 16 S. W. R. 555; East St.
Louis V. Flannigan, 34 111. App. 596;
Poultney v. Wells, 1 Ark. (Vt.) 180;
Trustees v. Bradbury, 2 Fairf. (Me.)
118; Harrison v. Bridgewater, 16
25
§ 14 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. II.
private corporatioa. There has not been any adjudication on
this particular question, but there can be very little doubt that
those courts will deny to the legislature the power to abridge
or impair contracts made between two municipal corporations,
which deny to the legislature the power of interference with the
private property of such a corporation. And there is certainly
no doubt that a contract, made by the municipal corporation
with private individuals, should come within the constitutional
prohibition, of the enactment of laws impairing the obligation of
a contract. Whatever the legislature may do in respect to the
continued existence of the municipal corporation as a body
politic, it can do nothing that would in any way impair the ob-
ligation of the municipal corporation or its contract to third
persons.-^ Not only can there be no direct abolition of the con-
tract or destruction of the contractual rights of the municipal
creditors ; but even indirectly is it impossible for the legislative
act to impair such a contract. Thus, for example, where at the
date of execution of the contract in question, the power of the
municipal corporation to levy taxes was subject to a particular
limitation, the scope and extent of the power of taxation of the
municipal corporation constitutes a part of the contract, wliich
the corporation has made with third persons, and the legislature
cannot by subsequent enactments further curtail or limit the
power of taxation, to the detriment of the creditors. This is
true, in whatever way the subsequent legislation curtails the
power of taxation, either by reducing the rate or amount of
taxation ;2 or by a repeal of a provision of the law for com-
Binghamtou v. E. R. Co., 61 Hue,
479; Western Savings Fund Society
V. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175, 185;
San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal.
541 ; Lee County v. Rogers, 7 Wall.
185 ; contra. New Orleans v. N. 0. W.
Co., 142 U. S. 79.
2 United States v. Mobile, 12 Fed.
R. 768; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S.
768; State v. New Orleans, 37 La.
An. 528; Stewart v. Police Jury, 34
La. An. 673 ; State ex rel. Carriers v.
New Orleans, .36 lb. 687: Morris v.
State, 62 Tex. 728; State ex rel
Marchand v. New Orleans, 37 La.
An. 13.
26
Mass. 16; Plymouth v. Jackson, 15
Pa. 44.
iKoonce v. Russel, 103 N. C. 179;
Lansing v. County Treasurer, 1 Dil-
lon Cir. C. R. 522; Meriwether v.
Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; Furman v.
Nichol, 8 Wall. 44; Underhill v. Es-
sex, 23 Atl. R. 617; State v. Milwau-
kee, 25 Wis. 122; Brooklyn Park
Comm'rs V. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234;
Wolfe V. New Orleans, 103 U. S.
358; Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. 705;
Goodale v. Feunell, 27 Ohio St. 426;
s. c, 22 Am. Rep. 321 ; Von Hoffman
V. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Houston v.
R. R. Co., (Tex. 92) 19 O. W. R. 127;
Woodruff V. Trapnall, 10 How. 206;
CH. II.J
LEGISLATIVE CONTKOL.
§14
pulsory taxation ; ^ or by any provision, which operates as a re-
duction or limitation of the present power of the corporation to
provide by taxation for the payment of its debts.^
But, on the other hand, the power of the legislature to mod-
ify the lules of taxation, as applied to municipal corporations, is
not completely taken away bj- the existence of corporate debts,
provided the modification or other change in the mode of taxa-
tion produces no matei'ial impairment of the rights of the cred-
itors. Thus, for example, it is possible for a state to provide
by law for the release of certain property from taxation by a
municipal corporation. ^ For the limited amount of such prop-
erty, which is thus exempted, makes it impossible that the
change in the law of taxation of such corporation should oper-
ate as a material impairment of the rights of the city's credit-
•ors.* And so, also, may the legislature repeal a statutory
authority to the city or county, to subscribe for the stock of a
railroad corporation and issue bonds therefor, as long as the
subscription, or the binding contract for it, has not been made
with the railroad corporation.^ The act of the legislature,
which provides for the creation of a sinking fund for the pay-
ment of the debts of a municipal corporation, cannot be re-
pealed by a subsequent legislature, or such sinking fund be
devoted to a different purpose, or the rights of the parties in
and to such sinking fund in any other way interfered with."
So, also, where the legislature authorizes a city to fund its
1 Sawyer v. Concordia, 12 Fed. Rep.
754.
sSeibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284;
Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 TJ.
S. 710; Louisiana v. Pillsbury, 103
U. S. 278.
* House of Refuge v. Smith, (Pa.
90) 21 Atl. R. 353; State /. Univer-
sity, (Minn. -90) 48 N". W. R. 1119;
Roaring Creek Co. v. Girton, (Pa. 90)
21 Atl. 780; Northampton Co. v. La-
fayette College, 18 Atl. Rep. 516;
Detroit Home v. Detroit, 76 Mich.
521; Bannon v. Byrnes, 39 Fed. Rep.
892; People v. Assessors, 111 N. Y.
505.
* Muscatine v. Railroad Co., 1 Dil-
lon, C. C. 536; Gilman v. Sheboygan,
2 Black, 510; Seibert v. Lewis, 122
U. S. 284; Goodale v. Fennell, 27
Ohio St. 426; 22 Am. Rep. 321.
^Binghamton v. Railroad Co., 61
Hun, 479; People v. Coon, 25 Cal.
635 ; Aspinwall v. County of Jo Da-
viess, 22 How. 364; Shelby Co. v.
Cumberland & C. R. R. Co., 8 Bush.
(Ky.) 299; State v. Meller, 67 Mo.
604; Union Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Davis County, 6 Kan. 256; People v,
Morse, 43 Cal. 534; C. & O. R. R. Co.
v. Barren Co., 10 Bush. (Ky.) 604;
Town of Concord v. Portsmoutli Sav.
Bank, 92 U. S. 625.
0 Terry v. Banks, 18 Wis. 87; Liqui-
dators V. Municipality, 6 La. An. 21 ;
Smith V. Morse, 2 Cal. 524.
27
§15
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. n.
floating debt ; and in reliance upon that act, the creditors sur-
render their claims, and receive new obligations, this final
transaction operates as a pledge of the city's revenues and prop-
erty, vphich could not be materially altered by subsequent leg-
islation, without the consent of the creditors.^ It has also been
held that, where the legislature, in authorizing a municipal cor-
poration to issue bonds to a specific amount in settlement of
its indebtedness, makes provision against the further increase
of the municipal debt, which was evidently intended to influ-
ence the negotiation of the bonds thus authorized to be issued,
the city would not thereafter be permitted to issue further
bonds, except in payment of its bonded debt. That provision
was held to constitute a contract with the creditors, which
could not be repealed or impaired by subsequent legislation,
authorizing a further issue of bonds by such corporation. ^
§ 15. Compulsory contracts. — Another difficult question, in
determining the legislative power of control over municipal
corporations, is the extent to which the legislature can, without
the consent of a municipal corporation, compel such corpor^,-
tion to assume contractual obligations. The general propo-
sition has been maintained by the authorities that, while a
legislature may authorize corporations to make contracts, it is
impossible for the legislature to make contracts for the corpora-
tion without its consent. This has been the rule of the great
majority of the courts in this country.^ In Michigan an act of
• ' Bi-ooklyn Park Comrs. v. Arm-
strong, 45 N. y. 234; People v. Bond,
10 Cal. 563; People v. Wood, 7 lb.
579.
2 Atkins V. Randolph, 31 Vt. 226;
Darlington v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y.,
31 N. T. 164, 205; Hasbrouck v. Mil-
waukee, 13 Wis. 37; Mills v. Charlton,
29 Wis. 400; Philadelphia v. Meld,
58 Pa. St. 320; State v. Tappan, 29
Wis. 664; s. c, 9 Am. Bep. 662. See
further, as to rights of creditors, post,
chapters on Contracts and Manda-
mus.
3 Darlington v. Mayor, 31 N. Y.
164, 205 ; Cairo & St. Louis R. R. Co.
V. City of Sparta, 77 111. 505; Atkius
V. Randolph, 31 Vt. 22(>; White v.
28
Fuller, 31 lb. 226; People v. Chicago,
(Lincoln Pk. case,) 51 111. 17; People
V. Salman, 51 lb. 37; Harard v.
Drainage Co., 51 lb. 130; In re Union
Col., 29 N. E. R. 460; 129 IST. Y. 308;
Brunswick v. Litchfield, 2 Me. (2
Greenl.) 28, 32; Louisville v. The
University, 15 B. Mon. 642; Western
Sav. Fund Soc. v. Philadelphia, 30
Pa. St. 175, 185; Regents of Univer-
sity V. Williams, 9 Gill & Johns. 365 ;
Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29
Vt. 12; Norris v. Trustees Abingdon
Academy, 7 Gill & Johns. (Md.) 7;
Trustees v. Winston, 5 Stew. & Port.
(Ala.) 17; Winn v. Comrs., (Ky. 00)
14 I. W. R. 421; Philadelphia v. Field,
58 Pa. St. 30; State v. Tappen, 29
CH. n.]
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL.
§15
the legislature directed a board of park commissioners to be
created, and such board were authorized to acquire sufficient
lands by purchase for the establishment of a public park in the
city of Detroit, and directed the city council, to whom was
given no control whatever over the commissioners or the pur-
chase of the land, or tlie establishment of the park, to provide
the necessary funds by the issue and sale of city bonds. The
Supreme Court of Micliigan lield that a municipal corporation
cannot be compelled by legislative act to contract debts for
purely local purposes, and declared that, in this particular
case, a park was purely a matter of local concern, in which
the state at large had no interest ; and the legislative act,
which undertook to compel the establishment of such a park,
against or without the consent of the municipal corporation,
was unconstitutional.^
But if the purpose for which the debt is to be contracted is
of a strictly public character, it would then seem that the
Wis. 664; Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee,
13 lb. 37; Mills v. Charlton, 29 Wis.
400; Cf. contra, West Chicago Com'rs
V. McMuUen, (111. 90) 25 N. E. R. 676.
' People ex rel. Park Commis-
sioners V. Common Council of De-
troit, 28 Mich. 228; s. c, 15 Am.
Rep. 202. "It is a fundamental
principle in this state, recognized
and perpetuated by express provision
of the constitution, that the people
of every hamlet, town, ^nd city of
the state, are entitled to the benefits
of local self-government. But au-
thority in the legislature, to deter-
mine what shall be the extent of the
capacity in the city to acquire and
hold property, is not equivalent to,
and does not contain within itself,
authority to deprive the city of
property actually acquired by legis-
lative permission. As to property
it thus holds for its own private pur-
poses, a city is to be regarded as a
constituent of the state government,
and is entitled to the like protection
in its property rights as any natural
person vfho is also a constituent.
The right of the state is a right of
regulation, not of appropriation. It
cannot be deprived of such property
without due process of law. And
when a local convenience or need is
to be supplied in which the people
of the state at large, or any portion
thereof outside the city limits, are
not concerned, the state can no more
by process of taxation take from the
individual citizens the money to pur-
chase it, than they could, if it had
been pi'ocured, appropriate it to the
state use. From the very dawn of
our liberties the principle most un-
questionable of all has been this:
that the people shall vote the taxes
they are to pay, or be permitted to
choose representatives for the pur-
pose." It has on the same ground
been held that city gas works Is a
matter, private and distinct from
pviblic concerns. Western Sav.
Fund Soc. V. Philaidelphia, 31 Pa.
St. 183.
29
§ 15
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. U.
legislature has the power to compel the creation of the indebt-
edness, against or without the consent of the municipal corpo-
T'ation. Thus, it has been held to be competent for tlie legisla-
ture to compel a municipal corporation to build a bridge over
a navigable stream within its limits. Or, in case it is deemed
expedient, the state may appoint its own agents for the con-
struction of such a bridge, and even authorize such commis-
sioners to provide for the payment of the cost of the bridge,
by negotiating a loan on the credit of the corporation. ^ So,
also, may municipal corporations, in their character as local in-
struments of government, be required by the legislature to
keep the streets and highways and bridges, connected with
such corporation, in repair.^ But corporations cannot be com-
pelled by state statute to create a debt in aid of the construc-
tion of a railway.^ In the case of the Brooklyn and New York
bridge, the court of appeals decided that the erection of the
bridge between the two cities was a purpose for which an in-
debtedness may be incurred by these cities, and did not come
in conflict with the constitutional provision, which declares
that no city, county, or town shall give money, or loan its
credit to any individual or corporation, or become an owner
of corporate stock or bonds. It is held that, in that particular
case, the contract was clearl}' within the authority of the two
cities.*
It is also possible for a legislature to provide, in its acts for
incorporation of one city out of two or more, that the debts of
the two cities should become one indebtedness upon both, or
to provide for a separate maintenance of the two debts, and
iPac. Bridge Co. v. Clackamas, 4
Fed. E. 217; Carter v. Bridge Pro-
prietors, 104 Mass. 236; Haverhill v.
G-roveland, (Mass.) 25 N. E. R. 976;
Erie v. Canal, 59 Pa. St. 174; Kirk-
wood V. Newbviry, 125 N. Y. 571;
Guilder v. Otsego, 20 Minn. 74; Unit-
ed States V. B. & O. R. E. Co., 17
Wall. 322.
-See post, §§.315, 316; County v.
People, 5 Neb. 136; Sliadler v. Blair,
136 Pa. St. 488; Fountain v. Warren,
Co., (Ind. 90) 27 N. E. E. 125. By a
constitutional amendment of 1874
30
in New York state, it is provided
that tha legialatiiTe may ctnnpel a
municipal corporation to improve
its highways and keep them in re-
pair, but the power must, before its
exercise, be delegated to the local
authority under general laws. Peo-
ple V. Supervisors, 112 N. Y. 585.
3 People V. Batcheller, 53 N. Y.
128; 13 Am. R. 480; Cf. Berlin Bridge
Co. V. Wagner, (N. Y. 90) 57 Hun,
346.
* People V. Kelly, 5 Abbott's New
Cases (N. Y.) 383; 76 N. Y. 475.
CH. II.]
LEGISLATIVE CONTKOL.
§15
impose the liability in respect to each debt upon that part of
the new corporation, which constituted the original debtor.
All provisions of that sort are purely questions of government-
al policy, and neither the existing creditors, nor the people of
the new municipal corporation, can object to any such subse-
quent change in its affairs by the legislature, as long as the
original obligation is not impaired. ^ Thus, for example, by
act of the legislature the city of Lafayette was added to and
incorporated with the city of "New Orleans, and a provision
was inserted in the act, that the added district, whose indebt-
edness was proportionately less than the old city of New Or-
leans, should be charged only with the payment of its own
debts. . A subsequent act of the legislature required that taxes
should be levied uniformly throughout the entire city, the ef-
fect of which was to increase the burden of taxation of the
addition to the city. But it was held that this subsequent leg-
islation did not interfere with the vested rights, either of the
citizens of the added district, or of their creditors.^ But it is
not lawful for a legislature to impose in whole or in part upon
one independent municipal corporation the obligation to pay
the debt contracted by another corporation ; as where the leg-
islature undertook to assess lands in the town of Flatbush to
pay debts previously incurred by the adjoining city of Brook-
lyn, in the establishment of a park, notwithstanding that a
portion of the land in the park was taken from the limits of
the town of Flatbush. This case is to be distinguished from
the case, where the indebtedness of one town is made the com-
mon indebtedness of a new corporation, formed by the consoli-
dation of two or more.**
1 Columbus V. Town, (Wis. 92) 52
N. W. R. 425 ; Maddrey v. Cox, 73
Tex. 538; Saunders v. Municipality,
24 Fla. 226.
2 Eschenliurg v. Com'rs, 28 N. E. R.
865, (lud. 92); Maltby v. Tantges,
(Minn. 92) 52 N. W. R. 858; Little v.
Union Township Com., 40 N. J. L.
397; Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La.
An. 515; Brown v. Memphis, 97 U.
S. 800; People v. Hill, 7 Cal. 97;
Vance v. Little Rock, 30 Ark. 435,
439; State v. Flanders, 24 La. An.
57; Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga.
527; San Francisco v. Canavan, 42
Cal. 541; Sedgwick v. Bark, 11 Kan.
031 ; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S.
644.
3 Town of Flatbush, In re, 60 N.
Y. 398. In rendering this opinion,
the court through Judge Miller says :
" But such is not this case. . .There
is no principle that I am aware of
which sanctions the doctrine that it
31
§16
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS.
[CH. II.
In regard to the general proposition that the city corporation
cannot be compelled by the legislature to incur debts for the
attainment of a strictly local interest, there is but one really
dissenting opinion, and that comes from Pennsylvania. It was
held by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that the legisla-
ture has the power to provide for the erection of a city hall,
and thereby to provide for the accommodation of the courts
for municipal purposes within the city of Philadelphia, and
to determine the extent of the indebtedness thus incurred, and
to compel such city to pay the debt.^ In consequence of the
public feeling created by this extraordinary act of the legisla-
ture, and the great burden imposed upon the city thereby, an
amendment was made to the constitution of 1874, which de-
clared " That the general assembly shall not delegate to any
special commission, private corporation or association, any
power to make, supervise, or interfere with any municipal im-
provement, money, property, or effects, whether held in trust
or otherwise ; or to levy taxes, or to perform any municipal
function whatever." ^ Directly contrary to this Pennsylvania
case, the Supreme Court of Michigan held, that the legislature
cannot compel an incorporated city to erect a court house in
the count}^, in which the town or city is situated.^
§ 16. Compulsory satiRf action of non-legal claims against
cities. — In a great variety of cases, the legislatures of the dif-
ferent states have assumed the right to compel the municipal
corporation to recognize as a legal obligation, and to perform,
all such obligations which have no binding force in law, but
is withiu the taxing power of tlie
legislature to compel one town, city,
or locality to contribute to the pay-
ment of the debts of another. The
government has no such authority,
and this case is entirely without a
precedent. If such assessments were
authorized they might not be limited
to adjoining towns, cities, or villages,
but applied to those located at great
distances from each other. Such
legislation would be unjust, mis-
chievous, and oppressive, and cannot
be tolerated." But see, contra, Car-
32
ter V. Bridge Proprietors, 104 Mass.
236.
1 Perkins v. Slack, 86 Pa. St. 283;
1 Hale's Am. Const. Law, 630.
2 Art. .S, sec. 20, Constitution of
1874. A further provision was add-
ed that "no debt shall be contracted
or liability incurred by any munici-
pal commission, except in pursuance
of appropriations previously made
by the municipal government." Art.
15, sec. 2, Constitution of 1874.
8 Callam v. Saginaw, 50 Mich. 7.
CH. II.J
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL.
17
which have a moral claim for satisfaction. And it has been
held that the legislature, in thus recognizing a moral claim
against a city, and in compelling such city to pay such a claim,
is not exceeding its power of control over such corporation.^
It is held, however, that the legislature cannot undertake to
compel a municipal corporation to pay every debt or claim,
which is not a legal obligation. Thus, the legislature is not
authorized to provide by legislation for the payment of a debt,
which is unconstitutional, because it exceeded the limit of mu-
nicipal indebtedness, which is fixed by the constitution.^ But
whenever the limitations or conditions, which are imposed up-
on the contractual power of the corporation, are found in state
statutes, the same authority, which imposed the limitation or
conditions, may waive such conditions, and ratify or validate
the debt of a corporation, which otherwise would be invalid.^
§ 17. Ratifying void local assessments. — For the same
reason, and on the same general principle, as laid down in the
previous paragraph, it has been frequently held to be within
the power of the legislature to ratify an assessment, made by a
municipal corporation for local improvements in front of abut-
ting property, and compel the abutting owner to pay such
assessments, notwitlistanding the original invalidity of the as-
' People V. Squire, 145 U. S. 175;
In re CuUen, 53 Hun, 534; People v.
Dayton, 55 N. Y. 367; Shelby Co. v.
Railroad Co., 5 Bush. (Ky.) 225;
Smith V. Morse, 2 Cal. 524; Grogan
V. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590; Brew-
ster V. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Devers
V. York, 150 Pa. St. 208; 30 W. 'S.C.
390; Xew Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S.
644; People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15;
United States v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322; Creighton
V. San Francisco, 42 Cal. 446; People
V. Supervisors, 70 N. Y. 228; Baker
V. Seattle, 2 Wash. St. 576; New Or-
leans V. Clark, 95 U. S. 654; Guilford
V. Supervisors, etc., 13 N. Y. 143;
Philadelphia V. Field, 53 Pa. St. 320;
Lycoming V. Union, 15 Pa. St. 166;
Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; North
Mo. R. R. Co. V. Maguire, 49 Mo.
3
490, 500; Nevada v. Hampton, 13
Nev. 441; Mayor, etc., of New York
V. Tenth National Bank, 111 N. Y.
440; People v. Mayor, etc., of Brook-
lyn, 4 Comst. (N. Y.) 419; Thomas
v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65 ; but see con-
tra, State V. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664;
s. c, 9 Am. Rep. 622; Hoagland v.
Sacramento, 52 Cal. 142; corap. also
Waupaca County v. Town of Matte-
son, (Wis. 91) 48 N. W. R. 213; Bouk-
night V. Davis, 33 S. C. 410; 12 S. E.
R. 96.
2 J)i re Flower, 29 N. E. R. 463; In
re Union College, 29 lb. 460; 129 N.
Y. 308; Mosher v. Sch. District, 44
Iowa, 122.
8 Creighton v. San Francisco, 42
Cal. 440; New Orleans v. Clark, 95
U. S. 644; Sinton V. Ashbury, 41 Cal.
525.
33
§17
MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS.
[CH. II.
sessment.^ In these cases, it is simply a failure on the part of
the corporation to comply with some special requirement of
the state statutes ; and the substantial obligations of the abut-
ting owners have not been materially affected thereby. It is a
general rule of construction of legislative authority, that what-
ever the legislature could have permitted to be done, it may
subsequently ratify and give it legal effect.^ And the fact, that
such legislative acts of ratification have a retrospective opera-
tion, does not constitute any serious objection to such legisla-
tion, as long as the retrospective operation of the act does not
effect an impairment of vested rights.^ But where the invalidity
of the assessment, or other municipal act, was due to a failure
to observe a constitutional provision, the illegality of the as-
sessment or other municipal act is beyond the curative effect
of a legislative enactment. Thus, for example, where a con-
stitution requires that all taxation should be uniform and im-
posed equally upon the taxpayers, and the assessment provides
for the payment of a local improvement by the abutting own-
ers, with the exception of one lot which was equally benefited
by such improvement ; a subsequent act of the legislature, rat-
ifying such assessment law, would be inoperative as long as
the omission and exception of the lot in question was retained ;
1 Baltimore v. Horn, 26 Md. 194;
Great Falls Ice Co. v. Bistiict of Co-
lumbia, 19 D. C. 327; Lennon v. N.
Y., 55 N. T. 361.
2 Marion Co. v. Louisville Co., (Ky.
92) 15 S. W. R. 1061; Lockhart v.
*rroy, 48 Ala. 579; McMillenv. Boyles,
6 Iowa, 304; lb. 391; Emporia v. Nor-
ton, 13 Kan. 560; Mason v. Spencer,
35 Kan. 512; Otoe County v. Bald-
win, 111 U. S. 1; Grenada Co. v.
Brogden, 112 U. S. 261, 262; In re
East Ave. Bap. Church, 11 N. Y. S.
113; Anderson V. Santa Anna, 116 U.
S. 364; Belles v. Bromfleld, 120 S. U.
759; San Francisco v. Certain Real
Estate, 42 Cal. 517; Marshall v. Silli-
raan, 61 111. 218; In re Byrnes, 57
Hun, 590; Katzenberger v. Aberdeen,
121 U. S. 172; Atchison, etc., K. E.
Co. V. Maquillon, 12 Kan. 301 ; Citi-
zens' Water Co. v. Bridgeport Hy-
34
draulic Co., 55 Conn. 1; Tifftv. Buf-
falo, 82 ISr. Y. 205 ; Atchison v. Butch-
er, 3 Kan. 104 ; Frederick v. Augusta,
5 Ga. 561 ; Great Falls Ice Co. v. Dis-
trict, 19 D. C. 327; Winn v. Macon,
21 Ga. 275; Mattenly v. District of
Col., 97 U. S. 687; New Orleans v.
Poutz, 14 La. An. 853; Allison v. K.
W. Co., 9 Bush. (Ky.) 247; Truchelut
V. City Council, 1 Nott& McCord (S.
C.) 227.
8 Cromwell v. McLean, 123 N. Y.
474; Municipality v. Theater Co., 2
Eob. (La.) 209; Danlellyv. Cabaniss,
52 Ga. 211 ; New Orleans v. Clark, 95
U. S. 644; Pompton v. Cooper Union,
101 lb. 196; Bridgeport V. R. R., 15
Conn. 475, 497; see also, Pardridge
V. Village of Hyde Park, 131 111. 537;
23 N. E. K. 345 ; State v. Village of
South Orange, 6 Alt. 312; 49 N. J.
L. 104.
CH. II.]
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL.
§18
the ground being, that such omission and exemption was in
violation of the provisions of the constitution.^
§ 18. Legislative control of offices and officers in munici-
pal corporations. — The power of a legislature over municipal
offices and officers has always been the subject of discussion.
And here, as elsewhere, in determining the limitations of the
legislative control, the distinction is to be made between those
officers of the municipal corporation, who are charged with the
performance of duties of a strictly public character and in which
the state at large has a concern, — such as judges, and all par-
ties who are engaged in the administration of justice, or the
preservation of the public peace ; — and on the other hand, the
strictly municipal officers, whose duties are of strictly municipal
concern, such as the establisliment and management of gas
works, water works, sewers, and the like. It is held that the
state has the authority to regulate, if it desires, the appoint-
ment of public officers as just described, but it cannot interfere
with the control of matters of local concern, or direct the ap-
pointment of the officers who are charged with their manage-
ment.^
While an extensive and very comprehensive discretion is
vested in the legislative power of the state, in shaping the gen-
eral features and outlines of local municipal government, subject
' In re Flower, 29 N. E. K. 463; In
re Union College, 29 lb. 460; 129 N.
T. 308; People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15;
Schumacher v. Toberman, 56 lb.
508.
2 Lloyd V. Silver B. Co., (Mont. 92)
28 Pac. E. 453 ; Greene v. Fresno,
(Cal. 92) 30 Pac. K. 544; State v-
Canavan, 30 Pac. Rep. 1079; 17 Nev.
422; State v. 0' Conner, (JST. J. 92) 22
Atl. R. 1091; State v. Adams, 90
Tenn. 722; Chicago v. Wright, 69 111.
326; Buroh v. Hardwick, 30 Gratt.
24; U. S. V. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284;
State V. Hine, 59 Conn. 50; State v.
Stanfleld, (Tex. 92) 18 S. W. R. 577;
State V. Hunter, 38 Kan. 578; Hath-
away v. New Baltimore, 48 Mich. 251 ;
State V. George, 23 Fla. 585; State v.
Bogard, (Ind. 92) 27 W. E. E. 252;
Evansville v. State, 118 Ind. 426;
Davies v. Saginaw Co., 89 Mich. 295;
Britton v. Steber, 62 Mo. 370; People
V. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; People v.
Shepherd, 36 N. Y. 285; Speed v.
Crawford, 3 Met. (Ky.) 207;-Police
Commissioners v. Louisville, 3 Bush
(Ky.) 597 ; People v. Bull, 46 N. Y. 57;
People V. McKinney, 52 lb. 374; Peo-
ple V. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15;. People v.
Curley, 5 Col. 412; People v. Clute,
50 N. Y. 451; Richmond Mayoralty
Case, 19 Gratt. (Va.) 673; People v.
Batchellor, 22 N. Y. 128; People v.
Palmer, 52 N. Y. 83; People v. Al-
bertson, 55 N. Y. 50; State v. Denny,
118 Ind. 382; s. C, 21 N. E. R. 252,
274.
36
§18
MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS.
[CH. 11.
onlj' to the existing constitutional limitations and restraiiits,iit
is, nevertheless, a deeply rooted principle of American and Eng-
lish law that the ultimate control of purely local affairs must
be vested in the local governments of towns, cities and counties,
and should be administered by ofBcers chosen by their inhabi-
tants.^ And so, also, while the legislature has no power to
appoint, it has the power to prescribe how the act of appoint-
ment shall be performed^ and, generally, to create new offices,
abolish those alread}' existing and regulate by re-distribution
that portion of the sovereign power which is administered by
executive public officials ; * and, in exchanging an old .system
of administration for a new one, or in creating a system of
local government, the legislature may make provisional appoint-
ments.® Where the officers are charged with the performance
of duties of a strictly public character, which are transferred to
the municipal corporation, as a legal franchise from the state
government ; the state legislature may, in the absence of ex-
press constitutional limitations, exercise an unlimited power
of control, and determine how the office shall be filled, and
take away from municipal corporations the power of appoint-
ing such officers. It has thus become a common practice, in a
great many of the states to provide for the establishment of
what is known as a metro[)olitan police, controlled by the state
government, through appointment of police commissioners by
the governor or legislature of the state ; to take away from
1 Atty. Gen. v. Detroit, 29 Mich.
108; People v. Huiibut, 24 lb. 44;
People V. Draper, 15 N. T. 532.
2 State V. Goiildey, (N. J. 88) 18
Atl. R. 69.5 ; Atty. Gen. v. Twombley,
89 Mich. 50; 50 N. W. R. 744; People
V. Morgan, 90 111. 558; People v. May-
or, 91 lb. 17; State v. Swift, 11 Nev.
128; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y.
50; Kaumanu v. Board, (Mich. 88)
41 N. W. R. 267; Evansville v. State,
118 Ind. 426; People v. Highland Pk.,
88 Mich. 653; State v. Wright, (N". J.
92) 23 Atl. 116; Taylor v. Palmer, 31
Cal. 252; In re Scranton, 113 Pa. St.
176; Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Vt. 226;
Com. V. Denworth, 145 Pa. St. 172;
22 Atl. R. 820.
36
3 State V. Hoagland, (N. J.) 16 Atl.
R. 166; Brady v. "West, 50 Miss. 68;
People V. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; State
V. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102; Bridges
V. Shallcross, 6 W. Va. 562; People
v. Board, (N". Y. 93) 20 N. Y. S. 51;
MoCormick v. People, (92 111.) 28 Jf.
E. R. 1106.
* State V. Smith, (Neb. 92) 52 K W.
R. 700; State v. Becker, (S. D. 92) 51
lb. 1018; Dougherty v. Austin, 94
Cal. 601 ; Board v. Hiester, 87 N. Y.
661; State v. Field, 17 Mo. 529; Peo-
ple V. Porter, 90 N. Y. 68.
6 Mayor v. State, 15 Md. 376; State
V. Benedict, 15 Minn. 198; State v.
Swift, 11 Nev. 128; Sabin v. Curtis,
(Idaho 93) 32 Pac. 1130.
CH. II.]
LEGISLATIVE CONTEOL.
§18
the municipal corporation the charge of the police force, and
intrust it to the board of commissioners ; and, in pursuance of
this transfer of control, to turn over to the commissioners the
use of the station houses, the wagons, books, police telegraph,
and other property of the city, which are used for police pur-
poses.i But in Indiana, it has been lately held, that the act for
the establishment of a metropolitan police and fire board for
the larger cities is unconstitutional, as being an unwarrantable
interference with the constitutional principle of local self gov-
ernment.*
It is not always easy, however, to determine what offices are
of a public character and involve the performance of duties of
general public concern, and distinguish them from those in
which the duties involve niatters of local concern, and which
should for that reason be administered by appointees of the
municipal corporation. As alreadj- stated, with one exception,
that of Indiana, police boards are deemed to be public or state
offices, and therefore fall within the legislative control. And
while, on the other hand, the general rule is that other officials,
such as park commissioners and water commissioners are city
officials, yet it is not always the case ; and there are authorities
which hold that even water commissioners, and park commis-
sioners, and highway commissioners, are state officials, who
may be subjected to legislative control.^ Wherever the legis-
lature has the right to assume control of a municipal office,
it has likewise the right to compel the city to provide for de-
fraying the expenses of such an office.* And not only is that
"Hudson etc. Co. v. Seymour, 6
Vroom, 35 N. J. L. 47; County v.
Griswold, 58 Mo. 175 ; People v. Dra-
per, 15 N. Y. 532; Daily v. St. Paul,
7 Minn. 390; State v. Valle, 41 Mo.
29; State v. St. Louis County Court,
34 Mo. 546; People v. Detroit, 28
Mich. 228; Payne v. Washington Co.,
(Fla. 90) 6 So. K. 881.
* Railroad Co. v. Adler, 56 HI. 844;
Durach's App., 62 Pa. St. 491; Peo-
ple V. Commissioners of Police, 8 N.
T. S. 725; Gadsden v. Greene, 22
Fla. 102.
37
^Mclnerneyv. Denver, (Col. 92)29
Pac. 516; Com. v. Plaisted, 148 Mass.
375; 19 N. E. E. 224; Pruice v. Bos-
ton, 148 Mass. 370; 19 N. E. E. 218;
People V. McDonald, 69 N. Y. 382;
People V. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228;
Francis v. Blair, 96 Mo. 515; People
V. Chicago, 51 111. 17; Burch v. Hard-
wick, 30 Gratt. 24 ; Columbus v. Town,
(Wis. 92) 52 N. W. R. 425; Comm'rs
V. Louisville, 3 Bush, 597; Diamond
V. Cain, 21 La. .An. 309; State v.
Hunter, 38 Kan. 578 ; State v. Kolsem,
(Ind. 92) 29 N. E. E. 595.
iiEvansville v. State, 118 Ind. 426.
§18
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. n.
the case, but the legislature may likewise provide that, where
a county, adjoining a city, or in which a city is located, receives
the benefits of the presence of a police force, such county shall
be called upon to defray in part the expenses of such police
force. ^
1 Sangamon v. Springfield, 63 111.
66; St. Louis v. Shields, 52 Mo. 351;
Weymoutli etc. Fire Dis. v. County
Com'rs, 108 Mass. 142 ; State ex rel.
St. Louis Police Com'rs v. St. Louis
38
Co. Ct., 34 Mo. 546; People v. Morris,
13 Wend. 325 ; Stitz v. Indianapolis,
55 Ind. 515; contra, Mayor v. Tows,
5 Sneed, 186.
CHAPTER III.
THE INCORPORATION OP MUNICIPALITIES.
Section.
21 — Modes of creating muuicipal
corporations in England.
22 — Creation of muuicipal corpo-
rations in the United States.
23 — ^Who composes the corpora^
tion.
24 — Acceptance of municipal cor-
porations, when necessary.
25 — How far precise forms of words
are required for incorporation,
— Creation by implication.
26 — Creation by special act, when
permitted.
27 — Creation by general laws,
when required.
Section.
28 — Only one object which sliall
be expressed in the title.
29 — Corporate existence not open
to collateral attack.
30 — Judicial notice of charters and
of acts of municipal corpora-
tions.
31 — Proof of corporate existence.
82 — Power to repeal and amend
city charter, effect of exercise
of such power.
33 — Special power when repealed
by general laws.
34 — Implied repeal of general laws
by special laws.
§ 21. Modes of creating municipal corporations in Eng-
land.— Under the early English law there were strictly but two
ways of creating municipal corporations; viz., first, by the king's
charter ; secondly, b3'-act of parliament. But, in addition there-
to, there were a great many corporations, whose existence and
power were derived from immemorial usage, or which had ex-
isted for so long a time, that the claim could be made, under
the doctrine of prescription, of an original incorporation. The
result was, that municipal corporations in England were very
irregular, not only as to the mode of their creation, but also as
to the extent of their power. This condition continued up to
1836, when parliament passed the " Municipal Corporation Act "
of that year, which was designed, not only to provide for the
creation of municipal corporations in the future by act of par-
liament, but also to give a uniform character to the powers and
nature of all the existing municipal corporations. And the act
with its amendments was finally incorporated in the Municipal'
Corporation Act of 1882. Under these acts, the English mu-
nicipal corporation has a uniform character, and its power and
mode of administration are regulated by the general law so
39
§ 22 MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS. [CH. UI.
enacted. A great many abuses have, by this municipal corpora-
tion act, been abolished.
§ 22. Creation of municipal corporations in the United
States. — In the United States, a municipal corporation can only
be created by a legislative act. Although, as will be seen in a
subsequent connection,^ it is possible for the municipal corpora-
tion to claim by prescription the right to corporate powers, in
the absence of positive proof of the legislative act of incorpora-
tion, resulting from a long enjoyment of the corporate powers ;
yet the instances of prescriptive incorporation are very rare;
so much so that no general account of the mode of creating
corporations by prescription need be considered.
The legislative branch of the government, under the consti-
tutional laws of this country, can alone exercise the power of
creating a corporation. In consequence of confining the exer-
cise of this power to the legislative department, and the greater
demand of American civilization for the creation of corporations,
acts of incorporation by the legislature have increased to great
proportions, far beyond what has ever been known in the history
of jurisprudence. As a general rule, corporations, both munici-
pal and private, within the territorial limits of the states, can
only be created by acts of the state legislature ; and while Con-
gress has been held by the courts to have the power of creating
all sorts of corporations, both public and private, whenever such
acts of incorporation become necessary or appropriate to the
effectual exercise of any of the constitutional powers of the
United States Government ; or whenever such acts of incor-
poration are in any way an aid to the exercise of the jurisdic-
tion over the States and Territories ; ^ yet, in the creation of
municipal corporations within state limits, the United States
Govei-nment or Congress cannot interfere. Municipal corpora-
tions, within the states can alone be created, or their powers modi-
fied, enlarged or restricted, by the legislative action of the State.
But Congress has the power, outside of state boundaries, not
onl}' of creating municipal corporations by direct legislative act ;
but it may likewise pass, and it is in the habit of passing, acts
'See post, §25, 31. v. Hill, (Wash. 92) 27 lb. 922; see
2MoCunoughv.Mai-yland,4Wlieat. Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 145;
316; Osborne v. Bank, 9 lb. 738; Tiedeman on Private Corporations
Thompson V. E. R., 9 Wall. 579; Guth- § 20, Morawetz, § 9.
rie V. Territory, 31 Pao. E. 190; Alger
40
CH. in.J THE INCOKPOEATION OP MUNICIPAIilTIBS. § 23
vesting in the territorial governments the power of creating
both public and private corporations in the respective territories.
Objection was at first made to this grant of power to the terri-
torial government, on the ground that the act conferring such
power was a delegation of authority by the sovereign power to
a subordinate political organization. But this objection has
been overruled and the general rule laid down, that a territorial
legislature, which is vested with general legislative power by
grant from Congress, acquires by such general grant, and inde-
pendently of any special grant, the power to create both public
and private corporations.^
§ 23. Who composes the corporation Under the early
municipal corporation law of England, the corporation is not
confined to territorial limits ; nor could one determine, by a
reference to such territorial limits, who composed the munici-
pality. The ancient municipal corporation was not the town
or place, at which such corporation was located, nor was it
composed of all the people who inhabited such town or place ;
it was rather a grant by the crown generally, and sometimes by
the parliament, to certain persons or classes of persons, living
within such town or place, and sometimes residing elsewhere,
[as in the case of many of the American colonies,] vesting in
such persons the franchise of governmental control of the place
or community. The corporation, therefore, was not the people
who composed the community ; but consisted generally of three
distinct classes or parties : First, the mayor ; secondly, the al-
dermen ; thirdly, the commonalty, who consisted of the free-
men who fell within the desciiption of the persons entitled to
participate in the management of the corporation, and whose
rights were from time to time curtailed or enlarged. Under
the English municipal corporation act of 1835 and the subse-
quent amendments thereto, as well as generally in the United
States, the municipal corporation is not composed of the city
council or the mayor, but of the people who constitute the com-
Central, 1 Col. 323; Myers v. Bank,
20 Ohio, 283; State v. Young, 3 Kan.
445; Keddlck v. Amelia, 1 Mo. 5;
People V. Butte, 4 Mont. 174; Act of
Mar. 2, 1867; 14 Stats, at Large, 426,
§1; Rev. S. of U. S. §1889.
41
> Alger V. Hill, 27 Pao. E. 922; 2
Wash. 344; Board v. Da vies, 24 Pac.
R. 540; Elk Point v. Vaughan, 1 Dak.
113; 46 N. W. R. 577; Seattle v. Ty-
ler, Wash. Terr'y, 1877; Yanoe v.
Bank, 1 Blackf. 80; Deitz v. City of
§24
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. III.
munity, which has by the act of incorporation been created into
a legal personality. The mayor and the councils, instead of
being the corporation itself, are not even a constituent part
of such corporation ; they are nothing more than the servants
or agents of the incorporators, who are the inhabitants of the
community in general.^
§ 24. Acceptance of municipal corporations, when neces-
sary.— It seems that under the early English law, in respect to
municipal corporations, where the crown undertook to confer a
charter upon a community, the assent on the part of the com-
munity was necessary to the creation of a corporation, or to the
modification of the powers of the existing corporation, if there
be one. But where the parliament undertook to control or limit
the powers of the existing municipal corporation, or to create
a municipal corporation, where one had not theretofore existed,
the assent of the incorporators, or of the community, was not
necessary; parliament having this power, without the consent
or co-operation of the people of the communitj'. But in the
United States, where all acts of incorporation are legislative
acts, the acceptance of a charter by a community is not neces-
sary to the creation of a municipal corporation. And, unless
the act of incorporation is made by the legislature conditional
upon such acceptance,^ it is binding upon all who live within
the limits of the incorporated district, and nothing can prevent
the taking effect of the act of incorporation. The public or
municipal corporation comes into existence, as soon as the leg-
islature passes the act of incorporation.^
But while the legislature is not bound to obtain the consent
^ Ante, §21; Lowber v. Mayor, 5
Ab. Pr. E. 325; Baumgartner v.
Hasty, 100 Ind. 575.
2 Clarke v. Rogers, 81 Ky. 43; State
V. Lamoureux, 30 Pac. K. 24'?.
3 State V. Babcock, 41 N. "W. E. 654;
23 Neb. 709 ; People v. Butte, 4 Mont.
174; Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H.
524, 532; State v. Canterbury, 28 N.
H. 218; Buford v. State, 72 Tex. 182;
Smith V. Crutoher, (Ky. 92) 18 S. W.
R. 521; State v. Curran, (12 Ark.
42
321; Fire Department v. Kip, 10
Wend. 267; People v. Morris, 13
Wend. 325; Millville Bor., In re, 10
Pa. Co. Ct. R. 321; Brouwer v. Ap-
pleby, 1 Sandf. 158; Gorham v.
Springfield, 21 Maine, 58; People T.
Stout, 23 Barb. 349 ; Warren v.
Charlestown, 2 Gray, 104; Mills v.
Williams, 11 Ire. 558; Berlin v. Gor-
ham, 34 N. H. 266; People v. Wren,
4 Scam. (5 111.) 269; People v. Oak-
land, 92 Cal. 611.
CH. ni.J THE INCOEPORATION OF MUNICIPALITIES.
§^^
of the community which it is proposed to incorporate, before a
municipal corporation can be set up ; yet it is possible for the
legislature, instead of providing for the unconditional incorpora-
tion of the municipality, to make the creation of such a corpora-
tion dependent upon the consent of the community to the act of
incorporation.! Where no particular mode is prescribed for pro-
curing an expression of assent, on the part of the people, such
expression may be implied from circumstances, and from the
conduct of the people, as in the case of private corporations.^
So, also, is it possible for the legislature to provide, that the
continued existence of an existing township should be deter-
mined by a vote of the qualified electors.* So, also, may the
question be submitted to the people, whether a portion of an
adjoining county shall be annexed ; or whether certain improve-
ments should be made ; or whether certain liabilities should be
incurred.* The power of a legislature to provide for the local
regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors by the so called
local option laws has been disputed. These acts have been de-
^ Ex parte Schlomberg, (Miss. 93)
11 So. K. 721 ; In re Vacation of Henry
St.,123Pa. St. 646; In re Edgewood,
18 Atl. E. 646; Ford v. Des Moines, 45
N. W. E. 1031; People v. City of
Butte, 4 Mont. 174; Lafayette, etc.,
E. E. Co. V. Geiger, 34 Ind. 185;
Bank v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467; Call v.
Chadbourne, 46 Maine, 206; People
V. Riverside, 70 CaL 461 ; 11 Pac. E.
759; Gueble v. Epply, (Col. 92) 28
Pac. E. 89; Patterson v. Society,
etc., 4 Zabr. 385; Smith v. McCar-
thy, 56 Pa. St. 359; People v. Sal-
mon, 51 111. 53; Alcorn v. Horner, 38
Miss. 652; In re TuUytown, 11 Pa.
Co. Ct. E. 97; Lum v. Bowie, (Tex.
92) 18 S. W. E. 142; State v. Scott,
17 Mo. 521 ; Hudson Co. v. State, 4
Zabr. (24 N. J. L.) 718; Bull v. Eead,
13 Gratt. (Va.) 18; In re Wintergreen
Alley, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 126; State v.
Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458.
2 Taylor v. Newberne, 2 Jones Eq.
N. C. 141 ; see Zabriskie v. Eailroad
Co., 23 How. U. S. 381, 397.
8 Lum V. Bowie, (Tex. 92) 18 S. W.
E. 142; People v. Wiant, 48 111. 263;
Eailroad v. Davidson County, 1 Sneed
(Tenn.) 692; Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Mon.
526; State v.Winkelmeier, 35 Mo. 103 ;
Smith V. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359;
St. Joseph V. Eogers, 16 Wall. 644;
People V. Warfield, 20 111. 103.
* State v.Waxahachie. 81 Tex. 628;
Lum v. Bowie, supra ; North Spring
field V. Springfield, (111. 92) 29 N. E.
E. 849; Bank of Eome v. Rome, 18
N. Y. 38; Trustees v. Cherry, 8 Ohio
St. 564; Eailroad Co. v. Com., lOhio
St. 77; Foote v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio,
408; Bank v. Brow, 26 N. Y. 467;
Hammond v. Haines, 25 Md. 541;
Bai-to V. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483; Clarke
V. Eochester, 28 N. Y. 605 ; St. Louis
V. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; Blanding
V. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; Burnes v. Atch-
ison, 2 Kan. 454.
43
§25
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS.
[CH. III.
clared to be constitutional by some of the cases,^ although their
invalidity has been likewise denied.^
§ 25. How far precise forms of words are required for in-
corporation— Creation by implication. — In the creation of a
municipal corporation it has been generally held, whenever the
question has been raised, that no particular form of words is
required to be used, in the act of incorporation of a munici-
palitj'. While formal expressions are generally employed, the
absence of them will in no case interfere with the creation of
a municipal corporation, provided sufficient words are employed
to indicate the intention to create a municipal corporation.
Hence, where the intention to create a body politic or corporate
is manifest in the words employed in the legislative act, the
failure to insert, in such charter or act, words conferring the
necessary powers of a corporation, such as that the organiza-
tion shall have the power to plead and be impleaded, or to have
a seal, or to make contracts and by-laws, and the like ;' if the
intention to create a corporation was clearly manifested, its
necessary powers would be implied.^ And so, also, would it
not be absolutely defective, if the name of the corporation
were omitted, provided such name could be ascertained indi-
rectly from the terms of the act, or from the nature of the
1 State V. Morris, 36 N. J. L. 72;
State V. Dugan, (Mo. 92) 19 I. W. E.
195 ; Friesner v. Charlotte, (Mich. 92)
52 K. W. E. 18; State v. Moore, (Mo.)
16 S. W. E. 937; Ex parte Swann, 96
Mo. 44; Lemon v. Peyton, 64 Miss.
161; see also Howe v. Plainfield, 37
N. J. L. 146; Donovan v. County, 60
Conn. 339; Hudson Co. v. State, 24
"N". J. L. 718; State v. Pond, 6 S. W.
E. 469; 93 Mo. 617; State v. Watts,
20 S. W. E. 237; 111 Mo. 553.
2 Prentiss v. Davis, 22 Atl. E. 246;
33 Me. 365; Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa.
St. 491; Gloversville v. Howell, 70
N". Y. 287; State v. Wilcox, 42 Conn.
364; 19 Am. Eep. 536.
3 Duncan v. State, (Fla. 92) 10 So.
E. 815 ; Wells v. Burbank, 17 N. H.
393; Society, etc., v. Pawlet, 4 Pet.
44
(U. S.) 480, 502; Newport Trustees,
In re, 16 Sim. 346; Thomas v. Dakin,
22 Wend. 9, 84; Stebbinsv. Jennings,
10 Pick. 172; Medical Institute v.
Patterson, 1 Denio, 61 ; Lewis v. Co-
manche Co., 35 Fed. E. 343; Inhabi-
tants, etc., V. Wood, 13 Mass. 193;
Lord V. Bigelow, 6 Vt. 465; Bow v.
Allentown, 34 N. H. 351, 372; Ben-
ton V. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 325, 326;
Jeffreys & Gurr, 2 B. & Adol. 841;
Mahoney v. The Bank of the State,
4 Ark. 620; Myers v. Irwin, 2 Serg.
& Eawle, 368; Conservators v. Ash,
10 Barn. & Cress. 349 (12 Eq. C. L.
97) ; Overseers v. Sears, 22 Pick. 122,
130; Cf. People v. Harvey, (111. 93)
32 ISr. E. E. 295; Freligh v. Sauger-
ties Village, 24 N. Y. S. 182.
CH. in.] THE INCORPORATION OP MUNICIPALITIES.
§26
powers granted.! But where the charter or act, which is pre-
sumed to operate as an incorporation of the municipality, ex-
pressly denies to the organization, which is presumed to have
been incorporated, powers which are necessary to its existence
as a corporation, it would be plain in such a case that there
had not been an effective incorporation of the community .^
§ 26. Creation by special act, when permitted. — In the ab-
sence of constitutional limitations, the common, in fact the
only, method of creating a municipal corporation is by a spe-
cial act of the legislature, calling into being the particular cor-
poration in question. But in consequence of constitutional
provisions, looking to the incorporation of both public and
private corporations under general laws, instead of by special
acts, the power to create corporations by special act has in some
cases been expressly reserved ; as for example, in New York,
Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, Louisiana, Nevada.
And in Missouri it was provided that no municipal corporation
shall be created by special act, except in cities of at least 5,000
inhabitants, and in that case the special act is to be provided
by the vote of the inhabitants on the matter.^ In some of
the states, it is also provided by the constitution, that in all
cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special
law shall be permitted. And the question is raised under that
constitutional provision, whether it is a legislative or judicial
question, whether in the particular case under inquiry a gen-
eral law can or cannot be made applicable. It has finally been
determined that it is a question for the legislature, and not
for the courts.*
1 School Com. V. Dean, 2 Stew. &
P. (Ala.) 190; Trustees v. Parks, 10
Me. 141.
2 1 Dillon Mun. Corp. § 42.
s Const. 1865 of Mo., art. viii, sec.
5; New York Const. 1846, art. viii,
sec. 1; names of tlie states which ap-
pear in this connection are not in-
tended to be ii complete enumera-
tion of the states in which this con-
stitutional provision has been adopt-
ed. It is very probable that the
same provision will be found else-
where. Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn.
171; Virginia City v. Mining Co., 2
Nev. 86; State v. Simon, 22 Atl. R.
120; Straub v. Pittsburgh, 138 Pa. St.
356; Com. v. Reynolds, 137 lb. 389;
Nev. Sch. Dist. v. Shoecraft, 88 Cal.
372.
* Edmonds V. Herbrandson, (JT. D.
92) 50 N. W. R. 970; State v. Kolsem,
(Ind. 92) 29 N. E. R. 495 ; MoCormiok
V. West Duluth, 50 N. W. R. 128; 47
Minn. 272; Richman v. Muscatine
Co., 77 Iowa, 513; Hughes v. Mulli-
gan, ( Kan. 88) 22 Pac. R. 313; Fel-
lows v. Walkers, 39 Fed. R. 651; Gen-
45
§27
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIOXS.
[CH. nr.
§ 27. Creation by general laws required. — In many of the
states, however, it is expressly required that all corporations,
both public and private, should be created under general laws,
and special acts of incorporation are prohibited to all. Such is
the rule in Iowa, Florida, Nebraska, and under the new constitu-
tion of Illinois, Wisconsin, Kansas, Ohio. In Missouri and New
York, provision is made for general incorporation acts, as well
as special. The object of these constitutional provisions, in re-
quiring the exercise of the legislative power in the creation of
corporations by general act, instead of by special, is to avoid and
prevent, as far as possible, any interference by the legislature in
tlie affairs of a local community, and the further concentration
in the community, of the principle of local civil government.
As already stated, in some of these constitutional provisions
there is an express requirement that the legislature shall not
pass any special act of incorporation, either of public or pri-
vate corporations. But in some of them, as for example in
Kansas and Ohio, the constitution only provides that the legis-
lature shall pass no special act, conferring corporate powers.
In these states, the Supreme Courts have held that the provis-
ions applied to municipal, as well as to private, corporations.'
In New York where there is a constitutional provision that two
tile V. State, 29 Ind. 409; Murdock v.
Woodson, 2 Dillon C. C. 188; Board
V. Shields, 62 Mo. 247; Evans v. Job,
8 Nev. 322; contra. In re House Bill,
48 X. W. R. 275; Ayer's App., 122 Pa.
St. 366; Von Pliul v. Hammer, 29
Iowa, 222; Pritz, Jji re, 0 Iowa, 30.
1 State V. Toledo, (Ohio, 90) 26 K.
E. K. 1061; Cook v. Portland, 20 Or.
580; Sch. Dist. v. Ins. Co., 103 U. S.
707; State v. Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St.
18; Atkinson V. Railroad Co., 15 Ohio
St. 21; Savings Assoc, v. Topeka, 3
Dillon, 376; Atchison v. Bartholow,
4 Kan. 124; State v. Pugh, 43 Oliio
St. 98; Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall.
o74; Olcott V. Supervisors, 16 Wall.
678 ; 20 Wall. 655 ; Logan v. Western,
87 Ga. 533; Merrill v. Toledo, 6 Ohio
Cir. Ct. 430; Lodi v. State, 18 Atl.
R. 749; State v. Mullica, 17 lb. 941
46
(N. J. 88); Zra re Denver, (Colo. 93)
32 Pac. R. 615; Metcalf v. State, 49
Ohio St. 586; 31 N. E. K. 1076; see
post, chap. X., on Conti-acts, and
chap. XVI., on Streets. In New
Jersey, it has been held to apply
exclusively to private corporations;
State V. Newark, 40 N. J. L. 550,
558; so in Tennessee; Williams v.
Nashville, 15 S. W. R. 364. A simi-
lar provision is likewise found in
Nebraska, and perhaps in many
other states. Clegg v. Richardson
Co., 8 Neb. 178; Dundy v. Richard-
son Co., 8 Neb. 508. But it has been
lield in Kansas that, while the pro-
vision of the constitution referred to
includes municipal corporations
proper, it does not include quasi cor-
porations, such as school districts.
Beach v. Leahy, 11 Kan. 23.
CH. III.J THE INCORPOKATION OF MXJNICIPALITIES.
§28
thirds of the general assembly shall be requisite to every bill
creating, continuing, altering, or renewing any body politic or
corporate, such provision was held by the court of appeals to
extend to public and municipal, as well as to private, corpora-
tions.^ The constitutions of some of the states also contain a
provision, that corporations shall not be created by special acts,
except for municipal purposes. And in determining the scope
of this provision, it is necessary to ascertain what is a munici-
pal purpose. It has been held, for example, that a board of
commissioners, charged with filling in certain slough ponds in
the city of St. Louis, was an incorporation for municipal pur-
poses whicli could be created by special act, without violating
the constitutional provision against special legislation.^ It has
likewise been held to be the creation of a municipal corpora-
tion, where a board of park commissioners has been created with
corporate authority.*^ So, also, a board of school commission-
ers.* But it is questionable, whether this is a strictly proper
use of the word " municipal." ^
§ 28. Only one object, which shall be expressed in the
title. — Many of the state constitutions contain a provision, re-
quiring that any legislative act shall not contain more than one
object, which shall be expressed in the title, and thus prohibit-
ing the inclusion, in the one act, of more than one object. The
purpose of this constitutional prohibition is plainly to prevent
what is known as log-rolling legislation, whereby members of a
legislature may combine in securing the passage of one act con-
taining the individual desires of each other, not upon the con-
sideration of the merits of each proposed bill, but by way of
combination of their forces. The requirement that the object
of the bill should be expressed in the title, is to prevent the
practice of deception upon the legislator, and to furnish him
with the means of determining, upon reading the title of the
'Smith V. Helmer, 7 Barb. 416;
Norris v. People, 3 Denio, 331; South-
worth V. Railroad Co., 2 Mioh. 287;
Purdy V. People, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 384,
reversing 2 Hill, 31; Corning v.
Green, 23 Barb. 33.
2 St. Louis V. Shields, 62 Mo. 257;
State ex rel. Choteau v. Lefflngwell,
54 Mo. 458; Cook v. Portland, 20
Or. 580; San Francisco v. S. V. W.
W., 48 Cal. 493.
3 People V. Solomon, 51 111. 37.
* Horton v. Mobile School Com'rs,
43 Ala. .=)96.
5 St. Louis V. Shields, 62 Mo. 251;
Cf. "Wilson V. Sanitary Dist., (111. 90)
27 N. E. R. 203.
47
§ 28
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. in.
bill, what is its object and the scope of its operation.^ The fact,
that a bill contains more than one object, will only invalidate
the bill, so far as it incorporates objects not expressed in the
title ; and if a bill contains more than one object in the operat-
ing clause, but only one object is expressed in the title, the bill
will be valid as to the subject expressed in the title, although
invalid as to any subject not so expressed.^ In some of the state
constitutions, this prohibition against inserting in one bill more
than one object, and requiring one object to be expressed in the
title, is limited to local and private acts. But in a great many
of the states, however, no limitation is imposed, and the pro-
hibition is declared to have a general application. And the
general ruling of the courts is that, in the absence of an ex-
press limitation on the operation of the constitutional prohibi-
tion in question, it applies to acts of the legislature, whic'h are
designed to create or regulate municipal corporations, as well
as to acts applying to private individuals.
But it is not required that all of the details of a bill should
he set foi'th in the title ; as for example, where the act pur-
ports to incorporate a city or town, it i-s not necessary to pro-
ceed to the enumeration in the title of the bill, of all the powers
which are intended to be conferred upon such a corporation.
In determining, whether a law be in conflict with these provis-
ions or not, the unity of the object, which appears to be the
scope of the act of legislation, is alone to be stated in the title,
and the details will be included by implication, within the gen-
eral object so expressed.^ But where a statute is described in
' Com. v. Reynolds, 8 Pa. Co. Ct.
R. 568; People v. Wliitlock, 92 N. T.
191; Matter of Knaust, 101 N. Y.
188; Glenn v. Lynn, 89 Ala. 608;
People V. Wilber, 15 ST. T. S. 435;
Matter of Department of Public
Parks, 86 N. Y. 439; Jonesboro v.
Cairo R. R. Co., 110 U. S. 192; Audi-
tor V. Stiles, 83 Mich. 460; Mahomet
V. Quackenbush, 117 U. S. 509; Astor
V. Railway Co., 113 N. Y. 93; Phila-
delphia V. Ry. Co., 28 W. N. C. 106;
Carter County v. Sinton, 120 U. S.
517; Montclair v. Remsdell, 107 U.
S. 147; State v. Jackson Co., 102 Mo.
531; In re Rafferty, 1 Wash. St. 382;
Ackley School Dist. v. Hall, 113 U.
S. 136; lie Phoenlxville, 109 Pa. St.
44; Be Airy Street, 113 Pa. St. 281.
2 Ex parte Covert, (Ala. 90) 9 So.
R. 225 ; Van Antwerp, In re, 56 N.
Y. 261, 267; MoGee's Appeal, 114
Pa. St. 470, 478; Dewhurst v. Alle-
gheny City, 95 Pa. St. 437.
estate V. Mortlaud, 52 N. J. E.
521; Auditor y. Stile, 83 Mich. 460;
Lockhart v. Troy, 48 Ala. 581; St.
Paul V. Coulter, 12 Minn. 41, 50;
Powell V. Suprs., (Va. 92) 14 S. E.
R. 543; State v. New Whatcom, 3
CH. III.] THE INCORPORATION OF MUNICIPALITIES.
§28
the title to be an amendment to a city charter, and it embraces
objects which are foreign to the charter ; so far as these for-
eign objects are concerned, the act is in conflict with the con-
stitution of the state, and for that reason is void.^ It has also
been held that the object of the act has not been specially ex-
pressed, where it is entitled, " An act to legalize and authorize
the assessments of street improvements and assessments," be-
cause the city or locality, to which the act is to be applied,
has not been expressed in the title.^ It seems that here, as
well as elsewhere, all doubts in respect to the conditions of the
legislative acts, because of these provisions of the constitution,
should be solved ultimately in favor of the constitutionality of
the act, in the absence of overwhelming conviction, as to its
violation of the constitutional provision.^
Wash. St. 7; Holtin v. State, 28 Fla.
303; Hubert v. People, 49 N. Y. 132;
State V. Union, 33 N. J. L. 350 (4
Vroom) ; Annapolis v. State, 30 Md.
212; Kathmau v. New Orleans, 11
La. An. 145; People v. Mellen, 32 111.
181 ; Stockman v. Brooks, (Col. 92)
29 Pao. 746; Sullivan v. New York,
53 N. Y. 652; Airy Street, 113 Pa.
St. 281; Re Phoeuixville, 109 Pa. St.
44; Pierce v. Smith, (Kan. 92) 29
Pac. K. 565 ; Ottawa v. People, 48 111.
233; Miles v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400;
Astor, In re, 50 N. Y. 363; Columbus
Co. V. Wright, (Ga. 92) 15 S. E. K.
293; Murdock v. Woodson, 2 Dillon
C. C. E. 188; Ex parte Liddell, 29
Pac. K. 251; 93 Cal. 633; Atty. Gen.
V. Bradley, 36 Mich. 447; People v.
Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44; s. c, 9 Am.
Kep. 103; People v. Mahaney, 13
Mich. 481 ; White v. Lincoln, 5 Neb.
505 ; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553 ;
Butler V. State, 15 S. E. E. 768; 89
Oa. 821; State v. Lewelling, (Kan.
tW) 33 Pac. 423 ; State v. Blaokstone,
(Mo. 93) 22 S. W. E. 370; Kelly v.
Township of Mayberry, 26 Atl. 595 ;
154 Pa. St. 440; 32 W. N. C. 224; Fox
V. McDonald, (Ala. 93) 13 So. 416;
Stale V. Orange, (N. J. 93) 26 Atl. 790.
' Williamson v. Keokuk, 44 Iowa,
88 (1876).
2 Durkee v. Janesville, 26 Wis. 697.
' Mr. Justice Harlan, in Mt. Clair
V. Eemsdell, 107 U. S. 147, says : " The
objections should be grave, and the
conflict between the statute and the
constitution palpable, before the ju
diciary should disregard a legislative
enactment upon the sole ground that
it embraces more than one object,
or if but one object, that it was not
sufficiently expressed by the title."
State V. Story Co., 17 Nev. 96; La-
Plume V. Gardner, (Pa. 92) 23 Atl. E.
899; State v. Harrub, (Ala. 92) 10
So. K. 752; State v. Shaw, (Or. 92) 29
Pac. E. 1028; State v. Burlington, 88
Mich. 438; State v. La Vague, 49 N.
W. E. 525; 47 Minn. 106; State v.
Elvino, 32 N. J. L. 362; State v.
Newark, 34 lb. 236; Dows v. Elm-
wood, 34 Fed. E. 114; E. E. Co. v.
JefEerson, 29 lb. 305 ; Marion v. Har-
vey Co., 26 Kan. 181; People v. Wil-
sea, 60 N. Y. 507; Devlin v. New
York, 63 lb. 8; State v. Bronson,
(Mo. 93) 21 S. W. E. 1125; Board v.
Aspen M. & S. Co., (Col. 93) 32 Pac.
717; Blair v. State, (Ga. 93) 17 S. E.
E. 96; Walters v. Richardson, (Ky.
93) 20 S. W. E. 279; hi re Comrs.
Johnson Co., (Wyo. 93) 32 Pac. 850.
■ 49
§80
MTJNICrPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. ur.
It has also been held, that this constitutional provision is
limited in its application to state legislation, and does not ap-
ply to the ordinances of municipal corporations.^
§ 29. Corporate existence not open to collateral attack.—
Where a municipal corporation is exercising the powers of a
body politic, and its existence as a municipal corporation is not
questioned by the state, the legality of its corporate existence
cannot be inquired into collaterally by private parties, in suits
brought against them, in which the municipal corporation is a
party. And this is the rule, even where the constitution of
the state prescribes a particular mode of incorporation .^ Thus,
for example, in an action by a municipal court to recover pen-
alties imposed by its ordinances, it is not a good defence to set
up, that the plaintiff is not a corporation.
§ 30. Judiclalnotice of charters and acts of mnnicipal cor-
porations.— The courts will take judicial notice of the legisla-
tive act of incorporation of a municipality, without such act
being specially pleaded, it matters not whether such act is de-
clared to be a public statute, as long as it is in fact an act of
creation of a municipal corporation.^ And so, also, will the act
of the legislature, supplementing and amending a city charter,
be likewise judicially noticed.* But it has beeu held that,
where the city is incorporated under a general act, the fact of
its corporate character must be averred and proved.^ But in
Indiana, it is held to be sufficient, if a city has been incorpo-
rated under a general law, to be called a corporation in the
1 Humboldt v. McCoy, 23 Kan. 249;
Green v. Indianapolis, 52 Ind. 490.
2 St. Louis V. Shields, 62 Mo. 247;
In re Sliort, 47 Kan. 250; State v.
Leatherman, 38 Ark. 81 ; Henderson
V. Davis, 106 IST. C. 88; Meudenball v.
Burton, (Kan. 89) 22 Pac. R. 558;
State V. Fuller, 9 S. W. R. 583; see
post, ch. XVIII.
" Savannab v. Dickey, 33 Mo. App.
522; Rock Island v. Crinely, 26 HI.
App. 173; Wetumpka v. Wetumpka
Wharf Co., 63 Ala. 611; Potwin v.
Johnson, 108 111. 70; Dwyer v. Bren-
ham, 65 Tex. 526; Ellsworth v. Nel-
son, (Iowa, 90) 46 N. "W. R. 740; Ber-
fenning v. Chi. etc. Co., (Minn. 90)
48 N. W. R. 444; Solomon v. Hughes,
24 Kan. 211 ; State v. Tosney,.26 Minn.
262; Durch v. Chippewa Co., 60 Wis.
227; Smith v. Janesville, 52 Wis. 680;
Pejryman v. Greenville, 51 Ala. 510.
^Railroad Co. v. Plumas, 37 Cal.
354; Arapahoe v. Albee, (Neb. 88)
38 N. W. R. 737; Jameson v. People,
16 111. 257; Swain v. Corastock, 18
Wis. 463 ; Virginia City v. Mining Co.,
2 Nev. 86; Newark Bank v. Assess-
ors, 30 N. J. L. 22; State v. Bergen,
34 N. J. L. 439; New Jersey v. Yard,
95 U. S. 112; Society, etc., v. Pawlet,
4 Pet. 480; Railroad Co. v. Cbenoa,
43 111. 209; People v. Farnham, 35 111.
562; Bow v. AUentown, 34 N. H. 351.
single V. Jones, 43 Iowa, 286; Mor-
gan V. Atlanta, 77 Ga. 662.
CH. III.] THE INCOEPOEATION OF MUNICIPALITIES. § 31
pleadings of the suit ; and from that fact the presumption in
favor of its proper incorporation will arise.^ But the acts and
ordinances of a municipal corporation are not held to he public
laws, and hence must be both pleaded and proved, unless other-
wise provided by statute.^
§ 31. Proof of corporate existence. — Of course, the primary
evidence of a special charter or act of incorporation would, in
this country, be the original or an authenticated copy of the
act ; and under statutor}' provisions in some states, a printed
copy, which is published by the authority of the state. But
where such primary evidence cannot be had, because it has
been lost, parol or secondary evidence of the existence of the
municipal corporation would be admissible.^ Thus, where a
public corporation had existed for a long space of time, and the
original act of incorporation cannot be found or a copy thereof,
the court will permit the introduction of evidence to show by
general reputation, that the community had been incorporated,
and what its corporate privileges were.* It is competent to go
to the jury on circumstantial evidence, showing a long user of
corporate powers by the community, in support of the averment
of the existence-of the corporation, and to claim from this cir-
cumstantial evidence the presumption of a charter from the
legislature,^ or the establishment and existence of a corporation
' Clark V. No. Muskegon, SON. W.
R. 254 ; 88 Mich. 308 ; House v. Greens-
burg, 93 Ind. 533; Smith v. Warrior,
(Ala. 93) 10 So. K. 418.
2 Moundsville v. Velton, (W. Va.
89) IS S. E. E. 373; Prell v. McDon-
ald, 7 Kan. 426; 7 Am. Kep. 423;
Vance v. Bank, 1 Black! (Ind.) 80,
and note (2); Young v. Bank, etc.,
4 Cranch, 384; Garland v. Denver,
19Pac. R. 460; Anderson v. Donnell,
7 S. E. R. 523; Beatty v. Knowles, 4
Pet. (U. S.) 152, 157; Stierv. Oska-
loosa, 41 Iowa, 353; Ingle v. Jones,
43 Iowa, 286; Clarke v. Bank, (10
Ark.) 516; State v. Mayor, 11 Humph.
(Tenn.) 217;WesternR. Co. v. Young,
(Ga. 92) 7 S. E. E. 912 ; Portsmouth,
etc., Co. V. Watson, 10 Mass. 91;
Clapp v. Hartford, 35 Conn. 66;
Briggs V. Whipple,? Vt. 15, 18; Case
V. Mobile, 30 Ala. 538; People v.
Potter, 35 Cal. 110; Fauntleroy v.
Hannibal, 1 Dillon, C. C. 118; City of
McPherson v. Nichols, 48 Kan. 430.
8 Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge,
12 Mass. 400; Braintree v. Battles, 6
Vt. 395 ; Blackstone v. White, 41 Pa.
St. 330.
"Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt. 439;
Bow V. Allentown, 34 N. H. 351 ; Bas-
sett V. Porter, 4 Cush. 487; People
V. Maynard, 15 Md. 463; London-
derry V. Andover, 28 Vt. 416; Jame-
son V. People, 16 111. 257; People v.
Farnham, 35 111. 562.
^ New Boston v. Dumbarton, 15 N.
H. 201 ; Mayor b. Kingston v. Horner,
Cowp. 102; Worly v. Harris, 82 Ind.
493.
51
§32
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. ni.
under some general act.^ Where the fact of incorporation
arises as a collateral question, it is only necessary that it be
proven, that the city is a corporation de facto?
Proof of the existence of a quasi public corporation, such as
school and road districts, by circumstantial evidence, is com-
monly the only possible method, inasmuch as the officials of
these quasi corporations are very negligent in the keeping of
the records.^
Where a corporation is created or declared to exist by a di-
rect act of the legislature, its existence as a corporation does not
require any special proof, either as to organization or user of its
powers.* And so also will the existence of the corporation be
inferred from the fact that the corporation has been recognized
by subsequent legislation.^
§ 32. Power to repeal and amend city charter — Effect of
exercise of such power. — The powers and privileges, conferred
upon a municipal corporation by act of the legislature, may at
any time be repealed or amended by the legislature, either by a
general law, applicable to all municipal corporations through-
out the state ; or, in absence of constitutional limitations, by a
special act applying to the particular corporation.^ But a char-
' Bassett v. Porter, 4 Cush. 487;
New Boston v. Dumbarton, 12 N. H.
409, 412; s. c, 15 X. H. 201; Robie
V. Sedgwick, 35 Barb. 319.
2 Duncan v. State, (Fla. 92) 10 So.
E. 815; Hill v. Koboka, 35 Fed. K. 32;
Crdwder v. Sullivan, (Ind. 91) 28 IST.
E. K. 94; State v. Fuller, 9 S. W. K.
583; Louisville etc. Co. v. Shires,
108 111. 617.
2 Lathrop v. Sunderland, (Vt. 92)
23 Atl. R. 619; Highland v. McKean,
11 Johns. 154; Mendenhall v. Burton,
(Kan. 89) 22 Pac. R. 558; London-
derry V. Audover, 28 Vt. 416; Owings
v. Spew, 5 Wheat. 420.
*McVicker v. Cone, 21 Or. 353;
Pasadena v. Stimson, (Col. 89) 27
Pac. K. 604; Proprietors etc. v. Hor-
ton, 6 Hill (ISr. Y.) 501; Wood v.
Bank, 9 Cowen, 194; People v. Presi-
dent, 9 Wend. 351 ; Cahill v. Insur-
ance Co., 2 Doug. (Mich.) 124; Fire
52
Department v. Kip, 10 Wend. 266.
s Arapahoe v. Albee, 38 N. W. E,
737; Bow v. AUentown, 34 N. H. 351
Railroad Co. v. Chenoa, 43 111. 209
Virginia City v. Mining Co., 2 Nev.
86; Boykin v. State, (Ala. 92) 11 So,
E. 66; Swain v. Comstock, 18 Wis,
463; People v. Farnham, 35 111. 562;
Railroad Co. v. Plumas County, 37
Cal. 354.
^ Essex Pub. etc. Board v. Skinkle,
140 U. S. 334; Wallace v. Trustees,
84N. C. 164; State v. Palmer, 4 N.
W. Rep. 986; Churchill v. Walker,
68 Ga. 681 ; State v. Toledo, 26 N. E.
E. 1061 ; Indianapolis v. Indianapolis
Gas. Co., 66 Ind. 396; Crook v. Peo-
ple, 106 111.237; Rose v. Hardee, 98
N". C. 44; State v. Troth, 34 If. J. L.
379; Worthley v. Steen, 43 N. J. L.
542; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325;
Daniel v. Mayor, etc., 11 Humph.
(Tenn.) 582.
CH. in.J THE INCOEPOBATION OF MUNICIPALITIES.
§32
ter may be amended, and even the name of the place and the
governing body of such corporation changed, and its boundaries
extended or cut down, while the corporation remains in law
the same legal personality.^ Nor does any change in the char-
ter, or in the territorial limits of the corporation, operate to ex-
tinguish the indebtedness of the old corporation.^ And where
an amended charter is granted to a corporation in the place of
the old one, containing the same provisions as are found in the
old charter, such legislative amendments of the old charter, or
substitution of the new charter for the old, do not operate to
annul the rights and powers of the corporation which were ac-
quired by it under the former charter, and under its former
name ; nor does such a substitution of an amended charter op-
erate to abrogate or repeal ordinances passed by the corporation
under its old charter, provided such ordinances are not incon-
sistent with the provisions of the new charter. So far as such
ordinances are in harmony with the provisions of the new
charter they will continue to be in force, until repealed by the
legislative power of the corporation.^ Where an original
1 State V. Hedlund, 16 Keb. 566;
Wood V. Board of Election, 58 Cal.
561 ; State ea; rel. v. White, 20 Neb.
37; Dillon Mun. Corp. §85.
^Fluellenv. Pi'oetzel, post; Fowle
V. Alexandria, 3 Pet. 398, 408; Mu-
nicipality V. Commissioners, 1 Eob.
(La.) 279; East St. Louis v. Rhein,
139 111. 116; Olney v. Harvey, 50 111.
453; Frank v. San Francisco, 21 Cal.
668; Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall.
1 ; Savannah v. Steamboat Company,
K. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 342.
sBirford v. State, 72 Tex. 182;
Fluellen v. Proetzel, (Tex. 90) 15 S.
W. K. 1043; Inre House Bill, 12 Colo.
337; Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gas
Co., 66 Ind. 296; Stewart v. Schoo-
maker, 32 Pac. E. 122; 50 Kan. 560;
Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick.
(Mass.) 474; Broughton v. Pensacola,
93 U. S. 266; Milner's Admx. v. Pen-
sacola, 2 Woods, 632; Laird v. Be
Soto, 22 Fed. Eep. 421; St. Louis v.
Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; State etc. v.
Mobile, 24 Ala. 701: "There is no
doctrine better settled than that a
change in the form of government
of a community does not ipso facto
abrogate pre-existing law, either
written or unwritten. This is true
in regard to what is strictly mu-
nicipal law, even when the change
is by conquest. The act of ageneral
assembly, converting a borough into
a city, did not, therefore, of itself,
and in the absence of express pro-
visions to that effect, either repeal
the former acts of assembly relative
to the borough, or annul existing or-
dinances. It was solely a change in
the organic law for the future, and
left unaffected the existing ordi-
nances," precisely as a change of a
state constitution leaves undisturbed
all prior acts of assembly.'' Mr. Jus-
tice Strong in Trustees of Academy
v. Erie, 31 Pa. St. 515, 517.
63
§ 33 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. III.
charter of a city contains provisions, which are retained in an
amended charter, with the omission of some (Jualifying clause
which appears in the original charter, the general rule is laid
down by the authorities, that the amended charter is intended
to operate as a substitute for the old charter, and an implied re-
peal of the provisions of the old charter so far as such provis-
ions have not been incorporated in the amended charter.^ But
it has been held that where the original charter of a city, in
prescribing the qualifications of the persons who are eligible to
the office of mayor, contains a .proviso that certain facts dis-
qualify a person ; an amended charter, which contains the orig-
inal act in respect to the qualification of candidates for the office
of mayor, with the exception of the proviso referred to, does not
by implication abrogate the excluded provisions of the original
charter, particularly since all provisions of the old charter were
expressed to be in force, which were not inconsistent with the
provisions of the amended charter.^ But this is altogether a
question of intention of the legislature ; and the conclusion in
this particular case is no very reliable guide, except in the
light of the peculiar circumstances of that case. And so where
a later statute apparently undertakes a complete revision of the
prior law, the omission of a clause or proviso of the old law
must be presumed to be an intentional repeal.^ It has also
been held that where the provisions of the amendatory act of
the legislature reduce the number of councilmen and do not
provide any special time for a new election, the amendment
does not take effect until the regular time for holding the
municipal election ; and until that time arrives, the existing
council remains unaffected by the amendment.*
§ 33. Special powers, when repealed by general laws.—
It is a rule of very general application that statutes, having a
1 Cartriglit v. Crow, 44 Mo. App.
563; Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall.
590, 617; Barton v. Sell. Dist, (Id. 92)
29 Pac. E. 4.3; Goodenow v. Butter-
ick, 7 Mass. 140, 143; Industrial
School V. Wliitehead, 2 Beasley, N.
J. 290; State v. Kelly, 5 Vroom (34
X. J. h.) 75.
2 State V. Merry, 3 Mo. 278.
2 Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall.
590; School v. Whitehead, 2 Beasley,
64
290; In re Wheelook, 3 N". T. S. 890
Little V. Cogswell, 25 Pac. B. 727
State V. Townsby, 23 Atl. E. 666
Wood V. State, 47 Ark. 488; In re
Primes' Est., 32 N. E. E. 1091; 136
N. T. 347; contra, State v. Young, 30
S. C. 399.
* Reading v. Keppleman, 61 Pa. St.
233; Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St.
126.
CH. m.] THE INCORPORATION OF MUNICIPALITIES. § 33
general operation, will not repeal by implication special statutes,
or statutes which are passed for the benefit of particular munici-
palities, unless they are absolutely antagonistic, and, therefore,
cannot stand together. But the fact, that they are inconsist-
ent, does not of itself cause the special law to be repealed by
the general law ; the 'court will hold, as a general rule, that the
legislature had no intention of interfering with the continued
enforcement of the special law, and that the general law was
intended to be enforced only in those parts of the state, where
the special law did not apply .^ ■ But in all these cases, it might
be said, it is a question of legislative intent, whether the special
law should remain unchanged or should be repealed; and, in
determining this question, it is necessary to read the partic-
ular provisions of the charter in the light of all the circum-
stances of the case, and the consequence and effect of repealing
such special act by implication, or of leaving such laws in force,
notwithstanding their inconsistency with the general laws of
the state.'^ Thus, for example, where there was a charter provi-
sion, in reference to bribery committed by a municipal officer,
and by subsequent legislation the same act was made an of-
fence punishable in the state courts by a greater penalty, it
was held that the charter provision was repealed.^ So, also,
a general railroad tax law was held to repeal by implication all
prior special laws, conferring charter privileges upon munici-
palities.* Where a general statute is declared to repeal all acts
contrary to its provisions, it is held that this declaration does
ville S. Ry. Co., 78 Ind. 261; Chicago
D. Co. V. Garrity, 115 111. 155; Thoin-
ason V. Ashwoi-th, 73 Cal. 73; Bab-
cock V. Helena, 34 Ark. 499; People
V. Page, 23 Pac. R. 761 ; Janesville v.
Markoe, 18 Wis. 350; Powell v. Park-
ersburg, 28 W. Va. 698; Holland v.
Baltimore, 11 Md. 186; New Bedford
Ry. Co. V. Aouslinet Co., 143 Mass.
200; Moran v. Long Island City, 101
N. T. 439.
'People V. Jaelme, 103 N. T. 182;
People V. O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 251.
State V. Severance, 55 Mo. 378;
Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cheyenne,
113 U. S. 516.
1 State V. Kirk, 53 Ark. 337; State
V. Howe, 28 Neb. 618 ; State v. Brauin,
3 Zabr. (23 N. J. L.) 484; State v. Mor-
ristown, 33 N. J. Law, 57; Pavey v.
Utter, 132 111. 489; State v. Trenton,
7 Vroom (36 N. J. L.) 198, 201; Ot-
tawa V. County, 12 111. 339; Egypt
Street, 2 Grant (Pa.) 455; Han-is-
burg V. Seek, 104 Pa. St. 53; Rush-
ville V. Town, 32 111. App. 320; God-
dard, In re, 16 Pick. 504; Railroad
Co. V. Alexandria, 17 Gratt. (Va.)
176.
2 State V. Young, 30 S. C. 399; Ca-
nal Company v. Railroad Company,
4 Gill & Johns. 1; Smith v. Ker-
nochen, 7 How. 198;Bichelsv. Evans-
55
34
MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS.
[CH. m.
not apply to the special laws, contained in the charter of a mu-
nicipal corporation upon the same subject.^ But if the general
law is declared to repeal all inconsistent local or special acts,
the special laws would in that case be repealed by this express
and comprehensive declaration of the statute.^
The adoption of a new state constitution does not repeal
special charter powers, unless they are in conflict with some
provision of the new constitution.* And where a new consti-
tution expressly continues all existing charters in force, this
special recognition of the existence of the charter of the munici-
pal corporation does not impliedly take away from the legisla-
ture its existing powers of amendment of the charter.*
§ 34. Implied repeal of general laws by special laws.—
While it is possible for a legislature to repeal general laws by
the subsequent enactment of special laws, the presumption, in
favor of such repeal by implication, is not recognized or in-
dulged, as long as such presumption is not necessary to avoid
an inconsistency of a serious nature. It is only permitted for
such a repeal to take place by implication, when the two pro-
visions are absolutely irreconcilable.^ Thus, for example, a
general law, which prohibits the opening of streets through a
cemetery, is not repealed by implication by a subsequent act,
which extends the limits of a municipal corporation, so as to
include the cemetery, and gives such corporation the power to
open up and lay out streets, alleys, etc. ; for the two acts are not
absolutely and necessarily irreconcilable. They may be recon-
ciled by limiting the application of the general power of the
1 State V. Bi-anin, 23 K. J. L. 484;
Busliville V. TownsMp, 32 111. App.
320.
2 Adam v. Wright, 84 Ga. 720; State
V. Miller, 30 X J. L. 368; Bank v.
Bridges, lb. 368; Tierney v. Dodge,
9 Minn. 166; Clintonville v. Keeting,
4 Denio, 341.
8 People V. Jones, 7 Col. 475; Trus-
tees v. Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 618; Cliid-
sey V. Scrantou, (Miss. 93) 12 So. 545.
4 "Wiley V. Bluffton, 111 lud. 152.
6 People V. Heushaw, (Cal. 88) 18
Pao. E. 413; Com. v. Wetzel, 84 Ky.
537; 2 S. W. K 123; Com. v. Duff, 87
66
Ky. 586; State v. De Bar, 58 Mo. 395;
State V. Mills, 5 Vroom (34 N. J. L.)
177, 180; Montezuma V. Minor, 70 Ga.
191; St. Jolinsbury v. Thompson, 59
Vt. 300; Eaton v. Burke, (If. H. 92)
22 Atl. R. 452; State v. Young, 17
Kan. 414; Wooley v. Watkins, 22
Pac. B. 102; Givens v. Van Studdi-
ford, 86 Mo. 149; State v. Clark, 54
Mo. 17; State v. Clark, 1 Dutch. (N.
J.) 54; Kern v. People, 44 111. Ap.
181; Mersereau v. Mersereau Co.,
(N. J. 93) 26 Atl. R. 682; In re Prime's
Est., 32 N. E. R. 1091; 136 N. Y. 347.
CH. ni.] THE INCORPORATION OP MTTNICrPALITIES. § 36
corporation to the new land, which is taken within its bor-
der, outside of the cemetery .^ So, also, where a state statute
requires auctioneers to take out a state license, and a subse-
quent act authorized a municipal corporation to requii'c a simi-
lar license of such persons, it was held that the two laws were
not inconsistent with each other, and that the special law,
granting to the corporation the power to impose the license,
did not operate as a repeal by implication of a state law impos-
ing a similar license ; but that both licenses might be exacted.^
So, likewise, where a general law prohibits a municipal corpo-
ration from denying to its citizens the right to sell goods at
wholesale at the city market, there is no implied repeal of the
same by the general grant to a city of the power to pass " such
ordinances as appear to them necessary for the security, wel-
fare, etc., of the city." ^
I Egypt Street, 2 Grant (Pa.) Cas.
455.
2 Simpson v. Savage, 1 Mo. 359 ; Sie-
benhauer, In re, 14 Nev. 365.
' Haywood v. Savannah, 12 Ga. 404.
57
CHAPTER IV.
DISSOLUTION OF MUNICrPAL COKPOEATIONS.
Sectioit.
42 — The rights of creditors where
a second corporation has
been established in its place.
43 — EfEect of dissolution of corpo-
ration in general, where no
other corporation has been
substituted therefor.
44 — Eevival by a new charter.
Sectioh.
37 — How dissolved in England.
38 — How dissolved in the United
States.
39 — Forfeiture of corporate exist-
ence.
40 — Effect of dissolution of corpo-
ration.
41 — Eights of creditors on a dis-
solution of a municipal cor-
poration.
§ 37. How dissolved in England — It is said that, in Eng-
land, a municipal corporation may be dissolved in one of four
ways : First, by act of Parliament. Inasmuch as the powers
of Parliament are unrestricted by constitutional limitations,
there can be no doubt that an act of Parliament, dissolving a
corporation, whether it be public or private, will have the ef-
fect of destroying such corporation as a legal personality.^ The
King may, in th-e exercise of his prerogative, create a corpora-
tion, but he cannot destroy one already existing. He may
grant to such corporation a variety of franchises, but he can-
not take away or annul one, which is already vested in the cor-
poration.2 Secondly, the municipal corporation may in England
be dissolved by the loss of an integral part of such corporation, or
by a loss of all, or a majority, of the members of an integral part,
without whose co-operation it is impossible for the municipal
corporation to transact its business. It will, however, be remem-
bered that, in the preceding chapter, in explaining the difference
in municipal corporations in England and in this country, it was
stated that, prior to the Municipal Corporation Act of 1835, the
municipal corporation in England was in the nature of a polit-
ical franchise granted to individuals, falling within the descrip-
dith, 36 N". H. 284; St. Louis v. Al-
' State V. Trustees etc., 5 Ind. IT;
Com'rs V. Cox, 6 lb. 403; 2 Kent,
305; Co.,Litt. 176, note; Kex v. Am-
ory, 2 T. K. 515 ; Eastman v. Mere-
58
len, 13 Mo. 400.
2 Rex V. Amory, 2 T. R. 515; Uni-
versity V. Williams, 9 Gr. & Johns.
365, 409.
CH. IV.]
DISSOLUTION OF COEPOEATION.
§37
tion employed, separate and apart from the population and
community in general, and not necessarily a part of the commu-
nity itself ; that the corporation, so called, was composed of dis-
tinct integral parts, usually described as the mayor, aldermen,
and commonalty of the corporation. It is upon this concep-
tion of a municipal corporation, as composed of its separate
integral parts, instead of being in the American sense t^e in-
corporation of the community in general, that this doctrine of
a dissolution of the corporation by a loss of an integral part
rests. It seems to be a definite and well established rule of
the English law.^
Thirdly, a municipal corporation may in England be destroy-
ed or dissolved by a surrender of the franchise of such corpo-
ration to the crown, and its acceptance by the crown.^ This
power of surrender has been very considerably limited, and it
is now held to apply only to those corporations which receive
their charter from the crown. It is not permitted to apply to
corporations which have been created or coniirmed by act of
Parliament. These corporations cannot dissolve themselves by
any surrender of its charter or franchise, except upon the con-
sent, or with the co-operation, of Parliament, which would
make this case one of dissolution by act of Parliament.
Fourthly, a municipal corporation can also be dissolved or
aimulled in England by a foj-feiture of its charter, on account
of negligence or abuse of the francliise ; such forfeiture result-
ing from a judgment in a proceeding in quo warranto, or scire
facias. This mode of dissolution of franchises is very com-
monly applied, both in England and in this country, to private
1 Smith's Case, 4 Mod. 53; Smith
V. Smith, 3 Desaus. (S. C.) 657; Ban-
bury's Case, 10 Mod. 346; Rex v.
Tregony, 8 Mod. 129; Bacon v. Rob-
ertson, 18 How. (U. S.) 480; "Welch
V. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Mlon C. C. 130;
Rol. Abr. 514; Eegina v. Bewdley, 1
P. Wms. 207; People v. Wren, 4
Scam. (5 111.) 275 ; Colchester v. Sea-
ber, 3 Burr. 1870; S. C, 1 Wm. Bl.
591. In Rex v. Passmore, 3 Term R.
421, Lord Kenyoii said, in delivering
tlie opinion of the court, "When an
integral part of a corporation is gone,
without whose existence the func-
tions of the corporation cannot be
exercised, and the corporation has
no manner of supplying the integral
part, tlie corporation is dissolved as
to certain purposes. But the king
may renovate, either with tlie old or
new corpoi-ators.''
^Dillon Mun. Corp. §165; Rex v.
Osborne, 4 East. 326; Rex v. Miller,
6 Term R. 277; Willc. 332, pi. 861;
Howard's Case, Hutt. 87; Thicknesse
V. Canal Co., 4 M. & W. 472.
59
§38
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. IX.
corporations. In England, it has also been applied to munici-
pal corporations, where misuse, or failure to exercise the rights
of the franchise, have resulted in a judgment of forfeiture.
And in the time of Charles II., it was held that a municipal
corporation might forfeit its franchise, in consequence of the
negligence or misconduct of its officers.-'^
§ 38. How dissolved in the United States. — As has been
already stated in the preceding paragraph, in explanation of
the modes of dissolution of corporations in England, the sec-
ond mode, which is possible in England by a loss of an integral
part of the corporation, would not be possible in this country,
because here the municipal corporation is not a franchise, pos-
sessed and enjoyed by a few persons of the community, but is
an act of incorporation of the community. Each individual
citizen of the corporation is an integral part, but the officers
of the corporation do not in any sense of the term constitute an
integral part of the corporation ; they are merely the agents of
the corporation, for whose wrongful acts the corporation may
be liable to parties injured thereby. The corporation itself
does not depend for its existence upon the continuance or exist-
ence of such officers. It is, of course, possible that a municipal
corporation may practically become nonexistent, in consequence
of the desertion of a locality by the entire people. If a com-
munity should in one body remove from that locality, abandon
the territor}"^ which has been assigned for the municipal corpo-
ration, it would be impossible for such a municipal corporation
still to exist-; but the mere neglect or failure of the community
to elect officers to practically carry on the administration of the
1 See Tiedeman's Private Corpora^
tions, chapter on Dissolution; Eex
V. Nicholson, 1 Str. 299; People v.
O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1; Attorney Gen-
eral V. Shrewsbury, 6 Beav. 220;
Whalen v. Macomb, 76 111. 49; Mum-
ma V. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. (U. S.)
281; Boston Glass Manuf. v. Lang-
don, 24 Pick. 49, 52; Rex v. Kent, 13
East, 220; Priestly v. Foulds, 2 Scott,
N. R. 205, 225; Commonwealth v.
Union Ins. Co., 5 Mass. 230, 232; Rid-
dle V. Locks and Canals, 7 Mass. 169 ;
60
School V. Canal, etc., Co., 9 Ohio, 203;
Canal Co. v. Railroad Co., 4 Gill &
Johns. 1; Vincennes University v.
Indiana, 14 How. 268; Eex v. Saun-
ders, 3 East, 119; Mayor, etc., of
Lyme v. Henley, 2 CI. & F. 331;
Smith's Case, 4 Mod. 55, 58; s. c, 12
Mod. 17; Skin. 311; 1 Show. 278;
Black. Com. 485; Taylors of Ipswich,
1 Rol. 5; Rex v. Grosvenor, 7 Mod.
199. See Butler v. Walker, (Ala. 93)
13 So. 261; Swamp Land District No.
170 V. Silva, (Cal. 93) 32 Pac. E. 866.
CH. IV.]
DISSOLUTION OF COEPOEATXON.
§39
municipal government would certainly not dissolve the fran-
chise, as long as the right or capacity to elect such ofBcers, and
to place the municipal corporation on a working basis, still
continues.^
So, also, would it not be proper to consider it possible, in this
country, to secure a dissolution of a corporation by virtue of a
surrender of the franchise. Such a surrender would not be
possible, except iu conjunction with an acceptance of the sur-
render by the legislature which created the corporation ; and
when the acceptance has been given, the entire transaction
would be equivalent in its effect, and in its real character, to
an act of dissolution of the municipal corporation.^ But it has
been held by the Supreme Court of Missouri, and it is probably
a sound conclusion of law, that, where municipal corporations
are incorporated under a general act, which contains provisions
for the dissolution of such a corporation, by compliance with
this provision the town may be dissolved, without the direct
interference of the legislature.^
§ 39. Forfeiture of corporate existence. — For the same
reason, the English doctrine, that a municipal corporation may
forfeit its existence as a corporation, in consequence of the
neglect or abuse of its franchise, cannot find application in this
country to municipal corporations.* If there is any neglect or
abuse of the powers and privileges of the municipal corporation,
appropriate remedies are provided for tlie redress of the injuries
1 Butler V. "Walker, (Ala. 93) 13 So.
261; Largen v. State, 13 S. W. E. 161 ;
76 Tex. 323; State v. Dunson, (Tex.
88) 9 S. W. E. 203; People v. Wren,
4 Scam. (5 111.) 275; IT. S. El. LigM
Co. V. Leiter, 19 D. C. 575; Com. v.
Cullen, 1 Harris (Pa.) 133; President
V. Thomas, 20 111. 197; Welch v. Ste.
Genevieve, 1 Dillon C. C. 130; Green
Township, 9 Watts & S. (Pa.) 22;
Schriber v. Langdale, 66 Wis. 616;
Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14
How. 268; Muscatine v. Funck, 18
Iowa, 469 ; see Lea v. Hei-naudez, 10
Tex. 137, in which it is held that
where a Texas town, incorporated
prior to 1848, for three years and
over had failed to elect ofi&cers or to
provide any other governmental or-
ganization, and did not even possess
officers de facto, the failui-e of the
community to elect officers to carry
on the government of the town ope-
rated as a dissolution of the corpo-
ration. But the court reaches this
conclusion without citing any au-
thority in support, and without giv-
ing any reason for its judgment.
2 Brennan v. Bradshaw, 53 Tex.
330; Morris v. State, 63 Tex. 53.
s Hambleton v. Dexter, 89 Mo. 188;
Largen v. State, sui)ra.
* See Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1
Dillon C. C. 130; Butler v. Walker,
(Ala. 93) 13 So. 261.
61
f
40
MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS.
[CH. IT.
which may be sustained thereby by private individuals. Or,
if public rights are suffering from a neglect of the performance
of the duties of a municipal corporation, the court may, by
mandamus, secure the performance of such duties. It would
be a matter of very great surprise to a municipal community
in the United States, to learn that its charter had been for-
feited in a proceeding of quo warranto, because of the failure of its
officers to perform the duties intrusted to them. The conclu-
sion of the entire discussion is, that in this country there is but
one way, whereby corporations may be destroyed or annulled ;
and that is, by an act of the legislature, which has created the
municipal corporation, iind which has the sole power of control
over it.^ It seems that in Missouri the city of Kahoka was in
1886 deprived of its charter by forfeiture for nonuser, in a pro-
ceeding of quo warranto, and subsequently the community was
reincorporated under the general laws of the state as a city of
the fourth class. It is doubtful what was the effect of tlie ju-
dicial proceeding in the case ; certainly, under the general laws
of the state, the reincorporation operated as a surrender of the
old charter."'^
§ 40. Effect of dissolution of corporation. — At common
law a corporation, whether public or private, upon dissolution,
was held to be civilly dead. Nothing remained in the character
of a legal personality in the place of such corporation, and its
rights of property and lands, for example, reverted to the gran-
tor or his heirs, while the choses in action of the corporation,
whether owned b}' them or due to it by others, became extinct.
Leases of lands by such corporation were also terminated with
its dissolution.^ But, in this country, if not in England, an
entirely different view has been taken of the act of incorpora-
tion, and the effect of dissolution. Instead of recognizing that,
'Dillon Mun. Corp. §168; People
V. Bancroft, 29 Pac. R. 112; (Ida. 92) ;
Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472;
Mobile V. Watson, 116 lb. 289; State
V. Hamilton, (Kan. 87), 19 Pac. 723 ;
State V. Board of Education, 7 Ohio
Cir. Ct. E. 152 (Ohio 93.)
2 Hill V. Kahoka, 35 Fed. Rep. 321;
see also, Meyer v. Porter, 65 Cal. 67;
Hambleton v. Town of Dexter, 89
62
Mo. 188.
3 Commonwealth v. Koxbury, 9
Gray, 510, note; Attorney General v.
Gower, 9 Mod. 226; 1 Rol. Abr. 816;
Rex V. Passmore, 3 Term R. 247;
Grant Corp. 805; Colchester v.
Brooke, 7 Queen's B. 383; Co. Litt.
13; 1 Lev. 237; Knight v. Wells, 1
Lut. 519; Rex v. Saunders, 3 East,
119.
CH. IV. J DISSOLUTION OP COKPOEATION. § 41
in the dissolution of a corporation, a complete extinction of the
legal personality, created by the act of incorporation, took place,
leaving nothing in its place as the inheritor of its rights and
obligations ; the American courts recognize in the dissolution
only a termination of its franchises, as forfeiture of the right to
transact business in its corporate capacity, and hold that its
rights and duties remain intact and unaffected by the dissolu-
tion of such a corporation. The property of the corporation,
upon its dissolution, would be retained and taken charge of hy
a Court of Equity or placed in the hands of trustees appointed
for that purpose, to be administered by them for the ben-
efit of the creditors of the defunct corporation, in the first
place, and to secure a subsequent distribution of the remaining
property among the incorpoi'ators. There is, therefore, no re-
version of the lands held by a corporation in fee to the grantor
or his heirs, or a loss or termination .of leases held by the cor-
poration, or a termination of charitable trusts, which were vest-
ed in the dissolved corporation. In all these cases, a Court of
Equity will direct a distribution of the property among the in-
corporators; or, in the case of charitable trusts, appoint other
trustees to administer the trusts, and thus prevent their de-'
! traction. This is certainly the rule in America, in regard to
private corporations, and the same rule has been applied equal-
ly to municipal corporations.^
§ 41. Rights of creditors on a dissolution of a municipal
corporation.-— It is explained in a subsequent chapter, that the
property which a corporation holds for public use, such as pub-
lic buildings and fire engines, wharves and the like, cannot be
subjected to execution for the paj'ment of the debts of the city.''
It is likewise held that, upon the dissolution of a corporation,
such property continues to be exempt from liability for the
debts of the corporation, and it passes into the immediate con-
tiol of the state.** So, also, has it been decided that the private
I In re Board, 48 Fed. R. 350; Mum-
ma V. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 281; Cur-
ran V. Arkansas, 15 How. (U. S.) 312;
Vinoennes v. Indiana, 14 How. 268;
Owen V. Smith, 31 Barb. 641; Schlie-
der V. Dielman, 10 So. K. 934; Coul-
ter V. Robertson, 24 Miss. 278 ; County
V. Cox, 6 Ind. 403; Bacon v. Robert-
son, 18 How. (IT. S.) 480; People v.
O'Brien, 111 N. T. 1; Com. v. Rox-
bury, 9 Gray, 510, note; Girard v.
Philadelpliia, 7 Wall. 1; Ewing v.
Dallas, (Tex. 92) 19 S. W. R. 380.
2 See post, § 212.
3 Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S.
266, 268, 269.
63
§ 42 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. IV.
property of individuals, living within the municipality, cannot
be subjected to liability for the payment of the debts of the
city, except through taxation ; and that the power of taxation
can only be exercised by the corporation, under the authority
of the Legislature.^ But, granting that these two propositions
are sound law, it still remains an important question what reme-
dies the creditors of a dissolved municipal corporation may em-
ploy to secure the payment of its just debts ? There are two
cases that require special consideration in this inquiry ; One,
where the particular municipal corporation is dissolved, and
a new and distinctly separate corporation is created by the
state to take its place, and in whom are vested the ordinary
powers of a municipal corporation ; Secondly, where the cor-
poration is dissolved, and no other municipal corporation is
created to take its place. These two cases will be discussed
separately; but prior to the discussion of them, it is necessary
to remember, that the rights of creditors aie protected by the
provision of the Federal Constitution, which prohibits the pass-
ing of laws which impair the- obligation of contracts ; and it
has been decided that where a municipal corporation has agreed
with its creditors that a special levy of taxes should be made
for the payment of its debts, or the interest on such debts,
such an agreement with the corporation for a special levy of
taxes constitutes a part of the obligation of the contract with
the creditors, which is protected by this constitutional prohibi-
tion.^
§ 42. The rights of creditors where a second corporation
has heen established in its place. — Mere changes in the name
of a corporation, or of its boundaries or mode of government,
which fall short of a dissolution of the corporation, cannot have
any effect whatever upon its rights of property, or upon its obli-
gations to creditors. It still continues to be the same corpora-
tion under a changed form or name, and therefore the rights of
creditors can in no wise be thereby affected.^ So, also, would
it be impossible to effect a dissolution of a municipal corpora-
tion, as to its creditors, by the substitution of a new municipal
1 Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 IT. S.
472.
^Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284;
see post, § 196.
64
3 People V. Bagley, 85 Cal. 343;
Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 XT. S.
266; Girard v. Philadelphia, 7
Wall. 1.
CH. IV.] DISSOLUTION OF COItPOK AT ION. § 42
charter in the place of one, under which the corporation was
operated, at the time when the debts were contracted ; even
though the powers and privileges under the new charter are
essentially different from those which were enjoyed under the
old charter.^ And in determining the rights of creditors, the
presumption is very strong that the same corporation continues
to exist, notwithstanding different powers are given to the cor-
poration, and different officers provided for the administration
of its affairs.'^ In a number of cases, for the purpose of avoid-
ing the liability for their debts, Legislatures have dissolved mu-
nicipal corporations — in the vernacular of the day, legislated
them out of existence altogether — and have established in their
place, with some modification of their boundaries and powers,
and with the substitution of some entirely different name, some
other body politic or local government, which it was claimed
could not be treated as the old municipal corporation under a
changed form. Thus, in Tennessee, the city of Memphis,
and other municipal corporations, were abolished by legislative
act, and in their place a public g'Masi-corporatiou was estab-
lished, called " taxing districts," in which were vested most of
the original powers of the dissolved municipal corporations.
But, at the instance of creditors, it was held that these " taxing
districts" were municipal corporations, and as such they in-
herited both the liabilities and the rights of property of the de-
funct corporation, whose place they were created to take.^ So,
also, the city of Mobile was dissolved by the act of the legisla-
ture of Alabama, and on the same day,.Avith a diminution of
the territory of the old corporation, the Port of Mobile was in-
corporated ; and in that port was vested all the public property
of the old city and most of its taxable property, while fourteen-
fifteenths of the population of the old city were included in the
Port. It was held by the United States Supreme Court, that
the Port of Mobile was a municipal corporation, and as such
1 State T. Natal, 39 La. An. 439;
Girard v. Philadelpliia, 7 Wall. 1.
-Walnut Townsliip v. Jordan, 38
Kan. 502; Broughton v. Pensacola,
93 U. S. 266; Milner's Admx. v. Pen-
sacola, 2 Woods, 632; Barkley v.
Levee Com'rs, 93X1. S. 238.
'Lea V. State, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 478;
Luehrman v. Taxing District, 2 Lea
(Tenn.) 425; Devereaux v. City of
Brownsville, 29 Fed. Rep. 742; O'Con-
nor V. Memphis, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 730;
Uhl V. Taxing District, 6 Lea (Tenn.)
610; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.
S. 472; State v. Taxing District of
Shelby Co., 10, Lea (Tenn.) 240.
5 Qb
§42
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. IV.
was the successor of the old city, and became liable as such for
the debts of the old city.^ In this case the Supreme Court
said : " When the Legislature of a state has given a local com-
munity, living within designated boundaries, a municipal or-
ganization, and by a subsequent act, or series of acts, repeals its
charter and dissolves the corporation, and incorporates substan-
tially the same people as a municipal body under a new name
for the same general purpose, and the. general mass of the taxa-
ble property of the old corporation is included within the limits
of the new, and the property of the old corporation used for
public purposes is transferred without consideration to the new
corporation for the same public uses, the latter, notwithstand-
ing a great reduction of its corporate limits, is the successor in
law of the former, and liable for its debts ; and if any part of
the creditors of the old corporation are left without provision
for the payment of their claims, they can enforce satisfaction
out of the new." Similar judgments have been rendered in
cases of the same sort in other states.^ It has also been held,
that if, in the change from the old corporation to the new, the
powers of the new corporation have been restricted to a greater
degree than the powers of the old corporation, any such new
limitation of the corporate powers, so far as the rights of exist-
ing creditors are thereby affected, is in violation of the constitu-
tional provision, which protects the obligation of contracts from
impairment by subsequent legislation.^
1 Mobile V. Watson, 116 U. S. 289.
^Broughtou V. Pensacola, 93 U.
S. 266; Devereaux v. City of Browns-
ville, 29 Fed. Rep. 742; Laird v. De
Soto, 22 Fed. Kep. 421; People v.
Murray, 73 N. Y. 535.
8 Owen V. Smith, 31 Barb. 641;
Welsh V. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon C.
C. 130; Beckwith v. Racine, 7 Biss.
142; Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith,
100 U. S. 514; Meriwether v. Gar-
rett, 102 U. S. 472; Brooklyn v.
Smith, 104 111. 429; Memphis v.
Bethel, 17 S. W. R. 191; Louisville
Bridge Co. v. Louisville, 81 Ky. 189;
Barkley v. Levee Commissioners, 93
U. S. 266; Robinson v. Lane, 19 Ga.
337; Muscatine Turnverein v. Funck,
66
18 Iowa, 469; Thompson v. Allen
County, 115 U. S. 550; Amy v. Water-
town, 130 IT. S. 301; Hopkins v.
Whitesides, 1 Head (Tenn.) 31; Bank
V. Lockwood, 2 Harring. (Del.) 8;
Thompson v. Abbott, 61 Mo. 176; St.
Louis Bridge Co. v. East St. Louis,
121 111. 238; State txre. Bridge Co.
V. Columbia, 27 S. 0. 137. There ap-
pears to be one case in contradiction
with this line of authorities, an old
case in Mississippi, in which it was
held that the repeal of the charter of
a municipal corporation extinguish-
ed the debts due it from such cor-
poration. Port Gibson v. Moore, 13
Sra. & Marsh, 157.
CH. IV.] DISSOLUTION OP CORPORATION. § 43
§ 43. Effect of dissolution of corporation, where no other
corporation has been substituted therefor. — If the Legisla-
ture repeals the charter of a municipal corporation, while it is in
debt, and makes no provision for the payment of its debts, and
does not create any other corporation to take its place, and to
exercise the powers of local government, and the administra-
tion of the public affairs of the community is assumed by the
state government itself, so far as the adjudications up to the
present time carry one to any conclusion, it would seem that
the courts are practically powerless to protect creditors of the
defunct corporation against a total loss of their claims, as long
as they find it impossible to secure relief at the hands of the
Legislature, which has dissolved the corporation. That is, since
the corporation has been extinguished, and in view of the fact,
that the creditors of the corporation can only look to the exer-
cise, by the municipal corporation or its successors, of the power
of taxation for payment of its debts ; and have no claim of satis-
faction against the public property of such corporation, or
against the private property of its citizens, either before or after
dissolution of the corporation ; the assumption of the powers of
the local government by the state, in consequence of the disso-
lution of the corporation, would seem to bring the exercise of
such powers necessarily within the discretion of the state Legis-
lature ; and the state government is protected from judicial
interference by another provision of the United States Consti-
tution.i For this reason, it would seem that there is no judi-
cial remedy open to the creditors under these extraordinary
circumstances.^ But Judge Dillon ventures the suggestion,
that the true solution of these difficulties may possibly be found
in the consideration that the power of a municipality to levy
taxes to pay its debts, as the power existed at the time when
the debts were created, is in its essence not the grant of a power
to the incorporated bodj', but to the inhabitants of the incorpo-
rated territory, which cannot be taken away by subsequent leg-
' Art. XI. araendment to the Con-
stitution.
" Barkley v. Levee Com'rs, 93 U.
S. 258; Heine v. Levee Com'rs, 19
Wall. 655; Thompson v. Allen Co.,
115 IT. S. 550; Rees v. Watertown, 19
Wall. 107; Amy v. Watertown, 130
U. S. 301; Meriwether v. Garrett,
102 U. S. 472.
67
§ 44 MTTNICIPAL COEPOBATIONS. [CH. IV.
islation, as against existing creditors.^ This suggestion of the
distinguished author is strictly in line with the fundamental
conception of the character and origin of a municipal corpora-
tion, viz., that such corporation does not rest for its fundamen-
tal existence upon the act of incorporation, but upon its natural
existence as a community ; and that the act of incorporation
was simply a legislative investment of the community with the
franchise of acting as a legal personality and of exercising the
powers of local government. It is believed that the adoption
of this theory would certainly work no harm to the true inter-
ests of the community which has been incorporated, while at
the same time it would furnish the means of escaping from the
outrageous consequence of a mere technicality of the law. It
is, however, so seldom the case that a municipal corporation
can be legislated out of existence, without some sort of public
corporation being created by the Legislature to take its place,
tliat it is not likely that the case can become a common one,
§ 44. Kevival by a new charter. — It was a rule of the Eng-
lish law that, where the charters of an old corporation have
been suspended or even dissolved by its loss of members or the
loss of an integral part, such dissolved or defunct corporation
may be revived by a new charter, and the rights and obligations
of the old corporation transferred to a new corporation thus
created ; so that, in effect, the new corporation would be noth-
ing more than a continuation of the old corporation.^
Inasmuch as the existence of a municipal corporation in this
country can only be interfered with by a dissolution of the
corporation, the doctrine of revival by the new charter can
only be applied here to municipal corporations, in a modified
form, in the case where there has been a dissolution of the
old corporation and the creation of a new corporation to take
its place, which has been already explained in a preceding par-
agraph. Certainly, under these circumstances the new corpo-
ration is properly described as being no more than a changed
form of the old corporation.*^
' Dillon Muu. Corp. § 173. 141; Eex v. Passmore, 3 Term K.
''Bellows v. Bank, etc., 2 Mason C. 119, 24*7; Eegina v. Bewdley, 1 P-
C. 43; Hoffman V. Van Nostrand, 42 Wms. 207; Colchester v. Brooke, 7
Barb. 174; Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Queen's Bench, 383; Colchester v.
Wall. 1 ; Olney v. Harvey, 50 111. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1866.
453 ; Neely v. Torkville, 10 S. C. ^ gee ante, § 42.
68
CHAPTER V.
CORPORATE NAJIE, SEAL AND BOUNDARIES.
Section.
47 — Corporate name, how ob-
tained.
48 — Change of corporate name —
Name acquired by reputation.
49 — ^Effect of misnomer in general.
50 — Use of corporate name in suits.
51 — Requirement of a corporate
seal.
52 — Seal, how proved.
53 — Boundaries, how defined.
54 — Corporate boundaries by refer-
ence to streams and high-
ways.
55 — ^Enlargement of boundaries —
Annexation of territory.
56 — What territory may be annex-
ed— Farm lands.
Section.
57 — Effect of extension of city
boundaries.
58 — E ff e c t of annexation of one
town to another.
59 — Effect of division of one town
into two.
60 — Legislative power to apportion
property and debts in cases
of annexation and division.
61 — Procedure in cases of annexar
tiou. When annexation legal.
62 — Exercise of power beyond city
limits, only one corporation
over same area.
63 — Division of municipal territory
into wards.
§ 47. Corporate name, how obtained — Inasmuch as a cor-
poration is an intangible personality, a creature of the law, it,
probably more than the natural person, requires a name. With-
out a name, the corporation could hardly identify itself, or give
any form whatever to its legal personality.^ Ordinarily, the
power which creates a corporation gives its name, and where it
is created by special charter, the charter contains or prescribes
the name. Under the English Municipal Corporation Act of
1838, it is provided that the names of all municipal coiporations
in England shall assume a common form, the proper corporate
name for boroughs being " mayor, aldermen and burgesses of
," and for cities " mavor, aldermen and citizens of -
"2
1 Smith V. Tallahassee Branch of
Central Planks Road Co., 30 Ala. 65;
Atty. Gen. v. Worcester, 2 Phillips,
3; Lancaster Co. v. Rush, 52 N. W.
R. 837; Middlesex H. & M. Soc. v.
Davis, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 138; Knight
V. Wells, 1 Lord Raym. (Eng.) 80;
Physicians v. Salmon, 3 Salk. (Eng.)
102; No. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Walker, 47
Fed. R. 681; Dutchess Mfg. Co. v.
Davis, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 238; 7 Am.
Dec. 459; Gostin v. State, (Ga. 92) 15
S. E. R. 361 ; Trustees v. Peaslee, 15
N. H. 317.
2 Atty. Gen. v. Worcester, 2 Phil.
3; Rochester v. Lee, 15 Sim. 376.
69
§48
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. V.
In this country, where municipal corporations are very often
created under general acts, provision is made under these cor-
poration acts for the adoption by the municipality itself of a
name; but all are required, as in the English corporation act,
to conform to the general form, as the city or tovim of . The
form prescribed by these general acts is noted to be different
from the English form, in that it is the city or town which is
incorporated, and not the mayor, aldermen and citizens, form-
ing integral parts of the corporation ; the community is incor-
porated, and not any particular individuals of that community.
The corporate name of a city, which appears in a special act
or charter, will with the charter itself be judicially noticed by
the courts, and special proof of the same would not be required
in any suit, where that fact was required to be established.
But where the city is organized under a general act, and the
name is selected by the community, it would have to be ex-
pressly proven ; for the court would not take judicial notice of
the selection of a name by the community.^
§ 48. Change of corporate name — Name acquired by rep-
utation.— While it is unquestionably the rule of law, notwith-
standing the popular or general impression to the contrary ,2 that
a natural person has the right at anytime, without the consent
or ratification of the Legislature, to adopt any name he pleases,
and to be known by such name, instead of by the baptismal
name, as long as the change of name has not been made for
fraudulent or illegal purposes ; ^ it seems that the same princi-
1 Douglas V. Bank, 19 Ala. 659;
Stroudsbuig v. Brown, (Pa. 92) 11
Pa. Co. Ct. 272; Linck v. Litchfield,
31 N. E. E. 123 ( Mass. 92 ) ; Johnson
V. Indianapolis, 16 Ind. 227; Kansas
etc. Co. V. Burge, 40 Kan. 736; Marx
V. Croison, 17 Or. 393; Pittsburgh v.
Craft, 1 Pitts. (Pa.) 158; Pendleton
V. Bank of Kentucky, 1 Mon. 177;
Med way v. Adams, 10 Mass. 360;
Trammell v. State, 93 Ala. 388; Bow-
er V. State Bank, .5 Ark. 234; Pierce
V. Somerworth, 10 N". H. 369; Neely
V. Yorkville, 10 S. C. 141; State v.
Cooper, 101 N. C. 684; Kentucky
Seminary v. Wallace, 15 B. Mon. 35 ;
70
People v. Love, 19 Cal. 676; African
Society v. Varick, 13 Johns. 38.
2 Even Judge Dillon appears to en-
tertain the contrary impression, as
is manifest by the following quota-
tion: " If a particular name be given
to a corporation in its charter, the
corporation can no more change it
at its pleasure than a man can at
pleasure change his baptismal
name." Dillon Mun. Corp., vol. 1,
sec. 175.
8 England v. New York Publishing
Co., 8 Daly ( N. T.) 375; Hygeia W.
I. Co. v. N. T. Hyg. I. Co., 19 N. Y.
602 ; Bell v. Sun Printing Co., 42 N. Y.
CH. v.]
CORPOBATE NAME.
§48
pie cannot be applied to municipal corporations, if it is possible
to apply it to any kind of corporation. From the fact that a cor-
poration is a creature of a legislative act, and has no tangible ex-
istence as a legal personality, outside of the act of incorporation,
the legal name acquired by the act of the Legislature is deemed
to be beyond the power of change by the municipal corpora-
tion without legislative action.^ And even where the Legisla-
ture, in a subsequent act, applies a second or different name to
the corporation, it is held that there is necessarily a repeal of
the first name given to it by the Legislature ; it is said that a
corporation cannot have two legal names.^ But, notwithstand-
ing this general doctrine, it has been held, that where quasi
'public corporations are created by legislative act, without any
provision for giving to the particular corporation a distinct or
formal name, such corporation may acquire a name by reputa-
tion, as in the case of natural persons, and sue and be sued by
such name.^
Super. Ct. 567; Snook, 2 Hilt. (K Y.)
566. In Doe v. Yates, 5 Barn. &
Aid. 544, Abbott, C. J., said: " A
name assumed by the voluntary act
of a young man at his outset in life,
adopted by all who know him, and
by which he is constantly called, be-
comes, for all the purposes that
occur to my friend, as much and
effectually his name as if he had ob-
tained an act of Parliament to con-
fer it on him." " No person is bound
to accept his patronymic as a sur-
name, nor his Christian name as a
given name, though the custom to
do so is almost univers.al among
English speaking people, who have
inherited the common law.'' Biddle,
J., in Scofield v. Jennings, 68 Ind.
233.
iJn re Mer. Eep. Co., 115 X. Y.
176; Episcopal etc. Society v. Epis-
copal Church, 1 Pick. 372; Girard v.
Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1; In re. East
Stroudsburg, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 529.
^Eeesv. Newport etc. Co., 32 W.
Va. 164; Physicians v. Salmon, 3
Salk. (Eng.) 102; Atty. Gen. v. Wor-
cester, 2 Phillips, 25; Smith v. Tal-
lahassee Branch, 30 Ala. 650; Manu-
facturing Co. V. Davis, 14 Johns.
238; Society etc. v. Young, 2 N. H.
310; Trustees v. Peaslee; 15 N. H.
317; Dutchess Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 14
Johns. (N. Y.) 238; 7 Am. Dec. 450;
Haselton B. Co. v. Hazelton T. B.
Co., 30 N. E. R. 339; Atty. Gen. v.
Corporation of Leicester, 9 Beav.
(Eng.) 546; Middlesex, etc., v. Da-
vis, 3 Met. (Mass.) 133; Trustees v.
Peaslee, 15 N. Bt. 317; State v. Coo-
per, 101 K. C. 684; Society of Mid-
dlesex H. & M. Soo. V. Davis, Met.
(Mass.) 133; All Saints Church v.
Lovett, 1 Hall (N. Y.) 191; Knight
v. Wells, 1 Ld. Eaym. 80.
8 King V. Norris, 1 Ld. Kaym. 337;
The Queen v. Bailiffs of Ipswich, 2
Ld. Raym. 1232, 1238, 1239; School
District v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn. 227.
Use of names by corporations, see
32 Am. &Eng. Corp. Cases, 22; Epis-
copal Society v. Episcopal Church, 1
Pick. 372.
71
§49
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. V.
§ 49. Effect of misnomer in general — While it has been
generally held that a name is necessary to the existence of a
corporation, as a means of identifying the corporation, and
distinguishing it from other persons in the various relations of
life ; ^ yet the identification of the corporation is the important
element of the requirement.'-' Hence it is that, as a general rule,
any variation from the true legal name of a corporation in grants
and bequests to such corporation, will not have the effect of viti-
ating or invalidating such grant or bequest, on account of the
uncertainty of the grantee or donee, as long as the variation or
misnomer is not so pronounced as to make it impossible to iden-
tify the corporation.^ Thus, it has been held that, vy^here in a
1 Middlesex H. & M. Soc. v. Davis,
3 Mete. (Mass.) 133; Knight v. Wells,
1 Lord Eyan. (Eng.) 80; Corp. of
Rochester v. Lee, 15 Sim. (Eng.)
376; Dillon, Mun. Corp., sees. 175-6;
Dutchess Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 14 Johns.
(N. T.) 238; 7 Am. Dec. 459; Physi-
cians V. Salmon, 3 Salk. (Eng.) 102;
Atty. Gen. v. Worcester, 2 Philips, 3.
2 Wetmore v. Institution, 3 N. T.
S. 179; Keely v. Torkville, 10 S. Car.
141 ; Pierce v. Somerworth, 10 N. H.
369; Atty. Gen. v. Kerr, 2 Beav.420;
St. Louis Hospital v. Williams, 19
Mo. 609; Andrews v. Dyer, 81 Me.
104; Bristol v. Ontario, 60 Conn. 472;
]n re Pepper, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 257; Peo-
ple V. Love, 19 Cal. 676; Kentucky
Seminary v. Wallace, 15 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 35; Milford etc. Co. v. Brush,
10 Ohio, 111; 36 Am. Dec. 78; Med-
way Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 10 Mass.
360; Inhabitants v. String, 10 N. J.
L. 323; Kimball V. Chapel, 27 Ab. N.
C. 437; Faulkner v. Home, 29 N. E.
645 (Mass. 92) ; Bellows v. Hallowell
etc. Bank, 2 Mason (U. S.) 43; Hoff-
man V. Van Nostrand, 42 Barb. (IST.
Y.) 174; Whitby v. Harrison, 18 Up.'
Can. Q. B. 603; Bruce v. Cromar, 22
Up. Can. Q. B. 321; Douglas v.
Branch Bank, 19 Ala. 659; Bower v.
State Bank, 5 Ark. 234.
8 Wakefield v. Brown, 38 Minn.
75
361; 37 N. W. R. 788; Morris v.
State, 84 Ala. 446; 4 So. R. 628;
Wood V. Hammond, (R. I. 88) 17
Atl. E. 324; In re Look, 1 Con. Sur.
403; Neely v. Torkville, 10 S. Car.
141; Berks Co. Turnpike Road Co.
V. Myers, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 12; 9 Am.
Dec. 402; People v. Love, 19 Cal.
676; African Society v. Varick, 13
Johns. 38; Chapin v. School Distiict
in Winchester, 35 N. H. 445 ; People
V. Runkle, 9 Johns. (N. T.) 147; Bi-
ker V. Leo, 115 N. Y. 93; Pittsburgh
V. Craft, 1 Pitts. (Pa.) 158; Douglass
V. Branch Bank etc., 19 Ala. 659;
Sutton V. Cole, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 232;
Kew York Institute v. How, 10 N.
Y. 84; Centenary M. E. Ch. v. Par-
ker, 43 N. J. Bq. 307; 12 Atl. E. 142;
Vausant v. Roberts, 3 Md. 119; Mi-
not V. Boston Asylum, 7 Meto. (Mass.)
416; Bodman v. American Soc, 9
Allen (Mass.) 447; Neely v. York-
ville, 10 S. C. 141; Kentucky Semi-
nary V. Wallace, 15 B. Mon. 35; Pen-
dleton v. Bank, 1 Mon. 177; Faulkner
V. Nat. Sailors' Home, (Mass. 92) 29
N. E. E. 645; N. Y. Conference v.
Clarkson, 4 Halst. Ch. (N. J.) 541;
Preacher's Aid Soc. v. Eich, 45 Me.
552; Chappell v. Missionary Society,
(Ind. 92) 29 N. E. E. 624; Pierce v.
Somerworth, 10 N. H. 369; Camden
v. Clerke, Hobart (Eng.) 32; Atty.
CH. v.]
CORPORATE NAME.
§50
devise to a town the popular name of " South Parish in Sutton "
was used instead of the lawful name " The -first Parish in Sut-
ton," notwithstanding the variation, the devise was valid.i And
so, likewise, a devise was sustained, which was made to the
" Right Worshipful Jurats and General Council of the Town
of Rye ; " whereas its legal corporate name was " the Mayor,
Jurats and Commonalty of the Town of Rye." ^ A devise has
often been held to be valid, although it be made to a corpora-
tion which is described instead of being named, as long as the
description is sufficient to identify whicli corporation was in-
tended to be the recipient of the gift.^
§ 50. Use of corporate name in siiits. — But the requirement
of a strict conformity with the legal provision for a name is
more strictly enforced, and the necessity for it is greater, in the
case of suits, than where the name is employed in grants to, or
contracts with, the corporation. A misnomer of a substantial
character in the pleadings would be the subject for demurrer ;
but, in these days, the opportunity for frequent amendments
of the pleadings would deprive the misnomer in a suit of its
important consequences. But a misnomer in a suit is fatal to
the suit, as long as it is not corrected.* Where a corporation's
Gen. V. Mayor of Rye, 7 Taunt.
(Eng.) 546; St. Louis Hospital v.
Williams, 19 Mo. 609; Kimball v.
Chappell, 18 N. Y. S. 30; 27 A. K.
C. 437; Crydou Hospital v. Farley, 6
Tauat. (Eng.) 467; The King v.
Croke, Cowp. (Eng.) 29; Goodwyn
and Railway Co., In re, 13 U. C. C.
P. 254; Bristol v. Ontario Orph. Asy-
lum, 60 Conn. 472; Bower v. State
Bank, 5 Ark. 234; Milford etc. Co.
V. Brush, 10 Ohio, 111; 36 Am. Deo.
78; In re Pepper's Estate, 1 Pa. Dist.
148; Beverly v. Barlow, 10 U. C. C.
P. 178; Mayor and Burgesses etc., 10
Coke, 120. Chancellor Kent says:
"The general rule to be collected
from the cases is, that a variation
from the precise name of the corpo-
ration, when the true name is neces-
sarily to be collected from the instru-
ment, or is shown by proper aver-
ments, will not invalidate a grant by
or to a corporation, or a contract
Vith it, and the modern cases show
an increased liberality on this sub-
ject." 2 Kent Com. 292.
1 First Parish in Sutton v. Cole, 3
Pick. 232.
- Attorney General v. Mayor of Rye,
7 Taunton, 546; 2 Eng. Com. Law,
213.
8 Trustees v. Peaslee, 15 IST. H. 317;
Bodman v. American Tract Society,
9 Allen, 447; Vansant v. Roberts, 3
Md. 119; Preacher's Aid Society, 45
Me. 552 ; New York Institute v. How,
10 N. Y. (6 Seld.) 84. See Tiedeman
on Wills, chapter xvi.
* Seminary v. Wallace, 15 B. Mon.
35 ; County v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175 ;
Romeo v. Chapman, 2 Mich. 179;
Carder v. Com'rs, 16 Ohio St. 353;
Insane Asylum v. Higgins, 15 111.
185 ; Porter v. Blakely, 1 Root (Conn.)
440; Trustees v. Campbell, 16 Ohio
73
§15
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. U.
name has been changed by law, without any change in the
identity of the corporation, suits should ordinarily be institut-
ed in the new name, although the subject-matter of the suit,
the contract or grant, was made in the old name, provided the
change from the old name to the new one is proven in the prop-
er form in the suit, in order to connect the corporation suing
or sued with the corporation named in the grant or contract.^
And this is likewise the rule, where, in a grant or contract, a
different name has been employed to designate the corporation.
The corporation would be compelled to sue in its lawful name
on such a contract or conveyance, and would establish its
right to maintain the suit, by proving that it was intended un-
der the name emplo3'^ed in the contract or conveyance.^
§ 51. Requirement of a cprporate seal. — The charter of
municipal corporations, and, likewise, the general corporation
act, usually provides that the corporation shall have and use
a common seal ; and the authority is ordinarily given to the
corporation to select its own seal, and to change it at pleasure.
But the express grant of the authority to have a seal is not
necessary ; the power would be implied, in the absence of such
an express grant. But, in any case, the corporation need not
have a formal seal, which they must use on all occasions. Any
seal, in the absence of a formal seal, would be a good seal for
the corporation, which is authoritatively affixed to the instrument
and declared to be a corporate seal, although it has not been
formally or regularly adopted as the seal of the corporation.^
St. 11; Cambridge University v.
Crofts, 10 Mod. 208; Berks Co. etc.
V. Myers, 6 Serg. & Eawle (Pa.) 12;
Bvittan v. Newland, 2 Dev. & Bat.
(N. G.) 363.
' Fort Wayne v. Jackson, 1 Blackf .
(Ind.) 36; Colcliester v. Seaber, 3
Burr. 1866; Kegina v. Ipswicli, 2 Ld.
Eaym. 1232, 1238.
-'10 Co. 12.5 6; Underbill v. Santa
Barbara etc. Co., 93 Cal. 300; Trus-
tees V. Reneau, 2 Swan (Tenn.); Fort
Wayne v. Jackson, 7 Blackf. (Ind.)
36; Young v. Com'rs, 53 Fed. 895.
Armfield v. Solon, 19 N. Y. S. 44;
Solon V. Williamsburg Bank, 114 N.
Y. 122; Koehler v. Black E. Falls
74
Iron Co., 2 Black (U. S.) 715; Stock-
ton V. Powell, (Fla. 92) 10 So. K. 688;
City Council v. Mooreliead, 2 Eich.
Law, 430; Porter v. Eailroad Co., 37
Me. 349; Ruffner v. Welton C. & S.
Co., (W. Va. 92) 15 S. E. R. 48; Bank
of Middlesex v. Rutland R. Co., 30
Vt. 159; Tenney v. East Warren
Lumber Co., 43 N. H. 343; Mill Dam
Foundry v. Hovey, 21 Pick. 417;
Stebbins v. Merritt, 10 Cusli. 27; Por-
ter V. Androscoggin etc. R. Co., 37
Me. 349; Gordon v. Diego, (Cal. 93)
35 Pac. 885 ; Gary Lumber Co. Y. Cain,
(Miss. 93) 13 So. 239; Tetig v. Ross-
man, 12 Mont. 404.
CH. V.J
COEPOEATE SEAL.
§51
The common law seal required an impression to be made in
wax upon the paper ; but it is probably true everywhere in this
country, that corporations like private individuals are not requir-
ed to employ the common law seals, where seals are required at
all ; but that any impression upon the paper, either by a stamp
or by a pen, would be a sufficient seal. Certainly, this is the
rule in regard to private individuals ; and it is unquestionably
the law in regard to municipal corporations, that the employ-
ment of wax is not required, but that the impression stamped
into the paper is sufficient corporate seal.^ But in order that
any sealing of the instrument may be binding upon a corpora-
tion, whether the. regular or temporary seal is employed, the
seal must have been affixed by an officer, who is legally au-
thorized to bind the corporation by such act.^
The common law rule was, that a corporation could not
perform any legal binding act, except under seal ; and that a
parol contract, entered into in the name of the corporation,
would not be binding upon the corporation, but only upon
the officers, who executed or made such a contract. The mod-
ern rule is, however, very different from this. Instead of hold-
ing that a parol contract is not binding upon a corporation,
the contrary rule has been established almost everywhere, re-
lating both to municipal, as well as private, corporations, that
the corporation is required to make use of its seal, in the execu-
tion of legal instruments, only where the natural person would
likewise be required to do so. As Judge Story has said:
"Where a corporation is acting within the scope of the legiti-
mate purposes of its institution, all parol contracts made by its
authorized agents are express promises of the corporation ; and
all duties imposed on them by law, and all benefits conferred at
their request, raise implied promises, for the enforcement of
which an action lies."^ But it has been held in some in-
1 Hendee v. Pinkerton, 14 Allen,
381; comp. Solon v. Williamsburg,
114 K Y. 122.
2 Koehler v. Iron Co., 2 Black, 715 ;
Bank of Ireland v. Evans, 32 Eng.
Law & Eq. 23. SeeTiedeman's Pri-
vate Corporations for a fuller cita^
tion of cases.
2 Bank of Columbia v. Patterson
7 Cranch, 299; Over v. Greenfield,
107 Ind. 231 ; Bank of United States
V. Danbridge, First N. Bk. v. Salem
etc. Co., 39 Fed. 89; Clark v. Farm-
ers' etc. Co., 13 Wend. 256; lb. 265;
Cicotte V. Cburcb, 60 Mich. 532; Ber-
nardiu v. No. Dufferni, 19 Can. S. C.
R. 581 ; Sturtevant v. Alton,3 McLean,
393; Davenport v. Insurance Co., 17
75
r,«?
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. V.
Stances, as in Iowa and Illinois, that a corporate seal is essen-
tial to the validity of a legal instrument when executed by the
municipal or public corporation.^
It has also been held that a corporation can appoint its agents
by a parol act, and the appointment need not be made under
seal.^
§ 52. Seal, how proTCd — A seal of a private corporation
unquestionably does not prove itself ; but 'the fact, that it is
the seal of a particular corporation, must be proven by proper
evidence.^ In this country, this is probably the case, likewise,
with municipal corporations, except where the laws of the state
provide otherwise. But it seems that, in England, the corpo-
rate seals of old cities, like London or Edinburgh, have been de-
clared to be the subject of judicial notice of the courts, on
account of their great antiquity.* But where a legal instru-
ment contains what purports to be a corporate seal, and the
corporate character of the seal and conveyance is confirmed by
the signatures of proper officers, it is held that the presence of
Iowa, ilG; Lesesne v. White, 1
Spears (S. Car.) 31; State Board of
Education v. Aberdeen, 56 Miss. 538;
Shrewsbury v. Brown, 25 Vt. 197;
Gassett v. Audover, 21 Vt. 342;
Adams v. Farnsworth,15 Gray(Mass.)
423; Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. (jST. T.)
513; 13 Am. Eep. 550; Eandall v.
Van Vechten, 19 Johns. (N. T.) 60;
10 Am. Deo. 193; Wayne County v.
Detroit, 1*7 Mich. 390; American Ins.
Co. V. Oakley, 9 Paige (N. T.) 49;
38 Am. Dec. 561 ; Canaan y. Derush,
47 3Sr. H. 211; Lebanon v. Heath, 47
N. H. 353 ; Magill v. KaufCman, 4 S. &
R (Pa.) 317; 8 Am. Dec. 713; Dunn v.
Rector etc. of St. Andi-ews Church,
14 Johns. (N. Y.) 118; Danforth v.
Sclioharie etc. Turnpike Co., 12
Johns. ; Perkins v. Washington
Ins. Co., 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 645; Sanford
V. Tremlett, 42 Mo. 384; Legrand v.
Sidney College, 5 Munf. (Va.) 324;
Peterson v. Mayor etc. of N. Y., 17
N. Y. 449; Maher v. Chicago, 38 111.
266; Frankfort Bridge Co. v. Frank-
76
fort, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 41; Kenzie v.
Chicago, 2 Scam. (111.) 188; 33 Am.
Dec. 443 ; Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 532;
32 Am. Eep. 637; Dunlap v. Water
Com'rs of Erie, 25 Atl. E. 60; 151 Pa.
St. 477; 31 W. N. C. 231.
1 In the lo wa, case it is the county
warrant; Smeltzer v. White, 92 TJ. S.
390 ; Prescott v. Gouser, 34 Iowa, 178;
Springer v. Clay Co., 35 Iowa, 243;
and in Illinois it is a lease; Kinzie
V. Chicago, 2 Scam. (111.) 188.
^ See Tiedeman on Private Cor-
porations for citations of authori-
ties.
8 Moises V. Thornton, 8 Term E.
303; City Council v. Moorehead, 2
Eich. (S. C.) Law, 430; Gilbert Ev.
19; Jackson v. Pratt, 10 Johns. 381;
Fosterv. Shaw, 7Serg. & Eawle(Pa.)
163; Id. 318; Den v. Vreelandt, 2
Halst. (N. J.) 352; Mann v. Pentz, 2
Sandf. Ch. 257; Com. v. Dunlop, (Va.
93) 16 S. E. E. 273, (state seal.)
* Den V. Vreelandt, 2 Halst. (N. J.)
352.
CH. v.]
COEPOEATE BOUNDAEIES.
§53
the corporate seal is thereby established by prima facie evidence,
although it is insufficient to support the conclusion that the seal
was lawfully placed there, and that the instrument is an act
binding upon the corporation.^
§ 53. Boundaries, how defined. — It is required, in order to
make a valid municipal corporation, that its boundaries should
be definite and certain. Uncertainty in regard to the boundary
has so many important consequences in its train, that there
cannot be a valid incorporation, as long as this uncertainty has
not been cured.'-' Thus, for example, the boundaries of a town
were held to be uncertain and insufficient, where it was describ-
ed in these words : " Commencing with Samuel Hall, thence
to William Scales, also including John W. Dana, Jason and
Warren Britt, and Thomas Lyford." ^ But where the state
laws provide that boards of supervisors should lay out the town,
in accord with the general description of the proposed town
which is contained in the certificate, the subsequent establish-
ment of the boundaries by the supervisors M'ould cure the un-
certainty arising in the description of the town, as contained in
the certificate.* Whenever there is a dispute in regard to bound-
aries, a subsequent acquiescence on the part of the people of
the community, and of the state authorities, in the adoption of
a particular boundary as a settlement of the dispute, will be
binding upon the parties concerned, and would operate to cure
the original defect in the boundary.^ These boundaries are
originally described or set out in the charter of the corporation
in connection with some method, wliich is prescribed in the
charter, or in the general incorporation act, for subsequently
setting out and ascertaining such boundaries. The Legislature
has invested in itself as a matter of course, in the first instance.
' Fidelity etc. Co. v. Shenandoah
etc. Co., 32 W. Va. 244; Bi-ennan v.
Weatherford, 53 Tex. 330; 37 Am.
Rep. 758; Levering v. Mayor, 7
Humph. (Tenn.) 553; Mempliis v.
Adams, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 518; Musser
V. Johnson, 42 Mo. 74; 97 Am. Dec.
316.
2 Enterprize v. State, 10 So. K. 740;
House V. Greenburg, 94 Ind. 533;
San Diego v. Granniss, 77 Cal. 510;
Plantation No. 9 v. Bean, 40 Me. 218 ;
Guebelle v. Epley, 28Pac. 89; Pierce
V. Carpenter, 10 Vt. 480; Douglas v.
Town of Harrisville, 9 W. Va. 102.
3 Cutting V. Stone, 7 Vt. 471.
* People V. Carpenter, 24 jST. T.
86.
^ Omaha v. So. Omaha, 47 N. W.
R. 1113; Strosser v. Ft. Wayne, 100
Ind. 443; Hamilton v. McNeil, 13
Gratt. 389; People v. Farnham, 35
111.562; Milne v. Mayor, 13 La. An.
69.
77
§ 53 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. V.
the power to determine the geographical limits of a municipal
corporation ; and in the absence of any constitutional limita-
tions, the power of the Legislature in this regard is unlimited,
and no objection can be made to any actual setting out of
boundaries by the Legislature.^ The fact, that the existing
cities and towns are mentioned by name in a constitution subse-
quently adopted, does not give to the boundaries of such cor-
porations such a fixity, as would deny to the Legislature the
power to subsequently change them.^ It is a legislative ques-
tion, and not a judicial question, where the boundaries of a
municipal corporation should be fixed by the Legislature. Tiie
legislative discretion can in no wise be interfered with .or con-
trolled by the courts.^ In the general incorporation acts, pro-
vision is made for the boundaries being set out by some one,
other than the Legislature, and the constitutional question is
raised whether the Legislature has the power to delegate its au-
thoritj'- to fix the boundaries of a proposed municipal corpora-
tion, the authorities reaching conflicting conclusions. Thus,
it has been held that the power to fix and determine upon the
boundaries of a municipal corporation maybe delegated to a
court, a County Court, for example.* On the other hand, it
has been held, that a Legislature has not the power to delegate
' Rome V. Anderson, 89 Tenn. 259;
Norris v. Mayor etc. of Smythville,
1 Swan (Tenn.) 164; McCollie v.
Mayor of Cliattanooga, 3 Head.
(Tenn.) 317; In re Boundary (Pa.
92), 23 Atl. R. 1041; Pool v. Brown,
98 Mo. 675 ; Washburn v. Oshkosh, 60
Wis. 453; SuflBeld v. Town of East
Granby, 52 Conn. 175 ; Union v. Knox
Co., 90 Tenn. 541; People v. Nevada,
0 Col. 143; People v. Bennett, 29
Mich. 451; 18 Am. Rep. 107; St. Louis
V. Eussel, 9 Mo. 507 ;• Atchison etc.
R. Co. V. Maquilkin, 12 Kan. 301;
St. Louis V. Allen, 13 Mo. 400; Stone
V. Flournoy, 28 La. An. 850; Little
Rock V. Parish, 36 Ark. 166; Stilz
V. Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515 ; Wiley
V. Bluffton, 111 Ind. 152; Martin v.
Dix, 52 Miss. 53; 24 Am. Rep. 661;
Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 111. 152 ;
78
Wade V. Richmond, 18 Gratt. (Va.)
583.
2 Wade V. Richmond, swpra.
= Little Rock v. Parish, 36 Ark.
166; Galesburg V. Hawkinson, 75 111.
152; Wiley v. Bluffton, 111 Ind. 152.
* State V. Pooaletto, 28 Pac. R.
411; People V. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451;
29 Am. Rep. 107; In re Boundary
Line of Townships (Pa. 92), 23 Atl.
1041; Appeal of Singer (Pa.), 18 Atl.
Rep. 931; Burlington v. Leebrick,43
Iowa, 252; Board of Education v.
Board of Education, 30 W. Va. 424;
20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 11 (di-
vision of school district) : Town o£
Suffield V. Town of East Granby, 52
Conn. 175; 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.
1 ; Kayser v. Trustees etc. of Brenen,
16 Mo. 88.
CH. v.]
COEPOEATE BOUNDAEIES.
§54
its right to afSx boundaries to any court whatever, on the
ground that it is a legislative authority, and not a branch of
the judicial power.^ It is clearly impossible for the Legislature
to delegate the power of fixing boundaries to private citizens,
or to a private board.^ But it is, on tUe other hand, very gen-
erally held that the power of fixing and determining upon the
boundaries of a municipal corporation may be delegated to
local bodies or boards, representing the municipal corporation.^
§ 54. Corporate boundaries by reference to streams and
highways. — Generally, where reasonable care is employed in
the fixing of boundaries, no difficulty is experienced in their
actual location, because the reference is made to well known
objects or monuments, or the boundary is described by metes
and bounds.* But where a city or town is described as being
bounded by a river, it is often difficult to ascertain, apart from
the actual inquiry into facts of the particular case, where the
boundary line is ; i. e., whether it is at the center of the stream,
or at the high-water or low-water mark, on the one side or the
other of the stream. In all such cases, either the description
contained in the charter, or act of incorporation, would deter-
mine the answer in the particular case, or it is determined by
the local usage or custom. The general rule is that, where
towns are bounded by rivers which are not navigable, the cen-
ter of the stream will be the boundary line.^ And the same
rule determines the boundary line, where the town is bounded
iWillett V. Belville, 11 Lea (Tenn.)
1; City of Galesburg v. Hawkiuson,
75 111. 152.
2 Town of Suffleld v. Town of East
Granby, 52 Conn. 175 ; Eulis v. Mc-
Adams, 7 S. E. E. 725; People v.
Bennett, 29 Mich. 451 ; 18 Am. Eep.
107.
a Ewing v. State, (Tex. 91) Ifi S. W.
E. 872; Fisher v. San Diego, 86 Gal.
158; 24 Pao. E. 1000; People v. Car-
penter, 24 N. Y. 86; Osgood v. Clark,
6 Frost (N. H.) 307; People v. Ben-
nett, 29 Mich. 451; Blanchard v. Bis-
sell, 11 Ohio St. 96; Borough of
Blooming Valley, lb. 66; Kelly v.
Meeks, 87 Mo. 396; Stilz v. Indian-
apolis, 55 Ind. 515; Devore's Appeal,
56 Pa. St. 163; People v. Bennett, 29
Mich. 451.
■■ Elmendorf v. Mayor, etc., 25
Wend. 693 ; Hamilton v. McjSTeil, 13
Gratt. (Va.) 389; Raab v. Maryland,
7 Md. 483; Gray v. Sheldon, 8 Vt.
402; Pierce v. Carpenter, 10 Vt. 480;
Hollenbeck v. Sykes, 29 Pac. 380;
People V. Carpenter, 24 N. Y. 86.
5 Smith V. Skagit Co., 45 Fed. E.
725; /re re Spier, 3 N. Y. S. 438; Cold
Spring etc. v. Tolland, 9 Cush. 492;
State V. Canterbury, 8 Fost. (28 N. H. )
195; State v. Gilmanton, 14 jST. H.
467; Flynn v. Boston, (Mass. 92) 26
N. E. E. 868 ; Galesburg v. Hawkin-
son, 75 111. 156; Kelly v. Pittsburgh,
104 U. S. 78; People v. Supervisors,
79
§54
MUNICIPAL COEPOUATIONS.
[CH.
by a road ; the center line being the boundary .^ This is, ordi-,
narily, the rule also, where the monument of boundary is a
navigable stream. The boundary line would ordinarily be the
center line of the river. But in particular cases, this general
rule is controlled by local settlements of boundary, in opposition
to its principle. Thus, the boundary line of the city of Brook-
lyn extends, for police purposes, to the low-water line on its
own side of the East river ; and the boundary line of New
York city coveis the entire East river up to the low-water hne
on the Long Island and Brooklyn shore.^ The boundary of
the city of Philadelphia extends to the high-water mark on the
New Jersey shore of the Delaware river, in accordance with
the agreement entered into by the States of Pennsylvania and
New Jersey.* On the other baud, the city of St. Louis is de-
cided to have jurisdiction over the Mississippi river to the
middle of the stream, and not merely to the western shore.*
Generally, in Pennsylvania, it is held that, where a municipal
corporation is bounded by a navigable stream, its jurisdiction
will extend to the low-water mark.*' Inasmuch as the stream
is constantly changing its channel, the boundary line of a town
which is bounded by such stream, is necessarily shifting with
the natural and artificial changes, which are made in the shore,
and in the movement of such stream." But the fact that the
jurisdiction of a town extends over navigable waters, does not
give to the city any title to the land, which is covered by such
water. It simply confers upon the corporation the governmen-
tal control of such territory.^
17 K. E. E. 147; Hoyt v. Mayor, 9
Weud. 602 ; Granger v. Avery, 64 Me.
ii92; Cold water v. Tucker, 36 Mich.
474; 24 Am. Kep. 601; Gould v.
Eoohester, 105 N". T. 46; Bechtel v.
Village of Edgewater, 45 Hun (N. Y.)
245; Pleasant v. Kost, 29 111. 490;
Neal V. Com., 17 S. & K. (Pa.) 67;
Gouverneur v. National Ice Co., 134
N. Y. 355.
1 State V. Thomaston, 74 Me. 198;
In re Flick, (Pa. 92) 6 Gulp. 329.
2 Palmer v. Hicks, 6 Johns. 133;
Furman Street, 17 Wend. 649, 661 ;
Udall V. Trustees, 19 Johns. 179;
Luke V. Brooklyn, 43 Biib. (N. Y.) 54.
80
"Neal V. Com., 17 S. & K. 67;
Gould V. Rochester, 105 IST. Y. 46;
Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474.
* Jones V. Souland, 24 How. 41.
6 Gilchrist's App., 109 Pa. St. 600.
« Pleasant v. Kost, 29 111. 490.
' Palmer v. Hicks, 6 Johns, 133.
As to the statutory duty of munici-
pal coi'porations, in the control and
support of bridges constructed be-
tween the towns on opposite banks
of the stream, see Brookline v. Westr
minster, 4 Vt. 224; Granby v. Thurs-
ton, 23 Conn. 416, and post, §316;
Tebo V. City of Brooklyn, 31 N. E. R.
984; 134X. Y.341.
CH. v.]
COllPOBATK BOUKDARIES.
§55
§ 55. Enlargement of boundaries — Annexation of terri-
tory.— ^Not only may the Legislature, in the act of incorporation,
fix and determine upon the territorial limits of such corporation,
but unless the power is restrained in any way through special
constitutional limitations, the Legislature may, likewise, after a
creation of the corporation, extend its boundaries, and thereby
annex land contiguous to the original territory, but which prior
tiiereto was outside of the municipal corporation.^ In some of
the states, constitutional provisions have been adopted, looking
towards the limitation of the power of the Legislature, and in-
tended in most instances to avoid the arbitrary and injurious
exercise of the power, but not in any case taking away the
power altogether. Thus, while, independently of limitations
or statutes requiring the same, the enlargement of the territory
of a corporation, and the annexation of contiguous land, can be
done, notwithstanding the remonstrance of such contiguous
territory ; yet, in some cases, the constitution of the state re-
quires that the consent of the inhabitants of such contiguous
territory should first be obtained.^ The consent of the inhabit-
ants of the contiguous territory is frequently required by stat-
ute, as a condition precedent to the annexation of this territory.^
The Missouri Act of 1841, which extended the limits of the city
1 Emporia v. Smith (Kan. 92), 22
Pac. E. 616; Warren v. Mayor etc. of
Charlestown, 2 Gray (Mass.) 84;
Omaha v. So. Omaha, 47 N. W. K.
1113; Maddrey v. Cox, 73 Tex. 538;
Glover v. Terre Haute, 129 Ind.-593;
State V. Waxahaohie, 81 Tex. 626;
Smith V. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359;
Chandler v. Boston, 112 Mass. 200;
Giboney v. Cape Girardeau Co., 58
Mo. 141; Woods v. Henry, 55 Mo.
560; Gunter v. Fayetteville, 19 S. W.
E. 577; People v. Oakland, 92 Cal.
611 ; State v. New Whatcom, 3 Wash.
St. 7; Gottschalk v. Becher, 32 Neb.
053; Powers v. Wood Co., 8 Ohio St.
286; United States v. Memphis, 97
U. S. 284; Stoner v. Flournoy, 28 La.
An. 850; People v. Bradley, 36 Mich.
447; Covington v. East St. Louis, 78
111. 548; Daly v. Morgan, 69 Md. 460;
23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 554; Smith
6
V. Mayor etc. of Saginaw (Mich. 1890),
45 N. W. Kep. 964; Blanchard v. Bis-
sell, 11 Ohio St. 96; Succession of
Teaulet, 28 La. An. 42; Martin v.
Dix, 52 Miss. 53; 24 Am. Eep. 661.
2 Hartington v. Luge, 50 N. W. R.
957; Opinion of Justices, 6 Gush. 580;
Wahoo V. Dickinson, 36 N. W. K.
813; Daly v. Morgan, 69 Md. 460;, 23
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 454; Chand-
ler V. Boston, 112 Mass. 200.
8 Sum V. Bowie, (Tex. 92) 18 S. W.
E. 142; Daly v. Morgan, 69 Md. 460;
23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 454; North
Springfield v. Village (111. 92), 29 N.
E. E. 849; Strosser v. Fort Wayne,
100 Ind. 443; In re Sadler (Pa. 90),
23 Atl. E. 978; Stone v. Charlestown,
114 Mass. 214; East Dannas v. State,
73 Tex. 371; Topeka v. Gillett, 32
Kan. 431 ; Hyde Park v. Chicago, 16
N. E. 222.
81
§65
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. V.
of St. Louis, provided that the act should become absolute, upon
an acceptance of the same by a majority of the aitizens of the
territory, which was included in the charter as amended. And
it was held that this provision of the statute required that the
majority of the people, living within the extended boundaries
of the city, should consent to the ex-tension of the city limits ;
and that the act would under those circumstances take effect,
even though the parties living outside of the existing city limits
were more or less unanimous in their opposition to the exten-
sion of the city boundaries, and the inclosure of their territory
within such boundaries. -"^
It is also a constitutional requirement, in some of the states,
that the extension of the boundaries of the city or town, by the
annexation of contiguous territory, should not be done, so as to
interfere with the boundaiies of elective representative districts,
at a time when it is impossible for a change to be made, under the
provisions of the constitution, in the boundaries of these repre-
sentative districts.^
But it has been held that the Illinois constitutional provision,
which limits the extent of municipal indebtedness, does not make
the union of two municipalities into one invalid, because the
joint indebtedness of the two corporations would exceed the
constitutional limit of indebtedness.^ And it is no constitu-
tional objection to the exercise of the power of compulsory an-
nexation of territory to an already existing corporation, and the
consequent enlargement of its boundaries, that the existing cor-
poration has a large indebtedness hanging over it, which would
necessitate the increase of the rate of taxation upon the terri-
tory, which has thus been added to the city limits. In the
absence of a special constitutional provision prohibiting, or
otherwise providing for, the exercise of this power, the discre-
tion of the Legislature is unlimited.*
1 St. Louis V. Kussell, 9 Mo. 507.
2 People V. Holihan, 29 Mich. 116;
People V. Bradley, 36 Micli. 447;
Smith V. Saginaw (Mich. 1890), 45 N.
W. Eep. 964; Com. v. Brenham, 22
N. E. K. 628.
8 True V. Davis (111. 89), 22 N". E.
410.
'' Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St.
82
96; Powers v. Wood Co., 8 Ohio St.
286; Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St.
359; Indianapolis V. Patterson, UN.
E. R. 551; St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo.
400; Daly v. Morgan, 69 Md. 454; 23
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 462; Wade
V. Richmond, 18 Gratt. (Va.) 583;
Wahoo V. Dickinson, (Neb. 88) 36
N. W. E. 813; Prince George's Co.
CH. v.]
CORPORATE BOUNDARIES.
§55
The Legislature may delegate to local boards the power of
determining the extent to which the boundary shall be enlarged,
and what territory shall be annexed to the city limits.^ But it
has been held that while such acts, which confer on cities the
power of determining the extent to which their boundaries
shall be enlarged, are constitutional and valid, in the absence
of constitutional provisions to the contrary, yet it is. subject
to the constitutional limitation thai the power must be reason-
Comra'rs v. Bladensburg, 51 Md. 465;
Chandler v. Boston, 112 Mass. 200;
United States v. Memphis, 97 U. S.
284; Railroad Co. v. Spearman, 12
Iowa, 112; Norris v. Mayor etc., 1
Swan (Tenn.) 164; Gorham v. Spring-
field, 21 Me. 59; Girard v. Philadel-
phia, 7 Wall. 1; Covington v. East
St. Louis, 78 111. 548; Cheany v.
Hooser, 9 B. Mon. 330; Elston v.
Crawfordsville, 20Ind. 272; Edmunds
V. Gookins, lb. 477 ; Arnoult v. New
Orleans, 11 La. An. 54; Graham v.
Greenville, 67 Tex. 62 ; Board etc. of
Chickasaw Co. v. Board etc. of Sum-
ner Co., 58 Miss. 610; Morford v.
Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Washburn v.
Oshkosh, 60 Wis. 453 ; Laramie Coun-
ty V. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307;
Giboney v. Girardeau, 58 Mo. 141;
Queen v. Local Governing Board, L.
R. 8 Q. B. 227; Woods v. Henry, 55
Mo. 560; State v. McReynolds, 61 Mo.
203; Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La.
An. 515. In Powers v. Wood Co., 8
Ohio St. 286, the court said: "That
injustice may be, and has, sometimes
been done by the annexation of ter-
ritory to a town, which has contracted
an improvident debt, is, no doubt,
true; and, sometimes, and perhaps
more frequently, the owners of con-
tiguous territory have had the bene-
fit, by reflected value and conven-
ience, of expenditures for which they
have not contributed anything. The
question is one beyond the reach of
practical consideration, in the ab-
sence of any statute; and it would
require a very artificial and unsound
mode of reasoning to hold that ter-
ritory could not be annexed to a town
which owed debts, until the owners
of such territory were paid a com-
pensation in money for a propor-
tional part of such debts, on the
ground that the property annexed
was condemned for public use."
1 State V. Forrest, 74 Wis. 610;
Wahoe v. Dickinson, (Neb.) 36 N. W.
R. 813; Graham v. Greenville, 67
Tex. 62 ; Callen v. Junction City, 41
Kans. 466; Collins v. New Albany, 59
Ind. 396; State v. Picatello, (Idaho,
92) 28 Pac. R. 411; East Dallas v.
State, 73 Tex. 371 ; Kellog v. Meeks,
87 Mo. 396; Dodson v. Ft. Smith, 33
Ark. 508; Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa.
St. 359; Jacksonville v. L'Engle, 20
Fla. 344; Covington v. East St. Louis,
78 111. 548; Murray v. Virginia, 91 111.
558; City of Pensaoola v. Louisville
etc. R. Co., 21 Fla. 492; Sanders v.
Provisional Municipality, 24 Fla. 226;
Strosser v. Fort Wayne, 100 Ind. 443;
8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 636; Em-
poria v. Smith, 42 Kan. 431 ; Indian-
apolis V. Patterson, 14 N. E. R. 451;
Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431; Lo-
gansport v. La Rose, 99 Ind. 117;
Millikin v. Bloomington, 72 Ind. 161 ;
Hewitt's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 55 ; Elston
V. Board of Trustees of Crawfords-
ville, 20 Ind. 272; Mendenhall v. Bur-
ton, (Kan. 89) 22 Pac. 558.
83
§56
MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS.
[CH. V.
able and properly exercised.^ But the corporation can neyer
exercise the power of enlarging or changing its boundaries
without the consent of the Legislature, either given in the par-
ticular case or under general laws.^
§56. What territory can be annexed — Farm lands.—
Where the Legislature exercises the power of annexation of con-
tiguous territorj', in the enlargement of the boundaries of a city,
the extent to which the power is exercised, in the absence of
constitutional limitations, cannot be limited or controlled in any
way whatever; and it matters not how extensive the enlarge-
ment of the boundaries may be, if done directly by the Legisla-
ture, there is no redress, or no way in which the act of the
Legislature may be subjected to judicial review.^ But where the
power is delegated to a local body representing the municipal
corporation, then it is customary to subject the exercise of the
power to certain restrictions. Thus, for example, it is gener-
ally required that the territory to be attached must be contiguous
to the present territory of the city.* But where the pieces of
property which are annexed, in the exercise of its power to en-
1 Kellog V. Meeks, 87 Mo. 396 ; Hart-
ington V. Luge, 50 N. W. E. 957;
Indianapolis v. Patterson, 14 N. E. R.
551.
" Commissioners of Shawnee Co. v.
Carter, 2 Kan. 115; McCallie v.
Mayor of Cliattanooga, 3 Head.
(Tenn.) 318; Atchison, etc. K. Co. v.
Maquilkin, 12 Kan. 301; Norris v.
Mayor, etc. of Smithville, 1 Swan
(Tenn.) 164; Walnut Township v.
Jordon, 38 Kan. 562; 20 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. 1. But see Delphi v_
Startzman, 104 Ind. 343; 11 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 87, where it has
been held that the corporate bound-
aries may be extended, without di-
rect limitation, or express agreement,
operating under particular circum-
stances as an estoppel.
3 State V. Waxahachie, 81 Tex. 626;
Saunder v. Pensacola, 4 So. R. 801;
State V. Baird, 79 Tex. 63 ; Laramie
Co. T. Albany Co., 92 U. S. 307; Smith
V. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359; Daly v.
84
Morgan, 69 Md. 460; 23 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. 454; Louis v. Allen, 13
Mo. 400; Giboney Cape v. Girardeau
Co., 58 Mo. 141; Tilford v. Olatlie,
44 Kan. 721 ; Powers v. Wood Co.,
8 Ohio St. 286; United States v.
Memphis, 97 U. S. 284; Woods v.
Henry, 55 Mo. 560; Santa Eosa v.
Coulter, 50 Cal. 537; People v. Brad-
ley, 36 Mich. 447; Blancliard v. Bis-
sell, 11 Ohio St. 96; Martin v. Dix,
52 Miss, 53; 24 Am. Eep. 661; Smith
V. Mayor etc. of Saginaw, (Mich.
1890) 45 N. W. Eep. 964; Stonerv.
Elournoy, 28 La. An. 850; Chandler
V. Boston, 112 Mass. 200; Covington
V. East St. Louis, 78 111. 548.
*Evansville v. Page, 23 Ind. 525;
Smith V. Sherry, 50 Wis. 210; Truax
V. Pool, 46 Iowa, 256; Enterprize v.
State, 10 So. E. 740; Woodruff v.
Enverce, 55 Ark. 618; Murray v.
Virginia, 91 111. 558; Blanchard v.
Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96.
CH. V.J
CORPOEATB BOITNDAEIES.
56
large the city boundaries, are contiguous to each other, the fact
that they are not all contiguous to the city will not make the
annexation of all of them invalid. In the constitutional sense,
such territory would be properly considered to be adjoining the
city.^ So, also, has it been held that land, on the opposite bank
of a stream, will be contiguous territory in this statutory or con-
stitutional sense, where it is proposed to annex such lands, and
bring them within the limits of a city located on the opposite
bank of the river .^
The most difficult question, in regard to the power of annex-
ing contiguous territory, is raised in the case of the annexation
of farm lands to the city limits, thus increasing the rate of tax-
ation upon such lands, while at the same time the territory so
annexed derives no special benefit from the municipal improve-
ments, which are the occasion of the increased taxation. This
circumstance does not generally interfere with the power of
annexing such farm lands to the city limits, as long as the con-
stitution or statute, under which the municipal corporation acts,
does not prohibit it.^ But the courts have frequently held,
even in the absence of statute, that, where the power to annex
contiguous territory and to enlarge city boundaries is exercised
under, and is authorized by, general incorporation acts, the con-
sent of the people living within the territory, which is proposed
to be aimexed to the city, must first be obtained-* In some
states, it is also provided that the municipal corporation can-
not exercise the power of annexing contiguous territory, unless
1 State V. "Waxahachie, 81 Tex. 626 ;
17 S. W. R. 348; Evansville v. Page,
23 Ind. 525; Smith v. Sherry, 50 Wis.
210; Hurla v. Kansas City, (Kan. 91)
27 Pac. E. 143; In re Sadlier, 21 Atl.
Eep. 978.
- Vestal V. Little Rock, 15 S. W.
R. 891; Vogel v. Little Rock, 15 lb.
836; Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St.
96.
3 In re TuUytown, 11 Pa. Co. Ct.
E. 97; State v. Baird, 15 S. W. E.
98; 79 Tex. 63; McClay v. Lincoln
(Neb. 91) 49 N. W. E. 282; Ves-
tal V. Little Eock, supra; Kelly v.
Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St. 170; 27 Am.
Uep. 633; 104 TJ. S. 78; St. Louis v.
Allen, 13 Mo. 400; St. Louis v. Eus-
sell, 9 Mo. 507; Lee v. Thomas, 49
Mo. 112; State V. Waxahachie, swpj-a;
State V. Reynolds, 61 Mo. 203; Mu-
nicipality No. 3 V. Michoud, 6 La.
An. 605; Barker v. State, IS Ohio,
514; Gillette v. Hartford, 31 Conn.
351; Hewitt's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 55;
Eureka Springs v. Woodruff, 55 Ark.
618; Kountze v. Omaha, 5 Dillon (C.
C.) 443; 88 111. 154; 30 Am. Kep. 543;
Walden v. Dudley, 49 Mo. 421.
^ In re Lutte Meadows, 28 Pa. St.
256; In re West Philadelphia, 5 W.
& S. (Pa.) 281 ; People v. Bennett,
29 Mich. 451; Inre Blooming Valley,
56 Pa. St. 66; lb. 163.
85
§56
JIUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS.
[CH. V.
such land has been laid off in lots and platted, or unless the
consent of the owner has been obtained.^ And in order that
the platting of land, and laying out into town lots, may have
the effect of authorizing the city to annex such territory, it
must have been done by one having a legal title to the prop-
erty.^ In Indiana, it is also provided by statute, that contigu-
ous territory may be annexed to city limits, even without the
consent of the owners of property, and without such land hav-
ing been plotted or laid off into lots by the county commis-
sioners, upon the petition of the common council of the city,
praying for such annexation of territory.^ But in Kentucky
and Iowa, it has been held, independently of statute, that, while
the power of the corporation to extend its boundaries will not
be interfered with or limited by the fact that the rate of tax-
ation inside the city limits is greater than what prevails over
the territory which is proposed to be annexed, yet, in the ex-
ercise of such power, it is required that the city must estab-
lish a special rate of taxation for the territory so annexed, in
order to avoid any unjust increase of the burden of taxation,
disproportionate to the benefits received.* Whether the Legis-
lature has or has not substantially complied with these require-
iTilford V. Olathe, 44 Kan.. 721;
Pittsburgli V. Eiley, 42 Mo. Ap. 18;
Ewing V. State, 16 S. W. R. 872;
Vestal V. Little Kock, 15 lb. 891;
Lum V. Bowie, 18 lb. 142; Strosser
V. Foi-tAYayne, 100 Ind. 443; 8 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 636; Union Pac.
E. Co. V. Kansas City, 42 Kan. 497;
Taylei- v. Fort Wayne, 47 Ind. 274;
Peru V. Bearss, 55 Ind. 576; Town of
Cicero v. Williamson, 91 Ind. 541;
Collins V. New Albany, 59 Ind. 396;
Logansport v. La Eose, 99 Ind. 117.
2 Glover v. Terre Haute, 129 Ind.
593; 29 N. E. E. 412; Indianapolis v.
Patterson, 112 Ind. 344.
8 Strosser v. Fort Wayne, 100 Ind.
443 ; Glover v. Terre Haute, 129 Ind.
593; see Pensaoola v. Louisville,
,eto. E. Co., 21 Fla. 492; Logansport
v. La Eose, 99 111. 117.
4 Maltus v. Sbields, 2 Mete. (Ky.)
553 ; Louisville Bridge Co. v. Louis-
86
ville, 81 Ky. 189; 3 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cas. 503; Covington v. Southgate, 15
B. Mon. (Ky.) 491 ; Sharp v. Dunavan,
17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 223; Arbegust v.
Louisville, 2 Bush (Ky.) 271; Dei-
man V. Fort Madison, 30 Iowa, 542;
Lancaster v. Eush, 52 N. W. R. 837;
Davis V. Dubuque, 20 Iowa, 458;
Butler V. Muscatine, 11 Iowa, 433;
Fulton V. Davenport, 17 Iowa, 404;
Swift V. Newport, 7 Bush (Ky.) 37;
Lum V. Bowie, 18 S. W. K. 142;
Courtney v. Louisville, 12 Bush (Ky.)
419; Langworthy v. Dubuque, 13
Iowa, 86; s. c, 16 Iowa, 371; Buell
V. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282; Hurla v. Kan-
sas City, 46 Kan. 738; Durant v.
KaufEman, 34 Iowa, 194; Brooks v.
Polk Co., 52 Iowa, 460; Cheaney v.
Hooser, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 330; Winzer
V. Burlington, 68 Iowa, 279; 12 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 505.
CH. V.j
COEPOKATE BOUNDARIES.
§57
merits, is a judicial question, although the presumption is in
favor of the validity of the legislative or municipal act of an-
nexation ; ^ and in the light of this distinction, it has been held
that adjoiniug property, which is laid off in lots for town pur-
poses, is taxable lilce any other property within the municipal-
ity .^^ In some of the states the same result is now attained by
statutes providing that, when lural property is brought within
the limits of municipal corporations, a lower rate of taxation
should be imposed upon such lands.^ The power of the Legis-
lature to prescribe a different rate of taxation for city purposes,
between the property included within the old boundaries of the
city, and the rural property which becomes a part of the city
limits by subsequent enlargement of the boundaries, cannot be
successfully contested.*
§ 57. Effect of extension of city boundaries. — As long
as the identity of the corporation has not been lost or changed
by the enlargement of the boundaries of the city, and the char-
ter of the original corporation has not been surrendered or the
corporation dissolved, its claim or title to property remains un-
affected.^ On the other hand, the annexation of territory, in
consequence of the enlargement of the boundaries, will not re-
1 Sharp V. Dunavan, 17 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 223.
-Maltus V. Shields, 2 Mete. (Ky.)
553 ; Arbegust v. liouisville, 2 Bush
(Ky.) 271; Swift v. Kewport, 7 Bush
(Ky.) 37.
8 Gillette v. Hartford, 31 Conn. 351 ;
United States v. Memphis, 97 U. S.
284; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St.
353; 8 Am. Eep. 255; Seely v. Pitts-
burgh, 82 Pa. St. 360; 22 Am. Eep.
760; Kaiser v. Weise, 85 Pa. St. 366;
Craig V. Philadelphia, 89 Pa. St. 265 ;
Keith V. Philadelphia, (Pa. 1889) 27
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 93; Pitts-
burgh's Appeal, 118 Pa. St. 458.
■* United States v. Memphis, 97 U.
S. 292; Daly V. Morgan, 69 Md. 460;
23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 454; Gil-
lette V. Hartford, 31 Conn. 357; Pow-
ell V. Parkersburg, 28 W. Va. 698;
Serrill v. Philadelphia, 38 Pa. St. 355 ;
McCallie v. Mayor etc. of Chatta-
nooga, 3 Head (Tenn.) 317; Carriger
V. Morristown, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 116;
Henderson v. Lambert, 8 Bush (Ky.)
607; Benoistv. St. Louis, 19 Mo. 179.
Cf. contra, Smith v. City of Amer-
icus, 15 S. E. R. 752; 89 Ga. 810.
SHeizer v. Yohu, 37 Ind. 415;
Town of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee,
12 Wis. 93; Springwells v. Wayne Co.
Treasurer, 58 Mich. 240; Norris v.
Mayor etc. of Smithville, 1 Swan
(Tenn.) 164; Girard v. Philadelphia,
7 Wall. (U. S.) 1; Serrill v. Philadel-
phia, 38 Pa. St. 355 ; Kalbrier v. Leon-
ard, 34 Ind. 497; Barker v. State, 18
Ohio, 514; Municipality No. 3 v.
Michoud, 6 La. An. 605 ; Third Mu-
nicipality of N. O. V. Ursuline Nuns,
2 La. An. 611; Carrigan v. Morris-
town, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 116; New Or-
leans V. Michoud, 10 La. An. 763;
East St. Louis v. Rhein, 139 111. 116.
87
§ 57 MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIOKS. [CH. V.
move such territory from the judicial jurisdiction, in which it
was previously placed ; that is, the jurisdiction of State courts
is never affected by changes in the boundaries of the municipal
corporation.! With the enlargement of the corporation limits,
however, the city assumes toward the annexed territory the same
duties and liabilities, in respect to the streets laid out in such
annexed district, as are imposed upon it in respect to the streets
within the original territory.^ But if there is a turnpike road in
the annexed district, the annexation of such territory cannot
impair the private rights of the turnpike company.^ And
where the general law prohibits the opening of streets through
a cemetery, the fact, that the cemetery is brought within the
limits of the municipal corporation by the extension of its
boundaries, does not operate as a repeal of this prohibitive law,
in consequence of the grant to the corporation of a general
power to lay out streets in the teriitory thus brought within
the city limits.*
All laws or ordinances of the city applj"- to the added dis-
trict after annexation, as well as to the original territory.^ But
where two cities are consolidated, each having its own set of
ordinances, it has been held that each set of ordinances will
prevail over the territory of the old town which enacted them,
until the common council of the consolidated city takes action
for the adoption of a code of ordinances which may be applica-
ble to the entire city as consolidated.^ It has, on the other
hand, been held that, where a county seat is located within the
boundaries of a municipal corporation, the boundaries of the
county seat will not be extended with the increase of territory
of the municipal corporation, unless that fact is expressly pro-
vided for by statute.^
Where homesteads have been created in territory, outside
1 Harrison v. Hernsheim, 28 La.
An. 881.
2 Ehrgott V. Mayor etc. of New-
York, 96 N. Y. 264; 6 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. 31; 48 Am. Eep. 622.
3 Turnpike Co. v. Cincinnati, 4 Am.
L. Rec. (Ohio) 325.
46 Mo. 121; Town of Toledo v.
Edens, 59 Iowa, 352; Town of Mil-
waukee V. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93;
McCannie v. Mayor etc. of Chatta-
nooga, 3 Head (Tenn.) 317.
6 Camp V. Minneapolis, 33 Minn.
461.
* Egypt Street, 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.) , ' State v. Board etc. of Atchison
455. j Co. (Kan. 1890), 24 Pac. Eep. 87.
^ St. Louis G. L. Co. v. St. Louis, I
CH. V.J
COKPOEATE BOUNDARIES.
§58
of the city limits, under a homestead law which contains differ-
ent provisions for homestead claims against country property,
the annexation of such territory to the city limits will not have
the effect of changing the claim of homestead, or of cutting
down the amount of the land which may be claimed under the
homestead law, in order to bring this particular claim of home-
stead into conformity with the law, as a claim of homestead
over city property.^ So, likewise, any other difference of law,
in respect to the regulation or enjoyment of private rights, be-
tween city and country property, will not be permitted to af-
fect private rights, which were created in the annexed district
under the law, which applies to country property.^
§ 58. Effect of annexation of one town to another. — In
the absence of any express constitutional limitations, the legal
existence of a municipal corporation is subject to the absolute
will of the Legislature ; and such Legislature, as has already been
explained,^ may legislate such corporation out of existence, and
either annex such territory to some other corporation, or reserve
to itself the power of administering the public affairs of the dis-
solved corporation. Where the corporation has been extinguish-
ed, and the community and the territory have been annexed to
an adjoining corporation, the general rule of law is plain that,
by such annexation, the rights of property, as well as the lia-
bilities of the corporation which has thus been annexed, are
acquired by the corporation to whicli it is annexed. And the
consolidated corporation, thus formed, will enjoy the benefits
of the property of both, and at the same time assume the lia-
bilities and debts of both.* But, in such a case, the ordinances
of the two corporations will continue to operate upon the ter-
ritory, originally included within each corporation, until the
1 State V. Waxahachie, 81 Tex. 626;
Finley v. Districk, 12 Iowa, 516;
Truax v. Pool, 46 Iowa, 256.
2 Williams v. ISraslivllle, 15 S. W. E.
364; Chilton v. Brooks, 69 Md. 584.
Cf. Gottschalk v. Becker, 32 Neb.
653; 49 N. W. R. 715.
* Ante, § 11, et seq.
*Demattos v. New Whatcom
(Wash. 92), 29 Pac. R. 933; Watson v.
PamUco Co. Com'rs, 82 N. Car. 17;
Gorham v. Springfield, 21 Me. 61;
North Yarmouth v. Skillings, 45 Me.
133; 71 Am. Dec. 530; Winters v.
George, 21 Oregon, 251; Town of
Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100
U. S. 514; Neilson v. Newark, 49 N.
J. L. 246; Thompson v. Abbott, 61
Mo. 176; Smith v. Mayor etc. of
Saginaw (Mich. 1890), 45 N. W. Rep.
964; Stone V. Charlestown, 114 Mass.
214; Donsman v. Milwaukee, 1 Pinn.
(Wis.) 81 ; Harrison v. Bridgton, 16
Mass. 16.
89
§59
MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS.
[CH. V.
common council of the consolidated corporation has adopted
one code of ordinance for the government of all the territory
included within the new boundaries. ^
§ 59. Effect of division of one town into two.— Not only
does the Legislature have the power of consolidating two mu-
nicipal corporations into one, but it may likewise divide an
existing corporation, and thereby create two new corporations
out of the territory of the old, or transfer a part of the territory
of the old corporation, and annex the same to some other exist-
ing and adjoining corporation. In either case, the division of
the old corporation has a material effect upon the property
rights of the old corporation ; and the effect will vary accord-
ing to the presence or absence of express legislative regulation
of the same. In the absence of such legislative regulation, as
a general proposition, all the rights, as well as debts, of the old
corporation will remain with that part of the old territory which
letains its legal identity with the old corporation. This part
of the old town or community will be able to claim all the prop-
erty, and must answer for all the debts and liabilities, of the
old corporation.^ But it has been held that property of a coi-
1 North Springfield v. Springfield
(111. 91), 29 N. E. R. 849; Vogel v.
Little Rock, 55 Ark. 609; Camp v.
Minneapolis, 33 Minn. 461.
2 Graham v. Greenville, 67 Tex. 62;
Cooke V. Sell. District, 21 Pao. R.
496; 12 Colo. 453; Board of Educa-
tion of Barlor Dist. v. Board etc. of
Valley Dist., 30 W. Va. 424; Brewis
V. Duluth, 3 McCrary (U. S.) 219;
I'ierson v. Reynolds, 49 Mich. 224;
Mobile V. Watson, 116 U. S. 289;
Town of De Pere v. Town of Belle-
vue, 31 Wis. 120; 11 Am. Rep. 602;
Hartford Bridge Co. v. East Hart-
ford, 16 Conn. 149; affirmed, 10 How.
(U. S.) 511; Sill V. Corning, 15 N. T.
297; Mayor etc. of Baltimore v.
State, 15 Md. 376; North Hempstead
V. Hempstead, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 109;
Cobb V. Kingman, 15 Mass. 197;
Greenville v. Mason, 53 N. H. 515;
Chiokesaw Co. v, Sumner Co., 58
90
Miss. 619; West Carroll Parish v.
Gaddis, 34 La. An. 928; Laramie Co.
V. Albany Co., 92 U. S. 307; Morgan
v. Beloit, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 615; Aokley
V. Vilas, 79 Wis. 157; Knight v.
Town of Ashland, 61 Wis. 233; Town
of Le Pointe v. O'Malley, 47 Miss.
332; People v. Trustees of Schools,
86 111. 613 ; Richland Go. v. Lawrence,
12 111. 1 ; Mount Pleasant v. Beck-
with, 100 D". S. 532; Fendor v. Neosho
Falls, 22 Kan. 305; State v. Lake
City, 25 Minn. 404; Montgomery Co.
V. Menefee (Ky. 92), 18 S. W. 102;
Richards v. Daggett, 4 Mass. 539;
Goodhue v. Beloit, 21 Wis. 636; But-
ternut v. O'Malley, 50 Wis. 333; Mills
Co. v. Brown (Tex. 92), 20 S. W. 81;
10 How. (U.S.) 511, 541; Richland
Co. V. Lawrence, 12 111. 1 (1850);
74 Am. Dec. 572; Olney v. Harvey,
50 111. 453; 99 Am. Dec. 530; Blafik-
I stone V. Taft, 4 Gray, 250 (1855).
CH. V.J
CORPORATE BOUNDARIES.
§60
poreal nature, which is actually situated within the limits of
the territory, which is taken away from the old corporation, to
he formed into a new corporation or annexed to some adjoining
corporation, will become the property of the new corporation or
the corporation to which such territory is annexed ; and the cor-
poration, which previously included this territory within its
limits, can make no claim to such public property .^ But the
contrary proposition has been maintained, that the old corpora-
tion, upon separation of a part of its territory, retains its con-
trol over all its public property, including that which is found
within the limits of the other corporation, which is created out
of the detached territory, or to which such territory has been
annexed.^
§ 60. legislative power to apportion property and debts
in cases of annexation and division. — But the power of the
Legislature, in dividing towns or annexing other territory to
the boundaries of such towns, and thereby diminishing or in-
creasing the same, has invariably been held to include the power
to apportion the common property and tlie common burdens of
the old municipalit}', so as to make an equitable division of the
same between the corporation which has been benefited by the
change in the boundaries of such a corporation and the corpora-
1 North Hempstead v. Hempstead,
2 Wend. 109. C. J. Savage said:
"The State to be divided iDto two
States: without some special agree-
ment, each would own tlie public
property within its limits. So of
counties: the public buildings are
as much public property as public
lands. So as to the plains, meadows,
and marshes which are the subject
of this suit. A bill filed by a new
county for the partition of the gaol
and courthouse, which had been
common property, would be the
same in principle as the bill in this
suit. Would not such a suit be
considered preposterous ? Suppose
a religious corporation possessed
of a church and parsonage; it be-
comes expedient to erect part into a
new corporation: would not the old
corporation retain the property, un-
less an agreement was made as to
the partition of it?" See, to the
same general effect, Laramie Co. v.
Albany, 92 U. S. 307; West Carroll
V. G-addis, 34 La. An. 928 ; Milwaukee
V. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93; Burgess
V. Darby, 21 Atl. R. 394; 140 Pa. St.
250; Land etc. Co. v. Oneida Co., 53
jS". W. R. 491; 83 Wis. 649; Demattos
V. City of New Whatcom, 4 Wash.
St. 127.
2 School Dist. V. Richardson, 25
Pick. (Mass.) 62; Winona v. School
Dist. No. 82, 40 Minn. 13; 24 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 121; Union Baptist
Society v. Town of Candia, 2 N. H.
20; Town of Milwaukee v. Milwau-
kee, 12 Wis. 93; North Yarmouth v.
Skillings, 45 Me. 133; 81 Am. Dec.
530; Board of Health of Buena Vista
V. East Saginaw, 4a Mich. 257.
91
§60
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. V.
tion whose territoiy has been cut down. And it is a very com-
mon practice for the Legislature to make such an apportionment
of the property and debts, whenever territory is taken from
one corporation and added to another, or established as a new
corporation.^ It has, however, been held in Maine, that, upon
the division of a town into two corporations, and the apportion-
ment of its debts, the old town is the agent of the new town in
defraying such debts ; and where the old town acts in good faith
and pays such debts, the new town is liable on a claim of con-
1 Burgess v. Darby, 21 Atl. R. 394;
140 Pa. St. 250; In re House Bill, 9
Colo. 624, 639; Dunsraore's Appeal,
52 Pa. St. 374; Barkley v. Levee
Comm'rs, 93 U. S. 258; Lakin v.
Ames, 10 Cusb. 198; Gorliam v.
Springfield, 21 Me. 61; North Yar-
mouth V. Skillings, 45 Me. 133; Har-
rison V. Bridgton, 16 Mass. 16; lb.
76; Hempstead v. Howard, 51 Ark.
344; State v. Harshaw, 73 Wis. 211;
40 N. W. R. 641 ; Broughton v. Pen-
sacola, 93 U. S. 266; County Court v.
County Couit, 2 Bush (Ky.) 93;
Granby v. Thurston, 23 Conn. 416,
419; Willimantic Society v. School
Society, 14 Conn. 457; State v. Hor-
dey, 41 Kan. 630; Sierra v. Dona
Ana (N. M. 88), 21 Pac. R. 83; Ter-
ritory V. Com'rs, 8 Mont. 396; De-
mattos V. New Whatcom, 29 Pae. R.
933; Pelican v. Rock Falls (Wis. 92),
51 N. W. R. 871; Olney v. Harvey,
50 111. 453 ; Sedgwick Co. v. Bailey,
11 Kan. 631 ; Laramie County v. Al-
bany County, 92 U. S. 307 ; London-
derry V. Derry, 8 N. H. 320; Waring
V. Mobile, 24 Ala. 701; Mayor v.
State, 15 Md. 376; Sill v. Corning, 15
N. Y. 297; People v. Draper, 15 N.
Y. 532; Schriber V. Langdale, 66 Wis.
616; Knight v. Town of Ashland, 61
Wis. 233; Waldron v. Lee, 5 Pick.
323; New London v. Montville, 1
Root (Conn.) 184; Hughes v. School
District, 72 Mo. 643; Board etc. v.
Board etc., 30 W. Va. 424; Tileson
92
V. Newman, 23 Vt. 421; Richards v.
Daggett, 4 Mass. 534; Love v.
Schenck, 12 Ired. Law, 304; Sangar
mon County v. Springfield, 63 111.
66; School Dist. v. Richardson, 23
Pick. (Mass.) 62; North Hempstead
V. Hempstead, 2 Wend. (N. T.) 100;
People V. Town of Gran, 121 111. 650;
Sanbornton v. Til ton, 55 N. H. 603;
Canovo v. State, 18 Pla. 512; State
V. Lake City, 25 Minn. 405; Neilson
V. Newark, 49 N. J. L. 426; Town of
Milwaukee v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93;
Tileson v. Newman, 23 Vt. 421;
Waldron v. Lee, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 323;
Comm'rs of Ottawa v. Nelson, 19
Kan. 234; Eagle v. Beard, 33 Ark.
497; Perry Co. v. Conway Co. (Ark.
1890), 12 S. W. Rep. 877; Craft v. Lo-
finck, 34 Kan. 365; Hunt v. Hamil-
ton, 25 Kan. 82; Com'rs of Marion
Co. V. Harvey Co., 26 Kan. 181; Eicli-
land Co. v. Lawrence Co., 12 111. 1;
Morrow Co. v. Hendryx, 14 Greg.
397; Chickasaw Co. v. Clay Co., 62
Miss. 325 ; Mills v. Brown, 20 S. W. E.
81. In Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N.
H. 524, Richardson, C. J., said: "The
power to divide towns is strictly
legislative, and the power to pre-
scribe the rule, by which a division
of the property of the old town shall
be made, is incident to the power
to divide the territory, and in its
nature purely legislative. No gen-
eral rule can be prescribed by which
an equal and just division in such
CH. V.J
CORPORATE BOUNDARIES.
60
tribution to the old town for its proportionate share of such
debts, which has been apportioned to it by the Legislature.^
A legislative discretion, in determining the rule of apportion-
ment, is in no wise subject to the supervisory control of the
courts ; the judgment of the Legislature is final, and cannot be
reviewed in any judicial proceeding.^
It has been held that, in order that this apportionment may
be made, it should be contemporaneous with the partition of
the territory of the old corporation, and a subsequent act of the
Legislature is an unconstitutional exercise of power.^ But this
proposition is not generally recognized ; and the better rule,
perhaps, is that, in the absence of constitutional limitations,
specially restricting the power of the Legislature, the Legislature
is able after, as well as contemporaneously with, the division of
the town, to provide by legislation for apportionment, between
the two new towns, of the property and debts of the old town.*
It has also been held in Kansas, that, in the apportionment of
the debts of an old town between the two towns, which obtain a
part of the territory of the old town, bonds cannot be included
which have been declared void before the separation, where the
improvements, on which the bonds were founded, were not be-
gun until after the separation, and the benefit of it accrued
solely to the territory retained by the old corporation.^
cases can be made. Such a division
must be founded upon the circum-
stances of each particular case."
' Mt. Desert v. Monmouth, 72 Me.
348.
2 Bristol V. New Chester, 3 X. H.
524; St. Louis v. Kussell, 9 Mo. 507;
Sedgwick Co. v. Bunker, 16 Kan. 498;
Board of Education of Barker Pis-
trict V. Board of Education of Valley
Dist., 30 W. Va. 424; Overseers of
Norwich v. Overseers of New Berlin,
18 Johns. (N. Y.) 382; "Walters v.
Richardson (Ky. 93), 20 S. W. R. 279;
Land, Log & Lumber Co. v. Oneida
Co., 53 N. W. E. 491; 83 Wis. 649;
Nez Perces County v. Latah Co., 31
Pac. R. 300; 2 Idaho, 1131; Los An-
geles Co. V. Orange Co., 32 Pac. R.
316.
" Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6
Greenl. (Me.) 112 ; Windham v. Port-
land, 4 Mass. 390; Hampshire v.
Franklin^ 16 Mass. 76.
* Montgomery Co. v. Menifee (Ky.
92), 18 S. W. R. 1021; Mills Co. v.
Brown Co. (Tex. 92), 20 S. W. R. 81;
Sedgwick Co. v. Bunker, 16 Kan.
498; Greighton v. San Francisco, 42
Cal. 446; Laramie County v. Albany
County, 92 U. S. 307; Town of Guil-
ford V. Supervisorsof Chenango Co.,
13 N. Y. 143; New Orleans v. Clark,
95 U. S. 654; Lay ton v. New Orleans,
12 La. An. 515; Lycoming v. Union,
15 Pa. St. 166; 53 Am. Dec. 575; Perry
Co. V. Conway Co. (Ark. 1890), 12
S. W. Rep. 877; Dunmore's Appeal,
52 Pa. St. 374.
5 Craft V. Lofinck, 34 Kan. 365.
93
§ 61 MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS. [CH. V.
§ 61. Procedure in case of annexation — When annexa-
tion legal. — ^The proceedings for the annexation of contiguous
territory to the limits of a municipal corporation, rest altogether
upon statute ; and in order that such annexation may be valid,
all the requirements of the statute, as to the method of proced-
ure and the method of exercise of the power, must be complied
with. Any material deviation from these requirements will
have the effect of invalidating the annexation. ^ It is, however,
presumed in every case that the annexation has been in compli-
ance with the statutory requirements, and hence legal.^
The statute usually provides that notice of the intended an-
nexation shall be giveh.^ But this requirement of notice is
complied with, if there is a publication of such intention, and
accompanying such publication an accurate description is given
of the land, which is to be included within the addition to tlie
town. It is not necessarj' that the notice should contain the
names of all the persons whose property is to be brought by such
annexation within the city limits.*
In Tennessee, it has been held that the application for an-
nexation cannot be made in court, where the court has the au-
thority to grant such annexation, by private citizens, but must
be made by the authorities of the town.^ In Pennsylvania, on
the other hand, it is required that, before a town council may
annex adjoining territory to the city limits, a petition therefor
must be signed by twenty freeholders of lands, located in the
territory which is proposed to be annexed ; and such freeholders
must be residents of the territory .^ In Texas and Iowa the
consent of a majority of the inhabitants of the annexed district
seems to be required ; ^ and the wish of the majority may be
manifested by signing the petition, instead of by a formal elec-
1 Seward v. Cowroy, 50 IST. W. R.
329; Woodrufe v. Eureka, 19 S. W.
R. 15; 55 Ark. 618; Windman v.
Vinoennes, 58 Ind. 180; Smitli v.
Sherry, 54 Wis. 114.
2 State v. Waxahaohie, 81 Tex. 626;
Huff V. Lafayette, 108 Ind. 14; Muli-
kin V. Bloomington, 72 Ind. 161 ; State
V. Westport, (Mo. 93) 22 S. W. E.
888.
3 Gunter v. Payetteville, 19 S. W.
R. 577; Stilz v. Indianapolis, 55 Ind.
94
515; Village of Franklin v. Oroll, 31
Oliio St. 647.
* Woodfil V. Town of Greensburg,
18 lad. 203; 45 N. W. R. 1031; Elsten
V. Crawfordsville, 18 Ind. 203.
^ Mason v. London, 3 Baxt. (Tenn.)
94; Stilz V. Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515;
Huff V. Lafayette, 108 lb. 14.
6 Devore's App., 56 Pa. St. 163.
' Ford V. No. Des Moines, 80 Iowa,
626; Graham v. Greenville, 67 Tex,
62.
CH. v.] CORPORATE BOUNDARIES. § 61
tion. In Indiana, where the count}' commissioners have the
power of authorizing the annexation of adjoining territory of a
municipal corporation, th§ proceedings are instituted by a peti-
tion from the city council ; and two thirds of the members of
the council are required to sign such petition.^ Where the
county commissioners or coiinty court are authorized to make
the annexation, while a judicial inquiry can be made into the
legality of the proceedings, and the jurisdiction of the court or
county commissioners or city council, yet tlie merits of the case
cannot be again inquired into. The interference of a court can
ouly be permitted for the purpose of correcting errors or irregu-
larity in the proceedings, or inaccuracy in the description of
the territory to be annexed.^
Where there has been an illegal annexation, it is held that tax-
payers of the territory, which is sought to be annexed, may or-
dinarily maintain suits for the purpose of avoiding such illegal
annexation in their own behalf, and in behalf of the other citi-
zens or residents of the territory.^ It has, however, been held
that a private citizen who has no other interest but that of a
resident and a taxpayer of the proposed addition to the town,
cannot maintain a petition for mandamus, for the purpose of
determining the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature
providing for the consolidation of two cities.*
The long continued acquiescence in an illegal annexation will
very often preclude a subsequent avoidance of such annexation ;
inexcusable delay, in resorting to the courts for relief, will
operate as an estoppel against such parties, whenever the public
interests require the application of the doctrine of estoppel.^
But the individual property owner is not estopped from insti-
tuting an action for determining the validity of the annexation,
1 Stilz V. Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515;
Hufe V. Lafayette, 108 Ind. 14; Mason
V. London, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 94.
2 Peru V. Bearss, 55 Ind. 576; In-
dianapolis V. Sturm, .39 Ind. 159;
Hulbert V. Mason, 29 Ohio St. 562;
Windman v. Vincennes, 58 Ind. 480;
Trustees, etc. of Princeton v. Manck,
35 Ind. 51; Church v. Town of
Knightstown, 35 Ind. 177; contra,
Vestal V. Little Rock, (Ark. 90) 15
S. W. R. 891.
•I Delphi V. Stratzman, 104 Ind. 343;
11 Am. & Bng. Corp. Cas. 37; Tope-
ka V. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431 ; 5 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cas. 290; Morris v. Nash-
ville, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 337.
■1 Smith V. Saginaw, 45 N. W. R.
964; 81 Mich. 123.
6 Black V. Brinkley, (Ark. 90) "15
S. W. R. 1030; Sherry v. Gilmore, 58
Wis. 324; Logansport v. La Rosa, 99
Ind. 117.
95
§62
MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS.
[CH. V.
by his participation in the rights and duties of a citizen of the
territory, to which the property has been illegally annexed.^
On the other hand, when a municipality unlawfully attempts
to annex territory to its limits, when it has no power to do so,
the unlawful annexation cannot be validated by a subsequent
statute, ratifying the unlawful annexation.^
§ 62. Exercise of power beyond city limits — Only one
corporation over same area. — While, ordinarily, a municipal
corporation cannot exercise any governmental powers beyond
the city limits, in the absence of an express authority to do so,
there can be no claim whatever to such an authority ; and such
authority, if it existed at all, must rest upon the express pro-
vision of a statute.^ Yet it is not so very uncommon a thing
for a municipal corporation to be given such a power. In a
subsequent section, reference is made to the power to purchase
property beyond corporate limits.* And, in the exercise of this
power, it is held to be valid for the municipal corporation to be
authorized to acquire lands, and confiscate them for the pur-
pose of establishing a system of sewerage,^ or for the establish-
ment of hospitals, or water works.^ So, also, has it been held
to be valid for a municipal corporation to be authorized to re-
quire a license for the sale of goods beyond city limits, in order
that the legitimate trade of the corporation within its limits
may be protected against the unlicensed business outside.'^ And
1 Strosser v. Fort Wayne, 100 Ind.
443; 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Gas. 636;
Buell V. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282; Lang-
worthy V. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 86;
Greenoastle Township v. Black, 3
Ind. 587.
- Comra'rs of Shawnee Co. v. Car-
ter, 2 Kan. 115; Atchison, etc., N.
Co. V. Naquilkin, 12 Kan. 301. In
the case last cited, the court said:
" Both the annexation of said prop-
erty and the taxing of it were void
for the want of jurisdiction over
the subject-matter thereof. Retro-
spfective statutes of a remedial na-
ture, curing the defective execution
of some power really possessed by
the person, tribunal, or officer at-
tempting to exercise it, have often
96
been held valid. But a retrospec-
tive statute attempting to create a
power, or to cure a defect of juris-
diction, we believe, has never been
held valid."
^Begein v. Anderson, 28 Ind. 79;
Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 111, 301 ; State
V. Franklin, 40 Kan. 410; Cold water
V. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474; 24 Am. Eep.
601.
" See post, § 201.
^ Neal V. Commonwealth, 17 Serg.
& R. (Pa.) 67; Coldwater v. Tucker,
36 Mich. 474; 24 Am. Rep. 601; Gould
V. Rochester, 103 iST. Y. 46.
« State V. Franklin, 40 Kan. 410.
' Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala. 361;
45 Am. Rep. 83.
CH. v.]
CORPORATE BOUNDARIES.
§62
this rule has been particularly applied to the case of the sale of
intoxicating liquors.^ So, also, has it been held possible for the
Legislature to authorize a city to expend money in the improve-
ment of roads outside of the city limits, and to levy a tax there-
for.^ But the general rule is, that there cannot be two municipal
corporations, for the same purpose and with equal powers in-
cluding the same territory ; the existence of one would neces-
sarily preclude the possible legal existence of the other.* But
where there is only one legal corporation, and the other, which
actuall}'^ has control of the affairs of the territory, is not legal,
simply a de facto corporation ; upon the suppression of the de
facto corporation, the only legal corporation will at once assume
control, the functions of the legal corporation being only tem-
porarily suspended.*
But while this legal axiom, that two municipal corporations
cannot include the same territory, as a general rule, is subject
to no serious exception ; yet it has in a comparatively late case
been held, that two corporations may at the same time exercise
a limited governmental control over the same territory. In
order that the city of Chicago may successfully regulate the
management and construction of packing houses, it was given
the power to exercise its regulation over packing hosues located
beyond its limits within a distance of one mile ; and the fact,
that within this distance of one mile a different and indepen-
dent municipal corporation, viz., the town of Lake, was located,
did not interfere with the power of the city of Chicago to re-
quire of the packing houses, located within this town, a license
similar to what it was generally authorized to require of pack-
ing houses, which were located within the distance of one mile
from the city limits. The person, or the corporation, carrying
iKaufle V. Delaney, 25 W. Va.
410; Flack v. Fry, 32 lb. 364; Em-
erich v. Indianapolis, 118 Ind. 279.
2 Skinner v. Hutton, 33 Mo. 347.
3 Enterprise v. State (Fla. 91), 10
So. R. 740; Rex v. Passmore, 3 Term
R. 243; Rex v. Amery, 2 Bro. P. C.
336; Ashley v. Calliope, 71 Iowa,
466; Paterson V. Society etc., 24 N.
J. L. 385; Martin v. Aston, 60 Cal.
65 ; Strosser v. Fort Wayne, 100 Ind.
443; 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 636;
7
state V. Town of Winter Park, 25
Fla. 371; Drain Commissioners v.
Baxter, 57 Mich. 127. " The propo-
sition that two independent govern-
ments cannot exercise the same pow-
er, within the same district, at the
same time, is a self-evident one."
Cf. Peoria & A. P. U. Ry. Co. v.
People (111. 93), 33 N. E. R. 873.
* Taylor v. Fort Wayne, 47 Ind.
274, 281.
97
§ 63 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [OH. V.
on the business of packing meats, would be subject to the h-
cense charged by both the city of Chicago and the town of
Lake.^
§ 63. Division of municipal territory into wards. — For
the purpose of convenience, in arranging for the local govern-
ment of a city, it is customary for the territory of a municipal
corporation to be divided into wa];ds, and to provide for a rep-
resentatioji of each ward in the city council. In providing for
this division of the city into wards, the Legislature is required
to observe the constitutional limitation of the equality of rep-
resentation, and to make the wards as nearly as possible equal,
either in size or in population, and apportion to each ward the
number of representatives, according to the population of each
ward. Any violation of these principles would make the ap-
portionment void under the constitutional provision referred
to.^ The procedure, whereby a city may be divided into wards,
is, of course, purely statutory, and the provisions of the statute
must be complied with.^ It has been held, that where the au-
thority is given by the Legislature to the city council to effect
a division of the city into a given number of wards, it is not
permitted of the Legislature in the exercise of its delegated
power, to increase or diminish the number of such wards.*
1 Cliioago Pack'g Co. v. Chicago,
88 111. 221 ; see State v. Franklin, 40
Kan. 410.
•■! People V. Canoday, 73 N. C. 193;
State V. Bayonne, 22 Atl. R. 1006.
8 In re Gettysburg, 90 Pa. St. 355;
98
In re Fifteenth Ward, 11 Phila. (Pa.)
466; see cases on alteration of wards,
33 Amer. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 661.
* Schroeder y. City Council of
Charleston, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 533; Peo-
ple V. Young, 38 111. 490.
CHAPTER VI.
MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFPIOEES.
Section.
65 — Time and place of holding
elections.
66 — Qualifications of voters — Eesi-
dence.
67 — Who are municipal officers ?
68 — Legislative control over offi-
cers.
69 — Qualification for municipal
office — Women when eligi-
ble.
70 — Civil service examinations.
71 — ^Preference for veterans.
72— Official bonds.
73 — Official oaths.
74 — Disqualifications on account
of prior official position.
75 — Appointments to office.
76 — Exercise of the appointing
power.
77 — Legality of appointment pre-
sumed.
78 — Acceptance of office. '
79 — Compensation.
80 — Assignment of salary.
Section.
81 — Holding over after expiration
of term of office.
82 — Vacancies.
83 — Removals vrhen for cause.
84 — Proceedings to remove for
cause.
85 — Illegal removals — Eight to sal-
ary.
86 — Resignations — Incompatible
offices — Change of residence.
87 — General powers and duties of
officers.
88 — De facto officers.
89 — Police officials — Power to ar-
rest.
90 — The mayor — Nature of his du-
ties and powers.
91 — Liability of the officer to the
corporation.
92 — Municipal liability for official
acts.
93 — Jurisdiction of courts over
elections.
§65.
Time and place of holding elections — The time and
place of holding elections in municipalities are sometimes regu-
lated by the general statutes of the state ; but in the absence
of any general election law, applicable to the whole state, mu-
nicipal elections are held at such times and places, as ma}- be
designated in the charter or in some special act passed for the
purpose. When the law requires tlie time and place of holding
such elections to be determined by some officer or select board,
it is essential to the validitjr of such election that the delibera-
tion be participated in by all those, who are empowered or di-
I'ected to do so.^ Any determination of the time and place of
Stephens v. Peo., 89 111. 337; Glencoe
V. Peo., 78 lb. 382; Dickey v. Hurlbut,
5 Cal. 343 ; Peo. v. Murray, 15 lb. 221 ;
99
1 Peo. V. Harvey, 58 Cal. 337; Juicer
v. Commonwealth, 20 Pa. St. 484;
Chadwiclc v. Kelvin, 68 Pa. St. 333;
§65
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. VI.
election by a meeting, composed of only a part of those who
were required by law to participate, — certainly, where only a
part of tliem were duly summoned — would invalidate the en-
suing election. So, also, if it be within the discretion of mu-
nicipal officials whether an election shall be held or not, and they
neglect to fix the time and place ; any election, which might be
held under such circumstances, would necessarily be void.^
But where the time and place of the election is definitely fixed
by law, any failure of the municipal officers to give the proper
notice of the time and place of such election will not invalidate
the election, which is actually held by the qualified voters of
the city, unless the statute makes the notice a necessary condi-
tion precedent, when it cannot be dispensed with.^ And in
that case, mandamus will lie to compel a compliance with the
statutory requirements on the part of the officers, whose duty
it is to issue the notices.^
But elections are not to be declared invalid, because of slight
irregularities which do not affect the result of such election.*
The courts are disposed to sustain the will of the people as
evinced at an election, if it is possible ; ^ and a municipal elec-
tion will not be vitiated, because of a verbal inaccuracy in the
ballots, whether it be a misnomer of the office or of the candi-
State V. Carroll (11. I. 91), 24 Atl. R.
106; Miller v. English, 21 K. J. L. 317;
Marshall v. Cook, 38 111. 44; Force v.
Batavia, 61 111. 99; Foster v. Scarf,
15 Ohio St. 5.35; Clarke v. Board, 27
111. 310; Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan.
(Tenn.) 68.
1 Opinions of Judges, 7 Mass. 525 ;
15 lb. 537; Cook v. Mock, 40 Kan.
472; People v. Santa Anna, 67 111. 57;
George v. Oxford, 16 Kan. 72, 80;
People V. Mathewson, 47 Cal. 442.
^ State V. Carroll, supra; People v.
Cressey, 91 N. Y. 61U; In re Narra-
ganset (R. 1. 88), 16 Atl. R. 907 ; Queen
V. Justices, 8 Ad. & El. 173; People
V. Korth, 72 N. Y. 124; "Wars on v.
Hastings, 22 Minn. 437; People v.
Fairburg, 51 111. 149.
3 See post, § 371.
* Howard v. Shields, 16 Ohio St.
184; Peo. v. Shaw, 19 N. Y. S. 302;
100
Kinney v. O' Conner, 26 Tex. 5; Peo.
V. Cook, 14 Barb. 259; Com. v. Smith,
132 Mass. 289 ; "Walker v. "W. Boylston,
128 lb. 550; State v. Russell (Neb. 92),
5 N. "W. R. 465; Peo. v. Higgins, 3
Mich. 233; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa,
212; Truehcart v. Addicks, 2 Tex.
217; Ewing v. Filley, 43 Pa. St. 384;
Shields V. Jacobs, 88 Mich. 164;
Sprague v. Norway, 31 Cal. 173;
Bomiand v. Hildreth, 26 lb. 161 ; Day
V. Kent, 1 Oreg. 123; Taylor v. Tay-
lor, 10 Minn. 112; State v. Jones, 19
lud. 356; Rutledge v. Crawford, 91
Cal. 526.
5 Rogers v. Jacobs (Ky. 88), 11 S.
"W. R. 513; Brown v. McCollum, 70
Iowa, 479; Fentou v. Scott, 17 Ore.
189; Gun v. Hubbard, 97 Mo. 311;
Russell V. Wellington (Mass.91), 31 N.
E. R. 630; State v. Barbour, 53 Conn.
76; State v. Quinly, 17 Atl. E. 952.
CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS.
§66
date ; ^ or because of illegal voting, provided the illegal act or
iiTegularity does not change the result.^ A ballot will, how-
ever, be rejected which contains the names of more officers
than there are offices to be filled ; as, for example, where two
offices of the same kind are to be filled, a vote for three or more
persons for these offices would be void, and would not be count-
ed at all, in the absence of statutory regulation to the contrary.^
So, also, any departure from the requirements of the election
law, which tends in any material way to affect the result of the
election, will invalidate the election. Thus, an election will be
invalidated by the closing of the polls at an earlier hour than
what was provided by the law,* or by an adjournment of the
election to some other time or place than what was designated
in the notice, or what was provided for by law.^ An election
will also be invalid at common law, where " rioting takes place
(i. e., at or near the polls,) to such an extent that ordinary men,
having the ordinary nerve and courage of men, are thereby pre-
vented from recording their votes." ^
§ 66. Qualification of voters — Residence. — The qualifica-
tions of voters are regulated by the state constitutions, and by
the general election laws of the several states ; and these quali-
fications cannot be limited or enlarged by municipal ordinances.^
And where the constitution of the state sets forth the qualifi-
cations of voters in all elections within the state, without any
restrictive clause in favor of electors of a municipality, or ex-
press grant of power to the Legislature to establish substitu-
tionary regulations, it is beyond the power of the Legislature
or municipal council to require additional or different qualifl-
1 People V. Loomis, 8 Wend. 396;
People V. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409; State
V. Griffey, 5 Neb. 161 ; People v. Mat-
terson, 17 111. 167.
"Judklns V. Hill, 50 N. H. 140;
First Par. v. Stearns, 21 Pick. 148;
People V. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283; In re
Murphy, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 153; John-
ston v. Charleston, 1 Bay (S. C.) 441.
8 People V. Loomis, 8 Wend. 396;
State V. Griffey, 5 Neb. 161; Kex v.
Mayor of Leeds, 7 Ad. E. 963; Peo-
ple V. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409.
< Pennsylvania Dist. Election, 2
Par. (Pa.) 526; Clark's Case, 2 Par.
(Pa.) 521.
5 Commonwealth v. Commission-
ers, 5 Rawle, 75 ; Coles Co. v. Allison,
23 111. 437; People v. Keeling, 4 Col.
129.
6 Nottingham, In re, 1 O'M. & H.
245; Drogheda, In re, 1 O'M & H.
252.
' Petty V. Tooker, 21 N. Y. 267;
People V. Phillips, 1 Denio (N. Y.)
388; Rex v. Bumstead, 2 B. & Ad.
699.
101
66
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. Vli^
cations, than those which are set forth in the constitution.
Thus, a legislative act or charter, which requires a special
qualification as to length of residence in the case of voters in
a municipality, was held unconstitutional, where by the consti-
tution another period was fixed upon by implication.^ So, also,
when, as is now the rule in most if not all the states, laws have
been passed the object of which is to guarantee an absolutely
secret ballot, no law or ordinance can be of any force which
will in tlie slightest degree impair or violate this secrecy.^
But where the state constitution is silent as to qualifications
of voters, and the regulation of the matter of elections, both
state and municipal, is left to the control and discretion of the
Legislature, the Legislature may prescribe for municipal electors
different qualifications from those which are required of voters
in general state elections. And this discrimination is not un-
common, particularly in requiring the voters in a city or town
to be registered before they are entitled to vote. The consti-
tutionality of such a local regulation cannot be successfully
contested.^ But in the absence of special regulations, munici-
pal elections are governed by the general election laws of the
state, both as to the manner in which they should be conduct-
ed, and as to the rules by which the results are ascertained and
announced.*
Residence in the municipality is almost invariably stated in
express terms to be a necessary qualification for the voter ; but
what will constitute a residence is a much controverted ques-
tion.^ In ases arising out of the exercise of the elective fran-
chise, it is safe to say that a man's residence is where his home or
familj"- is located.^ And this general rule is a reliable guide in
determining the location of one's domicile and place of voting,
where one has but one residence, and actually has one perma-
1 People V. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198.
3 Williams v. Stern, 38 lud. 89.
5 McMahau V. Savannah, 66 Ga. 217.
* See C o o 1 e y Cons. Limitations,
p. 598.
5 Story Conf. of Laws, sec. 53,
et seq.
6 Topsham v. Lewiston, 74 Me. 236;
Grant v. Dalliber, 11 Conn. 234; Nu-
gent V. Bates, 51 Iowa, 77; Keough v.
102
Holyoke, (Mass. 91) 31 N. E. R. 387;
Colburn v. Holland, 14 Rich. Eq. 176;
Yonkey V. State, 27 Ind. 236; Gilmer
V. Gilmer, 32 Ga. 685; Rumney v.
Caraptown, 10 N. H. 567; Keith v.
Letter, 25 Kans. 100; Sherwood v.
Judd, 3 Bradf. 167; Blucher v. Mil-
sted, 31 Tex. 621; Ames v. Dury.ea, 6
Lans. 155; Kellogg v. Hickman, 12
Colo. 256.
CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS.
§66
nent residence. But where one has more than one residence,
or has no permanent residence at all, other tests must be re-
sorted to for the purpose of determining where one's domicile
is.^ And it is a question of fact, on the evidence of each case,
where one's domicile is. Where the party in question has ex-
ercised the right of suffrage in prior elections, the place where
he voted is presumptively his domicile, and such evidence is or-
dinarily controlling in the determination of one's present domi-
cile, where there has been no abandonment of the residence at
that place.'^ And so, likewise, is the question of domicile very
strongly controlled by the negative evidence, that one's vote had
been offered, but refused, at a prior election, on the ground of
want of residence.^ Among other facts, which may be proven
for the purpose of locating one's domicile, is the place of naturali-
zation,* payment of taxes on personal property,^ jury service,*"
' Thorndike v. Boston, 1 Met.
(Mass.) 245; Atty. General v. Par-
ker, 3 Atk. 576; Cohen v. "Wigfall, 8
Eich. Law, 237; 2 lb. 489; People v.
Barker, 63 Hun, 630; Fry's Election,
71 Pa. St. 302; Gildersleeve v. Alex-
ander, 2 Speer (S. C.) 298; Mobile
etc. Co. V. Barnhill, 19 S. "W. K. 21;
Seay v. Hunt, 55 Tex. 545; Hinds v.
Hinds, 1 Iowa, 36: Etberingtou v.
AVilson, L. K. 1 Ch. Div. 160; Taylor
V. Caesar, 11 ITpp. Can. Q. B. 461;
Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488.
2 United States v. Thorpe, 2 Bond
U. S. 340; Smith v. Groom, 7 Fla. 81;
Woodworth v. St. Paul etc. E. E., 18
Fed. Eep. 282; Kellogg v. Oshkosh,
14 AVis. 678 ; Sanderson v. Ealston,
21 La. An. 312; Shelton v. Tiffin, 6
How. 185; Fiske v. Chicago etc. Co.,
13 Barb. 472; East Li verpool v. Farm-
ington, 74 Me. 154; Hairsten v. Hair-
sten, 27 Miss. 704; Brunei v. Brunei,
L. E. 12 Eq. 298; Carey's App., 75
Pa. St. 201; Easterly v. Goodwin, 35
Conn. 279; FoUweiler v. Lutz, 112
Pa. St. 107; Weld v. Boston, 126
Mass. 166.
8 Ilindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. St.
466; Guier y. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. (Pa.)
349 ; New Orleans v. Shepherd, 10 La.
Ann. 268; Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How.
163; Heirs of HoUiman v. Peebles,
1 Tex. 673.
* Drevon v. Drevon, 34 L. J. Ch.
129; Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. St. 106;
Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400.
^Hulett V. Hulett, 37 Vt 518;
Weld V. Boston, 126 Mass. 166; Ton-
key V. State, 27 Ind. 236; Harvard
College V. Gore, 5 Pick. 370; State
V. Steele, 33 La. Ann. 910; Carey's
Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 201; Mitchell v.
United States, 21 Wall. 350. The
omission or refusal to pay taxes, is
not a very important circumstance
in the determination of the domi-
cile, unless the refusal was caused
by a denial of a domicile in the
place where taxes were demanded.
Hallett V. Bassett, 100 Mass. 167;
Moar V. Harvey, 128 Mass. 219; Hind-
man's Appeal, 85 Pa. St. 396; Guier
V. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 349.
8 Sanderson v. Ealston, 20 La.
Ann. 312; Villere v. Butman, 23 La.
Ann. 515.
103
§67
MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS.
[CH. VI.
t'le holding of office,^ and any other official act, which recog-
nizes one as an inhabitant of a particular place.^ So, also, in
the absence of positive proof of a permanent residence, evi-
dence is admissible, as tending to prove the location of one's
domicile, of one's presence in a place,^ the hiring of lodgings,*
the purchase of a burying-ground,* the deposit of valuables,®
and the absence of proof that a domicile once acquired has
been changed^ ^
§ 67. Who are municipal officers ? — It sometimes becomes
both necessary and important to ascertain what elements are
essential to constitute a public officer, and to distinguish offi-
cial status from that of an agent, employee or contractor.^ The
word office implies a more or less permanent delegation of a
portion of governmental power,^ coupled witli legally defined
duties^" and privileges,^^ continuous in their nature ; ^^ and which
upon the death, resignation or removal of the incumbent, de-
volves upon his successor.^^ A person who occupies a position
5 Miller v. Sacramento, 25 Cal. 98;
Peo. V. Middleton, 28 lb. 603 ; Bunn v.
Peo., 45 111. 397 ; State v. Kirk, 44 Ind.
401 ; Olrastead v. Mayor, supra; Doyle
V. Raleigh, 89 N". C. 133; Sheboygan
V. Parker, 3 Wall. 93; Atty. Gen. v.
Barstow, 4 Wis. 567.
w Where there are no duties, there
is no office. Com. v. Gamble, 62 Pa.
St. 343.
"State V. Valle, 41 Mo. 29; State v.
Anderson, 45 Ohio St. 196; Hill v.
Boylan, 40 Miss. 618; Peo. v. Comptr.,
20 Wend. 595 ; Moser v. Mayor, 21
Hun, 163; Prather v. Lexington, 13
B. Mon. 539; Ellis v. State, 4 Ind. 1;
Bunn V. Peo., 45 111. 397; Bradf. v.
Just, 33 Ga. 332 ; Ogdeu v. Raymond,
22 Conn. 379.
Instate V. Board, etc., 51 X J. L.
240; Shelby V. Alcorn, 38 Miss. 273;
State V. Wilson, 29 Ohio, 347.
" Bunn V. Peo., 45 HI. 897; State v.
Wilson, 29 Ohio, 347; U. S. v. Mau-
rice, 2 Brook. (U. S.) 103; Peo. v.
Jobs, 7 Colo. 589;
1 Drevon v. Drevon, 34 L. J. Ch.
198; Butler v. Hopper, 1 Wash. C.
C. 449; Cole v. Cheshire, 1 Gray,
441; Harvard College v. Gore, 5
Pick. 370.
2 West Boylston v. Sterling, 17
Pick. 126. See, also, Mead v. Box-
borough, 11 Gush. 362; Fisk v. Ches-
ter, 9 Gray, 506; Sewall v. Sewall,
122 Mass. 156.
8 Bruce v. Bruce, 2 B. & P. 229;
Stanley v. Burnes, 3 Hagg. Eccl.
373; Bempde v. Johnstone, 3 Vesey
Jr. 198.
* Craige v. Lewin, 3 Curt. 435.
° Succession of Franklyn, 7 La.
Ann. 395; Haldane v. Eckford, L.
E. 8 Eq. Cas. 631; In n Capdevielle,
33 L. J. Exch. 306.
" Curling v. Thornton, 2 Add. 219;
Hodgson V. De Beauchesne, 12 Moore
P. C. 285.
' Munro v. Munro, 7 CI. & F. 842.
8 Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Grat. 230;
Olmstead v. Mayor, 42 N. T. Super.
Ct. 289; Peo. v. Pinckney, 32 N. Y.
377.
104
CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELEOTIOiSrS AND OPPICEES.
§67
the duties of which are not defined by law,^ or whose duties are
contractual merely,^ and are not performed in the execution of
any statute or standing rule of law,* is not an officer, but an em-
ployee or agent.* The powers, rights and privileges, conferred
upon an individual by an appointment or election to a public
office, are not property and confer no proprietary rights in the
office,^ but create a public trust; which it is absolutely incum-
bent upon him to execute honestly, and to the best of his abilitj^,
with the object of promoting the interests of the community
within his jurisdiction.® Applying these and analogous princi-
ples to municipalities, we find that a board, deriving their powers
from the act creating them, are officers.'^ So, treasurers and all
persons receiving, disbursing or acting as custodians of public
funds are always officers,^ including collectors and assessors of
taxes.^ It has been held that trustees, directors and other offi-
cials of the state benevolent and penal institutions are public
officers ; and the same rule would hold in similar institutions
iPeo. V. Langdon, 40 Mich. 073;
Kavanaugh v. State, 41 Ala. 399;
Smith V. Mayor, 67 Barb. 223; U. S. v.
Smith, 124 U. S. 525.
2 Shelby v. Alcorn, 36 Miss. 273;
Detroit F. P. Co. v. State, 47 Mich.
135; Eliason v. Coleman, 86 N. C.
235; Butler v. Regents, 32 Wis. 124;
U. S. V. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 358;
Vaughn v. English, 8 Cal. 39; Sand-
ford V. Boyd, 2 Cranch. 79.
"State V. Gardner, 43 Ala. 234;
State V. Piatt, 4 Harr. 154; McArthur
V. Nelson, 81 Ky. 67; Doyle v.
Raleigh, 89 N. C. 133; Walker v.
Cinoin., 21 Ohio, 14
» Shelby v. Alcorn, 36 Miss. 273;
and see cases above cited.
" Peo. V. Stratton, 28 Cal. 382;
Com. V. Gamble, 62 Pa. St. 343; State
V. Dews, E. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 397;
Beebo v. Robinson, 52 Ala. 67; Peo.
V. Murray, 70 N. T. 521; State v.
Douglas,26 Wis. 428; State v. Haw-
kins, 44 Ohio St. 109; Prince v. Skil-
lin, 71 Me. 361 ; State v. Davis, 44 Mo.
120; Conner v. Mayor, 5 N. T. 285-
Smith V. N. Y., 37 lb. 578; In re Cor-
liss, 11 R. I. 638; Peo. v. Nostrand,
46 N. Y. 375 ; see contra, King v. Hun-
ter, 65 N. C. 203; Vaun v. Pipkin, 77
N. C. 408; Brown v. Turner, 70 lb.
93; Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. (X.
C.)l.
«Peo. V. Stratton, 28 Cal. 382;
Com. V. Gamble, 62 Pa. St. 343; Bow-
ers V. Bowers, 26 Pa. St. 74; Atty.
Gen. V. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567; Row-
land V. Mayor, 83 N. Y. 372; Smith
V. Moore, 90 Ind. 294.
T State V. Valle, 41 Mo. 29.
estate V. Brandt, 41 Iowa, 493;
Peo. V. MoKinney, 10 Mich. 54; Com.
V. Morrissey, 86 Pa. St. 416; Com. v.
Evans, 74 lb. 124; Brown v. Turner,
70 N. C. 93; U. S. v. Bloomgart, 2
Ben. (JSr. J.) 356; State v. Boody, 53
N. H. 610.
» State V. Walton, 62 Me. lOG;
Morse v. Lowell, 7 Met. 152 ; Peo. v.
Bedell, 2 Hill, 199; Lorillard v. Mon-
roe, 11 N. Y. 392; Houseman v. Com.,
100 Pa. St. 222.
105
§68
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. VI.
connected with a municipal corporation.^ So, likewise, are
county commissioners ^ and school trustees.^
It may be laid down as a general rule that a city policeman
is a public officer, deriving his power, not from the municipal-
it3s but from the state, whose laws it is his duty to enforce ; J
but it has been held in one instance that police patrolmen are
not public officers.^ So, fireman, and officers of the fire depart-
ment, are not public municipal officers, but agents of the mu-
nicipality ; * aud this is also true of road supervisors,^ police
jurymen,** bridge tenders,^ and a medical superintendent of a
municipal insane asylum.^" On the other hand, it is now well
settled that a court crier ^^ and court attendants in general, are
public officers ; ^ and that a clergyman acts as a public officer,
in solemnizing and certifying to a marriage. ^^ This ruling of
the Connecticut court would presumably be sound, only where
the clergyman, in connection with the act of solemnizing a
marriage, is required by statute to do some official act, sucii as
iin indorsement and return of the marriage license. Deputies
of officers, who hold their positions under statutory provisions,
and whose duties are prescribed by law, are likewise, public
officers, and not employees. ^^ But it is otherwise, when a
special deputj" is appointed for a particular purpose.^^ He acts
rather in the capacity of a personal representative of the offi-
cer, whose deputy he is.
§ 68. Legislative control over offices In a preceding
paragraph,^^ the limitations upon the legislative control of mu-
' Peo. V. Nicliols, 68 N, C. 429 ; Peo.
V. Bledsoe, 68 lb. 457; Peo. v. San-
derson, 30 Cal. Porter V. Pillsbury, 11
How. Pr. 240.
-Hummells Case, 9 Watts (Pa.)
416.
3 Ogden V. Raymond, 22? Conn. 379.
^Farrell v. Bridgeport, 45 Conn.
191.
5 Shanley v. Brooklyn, 30 Hun, 396.
0 People v. Pinckuey, 32 N. T. 377.
'' State V. Putnam, 35 Iowa, 561.
* State V. Montg., 25 La. Am. 138.
" State V. Board, 51 N. J. L. 240.
"> MacDonald v. Mayor, 32 Hun, 89.
106
" Rioketts v. Mayor, 67 How. Pr.
320.
12 Moser V. Mayoret, 21 Hun, 163;
Sweeney v. Mayor, etc., 5 Daly, 274;
Rowland v. Mayor, etc., 83 N. T. 372.
1^ Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn.
209.
"Dayton v. Lynes, 30 Conn. 351;
White V. State, 44 Ala. 409; Conwell
V. Voorhies, 13 Ohio, 523; Towns v.
Harris, 13 Tex. 507; Eastman v. Cur-
tis, 4 Vt. 016.
i^Kavanaugh v. State, 41 Ala. 399;
Armstrong v. U. S., Gilp. (U. S.) 399.
" § 18.
CH. TI.J MUI^IGIPAL ELECTIOXS AXD OPFICEKS. § 69
nicipal offices and officers are fully set forth, and nothing need
be added in the present connection.
§ 69. Qnaliflcations for mnuicipal office — Women wlieu
eligible. — These are usually the same as are required of can-
didates for state offices. In general, aliens are not eligible ;
although, if all inhabitants are declared to be eligible, they need
not be citizens.^
A certain period of residence prior to election is generally
required in express terms, to render one eligible for any munici-
pal office of a political or executive character.^ But if there be
no such statutory provision, nonresidents are eligible ; ^ espe-
ciall}', if the office be one which requires professional skill, and
does not involve the exercise of strictly governmental power.*
Where residence within the municipal district is a prerequisite
for holding office, a permanent removal therefrom will be treat-
ed as an abandonment or implied resignation of the office.^
But a temporary change of residence, or absence, coupled with
the intention to return, will have no such effect.*"
It is a well nigh universal rule, founded upon the incapacity
of minors to do any act which will be legally binding on them-
selves, that no one under age is eligible to office ;'^ although
exceptions have been made by the courts in respect to those
offices, whose duties are clerical and administrative in cliar-
acter, and do not involve the exercise of official discretion.^
The lack of legal recognition, which woman received at com-
mon law, had as one of its effects the creation of a condition
of ineligibility on her part for the holding of public office.®
Under our constitutions, read in the light of that condition, and
by necessary implication therefrom, women, although citizens,
are not by that fact, in the absence of statute, vested with any
1 State V. Kilroy, 86 Ind. 118.
2 People V. Piatt, 115 N. T. 159;
State T. Williams, 99 Mo. 291 ; Soo-
ville V. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 126.
'Com. V. Jones, 12 Pa. St. 365;
State V. Swearingen, 12 Gra. 23.
* State V. Blanchard, 6 La. Ann.
572; State v. George, 23 Fla. 585.
"Rumsey v. Canipton, 16 N". H.
56Y; Giles v. Soh. Dis., 31 lb. 304;
Barre v. Greenwich, 1 Pick. 120.
6 People V. Met. Pol., Brd.,19 N. Y.
201; Lyon v. Com., 3 Bibb. (Ky.) 430;
Van Osdall v. Hazzavd, 3 Hill (jST. Y.)
243; Hanner v. Grizzard, 89 N. C.
115.
' Tyler v. Tyler, 2 Root, 419; Moore
V. Graves, 3 N. H. 308; Barrett v.
Seward, 22 Vt. 176.
8U. S. V. Bixby, 9 Fed. Rep. 78;
Ex parte, Dewey, 11 Pick. (Mass.)
263.
"Robinson's Case, 101 Mass. 376;
Schiichards v. People, 99 111. 501.
107
ro
MUNICIPAL CORPORA'^IOKS.
[CH. vr.
absolute right to hold office ; ^ but the state Legislatures can
make, and frequently have made, women eligible to certain
subordinate official positions ; among which are those relating
to public instruction, and the care of the sick and insane.^
Women have in some cases been declared eligible, where the
constitution was silent or its language general in character ; and
appointments of women to office are more and more meeting
with the approval of public opinion,^ and favorable considera-
tion from the courts. Indeed, as a question of legal right or
qualification, the conclusion, that a woman is ineligible to of-
fice, notwithstanding the silence of the constitution and statutes
of the state on that subject, can justly be charged to be the
result of sexual prejudice. The claim, that there is a funda-
mental difference in the mental, as well as in the physical, char-
acteristics of men and women, may be a profound philosophical
truth; but the determination of the- question of qualification
for holding public office is not so rigidly, answered in connec-
tion with the candidacy of males, in order to justify, on the
ground of personal disqualifications, the general denial of eligi-
bleness to women on account of their sex. In the absence of
express restrictions, women are eligible to any office, on the
same terms and under the same conditions with men.
Constitutional provisions have been adopted in a few of the
Southern and Western States* forbidding the ]-equirement of
any property qualification for office ; but in the absence of such
provisions, reasonable property qualifications can be imposed,
such as that the municipal or other official shall be a freeholder,
or taxpayer."
§ 70. Civil service examinations. — In many of the states,
laws have been enacted, providing that applicants for appoint-
ment to public office, municipal and state, must pass an exami-
1 Brad well v. Illinois, 16 "Wall. 1.30;
Kobinson's Case, 131 Mass. 376;
Atchison v. Lucas, 83 Ky. 451;
Wheeler V. Hall, 6 Allen, 558; Jack-
son V. Phillips, 14 lb. 539.
2 HufE V. Cook, 44 Iowa, 639; Atch-
ison Co. V. Lucas, 83 Ky. 451,- State
V. Gorton, 33 Minn. 345. As to school
officers, see Wright v. Xoell, 16 Kan.
601; Opinions of Judges, 115 Mass.
108
602 ; HoflE v. Cook, 44 Iowa, 639; State
V. Gorton, 33 Minn. 345.
' Jeffries v. Harington, 11 Colo.
191 ; Sohuchardt v. People, 90 111. 501 ;
Wright V. Noell, 16 Kan. 601; In re
Hall, 50 Couu. 131.
■> Stimson Am. Stat. L. 222.
''Dari-ow v. People, 8 Colo. 417;
People V. Sheffield, 47 Hun, 481.-
CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFriCEES. § 71
nation, with a view of ascertaining their capacity, knowledge
and litness, both mental and physical, for the positions they seek.
At the same time, it is provided that appointments must be
made from the names on a list of those who have passed such
examinations, the persons to be selected from those grades high-
est thereon ; and, generally, also, that all promotions shall be
made upon the same basis.^ Such laws are constitutional and
valid ;^ and include generally, within the operation of its pro-
visions, not only officers strictly so called, but all of the persons
in the civil service of the government,^ except laborers or un-
skilled workmen on the one hand ; and on the other hand, con-
fidential subordinates, and those for whose official misconduct
the appointing officer would be financially responsible.*
It has been held that the civil service reform laws are so far
derogatory of common law right, that the burden of proof is on
him, who seeks to prevent the appointment of any one, who is
alleged to be within a prohibited class.^ But it is clear, under
the general rules of statutory construction, bj' which the courts
are guided in their determinations, that the laws for the regu-
lations of the civil service should receive such a construction
as will carry out the legislative intention, and eflfectuate the
dominant principle of the law relating to public officers, viz. ;
that they are public trusts, to be administered for the common
welfare, and not as reward for part}' and political services.
Any appointment, made in violation of these laws, is illegal
and void ; and no appropriation is valid, which is made to pay
for services rendered under such an illegal appointment.^
§ 71. Preference to yeterans — It is sometimes provided
that, in making appointments to office, state or municipal, pref-
erence shall be given by the appointing power to honorably
discharged Union soldiers and sailors ; and advanced age, loss
of limb or other physical impairment, which does not in fact
render them incapable, shall not disqualify them.'' This pref-
• New York, 1883, ch. 354; 1848, oh.
357, 410; 86, ch. 9; Massachusetts,
1884, ch. 320; Opinion of Justices, 145
Mass. 587; Peck v. Eochester, 3 N.
Y. Supp. 872; Kogers v. Buffalo, 123
N. Y. 173.
2 Rogers v. Buffalo, 3 N. Y. Supp.
C74; People v. Angle, 109 N. Y. 504;
Rogers v. Buffalo, 51 Hun, 637.
3 Peo. V. Civ. Ser. Brd., 41 Hun, 287.
< Rogers v. Buffalo, 51 Hun, 637.
5 Peck V. Belknap, 55 Him, 91.
6 Rogers v. Buffalo, 2 N. Y. Supp.
327; Peck v. Rochester, 3 lb. 852.
' New York Laws, 1884, ch. 312,
§1; Amended Laws, 1887, ch. 464;
109
72
MTTNICIPAL COEPOEATtONS.
[CH. VI.
erence is to be given in the employment of oidinary laborers,^
and applies to veterans in office, when the statute was passed,
as well as to those who are appointed subsequently .^ The Leg-
islature having the constitutional power to provide for the do-
ing of public work by such means as to it may seem proper,
the constitutionality of laws, creating such a preference, may be
said to be beyond reasonable doubt ; ^ but the failure of the offi-
cer, to whom the power of appointment was given, to respect
the preference so required to be shown to veterans, was held not
to be a misdemeanor.* But in New York it is now provided
by statute, that the failure to observe these provisions for the
preference to veterans is a misdemeanor.®
§ 72. Official bonds. — Municipal officials, intrusted with pub-
lic money or property, are invariably required to give bonds for
the safe custody of what is committed to their charge ; but, un-
less the failure to furnish the proper surety promptly is expressly
declared to vacate the office, the bond may be given after the
officer has begun the performance of his duties.® So, too, it
has been held that a town may lawfully require a receiving or
disbursing officer to give bonds without having an express power
to do so.'' Unless some precise form is prescribed by charter
or statute and an exact compliance therewith made essential to
their Validity, official bonds will be valid, so long as their con-
ditions conform in a substantial manner to the general stat-
utory requirements.^ So bonds, without seals, or without
State V. Board of Public Works, 51
K. J. L. 240; Sullivan v. Gilroy, 55
Hun, 585; Peo. v. French, 51 Hun.
.345; Peo. v. Wallace, 55 Hun, 585;
Opinion of Justices, 145 Mass. 587.
1 Sullivan v. Gilroy, 55 Hun, 285.
2 People V. French, 52 Hun, 464:
See generally State v. Boughner, (N.
J. 93) 26 Atl. K. 808; People v.
Com'rs, 65 Hun, 169; State v. De-
lany, (N. J. 93) 25 Atl. R. 936; but
held in New York nottoapply to pro-
motions; Zn re McGuire, 50 Hun, 203.
" Morris v. Nevpark, (S. J. 93) 26
Atl. E. 82; In re Wardmau, 2 N. Y.
S. 324; 22 Ab. N. C. 137; People v.
Bardin, 7 lb. 123; People v. Wal-
lace, 55 Hun, 149.
. 110
« People V. Dustin, 3 N. Y. S. 522.
5 N. Y. Laws, 1884, ch. 312, § 312,
as amended by Laws 1887, ch. 464,
eCawley v. Peo., 95 111. 249; Cas-
key V. Greensb. 78 Ind. 233; State
V. Barnes, 33 Pac. R. 621; Launtz v.
Peo., 113 111. 137; U. S. v. LeBaron,
19 How. 73; s. c, 4 Wall. 642; Sproul
V. Lawrence, 33 Ala. 674; State v.
Findley, 10 Ohio, 51 ; Smith v. Cronk-
hite, 8 Ind. 134.
' Morrell v. Sylvester, 1 Greenl.
(Me.) 248; Lynn v. Cumberland, (Md.
93) 26 Atl. R. 1061. •
8 People V. Benfield, 80 Mich. 265;
State V. Barnes, (Kan. 93) 33 Pac. K.
621; Herd v. Cist, (Ky. 89) 12 S. W.
R. 466.
CH. VI.] MtTNlCIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICEKS.
§73
designation of the obligee,^ are nevertheless valid. Addition-
al duties, analogous to those already appertaining to the office,
may be imposed upon the official, without releasing the sureties
or affecting their liability, unless the bond contains express re-
striction against liability for additional duties of any sort.^
If bonds be given voluntarily, and not in pursuance of any
statute or ordinance requiring them, they are nevertheless
good as common law obligations, and the municipality can
I'ecover on them from the obligors.^ The bond being condi-
tioned for the faithful performance of the duties of an official
during his term of office, the obligors are not liable for mal-
feasance or nonfeasance by the officer, which has occuri-ed dur-
ing a term, either prior * or subsequent ^ to that for which the
bond was executed.
§ 73. Official oath. — It is the custom to require municipal
officers to take an oath before entering upon the performance
of the duties of their office ; ^ and statutes requiring such oath
are generally mandatory in their nature. But such oath of
office is by no means indispensable and its requisition depends
upon usage and positive statutory direction.^
The oath is generally to the effect, that the official will faith-
fully discharge the duties of his office ; and sometimes, that he
will support the constitution of the United States and of the
state.^ But no oath can be required which imposes any test of
1 State V. Wood, 51 Ark. 205; Fel-
lows V. Gilraan, 4 Wend. 414.
2 Morrow v. Wood, 56 Ala. 1 ; Or-
man v. Pueblo, 8 Col. 292; Board
etc. V. Quick, 99 N. Y. 138; Mayor
V. Kelly, 98 lb. 467; Board v. Clark,
92 lb. 467. •
8 Com. V. Wolbert, 6 Binn. 292;
Supervisors v. Coffinbury, 1 Mich.
355 ; Peo. v. John, 22 lb. 461 ; Platte-
ville V. Hopper, 63 Wis. 381 ; Turner
V. Clark, 67 Mo. 243; Montville v.
Houghton, 7 Conn. 543; but see con-
tra, State V. Hersey, 56 Iowa, 404;
State V. Bartlett, 30 Miss. 624; U.
S. V. Humason, 6 Sawy. 199.
4 State V. Finn, 98 Mo. 532; Padu-
cah V. Cully, 9 Bush (Ky.) 323; Bis-
sell. V. Saxton, 77 N. Y. 191 ; Myers
V. U. S., 1 McLean, 493; Overacre v.
Garrett, 5 Lans. 156; Rochester v.
Bandall, 105 Mass. 295; Manaska v.
Ingalls, 16 Iowa, 81; Townsend v.
Everett, 4 Ala. 607; Miller v. Stew-
art, 9 Wheat. 702; Stern v. Peo., 96
111. 475 ; Mclntire v. Sch. Trustees, 3
111. App. 77; Austin v. French, 7
Met. 126; Kingston I. Co. v. Decker,
33 Barb. 196; U. S. v. Boyd, 5 How. 50.
6 Dover v. Twombly, 42 N. H. 59;
Chelmsford Co. v. Demarest, 7 G-ray
(Mass.) 1; Mayor v. Horn, 2 Harr.
(Del.) 190.
6 State V. Stanley, 66 N. C. 59; Fox
v. McDonald (Ala. 93), 13 So. K. 416.
' Johnson v. Wilson, 2 N. H. 202;
State v. Stanley, supra.
sstimson's Am. Stat. L. §§ 224, 225.
Ill
§74
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. VI.
a religious nature,^ or which renders an individual ineligible
for any previous act, which was not a crime when committed.''
If the taking of an official oath is by statute or usage a con-
dition precedent to admittance into office, a person elected or
appointed thereto cannot justify ; nor does he possess any rights,
as such officer, before he shall have complied wj^th this require-
ment of the law.^ But a substantial compliance with the law
is all that is required ; * and, although when a form is prescribed
it should be followed,* if the oath taken is equivalent in sub-
stance to that prescribed, it has been held to be sufficient.®
§ 74. Disqualification on account of prior ofScial posi-
tion.— In many of tlie United States, statutes exist which pro-
hibit the holding of more than one lucrative office ^ of any
sort, and the appointment or election of members of the Legisla-
ture to offices which have been created, or the compensation of
which has been increased during their terms, or the election to
the Legislature of a person holding a federal office.^
These statutes receive a strict, if not literal construction ; '
and appointments made in contravention of their terms are void.^**
It has been held, however, that these statutes do not apply to
a merely de facto incumbency, as when a coroner is authorized
iCon. TJ. S., art. 6, §3.
^ Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall.
277. See Tiederaan's Limitations of
Police Power, pp. 72-74.
^ Thompson v. Nicholson, 12 Rob.
La. 326; Peo. v. McKinney, 52 N. Y.
374) City v. Given, 60 Pa. St. 136.
iQlney v. Pearee, 1 R. I. 292; Rid-
dle V. Bedford Co., 7 Serg. & Rawle,
392; Neale v. Overseers, 5 Watts.
588; State v. Perkins, 24 N. J. L.
409; Davis V. Berger, 54 Mich. 692;
Hoaglandv. Culvert, 20 N. J. L. 387,"
Tide Water v. Archer, 9 Gill & J.
(Md.) 479.
^Bassett v. Den, 17 N. J. L. 432;
State V. Ayres, 15 lb. 479; Hankins
V. Culloway, 88 111. 485; Young v.
State, 7 GUI & J. (Md.) 253.
« State V. Trenton, 35 N. J. L. 485.
'' County recorder, commissioner,
township trustee and supervisor are
lucrative offices in the constitutional
112
sense. Daily v. State, 8 Blackf. 329;
Creighton v. Piper, 14 Ind. 182; but
not city councilman. State v. Kirk,
44 Ind. 401.
8 Stimson's Am. Stat. L. §220;
Darley v. State, 8 Blackf. 329; In re
Carlis, 11 R. I. 638; State v. Degress,
53 Tex. 387; Davenport v. Mayor, 67
N. Y. 456; State v. Valle, 41 Mo. 29;
Peo. v. Leonard, 73 Cal. 230; Foltz
V. Kerlin, 105 Ind. 221.
3 Goal V. Townsend, 77 Tex. 404;
Troy V. Wooten, 10 Ind. 377; State v.
Harrison, 116 Ind. 300; Heller v.
Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309; State v. Wes-
ton, 4 Neb. 234; De Turk v. Com., 129
Pa. St. 151; Carpenter v. Peo., 8
Colo. 116; State v. McCollister, 11
Ohio, 46.
i» State V. Taylor, 12 Ohio St. 130;
Brady v. Howe,. 50 Miss. 625; Shelby
V. Alcorn, 36 lb. 273; McGregor v.
Balch, 14 Vt. 428.
CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS.
§75
by statute, in certain contingencies, to perform part of the du-
ties of a sheriff ; ^ nor, if the term of the prior office has expired,
and the incumbent be occupied only with the settlement of his
affairs, in preparation for a surrender of the office to his suc-
cessor
,2
So, also, if the provision against holding incompatible offices
be found in the constitution, it has been held that the prohibi-
tion is applicable only to offices ^¥hich are established or pro-
vided for by the body of the constitution, and would not prevent
the incumbent of such an office from holding a municipal office.*
When the constitution forbids the holding of an office for more
than a certain specified number of consecutive terms, any period
of time, intervening between the terms, could prevent the attach-
ment of such disqualification.*
§ 75. Appointiuents to office. — At common law, every cor-
poration lias an inherent power to appoint or elect such officers
as may be necessary to enable it to carry out the purposes for
which it was created.* And municipal corporations have the
power, in the absence of statutory regulations, to appoint or
elect officers, whose sphere of activity is limited to the exercise
of the charter powers and the enforcement of the municipal by-
laws.^ In this countrjs it is the universal practice for the char-
ter or municipal constitution to provide for the creation of all
the principal officers, in such a way as to leave very little oppor-
tunity for the exercise of this common law power.'^ These stat-
utory provisions must be strictly observed ; ^ and the choice of
i Powell V. Wilson, 16 Tex. 59;
Crawford v. Dunbar, 52 Cal. 36.
•■'State V. Somniers, 96 N. C. 467;
Peo. V. Duane, 55 Hun, 315.
^Justices' Opinions, 68 Me. 594;
Peo. V. Whitman, 10 Cal. 38; State
V. Somnier, 33 La. An. 237; Peo. v.
Duane, 55 Hun, 315 ; State v. Mont-
gomery, 25 La. An. 138; State v.
Kirk, 44 Ind. 401 ; Molian v. Jackson,
52 Ind. 599; De Turk v. Com., 129
Pa. St. 151.
*Horton v. Watson, 23 Kan. 229;
State V. Derbes, 11 La. An. 50; Grie-
bel V. State, 111 Ind. 369; Davis v.
Patten, 41 Kan. 480.
8
6 Vintners v. Passey, 1 Burr, 237;
Dillon's Mun. Corp. §206; Lafayette
V. State, 69 Ind. 218; Peo. v. Stevens,
51 How. Pr. 103.
6 Dillon's Mun. Corp. 206.
7 People V. Bedell, 2 Hill (N. Y.)
196; Hotiman v. Jersey City, 34 N.
J. L. 172; Hoboken v. Harrison, 30
lb. 73; People v. Pinokney, 32 N. Y.
377; People v. Canly, 44 111. 33.
» State V. Dillon, 125 Ind. 65 ; Jones
V. Parkhurst, 22 N. E. E. 899; 150
Mass. 243; Jacksonville v. Allen, 25
111. Ap. 54; Bellows v. Cincjinnati,
11 Ohio St. 544; Monroe v. Hoffman,
29 La. An. 651.
113
§76
MTJNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. vr.
an officer, in any way not prescribed by law, is void.^ In one
case, however, authority to appoint was inferred from the fre-
quent mention which was made in the charter of the officer and
his duties.'^
§ 76. Exercise of the appointing power. — The appointing
power must exercise its functions in the manner prescribed by
law.* Thus, when a city council is empowered to elect or ap-
point ofiScials, but the mode, in which the power is to be exer-
cised, is not specifically pointed out, it may elect or appoint
either by resolution or by ballot ; * and it may in certain contin-
gencies delegate the power of appointment to a committee.^ It
has been held that an appointment can be made by parol, only
when such a method is sanctioned by the terms of the statute,
from which the power is derived ; •> while it is the rule in states,
where the mode is not prescribed, that no writing is required.''
Until the act of appointment is legally completed, it may be
recalled; but when the act of appointment is consummated, it
is irrevocable, provided the appointee cannot be removed by
the appointing power. In such cases, the power of appoint-
ment to that office cannot be again exercised, until the office
becomes vacant by voluntary resignation or death of the ap-
pointee.^ But when an appointment is illegally made, or fraud-
' Hobokeu v. Harrison, 30 N. J. L.
"73; Hoffman v. Jer. City, 34 lb. 172;
State v. Michellon, 42 N. J. L. 405;
Stone V. Small, 54 Vt. 498; Claren-
don V. Phila., 13 Phila. 54; Baker v.
Pt. Huron Police Com'rs, 62 Mich.
527; State v. Hudson, 29 N. J. L.
104; State v. Bryson, 44 Ohio St.
457; Saunders v. Lawrence, 141 Mass.
380.
2Peo. V. Bedell, 2 Hill (X. Y.) 196;
see Field v. Gir. Col., 14 Pa. St. 233.
3 Launtz v. Peo., 113 111. 137; State
V. Cui-ry, (93 Ind.) 33 N. E. R. 685;
State V. Guiney, 26 Minn. 313 ; State
v. Peele, 124 Ind. 515 ; State v. Dillon,
125 Ind. 65; State v. Kenny, 45 N. J.
L. 251; Peo. v. Murray, 70 N. Y. 521;
State V. Michellon, 42 K. J. L. 405 ;
Com. V. Crezer, (93 Pa.) 26 Atl. R.
114
697; Commonwealth v. Crogaoi, 26
Atl. R. 697; 155 Pa. St. 448.
*Low V. Commissioners, R. M.
Charlt. (Ga.) 302.
5 Trowbridge v. Newark, 46 N.- J.
L. 140; Com. v. Pittsburgh, 14 Pa.
St. 177; Peo. v. Bedell, 2 Hill (N.Y.)
196; Com. v. Fitler, 147 Pa. St. 288.
6 Peo. V. Murray, 70 N. Y. 521 (ex-
cise commissioners) ; Peo. v. Murray,
5 Hun, 42, citing Peo. v. Molineaux,
53 Barb. 9; Peo. v. Willard, 44 Hun,
580; Peo. v. Fitzsimmons, 68 N. Y.
514.
' Hoke V. Field, 10 Bush (Ky.) 144;
Peo. V. Murray, 5 Hun, 42; Saunders
V. Owen, 2 Salk. (Eug.) 247.
8 Peo. V. Woodruff, 32 N. Y. 355;
Peo. V. Stowell, 9 Abb. N. C. 456;
State V. Wilson, 2 N. H. 456.
CH. VE.J MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OmCERS.
§78
ulently obtained, it is void, and a subsequent appointment will
be valid.i Failure to appoint, at a date prescribed by law, does
not cause a forfeiture of the power ; its exercise being essential
to the public welfare.^ But the reverse of this is the case when,
from the nature of the appointment, the character of the office
to be filled, or from tlie language employed by the statute con-
ferring the power, it is evident that the requirement as to the
specific time, at which it is to be exercised, was intended as a
limitation or restraint upon the power.'^
§ 77. Legality of appointment presumed. — When a mu-
nicipal or other public official has acted notoriously as such,
and has been continuously recognized as such by the corpora-
tion, a regular legal appointment will be presumed, and his au-
thority to bind the corporation may be implied ; nor need any
written proof of his appointment be produced.* But such pre-
sumption may be rebutted,^ although not by the officer him-
self ; ^ he being estopped upon general principles, in order to
protect innocent third persons. The inquiry into the validity
of his appointment can only be had at the instance of the pub-
lic or of citizens, by a proceeding in quo warranto!'
§ 78. Acceptance of office. — If no special provision of
the law requires it, acceptance need not be couched in express
terms; but may be, and usually is, implied from the acts of
qualifying and entering upon the performance of official duty.*
It has, howevei', been held that an acceptance is always neces-
State V. Chapman, 44 Conn. 495;
Peo. V. Keid, 11 Colo. 138; Peo. v.
Cazneau, 20 Cal. 503; Thomas v.
Burnes, 23 Miss. 550; State v. Mc-
Neely, 24 La. Ann. 19.
' Com. V. Phila. Comrs., 5 Binn.
(Pa.) 534; Com. v. Douglas, 1 lb.
77; Peo. v. Eeid, 11 Colo. 138.
2 Dyei- V. Bayne, 54 Mich. 87; Peo.
V. Allen, 6 Wend. 486; Peo. v. Wheel-
er, 18 Hun, 540; Peo. v. Board, 46
lb. 296.
8 Peo. V. Allen, 6 Wend. 486; Peo.
V. Board, 46 Hun, 296.
* Bank etc. v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat.
(U. S.) 64, 70; Kllley v. Forsee, 57
Mo. 390; Johnston v. Wilson, 2 N.
H. 202; 9 Am. Dec. 50; Jones v.
Gibson, 1 N. H. 266; Carter v. Symp-
son, 8 B. Mon. 155; Peo. v. Clingan,
5 Cal. 389; State v. Ferguson, 31 N.
J. L. 107; State V. Skrine, 3 Brev.
(S. C.) 516; Fenwick v. Sears, 2
Cranch. 150.
6 Johnson v. Wilson, 2 N. H. 202;
Regina v. Koberts, 36 Law Times
Rep. 690; s. c, 6 Am. Law Rep.
414.
•i State V. Sellers, 7 Rich. Law,
368; State v. Mayberry, 3 Strob. 144.
' Post, § 381.
8 Written acceptance. See Winne-
gar V. Rowe, 1 Cow. 258 ; State v.
Weatherby, 17 Neb. 553 ; Johnson v.
Wilson, 2 N. H. .202; Hartford v.
Bennett, 10 Ohio St. 441.
115
§ 79
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIOKS.
[CH. VI.
sary, and passive acquiescence in election or appointment will
not be permitted to take its place.-*- By the common la-w, ofiSce
■was regarded as a burden in the nature of a public duty, and
a citizen elected thereto, under a municipal corporation, was
obliged to accept or render himself indictable by his refusal."''
Although this common law rule has almost wholly fallen into
desuetude in America b}"- reason of the avidity -with which
public office is sought after, it has been found necessary in some
localities to render the holding of certain offices, which are
more onerous than lucrative, obligatory upon those appointed
or elected to them.*
But an individual, holding one office, cannot be compelled
to accept another, which is legally incompatible with the former.*
And it has been held that no one is under the necessity of ac-
cepting an official position, to which no compensation is at-
tached.® This is certainly not a sound conclusion, and is not
followed b)^ the authorities, administrative or judicial. It is
not uncommon to require official duty of one, without providing
adequate compensation, as in the case of duty as a juror; and
sometimes, without any provision for personal compensation
whatever, as in the case of military service. Such laws have
iiever been declared to be unconstitutional.''
I 79. Compensation. — The transcendent authority, which
the Legislature possesses over public officers within its jurisdic-
tion, can be, and is ordinarily, transferred to the municipalities
themselves ; and thus they are given complete control over
their own officials.^ But municipal officers are created, and
exist, wholly for the benefit of the public ; and the legislative
power may, unless hampered by constitutional restraints, abridge
or increase their terms, add to or diminish official duties, regu-
late, increase or diminish official compensation in any way ;
1 Smith V. Moore, 90 Ind. 294.
2Edtrards v. U. S., 103 U. S. 471;
State V. Ferguson, 31 N. J. L. 107;
Vanackers Case, 1 Ld. Rayra. 496.
3 London V. Headen, 76 N". C. 72;
Edwards v. U. S., supra ; Brooklyn v.
Soholes, 31 Hun, 110; Haywood v.
Bleecker, 11 Johns. 432;Wmnegar v.
Foe, supra; Bentley v. Phelps, 27
Barb. 524; State v. Molntyre, 3 Ired.
116
171; Conner v. Mayor, 2 Sandf. 355;
Hake v. Henderson, 4 Dev. (S. C.) 1.
*Hartf. V. Bennett, 10 Ohio St. 441;
Smith V. Moore, 90 Ind. 294; see con-
tra, Goettman v. Mayor, 6 Hun, 132.
5 Hinze v. People, 92 111. 406.
6 Dillon Mun. Corp. § 228.
'Dil. Mun. Corp., §229; State v.
Douglas, 26 Wis. 428; Love v. Jer.
City, 40 X. J. L. 456.
CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICBKS.
79
and if the public interest demand it, abolish the ofEce alto-
gether.-' This wide-reaching control over the duration of mu-
nicipal officers maybe delegated to the municipal corporation ;
and it has been held that when a department, a board of offi-
cers, or a single oflScial, is invested with a discretionary au-
thority to create an office, the power to abolish such office at
pleasure follows as an incident of the creative power.^ Con-
stitutional restrictions upon the power to increase or diminish
official compensation will receive liberal construction and rigid
enforcement; * and the legislative power of control is further
qualified by the rule that subsequent legislation should not be
permitted to affect already established rates of compensation,
so far as incumbents are concerned, unless it is plainly intended
to apply thereto.*
There is no implied promise or liability on the part of munici-
pal corporations to pay salaries to those officials, whom it is
1 State V. Starkey, (Minn. 92) 52 N.
W. K. 24; Stanfield v. State, (Tex. 92)
18 S. W. K. 577; State v. Kaw, (Iowa,
92) 46 N. W. E. 872; Swann v.
Buck, 40 Miss. 208; Bryan v. Cattell,
15 Iowa, 538, 553; Butler v. Penn., 10
How. 402; Smith v. New York, 37 N.
Y. 518; Peo. v. Mahaney, 13 Mich.
481 ; Bouglas v. Timme, (Neb. 90) 49
N. W. R. 266.
2 Baldwin v. Phila., 99 Pa. St. 164;
Cox V. Newark, 103 N. Y. 519; Ford
V. Har. Oomrs., 81 Oal. 19; Peo. v.
Kings Co., 105 N. Y. ; State v. Mayor,
15 Lea. 697; Harvey v. Hush Co., 32
Kan. 159; Bird v. Wasco, 3 lb. 282;
Cowdin V. Huff, 10 Ind. 83; Prince
V. Skillen, 71 Me. 361; Conner v.
Mayor, 5 N. Y. 285; Warner v. Peo.,
7 Hill (N. Y.) 81; 2 Denio, 272; Mar-
den V. Portsmouth, 59 N. H. 18; State
V. Gales, 77 N. C. 283; Castle v. Win-
tah, 2 Wyom. 126; Perkins v. Corbin,
45 Ala. 103; Hennepin Co. v. Jones,
18 Minn. 199; Kendall v. Canton, 53
Miss. 526; Robinson v. White, 26 Ai-k.
139; Augusta v. Sweeney, 44 Ga. 463;
Riley v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 331 ; Crawf .
Co. V. Nash, 99 Pa. St. 253; Field v.
Marge, 83 Va. 882; Peo. v. Lippin-
cott, 67 111. 333; Iowa City v. Foster,
10 Iowa, 189; Euoker v. Supervisor,
7 W. Va. 661; U. S. v. Mitchell, 109
IJ. S. 146; Williams v. Newport, 12
Bush (Ky.) 438; Evans v. Populus,
22 La. An. 121.
8 State V. Raine, (Ohio 92) 31 N. E.
R. 741; Lloyd v. Silver Bow Co.,
(Mont. 92) 28 Pac. R. 453; Weeks v.
Texarkana, 50 Ark. 81; Hall v. Bever-
idge, 81 111. 128; Green v. Fresno,
(Cal. 92) 30 Pac. R. 544; Wheelock
V. Peo., 84 111. 551; Apple v. Craw-
ford Co., 105 Pa. St. 300; Doe v.
Wash'n Co., 30 Minn. 392 ; Merri weth-
er V. U. S., 22 Ct. of Claims, 332;
Cherokee Co. v. Chew, 44 Kan. 162;
Garvie v. Hartf., 54 Conn. 440; Cox
V. Barlington, 43 Iowa, 612.
* Council Bluffs v.Waterman, (Iowa,
92) 53 N. W. R. 289; Tacoma v. Lil-
lis, (Wash. 93) 31 Pac. 321; Kirk-
wood V. De Soto, 87 Cal. 394; Wren
V. Luzerne Co., 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 22;
State V. Raine, supra ; Woodruff v.
Imperial, etc., 90 N. Y. 521; State v.
Steele, 57 Tex. 200 ; Cox v. New York,
103 N. Y. 519.
117
§79
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. VI.
necessary for them to appoint ; ^ and compensation for oJBBcial
service should be, and almost universally is, fixed, either by
charter, general law or by ordinance, or by a special contract.^
Municipal officials are always considered to have accepted of-
fice, with full knowledge on their part of all such existing pro-
visions, referring to their own compensation or duties.^ So,
likewise and for the same reasons, a municipal official cannot
recover compensation for services rendered under a statute,
which is in violation of some provision of the constitution.*
The authorities seem to hold that an officer de facto can-
not recover the salary of the office ; * such salary being depend-
ent on the legal title to the office.^ And it has been held that
the officer de jure may recover his compensation from the mu-
nicipality, although such compensation ^has already been made
to the officer de facto? This question is however far from be-
ing settled.^ And, if the paj'-ment was made prior to a deter-
mination of the legal title to the office, it is held to be a good
1 Blackburne v. Oklahoma, 31 Pac.
K. 782; Talbot v. E. Maohias, 76 Me.
416; Haswell v. New York, 81 N. Y.
255; Perry v. Cheboygan, 55 Micb.
250; Drott V. Kiverside, 4 Ohio Clr.
Ct. 312 ; Walker v. Cook, 129 Mass.
578; State v. Brewer, 59 Ala. 130;
White V. Levant, 78 Me. 568; Eowe
V. Kern, 75 Cal. 353 ; Eiley v. Kansas
City, 31 Mo. App. 439; Barnes v. Ba-
kersfleld, 5 Vt. 375 ; Carlyle v. Sharp,
51 111. 71 ; Gamier v. St. Louis, 37
Mo. 554; Barton v. N. O., 16 La. An.
317; Posey v. Mobile Co., 50 Ala. 6;
Crittenden Co. v. Crump, 25 Ark.
235; Worthen v. Grayson Co. Ct., 13
Bush, 53.
2 Smith V. Com., 41 Pa. St. 335;
Devoy v. New York, 39 Barb. 169;
Bladen V. Phila.,60 Pa. St. 464; Bos-
worth V. New Orl., 26 La. 464.
" Locke V. Ceu. City, 4 Col. 65.
And he cannot claim any other com-
pensation for services rendered, on
any theory of an implied contract,
or a quantum meruit. Dil. Mun. Corp.
§ 230; Coyne v. Eennie, (Cal. 93) 32
Pac. R. 578; Barnes v. Williams, 13
118
S. W. E. 845.
* Meagher v. County, 5 Nev. 244;
City V. Sears, 2 Col. 588; Lancaster
V. Fulton, 24 W. N. C. 401.
^ Sammis v. King, 40 Conn. 298;
Bentley v. Phillips, 27 Barb. 524;
Peo.-v. Tieman, 30 lb. 193; State v.
Carrol, 38 Conn. 471 ; Riddle v. Bedf .
Co., 7 S. & E. (Pa.) 386.
6 Burke v. Edgar, 67 Cal. 182; Me
chan V. Hudson, 46 N. J. L. 276;
Dorsey v. Smith, 28 Cal. 21; Carroll
V. Silbenthaler, 37 lb. 193; Meagher
V. Co., 5 Nev. 244.
' State V. Carr, ( Ind. 92) 28 N. E.
E. 88; State v. Holmes, 43 La. An.
1185; Andrews v. Portland, 79 Me.
484; Williams v. Clayton, 21 Pa. Eep.
398.
8 See cases contra to text, Parrel
V. Bridgeport, 45 Conn. 191; Bruns-
wick V. Fahm, 60 Ga. 109; Smith v.
New York, 37 N. Y. 518; Dolan v.
Mayor, 68 N. Y. 279; Hadley v. May-
or, 33 N. Y. 603; Cf. McVeany v.
New York, 80 N. Y. 135; and sec. 85
on Illegal Removal and cases there
cited. See, also, § 88.
CH. VI.] MXTNICIPAI, ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS.
§79
defence to an action by the officer de jure?- But in such a case
the officer de facto is liable for the amount so received to the
officer de jure.^
Where the holding of a municipal office does not create any-
contractual relation ^ a municipality parallel with a similar au-
thority, of the state, has, unless restrained by an express rule of
constitutional or statute law, the power to increase or diminish
the official compensation during the official term, or at any other
time.* But it has been held that the employment of a person,
in a professional or semi-private capacity ; as, for example, that
of engineer or attorney at law, for a fixed period at a sum
agreed on (even though under an ordinance), constitutes a
contract, the obligation of which cannot be impaired. But in
such cases, there must be a coincidence on both sides of all the
elements which constitute a contract. The services should be
of a professional, rather than of an official character ; and the
party entitled to compensation should be precluded from with-
drawing at his pleasure, a privilege which is almost universally
an incident of official positions.^ These cases are, however, not
1 Hannon v. Grizzard, 96 N. C. 293;
Selby V. Portland, 14 Greg. 243; Lu-
zerne Co. V. Trimmer, 95 Pa. St. 97;
Peo. V. Brennan, 1 Abb. Pr. N. L 184;
In re Havird (Idaho), 24 Pac. Eep.
542; Wheatley v. Covington, 11 Busli
18; Wayne Co. v. Benvit, 20 Mich.
176; 4 Am. Rep. 382; Parker v. Dak.
Co., 4 Minn. 59; Andrews v. Port-
land, 79 Me. 484 ; MoVeany v. Mayor,
80 N. T. 185 ; Saline v. Anderson, 20
Kan. 298; Schlass v. Hewlett, 81 Ala.
266; Shaw v. Pima Co. (Ariz. 1888),
18 Pac. Rep. 272; Steubenville v.
Gulp, 38 Ohio St. 18.
2Mayfield v. Moore, 53 HI. 428;
Glasscock v. Lyons, 20 Ind. 1; An-
drews V. Portland, 79 Me. 484; Nich-
ols V. McLean, 101 N. Y. 526; Saline
Co. V. Anderson, 20 Kan. 298; Peo.
V. Miller, 24 Mich. 458; Wayne Co. v.
Benort, 20 lb. 176; Dolan v. Mayor,
68 K. Y. ^74; Rule v. Tait, 38 Kan.
765; Bier v. Garrell, 30 W. Va. 95;
Hunter v. Chandler, 45 Mo. 452.
8 Com. V. Bacon, 6 Serg. & R. 322 ;
Baker v. Pittsburgh, 4 Pa. St. 49;
Univ. V. Walden, 15 Ala. 655 ; Fitz-
simmons v. B'klyn, 102 N. Y. 536.
* Doolan v. Manitowoc, 48 Wis.
312; Barrett v. New Oris., 38 La.
An. 101; Devoy v. Mayor, 39 Barb.
169; Green v. Mayor, 5 Ab. Pr. 503;
Butcher v. Camden, 29 N. J. Eq.
478; Mayor v. Gear, 27 N. J. L. 265;
Crane v. Des Moines, 47 Iowa, 105 ;
Augusta V. Sweeney, 44 Ga. 463;
Madison v. Kelso, 32 Ind. 79; Carr
V. St. Louis, 9 Mo. 191 ; Iowa City v.
Foster, 10 Iowa, 189; Cox v. Bur-
lington, 43 lb. 612; Gillespie v.
Mayor, 6 Daly, 286; Conner v. Mayor,
5 N. Y. 285 ; Haswell v. Mayor, 81
N. Y. 255; lb. 425; Waldraven v.
Memphis, 4 Coldw. 431.
6Dil. Munc. Corp. §232; Chase v.
Lowell, 7 Gray, 33; Caverly v. Low-
ell, 1 Allen, 289; contra, Chicago v.
Edwards, 58 111. 252; Hiestand v. N.
O., 14 La. An. 330.
119
§79
MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIOXS.
[CH. VI.
very safe guides in determining the extent of the exception to
the general rule, if there be any well-founded exception at all.
The qualification, that the official must not have the privilege
of resigning his position, prior to the expiration of his term,
is undoubtedly indispensable, but the privilege of resignation,
seems to be rather a result, than a cause, of the governmental
power to abolish or interfere with the duties and perquisites of
the office. Thus, it is held that the appointment of a police
officer for one year does not constitute a binding contract,
which cannot be abrogated or altered by the city.^ But if, as
is not unusual, the constitution of the state forbids any dimi-
nution or increase of the salary of an officer during his incum-
bency, such officer may make a contract with the government
for a change in the terms of his service, which, if based upon
a sufficient consideration, will be binding upon both parties.^
But, after official services have been fully rendered, an exe-
cuted contract exists between the city and the official, the ob-
ligation of which is always beyond impairment or change by
State or municipalauthorities.^ For, at this stage of the trans-
action, the relation of debtor and creditor is created, with an
executed consideration on the part of the official, and the rights
of the latter ma)' be enforced by mandamus.^ Such a judicial
proceeding would be necessary, as a means of recovery of sal-
ary already earned, even where the claimant, as treasurer or
collector, has charge of the public funds. He cannot pay him-
self out of these funds, or offset a legal demand made on him
for such money, by his claim for compensation.®
An official cannot claim an extra allowance of salary for the
discharge of incidental duties, even though his compensation
be grossly inadequate ; ^ or the duties pertaining to his office be
1 Chicago V. Edwards, 58 111. 252.
- Crane v. Des Moines, 47 Iowa,
105 ; Iowa City v. Foster, 10 Iowa, 189.
3 Fisk V. Jef. Pol. Jury, 116 U. S.
131; Stewart v. Jef. Pol. Jury, 116
lb. 135.
■> See § 375.
* New Orleans v. Fimerty, 27 La.
Am. 681; 7ft re Clarke's Fees, 25 Hun,
593; Del. Co. v. Griffen, 17 Iowa, 166;
State V. Boyd, 19 Nev. 356; Cullom
V. Dulloff, 94 111. 330.
120
6 Beard v. Decatur, 64 Tex. 7;
Hobbs V. Tonkers, 32 Hun, 454;
Beckwell v. Amador Co., 30 Cal. 237;
Cowen V. Mayor, 3 Hun, 632; Stock-
well V. Genesee Co., 16 Mich. 221;
Kernion, 1 La. An. 419 ; Bartch v.
Cutler (Utah, 1890), 24 Pac. Kep. 526;
Nowles V. Jasper Co., 86 Ind. 179;
Stropes V. Green Co., 84 lb. 560; In
re Parsons, 54 N". T. Super. Ct. 451;
Bubb V. Lycoming, 134 Pa. St. 112;
Shephard v. Lawrence, 141 Mass. 479 ;
CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS.
§79
materially increased after his acceptance of the office, and his
entrance upon the performance of his duties. His only remedy
in such a case is resignation. ^ A promise to reward an officer,
to pay him an extra sum beyond his legal compensation, for
a faithful performance of that which it was his official duty to
do, is void as without consideration, and cannot be enforced by
the ofQcial.2
If, however, the officer be employed or compelled by law to
render services altogether unofficial which are not merely an
extension of his official duties and incidental thereto, and which
could as well be performed by any other person, he may, es-
pecially if such service entail upon him extra trouble and ex-
pense, recover additional compensation therefor.^
Upton v. U. S., 19 Ct. of CI. 46; Bai-t-
lett V. U. S., 25 Ct. CI. 389; Decatur
V. Vermillion, 77 111. 31.5; Stiffler v.
Delaware, (Ind. 91) 27 Jf. E. K. 641;
Sidway v. Com'rs, 120 111. 456; Bunn
V. People, 32 111. App. 410; Hand v.
Tippecanoe, 26 Ind. 179; Eowe v.
Kern, Co., 72 Cal. 353; Gilbert v.
Marshall, 18 B. Mon. 427; Biggs v.
Brewer, 64 Ala. 282; Gordon Co. v.
Harris, 81 Ga. 220; Board v. Johnson,
(Ind. 91) 26 JT. E. K. 821.
1 Bussier v. Pray, 7 S. & E. (Pa.)
447; Robinson v. Dunn, 77 Cal. 473;
Wendell v. Brooklyn, 29 Barbour,
204; Warner v. Trenton, 24 IST. J. L.
764; Miami Co. v. Blake, 21 Ind. 32;
Jay Co. V. Templer, 34 lb. 322; Tur?
pen V. Tyston Co., 7 lb. 172; Palmer
V. New York, 2 Sandf. 318; Peo.
V. Edmonds, 19 Barb. 468; Territory
v. Carson, 7 Mont. 412; Bay ha v.
Webster Co., 18 Neb. 131; State v.
Bloxham, (Fla. 1890) 7 So. Eep. 878;
Billings V. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 413; Lane.
Co. V. Fulton, (Pa. 89) 18 Atl. Eep.
384; Haynes v. State, 3 Humph. 480;
State V. Holliday, 67 Mo. 64; Wood-
ruff V. State, 3 Ark. 285; Peo. v.
Drolin, 33 N. Y. 269; Andrews v.
Pratt, 44 Cal. 309; Peo. v. Calhoun
Co., 36 Mich. 10; In re New York etc.,
7 Abb. N. C. 408; Erie Co. v. Jones,
119 N". Y. 337; State v. Kelsey, 44 N.
J. L. 1 ; LaGrange v. Cutler, 6 Ind.
354.
2 Pilie v. Kew Orleans, 19 La. An.
274; Decatur v. Vermillion, 77 111.
315; Gilmore v. Lewis, 12 Ohio, 281;
Pool V. Boston, 5 Cush. 519; Davies
V. Burns, 5 Allen, 349; Palmer v.
Mayor, 2 Sandf. 318; Callahan v.
Hallett, 1 Caines, 104; Eea v. Smith,
2 Handy (Ohio) 193; Eobinson v.
Dunn, 77 Cal. 473; Smith v. Smith,
1 Bailey (S. C.) 70; Debolt v. Cincin-
nati, 7 Ohio St. 237; Heslep v. Sacra-
mento, 2 Cal. 580; Hatch v. Mann,
15 Wend. 44; Preston v. Bacon, 4
Conn. 471; Shattuck v. Woods, 1
Pick. 175.
3 United States v. Eipley, 7 Pet. 18;
United States v. Brindle, 110 U. S.
688; Evans V. Trenton, 24 N. J. L. 764;
Burroughs v. Norton Co., 29 Kan.
196; Love v. Baehr, 47 Cal. 364; Lang
V. Board, (Ind. 89) 22 K. E. E. 667; Mc-
Bride v. Gr. Rap. , 47 Mich. 236 ; Mayor
V. Muzzy, 33 Mich. 61; Collier v. U.
S., 22 Ct. of CI. 125; Long v. U. S., 8
lb. 398; Peo. v. Haws, 34 Barb. 69;
Peo. V. Super's, 12 Wend. 257; Bright
V. Supei-'s, 18 Johns. 242; Mallory v.
Super's, 2 Cowen, 531; Detroitv. Eed-
field, 19 Mich. 376; McBride v. De-
121
§ 81
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATCONS.
[CH. VI.
§ 80. Assignment of salary. — For the purpose of protect-
ing the interests of the public service and increasing its effi-
ciency, by securing to those engaged therein the full benefit of
all such compensation, which they may be by law entitled to
receive, it has become a universally accepted principle of law
and of public policy, that the salary of an official is not assign-
able.^ Money, due to officials, and remaining in the hands of
the municipality or its disbursing agents, upon the same prin-
ciple, is not subject to attachment or garnishment at the instance
of creditors of the officials.^
§ 81. Holding over after expiration of term of ofSce. —
It is an almost universal rule in the United States that munici-
pal officers, particularly those of a high grade, as the mayor and
the officers or commissioners, who are placed at the head of the
various municipal departments, shall be elected or appointed
for a certain fixed and definite term. But, in the absence of
any express constitutional or statutory prohibition, it is never-
theless the law, that all public officers, whose terms are fixed
as to duration by law, are entitled to continue in office until a
successor is legally chosen and qualified.^ To prevent unavoida-
troit, 47 lb. 236; Huffman v. Green-
wood, 23 Kan. 281; White v. Polk
Co., 9 Kan. 307; Eeif v. Paige, 55
Wis. 496.
1 Bliss V. Lawrence, 58 N. T. 442;
Bangs V. Dunn, 66 Cal. 72; Schlass v.
Hewlett, 81 Ala. 266; King v. Hawk-
ins, Arizona (1888), 16 Pac. Rep.
434; Field V. Chipley, 79 Ky. 260;Beal
V. McVicker, 8 Mo. App. 202; Billings
^. O'Brien, 45 How. Pr. 392; Shannon
V. Bruner, 36 Fed. Rep. 147; Brackett
V. Blake, 7 Met. 335 ; Conway v. Cut-
ting, 51 N. H. 407; State v. Hastings,
15 Wis. 78; Mulhall v. Quinn, 1 Gray,
105; Macomber v. Duane, 2 Allen,
541.
2Ladd V. Sale, 57 N. H. 210; Bulk-
ley V. Eckert, 3 Pa. St. 368; Memphis
V. Laski, 9Heisk, 511; Bank v. Dib-
rell, 3 Sneed, 379; Dewey v. Garvey,
130 Mass. 89; Troy, etc. v. Com., 127
lb. 43; Hawthorn v. St. Louis, 11
Mo. 59; Sch. Dis. No. 4 v. Gage, 39
122
Mich. 434; Tracy v. Hombuckle, 8
Bush. 336; Merrell v. Campbell, 49
Wis. 535 ; Buchanan v. Alexander, 4
How. 20; Hodgson v. Dexter, 1
Cranoh, 345; Mayor etc. v. Root, 8
Md. 95 ; Mayor etc. v. Rowland, 26
Ala. 498; Clark v. Mobile Com'rs, 36
lb. 621; McMeekin v. State, 9 Ark.
563 ; Ward v. Hartf. Co., 12 Conn. 404;
Merwin v. Chicago, 45 111. 133; Trie-
bel V. Colburn, 64 111. 370; Hightower
V. Slaton, 54 Ga. 108 ; Caiaker v. Math-
ews, 25 Ga. 571 ; Divine v. Harvey, 7
B. Mon. 439.
^ Chandler v. Bradish, 23 Vt. 416;
Sob. Dis. V. Atherton, 12 Met. 105;
Dow V. Bullock, 13 Gray, 136; Peo.
V. Fairbury, 51 111. 149; State v. Pa-
gan, 42 Conn. 32 ; Wier v. Bush, 4
Litt. 433; Stratton v. Oulton, 28 Cal.
44; Central v. Sears, 2 Colo. 588;
Walker v. Ferrill, 58 Ga. 512; State
V. Harrison, 113 Ind. 440; Thomas v.
Owens, 4 Mo. 188; Robb v. Carter, 63
CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICEKS.
§81
ble lapses, and to give certainty and permanence to this rea-
sonable rule of the American common law, it has in most of
the States been incorporated into a statute.^ An official's right
to hold over, which terminates with the election and qualifica-
tion of a successor, is not revived by the death or disability of
the successor, where such death or disability occurs after quali-
fication, although it may happen before the successor has be-
gun to serve. This, at least, is the conclusion of the cases
cited in the note below.^ But inasmuch as the enforcement of
this rule would bring about the same evil consequences, which
attend any delay in the election or qualification of the successor
after the expiration of the incumbent's term of office, and wliich
the provision for holding over was intended to prevent, it would
seem to be reasonable to extend the provision for holding over,
until the successor has actually entered upon the performance
of his official duties, and such has been the ruling in one case.*
When a municipal corporation has been legislated out of ex-
istence ; * or when the official has for some cause forfeited his
office,^ the rule, enabling officei's to hold over, has no applica-
tion whatever. Upon the principle that no one shall profit by
his own wrong, where it is made the express duty of officials
to give notice for and to hold an election, at which their succes-
sor shall be chosen, and they, even though inadvertently, neg-
Ib. 329; Overseers v. Sears, 22 Pick.
130; People v. Ferris, 16 Hun, 219;
Cordiell v. Frizell, 1 Nev. 130; State
V. Wells, 8 lb. 105 ; York County v.
Small, 1 W. & S. (Pa.) 315.
1 Peo. V. Whitman, 10 Cal. 38; Peo.
V. Tilton, 37 lb. 614; State v. Fagan,
42 Conn. 32; Peo. v. Keid, 11 Cal.
138; Bonner v. State, 7 Ga. 473; Peo.
V. Fairbury, 51 111. 149; State v. Berg,
50Ind. 149; Elam v. State, 75 Ind.
518; Gosman V. State, 106 Ind. 203;
State V. Harrison, 113 Ind. 440; Wa-
pello V. Bigham, lOIo-wa, 39; Killion
V. Herman, 43 Kan. 37; Marshall v.
Harwood, 5 Md. 423; Dow v. Bul-
lock, 13 Gray (Mass.) 156; People v.
Lord, 9 Mich. 227; State v. Thomas,
102 Mo. 85; State v. Smith, 87 Mo.
158; Tappan v. Gray, 9 Paige, 507;
State V. Howe, 28 Ohio St. 588; State
V. Brewster, 44 lb. 589; Com. v. Han-
ley, 9 Pa. St. 513; Macoy v. Curtis,
14 S. C. 367; James v. Jefferson, 66
Tex. 578; Vaughan v. Johnson, 77
Va. 300; State v. Washburn, 17 Wis.
658; Tuley v. State, 1 Ind. 500, 502;
Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266;
Peo. V. Eunkel, 9 John. 147; Vernon
Soc. V. Hills, 6 Cow. 23; Slee v.
Bloom, 5 Johns. Ch. 366; Bank v.
Petway, 3 Humph. (Tenu.) 522.
estate V. Seay, 64 Mo. 89; State v.
Hopkins, 10 Ohio St. 509.
3 Com. V. Hanley, 9 Pa. St. 513.
^BeckwitU v. Racine, 7 Biss. 142;
State V. Bailey, 37 Ohio St. ; Barkley
V. Levee Com'rs, 93 U. S. 258.
5 Hyde V. State, 52 Miss. 055.
123
§82
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. VI.
lect to do so, thej' cannot hold over as against the public,
although they are entitled by the charter to remain in office
until their successors are elected and. qualified.^
§ 82. Vacancies. — An office may be defined to be vacant,
in contemplation of law, when it is not occupied by one who
is lawfully entitled to its incumbency until the happening of
some future contingency. An office is vacant, even though
there be an incumbent de facto, whether his title to the office
was originally defective, or his lawful title to the same has
since expired.^
An appointment, made to fill a supposed vacancj' which does
not in fact exist, is void ab initio, and cannot be validated sub-
sequently.* And, although an officer's resignation, tendered to
take effect in the future, will create a vacancy in the office,
when the time of taking effect arrives, the fact that it may be
withdrawn prior thereto, makes it impossible for a new appoint-
ment to be made to such an office, until the resignation has
actually taken effect and a vacancy actually created.* It has,
however, been held that, if there is no express prohibition of the
law, a present exercise of tlie power of appointment, anticipa-
tory of a future vacancy, or to fill a newly created office, is
valid ;* but no officer, whose own term is to expire, before the
vacancy occurs, will be allowed thereby to unjustly deprive his
successor of his official privilege.^ And it may be stated, as a
general rule, that a vacancy in an office already existing occurs
only when the official term fixed by law has expired,^ or upon
the death, resignation or removal of the de Jure incumbent,*
' Peo. V. Bartlett, 6 Wend. (N. Y.)
422; Lynch v. Lafland, 4 Colder
(Tenn.) 96.
estate V. Harrison, 113 Ind. 434;
Peo. V. Van Home, 18 Wend. 518;
State V. Howe, 25 Ohio St. 588 ; State
V. MeNeely, 24 La, An. 19; Com. v.
Hanley, 9 Pa. St. 513; Peo. v. La-
combe, 34 Hun, 409; State v. Had-
ley, 64 N. H. 473; State v. Seay, 64
Mo. 89; Peo. v. Whitman, 10 Cal. .38;
Stocking V. State, 7 Ind. 326; Collins
V. State, 8 lb. 344.
" State V. Peele, 124 Ind. 51-5 ; see
12i
Lindsey v. Luckett, 20 Tex. 516;
People V. Witherell, 14 Mich. 48.
4 Biddle v. Willard, 10 Ind. 63.
5 State V. Van Buskirk, 40 N. J.
L. 463 ; Haight v. Love, 39 lb. 14.
6 State V. Meehan, 45 N. J. L. 189;
Haight V. Love, supra ; Ivy v. Lusk,
11 La. An. 486.
' State V. Harrison, 113 Ind. 434.
' States V. Johns, 3 Oregon, 533;
State V. Newark, 27 N. J. L. ;
Johnston v. Wilson, 2 N. H. 202;
Peo. V. Langdon, 8 Cal. 1; Peo. v,
Bissell, 49 Cal. 407.
CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS.
§82
or through the occurrence of some event, by which the duties
cease to be legally discharged by any one.^ The insanity of
the incumbent does not necessarily create a vacancy,^ nor will
a judgment of ouster in a quo warranto proceeding.^
If an enumeration is made by statute of the events which
will create a vacancy, all others must be presumed to be ex-
cluded ; the law favoring the continuity of oiScial service, rather
than its cessation or interruption.* There is nothing peculiar
in the legal meaning of the term " vacancy," when applied to
official positions ; and there is no reasonable ground for the
distinction, which is sometimes made, between offices newly
created, and those to which others had already been appointed
or elected. An office will be vacant, in either case, where there
is no lawful incumbent.^ No vacancy is created if, upon the
expiration of the term of an elective officer, he holds over un-
til his successor shall have been elected ; and there is a failure
to fill the position by election or the duly elected successor
dies, or neglects to qualify.® The incumbent continues to hold
over, as officer de jure'' But the reverse of the rule, above
given, obtains, when it is expressly declared that failure of the
successor to qualify, on or before a certain date, shall create a
vacancy.^
In the absence of any authority to hold over, the office, of
course, becomes vacant, immediately upon a failure to elect or
qualify.^
' Peo. V. Bissell, 49 Cal. 407; State
V. Howe, 25 Ohio St. 588; States v.
Jones, 19 Ind. 356.
2 State V. Pidgeon, 8 Blackf . 132.
s State V. Balls etc., 45 Mo. 58.
* Eosborougli v. Boardman, 67 Cal.
116; Peo. V. Whitman, 10 Cal. 38.
5 Stocking V. State, 7 Ind. 326;
Collins V. State, 8 Ind. 344.
«Com. V. Hanley, 7 Pa. St. 513;
Peo. V. Mizner, 7 Cal. 19; Cordille v.
Frizell, 1 Nev. 130; Ex parte Law-
thoine, 18 Gratt. 85 ; Tappan v. Gray,
9 Paige, 507; State v. Lusk, 18 Mo.
333; Gosman V. State, 106 Ind. 203;
State V. Harrison, 113 Ind. 434; Stew-
art V. State, 4 lb. 396; State v. Mc-
MuUen, 46 lb. 307; Peo. v. Bissell, 49
Cal. 407; People v. Tilton, 47 lb. 614.
'Walker v. Ferrill, 58 Ga. 512;
Elam V. State, 75 Ind. 518; Brady v.
Howe, 50 Miss. 607; Sappington v.
Scott, 14 Md. 40; Smoot v. Somer-
ville, 59 lb. 88; contra, State v.
Cooke, 54 Tex. 482.
8 Peo. V. Crissey, 91 N. Y. 610;
Peo. V. Wilson, 72 N. C. 155; State
V. Washburn, 17 Wis. 658; Adv.
Opin., 5 So. Eep. 613; Win. Co. v.
Maynard, 44 Iowa, 15 ; State v. Matli-
eney, 7 Kan. 327; State v. Hunt, 54
N. H. 431.
9 Peo. V. Curtis, 1 Idaho N. S. 753;
Peo. V. Baine, 6 Cal. 509; King v. Mc-
Lure, 84 N. C. 153 ; Mayoralty Case,
19 Gratt. 673.
125
83
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIOIirS.
[CH. VI.
§ 83. Removals — When for canse. — Where there are no
constitutional or statutory restraints, and where the duration of
the official term is not fixed by law, the power of removal is an
incident of the power to appoint ; and it may be exercised at
the pleasure of the appointing officer.^
Such a power of removal at pleasure while it is discretionary,
is not judicial, and the officer exercising it has the sole and ex-
clusive right to pronounce upon the propriety of using it.^ And
no notice or hearing need be accorded to the official before being
removed.^ But such arbitrary power of removal does not exist,
when the official tenure is fixed by law,* or when the right to
remove can be exercised for cause only.^ So, if the officer be
appointed to hold during the pleasure of some third officer, the
appointing officer cannot remove him arbitrarily, nor can an offi-
cer, holding office at the pleasure of the appointing power, be
removed by any other person, except it be for malfeasance in
office, by judicial decree.^
The power of removal for cause is strictly construed, and its
exercise should be restrained within the limits assigned to it
^Newsome v. Cocke, 44 Miss. 352;
Williams v. Gloucester, 148 Mass.
2.56; Hudson v. Denver, 12 Colo. 157;
20Pac. R. 329; State v. Alt 26 Mo.
App. 673; State v. Pol. Com'rs, 88
Mo. 144; People v. Whitlock, 92 N.
Y. 191; Peo. v. Robb, 126 lb. 180;
Peo. V. Thompson, 94 N. Y. 451; Peo-
ple V. Kobb, 27 X. E. R. 267 (N. Y.
91); People v. Cain, 47 N. W. R. 484;
84 Mich. 223; State v. Somers, (Keb.
93) 53 N. W. K. 146; People v Pur-
loy, 10 N. Y. Sup. 181; Avery v. Ty-
ringham, 3 Mass. 277; Blake v. U. S.,
103 tJ. S. 227; Evans v. Jus., 3
llayw. (Tenn.) 26; Madison v. Kelso,
32Ind. 79; State v. Kiichli, (Minn.
93) 54 N. W. R. 1069; Carter v. Du-
rango, 27 Pac. R. 1057; 16 Colo. 534;
State v. Common, 6 Atl. R. 518; 49
N. ,T. L. 177; People v. Fire Com'rs,
73 K. Y. 437; Peo. v. Mayor, 16 Hun,
309; Ford v. Board etc., 81 Cal. 19;
"Williams v. Boughner, 6 Coldw. 486;
Com. V. Sutherland, 3 So. E. 14.j;
126
Houseman v. Com., 100 Pa. St. 222;
Cincin. v. Sloane, 31 Ohio St. 1 ; State
V. Barrow, 29 La. An. 243; Smith v.
Brown, 59 Cal. 672; State v. St.
Louis, 90 Mo. 672.
2 People V. Mayor, 82 N. Y. 491.
sField V. Com., 32 Pa. St. 478; State
V. St. Louis, 90 Mo. 19; State v. Ste-
vens, 46 N. J. L. 344; State v. Mc-
Garry, 21 Wis. 496; Smithy. Brown,
59 Cal. 672.
*Dil. Mun. Corp. § 250 ; People v.
Flynn, 62 N. Y. 375; People v. Hill,
7 Cal. 79; People v. Jewett, 6 lb.
291; State v. Chatburn, 63 Iowa, 659;
Keenau v. Perry, 24 Tex. 253 ; Col-
lins v. Tracy, 36 lb. 546.
6 Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201;
Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 lb. 480;
People V. Hayden, 133 N. Y. 198;
Field V. Com., 32 Pa. St. 478; Duer
V. Board, (N. J. 93) 26 Atl. 144; Wil-
son v. DuUam, 53 Mich. 392; Com. v.
McReak, 20 S. W. R. 220 (Ky. 91).
« Carr v. State, 111 Ind. 101.
CH. YI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICEKS.
§83
by the enabling statute.^ Where removals are authorized for
causes named in , the statute, removals can be made 6n\y for
such causes, and others of a similar nature.^ The power to re-
move subordinates, for the purpose of reducing the number of
officials employed, cannot be exercised to create vacancies to
be filled by the appointing power ; ^ but it should in this connec-
tion be observed that the Legislature may confer upon a mu-
nicipal official the authority to make removals for cause, and to
make him the sole judge of the sufficiency of the cause.*
The power to remove for cause is judicial in its nature ; and
when conferred upon superior officers, it must be exercised rea-
sonably ; not capriciously or arbitraiily, but in the spirit of
impartiality and fairness; and must be guarded by proper pre-
cautions against favoritism and injustice.^ For this reason, the
exercise of the power is always subject to judicial review.® If
the cause of removal be misconduct on tlie part of the official
it must, in order to justify his removal, be of such a character as
to affect his performance of official duty,' and not merely such
iDuerr v. Board, (N. J. 93) 26 Atl.
R. 144; People v. McLean, 21 N. T.
Supp. 625; Cleary V. Trenton, 20 N.
J. L. 331; Clark v. Cape May, 50 lb.
558; Clark v. Peo., 15 111. 213; Haw-
kins V. Kercheval, 10 Lea (Tenn.)
535; State V. Chamber, 20 Wis. 63;
Mead v. Dreas, 36 Mich. 416; State
V. Lingo, 26 Mo. 496; People v. Al-
bany M. Col., 62 How. Pr. 220; State
V. Jer. City, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 536;
Mayor etc. v. Shaw, 16 Ga. 172; Com.
V. Slifer, 25 Pa. St. 28; Crawford v.
Township, 24 Mich. 248; McGregor
V. Gladwine Co., 37 lb. 388.
MVellman v. Board, 84 Mich. 558;
47 N. W. E. 558 ; Peo. v. Higgins, 15
111. 110; Dubrie v. Voss, 10 La. An.
210; State v. McGarry, 21 Wis. 496;
Com. yf. Williams, 79 Ky. 42.
^ Lincoln v. Yeoman, (Neb. 92) 51
N. W. R. 844; State v. Schumaker,
27 La. An. 332.
" Patton V. Vaughan, 39 Ark. 211 ;
Wilson V. People, 90 111, 186; People
V. New York, 82 N. Y. 491; Keenan
V. Perry, 24 Tex. 253; State v. Do-
herty, 25 La. An. 119; Nolan v. New
Orleans, 10 lb. 106; State v. Reg-
ister, 59 Md. 283; Peo. v. Whitlock,
92 N. Y. 191; State v. Stevens, 46 N.
J. L. 344; People v. Board etc., 73
N. Y. 437; State v. Board etc., 26
Ohio St. 24; State v. McGarry, 21
Wis. 496.
^Duerr V. Board, supra; Madison
V. Korbley, 32 Ind. 74; Stadler v.
Detroit, 33 Mich. 346; Stockwell v.
Township, 22 Mich. 341 ; Dullam v.
Wilson, 53 lb. 392; In re Eaves, 30
Fed. Rep. 21; Randall v. State, 16
Wis. 340; Larkinv. Noonan, 19 lb. 82.
6 People v. McLean, 57 Hun, 587;
Foster V. Kansas, 112 lb. 201; Wil-
lard's App., 4 E. L 601 ; Field v. Com.,
32 Pa. St. 478; State v. Bryoe, 7 Ohio,
pt.l, 282; In re Nichols, 57 How. Pr.
395; Page v. Hardin, 8B. Mon. (Ky.)
672; see also 58 Hun, 603; 59 lb. 623;
58 lb. 654; 63 lb. 633.
' Clapp v. Board of Pol., 72 N. Y.
415; Com. v. Williams, 79 Ky. 42;
People v. Board, 55 Hun, 445 ; Com.
V. Chambers, 1 J. J. Marsh, 160;
127
§83
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. vr.
moral delinquencies, which only affect his character as an iiidi-
vidualnnember of the community ; unless the offence be of such
an infamous character as to render him unfit to exercise any
public office, because it would shock the public sense of decency,
to permit him to retain his office. Such a state of affairs would
make it impossible for the offending ofEcial to perform the du-
ties of the office in an acceptable manner.^ While the forego-
ing statement is a reasonably correct statement of the existing
law, it must, however, be remembered that a most radical
change in public opinion on this question is taking place, par-
ticularly in regard to the effect of unchastity on the fitness of
a candidate for public office, which will probably effect a uioje
or less serious modification of the existing law.^ If the offence
be criminal^ but it does not constitute a breach of official duty,
it. is held by many cases, in consonance with the legal princi-
ple that every man must be presumed to be innocent until his
guilt be proven, that the officer should not be deprived of his
office, until his guilt has been judicially established in a court
of competent jurisdiction.^ If the official be accused of an of-
fence which is a breach of duty, but which is not at the same
tiriie a crime, he is triable by the official in whom the power of
removal is vested.* And when the offence is both a breach of
duty and a criminal or infamous offence, the offending official
may be tried and removed for the breach of duty, before trial for
the public delinquency.^ When misconduct or malfeasance is
Com. V. Barry, Hard. (Ky.) 229; Mc-
Comas V. Krug, 81 Ind. 327; State
V. Savage, 89 Ala. 1.
1 Com. V. St. Patricks, 9Binn. (Pa.)
441; Com. v. Guardians, etc., 6 S. &
R. (Pa.) 469; Society v. Com., 52 Pa.
St. 125; Evans v. Phila. Club, 50 lb.
107; Peo. V. Board, etc., 72 N. Y.
445; Com. v. Shaver, 3W. <& S. (Pa.)
338; Breckinridge v. State, 27 Tex.
App. 513; Peo. v. Cooper, 57 How.
Pr. 416; Mayor v. Shaw, 16 Ga. 172.
^ See Tiederaan's Limitations of
Police Power, § 17 c.
2 Com. V. Jones, 10 Bush, 725 ; State
V. Humphries, 74 Tex. 466; Cum-
mings V. Missouri, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 277;
Peo. V. Board, 9 Hun, 222; 20 Hun,
128
333; Rex v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517,
538 (1758), is a leading case; Barker
V. Peo., 3 Cow. 686; Mayor, etc., v.
Shaw, 16 Ga. 172; In re Dorsey, 7
Port. (Ala.) 293; Cort v. State, 28
Ark. 417; Com. v. Chambers, 1 J. J'
Mai-sh. (Ky.) 160; see contra, Peo. v.
French, 32 Huu, 112; 60 How. Pr.
377; Peo. v. Board, 11 Hun, 403;
Oliver v. City Council, 69 Ga. 165.
* Rex V. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517;
Com. V. St. Patricks, etc., 2Binn.441.
5 Rex V. Chalke, 6 Comb. 397; Don-
ohue V. Will Co., 100 111. 94; Peo. v.
French, 32 Hun, 112 ; 60 How. Pr.
377; Rex v. Wells, 4 Burr. 1999; Dil.
Mun. Corp. §251.
CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS.
§84
named as the cause for removal, the words have reference to
the official conduct of the officer, and .signify a vtfillful or negli-
gent breach of his duty, or a perversion of his official authority,
by which some one is unjustly injured.^ The elements of ille-
gality, neglect, omission of duty or corruption must be present,
in order to constitute official misconduct or malfeasance.^
§ 84. Proceedings to remove for cause. — When it is pro-
vided that the official tenure shall continue during good be-
havior, or when the power oE removal can only be exercised
upon the occurrence of certain specified causes, there must be
a notice to the accused official, a formulated charge, a hearing
of the evidence in its support, and an opportunity granted to
the party defendant of making a defence.^ The accused official
is entitled to a personal notice of the charges which have been
made against him, and of the time when the trial will take
place.* The body, which is empowered to conduct the trial,
should be composed of all those officials, in whom the power of
removal is vested.^ It is not necessary that the citation should
set out all the charges in detail ; ^ but it is a well settled rule,
that the basis of the proceedings must be specific charges, suffi-
cient, if proven, to furnish a cause for removal.^ It is the right
1 Wellman v. Board, 51 N. W. E.
1070; O'Neill v. Register, (Md. 92) 23
Atl. 960; Peo. v. Mays, 117 III. 237;
Peo. V. Jordan, 90 N. Y. 53; State v.
Hixon, 41 Mo. 210; State v. Teasdale,
21 Fla. 652; Minkler v. State, 14 Neb.
181; Hughes v. Court, 42 N. W. K.
984; 75 Mich. 574; Taggart v. Detroit,
38 N. W. R. 714; State v. Hawkins,
44 OMo St. fS; People v. Com'rs, 49
H. T. Super. Ct. 369; Woods v. Var-
num, 83 Cal. 46; Runnels v. State,
Walk. (Miss.) 146; State v. Jersey
City, 25 N. J. L. 536; Mayor v. Shaw,
16 Ga. 172.
2 Peo. V. Board, 55 Hun, 445; State
V. Council, (Minn. 93) 55 N. W. R.
118; Coit V. Lyons, 33 Conn. 109; Mil-
liken v. Council, 54 Tex. 388; Oliver
V. Council, 69 Ga. 163.
a State V. Smith, 52 N. W. R. 700
(Neb. 92) ; Duerr v. Board, 26 Atl. R.
144 (N. J. 93); Field v. Com. 32 Pa,
9
St. 478; Hoboken v. Gear, 3 Dutch.
265; Madison v. Korbley, 32 Ind. 74;
Stadler v. Detroit, 13 Mich. 346.
* The accused may waive notice by
appearance and answer, or by a total
desertion of the place; as, for ex-
ample, where he has removed from
his former residence, and changed his
domicile permanently. Dil. Muu.
Corp. §254; Rex v. Ipswich, 2 Ld.
Ray. 1240; Rex v. Grimes, 5 Burr.
2601.
5 Charles v. Mayor, etc., 27 N.J. L.
203; Jacksonville V. Allen, 25 111. Ap.
54; Andrews V. King, 77 Me. 224; Peo.
V. Board, 23 Hun, 351.
I* Peo. V. Benev. Soc, 24 How. Pr.
216; Society v. Van Dyke, 2 Whart.
^Pa.) 309; In re Nichols, 6 Abb. New
Cas. 474; Peo. v. Com'rs, etc., 106 N.
T. 64.
'Woods V. Varnura, 85 Cal. 639;
Peo. V. Mayor, etc., 19 Hun, 441; Peo-
129
§85
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIOKS.
[CH. VI.
of the accused to have reasonable time and opportunity, in
which to prepare his defence, to employ and be represented at
the hearing by counsel, to call witnesses in his defence, and to
cross-examine the witnesses and take exception to the testi-
mony offered against him.^ Although the rules governing judi-
cial procedure are substantially applicable,^ yet the proceedings
are not required to be carried on with that degree of preciseuess,
which is usual in common law pleading and practice.* In every
case, the truth of the charges must if not admitted be proven.*
If an officer refuses to surrender his office, after he has been re-
moved by the lawful authority and in a lawful manner, he may
be ousted by a proceeding in quo warranto.^
§ 85. Proceedings in case of illegal removal — Right to
salary when wrongfully deprived of his office. — The courts
of general jurisdiction exercise a supervisory power over re-
movals for cause ; ^ and will grant a mandamus to restore an
official who has been erroneously or illegally removed.''
An official of a municipal corporation, who has been illegally
removed, can also recover the amount of compensation due him
from the date of his removal to that of his reinstatement, or to
the expiration of his term.^ But in determining, whether the
pie V. Carroll, 42 Hun, 438;.Peo. v.
French, 102 N. Y. 583; Peo. v. Nich-
ols, 79 lb. 582; Peo. v. Stavks, 33
Hun, 384; Peo. v. Therrien,80 Mich.
187; In re Nichols, 57 How. Pr. 397;
Peo. V. Fire Com'rs, 77 N. Y. 153.
iDuerr v. Board, 26 Atl. 144; Peo-
ple V. Hanuan, 56 Hun, 469; State v.
Bryce, 7 Ohio, pt. 2, 414; Murdock
V. Academy, 12 Pick. 244; In re Nich-
ols, 6 Abb. N. C. 474; In re Em-
mett, 65 How. Pr. 266; Ledbetter v.
State, 10 Ala. 241; Peo. v. Nichols,
79 N. Y. 582.
2 Peo. V. Doolittle, 44 Hun, 293;
Peo. v. Therrien, 80 Mich. 187; Peo.
V. Starks, 33 Hun, 384.
" People V. McClave, 123 N. Y. 512;
25 N. E. E. 1047; McAulliffe v. New
Bedford, (Mass. 92) 29 N. E. E. 517;
People V. Com'rs, 98 N. Y. 332.
« People V. Eobb, 6 N. Y. S. 831 ;
State V. Board, 6 Atl. E. 659; 49 N.
130
J. L. 170; Peo. v. Cooper, 58 How.
Pr. 358; Callahan v. State, 2 Stew. &
P. (Ala.) 379; Com. v. Arnold, 3 Litt.
(Ky. ) 309.
5 Eex V. Doncaster, 2 Ld. Eaym.
1566; Cushing v. Frankfort, 57 Me.
541; Jay's Case, 1 Vent. 302. See
post, §§ 381, 382.
6 Woods V. Varnum, 83 Cal. 46;
Mayor v. Brown, 54 Ga. 229; Peo. v.
French, 60 How. Pr. 377; Storer v.
Washington, Peck (Tenn.) 334.
' People v. Campbell, 82 N. Y. 247;
Com. V. German Soc, 15 Pa. St. 251;
State V. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. 536;
Donnelly v. Teasdale, 21 Fla. 632.
See post, § 372.
sstadler v. Detroit, 13 Mich. 346;
Shaw V. Mayor, 19 Ga. 468; Eiley v.
Kansas City, 31 Mo. Ap. 439; Hobo-
ken V. Gear, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 275;
White V. Mayor, 4 E. D. Smith, 563.
CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AST) OFFICERS.
§85
removal was unlawful, the reviewing court will not be confined
to the consideration of the grounds which were assigned for
the removal, but may and should consider all the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case which affect the question of legality of
the removal, and find for the city, whenever there is sufficient
justification for the removal, whether the authorities made the
removal on that ground or on some other untenable ground.^
Where, however, there is no legal justification for the removal,,
either assigned or not referred to, the officer may be reinstated,
and be given a judgment for back salary, even though the au-
thorities, who made the removal, acted in a judicial capacity,
and in pursuance of judicial power, vested in them by law ; '■^
unless the statute, which vests this judicial power of removal
in the municipal authorities, expressly declares that their judg-
ment is final and denies the right of appeal to the courts of
general jurisdiction ; when the latter courts in that case have no
jurisdiction over the case.^ And so, also, where a municipal
official is under arrest to answer a charge of crime, brought by
the state, and he is removed and his successor appointed ; his
acquittal from the criminal charge does not give him an action
against the city for the salary, of which he had been deprived.*
The incumbent of an office is, however, entitled to compensar
tion until he receives actual notice of his removal ; ^ and, so it
has been held, until his successor has been appointed.''
But whether the municipality is liable to its officer dejure for
salary for any period, during which the officer was not actually
in office, even though he was prevented wrongfully from occu-
pying the position, has been decided both in the negative "^ and
yor etc. v. Shaw's Adm'r, 25
Ga. 590; Hex v. Mayor, 2 Cowp. 523;
King V. Mayor, 12 T. K. 182.
2 Shaw V. Mayor etc., 19 Ga. 468;
Shaw V. Mayor etc., 21 6a. 280; s. c,
Mayor etc. v. Shaw, 25 Ga. 590.
8 Nolan V. New Orleans, 10 La. An.
106. See Queen v. Atlanta, 59 Ga.
318.
4 Brunswick V. Fahn, 60 Ga. 109.
' Jarvis v. Mayor, etc., of New
York, 2 N. T. Leg. Obs. 396.
' White V. Mayor of New York, 4
E. D. Smith, 563.
'Brunswick v. Fahn, 60 Ga. 109;
State V. Milne, (Neb. 93) 54 N. W. E.
521; Newtonville v. Gulp, 38 Ohio St.
13; Farrell v. Bridgeport, 45 Conn.
191 ; State v. Davis, 44 Mo. 131 ; Smith
V. New York, 37 N. Y. 518; Wayne v.
Benoit, 20 Mich. 176; Saline v. An-
derson, 20 Kan. 298; Webster v. Kan-
sas City, 64 Mo. 493 ; Dolan v. Mayor,
68 N. Y. 279; Queen v. Atlanta, 59
Ga. 318; Hadley v. Mayor, 83 N. Y.
603.
131
§86
MTJNICIPAL COKPORATIONS.
[CH. VI.
the afiSrmative ; ^ according to whether the courts consider the
matter of official salary, as a question of compensation for
services rendered, or as one of personal right, as a perquisite
or appurtenant to one's lawful title to the office, something in
the nature of a private franchise. And while it is generally-
held that the officer de facto is not entitled to the salary at-
tached to the office, although he may perform his official duties
satisfactorily ; ^ it seems to be generally settled everywhere,
that the courts will not ordinarily interfere to restrain the pay-
ment of official salary, pending a contest over the possession
of the office by the opposing claimants, unless the bill shows
special grounds for equitable relief.^ But where the liability
of the city for back salary to an officer, who is unlawfully kept
out of office by an intruder, is denied, the officer dejure, upon
establishment of his right to the office, may maintain an action
for damages against the usurper for the salary which he had
drawn for the time during which he had been the officer de
facto.* And where the usurping official had received only a
part of such salary, the balance may be recovered of the city
by the officer de jure, upon his installation in office.^
§ 86. Resignations — Incompatible oflBces — Change of
residence.^" An office must be resigned either expressly or by
■Phila. v. Given, 60 Pa. St. 136;
Memphis v. Woodward, 12 Heisk.
499; People v. Miller, 24 Midi. 458;
Savage v. Piokard, 14 Lea, 46; Fitz-
siraons v. Brooklyn, 102 N". Y. 536;
^V'illiams V. Clayton, 21 Pao. R. 398;
Andrew^s v. Portland, 79 Me. 484;
Dorsey v. Smith, 28Cal. 21; Meagher
V. County, 5 Nev. 244; Carroll v. Sie-
benthale, 37 Cal. 193.
estate V. Carroll, 38 Conn. 471;
Bentley v. Phelps, 27 Barb. 524;
Samis v. King, 40 Conn. 298; People
V. Tieman, 30 Barb. 193; Riddle v.
Bedford Co., 7 Serg. & R. 386. Cf.
contra, Behan v. Board of Com'rs,
(Ariz. 93) 31 Pac. 521; Blackburn v.
Oklahoma, 31 Pac. 382.
8 Field v. Commonwealth, 32 Pa.
St. 478; Colton v. Price, 50 Ala. 424;
Queen v. Governors, etc., 8 Ad. &
182
El. 632; Bruner v. Bryan, 50 Ala.
523; Bowerbank v. Morris, Wall. C.
C. R. 118; In re Ramsay, 83 Eng. C.
L. 174; Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Men.
648; In re Henner, 13 Pet. 230; post,
§§ 392, 393.
' 4 Dorsey v. Smythe, 28 Cal. 21;
Nichols V. McLean, 101 N. Y. 526;
City V. Given, 60 Pa. St. 136; People
V. Nolan, 102 N. Y. 539; Douglas v.
State, Sllnd. 429;Strattonv. Sulton,
28 Cal: 44; State v. Sherwood, 42 Mo.
179; Allen v. McKeau, 1 STimn. 276;
Beyter v. Dodsworth, 6 T. E. 681;
Hunter v. Chandler, 45 Mo. 452; 10
Am. L. Reg. 440; People v. Miller,
24 Mich. 458; Sadler v. Evans, 4
Burr. 1984.
5 McVeany v. New York, 80 N. Y.
185 ; Beuoit v. Wayne Co., 20 Mich.
176, Cooley, J., dissenting.
CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OEFICBES.
§
implication.^ At common law, a tender or offer of one's resig-
nation is revocable until accepted ; and the act is not a resig-
nation until the offer shall have been accepted by the proper
authority.^ This English rule has been commonly followed in
America, wherever it has not been changed by statute,^ although
it cannot be said to be definitely settled. There are many
American decis^ions, which hold that a resignation creates a
vacancy, as soon as it comes to the hands of the proper authority,
without any acceptance, express or implied.* And this is in-
variably so, if the statute provides that the officer may resign at
pleasure.®
Unless prescribed by statute, no particular form of words are
required in a resignation ; ® and the acceptance ma}-^ be implied
as well ,as express."^ It is a well settled rule at common law,
that the acceptance by an officer of a second office, which is
incompatible with the first, is equivalent to and implies his
resignation of the first, and that the first office is vacant with-
out any other act on his part, and without a proceeding for re-
moval or quo warranto? If the first office be one, from which
1 Dillon's Mun. Corp. §224; Eeg.
of University, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 365,
422.
2 Rex V. Lane, 2 Ld. Raymond,
1304.
"Thompson v. U. S., 103 U. S.4'71;
Edwards V. U. S., 103 lb. 471; Ore-
gon V. Jennings, 119 U. S. 74; State
V. Newark, 27 N. J. L. 198; State v.
Ferguson, 31 N. J. L. 120; Greene v.
Hudson Co., 44 N. J. L. 388; Hoke
V.Henderson, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 1; 25
Am. Dec. 677; London v. Headon, 76
N. C. 72; Jones v. Jefferson, 66 Tex.
576;Waycross v. Youmans, 80 Ga.
708; Hetherington v. Sterry, 28 Kan.
429; Rogers v. Slonaker, 32 lb. 193.
■•U. S. V. Wright, 1 McLean, 509;
Gilbert v. Luce, 11 Barb. 91 ; 01m-
stead V. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 378; Bunt-
ing V. Willis, 27 Gratt. 144; 21 Am.
Rep. 338; Smith v. Dyer, 1 Cull. (Va.)
562; Gates v. Del. Co., 12 Iowa, 405;
State V. Mayor, 4 Neb. 260; State v.
Clark, 3 Nev. 566; State v. Pitts, 49
Ala. 402; People v. Porter, 6 Cal. 26.
6 Amy v. Watertown, 130 U. S. 302;
Reese v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107
(resignation to avoid mandamus),
and Leav. Co. v. Sellew, 99 0. S. 624;
Leav. V. Kinney, 99 U. S. 623 ; Dillon
Mun. Corp. § 861 6.
« Van Orsdale v. Hazard, 3 Hill (N.
Y.) 243, 248; State v. Allen, 21 Ind.
516; Peo. v. Pol. Board, 26 N. Y. 316;
Edwards v. U. S., 103 U. S. 471; Peo.
V. Brooklyn, 77 N. Y. 503.
' Edwards v. United States, 103 U.
S. Rep. 471; Gates v. Del. Co., 12
Iowa, 405; Pace v. People, 50111. 432.
8 Com. V. Hawkes, 123 Mass. 525;
Magie v. Stoddard, 25 Conn. 565;
Peo. V. Hanifan, 96 111. 420; Dailey
v. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 329; Lucas
V. Shepherd, 16 Ind. 368; State v.
Butz, 9 S. C. 156; State v. Hutt, 2
Ark. 282; Wilson v. King, 3 Litt.
(Ky.) 457; State v. Newhouse, 29 La.
133
§86
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. VI.
the officer cannot resign without the concurrence of superior au-
thority, the acceptance of an incompatible office does not work
an absolute vacancy of the first office, unless the superior au-
thority be privy to the incompatible appointment.^ But in this
country, where an official can usually resign at pleasure, it has
been held that the superior authority cannot refuse the resigna-
tion,^ or compel the officer to retain the first office against his
will.3
Something more than the mere physical impossibility to per-
form the duties of the two offices is required, to constitute this
incompatibility. Offices may properly be said to be incompati-
ble, when for reasons, arising out of an enlightened public pol-
icy, it would be wrong for one person to retain both.* In every
case, it is a question of fact for judicial determination, whether
the public interests require the abandonment of one or the other
of the two alleged incompatible offices ; and it is also very likely,
that the inordinate demand for public office leads to the deter-
mination that the offices are incompatible, when in fact there
would be no difficulty in the acceptable performance of the du-
ties of both offices by the same person. It is surprising to what
extent this question has been raised before the courts, and the
citations are very numerous.
It has thus been held that the office of alderman, of a town or
city, is incompatible with that of county treasurer,^ town clerk,*
capital burgess '' and city chamberlain.^ The office of town
An. 824; Stubbs v. Lee, 64 Me. 195;
Ex parte Call, 2 Tex. App. 497;
Pooler V. Eeed, 73 Me. 129; State v.
Draper, 45 Mo. 355 ; Shell v. Cousins,
77 Va. 328; State v. Brown, 5 K. 1. 1;
State V. GofE, 15 K. I. 505; Peo. v.
Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 375 ; Bieucourt v.
Parker, 27 Tex. 558; State v. Brink-
erhoff, 66 lb. 45 ; Davenport v. Mayor,
67 N. T. 456; Peo. v. Carrique, 2 Hill
(N. Y.) 93; Van Orsdell v. Hazard, 3
lb. 248.
iRex V. Patterson, 4 B. & A. 9;
Gates V. Del. Co. , 12 Iowa, 405 ; con-
tra, U. S. V. Board, 53 Fed. 739.
• IT. S. V. Wright, 1 McLean, 509.
= State V. Mayor of Lincoln, 4Keb.
260. Cf. State v. Ferguson, 2 Vroom,
134
31 N". J. L. 107, 129; People v. Mc-
Lean, 62 Hun, 42; Peo. v. Porter, 6
Cal. 26; see § 78 on Acceptance; and
see People v. Williams, (111. 93) 33
IST. E. E. 849.
* Preston v. U. S. , 37 Fed. Eep. 417 ;
State V. Feibleman, 28 Ark. 424;
State V. Briukerhofe, 66 Tex. 45;
Stubbs V. Lee, 64 Me. 195; People v.
Green, 5 Daly, 254; 58 N. Y. 295.
s Eex V. Patterson, 4 B. & Ad. 9;
24 E. C. L. 11.
6 Eex V. Tizzard, 9 B. & C. 418; 17
E. C. L. 411.
' Eex V. Hughes, 5 B. & C. 886; 12
E. C. L. 399.
8 Throop's Public Officers, § 35.
CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS.
86
marshal is incompatible with that of hailiff,i city councilman ; ^
and the city councilman with that of director of state prison,*
although compatible with a town clerk.* The office of mayor is
held to be incompatible with that of town clerk,^ director of state
prison,® retired U. S. army officer;'^ although a retired army
officer may be also an aqueduct commissioner.* The offices
of chief supervisor of elections, and of counsel to the health de-
partment of a city, are incompatible ; ® and so are a jury com-
missioner and a police commissioner.^" On the other hand, it is
held that there is no incompatibility in the case of the inspector
of elections and an interpreter of a Municipal Court,-'-'^ deputy
clerk of municipal court and legislator,^^ county cleik and clerk
of Circuit Court,^^ clerk andcollector of school district.^* Other
illustrations may be added, where the question of incompati-
bility was raised between offices, not municipal ; but they are
not needed for the purpose of illustrating the principle .^^
Resignation may be implied from other circumstances than
the acceptance of an incompatible office, as in a case where
residence within the municipality is a prerequisite to eligibility
for office, permanent removal from the city would have the effect
of resignation, on account of incidental disqualification for the
office.!® But if the subsequent residence beyond tlie limits of
the election district is due to a change in the boundaries of the
district, and not to a change of residence, the officer's title to
his office is not affected thereby, and there is no implied res-
1 Lewis V. Wall, 70 Ga. 646.
2 State V. Hoyt, 2 Oregon, 246.
3 State V. Kirk, 44 Ind. 401 ; 15 Am.
Rep. 239.
4 Rex V. Jones, 1 B. & Ad. 677.
s Com. Dig. 7, tit. Officer B. 6.
^Howard v. Shoemaker, 35 Ind.
111.
■State V. DeGress, 53 Tex. 387.
8 People V. Duane, 121 N. Y. 367.
"Davenport v. Mayor, etc. of N.
Y., 67 N. T. 456.
'"State V. Newhouse, 29 La. An.
824.
" Goettman v. Mayor, etc. of N.
7., 6 Hun, 132.
'2 People V. Green, 58 N. T. 295, re-
versing 5 Daly 254; 46 How. Pr. 169;
People V. Murray, 73 N. Y. 535, re-
versing 8 Daly, 347.
13 State V. Lusk, 48 Mo. 242.
1* Howland v. Luce, 16 Johns. 135.
15 For a rather full citation of com-
patible and incompatible officers in
general, see 19 Am. & Eng. Euc. of
Law, 562 w., and Throop's Public
officers, §35, et. seq.
16 Curry v. Stewart, 8 Bush. 560;
State V. Graham, 26 La. Ann. 568;
21 Am. Rep. 551 ; People v. Parker,
3 Neb. 409; 19 Am. Rep. 634; Mc-
Gregor V. Allen, 33 La. Am. 870;
Yonkey V. State, 27 Ind. 236.
135
§87
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. VI.
ignation.^ And so, also, there is no implied resignation, where
the absence or change of residence of the official is only tempo-
rary. ^
§ 87. General powers and duties of officers. — The powers
and duties of municipal officials are purely statutory ; ^ or in the
absence of statute, such as may be necessarily implied for the
proper exercise of municipal functions.*
Statutory provisions, conferring powers upon municipal offi-
cials, must be strictly construed and followed ; ^ and the statu-
tory powers, with which they are invested, should by no means
be extended beyond the limits marked out for their exercise, by
the declarations of the legislative intention.®
1 State V. Milwaukee, 21 "Wis. 433;
contra, People v. Highland Park, 50
K. W. R. 660; 88 Mich. 653.
2 Kex V. Harris, 1 B. & Ad. 936 ; 20
E. C. L. 509; Page v. Hardin, 8 B.
Mon. 648; Hedley v. Franklin Co., 4
Blackf. 116; State v. Allen, 21 Ind.
516; 83 Am. Dec. 367.
3 Condron v. New Orleans, 43 La.
An. 1202; Wilson v. Shreveport, 29
La. An. 673 ; Nelson v. Mayor, 5 Hun,
190; Graves v. Otis, 2 Hill (IST. Y.)
466; Smith v. Deweese, 41 Tex. 594;
Peo. V. Ransom, 56 Barb. 514; Gage
V. Hornellsville, 41 lb. 87; Gale v.
Mayor, 8 Hun, 370; Jane v. Alley,
64 Miss. 446; Greathouse v. Dunn,
60 Cal. 311; Indianapolis v. Wasson,
74 Ind. 133 ; Robertson v. Groves, 4
Oreg. 210.
* Connett v. Chicago, 29 N. E. R.
280; 114 111.233; In re Eckstein, 24
Atl. R. 63; 30 W. N. C. 59; Perry v.
Cheboygan, 55 lb. 250; Mayor v.
Sands, 105 N. T. 210; Schwarz v.
Barry, (Mich. 92) 51 N. W. R. 279;
Pagan v. Mayor etc., 84 N. Y. 348;
Larned v. Briscoe, 62 Mich. 393;
Geary v. Kansas, 61 Mo. 378 ; Labrie
V. Manchester, 59 N. H. 120; Sher-
lock V. Winnelka, 68 111. 530.
^Bellaire Co. v. Pindlay, 5 Ohio
Cir. Ct. 418; Keeler v. Milledge, 24
N. J. L. 142; Galveston v. Devlin, 19
136
S. "W. R. 395; Larned v. Briscoe, 62
Mich. 393; Logansport v. Legg, 20
Ind. 315; Jeffersonville v. Patterson,
32 lb. 140; Cen. Bridge v. Lowell,
15 Gray, 106; Andrews v. King, 77
Me. 224; Gurnee v. Chicago, 40 111.
165; Glass v. Ashburg, 49 Cal. 571;
Mayor etc. v. State- Bk., 8 Ark. 227;
Dalzell etc. Co. v. Pindlay, 5 Ohio
Cir. Ct. 4.35 ; Foster v. Findlay, 5 lb.
455 ; Tower v. Walker, (Iowa, 93) 53
N. W. R. 289.
"> Advertiser etc. v. Detroit, 43
Mich. 116; Mudge v. Williamsport, 78
Pa. St. 158. See as to powers, duties
and jurisdiction of municipal officers
under particular charters, Board v.
Glennon, 21 Hun, 244; In re Wright,
29 lb. 357; 65 How. Pr. 119; Lyth
V. Buffalo, 48 Hun, 175; Weeks v.
Forman, 16 N. J. L. 237; In re 11th
Ave., 49 How. Pr. 208; Charles v.
Stewart, 49 Mo. 132; Campbell v. St.
Louis, 71 lb. 106; Barber v. Sag.
City, 34 Mich. 52; Miller v. State,
106 Ind. 415; McGarry v. N. Y. Co.,
7 Robt. 464; Pedrick v. Baily, 12
Gray, 161 ; Tyng v. Boston, 133 Mass.
372; Peo. v. East Sag., 33 Mich. 164;
State v. Heath, 20 La. 518; St. Peter
V. Bauer, 19 Minn. 327; Planters etc.
V. Hanes, 52 Miss. 469; Miller v.
Mayor euc, 5 T. & C. (N. Y.) 219;
Yard's Case, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 41;
CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS.
A municipal or other public official can perform no official
act, and exercise no function, either outside of or within the
municipal jurisdiction, after the close of his term of office ; ^ ex-
cept that, where an executive officer has begun an official act
and carried its performance so far as to render himself liable
therefor, he is authorized to consummate the performance of
that particular official act, notwithstanding he has been removed,
or his term has expired.'''
§ 88. De facto officers. — An officer de facto is one who, with-
out lawful title to the office, successfully, and against all oppo-
sition, obtains the possession of the office under some color of
title, and performs its duties and enjoy its privileges. He is
to be distinguished, on the one hand, from the officer de jure,
who has the paramount title to the office, but who is deprived of
its enjoyment ; and on the other hand from the mere usurper,
who has neither title nor color of title. The acts of officers de
facto, as distinguished from mere usurpers, are universally held
to be valid ; and this rule applies, not only to municipal execu-
tive officials, but to the legislative or governing municipal
council.^
Jackson, 6 Wend. 224; Doolittle v.
Bryan, 14 How. (U. S.) 563.
s Hallgreave v. Campbell, 82 Mich.
255; Eiddeev. Bedford, 1 S. &R.(Pa.)
386; People v. Hopson, 1 Denio, 574;
People V. Runkle, 9 Johns. 147; Trus-
tees V. Hill, 6 Cow. 23 ; State v. Lane,
16 K. I. 620; Kirker v. Cincinnati, '
(Ohio 92) 27 N. E. K. 898; Koontz v.
Hancock, 64 Md. 134; Pritchett v.
Peo., 1 Gilm. 529; Williams v. School
Dis. , 21 Pick. 75; Laver v. MoGlach-
lin, 28 Wis. 364;.Cushing v. Frankf.,
57 Me. 541; Lockhart v. Troy, 48
Ala. 579 ; Koontz v. Burgess, 64 Md,
134; Hamlin V. Dingman, 5 Lans. 61;
People V. Nostrand, 46 K. T. 375 ;
Olmstead v. Dennis, 77 lb. 378; Peo-
ple V. Stevens, 5 Hill. 616; State v.
Jacobs, 17 Ohio, 143 ; People v. Bart-
lett, 6 Wend. 422; Cochran v. Mc-
Cleary, 22 Iowa, 75, 84; Sooville v.
Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 126; Deoorah
V. BuUis, 25 Iowa, 12.
137
Schwartz v. Barry, 51 K W. E. 279;
Keenan v. Goodwin, (E. I. 92) 24 Atl.
E. 148; In re Passaic, (N. J. 92) 20
lb. 517; Peo. v. Flagg, 16 Barb. 503;
Mayor etc. v. Tucker, 1 Daly, 107;
Buokwell V. Hamele, 57 lb. 490;
Board v. Gun-in, 6 Daly, 349 ; Harris
V. Peo., 64 N. T. 148; Peo. v. Dun-
lap, 66 N. Y. 162; Pinney v. Brown,
60 Conn. 164; Peoria etc. Co. v. Peo-
ple, 31 N. E. E. 113; Twogood v.
Mayor, 11 Daly, 167; Muller v. Mayor
etc., 63 N. Y. 355; Hogan v. Mayor,
68 N. Y. 17; Peo. v. Fire Com'rs, 49
N. Y. Super. 369; Peo. v. Connally,
4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 375; Peo. v. Civ.
Ser. Brd., 17 Abb. N. C. 64.
1 Page V. Staples, 13 E. I. 806; Jack-
son V. Humphrey, 1 Johns. 498; Carr
V. Phillips, 39 Mich. 319; Mitchell v.
Malone, 77 Ga. 301 ; Ingerson v. Ber-
ry, 14 Ohio St. 315 ; Guillard v. Ana-
line, 10 Martine (La.) 479.
2 Clark v. Pratt, 55 Me. 546; State
V. Roberts, 12 N. J. L. 114; Tuttle v.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[oh. VI.
This rule should be taken with the qualification, that, as it is
intended to protect the public interests and innocent third per-
sons,^ it is no protection to the officer himself. His acts are
invalid, so far as they constitute an usurpation of another's
rights, and for the unlawful act he is liable to the officer de
jure.^
It must also be borne in mind that, where there is no office,
there can be no officer de facto?
§ 89. Police officials — Power to arrest — The duties of
police officials are now wholly regulated by statute ; and the
police officers can exercise such powers only as have been ex-
pressly conferred upon them by the Legislature, or which under
a strict construction of the statutorj' grant may be said to have
been created by necessary implication.*
Although the duties executed by police officials are confined
usually to some certain limited municipal district, the police
officials are regarded as state, rather than as municipal, officers.^
Nor does it alter this view, that the property, under the charge
of the police, such as station houses, patrol wagons, etc., is
owned by the municipality.^
When the common law powers of constables are conferred
upon police officers, and they act as public conservators of the
peace, they are authorized to arrest upon view and without
1 People V. Sassovioh, 29 Cal. 480;
Hooper v. Goodwin, 48 Me. 79; Pe-
tersiler v. Stone, 119 Mass. 465;
State V. Carroll, 38 Conn. 440; Morton
V. Lee, 28 Kan. 287; Qulnn v. Com.,
25 Grratt. 31; Mclnstry v. Tanner, 9
Johns. 135; Phillips v. Payne, 92 U.
S. 132; Hussey v. Smith, 99 lb. 24;
Wilcox V. Smith, 5 Wend. 231 ; Bur-
gess V. Koontz, 64 Md. 134.
2 Patterson v. Caldwell, 1 Mete.
(Ky.) 493; Gourley v. Hawkins, 2
Iowa, 73 ; G-reea v. Burke, 23 Wend.
490; Keyser v. McKissan, 2 Kawle,
139 ; Neale v. Overseers, 5 Watts, 539 ;
Conover v. Devlin, 15 How. Pr. 477;
Blake v. Sturtevaut, 12 N. H. 567;
Peo. V. Hopson, 1 Denio, 574.
3 Winona v. St. Peter R. Co., 31
Minn. 472; Decorah v. Bullis, 25
138
Iowa, 15, 18; Carleton v. Peo., 10
Mich. 250; Norton v. Shelby Co., 118
U. S. 425; People v. White, 24 Wend.
520, 540.
* Com. V. Dugan, 12 Met. 233; Peo.
V. Police Board, 19 N. T. 188; State
V. Blend, 23 N. E. E. 511; 121 Ind.
514.
'• Baltimore v. Board of Pol., 15
Md. 376; Dillon's Mun. Corp. §§ 60,
61 ; Farrell v. Bridgeport, 45 Conn.
191 ; Burch v. Hardwick, 33 Gratt.
34; Peo. v. Draper, 15 N. T. 532;
Metro. Brd. of Health v. Heister, 37
lb. 661; McDermott V. Met. Pol. Brd.,
5 Abb. Pr. 422; Pol. Com'rs v. Lou-
isville, 3 Bush, 597; see ante, § 18, as
to legislative control of the police
department of a city.
CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS.
§89
warrant, all disorderly persons and other violators of the law
of the state,^ as well as of municipal ordinances,^ either im-
mediately, or as soon as possible, after the commission of the
offence.^
The general rule of constitutional law requires that a war-
rant be obtained for the arrest of one, who is charged with a
breach of the criminal law.* But there are eases, in which the
requirement of a warrant is dispensed with, in order to attain
an enforcement of the law and a due protection of persons and
property against violence. The exceptions to the general rule
are limited, however, to the following cases :
1. When a felony is being committed, an arrest may be made
without a warrant to prevent any further violation of the law.^
2. "When the felony has been committed, and the officer or
private person is justified, by the facts within his knowledge, in
believing that the person arrested has committed the crime.''
3. All breaches of the peace, in assaults and batteries, affrays,
riots, etc., for the purpose of restoring order immediately.^
4. The arrest of all disorderly and other persons who may
be violating the ordinary police regulations for the preservation
1 Taylor v. Strong, 3 Wend. 384;
Com. V. Hastings, 9 Met. 259; Prell
V. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426; Mitchell v.
Lemon, 34 Md. 176: Griffin v. Flock,
llDaly (N. Y.) 274; Taylorv. Strong,
3 Wend. 384.
2 Bryan v. Bates, 15 111. 87; Main v.
McCarty, 15 111. 442 ; State v. Lafferty,
5 Harring., 491; State v. Sims, 16 S.
C. 486.
' Boaz V. Tate, 43 Tnd. 60.
* Tiedeman's Limitations of Police
Power, §§ 33, 33a.
SRulofe V. People, 45 N. Y. 213;
Keenan v. State, 8 Wis. 132; but see
Somerville v. Richards, 37 Mich. 299.
" But the belief must be a reason-
able one. If the facts within his
knowledge do not warrant his belief
in the guilt of the innocent party
whom he has arrested, he will be lia^
ble in an action for false imprison-
ment. State V. Holmes, 48 N. II. 377 ;
Ilally V. Mix, 3 Wend. 350; Renck v.
McGregor, 32 N. J. 70; Common-
wealth v. Deacon, 8 Berg. & R. 47;
State V. Roane, 2 Dev. 58; Long v.
State, 12 Ga. 233; Eames v. State, 6
Humph. 53. Less particularity, in
respect to the reasonableness of the
suspicions against an individual, is
required of an oiEcer who makes an
arrest without warrant, than of a
private person ; the suspicions must
be altogether groundless, in order to
make the officer liable for the wrong-
ful arrest. See Marsh v. Loader, 14
C. B. {S. S.) 535 ; Lawrence v. Hedg-
er, 3 Taunt. 14; Rohan v. Sawin, 5
Gush. 281; Halley v. Mix, 3 Wend.
350; Burns v. Erben, 40 N. Y. 463;
Drennan v. People, 10 Mich. 169.
T Phillips v. Trull, 11 Johns. 477;
Respublica v. Montgomery, 1 Yeates,
419; City Council v. Payne, 2 Nottife
McCord, 475; Vandeveer V. Mattocks,
3 Ind. 479.
139
§90
MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS.
[CH. VI.
of public Older and health, such as vagrants, gamblers, beggars,
who are found violating the law in the public thoroughfares.^
5. It may be added, all similar offences against the ordinances
of the municipality.^
The statutory grants of authority to police officials are very
strictly construed, in order to prevent the abuse of the power,
to the serious infringement of the personal liberty of the citizen,
and the requirements of the statute must be strictly obeyed.^
A police officer must without unreasonable delay * take his
prisoner before the proper tribunal and prefer a complaint
against him, as bj' statute provided.^ But if no tribunal be in
session, the prisoner can legally be detained, for a reasonable
time, at the police station.^
§ 90. The mayor — Nature of Ms duties. — At the head of
every municipal corporation is the mayor, whose duties are
chiefly executive in their nature, although at times, also, both
legislative and judicial; and for their scope and force depend-
ing upon the charter of the corporation, and upon the ordi-
nances and bj'-laws made in pursuance thereof.^
It is his duty in general to see that the municipal ordinances
are obeyed and to pi'eside at corporate meetings.*
As part of the executive power to enforce municipal ordi-
nances, as well as by express statutory provisions, the mayor
1 See Mitchell v. Lemon, 34 Mo.
176, where it was held that one may
be arrested without a warrant, who
was found violating the rules pre-
scribed by the city board of health
for the preservation of the public
health.
-^ 2 White V. Kent, 11 Ohio St. 550;
Thomas v. Ashland, 12 lb. 127. Cf.
Pesterfleld v. Vickers, 3 Coldw.
(Tenn.) 205.
3Com. V. Hastings, supra; Main
v. MeCarty, 15 111. 441 ; Pow v. Beck-
ner, 3 Ind. 475; Roddy v. Finuegan,
43 Md. 490; Com. v. Carey, 12 Gush.
246; Com. v. McLaughlin, 12 lb. 615 ;
Quinn v. Heisel, 40 Mich. 576; Rob-
erts v. Morse, 14Mo. 138; Stage Horse
Cases, 15 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 51;
White V. Kent, 11 Ohio St. 550; Low
140
v. Evans, 16 Ind. 486; Ramsey v. Foy,
10 Ind. 479.
* Johnson v. Americus, 46 Ga. 80.
6 Dillon's Mun. Corp. §§210, 211;
Low V. Evans, 16 Ind. 486; Pow v.
Becker, 3 lb. 475 ; Vandever v. Mat-
tock, 3 lb. 479.
6Boaz v. Tate, 43 Ind. 60; State v.
Freeman, 86 K C. 683; Scircle v.
Nevis, 47 Ind. 289.
' State v. Jer. City, 30 K. J. L. 93;
North V. Crary, 4 Thomp. & C. (N.
T. ) 357 ; North Lawrence v. Hoysradt,
6 Kan. 170; Test v. Com., 4 Dana,
522; Hatch v. Cincinnati, 17 Ohio St.
48; State V. Hudson, 44 lb. 137; Mor-
ley V. Weakley, 86 Mo. 451; Barnes
V. Gottschalk, 3 Mo. Ap. Ill; Daniel
V. Mayor, 11 Humph. 682.
8 Dillon Mun. Corp. § 208.
CH. VI.J MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OPPICBES.
§90
in our larger municipalities is invested with the power of ap-
pointing the heads of the various departments, by which such
ordinances are enforced or put into operation.
In addition to those executive and administrative duties, which
properly appertain to the office, others of a judicial nature, in-
volving the exercise of a very wide discretion, are sometimes
imposed upon him ; and it frequently becomes his duty, under
such circumstances, to administer and enforce, not only the mu-
nicipal charter and ordinances, but, likewise, the general laws
of the state.^
The preservation of public order being of paramount im-
portance, and the municipality being responsible for injury to
property by mob violence, it is within the authority of the
mayor to suppress riots or similar manifestations of a disorderly
character.'* As public morals should be the concern of every
officer sworn to support the law, the mayor, it has been held,
may arrest and fine disorderly and lewd women. ^ But when,
as in most municipalities, the preservation of public order, and
the protection of public morality, is committed to a police de-
partment, established bj- statute ; particularly, when it is placed
under the control of state commissioners, it would seem that
these police powers of the mayor are seriously curtailed, if not
altogether abrogated.
Where the mayor is clothed with judicial power and while
acting as a justice of the peace, he has the power to convict of-
fenders summarily, such power is strictly construed ; and the
record must show the legality of the conviction, and point out
the offence with the utmost precision.*
In many of the cities of the country, the mayor is, ex officio,
a member of the city council, having the power to vote ; and,
1 Henderson v. Davis, 106 N. C. 88;
State V. "Wood, 9 Bosw. (N. T.) 15;
Luehrman v. Shelby Co. etc., 2 La.
425 ; Robinson v. Benton, 49 Ark. 49 ;
Bain v. Mitchell, 82 Ala. 304; Pres-
sel V. Bice, 21 Atl. R. 813; Louis-
iana V. Hardin, 11 Mo. 551; Ex parte
Smith, Hemp St. (U. S.) 200; Sel-
lers V. Corvallis, 5 Oreg. 237; Mar-
tindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411; Prell
V. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426; Starr v.
Wilm. Counc.,3Har. (Del.)294; Com.
V. Leight, 1 B. Mon. lOY; Cluggishv.
Rogers, 13 Ind. 538; People v. May-
nard, 14 111. 419; Morrison v. Mc-
Donald, 21 Me. .^50; Warwick v.
Mayo, 15 Gratt. 528; Maguire v.
Hughes, 13 La. An. 281; Muscatine
V. Stack, 7 Iowa, 505.
2Ela V. Smith, 5 Gray, 121.
^Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331;
79 Am. Dec. 656.
142.
141
§ 92 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VI.
in other municipalities, particularly in the larger ones, he is
given the power of vetoing all legislation of the city council.
In either case, he belongs to the legislative branch of the city
government, and exercises legislative powers.'^
§ 91. Liability of the officer to the corporation.— When
a municipal corporation sustains injury through the negligent
act of its own officer, the officer is liable therefor ; but, in the
absence of a special statutory rule, the recoverj' can only be had
for damages caused by faithlessness in the performance of duty,
or for lack of individual integrity, and not for those arising from
an honest mistake.^ But it is now an almost universal custom
for municipal ofBcials, occupying positions of responsibility, to
give bonds, or furnish sureties, for the faithful performance of
these duties ; and in such cases, the corporation can of course
recover, if the condition of the bond be not performed.^
§ 92. Municipal liability for official acts — In determin-
ing the scope of the liability of the municipality for the tor-
tious acts of its officers, we must recur to the distinction already
drawn* between the puhlic and semi-private character of the mu-
nicipal corporation. So far as the official tort-feasor is charged
with the performance of the strictly public duties of the mu-
nicipal corporation, which are imposed upon it as a local branch
of the state government, and the performance of which concern
the whole state, more or less, as well as the local community,
he is rather to be considered as the agent and servant of the
public, than of the muuicipalitj^, even though he may be ap-
pointed by the municipality.^ Under this rule municipal corpo-
' See post, cliap. vii. on Munici-
pal Councils, etc.
^ Boutte V. Emraer, 9 So. 921; Ken-
dall V. Stokes, 3 How. 87; Lincoln v.
Cliapin, 132 Mass. 470; Minor v. Bank,
1 Pet. (U. S.) 46, 69; McCrea v. Cha-
hoen, 54 Hun, 577; Peo. v. Lewis, 7
Jolins.73; Palmer v. Carroll, 24 IST. H.
314; State v. Chamber of Com., 20
Wis. 63; State v. Nevin, 19 Neb. 162;
Seaman V. Patten, 2 Gaines, 312; Rol-
lins V. Board, 15 Colo. 103; Wilson v.
Mayor, 1 Dcnio, 595; Com. v. Gen-
tber, 17 S. & R. 135; Trafton v. Al-
fred, 15 Me. 258.
" See ante, § 72.
142
5 Bates V. Rutland, 62 Vt. 178; 20
Atl. R. 278; Bulger v. Eden, 82 Me.
352 ; Culver v. Streator, 34 111. App.
77; 22 N. E. R. 810; Laurel (Ind. 91)27
N. E. K. 801; Atwater v. Canandai-
gua, 124 N. Y. 602 ; Van Valkenbergli
V. Mayor, 43 Barb. 109; Rogers v.
Buffalo, 51 Hun, 637; Thompson v.
Mayor, 52 N. Y. Super. 427; O'Leary
V. Board, (Mich. 93) 44 N. W. R. 608;
Terliune v. Mayor, 88 N. Y. 47;
Larned v. Briscoe, 29 N. W. R. 22;
62 Mich. 393; Haskell v. New Bedf.,
108 Mass. 208; Schultz v. Milwaukee,
49 Wis. 254; Doster v. Atlanta, 72
CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS.
§92
rations are not liable for tlie acts of the officers of their police,^
or fire department,^ or firemen,^ or collectors and health officers.^
But where the officers, agents or servants of the municipality
are charged with carrying out the special and strictly local pur-
poses of corporate existence, in the attainment of which the
corporation assumes its semi-private character, and from which
the local community receives the overwhelming, if not sole ben-
efit, the corporation is liable to the same extent, as would any
individual or private corporation under the same circumstances.^
Thus, the municipal corporation is held to be liable in dam-
Prince V. Lynn, 149 Mass. 193 ; Mc-
Elroy v. Albany, 65 Ga. 387; Green-
wood V. Louisville, 13 Bush (Ky.) 221.
' Campbell v. Montgomery, 53 Ala.
527; Thomas v. Grafton, 34 W. Va.
282; Attaway v. Mayor, 68 lb. 740;
Calwell V. Boone, 51 Iowa, 687; Odell
V. Sohroeder, 58 111. 353; Whitfield
V. Paris, (Tex. 92) 19 S. W. R. 566;
Corsicana v. White, 57 Tex. 382; Lit-
tle V. Madison, 49 Wis. 605 ; Hart v.
Bridgeport, 13 Blatohf. 289.
2 Holler V. Mayor, 53 Mo. 159; Mc-
Kenna v. St. Louis, 6 Mo. App. 820;
Robinson V. Evausville, 87 Ind. 334;
Kies V. Erie, 26 W. N. C. 112; Wilcox
V. Chicago, 107 111. 334; Welch v.
Rutland, 56 Vt. 228; Hayes v. Osh-
kosh, 33 Wis. 314; Fisher v. Boston,
104 Mass. 87; Burrill v. Augusta, 78
Me. 118; Hafford v. New Bedf., 16
Gray, 297.
» Alexander v. Vicksburg, 68 Miss.
564; Gillespie v. Lincoln, (Neb. 92)
52 N. W. R. 811; Dodge v. Granger,
(R. I. 92) 24 Atl. R. 100; Jewett v.
New Haven, 38 Conn. 368; Tarbush
V. Norwich, 38 lb. 225.
* Dannaher v. Brooklyn, 51 Hun,
563; Spring v. Hyde Park, 137 Mass.
554; Ogg V. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495;
Dunbar v. Boston, 112 Mass. 75; Lib-
erty V. Hurd, 74 Me. 101 ; Alger v.
Easton, 119 Mass. 77; Bryant v. St.
Paul, 83 Minn. 289.
6 Stock V. Boston, 149 Mass. 410;
Welter v. St. Paul, 40 Minn. 460; 42
143
Ga. 233; La Clef v. Concordia, 41
Kan- 423; 21 Pac. R. 272; Sherbourne
V. Yuba Co., 21 Cal. 118; Jewett v.
New Haven, 38 Conn. 368; Bryant
V. St. Paul, 38 Minn. 289; Forbush
v. Norwich, 38 Conn. 225 ; Moffit v.
Asheville, 103 N. C. 237; Gibbes v.
Beaufort, 20 S. C. 218; Rowland v.
Gallatin, 75 Mo. 184; Bamber v.
Rochester, 26 Hun, 587; Barney v.
Lowell, 98 Mass. 570; Brown's Adm.
V. Guyandotte, 34 W. Va. 299; Peters
V. Luudsborg, 40 Kan. 654; 20 Pac.
R. 490; Dannaher v. Brooklyn, 51
Hun, 563; Caspary v. Portland, 19
Or. 496; 24 Pac. R. 1036; Tindley v.
Salem, 137 Mass. 171 ; Fisher v. Bos-
ton, 104 lb. 87; Bladen v. Phila., 60
Pa. St. 464; Kies v. Erie, 26 W. N. C.
112; Bennett v. New Orleans, 14 La.
An. 120; Brown v. Vinalhaven, 65 Me.
iO-J; Wild V. Paterson, 47 N. J. L.
406; Richmond v. Long, 17 Gratt.
375; Wallace V. Menacha, 48 Wis. 79;
Lumber Co. v. Brooklyn, 71 N. Y.
580; Diehm v. Cincinnati, 15 Ohio
St. 305; Robinson v. Rolir, 73 Wis.
436; Dargau v. Mobile, 31 Ala. 469;
Sch. Dist. V. Williams, 38 Ark. 454;
Waller v. Dubuque, 69 Iowa, 541;
Wilcox V. Chicago, 107 111. 334; Free-
man V. Phila., 13 Phila. 154; Thomas
V. Graffton, 34W. Va. 282; Elliott v.
Phila., 75 Pa. St. 347; Ashby v.Erie, 85
lb. 286; Robinson v. Evansville, 87
Ind. 334; Summers v. Dav. Co., 108 lb.
262; Wheeler v. Cin., 18 Ohio St. 19;
§92
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. VI.
ages for the torts of the waterworks officials, although appointed
by the governor and state senate,^ of the highway commis-
sioners,^ the public administrator ; ^ of its agents in laying its
own gas pipes,* of the janitor of a municipal building, in which
rooms are let to private persons ; ^ of the City Council, acting
as commissioners for the improvement of a canal ; ^ and in
every other case, where a mandatory duty of local concern is
imposed upon the corporation, and where all discretion in re-
spect to its performance is taken awayJ But the municipal
corporation is not liable, where the particular duty is imposed
upon the officer, and not in the first instance upon the corpora-
tion.* And so, also, is the municipal corporation not liable for
N. W. E. 392 ; Teall v. Syracuse, 120 N.
Y. 184; Caspary V. Portland, 19 Or.
496; 24Pac. R. 1036; Lloyd v. Mayoi-,
etc., 5 N. Y. ; Mayor, etc., v. Las-
scr, 9 Humph. (Terra.) 757; Sheldon
V. Kalamazoo, 24 Mich. 383; Sharp
V. Mayor, 40 Barb. 256; Hunt v.
Boouville, 65 Mo. 620; Hecker v.
Mayor, 18 Abb. Pr. 369; White Ld.
Works V. Eochestor, 3 N". Y. 467;
Semple v. Mayor, etc., 62 Miss. 63;
Lewis V. Elizabeth, 25 N. J. Eq. 298;
Masterson v. Mt. Vernon, 58 K. Y.
391; Bailey v. Mayor, 3 Hill, 531;
Byrnes V. Cohoes, 67]Sr. Y. 204; Day-
ton V. Pease, 4 Oliio St. 80; Boston
V. Simmons, 150 Mass. 461; Perry v.
Worcester, 6 Gray, 544; Cotes v.
Davenport, 9 Iowa, 227; Williams v.
Dunkirk, 3 Lan. 44; Irontoa v. Kelly,
38 Ohio St. 50; Walsh v. Mayor, 41
Hun, 299; Vincent v. Brooklyn, 31
lb. 122; Aldrich v. Tripp, 11 E. I.
141; Durkee V. Kenosha, 59 Wis. 122:
Wilde V. N"ew Orleans, 12 La. An. 15 ;
Hool V. U. S., 1 Cranch, 98; Harris-
burg v. Taylor, 87Pa. St. 216; Thayer
V. Boston, 19 Pick. 511; Hildredth v.
Lowell, 11 Gray, 345.
1 Connolly v. Waltham, (Mass. 92)
31 ]Sr. E. R. 202; Bailey v. Mayor, etc.,
of N. Y., 3 Hill, 531; 38 Am. Dec.
669; Clark v. Mayor, etc., of N". Y.,
3Baib. 290; Stoddard v. Winchester,
144
32 1^. E. E. 948; Aldrich v. Tripp, 11
E. L 141; 23 Am. Eep. 434.
2 Inman v. Tripp, 11 E. I. 520; see
§ 341, et seq.
5 Glover v. Mayor, etc., of 'N.Y.,^
Hun, 232; Matthews v. Mayor, etc.,
of N. Y., 1 Sandf. 132.
* Scott V. Mayor, 1 H. & W. 59;
Stock V. Boston, 149 Mass. 410.
= Worden v. New Bedford, 131
Mass. 23; 41 Am. Eep. 185.
^Kew York, etc., Lumber Co. T.
Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 580.
' Lehn v. Brooklyn, 19 jST. Y. S. 668;
McSherry v. Canandaigua, 129 N. T.
612 ; Davenport v. Hannibal, 18 S. W.
E. 1122; Frostburg v. Hitohins, (Md.
90) 16 Atl. E. 380; Barney, etc., Co.
v. New York, 40 Fed. 50; Mayor,
etc., of Helena v. Thompson, 29 Ark.
569; Clayburgh v. Chicago, 25 111.
535; McCuUough v. Mayor, etc., of
Brooklyn, 23 Wend. 458; Elgin v.
Goff, 38 111. App. 362; Fitz Patrick
V. Slocum, 89 N". Y. 358; Kankakee
V. Linden, 38 111. App. 657 ; Sawyer
v. Corse, 17 Gratt. 230; Walling v.
Mayor, etc., 5 La. An. 660; Barton
V. Syracuse, 36 N. Y. 54; Lacoui-v.
Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 3 Duer, 406.
McLaughlin v. Municipality No. 2,
5 La. An. 504.
■ 8 Maximilian v. Mayor, etc., of K.
Y., 02 X. Y. 160; 20 Am. Eep. 196;
CH. VI.] MTTNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFPICEES.
§92
the torts of independent contractors, employed by such corpo-
ration,^ unless the necessary effect of the work contracted for
would be the infliction of injury on others,^ or the city reserv-
ed to itself a supervisory control over the work, and the power
to dismiss persons, who were employed by the contractors ; ^ or
unless the act of the contractor be a failure to remove an exist-
ing nuisance, for which the city incurs a continuing liability.*
A municipal corporation 'is not liable, however, for the acts
of its officers, if wholly ultra vires and not within the power
vested in the corporation by charter ; nor for any illegal acts of
an official, unless they were previously authorized or subse-
quently ratified by the corporation.^ The subject of municipal
liability for tort is more fully discussed in a subsequent chapter,®
to which the reader is referred for further information.
Haw V. Mayor, etc., of N. T., 37 N.
Y. Super. 456; Gray v. Brooklyn, 2
Abb. Ap. Cas. 267.
1 Pritcbard V. Keeper, 53 111. 117;
Hennington v. Lansingburgh, 36
Hun, 598; East St. Louis v. Giblin,
o 111. App. 219; Kelly v. Mayor, etc.
of N. Y., 11 N. Y. 432; Keed v. Al-
legbeny, 79 Pa. St. 300; Pack v.
Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 8 N. Y. 222;
Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. St. 213;
Kelley v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 4 E.
D. Smith, 291; Treadwell v. Mayor,
etc. of N. Y., 1 Daly, 123; McCarty
V. Bauer, 3 Kan. 237; Barry v. St.
Louis, 17 Mo. 121. See also, post,
§ 347, for a full discussion of this
subject.
2 Pearson v. Zahle, 78 Ky. 170;
Sullivan v. Holyoke, 135 Mass. 273 ;
Logansport v. Dicle, 70 Ind. 65 ; 36
Am. Rep. 166; Broad well v. Kansas
City, 75 Mo. 213; 42 Am. Eep. 406;
Sewall V. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 511.
8 Chicago V. Joney, 60 111. 383;
Chicago V. Deomody, 61 HI. 431 ; but
see Erie v. Caulkins, 85 Pa. St. 24.
*Vanderslice v. Philadelphia, 103
Pa. St. 102.
5 Walling V. Shreveport, 5 La. An.
660; Horton v. Newell, (E. I. 92) 23
Atl. R. 610; Herzo v. San Francisco,
10
33 Cal. 134; Browning v. Owen Co.,
44 Ind. 11; Ball v. Woodbine, 61
Iowa, 83; Cumberland v. Willison,
50 Md. 128; O' Dell v. Schroeder, 58
111. 353; Barnes v. Phila., 3 Phila.
409; Small v. Danville, 51 Me. 350|;
Cheeuey v. Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53;
Worley v. Columbia, 88 Mo. 106;
McCarthy v Boston, 135 Mass. 197;
Smith V. Rochester, 76 N. Y. 510;
Chicago V. McGraw, 75 111. 566;
Trammell v. Russellville, 34 Ark.
105 ; Emmert v. DeLong, 16 La. An.
317; Elliott V. Phila., 75 Pa. St. 347;
Haag V. Vanderburgh Co., 60 Ind.
511; Shelby Co. v. Deprez, 87 lb.
509; M^yor, etc. v. Cunlife, 2 N. Y.
165 ; Cuyler v. Rochester, 12 Wend.
165; Wakefield v. Newport, 60 N.
H. 374; Ross v. Phila., 115 Pa. St.
222; Ready v. Tuskaloosa, 6 Ala.
,327; Chicago v. Shober, etc., 6 111.
App. 560; Hilsorp v. St. Louis, 45
Mo. 94; Hunt v. Boonville, 65 lb.
620; Rowland v. Gallatin, 75 lb. 134
Manley v. Atchison, 9 Kan. 358
Brown v. Vinalhaven, 65 Me. 402
Woodcock V. Calcio, 66 lb. 234; Seele
v. Peering, 79 lb. 343; Morrison v.
Lawrence, 98 Mass. 219. See post,
§338.
s Chap. XVII.
145
§ 93 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VI.
§ 93. Jurisdiction of courts over electious. — The question
of jurisdiction of courts over contested elections, as well as the
whole matter of judicial remedies in such cases, is fully dis-
cussed and explained in connection with an exposition of the
extraordinary remedy, quo warranto, to which the reader is
referred.^
1 Chap. XIX. § 361.
146
CHAPTER VII.
MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, RECORDS AND COURTS.
Section.
95 — Notice of corporate meetings
— New England town meet-
ings— Adjournment.
96 — Town councils — Presiding offi-
cers.
97 — Eegular, special and adjourned
meetings.
98 — Methods of proceeding — Ayes
and noes.
99 — Quorum of the council — Joint
bodies — Action of the ma-
jority binding.
100 — Municipal business must be
transacted by the council as
a body — Meetings.
101 — Municipal courts at common
law.
Section.
102 — Municipal courts — Power to
establish.
103 — Competency of corporators
as jurors, judges and wit-
nesses.
104 — Summary proceedings — Jury
trials.
105 — Review by Superior Court —
Jury trials.
106 — Custody of municipal records
— Power to amend.
107 — Municipal records as evidence
— Admissions.
108 — Admissibility of parol evi-
dence to explain municipal
records.
§ 95. Notice of corporate meetings — New England town
meetings — Adjournment. — All citizens are presumed to know,
as part of the general law, the days prescribed by the charter,
statute, by-law or usage, for the transaction of the ordinary
municipal affairs by the governing body ; and, ordinarily, notice
is not required to be given. But the common law has estab-
lished certain rules, regarding notice, which have been made
the basis of the statutory law, and which have been followed
by the courts in this country.
The importance of the principles considered is evident, when
tlie meetings called are composed of the inhabitants of the town,
as in New England, and not of a definite and limited class of
duly elected officials. At common law, when notice of such a
meeting is required to be given, it may be deemed to be dis-
pensed with or waived, from the presence of those entitled to
the notice ; ^ but this rule of the common law is not applicable
to the New England town meeting.
1 Beaver Creek v. Hastings, 52 Mich. 528; Lord v. Anoka, 36 Minn. 17(5;
State V. Smith, 22 lb. 218.
147
95
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. vn.
At common law the notice should give the time, and place
of meeting if the latter is unusual. If the meeting relates to
the ordinary corporate affairs it is not necessary that its object
should be specified ; but when the proposed business is the
election or removal of officials, or the passing, of ordinances, the
fact should be stated in the call.
In the absence of charter provisions, if all, who are present at
a legal and valid meeting of a select body, consent to transact
business, it may be done, although no notice, or an insufficient
notice, was given ; but such unanimity should appear from their
recorded declarations or acts.
In England, the guild hall is the proper place for the meet-
ing ; and acts done at an unusual place will be closely scruti-
nized.i But the whole subject is now regulated by statute ;^
and such is also the case in New England, where it is required
that the inhabitants are to be notified or wai'ued of town meet-
ings. The object of the meeting, or the matters to be acted
upon, must be stated in the notice ; and town meetings, for
which the proper legal notice was not given, are invalid; and
the acts done at the meeting are void.^ A tax voted at a meet-
ing which was illegally warned, is illegal.* The object of the
town meeting should be stated in the warning, but it is sufB-
cient if this can fairly be understood.® Where the statute,
as in Vermont, requires the notice "to specify the business
to be done," a notice stating that the meeting was called " to
do any proper business" is insufficient;'' and all contracts
1 Dillon Mun. Cor. §264, citing Kex
V. Hill, 4 B. & C. 441; Kex v. Liver-
pool, 2 Burr. 734; Rex v. Doncaster,
2 lb. 744; Rex v. May, 5 lb. 2682;
Rex V. Grimes, 5 lb. 2601; Kynaston
V. Shrewsbury, 2 Stra. 1051; Mus-
grove V. Nairson, 1 lb. 584; Rex v.
Theodorick, 8 East, 545; Rex v.
Shrewsbury, oases temp. Hardwicke,
147; Smyth v. Darley, 2 House of
Lords Cases, 789. The rule as to
necessary notice is applicable to
both select and indeiinite bodies.
Rex V. Langhorne, 4 Ad. & El. 538.
2 English Municipal Act, 5 and 6
Wm. IV. ch. 71, sec. 69.
3 Brewster V. Hyde, 7 jST. H. 206;
148
Reynolds v. New Salem, 6 Met. 340;
Cong. Society v. Sperry, 16 Conn.
200; Haj'wardv. Sch. Dis., 2 Cush.
419; Moor v. Newfield, 4 Greenl. 44;
Lander v. Sch. Dis., 33 Me. 239;
Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank, 121
U, S. 129; School Dis. v. Atherton,
12 Met. 105; Little v. Merrill, 10
Pick. 543; Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 Vt.
337; Pratt v. S wanton, 15 lb. 147;
Rand v. Wilder, 11 Cush. 294; Stone
V. Sch. Dis., 8 lb. 592.
4 Rideout v. Sch. Dist., 1 Allen, 232.
6 School District v. Blakeslee, 13
Conn. 227.
6 Hunt V. School District, 14 Vt.
300; Sherwin v. Bugbee, supra.
CH. Vir.] MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC.
§95
made, or laws enacted,^ or other acts done at such a meeting,
which are not specified in the call, are invalid ; ^ and a partici-
pant in an illegal meeting is not estopped to deny its legality .^
When the statute requires the time and place to be named in
the notice, they are material ; and there can be no legal meet-
ing, except at the time and place named ; * and the meeting
must be opened within a reasonable time after the hour named.^
So, when the place named is the schoolhouse, a gathering near
the schoolhouse, with an adjournment to another place, is ille-
gal.® If the subject of the town meeting is mentioned in the
warning, it is no objection, that it is considered when the ma-
jority of the voters have retired ; "^ and action, taken at a meet-
ing not duly noticed, can be ratified by a subsequent legal
meeting.^
Authority in the clerk, to call annual town meetings, does not
empower him to call " special " meetings ; ^ nor does power to
"warn" a meeting imply power to call one.^" If the town
meeting has been validly warned and called, those who attend,
though less than a majority of the whole, have full power to act
for and to bind tlie whole ; and the absence of the others will be
presumed to be equivalent to an assent to any action taken.-'^ A
majority of the members of the town meeting have the power, in
the absence of any statutory provision upon this point, to ad-
journ any legal meeting to another time : and, if done in good
'Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391;
Willard v. Killingworth, 8 Conn.
247; Bloomfield v. Char. O. Bk., 12l
U. S. 121, 130.
2 St. Louis V. Withans, 90 Mo.
640; Cornish v. Pease, 19 Me. 184;
Spear v. Robinson, 29 lb. 531; Little
V. Merrill, 10 Pick. 543; Blackburn
V. Walpole, 9 lb. 97; Torrey v. Mil-
bury, 21 lb. 64; Hadsell v. Hancock,
3 Gray, 526; Jones v. Andover, 9
Pick. 146; Kingsbury v. School Dis.,
12 Met. 99.
'Sch. Dis. V. Atherton, 12 Met.
105.
*Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Yt. 439,
444.
'Sch. Dis. V. Blakeslee, 13 Conn.
227.
6 Chamberlain v. Dover, 13 Me.
466; Haines v. Soh. Dis., 41 lb. 246;
Kingsbury v. Sch. Dis., 12 Met. 99;
compare. Brown v. Winterport, 79,
Me. 305.
' Bean v. Jay, 23 Me. 117.
^ Jordan v. School District, 38 Me.
164.
^School District v. Atherton, 12
Met. 105.
i» Stone V. Sch. District, 8 Cush.
592.
11 Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. 345,
355; Com. v. Ipswich, 2 lb. 70; Wil-
liams V. Lunenberg, 21 lb. 75 ; First
Parish V. Stearns, 21 lb. 148; State
V. Binder, 38 Mo. 350; Church Case,
5 Kobt. 649.
149
S9S
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. VK.
faith, to another place within the corporate limits.^ But such
a power must be exercised, only when absolutely necessary ; ^
and the adjournment can only be proved by the record.^ After
an adjournment, no valid action can be taken by a town
meeting.*
§ 96. Town councils — Presiding officers. — Outside of New
England, the councils of cities and towns are representative bod-
ies, whose members are limited by law, and are elected by the
legal voters of the incorporated place. The constitution of the
council, its powers, its regular and special meetings, what no-
tice is required, and how many shall constitute a quorum, are
usually prescribed in the municipal charter. Usually, the city's
territory is divided into districts or wards, the voters in each of
which elect annually an alderman or councilman.^
When the mayor is the presiding officer of the board or
council, he can vote only when he is also a member of the
council ; while, in other eases, he either has no power to vote,
or has the power only, when there is a tie vote in the coun-
cil.^ The English rule, that the presence of the mayor at a
corporate meeting was absolutely necessary, in the absence of
special provisions, has no application in this country ; and the
mayor is not a member of the council, nor has he any right to
preside over it, if these privileges are not given him bj'' the
law.'^ The mayor's approval may by the charter be essential
to the validity of the proceedings of the council ; ^ and, when
required, should be in writing, attested by the mayor's signa-
ture.^ A writ of quo warranto wiil lie to test the right of the re-
corder ex officio to be the presiding officer, although not a member
^ Chamberlain v. Dover, 13 Me.
466; Hubbard v. Windsor, 15 Mich.
146; Kimball v. Marshall, 44 N. H.
465; Drisko v. Columbia, 75 Me. 73;
Goodell V. Baker, 8 Cowen, 286.
^ People V. Martin, 5 N. Y. 27.
3 Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick. 397.
* Kimball v. Lamprey, 19 N. H.
215.
° K. Y. Con. Act, § 29.
« Lamb V. People, 113 111. 137; Car-
roll V. Wall, 35 Kan. 36; Green v.
Durham, 1 Burr. 131; Rex v. Head,
4 lb. 2513; Carleton v. People, 10
150
Mich. 250; Decorah v. Bullis, 25
Iowa,' 12; Hildreth v. Molntyi-e, 1 J.
J. Marsh, 206; People v. White, 24
Wend. 520; CarroUtown v. Clark, 21
111. App. 74; State v. Gray, 23 Neb.
365.
'Cochran v. McOleary, 22 Iowa,
75; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200;
Ashley's Case, 4 Abb. Pr. Rep. 35;
Com. V. Kepner, 10 Phila. 510.
8 Graham v. Carondolet, 33 Mo.
262; Kepner v. Com., 40 Pa. St. 124.
9 N. Y. etc. Co. V. Waterbury, 55
Conn. 19.
CH. Vn.] MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC.
§96
of a council, and to vote in case of a tie vote, such right being a
franchise.-' When there are no charter requirements as to the
number of votes which are necessary to elect a presiding officer,
the votes of the majority of a quorum will suffice.^ The relation
of the mayor, or of the presiding officer, to the council, and the
position which he occupies, are to so great an extent the subject
of special charter provisions,^ that few general rules can be laid
down, which will apply in all cases.*
The statiis of members of the city council, or of the council
itself, is usually regulated by a court of law ; but where there
is a conflict of authority between two boards, each claiming to
be, and acting as, the legal board, either may obtain an injunc-
tion to prevent the usurpation of power hj the other, to which
it has no title ; ^ although disputes as to the title to public office
and the validity of elections, are exclusively within the juris-
diction of the courts of law.^
When, for any reason, the acting city authorities are not
those, in whom by its charter the power of municipal legislation
is lodged, ordinances enacted by them are invalid.^ The princi-
ples, applicable to de facto officers, are also applied to de facto
municipal councils ; and the acts and ordinances of such gov-
erning bodies are valid, provided the right to elect such a coun-
cil or governing board is vested in the city.^
' Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. An.
162; see also Rex v. Williams, 1
Burr. 402; Com. v. Arrison, 15 S. &
R. (Pa.) 130.
2 State V. Farr, 47 N. J. L. 208.
' As to the powers of the president
of the board of aldermen in New
York city, see People v. Lacomhe,
99 N. T. 43.
* Where it was provided in a charter
that the intendant shall have a seat
in the board of commissioners (the
governing council), and shall preside;
but if he were absent the board could
elect a presiding officer pro tempore;
it was held that he was a commis-
sioner, and had the right to partici-
pate in municipal legislation.
Raleigh v. Sorrell, 1 Jones (N. C.)
Law, 49. So when the power to leg-
islate is conferred on " the mayor
and oouncilmen," the co-ordinate
action of both is required, in order
to give validity to a by-law, or other
municipal act. Saxton v. Beach, 50
Mo. 488; Saxton v. St. Joseph, 60 lb.
153.
»Kerr v. Trego, 47 Pa. St. 292.
" Zn re Sawyer, 12411. S. 212, 223;
see post, ch. xix. § 871 et seq.
' Decorah v. BuUis, 25 Iowa, 12.
8 Winona v. St. Peter Ry. Co., 31
Minn. 472; Hildreth's Heirs v. Mc-
Intire, 1 J. J. Marsh. 206; Welch v.
St. Genevieve, 1 Dillon C. C. 130;
Decorah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa, 12; Peo-
ple V. White, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 520;
Norton v. Sheely Co., 118 U. S. 425;
Carleton v. Peoj)le,. lOMich. 250.
151
§97
MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS.
[CH. VII.
§ 97. Regular, special and adjourned meetings. — Mem-
bers of the council are presumed to know the times, which are
appointed in the charter for holding its stated meetings ; ^ and if
a member fails to attend, he neglects his duty, and waives his
right to participate therein. But he is not presumed to know
all that is done at a regular meeting. So, if at such meeting, a
special meeting is called to take action at some future time, the
action taken at the subsequent meeting will be void, unless ac-
tual notice of the special meeting is given to those membere,
who were absent from the regular meeting.^ In a case whei'e
the charter fails to provide, how the time for holding stated meet-
ings shall be fixed, the council may itself on motion change or fix
the time ; although it has previously been fixed by a formal
resolution.^ Special meetings, properly called according to the
rules laid down in the charter, are legal, and the proceedings
valid, if all the members entitled to be present are properly noti-
fied ; * but notice, it has been held, is not necessary, where every
one entitled to it is present at the special meeting of the
council.^
An adjourned meeting is simply a continuation of the original
special or regular meeting ; and, at an adjourned meeting, not
only may items of unfinished business be completed ; but any
act may be performed, which could have been legally done, had
there been no adjournment.® The courts will, when a question
arises as to the regularity of the meeting, and of the adjourn-
ment, presume them to have been regular.' But when an or-
dinance must be introduced at a meeting previous to the one,
at which it is to be acted upon, it cannot be passed at an
adjourned meeting.^
1 Smith V. Law, 21 N. T. 296; In-
surance Co. V. Sandars, 36 K. H. 352.
2 People V. Batchelor, 22 N. Y. 129.
estate V. Kantler, 33 Minn, 69,
4 State V. Smith, 22 Minn, 218; In
re Rogers, ^ Cow. 526; Downing v.
Kugar, 21 Wend. 178.
'Lord V. Anoka, 36 Minn. 176; Bea-
ver Creek v. Hastings, 52 Mich. 528.
« Staates v. Washington, 45 N. J. L.
S18; Ex parte Wolf, 14 Neb. 24; Smith
V. Law, 21 N. Y. 296; Warner v.
Mower, 11 Vt. 385 ; People v. Batche-
152
lor, 22 N. Y. 128; Kex v. Harris, 1 B.
& A. 936; Scadding v. Lorant, 5 Eng.
L. & E. 16; People v. Martin, 5 N. Y.
22; Street Case, 1 La. An. 412: New
Orleans v. Brooks, 36 lb. 641: Ex
parte Mirande, 73 Cal. 365.
' Hudson Co. v. State, 24 N. J. L.
718; Rutherford v. Hamilton, 97 Mo.
543; Tierney v. Brown, 65 Miss. 563;
State V. Smith, 22 Minn. 218; Insur-
ance Co. V. Sortwell, 8 Allen, 217.
' Staates v. Washington, supra.
CH. VII.] MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC. § 98
When a special meeting is held, the business transacted must
be exclusively that named in the call ; ^ and any act of the meet-
ing, wholly outside of the special purpose of the meeting, is
void.^ When at a regular meeting the council can act only upon
a specific matter, or at a special meeting upon such matters as
have been mentioned in the notice ; in either case, it seems that
an adjourned meeting would be limited to those specific mat-
ters, which could have been attended to at the original meet-
ing.*
§ 98. Methods of proceeding — Ayes and nays. — When
the charter provides that the municipal legislative body shall
consist of two branches ; the rules, applicable generally to leg-
islative bodies similarly composed, are considered to be adopted
by necessary implication. Hence, one branch has no power to
bind the city, without the concurrence of the other, elected at
the same time.* Although in this case it was held, that the
concurrence must be by simultaneously existing bodies ; yet, it
has been held that knowledge communicated to a council is
binding on its successors.® But general parliamentary rules
may, in the case of municipal councils, be limited and modified
by the charter, and by otlier statutory provisions. And an or-
dinance is not invalid, if it is passed in accordance with statutory
rules, even though some general parliamentary law was violated
in its passage.^ It is well settled that a city council can act,^ or
obtain information, by means of a select committee to which a
matter is referred ; * and the members of the council may act,
without further inquiry, upon facts within their own personal
knowledge.
A notice, to appear before a committee, is equivalent to a no-
tice to appear before the council ; ® and, the committee being but
1 St. Louis V. Withans, 90 ko. 646.
2 Bergen v. Clarkson, 1 Halst. 352;
Kex V. Liverpool, 2 Burr, 735 ; Rex v.
Doncaster, lb. 738; King v. Mayor,
1 Str. 385.
3 Scadding v. Larant, 5 Eng. L. &
E. 16;17Law J. 225.
* Wetmore v. Story, 22 Barb. 414.
5 Bank v. Seton, 1 Peters. 299.
8 McGraw v. Whitson, 69 Iowa,
348.
' Collins V. Holyoke, 146 Mass. 298 ;
Dorey V. Boston, 1461b. 336, 339;Bur
lington V. Dennison, 42 N. J. L. 165
Gillett V. Logan Co., 67 111. 256
Klamrath v. Albany, 53 Hun, 206
Edwards v. Watertown, 61 How. Pr,
463.
8 Bissgll V. Jeffersonville, 24 How.
287, 296; Com. v. Pittsburgh, 14 Pa.
St. 177; Main v. Ft. Smith, 49 Ark.
480.
9 Preble v. Portland, 45 Me. 241.
153
§ 98
MTJXICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. VII.
the agent of the council, its powers are revocable at any time.^
Every municipal council has the inherent power to reconsider
its action, at anj^ time during its session, and adopt lost motions,
or revoke those adopted.^ So, also, action, taken at a previous
meeting, may at a subsequent regular meeting be rescinded,
provided private rights have not been acquired under such
act.^ Thus, it was held that, so long as public funds remained
in the hands of a disbursing official, the council may rescindan
order, drawn on him to pay the same over ; * and the same prin-
ciple has been applied to the rescission of the action of a town
council, authorizing a subscription in aid of a railroad, when
the rights of third parties had not already become vested there-
in .^ Under similar circumstances, and for the same general rea-
sons, a simple resolution, providing for the levy of a tax, so long
as it has not been acted on, may be rescinded ; and after res-
cission, the collection of the tax cannot be legally enforced.^
A resolution or ordinance, which was passed by the council,
under circumstances when, or in a mode by which, it was not
authorized to act, may be subsequently ratified and validated
by the council at a regular meeting, acting in the mode pre-
scribed by lawJ
Municipal councils are usually required by law to keep a
record of their proceedings ; and this has also been required
of other municipal bodies, such as a board of public works,
although no record had been expressly provided for.^
The general rule is, that when a city charter requires the ayes
and noes ^ to be called and recorded, upon a vote in the citj'^
council, such requirement is important and material, and cannot
1 Damon v. Grauby, 2 Pick. 345;
comp. Salmon v. Haynes, 50 N. J.
L. 97.
■' State V. Foster, 2 Hulst. 101, 107;
Jersey City v. State, 30 N. J. L. 521,
529 ; State v. Jersey City, 3 Dutch. 536.
* State V. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76;
State V. Chapman, 44 lb. 595; Bige-
low V. Hillman, 37 Me. 58; Keiff v.
Conner, 5 Eng. (Ark.) 241; State v.
Hoyt, 2 0reg. 246; Koad Case, 17 Pa.
St. 71, 75 ; New Orleans y. St. Louis
Ch., 11 La. An. 244; Locke v. Roches-
ter, 5 Lansing, 11 ; Saak v. Philadel-
154
phia, 1 Pa. Leg. Gaz. Rep. 259; Ba-
ker V. Cushman, 127 Mass. 105.
4 Tucker v. Justices, 13 Ire. (N. C.)
434; Dey V. Lee, 4 Jones (X C.)Lan-,
238.
6 Estey V. Starr, 56 Vt. 690.
6 Stoddard v. Gilraan, 22 Ut. 568;
Pond V. Negus, 3 Mass. 230.
' State V. Hennepin Co., 33 Minn.
235.
8 Larned v. Briscoe, 62 Mich. 393.
' And even when it does not. Mc-
Cormick v. Bay City, 23 Mich. 457.
fJH. Vll.J MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC.
§99
be dispensed with.^ The object of this regulation is to muke
the members realize their responsibility, and to compel each to
bear his share of the praise or blame, by the creation of a record
which cannot be disputed.^ So, when the ayes and nays are
taken, this fact can only be shown by the production of the
journal ; ^ and where the journal does not show a vote by ayes
and nays, there is no presumption that such a vote was taken.*
It has been held that, although the ayes and noes were required
by the charter to be called in all cases, the clause did not apply
to a motion to adjourn ; ^ and in New York a provision, that
the ayes and noes shall be called, was held to be directory, not-
withstanding the use of the word " shall." " In a case, where
the calling and recording of the ayes and noes was required,
and the record of the same is omitted, it is proper for the council
to cause an entry of the same to be made nunc pro tunc,'' at a
subsequent legal meeting of the council.
§ 99. Quorum of the council— Joint bodies — Action of
the majority binding. — When the incorporating statute, or
the charter, is silent as to what shall constitute a quorum, com-
mon law principles apply, and a majority of the members elect
constitute the legal quorum.^ When the board has a definite
number of members, it does not legally exist until all are cho-
sen, and have qualified ; and, consequently, the majority cannot
proceed to transact business, until the minority have been cho-
sen and qualified.® So, if the council consists of twelve mem-
^ Sullivan v. Leadville, 11 Colo.
483; Spanglerv. Jacoby, 14 111. 297;
Sup'rs V. People, 25 lb. 297; Rich
V. Chicago, 59 lb. 286; Delphi v.
Evans, 36 Ind. 90; Tracy v. People, 6
Colo. 151 ; In re Mt. Morris Sq. , 2 Hill,
20; Elmendorf v. Mayor, 25 Wend.
693; Cutler v. Russellville, 40 Ark.
105; Morrison v. Lawrence, 98 Mass.
219; Indianola v. Jones, 29 Iowa, 282.
2 Stecker v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich.
104.
^In re Carlton, 16 Hun, 497; Solo-
mon City V. Hughes, 24 Kan. 411 ;
St. Louis V. Foster, 52 Mo. 513; Peo-
ple V. Adams, 9 Wend. 333; Denning
V. Rome, 6 lb. 651, and cases cited
supra, note 1.
1 Tracy v. People, 6 Colo. 151.
^ Green Bay v. Brauus, 50 Wis.
204.
6 Striker v. Kelly, 3 Denio, 322.
' Delphi V. Evans, 36 Ind. 90; Mus-
selman v. Manly, 42 lb. 462; Vawter
V. Franklin College, 53 lb. 88; Lo-
gausport V. Crockett, 64 lb. 319;
Mayhew v. Gay Head, 13 Allen, 129 ;
Com'rs V. Hearn, 50 Ala. 371; St§ck-
ert V. East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104.
8 Heiskill v. Baltimore, 65 Md. 125;
Barnert v. Paterson, 48 N". J. L. 395 ;
Cadmus v. Farr, 47 lb. 208; McDer-
mott V. Miller, 45 lb. 251.
9 Schenok v. Play, 1 Woolw. 175 ;
contra, Hartshorn v. Schoff, 58 N.
H. 1971.
155
§99
MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS.
[CH. VII.
bers, seven is the smallest number that can hold a legal meethig;
although, if this number be present, four of them may act.^
In a council having a membership of eighteen, an election of a
clerk, who received the votes of nine members, was held valid;
the presence of the others, who refused to vote, implying an
acquiescence in the action of the majority.^ So, also, when
a statute declares that a majority of those present at any reg-
ular meeting shall be competent to transact business, the com-
mon law requirement as to the quorum applies; and it was
held that this provision did not allow a minority of the whole
body to act as the council.^
It has also been held that a charter, which allowed a council
to settle its rules of procedure, did not authorize it to declare
what number should constitute a quorum ; * and the common
law rule governed in that case, in defining what a legal quorum
is. A provision, that an officer might be removed by a two-thirds
vote of the city council, was construed to mean a two-thirds
vote of a legal quorum, and not a two-thirds vote of all the
members composing the council.^ Acts which are done when
less than a legal quorum is present, are of course void.^ Of
course, when the charter contains a special provision '^ as to
what number of the council can transact business, such pro-
vision is mandatory, and exclusive of the common law principle,
governing a quorum. Thus when a charter prescribed, that the
council could pass no ordinance, except bj' a majority of the
eight members elected, it was decided that an ordinance could
not be passed by a vote of four against three, although foui'
constituted a majority of the legal quorum present.^ Not only
may the majority of those present at a legal meeting of the
i/n re Willcock, 7 Cow. 402, 410;
Buell V. Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284;
Regents v. Williams, 9 G. & J. (Md.)
365 ; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470.
2 State V. Green, 37 Ohio St. 227.
'In re Willcocks, 7 Cow. 402, 463,
526.
* Heiskell v. Baltimore, Qo Md.
125; Barnert v. Paterson, 48 N. J. L.
395.
s Warnock v. Lafayette, 4 La. An.
419; Logansport v. Legg, 20 Ind.
156
315; State v. Porter, 113 lb. 79.
^Logansport v. Legg, 20 Ind. 31.);
Perguson V. Chittenden, 6 Ark. 479;
Price V. Eailroad Co., 13 Ind. 58;
Pimental v. San Francisco, 21 Cal.
351.
'N. T. Consol. Act, §46.
8 San Francisco v. Hazen, 5 Cal.
169; Oakland v. Carpenter, 13 lb.
540; McCraoken v. San Francisco,
21 lb. 351.
CH. Vn.] MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC.
§99
council or other body ,^ acting judicially, bind all,^ whether pres-
ent or absent ; but it is necessary, in the absence of special en-
actment, that the majority of those present should concur, in
order to do any valid act.^ The general rule as to actions by
majorities may be conciselj'- stated, as follows : no minority of a
city council or other governing body, exercising the corporate
power, or of any committee appointed by- the same, through or
by which the corporation acts, can bind the majority or the
corporation, or do any valid act.* If, at a regular meeting of
the cftuncil, a majority of those present withdraw, the power
of those remaining is nullified, and the meeting is dissolved.^
But where the action to be taken, in place of being legisla-
tive and discretionary, is piinisterial, and of such a character as
not to require the deliberative consideration of the whole body,
the rule requiring the majority to act,® in order to bind the
council, has been somewhat modified. When a majority is au-
thorized to act for a town council or committee, it may enter
into a contract with another member of the council or com-
mittee, as an individual ; and if such a contract is fairly made,
and free from fraud, it will bind the corporation ; ^ although
members of councils are disqualified from voting upon a matter,
in which they are financially interested, adversely to the city.^
1 Action by a majority of police
commissioners in New Tork: Peo-
ple V. Board, 99 N. T. 676.
'In re Rogers, 7 Cow. 526; Charles
V. Hoboken, 3 Dutch. 203; Martin v.
Lemon, 26 Conn. 192; Astor v. New
York, 62 N. Y. 567, 580; People v.
Palmer, 52 lb. 83; People v. Syra^
ciise, 63 lb. 291.
* Laboiu-dette v. Municipality, 2
La. An. 527; State v. Deliesseline, 1
McCord (S. C.) 52; State v. Huggins,
Harper (S. C.) Law, 94.
•> Adams v. Hill, 16 Me. 215 ; Kup-
fer V. So. Parish, 12 Mass. 185 ; Allen
V. Cooper, 22 Me. 133; Damon v.
Granby, 2 Pick. 345; Walcott v.
"Walcott, 19 Vt. 37, 39; Jones v. An-
dover, 9 Pick. 146.
5 Kingsbury v. School Dist., 12 Met.
99; Day v. Green, 4 Cush. 438, 439;
Kushville G. Co. v. Eushville, 23
N. E. E. 72; 121 Ind. 206; State v.
Jersey City, 3 Dutch. 493 ; Charles v.
Hoboken, 3 lb. 203 ; State v. Priester,
43 Minn. 373; 45 N. "W. R. 712; Dey
V. Jersey City, 19 N. J. Eq. 412; Bal-
timore V. Poultney, 25 Md. 18; At-
kins V. Phillips, (Fla. 91) 8 So. E.
429; Brown v. District, 127 U. S.
579, 586.
6 Downing v. Rugar, 21 Wend. 178;
Com'rs V. Leckey, 6 S. & R. (Pa.)
166; Curtis v. Butler Co., 24 How.
435 ; Jefferson Co. v. Slagle, 66 Pa.
St. 202; Martin v. Lemon, 26 Conn.
192; Shea v. Milford, 145 Mass. 528.
' Niles V. Muzzy, 33 Mich. 61; Jun-
kins V. Union Seh. Dis., 39 Me. 220;
Buell V. Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284.
8 Oconto Co. V. Hall, 47 Wis. 208;
Pickett V. Sch. Dis., 25 lb. 551; Coles
157
§100
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIOXS.
[C'H. VII.
It has been held, that when the functions of a municipal board
are discretionary, the entire board must meet, although a ma-
jority can take final actfon.^ But if the whole board have con-
vened, the majority will not be hindered from acting, because
of tlie withdrawal of the minority, before any action is taken.^
The common law rule, — that in a joint body all the constituent
parts must be present, until the municipal action is completed,
or the act would be invalid, — being subject to abuses by one of
the parts withdrawing, in order to defeat the joint action, is
applied with caution in this country, if it is not denied alto-
gether.^ So, to constitute a valid meeting of a joint body, a
majority of each of the separate bodies must be present when
the meeting is opened ; but after it is organized, the identity of
eaeli part is lost, and a majority of all those present can act for
all, even though one of the separate bodies has withdrawn, be-
fore action is had.*
§ 100. Municipal affairs must be transacted by the coun-
cil as a body — Meetings. — The affairs of municipal corpora-
tions proper are usually administered by a select council, which
is chosen by the qualified voters. The council is not only not
the municipal corporation ; it is, ordinarily, not even a corpora-
tion.^ Its acts are the acts of the corporation, whose agent it
is for the accomplishment of municipal purposes.^ Whether
the affairs of the public are transacted in an assemblage of all
the citizens, as in the New England town meeting; or whether
they are carried on by a council, as in most municipal corpora-
com, 20 K H. 213, 226, the court, cit-
ing Whiteside v. People, 26 Wend.
634, and In re Humphrey, 10 lb. 612,
the court refused to follow the com-
mon law rule; and this case was fol-
lowed in Kimball v. Marshall, 44 N.
H. 465.
* Gildersleeve v. Board, 17 Abb. Pr.
201; King v. Bower, 1 Barn. & Cr.
492; Whiteside v. People, 26 Wend.
634.
5Dil. Mun. Corp. §259; Keg. v.
Paramore, 10 Ad. & El. 286; Beg. v.
York, 2 Queens B. 850; Mayor v.
Simpson, 8 lb. 73.
" Richards v. Clarksburg, 30 W. Va.
491.
V. Williamsburgh, 10 Wend. 659;
Walworth Bank v. F. L. & I. Co., 16
Wis. 629; United Br. Church v. Tan-
ducan, 37 lb. 54.
1 People V. Walker, 23 Barb. 304;
Ballard v. Davis, 31 Miss. 525 ; Grid-
ley v. Barker, 1 B. & P. 236.
2 Ex parte Rogers, 7 Cow. 526; but
compare In re Beekman, 31 How.
Pr. 16.
8 King V. Williams, 2 Maule & Sel.
141; King v. Buller, 8 East. 389; King
V. Miller, 7 Term R. 278; Humphrey,
In re, 10 Wend. 612; People v. Batch-
ellor, 22 K. Y. 128, 146; First Parish
V. Stearns, 21 Pick. 148; Coles Co. v.
Allison, 23 111. 437. In Beck v. Hans-
158
CH. Vn.] MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC.
I 101
tions, the corporate affairs can only be legally administered at
regularly called meetings, unless some other provision is made
by law.^ 1
The council must act as a unit, and only at its regular meet-
ings ; ^ and individual members cannot bind the council, even
though their action is ratified by the majority, if such ratifica-
tion is not the deliberative action of the board, evidenced by
some ordinance or resolution, or some similar act of the board, as
such.^
At common law, the presence of the mayor was necessary to
constitute a legal meeting of the council, he being considered
an integral part of the corporation. If there were, beside the
select or definite class which composed the council, any indefi-
nite class called the commonalty, it was necessary that. some of
them should be present ; and in any event, it was necessary that
a majority of the select class, which constituted the governing
body, should attend the meeting, in order that any valid munic-
ipal action may be had.* Though the presence of a majority of
the actual members of the select class, or definite governing
part of the municipality, was required to be present, yet it was
well settled that the majority of those present at a valid cor-
porate meeting could bind all.^
§ 101. Municipal courts at common law Among the
franchises, which were possessed by municipal corporations at
■ State V. Haynes, 72 Mo. 377; Cen-
tral Bridge V. Lowell, 15 Gray, 106 ;
State V. Jersey City, 35 N. J. Eq. 404;
Dey V. Jersey City, 19 lb. 412.
2 Dey V. Jersey City, supra; Balti-
more V. Poultney, 25 Md. 18.
2 Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J.
Eq. 143; Strong v. District, 4 Maokey
(D. C.) 242; 9 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cases,
568. In McCortle v. Bates, 29 Ohio
St. 419, the court said: "The mem-
bers composing the board have no
powei to act as a board except when
together in session. They act as a
body or a unit." Comp. Jefferson
Co. V. Slagle, 66 Pa. St. 202.
*Eex V. Smart, 4 Burr. 2143; Eex
V. Morris, 4 East. 87; Eex v. Atkyns,
3 Mod. 23; Eex v. Bellringer, 4 Term
E. 823; Eex v. Miller, 6 lb. 278.
^Launtz v. People, 113 111. 137;
Coles V. Trustees, 10 "Wend. 658;
Booker v. Young, 12 Gratt. 303; La^
bourdette v. Municipality, 2 La. An.
527; In re Willcocks, 7 Cow. 402,
462, 463; Young v. Buckingham, 5
Ohio, 489; The Queen v. Barhhart,
7 Up. Can. L. J. 126; The Queen v.
Murray, 1 lb. JJ". S. 604; Kingsbury
V. Sch. Dist., 12 Met. (Mass.) 99; Da-
mon V. Granby, 2 Pick. 355; Buell v.
Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284; State v.
Huggins, Harper, 94; Eex v. Bower,
1 B. & C. 492; Eex v. May, 4 lb. 843;
Eex V. Headley, 7 lb. 496; Eex v.
Greet, 8 Barn. & C. 363; Eex v. Dev-
onshire, 1 lb. 609.
159
§102
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. vir.
common law, was that of holding courts for the judicial deter-
mination of matters of limited and local importance, rtr involv-
ing the recovery of judgments for limited amounts. Inasmuch
as any provision, by which justice can be cheaply and expedi-
tiously administered, was considered to be of great benefit to
the community, the charter or common law prescriptive right
of holding court was usually considered as imposing upon the
city, who was the donee of such right, a corresponding munici-
pal duty to the public, to hold and maintain such a court,
which was imperative, even though the charter only provided,
that the municipality may hold a court ; ^ and a nonuser of the
right, although lasting for two hundred years, or the lack of
sufficient funds, was held to be no defence to a mandamus, to
compel a municipal corporation to do its duty in respect to hold-
ing a court.^
In consequence of the maxim, that rio one can be a judge in
his own cause, it was the rule at common law, that a borough
could not bring an action against a stranger in its own court, by
which it sought to obtain a benefit to itself ; nor could the cor-
porators act as jurors in such cases.^
§ 102. Municipal Courts — Power to establish The state
Legislature may* establish certain inferior and local judicial
tribunals ; and may clothe them with such a measure of jurisdic-
tion and power, as it may deem expedient ; provided there ex-
ist no constitutional prohibition. Usually the matters, which
are brought within the jurisdiction of such minor courts, relate
to the enforcement of municipal ordinances, the recovery of
1 Rex V. Mayor etc. Hastings, 5 B.
& Aid. 692; see also Haddock's Case,
T. Eaym. 435.
2 Rex V. Mayor etc. Wells, 4 Dowl.
P. C. 562; Rex v. Hastings, 1 B. &
A. 148; 5 B. & A. 692; Rex v. Hav-
ering, 5 lb. 291.
3 London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 674;
1 Salk. 398; Hesketh v. Braddock, 3
Burr. 1856-1868; Boswortli v. Bud-
gen, T Mod. 461; Reg. v. Rogers, 2
I Ld. Raym. 778. In England, the Mu-
nicipal Corporation Act of 1835 de-
fines the jurisdiction of municipal
courts, authorizes boroughs to es-
160
tablish them, and expressly pro-
vides that the citizens or burgesses
shall be competent to serve as jurors,
or magistrateSjOr testify as witnesses,
notwithstanding the fact, that they
are liable to contribute to the funds
in the treasury of the municipality.
5 and 6 Wm. iv. ch. Lxxxvi. §§ 90,
91, 118-134, 270-341.
* In New Hampshire, Massachu-
setts, Connecticut, New York and
California, there are express consti-
tutional provisions, empowering the
Legislature to erect inferior courts,
civil and criminal.
CH. VII.] MtlNICirAL COUNCILS, :. EETINGS, ETC.
§102
the penalties for the breach thereof, minor misdemeanors, and
trifling infractions of the peace and good order of the com-
munity, and suits between individuals when the amount in-
volved is within a certain specified limit.^ It has been held
that Municipal Courts, unless created by express provision of
the constitution, may be abolished at any time by the Legis-
lature.^
The Legislature, in exercising its power to establish inferior
municipal or other courts and to mark out their jurisdiction,
must act within constitutional limits, and subject to constitu-
tional restraint.^ Thus, it has been held that, when the judi-
cial power is in terms vested by the constitution in district*
or other courts,^ the Legislature cannot constitutionally pass
an act, conferring judicial power upon the mayor of a city ; but
that for violations of its ordinances, the municipality must re-
sort to the constitutional tribunals.
' Koliland v. St. Louis etc. Co., 1
S. W. E. 747; 89 Mo. 180; People v.
Lawrence, 22 Pac. 1120; 82 Cal. 182;
People V. Provines, 34 Cal. 520; In re
Stratman, 39 lb. 517; Baker v. Steam-
boat Milwaukee, 14 Iowa, 214; Bran-
don V. Avery, 29 N. Y. 469; McCrea
V. Jacobs, 19 Abb. N. C. 188; Charles-
ton V. Ashley Phosphate Co., (S. C.
90) 11 S. E. E." 386; Hunt v. Genet,
14 Daly, 22.j; Northern Indiana v.
Milliken, 7 Ohio St. 382; Com. v.
Browden, Thacli. (Mass.) Cr. Cas. 9;
People V. Evans, 18 111. 361; Fesh v.
Com., 4 Dana, 522; Nugent v. State,
18 Ala. 521 ; N. Y. Consol. Act, § 1519 ;
State V. Judge etc., 6 So. 784; 41 La.
An. 953; Fox v. Ellison, 44 N. W. R.
671 ; 43 Minn. 41 ; Burns v. La Grange,
17 Tex. 415; In re Slattery, 3 Ark.
484; lb. 561; Holmes v. Fihlenburg,
54 lb. 203; Van Swartier v. Com., 24
Pa. St. 131; Henderson v. Davis, 11
S. E. 573; 106 N. C. 88; In re Clor-
herty, 2 Wash. St. 137; State v.
AVriglit, 80 Wis. 648; Ferre v. Ells-
worth, 19 N. Y. S. 659; Myers v. Peo-
ple, 26 111. 173; Davis v. Woolnough,
9 Iowa, 104; People v. Wilson, 15111.
11
389; State v. Helfrid, 2 N. & McC.
(S. C.) 233; Callahan v. New York,
66 N. Y. 656; People v. Curley, 5
Cal. 412; Brown v. Jerome, 102 111.
371; Montrose v. State, 61 Miss. 429;
People V. Stott, (Mich. 92) 51 N. W.
E. 509; Egleston v. City Council, 1
Mill. Const. 45 ; Recorder, see Schro-
der V. City Council, 2 Const. Rep. 720 ;
Vassault v. Austin, 36 lb. 691 ; Peo-
ple V. Nyland, 41 Cal. 129; Muscatine
V. Steck, 7 Iowa, 503; Richmond
Mayoralty Case, 19 Gratt. 673; Floyd
V. Eatonton Cora'rs, 14 Ga. 354; Hill
V. Dalton, 72 lb. 314.
2 Boyd V. Chambers, 78 Ky. 140.
3 Zylstra v. Charleston, 1 Bay (S.
C.) 382: Slaughter v. People, 2 Doug.
(Mich.) 334; State v. Theard, (La. 93)
12 So. E. 892 ; Daniel v. Hutcheson,
(Tex. 93) 22 S. W. E. 278. For full
details regarding the constitutional
and statutory regulations respecting
inferior courts, see Stimson Statutes,
§§ 558, 559.
* Lafon V. Dufrocq, 9 La. An. 350.
5 State V. Maynard, 14 111. 420;
Beesraan v. Peoria, 16 lb. 484.
161
§ 102
MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS.
[CH. VII.
Upon this question, however, the cases are not harmonious;
and there are decisions, which hold that a plain and explicit
constitutional provision, that the judicial power shall be vested
exclusively in a Supreme Court, District, Probate and Justice
Courts, will not render void or unconstitutional a statute, erect-
ing Municipal Courts for the trial of offenders against ordi-
nances.^ Although by the constitutions of a majority of the
states, it is provided that justices of the peace shall be elected by
the citizens of their respective districts,^ it has been held that
the Legislature may confer upon the mayor the powers and ju-
risdiction of a justice of the peace.** And where this is done,
he may be deemed with fairness to be a judicial officer, within
the meaning of these words, as used in a state constitution.*
Municipal Courts are not designed to supersede the Superior
State Courts ; but rather to aid the latter, by relieving them of
a portion of the litigation whicli is occasioned by the growth of
large and populous municipal communities.^ And when they
are established for municipal purposes, under a special power
which is conferred upon the Legislature by the Constitution of
the State, their territorial jurisdiction should be confined within
the municipal boundaries ; and the action of their magistrates,
in committing persons for public criminal offences against the
laws of the commonwealth, will be unconstitutional.^ But such
1 State v. Young, 3 Kan. 445 ; Sbaf er
V. Mumma, 17 Md. 331; Hutchings
V. Scott, 4 Halst. 218.
2 Stimson Stat. § 560, p. 127.
3 State V. Perkins, 24 N. J. L. 409;
1 Harr. N. J. 237; Ha we v. Plainfleld,
37 N". J. L. 145 ; State v. Zeigler, 32
lb. 262; MoConrill v. Jersey City, 39
lb. 38, 42; Bain v. Mitchell, 82 Ala.
304; Robinson v. Benton Co., 49 Ark.
49; Baton Rouge v. Bearing, 15 La.
An. 208; contra, Edenton v. Wool, 65
N. C. 379.
4 Waldo v; Wallace, 12 Ind. 569;
Gulick V. New, 14 lb. 93; Howard v.
Shoemaker, 35 lb. Ill; Morrison v.
McDonald, 21 Me. 550; State v. May-
nard, 14 111. 419; Com. v. Dallas, 3
Yeates, 300; State v. Wilmington, 3
Harr. (Del.) 294.
' Grand Rapids etc. Co. v. Gray, 38
162
Mich. 461. " These Municipal Courts,
so far as tliey act under city by-laws,
are not designed to decide between
man and man, or to administer gene-
ra] laws. They are ordained to pre-
vent disorder in matters of local
convenience, and to regulate the use
of public and quasi public easements
so as to prevent confusion. If, in
exercising this power, they can inci-
dentally decide upon the rights of
private property, so as to determine
its enjoyment without review, there
would seem to be a practical annihi-
lation of the right to resort to the
general tribunal and the common
law." Jackson v. People, 9 Mich.
Ill, 117.
" Meagher v Storey Co., 5 Nev. 244.
Municipal Court cannot sit outside
city limits. HershofE v. Beverly, 43
N. J. L. 139.
CH. Vn.] MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC. § 103
a prohibition of the exercise of general judicial powers will not
be construed to prevent the exercise of the police power by a
municipality, by the infliction by its courts of fines and other
penalties upon disorderly persons and offenders against public
morality, within the limits of the corporation;^ provided, al-
ways, that an offender, convicted by a Municipal Court in a
summary proceeding, is not deprived of his constitutional right
to a jury trial, to v/hich he would be entitled, in a prosecution
by the state for the offence charged .^
§ 103. Competency of corporators as jurors, judges and
witnesses. — We have seen that, at common law, a municipal
corporation could not be a suitor in its own coarts ; nor could a
coi'porator act upon a jury, whose duty it was to decide a ques-
tion, to which the municipality was a party. This rule has no
application to the courts of municipalities in the United States.
On the other hand, it is not only allowable, but in fact quite
customary, for the mayor to act as a judicial officer, in the trial
of offenders against ordinances, and the evidence of citizens is
freely received.'^ Whatever may have been the justice or rea-
son of the common law rule — manifestly, the only plausible
reason was the technical one, that the incorporated municipal-
ity was to be distinguished from the community at large, and
was held by a comparatively few persons as a franchise, more
or less personal in character — the rule itself has been univer-
sally considered to be superseded, in respect to the competency
of judges, jurors or witnesses in strictlj' Municipal Courts.* A
iShafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331;
judicial power of Mayor under Mary-
land Const., Hagerstown v. Dechert,
32 lb. 369. In Massachusetts, a Mu-
nicipal Police Court was held to be
a "Court of the Commonwealth."
Com. V. Hawkes, 123 Mass. 525.
^ See, as to conflict between the ju-
dicial power of the municipality and
that of the state, Jenkins v. Thom-
asville, 35 Ga. 145 ; Vason v. Augus-
ta, 38 lb. 542; Savannali v. Hussey,
21 lb. 80; Slaughter v. People, 2
Doug. 334; contra, Williamson v.
Com., 4 B. Mon. 146.
' Thomas v. Mt. Vernon, 9 Ohio,
290; Com. v. Read, 1 Gray, 475; Lex-
ington v. Long, 31 Mo. 369; Wheel-
ing V. Black, 25 W. Va. 266; Com. v.
Ryan, 5 Mass. 90; State v. Wells, 46
Iowa, 662.
* City Council v. King, 4 McCord.
(S. C.) 487; Carwein v. Hames, 11
Johns. 76. In City Council v. Pepper,
1 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 364, the court
said : " The statutory authority given
to the City Court to try all offenders
against city ordinances, impliedly de-
clares that, notwithstanding the com-
mon law objection, it was right and
proper to give it the power to en-
force the city laws against all of-
fenders. The interest is too minute,
too slight to excite prejudice against
163
§104
MtnsriCIPAi COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. VII.
distinction is made, in respect to the competency of a taxpayer
to serve as a juror, between the Municipal Courts and the gen-
eral courts of the State. In actions, brought in the latter class
of courts, when a municipal corporation is a party, it has been
held that a resident taxpayer is incompetent to serve as a juror,
except where his common law incapacity has been either ex-
pressly or impliedly removed by statute ; it being considered
that his interest as a taxpayer, in the verdict to be rendered by
the jury, will justify his challenge for cause.^
An owner of a lot upon a street, about to be widened, is not
disqualified from presiding over the commission, when he is the
mayor ; ^ or from taking part as a juror, in the proceedings for
the appropriation of private property upon that street, for street
purposes.^
§ 104. Summary proceedings — Jury trials. — In respect to
Municipal Courts, two principles should be borne in mind:
First. These courts have only such powers and such jurisdiction
as are expressly conferred by statute, or necessarily implied
therefrom.* In all cases, where any ambiguity exists, that con-
struction of the statute is to be favored, which will tend to re-
strict the jurisdiction and power of the court. Secondly. In all
proceedings, which are had in such courts, due care must be
exercised, to secure and protect the personal liberty and the
rights of the accused. In nearly all of the States of the Union,
express constitutional provisions exist, securing to a person
accused of a crime a trial by an impartial jury, or providing
that a person shall not be deprived of life, liberty or property,
a defendant; for the judge, sheriff
and jurors are members of a corpo-
ration of many thousand members.
What interest of value have they in
a fine of twenty dollars? It would
put a most eminent calculator to
great trouble to ascertain the very
minute grain of interest, which each
of these gentlemen might have. To
remove so shadowy and slight an ob-
jection,the Legislature thought prop-
er to clothe the City Court, consist-
ing of its judge, clerk, sherifi and
jurors, with authority to try the de-
fendant, and he cannot object to it."
164
See, also, cases cited in last note.
iDiveuey v. Elmira, 51 N. T. 506;
see, also, Johnson v. Americus, 46
Gra. 80; Carters ville v. Lyon, 69 Ga.
577; Kose v, St. Charles, 49 Mo. 509;
Fulweiler v. St. Louis, 61 Mo. 479;
Montezuma v. Minor, 73 Ga. 484.
2 Lexington v. Long, 31 Mo. 369.
8 Kundlnger v. Saginaw, 59 Mich.
355 ; Keraper v. Louisville, 14 Bush
(Ky.) 87; Boston v. Baldwin, 139
Mass. 315.
* Municipal Courts in the city of
New York. N. Y. Con.Act, §§ 1279,
1440.
CH. VII.J MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC.
§10i
without due process of law.^ How far the State Legislatures
are restrained by these constitutional provisions in respect to
trial by jury, in adopting summary methods for punishing of-
fenders, either against the statute law or against municipal or-
dinances, can be ascertained in any particular instance, only by
an actual inspection of the constitution or statutes of the state,
in which the question is raised.^
It has been generally considered, that as offences against mu-
nicipal ordinances, as, for example, those relating to markets,
streets, the use of water and the construction of buildings, etc.,
which in the exercise of the express or implied powers of the
municipal corporation, have been adopted as municipal police
regulations, are not of a criminal nature ; they may be prosecuted
summarily, and need not be prosecuted by indictment or tried
by a jury .3 Such offences are not crimes or misdemeanors, to
wliich the constitutional right of a jury trial attaches.* The
same principle of constitutional interpretation and construction
is adopted here, which is followed, when it is held that the con-
stitutional provision for trial by jur}^, does not apply to cases
falling within the equity jurisdiction,^ viz. : that the peculiar
1 In Delaware,]SrortliCarolina,South
Carolina and Iowa, the Legislature is
authorized by the constitution to
provide summary modes of trial for
petty offences. For the constitu-
tional I'ights of trial by jury, etc., see
Stimson Statutes, §§ 12, 73, 130, 131,
132.
■^ Cases construing statutes and
constitutions. Thomas v. Ashland,
12 Ohio St. 124; Work v. State, 2 lb.
296; Law v. Com'rs, R. M. Charlton,
302; Green v. Savannah, lb. 368,371;
Frigally v. Memphis, 6 Coldw. 382;
Anderson v. O'Donnell, 7 S. E. Rep.
524; Alexander v. Bennett, 60 N. Y.
204; In re Tenn. Hall, 5 Pa. St. 204;
Goodrich v. Brown, 30 Iowa, 291;
Sill V. Corning, 15 N. Y. 297; Fay-
ette V. Sha^rath, 25 Mo. 445 ; Willis
V. Boonville, 28 lb. 543; Markle v.
Akron, 14 Ohio, 586; Cincinnati v.
Gwynne, 10 Ohio, 192; Hutchings v.
Scott, 4 Ilalst. 218; Malone v. Mur-
phy, 2 Kan. 250; Com. v. Pindar, 11
Met. (Mass.) 539; Com. v. Eoark, 8
Cush. 210; Com. v. Emery, 11 lb.
406; Elder v. Dwight Mfg. Co., 4
Gray, 201 ; State v. Eicker, 32 N. H.
179; Myers v. People, 26 111. 173;
Rice v. State, 3 Kan. 141. Territorial
Jurisdiction. State v. Clegg, 27 Conn.
593; Covin v. Phy., 26 111. 432; State
V. McArthur, 13 Wis. 383; Hoag v.
Laraont, 60 N. Y. 96.
3 State V. Gutierrez, 15 La. An. 190
Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn. 166, 169
St. Peter v. Bauer, 19 lb. 327, 332
-Ex parte Hollwedel, 74 Mo. 395
Williams v. Augusta, 4 Ga. 509;
Floyd V. Com'rs, 14 Ga. 358; Vason
v. Augusta, 38 lb. 542 ; Byers v. Com . ,
42 Pa. St. 89; 1 Bish. Cr. Pr., sec 758;
State V. Conlin, 27 Vt. 318.
* Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540;
State V. Powell, 97 N. C. 417.
^ Tiedeman's Limitations of Police
Power, § 34/.
165
§104
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. VII.
necessities of the case made it impossible to obey the constitu-
tional injunction.! Hence, the authority, which may be con-
ferred by charter upon Municipal Courts to punish violators of
ordinances, and other petty offenders, by a slight fine or limited
term of imprisonment without a trial by a jury, is valid ; and
does not conflict with a constitutional provision, which declares
that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.^
So, it was held in Pennsylvania, that the arrest by the city,
under statutory authority, of professional thieves and other
wrongdoers, frequenting any railroad depot or other public
place, and their summary commitment by the mayor without a
jury trial, was not in conflict with constitutional guaranties
that the right of trial by jury should not be infringed.^ What-
ever may be one's opinion of the merits of the jury trial, as a
means of doing exact justice between man and man, one can-
not escape the conclusion, that this elastic rule of constitutional
construction, — whereby summary proceedings for the trial of
offenders against municipal ordinances are permitted without
the aid of a jury, and are held not to conflict with the constitu-
tional requirement of a jury — is sometimes carried to a point,
where it is extremely difScult to discover why in any case the
State majr not abolish trial by jury, without infringing this con-
stitutional provision.* And, in the light of this fear, that this
provision of the constitution may ultimately become valueless,
as a protection against governmental tyranny, the courts are
disposed to hold that the constitutional guaranty of trial by
jury must be strictly obeyed in every case of criminal prosecu-
1 See Tiedeman's Lim. of Police
Power, § 47, where the vagrant laws
are criticized from the standpoint of
constitutional limitations in protec-
tion of personal liberty.
'■^Johnson V. Barclay, 1 Hai-r. (N. J.)
1; Howe v. Plainfield, 37 JST. J. L.
1.15; People v. Justices, 74 N. Y. 406;
18 Abb. L. J. 254; McAlar v. Wood-
ruff, 33 N. J. L. 213; State v. Lee, 29
Minn. 445; Mankato v. Arnold, 36
Minn. 62; Ex parte Schmidt, 24 S. C.
363; Hill v. Mayor of Daltoii, 72 Ga.
314; Moundsville v. Fountain, 27 W.
Va. 182, 204; Dively v. Cedar Falls,
166
21 Iowa, 565; Davenport, etc. Co. v.
Davenport, 13 lb. 229; Monroe v.
Meuer, 35 La. An. 1192; Stebbins v.
Mayor, 18 Pac. Rep. 745; State v.
Topeka, 36 Kan. 76; Hollenbeck v.
Marslialltown, 62 Iowa, 21; In re
Rolfs, 30 Kau. 758; see also cases
cited in last note.
sRyers v. Com., 42 Pa. St. 89; see
also Dunmares App., 52 Pa. St. 374;
Ewing V. Jilley, 43 Ib^. 384; Van
Swarton v. Com., 24 lb. 131; Barter
V. Com., 3 Pa. (Pen. & W.) 253 ; Rliines
v. Clark, 51 Pa. St. 96.
4 Plimpton V. Somerset, 33 Vt. 283.
CH. VII.] MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, 5IEETINGS, ETC. § 104
tion, except where the offence is of a trivial character, and con-
stitutes a breach of some ordinance of the cit}^^ In pursuance
of this trend of judicial opinion, it has been repeatedly decided,
that it is not within the constitutional powers of a State Legis-
lature, to confer upon Municipal Courts a summary jurisdiction
to try persons for the commission of acts, which, being against
the public at large, are indictable by the state, or which are
essentially criminal offences against the commoner statute law.
Under a clause of a constitution, providing that no one shall
be called upon to answer a criminal charge, except by indict-
ment etc., and requiring a unanimous conviction by a jury, an
act of the Legislature, empowering a town official or court to
try summarily assaults, batteries and other crimes, would be
unconstitutional, as violating one or both of the' above provi-
sions.^ It has been held that an act, providing for a snmmarj'-
conviction of a new offence by a court of inferior jurisdiction
without a jury trial, does not violate a constitutional provision,
that trial by jurj'^ shall be as heretofore, or that the right thereof
shall remain inviolate.^
It is not always easy to ascertain, whether any given offence
is a crime, for which a jury trial may of right 'be demanded.
The fact, that a term of imprisonment may be imposed, as part
of tiie sentence, does not necessarily render the prosecution a
criminal one, in which a jurjf trial may be required or demand-
ed ; and, after all, the most that can be said is, that the ques-
tion depends almost wholly upon the nature of the offence and
and statute law, cannot be punished
summarily in a Municipal Court:
People V. Slaughter, 2 Doug. (Mich. )
334; Welch v. People, lb. 332; In re
Sic, 73 Gal. 142; Burns v. La Grange,
17 Tex. 415; Smith v. San Antonio,
lb. 643; Barter V. Com., 3 Pa. (P. &
W.) 253. But see contra, Be John-
son, 73 Cal. 228.
" Van Swarton v. Commonwealth,
24 Pa. St. 131; Ehines v. Clark, 51
Pa. St. 96, see also Boring v. Wil-
liams, 17 Ala. 510; Times v. State,
26 lb. 165 ; In re Powers, 25 Vt, 261 ;
Murphy v. People, 2 Cow. 81.');
Shirley v. Lunenberg, 11 Mass. 379.
167
1 State V. Lockwood, 43 Wis. 463;
Neales v. State, 10 Mo. 498; State v.
Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470; Com. v. Shaw,
1 Pitts. (Pa.) 492, see also Cooley's
Const. Lim. §§ 319, 410; Proffatt's
Jury Trials, § 113, see ch. viii. § 129,
Municipal power to legislate on sub-
jects, etc.
^ State V. Mass., 2 Jones (N. C.)
Law, 66; Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn.
106; Rector v. State, 6 Ark. 187; Durr
V. Howard, 6 lb. 461; Lewis v. State,
21 lb. 211. When the provision is,
that no one should be compelled to
answer criminal offences, except up-
on indictment, the keeping of a house
of ill fame, being such by common
§105
MUNICIPAL OOEPOKATIONS.
[CH. vn.
the public need of a summary proceeding, in order to maintain
an effective restraint upon evildoers.
Aside from the minor offences, upon which there has always
been, both in England and the United States, a substantial agree-
ment as to the legality of summary proceedings, there is a class
of cases approaching near the boundary of crimes, in respect to
which a difference of opinion has existed, which is in many in-
stances irreconcilable. An extended discussion being impracti-
cable here, the reader is referred to the cases cited for a further
elucidation of the matter.^
§ 105. Review Iby Superior Courts — Jury trial. — The de-
cisions of the courts of several of the States cannot be recon-
ciled with the views which are held by the Supreme Court of the
United States upon the question, whether, if a person, accused of
crime, is tried by a summary proceeding in a municipal or infe-
rior court without a jury, he is thereby deprived of his consti-
tutional right to a trial by an impartial jury, if he can by an ap-
peal from the judgment of the court obtain as a matter of right
a second trial in the appellate tribunal. The State courts have
held that one, who is accused of a crime in an inferior court, and
therein convicted by a summary proceeding, is deprived of no
constitutional privilege or right, if, upon an appeal hampered
by no unreasonable restrictions, he can obtain a trial bj"^ jury of
the accusation against him.^ TMs doctrine was repudiated by
the Supreme Court of the United States, when an application
was made for a writ of Habeas Corpus, to release a person who
had been summarily convicted of the crime of conspiracy in a
Police Court of the District of Columbia, where a jury trial
1 1 Steph. Hist. Cr. Law, ch. iv.
p. 122; Atty. General v. Bowmau,
2 B. & P. .532; Same v. Siddon, 1 0. &
J. 220; Heme v. Gaston, 2 E. & E.
66; In re Lucas v. MoGlashau, 20
Up. Can. Q. B. 81; Atty. Gen. v. Sul-
livan, 32 L. J. Ex. 92; Easton's Case,
12 A. & E. 645; Cobbett v. Slow man,
9 Exch. 633 ; Egington, In re, 2 E. &
B. Y17; Huntley v. Lusoombe, 2 B.
& P. 530; Rackhara v. Bluok, 9 Q.
B. 691; Sweeney v. Spooner, 3 B. &
S. 329; Eeeve v. Wood, 5 lb. 334;
Cattell V. Ireson, E. B. & E. 91; Mar-
168
den V. Potter, 7 C. B. N. S. 641.
2 Maxwell v. Board, 119 Ind. 20;
Woodward v. Cabanirs, 77 Ala. 328;
Sedgwick Stat, and Const. Law, 549;
Beers V. Beers, 4 Conn. 535; Jones v.
Robbins, 8 Gray, 329; Stewart v.
Mayor, 7 Md. 501; Dargau v. Boston,
12 Allen, 223; Morford v. Barnes, 8
Terger (Tenn.) 444; McDonald v.
Schell, 6 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.) 240;
Cameron v. United States, 13 S. Ct. K.
595 ; 148 U. S. 301 ; Mclnerney v. Den-
ver, 17 Colo. 302; State v. Fouoade,
(La. 93) 13 So. R. 187.
CH. Vn.] MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC.
§105
had been denied him, although it had been demanded.^ The
power of the Superior Courts, to review the proceedings of in-
ferior tribunals, will not be deemed to be taken away, unless the
legislative intent to do so is clear, and free from doubt or ambi-
guity. The need of an opportunity for a judicial review of a
case determined in Municipal Courts, becomes strikingly ap-
parent, when their character and methods of procedure are
considered in connection with the fact, that justice is so fre-
quently administered there by men without professional knowl-
edge, or judicial experience.
So, also, the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts, to review by
cerfioran or otherwise, and control the subordinate tribunal, can-
not be considered as taken away by mere negative enactments,
or by implication of law,^ or by a statutory declaration that the
1 Callan v. Wilson, 12V U. S. 540.
In this case, tlie court said : " It (con-
spiracy) is an offence of a grave
character, affecting tlie public at
large, and we are unable to hold that
a person, charged with having com-
mitted it in this district, is not enti-
tled to a jury when put upon his
trial. The jurisdiction of the Police
Court, as defined by existing stat-
utes, does not extend to the trial of
infamous crimes or offences, punish-
able by imprisonment in the peniten-
tiary. But the argument, made in
behalf of the government, implies
that if Congress should provide the
Police Court with a grand jury, and
authorize that court to try, without
a petit jury, all persons indicted, —
even for crimes punishable by con-
finement in the penitentiary — such
legislation would not be an invasion
of the constitutional right of trial by
jury, provided the accused, after be-
ing tried and sentenced in the Police
Court, is given an unobstructed right
of appeal to, and trial by jury in,
another court, to which the case may
be taken. We cannot assent to that
interpretation of the constitution.
Except in that class or grade of of-
fences, called petty offences, which
according to the common law may be
proceeded against summarily in any
tribunal legally constituted for that
purpose, the guaranty of an impar-
tial jux-y to the accused in a criminal
prosecution, conducted either in the
name of, or by or under the authority
of the. United States, secures to him
the right toenjoy that mode of trial
from the first moment, and in what-
eyer court he is put on trial for the
offence charged. In such cases, a
judgment of conviction, not based
upon a verdict of guilty by a jury,
is void. To accord to the accused a
right to be tried by a jury, in an Aj)-
pellate Court, after he has been once
fully tried otherwise than by a jury,
in the court of original jurisdiction,
and sentenced to pay a fine or be im-
prisoned for not paying it, does not
satisfy the requirements of the con-
stitution." See also In re Fry, 3
Mackey, 135; In, re Dana, "7 Bene-
dict, 1.
2 State V. Fitzgerald, 44 Mo. 42.5 ;
Com. V. McCloskey, 2 Eawle (Pa.)
369; In re Strahl, 16 Iowa, 369; State
V. Funk, 17 lb. 365; Wararaack v.
Holloway, 2 Ala. 31; Bateman v.
169
§105
MTTNICrPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. Vlf.
judgment of the inferior tribunal shall be "final and. conclu-
sive," or " without appeal." ^ But a provision of the charter,
however, that appeals and writs of error from the decisions of
the mayor should be allowed, only where the fine imposed by
him exceeded the sum of five dollars, was construed as show-
ing the intention of the Legislature, that judgment should be
final and conclusive in all cases, where the fine did not exceed
that sum. Hence, a writ of certiorari was denied.^
It is well settled that, while a writ of certiorari, to review
the findings of an inferior tribunal, will lie unless plainly and
explicitly denied, or superseded by some other specific remedy ;2
a right to an appeal to a Superior Court does not exist, unless
expressly given.*
With respect to courts having an original jurisdiction of a
general and superior nature, as, for example, the Supreme Court
of the State of New York, a provision, that their decisions shall
be final and conclusive upon the parties interested, and upon all
other persons, takes away the right of appeal, which would or-
dinarily be allowed.^ It has been held that, if a question arises
as to the ownership of real property, in an action brought in a
Municipal Court to enforce an ordinance, the mayor or justice
cannot decide it, as upon common law principles these inferior
courts have no jurisdiction to determine the title to real prop-
erty, hereditaments or franchises.®
Magowan, 1 Met. 533; Bernstein v.
Clark, (Ga. 90) 13 S. E. E. 336; Green-
wood V. Boyd & B. Furn. Factory,
13 S. E. R. 128; 88 Ga. 582; State v.
Ellis (La. 90) 9 So. R. 639; Heep v.
Burr, 34 111. App. 470; Fox v. Penin-
sular White Lead & Color Works, 48
jST. W. R. 203; 84 Mich. 676; Blair v.
Sennott, 35 111. App. 368; 24 N. E. R.
969; Com. v. Meeser, 44 Pa. St. 341;
Davidson v. Woodruff, 68 Ala. 356;
State V. Gates, 35 Minn. 385; Garvin
V. Gaman, 63 Mich. 221; Ducheneau
V. House, 4 Utah, 463; Lees v. Drain-
age Com'rs, 24111. App. 487; Callahan
V. Lewis, 44 N. W. R. 892; Boyer v.
Teague, 106 N. C. 571.
1 See cases cited in last note. Ew-
ing V. Filley, 44 Pa. St. 384; Bex v.
Moreley, 2 Burr. 1040; Lawton v.
170
Com'rs, 2 Caines, 179, 181; Starr v.
Trustees, 6 Wend. 564; In re Heath,
3 Hill, 42; People v. Mayor, 2 Hill
(N. Y.) 9; Tierney V. Dodge, 9 Minn.
166; Camden v. Block, 65 Ala. 236.
2 Wertheimer v. Boonville, 29 Mo.
254.
^ Cunningham v. Squires, 2 W. Va.
611. See § 398 on scope of certiorari
in respect to municipal corporations.
* Conboy v. Iowa City, 2 Iowa, 90;
People V. Pol. Justice, 7 Mich. 456;
Dubuque v. Redman, 1 la. 444; Mo-
Garty v. Deming, 51 Conn. 422.
'' In re Canal v. Walker Street, 12
K. Y. 406; N. Y. Cen. R. Co. v. Mai--
vin, 11 lb. 276.
* Warwick v. Mayo, 15 Gratt. 528;
Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. Ill ; Grand
Rapids V. Hughes, 15 Mich. 54.
CH. VII.J MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC.
§ 106
§ 106.. Custody of municipal records — Power to amend.
— The records of a municipal corporation should remain in the
hands of the town clerk, or other official, whose legal duty is
to care for them. And if they ai'e kept out of his possession,
it has been held that an action of replevin will lie to recover
possession of them in the name of the corporation.^ The pos-
session of the clerk is the possession of the corporation, in a
case of disputed possession between him and a stranger.^
It is now the general rule, however, to employ the writ of
mandamus, as the most appropriate and effective remedy, for
the recovery of the possession of municipal records from a pred-
ecessor in, or usurper of, an office.^ So, also, mandamus, and
not replevin, is generally the proper remedy for the recovery by
the owner of possession of papers filed in a public office.* It
was held in Indiana,^ that the proper party, to bring an action
to recover records, was the board succeeding that in whose
possession the records were ; and that a mere citizen, although
acting for all the citizens of the town, could not compel their
surrender.
The right to inspect municipal records, under proper circum-
stances, is possessed by the corporations, inhabitants, or rate
payers ; and this right is enforceable by mandamus.^
Corporations have the power to appoint a clerk pro tem-pore,
whenever the regular clerk is absent from a corporate meeting ;
and his entries, or the entries made by the regular clerk from
his memoranda,'^ are competent evidence of the proceedings ; ^
and they will not be invalidated by a failure of the clerk jpro
tempore to take the oatli of office.*
' Sudbury v. Stearns, 21 Pick. 148.
2 School Dis. V. Lord, 44 Me. 374.
8 Rex V. Nottingham, 1 Sid. 31 ; 1
Barnard, 402; Proprietors v. Slack, 7
Gush. 226; Rex v. Ingram, 1 W. Bl.
50: see § 373.
'Desmond v. McCarty, 17 Iowa,
525; La Grange v. State Treas., 24
Mich. 468.
5 Carr v. McCampbell, 61 Ind. 97.
^ King T. Sargent, 5 Term R. 466;
King V. Richmond, 6 lb. 560; Cock-
burn V. Bank, 13 La. An. 289; Peo-
ple V. Walker, 9 Mich. 328; Peo-
ple V. Cornell, 47 Barb. 329; People
V. Mott, 1 How. Pr. 247; Bruce
V. Bruce, 2 B. & P. 229; King' v.
Mitchell, 10 East, 511 ; see chapter
XIX on Mandamus, where the sub-
ject of mandamus is very fully set
forth.
' Louisville v. McKerney, 7 Bush,
651.
8 Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11 Vt. 402;
Rex V. Mothersell, 1 Stra. 93.
9 Stebbins v. Merrit, 10 Cush. 27.
171
§106
MUNICIPAL, CORPORATIONS.
[CH. Vtl.
Under a statutory I'equirement, that the minutes should be
signed by a chairman, they will not be impaired by the fact,
that they were signed on a day subsequent to the date of the
meeting.^
In the very numerous municipal and quasi municipal corpora-
tions, by which the local affairs of communities are controlled,
it is apparently impossible that persons should be selected by
the corporations to act as municipal officials, without the choice
of some who are totally unfit to perform the clerical services
required of them. On this account, it has long been the law to
permit the clerk of the New England town, who has made an
incorrect record, to amend the same during his incumbency of
the ofSce, he being held liable for any abuse of the privilege.^
If, however, he makes a fraudulent or untruthful amendment,
the town will not be bound by the altered record, unless it shall
be estopped by having ratified it after it has been made.^ The
courts are favorably disposed towards upholding town records
which are, however irregular, free from dishonest or willful
error ; and for this reason they will not be too strict, when
amendments come before them for consideration.* A town
clerk has no authority to amend the town records after he is
out of ofBce.* Nor can a town clerk, or similar municipal
officer, amend records kept by his predecessor,^ unless in a
proper case, the municipality empowers him to correct the er-
loneous, or insert the omitted, matter.^
1 Miles V. Bougli, 3 Gale & D. 119;
Inglis V. Railway Co., 16 Eng. L, &
Eq. 55; Logansport v. Crockett, 64
Ind. 319.
2 Bishop V. Cone, 3 N. H. 513; Hoag
V. Durfey, 1 Aiken (Vt.) 286; Cham-
berlain V. Dover, 13 Me. 466.
= Whittier v. Varney, 10 N. H. 291;
Gibson v. Bailey, 9 lb. 168; Harris
V. School Dis., 28 lb. 58, 66; Cass v.
Bellows, 31 lb. 501 ; Law v. Pettengill,
12 lb. 340; Pierce v. Richardson, 37
lb. 306; Scammon v. Scammon, 28
lb. 429; Boston T. Co. v. Pomfret,
20 Conn. 590; New Haven etc. Co. v.
Chatham, 42 lb. 465 ; President etc.
V. O'Malley, 18 111. 407; Mott v. Rey-
172
nolds, 27 Vt. 206; Samis v. King, 40
Conn. 298.
4 Welles V. Battelle, 11 Mass. 477,
481; Keller v. Savage, 17 Me. 444;
St. Charles v. O'Malley, 18 111. 408;
Williams v. School District, 21 Pick.
75; Bishop v. Cone, 3 N. H. 513;
Hoag V. Durfey, 1 Aiken (Vt.) 286.
6 School Dist. V. Atherton, 12 Met.
(Mass.) 105; Hartwell v. Littleton,
13 Pick. 229, 232; contra, Gibson v.
Bailey, 9 N. H. 168; Kiley v. Cranar,
51 Mo. 541, 543.
estate V. Williams, 25 Me. 555,
561; 29 lb. 523; Taylor v. Henry, 2
Pick. 397.
7 Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11 Vt. 402,
419.
CII. VII.J MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC.
§106
A municipal corporation, like courts of record, possesses the
power of amending its records nunc pro tunc^ This rule has
been applied in case of assessments, where some essential action,
preliminary thereto, had been properly taken, but mention of
it had been omitted from the council minutes.''^ So, also, a
town council may at any time instruct its clerk to correct its
official journal, even after the minutes contained therein have
been approved. But it has been held that a council cannot
correct errors or omissions in the minutes of meetings, which
were held by their predecessors, in order to make it appear
therein that an ordinance had passed, when it appeared from
the minutes that it had only been reported.^
As the validity of municipal records should be supported
when possible, if an order, to which unanimous consent is re-
quired in order to give it legal force, is found entered in the
minutes, it will be presumed to have received unanimous con-
sent, unless the contrary plainly appears.*
The question sometimes arises, in respect to the amendment
of a record, pending a trial, in which it is to be used as evidence,
it was held that this could be'done even by a town clerk, who
had been out of office, but had been reinstated.^ In a some-
what similar instance, where the amendment was made pending
the trial of a suit, brought against the town six years subse-
quent to the original entry, the court sustained the compe-
tency of the clerk, to make an alteration in the record, by
which the plaintiff's cause of action was wholly annulled.'' In
1 Musselman v. Manly, 42 Ind. 462;
Vawter v. Franklin College, 53 lb.
88; Com'rs V. Hearne, 59 Ala. 371;
Mayhew v. Gay Head, 13 Allen, 129;
Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich.
104; Cliaraberlain v. Evansville, 77
Ind. 542; Pontiac v. Axford, 29 Mich.
69; Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90.
•-City V. Blakemore, 17 Ind. 318;
Stadler v. Roth, 59 Mo. 400; Kily v.
Cranor, 51 lb. 541 ; Halleck v. Bey-
leston, 117 Mass. 469;. Parish v. Gol-
den, 35 N. T. 462.
3 Covington v. Ludlow, 1 Met. (Ky.)
295 ; Dexington v. Headley, 5 Bush,
508; Graliam v. Carondelet, 33 Mo.
262; State v. Jersey City, 30 N. J. L. |
93, 148.
* Lexington v. Headley, 5 Bush,
508; Covington v. Boyle, 6 lb. 204;
MoCorraiok v. Bay City, 23 Mich. 457.
5 Mott V. Eeynolds, 27 Vt. 206, 208.
The court cautiously saying: "But
even an officer could alter or amend
a record upon the testimony of third
persons ordinarily, and ought not to
do it upon his own recollection, un-
less in very obvious cases of omis-
sion or error, of which the present
might fairly be regarded as one, prob-
ably." Comp. Hadley v. Chambei'-
lain, 11 Vt. 618.
6 Boston T. Co. v. Pomfret, 20
Conn. 590.
173
§ 107 MUNICIPAL COBPOEATIONS. [CH. VH.
this case, two out of five judges dissented, and held that in spe-
cial cases, where there had been such a lapse of time, the clerk
had no authority to amend ex parte, without memoranda or any
personal recollection ; and the proper remedy was an applica-
tion for a mandamus to correct the mistake, thus giving the
opposite party an opportunity to show that the record was cor-
rect.^
The records or reports of commissioners, appointed by the
court to assess damages for property taken in opening streets
and highways, will, if defective, be recommitted for amend-
ment.2
§ 107. Municipal records as evidence — Admissions.— Not
only are public or municipal records competent. evidence in the
trial of an action, to which the corporation is not a party ; ^ but
the municipality may itself offer its records in evidence, in
suits to which it is a party.* But the records or the compared
or certified copy must be properly authenticated, according to
the rules which obtain in the jurisdiction,^ where it is to be
used ; and the public character of the record, together with the
official character of the entry, oV of the certified copy or tran-
script, if they do not appear primafacie, must be shown, unless the
statute provides for a presumption in favor of their genuine-
ness.^ In consequence of the great inconvenience which attends
the production in court of original municipal records, which are
commonly bulky, and often in constant use, it has become the
general rule to receive duly certified, sworn, or compared tran-
scripts or copies of them, as of equal force with the original.^
* Metro. S. E. Co. v. Johnson, (Ga.
93) 16 S. E. R. 49; McFarland v.
Triton Ins. Co., 4 Denio, 392; High-
land Turn. Co. v. MoKean, 11 Johns.
154 ; GrafEton v. Read, 34 W. Va. 172;
Wood V. Jefferson Co. Bk., 9 Cow.
205; contra, Mayor v. Wright, 2 Port.
(Ala.) 230.
6 Adams v. Mack, 3 K. H. 493, 499;
see cases cited supra; Rex v. Tliet-
f ord, 12 Vin. Abr. 90, p. 16.
« Kex V. Debenham, 2 B. & Aid.
87; Marriage v. Lawrence, 3 B. &
Aid. 144; Eegina v. Thomas, 8 A. &
E. 183.
' People V. Minok, 21 X. T. 539;
' See further on this subject, Sam-
mis V. King, 40 Conn. 298; Farrell v.
King, 41 lb. 448; Logansport v.
Crockett, 64 Ind. 319.
^In re Kings Co. El. R. Co., 12 ST.
T. S. 198; Long v. Talley, 91 Mo.
505; Spring Brook Road, 64 Pa. St.
451; Green V. EastHaddam, 51 Conn.
547; In re Bryan, 58 Hun, 608; Con-
well v. State, 107 Ind. 571; Crawford
V. Valley R. R. Co., 25 Gratt. 467;
Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Ran-
dolph Townsite Co., (Mo. 90) 15 S.
W. R. 437; People v. White, 59 Barb.
666.
» Rex V. Smith, 1 Stra. 126.
174
CH. VII.] MUNICIPAL COUJS'CILS, MEETINGS, ETC. § 107
This rule in many of the states is the product of statutory en-
actment.^ It has been held, however, — although the rule would
not seem applicable to municipalities, — that the by-laws of a
corporation must be proved by the production of the original
by-laws ; ^ and the votes must be proved by the production of
the record itself.^
The rule, that a party's admission is competent evidence
against him, is of course applicable to municipal corporations.
But the acceptance of the report of a committee of inquiry by
a municipal corporation is not an admission of its truth ; nor
does it render the report admissible as evidence.*
Verbal or written admissions, to be binding upon a munici-
pal corporation, must be made by its agent, acting in the line
of his duty, and within the powers delegated to him by the
corporation.^ The admission of incorporation is not binding
on the corporation in this country.^ So, also, declarations, not
against interest, but which accompany official acts, and form a
part of the res gestce, are admissible for or against the corpora-
tion.' It has been held that there is no presumption, that the
officials of a city or town are acquainted with the entries con-
tained in the municipal records ; nor are they liable personally
for libelous matter contained in their annual reports, when
made in good faith.^
Hiokok V. Shelburne, 4 Vt. 409 ; Com.
V. Chase, 6 Cush. 248; Best, Prin. of
Ev. 456; Mortimer v. MoCoUan, 6 M.
& W. 67.
' Rex V. Lord Greo. Gordon, Doug.
193; 1 Phillips Evidence, 405; Denn-
ing V. Eome, 6 Wend. 651; People
V. Adams, 9 lb. 333; Turnp. Co. v.
McKean, 11 Johns. 154; People v.
Murray, 57 Mich. 396; O'Mally v.
McGinn, 53 Wis. 353.
2 Lumbard v. Aldrich, 8 N. H. 31 ;
Hollowell Bk. v. Hamlin, 14 Mass.
178; see oh. Ordinance, manner of
proof.
'Haven v. Asylum, 13 N. H. 532;
Manning v. Parrish, 6 Pick. 6; Green
V. Indianapolis, 25 Ind. 490.
* Dudley v. Weston, 1 Met. 477;
Collins V. Dorchester, 6 Cush. 396.
6 Jordan v. Sch. Dis., 38 Me. 164;
County V. Simmons, 10 111. 516; Rail-
road v. Ingles, 15 B. Mon. 637; Glid-
den v. Unity, 33 N. H. 577; Toll Co.
V. Bettsworth, 30 Conn. 380; Barnes
V. Pennell, 2 H. of L. Gas. 497; Pey-
ton V. Hospital, 3 C. &F. 363; Cur-
nen v. New York, 79 N. Y. 511.
*■ Hartford Bank v. Hart, 3 Day
(Conn.) 493, denying King v. Hard-
wick, 11 East, 578; Osgood v. Man-
hattan Co., 3 Cow. 612, 623.
' Perkins v. Railroad, Co., 44 N.
H. 223; Grimes v. Keene, 52 lb. 330;
Harpswell v. Phipps, 29 Me. 313;
Coffin V. Plymouth, 49 lb. 173.
" Lancey v. Bryant, 30 Me. 466.
175
§108
MUNICIPAL CORPOBATIONS.
[CH. vn.
§ 108. Admissibility of parol evidence to explain mu-
nicipal records. — The record itself is the best or primary evi-
dence of its contents ; and, until its absence or nonexistence is
sufficiently accounted for, parol or secondary evidence is not
allowed to be substituted. ^ But parol evidence is admissible
to identify the subject, to which an entry in the town records
was intended to apply; and evidence may be given of such
facts, which were before the town council at the time of the
municipal action, as will explain the meaning of the entry, and
the effect of the action of the council upon the rights of a party,
who has acted in good faith upon a recorded ordinance or reso-
lution.2 But, in respect to matters of a routine nature, which
fall within the jurisdiction of the municipality because of its
public character ; as, for example, the laying out or abandon-
ment^ of a highway; and, particularly, if the entry is made in
pursuance of a statute, parol evidence is not admissible to ex-
plain, vary or contradict the record.* When an owner has
dedicated a portion of his land to public purposes, as set forth
in a plat, which has been placed on record, parol evidence to ex-
plain such reward or dedication is only admissible, where the
plat is not complete, and where its terms are ambiguous or
uncertain.*
Respecting municipal meetings, it has been decided that
parol evidence may be given in explanation of the minutes, to
show the time and place of holding the meeting, the number
ilsley V. Boom, 13 S. E. K. 795;
109 N. C. 555; Smith v. Lawrence,
12 Mich. 431; United States v. Kuhn,
4 Cranch C. C. 401; Leavitt v. East-
man, 1'J Me. 117; Long v. Battle
Creek, 39 Mich. 323; Oliphant v.
Com'rs, 18 Kan. 886; Kohlhapp v.
W. Boxbury, 120 Mass. 596; Town-
ship of Corwin v. Morehead, 49 jST.
W. R. 1052; 51 Iowa, 99; Gurnsey v.
Edwards, 26 N. H. 224; Anderson v.
Oom'rs, 12 Ohio St. 365; Austin v.
Allen, 6 Wis. 134; Aurora v. Fox, 78
Ind. 1; Monaghan v. Sch. Dis., 38
Wis. 101. If the requirement that a
record of a fact be kept is directory,
it has been held that parol evidence
is admissible to show the fact: Keller
176
V. Savage, 17 Me. 444.
" Baker v. Windham, 13 Me. 74.
^Lathrop v. Cent. La. E. E. Co.,
69 Iowa, 105.
* Satterlee v. Hickman, 38 HI. App.
139; Galbraith v. Luttreoh, 73 HI.
209; Wild v. Deig, 43 Ind. 455; Da-
nim V. Gow, 50 N. W. R. 140; 88
Mich. 99; Pittsburgh v. Cluley, 74
Pa. St. 262; Leavitt v. Eastman, 77
Me. 117; Weaver v. Lammon, 28 If.
W. R. 905; 62 Mich. 366; Hedges v.
Bugg, 45 K. W. R. 841; Stevenson v.
Flournoy, 13 S. W. E. 810.
' Grandville v. Jennison, 86 Mich.
567; 49 N. W. E. 544; Princeville v.
A n t e n, 77 111. 325 ; Darlington v.
Cora., 41 Pa. St. 63.
CH. Vn.J MUNICIPAL COTTNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC.
§108
present, and how many, coming later and finding no meeting,
went honie.^ But when it is sought to validate acts done at an
adjourned meeting, the adjournment, not appearing upon the
minutes, cannot be shown by extrinsic evidence.^
While it is not allowable to contradict the record by parol
evidence, such evidence has often been admitted to show facts
omitted from the record, in cases where the law does not im-
peratively require them to appear of record, and does not make
the record the only evidence.* If, however, the record, or a
certified copy, is by statute made the only competent evidence,
then its production is indispensable ; and parol evidence of the
facts contained in it cannot be admitted.* The reason and jus-
tice of the admissibility of parol evidence are manifest, where the
rights of third persons or of creditors are likely to be prejudiced
by the negligence of municipal officers in making proper entries
in the record ; and it seems that both the corporation and third
parties may avail themselves of parol evidence in all such cases,
for the purpose of supplying the defects or omissions of the
record.^ Thus, where the records of the council were negli-
gently kept, and failed to show the adoption of a resolution,
parol evidence was admitted to prove that certain work was
authorized by the city. In this case, the plaintiff was permit-
ted to prove the passage of the resolution, the appointment
of a committee to have charge of the expenditure, their report,
and its adoption by the council.®
Although there is some lack of agreement in the decisions, in
1 Chamberlain v. Dover, 13 Me. 466.
2 Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick. 397.
8 People V. Bussey, 46 N". W. K. 97;
People V. Fairfield, (Cal. 90) 27 Pac.
E. 199; Troy v. Atcliison etc. Co.,
13 Kan. 70; 11 lb. 519; Downing v.
Diaz, (Tex. 90) 16 S. W. E. 49; Ste-
phens V. St. Louis & S. F. Co., 47
Fed. E. 530; Danira v. Gow, 88 Mich.
99; Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat.
(U. S.) 64; United States v. Fille-
brown, 7 Pet. 28; Slate v. Mason,
33 La. An. 590; School Dist. TSTo. 2
V. Clark, 51 N. W. K. 529; Satterlee
V. Hickman, 38 111. App. 139; Meeker
V. Van Eensselaer, 15 Wend. 397;
Darlington v. Com., 41 Pa. St. 68.
12
* See cases cited in last note ; Mor-
rison V. Lawrence, 98 Mass. 219;
Spencer v. Credle, 102 N. C. 68;
Bridgford v. Tuscumbia, 4 Woods,
611; 16 Fed. E. 910; Indianapolis v.
Imberry, 17 lud. 175, 179; Haney v.
McClure, 10 S. W. K. 427; Delphi v.
Evans, 36 Ind. 90; Lowell v. Whee-
lock, 11 Gush. 391; Harris v. Whit-
comb, 4 Gray, 433; County Cora'rs
V. Chitwood, 8 Ind. 504, 507.
6 Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11 IT. S. 402,
411 ; Sell. Dist. No. 2 v. Clark, supra ;
San Antonio v. Lewis, , 9 ' Tex. 69 ;
Stevens v. Eden etc., 12 Vt. 688; Sat-
terlee V. Hickman, 38 111. App- VAd-
" Koss V. Madison, 1 Ind. 281.
177
§108
MUNICIPAL COllPOrwATIOKS.
[CH.
VII.
regard to the admissibility of evidence to impeach public records
in collateral actions, the weight of authority supports the rule,
that such records are conclusive, and cannot be contradicted
or shown to be erroneous by parol evidence. In such cases,
the proper remedy is for the party interested to compel a cor-
rection of the mistakes in the record, if any exist, by a writ of
mandamus}
1 Durfey v. Hoag, 1 Aiken (Vt.)
286; School District v. Atherton, 12
Met. (Mass.) 105; Morrison v. Law-
rence, 98 Mass. 219; Mayhewv. Gay
Head, 13 Allen (Mass.) 129; Eldora
V. Burlingame, 62 Iowa, 32; Boston
178
Turnp. Co. v. Pomfret, 20 Conn. 590
Gilbert v. New Haven, 40 lb. 102
Nichols V. Bridgeport, 23 lb. 189
Bissell V. Jeffersonville, 24 How. U,
S. 287, 298.
CHAPTER VIII.
CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, CONSTRUCTION AND
LnUTATlONS.
Sbction.
110 — Classification and construc-
tion of charter powers.
Ill — Imperative and discretionary
powers distinguished.
112 — Discretionary powers.
113 — ^Delegated powers cannot be
delegated.
114 — Usage in construing powers
— Prescription.
115 — The indemnity for officials
acting in good faith.
116 — The police power cf munici-
pal corporations — Its scope
and limitations.
116a-Territorial limits of police
regulations.
117 — The municipal power to legis-
late upon subjects covered
by state statutes.
118 — Sanitary regulations —
Slaughter houses — Ceme-
teries— Unwholesome pro-
visions.
119 — Sanitary regulations, contin-
ued— Contagious diseases
— Removal of refuse — Wa-
ter supply.
120 — The regulation and abate-
ment of nuisances in gen-
eral.
121 — Regulation of harbor and
navigable waters.
122 — Regulation o f occupations
and amusements.
123 — Licenses, when a police regu-
lation, and when a tax.
124 — License power of municipal
corporation construed.
125 — Licenses for the sale of in-
toxicating liquors.
126 — Supervision and care of pau-
pers, vagrants, indigent
Section.
insane and sick persons.
127 — Inspection of goods and othei
commodities.
128 — Establishment and regulation
of public markets.
129 — Impounding animals — Ordi-
nances respecting dogs.
130 — Prevention of fires — Fire lim-
its— Purchase of fire ap-
paratus.
131 — Regulation of buildings and
their construction.
132 — K egulation of private
wharves.
133 — Public wharves.
134 — Ferries and ferriage.
135 — Regulations providing for the
public welfare, peace and
safety.
135 a-Regulations of railroads
within city limits.
136 — Power to appropriate funds
for lobbying purposes.
137 — Power to borrow money.
138 — Payment of bounties.
139 — Celebrations and entertain-
ments.
140 — Rewards.
141 — Erecting, furnishing and re-
pairing public buildings.
142 — Compromises and arbitra/-
tions.
143 — Power of municipality to sue
and be sued.
144 — Power to create private mo-
nopolies.
144a-Power to create and operate
municipal monopolies —
Municipal ownership o f
gas, electric light and wa-
ter works.
179
§110
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. vm.
§ 110. Classification and construction of charter pow-
ers.— The powers, which ai'e ordinarily conferred by its char-
ter upon a municipal corporation, may be classified as fallows :
First, those granted in express terms ; Secondly, those neces-
sariljr or fairly implied in, or incident to, the express powers ;
Thirdly, those which are indispensable to the accomplishment
of the purpose of corporate existence.^ Any act done, or con-
tract entered into, by the corporation, in the exercise of power
claimed to be possessed by it, but which cannot be reasonably
included in one of these classes, is illegal and void ab initio ;
and the corporation incurs no liability thereby ; '^ and if there
exist a fair and reasonable doubt as to the possession of any
particular power by a municipal corporation, the inclination
of the courts is to decide against its existence ; and its posses-
sion by the corporation.^
" In this country,* all corporations, whether public or private,
derive their powers from legislative grant, and can do no act
for which authority is not expressly given, or may not be rea-
sonably inferred. But if we say that they can do nothing for
which a warrant could not be found in the language of their
charters, we should deny them in some cases the power of self-
preservation, as well as many of the means which are necessary
to effect the essential object of their incorporation ; and, there-
fore, it has long been an established principle in the law of cor-
porations that they may exercise all the powers, within the fair
1 Dillon Mun. Corp. §89; Corring-
ton& M. K. Co. V. Athens, (Ga. 90) 11
S. E. K. 663; Richmond v. Mcairr,
78 lud. 192, 197; Cook Co. v. MoCrea,
93 111. 236; Ottawa v. Carey, 108 U.
S. 110; Greenville W. Co. v. Green-
ville, 7 So. R. 409; Ravenna v. Penn-
sylvania Co., 45 Ohio St. 118; Haynes
v. Cape May, .52 N. J. L. 180; Scott v.
Slireveport, 20 La. An. 714; Desmond
V. Jefferson, 19 lb. 483; Eufaula v.
MoNab, 67 Ala. 588; Michigan City
V. Boeckling, 23 IST. E. E. 518; 122
Ind. 39; Danville v. Shelton, 76 Va.
.S25; Bell v. Platteville, 71 Wis. 139;
Linkenhenner v. Com., 23 W. L. Bui.
433; Blake v. Walker, 23 S. C. 517;
Kansas City v. Swope, 79 Mo. 446;
180
Portland V. Schmidt, 13 Dreg. 17.
^See § 169on UJiraFtr-es Contracts;
Birmingham v. P. M. Ry. Co., 79 Ala.
465 ; Spengler v. Trovfbridge, 62 Miss.
40; Gas Co. v. Parkersburg, 30 W.
Va. 433; St. Johnsbury v. Thomp-
son, 59 Vt. 300; Christie v. Maiden,
23 W. Va. 667; Dwyer v. City of
Brenham, 65 Tex. 526; Davenport v.
Kleinschmidt, 6 Mont. 502; Heiskell
v. Baltimore, 65 Md. 125.
"Kirkham v. Russell, 76 Va. 956;
Tax Collector v. Deudinger, 38 La.
An. 261 ; Hanger v. Des Moines, 54 la.
193 ; Williams v. Davidson, 43 Tex. 33 ;
Brenham v. Water Co., 67 Tex. 542.
* Bridgeport v. Railroad Co., 15
Conn. 475, .501.
CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 110
intent and purpose of their creation, which are reasonably prop-
er to give effect to powers expressly granted. In doing this,^
they must have a choice of means adapted to ends, and are not
to be confined to any one mode of operation." ^
Since municipal powers are wholly of legislative origin, the
citizens cannot by any act of theirs ratify or confer upon the
municipal council any power, which is not expressly or impliedly
granted in the charter.* The question as to the existence, lim-
itation or extent of charter powers, is one of construction. The
intent of the Legislature should be sought for in every in-
stance, and carried out, if possible ; but the courts have gener-
ally favored the common law rule, that municipal charters, like
all grants of power from the State, are to be construed in favor
of tlie State, and against the grantee, whenever a reasonable
doubt exists.* The powers, granted to municipal corporations,
are so extensive and far-reaching, and their abuse so likely to
result in the imposition of grievous burdens on the individual
citizens, that a strict construction of charter powers is abso-
lutely necessary, and has been the almost uniform practice of
the courts.
' The power may be limited.
"Gorvallis v. Carlile, 10 Oreg". 139;
Petersburg v. Metzger, 21 111. 205;
New London v. Brainard, 22 Conn.
552; Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110;
Gilman v. Milwaukee, 61 Wis. 588;
Cora. V. Turner, 1 Gush. 493, 495;
Cooley V. Granville, 10 lb. 57; Hie-
stand T. New Orleans, 14 La. An.
330; Leconteulx v. Buffalo, 33. N. Y.
333; Levy v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah,
63; Gallia Co. v. Holcomb, 7 Ohio,
pt. 1, 232; Com'rs v. Mighels, 7 Ohio
St. 100; Merriam v. Moody, 25 Iowa,
163; Miuton V. Larne, 23 How. 435;
Kelly V. Milan, 21 Fed. R. 842; Louis-
iana State Bk. v. N. O. Nav. Co., 3
La. An. 294; State v. Mayor, 5 Port.
279; Head v. Ins. Co., 2 Crauch, 168;
Smith V. Newbern, 70 N. C. 14; Cor-
sicana V. Carr, 75 Tex. 207; DeRus-
sey V. Davis, 13 La. An. 468; People
V. Bank, 1 Doug. 282; City Council
V. Plank Koad, 31 Ala. 76; In re Bur-
nett, 30 lb. 461; Richards v. Clarks-
burg, 30 W. Va. 491 ; Ottawa v. Carey,
108 -U. S. 110; Bell v. Platteville, 71
Wis. 142; Roodhousev. Jennings, 29
111. App. 50; Conery v. N. O. W. Co.,
41 La. An. 910; Bangs v. Snow, 1
Mass. 181; Stetson v. Kempton, 13
lb. 272; Willard v. Newburyport, 12
Pick. 227; State v. Natal, 41 La. An.
700; 6 So. 722; Hansen v. Hunter, 53
N. W. R. 84; Hayes v. Appleton, 24
Wis. 544; People v. Railroad, 12
Mich. 389; Vance v. Little Rook, 30
Ark. 435; State v. Sharkey, (Minn.
92) 52 N. W. R. 24; Logan v. Buck,
3 Utah, 301; Ravenna v. Penna. Co.,
45 Ohio St. 118; Noyes v. Mason, 5
N. W. R. 595; In re Prank, 52 Cal.
606; Green v. Cape May, 41 N. J.
L. 45.
8 Torrent v. Muskegon, 47 Mich.
115.
^ " It is a well settled rule of con-
struction of grants by the Legislar
181
§111
MUNXCIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[cH. vm.
Although the courts have, in view of the above considera-
tions, and because any other course would frequently result in
imposing unjust burdens upon the inliabitants of the commu-
nity, or in abridging their natural or common law rights of lib-
erty and pioperty, adopted the principle of strict construction
of charter powers ; ^ it should not for a moment be understood
that an unreasonable construction, which is calculated, to defeat
the object of the legislative enactment, will be sustained. There
must exist a fair and reasonable doubt as to the legislative in-
tent to confer the disputed power, before the courts will deny
its possession by the municipality .^
The incidental powers of a municipal corporation must be
germane to the purpose, for which it was created ; ^ and, when it
is conceded that any particular power, as, for example, the power
of levying taxes or erecting buildings, is possessed by the cor-
poration, it will, if the statute be silent, be allowed to construct
and employ the usual and proper machinery,* or to select an
appropriate and suitable place,* for the exercise of the power.
§ 111. Imperative and discretionary powers distinguish-
ed.— The differentiation of charter powers, which are impera-
tive, from those which are discretionary, is at times a very
ture to corporations, whether public
or private, that only such powers and
rights can be exercised under them,
as are clearly comprehended with-
in the words of the act, or derived
therefrom by necessary implication,
regard being had to the object of
the grant. Any ambiguity or doubt
arising out of the terms used by the
Legislature must be resolved in favor
of the public." Miuturn v. Larue, 23
How. 435, 436; see cases cited supra ;
Logan V. Pye, 43 Iowa, 524; Bloom
v. Xenia, 32 Ohio St. 461; Carr v.
Dooley, 122 Mass. 257; Pye v. Peter-
son, 45 Tex. 312; Winooski v. G-okey,
48 Vt. 282; Dalrymple v. Wilkes-
Barre, 11 Luz. L. R. (Pa.) 41; Thomp-
son v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. 92;
Parker v. Barker, 1 Clark, 223 ; "Weel
V. Eicord, 24 N. J. Eq. 169; Schakel-
ton v. Guttenberg, 39 N. J. L. 660;
Wlieatley v. Covington, 11 lb. 18;
182
Kniper v. Louisville, 1 Bush, 599.
1 Bank v. Chillicothe, 7 Ohio, pt.
2, 31, 35.
2 Thomson v. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 320;
Thomas v. Richmond, lb. 349; Wil-
lard V. Killingworth, 8 Conn. 247;
Clark V. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 495;
Merriam v. Moody, 25 lb. 163; Kyle
V. Malin, 8 Ind. 34; Memphis v. Ad-
ams, 9 Heisk. 518; Nicol v. Mayor,
etc., 9 Humph. 252; Leonard v. Can-
ton, 35 Miss. 189; Lafayette v. Cox,
5 Ind. 38; Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio,
523; Pt. Huron v. McCall, 46 Mich.
565 ; Douglas v. Placerville, 18 Cal.
643, 647.
3 Mayor v. Tule, 3 Ala. 137; Har-
ris V. Intendant, 28 Ala. 577 ; Intend-
ant V. Chandler, 6 lb. 899.
4 Union Pac. K. Co. v. Eyan, 2Wyo.
408; s. c, 113 U. S. 516.
5 Poillon V. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y.
432. *
CH. VIII.] CHAETEK POWEES, THEIR KATUKB, ETC. § 111
diflScult question of construction. In every case, of course,
it is presumed that the legislative intent is ascertained.^ But
no positive and unyielding rule can be enunciated, which will
be of real or undoubted value. For, under peculiar circum-
stances, permissive words, like "may," or "it shall be lawful,"
will be held to impose an imperative duty, in connection with
which there is no grant of discretion. Thus, when an indi-
vidual, or the public, has a special interest in having an act
done, and the municipalit)'- is vested with power to do this
act, and adequate means are at its disposal for the purpose of
promptly and .properly performing it, the duty will be held to
be mandatory, despite the fact that the word " may," and not
" must," is employed in the statute.^ On the contrary, when
the act to be performed will not confer any great benefit upon
third persons, or upon the public ; and, particularly, when the
means for its performance are not supplied to the municipal
authorities, the words " may " or " it is lawful " will be held
to have the natural and .ordinary effect of granting a discre-
tionary power, and not to create an imperative duty, for the
breach of which an action in damages, or a mandamus, will lie
by an injured party against the corporation.^ But the expres-
sion "hereby authorized" has been held to create a manda-
tory duty.* And the same is generally true of the word
" shall." ^ On the other hand, there are cases which hold
that the word " must," when employed in a statute, does not
necessarily make a duty enjoined thereby absolutely impera-
tive, but may under peculiar circumstances be held to be the
1 Mason v. Fearaon, 9 How. 248;
Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 336; Vea-
•zie V. China, 50 Me. 518; St. Joseph
etc. R. Co. V. Buchanan Co. Court,
39 Mo. 485.
^ Cases in last note. Phelps v.
Hawley, 52 N. Y. 53; Blake v. Ports-
mouth etc. Co., 39 X. H. 435; Steines
V. Franklin Co., 48 Mo. 167; Seiple
V. Elizabeth, 27 N. J. L. 407; State
V. Newark, 3 Dutch. 491 ; Vason v.
Augusta, 38 G-a. 542; Mayor v. Furze,
3 Hill, 612; 16 N. T. 162; Reed v.
Bainbridge, 1 Southard, 351, 358.
"Atty. General v. Lock, 3 Atk.
164; Rex v. Mayor of Chester, 1
Maule & S. 101 ; Rex v. Bailiffs, 1
B. & C. 86; Minor v. Mechanics'
Bank, 1 Pet. 46; Goodrich v. Chicago,
20 IIV 445; Railroad V. Platte, 42 Mo.
171; Joliet v. Verley, 35 III. 58; Rail-
road Co. V. Buchanan, 39 Mo. 485;
Ottawa V. People, 48 111. 233; Grant
V. Erie, 69 Pa. St. 429; see also State
V. Shakespeare, 41 La. An. 156; In
re Whitney, 3 N. T. S. 838; and J 362
in chapter on ManAamus.
* Vason V. Augusta, 38 Ga. 542.
6 People V. French, 13 N. T. St. R. ;
People ex rel. Satterlee, 75 N. Y. 38,
183
§113
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. VIII.
grant of a discretionary power.^ In every case, it is presump-
tively a question of legislative intent, but really a judicial con-
sideration of the public interests, and the best mode of promoting
them. The reliance upon the supposed legislative intent is a
harmless fiction, and constitutes no serious obstacle to the due
and intelligent consideration of the public interests ; at least,
in the special case under inquiry.^
§ 112. Discretionary powers. — When the power to do an
act is conferred upon a municipal corporation, but the language
conferring the power is such that no imperative duty is imposed
upon the corporation, that the act shall be done at all events, the
power is said to be discretionary, as distinct from mandatory and
imperative. In the exercise of such powers, the municipality is
exempted from judicial supervision, and from liability in dam-
ages, except in cases where fraud, or a plain abuse of the power,
is shown.^ As this subject is treated at length in other parts of
this work* to which the reader is referred, any minute discus-
sion in this place is deemed unnecessary.
§ 113. Delegated powers cannot be delegated The prin-
ciple, elsewhere adverted to, that a municipal corporation cannot
shift responsibility for the execution of the public discretionary
powers, delegated to it, by delegating the exercise of the dis-
cretion to others, is a plain corollary of the proposition, that
such powers are held and to be exercised in trust for the public.^
The city council is the governing body of the corporation, and
' Spears v. Mayor, 72 N. T. 442 ;
Hemmer v. Hustace, 51 Hun, 457;
Merrill v. Shaw, 5 Minn. 148. Cf.
Wallace v. Feeley, 88 N. T. 646.
2 For a general criticism of this
cardinal rule of interpretation, see
Tiedeman's Unwritten Constitution
of the United States, p. 145 et seq.
8 Bush y. Carboudale, 87 111.74;
Conery v. W. Co., 41 La. An. 910; 7
So. E. 8; Dodd v. Hartford, 25 Conn.
232; Deane v. Todd, 22 Mo. 90.
*See chapter on Streets, §289;
Mandamus, §362; Injunction, §393;
LiaUUtyfor Torts, §§327, 328.
^ See ch. xvi. on Streets, also State
V. Hauser, 63 Ind. 155; Dougherty v.
Austin, 29 Pac. K. 1092; 94 Cal. 601;
■ 184
Thompson v. Scliermerhorn, 6 N". Y.
92; Minn. 6. L. Co. v. Minneapolis,
36 Minn. 139; Meuser v. Kisdon, 36
Cal. 239; Davis v; Read, 65 N". T. 566;
People V. Riordan, (Mich. 89) 41 N.
W. 482; Clark v. Washington, 12
Wheat. 40, 54; State v. Fiske, 9 R. I.
94; Hydes v. Jones, 4 Bush, 464; Bird-
sail V. Clark, 73 N. Y. 73; In re Trus-
tees, 50 How. Pr. 500; State v. Free-
holders, (N. J. 89) 18 Atl. 117;
Baltimore v. Scharf, 54 Md. 499;
Lyon V. Jerome, 26 Wend. 485 ; Stan-
field V. State, (Tex. 92) 18 S. W. 577;
Railway Co. v. Baltimore, 21 Md.
93; Bibel v. People, 67 111. 175; Lyth
V. Buffalo, 48 Hun, 175; State v.
Trenton, 51 N. J. L. 498; Mullar-
CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 113
by it the discretion of the municipality is properly exercised.
When, therefore, the necessity or expediency of initiating some
local improvement is left by statute to the discretion of the
council, that body cannot delegate this dut}"-, wliich belongs to
it as the legislative department of the municipal government,
to an administrative ofBcial.^ So, also, where a city council
was authorized to prescribe the dimensions of sewers, it was
held that the council could not by ordinance delegate the power
of fixing these dimensions to the cit}''s engineer.^ So, also,
powers, which involve the exercise of deliberation and discre-
tion, and which should therefore be carried out by the enact-
ment of an ordinance bj' the municipal Legislature, cannot legally
be delegated to a subordinate committee of the council.'^
Generally, when a municipal council is empowered to fix
rates, for which some service is to be rendered, as in cases of
license fees or assessments,* or to appoint a time when persons,
having business with the corporation, may be heard,^ it cannot
delegate its discretion. This principle was applied, where the
city was authorized to fix and collect tolls for the use of a pier
owned by it, but which it had leased. In an action brought by
the lessee for damages, which were caused by the city's failure to
keep the pier in repair, the lease was declared void, as attempting
to delegate to the lessee a power, which could legally be exer-
cised by the city alone." Whether in the particular case, the
mayor is under the provisions of the charter, a member of the
council in general, or the mayor and aldermen together are by
charter constituted one body for the doing of some particular
legislative act ; in either ease, there cannot be a delegation of a
discretionary power to the mayor. In such a case, it was held,
key V. Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa, 21;
Schenley v. Com., 36 Pa. St. 62; Dar-
ling V. St. Paul, 19 Minn. 389.
' State V. Faribald, 11 So. Rep. 36;
Euggles V. Collier, 43 Mo. 359; She-
lian V. Gleason, 46 lb. 100; E. St.
Louis y. Wehrung, 50111. 28; State v.
Bell, 34 Ohio St. 194.
2 St. Louis V. Clemens, 43 Mo. 395.
8 Minneapolis G.L. Co. v. Minneap-
olis, 36 Minn. 159; Whyte v. Mayor,
2 Swan. 364; Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal.
524; Oakland v. Carpenter, 13 Cal.
540; Cf. State v. Atlantic City, 34 N.
J. L. 99, 108.
* Mathews v. Alexandria, 68 Mo.
115.
'State V. Jersey City, 1 Dutch.
309 ; State v. Patterson, 34 N. J. L. 163.
6 Lord V. Oconto, 47 Wis. 386; see
also Lanenstein v. Fond du Lac, 28
lb. 336; Mullarty V. Cedar Falls, 19
Iowa, 21; Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23
Mich. 344; Milhau v. Sharp, 19 Barb.
435; Oakland v. Carpenter, 13 Cal.
540.
185
§113
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. vni.
where the power to license was under discussion, that the al-
dermen could not by a vote delegate their share of the licens-
ing power to the mayor ; i or, a fortiori, to third persons.^
So, the powers, to construct and control wharves,^ to grant
permission to a railroad company to lay its track in the streets,*
to issue bonds,^ to make local improvements," to appoint attor-
neys,'^ to establish pounds and appoint keepers,^ and to pro-
vide for lighting the streets,^ have been held by the courts to
be beyond the power of delegation. A valid delegation of leg-
islative or discretionary public power can be made, however,
by the municipal council, when it is permitted, or so directed
by express legislative provision.^"
The rule, forbidding the delegation of corporate power, does
not apply to the delegation of ministerial or administrative
powers to a subordinate official or committee ; nor does it pre-
vent the performance of ministerial and routine duties by agents
appointed by the council.^^ Thus, when the charter gives the
council the power to pass by-laws, relating to wharves, and to
appoint the necessary officers to carry the same into effect; and
the council created the office of wharf superintendent ; it was
held that the power, to regulate the moving of vessels, under
the ordinances of the city, might be delegated to him by the
council. 1^ The power of the municipality, to protect the public
health, cannot be surrendered, or the resultant duty shifted ; but
the city may contract with a party to execute a portion of this
power in its stead, by giving him the exclusive riglit to remove
the bodies of dead animals, offal or refuse matter.^^ Also, if a
1 Day V. Green, 4 Cush. 433.
estate V. Patterson, 34 N. J. L.
I(i3.
3 Oakland v. Carpenter, 13 Cal.
540.
4 State V. Bell, 34 Ohio. St. 194.
6 State V. Hauser, 63 Ind. 155.
^ Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6
N. Y. 92.
' St. Louis V. Thomas, 11 111. App.
283.
8 DillardV. Webb, 55 Ala. 468.
' Minn. Gas L. Co. v. Minneapolis,
,">6 Minn. 159.
' State V. Patterson, 34 N. J. L.
186
163; Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 K. Y.
591.
" Gillett V. Logan Co., 67 111. 256;
Hitchcock V. City, 96 U. S. 341; Mc-
Claughey v. Hancock Co., 46 111. 356;
Hannibal, etc., E. Co. v. Marion Co.,
36 Mo. 294; Edwards v. Watertown,
61 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 463; Schenleyv.
Com., 36 Pa. St. 62; Stewart v. Coun-
cil Bluffs, 58 Iowa, 642 ; Gregory v.
Bridgeport, 41 Conn. 76.
12 Gregory v. Bridgeport, 41 Conn.
76.
IS Louisville v. Wible, 84 Ky. 290;
N. Y. Con. Act, § 280.
CH. VIII.] ' CHAETEE POWEBS, THEIR NATTTKE, ETC. § 114
contract should be invalid when made, because of an illegal
delegation of power, it may be validated by a subsequent ratifi-
cation by the governing body.^
Municipal corporations cannot, without legislative permission,
either express or by implication, barter away or surrender their
public powers. They cannot legally enter into a contract, or
make by-laws, by which they shall agree to cede or impair their
delegated governmental powers, or to incapacitate themselves
from performing their public duties.^
§ 114. Usage in construing charter powers — Prescription.
— Under the rule that prescription, or the long continued exer-
cise of a right, presupposes an original valid grant, upon which
the right is founded, municipal corporations in England are
admitted to possess and exercise certain powers, which did not
originate in, and as a matter of fact never could have lawfully
been granted to them b}', a royal grant or charter.*
But in the United States, prescription has no effect in con-
1 Hitchcock V. Galveston, 96 U. S.
341.
^Dingman v. People, 51 111.277;
Roberts v. Chicago, 26 lb. 249;
Quincy V. Janes, 76 lb. 231; Nevins
V. Peoria, 41 lb. .502; Peru v. Gleason,
91 Ind. 566; Minn. G. L. Co. v. Min-
neapolis, 36 Minn. 159; Matthews v.
Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115; Weyman v.
Jefferson, 61 Mo. 55 ; Davis v. Mayor
etc., 14 N. y. 506; New York v. Sec.
Ave. R. Co., 32 lb. 261 ; State v. Free-
holders, (N". J. 89) 18 Atl. R. 117;
Shinner v. Hartf. B. Co., 29 Conn.
523; State v. New Brunswick, 81 N.
J. L. 395 ; Martin v. Mayor etc. of
B'klyn, 1 Hill, 545; Britton v. Mayor
etc., 21 How. Pr. 251; Lyth v. Buf-
falo, 48 Hun, 175; Stanfield v. State,
(Tex. 92) 18 S. W. R. 577; Jackson v.
Bowman, 39 Miss. 671; White v.
Yazoo City, 27 lb. 857; Pontiac v.
Carter, 32 Mich. 164; Costar v. Bush,
25 Wend. 628; East Hartford v. Hart-
ford Bridge Co., 10 How. (U. S.) 545;
. Lippelmann v.Cincinnati,40 Ohio Cir.
Ct. 327; Rounds v. Mumford, 2 R. I.
154; Roll V. Augusta, 32 Ga. 326; 111.
etc. R. & C. Co. V. St. Louis etc. Co., 2
Dill. 70;Karst v. St. Paul, 22 Minn.
118 ;Bodine V.Trenton, 36 N. J.L. 198;
Milhau V. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611; State
V. Trenton, (N. J. 89) 18 Atl. R. 116;
City of Nevada v. Morris, 43 Mo.
App. 586; Reading V. Keppleman, 61
Pa. St. 233; Brimmer v. Boston, 102
Mass. 19; Blount v. Janesville, 81
Wis. 640; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 851,
373; Bryson v. Philadelphia, 47 Pa.
St. 329; Gulf Co. & S. R. Co. v. Rior-
dan, (Tex. 93) 22 S. W. R. 519; Mo-
Crowell V. Bristol, (Va. 93) 16 S. E.
R. 867; Atty. Gen'l v. Mayor etc., 3
Duer, 119; Richmond etc. Co. v.
Middletown, 59 N. Y. 228; Peoples
R. R. v. Memphis, 10 Wall. 38, 50;
Lehigh Water Co.'s App., 102 Pa. St.
515.
8 Clark V. Denton, 1 B. & A. 92;
Rex V. Mashiter, 6 A. & E. 153; Rex
V. Salway, 9 B. & C. 424; Clark v.
Le Crew, 9 lb. 52; Atty. Gen. v.
Foster, 10 Ves. 335; Chad v. Tilsed,
5 J. B. Moore, 185. But see Stock,
bridge v. West Stockbridge, 12 Mass.
399.
187
§ 115 MUNICIPAL COBPOIIATIONS. [CH. VIII.
ferring powers upon municipal or private corporations ; and
custom is only an element to be considered in construing mu-
nicipal charters, or interpreting the significance of the words or
phrases contained in them.^ If the meaning of the charter be
uncertain or ambiguous, a well established, ancient and uni-
form usage will be considered by the courts as important in
determining the mode, in which the charter powers may be ex-
ercised; but usage does not enter as an element, into construc-
tion and interpretation, when the language of the charter is
clear, and its grammatical and literal meaning free from doubt.^
Where the statute provides for the exercise of power in a
particular place, it is held that only the usage of such place
must be kept in view, in construing the meaning of the statute.
Thus, when an inspector was empowered to carefully weigh
and determine the weight of all grain, it was held that this
might be legally done by weighing one bushel in sixty, accord-
ing to a long established local custom.^
The acquiescence of the municipal authorities in a certain
construction of a charter may, if this construction is acted upon
by third persons in good faith in the acquisition of vested rights,
constitute such a usage, or establish such a precedent, as will,
in a case where the question is simply one of an irregular ex-
ercise of power, estop the municipality from denj-ing that this
construction was the true one.*
§ 115. Indemnity for oiiicers acting in good faith A
municipal corporation can indemnify its officials against any
1 In Hood V. Lynn, 1 Allen, 103,
C. J. Bigelow said: "An unlawful
expenditure of money by a town
cannot be rendered valid by usage,
however long continued. Abuses of
power and violations of right derive
no sanction from time or custom.
A casual or occasional exercise of a
power by one or a few towns will
not constitute usage. It must not
only be general and of long continu-
ance, but, what is more important,
it must also be a custom necessary
to the exercise of some corporate
power or the enjoyment of some
corporate right, or which contributes
essentially to the necessity and con-
188
veniences of the inhabitants. See
Willard v. Newburyport, 12 Pict.
227; Spauldingv. Lowell, 23 lb. 71;
Smith V. Cheshire, 18 Gray, 308;
Butler V. Charlestown, 7 lb. 12, 16;
Benoit v. Conway, 10 Allen, 528.
"Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt. 439,
444; Smith v. Cheshire, 13 Gray,
308; Butler V. Charlestown, supra.
sFrazier v. Warfield, 13 Md. 279,
303; Love v. Hinkley Abt. Adm.
436; see also Eex v. Chester, 1
Maule & S. 101 ; Eex v. Salway, 9
B. & C. 424.
*Van Hastrap v. Madison City,'l
Wall. 291.
CH. Vin.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC.
115
liability, which they may incur in a iona fide performance of
their duties, even though they may have exceeded their legal
authority ; ^ and this may be effected by a vote to employ coun-
sel, to defend a suit pending against municipal ofBcers,^ or by a
by-law, providing that all municipal officials shall be indemnified
for their unlawful acts, when done in an official capacity.^ The
official indemnified must have been acting for the town when
he became liable ; for, if the corporation has no interest in the
matter involved in the action, and the judgment will in nowise
affect municipal property or rights, it has no legal power to de-
fend the suit, or to appropriate funds to paj' the judgment;*
or to indemnify the officer, after the judgment shall have been
satisfied by him.^ If payment to the official of costs incurred
by him, in a case in which the city has no interest, is contem-
plated, an injunction will lie to restrain it."
The tax assessors of a town, having levied an illegal assess-
ment, were compelled to refund to the taxpayers the amount
which had been illegally collected. It was held that a legal
consideration had been created by the vote of the council, to
provide an indemnity, which was sufficient to support an irrevo-
cable promise, although without such a vote the town would not
have been liable.^ As a general rule, however, a municipal
' Brown v. Melrose, (Mass. 92) 30
N. E. E. 87; Sherman v. Carr, 8 K. I.
431; Bancroft v. Lyunfield, 18 Pick.
566; Bloomington v. Lilliard, 39 111.
Ap. 616; Fuller v. Groton, 14 Gray,
340; Pike v. Middleton, 12 N. H. 278;
Hart V. Newell, 23 Atl. E. 610; East
Hampton v. Bowman, 14 N. Y. S.
668; Babbitt v. Savoy, 3 Cush. 530;
Hadsell v. Hancock, 3 Gray, 526; Ro-
pin V. Laurinburg, 90 N. C. 427;
Lewis v. Eochester, 9 C. B. 401;
Kemper v. Burlington, ( Iowa, 90) 47
N. W. E. 72; Holdswarth v. Dart-
mouth, 11 A. & E. 490.
' Baker v. "Windham, 13 Me. 74;
CuUen V. Carthage, 103 Ind. 196.
'Irwin V. Mariposa, 22 Up. Can. C.
P. 367.
4 Halstead v. Mayor, 3 Comst. ( 3
N. Y.) 430; Leinkenheimer v. Comp.,
23W. L. Bui. 433; People v. Law-
rence, 6 Hill, 244; Bank v. Supervi-
sors, 5 Denio, 517, 521; Merrill v.
Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126; Eeg. v.
Leeds, 4 Q. B. 796; Reg. v. Bridge-
water, 2 P. & D. 558; In re Bell &
Manvevs, 2 Up. Can. C. P. 507.
6 Vincent v. Nantucket, 12 Cush.
105 ; Gregory v. Bridgeport, 41 Conn.
76.
^ Gregory v. Bridgeport, supra. By
the Consol. Act, § 211, the city of
New York is authorized to reimburse
the successful ofBcer in a contested
election case.
'Nelson v. Milford, 7 Pick. 18.
The conclusion of the court in this
case is probably sound, but it can
be better sustained on the ground
that the vote for indemnity was an
executed gift or grant than that
such vote constituted a valid con-
sideration for a strictly executory
189
§116
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. vni.
corporation has no power to reimburse its official for a loss or
expense, which was incurred by him on account of an act of
an unlawful character.^
Persons, who are intrusted with the control and expenditure
of a fund, have a right to retain out of it the proper and legiti-
mate expenses, which were incurred by their administration of
the trust.^
§ 116. The police power of municipal corporations— Its
scope and limitations. — It is not an unfrequent occurrence, but
is in fact, the almost universal custom, for the State to delegate
to the municipal corporation, within its limits, and sometimes
without its limits,* the general exercise of the police power of
the State, for the preservation of the public peace, order and
health, and for the promotion of the general welfare of the com-
munity.* Whenever a municipal corporation undertakes the
enforcement of a particular police regulation, its power in the
premises may be resisted on one of two grounds, viz. : First,
that the particular regulation is in violation of the general con-
stitutional limitations upon the power of the State government;
and Secondly, that although the State government may exercise
such a power, without violating any provision of the Federal
and State Constitutions, it either cannot or did not, under the
provisions of the municipal charter, or of the general laws un-
der which the municipality was incorporated, confer upon such
municipal corporation the right to exercise such a power. To
contract. The latter construction
offends a fundamental principle of
the law of consideration.
1 Irwin V. Mariposa, 22 Up. Can.
C. P. 367.
2 Attorney Gen'l v. Mayor of Nor-
wich, 2 M. & C. 406; Kegiua v. The
Mayor etc. of Sheffield, L. R. 6 Q. B.
652.
"Seeposi, §H6o.
* Ogden V. McLaughlin, 5 Utah,
387; Lawrence v. Monroe, 44 Kan.
607; Kellar v. Corpus Christi, 50
Tex. 614; State v. St. Louis Court,
34 Mo. 546; Jacksonville v. Ledurth,
7 So. R. 885 ; People v. Pratt, 14 N. Y.
S. 551; Carthage v. Rhodes, (Mo. 90)
14 S. W. R. 181; City Council v.
190
Payne, 2 Xott & McCord, 475; Peo-
ple v.Hui-lbut, 24 Mich. 44; 9 Am.
Rep. 103; generally, Vanderbilt v.
Adams, 7 Cow. 349; Com. v. Tewks-
bury, 11 Met. 551 ; Rush v. New Or-
leans, 43 La. An. 275 ; People v. Ben-
nett, 83 Mich. 457; Com. v. Parks,
30 N. E. R. 174; Jditchell v. Rock-
land, 51 Me. 118, 122; 52 lb. 118;
Brown v. Vinalhaven, 65 lb. 402;
Dingley v. Boston, 100 Mass. 544;
Cobb V. Boston, 122 lb. 181; Ban-
croft V. Cambridge, 126 lb. 438; Bur-
dett V. Allen, 35 W. Va. 347; Kosci-
usko V. Sternberg, 68 Miss. 469 ; Hum-
phrey V. Church, 109 N. C. 132;
Welch V. Boston, 126 Mass. 442;
Little Rock v. Barton, 33 Ark. 436.
CH. VIII.] CHAETEK POWERS, THEIK NATURE, ETC. § HT
undertake the explanation in detail of the first of these grounds
for resisting enforcenient of a municipal police regulation,
would require a full and complete discussion of the whole sub-
ject of constitutional limitations, as it bears upon the question
of the police power of the government. This is not only im-
possible to do, for the want of space ; but it is likewise unne-
cessary, as that subject can be found fully and elaborately, and
more appropriately, discussed elsewhere.^ We will, for these
reasons, limit the present discussion of the subject of municipal
police power to the second subdivision, as given above, with a
special reference to those phases of police power, which are
commonly brought into inquiry by the ordinary municipal reg-
ulations.
§ 116 a. Territorial limits of police regulations. — It is a
manifest proposition that, ordinarilj-, the police powers of the
municipal corporation can be exercised only within the terri-
torial limits of the municipalitj-, and not beyond or outside of
the same. But, as an instrument of local government, or local
branch of the state government, it is not beyond the power of
the State to gl'ant to the municipal corporation the exercise of
governmental control over territory outside of the city limits ;
and, in many extraordinary cases, even over territory, which falls
within the boundaries of some other municipality. This sub-
ject, however, has a sufficient treatment elsewhere,^ and it is
only necessaiy, in the present connection, to state the fact, for
the purpose of accentuation.
§ 117. Municipal power to legislate upon subjects cover-
ed by the statute law. — Reference is made elsewhere to the re-
quirement, that municipal ordinances shall be consistent with the
State Constitution, the statute law and the charter of the town
or city.** Thus, a town cannot by licensing legalize an occupa-
tion, such as gaming, the prosecution of which is a crime under
the statute law of the state.* Nor will the power to suppress
gambling confer the power to license houses, in which it is car-
' Tiedeman's Limitations of Police ingto the enactment of general laws,
Power; Cooley's Constitutional Lim- and those prohibiting local or pri-
itations. vate laws, see Stimson Statutes, § 391
2 §62. to § 396 inclusive.
8 See ch. ix. on Ordinances, § 146. * State v. Lindsay, 34 Ark. 372 :
For constitutional provisions, relat- Schuster v. State, 48 Ala. 199.
191
§ 117 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. YUl.
ried on.^ The general laws of the slate operate within munic-
ipal limits as elsewhere, except as to those matters upon which
the State Legislature has deemed it proper to delegate to the
municipal corporation the exclusive power of legislation.^
When the exclusive power of legislation over any subject is
possessed either by the State, or by the municipality, no diffi-
culty can exist ; but when, as is frequently the case, power is
granted to a luunicipality to pass ordinances regulating a sub-
ject, which is already regulated by the law of the State, it may
very easily happen, that an accused person will be placed in a
position, where he will be amenable to a double prosecution,
and, it would seem logically, to a double punishment. Upon
the question, whether the offender can be punished for the same
offence, under the statute and under the ordinance, the cases
are irreconcilable.* It is held by some of the decisions, that the
same act may constitute a crime, both against the State, and
the municipality, and be the occasion of two separate and inde-
pendent prosecutions.* Others hold that the act is but a single
offence, punishable once only, by whichever court first acquires
jurisdiction. So, where gambling is a public offence, and the
city at the same time has the charter power to suppress gam-
bling houses, either the State or the city may prosecute, accord-
ing to the priority of obtaining jurisdiction of the accused.^ A
general grant of power, to make by-laws, has been held to con-
fer no authority upon the corporation to make punishable, by
ordinance, an act which is already punishable as an offence
against the State. The power of the municipality to legislate
by ordinance, concurrently with, or in supersession of, the State,
cannot be implied ; nor is it incidental to the municipal pur-
pose.^ And a statute for restraining towns from punishing
' Groetler v. State, 45 Ark. 454 ;
Society of Arts etc. v. Musgrove, 44
Miss. 820; Moore v. State, 48 lb. 147.
2 Thus, the Legislature can confer
the power to suppress bawdy houses
upon a city; and a municipal ordi-
nance in such a case, has been held
to supersede the state law upon the
subject. Rogers v. The People, 9
Col. 450; State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17;
State V. Debar, 58 lb. 395.
3 Plattsburgh v. Trimble, 46 Mo.
192
App. 459; DeSoto v. Brown, 44 lb.
148 ; Mclnerney v. Denver, 29 Pa.
Eep. 576.
* See post, same section.
5 Rice V. State, 3 Kan. 141; Stat(!
V. Crummey, 17 Minn. 72; State v.
Cowan, 29 Mo. 330.
^ Washington v. Hammond, 76 N.
C. 33; State v. Langston, 88 lb. 692;
State V. Britain, 89 lb. 574; Center-
ville V. Miller, 57 Iowa, 56; People v.
Brown, 2 Utah, 462; State v. Keith.
CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIIl NATURE, ETC. § 117
offences which are cognizable by the State, is constitutional.^
But if the act is one which, by its intrinsic nature, constitutes
at the same time an offence both against the State and the city,
the latter may constitutionally provide by ordinance a penalty
for its commission, if by a reasonable interpretation of the char-
ter, it is evident that it was the intention of the Legislature
to permit or authorize the city to do so.^ Accordingly, it has
been held that a city, having power to enact ordinances " for
i\iQ good government of the place not contravening the laws of
the State," may by ordinance provide for the punishment of an
assault and battery committed upon its streets ; and a previous
penalty, imposed by the State for the same act, is not a bar to
the prosecution by the corporation. ^
The power of the municipal corporation, to provide for the
punishment of a particular offence, will be more readily in-
ferred from the general grant of legislative power to such a cor-
poration, if the offence, to be prohibited and punished, is
peculiarly the concern of the local community, and does not
necessarily, or vitally, affect the public interests of the State at
large.*
iJett V. Eichmond, 78 Ind. 316;
Indianapolis v. Huegle, 18 N. E. R.
172.
2 Grand Rapids v. Bateman, (Mich.
93) 53 K "W. R. 6; Howe v. Plainfield
Treas., 37 N. J. L. 145; Brownville
V. Cook, 4 Neb. 101 ; State v. Grimes,
52 N. W. R. 42; Ex parte Tuttle, 91
Cal. 589; In re Cheney, 27 Pac. R.
436; 90 Cal. 617; Cooley Const. Lim.
199; March v. Com., 12 B. Mon. 25,
29.
3 Mayor v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400. In
this case, Collier, P. J., says: "The
object of the power conferred by the
charter, and the purpose of the or-
dinance itself was not to punish an
offence against the criminal justice
of the country, but to provide a
mere police regulation for the en-
forcement of good order and quiet
within the limits of the corporation.
The offence against the corporation
and the State are distinguishable,
13
and wholly disconnected, and the
prosecution at the suit of each pro-
ceeds upon different hypotheses : the
one contemplates the observarjce of
the peace and good order of the
city; the other has a more enlarged
object in view, — the maintenance of
the peace and dignity of the State."
See also Mayor etc. v. Rouse, 8 Ala.
515; Moore v. State, 16 lb. 411;
Greensboro v. MuUins, 13 lb. 341 ;
Van Buren v. Wells, 14 S. W. R. 38;
Pittsburgh v. Trimble, 46 Mo. App.
459; De Soto v. Brown, 46 Mo. App.
148; McPhei'son v. Ghebouse, 114
111. 46; City of Madison v. Hatcher,
8Blackf. (Ind.) 341; Waldo v. Wal-
lace, 12 Ind. 582.
* Barter v. Com., 3 Pa. St. 253;
State v. Clark, 1 Dutch. 54; State v.
Pollard, 6 E. I. 290; People v. Jack-
son, 8 Mich. 110; State v. Topeka,
36 Kan. 76; In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142;
Ex parte Bourgeois, 60 Miss. G63;
193
§118
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. vni.
It is, of course, always competent for the Legislature, in the
absence of constitutional prohibition, to authorize a municipal-
ity by express statute to impose new and additional penalties,
and to create new remedies for acts already punishable by the
State.i
§ 118. Sanitary regulations— Slaughter houses— Cemeter-
ies— ^Unwholesome provisions. — There is no dispute as to the
right of the State to delegate to municipal corporations that por-
tion of its police power, by which the health of the community
is protected.^ And quarantine ordinances, passed in the exer-
cise of such delegated power, are not in contravention of the
clause of the Federal Constitution, relating to the national con-
trol of foreign and interstate commerce.^ By virtue of the
power thus delegated to them, municipal corporations have at-
tempted to regulate the occupations of their citizens and the
State V. Labatut, 2 So. 550 (La. 87);
Dairs v. Anita, 35 N. W. E. 244; 73
Iowa, 325 ; Diamond State Iron Co.,
8 Atl. K. 368; McLaughlin v. Steph-
ens, 2 Cranch C. C. 148; St. Louis v.
Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; United States v.
Holly, 3 Cianch C. C. 656; Brophy
V. Hyatt, 15 Pac. R. 399; 10 Col. 223;
State V. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330; Amboy
V. Sleeper, 31 111. 499; Cliillioothe
V. Brown, 38 Mo. App. 608: State v.
Ledford, 3 Mo. 102; St. Louis v. Caf-
ferata, 24 lb. 94; Independence v.
Moore, 32 lb. 392; State v. Heiden-
hin, 7 Bo. 621 (smoking in street
cars); Lancaster v. Elec. Co., 8 Pa.
Co. Ct. R. 178; Brooklyn v. Toynbee,
31 Barb. 282; Davenport v. Bird, 34
Iowa, 524; St. Charles v. Meyer, 58
Mo. 86 ; Kew Orleans v. Miller, 7 La.
An. 651.
1 State V. Ludwig, 21 Minn. 202;
State V. Charles, 16 lb. 474; Lowen-
stein V. Myers, 20 N. T. S. 761 ; State
V. Tryon, 39 Conn. 183; Com'rs v.
Harris, 7 Jones (Law) 281; State v.
Grimes, 52 N. W.'R. 42.
2 People V. Wagner, 86 Mich. 594;
Com. V. Parks, (Mass. 92) 30 N. E.
R. 174; Com. v. Cutter, (Mass. 92)
194
29 N. E. R. 1146; In re Shrader, 33
Cal. 279; Ashbrook v. Com., 1 Bush,
139 ; State v. Schlemmer, 42 La. An.
1166 (ordinance requiring the filling
up of wells); Kansas City v. Cook,
38 Mo. App. 660; People v. Gordon,
(Mich. 90) 45 N. W. E. 658; State
V. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330; Monroe v.
Gerspach, 33 La. An. 1011; Wreford
V. People, 14 Mich. 41; Harrison v.
Baltimore, 1 Gill, 264; Boehn v.
Same, 61 Md. 259; Summerville v.
Pressley (S. C. 90) 11 S. E. R. 545;
City & S. R. Co. V. Savannah, 77 Ga.
731 ; Tucker v. Virginia City, 4 Jfev.
20; Johnson V. Simouton, 43 Cal. 242;
In re Lineham, 72 Cal. 114; Huesing
V. Rock Island, 128 111. 465 ; Gregory
V. Mayor, 40 N. T. 293; People v.
MulhoUand, 82 N. Y. 324; State v.
Wordin, 56 Conn. 216; Train v. Bos-
ton Dis. Co., 144 Mass. 523; O'Dono-
van V. Wilkins, 24 Fla. 281; Polinsky
v. People, 73 N. T. 35 ; Health Dep.
N. Y. V. Knoll, 70 N. Y. 530.
3 St. Louis V. McCoy, 18 Mo. 238;
St. Louis V. Boffinger, 19 lb. 13; Met-
calf V. St. Louis, 11 lb. 103. Cf. con-
tra, New Decatur v. Berry, 90 Ala.
432.
CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 118
use of their property, both real and personal, their customs and
manner of living; and, in fact, have endeavored to control to a
certain extent the life of the citizen from the moment that he
is sent ^ into the world, until his corpse is deposited in the
grave .^
It is very evident that a comprehensive power like this,
touching the social and business life of the community at so
many points, is subject to abuse, and may, by conferring ex-
clusive privileges or unduly interfering with private rights,
be so exerted as to prove tyrannous instead of beneficial, and a
public burden, in place of a public protection.^ For the exer-
cise of such delegated discretionary powers, the municipality
will not be liable ; * but it should always be remembered that
even discretionary and public police powers must be exercised
by a municipality in good faith,^ without malicious intent, and
in conformity with the paramount authority of the Federal and
State Constitution, and the general law of the land.®
Under the general charter power, to establish regulations for
the preservation of the public health, slaughter-houses may be
regulated, and confined within specified territorial limits ; ^ and
ordinances may be adopted, imposing a fine for the sale of stale
or unwholesome provisions.^ In the larger municipalities, this
power is often expressly conferred.^ But when the destruction
of putrid or unsound provisions is ordered, the health officials.
1 Record of birth. N. T. Con. Act,
§§603-607; In re Lauteryung, 48 N.
Y. Super. 306.
'^ N. T. Con. Act, § 569.
' See the very able and instructive
dissenting opinions of C. J. Chase,
and JJ. Field, Swayne and Bradley,
in the well known Slaughter House
cases, 16 Wall. 36.
* People V. Board of Health, 33
Barbour, 344.
^ Powers of boards of health con-
strued. See Barton v. New Orleans,
16 La. An. 31Y ; Hutton v. Camden,
39 N. J. L. 122; Ferguson v. Selma,
43 Ala. 398; Belcher v. Farrar, 8
Allen, 325; Hazen v. Strong, 2 Vt.
427; Comrs. v. Powe, 6 Jones Law,
134; Wilkinson v. Albany, 28 N. H.
9; State v. Trenton, 36 N. J. L. 283;
Weil T. Record, 24 N". J. Eq. 169.
^ See this subject, Tiedeman Limi-
tation of Police Power, § 2, et seq.
'Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass.
315; Metro. Board v. Heister, 37 IN".
Y. 661; St. Paul v. Burnes, 38 Minn.
176; Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y. 318;
Wreford v. People, 14 Mich. 41 ; Ex
parte Heilbron, 65 Cal. 609; Ex parte
Shrader, supra ; Jugman v. Chicago,
78 111. 405; Butchers Union S. House
V. Ores. City L. S. Landing, 111 U.
S. 746; s. c, 16 Wall. 13.
8 Rochester v. Collins, 12 Barb.
559; Johnson v. Simonton, 43 Cal.
242.
!>N. Y. Consol. Act, ch. 12, p. 268,
et seq. (ed. 1891.)
195
§ 118 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VIII.
in order to escape personal liability, must show that the property-
was in some way dangerous to the public health.^
Under the well settled rule that municipal corporations may
by ordinances, or otherwise, make proper and reasonable regu-
lations for the burial of the dead,^ the relatives of the deceased
will not be allowed to create a nuisance by the manner in which
the corpse is disposed of. So a by-law is valid, which requires
that the body must be interred at a certain place, and in a
grave having a specified depth.^ But the power, vested in a
municipality to establish cemeteries, within or without city
limits, does not give it the right to prohibit the establishment
of private cemeteries outside the city limits ; or the privilege
of controlling or supervising the use, which is made of them.^
In New York it was held that a municipal grant of land for
cemetery purposes, with covenants for quiet enjoyment, or a
license permitting interments in private grounds, would not pre-
vent the passage of an ordinance, prohibiting interments in
that part of the citj'.^ Whether cemeteries in cities are nui-
sances -per se, or can only be made so by special circumstances,
is a question, upon which the authorities are not agreed ; ^ al-
though the fact, that their existence reduces the value of prop-
erty near by, does not necessarily constitute them a nuisance.'''
It is very evident that land and buildings in agricultural dis-
tricts, or sparsely settled rural villages, may be put to far dif-
ferent uses by their owners, than in thickly populated and
commercial cities. For this reason, under the power to pass
necessary ordinances for the preservation of the public health,
New Orleans v. St. Louis Church,
1 Underwood v. Green, 42 N". T.
140.
2 Coates V. Mayor, 7 Cow. 585 ;
Brick Pres. Ch. v. New York, 5 lb.
538; Mayor of N. T. v. Slack, 3
"Wheel. Cr. Gas. 237; Austin v. Mur-
ray, 16 Pick. 121; New Orleans v.
St. Louis Ch., 11 La. An. 244; Mus-
grove V. St. Louis, 10 lb. 431; City
Council V. Bapt. Church, 4 Strob.
(S. C.) 806; Kincaid's App., 66 Pa.
St. 411; Com. v. Fahey, 5 Cush. 408;
Com. V. Goodrich, 13 Allen, 546.
^Bogert V. Indianapolis, 13 Ind.
134; City Council v. Church, supra;
196
supra.
* Begein v. Anderson, 28 Ind. 79.
* Brick Pres. Ch. v. Mayor, 5 Cow.
538; People v. Pratt, 14 N. T. S. 551;
compare contra. Lake View v. Rose
Hill Cem. Co.,' 70 111. 192.
8 See Tiedeman's Limitations of
Police Power, § 122 d ; Lake View v.
Rose Hill Cem. Co., 70 111. 192; Brick
Pres. Ch. v. Mayor, 5 Cow. 538, and
other cases cited in Police Power.
' New Orleans v. St. Louis Church,
11 La. An. 244; Musgrove v. Same,
10 lb. 431; Lake View v. Letz, 44
111. 81.
CH. VIII.] CHAKTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 119
it was held to be valid for a city to forbid the growing of rice
within the municipal limits ; ^ or for the council to limit the
amount of land, which can be cultivated within its limits by
anj' one person or family.^
§ 119. Sanitary regulations — Contagions diseases — Re-
moral of refuse — Water supply. — Perhaps the most impor-
tant power, which is exercised by a municipal corporation in
the protection of the health of the city, is the power to remove
to a place of detention all persons, who are sick with contagious
or infectious diseases, and to prevent communication with
houses, where such diseases have broken out.^ The power and
right of the state to place those unfortunate persons, who are
suffering from a disorder which is likely to become epidemic,
in a place of confinement, exercised directly or delegated to a
municipal corporation, is too well settled to need much discus-
sion.*
When the city was authorized " to enact all ordinances neces-
sary .... to prevent the introduction of contagious diseases
within the city and within three miles of the same," the Court
said:® "The transfer of this salutary and essential power is given
iu terms as explicit and comprehensive, as could have been used
for such a purpose. To accomplish, within the specified territo-
rial limits, the objects enumerated, the corporate authori ties were
clothed with all the legislative powers which the General As-
sembly could have exercised. Of the degree of necessity for
such municipal legislation, the mayor and city council were the
exclusive judges. To their sound discretion is committed the
selection of the means and manner (contributory to the end) of
exercising the powers which they might deem requisite to the
accomplishment of the objects of which they were made the
guardians. ' To prevent the introduction of contagious diseases
within the city,' etc., they might impose heavy penalties on the
captain, owner or consignee of any ship or other vessel enter-
ing the port, on board of which small-pox or other contagious
^ Green v. Savannah, 6 Ga. 1.
2 Summerville v. Pressley, 11 S. E.
Rep. 545.
SN". T. Consol Act. §549, etc.,
p. 275 (ed. 1891). See Brown v. Pur-
dy, 6 N. T. St. Rep. 143; Gregory v.
Mayor, 49 N. Y. 273, for Powers of
the Board of Health of New Tork
City.
*See Tiedeman's Limitations of
Police Power, § 42; Harrison v. Balti-
more, 1 Gill, 264.
5 In Harrison v. Baltimore, 1 Gill,
264.
197
§119
MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS.
[CH. vni.
disease might prevail, or they might seek the accomplishment
of their object by causing the vessel and all persons to be taken
possession of and controlled, until their purification and dis-
infection were effected, and impose on the captain, owner or
consignee, the payment or reimbursement of all the expenses
incurred by such proceedings ; or they might adopt, at the
same time, both suggested remedies, if for the successful and
faithful execution of their powers they deemed it necessary to
do so." ^ When its charter confers upon a city the express or
implied power to employ means for the protection of the public
against the ravages of a pestilential disease, the power to hire
or erect buildings, for the confinement and care of infected
and sick persons, will be included.^
The time, manner and necessity of cleaning sinks, cesspools
and other receptacles for refuse, are legitimate objects of munic-
ipal regulation ; ^ and it is competent for the corporation in the
same connection to forbid the removal of house dust, or offal
of any kind, through the streets by anyone, not holding a license
from the city ; the object to be accomplished being the exercise
of a stricter municipal control over the matter, by limiting the
number of those who may be employed to do this work.*
The power to contract for a municipal water supply will be
found treated at some length in another section of this work ; ^
and it need only be said in this connection, that, on the ground
that plenty of water is necessary to the preservation of tlie pub-
lic henlth, it was held that a city, under its power to pass police
ordinances, and ordinances to preserve health, could contract
for an artesian well, to be bored on its own land.^ But the
1 Cf. Dubois V. Augusta, Dudley
(Ga.) 30.
2 Anderson v. O' Conner, 98 Ind.
168; Boom v. Utica, 2 Barb. 104;
Viouet V. Municipality N'o. 1, 4 La.
An. 42; Bozant v. Campbell, 9 Eob.
(La.) 411; City Council v. Boyd, 1
Const. Rep., A. D. 1817 (S. C.) 352;
Kiohmond v. Henrico Co., 83 Va.
204; Hull V. Lexington, 18 Mo. 401.
s Com. V. Cutler, (Mass.) 29 N". E.
R. 1146; Nicoulin v. Lowery, 49 N.
J. L. 891.
^In re Vandine, 6 Pick. 187; Com.
198
V. Stodder, 2 Gush. 562, 575, 576; N.
Y. Con. Act, §§ 566, 567.
^ §§ 144, 144 tt, and ch. x. Contracts,
§ 175.
^ Livingston v. Peppin, 31 Ala. 542 ;
Hale V. Houghton, 8 Mich. 458; Mc-
Knight V. New Orleans, 24 La. An.
412; Rome v. Cabot, 28 Ga. 50; Peo-
ple V. McClintock, 45 Cal. 11; Suf-
field v. Hatliaway, 44 Conn. 521 ; fur-
ther, as to water supply, see Spring-
field V. Fulmer, (Utah) 27 Pac. Rep.
577; Dutton v. Aurora, 114 111. 1 ;
Long V. Duluth, 51 N. W. Rep. 913
(exclusive franchise).
CH. VHI.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR IsTATURE, ETC. § 120
power to protect the health of the public must be exercised in
a reasonable manner ; and, on this ground, an ordinance forbid-
ding any person from bringing second hand clothing into a
town, or exposing it for sale therein, without furnishing proof
that it did not come from an infected district, is not, in the ab-
sence of an epidemic, a valid exercise of a charter power, to
establish quarantine regulations, but is an unreasonable re-
straint of trade.^
§ 120. Regulation and abatement of nuisances in gen-
eral.— For the better security and promotion of the health of
the community, municipalities are, commonly, most liberally en-
dowed with power to prevent the creation and maintenance of
nuisances ; and it has been said that the power to abate nui-
sances is inherent in municipal corporations, so absolutely essen-
tial is it to the proper exercise of the police power ; ^ especially
in large and crowded commercial, and manufacturing, cities.^
Such power is peculiarly subject to abuse, and its exercise may
become unlawful, either because the thing or act complained of
is not in fact a nuisance, or because the remedy provided goes
beyond the abatement of the nuisance, and restrains tlie en-
joyment of personal rights or of property, which is in no legal
sense a nuisance. In all these cases, it is a judicial question,
whether the regulation for abatement is unconstitutional, on
these grounds.* For example, a municipality may cause a
house, which has fallen into decay or is irretrievably un-
healthy, to be destroyed ; * but when the nuisance consists
merely in the use which is made of property, and the property
is not in itself a nuisance per se, such an act would be illegal,
because the remedy went beyond the abatement of the nui-
sance.® It follows, as a result of the first proposition above set
^Eoseinsko v. Slombei-g, 9 So.
Eep. 297.
2 Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick. 184;
Kennedy v. Phelps, 10 La. An. 227 ;
State V. Heidenhain, 42 lb. ; Hel-
len V. Noe, 3 Ired. (N. C.) 493.
' Hart V. Mayor etc., 9 Wend. 571.
* Tiedeman's Limitations of Police
Power, § 122 a.
'Theilan v. Porter, 14 Lea, 622;
Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 1.5 Wend.
397; Manhattan Co. v. Van Keuren,
23 N. J. Eq. 251; Green v. Lake, 60
Miss. 451.
6 Welch V. Stowell, 2 Dough.
(Mich.) 332; Clark v. Syracuse, 13
Barb. 32; see, also, Tiedeman's Lim-
itations of Police Power, § 122 g ;
Earp V. Lee, 71 111. 193; Miller v.
Burch, 32 Te:x. 209; Brightman v.
Bristol, 65 Me. 426; Shepard v. Peo-
ple, 40 Mich. 487; Czarniecki's App.
(Pa. 1887), 11 Atl. Kep. 660; Elias v.
Nightingale, 8 E. & B. 698; Anthony
199
§120
MUNICIPAL COUPOIiATrt)NS.
[CH. vni.
forth, that a general power to abate nuisances can only be val-
idly exercised upon that which has been judiciallj'- determined
to be a nuisance, either by reason of its nature, location, or use.^
In some of the States, the use of real property for certain pur-
poses, is declared a nuisance by statute. Thus, in Maine and
Rhode Island, keeping a house of ill fame or for lewd purposes,
for gambling or for the illegal sale of liquor, is a statutory nui-
sance ; and the same statute obtains in some other States.^
The State may confer upon a municipal corporation the ex-
press power to deal summarily with a nuisance, without requir-
ing a resort to a formal legal proceeding ^ or a jury trial.* But
V. Brecon M. Co., L. E. 2 Ex. 167;
lb., 7 Ex. 399; Saltoustallv. Bancker,
8 Gray, 195; Hudson v. Thorne, 7
Paige (jST. Y.) 261 ; Chicago v. Laflin,
49 111. 172; Nortii W. Fer. Co., 97 U.
S. 659; comp. Kidgeway v. West, 60
Ind. 371.
iKoberts V. Ogle, 30 111. 459; Sa^
lem V. Eastern R. Co., 98 Mass. 431;
Dingley v. Boston, 100 Mass. 544;
Van Dyke v. Cincinnati, 1 Disney
(Ohio) 532; Crosby v. Warren, 1
Rich. (S. C.) 385; Ward v. Little
Rock, 41 Ark. 526; Denver v. Mul-
len, 7 Col. 345; McKibbin v. Fort
Smith, 35 Ark. 352; St. Paul v. Gil-
fillan, 36 Minn. 298. In Yates v.
Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, the court
said: " The mere declaration by the
city that a certain structure was an
encroachment or obstruction did not
make it so, nor could such declara-
tion make it a nuisance, unless in
fact it had that character. It is a
doctrine, not to be tolerated in this
country, that a municipal corpora-
tion, without any general law, either
of the city or of the State, within
which a given structure can be
shown to be a nuisance, can, by the
mere declaration tha€ it is one, sub-
ject it to removal by any person sup-
posed to be aggrieved, or even by the
city itself. This would place every
house, every business, and all the
200
property in the city, at the uncon-
trolled will of the temporary local
authorities." Des Plaines v. Poyer,
123 111. 348; State v. Kewark, 38 N".
J. L. 264; Everett v. Council Bluffs,
46 Iowa, 66; Cole v. Kegler, 64 lb.
59; Fieri v. Shieldsboro, 42 Miss.
493; Compton v. Waco B. Co., 62
Tex. 715; Underwood v. Green, 42
N. Y. 140; Miller v. Burch, 32 Tex.
208; Vogt V. Mayor etc., (Md.) 4 Am.
& Eng. Cor. Cas. 329; River Render-
ing Co. V. Behr, 77 Mo. 91; State v.
Mott, 61 Md. 297; Hennessy v. St.
Paul, 37 Fed. Rep. 565 ; Arkadelphia
v. Clark, (Ark. 1889) 27 Am. & Eng.
Cor. Cas. 586; Evansville v. Martin,
41 Ind. 145; Green v. Savannah, 6
Ga. 1; State v. Jer. City, 29 N. J. L.
170; Glenn v. Baltimore, 5 Gill & J.
429; Alpers v. Brown, 60 Cal. 447;
Everett v. Marquette, 53 Mich. 450;
Joyce v. Woods, 78 Ky. 386; Bab-
oock v. Buffalo, 56 N. Y. 268; Darst
V. People, 02 111. 306; Pye v. Peter-
sop, 45 Tex. 312; McCrowell v. Bris-
tol, 5 Lea, 685; Ison v. Manley, 76
Ga. 804.
2 Stimpson Amer. Stat. Law,
§ 2059.
^ Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind.
575.
4 See article of John B. Uhle, 30
Am. Law E. (N. S.) 157; King v.
Davenport, 98 111. 305.
CH. VIII. J CHAETEE POWEES, THEIE MATUEE, ETC. § 120
when the injury caused by the existence of the nuisance is gen-
eral, and public rights are affected, an indictment or other pub-
lic prosecution is the proper remedy, both to abate the nuisance,
and to punish the person who is responsible for its existence.^
When, however, as it frequently happens, the nuisance is both
public and private, its abatement may be obtained by a private
individual, who suffers special damage, if the municipal authori-
ties should neglect to prosecute the person maintaining it.^
In addition to the remedy at law by indictment, a municipal
corporation may invoke the assistance of a Court of Equity, to
lestrain or forbid the erection or maintenance of a public nui-
sance by the issue of an injunction ; particularly, where the
nuisance is likely to be permanent and continuous.^ And the
same remedy is available to private individuals, who suffer
special damage from the public nuisance.*
A municipal corporation has no more right to maintain a
nuisance, or allow others to maintain one, than has an individual ;
and, for a nuisance upon its property, created or permitted by
it, it will be subject to the same remedj^ by injunction, or a suit
1 State V. Bell, 5 Port. (Ala.) 365;
Kex V. White, 5 Burr. 333 ; State v.
Munzenmaler, 24 Iowa, 87; State v.
Anwerda, 40 lb. 151; Syracuse etc.
Co. V. People, 66 Barb. 25; State v.
Noyes, 30 IST. H. 279; Maxwell v.
Bryne, 30 Ind. 120; TaRgart v. Cora.,
21 Pa. St. 527; State v. Haines, 30
Me. 65; School Dis. v. Neil, 36 Kan.
617; Billard v. Erhart, 35 lb. 611;
Blanc V. Murray, 36 La. An. 162;
King V. Sadler, 4 0. & P. 218 ; Holmes
V. Wilson, 10 A. & E. 503 ; In re Doug-
las, 3 Q. B. 825 ; Thompson v. Gib-
son, 7 M. & W. 456; Queen v. Chor-
ley, 12Q. B.515; Queen v. Liscombe,
2 Chit. 214.
2 Lutterloh v. Cedar Keys, 15 Fla.
506; Henkel v. Detroit, 49 Mich. 249;
Fritz V. Hobson, 19 Am. Law Keg.
615; Bushnell v. Robeson, 62 Iowa,
540; Irwin v. Telephone Co., 37 La.
An. 63; McDonald y. Newark, 42 N.
J. Eq. 136; H.ariey v. Merrill B. Co.,
48 N. W. Rep. 1000. Definition of
Nuisance. King v. Lloyd, J Esp.
200; King v. White, 1 Burr. 333;
King V. Davey, 5 Esp. 217; Burditt
V. Swenson, 17 Tex. 489.
8 Hoole V. Atty. General, 22 Ala.
190; Atty. General v. Gas Co., 19
Eng. L. & Eq. 639; Aldrich v. How-
ard, 7 R. I. 87; Zabriskie v. Jersey
City, etc., 13 N. J. Eq. 314; Jersey
City V. Hudson, lb. 420; People v.
St. Louis, 10 111. 372; Attorney Gen-
eral V. Brown, 24 N. J. Eq. 89; Moore
V. Walla Walla, 2 Wash. Ter. 184;
Metro. City R. R. v. Chicago, 96 111.
620; Dumesnil v. Dupont, 18B. Mon.
800; Stearns Co. v. St. Cloud, etc.
Co., 36 Minn. 425; Earl of Ripon v.
Hobart, 3 Mylne & Keen, 169, 179;
Flint V. Russell, 5 Dillon, 151; Pine
City V. Munich, 27 Am. & Eng. Cor.
Cas. 572; Ottumwa v. Chinn, 75 Iowa,
405 ; Newark Aq. Brd. v. Passaic, 45
N. J. Eq. 393 ; see New York Consol.
Act, § 646, and Health Dep. v. Pur-
don, 99 N. Y. 237.
* Tiedeman Equity .Jurisprudence,
§ 484.
201
§120
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. VIII.
for damages.^ So, a license from the municipality will be no de-
fence, in an action against an individual to abate a public nui-
sance.^
Subject to the qualifications and restrictions above stated, it
may be said generally that, vjrhen a municipal corporation has un-
der its charter the authority to remove nuisances, or to prevent
their creation, in order to render the exercise of the power legal,
it must be shown that what is being done is in the interest of
the public health, safety and convenience ; or, in other words,
that the thing or act prohibited is a nuisance.^ Where ths
property or act is a nuisance per se, the power of the munici-
pality is unquestioned,* even though its exercise may involve
the destruction of private property.^ But when the munici-
pality assumes to pronounce property to be a nuisance, which
is not a nuisance, either by statute,*" by the nature of the prop-
erty, or by its use or location, it will be held liable to the owner
for all damages which may be caused by its action, in the abate-
ment of the alleged nuisance,^ to the same extent as a private
person would be, under similar circumstances.^
Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 Iowa, 450;
Com'rs V. Korthern Lib. G. Co., 12
Pa. St. 318; People v. Albany, 11
Wend. 539; St. Louis v. Bentz, 11
Mo. 61; Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio,
523; New Orleaas v. Phillipi, 9 La.
An. 44; Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N. J.
222 ; Peck v. Lookwood, 5 Day (Conn.)
22; Baltimore v. Eadecke, 49 Md.
217.
* Ferguson v. Selma, 43 Ala. 398;
N"olin V. Franklin, 4 Yerg. 163; North
Chicago, etc., Co. v. Lakeview, 105
111. 207; Hart V. Albany, 9 Wend. 571.
"See Kiley v. Kansas, 69 Mo. 102;
Parker v. Macon, 39 (Ja. 729; Bissett
V. St. Joseph, 53 lb. 290; Cain v.
Syracuse, 95 N. Y. 83; as to liability
of the city for a failure to exerciso
the power to abate nuisance created
by others.
" Nuisance as applicable to New
York city defined. Con. Act, § 636.
' Cole V. Kegler, 64 Iowa, 59.
8 Welch V. Stowell, 2 Doug. 332;
Clark V. Mayor of Syracuse, 13 Barb.
1 Judge V. Meriden, 38 Conn.
Mootry v. Daubury, 45 lb. 430; Ft.
Worth V. Crawford, 74 Tex. 404;
Suilolk V. Parker, 79 Va. 660; Penn-
oyer v. Saginaw, 8 Mich. 534; Has-
kell V. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 208 ;
Boston Roll. Mills v. Cambridge, 117
lb. 396; State v. Mayor, 12 Lea, 146;
Chapman v. Rochester, 110 N. Y.
273; Sherman v. Langham, 30 Am. &
Eng. Cor. Cas. 539; Niblett v. Nash-
ville, 12 Hersk. 684; Hannibal v.
Richards, 82 Mo. 330; Harper v. Mil-
waukee, 30 Wis. 363 ; Brayton v. Fall
River, 143 Mass. 218; Petersburg v.
Applegarth, 28 Gratt. 321; Haag v.
Com'rs, 60 Ind. 511.
2 King V. Cross, 2 C. & P. 483;
Pettis v. Johnson, 56 Ind. 139; Ryan
v. Copes, 11 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 217;
Garrett v. State, 49 N. J. L. 94a.
" Ex pm-ie Robinson, (Tex.)17S. W.
1057; May v. People, 27 Pac. Rep.
1010; Dingley v. Boston, 100 Mass.
544; Lake View v. Letz, 44 111. 81;
Com. V. Worcester, 13 Pick. 462;
202
CH. VIII.] CHAETEE POWEES, THEIE NATUEE, ETC. § 120
It is no defence, in an action to abate a public nuisance, that
the defendant was too poor to abate it himself ; ^ that the public
derived some advantage from it;^ that the municipality had
not assigned a separate place for the obnoxious business ; ** that
similar nuisances have been allowed or acquiesced in by the au-
thorities;* that the defendant has leased the premises, and can-
not lawfully enter to abate the nuisance,^ or that he has used
the utmost possible care to prevent the nuisance from injuring
others.^ What combination of annoyances will constitute a
public nuisance in any particular instance, usually depends on
the circumstances of each case, as it arises.'^ No particular
sorts of annoyance are necessary to make a nuisance ; and the
Courts have not laid down any definition of nuisances which
is at all exhaustive or inclusive.
Aside from those things, which are prejudicial to the public
welfare or morals, or injurious to private rights wherever they
may be located, much latitude has been allowed in modern times
in the doing of what, by the earlier decisions, had been pro-
nounced to be nuisances ; and this is to be accounted for, and jus-
tified by the rapid advance in population of the towns and cities
of this country ^ and England, coupled with the necessity for
32; Church v. Milwaukee, 31 Wis,
512; Kennedy v. Board of Health, 2
Pa. St. 366; Green v. Savannah, 6 Ga.
1; Underwood v. Green, 42 N. Y.
140; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall.
497; Wreford v. People, 14 Mich. 41;
Everett v. Council Bluffs, 46 Iowa,
60; Salem v. Eastern R. Co., 98 Mass.
431. In a few of the states, provis-
ion has been made in certain cases
for remuneration of those whose
property Is injured through the
abatement of nuisances. Leavitt v.
Cambridge, 120 Mass. 157; Fams-
worth V. Boston, 126 lb. 1; Barnsta-
ble Sav. Bk. V. Boston, 127 lb. 254;
Cavanaugh v. Boston, 139 Mass. 426;
III re Chessborough, 17 Hun, 561;
Read V. Cambridge, 126 Mass. 427;
Nickerson v. Boston, 131 lb. 306;
Bush V. Dubuque, 69 Iowa, 233.
1 Baltimore etc. T. Co. v. State, 63
Md. 573.
SRespublica v. Caldwell, 1 Dall.
150; State v. Kaster, 35 Iowa, 221;
Works v. Junction R. Co., 5 McLean,
425 ; Duluth v. Mallet, 43 Minn. 204.
3 State V. Hart, 34 Me. 36.
* People V. Mallory, 4 Thompson &
C. (N. Y.) 567.
5 Thompson v. Gibson, 7 M. & W.
455 ; Smith v. Elliott, 9 Pa. St. 345.
^ McAndrews v. CoUard, 42 N. J. L.
189; Cogswell v. New York, etc. Co.,
103 ]Sr. Y. 10; People v. Lead Works,
82 Mich. 471.
'See remarks of Pollock, J., in
Bamford v. Turnley, 113 Eng. C. L.
66, upon the impossibility of laying
down any clear or certain rule as to
what will constitute a nuisance.
8 See this branch of the subject
discussed in Galbraith v. Olivet, 3
Pitts. (Pa.) 79, and Huckenstine's
App., 70 Pa. St. 102.
203
§120
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. VIII.
the location in large centers of population of mills, factories and
shops, in which the wage-earners of the locality may find em-
ployment, and by which the inhabitants of the cities are sup-
plied with the necessities of life. In the light of these profound
changes in the material, economic and municipal life of the mod-
ern world, there is a necessary revision of the conception of
what constitutes an unlawful nuisance.^ " If one lives in a
city he must expect to suffer the dirt, smoke, noisome odors,
noise and confusion incident to cit}- life. As Lord Justice
James beautifully said, in Salvin v. North Brancepeth Coal Co.,^
' If some picturesque haven opens its arms to invite the
commerce of the world, it is not for this Court to forbid the
embrace, although the fruit of it should be the sights and
sounds and smells of a common seaport and shipbuilding town,
which would drive the Dryads and their masters from their
ancient solitude.' " * In another case,* it was said that " the
people who live in such a city, i. e. where the principal indus-
tiy consists of manufactures, do so of choice, and they volunta-
rily subject themselves to its peculiarities and its discomforts
for the greater benefits they think they derive from their resi-
dence or business there."
The application of steam to manufacturing purposes, the use
of gas and electricity for illuminating streets and buildings, the
running of horse cars and railroad trains in city streets, and
similar modern innovations, have created annoyances which, by
their magnitude and injurious character, have caused the minor
evils, with which the earlier English cases deal, to dwindle into
insignificance. Under such changed conditions, the principles
of the earlier decisions are not always applicable, and many
trades, which were at one time declared nuisances per se, would
now not be deemed nuisances at all, unless they should become
so by the manner, or the locality, in which they are conducted.^
It is impossible in a work of this nature, to treat the subject
' Harrison v. Good, L. K. 11 Eq.
338; Salvin v. Nortli Brancepeth C.
Co., L. K. 8 Ch. Ap. 467; Broder v.
SalUard, L. R. 2 Cb. Dlv. 692; Bam-
ford V. Turuley, 3 B. & D. 62, 66;
Tipping V. St. Helen's Smelting Co.,
4 lb. 608; 11 H. L. Cas. 642; Gaunt
V. Fyuuey, L. R. 8 Cli. Ap. 8.
204:
2 L. R. 9 Ch. App. 705.
* Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N". T. 568.
* Huckenstein's Appeal, 70 Pa. St.
102; 10 Am. Kep. 669.
^ In Toyhales Case, Cro. Car. 510, a
candle f actory,and in Jones v. Powell,
Palm. 537, a tobacco factory and brew-
ery, were declared nuisances per se.
OH. VIII.J CHAUTEE POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 120
of nuisances in detail, or to enumerate more than a small pro-
portion of the things, which have at various times been regarded
as nuisances by the courts of law. So far as trades and occu-
pations of an offensive character are concerned, it may be said
that it is not necessary that the disagreeable smell produced
should be injurious to health,^ provided the neighborhood is
materially deprived of fresh and pure air.
A dense smoke has been judicially declared to be a nuisance,^
and a noise, such as the ringing of bells, has been enjoined.^
But whether smoke, noise or smell would constitute a nuisance,
within the limits of a municipal corporation, would depend to
a great extent upon their character, and upon the location and
surroundings of the source of the annoyance.* So, the noise
made by a tinsmith,'' a circus,^ a rolling mill,^ a shooting gal-
lery,^ in working stone quarries,^ by the stamping of horses in
a stable,^" or cattle in a pen,ii by a gold beater,^ a blacksmith,^^
or a printing press,-^* have been held sufficient to constitute such
occupations a nuisance ; particularly, when carried on in quiet
localities.
But a livery stable, tannery,^^ or brick kiln,^^ is not even in a
populous city a nuisance per se; and whether it shall be re-
garded as a nuisance at all, depends upon its location, and the
mode in which it is built and used.^"
Many things, such as cemeteries, factories, or lime kilns are
1 The King v. White, 1 Burr, 337;
The King v. Neil, 2 C. & P. 485; St.
Helens Chem. Co. v. St. Helens, L.
E. 1 Ex. Div. 196.
2 Harmon v. Chicago, 110 HI. 400;
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Orr, (Ky.)
1.3 S. W. Rep. 8; corap. contra, St.
Paul V. GilfiUan, 36 Minn. 298.
^ Harrison v. St. Marks Church, 12
Phila. (Pa.) 259; Leete v. Pilgrim
etc. Church, 14 Mo. App. 590; Davis
V. Savryer, 133 Mass. 289.
* See Peo. v. Lewis, 49 N. W. 140.
'- The King v. Lloyd, 4 Esp. 200.
^ Inchbold v. Robinson, L. R. 4
Ch. App. 388.
' Scott v. Firth, 4 F. & F. 349.
8 King V. Moore, 3 B. & Ad. 184.
' Queen v. Matters, 10 Cox, 6.
1" Dargan v. Waddell, 9 Ired. ( N.
C.) 244.
" Bishop V. Banks, 33 Conn. 121.
'2 Wallace v. Ames, 10 Phila. 356.
15 Fish V. Dodge, 4 Den. 311.
i< Roberson v. Campbell, 13 F. C.
(S. C.) 61.
" State V. Cadwalader, 36 N. J. L.
283.
16 Wanslead etc. v. Hill, 13 C. B.
479; State v. Mott, 61 Md. 297.
17 Aldrich v. Howard, 7 R. I. 87;
s. c, 8 lb. 246; Morris v. Brower,
Anthons N. P. (N. Y.) 368; Flint v.
Russell, 5 Dillon, 151; Harrison v.
Brooks, 20 Ga. 537; Packard v. Col-
lins, 23 Barb. 444 ; Shiras v. Olinger,
50 Iowa, 571.
The following have been in recent
205
§120
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIOKS.
[CH. vin.
not in themselves nuisances, when established remote from
dwelling houses, but may become so by the increase of urban
population, and the extension of the city's area into the sur-
rounding country. In such a case, the length of time, during
which the objectionable object existed, will not eliminate its il-
legal character as a nuisance ; and the fact, that the complain-
ant approaches it, does not make the person maintaining the
nuisance the less liable for his wrongdoing.^
times declared nuisances by the
courts on account of the nature of
the thing itself, or of the mode or
location in which it existed : A pig
sty (Com. V. Van Sickle, Bright.
(Pa.) 69 ), steam -whistle (Parker v.
Union W. Wks., 42 Conn. 309), bow-
ling alley (State v. Haynes, 30 Me.
65), sawing of marble ( McKeou v.
See, 51 N. Y. 300), pigeon match (Rex
V. Moore, 3 B. & A. 184), skating
rink ( Snyder v. Cabell, 29 W. Va.
48), an electric light engine (Yocum
V. Hotel St. George, 18 Abb. N". C.
340), blacksmith shop (Brown v.
Muzzy, 117 Ind. 258), brick burning
(Walter v. Seefe, 15 Jur. 416; 4 Eng.
L. & Eq. 18), tallow factories (Blunt
V. Hay, 4 Sandf. Ch. 363), soap works
( Howard v. Lee, 3 Sandf. Ch. 281),
fat boiling (State v. Neidt, 19 Atl.
Eep. 318), bone boiling (Meigs v.
Lister, 23 N. J. Eq. 320), gas works
(People V. N. T. Gas L. Co., 64 Barb.
55; Bolian v. Pt. Jervis G. L. Co., 25
N. E. R. 246; 122 K. Y. 18), a carpet
cleaning establishment ( Craven v.
Rodeuhausen, 21 Atl. Eep. 774), cat-
tle yards (Cora. v. Alden, 14.3 Mass.
113), barns (GifEord v. Hulett, (Vt.)
19 Atl. Rep. 230), pools of stagnant
water (Com. v. Read, 34 Pa. St. 27.5 ;
Lockett V. Ft. Worth etc. Co., 78
Tex. 211; Busch v. N. Y. L. & W.
E. Co., 12 N. Y. S. 85), oil factory
(Com. V. Brown, 13 Met. 365), guano
warehouse (Ruff v. Phillips, 50 Ga.
1.30), manure deposit (People v.
Board of Health, 33 Barb. 344), a
206
dairy (State v. Ball, 59 Mo. 321), a
fertilizer factory ( State v. Luce,
(Del.) 6 Cent. Eep. 862; Susquehan-
na F. Co. V. Malone, 73 Md. 268),
varnish works ( Rex v. Neil, 2 C. &
P. 485 ), chemical works ( Rex v.
White, 1 Burrows, 3.33), a distiUei7
(Smith V. MoConathy, 11 Mo. 517),
privies (Wahle v. Eeinback, 76 111.
322), a cooking range ( Grady v.
Walsner, 46 Ala. 381), powder mag-
azine (Laflin, Eand etc. Co. v. Tear-
ney, 23 N. E. Eep. 389; Chicago W.
& V. Coal Co V. Glass, 34 111. App.
364), coal shed (Wiley v. Elwood, 25
jSr. E. Eep. 570), blasting rocks (Hun-
ter V. Farren, 127 Mass. 381), any ob-
ject which collects a crowd (Boston
V. N^orth Staf. E. Co., 5 De G. & S.
584), gambling house ( McClean v.
State, 49 N. J. L. 471), a saloon
where liquor is sold illegally (Mey-
er V. State, 42 N. J. L. 145), crying
aloud on a public street (Com. v.
Harris, 101 Mass. 29; State v. Earn-
hardt, 107 N. C. 789).
' Coates V. Mayor, 7 Cow. 585 ; Bra-
dy V. Weeks, 3 Barb. 157; Cemetery
Ass. V. Eailroad Co., 121 111. 199.
See on- " coming to a nuisance, "
Howell V. McCoy, 3 Eawle ( Pa. )
256; Smith v. Phillips, 8 Phila. (Pa.)
10; Ladies Dec. Art Club, 25 W. jST.
C. (Pa.) 75; Hillegass v. Helley, 5
Pa. St. 97; Alexander v. Kerr, 2
Eawle, 83; 19 Am. Eep. 616; Com. v.
Upton, 6 Gray (Mass.) 473 ; Boston
Roll. Mill V. Cambridge, 117 Mass.
396; Mulligan v. Ellis, 12 Abb. Pr.
CH. VIII.J CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 121
§ 121. Harbor and navigable waters. — Very extensive
powers are usually committed to maritime municipal corpora-
tions, by the exercise of which the use of navigable waters
within municipal boundaries may be regulated.^ Under such
powers, the municipality may establish pier head lines, remove
obstructions in the harbor, and regulate the use of the Water
by fishermen and others.^ But the power of the municipality,
to rid the harbor of obstructions, does not, it has been held,
take away the right of the State authorities to have the same
declared a purpresture or nuisance.^ The dumping of ashes
and refuse in the harbor may be prohibited by the city under a
penalty ;* but it has been held that an action in rem, to enforce
these penalties, cannot be maintained.^
The duty of a municipality, having the control of an open
and public harbor, is to keep it reasonably safe for those using
it, whether it receives tolls or harbor dues for its use, or not.^
. It has been held that an embankment,^ a line^ or a wire
cable stretched across a river,^ a gas pipe ^^ or oil pipe line,^^ a
telegraph cable,^^ a weir,^'' deposits of sewage,^* or of sediment
N. S. 259; Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.
Y. 568; Vedder v. Vedder, 1 Den.
257; Bavwell v. Brooks, 1 L. T. N. S.
454; Cooley on Torts, 612, 613.
• See Culbertson v. Southern Belle,
I Newb. (U. S.) 461; Remy v. New
Orleans, 15 La. An. 657.
2N. T. Consol. Act, p. 353, (2d ed.
1891); People v. Bryan, 46 Barb. 355.
8 People V. N. Y. & S. I. Ferry Co.,
68 N. Y. 71; People v. Vanderbilt,
31 lb. 205; People v. Supervisors, 73
N. Y. 393.
* Com'rs V. Frost, 4 Daly, 353.
^Com'rs v. Dick, 5 Daly, 391;
Com'rs V. Pidgeon, 23 Hun, 346.
« Ligare v. Chicago, (111 . Sup.) 28 N.
E. R. 934; Parnaby v. Lan. Can. Co.,
II A. & E. 223; Metcalf v. Hether-
ington, 11 Ex. .257; Gibbs v. Liver-
pool Docks, 3 H. & N. 164; s. c, L.
E., 1 H. L. 93, 104, 122; Loagmore v.
G. W. R. Co., 35 L. J. C. P. 135;
Francis v. Cockrell, L. R. 5 Q. B. 184;
Webb V. Pt. Bruce Harbor Co., 19
Up. Can. Q. B. 626; Coe v. Wise, L.
R. 1 Q. B. 711 ; Winch v. Conserva-
tors, etc., L. E. 7 C. P. 471; Sweeney
V. Pt. Burwell H. Co., 17 Up. Can.
C. P. 574; 19 lb. 376; Berry man v.
Same, 24 Up. Can. Q. B. 34.
' Eex V. Ward, 6 N. & M. 38.
SMcCord V. Tiger, 6 Biss. 409.
'The Vancouver, 2 Sawyer, 381.
Ladd V. Foster, 31 Fed. Eep. 827.
1' Omslaer V. Philadelphia Co., 31
Fed. Eep. 8.54.
" Buffalo etc. Co. v. New York etc.
R. Co., 10 Ab. N. C. 107.
1- S. & C. Trans. Co. v. West. Union
T. Co., 8 Ben. 502.
w Williams v. Wilcox, 3 N. & P. 600.
1* Brayton v. Fall River, 113 Mass.
218; Washburn etc. Co. v. Worcester,
116 lb. 458; Boston Rolling Mills v.
Cambridge, 117 lb. 396; Clark v.
Peckham, 10 E. I. 35.
207
§122
MUNICrrAL COEPORATIOXS.
[CH. VI n.
and d^bris,^ are serious obstructions, which constitute public
nuisances and should be abated by the municipal authorities,
who have control of the navigable waters.
§ 122. Regulation of occupations and amusements. — The
State, in the exercise of the police power, may subject all occu-
pations to a reasonable regulation, when this is required for the
protection of public interests or of the public welfare.^ Bat
such a power is by no means arbitrary or unlimited, so that the
State, either directly or by the agency of a municipality, can
prohibit the prosecution of a harmless business.^
It is comparatively easy to lay down general rules upon this
subject ; but much more dilEcult to apply them to the multifa-
rious occupations, which, it has been claimed, may be regulated
and restricted. To dictate to the individual what method he
shall or shall not adopt to procure the means of livelihood,
seems a most serious invasion of his right to life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness, guaranteed him by the constitution.*.
When, however, a particular calling threatens damage to the
public health or welfare, or to private individuals, it is a proper
subject for municipal police regulation. But such power must
be exercised with caution so as not to unnecessarily infringe
individual rights ; and, as in the analogous cases of the sup-
pression of nuisances, whether in any case the trade or occupa-
tion requires, or justifies police regulation, is a judicial and
not a municipal question.* The courts will not permit an oc-
1 Garltee v. Baltimore, 53 Md. 422;
People V. Gold Run Ditch Min. Co.,
56 Am. Eep. 80.
2 Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts,
07 U. S. 25; N. O. Gas Co. v. Loui-
siana L. Co., 115 lb. 650, 661; Barte-
meyer V. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; Foster
V. Kansas, 112 U. S. 291; Kidd v.
Pearson, 128 U. S. 1; Mugler v. Kan-
sas, 123 lb. 623; State t. Holcomb,
68 Iowa, 107; Com. v. Patch, 97 Mass.
221.
3 For a full and exhaustive treat-
ment of the subject of police regula-
tion of trades and professions, see
Tiedeman'# Limitations of Police
Power, chapter ix.
* Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall.
208
106; Coi-field v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.
C. 38; In re Jacobs, 98 ST. T. 98;
Opinion of Andrews, J., in Bertholf
V. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509; People v.
Marx, 99 jST. Y. 377, 386; Miller, J., In
re John Brosnahan, Jr., 4 McCrary,
1. That the power of a municipal
corporation to regulate does not im-
ply the power to prohibit, see Tay-
lor V. Griswold, 2 Green (N. J.) 222;
State V. Mott, 61 Md. 297; Milliken v.
Weatherford, 34 Tex. 388; Hayden v.
Noyes, 5 Conn. 391;.Peck v. Lock-
wood, 5 Day (Conn.) 22 ; Willard T.
Killingworth, 8 Conn. 247; Clason v,
Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316.
5 Beebe v. State, 26 Ind. 501.
CH. Vltl.] CHARTER POWKKS, THEIR N'ATURE, ETC.
§122
cupation to be interfered with, or property rights to be invaded,
by a municipality, under the guise of a police regulation, when
it is clear that the promotion of the public health, welfare or
morals is not the end sought.^
The means, chosen by a municipalitj', in regulating occupa-
tions should not go beyond the prevention of the evil, and pro-
hibit what is not an evil.^ Thus, the keeping of a gambling
house is a public evil, and a municipality may place it under
whatever regulations it may see fit, even to the extent of pro-
liibiting the keeping of one altogether.^ But a laundry is not
per se a nuisance ; nor is that business anywhere unlawful. For
this reason, a municipality has no power to arbitrarily give or
withhold consent for the carrying on of such a lawful business,
without regard to the discretion or competenc}' of the person
seeking a license.* On the other hand, an ordinance, prohibit-
ing the carrying on of this business in certain localities during
specified hours, was sustained as a valid and constitutional ex-
ercise of the police power.^ The municipality caniidt, by pass-
ing a regulative ordinance forbid others from engaging in that
business in the same locality, while those already established are
allowed to remain there.^ When the business, which is souglit
to be regulated, is one which, from the manner in which it is
being conducted, is verj- likely to become a nuisance, and to
seriously injure the health of the community, the delegated
police power of the municipal corporation can be exercised to
a much wider extent to avert the threatened evil, even to the
1 Austin V. Murray, 16 Pick. 126;
Green v. Savannah, 6 Ga. 1 ; People
V. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330; Ames v. P.
H. L. Co., 11 lb. 139; State v. Beau,
91 N. C. 554; Ex, parte Mirande, 73
Cal. 365; O'Maley v. Freeport, 96 Pa.
St. 24; Vansans v. Harlem Stage Co.,
59 Md. 330; Muhlenbrinck v. Com'rs,
42 N. J. L. 364; Flanagan v. Plain-
field, 44 lb. 118; Clark v. New Bruns-
wick, 43 lb. 175.
2 In re Frank, 52 Cal. 606; District
V. Saville, 1 McArthur, 581; St. Louis
V. Fitz, 53 Mo. 582; Long v. Taxing
Dis., 7 Lea, 134.
8 N. T. Con. Act, § 285.
u
* Yick Wo. V. Hopkins, 118 U. S.
356, rev'g In re Tick Wo, 68 Cal. 294;
see In re Tie Loy, 26 Fed. Rep. 611.
SBarbier v. Connolly, 118 U. S. 27;
Soon Hing v. Crowley, 118 lb. 703;
^s parte Mayniei', 65 Col. 33; In re
HongKie, 69 Cal. 149; lure Quong
Wo, 7 Sawyer, 526.
8 Tugman v. Chicago, 78 111. 405 ;
Brooks V. Mongam, 86 Mich. 576; 49
N". W. K. 633; Sayre v. Phillips, 24
Atl. Rep. 76; 30 W. N. C. 196; Cf.
Martin v. Rosodale, 29 N. E. Rep.
410; Ex parte Heyle, 92 Cal. 492;
Richmond v. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112;
28 N. E. r; 312.
209
§ 122 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VIII.
interference with valuable rights which had become vested.^
In the early system of English municipal government, certain
prescriptive rights had been exercised by the borough, to grant
exclusive privileges of trading, or of carrying on other voca-
tions. These customary rights, which were considered to have
their foundation in charters long since lost, do not exist in the
United States ; and, for this reason, the English decisions, dis-
cussing and enforcing them, are out of place in American juris-
prudence.
The maxim of the law, enunciated in several of the earher
American decisions,^ that ordinances must not be in restraint
of trade, must be taken with the proviso, as pointed out in this
section, that the municipality may regulate the occupation of
all those coming within its jurisdiction, as far as it is necessary
for the protection and advancement of the public health, wel-
fare and morals.*
By virtue of a " power relative to nuisances " it has been
lield that a city may prohibit the keeping of bowling alleys
for gain ; * or may prescribe that they shall be closed at a cer-
tain hour.* But a statute, authorizing the police to suppress
gambling by seizing gambling implements and publicly destroy-
ing the same, without anj"- notice to the owner or any form of
investigation, was declared unconstitutional, as depriving the
owner of his property without due process of law." Nor will
the power to suppress gambling houses authorize the municipal-
ity to destroy the houses, in which the gambling is carried on.'^
The charter power, to suppress or restrain bawdy or disor-
derly houses, confers by implication the power to adopt meas-
ures conducive to the accomplishment of that end. Thus,
the municipal authorities may forbid house owners from leas-
ing their premises for this purpose,^ and may.impose penalties
35 Am. Rep. 420; Fisher v. McGirr,
IGray, 1; Hibbardv. People, 4 Mich.
120; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 354.
'. Bosley v. Davis, L. E. 1 Q. B.
Div. 84; Brodie v. Bowmanville, 38
Up. Can. Q. B. 580.
8 Childress v. Mayor etc., 3 Sneed,
347; Shreveport v. Koos, 35 La. An.
1010; State v. Williams, 11 S. Car.
288; Ogden v. McLaughlin, 16 Pac.
Kep. 72.
1 See § 120, Nuisances, State v.
Fisher, 52 Mo. 174; Elec. Imp. Co. v.
San Francisco, 45 Fed. Kep. 593.
a Com. V. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562, 568.
3 Mays V. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268.
< Tanner V. Albion, 5 Hill, 121; Up-
dike v. Campbell, 4 E.D. Smith, 570;
People V. Sergeant, 8 Cow. 139.
s State V. Hay, 29 Me. 457; State v.
Freeman, 38 N. H. 426.
^ Lowry v. Rainwater, 70 Mo. 152;
210
OH. VIII. J CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 123
on the keepers of disreputable houses, or on persons owning
houses used for such purposes,^ on persons soliciting ^ or visiting,
or being in houses of this cliaracter.^ And this, it has been
held, may be done, although the offences are punishable under
the law of the state.* But it is not constitutional for a munic-
ipality to forbid the leasing of premises to one, who is, or has
been a prostitute, where the premises are not to be used for the
purposes of prostitution.^ So the municipal authorities cannot
arbitrarily order the destruction of such houses ; ^ or, under a
power to pass by-laws, which are deemed expedient for the sup-
pression of houses of ill fame, enact an ordinance making it a
misdemeanor for a prostitute to live or to be found within mu-
nicipal limits '' or to return to the city after a departure from
it.^ In an Iowa case,^ it was held that the power to suppress
bawdy houses did not include the power to declare the keeping
of one a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment.
It would seem, however, that this is a refinement of distinction,
not warranted by the authorities in general.
§ 123. Licenses, when a police regulation, and when a
tax. — It is very common for a municipal corporation, and not
unusual for the state, and even the national government, to re-
quire the procurement of a license, and the payment of a fee
therefor, as a condition precedent to the prosecution of a cer-
tain trade or business, and to enforce thp payment of such fee
by the imposition of heavy penalties. Although the courts are
not always clear in their statements of the grounds upon which
they have sustained the legality of these licenses, the constitu-
tional objections to them have been very generally denied on
one ground or another.^" The cases are very numerous, and the
iMcAlister V. Clark, 33 Conn. 91;
Ely v. Supervisors, 36 N. Y. 297;
Shaffer v. Mumraa, 17 Md. 331 ; Peo-
ple V. Erwin, 4 Den. 129 ; Territory
y. Dakota, 2 Dak. 155;Tiedeman Po-
lice Powers, §126; Cf. contra, State
V. Webster, 107 N. C. 962.
=! Thomas v. Hot Spgs, 34 Ark. 553.
'State V. Botkin, 71 Iowa, 87; In
re Johnson, 73 Cal. 228.
*Wong V. Astoria, 13 Oreg. 538;
People V. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611 ;
State V. Wisten, 62 Mo. 592.
^ Milliken v. City Council, 54 Tex.
388 (38 Am. Rep). 629.
6 See ante, § 129.
'Buell V. State, 45 Ark. 336; Mil-
liken V. City Council, 54 Tex. 388 (38
Am. Rep. 629).
8 Parmlee v. Camden, 49 Ark. 165.
^ Chariton v. Barber, 54 Iowa, 360
(37 Am. Rep. 209).
"Carroll v. Tuskaloosa, 12 Ala.
173; Merriara v. New Orleans, 14 La.
An. 314; Wynne v. Wright, 1 Dev. <fe
211
§123
JIUXICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. VIII.
license has been required in a great variety of trades and pro-
fessions. Among those, which the courts have held to have
been legally subjected to a license, may be mentioned the vend-
ing of merchandise by hucksters,^ the practice of law and medi-
cine,2 bankers,^ telegraph companies,* natural gas companies,*
the selling of bread,^ amusements of a public character,^ driv-
ing of cabs, stages and drays,* the sale of milk,' junk shops,i"
auctions,!^ livery stables,^^ and the liquor traffic.^*
B. (N. C.) Law, 19; Savannah v.
Hartridge, 8 Ga. 23; Collins v. Louis-
ville, 2 B. Mon. 134; The Germania
V. State, 1 Md. 1; Lucas v, Lat.
Com'rs, 11 G. & J. (Md.) 506; Sears
V. West, 1 Murph, (N. C.) 291; E, St.
Louis v. Trustees, 102 111. 489; "Wig-
gins F. Co. V. East St. Louis, 102 lb.
560; State v. Hayne, 4 S. C. 403;
State v. Columbia, 6 lb. 1 ; United
States D. Co. v. Chicago, 112 111. 19;
Van Hook v, Selma, 70 Ala. 361. See
cases infra.
1 Huntington v. Cheesbro, 57 Ind.
74; Ex parte ah Foy, 57 Cal. 92;
Temple v. Sumner, 51 Miss. 13.
=* Simmons v. State, 12 Mo. 268;
State v. Hibbard, 3 Ohio, 33 ; State v,
Pi-oudfit, 3 lb. 33; State y. Gazley,
5 lb. 21; Savannah v. Charton, 36 Ga,
460; Young V. Thomas, 17 Fla. 169;
Longville v. State, 4 Tex, App, 312;
Girard v. Bissell, 45 Kan. 56; 25 Pac.
Rep. 232.
" Oil City V. Trust Co,, 11 Pa, Co,
Ct. K. 350.
*W. U. Tel, Co. V. Philadelphia, 12
Atl. Kep. 144; Allentown v. "W. U.
Tel. Co., 23 lb. 1070,
5Rushville v. Gas, Co., 28 N, E.
Eep, 853,
« Mayor etc. v. Yuille, 3 Ala, 137;
People V. Wagner, 49 N. W, 609; 86
Mich, 594,
' Charity Hos. v. Stickney, 3 La.
An. 550; Seers et al. v. West, 1 Mur-
phy, 291; Germania V. State, 7 Md. 1;
Mabey v. Tarver, 1 Hump. 94.
8 Brooklin v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591;
212
Frankfort etc, Co. v. Philadelphia,
58 Pa. St. 119; Council v. Pepper, 1
Rich. L. 364; St. Louis v. Green, 70
Mo. 562; Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15
Ohio, 625; Com. v. Mathews, 122
Mass. 60; St. Paul y. Smith, 27 Minn.
164.
s People v. Mulholland, 19 Hun,
548; 8. c, 82 N. Y. 324; Chicago v.
Bartree, 100 111. 57.
i»City Council v. Goldsmith, 12
Rich. (S. C.) Law, 470.
"Wiggins V. Chicago, 63 111. 372;
Deoorah v. Dunston,. 38 Iowa, 96;
Fretwell v, Troy, 18 Kan. 271; Ifew
Orleans v. Turpin, 13 La. An. 56.
12 Municipality v. Dubois, 10 La.
An. 56.
Instate V. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 312,
Bancroft v. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456; State
V. Brown, 19 Fla, 563; Lewellen v.
Lockhardts, 21 Gratt. 570; Hirsh v.
State, 21 lb. 785; Wiley v. Owens, 39
Ind. 429; Pleuler v. State, 11 Xeb.
547; State v. Harris, 10 Iowa, 441;
Hammond v. Hames, 25 Md. 541;
Trustees v. Keeting, 4 Denio, 341;
Town Council v. Harbors, 6 Rich. L.
96; State v. Plunkett, 3 Harr. (K. J.)
5 ; Burckhatter v. McConnellsville, 20
Ohio St. 308; State v. Sherman, 20
Mo. 265 ; State ex rel. Troll v. Hud-
son, 78 Mo, 302; Gunnarssohn v.
Sterling, 92 111. 669; East St. Louis v.
Wehrung, 45 lb, 382; Hill v. Deca-
tur, 22 Ga. 203; Young Blood v. Sex-
ton, 32 Mich, 406. Licensing of huck-
sters has been held unreasonable in
Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. 462;
CH. Vni.] CHAETER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 123
But out of the confusion, occasioned by the judicial uncer-
tainty in this connection, as to the character of the license, and
the grounds upon which its imposition may be justified, the fol-
lowing conclusions may be drawn.^ The license can only take
one of two forms : either it is a tax upon the trade or business,
and then its legality or illegality is determined by its compliance
with the constitutional restrictions upon the power of taxation j''^
or it is a police regulation, which finds its justification and lim-
itations in the prevention of some threatened evil. Where the
license is imposed as a tax, the amount is to be determined ac-
cording to the general discretion of the legislative power, under
the constitutional rules as to equality and uniformity of taxa-
tion. If it is a police regulation, it must be limited in amount
to what would cover the expense of issuing the license certifi-
cate, and maintaining the police supervision. And, although it
is a judicial question, whether the sum exacted is a reasonable
one, a wide latitude is given to the exercise of legislative dis-
cretion, in the determination of the amount of the license fee.*
The license may be required as a police regulation, for the pur-
pose of insuring the proper police supervision, whenever the
character of the trade or business is such, that the absence of
the police supervision would occasion injury to the public, deal-
ing with those engaged therein, either because the trade re-
quires a certain degree of skill and professional qualifications,
or because it furnishes abundant opportunities for the perpetra-
tion of frauds, which without police supervision will very likely
prove successful. On these general grounds, it is competent
for a municipality to require licenses, and subjection to police
supervision, of plumbers, pharmacists,* keepers of boarding
houses, cartmen, truckmen, cabmen, car drivers, junk dealers,
keepers of intelligence offices, dealers in second-hand articles.
Mulilenbrink v. Com' is, 42 N. J. L.
364; Framraer v. Richmond, 31 Gratt.
646; Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307; St.
Paul V. Traeger, 2.5 Minn. 248; Mays
V. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268; see
§122.
'See Tiedeman's Limitations of
Police Power, § 101, where this mat-
ter is more elaborately presented.
2 See post, §261.
* Boston V. Schaffer, 9 Pick. 415;
Welch V. Hotchkiss, 39 Conn. 140;
Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St.
445 ; State v. Hoboken, 41 N. J. L.
71; Ash V. People, 11 Mich. 347; Van
Baalen v. People, 40 lb. 458; Bui--
lington V. Putnam Ins. Co., 31Iowa,
102.
* People V. Eontey, 21 N. Y. State
Kep. 173; 4 N. Y. Supp. 235; 51 Hun
640.
213
§124
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. vxri.
peddlers and itinerant venders,^ and others, upon whose hon-
esty and care the public have to depend, often without previ-
ous acquaintance with them, and usually without opportunities
for investigation.^ Where the character of the business is such
that the due protection of the public would require the restric-
tion of the number who are engaged in its prosecution, then the
license fee may be placed at such an amount that it would se-
cure a reduction of the nuQiber who would apply for the license.
Such would be the case with the sale of intoxicating liquors,
which is more fully treated in a subsequent connection.^ In
fixing the amount of the license fee, the following items have
been held to be properly takeu into consideration : " First, the
value of the labor and material, in merely allowing and issuing
the license ; seco7id, the value of the benefit of the license to
the person obtaining the same ; third, the value of the con-
venience and cost to the public in protecting such business ;
and in permitting it to be carried on in the community ; fourth,
and in some cases an additional amount imposed as a restraint
upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in
the business." *
»
§ ] 24. The licensing power of municipal corporations, con-
strued.— Here, as elsewhere, in determining the scope of the
Barenstein,
' State Center
Iowa, 259.
2 People V. Fulcla, 52 Hun, 65 (Phy-
sician); Com. V. Mathews, 122 Mass.
60; Com. v. Robertson, 5 Cush. 438;
Com. V. Brooks, 99 Mass. 434; Vene-
man v. Jones, 118 Ind. 41 ; State v.
Topp, 97 N. C. 477; see, also, cases
in preceding notes. " Huckster" de-
fined, Mayo V. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St.
268, 272. "Hawker and peddler"
defined, Cerro Gordo v. Rawlings,
25 N^. E. E. 1006, following Emmons
V. Lewlston, 24 Is^. E. R. 58; see 32
111. App. 215; see further, Com. v.
Eichenburg, 21 Atl. Rep. 258; Du-
boistown v. Roch. Brew. Co., 9 Pa.
Co. Ct. R. 442; Duluth v. Krupp, 49
N. W. Rep. 235 ; Com. v. Gardner,
133 Pa. M. 284; Spanish Fork City
V. Mortensen, 24 Pac. R. 620; Com.
V. iioseucrans, 9 Pa. Co. Ct, 399;
214
s
" Butcher " defined, Henback v.
State, 53 Ala. 523; 25 Am. Rep.
650. "Auctioneer" defined, Goshen
V. Kern, 63 Ind. 438.
8 See post, § 125.
^ Leavenworth v. Booth, 15 Kans.
627. See, generally, to the same ef-
fect, Toungblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich.
406 (20Am. Rei3. 554); Carter v. Dow,
16 Wis. 299; Tenny v. Lauz, 16 Wis.
566; Mt. Carmel v. Wabash, 50 111.
69; Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kans.
622; Adler v. Whltbeck, (Ohio) 9 X.
E. Rep. 672; Portwood v. Baskett,
(Miss.) 1 So. Rep. 105 ; Atkins v. Phil-
lips, 8 So. E. 429 ; Jacksonville v. Led-
with, (Fla.) 7 So. Rep. 885; City of
Duluth V. Krupp, (Minn.) 49 N. W.
Rep. 235; Pigeon v. Recorder's Ct.,
17 Can. S. C. R. 495 ; Haefling v. San
Antonio, 20 S. W. Rep. 85.
CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 124
power of the municipal corporation to require licenses of those,
who are engaged in the prosecution of a business within the
city's limits, or in close proximity thereto, the supreme test is,
whether the charter contains anj'- grant of the power to impose
the license. If the power cannot, by the rules of interpretation
and construction, applicable thereto, be included within the char-
ter grant of powers, the city cannot exact the license. The gen-
eral rule is, that the power to require a license must be plainly
conferred upon a municipal corporation, and will not be im-
plied from a general power to enact by-laws for the good gov-
ernment of the city.^ But, although it is the general rule that
a power to license must be expressly ^ conferred by the Legisla-
ture, there are a few decisions construing charter powers, which
maintain that the power to issue licenses may be implied, where
the express power to regulate has been granted, as a proper,
effective and reasonable mode of exercising the latter power.^
The power to license, and the power to regulate occupations,
are usually coupled together in charter grants ; and where this
is the case, the corporation may require a license and charge a
reasonable fee for granting it, but cannot levy a tax upon the
occupation itself. So, also, the power to regulate will author-
ize the city to enact all proper and reasonable ordinances, re-
specting the mode in which the occupation shall be regulated.*
It has been held that a general power to license certain enum-
erated occupations, will impliedly prevent a municipality from
requiring the payment of a license by those who are engaged in
occupations, which are not included in the list ; ^ but one, who
carries on business as a wholesale and retail dealer, may be re-
quired to take out a license in each capacity.''
^ Dunham v. Rochester, ' 5 Cow.
462; St. Paul v. Tiueger, 25 Minn.
248; Com. v. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562;
Mays V. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268;
Gale V. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; St.
Paul V. Stoltz, 33 Minn. 233; see
Xapman v. People, 19 Mich. 352;
Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307; 9 Am.
Rep. 576; Hayes v. Appleton, 24
Wis. 542; Tayler v. Pine Bluff, 34
Ark. 603; Shuman v. City of Ft.
Wayne, (Ind.) 26 N. E. Rep. 560.
2 See Newton v. Atchison, 31 Kan.
131.
8 Kinsley v. Chicago, 124 111. .359;
Smith V. Madison, 7 Ind. 86; St.
Jolmsbury V. Thompson, 59 Vt..300;
Boston V. Shaffer, 9 Pick. 415 ; City
Council V. Pepper, 1 Rich, (S. C.)
Law, 364; St. Louis v. Woodruff, 4
Mo. App. 169.
* Cincinnati v. Boyson, 15 Ohio,
625; Compare Mays v. Cincinnati, 1
Ohio St. 268; Cincinnati v. Bucking-
ham, 10 Ohio, 261.
6 Cairo v. Bross, 101 111. 475.
^New Orleans v. Koen, 38 La. An.
328. 215
§124
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. VIII.
The power to regulate or to license, when conferred upon a
municipal corporation, seems to have been regarded by the
courts as more extensive and inclusive in its applications to
amusements, exhibitions, etc., than in relation to trades, profes-
sions or occupations.-'^
A charter provided that in granting licenses the fee charged
should be proportioned to the amount of business transacted
by the licensee. Under this provision an ordinance, providing
for license fees according to the number of employees, was
held to be lawful.^
When the power to license is granted in general terms,
coupled with the further grant of power to suppress and to pro-
hibit, the corporation may license, and impose any restrictive
burdens or conditions it may deem necessary.^ So, also, where
the power to license implies the power to fix a reasonable rate
of license fee,* and wheie discretion to fix the license fee was
lodged in the mayor, he was permitted to include in the fee
charged a reasonable amount, as compensation for the police
supervision which was exercised over the licensed occupation.^
Where the power was conferred, to compel all owners of wagons
using them in the town to procure a license, it was construed
to include both residents and nonresidents, and taxpayers in
other towns.^ The power to license or regulate vehicles used
for public travel and traffic, such as horse cars, cabs, express
wagons, etc., will not suffice to authorize the imposition of a
license or tax upon private vehicles, which are used by mer-
chants or storekeepers ; ^ or the grant by the municipality, by
1 N. T. Con. Act. § 1998 et seq. ;
Mayor v. Eden Musee, 102 N. T. 593;
Society v. Diers, 10 Abb. Pr..N. S.
216; Wallack v. Society, etc., 67 N".
Y. 23; People v. Worth, 58 Hun, 455;
St. Paul V. Treager, 25 Minn. 248;
Bennett v. People, 30 111. 389; East
St. Louis V, Welirung, 36 lb. 392;
Asli V. People, 11 Mich. 347; Free-
holders V. Barber, 2 Halst. 64; Car-
roll V. Tuscaloosa, 12 Ala. 173;
Greensboro v. Mulling, 13 lb. 341;
City Council v. Ahrens, 4 Strobh
(S. C.) 241; Kip v. Paterson, 2 Dutch.
298; Portland V. O'Neill, 1 Oreg. 218;
216
Bennett v. Berminghara, 31 Pa. St.
15 ; Day v. Green, 4 Cush. 433 ; Dun-
ham V. Rochester, 5 Cow. 462 ; Cheny
V. Shelbyville, 19 lb. 84.
2 Ex parte Sisto Li Protti, 68 Gal.
635.
5 Launder v. Chicago, 111 111. 291.
* Welcli V. Hotchkiss, 39 Conn. 140;
Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43;
State V. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123.
= Ash V. People, 11 Mich. 347.
^ Frommer v. Eichmond, 31 Gratt.
646.
' St. Louis V. Grove, 46 Mo. 574.
CH. Vni.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 125
means of the issue of a license, of an exclusive privilege to run
an omnibus line within the city limits,-' or the creation of any
other monopoly or exclusive privilege.^
In the absence of express provisions to the contrary, licenses
are usually regarded as personal, non-transferable, and termina-
ble by the death of the. licensee.^ And the fact, that a license
may be revoked without notice to the licensee or a hearing,
does not make the ordinance providing for such license void.*
§ 125. licenses for the sale of intoxicating liqnors. — A
very common exercise of the licensing power of a municipal
corporation occurs in connection with the traffic in intoxicating
liquors.^ Although the enactment of a general license law will
not necessarily prevent the Legislature from granting to cities
the power to regulate this traffic still further by requiring retail
licenses ; ® it has been deemed advisable, in some instances, to
expressly provide, that municipal corporations should be ex-
empt from the operation of the general laws of the State, in
relation to the liquor trade. This result has been accomplished
by the adoption, either of a general license law, applicable to
towns and cities "^ within certain limits ® as to population ; or
by permitting the town or city, in any given instance, to regu-
late the liquor traffic in the exercise of some charter power,
which has been conferred upon it.^ But where there is a gen-
1 Logan V. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524;
Snyder v. Korth Lawrence, 8 Kan.
82.
2 Chicago V. Rumpf, 45 111. 90;
Gale V. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344;
Tuckahoe Can. Co. v. Railroad Co.,
11 Leigh (Va.) 42; Brenham v.
Water Co., 67 Tex. 542.
^ Brunette v. New Orleans, 9 La.
430- Munsell v. Temple, 8 111. 96;
Lewis V. United States, Morris (Iowa)
199; Lombard v. Cheever, lb. 473;
Towns V. Tallahassee, 11 Fla. 190.
4 Child V. Bemus, (R. I.) 21 Atl.
Rep. 539.
' In some of the States constitu-
tional provisions exist, expressly
regulating or prohibiting the liquor
traffic. Stimson's Statutes, § 510.
8 Wolf V. Lansing, 53 Mich. 367.
Of. Grantham v. State, 14 S. E. R. 892 ;
State V. Kaufman, 45 Mo. App. 656;
State V. Harris, 52 N. W. Rep. 387.
' Moundsville v. Fountain, 27 W.
Va. 182.
8 Township trustees are not au-
thorized by such a law to grant liquor
licenses. Walter v. Columbia City,
61 Ind. 24; Cowley v. Rushville, 60
lb. 327; McFee v. Greenfield, 62 lb.
21.
^Sx parte Russellville, 11 So. 18;
State V. Plunkett, 3 Harr. 5 ; Burk-
halter v. McConnell, 20 Ohio St. 308;
People V. Cregier, (111. 92) 28 N. E. R.
812; Louisville v. McKean, 18 B.
Mon. 9; Ex parte Cowert, 92 Ala. 94;
Dyers v. Olney, 16 111. 33; Ginno-
chio V. State, (Tex. 92) 18 S. W. R.
82; Page v. State, 11 Ala. 849;
217
§125
MTJNICIPAIi COKPOEATIONS.
[CH. vm.
eral State law, regulating the trade in intoxicating liquors, the
municipal power to make by-laws relating to the peace, good
order, and general welfare of the community, will not author-
ize the corporation to require a license for their sale,i or by or-
dinance to prohibit the traffic altogether.^
On the other hand, it has been held, that where there is no
general State law, the charter power, " to pass every other by-
law or regulation that shall appear to the city council requisite
and necessary for the security, welfare and convenience of the
city, or for preserving the peace, order and good government
of the same," would authorize a city to compel shopkeepers to
take out a license for the sale of liquors at retail.*
Construing special charter provisions, it has been held that a
power, " to prohibit or regulate the sale of liquors," will permit
of a partial * as well as of a total prohibition. When a compre-
hensive power of this character is granted, an ordinance, forbid-
ding the sale of liquors in less quantities than five gallons, was
held valid ; it being considered that the Legislature had left it
tp the discretion of the city, whether to license and regulate or
wholly or partially to prohibit.^
Clinton v. Grusendorf, (Iowa, 90) 45
N. W. 407; Trustees v. Keeting, 2
Denio, 341 ; Thillips v. Tecumseh, 5
Neb. 305 ; State v.Topeka, 30 Kan. 553 ;
In re Bickerstaff, 70 Cal. 35 ; Woods
V. Prlmeville, (Or. 90) 23 Pac. E. 880;
Town Council v. Harbers, 6 Rich.
(S. C.) Law, 96; State v. Estabrook,
6 Ala. 653 ; Territory v. McPherson,
50 X. W. K. 351; 6 Dak. 27; State v.
Preester, 43 Minn. 373; Eobinson v.
Mayor, 1 Humph. 156; Mount Pleas-
ant V. Vansice, 43 Mich. 361 ; State
V. Harper, (La. 90) 7 So. R. 446; Cuth-
bert V. Conley, 32 Ga. 211; Harris v.
Intendaut, 28 Ala. 577; Toungblood
V. Sexton, 32 Mich. 416; Kansas v.
Topeka, 31 Kan. 452; State v. Gar-
lock, 14 Iowa, 444; Salt Lake City v.
Wagner, 2 Utah, 400.
1 Com. V. Turner, 1 Gush. 498 ; Gino-
chio V. State, 18 S. W. R. 82; Loeb v.
Attica, 82 Ind. 17; Com. v. Dow, 10
Met. (Mass.) 382.
218
2 In re Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; contra,
JEx parte Russellville, (Ala.) 11 So.
Rep. 18.
8 Heigenbuttle v. City Council, 2
McMuUan (S. C.) Law, 233; City
Council V. Ahrens, 4 Strobh. (S. C.)
Law, 241; City Council v. Baptist
Church, lb. 306, 308.
*The sale of intoxicants may be
licensed in one part of the town and
not elsewhere : People v. Cregier, 28
N". E. Rep. 812.
5 Foster v. Duneau, (Ky. 91) 15 S.
W. E. 55 ; Gunnarssohn v. Sterling,
92 111. 569; Goddard v. Jacksonville,
15 lb. 588; Perry v. Salt Lake City,
25 Pao. 739; Spray berry v. Atlanta,
(Ga. 91) 13 S. E. R. 197; Woods v.
Prlmeville, 19 Or. 108; Baldwin v.
Murphy, 82 111. 485; Byers v. Olney,
16 lb. 35 ; Martin v. People, 88 lb.
390;Dennehy V. Chicago, 120 lb. 627.
See United States Distilling Com-
pany V. Chicago, 112 111. 19.
CH. VIII.] CHAETEK POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC.
§12[
A power " to regulate the liquor traiBc," or " to regulate
places where liquor " is sold, will authorize the city to pro-
hibit the emploj'ment of women in them,'' and to confine the
places themselves to designated parts of the city.^ So, the
charter power " to regulate and suppress shops and places for
the sale of ardent spirits," amounts to an authority to foi'bid
their sale, for the reason that a suppression of the shops or
places rriust necessarily suppress the sale.^
A fee, paid for a license to sell liquors, is not taxation,* and
creates no contractual or vested rights in favor of the licensee.
Such licenses are always subject to police control, and are revo-
cable at the discretion of the State.^ So, also, the payment of
a license to a city does not create an exemption from the impo-
sition of a license fee by the county.^ And the fact, that a
druggist has obtained a license as such, will not exempt him
from the necessity of taking out a license for the sale of liquors,
if he use intoxicating liquors in compounding his prescriptions."
Prohibiting by ordinance the sale of liquors on Sunday, is
not in violation of any constitutional provision, against the es-
tablishment of religion.^ But forbidding their sale during the
continuance of divine service, was invalid because vague, un-
certain and discriminating.^
A power to require a license is incidental to a power " to
restrain or prohibit saloons." ^^ But it is held in such a case,
that the licensing power applies to retail establishments onlj^,
and does not include manufacturers. ^^
When a charter was silent as to the amount which could,
under the existing power to require licenses, be charged, the
sum of f 500 was held to be reasonable ; -^ and where the power
1 Bergman v. Cleveland, 40 Ohio
St. 651.
2 In re Wilson, 32 Minn. 145.
' Clintonville v. Keeting, 4 Denio,
341; Thomas v. Mt. Vernon, 9 Ohio,
290; corap. Hill v. Decatur, 22 Ga.
203.
*East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 46
111. 392.
'Columbus City v. Cutcomp, 61
Iowa, 672; Metropolitan Board of
Excise V. Barrie, 34 JT. Y. 657; Cal-
derv. Kurby, 5 Gray, 597; Com. v.
Brenuan, 103 Mass. 70.
^ In re Lawrence, 69 Col. 608.
' State V. Gray, 22 Atl. Eep. 675.
* Minden v. Silverstein, 36 La. An.
912.
"Gilham v. Wells, 21 Alb. Law
Jour. 319; 64 Ga. 192.
10 Mt. Carmel v. Wabash Co., 50
111. 69; Schweitzer v. Liberty, 82
Mo. 309 ; Portland v. Smith, 13
Oreg. 17.
'■Strauss v. Pontiao, 40 111. 301;
St. Paul V. Troyer, 3 Minn. 291.
12 Perdue v. Ellis, 19 Ga. 586; In re
Burnett, 30 Ala. 461. 21J
§ 127 JIDXICIPAL CORPOIIATIONS. [CH. VIII.
to thus fix the fee is committed to a municipality, its discretion
will not be re^viewed by the coui-ts ; ^ nor will they presume,
that the amount of the license fee is unreasonable or oppres-
sive.^ These statements of the law, in respect to the reason-
ableness of the license fee, must be considered in the light of
what is stated elsewhere,* in respect to the difference between
those trades and professions, which require only a general police
supervision, and those which, like the liquor trade, must and
can constitutionally be suppressed, or restricted more or less,
in the interest of the public.
When a petition for a license, signed by a certain number of
citizens, is required as a prerequisite to the issue of the license,
one, which is gianted without this requirement being fully ob-
served, is void.* In a case of this character, the issue of the
license is not a mandatory dut}'' of the citv,^ and cannot be
compelled b}'' mandamus.^
§ 126. Supervision and care of paupers, vagrants and in-
digent insane and sick persons — -In the larger municipal
corporations, the care of these classes of persons is usually
within the jurisdiction of a department, for wiiich, although be-
longing to the city government, there is no municipal liability."
It has been held that such a department has the powers of
the common law overseers of the poor ; ^ but can neither sue nor
be sued,^ nor borrow money and create a debt against the city.^"
Nor has such a department the power to hire out to a contract-
or the prisoners in the workhouse, although by the charter
they may be compelled to work out their fines.^i
§ 127. Inspection of foods and other commodities. — In
order to afford to private persons increased facilities for the
1 Goldsmith v. New Orleans, 31
La. 640; State v. Dolierty, (Idaho)
29 Pac. Rep. 855 ; Wolf v. Lansing,
5.3 Mich. 3(37.
'^In re Guerrero, 69 Cal. 88; Ex
parte McXally, 73 lb. 032; comp.
Zanone v. Mound City, 103 111. 552.
8 See § 133.
* State V. Moniteau Co., 45 Mo.
App, 387; Eureka v. Davis, 21 Kan.
578.
^Welsford v. Weidlein, 23 Kan.
601; State v. Young, 17 lb. 414; Ins.
220
Co. V. State, 9 lb. 210; Wabaunsee
Co. V. Muhlenbacker, 18 lb. 129;
Bouldin v. Baltimore, 15 Md. 18.
" State V. Stevens, 23 Kan. 456.
' N. Y. Con. Act. § 385 et seq.
8 Board V. McGurrin, 6 Daly, 349;
People V. Weissenbach, 00 K. Y. 385.
^ N. Y. Bal. D. D. V. Mayor, 8 Hun,
247.
10 Tenth Nat. Bk. v. Mayor, 80 N. Y.
660.
'1 St. Louis v. Davidson, 102 Mo.
149.
CH. VIII.J CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 127
detection of fraud, and the adulteration of foods and other com-
modities, the courts have frequently sustained legislative enact-
ments, generally enforced by municipal officials, providing for
the inspection of flour, and tobacco,^ the inspection and regula-
tion of weights and measures,^ the regulation of the weight of
bread,^ requiring all lumber to be surveyed by a public survey-
or,* and providing for the weighing of coal and other articles of
great bulk on public scales.® They have uniformly been held
to be lawful regulations.
At common law, the offering of tainted meat at public sale
was a nuisance,^ and indictable ; '^ and each separate exposure
or offer for sale was a distinct offence.^ But in the United
States, the power, which a city possesses over the sale of pro-
visions, must be expressly granted to it by the Legislature, or
implied, because it is absolutely required for the accomplish-
ment of corporate ends and purposes.®
When " all the powers, incident to municipal corporations
and necessary to the proper government of the same " were con-
ferred upon a city council, it was held that, while the city
could provide for the inspection of flour and prevent the sale
of unwholesome bread, it could not regulate the weight or size
1 Turner v. MaiTrland, 107 U. S. 38.
- Ritchie v. Boynton, 114 Mass. 431 ;
Eaton v. Keagan, lb. 433; Durgln v.
Dyer, 68 Me. 143; Woods v. Arm-
strong, 34 Ala. 150.
3 Mobile V. Guille, 3 Ala. (N. S.) 140.
* Pierce v. Kimball, 9 Me. 54.
'' City Council v. Rogers, 2 McCord,
405. See Tiedeman's Limitation of
Police Powers, § 89, pp. 208, 209;
Hoffman v. Jersey City, 34 N. J. L.
172.
i^Shillito V. Thompson, L. B. 1
Q. B. Dw. 12.
' Regina v. Stevenson, 3 F. & F. 106.
sQueen V. Jarvis, 3 F. & F. 108;
Reg. V. Crawley, 3 lb. 109; In re
Hartley, 31 L. J. M. 232; Emmerton
V. Mathews, 7 H. & N. 586.
" Stokes y. New York, 14 Wend. 87 ;
Raleigh v. Sorrell, 1 Jones Law, 49;
Chicago V. Quimby, 38 111, 274; Howe
V. Norris, 12 Allen, 82; Libby v.
Downey, 5 lb. 299; Collins v. Louis-
ville, 2 B. Mon. 134; People v. Har-
per, 91 111. 357 ; Paige v. Fazackerly,
36 Barb, 392; Mayor etc. v. Nichols,
4 Hill, 209; Mayor v. Hyatt, 3 E. D.
Smith (N. T.) 156; Rogers v. Jones,
1 Wend. 237; Yates v. Milwaukee,
12 Wis. 673; People v. Rochester, 45
Hun, 102; Huesing v. Rock Island,
128 111, 465; Briggs v. Boat, 7 Allen,
287; Davis v. Anita, 75 Iowa, 325;
Guillotte V. New Orleans, 12 La. An.
432; Taylor v. Pine Bluff, 34 Ark.
603; Gass v. Greenville, 4 Sneed. 62;
St. Louis V. Shands, 20 Mo. 149; In
re Snell, 30 N. C. Q. B. 81. In New
York, Pennsylvania, California and
Alabama, the creation of state offi-
cers for weighing, gauging or inspec-
tion of merchandise or produce is
forbidden by the constitution of
these states.
221
8 128 JIUNICIPAL COEPORATrONS. [CH. VHt.
of the loaf ; such power not being necessary for the proper
government of the city. But where there was an express grant
of power " to regulate everything which relates to bakers," an
ordinance, fixing the weight, size and price of bread, was held
to be valid and constitutional.^
The power " to regulate the public market and to pass such
other ordinances, as shall seem meet for the improvement and
good government of the city " will empower the enactment of
an ordinance which prescribes that coal,^ oats, hay, etc., shall be
weighed by a public weigher before sale.^ But an ordinance,
requiring all persons to have their cotton weighed by a public
weigher has been held void ;* nor can a city, without legislative
authorization, compel cotton merchants to keep open for inspec-
tion a record of their daily transactions in loose cotton.^
§ 128. Establishment and regulation of public markets. —
In England, the municipal regulation of markets has been cus-
tomary from very early times ; * and by-laws, designed to
control their operation in the interest of health and good gov-
ernment, have, when reasonable and not oppressive, been sus-
tained. " A market is a franchise or liberty derived from the
crown, by grant or by prescription which presupposes a grant." ^
In the United States, a market is defined as " a designated place
in a town or city, under municipal police supervision, to which
all persons can repair who wish to buy or sell articles there ex-
posed for sale." ^ "A municipal market consists : 1. In a place
for the sale of provisions and articles of dailj' consumption.
2. Convenient fixtures. 3. A system of police regulations, fix-
ing market hours, making provisions for lighting, watching,
cleaning, detecting false weights and unwholesome food, and
other arrangements calculated to facilitate and ensure the hon-
' Guillotte V. New Orleans, 12 La.
An. 432; Mobile v. Tuille, 3 Ala. 139;
Paige V. Fazackerly, 36 Barb. 392; Cf.
Phillips V. Allen, 41 Pa. St. 481.
2 O'Maley V. Fieeport, 96 Pa. St. 24.
8 Raleigh v.Sorrell, IJones (N.C.)
Law, 49; Stokes v. Mayor etc., 14
Wend. 87; see Gass v. Greenville, 4
Sneed. 62 ; and oases supra. In the
city of New York the power to pass
inspection ordinances and regulate
weights and measures is vested in the
Board of Aldermen, Consol. Act.
§ 87 (ed. 1891).
* Sumter v. Deschamps, 4 S. C. 297.
s Long V. Shelby Co., 7 Lea, 134.
6 Dillon Mun. Corp., § 380, citing
Player v. Jenkins, 1 Sid. 284; Eex v.
Cottrell, 1 B. & Aid. 67; Mosleyv.
"Walker, 7 Barn. & C. 40; Macclesfield
v. Pedley, 4 Barn. & A. 397.
' 2 Blackstone, 37.
8 Caldwell v. Alton, 33 111. 416.
CH. VIII.] CHAKTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 128
esty of buyer and seller. 4. Proper officers to preserve order
and enforce obedience to the rules." ^
The State may '■' and usually does, delegate to municipal cor-
porations the power to establish public markets, or to authorize
others to establish them ; and although this power is, in the
majority of instances, conferred by the charter in express terms,
it may, it has been held, be implied ^ from a grant of power to
a municipal corporation " to make by-laws for managing and
ordering its prudential affairs ; " the court looking somewhat
to usage, in order to ascertain to what description of municipal
affairs the adjective " prudential " was applicable.
Grants to municipalities of authority to establish or regulate
markets, and to supervise the business transacted therein, are
said not to be construed as strictly, as others of more unusual
character ; except in cases where it is attempted, by means of
such powers, to confer exclusive privileges, or to create monop-
olies.* Although much litigated, it is now admitted, according
to the weight of the decisions, that it is within the police power
of the State, whether delegated to the municipality or exercised
by the State government, to restrict to a particular place the
vending of fresh meat, vegetables, and other provisions, and to
forbid any trading in such articles at any other place than the
market thus established. The preservation of the public health,
by the strict supervision of the sale of perishable foods, and the
prevention of the sale of those which are unwholesome, are the
justification for this restraint upon trade.^
' Cincinnati v. Buckingham, 10
Ohio, 257.
2 Munio. V. Cutting, 4 La. An. 355.
sSpauldingv. Lowell, 23 Pick. 171.
« Wartman v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa.
St. 202,209 ; White v. Kent, 11 Ohio St.
550; St. John v. Mayor, 6 Duer (N.
T.) 315; St. Louis v. Jackson, 25 Mo.
37; 7n re Nightingale, 11 Pick. 168;
Cougot V. New Orleans, 16 La. An.
21; Yates v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 673;
Badkins v. Robinson, 53 Ga. 613;
Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356;
Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La. An.
336; New Orleans v. Guillotte, 12 La.
An. 818; State v. Lieber, 11 Iowa,
407; Dubuque V. Miller, 11 Iowa, 583;
Morano v. New Orleans, 2 La. An.
217; Atlanta v. White, 33 Ga. 229;
Paul V. Coulter, 12 Minn. 41.
5 Buffalo V. Webster, 10 Wend. 99;
Natal V. State, 11 S. Ct. 636; 139 U.
S. 621; City of Jacksonville v. Led-
with, (Fla.) 7 So. R. 885 ; Ex parte
Canto, 21 Tex. App. 61; Vidalat v.
New Orleans, 10 So. E. 175; 48 La.
An. 1121; Bush v. Seabury, 8 Johns.
418; Winnsboro v. Smart, 11 Rich. L.
551; Bowling Green v. Carson, 10
Bush. 64; New Orleans v. Stafford,
27 La. An. 417; Wartman v. Phila-
delphia, 33 Pa. St. 202; St. Louis v.
Weber, 14 Mo. 547; Ash v. People, 11
Mich. 347; Le Claire v. Davenport,
22-3
§ 128
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. VIII.
The municipal power to regulate markets, being a continu.-
ing one, markets once established may be abandoned or changed,
at the pleasure of the corporation. When this is done, what-
ever may be the rights of the stall owners ^ in the market, it is
well settled that the taxpayers or property owners cannot re-
strain the municipal action."''
As incidental to the power to erect a market building, may
be mentioned the power to determine its form, dimensions and
architectural style, and to employ an architect to prepare plans
and specifications,^ as well as to purchase the land upon which
the market building is to be erected.* But no use of land
for market purposes, however long continued and uninterrupt-
13 Iowa, 210; contra, Bethune v.
Hayes, 28 Ga. 560; Caldwell v. Alton,
.34 ni. 416; Bloomington v. Wahl, 46
111. 489. In New Orleans v. Stafford,
27 La. An. 217, tlie court said : " The
power arises from the nature of
things and is what is termed a police
jjower. It springs from the great
principle, salus poplili suprema est
lex. There is in the defendant's case
no room for any well grounded oom-
jilaint of the violation of a vested
private right; for the privilege, if he
really possessed it, of keeping a p i-
vate market was acquired, subordi-
nately to the right existing in the
sovereign, to exercise the police
power to regulate the peace and good
order of the city, and to provide for
and maintain Its cleanliness and salu-
brity. By way of illustrating this
necessarily existing power to regu-
late the number, location and man-
agement of markets, tate the city of
New Orleans, in a warm climate,
located in a low district of country,
surrounded by marshes and swamps,
which in the hot season under favor-
able conditions envelopes its large
population in a malarious atmos-
phere. Under such circumstances,
the danger of epidemics becomes
imminent. It behooves the city at
such periods to obviate local causes
224
of disease within the limits of the
city. Among such causes the decay
of animal and vegetable matter is a
prominent one. The markets must
on that accoimt be strictly attended
to, and such measures adopted in re-
gard to them, as in the judgment of
the proper authorities the public
health may x-equire." See Tiede-
man's Limitations of Police Power,
§104.
1 It has been held that a munici-
pality may delegate to an individual
the franchise of establishing a pub-
lic market and of charging rent for
the use of the same ; and that having
covenanted to protect its grantee in
this exclusive privilege, the city can-
not abolish such a market, without
compensating the holder of the fran-
chise. Le Claire v. Davenport, 13
Iowa, 210, overruling Davenport v.
Kelly, 7 lb. 102; Cf. Gale v. Kala.
mazoo, 23 Mich. 344.
2 Gall V. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio St.
563.
^ Peterson v. Mayor etc. of New
York, 17 N. Y. 449.
* Caldwell v. Alton, 33 111. 416;
Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 35fi,
People V. Lowber, 28 Barb. 65; 7
Ab. Pr. 158; Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23
Mich. 344.
CH. VIII.] CHAUTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC.
§129
ed, will operate impliedly as a dedication of it for use as a mar-
ket exclusively, even when it is purchased with public funds and
the fee is vested in the corporation. ^ But it is within the
power of the Legislature to dedicate land for a market by ex-
press provision in a municipal charter, or by some other statute.^
The municipal power to establish and build markets will not
authorize a city, without statutory authorit}^ to build them in a
public street. If so erected, they constitute a public nuisance,
and the municipality may be proceeded against criminally, or
otherwise, even though sufficient space be left unobstructed
for the use of vehicles and. foot passengers.*^
Having erected a market house, the city may let the stalls in
it, or license persons to expose and vend merchandise there.
Bj' such action, however, although it may do so expressly,*
the city does not agree by implication to protect its lessee
from competition ; nor can such an agreement be implied from
the existence of an ordinance, forbidding sales by unlicensed
persons.^ So, also, a city owning a market house does not by
leasing the same, impliedly engage that it will refrain from
erecting other market houses, and leasing them to others.''
§ 129. Imponnding animals — Ordinances respecting dogs.
— A municipality, by virtue of the power delegated to it in
the general welfare clause, may prohibit the running at large
of domestic animals,'^ and provide as a penalty, to insure the en-
forcement of such a regulation, that the animals may be sold,,
after due notice to their owner, and time allowed for their re-^
demption, and paying to him the proceeds of the sale, after de-
ducting what is due to the city as a penalty.^ But laws, impos-
' Gall V. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio St.
563; Cooper V. Detroit, 42 Mich. 584.
Control of market property in New
York City, Con. Act. § 170.
2 New York Con.sol. Act. § 129; In
re Cooper, 28 Hun, 515.
8 See chapter xvi. Streets, §§ 293,
.100; St. John v. New York, 3 Bosw.
483; McDonald v. Newark, 42 N. J.
Eq. 136; Wartman v. Philadelphia,
33 Pa. St. 202, 210; State v. Mobile,
5 Poi-t. 279; Com. v. Kush, 14 Pa.
St. 186; Com. v. Bowman, 3 lb.
202, 206; State v. Laverack, 34 N. J.
15
L. 201 ; Higgins v. Princeton, 4Halst.
Ch. 309, 320.
^ Vidalat v. New Orlerns, 43 La.
An. 1121.
5 Peck V. Austin, 22 Texas, 261.
* Congot V. New Orleans, 16 La.
An. 21.
■^ KuTining at large defined. Kinder
V. Gillespie, 63; 111. 88; Case v. Hall,
21 lb. 632; Spitler v. Young, 63 Mo.
42; Quiucy y. O'Brien^ 24 111. App.
591.
8Cami)em v. Langley, 39 Mich.
451; WilcoK v. Hemming, 58 Wis.
225
§ 129 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VIII.
ing a penalty, should be strictly construed ; and when ambiguous
or uncertain, the courts will lean towards that construction, by
which a forfeiture may be fairly avoided.^ Power " to impose
penalties " upon the owner of the animal has been held to exclude
by implication the power to enforce the by-law by a sale of the
animal ; ^ and so, likewise, under authority to impose a fine only,
an ordinance, authorizing a city marshal to kill hogs running at
large, and to appropriate their bodies to his own use, is invalid.^
It is in conformity with a general principle of law, that a mu-
nicipality cannot by ordinance forfeit the animals of an individ-
ual, and, without notice to him or due process of law, transfer
the ownership in them to another. So, where it is the general
policy of the State to suffer aiiimals to run at large ; * or where
towns are forbidden to subject non-residents to their ordinances ; ^
a municipal corporation, it has been held, possesses no implied
power to restrain cattle from running at large, if this is permis-
sible by the statute law of the State. Under authority to enact
ordinances for the removal of nuisances, the following was en-
acted : " Every hog at large in the said town shall be taken
up and penned and advertised to be sold on the third day ; and
unless the owner should pay the charges for ta,king up, and
keeping such hog, and a sale is effected, the money arising
therefrom, after paying the charges, shall be paid over to the
owner of the said hog." This ordinance was considered rea-
sonable, and the power exercised over stray animals was justified
by the terms of the charter." The period of notice was also
deemed sufficient, and it was added tliat personal notice vcas
144; Faribault v. Wilson, 34 Minn.
254; Eockwell v. Nearing, 33 N. Y.
302; Com. v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221;
Campbell v. Evans, 45 N". Y. 356-, Cook
V. Greg^, 46 lb. 439; Varden v.
Mount, 78 Ky. 86; Roberts v. Ogle,
38 111. 459; "Waco v. Powell, 32 Tex.
258; CoUinsville v. Scanland, 58 III.
221; Fritz v. First Div. etc. Co., 25
Minn. 404; Bropliy v. Hyatt, 10 Col.
223; Amyx v. Taber, 23 Cal. 370;
Pettit V. May, 34 Wis. 666.
'Donovan v. Vicksburg, 29 Miss. 247;
Willis V. Legris, 45 111. 289; Rounds
V. Stetson, 45 Me. 596; Gilmore v.
Holt, 4 Pick. 258; Rounds v. Mans-
226
field, 38 Me. 586; see Smith v. Gates,
21 Pick. 55; CofBn v. Cohn, 7 Cush.
355 ; and Clark v. Lewis, 35 111. 417,
for the notice which must be given
to the owner of the animal before a
valid sale can be made.
^ Miles V. Chamberlain, 17 Wis.
446; Brophy v. Hyatt, 10 Col. 223;
Cartersville v. Lanham, 67 Ga. 753.
sMcRae v. O'Lain, 1 McMuUan, (S.
C.) Law, 328. See ch. ix. on Ordi-
nances, § 155, Forfeitures.
* Collins V. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 523.
6 Marietta v. Fearings, 3 lb. 427.
" But see contra, Spitler v. Young,
63 Mo. 42.
CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATTTRE, ETO. § 129
not necessary. To an objection, that the ordinance did not
provide for a judicial determination of the question, the court
said : " The owner may if he choose, have a full investigation
of the case by bringing an action of replevin, as in any other
case of distress. " ^
In several of the States, not only may the town or city im-
pound animals found running at large ; but the private owner,
whose lawful fence is broken by stray cattle, may seize them,
and have them placed in the public pound,^ and maintain an
action for trespass against their owner, as at common law.^
While a pound marshal cannot delegate his authority, he may
employ necessary assistants ; * and replevin will not lie against
him at common law, while the animals are in his legal custody.^
But replevin will lie, if the pound keeper parts with his legal
control, or keeps the animals elsewhere than in the pound.^
Municipal ordinances for the regulation of the keeping of
dogs are very common. No one, independent of statutory au-
thority, has a right to kill a dog who was not doing harm.'^ But
a dog, or any animal damage feasmit, may be killed, if necessary ;
and the same rule applies to a ferocious dog running at large, un-
muzzled, if addicted to biting, irrespective of what the dog is
doing, and whether the owner had notice of its bad disposition
or not.^
'Sliawv. Kennedy, (N. C.) TermR.
158(1817); Whifcefield v. Longest, 6
Ire. L. §268; Hellen v. Noe, 3 lb. L.
493; Gasselink V. Campbell, 4 Iowa,
296; Gilchrist v. Schmidling, 12 Kan.
263; Moore v. State, 11 La. 35. But
see, contra, Donovan v. Vicksburg,
29 Miss. 247.
^Stimpson, Amer. Stat. Law,
§2189. See Nortlicott v. Smitli, 4
Ohio Cir. Ct. 565 ; Irwin v. Mattax,
138 Pa. St. 466; Atkinson v. Mott,
102 Ind. 431.
8 Stewart v. Benninger, 138 Pa. St.
437.
* Jackson v. Monis, 1 Denio, 199 ;
Friday v. Floyd, 63 111. 50.
sPritchard v. Stevens, 6 Durn. &
E. 522; Ilsley v. Stubbs, 5 Mass. 283;
Smith V. Huntington, 3 K H. 76;
King V. Ford, 70 Ga. C28.
" Bills V. Kinson, 1 Foster (Jf. H.)
448; comp. Osgood v. Green, 33 N.
H. 318.
7 Brent v. Kimball, 60 III. 21 ; Ean-
son V. Kitner, 31 111. App. 241;
Mathew v. Fiestel, 3 E. D. Smith,
90; Dodson v. Mocli, 4 Dev. & B. L.
146.
8 Hubbard v. Preston, 51 N. W.
Rep. 209; Simmonds v. Holmes, 23
Rep. 702; Aldrich v. Wright, 53
H. 398; Putnam v. Payne, 13
Johns. 312; Maxwell v. Palmerton,
21 Wend. 407; Dunlap v. Snyder, 17
Barb. 561 ; People v. Board of Police,
15 Abb. Pr. 167; Brown v. Carpenter,
26 Vt. 638; Woolf v. Chalked, 31
Conn. 121 ; Spaight v. McGovern, 16
R. t 658.
227
§130
MUNICIPAL CORPOKATCONS.
[CH. vm.
In most of the States, the subject has been regulated by stat-
ute ; by which, in some instances, it has been provided that
police or other officials may, during a prescribed period in each
year, kill unlicensed dogs ; ^ and, in some cases, the dog's owner
is made responsible for damages caused by the dog to persons
or domestic animals. Sucli legislation, as well as the grant to
a municipal corporation of the power to requii'e a license for
the keeping of dogs, is a reasonable and valid exercise of the
police power; and is not open to judicial objection, upon the
ground of unconstitutionality,^ as violating the requirements
of uniformity of taxation ;3 or for any other reason, such as
operating as a restriction upon the keeping of those animals.*
But an act, by which it was sought to make the owner an-
swerable for the amount of damage caused by his dog, as fixed
by the selectmen, without giving him any opportunity to be
heard, is unconstitutional iu New Hampshire,^ and probably in
every other State.
§ 130. Prevention of fires — Fire limits — Purchase of
apparatus. — Among the useful regulations, which may be
made by a chartered city or town, under its implied police
power — although, usually, the power is expressly conferred, —
are those having for their object the prevention or extinguish-
ing of fires.^ So, also, although it is usually the subject of an
express grant of power,' a municipal corporation may, under
■ Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass. 136;
Mowery v. Salisbury, 82 N. C. 175;
State V. Topeka, 36 Kan. 76.
2 See cases cited in last note.
Com. V. Chase, 6 Cush. 248; Com.
V. Steffee, 7 Bush. 161; Culver v.
Streator, 27 Ain. & Eng. Cor. Cas.
602; Ex parte Cooper, 3 Tex. App.
489; Mayor, etc., of Washington v.
Meigs, 1 Mc Arthur (D. C.) 53; Har-
rington V. Miles, 11 Kan. 480; Tower
V. Tower, 18 Pick. 262; Cummings
V. Perhara, 1 Met. 555; Morey v.
Brown, 42 N. H. 373; Cranston v.
Augusta, 61 Ga. 572; Cf. Mitchell v.
Williams, 27 Ind. 62; State v. Corn-
wall, 27 Ind. 62.
s Carthage v. Rhoads, 14 S. W. 181.
* Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis. 298; Ten-
228
ney v. Lenz, lb. 566; Fire Dept, v.
Helfenstein, 16 lb. 136.
^ East Kingston v. Towle, 48 K H.
57.
" The rule, that a municipality has
the inherent power to adopt means
to protect the property of its citizens
from fire, is of ancient origin. 2 Ba-
con's Abr. 147; 2 Kent's Com. 339;
Filby V. Combe, 2 M. & W. 677; Law
V. Dodd, 1 Ex. 845; Gay v. Cadbf,
L. R. 2 C. P. Div. 891; Fertilizer Co.
V. Hyde Park, 97 TJ. S. 659; Baum-
gartner v. Hasty, 109 Ind. 375.
' N. Y. Consol. Act, §§ 495, 496. See,
construing these sections. Tucker v,
D'Oluch, 44 Hun, 33; Fire Dept. v.
Atlas S. S. Co., 108 N. T. 566.
CH. VIII.j CHARTBE POWEKS, THEIR NATURE, ETC.
130
the general welfare clause alone, coupled with the implied power
inherent in all corporations to make fit and appropriate by-laws,
and without any express legislative grant of power, establish
limits, within which the erection of wooden buildings shall be
absolutely prohibited, and make other regulations which are
deemed necessary to prevent fires.^ It has been held that the
exercise of the power, to forbid the erection of wooden build-
ings within specified limits, does not " impair the obligation of
a contract" where a contract to build was made prior thereto.^
But it is held that, where it is proposed to remove from the fire
limits wooden buildings, already constructed when the fire lim-
its were established, the charter power in the premises should
be strictly construed against the city, and in favor of the prop-
erty owner.^ But such regulations do not violate any provision
of the State or National Constitutions.* Under the same gen-
eral powers, a city may prohibit the storing of more than five
tons of hay on one block, unless protected by a fire proof struc-
ture ;^ and remove a dangerous forge and the building in which,
it is located.*" The authorities are, however, not uniform on the
question of an implied power to establish fire limits. And so,
it has been held that this power could not be inferred from a
charter power to make regulations against danger from fires,^
or from the power contained in the general welfare clause,^ or
from a power to abate nuisances.^
' Com. V. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55, 58;
King V. Davenport, 98 111. 505 ; Mon-
roe V. Hoffman, 29 La. An. 651; Ford
V. Tbrailkill, 84 Ga. 169; Charleston
V. Reed, 27 W. Va. 681; Vanderbllt
V. Adams, 1 Cow. 349; Richmond v.
Dudley, 26 N. E. R. 184; Mx parte
Fiske, 72 Cal. 125; McCloskey v.
Krelling, (Cal. 88) 18 Pac. R. 433;
Klingerv. Bickel, 117 Pa. St. 326;
Douglas V. Com., 2 Rawle (Pa.) 262;
Troy V. Winters, 4 T. & C. (N. T.)
256; Williams v. Augusta, 4Ga. 509;
Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575;
Clark V. South Bend, 85 lb. 276; Hine
V. New Haven, 40 Conn. 478 ; Welch
V. Hotchkiss, 38 lb. 140; Wadleigh
V. Oilman, 12 Me. 403 ; City Council
V. Elford, 1 McMullan (S. C.) Law,
234; contra, State v. Schuchardt, 70
So. R. 67; Pratt v. Litchfield, 25 Atl.
461; 62 Conn. 112.
2 Knoxville v. Bird, 12 Lea, 121.
8 Louisyille v. Webster, 108 111. 414;
Buffalo V. Chadcayne, 31 N". E. Rep.
443 (1892).
« Ex parte Fiske, 72 Cal. 125; Klin-
ger V. Bickel, 117 Pa. St. 326; Eich-
enlaub v. St. Joseph, (Mo. 93) 21 S.
W. R. 8.
5 Clark v. South Bend, 85 Ind. 276.
•> Dupree v. Brunswick, 85 Ga. 727.
^ Des Moines v. Gilchrist, 67 Iowa,
210; contra, Hubbai-d v. Medford,
(Or.) 25 Pac. Rep. 640; City of Olym-
pia v. Mann, 1 Wash. St. 389.
* Knoedler v. Korristown, 100 Pa.
St. 368 ; Respublica v. Duquet, 2
Yeates, 493.
3 Pye V. Peterson, 45 Tex. 312.
229
§130
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. VIII.
While the weight of the decisions favors the view that a city
may, without express statutory authority, prohibit the erection
of frame structures within certain limits, it seems that there is
no inherent power to forbid the repair of those already erected.^
It has been held, in construing ordinances creating fire lim-
its, that enlarging or raising ^ a wooden building, so as to alter
its character,^ or the removal of a frame building to a location
within the limits, whether from without or not,* is au erection
of a building.
In a case, where a city is empowered to forbid the erection
of wooden structures, and has passed an ordinance to that ef-
fect, it may remove them without proceeding against their
ownei'.^ The abatement of a nuisance of this sort is not con-
sidered a forfeiture of property.^
But if the building was erected, before the ordinance went
into effect, and is subsequently damaged by fire to such an ex-
tent, that its re-erection is necessary, it is held that the city
cannot remove it, but must direct the owner to do so.'^
A Court of Equity will not restrain by injun&tion the erection
of wooden buildings within fire limits ; because the act com-
plained of is made unlawful by an ordinance, which presuma-
bly supplies an adequate remedy for its enforcement.^ On the
other hand, the wrongdoer cannot secure the aid of equity to
enjoin the tearing down by the city of a building, the erection
1 Brown v. Hutton, 27 Conn. 332;
Eeg. V. Howard, 4 Ont. Kep. 377;
Brady v. Northwestern Ins., Co., 11
Mich. 42.5. But see Knoxville v. Bird,
12 Lea, 121, in respect to avoidance
of existing contracts to build frame
houses. See Pye v. Peterson, 45 Tex.
312; Des Moines V. Gilchrist, 67 Iowa,
210.
2 Brady v. IT. W. Ins. Co., 11 Mich.
425, 449; Louisville v. Webster, 108
111. 414; Booth v. State, 4 Conn. 65;
Stamford v. Stowell, 21 Atl. Kep.
101.
2 Douglas V. Com., 2 Eawle (Pa.)
262.
4 ^Vadleigh v. Oilman, 12 Me. 403.
In Connecticut a removal within the
limits is not an erection. Brown v.
230
Hunn, 27 Conn. 334; see also State
V. Kearney, 25 Neb. 262; Cleveland
V. Lenz, 27 Ohio St. 383.
5 McKibben v. Fort Smith, 35 Ark.
352; Aronheimer V. Stokley, llPhila.
283; Klingler v. Bickel, 117 Pa. St.
326; King v. Davenport, 98 111. 305.
" Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind.
575.
' Louisville v. Webster, 108 111. 414.
* Waupun V. Moore, 34 Wis. 450;
Mayor v. Thorne, 7 Paige, 261; Phil-
lips V. Allen, 41 Pa. St. 481; St. John
V. McFarlan, 33 Mich. 72, the court
saying : " A court of chancery has
no jurisdiction to restrain the threat-
ened violation of a village ordinance,
unless the act threatened to be done,
if carried out will be a nuisance."
CH. VIII.] CHARTEK POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 131
of which was in violation of its by-laws ; ^ even though he has
made it fire proof, pendente lite?
Charter provisions, conferring the power to prescribe fire
limits, and to remove all buildings therein damaged by fire,
should be strictly construed in favor of the private owner.^
Under the implied power to protect property within the
city's jurisdiction against damage by fire, a municipalit}- may
appropriate funds for the purchase or repair of apparatus used
for the extinguishment of fire,* or for the repair of an engine
house.^ Money may legitimately be appropriated for the bene-
fit of hook and ladder, and engine companies ; ^ but the fact,
that a volunteer company renders services in extinguishing
fires, does not necessarily impose upon the city an obligation
to pay its members.''
As incidental to the power to adopt measures for the preven-
tion of fires, the municipality may also regulate the manner in
which ashes shall be removed, and prescribe that metal recep-
tacles shall be employed for the purpose.^
A board of fire commissioners and their employees, are not
agents of the city, at least so far as to make the municipality
responsible for their wrongful acts of commission or omission.^
§ 131. Kegulatiou of buildings, and their construction.
— A reasonable regulation of the use, which may be made of
land in populous cities, is absolutely essential ; and is justified
1 Aronheimer v. Stokley, 11 Pliila.
283.
2 Hine v. New Haven, 40 Conn. 478.
8 Louisville v. Webster, 108 111.
414; Reg. v. Howard, 4 Ont. 577;
State V. Tennant, 110 N. 0. 609.
* Clark V. South Bend, 85 Ind. 276;
Bfturagartnei- v. Hasty, 100 lb. 575;
Van Sickler v. Burlington, 27 Vt.
70; Hardy v. Waltham, 3 Mete.
(Mass.) 1()3; Fisher v. Boston, 104.
Mass. 89; Witheril v. Mosher, 9 Hun,
412; Berminghain v. Rumsey, 63
Ala. 352 ; Burlington v. Dennison, 42
N. J. L. 163; Allen v. Taunton, 19
Pick. 485; Hunneman v. Fire Dis.,
37 Vt. 40; Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12
Me. 403; Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7
Cow. 349, 352; Green v. Cape May,
41 N. J. L. 45; Bluffton v. Studa-
baker, 106 Ind. 129; Carleton v.
Washington, 38 Kan. 728; Bridgford
V. Tuscumbia, 16 Fed. Rep. 910.
6 Robinson v. St. Louis, 28 Mo. 488.
^ Van Sicklen v. Burlington, 127
Vt. 70; Cf. Miller v. Savannah Fire
Co., 26 Ga. 678.
' Jacksonville v. JStna F. Eng. Co.,
20 Fla. 100.
8 Filbey v. Combe, 2 M. & W. 677;
Law V. Dodd, 1 Ex. 845; The Queen
V. Wood, 5 E. & B. 49; Guardians v.
Vestry of St. Leonard Shoreditch,
L. R. 2 Q. B. Div. 145; Gay v. Cad-
by, L. R. 2 C. P. Div. 391; Lyndon
V. Stadbridge, 2 H. & N. 45.
° Wooldridge v. Mayor, 49 How.
Pr. 67; Terhune v. Same, 88 N. Y. 24.
231
§131
MCNIOIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. vm.
by the protection thus afforded to the health and safety of the
community. The power to regulate the erection, maintenance
and repair ^ of private buildings, and to prescribe their height,^
the materials and manner of their construction, is frequently
conferred on municipalities by their charters ; and sometimes
with a fulness of detail, which is at once stringent and confus-
ing.^ The fee, which is charged for a building permit issued by
the city, under the power just mentioned, is a license,* not a tax :
and yet, it is held that its amount may be graduated according
to the cost of the edifice.®
The common law relations of adjoining landowners, in re-
spect to the lateral support, which they are bound to afford to
one another, have been, in some instances, materially modified
by charter provisions. Thus, in New York City, any land-
owner, making an excavation ten feet or more in depth below
the curb line, is required, (if given the necessary license to en-
ter on his neighbor's land,) to take proper precautions at his
own expense, for preserving any wall, standing wholly or part-
ly thereon, from injury by reason of a lack of lateral support,
which is caused by his excavations."
A general power to regulate building operations must be rea-
sonably and fairly exercised. Thus, a city council cannot, under
such a general power, prohibit the erection of other buildings
than dwelling houses,' or require the outer walls of a building
to be of any specified thickness.* So, too, a charter power, to
make rules for the regulation of bay windows, does not impli-
edly authorize an ordinance, which gives permission to construct
a bay window projecting beyond the boundary line of the lot.'
1 Donoliue v. Kendall, 50 N". Y. Su-
per. 386 ; Brennau v. Laoliat, 14 Daly,
197; Willy v. Mulledy, 78 K. T. 310:
K. Y. Cousol. Act, § 652.
2 People V. D'Oluch, 111 N. Y. 359.
3 See New York Consol. Act, § 471
-518 inc. ; Fire Dept. v. Wendell, 13-
Daly, 430; St. Paul v. Dow, 37 Minn.
20; Philadelphia v. Coulston, 13
Phila. 182; Ex parte White, 67 Cal.
102; Ilenuessy v. St. Paul, 37 Fed.
Rep. 565. See article by W. S. Gor-
don, 43 Alb. L. J. 349.
* See Comrs. of Easton v. Covey,
2-32
22 Atl. Rep. 266.
5 St Paul V. Dow, supra ; Phihada.
V. Coulston, 13 Phila. ( Pa. ) 182;
Welch V. Hotchkiss, 39, Conn. 140.
" K. Y. Consol. Act, p. 220; Dorrity
V. Rapp, 72 N. Y. 307, 310; Sherman
V. Seaman, 2 Bosw. 127; Ketchum v.
Newman, 116 N. Y. 422; Johnson v.
Oppenheimer, 55 lb. 286; Bernhei-
mer v. Kilpatrick, 53 Hun, 316.
' Newton v. Belger, 143 Mass. 598.
8 State V. Patterson, 45 N. J. L.
310.
» Reimer's App., 100 Pa. St. 182.
CH. Vni.J CHAKTER POWERS, THEIK NATUKE, ETC. § li^l
The power conferred upon a municipal department, to re-
quire the construction of fire escapes by owners of buildings, is
not unconstitutional, and does not deprive the owner of his prop-
erty without due process of law ; ^ and the fact, that the owner
has provided fire escapes of an approved pattern, does not ex-
empt him from providing additional fire escapes, when called
upon to do so by the proper authorities.^
In consequence of the manifest danger of the occurrence of
fires, and the consequent panics, in places of amusement, very
extensive powers are committed to municipal corporations, for
the regulation of the construction and the use of theaters and
halls.^ Provisions, requiring that the aisles and passageways of
churches and theaters shall be kept clear of persons or chairs,
should be literally construed ; and do not give the manager of
a theater discretion to allow any persons to occupy the passage-
ways, even though the number be not so great as to prevent
free exit in case of danger.*
The charter power, to regulate the erection of party walls
and fences, includes the power to authorize their erection, on
the application of either owner, without the other's consent ;
and such action is not unconstitutional, because compensation
is not made to the opposing or unwilling abutter for the land
occupied in part by the wall.^ But such regulations must be
strictly construed, so that individuals shall not, under color
thereof, be permitted to injure the property of their neighbors.^
A regulation, requiring that hoistways shall be guarded by a
sufficient railing and trap doors, is a reasonable police regula-
tion for a municipality, and may be enforced by the infliction
of an appropriate penalty.'^ Such an ordinance does not unnec-
essarily interfere with private rights. On the other hand.
As to bay windows, Livingston v.
Wolf, 136 lb. 519.
' Fire Dept. v. Sturtevant, 33 Hun,
407.
^ Fire Dept. v. Chapman, 10 Daly,
377. A receiver, pendente lite, is not
responsible as an owner. Wyckoff
V. Soofleld, 53 N. Y. Super. Ct. 237 ;
103 N. Y. 630; N. Y. Con. Act, § 499.
" N. Y. Consol. Acts, § 500, Con-
struction of Theaters.
' Fire Dept. v. Stetson, 14 Daly,
125; 6 N. Y. State E. 255; Same v.
Hill, 14 ]Sr. Y. Supp. 158.
° Hunt V. Armbruster, 17 N. J. Eq.
208.
6 Pratt V. Hillman, 4 B. & C. 269;
Reg. V. Ponsford, 1 D. & L. 116; Bar-
low V. Newman, 2 W. Bl. 959; Sims
V. Estate Co., 14 L. T. N. S. 55 ; Matts
V. Hawkins, 5 Taunt. 20.
' N. Y. Con. Act, § 453; Mayor of
K. Y. V. Williams, 16 N. Y. 502.
§132
MUNtCIPAL CORPOKATIONS.
[cH. vm.
when a city forbade a roof already existing, from being relaid,
except in a manner prescribed, the ordinance was held to be ul-
tra vires, as a wrong and needless interference with private prop-
ert}"- rights.^ The variance of the judicial opinion in these cases
is due to difference in the character and necessity of the regu-
lations in the several cases. Where the regulation is not need-
ed for, or does not actually serve as, a protection against some
threatened injury, it is unreasonable and may be resisted.
§ 132. Regnlation of private wharves. — Wharves and
landing places may be either public or private. If private, the
public have no right to use the wharf without the owner's con-
sent ; while public wharves may be used by all persons, upon
payment of a reasonable compensation. It is held in many of
the States, that the riparian owner may without legislative au-
thority, erect wharves or landing places on his land, provided
they are built and maintained in conformity with the regula-
tions of the State ; and are not impediments to the navigation
of the stream or other body of water.^ Such structures, if
confined to tlie shore, are lawful, provided no positive existing
enactment is violated.^
But the grant by the State of land under water, below low-
water mark, does not necessarily convey the right of collecting
wharfage to the grantee. The right depends usually upon the
express terms of the grant; or upon its intent as evinced by its
declared purpose, or by the fair inference, which may be drawn
from it or from surrounding circumstances.*
1 Eeg. V. Howard, 4 Ont. 377; comp.
Jordan v. Helwig, 1 Wilson (Ind.)
447.
2 In Vermont, JTew Jersey, Iowa,
Maryland, West Virginia, North Car-
olina, Oregon, Washington and Flor-
ida, the sole right of making im-
provements in water fronting his
land is secured to the riparian pro-
prietor by statute.
3 Gruy V. Aiken, 40 La. An. 798 ;
Potomac S. Co. v. Upper Pot. etc.
Co., 109 U. S. 672; Hoboken v.Penn.
E. E. Co., 124 lb. 656; Mayville V.
Wilcox, 61 Hun, 223; Mayor v. Hart,
9.5 N. T. 443, 457; Heeney v. Heeney,
2 Denio, 625 ; Grand Rapids v. Pow-
284
ers, 89 Mich. 94; Myers v. St. Louis,
82 Mo. 367; Union Depot Co. v.
Brunswick, 31 Minn. 297; De Bary,
etc. Line v. Jacksonville, 40 Fed. B.
392; Tharnton v. Grant, 10 E. I. 477;
Ladies Sea. Friends Soc. v. Halstead,
58 Conn. 144; Sherlock v. Bainbridge,
41 Ind. 35; Wilhelm v. Burleyson,
106 N. C. 381; Bond v. Wool, 107 lb.
139; Illinois v. 111. Cen. E. E. Co.,
33 Fed. Rep. 730; State v. Jersey
City, 1 Dutch. 526, 530; Miller v.
Mendenhall, 43 Minn. 95; Wetmore
V. Brooklyn Gas Co., 42 N. T. 384;
Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349.
4 Weber v. Com'rs, 18 Wall. 57; Po-
tomac S. Co. V. Upper Potomac Co.,
CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 132
Where the vested right to take wharfage exists, the city will
be liable in damage to private owners for its destruction or im-
pairment, by reason of the construction of a dock system ;^ or
for special injury, caused by the construction by the city, or by
a third person, to whom the city has delegated the power, of a
dock not in accordance with the statutory plan.^
The Legislature may by law establish a pier-head line, or
delegate the same power to a municipal corporation.
In the exercise of this power, to establish a pier-head line,
the riparian owners may be forbidden to extend wharves on
their own land beyond the line, even though such wharves, if
extended, would not prove materially injurious to navigation.^
The right of the riparian owner to build wharves or piers in
front of his land, as long as they do not interfere with the pub-
lic easement of navigation in the stream, is an absolute property
right growing out of his title to his land. If, therefore, this right
is impaired by the appropriation of the land under water, to pub-
lic use, private property has been taken, under the right of emi-
nent domain, for which due compensation must be made to the
owner.* So, also, where a city possessed the power to enlarge
slips by building piers, or extending them into the river, it was
held that it could not under this power sink piers against a bulk-
head or wharf opposite private property, without the consent of
the owner. When this was done, however, and the owner ac-
quiesced and co-operated in the extension at the expense of the
109 TJ. S. 672; Turner v. People's
Ferry Co., 21 Fed. Rep. 90; Langdon
V. Mayor, 93 N. T. 129, 144, 145; In-
graham V. R. R. Co., 34 Iowa, 249 ;
Gould V. Hudson R. etc. Co., 6 IT. T.
522; Tomlin v. R. R. Co., 32 Iowa,
106; Hoboken v. Penn. E. E. Co., 124
TJ. S. 656; Lehigh Valley v. Trone,
28 Pa. St. 206.
I Langdon V. Mayor, 93 X. T. 120;
Williams v. Same, 105 lb. 419; Kings-
land V. Same, 100 lb. 569; Whitney
V. Same, 6 Abb. IST. C. 329; Bedlow
V. N. Y. Floating D. D. Co., 112 N.
Y. 263.
2N. Y. City Consol. Act, p. 345
(ed. 1891); Cunard S. S. Co. v. Voor-
hies, 50 N. Y. Super. (J. & S.) 253.
8 Com. V. Alger, 7 Cush. 53; Grand
T. R. Co. V. Backus, 46 Fed. Rep.
211; Hagan v. Campbell, 8 Port.
(Ala.) 9; Mobile v. Eslava, 9 lb. 577;
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; Chi-
cago Lake Ft. Case, 33 Fed. Rep. 730;
Hart V. Mayor, 7 Wend. 571; Wet-
more V. Brooklyn Gas Co., 42 N. Y.
384; Railroad v. Winthrop, 5 La. An.
36; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497;
Lyon V. Fishmongers Co., L. R. 1
App. Cas. 662.
4 Delaplaine v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co.,
42 Wis. 214; Railroad Co. v. Ren-
wick, 102 U. S. 180; Backus v. De-
troit, 49 Mich. 110, 114. Contra,
Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N. Y. 129;
Watson V. TurnbuU, 34 La. An. 856.
235
§ 132 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. Vm.
citj-, the rights of the city over the structure and the slip were
the same as over its public piers.^
When a charter confers upon a municipal corporation the
power to lease docks, the use which the lessee is authorized to
make of the dock is subject to such restrictions, as Congress
maj' make, under its power to regulate interstate commerce.^
The lease of a dock, although protected against appropriation
without compensation,^ does not vest in the lessee any right
of property in the wharf of the nature of a corporeal heredita-
ment, but merely creates a franchise of wharfage.*
The municipal powers of control over, and regulation of,
private wharves, depend upon the provisions of each charter,
which must be construed strictly against the municipal corpo-
ration, whenever the exercise of the charter power will be
likely to operate injuriously against the rights of private prop-
erty. The proprietors of the private wharves, under such cir-
cumstances, possess the same remedy for a wrongful taking, or
for injury to, their propert3% when committed by the munici-
pality, as do the owners of any kind of property within the
municipal limits, which have been subjected to trespass by pri-
vate persons.^
The opening of a wharf to general public use creates a gen-
eral license to vessels to use it for lawful purposes, under rea-
sonable regulations of the municipalitjr or of the wharf owners,
as the case may be, which license is, however, terminated by no-
tice to remove the vessel.^ Municipalities'^ and private individ-
uals owning or leasing* docks or wharves are impliedly liable,
to those lawfully using them, for negligence in not keeping them
in a state of good repair, and safe and convenient for public use.
1 Verplanok v. Mayor, 2 Edw. 220; the collection of wharfage. Mayor
comp. Marshall v. Guion, 11 N. T.
461; Thompson v. The Mayor, UN.
T. 113; Marshall v. Vultee, 1 E. D.
Smith, 294; Murray v. Sharp, 1 Bosw.
539.
2 Hoeft V. Seaman, 46 How. Pr. 24.
3 Williams v. Mayor, 105 N. Y. 419.
4 Taylor v. Beebe, 3 Rob. 262. The
lessee will be estopped from deny-
ing the validity of such a lease,
when he has received the full bene-
fit of it in the use of the pier, and
236
V. Sonnehorn, 113 K. T. 423; Mayor
V. Huntington, 114 lb. 631.
* Grant v. Davenport, 18 Iowa, 179.
* Heeney v. Heeney, 2 Denio, 623;
NicoU V. Gardner, 13 "Wend. 289;
Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9; Dut-
tou V. Strong, 1 Black, 23; Chicago
Dock V. Garrity, 115 111. 155.
' Wiley V. Allegheny, 118 Pa. St.
490.
8 Radway v. Briggs, 37 N. T. 256.
CH. Viri.J CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 133
The wharf owner, upon proof of negligence, is liable for any-
special injury to vessels or other property which may result
therefrom ; it matters not, whether the city has by ordinance
undertaken to regulate the use of the wharf, or the matter has
been left under the provisions of the common law.^
It is no defence to an action for wharfage, that the dock was
not well built, or needed improvement or repairs.^ The stat-
utes of several States give the wharf owner a lien upon the ship
and tackle for wharfage, anchorage or dock charges.^
§ 133. Public wharves. — While the private riparian owner
may erect a v/harf for private use, which, without his consent,
cannot be used by the public for any purpose whatever, the
privilege or right to erect public wharves, or docks, and to
charge wharfage for the use of the same, when claimed or pos-
sessed by a public owner, is a franchise, which must be granted
by the Legislature.* But where a city is the owner of land
upon the water front, it will by analogy to a private owner, and
in the absence of a charter provision, restraining it or author-
izing it to do so, have implied authority to erect wharves, together
with the incidental power of charging tolls or wharfage for their
use. Such a right in this case is not a franchise, but a vested
right of property.® That compensation is received for the use
1 Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 1 H. L.
93; Seamen v. New York, 3 Daly,
147; People v. Albany, 11 Wend.
539, 543; Buokbee v. Brown, 21 lb.
110; Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. St.
54; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H.
2S4; Shinkle v. Covington, 1 Bush,
617; Allegheny v. Campbell, 107 Pa.
St. 530.
- Prescott V. Duquesne, 48 Pa. St.
118; Jeffersonville v. Ferry Co., 27
Ind. 100; Winpenuy v. Philadelphia,
65 Pa. St. 135.
3 Stimson Statutes, § 4643.
* Wiswall V. Hall, 3 Paige Ch. 313;
Thompson v. Mayor, 11 N. Y. 115;
Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S.
166; Christie v. Maiden, 23 W. Va.
667; The Geneva, 16 Fed. Rep. 874.
* People V. Wharf Co., 31 Cal. .34;
Boston V. Lecraw, 17 How. (U. S.)
426; 19 lb. 263; 24 lb. 188; Railroad
Co. V. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166; comp.
Snyder V. Eockport, 6 Ind. 237; Lang-
don V. Mayor, 93 N. Y. 129; State v.
Jersey City, 34 N. J. L. 31 ; Hoboken
V. Pa. R. R., 124 TT. S. 656; Railroad
Co. V. Winthrop, 5 La. An. 36. In
Horn V. People, 26 Mich. 224, the
court thus defines a public wharf :
" There is no instance in which the
term ' public wharf ' has been used
in our legislation to indicate any-
thing analogous to a dedication to
any public use, like that of high-
ways. Such a public i-ight is un-
known to the common law. Wharf-
age involves exclusive use, for longer
or shorter periods, by each vessel,
depending on the nature of its busi-
ness and the extent of its cargo. All
that is meant in the charter by a
public wharf, is a wharf belonging
to the city, and to be used like other
237
§133
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[cH. vrn.
of a wharf, does not of itself deprive it of its public character.^
So, also, a paved street, extending far enough into the water to
be used by vessels .as a landing place, is a wharf, for the use of
which wharfage may be charged.^
Those municipal corporations, which are situated upon navi-
gable waters, are generally empowered by their charters to erect
docks and wharves, and charge a compensation for the use of
the same.^ The possession or exercise of such powers is not nec-
essarily in violation of the Federal Constitution,* although all
State and municipal regulations of navigable streams must, in
order to be constitutional and valid, conform to and keep within
the limitations of the provisions of the United States Constitu-
tion, which give to the Federal Government supreme control
over matters, relating to interstate and foreign commerce.^ The
money collected for wharfage, it has been held, is paid as com-
pensation or rent for the actual use of the docks or wharves,
and is not taxation, ^ or a tonnage dutyJ Wharfage, however.
wharf pi-operty. Tlie term is ap-
plied, as well to wharves on city prop-
erty away from streets, as to wharves
at the end of streets."
1 Galveston W. Co. v. Galveston,
63 Tex. 14.
2 Keokuk v. Keokuk P. Co., 45
Iowa, 196, 206.
81Sr. T. City Consol. Act, p. 379
(ed. 1891); Turner v. People's Fer-
ry, 21 Fed. Rep. 90; Brooklyn v. >r.
T. Ferry Co., 87 N. T. 204; Williams
V. Same, 105 lb. 419; Langdon v.
Mayor etc., 93 lb. 139; Kingsland v.
New York, 110 IST. T. 569; New Or-
leans V. U. S., 10 Pet. 662, 737; Pol-
lard V. Hagan, 3 How. (U. S.) 212;
Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80;
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324;
Weber v. Cora'rs, 18 Wall. 57; The
Lizzie E., 30 Fed. Rep. 876; Silver v.
Tobin, 28 lb. 545; The Shadyside,
28 lb. 731; Wharf Case, 3 Bland, Ch.
(Md.) 383; 111. etc. Co. v. St. Louis,
2 Dillon, C. C. R. 70; Municipality v.
Pease, 2 La. An. 538; The Virginia
Rulon, ISBlatchf. 519; Com. v. Al-
ger, 7Cush. 53, 82; Railroad Co, v.
238
Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166; Mobile v.
Mood, 53 Ala. 561; Packet Co.
V. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423; Vicks-
burg V. Tobin, 100 lb. 430; The Ge-
neva, 16 Fed. Rep. 874; Leathers v.
Aiken, 9 lb. 679 ; Baldwin v. Franks,
120 U. S. 688; Mayor of St. Martins-
ville v, Mary Lewis, 32 La. An. 1293.
* Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105
U. S. 559.
^ Cooley V. Board of Wardens, 12
How. 296; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,
3 How. 212; Steamship Co. v. Joliffe,
2 Wall. 450; OuachitaP. Co. v. Aiken,
121 U. S. 444; Cisco v. Roberts, 36
N. T. 292 ; JefEersonville v. Ferryboat;
35 Ind. 19; Harbormaster v. South-
erland, 47 Ala. 511; Transportation
Co. V. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691;
Chapman v. Miller, 2 Speers (S. C.)
Law, 769; Alexander v. Railroad
Co., 3Sti-ob. (S. C.) Law, 594; State v.
City Council, 4 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 286.
» Railroad v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166.
' Trans. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 XT.
S. 691; Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken,
121 U. S. 444; N. W. Packet Go. v.
St. Louis, 4 Dillon, 10.
CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 138
must be reasonable ; ^ and althougb it has been held that its
rates cannot be graduated according to the tonnage of the ves-
sel, for the reason that wharfage, rated according to tonnage,
would be a tonnage duty, and as such would be unconstitutional
and void, under the provisions of the United States Constitu-
tion,^ the later opinion is that it would nevertheless be a lawful
charge.^ It has also been held that a grant of exclusive power
to erect wharves is so far beneficial to the public generally, that
it is not in violation of a constitutional provision, that no set
of men shall be entitled to a grant of public privileges from the
community ; * and it is a well recognized rule, that the Legisla-
ture may in its discretion confer the power to erect wharves
and collect wharfage upon municipal corporations, to whatever
extent it may be deemed expedient.* Powers, so granted by
the Legislature, are, however, subject to legislative repeal, re-
striction and modification at pleasure, provided no municipal
rights of property ^ or the rights of municipal creditors are
thereby impaired.^
Public wharves are in legal contemplation highways, or of
the nature of highways ; and, in the absence of express statu-
tory authority, cannot be leased by a city to private persons.^
But there is no constitutional objection to charter provisions,
by which the public wharves may be leased to private persons,
and such lessees be allowed to erect sheds over them ; for it is
competent for the Legislature to grant to a municipality the
power to place public wharves under semi-private supervision
• De Bary etc. Co. v. Jacksonville,
40 Fed. 392; Ouachita P. Co. v.
Aiken, 121 U. S. 444; Heron v. The
Marchioness, 40 Fed. 173; Packet
Co. V. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423; Lin-
coln V. Penn. Warehouse Co., 8 Pa.
Co. Ct. 195; Ellerman v. McMonies,
30 La. An. 190; Muller v. Spreckels,
48 Fed. R. 574; Bain v. The Minnie
L. Gerow, 48 Fed. 836; People v.
Roberts, 92 Cal. 659 (wharfage de-
fined).
2 Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall.
577; Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 581;
Packet Co. v. St. Paul, 3 Dill. 454.
8 See cases in n. 1, supra, and p. 238,
n. 7.
* Fuller V. Edings, 11 Rich. (S. C.)
Law, 739; Martin v. O'Brien, 34 Miss.
21 ; Geiger v. Filor, 8 Fla. 325.
6 Waddington v. St. Louis, 14 Mo.
190; Weber v. Harbor Com'rs, 18
Wall. 57; Ravenswood v. Flemings,
22 W. Va. 52.
« Railroad v. Ellerman, 105 U. S.
166.
7 St. Louis V. Shields, 52 Mo. 361.
8 Baleman v. City of Covington, 14
S. W. 361; see also Belcher S. R. Co.
V. St. Louis Grain El. Co., 101 Mo.
192.
239
§133
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIOKS.
[cH. vin.
and control, provided the substantial rights and benefits of the
public in such wharves are promoted thereby, rather than im-
paired.^ A lease of a wharf gives the right to wharfage only;^
and it remains a public wharf, from which the municipality has
power to remove all obstructions, which tend to interfere with
its free use.^ And when a penalty is imposed upon the occu-
pants of a pier, for failure to keep it unobstructed, the fact, that
the obstruction was originally caused by another person, is im-
material.*
Regulations, by which particular wharves and contiguous
water are set apart for the exclusive use of certain classes of
ships, boats or barges, are not unconstitutional, as depriving
the owner of the wharves of any rights or privileges, or of
his property, without due process of law. They are police
regulations, adopted for the purpose of rendering more con-
venient the transaction of business in the harbor.^ The mu-
nicipal authorities may, under a statutory power to construct
wharves, cause them to be constructed at the end of streets
running to the river ; or at right angles to or along the front
of streets, or of a park or common ; ^ or bordering on and run-
ning parallel to the water, without being liable to the abutting
owner or the riparian proprietor, unless his own property is
taken for such use." And this is true, irrespective of the fact
that the fee of the street may be in the abutting owner.^
The power of the municipality, to erect a wharf upon private
property, upon making due compensation to the owner, cannot
be restrained by an offer of the private proprietor to erect a
wharf there, of which tlie public shall have the use.^
' People V. Baltimore & Ohio K. E.
Co., 117 N. T. 150.
2 Com'rs of Pilots v. Clark, 33 N.
T. 2.51.
2 People V. Mallory, 46 How. Pr.
281.
« Com'rs V. Erie E. E. Co., 5 Eobt.
366; 41 N. Y. 619.
5 Cusliiug V. The John Frazer, 21
How. (U. S.) 184; Heokei- v. N. T.
Balance Dock Co., 24 Barb. 21.5;
Eoosevelt v. Goddard, 52 Barb. 533 ;
Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349.
■* Newport v. Taylor, 16 Barb. 700.
240
' Bond V. Wool, 107 N. C. 1.39; Po-
tomac S. Co. V. Upper Potomac etc.
Co., 109 U. S. 672, 682, 683; Doe v.
Jones, 11 Ala. 63; McMurrayv. May-
or etc., 54 Md. 104; Dugan v. Mayor,
5 GiU& J. 375; Eisenbach v. Hat-
field, 26 Pac. E. 539; Louisville v.
Bank, 3 B. Mon. 144; Kennedy v.
Covington, 8 Dana, 61; Barney v.
Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; Baltimore v.
White, 2 Gill ( Md. ) 444; Rowan's
Ex'r V. Portland, 8 B. Mon. 253.
8 Backus V. Detroit, 49 Mich. 110.
' Iron Railroad Co. v. Trenton, 19
CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 13J:
§ 134. Ferries and Ferriage. — The grant to the municipal
corporation of the power, to confer ferry franchises upon pri-
vate persons and corporations, is not in its nature a contract,
which cannot be impaired or avoided.^ It may at any time be
taken awa)'' from the municipality, or modified in any way, that
the public interests may, in the judgment of the Legislature, re-
quire.^
If the Legislature has delegated to the city the exclusive
power to establish or regulate * ferries within municipal limits,
tlie municipal authorities may likewise grant a franchise, con-
ferring an exclusive privilege to operate ferries.* But this can-
not be done, unless it is clear from the express language of the
charter, or by necessary implication, that it was the intention
of the Legislature to delegate to the municipal corporation the
power to grant exclusive franchises of this kind.^ And although
the general power to license or grant franchises does authorize
the city to limit the number of franchises, which it will create
under the power, it does not, necessarily imply that the city
may under this general power create in any one person or cor-
poration, a monopoly or exclusiA'"e right to the establishment
and conduct of ferries, at any and every point upon the waters
within municipal limits. An express grant of such a power
seems to be necessary.® The power, to establish ferries and
regulate rates of ferriage, will authorize the city to lease a ferry
owned by it ; but it cannot wholly surrender its control and
Ohio St. 299; Page v. Baltimore, 34
Ind. 558; State v. Jersey City, 34
N. J. L. 390.
'Duckwortli V. New Albany, 25
T-nd. 283.
•■^East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge
Co., 10 How. IT. S. 511; Roper v.
MoWharter, 77 Va. 214. The city of
New York has an exclusive, but not
an irrepealable, power to grant ferry
franchises: Mayor v. N. Y. & S. I.
Ferry Co., 40 N. Y. Super. 232; Same
v. Longstreet, 64 How. Pr. 30; Ben-
son v. Mayor, 10 Barb. 223; People
V. Mayor, 32 lb. 102; In Pennsylvar
nia, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota,
Nebraska, West Virginia, Missouri,
Texas, California, Colorado and
16
Louisiana the constitution expressly
prohibits special or local laws licens-
ing or chartering ferries.
' Under this power, ferries may be
regulated, though one bank only of
the river, on which they ai-e operated,
is within the municipal territory:
Arkadelphia L. Co. v. Arkadelphia,
19 S. W. Rep. 1053.
*Costar V. Brush, 25 Wend. 628;
Mayor v. Starin, 106 N. Y. 1 ; Mayor
V. N. Y. & N. J. S. N. Co., 106 lb. 28.
5 Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. 435 ;
Harrison v. State, 9 Mo. 526; Mc-
Ewen V. Taylor, 4 G. Greene, 532.
» Chicago V. Rumph, 45 111. 90;
Logan V. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524; B. &
H. Ferry Co. v. Davis, 48 lb. 133.
241
§135
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. VIII.
supervision to the lessee.^ So, if the municipal corporation
leases a ferry, owned by it, with a covenant for qniet enjoy-
ment, it will not be restrained thereby from exercising the
public powers, delegated to it by statute, to license another
ferry, if in its judgment the public convenience demands it,
unless the municipality is given the express power to grant
exclusive privileges. The city would be impliedly liable on its
covenants to its lessee, if it had undertaken the unauthorized
grant of an exclusive franchise, where, relying upon the pos-
session of an exclusive privilege, the lessee had made improve-
ments, incurred expenses, and acquired proprietary rights,
which receive actual damage through the municipal breach of
covenant.^
§ 135. Regulations providing for the public welfare,
peace, safety and convenience. — In most municipal charters,
and general laws providing for municipal incorporation, after
special grants of powers to the municipality, an additional gen-
eral authority is granted, to provide by ordinance for the preser-
vation and promotion of the public welfare, peace, safety, con-
venience, etc. With a view to recognize in the city sufficient
authority to provide and enforce all needful regulations of the
acts and doings of its citizens, which serve to promote the gen-
eral welfare, and the need of which cannot be foreseen or antici-
pated, and which cannot ordinarily be the subject of a special
grant of power, the courts have been inclined to hold that they
find in this so-called general welfare clause sufficient municipal
authority foi- the enactment and enforcement of any reasonable
regulation, which does actually promote the general welfare, by
preventing or reducing some public evil. Thus, it has been held
that, under this general giant of power, a city may regulate the
'McDonell v. International & G.
N. Co. , 60 Tex. 590. And it has been
held that, inasmuch as the munici-
pal corporation takes the power, to
establish and regulate ferries, as a
trust for the public, it must be per-
formed by it, and cannot, without
legislative sanction, be delegated to
another by a lease or otherwise. Ro-
per v. McWharter, 77 Va. 214; Water-
bury V. Laredo, 68 Texas, 565.
242
2 In re Fay, 15 Pick, 243; see gen-
erally, Fanning v. Gregoire, 16 How.
524; Equity may annul ferry lease.
Phillips V. Bloomington, 1 G. Greene,
498; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43;
0' Neill V. Police Jury, 21 La. An. 586;
Aiken v. Railroad Co., 20 N. T. 370;
Harris v. Nesbit, 24 Ala. 398; Conner
V. Albany, 1 Blackf. 43; City v. Ferry
Co., 27 Ind. 100; Shallcross v. JefEer-
sonville, 26 Ind. 196,
CH. Vm.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 135 a.
more or less religious observance of Sunday,^ enact ordinances
for the protection of trees in public places,^ prohibit domestic
animals from running at large,^ compel the closing of saloons
and restaurants at a certain hour,* arrest and fine vagrants,*
prevent cruelty to animals,** regulate the keeping of gunpow-
der,^ prohibit the blasting of rocks,^ prohibit the carrying of
concealed weapons,^ prohibit gambling,^" appoint policemen,ii
provide for the arrest and punishment of intoxicated persons,^^
or of those addicted to profane swearing,^^ prohibit street preach-
ing,^* or enact any other proper regulation, not repugnant to
the State Constitution or laws, which is adapted to preserve the
peace and quiet of the community.^*
§ 135 a. Regulation of railroads within city limits. —
Under the general welfare clause, as well as, sometimes, by
special grant of power, the courts have held that the munici-
pal regulation of the speed of railroad trains within the city
limits, when reasonable, is generally admitted to be a valid ex-
ercise of the police power.^^ Such a regulation applies to all
1 Mayor v. Luick, 12 Lea, 499 ; Van
Buren v. WeUs, 14 S. W. Eep. 38;
Gabell v. Houston, 29 Tex. 335;
City Conn, of Charleston v. Ben-
jamin, 2 Strobh. (S. C.) Law, 508
St. Louis V. Cafferata, 24 Mo. 94
Cincinnati v. Rice, 15 Ohio, 225
State V. Ludwlg, 21 Minn. 202
Shrevepoi-t v. Levy, 26 La. An. 671
Karwisch v. Atlanta, 44 Ga. 404
Megowan v. Com., 2 Mete. (Ky.) 3
Frolickstein v. Mobile, 40 Ala. 725
State V. Welch, 36 Conn. 215; Cf.
State V. Langsten, 88 N. C. 692. On
tlie question of constitutionality of
Sunday laws in general, because of
their religious partiality, see Tiede-
man's Limitations of Police Power,
§76.
2 State V. Merrill, 37 Me. 329; comp.
Goshen v. Cravy, 58 Ind. 268.
"See §129.
* State V. Welch, 36 Conn. 215;
Morris v. City of Rome, 10 Ga. 532;
Staats V. Washington, 45 K. J. L.
318; Hudson v. Geary, 4 R. I. 485;
State V. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426.
^ See § 126.
" St. Louis V. Sohoenbusch, 95 Mo.
618.
' Fredei-ick v. Augusta, 5 Ga. 561 ;
Davenport v. Richmond, 81 Va. 636.
8 Com. V. Parks, 30 N. E. Eep. 174.
9 In re Cheney, 90 Cal. 617.
i» Ex parte Tuttle, 91 Cal. 589; Van
Buren v. Wells, 14 S. W. E. 38.
11 State V. Sims, 16 S. C. 486.
1- Bloomfleld v. Trimble, 54 Iowa,
399; Homer v. Blackburn, 27 La.
An. 544.
W£x parte DeLaney, 43 Cal. 478;
State V. Debnara, 98 N. C. 712.
i*Com. V. Davis, 140 Mass. 485;
Mankato v. Fowler, 32 Minn. 364;
Washburn v. City of Bloomington,
32 111. App. 245; Bloomington v.
Richardson, 38 lb. 60.
16 Mobile V. Barton, 47 Ala. 84; Cot-
tonwood v. Smith, 36 Kan. 401;
State V. Bills, 13 Ind. 373; Com. v.
Cutter, 29 N. E. Rep. 1146.
1' Massoth V. Delaware etc. Co., 64
N. T. 524; Baltimore C. P. Ry. Co.
V. McDonnell, 43 Md. 534; Fletcher
243
§136
MUNICIPAX, CORPORATIONS.
[oh.
vnr.
the municipal territory, including inclosed lands owned by the
railroad company ; and the fact, that the company was engaged
in carrying the mail, is immaterial. ^ Municipal ordinances, re-
stricting the running of trains to four miles an hour,^ requir-
ing railroads to keep flagmen at crossings,^ requiring a horse
railway company to keep an agent on each of its cars, to aid
the driver in controlling the car and to prevent accident;* to
keep its tracks watered to allay dust,® and forbidding the rail-
road company from allowing a car to stand longer than ten min-
utes at a street crossing,^ are valid and reasonable, and not in
unlawful restraint of traffic. But a city has no right to make
an unjust and unwarranted discrimination between competing
roads, by dividing the city into two districts, and limiting the
speed of trains passing through one district only.^
§ 136. Power to appropriate funds for lobbying pur-
poses.— A municipality has no incidental or inherent right to
appropriate its funds to the liquidation of expenses, which have
been incurred in obtaining an increase of its charter powers."
8 State V. East Orange, 41 N. J. L.
V. Atlantic etc. Co., 64 Mo. 484;
Eiclimond etc, Co, v. Kichmond, 96
U. S. 521; St. Louis etc. Co. v. Ma-
thias, 50 lud. 65 ; Haas v. Chicago
B. etc. Co., 41 Wis. 44; Hooker v.
Chicago etc. Co., 76 lb. 542; Faber
V. St. Paul etc. Co., 29 Minn. 465;
Evison V. Chicago etc. Co., 45 Minn.
370; Donnaher v. State, 8 S. & M.
(Miss.) 649; Taylor v. Lake Shore
etc. Ky. Co., 45 Mich. 74; Meyers v.
Chicago etc. Co., 57 Iowa, 555; Frick
V. St. Louis etc. Co., 75 Mo. 595;
Merz V. Mo. Pac. E. Co., 88 Mo. 672;
Grube V. Same, 98 lb. 330; St. Louis
etc. Co. V. Dunn, 78 111. 197; Weyl v.
Chicago etc. Co., 40 Minn. 350; State
V. Mayor of Jersey City, 47 N". J. L.
286; Chicago etc. Co. v. Haggerty,
67 111. 113; Same v. Reid, 66 lb. 43.
1 Whitson V. Franklin, 34 Ind. 392.
2 Knolblooh v. Chicago etc. Co., 31
Minn. 402. See, contra, where the
attempted regulation was in a town
of 1500 inhabitants, thinly settled,
White V. St. Louis & S. F. Ey. Co.,
44 Mo. App. 540.
244
127; Toledo etc. Co. v. Jacksonvillej
67 111. 37; Chicago & Alton Ey. Co.,
67 111. 11; Erie v. Erie Canal Co., 59
Pa. St. 174; Phila. etc. Co. v. Bow-
ers, 4 Houst. 506 ; Ladd v. Southern
C". P. & M. Co., 53 Tex. 172; Green
V. Eastern By. Co. (Minn. 93), 53 N.
W. B. 808; Sloan v. Pac. E. E. Co.,
61 Mo. 24.
* State V. Trenton, 20 Atl. Eep.
1076; So. Gov. etc. Ey. Co. v. Berry,
18 S. W. Eep. 1026; Penna. Co. v.
Stegemeier, 118 Ind. 305.
6 City V. Suburban Ey. Co. of Sa-
vannah, 77 Ga. 731.
6 McCoy V. Phila. etc. Co., 5 Del.
599; Burger v. Miss. By. Co., 112 Mo.
238; 20 S. W. 349.
'Lake View V. Tate, 130 111. 247.
For a full consideration of the po-
lice power of the state, so far as rail-
roads are concerned, see Police Pow-
ers, § 194, and Tiedeman on Kail-
roads, chapter on Police Begulations.
8 Henderson v. Covington, 14 Bush,
312.
CH. VIII.] CHAETEE POWERS, THEIR NATUEE, ETC. § 138
Nor can a town raise money by taxation, or pledge its credit,
lor the purpose of meeting the expenses, incurred in opposing
before the Legislature a division of its territory ,i or procuring
its annexation to another town.^ So, also, it has been held
that a municipal corporation has no power to pay the expenses
of individuals, which are incurred before its incorporation in
obtaining a charter for it from the Legislature;^ and, a for-
tiori, of persons, employed by it, to obtain from the Legislature
the enactment of an unconstitutional law.* In all these cases,
the act, in which the expense was incurred in behalf of the
municipality, was a case of " lobbying," which is generally pro-
nounced to be reprehensible, and an insufficient consideration
for any contract, whether made by public or private parties.®
§ 137. Power to borrow money — Since taxation is legiti-
mately presumed to be the most natural, and the most just, mode
of providing the means of satisfying the debts of a municipal-
ity, much discussion and litigation have arisen out of the fre-
quent resort of municipal corporations to the power to borrow
money, in order to meet maturing obligations, without having
an express charter grant of such power. A full discussion of
this subject, together with the collateral question of the mu-
nicipal power to emit negotiable paper, and the general con-
stitutional limitations on municipal indebtedness, will be found
in another part of this work.*
§ 138. Payment of bounties. — It was held to be competent
for the Legislature to authorize municipal corporations to raise
and appropriate money for the payment of bounties to persons,
as an inducement for them to enlist in the armies of the United
States during the War of the Rebellion ; or for the repayment
of money advanced for such purposes.' But without special
legislative authority, appropriations made by municipalities for
such purposes are illegal and ultra vires ;^ but, although they
' Westbrook v. Bearing, 63 Me.
231 ; Frankfort v. Winterport, 54 lb.
250.
'' Minot V. West Roxbury, 112 Mass.
1; Coolidge v. Brookline, 114 lb.
592.
' Front V. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152.
* Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass. 341.
' Tiedeman, (;om. Paper, § 187.
^ Chap. X. on Municipal Contracts,
and chap. xi. on Municipal Securi-
ties.
'Lowell Sav. Bk. v. Oliver, 8 Allen,
247; Freeland v. Hastings, 10 lb. 570;
Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass. 341; Hil-
bish V. Catherman, 64 Pa. St. 154;
Speer V. School Directors, 50 lb. 150.
*Kunkler v. Franklin, 13 Minn.
245
139
MUNICIPAL CORPOBATIONS.
[CH. vin.
may have been illegally made, it was held that their illegality
or invalidity may be cured by subsequent legislative action.'
So, also, cities have no implied or incidental power to raise
money by taxation for the purpose of paying the commutation
of citizens who may have been drafted to serve in the armies
of the United States.^ The same conclusion has been reached
in respect to the power of a city to provide for the families of
enlisted soldiers.^
§ 139. Celebrations or entertainments. — The furnishing
of amusement or entertainment to the public is not within the
purposes for which municipal corporations are created by the
Legislature. For this reason, it is well settled that such corpo-
rations, unless they are expressly authorized by statute, have no
power to furnish entertainments for their citizens, official visit-
ors, or others ; * or to arrange for celebrations of any kind, at the
expense of the corporation ; ^ not even when the proposed cele-
bration is of a strictly public character, and of national impor-
tance ; as, for example, the celebration of Independence day.^
And an action cannot be maintained against them upon a con-
tract, which was made with them to furnish such celebrations.^
So, also, a city has no authority to appropriate city funds for
the expense attendant upon a ball and banquet ; and an injunc-
tion will be granted in such a case, to prevent the payment by
the city treasurer of money thus illegally appropriated.^ In the
absence of express constitutional restrictions, the Legislature
may always by express grant, vest in the municipal corporation
the power to provide for such public celebrations, and to con-
127; Shackford v. Newington, 46 N.
H. 415; Fiske v. Hazard, 7 E. I. 438;
State V. Tappin, 29 "Wis. 6H4; Par-
ker V. Saratoga Co., 106 N. T. 392;
Thompson V. Pittstou, 59 Me. 545 ;
Russell V. Providence, 7 E. I. 566;
Tyson v. Halifax Soh. Dis., 51 Pa. St.
9; Grim v. Weissenberg Soh. D., 57
Pa. St. 433; Brodhead v. Milwaukee
19 Wis. 624; Comer v. Folsom, 13
Minn. 219; Sperry v. Harr, 32 Iowa,
184.
I Booth V. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118;
Kunkle v. Franklin, 13 Minn. 127;
State V. Richland, 20 Ohio St. 362.
246
2 Barbour v. Camden, 51 Me. 608.
s Veazie v. China, 50 Me. 518.
■> Law V. People, 87 111. 385.
6 Cornell v. Guilford, 1 Denio, 510;
Hale V. People, 87 111. 72.
6 Hood V. Lynn, 1 Allen, 103. But
see Hill v. East Hampton, 140 Mass.
381.
' Hodges V. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110.
s Austin V. Coggeshall, 12 R. 1. 329;
Greenough v. Wakefield, 127 Mass.
275. In Claflin v. Hopkins, 4 Gray,
502, the same principle was apphed
to the unlawful purchase of uniforms
for a military company by a town.
CH. Vin.] CHAKTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 141
tract debts for the same, as well as to appropriate the funds of
the city therefor.^
§ 140. Rewards. — The authorities are not agreed upon the
power of a municipality, to offer rewards for the detection and
punishment of crimes, in the absence of an express statute, em-
powering it to do so .2 The weight of the decisions is against
the existence of any such power in municipal corporations,
unless, of course, the Legislature has deemed it expedient to
confer it upon them by statute.^ And a power, to pass all
needful by-laws for the administration of justice, will not au-
thorize the appropriation of money to enforce the laws of the
commonwealth, in which every community has the same inter-
est.* If the city has power to offer a reward, and an offer is
to be made by the mayor and ratified by the council, it is bind-
ing although not ratified until after the service, for which the
reward is to be paid, has been rendered.^
§ 141. Erecting, furnishing and repairing public build-
ings.— The express power, to repair or alter public buildings,
will not confer upon the municipal corporation the authority
to erect a new building." The municipal corporation, as a
general rule, has no implied authority to erect buildings for
municipal purposes, and to incur debts therefor ; certainly, not
beyond what is absolutely necessary houseroom for carrying
on the city government.'^ But municipal charters and the gen-
Contra, York v. Forscht, 23 Pa. St.
1 Hill V. East Hampton, 140 Mass.
381; where it has been held that,
where a general statute authorizes
towns to appropriate money for the
purpose of celebrating the centennial
of their incorporation, the town may
date its incorporation from the time
of its incorporation as a district.
- By N. Y. Con. Act, § 259, the Po-
lice Board is expressly authorized to
offer rewards for ari-est and convic-
tion of persons guilty of homicide,
arson and receiving stolen goods.
3 Huthsing v. Bosuquet, 3 McCrar
ry, 152; Pattonv. Stephens, 14 Bush,
324; Murphy v. Jacksonville, 18 Fla.
318; Grant Co. v. Bradford, 12 Ind.
455; Gale v. South Berwick, 51 Me.
174; Hanger v. Des Moines, 52 Iowa,
193;Loveland v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 357.
.^91 ; Crawshaw v. Roxbury, 7 Gray,
374; Abel v. Pembroke, 61 N. H. 357.
* Patton V. Stephens, 14 Bush (Ky.)
324.
5 Janvrin v. Exeter, 48 N. H. 83.
6 Peterson v. Mayor etc., 17 N. Y.
449, 455.
'Reynolds v. Albany, 8 Barb. 597;
People V. Harris, 4 Cal. 9; Vanover
v. Davis, 27 Ga. 357. It has, how-
ever, been held in one instance, that
the erection of a schoolhouseis with-
in the scope of the municipal author-
ity, and such a building may be
erected without express charter au-
thority, in the absence of a statutory
prohibition: Cartersville v. Baker,
73 Ga. 686.
247
§142
MUNICIPAIi CORPOEATIONS.
[cH. vrn.
eral statutes, under which the municipal communities are in-
corporated, generally contain express grants of power to erect
the necessary municipal buildings, and to determine the cost
thereof. Unrestricted authority, to purchase real estate, will
imply that the expediency and necessity of the purchase are to
be determined upon by the city council ; ^ and the powers, to
build and to repair, are so far discretionary that the determina-
tion of the plan and mode of their exercise is impliedly inci-
dental thereto.'-* A city council, it is admitted, has the power
to furnish its meeting room in a suitable manner, of which they
are to be the sole judges, in the absence of statute ; and an in-
junction, to prevent a city council from decorating the council
chamber with certain portraits, was refused.^
It has been held that, although a Legislature cannot compel
a municipality to bear more than its share of the expense of
conducting the State government, the city itself may, in the ab-
sence of express statute forbidding such action, erect buildings,
at its own expense, for the use of the county officials.*
§ 142. Compromise and arbitration Municipal coi-pora-
tions have been repeatedly held to have the incidental power
to compromise claims, which may exist in their favor or against
them.^ Accordingly, town trustees may compromise a judg-
ment obtained in a suit against them to recover a penalty;^ and,
on the other hand, a city council,'^ an overseer of the poor,^ or
a board of supervisors,® may compromise judgments, which are
held by the corporation against individuals. A town maj' accept
a note, in payment of a fine due it,^*' and enforce notes which
are taken by it, as security for claims against private persons.^^
3 Riclimond v. McGirr, 78 Ind. 192;
French, v. Quinoy, 3 Allen, 9.
2 Ely V. Rochester, 26 Barb. 133;
Bell V. Platteville, 11 Wis. 139; Gal-
veston V. Devlin, 84 Tex. 319.
a Reynolds v. Albany, 8 Barb. 597;
People V. Harris, 4 Gal. 9. Of. Hodges
v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110; Stetson v.
Kempton, 13 Mass. 272.
' Callam v. Saginaw, 50 Mich. 7.
5 Bean v. Jay, 23 Me. 117; Bally ville
V. Lowell, 20 lb. 178; Grimes v. Ham-
ilton Co., 37 Iowa, 290; Mills Go. v.
Bur. etc. Co., 47 lb. 66; People v.
248
San Francisco, 27 Cal. 655; Agnew
V. Brail, 124 111. 312; So. Boston Iron
Co. V. U. S., 118 U. S. 37; State v.
Martin, (Neb.) 43 N. W. R. 244; Tut-
tle V. Weston, 59 Wis. 151; as to the
power of New York city, see Consol.
Act, § 1788.
^ Petersburg v. Mappin, 14 111. 193
' Agnew V. Brail, 124 111. 312.
8 Olp V. Leddick, 59 Hun, 627.
9 Collins V. Welch, 58 la. 72; Shank-
lin V. Madison Co., 21 Ohio St. 575.
11 Caldwell v. Wright, 25 111. Ap. 74.
II Buffalo V. Bettinger, 76 N. T. 393.
CH. Vni.J CHAKTEE POWERS, THEIK NATUKE, ETC. § 143
A municipal corporation may, when it ascertains that it has
become a party to a contract, whicli will act oppressively upon
the other party, release him therefrom ; certainly, where a court
of equity would relieve him from the contract.^ But while a
town council can legally release a doubtful debt,^ it cannot vote
a gratuity to a person, having a claim against it for injuries
sustained, on account of his indigency, where the claim has no
legal basis. ^
Unless forbidden to do so by its charter, a municipal corpo-
ration may submit a disputed claim against it to arbitration.*
The award will be binding upon the city,^ and the remedy, by
which its payment by the city may be compelled, is an action
on the award, and not by a mandamus.^
§ 143. Power of municipalities to sue and be sued. — A
municipal corporation may, unless expressly prohibited, or un-
less some special provision or exemption is made by statute,
protect its property, enforce its contracts, collect its debts, and
redress its wrongs,' by the same remedies which are open to
individuals.^ And it has been held that one municipal corpora-
tion can sue another.^ And so, likewise, municipalities may
be sued for the breach of express contracts, and for many kinds
of torts.i"
But a department of the city government of New York city
cannot be sued ; ^^ nor can a recovery be had in the United States
1 Beau V. Jay, 23 Me. 117, 121 ; Meech
V. Buffalo, 29 K T. 210.
2 Ford v. Clough, 8 Me. 334.
' Mathews v. Inliabitants, 134 Mass.
355; contra, McGinness v. New York,
26 Hun, 142.
* Alexander Canal Co. v. Swann, 5
How. TJ. S. 83 ; Dix v. Dummerston,
19 Vt. 263; Buckland v. Conway, 16
Mass. 390; Paret v. Bayonne, 39 N".
J. L. 559; Eemington v. Harrison
Co. Ct., 12 Bush, 148; Springfield v.
Walker, 42 Ohio St. 543 ; Kane v.
Fond du Lao, 40 Wis. 495; Town-
ship V. Kankin, 70 Iowa, 65 ; Shaw-
neetown v. Baker, 85 111. 568.
« Smith V. Philadelphia, 13 Phila.
(Pa.) 177.
6 State V. Jersey City, 41 N. J. L.
135.
'Union Coal Co. v. La Salle, (111.)
26 K E. E. 506.
8 Ottawa D. C. v. Law, 6 Can. Q.
B. 546; First Nat. Bk. etc. v. Nat.
Ex. Bank, 92 U. S. 122; Augusta v.
Leadbetter, 16 Me. 45; Detroit v.
Carey, 9 Mich. 165 ; Oliver v. Wor-
cester, 102 Mass. 489; Buffalo v. Bet-
tinger, 76 N. T. 393. Contra, as to
counties, Whittaker v. Tuolumne
Co., 30 Pac. 1016; 96 Cal. 100.
9 Huron D. C. v. London D. C, 4
Up. Can. Q. B. 802.
'" See post, oh. x. and xvii.
" Swift V. New York, 83 N. T. 528.
249
§144
MTJXICIPAL CORPOHATIONS.
[CH. vni.
Courts, upon bonds or coupons, held by the citizens of a State,
in which the city owing them is located, but which are trans-
ferred to a resident of another State for the sole purpose of
giving the Federal Courts jurisdiction.^
§ 144. Power to create private monopolies. — As a gen-
eral proposition, it may be conceded that the creation of a
monopoly out of an ordinary calling is an unconstitutional in-
terference with private propert}- and personal liberty. But it
will not do to say that aU monopolies are void. Every man
has, under reasonable regulations, a right to pursue any one of
the ordinary callings of life, as long as its pursuit does not in-
volve evil or danger to society. And a law, which granted to
one man, or to a few individuals, the exclusive privilege of pros-
ecuting the trade or business, would violate the constitutional
rights of those who are prohibited from pursuing the same call-
ing. On the other hand, when the State bestows upon one or more
the privilege of pursuing a calling or trade, the prosecution of
which is not a common natural right, — either because it cannot
be carried on without specinl franchise powers, or because the
general prosecution of the business has been lawfully prohibit-
ed, in the constitutional exercise of the police power, — a mo-
nopoly is created, without, however, violating the rights of
anyone ; for, with the abolition of the monopoly thus created,
would disappear all right to carry on the trade. The trade
never existed before as a lawful calling.^
Thus, although it has been held to be an unconstitutional
and void creation of a monopolj', to give to one private corpo-
ration or company the exclusive privilege of supplying the city,
or certain parts of a city, with illuminating gas,'' yet there can
be no doubt that the grant of such an exclusive franchise is law-
ful, on the ground that the public interests must be protected
against the indiscriminate allowance of excavations in the streets
for the purpose of laying down the conducting pipes.* The same
1 New Providence v. Halsey, 117
U. S. 336; Farmiugton v. PlUsburg,
114 lb. 138.
2 For a more full and general dis-
cussion of the constitutionality of
private monopolies, see Tiedeman's
Limitations of Police Power, § 105.
* Norwich Gaslight Co. >'. Norwich
250
City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19; State v.
Cincinnati etc. Gas Co., 18 Ohio St.
292.
* State V. Milwaukee Gaslight Co.,
29 Wis. 454; Indianapolis v. Indian-
apolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396; Parkers-
burg Gas Co. V. Parkersburg, 30 W.
Va. 435;. Grant v. City of Davenport,
CH. Vm.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § I'lJ
ruling has been sustained in, and applied to, the grant of an
exclusive privilege to establish an electric light plant,^ water-
works,^ and to construct a street railway.^ But while in all of
these cases of a grant of an exclusive monopoly, the grant is
properly to be considered a contract, which cannot be impaired
or abrogated by subsequent legislation ; * yet, the grant does
not interfere with the exercise of the police power in regard
to the public health, safety and general welfare, wherever the
two conflict.^ Nor does the grant of such an exclusive fran-
chise restrict the exercise of the power of taxation,^ the right
of eminent domain,^ or the charter power of a city to estab-
lish a municipal monopol)' of the same kind."
But in order that a municipal corporation may grunt an ex-
30 Iowa, 396; New Orleans Gas Co.
V. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650;
People's Gaslight Co. v. Jersey City,
40 N. J. L. 297; Louisville Gas Co. v.
Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U. S. 683, re-
versing s. c, 81 Ky. 263; Newport v.
Newport Light Co., 84 Ky. 167.
1 Grand Rapids Electric etc. Co. v.
Grand Rapids Edison etc. Co., 33 Fed.
Rep. 659.
2 Atlantic City Waterworks v. At>
lanticCity, 39 N. J. Eq. 367; New
Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Rivers,
115 U. S. 074. But see Brenhara v.
Brenliam Water Co., 67 Tex. 542;
New Orleans Water Co. v. Louisiana
Sugar Refinery Co., 35 La. An. 1111;
Citizens' Water Co. v. Bridgeport
Hydraulic Co., 55 Conn. 1.
'Citizens' Street R'y Co. v. Jones,
34 Fed. Rep. 579 ; Davies v. New York,
14 N. Y. 506; Birmingham & P. M.
St. R'y V. Birmingham St. R'y Co.,
79 Ala. 465; Newell v. Minn. etc. R'y
Co., 35 Minn. 112 ; N. Y. Elevated R.R.
Co., In re, 70 N. Y. 327; Gilbert Ele-
vated R'y Co., In re, lb. 301; Fort
Worth St. R'y Co. v. Rosedale St.
R'y Co., 68 Tex. 169; Des Moines
Street R. R. Co. v. Des Moines
Broad-guage St. R'y Co., 73 Iowa,
513.
' New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana
Light Co., 115 U. S. 650; Louisville
Gas Co. V. Citizens' Gas Co., lb. 083;
New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Riv-
ers, lb. 674.
5 Same cases as in preceding note,
and Stein v. Bienville Water Supply
Co., 34 Fed. Rep. 145; National Wa-
terworks V. Kansas City, 28 Fed. Rep.
921.
estate v. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123; Los
Angeles v. So. Pac. R. R. Co., 67Cal.
433; Columbus V. Street R. R. Co.,
45 Oliio St. 98. But see Des Moines
V. Chicago, R. L & P. R. R. Co., 41
Iowa, 560.
' West River Bridge v. Dix, OHow.
507; Charles River Bridge v. Warren
River Bridge, 11 Pet. 420; Central
Bridge Co. v. Lowell, 4 Gray, 474;
In re Rochester Water Commission-
ers, 66 N. Y. 413; In re Towanda
Bridge, 91 Pa. St. 210; Central City
Horse R'y Co. v. Fort Clark etc. R'y
Co., 87 111. 523; Lake Shore etc. R.
R. Co. V. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 97
111. 500; N. C. R. R. Co. v. Carolina
Cent. R. R. Co., 83 N. C. 489.
'Long V. Duluth, 51 N. W. Rep.
913; Altgelt v. San Antonio, 81 Tex.
436; Brenliam V. Brenbam Water Co.,
67 Tex. 143; Parkersburg Gas Co. v.
Parkersburg, 30 W. Va. 435; 4 S. E.
Rep. 650.
251
§ 144 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VTII.
elusive piivilege of the character, which has just been explained
and pronounced to be within the constitutional powers of the
State, the power to do so must have been granted to the cor-
poration, either expressly or by necessary implication. The
power cannot ordinarily be implied.^ It has thus been held
that the grant to the municipality of the power to establish and
regulate ferries, does not give the city the exclusive power of
regulation, and, much less, the power to create exclusive f ran-
ch ises.^ The same has been held to be true of- the charter
power to license, or to license and regulate certain trades and
occupations.^ And it is true, also, that, although the power to
license be made exclusive, it does not give the power to grant
an exclusive franchise, unless the city is authorized " to grant
or refuse " a license.* The city cannot grant an exclusive right
to furnish gas for the inhabitants, under a charter power to
" cause the streets to be lighted," and to provide " reason-
able regulations " therefor ; ^ or to furnish water, under a
charter power to make " ordinances, rules," etc., " to supply
the city with water." ^ On the other hand, where the charter
authorized the city to maintain gas works or waterworks of its
own, it impliedly granted to the city the power to create a pri-
vate monopoly of it.^
The grant to a street railway company of the power to lay
down its tracks and operate its road in certain streets, does not
constitute an exclusive franchise, which would enable the street
railway to resist the use of the same street by another compet-
ing company, unless the grant was expressly declared to be a
monopoly.^ But the track of the first railway is its private
1 People V. Benson, 34 Barb. 24;
State V. Cincinnati Gas Light Co., 18
Ohio St. 262; Stein v. Bienville Water
Supply Co., 34 Fed. Kep. 145; Daven-
port V. Kleinschniidt, 6 Mont. 502.
2 Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. 435 ;
McEwen v. Taylor, 49 Greene (Iowa)
532 ; Harrison v. State, 9 Mo. 526.
8 Chicago v. Rumph, 45 111. 90; B. &
H. Ferry Co. v. Davis, 48 Iowa, 133;
Logan V. R. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524; Sny-
der V. North Lawrence, 8 Kans. 82 ;
Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. Railroad R.
K. Co., 11 Leigh, 42; Gale v. Kala^
mazoo, 23 Mich. 344 (9 Am. Rep. 80),
252
opinion of Cooley, J.
* B. & H. Ferry Co. v. Davis, 48
Iowa, 133.
^ Saginaw Gasl. Co. v. Saginaw, 28
Fed. Rep. 529.
^ Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse,
116 N. T. im.
' Newport v. Newport Light Co.,
84 Ky. leY; Atlantic City Water
Works V. Atlantic City, 39 N. J. Eq.
381; Saginaw Gaslight Co. v. Sagi-
naw, 28 Fed. Rep. 535; but see contra,
Brenhara v. Brenham Water Co., 67
Tex. 542.
8 Gulf City Street Ry. Co. v. Gal-
CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 144 a.
property, whether its franchise be exclusive or otherwise ; and
it has been held, that in no case can the second railway, which
obtains the authority to operate a railway in the same streets,
make use of the track of the first railway, without making com-
pensation for what is a taking of private property, in the exer-
cise of the right of eminent domain.^
§ 144 a. Power to create and operate municipal monopo-
lies—Municipal ownership of gas, electric light and water-
works.— If the question had been raised fifty years ago, whether
11 municipal corporation could, within the provisions and the
spirit of the State Constitutions, under authority from the State
Legislature, undertake the establishment and operation of mu-
nicipal monopolies, in the place of private monopolies, — espe-
cially in the case of gas, electric light and waterworks, — it is
very likely that the question would have been answered in the
negative. The popular opinion of that day opposed the as-
sumption, by any part of government, of powers beyond what
were necessary to the preservation of peace and good order, the
enforcement and protection of private rights, and the allevia-
tion of individual distress through the medium of public hospi-
tals, asylums and almshouses ; and the same public opinion
would have controlled the judgment of the courts, if such a
monopoly had by some accident or oversight been created, in
pronouncing upon its validity. But, since then, the popular
sense of right, under the influence of modern socialism, has
manifested a decided socialistic tendency in favor of the inter-
vention of the State in many instances, which would not have
been seriously considered in times past. It is true that for
more than a century, we have had in this country, as well as
elsewhere in the civilized world, a government monopoly, in
the transportation and distribution of the mail. But that mo-
nopoly had been created by an express provision of the United
States Constitution, and had thereby been placed far above the
reach of judicial criticism. Nor have we had since then, in the
veston City Ry. Co., 65 Tex. 502;
Jackson Co. Horse Ry. Co. v. Inter-
state Rapid Transit Ry. Co., 24 Fed.
Rep. 306.
1 Jersey City & B. E. E. Co. v. J.
C. & Hob. H. R. R. Co., 20 N. J. Eq.
01;&ul£ City Ry. Co. v. Galveston
City Ry. Co., 65 Tex. 502; State v.
Corrigan St. Ry. Co., 85 Mo. 263;
Jackson Co. Horse Ry. Co. v. Inter-
state Rapid Transit Co., 24 Fed. Rep.
306; Eichels v. Evausville St. Ry.
Co., 78 Ind. 261.
§ 144 a.
MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS.
[CH. viri.
United States, any other instance of a State or National gov-
ernment monopoly, except the recent establishment, in South
Carolina, of a State monopolj- in the sale of intoxicating liq-
uors ; and the results of the pending judicial contests over its
constitutionality must remain for the present a matter of con-
jecture.
But in determining the constitutionality of government mo-
nopolies, a very important distinction must be made between the
monopolies, which may be established and operated by the State
government, and those which may, under legislative authority,
be erected by a municipal corporation. The distinction rests
upon the generally accepted doctrine, that a municipal corpo-
ration has a quasi private character, as well as a strictly public
character. The grant by the State to a municipal corporation
of the power to establish and operate gas, electric light or water-
works, is a grant to the corporation in its semi-private charac-
ter, as the corporate representative of the local community, and
not to it as the public representative of the State government.^
Involved in the question of the constitutionality of munici-
pal ownership of gas, electric light and waterworks, are two
distinct queries : first, can the municipal corporation supply it-
self with the light and water which it may need for lighting
and cleansing the streets and other strictly municipal property ;
and, secondly, can it vend to private consumers the light and
water they may need ? In regard to the first query, there is
little room for doubt, and the cases are unanimous, that the
municipal corporation may, if the State Legislature grants the
power, supply itself, for public needs, with light and water, by
the establishment and operation of its own works, as well ashy
contract with private manufacturers of the same.^
Where the municipality undertakes, as it always does when
it establishes and operates its own lighting or waterworks, to
' See ante, § 9.
- Brenliam v. Brenham Water Co.,
67 Tex. 542; Atlantic City Water
Works V. Atlantic City, 39 N. J. Eq.
367; Parkersburg Gas Co. v. Park-
ersburg, 30 W. Va. 435; 4 S. E. Rep.
650; Saginaw Gaslight Co. v. Sagi-
naw, 28 Fed. Rep. 535 ; Garrison v.
Chicago, 7 Biss. 480; Long v. Du-
254
luth, 51 N. W. Rep. 913; Altgelt v.
San Antonio, 81 Tex. 436; State v.
City of Hamilton, (Ohio) 23 N. E.
Rep. 935; Hamilton Gaslight & Coke
Co. V. City of Hamilton, 37 Fed.
Rep. 832; Mauldin v. City Council
of Greenville, 33 S. C. 1; 11 S. E.
Rep. 134; see, also, State v. Town
of Columbia, (Mo.) 20 S. W. Rep. 90.
CH. Vni. J CHARTER POWKRS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 144 (
supply private consumers in their private houses, the munici-
pal government is without doubt engaged in a private business,
which fift)' years ago would very likely have been conceded to
be beyond the legitimate sphere, even of a municipal corpora-
tion, and this has been the judgment of the Supreme Court of
South Carolina in a very late case.^ But in every other case,
where the question has been raised, the courts have held that
the vending of light and water to private consumers was but
an incident of the supply of these elements for strictly public
use, and was within the constitutional limitations.'^
But the attempt of a city government, to establish and op-
erate its own gas, electric light and waterworks, will not be
lawful in any case, unless the State Legislature has granted, ex-
pressly or by plain implication, the power to do so. It has thus
been decided very lately by the Massachusetts Supreme Court,
that, under existing statutes, towns in the State of Massachu-
setts have not the power to maintain electric light plants.^
On the other hand, it has been held that the authority for mu-
1 Mauldin V. City Council of Green-
ville, 33 S. C. 1 (11 S. E. Eep. 434).
^ Atlantic City WaterwoAs v. At-
lantic City, 39 N. J. Eq. 367; Dayton
V. Quigley, 29 N. J. Eq. 77; Hale v.
Houghton, 8 Mich. 451; Rochester
Water Co., In re, 66 N. Y. 413; Way-
land V. Com'rs, 4 Gray, 500; Craw-
fordsville v. Braden, (Ind.) 28 N. E.
849; Springfield v. Fullmer, (Utah)
27 Pac. Eep. 577; Thompson Hous-
ton Electric Co. v. Newton, 42 Fed.
Eep. 723; Smith v. Mayor, 88 Tenn.
464 (12 S. W. 924) ; in the last case,
the court saying: "Nothing should
be of greater concern to a municipal
corporation than the preservation of
the good health of the inhabitants.
Nothing can be more conducive to
that end than a regular and sufficient
supply of wholesome water, which
common observation teaches all can
be furnished in populous cities only
through the instrumentality of well-
equipped waterworks. Hence, for
a city to meet such a demand is to
perform a public act and confer a
public blessing .... It cannot be
held that the city in doing so is en-
gaging in a private enterprise, or
performing a municipal function for
a private end." " Municipal corpo-
rations constitute a part of the civil
government of the State, and their
streets are highways, which it is the
province of government, by appro-
priate means, to render safe. To
that end the lighting of streets is a
matter of which the public may as-
sume control, .... the manufac-
ture of gas, and its distribution for
public and private use .... is a
business of a public nature, and
meets a public necessity for which
the State may make provision. It is
one which so far from affecting the
public injui'iously has become one
of the most important agencies of
civilization for the promotion of the
public convenience and safety."
New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisi-
ana Light Co., 115 U. S. 658.
» Spaulding v. Peabody, (Mass.) 26
N. E. Rep. 421.
255
§144.
MUXICIPAL COKPOKATIONS.
[OH. vm.
nicipal ownership will be inifilied from the charter power "to
provide for lighting " the streets, and other public places.^ In
one case,^it was held that this was an inherent power of
municipal corporations. The power to establish and operate
waterworks has also been conceded to municipal corporations,
under the grant of power " to provide the city with water ; ^
and even under the power " to provide for the general wel-
fare.""
1 Parkersburg Gas Co. v. Parkers-
burg, SOW. Va. 435; Garrison v. Chi-
cago, 7 Biss. 480; Crawfordsville v.
Braden, ( Ind.) 28 K. E. 849, power
" to light streets witli electricity, to
contract for the same, to permit
poles," etc.; Saginaw Gaslight Co. v.
Saginaw, 28 Fed. Rep. 533, " to cause
its streets to be lighted."
^ Crawfordsville v. Braden, supra.
3 Atlantic City Water Works v. At-
lantic City, 39 iSr. J. Eq. 367; Hale v.
Houghton, 8 Mich. 451; Smith v.
Mayor, 88 Tenn. 464 (12 S. W. 924) ;
Hackensack Water Co. v. Hoboken,
(N". J.) 17 Atl. 307; Putnam v. Grand
Rapids, 58 Mich. 417; Atty. Gen. v.
Detroit, 55 Mich. 181.
* Springfield v. Fullmer, ( Utah)
27 Pac. 577; Mauldin v. Greenville,
33 S. C. 1(11 S. E. 434). Judge
Brown, in the case of Harlan Gas
Light Co. V. New York, 33 N. Y. 309,
says: "The power and duty of mu-
nicipal government to furnish light
for the streets and avenues of the
city is not disputed or put in contro-
versy in this action. Indeed it could
not be, with any show of reason or
256
good sense. In our northern lati-
tude, when darkness prevails over
half the twenty-four hours for a
large part of the year, light diffused
through the public streets and ave-
nues is a predominant and urr/ent
necessity which no well-governed
city can do witliout. This beneficent
application of artificial light is one
of the distinguishing characteristics
between the city of modern times
and those of the middle ages, when
darkness reigned supreme for no
inconsiderable portion of the time,
broken only to become more visi-
ble by the occasional torch of the
link boy, or the lantern of the soli-
tary watchman. That modern gas
light diffuses its rays over every part
of the public thoroughfare, is a
source of pleasure and comfort and
convenience, as well as a security
against crime and disorder, which
no other agency can supply. It is
indispensable at all times, and no
municipality can be said to be well
governed, which is not able to com-
mand its presence under all circum-
stances."
CHAPTER IX.
ORDINANCES.
Section.
145 — Definition — Ordinances and
resolutions distinguished.
146 — Power to pass ordinances.
147 — ^Delegation of power of
legislation — Official non-
liability.
148— Method of enactment — Mode,
time and proof of publica-
tion— Mayor's approval.
149 — Ordinances must be enacted
in good faith.
1.50 — Ordinances must be lawful
and reasonable.
151 — Ordinances must not be op-
pressive.
152 — Ordinances must be impartial
and general.
Section.
153 — Those on whom ordinances
are binding — Notice — Evi-
dence.
154 — Power to enforce ordinances
by fines or imprisonment.
155 — Forfeitures.
156 — Procedure to enforce ordi-
nances— Arrest.
157 — ^Action in name of corporar
tion.
158 — ^Pleading ordinances.
159 — Validity of ordinances, a
question of law.
160 — Evidence — Defence — C on-
struction of ordinances.
161 — Kepealing ordinances.
162 — Eatification of invalid ordi-
nances by Legislature.
§ 145. Definition — Ordinances and resolutions distin-
guished.— Among the common law incidents of the grant of
power to corporations, both public and private, was the general
implied right to make such by-laws, not inconsistent with the
charter of the corporation, as would enable it to carry on most
effectually the business for which it had been created.^ In the
case of municipal corporations, especially, the implied power to
enact by-laws is very largely supplemented, if not superseded
altogether, by express grants of power. These by-laws of a
municipal corporation are in this country given the name of
ordinances, although in England they are called hy-laws, the
term hy or lye meaning a place of habitation, or local commu-
nity .^
1 Coal Float v. Jeffersonville, 112
Ind. 15; Chamberlain v. Evansville,
76 lb. 542.
"- Com. V. Turner, 1 Cush. 493; Tay-
lor v. Lambertville, 4.S N. J. Eq. 107;
Citizens Gas etc. v. Elwood, 114 Ind.
17
332. In Gosling v. Veley, 19 L. J.
(N. S.) Q. B. it was said by Baron
Parke "that a municipal by-law
(i. e. ordinance) is a rule binding on
a particular district, not being at va-
riance with the general law of the
257
§146
MUNICIPAL COKrOKATIOXS.
[CH. IX.
Ordinances are to be discriminated from resolutions,^ in that
the former are of the nature of a local law, prescribing a general,
uniform and permanent rule of conduct; while the latter are
special, temporary and limited in their creation or application.^
This distinction is important ; for, when a charter prescribes
that by-laws and ordinances were to be submitted to the mayor
for approval, resolutions need not be.^ This distinction ac-
quires further importance when, by express provisions of the
charter, or by necessary implication, an act of a legislative mu-
nicipal body is required to be done or manifested by ordinance.
In such a case, a resolution is neither proper nor sufficient.*
If an act is to be done by a council, and the charter is silent
as to the mode, it may be done by a resolution, duly signed
and executed.* It has been held, too, that ordinarily the ef-
fects of the ordinance and the resolution are the same, both
being legislative acts ; and that, under a general power to make
ordinances and by-laws, any enactment is valid, whether it
purports to be an ordinance or resolution, the form being im-
material.®
§146. Power to pass ordinances. — The charter of a city
holds the same relative position to the municipal ordinances,
which are subordinate to it, that the State Constitution does
to the statutes of the Commonwealth; and the rules of con-
struction are to some extent the same in both classes of laws.^
realm, and being reasonable and
adapted to the purposes of tlie cor-
poration, and any rule or ordinance
of a permanent character, which the
corporation is empowered to make,
is a by-law." Hopkins v. Swansea,
4 M. & W. 621 ; Queen v. Osier, 32
Up. Can. Q. B. 324.
1 Expression of corporate power
byresolutions. State v. Jersey City,
30 N. J. L. 148; State v. Elizabeth,
37 lb. 432.
2 Citizens' Gas etc. v. Elwood, 114
Ind. 332; Blanchard v. Bissell, 11
Ohio St. 103.
3 Kepner v. Com., 40 Pa. St. 124.
* Paterson v. Barnet, 46 N. J. L.
62; Springfield v. Knott, 49 Mo. Ap.
612; State v. Bayonne, 35 N. J. L.
258
335 ; Anderson v. O' Conner, 98 Ind.
168 ; Newman v. Emporia, 32 Kan.
456; Hunt v. Lambertville, 45 N.J.
L. 279; Central v. Sears, 2 Col. 588;
Daniels v. Burford, 10 Up. Can. Q.
B. 478; Bearden v. Madison, 73 Ga.
187; State v. Tryon, 39 Conn. 183;
Starr v. Burlington, 45 Iowa,87; Bur-
meister v. Howard, 1 Wash. T. 207.
estate V. Jersey City, 3 Dutch.
493;Merch. etc. v. Chicago, 70 Iowa,
105 ; Butler v. Passaic, 4-i N. J. L.
171; Board v. DeKay, 148 U. S. 591;
13 S. Ct. 706.
eSower v. Phila., 35 Pa. St 231;
Green v. Cape May, 41 N. J. L. 45;
Green Bay v. Brauns, 50 Wis. 204.
'Quiuette v. St. Louis, 76 Mo. 402;
In re Tickno, 68 Cal. 294.
CH. IX.] ORDINANCES. § 146
The powers of a corporation are conferred upon it by its char-
ter and the laws of the State ; and they cannot be enlarged, di-
minished or varied in any way, by the enactment of ordinances,
which are either inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the char-
ter provisions, or the general law of the land. Such ordinances
will be ultra vires of the corporation. ^ But the Legislature may
grant to the municipal coiporation the express power to pass
an ordinance which will conflict with, and supersede within the
city's jurisdiction, the State law upon the same subject.^ The
power of a municipality, to make ordinances for the government
of the community, its scope and limitations, can therefore only
be determined by the provisions of the city's charter, or of the
general laws of the State, under which municipalities are incor-
porated, or which are intended to control or relate to the powers
of municipal corporations in general. Specific powers are usual-
ly enumerated in the grant of power to the municipal corpora-
tion ; followed generally, by a general authority to pass all
ordinances which may be necessary for the promotion of the
general welfare, good order, etc., aTid which are not inconsistr
ent with the constitution and general laws. Occasionall)',
however, there is no enumeration^ of the subjects upon which
the corporation may legislate ; but it is generally empowered,
to pass all ordinances, which are necessary to the well-being
and good order of the local community.
In a charter of the character first mentioned, the general
welfare clause confers no power to abrogate, impair, or enlarge
the poweis which are conferred by the special grants of power ;
but it can only be construed to confer authority to pass ordi-
nances upon all other matters, which are excluded from the
specific grants of power, yet within the ordinary scope of the
municipal authority,* or which are absolutely necessary for the
I Weber v. Johnson, 37 Mo. App.
601; Com. v. Roy, 140 Mass. 432;
Garden City v. Abbott, 34 Kan. 283;
Bergman v. St. Louis etc. Co. 1 S. W.
R. 384; Breninger v. Belvidere, 44 N.
J. L. 350; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio
St. 268, 2Y2; State v. Kash villa, 15
Lea, 697; State v. Munic. Ct. etc., 32
Minn. 329; Missouri etc. Co. v. Wyan-
dotte (Kan. 90), 20 Pac. R. 950;
Thompson V. Carroll, 22 How. 422;
Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. 349;
Andrews v. Ins. Co., 37 Me. 256.
2 State y. Binder, 38 Mo. 450.
" For an enumeration of almost
every subject upon which ordinances
can, under any possible combination
of circumstances, be enacted by a
municipal corporation, see N. T.
Consol. Act, §§ 85, 86, et seq.
* Dil. Mun. Corp. §§ 315, 316; State
V. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424, 430; see
259
§147
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. IX.
fulfillment of municipal purposes. The specific enumeration
should, however, not be considered to exclude the inherent
power of every corporation to make needful by-laws, on sub-
jects not enumerated, unless the intent to exclude them is plain
and manifest.^ It has, therefore, been held that, when an act
is to be done, or an ordinance is to be passed, and no precise
mode is prescribed, any mode is valid, which does not violate
the charter, or the general law.*
§ 147. Delegation of power of legislation— Official non-
liability. — -As an exception to the rule, forbidding the delega-
tion of the power to make laws,^ it is held that it is competent
for the Legislature to delegate this power to municipal corpo-
rations, so far as is necessarj' to enable them to pass ordinances,
which will have the force and effect of laws, within the jurisdic-
tion of the municipality.*
cases cited in next note ; see also An-
gell & Ames on Corp. 17*7; Child v.
Hudson Bay Co., 2 P. Wras. 207;
Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307.
1 Com'rs V. Covey (Md. 90), 22 Atl.
266; Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 523;
New Oris. v. Philippi, 9 La, An. 44;
State V. Schleiumer, 42 La. An. 1166
(bakers); Richmond v. Dudley (lud.
90), 26 N. E. E. 184; State v. Freeman,
38 N. H. 426; Com. v. Turner, 1 Cush.
493; Lawrence v. Monroe, 44 Kan.
607; State v. Webber, 107 N", C, 962
(prostitution); Indianapolis v. Gas
Co., 66 Ind. 396; Laundry etc., 22
Fed. Eep. 701; Clark v. South Bend,
85 Ind. 276; State v. Sharkey, (Minn.
92) 52 N. W. R. 24; Com. v. Cutler,
(Mass. 92) 29 3S". E. R. 1146; McPher-
son V. Chebanse, 114 111. 46 (Sunday
closing). "The city council is re-
strained to such matters, whether
specially enumerated or included un-
der general gi-ant, as are indifferent
in themselves, free from constitu-
tional objection, and have not been
the subject of general legislation, or,
as it is expressed in the charter, are
not repugnant to the constitution or
laws of the land." Dubois v. Au-
260
gusta, Dudley (Ga.) Rep. 30; Wil-
liams v. Augusta, 4 Ga. 509, 514.
2 Tyler v. Columbus, 6 Ohio Cir.
Ct. R. 224; Larkin v. Burl. C. E. & N.
Ey. Co., (Iowa 92) 52 N. W. E. 480;
Crawfordsville v. Braden, (Ind. 92)
28 N". E. E. 849; People v. Wagner,
86 Mich. 594 (title of ordinance).
3 State v. Hayes, 61 K. H. 314.
« Duluth V. Krupp, (Minn. 91) 49
N. W. R. 235 ; Batsel v. Blaine, 15 S.
W. R. 283; State v. Clark, 28 N. H.
176 ; Milne v. Davidson, 5 Martin, N.
S. (La.) 586; Covington v. East St.
Louis, 78 111. 548 ; Strauss v. Pontiac,
40 lb. 301; New York v. D. D. E. B.
6 B. R. Co., 15 N. Y. 297; State v.
Anderson, 8 So. 1 ; Markle v. Akron,
14 Ohio, 586, 590; Mayor v. Morgan,
7 Martin, N. S. (La.) 1; Bowles v.
Landaff, 59 K. H. 164; Gould v. Ray-
mond, 59 lb. 260; State v. Trenton,
(N. J. 91) 20 Atl. 1076; State v. Tryon,
39 Conu. 183; Indianapolis v. Gas Co.,
66 Ind. 396; Mason v. Shawneetowa,
77 111. 533; Gas Co. v. Des Moines,
44 Iowa, 508; Ex parte Christensen,
85 Cal. 208; State v. Cozzens, 8 So.
R. 268; In re Wall, 48 Cal. 279; Glo-
versville v. Howell, 70 N. Y. 28T.
CH. IX.j OEDINANCES. § 148
As the charter is analogous to the State Constitution, so the
law-making power, the council or governing body, of a munic-
ipality is, so far as its jurisdiction extends, and in relation to
the subjects upon which it has the power to legislate, similar -in
character to the State Legislature.^ And this analogy has been
observed and applied, in declaring contracts unlawful, which
are in contravention of a municipal ordinance;^ and in the
general rule, that a penalty imposed by ordinance amounts to
a prohibition, and renders the prohibited act illegal.^
Municipal officers, invested with power to make ordinances
or laws for the government of the affairs of the municipalitj',
are not liable pei'sonally for the enactment of any ordinances,
either within their authority, or unauthorized by the powers
which they possess.* This exemption from liability for their'
acts, as members of the law-making branch of the municipal
government, is another analogy between the city council and
the State Legislature.
§ 148. Method of enactment — Mode, time and proof of
publication — Mayor's approvaL — It is absolutely essential to
the validity of municipal legislation, as expressed in ordinances,
that it should be enacted by the proper body, duly assembled,
and in the precise form and manner, if any be prescribed by the
municipal constitution and general law, from which it derives
its authority.*
So, where a charter forbade the passage of ordinances, un-
less they were introduced at a previous regular meeting, an or-
dinance was declared void, where the rule had not been literally
complied with.^ A requirement, that a proposed ordinance shall
1 Taylor v. Carondelet, 22 Mo. 105 ;
St. Louis v. Foster, 52 lb. 513; Hop-
kins V. Mayor, 4 M. & W. (Eng.) 621,
640; Milne v. Davidson, 5 Martin, N.
S. (La.) 586.
2 Milne v. Davidson (supra) ; Heland
V. Lowell, 3 Allen, 407; Cf. Heeny v.
Sprague, 58 Me. 199.
" Johnson v. Siraonton, 43 Cal. 242.
* Paine v. Boston, 124 Mass. 486;
Jones V. Looing, 55 Miss. 109; Frfee-
port V. Marks, 59 Pa. St. 257 ; Baker
V. State, 27 Ind. 485; Com'rs v.
Ducket, 20 Md. 468; Weaver v. De-
fendorf, 3 Donio, 117; Tike v.' Ma-
^ Cantril v. Sainer, 59 Iowa, 26 ;
Dempsey v. Burlington, 66 lb. 687 ;
Smith V. Emporia, 27 Kan. 528; Steb-
bins V. Mayor, 38 lb. 473; but see
contra, as to the ordinary clause, St.
Louis V. Foster, .52 Mo. 513; Pacific,
etc., V. Governor, 23 lb. 353; Cape
Girardeau, 52 lb. 424; see Peo. v.
Mun-ay, 57 Mich. 396, when a stat-
ute or ordinance is well authenti-
cated.
"State V. Bergen, 33 N. J. L. 39;
New Orleans v. Brooks, 36 La. An.
64; Danville v. Shelton, 76 Va. 325;
Cooley Const. Lim. § 139.
goun, 44 Mo. 491. 261
§148
MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS.
[CH. IX.
be read on three different days, is fulfilled if it be so read,
even when the final reading takes place after the election and
induction into ofQce of a new mayor, and of several new mem-
bers of the municipal council.^ The prescribed readings may
also be had at adjourned meetings.^
The necessity for the attachment of the signature of the
mayor to an ordinance usually depends upon the provisions of
the charter.^ When examination and approval by him are
required, this duty must be exercised by him in person, and
cannot be delegated to a subordinate.* If the charter requires
the concurrence of the maj'or, as a part of the lawmaking pow-
er, a resolution or ordinance which is vetoed by him, or which
lacks his approval, as manifested by signature or in some other
■proper manner, is a nullity.^ But, unless the mayor's approval
of an ordinance is absolutely required, the provision for his sig-
nature may be considered as director}- ; and the absence of the
signature will not affect the validity of the ordinance, if it has
been enacted otherwise in strict conformity to charter require-
ments.® So, also, mere informalities in the signing of an ordi-
nance by the mayor will not be regarded, when all substantial
requirements have been otherwise observed in enacting it."
An injunction will not be granted to prevent the mayor from
approving an ordinance, even when the effect of such action on
his part would be to impair a valid contract, previously made
by the city.^
1 Brown v. Lutz, (Web. 93) 54 N.
W. K. 860; MoGraw v. Wliitson, 69
Iowa, 348.
2 Outcamp V. Utt, 60 Iowa, 156.
3]Sr. T. Consol. Act, §75.
4 Lyth V. Bufialo, 48 Hun, 175.
6 Saxtou V. St. Joseph, 60 Mo. 153 ;
Irving V. Devors, 65 lb. 625 ; Chari-
ton V. Holliday, 60 Iowa, 391 ; Whit-
ney V. Pt. Huron, 88 Mich. 268.
6 Terre Haute v. Voellcer, (111. 89)
22 N. E. R. 20; Fisher v. Graham, 1
fin. (Oliio) 113; Martindale v. Palm-
er, 52 Ind. 411; Toledo Con. S. R.
Co. V. Toledo Eleo. St. Ey. Co., 6
Ohio Cir. Ct. 362 ; Pennsylvania Globe
G. L. Co. V. Scranton, 97 Pa. St. 538;
Sullivan v. Pausch, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct.
262
R. 196; Blanchardv. Bitsell, 11 Ohio
St. 96; Elmendorf v. Mayor of N.
T., 25 Wend. 693; State v. Newark,
1 Dutch. 399 ; Magneau v. Fremont,
(Neb. 91) 47 N. W. R. 280; State v.
Jersey City, 30 N. J. L. 93; Kepner
v. Com., 40 Pa. St. 124; Com. v.
Fitler, 136 Pa. St. 129; Weinicke v.
R. R. Co., 61 Hun, 619; Whitney v.
Pt. Huron, 88 Mich. 268; Opelousa
V. Andrus, 37 La. An. 699; State v.
Henderson, 38 Ohio St. 644; Hall v.
Racine, (Wis. 92) 50 N. W. R. 1094.
7 Becker v. Washington, (Mo. 88)
7 S. W. R. 291; Allentowu v. Grim,
109 Pa. St. 113.
8 New Orleans El. Ry. Co. v. New
Orleans, 39 La. An. 127.
CH. IX.]
OEDIKANCES.
§148
When the charter requires publication of an ordinance be-
fore it will be effective, no penalty can be enforced for its in-
fraction, until proper publication has been made, in the manner
prescribed by law.^ An assessment based upon an ordinance,
which has not been legally published, if publication be required,
is void and cannot be collected.^ Aud so, also, it has been
held that, where no provision is made for publication, the ordi-
nance must be promulgated for a reasonably sufficient length
of time, in order to enable parties interested to become informed
as to its requirements.^ But the presumption is not only in
favor of the reasonableness of whatever provision has been ac-
tually adopted for the promulgation of the new ordinance ; but,
likewise, it would seem that the better rule is, that publication
is not necessary, if it is not expressly prescribed.* And it is
held in Massachusetts that even where publication is prescribed,
it is directory, and not a necessary condition precedent to the
validity of the ordinance.® The method of publication will de-
pend wholly upon statutory requirements, which should be con-
sulted in every instance.^ It has been held that the duty of
publishing ordinances and resolutions which are adopted by
the board of aldermen of New York city, is mandatory.^
If a choice of modes of publication is permissible under the
regulating statute, and the statute delegates the power of selec-
tion to the corporation, a publication by a clerk, without any
selection on the part of the corporation, is not sufficient to
give validity to the ordinance.^ Publication for five successive
1 People V. Keir, (Mich.) 43 N. W.
1039; Meyer v. Fromm, 108 Ind. 208;
Napav. Easterby, 61 Cal. 509; Na-
tional Bank v. Grenada, 41 Fed. 87;
48 lb. 278; Wain v. Philadelphia, 99
Pa. St. 330; Schwartz v. Oshkosh, 55
Wis. 490; O'Hare v. Park I?iver, (N.
D.) 47 ISr. W. K. 380; Amey v. Alle-
gheny City, 24 How. 364; Clark v.
Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; Smith v. Eau
Claire, (Wis.) 47 N. W. R. 830; Chi-
cago V. McCoy, 26 N. E. E. 863; Ex
parte Christensen, 85 Cal. 49; State
V. Orange (TS. J. 92), 22 Atl. 1004;
Pittsburgh v. Reynolds, 29 Pac. 757.
2 In re Smith, 52 N. T. 526; In re
Phillips, 60 lb. 16; In re Douglas, 46
lb. 42; State v. Hoboken, 38 N. J. L.
110; State v. Smith, 22 Minn. 218.
3 Pitts V. Opelika, 79 Ala. 527.
« In re Guerrero, 69 Cal. 88; Wash-
burn V. Lyons, 32 Pac. R. 310.
5 Com. V. Davis, 140 Mass. 485.
6 New York Consol. Act, § 80; In re
Phillips, 60 N". T. 16; In re Bassford,
50 lb. 509; Napa v. Easterby, 18 Pac.
R. 253.
' In re Douglas, 46 N. T. 42, rev'g
58 Barb. 174; 12 Ab. Pr. (N. S.) 161;
Moore v. Mayor, 73 lb. 238; In re
Burmeister, 76 N. T. 174.
^Higley v. Bunce, 10 Conn. 435;
Byarsv. Mt. Vernon, 77 111. 467; R.
R. Co. V. Engle, 76 lb. 317.
263
§ 1-18
MUNICIPAL COi;POHATIONS.
[CH. IX.
week days, a Sunday intervening, will fulfill a statutory I'e-
quireinent, that an ordinance must be published for five succes-
sive days.^ So, where publication for twenty days, before the
ordinance would go into effect, was required, it was held that
an ordinance would go into effect twenty daj'S after its first
publication, and that it would be sufficient if it was published
in each number of the paper which was issued during the period
mentioned.^ When publication is required, and no newspaper
is specified, the newspaper in which ordinances have been usu-
ally published, will suffice, although it is not the only news-
paper which is published in the city.^
After an ordinance has been properly enacted and duly pub-
lished, no republication will be required, when it is afterwards
included in a digest or revision of municipal legislation.* A
printed copy of an ordinance, or a newspaper, printed pamph-
let or book, in which the same has been published, if purport-
ing to have been so published by authority, is prima facie
evidence of the existence, adoption and publication of the or-
dinance.^ In an action brought against a municipal corpora-
tion, the plaintiff need not prove publication, when it appears
that the city had acted under the ordinance for seveial yeai-s,
and enforced or recognized it as a valid law.^ It has been heid
that a provision, that existing ordinances shall remain in force,
provided they shall be recorded within four months, is directory
merely, and does not invalidate ordinances not so recorded.^
Nor is it a valid objection to the record of an ordinance under
such a regulation, that a printed cop}'- is pasted upon the record,
and tliat it was not recorded in manuscript.^ An ordinance need
' Ex parte Fiske, 72 Cal. 125.
2 Hobokeu v. Gear, 3 Dutcli. 265.
3 Truclielut v. City Council, 1 Nott
&McC. S. C. 227; publication in Sun-
day newspaper, Hastings v. Colum-
bvis, 42 Ohio St. 585.
4 St. Louis V. Foster, 52 Mo. 513;
St. Louis V. Alexander, 23 lb. 509;
comp. Emporia v. Norton, 16 Kan.
238.
* St. Louis V. Foster, 52 Mo. 51;>;
Lindsay v. Chicago, 115 111. 120;
Downing V. Milltonvale, "6 Kan. 740;
Block V. Jacksonville, 36 111. 301;
264
Prell V. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426; Pen-
dergast v. Peru, 20 111. 51; comp. St.
Charles v. O'Malley, 18 111. 407; Moss
V. Oaklamd, 88 111. 109. Method of
proving local laws under K. T. Con-
sol. Act, see § 1107.
« Atchison v.King, 9 Kan. 550; State
V. Atlantic City, 34 N. J. L. 99, 106;
' Trustees of Academy v. Erie, 31
Pa. St. 515; Amey v. Allegheny City,
24 How. 364; Tipton v. Xorman, 72
Mo. 380.
8 Ewbaaks v. Ashley, 36 111. 177.
CH. IX.] OEDINANCES. § 149
not, in order to be valid, expressly designate the charter pow-
er, in execution of which it has been enacted,^ nor the reasons
for its adoption.^ It will, if silent in this respect, be referred
to that charter power, which would most reasonably warrant
its passage ; or, where it is authorized by either of two powers,
it will be treated as coming within that power with which, b)"
its character and provisions, it seems to be most in conformity.^
When it is stated in the charter that the power to pass a
certain ordinance is only to be exercised, when it is necessary,
the necessity need not be recited or declared in the ordinance,
unless that is imperatively required by the charter,* but it
will be implied from the fact of its enactment.®
§ 149. Ordiuances must Ibe enacted in good faith. — It can
never be made the subject of judicial investigation, whether the
Legislature has, in the exercise of the law-making power, been
moved by laudable and authorized motives and considerations,
as long as the power has been exercised in conformity with the
provisions of the constitution. For improper motives, and for
injudicious exercise of its power, the Legislature is answerable
to the people alone.^
Tliis principle is applicable by analogy to municipal legisla-
tion.'' But it is not to be understood therebj'', that the courts
cannot inquire into the consideration for the legislative action
of a municipal corporation, so far as to discover and prevent
fraud or bribery. The municipal officials will not be allowed
to exercise this legislative power, in puisuit of their own self-
aggrandizement.^ This question has been discussed by the
courts to but a limited extent. But there are decisions, which
directly sustain the principle above stated. Thus, where a com-
pany was chartered for the manufacture of gas, and the Legis-
1 Eex V. Harrison, 3 Burr, 1328.
2 Grierson v. Ontario, 3 Up. Can.
Q. B. 623; Fisher v. Vauglian, 10 lb.
492.
" Methodist Church v. Baltimore,
6 Gill, 391.
* Hoyt V. East Saginaw, 19 Mich.
39.
^ Stuyvesant v. Mayor etc. N. Y.,
1 Cow. 588; Young v. St. Louis, 47
Mo. 492; Kiley v. Forsee, 57 lb. 390;
Platter v. Elkhart Co., 103 Ind. 360.
« Cooley Const. Lim. §§ 186, 187,
208.
' MoCulloch V. State, 11 Ind. 424,
431; Suubury etc. v. Cooper, 7 Am.
Law Eeg. 158; Wright v. Defrees, 8
Ind. 398.
8 Dil. Mun. Corp. §§ 311, 312; Buell
V. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282; Preeport v.
Marks, 59 Pa. St. 253.
265
150
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[oh. DC.
lature delegated its control over the company to a municipal
council, authorizing it to regulate the price of gas, it was held
that the council must fix a reasonable and fair price. The ac-
tion of a majority of the members in fixing the price, at a rate
they well knew the gas could not be made and sold at, without
loss to the company, being actuated by fraudulent motives, was
not binding on the company ; and the good faith of the council
could properly be inquired into.^ It is, of course, also a ground
for declaring void such an unreasonable regulation, apart from
the existence of fraudulent motives, that the council had only
the power to prescribe a reasonable price for the gas, and that
the prescription of an unreasonable rate, one which did not ad-
mit of a reasonable profit, was ultra vires, and therefore void.^
§ 150. Ordinances must be lawful and reasonable. — Un-
der the common law doctrine, that every corporation has an
incidental power to make by-laws, taken in connection with
the fact that in the royal charters the subject-matters, which'
could be regulated by by-laws, were seldom specified, the Eng-
lish courts at an early day required that all municipal ordinances
must be reasonable, and must not conflict with the statutes
passed by Parliament, or with the principles of the common law.^
That such a lule was imperatively required to protect the lib-
erty of the individual, and the rights of private property, is
evident from the history of municipal corporations in England,
prior to the enactment of the municipal corporations act.*
Following the English doctrine, the courts of the United
States have always held that all municipal by-laws, particularly
those which are passed under the implied power to make by-
laws, or under a general charter power to enact such laws as
are necessary, must be reasonable in their character and effect,^
1 State V. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18
Ohio St. 262; Bank v. United States,
1 Gr. Greene (Iowa) 553.
2 See post, § 130.
8 Dillons Mun. Corp. §319, citing
Eexv. Maidstone, 3 Burr. 1837; Felt-
makers V. Davis, 1 Bos. & P. 98, 100;
Sutton's Hosp. Case, 10 Eep. 31;
London v. Vanacre, 1 Ld. Raym. 496.
» 5 & 6 Wra. IV. ch. Lxxvi. § 90.
5 Com. V. Steffee, "7 Bush, 191; Kip
V. Paterson^ 2 Dutch. 298 ; Dayton v.
266
Quigley, 29 N. J. Eq. 77; Birming-
ham V. Ry. Co., (Ala. 93) 13 So. R.
141; Mayor v. Beasley, 1 Humph.
232; State f. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426;
Mclnerney v. Denver, (Colo. 92) 29
Pac. 516; Waters v. Leech, 3 Ark.
110; Mayor v. Winfield, 8 Humph.
107; Davis v. Anita, 73 Iowa, 325;
In re Frank, 52 Cal. 506; Read v.
Camden, (N. J. 92) 24 Atl. R. 549;
Fisher v. Harrisburg, 2 Grant Cases,
291; Gilham v. WeUs, 64 Ga. 192;
CH. IX.]
OEDINANCES.
§150
consonant with the objects and purposes of the charter ; and
not repugnant to the fundamental rights of citizens, as guar-
anteed by the constitution and laws.^ Accordingly, it has been
held that an ordinance, by which the purchaser of land at a
tax sale was empowered to call upon the police to aid him in
securing possession, was unconstitutional, as depriving the own-
er of his property without "due process of law."^ And the
same objection may be" made to an ordinance, which imposes a
license upon the towboats engaged in interstate commerce.^
So, although it is of course competent for a municipality to
regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, an ordinance, requiring
the furnishing quarterly by every druggist of a verified state-
ment of the quantity and kinds of intoxicating liquors sold, to
whom, etc., was held to be void as unreasonable and unjust.*
An ordinance, designed to prevent petty peculation of cotton,
and providing that every dealer in that commodity must keep
a record of all loose cotton purchased by him, giving the name
of the seller and quantity sold, was held to be unreasonable,
and an unlawful infringement of one's personal liberty.^ So,
also, although the preservation of the public health is an object
of paramount importance, and likely to be advanced by the
prompt removal of dead animals, an ordinance giving a person
a right to remove and convert to his own use the bodies of
Crawford v. Topeka, (Kan. 93) 32 Pac.
R. 4Y6; Clason v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis.
31(5; Seymour V. Tacoma, (Wash. 93)
32 Pac. R. 1077; Kirkham v. Russell,
76 Va. 956; Atkinson v. Goodrich
etc., 60 Wis. 141; Collins v. Hall,
(Ga. 93) 17 S. E. R. 622; Sipe v. Mur-
phy, 31 N. E. R. 884; Cape Girardeau
V. Riley, 72 Mo. 220; White v. Mayor
etc., 2 Swan, 364; Pedrick v. Bailey,
12 Gray, 161 ; Brown v. Lutz, (Neb.
93) 54 N. W. R. 526.
1 McCormick v. Calhoun, 30 S. Ct.
(93); Carr v. St. Louis, 9 Mo. 191;
Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427; Col-
lins V. Hatch, 18 lb. 523 ; Heisenbuttle
V. Council, 2 McMul. 233 ; City etc.
V. Goldsmith, 2 Speers, (S. C.) 435;
Bills V. Goshen, 117 Ind. 221; Wil-
liams V. Augusta, 4 Ga. 509; Adams
V. Mayor, 29 lb. 56; St. Louis v.
Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; Mayor etc. v.
Nichols, 4 Hill, 209; Com. v. Turner,
1 Cush. 493; JEx parte Solomon, 91
Cal. 440; State v. Brittain, 89 N. C.
574; Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga. 586;
Council V. Benjamin, 2 Strob. 508;
Landis v. Vineland, (N. J. 92) 23 Atl.
R. 357; Haywood v. Mayor, 12 Ga.
404; Paris v. Graham, 33 Md. 94;
Newton v. Bilger, 143 Mass. 598;
White V. Bayonne, 49 N. J. L. 311 ;
Lozier v. Newark,' 48 lb. 452; Volk
V. Newark, 47 lb. 117.
'• Calhoun v. Fletcher, 63 Ala. 574.
sMoran v. New Orleans, 112 TJ. S.
69; U. S. Cons., art. I. §8, par. 3;
Ex parte Holmquist, (Cal. 92) 27 Pac.
R. 1099; Mx parte Christensen, 85
Cal. 208.
4 Clinton v. Phillips, 58 111. 102.
5 Long V. Taxing Dis., 7 Lea, 134.
267
§151
MtnsriCIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. IX.
dead animals, to the exclusion of the owner's right thereto, was
held unconstitutional as a taking of private property without
compensation.^ Where the municipality has, and exercises,
the power to regulate the price of commodities, it must so
regulate the prices which one may be permitted to ask for
things or services, as that the party engaged in the business
may be enabled to make a reasonable profit. If the regulating
ordinance places the maximum price at-such a figure that there
is no opportunity for obtaining a profit, — and a fortiori, where it
entails a loss, — the regulation is unreasonable, and for that rea-
son is unconstitutional and void.^
But all rules, concerning the reasonablenesij of ordinances,
must be conyidered in the light of the facts of each particular
case ; and it may well be that a general ordinance may be both
reasonable and unreasonable, under varying circumstances.^
§ 151. Ordinances must not be oppressive. — It is a still
more serious objection to an ordinance that it is oppressive in
its operation, beyond what is necessary to prevent the threai>
ened evil. The oppressiveness and inequality, with which an
ordinance is charged, must be shown to the court,* and when
this is manifest, the ordinance will be declared void. Thusi,
when a city had enacted that all free negroes, found out after
ten o'clock at night, should be subject to arrest, imprisonment
and fine, the court declared it to be void, as an oppressive reg-
ulation.^ In a case, where a municipality, owning waterworks,
refused to furnish one~of its citizens with water, because his
tenant already owed a bill for water supplied him elsewhere,
the ordinance was declared to be oppressive, and hence void.^
Any ordinance, which commits to the will of a single offi-
cial, unrestrained by charter or otherwise, the practically abso-
lute power of prohibiting the use of some well known means
1 R i V e r Rendering Co. v. Behr,
77 Mo. 91; see also Greensboro v.
Ehrenreich, 80 Ala. 579.
2 See Chicago, etc. Co. v. Becker, 35
Fed. Rep. 883; Chicago, etc. N. W.
Co. T. Dey, 35 Fed. Rep. 866; Pensa-
cola & A. Ey. Co. v. State, 5 So.
Rep. 833; 25 Fla. 310; Stone v. Trust
Co., 116 U. S. 307; Railway Co. v.
Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418; Chicago,
268
etc. Co. V. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339.
3 Nicolin V. Lowrey, 49 jST. J. L. 391 ;
Penn. R. R. Co. v. Jersey City, 47 lb.,
286.
* Mayor v. Beasly, 1 Humph. 232;
St. Louis V. Weber, 44 Mo. 547; Cor-
rigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541.
6 Mayor v. Winfield, 8 Humph. 707.
« Dayton v. Quigley, 29 N. J. Eq. 77.
CH. IX.] ORDINANCES. § 152
of commercial or social activity, not a nuisance — as, for exam-
ple, a steam engine, or street processions, — is .prima facie
unreasonable and oppressive, and hence unconstitutional and
void.^
§ 152. Ordinances must be impartial and general. — In
conformity with the well recognized repugnance of the law
and of public policy to discriminating legislation, all statutes,
and particularly those of a penal nature, are required to be
general in their scope and application. The same principle is
applied to the local legislation of the municipality. Municipal
ordinances must, so far as it is practical, be general in their na-
ture, and impartial in their operation.^
Upon this principle, it has been held that a resolution, passed
under an authority, which was conferred on a water board by a
charter, requiring certain consumers of water to put in expen-
sive meters, under a penalty of having the supply cut off, was
void as being discriminative in its character.^
Ordinances must be general in their application, and there
must be no intention manifest therein to discriminate against *
or in favor of individuals ; but this principle does not render an
ordinance discriminating, because it affects a certain class, or is
applicable only to a certain designated district, or to a certain
street. The general or special character of an ordinance must
be determined by the facts of each case, and not by any fixed
iron-cast rule. According to the change of point of view,
everything is both special and general. And because the or-
dinance by its terms prescribes a regulation for a particular
class of persons, it does not, for that reason, necessarily come
within the objection that it is discriminating, and special.^ And
where the ordinance is general in its terms and scope of opera-
tion, the fact, that it peculiarly affects a particular person, cre-
' In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396; s. c, I Cal. 78; Council v. Ci-emouini, 36 La.
0 N. W. Rep. 72 (Salvation Army); ! An. 247; Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige,
' 261; Chicago v. Eumpff, 45 111. 90.
Baltimore v. Eadeke, 49 Md. 217.
- Tugman v. Chicago, 78 111. 405 ;
Euss V. Mayor etc., 12 N. Y. Leg.
Obs. 38; White v. Mayor, 2 Swan.
(Tenn.) 364; De Ben v. Gerard, 4 La.
An. 30; Citizens Gas Co. v. Elwood,
114 Ind. 332; Zanone v. Mound City,
103 111. 552: Ex parte Chin Yan, 60
8 Eed Star Steamship Co. v. Jersey
City, 45 N. J. L. 246.
* White V. Nashville, 2 Swan, 364.
^ Bozant v. Campbell, 9 Eob. (La.)
411 ; Com. v. Goodrich, 13 Allen, 545 ;
Covington v. East St. Louis, 78 111.
548.
269
§153
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. IX.
ates no presumption, that it was enacted for the purpose of dis-
ciiminating against him, or of annoying him.^
§ 153. Those on whom ordinances are binding— Notice
to such persons— Evidence. — By the common law, ordinances
of a general nature and purpose bound not only the members
of the municipal corporation, but all persons whatever, coming
within the municipal limits or jurisdiction.^ This rule of the
English common law has been affirmed in the United States,
and general ordinances in American cities and towns are bind-
ing, not only upon their inhabitants, but upon nonresidents and
strangers, temporarily within the municipal limits, where such
ordinances do not impose a strictly civil duty.^ On the other
hand, municipal ordinances have no extra territorial efficacy or
force, unless this power is expressly created or conferred upon
the city by the Legislature of the State.* It was held in one
instance that a city has no power to require by an ordinance a
license from nonresident owner of wagons using the city streets.^
But a person resident without the boundaries of the corpora-
tion, who permits his cattle to run at large within the corpora-
tion, is amenable to city ordinances, so far as the power of
forfeiture of his property within city limits is concerned.^ But
the power to impose a personal penalty upon a nonresident
owner under such circumstances, must, we think, be expressly
^Wagnei- v. City of Rook Island,
34 N. E. R. 545 ; Shinkle v. Coving-
ton, 83 Ky. 420; Richmond etc. v.
Richmond, 96 U. S. 521.
"London v. Vanacre, 1 Ld. Raym.
498; Salk. 143; Fazakerly v. Wilt-
shire, 1 Stra. 462.
^Swift V. Topeka, 43 Kan. 671;
Pierce v. Bartram, Cowp. 269; He-
land V. Lowell, 3 Allen, 407; Knox-
ville V. King, 7 Lea, 441; Bott v.
Pratt, 33 Minn. 323; Merz v. Mis-
souri P. R. Co., (Mo. 89) 1 S. W. R.
382; Com'rs of Plymouth v. Petti-
john, 4 Dev. (Law) 591; Strauss v.
Pontiac, 40 111. 306; City of Buffalo
V. Schleifer, 21 N. Y. S. 913; Homey
V. Sloan, 1 Smith (Ind.) 136; IJodge
V. Gridley, 10 Ohio, 173.
* Scudder v. Heushaw, (Ind. 93) 33
N. E. R. 791 ; Chicago Packing Co. v.
270
Chicago, 88111. 221; Reed v. People, 1
Park Cr. Rep. 481. " But within city
limits a valid by-law or ordinance has
the same effect with respect to the
persons upon whom it lawfully op-
erates, as an act of Parliament upon
the subject at large." Lord Abing-
don in Hopkins v. Mayor of Swansea,
4 M. & W. 621, 640; Milne v. David-
son, 5 Martin (La.) 586.
6 St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo. 122.
So nonresidents cannot be discrimi-
nated against by the imposition of a
license not required of residents.
State V. Ocean G-rove Assn., (N. J.
93) 26 Atl. R. 798 ; Cohen v. Plymouth,
7 Kulp. 101; Radebaugh v. Plain
City, 28 Wkly. L. Bui. 107.
« Spitler V. Young, 63 Mo. 42;
Rose V. Hardie, 98 N. C. 44; Nehr v.
State, 53 N. W. R. 589; 35 Neb. 638.
CH. IX.]
ORDINANCES.
§154
conferred or clearly implied by strict judicial construction from
the charter or general statutes from which the city derives its
power.^ Persons upon whom ordinances are binding, are bound
to take notice of them.^ If the corporation allows without
objection the erection within its limits by a railroad or other
company of large and expensive warehouses, for the storage of
fertilizing material, it will be estopped from enforcing an ordi-
nance forbidding the storage of fertilizers, which was enacted
some time prior to the erection of the prohibited structures.**
Where one is required to perform a duty, upon receiving notice
from the municipality, a more specific notice is required than
notice by publication in a newspaper, in order to impose upon
the delinquent the statutory penalty, unless the statute or or-
dinance makes such a notice sufficient.*
§ 154. Power to enforce ordinances by fines or imprison-
ment.— As a by-law or ordinance, without any penalty provided
for its infraction, would be futile*^ and inoperative, the inherent
or conferred power to enact by-laws will imply a power in a
city or town to impose a reasonable and proper fine upon all
pei'sons breaking them, in the absence of any statutory regula-
tion of the sanction.® At common law, it was held that, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Magna Oharta, no municipal
corporation could, without express authority, conferred by Par-
liament, enforce its by-laws by disfranchisement, by impris-
onment or by forfeiture of goods. Without such statutory
authority municipal corporations are at common law limited to
the imposition of pecuniary penalties or fines, which must be
certain, definite and reasonable.''
iPlymoulh v. Pettijohn, 4 Dev.
591 ; Fostei- v. Roads, 19 Johns. 191 ;
(power to make ordinances govern-
ing those who hold certain common
lands); People v. Works, 7 Wend.
486; Holladay v. Marsh, 3 lb. 142.
^Palmyra v. Morton, 25 Mo. 593;
Buffalo V. Webster, 10 Wend. 99:
Knoxville v. King, 7 Lea, 441 ; Fari-
bault V. Wilson, 34 Minn. 254.
'Mayor of Athens v. Georgia B.
R., 72 6a. 800; Atlanta v. Gate City
Gas Light Company, 71 Ga. 106.
*Keckley v. Commissioners, 4 Mc-
Cord (S. C.) 2o7.
6 State V. Cleveland, 3 R. L 117.
«7ri re O'Keefe, 19 N. Y. S. 676;
Fisher v. Harrisburg, 2 Grant Cas.
291 ; In re Cameron, 13 U. C. Q. B.
190; State V. Carpenter, 60 Conn. 97;
Trigally v. Memphis, 6 Coldw. .382;
Hooksett v. Amoskeag etc. Co., 44
N. H. 105; Conley v. Albany, 132 N.
Y. 145; Zylsta v. Charleston, 1 Bay
(S. C.) 382; contra, Knoxville v. R. R.,
(Iowa* 92) 50 N. W. R. 61; Eyerman
V. Blakesly, 78 Mo. 145.
^ In State v. Bright, 38 La. An. 1,
271
§154
MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS.
[CH. IX,
The rule of the common law has been adopted and recognized
in the United States ; and in the constitutions of all the States,
provisions have been incorporated, by which excessive fines are
expressly forbidden. So, also in most municipal charters, an
amount is fixed, beyond which the power of the municipality
to inflict pecuniary fines is not permitted to extend.^
Where the charter prescribes the mode of enfoi-cing an ordi-
nance, and the penalties which may be imposed for infractions,
the municipal corporation is excluded from a resort to any other
mode of enforcement, which would otherwise by implication be
within the power of the corporation ; the city is confined to the
modes and penalties, expressly prescribed by the charter.^
When the charter of a municipality does not prescribe the
precise pecuniary penalty, which may be imposed upon the
wrongdoers, or when it mentions a maximum sum, which is
not to be exceeded in imposing a fine, it is competent for the city
in the former case to make the fine discretionary within reason-
able limits, as " not more than |50 ; " and in the latter case,
within the limits prescribed by the charter.^
But the cases are not harmonious, and there are decisions by
which ordinances, imposing fines stated as " not more than" or
" not exceeding " a certain sum, have been held to be invalid
the court said: " A municipal corpo-
ration has no right to enforce obedi-
ence to the ordinances, which it has
the power to pass, by fine or impris-
onment or otlier penalty, unless that
right has been unquestionably given
by the lawgiver." See also Sless-
man v. Crozier, 80 Ind. 487; Peters
V. London, 2 Up. Can. Q. B. 543; In
re Snell, 30 lb. 81; State v. Eice,
(K C.) 2 S. E. E. 180.
1 N. Y. Consol. Act, § 85. Limit
$100, or imprisonment not more than
10 days. Mayor v. Ordrenau, 12
Johns. 122.
2 Kirk V. Kowill, 1 Term E. 118,
124. In this case it was held that
when a charter provided for a fine or
amercement, as a punishment for a
breach of a by-law, forfeiture could
not be substituted. Grand Eapids v.
272
Hughes, 15 Mich. 54; Charleston v.
Oliver, 16 S. C. 47; New Orleans v.
Costello, 14 La. An. 7; Amite City
v. Clements, 24 lb. 27; Columbia
V. Hunt, 5 Eich. (S. C.) 550, 558;
McMullen v. City Council, 1 Bay
(S. C. ) 46 ; Hart V. Mayor etc. , 9 Wend.
571, 588,606; Cotter v. Doty, 5 Ohio,
393 ; Heise v. Town Council, 6 Eich.
Law, 404; Miles v. Chamberlain, 17
Wis. 446; Ex parte Hollwedell, 74
Mo. 395.
8 Mayor v. Phelps, 27 Ala. 55 ; State
V. Cainan, 94 N. C. 883; State v.
Crenshaw, lb. 877; State v. Cantieny,
34 Minn. 1; MoConville v. Jersey
City, 39 N. J. L. 38; Haynes v. Cape
May, 50 lb. 55; State v. Zeigler, 32
lb. 262 ; Melick v. Washington, 47 lb.
254.
OH. IX.] OEDmANCES. § 154
for vagueness, and for attempting to evade the exercise of mu-
nicipal discretionary powers.^
In England, when the statute or ordinance gives a discretion,
either as to the amount of the fine, or as to any other matter,
and this discretion is accepted and exercised by the court, the
conviction must show on its face, in what manner the discretion
has been exercised.^
While on the one hand, an ordinance fixing a fine at " not
more " than a certain sum specified may be void for vagueness,
so, an ordinance fixing a minimum fine will be invalid, when the
amount imposed is less than the minimum prescribed by law.^
A municipal corporation must exercise its power, to punish
violations of its regulations, in a reasonable manner ; and can-
not multiply one offence into many, and fine or imprison for
each. So, when the ordinance forbade the cutting of cedar
trees, and the complaint charged that defendant had cut down
a tree and continued to do so from time to time, until he had
committed one hundred violations of this ordinance ; the court
held that this was but a trespass with a eontinuendo and con-
stituted but a single offence.* This policy cannot be pursued
by the municipal corporation for the purpose of imposing a
heavier penalty than what is allowed by the charter. In all
such cases, the acts constitute but one offence, where they con-
stitute in fact but one transaction.^ But it is not beyond the
power of the municipality to grade the amount of the fine ac-
cording to the number of the prohibited acts, even though
these acts constitute in law but one criminal offence, provided
the legal limit of the fine be not exceeded by the aggregate of
fines imposed.
A power to impose fines to the extent of one hundred dol-
1 In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396; State
V. Worth, 95 N. C. 615; Same v.
Crenshaw, 94 lb. 877; Same v. Cai-
nan, 94 lb. 883. "A by-law to be rea-
sonable should be certain. If it
affixes a penalty for its violation, it
would seem that such penalty should
be fixed in a certain amount, not
left to the officer or court, which is
to impose it upon conviction; though
a by-law imposing a penalty not ex-
ceeding a certain sum has been held
18 273
not to be void for uncertainty."
Cooley Const. Lim. 202.
2 Dillon Mun. Corp. §337, citing
King V. Priest, 6 T. R. 538, and other
English cases.
8 Petersburg V. Metzker, 21 111. 205.
* State V. Moultrieville, Rice (Law)
158.
* Mayor, etc., of N. T. v. Ordrenau,
12 Johns. 122; Marshall v. Smith, L.
R. 8 C. P. 416.
§ 154 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIOKS. [CH. IX.
lars, coupled with the power to regulate the sale of and inspec-
tion of flour, was conferred upon a city by its charter. By vir-
tue of the latter power, an ordinance was passed imposing a fine
of five dollars a barrel for each barrel sold, upon all who should
sell flour without inspection. The court held that the penalty
of this ordinance could be imposed to the extent that it did
not exceed the charter limit of one hundred dollars ; that if a
single sale exceeded twenty barrels the penalty of one hundred
dollars would be the maximum, while if the quantity sold
were less, the fine would be at the rate of five dollars a barrel.^
When a charter contained a specific enumeration of powers,
which by express authorization the council could enforce under
a penalty of one hundred dollars fine, and the council was at
the same time empowered to remove obstructions upon the
streets, but with no provisions as to the imposition of penal-
ties, an ordinance imposing a continuing fine of ten dollars a
day for every day such an obstruction was permitted to remain
after notice, was held invalid, upon the ground that the powers
enumerated excluded the right to enforce any non-enumerated
power by a fine or other penalty .^
The power to imprison the violator of an ordinance or by-
law, either in the first instance, or upon the nonpayment of a
pecuniary fine or penalty imposed upon him, cannot be inferred,
but must be plainly conferred upon a municipal corporation by
the lawmaking power of the State ; and when thus granted its
exercise must be preceded by a judicial determination of the
guilt of the accused.^ Thus, where the charter gave the power
to punish "by fines, imprisonment, labor or other penalty pre-
scribed by ordinance," the city council could impose either a
fine or imprisonment; but in no event could the offender be
punished by both. So, also, under such a grant, so strictly is
It has also been held that an ordi-
nance may require hard labor of one
who is imprisoned for refusal to pay
a license tax, which had been law-
fully assessed against those who
were engaged in a certain occupation.
Ex parte City Council of Montgom-
ery, 64 Ala. 463. For constitutional
guaranties see Stimson Amer. Stat
§§ 70-78 inc.
1 Chicago V. Quiraby, 38 111. 274.
2 Grand Rapids v. Hughes, 15 Mich.
54.
^ Burlington v. Keller, 18 Iowa, 59;
New Orleans v. Costello, 14 La. An.
37; In re Burnett, 35 La. An. 461;
Mayor v. Herdt, 40 N. J. L. 264; In-
wood V. State, 42 Ohio St. 186; Shef-
field V. O'Day, 7 111. App. 339; State
V. Ruff, 30 La. An. 497; Board of
Trustees v. Schroeder, 58 111. 353.
274
CH. IX.]
OEDINAXCES.
§155
it construed, that it was held that there existed no power to
imprison for the nonpayment of a fine.^
An ordinance, which provides that a person, violating its
provisions, shall he fined and imprisoned, or either, will not
justify a sentence imposing a fine, or a stated period of labor
on the public streets. Such a sentence, being vague, uncertain
and in the alternative, will for that reason be illegal and void.^
A municipal ordinance, prescribing a term of imprisonment,
the duration of which is to be fixed by the magistrate upon con-
viction, and which ma}', but need not necessarily, exceed the
limitation authorized by the constitution, may be enforced as
long as the magistrate does not exceed the constitutional limits,
as to duration of the imprisonment.^
§ 155. Forfeitures. — At common law, no municipal corpo-
ration could, by virtue of its inherent power to make by-laws,
impose the penalty of forfeiture for any infraction of its code.*
The rule both in England and in the United States, is that, in
order to possess and exercise such a power, it must be by clear
implication, if not expressly, conferred b}"- the Legislature.* The
power of punishing by a forfeiture of property, even when
expressly and positively conferred, cannot be exercised by
the municipal authorities in an arbitrary or summary manner.
Thus, no one can be deprived of his property by forfeiture,
merely by the enactment of an ordinance, and without notice of
a legal investigation, at which he may have an opportunity to
be heard. Such a method of procedure is not only contrary to
' Brieswick v. Brunswick, 51 Ga.
639; comp. Huddleson v. Ruffin, 6
Ohio St. 604.
2 Ex 2Mrte Martini, 23 Fla. .343.
' Dressel v. Keokuk, 47 Iowa, 591.
* In England municipal corpora-
tions sometimes possessed the power
to decree forfeiture, by usage or pre-
scription, which by a fiction of law
presupposed an express grant, the
record of which had been lost.
^Kirkv. Nowill, 1 Term R. 118,
124; Hart v. Mayor etc. of New
York, 9 Wend. 571, 588, 605; Wilcox
V. Hemming, 58 Wis. 144; Cincinnati
V. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 257; Mayor
etc. of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137;
Taylor v. Carondelet, 22 Mo. 105,
112 ; Bergen v. Clarkson, 1 Halst. (N.
J.) 352; White v. Tallman, 26 N. J.
L. 67; Baxter v. Com., 3 Pa. (Pen. &
W.) 253; Kneedler v. Norristown,
100 Pa. St. 368; Narden v. Mount, 78
Ky. 86; Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow.
462; Mayor etc. v. Ordrenau, 12
Johns. (N. Y.) 122; Phillips v. Allen,
41 Pa. St. 481; Adley v. Reeves, 2 M.
& S. 60; Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa,
378; Donovan v. Vicksburg, 23 Miss.
247; Miles v. Chamberlain, 17 Wis.
446; Leev. Wallis, 1 Ky. 292; Clerk
V. Tucket, 3 Lev. 281; Cotter v. Doty,
5 Ohio,«394; Ridge way v. West, 60
Ind. 371.
275
§ 155 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. IX.
the genius of our laws and institutions,^ but is explicitly con-
demned and forbidden in all the States of the Union by consti-
tutional provisions, which guarantee the right of the individual
to hold and enjoy his property until deprived of it by due proc-
ess of law.^ But the city is not compelled to establish its case
beyond a reasonable doubt ; it being sufficient to legalize a for-
feiture, that the evidence preponderates in favor of the plain-
tiff.^ Corporations have no more right than private persons to
constitute themselves . judges in their own cause. So, when a
city by ordinance authorized a forfeiture, and sale of all the
property, which had been allowed by its owner to remain in a
public place longer than a period specified, the ordinance was
declared void, as inflicting a forfeiture and divesting the owner
of his property, without a legal trial of any sort. Such an ar-
bitrary exercise of municipal power will not be countenanced,
unless in extreme cases ; as, for example, when it becomes nec-
essary to destroy property, which is a nuisance ^er se, in order
to protect the health and welfare of the community.* In con-
formity with the rule that statutes or ordinances inflicting a
penalty must be strictly construed, a city under charter power
to fine will not be permitted to impose a forfeiture upon delin-
quents.
A town council having power to fine, in a sum not exceeding
fifty dollars, had special authority conferred upon it to grant
licenses to retail liquor dealers. An ordinance having been
passed regulating the liquor traffic for the violations of which
" a fine of not more than fifty dollars for each offence, and also
a forfeiture of the license was imposed," it was held that the
license having been granted and paid for was, as respects the
municipality, private property ; and that as the council could
only impose a fine, it had no power to arbitrarily deprive the
licensee of that which was his private property.*
6 Heise v. Town Council, 6 Kich. (S.
C.) 404. In this connection it may
be noted tliat the forfeiture of a
1 Cotter V, Doty, 5 Ohio, 393, 898;
Eosebaugh V. Saffln, 10 lb. 32; Sless-
man v. Crozler, 80 Ind. 487.
2 Tiedeman's Limitations of Police
Power, §§ 34r-34/.
8 People V. Briggs, 114 K. Y. 56.
■iLanfear v. Mayor, 4 La. An. 97;
see Tiedeman's Limitations of Police
Power, §§ 139, 141.
276
license by a municipality for a
breach of a condition contained in it,
(Huber v. Baugh, 43 Iowa, 514) or
its termination by the repeal of the
State law under which it was granted,
is valid. State v. Bonnell, 21 N. E.
Eep. 1101.
CH. IX.]
OEDINANOBS.
§155
The courts frequently have occasion to consider the right of
municipalities to exercise a power of forfeiture in the case of
domestic animals running at large. The right to pronounce a
forfeiture must be plainly conferred, and notice must be given
before they can be sold or otherwise disposed of by the city.^
Unless the power to pass such is plainly conferred by the Leg-
islature, all ordinances, by which it is provided that domestic
animals, such as horses, cows or hogs, shall not be allowed by
their owners to run at large, upon penalty of having the same
forfeited and sold, and the proceeds paid into the city treasury,
or divided between the city and the person finding the estray,
are invalid and unconstitutional, unless some notice be given
so that the owner may have an opportunity of being heard at
some stage of the proceeding, and afforded a chance to redeem
his property.^
The general rule, that a court of equity will not interfere
to give relief against a statutory forfeiture, although it may in
the case of a forfeiture imposed by contract, is applicable to
municipal forfeitures. As between individual parties to a con-
tract, compensation can be awarded by the chancellor to the
party entitled to the forfeiture, where the breach is due to some
unforeseen accident, and where it constitutes the nonpayment
of a sum of money, which can be fully compensated for in
1 Varden v. Mount, 78 Ky. 86; Wil-
cox V. Hemming, 58 Wis. 144; Knox-
ville V. King, 7 Lea, 441.
2 See ch. viii. § 129 ; Donovan v.
Vicksburg, 29 Miss. 247; Spitler v.
Young, 63 Mo. 42; Cincinnati v.
Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 247; Moore v.
State, 11 Lea, 35 ; Poppen v. Holmes,
44 ni. 362; White v. Tallman, 2
Dutch. 67; Darst v. People, 51 111.
286; Bullock v. Glomple, 45 lb. 360;
Heise v. Columbia, 6 Rich. 404; Wil-
lis V. Legris, 45 111. 289; McKee v.
McKee, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 433 ; Gilchrist
V. Schmidling, 12 Kan. 263; Wilson
y. Bryers, 5 Wash. St. 303; 32 Pac. R.
90; Hanscom v. Bermod, 53 N. W.
R.371; 35 Neb. 504; White v. Brinim,
48 Mo. App. Ill ; Bowers v. Horan,
93 Mich. 420; 53 N. W. R. 535; Jarman
V. Patterson, 7 B. Mon. 647; Gosse-
linck V. Campbell, 4 Iowa, 296 ; Port
Smith V. Dodson, 46 Ark. 296; Whit-
field v. Longest, 6 Ire. Law, 268;
Rose V. Hardie, 98 X. C. 44; Hellen
V. Noe, 3 Ire. Law, 493. " The ordi-
nance commands the marshal to
seize and impound the hogs, and
then, without any reserve, without
any notice, by means of which the
owner might be able to exculpate
himself, directs them to be sold and
the proceeds placed in the city treas-
ury. Such an ordinance is as con-
trary to the spirit of the charter
(Cincinnati) as it is alien from the
general genius of our institutions."
Grimke, J., in Rosebaugh v. Saffin,
10 Ohio, 33, 37.
277
§ 156 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. tX.
money.^ But not even under such circumstances will a court
of equity grant relief from a valid forfeiture, incurred through
the infraction of a penal statute.'-^
§ 156. Procedure to enforce ordinances — Arrest. — la
England, prior to the Corporation Act of 1835, the authority
of the municipal corporation to enact by-laws, always rested
upon implication of law. By that act, the municipal council
was empowered to make such by-laws as were necessary for
the prevention and suppression of all nuisances, not punishable
by act of Parliament. The corporation was also given the
power to impose fines in a sum not to exceed five pounds.
The act also prescribes that prosecution for the breach of any
ordinance shall be begun within three months after the offence
has occurred ; and that the charge shall be made on oath ; sum-
mons also must be served, but the magistrate may proceed
without the appearance of the defendant, and may issue a war-
rant for his arrest. Upon conviction, the fine must be paid at
once, unless the magistrate shall consider it proper to extend
the time. If the fine is not paid, its payment may be enforced
by a distress and sale ; and for want of sufficient goods to dis-
train, the offender may be imprisoned for a period not to exceed
one month, but which may be terminated upon the payment of
the sum due. At the common law, the method of enforcing
an ordinance was by an action by the municipal corporation or
proper official against the offender, to recover the penalty im-
posed for the violation of the ordinance. This action was, in
form, either debt or assumpsit.
The action of assumpsit was employed in the recovery of
penalties, upon the theory that there had been a breach of the
duty which, by a fiction of law, the defendant had promised
the plaintiff to perform. The action of debt could be employ-
ed because the penalty was a sum certain, and in the nature of
liquidated damages. And when it was expressly provided,
that the penalty should be recovered by an action of debt, that
form was exclusive, and no other could be employed.
Unless permitted by custom or statute, a city or town could
1 Tiedeman on Equity Jur. § 180.
2 Taylor v. Carondelet, 22 Mo. 105 ;
Peachey V. Somerset, 1 Str. 447; Gor-
man v. Low, 2 Ed w. Ch. 324; Keat-
278
ing V. Sparrow, 1 Ball & Beat. 367;
State V. Railroad Co., 3 How. (U. S.)
534.
CH. IX.]
ORDQIAl^CBS.
§156
not, by a by-law, prescribe that the penalty should be recovered
by distress and sale.^ Where the mode of procedure to en-
force ordinances is prescribed by statute or charter, that mode
must be pursued.^ But when no statutory method is prescrib-
ed, the common law remedy by an action of debt or assumpsit
as above outlined, may be adopted ; or where the common law
forms have been abolished, the statutory civil action is the
proper remedy .^ Unless expressly forbidden by statute, mu-
nicipal corporations have the inherent power to provide for an
action of debt, to recover a penalty in their own courts.*
In every case where it is sgught to recover the amount of a
fine or penalty by the method above described, the proceeding
is civil rather than criminal ; and the rules of civil procedure
are generally applicable.^ When the method of procedure to
enforce the payment of a fine or penalty is not by a suit at law,
but by flomplaint before a municipal magistrate, who is to de-
termine the matter and impose a fine, the proceedings have
been sometimes deemed to be of a criminal or quasi criminal
nature. In such proceedings, if the statute designates with
certainty the purpose to which the fine is to be appropriated,
it is enough for the magistrate to impose a fine, to be paid and
applied according to the statute.^ But if the magistrate in his
1 Adley v. Beeves, 2 M. & S. 61.
See White v. Tallman, (N. J.) 2 Dutch.
67; and Berger v. Clarkson, (N. J.) 1
Halst. 352 ; Bodwic v. Fennell, 1 Wils.
233. As to common law procedure to
recover fines in United States, see
Jacksonville V. Holland, 19 III. 271;
Columhia v. Harrison, 2 Mills Const.
(S. C.) 213; Brookville v. Gagle, 73
Ind. 117.
2 Coonley v. Albany, 132 K T. 145;
State V. Zeigler, 32 IST. J. L. 262 ; Lan-
sing V. Chicago, etc., Co., 52 N. W.
K. 195; Bolter v. New Orleans, 10
La. An. 321; Ewbanks v. Ashley, 36
111. 177; Israel v. Jacksonville, 2 lb.
290; Earnhart v. Lebanon, 5 Ohio
Cir. Ct. 578; Williamson v. Com., 4
B. Hon. 146, 151; Charleston v. Ash-
ley P. Co., 34 S. C. 541.
8N. T. Consol. Act, §§216, 1290;
Coates v. Mayor, 7 Cow. 585, 608;
Ewbanks v. Ashley, supra ; Israel v.
Jacksonville, supra ; N. T. Code Civ.
Pro. § 3215.
* Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Burr.
1858; Barter v. Com., 3 Pa. 353.
*DeSoto V. Brown, 40 Mo. App.
148; St. Louis v. Vert, 84 Mo. 204;
Miller v. O'EeiUy, 84 Ind. 168;
Brophy v. Perth Amboy, 44 K. J. L.
217; In re Miller, 44 Mo. App. 125;
Williamson v. Commonwealth, 4 B.
Mon. 146, 151 ; Lewiston v. Procter, 27
111. 414; Quincy v. Ballance, 30 lb.
185 ; Davenport v. Bird, 34 Iowa, 524.
0 The King v. Thompson, 2 T. E.
18; The King v. Hyde, 21 L. J. May.
Cas. 94; In re Boothroyd, 15 M. & W.
1; State v. Keenan, 57 Conn. 286;
Queen v. Cridland, 7 E. & B. 853;
King V. Glassop, 4 B. & A. 616; Sea-
men's Hospital V. Liverpool, 4 Ex.
180.
279
§156
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. IX.
judgment of conviction appropriates the fine to some purpose
different from what the statute prescribed, which amounts to
a material variance between it and the statutory appropriation,
tlie conviction will be bad.^
The question of the civil or criminal nature of the judicial
proceeding to collect a fine, becomes of some importance, when
the right of a trial by a jury is contended for. In all of the
States tliere is a constitutional provision, guaranteeing to the
accused a trial by jury; although in several of them, qualifica-
tions are made, in the case of suits to recover small sums, and
of prosecutions for petty offences.^ In a case, where the guar-
anty of the inviolability of the right of trial by jury in criminal
prosecutions was absolute, the court held that a prosecution to
I'ecover a fine incurred by the infraction of an ordinance, not
being in the nature of a criminal prosecution, was not within
the constitution.** So, too, it has been held that the'require-
ment of security for costs in a prosecution under a penal statute
has no application to prosecutions for violations of municipal
by-laws.*
On the other hand, in many of the States such prosecutions
are not regarded as civil actions, brought by the city to en-
force a private right ; ^ but as substantially public prosecu-
1 Griffiths V. Harries, 2 M. & W.
335; Chaddock v. Wilbraliam, 5 C.
B. 645.
2 See Stimpson Amer. Statutes,
§§ 72, 132.
3 Williams v. Augusta, 4 Ga. 509.
In this case, the court said: " Inas-
much as the right of trial by jury
existed in England, and was secured
by Magna Charta, and municipal cor-
porations in that country enforced
their by-laws by pecuniary penalties
in a summary manner, and the same
right being conferred upon similar
corporations in this State, anterior
to the adoption of the constitution,
and constantly exercised; the right
of trial by jury, as heretofore used
in this State was not violated by the
city council of Augusta by the im-
position of the penalty for the breach
of the local police regulations of the
280
city." See, also, to same effect, By-
ers V. Com., 42 Pa. St. 89, 94; Low
V. Com'rs etc., R. M. Charlt. (Ga.)
316; Flint R. S. Co. v. Foster, 5 lb.
194; Floyd v. Com'rs etc., 14 lb.
354; Kip v. Paterson, 2 Dutch. 298;
Keeler v. Milledge, 24 X. J. L. 142;
Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331; Dun-
more's App., 52 Pa. St. 96; Com. v.
Borden, 61 lb. 272; Plimpton v. Som-
erset, 33 Vt. 283; Wayne Co. v. De-
troit, 17 Mich. 390; People v. Same,
18 lb. 445 ; Charleston v. Oliver, 16
S. C. 47; Goshen v. Croxton, 34Ind.
239.
4 Lewiston v. Proctor, 27 III. 414;
Quincy v. Ballaus, 30 lb. 185; Alton
V. Kirsch, 68 lb. 261.
6 In re Goddard, 16 Pick. 504; Pax-
son V. Sweet, 1 J. S. Green (N. J.)
200.
CH. IX. J OEDINAiTCBS. § 157
tions or ciirainal proceedings,^ in which it is authorized tc
disallow the defendant costs.^ And the fact, that the defend-
ant does not receive costs upon his acquittal, does not render
ujiconstitutional a statute, providing for prosecutions in the
name of the commonwealth of those who violate municipal
ordinances.'
Police officers, city marshals, or other municipal officials, may
be empowered hj ordinances to arrest without warrant, offend-
ers against city ordinances or regulations (unless expressly for-
bidden to do so by the constitution or the statutory law) for an
offence committed in their presence, when such an arrest is pre-
liminary to a judicial determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused.* But an ordinance, empowering an officer to
arrest any person refusing to obey an order given at a fire, and
to detain such person until the fire is extinguished, was uncon-
stitutiohal, as depriving him of his liberty without due process
of law.* The genei'al power to make arrests, with or without
warrant, is more fully presented elsewhere.^
§ 157. Action in name of corporation. — At common law,
when the clause imposing the penalty was couched in general
terms, the suit or prosecution to enforce the ordinance was as
a general rule required to be brought in the name of the mu-
nicipality. But it veiy frequently happened, that the ordi-
nance or by-law conferred the right or privilege, of bringing
an action for the purpose of recovering the fine incurred for its
breach, upon some particular officer of the corporation, who
was thereby empowered to recover the same and appropriate it
to some designated official purpose. And, although the power
of recovering the penalty could not be conferred by the city
upon a stranger, yet the penalty itself might be given by the
ordinance, wholly or in part, to an informer.''
estate V. Stearns, 31 N. H. 30fi;
Mobile v. Jones, 42 Ala. 630; Fink
V. Milwaukee, lY Wis. 26.
2 Com. V. Gay, 5 Pick. 44; Cora. v.
Fahey, 5 Cush. 408.
8 In re Goddard, 16 Pick. 504.
* Bryan v. Bates, 15 111. 87; Main
V. McCarthy, 15 111. 442; State v. Laf-
ferty, 5 Harring. 491 ; Newark v. Mur-
pliy, 40 N. J. L. 145 ; Mitchell v. Lem-
on, 34 Md. 176; Butolph v. Blust, 5
Lans. 84.
^ Johnson v. Eeardon, 16 Minu.
431.
» Sec. 89.
' Feltmakers Co. v. Davis, 1 B. &
P. 101; Boduri v. Fennell, 1 Wils.
233; Totterdell v. Glazby, 2 lb. 226;
Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Burr, 1348;
Wood V. Searl, Bridg. 141; Graves
V. Colby, 9 Ad. & El. 356; Vintners
V. Passey, 1 Burr, 235; Williamson
V. Cora., 4 B. Mon. 146, 151.
281
^158
MTTNIOIPAIi COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. IX.
If a municipal official is authorized to bring an action in his
own name, it wiU not be necessary for him to plead his election
or appointment. It is sufficient for him to aver, that he is the
official who is authorized by the ordinance to sue.^
§ 158. Pleading ordinances. — Judicial tribunals, other than
municipal courts,^ do not take judicial notice of municipal or-
dinances.^ For this reason, when it is sought to enforce an
ordinance, or when one is relied upon by the defendant as a
justification, it is necessary that it should be specially pleaded.
It is ordinarily sufficient under the liberal modern rules, ap-
plicable to pleading, to set forth plainly and concisely the legal
substance of that part of the ordinance, which it is desired to
enforce, or which is relied upon for justification ; adding, for pur-
poses of identification, the title, date of passage, and section.*
In an action to enforce a by-law, it is necessary to allege
facts, showing a breach thei'eof,^ and to set forth the offence
charged with reasonable clearness and certainty,® so that de-
1 Harris v. Wakeman, Say. 254;
Exeter v. Starre, 2 Show. 159; Watts
V. Scott, 1 Dev. (N". C.) 291; Com. v.
Fahey, 5 Cush. 408.
2 Western R. Co. v. Young, 7 S. E.
R. 912; Garland v. Denver, (Col. 90)
19 Pac. R. 460; Conboy v. Iowa
City, 2 Iowa, 90; Anderson v. Don-
nell, 7 S. E. R. .523.
^ See cases cited in last note, and
Austin V. Walton, 68 Tex. 507; Wheel-
ing V. Black, 25 W. Va. 266; People
V. Buchanan, 1 Idaho, 681; People
V. Mayor, etc., 7 How. Pr. 81;
Coxv. St. Louis, 11 Mo. 431; Gar-
vin V. Wells, 8 Iowa, 286; Mooney
V. Kennett, 19 Mo. 551 ; New Orleans
V. Boudro, 14 La. An. 303; Case v.
Mobile, 30 Ala. 538.
* Cora. V. Odenweller, (Mass. 92)
SON. E. R. 1022; Mooney v. Ken-
neth, 19 Mo. 551; Austin v. Walton,
68 Tex. 507; Case v. Mobile, 30 Ala.
538; Charleston v. Chur, 2 Bailey
(S. C.) 164; Miles v. Kern, (Mont. 92)
29 Pac. R. 720; Emporia v. Vol-
mer, 12 Kan. 622, 628; Stokes v. Cor-
poration of N. Y., 14 Wend. 87; Cox
282
V. St. Louis, 11 Mo. 431; Barker v.
New York, 17 Wend. 199; Kip v.
Paterson, 2 Dutch. 298.
^ Time and manner of violation es-
sential: State V. Trenton, 36 N. J. L.
283; Hendersonville v. McMinn, 82
N. C. 532. Ordinance need not be
recited in full: Emporia v. Volmer,
12 Kan. 622; Goldthwaite v. Mont-
gomery, 50 Ala. 486; St Louis v.
Smith, 10 Mo. 438; nor section:
Meyer v. Bridgeton, 37 N. J. L. 160.
« State V. Baker, (La. 92) 10 So.
405; State v. Camden, (N. J. 92) 19
Atl. R. 539; Com. v. Bean, Thacb.
(Mass. Crim. Cas.) 85; Eink v. Mil-
waukee, 17 Wis. 26; Johnson v. Win-
field, 48 Kan. 129; Frankfort v.
Aughe, 15 N. E. Rep. 802; Whiston
V. Franklin, 34 Ind. 392; State v.
Cainan, 94 N. C. 880; Woods v.
Primeville, (Or. 92) 23 Pac. B. 880;
Napmau v. People, 19 Mich. 352;
Goshen v. Croxton, 34 Ind. 239; Carr
v. Couyers, 10 S. E. R. 630; 84 Ga.
287; Keeler v. Milledge, 4 Zabr. (24
N. J. L.) 142; Van Buren v. Wells,
(Ark. 92) 14 S. W. R. 38.
CH. IX.]
ORDINANCES.
§159
fendant's liability may clearly appear.^ But no such degree of
strictness is required in forming a complaint for the violation
of an ordinance, as is required in the case of an information or
indictment. But a charge, that defendant committed an offence
contrary to an ordinance of the town,^ or that he knowingly
associated with thieves, no names of persons or places being
given,^ will be dismissed for vagueness. It is not necessary to
aver that defendant had notice of the ordinance, such notice
being conclusively presumed,* nor that a demand of obedience
to the ordinance has been made, unless a previous demand is
absolutely and positively required.* It has been held, however,
that a defective complaint, in an action to enforce a municipal
ordinance, will be cured by the defendant pleading not guilty,
and proceeding to a trial on the merits."
Penalties for several breaches of one ordinance may be sued
for in the same action, provided the total amount of the judg-
ment asked for will not take the cause out of the magistrate's
jurisdiction.'^
§ 159. Yalidity of ordinances a question of law — Construc-
tion.— The reasonableness, fairness and justice of a municipal
ordinance, are questions of law for the judge, and not the jury,
to determine. But in deciding these questions the judge must
take into consideration all the circumstances of the case, in-
cluding the condition of the municipality, the necessity for the
by-law, the object sought by its enactment, and its relation to
the State and Federal Constitutions and laws. It is very evi-
dent that ordinances and regulations, admirablj^ adapted to a
large commercial city or populous manufacturing town, would
be very unreasonable and out of place in sparsely populated
rural villages and towns.* Hence, the rule of construction has
' State V. Carpenter, 22 Atl. R. 497;
60 Conn. 97; Case v. Mobile, 30 Ala.
538; Coates v. Mayor, 7 Cow. 585,
608; State v. Baker, 10 So. K. 405;
Com. V. Cutter, (Mass. 92) 29 N. E.
E. 1146; Johnson v. "Winiield, 48 Kan.
129; 29 Pac. K. 559.
2 Memphis v. O' Conner, 53 Mo. 468.
"St. Louis V. Fitz, 53 Mo. 582.
' London v. Bernardiston, 1 Lev. 16.
* Butchers' Co. v. Bullock, 3 Bos.
& P. 434, 437.
6 State V. Welch, 21 Minn. 22.
' Hensoldt v. Petersburgh, 63 111.
111.
8Kuhn V. Chicago, 30 111. App.
203; State v. Miller, 41 La. An. 53;
Frazee's Case, 30 N. W. E. 72; 63
Mich. 396; State v. Heidenhain, 7 So.
E. 621; Heller v. Alvaredo, (Tex. 93)
20 S. W. R. 1003; Dunham v. Eoclies-
ter, 5 Cow. K. Y. 462; Woodward v.
Boscobel, (Wis. 93) 54 N. W. E. 332;
Kneedler v. Norristown, 100 Pa.
283
§159
MUNICIPAL COEPOBATIONS.
[CH. IX.
been adopted that, when a municipality has enacted an ordi-
nance in the exercise of a valid power, the court will be slow
to pronounce such an ordinance to be oppressive, and will give
the municipality the benefit of any insoluble doubt.^ And it
has been held that, where the Legislature expressly grants to a
municipal corporation the power to do a particular act, the
courts are not permitted to inquire into the reasonableness of
the authorized act, although that would be a legitimate inquiry,
if the act were attempted, not in pursuance of an express legis-
lative authority, but under the general authority to enact all
needful ordinances and regulations.^ It is not believed that
this can now be considered as sound law, in the light of the
fact that the courts unhesitatingly pronounce acts of the Leg-
islature to be unconstitutional and void, on account of their un-
reasonableness ; as, for example, where the maximum tariff of
railroad charges does not admit of a reasonable profit.^ Neither
public nor judicial opinion now agree with Judge Napton, in
the Missouri case, quoted in the note below, that it would be
an unwarrantable aifronttothe Legislature to declare their offi-
cial act to be against public policy. In consequence of the ex-
tension of governmental powers, now occasioned by the spread
of socialistic doctrines, the courts are compelled, in the inter-
ests of vested rights, to pronounce unreasonable regulations to
be for that reason unconstitutional and void. It is, therefore.
St. 368; Com. v. Worcester, 3 Pick.
462; Paxson v. Sweet, 1 Green (N.
J.) 196; III re Vandlue, 6 Pick. 187;
Boston V. Shaw, 1 Met. 130, 135 ; Aus-
tin v. Murray, 16 Pick. 121, 125; Hud-
son V. Tliorne, 7 Paige Cli. (N. T.)
261. But see Clausen V. Milwaukee,
30 Wis. 316.
iPisber v. Harrisbvirg, 2 Grant,
291; St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547;
Com. V. Robinson, 5 Gush. 438, 442;
Poulters Co. v. Phillips, 6 Bing. N.
C. 314; St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn.
41; Com. v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221.
2 St. Paul V. Colter, 12 Minn. 41;
Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591,
596; A Coal Float v. Jeffersonville,
112 Ind. 15; Breninger v. Belvedere,
44 N. J. L. 350; Peoria v. Cal-
284
houn, 29 111. 317; State v. Clarke, 54
Mo. 17, 36; Haynes v. Cape May, 50
N". J. L. 55 ; District v. Waggaman,
4 Mackey, 328. In State v. Clarke,
54 Mo. 17, 36, Judge Napton said:
" It is naked assumption to say that
any matter allowed by the Legisla-
ture is against public policy. The
best indications of public policy are
to be found in the enactments of the
Legislature. To say that such a law
is of unusual tendency is disrespect-
ful to the Legislature, who, no doubt,
designed to promote the morals and
health of the citizens. Whether the
ordinance in question is calculated to
promote the object is a question with
which the courts have no concern."
^ See cases cited in § 150.
CH. IX.] ORDINANCES. § 160
not safe, in the present connection, to go beyond the statement
that the courts would not be so readily inclined to pronounce
an ordinance to be unreasonable, which had been enacted in
pursuance of an express delegation of power, as where the or-
dinance had been enacted under the " general welfare " clause
of the charter. Ordinances are not ordinarily considered to be
of the character of penal statutes ; for the penalty imposed is
but liquidated damages, which may be and usually is, recovered
in a civil action, brought against the wrongdoer. For this rea-
son, the same degree of strictness and technicality is not ob-
served in the construction of ordinances, which the courts
have uniformly employed in the construction of penal stat-
utes.^ When it is remembered that the by-laws of corpora-
tions of all kinds, and particularly the ordinances of towns
and villages, are frequently drawn up by men having little ac-
quaintance with the niceties of legal phraseologj', the necessity
for a reasonable, rather than a technical construction, becomes
apparent.^
As with statutes, the title and the body of the ordinance may
be construed together, in order to ascertain its meaning.^ And
contemporary opinion of the meaning of the ordinance is of
the highest value.* If, however, the ordinance, by reason of
its general character and purpose, and the largeness of the fine
imposed, assimilates to a penal statute, it ought to be, and usu-
ally will be, construed, especially when enforced by a criminal
proceeding, with the same degree of strictness as a statutory
enactment imposing a penalty.^
§ 160. Evidence — Defences. — The rules of evidence, ap-
plicable in all judicial proceedings, are employed in prosecu-
tions to enforce ordinances, except to the extent that they have
been modified by statutory enactment ; *' and the corporation
will be estopped by the same acts and upon the same grounds,
as would a private individual be under similar circumstances.
' See, iu support of the general
propositions of the text, Municipal-
ity V. Cutting, 4 La. An. 335 ; Mer-
riam v. New Orleans, 14 lb. 318;
Loze V. Mayor etc., 2 lb. 427; Balti-
more V. Clunet, 23 Md. 449.
2 Whitlock V. West, 26 Conn. 406.
' Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411 .
* State V. Severance, 49 Mo. 401.
sKriokle V. Com., 1 B. Mon. 261;
State V. Paris Ry. Co., 55 Tex. 76;
Pacific V. Seifert, 79 Mo. 210.
<* City Council v. Dunn, 1 McCord
(S. C. ) 333; Fitch v. Pinckard, 4
Scam. (5 111.) 78.
285
§ 161 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. IX.
Thus, when a city had received the fee paid for a liquor license,
which had been granted by its de facto official, and had re-
tained and used the same, it was estopped by that fact from main-
taining an action to recover a penalty for selling liquor without
a license.^ And it may be said that, as a general rule, any ac-
tion on the part of municipal officials, which is within the
power of the municipal corporation, and which has induced
another party to act to his own disadvantage, with a corre-
sponding gain to the corporation, will estop the municipality
from retracting or denying what its officers have done.^
In a civil proceeding, the defendant's admission that he has
violated the ordinance is admissible in evidence against him.'
As an exception to the well known rule, it has been held that
the granting of a license, after a suit has been commenced to
recover a penalty for acting without it, even though the license
is worded so as to take effect previous to the commission of the
offence, does not legalize it or waive the city's right to recover
the penalty.* The illegality of the municipal charter cabnot
be given in evidence, as a matter of defence, in an action to
enforce a penalty ; such a question cannot be raised in a collat-
eral proceeding.®
§ 161. Kepealing ordinances. — Although a valid municipal
ordinance will never become obsolete because it is not enforced,
it may at any time be repealed directly or inferentially by the
corporation, or by the Legislature. The power to enact implies
the power to repeal.^ And the repeal need not be express ; for
a clause in an ordinance, which is repugnant to previous munic-
> Martel v. East St. Louis, 94 111.
67; 21 Alb. L. J. 195.
^Eobyv. Chicago, 64 111. 447; Chi-
cago, R. I. & P. E. Co. V. Joliet, 79
lb. 39; Logan Co. v. Lincoln, 81 lb.
156; seeposS, §§169, 195.
'^ Columbia v. Harrison, 2 Const.
R. (S. C.) 213.
* City Council v. Feldman, 3 Rich.
(S. C.) Law, 385; City Council v.
Schmidt, 11 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 343.
sDecorah v. Gillis, 10 Iowa, 234;
Kettering v. Jacksonville, 50 111. 39;
Tisdale v. Minouk, 46 lb. 9; Ilarden-
brook V. Ligonier, 95 lud. 70; Coles
Co, V. Allison, 23 111. 437.
286
« Waukesha Hy. M. S. Co. v. Wau-
kesha, (Wis. 93) 53 N. W. R. 675;
Greeley v. Jacksonville, 17 Fla. 174;
In re MolUe Hall, 10 Neb. 537; Kan-
sas City V. White, 69 Mo. 261; Santo
V. State, 2 Iowa, 165 ; East St. Louis
etc. Co. V. E. St. Louis, 31 111. App.
398; hi re Great West. Ry. Co. etc.,
23 Up. Can. C. P. 28; Bloomer v.
Stolley, 5 McLean, 158; Gormleyv.
Day, 114 111. 185; 28 N. E. R. 693;
Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N.
Y. 467; Rice v. Poster, 4 Harring.
(Del.) 470; People v. Collins, 3 Mich.
347; Welch v. Bowen, 103 Ind. 552.
CH. IX.]
ORDINANCES.
§162
ipal legislation, will repeal the prior ordinance so far as it may
be inconsistent therewith.^
But the repeal of an ordinance cannot act retrospectively, so
as to divest a person of a vested right v^hich he had already
acquired under the ordinance, which violated no constitutional
lestriction upon the power of the State or municipality, to create
vested rights in derogation of public interests.^
While subsequent constitutional or statutory enactments will,
if inconsistent with it, repeal by inference an existing ordinance,^
an act changing an incorporated town into a city will not, it
has been held, necessarily have this effect.*
The rule, that the repeal of a statute does not put an end to
a pending prosecution for a past infraction of it does not apply
to municipal ordinances.® The repeal of the ordinance puts an
end to a pending prosecution under it, unless a saving clause
be inserted in the repealing ordinance or statute.
§ 162. Katiflcation of invalid ordinances by Legislature.
— The State Legislature may validate ordinances which are not
in conflict with the constitution, but which for any reason are
not binding. But when the invalidity of an ordinance is thus
cured, a prosecution for an infraction should be brought under
the ordinance, and not under the curative act.®
^Mx parte Wolf, 14 Neb. 24; Bur-
lington V. Est. Law, 43 N. J. L. 13.
2 Ashton V. Rochester, 14 N. Y. S.
855; Cape May etc. Co. v. Cape May,
35 N. J. Eq. 419; People v. O'Brien,
111 N. T. 1 ; Cunningham v. Almonte,
21 Up. Can. C. P. 459; Stoddard v.
Gilman, 22 Vt. 568; Pond v. Negus,
3 Mass. 230; Pardridge v. Hyde Park,
23 N. E. R. 345; 131 111. 5.37; Ter-
re Haute v. Lake, 43 Ind. 480;
State V. City Clerk, 7 Ohio St. 355 ;
State V. Graves, 19 Md. 351; Bigelow
V. Hillman, 37 Me. 521 ; Hyde Park v.
Corwith, 12 N. E. R. 238; Nelson v.
St. Martin's Parish, 111 U.S. 716;
Louisiana v. Pillsbury, 105 lb. 278.
The rule in the text is subject to the
limitation, incumbent upon munici-
palities, that they cannot bargain
away by ordinance their responsibil-
ity for the suppression of nuisances
and for the protection of the health
and safety of the community.
^Mobile V. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310.
On this general subject, see ante,
§§ 33, 34.
* Erie Academy Trus. v. Erie, 31
Pa. St. 515 ; see ante, §§ 32, 58, 59.
^Naylorv. Galesburg, 56 111. 285;
Earnhart v. Lebanon, 5 Ohio Cir.
578; Junction T. Webb, (Kan. 91) 2:5
Pac. E. 1073; Kansas City v. Clark,
68 Mo. 588; Barton v. Gadsden, 79
Ala. 495.
6Devers v. York, 1.50 Pa. St. 208;
30 W. N. C. 390; Schonley v. Com., 36
Pa. St. 29;Mattingly v. District, 97
U. S. 687; McMillen v. Boyles, 6
Iowa, 304; Frederick v. Augusta, 5
Ga. 561; Winn v. Macon, 21 Ga. 275;
Logansport v. Crockett, 64 Ind. 319.
287
CHAPTER X.
MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS.
Section.
163 — Inherent or implied power to
contract.
164 — Implied contracts.
165 — Mode of contracting, writing
or seal when necessary —
Statute of frauds.
166 — ^Municipal contracts with its
agents.
167 — Form of contracts made by
municipal agents.
168 — Non-liability of public offi-
cial acting within his au-
thority.
169 — Authority of municipal offi-
cials to contract — Ultra vi-
res.
Section.
170 — Ratification, what consti-
tutes.
171 — Contracts for public works —
Contractor' s bond — Pay-
ment.
172 — Advertising and letting to
lowest bidders — Patented
articles.
173 — B ids — S e a 1 e d proposals—
Taxpayer's remedy —
Fraud in bidding.
174 — Annulment of contracts —
Corporate control of work.
175 — Contracts for water supply.
176 — Contracts with attorneys at
law.
§ 163. Inherent or implied power to contract — A munic-
ipal corporation may, unless restricted by charter or State stat-
ute, enter into any contract which may be necessary to the
execution of the powers and functions conferred upon it by its
charter, and may sue or be sued upon the same.^ The general
power to contract, in furtherance of corporate purposes, is in-
herent in all classes of corporations, both public and private.^
Under a general power to contract, liquidated damages maybe
1 Galveston v. Loonie, 54 Tex. 517 ;
Smith V. Stephau, 66 Md. 381 ; Moutg.
Co. V. Barber, 45 Ala. 237; Indian-
apolis V. Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396; Bate-
man V. Ashton, 3 H. & N. 322; Sie-
brecht v. New Orleans, 12 La. An.
496; Bank v. Patterson, 7 Cranch,
299; Goodrich v. Detroit, 12 Mich.
279; Chaffee v. Granger, 6 lb. 51;
Douglass V. Virginia City, 5 Nev. 147 ;
Galena v. Corinth, 48 111. 423 ; Strauss
V. Eagle I. Co., 5 Ohio St. 59; Eae v.
288
Mayor, 51 Mich. 526; Albright v,
Council, 9 Rich. L. (S. C.) 399; Wil-
liamsport v. Com., 84 Pa. St. 487
"Wells V. Atlanta, 43 Ga. 67; Jones
V. Richmond, 18 Gratt. 517; Bren-
ham V. Brenham W. P. Co., 67 Tex,
542; Robinson V. St. Louis, 28 Mo,
488; Gregory V. Bridgeport, 41 Conn,
76.
2 Pullman v. Mayor, 54 Barb. 169
Portland L. etc. Co. v. East Portland,
(Greg.) 22 Pac. Rep. 536.
CH. X.J
MUKICIPAL CONTRACTS.
§163
agreed on and the sum inserted in the contract.^ Usually,
the power to contract is conferred in general terms in the char-
ter ; leaving the extent of the power, and the mode in which
it is to be exercised, to be ascertained by a consideration of the
corporate needs in that direction, and the limitations and re-
strictions, if any, to be found in the general statutes of the State.
Express provisions of charter or statute modify the inherent
or conferred general power to contract, and consequently de-
serve the carefulest consideration, in determining the scope of
the general powers. And, furthermore, too much emphasis
cannot be given to the rule, that any power to contract, whether
conferred upon or inherent in a corporation, does not authorize
the making of every sort of contract ; but of such only as are
fit, usual and necessary, to enable the corporation to carry into
effect the purposes for which it was chartered. Under a gen-
eral authority to make all contracts necessary for its welfare,^
and to pass ordinances necessary for the security and welfare
of its inhabitants, a city may contract for a water supply,^ the
furnishing of pure water being the duty of the city and a di-
rect corporate purpose.* But a municipality has no power, by
virtue of any mere general grant, to contract for a permanent
and exclusive water supply,^ although if by express statutory
authority it has power " to pi'ovide a supply of water," it has
been held that this may be done.® As further illustrations of
the classes of contracts, to which a municipal corporation may
become a party, under a general authority to make necessary
contracts for its welfare, may be cited, contracts for lighting''
and grading streets;^ for building sidewHlks,^ and a break-
water, to protect city streets.^'* The question has arisen whether
a city can make a contract with a private person, by which
public property, designed and generally employed for public
' Parr v. Greenbush, 42 Hun, 2.32.
2 Cabot V. Rome, 28 Ga. 50; Wells
V. Atlanta, 43 lb. 67; Livingston v.
Pippin, 31 Ala. 542; Hale v. Hough-
ton, 8 Mich. 458.
» Indianapolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396.
*Nichol V. Mayor, 9 Hun, 268;
Grant v. Davenport, 36 lovya, 402.
5 Greenville W. Works v. Green-
ville, (Miss.) 1 So. Rep. 409.
19
» Atl. City Water Wks. v. Atlantic
City, 39 N. J. Eq. 367.
'Indianapolis v. Gas Co., 66 Ind.
396.
^Sturtevant v. Atton, 3 McLean.
393.
9 Wyandotte v. Zeitz, 21 Kan. 649;
Lawrence v. Killam, 11 lb. 512.
10 Miller v. Milw., 14 Wis. 642;
Clason V. Milw., 30 lb. 316, 322.
289
§164
MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS.
[CH. X.
purposes, can be employed for the private advantage of an in-
dividual. It has been held that, although a city can make no
contract with a private person or corporation for the discharge
of its public duty, it may when in possession of instrumental-
ities for this purpose, hire them out for use in private service,
when the public use does not require tlieui.i Municipal cor-
porations have all the powers of ordinary persons in regard to
the contracts they are authorized to make, except when spe-
cially restricted. Hence, it follows that they may be sued, or
sue thereon, in the same manner as individuals.''^
§ 164. Implied contracts. — Municipal corporations may be
held liable upon implied contracts, where the subject-matter is
within their powers ; and these contracts may arise from the
performance of certain corporate acts, without vote, deed or
writing.^
The theory of an implied contract, here as at common law,
rests upon the legal fiction that there had been an indefinite
promise to answer for a certain class of obligations, which are
considered to be equitable and just claims against the implied
obligor. The promise was implied, because the common law
authorities declared that all actions must arise ex contractu and
ex delicto ; and when in the absence of a delictum^ which they
construed as a synonym of a trespass, and of any express agree-
1 The Maggie P., 25 Fed. Eep. 202.
2 Agnew V. Brail, 124111. 312; Wes-
tern Sav. Fd. V. Philadelphia, 31 Pa.
St. 175; Strauss v. Eagle Ins. Co., 5
Ohio St. 59; Semmes v. Columbus,
19 Ga. 471; New Orleans v. St. Louis
Church, 11 La. An. 244; Sebreoht v.
New Orleans, 12 lb. 496; Hight v.
Monroe Co., 68 Ind. 576; Jackson Co.
V. Applewhite, 62 lb. 464; Cullen v.
Carthage, 103 lb. 196.
^Dil. Muu. Corp. §459; Bank v.
Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299;. Seagreaves
V. Alton, 13 111. 366; Call Pub. Co.
V. Lincoln, (Neb.) 45 N. W. Eep. 245;
Adams v. Farnsworth, 15 Gray, 423 ;
Crowder v. Sullivan, (Ind.) 28 N. E.
Eep. 94; Roodhouse v. Jennings, 29
111. App. 50; Peterson v. Mayor, 17
N. T. 449; Maher v. Chicago, 38 111.
290
266; Frankfort B. Co. v. Frankfort,
18 B. Mon. 41 ; Railroad Co. v. Athens
(Ga.) 11 S. E. Rep. 663; Bryan v.
Page, 51 Tex. 532; Canaan v. Derush,
47 N. H. 212; Ellsworth v. Rossiter,
(Kan. 90) 26 Pae. Rep. 274; Michigan
City V. Boeclding, 122 Ind. 39; Davis
V. Jackson, 61 Mich. 530; Bank v.
Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 74; Bissell v.
R. R., 22 N. Y. 2681 Backman v.
Charlestown, 42 N. H. 125; St. Louis
V. Gas Co., 98 111. 415; Brown v.
Belleville, 30 Up. Can. Q. B. 373;
Wentworth v. Hamilton, 34 lb. 585;
Brown v. Lindsey, 35 lb. 509; East
St. Louis V. Gas Co., 98 111. 415; State
Brd. V. Aberdeen, 56 Miss. 518. But
see Sohell City v. Rumsey, 39 Mo.
App. 264; Spitzer v. Blanchard, 82
Mich. 234.
OH. X.J MUNICIPAL CONTiiACTS. § 164
ment to do anything, a party was in equity and conscience bound
to compensate another for services rendered, or favors bestowed,
the proper action was declared to be ex contractu, and the neces-
sary contract or promise was implied. The more correct and
plainer statement is that the implied contract is an obligation
or duty imposed bj' law ; and the only occasion for the implica-
tion of a contract, is the false statement, that all actions must
arise ex contractu or ex delicto.
" The doctrine of implied municipal liability applies to cases
where money or other pi'operty of a party is received under
such circumstances that the general law, independent of ex-
press contract, imposes the obligation upon the city to do jus-
tice with respect to the same. If the cit}'' obtain money of
another by mistake, or without authority of law it is her duty
to refund, not from any contract entered into by her on the sub-
ject, but from the general obligation to do justice which binds
all persons whether natural or artificial. If the city obtain
other property which does not belong to her, it is her duty to
restore it; or if used by her, to render an equivalent to the
true owner, from tlie like general obligation ; the law, which
always intends justice, implies a promise. In reference to
money or other property it is not difficult to determine in
any particular case whether a liability with respect to the
same has attached to the city. The money must have gone
into the treasury, or been appropriated by her ; and when it is
property, other than money, it must have been used bj^ her, or
be under her control. But with respect to services the case is
different. Their acceptance must be evidenced by ordinance
(or other express action) to that effect. If not originally au-
thorized, no liability can attach upon any ground of implied
contract. 1|he acceptance, upon which alone the obligation to
pay could arise, would be wanting." ^
Whether the obligation rests in contract or not, it is one
which is constantly recognized ; and which hag been applied to
the purchase of real estate,^ to the use of a bridge for laying
pipes,^ to work done in widening and deepening a river,* to
1 Chief Justice Field in Argente v.
San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255, 282.
2 Chapman v. Douglas Co., 107 U.
S. 348.
8 Frankf. B. Co. v. Frankfort, 18
B. Mon. 41.
* Maher v. Chicago, 38 111. 266.
291
§164
MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS.
[CH, X.
work upon plans for a market,'^ for a survey,^ and to many
other similar cases, where there is no express contract.*^
A distinction has been made between money or property ob-
tained by the city, and service rendered in local improvements.
It has been held that a city cannot be required to compensate
the voluntary performance of a municipal duty by a person
who was not requested by the city to perform it ; * and the fact
that the city authorities saw him at work and received the
benefit, does not alter the ease.^ Another exception to the
rule of implied liability occurs in the case of local improve-
ments, for which the abutters are ultimatelj' liable. If the
contract is not made in the legally prescribed manner, the city
is not impliedly liable unless it has collected the amounts from
the adjoining owners.^
Care should be exercised in the application of the doctrine
1 Peterson v. Mayor, 11 N'. T. 450.
2 Eandall v. VanVechten, 19 Johns.
60.
8 Thomas v. Pt. Hudson, 27 Mich.
323; Ellsworth v. Rossiter, 26 Pac.
E. 674; 46 Kan. 237; Nicholson v.
Guardians, L. E. 1 Q. B. 620; Alle-
gheny City V. McClurkin, 14 Pa. St.
31 ; Armstrong Co. v. Clarion Co., 66
lb. 318; Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96
U. S. 341; Morville V. Tract Soc, 123
Mass. 129; Crowder v. Sullivan, (Ind.
91) 28 N. E. E. 94; Louisiana v.
Wood, 102 U. S. 294; Chapman v.,
rjouglas Co., 107 lb. 348; Mayor v.
Eay, 19 Wall. 468; Bangor S. Bk. v.
Stillwater, 49 Fed. 721; Brewer v.
Otoe, 1 Neb. 373; Sangamon Co. v.
Springfield, 63 111. 66; Marsh v. Ful-
ton, 10 Wall. 676, 684; Herzo v. San
Francisco, 33 Cal. 140; Montgomery
v. M. Water Works, 79 Ala. 233; New
Haven v. New Haven & D. E. Co.,
(Conn. 93) 25 Atl. 316; Paul v. Ke-
nosha, 22 Wis. 266; Lemington v-
Blodgett, 37 Vt. 215; Searcy v. Tar-
nell, 47 Ark. 269; Carey v. East Sag-
inaw, (Mich.) 44 N. W. E. 168; State
Board v. Aberdeen, 56 Miss. 518;
Moore v. Mayor, 73 N. Y. 238; Eyan
292
V. Coldwater, (Kan. 91) 26 Pac. E. 675 ;
Nelsou V. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 535 ; Oneida
Bank v. Ontario Bank, 21 lb. 495;
McDonald v. Mayor, 68 lb. 23; North
Pac. L. & M. Co. v. East Portland,
12 Pac. E. 4; 14 Oregon, 3; Shrews-
bury v. Brown, 25 Vt. 197; Gassett
V. Andover, 21 lb. 342. Contra, Sei-
brecht v. New Orleans, 12 La. An.
496; Jones v. Lancaster, 4 Pick. 149;
Loker V. Brookline, 13 lb. 343; Wood
V. Waterville, 5 Mass. 294; Bentley v.
Com'rs, 25 Minn. 259.
* Salsbury v. Phila., 44 Pa. St. 303;
Huntington v. Boyle, 9 Ind. 296; Jef-
fersouville v. The J. Shallcross, 35
lb. 19.
6 Nelson V. City, 29 N. E. E. 814;
131 N. Y. 4; Alton v. Mulledy, 21 111.
76; Elizabeth v. White, 48 Ohio St.
577; 29 N. E. E. 47; Brown v. Melrose,
(Mass. 92) 30 N. E. E. 87.
« Argeuti v. San Francisco, 16 Cal.
255; Craycraftv. Selvage, 10 Bush,
696; lb. 549; Saxton v. St. Joseph,
60 Mo. 153. The same where the
assessment lias been declared void.
Polk Co. Savings Bk. v. State, 69
Iowa, 24; Schofleld v. Council Bluffs,
68 lb. 695.
CH. X.]
MUNICIPAL CONTEACTS.
§165
of implied contracts ; ^ for, although a city may he liable for
money or property received, it will not be liable when the
money or property is received and used in disregard of positive
legal prohibitions.^ The law will never impose an obligation
to do an act contrary to duty or to law ; and a promise to car-
ry out a contract can never be implied, where the cit}' has no
legal power to do it.^ So, when a city charter prescribes, that
all municipal contracts shall be made in a certain way,* as in
writing,^ or when a city attempts to make a contract, by which
it agrees not to exercise part of the franchise committed to it
for public purposes,^ there is no room for saying that there is
an implied contract. This exception to the general rule has
been frequently recognized, where there has been a neglect to
observe the charter requirement, that contracts should be
awarded to the lowest bidder. Inasmuch as the contract in
this case is void and illegal, the courts will not imply a prom-
ise to pay, because a plain statutory requirement has been dis-
regarded.''
§ 165. Mode of contracting — Use of writing or of seal —
Statute of Frauds.^It is well settled that when the mode of
making municipal contracts is plainly prescribed by law, such
mode is exclusive and must be closely adhered to, in order that
the contract may be valid.^ A party dealing with a corpora-
1 Peterson v. Mayor, 17 N. T. 449,
453; Poultney v. Wells, 1 Aiken, 180.
2 State Board v. Cit. S. R. Co., 47
Incl. 407; Sohell v. L. M. Eumsey
Co., 39 Mo. App. 264; McDonald v.
,New York, 68 X. Y. 23. '
8 BurriU v. Boston, 2 Clife. C. C.
590; Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall.
1, 12; Spitzer v. Blanchard, 82 Mich.
234; Murphy v. Louisville, 9 Bush,
189; Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 532;
Meyer v. Keyser, (Md. 91) 19 Atl. 706.
* Pimental v. San Francisco, 21
Cal. 351; Starkey v. Minneapolis, 19
Minn. 203 ; Dickenson v. Poughkeep-
Bie, 74 N. Y. 65.
^ McDonald v. Mayoi-, 68 N. Y. 23.
« Cornell v. Guilford, 1 Denio, 510;
St. Louis V. Gas Co., 5 Mo. App. 484,
529; Thomas v. Kiohraond, 12 Wall.
349; Morgan v. Menzies, 60 Cal. 341.
' Ryoe V. Osage, (Iowa, 93) 45 N.
W. R. 532; Hodges v. Buffalo, 2
Denio, 110 ; McBrien v. Grand Rapids,
56 Mich. 95; see cases under §165,
Mode of Contracting, and § 172, Ad-
vertising for, Bids; Parr v. Green-
bush, 72 N. Y. 463; Brady v. New
York, 20 lb. 312.
8 Beers v. Dalles, 18 Pac. 835; Lit-
tlefield T. Boston etc. Co., 146 Mass.
268; 15 N. E. E. 268; Mayor v. Key-
ser, (Md. 91) 19 Atl. 706; Crutchfleld
v. Warrensburg, 30 Mo. App. 456;
Prince v. City of Quincy, 28 111. App.
490; 21 N. E. K. 768; 128 111. 443;
Spilman v. Parkersburg, 35 W. Va.
605; Goldsboro v. Moffatt, 49 Fed.
B. 213; Cartersville Imp. Gas & W.
Co. V. Cartersville, (Ga. 93) 16 S. E.
293
§165
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. X.
tion is under the necessity of observing all the mandatory pro-
visions of the law himself, and of seeing that the municipal
corporation does the same, or suffer the consequences of his
neglect.! The act creating the corporation is the source from
which it derives its power to contract; and if in this act, or in
the charter, a mode is prescribed in which the power is to be
exercised, any contract not so made will be as invalid as though
the city had never been incorporated at all.^ If, for example,
the charter requires that a certain class of contracts must be
authorized by a vote of the municipal taxpayers, a contract not
so sanctioned is void.^ It is not only in making a contract, but
likewise in annulling or altering it, that the proper statutory
regulations must be strictly complied with.* Thus, it has been
K. 25 ; State v. Passaic, 41 K J. L.
90; Periine v. Farr, 22 lb. 356; Car-
rou V. Martin, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 594;
Athens v. Hemerick, (Ga. 93) 16 S.
E. E. 72; State v. Marion Co,, 21
Kan. 419; Eeis v. Graff, 51 Cal. 86;
Addis V. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St. 379;
McBean v. San Bernardino, (Cal. 93)
31 Pao. E. 49; McDonald v. Mayor,
68 N. Y. 23; McCoy v. Brant, 53 Cal.
247; Mt. Adams & Inclined Ey. Co.
v. Cincinnati, 25 Wldy. Law Bui. 91 ;
Baltimore v. Eeynolds, 20 Md. 1;
Durango v. Pennington, 8 Cal. 257;
Worthington v. Covington, 82 Ky.
265 ; Sohell City v. Eumsey, 39 Mo.
App. 264; Laycock v. Baton Eouge,
36 La. An. 475; North Pao. etxs. Co.
V. E. Portland, 14 Oreg. 3; Spitzer
V. Blanchard, 46 N. W. E. 400; 82
Mich. 234; Los Angeles G. Co. v.
Toberraan, 61 Cal. 199; Terre Haute
V. Lake, 43 Ind. 480; Butler t.
Charlestown, 7 Gray, 12; Trustees v.
Cherry, 8 Ohio St. 564; McCracken
V. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591 ; Dey v.
Jersey City, 19 N. J. Eq. 412; Bank
V. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, 68; Dig-
gle V. Eailway Co., 5 Exch. 442.
1 New Decatur v. Berry, 7 So. E.
838; 90 Ala. 432; Sullivan v. Lead-
ville, 11 Colo. 483; McBrien v. Grand
Eapids, 56 Mich. 95; K«,nsas City v.
294
Flanagan, 69 Mo. 22; Eeilly v. Phila-
delphia, 60 Pa. St. 467; St. Louis v.
Davidson, 14 S. W. E. 825 ; 102 Mo.
149; Murphy v. Louisville, 9 Bush,
189; Crutchiield v. Warrensburg, 30
Mo. App. 456; People's K. E. v. Mem.
E. E., 10 Wall. 38; Ziegler v. Chapin,
13 N. Y. S. 783; 59 Hun, 214: 27 N.
E. E. 471; Steckert v. E. Saginaw,
22 Mich. 104; Niles W. Wks. v. Niles,
59 lb. 311; Bonesteel v. Mayor, 22 N.
Y. 162; Starkey v. Minneapolis, 19
Minn. 203 ; Heidelberg v. St. Francois
Co., 100 Mo. 69; Jones v. Town of
Lind, (Wis. 90) 48 N. W. E. 247; Hunt
V. Wimbledon Loc. Board, 4 Ont.
Eep. C. P. D. 48; Kenney v. Jersey
City, 47 N. J. L. 449; Henderson v.
Marietta, 64 Ga. 286; Wilhelm v.
Cedar Co., 50 Iowa, 254; Gates v.
Hancock, 45 N. H. 528; Dey v. Jer-
sey City, 19 N. J. Eq. 412; Bentley
V. Com'rs, 25 Minn. 259; People v.
Weber, 89 111. 347; Butler v. Nevin,
88 lb. 575; Mathewson v. Grand
Eapids, 50 N. W. K. 651 ; 88 Mich.
558; Driftwood V. T. Co. v. Com'rs,
72 Ind. 226.
2 Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheaf.
64, 68.
3 Niles W. Wks. v. Niles, 59 Mich.
311.
* Terre Haute v. Lake, 43 Ind. 480.
CII. X.]
MtTNICIPAL CONTRACTS.
§165
held that a contract, authorized by ordinance, can only be can-
celed or altered by a similarly authenticated act.^ But if the
charter mode of dealing is not absolutely mandatory, the con-
tract may be upheld, although the details of the prescribed
mode are not strictly complied with.^ So, when a charter pre-
scribed that money should be drawn from the treasury upon an
order of the council, signed by the mayor, an order founded
upon a memorandum, without a formal order being entered, was
considered a sulficient compliance with the statute.^ And so^
also, when the statute requires a specific condition in a munici^
pal contract, the precise words of the statute need not be used ;
but if the contract by a reasonable construction can be said to
substantially contain the condition, it will suffice.* General
provisions of a mandatory nature, that no contract will bind the
city unless an appropriation has been made therefor, are impli-
edly repealed pro tanto by a subsequent special act, requiring a,
certain official or department to purchase supplies, but making
no appropriation to pay for them.^ If no mode be prescribed,
valid contracts, within the limits of the corporate powers, may
be entered into in the same manner that natural persons make
contracts.^ An}"^ prescribed mode of contracting will be strictly
confined to that sort of contracts, or the particular class of
officials, to which it is applicable ; and, it has been held, will not
prevent the making of other valid contracts by the corporation
through its officers and agents, according to the ordinary cus-
tom and usage of the business world.'' When no bad faith or
fraud is shown to exist, the State is precluded from interfering,
through its attorney-general, to enjoin the corporation from ex-
ecuting a contract ; merely because charter formalities, prelimi-
nary thereto, have not been followed.*
1 Sacramento v. Kirk, 7 Cal. 449.
2 Kelly V. Mayor, 4 Hill (^. Y.)
263; Moqre v. Mayor, 73 N. Y. 238;
Neiffer v. Bank, 1 Head (Tenn.) 162;
Pennington v. Taniere, 12 Q. B. 998,
1013; M add ox v. Graham, 2 Met.
(Ky.) 56 ; People v. Yonkers, 39 Barb.
266.
»Kelley v. Mayor, etc., 4 Hill (N.
T.) 263.
4 Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240.
"Assessors, etc , v. Commission-
ers, 3 Brews. (Pa.) 333.
6 Booth V. Shreveport, 29 La. An.
581; Indianola v. Jones, 29 Iowa,
282; Buncombe v. Ft. Dodge, 38 lb.
281 ; Burrill V. Boston, 2 Cliff. (U. S.)
590; Selma v. Mullen, 46 Ala. 411.
Montgomery v. Barber, 45 Ala. 237.
' Indianola V. Jones, supra; Baker
V. Johnson, 33 Iowa, 151.
8Atty. Gen. v. Detroit, 55 Mich.
181; 5 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 497;
Attorney General v. Detroit, 26
Mich. 263.
295
§165
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. X.
Municipal corporations may, unless expressly prohibited, en-
ter into parol contracts through their duly authorized agents. ^
But if the statutes provide that a contract of a municipality
shall be in writing, the provision must be observed, or the con-
tract will be void.2
So, a municipal contract, not to be performed within a year,
is within the Statute of Frauds ; and a resolution or ordinance,
approving a contract of this sort, does not constitute a signing,
as required by that statute.^ Generally, however, a municipal
corporation may contract by ordinance, and a regularly enacted
ordinance or resolution dulj-^ passed by the governing body, ac-
cepting a proposition made to the city, constitutes an assent,
and fulfills the requirement of a note or memorandum in writ-
ing.*
The ancient common law rule required all contracts of cor-
porations to be under seal. But that rule is no longer observed,
and it is now well settled that the contract of a municipal cor-
poration, in the absence of express legislative enactment, need
not be under seal.^
But when a contract is executed under the seals of officials.
^ Baker v. Johnson Co., 33 Iowa,
151 ; Duncombe v. Ft. Dodge, 38 Iowa,
281; Selma v. Mullen, 46 Ala. 411;
Logansport v. Dykeman, 116 lud. 15.
2 McDonald v. Mayor etc., 68 N". Y.
23; 23 Am. Eep. 144; Maupin v.
Franklin Co., 67 Mo. 327; Condon v.
Jersey City, 43 ST. J. L. 412; Stewart
V. Cambridge, 125 Mass. 102; Starkey
V. Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 203; Logans-
port V. Blaokmore, 17 Ind. 318; Carey
V. East Saginaw, (Micli.) 44 N. W.
Kep. 168.
3 Wade V. Newbern, 77 K. C. 460.
* Draper v. Springport, 104 U. S.
501 ; Montgomery v. Barber, 45 Ala.
237; Clark v. Washington, 12 Wheat.
524; Halbut v. Forrest City, 34 Ark.
246; Wiles v. Hoss, 114 Ind. 371;
Alton V. Mulledy, 21 111. 76; Ross v.
Madison, 1 Ind. 281; Bellmyer v.
Marshalltown, 44 Iowa, 564; Fanning
V. Gregoire, 16 How. (XJ. S.) 524;
Abby V. Billups, 35 Miss. 618 ; Sacrar
296
mento v. Kirk, 7 Cal. 419; People v.
Supervisors, 27 Cal. 655; Argus Co.
V. Mayor etc., 55 N. Y. 495; Logans-
port V. Blackmore, 17 Ind. 318; San
Antonio v. Lewis, 9 Tex. 69; Detroit
V. Jackson, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 106.
^ Beers v. Dalles, 18 Pac. E. 835 ;
Trustees v. Moody, 62 Ala. 389; Bur-
lington V. Plank Kd., 11 Iowa, 75;
Sheffield Sch. Township v. Andress,
56 Ind. 157; Crutchfield v. Warrens-
burg, 30 Mo. App. 456; Buckley v.
Briggs, 30 Mo. 452; McCullough v.
Talladega etc. , 46 Ala. 376 ; Gadsboro
V. MofEatt, 49 Fed. E. 213;. Watson
V. Bennett, 12 Barb. 196; Flecknerv.
U. S. Bank, 8 Wheat. 338, 357; De-
troit V. Davis, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 106;
Christian Church v. Johnson, 53 Ind.
273; Missouri etc. Co. v. Com'rs, 12
Kan. 482; Bernardin v. N. DufEerin,
19 Can. S. C. K. 581; McPherson v.
Nichols (Kan. 91), 29 Pac. R. 679.
CH. X.] MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. § IGP
or of committeemen authorized to act for the town, it cannot
be considered the deed of the town ; but the paper will be re-
garded as a simple contract and binding as such on the munic-
ipal corporation, while the seals will be rejected as surplusage.
If the corporation have a seal, which is affixed to the instru-
ment by the proper official, it may then be the deed of the cor-
poration ; ^ although the affixing of a seal to an instrument by a
corporation is not conclusive of an intent to create a specialty.^
When a contract is legally made by a municipal corporation,
its assent to a variation or modification thereof may be implied
from acts relating to the work done under the contract, subse-
quent to the date of its making ; ^ but such implied assent must
emanate from the corporate officials who are legally authorized
to give it.* So, it has been held that a renewal of a contract,
which is legal in its inception, will be conclusively presumed
fiom the municipal acquiescence and tacit acceptance of bene-
fits thereunder.^
The form of action, in such cases, where common law principles
of pleading obtain, is not covenant or debt, but for damages, or
in assumpsit.^
§ 166. Municipal contracts witli its agents. —It is a well
founded principle of law and of equity, the justice and fair-
ness of which is evident, that he who acts as agent or trustee
cannot be allowed to make profit out of the transaction in which
he acts, over and above the compensation which has been agreed
upon between him and his principal or the beneficiary of the
trust. The agent of the buyer cannot act at the same time as
an agent for the vendor ; nor can an agent to buy be himself
the vendor.
The opportunities to defraud, and the judicial conviction,
that one cannot act justly towards his principal, when he is
1 Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. 345,
352; Randall v. Yan Veohten, 19
Johns. 60, 65.
2 Bank v. Charlotteville etc. Co., 5
S. C. 156; Rand v. Dovey, 83 Pa. St.
280.
3 Messenger v. Buffalo, 21 N. T.
196.
< Bonesteel v. Mayor, 22 N. T. 162;
Hague V. Pliilada., 48 Pa. St. 527;
O'Hara v. New Orleans, 30 La. An.,
pt. 1, 152; Hasbrouckv. Milwaukee,
21 "Wis. 217.
' Taylor v. Lambertville, 43 N. J.
Eq. 107.
•> Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns ;
60, 65 ; Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. 345 ;
Fullam V. Bi-ookfield, 9 Allen, 1 ; Bank
V. Patterson's Adm., 7 Cranch, 299.
Clark V. Cuckfleld Union, 11 Eng. L.
& Eq. 442; Pennington v. Taniere, 12
Q. B. 1011.
297
§167
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. X.
himself interested adversely in the transaction, are the grounds
for holding all such transactions to be tainted with fraud, either
actual or constructive, and for that reason to be voidable at the
instance of the principal or beneficiary of the trust, as the case
may be.^ However much this rule may be violated by munici-
pal and other public officials, there is no doubt of the applica-
tion of the rule to them, and the decisions are numerous, in
which contracts with municipalities, in which officials were
financially interested, have been set aside.^ Thus, when the
mayor secretly contracted to purchase at a discount a large
amount of municipal debentures, which were afterwards issued
by ordinance, in the enactment of which he was actively en-
gaged, he was held to be a trustee for the city, to the amount
derived by him from the transaction.^ A citj' oflicial cannot,
while in office, become a landlord to the corporation ; and a
lease establishing such a relation has been held void* as against
public policy, which prohibits a trustee from contracting with
himself. So, it has been held that a plaintiff could not recover
a livery bill for horses and carriages, used in a celebration, the
appropriation for which was voted by a council of which he was
a member, even though the appropriation was valid.^ In Can-
ada, an action at law brought by a trading partnership against
a city can be resisted upon the ground that a member of the
firm is also a city councilman.^
§ 167. Form of contracts made by municipal agents
In contracts made by agents of private corporations, where the
only evidence in the contract tliat the agent does not intend
to bind himself is the affixing to his signature of some designa-
tion of agency, as where he signs himself as treasurer or presi-
dent, without stating for what company he is acting, it is
1 Tiedeman's Equity .Tur. § 233.
■^ Stott V. Franey, 20 Or. 410; Case
V. Johnson, 91 Ind. 477; Macon v.
Huff, 60 Ga. 221 ; Grand Is. etc. Co.
V. West, (Neb. 89) 45 N. "W. R. 242;
Com' IS V. Eeynolds, 44 Ind. 509;
Dalzell etc. Co. v. Findlay, 5 Ohio
Cir. Ct. 418; Emigrant Co. v. Wright
Co., 97 U. S. 339; Call Pub. Co. v.
Lincoln, 29 Neb. 149; McGregor v.
Logansport, 79 Ind. 168; Bellaire
etc. Co. V. Findlay, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct.
298
418; Milford v. Milf. W. Co., 124 Pa.
St. 610; 17 Ati. R. 185; Fort Wayne
V. Eosentlial, 75 Ind. 156; Butts v.
Wood, 37 N. T. 317.
3 Toronto v. Bowes, 4 Grant (Can.)
504. Cf. Collins v. Swindle, 6 lb. 282;
Cummings v. Saux, 30 La. An. 207;
Doll V. State, 45 Ohio St. 445.
* Macon v. Huff, 60 Ga. 221.
s Smith V. Albany, 61 N. Y. 444.
^ Brown v. Lindsay, 35 Up. Can.
Q. B. 509.
CH. X.]
MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS.
§167
nevertheless the individual obligation of the agents and the
company is not bound.^ This harsh and technical rule is being
very materially modified by later adjudications, in order to
avoid the infliction of wrong, and to carry out the real inten-
tions of the parties. And the rule is almost completely abro-
gated in reference to the contracts of municipal and other
public corporations. It is now a well settled rule of law that a
contract in writing, made by municipal agents, duly and legally
appointed and acting within their authority, is regarded as the
contract of the corporation, although signed by the agents in
their own name, and sealed with their own seals. But, of course,
it must be reasonably clear upon the face of the paper, that the
purpose of the agent was to act for the municipality ; and that
he did not intend to assume a personal liability.^
The contrary doctrine has been held however, in certain cases,
where the contractual liability of school districts was involved.^
' Tiedeman on Commercial Paper,
p. 202 ; Tucker v. Fairbanks, 98 Mass.
101.
2 Hatch V. Barr, 1 Ham. (Ohio)
390; Baker v. Chambles, 4 G. Greene,
(Iowa) 428; (individual signatures.)
Lyon V. Adarason, 7 Iowa, 509; Mott
V. Hicks, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 513, 534;
Blanchard v. Blackstone, 102 Mass.
343; Stanton v. Camp, (individual
signatures with "committee"added.)
4 Barb. 274, Mechanics' Bk. v. Bk. of
Columbia, 5 Wheat. 326 ; Kegents v.
Detroit, 12 Mich. 138; Hopkins v.
Mahoffy, 11 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.) 126;
Gale V. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344;
Burrill v. Boston, 2 Clife. 590; (sign-
ed by mayor.) Sweetzer v. Mead, 5
Mich. 107; Bank v. Gottschalk, 14
Pet. 19; Compare Dugan v. United
States, 3 Wheat. 172, where it was
held that the United States could
sue " when it appeared not only on
the face of the instrument but from
all the evidence that it alone was in-
terested, although the bill was pay-
able to " Tucker, Treasurer of the
U. S." Parr v. Greenbush, 72 N. Y.
463; see also Bowen v. Morris, 2
Taunt. 374, 387; Balcorabe v. Kor-
tlirup, 9 Minn. 178; (note payable to
I. E. F. U. S. Indian Agent, his suc-
cessors in office or order.) Irish v.
Webster, 5 Greenl. 171; (to " James
Irish, Land Agent of Maine." ) United
States v. Boyce, 2 McLean, 352 ; State
v. Boise, 2 Fairf. 474; School I. of
Monticello v. Kendall, 72 Ind. 208;
Andrews v. Estes, 11 Me. 267; (we,
the undersigned committee for the
First School Dis. signed A. B. C.
Committee.) Hodges v. Eunyon, 30
Mo. 491; McGee v. Larramore, 50
lb. 425; (signed "A. B. Director.")
Heidelberg v. Horst, 62 Pa. St. 301 ;
Dubois V. Canal Co., 4 Wend. 285;
Worrell v. Munn, ISeld. (N. Y.) 229;
Ford V. Williams, 13 N. Y. 577, 585;
Richardson V. Scott, etc., Co., 22 Cal.
150; Robinson v. St. Louis, 28 Mo.
488; (contract signed " G. N. S. In-
spector.")
3 Cahokia S. Trustees v. Ranten-
berg, 88 111. 219; Bayliss v. Peterson,
15 Iowa, 279; Fowler v. Atkinson, 6
Minn. 579; Bingham v. Stewart, 13
Minn. 106.
299
§168
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. X.
When a contract was made,involving subject-matter exclusively
pertaining to the corporation between " T. Van V., J. W., C.
D. C, a committee appointed by the corporation of the city
of Albany for that purpose, of the first part, and J. R. of
the second part," in which the parties of the first part prom-
ised to make certain payments and signed and sealed the
same individually, it was decided that the corporation, and
not they, were liable.^ Of course, the contract must be one
which the agent was authorized to make ; and when such
is the case, the contract is valid and binding, although there
has been no formal acceptance by a vote ; or even if it be re-
jected by the corporation.^ It must also be remembered that
the corporation is not bound by contracts which are made by its
ofBcials, while acting in their individual capacity. So, a town
in New England is not bound by the individual action of its
selectmen,^ as where a contract is signed by one for all the
selectmen.* Nor is a city liable upon a contract which is made
by a majority of its aldermen without the required legal and
otScial action of the citj' council.^ But a contract, entered
into by supervisors, for and in behalf of the board and .signed
by the chairman of the board, was held to be binding on the
county.^
§ 168. Non-liability of putolic official, acting within Ms au-
thority.— Except when public officials act beyond their author-
ity, or fail to evince in the written instruments, executed by
them, the intention to act for and in the name of the munici-
pality,'^ they cannot be held personfClly liable on contracts made
by them in their official and representative capacity.*
1 Eandall v. Van Vechten, 19 Jolms.
60; Cf. FuUam v. Brookfield, 9
Allen (Mass.) 1; Bank v. Patterson,
7 Cranch, 5J99; but compare, contra,
Alam V. Boyd, 87 Pa. St. 477, (where
contract was signed by committee, )
.and Providence v. Miller, 11 R. I.
.272.
2 Davenport v. Hallowell, 10 Me.
317; Junkins v. Scb. Dis., 39 lb. 220;
Willai'd V. Kewburyport, 12 Pick.
227; Kingsbury v. Sch. Dis., 12 Met.
99.
^Haliburton v. Frankford, 14 Mass.
300
214; Butler v. Charlestown, 7 Gray,
12; Stetson v. Kemptou, 13 Mass.
272.
* Andover v. Grafton, 7 N. H. 298,
30.5.
■^ Bntler v. Cliarlestown, 7 Gray,
12; Sikes v. Hatfield, 13 lb. 347.
6 Babcock v. Goodrich, 47 Cal. 488.
' See ante, § 167.
' Macbeath v. Haldiraoud, 1 D. &
E. Term, 172; Hodgson v. Dexter, 1
Cranch, 34; Olney v. Wickes, 18
Johns. 122; King v. Butler, 15 Johns.
281; Mott V. Hicks, 1 Cow. (N. Y)
CH. X.] MUNICIPAL CONTEACTS. § 169
Where the other contracting party knows the extent of the
ofEeial's authority he cannot hold the official personally lia-
ble, unless the intention to be personally bound is plainly ex-
pressed.^ So, also, when the officers of a municipal corporation,
acting in good faith, perform an official act, or attempt to enter
into a municipal contract, under an innocent mistake of law
that they have legal authority to do so, in which mistaken im-
pression the other party shares, no liability attaches, either to
the officials personally, or to the corporation.^
This rule of nonliability is justified by the fact, that the
scope of the authority of a municipal or other public official is
easily ascertained by any one, who is concerned in the matter,
by an examination of the laws, from which alone the official
can derive his authority, and to which every one has equal
access. One of the necessary elements of an estoppel would
be absent in that case. It is different with the agents of pri-
vate individuals and private corporations.**
§ 169. Authority of municipal oiflcers to contract — Con-
tracts ultra vires. — Municipal corporations can contract only
by their officers, and other properly authorized agents; and the
authority of all such agents is limited to the making of such
contracts as are within the corporate purpose. Public officers
and agents are held more strictly within the express limitations
of their authority, than are officers of private corporations;
and all contracts made by them, though within the apparent
scope of their authority, are void, unless they possess actual
authority, express or implied.* Nor will the official's false rep-
Eeraington v. Ward, (Wis. 91) 47 N.
W. R. 659; Adams v. Whittlesey, 3
Conn. 560; Copes v. Mathews, 18
Miss. 398; Miller v. Ford, 4 Rich.
(S. C.) L. 376; Toungv. Com'rs etc.,
2 Nott & McC. 537.
1 Broadwell v. Chapin, 2 111. App.
511.
^Willett V. Young, (Iowa 91) 47
K. W. R. 990; Stone v. Huggins, 28
Vt. 617; Ives v. Hulet, 12 lb. 314;
Houston V. Clay Co., 18 Ind. 396;
Lyon V. Irish, 58 Mich. 518; Powell
V. Heisler, 48 N. W. E. 411; 45 Minn.
549; Hall v. Cockrell, 28 Ala. 507;
Whyte V. Mills, 8 So. 171; 64 Miss.
158; Dameron v. Irwin, 8 Ire. L.
(N. C.) 421; Ogdenv. Raymond, 22
Conn. 379; Wheeler v. Wayne Co., 31
111. App. 299; 24 N. E. 625; Duncan
V. Niles, 32 111. 532; Boardman v.
Hayne, 29 Iowa, 339; Breen v. Kelly,
47 N. W. R. 1067; 45 Minn. 852;
Tucker v. Shorter, 17 Ga. 620; Dey
V. Lee, 4 Jones, 238; Tucker v. Jus-
tices, 13 Ire. L. (N. C.) 434.
*See Tiedemau's Private Corpo-
rations, chapter on the Authority of
Agents and Officers.
iParsel v. Barnes, 25 Ark. 261,
Williams v. Peyton's Lessee,4 Wheat.
77.
301
§169
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. X.
resentations as to his authority fix a liability upon the corpora
tion for a contract which he had no authority to make.^ Thus,
a municipal corporation is not liable for extra work, ordered by
its agent without authority .^ In order to render a corporation
liable upon a contract, the contract must be one which it pos-
sessed authority to enter into. Municipal corporations like
other corporate bodies are created for certain specific purposes,
and to accomplish certain well defined objects. It follows logic-
ally that the only legal powers which the corporation possesses
are such as will effectuate the purposes for which the corpora-
tion was given existence, and any act or contract which is un-
connected with these purposes, or which will cause an application
of the corporation funds to foreign purposes, is ultra vires and
therefore void.^ And the question as to whether any act is
1 Chemung Can. Bk. v. Sup'rs, 5
Denio, 517; Albany v. Cunllff, 2
Const. 178; Delafield v. State, 2 Hill
(N. Y.) 159, 174; 26 "Wend. 192;
Hodges V. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110; 3
Const. 430; 2 Barb. 104; Famsworth
V. Pawtucket, 13 R. I. 82; Belleview
V. Hohn, 82 Ky. 1; Sup'rs v. Bates,
17 N. T. 242; Norwich v. Pharsalia,
15 lb. 341; Tippecanoe v. Cox, 6Ind.
403; Inhabitants v. Weir, 9 lb. 224.
2 Hague V. Phila., 48 Pa. St. 527;
O'Hara v. New Orleans, 30 La. An.
152; Bonesteel V. Mayor, 22 N. T. 162;
Stuart V. Cambridge, 125 Mass. 102.
8 Dorsey v. Whitehead, 47 Ark. 205 ;
Bass etc. Co. v. Parke Co., 115 Ind.
234; Seibrecht v. New Orleans, 12
La. An. 496; Loker v. Brookline, 13
Pick. 343, 348; Standley v. Perry, 23
Grant (U. C.) 507; Campbell v. El-
ma, 13 Up. Can. 296; Western Col-
lege V. Cleveland, 12 Ohio, 375; Bate-
man V. Covington,(Ky. 91) 14 S. W.
E. 361; New Decatur v. Berry, 90
Ala. 432; 7 So. R. 838; Smead v.
Indianapolis etc. Co., 11 Ind. 104;
Brady v. New York, 20 N. Y. 312 ;
Pa. etc. Co. V. Dandridge, 8 Gill & J.
(Md.) 248, 319; Hodges v. Buffalo, 2
Denio (N. Y.) 210; St. Louis v. David-
son, 102 Mo. 149; Carlyle W. etc. Co.
302
V. Carlyle, 31 111. App. 325; Philadel-
phia V. Flanigan, 47 Pa. St. 21 ; Hal-
stead V. New York, 3 N. Y. 430; Mar-
tin V. Mayor, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 545;
Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676;
Leavenworth v. Rankin, 2 Kan. 357;
Zeigler v. Chapin, 27 N. E. R. 471;
Altgelt V. San Antonio, 81 Tex. 436 ;
Overseers v. New Berlin etc., 18
Johns. 382; Donovan v. New York,
33 N. Y. 291 ; Horn v. Baltimore, 30
Md. 218; Bridgeport v. Housa. R. Co.,
15 Conn. 475, 493; Mathewson v.
Grand Rapids, 88 Mich. 558 ; Ryce v.
Osage, (Iowa, 93) 55 N. W. R. 532;
Bateman v. Ashton, 3 Hurl. & Nor.
323; Montgomery C. C. v. M. W. P.
R. Co., 1 Ala. 76; Dill v. Wareham,
7 Met. (Mass.) 438; Branham v. San
Jose, 24 Cal. 585, 602; McCoy v.
Brant, 53 Cal. 247; Grafton v. Ell-
wood, 32 Pac. R. 1026; Hamilton v.
Shelbyville,(Ind. 93) 33 N. E. R. 1007;
State V. Bayonne, (N. J. 93) 26 Atl.
R. 81; Treadway v. Schnauber, 1
Dak. Ter. 236; Craycraft v. Selvage,
10 Bush, 696; Baltimore v. Musgrave,
48 Md. 472; State v. Haskell, 20
Iowa, 276; Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex.
532; Neely v. Yorkvllle, 10 S. C. 141;
People V. Baraga, 39 Mich. 534; Rich-
mond V. Munic, 8 Up. Can. Q. B
CH. X.J
MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS.
§1G9
ultra vires, is to be decided only upon a careful consideration of
the charter and collateral legislation, affecting or controlling the
powers of municipal corporations in general, or of the particular
corporation under inquiry .^
It does not affect the application of the principle of ultra vires
to municipal contracts, that they were acquiesced in or known
to the majority of the citizens.^ So, also, payment for a portion
of the work done under a contract, coupled with a denial of
Corporate liability as to the balance, will not estop the city from
setting up the plea of ultra vires as a bar to a recovery of the
residue of the claim on the contract.^ When the consideration,
which is received by the city under an ultra vires contract, can
be restored, equity will order this to be done before relieving
the corporation from liability.*
If, in dealing with individuals, a municipal corporation makes
contracts in the exercise of a power which it does not possess,
it will not be excused from its obligations thus assumed, if they
can be performed by means of other powers which it does pos-
sess.® Thus, if a contract be entered into by a municipal cor-
poration, which as such is not invalid, because against public
567; Baby v. Baby, 5 lb. 510; Barley's
App., 103 Pa. St. 273; Lincoln v.
Stockton, 75' Me. 141; Jackson v.
Bowman, 39 Miss. 671; Salt Lake
City V. HoUister, 118 U. S. 256; Bate-
raan v. Covington, (Ky. 91) 14 S. W.
E. 361 ; Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass.
272; Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. 396;
New Jersey v. Fire Com'rs, 34 N. J.
Eq. 117; Maupin v. Franklin Co., 67
Mo. 327; Montgomery v. Water Co.,
(Ala. 91) 9 So. R. 339; Clark v. Polk
Co., 19 Iowa, 248; Perry v. Superior
City, 23 Wis. 64; Boom v. Utica, 2
Barb. 104; Cornell v. Guilford, 1
Denio, 510; Spitzer v. Blanchard, 46
N. W. R. 400; 82 Mich. 234; Mitchell
V. Rockland, 45 Me. 496; Estep v.
Keokuk Co., 18 Iowa, 199; Boyland
V. Mayor, 1 Sandf. 27; Vincent v.
Nantucket, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 103, 105;
Wood V. Lynn, 1 Allen, 108; Spald-
ing V. Lowell, 23 Pick. 71.
1 Vaile V. Independence, 22 S. W.
R. 695; Pearce v. Madison etc. Co.,
21 How. 441 ; Moore v. New York,
73 N. T. 238; Cheeney v. Brookfield,
60 Mo. 53; Philadelphia v. Jewell,
21 Atl. R. 239; 140 Pa. St. 9. Con-
tracts surrendering legislative dis-
cretion (Martin v. Mayor, 1 Hill, 545),
against public policy (Indianapolis
V. (Jas Co., 66 Ind. 396), or parting
with inherent governmental power
(Gas Co. V. Middletown, 59 N. Y.
228; Lord v. Oconto, 47 Wis. 386;
State V. New Brunswick, 30 N. J. L.
395), are of course invalid.
''■ Allegheny City v. McClurkin, 14
Pa. St. 81; Loker v. Brookline, 13
Pick. 343.
'People V. New York, 1 Hill, 362.
♦Turner v. Cruzen, 70 Iowa, 202;
Pratt V. Short, 53 How. Pr. 506;
Moore v. Mayor, 73 N. Y. 238; Leon-
ard v. Canton, 35 Miss. 189; Lucas
Co. V. Hunt, 5 Ohio St. 488.
6 Maher v. Chicago, 38 HI. 267.
303
§169
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. X.
policy, or beyond the scope of the corporate power, it will be
still binding upon the corporation, even though the corporation
has no authority to issue the bonds, or other municipal paper,
by which it has agreed to pay for the same. The contract, being
valid, creates an obligation to pay ; and it is no defence, to an
action instituted to recover payment, to say that the method
provided in the contract was illegal, when there were other
lawful methods of raising the necessary funds. The suit would
be on the original indebtedness, and not on the bonds.^
Not only is the defence of ultra vires good when it is sought
to fix a contractual liability upon a municipality, 'but it may be
interposed by a party against whom the city is seeking to re-
cover damages in tort.^ An illustration of this may be found
in a case, where the city loaned its securities to a party who
was to raise money thereon, and pay for a road which the city
had no authority, either to construct, or to assist in construct-
ing. X penal bond, taken by the city to secure the proper ap-
plication of this money, was held to be invalid, and in order
1 In a case, in which this question
was decided in the Supreme Court
of the United States, Mr. Justice
Strong said: "If payments cannot
be made in bonds, because their is-
sue is ultra vires, it would be sanc-
tioning ranlc injustice to hold that
payment cannot be made at all.
Such is not the law. The contract
between the parties is in force so far
as it is lawful. There may be a dif-
ference between the case of an en-
gagement made by a corporation to
do an act expressly prohibited by
its charter, or some other law, and a
case where legislative power to do
the act has not been gi-anted. Such
a distinction is asserted in some de-
cisions. But the present is not a
case in which the issue of the bonds
was prohibited by statute. At most
the issue was unauthorized; at most
there was a defect of power. The
promise to give bonds to the plain-
tiff, in payment of what they under-
304
took to do, was therefore at farthest
ultra vires ; and in such a case, though
specific performance of an engage-
ment to do a thing, transgressive of
its corporate power, may not be en-
forced, the. corporation can be held
liable on its contract. Having re-
ceived benefits at the expense of the
other contracting party, it cannot
object that it was not empowered to
perform what it promised to perform
in the mode in which it promised to
perform.'' Hitchcock v. Galveston,
9b U. S. 341; see also, Board v. Citi-
zens etc. Co., 47 Ind. 407; Allegheny
City V. McClurkin, 14 Pa. St. 81;
Maher v. Chicago, 38 111. 266; Oneida
Bk. V. Ontario Bank, 21 N. Y. 495 ;
Argenti v. San Francisco, 10 Cal.
256; Silver Lake Bk. v. Nortli, 4
Johns. Ch. 373.
2 Montgomei-y C. Council v. E. R.
Co., 31 Ala. 76; Penn. etc. Co. v.
Dandridge, 8 Gill & J. 248, 319;
Hodges V. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110.
CH. X.J
MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS.
§170
that the city may recover, it had to bring its action in some
other mode than upon the contract.^
But when a city, having without charter power guaranteed
the bonds of a railroad, became their owner by being compelled
to pay them, it was held that, while the liability of the city
might have been successfully disputed in an action to enforce
the guaranty, the want of authority did not defeat its lien on
the railroad, as against other creditors of the road.^
§ 170. Ratification, what constitutes. — A municipal cor-
poiation is not bound by a contract made by its agent or officer,
which the agent or ofScer had no authority to make. But if
the contract is for a corporate purpose, and within the powers
conferred upon the municipality by its charter, or by the gen-
eral law, it may be ratified by the corporation and become bind-
ing upon it.^ So, also, contracts, made in the name of a corpo-
reity Council V. Plank Eoad Co.,
31 Ala. 76; Wetumpka v. Winter, 29
lb. 6.51 ; Halstead v. New York, 3 N.
T. 430; Bridgeport V. Housatonic E.
Co., 15 Conn. 475, 493.
-Hay V. Alexandria etc. Co., 20
Fed. Rep. 15.
3 Fort Wayne v. Lake Shore & M.
S. Ry. Co., 32 N. E. R. 215; 132 Ind.
558; East Hampton v. Bowman, 136
N. T. 521; Emerson v. Newbury, 13
Pick. 377; People v. Detroit, 28 Mich.
228; 15 Am. Rep. 202; Burrill v. Bos-
ton, 2 Cliff. 590; Silsbry M. Co. v.
Allentown, (Pa. 93) 26 Atl. R. 646;
Moore v. Allen, 98 N. Y. 396; City
Bank v. Albany, 92 lb. 363; Hotohin
V. Kent, 8 Mich. 526; Estey v. West-
minster, 97 Mass. 324; Marshall Co.
V. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772 ; People v.
Swift, 31 Cal. 26; Kinsley v. Norris,
60 N. H. 131; Marsh v. Fulton Co.,
10 Wall. 676; Episcopal C. So. v.
Episcopal Church, 1 Pick. 372; Davis
V. Mayor, 61 Mich. 530; Crawshaw v.
Roxbury, 8 Gray, 374; Gifford v.
White Plains, 25 Hun, 606; Topsham
V. Rogers, 42 Vt 189; Murphy v.
Louisville, 9 Bush, 189; Cory v.
Freeholders, 44 N. J. L. 445; San
20
Francisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco,
9 Cal. 453 ; Bleu V. Bear River etc.
Co., 20 lb. 602; 81 Am. Dec. 132; Har-
ris v. School District, 28 N. H. 65;
Bruce v. Dickey, 116111. 527; Schmidt
v. Stearns, 34 Minn. 112; People v.
Lathrop, 24 Mich. 235; Strong v. Dis-
trict, 1 Mackey, 265 ; Wilson v. School
District, 32 N. H. 118; Back man v.
Charlestown, 42 lb. 125 ; Brown v.
Winterport, 79 Me. 305; Chouteau v.
Allen, 70 Mo. 290; Clarke v. Lyon
Co., 8 Nev. 181; Mills v. Gleason, 11
Wis. 470; 78 Am. Dec. 721; Lamm v.
Port Deposit etc., 49 Md. 233; N. O.
V. Southern Bank., 31 La. An. 560;
Howe V. Keeler, 27 Conn. 538; St.
Louis v. Armstrong, 56 Mo. 298;
Trottv. Warren, 11 Me. 227; Sulli-
van V. School District, 39 Kan. 347;
Shawneetown V. Baker, 85 111. 563;
Peterson v. Mayor, 17 N. Y. 449;
Hoyt V. Thompsim, 19 lb. 207, 218;
Squire v. Cartwright, 22 N. Y. S.
899; Brady V. Mayor, 20 N. Y. 312;
Dubuque F. Cul. v. Township etc.,
13 Iowa, 555 ; Merrick v. Burlington
etc. Co., 11 lb. 74; Galveston v. Mor-
ton, 53 Tex. 409;: Strong v. District,
1 Mackey, iGd»
305
§170
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. X.
ration, before it has been chartered,^ or before it has received
legislative authority to contract,^ may be ratified by the corpo-
ration after it has been incorporated, or authorized to contract.
The distinction between contracts which are illegal, because
beyond the corporate power, or against public policy, and those
which are merely unauthorized by the corporation, is important.
The unauthorized action of the officer, if within the corporate
power, can be ratified by the corporation. But a contract ultra
vires cannot be ratified, unless the power to do so is expressly
conferred by the Legislature.^ It is well settled that the Leg-
islature may within constitutional limits ratify or authorize the
ratification of a municipal contract.*
When the statutes prescribe a special mode in which alone a
valid contract can be made by the municipality, and the con-
tract is invalid, because of non-compliance with the statutory
requirement, it must be observed in any act of ratification.
Thus, where a corporation could only make a valid contract
by ordinance, the ratification is required to be by ordinance,*
and cannot be ratified by a subsequent resolution.^ So, also, a
ratification by one board, in a case where two boards should
have concurred originally,^ or the approval of the bill by a
^ Dubuque Fein. Col. v. Dis. Towns,
13 Iowa, 555.
2 Mills V. Gleasou, 11 Wis. 470.
' Peterson v. Mayor, 17 N. Y. 449,
454; Nash v. St. Paul, 11 Minn. 174;
Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 532; Parsons
V. Monmouth, 70 Me. 262; Jefferson
Co. V. Arrighi, 54 Miss. 6fi8; Wilhelm
V. Cedar Co., 50 Iowa, 254; Buttrick
V. Lowell, 1 Allen, 172 ; 19 Am. Dec.
721; Shawneetown v. Baker, 85 111.
563; Cory v. Freeholders, 44 N. J. L.
445 ; Green v. Cape May, 41 lb. 45 ;
Hague V. Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St.
528; Union Township v, Gibboney,
94 lb. 534; Reilly v. Phila., 60 Pa.
St. 467; Sault St. Marie Co. v. Dusen,
40 Mich. 429; Taymouth v. Koehler,
35 lb. 22; Brady v. Mayor, 20 N. Y.
312; McDonald v. Mayor, 68 lb. 23;
Smith V. Newberg, 77 lb. 130; Hor-
ton V. Thompson, 71 lb. 513; Brown
V. Mayor, 63 lb. 239; Cowen v. W.
306
Troy, 43 Barb. 48; Lewis v. Shreve-
port, 108 U. S. 282; Water Co. v. San
Diego, 59 Cal. 517; Bank t. States-
ville, 84 N. C. 169; Laredo v. Mao-
donnell, 52 Tex. 511.
* Campbell v. Kenosha, 5 Wall. 194;
Supervisors v. Schenck, lb. 772;
Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 111. 405;
Winn V. Macon, 21 Ga. 275; Grogan
V. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590; Has-
brouck V. Milwaukee, 21 Wis. 217.
^ Cory V. Freeholders, 44 N. J. L.
445; People V. Swift, 31 Cal. 28; Zott-
man v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96;
McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal.
623 ; Durango v. Pennington, 81 Colo.
257.
6 Cross V. Morristown, 18 N. J. Eq.
305; Newman v. Emporia, 32 Kan.
456; and see ante, § 145.
' State V. Jersey City, 47 N. J. L.
449.
CH. X.]
MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS.
§171
board, a subcommittee of which had given the order through
its chairman, 1 will not siifl&ce.^
It has been held that a city may ratify an unauthorized con-
tract for the erection of a building, by using it when completed.^
But this is not ordinarily the rule.* So, the voting of an addi-
tional tax, to be applied to building, does not ratify expenditures
be5'ond the amount already appropriated.^
Part payment will not constitute a ratification of either an
illegal or unauthorized contract, entered into by municipal offi-
cials.* But it has been held that a ratification may be inferred
from the presentation and credit of bills for materials which are
furnished by officials, having the authority to contract for them
originally.'
§ 171. Contracts for public works— Contractor's bonds —
Payment. — When a contract for a public work has been made,
in which the price payable is the full sum authorized to be ex-
pended, alterations increasing the cost are illegal and void.'
But when a legal contract has been made, the amount payable
thereon cannot be reduced by a resolution limiting the expend-
iture, which is passed after the work had been completed, and
of which the other contracting party had no notice.^ If a lim-
ited fund be provided by legislative authority for special pur-
poses, a contract within the limit is not invalidated by the fact,
that subsequent contracts were made which exhausted the ap-
1 Keeney v. Jersey City, 47 N. J.
L. 449.
^Wilhelra v. Cedar Co., 50 Iowa,
254.
8 Fisher V. Sch. Dls.No. l'7,4Cush.
494; Abbott v. Hermon, 7 Me. 118;
Hayden v. Madison, 7 Me. 76 ; Hay-
ward V. Sch. Dis. No. 13, 2 Cush.
419; Moor v. Cornville, 13 Me. 293;
People V. Swift, 31 Cal. 26; Keyser
V. Sch. Dis., 35 N. H. 477.
» Davis V. Sch. Dis. No. 2, 24 Me.
349; Wilson v. Sch. Dis., 32 N. H.
118; Pratt v. Swanton, 15 Vt. 147;
Dullanty v. Town of Vaughn, (Wis.)
45 N. W. Rep. 1128; Lokerv. Brook-
line, 13 Pick. 343; Knowlton v. Plan-
tation No. 4, 14 Me. 20; Springfield
Co. V. Lane Co., 5 Oreg. 265; Sceery
V. Springfield, 112 Mass. 512; Hay-
den V. Madison, 7 Greenl. 79; Mor-
ris V. Dixfield, 30 Me. 157, 160.
^Turney v. Bridgeport, 55 Conn.
412; King v. Mahaska, 75 Iowa, 329.
sDurango v. Pennington, 8 Colo.
257; Milford v. Mil. Water Co., 124
Pa. St. 610.
'• Albany City Nat. Bk. v. Albany,
92 N. T. 363; 2 Am. & Eng. Cor.
Cas. 61.
8 King V. Mahaska Co., 75 Iowa,
329; 24 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 577
Kingsley v. Brooklyn, 78 N. T. 200
Turney v. Bridgeport, 55 Com. 412
Pim. V. Mun. Cor. of Ontario, Ont.
Rep. 9 C. P. D. 304.
'Duncombe v. Fort Dodge, 38
Iowa, 281.
307
MIXSICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. X
propriation.i Generally, where the expenditure is not limited,
the contractor may recover for extra work done, although it
may not have been formally contracted for ; ^ particularly, if
the extra work done, or material furnished, was rendered nec-
essary by the action of the municipality.* Estimates must al-
ways be adhered to, in contracting for public works ; * but a
discrepancy, due to clerical error, between the plans and the
ordinance, will not necessarily render the whole contract in-
valid.°
Bonds are usuallj' required of contractors, doing work for
a municipaUty, conditioned that the contractor will pay all just
claims against him for labor or material as the same shall ma-
ture.® And the city may maintain an action thereon for all
damages sustained bj' it, because of the contractor's defanlt in
meeting his obligations.' This, however, is only a right of the
city ; and it has been held that the creditors of the defanlting
contractors could not maintain an action on ~a:-h a bond in
their own names.* In Michigan, when the eitv ~ interest is
such that, if it were a private individual, no mechanic'f lien
could attach, it is not the duty of the city to require a bond of
the contractor ; ^ nor is the validity of a contract affected by faQ-
ure to do so.^" When several persons as contractors g-ive a
bond for the faithful performance of a contract with the citv, a
surety thereon is not released from liability for breach of the
bond, by a notice, given under a clause in the contract, to dis-
continue work, followed by a subsequent reletting of the work
to another contractor, and the completion of the work bv the
city."
A municipal corporation may stipulate, that no payments
shall be made to a contractor, while any claims are outstand-
1 Cincinnati v. Cameron,. 33 Ohio
St. 336.
■^ Green v. Orford, 15 Ont 506; 24
Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 617.
' Messenger v. Buffalo, 21 X. T.
196.
* Ireland r. Rochester, 51 Barh. 414.
^Eyennan V. Provenchere, 15 Mo.
App. 256.
■^St. Paul T. Butler, 39 Minn. 4.59.
308
"Mayor, etc. v. Crawford, 111 X.
T. ass.
8 state Bk. etc. v. Heney, 40 Minn.
145.
* Eaton V. Monroe, 63 Mich. 525.
•' Carey v. East Saginaw, 44 X. W.
Rep. 168.
"Xewton T. Devlin, 134 Mass. 490;
see this case also for the extent of
surety's liability upon his principal's
default.
CH. X.]
MUNICIPAL CONTEACTS.
§172
ing against him,^ and a court can order the payment, from
money so withheld, of valid claims against the contractor ; ^ and
where a certain portion of the sum, for which a contractor had
agreed to erect a building, was to be retained until its comple-
tion, he cannot recover the sum retained if he fail to complete
the building.^ If improvidently,* by mistake,^ or as an allow-
ance for his losses,^ a contractor has been overpaid, the corpora-
tion may recover the amount so paid. On the other hand, if
he is to be paid out of a particular fund, the corporation is liable,
though the fund may have been misappropriated^
The assignment of a contract for municipal work is not
against public policy ; and, unless prohibited by statute, such
assignment is valid, and does not authorize the municipal cor-
poration to terminate or repudiate the contract.^
§172. Advertising and letting to lowest bidder— Pat-
ented articles. — When the municipal authorities are required
by statute to award contracts to the lowest bidder, a contract
not so awarded is illegal ; and its illegality may be pleaded by
the city in an action brought thereon.^ Although, when not
' Knapp V. Swaney, 56 Mich. 345.
2 Merch. Bk. v. New York, 97 K.
Y. 355.
* King V. Mahaska, 75 Iowa, 329.
« State V. Flood, 26 Mo. App. 500.
5 Betts V. District, 20 Ct. of CI. 445 ;
Barnard v. District, lb. 257.
6Murdock v. District, 22 Ct. of
Claims, 464.
' Lansing v. Van Garder, 24 Mich.
456; Chaffee v. Granger, 6 lb. 51.
8 Devlin v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 8;
Philadelphia v. Lockhardt, 73 Pa.
St. 211; McCubbin v. Atchison, 12
Kan. 166; Deffenbaugh v. Foster, 10
Ind. 382.
'Mayor v. Keyser, 19 Atl. R. 706;
Smith V. Mayor, 21 How. Pr. 1;
Greene v. Mayor, 60 N. Y. 303; Yar-
nold V. Lawrence, 15 Kan. 126; Dick-
inson V. Poughkeepsie, 75 N. Y. 65;
Burchfleld v. Kew Orleans, (La. 93)
7 So. R. 448; Mappa v. Los Angeles,
61 Cal. 309; Carter v. Kalloch, 56 lb.
335; Maxwell v. Stanislaus Co., 53
lb. 389; Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee,
21 Wis. 217; People v. Detroit, 41
Mich. 224; Bank v. Portland, 33 Pac.
R. 532; Worthiugton v. Boston, 41
Fed. Rep. 23; Bigler v. Mayor, 5 Abb.
New Gas. 51 ; In re Eager, 46 N. Y.
100; Nash v. St. Paul, 8 Minn. 172;
White V. New Orleans, 15 La. An.
667; State v. Barlow, 48 Mo. 17;
Twiss V. Port Huron, 63 Mich. 528;
Gutta Percha Co. v. Starkley, 11 Phila.
219; Fulton v. Lincoln, 9 Neb. 858;
Reilly v. N. Y. City, 54 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 463; Brady v. Mayor, 20 N. Y.
312; 2 Bosw. 173; 7 Abb. Pr. R. 432;
People V. Flagg, 17 N. Y. 584; In re
Anderson, 47 Hun, 203; Trenton v.
Shaw, 10 Atl. Rep. 273; Davenport
V. Kleinsohmidt, 10 Pac. Rep. 249;
Mazet V. Pittsburgh, 20 Atl. 693; 137
Pa. St. 548; In re Manhattan R. Co.,
162 N. Y. 301; People v. Gleason, 25
N. E. R. 4; 121 N. Y. 631; McEwen
V. Gilker, 38 Ind. 233; Burchfleld
V. New Orleans, (La. 90) 7 So. Rep.
448; American etc. Co. v. Wagner,
139 Pa. St. 6ii5.
309
§172
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. X.
expressly required to do so, municipalities maj' contract with-
out calling for bids ; ^ yet if notice, advertising and similar pre-
liminaries are required by statute, neither the corporation nor
any of its officials can make a valid contract, which shall bind
the corporation, unless the statute is rigidly complied with.^
So, if there be any informality or irregularity in giving the
notice, in writing proposals,® or in selecting the proper news-
paper in which to advertise for bids,* or in the substitution of
advertising, when the posting of a printed notice is required,^
the contract may be avoided. But a mere typographical error,
the notice in other respects being sufficient, by which no one
was misled, is not material.^
In fairness to bidders, it has been held that they must be sup-
plied with such information as will enable them to act intelli-
gentl}'' ; ^ and the bidder should not be compelled to fui'nish his
own plans and specifications ; ^ which the notice must provide
for.^ So, if the specifications be indefinite as to the quantity
and quality of the materials required, the contract based there-
on will be void.^" Nor can a public officer, required to adver-
tise for bids, fix therein an arbitrary price for certain specified
work.i^
In some instances, it is provided that contracts, involving
the expenditure of more than a certain specified sum, in New
York $1,000, can be awarded only to the lowest bidder, and
after advertising for bids.^^ In New York it has been held that
such statutory provisions do not apply to contracts which are
not for the completion of one particular job, and which do not
necessarily involve the expenditure of more than $1,000.^^
^ Kingsley v. Brooklyn, 5 Abb. N.
Cas. 1; Cummings v. Seymour, 79
Ind. 491; 41 Am. Eep. 618.
■'Addis V. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St.
379.
* Himmelmau v. Cahn, 49 Cal. 285;
Brooks V. Satteiiee, 49 lb. 289.
4 Taylor v. Lambertville, 42 N. J.
Eq. 107.
» Kretsch v. Helme, 45 Ind. 438.
6 Case V. Fowler, 65 Ind. 29.
' Detroit v. Hosmer, (Mich.) 44 K.
W. Rep. 622.
* People V. Com'rs, 4 ffeb. 150.
310
3 Wilkins v. Deti-oit, 46 Mich. 120.
1^ Bigler v. New York, 5 Abb. K.
Cas. 51.
11 In re Mahaii, 20 Hun ( N^. Y.)
301.
12 See Phelps v. New York, 112 N.
Y. 216; 23 Am. & Eug. Cor. Ca.s.
479; Cf. People v. VauNort, 64 Barb.
205.
IS Swift V. Mayor, 83 N. Y. 528; see
also, Brady v. New York, 55 N. Y.
Super. Ct. 45; Greene v. Mayor, 60
N. Y. 303.
CH. X.]
MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS.
§172
If security is required from the lowest bidder, and the law-
requires notice to be given of proposals, noncompliance with
these requirements will invalidate the contract.^ On the same
grounds, a council has no authority, after the bids have been
opened, to alter the contract in a material respect, and award
it to one of the bidders, without again advertising for bids up-
on what is substantially a new contract.^
If, however, a contract has been properly awarded to the
lowest bidder, who has defaulted and abandoned it, a new ad-
vertisement and award is not necessarj', the original contractor
having made himself liable for the extra expense incurred.^
But the rule is otherwise, where the charter requires that the
same preliminaries of notice and award to the lowest bidder
shall apply to a reletting, as well as to the original letting.*
The same strictness is employed in construing charter provis-
ions, by which the sale of municipal franchises,® or of proper-
ty, real or personal, belonging to the corporation, or the leasing
of municipal real estate, is regulated.^ It is generally pro-
vided that the highest bidder shall be preferred, and the stat-
utes must be folk)wed, or the sale or lease will be void.''
It has been held that when the work or material contracted
for by the corporation is patented, and owned or controlled by
a single firm or individual, that a statutory requirement of ad-
vertisement and letting to the lowest bidder is not applicable.'
But many decisions hold that the statutory provisions apply
in such cases.* In one instance, construing a provision that
all contracts should be made after advertisement, it was held
that an assessment was void, which had been levied to meet
the expenses incurred by the laying of a pavement, which con-
' Dickinson v. Poughkeepsie, 74
N. Y. 65; Maxwell v. Stanislaus, 46
N. T. 100.
2 Dickinson v. Poughkeepsie, 74
N. Y. 65..
3 In re Leeds, 53 N. Y. 400.
* Mitchell V. Milwaukee, 18 Wis.
92; Hasbrouck V. Milwaukee, 21 lb.
217.
5 People V. Bai-nard, 110 N. Y. 548.
^ San Francisco etc. v. Oakland,
43 Cal. 502.
' Kerr v. Philadelphia, 8 Phila.
(Pa.) 292.
' Hobart v. Deti-oit, 17 Mich. 246;
97 Am. Dec. 185; In re Dugro, 50 N.
Y. 513; People v. Van Nort, 65 Barb.
331; Of. Dolan v. Mayor, 4 Abb. Pr.
N. S. 397 ; see also, Yarwold v. Law-
rence, 15 Kan. 126.
9 Nicholson P. Co. v. Painter, 35
Cal. 699; Burgess v. Jefferson City,
21 La. An. 143; Dean v. Chai'lton, 23
Wis. 590; Dean v. Berchsennis, 30
lb. 236; Barber etc. Co. v. Hunt, 100
Mo. 22.
311
§ 173 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. X.
sisted partly of a patented, and partly of an unpatented article,
upon the ground that under those circumstances, a separate
contract should have been made for each portion of the work,
so that there might be bids on the part which did not call for
a patented article.^ So, also, if there is but one person or firm
manufacturing a certain article, such as illuminating gas, of
the delivery and sale of which they have exclusive control,
any law requiring competitive bidding is inapplicable, as un-
der the circumstances it is clear that there can be no competi-
tion.^ So, too, professional services,^ and articles requiring
the personal skill of the manufacturer to give them their value,*
are not within this statutory requirement.
§ 173. Bids— Sealed proposals— Taxpayer's remedy —
Fraud in bidding. — When bids are advertised for, and are filed
in compliance with the advertisement, their merits, both actual
and relative, must be determined solely by a consideration of
the terms and conditions set forth in the advertisement or other
public notice ; and an award on other grounds and considera-
tions will be invalid. Thus, if the notice required that the
bidders must warrant the article they furnish for six years, an
award to one who is not the lowest bidder, but who gives a
warranty for a longer period than the others^ will not stand.^
Favoritism in any degree, however slight, is directly opposed
to the principle underlying the award of public contracts, so
that no requirements in a notice, which are made imperative by
an ordinance, can be dispensed with ;® nor can the lowest bidder
be allowed to withdraw his bid, and the official then proceed to
let the contract to the next lowest.'
Bidders should be informed in detail as to the quality and
character of the work, or material required;** and he, whose bid
is the lowest upon the amount of work which is required by
the estimate, is entitled to the contract and does not lose it,
because the estimate is erroneous.® When the right is renewed
to reject any and all bids, if deemed for the interest of the coi -
1 In re Eager, 46 N. Y. 100.
2 Harlem G. Co. v. Mayor, 33 N. Y.
309.
3 People V. Flagg, 5 Abb. Pr. 232.
* Uetwiller v. Mayor, 1 Thomp.
& C. (N. Y.) 657; 46 How. (N. Y.)
Pr. 218.
312
6 State V. Trenton, 49 N. J. L. 339.
6 Smith V. Mayor, 10 N. Y. 504;
Mayor v. Keyser, (Md.) 19 Att. Kep.
706.
' Twiss V. Pt. Huron, 63 Mich. 528.
8 Kneeland v. Furlong, 20 Wis. 437.
9 Reilly v. Mayor, 111 K. Y. 473.
CH. X.J MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. § 173
poration, but not otherwise, all iniiy be rejected and a re-
advertiseraent ordered.^ But the rejection may be reconsid-
ered, and an award made, if it is done before re-advertisement.^
The action of municipal ofHcials, in accepting or rejecting
bids, is judicial and discretionary, and the corporation will not
be liable in damages, even though the lowest bid has been re-
jected ; ^ nor does a bidder acquire any legal right which can
be enforced by a mandamus, until a contract has been formed
by the acceptance of his bid.* But the acceptance of a bid in
a proper and legal manner constitutes a contract ^ and vests in
the bidder a property, of which he cannot be deprived without
compensation. For this reason, an act of the Legislature, sub-
sequently passed, will not be permitted to impair the obligation
of the contract, already completed by the acceptance of the
bid.® If the statute or ordinance under which proposals are
received, requires that bidders must furnish good and sufficient
security for the faithful performance of their contracts, the cor-
poration is under no compulsion to accept the lowest bidder,
where the security offered is not sufficient or satisfactory.^
Bids must not be indefinite in any material respects, as to
price or quantity ; but the omission of one or two insignificant
items,^ the reference to " plans, specifications," etc., without a
detailed description of suoh plans and specifications,® or the
failure to name any particular system to be used, in a contract
to furnish light,i° will not invalidate the bids.
When a municipal corporation is required by law to award
its contracts to the lowest bidder after advertisement, an in-
junction will lie, at the suit of a taxpayer, to restrain the au-
thorities from making an award without advertising ; ^^ or from
1 Walsh V. Mayor, 113 N. Y. 143;
24 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 530; State
V. Directors, etc., 5 Ohio St. 234;
Kelly V. Chicago, 62 HI. 279; Keogh
V. Wilmington, 4 Del. Ch. 491.
2 Ross V. Stackhouse, 114 Ind. 200.
" East Riv., etc., Co. v. Donnelly,
93 N. Y. 557; 2 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas.
322.
* People V. Croton Aqueduct Brd.,
26 Barb. (N. Y.) 240; Kelly v. Chi-
cago, 62 111. 279; Weed v. Beach, 56
How. Pr. 470.
5 Argent v. San Fran., 16 Cal. '^.'56.
6 In re Protestant, etc., Sch., 58
Barb. (N. Y.) 161; 40 How. Pr. (N.Y.)
19.
' Smith V. Mayor, 10 N. Y. 504;
State V. Board, 42 Ohio St. 374; May
V. Detroit, 2 Mich. N. P. 235.
8 State V. Com'rs, 13 Neb. 57.
9 Sexton V. Chicago, 107 111. 323.
w Detroit v. Hosraer, (Mich.) 44 N.
W. Rep. 622.
" Com'rs V. Templeton, 51 Ind. 266.
313
§174
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. X.
carrying into execution any contract illegally entered into.'
It has been held, however, in Connecticut, that in such a case
an injunction could not be maintained ; the court basing its
decision upon the fact, that any contract, not awarded to the
lowest bidder, being illegal, the corporation would not be bound.
Hence, no taxpayer was in danger of any loss ; and, therefore,
there was no occasion for judicial interference by an injunction.^
It need hardly be said that any unlawful combination to pre-
• vent bidding, or any element of fraud in the bid itself,^ by which
competition is prevented ; or which results in the letting of the
contract to any but the lowest bidder, will authorize a rejection
of the proposals, or a repudiation of the contract.*
§ 174. Annulment of contracts — Corporate control of
work. — When a contract reserves to the city the right to can-
cel it, upon the failure to complete the work in the specified
time, the agreement may be annulled upon failure or abandon-
ment by the contractor.^ But it is held that the right of the
contractor, to recover for work already done, was not destroyed
by such an annulment, when his failure to complete the contract
was caused by circumstances not within his control.^
Notice to a contractor by the city, that it will no longer pay
or proceed under the contract, is not an annulment.'^ If the
penalty for noncompletion be the forfeiture of a sum of money,
the city may waive the forfeiture although forbidden to make
any extra allowan.ce ; ^ but provisions, requiring a reletting of
a contract, are mandatory, and an extension of time is invalid.*
If the work must be done under the suspervision, and to the sat-
isfaction, o'f some municipal ofEcial, the city cannot complain
if, though varying from the contract, the work was done as he
1 FoUmer v. Nuckolls Co., G Neb.
204; Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J.
Eq. 143.
2 Dibble v. New Haven, 56 Conn.
199; 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 174.
3 Brady v. Bartlett, 56 Cal. 350.
* Peoples V. Stephens, 71 N. T. 557;
Jennings Co. Com'rs v. Verbarg, 63
Ind. 107; Nelson v. New York, 5 N.
y. Sup. 688; In re Delaware etc. Co.,
8 lb. 352; compare In re Anderson,
109 N. T. 554.
'■ Bietry V. New Orleans, 24 La. An.
314
21; Powers v. Yonkers, 114 N. Y.
145; Farmers L. & I. Co. v. Gales-
burg, 133 U. S. 156; Rittenhouse v.
Mayor etc., 25 Md. 836.
^ Bietry v. New Orleans, 22 La. An.
149.
' Davenport etc. Co. v. Davenport,
13 Iowa, 229.
* People V. Brennan, 18 Abb. Pr.
100.
^ Beveridge v. Livingstone, 54 Cal.
54.
CH. X.]
MUNICIPAL CONTKACTS.
§175
directed;^ nor can the contractor's right to collect payment be
defeated or impaired by the neglect or refusal of the municipal
official to examine or inspect the work ; ^ or by any unauthorized
alteration of the contract by the city official supervising it.**
General direction and supervision of a public work, when in-
trusted to a municipal committee, are not limited to the quality
of materials and manner of working, but extend to the time as
well.*
A satisfactory performance is held to mean a performance in
accordance with the specifications.^ The acceptance by the
municipality of work done is oiil)'' prima facie evidence that
the terms and specifications of the contract are being complied
with ; " but when payments are made, as the work progresses,
upon the certificates of the supervising officials, their certificates
are conclusive, so far as the payments are concerned.^ So,
when the municipal board is made an arbiter, to determine all
questions as to amount earned on city contracts, their award
upon a contract within their jurisdiction is binding.^
§ 175. Contracts for a water supply.^ — Under the author-
ity commonly conferred by charter to make such ordinances
and by-laws as shall be necessary for the security and welfare
of the inhabitants, and for preserving health, order and good
government, a city may contract for a water supply.^* Some-
times such contracts are authorized by special laws,^i or by spe-
1 Kingsley v. Brooklyn, 78 N. T.
200; Omaha T. Hammond, 94 U. S. 98.
-Neenan v. Donoghue, 50 Mo.
593; Fhelan v. New York, 119 N. T.
86.
« Drew V. Altoona, 121 Pa. St. 401 ;
Dillon V. Syracuse, 9 K. T. Sup. 98.
* Chapman v. Lowell, 4 Cush. 378.
^Kinsley v. Monongahela Co., 31
W. Va. 464.
"Bulick V. Connely, 42 Ind. 134;
Omaha v. Hammond, 94 U. S. 98;
Despard v. Pleasants Co., 23 W. Va.
318.
^ Malone v. Philadelphia, 12 Phila.
270; McGuire v. Rapid City, pak.)
43 N. W. Kep. 706; Eeilly v. Albany,
112 N. Y. 30.
8 Forristal v. Milwaukee, 57 Wis.
628.
s See ante, §§ 144, 144 a, power to
establish pi-ivate and municipal mo-
nopolies.
w Indianapolis v. Gas Co., 66 Ind.
396.
11 Rome V. Cabot, 28 Ga. 50; Bur-
lington W. W. Co. V. Burlington, 43
Kan. 725 ; Hackensack W. Co. v. Ho-
boken, 51 N. J. L. 220; Atl. City W.
W. Co. V. Read, 50 lb. 665; State v.
Harrison, 46 lb. 79. But the power
to contract for water supply held
not to include power to purchase
a site for works: People v. Mc-
Clintock, 45 Cal. 11.
315
§176
MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS.
[CH. X.
cific provisions of the charter,^ or by the general authority to
make contracts, which are deemed necessary for the municipal
welfare.^ The large discretion which municipal corporations
possess, in providing a water supply, under the comprehensive
powers usually conferred by the Legislature, will not, unless
abused, be interfered with by the courts.^ Of course, such dis-
cretionary power, being equivalent to a power to levy taxes,
must be exercised in a conservative manner ; * it having been
held in one case, that a waterworks committee, without special
authority, could not bind a city by contracting for a new and
expensive improvement in the existing system.^
If the contract for the construction of waterworks be ille-
gal,^ or if it will increase the city's debt beyond the legal limit,''
an injunction will lie to prevent the carrying out of the con-
tract.^
§ 176. Municipal contracts with attorneys at law A
municipal corporation has the implied authority to employ an
attorney to attend to its corporate interests, and to prosecute
and defend actions in its behalf,^ even though the charter pro-
vides for a city attorney.^" But it has been held that a city
contract with another person, for services which the law re-
quires to be performed by the city attorney, is void.^^ Nor can
1 Couery v. N. O. W. "W. Co., 41 La.
An. 910; Atl. City W. W. Co. v. Atl.
City, 48 N. J. L. 378.
2 Wells V. Atlanta, 43 Ga. 67; Hale
V. Houghton, 8 Mich. 458; Grant v.
Davenport, 36 Iowa, 402; Livingston
V. Pippin, 31 Ala. 542.
"Atl. C. W. W. Co. V. Atl. City, 48
N. J. L. 378; Memphis v.Mem. W.
Co., 5 Heisk. 528; Warren v. Chicago,
118 111. 329.
* Morton v. Power, 33 Minn. 521.
5 Mayor of Nashville v. Hogan, 9
Baxter, 495.
« Davenport v. Kleinschmidt, 6
Mont. 502.
' Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1.
8 See post, § 397, and Dibble v. New
Haven, 56 Conn. 199; Sackett v. New
Albany, 88 Ind. 473; Madison v.
Smith, 83 lb. 502; Noble v. Vin-
316
cennes, 42 lb. 125 ; Pedrick v. Eipon,
73 Wis. 622.
9 Clarke v. Lyon Co., 8 Nev. 181
Thacher v. Com'rs, 13 Kan. 182
Shirts V. Noblesville, 122 Ind. 580
24 N. E. R. 167; Hornblower v. Du-
den, 35 Cal. 664; Sherman v. Carr, 8
E. L 431; Wilhelm v. Cedar Co., 50
Iowa, 254; Mt. Vernon v. Patton, 94
111. 65; People v. Warren, 14111. App.
296; Roodhouse v. Jennings, 29 111.
App. 50; Memphis v. Adams, 9 Heisk.
518; State v. Heath, 20 La. An. 172;
96 Am. Dec. 390; Bruce v. Dickey,
116 111. 527; Connolly v. Beverley
(Mass. 90), 24 N. E. Rep. 404.
10 Smith V. Mayor, 13 Cal. 531;
Hugg V. Camden, 20 N. J. Eq. 6;
comp. Ransom v. Mayor, 24 Barb.
226.
" Clougb V. Hart, 8 Kan. 487.
CH. X.J
MITNICIPAL CONTEACTS.
§176
the municipal authorities take any particular class of cases out
of his hands and confide them to others.^ When an attorney
for a municipal corporation is chosen by the people, he cannot
be ignored or superseded by authority, derived from the same
source as his own.^ Municipal corporations also, are not excep-
tions to the general rule that a substitution of attorneys in a
pending action must be made by order duly entered in the
minutes.^ It has also been decided, where a municipal corpora-
tion possesses the " general common law power of such corpora-
tions," that no action would lie against it by counsel, whom it
had employed to assist the State in a criminal prosecution of
former city officers.* But, apart from these special cases, it is
held that where it is incumbent upon a municipal corporation
to indemnify its officials who, in the legitimate performance of
their duties, incur liabilities to others, the corporation may em-
ploy counsel to defend such officials.^ And where a legal con-
tract has been made with an attorney, who has rendered service
thereon, the municipality is bound to compensate him,® even
though the contract maj- not have been evidenced by an ex-
press vote or ordinance.''' But if an attorney is employed on a
quantum meruit, and during the rendition of his services he is
appointed as the regular solicitor of the municipal corporation,
it has been held that he could not recover special compensation
for the services he subsequently rendered in the pending suit.^
1 State V. Paterson, 40 N', J. L.
186.
2 Clough V. Hart, 8 Kan. 487.
^Parker v. Williamsburgh, 13
How. Pr. 250.
< Butler V. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 498.
5 Sherman v. Carr, 8 R. I. 431 ; Ko-
per V. Laurienberg, 90 N. C. 429.
When a county causes a resident to
refuse to pay a tax upon its bonds
for the purpose of testing their val-
idity in a suit to re(!over the tax, the
county may pay an attorney to aid the
taxpayer, where it has authority to
" do all acts necessary to the exercise
of its corporate powers." Franklin
Co. V. Laymon, 33 N. E. R. 1094; 43
III. App. 163; CuUen v. Carthage, 103
Ind. 196. Cf. City of New Haven v.
New Haven & D. R. Co., (Conn. 93)
25 Atl. B. 316; Holraan v. Robbins,
(Ind. 93) 31 N. E. B. 863; Butler v.
Sullivan Co., 108 Mo. 630.
s Baker v. Inhabitants, 13 Me. "74;
Thacher v. Jefferson Co., 13 Kan.
182; State v. Hammontown, 38 K. J.
L. 430; Barnett v. Mayor, 48 lb. 395;
Ellis V. Washoe Co., 7 Nev. 291;
Knight V. Ashland, 61 Wis. 233; But-
ternut V. O'Malley, 50 lb. 333; Kin-
nie V. Waverly, 42 Iowa, 437.
' Kinnie v. Waverly, 42 Iowa, 437;
Langdon v. Castleton, 30 Vt. 285;
Wallace v. Mayor etc., 29 Cal. 180.
8 Detroit v. Whittemore, 27 Mich.
281.
317
CHAPTER XI.
MUNICIPAL SECUEITIBS.
Section.
177 — Municipal warrants — Nego-
tiability— Form and effect
— Presentment — Payment.
178 — ^Warrants payable out of a
particular fund.
179 — -Presentment of warrants —
Indorsement — Actions by
and against whom.
180 — When actions may be brought
— Defences — Statute of
Limitations.
181 — Municipal scrip — Illegal obli-
gations as circulating me-
dium.
182 — Implied power to borrow
money and to emit negoti-
able paper.
183 — Power to issue negotiable se-
curities.
184 — Public purposes — Aid to rail-
road.
185 — Construction, completion and
location of road as afiecting
the validity of bonds issued
in its aid.
186 — Subscriptions for stock —
Conditions precedent.
187 — Legislative power to compel
the issue of bonds for pub-
lic purposes.
187a— Curative statutes validating
irregular subscriptions and
invalid securities.
188 — Bonds issued in aid of private
purposes — Constitutional
prohibitions.
189 — Consent of taxpayers or
voters as a condition pre-
cedent to issue of munici-
pal bonds.
189a — Limitations upon municipal
indebtedness.
190 — The municipal coupon bond.
318
Section.
190a — Execution of the municipal
bond — By what officials
must it be signed.
191 — Negotiability of coupon
bonds — Rights of holder.
191a — To whom payable — Transfer
by indorsement or delivery.
1916 — The formal parts of bond and
coupon — Seal not neces-
sary.
191 c — Eegistration of municipal se-
curities by State officials.
192 — Presentment of coupons for
payment.
192a — The time of payment.
192 6 — Interest and exchange on
bond and coupon.
193 — Actions on bonds and cou-
pons.
193a — When consideration paid to
corporation for invalid
bond may be recovered.
194 — Legislative control of reme-
dies to enforce payment.
194(1 — Remedies for enforcement
of municipal indebtedness.
195 — Defences to bonds.
195a — Nonperformance of condi-
tions as a defence.
1956 — Defences not appearing on
face of bond.
195c — ^Who are 6ona fide holders.
195<i — Effect of notice on rights of
bona fide holders.
195 e — Effect of inserting unauthor-
ized terms and conditions.
195/ — Burden of proof.
196 — Doctrine of estoppel, as ap-
plicable to 6ona fide hold-
ers— Effect of recitals.
197 — Renewal and funding.
198 — Disposal and sale of bonds.
199 — Statute of Limitations.
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECUBITIES.
§177
§ 177. Municipal warrants — Negotiability — Form and
effect — Presentment — Payment. — The power to issue war-
rants or orders, by which the payment of money is directed by
the financial officers of a corporation, to a person named, to his
order, or to the bearer, is not, as a general rule, expressly con-
ferred upon corporations, but is generally inferred as absolutely
necessary to the corporate existence, and the exercise of its ex-
press powers.^ They must be drawn and signed by the proper
municipal official ; or they will be void in whosesoever hands
they may be.^ The duty to issue a warrant is ministerial, and
the officer, on whom it is imposed, may be compelled to perform
it by mandamus?
It is held, as a general rule, that these warrants or orders,
having for their main object the furnishing of the disbursing
officer with vouchers, are not negotiable.* The law does not
' Mayor of Nashville v. Eay, 19
Wall. 468, 477; Shawnee Co. v. Car-
ter, 2 Kan. 115 ; Tiedeman, Commer-
cial Paper, § 138.
2 Newgass v. City of New Orleans,
42 La. An. 165; s. c, 43 lb. 78; Ban-
gor Sav. Bk. V. City of Stillwater, 45
Fed. 544; Flagg v. St. Charles, 27 La.
An. 319; Capraartin v. Pol. Jury, 19
lb. 448; Cook v. Lowe, 25 111. App.
649; Clark Co. v. Lawrence, 63 111. 32;
Hubbard v. Lyndon, 28 Wis. 674;
Grimmett v. Askew, 48 Ark. 171; Sa-
line V. Wilson, 61 Mo. 237; Keller v.
Hyde, 20 Cal. 593; Conner v. Morris,
23 Cal. 447.
^ See post, § 373, and Campbell v.
Polk Co., 3 Iowa, 467; Merkle v.
Berks, 81 Pa. St. 505; Babcock v.
Goodrich, 47 Cal. 488.
* Tiedeman, Coml. Paper, § 138;
District of Columbia v. Cornell, 130
U. S. 655 ; United States v. Miller Co. ,
4 Dill. 233; Carroll Co. v. U.S., 18
Wall. 71 ; Mayor of Nashville v. Ray,
19 WaU. 478 ; Wall v. Monroe, 103 U. S.
74; Ouachita v. Wolcott, 103 lb. 559;
Claiborne Co. v. Brooks, 111 lb. 400;
Talty V. Freedman T. Co., 1 McAr-
thur, 522; Sturtevant v. Liberty, 46
Me. 457 ; Emery V. Mariaville, 56 Me.
315; Smith v. Cheshire, 13 Gray, 318;
Andovei: v. Grafton, 7 N. H. 298;
Eaton V. Berlin, 49 N. H. 219; Hyde
V. Franklin Co., 27 Vt. 155; Eead v.
Buffalo, 67 Barb. 526; Fairchild v.
Ogdensburg etc. Co., 15 N. T. 338;
Bull V. Sims, 23 lb. 570; Oatman v.
Taylor, 29 lb. 657; Hackettstown v.
Swackhammer, 37 N. J. L. 191;
Knapp V. Mayor, 39 N. J. L. 394;
East Union v. Eyan, 86 Pa. St. 459;
State V. Debuclet, 23 La. An. 267;
State V. Liberty, 22 Ohio St. 144; In-
habitants etc. V. Weir, 9 Ind. 224;
Hubbard v. Lyndon, 28 Wis. 674;
Goodnow V. Eamseyles, 11 Minn. 31;
Sch. Dis. V. Fogleman, 76 111. 189;
People V. Johnson, 100 lb. 537; 39
Am. Kep. 63; Sch. Dis. v. Stough, 4
Neb. 357; State v. Huff, 63 Mo. 288;
Matthis V. Cameron, 62 Mo. 504; Bur-
lington E. Co. V. Clay Co., 13 Neb.
367; Clark v. Des Moines Co., 19
Iowa, 199, 211-214; Bayerque v. San
Francisco, 1 McAU. 175; Dana v.
San Francisco, 19 Cal. 486; People
V. El Dorado, 11 Cal. 170; Fox v.
Shipraan, 19 Mich. 312; Second Nat.
Bank v. Lansing, 1 Mich. (N. P.)
319
§177
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIOXS.
[CH. XI.
regaid them as of the nature of bills of exchange, inasmuch as
they are drawn by one officer of a corporation upon another,
and, therefore, the drawer and drawee are the same person, viz. :
the corporation itself.^
It is the general rule that public officials, or municipalities,
have the implied power to issue negotiable paper, only when such
povirer is absolutely essential to effectuate some other power ex-
pressly conferred.^ And it has been held that, should the offi-
cer issuing the warrant give it a negotiable character and form,
he exceeds his powers, and to this extent does not bind the cor-
poration.^ But there are some decisions, in which the negoti-
ability of these instruments has been affirmed, when from their
form it was evident that the parties had regarded them, or had
treated them, as possessing the character of commercial paper.*
Where the warrants are held to be vouchers, they do not bear
interest, even after demand and refusal of payment.* The
warrants are then like open accounts, and do not entitle him to
more than the principal sum ; ^ but if negotiable, they will bear
interest from the day paj'ment is refused.'' No mere technical
181; Chemung C. Co. v. CliemuDg
Co., 5 Denio,517; O'Donnell v. Philar
clelphia, 2 Brewst. 481 ; Dalrymple v.
AVliittingham, 26 Vt. 345. Statutory
power to issue orders, it has been
held, does not confer power to issue
bonds. Gooduowv. Com'rs, 11 Minn.
31; Hull V. County, 12 Iowa, 142.
1 Jliller V. Thompson, 3 Man. &
Gr. 576; Fairchild v. Odgensburg, 15
X. T. 337; Hasey v. White Pig B. S.
Co., 1 Boug. (Mich.) 193; Dyer v.
Covington, 19 Pa. St. 200;Walwyn v.
St. Quentin, 1 Bos. & P. 652 (Eng.) ;
Allen V. Sea, etc., Assn., 9 C. B. 574;
Chandler v. Bay St. Louis, 57 Miss.
526, and cases cited in last note.
- Tiedeman Coml. Paper, § 132, p.
214; Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 667;
Police Jury v. Britton, 15 lb. 566;
Clark V. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199.
3 Tiedeman Coml. Paper, § 138;
Camp V. Knox Co., 3 Lea, 199; Smith
V. Cheshire, 13 Gray, 318.
* Sweet V. Com'rs, 16 Minn. 107;
320
Talby v. Freedman's Trust Co., 1
MacArthur, 522; Kclley v. Mayor,
etc., 4 Hill N. T. 265; Moss v. Oak-
ley, 2 lb. 265; Crawford v. Wilson, 7
Ark. 219; Guilfont v. Parish, 28 La.
An. 413; Garvin v. Wiswell, 83 111.
215 ; Craig v. Richmond, 1 Phila. (Pa.)
33.
6 Allison V. Juniata Co., 50 Pa. St.
353; Langdou v. Castleton, 30 Vt.
285; Warren Co. v. Kern, 51 Miss.
807; Leavenworth v. Klein, 6 Kan.
510; Camp v. Knox Co., 3 Lea, 199;
Hall V. Jackson Co.. 95 111. 353; Scran-
ton V. Hyde Pk. Company, 102 Pa.
St. 382.
6 Dyer v. Covington, 19 Pa. St. 200.
'Com'rs V. Keller, 6 Kansas, 518;
State v. Paciac, 61 Mo. 155. As to
interest on coupons and warrants,
see Rogers v. Lee Co., 1 Dillon, 529;
Evansville v. Evansville, 15 Ind. 395;
Pruyn v. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 367;
Quincy v. Warfiekl, 25 111. 317: Dan-
ville V. Sutherlin, 20 Gratt. 555.
CH. XI.] MTTNICIPAL SECURITIES. § 177
informality in their form should be permitted to invalidate the
warrants as against a party who has received them in pajnneiit
of a legal claim against the city,^ since their effect, particular-
ly where there is money in the treasury, is not to create a new
indebtedness, but to furnish a means of paying a debt already
in existence.^ But, of course, in estimating the amount of mu-
nicipal indebtedness outstanding, warrants should be included.^
A municipal creditor may refuse to accept a warrant, and de-
mand and sue for payment in legal currency.* But, in Califor-
nia, it has been held that a debt, pa3'able in warrants, is in
effect payable in money.® And, it has also been held that if
the creditor accepts a warrant, such action is a satisfaction of
the original debt, and he can no longer sue upon it.*" But the
general rule is that a warrant does not ordinarily work an ex-
tinguishment of the debt, so that the holder may, if payment of
the warrant is refused, sue upon his original cause of action.^
In California, under statute, a party who registers his warrant
becomes a preferred creditor ; ^ and when warrants are unreg-
istered, the order of payment cannot be changed,^ or postponed,
in favor of others for current expenses.^" Money, paid on war-
rants out of their order, on the false representations of the
holder, may be recovered by the disbursing officer.^i
A new warrant may be issued in the place of one lost or de
stroj'ed ; ^^ but if the lost warrant be found, the issue of the
duplicate is not necessarily an admission of the validity of the
original.^^
Without express legislative authority, a city has no power to
discount its warrants, or to issue warrants for a larger sum than
' Burrton v. Harvey, etc. Bank, 28
Kan. 390; Young v. Camden Co., 19
Mo. 309.
2 Dively v. Ced. Palls, 27 Iowa, 227;
Dana V. San Francisco, 19 Cal. 486;
Bayerque v. Same, 1 MoAll. 175.
8 Lake Co. v. Kollins, 130 U. S. 662;
26 Am. Eng. Cor. Cas. 465.
*Benson v. Carmel, 8 Me. 110;
Willey V. Greenfield, 30 lb. 452;
State V. Pillsbury, 30 La. An. 705.
sBabcock v. Goodrich, 47 Cal. 488.
« Dalrymple v. Whittington, 26 Vt.
.345.
21 321
'Paddocks v. Symonds, 11 Barb.
112; Dyerv. Covington Tp., 19 Pa.
St. 200; Benson v. Carmel, 8 Me. 110,
112 ; Goldschmidt v. New Orleans, 5
La. An. 436; Allison v. Juniata Co.,
50 Pa. St. 351.
8 Taylor v. Brooks, 5 Cal. 332.
9 Lafargo v. Magee, 6 Cal. 285.
M People v. Austin, 11 Col. 134.
11 Morrow v. Surber, 97 Mo. 155 ;
comp. McCall v. Harris, 6 Cal. 281.
12 Craig V. Chicot, 40 Ark. 233.
isEoyster v. Granville, 98 K. C. 148.
§178
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XI.
is due ; such warrants are void as to the excess, even in the
hands of a lona fide holder, for such holder will he considered
only as an equitable assignee of the payee, and as acquiring
only the rights of the original paj'ee.^ So, when the payee sold
the city's warrants, at a discount, the corporation is not liable
for the loss to the holder.^
Warrants once paid cannot be reissued. And if they are
again put in circulation, they will not bind the municipality,
even in the hands of an innocent holder.^ Payment, once
made in good faith, releases the corporation ; * but receiving
an order in payment of taxes is not sufficient evidence of the
payment and extinguishment of the order.*
Nor is the city liable for the increased amount of a warrant,
which has been fraudulently raised after its issuance.^ So, also,
the sureties on the bond of an official, forbidden by law to deal
in warrants, were not liable, even to an innocent purchaser for
value, where the warrant had been reissued by the official after
payment.'^
§ 178. Warrants payable out of a particular fund. — When
by law a claim is pa3'able only out of a particular fund, the
warrant for its payment should be drawn on this fund ; for, if
drawn on the treasury generally, it is invalid ; the corporation
not being bound by this illegal act of its officials, is only liable
to the extent of the fund in question, and cannot be compelled
to pay such claims out of its general funds.* But a distinction
should be observed between the class of warrants above de-
scribed, and those which are evidences of general corporate in-
debtedness, but which are to be charged to a particular account.
1 Shirk V. Pulaski, 4 Dill. 209;
Goyne v. Ashley Co., 31 Ark. 552;
Baver v. Franklin Co., 51 Mo. 205;
Foster v. Coleman, 10 Cal. 278; Dan-
ville v. Sutherlin, 20 Gratt. 255;
Lynohberg v. Norvell, 20 lb. 601.
2 Morgan v. District, 10 Ct. of CI.
156; Looney v. District, 19 lb. 230;
State V.Wilson, 71 Tex. 291.
^ Chemung Bk. v. Sup'rs. 5 Denio,
517; District V. Cornell, 130 U. S. 655;
Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468; Hal-
etead v. Mayor, 3 Comst. 430.
* Sweet V. Carver Co., 16 Minn. 106.
322
5 Wiley V. Greenfield, 30 Me. 452.
6 Chandler v. Bay St. Louis, 57
Mich. 327.
' McCounell v. Simpson, 36 Fed.
Rep. 750.
8 Baker v. Seattle, 2 Wash. St. 576;
Bates V. Porter, 15 Pac. Eep. 732;
74 Cal. 224; Priet v. Reis, 28 Pac.
Eep. 798; 93 Cal. 85; Campbell v.
Polk Co., 76 Mo. 57; Boro. v. Phil-
lips Co. , 4 Dill. 216, 223 ; McCullough
V. Mayor, etc., 23 Wend. 458; Tip-
pecanoe Co. V. Cox, 6 Ind. 403; P(!0-
ple V. Wood, 71 N. Y. 371.
CH. XI.] MtrmClPAL SECURITIES. § 178
In the latter case, the liabilitj- of the municipal corporation is
general and absolute, and not at all dependent upon the exis-
tence of the particular fund, out of which it is directed to be
paid. This direction for the payment of the general indebted-
ness out of a particular fund, is only a provision for the con-
venience of the city. Therefore, where the particular fund,
out of which the warrant for such a debt was directed to be
paid, had never existed or had been exhausted before presenta-
tion of the warrant, the holder could sue generally on the war-
rant; or if not on the warrant, on the original indebtedness,
and obtain a general judgment against the city.^ Each case
depends upon the conditional or absolute character of the origi-
nal indebtedness. A warrant, containing the words " charge
the same to account of Union avenue," was payable out of
a particular fund, which had never existed, and it was held
that no action could be maintained on the warrant.^ On the
other hand, an order, made payable out of the fund " for jail
purposes," ^ or out of the Bedford road assessment,* has been
held to be payable out of the general treasury ; and the words
" out of any money not otherwise appropriated " mean that the
warrant is payable unconditionally, and not out of any special
fund.^ The words "i* being for the appropriate part of the
surplus revenue fund " indicate the purpose, and not the par-
ticular fund from which the warrant is alone payable.*"
As the law will not compel the doing of an illegal act, man-
damus will not lie to compel the payment of more money than
what is in the fund.^ But, unless the law requires a claim to
be paid only out of a certain fund, the warrant will not be in-
valid, if drawn on an improper fund.^ In Missouri, under
special statutory provisions, no county warrant issued for any
extraordinary expenditure can be paid, until the usual and or-
' Clark V. Des Moines, 19 Iowa,
199; Pease v. Cornish, 19 Me. 191;
Union Co. v. Mason, 9 Ind. 97; Bay-
erque v. San Fi-ancisco, 1 McAU. 175;
Bull V. Sims, 23 N. Y. 570.
2 Lake v. Williamsburgh, 4 Den.
520, distinguished from Kelly v.
Mayor, 4 Hill, 263.
"Montague v. Horton, 12 Wis. 597.
iKelley V. Brooklyn, 4 Hill, 263;
Steele v. Davis Co., 2 G. Greene, 469.
4 Campbell v. Polk Co., 3 Iowa,
467.
^ Pease v. Cornish, 19 Me. 191.
' Bates V. Porter, 74 Cal. 224; Priet
V. Keis, 93 lb. 85; Day v. Callow, 39
Cal. 593.
8 Warren Co. v. Klein, 51 Miss. 807.
323
§179
MXJ>riCIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. XI.
dinary expenses for the year have been provided for by the
treasury.^
§ 179. Presentment of warrants— Indorsement— Actions
on and by whom brought In compliance with established
usage, the bolder of a vi^arrant is bound to present it for pay-
ment ; 2 and until the payment of fhe warrant has been de-
manded, the corporation cannot be said to be in default.* This
requirement seems to be just and reasonable, on account of the
extensive operations, conducted by municipal corporations, in
order that the disbursing officials can make the proper arrange-
ments for payment. But in th.e case of private corporations
jiresentment or notice of nonpayment is generally considered
unnecessary ; * and there are decisions, in which the same rule
has been applied to municipal warrants.^ And even when pre-
sentment has been deemed necessary, the corporation will not
be discharged from liability. The failure to make demand only
has the effect of preventing the recovery of damages and costs.^
Whenever a warrant is held to be negotiable, it may be
transferred by indorsement, and the indorser is subject to the
same liability as though it were a bill or note ; '' and when in
form, though not in fact, negotiable, they must be indorsed to
give the assignee a good title.^ But when the negotiability of
a warrant is denied, one who transfers it does not become liable
as an indorser ; except, perhaps, that he may be made to return
the consideration he received, if the warrant proves to be in-
valid or illegal.^
Although it is the rule that warrants are not negotiable, it
1 Kev. St. Mo. §5370; Mo. Act,
1865, p. 86, §13; State v. Trammel,
11 S. W. Rep. 748.
2 Varner v. Kobleborough, 2 Me.
126; Pease v. Cornish, 19 lb. 193;
East Unioa v. Ryan, 86 Pa. St. 459 ;
Dalrymple v. "Whittingham, 26 Vt.
346; Central v. Willcoxen, 3 Col. 566;
Kelly V. Mayor, 4 Hill, 265.
sPekiu V. Reynolds, 31 111. 529;
82 Am. Dec. 244.
* Tiedeman's Commercial Paper,
§ 128 ; Tiedeman's Private Corp. §
^ Steele v. Davis Co., 2 G. Greene,
(Iowa) 469; see Miller v. Thompson,
324
3 Man. & G. 576; Fairchild v. R. Co.,
15 N. T. 337; Justices v. Orr, 12 Ga.
137; Harvey v. W. P. S. Co., 1 Doug.
193; Clark v. Polk Co., 19 lovfa, 247;
Dana v. San Francisco, 19 Cal. 486.
« Kelly V. Mayor, 4 Hill, 263; Com-
mercial Bank v. Hughes, 17 Wend.
94,97; Harker v. Anderson, 21 lb.
375; Lusk v. Perkins, 48 Ark. 238.
' Bull v. Sims, 23 N. Y. 571; Fair-
child V. Ogdensburg, 15 N. Y. 337;
Hodges V. Schuler, 22 lb. 114.
8 Garvin v. Wiswell, 83 111. 390.
s Keller v. Hicks, 22 Cal. 460; see
Smeltzer v. White, 92 U. S. 390.
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES.
§180
is universally conceded that they can, in the absence of express
restriction, be assigned ; and the assignee may recover in an
appropriate action against the corporation. But whether the
action should be brought in the name of the assignee, or in
that of the assignor, is differently decided. If the warrant is
negotiable, the indorsee can sue in his own name.^
Since non-negotiable contracts were not assignable at com-
mon law, the law courts did not recognize the assignee; and if
suit was brought in such a court, it had to be brought in the
assignor's name, permission to use which, in maintaining a suit,
would be compelled by a court of equity. This is still the law
wherever it has not been changed by statute.^ But in most of
the States, the assignee can now sue in his own name ; but can-
not claim any privileges or exemptions from defences to wliich
the assignor is not entitled.^ In California, there must be an
assignment of the original debt ; * wliile, in Minnesota, the as-
signee must prove the consideration, if suing in his own name.*^
Municipal warrants, signed by the proper officials are binding ;
and impeachment must come from the defendant, as it is a legal
presumption that public officials have done their duty.^
§ 180. When action may be brought — ^Defences — Statute
of Limitations. — A warrant, not paid upon presentation, may
be sued on at once ; ^ for a general warrant, which is not paya-
ble out of a special fund,^ is a written acknowledgment of in-
1 Kelly V. Mayor, 4 Hill, 263; Dal-
rymple v. WMttingham, 26 Vt. 345 ;
Clark V. School Dlst., 3 E. I. 199;
Moss V. Badley, 2 Hill, 255 ; Justice
V. Orr, 12 Ga. 137 ; Leavenworth v.
Keller, 6 Kans. 510; Commissioners
V. Day, 19 Ind. 450; Cravirford Co. v.
Wilson, 7 Ark. 219; See Dively v.
Cedar Falls, 21 Iowa, 565.
2 Hyd-e v. Franklin, 27 Vt. 185 ; Al-
lison V. Juniata Co., 50 Pa. St. 353;
Dalrymple v. Whittingham, 26 Vt.
345; Klein v. Supervisors, 54 Miss.
878; Smith v. Cheshire, 13 Gray, 318.
^Sturtevaut v. Liberty, 46 Me.
459; Emery v. Mariaville, 56 lb. 316;
Campbell v. Polk Co., 3 Iowa, 467;
Clark V. Same, 19 lb. 248; Bank v.
Franklin Co., 65 Mo. 105; Mathis v.
Cameron, 62 lb. 504; Bank v. Farm-
ington, 41 N. H. 32 ; Leavenworth v.
Keller, 6 Kan. 510; Beals v. Evans, 10
Cal. 459; Kelly v. Mayor, 4 Hill, 263;
Clark V. Sch. Dis., 3 R. 1. 199; Com'rs
v. Day, 19 Ind. 450; Dively v. Cedar
Falls, 21 Iowa, 365; Andover v. Graf-
ton, 7 N. H. 298.
4 People V. Gray, 23 Cal. 125;
Dana v. San Francisco, 19 lb. 488.
^Goodnow V. Ramsey, 11 Minn. 31.
6 Floyd Co. V. Day, 19 Ind. 450;
Hamilton v. Newcastle, etc., Co., 9
Ind. 359; Clark v. Des Moines, 19
Iowa, 211.
'Inter. Nat. Bk. v. Franklin, 65
Mo. 105 ; Beals v. Evans, 10 Cal. 459.
" Brown v. Johnson Co., 1 Green,
486.
180
MTJNICIPAIi COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XI.
debtedness, which, if not paid upon presentation, may be sued
on by the holder, although there may be no mone}-- in the
treasury.^
The holder is not bound to request before suit that a tax be
levied to replenish the treasury, ^ it being the clear duty of the
municipality to raise money to pay these orders, as well as any
other indebtedness.* An exception to the general rule prevail-
ed in Nebraska, where it was held that one receiving a warrant,
in which no time of payment is fixed, takes it with the expec-
tation, if there are no available funds in the treasury, of waiting
until the money can be raised in the ordinary way.*
Lack of consideration, or usury ,^ is a good defence to an ac-
tion upon a warrant ; and in all cases the consideration must be
a valid one.^ When the warrant has been legally issued, valid-
ity and sufficiency of consideration will be presumed.'^
The fact, that an account has been audited by a board or of-
ficial, does not constitute, in the case of claims against counties,
such a judicial settlement as will conclude either party in an
action upon a county warrant ; and the same principle applies
to a city or other public corporation.*
Payment is always a good defence ; but if the warrant be
negotiable, its transfer discharges the city's liability to the payee
for the debt.9
The Statute of Limitations begins to run on warrants from the
date upon which their payment was refused by the corporation,!"
1 Natl. Lumber Co. v. City of Wy-
more, (Neb.) 46 N. W. Rep. 622;
Mills Co. N. Bk.v. Mills Co., 67 Iowa,
697; Floyd Co. v. Day, 19 Iowa, 450;
Lyell V. Lapeer Co., 6 McLean, 446;
Interuational Bank v. Franklin Co.,
65 Mo. 105 ; Packard v. Bovina, 24
Wis. 382.
2 Mills Co. Bk. V. Mills Co., 67 Iowa,
697.
3 Terry v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 490.
* Brewer v. Otoe Co., 1 Neb. 373.
5 Clark V. Des Moines, 19 Iowa,
199; Danville v. Sutherlin, 20 Gratt.
D55; Lynchburg v. Narvell, 20 lb.
601.
*Gray V. Latham, 84 Ala. 546; see
Clayton v. Mc Williams, 49 Miss. 311.
326
'Floyd V. Day, 19 Ind. 451.
8 Shirk V. Pulaski Co., 4 Dill. 209;
Nashville v. Eay, 19 Wall. 468; Web-
ster Co. V. Taylor, 19 Iowa, 117, 120;
Cheeny v. Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53;
Goodnow V. Ramsay, 11 Minn. 31.
But see Carroll v. Board etc., 28
Miss. 38.
^ Crawford Co. v. Wilson, 7 Ark.
214.
10 Kenosha v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 478;
Clark V. Iowa City, 20 Wall. (U. S.)
583; Carroll v. Tishomingo Co., 28
Miss. 38; Decordova v. Galveston, 4
Tex. 470; Leach v. Wilson Co., 68
lb. 353; Baker v. Johnson Co., 33
Iowa, 151; and Belleville S. Bk. v.
Winslow, 30 Fed. Rep. 488.
OH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECUEITIES.
§181
although it has been held that warrants are not within the stat-
ute.i
Though a warrant, properly signed, imports prima fade a
valid and subsisting cause of action, it is always competent for
a municipal corporation even after the issue of a warrant,
which is simply a means of payment, and not the creation of a
new debt, to set up the defence of ultra vires? Under this rule,
the plaintiff in suing upon a warrant must show, that the law
has been strictly complied with,^ the authority of the official,
by whom it was issued, being always open for examination.*
No purchaser can recover on a warrant which is known by the
original holder to have been issued ultra vires.^ A bill in chan-
cery may be filed by a municipal corporation to have illegal
warrants delivered up and canceled.®
§ 181. Municipal scrip — Illegal obligation as circulating
medium. — Inasmuch as the right to coin money and regulate
the value thereof was limited to the national government, and
the States were prohibited from emitting bills of credit, or mak-
ing anything but gold or silver a legal tender,'^ scrip, or war-
rants, intended to circulate as money, are unconstitutional and
void, so far as they are given the character of currency.^ The
city, however, is not released from its liability on the original
debt, although there may exist no liability upon the scrip;
either by the fact that the city expected that the warrants
1 Brewer v. Otoe Co., 1 Neb. 373. ,
2 Cheeney v. Town of Brookfield,
60 Mo. 53; Thomas v. Richmond, 12
Wall. 349; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10
lb. 776; Boom v. Utica, 2 Barb. 104;
Leavenworth Co. v. Keller, 6 Kan.
510; Hall v. Jackson, 95 111. 352; see
Allegheny v. McClurkan, 14 Pa. St.
81; Underwood v. Newpoi't Lye,
5B.Mon. 129.
3 East Union v. Eyan, 86 Pa. St.
459.
* Taft V. Pittsford, 28 Vt. 286; Peo-
ple V. Klokke, 92 111. 134.
5 Salamanca v. Jasper Co. Bk., 22
Kan. 696.
^Pulaski Co. v. Lincoln, 9 Ai-k.
320; Webster Co. v. Taylor, 19 Iowa,
117; Paris v. Cherry, 8 Ohio St. 564;
Glastonbury v. McDonald, 44 Vt. 450.
' Craig V. Missouri, 4 Pet. 35, 453;
Briscoe v. Bank, 11 lb. 257, 313, 334,
336; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall.
557, 558, 622.
8 Cheeney v. Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53;
Lindsay v. Eottaken, 32 Ark. 619;
Jones V. Little Rock, 25 lb. 301; Mer-
chants Bank v. Little Rock,5 Dill.299;
s.c. 98 U.S. 308; Thomas v.Richmoud,
12 Wall. 349; Allegheny v. McClur-
kan, 14 Pa. St. 81; Miller v. Lynch-
burg, 20 Gratt. 330; State Board v.
Aberdeen, 56 Miss. 518; Brown v.
Belleville, 30 Up. Can. Q. B. 373;
Wentworth v. Hamilton, 35 lb. 509;
Parsons v. Monmouth, 70 Me. 262;
Bangor Sav. Bk. v. Stillwater, 46
Fed. Rep. 899.
327
§182
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XI.
would furnish a convenient circulating medium, or that they
have become such.^ So, when a city had issued illegal scrip,
with which it paid its creditors, but afterward called it in, and
issued new and valid obligations, it was held liable upon the
latter.^
§ 182. Implied power to borrow money, and to emit ne-
gotiable paper. — The question whether a municipal corpora-
tion can borrow money and become a party to commercial
paper, is only difficult to answer, where there is no express grant
of such a power or powers in a charter, or other statute, which
affects or controls the powers of municipal corporations. In
the absence of constitutional prohibition, the State Legislature
may undoubtedly grant such a power to any municipal or pub-
lic corporation. Two questions are involved in this discussion :
First, whether a municipal corporation has the implied power
to borrow money, and bind the corporation by the obligation
thus assumed ; or whether such a corporation can only obtain
funds by taxation. Secondly, whether, if the implied power to
borrow money be conceded, it includes the power to give in
evidence of the debt so created a negotiable note or bill.
On the first question the authorities are divided. It is urged
in behalf of the denial to municipal corporations of any implied
power to borrow money, that they are established for the pur-
pose of local government, and the means of carrying on and
effectuating such purposes are ordinarily attainable by taxation.
That being ordinarily a sufficient source of revenue, there is
no reason whj^ the power to borrow money should be implied.
If an extraordinary benefit is proposed which can only be secur-
ed by the exercise of the power to borrow, the Legislature can
1 Dively v. Cedar Falls, 21 Iowa,
565.
2 Little Rock v. Merchant's Nat.
Bk., 98 U. S. 308, 5 Dil. 299. In this
case, the court said: " By taking up
the illegal obligations, the city in
effect said, we will purge the trans-
action of its illegality. We had the
authority to accept from you, . . .
the sums in question. We did so re-
ceive and expend for legitimate pur-
poses. We erred in making a pay-
ment to you in objectionable form.
328
We now pay our just and lawful
debts by canceling the bank notes
issued by us, and delivering to you
obligations in the form of bonds, to
which form there is no legal objec-
tion." See, also, Hitchcock v. Gal-
veston, 96 U. S. 350; Nashville v.
Ray, 19 Wall. 468; Pal. Jury v. But-
ton, 15 lb. 570; Mullarkey v. Cedar
Falls, 19 Iowa, 24; Sykes v. Laffery,
27 Ark. 407; Wright v. Hughes, 18
Ind. 113.
OH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECUEITIES.
§182
be asked for a special grant of the power.^ But the position
above taken is not supported bj'' the majority of the cases ; the
current of decisions is running in favor of the view, that a
municipal corporation may exercise any povs^er, that is suitable
or needful to effectuate the objects, for which it is created,
whether the power be expressly granted or must be implied ;
and that in the implied powera of a municipal corporation
should be included the power to borrow money .^ The power
1 Hackettstown v. Swackhamer, 37
K. J. L. 191. Dissenting opinion of
Agnew, C. J., in Williamsport v.
Cum., 74 Pa. St. 488, 50.5 ; Knapp" v.
Hoboken, 39 N. J. L. 394; Gause v.
Clarksville, 5 Dillon, C. C. 165; Brad-
ley, J., opinion in Mayor of Nashville
V. Kay, 19 Wall. 475. For a strong
presentation of the arguments
against the impolicy of permitting
or conceding to the municipality the
implied power to borrow money and
to issue commercial paper, see Dillon
Mun. Cor. §§ 507, 507 o, 508, et seq.
(ed. 1892).
2 Bank of Chillicothe v. Mayor, 7
Ohio, pt. 2, p. 31 ; Douglas v. Vir-
ginia City, 5 Nev. 147; Sturtevant v.
Alton, 8 McLean, 393; Mullarkey v.
Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa, 21; New Al-
bany Bk. V. Danville, 60 Ind. 504;
Sheffield v. Andress, 56 Ind. 157;
Galena v. Corwith, 48 111. 423; Board
V. Day, 19 Ind. 450; Mells v. Gleason,
11 Wis. 470; Ketchum v. Builalo, 14
N. T. 356; Kelley v. Mayor, 4 Hill,
263; Clarke v. Sch. Dis., 3 K. I. 199;
First Municipality v. McDonough,
2 Robinson, 244; Clarke v. Des
Moines, 19 Iowa, 199 ; Adams v. E.
R. , 2 Coldw. 645. In England, Pallis-
ter V. Mayor, 67 Eng. C. L. (9 C. B.)
744; Payne v. Mayor, etc., 3 Hurl.
F. 372; Kendall v. King, 84 Eng. C.
L. (17 C. B.) 483; Nowell v. Mayor,
9 Exoh. 457, but compare as to prom-
issory notes issued, Reg. v. Litch-
field, 4 Q. B. 893; see further, State
V. Madison, 7 Wis. 688; Clark v.
Janesville, 10 lb. 136; State v. Bab-
cock, 22 Neb. 614; Kenosha v. Lam-
son, 9 Wall. 477, 486; Mass. v.
Harpeth, 7 Heisk. 283; Com. v.
Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. St. 486; Folsom
V. Sch. Dis., 91 111. 404; Clark v.
Sch. Dis., 78 lb. 474; Desmond v.
Jefferson, 19 Fed. Rep. 483; Danielly
V. Cabanis, 52 Ga. Ill; Iviuson v.
Hance, 1 Wyora. Ter. 270; Merrill
V. Monticello, 138 N. S. 673. In Wil-
liamsport v. Com., 84 Pa. St. 487, the
court said: "In its broad sense the
power to borrow money and issue
bonds therefor cannot be said to be
among the implied powers of a mu-
nicipal corporation. For general
purposes, such power does not exist
for the reason that it is not necessary
for the objects for which it was
created. Thus it has never been
contended that a municipality may
borrow and issue bonds or notes for
objects having no necessary relation
to the performance of municipal
duties. To admit such a principle
would be destructive of such organ-
izations and place the taxpayers of
a city at the mercy of the first band
of plunderers who should happen to
obtain the temporary contj-ol of its
affairs. The question for our con-
sideration is, whether the power to
issue bonds is one of the inherent
powers of a municipal corporation
in a limited sense; that is to say for
the purpose of providing for such
expenditure as is strictly germane
to the objects for which such corpo-
329
§182
MTJNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XI.
to borrow is held to be implied, not only when there has been
no express grant of such a power, but also when this power has,
with limitations, been expressly granted, and it seems to be
necessary to use it beyond the limits imposed in the express
grant ; as when a city charter expresslj- grants to the corpora-
tion the power to borrow whatever money it may need, not ex-
ceeding a certain snm per year, and to issue bonds for the same.
It was held in Illinois that under the implied power to borrow,
the city maj' lawfully borrow more money than what is stated
in the charter.^
This is certainly carrying the doctrine of implied powers to
the extreme limits, and in violation of the general rule of con-
struction, that the express grant of a power with limitations
excludes anj' implication of such a power beyond the limitation.
It may be well to state that the implied power to borrow
money was exercised by municipal corporations in this country
idv many j-ears without question ; and it is very probable that
the implication of the power would not have been disputed, if
rations are created, we are not with-
out authorities that question if they
do not deny this power. Judge Dil-
lon, one of the ablest writers upon
this branch of the law, says in his
treatise on the Law of Municipal
Bonds : ' We regard as alike unsound
and dangerous that a public or mu-
nicipal corporation possesses the
implied power to borrow money for
its ordinary purposes and as inci-
dental to that the power to issue
commercial securities.' The ground
relied upon by the learned author
and others, who take this view of
the question, is that the power is a
dangerous one. But showing that
the power is dangerous does not
prove that it does not exist. Power
is always dangerous. . . . The dan-
gerous nature of a power might be
a persuasive argument with the Leg-
islature, why it should be denied to
a municipal corporation, but cannot
be accepted as a conclusive reason
330
that it does not exist. I am willing
to concede that the power to issue
municipal bonds is dangerous. It
afEords oppoi-tunity to unscrupulous
men hungering for the spoils of rich
municipalities, to enter into extrava-
gant contracts, at ruinous prices, by
mortgaging the resources of the
people in advance. The facility of
placing municipal bonds at high
rates of interest and having many
years to run is certainly a great in-
ducement in many cases to unwise
and lavish expenditure. It might
have been better for the Legislature
in the first instance to have applied
the principle ' pay as you go ' to such
corporations, and to have required
them to seek legislative action, when-
ever they sought to incur obliga-
tions. . . This, however, is a ques-
tion with which we have no present
concern."
1 Galena v. Corwith, 48 111. 423.
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECUKITIES.
§183
American municipalities had not entered upon a career of reck-
less expenditure.
§ 183. Power to issue negotiable securities. — Conceding
that municipalities generally possess the implied power to bor-
row, when such power is essential to the attainment of the ends
contemplated in the grant of some express power ; it follows, ac-
cording to the weight of decisions, that the implied power to
borrow money includes by implication the power to arrange for
the payment of the debt so contracted by the issue of negoti-
able bonds,^ which shall possess the same characteristics as other
commercial paper.^ That is, the municipal bond has all the
qualities of negotiability, and is subject to only those defences,
which are the incidents of commercial paper in general, pro-
vided all the requisites of negotiability are present in the bond.
The absence of a requisite ^ or the presence of an inconsistent
1 Bangor Savings Bk. v. Stillwater,
46 Fed. 899; Goodnow v. Kamsey Co.,
11 Minn. 31; Carlton v. Washington,
28 Kan. 390; Little Kock v. Bank, 98
U. S. 308; Galena v. Corwith, 48 111.
423; Kogers V. Burlington, 3 Wall.
6.54; Chittenden Co. v. Shanks,
(Ky. 89) 11 S. W. E. 468; Seybert v.
Pittsburgh, 1 Wall. 372; Meyer v.
Muscatine, 1 lb. 387; R. E. v. Evans-
ville, 15 Ind. 395 ; De Voss v. Eich-
mond, 18 Gratt. 338; Newgass v.
New Orleans, (La. 92) 7 So. E. 565;
Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall. 572;
Mayor v. luman, 57 Ga. 370; Tucker
V. Ealeigh, 75 N. C. 267; Mayor v.
Lombard, 57 Miss. 125 ; Williamsport
V. Com., 84 Pa. St. 500; Middletown
V. Allegheny Co., 37 lb. 241. In two
recent decisions the Supreme Court
of the United States has denied to
municipalities the implied power to
issue negotiable securities where the
express power to borrow money had
been conferred. Merrill v. Monti-
cello, 138 U. S. 673 (1891); and see
Brenham V. Germ. Am. Bk., 12 S. Ct.
559; 144 U. S. 173; Ib.,12S. Ct. 975;
144 U. S. 549; reversing 35 Fed.
Rep. 185 ; overruling Eogers v. Bur-
lington, 3 Wall. 654; Mitchell v. Bur-
lington, 4 lb. 270; and distinguish-
ing Dwyer v. Mackworth, 57 Tex.
245; Harlan, Brewer and Brown, J J.,
dissenting.
2Moran v. Miami Co., 2 Black, 722;
White V. Verm. R. R. Co., 21 How.
575 ; Marshall Co. v. Schenk, 5 Wall.
784; Lexington v. Butler, 14 lb. 282;
Hotchkiss V. Bk., 21 lb. 354; Bur-
leigh V. Rochester, 5 Fed. Rep. 667;
United States v. U. P. R. R. Co., 91
U. S. 72 ; Humboldt v. Long, 92 lb. 642 ;
Cromwell V. Lac. Co., 96 U. S. 51;
Macon Co. v. Shares, 97 lb. 272;
Com'rs v. Block, 99 lb. 686; New
Providence v. Halsey, 117 lb. 336;
Ottawa V. First N. Bk., 105 lb. 342;
Wilson Co. v. Bank, 103 lb. 770; Ack-
ley Sch. Dis. v. Hall, 113 U. S. 135;
Gorgier v. Millville, 3 B. & C. (Aug.)
45 ; Brooks v. Mitchell, 9 M. & W.
15; Goodwin v. Roberts, L. R. lApp.
Cas. 476; Boss v. Hewett, 20 Wis.
460. And see in New York, Starin v.
Genoa, 23 N. Y. 454; Gould v. Ster-
ling, 23 lb. 458.
8 See Tiedeman Commercial Paper,
§§ 10-35, for a full discussion of the
requisites of commercial paper.
331
§184
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIOKS.
[CH. XI.
element, will destroy the negotiability of the bond, as it would
thaf of a bill, check or promissory note. Thus, a bond in the
usual form is not made non-negotiable, because payable at the
pleasure of the obligor at any time ; ^ but when bonds are pay-
able to bearer upon completion of a road, they will be non-
negotiable, because payable on a contingency.^ The chief
ground of objection to the validity of a municipal bond is the
character of the purpose, for which the money was borrowed,
and the bonds negotiated. Inasmuch as the payment of the
bonds will ultimately have to be provided for by the exercise
of the power of taxation, the Legislature can only authorize the
issue of municipal bonds for some municipal or public purpose ; ^
and if the bonds are issued to secure some private end, they
are void, even though authorized by the Legislature.* What
are public purposes, in the light of the present inquiry, will be
more fully set forth in the succeeding paragraphs.
§ 184. PaMic purposes — Eailroad aid.-— Every purpose is
public which involves the construction and improvement of the
public buildings, works and grounds.^ And where power is
given to issue bonds for internal improvements, those public
works are referred to, from which the public derive a direct
1 Ackley S. D. v. Hall, 113 U. S.
135.
2 Blackman v. Layman, 63 Ala.
547.
8 See ch. xv. on Taxation, § 254,
and Sweet v. Hulbert, 51 Barb. 312;
Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655;
Curtis V. Whipple, 24Wis. 350; Whit-
ing V. Fond du Lac, 25 lb. 167; Allen
V. Jay, 60 Me. 124; Jenkins v. Ando-
ver, 103 Mass. 94; Pray v. No. Liber-
ties, 31 Pa. St. 09 ; In re Mayor of
New York, 11 Johns. 77; Camden v.
Allen, 26 N. J. L. 398; Sharpless v.
Mayor, 21 Pa. St. 147; Hanson v.
Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28.
* See cases in last note. Bren-
ham V. German Am. Bank, 144 IT. S.
173; lb. 549; Davidson v. Eamsey, 18
Minn. 482; Burlington v. Beasley, 94
332
U. S. 310; Coml. Bank v. lola, 9 Dill.
353; State v. Osawkee, 14 Kan. 418:
such unlawful issue of bonds may be
enjoined by a taxpayer. Crampton
V. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601; see post,
§373.
^Com'rs V. Chandler, 96 U. S. 205
(bridge); Burlington v. Beasley, 94
lb. 314; Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74
(gas works) ; Rome v. Cabot, 28 Ga.
50 (waterworks); Stein v. Mobile,
24 Ala. 591; Hale v. Houghton, 8
Mich. 458; Greeley v. People, 60 111.
19 (town hall); Rogers v. Burling-
ton, 3 Wall. 362; Sturtevant v. Al-
ton, 3 McLean 393 ; State v. Madison,
7 Wis. 688 (markets); Robinson v.
St. Louis, 28 Mo. 488 (fire engines);
Fellows V. Walker, 39 Fed. Rep. 651;
Cf. Weisner v. Douglas, 04 N. T. 91.
OH. XI.J
MTJNICIPAL SECURITIES.
§184
benefit, such as roads, highways,^ public bridges,^ toll bridges,^
and water power for a public mill ; * but, semble, not a court
house.* But a municipal corporation has no power to appro-
priate money to erect a building to be used in part by a Grand
Army post, it being held that this is not a public use.®
According to the weight of decisions, it is a public purpose
for the municipality to aid in the construction of railroads. The
ground, upon which these decisions rest their conclusion, is
that the grant of the franchise to build a railroad ai>d manage
it, is confessedly and actually justified by its promotion of the
public welfare, although provision is made for compensation to
the private corporation which advances the necessary capital.
If the State or city can lawfully grant a valuable franchise to
a private corporation, because the public welfare will be pro-
moted thereby, it may lawfully add to the franchise a sum of
money, or the credit of the State or municipality, as an addi-
tional inducement to construct a railroad which promises to
develop the resources of the community.'^ " The public has an
1 "Wetumpka v. Winter, 29 Ala. 660.
= Union etc. Co. v. Colfax Co., 4
Neb. 450; Wilcox v. Deer Lodge Co.,
2 Mont. T. 574.
8 Dodge Co. V. Chandler, 96 U. S.
205 ; see, also, internal improvements
defined, Fremont etc. v. Sherwin, 6
Neb. 48; aetchell v. Benton, 47 N.
W. R. 468; Burlington v. Beasley, 94
TJ. S. 310; Guernsey V. Burlington,
4 DiU. 372; Lewis v. Sherman Co.,
5 Fed. Eep. 269.
4 Blair v. Cuming Co., Ill U. S. 373.
' Dawson Co. v. McNaraar, 10 Neb.
276; 4 N. W. R. 991.
* Kingman v. Brockton, 26 N. E.
E. 998.
'Hill V. Memphis, 10 S. Ct. 562;
134 TJ. S. 198; Com. v. Williams-
town, (Mass. 92) 30 N. E. R. 472;
(implied power to issue bonds;) Ca-
sey V. People, (111.) 24 N. E. E. 570;
Manchester etc. Co. v. Keene, 62 N.
H. 81; State V. Hannibal etc. Co., 13
S. W. E. 505; Strickland v. E. E. Co.,
27 Miss. 209; Leavenworth Co. v.
Miller, 7 Kan. 479; Taylor v. Board,
(Va.) 10 S. E. E. 438; Kluse v. Ga-
lusha, 78 Iowa, 310; Sheboygan Co.
V. Parker, 3 Wall. 96; Havemeyer v.
Iowa Co., 3 lb. 294; Thomson v. Lee
Co., 3 lb. 330; Eogers v. Burlington,
3 lb. 362; Northern Pac. Ey. v. Eob-
erts, 42 Fed. Eep. 734; Bouknight v.
Davis, 12 S. E. E. 96; 33 S. C. 410;
Gibbons v. E. E. Co., 36 Ala. 410;
Augusta Bk. v. Augusta, 49 Me. 507 ;
Hallenback v. Hahn, 2 Neb. 377;
City V. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; Tola
V. Merriman, 46 Kan. 49; 26 Pac. 485;
Gillim V. Daviess Co., (Ky. 91) 14 S.
W. E. 838; Shelby Co. v. Jernagin,
(Tenn. 91) 16 S. W. E. 1040; Nicol v.
Magee, 9 Hump. 252; Com. v. Mc-
Williams, 11 Pa. St. 61; Sharpless v.
Mayor, 21 lb. 147; Moses v. Eeading,
21 lb. 178; Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. T.
439; Gould v. Sterling, 23 lb. 439;
San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Tex. 405 ;
Scotland Co. v. U. S., 140 U. S. 41;
Samson v. People, (111. 92) 30 N. E.
781; State v. Trammel, 106 Mo. 510;
Post V. Pulaski Co., 49 Fed. Eep. 628;
9 U. S. Ap. 1; 1 C. C. A. 405; (power
333
§184
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XI.
interest in such a road, when it belongs to a corporation, as
clearly as they would have if it was free, or as if the tolls were
payable to the State, because travel and transportation are
cheapened to a degree, far exceeding all tolls and charges of
every kind, and this advantage the public has over and above
those of rapidity, comfort, convenience, increase of trade, open-
ing of markets, and other means of rewarding labor and pro-
moting wealth." ^ But the power, to aid a railroad in any
manner, must be expressly conferred by statute, as in no case
will it be implied ; ^ and when in connection with it, the power
to levy and collect taxes for the purpose is conferred, the issue
of bonds is not only not permitted, but by implication excluded.*
If it be once settled that the construction of a railroad is a pub-
lic purpose, to which municipal funds or credit may be devoted,
it is of no importance, so far as legislative power is concerned,
whether the money raised is given or loaned to the company,
or used in paying for stock in it; * although in one instance it
was held, that, although the Legislature could authorize a sub-
scription, it could not empower .a donation to be made.^ So,
also, power to subscribe for stock will not authorize a donation.*
But the word aid has been deemed to authoi-ize a donation'; ^
and the power to donate land purchased or owned by the city,
in aid of a railroad, will authorize the city to donate its bonds
2 Wells V. Pontotoc Co. Sup., 102
to subscribe will not authorize a gift ;)
Simpson Co. v. Louisville etc. Co.,
(Ky. 92) 19 S. W. K. 665; Hutchinson
etc. Co. V. Fox, 48 Kan. 70; Duanes-
burg V. Jenkins, 49 Barb. 579; Winn
V. Macon, 21 Ga. 275; Eandolph v.
Post, 93 U. S. 502; Clarke v. Roches-
ter, 24 Barb. 446; Bank v. Rome, 18
N. T. 38; Society v. New London,
29 Conn. 174; Douglas v. Chatham,
41 lb. 211; Powers v. Sup. Ct., 23 Ga.
65; R. R. V. Otoe Co., 16 Wall. 667;
Queensburg v. Culver, 19 lb. 84;
Maddox v. Graham, 2 Met. 56; Com.
V. Perkins, 43 Pa. St. 410.
' C. J. Black in Sharpless v. Philar
delphia, 21 Pa. St. 147, 169.
2 Kelly V. Milan, 127 U. S. 139; Nor-
ton V. Dyersberg, 127 lb. 160; Con-
cord V. Robinson, 121 lb. 165 ; Welch
V. Post, 99 111. 471.
334
U. S. 631, 632; Ogden v. Daviess Co.,
102 lb. 634, 639; Clairborne Co. v.
Brooks, 111 lb. 400, 406.
* Queensburg V. Culver, 19 Wall. 82;
Davidson v. Ramsey Co., 18 Minn.
482; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Com'rs, 4
Neb. 450; Stewart v. Polk Co., 30
Iowa, 9 ; New Orleans v. McDonald,
53 Miss. 240; Samson v. People, (111.
92) 30 N. E. R. 689.
* Whiting V. Sheboygan, etc., Co.,
25 Wis. 167, 196; Sweet v. Hulbert,
51 Barb. 312.
6 Hamlin v. Meadville, 6 Neb. 227,
Post V. Pulaski Co., 9 U. S. Ap. 1;
1 C. C. A. 405.
'State V. Babcock, 19 Neb. 230;
Northern Pac. R. R. Co. v. Roberts,
42 Fed. 734; comp. Ellis v. Railroad
Co., 71 Wis. 114.
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECUKITXES.
§185
to the companj', in place of the land, where the city has the
express and unlimited power to borrow money, and to issue
bonds to fund its indebtedness.^ It has been held that, when
the municipal corporation has the power to aid in the construc-
tion of a road, the road to be aided need not be in the same
State in which the city is located, but may be wholly within
another State.^
§ 185. Construction, completion and location of road,
as affecting the validity of bonds issued in its aid. — Where
the construction and completion of the road by a certain date,
is a condition precedent to the issue of bonds, — and whether it
is a condition, or not, is a question of statutory construction,^ —
it will be rigidly enforced.* And if the condition is not com-
plied with, the delivery of the bonds to the railroad company
may be suspended ; ^ and in any event, the company cannot by
mandamus compel the issue of bonds, as long as the conditions
as to location have not been complied with.^
But it is held that where a railroad company has constructed
its line to within a quarter of a mile of the town, from which
point it enters the town upon the track of another road, it has
complied with the requirement that it should complete its road
between the two termini.'^ But running trains over the track of
another company for five miles, under a lease terminable at one
year's notice, is not a compliance with such a condition.^ Nor
is the completion of the road to within three quarters of a mile
of the opposite bank of the river, on which the terminal town
is located.^ In-a case of this character, however, it is not ab-
1 Converse v. Fort Scott, 92 U. S.
503.
a Bell V. Mobile etc. Co., 4 Wall.
598; Chicago etc. Co. v. Otoe Co., 16
Wall. 677; State v. Dallas Co., 72 Mo.
329; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio
St. 14; see Woods v. Lawrence Co.,
1 Black (U. S.) 386.
8 Kansas etc. Co. v. Alderman, 47
Mp. 349.
* BufCalo etc. Co. v. Falconer, 103
U. S. 821 ; German Sav. Bk. v. Frank-
lin Co., 128 TJ. S. 526; Portland etc.
Co. V. Hartford, 58 Me. 23; Woon-
Booket etc. Co. v. Sherman, 8 K. I.
564; Memphis etc. Co. v. Thompson,
24 Kan. 170.
5 Cooper V. Sullivan Co., 65 Mo.
542.
^ State V. Minneapolis, 32 Minn. 501.
f State V. Clark, 23 Minn. 422; Mis-
souri Pac. R. Co. V. Tygard, 84 Mo.
263; Stockton v. Stockton etc Co.,
51 Cal. 328; see Sykes v. Columbia,
55 Miss. 115.
8 People V. Clayton, 88 111. 45.
sHodgman v. St. Paul etc. Co., 20
Minn. 48; Winona v. Cowdrey, 93 U.
S. 612.
335
§185
jrUSICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XI.
solutely necessary that a bridge should be built ; but such
means of crossing the river should be provided by the company,
as at the time are usual and customary, as well as adequate and
convenient.^
Construing a promise on the part of a municipal corporation
to pay to the railroad $4,000 for each mile of track constructed,
the court held that the computation should be based upon the
main line and side tracks "to and into the city;"^ and that a
" road of standard gauge and completed as first class," and in
operation by lease or otherwise, meant a road completed and
operated in such a manner, that it could be regularlj' and prop-
erly used by the public.^
If the time, when the road is to be finished, is not a condition
precedent, the municipality will not be released, if it has re-
ceived the benefit sought by the subscription ; * and the railroad
company may collect the part earned, although it has not spent
enough in the town to entitle it to all the aid promised.* It
has also been held that, wheii the power to subscribe is con-
ferred by the charter of the road, the right to subscribe is not
destroyed by the expiration of the period, within which the char-
ter of the road prescribes it shall be completed ; and when the
Legislature extends the time for the completion of the road, the
time to subscribe is also extended.^ Nor is the municipality
released from its liability for aid promised, to be rendered when
a certain part of the road is completed, where the time for its
completion is extended by act of the Legislature.'^
It may be required of the company that their road shall be
located, before the question of subscription is submitted to a
popular vote,^ and a breach of such a condition will work a for-
feiture of the promised aid, and invalidate the bonds which may
be issued in pursuance thereof.® But it is held that in all cases,
where there is a breach of a condition of this sort, the objection
iHodgmau v. Chicago etc. Co., 23
Minn. 153.
^Atkinson etc. Co. v. Pliillips Co.,
25 Kan. 261.
3 Southern etc. Co. v. Towner, 26
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 667.
* Kansas City etc. Co. v. Alderman,
47 Mo. 349.
' Cassaday v. Lowry, 49 Iowa, 523.
336
6 Com. V. Pittsburgh, 41 Pa. St.
279.
' Jacks V. Helena, 41 Ark. 213.
8 Cass Co. V. Jordan, 95 U. S. 373;
TreadweU v. Hancock Co., 11 Ohio
St. 183.
'Virginia etc. Co. v. Lyon Co., 6
Nev. 68; State v. Davis Co., 64 Mo.
30; Parker v. Smith, 3 HI. App. 356.
CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. § 185
must be raised by the municipal corporation, before the bonds
have reached the hands of bona fide holders, without notice.'
So great is the disposition to protect this class, that it has been
held by the Supreme Court of the United States that a statutory
provision, conferring authority to aid a railroad " to the said city"
would authorize aid to a road, which by its charter and in fact
terminated forty-six miles distant, whence its cars could only
enter the city on the track of another company.^
What shall in such cases constitute a sufficient compliance
with a requirement, that the road shall be located along a cer-
tain route, or between two terminal points, is not decided uni-
formly on the same lines. Most of the cases hold that the
company must adopt and locate its whole route, before the
proposition to lend the city's credit or contribute its funds, can
be lawfully submitted to the popular vote, and it is not enough
that the location should be made in a single county .^ But it
has been held that the validity of the election was not depend-
ent on the entii'e location of the line, provided the termini and
general direction of the road had been definitely determined
and described.* Under these circumstances, there cannot be
a material divergence from the projected route, after it has
been announced, and the city or county had taken action on
the proposition to subscribe to the stock of the railroad, or to
lend its credit, etc. It is often difficult to determine whether
a particular divergence is material. Thus, it was held in one
case that a difference of 800 feet was a noncompliance with the
condition,^ while in another case a much larger divergence was
disregarded.® If the divergence is material, the delivery of the
bonds will be restrained;'' but the municipality,^ or the Legis-
' Missouri etc. Co. v. Fort Scott, 15
Kan. 435; State v. Van Home, 7 Ohio
St. 327.
2 Van Hostrup v. Madison City, 1
Wall. 291; see Aurora v. West, 22
Ind. 88, 96, 503; Kirkbride v. Lafay-
ette Co., 108 U. S. 208.
sPurdy V. Lansing, 128 U. S. 557;
s. c, 20 Blatchf. 278, 286; People v.
Morgan, 55 N. T. 587; Mellon v. Lan-
sing, 19 Blatchf. 512; 11 Fed. Kep.
829; Thomas V. Lansing, 21 Blatchf.
22 337
119; Winston v. Tenn. R. Co., 1 Baxt.
60.
* Wilson Co. V. First Nat. Bank,
103 U. S. 770; Johnson Co. v. Thayer,
94 lb. 631; Callaway Co. v. Foster, 93
lb. 567.
^Virginia etc. Co. v. Lyon Co., 6
Nev. 68; Aurora v. West, 22 Ind. 88.
6 Johnson v. Thayer, 94 U. S. 631.
' Allen V. Adams Co., 76 111. 101.
8 Coleman v. Martin, 50 Cal. 493.
§186
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS.
[CH. XI.
lature,^ may authorize a divergence, after the aid is given or
voted to the railroad.
It is competent, in a charter to a railroad company, to au-
thorize counties to subscribe for stock, before the road is organ-
ized, or its route located.^ But a subscription by a city or
county to a railroad, before the filing of its articles of incorpora-
tion, would be void.^ So, a failure to comply with a statutory
lequirement, that certain plans be filed before the bonds are
issued, is fatal to an application to compel their issue.*
§ 186. Subscriptions for stock — Conditions precedent —
It is a verj' common statutory requirement that, before a mu-
nicipality can bind itself by a subscription to the stock of a
railroad company, it must be submitted to the vote of the peo-
ple. Sometimes the matter is regulated by a special provision
of the constitution ; and in that case, any material variation of
the statute from the constitutional requirement would be fatal.
Thus, a statute empowering resident taxpayers to authorize the
issue of railroad aid bonds, is unconstitutional in the face of a
constitutional provision that questions of local taxation should
be submitted to the electors.^ But the vote of the people does
not of itself constitute a valid subscription,^ unless it was the
intention of the Legislature to make it equivalent to one.^ The
vote merely empowers the proper officials to bind the city by a
formal subscription ; ^ and until the subscription is completed
by a manual signing, or by some binding act, such as the pass-
iCom. V. Pittsburgh, 41 Pa. St.
278.
2 Woods V. Lawrence Co., 1 Black,
386.
» Kubey v. Shain, .54 Mo. 207.
*1ti re Stratford etc. Co., 38 Up.
Can. Q. B. 112.
5 Harrington v. P 1 a i n v i e w, 27
Minn. 224; Plainview v. Winona etc.
Co., 36 lb. 505.
6 Gunn V. Barry, 15 Wall. 610, 623;
U. S. V. Jefferson Co., 1 McCrary,
356; Aspinwall v. Daviess Co., 22
How. 364; Land Grant etc. Co. v.
Davis Co., 6 Kan. 256; Cumberland
etc. Co. V. Barren Co., 10 Bush, 604;
Harshman v. Bates Co., 92 U. S. 569;
FairfieW v. Gallatin Co., 100 lb. 47;
338
Wadsworth v. Eau Claire, 102 lb.
534; German S. Bk. v. Franklin Co.,
102 lb. 526; Jeffries v. Lawrence, 42
Iowa, 498; State v. Saline Co., 48
Mo. 390; Limestone v. Racher, 48
Ala. 4.33; Board v. Wis. etc. Co., 43
Wis. 543.
' E. Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 U. S.
801; People v. Pueblo Co., 2 Colo.
360. Actual subscription on the
company's books held unnecessary.
Cass Co. V. Gillett, 100 U. S. 585 ;
Bates V. Winters, 112 U. S. 325 ; Xu-
gent V. Putnam Co., 19 Wall. 241.
" People V. Batchellor, 53 N. Y.
128; People V. Tazewell Co., 22 111.
147; Crawford v. Louisville etc. Co.,
39 Ind. 192.
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES.
§ 186
ing of an ordinance or resolution, which, as expressive of the
municipal interest, is equivalent thereto,^ no contract exists,
which can be enforced by mandamus? or which may not be
impaired or destroyed by subsequent legislation or constitu-
tional amendments.3 While the conferred authority to sub-
scribe remains unexecuted, the extinction of the railroad com-
pany or its consolidation with another company, will revoke it,
as no vested rights are impaired by such revocation.* And the
authority, while executory, is alwaj'^s subject to constitutional
repeal or limitation.^
The subscription is not binding, at least between the original
parties, unless it is strictly in accordance with statutory require-
ments,® and all conditions precedent must have been complied
with ; ' as, for example, that the company has secured a certain
amount of private subscriptions to its stock.^ But when a sub-
scription is once made by a municipal corporation to the stock
of a railroad company, it vests a right in the railroad company,
and creates a contract which is not only protected by constitu-
tional guaranties against legislative interference or annullment,
but which may be transferred to a new corporation, formed by
the consolidation of the road, in which the right is vested, with
another ; ^ and the subscription may, likewise, be enforced by
the creditors of the railroad.^"
1 Moultrie v. Kocklngham etc. Bk.,
92 U. S. 631 ; Clark Co. v. Paris etc.
Co., 11 B. Mon. 143; Paolo etc. Co. v.
Anderson Co., 16 Kan. 332; Concord
V. Portsmouth, 92 U. S. 62.5 ; Living-
stone Co. V. Bank, 128 lb. 102; Scott
V. Hansheer, 94 Ind. 1 ; Sacramento y.
Kii-k, 7 Cal. 419; Western Sav. Fd. v.
Philada., 31 Pa. St. 174.
2 People V. Ohio Grove, 51 111. 192;
Com'i-s V. Sharter, 50 Ga. 489; Napa
etc. Co. V. Napa Co., 30 Cal. 435; Oro-
ville etc. Co. v. Plumas Co., 37 lb.
354.
3 U. P. R. R. Co. V. Davis Co., 6
Kan. 256; State v. Saline Co., 45 Mo.
242; Concord v. Portsmouth, supra.
« Harshman v. Bates Co., 92 IT. S.
569; Bates Co. v. Winters, 97 lb. 83;
B. c, 112 U. S. 325; McClure v. Ox-
ford, 94 U. S. 429; State v. Garroutte,
67 Mo. 455.
^ Cases cited, supra.
6 Louisville v. Shreveport, 27 La.
An. 623.
' Louisville etc. Co. v. Davidson
Co., 1 Sneed, 637; Chambers Co. v.
Clews, 21 Wall. 317.
8 Chicago D. & V. R. R. Co. v. St.
Anne, 101 111. 151.
» Nugent V. Putnam, 19 Wall. 241;
Eay Co. v. Vansycle, 96 U. S. 675 ;
County of Scotland v. Thomas, 94 lb.
682; Scotland Co. v. Hill, 132 U.S.
107; East Lincoln v. Davenport, 94
lb. 801; Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 lb.
499;Menasha V. Hazard, 102 lb. 81;
Harter v. Kernochan, 103 lb. 562.
'» Morgan Co. v. Thomas, 76 III.
120.
339
§ 186
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XI.
If no conditions are prescribed by law, a municipal corpora-
tion may subscribe for stock upon such conditions as may be
necessary to protect its interests. -"^ Power to subscribe for
stock implies power to make a conditional subscription ; ^ and
the voters may agree to subscribe upon any conditions they
consider proper, ^ provided they are not in contravention of
any statutory provision or rule of public policy.* Without
legislative authority, a railroad company cannot agree to treat
the municipality better than other stockholders, as by paying a
fixed rate of interest on the stock, equivalent to the rate on
the bonds.^ And it seems that there is one necessary condi-
tion, without which there is no contract, although the subscrip-
tion has been voted for, and has been accepted by the companj-,
viz. : the condition which makes it obligatory on the company
to build the road through the town which subscribes to the
stock.^ Conditions made by the municipality may subsequent-
ly be waived by it ; ^ but not after they have been submitted
to, and approved by, the electors.^ And so, likewise, when a
condition precedent to the subscription is adopted by the pop-
ular vote, the power of the voters being exhausted by their first
exercise, it cannot be altered by a new election,^ and it cer-
tainly cannot by the municipal government,^" unless, perhaps.
1 People V. Holden, 91 111. 446; Fal-
coner V. Buff. etc. Co., 69 N. Y. 491 ;
Portland etc. Co. v. Horsford, 58
Me. 23 ; Townsend v. Xamb, 14 Neb.
324; California etc. Co. v. Butte Co.,
18 Cal. 671; Coe v. California etc. Co.,
27 Minn. 197; Atchison etc. Co. v.
JefEerson, 21 Kan. 309.
2 Jacks V. Helena, 41 Ark. 213 ;
Atchison etc. Co. v. Jefferson Co.,
supra; Brocaw v. Gribson Co., 73 Ind.
543.
^ People V. Logan Co., 45 111. 162;
People V. Dutcher, 56 lb. 144; Vee-
der V. Lima, 19 Wis. 280; Chicago
etc. Co. V. Aurora, 99 111. 205 ; Mem-
pliia Ketc. Co. v. Thompson, 24 Kan.
170.
■• Coe V. Caledonia & M. Ey. Co.,
27 Minn. 197.
5 Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. Allegheny
340
Co., 79 Pa. St. 210; see also, 63 Pa.
St. 127.
^Concord v. Portsmouth Sav.
Bank, 92 U. S. 625; Burges v. Mabin,
70 Iowa, 633; Barthol v. Meader, 72
lb. 125.
"Eandolph v. Post, 93 U. S. 502;
Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall.
373; Moultrie v. Kockinghara etc.
Bank, 92 U. S. 631 ; Converse v. Fort
Scott, 92 lb. 503; Cooper v. Sullivan
Co., 65 Mo. 542.
' Hodgman v. Chicago Ey. Co., 20
Minn. 48.
^ State V. Daviess Co., 64 Mo. 30;
People V. Waynesville, 88 111. 469.
i» Platteville etc. Co. v. Galena, 43
Wis. 493; State v. Daviess Co., 64 Mo.
30; Douglas Co. v. Walbridge, 38
Wis. 179.
CH. XI.J
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES.
§ 187 a
where the city has the power to, and does actually, consent to
a slight divergence of the road.^ Conditions, when imposed
by the popuLir vote, are part of the authority for the subscrip-
tion.2 But it has been held that, when the statute provides
that the county shall have power to subscribe after an affirma-
tive popular vote, the power is nevertheless discretionary .^
The terms of the conditions must be construed according to
their ordinary meaning.* When it appears that the funds sub-
scribed by the municipality are in danger of being misapplied,
proper security can be demanded of the company.*
§ 187. Lesislative power to compel the issue of bonds for
public purposes. — Not only may the Legislature authorize a m u-
nicipal corporation to aid in the construction of works for public
purposes, but it may in certain cases compel municipal corpora-
tions to make such contracts.® And, thus, when a municipality
is legally indebted, the Legislature may compel it to issue its
bonds for the settlement of the indebtedness,'^ upon the same
principle that a tax may be imposed, and the payment of a claim
against a city directed to be paid with the proceeds.* But there
is no power in the Legislature to compel a municipality to in-
cur a debt for a private purpose, or to issue bonds and exchange
them, or the money arising from their sale, for the* stock of a
private corporation.'^
§ 187 a. Curative statutes, validating irregular subscrip-
tions and invalid securities. — Elsewhere, it is shown how far
' Coleman v. Marion Co., 50 Cal.
493.
•^ German Sav. Bk. v. Franklin, 128
U. S. 526.
s St. Joseph etc. Co. v. Buchanan
Co., .39 Mo. 485.
- People V. Clayton, 88 111. 45. As
to power to subscribe without a pop-
ular vote, see Hawkins v. Carroll
Co., 50 Miss. 735; State v. Sch. Dis.,
10 Neb. 544; State v. Green Co., 54
Mo. 540.
5 Cumberland etc. Co. v. Washing-
ton Co., 10 Bush, 564.
*U. S. V. Baltimore, etc., Co., 17
Wall. 322; Carter v. Propes, 104 Mass.
236; Guilder v. Otsego. 20 Minn. 74;
Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65;
Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. St. 320;
see ante, § 15, for a fuller discussion
of this proposition.
' JefEerson Co. v. People, 5 Neb.
136.
8 Guilford v. Chenango Co., 13 N.
Y. 143; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.
S. 62; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y.
116; contra, State v. Tappau, 29 Wis.
664.
9 People V. Batchellor, 53 N. Y.
128; (Railroad aid,) Cooley Const.
Lim. 230-1; Thompson v. Park
Com'rs, 44 Mich. 602; Detroit v. De-
troit, etc., Co., 43 lb. 140; People v.
Com'rs, 28 lb. 228; Pompton v.
Cooper Union, 101 U. S. 196.
341
§ 187 a. MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [OH. XI.
the Legislature may go in general, in compelling municipalities
to pay claims against them, which cannot be legally enforced.^
And on the same grounds, it is held that, in the absence of
constitutional restrictions, the State Legislature has the power
to enact statutes, by which the irregular or defective execution
of a power by a municipal corporation can be cured and vali-
dated.^ In accordance with this general rule, the Legislature
may legalize a municipal subscription to the stock of a railroad
company, made without authority, provided no constitutional
limit of power has been transgressed.^ And laws of this char-
acter, acting retrospectively to obviate the objections which
might be caused by irregular exercise of powers, are favored by
the courts, as long as no rights of third persons are unjustly
affected.* But such validating acts should be considered in the
light of the principles contained in the Constitution of the State ;
and they will not be approved by the courts, when their effect
would be to render valid that, which is constitutionally void.
So, where the constitution limited the power to assess taxes to
the corporate authorities, it was decided that the Legislature
could not confer it elsewhere by an act validating a town elec-
tion, illegally called and notified, at which assent had been given
to a subscription to railroad stock. Such an act would enable
persons, who were not the corporate authorities, to exercise the
power of taxation, and coerce the corporation into incurring a
debt to which it had not given its assent.^
It has been said that the rights of bona fide holders of mu-
1 See ante, §§ 16, 17.
2 Osboru V. Hide, 68 Miss. 45 ;
Baker v. Seattle, 2 Wasli. St. 576;
Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 111. 405 ; Gage
V. Nichols, 135 111. 128; Bradley v.
Franklin Co., 65 Mo. 638; Louis v.
Shreveport, 3 Woods, 205 ; Louisville
& N. W. K. Co. V. Bullitt Co., (Ky.
92) 17 S. W. R. 632; Otoe Co. v. Bald-
win, 111 TJ. S. 1; Thompson v. Per-
rine, 103 lb. 806; 106 lb. 589; Van-
deventer v. Long Island City, 10 N.
Y. S. 801; 57 Hun, 590; In re East
Ave. Baptist Church, 11 N. T. S. 113;
57 Hun, 590; Campbell v. Kenosha,
5 Wall. 194; Steiues v. Franklin Co.,
48 Mo. 166; In re Byi-nes, 11 N. Y. S.
342
113; 57 Hun, 590; Bass v. Columbus,
3iO Ga. 845; BoUes v. Brimfield, 120
IT. S. 759; Dovrs v. Elmwood, 34 Fed.
114; Knapp v. Grant, 27 Wis. 147;
Black v. Cohen, 52 Ga. 621; Kimball
V. Eosendale, 42 Wis. 407.
'Grenada Co. v. Brogden, 112 TJ.
S. 261; Otoe Co. v. Baldwin, 111 lb.
1; Grannis v. Cherokee, 47 Fed. 427;
Williams v. People, 132 HI. 574;
Deyo V. Otoe Co., 37 F. 246.
*St. Joseph V. Rogers, 16 Wall.
666.
'Elmwood V. Marcy, 92 U. S. 289;
Marshall v. Silliman, 61 HI. 218;
Quiucy V. Cooke, 107 TJ. S. 549; Peo-
ple V. Mayor etc., 51 111. 17.
CH. XI.]
MXTNICIPAL SECURITIES.
188-
nicipal bonds are " to be determined by the law as it was judi-
cially construed, when the bonds were put on the market as
commercial paper ; " ^ but subsequent legislative sanction is
equivalent to the possession of the original legal authority,^
provided the legislative intention, to validate the invalid act,
be clear, and is in no way vague or doubtful.*
§ 188. Bonds issued in aid of private purposes— Consti-
tutional prohibition. — The incidental benefits to the public,
derived from the pursuit of ordinary business by individuals
or corporations, do not constitute a public purpose in the legal
sense, for which bonds may be issued. Although some might
find no fundamental distinction between pecuniary aid in favor
of railroads, and similar aid in support of other enterprises of
private persons, in the furtherance of which the public may be
more or less interested, the courts recognize such a distinction ;
and while it is generally held that municipal bonds are valid,
which are issued in aid of the construction of railroads,* the
authorities are equally decided in holding that the city has no
power, and the Legislature cannot grant to a city the power,
to issue bonds in aid of any enterprise of a private character,
liowever interested the public may be. It matters not that
the object to be accomplished is to relieve and aid a large num-
ber of citizens, who have been perhaps irretrievably ruined by
a far-reaching and overwhelming disaster, such as a conflagra-
tion or an epidemic ; ^ or to enable individuals to erect mills or
otlier buildings, which will be of great service in advancing
the city's commercial prosperity ;^ or to aid in securing water
power which would be of great benefit to the health of the city.'^
The policy of our law is against any species of paternalism by
>■ Ralls V. Douglas, 105 U. S. 728;
Green Co. v. Gouness, 109 lb. 104;
Sawyer v. Concordia Parish, 12 Fed.
Eep. "754; Marshall v. Elgin, 8 lb. 783.
■' Wilson V. Hardesby, 1 Md. Ch.
06; Jasper V. Ballon, 103 U. S. 745;
Shaw V. Norfolk, etc., Co., 5 Gray,
180; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet.
380; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 lb. 627;
^Vatson V. Mercer, 8 lb. 88; Croxall
V. Sherrerd, 5 Wall. 268.
s Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S.
120; distinguishing Grenada Co. v.
Brogden, 112 lb. 261.
* See § 184.
5 Lowell V. Boston, 111 Mass. 463 ;
15 Am. Eep. 59; State v. Osawkee,
14 Kan. 418; Feldman v. Charles-
ton, 23 S. C. 57.
« Allen V. Jay, 60 Me. 124; Bissell
V. Kankakee, 64 111. 249; Mather v.
Ottawa, 114 lb. 659; Bank v. lola,
20 Wall. 655 ; Weismer v. Douglass,
64 N. Y. 61.
' Coates V. Campbell, 37 Minn. 498.
343
§188
MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS.
[CH. XI.
which the State, or any of its component parts, shall become a
partner in any private industry, however important or beneficial
that business may be ; ^ and bonds issued for such purposes are
ipso facto void,^ and neither the payment of interest nor the acts
of the city officials operate, by way of estoppel, to render the
corporation liable on such obligations.*
The constitutions of many of the States prohibit counties,
towns and municipal corporations, from giving monej^ or other
property to any individual or private corporation whatever,* or
from loaning money or credit to private corporations,* or to a
raih'oad company,® or from becoming a surety,^ or from becom-
ing stockholders in private corporations.* If these prohibitions
are directed against the power of the Legislature to authorize
the city to do these things, their effect is prospective, and exist-
ing statutes relating to municipalities are not repealed.® But
1 See ante, § 144.
2 Comstock v. Syracuse, 5 N. T. S.
874; Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall.
655; In re Eureka Basin, 90 ]Sr. T. 42;
In re Mayor, 11 Johns. 77; Hanson
V. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 47; Eufaula v.
McNab, 67 Ala. 588; Frantz v. Jacob,
(Ky. 89) 11 S. W. E. 654; Ohio Val. L
Wks. V. Moundsville, 11 W. Va. 1;
People's Bank v. Pomona, 28 Pac.
1089; 48 Kan. 55; People v. Parks,
58 Cal. 624; McConnell v. Hammond,
16 Kan. 228; Cen. Branch Un. P. R.
Co. V. Smith, 23 lb. 745 ; Brenham v.
Germ. Sav. Bank, 12 Sup. Ct. 559, 975;
144 U. S. 173, 549; Cole v. Le Grange,
113 U. S. 1; Blair v. Cuming Co., Ill
Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 363; Wasson
V. Com'rs, 27 W'kly L. Bui. 134;
Getchell v. Benton, (Keb. 90) 47 N.
W. E. 468; Parkersburg v. Brown,
106 TJ. S. 487; Curtis v. Whipple, 24
Wis. 350; Jenkins v. Andover, 111
Mass. 354.
2 Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S.
487.
* This prohibition will be found in
the Constitutions of New York, Xew
Jersey, New Hampshire, Pennsylva-
nia, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wiscon-
sin, Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, Cali-
344
fomia, Oregon, Colorado, Georgia,
Alabama, Florida and Louisiana.
* In Tennessee and Nevada and in
all States cited in last note except
Wisconsin.
* In Connecticut and Nebraska.
' In New Hampshire, New Jersey,
California, Colorado, and Louisiana.
8 In New Hampshire, Connecticut,
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva-
nia, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Nebraska,
Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, Tex-
as, Oregon, Nevada, Colorado, Geor-
gia, Alabama, Florida, Louisiana,
Nebraska.
sGillim V. Davis Co., (Ky. 92) 14
S. W. E. 838; Callaway Co. v. Foster,
93 U. S. 567; Randolph Co. v. Post,
93 lb. 502; Moultrie v. Fairfield, 104
lb. 370; Red Rock v. Henry, 106 lb.
596; Sweet V. Syracuse, (N. Y. 92)27
N. E. R. 1081; Ralls Co. v. Douglas,
105 U. S. 728; Louisiana v. Taylor,
105 lb. 454; Cass v. Gillett, 100 lb.
585, 592; Fairfield v. Gallatin Co.,
100 lb. 47; Louisville V. Portsmouth
Sav. Bk., 104 lb. 469; Calhoun Co. v.
Galbraith, 99 lb. 214; Schuyler Co.
V. Thomas, 98 lb. 169; Smith v. Clark
Co., 54 Mo. 58; Fosdick v. Perryville,
14 Ohio St. 472.
CH. XI.]
MtTNICIPAL SECURITIES.
§189
when the constitutional provision prohibits a municipal corpo-
ration from employing its funds or its credit in aid of the pro-
hibited purposes, all existing statutes, which authorized such
aid, will be thereby repealed, and the power of the city to aid
the private or semi-public enterprises which fall under the con-
stitutional ban, is thereby taken away, unless rights have be-
come vested thereunder.^
§ 189. Consent of taxpayers or voters as a condition pre-
cedent to issue of municipal Ibonds. — In nearly all the States
the constitutions require that, before a municipal corporation
can create a bonded indebtedness, the consent of a certain pro-
portion of the taxpayers or voters shall be obtained. But a
popular vote cannot give a municipality a power, which it does
not otherwise possess. If, for example, a city cannot claim, by
express provisions of a statute or constitutional provision, or
by necessary implication therefrom, the power to issue bonds
for a particular purpose, or to create any other indebtedness, a
popular vote is not enough to invest a city with such a power.^
The popular vote is only required as a condition precedent to
the exercise of a power conferred by the State. In a previous
paragraph,^ the submission to a popular vote of the proposition,
to subscribe to stock of a railroad, is fully explained. Here, the
general subject is explained in connection with the general crea-
tion of municipal indebtedness.
All the statutory requirements as to the prelimina,ries and
details of the election are mandatory;* and here the word may
generally means must.^ But a mere informality, or a slight ir-
regularity, not affecting the result, will not invalidate the bonds
in the hands of a bona fide holder.^ In some States a petition.
' Aspinwall v. Com'rs, 22 How. 464 ;
Concord v. Port. Sav. Bk., 92 XJ. S.
625; Buff. etc. E. Co. v. Falconer, 103
lb. 821; Jarrolt v. Moberly, 103 U. S.
508; Kelly V. Milan, 127 U. S. 139, 154;
Norton v. Brownsville, 129 U. S. 479;
Pulaski V. Gilmore, 21 Fed. Eep. 870;
List V. Wheeling, 7 W. Va. 501.
2 Allen V. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80;
Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 120.
» § 186.
* Bogart V. Lamotte, (Mich. 92) 44
N". W. Eep. 612; Lewis v. Bourbon
Co., 12 Kan. 186; Bowen v. Greens-
boro, (Ga.) 4 S. E. Eep. 159. Cf. Natl.
Bk. of Commerce v. Town of Grena^
da, 44 Fed. Eep. 262.
5 Leavenworth etc. E. E. Co. v.
Platte Co., 42 Mo. 171; Steines v.
Franklin Co., 48 lb. 167.
6 National Bank v. Grenada, 41
Fed. 87; Eanney v. Baeder, 50 Mo.
600; Irwin v. Lowe, 89 Ind. 540; Mad-
ison v. Priestley, 42 Fed. E. 817; Pana
345
§ 189 MUNICIPAIj COKPOEATIONS. [CH. XI.
signed by a majority of the taxpayers, is required by statute as a
preliminary to an election, or to action by a county judge, in de-
termining whether bonds shall be issued in aid of railroads ; and
in the State of New York it has been repeatedly held that these
details shall be strictly pursued, before the election can be had,
or the county judge exercise jurisdiction.^ But it has been held
that, where a statute provided that stock could be subscribed
for on a petition of two thirds of the citizens, — upon the princi-
ple, that slight irregularities would not vitiate the exercise of
the power, — the municipality was deemed to be concluded, as to
the fact of a petition by the required number, by a declaration
upon the minutes of the council that "the freeholders with
great unanimity had petitioned," coupled with the recitals in
the bonds that they were issued by virtue of a city ordinance.^
Reasonable care should be observed in the manner of voting; ^
and if more than one proposition is submitted at the same time,*
they should be stated separately, and distinctly announced as
being two or more independent propositions.^ For, if two prop-
ositions are to be voted on, and they are so blended that the
voters cannot give their assent to one, without dissenting at the
same time to the other, the election is void.® When the statute
requires the authorized amount of the indebtedness to be speci-
fied, a vote not specifying it is void, as between the immediate
parties,^ in an application for mandamus, but does not invali-
date the bonds in the hands of a bona fide holder.^ When the
required notice of the election is not given ^ or when the elec-
V. Bowles, 107 TJ. S. 529; Johnson
City V. Thayer, 94 lb. 631; Baker v.
Seattle, 2 Wash. St. 576; State v.
Hardey, 18 Pac. Hep. 942.
1 Craig V. Andes, 93 ST. Y. 405 ; Peo-
ple V. Spencer, 55 lb. 1; People v.
Smith, 55 lb. 135; Wellsborough v.
New York etc. Co., 76 lb. 182; Metz-
ger V. Attica E. Co., 79 N. Y. 171;
Town of Solon v. Williainsburg Sav.
Bk., 35 Hun, 1; Eich v. Mentz Tp.,
134 U. S. 032; 18 Fed. Kep. 52.
2 Van Hostrup v. Madison City, 1
Wall. 291; Meyer v. Muscatine, 1
Wall. 384.
s Eanney v. Baeder, 50 Mo. 600.
* Thompson Hous. Co. v. Newton,
346
42 Fed. E. 723; Fulton Co. v. Miss,
etc. Co., 21 111. 338.
5 Thompson H. E. Co. v. Newton,
42 Fed. Eep. 723; San Luis Obispo
V. Haskin, 91 Cal. 549; Baker v. Se-
attle, 2 Wash. St. 576.
" Gray v. Mount, 4.5 Iowa, 591 ;
Metcalf V. Seattle, 1 Wash. St. 305;
Yesler v. Seattle, 1 lb. 308.
' State V. Saline Co., 45 Mo. 242;
People Nat. Bank v. Pomona, 48
Kan. 55; Mercer Co. v. Pittsburgh
etc. Co., 27 Pa. St. 389.
6 State V. Saline Co., 48 Mo. 390.
9 George v. Oxford, 16 Kan. 72;
Harding v. Eockford etc Co., 65 111.
90.
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAIi SECT7EITIES.
§189
tion is not called by those officials, who are empowered by law
to call it, the entire proceedings are void as between tlie origi-
nal parties, and the issue of the bonds may be enjoined.^
The law does not require such a degree of technical accuracy
in the notice of or warrant issued for an election or town meet-
ing,2 and equity will not cancel bonds for a mere irregularity in
calling a town meeting, at which their issue was ordered.^ But
a notice which fails to state the amount, rate of interest and the
time and place of payment, is insufficient.* When a notice is
required to be given by the supervisors, as by posting it in
some conspicuous place, the manual act of posting may be per-
formed by others, authorized by them.^ When a statute re-
quires that consent be given to the issue of bonds by a majority
of the legal voters, a majority of the legal voters who vote at
the election is held to be sufficient ; ^ and the proper method to
ascertain whether such consent has been given, is by a count of
the ballots cast.'' In Missouri, however, it has been held that
the expression, " two thirds of the qualified voters " meant, not
two thirds of the number actually voting, but two thirds of the
whole number of qualified voters who are resident in the town,
according to the registration lists.^
In construing statutes requiring consent of this kind, the " in-
habitants " mean legal voters^ and a majority of such voters
is sufficient, when the consent of a majoritj'' of the taxpayers
is required ; i" but in Missouri a distinction is made between
1 Jacksonville etc. E. Co. v. Vir-
den, 104111. 339; McVi.cl\ie v. Knight,
(Wis. 92) 51 N. W. Bep. 1094; Win-
amae v. Huddleston, (Ind. 92) 31
N. E. R. 561; National Bank v. Gre-
nada, 44 Fed. E. 262.
2 Belfast etc. Co. v. Brooks, 60 Me.
568.
^ Sauerhering v. Iron Eidge etc.
Co., 25 Wis. 447.
«Bowen v. Mayor, 79 Ga. 709; Chi-
cago E. Co. V. Pinckney, 74 111. 277;
Woodward v. Eeynolds, (Conn.) 19
Atl. Eep. 511. See as to requisites of
notice when railroad is to be aided :
Marshall v. Silliman, 61111. 218; State
V. Eoggen, 22 Neb. 118.
^rhillips V. Town of Albany, 58
Wis. 340.
6 Metcalf V. Seattle, 25 Pac. Eep.
1010; 1 Wash. St. 297; State v. Snod-
grass, 25 Pac. Eep. 1014; 1 Wash. St.
305; Day V.Austin, (Tex. 93) 22 S.
W. Eep. 757.
' St. Joseph V. Eogers, 16 Wall.
644; Carroll Co. v. Smith, 111 U. S.
556; People V. Winant, 48 111. 263;
Cass Co. V. Johnston, 95 U. S. 560.
8 State V. Harris, 96 Mo. 29; Cass
Co. V. Johnston, 95 U. S. 360; Bell v.
Americus, 3 S. E. Eep. 612; but com-
pare State V. Mayor of St. Joseph,
37 Mo. 270.
9 Walnut Tp. v. Wade, 103 U. S.
683.
ID Hannibal v. Fauntleroy, 105 U.
S. 408; Day v. Austin (Tex. 93), 22 S.
W. Eep. 757.
347
§ 189 a. MtTNICIPAL COEPOUATIONS. [CH. XI.
" qualified electors " and " legal voters." ^ In the State of North
Carolina, it has been repeatedly held that a " majority of the
qualified electors " means a majority of the registei'ed voters
of the previous election, and the municipal authorities have no
power under such circumstances to order a new registration.^
This seems the most reasonable construction that can be placed
upon this expression. A statute, which permitted bonds to be
issued if "two thirds of the qualified voters voting at such
election " should assent, was held by the Supreme Court of the
United States to be unconstitutional, because repugnant to a
clause in a State Constitution which prohibited such subscrip-
tion, unless assented to by two thirds of the qualified voters of
the municipality.^
It is well settled that municipal authorities may rescind any
action taken by them, by means of resolution or ordinance, by
a subsequent ordinance or resolution regularly enacted, where-
ever the vested rights of third parties have not intervened.
And this principle applies to their action, in voting to issu«
bonds, or to enter into any contract, provided the rescission
occurs before the rights of third persons have become vested.*
So also, when a taxpayer had given his written consent, it was
held that he might revoke it by a writing executed with the
proper formalities, before it had been acted upon.^ So, like-
wise, a signer of a petition to a county judge may withdraw
his iiame,^ if he do so before the judge has acquired jurisdic-
tion by the petition being submitted to him.'' On the other
hand, a proposition, once voted down, may on resubmission be
adopted, unless the enabling act shows a contrary legislative
intent.^
§ 189 a. Limitations upon municipal indebtedness.— In
consequence of the hasty and injudicious manner in which mu-
1 Sanf ord v. Prentice, 28 Mo. 358 ;
comp. Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn.
107.
2 Smith V. "Wilmington, 98 K. C.
343; Soutlierland v. Goldsborough,
98 N. C. 49; McDonald v. Mass. etc.
Co., 96 lb. olY; Simpson v. Mecklin-
burg Co., 84 N. C. 158.
'Harshman v. Bates Co., 92 TJ. S.
569.
^ § 146.
348
'^Springport v. Teutonia Sav. Bk.,
84 N. Y. 403; People v. Allen, 52 N.
Y. 538.
"People V. Sawyer, 52 K. Y. 296;
In re Taxpayers of Greene, 38 How.
Pr. 515.
' People V. Henshaw, 61 Barb. 409.
^ Soc. for Sav. v. New London, 29
Conn. 174; Smith v. Clark Co., 54
Mo. 58; Woodward v. Calhoun Co.,
2 Cent. Law Jour. 396.
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES.
§ 189 a.
nicipal debts have been contracted, limitations have in some in-
stances been imposed upon the powei' of the Legislature, or of
the municipal corporation, to incur indebtedness.^ Limitations
upon the power of municipal corporations to contract debts
should be construed according' to the terms of the constitution
or statute in question, with reference to existing facts ; and
any construction which would defeat their object should not be
favored.2
If this limitation is imposed upon the Legislature, it will not
repeal any existing power which has been vested in a munici-
pality by prior statute.^ But if the limitation or restriction is
applicable to a municipality, it repeals at once pro tanto any
charter provision by which unlimited power to contract debts
could previously have been exercised.* But this prohibition will
not affect the prior indebtedness of the municipality, even
though that exceeds the limit prescribed.^ Nor will it affect
contracts already made,^ or invalidate bonds when the authorit}^
to issue them was legally conferred, prior to the adoption of
the constitutional or statutory limitation.'^ The person who is
about to enter into a contract, by which he will become a mu-
nicipal creditor, must ascertain at his peril the legal limits of
municipal indebtedness, and determine for himself whether the
1 In the Constitutions of Maine,
Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, West Vir-
ginia and Missouri, municipal corpo-
rations are forbidden to become
indebted to an amount exceeding 5
per cent of the assessed valuation.
In Georgia and Pennsylvania the
limit is 7 per cent, in New York 10
per cent, in Coloi-ado 3 per cent, in
Indiana 2 per cent, and South Caro-
lina 8 per cent. In Oregon no coun-
ty can incur debts to exceed $5,000,
except to repel invasion or suppress
insurrection. In Indiana, the limit
may be exceeded, in order to provide
for the people in time of great pub-
lic calamity; in Missouri, to erect a
courthouse; in New York, a gaol;
and in Colorado, to supply water.
No municipality can contract any
except a temporary debt in Missouri,
California and Georgia, without the
assent of two thirds of its voters, in
West Virginia without three fifths,
and, in Colorado, a majority.
2 Law V. People, 87 111. 38.5; French
V. Burlington, 42 Iowa, 614, 619.
sCass V. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607;
Leavenworth v. Miller, 7 Kan. 499;
Patterson v. Yubaco, 13 Cal. 175.
4 East St. Louis v. People, 124 111.
655; 23 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 408;
Gould V. Paris, 68 Tex. 511; 17 Am.
& Eng. Cor. Cas. 350; List v. Wheel-
ing, 7 W. Va. 501.
5 Scott V. Davenport, 34 Iowa, 208.
"Moultrie v. Rockingham , etc.
Bank, 92 U. S. 631 ; Davenport G. L.
etc. Co., 13 Iowa, 229; Bound v.
Vise. etc. Co., 45 Wis. 543.
' Board v. Bolton, 104 111. 220.
349
§ 189 a.
MUNICIPAL COllPOKATIONS.
[CH. XI.
proposed contract will cause this limit to be exceeded.^ In such
cases, he cannot enforce payment of the debt due him.^ It is
well settled that any prohibition of indebtedness, beyond a speci-
fied limit, will apply in all cases, no matter what form the debt
may assume, whether express or implied ^ or for what purpose
incurred,* and if it is couched in general terms the limitation is
not applicable to bonds alone.* There is a conflict in the deci-
sions as to whether such constitutional or statutory prohibitions
apply to an indebtedness arising out of duties, which are by law
imposed upon municipal corporations, as where salaries must
be paid. The Supreme Court of the United States has held ^
that a clause in a State Constitution which provided that the
indebtedness of any county for all purposes should not exceed
a specified limit, applied to warrants for fees, salaries and other
current expenses.'^ But there are other cases which hold, that
a municipality has the right, as a matter of necessity, to incur
debts for its ordinary running expenses after the constitutional
limit has been reached ; and that such prohibitions do not apply
to indebtedness which a municipality is by law compelled to
assume.* So, when the prohibition is aimed against the incur-
ring of indebtedness /or general purposes, it has been held that
the laying of a sidewalk, being a special purpose, was not with-
in the rule.^
Liabilities, ex delicto which are cast upon it by law, cannot
be shifted from a municipal corporation by a plea, that its in-
1 Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 U. S.
278; Doonv. Cummins, 142 U. S.366;
French V. Burlington, 42 Iowa, 614;
Brown v. Point Pleasant, 1.5 S. E.
Eep. 209; Bank v. Grenada, 48 Fed.
E. 278; Nesbit v. Riverside, 144 U.
S. 610; Spilman v. Parkersburg, 35
W. Va. 605.
2 Law V. People, 87 111. 385.
3 Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 TJ. S. 190.
*Davenportv. Kleinschmidt, 6
Mont. 502; Council Bluffs v. Stewart,
51 Iowa, 385; Lake v. Rollins, 130 U.
S. 662.
6 Prince v. Quincy, 105 111. 138;
Erie's App., 91 Pa, St. 398; Wise,
etc. Co. V. Taylor Co., 52 Wis. 37.
6 Lake Co. v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662.
350
'Followed in Springfield v. Ed-
wards, 84 111. 626; Law v. People, 87
lb. 385 ; Fuller v. Chicago, 89 lb. 282;
Fuller V. Heath, 89 111. 297; Princes
V. Quincy, 105 111. 138; 128 HI. 443;
Sackett v. New Albany, 88 Ind. 473.
"Potter V. Douglas, 87 Mo. 239;
Laycock v. Baton Rouge, 35 La. An.
475; Grant v. Davenport, 36 Iowa,
396; Grant v. Lake Co., 17 Oreg.
453; Corpus Christi v. Woessner, 58
Texas, 462; Terrell v. Dissaint, 71
Tex. 770; Hoppikus v. Com'rs, 16
Cal. 249; People v. Pacheco Co., 27
lb. 207.
8 Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 IT. S.
341; Byrne v. Covington, (Ky. 93) 21
S. W. Rep. 1050.
CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. § 189 a.
debtedness has reached the legal limit.^ This doctrine has been
applied in an action to recover damages for personal injuries,^
in an action upon a liability arising out of the want of fidelity
of a municipal ofEcer,^ in actions for damages caused by inju-
ries received from negligently constructed streets, gutters and
sidewalks,* and to recover money paid illegally,^ or by mistake,^
and without consideration.
An adequate water supply is a prime necessity of municipal
life ; but this cannot be contracted for and a debt incurred to
be paid in fixed annual sums, if the limit of indebtedness has
been reached, unless steps are taken to raise by taxation the
funds needed to meet the accruing debt.^ But it is held in
Iowa and New York that, as the money paid for water is part of
the ordinary expenses of the city, such contracts are not within
the prohibition ; ^ and in other States, the future liability for the
payments upon such a contract is not considered as increasing
the debt, the contract being deemed a continuing provision for
the liquidation of current expenses,^ although payable in in-
stallments. Although there is some fluctuation in the decis-
ions, the majority of the cases favor the view that, where the
contract is one which is to be performed during a long period,
and the city is only bound to pay as this performance takes
place, the contract is not prohibited, although the amount pay-
able on the whole contract may exceed the limits of the author-
ized indebtedness.^" But a debt payable in the future is no less
a debt than one payable presently ; and hence, as a general rule,
when a debt is incurred which the city is bound to pay, the date
1 People V. May, 9 Colo. 404, 410.
2 Bloomington v. Perdue, 99 HI.
329.
3 Chicago V. Sexton, 115 111. 230.
* Bartle v. Des Moines, 38 Iowa,
414; Rice v. Same, 40 lb. 638.
^ Thomas v. Burlington, 69 Iowa,
140.
" McCracken v. San Francisco, 16
Cal. 591, 632.
7 Salem W. Co. v. Salem, 5 Oreg.
•SO; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 U. S.
278; Fuller v. Chicago, 89 111. 282;
State V. Atlantic City, 49 N. J. L.
558; Prince v. Quincy, 105 111. 138.
' Grant v. Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396;
Utica Water Co. v. Utioa, 31 Huu,
431.
9 Smith V. Dedham, 144 Mass. 177;
Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1 ;
Burl. W. Co. V. Woodward, 49 Iowa.
58.
10 East St. Louis v. E. St. Louis,
etc., Co., 98 111. 415; 38 Am. Rep. 97;
Dively V. Cedar Falls, 27 Iowa, 233;
East St. Louis v. Flanigan, 26 111.
App. 449. No debt is created until
the contract has been performed.
Weston V. Syracuse, 17 N. T. 110; Cf.
Burl. W. Co. V. Woodward, 49 Iowa,
58, 62.
85X
§ 189 a. MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS. [CH. XI.
upon which it will have to be paid is not an element to be con-
sidered, in construing the application to the case under inquiry
of a constitutional limitation of indebtedness.^ " But if the
fact of the indebtedness depends upon some act of the city, or
upon its volition to be exercised or determined at some future
date, then no indebtedness is incurred and none will be until
the period arrives." ^
If the contract does not fix any liability upon the corpora-
tion, as when a contractor agrees to build a sewer, and accept
as pay certificates, assessing the benefits against property own-
ers, it is not invalidated, because at the time the limit of mu-
nicipal indebtedness had been reached.^ There is in such a
case no increase in the municipal indebtedness. It has been
held that these constitutional restraints are not intended to pro-
hibit the issue of bonds to pay off an already existing debt, or
the issue of coupons to provide for the payment of interest on
the same, neither being the creation of a debt.*
The fact that by incurring the debt the city will acquire val-
uable property, from which a revenue will be derived, does not
remove the constitutional objection.* As examples of contracts,
which were invalid, because the municipal indebtedness was
exceeded, may be instanced, contracts to pay an annual rent
for a market house,^ for grading streets,'^ and for building a
court house."
The expenses, incidental to the protection or assertion of the
disputed rights and liabilities of the city, by a resort to a legal
action or otherwise, do not come within the constitutional lim-
itation of the amount of the municipal indebtedness. So, if
the limit has been actually or nominally reached, a city will
not be prohibited from contracting, upon a contingent fee with
1 Niles W. Wks. v. Niles, 59 Mich.
311; Law v. People, 84 111. 385; Cul-
bertson v. Fulton, 127 111. 30; Prince
V. Quincy, 128 111. 443; Coulson v.
Portland, Deady (U. S.) 481; Tenill
V. Dessaint, (Tex.) 9 S. W. 593; Dav-
enport V. Kleinschmidt, 6 Mont. 502;
Wallace v. San Jose, 29 Cal. 180.
Indebtedness defined. Sackett v.
New Albany, 88 Ind. 473.
2 Burlington W. Co. v. Woodward,
49 lo-wa, 62.
352
''Davis V. Des Moines, 75 Iowa,
500.
* Powell V. Madison, 107 Ind. 106.
s Scott V. Davenport, 34 Iowa, 208.
« Erie Appeal, 91 Pa. St. 398.
' French v. Burlington, 42 Iowa,
614; Dhrew v. Altooua, (Pa.) 15 Atl.
636.
' Hebard v. Ashland Co., 55 Wis.
145; People v. Johnson, 6 Cal. 499;
Book v. Eai-l, 87 Mo. 246.
CH. XI.] MX7NICIPAL SECTTEITIES. § 189 a.
an agent, to contest the validity of a certain indebtedness, and
thereby reduce the amount of the city debt.^
In computing the amount of a city's indebtedness, raih'oad
aid bonds should be included ; and money in the treasury which
is applicable to the payment of such bonds cannot properly be
deducted, in order to bring the amount of indebtedness within
the permitted limit.^ Nor are uncollected taxes, or the levy for
the current year, to be deducted.^ On the other hand, coupons,
which are attached to the bonds, are not to be included.* The
date of the assessed valuation is important, in the consideration
of this question. The assessments, which are made by the local
assessors, are to furnish the basis for computation ; ® and the as-
sessment for the year, immediately preceding that in which the
indebtedness is incurred, must be selected ; ^ and if, when the
indebtedness was incurred, the limit was not exceeded, the debt
will not be invalidated by a subsequent reduction of the value
of the assessed property."
Even though the limits of municipal indebtedness may have
been reached, it is held that the appropriation of anticipated
income does not create an indebtedness,® and is valid.^ But the
warrant, order or other instrument, which is issued after the
limit is passed, by which taxes, levied but not collected, are
appropriated, must not be general in form, but must be specifi-
cally diawn against the uncollected taxes of the particular
year, or against the fund to which the money was advanced; ^^
and it must have the legal effect of an assignment of the anti-
cipated income, and impose on the proper officers the duty of
Wilkinson v. Van Orman, 70 Iowa,
230.
' State V. Babcock, 24 Neb. 640.
8 State V. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 17;
Koppikus, Com'rs, 16 Gal. 248; Peo-
ple V. Pacheco, 27 lb. 175.
^ East St. Louis v. Flanigan, 26 111.
App. 449; State v. McCauley, 15 Cal.
430; People V. Brooks, 16 lb. 1; Grant
V. Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396; People
V. May, 9 Col. 404, 411; Springfield
V. Edwards, 84 111. 626; Fuller v.
Heath, 89 lb. 296.
11 Fuller V. Chicago, 89 111. 282 ; Ful-
ler V. Heath, 89 lb. 296.
23 353
1 Williams v. Louisana, 103 U. S.
637; Logansport v. Dykeman, 116
Ind. 15; Talbot v. Iberville, 24 La.
An. 135.
"Waxahachie v. Brown, 67 Tex.
519.
8 Jones V. Hurlbut, 13 Neb. 125;
Council BlufEs v. Stewart, 51 Iowa,
385.
*Durant v. Iowa Co., Woolw. (U.
S.) 69.
^ People V. Hammill, 22 Am. v. Eng.
Cor. Cas. 39.
«Culbertson v. Fulton, 127 111. 30;
§ 189 a.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XI.
collecting the tax, and pajing it to the assignee. But any lia-
bility thereby imposed must rest on these officers, and not upon
the city, in order to escape the characterization of a municipal
indebtedness.^
If the debt is severable, without the violation of any princi-
ple of law or equity, so that part may be within the constitu-
tional limit, the invalidity will attach to that portion only, which
constitutes the excess.^ But if the debt is entire and indivisi-
ble, as when a county contracted to issue bonds as a donation
of a specified sum, to aid a railroad, tlie whole transaction is
ultra vires, and all the bonds are void ; and the aid of equity
cannot be secured to scale down the donation so far as it is in
excess of the limit.^ Any provision, by which a municipal
corporation is forbidden to exceed a certain limit of debt, will
operate to prevent money, loaned in violation of its terms, from
becoming a lien upon the works which are constructed with the
money, so illegally borrowed ; * and any statute creating such
a lien is invalid.^
Not only will contracts, entered into by a municipal corpora-
tion in disregard of the constitutional prohibition, be invalid,
but a taxpayer maj' enjoin the city from entering into such a
contract,^ from carrying it out," from issuing bonds in excess
of the limit, in payment of the debt so contracted,^ and from
levying and collecting taxes to pay such a debt.^ So, also, if
the city neglect to defend itself, when an action is brought
to compel it to levy a tax for the paj'ment of an indebtedness
beyond the limit, a taxpayer is entitled to intervene, and set
1 Spriugfleld v. Edwards, 84 El.
626; La-sr v. People, 87 lb. 385, 399,
400; People v. May, 9 Col. 404, 412,
413.
2Culbertson v. Fulton, 127111.30;
McPherson v. Foster, 43 Iowa, 48;
22 Am. Rep. 215; Stockdale v. Way-
land, 47 Mich. 226; Daviess Co. v.
Dickinson, 117 U. S. 657. In this
case the court says: "Which of the
bonds are valid and which invalid ?
We can have no doubt that the test
is: Which were first delivered ? "
' Hedges v. Dixon Co., 37 Fed.
354
Rep. 304; Millerton v. Frederick,
114 Pa. St. 4;?5.
* Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U. S.
190.
^Mosher v. Sch. Dis., 44 Iowa,
122.'
« Springfield v. Edwards, 84 111.
626; Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1.
■ Davenport v. Kleinschmidt, 6
Mont. 502.
8 Wilkinson v. "Van Ormon, 70 Iowa,
230.
9 Howell V. Peoria, 90 HI. 104.
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES.
§ 190
up this violation of constitutional or statutory limitation as a
defence.^
A limitation of this sort does not invalidate the legal con-
solidation of two or more municipalities, although the indebt-
edness of one or of all exceeds the limit.^
If the excess is caused by an order, which in the payee's
hands is invalid, his assignee will take it subject to this defence,
existing against the assignor, where such an instrument is not
deemed to be negotiable paper : ^ but if bonds are issued to sat-
isfy a judgment against a municipality, and are held by an in-
nocent holder, without notice, their validity cannot be attacked
on the ground that tte judgment was rendered on warrants,
drawn in excess of the limitation of an indebtedness.*
§ 190. The municipal coupon bond, its nature and defini-
tion.— When a municipal corporation undertakes to create an
indebtedness, and to issue negotiable paper in settlement of the
same, the obligation takes the form of a coupon bond, as it is
called, which is commonly used, not only by municipal corpo-
rations, but likewise by the State and National Governments,®
the Territorial Governments,^ and all sorts of private corpora-
tions,'' and even, under extraordinary circumstances, by private
individuals.^ The coupon bond is a primary obligation, in the
nature of a promissory note, promising to pay a sum of money
on a day certain in the future, to which are attached certain
other obligations called coupons,* which call for the payment
of the installments of interest on the principal debt, as they
fall due ; each coupon representing an installment of interest,
and payable when the installment of interest falls due. The
coupon may be severed from the bond at or before its maturity,
and when severed may and does pass as a separate and independ-
1 Richards v. Supervisors, 69 Iowa,
612.
2 True V. Davis, (111.) 29 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Gas. 12. See ante, § 58.
8 Nat. St. Bank v. Marshall, 39
Iowa, 490.
* Sioux Co. V. Osceola Co., 45
Iowa, 168.
^Tiedeman's Commercial Paper,
§132.
" National Bank v. County of Tank-
ton, 101 TJ. S. 133.
' Tiedeman's Commercial Paper,
§117.
8 Simeon Leland in Bankruptcy, 6
Ben. 175.
' They are called coupons from the
Fi-ench verb, couper, to cut, because
they ai-e so attached that they may
be cut off, whenever they fall due.
2 Daniel's Negot. Inst. § 1489.
355
§190
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS.
[CH. XI.
ent security.^ It matters very little what the form of the cou-
pon is, it practically amounts to nothing more than a promissory
note, essentially differing from the ordinary promissory note only
in being payable without grace.^ Sometimes the coupon is in
the form of a draft or order on a bank ; but in that case it dif-
fers from a bill of exchange in that it need not be presented for
acceptance.^ When it is payable to bearer or order, the cou-
pon is of course negotiable,* and may be sued on by the hold-
er, though the bonds are in possession of some one else.^
Notwithstanding the possibility of the severance of the cou-
pon from the bond, the relation between the two is so intimate
that the power to issue the coupons is implied from the legis-
lative authority to issue bonds.® And the mortgage, which is
given to secure the payment of the bond, will cover each and
every coupon, whether attached or detached, together with in-
terest on the coupon.'
1 Clark V. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 584;
Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall.
327; City v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477;
Clarke v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136;
Kose V. City of Bridgeport, 17 Conn.
243; Railway V. Cleneay, 13 Ind. 161;
Commonwealth v. Industrial Assn.,
98 Mass. 12; Spooner v. Holmes, 102
Mass. 503; Arents v. Commonwealth,
18 Gratt. 776; Com'rs of Knox Co. v.
Aspinwall, 21 How. 539 ; Town v. Cul-
ver, 19 Wall. 84; Beaver County v.
Armstrong, 44 Pa. St. 63; Maddox
V. Graham, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 56; Brain-
ard V. JJ'. T. & H. R. E. Co., 25 ST.
Y. 496; Evertsen v. Nat. Bank of
Newport, 11 N. Y. S. C. (4 Hun)
694; Langston v. S. C. E. E. Co., 2
S. C. 249; Nat. Ex. Bank v. Hartford
E. E. Co., 8 E. I. 375.
2 2 Daniel's Negot. Inst. §1490 a;
Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt.
773. But it has been held lately in
New York that coupons are entitled
to days of grace. Eversten v. Nat.
Bank of Newport, 66 N. Y. 22. See
Cooper V. Town of Thompson, 13
Blatchf. 434.
3 Va. & Tenn. E. E. Co. v. Clay,
356
cited from MSS. Special Court of
Appeals of Va. in 2 Daniel's Negot.
Inst. § 1489.
* Aurora v. West, 7 Wall. 82.
s Thomson v. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 327.
* Arents v. Commonwealth, 18
Gratt. 773.
^ Beaver County v. Arnasti'ong, 44
Pa. St. 63; Union Trust Co. v. Mon-
ticello etc. E. E. Co., 63 N. Y. 314;
Miller V. Eutland etc. E. E., 4 Vt.
399; Gilbert v. W. C. V. M. etc. K.
E. Co., 33 Gratt. 599; Haven v.
Grand Junction E. E. Co., 109 Mass.
88. The mortgage proceeds of sale
in case of insufficiency are distrib-
uted pro rata according to the face
value, among all the holders of the
bonds and coupons, covered by the
mortgage. Stanton v. A. & C. R. E.
Co., 2 Woods C. C. 523; Ketchum v.
Duncan, 96 U. S. 671; Pennock v.
Coe, 23 How. 130; In re Eegent's
Canal Iron Works Co., 3 Ch. Div.
43; Hodge's Appeal, 84 Pa. St. 359.
But the coupons cannot share with
the bona fide bondholders, where the
coupons have been taken up and paid
by certain persons, who advanced the
CH. XI.J MUNICIPAL SECUEITIES. § 190 a
§ 190 a. Execution of the muuicipal bond — By what offi-
cials must it he signed. — All questions concerning the suffi-
ciency of execution should, in every instance, be tested and
decided strictlj'^ in conformity with the terms of the enabling
statute, from the material requirements of which no depart-
ure is allowed^ or excused by the fact, that full value has been
received for the bonds."-'
Unless otherwise provided, bonds should be signed by the
municipal officers," as, for example, the supervisors and clerk of
a town.* But if a council or other municipal governing body
is authorized to sign, the signatures of the majority will gen-
erally be held to be sufficient.*
An officer will be presumed to have signed a bond during
his term ; ® and a statute wliich prescribes that a certain officer
shall sign bonds, means the officer who is actually holding office
wlien they are signed? And an otherwise invalid signature
cannot be made valid and binding upon the corporation, by'
ante-dating or post-dating the bonds, in order to make them
appear to have been signed when the officer signing was in
office, and was therefore authorized to sign for the corporation.
A false date is equivalent to a forgery under such circum-
stances, and it can be shown, even against bona fide holders of
the bonds.^ Purchasers must always take the risk of the gen-
uineness of the signatures. For if a statute requires that a par-
ticular officer should sign bonds, they are not valid without his
signature.®
No municipal officer has the implied power to bind the cor-
8 Lane v. Embden, 72 Me. 354;
Middleton v. MuUica, 112 N. Y. 433.
* Walnut V. Wade, 103 U. S. 683.
6 First N. Bk. v. Arlington, 16
Blatoli. 57; Burleigh v. Eoohester, 5
Fed. Eep. 667; Marion v. Clark, 94 U.
S. 278; Bissell v. Spring Val. Tp.,
110 lb. 162; Blair v. Curaming Co.,
111 lb. 363.
« Scb. Dis. V. Xenia Bank, 19 Neb.
89.
' Coler V. Cleburne, 131 U. S. 162.
8 Anthony v. Jasper Co., 101 U. S.
693; Weyauwega v. Ay ling, 99 lb.
112.
9 Bissell V. Sp. Valley, 110 U. S,
357
money for that purpose to the corpo-
ration which issued the bonds. Union
Trust Co. V. Monticello & P. K. E.
Co., 63 N. Y. 311. See Harbeck v.
Vanderbilt, 20 N. Y. 398; Miller v.
Eutland etc. K. E. Co., 40 Vt. 399;
Haven v. Grand Junction E. E. Co.,
109 Mass. 88; James' v. Johnson, 6
Johns. Ch. 423 ; Eobinson v. Leavitt,
7 N. H. 100.
1 Anthony v. Jasper Co., 101 U. S.
693; Coler v. Cleburne, 131 lb. 162;
Young V. Clarendon, 132 lb. 340.
2 Aroma v. Auditor, 15 Fed. Eep.
843; Bank v. Statesville, 84 N. C.
169;Melvin v. Lisenby, 72 111. 63.
§191
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XI.
poration by signing negotiable securities in its name. The
mayor cannot, ^ nor the trustees and selectmen,^ nor the mayor
and recorder, nor the city auditor.^ Nor is there any such
implied power in the judges or supervisors,* or in the clerk of
the County Court, and county boards of supervisors,® or in the
police jury of a parish.^ In all these cases, the legislative
power of the city or county, in whomever such power is lodged,
must designate and empower the officer?, who are intended to
execute the bonds for such city or county.
A signing in blank, the blanks being filled in afterwards,^
does not invalidate the bonds ; and the omission to counter-
sign bonds is a defect of execution, which a court of equity
will remedy.* Although drawn and signed, municipal bonds
take effect only hy and on delivery.®
§ 191. Negotiability of coupon bonds — Rights of holder
of the same. — Although it was a rigid rule of the old law mer-
chant that a seal destroyed the negotiability of commercial
paper,!'' ^jjg modern demands of the commercial world for cor-
porate securities, — accompanied by the highest evidence of its
execution by the proper officers, viz., the seal of the corporation,
— and the further fact that it was once held that a corporation
could not act, except by and under its seal,!! broke in upon the
162; Northern Bank v. Porter, 110
lb. 608; Merchant's etc. Bank v. Ber-
gen Co., 115 TJ. S. 384; see also
Brown v. Bon Homme Co., 46 W. W.
Eep. 173. A lithograph or printed
fac simile signature is sufficient, if
adopted by the maker. McKee v.
Vernon Co., 3 Dill. 210; Pennington
V. Baehr, 48 Cal. 565 ; Lyde v. Coun-
ty, 16 Wall. 6; Neely v. Torkville, 10
S. C. 141.
1 Little Eock v. State Bk., 3 Eng.
(Ark.) 227; Goldschmidt v. New Or-
leans, 5 La. An. 436.
2 Eich V. Errol, 51 N. H. 350; Hub-
bard V. Lyndon, 28 Wis. 674.
3 Clark V. Des Moines, 19 Iowa,
200; People v. Gray, 23 Cal. 125;
Keller v. Weeks, 22 lb. 460.
*Hyde v. Franklin, 27 Vt. 186;
Daviess Co. v. Howard, 13 Bush. 102;
358
People V. Suprs. El Dorado Co., 11
Cal. 175 ; Chemung Bk. v. Sup'rs, 5
Den. 517.
6 Parcel v. Barnes, 25 Ark. 261;
Clark V. Polk Co., 19 Iowa, 248.
« Pol. Jury V. Britton, 15 Wall. 566.
' Niantic Sav. Bank v. Douglas, 5
111. 579.
8 Melviu V. Lisenby, 72 HI. C3.
The act of countersigning bonds by a
town clerk is ministerial. Houghton
V. People, 55 lb. 398.
8 Toung V. Clarendon, 132 U. S.
340; Bayley V. Taber, 5 Mass. 285;
Marvin v. McCullom, 20 John. 288;
Ward V. Churn, 18 Gratt. 801; Love-
joy V. Whipple, 18 Vt. 379.
1" See Tiedeman, Commercial Pa-
per, § 32.
" See Tiedeman, Commercial Pa-
per, § 117.
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECXJEITIES.
§191
force of this rule, and created an exception in favor of the ne-
gotiability of corporate securities, notwithstanding they are
under seal. It is now the law, in the United States, supported
by an almost unbroken line of authorities,^ that the coupon
bond, when it contains the usual or equivalent words of nego-
tiability, is for every purpose as negotiable as bills of exchange
and promissory notes.^
In England in 1811, the bonds of the East India company
were declared to be non-negotiable.^ Immediately thereafter.
Parliament enacted that such bonds were assignable and trans-
ferable by delivery.* Following the example thus set them by
Parliament, the English courts applied the doctrine of negotia-
bility to all sorts of coupon bonds.^
The fact that provision is made in the bond for its being
32 Tex. 405; Consolidated Associa-
tion V. Avegno, 28 La. 552 ; Durant v.
Iowa County, 1 Woolworth C. C. 72;
Blackman v. Lehman, 63 Ala. 519;
State ex rel. Plock v. Cobb, 64 Ala.
128; Arents v. Commonwealth, 18
Gratt. 773; Clark v. Janesville, 10
Wis. 136; Mills v. Jefferson, 20 Wis.
50; Johnson v. County of Stark, 24
111. 75 ; Chapin v. Vt. & Mass. K. R.
Co., 8 Gray, 575; Nat. Exch. Bank v.
Hartford, etc., E. R. Co., 8 K I. 379;
Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cleve-
' See contra, Diamond v. Lawrence
Co., 37 Pa. St. 353: "We will not
treat these bonds as negotiable se-
curities. On this ground we stand
alone. All the courts, American and
English, are against us."
2 White V. Vt. & Mass. E. R. Co.,
21 How. 575; Moran v. Com'rs of
Miami Co., 2 Black, 722; Mercer
County V. Hackett, 1 Wall. 83;
Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall.
175; Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall.
382; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110;
Thompson v. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 227;
Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772;
Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 82;
Com'rs of Manor v. Clark, 94 U. S.
279; First Nat. Bank v. Mt. Tabor, 52
Vt. 87; Railway v. Cleneay, 13 Ind.
161 ; Clapp V. Cedar County, 5 Clarke,
16; Eingling v. Kohn, 4 Mo. App.
63 ; Lafayette Sav. Bank v. Stoneware
Co., 4 Mo. App. 276; Barrett v.
County Court, 44 Mo. 197; Craig v.
City of Vicksburg, 31 Miss. 216; So-
ciety for Savings v. City of New Lon-
don, 29 Conn. 174; Virginia v. Ches-
apeake & Ohio Canal Co., 32 Md.
501; Spoonerv. Holmes, 102 Mass.
503; Hinckley v. Union Pac. R. E.,
129 Mass. 52; Langston v. S. C. E. E.
Co., 2 S. C. 248 ; San Antonio v. Lane,
land, etc.jR. R. Co., 41 Barb. 9; Bank
of Rome v. Village of Rome, 19 N.
Y. 24; Seybel V. Nat. Currency Bank,
54 N. Y. 288; Evertson v. Nat. Bank
of Newport, 4 Hun (11 N. Y. S. C.)
695; 66 N. Y. 15; Morris Canal, etc.,
Co. V. Fisher, 1 Stock. 667; City of
Elizabeth v. Force, 29 N. J. Eq. 587;
Weith V. City of Wilmington, 68 N.
C. 341.
s Glynn v. Baker, 1 East, 510.
4 51 Geo. III. ch. 64.
6 Wookey v. Pole, 4 B. & Aid. 1;
Gorgier v. Melville, 3 B. & C. 45;
Lang v. Smith, 7 Bing. 284; Eumball
v. Metropolitan Bank, 2 Q. B. Div.
194; Goodwin v. Eoberts, L. R. 10
Exch. 76, 337.
359
§ 191 a.
MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIOJrS.
[CH. XI.
" registered and made payable by transfer only on the books of
the company," will not of itself destroy the negotiability of
the bond.^ But actual registration does.
The holder or purchaser of the coupon bond takes it, with
all the rights and privileges of the purchaser of a bill of ex-
change or a promissory note ; and he will be a bona fide holder,
under the same circumstances, and be subject to the same
defences, as if his bond had been an unsealed bill or note.^
Fraud in the election, upon which the issue of bonds was based,
should be set up before the rights of honafide holders have ac-
crued.^
If the coupon is overdue when it is transferred, the purchaser
takes it subject to all the equities.* But the fact that overdue
coupons are attached to a bond, when the bond is sold and
transferred, will not of itself affect the negotiability of the bond,
if it was itself not yet due.* But the overdue coupon may, in
connection with other facts or circumstances in the knowledge
of the purchaser, be sufficient to put the purchaser on his in-
quiry.® And, of course, this would be the case, where it was
stipulated in the bond that, on default in the payment of any
coupon, the bond itself will be due and payable.''
§ 191 a. To whom payable — Transfer by indorsement or
delivery. — Coupon bonds are usually made payable to bearer,
and are transferable by delivery ,8 although they may be made
1 Savannah & Memphis E. K. Co.
V. Lancaster, 62 Ala. 563.
2 2 Daniel Negot. Inst. §§1502,
1503. See ante, chapter on rights of
Bona Fide Holder.
SButler v. Dunham, 27 111. 474;
People V. San F. Sups., 27 Cal. 655.
*Arents v. Commonwealth, 18
Gratt. 773 ; First Nat. Bank v. County
Com'rs, 14 Minn. 79; Ashurst v.
Bank of Australia, 37 Eng. L. & Eq.
195 ; Evertsen v. Jv'ational Bank, 66
N. T. 22, 23, semUe. See Bank of
La. V. City of K O., 5 Am. Law Eeg.
(N. S.) 555 ; Brown v. Davies, 3 T. R.
80; Rothschild v. Carney, 9 B. & C.
391; Hinckley v. Union Pac. R. R.
Co., 129 Mass. 52. The presumption
of law is, however, that the holder
360
acquired the coupon bona fide and
before maturity. City of Lexington
V. Butler, 141 Wall. 295.
6 Railway Co. v. Sprague, 103 U. S.
762, distinguishing the case of Par-
sons V. Jackson, 99 TT. S. 434, and
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 U. S.
58. See also Nat. Bank v. Kirby,
108 Mass. 497; Gilbough v. Norfolk,
etc., Co., 1 Hughes, 410; Boss v.
Hewitt, 15 Wis. 260; State ex rel.
Plock V. Cobb, 64 Ala. 158. See
contra, 14 Minn. 77.
^Parsons v. Jackson, 99 U. S. 434.
T May or, etc., of Griffin v. City
Bank, 58 Ga. 584; Walnut v. Wade,
103 U. S. 695.
8 Brookman v. Metcalf , 32 N. Y.
591; Conn. Ins. Co. v. 0. C. & C. R,
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SEOUEITIES.
§ 191 a.
payable to tlie order of the person to whom they are issued, and
in that case they could be transferred only by indorsement.^
Statutory directions, as to whom municipal bonds shall be pay-
able, are not mandatory,^ and when the statute directed that
the bonds should be payable " to the president and directors
of the railroad company, their successors and assigns," making
them payable "to the railroad company or bearer" was held
to be sufficient.^
Bonds may be delivered to a third person, who may be em-
powered to decide when, if at all, they shall issue, and his de-
cision is binding upon all who are cognizant or chargeable with
notice.*
Although it is necessary in ordinary commercial paper to
give the name of the payee, or to describe him in some other
way; ^ this is not necessarj'^ to the validity or to the negotiable
character of a coupon bond. The coupon bond is designed to
pass from hand to hand indefinitely, and it does not matter to
know to whom it was first issued.^
But in order that the coupon bond may be transferable at all,
E. Co., 41 Barb. 9; Mercer County
V. Hackett, 1 Wall. 83; City of Ken-
osha V. Lamson, 9 Wall. 478 ; Roberts
V. BoUes, 101 U. S. 122; Morris Bank-
ing & Canal Co. v. Lewis, 1 Beas,
323; Eaton & H. E. E. Co. v. Hunt,
20 Ind. 457 ; Carr v. Le Fevre, 27 Pa.
St. 413 ; Johnson v. County of Stai-k,
24 111. 75; Supervisors of Mercer
County V. Hubbard, 45 111. 139; Town
of Eagle V. Kohn, 84 111. 292.
1 City of Lexington v. Butler, 15
Wall. 295. The party transferring
by indorsement assumes the custom-
ary liabilities of indorsers of com-
mercial paper. Bonner v. City of New
Orleans, 2 Woods C. C. 135 ; Jones on
R. E. Securities, § 348. And whether
the transfer be by delivery or by in-
dorsement, the transferrer guaran-
tees the genuineness of the bond,
and is obliged to refund the consid-
eration, if the bond should prove to
be a forgery. Smith v. McNair, 19
Kan. 330; First Nat. Bank v. Peck, 8
Kan. 660. See chapters on Transfer
in General, and Transfer by Indorse-
ment in Tiedeman's Commercial
Paper.
2 Calhoun Co. v. Galbraith, 99 U.
S. 214. A bond made payable to
bearer is a sufficient compliance with
the direction, that title to it shall
pass by delivery. Com. v. Alle-
gheny, 37 Pa. St. 237; Thomas v.
Morgan Co., 39 111. 496; Com'rs v.
Nichols, 14 Ohio St. 260.
8 Woodward V. Calhoun Co., U. S.
Dis. Ct. for Miss., 2 Cent. Law Jour.
396.
« Young V. Clarendon, 132 U. S.
340.
^See Tiedeman Commercial Pa-
per, §17.
8 Woods V. Lawrence Co., 1 Black,
360; White v. Vermont, etc., R. R.,
21 How. 575; Preston v. Hull, 23
Gratt. 613. See Eversten v. Nat. Bk.
of Newport, 66 N. Y. 19, 20.
3B1
§ 1916.
MUNICIPAL COEPOEAilONS.
[CH. XI.
it must contain words of negotiability. It is not necessary to
employ the usual words, or order or bearer, but any other word
which indicates the intention to permit its transfer will suffice,
such as to the " holder ;" ^ or to A. and his assignS, when the
transfer must be by indorsement.^ Delivery is as essential to
passing the title of coupon bonds, as of any other kind of com-
mercial paper ; and if possession is piocured without a delivery,
the rights of a bona fide holder will be the same as if it had
been a bill or note.*
§ 191 b. The formal parts of bond and coupon — Seal not
necessary. — The bond and coupons are generally piinted on
paper of very fine texture, more or less beautifully engraved.
But in other respects, the bond differs in form very little from
a promissory note. The coupon may take on any form : Some-
times it is a promissory note ; * at other times, a bill of exchange
on the treasury of the corporation;^ a draft or order, without
naming any drawee ; *■ a check,''' and a mere duebill or ac-
knowledgment of indebtedness.*
It has been sometimes dpubted whether a coupon bond would
be unaffected by the absence of a seal.^ But inasmuch as the
seal was originally the only objection to the application to these
bonds of the character and incidents of negotiability, it is diffi-
cult to see any reason why the absence of the seal would now
change their character in any essential respect, and this is now
the ruling of the courts.^" It has been held that, where the
authority is simply " to issue bonds," a seal is necessary ; ^^ but
'Areuts v. Commonwealth, 18
Gratt. 750; County of Wilson v. Na-
tional Bank, 103 U. S. 776; Porter v.
City of Janesville, 3 Fed. Eep. 619.
2 Bralnard v. New York, etc., R. E.
Co., 25 N. y. 496; 10 Bosw. 832.
^Ledwiok v. MoKim, 53 N. T. 815;
Eedlick v. Doll, 54 N. Y. 236. If
coupons refer to bonds to which they
were attached, the purchaser of a
severed coupon is chargeable viith
notice of all that the bond contains.
McClure v. Oxford Township, 94 U.
S. 429; Selliman v. Eailroad Co., 27
Gratt. 119.
* Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall.
327.
362
° Moran v. Com'rs of Miami Coun-
ty, 2 Black, 722.
" Mercer County v. Hubbard, 45
111. 140.
' Arents v. Commonwealth, 18
Gratt. 753.
* Woods V. Lawrence County, 1
Black, 360.
' Mercer County v. Hackett, 1 Wall.
83.
1" The People v. Mead, 24 N. Y. 124;
Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cleveland,
etc., E. E. Co., 41 Barb. 22; Augusta
V. Augusta Bank, 56 Me. 176; San
Antonio v. Meharty, 96 XJ. S. 315;
Draper v. Springport, 104 U. S. 501.
11 Avery v. Springport, 14 Blatch.
272.
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECUEITIES.
§ 191 h.
its omission, through misunderstanding or mistake, may be re-
lieved in equity .1
Where it is the legislative intent that the municipality shall
be bound, regardless of seal, the bonds are valid without it ; as
where the statute empowered a city " to issue bonds bearing in-
terest, or otherwise pledge the faith of the city to pay." ^ In
New York, where a statute required bonds to be under seal a
scroll was held to be insufficient.^ But where the bonds were
to be issued " under the official signature of the supervisors "
no seal was required, notwithstanding the statutory provision,
the court holding that any implication arising from the word
bonds is overcome by the explicit direction as to their execu-
tion.*
Like other commercial paper, it is necessary to the negoti-
ability of the bond, that the amount to be paid is certain. Any
uncertainty in respect to the amount will destroy the negoti-
ability of the bond.*
The parties to commercial paper have generally the unre-
stricted power to stipulate a place of payment in the paper ;
and, according to the weight of authoritj'', the parties to coupon
bonds are not hampered by any restrictions in that regard.^
Any place within or without the State may be chosen by the
municipal corporation as a place of payment.'^ But it has been
held in Illinois that a municipal corporation cannot, without
express authority from the Legislature, provide for the paj-ment
1 Wiser v. Blackly, 1 John. Ch.
eOT; Bernards v. Stebbins, 109 U. S.
341; Cockerel v. Cholmondely, 1
Kuss. & Myl. 418.
2 San Antonio v. Mehaffy, 96 U. S.
312 ; Augusta Bk. v. Augusta, 50 Me.
176; Conn. Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, etc.,
Co., 41 Barb. 9; Bernards Tp. v.
Stebbins, 109 U. S. 341; Draper v.
Springport, 104 lb. 501. Coupons
need no seal. Ring v. Johnson, 6 la.
265; see ante, § 51.
8 Solon V. Williamsburg Sav. Bk.,
112 K. Y. 122, changed by statute.
* People V. Mead, 24 N. Y. 114;
Kelley v. McCormick, 28 lb. 318;
Board v. Fonda, 77 lb. 350.
6 Parson v. Jackson, 99 U. S. 434;
also Jackson v. Vicksburg, etc., R.
R. M. Co., 2 Woods C. C. 141.
8 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 178;
Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall.
338; City of Kenosha v. Lamson, 8
Wall. 478; City of Lexington v. But-
ler, 14 Wall. 289; Lynde v. County of
Winnebago, 16 Wall. 13; Cenn. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co.,
41 Barb. 9.
' Meyers v. Muscatine, IWall. 384;
Thomson v. Lee Co., 3 lb. 327; Gel-
pcke V. Dubuque, 1 lb. 175 ; Lexing-
ton v. Butler, 14 lb. 282; Lynde v.
Winnebago, 16 lb. 6; Calhoun v. Gal-
braith, 99 U. S. 214; Mygaltv. Green
Bay, 1 Biss. 292.
363
§ 191 c.
MtnSriCIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. XI.
of its bonds and coupons at any other place than its treasury .^
The figuies, denoting the number of the bond in a series, con-
stitute no essential part of it, and an alteration of them will
not affect the rights of a bona fide holder of the bond.^ Nor
does the dating of a bond after the date of the ordinance pro-
viding for its issue affect its validity.*
Where the coupon bonds of a corporation are guaranteed
by the State, any agreement entered into and indorsed on the
bonds by the corporation, subsequent to their execution by the
State, will bind only the corporation, and not the State, as
guarantor.*
§ 191 c. Eegistration of municipal securities by State
oHicials. — To so great an extent have the conditions of requir-
ing popular consent been evaded, that in some of the States
acts have been passed, requiring all bonds to be registered by
the State authorities, before they can be legally issued. These
enactments were designed to prevent the improvident issue of
bonds ; and bonds are not duly issued unless these provisions
are complied with.^ In the State of Missouri, the act provided
that " before any bond hereafter issued shall obtain validity or
be negotiated," it should be registered by the auditor, who was
to certify thereon that all conditions precedent had been com-
plied with. In a case,^ arising out of the construction of this
statute the rule was applied that when a statute, declares that a
contract, bond or note is absolutely void, it is so into whosesoever
hands it may come.^ This rule has been held to rest upon the
ground that such statutes, as component parts of the existing
law, are notice of limitations upon the powers of municipal
corporations, which affect all the world,^ so that a purchaser of
I Prettyman v. Tazewell County,
19 111. 406; People ex rel., etc., v.
Tazewell County, 22 111. 151; John-
son V. County of Stark, 24 111. 91;
Pekin v. Reynolds, 31 111. 530.
' City of Elizabeth v. Force, 29 N.
J. Eq. 591, oveiTuling 28 IST. J. Eq.
587; Commonwealth v. Emigration
Sav. Bank, 98 Mass. 12; Birdsall v.
Russell, 29 N. Y. 220.
" Flagg V. Elmira, 33 Mo. 440.
' Wallace v. Loomls, 97 U. S. 147.
'Douglas V. Lincoln Co., 2 Mc-
364
Crary, 449.
8 Anthony v. Jasper Co., 101 U. S.
693.
'Bayley v. Taber, 5 Mass. 286;
see Tiedeman Commercial Paper,
§178.
8 Hofe V. Jasper Co., 110 U. S. 53;
Northern Bank v. Porter Towns., 110
U. S. 608; Lewis v. Cora'rs, 105 lb.
739; Menasha v. Hazard, 102 lb. 81;
January v. Johnson Co., 3 Dill. C. C.
392; Bissell v. Spring V. Tp., 124 U.
S. 225; Crow v. Oxford, 119 lb. 215;
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES.
§192
unregistered bonds, who takes them thus incomplete, cannot
claim protection in his character as an innocent holder without
notice.^ If the State statute makes the certificate of the reg-
istering of3ficial conclusive upon the municipality as to the facts
contained therein, the effect is the same as if the recitals of the
certificate were the recitals of the municipal officials ; and they
are estopped from asserting their own lack of power. But
where the certificate is not expressly conclusive, the munici-
pality may deny the facts certified to.^
A municipal corporation, having the power to boi'row money,
issued bonds valid on their face, but antedated them in order
to avoid the registration act. The proceeds of the bonds went
into the city treasury, and were used for lawful purposes. In
this case, the court made the distinction that, while the city
was not liable on the bonds, the actual amount of money, which
was paid to the corporation, could be recovered in an action for
money had and received.^
§ 192. Presentment of coupons for payment. — The cou-
pons need not be pi-esented for payment on the day of maturity,
in order to hold the principal obligors liable, even when they
are in the form of a draft or order on a bank.* But it would
be necessary to present at maturity, in order to hold an in-
dorsei', if there be one;^ and within a reasonable time after
maturity, in order to hold a guarantor.® Nor is a prior pre-
sentment for payment necessary to the recovery of interest on
coupons,^ even wheij the coupons are made payable at a par-
Dixon
Lewis V. Com'rs, 105 lb. 739
Co. V. Field, 111 lb. 83.
1 DeVass v. Richmond, 18 Gratt.
338; State V. Eoggen, 22 Neb. 118;
State V. Babcock, 19 lb. 223, 230.
2 Dixon Co. V. Field, 111 U. S. 83;
German Sav. Bank v. Franklin Co.,
128 lb. 526, 540; Crow v. Oxford, 119
lb. 215; Lewis V. Barbour Co., 105
U. S. 739; comp. Pana v. Bowler,
107 lb. 529; Oregon v. Jennings, 119
lb. 74; Randolph Co. v. Post, 93 lb.
502.
8 Wood V. Louisiana, 102 U. S. 294;
see § 193 a.
* Mayor, etc., v. Potomac Ins. Co.,
58 Tenn. 296; County of Greene v.
Baniel and County of Pickens v.
Daniel, 102 U. S. 187; Arents v. Com-
monwealth, 18 Gratt. 773 ; Langston
V. S. C. E. R. Co., 2 S. C. 248; Jeffer-
sonville v. Patterson, 26 Ind. 16.
^ Bonner v. New Orleans, 2 Woods
C. C. 135.
6 Arents v. Commonwealth, 18
Gratt. 773.
7 Walnut V. Wade, 103 U. S. 683;
Ohio V. Frank, 103 U. S. 697; North
Pa. R. R. Co. V. Adams, 54 Pa. St. 97;
Mills V. Jefferson, 20 Wis. 50; Jeffer-
sonville v. Pattersonville, 26 Ind. 16;
Langston v. S. C. R. R. Co., 2 S. C.
248; San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Texas,
403; Virginia v. Chesapeake, etc.,
365
§ 192 h.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XI.
ticular bank in another State.^ But if the municipal or other
corporation, which issued the bond and coupon, can show that
it was ready at the stipulated place, or at its treasurj', to pay
the coupon on the day of maturity, no interest could then be
recovered on the coupon.^
§ 192 a. Time of payment.— When the statute is silent as
to the time when bonds must be paid, this matter may be ar-
ranged, and the date fixed, bj'- agreement between the corpora-
tion and the purchasers ; ^ but if the statute fixes the date,
bonds issued in disregard thereof are Yoid ; * at least, where
they are made to fall due at a later date. It seems that bonds
may be issued to mature before, but not after, the date fixed
by the statute, without affecting their validity.® On the other
hand, it is held that the fact that municipal bonds which are
regular in all other respects violate a statutory provision, that
no more than ten per cent of the loan shall be paid in any
one year, does not invalidate them.^ In Pennsylvania, where
bonds were payable " in twenty-five years after date " with a
proviso, that they " will be redeemed if desired, twelve years
after date," it was held that the bonds were not payable until
twenty-five years had elapsed ; that the proviso gave the obligee,
and not the obligor, an option to enforce payment at the earli-
er date, so that the holder could not against his wishes be com-
pelled to accept the amount due at the expiration of twelve
years. ^
§ 192 h. Interest and exchange on ltu)nd and coupon.^
During the time that the bond is running, the interest collecti-
ble upon the bond is represented by the coupon, and it can only
Canal Co., 32 Md. 501. See contra,
Whittakerv. Hartford, etc., R. R. Co.,
8 R. I. 47; Pekiu v. Reynolds, 31 HI.
531; Johnson v. Stark County, 24111.
To; Chicago v. People, 56 111. 327.
1 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 ;
Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327.
See also Aurora City v. Welt, 7 Wall.
82; Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 583;
Genoa v. Woodruff, 92 U. S. 502.
2 Walnut V. Wade, 103 U. S. 697;
North Penn. R. R. Co. v. Adams, 54
Pa. St. 97.
366
8 Chicago etc. Co. v. Aurora, 99111.
205.
* Woodruff V. Okolona, 57 Miss.
806; Davis v. Tuba Co., 75 Cal. 452;
Cairo etc. Co. v. Sparta, 77 111. 505 :
Green v. Dyersburg, 2 Flip. 477;
Brownell v. Greenwich, 114 N. Y.
518.
6 Potter V. Greenwich, 26 Hun, 326;
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Elizabeth, 42 N.
J. L. 249.
6 Hoag V. Greenwich, 133 N. T. 152.
' Allentown Sch. Dis. v. Derr, 115
Pa. St. 439.
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES.
193
be recovered by a presentment of the coupon.^ After maturity
of the bond, interest may be recovered by the holder of the
bond for any delay in payment.
Since coupons ai-e separate and independent securities, they
bear interest themselves after their maturit}' ; and the interest
is recoverable by the holder of the coupon.'^ And so, also, may
exchange be recovered on coupons, whenever it could be recov-
ered on bills and notes.^
§ 193. Actions on bonds and coupons. — The holder of both
the bond and the coupons may sue on them in his own name ; *
and although it has been denied,^ it is now generally held to be
the law, that the holder of the coupon may in any case maintain a
separate action on the coupon, and need not join with the holder
of the bond; nor need the bond be produced in evidence.^
' City of Kenosha v. Lamson, 9
Wall. 482; Williamson v. New Al-
bany, etc., E. K. Co., 9 Am. Ry.
Times, 37, V. S. C. C.
2 Aurora City v. West, 1 Wall. 105 ;
Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 206;
Thomson v. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 332;
Genoa v. Woodruff, 92 U. S. 502;
Amy V. Dubuque, 98 U. S. 471 ; Kosh-
konong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668;
Mills V. Jefferson, 20 Wis. 50; San
Antonio v. Lane, 32 Texas, 405 ; Nat.
Exch. Bank v. Hartford, etc. R. E.
Co., 8 E. I. 375; Beaver County v.
Armstrong, 6 Wright, 63; North
Penn. E. E. Co. v. Adams, 54 Pa. St.
94; Welsh v. St. Paul, etc., E. E. Co.,
25 Minn. 320; Arents v. Common-
wealth, 18 Gratt. 776; Gilbert v. W.
C. V. M., etc., E. E. Co., 33 Gratt.
599; HoUingsworth v. City of De-
troit, 3 McLean, 472; Virginia v.
Chesapeake, etc.. Canal Co., 32 Md.
591; Langston v. S. C. E. E., 2 S. C.
248; Conn. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cleve-
land, etc., R. E. Co., 41 Barb. 9.
« Gelpcke V. Dubuque. IWall. 20;
Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S.
668; Jeffersonville v. Paterson, 26
Ind. ] 6. In Gelpcke v. Dubuque, the
Court said: " municipal bonds with
coupons payable to bearer, having
by universal usage and consent all
the qualities of commercial paper,
a party recovering on the coupons is
entitled to the amount of them, with
interest and exchange at the place
where by their terms they were
made payable."
^Society for Savings v. City of
New London, 29 Conn. 175 ; Carr v.
LeFevre, 27 Pa. St. 413; Johnson v.
County of Stark, 22 111. 75.
6 In Jackson v. T. & C. E. E. Co., 2
Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 585; Crosby
V. New London, etc., R. R. Co., 26
Conn. 121, it was held that no sepa^
rate action can be maintained on
the coupon, unless the coupon con-
tained a distinct promise to pay.
8 Com'rs of Knox Co. v. Aspin-
wall, 21 How. 54; Beaver Co. v. Arm-
strong, 44 Pa. St. 63; Kennard v.
Cass Co., U. S. C. C, 3 Dillon C. C.
147; Town of Cicero v. Clifford, 53
Ind. 191; First Nat. Bank v. Mt. Ta-
bor, 52 Vt. 87; Thompson v. Lee
County, 3 Wall. 327 ; Walnut v. Wade,
103 U. S. 695 ; Nat. Exch. Bank v.
Hartford, etc., E. E. Co., 8 R. I. 375;
Mayor, etc., v. Potomac Ins. Co., 58
Tenn. 296; Welch v. First Div. St.
Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 25 Minn. 320.
The coupons may be sued on, not-
367
§194
MI7NICIPAL COKPOEATIONS.
[CH. XI.
The recovery on the bonds is so independent of the recovery
on the coupons, that a judgment, that one is a bona fide owner
of certain coupons, does not prove that he is also a bona fide
owner of the bonds, from which the coupons were detached.^
The same provision of the Statute of Limitation applies to
both bond and coupon ; and in order that action may be brought
on the coupon, it must be begun within the statutory period
after its maturity, although the bond is not yet due.^
§ 193 a. When consideration paid to corporation for in-
valid bond may be recovered. — When the transaction, in which
the bonds were issued, is not a malum in se, and the parties
paying for the bonds are not participants in the violation of
the law, the consideration paid to the corporation for the ille-
gal bonds can be recovered back, with interest from the time
that the corporation denied its liability and refused to pay.^
§ 194. Legislative control of the remedies to enforce pay-
ment of municipal debts. — The general rule of constitutional
law is that the Legislature of a State lias not the power to de-
stroy or impair the obligation of a contract, by taking away all
remedies for the enforcement of the contract. A denial of all
remed}^ would be as unconstitutional, as a legislative declaration
against the validity of the contract.* But as long as a substan-
tial remedy is provided for the enforcement of the contract, the
character of the remedy may be changed at the pleasure of the
Legislature ; and such a change, however material, will not be
considered to impair the obligation of the contract, in the con^
withstanding the bonds have been
ah-eady paid and surrendered. STat.
Exch. Bank v. Hartford, etc., E. E.
Co., supra; and altliough the bonds
need not be produced in evidence,
tlie coupons in suit should ordinarily
be identified in the declaration by a
statement of the number of the bond,
date, sum and time of payment.
Kennard v. Cass Co., supra.
1 Stewart v. Lansing, 104 U. S. 505.
2 City of Kenosha v. Lamson, 9
Wall. 483, 484; City of Lexington v.
Butler, 15 Wall. 296; Clark v. Iowa
City, 20 Wall. 586; Amy v. Dubuque,
08 U. S. 471; Koshkonong v. Burton,
104 U. S. 668.
368
s Louisiana v. Wood, 102 U. S. 294,
affirming s. c. in 5 Dillon C. C. 122.
See also Thomas v. City of Eich-
mond, 12 Wall. 354 ; Draper v. Spriag-
port, 104 U. S. 501 ; Oneida Bank v.
Ontario Bank, 21 N. Y. 496; Jack-
son County V. Hall, 55 111. 444.
* Osborne v. Nicholson, 13 Wall.
662; Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 480;
Penrose v. Erie Canal Co., 56 Pa. St.
46 ; Thompson v. Commonwealth, 81
Pa. St. 314; West v. Sansom, 44 Ga.
295 ; Eison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161 ; Grif-
fin V. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; McFarland
V. Butler, 8 Minn. 116; Jackson v.
Butler, 8 Minn. 117.
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECUmTIES.
§194
stitutional sense, although the change is to a less desirable and a
more inconvenient remedy.^ The most radical changes are per^-
missible, as long as a substantial remedy remains. Thus, a law-
may take away from existing contracts the right to confine the
debtor in prison, and yet not impair the obligation of the con-
tracts.^ And so may a judgment lien on real property be taken
away by a repeal of the statute, authorizing it.^
But, inasmuch as the creditors of a municipal corporation are
ordinarily limited to one or more special remedies for the en-
forcement of their claims, and cannot resort to the general
remedies for the enforcement of contracts, a different rule is
recognized in relation to such debts, viz. : that laws, in force
when the bonds are issued, which authorize the levy of taxes for
the payment of the principal and interest thereof, are a part of
the contract between a municipality and its creditors ; and to
i-epeal such laws is to impair the obligation of the contract.*
And it is no answer to claim that the subsequent legislation,
ill curtailment of the municipal power of taxation, does not ut-
terly destroy the rights of the creditors or bondholders.^ The
same rule applies to all other remedies which are specially pro-
vided for the liquidation of a municipal or county indebtedness,^
and any subsequent State legislation, which affects these reme-
1 Ogden V. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213;
Beers v. Houghton, 9 Pet. 329; Ten-
nessee V. Sneed, 96 C. S. 69; Simpson
V. Savings Bank, 56 N. H. 466; Banks
V. Quackenhush, 1 N. Y. 129; Morse
V. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281; Baldwin v.
Newark, 38 N. J. 158; Moore v. State,
43 N. J. 203.
2 Marshall, C. J., in Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; see
Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370; Pen-
niman's Case, 103 U. S. 714; Matter
of Nichols, 8 R. I. 50; Sommers v.
Jolinson, 4 Vt. 278 (24 Am. Dec. 604);
Ware v. Miller, 9 S. C. 18; Maxey v.
Loyal, 38 G-a. 531; Bronson v. New-
herry, 2 Dougl. (Mich.) 38.
" Watson V. N. Y. Central E. E. Co.,
47 N. Y. 157; Woodbury v. Grimes,
1 Col. 100; contra, Gunn v. Barry,
15 Wall. 610.
24
* United States v. Jefferson Co., 1
McCrary C. C. 356; Von Hoffman v.
Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Galena v. Amy,
5 lb. 705, 709; Ealls Co. v. 'United
States, 105 U. S. 733; Wolff v. New-
Orleans, 1031b. .358; Quincy v. Jack-
son, 113 lb. 332; Eiggs v. Johnson
Co., 6 Wall. 106, 194; Eees v. Water-
town, 19 lb. 107, 120; Lansing v.
County Treasurer, 1 Dill. 523 ; State
V. Milwaukee, 25 Wis. 122 ; Vance v.
Little Eock, 30 Ark. 435, 440; see
ante, § 14.
6 United States v. Jefferson Co., 6
Fed. Eep. 486.
6 Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595;
Ealls Co. V. United States, 105 U. S.
733; Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 lb.
278; State v. Mayor of N. O., 109 lb.
285.
369
§ 194 a.
MTJNICrPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XI.
dies, so as to lessen their adequacy or which destroys them al-
together without substituting another, is unconstitutional.^
Carrying out this rule, the Supreme Court of the United
States has decided that a law, by which certain bondholdere
possessed the right to have a special county tax levied for their
benefit, was still in force, although subsequently repealed by a
State Legislature, in favor of judgments recovered on debts
which were incurred prior to the repeal.^ So, also, the law of
tlie State, with the construction placed upon it by the highest
State court, is part of the obligation of the contract, and that
construction will be recognized and enforced by the Federal
courts, in all suits on contracts arising thereunder.^ So, like-
wise, a sinking fund, which is pledged by the statute creating
the debt, cannot be diverted by the Legislature to other pur-
poses ; * and an injunction will lie to prevent the municipal cor-
poration from carrying out such a law.* So, also, when an
ordinance, authorizing the issue of bonds, devotes the income
of certain property to their paj'ment, the municipal authorities
cannot subsequently appropriate the income to other purposes.^
§ 194 a. Eemedies for enforcement of mnnicipal indebted-
ness.— As a general rule, municipal corporations seldom possess
any pecuniarj' resources, except those furnished bj' taxation. For
this reason, coupled with the fact that property held by the city
for public purposes cannot be sold under execution,^ the power
of levying taxes is b}" inference deemed to be conferred by the
Legislature, as an appurtenant of the power to contract an in-
debtedness ; and an express power to issue bonds implies a power
to raise the money necessary for their payment by taxation.^ For
iSieberty, Lewis, 122 TJ. S. 284.
•^ Cape Girardeau v. Hill, 118 IT.
S. 68; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S.
595; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall.
535; Bronson v. McKinzie, 1 How.
311, 317; Louisiana v. New Orleans,
102 U. S. 203, 208; Poindexter v.
Greenhow, 114 lb. 270; Eoyall v.
Virginia, 116 lb. 572.
* German Sav. Bank v. Franklin
Co., 128 U. S. 526; see post, § 195.
* Liquidators v. Municipality, 6 La.
An. 21; Terry v. Wisconsin M. & F.
Ins., 18 Wis. 87.
370
5 Fazende v. Houston, 34 Fed. Rep.
95.
6 State V. Police Jury, 111 U. S. 716;
Bates V. Porter, 74 Cal. 224; New
Orleans v. United States, 49 Fed.
Rep. 40; 2 U. S. App. 125.
' Meriwetlier v. Garrett, 102 U. S
472. See post, § 212.
« Quincy v. Jackson, 113 U. S.333;
Feldman v. Charleston, 23 S. C. 57;
Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655,
660; United States v. New Orleans,
98 U. S. 381, 393; Ralls Co. v. United
States, 105 lb. 733, 735 ; United States
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES.
§194,
this reason, also, when a special tax is provided for, the bond-
holder is not limited for his remedy to this special tax ; but he
is entitled to payment of principal and interest out of the gen-
eral fund of the municipality, unless he is expressly limited to
the special fund.^
To enforce a lawful stock subscription made by a municipal-
ity ; 2 to compel the delivery of bonds, or the appropriation of
money to pay them ; ^ or to I'equire the levy of a tax to raise
the necessary amount ; a mandamus is the appropriate remedy.*
And, although there is some conflict of the decisions, it seems
to be the rule, according to the weight of the decisions, that
when it is the duty of an officer to levy the tax he may be com-
pelled to do so by a mandamus, after a judgment had been ob-
tained.^ The taxes so raised should be set aside as a special
fund for the creditors who procured the mandamus.^
Whei'e the municipal official does not possess the power to
execute the act, which the mandamus seeks to compel him to do,
it is a good defence,^ and a Federal mandamus cannot require
an official to violate the law of his own State.** On the other
hand, a city official, who refuses to obey a mandamus rightfully
issued, is subject to punishment for contempt and to a suit for
damages.^
Generally, throughout the countrj^, private property is ex-
empt from execution for public debt. But in the New England
States, by common law and ancient usage, the property of all
the citizens is liable on execution,^" and. all the inhabitants are
regarded as defendants in an action against the corporation."
In considering the remedies open to a municipal creditor, a
V. MaoonCo., 99 lb. 582; Parkersburg
V. Brown, 106 lb. 487, .501.
1 United States v. Clark Co., 95 U.
S. 769; United States v. Knox Co., 2
McCrary, 625; Macon Co. v. Hulde-
koper, 99 U. S. 592; Knox Co. v.
Harshman, 109 lb. 229.
2JEa; parte Selma, 45 Ala. 696.
8 Cherokee Co. v. Wilson, 109 U. S.
621.
* See § 375 in chapter on Mandamus
and Quo Warranto.
' See § 375 on Mandamus ; comp.
Heine v. Levee Com'rs, 19 Wall. 655,
657; Queensbury v. Culver, 19 lb. 83,
92; Kiggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall.
166.
6 Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. 705 ; Coy
V. Lyons, 17 Iowa, 1 ; Santee v. Alle-
gheny, 10 Pitts. Leg. J. 241; Vance
V. Little Kock, 30 Ark. 435.
'United States v. Clark Co., 95 U.
S. 769.
8 United States v. Knox Co., 2 Mc-
Crary C. C. 625.
9 Dow V. Humbert, 91 U. S. 294.
1" Sec. 212.
" See § 375 on Mandamus.
371
§ 195 MTTNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [OH. XI.
clear distinction should be drawn between a total absence of
remedy, and the fact that the remedy is ineffectual under the
circumstances of the case. "Where the remedy at law is ade-
quate under ordinary circumstances, and the only diffieulty is
in its inapplicability or ineffectiveness, in the particular case,
equity will not interfere.-' For example, if, upon a mandamus
being granted to compel the levy of a tax, it is found that the
corporation has no power to levy such a tax, no court of law,
however great its power, can compel the municipality to exer-
cise a power it does not legally possess ; .or confer upon it the
power to tax. In such a case, the last and only resort of the
disappointed creditor is the Legislature of the State, where the
municipal corporation is located.^
But I am inclined to hold, in one very extraordinary case,
that a court of equity could interfere for the enforcement of a
levy of the tax, where the mandamus might not lie, viz. : where
the municipality had the power to levy the tax, but the Legis-
lature revoked the charter of the municipality, and did not sub-
stitute any other incorporation. Under those circumstances it
is claimed that the community, whose incorporation has been
taken away, is still liable for the debts of the dissolved munici-
pal corporation.^ And, certainly, that claim cannot be made
a practical reality, if the court of equity could not, in the as-
sumption of an extraordinary power, as trustee of the powers
of the dissolved municipality, order a levy of the taxes, which
could have been levied, had it not been for the dissolution of
the corporation. This is practically holding, that, for the pur-
pose of providing for its indebtedness, a dissolved municipal
corporation still exists.
§ 195. Defences to Ibonds — Conflict of decisions — ^Want of
power. — Coupon bonds possess in general the nature of nego-
tiable paper, and confer upon the bona fide holder the rights
and privileges which are enjoyed by bona fide holders of ordi-
nary commercial paper, with the exception that, as all men are
presumed to know the law, anj-- bonds, whicli are illegally or
' Eeese v. Watertown, 19 Wall.
Iff?, 124; State v. McCrillin, 4 Kan.
250; Humphreys Co. v. McAdoo, 1
Heisk. 585.
372
2 Heine v. Levee Com'rs, 19 Wall.
655, 658; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102
U. S. 472, 518.
3 Sec. 43.
CH. XI. j
MUNICIPAL SECUEITIES.
§195
unconstitutionally issued, ^ or issued in excess of, or without
legal authority, are void.
The Supreme Court of the United States has, in the interest
of bona fide holders, opposed a narrow construction of statutes
regulating bonded indebtedness ; and against such holders it
has not favored defences based on technicalities, and not in-
volving the question of power. It is useless, however, to seek
a constant uniformity of the decisions in the minor principles,
which from time to time have been enunciated by this court,
or to expect to find the decisions of the State courts always
in harmony with its rulings ;2 and these facts must not be lost
sight of, in comparing the line of decisions in the Federal and
State courts. Thus, it is the general rule of the State courts,
that even when the bonds are in the hands of bona fide holders,
the noncompliance with some requirement of the statute, as
the omission to hold a prior election, or an irregularity in con-
ducting such an election ; ^ or the lack of assent by a certain
proportion of the resident taxpayers ; * or the non-location of
the road, * when these are conditions precedent, is a good de-
fence.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, unless
it be perhaps in cases where the question is one of rights aris-
ing under the State Constitution or law,^ it is not bound by a
decision of the State court, which is rendered after the bonds
have reached the hands of bona fide holders ; ' but where the
bonds are issued after a State statute has been construed by
the highest court of the State, such construction becomes a part
1 Harshman v. Bates Co., 92 IT. S.
569; Lamville etc. Co. v. Fairfield,
51 Vt. 257; Grant v. Cooke, 7 D. C.
165.
2 Dillon Mun. Cor. §§ 515, 550, 551.
3 Marshall Co. v. Cook, 38 111. 44;
Shoemaker v. Goshen, 14 Ohio St.
569; Berliner v. Waterloo, 14 Wis.
378; Duunovan v. Green, 57 111. 63;
Hancock v. Chicot Co., 32 Ark. 575.
* SUrin v. Genoa, 23 N. T. 439;
Gould V. Sterling, lb. 439, 456; Peo-
ple V. Mead, 36 N. T. 224.
' Treadwell v. Hancock Co. Com'rs,
11 Ohio St. 183; Veeder v. Lima, 19
Wis. 280; State v. Van Homo, 7 Ohio
St. 327.
6 In such cases the Federal courts
accept the decisions of the highest
State courts. BoUes v. Brimfield,
120 U. S. 759; Carroll Co. v. Smith,
111 lb. 566; Elmwood v. Maxcy, 92
lb. 289; Claiborne Co. v. Brooks, 111
lb. 400, 410.
' Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175
Havenmeyer v. Iowa Co., 3 lb. 294
Olcott V. Fond du Lao, 16 lb. 678
Carroll Co. v. United States, 18 Wall
71; Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 lb. 666
Douglas V. Pike Co., 101 U. S. 677,
373
§ 195 a.
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XI.
of the statute, and is respected by the Federal courts.^ And the
statute thus construed forms a part of all contracts entered in-
to under it, and with which the bona fide holder is bound to be
acquainted.^
§ 195 a. Nonperformance of conditions as a defence. — A
very frequent defence to bonds, issued in aid of railroads, is a
denial that some condition precedent, such as a popular vote,
has been complied with, and hence the power to issue the
bonds did not exist.^ As between the original parties, there
may be a full inquiry whether the conditions,* from which the
valid commercial instruments, but
ifissuedbysucha corporation which
possessed no power from the Legis-
lature to grant such aid, they are in-
valid, even in the hands of innocent
holders. Such a power is frequently
conferred to be exercised in a special
manner, or subject to certain regu-
lations, conditions or qualifications;
but if it appears that the bonds is-
sued show by their recitals that the
power was exercised in the manner
required by the Legislature, and that
the bonds were issued in conformity
with those regulations and pursuant
to those conditions and qualifica-
tions, proof that any or all of those
recitals are incorrect, will not con-
stitute a defence in a suit on the
bonds or coupons, if it appears that
it was the sole province of the mu-
nicipal oflSeers who executed the
bonds to decide whether or not there
had been an antecedent compliance
with the regulations, conditions or
qualifications which it is alleged were
not fulfilled." Clifford, J., in St.
Joseph Township v. Kogers, 16 Wall.
644.
3 See §§ 184, 186. See also McManus
v. Duluth etc. R. Co., (Minn. 93) 52
N. W. E. 980.
*If the conditions precedent have
not been performed the issue may be
enjoined. Chambers Co. v. Clews,
21 Wall. 317; Union P. Co. v. Lin-
cobi Co., 3 Dill. 300; Union P. Co. v.
1 Douglas Co. V. Pike, 101 U. S.
617.
2 Warren v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96;
Knox Co. V. Ninth Nat'l Bank, 13
S. Ct. 267; 147 U. S. 91; Phelps v.
Lewiston, 15 Blatchf. 131; German
Bk. V. Franklin, 128 U. S. 526; Cal-
oma V. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484; Bergess
V. Seligman, 107 lb. 20; Anderson
v. Beal, 113 lb. 227; Green Co. v.
Conn ess, 109 lb. 154; Dixon v.
Field, 111 lb. 83; Douglas v. Pike
Co., 101 lb. 677; Northern Bank v.
Porter, 110 lb. 608; Parmlee v. Chi-
cago, 60 111. 267; Buchanan v. Litch-
field, 102 U. S. 278; Elmwood v.
Maxcy, 92 U. S. 289; Lane v. Emb-
deu, 72 Me. 354; Anderson v. Santa
Anna, 116 U. S. 356; Anderson v.
Houston etc. Co., 52 Tex. 228; Tay-
lor V. Ipsilanti, 105 U. S. 60; Irwin
V. Ontai-io, 3 Fed. 49; Hopper v. Cov-
ington, 8 lb. 777; Carrier v. Shawan-
gunk, 10 lb. 220; Grande Chute v.
Winegar, 15 Wall. 377; Lyude v.
County, 16 lb. 6; Beecher v. Cliesh-
ire, 125 U. S. 555 ; Bissell v. Jeffer-
sonville, 24 How. 287; Smith v. Tal-
lapoosa Co., 2 Woods, 574; Kenosha
v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477; Foster v.
Kenosha, 12 Wis. 615 ; Columbia Co.
V. King, 13 Fla. 421 ; Mayor v. Lom-
bard, 57 Miss. 208; Cutler v. Masen,
56 lb. 115. " Bonds payable to bear-
er issued by a municipal corporation
— if issued in pursuance of a power
conferred by the Legislature, are
371
CH. XI.] MtrsriCIPAL SECTTRITIES. § 195 h.
lawful existence of the power was to arise, had been complied
with.^ And in a suit by the payee, no recital will conclude
the question, whether the conditions precedent have been per-
formed.^ And, so, likewise, the municipal corporation may re-
cover the amount which it has had to pay to a hona fide holder
of unconstitutional bonds, to whom the railroad company had
wrongfully transferred them.^
§ 195 b. Defences not appearing on face of bond. — But
the purchaser of bonds, who takes them for value, is protected
from many defences which do not appear upon the face of the
bond, but which might prevail as between the original parties.
One who, without notice, and for value, comes into possession
of municipal bonds is entitled to all the rights of a hona fide hold-
er, even though they were stolen.* But the forger}'- or altera-
tion of a material part of the bond is a good defence, in an ac-
tion by a hona fide holder. Thus, if the instrument, when stolen,
is incomplete in any essential respect ; and this is supplied by
the thief or the holder, no recovery can be had ; as for example,
when the place of payment is left blank ; ^ but such a result will
not be brought about by an alteration of the number of the
bond.* And as a bond takes effect on delivery, a blank in the
date will not affect a recovery ; but when bonds were stolen,
upon which both the corporate seal and the indorsement of the
trustees were wanting, and these were forged, no recovery
could be had.' The insertion of the name of the payee in a
stolen bond is not such an alteration as will avoid the bonds
in the hands of a hona -fide holder.^ Where the bonds or cou-
Merriok Co., 3 lb. 359; Packard v.
Jefferson Co., 2 Col. 338; Cairo, etc.,
Co. V. Sparta, 77111. 505; or if issued
may be declared void and canceled
in the hands of a holder with notice
of the defect. Belo v. Forsythe Co.,
76 N. C. 489.
' See § 189 a.
2 Chambers Co. v. Clews, 21 Wall.
317, 321; Madison V. Smith, 83 Ind.
502; Lamoille v. Fairfield, 51 Vt. 257;
Jackson v. Brush, 77 111. 59 ; Harding
V. Rockford, etc., Co., 65 111. 90; and
cases cited by Thornton, J., in his
opinion. Portland, etc., Co. v. Hart-
ford, 58 Me. 23.
' Plain view v. Winona, etc., Co.,
36 Minn. 505.
1 Tiederaan Coml. Paper, §282;
Gilbraugh v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 1
Hughes (U. S.) 410; Planters' Assn.
V. Avigno, 28 La. An. 552; Elizabeth
V. Force, 29 IST. J. L. 587; Battles v.
Landenslager, 84 Pa. St. 446.
^Ledwich v. McKim, 53 N. T. 307.
6 Birdsall v. Russell, 29 Jf. Y. 220;
Diamond v. Lawrence Co., 37 Pa. St.
353; Crosby v. New London, etc.,
Co., 26 Conn. 121.
' Maas V. Miss., K. & T. Ry. Co.,
11 Hun, 8.
" Boyd V. Kennelly, 9 Vroom, 146.
375
§ 195 d.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XI.
pons were overdue when stolen, they cannot be I'ecovered on
even in the hands of bona fide holders for value.^
§ 195 c. Who are bona fide holders. — But in order to con-
stitute one a bona fide holder, he must have parted with value,
and he without notice of iiTegularities actual or constructive,
or be himself the successive grantee of a holder, who is a bona
fide holder.^ A pledgee ^ or one who takes bonds in payment of
a debt,* or who gives a note for them,® is entitled to all the rights
of a bona fide holder, and may recover the face value of the
bonds, although he paid less than par for them." But one who
purchases municipal bonds from a railroad company is not, upon
their being pronounced invalid, subrogated to the lights of the
railroad company if it had any.^
§ 195 i. Effect of notice on rights of bona fide holders. —
In considering what a bondholder is bound to take notice of, or
what is sufficient to put him on his guard, it should be said that
the doctrine of lis pendens is not applicable, and a purchaser is
not bound to know that an action is pending to decide upon the
validity of the bonds which he is about to buy,* or that an in-
junction had been granted to restrain the issue.^ But a pur-
chaser of overdue bonds, after such bonds have been adjudged
void, is bound by the judgment.-"'
Every one purchasing bonds is chargeable with notice of
whatever facts appear stated on their face ; ^^ and if reference is
there made to a statute, the buyer is presumed to have knowl-
edge of all the statutory requirements.-'^ Thus, if on the face
1 Arents v. Com., 18 Gratt. 750;
Yermilyea v. Adams Ex. Co., 21
"Wall. 1.38.
2 McClure v. To-wnship, 94 U. S.
429; Cromwell v. Sac Co., 96 lb. 51;
Scotland Co. v. Hill, 132 lb. 107; Suf-
folk Sav. Bk. V. Boston, 149 Mass.
364.
^ Allen V. Dallas etc. Co., 3 Woods,
316.
' Foote V. Hancock, 15 Blatchf.
343; Mobile Sav. Bank v. Oklibbeha
Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 110.
5 Orleans v. Piatt, 99 U. S. 676.
« Crom-well v. Sac Co., 96 U. S. 51;
Chlcopee Bank v. Chapin, 8 Mete.
(Mass.) 40; Fowler v. Strickland, 107
376
Mass. 552; Nat. Bank of Mich. v.
Greene, 33 Iowa, 140.
^ ^tna L. I. Co. v. Middleport, 124
U. S. 534.
8 Scotland Co. v. Hill, 132 U. S. 107;
10 S. Ct. Rep. 26; Olcott v. Fond du
Lac, 16 "Wall. 678; Nat'l Bank of
Wash. V. Texas, 20 lb. 72; Warren
Co. V. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96; Orleans v.
Piatt, 99 U. S. 676; Cass Co. v. Gil-
lett, 100 lb. 585 ; Letch v. Wells, 48
N. Y. 586.
9 Carroll v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556.
i» Louis V. Brown Tp., 109 U. S. 162.
11 Brown v. Bou Homme Co., 46 N.
W. Rep. 173, 176.
li McClure v. Oxford, 94 U. S. 429;
CH. XI.J
irUNICIPAL SECURITIES.
§ 195 d.
of the bond it is provided that nonpayment of interest renders
the bond itself due, unpaid coupons are notice to the purchaser
that the whole bond is due and payable.^ But where the bond
does not contain a provision that, upon default of interest, the
bond shall become due, the presence of overdue coupons is not
enough to charge the bona fide purchaser with notice of exist-
ing defences.^ And the statutory requirement that an affidavit
should be on file renders the absence of the affidavit sufficient
to put a purchaser on his guard * And, furthermore, if the
facts recited in the bond are such as to put the holder on his
guard, he is presumed to have notice of whatever he should sub-
sequently have discovered by reasonable inquiry.*
All . bondholders are affected with constructive notice of
whatever may be of public record, but they need not go be-
hind the record ; and whatever is found therein is conclusive
on the corporation, as well as on a purchaser.^ But a pur-
chaser of rnunjpipal bonds is not bound to take notice of pri-
vate records.®
As limitations upon municipal power, and the scope of the
authority possessed by public and municipal agents and offi-
cials, are matters of public law and record, the bona fide pur-
chaser of municipal bonds is properly charged with constructive
notice of them.'^ Thus, when the Legislature has made the
negotiability of bonds to depend upon their delivery by a State
ofQcial, a purchaser is not a bona fide purchaser without notice,
if the bonds are fraudulently issued and delivered by some one
other than the authorized official.^
Bank etc. v. St. Joseph, 31 Fed. Eep.
216.
1 Mayor v. City Bank of Macon, 58
Ga. 584.
2 Miller v. Berlen, 13 Blatchf. 245;
Eouede v. Jersey City, 18 Fed. Eep.
719; Gilbrough v. Norfolk Co., 1
Hughes, 410; State v. Cobb, 64 Ala.
127; Nat'l Bank v. Kirby, 108 Mass.
497; Boss v. Hewitt, 15 Wis. 260.
» Veeder v. Lima, 19 Wis, 280.
* Bates Co. v. Winters, 97 U. S.
85 ; McClure v. Oxford, supra ; Harsh-
man V. Bates Co., 92 IT. S. 569; My-
gatt V. Green Bay, 1 Biss. 292.
sFirstTSTat. Bk. v. Concord, 50 Vt.
257. County records. See Lewis v.
Bourbon Co., 12 Kan. 186; State v.
Commissioners, 37 Ohio St. 526.
6 Town of Eagle v. Kohn, 84 111.
292.
' Johnson Co. v. January, 94 U. S.
202; Ogden v. Daviess Co., 102 lb.
034; Northern Bank v. Porter, 110
lb. 608; Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114
lb. 120; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10
Wall. 676; United States v. City
Bank of Columbus, 21 How. 356.
8 Lewis V. Barbour Co. Com'rs, 3
Fed. Rep. 191.
377
§ 195/.
MtTNICrPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XI.
§ 195 e. Effect of inserting nnauthorized terms and con-
ditions.— The officers of the municipality cannot make any-
different agreements, affecting the liabilit)' of the municipality,
from those which are required by the statute, under which the
bonds were issued. So, when the bonds were unconditional
promises to pay in thirty years ; and their form was in strict
conformity with the authority conferred, as it appeared from
the record ; it was held that purchasers and bona fide holders
were not affected by a private arrangement as to the redemp-
tion of the bonds, which was made by the city with the banker,
who put them on the market,^ or by the fact that the funds,
the payment of which is secured by the bonds, had been mis-
applied 2 or used for an unlawful purpose.
No person can be a de facto officer, where no office exists;
and for this reason, bonds issued by persons who purported to
be county commissioners are invalid even in the hands of h'ona
fide holders, when the statute, by which the office had been
created, was unconstitutional.^
If bonds have been issued without legislative authority, or
in disregard of the limitations which were imposed by such
authority,* or by the State or Federal Constitution,* upon the
expressly conferred power to issue them, the bonds are invalid
in whosesoever hands they may be found.^
§ 195/. Burden of proof. — In the case of coupon bonds,
payable to bearer, possession is prima facie evidence of owner-
ship ; ^ but strong evidence of fraud in the creation of the se-
1 Suffolk Sav. Bank v. Boston, 149
Mass. 364.
2 Lynchburg v. Slaughter, 75 Va.
57.
8 Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S.
425.
* Milan V. Tenn. etc. Co., 11 Lea,
329; ISTorton v. Dyersburg, 127 IT. S.
160.
^WeUs V. Pontotoc Co., 102 U. S.
625; Ogden V. Daviess Co., 102 lb.
634; Allen v. Louisiana, 103 lb.
580; Lamculle etc. Co. v. Fairfield,
51 Vt. 257.
"Force v. Batavia, 61 111. 100; Wil-
liams V. Koberts, 88 lb. 13 ; Lippin-
cottv. Pana, 93 lb. 24; Nesbitt v.
378
Riverside, 144 U. S. 610; Eddy v.
People, 127 111. 428; Memphis v.
Bethel, 17 S. W. K. 191; Agawam N.
Bk. V. South Hadley, 128 Mass. 503;
Barnes v. Lacou, 84 111. 461; Wil-
liams V. People, 132111. 574; Frick v.
Mercer, 138 Pa. St. 523; Aspinwall v.
Daviess Co., 22 How. .364; Marsh v.
Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 655; Duke v.
Brown, 96 N. C. 127; MerriU v. Mon-
ticello, 138 U. S. 673; Getohell v.
Benton, 47 N. W. R. 468 (Neb. 90);
Ottawa V. Carey, 108 U. S. 110; Pui-dy
V. Lansing, 128 U. S. 557.
' Tiedeman Coml. Paper, § 312,
where the burden of proof is more
fully explained.
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES.
§196
curities would throw upon the holder the burden of proving
aflSrinatively that he paid value ;^ where, however, the author-
ity to issue bonds is limited as to the amount which can be is-
sued, the burden of proving that the limit had been reached is
on the corporation.^
§ 196. Doctrine of estoppel as applicable to bona fide
holders— Effect of recitals in the bonds. — In discussing to
what extent a municipal corporation may be estopped, in ac-
tions brought ac^ainst it on its bonds, it should be noticed that
the doctrine applies only after the bonds have been issued.^
In cases where the alleged want of power is predicated upon
an omission to give legal notice of the election, or upon other
irregularities, it is held that the decision of the board, who were
the public agents of the corporation issuing the bonds, is con-
clusive as to the facts occurring previous to their issue, and that
the municipality is thereby estopped * in an action brought by
a lona fide holder. But in order that the recitals in bonds of
compliance with conditions precedent may bind the corporation,
thej' must purport to come from some officer, who is charged
by the law with the duty of ascertaining the fact, that the con-
ditions precedent have been fully performed,^ as, for example,
from the officials signing the bonds on behalf of the corpora-
tion ; ^ or, as express directions on this point are so frequently
omitted from the statute, from those officials to whom full con-
trol is given.^ The power, to determine whether the condi-
tions precedent have been complied with, cannot be delegated
1 Marion Co. v. Clark, 94 U. S. 278;
Macon Co. v. Shares, 97 lb. 272; Stu-
art V. Lansing, 104 lb. 505.
^Neely v. Torkville, 10 S. C. 141.
'Union Pac. E. Co. v. Lincoln Co.,
3 Dill. 300. See Travellers v. Oswe-
go, 55 Fed. Eep. 361; Nesbitt v. Riv-
erside, 144 U. S. 610.
< Bernards v. Morrison, 183 U. S.
523; National Bank v. Grenada, 41
Fed. Eep. 87; Brown v. Pt. Pleasant,
(W. Va. 92) 15 S. E. 209; Brown v.
Milliken, 42 Kan. 769; Fulton v. Riv-
erton, 42 Minn. 395 ; Bissell v. Jeffer-
son ville, 24 How. 287; Menasha v.
Hazard, 102 U. S. 81 ; Town of Prai-
rie V. Lloyd, 97 111. 170; Hannibal v.
Fauntleroy, 105 U. S. 408; Pana v.
Bowler, 107 lb. 529; Moran v. Miami,
2 Black, 722; McCall v. Hancock, 10
Fed. Rep. 80.
6 Humboldt v. Long, 92 U. S. 642;
Marcy v. Oswego, lb. 638; Venice
V. Murdock, lb. 194; Rock Creek
V. Strong, 96 lb. 271; Montclair v.
Ramsdell, 107 lb. 147; Anderson Co.
V. Beal, 113 lb. 227; Lincoln v. Cam-
bria Co., 113 lb. 412.
s Oregon v. Jennings, 119 U. S. 74,
92.
"< Bernards Tp. v. Morrison, 133 U.
S. 523.
379
§196
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS.
[cH. xi;
by the corporation ^ to others than its own officers. And when
all the facts are exclusively within the knowledge of the board
by whom the bonds are authorized to be issued, it will be im-
plied that it was the legislative intent to make this body the
judge, whether the conditions had been complied with.^ But
the rule is decisively laid down that in no case is a municipal
corporation estopped by recitals or declarations made by agents
or officials who are not authorized to make them.^
A municipal corporation is never estopped, by conduct or by
recitals, from setting up as a defence a total lack of power to
issue the bonds.* A hona fide holder is always obliged to deter-
mine at his peril, whether the municipal corporation was author-
ized to issue the bonds under any terms or conditions.^ So, also,
it must be observed that, when the condition requires that the
assent of the people shall be given prior to an issue of bonds, no
subsequent acts of the municipal officers, aside from recitals of
the bonds, will estop the city from showing that such assent was
not given.^ When the question is as to an irregular exercise
of the power, or a failure to comply with the conditions, the
corporation may be estopped, as against a lona fide holder, by
its course of dealing; as, for example, by payment of interest
on the bonds,'' or by retaining and using for municipal purposes
1 Jackson Co. v. Brush, 77 111. 59.
' Evansville, etc., Co. v. Evansville,
15 Ind. 395 ; Mutual Ben. L. I. Co. v.
Elizabeth, 42 JT. J. L. 235.
2 Chlsolm V. Montgomery, 2 Woods,
584; Brown v. Bon Homme Co., 46
N. W. Eep. 173; Bank v. Bergen Co.,
115 U. S. 334; Whiteside v. United
States, 93 lb. 247; Daviess Co. v.
Dickinson, 117 lb. 657; Cagwin v.
Hancock, 84 N. Y. 532; Concord v.
Robinson, 121 U. S. 165 ; Williams v.
Roberts, 88 111. 11; Hudson v. Wins-
low, 35 N. J. L. 437; Gould v. Ster-
ling, 23 N. Y. 464; Stariu v. Genoa,
23 lb. 452; People v. Mead, 36 lb.
224; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 TJ.
S. 278; Northern Bank v. Porter Tp.,
110 lb. 608; Dixon v. Field, 111 lb. 88.
380
■• Sherrard v. Lafayette Co., 3 Dil-
lon, 236; Bissellv. Kankakee, 64111.
249; Middleport v. ^tna, etc., Co.,
82 lb. 562; Gaddis v. Eichmond, 92
lb. 119; Douglas v. Niantic Sav. Bk.,
97 lb. 228; Lewis v. Bourbon Co., 12
Kan. 186; Belo v. Forsyth Co., 76 N.
C. 489; State v. Green Co., 54 Mo.
540.
5 Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 283 ;
Flagg V. Palmyra, 33 Mo. 440; Ken-
nicott V. Wayne Co., 16 Wall. 452;
Burr V. Chariton Co., 2 McCray, 604.
6 Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S.
425; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall.
684.
' Alvord V. Syracuse Sav. Bk., 98
N. T. 599.
CH. XI.J
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES.
§196
the money received for them,^ by provision for funding,^ or by
receiving an outstanding bond and issuing another in its place.'
When the bonds were issued in payment of a subscription to
the stock of a railroad, the municipal corporation was held to
be estopped if it retained the company's stock,* although the
bonds contained no recital of a compliance with the conditions,
and although the interest had never been paid.^
Delay in resorting to legal remedies for voiding the bonds,
or for restraining their negotiation, is also a circumstance from
which the municipality may be estopped. Thus, where the
issue of the bonds had not been enjoined for more than two
years after the election and the placing of the bonds in the
market, this delay was held to be material as bearing on the
question of the estoppel." Payment of one year's interest is
not sufiBcient, in the absence of other acts, to constitute an es-
toppel.'^ Misconduct on the part of municipal officers, such as
fraud or embezzlement, not involving the question of the legal
power of the municipality to issue the bonds, cannot be set up
as a defence against a lona fide holder without notice.^ And
although laches on the part of the town may estop it, when de-
fending a suit brought by a hona fide holder,^ yet, if it seeks
the aid of a court of equity to have a bond reformed, which
had been, through the negligence of its own officers, erroneous-
ly executed, the town will be entitled to relief, as against a
1 Bennington v. Park, 50 Vt. 178;
Shoemaker v. Goshen, 14 Ohio St.
569; State v. Van Home, 7 lb. 327,
331; Steines v. Franklin Co., 48 Mo.
167; New Haven, etc., Co. v. Chat-
ham, 42 Conn. 465; People v. Cline,
63 111. 394; Marshall Co. v. Schenck,
5 Wall. 772, 781 ; Rogers v. Burling-
ton, 3 lb. 654, 667; Portsmouth Bk.
V. Springfield, 4 Fed. Eep. 276;
Moulton V. Evansville, 25 Fed. Hep.
382; Ray Co. v. Van Sycle, 96 U. S.
675; McKee v. Vernon Co., 3 Dill.
210; Munson v. Lyons, 12 Blatchf.
539; Lulingv. Racine, 1 Biss. 314.
2 State v. Wilkinson, 20 Neb. 610.
3 Johnson v. Stark Co., 24 111. 75.
* Third Nat. Bk. v. Seneca Falls, 15
Fed. Rep. 783; Whiting v. Potter, 2
Fed. Rep. 517.
5 Pendleton Co. v. Amy, 13 Wall.
297.
« Anderson Co. v. Beal, 113 U. S.
227.
'Mertz V. Cook, 108 N. T. 505;
Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655.
8 Butler V. Dunham, 27 111. 474;
East Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 U. S.
801; Johnson Co. v. Thayer, 94 lb.
631; Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15
Wall. 355; Railroad Co. v. Otoe Co.,
1 Dill. 338; Belo v. Forsythe Co., 76
N. C. 489; Black v. Cohen, 52 Ga.
621; Lane v. Schomp, 20 N. J. Eq.
982.
» Marshall Co. v. Schenk, 5 Wall.
781 ; Meyers v. Muscatine, 1 lb. 384.
381
§196
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. XI.
holder having notice of the error, although suit was not brought
until several years after the mistake had been discovered.^
When the bonds, the ordinance w^hich authorizes their issue,^
or the corporation minutes,^ import by recitals a compliance with
the requirements of the law, a bona fide holder is not obliged
to look further for the proof of the performance or observance
of the conditions required.* But wherever a statute expressly
declares bonds to be absolutely void, unless the conditions un-
der whichthey are issued are performed, recitals have no bind-
ing force as estoppels.^ A recital in a bond, that it is issued
under authority of an act, has been held to estop the munici-
pality from showing, as against a bona fide holder, that the road
was not completed in time ; ® and this is the effect of such a reci-
tal, even when the statute expressly says the bonds shall not
be valid until all conditions are complied with.^ Bonds, which
appear by their recitals to have been issued under a law, which
had been repealed, will be valid if they have been issued in
substantial compliance with other statutory provisions then in
force.^ The recitals in such a case furnish no aid to the holder.
1 Essex V. Day, 52 Conn. 483.
'■' Gause v. Clarksville, 1 McCrary, 78.
8 Aberdeen v. Sykes, 59 Miss. 236.
* Barnett v. Denison, 145 U. S. 135 ;
National Bank v. Grenada, 41 Fed.
87; 48 Fed. 278; Knox Co. v. Aspin-
wall, 21 How. 545 ; Moran v. Miami,
2 Black, 722; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1
Wall. 175, 203 ; Rogers v. Burlington,
3 lb. 354; Brown v. Milliken, 23 Pac.
167; 42 Kan. 769; Lexington v. But-
ler, 14 Wall. 284; Grand Chute v.
Winegar, 15 lb. 372; Township v.
Bernards, 133 U. S. 523; Moultrie v.
Savings Bank, 92 lb. 631; Randolph
Co. V. Post, 93 lb. 502; Cass Co. v.
Johnston, 95 lb. 360; Hacket v. Ot-
tawa, 99 lb. 86; Schuyler Co. v.
Thomas, 93 lb. 169; Fulton v. River-
ton, 44 jSr. W. R. 257; 42 Minn. 395;
Leavenworth Co. v. Barnes, 94 U. S.
70; Douglas Co. v. Bolles, 94 lb. 154;
Coler V. Richland, (N. D. 93) 55 N.
W. R. 587: Pendleton v. Amy, 13
Wall. 305 ; Rock Creek v. Strong, 96
U. S. 227; San Antonio v. Mehaffy,
382
96 lb. 313; Pompton v. Cooper Un.,
101 lb. 204; Harter v. Kenochan, 103
lb. 562 ; Bonham v. Needles, 103 lb.
648; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 lb.
278; Am. L. I. Co. v. Bruce, 105 lb.
328 ; Nor. Bank v. Porter, 110 lb. 608;
Walnut V. Wade, 103 lb. 683; Clay
Co. V. Savings Society, 104 lb. 579;
Meyer v. Brown, 65 Cal. 583; Lane
V. Embden, 72 Me. 354; Moulton v.
Evansville, 25 Fed. Rep. 382; Smith
v. Clark Co., 54 Mo. 58; Narment v.
Charlotte Co., 85 N. C. 387; Belo v.
Forsythe Co., 76 lb. 489; contra,
Comm. Bank of Commerce v. Gren-
ada, 44 Fed. 262; Spitzer v. Blanch-
ard, 46 N. W. R. 400; 82 Mich. 234.
6 German Sav. Bk. v. Franklin, 128
U. S. 526; Anthony v. Jasper Co., 4
Dill. 136.
^ Oregon v. Jennings, 119 TJ. S. 74.
' Am. L. Ins. Co. v. Bruce, 105 U.
S. 328.
' Johnson Co. v. January, 94 U. S.
202; Anderson Co. v. Beal, 113 U. S.
237.
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES.
§196
and he must show that the provisions of the law which were
enacted for his protection have been observed ; ^ but he is not
estopped by a recital, that a bond was issued under a special act,
from showing that it was voted for and issued under a general
law.^ The particular form, which the recitals assume, is not
material provided they are couched in terms that will give the
holder to understand that the bonds have been issued legally.^
But a statement, that a subscription was authorized by stat-
ute and that the sum mentioned in the bonds was part of it,
does not constitute a recital that the bonds were issued in pur-
suance of the statute.* So, a recital that bonds were issued in
pursuance of law will not estop the municipal corporation from
showing that it did not have the necessary population required
by the act, as a condition precedent to the creation of the debt.^
A recital, that the consent of the taxpayers, as expressed
by written assent or petition filed, was properly obtained, — when
made by the proper officials, — is conclusive, as against the bona
fide holders of the bonds.®
It has been held that municipal corporations may be estopped
by recitals in bonds, that the amount of the bonds issued is not
in excess of the statutory limit of indebtedness.'^ But where
1 Crow V. Oxford Tp., 119 U. S.
215; Gilson v. Dayton, 123 lb. 59.
2 Kinth Nat. Bk. v. Knox Co., 37
Fed. Eep. 75.
8 Sch. Dis. V. Stone, 106 TJ. S. 183.
" It is not necessary Uiat the recital
should enumerate each particular
fact essential to the existence of the
obligation. A general statement,
that the bonds have been issued in
conformity with the law, will suffice
so as to embrace every fact which the
officers making the statement are
authorized to determine and satis-
fy." Dixon Co. V. Field, 111 U. S.
83; Marcy v. Oswego Tp., 92 lb. 637;
Douglas Co. .V. Bolles, 94 lb. 104;
Marion Co. v. Clark, 94 lb. 278; Pana
V. Bowler, 107 lb. 529; Liebman v.
San Francisco, 24 Fed. Eep. 705 ;
ShurtlefE v. "Wiscasset, 74 Me. 130;
contra, Bk. of Commerce v. Grenada,
44 Fed. Eep. 262.
♦Carroll Co. v. Smith, 111 U. S.
556; Bolton v. Board, 1 Bradw. 193;
Woodruff v. Okalona, 57 Miss. 806.
6 Kelly v. Milan, 21 Fed. Eep. 842.
6 Venice v. Murdock, 92 U. S. 494;
Society for Savings v. New London,
29 Conn. 174; Evansville etc. Co. v.
Evansville, 15 Ind. 395; Knox Co. v.
Nichols, 14 Ohio St. 260. The New
York cases contra of Starin v. Genoa,
23 N. T. 439, and Gould v. Sterling,
23 lb. 456, are in conflict with all the
decisions of the Federal couits and
with decisions in other State courts
upon this point.
'Humboldt v. Long, 92 U. S. 642;
Concord v. Portsmoutli Sav. Bank,
92 lb. 625 ; Marcy v. Oswego, 92 lb.
637; Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 lb. 499;
Dallas Co. v. McKensie, 110 lb. 686;
New Providence v. Halsey, 117 lb.
836; Darlington v. La Clede, 4 Dill.
200.
383
§196
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CU. XI.
limitations upon municipal indebtedness exist, the question is
often a mixed one of law and fact, so complicated tliat it is
difficult to give any rule, which will be universally applicable.
Since such limitations are imposed by statute, they are con-
structively known to hona fide holders, and no mere acquies-
cence or assent, aside from recitals in the bonds, will estop the
city.^ But when the facts are in question, they are not pre-
sumed to be within the knowledge of all ; and particularly, when
the limit is of legislative creation and the Legislature has con-
stituted a board to determine if its limit has been exceeded, its
findings as to facts are conclusive.^
The views, above enunciated, hardljr represent the condition
of the law now ; as, although not perhaps overruled, there has
been a departure from these principles by tlie Supreme Courts
of the United States and of the States, and a distinction is
made between cases where the limitation is of a constitutional,
as distinct from a statutory, character.^ In a recent case, where
the recitals showed the amount of the indebtedness, and that all
the provisions of the law had been complied with, the munici-
pality was not estopped to question their truth, when the bonds
caused a constitutional limit of indebtedness to be exceeded.*
^ Daviess Co. v. Dickinson, 117 U.
S. 657; McPherson v. Foster, 43
Iowa, 48; Masher v. Ind. Sch. Dis.,
44 Iowa, 122; comp. Mer. Bk. v. Ber-
gen Co., 115 U. S. 384.
- Oregon Co. v. Jennings, 119 IT. S.
74; Sherman Co. v. Simons, 109 lb.
735. In the latter case the court
said: "Every prerequisite fact to
the execution and issue of the bonds
was of a nature tliat required exam-
ination and decision. The existence
of sufBcient taxable property to war-
rant tlie amount of the subscription
and issue was no more essential to
the exercise of the authority con-
ferred upon the board of county
commissioners than was the peti-
tion for the election, or the fact that
fifty freeholders had signed, or that
three fifths of the legal voters had
voted for the subscription. These
are all extrinsic facts bearing not so
384
much upon the authority vested in
the board to issue the bonds, as upon
the question whether it should be ex-
ercised. They are all by the statute
referred to the inquiry and determi-
nation of the board, and they were
all determined before the bonds and
coupons came into the hands of the
plaintiff." Affirming Marcy v. Oswe-
go Tp., 92 U. S. 637; Buchanan v.
Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278.
^ Cummins v. Lawrence Co., 46 Jf.
W. Rep. 184.
* Lake Co. v. Graham, 130 U. S.
674; Dixon v. Field, 111 U. S. 83;
distinguishing Marcy v. Oswego, 92
U. S. 637; and holding^ public record
of assessment notice to all parties;
Buchanan V. Litchfield, 192 U. S. 278;
Northern Bk. v. Porter, 110 U. S. 608;
Potter V. Chaffee Co., 33 Fed. Rep.
614; Lake Co. v. BoUins, 130 U. S.
662; Lake Co. v. Graham, 130 lb.
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SEOUEITIES.
§197
Constitutional limitations of this character have been regarded
as so necessary to the protection of public interests, that in many
States the courts have felt a great hesitancy in taking a posi-
tion which would have the effect of nullifying these safeguards.
And here, too, where the recital is that the bonds are issued in
pursuance of law or in conformity with law, the facts involved
in the question, whether the constitutional or statutory limita-
tion has been exceeded, are usually matter of record of which
all have constructive notice, and which is conclusive on all.
It should also be observed that the amount of municipal in-
debtedness as well as the amount of assessed valuation is easy
of ascertainment, the bonds frequently showing on their face
the total amount of the whole issue, making the calculation of
the ratio it bears to the valuation a comparatively easy matter.^
§ 197. Renewal — Funding. — When a municipal corporation
has, for its own advantage, issued new bonds, and recalled its
old bonds which are outstanding, it is estopped from urging the
defences, which coald have been interposed in suits on the
original obligations ; unless, of course, they have been actually
declared invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction. If bonds
have been judicially declared invalid, the corporation has no
general authority to issue others in their stead ; but if new bonds
are specially authorized in order to fund the city debt, the obli-
gation on the prior invalid bonds will be a sufficient considera-
tion for the new bonds.^
The creditor, who has accepted a less valuable security in
place of his original bond, has a right to assume that his debtor
has waived all defences which he might have originally made,
in consideration of the benefit conferred in the exchange.'* The
power to issue bonds implies the power to issue other bonds in
renewal or redemption of the old bonds,* and it has been held
674; Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa.
St. 338; East St. Louis v. People, 12^
m. 055.
1 Dixon Co. V. Field, 111 F. S. 83.
2 Hill V. Peekskill, 101 K. T. 490.
'Chandler v. Attica, 18 Fed. Eep.
299; Jasper Co. v. Ballou, 103 U. S.
745; Little Rock v. Mer. N. Bank, 98
lb. 308; Aroma v. Auditor, 15 Fed.
Eep. 843; Moultrie v. Eockingham
25
etc. Bank, 92 U. S. 631; Maroy v.
Oswego, 92 lb. 637; Warren Co. v.
Marcy, 97 lb. 97.
* Sullivan v. Walton, 20 Fla. 552;
Portland Sav. Bk. v. Evansville, 25
Fed. Eep. 389; Galena v. Corwith, 48
111. 423; Lynde v. Winnebago, 16
Wall. 6; McKee v. Vernon Co., 3
Dill. 210.
385
§199
MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS.
[CH. XI.
that, since such issue does not create any new debt, it need not
be submitted to a popular vote, where such vote is required.^
The holder of the new bonds may avail himself of the same
remedies as the holder of the old ; ^ and should they prove in-
valid, he may sue on the original bonds although the)' have
been canceled.^
§ 1 98. Disposal and sale of bonds. — Municipal bonds may
be disposed of through an agent ; * but a prohibition against
selling bonds below par will prevent the allowance of any re-
bate or commission to the purchaser.^ When the authority to
dispose of bonds to the best advantage is conferred, and the
proceeds are to be invested in stock, the bonds may be delivered
to the companjr in exchange for stock.^
It has been held that a donation of the bonds, issued to aid a
railroad, may be made to the company where the city was em-
powered " to dispose of bonds to the best advantage but not
for less than par ; " ^ but if the company sells the bonds below par,
when the statute forbade their sale on such terms, the subscrip-
tion may be rescinded, and the bonds unsold and the par value
of those sold maj' be recovered.^ Such a condition is usually a
condition precedent.^ But if the city or county, which issued the
bonds, received their par value, it cannot defend against a bona
fide holder, by showing that the company to which they were
delivered, sold them below par.^* Under an authority to issue
bonds at six per cent, bonds may be issued at five per cent and
sold below par,ii although the requirement of the statute, au-
thorizing the issue, is that they be sold at par.
§ 199. Statute of Limitations The Statute of Limitations
applies to municipal bonds ; and since the bond and coupon
are contracts of equal dignity and of the same legal character.
1 Blanton v. McDowell Co., 101 N.
C. 532.
•i People V. Llppincott, 91 111. 193.
^Dego V. Otoe Co., 37 Fed. Rep.
247; Gause v. Clarksville, 1 McCrary
78; Plattsraoutli v. Fitzgerald, 10
Neb. 401.
* Cushman v. Carver, 19 Minn. 295.
^Whelen's App., 108 Pa. St. 162.
« Foote V. Hancock, 15 Blatclif . 343.
'Queensbury v. Culver, 19 Wall.
83.
386
' Lawrence Co. App., 67 Pa. St. 87;
Same v. N. W. R. R. Co., 32 lb. 144.
'Adams v. Lawrence Co., 2 Pitts.
R. 60; Com. v. Allegheny Co., 32 Pa.
St. 218; Armstrong Co. v. Brinton,
47 lb. 367; Omaha Nat. Bank v.
Omaha, 15 Neb. 333; Newark v. Elli-
ott, 5 Ohio St. 114.
i» Woods v. Lawrence Co., 1 Black.
386.
" Omaha Bank v. Omaha, 15 Neb.
333.
CH. XI.]
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES.
§199
the same period will apply to both. So, it has been held that,
when a suit for the interest cannot be maintained on the cou-
pon because of the lapse of the statutory time, it cannot be
recovered by suing for the same interest on the bond.^ When
a note or bond is payable in instalments, the statute begins to
]un against each instalment from the time the instalment ma-
tures ; and, although it has been held that interest is a mere
incident of the debt, is inseparable from it and may be recov-
ered in the same suit with the debt ; ^ yet, in the case of coupon
bonds, since the promise to pay interest takes the form of a
distinct negotiable instrument ; and such coupon may, and of-
ten is, separated from the bond, the statute runs against each
coupon, as it matures.^ The statute may be prevented from
running bj' a legislative recognition of the debt.*
A railroad company, suing to obtain possession of bonds is-
sued in its aid, but which has been returned to the municipality
by the State official who was authorized to deliver them to the
lailroad company, is barred by laches which extends over a
period of thirteen years.^
■ Griffin v. Macon Co., 36 Fed. Kep.
885.
2 Grafton Bk. v. Doe, 19 Vt. 463;
Ferry v. Ferry, 2 Cush. 92.
'Kenosha v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477;
Lexington v. Butler, 14 lb. 282;
Clark V. Iowa City, 20 lb. 583.
njnderhill v. Sonora, 17 Cal. 172;
Fort Scott V. Hickman, 112 U. S. 150.
6 Toung V. Clarendon Tp., 26 Fed.
Kep. 895.
Note. — It is manifest tliat, in this chapter, the attempt is not made to
include a full and complete discussion of the law of coraraercial paper,
particularly, in setting forth what defences can avail against a bona fide
holder, or when one can -claim the protection of a bona fide holder. Noth-
ing more is attempted here than to give a statement of those cases, in
which the defences have particular reference to municipal and coupon
bonds, and refer the reader to the special works on commercial paper for
a discussion of the whole subject.
387
CHAPTER XII.
ItlGHT OF MtrmCIPAL CORPORATIONS TO OWN AND CONTROL
PROPERTY.
Section.
200 — Eight of municipal corpora-
tions to acquire property.
201 — Real estate beyond corporate
limits.
202 — ^Donations of land to a mu-
nicipal corporation.
203 — Power of municipal corpora-
tions to serve as trustee of
a charitable use.
204 — ^Devises and grants for ob-
jects foreign to corporate
purposes.
205 — Gifts or grants to unincorpo-
rated communities.
Section.
206 — Interference by State courts
in performance of trusts
by municipal corporations.
207 — Invalid grants to municipal
corporations, how invali-
dated.
208 — Power of alienation.
209 — Power to mortgage.
210 — Power to lease corporate
property.
211 — ^Requisites of conveyances by
municipal corporations.
212 — Sale of corporate property
on execution — Liability
for debts.
§ 200. Right of municipal corporations to acquire prop-
erty.— The English statute of mortmain was primaiily enacted
for the purpose of restraining private civil and eleemosynary
corporations from acquiring lands ; and, at first, the statutes were
uot made applicable to cities ; presumably, on the ground that
the same objection to the acquisition of lauds did not obtain to
cities, as to religious and other private corporations. A cen-
tury later, there was a direct prohibition of the acquisition of
such lands by municipal corporations.^ But, independently of
the statutes of mortmain and at the common law, corporations,
both public and private, are authorized to take,hold or dispose
of lands for any purposes which are not inconsistent with the
object of their creation.^ The English statute of mortmain will
not be enforced in this country, except in pursuance of some ex-
press legislation.^ And hence the municipal corporation has in
1 Mereweth. & Steph. Hist. Corp.
389, "702; per Justice Campbell, Mc-
Donough Will Case, 15 How. 404-407.
2 1 Wash. Real Prop. (4th ed.) 50,
pi. 26; Sutton V. Cole, 3 Mass. 239;
388
1 Blacks. Cora. 475, 478; 1 Kyd. 108.
8 Peri n v. Carey, 24 How. 465
(1860) ; Davidson College v. Cham-
ber's Executors, 3 Jones Eq. (N. C.)
253 (1857) ; 2 Kent Com. 282, 283
CH. XII.J
MUNICIPALITY AS PEOPRIETOE.
§ 200
this country the implied power, in the absence of restrictions
of charter or statute, to purchase and hold all such real estate
as may be necessary or reasonably subservient to the attainment
of the objects which are intrusted to such corporation.^ It is
not necessary, therefore, that there should be any express grant
of power to the municipal corporation, in order to hold or ac-
quire lands, for the purposes for which the corporation was cre-
ated, or to enable it to carry out some express power. As, for
example, where a municipal corporation is given the power to
establish a market, it has the implied power to purchase the
land that may be needed for the erection and maintenance of
such a market.^ The charter, or the general laws under which
the municipal corporation has been created, are the source of
power of such corporations in every case ; and while the im-
plied power exists, as just explained, in the absence of any ex-
press provisions of the charter, or of the general law under which
municipal corporations are formed ; yet, where there are special
provisions governing the matter, either in restraining or enlarg-
ing or specifying the scope of the powers of such corporation,
then these limitations or express provisions will supersede the
implied powers of acquisition, and control the determination of
the scope of power of the municipal corporation in such mat-
Chambers V. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543,
575; Dodge v. "Williams, 46 Wis. 70;
Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 591;
Gould V. Taylor Orphan Asylum, lb.
106; Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y.
392; Page v. Heineberg, 40 Vt. 81.
'West Chi. Park Com'rs v. Mc-
MuUen, 25 N. E. K. 676; Proprietors
of Jeffries Neck v. Inhabitants,
(Mass. 90) 26 N. E. K. 239; Keynold's
Heirs v. Stark County Com'rs etc.,
5 Ohio, 204; Corinth v. Locke, 62 Vt.
411; Coleman v. San Kafael Turn-
pike Co., 49 Cal. 517; Root v. Shields,
Woolw. C. C. 340; McCartee v. Or-
phan Soc. of N. Y., 9 Cow. 437;
Peru Iron Co., In re, 7 Cow. 540, 552;
Leeds v. Richmond, 102 Ind. 372;
Ketclmm v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356,
360; Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo.
543, 573, 576; State v. Mansfield
Com'rs, 23 IS". J. L. 510; Nicoll v. N".
Y. & E. E. R. Co., 12 N. Y. (2 Kern.)
121 ; Rensselaer etc. R. E. Co. v. Da-
vis, 43 N. Y. 137; State v. Brown, 27
N". J. L. 13; Davidson College v.
Chambers' Executors, 3 Jones Eq.
(N". C.) 253; Lester v. Jackson, 11
So. 114; 69 Miss. 887. Cf. Young v.
Board of Commissioners, 51 Fed. R.
580.
2 Ketohum v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356;
Le Couteulx V. Buffalo, 33 N". Y.333;
Paterson v. Mayor, 17 N. Y. 449.
But, on the other hand, if the power
be given to the corporation to enter
into a contract for the supply of
water to the city, it has been held
in California that there is no implied
power to purchase a site upon which
to erect the waterworks. People v.
McClintock, 45 Cal. 11.
389
201
MUNICIPAL COBPOEATIONS.
[CH. xn.
ters.^ But in every case, in the absence of express provisions
in such charter, or in the general laws of the State, a general
authority to purchase and hold property is invariably construed
to mean for purposes authorized bj'' the charter, and to prohibit
the purchase of lands merely for thfc purpose of investment or
speculation.^
Municipal corporations may likewise claim the right of apro-
j)rietor, in regard to alluvium which may be formed within
corporate limits and on land, the title to which is in the city.'
So, likewise, vfhere the municipal corporation has the title to
a water front, it has the same powers in regard to the grant of
wharf privileges, as a private owner would have.*
§ 201. Real estate beyond corporate limits. — Inasmuch as
a municipal corporation is a governmental institution, designed
to create a local government over a limited territory, it is laid
down as the general rule, that a municipal corporation cannot
purchase and hold real estate, located beyond its territorial
limits, unless such power is expressly conferred by the Legisla-
ture.^ And while this is the general rule, yet there are some
purposes, promoting the public welfare, which are intrusted to a
municipal corporation, and which cannot be attained except by
1 Bouham v. Taylor, 16 S. W. K.
555; Kingman v. Brockton, (Mass.)
26 N. E. R. 998; Lauenstein v. Fond
du Lac, 28 Wis. 336; State v. Nash-
ville Univ., 4 Hump. 157; State v.
Madison, 7 Wise. 688 ; Heyward v.
Mayor, etc. of New York, 7 N. T.
314; Beaver Dam v. Frings, 17 Wis.
398.
estate V. Natal, 41 La. Ann. 887;
Crawfordsville v. Braden, 28 N. E.
K. 389; Springfield v. Fulraer, (Utah)
27 Pac. R. 577 ; Keller v. Wilson, (Ky. )
14 S. W. R. 332; McCartee v. Orphan
Asylum, 9 Cow. (N. Y.)437: Bank v.
Niles, 1 Doug, (Mich.) 401; Davidson
College V. Chambers' Executors, 3
Jones Eq. (N. C.) 253; Champaign v.
Harmon, 98 111. 491 ; Cf. contra, Mu-
nicipality v. McDonough, 2 Rob.
(La.) 244; Corinth v. Locke, 62 Vt.
411.
390
' Clarke v. Providence, (R. I.) 15
Atl. R. 763; Leonard's Heirs v. Baton
Rouge, 4 So. R. 241; Beaufort v.
Duncan, 1 Jones (N. C.) Law, 234;
Remy v. Municipality, 11 La. An.
148; St. Louis v. Lemp, 93 Mo. 477;
Carrollton K. R. Co. v. Winthrop, 5
La. An. 36; Richardson v. Boston, 24
How. (U. S.) 188; Kennedy v. Muuic-
ipality, 10 La. An. 54; see post, § 225.
* Leonard's Heirs v. Baton Rouge,
supra ; Illinois v. Illinois etc. Co., 33
Fed. R. 730; Dana v. Jackson, etc.
Co., 31 Cal. 118; Bell v. Gough, 23
N. J. L. 624.
5 Bullock V. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.)
171; Riley v. Rochester, 9 N. Y. (5
Seld.) 64 ; Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns.
Ch. (N. Y.) 320; Girard v. New Or-
leans, 2 La. An. 897; Chambers v.'
St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Concord v.
Boseawen, 17 N. H. 465.
CH. xn.]
MUNICIPALITY AS PBOPRIETOR.
§ 202
the acquisition and ownership of lands beyond the city limits ;
as, for example, where it is desired to establish a pest-house or
cemetery ; and, in some cases, waterworks. In these cases, it
has been held that it is possible for the municipal corporation, for
buch purposes, to purchase lands beyond the city limits, without
any express authority therefor from the Legislature. And not
only is it held that they may purchase lands beyond the city
limits, within the same State in which the city is situated ; but
even in other adjacent States, provided the laws of the State,
in which the land is situated, did not restrain such a purchase
or acquisition of the land by a foreign municipal corporation. ^
Where foreign territory, or land beyond the city limits, has
been acquired by a municipal corporation. Judge Cooley states
that the city will hold such land without its limits for a park,
" not in its public capacity as an agency of the government,
and subject to the unrestricted control of the State, but as a
corporate individual, having private rights of its own, which
it is at liberty to enjoy undisturbed by the State, and in the
enjoyment of which the constitution will-protect its people." ^
§ 202. Donations of laud to a municipal corporation. —
Municipal corporations ma}', like any other class of legal per-
sonalities, be the object of both public and private bounty. The
duties of a municipal corporation are varied in character; in
carrying such purposes into effect, means are needed, and, in
order to attain such purposes, they aie authorized to receive
such means not only by taxation and the incurment of debt,
but may, likewise, receive legacies of personal property, grants
and devises of lands, as long as special restrictions upon the
power of such a corporation are not imposed by statute.^ In
1 Lester v. Jackson, 11 So. 114; 69
Miss. 887; McDonough Will Case, 15
How. (U. S.) 567; Banlc of Augusta v.
Eaile, 13 Pet. 519, 584; Runyan v. Cos-
ter's Lessee, 14 Pet. 122; Chambers v.
St. Louis, 29 Mo. 542, 574, 575; See-
bold V. Shitler, 34 Pa. St. 133.
^Thompson V. Moran, 44 Mich. 602;
Lester v. Jackson, (Miss. 92) 11 So.
K. 114.
* Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo.
543, 574; Franklin's Admr. v. Phila-
delphia, 18 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 241; 2 Pa.
Dist. E. 435; Sears v. Chapman,
(Mass. 93) 33 N. E. E. 604; Perin v.
Carey, 24 How. 465 ; In re Gehrig Est.,
27 N. E. E. 784 (N. T.) ; Skinner v. Har-
rison Tp., (Ind.) 18 K. E. E. 529 ; Brown
V. Brown, 7 Oreg. 285; Bunbar v.
Soule, 129 Mass. 284; Green v. Hogan,
(Mass.) 27 N. E. E. 413; Sargent v.
Cornish, 54 N. H. 18 ; Hamden v. Eice,
24 Conn. 350; Coggeshall v. Pelton,
7 Jolins. (N. T.) Ch. 292; Davis v.
Barnstable, (Mass.) 28 N. E. E. 165.
391
§203
MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS.
[CH. xn.
New York, the Statute of Wills does prohibit bodies politic and
corporate from taking the real estate directly. And in order
that such bodies may acquire any benefit from such a devise,
it must be made a trust for their benefit,^ except where a spe-
cial statute has authorized such direct acquisition of lands. But
where the statute authorizes a corporation to take lands " by
direct purchase or otherwise," it is held that such a corpora-
tion has the authority to take lands by will.^ Municipal cor-
porations, however, seem to be generally authorized to accept
donations of lands both by grant and by devise. It is thus a
very common occurrence for private individuals to make dona-
tions of lands by grant or by will for the service of public and
charitable purposes, for the establishment of schoolhouses, city
halls, libraries, and the like ; and no objection is raised to the
acceptance by the corporation of such donations.^ It has been
held that a city may take and receive real and personal prop-
erty, iu order to provide for the development of a coal mine
located near the city limits.*
In this case of special donations to the city for special pur-
poses, the property is taken by the citj' in trust for the purpose
for which the donations have been made, and it is impossible
for the land so conveyed to be devoted to any other use but
that for which it was intended. It is very different where cor-
porations purchase the land for specific purpose, and when the
power of alienation has not been interfered with.^
§ 203. Power of municipal corporations to serve as trus-
tee of a cliaritaWe use. — The general rule has already been
stated in a previous paragraph, in respect to the power of a
' McCartee v. Orphan Asylum So-
ciety, 9 Cow. (N". Y.) 437; Auburn
Tlieol. Sem. v. Childs, 4 Paige (N.
Y.) Ch. 418.
2 In re Huss, 27 ]>?". E. E. 781, 784;
Fosdick V. Hempstead, 125 N. Y. 581 ;
26 ]Sr. E. E. 801; Fox's Will, 52 N. Y.
530; s. c, 94 U. S. 315; Downing v.
Marshall, 23 N. Y. 366; Kerr v.
Dougherty, 79 N. Y. 327.
s Succession of Vance, (La. 90) 2
So. E. 54; Skinner V. Harrison, (lud.)
18 N. E. E. 529; Piper v. Moulton, 72
Me. 155; Heyward v. Mayor etc. of
392
New York, 7 N. Y. 314; jSTicoll v. N.
Y. & E. E. E. Co., 12 3Sr. Y. 121; Le
Couteulx V. Buffalo, 33 N". Y. 333;
People V. Mauran, 5 Denio (N. Y.)
389; Davis v. Barnstable, (Mass.) 28
N. E. E. 105 ; Page v. Heineberg, 40
Vt. 81; Fernch v. Quincy, 3 Allen
(Mass.) 9; Green v. Hogan, 27 N. E.
E. 413; Kelly v. Kennard, 60 N. H. 1;
Jackson v. Pike, 9 Cow. (JST. Y.) 61;
State V. Atkison, 24 Vt. 448.
* Delaney v. Salina, 34 Kan. 532.
i" Beach v. Haynes, 12 Vt. 15; State
V. Woodward, 23 Vt. 92.
CH. XII.] MTJNICIPALITy AS PEOPKIETOE.
§203
municipal corporation to acquire and hold property of any sort ;
viz., for purposes, which were in contemplation in the establish-
ment of a municipal corporation, and which are not foreign
to the object of such incorporation. Or, to use the language
of Judge Dillon, " municipal corporations are capable, unless
specially restrained, of taking property for any purpose whicli
is germane to the objects of the corporation." ^ Not only is
this the case, where the property is directly granted to the mu-
nicipal corporation for its own special benefit, but also where
such property, both real and personal, is devised or granted to
a municipal corporation in trust for some public charity or elee-
mosynary object, of such a character as would involve aid to
the corporation in the performance of its own public duties. A
municipal corporation cannot serve as a trustee of a private
trust, however worthy such ti;}ist may be. But a trust, estab-
lished for the benefit of the poor in general, or for the people
of a community included in the municipality, is held to be with-
in the powers of a municipal corporation, and a court will not
interfere with the performance of such a trust by the municipal
corporation.^ In illustration of the power of a municipal cor-
12 Dillon's Mun. Corp. § 567.
2 Succession of Vance, 2 So. E. 54;
Miller v. Leroh, 1 Wall. Jr. (U. S. C.
C.) 210; Webb v. Neal, 5 Allen
(Mass.) 575; Philadelphia v. Elliott,
3 Eawle, 170; Girard's Will, 2 La. An.
898; Vidal v. Philadelphia, 2 How.
127; Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Johns.
(N. Y.) 422; Bell County v. Alexan-
der, 22 Texas, 350; Barkley v. Don-
nelly, (Mo. 92) 19 S. W. E. 305 ; Girard
V. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1; Chambers
V. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Orford
Union Cong. Soc. v. West Cong. Soc,
55 N. H. 463; Phillips Acad. Trs. v.
King, 12 Mass. 546; Pickering v.
Shotwell, 10 Pa. 27; McDonough
Will Case, 15 How. 367. But see
Fosdick V. Hempstead, 125 N. Y.
581; 26 N. E. E. 801; Gillespie's
Appeal, 30 W. N. C. 337; Franklin's
Trust, 24 Atl. E. 626; Daily v. New
Haven, 60 Conn. 314; Mr. Justice
Sharswood, in the leading case, in-
volving a construction of the grant
by Mr. Girard of a trust to the city
of Philadelphia, describes the pow-
ers of municipal coi-porations, to
serve as trustees in public or chari-
table.trusts, as follows: "It could
hardly be pretended, I think, in this
country, that it could be a trustee
for the separate use of a married
woman, to educate the children of a
donor or testator, or to accumulate
for the benefit of particular persons.
It certainly is not compellable to ex-
ecute such trusts, nor does it seem
competent to accept and administer
them. The trusts held by the city
of Philadelphia, which are enumer-
ated in the bill before us, are ger-
mane in their objects. They are
charities, and all charities are in
some sense public. If the trust is
for any particular persons, it is not
a charity. Indefiniteness is of its
essence. The objects to be benefit-
393
§ 203
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XII.
poiation to serve as trustee of a public trust, it may be'^further
stated that it has been held that a city has such a power to ac-
cept property, both real and personal, for the education and sup-
port of the orphans of a city,i and for the purpose of educating
the poor, without cost to them, in the city of New Orleans and
Baltimore.^ A similiar donation was sustained in Cincinnati for
the establishment and maintenance of two colleges for the educa-
tion of boys and girls ; and further, for the suppoi't of the orphans
of the poor.^ So, also, did the courts sustain a devise of property
to St. Louis, in trust for furthering relief for the poor emigrant
travelers coming to St. Louis, on their way hona fide to settle
in the west.* In this last case, most of the land composing
the trust fund was situated in St. Louis county, outside of the
city limits ; and it was held that such property could be taken
and held by the city for the purpose of the trust. So, also, jvas
a bequest upheld by the city of Philadelphia to purchase or es-
tablish and maintain an hospital for the indigent, blind and
lame.^ So, likewise, have been upheld bequests to the citizens
of the municipality for the purchase of a fire engine:® to a
ed are strangers to the donor or tes-
tator. The widening and improve-
ment of streets and avenues ; planting
them with ornamental and shade
trees; the education of orphans; the
building of schoolhouses; the assist-
ance and encouragement of young
mechanics; rewarding ingenuity in
the useful arts; the establishment
and support of hospitals; the dis-
tribution of soup, bread or fuel to
the necessitous, are objects within
the general scope and purpose of the
municipality." Philadelphia v. Fox,
04 Pa. St. 169.
1 Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2
How. 127; Periu v. Carey, 24 Ho .
4G5 ; Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1.
■' McBonough Will Case, 15 How.
(U. S.) 367; 8 La. An. 171; Girard
Heirs v. New Orleans, 2 La. An. 898.
8 Succession of Vance, 2 So. R. 54;
Green v. Hogan, 27 N. E. R. 413;
Le Couteulx v. Buffalo, 33 N. T.
394
■333; Dashiell v. Attorney General, 5
Har. & Johns. (Md.) 392; 6 Har. &
Johns. (Md.) 1; Castleton v. Lang-
don, 19 Vt. 210; Reynolds' Heirs v.
Stark County Comm'rs, 5 Ohio, 204;
Kelley v. Kennard, 60 N. H. 1; Jack-
son v. Pike, 9 Cow. (N. T.) 61 ; State
v. Atkinson, 24 Vt. 448; NiooU v. N.
Y. & E. R. R. Co., 12 N. T. 121;
French v. Quincy, 3 Allen (Mass.) 9;
Piper v. Moulton, 72 Me. 155 ; Hey-
ward v. Mayor etc. of New York, 7
N. Y. 314; Perin v. Carey, 24 How.
645 ; Tripp v. Frazier, 4 Har. ifc Johns.
(Md.) 446; People v. Mauran, 5 De-
nio (N. Y.) 389.
* Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo.
543.
" Philadelphia v. Elliott, 3 Rawle,
(Pa.) 170.
" Wright V. Linn, 9 Pa. 433; see
Kirk V. King, 3 Pa. 436; Tyrone Tp.
School Directors v. Benkleberger, 6
Pa. 31.
CH. XIJ.] MUNICIPALITY AS PEOPEIETOR.
§204
county for the benefit of the public schools,^ and other bequests
of a similar nature.^
§ 204. Devises and grants for objects foreign to corporate
purposes. — But if the devise or grant is for a purpose, which
is foreign to the powers of a municipal corporation, the grant
or devise cannot be sustained or enforced by the municipal cor-
poration. And such attempted devises will be administered
by the court of equity, if it is possible for it to do so, and the
provisions of the donor carried out by the appointment of a
trustee.^ Not only would this rule of limitation, of the power
of a municipal corporation to serve as a trustee, apply to cases
of purely a private trust ; but, likewise, to a devise or gift to a
city, for the purpose of maintaining or establishing some charit-
able trust, outside the city limits, for the benefit of people hav-
ing no residence permanent, or temporary, within the city ; as,
for example, for the erection of a court house or jail for county
purposes, or for building a church or schoolhouse. On the
other hand, it has been held that the county cannot be charged
with the administration of a trust for the erection of a school-
house, for the use of the inhabitants of a particular town in
that county.* So, also, has it been held that a city is not per-
' Bell County v. Alexander, 22 Tex.
350.
^Southington First Cong. Soc. v.
Atwater, 23 Conn. 34.
8 Davis V. Barnstable, 28 N. E. K.
165 (Mass. 91) ; Sloane v. McConahy,
4 Ohio, 157; BuUard v. Sbirley, 153
Mass. 559; So. Newmarket Meth.
Sem. Tvs. v. Peaslee, 15 N. H. 317,
331 ; North Hempstead v. Hempstead,
2 Wend. 109; Farmers' Loan & T. Co.
V. Carroll, 5 Barb. 613; Coggeshall
et al.. New Bochelle Trs. v. Pelton,
7 Johns. Ch. 292; National Bank v.
Grenada, 41 Fed. Kep. 87.
* Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Johns. (N.
Y.) 422; Jackson v. Cory, 8 Johns.
(N. Y.) 385. " Our laws are full of
instances of persons clothed with
corporate powers for certain special
purposes. The loan officers of a
county are a corporation; and could
they, as such, receive a grant of land
for the use of the town or for a
church? Certainly not. Nor can
the supervisors of Oneida county
take a grant of land for the use of
the town of Kome. Such a grant
must be deemed void upon every
principle, whether we consider the
special and definite objects of the
corporate capacity in the board of
supervisors; whether we consider
the power given them by statute to
take conveyances of land for the use
of the county; or, lastly, whether
we i-efer to the incapacity of all cor-
porations to hold lands in trust for
any other object, than that for which
the corporation was created. Whether
the court of equity would or would
not prevent the trust as to the in-
habitants of Kome from failing for
want of a trustee is not a question
395
§ 205
MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS.
[CH. XII.
mitted to receive as a trustee a fund for the promotion or sup-
port of missionaries.-^
§ 205. Gifts or grants to unincorporated commnnities.—
It is a well settled rule of the common law, which remains to
this day unless modified by statute, that a grant is not valid
unless it is made to a definite grantee, who may be identified
beyond reasonable doubt by the description of such grantee,
contained in the instrument of conveyance. Hence it is nec-
essary to the validity of a grant, that it be made either to the
natural person, or to the corporation, who is capacitated to take
such property either in his or its own right, or as trustee.^ A
grant, therefore, to an unincorporated community or body of peo-
ple, as for example, to the people of a specific county, which
has not been incorporated, is void.* So, likewise, would a res-
ervation, in a conveyance to inhabitants of an unincorporated
community, be likewise invalid.* And for the same reason it
has been held, that a bequest to school commissioners was void,
because there was no corporation to whom the bequest was
made.^ But the. fact, that a bequest is made to the citizens of
an incorporated place, would not of itself affect the validity of
the grant, because by that description the court, under the usual
liberal rule of construction, would presume that the grantor in-
tended thereby the municipal corporation itself, instead of the
individual citizens of such corporation, and the form of the de-
vise would have no greater effect than a case of mere misnomer
of the corporation.^ Where the estate is granted for an unin-
corporated community, by the State government itself to two
for a court of law (In an action of
ejectment) to decide." Per curiam,
in Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Johns.
(K. T.) 422.
1 So. Newmarket M. P. T. v. Peas-
lee, 15 N. H. 317. But in New Hamp-
shire it has been held that the town
may be trustee of a fund for the pro-
motion and support of religion with-
in its limits. Contra, BuUard v. Shir-
ley, 27 N. E. R. 766.
2 Jackson v. Cory, 8 Johns. (N. Y.)
SS.') ; Jackson v. Hartwell, lb. 422.
" Boston Overseers v. Seers, 22
Pick. (Mass.) 122.
396
* Mason v. Muncaster, 9 Wheat.
445; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43,
52 ; Jackson v. Cory, 8 Johns. (Ni Y.)
385; Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 9
Johns. (N. Y.) 73; North Hempstead
V. Hempstead, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 109,
133.
5 Janey's Executors v. Latene, 4
Leigh, (Va.) 327.
6 Kirk V. King, 3 Pa. St. 436 ; Wright
V. Linn, 9 Pa. 433 ; Tyrone Tp. School
Directors t. Dunkleberger, 6 Pa. 3.
As to name and misnomer see ante,
§§ 49, 50.
CH. XII.] MXJNICIPALITr AS PEOPEIETOE. § 206
or more persons, who are named as trustees for the benefit of
themselves and the inhabitants of the unincorporated town, the
grant is nevertheless valid ; because, coming from the supreme
power of the State, there would be an implied incorporation of
such persons for the purpose of the grant, which without this
implication would prove inoperative.^
§ 206. Interference by State courts in the performance
of trusts by municipal corporations. — A municipal corpora-
tion, when acting as a trustee of a fund placed in its charge by
a grant or devise, is acting in a fiduciary relation, and thereby
takes on a semi-private character, and comes in that relation
within the general authority of the court of equity to supervise
and inquire into the due administration of the trust. The
court of equity has the authority to interfere for the protection
of the trust fund in the administration of such trust, whether
the trustee be a private person or a municipality. Thus, it has
been held in the case of Girard's will, that an act of the Leg-
islature, depriving the city of Philadelphia of the power to ad-
minister the trust, and vesting such power in an independent
and separate, board of trustees, appointed by the court or other-
wise than by the city, was valid and constitutionally unobjec-
tionable. In pronouncing the opinion of the court in favor of
the constitutionality of such interference, Mr. Justice Shars-
wood says : " When, therefore, the donors or testators of these
charitable funds granted or devised them in trust to the munici-
paUty, they must be held to have done so with full knowledge
that their trustee so selected was a mere creature of the State,
and an agent acting under a revocable power. Substantially,
they trusted the good faith of the sovereign. It is plain — too
plain, indeed, for aigument — that the corporation, by accepting
such trusts, could not thereby invest itself with any immunity
from legislative action. Such an act could not change its es-
sential nature. It is surely not competent for a mere municipal
organization, which is made a trustee of a charity, to set up a
vested right in that character to maintain such organization in
' North Hempstead v. Hempstead,
2 Wend. (N. T.) 109, 133 (1828); and
see also, Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns.
Ch. (If. Y.) 320; People v. Sohermer-
hoin, 19 Barb. 540, 55.5; Goodell v.
Jackson, 20 Johns. (N. T.) "706; Jack-
son V. Leroy, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 397 ; Bow
V. AUentown, 34 N. H. 351, 372; Gi-
rard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1; Clark
V. Brookfleld, 81 Mo. 503.
397
I 207 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XII.
the form in which it exists when the trust was created, and
thereby prevent the State from changing it as the public inter-
est may require." ^
§ 207. Invalid grants to mnnicipal corporations how in-
validated.— Where a municipal corporation has taken real es-
tate, in cases where it has no authority to acquire and hold
such real estate, it is an important inquiry as to the effect of
such unauthorized extension of the power of the corporation,
not only upon its own title to such property, but also as to the
person or persons, who may take advantage of such defect of
title, or want of authority, and secure a forfeiture of the real
estate, so unlawfully acquined by the corporation. In this con-
nection, a distinction is made between the cases in which the
city has the power to acquire real estate in general or for cer-
tain specific objects, and those in which the corporation is de-
nied altogether the power to acquire real estate. Where the
corporation is generally forbidden by its charter to purchase
as well as to hold land, the deed made to it is then absolutely
void. The distinction is made by the court between the pro-
hibition to take lands on the one hand, and the prohibition to
hold them. And where the prohibition is both against the pur-
chase and the taking of the lands, then, presumably in all such
cases, the grantor's title to such lands remains unaffected by
the conveyance, and the city acquires no title to it whatever.^
But where the municipal corporation has the power to acquire
land for purposes germane to its institution, and there is a con-
vej'ance or grant of land to such corporation for some purpose
not authorized by the charter, either expressly or impliedly, then
the title of the grantor is completely transferred, but the mu-
nicipal corporation, as grantee, takes the title to such property
subject to its being divested at the instance of the State. The
State alone can interfere with the enjoyment of the property so
acquired by the municipal corporation.^ This explanation of
1 Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St.
169; see, to same effect, Montpelier
V. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 21; Girard
V. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 14.
2 Leazui-e v. Hillegas, 7 Serg. &
Eawle (Pa.) 313; see Bank v. Xiles,
1 Doug. (Mich.) 401; Bank v. Poiti-
aux, 3 Rand. (Va.) 136.
398
= See Bank of Mich. v. Niles, 1
Doug. (Mich.) 401 ; Bank of Va. v.
Poitiaux, 3 Kand. 136; Martin v. Br.
Bank, 15 Ala. 587; Baird v. Bank of
Wash., 11 Serg. & R. 411; Goudie v.
North Water Co., 7 Pa. St. 233; An-
gell & Ames Corp., sees. 152, 153;
Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543,
CH. XII.J
MUNICIPALITY AS PEOPEIETOR.
§ 208
the authority of the grantor, or of the State, to avoid convey-
ances or grants of laiid to the municipal corporation, in cases in
which the municipal corporation is not authorized to acquire or
to hold such lands, must necessarily be applied only to actual
purchases of the land.
Where there has been a donation of the lands by the private
owner or grantor, in trust for purposes which cannot be carried
out or performed by the municipal corporation, because such
performance is beyond the limitations of its power as a corpo-
ration, the consideration for the gift or grant failing, there would
necessarily be vested in the grantor the power of avoiding the
conveyance ; unless, possibly, where the court of equity takes
charge of the trust so created, and which cannot be performed
by the corporation, and appoints other trustees in the place of
the corporation, who are charged with the duty of carrying
out such trust in accordance with the intentions of the donor.
Thus, for example, where the gift was made of real estate to
tlie town of "Worcester, in consideration of the agreement of
the town to support the grantor or donor during the rest of her
life, the conveyance was invalid, because of the want of power
in the municipal corporation to assume such an obligation ;
and for that reason, the grantor was authorized to avoid such
conveyance, and it was held that the deed would remain good,
until so avoided by the grantor, or by some one in privity with
her.i
§ 208. Power of alienation. — In determining the limitation
of the power of a municipal corporation, to dispose absolutely of
Alexander v. ToUeston Club of Chi-
cago, 110 111. 65; Land v. Coffman,
50 Mo. 243; s. c, 12 Am. Law Reg.
(N. S.) March (1873), p. 143; Hough
V. Cook County Land Co., 73 III. 23;
Smith V. Seeley, 12 Wall. 35; Barnes
V. Suddard, 117 111. 237; Davidson
Col. V. Chambers' Executors, 3 Jones
Eq. (N. C.) 253, 258; Myers v. Croft,
13 Wall. 291; Baker v. Neff, 73 Ind.
68; Union Nat. Bk. v. Matthews, 98
U. S. 628; Goudie v. Water Company,
7 Pa. St. 233; Eufaula v. McNab, 67
Ala. 588; Ealey v. Umatilla County,
15 Oreg. 172; Barrow v. Nashville &
C. Turnp. Co., 9 Humph. 304; Lea-
zure V. Hillegas, 7 Serg. & Kawle
(Pa.) 313, 320; Hayward v. Davidson,
41 Ind. 214.
' Inh abitants of Worcester v. Eaton,
13 Mass. 371 ; Parish of Plaquemines
V. Fulhouze, 30 La. An. 64; Matthews
V. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115 ; Common-
wealth V. Wilder, 127 Mass. 1 ; Ken-
nedy V. McElroy, (Ky. 90) 17 S. W.
E. 202; Wood v. Hammond, 16 E. I.
89. See also Sears v. Chapman,
(Mass. 93) 33 N. E. E. 604.
399
§ 208
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. xri.
the property, which it has acquired by purchase or by donation,
a distinction is made between the property which such corpo-
ration acquires or holds in its semi-private capacity, and that
which it holds as trustee for some public charity, or which has
been donated to some public use. Where the property is of
the latter character, i. e., where it is held in trust for some
public benefit, or has been donated to public use, such as for
public squares and streets, the corporation cannot, without
legislative authority, make alienation of the same. In the
case of property held in trust, no other disposition can be made
whatever ; but in respect to the property which the city owns
and which has been donated to public use, alienation can be
made only under special legislative authority.^ But the fact,
that the corporation has purchased land for a public use, does
not in itself make it impossible for the same land to be disposed
of by such a corporation. It is not the purchase for a public
purpose, but its dedication to the public use, which makes such
property inalienable ; so that, if the corporation has purchased
such property, and before its dedication to the public use should
determine to sell such property, there is no limitation upon
the power of the corporation in respect to its sale.^
Where lands are donated to the city in trust for some gen-
eral or special purpose, or where the land so conveyed is granted
subject to a condition, restraining the use or disposition of such
property, the grantor in such cases has the right of securing a
forfeiture of the grant for the breach of the condition, or
lAlve V. Henderson, 16 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 131, 168; Macon v. Dasher,
(Ga. 93) 16 S. E. E. 75; Mowry v.
Providence, (E. I. 91) 16 Atl. E. 511 ;
Dubach v. Hannibal, etc. Co., 1 S.
W. E. 86; 89 Mo. 483; Lord v. Ocon-
to, 47 Wis. 386; Warren Co. Sup. v.
Patterson, 56 111. Ill; Augusta v.
Perkins, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 437; Hoad-
ley's Admrs. v. San Francisco, 124
U. S. 639; San Francisco v. Itzell, 80
Cal. 57; Shannon v. O'Boyle, 51 Ind.
565 ; Matthews v. Alexandria, 68 Mo.
115; Meriwether V. Garrett, 102 U.
S. 472; Kings County Fire Ins. Co. v.
Stevens, 101 N. T. 411; Eoper v. Mc-
Whorter, 77 Va. 214; Cummings v.
400
St. Louis, 20 W. E. 130; 90 Mo. 259;
Still V. Lansingburgh, 16 Barb. (N.
Y.) 107; Reynolds v. Stark County,
5 Ohio, 204; Knox County v. Mc-
Comb, 19 Ohio St. 320; Newark v.
Elliott, 5 Ohio St. 113; Bowlin v.
Furman, 28 Mo. 427; Clark v. Provi-
dence, 16 Atl. E. 763; Ransom v.
Boal, 29 Iowa, 68; Kennedy v. Cov-
ington, 8 Dana (Ky.) 50.
2 Fort Wayne v. Lake Shore, etc.
Co., (Ind. 93) 32 N. E. E. 215; War-
ren V. Patterson, 56 111. Ill; Bushel
v. Whitlock, 77 Iowa, 285; 42 N. W.
E. 186; State v. Woodward, 23 Vt.
92; Beach v. Haynes, 12 lb. 15; Kon-
rad v. Eogers, 70 Wis. 492.
CH. XII.] MUNICIPALITY AS PllOPRIETOR. § 210
the violation of the trust. In all such cases, if the grantor
waives the performance of the condition, the breach of it is
excused, and the title of the purchaser becomes absolute.^ It
has been held in Vermont that, where the selectmen of a town
are empowered by statute to lease certain glebe lands, the ex-
press authority is an implied denial of the power to make an
absolute sale of such land, and hence such an absolute convey-
ance would be void, conveying no title to the purchaser.^
§ 209. Power to mortgage. — Where the property held by a
corporation is not charged with a trust, or has not been donated
to public use, in the absence of statutory restrictions, the mu-
nicipal corporation may mortgage it to secure any debt or obli-
gation, which the corporation may have the power to create.^
And so, also, it may receive as payee a mortgage of property,
to secure the payment of any indebtedness due to it, and in
turn assign such mortgage and note, payable to it, to secure
its own lawful indebtedness to another, instead of making a
mortgage of its own property.* Not only is this power to
mortgage conceded, in regard to the strictly private property
of such corporation ; but it has been held that a corporation
has the power to mortgage its waterworks, in order to secure
the payment of the bonds that were issued for the payment of
the cost of their construction.^ And so, also, has it been held
that, where property is purchased for any purpose by a munic-
ipal corporation, in the exercise of a lawful power, such cor-
poration has the power to secure the payment of the purchase
money by a mortgage of the property so purchased.®
§ 210. Power to lease corporate property. — The municipal
corporation has also the power to lease the property of a pri-
vate nature which it holds, wherever that is deemed more ex-
pedient than an absolute sale of it.^ And the lease will be valid,
1 See Sharon Iron Company v.
Erie, 41 Pa. St. 341.
2 Bush V. Whitney, 1 Chip. (Vt.)
3!9.
3 Knox Co. V. Goggin, (Mo. 91) 16
S. W. R. 684; Grant v. Huston, (Mo.
91) 16 lb. 680; Gordon v. Preston, 1
Watts (Pa.) 385 ; Braham v. San Jose,
24 Oal. .585 ; Goodwin v. McGehee, 15
Ala. 233; Middleton Bank v. Du-
buque, 15 Iowa, 394.
* Floyd Co. Com'rs V. Day, 19Ind.
450; Vanarsdall v. State, 65Ind. 176;
Sturgeon v. Daviess Co. Com'rs, 65
Ind. 302.
5 Adams v. Rome, 59 Ga. 765.
^Edey v. Shreveport, 26 La. An.
636.
' Belchers S. R. Co. v. Grain EL,
(Mo. 90)13 S. W. R. 822; Taylor v.
Carondelet, 22 Mo. 105 ; Hand v. New-
ton, 92 N. Y. 88.
36 401
§ 211 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. XU.
although there is irregularity in the form, or in the use, of the
corporate name.^ Where the property is donated to a public
use, such as waterworks, or a railway franchise, it is doubtful
whether the municipal corporation has the power, in the absence
of express statutory authority, to lease it.^ But, certainly, if
the power to lease is conceded, the municipal corporation can-
not make such a lease, in point of duration or absolute charac-
ter, so as to deprive the corporation of its power of control of
the management of such property, to the detriment of the
public.^
It is quite a common occurrence for municipal corporations,
having municipal property donated to a public use, such as a
city hall, to rent the hall to private pei-sons for unobjection-
able purposes, such as concerts and other entertainments ; aud
this has been held to be no violation of the rights of the pub-
lic* So, also, where a building, which had formerly been
donated to public uses, has been abandoned, the town has the
right to repair such building for leasing purposes.®
Not only has the municipal corporation the right to lease its
own property', but it has also the power to rent the property of
others, whenever the public needs require it, and it is deemed
more expedient to rent than to buy.®
§ 211. Reqaisites of conveyances by municipal corpora-
tions.— It is a general rule of the law of corporations, that
the same formalities are required, in the absence of express
legislative authority, for a valid conveyance of lands by such
a corporation, as in the case of natural persons ; and the mu-
nicipal corporation is no exception to this rule. Hence the
conveyance by municipal corporations, in the absence of ex-
press statutory authoritj% must be by deed, executed in the
corporate name, and under the corporate seal.'' And the oflS-
1 New York v. Kent, 5 N. T. S. 567 ;
McDonald v. Schneider, 27 Mo. 405 ;
St Louis V. Merton, 6 Mo. 476.
2 Pennsylvania K. R. Co. v. St.
Louis, A. & T. H. R. R. Co., 118 U.
S. 290; Marine I. Co. v. Railroad, 41
Fed. R. 643 ; Thomas v. West Jersey
R. R. Co., 101 U. S. 70.
2 Mahon v. Columbus, 58 Miss. 310.
4 Bell V. Platteville, 70 Wis. 189;
Stone V. Oconomowoc, 71 Wis. 155.
402
5 Bates V. Bassett, 60 Vt. 530.
s Davies v. Mayor etc. of N. Y., 83
N. Y. 207.
' Noyce v. Jones, 25 Neb. 643 ; Mar
con V. Dasher, 16 S. E. R. 75; Props.
V. Ipswich, 153 Mass. 42; Barrow v.
Wilson, 39 La. An. 403; Young v.
De Putren, 37 Fed. 46; Osborne v.
Tunis, 25 N. J. L. 633; Remillard v.
Blackmar, 52 N. W. R. 133; Bank t
Dubuque, 19 Iowa, 467.
CH. Xn.] MUNICIPALITY AS PROPEIETOE. § 211
cers, who aiBxed the corporate name and seal to the convey-
ance, as representatives of the corporation, can only do so by
virtue of the authority conferred upon them under the general
laws of the State, or by the municipal ordinances.^ This being
the rule, that a conveyance by a municipal corporation must, in
the absence of special authority, be by deed in the corporation's
name and under the corporate seal, it is clear that no convey-
ance can be made by the corporation, vesting in the purchaser
the legal title to lands, by a vote of the city council to that
effect.^ The only effect of such transaction is to create in the
purchaser an equitable claim to a formal conveyance, or an ex-
ecutory contract of sale, the specific performance of which can
be enforced in equity.*
On the other hand, if the charter or ordinance prescribes a
particular method of transfer, or imposes certain conditions,
upon which the conveyance shall be made, in every case the
general rule thus explained has been superseded or modified, as
the case ma}^ be ; and no valid conveyance can be made by
such corporation, in violation or disregard af the express pro-
visions of the law. Thus, where the city charter requires sales
of property to be made by ordinances, after advertisement of
the same, the sale in ordinary form or in disregard of these
requirements, if it should be made by ordinances, would be void,
and the expenditure by the city of the proceeds of sale would
not prevent the invalidation of such a sale, but only impose
upon the city the obligation to refund the money so received.*
So, also, where a condition is imposed, as where the previous
consent of the majority of the legal voters is required, the con-
veyance without such consent is void.^
In the absence of any special provisions, in respect to the
character of the vote of the city council, or other corporate
1 Merrill v. Burbank, 23 Me. 538; = Grant v. Davenport, 18 Iowa, 1Y9.
Clark V. Pratt, 47 Me. 55 ; Mensen v.
Tripp, 81 Me. 24; Of. New York v.
Kent, 5 N. Y. S. 567.
2Copp V. Neal, 7 N. H. 275, 278;
Beaufort v. Duncan, 1 Jones (N. C.)
Law, 239; Cofran v. Cockran, 5 N.
H. 458; Coburn v. EUenwood, 4 N.
H. 99, 102.
* McCracken v. San Francisco, 16
Cal. 591; Mensen v. Tripp, 81 Me.
24; Pimental v. San Francisco, 21
Cal. 351; Salterlee v. Same, 23 lb.
214; Herzo v. Same, 33 lb. 134.
6 Still V. Lansingburgh, 16 Barb.
107; Middleton Bank v. Dubuque, 15
Iowa, 394.
403
§212
MITNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XII.
board, which is required to make the sale of the land valid,
the majority of the members of such board are impliedly au-
thorized to direct the sale.^
§ 212. Sale of corporate property on execution — Liability
for debts. — The general rule in most of the States is, that a
judgment obtained against a municipal corporation cannot be en-
forced by ordinary writs of execution ; and that the only remedy
of the creditor is by mandamus, to compel payment out of the
general funds of such municipal corporation, or to levy a tax
for that purpose.^ But in the absence of statutory regulations,
it is elsewhere held that while mandamus is tlie ordinary rem-
edy,^ where the corporation is possessed of strictly piivate prop-
erty, which is not held in trust, or which is not donated to
public uses, such property may be sold on execution to satisfy the
judgments obtained against the city.* -Thus, for example, in
New Orleans a market bazaar, which was leased out to private
individuals, was held to be subject to sale on execution.^ But
where property is owned by the corporation for any public use,
or in trust, such as public buildings, fire engines, waterworks,
hospitals and sanitariums, the property cannot be reached by
the writ of execution, and, as a necessary consequence of that
conclusion, the judgment lien will not attach to such property.^
It seems that in New England the creditors of a municipal
iSan Diego v. S. D. & L. A. K. E.
Co., 44 Cal. 106.
2 Sherman V.Williams, (Tex. 92) 19
S. W. E. 606; Overton Bridge Co. v.
Taylor, (Neb. 92) 51 N. W. E. 240;
Elrod V. Bernadotte, 53 111. 368;
Bloomington v. Brokaw, 77 111. 194,
197; Commonwealth v. Allegheny-
County, 37 Pa. St. 277, 290; Common-
wealth v. Perkins, 43 Pa. St. 400;
Klein v. New Orleans, 99 U. S. 149;
Curry V. Savannah, 64 Ga. 290; Cairo
V. Allen, 3 111. App. 398; Morrison
V. Hinkson, 87 111. 587; State v. Mil-
waukee, 20 Wis. 87; State v. Beloit,
lb. 70; Crane v. Fond du Lao, 16 Wis.
196; Chicago v. Halsey, 25 111. 595;
Olney v. Harvey, 50 111. 453.
^ Winslow v. Perquimans Co.
Com'rs, 64 N. C. 218; Gooch v. Greg-
ory, 65 N. C. 142.
404
* Brown v. Gates, 15 W. Ta. 131;
Birmingham v. Eumsey, 63 Ala. 352;
Hart V. New Orleans, 12 Fed. Eep.
292; Holliday v. Frisbie, 15 Cal. 630;
Davenport v. Peoria Ins. Co., 17 Iowa,
276.
^ New Orleans v. Homes Ins. Co.,
23 La. An. 61. But in New Orleans
V. Louisiana Co., 140 U. S. 654, it
was held that a public square leased
for private purposes was exempt.
6 Brown v. Gates, 15 W. Va. 131;
Cole V. Green, 25 111. 104; State v.
Tiedemau, 69 Mo. 306 ; President, etc.
V. Indianapolis, 12 Ind. 620; Green
V. Marks, 25 111. 221; Meriwether v.
Garrett, 102 V. S. 472; Lowe v. How-
ard County, 94 Ind. 553; Mariner v.
Mackey, 25 Kan. 669; New Orleans v.
Morris, 105 U. S. 600; Foster v. Fow-
ler, GO Pa. St. 27; Darling v. Haiti-
CH. XII.]
MUNICIPALITY AS PKOPEIETOK.
212
corporation may resort to the private property of individual
citizens of the town, for the purpose of securing paj-ment of
the municipal debt.^ But, elsewhere, in those States where a
writ of execution will not lie for the enforcement of a judg-
ment against a municipal corporation, it cannot be employed
for attaching the private property of a citizen.^
One of the results of the general rule here laid down, that
the public property of a municipal corporation cannot be made
liable for the debts of the corporation on a writ of execution,
is that the mechanic's lien cannot be enforced against such prop-
erty. Thus, it has been held that the mechanic's lien cannot
be enforced against public property, such as public buildings
of all sorts, bridges and the like. The only remedy of the me-
chanic in such cases is to obtain judgment against the munici-
pal corporation, and to enforce the payment of such judgment
by a mandamus.^ A contrary conclusion has been reached in
Louisiana, where a mechanic was permitted to file a suit for
foreclosure of a lien on a building, which had been constructed
for use as a jail.* And in New York, it is provided by statute
that contractors for public municipal buildings may secure a
lien upon any money in the control of the city.^
more, 51 Md. 1; Lilly v. Taylor, 88
N. C. 489; Wallace v. Trustees, 84 N.
C. 164.
iBeardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 368.
2 Miller v. McWilliams, 50 Ala. 427 ;
20 Am. Eep. 297; Horner v. CofCey,
25 Miss. 434; Meriwether v. Garrett,
102 U. S. 472.
8 McNeal etc. Co. v. Bullock, 38
Fed. K. 565; Guest v. Lower M. W.
Co., 21 Atl. K. 1001 ; Front etc. Co. v.
Johnston, (Wash. 91) 25 Pac. E. 1084;
Mayrhafer v. Board, (Cal. 91) 26 Pac.
R. 646 ; Loring v. Small , 50 Iowa, 271 ;
Board etc. v. Neidenberger, 78 111.
58; Morrison v. Hinkson, 87 HI. 587;
Curry v. Savannah, 64 Ga. 290; Char-
nock V. Colfax, 51 Iowa, 70; Parke
Co. Com'rs v. O'Conner, 86 Ind. 531;
Winslow V. Com'rs, 64 N. C. 218;
Jordan v. Board, 39 Minn. 298 ; Leon-
ard V. Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 498; Port-
land Lumbering etc. Co. v. School
District, 13 Oreg. 283; County v. An-
gus, 18 S. W. E. 563 ; New Orleans v.
Morris, 3 Woods, C. C. 103; Foster v.
Fowler, 60 Pa. St. 27; Schwartz v.
Salter, 40 La. An. 264; Elrod v. Ber-
nadotte, 53 111. 368 ; Bloomington v.
Brokaw, 77111. 194; Bouton v. Super-
visors, 5 C. L. J. 105 ; Klein v. New
Orleans, 99 U. S. 149; Dallas v. Loone,
(Tex. 92) 18 S. W. E. 726. Where a
city brought an action against its
collector of taxes and his sureties to
recover taxes assessed to meet rail-
road aid bonds, it was held that the
money paid to compromise the ac-
tion, standing in lieu of the taxes
themselves, was exempted from exe-
cution, and that a levy upon it would
be enjoined. Sherman v. Williams,
(Tex. 92) 16 S. W. E. 606.
4 McKnight v. Grant, 30 La. An.
361.
5 Bell V. New York, 105 N. Y. 139.
405
CHAPTER XIII.
DEDICATION OF PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE.
Section.
214 — General statement.
215 — General requisites of statu-
tory dedications.
216 — Extent of statutory dedica-
tion.
217 — General requisites of com-
mon law dedication.
218 — Who may dedicate.
219 — Intention to dedicate, how
established.
220 — Presumption of intention
from long user.
221 — Platting and sale of lots as
evidence of intention.
Section.
222^A dedication irrevocable,
when accepted.
223 — Effect of acceptance.
224 — Extent of common law dedi-
cation, as respects donor's
title.
225 — Public right to alluvium and
accretions.
226 — ^Dedication to use as public
square.
227 — ^Dedication to other public
uses.
228 — Effect of misuser or abandon-
ment of dedicated lands.
229 — AlienatioDof dedicated lands.
§ 214. General statement.— Probably the most common
method of acquiring property, and especially real property, on
the part of a municipal corporation, is that of dedication by
the private owner to public use. There are two kinds of dedi-
cation to public use, one known as the statutory dedication ;
and the other, as the common-law dedication. As their names
imply, their principal distinction is in the fact, that one rests
upon common law rules, and the other depends upon the express
provisions of the statute, which either authorized or provided
for the dedication. There are, however, other important dis-
tinctions between the two methods of dedication, which will
receive special illustration in the succeeding paragraphs.
§ 215. General requisites of statutory dedications. — The
statutory dedication finds its authority in the statute, which
provides for such dedication. If, therefore, a statutory dedica-
tion is intended to be made, it will be effectual as a statutory
dedication, only when it has been made in conformity with the
requirements of the statute. Thus, for example, where the
statute requires, in order that lands may be dedicated to the
public use, as streets, or squares, or commons, that the plat or
406
CH. Xm.] DEDICATION OF PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE. § 215
map describing the same must be recorded,^ or that such map
or plat should be acknowledged before it is recorded,^ a failure
to comply with these requirements of the statute would have
the effect of invalidating such dedication under the statute.*
It is also another effect of the statutory provisions for dedica-
tion, that under tlie statute the assent or acceptance on the part
of the public is dispensed with, and the statutory dedication
becomes complete, effectually transferring to the public the
right to use such property, without any express or implied ac-
ceptance ou the part of the public, beyond what is implied from
the compliance with the provisions of the statute.* The statu-
tory dedication, also, is in fact a conveyance or grant, and dif-
fers from the common law dedication in that respect, inasmuch
as a common law dedication is not in fact any express grant,
but rather creates or vests in the public certain rights, in re-
spect to the property, by means of an estoppel in pais of the
owner of the land.^
1 Board v. Wilqus, (Kan. 90) 22 Pac.
R. 615; Strong v. Darling, 9 Ohio,
201 ; Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa,
546.
2 Archer v. Salinas, 93 Cal. 43 ; State
V. Logue, 73 Wis. 598; Gosselin v.
Chicago, 103 111. 623; Detroit v. Det.
& Milw. R. R. Co., 23 Mich. 173; Lake
View V. Lebahn, 9 N. E. R. 269; 120
111. 92; Chicago etc. Co. v. Ellithorpe,
(Iowa, 90) 43 N. W. E. 277; Grand-
ville V. Jenison, 86 Mich. 567 ; Stewart
V. Perkins, (Mo. 92) 19 S. W. R. 989;
Buffalo V. Harling, (Minn. 92) 52 N.
W. R. 931; Wisby v. Bonte, 19 Oliio
St. 238; Fulton V. Mehrenfeld, 8 lb.
440; Winona v. Huff, 11 Minn. 119;
Heitz V. St. Louis, (Mo. 92) 19 S. W.
R. 735; Powell v. Oilman, 38 111. App.
611; Auburn V. Goodwin, 21 N. E.
R. 212; Des Moines v. Hall, 24 Iowa,
234; Schurmeier v. St. Paul & Pac.
E. R. Co., 10 Minn. 82; State v. Hill,
10 Ind. 219; Hays v. State, 8Ind. 425.
' Woodrufi V. Douglass Co., 17 Or.
314; Baird v. Rice, 63 Pa. St. 489:
Ragan v. McCoy, 29 Mo. 856; United
States V. Chicago, 7 How. 185; Bid-
die's Lessee v. Shippen, 1 Dallas, 19;
Commonwealth v. Wood, 10 Pa. St.
93; Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. v.
Banker, 44 111. 26 ; Gebhardt v. Reeves,
75 111. 301.
1 Archer v. Salinas, 93 Cal. 43 ; Tay-
lor V. Phillippi, 35 W. Va. 554; Baker
V. St. Paul, 8 Minn. 491, 493; Regan
V. McCoy, 29 Mo. 356; Wisby v.
Bonte, 19 Ohio St. 238; Harrison v.
Seal, (Miss. 90) 5 So. R. 622; Pierce
V. Roberts, 17 Atl. R. 275 ; 57 Conn.
31; People v. Jones, 6 Mich. 176;
Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Ry. Co.,
67 111. 540.
^Deraopolis v. Webb, 87 Ala. 659;
Forney V. Calhoun Co., 86 lb. 463;
Schurmeier v. St. Paul & Pac. R. R.
Co., 10 Minn. 82, 104; Cincinnati v.
White, 6 Pet. (IT. S.) 431 ; Pawlet v.
Clark, 9 Cranch, 292; Dobson v.
Hohenadel, 30 W. N. C. 54; Miller v.
Schenck, 43 N. W. R. 225; Cook v.
Harris, 61 IST. T. 448; Zinc Co. v. La
Salle, 117 111. 411 ; Reid v. Board, 73
Mo. 295 ; Brown v. Manning, 6 Ohio,
298, 303; Cincinnati's Lesseev. Ham-
ilton Co. Comm'rs etc., 7 Ohio, pt. 1,
407
§216
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. xm.
It needs to be stated finally, that where an attempt is made
to provide for a statutory dedication, but on account of a fail-
ure to comply with the provisions of the statute, such dedica-
tion is invalid under the statute ; if such ineffective dedication
has been accepted by the public, or rights under such dedica-
tion have been acquired by third persons, and the other require-
ments of the common law dedication have been satisfied, then
what would be an impossible statutory dedication, would oper-
ate as a common law dedication, in favor, of both the public
and third persons, whose rights have been thereby affected.^
§ 216. Extent of statutory dedication It is also explained
to be the fact, that in the statutory dedications the statute op-
erates as a conveyance to the public, not only of an easement
over the lands, but of a title to the land; so that the dedicator
has thereafter no interest or claim in such land, subject simply
to the public easement.^ But it has been held in Minnesota
that under a statutory dedication, the fee simple title to the
land, which has been dedicated for streets and squares, does
not pass, and that the public acquires only an easement therein
for the purpose of the trust.^ But while the general rule is as
thus seated, that the title in fee iu the land dedicated to public
use passes to the public, unless the statute prohibits an express
reservation, the dedicator may by express provision limit his
dedication to the grant of an easement, and reserve to himself
the title to the soil.* So, also, may the dedication be in other
88; lb. 217; Fulton v. Mehrenfeld, 8
Ohio St. p. 444.
1 Hurley v. Boom Co., 34 Minn.
143; Field V. Carr, 59 111. 198; Waugh
V. Leech, 28 111. 488; Belleville v.
Stookey, 23 111. 441 ; Fulton v. Meh-
renfeld, 8 Ohio St. 440; Baker v.
Johnston, 21 Mich. 319; Cf. State v.
Adkins, 42 Kan. 203. But see Tay-
lor V. Fort Wayne, 47 Ind. 274, in
which it is held that a failure to com-
ply with the provisions of the stat-
ute in respect to the record of the
plat of the land dedicated makes the
record a nullity.
2 Maywood Co. v. Maywood, 118 111.
61; Zinc Co. v. La Salle, 117 111. 411;
408
Wood V. Natl. W. Works Co., 33
Kan. 590; Gosselin v. Chicago, 103
111. 623.
3 Penn. Ky. Co. v. Ayres, 14 Atl.
E. 901; Eutherford V. Taylor, 38 Mo.
315; Price v. Thompson, 48 Mo. 363;
Cox V. Louisville N. A. & C. E. R,
Co., 48 Ind. 178; Schurmeier y. St.
Paul & Pacific E. E. Co., 10 Minn.
104.
< Stevens v. Shannon, 6 Ohio Cir.
142; Dubuque v. Benson, 23 Iowa,
248; Noblesville v. Lake Erie etc.
Co., (Ind. 92) 29 N. E. E. 484; Manly
V. Gibson. 13 111. 312; Peck v. Prov.
Steam Engine Co.,8E. L353; Noyes
v. Ward, 19 Conn. 250 (1848).
CH. XIII.] DEDICATION OF PEOPERTY TO PUBLIC USB. § 217
ways qualified ; as, for example, as to the nature and extent of
the use to which the land shall be put, as for a common or a
market place, or public square.^ A dedication may be made
presently to operate in the future,^ and maj- be made, in the
absence of legislation, subject to express conditions.* The
only limitation, of the power of an owner of property to make
a dedication of his property to public use, is to be found in the
fact that he is not able to confer upon any county, or other ex-
traneous corporation the control of the streets in a city, which
he opens up for the public use. The governmental control by
the municipal corporation, over the streets within its limits,
cannot in this way be interfered with by the term of the dedi-
cation.*
§ 217. General requisites of common law dedication. —
The power to make a common law dedication of lands to public
use is not ordinarily taken away by statutory provisions for
dedication of lands, where the statute does not expressly repeal
the prior common law method ; ^ so, that everywhere, as a gen-
eral rule, the common law dedication still exists, side by side
with any statutory dedication, which might be provided for by
the statutes of the State. Although,^n explaining the general
requisites of a statutory dedication, and the points of distinc-
tion between such dedication and the common law dedication,
a somewhat indirect explanation has been given of the requi-
sites of the common law dedication, it is necessary for the matter
to be presented directly.
Succinctly stated, it maybe declared, that the validity of the
common law .dedication does not depend upon the transfer of
the legal title of the owner of the land. The general rule is,
that the public acquires by the common law dedication nothing
1 Arkansas etc. Co. v. Sarrells,
(Ark.) 8 S. W. E. 683; Cummings v.
St. Louis, 90 Mo. 259; Hoboken v.
Pa. E. E. Co., 124 U. S. 636, 681; Ni-
agara Falls Susp. Br. Co. v. Bach-
man, 66 N. Y. 261 ; Tyler v. Sturdy,
108 Mass. 196; Hoboken Imp. Co. v.
Hoboken, 36 N. J. L. 340.
2 Forney v. Calhoun Co., 84 Ala.
215; 4 So. E. 1.53; Des Moines v.
Hall, 24 Iowa, 234.
" Frederick Co. v. Winchester, ( Va.
88) 4 S. E. E. 844 ; Port Huron v. Chad-
wick, 52 Mich. 320; Boughner v.
Clarksburg, 15 W. Va. 394; St. Louis
V. Meier, 77 Mo. 13; Los Angeles etc.
Co. V. Los Angeles, (Cal. 92) 30 Pac.
523.
« Derby v. Ailing, 40 Conn. 400;
Noblesville v. E. E. Co., (Ind. 92) 29
N. E. E. 484.
6 Penin I. & L. Co. v. Crystal Falls,
60 Mich. 510; Abbott v. Cottage
City, 143 Mass. 521; Sanborn v.
409
§217
MUNXCIPAIi CORPORATIONS.
[cH. xrii.
more than an easement.^ It is also not necessaiy to the vahd-
ity of a common law dedication, that there should be at the
time of the dedication any body corporate or other well defined
grantee in being.^ If there is a dedication to the public, such
as lands for use as streets or commons, or the like, before a mu-
nicipal corporation has been created, such public easement will
pass to the corporation whenever it is created by operation of
law.^ And even where the donee or transferee of the public
use has been named by the dedicator, trustees may be appointed
for the administration of the trust for the benefit of the public,
either by the action of the Legislature or by interference of a
court of equity.* But the dedication must be for a public use.
Although a dedication for the use of certain specific persons
may involve some indirect benefit to the public, as in the case
of a dedication to the use of a railroad, there is not such a dedi-
cation to the public, as would enable it to come within the
operation of the rules here laid down.^
To make a valid dedication, no deed or writing is required ;
a parol dedication is sufficient.*' But while a formal convey-
Minneapolis, 35 Min. 314; McClarley
V. Lemeunier, 40 La. An. 253; Wake-
man V. Wilber, 4]Sr. Y. S. 938; Browne
V. Bowdoinham, 71 Me. 144.
' Meier v. Portland, 19 Pac. R. 610;
Ellsworth V. Lord, 40 Minn. 337;
People V. Moore, 50 Han, 356; Du-
buque V. Malouey, 9 Iowa, 450; Kel-
sey V. King, 33 How. (^. Y.) Pr. 39;
Lahr v. Metrop. El. Ry. Co., 104 N.
Y. 268; lb., p. 291; Backus v. De-
troit, 49 Mich. 110; Scheimer v. Price,
65 Mich. 638; Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet.
(U. S.) 566; New Orleans v. United
States, 10 Pet. 662.
2 Winona V. Huff, 11 Minn. 119;
Pawlet V. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292; Doe
V. Jones, 11 Ala. 6:?; McConnell v.
Lexington Trs., 12 Wheat. 582; Du-
luth V. R. R. Co., (Minn. 92)51N.W.
1163; New Orleajis v. United States,
10 Pet. 661, 713; Atty. Gen. v. Ab-
bott, 154 Mass. 323.
3 Waugh V. Leech, 28 111. 488; San
Leandro v. Le Berton, 72 Cal. 170;
410
Doev. Jones, H Ala. 63; Klinkener
V. M'Keesport Sch. Dir., 11 Pa. St
444; Savannah v. Steamboat Co. of
Ga., R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) R. 242; Tay-
lor V. Phillipi, 35 W. Va. 554.
* Bryant's Lessee v. McCaudless,
7 Ohio, pt. 2, 135.
5 Talbott V. Richmond & D. R. R.
Co., 31 Gratt. 685; Illinois Ins. Co.
V. Littlefield, 67 111. 368.
« Hargro v. Hodgdon, 26 Pac. 1106;
Forney v. Calhoun Co., 84 Ala. 215;
Burnett v. Harrington, 7 S. W. R.
812; Singleton v. Sch. District, 10 lb.
793; Tick v. Vioksburg, 1 How.
(Miss.) 379 (1837) ; State v. Catlin, 3
Vt. 530; Post V. Pearsall, 22 Wend.
(N. Y.) 425, 454; Barclay v. Howell's
Lessee, 6 Pet. 493 ; Smith v. Navasota,
72 Tex. 422;Dummer v. Jersey City,
Spencer (20 N. J. L.) 86; Starr v.
People, (Col. 92) 30 Pac. 64; Hunter
V. Sandy Hill Trs., 6 Hill (N. Y.) 407;
Cook V. Harris, 61 N. Y. 448; Denver
V. Jacobsen, (Col. 92) 30 Pac. 246.
CH. Xril.J DEDICATION OF PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE. § 218
ance is not required to effect a common law dedication, yet
there must be a definite and certain description of the lands,
which are dedicated, and of the intention of the owner to dedi-
cate them.i Nor is it necessary that the public should have
possession of the lands so dedicated to them for any special
length of time. All that is required is the dedication of land
by its owner, which may be manifested not only by direct proof
of the same, but also by proof of his assent to the use of the
property by the public, and the actual enjoyment of thesame
by the public for a length of time, sufficient to huve created on
the part of the public such reliance upon the enjoyment of
such easement, as that the denial of such rights would now in-
terfere materially with the public convenience and with pri-
vate rights.^ The common law dedication does not operate
so much as a conveyance as an estoppel in pais, which prevents
the original owner from interfering with the continued enjoy-
ment by the public of the lands dedicated.^
§ 218. Who may dedicate. — The dedication of land to the
public use can only be made by the owner of the land, or by
the owner of an estate in such land.* It is not necessary that
the party dedicating the lands should have the legal title ;
iCummings v. St. Louis, 90 Mo.
259; Shreveport v. Dronin, (La.) 6
So. R. 656; Boughner v. Clarksburg,
15 W. Va. 394; Winuetka v. Trouty,
107 111. 218; Littler v. Lincoln, 106
111. 353.
2 Forney v. Calhoun Co., 86 Ala.
463; Cohoes v. D. & H. Can. Co., 31
N. E. R. 88Y; Jarvis v. Dean, 3 Bing.
447; State v. Catlin, 3 Vt. 530; Bar-
clay V. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 498;
Topeka v. Cowee, 29 Pac. 560; De-
mopolis V. Webb, 87 Ala. 659; Tolo
V. Barney, 79 Cal. 375 ; Weisbrod v.
Railroad Co., 18 Wis. 35; Chicago v.
Wright, 69 111. 328; Field v. Carr, 59
III. 197; Ragan v. McCoy, 29 Mo. 356;
Evansville v. Evans, 37 Ind. 229;
Fisher v. Beard, 32 Iowa, 346 ; Haynes
V. Thomas, 7 Ind. 38; Columbus v.
Dahn, 36 Ind. 330; Saulet v. New
Orleans, 10 La. An. 81 ; Boughner v.
Clarksburg, 15 W. Va. 394; Macon v.
Franklin, 12 Ga. 239; Smith v. Flora,
64 111. 93; Arrowsmith v. New Or-
leans, 24 La. An. 194; Peoria v.
Johnston, 56 111. 45 ; Mason v. City,
51 N. W. R. 770; Noyes v. Ward, 19
Conn. 250, 268; Commonwealth v.
Alburger, 1 Wliart. (Pa.) 469; Lee v.
Lake 14 Mich. 12; Baker v. John-
son, 21 Mich. 319.
8 Leonard's Heirs v. Baton Rouge,
(La.) 40 So. R. 241; Cincinnati v.
White's Lessee, 6 Pet. 431; Morgan
V. Chicago etc. Co., 96 U. S. 716;
Denver v. Jacobsen, 30 Pac. R. 246.
* Forney v. Calhoun Co., 84 Ala.
215; 4 So. 153; St. Louis v. Laclede
etc. Co., (Mo.) 9 S. W. R. 581; Eden-
ville v. C. Mete. Co., 77 Iowa, 69;
Warren v. Brown, 47 N. W. 632; Bau-
gan V. Mann, 59 111. 492; Lawe v.
Kaukauna, 70 Wis. 306; 35 N. W.
Rep. 561 ; Brunswick etc. Co. v. Way-
cross, (Ga. 92) 13 S. E. R. 835.
411
218
MUNICIPAL COKPOEATtONS.
[CII. XIII.
the owner of the equitable estate may exercise the right to
dedicate it, and the trustee, who merely owns the naked legal
title, cannot interfere with such dedication, but would be
required to maintain it ; and would, if he retained the legal
title, .serve as a trustee of such land for the public use, in the
place of the original cestui que trust. If the party dedicating
the land is the owner only of a particular estate, such dedica-
tion cannot interfere with the rights of the remainderman.!
So, also, will the donation of land by the owner in no way af-
fect the title of a mortgagee, or of purchasers at a sale under
the mortgage ; ^ or, as a general rule, with the wife's dower, al-
though in New York, Louisiana and elsewhere, it is held that
a certificate of renunciation by the wife of the dedicator is not
necessary to bar her dower right.^
A married woman can make a dedication of her land to
public use.* And the presumption of a dedication by long
user wil operate as well against a married woman.^ But she
alone can make an effective dedication of her own property.
The husband's dedication of her property is not binding upon
her.^
The dedication may be made hy an agent when duly author-
ized.'' And even where the dedication of the property by the
agent to public use has been without authority, the owner may
ratify such dedication by accepting its results, as where he adopts
the numbers of the lots as made by the agent in the platting
accepted by him, and by reference in the conveyance of these
lots to the recorded town plat and the public square.^
Where the will authorized the dedication of land to public
use, such dedication must be made by the executor or adminis-
1 Smith Lead. Cas. 95 ; Detroit v.
Det. & Milw. R. E. Co., 23 Mich. 173
(1871).
2 Moore v. Little Eock, 42 Ark. 66;
McSliane v. Moberly, 79 Mo. 41;
Smith V. Heath, 102 111. 130; People
y. Herbel, 96 111. 384.
8 Lawrence v. Jeff. Par. Pol. Jury,
35 La. An. 601 ; see Menkato v. Mea^
gher, 17 Minn. 265 ; see also, Gwynne
V. Cincinnati, 3 Ohio, 25 (1827) ; Moore
V. New York, 8 N. Y. 110.
4 Todd V. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C.
412
R. E. Co., 19 Oliio St. 514.
5 Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36
Pa. St. 29.
8 Indianapolis v. Patterson, 112 Ind.
344; Marshall v. Anderson, 78 Mo. 85.
' United States v. Chicago, 7 How.
(U. S.) 185; Barclayv. Howell'sLes-
see, 6 Pet. 498; Niagara Falls Susp.
Br. Co. V. Bachman, 66 N. Y. 261
(1876).
« Brown v. Manning, 6 Ohio, 298
(1834).
CH. XIII.] DEDICATION OF PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE. § 219
trator.^ And so, likewise, may there be dedications of lands by
the State government,^ or by the United States government.^
And there may also be a dedication of lands to public use by
railroad companies,* and by any other corporation, such as a
canal company.^
§ 219. Intention to dedicate, how established. — In order,
however, that any dedication of public lauds might prove ef-
fective, the intention on the part of the owner to so dedicate
his land must be established beyond reasonable doubt. And
unless such intention is established by competent evidence,
there is no valid dedication, and the public have nothing which
it can claim." It is not necessary to establish the intention to
dedicate by formal declarations of the owner ; but such inten-
tion may be as well established by parol evidence, proving dec-
larations or acts on the part of the owner of the lands, which
1 Earle v. New Brunswick, 38 N. J.
L. 47; Kaime v. Harty, 73 Mo. 316;
Logansport v. Dunn, 8 Ind. 378.
■iTerre Haute & I. E. E. Co. v.
Scott, 74 Ind. 29; May v. City, 17 N.
Y. S. 348; Matthiessen & H. Zinc Co.
V. La Salle, 117 111. 411; Eeilly v. Ea^
cine, 51 Wis. 526.
estate V. Woodward, 23 Vt. 92;
Macon V. Franklin, 12 Ga. 239; Wells
V. Pennington, (S. D.) 48 N. W. 305;
Boston V. Lecraw, 17 How. {U.S.) 426.
* Williams v. N. Y. & N. H. E. E.
Co., 39 Conn. 509; Brunswick etc.
Co. V. Waycross, (Ga. 92) 13 S. E. E.
835.
^Niagara Falls Susp. Br. Co. v.
Bachman, 66 N. Y. 261; Green v.
Canaan, 29 Conn. 157; San Francis-
co V. Calderwood, 31 Cal. 585 ; Grand
Surrey Canal Co. v. Hall, 1 M. & Gr.
392 ; Lamar County v. Clements, 49
Tex. 347.
« State V. Adkins, 42 Kan. 203;
Campbell v. Karr, 20 111. App. 305;
State V. McCabe, 43 K. W. E. 322, 74
Wis. 481; Fisk v. Havana, 88 111. 208;
Grube v. Nichols, 36 111. 92 ; Chicago
V. Drexel, (111. 92) 30 N. E. E. 774;
Harding v. Hale, 61 111. 192; 111. Ins.
Co. V. Littlefield, 67 111. 308; Wragg
V. Penn. Tp., 94 HI. 11; Shellhouse
V. State, 110 Ind. 509, 513; Brooks v.
Topeka, 34 Kan. 277; Irwin v. Dix-
ion, 9 How. 10; St. Louis City v.
Wetmore, (Mo. 92) 19 S. W. E. 534;
Turner v. People's Ferry Co., 21
Fed. Rep. 91; Logansport v. Dunn,
8 Ind. 378; San Francisco v. Cana-
van, 42 Cal. 541; People v. Eeed,
(Cal.) 20 Pac. Eep. 708; Columbus v.
Dahn, 36 Ind. 330; Laraar County v.
Clements, 49 Tex. 347; Long worth v.
Cincinnati, 48 Ohio St. 637; Mander-
schid V. Dubuque, 29 Iowa, 73 ; De-
troit V. Det. & Milw. E. E. Co., 2:!
Mich. 173 ; Cincinnati v. White's Les-
see, 6 Pet. 435; Wilson v. Sexton, 27
Iowa, 15 ; Slireveport V. Dronin, (La.)
6 So. Eep. 656; McGehee v. Wood-
ville, 59 Miss. 648; Talbott v. Eich-
mond Co., 31 Gratt. 685; Vaughn v.
Lewis, (Va. 92) 15 S. E. R. 525; Pen-
nington V. Willard, 1 E. I. 93; West-
fall v. Hunter, 8 Ind. 174; Chicago
V. Johnson, 98 111. 618; Collins v. Ma-
con, 69 Ga. 542 ; Marion v. Skillman,
127 Ind. 130; Glenn v. Baltimore, 67
Md. 390; Price v. Breckenridge, 92
Mo. 378.
413
220
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[cH. xm.
are inconsistent with any other presumption than that he had
intended to make a dedication to public use. Thus, for exam-
ple, informal declarations of the owner of the soil will be ad-
missible to show a dedication.^ And very often the declaration
of a deceased surveyor, who had been employed to make the
survey, will be admissible to establish the intention to dedicate
the land to public use.^ On the other hand, parol evidence
is admissible to prove acts and circumstances surrounding the
land, and the parties, which tend to establish the intention to
dedicate the land to the public use.^ Parol evidence is always
admissible to prove those facts which tend to establish such in-
tention. Where, however, there is a formal declaration on the
part of the owner of the land that the property has been dedicatr
ed to a public use, then parol evidence is not receivable for the
purpose of proving or establishing some counter intention of the
donor, or to modify or qualify in any way the declared inten-
tion of the donor.* But where the statements and declarations
are ambiguous, then parol evidence is admissible to explain or
establish more plainly, what the intention of the donor was.'
§ 220. Presumption of intention from long user. — The
intent to dedicate property to public use will also be presumed
against the owner of the land, from the fact that the pub-
lic have for a long time had the use of such land, and that
the owner of the land had acquiesced in its public use for a
1 Denver v. Jacobsen, (Col. 92) 30
Pac. 246; Starr v. People, (Col. 92) 30
Pac. E. 64; Evans v. Evansville, 37
Ind. 229; McKee v. Perchment, 69
Pa. St. 342; Nixon v.Bilaxi, o So. E.
621; McKee v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 184;
Buchanan v. Curtis, 25 Wis. 99.
- Birmingham v. Anderson, 40 Pa.
St. 506; Barclay v. Howell's Lessee,
6 Pet. 498.
3 Denver v. Jacobsen, ( Col. 92 ) 30
Pac. E. 246; State v. Woodward, 23
Vt. 92; Smith v. State, 23 N. J. L.
712, 725; 111. Ins. Co. v. Littlefleld,
67 111. 368; Quinn v. Anderson, 70
Cal. 454; Lee v. Lake, 14 Mich. 12;
Stuyvesant v. Woodruff, 21 N. J. L.
145; Mayo v. Murchie, 3 Munf. (Ya.)
358; Abbott v. Mills, 3 Vt. 521; Ni-
414
agara Falls Susp. Br. v. Buchanan,
66 N. T. 261 ; Aiken T. C. v. Lythgoe,
7 Eich. Law. 435 ; Princeville v. Au-
ten, 77 111. 325 ; Shreeveport v. Dro-
nin, (La.) 6 So. E. 656; Common-
wealth v. Alburger, 1 Whart (Pa.)
469; State v. Wilkinson, 2 Vt. 480.
* Smith V. Navasota, 72 Tex. 222;
Lebanon v. Warren Co. Com'rs, 9
Ohio, 80; Princeville v. Auten, 77
111. 325; Indianapolis v. Cross, 7
Ind. 9.
^ Shreeveport v. Dronin, supra;
Fassion v. Landrey, ( Ind. 90 ) 24 N.
E. E. 96; Harris County v. Taylor,
58 Tex. 690; Hickerson v. Mexico,
58 Mo. 61; Grandville v. Jennison,
86 Mich. 567; San Francisco v. HolU-
day, 76 Cal. 18.
CH. XIII.] DEDICATIOK OF PKOPEETY TO PUBLIC USE. § 220
certain length of time. That presumption will not ordinarily
arise simply from the fact of long user ; additional facts would,
as a rule, be required to establish from long user the intention
to dedicate.! But where the evidence simply establishes a long
user without the accompanying circumstances, which are need-
ed to support the presumption of an intention to dedicate ;
then, in order that the public may claim the right to such ease-
ment over the land in question, the public use must have been
maintained without interruption for the period of time which
the Statute of Limitations requires in ordinary actions, and
which by analogy is required for the creation of a prescriptive
right. For, under these circumstances, the public can only
claim the right to such public use of the land by prescription.^
But where the facts of the case, iu addition to long user, are
sufficiently strong, with the long user, to support the presump-
tion of an intention to dedicate the land for public use, then
the intent to so dedicate the laud will be proven by a public
use of such land, for a period less than that which is required
to support the claim as a prescriptive right. Under these cir-
cumstances, the intention to dedicate is established without
proof of a prescription.^ No particular time, during which the
■ In re Hand, 52 Hun, 206; Smith
V. State, 23 N. J. L. 130; Shawan-
gunk Kill Br., In re, 100 N. Y. 642;
Talbot V. King, 32 W. Va. 6; 9 S. E.
R. 48; Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick.
(Mass.) 511; Talbottv. Grace, SOInd.
389; Hope v. Barnett, 78 Cal. 9; Co-
hoes V. D. & H. Co., 31 N. E. K. 887;
McHey v. Hyde Park, 37 Fed. 389;
Smith V. Gardner, 12 Oreg. 221; On-
stott V. Murray, 22 Iowa, 457 ; Peo-
ple v. Davidson, 21 Pac. K. 538; 79
Cal. 166; Keyes v. Tait, 19 Iowa, 123;
Detroit v. Det. & Milw. E. E. Co.,
23 Mich. 173; Manderschid v. Du-
buque, 29 Iowa, 73.
2 Penin etc. Co. v. Crystal Falls, 60
Mich. 510; Peri-y v. New Orleans, M.
& C. E. E. Co., 55 Ala. 413; Kranz v.
Baltimore, 64 Md. 491; Oelet v. New-
port Bd. of Aid., 14 E. I. 295; Ells-
worth V. Lord, 40 Minn. 337; Bush v.
Johnson, 23 Pa. St. 209; Childs v.
Nelson, 69 Wis. 125; Sherman v.
Kane, 86 N. Y. 57; Eulaud v. South
Newmarket, 59 N. H. 291; McAllister
V. Pickup, (Iowa, 92) 50 N. W. E.
556; Smith v. Inge, 80 Ala. 283; Peo-
ple V. Blake, 60 Cal. 497; Getchell v.
Benedict, 57 Iowa, 121; Bales v. Pig-
eon, 129 Ind. 548; Visalia v. Jacobs,
65 Cal. 434; Stewart v. Frick, 94 N.
C. 487 ; see San Francisco v. Canavan,
42 Cal. 541 ; Ely v. Parsons, 55 Conn.
83 ; Steele v. Sullivan, 70 Ala. 589.
" New Orleans v. United States, 10
Pet. 661, 722;Weisbrod v. Chicago &
N. W. Ky. Co., 18 Wis. 35; Pella v.
Scholte, 24 Iowa, 283; City Cem.
Assoc. V. Meninger, 14 Kans. 312;
Mason v. City, 51 N. W. E. 770;
Smith V. Inge, 80 Ala. 283; Faust v.
Huntington, 91 Ind. 493; Grandville
v. Jennison, 86 Mich. 567; Shea v.
Ottumwa, 67 Iowa, 39; McKenna v.
Boston, 131 Mass. 143 ; Irwin v. Dix-
415
§221
MUNICIPAL COBPOKATIONS.
[CH. XIII.
land is used by the public, is necessary to establish the fact of
dedication ; aud the fact may be established independently of
any user by the public in every respect, except so far as such
use is needed to indicate the acceptance of such a dedication.
But, for that purpose, the actual occupation of the land in the
enjoyment of the public purpose or public use even for an in-
stant of time is deemed to be sufficient.^ The user by the pub-
lic must also be shown to have been had with the owner's
knowledge.^ On the other hand, while user is a very strong
circumstance in support of the intention to dedicate, nonuser
is not conclusive, although very important evidence against the
rights of the public.^
In line with the general principles here laid down, it has
been held that the actual widening of the street by the abutting
owner and the removal of the fence so as to secure the addi-
tion to the width of the street sufficiently establishes tlie inten-
tion to dedicate ; and the owner of the property cannot thereafter
restore the old boundary of the street, upon showing that the
original survey of the street made the boundary line different
from what had been long regarded as the true line.*
§ 221. Platting and sale of lots as evidence of intention.
— While a survey of the land into lots and the preparation of
iou, 9 How. 10; Cincinnati Trs. v.
White's Lessee, 6 Pet. 431; Griffin's
Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 150; State v.
Wilkinson, a Vt. 480; Marcy v. Tay-
lor, 19 111. 634; Grube v. Nichols,
36 111. 93; Hoolev. Attorney General,
22 Ala. 190; Evansville v. Paige, 23
Ind. 525.
1 Woody erv. Haddeu, 5 Taunt. 126,
pej'Chambre, J.; 2 Smith Lead. Cas.
176.
2Durgin v. Lowell, 3 Allen, 398;
Kleurs v. Town of Walnut Lake,
(Minn. 93) 53 M. V. R. 703; Ger-
berling v. Wunnenberg, 51 Iowa,
125; McHey v. Hyde Park, 37 Fed.
389; Wilson v. Sexon, 27 Iowa, 15;
State V. Kan. City, St. J. & C. B. K.
E. Co., 45 Iowa, 139; Topeka v.
Cowee, 29 Pac. R. 560; Roberts v.
Karr, 1 Campb. 262; Schoonmaker
416
V. Ref. Prot. Dutch Church, 5 How.
(N. Y.) Pr. 265; People v. O'Keefe,
79 Cal. 171 ; Skeen v. Lynch, 1 Eob.
(Va.) 186, 194.
" Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet
498; Grand ville v. Jennison, 86 Mich.
567; 84 lb. 54; Travis Co. v. Chris-
tian, (Tex. 93) 21 S. W. E. 119.
4 Hart V. Bloomtleld Tp., Trs., 15
Ind. 226; Barlington v. Common-
wealth, 41 Pa. St. 63; Ellsworth v.
Lord, 40 Minn. 337; State v. Jersey
City, 40 N. J. L. 483. But see Balti-
more V. White, 62 Md.362; Eozell v.
Andrews, 103 N. Y. 150, which hold
that the mere removal of the fence,
without the acceptance by the public,
does not constitute a dedication.
See also Smith v. State, 26 N. J. L,
705.
OH. XIII.] DEDICATION OP PEOPERTY TO PUBLIC USB. § 221
a map, describing or setting out streets and squares and the
like, will not of itself constitute a dedication, binding upon the
donor ; ^ yet, if after such a survey and platting of the land, lots
are sold and described as bounded by those streets and squares,
the facts, thus described as existing, will be suf33eient, certainly
as between the grantor and grantee of the lots, to amount to
an immediate and absolute dedication of the streets.^ And
where the platting, as a whole, is considered as indicating the
condition of the town and of the adjoining lots, as an induce-
ment to a purchaser of a particular lot, the purchaser's right
1 People V. Eeed, 81 Cal. 70; 22
Pac. E. 474; United States v. Chi-
cago, 7 How. (U. S.) 185, 196; but
see Moore v. Little Rock, 42 Ark. 66.
2 Gormley v. Clark, 134 U. S. 338;
Taylor v. PMllipi, 35 W. Va. 554;
San Leandro v. Le Breton, 72 Cal.
170; Duluth v. St. Paul etc. Co., 51
K W. E. 1163; Hurley v. Miss. &
Rum River B. Co., 34 Minn. 143;
Hobson V. Monteith, 15 Greg. 251;
Campbell Co. Court v. Newport, 12
B. Mon. (Ky.) 538; Dobson v. Hoben-
adel, 30 W. N. C. 54; Dubuque v.
Maloney, 9 Iowa, 450; Pope v. Union,
18 N. J. Eq. 282; Middleton v. Whar-
ton, 41 Minn. 266; White Bear v.
Stewart, 40 Minn. 284; McKemia v.
Lancaster Dist. E. Comm'rs, Harper
(S. C.) Law, 381 ; Wolf v. Brass, 72
Tex. 133; White v. Cower, 4 Paige
(N. T.) 510; Memphis & St. L. Packet
Co. V. Grey, 9 Bush (Ky.) 137, 146
(1872); Schneider v. Jacob, (Ky.) 5
South West. Eep. .350; Giffen v. 01a-
the, 24 Pac. R. 470; WicklifCe v. Ma-
gruder, (Ky. 90) 13 S. W. R. 523;
Heitz V. St. Louis, 19 S. W. R. 735 ;
Campbell v. Kansas City, (Mo. 90)
13 S. W. E. 897; Aiken T. C. v. Lyth-
goe, 7 Rich. (Law) 435; Cook v.
Burlington, 30 Iowa, 94; Furman
Street, In re, 17 Wend. 649 ; Living-
ston V. New York, 8 Wend. 85 ; Ar-
rowsmith v. New Orleans, 24 La. Ad.
194; Hicklin V. McLear, 18 Or. 126;
27
Eureka v. Armstrong, 83 Cal. 623
In re North 3d Ave., 3 N. Y. S. 641
Lake View v. Lebahn, 120 111. 92
Preston v. Navasota, 34 Tex. 684
Hannibal v. Drop, 15 Mo. 634; Doe
V. Attica, 7 Ind. 641, 644; Tinges v.
Baltimore, 51 Md. 600; Vicksburg
V. Marshall, 59 Miss. 563 ; Meth. E.
Oh. V. Hoboken, 33 N. J. L. 13; State
V. Elizabeth, 37 lb. 434; Lamar v.
Clements, 49 Tex. 347; Harrison v.
Seal, (Miss.) 5 So. Rep. 622; Shea v.
Ottumwa, 67 Iowa, 39; Stephenson
V. Chattanooga, 20 Fed. Rep. 586;
Smith v. Portland, 30 lb. 734; Pearl
Street, In re. 111 Pa. St. 565; Chapin
v. Brown, 15 E. I. 579; Fisher v.
Beard, 32.Iowa, 346; Wiggins v. Mc-
Cleary, 49 N. Y. 346; Brown v. Man-
ning, 6 Ohio, 298; Smith v. Lock, 18
Mich. 56; Union Co. v. Peckham, (E.
L) 12 At. Eep. 130; Steele v. Sulli-
van, 70 Ala. 589; Kittle v. Pfeiffer,
22 Cal. 490; McKee v. Perchment,
69 Pa. St. 342; State v. 111. Cent. E.
R. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 730, 752; Fes-
sion V. Landrey, 24 N. E. R. 96; Wil-
loughby V. Jenks, 20 Wend. 96; Os-
wego v. Osw. Canal Co., 6 N. Y. 257;
Davis V. Sabita, 63 Pa. St. 90; Lamar
V. Clements, 49 Tex. 347; Heselton
V.Harmon, (Me.) 18Atl. E. 286; Peo-
ple V. Lamblier, 5 Denio, 9, 19; Wy-
man v. New York, 11 Wend. 487;
Livingston v. New York, 8 Wend.
85.
417
221
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. xni.
to the existence and use of the street extends to the entire land,
which has been platted ; and he has a right to insist upon hav-
ing all the streets, set out upon such plat, remain open for the
use of the public.^ Of course, where the plat shows an alley
to be a private one, while the rights of the purchasers of lots
are practically the same, }'et there will in this case be no dedi-
cation of the alley to public use.^ But, generally, the platting
of land, and the sale of lots with reference to such plat, will
operate as a binding dedication to the public use, not only in
favor of the purchaser of the lots, but, likewise, in favor of
the public ; the right of the public in the land so dedicated to
public use is irrevocable.^
In order to raise the implication, and to support the intention,
to dedicate lands to public use by platting the same, there must
be affirmative evidence, upon the face of the plat, of an intention
to make such dedication, in order that the mere platting of the
land may serve such a purpose. The mere fact, that there is a
blank space, without any mark indicating the use to which such
land may be put, will not indicate any intention of dedicating
such blank space, to a public use as a public square.* It is also
held that there has been no dedication, where there is simply a
water street, with an open space on the riverside unmarked.^
1 White V. Flaunigan, 1 Md. 525,
540; Griffiths V. Galindo,86 Gal. 192;
Rowan v. Portland, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.)
232; Winona v. Huff, 11 Minn. 119;
Dubuque v. Maioney, 9 Iowa, 450;
Hitchcock V. Oberlin, (Kan. 90) 26
Pac. 466; Huber v. Gazley, 18 Ohio,
18; Thomson v. McCormick, 26 N.
E. E. 373 ; Logansport v. Dunn, 8 Ind.
378; Underwood v. Stuyvesant, 19
Johns. 186.
2 Dexter v. Tree, 117 111. 532.
3 Arrowsmith v. New Orleans, 24
La. An. 194; Parsons v. Atlanta Univ.
Trs., 44 Ga. 529; Sherer v. Jasper,
9 So. 584; Darker v. Beck, 11 N.
Y. S. 94; Heselton v. Hannon, 14
Atl. R. 286; Hawley v. Baltimore, 33
Md. 270; Detroit v. Det. & Milw. R.
R. Co., 23 Mich. 173; Evans v. Evans-
ville, 37 Ind. 229; Hall v. Baltimore,
56 Md. 187; West Gov. v. Freking, 8
418
Bush (Ky.) 121; State v. Chase, 42
Mo. App. 343. But see Gilder v.
Brenham, 67 Tex. 345 ; Galveston v.
Williams, (Tex.) 6 S. W. Rep. 860;
where it is held that the city cannot
acquire any rights until acceptance;
see, also, post, § 222, 223.
*New York v. Stuyvesant, 17 N.
Y.34; Oswald V. Grenet, 15 Tex. 118.
See generally, Yates v. Judd, 18 Wis.
118; Hogue v. Albina, (Or. 90) 25
Pac. 386; Saulet v. New Orleans, 10
La. An. 81; Municipality v. Palfrey,
7 La. An. 497; Hanson v. Eastman,
1 Minn. 509; Barclay v. HoweU's
Lessee, 6 Pet. 498.
5 Reid V. Edina Bd. of Ed., 73 Mo.
295; New Albany v. WilUams, 126
Ind. 1; Burbach v. Schweinler, 56
Wis. 386; Central Land Co. v. Provi-
dence, 15 R. L 246.
CH. XIII.] DEDICATION OF PROPERTY TO PTTBLIC USE. § 222
On the other hand, a different ruling is maintained, where both
lines of the water street are defined and the width indicated.^
Of course, where the parties expressly reserve on the map cer-
tain spaces from public use, or mark such space by the word
" reserved," as in the case of a landing on the water front, the
intention to dedicate such landing to the public use is com-
pletely rebutted.2
The construction of the legal effect of a plat is also a ques-
tion for the court.^ And if erasures are discovered upon such
map or plat, parol evidence is admissible for the purpose of ex-
plaining it.*
§ 222. A dedication irrevocable when accepted. — As long
as a dedication of land to public use has not been accepted,
either by the public or by private individuals, through the pur-
chase of lots, described as bound by such streets, such dedication
may be revoked by the dedicator.^ But this is not a uniform
rule ; for it has been held that, if the dedication has been made
by a map and platting of the ground, the dedication is complete
and cannot be thereafter revoked, although it has not been ac-
cepted.^ Where, however, there has been an acceptance or ac-
tual user of the land dedicated, then the dedication becomes
' Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6
Pet. 498; United States v. Chicago,
7 How. 185 ; Columbiis v. Dahn, 36
Ind. 330; People v. Klumpke, 41
Cal. 263; Commonwealth v. Albur-
ger, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 469; Common-
wealth V. McDonald, 16 Serg. &
Rawle, 390; Penny Pot Landing
Case, 16 Pa. St. "79; Penin. v. N". T.
Central R. R. Co., 36 N. T. 120; Grant
V. Davenport, 18 Iowa, 179; Cowles
V. Gray, 14 Iowa, 1 ; Newport v. Tay-
lor'sEx., 16B. Mon. (Ky.) 699; Cook
V. Hillsdale, 7 Mich. 115; Baker v.
Johnston, 21 Mich. 319; Van Valken-
burgh V. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 338;
Field V. Carr, 59 111. 198; McLaugh-
lin V. Stevens, 18 Ohio, 94.
2 Grant V. Davenport, 18 Iowa, 179;
Cowles V. Gray, 14 Iowa, 1.
' Hanson v. Eastman, 21 Minn.
509; State Hist. Assoc, v. Lincoln,
14 Neb. 336.
* Smith V. Portland, 30 Fed. Rep.
734.
5 Trustees of First Ev. Church v.
"Walsh, 57 111. 370; Schmitz v. Ger-
mantown, 31111. App. 284; Winuetka
V. Prouty, 107 HI. 218; Littler v.
Lincoln, 106 111. 353 ; San Francisco
V. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541; Warren v.
Brown, 47 N. W. R. 633; Baker v.
Johnston, 21 Mich. 319; Cass Co. v.
Banks, 44 Mich. 467; Perry v. New
Orleans, M. &. C. R. R. Co., 55 Ala.
413; Tillman v. People, 12 Mich.
401; Logan v. Rose, 88 Cal. 263;
Stone V. Brooks, 35 Cal. 489; Han-
son V. Eastman, 21 Minn. 509; Hol-
dane v. Cold Springs, 21 N. Y. 474.
6 Meth. E. Ch. v. Hoboken, 33 N.
J. L. 13; Cook v. Burlington, 30
Iowa, 94; Stone v. Brooks, 35 Cal.
489.
419
§223
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. xiir.
irrevocable.-' Bnt a dedication of a tract of land is not affected
by the fact, that only a part of such land has been devoted to
the intended public use, while the rest of such land is tempora-
rily leased to private individuals.^ So, on the other hand, will
the claim of the public to lands, which have been dedicated, be
effected by proceedings begun by the corporation for the con-
demnation of the land, or for taxing the laud for city or countj''
purposes, under the mistaken impression that the city had no
claim to such land.* But if the corporation has accepted a ded-
ication of property to public use, the dedicator and the city
may combine to revoke such dedication and acceptance, pro-
vided third persons have not acquired vested rights therein,
through the purchase of lots bound by the land dedicated to
public use.*
§ 223. Effect of acceptance Apart from the effect of ac-
ceptance in making a dedication irrevocable, the further conse-
quence of the etsistence or absence of the act of acceptance,
is that in order that the municipality may be charged with the
duty of repairing and keeping in proper condition the lands so
dedicated to public use, and be liable to injuries incurred by in-
dividuals, while making use of such land, there must be an accept-
ance of the dedication by the duly authorized agents or officers
of the corporation. It is not necessary that this acceptance
should appear as a matter of record, or be made bj^ an ordinance ;
but it may be implied from the making or ordering of repairs by
the proper officers.^ Or it may be implied, where such repairs
1 Crockett V. Boston, 5 Cusli. (Mass.)
182; Baker V. Johnston, 21 Mich. 319;
Long V. Battle Creek, 39 Mich. 323.
2 Plaquemines Par. Pol. Jury v.
Foulhouze, 30 La. An., part I. 64.
3 Lemon V. Hayden, 13 Wis. 159;
Chicago Y. Wright, 69 111. 328.
' Municipality v. Levee, S. C. P.
Co., 7 La. An. 270.
^In re Com'rs of Parks, 53 Hun,
556; Hobbs v, Lowell, 19 Pick. (Mass.)
415; Teagarden v. McBean, 33 Miss.
383; Gedge v. Commonwealth, 9
Bush(Ky.) 61; Cohoes v. D. & H.
Can. Co., 31 N. B. R. 887; Dayton v.
Rutland, 84 111. 279; s. c, 25 Am.
Rep. 457; Com. v. Moorhead, 118 Pa.
420
St. 344; Osage v. Larkins, 19 Pac.
R. 658; Atty. Gen. v. Tarr, 148 Mass.
309; State v. Bradbury, 40 Me. 154;
State V. Wilson, 42 Me. 9; Illinois Ins.
Co. V. Littlefleld, 67 111. 368; Jersey
City V. State, 30 N. J. L. 531; Holmes
V. Jersey City, 12 N. J. Eq. 299; Mass.
V. Springfield, 14 S. W. R. 630; Boo-
raem v. North Hudson County Ey.
Co., 39 N. J. Eq. 465; Tower v. Rut-
land, 56 Vt. 28; Oswego v. Osw. Ca-
nal Co., 6 N. Y. 257; Niagara Falls
Susp. Br. Co. V. Baohman, 66 N. T.
261; Gilder v. Brenham, 67 Tex.
345; Kennedy v. Cumberland, 65
Md. 514; Bartlott v. Beardmore, 77
Wis. 356; Parsons v. Atlanta Univ.
CH. XIII.] DEDICATION OF Pr.OPBRTY TO PUBLIC USE. § 223
have been made and subsequently paid for by the authorities,
■which had the legal power to accept such street or highway.^
The fact, that a dedication of land to the public is a beneficial
one, will support the presumption of an acceptance, and dispense
with any further direct or other proof of such acceptance.^
The acceptance of a plat, describing streets, etc., when done
by the proper authorities, was held a sufficient acceptance of
the dedication to bind a corporation.^ So, also, has it been
held to be sufficient proof of acceptance of a street for a town
council to direct a well to be dug therein.* Other similar acts
on the part of the corporation would be equivalent to an ac-
ceptance of the dedication.^ But, in oi-der that the acceptance
may be proven by implication from dealings with the property
dedicated, the officer so using or dealing with the property
dedicated must have the power, under the municipal chartei',
to accept the dedication. Thus, it was held tiiat a surveyor,
who had no power to accept a dedication, could not by the re-
pairs of the land so dedicated, bind the corporation to the legal
effect of an acceptance.^
Where the State dedicates lands to city purposes, there is
never any occasion for proof of acceptance by the city ; for
the act of dedication is likewise an acceptance of the same by
Trs., 44 Ga. 529; Wilson v. Hull, 24
Pac. K. "799; Commonwealth v. Bel-
den, 13 Met. (Mass.) 10; Jennings v.
Tisbury, 5 Gray (Mass.) 73; Folsom
V. Underbill, 36 Vt. 580; Gardner v.
Johnston, (R. I.) 12 Atl. Rep. 888;
Kelly's Case, 8 Gratt. 632; State v.
Carver, 5 Strob. (S. C.) 217; Abbott
V. Cottage City, 143 Mass. 521 ; Bow-
man V. Boston, 5 Cush. 1 ; Hyde v.
Jamaica, 27 Vt. 443.
• Jennings v. Tisbury, 5 Gray, 73;
Hayden v. Attleborough, 7 Gray, 338 ;
State V. Kew Boston, 11 N. H. 413;
Commonwealth v. Belden, 13 Met.
10; Hemphill v. Boston, 8 Cush. 195;
Manderschid v. Dubuque, 29 Iowa,
73.
2 Abbott V. Cottage City, 143 Mass.
521 ; Guthrie v. New Haven, 31 Conn.
308.
« Eequa v. Rochester, 45 K T. 129;
Niagara Falls Susp. Br. Co. v. Baoh-
man, 66 N. T. 261; Lake View v. Le
Bahn, 120111. 92; Baker v. Johnston,
21 Mich. 319; People v. Jones, 6
Mich. 467; Tillman v. People, 12
Mich. 401 ; Cass County v. Banks, 44
Mich. 467; State v. Chase, 42 Mo.
App. 343; Griffiths v. Galindo, 86
Cal. 192.
*Pope V. Union, 18 N. J. Eq. 282;
Aiken T. C. v. Lythgoe, 7 Rich. (S.
C.) Law, 435.
s Wayne etc. Bk. v. Stockwell, 84
Mich. 586; Baker v. Johnson, 21
lb. 319; Click v. Lamar Co., 79 Tex.
»217; Detroit v. Det. & Milw. R. R.
Co., 23 Mich. 173; Shortle v. Minne-
apolis, 17 Minn. 308; Emery v. Wash-
ington, 1 Brayton (Vt.) 128; Rose v.
St. Charles, 49 Mo. 509; Blodgett v.
Royalton, 17 Vt. 40.
6 State V. Bradbury, 40 Me. 154.
421
§224
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. xni.
the public. Or, rather, it would be better stated that, by the
act of dedication by the State, there was an overruling com-
mand for acceptance of such dedication, and of the obligations
dependent thereupon, by the city.^
In Iowa, the statute requires that the acceptance of lands
dedicated to the public, can only be made by ordinance ex-
pressly passed for that purpose.^
In accepting lands dedicated to public uses, it is not neces-
sary for the city to accept all or reject all ; part of the land
dedicated may be accepted and part rejected.^ In Michigan,
it has been held that there must be an acceptance within a rea-
sonable time, or otherwise the dedication will be presumed to
have been withdrawn.*
§ 224. Extent of common law dedication as respects
donor's title. — As a general proposition, in the absence of
statutes requiring the contrary, where lands are donated by
the owner for the public use by the common law dedication,
the donor is presumed to have intended to give a mere ease-
ment in favor of the public, and not the title in fee. In such a
oase, the owner is presumed to have intended to retain the title
to such land, the right to employ and make use of the land, in
every otiier way which does not conflict with the public ease-
ment thus created. As, for example, if there are minerals in
the soil, he has a right to mine such minerals, in the absence
of statutes controlling the same.^ This question, so far as it
1 Eeilly v. Eacine, 51 Wis. 526.
2 Laughlin v. Washington, 63 Iowa,
652.
8 Bell V. Burlington, 68 Iowa, 296.
4 Cass Co. V. Banks, 44 Mich. 467,
citing Baker v. Johnston, 21 Mich.
319; Wayne Co. v. Miller, 31 Mich.
447; White v. Smith, 37 Mich. 291.
But see Price v. Breckenridge, 92
Mo. 378; Barclay v. Howell's Les-
see, 6 Pet. 512; Borrowman v. Mitch-
ell, 2 Up. Can. Q. B. 135.
= Hobsonv. Monteith, 14 Pac. R.
740; Pomeroy v. Mills, 3 Vt. 279; Ab-
bott V. Mills, lb. 521; Des Moines v.
Hall, 24 Iowa, 234; White v. Godfrey,
97 Mass. 472; Bliss v. Ball, 99 Mass.
597; Brakkeu v. Minneapolis & St. L.
422
By. Co., 29 Minn. 41; Baker v. St.
Louis, 75 Mo. 671; Turner v. Hol-
land, (Mich.) 33 N. W. R. 383; Per-
ley V. Chandler, 6 Mass. 454; Boston
V. Richardson, 13 Allen, 152, 153;
Newington v. Jacobs, 25 L. T. (N.
S.) 800; Indianapolis v. Kingsbury,
101 Ind. 200; Lade v. Shepherd, 2
Stra. 1004; Dubuque v. Maloney, 9
Iowa, 450; Every v. Smith, 26 L. J.
Exch. 344; Perry v. New Orleans, M.
& C. R. R. Co., 55 Ala. 413; Stephen-
son V. Chattanooga, 20 Fed. Bep. 586;
Harrison v. Parker, 6 East, 154; Jack-
son V. Hathaway, 15 Johns. (N. Y.)
447; Dawes v. Hawkins, 4 L. T. (N.
S.) 288; Queen v. Plunkett, 21 Up.
Can. Q. B. 536.
OH. Xni.] DEDICATION OF PEOPEKTY TO PUBLIC USE. § 225
relates to streets will be more fully discussed in the chapter on
streets.-' Suffice it to say, that where there is a simple ease-
ment granted in the public streets, while the fee is retained by
the dedicator, lots which are bound by such streets extend their
boundary line to the middle of the street ; the grantee of the
abutting land takes to the center of the street subject to the
public easement.^ But where the dedication of the property
operates to pass the fee to the streets and alleys, the abutting
owner owns the edge of the street and cannot claim any pro-
prietary rights in the soil under the street.^ Although, in the
State in which the question arises, a dedication under statute,
or in other words, a statutory dedication, provides that the fee
shall pass to the streets and alleys ; yet, if the dedication in
the particular case is in some other way than that which is pre-
scribed by the statute, and can therefore only operate as a com-
mon law dedicator, the fee will in that case remain in the
dedicator or his grantees, and the easement for public use will
alone he created by the public*
§ 225. PuWiq right to alluvium and accretions. — If land
which is bounded by a river, is dedicated to the city for public
use, the city acquires by such dedication to the public use, the
rights and privileges of a riparian proprietor in respect to the
alluvium and accretions to such land.^ If, in such a case, a
street or public common lies along the stream, any accretion to
i§30l.
2 John and Cherry Streets, In re, 19
Wend. 659 ; In re Flick, (Pa. 92) 6 Gulp.
329; Lotz v. Heading I. Co., 10 Pa.
Ct. R. 497; Hollo way v. Southmayd,
18 ]Sr. Y. S. (92) 707; HoUoway v.
Delano, 28 Ab. N. C. 190; Stiles v.
Curtis, 4 Day (Conn.) 328; Bissell v.
Railroad Co., supra ; Sherman v. Mc-
Keon, 38 N. Y. 266; Bissell v. N. Y.
Central R. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 61; Co-
lumbus & W. Ry. Co. V. Witherow,
82 Ala. 190; Watkins v. Lynch, 71
Cal. 21; 11 Pac. R. 808; Ayres Penn.
E. Co., 20 Atl. R. 54; Penn. R. R. Co.
V. Pittsburgh Gr. Elev. Co., 50 Pa. St.
499; Willoughby v. Jenks, 20 Wend.
(N. Y.) 96; Wager v. Troy Union,
etc., E. E. Co., 25 N. Y. 526.
3 People V. Kerr, 27 N. T. 188;
Duyckruok v. New York, 125 N.
Y. 164; Clinton v. Cedar R. R. Co.,
24 Iowa, 455 ; Lindsay v. Omaha, 46
JT. W. 627; Moliter v. Sheldon, 87
Kan. 246.
*Warburton v. Demorett, 27 N. E.
E. 730; San Francisco v. Spring V.
W. W., 48 Cal. 493; Gebhardt v.
Reeves, 75 HI. 301; Silvey v. McCool,
86 Ga. 1; Dubuque v. Benson, 23
Iowa, 248.
*Kew Orleans v. United States,
10 Pet. 662; Hoboken v. Penn. R.
R. Co., 124 U. S. 656, 690; Trus-
tees V. School, 12 X. E. R. 243;
St. Louis V. Lemp, 6 S. W. R.
344; Turner v. Holland, (Mich.) 33
N. W. E. 383; Cox v. Louisville, N.
423
§225
municipaij corporations.
[CH. xni.
the shore, resulting from the operation of the water, will go to
the public ; and the private owners of lands, abutting on the
opposite side of the stream, will have no right to claim the
benefit of such accretions.^ Of course, in making a dedication
of lands fronting on a stream, the right to the soil under the
water may be reserved by the owner thereof.^ And so, also,
where the State is the owner of the land under water, the street
or public use in such lands cannot be dedicated by the riparian
proprietor, because he lias not the title to it ; and in case of
the filling up of such lands by natural accretion or deposit of
garbage and soil, the title to the land, thus formed, remains
in the State, in which it is already vested.^ But where the ri-
parian proprietor and not the State owns the submerged land,
and such riparian proprietor proceeds to fill in the land thus
submerged, with the extension of the water front and shore will
the public right to extend the street be recognized i. e., the
public easement over such land, by virtue of the dedication of
the land for the use of a street, will continue to extend indefi-
nitely out into the stream, in proportion to .formation of any
land on the shore by accretions.* So, also, where streets termi-
nate or border on navigable waters, whether they have been
A. & C. K. K Co., 48 lud. 178; Clarke
V. Providence, (R. I.) 15 Atl. R. 763;
Manley v. Gibson, 13 111. 312; Leon-
ard Heirs v. Baton Rouge, 4 So. E.
240; Cook v. Burlington, 30 Iowa, 94;
St. Paul & Pac. R. R. Co. v. Scliur-
meir, 7 Wall. 272, 289; Yates v. Mil-
waukee, 10 Wall. 497, 504; Euch v.
New Orleans, 43 La. An. 275 ; Tates
V. Judd, 18 Wis. 118; Elgin v. Beok-
with, 119 111. 367; Turner v. People's
Ferry Co., 21 Fed. Rep. 90; Illinois v.
Illinois Central R. R. Co., 33 Fed. Rep.
730; Martin v. Evansville, 32 Ind. 85.
' Potomac Steamboat Co. v. Upper
Pot. etc. Co., 109 U. S. 672.
2 New York v. Hart, 95 N. Y. 443,
452, 456.
^Hoboken v. Pennsylvania R. E.
Co., 124 U. S. 656.
< Illinois V. Illinois Cen. R. E. Co.,
33 Fed. 730; Barney v. Keokuk, 94
IJ. S. 324 ; Potomac Steamboat Co. v.
424
Up. Pot. Steamboat Co., 109 U. S.
672; Clarke v. Providence, (E I.) 15
Atl. E. 763; Morris Canal & B. Co. v.
Jersey City, 12 N. J. Eq. 252; Lock-
wood & N. Y. & N. H. R. E. Co., 37
Conn. 391 ; Campbell v. Laclede Gasl.
Co., 84 Mo. 352, 372; St. Louis v.
Eutz, 138 U. S. 226; Jersey City v.
Dummer, Spencer, 20 N. J. L. 106;
Louisiana Ice Co. v. New Orleans,
43 La. An. 217; The Hoboken Land
& Imp. Co. V. Hoboken, 36 N. J. Law,
540; Jersey City V. Morris Canal &
B. Co., 12 N. J. Eq. 547; New York,
L. E. & W. R. R. Co. V. Yard, 43 N.
J. L. 121; s. c, lb. 632; Eutz v. See-
ger, 35 Fed. 188; Cook v. Burlington,
30 Iowa, 94; Morris Canal & B. Co.
V. Central E. R. Co., 16 N. J. Eq.
419, 431 ; Jeremy v. Elwell, 5 OWo
Cir. 379; Steers v. Brooklyn, 101 >"•
Y. 51 ; Hoboken v. Pennsylvania R.
R. Co., 124 U. S. 656.
CH. Xlir.] DEDICATION OF PKOPEETY TO PUBLIC TTSE. § 226
established by condemnation, or by dedication, and whether the
fee to the land was acquired for public use in the city or in the
original proprietor ; in either case, the city has the power of
establishing on the water front, adjoining such streets, public
wharfs to be regulated by them ; and for the use of which they
may charge a reasonable wharfage.-' There exists, however,
under the adjudications, some doubt whether the public can
acquire land for a public landing, by way of implication or by
a common law dedication. While there can be no doubt that
there may be an express dedication of lands for such a purpose ;
yet, some of the cases maintain that there cannot be any im-
plied dedication of land for such a purpose, which is established
only by long user or acquiescence.^ But this is not generally
agreed to, and the contrary proposition is maintained by many
CHses,^ which hold that there may be a prescribed right, or a
common law implied dedication to use land as a public landing.
§ 226. Dedication to use as public squares. — Not only
may land be dedicated to public use as streets, which is the
more common case of dedication ; but, likewise, there may be
an effective dedication by the landowner of a part of his land
for use as a public square. And the fact of dedication for such
use maj' be established by the same evidence, and in the same
manner, as in the case of streets and highways. Thus, for
example, parties who buy lots which are marked out on a plat
1 Adams v. Ohio Falls Co., (Ind. 92)
31 N. E. E. 57; Barney v. Keokuk,
94 U. S. 324; Newport v. Taylor's
Ex., 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 699; McMurray
V. Baltimore, 54 Md. 104; Dugan v.
Baltimore, 5 Gill & J. 375; Godfrey
V. Alton, 12 111. 29; Alton v. 111.
Transp. Co., 12 111. 60; Haight v.
Keokuk, 4 Iowa, 199; Eowan's Ex.
V. Portland, 8 B. Mon. 253; Portland
& W. V. E. E. Co. V. Portland, 14
Oreg. 188; Newport v. Taylor's Ex.,
16 B. Mon. 700; Barney v. Baltimore,
1 Hughes C. C. 118; Coffin v. Port-
land, 11 Saw. C. C. E. 600; s. c, 27
Fed. Eep. 412.
2 State V. Wilson, 42 Me. 9 ; Pearsall
V. Post, 20 Wend. Ill; Littlefield v.
Maxwell, 31 Me. 184; Bethurse v.
Turner, 1 Me. 111.
* Abbott V. Cottage City, 143 Mass.
521; Municipality v. Kirk, 5 La. An.
34; Penny Pot Landing Case, 16 Pa.
St. 79; Coolidge v. Learned, 8 Pick.
505.
*Lee V. Mound Station, 118 111. 804;
Plumb V. Grand Eapids, (Mich.) 45
N. W. E. 1024; Huber v. Gazley, 18
Ohio, 18; Brown v. Manning, 6 Ohio,
298; Atty. Gen. v. Abbott, 154 Mass.
323; Daniels v. Wilson, 27 Wis. 492;
San Leandro v. Le Breton, 72 Cal.
170; Archer v. Salimas City, 93 Cal.
43; Kelly v. West Seattle, etc. Co.,
29 Pac. E. 1054; Baker v. Johnston,
21 Mich. 319; Smith v. Houston, 6
Ohio, 101; Abbott v. Cottage City,
143 Mass. 521; Abbott v. Mills, 3 Vt.
425
§ 226
MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS.
[CH. xni.
as bordering on a public square, and who purchase such lots
in reliance upon their proximity to the public square, acquire
the right to have such square opened and maintained ; and the
owner of the land which was described as being dedicated to
use as a public square or common, cannot inclose or take away
such land, from the use of the public and of the purchasers of
these lots.-' It has also been held that simply writing the word
" park " upon a block or map of the city, indicates a dedication
to public use for such a purpose ; and purchasers of adjoining
lots in reliance upon, or with reference to, such plat, will have
the power of compelling the donation of the land so described
to the use of the public as a park.^
To what use a public square may be put, will vary accord-
ing to the understanding of various communities, as to what
was the public intention, and what is proper. According to
some authorities, it is impossible for a public square to be used
for any pui'pose but as a place of public or common amusement ;
and it has been held that the courts may enjoin the erection
upon such public square or commons of any public buildings.^
But the general rule seems to be, that while it would be impos-
sible for the town to authorize the erection of private buildings
upon a public square or common, and if so authorized they may
be revoked as nuisances ; * yet, it is deemed generally to be ad-
missible for a public square to be used for the erection of a coun-
521; state v. Catlin, lb. 530; Pear-
sail V. Post, 20 Wend. Ill, 117; s. c,
22 Wend. 425, 433; Commonwealth
V. Eush, 14 Pa. St. 186; State v. Wil-
kinson, 2 Vt. 480; State v. Trask, 6
Vt. 355; Wateriown v. Coweu, 4
Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 510; Winona v.
Huff, 11 Minn. 119; Reynolds' Heirs
V. Stark Co. Com'rs, 5 Ohio, 204.
1 Laughlin v. Washington, 63 Iowa,
652; Cf. Clarke V. Providence, 15 Atl.
R. 763.
2 Price V. Plainfield, 40 X. J. L. 608;
Archer v. Salinas, 93 Cal. 43 ; May-
wood Co. V. Maywood, 118 111. 61.
But see Hennepin County Com'rs v.
Dayton, 17 Minn. 260, where it is
held that the words " county block,"
marked across a block on a town
426
plat, wer« not a sufficient dedication
under the statute of Minnesota.
s Prince ville v. Auten, 77 111. 325;
Cf. State V. Schweiekert, (Mo. 92) 195
S. W. E. 47.
i New Orleans v. United States, 10
Pet. 661, 725; State v. Woodward, 23
Vt. 92; Columbus v. Jaques, 30 6a.
506; State v. Atkinson, 24 Vt. 448;
Archer v. Salinas, 93 Cal. 43 ; Hutchin-
son V. Pratt, 11 Vt. 402, 423 ; Pomeroy
V. Mills, 3 Vt. 279; People v. Carpen-
ter, 1 Mich. 273; State v. Mobile, 5
Port. (Ala.) 279; Commonwealth v.
Rush, 14 Pa. St. 186; New Orleans v.
United States, 10 Pet. 661, 725, 735;
Cooper V. Alden, Han-ing. Ch.
(Mich.) 72.
CH. Xin.] DEDICATION OP PEOPEETY TO PUBLIC USE. § 226
ty or State public building, because the practice has been more
or less universal to locate the public buildings upon the public
squares.^ It has thus been held to be permissible for a public
square to be used for the location of a county court house and
jail; and, also, for the maintenance of hitching-posts and stand-
ing room on such square for farmers' horses.^ It has also been
questioned to what extent the county has any inherent right to
appropriate the use of a public square to county uses. The es-
tablishment of a custom to permit such use of a public square
is of course evidence of an original dedication to countj' as well
as to municipal uses ; but, in the absence of such established
practice or custom, the county has no more right than a private
individual to encroach upon the lands dedicated to the city for
public use as a square.^ In all cases, it is a question depend-
ent upon the laws and customs of the local community or State,
in which the question arises.* It has been held that a city has
the right to erect a public library building upon the said square,
it being held that such an appropriation of the public square
would still be for a public use and included in the purposes of
the dedication.^
The street or highway cannot be inclosed by the local au-
thorities, but a public square or common may be so inclosed,
where such inclosure is designed to provide for the better en-
joyment of the square as a place of amusement or recreation
for the public.^ It has also been held that it is possible for
a municipality to authorize the establishment of a street or
highway through a park; and that by so doing there has
not been any interference with the donation of that part of
' San Antonio v. Steinberg, (Tex.)
7 S. W. R. 754; Langley v. Gallipo-
lis, 2 Ohio St. 107, 110; Common-
wealth V. Bowman, 3 Pa. St. 202,
203.
2 Frederick Co. v. Winchester, (Va.)
5 So. E. Rep. 884. But see contra,
Samuel v. ]S'ash\^lle, 3 Sneed (Tenn.)
298.
' McCullough V. San Francisco
Board of Education, 51 Cal. 418;
Princeville v. Auten, 77 111. 325.
♦ Baker v. Johnston, 21 Mich. 319;
Baird v. Rice, 63 Pa. St. 489; State
V. Waddell, 52 N. W. E. 213; Com-
monwealth V. Bowman, 3 Pa. St.
202; Commonwealth v. Alburger, 1
Whart. 469.
* Riggs V. Detroit Board of Educa-
tion, 27 Mich. 262.
•■ Commonwealth v. Bowman, 3 Pa.
St. 202; Baird v. Rice, 63 Pa. St. 489;
Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11 Vt. 402,423;
Leftwich v. Placquemine, 14 La. An.
152; Baker v. Johnston, 21 Mich. 319;
Seguin v. Ireland, 58 Tex. 183; Lang-
ley V. Gallipolis, 2 Ohio St. 107.
427
227
MUNICIPAL COIiPOEATIONS.
[CH. xni.
the park for the public use as such.^ But this is not accepted
as a general doctrine ; on the contrary, it has been held else-
where that, without the consent of the adjoining lot owner,
the town could not lay out streets through the public park or
square, without being guilty of a diversion of the land from
the use to which the land was dedicated.^ The public may ac-
quire, however, a highway across a park or public square,
either by dedication, or by a user for the statutory period of
limitation.^ And if a street runs through the land when it was
dedicated to public use as a square, it is impossible for the citv
council to direct such street to be closed up.*
It has also been held that a town maj' grant to a railroad cor-
poration the right of establishing upon the commons of the
town a railroad depot.^
§ 227. Dedication to other pnlblic uses. — The dedication
of lands by private owners is not confined simply to use as a
public street or square ; but lands may be dedicated in writing
or parol to any other municipal, public, or charitable use ; and
be equally effective ; as, for example, dedication to the public
use for the erection of public buildings,^ for school purposes,'
for church squares or lots,^ for a burying ground,^ and for a
' Cohu V. Parcels, 72 Cal. 367.
2 Price V. Thompson, 38 Mo. 363;
Jacksonville v. Jacks. Ry. Co., 67
111. 540. In the latter case, Thorn-
ton, J., says: "What were the uses
and purposes intended? Streets and
puhlic squares are donated. Each
has a well-known and well-defined
meaning. The one was designed for
the purpose of travel, and the right
of passage over the streets in any
mode not to destroy their useful-
ness was given by the plat. The
square was intended for beauty and
adornment, and for the health and
recreation of the public. A dedica-
tion must always be construed with
reference to the object with which
it was made. The donors never
could have intended that this ground
should be used as a street."
8 Cohn V. Parcels, 72 Cal. 367;
Greene County v. Hufe, 91 Ind. 333.
428
1 Portland v. Whittle, 3 Oreg. 126;
see, also, Brooklyn Park Comm'rs
V. Armstrong, 45 X. Y. 234, 240.
5 Crawford v. Mobile & G. K. E.
Co., 67 Ga. 405. But see Barney v,
Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; State v. Wad-
dell, (Minn. 92) 52 N. W. E. 213.
6 Smith V. Heuston, 6 Ohio, 101;
lb. 298, 305 ; Reynold's Heirs v. Stark
Co. Comm'rs, 5 Ohio, 204.
' Klinkener v. School District, 11
Pa. St. 444.
^ Lennig v. Ocean City Assoc, 41
N. J. Eq. 24; Antones v. Eslava, 9
Port. (Ala.) 527; Hannibal v. Draper,
15 Mo. 634; Gumbert's App., 110 Pa.
St. 496. '
9 Post V. Pearsall, 22 Wend. (N.
Y.) 425, 454; Campbell v. Kansas
City, (Mo. 92) 13 S. W. E. 896; Wei-
senberg v. Truman, 58 Cal. 63; Wood
V. Macon & B. E. E. Co., 68 Ga.
539.
CH. XIII.J DEDICATION OF PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE. § 228
public mai'ket.i But in order that there may be a dedication
by any other means, except by a formal grant, it must be a ded-
ication to some public use ; otherwise the dedication is invalid.^
§ 228. Effect of misuser or abandonment of dedicated
lands. — Property which is unconditionally dedicated to the
public use in general, or to some particular use of the public,
will not revert to the original owner, except when the execu-
tion of such a use becomes impossible ; and when the city or
State makes an improper use of the land which has been dedi-
cated to the public, equity will, upon the interference by the
proper parties, prohibit such diversion of the land and compel
its devotion to the intended use.^ But whenever the applica-
tion of the land to the use, for which it was dedicated, becomes
impossible ; as, for example, where land had been dedicated for
a county-seat, and the county-seat was afterwards removed to
some other place, the right to the soil would necessarily revert
to the dedicator and his heirs and assigns.^ In the case of the
vacation of a street, the general rule of law provides that the
title to the abutting owners, extending to the center of the
street subject to the easement, such abutting owner will at
once acquire the absolute title to the land covered by the ease-
ment of the public.^ But, in Illinois, it has been held that, on
the vacation of a street, the land covered by such street reverts
to the original proprietor instead of the present owner of the
adjacent lots.^
1 President etc. v. Indianapolis, 12
Ind. 620; Dummer v. City, 1 N. J.
L. 86.
2 Todd V. Pittsburgh Ft. "W. & C.
R. E. Co., 19 Ohio St. 514; Ayres v.
Pa. R. E. Co., 48 N. J. L. 44; 57 Am.
Rep. 538; Mc Williams v. Morgan, 61
111. 89.
'Warren t. Lyons City, 22 Iowa,
351; Price v. Thompson, 48 Mo. 363;
Price V. Meth. E. Church, 4 Ohio,
514; Williams v. First Presbyterian
Soc, 1 Ohio St. 478; Webb v. Moler,
8 Ohio, 552; Campbell Co. Court v.
Newport, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 538; Au-
gusta V. Perkins, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.)
107; Brown V. Manning, 6 Ohio, 298;
Church V. Portland, 13 Oregon, 73;
Van Wert Board of Education v. Ed-
son, 18 Ohio St. 221; Coffin v. Port-
land, 11 Sawy. C. C. K. 600; s. c, 27
Fed. Rep. 412; Harris v. Elliott, 10
Pet. 25; Barclay v. Howell's Lessee,
6 Pet. 498, 507; Portland & W. V. R.
R. Co. V. Portland, 14 Oreg. 188.
* County of Kent v. Grand Rapids,
61 Mich. 144. But see contra, See-
bold V. Shitler, 34 Pa. St. 133.
6 Banks v. Ogden, 2 Wall. 57, 69;
Wallace v. Fee, 50 N. Y. 694; Weis-
bod V. Railroad Co., 18 Wis. 43.
5 Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 111. 301 ;
Zinc Co. V. La Salle, 117 111. 411.
But see contra, Day v. Schroeder, 46
Iowa, 546.
429
§ 229 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XIH.
§ 229. Alienation of dedicated lands. — It is manifest that
a municipal corporation has no implied authority to dispose of
lands which have been dedicated to it for the public benefit;
nor would such property be subject to sale for the payment
of the debts of the municipal corporation.^ Lands, which are
dedicated to the public use, are not even alienable, when on
account of the surrounding circumstances they become un-
suitable for the use to which they were dedicated. A sale of
such property by the municipal corporation can only be effected
by and with the consent of the dedicator or his representatives ;
for, otherwise, the fact that it becomes impossible to apply the
lands to the use for which they were dedicated, would cause a
reversion of the title of such land to the dedicator or his heirs.^
Lands are not even liable for the debts of a municipal corpora-
tion, where such lands are donated to use, as a market, even
where it has been granted to the corporation in fee, in exchange
for a square, by legislative authority, and which was originally
dedicated for use as a market place.^
This is the statement in regard to the power of a municipal
corporation to alien or dispose of property dedicated to pubhc
use through some implied power of such corporation. It is a
different and more difficult question to determine, how far and
when the Legislature of a State may authorize a municipal cor-
poration to dispose of property, which has been dedicated to it
for some public use. The general rule of constitutional limita-
tions will of course apply here, viz., to direct or authorize the
1 Xew Orleans v. United States, 10
Pet. 734; Haberman v. Baker, 128 N.
T. 253; Branliam v. San Jose, 24
Cal. 585; Los Angeles etc. Co. v. Los
Angeles, (Cal. 92) 30 Pac. R. 523;
Brooklyn Park Cora'rs v. Armstrong,
45 N. T. 234; Cummings v. St. Louis,
90 Mo. 259; Price v. Thompson, 48
Mo. 363; Hamilton v. Chicago etc.
Co., (111. 88) 15 N. E. B. 854; Mathews
V. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115 ; Cromwell
V. Conn. Brown Stone Q. Co., 50
Conn. 470; Arkansas K. P. Co. v.
Sarrells, (Ark.) 8 S. W. Rep. 683;
West Carroll Par. v. Gladdis, 34 La.
An. 928; Pickett v. Hastings, 47 Cal.
269; Rutherford v. Taylor, 38 Mo.
430
315; Commonwealth v. Alburger, 1
Whart. (Pa.) 469; San Francisco v.
Canavan, 42 Cal. 541 ; Frederick Co.
V. Winchester, (Va.) 4 S. E. E. 844;
Alves' Ex. v. Henderson, 16 B. Men.
(Ky.) 131, 168; Louisville v. Lieb-
friend, 17 S. W. E. 870; Police Jury
V. McCormack, 32 La. An. 624; Kau-
som V. Boal, 29 Iowa, 68; San Antonio
V. Lewis, 15 Tex. 388; School Dist.
No. 2 V. Hart, (Wyo. 92) 29 Pac. Kep.
741.
2 Van Wert Bd. of Ed. v. Edson, 16
Ohio St. 221; Sch. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hart, supra.
8 Indianapolis & B. R. B. Co. v. In-
dianapolis, 12 Ind. 620.
OH. XIII.] DEDICATION OF PEOPEETY TO PUBLIC USE. § 229
exercise of any power which is not prohibited by the constitu-
tion of the State or of the United States, expressly or by neces-
sary implication. Hence, wherever the municipal corporation
holds the full title to the ground which has been dedicated to
public use, instead of merely having the easement therein, the
Legislature may directly authorize the sale of such land.^ But
where the dedication has been made of simply an easement
therein; 2 and, also, for a specific and limited purpose, as, for
example, a public square ; then it is impossible, at least as held
by some of the courts, for any Legislature to authorize such
municipalitjr to sell the land so dedicated ; because such a sale
would be a violation of the special trust, which has been created
in favor of the public by the dedication of the land to the spe-
cific purpose.^
In Louisiana, by the Civil Law, in the case of land dedicated
to public use, the public acquire the title to the soil.* But not-
withstanding that fact, it is held that such laud did not con-
stitute a part of the public domain, and therefore cannot be
aliened or devoted to any other than the use to which it was
dedicated, except in the exercise of the right of eminent do-
main.^ But where public places or squares have been estab-
lished by public authoritj', then the power to control the dis-
1 Van Ness v. Washington, 4 Pet.
(U. S.) 232 (1830); Potomac Steam
Boat Co. V. Upper Potomac Co., 109
U. S. 672 (1883) ; Indianapolis & B. R.
R. Co. V. Indianapolis, 12 Ind. (520;
Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong,
3 Lans. (N. Y.) 429 (1871); s. c, 45 N.
Y. 234 (1871) ; Woodson v. Skinner,
22 Mo. 13 (1855) ; Carondelet v. Mc-
Pherson, 20 Mo. 192; Swartz v. Page,
13 Mo. 610; Les Bois v. Bramell, 4
How. (U. S.) 449, 458.
^ John and Cherry Streets, In re,
19 Wend. 659; Woodruff v. Neal, 28
Coun. 168 (1859).
' Warren v. Lyons City, 22 Iowa,
351 ; Gilman v. Milwaukee, 55 Wis.
328; Jacksonville v. Jacks. Ry. Co.,
67 111. 540; Stockton v. Newark, 42
N. J. Eq. (15 Stew.) 531. But the
last case was subsequently over-
ruled by Newark v. Stockton, 44 N. J.
Eq. 179, in which it was held that a
Legislature did have the right to au-
thorize the proliibition of the use of
laud as a burial ground, and devotion
of such land to other municipal uses,
although the title to such land had
been conveyed to the city for the pur-
pose of maintaining a burial ground.
Perhaps, in this case, the judgment
of the court had been mainly influ-
enced by the consideration of the
necessity of stopping or putting an
end to the use of the ground as a
burial ground, as an exercise of po-
lice power for the preservation of
public health.
* Renthrop v. Bourg, 4 Martin (La.)
97; Doe v. Jones, 11 Ala. 63, 83.
5 New Orleans v. United States, 10
Pet. 661, Y25, 835; 3 Kent Com. 451.
rtSl
§ 229 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. XIH.
position of such lands to other purposes of a public character
is in no wise limited by the consideration of the rights of own-
ers of the property abutting, or in the vicinity.^
' New Orleans v. Hopkins, 13 La.
326; New Orleans v. United States,
10 Pet. 662 ; New Orleans v. Leverich,
432
lb. 332; De Armas V. New Orleans,
5 La. 132.
CHAPTER XIV.
BMIKENT DOMAIN.
Section.
230 — Eminent domain defined.
231 — Constitutional limitations.
232 — Exercise of power regulated
by Legislature.
233 — Delegation of power to mu-
nicipal corporations.
284 — What is a public purpose.
234 a — Power to take lands for a
private road.
235 — Power to take land for orna-
mental purposes.
' 236 — Power to take lands for pur-
pose of draining them.
237 — Power to take land beyond
city limits.
238 — What property may be taken.
239 — ^What constitutes a taking.
240 — Exercise of eminent domain
Section.
by municipal corporations.
241 — Conditions precedent to the
exercise of the power.
242 — ^Effect of discontinuance of
proceedings.
243 — Compensation required.
244 — Who entitled to receive com-
pensation.
245 — Who assesses the damages.
246 — The measure of value or
damages.
247 — ^When payment should be
made.
248 — Apportionment of damages
among lots benefited.
249 — Revisory proceedings — Cer-
tiorari.
250 — Effect of accepting damages.
§ 230. Eminent domain defined. — I have elsewhere more
fully explained ^ how all lands were originally the common
property of the human race ; and necessarily so, since land is
the free gift of nature, and not the product of man's labor. It
was also demonstrated that, under the present law of real prop-
erty, the private owner of lands acquires only a tenancy of more
or less limited duration, under the absolute and ultimate pro-
prietorship of the State, as the representative of organized so-
ciety, subject to certain conditions, one of which is that the
State may at any time, on payment of its value, reclaim the'
tenancy so granted to private individuals, whenever the public
exigencies require such confiscation. The right of confiscation
of private lands for public purposes is called the right of emi-
nent domain. Mr. Cooley speaks of eminent domain as refer-
ring, not only to those superior rights of the State in the private
lands of the individual, but also to any lauds which the State
' See Tiedeman's Police Power, § 115.
28 433
§231
MITNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS.
[CH. XIV.
may own absolutely, such as public buildings, forts, navigable
rivers, etc.^ It seems to me that this more comprehensive use
of the term unnecessarily confounds it with " public domain,"
and deprives it of its technical and special signification. Mr.
Cooley also defines the term to mean " that superior right of
property pertaining to the sovereignty, by which the private
property acquired by its citizens under its protection may be
taken, or its use controlled, for the public benefit, without re-
gard to the wishes of its owners," ^ including personal as well
as real propertj-, except money and rights of action.^ There is
some foundation for this use of the term in the writings of po-
litical economists and publicists, and in the dicta of judges.*
It is also true that personal property may be forcibly taken
from private owners for public uses, whenever an extreme ne-
cessity requires it, as in the case of war or of a general fam-
ine.* But, inasmuch as the grounds for the justification of
this involuntary appropriation of private property to public
purposes are different, according as the property is real or per-
sonal, the former resting upon the claim of a superior property
in lands, the otlier upon the illogical plea of urgent and over-
ruling necessity, it is wise to confine the term " eminent do-
main " to the cases of land appropriated, and employ some
other term to signify the official appropriation of personal prop-
erty. Eminent domain, therefore, is the superior right of the
State to appropriate for public purposes the private lands with-
in its borders, upon payment of a proper cotapensation for the
property so taken.
§ 231. Constitutional limitations. — Both in the Constitu-
1 Cooley on Const. Lim. 647, 648.
2 Cooley on Const. Lim. 649.
3 Cooley on Const. Lim. 652, 653.
" Generally it may be said, legal and
equitable rights of every description
are liable to be thus appropriated.
From this statement, however, must
be excepted money, or that which
in ordinary use passes as such, and
which the government may reach by
taxation, and also rights in action,
which can only be available when
made to produce money; neither of
which can it be needful co take
434
under this power."
* " The right which belongs to the
society or to the sovereign of dis-
posing, in case of necessity, and for
the public safety, of all the wealth
contained in the State, is called the
eminent domain." McKinley, J., in
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How.
212, 223. In this case, as probably,
in all other actual cases of the exer-
cise of the right of eminent domain,
the thing appropriated was land.
* See Tiedeman's Police Power,
§ 137.
CH. XIV.] . EMINENT DOMAIN. § 231
tion of the United States, and in the constitutions of the re-
spective States composing the Union, there is a limitation upon
the power of the Legislature, either directly or indirectly, to
exercise the right of eminent domain, which is usually ex-
pressed as follows : Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation, or in words of similar
import. It is probable that some provision of that kind, ex-
pressly controlling and limiting the right of eminent domain,
is in every State constitution ; but, in the absence of such an
express provision, the protection of private property against
confiscation without compensation would be amply secured un-
der the ordinary construction placed upon the general consti-
tutional provision, that " no man shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, except by due process of law." For the
words " due process of law," or their constitutional synonym,
" the law of the land," are construed to mean that private prop-
erty cannot be taken from its owner in any arbitrary manner,
but only in conformity with the just principles of equity. In
the United States Constitution, the fifth article of the amend-
ments contains a provision, like the kind just described, pro-
hibiting the appropriation of private property to public use
without just compensation ; but this provision, like all of the
provisions curtailing the powers of government, which are found
in the first twelve amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion, has been held to apply to, and to limit only, the United
States government in its exercise of the right of eminent do-
main ; and is not intended to serve as a limitation upon the
similar power of the State government.^ The fourteenth
amendment of the constitution contains the provision that
" No State shall make or enforce any laws which shall deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law." This provision, in common with the provisions in the
thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, is held to
have been intended to operate as a restraint upon State ac-
tion ; and the courts would, in conformity with this general
declaration of the operation of this amendment, conclude that
it brings the private property of individuals within the protec-
tion of the United States government and constitution against
' Barron V. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 I (U. S.) 84(1857); Mills Em. Dom.,
(1833); Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. I sec. 348, and cases.
435
§ 231 MU>'ICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XIV.
any improper or unlawful exercise, by or through the State gov-
ernment, and certainly that is the case in regard to ordinary in-
terference with the rights of property. And the presumption
would, of course, be that the improper exercise of the right of
eminent domain by a State would furnish ground for the inter-
vention of the courts of the United States, and justify a trans-
fer of the case to such court.^ Mr. Justice Miller has intimated
in one case that the provisions of the fourteenth amend-
ment as to due process of law can only be made to apply to
cases of eminent domain.^ But Mr. Justice Bradley dissents
from this view.^ Probably it must still be considered a doubt-
ful question, how far the disposition of the United States courts,
to minimize the consequences of the fourteenth amendment,
under the influence of Mr. Justice Miller,* may tend in future
litigation to exclude cases of eminent domain from the protec-
tion of this amendment.
In consequence of a disposition of many of the courts to
consider the term " appropi iate," in these constitutional pro-
visions, to mean the corpus of land itself, rather than any rights
of an incorporeal character issuing out of the land, in determin-
ing when there has been a taking of property in the constitu-
tional sense, which calls for compensation ; in many of the States,
amendments have been made to this constitutional provision,
requiring that compensation shall be made, whenever piivate
property has been taken or " damaged or destroyed or injured"
for public use. The object of these provisions is to insure the
claim for compensation where the corpus of the land may not
have been taken for public use ; but incorporeal rights issuing
out of the land have been taken away, and thus^the damage
inflicted upon the private property ; as for example, in the case
of a use of the adjoining street in ways, which would materially
affect the enjoyment of the abutting property, by the con-
struction of surface or elevated railroads, as will be more fully
explained in subsequent connections.^ But the object of this
amendment, inserting the words " injured or damaged " in the
> Patterson v. Miss. & R. K. Boom
Co., 3 Dillon, 465 (1875), affirmed by
the Supreme Court, 98 U. S. 103
(1878) ; "Warren v. Wisconsin etc. R.
R, Co., fi Biss. C, 0. 425.
2 See Davidson v. N'ew Orleans, 96
436
U. S. 97, 105 (1887)..
8 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 TJ. S.
623.
*See Tiedeman's Unwritten Con-
stitutionj p. 97, et seq.
^ See post, ch. xvi. on Streets.
CH. XIV.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
§ 232
provision calling for the payment of compensation where pri-
vate property is taken for public use, is not to open up claims
for all the consequential damages, which property might sufPer
from a public improvement, but only to include the damage to
those special incorporeal rights which the individual property
owner can claim as his own, and as appurtenant to the land. It
is held that the purpose of the amendment is not to enable
property owners to claim damage for a depreciation in the value
of property, which arises from any special use to which the
streets or adjoining lands might be put.^ The same conclusion
has been reached in the English courts, in construing statutes
which provide for the payment of compensation, where property
has been injuriously affected by public improvements.^
§ 232. Exercise of power regulated by Legislature The
exercise of this right is in the first instance reposed in the Leg-
islature. Until the Legislature determines by enactment the
occasions, when, and the conditions under which, and the agen-
cies by which, the power of appropriation may be exercised,
there can be no lawful appropriation of lands to public pur-
poses. The exercise of the right is a legislative act, and re-
quires no judicial confiscation of the land, in order to divest the
private owner of his title.^ Except so far as the exercise of the
power may be limited and controlled by provisions of the con-
stitution, the necessity for its exercise is left to the legislative
discretion. The courts cannot question the necessity for the
taking, provided the land is taken for a public purpose. Tlie
legislative determination of the necessity is final, and is not
1 Columbia Del. Bridge Co. v.
Geisse, 35 N. J. L. 558 (1871) ; Ashby
V. White, 1 Smith's L. Cas. 264; Eig-
ney V. Chicago, 102 111. 64; Chicago
V. Taylor, 125 TJ. S. 161.
2 Hall V. Bristol, L. E. 2 C. P. C.
322; East & West India Docks Co.
V. Gattke, 3 MacN. & G. 155 ; Cham-
berlain V. West End of London & C.
P. E. Co., 2 Best & Smith, 605 ; 110
E. C. L. E. 604; lb. 61 Y; Beckett v.
Midland E. Co., L. E. 1 C. P. C.241;
on appeal, 3 C. P. C. 82; McCarthy
V. Metropolitan Board of Works, L.
E. 7 C. P. C. 508.
^ "It requires no judicial condem-
nation to subject private propei-ty to
public uses. Like the power to tax,
it resides with the legislative depart-
ment to whom the delegation is
made. It may be exercised directly
or indirectly by that body; and it can
only be restrained by the judiciary
when its limits have been exceeded,
or its authority has been abused or
perverted." Kramer v. Cleveland &
Pittsburgh E. E. Co., 5 Ohio St. 140,
146.
437
§ 232
MiriSriCIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XIV.
subject to review by the courts.^ But the question, whether
the appropriation shall be made, may be submitted by the Leg-
1 The following quotation, from an
opinion of Judge Denio, of the New
York Court of Appeals, (People v.
Sraith,21 N. Y. 595,) will be sufficient
to explain the reasons by which the
exclusion of this question from judi-
cial investigation, and the c o n s e-
quent denial to the property owner
of the right to be heard in his behalf,
may be justified. The learned
judge says: " The question then is,
whether the State, in the exercise of
tlie power to appropriate the prop-
erty of individuals to a public use,
wliere the duty of judging of the
expediency of making the appropri-
ation, in a class of cases, is commit-
ted to public officers, is obliged to
afford to the owners of the property
an opportunity to be heard before
those officers when they sit for the
purpose of making the determina-
tion. I do not speak of the process
of arriving at the amount of com-
pensation to be paid to the owners,
but of the determination whether,
under the circumstances of a partic-
ular case, the propei-ty required for
the purpose shall be taken or not;
and I am of the opinion that the
State is not under any obligation to
make provision for a judicial con-
test upon that question. The only
part of the constitution which re-
fers to the subject is that which for-
bids private property to be taken for
I>ublio use without compensation,
and that which prescribes the man-
ner in which the compensation shall
be ascertained. It is not pretended
that the statute under consideration
violates either of these provisions.
Tliere is, therefore, no constitutional
injunction on the point under con-
sideration. The necessity for appro-
priating private property for the use
of the public or of the government
438
is not a judicial question. The
power resides in the Legislature. It
may be exercised by means of a
statute which shall at once designate
the property to be appropriated and
the purpose of the appropriation; or
It may be delegated to public officers ;
or, as it has been repeatedly held, to
private corporations, established to
carry on enterprises in which the
public are interested. There is no
restraint upon the power, except
that requiring compensation to be
made. And where the power is com-
mitted to public officers, it is a sub-
j e c t of legislative discretion to de-
termine what prudential regulations
shall be established to secure a dis-
creet and judicious exercise of the
authority. The constitutional pro-
visions, securing a trial by jui-y in
certain cases, and that which de-
clares that no citizen shall be de-
prived of his property without due
process of law, have no application
to this case. The jury trial can only
be claimed as a constitutional right
where the subject is judicial in its
character. The exercise of the right
of eminent domain stands on the
same ground with the power of taxa-
tion. Both are emanations of the
lawmaking power. They are the
attributes of political sovereignty,
for the exercise of which the Legis-
lature is under no necessity to ad-
dress itself to the courts. In impos-
ing a tax, or in appropriating the
property of a citizen, or of a class of
citizens, for a public purpose, with a
proper provision for compensation,
the legislative act is itself due pro-
cess of law ; though it would not be
if it should undertake to appropriate
the property of one citizen for the
use of another, or to confiscate the
property of one person or a class of
CH. XIV.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
232
islature to a vote of the people, or to some court or jury.^ And
in Michigan, the submission of the question of necessity to a
jury, is made by the constitution an indispensable requirement.^
But while the power of the Legislature to determine the
mode and occasion of the exercise of the right of eminent do-
main is not restricted by constitutional limitations, when the
Legislature has prescribed the conditions, and established the
regulations for the exercise of the right, the performance of the
conditions, and the observance of the regulations, become an
indispensable condition precedent to the exercise of the right ;
and any failure to comply with the requirements of the statute,
will invalidate the confiscation of property. There must be a
most scrupulous observance of all those provisions, which were
designed to serve as a protection to the interests of the land-
owners.^ It is also recognized, as an invariable corollary to this
persons, or a particular description
of property upon some view of pub-
lic policy, where it could not be said
to be taken for a public use. It fol-
lojvs from these views, that it is not
necessary for the Legislature, in the
exercise of the right of eminent do-
main, either directly, or indirectly
through public officers or agents, to
invest the proceedings with the
forms or substance of judicial proc-
ess. It may allow the owner to in-
tervene and participate in the dis-
cussion before the officer or board,
to whom the power is given to deter-
niine, whether the appropriation
shall be made in a particular case ;
or it may provide that the officers
shall act upon their own views of
propriety and duty, without the aid
of a forensic contest. The appro-
priation of the property is an act of
])ublic administration, and the form
and manner of its performance is
such as the Legislature in its discre-
tion may prescribe." See also Unit-
ed States V. Harris, 1 Sumn. 21;
Spring V. Kussell, 3 Watts, 294; Va-
rick V. Smith, 5 Paige Ch. 137; (28
Am. Dec. 417) ; People v. Smith, 21
N. T. 595; Cooper v. Williams, 7 Me.
273; Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass. 395;
Aldridge v. Eailroad Company, 2
Stew. & Port. 199 (23 Am. Dec. 307) ;
O'Hara v. Lexington, etc., E. K. Co.,
1 Dana, 232; Henry v. Underwood,
IDana, 247; Waterworks Co. v.
Burkhardt, 41 Ind. 364; Ford v. Chi-
cago, etc., K. E. Co., 14 Wis. 609;
Scudder v. Trenton Del. Falls Co., 1
Saxt. (N. J.) 694; St. Louis Co. Court
V. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175 (1874), (For-
est Park Case) ; Tide Water Co. v.
Coster, 18 N. J. Eq. (3 C. E. Green)
518; Mills Em. Dom. §11; Chicago
V. Wright, 69 111. 327 (1873); People
V. Smith, 21 N. T. 597; Giesy v. Cine,
W. & Z. E. E. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308;
Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Ax-m-
strong, 45 N. Y. 234 (1871); Fowler,
In re, 53 N. Y. 60 (1873).
1 Iron E. E. Co. v. Ironton, 19 Ohio
St. 299.
2 Mansfield, etc., E. E. Co. v. Clark,
23 Mich. 519; Arnold v. Decatur, 29
Mich. 11.
' " The statute says that, after a
certain other act shall have been
passed, the company may then pro-
ceed to take private property for the
439
232
MUNICIPAL COBPOKATIONS.
[CH. XIV.
rule, that the grants of the right of eminent domain are to be
strictly construed, and the powers delegated are not to be ex-
tended by construction beyond the express limitations of the
statute.^
But there are two constitutional limitations, which are im-
posed very generally upon the exercise of the right of eminent
domain ; and it is also a judicial question whether the Legisla-
ture, in the exercise of the right, has fully complied with their
use of its road; that is equivalent to
saying that the right shall not be
exercised without such subsequent
act. The right to take private prop-
erty for public use is one of the
highest prerogatives of the sovereign
power; and here the Legislature has,
in language not to be mistaken, ex-
pressed an intention to reserve that
power, until it could judge for itself
whether the proposed road would be
of sufficient public utility to justify
the use of this high prerogative. It
did not intend to cast this power
away, to be gathered up and used by
any who might choose to exercise
it." Gillinwater v. Miss. etc. E. E.
Co., 13 111. 1, 4; Johnson V. Freeport
etc. Co., Ill 111. 413; In re Niagara
etc. Co., 46 Hun, 94; Owasso v. Eich-
fleld, (Mich. 89) 45 N. W. E. 129 ;
Fort Eidge etc. Assn. v. Eedd, 33 W.
Va. 262; Swan v. Chi. etc. Co., 38
Mo. App. 588; In re Cedar Eapids,
(Iowa, 92) 51 N. W. R. 1142; Toledo
etc. Co. V. Toledo El. S. E. Co., 6
Ohio Civ. Ct. E. 362; Simpson v.
Kansas City, (Mo. 92) 20 S. W. R. 38;
Santa Cruz v. Enright, (Cal. 92) 80
Pac. E. 197; Farmers M. Co. v. E. E.
Co., 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 25; Cheany v.
Board, 52 N. J. L. 544; Bass v. Fort
WJiyne, 121 Ind. 389 ; Amoskeag Co. v.
Goodale, 62 N. H. 66; Moore v. San-
ford, (Mass. 90) 24 N. E. E. 423; An-
derson v. Pemberton, 89 Mo. 61;
Turner v. Nye, 154 Mass. 579;
Kroop V. Forman, 31 Mich. 144 ; Bohl-
man v. Green Bay etc. E. It. Co.,
440
40 Wis. 157; Judson v. Bridgeport,
25 Conn. 426; Bloodgood v. Mohawk
etc. R. R. Co., 18 Wend. 9; Decatur
Co. V. Humphreys, 47 Ga. 565; Cam-
eron V. Supervisors etc., 47 Miss. 264;
St. Brady v. Bronson, 45 Cal. 640;
Maris v. Mason, 37 Texas, 447; Chi-
cago etc. It. R. Co. V. Smith, 78 111.
96; State v. Seymour, 35 N. J. L. 47;
W. Va. Transportation Co. v. Vol-
canic Oil & Coal Co., 5 W. Va. 382;
Wamesit Power Co. v. Allen, 120
Mass. 352; Lund v. New Bedford, 121
lb. 286; see Baltimore etc. R. E. Co.
V. Nesbit, 10 How. 395 ; Unite4 States
V. Eeed, 56 Mo. 565 ; Commissioners
V. Beckwith, 10 Kan. 603; St. Joseph
etc. E. E. Co. V. Callender, 13 Kan.
496; Allen V. Jones, 47 Ind. 442; Wat-
son V. South Kingston, lb. 563.
1 " There is no rule more familiar
or better settled than this; that
grants of corporate powers, being in
derogation of common right, are to
be strictly construed ; and this is
especially the case where the power
claimed is a delegation of the right
of eminent domain, one of the high-
est powers of sovereignty pertaining
to the State itself, and interfering
most seriously and often vexatiously
with the ordinary rights of prop-
erty." Currier v. Marietta, etc. E.
E. Co., 11 Ohio St. 228, 231; but see
Lamborn v. Bell, (Col. 93) 32 Pac.
989; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Foltz,
52 Fed. 627; Shake v. Frazer, (Ky.
93) 21 S. W. 583; Los Angeles v.
Reyes, (Cal. 93) 32 Pac. 233.
CH. XIV.J EMINENT DOMAIN. § 233
requirements. One has reference to the ascertainment and pay-
ment of the compensation to the landowner for the loss of his
lands, which will be discussed subsequently ; ^ and the second
provides that the private lands of the individual shall not be
taken, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, except
for public purposes. It is a legislative question, whether the
public exigencies require the appropriation, but it is clearly a
judicial question, whether a particular confiscation of land has
been made for a public purpose, or to serve some private end.^
§ 233. Delegation of power to municipal corporations
While the exercise of the right of eminent domain belongs
primarily to the Legislature, it is not necessary for it directly
to make the appropriation to the public use. Since the exer-
cise of the power is only permissible in the advancement of the
public interests, if that requirement is complied with, it is also
within the Legislative discretion to determine whether the con-
fiscation shall be made by it, or b}^ some other corporate body
or individual, to wliom the power is delegated. If the public
interests are subserved best, when the right is exercised by a
municipal corporation or a railroad company, there can be no
constitutional objection to the delegation of the power, for the
burden upon private property is not thereby increased. The
grant of the power to a town, city, county or school district,
needs no special defence, because the delegate of the power is
in each instance only a local branch of the general State gov-
ernment. It is the government in every case which makes the
confiscation. No cases are needed to support this proposition.
But when the power is granted to a corporation, composed of
private persons, who procure a grant of the power for the pur-
pose of making a profit out of it ; although the use to which
the land is put may serve to satisfy a public want, there is
more or less disposition to question the constitutional propriety
of the delegation of the power. But the constitutional objec-
1 See post, §§ 243-250.
2 Tyler V. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648; 01m-
Btead V. Camp, 33 Conn. 551; Beck-
man V. Eailroad Company, 3 Paige,
45 (22 An. Dec. 679) ; Matter of Deans-
ville Cemetery Association, 66 N. T.
509 (23 Am. Eep. 86); Scudder v.
Trenton, etc., Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 694 (23
Am. Dec. 756); Louglibridge v. Har-
ris, 42 Ga. 500; Harding v. Goodlett,
3 Terg. 40 (24 Am. Dec. 546) ; Chica^
go, etc., R. R. Co. V. Lake, 71 111. 333;
Water Works Co. v. Burkliardt, 41
Ind. 364; Eyerson v. Brown, 35 Mich.
333 (24 Am. Rep. 564) ; Bankhead v.
Brown, 25 Iowa, 540.
441
§234
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. XIV.
tion is deemed to be untenable. In granting to a private cor-
poration the right of eminent domain, the State does not consider
the benefit to the stockholders of the corporation, but rather
the public benefit derived from the construction and mainte-
nance of a turnpike, a railroad, etc. It is true the government
may undertake these public improvements, but it is the prevail-
ing opinion that the best interests of the public are subserved
by granting the right to a private corporation which assumes,
in return for the right of eminent domain and the private gain
to be gotten out of the business, to satisfy the public want ; and
tlie Legislature has uniformly been held to hold within its dis-
cretion the power of exercising this right or of delegating it,
according as the one course or the other seems best to promote
the public welfare. ^ Not only is this permissible, but it is also
held to be constitutionally unobjectionable to delegate to cor-
poration or individual, along with the exercise of the right of
eminent domain, the power to determine finally upon the neces-
sity for the taking, without any judicial investigation.^
§ 234. What is a pulblic purpose. — As long as the govern-
ment exercises the right directly and for the State's immediate
benefit, no diiSculty is experienced in determining what is a
public use. There can be no doubt that land is devoted to a
public use, when it is taken for the purpose of laying out parks,
and public gardens,® for the construction of public buildings of
1 Wilson V. Blackbird Creek Marsh
Co., 2 Pet. 245 ; Stevens v. Middlesex
Canal, 12 Mass. 466; Boston Mill
Dam V. Newman, 12 Pick. 46'7; Leb-
anon V. Olcott, 1 N. H. 339; Petition
of Mt. Washington Road Co., 35 K.
H. 134: Eaton V. Boston C. & M. R.
K. Co., 51 N. H. 504; Armington v.
Barnet, 15 Vt. Y45; White River
Turnpike v. Central R. R. Co., 21
Vt. 590; Bradley v. N. Y. & N. H.
E. R. Co., 21 Conn. 294; Olmstead v.
Camp, 33 Conn. 532; Beekman v.
Saratoga & Schenectady E. E. Co.,
3 Paige, 73 (22 Am. Dec. 679) ; Blood-
good V. Mohawk & Hudson R. R.
Co., 18 Wend. 9 ; Whiteman's Ex'vs v.
Wilmington etc. E. E. Co., 2 Harr.
514; Raleigh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Davis,
442
2 Dev. & Bat. 451 ; Svyan v. Williams,
3 Mich. 427; Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis.
603; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 (;al.
229.
2 People V. Smith, 21 K. T. 595;
Lyon V. Jerome, 26 Wend. 484; Mat-
ter of Fowler, 53 N. Y. 60; N. Y.
Central, etc., R. R. Co. v. Met. Gas
Co., 63 N. Y. 326; Hays v. Rlsher,
32 Pa. St. 169; Chicago, etc., R. E.
Co. v. Lake, 71 HI. 333; North Mis-
souri R. R. Co. V. Lackland, 25 Mo.
515; North Mo. R. R. Co. v. Gott,
25 Mo. 540; Bankhead v. Browny,
25 Iowa, 540; Warren v. St. Paul,
etc., E. R. Co., 18 Minn. 384.
" Owners of Ground v. Mayor, etc.,
of Albany, 15 Wend. 374; Matter of
Central Park Extension, 16 Abb. Pr.
CH,
XIV.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
§ 234 a.
all kinds,^ waterworks,^ adqueducts, drains and sewers,^ and the
building of levees on the banks of the Mississippi.* It is, like-
wise, freely admitted that the State may appropriate lands
without limitation for the purpose of laying out streets and
highways. In all these cases of the right of eminent domain,
the land is taken for the general use of the public, and there-
fore is devoted to a public use. If, in any one of these cases,
the land was to be used by a few private individuals, and not
by the public generally, it would not be a taking for a public
use, and consequently it would be unlawful.
§ 234 a. Power to take land for a private road. — There has
been considerable doubt felt and expressed concerning the con-
stitutionality of State statutes, providing for the opening and
maintenance of so-called private roads, at the expense of the
person or persons who may be benefited thereby. These stat-
utes usually provide that some local officer or officers, usually
the county court, shall in all cases, where the public necessity
will not justify the opening of a public road, to be constructed
and maintained at the expense of the county, authorize, under
56; Brooklyn Park Commissioners
V. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 244 (H Am.
Rep. 70); Mayor v. Park Com.'rs, 44
Mich. 602; Matter of Mayor of New
York, 99 N. Y. 569; Philadelphia v.
Gerraantown Pass. E. Co., 10 Phila.
(Pa.) 165; South Park Com'rs v.
Williams, 51 111. 57; County Court
V. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175; State v.
Leffingwell, 54 lb.. 458.
' Eichardson v. Com'rs, (Miss. 91)
9 So. E. 351 ; Williams v. School Dis-
trict, 33 Vt. 271; Long v. Fuller, 68
Pa. St. 170; Hooper v. Bridgewater,
102 Mass. 512.
2 State V. Newark, (N. J. 92) 23 Atl.
R. 129; Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444;
Spring Valley W. Co. v. Drinkhouse,
92 Cal. 528; Wayland v. Middlesex
Co. Com'rs, 4 Gray (Mass.) 500;
Rochester Water Com'rs, In re, 66
N. Y. 413; Umatilla v. Barnhart, 30
Pac. 37 ; Martin v. Gleason, 139 Mass.
183; Tyler v. Hudson, 147 lb.
609; In re Com'rs of Public Works,
10 N. Y. S. 705; Bailey v. Woburn,
126 Mass. 416; Lake etc. Water Co.
V. Contra Costa Co., 67 Cal. 669:
Spring Valley Water Works v. San
Mateo Water Works, 64 lb. 123;
Hurden v. Stein, 27 Ala. 104; Edge-
wood Water Co. v. Troy W. Co., 7
Pa. Co. Ct. R. 476.
^Passadena v. Simpson, 91 Cal.
238; Anderson v. Kerns Draining
Co., 14 Ind. 199; Gardner v. New-
burg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (7 Am. Dec.
526) ; Matter of Drainage of Lands,
54 N. J. L. 497; People v. Nearing,
27 N. Y. 306; Ham v. Salem, 100
Mass. 350; French v. White, 24 Conn.
174; Kane v. Baltimore, 15 Md. 240;
Burden v. Stein, 27 Ala. 104; Eeeves
V. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio St.
333; Chaplin v. Com'rs, 129 111. 651.
* MithofE V. Carrollton, 12 La. An.
185 ; Cash v. Wbitworth, 13 La. 401 ;
Inge V. Police Jury, 14 La. An. 117.
443
§ 234 a. MDNICIPAL COKPORATIONS. [CH. XIV.
certain limitations, those persons who will be benefited by the
opening of such a road, to construct and maintain it at their
own expense, and to appropriate whatever land is needful. The
constitutionality of these statutes has been attacked on the
ground that the roads, thus established, were private and not
for the benefit of the general public.^ The difficulty in the way
of a clear understanding of the matter is increased by a failure
to appreciate the intrinsic difference between a public and pri-
vate road. If one or more individuals have the power to ap-
propriate land for the opening of a road for their exclusive use
or benefit, from which they may shut out the general public,
and which they may maintain or discontinue at their pleasure,
without any supervisory conti'ol on the part of the State or mu-
nicipal authorities, the road is most certainly a private one, and
the forcible appropriation of land for it is a taking of private
property without due process of law. But if the road is open
to the general public, and the persons, for whose special benefit
the road was established, have not the power of closing it up
at will, but upon them the expenses of constructing it and
maintaining it is imposed, the road is a public one, even though
they may at will discontinue the repairs, and notwithstanding
it is called by the statute authorizing it a private road, and it is
opened for the special benefit of those who assume the expense
of its construction and maintenance. It being open to the pub-
lic, the need for the road is not open to judicial investigation.
The Legislature is the sole judge of the necessity for the appro-
priation of private lands to a public use.'*
I Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140; Buf-
falo & N. T. K. K. Co. V. Brainard. 9
N. Y. 100; Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt.
648 (8 Am. Kep. .398) ; Bradley v. N.
Y., etc. K. K. Co., 21 Conn. 294;
Pittsburgh v. Scott, 1 Pa. St. 809;
Varuer v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534;
Young V. McKenzie, 3 Ga. .SI ; Hick-
man's Case, 4 Harr, 580; Sadler v.
Laugham, 34 Ala. 311; Reeves v.
Tieasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio St.
333; Wild v. Deig, 43 Ind. 45 (13 Am.
Rep. 399); Stewart v. Hartmau, 46
Ind. 331;Blackman V. Halves, 72 Ind.
515; Osborn v. Hart, 24 Wis. 89 (1
Am. Rep. 161) ; Nesbit v. Trumbo, 39
444
111. 110; Dickey v. Tennison, 27 Mo.
373; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa,
540; Witham v. Osburn, 4 Ore. 318
(18 Am. Rep. 287) ; but see Whitting-
bam V. Bowen, 22 Vt. 317; Bell v.
Prouty, 43 Vt. 279; Proctor v. An-
dover, 42 N". H. 348; Pocopson Eoad,
16 Pa. St. 15 ; Harvey v. Thomas, 10
Watts, 63; Ferris v. Bramble, 5 Ohio
St. 109; Robinson v. Swope, 12 Bush,
21; Sherman v. Brick, 82 Cal. 241, in
which the constitutionality of such
appropriations is more or less sus-
tained.
2 The following quotation from an
opinion of the Supreme Court of
CH. XIV.]
EMINElilT DOMAIN.
§ 235
§ 235. Power to take land for ornamental purposes.—
Ill determining what is a public use, which would justify the
appropriation of private property without the consent of its
owner, it has been explained, at least in general terms, that the
purpose must be a useful one, and in some sense or other neces-
sary to the public welfare. And, based upon this doctrine that
the purpose must be a useful one, it has been held by some au-
thorities that private property cannot be taken for the public
use, where the use does not serve to supply some public need,
but only to ornament or embellish the city. And, in fact,
Mr. Justice Woodbury, in a case before the United States Su-
lowa -will amply illustrate the limit-
ations upon the power of establish-
ing "private" roads over private
lands: " The State may properly pro-
vide for the establishment of a pub-
lic road or highway to enable every
citizen to discharge his duties. The
State is not bound to allow its citi-
zens to be walled in, insulated, im-
prisoned, but may provide them a
way of deliverance. The State may
provide a public highway to a man's
house, or a public highway to coal
or other mines. If the road now in
question has been established as a
public road under the general road
law, as we confess we do not see why
it might not have been, there would
be in our minds no doubt of its va-
lidity, although it does not exceed a
half a mile in length, and traverses
the land of but a single person. For
the right to take land for a public
road, that is, a road demanded by
public convenience, as an outlet to a
neighborhood, or it may be, as I
think, for a single farmer, without
other means of communication, can-
not depend upon the length of the
road, or the number of persons
through whose property it may pass.
With respect to the act of 1866, we are
of the opinion that the roads there-
under established are essentially
private, that is, the private property
of the applicant therefor, because:
First, the statute denominates them
private roads. If these i-oads are not
private and different fx-om ordinary
and public roads, there was no neces-
sity for these provisions. Second-
ly, such a road may be established
upon the petition of the applicant
alone; and he must pay the costs and
damages occasioned thereby, and
perform such other conditions as to
fence, etc., as the board may require.
Thirdly, the public are not bound
to keep such roads in repair, and
this is a satisfactory test as to wheth-
er a road is public or private. (The
second and third reasons for holding
the road to be a private one here
stated, rather establish a rebuttal
than a conclusive presumption in
favor of its private character. The
establishment of the road upon the
petition of tlie applicant, and its
construction and maintenance at
his expense, are not necessarily
inconsistent with its being a pub-
lic road, if the public have the
use of it, and cannot be excluded
from it.) Fourthly, we see no reason
when such a road is established, why
the person at whose instance it was
done might not lock the gates open-
ing into it or fence it up, or other-
wise debar the public of any right
thereto. Could not the plaintiffs, in
this case, having procured the road
in question, abandon it at their pleas-
445
§ 235
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XIV.
preme Court,^ lays down the doctrine that private property can
be compulsorily taken only for the establishment of highways,
streets and railroad beds, where the land stands between thie
two termini of the road or street. And he holds that it is not
even possible to take lands from the owner, without his con-
sent, for the erection of public buildings ; on the ground that
any plot of land may be selected for that purpose, and a par-
ticular locality is not necessary to the usefulness of the public
building, and that the matter of beauty of location is not prop-
erly considered in determining the right of confiscation for pub-
lic use. In the course of his opinion, Judge Woodbury says :
" When we go to other public uses, not so m-gent, not connect-
ed with precise localities, not difficult to be provided for with-
out the power of eminent domain, and in places where it would
be only convenient, but not necessary, I entertain strong doubts
of its applicability. Who ever heard of laws to condemn pri-
vate property for public use, for a marine hospital or State
prison ? So a custom house is a public use for the general
ure ? Could tliey not relinquish it
to the defendants without consulting
the board of supervisors ? If this is
so, does it not incontestably establish
the fact, that it is essentially private ?
For it must be private if it is of such
a nature, that the plaintiffs can at
their pleasure use or forbid its use,
abandon or refuse to abandon it, re-
linquish or refuse to relinquish it ?
If the act of 1866 is valid, might
not the plaintiffs, having procured
the I'oad, use it for laying down a
horse or tramway, and forbid every-
body from using the road, and even
exclude all persons therefrom?
Who could prevent it? These
conditions make a great diiierence
between such a road and a pub-
lic highway, and demonstrate the
essentially private character of the
road." Dillon, Ch. J., in Bankhead
V. Brown, 25 Iowa. 545. " The use,
convenience and advantage of the
public, contemplated by the law, are
benefits arising out of the aggregate
of such improvements, to which a
446
particular road so established con-
tributes to a greater or less degree.
But no limitation upon the power of
the court, in regard to any proposed
road, is to be found in the degree of
accommodation, which it may ex-
tend to the public at large. That is
a matter which addresses itself not
to the authority, but the discretion
of the court. It cannot be predicated
of any road that it will be of direct
utility to all citizens of the county.
It may accommodate in travel and
transportation but a small neighbor-
hood, or only a few individuals. Still,
when established, it may be used at
pleasure by all the citizens of the
county or country; and the public is
interested in the accommodation of
all the members of the community."
Lewis V. Washington, 5 Gratt. 265.
See Varner v. Mg,rtin, 21 W. Va. 534,
for a more exhatj&tive review of the
law and authoritiifes on this subject.
1 West River Bridge v. Dix, 6 How.
545.
CH. XIV.J
EMINENT DOMAIN.
§235
government, and a court house or jail for a State. But it
would be difficult to find precedent or argument to justify tak-
ing private property, without consent, to erect them on, though
appropriate for the purpose. No necessity seems to exist which
is sufficient to justify so strong a measure. A particular locality
as to a few rods in respect to their site is usually of no conse-
quence, while as to lighthouse, or fort, or wharf, or highway
between certain termini, it may be very important and impera-
tive. I am aware of no precedents abroad for such seizures of
private property, for objects like the former, though some such
doctrines appear to have been advanced in this country." ^ But
while it is barely possible that in a case, where mere purposes
of ornament are to be satisfied by the appropriation of private
property to a public use, such an attempted appropriation would
be declared to be beyond the power of eminent domain ; yet,
where the property is taken for a useful purpose, and serves
to satisfy some public want, the fact that, incidentally to the
selection of the land, which is to be taken for public use, the
element of beauty or ornament is considered, is no justification
for interfering with the appropriation, or for declaring it to be
unconstitutional. " The passing from place to place," says
Mr. Justice Hoar,^ " is a rightful object of public provision in
itself ; and the occasions of it are as extensive as the pursuits
of life. Pleasure travel may be accommodated, as well as busi-
ness travel. If the doctrine for which the plaintiffs contend
were supported, it would also follow that the Legislature would
not have the constitutional right to take private property for a
public park or pleasure ground, making full compensation to
the owner, — a conclusion which we should hesitate to arrive at
' See, also, Boston Mill Corp. v.
Newman, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 476; Coo-
ley Const. Lim. 531, 533; Dunn v.
Charleston, Harper (S. C.) Law, 189
(1824); Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa,
540; Eldridge v. Smith, 34 Vt. 484;
Wild V. Beig, 43 Ind. 455 (1873) ; s. c,
13 Am. Rep. 399. Chancellor Kent,
Gardner v. Newburgh Trs., 2 Johns.
(N. Y.) Ch. 162, 166 (1816), lays down
the same proposition, and says that
Bynkershoeck " insists that private
property cannot be taken, on any
terras, without the consent of the
owner, for purpose of public orna^
ment or pleasure; and he mentions
an instance in which the Roman Sen-
ate refuses to allow the praetors to
carry an aqueduct through the farm
of an individual, against his con-
sent, when intended merely for orna^
ment."
2 Who gave the opinion of the
court in Higginson v. Nahant, 11
Allen, 530.
447
§ 237 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XIV.
without much further consideration, in view of the important
relations which air, exercise, and recreation bear to the general
health and welfare of the community." ^
§ 236. Power to take lands for purpose of draining them.
— The power of eyiinent domain has also been exercised, under
authority from the Legislature, to purchase or appropriate swamp
lands, contiguous to the city, for the purpose of raising and drain-
ing them and thus abate a nuisance which is prejudicial to the
health of the community .^ And so, also, is it possible for the
municipal authority to be authorized to enter upon private prop-
erty and construct drains which are necessary to the preserva-
tion of the public health.^ But it is not possible for the lands
of one person to be drained against the will of the owner for
the benefit of some private landowner, where the public wel-
fare does not require it.* In all these cases of draining lands,
or the construction of drains upon private property for public
welfare, it is held to be a case of taking private property for
public use, which can only be justified by the making of com-
pensation to the owner of the land.^
§ 237. Power to take land beyond city limits. — In order
to carry out or effect certain municipal improvements, such as
the construction of public parks and waterworks, it is impos-
sible for the municipal corporation to be confined to its own
limits in the confiscation of private property. It is also the
invariable rule, in the case of the construction of waterworks,
that the city must go beyond its limits and appropriate prop-
erty located outside.® It is only a difference of degree as to
1 Be Mt. Washington Road Co., .35
N. H. 134; Gardner v. Newburgh
Trs., 2 Johns. (N. T.) Ch. 162, 166;
Blodgett V. Boston, 8 Allen (Mass.)
237; Woodstock v. Gallup, 28 Vt.
587; Balch v. Essex Co. Com'rs, 103
Mass. 106.
2 New Orleans Draining Co., In re,
11 La. An. 338; Dingley v. Boston,
100 Mass. 544.
8 Rice V. Wellman, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct.
E. 334; People v. Nearing, 27 N. T.
306; Doyle v. Baughman, 24 111. Ap.
614; Albany Streets, In re, 11 Wend.
(N. Y.) 149 ; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige,
13; Bloodgoodv. Mohawk & H. R.
448
R. E. Co., 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 59;
Chaplin v. Com'rs, 126 111. 264; An-
derson V. Kerns Draining Co., 14
Ind. 199; Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray
(Mass.) 417; Rutherford's Case, 72
Pa. St. 82; s. c, 13 Am. Rep. 655;
contra. Ward v. Peck, 49 N. J. L. 42.
* Reeves v. Wood County Treas-
urer, 8 Ohio St. 333, 345 ; Norfleet v.
Cromwell, 70 X. C. 634; s. c, 16 Am.
Rep. 787.
5 See Cheesborough, In re, 17 Hun,
(N. T.) 561; Chronic v. Pugh, 27 N.
E. R. 415.
8 See ante, § 201.
CH. XIV.J
EMINENT DOMAIN.
§238
the necessity to go outside of the city limits in the construc-
tion of a park. But, whatever doubt may have been felt and
expressed by the authorities at an early day, it has since been
held that the power of eminent domain, when delegated to the
municipal corporation, extends to the appropriation of lands
beyond the city limits, whenever it is impossible to carry out
the express or implied powers of government by an appropria-
tion of lands within its-limits. It has thus been held uniformly,
that a city has the power to appropriate private property beyond
the city limits, for the establishment of a system of waterworks.^
So, also, has it been held that a city corporation may appropri-
ate lands outside of the corporate limits for the purpose of lay-
ing out public parks.^ And the same power has been held to
be vested in a county for the benefit of a city within its limits.*
§ 238. What property may toe taken. — Every species of
real property may be taken in the exercise of the right of emi-
nent domain. Not only may the land itself be taken, but also
anything which may actually, or in legal contemplation, be
considered a part of the land: All buildings and other struct-
ures that may be in the way of the public use of the condemned
lands,* streams of water,* the stone, gravel and wood, that may
be needed for the promotion of the public improvement.^
Apart from the land itself, an easement may be acquired over
the land, wliile the land remained private property; and so,
also, may franchises be condemned.'' But in all these cases.
1 New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio, (N.
Y.) 433, 446 (1845); Dwight Printing
Co. V. Boston, 122 Mass. 583 (1877).
- Mayoi' V. Park Com'rs, 44 Mich.
602 ; Matter of Mayor of New York,
99 N. Y. 569; Brooklyn Park Com'rs
V. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234 (1871).
8 State V. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458
(1873) ; St. Louis Co. Court v. Gris-
wold, 58 Mo. 175 (1874).
* Wells V. Somerset, etc., K. E. Co.,
47 Me. 345.
° Gardner v. Newburg, 2 Johns.
Ch. 162 (7 Am. Dec. 526) ; Johnson
V. Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co., 35 N. H.
569; Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Magruder, 35 Md. 79 (6 Am. Rep.
310).
29
6 Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315
(11 Am. Dec. 484); Wheelock v.
Young, 4 Wend. 647; Lyon v. Jerome,
15 Wend. 569; Bliss v. Hosmer, 15
Ohio, 44; Watkins v. Walker Co., 18
Tex. 585.
' West River Bridge v. Dix, 6 How.
507; Richmond R. R. Co. v. Louisa.
R. E. Co., 13 How. 71 ; State v. Noyes,
47 Me. 189; Arlington v. Barnet, 15
Vt. 745 ; White River Turnpike Co.
V. Vt. Cent. R. R. Co., 21 Vt. 590;
Pistaque Bridge Co. v. New Hamp-
shire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35; Boston
Water Power Co. v. Boston, etc., R.
R. Co., 23 Pick. 360; Central Bridge
Co. v. Lowell, 4 Gray, 474; In re
Rochester Water Commissioners, 66
449
§ 238 MTJNIOIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XIV.
no more of the property can be taken than what is necessary to
serve the public purpose for which it is condemned. No other
considerations will justify the taking of the whole of a man's
property, when only a part is needed ; and the excessive appro-
priation must under all circumstances be held to be unconsti-
tutional. This limitation is best explained by a reference to
the facts of a case, which arose in the State of New York.i
By a statute, municipal corporations were authorized, in con-
demning a part of a city lot, for the purpose of extending or
widening the streets, to appropriate the whole, if it was deemed
advisable, and to sell or otherwise dispose of the part not need-
ed for the improvement of the street. The statute was pro-
nounced unconstitutional. In delivering the opinion of the
court, Chief Justice Savage, said : " If this provision was in-
tended merely to give to the corporation capacity to take prop-
erty, under such circumstances with consent of the owner, and
then to dispose of the same, there can be no objection to it ;
but if it is to be taken literally, that the commissioners may,
against the consent of the owner, take the whole lot, when only
a part is required for the public use, and the residue to be ap-
plied to private use, it assumes a power which, with all respect,
the Legislature did not possess. The constitution, by authoriz-
ing the appropriation of private property to public use, impli-
edly declares that for anj' other use private property shall not
be taken from one and applied to the private use of another.
It is in violation of natural rights ; and if it is not in violation
of the letter of the constitution, it is of its spirit, and cannot
be supported. This power has been supposed to be convenient
when the greater part of a lot is taken, and only a small part
left, not required for public use, and that small part of but lit-
tle value in tiie hands of the owner. In such case the corpo-
N. Y. 413; Comnjiottwealth v. Pa.
Canal Co., 66 Pa. St 41 (.5 Am. Rep.
329) ; In re Towauda Bridge, 91 Pa.
St. 216; Tuckahoe Caual Co. v. R. R.
Co., 11 Leigh, 42 (36 Am. Dec. 374);
Chesapeake, etc.. Canal Co. v, Balti-
more, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Gill & J, 5;
No. Ca., etc., R. R, Co. v. Carolina
Gent, etc., R. R. Co., 83 Iv'. C, 489;
New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Southern, etc., Tel. Co., 53 Ala. 211;
450
Little Miamia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bar-
ton, 23 Ohio St 510; New Castle,
etc., R. R. Co. V. Peru, etc., R. R.
Co., 3 Ind. 464; Lake Shore, etc., R.
R. Co. V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 97
111. 506; Central City Horse Railway
Co. V. Fort Clark, etc., R'y Co., 87
111. 523.
1 Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend.
151 (25 Am. Dec. 618).
en. XIV.J EMINENT DOMAIN. § 238
ration has been supposed best qualified to take and dispose of
such parcels, or gores, as they have sometimes been called ;
and probably this assumption of power has been acquiesced in
by the proprietors. I know of no case where the power has
been questioned, and where it has received the deliberate
sanction of the court. Siappose a case where only a few feet,
or even inches, are wanted, from one end of a lot to widen a
street, and a valuable building stands upon the other end of
such lot ; would the power be conceded to exist to take the
whole lot, whether the owner consented or not? The quality
of the residue of any lot cannot vary the principle. The owner
may be very unwilling to part with only a few feet ; and I
hold it equally incompetent for the Legislature thus to dispose
of private property, whether feet or acres are the subject of
this assumed power." ^ It has also been held, that in establish-
ing a public improvement, it is the duty of those, who are ex-
ercising the right of eminent domain, to avoid as much as
possible the diversion of streams, and to construct whatever
culverts and bridges may be necessary to keep the streams in
their regular channels.^
Another application of the same principle would lead to the
conclusioji, that where the fee simple estate in the land was
not needed, only a less estate, or an easement, should be taken ;
and that the taking of the fee under such circumstances would
be an unlawful appropriation. In the absence of statutory reg-
ulations to the contrary, it is certainly a conclusive presump-
tion, that where less than a fee is needed for the public use,
and a joint occupation of the land by the public and by the
private individual was possible, as in the case of a highway,
the fee is not taken for a public use ; and if there should be at
2 See Proprietors, etc., v. Nashua
E. K. Co., 10 Cush. 388; March v.
Portsmouth, etc., K. R. Co., 19 N. H.
372; Eowe v. Addison, 34 N. H.
306; Haynes v. Burlington, 38 Vt.
350; Boughton v. Carter, 18 Johns.
405; Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130;
Pettigrew v. Evans ville, 25 Wis. 223;
Arimoud v. Green Bay Co., 31 Wis.
316.
^ See to the same effect, Dunn v.
City Council, Harp. 129; Baltimore,
etc., E. E. Co. V. Pittsburgh, etc., E.
E. Co., 17 W. Va. 812; Paul v. De-
troit, 32 Mich. 108. In Embury v.
Conner, 3 N. Y. 511, it was held that
this excessive appropriation of land
beyond what is needed for the pub-
lic use was permissible, provided it
was not done against the consent of
the owner.
451
§ 238
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
CH. XIV.
any time a discontinuance of the public use, the land would
be relieved of the public easement, and become again the ab-
solute property of the original owner.^ But, in some of the
States, it is now provided by statute that, in appropriating
lands for highways, the fee shall be held to be condemned, and
not simply a public easement acquire'd.^ And it would seem
plausible that, in the case of an ordinary highway, the fee
might be needed for use as a highway, since the demands of
modern civilization require the soil of a street of a city to con-
tain imbedded in it the gas, water and sewer pipes, the tele-
phone, telegraph, and electric light wires, etc., as well as to be
used as a highway ; thus rendering a joint occupation of the
land by the public and by the private owner impossible. It is
by no means unreasonable, therefore, to provide for the con-
demnation of a fee in the beginning, instead of allowing suc-
cessive condemnations of the soil, as the public demands each
particular use to which it can be put. But it is hard to see
the reason why in the condemnations of land, for other pur-
poses, for railroad purposes, for example, the fee should be
taken ; and, unless the necessity of taking the fee is proven,
the taking 'would be an unlawful condemnation of private
property.^ But if the fee is necessary, the taking of the fee
for any purpose is lawful ; and it seems to be the prevailing
opinion that the question, whether it is necessary, is a legisla-
i Rust V. Lowe, 6 Mass. 90; Bar-
clay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 493;
Weston V. Foster, 7 Met. 297; Dean
V. Sullivan R. R. Co., 22 N. H. 316;
Blake v. Rich, 34 N. H. 282; Jack-
son v. Rutland etc. R. R. Co., 25 Vt.
150; Giesy v. Cincinnati etc. R. R.
Co., 4 Ohio St. 308; Jackson v.
Hathaway, 15 Johns. 447 ; Henry v.
Dubuque & Pacific R. R. Co., 2 Iowa,
288; Elliott V. Fairhaveu etc. R. R.
Co., 32 Conn. 579, 586; Imlay v. Un-
ion Branch R. R. Co., 26 Conn. 249;
State V. Laverack, 34 N. J. 201; Rail-
road Co. V. Shurmeir, 7 Wall. 272.
2 People V. Kerr, 37 Barb. 357; s. c,
27 N. Y. 183; Brooklyn Central etc.
R. R. Co. V. Brooklyn City R. R. Co.,
452
33 Barb. 420; Brooklyn & Newton
R. R. Co. V. Coney Island R. R. Co.,
35 Barb. 364; Protzman v. Indian-
apolis etc. R. R. Co., 9 Ind. 467;
New Albany & Salem R. R. Co. v.
O'Dailey, 13 Ind. 353; Street Rail-
way V. Cummingsville, 14 Ohio St.
523; State v. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18
Ohio St. 262; Millburne v. Cedar
Rapids etc. R. R. Co., 12 Iowa, 246;
Franz v. Railroad Co., 55 Iowa, 107;
Moses V. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R., 21
111. 516.
8 See New Orleans etc. R. R. Co.
V. Gay, 32 La. An. 471. In Illinois
the condemnation of the fee for rail-
road purposes is expressly forbidden.
Const. 111. 1870, art. 2, sec. 13.
CH. XIV.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
§ 239
tive, and not a judicial one. The declaration of the Legislature,
that the fee is necessary, is, therefore, final and conclusive.^
§ 239. What constitutes a taking. — In order to lay the
foundation of a claim for compensation for the taking of prop-
erty in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, it is not
necessary that there should be an actual or physical taking of
the land. Whenever the use of tlie land is restricted in an}--
way, or some incorporeal hereditament is taken away, which
was appurtenant thereto, it constitutes as much a taking, as if
the land itself had been appropriated.^ The flowing of lands,^
the diversion of streams,* the appropriation of water fronts, on
streams where the tide does not ebb and flow,^ and, likewise,
in navigable streams, the condemnation of an exclusive wharf-
age,^ are only a few instances of the exercise of the right of
1 In Heyward v. Mayor etc. of New
York, V N. Y. 314, 325, it is said that
the power of deciding upon the need
of the fee, "must of necessity rest
in the Legislature, in order to secure
tlie useful exercise and enjoyment
of the right in question. A case
might arise where a temporary use
would be all that the public intei-est
would require. Another case might
require the permanent, and, appar-
ently, the perpetual, occupation and
enjoyment of the property by the
public, and the right to take it must
be coextensive with the necessity
of the case, and the measure of com-
pensation should, of course, be
graduated by the nature and the
duration of the estate or interest of
which the owner is deprived." In
this case the land was appropriated
for the purpose of extending the
almshouse. See, also, Brooklyn
Park Commisioners v. Armstrong,
45 N. Y. 234 ( 6 An. Rep. 70); Ding-
ley V. Boston, 100 Mass. 544; Baker
V. Johnson, 2 Hill, 343; Hunger v.
Tonawanda E. E. Co., 4 N. Y. 349;
Eexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308;
Coster V. N. J. E. E. Co., 22 N. Y.
227; putt V. Cox, 43 Pa. St. 486;
Waterworks Co. v. Burkhart, 41
Ind. 364.
2 Pampelly v. Green Bay, etc., Co.,
13 Wall. 186; Hooker v. New Haven,
etc., E. E. Co., 14 Conn. 146; Eaton
v. Boston, C. & N. E. E. Co., 51 N.
H. 504; Glover v. Powell, 10 N. J.
Eq. 211; Ashley v. Port Huron, 35
Mich. 298; Arimond v. Green Bay,
etc., Co., 31 Wis. 316.
2 Grand Eapids Booming Co. v.
Jarvis, 30 Mich. 308 ; Eaton v. Boston,
etc., E. E. Co., 51 N. H. 504; Brown
V. Cayuga, etc., E. E. Co., 12 N. Y.
488; Norris v. Vt. Cent. E. E. Co.,
28 Vt. 99.
* Harding V. Stamford Water Co.,
41 Conn. 87; Proprietors, etc., v.
Nashua & Lowell E. E. Co., 10 Cush.
388; March v. Portsmouth, etc., R.
E. Co., 19 N. H. 372; Eome v. Addi-
son, 34 N. H. 306 ; Johnson v. Atlan-
tic, etc., E. E. Co., 35 N. H. 569;
Haynes v. Burlington, 38 Vt. 350;
Boughton V. Carter, 18 Johns. 405;
Baltimore, etc., E. E. Co, v. Magru-
der, 34 Md. 79 (6 Am. Eep. 310);
Stein V. Burden, 24 Ala. 130; Petti-
grew V. Evansville, 25 Wis. 223.
6 Varick v. Smith, 9 Paige, 547.
6 Murray v. Sharp, 1 Bosw. 539.
453
§ 239 MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS. [CH. XIV.
eminent domain, in which the property taken is incorporeal.
In respect to the appropriation of waterfronts, according to the
older authorities, if the stream was a navigable one, that is, one
in which the tide ebbed and flowed, the title to the bed of which
was in the State, the appropriation to public uses of the water
front was held not to involve any taking of property for which
compensation had to be made.^ And this has also been held
to be the rule in reference to those fresh water streams, which
are practically navigable, and the title to whose beds is in the
State.^ But these cases have not been followed by later adju-
dications, as far as they assert the right to take away from the
riparian proprietor all access to the navigable stream by and
over his land. The right of access to the stream is declared to
be an incorporeal hereditament, appurtenant to the abutting
land, which cannot be taken away without proper compensar
tion.^
The diversion of navigable streams is also a taking of prop-
erty, for which compensation must be made to the riparian
owner. Although the riparian owner has no property in the
water, or in the bed of the stream, he has a right to make a
reasonable use of it, and since a diversion of the stream wUl
interfere with this reasonable use, perhaps deprive him alto-
gether of its use, compensation must be made to him for this
loss, as being a taking of property.*
It frequently happens, in the experience of municipal life,
that in order to prevent an accidental fire from becoming a gen-
eral conflagration, or to check an actual conflagration, one or
more houses which stand in the path of the fije will be de-
stroyed by means of explosion or otherwise. It is never done,
except in cases where the destroyed houses would have inevita-
bly been consumed by the fire. The" owners of these houses,
• Gould V. Hudson River E. R. Co.,
6 N. T. 522; Pennsylvania E. R. Co.
V. N. Y., etc., K. R. Co., 23 N. J. Eq.
157; Stevens v. Patterson, etc., R. B.
Co., 34 N. J. 532.
2 Tomlin v. Dubuque, etc., R. R.
Co., 32 Iowa, 106 (7 Am. Rep. 176).
3 Railway v. Renwick, 102 U. S.
180; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall.
497; Chicago, etc., R. E. Co. v. Stein,
75 111. 41. A« to rights of property
454
in higbways, see post, chapter xvr.
on Streets.
* People V. Canal Appraisers, 13
Wend. 355; Gardner v. Newburg, 2
Johns. Ch. 162; Bellinger v. N. T.
Central E. E. Co., 23 N. Y. 42; Mor-
gan v. King, 35 N. Y. 454; Hatch v.
Vermont Cent. R. E. Co., 25 Vt. 49;
Thunder Bay, etc., Co. v. Speedily,
31 Mich. 332; Emporia v. Soden, 25
Kan. 588 (37 Am. Rep. 265).
CH. XIV.] EJIINEKT DOMAIN. § 239
therefore, have not suffered any loss by their destruction ; and,
on this ground, and on the plea of overruling necessity, such
destruction of buildings has been held not to be an appropria-
tion under the right of eminent domain, and no claim for com-
pensation can be made by the owners. And where a municipal
officer orders the destruction, the municipal corporation is not
liable for damages, in the absence of a statute to that effect.^
The consequential or incidental injury to property, resulting
from the lawful exercise of an independent right, is never held
to be a taking of property in the constitutional sense, where the
enjoyment of the right or privilege does not involve an actual
interference or disturbance of property rights. " In the ab-
sence of all statutory provisions to that effect, no case, and cer-
tainly no principle, seems to justify the subjecting a person,
natural or artificial, in the prudent pursuit of his own lawful
business, to the payment of consequential damage to others in
their property or business. This alwaj-s happens more or less
in all rival pursuits, and often where there is nothing of that
kind. One mill, or one store, or one school, injures another.
One's dwelling is undermined, or its lights darkened, or its
prospect obscured, and thus materially lessened in value, by
the erection of other buildings upon lands of other proprie-
tors. One is beset with noise or dust or other inconveniences
by the alteration of a street, or more especially by the introduc-
tion of a railway, but there is no redress in any of these cases.
The thing is lawful in the railroad, as much as in the other cases
reported. These public works came too near some and too re-
mote from others. They benefit many and injure some. It is
not possible to equalize the advantages and disadvantages. It
is so with everything, and always will be. Those most skilled
in these matters, even empirics of the most sanguine preten-
sions, soon find their philosophy at fault in all attempts at
equalizing the ills of life. The advantage and disadvantage
of a single railway could not be satisfactorily balanced by all
I Taylor v. Plymouth, 8 Met. 462;
Kuggles V. Nantucket, 11 Cush. 433 ;
Stone V. Mayor etc. of N. Y., 25 Wend.
157; Russell v. Mayor etc. of N. T.,
2 Denio, 461 ; American Print Works
V. Lawrence, 21 N. J. 248; s. c, 23
N. J. 590; White v. Charleston, 1
Hill (S. C.) 571; Keller v. Corpus
Christi, 50 Tex. 614 (32 Am. Rep.
513); Conwell v. Emrie, 2 Ind. 35;
Field V. Des Moines, 39 Iowa, 575 ;
McDonald v. Redwing, 13 Minn. 38;
Sirocco V. Geary, 3 Cal. 69. See post,
sec. 335.
455
§ 239
MTJXICIPAL COEPOEATIOUS.
[OH. XIV.
of the courts in forty years ; hence they would be left, as all
other consequential damage and gain are left, to balance and
counterbalance themselves as they best can." ^ Thus, there is
no taking of property, if the owner of a fishery finds it re-
duced in value, in consequence of improvements in the navi-
gation of the river ; ^ when a spring is destroyed, or other
damage done to riparian land hj the same or similar causes ; ^
or when the value of adjoining property is affected by a change
in the grade of the street.* In reference to this general subject,
1 Hatch V. Vt. Central R. E. Co.,
25 Vt. 49; Eichardson v. Vermont
Central E. E. Co., 25 Vt. 465; Eail-
road Company v. Eichmond, 96 U.
S. 521 ; Davidson v. Boston & Maine
E. E. Co., 3 Cusli. 91; Kennett's Pe-
tition, 24 N. H. 135; Hooker v. Kew
Haven etc. E. E. Co., 14 Conn. 146;
Gould V. Hudson Eiver E. R. Co., 6
N. T. 522; People v. Kerr, 27 N. T.
188; Zimmerman v. Union Canal Co.,
I Watts & S. 846; Monongahela Navi-
gation Co. V. Coons, 6 Watts & S.
101; Shrunk v. Schuylkill Naviga-
tion Co., 14 Serg. & R. "71; Harvey
v. Lackawanna etc. E. E. Co., 47 Pa.
St. 428; Xinicum Fishing Co. v. Car-
ter, 61 Pa. St. 21; Fuller v. Edings,
II Eich. L. 239; Edings v. Seabrook,
12 Eich. L. 504; Alexander v. Mil-
waukee, 16 Wis. 247; Mun-ay v. Men-
efee, 20 Ark. 561.
2 Shrunk v. Schuylkill Navigation
Co., 14 Serg. & E. 71; see Parker v.
Mildam Co., 20 Me. 353 (37 Am. Dec.
56); Commonwealth v. Chaplin, 5
Pick. 199 (16 Am. Dec.) 386; Com-
monwealth V. Look, 108 Mass. 452 :
Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (4 Am.
Dec. 463).
^ Commonwealth v. Eichter, 1 Pa.
St. 467; Green v. Swift, 47 Cal. 536;
Brown v. Cayuga etc. E. E. Co., 12
N. Y. 486; Davidson v. Boston &
Maine E. E. Co., 3 Cush. 91 ; Sprague
V. Worcester, 13 Gray, 193; Tr.ans-
portation Co. v. Chicago, 99 IT. S.
635.
456
* Gozzler v. Georgetovm, 6 Wheat.
.'93 ; Smith v. Washington, 20 How.
(U. S.) 135; Callendar v. Marsh, 1
Pick. 418; Bender v. Nashua, 17 N.
H. 477; Skinner v. Hartford Bridge
Co., 29 Conn. 523; Green v. Eeading,
9 Watts, 382 ; O' Conner v. Pittsburgh,
18 Pa. St. 187; In re Ridge Street, 29
Pa. St. 391 ; Matter of Furman Street,
17 Wend. 649 ; Wilson v. Mayor etc.
of New Tork, 1 Denio, 595; Graves
V. Otis, 2 Hill, 466; Eadcliffe'sEx'rs
V. Mayor etc., Brooklyn, 4 N. T. 195;
Pontiac v. Carter, 32 Mich. 164; La^
fayette v. Bush, 19Ind. 326; Macy v.
Indianapolis, 17 Ind. 267; Vincennes
V. Eichards, 23 Ind. 381; Eoberts v.
Chicago, 26 111. 249; Murphy v. Chi-
cago, 29 111. 279; Greal v. Keokuk, 4
Greene (Iowa) 47; but, see, contra,
Atlanta V. Green, 67 Ga. 386; John-
son V. City of Parkersburg, 16 W.
Va. 402 (37 Am. Eep. 779); McComb
V. Akron, 15 Ohio, 474 (18 Ohio, 229) ;
Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459.
In the last two cases it is held that
when the gi-ade of streets is first es-
tablished, the consequential injury
to adjoining property does not con-
stitute a taking of property; but
when the grade has once been es-
tablished, and the adjoining prop-
erty improved with reference to the
existing grade, a change in the
grade, causing damage, would give
rise to a claim for compensation.
In O'Brien v. St. Paul, 25 Minn. 331,
it is held that if the change in the
CH. XIV.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
§240
Mr. Justice Miller has said,^ that the decisions, which have de-
nied the right of compensation " for the consequential injury
to the property of an individual for the prosecution of iniprove-
ments of roads, streets, rivers, and other highways," " have gone
to the extreme limit of sound judicial construction in favor of
this principle, and in some cases beyond it ; and it remains true
that where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced ad-
ditions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any
artificial structure placed on it, so as effectually to destroy or
impair its usefulness, it is a taking within tlie meaning of the
Constitution." ^
§ 240. Exercise of eminent domain by municipal corpo-
rations,— The Legislature, as has already been explained,^ has
in the first instance the sole power of exercising the right of
eminent domain, in confiscating private property to public use.
It has also been explained in the same connection, that the Leg-
islature has the authority to delegate the exercise of this power
to other organizations, either of a public or quasi-Tpnhlic character,
provided the use to which the land is to be devoted is a public one.
Thus, for example, the power to exercise the right of eminent
domain may be delegated to the municipal corporation, and in
delegating that power, the Legislature may also confer upon the
corporation the power of determining the necessity for the ex-
ercise of the right. So, for example, a municipal corporation
may, in strict conformity with the constitutional limitation, be
vested with the power to open up and lay out streets and parks,
whenever the city council may judge such action to be neces-
sary or expedient.* Generally, the determination of the neces-
grade of the street deprives the abut-
ting land of its lateral support, it is
a taking of property in the exercise
of the right of eminent domain.
iPumpelly v. Green Bay etc. Co.,
13 Wall. 166, 180.
2 The application of this question
to the effect of municipal control of
streets on the right of abutting own-
ers receives further discussion in
the chapter on Streets. See post,
ohap. XVI. sees. 303, 304.
8 Sec. 232.
' Commonvyealth v. Charlestown,
1 Pick. (Mass.) 180; In re Piscata-
vyay Towns, 54 N. J. L. 559; Harbeck
V. Toledo, 11 Ohio St. 219; Shaffuer
V. St. Louis, 31 Mo. 264; In re Locust
St., 153 Pa. St. 276; Rhine v. Mc-
Kinney, 53 Tex. 354; Alexander v.
Baltimore, 5 Gill (Md.) 383; Van
Husan v. Heames, (Mich. 92) 52 N.
W. K. 18; People v. Smith, 21 N. Y.
595 ; Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. K.
R. Co., 18 Wend. 9; Cherokee v.
Sioux City etc. Co., 52 Iowa, 279;
Swan V. Williams, 2 Mich. 427; Will-
son V. Bl. Cr. Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 251;
. 457
§240
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XIV.
sity of exercising the power in the given case is left solely to
the judgment of the city council.^ But it may also be specially
delegated by the Legislature to some other body, representative
of the municipal corporation, such as the park commissioners.^
The motives of the council or other body, having the power
to exercise the right of eminent domain, are presumed to be in
strict conformity with the public need ; and it is not necessary
that there should be any express declaration of such need, in
order to make the appropriation to public use constitutional ;
unless, possibly, where by express provisions of the statute, un-
der which the municipal corporation exercises the power, the
jurisdiction over the case is dependent upon a judicial finding
that such an appropriation to the public use was necessary.^
While tlie Legislature usually leaves to the municipal cor-
poration the exercise of the right of eminent domain, in behalf
of municipal purposes, including the laying out of the needed
streets and highways ; yet, it is possible for the same results to
be attained by the direct action of the Legislature ; as where
the Legislature orders a survey of the town in which certain
streets are laid out and the map declared by a legislative act to
be a public record. The streets laid out on that map are pub-
lic highways, even before they have been formally opened for
use.*
But, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the
municipal corporation is not permitted to go beyond the lim-
itations imposed by the Legislature upon its exercise of the
power ; and, as a general proposition, it is necessary, in the grant
to the municipal corporation of this power, that the purpose or
use for which it maj' take private property should be speci-
fied bj' the Legislature ; and the municipal corporation can in
that case not go beyond the express grant of power, or enjoy
Simpson v. Kansas City, 20 S. W.
K. 38: Mercer T. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. &
C. Kaih-oad Co., 36 Pa. St. 99; Toledo
etc. Co. V. Toledo Elec. Co., 6 Ohio
Cir. Ct. R. 362; Commonwealth v.
Charlestown, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 180.
1 Methodist Prot. Church v. Balti-
more, 6 Gill, 391 ; In re Cedar Rapids,
(Iowa, 92) .51 N. W. R. 1142; Curry v.
Mt. Sterling, 15 111. 320.
468
2 West Chicago Park Commission-
ers V. Western Union Tel. Co., 103
111. 33.
8 Hunter v. Newport, 5 R. I. 325;
Com'rs of Parks v. Moesta, (Mich.
92) 51 N. W. R. 903; O'Hare v. Chi-
cago etc. Co., (111. 92) 28 N. E. R.
923; Allen v. Jones, 47 Ind. 442.
*West V. Blake, 4 Blackf. (Ind.)
234.
CH. XIV.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
§241
such power by doubtful or extravagant construction.^ Thus,
for example, where a city corporation has been authorized to
appropriate private property for the construction of streets and
other public highways, and public squares and grounds ; it can-
not exercise the right of eminent domain for the purpose of es-
tablishing a prison for city use.^
§ 241. Conditions precedent to the exercise of the power.
— Not only can a municipal corporation not extend its power
by doubtful construction beyond the express limitations imposed
by the Legislature, but 'the exercise of tlie power in any case
will only be lawful, when in doing so all the requirements
either of the constitution, or of the State statutes, under which
the power is exercised, have been strictly obseived. If there
is any material or substantial deviation from the requirements
of constitution or statute, as to the mode or measure of exer-
cising the power, the appropriation of the private property
would in that case not be lawful ; and it would be subject to
avoidance by the owner of the land by an appropriate action.^
Hence, in order that any exercise of the power of eminent do-
main may be valid, a strict compliance with all the conditions
precedent laid down by the statute will be required ; a failure
to perform any one of the conditions precedent will operate to
1 Philip street, In re, 10 La. An.
313; Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525;
Morris v. Chicago, 11 111. 650; s. p.,
111. & Mich. Canal Trs. v. Chicago, 12
111. 403; Kane V. Baltimore, 15 Md.
240; Claiborne Street, In re, 4 La.
An. 7; Exchange Alley, In re, 4 La.
An. 4.
2 East St. Louis v. St. John, 47 111.
463; Davis v. Nichols, 39 111. App.
610; West Kiver Br. Co. v. Dix, 6
How. (U. S.) 545.
8 State V. Hudson City, 27 N. J. L.
214; Cincinnati v. Coombs, 16 Ohio,
181; State v. Heppenheimer, (N. J.
92) 23 Atl. K. 664; Baltimore v. Hook,
62 Md. 371 ; Byckman v. New York,
55 N. Y. 439; People v. Kniskern, 54
N. Y. 52; Thompson v. Schermer-
horn, 6 N. Y. 92; Hunt v. Utica, 18
N. Y. 442; Belcher Sugar Refining
Co. V. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co.,
82 Mo. 121; Speoht v. Detroit, 20
Mich. 168; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23
Conn. 189, 208; Shaffner v. St. Louis,
31 Mo. 264; Owosso v. Eichfield, 45
N. W. E. 129 ; Barteson v. Minneap-
olis, 33 Minn. 468; Harbeck v. Tole-
do, 11 Ohio St. 219; State v. Jersey
City, 25 N. J. L. 309; State v. Jersey
City, 26 N. J. L. 444; Godchaux v.
Carpenter, 19 Nev. 415 ; State v. Ta-
coma, ( Wash. 92) 29 Pac. Kep. 847;
Northern Pacific Terminal Co. v.
Portland, 14 0reg. 24; Buffalo, In re,
78 N. Y. 362; Ventura County v.
Thompson, 51 Cal. 577; Leslie v. St.
Louis, 47 Mo. 474; In re Consolidated
Gas Co., 63 Hun, 632; Hudson v.
Bridgeport, 25 Conn. 420; People v.
Brighton, 20 Mich. 57 : Kidder v. Pe-
oria, 29 111. 77 ; Exchange Alley, In re,
4 La. An. 4; Burnett v. Buffalo, 17
N. Y. 383.
459
§241
MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS.
[cH. xrv.
invalidate the proceeding and prevent it from divesting the
owner of his property .^ And, the municipal coi-poration must
show affirmatively that these requirements of the statute have
been complied with. Thus, it has been held, where the statute
requires that the owner of the land must be given an opportun-
ity to sell the land, it is required that an effort be made to effect
a private purchase of the land before the condemnatory proceed-
ings can be instituted ; and, in order that the proceedings may
be instituted and a lawful condemnation be obtained, it must be
shown that the parties failed to agree ' between them as to the
amount of compensation that was due to the owner for the
taking of his land for a public use.^ So also, has it been held
that, if a charter requires of a city council a previous effort to
make a private purchase of the land, an honest effort to secure
it by private purchase is necessary ; and that a mere formal and
perfunctory compliance with that requirement would not be
sufficient.®
It has also been held very generally, that notice of the pro-
ceeding should be given to the property owner, and a failure
to give such notice would invalidate the entire proceeding;*
and the record must show proof of service.* But it is com-
petent, however, for the Legislature, in the absence of any
special constitutional limitation, to provide for a simple con-
structive notice, and to dispense with an actual notification of
the property owner.® Thus, for example, it has been held that
iCom'rs V. Newby, 31 111. App.
378 ; Anderson v. Pemberton, 89 Mo.
61; Zeigler v. Hopkins, 117 U. S. 683;
Mulligan V. Smith, 59 Cal. 206.
2 In re New Toi-k City, 63 Hun, 632 ;
Moses V. St. Louis Co., 84 Mo. 242;
Dyckman v. New York, 5 N. T. 434;
Re Middleton, 82 N. T. 196; In re
Metro. E. R. E. Co., 12 N. Y. S. 502;
Kichols V. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189;
Pennsylvania E. E. Co. v. Porter, 29
Pa. St. 165; Grand Eapids v. Grand
Eapids & Ind. E. E. Co., 58 Mich.
641; Doughty v. Somerville & E. E.
E. Co., 21 N. J. L. 442; Toledo etc.
Co. V. Detroit etc. Co., 62 Mich. 564,
578.
3 Fort St. etc. Co. v. Jones, 83
460
Mich. 415 ; Lane v. Saginaw, 53 Mich.
442; Wookler v. Chicago, 61 111. 142.
* St. Joseph, etc. Co. v. Shambaugh,
106 Mo. 557; Owasso v. Eichfield, 45
N. W. E. 129; Kearney v. Ballentine,
23 Atl. E. 821; Trester v. Mo. E. E.
Co., 49 N. W. E. 1110; Nichols v.
Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189.
^Nielsen v. Wakefield, 43 Mich.
434.
8 State V. Heppenheimer, (N. J. 92)
23 Atl. E. 664; Chicago etc. Co. v.
Grierson, (Kan. 92) 29 Pac. E. 1082;
State V. Jersey City, 24 N. J. L. 662;
State V. Plainfield, 38 N. J. L. 95;
Baltimore, etc. Co. v. Baltzell, 23
Atl. E. 74; Wilkin T. St. Paul & Pac.
E. E. Co., 16 Minn. 271; Winnebago
CH. XIV.] EMINENT DOMAIN. § 242
the publication of the ordinance, in the absence of a special
constitutional requirement, may be made by the Legislature to
be a sufficient notice to the property owner that his property is
to be taken for a public use.^ But, in every case, it has been
held that a charter which did not provide for personal service
of notice upon the property ow^ner, was defective.^ But all
these questions must finally depend upon the terms and pro-
visions of the constitution, and the legislative act, by and under
which the power is conferred upon the municipal corporation.^
§ 242. Effect of discontiiiuance of proceedings. — It fre-
quently happens that a municipal corporation will proceed to a
condemnation of private property for public use, up to the point
when the damages for such condemnation will be assessed; and
the amount of the damages having thus been ascertained,
the corporation deems it expedient to abandon the further pros-
ecution of the case, on account of the amount of damages for
the condemnation. The question has been raised, at what time
in the course of the proceeding is the corporation still permit-
ted to withdraw ; or when has the proceeding gone so far as to
create in behalf of the property owner the right to a comple-
tion of the proceeding, and a recovery by him of the damages,
which have been assessed against the municipal corporation
for the proposed taking of his property for a public use. It
has been held by a great preponderance of authority that, be-
fore the property has been taken possession of, and before the
final confirmation of the report of the commissioners, or other
referees, in regard to the assessment of damages, the corpora-
tion may recede from or abandon the proceeding, without any
claim against it on the part of the property owner for damages
for such discontinuance of the proceedings.* And where such
F. Co. V. Ey. Co., (Wis. 92) 51 N. "W.
E. 576; Owners, etc., v. Albany, 15
"Wend. 374; Methodist Prot. Church
V. Baltimore, 6 Gill (Md.) 391 ; Stew-
art V. Hinds Co. Bd. of Police, etc.,
25 Miss. 479; Dubuque v. Wooton,
28 Iowa, 571.
'Winnebago, etc. Co. v.E. E. Co.,
(Wis. 92) 51 N. W. E. 576; Curry v.
Mt. Sterling, 15 111. 320; Johnson v.
Joliet & C. E. E. Co., 23 111. 202.
^Kundizer v. Saginaw, 59 Mich.
355, 363; Charlestown, etc. Co. v.
Comstock, (Va. 92) 15 S. E. E. 69; St.
Paul, Minneapolis & M. Ey. Co. v.
Minneapolis, 35 Minn. 141 ; State v.
Fond du Lac, 42 Wis. 298.
s Carey v. Chicago, etc. Co., 100
Mo. 282; Swan v. Willianis, 2 Mich.
427; Palmyra v. Morton, 25 Mo. 593,
597.
* Hawersley v. New York, 56 N. T.
533; Williamsport, etc. Co. v. P, &
E. K. Co., 27 W. N. C. 576; 21 Atl. K.
461
§242
MUIflCIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. xrv.
discontinuance is allowable, the city will only be required to
pay the taxable costs and expenses of the city, and is not called
upon to pay the attorney's fee and other expenses, which the
private owner might have incurred, which are not included in
the actual costs.-'
It is, however, doubtful under the authorities, what acts con-
stitute such a conclusion of the proceedings as to bind the
municipal corporation and compel it to go on with the condem-
nation, and take away the power to withdraw. According to
the authorities in New York and other States, it has been held
that where proceedings to condemn lands to public use have
progressed so far, as that the amount of damages has been
finally and definitely assessed, and the report which finds the
amount of damages has been filed and confirmed, the private
property owner has, at that point in the proceedings, acquired
the vested right to damages thus assessed in his favor, and the
city cannot escape the obligation to pay them.'^ But it has been
held in other cases that, as long as possession has not been taken
under the judgment of the court of condemnation, the city may
still withdraw from the transaction and abandon the proceedings,
without payment of the damages which have been assessed to
the owner, even though the report assessing the damages has
been presented and confirmed by the court. In these cases it is
held, that the confirmation of the report, in which the damages
have been assessed, is simply a determination of the value of the
land, if the city should finally conclude to take such land for
645; Rhinebeck R. R., In re, 67 jST. Y.
242; Simpson V. Kansas City, (Mo. 92)
20 S. W. E. 38; State v. Hug, 44 Mo.
116; Carson v. Hartford, 48 Conn. 68;
Stevens v. Danbury, 53 Conn. 9;
Hulliu V. Second Municipality, 11
Rob. 97; Jersey City Water Com'rs,
31 K. J. L. 72; Clough v. Unity, 18
N. H. 75; Municipality v. Levee, S.
C. P. Co., 7 La. An. 270; Com'rs of
Washington Park, In re, 56 X. T.
144 ; Military Parade Ground, In re,
60 N. T. 319; Millard v. Lafayette,
5 La. An. 112; Canal Street, In re,
11 Wend. 155.
1 Waverly W. Works Co., In re, 16
Hun, 57; St. Louis v. Meintz, (Mo. 92)
462
18 S. W. R. 30; MatUage v. N. T. El.
R. Co., 17 N. Y. S. 536.
2 Harrington v. Berkshire Co.
Com'rs, 22 Pick. 263; Dolores No. 2
Land & Canal Co. v. Hartman, (Col.
92) 29 Pack. 378; Funk's Admr. v.
Waynesboro, (Pa.) 10 Atl. R. 427;
O'Neill V. Hudson County, 41 N. J. L.
161; Fort Street etc. Co. v. Backus,
(Mich. 92) 52 N. W. R. 790; Garrison
V. New York, 21 Wall. 196; Dover
Street, In re, 18 Johns. 506; Duncan
v. Louisville, 8 Bush (Ky.) 98; People
V. Syracuse, Cora. Council, 78 N. Y.
57; Consumers' G. T. Co. v. Harless,
(Ind. 92) 29 N. E. E. 1062; Rhinebeck
R. R., In re, 67 N. Y. 242.
CH. XIV.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
§242
public use.^ In some of the cases, the language of the act or
charter of the city settles this question beyond dispute, as where
it is provided "that after the value and damages shall have
been ascertained, the amount with interest shall be paid to the
person interested, on demand."^
It has also been held that, as long as the assessment of dam-
ages has not been determined upon as a finality, the taking of
possession of the lands would not so far bind the municipal
corporation as to take away the power of discontinuing the
proceedings. The taking of possession is presumed to be with
the consent of the landowner, and it serves in no wa}'' whatever
as evidence of a contract to biij'^ the lands.^ But in all of these
cases of a discontinuance of the proceedings by the municipal
corporation, while it is true that there cannot be any recovery
of the sum, which might have been established as the true
measure of damages for the confiscation of tlie property for a
public use, j'et, the landowner has a special action for damages
for any wrongful or injurious acts of the municipal corporation
in respect to the land, and for injuries which the landowner
has suffered by the detention or use of the land by the cor-
poration.* It needs to be stated finally, that this entire doctrine
in respect to the right of discontinuing proceedings for con-
demnation of lands is opposed and rejected by the English cases.^
1 Baltimore & Susq. E. K. Co. v.
Nesbit, 10 How. 395; Garrison v.
New York, 21 Wall. 196; GrafE v.
Baltimore, 10 Md. 544; State v.
Graves, 19 Md. 351; Baltimore v.
Musgrave, 48 Md. 272; Merrick v.
Baltimore, 4.3 Md. 219; Norris v. Bal-
timore, 44 Md. 598; Black v. Balti-
more, 50 Md. 236 ; Baltimore v. Black,
56 Md. 333.
2 Devlin v. City of New York, 131
N. Y. 123; Longworth v. Cincinnati,
48 Ohio St. 637; Trustees Brooklyn
Bridge v. Cliurch, 63 Hun, 632; Gar-
rison V. New York, 21 Wall. 196;
Fai-nsworth v. Boston, 121 Mass. 173;
Lafayette v. Schultz, 44 Ind. 97 ; Staf-
ford V. Albany, 7 Johns. (N. Y.)541;
Higgins V. Chicago, 18 111. 276; Chi-
cago v. Wheeler, 25 111. 478.
^ Brokaw v. Terre Haute, 97 Ind.
176; Feiten v. Milwaukee, 47 Wis.
494; HuUin v. Munici'y, H Bob. (La.)
97; Norris v. Baltimore, 44 Md. 606;
Baltimore v. Musgrave, 48 Md. 272.
*EofBgnac Street, In re, 4 Rob.
(La.) 357; Stevens v. Danbury, 53
Conn. 9; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351;
GrafE v. Baltimore, 10 Md. 544; Whit-
ing v. Boston, 106 Mass. 89; Mc-
Laughlin V. Municipality, 5 La. An.
504; Simpson v. Kansas City, (Mo.
92) 20 S. W. R. 38; Baltimore v. Mus-
grave, 48 Md. 272 ; Anthony Street,
In re, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) «18; Walling
V. Shreveport, 5 La. An. 660.
5 King v. Market St. Com'rs, 4
B. & Ad. 335; Stone v. Commercial
Ry. Co., 4 M. & C. 122; Walker v.
Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 6 Hare 544.
463
§ 243
MTJJSriCrPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XIV.
§ 243. Compensation required.— The general provision of
the constitutions, limiting and controlling the exercise of the
right of eminent domain, requires the payment of compensation
for the appropriation of private property to a public use. Some
of the constitutional provisions enter into an express stipula-
tion, that the compensation should be made in money ; but, even
in the absence of an express provision of that kind, the com-
pensation would necessarily be presumed to be pecuniary in
character. In determining what is the compensation, the laws
of the State, and sometimes the provisions of the constitution,
require certain methods and modes of proceeding to be followed.
And in order that the compensation agreed upon may be bind-
ing upon both parties, the provisions of the constitution and
of the statute, under which the municipal corporation exercises
the power must be strictly pursued, and any material deviations
from these requirements would invalidate the condemnation.^
If the act of the Legislature or charter, which authorized the
taking of property for public use by the municipal corporation,
provided a specific remedy for the ascertainment of the dam-
ages, it is necessary that that remedy should be resorted to ;
because, if it is complete and adequate, it is regarded as exclu-
sive.^ Where the owner's right to damages has become vested,
1 state V. City, (N. J. 92) 22 Atl. R.
1052; Union etc. Co. v. Slee, (111. 88)
12 N. E. R. 543 ; 13 K. E. R. 222 ; Croft
V. Bennington, etc. Co., (Vt. 92) 23
Atl. R. 922; Thompson v. Chi. etc.
Co., (Mo. 82) 19 S. W. R. 77; Under-
hill V. Manhattan Ry. Co., (N. T. 92)
27 Abb. N. C. 478; 21 Civ. Pro. R.
441; Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247;
Sower V. Philadelphia, 35 Pa. St. 231 ;
Cairo & P. R. R. Co. v. Turner, 31
Ark. 495; Memphis & C. R. R. Co. v.
Payne, 37 Miss. 700; Foster v. Scott,
17 N. Y. S. 479; Cairo & P. R. R. Co.
V. Turner, 31 Ark. 459; Jamison v.
Springfield, 53 Mo. 224; Daniels v.
Railroad Co., 25 Iowa, 129; Chaffee's
Appeal, 56 Mich. 244; St. Louis v.
Franks, 78 Mo. 41 ; Butte v. Boydston,
64 Cal. 110; Floyd v. Turner, 23 Tex.
293; Kankaman v. Canallo, 142 U. S.
254 ; Boston v. Robbins, 126 Mass. 384.
464
estate V. Engelman, 106 Mo. 628;
Wamesit P. Co. v. Lowell etc. Co.,
139 Mass. 173; Hanes v. N. C. R. R.
Co. 109N. C. 490; Baltimore B. R.
Co. V. Baltzell, (Md. 92) 23 Atl. R. 74;
In re Opening of 163d St., 61Hun, 365 ;
State V. Heffenheimer, (N. J. 92) 23
Atl. R. 664; Dodge v. Essex Co.
Comm'rs, 3 Met. (Mass.) 380; Rein-
hart V. Buffalo, 15 N. Y. S. 844; Ran-
kin & Great Western Ry. Co., 4 tip.
Can. C. P. 463; Grimshaw v. Grand
Trunk R'y Co., 19 Up. Can. Q. B.
493; Mitchell v. Franklin &C. Turnp.
Co., 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 4p6; Brown v.
Beatty, 34 Miss. 227; Brown v. Calu-
met, (111. 92) 26 N. E. R. 501; Calking
V. Baldwin, 4 AVend. (IST. Y.) 667;
Baltimore B. R. Co. v. Baltzell, (Md.
92) 23 Atl. Rep. 74; Lafayette & I.
R. R. Co. V. Smith, 6 Ind. 249.
CH. XIV.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
§244
and the municipal corporation has failed to make payment of
the same, the private owner whose property has been taken
may sue the corporation therefor ; and, in an appropriate case,
obtain a mandamus to compel such corporation to provide for
the payment of the compensation, or to collect the assessments,
out of which such compensation is to be paid.^ But this is pos-
sible only when the proceedings for assessment have been made
final. As long as these proceedings are only provisional, there
is no right of action on the part of the private owner to compel
such payment.^
§ 244. Who entitled to receive compensation The gen-
eral rule is that the owner or owners of the property will be
entitled to receive the compensation, and it matters not who or
how many they are, or what their interests in the property are,
whether joint owners, or parties having separate interests in
the estate, each will be able to claim a share in the compen-
sation.^ Npt only is that the ,rule, in respect to the more or
less permanent interests in the property ; but it is likewise the
case, where the party claiming the interest is simply a tenant
for years, or where he has a more or less temporary interest in the
land. His dispossession, in the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, does not constitute an act of eviction, so as to relieve
him from liability on his covenant for rent ; nor is he subject to
a loss of his estate in the land by this exercise of eminent do-
main, without satisfying his claim for compensation. He has,
along with the landlord, an act for damages against the public,
or against the private corporation, in whose behalf the land has
been confiscated.*
' HoUingswoi'th v. Tensas Parish,
17 Fed. Kep. 109; Wrought Iron
Bridge Co. v. Utica, 17 lb. 316; Hig-
gins V. Chicago, 18 111. 276; Rome v.
Jenkins, 30 6a. 1.54; State v. Keokuk,
9 Iowa, 438; Philadelphia v. Dyer,
41 Pa. St. 463; Philadelphia v. Dick-
son, 38 Pa. St. 247; McCormack v.
Brooklyn, 108 N. Y. 49; State v.
Hugg, 44 Mo. 116; Mobile v. Richard-
son, 1 Stew. & Port. (Ala.) 12.
2 Carson v. Hartford, 48 Conn. 68.
3 Devlin v. New York, 131 Jf. Y.
123; Shaaber v. Reading, (Pa. 92) 24
Atl. E. 692; Mortimer v. Metro. El.
30
R. Co., 129 N. Y. 81; 29 N. E. R. 5;
Board v. Levee Gom'rs, 66 Miss. 248;
Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. Oliver, 19 Atl.
R. 47; 131 Pa. St. 408; Thompson v.
Chicago & Ch. etc. Co., (Mo. 92) 19
S. W. R. 77; Kearney V. Metro. E. R.
Co., 129 N. Y. 76; Missouri etc. Co.
V. Wilson, 45 Mo. App. 1; Chicago
etc. Co. V. Easley, 26 Pac. R. 731;
Korn V. Metro. Ry. Co., 59 Hun, 505;
Brown v. Chicago etc. Co., 101 Mo.
484.
iRiddle v. Hussman, 23 Mo. 597;
Kingland v. Clark, 24 Mo. 24; Leiter
V. Pike, 127 111. 287; see Gillespie v.
465
§245
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XIV.
A different conclusion is reached in regard to the effect of
the exercise of eminent domain on a wife's dower. It is well set-
tled, that the dower right of the wife or widow is defeated by
the exercise of eminent domain over the land, out of which the
dower issues. But it is a matter of considerable doubt, whether
the right before assignment, during the life of the husband, or
after his death, partakes so much of the nature of an interest or
estate in the land, as to entitle her to compensation separate
from her husband, and his heirs and assignees. It has been
held that she cannot claim such compensation, but the question
cannot be considered as definitely settled.^
§ 245. Who assesses the damage. — The body or tribunal,
to whom the assessment of damages for confiscation of land to
public use must be referred, will depend upon the express pro-
visions of the law of the State. And the provisions of that
law, whatever they may be, must be strictly followed.^ But
little difficulty is experienced, under this heading, except where
the law requires that the assessment of damages should be
made by a jury, in determining what is the sense in which the
word jury is here employed.
It has been, held, that where that statement is made, jury
means a common law jury ; and no other proceeding will supply
the place of an assessment by the jury.^ In Minnesota, it has
been held that the constitutional provision, reserving the right
of trial by jury, is not extended by implication to proceedings
.Thomas, 15 "Wend. 468; Parks v. Bos-
ton, 15 Pick. 198; Patterson v. Bos-
ton, 20 Pick. 159; Polts v. Huntley,
7 Wend. 210.
1 1 Waslib. on Real Prop. 270 ; Moore
V. New York, 4 Sandf. 450; s. c, 8
N. T. 110; Gwyilne v. Cincinnati, 3
Ohio, 24. See, contra, i-ecognizing
the widow's claim to compensation,
Ebey v. Ebey, 1 Wash. Ter. 185;
Venahle v. Wabash etc. Co., (Mo. 92)
19 S. W. R. 45.
2 McClure v. Red Wing, 28 Minn.
186; Allen V. Jones, 47 Ind. 442;
Rhine v. McEinney, 53 Tex. 354;
Miimeapolis v. Wilkin, 30 Minn. 140.
* St. Joseph etc. Co. v. Shambaugh,
106 Mo. 557; Chicago etc. Co. v.
466
Bates, (Mo. 92) 18 S. W. R. 1133; Chi-
cago etc. V. Elliott, (Mo. 92) 18 S. W.
R. 901; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5
Gill (Md.) 383; Meth. Prot. Church
V. Baltimore, 6 Gill. (Md.) 391"; Ala.
etc. Co. V. Kewton, (Ala. 92) 10 So.
Rep. 89; People v. Stuart, 97 111. 123;
Postal, Tel. Co. v. Railroad, 92 Ala.
331; Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio St. 167;
Beers v. Beers, 4 Conn. 535; Rail-
road Co. V. Miller, 17 S. W. R. 499;
106 Mo. 458; Sharpless v. West Ches-
ter, 1 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 257; Charles-
town etc. Co. V. Comstock, (W. Va.)
15 S. E. K 69; State v. Graves, 19
Md. 351; Lumsden v. Milwaukee, 8
Wis. 485; contra. Col. etc. Co. v,
Humphrey, 26 Pac. R. 165.
CH. XIY.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
§245
in the exercise of the right of eminent domain.^ It is very-
likely that constitutional provisions, like the one in Minnesota,
do not apply to the proceedings for an assessment of damages
in exercise of eminent domain, so as to bind the Legisla-
ture to prescribe that method of assessment. It is believed that
the authorities will agree that the Legislature is competent to
prescribe some other method or mode of assessing damages in
such cases, notwithstanding the general constitutional provision
preserving the right of trial by jury, as long as the constitution
contains no special provision, requiring such a trial in the special
case of proceedings in eminent domain.^ But the fact, that the
law of the State requires a resort to a jury, will not make it nec-
essary for the first assessment of damages to be made by the jury,
provided that the private owner has the opportunity, if he
desires it, of appealing to a court and jury for the review of
the assessment which is previously made by some other body or
tribunal. As long as he has this right of appeal from the pre-
liminary and otherwise unauthorized assessments by commis-
sioners or otherwise, there is no violation of the rule of law,
which requires that the assessment should be made by the jury.^
1 Ames V. Lake Superior & Miss.
E. R. Co., 21 Minn. 241, 293; Weir
V. St. Paul S. & T. F. K. E. Co., 18
Minn. 155.
2 Petition of Mt. Washington Road
Co., 35 N. H. 184; State v. Heppen-
heimer, (N. J. 92) 23 Atl. E. 664;
United States v. Engerman, 46 Fed.
R. 176; Weir v. St. Paul S. & T. F.
R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 155; Heyneman
V. Blake, 19 Cal. 579; Koppikus v.
Commissioners, 16 Cal. 248; Dalton
V. Northampton, 19 N. H. .362; Ames
V. Lake Superior & Miss. R. R. Co.,
21 Minn. 241, 293; Beekman v. Sara-
toga & S. R. R. Co., 3 Paige (N. Y.)
45; Lake Erie, W. & St. L. R. R. Co.
V. Heath, 9 Ind. 558 ; Hymes v. Ayde-
lott, 26 Ind. 431 ; Livingston v. New
York, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 85; State v.
Jersey City, 26 N. J. L. 444.
3 Callen v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540;
Postal etc. Co. v. Ala. etc. Co., (Ala.
92) 9 So. R. 555; Port Huron etc. Co.
V. Callmain, 61 Mich. 12; Alexander
V. Baltimore, 5 Gill (Md.) 383; Meth.
Prot. Church v. Baltimore, 6 Gill
(Md.) 891; Morford v. Barnes, 8
Yerg. (Tenn.) 444; Beers v. Beers, 4
Conn. 535; St. Joseph etc. Co. v.
Cudmore, 15 S. W. Rep. 535; Ken-
dall V. Post, 8 Oreg. 14; Evansville
& O. R. R. Co. V. Miller, 30 Ind. 209;
People V. McRoberts, 62 111. 38; Up-
per Coos R. Co. V. Parsons, 18 Atl.
Rep. 10; Minneapolis v. Wilkin, 30
Minn. 140; Stewart v. Baltimore, 7
Md. 500; Lumsden v. Milwaukee, 8
Wis. 485 ; Chicago etc. Co. v. Eubanks,
18 S. W. Rep. 1184; Kine v. Defen-
baugh, 64 111. 291; People v. Stuart,
97 111. 123; Warren v. St. Paul *
Pac. R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 884; Weir
V. St. Paul S. & T. F. R. E. Co., 18
Minn. 155 ; Connelly v. Griswold, 7
Iowa, 416; Wells Co. Road, In re, ^
Ohio St. 16; Cairo & F. R. R, Co. v.
Trout, 32 Ark. 17 (1877).
467
§ 245 MCTNrCIPAL COKPOEATIOJfS. [CH. XIV.
But, in any case, the owner of piivate propert}-, which is taken
in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, may waive his
claim to an assessment by jury, and consent to any other mode
of assessment. The provision is for his benefit, if he desires
to avail himself of it ; but it is not obligatory upon the public
authorities, if the private owner does not require it.^ In New
York, the constitution provides that the compensation " shall
be ascertained by a jury, or by no less than three commissioners
appointed by a court of record." This provision requires the
jury, in the absence of the appointment of commissioners ; but
it is left to the discretion of the court, whether a jury or three
commissioners should be selected. But the commissioners can
only be appointed by the court ; and no method of selection of
appraisers or commissioners by lot would be lawful, and a sub-
sequent appointment of them by the court would be an evasion
of the constitutional provision, which would make the assess-
ment by them invalid.^ It has also been decided that, under
this constitutional provision, the Legislature is not authorized
to give to the city council the power to appoint the appraisers.^
When the constitutional requirement is, that damages should
be assessed by a jury, the common law jury of twelve men is
what is presumptively intended by the provision ; and no other
body will satisfy the requirement.* But it has been held in
New York, under the constitutional provision just referred to,
and in the light of a legislative usage, that the term jury, as
used in this constitutional provision, did not necessarily require
ia body of twelve men, whose judgment depends upon their
unanimous agreement ; but that the provision would be satis-
fied by any body of a different number of jurors, and whether
they reached a unanimous verdict or decided the matter by a
majority vote. The court, however, proceeds to state that in
the absence of such a usage, modifying and controlling the in-
terpretation of such a constitutional provision, the common
law jury must be presumed to have been alone intended by the
1 People V, Stuart, 97 HI. 123; Wil-
liamson V. Cass County, 84 111. 361
(1877); Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio St. 167
(1854).
2 Cruger v. Hudson E. E. E. Co., 12
N. Y. 190 (1854); Eoanoke City v.
Pei-kowitz, 80 Va. 616.
468
3 Clark V. Utica, 18 Barb. (K. Y.)
451.-
* LuTusden v. Milwaukee, 8 Wis.
485; People v. Kimball, 4 Mich. 95;
Campau v. Detroit, 14 Mioh. 276 ; Hor-
ton V. Grand Haven, 24 Mich. 465;
Des Moines v. Layman, 21 Iowa, 158.
CH. XIV.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
§246
constitutional provision referred to.^ Although the charter of
a citjj^ provides that damages should be assessed by a jury, it
has been held that a city corporation would have the power to
lay aside the assessment made by the jury, and pay to the owner
of the property a larger sum than that which the jury had de-
clared to be a proper compensation. It could not force the
payment of a smaller sum without the consent of the owner of
the property; but the amount may be increased, where the city
council came to the conclusion that there had been an improper
assessment by the jury.^
It has been held in Massachusetts, that a city has not the
power to enter into an agreement, binding upon itself, to sub-
mit to arbitration the assessment of damages for the confisca-
tion of private property to public use.^
§ 246. The measure of value or damages. — The court, or
other tribunal, to which is assigned the duty of assessing the
amount of damages, to be paid to the owner of private prop-
erty which has been taken for public use, is required to ascer-
tain what is the exact loss to the owner of property by such a
confiscation of his property to public use. And while the sen-
timental appreciation of the property by its owner cannot be
taken into consideration ; * yet, whatever is the value of the
propert)' on the market, which is determined by the use to
which the land can be put, will be in general the rul-e for de-
termining the amount of damages, which should be awarded to
the owner for the confiscation of the property. It is not neces-
sary that the property should have that particular value to the
owner, or that he should put the property to the uses for which
the property is adapted and which determines or increases its
market value. The fact, that the propepty is adaptable to this
valuable use, is sufficient to enable him to claim that value as
the real rule for the measurement of his damages. In other
1 Cruger v. Hudson K. K. E. Co.,
12 N. Y. 190; Brooklyn v. Patchen,
8 Wend. (N. T.) 47.
2 Mobile V. Kichardson, 1 Stew. &
P. (Ala.) 12.
''Harvard College v. Boston, 104
Mass. 470; Brimmer v. Boston, 102
Mass. 19; Somervllle v. Dickerman,
127 Mass. 272; Boylston Market As-
sociation V. Boston, 113 Mass. 523.
1 Stafford v. Providence, 10 E. I.
567; 14 Am. Kep. 710; Kerr v. South
Park Com'rs, 117 U. S. 379; Provi-
dence & W. R. Co. V. Worcester,
(Mass. 92) 29 N. E. R. 56; Cook v.
South Park Com'rs, 61 111. 115 ; Green
v. Chicago, 97 111. 370.
469
§216
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XIV.
words, it is the market value of the property, and not any spe-
cial value of it to the particular owner, which constitutes the
true measure of damages.^
The measurement of the damages, to be recovered by the
owner of the private property, varies according to whether the
entire property is taken, or only a part. Where the proposed
confiscation to public use involves the appropriation of the en-
tire property, there is no difficulty in ascertaining what is the
true rule for measuring the damages to be recovered by the
owner. Such owner is entitled to the full market value of the
property, and this is determined by its adaptability to a valuable
use ; he is entitled to receive its full value and nothing more.^
But where, as is probably the more common case, only a part of
the property is taken, some difficult questions are likely to arise,
in determining what rule is to be followed in the measuring of
1 Goodin v. Cine. & W. Canal Co.,
18 OMo St. 169; Young v. Harrison,
17 Ga. 30; Furman Street, In re, 17
Wend. (N. Y.) 669; Miss. & R. Elver
Boom Co. V. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403
(1878); s. c, 3 Dillon, 46.5. The
rule has been very clearly stated by
the United States Supreme Court in
the opinion of Justice Field (in Miss.
& E. Eiver Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98
U. S. 403) : " In determining the value
of land appropriated for public pur-
poses the same considerations are to
be regarded as in a sale of property
between private parties. The in-
quiry in such cases must be, What
is the property worth in the marljet,
viewed not merely with reference to
the uses to which it is at the time
applied, but with reference to the
uses to which it is plainly adapted;
that is to say, what is it worth from
its availability for valuable uses ?
Property is not to be deemed worth-
less because the owner allows it to
go to waste, or to be regarded as
valueless because he is unable to put
it to any use. Others may be able to
use it and make it subserve the ne-
cessities or conveniences of life. Its
capability of being made thus avail-
470
able gives it a market value which
can be readily estimated. So many
and varied are the circumstances to
be taken into account to determine
the value of property condemned for
public purposes, that it is perhaps
impossible to formulate a rule to
govern its appraisement in all cases.
Exceptional circumstances wiU mod-
ify the most carefully guarded rule;
but, as a general thing, we should
say that the compensation to the
owner is to be established by refer-
ence to the uses for which the prop-
erty is suitable, having regard to the
existing business or wants to the com-
munity, or such as may be reasona-
bly expected in the immediate fu-
ture." See, also, San Jose v. Eeed,
65 Cal. 241.
- Patterson v. Miss. & E. Eivers
Boom Co., 3 Dillon, 465, 467 (1875);
affirmed by the Supreme Court, 98
U. S. 473 (1878) ; Giesy v. Cine. W. &
Z. E. E. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308 (1854);
Stafford v. Providence, 10 E. I. 567
(1873); s. c, 14 Am. Rep. 710; Somer-
ville & E. E. R. Co. v. Doughty, 22
ISr. J. L. 495 (1850) ; Driver & Western
Union R. R. Co., 32 Wis. 569 (1873);
s. c, 14 Am. Rep. 726.
CH. xrv.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
§246
the damages. He is entitled to whatever damage has been in-
flicted upon him and nothing more. But very often by the ap-
propriation of a part of the property to a public use, for example
in the laying out of the streets, the land which is left in the
private owner is very much more valuable than the entire prop-
erty was before the appropriation ; and the question is, to what
extent the courts can take into consideration the benefits or in-
juries which the property suffers by the appropriation, in de-
termining the true amount of damages to be recovered by the
property owner.
In this connection a distinction is made by the authorities
between general or public benefits, and injuries special or local.
A benefit or injury resulting from the public act is said to be
general or public, where it is suffered or enjoyed by the public
in general, and is not imposed or inflicted upon any one partic-
ular proprietor. A benefit or injury is said to be special or local,
where it affects the particular proprietor, part of whose land has
been taken in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, as,
for example, by 'rendering his own land more useful or con-
venient, and thus increasing its value, or by making it less
useful or convenient, and therefore diminishing its value. The
courts have very generally held, that the public benefits and in-
juries are not to be considered at all in the estimation of the
damages to be awarded to an owner of property for confiscation
of the part for public use ; but that special benefits, as well as
injuries, which such owner Las enjoyed or suffered, should be
considered in determining the amount of damages, unless it is
provided by the Constitution, or by the statutes of the State,
that all benefits of whatever kind should be excluded.^
It seems that there is no doubt in regard to the fact, that the
special damage to the part of the land, which it left to the own-
er, should be considered as well as the actual market value of
the property which has been taken, in order to secure a proper
^ Montgomery Co. v. Bridge Co.,
110 Pa. St. 54; Harris v. Schuylkill,
etc. Co., 21 AtLK. 590; 28 W. N. C.
44; Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Chi-
cago, 26 Fed. Rep. 415; Newman v.
Metro, etc. Co., 118 N. T. 618; San
Jose V. Mayne, 83 Cal. 563; 23 Pac.
R. 522 ; Upton v. South Reading Br.
R. R. Co., 8 Cush. 600; Louisville Co.
V. Ingram, (Ky.) 14 S. W. Rep. 534;
Chattanooga v. Geiler, 13 Lea, 611 ;
Louisville, etc. v. Asher, (Ky.) 15 S.
W. Rep. 517; Dwight v. Hampden
Co. Com'rs, 11 Cush. 201; Howard v.
Providence, 6 R. 1.514; Chicago, etc.
Co. V. Aldrich, (111.) 24 N. E. Rep. "763.
471
§246
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. XIV.
assessment of damages.^ And it is very generally held that
special benefits to the remaining property, accruing from the
proposed improvements, should be deducted from the valuation
of the property taken, in order to ascertain the measure of com-
pensation.2 In Massachusetts, it has been held, that the benefit
from widening a street was to be considered as direct and spe-
cial, although other estates on the same street have been simi-
larly benefited by the same improvements.* But in some of the
States, the special benefits are held to be excluded from the es-
timation of damages for confiscation.*
In widening streets, it very often occurs that a building will
be found to be in the way, either wholl}"- or partially so. Where
the building is wholly within the line of the proposed street,
tlie entire house would, of course, have to be condemned by
the city and paid for ; and the city could not compel the pri-
vate owner to remove such building and pay him only for the
> Montgomery v. Townseud, 80 Ala.
480; Providence etc. Co. v. Worces-
ter, (Mass. 92) 29 K. E. Kep. 56; Her-
cules V. Elgin etc. Co., (111. 92) 30
lb. 1050; Fort Worth Co. v. Downie,
82 Tex. 383; Charleston etc. Co. v.
Comstock, (W. Va. 92) 15 S. E. K.
69; Driver v. Western Union K. K.
Co., 32 Wis. 569; s. c, 14 Am. Rep.
726; Chicago etc. Co. v. Nix, (111.) 27
N. E. Kep. 81; Chicago etc. Co. v.
Blume, lb. 601.
2 Newman v. Metro, etc. Co., 118
N. T. 618; Haynes v. Duluth, 47
Minn. 458; Smith v. Lahore, 37 Kan.
480; 15 Pac. 577; Concordia Cem.
Assn. V. Minn. etc. Co., 121 111. 199;
12 N. E. R. 536; Lears v. Seattle,
(Wash. 93) 32 Pack. 794; Long v.
Harrisburg, 126 Pa. St. 143; 19 Atl.
R. 39; McReynolds v. Kansas etc. Co.,
34 Mo. App. 581; State v. Digby, 5
Blackf. (Ind.) 543; Robbins v. Milw.
& H. R. R. Co., 6 Wis. 636; Little
Rock v. Woodruff, (Ark.) 14 N. E.
Rep. 18; Hyde Park v. Washington
IceCo., 117111. 233; Roberts v. Brown
Co. Com'rs, 21 Kan. 247; Village of
Hyde Park v. Dunham, 85 111. 569 ;
472
Pacific R. R. Co. v. Chrystal, 25 Mo.
544; Jacob v. Louisville, 9 Dana (Ky.)
144; Arnold v. Gov. & Cine. Br. Co.,
1 Duvall (Ky.) 372; Louisville etc.
Co. v. Barrett, 16 S. W. Rep. 278;
Woodruff v. Nashville & C. R. R. Co.,
2 Swan (Tenu.) 422; Mclntire v.
State, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 384; Short v.
Roch. etc. Co., (Pa.) 8 Atl. Rep. 598;
McMahon v. Cine. & C. S. L. R. R.
Co., 5 Ind. 418; Isom v. Railroad Co.,
36 Miss. 300; Cleveland & P. R. R.
Co. V. Ball, 5 Ohio St. 568.
3 Donovan v. Springfield, 125 Mass.
371; Upham v. Worcester, 113 lb.
97; Cross v. Plymouth County, 125
lb. 557.
* Israel v. Jewett, 29 Iowa, 475;
Sater v. Burlington & Mt. P. PI. R.
Co., 1 Iowa, 893; Horbstein v. Atl.
& Gt. W. R. R.-, 51 Pa. St. 87; Har-
risburg & Pot. R. R. Co. V. Moore, 4
W. N. C. 537; Savannah v. Hartridge,
37 Ga. 113; Philadelphia v. Linnard,
97 Pa. St. 242. In Mississippi and
other States, incidental benefits can-
not be set off even against incidental
damages. New Orleans, J. & Gt. N.
R. R. Co. v. Moye, 39 Miss. 874.
CH. XIV.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
§247
cost of removal and restoration. Where only a part of the
house is within the line of the proposed street, it is held that
the city cannot he compelled to take the whole house ; but, in
such a case, it would be compelled to paj"- whatever was the
actual damage, which was suffered by the owner by the destruc-
tion of a part of the house.^
But in estimating the damages suffered by a proposed im-
provement, it is impossible to include consequential damage,
resulting from the character of the improvement, and its effect
upon adjoining property where the public use, to which the
property has been devoted, in itself constitutes a continuing
nuisance. Where it is a nuisance, an appropriate action for
the abatement of the nuisance could be employed by the owner
of the adjoining property ; such a circumstance would not be
taken into consideration, in estimating the assessment of dam-
ages.^
In ascertaining the measure of damages for the taking of
property for a public park, it has been held that it is impossi-
ble for evidence to be admitted to show the price, at which
land adjoining the proposed park was sold, after the establish-
ment of a park was announced and its boundaries established.
The true rule of measurement of damages being the value of
the land at the date of condemnation.^
§ 247. When payment should be made. — In the absence of
constitutional provisions, controlling and limiting the discre-
tion of the Legislature, it is competent for the Legislature to
authorize private property to be taken by municipal corporations
for a public use, without making prepayment of compensation.
It is more customary, either in accordance with constitutional
provision or legislative enactment, to require the compensation
to precede, or at any rate to accompany, the act of appropria-
tion.* But in the absence of constitutional provisions, this is
1 Portland v. Kamm, 10 Oreg. 383;
Schuchaidt v. New York, 53 N. T.
202.
2 Badger v. Boston, 130 Mass. ITO;
Eames v. New Engl. Worsted Co.,
11 Met. 570; Staple v. Spring, 10
Mass, 72.
8 In re Butler, 127 N. T. 463; Kerr
V. South Park Com'rs, 117 U. S. 379;
Cook V. South Park Com'rs, 61 111.
115.
4 Ohio Eiv. E. Co. v. Ward, 35 W.
Va. 481; Georgia etc. Co. v. Archer,
87 Ga. 237; Miller v. Mobile, 47 Ala.
163; Baltimore v. St. Agnes Hospi-
tal, 48 Md. 419; Casey v. Inloes, 1
Gill (Md.) 510; Phillips v. South
Park Com'rs, 119 111. 826; Colton
473
§247
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XIT
not necessary. A city may be permitted to make compensa-
tion for condemnation of lands to public use at a future time.^
However, in permitting this, it is necessary that the Legislature
shall make some certain and adequate provision for the com-
pulsory payment of the compensation at the instance of the
private owner, and without any unreasonable delay.^
Where the Legislature, in providing for the exercise of the
right of eminent domain, likewise provides an adequate and
complete remedy for the recovery of the compensation, it has
been held tliat the compensation must be enfoi-ced by means of
that remedy and bj' no other.^ And even where compensation
is not required to precede or to accompany the appropriation
of the land, the owner is entitled to payment of compensation
within a reasonable time, after the appropriation has been made.
And it is generally held that such a party is entitled to pay-
ment of compensation, when the report of the commissioners
of assessment, or the judgment of the jur)', had been finally
acted upon or confirmed ; or, even before confirmation, when
the municipal government has entered into possession of the
V. Rossi, 9 Cal. 595 (1858); McCann
V. Sierra County, 1 Cal. 121; Bohl-
man v. Green Bay & L. P. R. R. Co.,
30 Wis. 105; "Williams v. New Or-
leans M. & T. R. R. Co., 60 Miss. 689.
' Bloodgood V. Mohawk & H. R.
R. Co., 18 Wendi 9; Farmer's M. Co.
V. R. R. Co., 21 Atl. R. 902; 28 W.
K. C. Ill; McCormick v. Lafayette,
1 Ind. 48; Comm'rs v. Bowie, 34 Ala.
461; Lafayette v. Bush, 19 lud. 326;
'Beekman v. Saratoga & S. R. R. Co.,
3 Paige (N. Y.) Ch. 45.
2 Porter v. Midland etc. R. R. Co.,
2.J N. E. R. 556; 125 Ind. 476; Chap-
man V. Gates, 54 N. T. 132, 146; Kan-
sas etc. Co. V. Payne, 1 C. C. A. 192;
49 Fed. 119; State v. Lyle, 100 N. C.
497; Rexford v. Knight, UN. Y. 308;
Zimmerman v. Kearney, (Neb. 92)
50 N. W. Rep. 1126; People v. Hay-
den, 6 HiU (N. Y.) 359; Currant v.
Shattuck, 24 Cal. 427; McCann v.
Sierra County, 7 Cal. 121; Sage v.
Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 189; Be United
474
States, 96 N. Y. 227.
" Ross V. Georgia etc. Co., 12 S. E.
R. 101; 33 S. C. 477; Strickler v.
Midland Ry. Co., 125 Ind. 412; 25
N. E. R. 455 ; Railway Company v.
Cakes, 20 Ind. 9 ; Jones v. Stanstead
S. & C. R. R. Co., L. R. 4 P. C. App.
98, 120; McLean v. Great Western
Railway Company, 33 Up. Can. Q.
B. 198; Mitchell v. Franklin & C.
Turnpike Company, 3 Humph.
(Tenn.) 456; Brown v. Beatty, 34
Miss. 227; Dodge v. Essex Go. Com-
missioners, 3 Met. (Mass.) 380; Kim-
ble V. White, W.- V. Canal Co., 1 Ind.
285; Calking v. Baldwin, 4 Wend.
(N. Y.) 667; Grimshawe v. Grand
Trunk Railway Company, 19 Up.
Can. Q. B. 493; WeUand v. Buffalo
& L. H. Ry. Co., 30 Up. Can. Q. B.
147; s. c, 31 Up. Can. Q. B. 539;
contra, Watson v. R. R. Co., 48 N.
W. R. 1129; and McKee v. Canal Co.,
125 N. Y. 353.
CH. XIV.] EMINENT DOMAIN. § 248
property.^ The fact, that the street has not been opened to
the public, is no reason for the city to claim the right to delay
the payment of the compensation.^ It would seem that, where
there is an improper delay in the payment of compensation, the
landowner would be entitled to recover interest on the assessed
damages, or at any rate additional damages, for the detention.^
The right of compensation for confiscation of property under
eminent domain is personal, and can be exercised only by one
who was the owner of the property at the time when the prop-
erty was taken.* As soon as the right to compensation or dam-
ages has been definitely and completely ascertained, the owner
of the property may sue the corporation therefor, and have a
mandamus to compel such corporation to collect the assess-
ments, which, under the law, constitute the fund out of which
the payment of the damages must be made.^ As long as the
proceedings are provisional and incomplete, there is no claim
to compensation.® The claim to compensation, on the other
hand, is not affected by the fact that, after proceedings for com-
pensation have been instituted, the landowner has platted his
adjoining property, and is selling lots adjoining the proposed
streets, thus recognizing its existence.''
§248. Apportionment of damages among lots benefited.
— In the absence of special constitutional limitations upon the
power of the Legislature in the premises, it may be taken as
settled law that the Legislature may confer upon municipal
corporations, in opening streets and making other public im-
provements, the power to apportion the damages, awarded to
J. L. 11; Longworth v. Cincinnati,
48 Ohio St. 637.
« King V. New York, 102 N. Y. 171.
6 Donnelly v. Brooklyn, 121 N". Y.
9: Shaw v. Charlestown, 3 Allen
1 Stewart v. Baltimore, 7 Md. 500;
Johnson v. Alameda County, 14 Cal.
106.
2 Philadelphia v. Dickson, 38 Pa.
St. 247; In re Brooklyn Street, 118
Pa. St. 640; Griggs v. Foote, 4 Allen,
195; Shaw v. Charlestown, 3 Allen
(Mass.) 538.
» United States v. Engeman, 46
Fed.R. 898; Weiss v. Bethlehem, 136
Pa. St. 294; Old Colony E. K. Co. v.
Miller, 125 Mass. 1; Newgass v.
Eyles, (Ark. 91) 15 S. W. Rep. 188;
Phillips V. So. Park Com'rs, 119 111.
626; Haley v. Philadelphia, 68 Pa.
St. 43, 48, 49; Fink v. Newark, 40 N.
(Mass.) 538; Board v. Buffalo, 63 Hun,
565 ; Philadelphia v. Dyer, 41 Pa. St.
463; Rome v. Jepkins, 30 Ga. 154;
Sage V. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 189; Mc-
Cormick v. Brooklyn, 108 N. Y. 49;
Rexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. (1 Kern.)
308; Hollingsworth v. Tensas Parish,
17 Fed. Kep. 109,
» Carson v. Hartford, 48 Conn. 68.
' Jersey City v. Sackett, 44 N. J.
L. 428.
475
§248
MUKICrPAL COEPOBATIOKS.
[CH. XIV.
the owner of the property which is taken for public use, among
the lots which are specially benefited by its improvement, and
to provide by such assessments for the payment of the damages
or compensation due to such property owners. And, in levy-
ing this assessment upon lots especially benefited, it is also
permitted to impose its proportionate share of assessments up-
on the part of the land which has been left in the possession
of the owner, after the condemnation of the other part in the
exercise of eminent domain.^ And the imposition of assess-
ments for special benefits upon adjoining property, including
the remainder of the land left to its owner, is held not to be
restrained by the constitutional provision, which requires that
the assessment of damages, for confiscation of private property
for public use, is to be made without deduction for benefits.^
The power to levy assessments for public improvements upon
^Plum V. Kansas City, 101 Mo. 52;
V/yandotte etc. v. K. R. Co., 70 Mo.
629; Eyerman v. Blaksley, 78 Mo.
145; Longworth v. Cincinnati, 34
Oliio St. 101; Chapin v. Worcester,
124 Mass. 464; Smith v. Aberdeen,
25 Miss. 458; Genet v. City of Brook-
lyn, 99 N. Y. 296; Burlington v.
Quick, 47 Iowa, 222; Loweree v.
Newark, 38 N. J. L. 155; Piatt v.
Pennsylvania Co., 43 Ohio St. 228;
Howell V. Bristol, 8 Bush (Ky.) 493;
Washington Av. Case, 69 Pa. St. 352;
People V. Brooklyn, 4 N. T. 419;
Raleigh v. A. A. etc. Ry. Co., 74 N.
C. 220 ; Weekler v. Chicago, 61 111.
142; Do'rgan v. Boston, 13 Allen
(Mass.) 223; Boston Seamen's F.
Soc. V. Boston, 116 Mass. 181 ; Wil-
liams V. Cammack, 27 Miss. 209, 224;
Nichols V. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189,
207; G. &. C. R. R. Co. v. Partlow,
5 Pick. L. 428; Morin v. St. Paul M.
6 R. Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 100; Stroud
V. Philadelphia, 61 Pa. St. 255; Mt.
Washington Co.'s Petition, 35 N. H.
134; Hussen v. Rochester, 65 N. T.
516; State v. Portage, 12 Wis. 562.
2 Cleveland v. Wick, 18 Ohio St.
303. But see, generally, in respect
476
to the eflfect of such constitutional
provisions. Carpenter v. Jennings,
et al., 77 111. 250; Ala. & F. R. E.
Co. V. Burkett, 42 Ala. 83; Schenley
V. Allegheny, 25 Pa. St. 128; St. L.
A. & T. Ey. Co. V. Anderson, 39 Ark.
167; Atlanta v. Central R. E. & .B.
Co., 53 Ga. 120; Swayze v. New Jer-
sey M. Ry. Co., 36 N. J. L. 295; Pa-
ducah etc. R. R. Co. v. Stovall, 12
Heisk. 1; Henderson etc. Ry. Co. v.
Dickcrson, 17 B. Mon. 173; Edger-
ton V. Green Cove Springs, 19 Fla.
140; Egyptian Levee Company v.
Hardin, 27 Mo. 495 ; Washington Av.
Case, 69 Pa. St. 352; s. c, 8 Am. Rep.
255; Livingston v. Mayor, 8 Wend.
(N. Y.) 85; Britton v. Des Moines,
etc. R. R. Co., 59 Iowa, 540; Mil-
waukee & N. R. R. Go. V. Strange,
63 Wis. 178; Williams v. Detroit, 2
Mich. 560; Cone v. Hartford, 28
Conn. 363, 374; Macon v. Patty, 57
Miss. 397; Fremont, E. & M. V. R.
R. Co. V. Whalen, 11 Neb. 585; Ar-
gent! v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255;
Clapp V. Hartford, 35 Conn. 66; Em-
ery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal.
345; Howard v. Church, 18 Md. 451.
CH. XIV.]
EMINENT DOMAIN.
§249
abutting owners is also not in contravention of the constitu-
tional provision, that property subject to taxation shall be taxed
in proportion to its value ; or of the constitutional provisions,
which require equal and uniform taxation throughout the
State.^
§ 249. Revisory proceedings— Certiorari.— Unless some
special remedy, or the right of appeal, is given to the property
owner in the ease of confiscation of private property for "public
use, it has been very generally held that certiorari will lie
against a town or municipal corporation for the purpose of fur-
nishing to the property owner au opportunity of securing a
revision of the proceedings instituted by the municipal corpo-
ration, in appropriating private property to public use, and for
setting aside all such proceedings, whenever they are ascer-
tained to be invalid.2 In Vermont it is held that a writ of
mandamus, in the nature of a procedendo mav be employed as
well as the certiorari,^ but the court will not employ equitable
remedies for protection of the property owner, as long as the
legal remedies of certiorari and mandamus prove to be efficient
remedies for his protection.
In compliance with the general rule for determining the scope
of equitable jurisdiction, the court of equity, or a court in the
1 Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505 ;
State V. St. Louis, 62 Mo. 244; Amer.
B. N. Co. V. N. T. E. K. K., 13 N. T. S.
626; Suarez v. Man. K. Co., 15 N. Y.
S. 224; 'Washington Avenue, In re,
69 Pa. St. 352; s. c, 8 Am. Kep. 255.
Tlie general subject of assessment is
more fully discussed in the succeed-
ing paragraphs on taxation. See
post, §§ 277-282.
^Com'rs V. Newby, 31 111. App.
378; Trainer v. Lawrence, 36 111.
App. 90; Slater v. Kansas City, 89
Mo. 34; People v. Stedman, 10 N. T.
S. 787; Detroit etc. R. R. Co. v. Back-
us, 48 Mich. 582; Detroit etc. E. R.
Co. V. Graham, 46 Mich. 642; State
etc. E. E. Co. V. Hudson etc. Co., 38
N. J. L. 548; Campan v. Detroit, 14
Mich. 276; State v. Cockrell, 2 Rich.
Law, 6; Parks V. Boston, 8 Pick. 218;
Phillips V. County, 83 Me. 541; 22
Atl. 385; McCrary v. Griswold, 7
Iowa, 248; Spray v. Thompson, 9
Iowa, 40; Slate v. Stewart, 5 Strobh.
L. 20; California E. E. E. Co. v. Cent.
P. E. E. Co., 47 Cal. 528; Delaware,
L. & W. E. Co. V. Buxson, 61 Pa. St.
369; Dorchester v. Wentworth, 31 N.
H. 451; People v. Moore, 60 Hun,
586;Frenchv. Springwells H. Com'rs,
12 Mich. 267; Bridgenv. Bannerman,
8 Jones (IS". C.) 53; Baldwin v. Ban-
gor, 36 Me. 518; In re Eoaring Brook,
21 Atl. Eep. 412; 28 W. N. C. 141;
Myers v. Simms, 4 Iowa, 500; Gay v.
Bradstreet, 39 Me. 580; Preble v.
Portland, 45 Me. 241; Stone v. Bos-
ton, 2 Met. 220; Dwight v. Spring-
field, 4 Gray, 107.
8 Adams v. Newfane, 8 Vt. 271;
Lyman v. Burlington, 22 Vt. 131;
Woodstock V. Gallup, 28 Vt. 587.
477
§249
MtnsriCIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. xrv.
exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, will not undertake revisory
proceedings, except when it is demonstrated that the common
law remedies are inadequate to protect the property owner from
loss or damage.^ A municipal corporation will not be inter-
fered with by injunction, unless legal remedies prove inadequate.^
It has been held in Missouri, that where land has been wrong-
fully taken by a city and appropriated to a public use, the owner
of the land may maintain ejectment against the city for the
recovery of such lands.^
It is possible, perhaps, under some circumstances, to employ
1 Harvey v. Kansas etc. Co., 48
Kan. 228; Knox v. Metro. K. R. Co.,
38 Hun, 517; Hartley v. Keokuk etc.
Co., (Iowa, 92) 52 ??. W. R. 352;
Guest V. Brooklyn, 69 N". T. 506; An-
derson V. St. Louis, 47. Mo. 479, 486;
Leslie v. St. Louis, 47 Mo. 474;
Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 15
Wall. 547; Miller v. Mobile, 47 Ala.
163; s. c, 11 Am. Rep. 768. "Of
these grounds for relief, the princi-
pal are," says Mr. Justice Field,
giving the judgment of the Supreme
Court, in Ewing v. St. Louis, 5 Wall.
413, " that the proceedings were tak-
en without notice to the complain-
ant, or any appearance by him; that
the notice provided by law was not
published or required; that no pro-
vision was made for compensation
for the property taken ; that no pow-
er to render judgment was vested in
the mayor by the Legislature or
charter, and that the statute under
which the proceedings purported to
have been taken was repealed before
the proceedings were completed.
These grounds are, by the demur-
rer, admitted to be ti-ue; and being
true, no reason exists upon which
to justify the interposition of a
court of equity. . . The second ob-
ject of the bill— the obtaining of
compensation for the property actu-
ally appropriated by the city — falls
478
with the first. Tf the proceedings
for its appropriation were void, the
title remains in the complainant,
and he can resort (unless the Legis-
lature has required him to pursue a
particular remedy) to the ordinary
remedies afforded by law for the
recovery of the possession of the
real property wrongfully withheld,
or for the redress or trespass upon
it."
2 Zimmerman v. Kearney Co.,
(Neb. 92) 50 N. W. R. 1126; Henry
V. Dubuque & Pac. R. R. Co., 10
Iowa, 580; Van de Vere v. Kansas
City, (Mo. 92) 17 S. W. R. 695; La-
fayette V. Bush, 19 Ind. 326 ; Kansas
etc. Co. V. Payne, 49 Fed. 114; 4 U.
S. App. 77; Sower v. Philadelphia,
35 Pa. St. 231; Ohio Riv. R. Co. ».
Ward, 14 S. E. R. 142; 35 W. Va. 481;
Gardner v. Newburgh Trs., 2 Johns.
Ch. 162; Illinois etc. Co. v. Chicago,
(111. 92) 28 N. E. R. 740; Miller v.
Morristown, 47 N. J. Eq. 62; Mc-
Daniel v. Columbus, 13 S. E. R. 745;
87 Ga. 440; Mont. etc. Co. v. R. R.
Co., 12 Pack. 916; West Md. Ry. Co.
V. O wings, 15 Md. 199; Walker v.
Mad River & L. R. R. Co.. 8 Ohio,
38.
'Anderson v. St. Louis, 47 Mo.
484; Hammerslough v. Kansas City,
57 Mo. 219; Armstrong v. .St. Louis,
69 Mo. 309.
CH. XIV.J
EMINENT DOMAIN.
§250
the remedy of prohibition, in restraining illegal proceedings of
condemnation to public use.^
§ 250. Effect of accepting damages. — The voluntary ac-
ceptance of damages by the property owner will, in the absence
of proof of fraud or mistake of fact, operate as a bar to any
subsequent inquiry into the illegality or regularity of the pro-
ceedings, instituted and conducted for the condemnation of
land for public use. The owner is estopped by the acceptance
of such damages from disputing the legality of such proceed-
ings.'^ Thus, any delay in the deposit and payment of money
may be a serious irregularity ; but the actual receipt for dam-
ages by the party, who is entitled to them, will operate as a
waiver of such delay, and a ratification of the proceedings.^
Defective proceedings, in the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, may also be confirmed or ratified by legislative au-
thority.*
'See Williams, In re, 4 Ark. 537;
Arnold v. Shields, 5 Dana (Ky.) 18;
State V. Walkely, 2 Nott & McCord
(S. C.) 410; Mayo V. James, 12 Gratt.
(Va.) 17; Warwick v. Mayo, 15 Gratt.
(Va.) 528.
- Commonwealth v. Shuman's
Adm., 18 Pa. St. 343; Burns v. Milw.
& Miss. E. K. Co., 9 Wis. 450; Smith
V. Warden, 19 Pa. St. 426; State v.
Stanley, 14 Ind. 409; Magrath v.
Brock. Tp., 13 Up. Can. Q. B. 629;
Kile V. Yellowhead, 80 111. 208; Harts-
horn V. Potroff, 89 111. 509; Rees v.
Chicago, 38 111. 322; Town v. Blae-
berry, 29 111. 137; Pursleyv. Hays,
17 Iowa, 310; Deford v. Mercer, 24
Iowa, 118; 2 Smith Lead Cas. (5 Am.
ed.) 662; Brooklyn Park Com'.rs v.
Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234 (1871).
s Hawley v. Harrall, 19 Conn. 142,
151; Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511;
lb. 197;Arnot v. McClure, 4 Denio
(N. Y.) 45; Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill
(N. Y.) 9; s. c. in error, 2 Denio, 323;
Doughty V. Hope, 3 Denio (N. Y.)
249; Kennedy v. Newman, 1 Sandf.
(N. Y.) 187.
-Yost's Report, 17 Pa. St. 524;
Bennett V. Fisher, 26 Iowa, 497(1868);
Baltimore v..Horn, 26 Md. 194 (1866);
Lennon v. New York, 55 N. Y. 361,
365 (1874) ; Indianapolis v. Kingsbury,
101 Ind. 200.
479
CHAPTER XV.
MTIN-ICIPAL TAXATION AND LOCAL ASSESSMENTS.
Shctiow.
253 — Taxation defined and dis-
tinguished from eminent
domain and police power.
254 — Taxation autliorized only for
public purposes.
255 — Municipal authority to levy
taxes whence derived.
256 — Municipal power to tax, when
implied.
257 — Legislature may change the
taxing power of municipali-
ties at will.
258 — Federal limitations in the ex-
ercise of the power of taxa-
tion.
259 — Constitutional provisions as
to requirements of uni-
formity and equality.
259 a — Uniformity and equality in
local assessments.
260 — Eoad tax and compulsory
labor on the same.
260 d — Poll tax, constitutional.
261 — Power to tax professions,
trades and callings.
202 — Power to levy retrospective
taxes.
263 — Municipality cannot delegate
its authority.
264 — Power of taxation a continu-
ing one.
265 — Power of taxation cannot be
varied or enlarged by city
ordinances.
§ 253. Taxation defined and distingnished from eminent
domain and police power — Taxation may be defined to be the
power of government to compel the citizens and proprietors of
property to contribute money to the support of the government,
and the maintenance of public institutions and interests. It
480
Section.
266 — Limitation of tax rate cannot
be exceeded.
267 — Construction and reconcile-
ment of general laws with
special charter provisions.
268 — What can be taxed.
269 — Discrimination between real
and personal property,
when permissible.
270 — Exemption from taxes, when
permitted.
271 — Public property not taxable.
272 — Wliat property is within mu-
nicipality for purposes of
taxation.
273 — Taxation of banks, railways
and other corporations.
274 — Taxation of incorporeal he-
reditaments.
275 — Glioses in action when tax-
able.
276 — Taxation of agi-icultural land.
277 — Local assessments for sewers.
278 — Notice to and assent of abut-
ters to assessments.
279 — Power of Legislature to dis-
pense with notice.
280 — Reassessments.
281 — Adjoining owner's relation
to contract — His liability.
282— Methods of collection.
283 — Lien of taxes.
284 — Statute of Limitations.
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § -253
is to be distinguished from tlie right of eminent domain, in that
the right of eminent domain involves the appropriation of pri-
vate property to public use upon payment of compensation to
the owner, whereas taxation invok'es an appropriation of the
property of private individuals, irrespective of any special com-
pensation for the same.^
Although the benefits, accruing to the people of a community
from the expenditure of the mone}' collected by taxation, may
be maintained as the compensation received by the taxpa3'ers,
and as justifying the exercise of the power of taxation ; yet, that
is never a condition precedent to the exercise of the power, ex-
cept so far as it requires that taxation should only be imposed
for some public use or purpose. Irrespective of any inquiry
into the existence of a benefit, resulting to the taxpayers from
the expenditure of the money collected by taxation, the exer-
cise of the power cannot be contested. The citizen owes that
duty to the government, and as such must submit to its exer-
cise. This is certainly the case in regard to the imposition of
taxes upon citizens or residents of the country, in whose behalf
the tax is imposed. But where, as is permissible, the govern-
ment undertakes to impose a tax upon the lands and upon other
property, whose corpus is located within the territory of such
country, but whose owner is not domiciled therein, some other
ground than that of civic duty must be found, upon which to
rest the power of taxation. It has been elsewhere asserted by
the author ^ that the power to tax lands of non-resident owners,
is in fact an exercise by the State of its rights as an ultimate
owner of such lands, and that it is in the nature of a rent due
to the State as the ultimate landlord. But, whether this reason
for the exercise of the power of taxation over the real property
of non-resident owners be just or not, there is no question that
the power to exercise the right of taxation over such property
is universally asserted and exercised.
'Stewart v. Polk Co., 30 Iowa, 9;
Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 565;
People V. Salem, 20 Mich. 477; No.
Ind. E. R. Co. V. Connelly, 10 Ohio
St. 165; 1 Desty Taxation, sec. 11, p.
•SI; 1 Hare Am. Const. Law, 332;
People V. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419
(1851); Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N.
31 481
Y. 12 (1869); Gilman v. Sheboygan,
2 Black (U. S.) 510 (1862); Moale v.
Baltimore, 5 Md. 314 (1854). Eminent
Domain. Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa,
28, 54 (1869).
■^ See Tiedeman's Limitations of
Police Power, § 115.
§ 254 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIOXS. [CH. XV.
There is also the same necessity for raising a distinction be-
tween the power of taxation and the police power of the gov-
ernment. It has been elsewhere asserted by the writer,^ that
the power of taxation is but one phase of the police power of
the government. But, whether that be true or not, the power
of taxation is certainly distinguishable from the ordinary exer-
cise of police power ; and the necessity for that distinction is
most marked, when an inquiry is made into the power of the
government to impose a tax upon the trades and professions.
The necessity is felt in that instance of distinguishing between
the license, which is required of one pursuing a particular trade
or calling, as a police regulation for the purpose of preventing
injuries to the public by an improper prosecution of the trade
or business, and the license tax, which is imposed upon such
trade or business for the purpose of revenue solely. Where the
license is a police regulation, as in the case of licenses exacted
from liquor dealers and proprietors of saloons, the justification
for the exercise of the power, and the requirement of the li-
cense, is to be found in the injurious character of the business,
when permitted to be conducted without police supervision.
And the extent of the power is determined by the necessity for
such police regulation to prevent the anticipated evils resulting
from the prosecution of the business. But where the license
is a tax, imposed upon the trade or business for the purpose of
increasing the revenue of the city or town, then it is brought
within the taxing power of the government ; and the exercise
of such power is limited only by those provisions of the consti-
tution, which control the exercise of the power of taxation.
This matter has been more fully explained and the cases digested
in the writer's work on the Limitations of Police Power,^ and,
elsewhere, in the present volume.^
§ 254. — Taxation authorized only for public purposes. —
The levy of a tax is onl}"- permissible, except under tyrannical
government, when it is made for a public purpose ; and it is
proportioned uniformly among the subjects of taxation. When
the tax is imposed for some private or individual benefit, or it
is not uniformly imposed upon those who ought to bear it; it
is perfectly proper, nay, it is the dutj-^ of the courts to interfere
•See Tiederaan's Limitations of I ^§101.
Police Power, p. 481, note. | s §§ 123, 124.
482
CH. XV.] MTTNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 2o-±
and prohibit what may be justly called an extortion.^ But the
term "public purpose " must not be used in this connection in
any narrow sense. Taxes are levied for a public purpose, not
only when they are designed to pay the salaries of government
officials, to erect and keep in repair government buildings ; to
maintain the public rdads, harbors and rivers in a fit condition,
and to provide for the defences of the country ; but also for all
purposes of public charity. It is a public purpose to erect with
State funds, obtained from taxes, penitentiaries, orphan and
lunatic asylums, hospitals and lazarettos, public schools and
colleges. But it is only for the support of public charities that
the government may tax the people. A levy of a tax for a
donation to some private benevolent or charitable institution is
void.^ It is a public purpose to provide pensions for the sol-
diers and other employees of the government, when they have
become disabled in service or superannuated.^ And wherever
there is a reasonable doubt as to the character of the purpose
for which the tax was levied, the doubt should be solved in
favor of the power of the Legislature to lay the tax.*
But if the purpose be truly private ; if the tax in effect takes
the property of one man and gives it to another, it is illegal
1 " It is the clear right of every cit-
izen to insist tliat no unlawful or un-
authorized exaction shall be made
upon him under the guise of taxation.
If any such illegal taxation is at-
tempted, he can always invoke the
aid of the judicial tribunals for his
protection, and prevent his money
or other property from being taken
and appropriated for a purpose and
in a manner not authorized by the
constitution and laws." Bigelow,
Oh. J., in Freeland v. Hastings, 10
Allen, 570, 575. See, also, to the
same effect, Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me.
375; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124 (11 Am.
Rep. 185); Talbert v. Hudson, 16
Gray, 417 ; Weismer v. Douglass, 64
N. Y. 91 (21 Am. Rep. 588) ; Tyson v.
School Directors, 51 Pa. St. 9; Wash-
ington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. 352 (8 Am.
Rep. 255) ; People v. Township Board
of Salem, 20 Mich. 452; People v. Su-
pervisors of Saginaw, 26 Mich. 22;
Ferguson v. Landran, 5 Bush, 230;
Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Han-
seiT V. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28.
2 St. Mary's Industrial School v.
Brown, 45 Md. 310.
8 Booth V. "Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118;
Speer v. School Directors of Blair-
ville, 50 Pa. St. 150.
* " To justify the court in arresting
the proceedings and declaring the
tax void, the absence of all public
interest in the purposes for which the
funds are raised must be clear and
palpable; so clear and palpable as to
be perceptible by every mind at the
first blush." Per Dixon, Ch. J., in
Brodhead v. City of Milwaukee, 19
Wis. 624, 652. See Spring v. Russell,
7 Me. 273; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis.
411 (9 Am. Rep. 578).
483
§254
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. XV.
and it is the duty of the courts to enjoin its collection.^ For
example, it has been held unlawful to levy taxes in aid of man-
ufacturing and other private industrial enterprises,^ for the relief
of farmers, whose crops have been destroyed, to supply them
with seeds and provisions,^ or for making loans to pei-sons whose
homes have been destroyed by fire.* It has also been held ille-
gal to pay a subscription to a private corporation which is to be
devoted to a private purpose.^ On the other hand, it has been
repeatedly held that the Legislature may authorize counties and
municipal corporations to subsciibe for capital stock in railroad
companies, in aid of their construction, and may levy a tax iu
order to pay the subscription.^
I " The legislature has no constitu-
tional right to . . . lay a tax, or to
authorize any municipal corporation
to do it in order to raise funds for a
mere private purpose. Xo such au-
thority passed to the assembly by
the general grant of the legislative
power. This would not be legisla^
tion. Taxation is a mode of raising
revenue for public purposes. When
it is prostituted to objects in no way
connected with the public interest
or welfare, it ceases to be taxation
and becomes plunder. Transferring
money from the owners of it into
the possession of those who have no
title to it, though it be done under
the name and form of a tax, is uncon-
stitutional for all the reasons which
forbid the Legislature to usurp any
other power not granted to them."
Black, Ch. J., in Sharpless v. Mayor
etc., 21 Pa. St. 147, 168.
^Loan Association v. Topeka, 20
Wall. 655; Opinions of Judges, 58
Me. 590; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124 (11
Am. Kep. 185) ; Commercial Bank v.
lola, 2 Dill. 353.
estate V. Osawkee, 14 Kan. 418.
But the United States, as well as the
State governments, have frequently
come with the public funds to the
rescue of people of sections which
have been inundated by floods, or
484
devastated by disease or fire ; and it
would seem that the State aid under
such circumstances differed little if
at all from the ordinary bestowal of
alms upon the poor, and is equally
justifiable, as being a public charity.
* Lowell V. Boston, 111 Mass. 454
(15 Am. Eep. 39).
* Weismer v. Douglass, 64 iX. T. 91
(21 Am. Kep. 58(3).
"Zabriskie v. Cleveland, C. & K.
R. Co., 23 How. 381; Bissell v. City
of Jeffersonville, 54 How. 287; Araey
V. Allegheny City, 24 How. 364; Cur-
tis V. Butler Co., 24 How. 435; Mer-
cer Co. V. Haoket, 1 Wall. 83 ; Gelpcke
V. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175; Sey-
bert V. City of Pittsburgh, 1 Wall.
272 ; Van Horti-up v. Madison City, 1
Wall. 291; Meyer v. City of Musca-
tine, 1 Wall. 384; Havemeyer v. Iowa
Co., 3 Wall. 294; Thomson v. Lee
Co., 8 Wall. 327; Rogers v. Burling-
ton, 3 AVall. 654; Mitchell v. Bur-
lington, 4 Wall. 270; Campbell V. City
of Kenosha, 5 Wall. 194; Riggs v.
Johnson, 6 Wall. '166; Lee Co. v. Rog-
ers, 7 Wall. 181 ; Chicago B. & Q. R.
E. Co. v. County of Otoe, 16 Wall. 667 ;
Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510;
Tipton Co. V. Rogers L. & M. Works,
103 U. S. 523. The cases from the
State courts are too numerous to cite
in detail. But see, to the same ef-
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS.
25-1
Since the Legislature is prohibited from making levies for
private purposes, it cannot authorize municipal corporations to
do so.^
In addition to this general proposition limiting the exercise
of the power of taxation to the provision of means for the ef-
fectuation of public purposes, there is a special provision in
many of the State Constitutions, — and which is probably im-
plied from the general provisions of all of them, — that the ex-
ercise of the power of taxation bj' a municipal corporation must
be limited to local or corporate purposes. It is not permitted,
in other words, of a municipal corporation to exercise the right
of taxation for any other but local or municipal purposes. This
is especially provided in the Constitution of Illinois.^ It has
also been held that a State reform school vi^as a State institu-
tion, and not a local one, and that therefore taxation could not
be levied b}'^ a city or town for the purpose of maintaining and
supporting such a school.' So, likewise, the taxation for the
maintenance of bridges and highways.* It is very plain that
under no circumstances can a municipal corporation tax itself
for the benefit of any private institution or business, even
though the successful establishment of either of them may work
a consequential benefit to the community.^ It has also been
held, under the same constitutional provision, that taxes should
be levied by municipal corporations for corporate purposes, only
Avhen it is possible for the municipal corporation to levy such
a tax through its lawfully constituted authority, and that the
State could not compel the community to pay taxes which are
levied by officers appointed by the State.^ But where the peo-
fect, Supervisors of Portage Co. v.
Wis. Cent. R. E. Co., 121 Mass. 467;
Augusta Bank v. Augusta, 49 Me. 500 ;
■Williams v. Duanesburg, 66 N. Y.
129; Brown V. County Com'rs, 21 Pa.
St. 37; St. Louis v. Alexander, 23
Mo. 483; Smith v. Clark Co., .34 Mo.
58. See, also, §§ 184-186, for a fuller
discussion of this subject.
Attorney-General v. Eau Claire,
37 Wis. 400.
2 Spencer v. People, 68 111. 510
(1873); Murphy v. People, 120 111.
234; Constitution of Illinois, art. ix.
sec. 5; Harward v. St. Clair & M.
Levee & Dr. Co., 51 111. 130; Primm
V. Belleville, 59 111. 142 (1872).
2 The Supervisors of Livingston
County V. Weider, 427 (1872).
*Will Co. Sup. V. People, 110 111.
511. But see Burr v. Carbondale, 76
111. 455 ; Southern Illinois University
and Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen
(Mass.) 500, where it was held that
municipal bonds could be issued in
aid of State universities.
6 Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94.
■ People V. Chicago, 51 111. 17; s. c,
485
255
MXJNICIPAIi COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XV.
pie of the municipality adopt or accept the indebtedness in-
curred in their names by State commissioners, the adoption of
the debt is an implied appointment of the commissioners as
agents of the municipality, and makes their acts valid and bind-
ing upon the corporation to the extent of the taxes levied by
them, for the settlement of the debts which were incurred in
the name of the municipality.^
§ 255. Municipal authority to levy taxes whence derived.
— It is manifest that the power to levy taxes is in the first in-
stance alone vested in the Legislature of the State ; and no sub-
ordinate body politic maj% for any other purpose whatever,
impose taxes upon tlie public, unless the power to impose such
taxes has been lawfully conferred upon it by the Legislature.
Even in the absence of express constitutional provisions, the
Legislature has the power, as an implication from the power to
create local and municipal corporations, to vest such munici-
palities and local instruments of government with the power to
levy taxes for corporate purposes upon the persons and prop-
erty, coming within the jurisdiction of the body politic.^ Not
only would the power to impose taxes be construed to be a nec-
essary implication, in order to enable the municipal government
2 Am. Eep. 2'78; see also Wetlierell v.
Devine, 116 111. 631; State v. Henne-
pin Co. Dist. Court, 33 Minn. 235.
1 Wider v. East St. Louis, 55 HI.
133; Gage v. Graham, 57 111. 144;
Soliool Trs. V. People, 63 111. 299.
'^Speer v. Athens, 85 Ga. 49; Mag-
neau v. Fremont, (Neb. 90) 47 N. W.
E. 280; Tj'rrell v. Wheeler, 123 N. T.
76; Dasey v. Skinner, 11 N. T. S.
821 ; 57 Hun, 593 ; Jones v. Chamber-
lain, 16 N. E. R. 72; State v. Esta^
brook, 6 Ala. 653; Battle v. Mobile, 9
Ala. 234 ; Osborne v. Mobile, 44 Ala.
493; Cincinnati v. McMicken, 6 Ohio
Cir. Ct. R. 188; Hurford v. Omaha, 4
Neb, 336; St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49
Mo. 659; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich.
44; State v. Noyes, 30 N. H. 279;
Cheauey v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.)
330; Slack v. Maysville & Lex. R. E.
486
Co., 13 B. Mon. 1; San Luis Obispo
y. Pettit, 87 Cal. 499; People v. Kel-
sey, 34 Cal. 470; Harrison v. Vicks-
burg, 11 Miss. 581; Eanken v. Hen-
derson, 7 S. W. Rep. 174;Shreveport
V. Jones, 26 La. An. 708; Bowling v.
Allschrel, (Cal. 93) 33 Pac.532; Stein
V. Mobile, 24 Ala. 591; Niles v. Al-
bany, (Vt.) 7 Atl. Rep. 601; Alexan-
der T. Baltimore, 5 Gill (Md.) 383,
393; Hope v. Deaderick, 8 Humph.
(Tenn.) 1; Smith v. Aberdeen, 25
Miss. 458 ; Anderson v. Mayfield (Ky.
92), 19 S. W. Rep. 598; Washington
V. State, 13 Ark. 752; Butler's Ap-
peal, 73 Pa. St. 448; Kinney v. Zim-
pleman, 36 Tex. 554; Schultes v.
Eberly (Ala. 87) 2 So. R. 345; Bull v.
Read, 13 Gratt. 78, 98; Caldwell v.
Burke Co. Jus., 4 Jones Eq. (N. C.)
323.
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 256
to successfully perform the duties imposed upon it by the State,
but the delegation of the power of taxation to a municipal cor-
poration is demanded by public sentiment, which studiously
and persistently resists the imposition of taxes for local pur-
poses by any other power but the local government. The au-
thorization of local taxation is in close harmony with the political
sentiment that pervades Anglo-Saxon countries in support of
local self-government.i But the Legislature cannot confer the
power of taxation upon a municipal corporation to a greater
extent than what it possesses itself ; and, therefore, the power
of the municipality to impose taxes is limited by the same re-
strictions and limitations of the constitution, which the Legis-
lature must itself observe.^ The special limitations will be
referred to in a subsequent connection.^
§ 256. Maaicipal power to tax when implied. — Although
the general rule is laid down that the power of taxation can-
not be exercised by the municipal corporation except when it
has been conferred upon it by the Legislature ; and it is further
provided that the corporation cannot levy a tax, unless the
power to do so is plainly and clearly conferred upon it ; * yet
1 State ex rel. Jameson v. Denny,
118 Ind. 382; Evansville v. State, lb.
426; State ex rel. Holt v. Denny, lb.
449.
2 Moore v. St. Paul, ( Minn. 92 ) 51
N. W. R. 219; Brooks v. Mangam, 86
Mich. 576; Memphis v. Hernando
Ins. Co., 6 Baxter, 527; Reineman v.
Cov.,C.&B.H. E. R.Co.,7 Neb. 310;
Lancaster v. Clayton, ( Ky. 92 ) 5 S.
W. Rep. 864; Ex parte Montgomery,
64 Ala. 468; Sayi-e v. Phillips, 30 W.
N. C. 196; Union Bank of Tenn. v.
State, 9 Terg. (Tenn.) 490; and see,
Weightman v. Clark, 103 U. S. 256;
O'Donnell V. Bailey, 24 Miss. 386; No.
Mo. R. R. Co. V. Maguire, 49 Mo. 490,
500; Erie v. Reed's Ex., 113 Pa. St.
468; Nashville v. Thomas, 5 Coldw.
(Tenn.) 600; Clark v. Leathers, 5 S.
W. R. 576.
= See§§258, 259, et seq.
* Parsons v. Northampton, 154
Mass. 410; Covington etc. Co. v. Cov-
ington, (Ky. 02) 17 S. W. R. 808;
Gage V. Nichols, (111.) 25 N. E. R.
672; Board v. Currituck, 107 N. C.
110; Tacoma L. Co. v. Pierce Co., 1
Wash. St. 482 ; Kniper v. Louisville,
7 Bush, 593; Lum v. Bowie, 18 S. W.
Rep. 142; M. E. Church, In re, 66 N.
Y. 396; Jacksonville v. Ledvrith,
(Fla.)7So. Rep. 885; Sevrall v. St.
Paul, 20 Minn. 511 ; Lot v. Ross, 38
Ala. 156, 161; People v. Cofiey, 21
N. r. S. 34; In re Walnut St., 10 Pa.
Co. Ct. 173; Swamp Land Dist. v.
Haggin, 64 Cal. 204; Green v. Ward,
82 Va. 324; Scammon v. Chicago, 40
111. 146; English v. People, 96 HI.
566; State v. Van Every, 75 Mo. 530;
State v. Jersey City, 26 N. J. L. 444;
Chicago V. Wright, 32 111. 193; Plain-
field V. Plainfield, ( Wis. ) 30 N. W.
Rep. 672; Taylor v. Donner, 31 Cal.
480; Emery v. San Francisco Gas
Co., 28 Cal. 345; St. Louis v. Laugh-
lin, 49 Mo. 559; Schoolfleld, v. Lynch
487
§256
MtWICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XV.
this statement must be understood with the qualification, that
the power to impose a tax may be implied, whenever the im-
plication is absolutely necessary to the exercise of some power
expressly granted. Thus, it has been held by the Supreme
Court of the United States, where a municipal corporation has
been given the power to incur a certain obligation, that the
power to levy taxes for the payment of such obligation is nec-
essarily implied, in the absence of some express provision for
the satisfaction of such obligation.^
But it has been held that the power to tax cannot be implied
from a geneiHl welfare clause in the charter.^ So, also, has it
been held that, where a statute supplies the purpose for which
taxes may be levied, and adds " or for any other purpose they
may deem necessary," this general clause will only authorize
the exercise of the power of taxation for purposes similar to
those, which have been already enumerated.^ Thus, special as-
sessments for local improvements cannot be enforced by fines or
penalties, which are imposed by ordinances, and are not pro-
vided for in the charter authorizing the local assessment.* It
burg, 78 Va. 366; Port Towusend v.
Sheehan, (Wash. 93) 33 Pac. Rep. 427;
Leavenworth v. Korton, 1 Kan. 432;
Burner v. Atchison, 2 Kan. 454; Mur-
ray V. Tucker, 10 Bush, 249; Stone
V. Mobile, 57 Ala. 61; Beatty v.
Knowles, 4 Pet. 152 ; Henry v. Ches-
ter, 15 Vt. 460; Dyckman v. New
York, 1 Seld. (5 N. Y. ) 434; State v.
Guttenberg, 39 N. J. L. 660; Ashe-
■yille Commissioners v. Means, 7Ired.
L. (N. C.) 406; Jonas v. Cincinnati,
18 Ohio, 318; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1
Ohio St. 268; Zanesville v. Richards,
5 Ohio St. 589; Fairfield v. RatclifE,
20 Iowa, 396; Va. & Tenn. R. R. Co.
V. Washington Co., 30 Gratt. 471;
Sharp V. Spier, 4 Hill (K. Y.) 70;
Sharp V. Johnson, lb. 92; Manice v.
New York, 8 N. Y. 120; Oregon S.
Nav. Co V. Portland, 2 Oreg. 81;
Harmony Tp. Trs. v. Osborne, 9 Ind.
458; Henderson v. Baltimore, 8 Md.
352; Rathbun v. Acker, 18 Barb. (N.
Y.) 393; Howell v. Buffalo, 15 N. Y.
488
512; Burnett v. Buffalo, 17 N. Y.
383.
1 United States v. Orleans, 78 IT.
S. 341 ; Ralls Co. Ct. v. United States,
105 U. S. 733; State v. Toledo, (Ohio
92) 26 N. E. R. 10t!l; Meriwether v.
Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; Chicago v.
Wright, 32 111. 192; Wright v. Chi-
cago, 20 111. 252; Columbia v. Hunt,
5 Rich. (S. C.) 550; Annapolis v.
Harwood, 32 Md. 471; Taylor v. Mc-
Fadden, 50 N. W. Rep. 1070; State v.
Maysville, 12 S. C. 76; Fairfield v.
llatcliff, 20 Iowa, 396; but see contra,
Jeffries v. Lawrence, 42 Iowa, 498.
2 Mays V. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268.
8 Drake v. Phillips, 40 111. 388;
Hyde Park v. Borden, 94 111. 26; Pom-
frey v. Saratoga, (N. Y.) 11 N. E. E.
43 ; Asheville Com'rs v. Means, 7 Ired.
L. 406.
* Augusta V. Dunbar, 50 Ga. 387
(1873); see Ottawa v. Spencer, 40 111.
211; Gridley v. Bloomington, 88 111.
555.
CH. XV.J MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 257
has also been held that the power, to levy a special tax for light-
ing a city, will not authorize the addition of a percentage for
the collector's fees, or for the cost of t\\e proceedings before the
mayor. The service and expense must be provided for out of
the general revenue of the city.^ It would, however, be uncon-
stitutional for a Legislature to provide, that no cost shall be
recovered against the city in suits brought against it.^ The
power to levy a tax for purposes of revenue is ordinarily not
to be implied from an authority to license and regulate certain
trades and occupations.^ It has also been held that the power
to tax a community, for the payment of the expense of procur-
ing the location of a railroad along the line of a town, cannot be
implied from the power to make by-laws, which are necessary
"to promote the peace, good order, benefit and advantage"
of a corporation, and to assess taxes that may be necesaiy to
carry such power into effect.* And where the power to levy a
tax has a, proviso annexed thereto, the power cannot be exercised,
except in compliance with the terms and conditions of the pro-
viso.^
§ 257. Legislature may change the taxing power of mu-
nicipalities at will. — Except so far as the legislative power of
control over the municipal power of taxation is restrained
by a constitional provision, protecting the rights of the cred-
itors against subsequent legislative interference,® the Legisla-
ture has full power to change, modify or enlarge at its pleasure
the taxing power of a municipality ; and may even take away
such power of taxation from the municipal government, and
vest it in a board of commissioners.''
1 Minn. Linseed Oil Co. v. Palmer,
20 Minn. 468, 475; Bucknall v. Story,
36 Cal. 67; Williams v. Detroit, 2
Mich. 560; Jones v. Cincinnati, 18
Ohio, 318-323; Nelson v. La Porte,
33 Ind. 258.
2 Durkee v. Janesville, 28 Wis. 464.
' Tiedeman's Limitations of Police
Power, § 101 ; Columbia v. Beasley,
1 Humph. (Tenn.) 240; Mobile v.
Tuille, 3 Ala. 137; Collins v. Louis-
ville, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 134; State v.
Roberts, 11 Gill & J. (Md.) 506; Cin-
cinnati V. Bryson, 15 Ohio, 625 ; Bos-
ton V. SchafEer, 9 Pick. 419 ; Cincin-
nati V. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 261.
*Minn. etc. Co. v. Palmer, 20
Minn. 468.
6 In re Methodist Church, 60 N. Y.
395.
« See ante, §§ 12, 41^3, 194, 212.
' Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall.
535; State v. Newark, 11 Atl. E. 147;
49 N. J. L. 344; Butz v. Muscatine,
8 Wall. 575 ; McKusick v. Stillwater,
44 Minn. 372; 46 N. W. 769; Louisi-
ana V. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 301; Wolff
V. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358; State
489
§ 258 MUNICrPAIi CORPOKATIONS. [CH. XV.
§ 258. Federal limitations on the exercise of the power
of taxation. — The United States Constitution contains several
provisions, which operate to restrain the exercise of the power
of taxation, both of State and municipal corporations. It has
elsewhere been explained that the provision of the United
States Constitution, which prohibits the passing of laws im-
pairing the obligation of contracts, operates to restrain any
curtailment or modification of the taxing power of municipal
corporations where the exercise of the power of taxation has
been pledged to the liquidation of the interest or principal of
its existing indebtedness.-' And the same provision of the
constitution has been invoked for the purpose of invalidating
an attempt of the city government to impose a special tax upon
the interest due on its bonds, whether the bonds are held by
a resident or nonresident. It was held that this deduction of
the amount of the taxes from the bond, and the payment only
of the balance of the interest due thereon, was a violation of
the constitutional provision, prohibiting the passing of laws
impairing the obligation of contracts.'* The power of the State,
and of the municipalities created by the State, to levy taxes,
is also subject to other express and implied restrictions in the
United States Constitution, designed to avoid the present con-
flict of authority between these two distinct branches of the
government. Thus, it is expressly provided that the States can-
not, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties
upon imports or exports, except what might be necessary for
the purpose of enforcing their inspection laws ; nor can they,
without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage.^
In the United States, the independence of the Federal and
State governments of each other is guaranteed by the express
V. Brewer, 64 Ala. 287; Blanding v.
Bui-r, 13 Cal. 343; Lansing v. County
Treasurer, 1 Dillon, C. C. 522; Mus-
catine V. Miss. & Mo. R. R. Co., lb.
530; Chicago etc. Co. v. Chicago,
(111. 90) 27 N. E. R. 926; Gilman v.
Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510; Aspiuwall
V. Daviess Co. 22 How. 364.
1 See ante, § 194.
2 Cleveland etc. Co. v. Pennsylvar
nia, 15 Wall. 300; No. Cen. R. R. Co.
V. Jackson, 7 lb. 262; Mui-ray v.
490
Charleston, 96 U. S. 432.
8 U. S. Const., art. I, § 1, cl. 3. See
Tiedeman's Limitation of Police
Power, § 204; Inman Steamship Co.
V. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238; Packet Com-
pany v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; Hai-bor
Com'rs V. Pashley, 19 S. C. 315. See
Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis,
107 U. S. 365 ; City of New Orleans v.
Eclipse Towboat Co., 33 La. An. 647;
39 Am. Rep. 279; Transportation Co.
v. Wheeling, 9 W. Va. 170.
OH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 258
and implied limitations of the constitution, in order that the
success of the system may be assured. And to such an extent
is this limitation upon the power of both considered necessary,
that it has been held by the courts, that neither the United
States nor the State can tax the agencies of the government of
the other. Thus, the State cannot lay a tax upon the securities
of the national government. The courts hold " that the power
to tax involves the power to destroy ; that the power to destroy
may defeat and render useless the power to create ; that there
is a plain repugpaiice in conferring on one government a power
to control the constitutional measures of another, which other,
with respect to those measures, is declared to be supreme over
that which exerts the control, are propositions not to be denied. "^
Nor can the United States lay a tax upon the securities and
other agencies of the State government.^ For these reasons
1 Marshall, Ch. J., in MoCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 413; Weston
V. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449; Bank of
Commerce v. New York City, 2 Black,
620; Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200;
Society of Savings v. Conite, 6 Wall.
594; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall.
573; People v. Commissioners, 4 Wall.
244; Bradley v. People, 4 Wall. 459;
Banks v. The Mayor, 7 Wall. 16;
Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wall. 26.
Revenue stamps are not taxable.
Palfrey v. Boston, 101 Mass. 329.
United States treasury notes are not
taxable. Montgomery Co. v. Elston,
32 Ind, 27. See People v. United
States, 93 111. 30 (34 Am. Rep. 155),
in ■which the power of the State to
tax the property of the United States
held by private individuals for any
purpose was denied. See State v.
Jackson, 33 N. J. 450; Union Pac.
R. R. Co. V. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5
(1873) ; Thomson v. Union Pac. R. R.
Co., 9 Wall. 579; Union Pac. R. R.
Co. v. Lincoln County, 1 Dillon C.
C. R. 314 (1871); sec. 775; State v.
Central Pac. R. R. Co., lONev. 47;
People V. Central Pac. E. R. Co., 43
Cal. 898 (1872); McCuUoch v. Mary-
Charleston, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 449 (1829);
reversing s. c, 1 Harper Eq. (S. C.)
340; FirstNat. Bank of Louisville v.
Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353 ; Osborn
V. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 7.38;
Desty Taxation, sec. 20, p. 67.
2 Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113;
Ward V. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418;
Raili'oad Company v. Peniston, 18
Wall. 5; Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich.
505. "In respect to the reserved
powers, the State is as sovereign and
independent as the general govern-
ment. And if the means and instru-
mentalities employed by the govern-
ment to carry into operation the
powers granted to it are necessarily,
and for the sake of self-preservation,
exempt from the taxation by the
States, why are not those of the
States depending upon their several
powers, for like reasons, equally
exempt from Federal taxation ?
Their unimpairfid existence in the
one case is as essential as in the
other. It is admitted that there is
no express pi-ovision in the constitu-
tion that prohibits the general gov-
ernment from taxing the means and
instrumentalities of the States, nor
land, 4 Wheat. 316, 424; Weston v. | is there any prohibiting the States
491
258
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XV.
it has been held that the State cannot tax the property of a
bank, or the bank itself, which has been established by the
United States government, as a governmental agency, as was
the old Bank of the United States, or the present national
banks.i So, also, has it been held incompetent for a State
to tax the salary of a United States official.^ On the same
ground, it has been held that the act of Congress, declaring the
papers used in judicial process, -either as pleadings or as evi-
dence, shall be invalid unless stamped, was unconstitutional in
its application to the State courts.^ And it has, likewise, been
held incompetent for the United States to declare an ordinary
contract or deed, which is valid according to the State law, in-
valid because it has not been stamped.*
So, also, the State and its municipalities cannot impose any
tax upon interstate commerce, as long as the subject-matter
constitutes interstate commerce. Thus, it has been held that
State laws, exacting a license tax from drummers or traveling
salesmen, engaged in interstate commerce, are unconstitutional)
because they constitute a tax upon interstate commerce.* But
from taxing tlie means and instru-
mentalities of that government. In
both cases the exemption rests upon
necessary implication, and is upheld
by the greatlawof self-preservation;
as any government, whose means
employed in conducting its opera^
tions are subject to the control of
another and distinct government,
can only exist at the mercy of that
government, of what avail are these
means if another power may tax
them at discretion?" Nelson, J.,
in Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 124.
1 McCuUoch V. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316; Osborn V. United States Bank,
9 Wheat. 738. See National Bank v.
Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353.
2 Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie
Co., 16 Pet. 435; Collector v. Day, 11
Wall. 113; Freedman v. Sigel, 10
Blatchf. 327.
8 Carpenter v. Snelling, 97 Mass.
452; Green v. Holway, 101 Mass. 243
(3 Am. Eep. 339) ; Atkins v. Plimpton,
492
44 Vt. 21; Griffin V. Ranney, 35 Conn.,
239; People v. Gates, 43 N. Y. 40;
Moore v. Moore, 47 N. Y. 467 (7 Am.
Kep. 466); Hale v. Wilkinson, 21
Gratt. 75; Haight v. Grist, 64 N. S.
739; Smith v. Short, 40 Ala. 385;
Davis V. Eichardson, 45 Miss. 499
(7 Am. Rep. 632) ; Bumpass v. Tag-
gart, 26 Ark. 398 (7 Am. Kep. 623) ;
Union Bank v. Hill, 3 Cold. 325;
Hunter v. Cobb, 1 Bush, 239; War-
ren V. Paul, 22 Ind. 276; Craig v.
Dimmock, 447 111. 308; Jones v.
Estate of Keep, 19 Wis. 369; Sam-
mons V. Holloway, 21 Mich. 162 (4
Am. Rep. 465) ; Burson v. Hunting-
ton, 21 Mich. 415 (4 Am. Rep. 497);
Duffy V. Hobson, 40 Cal. 240.
* Moore v. Quirk, 105 Mass. 49
(7 Am. Rep. 499) ; Sayles v. Davis,
22 Wis. 225.
6 Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479;
Rattermau v. West. Union Tel. Co.,
127 U. S. 411; West. Union Tel. Co.
V. Texas, 105 U. S. 460; Robbins v
CH. XV.J MtnsriCIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 258
the distinction is made in this connection between traveling
salesmen who are engaged in interstate commerce, and itinerant
peddlers, who are selling goods held by them, and already
brought by them into the State, and which therefore have ceased
to be articles of interstate commerce. It is held that the mu-
nicipal corporation may tax its transient traders or peddlers,
without violating any express or implied prohibition of the Fed-
eral Constitution.^
But in all such exactions of licenses from nonresidents, it is a
further constitutional requirement that there should be no dis-
crimination against the nonresidents, or in favor of the residents.
The citizens of each State are granted by the Federal Constitu-
tion, equal participation in the privileges and immunities of
the several States.^ And the same rule applies to taxes which
are imposed upon the sales of merchandise brought within the
State, but belonging to the citizens of other States. A tax is
valid, provided it is uniform with the similar tax imposed upon
the similar goods of resident owners, and invalid if there be any
discrimination in the amount of the tax or in its mode of levy-
ing against the goods of nonresident owners.^
Shelby Co. Tax Bist. 120 IT. S. 489;
Asher v. Texas, 128 IT. S. 129; Le-
loup V. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640;
Chicago V. Bartee, 100 111. 57; Kan-
sas V. Collins, 34 Kans. 434.
^Ex parte Heyleman, 92 Cal. 492;
Martin v. Eosedale, 29 N. E. K. 410;
Wiley V. Parmer, 14 Ala. 627; Wig-
gins V. Chicago, 68 111. 372; Morrill
V. State, 38 Wis. 428; Ex parte Thom-
as, 71 Cal. 204; Welton v. Missouri,
91 tr. S. 275; Snyder v. Crossan, 50
N. W. E. 678; In re Spain, 47 Fed. E.
208; Com. v. Crowell, 30 N. B. E.
1015; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S.
344; Warren Bor. v. Geer, 117 Pa.
St. 207; Burr v. Atlanta, 64 Ga. 225;
Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C.
380; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127
U. S. 649; In re Houston, 47 Fed. E.
539; State v. Smithson, 106 Mo. 149;
Ficklin v. Taxing Dist., 145 IT. S. 1;
12 S. Ct. 810; Titusville v. Brennan,
143 Pa. St. 642; 28 W. N". C. 534; Ex
parte Brown, 48 Fed. R. 435 ; Daniel
V. Eichmond Trs., 78 Ky. 542; Ex
parte Taylor, 58 Miss. 473 ; Charles-
ton County V. Ahrens, 4 Strob. (S. C.)
241; State v. Stevenson, 109 N. C.
730; State v. French, 14 S. E. E. 383;
109 N. C. 722; In re Wilson, 19 D. C.
341; West. Union Tel. Co. v. Mass.
Atty. Gen., 125 U. S. 530; State, v.
Hodgdon,41 Vt. 139; Ward v. Mary-
land, 31 Md. 279; s. c, 12 Wall. 418;
Cowles V. Brittain, 2 Hawks (IST. C.)
204; Eandolph v. Yellowstone Kit.,
3 So. E. 706.
2 Guy V. Baltimore, 100 IT. S. 434;
State V. Green, 14 N. E. E. 352; Peo-
ple V. Loundes, 130 N. Y. 455 ; Black
V. Seal, 6 Houst. (Del. 92) 541; Eob-
ey V. Smith, (Ind. 92) 30 N. E. E. 1093;
Ward V. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418;
Paul V. Virginia, 8 Wall. 177; State
V. North, 27 Mo. 464.
8 Woodruff V. Parham, 8 Wall. 139;
Eeading E. E. Co. v. Pa., 15 Wall.
232; Pacific Junction v. Dyer, 64
Iowa, 38; Marshall town v. Blum, 58
493
§259
MUNICIPAL OOEPORATIONS.
[CH. XV.
This constitutional provision does not apply to foreign cor-
porations in their regulation and control by the State and munic-
ipal authorities. The privileges and immunities of citizenship
are held not to be guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States to corporations, but only to natural persons who can
claim the rights and privileges of a citizen. Foreign corporations
acquire by the act of incorporation the privilege of doing busi-
ness, or of conducting their affairs and acting in a corporate
capacity, only in the State or country which grants the charter.
And if such a corporation is permitted to act in its corporate
capacity in any other State or country, it is in the nature of a
grant of a new or special privilege, and not the exercise by such
corporation of any right which is guaranteed to it by the State
Constitution. Since a foreign corporation cannot claim as a
matter of right the privilege of conducting business in every
State and country, any taxes that might be levied upon foreign
corporations, whether equal to or in excess of the tax which is
imposed upon domestic corporations, would be perfectly valid
under the provisions of the Federal Constitution. And such
will be the case, it matters not how great may be the discrimina-
tion against the foreign corporation in favor of the domestic.^
§ 259. Constitutional provisions as to reqmrements of
uniformity and equality — A tax levy may also be open to ob-
jection, because it does not comply with the constitutional re-
Iowa, 184; Welton v. Missouri, 91
V. S. 275.
Pullman etc. Co. v. Com., 141 U.
S. 18; People v. Wemple, 15 N. Y. S.
446; Walker v. Springfield, 94 111.
364; Hughes v. Cairo, 92 111. 339;
State V. Morgan, (S. D. 92) 48 N. W.
R. 314; Com. v. N. T. etc. Co., (Pa.
90) 22 Atl. R. 212; Leavenworth v.
Booth, 15 Kans. 62*7; Rothermel v.
Meyerle, 136 Pa. St. 250; Port of
Mobile V. Leloup, 76 Ala. 401 ; Cin-
cinnati Mut. Health Ass. v. Rosen-
thal, 55 111. 85; Osborne V. Mobile,
16 Wall. 479; Southern Exp. Co. v.
Mobile, 49 Ala. 404; Walker v.
Springfield, 94 111. 364; Amer. F. Co.
V. Board, 43 Fed. R. 609; Singer
M. Co. V. Wright, 33 Fed. R. 121;
494
Augusta etc. Co. v. Randall, 4 S. E.
R. 674; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Mass.,
10 Wall. 566; West, anion Tel. Co.
V. Lieb, 76 111. 172; Woodward v.
Com'rs, (Ky. 90) 7 S. W. Rep. 643;
Commonwealth v. Hamilton Manuf.
Co., 12 Allen, 298; Augusta etc. Co.
V. Randall, 4 S. E. R, 674; Ducat v.
Chicago, 10 Wall. 410; Pembina etc.
Co. V. Pennsylvania, 8 S. Ct. 737;
Commonwealth v. Milton, 12 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 212; Slaughter's Case, 13 Gratt
(Va.) 767; Commonwealth v. Berk-
shire Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 25; Price v.
Hunter, 34 Fed. 355 ; Commonwealth
V. Cary Improvement Co., 98 lb. 19,
22; Boston Manuf. Co. v. Common-
wealth, 144 lb. 598 ; Pac. Ex. Co. v.
Seibert, 142 U. S. 339.
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 259
quirement of uniform apportionment. The exact phraseology
of the constitutional provisions appears in the different States^
to be, generally, that " taxation shall be equal and uniform
throughout the State," and any ordinary change in phraseology
is not material ; certainly, in securing or ascertaining the practi-
cal results of the same. Where the requirement by the State
Constitution of uniformity in State taxation is held to be appli-
cable to and to control municipal taxation, the result, in respect
to the constitutionality of the common method of municipal
taxation, is the same, whatever may be the phraseology of the
constitutional provision. In some of the States, however, it
is held, that the constitutional provision requiring uniformity
is not applicable to municipal taxation ; while, on the other
hand, the conclusion is reached, that, although the provision
does apply and does control municipal corporations, yet the
common methods of taxation are not unconstitutional.
Taxation must be equal and uniform ; but the constitutions
do not require that the same rule of uniformity should be em-
ployed in the apportionment of all taxes. No one rule of uni-
formity can be devised, which will be applicable to all kinds of
taxation ; and consequently for each mode of taxation there
must be a special rule of apportionment. Thus, for example,
the taxation of property is apportioned according to the value
of the property ; it being considered that such an apportionment
will bring about a more perfect equalization of the tax than any
other rule. But in laying a tax upon professions and occupa-
tions, a different rule of uniformity must be followed ; ^ and the
usual rule is to establish a scale of taxation upon the occupa-
tions, graded in proportion to their relative profits. The mean-
ing, therefore, of this constitutional limitation is, that whatever
the rule of apportionment ma}- be, it must be uniformly and
impartially applied to all the subjects of the special taxation.^
'With the exception of Massachu-
setts, which simply requires tliat
taxation should be " reasonable and
proportional." Merrick v. Amherst,
12 Allen (Mass.) 500.
''See post, §261, and Tiedeman's
Limitations of Police Power, § 101.
* See State Railroad Tax Cases, 92
U. S. 575; Curamings v. National
Bank, 101 U. S. 153; Oliver v. Wash-
ington Mills, 11 Allen, 268; Tide-
water Co. V. Costar, 18 N. J. Eq. 518;
Kittanning Coal Co. v. Common-
wealth, 78 Pa. St. 100; Galtin v. Tar-
borough, 78 N. C. 119; Youngblood
V. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406; Bureau Co.
V. Railroad Co., 44 111. 229; Marsh v.
Supervisors, 42 Wis. 502; Phillesv.
Hiles, 42 Wis. 527; Ez parte Robin-
son, 12 Nev. 263; Sanborn v. Rice, 9
495
§ 259 a.
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XV.
There cannot be an)' partial discrimination between persons or
property living in tiie same taxing district, and falling within
the established rule of apportionment.
The State has the right to determine the limits of the taxing
district. But the tax district must be of uniform character, so
that the tax shall fall upon those who are almost equally bene-
fited by the expenditure. It has thus been held unlawful for a
Legislature to extend the limits of a city, so as to include farm-
ing lands, and thus increase the revenue of the city.^ But when
the taxing district is established, and the rule of apportionment
determined upon, the tax must be uniformly apportioned
throughout the taxing district. There cannot be different rules
of apportionment for different persons or different sections of
the district.^
§ 259 a. Uniformity and equality in local assessments. —
The charge of illegality, because of the violation of the consti-
tutional requirements of equality and uniformity in the appor-
tionment, is most commonly brought against local assessments
so called. It is very common at the present day for municipal
corporations, — instead of providing for the improvement of the
streets, the construction of sewers and drains, and other local
arrangements for the promotion of health and comfort, by the
La Salle etc. Co. v. Doaoghue, 127
111. 27; Com. v. Germania Ins. Co.,
22 Atl. R. 240; Singer v. Wriglit, 33
Fed. E. 121; State v. Morgan, 48 K.
W. R. 314; Stirling Gas Co. v. Hig-
gins, (111. 92) 2.5 N. E. R. 660; State
V. Traders Bank, 6 So. R. 582; 41
La. An. 329; Daly v. Morgan, 16 Atl.
R. 287; 60 Md. 460; St. Louis v. Con-
sol. Coal Co., (Mo. 93) 20; S. W. Rep.
099; Verdery v. Rummers ville, 82
Ga. 138; Coal Ridge etc. Co. v. Jen-
nings, 127 Pa. St. 397; State v. So.
Ca. R. E. Co., 4 S. C. 376.
1 Bradshaw V. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16;
Durant v. Kauiiman, 34 Iowa, 194;
City of Covington v. Southgate, 15
B. Mon. 491 ; Arbegust v. Louisville,
2 Bush, 271. But see contra, Stilts
V. Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515 ; Martin
V. Dix, 52 Miss. 53 (24 Am. Rep. 661);
496
Giboney v. Cape Girardeau, 58 Mo.
141; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St.
170; Hewitt's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 55;
New Orleans v. Cazelear, 27 La. An.
156; see ante, §§56, 57.
•■' J?i re Pittsburgh, 138 Pa. St. 401;
27 W. N. C. 457; Fayette Co. v. Peo-
ples Bk., 47 Ohio St. 503; Commis-
sioners of Ottawa Co. v. Nelson, 19
Kans. 234 (27 Am. Rep. 101); First
Nat. Bk. V. Lindsay, 45 -Fed. Rep.
619 ; East Portland v. Multnomah Co. ,
6 Ore. 62 ; Kent v. Kentland, 62 Ind.
291 (30 Am. Rep. 182) ; State v. New
Orleans, 15 La. An. 3-54; Pine Grove
V. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666, 675; Chi-
cago, etc. R. R. Co. V. Boone Co., 44
111. 240; Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark.
289; Gillette v. Hartford, 31 Conn.
351; Serrill v. Philadelphia, 38 Pa.
St. 355.
CH. XV.J MtTNICrPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 259 a.
imposition of a general tax, collectiUe from all the taxpayers
of the city according to the value of their taxable property, — to
apportion the cost of the improvement among those contiguous
proprietors who are more directly benefited by the improve-
ment. There are two modes of apportionment of the cost of
these local improvements, both of which have been sustained
as being a substantial compliance with the constitutional re-
quirement of uniformity. One method is the more or less ar-
bitrary apportionment of the cost according to the legislative
judgment of the benefits received by each proprietor for the
improvement ;i and the other method is to make a taxing dis-
trict of one street of a city, and apportion the cost of improve-
ments among abutting proprietors, in proportion to the front-
age of their lots.'^ The reasoning of the courts is invariable
that in local assessments, as in the case of a general tax, there
is a more or less successful attempt at uniformity, although the
rules of apportionment may be different. " A property tax for
the general purposes of the government, either of the State at
large, or of a county, city, or other district, is i-egarded as a
just and equitable tax. The reason is obvious. It apportions
the burden according to the benefit, more nearly than any oth-
er inflexible rule of general taxation. A lich man derives
more benefit from taxation in the protection and improvement
of his property than a poor man, and ought therefore to pay
more. But the amount of each man's benefit in general taxa-
tion cannot be ascertained and estimated with any degree of
certainty ; and for that reason a property tax is adopted, in-
1 People V. Mayor etc. of Brooklyn,
4 N. T. 419; Livingston v. New York,
8 Wend. 85 (22 Am . Dec. 622) ; Wright
V. Boston, 9 Cush. 233; Jones v. Bos-
ton, 104 Mass. 461 ; Nichols v. Bridge-
port, 23 Conn. 189; Cone v. Hart-
ford, 28 Conn. 363; State v. Fuller,
34 N. J. 227; McMasters v. Common-
wealth, 3 Watts, 292; Weberv. Eein-
hard, 73 Pa. St. 370 (13 Am. Eep.
747) ; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill,
383; Howard v. The Church, 18 Md.
451; Scoville V. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St.
126; Sessions v. Crunkleton, 20 Ohio
St. 349; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio
St. 636; Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush,
667 (3 Am. Eep. 309); Hoyt v. East
Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39 ; Sheley v. De-
troit, 45 Mich. 431; Cook v. Slo-
cum, 27 Minn. 500; Lafayette v. Fow-
ler, .34 Ind. 140; Peoria v. Kidder, 20
111. 351 ; Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo.
505; Uhrig v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 458;
Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76.
See contra. State v. Charleston, 12
Eich. 702.
2 Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560;
Northern E. E. Co. v. Connelly, 10
Ohio St. 159; Lamsden v. Cross, 10
Wis. 282; contra, McBean v. Chand-
ler, 9 Heisk. 349; Perry v. LitUo
Kock, 32 Ark. 31.
32 497
§ 259 a.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XV.
stead of an estimate of benefits. In local taxation, however,
for special purposes, the local benefits may in many cases be
seen, traced, and estimated to a reasonable certainty." ^ In Ohio,
the Legislature has expressly authorized the municipal -govern-
ments to apportion local assessments, either according to the
frontage of lots or their assessed value.^
A local assessment differs from a general tax in that it is
levied upon specific property Ijang more or less near to the
street in which the improvement has been made or opened up,
and on the ground, more or less well founded, that the property
abutting thereon has been especially benefited, and that it is
1 People V. Mayor etc. of Brook-
lyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 427.
2 In declaring this law to be con-
stitutional, Peck, J. says : " It is said
that assessments, as distinguished
from general taxation, rest solely
upon the idea of equivalents; a com-
pensation proportioned to the spec-
ial benefits derived from the im-
provement, and that in the case at
bar, the railroad company is not,
and in the nature of things cannot
be, in any degree benefited by the
improvement. It is quite true that
the right to impose such special
taxes is based upon a presumed
equivalent, but it by no means fol-
lows that there must be in fact such
full equivalent in every instance, or
tJiat its absence will render the as-
sessment invalid. The rule of ap-
portionment, whether by tlie front
foot or a percentage upon the assess-
ed valuation must be uniform, affect-
ing all the owners and all the prop-
erty abutting on tl>e street alike.
One rule cannot be applied to one
owner, and a different rwle to anoth-
er owner. One could not be as-
sessed ten per cent, another five,
another three, and another left alto-
gether unassessed, because he was
not in fact benefited. It is manifest
that the actual benefits resulting
498
from the improvements may be as
various almost as the number of the
owners, and the uses to which the
property may be applied. No gen-
eral rule, therefore, could be laid
down which would do equal and ex-
act justice to all. The Legislature
has not attempted so vain a thing,
but has prescribed two different
modes in which the assessment may
be made, and left the city authorities
free to adopt either. The mode
adopted by the council becomes the
statutory equivalent for the benefits
conferred, although in fact the bur-
den imposed may greatly preponder-
ate,"- in Northern Indiana R. R.
Co. V. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 159. See,
generally, Willard v. Presbury, 14
Wall. 676; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174;
Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. 352 (8
Am. Rep. 255); Craig v. Philadelphia,
89 Pa. St. 265 ; Philadelphia v. Rule, di
Pa. St. 15; Hill v. Higdou, 5 Ohio St.
243; Ernst v. Kunkle, 5 Ohio Sf. 520,
Wliite v. People, 94 111. 604; Palmer
v. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329; St. Joseph
V. O'Donaghue, 31 Mo. .345; Hines v.
Leavenworth, 3 Kan. 186 ; Burnett v.
Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76; Chambers v.
Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497. See, for an
exhaustive treatment of this subject
Cooley Const. Lim. 616, 634; 2 Dill.
Muu. Corp. §§ 752-761.
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 259 a.
but equitable find just that the property so especially benefTted
by the improvement should pay for the same, instead of impos-
ing upon the community at large the burden of providing for
such improvement. The constitutional provision already re-
ferred to, requiring uniformity and equality in the levying of
taxes, has been invoked in favor of the abutting landowners
and in proof of the unconstitutionality of such local assessments.
The cases are very numerous in vi^hich this constitutional ques-
tion is raised and settled, and the question has been raised in
probably every State in the Union. There must necessarily be
a great deal of variation in the views and opinions expressed
by the courts in rendering judgment in the causes of action
brought before them ; but it would be impossible in this con-
nection to go into these details for the want of space ; and it
seems to the writer to be of no advantage to the general student
that this should be done. After all, it would be necessary for
him, in order to ascertain the exact conditions of the law in the
particular State to enter upon the close study of all the cases
of that State. For this reason, only the general statement of
the principles of law, applicable to the question will be given,
so far as they are necessary to a thorough knowledge of the char-
acter of the issue.
It is manifest that a local assessment, or any other tax, can-
not be declared by the courts to be inequitable or unjust, unless
it is so imposed as to be a violation of some constitutional prin-
ciple. The provisions of the constitution, already referred to,
provide generally that taxes should be uniform and equal
throughout the State. In some of the States, such as Kansas
and Arkansas, express reference is made in the constitutions
to assessments being required to be uniform or equitable ; and,
of course, in these States there can be no question as to the
applicableness of the constitutional requirement of uniformity
to the local assessment. But in every other State, where the
provision simply requires that taxation should be uniform, it
is a question whether the constitutional provision is applicable
to the matter of municipal taxation, and especially to that of
local assessments upon abutting property. A very large num-
ber of cases maintain that the local, assessments are not to be
treated as identical with taxation in the constitutional sense,
499
§ 259 a.
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XV.
■which requires uniformity in its levJ^^ And certainly this is
the only rational conclusion to take, if one is determined to
recognize the constitutionalitj- of a local assessment. A special
tax, imposed upon abutting owners who are declared to be es-
pecially benefited by the improvements made, is certainly not
a uniform tax throughout the State.
If the imposition of this tax is to be justified, it is not in the
nature of a tax, but rather in the character of a police regulation,
compelling the abutting owners and others, who may be bene-
fited by such improvement, either to make the improvement
themselves, or to pay for such improvement, when it is made by
the municipal authorities ; and, as a police regulation, it would
escape the requirement of uniformity, and probably at the same
time avoid any charge of injustice, as long as the parties who
are called on to pay for such improvement are not required to
pay more than the value of the special benefit, which they have
received from such improvement. However, the local assess-
1 Boston Seam. See. v. Boston, 116
Mass. 185; s. c, 17 Am. Rep. 153;
Wriglit V. Boston, 9 Gush. 233, 241 ;
Yateman v. Crandall, 11 La. An. 220 ;
Allen V. Galveston, 51 Tex. 302; Aus-
tin V. Gulf, Col. & Santa Fe R. R.,
45 Tex. 2.34; Roundtree v. Galveston,
42 Tex. 613, 626; Palmer v. Strumpf,
29 Ind. 329; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11
Ohio St. 534; Mays v. Cincinnati, 11
Ohio St. 268, 273. See Peay v. Little
Rock, 32 Ark. 31 (1877); see also Ex
•parte Montgomery, 64 Ala. 463;
Charity Hospital v. Stickney, 2 La.
An. 550 (1847) ; Municipality No. 2 v.
Duncan, lb. 182; State v. Volkman,
20 La. An. 585; Hamilton v. Port
Wayne, 40 Ind. 491 (1872); Munici-
pality No. 2 V. Dunn, 10 La. An. 57
(18^5); see Municipality No. 2 v.
White, 9 lb. 447; Birmingham V.
Klein, 89 Ala. 461, holding that an
assessment was not a tax within the
constitutional provisions referred to.
See Reeves v. Wood County Treas.,
8 Ohio St. 333; 9 Ohio St. 520; No.
Ind. R. R. Co. V. Connelly, 10 Ohio
St. 159, Richmond & Allegheny R.
500
R. Co. V. Lynchburg, 81 Va. 473;
Norfolk V. Ellis, 26 Gratt. 224; Roose-
velt Hospital V. New York, 84 N. Y.
108. "It is not ordained (by the
constitution) that taxation shall he
general, so as to embrace all persons
of all taxable property within the
State, or within any district or terri-
torial division of the State ; nor that
it shall or shall not be numerically
equal, as in the case of a capitation
tax; nor that it must be in the ratio
of the value of each man's land, or
of his goods, or of both combined;
nor that a tax ' must be coextensive
with the district, or upon all the
property in a district which has the
character of, and is known to the
laws as, a local sovereignty.' Nor has
the constitution ordained or forbid-
den that a tax shall be apportioned
according to the beneiit which each
taxpayer is supposed to receive from
the object on which the tax is ex-
pended. In all of these particulars,
the power of taxation (in this State)
is unrestrained." People v. Brook-
lyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 427.
CH. XV.] MUKICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 259 a.
ment is declared by many of the cases to be a tax in the con-
stitutional sense, and they have held that the constitutional
provisions referring to it apply in their full force.^
But even where it is held that the State constitutional re-
quirement of uniformity does apply to and control municipal
taxation, yet the general ruling of the courts is, that where
there is no special constitutional restriction, the expenses of the
local improvement may be assessed against property owners
on some other basis than that of the value of all of the property
within the taxing district, and yet not offend the constitutional
requirement of uniformity, as long as the apportionment is de-
termined in some way by reference to the amount of special
benefit received by individual property owners.^ It has also
• Austin V. Austin Gasl. & C. Co.,
69 Tex. 180; Van Antwerp, In re, 56
N. T. 241; Monticello v. Banks, 48
Ark. 251.
2 Jefferson v. Mt. Vernon, (93) 33
N. E. Kep. 109; Masters v. Portland,
33 Pac. E. 540; State v. Trenton, (N.
J. 93) 26 Atl. E. 83; In re Eogers
Ave., 22 N. Y. S. 27; Lewis v. Seat-
tle, (Wasli. St.) 32 Pac. Eep. 794;
Kankakee Stone & Lime Co. v. Kan-
kakee, 128 111. 173; Blair v. City of
Atchison, 40 Kan. 353; Palmyra v.
Morton, 25 Mo. 593 ; Egyptian Levee
Co. V. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495 ; Siuton v.
Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525; State v. Lef-
fingwell, 54 Mo. 458; Olson v. City
of Topeka, (Kan.) 21 Pac. E. 219;
De Koven v. City of Lake View,
(111.) 31 N. E. E. 813; Springfield v.
Sale, 20 N. E. E. 86; 127 111. 359;
State V. Marvin, 51 N. J. L. 298; St.
Louis V. Clemens, 36 Mo. 46; Eyer-
man v. Blaksley, 78 Mo. 145 ; St. Jo-
seph V. O'Donoghue, 31 Mo. 343;
Hunerberg v. Hyde Park, 22 N. E.
E. 486; Busbee y. Wake Co. Com'rs,
93 N. C. 143; Galveston v. Heard, 54
Tex. 420; McChesney v. Hyde Park,
28 N. E. E. 1102; Detroit v. Beecher,
75 Mich. 454; Preston v. Eudd, 84
Ky. 150; Keith v. Philadelphia, 126
Pa. St. 575; Baltimore v. Johns Hop-
kins Hospital, 56 Md. 1 ; Baltimore
V. Hanson, 61 Md. 462; Jaeger v.
Burr, 36 Ohio St. 164. " Local im-
positions for grading, paving, sewer-
age, and the like, have been many
times sustained by this court, and
are, in the long run, perfectly fair,
for they enter into and enhance the
value of the property assessed. The
public, it is true, are benefited, but
so is the individual; and as an own-
er of urban property, he is further
benefited when, in due time, the
same tax falls on his neighbor."
Philadelphia v. Tryon, 35 Pa. St.
401, 404. But see also, Guest v.
Brooklyn, 69 N. Y. 506, in which
Chief Justice Church, while conced-
ing the power of the Legislature to
authorize the imposition of local as-
sessments, condemns tlie practice,
wherever it is without legislative re-
straint, " as unjust and oppressive,
unsound in principle, and various in
practice. The right to make a pub-
lic street is based upon public neces-
sity, and the public should pay for
it. To force an expensive improve-
ment upon a few property owners
against their consent, and compel
them to pay the entire expense, un-
der the delusive pretence of a corres-
ponding specific benefit conferred
501
§ 259 a.
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XV.
been held that Congress has the legislative authority, in the
District of Columbia, to authorize the city of Washington to
assess the expense of local improvement, in or upon streets,
upon the adjoining landowners ; and that such tax need not be
laid generally upon all the property ownei'S of the city.^ But
a power to provide " general ordinances " for street improve-
ments, does not include the power to improve particular streets
for the public benefit generally, or for the benefit of the whole
city, at the expense of the abutting owner, in the absence of a
purpose to benefit the property in the locality of the improve-
ment.2
Not only can the Legislature authorize the making of im-
provements in streets and highways and the assessment of
the expenses upon adjoining property owners, bat it has also
been held that the Legislature may compel a municipal corpo-
ration to do the same.'*
Where the expenses of a local assessment are imposed upon
adjoining property owners, in cases where the property is held
by parties as tenant for life and remaindermen, such expenses
should be apportioned between them according to the value of
their respective interests in the estate.*
In Pennsylvania, there are no express constitutional provis-
ions, requiring uniformity of taxation ; but the general clause
of the constitution, looking to the protection of the individual
citizen against a tyrannical exercise of power, is held to be suf-
ficient to raise the question of constitutionality in the case of
upon their property, is a species of
despotism that ought not to be per-
petuated under a government whicli
claims to protect property equally
with life and liberty. Besides its man-
ifest injustice, it deprives the citizen
practically of the principal protection
(aside from constitutional restraints)
against unjust taxation, viz., the re-
sponsibility of the representative for
liis acts to his constituents. As re-
spects general taxation where all are
equally affected, this operates, but
it has no beneficial application in pre-
venting local taxation for public im-
provements. The majority are never
backward in consenting to, or even
502
demanding, improvements which
they may enjoy without expense to
themselves."
iWillard v. Presbury, 14 Wall.
676 (1871).
2 Burns v. Baltimore, 48 Md. 198.
8 People ex rel. McLean v. Flagg,
46 N. Y. 401.
« Peck V. Sherwood, 56 N. Y. 614
(1874) ; Sands v. Richmond, 31 Gratt.
(Va.) 571. See Tiedeman's Keal
Property, § 66, for the rule of appor-
tionment in such cases, and the al-
gebraic formula which may be profit-
ably employed in making such an
apportionment.
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 259 a.
unjust taxation. The courts in this State hold that local as-
sessments upon abutting property are constitutional.^
It does not seem to be doubled anywhere that the imposition
upon adjoining property of the expense of making a local im-
provement, to the extent of the special benefit received by sucb
property owners from the improvement, is constitutional, al-
though there may, possibly, not be a strict compliance with-
the constitutional requirement of uniformity.^ But wherei
there is any ground for claiming, that the improvement made
does not constitute or confer upon the property owner a special
benefit, apart from the general benefit which he receives as a
resident of the community at large ; there is, likewise, a gen^
eral unanimity of opinion that the local assessment is uncon-
stitutional. There must be a special benefit to the adjoining
proprietor in order that there may be any justificatiou of au.
imposition upon him of the cost of the improvement, in whole
or in part.^ It has thus been held that a bridge, whicli is part
of a public highway or street of a city, is not a local but a pub-
lic improvement; and a local assessment of the cost of such
bridge upon the adjoining property owners would not be con-
stitutional, because of the supposed special benefit which those
individuals may receive from the construction of the bridge.*'
■Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St. 258;
Schenley v. Allegheny, 25 Pa. St. 128;
Mc&onigle v. Allegheny, 44 Pa. St.
118; Seely v. Pittsburgh, 82 Pa St.
360. See Wolf v. McHargue, (Ky.)
10 S. W. Eep. 809. Whenever an as-
sessment is made upon the adjoining
property for local improvement, it
may be made a lien upon the prop-
erty benefited and the payment thus
secured. GreensburgBor. v. Young,
53 Pa. St. 280.
i^Ealeigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 32;
Maddux v. Newport, (Ky. 90) 14 S.
W. R. 957; Beaumont V. Wilkes-Barre,
(Pa. 90) 21 Atl. 888; Speer v. Athens,
85 Ga. 49; Darst v. Griffin, 48 N. W.
K. 819; Ancoin v. Board of Com'rs,
8 So. li. 906; 43 La. An. 15; In re
Howard St., 21 Atl. K. 974; 28 W. N.
C. 159; Eiohman v. Board of Sup'rs,
42 N. W. E. 422; 77 Iowa, 513; Cov-
ington V. Worthington, (Ky. 90) 10
S. W. E. 790; Eutherford v. Hamil-
ton, 97 Mo. 543; Conger v. Bergman,.
11 S. W. E. 84.
8 Mock v. Muncie, (Ind. 93) 32 N.
E. E. 718; Grand Eapids etc. Co. v.-
Grand Eapids, (Mich. 93) 52 N. W. E.
1028; Preston v. Eudd, 84 Ky. 150;
In re Sycamore Alley, 9 Pa. Co. Ct.'
E. 61; Fort Wayne v. Shoaff, 106 111.
6(3; Watkins v. Zwietusch, 47 Wis.'
315 ; Danershower v. District, 7 Mackj
ey, 99; Davis v. Los Angeles, 86 Cal.
37; City v. Tiffany, 22 N. T. S. 604;:
Johnson v. Duer, 21 S. W. E. 800;
State v. Judges, (Minn. 93) 53 N. W. E;
800.
4 Sawmill Eun Bridge, 85 Pa. St..
247; Tide- Water Co. v. Coster, 18 N.
J. Eq. 518; State v. Lefflngwell, 54
Mo. 458; Hudson v. Nashua, 62 N. H.
491; Broadway Bap t. Ch. v. McA tee,.
603
§ 259 a. MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS. [CH. XV.
It has also been held in Pennsylvania, that where a street has
been already paved, it cannot be considered a special benefit,
in the nature of a local improvement, to have such street re-
paved, so far as to impose upon the adjoining property owners
the cost of such repaving. The original paving is a local im-
provement ; and so, likewise, any necessary repair of the orig-
inal paving ; but the substitution of a more expensive and
ornate paving for the original paving would be a public im-
provement, which could only be provided for by general taxa-
tion.i But it has, on the other hand, been held that the wid-
ening of a street would be a local improvement, which could
be assessed against the adjoining property owners.?
Involved in this question of confining the power of imposing
local taxes on property for local improvement, is the question
how far may abutting railroad property be assessed for such local
improvements. But it seems to be generally held, that a rail-
road which has abutting property, is properly assessable for its
due proportion of the cost of the improvement of the street or
road.^ But it has been held that where a railroad runs parallel
to a street, it would be an improper exercise of the power of local
taxation, to assess upon such railroad its proportionate share
of the cost of such improvement, certainly, by measurement of
its frontage on such street.*
The existence of a special benefit being the ground of justifi-
cation for the imposition of a local assessment, it is important
to determine whether it is a legislative or judicial question
8 Bush (Ky.) 508, 512; compare La-
fayette V. Fowler; 34 Ind. 140; Wil-
liams V. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Hoyt
V. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39.
1 Ilammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa.
St. 146; s. c, 3 Am. Rep. 615; Ilal-
pin V. Campbell, 71 Mo. 493.
2 Be Centre Street Vac, 115 Pa. St.
247.
s Louisville N. A. & C. Ey. Co. v.
State, 122 Ind. 443 ; Chicago v. Baer,
41 111. 306; No. Ind. R. R. Co. v. Con-
nelly, 10 Ohio St. 159; Philadelphia
V. Phila., W. & B. R. R. Co., 33 Pa.
St. 41; New Haven v. Fair Haven &
W. R. R. Co., 38 Conn. 422; s. c, 10
Am. Rep. 399 ; Baltimore, O. & C. R.
504
Co. V. Ketring, 122 Ind. 5; St. Paul
& Pac. R. R. Co. v. St. Paul, 21 Minn.
526; Illinois Cen. R. R. Co. v. Com'rs
of East Lake Fork Drainage Dist., 21
N. E. R. 925; Burl. & Mo. R. R. R.
Co. V. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112; Junc-
tion R. R. Co. V. Philadelphia, 88 Pa.
St. 424; Mulherrin v. Del.,L. & W.
R. E. Co., 81 Pa. St. 360; New York
& N. H. R. K. Co. V. New Haven, 42
Conn. 279; s. c, 19 Am. Rep. 534.
* Burl. & Mo. R. R. R. Co. v. Spear-
man, 12 Iowa, 112; State v. Atlantic
City, 34 N. J. L. 99; Louisville N. A.
V. C. Ry. Co., 122 Ind. 443; No. Ind.
R. R. Co. V. Connelly, 10 Ohio St.
159.
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 259 a.
whether such benefit exists or not, and whether the cost of such
assessment is greater or less than the benefit received therefrom
by the abutting owners. It has been held in New York, and
other states following its ruling, that it is a purely legislative
question ; and that the courts cannot interfere at all in deter-
mining the accuracy of the legislative judgment, either as to
the existence of such a special benefit, or as to the extent of
such a benefit in relation to the cost of such improvement.^
And it has also been held that the validity of an assessment on
lots benefited by a local improvement, is not affected by the
fact, that the amount of such assessment is greater than the
assessed value of the lot.^
On the other hand, it has been held by other courts, and par-
ticularly in the later decisions of New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and other States, that the power of the Legislature is not un-
limited ; and in order that any local assessment may be justifiable,
and within the constitutional authority of the Legislature and
municipality, it must be so apportioned as to avoid an imposi-
tion of a greater burden upon the local property owner than
the amount of the benefit which he has received from the local
improvement.^ " The whole amount of the assessment must
1 Guest V. Brooklyn, 69 N. Y. 506;
Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 383;
Craycraft v. Selvage, 10 Bush (Ky.)
696; Howell v. Bristol, 8 Bush, 493;
Centre Street Vac, In re, 115 Pa. St.
247; White v. People, 94 111. 604;
Warren v. Henley, 31 Iowa, 31 ; Dick-
son V. Racine, 61 Wis. 545.
2 In re Sackett St., 74 N. Y. 95 ; con-
tra, Preston v. Eudd, 84 Ky. 250.
' Ilammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa.
St. 146; In re Sycamore Alley, 9 Pa.
Co. Ct. E. 61; Grand Eap. Sch. Fur.
Co. V. Grand Eapids, 52 N. W. E.
1028 (Mich. 93); Loeser v. Eedd, 14
Bush (Ky.) 18; State v. Fuller, 39
N. J. L. 576; Watkins v. Zwietusch,
47 Wis. 513; Johnson v. Milwaukee,
40 Wis. 315 ; Mock v. Munoil, (lud. 93)
32 N. E. E. 718; Danenhower v. Dis-
trict, 7 Mackey, 99; Johnson v. Duer,
21 S. W. E. 800; Ottawa v. Spencer,
36 III. 211; Taylor v. Chandler, 9
Heisk. (Tenn.) 349; Municipality
No. 2 V. Dunn, 10 La. An. 57; Wat-
kins V. Milwaukee, 52 Wis. 98; s. c,
55 Wis. 335 ; Zwietusch v. Milwaukee,
55 Wis. 369; Broadway Bapt. Ch. v.
McAtee, 8 Bush, 508; 8 Am. Rep. 481 ;
City V. Tiffany, 22 N. Y. S. 604; States
V. Judges, (Minn. 93)53 N.W. E. 800;
McChesney v. Hyde Park, 28 N. E.
E. 1102; Philadelphia v. Sheridan,
24 Atl. R. 80; Beecher v. Detroit,
(Mich. 92) 52 N.'w. E. 731; Graham
V. Conger, (Ky.) 4 S. W. Eep. 327;
111. Cen. R. E. Co. v. Chicago, (111. 92)
30 N. E. E. 1036; Ferguson v. Stam-
ford, 60 Conn. 432; Savage v. Buffalo,
131 N. Y. 568 ;Hoffeld V.Buffalo, 130
N. Y. 387; Independence v. Gates,
19 S. W. E. 728; Holmes v. Jersey
City, 12 N. J. Eq. 299; State v. Fuller,
34 N. J. L. 227; City of Kansas v.
Baird, 11 S. W. R. 562; 98 Mo. 215;
Niklans v. Conkling,20 N. E. R. 797;
505
§ 259 a.
MTJNICIPAL COEPOUATIONS.
[CH. XV.
be apportioned amongst the several lots and parcels of land
specially benefited, in the 'proportion that the special benefit to
each lot or parcel bears to the whole special benefits conferred
by the improvement. If the opening of a street rendered it
practicable to open another contemplated street, which could
not have been opened before, and this fact of itself specially
benefits lots adjacent to the new street, such special benefits
may properly be considered/in estimating the special benefit
conferred by the opening of the new street. The right, which
is given to municipal^ corporations of resorting to this kind of
taxation is not, like the right of general taxation in the State,
founded on necessity ; but on a principle of justice, by which
the public may take from an individual whose lands, owing to
their proximity to it, are specially benefited by the improve-
ment, such a portion of the cost thereof as is equivalent to, bat
not in excess of, the special benefits conferred by the improve-
ment ; and this principle of justice in itself, impliedly furnishes
the measure of, and limits the extent of the right." i .
The same contradiction of authority is found as to the proper
method of imposing the local assessment, so as to meet the con-
stitutional requirement of uniformity and equality. The com-
mon method adopted is to impose the tax upon the adjoining
property owners in proportion to the frontage of their property
upon the street, in which the improvement has been made. And
generally, this method of assessment is held to be a just and
equitable method of apportionment.^ On the other hand, it has
118 Ind. 289; State v. Paterson, 37
If. J. L. 380; State V. Kewark, 37 lb.
415; Thomas v. Gaines, 35 Mich. 156;
Nichols V. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 204;
Davis V. City of New Orleans, 6 So.
100; 40 La. An. 806; DeKoven v.
Lake View, (111. 90) 21 N. E. R. 813;
Brooks V. Baltimore, 48 Md. 265;-
Springfield v. Sale, 20 N. E. E. 86;
127 111. 359: Walters v. Town of Lake,
129 111. 23 ; State v. Town of West
Hoboken, (N. J. 90) 17 Atl. E. 110;
State V. Ramsey Co. Dist. Ct., 33
Minn. 295; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio St.
243; Meissner v. Toledo, 31 Ohio St.
367.
' Chamberlain V. Cleveland, 34 Ohio
506
St. 551. See Walnut St., In re, 10 Pa.
Co. Ct. 173.
2 Eutherford v. Hamilton, 97 Mo.
543; Denver v. Knowles, (Col. 93) 30
Pac. E. 1041 ; Barber Asph. P. Co. v.
Gogreve, 41 La. An. 241; 5 So. 848;
Noouan v. Smith, 50 Mo. 525; O'Con-
nor V. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. St. 187;
Keith V. Philadelphia, 126 Pa. St.
575; 17 Atl. E. 883; Seely v. Pitts-
burgh, 82 Pa. St. 360; Springfield v.
Green, 120 111. 2G9; McCorraick's
Est. V. Harrisburg, 18 Atl. E. 126;
O'Reilly v. Kingston, 114 N. Y. 439;
Jennings v. Le Breton, 21 Pac. E.
1127; 80 Cal. 8; Greensburg v. Laird,
8 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 608; Beaumont v.
CH. XV.] MXTNICrPAIi TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS, § 259 a.
been held, in a number of cases, that the assessment of the cost
of local improvement, in proportion to the frontage of property
on the street, would be unjust and inequitable ; and, therefore,
in violation of the Constitution of the State. Probably, in some
of these cases the facts bring out some special circumstance of
inequity, upon which the court rests its judgment as to its being
unconstitutional.! In some late cases ^ — which arose out of reck-
less schemes for local improvements, and which resulted in the
insolvency or, at least, serious financial embarrassment of the
City of Wilkes-Barre, (Pa. 90) 21 Atl.
K. 888; Bacon v. Savannah, 12 S. E.
E. 580; 86 Ga. 301; Holmes v. Jer-
sey City, 12 N. J. Eq. 299; State v.
Fuller, 34 N. J. L. 22T; State v. New-
ark, 37 N. J. L. 415; Hoyt v. East
Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39; Warren v.
Henly, 31 Iowa, 31; Gatoh v. Des
Moines, 63 Iowa, "718; Paxson v.
Sweet, 13 N. J. L. (1 J. S. Green)
196; Alberger v. City of Baltimore,
20 Atl. R. 988; 64 Md. 1; State v.
Newark, 35 N. J. L. 168; State v.
Passaic, 37 N. J. L. 65, 68; St. Paul
& Pac. E. R. Co. V. St. Paul, 21 Minn.
526, 528; Sewall v^. St. Paul, 20 Minn.
511, 525; Ottawa Co. v. Nelson, 19
Kan. 234; Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb.
336, 347; Shehan v. Cincinnati, 25
Wkly. L. Bui. 212; In re Walnut St.,
10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 173; Irwin v. Mo-
bile, 57 Ala. 6, 9; Birmingham v.
Klein, 89 Ala. 461 ; Williams v. Cam-
mack, 27 Miss. 209, 224 ; State v. Dean,
23 N. J. L. 335; Raleigh v. Peace,
110 N. C. 32; Scott Co. v. Hinds, 52
N. W. R. 523; Parker v. Atchison,
(Kan. 92) 30 Pac. 20; Broadway Bapt.
Ch. V. McAtee, 8 Bush (Ky.) 508; s.
c, 8 Am. Eep. 481; Hammett v.
Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 146; Martin
V. Carron, 26 N. J. L. 228; State v.
Newark, 27 N. J. L. 185, 193 ; State
V. New Brunswick, 30 N. J. L. 395;
Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28
Cal. 345; Hines v. Leavenworth, 3
Kan. 186; State v. Elizabeth, 40 N.
J. L. 278; Lexington v. McQuillan's
Heirs, 9 Dana (Ky.) 514; Louisville
V. Hyatt, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 277; No.
Ind. E. E. V. Connelly, 10 Ohio St.
166; Alcorn v. Horner, 38 Miss. 652;
Covington V. Boyle, 6 Bush (Ky.) 204;
Bradley V. McAtee, 7 Bush (Ky.) 667.
iSee Howell v. Bristol, 8 Bush
(Ky.) 493; State v. Newark, 37 N. J.
L. 415; 18 Am. Rep. 729; Peay v.
Little Rock, 32 Ark. 31; Bogert v.
Elizabeth, 27 N. J. Eq. 568; McBean
V. Chandler, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 349; 24
Am. Rep. 308; State v. Jersey City,
40 N. J. L. 485; State v. Hudson, 29
lb. 104; lb. 115; Taylor v. Chandler,
9 Heisk. 349; State v. Rah way, 39 N.
J. L. 046; Ottawa v. Spencer, 36 111.
211; State v. Guttenberg, 38 N. J. L.
419; Chicago V. Larned, 34 HI. 203;
Mobile V. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310. So
it has been held that while a front-
age assessment is valid, yet the as-
sessment can only be made on abut-
ting property by this mode (Kline
V. Cincinnati, 28 W'kly L. Bui. 139) ;
it must apply to each front foot along
the entire street (Frey v. Findlay, 7
Ohio Cir. Ct. 311), and the lots as-
sessed should be of substantially the
same depth. Denver v. Knowles, 17
Colo. 204.
2 Bogert v. Elizabeth, 27 N. J. Eq.
568; State v. Newark, 37 N. J. L. 415 ;
s. c, 18 Am. Rep. 729.
507
§ 259 a.
MUNICIPAL COUPOEATIONS.
[CH. XV,
municipal communities concerned — the question was raised by
the New Jersey Court as to whether the Legislature had the
power without limitation to authorize the municipal corpora-
tion to enter upon an extensive scheme of taxation for local
improvement, and to assess the cost of such improvement upou
adjoining property, without considering the benefit of such
improvement to the property owner. And it was held in these
cases, that the entire cost of such improvement cannot in any
case be imposed upon the adjoining property ; but- that such
cost should be apportioned between the abutting owner and the
general public, according to the amount of benefit which the
local property owner has derived from the improvement ; and
that the cost as assessed upon him shall not exceed such benefit.
When one owns a corner lot, it is held that he can be re-
quired to be assessed for improvements made on both of the
streets, upon which the land fronts.^
Where the law requires that the cost of improvement shall
be assessed upon property abutting the streets, upon which the
improvement is made, it is held that land cannot be said to be
bounded by a highway, when the lines of a railroad pass between
the street and the property in question.^
It has also been held that municipal corporations may assess
the cost of a local improvement upon the lots benefited, in pro-
portion to their superficial area, instead of their frontage on
the streets.'
The relative justice and injustice of local assessments accord-
ing to the frontage upon streets, has also been raised in Penn-
sylvania, in regard to the levying a tax for the improvement
of a highwaj'- upon rural property, which is brought within the
jurisdiction of a city ; and which, because of its rural character,
cannot be supposed to have derived the benefit from local im-
1 Morrison v. Hershire, 32 Iowa,
271 (1871) ; Wolf V. Keokuk, 48 Iowa,
129; Warren v. Henly, 31 Iowa, 31
(1870); Springfield v. Green, 120 111.
209.
2 Philadelphia v. Eastwick, 35 Pa.
St. 75 (1860); Philadelphia v. Phila.,
W. & B. R. R. Co., 33 Pa. St. 41. See,
also. Ward, hi re, 52 N. T. 395 (1873),
per Andrews, J. ; O'Keilley v. King-
508
ston, 114 ISr. T. 439 (1889), where the
words " adjacent and adjoining " are
distinguished and construed. '' Ad-
joining," being construed to mean
touching, while "adjacent" means,
lying near to it, not contiguous.
" Ray V. Jeffersonville, 90 Ind. 507;
Constitution of California, art. xi.
sec. 13; Emery v. San Fr. Gas. Co.,
28 Cal. 345 (1865).
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 259 a.
provemenfs which would necessarily accrue to sucli property,
where it had been adapted or appropriated to urban uses ; and
for that reason, it has been held by later decisions in the Penn-
sylvania courts, that assessment of property in the rural dis-
trict by the foot front rule is unconstitutional, because it imposes
upon the property so taxed a greater assessment than the bene-
fit which such pi"operty has derived from the improvement. ^
Finally, it may be stated that the question of constitution-
ality raised by these cases of local assessments has been held
by the Supreme Court of the United States not to be within
amendment XIV. of the United States Constitution, which
declares that no State shall pass any law depriving the owner
of his property without due process of law.^
It is very likely that the fact, that these local assessment laws
have been adopted generally and declared to be constitutional,
may be accounted for by the circumstance that this method of
local taxation was a common practice among the earlier Eng-
lish municipalities, and therefore is an inheritance from the
mother country, where the American objection to the local as-
sessment could not possibly be raised.^
iScranton v. Pa. Coal Co., 105 Pa.
St. 445; Washington Ave. Case, 69
Pa. St. 352; Seely v. Pittsburgh, 82
Pa. St. 360; Craig v. Philadelphia, 89
Pa. St. 265 ; City v. Eule, 93 Pa. St.
15 ; but see contra, Malchus v. High-
lands Dist., 4 Bush (Ky.) 547.
2 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.
S. 97, 104; County of Mobile v. Kim-
ball, 102 U. S. 691.
3 Bedford Union Poor Guard v.
Bedford Impr. Commissioners, 7
Exch. 777; Viner's Abr. "Sewers."
But it is a curious fact that at pres-
ent (1893) the landed proprietors of
London are objecting to proposed
local assessments for local improve-
ments, on the ground that they vio-
late tlie legal requirement of uni-
formity and equality in taxation.
See generally, on this subject: Frey
v. Findley, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. 311; Kline
v. Cincinnati, 28 W'kly L. Bull. 139;
Denver V. Knowles, 17 Colo. 204; Bos-
ton Seamen's Fr. Soc. v. Boston, 116
Mass. 181; In re Board of Street
Openings, 133 N. T. 436; Raleigh v.
Peace, 110 N. C. 32; Davies v. Sagi-
naw, 87 Mich. 439; Drummond v.
Eau Claire, 79 Wis. 97; Schmidt v.
R. Co., 90 Cal. 37; Beaumont v.
Wilkes-Barre, 142 Pa. St. 198; Fitz-
gerald v. Walker, 55 Ark. 148 ; State
v. Kamsey Co., 47 Minn. 406; Ede v.
Knight, 93 Cal. 159; Whitney v. Pitts-
burgh, 29 W. N. C. 363; Lowe v.
Omaha, (Neb. 92) 50 N. W. E. 760;
In re Walnut St., 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 173;
Malory v. Marietta, 11 Ohio St. 636;
Punshon v. Cincinnati, 27 Wkly.
Bui. 155; McChesney v. Hyde Park,
28 N. E. R. 1102; R. R. Co. v. East
St. Louis, 134 111. 656; Wilson v.
Trenton, 53 N. J. L. 645; Hoyt v.
Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39; s. c, 2 Am.
Rep. 76; Egyptian Levee Co. v.
509
§ 261 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XV.
§ 260. Road tax and compulsory labor on the same. — It
is a very common practice in rural communities for the repair
of the road to be provided for by special road tax, or by com-
pulsory labor of tlie residents of the communitj'^ upon such
road ; the provision originally being that each individual male
citizen is required to perforin so many days labor upon the road,
or to provide a laborer for the required number of days as his
substitute. No question has ever been raised as to the consti-
tutionality of such regulation ; and it is believed that the Leg-
islature has the power to impose upon individuals, apart from
any ovs^nership of lands, the burden of maintaining in good re-
pair the streets of a cit}', by the performance of tlie necessary
labor on the streets. And the grant to a municipal corpora-
tion, in its charter, of the power to require of the citizens la-
bor in the repair of roads, does not violate the constitutional
requirement that all taxation should be by valuation of the
property of the taxpayer.^ The municipal corporation can also
exercise the power to require such labor of its inhabitants, as
an implication from the general power " to make such rules,
orders, regulations, and ordinances as to them shall seem meet
for repairing streets." ^
The tax may be imposed for the repair of the public roads,
although such loads may be outside of the city limits, as long
as they lead into the city.^
§ 260 a. Poll tax, constitutional.— A poll tax may also be
levied by municipal corporations for municipal purposes, with-
out violating any constitutional requirement as to uniformity ;
even though certain persons, such as members of fire compa-
nies, ai'e exempted.*
§ 261. Power to tax professions, trades and callings
Notwithstanding tlie constitutional provision, requiring equal-
Haidin,27 Mo. 495, 497; Uhrigv. St.
Louis, 44 Mo. 458; Lock wood v. St.
Louis, 24Mo. 20; Garrett v. St. Louis,
25 Mo. 505 ; Crowley v. Copley, 2 La.
An. .S29; Wilmington v. Topp, 71 N".
C. 76; Hayden v. Atlanta, 70 Ga.
817; Egerton v. Green Cove Springs,
19 Fla. 140; Wright v. Chicago, 46
111. 44; Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kan.
186.
" Sawyer v. Alton, 4 111. 130; Tip-
510
ton V. Norman, 72 Mo. 380.
2 State V. Halifax Comm'rs, 4 Dev.
L. (N. C.) 345 (1833).
» Skinner v. Hutton, 33 Mo. 244
(1862) ; Chess v. Birmingham, 1 Grant
(Pa.) Cas. 438 (1857); Brooklyn v.
Breslin, 57 N. T. 591 (1874); Bennett
V. Birmingham, 31 Pa. St. 15 (1850),
* Faribault v. Misener, 20 Minn,
396 (1874).
CH. XV.J MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 261
ity and uniformity in the imposition of taxes, it has been held
that there is no implied prohibition of the imposition of a tax
upon trades and professions and callings, even though the
amount of the tax should vary with each calling or profession,
as long as all persons engaged in a particular occupation or
trade are taxed by and in accordance with the same rule. Tlie
variance of the amount of the tax, which is imposed upon the
different trades and occupations, will be no ground for claiming
that the constitutional requirement of uniformity has been vio-
lated.^ And in imposing the tax, it may be made individual,
so that the persons engaged in the occupation or trade may be
subject to the tax, although two or more of them may be as-
' Arkadelphia L. Co. v. City of
Arkadelphla, (Ark. 92) 19 S. W. R.
1053; Ould v. Richmond, 23 Gratb.
464; 8. c, 14 Am. Rep. 1-39; Ex parte
Montgomery, 64 Ala. 463; Simmons
V. State, 12 Mo. 268; Rankin v. Hen-
derson, (Ky. 92) TS. W. R. 174; Rome
V. McWilliams, 52 Ga. 251; Gold-
thwaite v. Montgomery Council, 50
Ala. 486; Glasgow v. Rouse, 43 Mo.
479; Spaulding v. Hill, 7 S. W. R. 27;
Sacramento v. Crocker, 16 Cal. 119;
Simmons v. State, 12 Mo. 268; St.
Louis V. Steinberg, 4 Mo. App. 453;
St. Louis V. Laiighlin, 49 Mo. 550;
Blackman v. Royal Ins. Co., 17 N. E.
R. 580; Nashville v. Althrop, 5 Coldw.
(Tenn.) 554; Mason v. Lancaster, 4
Bush (Ky.) 406; Germania v. State,
7 Md. 1; Lynchburg v. Korfolk & N.
W. R. R. Co., 80 Va. 237; Cuthbert
V. Commonwealth, ("Va. 88) 9 S. E.
R. 185; Gilkerson v. Frederick Jus.,
13 Gratt. 577; Baton Rouge Bd. of
Sel. V. Spalding, 8 La. An. 87; Port-
land V. O'Neill, 1 Oreg. 218; Little
Rook T. Barton, 33 Ark. 436; State
V. Traders Bank, 41 La. An. 329;
McGrath v. Newton, 29 Kan. 364;
Walcott V. People, 17 Mich. 68; Wil-
liams v. Detroit, 2 lb. 560; St. Louis
V. Sternberg, 69 Mo. 289; Shotwell
V. Moore, 45 Ohio St. 632; 16 N.
E. R. 470; Morrill v. State, 38 Wis.
428; s. c, 20 Am. Rep. 12; Wiley v.
Owens, 39 Ind. 429 ; Braun v. Chicago,
110 111. 186; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11
Oliio St. 534; Richmond etc. Co. v.
Reidsville, 101 N. C. 404; Concord
Comm'rs v. Patterson, 8 Jones L.
(N. C.) 102; Cousins v. State, 50 Ala.
113; s. c, 20 Am. Rep. 290; Ottawa
V. Nelson, 19 Kan. 234; Com. v.
Maury, 82 Va. 882 ; Kneeland v. Pitts-
burgh, 11 Atl. R. 657; Woodbridge
V. Detroit, 8 Mich. 274; Stein v. Mo-
bile, 49 Ala. 362; s. c, 20 Am. Rep.
283 ; Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 13
Gratt. (Va.) 767; St. Louis v. Spiegel,
2 S. W. R. 839; 90 Mo. 587; Marmet v.
State, 45 Ohio St. 12 N. E. R. 463 ; Los
Angeles v. Los Angeles Water Co.,
61 Cal. 65; Detroit v. Det. Ry. Co.,
(Mich.) 43 N. W. Rep. 447; Living-
ston V. Paducah, 80 Ky. 656; New
Orleans v. Com. Bank of N. O., lb.
735 ; Seller v. Phillips, 37 111. App.
74; Municipality No. 2 v. Dubois, 10
La. An. 56; New Orleans v. Staiger,
11 lb. 68; New Orleans v. South-
ern Bank, lb. 41; New Orleans v.
Turpin, 13 lb. 56; Merriam v. New
Orleans, 14 lb. 318; New Orleans v.
Kaufman, 29 lb. 283. But see San
Jose V. San I. & S. C. R. R. Co., 53 Cal.
476.
511
§262
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XV.
sociated as partners ; each individual tradesman or business
man may be required to pay the tax.^ Where nonresidents
pursue their business or calling within the corporate limits, the
fact that they reside beyond these limits does not restrain the
power of the municipal corporation to impose the same license
tax upon them as upon residents of the city.^ But the power
to tax nonresidents, who do business withiii the city limits,
must be fairly and properly exercised ; and any discrimination
against such nonresidents, in favor of the resident of the citj',
will be in violation of the provision of the Federal Constitu-
tion, which grants to each citizen the equal privileges and im-
munities of the citizens of the several States."
A city is authorized to impose a special license tax upon ex-
press companies in the nature of an ad valorem tax upon the
gross annual receipts of such express company, notwithstanding
the fact that no tax of the same kind was imposed upon the
merchants.*
§ 262. Power to levy retrospective taxes. — If, for any rea-
son, a tax has been declared to be invalid, because the consti-
tutional or statutory requirements have not been complied with,
and the imposition of the tax may have been valid in the first
instance by a compliance with the provisions of the Constitu-
tion of the State ; such defective or illegal taxation may be
remedied or ratified by a subsequent act, authorizing the impo-
sition of the tax. It would not be strictly a ratification of an
illegal tax, but rather a present imposition of a tax, in liqui-
dation of some obligation previously contracted, for the satis-
faction of which the pi;ior illegal taxation was invoked. A tax
' Lanier v. Macon, 59 Ga. 187;
Wilder v. Savannah, 70 Ga. 760; Mc-
Iver V. Clarke, (Miss. 92) 10 So. Rep.
581.
2 Worth V. Fayetteville Comm'rs,
Winst. Eq. (N. C.) 70; Baltimore v.
Hussey, (Md.) 9 Atl. Eep. 9; State v.
Charleston, lb. 719; Bridges v. Grif-
fin, 33 Ga. 113 (1861); Johnson v.
Lexington, 14 B. Mon. 648; Louis-
ville V. Henning, 1 Bush, 381; see
Moore v. Fayetteville Com'rs, 80 N.
C. 154.
3 State V. Charleston, 2 Speers L.
612
(S. C.) 719; Hefling v. San Antonio,
(Tex. 92) 20 S. W. R. 85; Joyce v.
Woods, 78 Ky. 386; Bennett v. Bir-
mingham Bor.,81 Pa. St. 15, where it
is held that statutes authorizing the
registration and taxation of vehicles
for the maintenance of the repairs
upon the streets have to be strictly
construed, and in the absence of
an express provision these statutes
do not apply to nonresidents.
' American Union Express Co. v.
St. Joseph, 66 Mo. 675.
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 263
to pay for past indebtedness of a municipality is not objection-
able on any constitutional grounds.^
§ 26-3. Municipality cannot delegate its authority The
municipal corporation, like any other legal personality, cannot
delegate to another the power vested in it, unless the power to
delegate is expressly given to it in its charter.^ And this pro-
hibition of delegation extends to the authority conferred by the
Legislature on municipal corporations, to levy and impose taxes
or assessments on property for local interests ; such an author-
ity cannot be delegated, unless the right of delegation is ex-
pressly given to the corporation.^ It has thus been held
impossible, in making local assessments, for the municipal cor-
poration to leave to some official the determination of the
amount of the tax or assessment to be levied upon abutting
owners, and to make their judgment in such matters final.*
And where the ^ower has been so delegated, there cannot
be any subsequent ratification of the assessment.^ But the
Legislature may authorize such delegation by the municipal cor-
poration, or it may expressly provide in the charter that the
1 St. Louis V. Clemens, 52 Mo. 133;
Municipality No. 1 v. Wheeler, 10
La. An. 745; Fairfield v. People, 94
111. 244; Tallman v. Janesville, 17
Wis. 71 ; New Orleans v. Poutz, 14
La. An. 853; see §§ 16, 17.
^Ante, § 113; Foss v. Chicago, 56
111. 354; Thompson v. Boone ville, 61
Mo. 282; Hunt v. Booneville, 65
lb. 620; Macon v. First Nat. Bank,
59 Ga. 648; Indianapolis v. Lawyer,
38 Ind. 348; Johnston v. Macon, 62
6a. 645 ; Macon v. Macon Sav. Bank,
60 lb. 133.
' Stifel V. Cooperage Co., 38 Mo.
Ap. 340; Purcell v. Bear Creek, 38
111. Ap. 499; Thompson v. Scher-
merhorn, 6 N. Y. 92; see Page v.
Chicago, 60 III. 441; Quid v. Rich-
mond, 23 Gratt. 471; Peoria etc. Co.
V. People, (111. 92) 31 N. E. R. 113;
Matthews v. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115;
Richardson v. Heydenfeldt, 46 Cal.
68; People v. Clark, 47 lb. 456; Ran-
dolph v. Gawley, 47 lb. 458; White
V. Stevens, 34 N. W.R. 255; Sheehan
33
V. Gleason, 46 Mo. 100; Lord v. Ocon-
to, 47 Wis. 386; Davis v. Rood, 65
N. Y. 566; Scofleld v. Lansing, 17
Mich. 437; People v. Hagadorn, 10
N. E. R. 891; 104 N. Y. 516; Bel-
linger V. Gray, 51 lb. 610; Hitch-
cock V. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341;
Murray v. Tucker, 10 Bush (Ky.)
240; Davis v. Reed, 65 N. Y. 566; Fay
V. Wood, (Mich. 87) 32 N. W. R. 612;
(Apportionment;) Walker v. Chica-
go, 62 111. 286; East St. Louis v.
Wehrung, 46 lb. 392; Lake Shore &
M. S. R. E. Co. V. Chicago, 56 lb.
454; Bryan v. Chicago, 60 lb. 507;
Foss V. Chicago, 56 111. 354; State v.
Copeland, 3 R. 1. 33 ; Meuser v. Risdon,
36 Cal. 239; State v. Swisher, 17 Tex.
441; and comp. State v. Briggs, 15
R. L 425; 7 Atl. R. 454; Danenhower
V. District, 7 Mackey, 99.
■* Phelps V. New York, 112 N. Y.
216.
'• Murray V. Tucker, 10 Bush, 240;
see Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U.
S. 341; Davis v. Reed, 65 N. Y. 500.
613
§264
MtrXICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XV.
assessment shall be made by some other body than the eitv
council ; and such grant of the power to delegate is within the
constitutional limitations of the authority of the Legislature.^
But where the ascertainment of the cost of an improvement,
and the apportionment of the expenses between property own-
ers, are delegated to an official of the corporation, to be reported
upon by him to the city council for its approval or rejection ;
the discretionary power of the city council has not been dele-
gated and the acts of this officer are only ministerial ; and hence,
there is no objection to the assessment, on the ground of the
unlawful delegation of the authority of the city council.^
§ 264. Power of taxation a continuing one. — Where the
municipal corporation is given the power to tax, whether it is
the power to impose a general tax, or to levy a special assess-
ment for a local improvement, in both cases the power is a con-
tinuing one ; and the authority is given to thfe municipality to
exercise the power from time to time, as the public needs may
require. Such a power is not exhausted by a single exercise ■
of it.* Thus, for example, the power to compel property owners
to pave the streets of the city, includes the power to compel
them to repave such streets, when required by the municipal
authorities.* But these decisions have been denied, especially
in Pennsylvania, where it is held that the power to impose a
local assessment upon abutting owners for the original paving
of a street is justifiable on the ground that it was the creation
1 Scliwatz V. Flatboats, 14 La. An.
243; Solienley v. Commonwealth, 36
Pa. St. 02; State v. Xew Brunswick,
30 JiT. J. h. 395.
2 City of Nevada v. Morris, (91) 43
Mo, App, 586; Strauss v. City of
Cincinnati., 24 Wkly. Law Bull. 422;
McKusick V, Stillwater, 44 Minn.
372.
" Dickinson y, Worcester, 138 Mass.
555 ; Budge v. Cjty of Grand Forks,
47 N. W. E. 390; Warner v. Knox, 50
Wis. 429; State v. New Brunswick,
44 N. J. L. 116; McVerry v. Boyd,
(Cal. 92) 26 Pac. 885; Taber v. Graf-
miller, 109 Ind. 206; McCormick v,
Patchin, 53 Mo. 33; 14 Am. Eep. 440;
Burmeister, In re, 76 N. Y. 174;
614
Smith V. City of Louisville, 14 S. W.
K. 349; Dooley v. Sullivan, 112 Ind.
451; Wiles v. Hoss, 114 lb. 371;
Phillips, In re, 60 N. Y. 16; Burke,
In re, 62 lb. 224.
« Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of
Quincy, (111. 90) 27 N. E. R. 192; Far-
rar v. St. Louis, 80 Mo. 379; Estes v.
Owen, 90 lb. 113; Town of Marion
v. O'Killman, (Ind. 91) 26 N. E. K.
676; Wilkins v. Detroit, 46 Mich. 120;
McCormick v. Patchin, 53 Mo. 33;
Hovey v. Barker, (Kan. 92) 26 Pac.
Kep. 591 ; Kokomo v. Mahan, 100 Ind.
242; Jelliff v. Newark, 48 N. J. L.
101; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich.
560.
CH. XV.j MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 265
of a special benefit to such local property owners ; but that the
repaying of such street, as distinguished from the repair of that
street, would not be included within the original power to pave,
and therefore the cost of such paving could not be imposed
upon the adjoining property owners.-^ In following out this
distinction between original paving and subsequent change in
the same, it has been held that where in the original plan of
paving a street a strip of land was left in the middle of such
street for trees and shrubbery, and a subsequent change in the
plan called for the paving of such strip, this subsequent re-
quirement of the paving of such strip, covered by the trees and
shrubbery, would be an original paving for which the property
owners could be assessed.^ In the city of New York, the prop-
erty owners are protected against the change of paving of the
street by a provision of the charter, which prohibits the cost of
the paving to be imposed upon the adjoining property owners,
unless such change in paving has been petitioned for by a ma-
jority of the owners of the abutting property.^ And so, also,
it has been held in Iowa, that the abutting owners cannot be
charged with the cost of repaving, where a good pavement has
been torn up for the purpose of constructing a sewer ; that the
cost of the repaving should be considered an item of expense
in the construction of the sewer.*
§ 265. Power of taxation cannot be varied or enlarged by
city ordinances. — The power of taxation is conferred upon a
municipal corporation by its charter, and the extent and limi-
tations of this power can alone be determined bj'' the provisions
of the charter. Hence, the extent of the exercise of the power,
and the amount of its exercise, can in no wise be varied or con-
trolled by ordinance, except, of course, where the regulation
of the exercise of the power in any one particular has been
intrusted to the corporation by its charter.^ The city, there-
fore, cannot impose terras or conditions on the exercise of the
power, which will in any way affect the validity of a tax-sale
' Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa.
St. 146; s. c, 3 Am. Eep. 61.5; Or-
phan Asylum's Appeal, 111 Pa. St.
135; Wistar v. Philadelphia, 111 Pa.
St. 604; s. c, 80 Pa. St. 112 (1876);
s. c, 21 Am. Eep. 112.
^Alcom V. Philadelphia, 112 Pa.
St. 494.
s Garvey, In re, 77 N. T. 523.
■1 Battle V. Mobile, 9 Ala. 234 (1846).
^Ante, chap, on Ordinances, § 146;
"Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242.
515
§265
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XV.
made under authority from the Legislature.-^ And, unless a
special authority is given to the municipal corporation to exer-
cise discretion in the matter, the municipal corporation cannot
transfer the power of collecting taxes from the officer designated
for that purpose in the charter, to some other appointee of the
city council,'^ or exempt property from taxation, which the gen-
eral law of the State made taxable,^ or to exempt from taxation
the improvements made upon the land, where the charter directs
the assessment to be made upon the value of the property.* So,
also, is it impossible for a city to make the liability for taxes a
lien upon the property, binding such property into whosesoever
hands the land may come, where the intention of the Legislature
is expressed to be that the taxes should be a personal debt of
the one who is the owner of the land, at the time the levy was
made.^
It is manifest, therefore, from what has just been stated in
general terms, that the mode of levying taxes, prescribed by
the charter of the city, or by the general laws of the State
under which municipal corporations are regulated, must be
strictly pursued. Any deviation of a material nature from the
mode prescribed will have the effect of vitiating the proceed-
ings for the levy of the tax.® The same rule applies, perhaps
even more strictly, to matters of proceedings for local assess-
1 Thompson v. Carroll, 22 How. (U.
S.) 422.
■ 2piacerville v. Wilcox, 35 Cal. 21.
estate V. H. & St. J. E. E. Co., 75
Mo. 208.
* Fitch V. Pinckard, 5 111. 68 ; Primm
v. Belleville, 59 111. 142.
6 Moale V. Baltimore, 61 Md. 224,
citing Dashiell v. Baltimore, 45 lb.
615; Gould v. Baltimore, 58 lb. 46;
s. c, 59 lb. 378; Handy v. Collins,
60 Id. 229.
6 Sewall V. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 511 ;
Ellison V. Lindford, (Utah, 91) 25
Pac. E. 744; State v. Perth Amboy,
38 N. J. L. 425 ; Brophy v. Landman,
28 Ohio St. 542; Fort Worth v. Davis,
57 Tex. 225; State v. Hagerty, 5 Ohio
Cir. Ct. 22; Butler v. Nevin, 88 111.
575; Churchman v. Indianapolis,
516
110 Ind. 259; Wabash Ey. Co. v.
People, (111. 91) 28 N. E. E. 57; Chi-
cago V. Wright, 32 111. 192; Crane v.
Janesville, 20 Wis. 305; State v. Phil-
lips, 102 Mo. 664; Knox v. Peterson,
21 Wis. 247; Collins v. Louisville, 2
B. Mon. (Ky.) 134; Tobiny. Gillespie,
152 Mass. 219; State v. Jersey City,
24 N. J. L. 662, 666; State v. Plain-
field, 38 lb. 95; Hewlett v. White,
(Mich. 90) 43 N. W. E. 1043; State
V. Crawford, 36 N. J.'l. 394; D'An-
tignac V. Augusta, 31 Ga. 700; Nis-
som V. Furman, 22 Fla. 581; State v.
Babcock, 20 Neb. 522; Sims v. War-
ren, (Miss. 90) 7 So. 226; Fitch v.
Pinckard, 5 111. 78; Henderson v.
Baltimore, 8 Md. 352; Frost v. Leath-
erman, 55 Mich. 33; Green v. Ward,
82 Va. 324.
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 265
ments; any substantial departure from the statute, which au-
thorizes the recovery of a local assessment, will avoid the pro-
ceeding.i And v^here, in the provision for the recovery of a
local assessment, certain requirements are made as conditions
precedent to the imposition of the liability for the improvement
upon the abutting owner, the contractor v?ho fails to take the
necessary steps to impose the liability upon the abutting owner,
cannot recover from the city for the value of the improvement
thus made ; notwithstanding a provision of the charter declares
that under the circumstances, when work is ordered to be done
on a local improvement, the abutting owner should be held
responsible for it. This provision is construed as a guaranty
that the cost of the improvement will be paid by the lot owner
when everything is done by the contractor to create the liability
upon the lot owners, which is required by the laws of the State.^
No liability on a local assessment for local improvements, which
lias been ordered by a municipal government, will be imposed
thereby on either the city or the abutting owner, unless all the
requirements of the Constitution or general laws of the State
relating thereto, which are intended to serve as conditions pre-
cedent, have been fully complied with.^ The commissioners,
who are directed to assess the damages and benefits for a local
improvement, have judicial powers ; and are judicial officers to
such an extent, that the general rule of law applies, which in-
capacitates them to act as commissioners, where they have any
special interest in the assessment proposed.* ItTias also been
held that it is fatal to the validity of a legal assessment, where
1 Bensinger v. Columbia, 6 Mackey,
285; Allen V. Galveston, 51 Tex. 302;
Gilmore v. TJtica, 55 Hun, 514; 9 N.
Y. S. 912; Pound v. Chippewa Co.
Sup., 43 Wis. 65; Merrett v. Port-
chester, 71 X. Y. 309.
2 Hall V. Chippewa Falls, 47 Wis.
267; Philadelphia v. Jewell's Est.,
19 Atl. E. 947; 26 W. >r. C. 292;
Fletcher v. Oshkosh, 18 Wis. 229;
Owens V. Milwaukee, 47 lb. 461;
Bouldin v. Baltimore, 15 Md. 18 ; No.
Pao. Lum. & M. Co. v. East Portland,
14 Or. 3; Philan v. New York, 119
N. Y. 86; Benton v. Milwaukee, 50
Wis. 368; Harrison v. Milwaukee, 49
lb. 247.
3 Ziegler v. Flack, 54 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 69; Eager, In re, 46 N. Y. 100;
Hewes v. Eels, 40 Cal. 255; Hager v.
Burlington, 42 Iowa, 601; Egerman
V. Payne, 28 Mo. Ap. 72; Nicolson
Paving Co. v. Painter, lb. 699; Him-
melman v. Oliver, 34 Cal. 246; New-
man V. Emporia, 32 Kan. 456; De
Koven v. Lake View, 129 111. 399;
Long V. Cincinnati, 23 Wkly. L. Bui.
100; Hawthorne v. East Portland,
13 Oreg. 271.
" State V. Crawford, 36 N. J. L. 394.
517
§ 265 MTJ^noIPAL coepoeations. [ch. xv.
the commissioners failed to take the oath required by the stat-
ute, or to hold such meeting at the place, which was named in
the notice of the assessment.^ Where the provision of the
charter is silent as to the manner in which the city shall exer-
cise its power in providing for the levy of taxes, or for the im-
provement of its streets, it is possible for provision to be made
by resolution, or by motion of the city council, as well as by
a formal ordinance.^ But if the charter requires that the de-
termination to order an improvement of a street, or a levy of
the tax, shall be made b}' ordinance, then the simple resolution
of the city council will not be valid.^
In this connection, however, it is difficult at times to distin-
guish provisions of the charter which are strictly mKndator)%
from those which are merely directory. The mandatory or im-
perative provision of the charter must, of course, be strictly
followed, while obedience to the directory provision is more or
less discretionary. Thus, a statute, requiring a tax to be levied
on a certain date named, is held as to the time of levy to be
directory ; and the same power may be exercised within a reason-
able time thereafter.* But the question, whether the provision
as to the time of the exercise of the power is imperative or di-
rectory, depends wholly upon the intention of the Legislature,
as manifested by the context of the statute and the nature of
the power to be exercised, and the I'elation of the parties and
the circumstances surrounding them. Thus, it has been held,
that where a statute provides that the town board of trustees
shall, before a given date, determine the amount of the general
tax for the current j'ear, the assessment of the tax before that
date was mandatory, and that a levy made after the statutory
time would be void.* It seems that where the object of a pro-
vision is the protection of the taxpayer against undue exaction
or excessive hardship, the provision is mandatory and must be
strictly complied with. But where the provisions only serve
•Wheeler v. Chicago, 57 HI. 415;
State V. Perth Amboy, 38 IST. J. L. 425.
2 Warrensburg v. Miller, 77 Mo. 56;
Indianapolis v. Imberry, 17 Ind. 175
(1865) ; Moberry v. Jeffersonville, 38
Ind. 198; Terre Haute v. Turner, 36
Ind. 522; Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90
(1871).
518
'Newman v. Emporia, 32 Kan. 456.
For the distinction between ordi-
nance and resolution, see § 145.
* Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Pa. St. 224
(1845).
s Williamsport v. Kent, 14 Ind. 306
(1860).
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 266
to promote dispatch, or provide a method or system of levying
or collecting the tax, and can in no wise or in any material de-
gree serve as an advantage to the taxpayer, the provisions are
generally held to be directory .^
§ 266. Limitation of tax rate cannot be exceeded It is
quite common in municipal charters, or in the general law un-
der which the municipality had been incorporated, to limit the
rate of taxes which may be raised in one year. Wherever the
power is so limited, any levy of a tax beyond the limit would,
of course, be void, and could be restrained by appropriate pro-
ceedings on the part of the citizens. Nor would the power be
enlarged ordinarily by implication, by other provisions of the
charter which confer generally the power to make contracts, or
to make improvements of a general character.^ And where the
limit of taxation has been reached, without provision for the
payment of the principal or interest of the municipal debt, it
is not possible for a court to award a mandamus, to compel the
levy of an additional tax to pay a judgment recovered for such
debt against the city or county.^ So, also, where the entire
amount of the tax has not been exhausted in the provision for
the current expenses ; and the surplus of the amount of taxa-
tion is still to be determined ; it has been held, by the Supreme
Court of the United States, that the disposition of the remain-
der of the taxes, which could be imposed under the charter lim-
its, was within the power of the city council ; and could not be
reached by mandamus, in advance of any ascertained surplus.*
Under the statutes of Georgia, the power of a municipal corpo-
ration to levy taxes was limited to such a levy for ordinary cur-
rent expenses ; but it was held that the cost of furnishing a
building for city government use, was an ordinary current ex-
pense, which is authorized under this statutory provision.^
While the statutory or charter limit of the power of taxation
' Steckert v. E. Saginaw, 22 Mich.
104; Starr v. Burlington, 45 Iowa, 87.
■■^ Clark V. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494;
Arnold v. Hawkins, 95 Mo. 569; 8 S.
W. E. 718; Johnston v. Becker Co.,
27 Minn. 64; 6 N. W. E. 411; Hecock
V. Van Dusen, (Mich. 91) 45 lb.
.34.3; Newaygo v. Echtinaw, (Mich.
91) 45 lb. 1010; United States v.
Cicero, 41 Fed. 8; Burnes v. Atchi-
son, 2 Kan. 454.
3 Clay County v. McAleer, 115 TJ. S.
616.
« East St. Louis v. Zebley, 110 U.
S. 321; Weber T. Traubel, 95 111. 427;
East St. Louis v. Underwood, 105 lb,
308.
■^ Rome V. McWilliaras, 67 6a. 106.
519
§ 267 MUNICIPAX, COEPORATIOXS. [CH. XV.
cannot be impliedly enlarged by other provisions of the charter,
calling for general improvement, or giving a general power to
contract debts ; yet, a special gi'ant of power in the charter
may have that effect; i. e., where the charter grants to the cor-
poration a speci.il authority to borrow money or contract a debt
for a specific purpose, and the exercise of this special power
would necessarily call for an assessment of taxes in excess of
the charter limit as to the rate of taxation ; for this special pur-
pose, the charter limit will be held to have been impliedly re-
pealed. Thus, a special act which authorizes a municipal
corporation to issue bonds in payment of a railroad subscrip-
tion, and which provides for the payment of such bonds by the
levy of taxes ; or, even independently of any express provision,
that the bonds shall be paid by a special levy ; it has been held
that this special act woiild confer an authority to levy taxes in
excess of the charter limit, for the purpose of providing. for
payment of the bonds.^
But where the charter limit of rate of taxation foi- a particu-
lar year has not been exhausted by the single levy, there may
be any number of levies during the same year, provided the
charter limit has not been exhausted by the total sum of taxes
levied ; and as long as the charter does not require that the
entire tax for the given year shall be levied at once.^
§ 267. Construction and reconcilement of general laws
with special charter provisions. — The general statutes of the
State usually contain provisions for taxation, applicable through-
out the entire State, and declaring what property is taxable,
and how the taxes should be levied. As has already been ex-
plained, the municipal corporation has no implied power to levy
taxes for local purposes, but must rest its claim to such power
upon a special grant of the power to it. It is the fact that
municipal corporations are expressly granted the power to im-
pose taxes, either in the charter, or by the general laws under
which the municipality has been incorporated. But the grant
of power to the corporation is ordinarily very general in its
^ Quincy v. Jackson, 11.3 U. S. 332;
distinguishing United States v. Ma-
con County, 99 U. S. 582; Commou-
■wealth V. Pittsburgli, 34 Pa. St. 496;
Amey v. Allegheny City, 24 How.
3G4; Fosdick v. Perrysburg, 14 Ohio
520
St. 472; Butz V. Muscatine, 8 Wall.
575 (1869).
2 Municipality No. 2 v. Orleans Cot.
Press Co., 6 Rob. (La.) 411; Benoist
V. St. Louis, 19 Mo. 179 (1873); Wat-
tles V. Papeer, 40 Mich. 624.
CH. XV.j MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 267
character, and the details, as to the extent of the power and the
manner of its exercise, are generally left to be determined by-
judicial construction. Where the special grant of power con-
tains no express provision for the application to municipal tax-
ation of the general rules laid down by the general statutes of
the State ; and where the charter contains no substitute resu-
lation of the same, presumptively, the scope and limitation of
the municipal power of taxation can only be found in the pro-
visions of the State statutes in respect to taxation. But, in
every case, it is a question of judicial construction ; and where
the provisions of the general statute in respect to taxation
cannot be carried out in the case of municipal taxation, this
provision of the statute will be held by the courts to have no
application to the municipal taxation.^ Thus, it has been held
in Virginia, — where the general laws of the State, in requiring
railroad companies to pay for their passenger transportation by
such company one mill for eveiy mile of travel, provide that
" every company paying such tax shall not be assessed with any
tax on its lands, buildings or equipments ; " — that this general
law of taxation, providing for an exemption of the railroad cor-
poration from the liability for any other tax, was intended to
apply only to State levies of taxes, and did not include the tax of
municipal corporations.^ Where the authority is granted to a
municipal corporation, to levy taxes " upon the freeholders and
inhabitants of such village, according to law," the provision
"according to law" means, according to the provisions of the
general statutes of the State, in respect to the power of taxa-
tion.3 So, also, it has been held that, where a city is author-
1 Cemetery v. Com'rs, 152 Mass.
408; City of Kansas v. Johnson, 18
Mo. 661; Savannah v. Jesup, 106 U.
S. 563; City of Wilkes-Barre App.,
116 Pa. St. 246; 9 Atl. E. SOS; Mu-
nicipality No. 2 V. Com. Bank of N.
0., 5 Eob. (La.) 151; Farrell v. Hath-
away, 22 N. E. E. 849; Columbia v.
Beasly, 1 Humph. 232, 240; Glass v.
White, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 475; South
Bend v. Cushing, (Ind. 89) 24 N. E.
E. 114; Furman v. Knapp, 19 Johns.
248; Trimble v. Sterling, (Ky. 91) 12
S. W. E. 1066; Shoal water v. Arm-
strong, 9 Humph. 217.
2 Winona etc. Co. v. Watertown,
(S. D. 92) 44 N. W. E. 1072; Green
etc. Co. V. Outagamie Co., (Wis. 91)
45 lb. 536.
8 Troy V. Mutual Bank, 20 N. Y.
387; Holtzhausen v. Newport, (Ky.
03) 22 S. W. E. 752; Davenport v.
Miss. & Mo. E. R. Co., 16 Iowa, 348;
State V. Carson, (Wash. 93) 33 Pac.
E. 428; Barrett v. Henderson, 4
Bush, 255 ; Dunleith & D. Br. Co. v.
Dubuque, 32 Iowa, 427; State Bank
V. Madison, 3 Ind. 43; Gardner v.
521
268
MtTNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XV.
ized by its charter to "assess all taxable real and personal
property within the city," reference must be made to the gen-
eral statute law of taxation, in order to ascertain what kind of
property is subject to taxation. And the power of the munic-
ipal corporation, under the provision of the charter referred to,
can be exercised, not only in respect to the property which was
taxable under the State laws when the charter was granted ;
but, likewise, any other propertj' which may subsequently be
made taxable by any general statute of the State.^ It has been
held in South Carolina that, where a city is authorized by its
charter to assess for taxes all taxable property, it authorizes
the municipal corporation to levy taxes, not only upon the kinds
of property which are actually taxed by the State, but all prop-
erty which is not exempt from taxation by the State laws ; and
that property may be included in municipal taxation, which
may not be actually taxed by the State, as long as it is not ex-
empt from taxation.^
§ 268. What can be taxed. As has been intimated by the
concluding statement of the preceding paragraph, the authority
of the municipal corporation to levy and collect taxes is limited,
not only in respect to the rate of taxation, but likewise as to
the subjects of it. In other words, a municipal corporation can
only levy taxes upon the property mentioned directly or iiiferen-
tially in the charter.^ But it is not necessary that the corpo-
rate charter should contain a direct limitation or specification
of the subjects of municipal taxation ; it would be sufficient
State, 21 N". J. L. 557; Am. Transp.
Co. T. Buffalo, 20 N. T. 388, Denio, J. :
" Where the general law is made ap-
plicable (to cities) in this way any
change in the general law would
produce a corresponding change in
the method of taxation by munici-
pal corporations, the reference being
to the law as it shall exist for the
time being."
1 Redmond v. Tarboro, 10 S. E. R.
845; 106 N. C. 122; see also, 106 N.
C. 151; Tackaberry v. Keokuk, 32
Iowa, 155; Lot v. Ross, 38 Ala. 156;
Ontario Bank v. Bunnell, 10 Wend.
186; Davenport v. Miss. & Mo. R. R.
522
Co., 16 Iowa, 348.
''■ Asylum v. City of New York, 104
N. Y. 581; 12 N. E. R. 2'79; State v.
Charleston Council, 10 Rich. L. 240;
Charleston Council v. St. Philip's
Church, 1 McMul. Eq. 139; Council
V. Condy, 4 Rich. L. 254; State v.
Charleston, 2 Speers L. 719.
" Winnipiseogee etc. Co. v. Gilford,
10 Atl. 849; 64 N. H. 337; Rabassa v.
New Orleans, 3 Martin, O. S. 218;
Ogden V. St. .Joseph, 90 Mo. 522; 3
S. W. R. 25; Harper v. Elberton, 23
Ga. 566; Morris v. Lone Star Chap-
ter, (Tex. 87) 5 S. W. R. 519; Barret
V. Henderson, 4 Bush, 255.
CH. XV.] MXTNICIPAL TAXATIOK AND ASSESSMENTS. § 269
if the municipal authority was generally described as being the
power to tax all property which is taxable by the State. But
where there is a general specification in the charter of the
subjects of taxation, the court will determine by judicial con-
struction, what kinds of property can be brought within the
power of taxation. Thus, for example, where the power is sim-
ply to tax real and personal property within the city limits, it is
held that the right to tax capital, employed in mercantile pur-
suits, is not implied in such power, distinct from the changeable
property in which the capital is invested.^ So, also, has it
been held that, where the charter simply authorizes the munic-
ipal corporation to tax real and personal property, this grant
of power does not include the power to tax the income or par-
ticular occupations.^
But it has been held in South Carolina, that a municipal cor-
poration, under the grant of power to assess taxable property,
may tax the income.^ And it has been likewise implied, under
the charter of the citj- of Richmond, that the corporation has
the power to impose a license tax upon lawyers.* But there can
be no doubt, however, that where the subjects of taxation have
been specified in a municipal charter, the power of taxation
must be limited to those specified, and cannot bj' implication be
applied to subjects not specified.^ Under the general grant of
power, to levy taxes upon real and personal property, it has been
held that improvements made by a lessee will be taxable as real
estate." And the same conclusion is reached in a case, where
the lessor was the municipal corporation itself.''^
§ 269. Discrimination between real and personal property,
when permissible. — In accordance with the provision of the
general laws of the State, and of the constitution, providing
that uniformity shall be observed in the imposition of taxes ;
it has been held that all kinds of property, which are not law-
fullj' exempted from taxation, must be taxed alike, and on the
1 Municipality No. 3 v. Johnson, 6
La. An. 20 (1851).
2 Savannah v. Hartiidge, 8 Ga. 23
(1850).
'Lining v. Charleston Council, 1
McCoid, 345; 1 Nott & McCord, 527;
* Ould V. Richmond, 23 Gratt. 464
(1873); 8. 0 , 14 Am. Eep. 139.
5 Baldwin v. Montgomei-y Council,
53 Ala. 437; Selma v. Selma Press &
W. Co., 67 Ala. 430.
^ Kussell V. New Haven, 51 Conn.
259.
' San Francisco v. McGinn, 67 Cal.
HO.
523
§ 270 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XV.
same standiird of valuation, and by the same rate of taxation.
And, therefore, a levy of a tax, to pay a certain debt of the city,
exclusively upon the real property situated within such city,
is such a discrimination against tlie real property, and in favor
of the personal property, as to violate the constitutional require-
ment of uniformity, and is therefore void.^ But this doctrine
has not been uniformly followed ; on the contrary, where the
corporation is simply permitted to levy taxes upon both real
and personal property, it has been held that the levy of a tax,
upon the real property exclusively, would not be a violation of
the constitutional requirement of uniformitj', and hence would
be lawful. The authority of the city to levy taxes upon both
kinds of pi'operty is not imperative, but simply permissive.^
But where the tax has been levied, the power to release the
lien from certain kinds of property, and to relieve the owner
of such property from the liability to pay it, cannot be exer-
cised by a municipal corporation or a county, unless such power
is expressly conferred by the statute of the State.^
§ 270. Exemption from taxes, when permitted. — The
question, as to uniformity of taxes and the extent to which the
constitution requires it, is also raised in connection with the
more or less common practice to exempt certain classes of
property from taxation. But the power of the State Legisla-
ture, to exempt property from taxes for charitable and quasi-
public purposes, has been everywhere conceded to involve no
conflict with this constitutional provision.* But, as a matter
1 Exchange Bk. & Hiues, 3 OMo
St. 1; Muscatine v. R. R. Co., 1 Dil-
lon C. C. 536; State v. Severance, 55
Mo. 378; Hale v. Kenosha, 29 Wis.
599; Zanesville v. Richards, 5 Ohio
St. 589; Cape Girardeau v. Hill, 118
U. S. 68; Attorney General v. Wilkes-
Barre, etc. Co., 11 Wis. 42; Living-
ston V. Albany, 41 Ga. 21 ; Weeks v.
Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; Mobile v.
Dargan, 45 Ala. 310.
2 Winter v. Montgomery, 65 Ala.
404; s. a, 79 lb. 481; Priuam v. Belle-
ville, 59 111. 142; Oakey v. New Or-
leans, 1 La. 1 ; Municipality No. 2 v.
Duncan, 2 La. An. 182; Frederick v.
Augusta, 5 Ga. 561.
524
3 Lowell V. Middlesex Co. Comm'rs,
3 Allen (Mass.) 550; State v. Central
Pac. R. R. Co., 9 Nev. 79; State v.
Central Pac. R. R. Co., 10 lb. 47;
Finch V. Temaha Co. Sup., 29 Gal.
453.
« State V. Woodruff, 37 N. J. L.
139; Files v. State, 48 Ark. 529; 3 S.
W. R. 817; Tomlinson v. Branch, 15
Wall. 460; Highgate v. State, 7 Atl.
R. 898; State v. Hannibal & St. J. R.
R. Co., 75 Mo. 208; Northwestern
Univ. V. People, 80 111. 333; Clark
v. Leathers, (Ky.) 5 S. W. R. 576;
Leicht V. Burlington, 73 Iowa, 29;
34 N. W. R. 494; Zabel v. Louisville
Home, (Ky. 92) 17 S. W. R. 212; Peo-
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 270
of course, the municipal corporation cannot exercise the power
to exempt property from taxation, unless the power has been
conferred upon it by its charter ; or unless its exercise of the
power is authorized by the general laws of the State.^ It has
been held that, wherever the right of exemption exists at all,
it must be found to rest upon a clear and explicit grant of
power ; and the power to exempt will be denied to the munic-
ipal corporation, unless the grant of the power is free from
reasonable doubt. " An intent to exempt anj'^ property, or any
portion of the value of anj^ property, from taxation must not
be presumed, but must be found plainly expressed in the stat-
utes." 2
These statutes, which authorize the exemption from taxa-
tion, are construed strictly against those claiming the benefit
of the exemption.^ The common cases of exemption are usu-
ally granted in favor of churches and schools, and other pub-
pie V. MoCreery, 34 Cal. 432; Life
Assoc, of Am. v. St. Louis Co. As-
sessors, 49 Mo. 512 ; State v. Butler,
(Tenn.) 8 S. W. E. 586; Com. v. Mc-
Kibben, 14 S. "W. K. 572; Chippewa
Co. V. Auditor Gen., 32 N. "W. R. 651 ;
Orange, etc. E. R. v. Alexandria, 17
Gratt. 176; State v. Newark, 26 N. J.
L. 519; People v. Eddy, 43 Cal. 333.
1 Anderson v. Maylield, (Ky. 92) 19
S. W. E. 598; Whiting v. Westpoint,
14 S. E. E. 698; Cartersville W. Co.
V. Cartersville, (Ga. 92) 16 S. E. E. 70;
Austin V. Gas. Co., (Tex.) 7 S. W. E.
200.
2 People V. N. Y. Tax Com'rs, 95
N. T. 554; I/i re Ee venue Law, 48
N. W. R. 813; Le Due v. Hastings,
(Minn.) 38 lb. 803; Lord Colchester
V. Kewney, L. E. 1 Exoh. 368;
Piatt V. Eice, 10 Watts (Pa.) ,352;
State V. Parker, 32 N. J. L. 426;
Crawford v. Bunell Tp., 53 Pa. St.
219; Newport v. E'way Co., 89 Ky.
29; Chicago etc. Co. v. Missouri, 7 S.
Ct. 693; 120 U. S. 569; 122 lb. 561;
Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet.
.^14; Delaware Railroad Tax, 18
Wall. 206; Washington University v.
Eowse, 42 Mo. 308; Pacific E. R. Co.
V. Cass County, 53; South Bend v.
Notre Dame Univ., 69 Ind. 344; Trask
V. Maguire, 18 Wall. 206; Auditor v.
Maier, 54. N. W. Rep. 640 ; Bor-
dages V. Higgins, (Tex. 93) 20 S. W.
R. 726; Com. v. Arnott S. R. Co.,
(Pa.) 22 Atl. R. 243; Lancaster v.
Clayton, 5 S. W. R. 864; New Or-
leans, etc. Co. V. New Orleans, 143
U. S. 192; Biscoe v. Coulter, 18 Ark.
423 ; Harvard College v. Boston,
104 Mass. 470; Swan Point Cemetery
V. Tripp, 14 R. I. 199; Austin v.
Austin Gasl. & C. Co., 69 Tex. 180;
State V. Chamberlain, 24 Atl. E. 479;
Salem M. Co. v. Salem, 29 N. E. E.
584; Meth. E. Church v. Ellis, 38 Ind.
3; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376.
» New Orleans etc. Co. v. City, 143
U. S. 192; Smulley v. Burlington, 63
Vt. 443; Jefferson Branch Bank v.
Skelly, 1 Black (U. S.) 436; Phillips
Exeter Acad. Trs. v. Exeter, 58 N. H.
306; Bordager v. Higgins, supra;
Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet.
514; Charles Eiver Br. Prop. v. War-
ren Br. Prop., 11 Pet. 420.
525
§270
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION'S.
[CH. XV.
lie or charitable institutions. Where the question is raised in
respect to such institutions, its determination depends rather
upon the use of the property by such institution, than upon
its ownership of the property.^ Thus, it has been held that the
statute, which exempts a church lot from taxation, does not
exempt a parsonage and a lot, upon which it is located.^ So,
also, the exemption cannot be applied to land, upon which a
church is being built, where the exemption is, by express pro-
vision of the statute, applicable only to churches already built.^
The Legislature has the power of extending the list of prop-
erty, which is exempt from taxation, and of making such ex-
emption to apply to municipal taxation, without the consent
of the municipality.* Where property is assessed by the mu-
nicipal corporation when it is exempt under the State law of
taxation, the owner of the property can defend all proceedings
for enforcing the tax, and perhaps secure an injunction against
the sale of the property for such tax.®
It is an interesting question, what is the efPect of an illegal
exemption of property from taxation upon the validity of the
general assessment. And the answer to that question depends
upon the effect of such illegal exemption upon the rate or
amount of taxation, which is assessed upon the other property
beyond what would be assessed upon it, if there had not been
an illegal exemption. The mere omission by an assessor of
certain property from his assessment list, without authority of
law, will not invalidate the entire assessment,^ as long as the
1 Salem Lyceum v. Salem, 27 N. E.
E. 672; St. Edwards Col. v. Marrison,
82 Tex. 1 ; Detroit T. M. Soc. v. De-
troit, 3 Mich. 172; St. Mary's Col. v.
Crowl, Treas., 10 Kan. 442; City v.
College, (Mo. 92) 20 S. W. K. 35;
Bishop's Residence v. Hudson, 91
Mo. 671; 4 S. W. R. 435; Phillips
Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 58 K. H.
506; Salem M. Soc. v. Salem, 29 N.
E. R. 584; Brown v. Pittsburgh,
(Pa. 88) 16 Atl. E. 43.
2 Morris v. Lone Star Chapter, 5
S. W. R. 519; 68 Tex. 698; State v.
Axtell, 41 N. J. L. 117; Ramsay v.
Church, 45 Minn. 229; People v. Ry-
an, (111. 92) 27 N. E. R. 1095; St
52t)
James Ins. v. Salem, (Mass.) 26 N.
E. R. 636; Association v. New York
City, 104 N. T. 581.
3 St. Mark's Church v. Brunswick,
78 Ga. 541; 3 S. E. R. 561; Mullen v.
Com'rs, 85 Pa. St. 288; State v. New-
berry Council, 12 Rich. L. 339; Orr
V. Baker, 4 Ind. 86.
* Richmond v. Richmond & D. R.
Co., 21 Gratt. 60.
* St. Louis B. & Sav. Assoc, v.
Lightner, 47 Mo. 393; Atl. & Pac.
R. R. Co. V. Cleino, 2 Dillon, 175;
Lee V. Thomas, 49 Mo. 112; Jeffer-
son City V. Opel, lb. 190; Walden v.
Dudley, lb. 419.
'People V. McCreei-y, 34 Cal. 43;
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 270
illegal exemption cannot be shown to have increased the amount
of the tax, which the other taxpayers have been required to
pay.^ Where there has been an exemption from municipal
taxation in favor of a particular corporation, a dissolution of
the corporation will not have the effect of terminating the ex-
emption ; the provision for exemption will continue to be en-
forced in favor of any successors of the defunct corporation.^
In determining the scope and operation of the exemption
from taxation, — and in compliance with the general rule that
the provision for exemption from taxation must be strictly con-
strued against the owner of property to be exempted — it has
been held that where in general terms a piece of property, as
for example, a church, is by general law exempted from tax-
ation, unless the law contained language relating to the ex-
emption, which makes the provision apply to assessments for
local improvements, as well as to all sorts of general taxation ;
such exemption will not be applied to street assessments ; and
the property so exempt from general taxation will be held lia-
ble for assessments for local improvements on the streets. The
ground, upon which the decisions rest this distinction, is that
the assessment for local improvement is different in creation
and in its general character ; and is assessed against propert}',
in consideration of the special benefit which such property has
received from the local improvement.** The same principle has
Doyle T. Austin, 47 lb. 353, 359;
Williams v. Lunenburg Sch. Dist.,
21 Pick. 75 ; Kneeland v. Milwaukee,
15 lb. 454; Welch v. Milwaukee,
10 Wis. 282; Dean v. Gleason, 16
Wis. 1, 15; Hersey V. Milw. Co. Sup.,
lb. 185; Bond v. Kenosha, 17 Wis.
274; Hale y. Kenosha, 29 lb. 599.
iBalfev. Bell, 40 Ind. 337; Win-
ters V. Montgomery, 65 Ala. 403;
Hassen v. Kochester, 65 N. T. 516;
Dunham v. Chicago, 55 111. 357.
2 Mobile etc. Co. v. Kennerly, 74
Ala. 566.
'Kilgus V. Trustees, (Ky. 93)
22 S. W. R. 750; Clinton v. Henry
Co., (Mo. 93) lb. 494; Brick Presb.
Church V. New York, 5 Cow. (N. T.)
538; New York V. Cushman, 10 Johns.
96; Bloomington Assn. v. People,
(HI. 90) 28 N. E. E. 1076; Pray v.
Northern Liberties, 31 Pa. St. 69;
Northern Liberties v. St. John's
Church, 13 lb. 104; Board v. School
District, (Ark. 90) 19 S. W. E. 969;
Zabel V. Louisville Bap. Orph. Home,
(Ky. 90) 17 lb. 212; Philadelphia v.
Penn. Hospital, 22 Atl. E. 744; 143
Pa. St. 367; Boston Seamen's Fr. Soc.
V. Boston, 116 Mass. 181; Beals v.
Providence Eubber Co., 11 E. I. 381 ;
Eailroad Co. v. Decatur, 18 N. E. E.
315; 126 111. 92; Sharp v. Speir, 4
Hill, 76; Sharp v. Johnson, 4 lb. 92;
Eosevelt Hosp. v. New York, 84 N.
Y. 108; Sheehan v. Good Sam. Hosp.,
50 Mo. 155 ; Church v. New York, 55
N. Y. Super. 160; Second Av. M. E.
627
§271
MTJNICIPAL COEPORATrOl^S.
[CH. XV.
been applied to the real estate, whieli is held by the board ot
public schools, a corporation distinct from the municipal cor-
poration.^ The same ruling has been maintained, denying the
application of the exemption to local assessments, where a rail-
road charter exempts the company from " any other or further
tax or imposition upon it." ^ But where the charter of a char-
itable institution provides that the corporate property "shall
not be subject to taxes or assessments" it is clear that the Leg-
islature intends that such a corporation shall not be liable either
for general taxation or for assessments for local improvements
of the streets.^ It has been held in Vermont that, where a
charter provides that the property' of a college shall be exempt
from " public tax," this would not exempt the land from local
municipal taxes, wliich were to be expended for the benefit of
the college.*
§ 271. Public property not taxable. — The general statutes
of the State, referring to the subjects of taxation, unquestion-
ably refer to private property only, and cannot reasonablj'' be
presumed to include property, which is owned by the State or
by a municipal corporation. Hence, it is impossible for the
property owned by the State or by the municipal corporatioa
to be taxed without express authoiity from the Legislature by
any other municipal corporation. Thus, for example, the city
of Brooklj-n has been held not to have the power to impose a
tax upon land located within the city, and owned and used
as a landing for a ferry company, who is a lessee of the city of
Church, In re, 66 N. T. .395; Mar-
shall V. Vicksburg, 15 Wall. 146;
State V. Newark, 36 K J. L. 478; In-
dianapolis, P. & C. K. E. Co. V. Ross,
47Ind. 25; Church v. City of New
York, 55 N. Y. Super. 160; Paine v.
Spratley, 5 Kan. 525 ; Bridgeport v. N.
Y. & N. H. E. R. Co., 36 Conn. 255;
Ludlow V. Cine. So. Ry. Trs., 78 Ky.
357;PaterRon V. Soc. forE. U. Manuf.,
24 N. J. L. 385. See also Henderson
V. McCullagh, 12 S. W. E. 932 (Ky.
90) ; Montgomery v. Wyman, 22 N.
E. E. 845; 130 111. 17; SUte v. Bell,
43 Minn. 344.
1 Public Schools v. St. Louis, 26
528
Mo. 468; Hartford v. West Middle
Sch. Dist., 145 Conn. 462.
2 Baltimore v. Green Mt. Cem.
Prop., 7 Md. 517.
8 See State v. Newark, 36 N. J. L.
478; 13 Am. Rep. 464, reversing 36
N. J. L. 157, and distinguishing the
case from State v. Newark, 27 N. J.
L. 185, in which the exception was
declared to be "from all taxes,
charges and impositions." And see
First Presb. Church v. Wayne, 36
Ind. 338; Gould v. Baltimore, 59
Md. 378.
* Morgan v. Cree, 46 Vt. 773; 14
Am. Rep. 040.
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 271
New York. The exemption from taxation of such propert3^ as
the property of the city of New York, is held to apply for the
benefit of the lessee.^ The same ruling has been made in Texas,
in respect to a public wharf owned by a municipal corporation ;
the public wharf being held to be non-taxable under the general
laws of the State.^ The same rule has been maintained in re-
spect to property of the city which is used as a cemetery.^
Nor is it possible for lands, which are used by the county for
a court 'house and other county purposes, to be taxed by a mu-
nicipal corporation. Nor does it seem to be possible to subject
such land to a liability for a local assessment ; * unless, of course,
an express authority is obtained from the Legislature.
The general rule, therefore, is that property, which is owned
by any instrument of government, cannot become the subject
of taxation, unless it is so provided by positive legislation. ^ In
Kentucky, a distinction has been made in respect to municipal
property, as a subject of taxation by the State authorities, be-
tween property which the municipal corporntioii liolds in its
1 People V. Brooklyn Assessors, 111
N. Y. 505.
2 Galveston "Wharf Co. v. Galves-
ton, 63 Tex. 14; Blaok v. Sherwood,
6 S. E. K. 484.
8 As to exemption of public prop-
erty see Clark v. Louisville W. Co.,
(Ky. 91) 14 S. "W. K. 502; Lockwood
v. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20; Garrett v.
St. Louis, 25 lb. 505; "Willard v.
Pike, 59 Va. 202; 9 Atl. 907; Black-
man V. Houston, (La.) 2 So. 193;
County of Erie v. Erie, 113 Pa. St.
360; Nashville v. Smith, 86 Tenn.
213; Rochester v. Kush, 80 N. T. 302;
Egyptian Lev. Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo.
495; Sheehau v. Good Sam. Hosp.,
50 lb. 155; s. c, 11 Am. Rep. 412;
Omaha Col. v. Rush, 22 Neb. 449; 35
N. W. R. 222; Green v. Hotaling, 44
N. J. L. 347; People v. Doe, 36 Cal.
220; Farnham v. Sherry, 74 Wis. 568;
Witt V. Armstrong, (Ark.) 6 S. W. R.
225; Doyle v. Austin, 47 Cal. 353;
Tyler v. People, 66 111. 322; Piper v.
Singer, 4 Serg. & R. 354; Nashville
V. Smith, (Tenn.) 6 S. W. R. 273;
u
Hall V. Marysville, 19 Cal. 391; Low
V. Lewis, 46 lb. 549 ; People v.
Shearer, 30 lb. 645 ; Callanan v.
Wayne Co., 73 Iowa, 109; 36 N. W.
R. 654; Meridan v. Phillips, (Miss.)
4 So. R. 119; Emery V. Gas Co., 28
Cal. 345; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 lb.
240; Brightman v. Kirner, 22 Wis.
54; Seamen's Fr. Soc. v. Boston, 116
Mass. 181 (1874); s. c, 17 Am. Rep.
153.
* Worcester Co. v. Worcester, 116
Mass. 193 (1874); s. c, 17 Am. Rep.
159; but see supra, § 270, on subject
of assessment and exemptions.
5 Board v. School District, (Ark.
90) 19 S. W. R. 969; Bloomington
Ass'n V. People, (111. 90) 28 N. E. R.
1076; Hall V. Marysville, 19 Cal. 391;
Low V. Lewis, 46 lb. 549; Daugherty
V. Thompson,- (Tex.) 9 S. W. R. 99;
State V. Gaffney, 32 N. J. L. 133;
Nashville v. Smith, 86 Tenn. 213;
Von Steen v. Beatrice, (Neb. 93) 54
N. W. R. 677 ; State v. Recorder, (La.
93) 12 So. R. 880; Clinton v. Henry
Co., (Mo. 93) 22 S. W. E. 494.
529
§ 272 MUNICIPAL COKrOKATIOXS. [CH. XV.
governmentiil character for public use, such as public buildings
and prisons and hospitals, which cannot be taxed by the State,
or any other municipal government; and property which is
owned and held by a municipal corporation for private pur-
poses, and, therefore in its quasi-T^rivate character, which can
be subjected to taxation, such as vacant lots, fire engines and
the like.^ It has, however, .been held elsewhere, that while it
is possible for the Legislature by express provision to subject
all municipal property to taxation, it is not presumed that the
Legislature intended to do so in respect to any municipal prop-
ertj', in the absence of an express declaration to that effect.*
It has also been held that the general government cannot tax
bonds belonging to a municipal corporation.^ And, on the
other hand, it has been held that a municipal corporation can-
not in the absence of an express authority levy a tax upon State
securities.*
§ 272. What property is within municipality for pur-
poses of taxation. — One of the general limitations upon the
taxing power of a municipal corporation is, that such taxation
can only be levied upon property within the municipality.
And, sometimes, it is hard to determine, whether property is
to be considered within a municipality for the purpose of tax-
ation. The general rule, however, is very plain, that the mu-
nicipal power of taxation cannot be extended by the corporation
by implication, to property not within its territorial limits.
Hence, for this reason, it has been held that a municipal cor-
poration cannot tax the coal beds under a river, upon whose
bank the city is situated, where the boundary line of such city
is the low water mark of the river.® The same question has
been raised in respect to the power of a city to tax bridges lo-
cated over navigable streams, where only a part of the bridge
is located within the city limits. In the Kentucky case, it has
been held that the city of Louisville could not tux a 1 ridge in
' Louisville y. Commonwealth, 1
Duvall (Ky.) 295 <(1864); see also to
same effect, Miteliellville v. Polk Co.
Sup., 54 Iowa, 554; Eiie County v.
E. Water Com'rs, 113 Pa. St. 368;
Sewickley Bor. v. SUoles, 118 Pa. St.
165.
2 People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432;
630
Doyle V. Austin, 47 Cal. 353 (1874) ;
Nashville v. Bank of Tenu., 1 Swan
(Tenn.) 269.
3 United States v. Bait. & O. E. r!
Co., 17 Wall. 322 (1872).
'Augusta Council v. Dunbar, 50
Ga. 387 (1873).
6 Gilchrist's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 600.
CH. XV.J MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 272
respect to the part of its propertj- not located within the city
limits ; because, for the purpose of taxation, such property can-
not be said to be within the city limits ; and the further special
reason is assigned by the court that the bridge derived no bene-
fit from the municipal taxation.^ It has, however, been held
elsewhere that bridges may be taxed under such circumstances
by the municipal corporation.^
Except in the case of bridges, there cannot be much difficulty
at any time in determining the situs of real estate for the pur-
pose of taxation. It is rather a matter of geographical location
alone that is involved in this inquiry." But where the question
of situation for taxation is raised iu respect to personal property,
considerable difficulty is experienced at times in determining
the right of taxation of such property. It seems, however, to
be the general rule of law that, where the property is tangible
or corporeal, and it is actually situated or held within the cor-
porate limits, that property may be subjected to municipal tax-
ation, although the owner of it does not reside within the city
limits.* But the question becomes still more perplexing, where
1 Louisville Br. Co. v. Louisville,
30 Ky. 189.
2 St. Louis Br. Co. v. East St. Louis,
121 111. 238; State ea; rel. C. Br. Co. v.
Columbia, 27 S. C. 137.
8 Hittinger V. Boston, 139 Mass. 17;
Augusta V. Dunbar, 50 Ga. 387; Fin-
ley v. Philadelphia, 32 Pa. St. 381;
People V. Niles, 35 Cal. 282; Bel v.
Pierce, 51 N. Y. 12; Mills v. Thorn-
ton, 26 111. 300; Sangamon & M. E.
E. Co. V. Morgan County, 14 lb. 163;
People V. N. Y. Tax Comm'rs, 64 N.
Y. 541; Denver, etc. Co. v. Church, 28
Pac. E. 468.
*Dunleith v. Eeynolds, 53 111. 45;
People V. Ogdensburgh, 48 N. Y.
390; Eieman v. Sliephard, 27 Ind.
288; Bates v. Mobile, 46 Aid. 158;
Pierce v. Eddy, 152 Mass. 594 (taxa-
tion on farm located in two towns) ;
Hoyt V. N. Y. Tax Comm'rs, 23 N.
y. 223; New Albany v. Meekin, 3
Ind. 481; St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry
Co., 40 Mo. 580; Poraeroy Salt Co. v.
Davis, Treas., 21 Ohio St. 555; Evans-
ville V. Hall, 14 Ind. 27; Madison v.
Whitney, 31 Ind. 261; Powell v. Mad-
ison, 21 Ind. 335. " We do not think
that, for the pui-poses of taxation, a
court is authorized to apply the rule
of law governing the personal estate
of deceased persons, which regards
its situs as following the domicil of
the owner. Surely, no one would
risk asserting the general proposi-
tion tliat, under the charter of New
Albany, all the personal property
owned by every resident of the city
no matter where situated, was liable
to be taxed by said city; that if a
citizen of New Albany was a partner
in a steamboat plying on some river
in California, or in a flock of sheep
kept in Kentucky, or in some part of
Floyd county in this State, out of
the corporation of New Albany, he
was liable to be taxed for it under its
charter. We do not deny that the
State might have authorized it to
631
§272
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XV.
the owner of property resides in one town and does business in
another. 1 It is, however, not possible for a municipal corpora-
tion, under a power to tax all property within its corporate
limits, to impose a tax upon its own bonds.^
The question is equally difficult when the attempt is made
to determine for the purpose of taxation the situs of vessels.
The general rule is, that the legal situs of vessels, for purposes
of taxation, is in the port, where such vessels are registered as
their home port, it matters not where the owner lives; and
this situs, which is dependent upon registration under the laws
of the United States, continues until the vessel has acquired a
new situs. Its more or less prolonged absence, in the course of
its navigation, does not affect the continuance of the situs so
acquired.^ It has been held that ferry boats are taxable, where-
ever their owner resides.* Whether a municipal corporation
can tax the ferry boat of a foreign private corporation is a
doubtful question. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that
the city had such a power,^ while the Supreme Court of the
United States held, on the appeal of the same case, that the
city had no such power ; for the reason that the chief relation of
such ferry boat to the city was " merely that of contract there
as one of the termini of their transit across the river in the pros-
ecution of their business." "
Where the property of nonresident owners is subject to tax-
ation ; in order that such taxation may not be invalid, there
tax such property, but we think that
she has not." Perkins, J., in New
Albany v. Meekin, 3 Ind. 481.
1 Gardiner Cotton & W. F. Co. v.
Gardiner, 5 Me. 133.
■^ Macon v. Jones, 67 Ga. 489. This
is certainly the case where tlie holder
of the bonds does not reside within
tlie limits of the city. Murray v.
Charleston Council, 96 U. S. 43; see
Bank v. Wilkes-Barre, (Pa. 92) 24 Atl.
11.
3 Newport v. Berry, (Ky. 92) 19 S.
"W. E. 238; Howell v. State, 3 Gil.
(Md.) 14; New Albany v. Meekin, 3
Ind. 481; Hays v. Pac. M. St. Co.,
17 How. 596; Wiggins Ferry Co. v.
East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365; Mor-
632
gau V. Parham, 16 Wall. 471 ; Mobile
v. Baldwin, 57 Ala. 61; People v. N.
T. Tax Com'rs, 58 N. T. 242; Perry
V. Torrence, 8 Ohio, 521; Irwin v. N.
0., St. L. & C. E. E. Co., 94111. 105;
Wheeling etc. Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.
S. 273, afE'g 9 W. Va. 170; Hoyt v.
Com'rs, 23 N. T. 224; Johnson v.
Drummond, 20 Gratt. 419; St. Joseph
V. Hannibal etc. Co., 39 Mo. 476; Oak-
land V. Wlaipple, 39 Cal. 112 ; contra,
Battle V. Mobile, 9 Ala. 234.
* Mobile V. Baldwin, 57 Ala. 61.
^ St. Louis V. Wiggins Ferry Co.,
40 Mo. 580.
^ St. Louis V. Wiggins Ferry Co.,
11 Wall. 423.
CH. XV.J MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 273
must be no discrimination against nonresidents, either as to
the right of taxation or assessment of the property, or as the
mode of lev5'ing such a tax. The constitutional provision pro-
hibits any discrimination on any grounds in favor of residents
and citizens of the State against the citizens of other States.^
It has been held that, where statutes provide for the registration
and taxation of vehicles, which are used in the public streets
of a city, the statute cannot be applied by implication to non-
residents ; and unless such a statute expressly provides that it
shall apply to nonresidents, the tax cannot be levied upon them.*
So, also, an ordinance was held to be void, under this constitu-
tional provision, which permitted persons, doing business with-
in certain limits, to sell goods under a license tax, either from
wagons or in their shops, and denied the same right to persons
not residing within its limits.^ But this protection of nonresi-
dents, against discrimination in favor of the residents, does not
apply to foreign corporations. A foreign corporation can only
do business within a State or municipality, by complying with
whatever conditions and terms such State or municipality may
require, even though similar conditions and terms are not re-
quired of domestic corporations and their residents.*
§ 273. Taxation of railways, bauli:s and other corpora-
tlons. — Where a corporation exists, and has property within a
certain State or Territory, the right of taxing such property
will depend upon the situs of such property, and upon the
character of the property. Thus, in the case of railroads, rail-
road tracks and other tangible property, held by such a rail-
road, will be taxable in the State or county or town, where
such property is located.^ And such property is likewise sub-
ject to special taxes and local assessments.® The rolling stock
etc. Co. V. Wriglit, (Ga. 92) 15 S. E.
R. 293.
5 Wilmington etc. Co. v. Alsbrook,
HON. C. 137; Wheeler v. Roches-
ter & S. R. R. Co., 12 Barb. 227;
Railroad Co. v. Morgan County, 14
111. 1; People v. Reed, 19 N. Y. S.
528; Prov. & Wor. R. R. Co. v.
Wright, 2 R. I. 459.
« No. Ind. R. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10
Ohio St. 159; Burl. & Mo. R. R. Co.
V. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112.
533
1 Hill V. Warrell, 49 N. W. R. 479;
87 Mich. 135; State v. Charleston, 2
Spears' L. (S. C.) 719.
2 Joyce V. Woods, 78 Ky. 386; Ben-
nett V. Birmingham Bor., 31 Pa.'St.
15; see ante, § 261.
» St. Louis V. Spiegel, 90 Mo. 587.
«J)i re Prime, 18 N. T. S. 603;
American Union Express Co. v. St.
Joseph, 66 Mo. 675, and ante, 261;
Republican V. etc. Co. v. Chase Co.,
(Keb. 92)51 N. W. R. 132; Columbus
§ 273
MtTNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XV.
of a corporation is, however, taxable in a State, town or county
where the corporation has its principal office.^
Banks and bank stock are taxable by the municipality, in
which the banks are located.^ The same rule applies in respect
to insurance companies^ and other domestic corporations.*
Where the general law of the State provides that the capital
stock of a bank shall be taxable only for State purposes, the
city cannot exercise the power of taxation over such bank or its
capital stock.'' So, also, it was held in Louisiana, that where a
bank was exempt from taxation by the State, a city corporation
is likewise prohibited from imposing taxes upon such bank.*"
^ People V. Coleman, 133 N. T. 279;
Minnesota v. St. Paul, 2 Wall. 609;
Stevens v. BufEalo & N. Y. C. R. R.
Co., 31 Barb. 590; Delaware County
V. E. R. Co., 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 326; Hill
V. La Crosse R. R. Co., 11 Wis. 214;
Coe V. Railroad Co., 10 Ohio St. 372;
Pao. R. R. Co. V. Cass County, 53 Mo.
17; Meyer V. Johnson, 53 Ala. 241;
Georgia etc. Co. v. State, 15 S. E. R.
293; App. Tax Ct. of Baltimore v.
No. Cent. Ry., 50 Md. 417; Phila.,
W. B. & B. R. R. Co. V. App. Tax
Ct. of Bait., 50 lb. 397; Columbus
S. R. Co. V. Wright, (Ga. 92) 15 S. E.
R. 293; Hoyle v. P. & M. R. R., 54
N. T. 314; Randall v. Elwell, 52 lb.
522 ; Beardsley v. Ontario Bank,
31 Barb. 619; Howe v. Freeman, 14
Gray, 566; People v. Wemple, 129 N.
T. 558; Denver & R. G. Ry. Co. v.
Church, (Col. 92) 28 Pac. R. 468; Du-
buque V. HI. Cent. R. R. Co., 39 Iowa,
56; Williamson v. N. J. So. R. R. Co.,
29 N. J. Eq. 311.
2 Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3
How. (U. S.) 133; Connersville v.
Bank of Ind., 16 Ind. 105; Wilkes-
Barre D. & S. Bank v. Wilkes-Barre,
(Pa. 92) 24 Atl. R. Ill; Cherokee
Ins. & E. Co. V. Whitfield Jus., 28
Ga. 121; Savannah v. Hartridge, 8
lb. 213; Bank of Ga. v. Savannah,
Dudley, 130; State v. Charleston
Council, 5 Rich. L. 561; Bank of
Chester v. Chester T. Council, 10
53J:
Rich. L. 104; People v. Coleman, 63
Hun, 633; 133 N. Y. 279; NashviUe
v. Thomas, 5 Coldw. (Teun.) 600;
Bank of Ind. v. 'Madison, 3 Ind. 43;
Evansville v. Hall, 14 lb. 27; King
V. Madison, 17 lb. 48; Madison v.
Whitney, 21 lb. 261 ; Macon v. Sav-
ings Bank, 60 Ga. 133; Gordon v.
Baltimore, 5 Gill (Md.) 231; O'Don-
nell V. Bailey, 24 Miss. 386; City
Bank of Dallas v. Vogel, 51 Tex.
354.'
5 Tripp Treas. v. Merchants Mut.
F. Ins. Co., 12 R. I. 435; Porter v.
Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. R. Co.,
76 111. 561; Dubuque v. N. W. L. Ins.
Co., 29 Iowa, 9; St. Louis i. Indep.
Ins. Co. of Mass., 47 Mo. 146, 168;
Republic L. Ins. Co. v. Pollak, 75 111.
292; Smalley v. Burlington, 63 Vt
443.
* State V. Heppenheimer, (N. J. 92)
24 Atl. 446; Lockwood v. Weston,
(Conn. 92) 23 lb. 9; Danville Lumber
& M. Co. V. Parks, 88 HI. 463.
^Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S.
679; State V. Union & Planters Bank,
(Tenn. 92) 19 S. W. R. 758; Schuyl-
kill Co. V. Citizens Gas Co., (Pa. 92)
23 Atl. 1055.
^Municipality No. 1 v. La. State
Bank, 5 La. An. 394; New Orleans
V. Com. Bank of N. O., 10 lb. 735;
New Orleans v. Southern Bank, 11
lb. 41 ; New Orleans v. Mecli. & T.
Bank, 15 lb. 107.
CH. XV.] MTTNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 274
Domestic corporations, located within a municipality, will be
taxable by such municipal corporation, even though the charter
authorizes such corporation " to raise money by a tax to be as-
sessed upon the freeholders and inhabitants according to law."
It was held that a banking corporation, located within such a
town, was an inhabitant of such town for purposes of taxation.^
§ 274. Taxation of incorporeal hereditaments. — The
question has also been raised as to whether a municipal corpo-
ration can tax incorporeal hereditaments, held and enjoyed
within its territorial limits. The question has been raised,
particularly, in respect to the right to tax the old bed of a
street railway company,^ and the property of gas and water
companies.* Whether the lessee of a city waterworks for a term
of years may be taxed by the municipal corporation, has been
decided in the affirmative,* as well as in the negative.^ The
elevated railways, in the streets of the city of New York, are
held to be taxable as lands, or as real estate.®
The power to tax street railways is not taken away from a
municipal corporation, where there has been an exclusive grant
to such railway company of the use of streets in the city for
railway purposes. And such railway company may, notwith-
standing, be required to pay a license tax.'^ Where a city grants
to a railway company the right to lay and maintain its track
over a bridge belonging to the city, without reserving its right
to levy toll or tax upon such railway company, it has been held
that itcannot impose a tax by any subsequent ordinance.*
It has been held that city railways may be subjected to an ad
also Covington, etc. Co. v. Covington,
(Ky. 92) 17 8. W. K. 808; Jackson-
ville V. Ledwitb, 7 So. K. 885, hold-
1 Bank v. Burnell, 10 "Wend. 186.
^ So. Nash. etc. Co. v. Morrow, 3
Pickle, 106; 11 S. W. 348; Middle-
sex R. E. Co. V. Charlestovi^n, 8 Allen
(Mass.) 330; People v. Cassidy, 2
Lansing, 294; People v. Conors, 4
N. Y. S. 41; St. Louis v. St. Louis
Railroad Co., 50 Mo. 94; No. Beach
& M. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 32 Cal. 499;
Prov. & Wor. R. R. Co. v. Wright, 2
R. L 459; L. City Ry. v. Louisville,
4 Bush, 478.
"Commonwealth v. Lowell Gasl.
Co., 12 Allen (Mass.) 75; Providence
Gas Co. V. Thurber, 2 R. I. 15.
ostein V. Mobile, 24 Ala. 591; see
ing franchise cannot be taxed.
6 Stein V. Mobile, 49 Ala. 362; s. c,
20 Am. Rep. 283; but see Dillon's
Mun. Corp., sec. 793, note.
« People V. N. Y. Tax Comm'rs, 82
N. Y. 462.
' State V. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123; Co-
lumbus V. Street R. R. Co., 45 Ohio
St. 98; Los Angeles v. Pac. R. R.
Co., 67 Cal. 433.
^Des Moines v. The Chicago, R. I
& P. R. E. Co., 41 Iowa, 569.
.535
§ 276 MUNICIPAL COBPOBATIONS. [CH. XV.
valorem tax on their property, notwithstanding the fact that
the city requires a license tax on each car employed by the city
i-ailway company.^
§ 275. Choses in action, when taxable. — Whether a mu-
nicipal corpoiation may impose taxes upon instruments of in-
debtedness, and other choses in action, without express authority
to do so, has been differently decided. So it has been held
that notes and mortgages belonging to a resident will be taxa-
ble by the municipality although they may be deposited outside
the city.^ It has, however, on the other hand, been held that
the power vested in a municipal corporation to tax real and
personal property, is confined to tangible or visible property,
actually situated within the limits of the city, and does not ex-
tend to debts and choses in action.^
§ 276. Taxation of agricnltnral land. — Elsewhere * it has
been explained how a municipal corporation may, in the ab-
sence of express constitutional restrictions, extend the corporate
limits, and include within such limits lands which are used for
agricultural purposes, with or without the Consent of the resi-
dents of the territory so annexed. The right to include ag-
ricultural lands within the corporate limits has never been
contested by the owners of such property except for the reason
that such inclusion of their lands within the city limits would
have the effect of increasing the rate of taxation, beyond what
was imposed upon it as agricultural lands.
In Kentucky and Iowa, and other States, it is held that the
courts will discriminate, in the imposition of municipal taxes
upon agricultural lands located within the city limits, between
the lands which are held strictly for agricultural purposes, and
the properties which, although not presently occupied as resi-
dences, have been platted as citj'- lots, and are held for an in-
iL. City Ry. Co. v. Louisville, 4
Bush, 478; Union Pass. Ey. Co. v.
Pluladelpliia, 101 U. S. 528; Kew
York V. Broadway & S. A. R. R. Co.,
17 Hun, 242.
2 Johnson v. Oregon City, 2 Oreg.
327; Trimble v. Sterling, (Ky. 91) 12
S. W. R. 1066; Trustees v. McCon-
nell, 2 111. 138; Macon v. Jones, G7
Ga. 489; Redwood v. Tarboro, 10 S.
636
E. R.*845; 106 N. C. 122; Wood v.
Edenton, 10 S. E. R. 854; 106 N. C.
151.
' Johnston v. Lexington, 14 B.
Mon. 648; Louisville v. Henning, 1
Bush, 381; but see Augusta v. Dun-
bar, 50 Ga. 387, 392; Bridges v. Grif-
fin, 33 lb. 113.
* Ante, § 56.
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 276
crease in their Viilue, due to the growth and development of
the city. The courts maintain that where property is held
strictly for agricultural purposes, even in the absence of an
express constitutional provision, the municipal corporation can-
not apply the same rate of taxation to such land, but must appor-
tion the tax, by a consideration of the degree of benefit which is
received by the owners of the agricultural lands from the city
improvements. But where property is platted, or held for other
than agricultural purposes, then there is no reason why such
lands should be exempt from the ordinary municipal rate of
taxation which is assessed upon the property which is actually
used and occupied for purposes of residence or business.^
" To enable us correctly to apply the rule above stated, we must
consider and determine the character of the benefits, which
will render lands, located within the city limits, liable to gen-
eral municipal taxation. These are not such as attach to all
lands near a city or large town, whereby they are rendered more^
valuable, but are such as accrue to the lands considered as city
property. Lands, lying contiguous to or near a city, though
incapable of any use except for agricultural purposes, are never-
theless of greater value on account of their location, than those
more remotely situated. Convenience to a market, etc., adds to
their value. Therefore, lands within a city kept and used only
for agriculture, and not capable of being used as city proper-
tj'', or not needed for that purpose, nor possessing a value based
upon their adaptation for the purpose of dwellings or business,
caunot be considered to be directly benefited by the fact of their
being within the city limits. It is held that such lands cannot
be taxed for general municipal purposes. The controlling fact
iMaltus V. Shields, 2 Met. (Ky.)
553; Henderson v. Lambert, S Bush,
607; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon.
330; Southgate v. Covington, 15 B.
Man. 491; Sharp v. Dunavan, 17 lb.
223; Louisville Bridge Co. v. Louis-
ville, 81 Ky. 189; Langworthy v.
Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 86; s. c. 16 lb.
271; Fulton v. Davenport, 17 lb.
404;Buell v. Ball, 20 lb. 282; Davis
V. Dubuque, 20 lb. 458; Deeds v.
Sanborn, 26 lb. 419; Durant v. Kauff-
man, 34 lb. 194; Brooks v. Polk Co.,
52 lb. 460; Winzer v. Burlington, 68
lb. 279; Evans v. Council Bluffs, 05
lb. 238. In Courtney v. Louisville,
12 Bush, 419, the court said: "Some-
thing more than benefits is necessary
to v^arrant that character of taxa-
tion. There must be both benefits
actual or presumed, and a town or
city population " so near as to neces-
sitate the extension of municipal
government over the farm land.
637
§ 276
MtmiCIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XV.
to be considered in such cases is the purpose for which they are
held. If held as city property, to be brought upon the market
as such whenever they reach a value corresponding with the
views of the owner, they ought to be taxed as city property.
There would be neither reason nor justice in permitting a pro-
prietor of a large tract of land, within a city, to hold it for an
opportunit}' to bring it into the market as city lots, and for no
other purpose ; and, under the pretence that it is agricultural
lands, to escape taxation for the general improvement of the
city, the very thing which will bring his lands into market, and
thus add greatly to their value." ^ In adopting the rule laid
down by the Kentucky court, the Iowa court provides that, in
order to exempt unplatted lands from municipal taxation, it
must appear that such land is employed exclusively for agricul-
tural purposes.^
But tlie position, which is taken by these courts, is not in-
dorsed generally by the courts of other States. The contrary
proposition is elsewhere held that, in the absence of express
provisions to the contrary, either in the State Constitution or
State laws, a municipal corporation may impose the same rate
of taxation upon agricultural lands, located within its limits, as
is provided for other lands and other property.^ And it seems
to be verj-^ generally held that rural propertj', situated within
city limits, may be subjected to assessments for street improve-
ments.*
iBeck, C. J., in Durant v. Kau£E-
man, 34 Iowa, 194.
^Subbesing v. Burlington, 68 Iowa,
691. See also, Washburn v. Oshkosh,
60 "Wis. 453 ; Baldwin v. Hastings, S3
Mich. 639; State v. Brown, 53 N. J.
L. 162; Eifert v. Central Covington,
(Ky. 90) 15 S. W. Eep. 180.
3 Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53; s. c,
24 Am. Rep. 661; Kelly v. Pittsburgh,
85 Pa. St 170; Santa Rosa v. Coulter,
58 Cal. .537; Dixon v. Mayes, 72 lb.
166; St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 400;
Beuoist V. St. Louis, 15 lb. 668; Gi-
boney v. Cape Girardeau, 58 lb. 141;
Lancaster v. Rush, (93) 52 N. W. R.
837; Kaiser v. Weise, 85 Pa. St. 366;
Cook V. Crandall, (Utah, 91) 26 Pac.
538
R. 927; Hurla v. Kansas City, 46
Kan. 738; Turner v. Altbaus, 6 Neb.
54, overi-uling Bradshaw v. Omaha,
1 lb. 16; Kountze v. Omaha, 5 Dil-
lon C. C. 443: Ellison v. Lindford,
(Utah, 91) 25 Pac. E. 744.
* Kelly V. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St.
170; s. c, 104 U. S. 78; New Orleans
V. Michoud, 10 La. An. 763; Serrill
V. Philadelphia, 38 Pa. St. 355; Gil-
lette V. Hartford, 31 Conn. 351; Kal-
brier V. Leonard, 34 Ind. 497; Leeper
V. South Bend, 106 lb. 375; Taber
V. Graf miller, 109 lb. 206; Gary v.
Pekin, 88 111. 154; Gillette v. Hart-
ford, 31 Conn. 351; Carriger v. Mor-
ristown, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 116.
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 277
§ 277. local assessments for sewers. — From whatever
source the authority to construct sewers may be derived, whetlier
from the corporate authority to make by-laws, or as part of the
corporate control over sanitary affairs, it is well settled that as-
sessments to meet the expenses thus incurred may be levied
upon owners of the land which is likely to be benefited.^
It has been held that a sewer assessment is apportionable
upon the face value of the lots^ of those who can use the sewer ;
and that the bentjfit derived from its construction is a necessary
element in the imposition of the tax.^ And in Couiiecticut
and New Jersey, rules apportioning assessments according to
frontage have been disapproved.* But when the lots are small,
of an equal depth and similarly situated so as to approximate
equality in value and in benefit from the construction of the
sewer, the assessment according to frontage is, with respect to
sewers and drains, as fair and just as any that cnu be devised.®
If there be no special constitutional limitation, the cost of
municipal sewers maybe paid for out of the funds aiising from
general taxation, or by assessment upon the property benefited,
according to the discretion of the city council.^ This latter
method is the one generally in use ; and upon the principle
applicable in all classes of assessments for local improvements
the special benefit, actual and probable, which each particular
piece of property receives, is the only foundation upon which a
lawful assessment can be made.'^
1 Murphy v. Wilmington, 6 Houst.
(Del.) 108; Boston v. Sliaw, 1 Met.
130; Downer v. Boston, 7 Gush. 2*77;
Wright V. Boston, 9 lb. 233; Patton
V. Springfield, 99 Mass. 627; see ante,
§ 259 a.
2'Snow V. Fitohburg, 136 Mass. 183;
Gilmore v. Hentig, 32 Kan. 156; Ma-
son V. Spencer, 35 lb. 512.
' See Gilmore v. Hentig, 32 Kans.
156.
*Clapp V. Hartford, 35 Conn. 66;
State V. Hudson, 29 N. J. L. 104.
'Dil. Mun. Corp. 809; Hoyt v. E.
Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39; Warren v.
Grand Haven, 30 lb. 24; Seeley v.
Pittsburgh, 82 Pa. St. 360; St. Joseph
T.Owen, (Mo. 92) 19 S. W. E. 713;
In re Washington Ave., 69 Pa. St.
301; Lipps V. Philadelphia, 38 lb
503.
"St. Joseph V. Owen, (Mo. 92) 19 S.
W. E. 713; Stroud V. Philada., 61 Pa.
St. 255; Williamsport v. Com., 84 lb.
487.
' Gray v. Board of Aldermen, 139
Mass. 328; Tide Water Co. v. Coster,
18 N. J. Eq. 519: State v. New-
ark, 37 N. J. L. 415 ; Wright v. Bos-
ton, 9 Cush. 233 ; In re Wasliington
Ave., 69 Pa. St. 360; Seely v. Pittsb.,
82 lb. 360; Topeka v. Huntoon, (Kan.
90) 26 Pac. R. 488; In re Lawden, 89
N. T. 548; Paterson v. Society, etc.,
24 N. J. L. 385; Collins v. Holyoke,
146 Mass. 298; Dorey v. Boston, 146
.539
§ 278
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. XV.
§ 278. Notice to and assent of abutters to assessments.—
When the exercise of the power to pave or otherwise improve
a street depends upon the assent of a certain proportion of the
owners of abutting lands, who are to be assessed for the ex-
pense, the whole proceeding of levying the assessment is void
without that assent; and non-assent will be a good defence in
an action to collect the assessment.^ When the validity of an
assessment for grading, improving or openings treets is in is-
sue, the burden of proof is upon the corporation to show that
everything has been done to render the assessment legal, and
the most necessary fact is the requisite application or consent,
to be shown in some way, of a propei- number of interested prop-
erty holdei-s.^
It has been held that it is within the power of the Legisla-
ture to confer upon a municipal corporation the authority to
improve its public ways at the costs of the adjoining property
owners without a petition on their part; ^ but when a petition
is I'equired by statute, it is indispensable to the valitity of the
.lb. 336; Thomas v. Gain, 35 Mich.
155. As to what use of a sewer will
authorize an assessment, see Brown
V. Fitchburg, 128 Mass. 282; Fair-
banks V. Fitchburg, 132 lb. 42 ; New-
ell V. Cincin., 45 Ohio St. 407; King
V. Reed, 43 N. J. L. 186.
iVoght V. Buffalo, (31 N. E. R.)
133 N. Y. 403; Sharp v. Johnson, 4
HiU (N. Y.) 92; In re Sharp, 56 N. Y.
257; Daniel v. New Orleans, 29 La.
An. 1; McGuinn v. Peri, 16 lb. 326;
Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 Mo. 123; In
re Royal St., 16 La. An. 393; James
V. Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. 199; Richman
V. Muscatine Sup'rs, 70 Iowa, 627;
Evans v. People, (111. 92) 28 jST. E. R.
1111 ; Li nek v. Litchfield, 31 lb.
123; Ilenryv. Thomas, 119 Mass. 583;
Mulligan v. Smith, 59 Cal. 200; Tur-
,rill V. Grattan, 52 lb. 97; Moberry v.
Jeffersonville, 38 Ind. 198; Shaffer v.
Weech, 34 Kan. 595; Welsford v.
Weidlein, 23 lb. 001; Henderson v.
Baltimore, 8 Md. 352; Covington v.
Casey, 3 Bush, 698; State v. Nelson,
57 Wis. 147; Wilson v. Trenton City,
5-10
53 N. J. L. 645 ; Lexington v. Head-
ley, 5 Bush, 508; Burnett v. Sacra-
mento, 12 Cal. 76; Boyle v. Bk'lyn,
71 N. Y. 1; People v. Bk'lyn, 71 lb.
495; Miller v. Mobile, 47 Ala. 163;
State V. Newark, 37 N. J. L. 415;
State V. Elizabeth, 30 lb. 176; For-
syth V. Kreuter, 100 Ind. 27; Ely v.
Morgan Co. etc., 112 lb. 361; In re
Lexington Ave., 63 Hun, 629; Jef.
Co. V. Cowan, 54 Mo. 234; St. Louis
V. Clemens, 36 lb. 467; Zimmerman
V. Snowden, 88 lb. 218; State v.
Hand, 31 N. J. L. 547; State v. Or-
ange, 32 lb. 49; Wells v. Burnham,
20 Wis. 112; Baltimore v. Eschbach,
18 Md. 276; Holland v. Baltimore,
11 lb. 186; Bereldin v. Baltimore,
15 lb. 18.
2 Howell V. Tacoma, 3 Wash. St.
711; 29 Pac. 447; Pittsburgh v.
Walter, 69 Pa. St. 365; Zeigler v.
Hopkins, 117 U. S. 683.
8 Elliott Roads & Streets, p. 249 et
seq. ; Dennison v. Kansas City, 95
Mo. 416; Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 lb.
379.
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS.
278
assessment.! jn raising the question as to the vtilidity of an
assessment for a local improvement, made upon a petition of
an alleged majority of the lot owners, a signer of such petition
is not estopped from denying that the required number have
signed it, if he has made no representation that it was signed by
the proper number.^ When the petition lacked one of the nec-
essary number of petitioners because the signer proved not to
be a proprietor, the proceedings were held to be void ; and the
plaintiff, a nonassenting lot owner, was granted an injunction
to prevent the sale of his property for nonpayment of the as-
■sessment.^
Before the corporation acts upon a petition of the abutting
owners, by entering into a contract for the desired improve-
ment, any one of the signers of the petition may revoke his ac-
tion, even though such revocation reduces the number below
the minimum required by law. The power to make the im-
provement is thereby withdrawn.*
Fraud in procuring the requisite number of signatures to the
■petition, will, of course, vitiate the entire proceeding. Thus,
where a few lot owners procured the additional signatures of
other property holders to a petition, by paying and agreeing to
pay them for the same, the whole proceeding was invalid as a
fraud upon the abutting owners, who did not participate in the
same, and who opposed the proposed improvement.^
Although the grading and paving of streets, and other simi-
lar local improvements, tend to enhance the value of the ad-
jacent property, they are manifestly a great benefit to the whole
municipality ; and to assess the entire cost of such improve-
ments upon the local lot owners, without obtaining their con-
sent, or giving them an opportunity to be heard for or against
the proposed assessment, would work a manifest injustice, some-
' State V. Morse, 50 N. H. 9; State
V. Otoe, 6 Neb. 129; People v. Judge,
40 Mich. 64; State v. Berry, 12 Iowa,
58; Oliphant v. Com'rs, 18 Kan. 386.
'^In re Sharp, 56 N. Y. 257; com-
pare People V. Goodwin, 5 N. Y. 568;
Kellogg V. Ely, 15 Ohio St. 64; see
contra, Burlington v. Gilbert, 31
Iowa, 356. A-s to estoppel, see State
V. Hudson, 34 N. J. L. 531; Quinn v.
Paterson, 27 lb. 35 ; State v. Burling-
ton, 45 Iowa, 87; Johnson v. Allen,
62 Ind. 57; Keese v. Denver, 10 Colo.
112; Tone v. Columbus, 39 Ohio St.
281; Columbus v. Sohl, 44 lb. 479.
3 Holland v. Baltimore, 11 Md. 186;
Bouldin v. Baltimore, 15 lb. 18; Mil-
ler V. Mobile, 47 Ala. 163.
* Irwin V. Mobile, 57 Ala. 6.
^ Maguire, v. Smock. 42 Ind. 1.
' 541
§ 278
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. XV.
what in the nature of taking private property without compen-
sation. As in a case, where the charter provided that the city-
council " should have full power to procure all streets to be im-
proved in any manner they may deem advisable, at the expense
of tlie property owners," and that the council may without the
petition or consent of the property owners authorize such im-
provements by the unanimous vote of the council ; it was held
that an assessment, attempted to be levied under an ordinance
passed by the council, but not unanimouslj'-, could not be col-
lected.i
Tiie Legislature has power, however, to make the determina-
tion of a municipal council, that the requisite number have
signed a petition when one is required, conclusive ; and under
such a provision of the law, the decision of the council is un-
impeachable, except for fraud. ^ But the power delegated to a
council is in all such cases limited and special ; and all acts per-
formed in pursuance of it are legal, only when done strictly
in conformity with the statutory directions.^ Thus, where a
statute authorized contracts to be made by the heads of munic-
ipal departments for such objects only as may be authorized by
the city council ; and the council authorized a paving contract,
with the proviso, that the contractor should be chosen by a
majority of the lot owners; it was held that such selection was
absolutely necessary to render the adjoining lot owner liable for
the assessment.* When it is required by statute that local im-
provements, the expense of which is to be met by special as-
sessments, shall be authorized by an ordinance " specifying the
nature, character, locality and description of such improve-
ment," any assessment made by an ordinance, not conformable
to this requirement, is invalid.^
1 Gage V. Chicago, 32 N. E. E. 264;
Merrill v. Abbott, 62 lud. 549 ; Smith
V. Duncan, 77 lb. 92.
2 King V. Portland, (Or. 93) 31 Pac.
R. 482; In re Kiernan, 62 N. Y. 457;
Von Steem v. Beatrice, (Neb. 92) 54
N. W. R. 677.
s Merrill v. Abbott, 62 Ind. 549;
Garlyle y. Clinton, SON. E. R. 782;
Hitchcock V. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341;
Mills V. City of Detroit, (Mich. 93)
54 X. W. R. 897; Perrine v. Farr,
642
22 N. J. L. 356; Brophy v. Land-
man, 28 Ohio St. 542 ; Carron v. Mar-
tin, 26 N. J. L. 594; State v. Passaic,
41 lb. 90; In re Clay, 22 N. T. S. 112;
67 Hun, 190.
4Reilly v. Philada., 60 Pa. St. 467;
see Philadelphia v. Wistar, 35 Pa. St.
427; see Lach v. Cargill, 60 Mo. 316.
. 5 City of Springfield v. Knott, 49
Mo. App. 412; Hyde Park v. Spen-
cer, 118 111. 446; Kankakee v. Pot-
ter, 119 lb. 327.
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 279
§ 279. Power of Legislature to dispense with notice
It has been held that the Legislature maj' directly, or through
the local authorities, decide upon the question whether a local
improvement will be specially beneficial and to what extent, so
as to justify the levying of an assessment to meet the expenses
incurred.^ So, likewise, when the proposition for a local im-
provement is determined without consent of the abutters, and
nothing further remains to be done, except to apportion the
special assessment, it is held that notice may be dispensed with.^
But it is not difficult to point out the injustice of a rule, by
which the amount, which each lot owner will have to pay, can
be arbitrarily fixed without giving him a hearing, whereby he
may be able to see that he is required to pay only what can be
justly required of him. For these reasons, statutes, which au-
thorize the levy of assessments, usually contain the requirement,
that at some stage of the proceedings the abutter shall have his
"day in court." ^ But there are many decisions from courts,
which are entitled to respect, as well as eminent writers, who
hold that, independently of statutory requirements, no notice
and no hearing is necessary to the validity of the assessment.*
If notice is required, and the mode of giving it has been pre-
scribed by statute, the prescribed mode must be substantially
1 Bowling V. Altschule, (Cal. 93)
33 Pao. 495; Dennison v. Kansas
CitT, 95 Mo. 416; Farrar v. St. Louis,
80 lb. 379, and ante, § 277.
2 Cleveland v. Tripp, 13 E. I. 50;
State V. Elizabetli, (N. J.) 17 Atl. R.
91; Amery v. City, 72 Iowa, 701;
Clapp V. City, 35 Conn. 66; Auburn
V. Paul, 24 Atl. R 817; 84 Me. 212;
Mayor v. Johns Hopkins' Hosp., 56
Md. 1; Gillett v. Denver, 21 Fed.
Rep. 822; Amery v. City, 72 Iowa,
401.
' Ulman v. Baltimore, (Md. 93) 20
Atl. E. 141.
« Scott V. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. St.
80; Craig v. Philadelphia, 89 lb.
269; Philadelphia V. Thomas, 25 Atl.
R. 888; Sewell v. St. Paul, 20 Minn.
511; Merritt v. Portchester, 71 N. Y.
309; Davidson v. New Oris., 96 U. S.
134; Lowell v. Wentworth, 6 Cush.
221; Chesapeake & O. E. Co. v. Mul-
lens, 22 S. W. E. 558; Williams v.
Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Nashville v.
Weiser, 54 111. 245; Butler v. Chi-
cago, 56 lb. 341 ; Myiick v. La Crosse,
17 Wis. 442; New Albany v. Con-
nelly, 7 Ind. 32; Dailing v. Gunn, 50
111. 424; Spencer v. Merchant, 125
U. S. 345 ; In re Washington Ave. , 09
Pa. St. 352 ; Boorman v. Santa Bar-
bara, 65 Cal. 313; Grand Eapids
School Furniture Co. v. City of Grand
Eapids, 52 N. W. E. 1028; 92 Mich.
564; Butler v. Saginaw Co., 26 lb.
221; Cleghorn v. Postlethwaite, 43
111. 428; Barker v. Omaha, 16 Neb.
269; Leat v. Tilson, 72 Cal. 404;
Stuart V. Palmer, 74 N. T. 183; Gar-
viss V. Daussman, 114 Ind. 429; 16
N. E. E. 826 ; Law v. Johnston, 118
Ind. 261 ; Darling v. Gunn, 50 III. 424;
Lehman v. Eobinson, 59 Ala. 219.
543
§ 279
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XT.
followed. 1 But while there must be substantial compliance
with these requirements of tlie statute, a mere technical or lit-
eral departure from the provisions of the statute, if it is not
substantial, will not affect the validity of the assessment.*
Thus, notice by advertisement, and notice b}' publication, are
held to be equivalent.^ But when the ordinance, which is
passed in pursuance of charter powers to levy a special tax,
prescribes publication in the official organ of the municipality,
such a publication is necessary to the validity of the tax.* It
has been held in one case that, where there is no charter pro-
vision to the contrary, the ordinance oi'dering the improvement
is sufficient notice.^ And, so, otherwise, has it been held that,
where the statute or ordinance, under which the assessment is
made, does not require that the notice be in writing or by pub-
lication, an oral notice will be sufficient.'^ If proper notice be
not given, a vs^rit of certiorari will lie to review the proceedings
by the proper court ; and if they are substantially defective,
they will be quashed.^ But it has been held that, where an ap-
peal is allowed,^ certiorari will not lie.® But there are authori-
ties, which hold that either remedy may be resorted to.^"
1 Ladd V. Spencer, (Or. 93) 31 Pac.
E. 474; Lake Shore etc. Co. v. Chi-
cago, (111. 93) 33 N. E. E. 602; Kroop
V. Forman, 31 Mich. 144; Bensinger
V. District, 0 Mackey, 285; Humboldt
Co. V. Dinsmore, 75 Cal. 604; Vail v.
Morris, etc. Co., 21 N. J. L. 189; Peo-
ple V. Gilon, 24 N. E. E. 944; Dehail
V. Morford, (Cal. 93) 30 Pac. E. 593;
Wilson V. Trenton, 53 N. J. L. 645;
23 Atl. E. 278; Wilson v. Seattle, 2
Wash. St. 543; 27 Pac. E. 474.
2 Gibson v. Owens, (Mo. 93) 21 S.
W. E. 1107; Windham v. Commis-
sioners, 26 Me. 406; Hildreth v. Low-
ell, 11 Gray, 560; Dickinson Co. v.
Hogan, 39 Kans. 606; 18 Pac. Eep.
611; Philadelphia etc. Co. v. Shipley,
(Md. 93) 19 Atl. E. 522; Toledo, etc.
Co. V. East Saginaw, etc. Co., (Mich.)
40 N. W. 436; Auburn v. Paul, 84
Me. 212; Voght v. Buffalo, 133 N. Y.
463; State v. Elizabeth, 30 N. J. L.
365; Durant v. Jersey City, 25 lb.
309.
544
3 State V. Plainfleld, 38 N. J. L. 95;
Vantilburgh v. Shann, 24 lb. 740;
State V. Jersey City, 24 lb. 662 ; State
V. Patterson Ave. etc., 41 lb. 83.
* Dubuque v. Wooteu, 25 Iowa, 571 ;
In re Burmeister, 56 How. Pr. 416.
' Palmyra v. Morton, 25 Mo. 597.
sWhitworth v. Puchett, 2 Gratt.
527; Hawkins v. The Justices, 12 Lea,
351. This is doubted in Elliott's
Eoads & Streets, p. 249.
'Dil. Mun. Cor. §805; Walker v.
District, 6 Mackey, 352; People v.
Betts, 55N. T.600; Farmington, etc.
Co. V. Commissioners, 112 Mass. 206.
8 See Howard v. Shaw, 126 111. 53;
Bridge v. Hampton, 47 N. H. 151;
Felton V. Addison, 101 Ind. 58.
s Cedar Eapids, etc. Co. v. Whelan,
64 Iowa, 694; People v. Myers, 32 N.
E. E. 241 ; Boston, etc. Co. v. Folsom,
46 N. H. 64.
10 Ladd V. Spencer, (Or. 93) 31 Pac.
Eep. 474; Com'rs v. Harper, 38 Bl.
104 ; Eoberts v. Williams, 13 Ark. 355.
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 280
A failure to object after due notice will be taken as a waiver
of all irregularities, if a party subsequently apply for an injunc-
tion to restrain the collection of an assessment.^ The defect of
the notice cannot be attacked in any collateral proceeding, un-
less the defect be of such a nature, as that it will raise a ques-
tion of jurisdiction of the court over the pending cause of
action. 2
§ 280. Re-assessments. — When the amount raised by an
assessment is insufficient ; or when for any reason the validity
of the assessment has been successfully attacked ; the Legisla-
ture may, if there exists no constitutional provision forbidding
it, authorize a re-assessment, or pass a bill validating the former
assessment.* A re-assessment may be ordered notwithstanding
the collection of the original assessment has been permanently
enjoined by a court of competent jurisdiction.* A legislative
act of ratification or validation will, it has been held, validate a
void assessment only from the date of its passage.^ But where,
in any State, the constitution contains a prohibition of retrospec-
24 Mich. 409.
1 State V. Paterson, 39 N. J. Ii. 159;
as to waiver, see Walker v. Aurora,
(111. 92) 29 K. E. R. 741; Auditor v.
Maier, (Mich. 93) 54 N. W. R. 640;
Nashville V. Weiser, 54111. 245; Gard-
ner V. Boston, 106 Mass. 549; Quick
V. River Forrest, 22 N. E. R. 816; 130
m. 323; Hopkins v. Mason, 61 Barb.
469; State v. Perthamboy, 29 N". J.
L. 259; Gilmore v. TJtica, 29 N. E. R.
841; 131 N.T. 26.
2 United States v. Arredondo, 6
Pet. 691; Scott v. People, ( 93 ) 33 N.
E. R. 180; Godohaux v. Carpenter,
19 Nev. 415 ; see Brown v. Rome, etc.
Co., 86 Ala. 206; Zimmerman v.
Snowdon, 88 Mo. 218; Shaffer v.
Welch, 34 Kans. 595 ; King v. Benton
Co., 10 Oreg. 512; Townsend v. Man-
istee, 88 Mich. 408; 50 N. W. R. 321;
Town V. Williamson, 91 Ind. 541;
United States v. Arredondo, 6 Peters,
691; Lake Shore etc. Co. v. Cincin-
nati etc. Co., 116 Ind. 578; Weinickie
V. R. R. Co., 61 Hun, 619; 15 N. T.
S. 689; Colville v. Judy, 73 Mo. 651;
Grand Rapids etc. Co. v. YanDrille,
35
8 In re Mead, 74 N. T. 216; Owens-
boro v. Callaghan, (Ky. 92) 17 S. W.
R. 278; 1)1 re Van Antwerp, 56 IST. T.
261; Brown v, New York, 63 lb. 239;
Howards. Ins. Co. v. Newark, (N. J.)
18 Atl, R. 672; Howell v. Buffalo, 37
N. T. 267; People v. McDonald, 69 lb.
362; Whitely v. Lansing, 27 Mich.
131; Manley V. Emlen, 46 Kan. 655;
27 Pac. R. 844; State v. Newark, 34
N. J. L. 236; State v. Plainfleld, 38
lb. 95; Edwards v. Jersey City, 40
lb. 176; Righter v. Newark, 45 lb.
104; Butler v. Toledo, 5 Ohio St.
225; Dill v. Roberts, 30 Wis. 178;
Whitney v. Pittsburgh, (Pa. 93) 23
Atl. R. 395; Dean v. Borohsenius, 30
Wis. 236; Bingaman v. Pittsburgh,
29 W. N. C. 364; Lennon v. New
York, 55 N. Y. 361, 365.
4 State V. Newark, 34 N. J. L. 236;
Emporia v. Bates, 16 Kan. 495 ; Mills
V. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400.
6Reis V. Graff, 51 Cal. 86; San
Fran. v. O'Neil, lb. 91 ; Same v. Kins-
man, lb. 92.
545
§281
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. XV.
tive laws, any statute, having for its object the validation of a
prior void assessment, would be void.^
§ 281. Adjoining owner's relation to contract — His lia-
bility.— An assessment, levied to meet the expense of a local
improvement, is always a tax ; and the claim against the abut-
ter is not subject to any set-off, even though, under statutory
authority, the suit to recover it is brought by the contractor,
who made the improvement.^ But any defence, which would
be good and effective in a suit against the city is good in his
behalf ; ^ as, for example, the poor quality of the work.*
The general power to make contracts for local improve-
ments is implied from an express grant to a municipal cor-
poration of power to make such improvements, provided there
be nothing in the act to show a contrary legislative intent.*
When, however, the statute directs the mode, in which the
contract is to be executed, or what it shall contain, the assess-
ment will be invalid if these directions are not substantially
complied with.^ As between the municipal corporation and
the contractor, it may be said that, while the property owners
cannot be strictly considered to be parties or privies to the con-
tract, the corporation is to a considerable extent their agent,
and enters into the contract in that capacity. The burden of
performing the contract falls on the shoulders of the abutting
owners ; they can only insist that the municipal authorities
secure a faithful performance of the contract on the part of the
1 St. Louis V. Clemens, 52 Mo. 133.
2 Burlington v. Palmer, 67 Iowa,
681; Emery v. San F. G. Co., 28 Cal.
345; Meuser v. Risdon, 36 lb. 239;
Himmelman v. Spanagel, 39 lb. 389.
8 St. Louis V. Clemens, 36 Mo. 469.
4 Erie Co. v. Butler, 120 Pa. St.
374.
5 Galveston v. Heard, 54 Tex. 420;
Lates V. Briggs, 64 N. Y. 404; Mayor
V. New Yoik, 63 lb. 455, 459; Gum-
ming V. B'klyn, 11 Paige, 596.
6 Allen V. Galveston, 51 Tex. 302;
People V. Weber, 89 111. 347; Dare v.
Milwaukee, 42 Wis. 108; Bentley v.
County, 25 Minn. 259; Hurford v.
Omaha, 4 Neb. 350; Addis v. Pittsb.,
«5 Pa. St. 379; McDonald v. Mayor,
646
68 N. Y. 23; Leavenworth v. Rankin,
2 Kan. 357; Montgomery v. Barber,
45 Ala. 237; White v. N. O., 15 La.
An. 667; Bank v. Dandridge, 12
Wheat. 64; Dey v. Jersey City, 19
N. J. Eq. 412. As to invitations for
proposals, see In re Rosenbaura, 6
N. Y. Sup. Ct. 184; In re Pennie, 108
N. Y. 364; In re Marsh, 88 lb. 42S;
In re Merriam, 84 N. Y. 596; Balto
v. Johnson, 62 Md. 225 ; Stockton v.
Whitemore, 50 Cal. 555; Yarnold v.
Lawrence, 15 Kan. 126; Nash v. St.
Paul, 8 Minn. 172; White v. N. 0.,
15 La. An. 667; State v. Barlow, 48
Mo. 317; Brevoort v. Detroit, 24
Mich. 322; Stuart v. Cambridge, 125
Mass. 102.
CH. XV.J MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 282
contractor.^ In order to render an abutting owner liable to
the city for the expense of a local improvement, the terms of
the law authorizing it must be strictly complied with and all
conditions precedent performed.^ So, if the ordinance requires
a sidewalk on the side of the street, the lot owner is not liable
for an assessment for one several feet away from the side of
the street.^ Nor is he liable for the expense of laying a stone
sidewalk, when by the ordinance a plank walk was specified.*
And when the owner of a corner lot had paid for a water pipe
laid along one front of his lot, at his request, he is not liable
for pipe which is laid along the other front without his con-
sent.^ But a substantial compliance with the law is all that
■is needed to make the lot owners liable.^ If the work has been
accepted by the corporation as complete and satisfactory, a
'prima facie case is made out as against the abutting owner.'^
§ 282. Method of collection There are many cases to sup-
port the doctrine, that a tax is not a debt for the recovery of
which, in the absence of a statutory remedy, a common law ac-
tion will lie.^ And the principle, applicable in the case of a
1 Williams v. Savings & Loan Soc,
(Cal. 93) 31 Pac. 908; Liebstein v.
Newark, 24 N. J. E. 200; Bond v.
Newark, 19 lb. 376; Heft v. Payne,
(Cal. 93) 31 Pac. K. 874; City v. Fow-
ler, 34 Ind. 140; see Brown v. Jenks,
(Cal. 93) 32 Pac. R. 701; Perine v.
Forbush, lb. 226; Washburn v.
Lyons, lb. 310; Libbey v. Ellsworth,
lb. 228; Louisville v. L. Gas Co.,
(Ky. 93) 22 S. W. Kep. 550; Fairchild
V. Wall, 93 Cal. 401 ; Gilmore v. Utica,
131 N. Y. 26.
2McBean v. Martin, (Cal. 92) 31
Pac. E. 5; Dorathy v. Chicago, 53 111.
79; Boyer v. Reading, (Pa. 92) 24 Atl.
E. 1070; Himmelman v. Byrne, 41
Cal. 500; McBean v. Redick, (Cal. 92)
31 Pac. R. 7; McGee v. Avondale, 7
Ohio Cir. Ct. E. 246; Harper's Ap.,
109 Pa. St. 9; Sheridan v. Fitchburg,
131 Mass. 523; Brown v. Jenks, (Cal.
93)32Pao. E. 701; JefEerson Co. v.
City of Mount Vernon, 33 W. E. E.
1091.
« Lowell V. Whelock, 11 Gush. 391 ;
In re N. Y. P. E. School, 47 N. Y.
556; City of Muscatine v. Chicago E.
etc. Co., (Iowa, 93) 55 N. W. E. 100.
4 Sloan V. Beebe, 24 Kan. 343.
6 Baker v. Gartside, 86 Pa. St. 498.
«Seeon«e, §178.
■? Munic. No. 2 v. Guillette, 14 La.
An. 297; Murray v. Tucker, 10 Bush,
240; DePay v. City of Wabash, 32
N. E. E. 1016; Eisley v. St. Louis, 34
Mo. 404; St. Louis v. De None, 44 lb.
136; Neenan v. Smith, 60 lb. 292.
8 Clinton v. Henry Co., (Mo. 93) 22
S. W. E. 494; Augusta v. North, 57
Me. 392; Perry v. Washburn, 20 Cal.
318; Shaw v. Pickett, 26 Vt. 486;
Lane Co. v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 80; Mc-
Crowell V. Bristol, (Va. 93) 16 S. E.
E. 867; Detroit v. Jopp, 52 Mich. 458;
Comm'rs v. First Nat. Bank, (Kan.
92) 30 Pac. 22; Catling v. Carteret,
92 N. C. 536; Charleston v. Oliver, 16
S. C. 47; New Orleans v. Davidson,
30 La. An. 541 ; Greer v. Covington,
83 Ky. 410. In Meriwetlier v. Gar-
rett, 102 U. S. 472, the court said.
547
§282
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XV.
general tax, acquires greater force in the case of a special as-
sessment, -which maj'- in particular cases seriously burden the
property it was designed to beneiit.
Upon the ground, that the true basis for the power to levy
assessment for local improvements is the benefit thereby con-
ferred upon adjacent land, any statutory regulation, which au-
thorizes other property than the abutting land to be held liable
for such assessments, or which imposes a personal liabihty upon
the abutting owners, is of doubtful constitutionality, as consti-
tuting a taking of private property for public use without com-
pensation.'^ The general rule is, that only such property is
liable, which is made so by the statute ; and in this respect there
is a substantial distinction between the power to levy general
taxes and the purely statutory power to make a special assess-
ment for local improvements, beneficial mainly to adjacent prop-
erty. The power to assess other property belonging to the
owner of a lot which is located on a street benefited by the local
improvements, can only be conferred, if at all, by express statu-
tory enactment.^ And hence, in the absense of statute, there
is no personal liability for local assessments.^
But the general taxes which are levied upon the whole com-
munity, or upon all members of a certain class, for the purpose
of defraying the general municipal expenses, are placed upon
a different basis.
" Debts are obligations for the pay-
ment of money founded upon con-
tract, express or implied. Taxes
are imposts levied for the support of
the government or for some special
purpose authorized by it. . . Kor is
their nature affected by the fact that
in some States an action of debt can
be instituted for their recovery."
I Brown v. Jenks, (Cal. 93) 32Pac.
K. 701; Burlington V. Quick, 47 Iowa,
226; Greeny. Ward, 82 Va. 324; Nee-
nan V. Smith, 50 Mo. 525 ; Macon v.
Patty, 57 Miss. 378; Littler v. Mc-
Cord, 38 111. App. 147; Higgins v.
Ausmuss, 77 Mo. 351; Louisiana v.
Miller, 66 lb. 467; Leeds & Co. v.
Hardy, (La. 92) 11 So. 1; see, Clem-
ens V. Mayor, 16 Md. 208; Bonsall v.
548
Lebanon, 19 Ohio, 419; Eshback v.
Pitts., 6 Md. 71; New Orleans v. Wire,
20 La. An. 500; Lowell v. French, 6
Gush. 223; In re Vac. Center St., 115
Pa. St. 247.
2 State V. State Board of Assessors,
(N. J. 92) 22 Atl. E. 1085; Macon v.
Patty, 57 Miss. 386; Wright v. Chi-
cago, 20 111. 352; Meyer v. Burritt, 60
Conn. 117; Craw v. Tolono, 96 111.
255; Virginia v. Hall, 96 lb. 278.
3 Lake Shore & M. S. E. Co. v.
Dunkirk, 20 N. T. S. 596; Balfe v.
Lammers, 109 Pa. St. 347, 350; Board
V. Fulton, 111 lb. 410; McCrowell v.
City of Bristol, 16 S. E. E. 867 (Va.
93); Green v. Ward, 82 Va. 324;
Wolf V. Philadelphia, 105 Pa. St.
25; City v. Moore, 113 lb. 597.
CH. XV.J MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 282
For this reason, many of the courts have held — and by some
the same doctrine has been errroneously as we think, deemed
to apply to local assessments — that the levy of a tax by a mu-
nicipal corporation, under and pursuant to authority conferred
by its charter, creates an obligation or debt, the payment of
which can be enforced by a common law action ex contractu,
even though there may be a statutory method of recovery of
a special and summary character.^ But when the power to
impose taxes is conferred by its charter upon a municipal cor-
poration ; and the charter is silent as to the express mode by
which their collection is to be enforced, the power to collect
them by an ordinary civil suit is necessarily implied.^ But the
general or special power to tax does not imply the power to
enforce the collection of tax by any methods more summarj'-
than the ordinary judicial proceedings, by which debts are col-
lected. The power to collect by distress and sale cannot be
implied from the fact, that the State adopts that method.^
However, the Legislature has power to provide summary
methods of collecting taxes and assessments, and to declare
what shall be 2, 'prima facie, case.* And such methods are con-
stitutional ; except, possibly, where the property-owner is de-
prived of his right to have the municipal action reviewed by
a court of superior jurisdiction.^ Proceedings to enforce tlie
payment of taxes and assessments are usually statutory ; and
if by charter or statute a power to sell the property assessed or
taxed, is conferred upon the municipality, the statute must be
closely followed ; and every requisite observed or no valid title
will pass by the sale.^ And if the municipality be given a
' Dugan V. Baltimore, 1 Gill & J.
(Md.) 499; Baltimore v. Hovard, 6
Ilar. & J. (Md.) 383; Gordon v. Bal-
timore, 5 Gill 236; 243; and comp.
cases cited in, last note. State v.
So. S. S. Co., 13 La. An. 497; Dunlap
V. Gallatin Co., 15 111. 9; Ryan v.
Gallatin Co., 14 lb. 82; Geneva v.
Cole, 61 lb. 397; Jonesboro v. Mo-
Kee, 2 Yerg, 167; Dubuque v. 111. C.
R. etc., 39 Iowa, 56; Davenport v. C.
K. I. etc., 38 lb. 633; Burlington v.
B. M. R. R., 41 lb. 134; Perry Co. v.
Selma. M. & M., 58 Ala. 546; Winter
V. Montgomery, 79 lb. 481; compare
Dollar Savings Bank v. United States,
19 Wall. 227.
estate V. Severance, 55 Mo. 378,
389; Amite City v. Clementz, 24 La.
An. 27; Jefferson v. McCarty, 74 Mo.
55.
8 See Dillon Mun. Corp. § 818.
4 Riley v. St. Joseph, 67 Mo. 491.
* Flournoy v. Jeffersonville, 17 Ind.
169.
" Goring v. McTaggart, 92 Ind. 200;
Wilson V. Poole, 33 lb. 443; Him-
melman v. Townsend, 49 Cal. 150;
549
§283
MUXICIPAL COEPOEATIOXS.
[CH. XV.
statutory remedy, it will ordinarily be' considered exclusive of
any other method of collecting or enforcing the tax at com-
mon law,i even though the statutory mode is inadequate.^ So,
where a town was empowered by its charter to levy and collect
taxes, and to enforce the same by a civil action ; it was held
that the corporation was precluded from collecting taxes by
any summary proceeding.^ The power to sell for non-payment
of taxes must be conferred in express terms, or by clear and
unavoidable implication.* Thus, the power to sell for non-
payment of taxes cannot be implied from a provision, that the
collection of taxes may be enforced by ordinance,* nor does a
power to sell delinquent lands for non-paymeat of taxes author-
ize their sale for non-payment of assessments.®
Unless expressly authorized, a municipal corporation cannot
be a purchaser at a sale of lands for non-payment of taxes.'^
§ 283. Lien of taxes. — In the absence of statute, taxes
and assessments are not liens upon the property against which
they have been assessed.^ Such liens are statutory and their
Board v. Johnson, (Miss. 90) 7 So.
K. 390; Turnpike Com'rs v. Louis-
ville etc. Co., 1 S. W. K. 671.
^Alexander v. Helber, 35 Mo. 334.
* Pueblo V. Eobinson, 21 Pao. R.
899; 12 Colo. 593; Annapolis v. Har-
wood, 32 Md. 471 ; Merriam v. Moo-
dy, 25 Iowa, 163 ; Mcluemy v. Bead,
23 Iowa, 410; Haskell v. Burlington,
30 lb. 232; Augusta v. Dunbar, 50
Gra. 387; Municipality v. Pance, 6
La. An. 515; Baltimore v. Howard,
6 H. & J. 383.
5 Merriam v. Moody, 25 Iowa, 163;
Paine v. Spratley, 5 Kan. 525; Mc-
luerney v. Keed, 23 Iowa, 410.
6 Sharp V. Johnson, 4 Hill (N.T.) 92.
'Knox V. Peterson, 21 "Wis. 247;
Bordages v. Higgins, (Tex. 92) 20 S.
W. R. 184; Champaign V. Harmon,
98 m. 491 ; Logansport v. Humphrey,
84 Ind. 467; Eaton v. Manitowoc, 44
Wis. 489.
8 State V. O'Xeill, (N. J. 93) 25 Atl.
273; Howard v. Strother, 33 X. W.
R. 238; Kansas City V. Payne, 71 Mo.
159; JefEerson v. Whipple, 71 lb.
Wyer v. Larocque, (Ky. 93) 33 Pac.
544; Jones v. Miracle, (Ky. 97) 21 S.
W. K. 241; Carroll v. Mitchell, 37 W.
Va. 130; Pierce v. Boston, 3 Met.
520; Deputron v. Young, 10 S. Ct.
539; 134 U. S. 241; Seattle v. Doran,
(Wash. St.) 32 Pac. R. 105; Oil City
V. Oil City B. Works, (Pa. 93) 25 Atl.
R. 549; McPhee v. Venable, 77 G-a.
772; Mix v. Ross, 57 111. 121; Sanger
V. Rice, 43 Kan. 580; Bender v. Dun-
gan, 99 Mo. 126; Beckley v. English,
129 111. 646 ; O' Byrne v. Philadelphia,
93 Pa. St. 225 ; AUentown v. Hower,
93 lb. 332; Carncross v. Lykes, 22
Fla. 587; Minter v. Durham, 13 Or.
470; Murdock v. Chaffee, 7 So. R.
519; Garlington v. Copeland, (S. C.
93) 10 S. E. R. 616.
1 Flournoy V. Jeffersonville, 17 Ind.
169; Mix v. Ross, 57 111. 521; Cf.
State V. Georgia Co., 17 S. E. R. 10;
see Topsham v. Blaisdell, 82 Me.
152; Lord v. Parker, 83 lb. 530.
^Fairbault v. Misener, 20 Minn.
396; Wood V. Nicholson, 43 Kan. 461;
Board v. Bank, (Kan. 92) 30 Pac. 22;
550
CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 283
force and extent depend entirely upon the statute creating
them.i But there is no doubt that the Legislature may declare
taxes to be a lien on the land as against the owner and all sub-
sequent purchasers,^ and the practice of providing such liens is
believed to be universal. The power to declare them a lien by
ordinance may also be, and is almost invariably conferred upon
a municipality.* Where the statute authorizes the municipality
to make the taxes it levies a lien upon the real estate, the valid-
ity of the lien will, of course, depend upon the validity of the
tax levy ; and will fail with an avoidance of the levy.*
The personal liability of the owner of property, for the taxes
levied against such property, which is enforceable by an action
at law against such owners, does not affect the lien upon the
property, which serves as a cumulative remedy,^ unless the
remedy in personam is made exclusive.® Water rents, paid to
a city owning waterworks, although called so by the charter, are
not taxes ; and the obligation to pay them rests upon an implied
or express contract to pay for water used. Nevertheless, such
water rents may be declared a lien on specific property ; and this
lien maj'- by statute be given priority over a subsequent mort-
gage.'' In a case, where a city was given power to collect taxes ;
and the tax was declared to be a lien, but no power was given
to enforce the lien by distress and sale ; nor was any other mode
of collection prescribed ; it was held that the lien could be en-
forced by a bill in equity.*
519; United States v. Snyder, 149
U. S. 210; Bryn Mawr Col. v. Ander-
son, 51 jST. W. R. 126; Allegheny
City's App., 41 Pa. St. 60; Howell v.
Philada.,38Ib. 471.
1 State V. ^tna L. Ins. Co., 117 Ind.
251; Shipman v. Forbes, 32 Pac. Rep.
599; Philada. v. Greble, 38 Pa. St. 339.
2 People V. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419;
Vreeland v. Jersey City, 37 N. J. Eq.
574; Bordages v. Higgins, (Tex. 93)
20 S. W. Rep. 726; Philada. v. Tryon,
35 Pa. St. 401 ; Meddsville v. Dickson,
24 W. N. C. 451; New York v. Col-
gate, 12 N. Y. 149; Hancock v. Bow-
man, 49 Cal. 413; Fitch v. Creighton,
24 How. 159.
' Bordages v. Higgins, (Tex. 93) 20
S. W. Rep. 726.
* Herschberger v. Pittsburgh, 115
Pa. St. 78.
^Eschback v. Pitts, 6 Md. 71; Mix
V. Ross, 57 111. 121 ; New Haven v.
Railroad, 38 Conn. 422.
•> Comp. as to liens and personal
liability for assessments : Trustees v.
Shotwell, 45 N. J. Eq. 106; Philadel-
phia V. Cook, 30 Pa. St. 56; Elma v.
Carney, (Wash. 92) 30 Pac. Rep. 732 ;
Jones V. Schulmyer, 39 Ind. 119;
Heine v. Com'rs, 19 Wall. 655; Ben-
nett v. Buffalo, 17 N. Y. 383; Guerin
V. Reese, 33 Cal. 292.
' Prov. Inst. V. Jersey City, 113 U.
S. 506.
^Mclnerny v. Reed, 23 Iowa, 410;
Lima v. L. Cem. Ass'n, 42 Ohio St,
128.
551
§284
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XV.
The statutory lien for unpaid taxes attaches at the date pre-
scribed by the statute ; ^ and parties, acquiring interests in the
property subsequently take it subject thereto.'^ As the lien is
the creation of the sovereign power, and necessary to the effec-
tive exercise of the povirer of taxation there is no doubt that
the Legislature may make this lien paramount to all other iu-
cumbrances.^ And this is the universal practice.
Statutes creating the lien are, like all remedial statutes, to
be libei-ally construed, so as to enable their purpose to be ac-
complished.* And being purely statutoiy, it maj^ be modified
or completely abrogated by subsequent statutes, even after it
has attached to the property of the delinquent; at least, vifhere
the unpaid tax is due to the State or to a municipality or county.^
But where the tax is a local assessment, and the lien is in favor
of the contractor, who, in reliance upon this security, has done
the work, involved in the local improvement ; and who is sub-
rogated to the claims of "the city against the abutting owner,^
any statute destroying the lien would be a violation of the
constitutional prohibition of interference with vested rights,
and of impairment of the obligation of contracts.'^
§ 284. Statute of Limitations. — In those jurisdictions, where
common law actions of debt are employed to recover taxes, the
Statute of Limitations may under its general provisions be a bar
to a personal judgment for taxes.^ But it is doubtful, whether
the Statute of Limitations applies generally to the statutory
> Langsdale v. Nicklans, 38 Ind. 289 ;
Jones V. Schulmeyer, 39 lb. 119.
2 Chancy v. State, 118 lb. 494.
' Prov. Inst. V. Jersey City, 113 U.
S. 596; State v. ^tna etc. Co., 117
Ind. 251; Moffatt v. Henderson, 18
J. & S. (N. Y.) 211.
* Eckhard v. Donahue, 9 Daly, 214;
Hudler v. Golden, 36 N. Y. 447 ; Weed
V. Tucker, 19 lb. 422.
5 Watson V. N. Y. Cen. R. R., 47
N. Y. 157; Hallv. Bunte, 20 Ind. 304;
Martin v. Hewit, 44 Ala. 418 ; Bangor
V. Goding, 35 Me. 73 ; Gray v. Carle-
ton, 35 lb. 481; Frost v. Ilsley, 54 lb.
345 ; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall.
314; Antoui v. Greenhow, 107 U. S.
652
766; Edwards v. Kearzly, 96 lb. 595;
Van Hoffman v. Quincey, 4 Wall. 535.
6 Philadelphia v. Wistar, 35 Pa. St.
427.
' In re Hope M. Co., 1 Sawy. 710;
Weaver v. Sells, 10 Kan. 609; Handel
V. Elliott, 60 Tex. 145; Wabash &
E. Canal v. Beers, 2 Black. 448;
Streubel v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 67;
Hallahan v. Herbert, 11 Ab. Pr. N. S.
326; Crowning v. Barnett, 30 Ark.
560.
8 Burlington v. B. & M. R. R. Co.,
41 Iowa, 134; Davenport v. C. R. I.
etc., 38 lb. 633; Mellinger v. Hous-
ton, 68 Tex. 37; Jefferson v. Whip-
ple, 71 Mo. 521.
CH. XV.] MUNICITAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 284
remedies for enforcing the payment of taxes. There are many
cases, which hold that, in the absence of a special statutory limi-
tation, assessments and taxes, not arising out of contract, are
not barred under any general provision of the Statute of Limi-
tations.i
1 District V. "Wash. & Ct. E. Co., 1 Newcomer v. Keedy, 2 Md. 19; Ho-
Mackey, 361; Eschback v. Pitts, 6 gan v. Ingle, 2 Crancli, 355; E. & O.
Md. 71; Magee v. Com., 46 Pa. St. R. R. Co. v. District, 3 MacArthur,
358; Pease v. Howard, 14 Johns. 479; 122.
55a
CHAPTER XVI.
STEBETS, BRIDGES AND TTJENPIKES.
SCCTION.
286 — ^Definition of street.
287— Alleys.
288 — Conflict of jurisdiction over
streets.
289 — ^Delegation of legislative
power over streets.
290 — Construction of charter pow-
ers over streets.
291 — Power to pave construed.
292 — Power to improve, pave and
grade continuous.
293 — Rights of the municipality in
soil of the streets, in gen-
eral.
294 — Eight of municipality in soil
of the sta-eets for construc-
tion of sewers and cisterns.
295 — Pipes in streets, for gas and
other purposes.
296 — Power to grant an exclusive
f rancliise to lay pipes and to
use streets for other semi-
private purposes.
297 — Poles for the hanging of tel-
egraph and otlier wires.
Abuttors' right to compen-
sation.
298 — Openings in and vaults under
sidewalks.
299 — Municipal regulation of street
travel and traffic.
300 — Street obstructions.
301 — Legislative control of streets
— Eights of abutting own-
ers therein.
302 — Legislative power over the
construction of railroads.
Its delegation to cities ;
construction of grant.
554
Section.
. 303 — Eights of abutting owners,
how afEeoted by construc-
tion of steam railroads
along the street.
304 — Abutting owners, how affect-
ed by surface street rail-
ways.
305 — ^Elevated street railways in
relation to abutting owners.
306 — Municipal control over the
construction and operation
of railroads in streets.
306 a — Electric and cable cars on ■
street railways.
307 — Eemedies of abutters — Meas-
ure of damages.
308 — Vacation of streets by Legis-
lature— ^Delegation of pow-
er to municipal corpora-
tions.
309 — Proceedings to vacate.
310 — Burden and means of proving
vacation and abandonment.
311 — Compensation to abutters on
vacation.
312 — Statute of Limitations, as ap-
plicable to the public ease-
ment in street — ^Equitable
estoppel.
313 — Definition, character and con-
struction of public bridges.
314 — Legislative and municipal
powers over bridges.
314a — ^National control over con-
struction and maintenance
of bridges.
315 — County liability for mainte-.
nance and repair of public
bridges.
CH. XVI.J STREETS, BKIDGES AIH) TURNPIKES.
§ 28G
316 — Bights and duties of munici-
pal corporations in build-
ing, rebuilding and main-
taining bridges.
317 — Private bridges on or inter-
secting highways.
318— Turnpikes.
319 — Extent of municipal power
over turnpike.
320— Incidents of toll.
321— The law of the road.
§ 286. Definition of street — A street is any public high-
way, improved or unimproved,^ in a city, town or village, open
to the use of all for purposes of travel and traffic, and such
other public or private purposes as may be permitted by the
municipality under whose control it is.^ The term includes all
public urban ways, whatever may be their length or width.
The fundamental idea of a street, that of a public highway,
maintained primarily and chiefly, though not solely, for public
benefit,^ does not permit of the bestowal of the term on turn-
pikes, owned by private corporations ; * and the distinction as-
sumes importance when the question of maintenance of these
two classes of public ways is to be considered.
If the owner of land causes it to be laid out in lots, and a map
to be made, upon which certain spaces are designated as " streets,"
it. will be understood that by that term are meant public ways
for travel and commerce. In no event could the word, in the
absence of express reservation, be considered to signify mere
private ways for the sole use of those owning contiguous lands.^
All persons, acquiring land on the line of any street so desig-
nated have the right, as against the grantor, to require such
ways to be opened as streets, and to enjoy all the ordinary rights
of the public in such highways.®
I Brace v. IST. T. Can., 27 N. T. 271;
Com. v. Boston etc., 135 Mass. 551;
Sharretts Road, 8 Pa. St. 92.
^ Elliott on Roads and Streets, ch.
II.; Perrin v. N. Y. etc., 36 N. T. 120;
Heiple v. East Portland, 13 Oreg. 97;
State V. Moriarity, 74 Ind. 104; Liv-
ingston V. Mayor, 8 Wend. 85 ; Bene-
dict V. Goit, 3 Barb. 459; State v.
Wilkinson, 2 Vt. 480; Cox v. Louis-
ville etc., 48 Ind. 178; Conner v.
Prest. etc., 1 Blackf. 42; State v.
Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185.
s Quincy v. Jones, 76 111. 231, 244;
Henkel v. Detroit, 49 Mich. 249.
* Wilson V. Allegheny, 79 Pa. St.
272; State v. New Bruns'k, 30 N. J.
L. 395; Elliott on Roads and Streets,
p. 60.
5 Denver v. Clements, 3 Colo. 470;
see ante, chapter xiii. § 221.
8 Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 101
Ind. 200; Hanson v. Eastman, 21
Minn. 209; Yates v. Judd, 18 Wis.
118; Sanborn v. Chicago, etc., 16 lb.
19; seeonie, §§221-223.
555
§ 288 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. ' [CH. XVI.
§ 287. Alleys. — " A narrow way, less in size than a street
is generally called an alley." ^ But whether such a passage is a
street or an alley, depends not so much upon its size, or upon
the limited number of persons using it, as upon its relation to
other ways, its location, and frequently upon statutory regula-
tions.^ If an alley be open to public use, it is a highway, and
the rules of law applicable to streets apply to it.^ Of course,
the alley cannot be considered a public way, so as to charge the
city with its maintenance and repair, unless it has been legally
established and accepted. But if such be the case, the city is
undoubtedly liable for an injury which is sustained from a defect
therein.* When the term "alley" is used on a map or in a
statute, unqualified by the word " private " or by some similar
term, it is presumed to mean a narrow street open to the public
use of the community.^ But there must be an acceptance of
the proffered dedication,® as no merely permissive public use of
a private alley will make it a public highway.'''
The rights and duties of a municipalitj' in regard to the re-
pair, maintenance and vacation of public alleys are the same
substantially, as those respecting streets.*
§ 288. Conflict of jurisdiction over streets. — Outside of
towns and cities, the control and supervision of highways are
ordinarily vested in the county or township, and exercised
through boards of highway commissioners or other officials of
a similar character.® When a municipal corporation is located
within the territory, over which these county or township offi-
1 Elliott Koads and Streets, p. 12.
2 Kex V. Kichardson, 8 T. K. 634;
Osage City v. Larkin, 40 Kan. 206;
19 Pac. E. 658 ; contra, Paul v. Detroit,
32 Mich. 108; Beeclier v. People,
supra; Bagely v. People, 43 Mich. 355.
Distinctive use of alleys. Beecher
V. People, 38 Mich. 289.
8 Morris v. Bowen, Wright (Pa.) 749.
* Indianapolis v. Murphy, 91 Ind.
382; Marseilles v. Howland, 124 111.
551.
^Hattonv. Chatham, 24 111. App.
622; Lasalle v. Mott, etc., 16 lb. 74;
Bailey v. Culver, 12 Mo. App. 175.
"Hamilton v. Chicago, etc., 124
HI. 241.
556
7 Dexter v. Tree, 117 111. 535.
'Marseilles v. Howland, 124 111.
551; Springfield v. Green, 120 lb.
269; Spiegel v. Gansberg, 44 Ind. 418;
Dexter v. Tree, 117 111. 535 ; St. Louis,
etc., V. Bellville, 122 111. 376.
^ For their powers and duties see
Elliott on Roads & Streets, ch. xviii. ;
Cummins v. Seymour, 79 Ind. 491;
Board v. Barnett, 107 111. 507; Trans.
Co. V. Chicago, 99 IT. S. 635; Bloom-
field v. Calkins, 62 N. Y. 386; Ster-
ling's App., Ill Pa. St. 35; s. c, 2
Atl. Eep. 105; Suffield v. Hathaway,
44 Conn. 521; Mallory v. Grifiey, 85
Pa. St. 275.
CH. XVI.] STE.EETS, BEIDOES AND TURNPIKES.
§ 288
cers claim to have jurisdiction, a conflict of authority frequently
arises. The solution of the question ordinarily depends upon
the intention of the Legislature. In the interpretation and
construction of statutes, conferring powers over highways, this
intention can be best ascertained by viewing the subject, so far
as the particular municipality is concerned, in the light of the
whole course of similar State legislation. ^ The weight of au-
thority favors the relegation to each jurisdiction of the exclu-
sive control of its own highways.^ As the Legislature has
unlimited power over all public highways, it may delegate its
control to* two governmental corporations, even when the pow-
ers of both are to be exercised within the same territorial lim-
its.^ But in view of the facts, that a conflicting jurisdiction
gives rise to a divided responsibility, and that the customary
uses of a municipal street are essentially different from those
to which county roads are applied,* the presumption is against
the grant of a co-ordinate jurisdiction ; and, except when re-
quired by express provisions of the statutes, or by necessarj'
implication, which is not common, the courts will limit the ju-
risdiction of the county or township commissioners to the roads,
located outside of the limits of the municipality, and give to the
street commissioners exclusive jurisdiction over the streets and
higliways within the city boundaries.^ For this reason, the terra
" highway " has sometimes been distinguished by the courts from
" municipal streets ; " " and where a statute gives to non-munici-
pal ofiicials the control over " highways " within certain terri-
torial limits, it would be presumed that the Legislature did not
intend to give to such officials the control of the streets of a
city, which are located within the same limits.''
iDil. Mun. Corp., 676; State v.
Cora'rs, 23 Fla. 632.
- Elliott on Eoads & Streets, p. 329;
People V. Chicago, 118 111. 520; s. c,
8 N. E. R. 824; Cowan's Case, 1 Overt.
311; State v. Jones, 18 Tex. 874; In-
dianapolis V. Croas, 7 Ind. 9; Lafay-
ette V. Jenners, 10 lb. 79; Tucker v.
Conrad, 1031b. 349; Cross v. Morris-
town, 18 N. J. Eq. 305 ; State v. Mor-
ristown, 33 N. J. I,. 57.
' Wells V. McLaughlin, 17 Ohio, 99 ;
Baldwin v. Green, 10 Mo. 410; Xor-
wich V. Story, 25 Conn. 44; Benning-
ton V. Smith, 29 Vt. 254; Road in
Milton, 40 Pa. St. 400.
* Palatine V. Kreuger, 121 111. 72;
and comp. Heiple v. E. Portl., 13
Greg. 97.
5 See cases in preceding note.
6 Indianapolis v. Croas, 7 Ind. 9.
" State V. Jones, 18 Tex. 874; In-
dianapolis V. Croas, supra; Cross v.
Morristown, 18 N. J. Eq. 305 ; Clark
V. Com., 14 Bush, 100.
5.57
289
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS.
[CH. XTT,
The question becomes more difficult to settle, where a mu-
nicipal corporation is established within a county or township,
without an express curtailment or withdrawal of the prior ju-
risdiction of county or township officials over the highways,
already opened to the public, which now fall within the terri-
torial limits of the new municipality. The general rule of
construction is that, upon the creation of a new governmental
agency, it takes the place of the preceding agency, to the extent
of the conflict of the two agencies ; and to that extent becomes
invested with the powers and duties of its predecessor, in con-
formity with the general principle, that the Legislature could
not have intended to create conflicting governmental agencies.^
This is sound as a general proposition of law, and we see no
reason whj' it should not apply to the case in question, and give
to the municipality exclusive control over a matter of so pe-
culiarly local concern as streets and urban roads.^ But the ju-
risdiction of the county officials over highways, located within
the limits of a proposed municipality, will not be ousted, until
the incorporation of the town has been completed. The re-
cording of the town map will not have this effect.^
§ 289. Delegation of legislative power over streets It
hiis been elsewhere explained in detail * how the Legislature
can delegate a portion of its lawmaking power to municipal
corporations ; and that the local authorities can by virtue of
> Hon. V. State, 89 Ind. 249; School
Town. v. Plain Sch. Tp., 86 lb. 582;
School Tp. of Allen v. School Town,
of Macy, 109 lb. 559; Sch. Dis. etc.
V. Tapley, 1 Allen, 49.
2 Elliott on Roads & Streets, p. 312-
310, inc.; O'Kanev. Treat, 25 111.458;
Fox V. Rockford, 38 111. 451; Ottawa
V. Walker, 21 lb. 605; JBa; paj-ie Rob-
erts, 11 S. W. R. 782; People v. Chi-
cago, 118 111. 520; s. 0., 8 N. E. Rep.
824; Cowan's Case, 1 Overt. 311;
State V. Jones, 18 Tex. 874; Indian-
apolis V. Croas, 7 Ind. 9; Lafayette
V. Jenneis, 10 Ind. 79; Tucker v.
Conrad, 103 Ind. 349; Cross v. Mor-
ristown, 18 N. J. Eq. 305; State v.
Morristown, 33 N. J. L. 57; Town-
send V. Hoyle, 20 Conn. 1. But see
558
in opposition to above view, jS'orwich
V. Story, 25 Conn. 44; Guthrie v. Jfew
Haven, 31 lb. 308; Wells v. McLaugh-
lin, 17 Ohio, 99; Butman v. Fowler,
17 lb. 101 ; Baldwin v. Green, 10 Mo.
410; Bennington v. Smith, 29 Vt. 254.
See, also, generally upon this sub-
ject, Waugh V. Leech, 28 111. 488;
Bell V. Foutch, 21 Iowa, 119; Van
Peet V. Davenport, .42 lb. 308; Pope
V. Com'rs, 12 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 407;
Penn. R. R. v. Duquesne Bor., 46 Pa.
St. 223; B. Mercer Bor. Road, 14
Serg. & R. 447; Newville Rd., 8
Watts, 172; Easton Road, 8 Rawle,
195.
« Waugh V. Leech, 28 111. 488.
* Ch. VIII.
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§ 290
such delegation enact ordinances and local laws, which have
within their jurisdiction the force of the general statutes of the
State. It is therefore well settled that the Legislature may-
delegate the power of regulating and controlling highways and
streets to the local municipal government.^ The municipal
control over streets depends entirely upon the provisions of the
charter or other legislative enactments.'^ But streets, in com-
mon with other public property, are held in trust by the munic-
ipality for public purposes ; and for that reason the city cannot
divest itself of responsibility for their improvement and care.^
Nor, on the other hand, is the municipality subject to judicial
supervision, in the exercise of its discretionary powers over
streets, except where these powers are abused or exceeded.*
§ 290. Construction of charter powers over streets. — The
general rule of construction, for the determination of the powers
of a municipality, applies here, as elsewhere, viz. : that they
depend upon the terms and provisions of the charter, and must
be expressly granted therein, or necessarily implied therefrom,
in order to carry into effect some power or municipal purpose
which is expressly authorized by the charter. The powers
thus delegated to cities are generally very broadly defined ; and
their scope and extent must be ascertained by liberal construc-
tion of the charter or statutory authority .*
The general authority to open, care for, regulate and improve
streets, together with the implied or express authority to enact
ordinances for the better carrying out of corporative ends, gives
the city full authority to keep the streets open and free for
'See State v. Topp, 97 N. C. 477;
State V. Hoagland, 51 N. J. L. 62; s.
c, 16 Atl. R. 166; Columbus Gas Co.
V. Columbus, (Ohio) 33 N. E. R. 292;
Hennepin Co. v. Bartelson, (Minn.)
34 X. W. R. 222; Sewer Street, (Pa.
92) 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 226; James v. Pine
Bluff, 49 Ark. 199; s. c, 4 S. W. Rep.
760; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129
U. S. 141; Phillips V. Huntington, 35
W. Va. 406.
2 Citizens Ry. Co. v. Memphis, 53
Ted. Rep. 715; Denver Circle etc. v.
Nestor, 10 Colo. 403; State v. Eliza-
beth, (K. J. 93) 26 Atl. R. 939; Mo-
Grew V. Stewart, (Kan. 93) 32 Pac. R.
896; In re Dassler, 35 Kan. 678.
3 Kreigh v. Chicago, 86 111. 407.
- Piatt V. Chicago etc., (la.) 31 N.
W. R. 883; Terrill v. Bloomfield, (Ky.
93) 21 S. W. Rep. 1041; State v. Nat.
Dock Co., (N. J. 9.3) 26 Atl. R. 145;
Leeds v. Richmond, 102 Ind. 372;
Weaver v. Templin, 113 lb. 242.
5 North Pac. etc. v. East Portland,
14 Oreg. 3; Northern Trans. Co. v.
Chicago, 99 IT. S. 635 ; Spokane St.
Ry. Co. V. Spokane, (Wash. 93) 32 Pac.
Rep. 456; Waukelha v. Village, (Wis.
93) 53 N. W. R. 675.
559
§ 290
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
the public, to remove all obstructions, and to regulate their use.^
Thus, it has been held that when a city has " the care, super-
vision and control of streets, squares and commons," it may
prohibit the use of them for private purposes, such as auction
sales.'''
In genera], a grant of authority, in broad and comprehensive
terms, carries with it by implication all incidental powers, nec-
essary to the execution of the main power. So, the power to
open streets has been held to confer the power to lay out and
establish streets,^ and, to lay out such streets across an existing
railroad track.* The power to open and extend streets has been
held to include the power to construct them.* The power to
" regulate streets and sidewalks " implies the incidental power
to prescribe what shall be their width ; ^ and the power to " con-
struct sidewalks," must be construed to mean, not only that the
city may construct them where they do not already exist ; but
that the municipality may also remove or dispense with them,
if it be so disposed.'' So, also, the power to lay out highways
confers the power to lay out a footway.^ As the sidewalk is a
part of the street, the power to improve streets includes power
to improve sidewalks ; ^ and if an owner of property fails to re-
move an unsafe sidewalk in front of his lot, where the cost of
sidewallcs is imposed upon the abutting landowner, the city
may remove it and relay it in its own way.i" So, likewise,
under a clause, empowering the city " to lay out, open, grade
and otherwise improve the streets and keep them in repair,"
it was held that a city could establish the grade, and require
the owuers of lots to make their sidewalks conform thereto.^^
1 Toledo P. & W., etc., v. Clienon,
43 111. 209; Eajlroad Co. v. Galena,
40 lb. 344; Terre Haute v. Turner,
36Ind. 522; Citizens, etc., v. Elwood,
114 lb. 332; Philadelphia v. Phila.,
etc., 58 Pa. St. 253; Mercer v. Pitts-
burgh, etc., 36 lb. 99; Cora. v.
Brooks, 99 Mass. 434; Dudley v.
Frankfort, 12 B. Mon. 617; Sinton
V. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525.
^Wliite V. Kent, ll Ohio St. 550;
Shelton v. Mobile, 30 Ala. 540.
3 Hannibal v. Hannibal & St. J.,
etc., 48 Mo. 480.
560
* Hannibal v. Winchell, 54 Mo. 172.
s Matthiessen, etc., v. Jersey City,
26 N. J. Eq. 247.
« State V. Morristown, 33 N. J. L.
57.
' Atty. Gen. v. Boston, 142 Mass.
200; Winter v. Montg9inery, 83 Ala.
589; s. c, 3 So. Rep. 235.
8 Boston, etc., v. Boston, 140 Mass.
87.
9 Taber v. Graf miller, 109 Ind. 206.
1" Emporia v. Gilchrist, 37 Kan.
532; see ante, §§259a, 277-281.
" Burr V. Newcastle, 49 Ind. 322.
CH. XVI. J STREETS, BKIDG-ES AST) TURNPIKES.
§291
Power to make ordinances "respecting streets, wagons, carts,
drays, etc., as to the council shall appear necessary for the secu-
rity, welfare and convenience of the city," was held to authorize
a regulation fixing the weight of merchandise, which vehicles
could cany when passing through the city.^
Under similar special clauses in charters, coupled with a
clause empowering the city to enact rules for the " general wel-
fare, it has been held that cities have the power to regulate
or forbid street auctions ; ^ to prohibit fast driving ; ^ to regu-
late the speed of railroad trains passing through the streets,*
and to make any other regulations, which may be proper and
essential to protect the community in the use of the streets.^
§ 291. Power to pave construed — The power to pave or
repave streets, which is usually granted in express terms, has
met with a most liberal construction b}' the courts. The word
"pave" includes the use of all means, by which a covering of
brick or stone is laid to make a level surface for the use of ve-
hicles, animals or pedestrians.^ Paving includes macadamiz-
ing/ flagging ^ and a sidewalk made of plank or other suitable
material.® And the term "pavement" includes brick side-
walks, of which curbs and gutters form a part.^"
So, the cost of paving street crossings and intersections is a
part of the expense of paving for which abutting owners may
be assessed.ii The power to pave includes the power to pur-
' iNagle V. Augusta, 5 6a. 546.
2 Caldwell v. Alton, 33 111. 416; St.
Paul V. Fraeger, 25 Minn. 248; White
V. Kent, 11 Ohio St. 550.
' Nealis v. Hayward, 48 Ind. 19.
*Donnaher v. State, 8 Sm. & M.
(Miss.) 649; K. E. Co. v. Buffalo, 5
Hill (N. T.) 209; Knoblock v. R. E.
Co., 31 Minn. 402; Grube v. Mo.
Pacite, 11 S. W. Eep. 736; Whitson
V. Franklin, 34 Ind. 392; Eichmond,
etc., V. Eichmond, 96 U. S. 521.
■* Nixon V. Blloxi, (Miss.) 5 So. Eep.
621; New Orleans, etc., v. Hart, 40
La. An. 474; Board v. Heister, 37 N.
Y. 661; Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 lb.
591; Com. V. Curtis, 9 Allen, 266;
Hawley v. Harrall, 19 Conn. 142;
Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray, (Mass.)
36
161 ; Shelton v. Mobile, 30 Ala. 540.
6 Burnham v. Chicago, 24 111. 496.
In this case, the court said " A pave-
ment is not limited to uniformly ar-
ranged masses of solid material, as
blocks of wood, brick or stone, but
it may be as well formed of pebbles,
or gravel, or other hard substances,
which will make a compact, even,
hard way or floor." Gurnee v. Chi-
cago, 40 111. 165.
'Warren v. Henley, 31 Iowa, 31.
8 In re Phillips, 60 N. Y. 16.
8 Burl. & Mo. E. etc. v. Spearman,
12 Iowa, 112.
1" O'Leary v. Sloo, 7 La. An. 25 ;
contra, Dyer v. Chase, 52 Cal. 440.
'i Powell V. St. Joseph, 31 Mo. 347;
Creighton v. Scott, 14 Ohio St. 438;
561
§ 292
MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
chase paving materials,^ and every other power which is neces-
sarj' to the effectual exercise of the expressly granted power.^
It has thus been held that grading is an incident of paving."
In Pennsylvania the power to ^aye and grade-was construed
to authorize the power to furnish and establish curbstones;* so
"trimming and guttering" have been held to be included in
"macadamizing."^ And inasmuch as macadamizing has been
held to be merely a species of paving, the power to trim and
lay gutters would doubtless be included in the power to pave.^
On the other hand, it has been held that the power to repair
does not include the power to pave in the fii'st instance ; ' the
word repair meaning to restore to sound or good condition after
injury or partial destruction.^
§ 292. Power to improve, pave and grade, continuous.^
The express power, conferred upon municipal corporations to
grade and improve streets, is a continuing one, and may be ex-
ercised from time to time ; it is not exhausted with its first
exercise.^ Thus, when the city had by ordinance established
a grade, corresponding to which the plaintiff made improve-
ments, and subsequently the city established another grade;
an injunction against the city to restrain the second change of
grade was dismissed ; the court holding that, as the power was
continuous, it was not exhausted by being exercised once, and
Gunning Gravel Co. v. New Orleans,
(La. 93) 13 So. 182 ; In re Eager, 46
N. T. 100; Schenectady v. Trustees,
21 N. Y. S. 147; 66 Hun, 179.
1 Bigelow V. Perthamboy, 1 Dutch.
297.
^Schenley v. Com., 36 Pa. St. 29,
30, 60; Schenectady v. Trustees, su-
pra ; see Harrisburg v. Segelbaura,
151 Pa. St. 172 ; McNamara v. Estes,
22 Iowa, 246.
3 State V. Elizabeth, 30 N. J. L. 365 ;
Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560.
■•Scbeuley v. Com., 36 Pa. St. 29;
Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich.
104; Deanv. Borchenins, 30 Wis. 236.
^ McNamara v. Estes, 22 Iowa, 246.
6 Philadelphia v. Ehret, 153 Pa. St.
1; see New Haven v. Whitney, 36
Conn. 373; see further as to power
to lay pavement, In re Burmeister,
562
76 N. Y. 174; Boyer v. Reading, 151
Pa. St. 185; In re Smith, 52 N. Y.
526; In re Levy, 63 lb. 637; In re
Folsom, 56 lb. 60; In re Burke, 62
lb. 224; City of Philadelphia v. Ball,
10 Pa. Co. Ct. 92; Morse v. West-
port, 110 Mo. 502; 19 S. W. K. 831;
Dooley v. Sullivan, 112 lud. 451;
Wiles v. Hoss, 114 lb. 371; Warner
V. Knox, 50 Wis. 429; Philadelphia
V. Dibeler, 147 Pa. St. 243; 23 Atl. 567.
' State V. Jer. City, 28 N. J. L. 500;
Watson V. Passaic, 46 lb. 124.
8 Pittsburgh etc. v. Pittsburgh, 80
Pa. St. 72.
3 Columbus G. Co. v. Columbus,
(Ohio 93) 33 N. E. R. 292; McCormick
v. Patchen, 53 Mo. 33; Williams v.
Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Estes v. Owen,
2 S. W. R. 133; 90 Mo. 113; Farrar v.
St. Louis, 80 lb. 392.
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§292
that, although the grade had been declared by the first ordi-
nance to be binding upon the corporation, and all other persons
whatsoever, this enactment was not in the nature of a contract,
and was therefore repealable at the pleasure of the municipal
authorities. Neither the corporation nor the State can prevent,
by contract or enactments of the kind described, the future ex-
ercise of legislative power. The counter-proposition is incon-
sistent with the successful maintenance of the government.^
The abutting owner has no claim against the city for dam-
ages caused by a change in the grade of the street, in the ab-
sence of a statutory provision for such compensation.^ The
injustice, occasioned by the enforcement of this rule, has led to
the enactment of statutes in many of the States, giving to the
abutting owner a right to recover for the damages caused by
such changes in the grade of a street.^
1 Goszler v. Georgetown, 6 Wheat.
597. In this case, Marshall, C. J.,
said: " When a government enters in-
to a contract there is no question of
its power to bind itself to any extent
not prohibited by its constitution.
A corporation can make such con-
tracts only as are allowed by the acts
of incorporation. The power of this
body to make a contract which
should so operate as to bind its legis-
lative capacities forever thereafter,
and disable it from enacting a by-law
which the Legislature enables it to
enact, may well be questioned. We
rather think that the corporation
cannot abridge its own legislative
power."
^Columbus Gas Company v. Co-
lumbus, (Ohio 93) 33 N. E. Rep. 292;
Quincy v. Jones, 76 111. 231 ; see notes
to EadclifE v. Mayor, .53 Am. Dec.
366; Dormon v. Jacksonville, 13 Fla.
589; White v. Yazoo, 37 Miss. 357;
City of Montgomery v. Townsend,
80 Ala. 489; 2 So. Eep. 155;.Flaggv.
Worcester, 13 Gray, 601; Reynolds
V. Shreveport, 13 La. An. 426; Kepple
V. Keokuk, 01 Iowa, 653; Genois v.
St. Paul, 32 Minn. 330; Henderson v.
Minneapolis, 32 lb. 310; Oakland v.
Carpentier, 13 Cal. 540; Gale v. Kal-
amazoo, 23 Mich. 344; McCash v. Bur-
lington, 72 Iowa, 26; 33 N. W. Rep.
346; Bord v. Oconto, 47 Wis. 386;
Belcher v. St. Louis etc., 82 Mo. 121;
St. Louis V. Gurno, 12 Mo. 414; Im-
ler V. Springfield, 55 lb. 110; Schatt-
ner v. Kansas City, 53 lb. 162; Free-
mansburg v. Rogers, (Pa.) 8 Atl. Eep.
872; Rounds v. Mumford, 2 R.I. 154;
Graves v. Otis, 2 Hill, 466; Rome v.
Omberg, 28 Ga. 46 ; Brown v. Low-
ell, 8 Met. 172; Skinner v. Bridge, 29
Conn. 523; Simmons v. Camden, 26
Ark. 276 ; Folinsbee v. Amsterdam,
21 N. Y. S. 42; Alexander v. Milw.,
16 Wis. 247; Snyder v. President, 6
Ind. 237; Cummins v. Seymour, 79
lb. 491; Rakowsky v. Duluth, 44
Minn. 188; Selden v. Jacksonville, 10
So. 457; 28 Fla. 558; City of Bloom-
ington V. Pollock, 31 N. E. Rep. 140;
State V. Judges, (Minn. 93) 53 N. W.
Rep, 800; Topeka v. Sells, 29 Pac.
Rep. 604; see contra in Ohio, Craw-
ford V. Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459;
Akron v. Chamberlain Co., 34 lb.
328; see Louisville v. Rolling Mill, 3
Bush, 416.
s Burr V. Leicester, 121 Mass. 241 ;
Columbus V. Woolen Mills, 33 Ind. 435 ;
563
§ 293
MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
Since the power to grade and improve is continuous in char-
acter, it may be, and indeed, on principles of public policy,
ought to be, emploj'^ed whenever there is a municipal or public
need for the same. And, inasmuch as legislative and discre-
tionary powers are exempt from judicial review, the courts will
not inquire into the motives and reasons upon which such mu-
nicipal legislation is based, or into the necessity for it, provided
the power is exercised in a reasonably impartial manner, and
its results do not conflict with the constitution or with the prin-
ciples of public policy.^
§ 293. Eights of municipality in SOU of streets. — Except
where the public acquires the title in fee to the roadbed, the
proprietor of land, over which a highway has been laid out,
continues his ownership of the soil of such highway for all pur-
poses, which are consistent with the public easement.^ He
may remove his property situated thereon, such as trees, flag-
stones, stepping-stones, and the like ; ^ or he may tunnel be-
neath it for minerals, or for the construction of cellars, provid-
ed the public easement is not impaired.
A distinction has in this connection been made between
country roads and streets ; and it has been held in some in-
stances that, under the very extensive power of grading streets,
if a removal of the earth be found necessary, it may be removed,
sold or used by the corporation in any way and for any pur-
pose it may deem proper,* and that although the abutting own-
Steams V. Richmond, (Va. 92) 14 S.
E. K. 847; McCarthy v. St. Paul, 22
Minn. 527; Eeardon v. San Francisco,
0 Pac. Eep. 325; Page v. Belvin, (Va.
92) 14 S. E. K. 843; Elgin v. Eaton,
83 111. 535; Harmon v. Omaha, 17
Neb. 548; see authorities cited in
Healey v. New Haven, 2 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. 450, 456.
1 Roanoke Gas Co. v. Roanoke,
(Va. 90) 14 S. E. R. 665; Columbus
Gas Co. V. Columbus, (Ohio 93) 33
N. E. R. 292; McCormick v. Patchen,
53 Mo. 33; Estes v. Owen, 90 lb. 113;
Koons V. Lucas, 52 Iowa, 177 ; Mc-
Kevitt V. Hobo, 45 N. J. L. 482; Els-
ter V. Springfield, 30 N. E. R. 274;
Dunham v. Hyde Park, 75 111. 371 ;
564
Gall V. Cincin., 18 Ohio St. 563;
Smith T. Washington, 20 How. (U.
S.)135; O'Connor V. Pittsb., 18 Pa.
St. 187; Cooper V. Dallas, (Tex. 92)
18 S. W. B. 92; In re Furman Sti'.,
17 Wend. 649.
3 Rich V. Minneapolis, (Minn.) 35
N. W. E. 2; Denniston v. Clark, 125
Mass. 216; Tucker v. Tower, 9 Pick.
109.
s Palatine v. Krueger, 12 N. E. E.
75; 121 111. 75; Goodtitle v. Alker, 1
Kenyon, 427, 437; Com. v. Noxon, 121
Mass. 42; Wellman v. Dickey, 78 Me.
20; Clark v. Dasso, 34 Mich. 86.
« Griswold v. Bay City, 35 Mich.
452; Huston v. Fort Atkinson, 56
Wis. 350.
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TUKNPIKES.
294
er may own the fee of the street, he has no title to the surplus
soil, resulting from grading or improving it.^ Where the city or
State has acquired the title to the bed or soil of the streets, the
right to remove and dispose of the soil cannot be questioned.
But it may be stated as a general rule that, when the fee to the
highway remains in the adjoining owner, all that the public
or the municipality has acquired is an easement for public trav-
el ; and, while doubtless the municipality has the right to em-
ploy any appropriate means to render the street convenient or
adapted to public purposes, it cannot justly be considered that
the owner of the fee has agreed to allow the city to take the
particles of soil owned by him without compensation and to de-
vote them to purposes in no way beneficial to him.^ Nor can it
be said that the distinction as to public right between city streets
aud country roads will alter this principle. It seems, how-
ever, to be a well established exception to the general rule,
that in cases of city streets " where there is a general plan for
the gradation and improvement of highways, intersecting streets
and highways in the vicinity of the one improved are to be
deemed part of the same general plan, and soil may be removed
from one street and placed upon another. " **
§ 294. Right of municipality to use the roadbed for
construction of sewers aud cisterns. — Whether the fee be in
the abutter or not, the corporation may, by virtue of its power
to make and maintain streets, and by the power conferred upon
it to do all necessary acts for the protection of the health of
the community,* construct sewers, drains and culverts in or
> Davis V. Clinton, (la.) 20 Alb. I<.
Jour. 56; Hovey v. Mayo, 43 Me.
322; New Haven v. Sargent, 38 Conn.
50.
^Elliott Eoads and Streets, p. 524;
Althen v. Kelley, 32 Minn. 280.
' Aurora v. Fox, 78Ind. 1, 6; Hov-
ey V. Mayo, 43 Me. 322; New Haven
V. Sargent, 38 Conn. 50; Denniston
V. Clark, 12.5 Mass. 216; Smith v.
Rome, 19 Ga. 89; Adams v. Emerson,
6 Pick. 58; Kendall v. Post, 8 Oreg.
141; Cusick v. Norwich, 40 Conn. 376;
Tucker v. Eldred, 6 R. I. 404; Wil-
liams V. Kennedy, 14 Barb. 629; Hig-
gins V. Reynolds, 31 N. Y. 151; Ladd
V. French, 6 N. Y. Sup. 56; Fisher v.
Rochester, 6 Lans. 225 ; Robert v. Sad-
ler, 104N. Y. 229; s. c.,58 Am. Rep.
498; and compare Burr v. Leicester,
121 Mass. 241 ; Jackson v. Hatliaway,
15 Johns. 447, 453; Fish v. Rochester,
6 Paige, 268, 272; Bissell v. Collins,
28 Mich. 277; Baxter v. Winooski
Turnp., 22 Vt. 114; Cole v. Drew, 44
lb. 49; Chapin v. Sullivan etc., 39 N.
H. 564.
^ State V. Charleston, 12 Rich. 702;
Ziggler v. Menges, (lud.) 22 N. E,
Rep. 722.
563
§294
MUNICIPAL CORPOBATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
upon the soil' of the street, not only without compensation be-
ing made to the adjacent owners, but at their expense.^ Such
use of a street is lawful,^ and the power to construct sewers,
like the power to grade, is continuous ; ^ which, however, should
be exercised only when the safety and healthfulness of the vi-
cinity demand it, and not for the private convenience and ac-
commodation of particular individuals.*
Nor will the courts ordinarily interfere with the exercise of
the power. It is not a judicial, but a legislative and municipal
question, how and when the power should be exercised.® When
the construction of a sewer has been decided upon and its pros-
ecution begun, the duty of the city becomes ministerial, and
liability for its negligent performance then attaches." The
power to construct sewers must be so exercised as not to result
in a nuisance.'^
Whether the power to construct sewers be a part of the police
power ^ or an exercise of the right of eminent domain,* it is a
sovereign power which cannot be bartered away or surrendered ;
and parties, who contract with a municipal corporation upon
matters involving such a use or occupation of the streets, do so
1 Spokane Ey. Co. v. Spokane, 5
Wash. St. 634; Stoudlnger v. Newark,
28 N. J. Eq. 72; Leeds v. Richmond,
102 Ind. 372; People v. Board, 69
Hun, 95 ; Adams v. Bay City, 44 N.
"W. K. 138; Griswold v. Bay City, 35
Mich. 452; In re Fowler, 53 N. Y. 60;
Maywood Co. v. Maywood, 29 N. E.
R. 704; Clapp v. Spokane, 53 Fed. R.
515; Gray v. Board, 139 Mass. 328;
see ante, § 277.
^Cincin. v. Perry, 21 Ohio St. 499;
Traphagen v. Jersey City, 29 N. J.
Eq. 206; Stondinger v. Newark, 28
lb. 187; s. c, lb. 446.
"R. R. Co. V. Quincy, (111. 91) 28
N. E. R. 1069; McKevittv. Hoboken,
45 N. J. L. 482.
* Kasmaks v. New York City, 117
N. Y. 361 ; Cone v. Hartford, 28 Conn.
363, 375; Heman v. Payne, 27 Mo.
Ap. 481; Bayha v. Taylor, 36 lb. 427.
■ ^ Kansas City v. Richards, 34 Mo.
Ap. 521; Horton v. Mayor, 4 Lea, 39;
566
40 Am. Reps. 1; Freburg v. Daven-
port, 63 Iowa, 119; Martin v. Hilb,
14 S. W. R. 94 (Ark. 90); Leeds v.
Richmond, 102 Ind. 372; Mayor v.
Eldridge, 64 Ga. 524; s. c, 37 Am.
Rep. 89; Oil City v. Boiler Wks., 25
Atl. E.,549; 152 Pa. St. 348.
6 Denver V. Rhodes, (Colo.)13Pac.
Rep. 729; Jones v. New Haven, 34
Conn. 1.
'Weis V. Madison, 75 Ind. 241; 39
Am. Rep. 135; Hebron R'd v. Har-
vey, 90 Ind. 192; 46 Am. Rep. 199;
Kellogg V. Thompson, 66 N. Y. 88;
Phinizy v. Augusta, 47 Ga. 260; Perry
V. Worcester, 6 Gray, 544.
8 Tiedeman Police Powers, 445;
Cooley's Cons. Lim. 234; Lowell v.
Boston, 111 Mass. 454; Donnelly v.
Decker, 58 Wis. 461; Pool v. Trexler,
76 N. C. 297.
3 People V. Nearing, 27 N. Y. 306;
In re Eyers, 72 lb. 1.
CH. XVI.] STKEETS, BEIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 295
subject to the future exercise of this power.^ In the exercise
of the power to construct a system of sewerage, the municipal
corporation is not limited as to the selection of a site for its
dumping ground by the territorial limits of the city, but it may
purchase such site wherever it is found to be best adapted for
the discharge of the sewage.^
Analogous to the power to construct sewers and drains is
the power to build street cisterns. The cases tend to support
the doctrine that the corporation may, for the purpose of " pre-
seiTing the public health, providing means for the prompt
extinguishment of fires and promoting the general welfare,"
cause reservoirs and cisterns to be made in the soil of the
streets.^ On the other hand, it has been held that a city may
abolish private wells in the soil of the street without compen-
sation to their owners.*
§ 295. Pipes in streets for gas and otlier purposes. — In
this country, as in England, legislative authority, either ex-
press or necessarilj' implied, is required, before gas pipes or
pipes for like purposes can be laid in city streets by private
corporations or individuals.^ And the franchise may be granted,
either directly by the Legislature, or indirectly by the munici-
pality under its charter powers.® For the Legislature may
grant to a city the power to permit private corporations to lay
down gas mains in its streets.^ The construction of a system
of gas pipes in the bed of country roads, is .so unusual, — and
therefore not to be presumed to have been contemplated, when
1 Elliott on Koads & Streets, p. 368 ;
Louisville, etc. v. Louisville, 8 Bush,
415; Kirby v. Citizens St. E'y Co.,
48 Md. 168; Dil. Mun. Corp. § 689.
^Coldwater v. Tucker, 56 Mich.
474; 24 Am. Eep. 601; Cummins v.
Seymour, 79 Ind. 491; a. c, 41 Am.
Eep. 618; Hyde Pk. v. Spencer, (111.)
6 West. Eep. 517; see ante, §201.
3 West V. Bancroft, 32 Vt. 367; Dil.
Mun. Corp. §690; Barter v. Conn., 3
Pa. St. 259; Branson v. Philadelphia,
47 lb. 329; coyitra, Dubuque v. Ma-
lohey, 9 Iowa, 460.
* Ferrenbach v. Turner, 86 Mo. 416.
*Eeg. V. Charles worth, 16 Q. B.
1012; Eeg. v. Train, 9 Cox C. C. 180;
Thompson v. Sunderland etc., L. E.
2 Ex. Div. 429; Ellis v. Sheffield etc.,
23 L. J. Q. B. 42; Eeg. v. Longton G.
Co., 29 L. J. M. C. 118.
» State V. Cincin. Gas Co., 18 Ohio
St. 262.
' Quincy v. Bull, 106 111. 337; s. c,
4 Ara. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 554; District
V. Gas Company, 20 D. C. 39; Garri-
son v. Chicago, 7 Biss. 480; Brown
V. Duplessis, 14 La. Ann. 842; Peo-
ple V. Gilroy, 67 Hun. .323; Smith v.
Metro, etc. Co., 12 How. Pr. 187; In-
dianapolis V. Gas Co., 66«Ind. 396;
Cf. People V. Benson, 30 Barb. 24;
Gas Co. V. Norwich City Gas Co.,
25 Conn. 19.
567
§ 296
MUNICIPAL COllPOllATlONS.
[cH. xvr.
the road was laid out, — that it is held to be the imposition of
an additional servitude for which, in Pennsylvania and New
York, the abutter is entitled to compensation.^ But the streets
of a city are never deserted at any hour of the night ; and the
presence in the city of evil designing persons, together with
the difficulty of locomotion in the dark, makes it highly essen-
tial to the safety and comfort of the inhabitants of a city th.it
its streets be properly lighted at nights. And since the construc-
tion of gas pipes in the roadbed of the streets has become a
common custom, it is presumed that the authority to do this
was impliedly acquired by the public in the original dedication
or confiscation of the land as a street, and the statement is
waiTanted that the laj-ing of gas pipes under legislative sanc-
tion is not an additional servitude, for which the owner of the
fee can exact compensation.^
§ 296. Power to grant exclusive franchise to lay pipes in
streets. — The power of the Legislature to grant to a private
individual or corporation the exclusive right to use the streets
of a city for the purpose of laying down gas pipes or other simi-
lar conduits in the roadbed, has been questioned ; but it has
been held very generally that such an exclusive Legislative
grant is valid, if it does not conflict with some express provision
of the State constitution.^ But the Legislature does not thereby
part with its police power of supervision in the interest of the
public welfare ; nor is the State relieved of its duty to protect
the public health, morals or safety against an improper or harm-
ful exercise of the franchise.*
1 Bloomfield etc. Co. v. Calkins, 62
N. y. 386; Sterling's App., Ill Pa.
St. 35.
2Ci-ooke V. Flat. W. Wks., 29 Hun,
245; Dil. Mun. Cor. §691, note; see
Nelson v. La Porta, 33 Ind. 258; New
Orleans v. Clark, 95 TJ. S. 644; Rich-
mond Co. Gasl. Co. V. Middletown,
59 N. Y. 228. In California, the
right of laying gas and otlier pipes
in the streets of a city, is regulated
by the Constitution of 18*79; People
V. Stephens, 62 Cal. 209.
'N. O. Waterworks v. Rivers, 115
U. S. 674; Louisville Gas Co. v. Cit.
568
Gas Co., 115 lb. 683; N. O. Gas Co.
V. Louisiana L. Co., 115 lb. 650;
State V. Milw. Gas Co., 29 Wis. 454;
8. C, 9 Am. Rep. 598; Newport v.
Newp. L. Co., 84 Ky. 167; Atlantic
C. W. Wks. V. Atlantic City., 39 N. J.
Eq. 367; comp. Citizens W. Co. v.
Bridgeport Hyd. Co., 55 Conn. 1;
State V. Cincin. G. & 0. Co., 18 Ohio
St. 262; see ante, § 144.
*N. O. Gas Co. V. Louisiana etc.,
115 U. S. 650; Cf. Stein v. Bienville W.
S. Co., 34 Fed. Rep. 145 ; Nat. W. Wks.
Co. V. Kansas City, 28 lb. 921.
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§ 296
It is very evident that all persons cannot have the right to
lay pipes in the soil of the streets ; and it is equally clear that
capital cannot be induced to make such an investment, unless
it can be guaranteed that the franchise granted will be so far
protected from arbitrary molestation, that it may expect a safe
and sure return. While it is true that the manufacture of gas
is an ordinary business, and that to restrict its manufacture to
one person would be a monopoly, the establishment of which is
ordinarily contrary to the law and public policy,^ it should be
observed that the monopol}' which is created by the legislation
under inquiry is as to the right to use the only means by which
it may be expeditiously and conveniently delivered to consumers,
viz. : that of pipes, laid in the roadbed of the streets ; and the
justification for the creation of such a monopoly, is the protec-
tion of the streets against constant and unnecessary injury,
through the laying of more pipes than what are needed to sup-
ply the public "want.^ For these reasons it is generally held
to be within the power of the Legislature to grant such exclu-
sive franchises, subject to such control and regulation as will
prevent it from becoming oppressive or working injustice upon
consumers. But a municipality cannot, in the absence of legis-
lative authority, grant such an exclusive franchise.^
So, it has been held that a general power to light the city,
expressly conferred, as, for example, to " use the streets for
gasmains and for lampposts" or to " enter into a contract for
the supply of gas," etc., will not authorize it to grant an exclu-
sive franchise to any private individual or coi'poration ; * and as
such power is repealable by the Legislature, any contract en-
tered into, or any privileges granted, are subject to annulment
at any time.^ It has thus been held that the power, to cause
^ See Tiedeman, Police Power, § 105,
and ante, § 144
'i Tiedeman, Police Power, § 105,
and ante, § 144.
s City Gas & M. Co. v. Elwood, 114
Ind. 332; State v. Milwaukee, 29 Wis.
454; Crescent G. Co. v. New Orleans
etc., 27 La. An. 148; Des Moines etc.
Co. V. Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 505;
Memphis etc. v. Williamson, 9 Heisk.
314; Grand Eapids etc. v. Grand
Rapids etc., 20 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cas. 270; Davenport v. Kleinsmidt,
16 lb. 301; E. R. Co. v. Transit Ey.,
24 Fed. Eep. 306; see ante, § 144.
* State V. Cincin. Gasl. etc. Co., 18
Ohio St. 262 ; Indianapolis v. Gaslight
Co., 66 Ind. 896; Parkersburg Gas
Co. V. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va. 435.
6 Richmond Co. Gasl. Co. v. Middle-
town, 59 N. Y. 228.
569
§ 297 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. X^ I.
the streets to be lighted, does not authorize the grant of the
exclusive privilege of laying mains for fifty years.-"^ But under
the power to light its streets, a municipality may authorize the
party supplying the illuminating agent to lay the necessary
pipes ; ^ and when the grantee of this franchise has performed
the public service thus required of him, the contract for com-
pensation, which the city had made with him, is an obligation
which cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation ; ^ at least,
so far as the contract fell short of granting an exclusive fran-
chise.
The same rules of law are held to be applicable to corpora-
tions which are organized for supplying a city with water.*
§ 297. Poles for the hanging of telegraph and other
wires — Abutter's right to compensation Whatever power
the municipal corporation possesses over this subject is deriva-
tive ; and legislative authorization is in all cases necessary,
before the streets can be used for the placing of poles for the
hanging of wire for telegraph, telephone, electric lighting or
similar purposes. Without such legislative sanction the poles
are nuisances, which may be abated.* In New Jersey it has
been held that, when the city had indicated the streets where
telegraph poles might be erected, it could not revoke its permis-
sion after the company had erected them.^
Despite the fact that the telegraph is an instrument of inter-
state commerce, a municipal corporation, through whose terri-
tory the line passes, may regulate its construction and use,'
1 Saginaw etc. Co. v. Saginaw, 28
Fed. Eep. 529; see Brush E. L. Co.
V. Jones, 5 Ohio C. C. 340; Koanoke
G. Co. V. Roanoke, (Va. 92) 14 S. E.
B. 665; Carlyle W. L. & P. Co. v.
Carlyle, 31 111. App. 325.
- Indianapolis v. Ind. Gas L. Co.,
66 Ind. 396; Des Moines G. Co. v.
Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 508; Quiucy
V. Bull, 106 111. 337.
" N. O. Gas Co. V. Louisiana L. Co.,
115 U. S. 650; Louisville Gas Co. v.
Citizens Gas Co., 115 lb. 683.
" Syracuse W. Co. v. Syracuse, 26
N". Y. State Kep. 364; Brenham v.
Bronham Water Co., 67 Texas, 542;
see ante, § 144.
570
6 Com. V. Boston, 97 Mass. 555;
Hanson v. Hunter, (93) 53 N". W.
Kep. 84; Domestic T. & T. Co. v.
Newark, 49 N. J. L. 344; Irwin v.
Great So. etc., 37 La. An. 63; Julia
Bldg. Assn. V. Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo.
258.
•■ Hudson T. Co. v. Jersey City, 49
N. J. L. 303; Dunn v. Great Falls,
(Mont. 93) 31 Pac. R. 1017; Citizens
V. Sands, (Mich. 93) 55 K W. Rep.
452; Rutland E. L. Co. v. Marble,
(Vt. 03) 26 Atl. Rep. 635; Webb v.
Demopolls, (Ala. 93) 13 So. Rep. 289.
' Mut. Un. Tel. Co. v. Chicago, 16
Fed. Eep. 309; St. Louis v. W. U,
Tel. Co., 149 U. S. 465.
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AXD TURNPIKES.
§ 297
control by ordinance the erection of the poles and the stringing
of wires, and impose a license upon the same under its police
power over streets.^ So, also, a statute passed by a State Leg-
islature, requiring all wires in certain cities to be laid under-
ground, was valid to be a proper police regulation.^
The right of the abutter to compensation, in a case where
the legislature has authorized the erection of a telephone, tele-
graph or electric light plant opposite his property, has been
variously determined. The question is, whether such a use,
though public, is not an additional servitude, not contemplated
when the street or highway was dedicated or condemned.^ The
fact, that the fee of the street is not in the abutter would, it
has been held in analogous cases, not affect his iight to com-
pensation.* And the sounder rule seems to be that the abut-
ting owner ought to be compensated for all actual injury to
his property, or the right to use the same. These cases dif-
fer from the laying of gas and other pipes in the roadbed, iu
that there is in the latter only a technical violation of the right
of property in any case, and no injury to the abutting property
or any diminution of its enjoyment ; whereas, telegraph poles and
wires produce a serious positive damage to abutting property,
not only by disfiguring the appearance of the street, but like-
wise by diminishing the light and air passing into the windows,
and by increasing the dangers of destruction of buildings and
loss of life by fire.^
iW. TJ. T. Co. V. Phila., 21 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cases, 40; see contra, St.
Louis V. W. El. T. Co., 39 Fed. Eep.
69; Eatterman v. W. XJ. T. Co., 127
U. S. 411.
2W. U. T. Co. V. New York, 38
Fed. Rep. 552.
sRoake v. Am. Tel. & T. Co., 41
N. J. Eq. 35; Broome v. N. T. & N.
J. Tel. Co., 42 lb. 141; 7 Atl. Eep.
851; Board of Trade Tel. Co. v. Bar-
nett, 107 111. 507; Irwin v. Gt. So.
Tel. Co., 37 La. An. 63; New Orleans
M. & T. E. R. Co. V. Southern & Atl.
Tel. Co., 53 Ala. 211; Gay v. Mut.
Union Tel Co., 12 Mo. App. 485, 494.
* §§ 303, 304.
'Story V. Elev. E. E. Co., 90 N. Y.
122; Mahady v. Bush wick etc., 91 lb.
148; N. Y. Cable Co. Case, 104 lb. 1;
Lahr's Case, 104 lb. 268; N. Y. Dist.
Ey. Case, 107 lb. 42 ; Dusenbury v.
M. U. T. Co., Abb. New Cas. 440;
Metro, etc. Co. v. Caldwell Lead Co.,
67 How. Pr. 365; Smith & Cen. etc.
T. Co., 2 Ohio Circ. Ct. 259; Willis
V. Erie etc. Co., 37 Minn. 347; Atl.
etc. Tel. Co. v. Chicago etc. R. E. Co.,
7 Biss. 158; Amer. Tel. etc. Co. v.
Smith, (Md.) 18 Atl. Rep. 910; Clauser
etc. V. Baltimore & O. T. Co., 17 Chic.
Leg. News, 22 ; People v. Squire," 107
N. Y. 593; Southwestern R. R. Co. v.
Southern etc. T. Co., 46 Ga. 43; s. c,
12 Am. Rep. 585 ; West. Union T. Co.
V. Rich, 19 Kan. 517, s. c, 27 Am.
671
§ 298
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
§ 298. Openings in and vaults under sidewalks — For
convenience in obtaining access to their cellars, it has become
common for abutting owners to make openings in the side-
walk ; and in some instances, vaults are excavated beneath the
sidewalks for the purpose of obtaining additional space or room
for the cellar, and for the construction of a fire-proof cellar,
whose contents will not be injured by a destruction by fire of
the abutting building. The streets, including the sidewalks,
are devoted to public use ; and this public use signifies their
employment in any and every way which may be beneficial to
the public ; including the construction of sewers, pipes, cisterns
and drains beneath the surface.^ To permit the abutting own-
er to make openings in or to undermine the surface of a city
street at pleasure, and free from municipal or legislative con-
trol, would most seriously impair, if not wholly destroy, the pub-
lic easement therein ; and this principle obtains whether the fee
of the street be in the city or not.
It is clear that the use of the subsoil of the sidewalk, in the
modes just indicated, maj' lawfully, and should always, be sub-
jected to such police regulations as may be needed to insure the
public safety and comfort in the legitimate use of the sidewalk.
But whether the fact, that the title to the fee of this subsoil is in
the abutting owner, would enable him to resist any interference
Kep. 159, and case cited in last note.
See contra, Julia Build'g Assn. v.
Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo. 258; Pierce v.
Drew, 136 Mass. 75. In his work on
Mun. Corp. § 698, Judge Dillon says :
" On the whole, the safer and per-
haps sounder view is that such a use
of the street or highway, attended
as it may be especially in cities with
serious damage and inconvenience to
the abutting owner, is not a street
or highway use proper, and hence
entitles such owner to compensation
for such use, or for any actual injury
to his property caused by poles and
lines of wire placed in front thereof."
Judge Elliott says on the same sub-
ject: "Such a use bears a very re-
mote analogy to the use [of streets]
for passage and repassage. If one
572
or two posts and wires may be placed
in front of a, man's property may
not a dozen be placed there ? In-
deed, in most of our cities, the poles
and wires are already so thick as to
seriously interfere with the light and
air and to greatly impair the chances
of saving a building in case of fire.
Has the owner no remedy in such a
case? Where shall the line be drawn?
. . . The abutting owner is specially
benefited by drains and sewers and
by gas mains, but this is not true of
telegraph lines, and so far from facil-
itating travel, they rather impede it
and interfere with the ordinary use
of the way." Elliott Roads and
Streets, pp. 535, 536.
1 Tiedeman Police Powers, p. 407,
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 44a
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
299
with his enjoyment of the same for the purposes of a cellar or
vault by the laying of pipes and wires under the sidewalk, ex-
cept in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and upon
])ayment of compensation, cannot be taken as definitely settled
by the adjudications. The difficulty is further increased by the
fact, often lost sight of, that in many cases, the title of the
abutting owner to the subsoil stops at tiie curbstone. It has
however been held in New York that, subject to municipal regu-
lations, the abutting owner has a right to excavate the soil be-
neath the surface of the street, or at least under the sidewalk,
and to use the space so obtained as a basement or for similar
purposes, provided tlie full and complete public use of the sur-
face of the street is not thereby interfered with.i In •Illinois,
the court held 2 that, while the abutting owner possessed no ab-
solute right to construct a coal cellar beneath his sidewalk ; yet,
upon the ground that such privilege would be of great private
convenience, authority might be implied, in the absence of any
action by the municipal authorities to prevent the work, after
it had become known. But the court adds that any such im-
plied license to use a street requires that the licensee shall
use more than ordinarj' care and expedition in prosecuting the
work, and in closing the cellar openings or shafts on the side-
walk.
§ 299. Municipal regulations of street travel and traffic.
— A municipality has the power by express grant, or by virtue
of the general authority to make laws relating to the public
welfare, to regulate the use of the streets in the interest of the
public safety and comfort,^ to regulate the speed of public travel
in the streets,* prohibit the stoppage of vehicles for a longer
period than what was stipulated in the statute, (twenty min-
1 McCarthy v. Syracuse, 46 N. Y.
194; Robert v. Sadler, 104 N. Y.229;
Lahr's Cases, 104 lb. 208; Irvine v.
Wood, 51 lb. 224; see, also, Fisher
V. Tbirkell, 21 Mich. 1; O'Llnda v.
Lathrop, 21 Pick. 292, 297; Pap-
worth v. Milw., 64 Wis. 389; Davis
V. City of Clinton, 50 Iowa, 585.
2 Nelson V. Gridley, 12 111. 22, 23;
Gridley v. Bloomington, 68 lb. 50.
'Farwell v. Chicago, 71 111. 269;
Joyce V. E. St. Louis, 77 lb. 156;
Knoxville v. Sanford, 13 Lea, 545:
Griffin v. Powell, 64 Ga. 625; Snell
V. Belleville, 30 IT. C. Q. B. 81; Com.
V. Fenton, 139 Mass. 195; Cora. v.
Brooks, 90 Mass. 439; see post, § 321,
on Law of the Road.
4 Com. V. Worcester, 3 Pick. 462;
Washington v. Nashville, 1 Swan
(Tenn.) 177; McBean v. Chandler, 9
Heisk. (Tenn.) 349.
299
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. xvr.
utes ;) 1 prohibit night walking ; ^ compel the removal of snow
from the sidewalk in certain specified localities ; ^ and to regu-
late the removal of build higs, and the use of the streets for
that purpose.*
Although a street is public and designed for general passage
and traffic, without distinction as to persons or vehicles,^ this is
by no means its sole use.^
A distinction must be made between the general use, which
all the public are permitted to make of the streets for ordinary
purposes, and the special and peculiar use, which is made by
classes of persons in the pursuit of their occupation or business,
such as hackmen, drivers of express wagons, omnibuses, etc. A
city may prescribe the routes in its streets to be taken by omni-
buses ; ^ and may designate proper localities or stands to be
occupied by express wagons, hacks and vehicles which are be-
ing offered for hire,^ provided such stands are not so located
that they will impair or interfere with the right of the abutting
owners.^
A municipality may require a license to be paid by the owner
of vehicles used for the transportation of heavy loads ; i" and, it
has been held, may regulate the width of the tires.^^ As a pro-
tection against the excessive damage to the roadbed, a license
on vehicles for hire may be enforced, although the owner of
such a vehicle does not reside in the city.^^ For the license in
1 Com. V. Brooks, 109 Mass. 355;
Com. V. Fenton, 139 lb. 195.
2Braddy v. Milledgeville, "74 Ga.
516.
'In re Goddard, 16 Pick. 504;
Uuion Railway Co. v. Cambridge, 11
Allen (Mass.) 287; Kirby v. Boyls-
ton, etc., 14 Gray, 252.
■' Day V. Green, 4 Gush. (Mass.)
433.
5 Starr v. Camden, etc., 24 N. J. L.
592; Barker v. Savage, 45 K. T. 191;
Belton V. Baxter, 54 N. T. 245.
« See Quinoy v. Jones, 76 111. 231,
244; Heukel v. Detroit, 49 Mich. 249.
' Com. V. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562.
« State V. Yopp, 97 N. C. 477; s.c,
2 Am. St. Rep. 305; Baker v. Boston,
12 Pick. 184; Vanderbilt v. Adams,
574
7 Cow. 349; lb. 385; Veneman v.
Jones, 118 Ind. 41 , St. Paul v. Smith,
27 Minn. 364; Com. v. Brooks, 99
Mass. 434; Com. v. Mathews, 122 lb.
60; Com. v. Robertson, 5 Cush. 438.
9 McCaffrey v. Smith, 41 Hun, 117;
Branahan v. Hotel Co., 39 Ohio St.
333; Lippincott v. Lasher, 44 N. J.
Eq. 120; comp. Masterson v. Short,
7 Eobt. (N. Y.) 241.
I'Nagle V. Augusta, 5 6a. 546;
Gartslde v. E. St. Louis, 43 111. 47;
Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591;
St. Louis V. Green, 70 Mo. 562; see
ante, §§ 124, 126.
" People V. James, 16 Hun, 426;
Reginald v. Pike, 1 Ontario, 43.
^ Council V. Pepper, 1 Rich. L. 364;
Memphis v. Battaille, 8 Hcisk. 524.
CH. XVI.] STKEETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§ 300
all such cases is a police regulation, and not a tax.^ But a li-
cense will not be enforced as against a nonresident whose use
is occasional only, in view of the distinction between the ordi-
nary use of the streets by vehicles and a special use or one
which is habitually dangerous or unusually destructive.'^ And
this is sometimes true, even when the tax is imposed upon vehi-
cles of every sort, without making any distinction between the
purposes for which the vehicles are employed.^
Under a charter power to regulate vehicles using the streets,
street cars,* bicycles ^ and sprinkling carts are included.® Bicy-
cles are vehicles, and the proper place for their use is the roadway.
Therefore, one who rides a bicycle recklessly upon the sidewalk,
in violation of a statute prohibiting riding or driving there, is
liable civilly for the damage caused thereby.'' Bicycles are sub-
ject to " the law of the road." ^
§ 300. Street obstructions. — The public are entitled to the
use of the whole street from side to side, and from end to end ; ®
and a partial obstruction, or an encroachment on the bounda-
ries of the street by the temporary deposit thereon of goods, is
no less a nuisance, because a passageway still remains, through
which' travel and traffic may flow.^"
The more or less nominal damage to the public, in a particular
case of partial obstruction or encroachment upon the public
highway, does not make it any less an actionable nuisance. If
any one individual be permitted to apply a highway to his own
'See Tiedeman's Police Power,
§ 101, and ante, § 123; see Scudder v.
Hinshaw, (Ind. 93) 33 N. E. Rep. 791 ;
Com. V. Page, (Mass. 92) 29 lb.
512; People v. yirUson, 62 Hun, 618;
Gibson v. Corapolis, 22 Pitts. L. J.
64; Gibson v. Borougli, lb.
2 Bennett v. Birmington, 31 Pa. St.
15; St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo. 122;
Gard. City v. Abbott, 34 Kan. 283;
Gass V. Greenville, 4 Sneed, 62.
SB'klynv. Nodine, 26 Hun, 512;
Ex parte Gregory, 20 Tex. App. 210;
seean^e, §§ 123, 124, 261.
4 Eailway Co. v. Philada., 58 Pa. St.
119; see AUerton v. Chicago, 6 Fed.
Kep. 555.
'Mercery. Corbin, 117 Ind. 450;
S. c, 10 Am. St. E. 76; In re Wright,
29 Hun, 357; Twilley v. Perkins,
(Md. 93) 26 Atl. Eep. 286; State v.
Yopp, 97 N. C. 471.
6 St. Louis V. "Woodruff, 71 Mo. 92.
'Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind. 450;
State V. Brown, 109 N. C. 802.
8 State V. Collins, (R. I.) 17 Atl.
Rep. 131; see post, § 321.
9 State V. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185, 193.
1° Emerson v. Babcook, 66 Iowa,
257; State v. "Woodward, 23 Vt. 92;
Philbrick v. Place, (Iowa, 93) 55 N.
"W. R. 345 ; People v. Vanderbilt, 28
N. Y. 396; Com. v. Blaisdell, 107
Mass. 234; Harrow v. State, 1 Greene,
(la.) 439; Cf. People v. Carpenter, 1
Mich. 273.
575
§300
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
use, however little, others would he tempted to do the same, with
a consequent serious perversion of the street from its original
purpose.! jTor this reason, the city may maintain an action to
prevent the continuance of obstructions and to obtain their re-
moval,^ as well as resort to criminal proceedings, as a punish-
ment for the past offence. Anything, which unnecessarily or
unreasonably impedes or obstructs the lawful use of a street, is
a public nuisance for which an indictment will lie.^
It is not necessary, to constitute a nuisance, that there
should be an actual physical obstruction upon the surface of
the street ; for it is very evident that a structure, adjacent to,
or projecting over, a street, may under certain conditions be-
come dangerous to travel thereon, and so he considered a nui-
sance.* Under this rule, a bay window, sixteen feet above the
ground,^ a house or wall, adjoining the street, which is suffer-
ed to remain in a dilapidated condition ; ^ and a wooden awn-
ing, covering a sidewalk,^ have been adjudged to be unlawful
obstructions and nuisances.^ But the right of the public to an
unobstructed use of the street is subject to some reasonable
and necessary limitations.*
' Elliott on Roads and Streets,
p. 478; Wright v. Saunders, 65 Barb.
213; Dickey v. Tel. Co., 46 Me. 483.
2 Chase v. Oshkosh, (Wis. 92) 51 N.
TV. R. 560; State v. Smith, 54 Vt. 403 ;
State V. Edens, 85 N. C. 522; Winona
V. Hoff, 11 Minn. 119; Buffalo v.
Harling, 52 N. W. R. 931; Neshkoro
V. Nest, (Wis. 93) 55 lb. 176; Bum-
mer V. Jersey City, 20 N. J. L. 86;
Metro. C. E. Co. v. Chicago, 96 111.
620.
* Waukesha etc. Co. v. Waukesha,
83 Wis. 475; Frauklyn v. Portland,
67 Me. 46; Yates v. Warrentown, 84
Va. 337; 4 S. E. R. 818; Neshkoro v.
West, swpra; Runyon v. BordinS, 2
J. S. Green (N. J.) 472; Smith v.
State, 23 N. J. L. 712; Heckerman v.
Hummell, 19 Pa. St. 64; N. O. v.
Gravier, 11 Martin, 620; McNerney v.
Reading, 150 Pa. St. 611; Cf. Bryans
V. Almond, 87 Va. 564; Davis v. Ban-
gor, 42 Me. 522; State v. Cincin. etc.,
576
18 Ohio St. 268; Callanan v. Gilman,
107 N. Y. 360; Clifford v. Dam, 81 lb.
52; State v. Merritt, 35 Conn. 314.
* Clift V. State, (Ind. 93) 33 N. E.
R. 211 ; Grove v. Ft. Wayne, 45 Md.
429; Bybee v. State, 94 lb. 443; Sal-
isbury V. Herchenrodei-, 106 Mass.
548; Jones v. Railroad, 107 lb. 261.
6 Reimer's Appeal, 100 Pa. St. 182.
6 Regina v. AVatts, 1 Salk. 357.
' Hume V. Mayor, 74 N. Y. 264;
Pedrick v. Baily, 12 Gray, 161; Cf. as
to awnings, Hoey v. Gilroy, 129 N.
Y. 132; doorsteps and stoops, Gush-
ing V. Boston, 128 Mass. 330.
8 Jenks V. Williams, 115 Mass. 217;
Hawkins v. Sanders, 45 Mich. 491;
Att'y Gen. v. Lombard, 1 W. N. C.
491; Miller v. St. Johns, 57 N. Y.
567; Garland v. Town, 55 N. H. 55;
see Fresno v. Canal Ins. Co., (Cal. 93)
32 Pac. R. 943; Clean v. Steyner, 135
N. Y. 341.
9 Clark V. Fry, 8 Ohio St. 358; Grant
CH. XVI.] STEEETS, BRIDGES AND TUENPIKES.
§300
It is a legitimate use of a street to employ it for the purpose
of carrying coal, wood, grain and other bulky articles, and in
delivering such merchandise the wagons or trucks may ob-
struct locomotion in the streets for a reasonable time.^ So,
also, may a street be temporarily obstructed by placing build-
ing material therein, if this be reasonable and necessary for
want of room elsewhere.^ But the free passage of a street
must not be unnecessarily interfered with, as by loading or un-
loading wagons, or by the deposit of bulky articles in front of a
warehouse facing thereon ;3 it is not permitted to turn the
street into a warehouse or place of deposit. And if such use
is unreasonably prolonged, or it interferes with the public use,
it is a nuisance.* Cars may be temporarily unloaded in the
street ; ^ but a street cannot be used as a depot,^ or for the stor-
age of cars,'^ or for a timber * or stone yard ; ^ or as a stable,!"
or as a place for the storage of carts and machinery ; ^^ or for the
exhibition of wild animals,^ or for the erection of buildings. ^^
If the moving of a building through the streets is done care-
fully and expeditiously, it is generally permitted under munici-
pal regulations.-'*
V. Stillwater, 35 Minn. 242; Cline v.
Cornwall, 21 Grant (Can.) 142; State
V. Omaha, 14 Neb. 265.
'Hobson V. Philadelphia, 155 Pa.
St. 131; St. John v. JTew York, 3
Bosw. 483; Clark v. Fry, 8 Ohio St.
358, 374; Eex v. Cross, 3 Campb. 226.
2 Raymond v. Kieseberg, 54 N. W.
K. 612 (Wis. 93); Wood v. Hears, 12
Ind. 515.
'Eex V. Russell, 6 East, 427; Peo-
ple V. Cunningham, 1 Denio, 524;
Birmingham v. R. R. Co., (Ala. 93)
13 So. 841; Rex v. Jones, 6 East, 230;
Owensboro etc. Co. v. Sutton, (Ky.
91) 13 S. W. R. 1086.
* State T. Eastman, 109 N. C. 785;
Palmer V. Silverthorn, 32 Pa. St. 65;
Welsh V. Wilson, 101 N. T. 254; Jo-
chem V. Robinson, 66 Wis. 638; Peo-
ple V. Fowler, 63 Hun, 627; Callanan
V. Gilman, 107 X. Y. 360; Cohen v.
New York, 113 lb. 532; Judd v. Far-
go, 107 Mass. 267; Haight V.Keokuk,
37
4 Iowa, 199; Davis v. Mayor, 14 N".
Y. 506.
6 Mathews v. Kelsey, 58 Me. 56.
8 Mahady v. Busher etc. Co., 91 N.
Y. 148.
' Vars V. Grand Trunk etc. Co., 23
Up. Can. C. P. 143; Harris v. Mobbs,
L. R. 3 Ex. D. 268.
8 Thorpe v. Brumfltt, L. R. 8 Ch.
Ap. 650.
^ Cushing V. Adams, 18 Pickering
(Mass.) 110; Com. v. King, 13 Met.
(Mass.) 115.
>" King V. Cross, 3 Campb. 224; Rid-
ley V. Lamb, 10 Up. Can. Q. B. 254;
Mott V. Schoolbred, L; R. 20 Eq. 22.
" Reg. V. Davis, 24 Up. Can. C. P.
575.
12 Little V. Madison, 42 Wis. 643.
13 State V. Morris etc. Co., 23 N. J.
L. §60.
14 Graves v. Shattuok, 35 N. H. 257;
Day V. Green, 4 Ark. 433.
577
§301
MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS.
[CFf. XVI.
On the other hand, the location and carrying of show boards
upon the streets or sidewalks may be forbidden.^
The act of inclosing a public street or square, by which the
public is wholly excluded therefrom, constitutes in law a nui-
sance ; and it is no defence that the inconvenience to the pub-
lic was outweighed by the public benefit.^
§ 301. Legislative control of street — Rights of abutting
owners therein. — The legislative control of the streets and
highways, within the State, seems to be subject to very little, if
any, limitation. The same may be said of the legislative con-
trol over commons, squares and the like. Nor are such public
places any less subject to legislative, as distinguished from mu-
nicipal, regulation, because they are located within the municipal
limits, and are under local regulation, supervision and control.^
But this legislative power of control is subject to constitutional
restraints in favor of abutting owners, and does not extend to
the granting of privileges which will impair the property rights
of abutting owners, without payment of compensation.*
It is well settled that streets, once dedicated and accepted,
or acquired by the right of eminent domain, are for a continu-
ous public use, and that, when relying upon that fact, important
public or private property rights have been acquired, the high-
^ Com. V. McCafferty, 145 Mass.
384; Crawford v. Topeka, (Kan. 93)
33 Pac. Eep. 476 ; WUkes-BaiTe v. Bur-
gnnder, 7 Kulp. 63.
estate V. Woodward, 23 Vt. 92;
State V. Atkinson, 24 lb. 448; Fresno
V. Canal & Irr. Co., (Cal. 93) 32 Pac.
Kep. 943; Clean v. Steyner, 135 N.
Y. 341; Taylor v. K. R. Co., 83 Wis.
645; Smith v. State, 23 N. J. L. 712;
State V. Mor. & Es. R. R. Co., 23 lb.
360.
8 Baird v. Rice, 63 Pa. St. 489; Gray
V. Iowa Land Co., 26 Iowa, 387; Pitts-
burgh R. R Co. V. Cheevers, 44 111.
App. 118; Reading v. Com., 11 Pa.
St. 196; Com'rs, etc. v. N. L. G-as Co.,
12 Pa. St. 318; Phila. & Tren. I^ E.
Case, 6 Whart. 25; s. c, 27 Pa. St.
339; Stubers' Road, 28 lb. 199; Pac.
R. R. Co. V. Leavenworth, 1 Dillon
C. C. R. 393; Albany North. K. R. v,
678
Brownell, 24 N. T. 345 ; Litchfield v.
Vernon, 41 N. Y. 123; South wark
etc. V. Phila., 47 Pa. St. 314; Dilley
V. Wilkes-Barre, etc. Co., 12 Pa. Co.
Ct. 270; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S.
324; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black,
418; Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn. 168;
James River etc. v. Anderson, 12
Leigh, 278; Baily v. Phila. etc., 4
Harring. (Del.) 389 ; Adler v. Metro.
R. R. Co., 138 N. Y. 173; Pusey v.
Allegheny, 98 Pa. St. 526; Clinton v.
Cedar Rap. etc., 24 Iowa, 455; Wood-
son V. Skinner, 22 Mo. 13; Perry v.
New Orleans, 55 Ala. 413; Indian-
apolis, etc. V. Hartley, 67 111. 439;
Stone V. P. P. & N. W. R. Co., 68 lb.
394; Stack v. E. St. Louis, 85 lb. 377;
Cairo etc. v. People, 92 lb. 170 ; but
see Warren v. Lyons City, 22 la. .351.
* Story V. N. Y. Elev. R. R Co., 90
N. Y. 122; Lahr's Case, 104 lb. 268.
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
301
way cannot by legislative enactment be permanently diverted
to a private use, without proper compensation being made to
those who are injured thereby.^ In considering the control
which the Legislature may exercise over streets, or the powers
over them, which it may delegate to corporations, private or
municipal, we are confronted with two distinct, and sometimes
more or less antagonistic, rights.
The street, so far as the public is concerned, is established for
the purposes of. travel and traffic thereon, and the public, in
the employment of the street for these purposes, has the mani-
fest right to utilize all the many modern agencies which render
travel convenient and speedy, and traffic safe and lucrative.^
But the abutting property owners have rights in relation to
the adjoining streets, which have recently been established, de-
fined and enforced, in a most emphatic manner, which conflict
more or less with the efforts to secure a more agreeable and safe
rapid transit.^ The owner of land, abutting on a street, has, in
common with the public at large, a right of passage and the
right of free and unimpeded ingress and egress to and from
his property, for himself and his animals or goods, even though
he may thereby cause a temporary public inconvenience.*
So, also, he has other rights, peculiar to himself, and which rest
upon the relation of his lot to the street, coupled with the fur-
ther and equally important fact, that, by virtue of his owner-
ship of that lot, he is charged with his private share of the
expense of improving and maintaining the street in a condition
for public use.*
These rights of the abutting owner in the street, which are
necessary to the proper enjoyment of his property, are as much
property as the land which he owns ; and as equally within the
protection of the constitution and the laws.® In Lahr's Case,''
the court said: "The ownership of such an easement^ is an
interest in real estate, constituting property within the meaning
1 Chicago V. Garrity, 115 111. 161;
Lee V. Mound Sta., 1181b. 312; Chi-
cago V. Crosby, 111 lb. 540; State v.
Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185 ; Scott v. Bos-
ton, 26 111. App. 108.
2 Bil. Mnn. Corp. § 656, note 2.
' Story's Case, 90 N. T. 122 ; Mahady
V. Bush, etc., 91 lb. 148; N. Y. Cable
Co. Case, 104 lb. 1; N. Y. Dist. Ry.
Case, 107 lb. 42.
iCallanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y.
360.
6 Lahr's Case, 104 N. Y. 268.
8 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 656 a.
7 104 K Y. 268.
8 i. e. of access.
579
§301
MXraiCIPAL COEPORATIONS.
[CH. xvr.
of that term, as used in the Constitution of the State, and re-
quires compensation to be made therefor, before it can be law-
fully taken from its owner for a public use." Where the fee
of the roadbed is in the public, the abutting proprietor has an
incorporeal right to the use of the highwaj' as such, and, if the
New York Elevated Railroad cases i will be fuUj'- indorsed by
subsequent adjudications in other States, to tlie free passage of
light and air over the street. If the fee is in the abutting
owner, the bed of the road is his property, subject only to the
public easement, that it be left open for use as a highway. The
abutting landowner may do anything with the land covered by
the highway, which is not inconsistent with the full enjoy-
ment of the right of way bj'- the public. Thus, the abutting
owner has the right to plant trees in the street, to consti'uct
cellars extending to the middle of the street, and to depasture
his cattle in the street in front of his own land, where the I'ight
has not been taken away by police regulations in the interests
of the public. And a law, which granted to another the right
of pasturage in such a street or road, would operate as an ex-
ercise of the right of eminent domain, and constitute a taking
of property.^ Subject to the above qualifications, the authority
of the Legislature over highway's is broad and far reaching.
By virtue of that authority alone, a municipality is authorized
to permit the erection of obstructions in a street which other-
wise would be nuisances.^ Illustrations of this principle may
be found in the use of streets for the construction of railway,
telephone and telegraph lines and electric light plants.
And it may be said of all acts or obstructions, which at com-
mon law would be nuisances, that they cease to become such,
if they are authorized by the Legislature in a constitutionally
who stood in the highway, opposite
his land, and ahused tlie proprietors
on the ground tliat lie was there
without license, and was using the
land of the abutter for other pur-
poses than as a highway.
3 Pittsburgh v. Scott, 1 Pa. St. 309;
Cora. V. Rush, 14 lb. 186; Columbus
V. Jacques, 30 Ga. 506; People v.
Vanderbilt, 28 IST. Y. 396; Shaubut v
St. Paul, etc., 21 Minn. 502.
1 See post, § 305.
2 Tonawanda R. R. Co. v. Hunger,
5 Denio, 255 ; Woodruff v. Neal, 28
Conn. 165. In Ohio, by an ancient
custom, as, also in many cattle raising
States the i-ight of pasturage in tlie
public highways is in the public.
Keawhacker v. Cleveland, etc. R. R.
Co., 3 Ohio St. 172. In Adams v.
Rivers, 11 Barb. 390, it was held that
trespass would lie in favor of the
abutting proprietor and against one
580
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TUKNPIKES.
§301
valid statute.^ And whatever limitations upon this power may-
exist, so far as the rights of the original owner of the property-
dedicated or of adjoining owners may be concerned; it is well
settled that, in respect to the public at large, the legislative
power is absolute and limitless as to the uses to which the streets
may be put.^ The Legislature can validate and sanction any
improvement in, or expenditure upon, streets which it could
previously have authorized ; and this, even though the improve-
ments were extraordinary and hurtful, and were executed in
an expensive and extravagant manner.^ To cite an extreme
illustration of the exercise of legislative power, it has been held
that the Legislature may establish a turnpike gate in a city
street,* but as such an act would be a public inconvenience and
derogatory of common right, the intention must be clearly and
unmistakably declared by the Legislature.*
It is a general rule of construction, applicable to the legisla-
tive legalization of a nuisance, that all statutes which interfere
with public rights and impose public burdens, are to be strictly
construed and closely followed ; and the authority conferred
must be exercised with an observance of proper care for the
public interests.^ An act of the Legislature, legalizing en-
croachments upon a public highway, being in the nature of a
mere license, is revocable ; and may be repealed at pleasure,
iPine City v. Muncli, 44 N. "W. E.
197; 42 Minn. 342; Detroit v. Detroit
etc., 37 Mich. 558; Sa-wyer v. Davis,
136 Mass. 239; People v. Rosenberg,
138 K T. 410; Clinton v. C. R. & M.
E. E. E. Co., 24 lo-wa, 455; Transp'n
Co. V. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635; Wil-
liams V. Hynes, 55 N. T. Super. Ct.
86; Kumler v. Silsbee, 38 Ohio St.
445; Ison ». Manley, 76 Ga. 804;
Cora. V. Capp, 48 Pa. St. 53 ; North
Vernon v. Voegler, 103 Ind. 314,
327; United States 111. Co. v. Grant,
55 Hun, 222; First Bap. Church v.
Utica etc., 6 Barb, 313; Citizens St.
Ey. Co. V. Memphis, 53 Fed. 715;
Steincke v. Bentley, 34 IST. E. E. 97;
(statutory definition of nuisance.)
2 Penna. E. Co. v. Angel, 41 N. J.
Eq. 316; s. c, 7 Atl. Eep. 432; Sulli-
van V. Eoyer, 72 Cal. 248; Baltimore
etc. V. Fifth Bap. Ch., 108 U. S. 317.
s Lennon v. Ne-w York, 55 N. Y.
365 ; Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525 ;
In re Com'rs of Assessment, 18 Al-
bany Law J. 199; In re Mead, 74 N.
Y. 216; In re Sackett Street etc., 74
lb. 95.
* Stormfeltz v. Manor Tump. Co.,
13 Pa. St. 555.
^ Comp. People v. Detroit etc., 37
Mich. 195.
6 St. Louis v. W. U. Tel. Co., 149
U. S. 465 ; Ne-«rark v. Del. etc. E. E.
Co., 42 N. J. Eq. 196; s. c, 5 Cent.
Eep. 630; Green v. Eastern Ey. Co.,
53 N. W. R. 808; Jersey City v. N. J.
Cen. E. E., 40 N". J. Eq. 417; s. c, 2
Atl. Eep. 262 ; Monongahela v. Mono.
El. L. Co., 12 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 529.
581
§ 302
MtTNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
unless by reason of some act done, or liability incurred, a con-
tractual relation has been established,^ which comes within the
constitutional prohibition of the impairment of the obligation
of a contract.
§ 302. Legislative power over construction of railroads
— Its delegation to cities — Construction of grants. — In both
England and America, legislative authorization is required to
enable any one to construct and maintain a horse or street rail-
road. The right to carry passengers and to take tolls is a
franchise, derivable from the sovereignty alone.^ Because of
the almost unlimited power, which the Legislature possesses
over highways, it can, in the absence of express constitutional
restraint, authorize a railroad company to construct its line on
a street or highway of a city, without municipal consent.^ The
manifest clanger of vesting such unlimited power in the Legis-
lature has led, in several States, to the imposition of restraints
upon its exercise. In New York, the Legislature is forbidden
to pass any private or local act, conferring authority to lay
down railroad tracks. Any such authority, derived from a gen-
eral act, cannot be exercised and a street railroad constructed
within municipal limits, unless it is consented to by the local
authorities, and by one half in value of the owners of abutting
propertj-.* Similar constitutional provisions are to be found in
several other States.^ The amendment, by which these restric-
'Eeading v. Com., 11 Pa. St. 196;
Detroit v. Det. & E. PI. R. Co. , 12
Mich. 333.
2 Areata v. Areata E. E. Co., 92
Cal. 639; Galbreatli v. Armour, 4
Bell App. Cas. 374; Queen v. Gas Co.,
2 Ellis & El. 651; State v. Hoboken,
35 N. J. L. 205 ; Newell v. Minn. etc.
Co., 35 Minn. 112;Davis v. EastTenn.
etc. Co;, 87 Ga. 605; 13 S. E. R. 567;
Reg. V. Train, 9 Cox Cr. Cas. 180;
Boston V. Richardson, 13 Allen, 146,
160; Daily v. E. R. Co., 80 Ga. 793; 7
S. E. R. 146; Comr. v. Frankfort, (Ky.
92) 17 S. W. R. 827; Paterson Ey. v.
Grundy, (N. J. 93) 26 Atl. R. 788 ; State
V. Corrigan etc. Co., 85 :^o. 263.
^ Savannah etc. Co. v. Savannah,
45 Ga. 602; Floyd Co. v. Rome etc.
Co., 77 Ga. 614; People v. Kerr, 27
582
N. T. 188; Dubach v. H. & St. Jo.
ete. Co., 89 Mo. 483; Milwaukee v.
Milw. etc. Co., 7 Wis. 85; Hine v. Ke-
okuk, 42 Iowa, 636; see cases cited
in § 301.
4 In re Crosstown R. Co., 22 N. T.
S. 818; 68 Hun, 236; Const. New
York, art. 3, § 15.
^Harner v. Columbus etc. Co., 29
W'kly L. Bui. 387; Sloaue v. People
El. Ry. Co., 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. E. 84;
Neare V. Mt. Auburn E. Co., 29 W'kly
L. Bui. 171; see also Chicago etc. v.
Story, 73 111. 541 ; Pell v. Newark, 40 N.
J. L. 71 ; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo.
73, and the Constitutions of the States
of Illinois, Colorado, Nebraska, Mis-
souri, North and South Dakota, New
Jersey, Montana and Pennsylvania.
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§302
tions were grafted upon the Constitution of the State of New-
York, has received much consideration from the Court of Ap-
peals, and numerous important cases have arisen under it.
The amendment, so far as it applies to street railroads, in-
cludes all such as may be constructed under or above the sur-
face, as well as those whose rails are laid upon it.^
The Legislature may delegate to tlie municipality, the power
to authorize absolutely the construction of a railroad,^ or it may
confer upon the city the power to prescribe, when, and upon
what conditions its streets may be so used.^ In conferring the
or different motor power provided
the right be not exclusive. . . The
constitution provides tliat all gen-
eral or special laws for the forma-
tion of corporations may be altered
or repealed; but where a special act
was passed prior to 1875, creating a
private corporation, an act to amend
its charter would be a private one,
and it could not, therefore, since
.Jan. 1, 1875, grant the right to lay
down railroad tracks. Nothing can
be done by the Legislature under
tlie power to alter acts of incorpora-
tion which it could not constitution-
ally do by an original bill. See also
Astor v. N. Y. Arcade Ey. Co., 113 N.
T. 93 ; Bailey v. Same, 113 lb. 615.
2 Morris etc. Co. v. Newark, 10 N.
J. Eq. 352, 357; Barney v. Keokuk,
94 U. S. 324; Atchison etc. Co. v.
Miss. R. E. Co., 31 Kan. 660; Harri-
son V. N. O. Ey. Co., 34 La. An. 452 ;
Springfield v. Conn. etc. Co., 4 Cush.
63 ; Cosby v. Owensboro etc., 10 Bush,
288; Black v. Phila. etc. Co., 58 Pa.
St. 249; Phila. & T. R. R. Co., In re, 6
Whart. 25; Com. v. Erie etc. Co., 27
Pa. St. 339; Green v. Pittsburgh etc.
Co., 8 Watts tfe S. 85; Tenn. etc. Co.
V. Adams, 3 Head. 596 ;» Murphy v.
Chicago, 29 111. 279; see oases in
next note.
s People's Pass. Ry. Co. v. Mem-
phis C. etc. Co., 10 Wall. 38; Com.
v. Erie etc. Co., 27 Pa. St. 339; Wolfe
V. Cov. & L. etc. Co., 15 B. Mon. 404;
583
Penn. R. R. Co., 31 N. J. Eq. 475,
489; State v. Hammer, 42 N. J. L.
435; Chamberlain v. Elizabeth, etc.
Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 43.
' El. R. R. Cases, 70 N. Y. 327; 90
lb. 122; 107 lb. 42. In the first of
these cases, the court, per Earl, J.,
said: "These constitutional provis-
ions do not prohibit a, private or
local bill to amend the charter of a
private corporation by regulating
powers, rights, privileges, and fran-
chises which it previously possessed.
Such a bill may not be passed to give
to an existing corporation any new
right to lay down railroad tracks, or
any new exclusive privilege or fran-
chise, but it may be passed to regu-
late and control the right to lay down
tracks previously existing or to give
new privileges or franchises provid-
ed they be not exclusive. A bill
may be passed waiving a forfeiture
of corporate rights. Such a bill
would confer no new rights upon the
corporation, but would simply be a
surrender or waiver by the sovereign
of its right to claim a forfeiture. A
bill may be passed to extend the
time within which corporate rights
inaybeexercised. Such a bill would
give no new substantial rights but
would simply extend the time with-
in which rights previously granted
would be exercised. So a bill may
be passed giving a private railroad
corporation the right to use a new
§ 302
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
franchise in such a case, the city exercises a derivative and not
an inherent power.^ The conditions may be imposed^ either
by the Legislature in the creation of the company holding the
franchise, or by the municipal corporation granting permission
to the exercise of it.^
Thus, it was held that when city councils were forbidden to
permit the construction of a street railroad, without the con-
sent of a majority in interest of the owners of property upon
the street being first obtained, such consent was essential to the
creation of the power of granting permission; and the laying
of a second track, upon a street where one already existed,
required an independent consent.^
When, in pursuance of this delegated authority, permission
Areata v. Areata Ry. Co., 92 Cal. 639;
Paterson Ry. Co. v. Grundy, (N. J.
93) 26 Atl. R. 788; State v. Atlantic
C. C, 34 N. J. L. 99; CMeago, B. &
Q. R. Co. V. Quiney, 28 N. E. R.
1069; Paterson, etc. Co. v. Paterson,
24 N. J. Eq. 158; State v. Hoboken,
35 N". J. L. 205 ; Detroit v. Ft. Wayne,
etc. Co., (Mich. 91) 51 N. "W. R. 688;
s. c, (Mich. 93) 54 N. W. Rep. 958;
Brooklyn v. B. City R. R. Co., 47 N.
Y. 475; Richmond etc. Co. v. Rich-
mond, 96 TJ. S. 521 ; In re Atlantic
Ave. R. R. Co., 32 N. E. R. 771; 136
K. Y. 292; Parkhurst v. Salem, (Greg.
92) 32 Pac. R. 304; Fox v. Catherine,
etc. Co., 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 180; Mercer
V. Pittsburgh etc. Co., 36 Pa. St. 99;
New York City v. Eighth Ave. R. R.
Co., 118 N. Y. 389; Heath v. Des
Moines etc. Co., 61 Iowa, 11; Mer-
chants' etc. Co. V. Railway Co., 70
lb. 105; Houston v. Houston City
Ry. Co., (Tex. 93) 19 S. W. Rep. 127.
1 Electric Ry. Co. v. Grand Rapids,
84 Mich. 257; Buckuer v. Hart, 52
Fed. 835; Canal etc. Co. v. C. C. Ry.
Co., 41 La. An. 561 ; Cincinnati v. Mt.
Auburn Co., 28 Wkly. Law Bui. 276;
State v. Hilbert, 39 N. W. Rep. 326;
Saginaw etc. v. Saginaw, 28 Fed.
Rep. 529.
2 Xo. Bait. P. Ry. Co. v. Baltimore,
584
(Md. 92) 23 Atl. R. 470; Lexington
etc. Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dana, 289;
Cosby V. Owensboro etc. Co., 10
Bush, 288; Cine. etc. Co. v. Cum-
mingsville, 14 Ohio St. 523; Phila-
delphia v. Ridge Ave. R. Co., 140 Pa.
St. 444; Kellinger v. Forty-sec. etc.
Co., 50 N. Y. 206; Moses v. Pitts-
burgh etc. Co., 21 m. 522; Middlesex
etc. Co. V. Wakefield, 103 Mass. 261;
New York v. Third Ave. R. R. Co.,
33 N. Y. 42; Hobart v. Milw. City R.
R. Co., 27 Wis. 194; Coast Line etc.
Co. V. Cohen, 50 Ga. 451; No. Cen.
etc. Co. V. Baltimore, 21 Md. 93;
Frankford etc. v. Philadelphia, 58
Pa. St. 119;Philadelpliiav. Cit. Pass.
Ry. Co., 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 16; Balti-
more U. P. Co. V. Baltimore, 71 Md.
405 ; Detroit v. Ft. Wayne etc. Co.,
supra ; Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. Birm-
ingham, 51 Pa. St. 41 ; Memphis etc.
Co. T. Memphis, 4 Coldw. 406; Jersey
City etc. Co. v. J. C. & H. H. R. R.
Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 61; Tenn. etc. Co.
V. Adams, 3 Head. 596; St. Louis v.
Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 44; Dry Dock etc.
Co. V. New York, 47 Hun, 221; New
York V. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 117 N.
Y. 404, 646.
3 Roberts v. Easton, 19 Ohio St.
78; Harner v. Columbia etc. Co., 29
Wkly. L, Bui. 387.
GH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
302
has been granted to use certain streets, — and the grant has been
confirmed by the Legislature where such confirmation is re-
quired,— it cannot be revoked.^ So, when the grant has been
made, and the road constructed at great expense, a contract is
created, the obligation of which cannot be impaired by subse-
quent legislation.^ It was accordingly held that when the city
had granted a license to lay a two-track road, which had been
laid at great expense to the company, it could not limit the com-
pany to a single track, in a street whej'e it was proposed to ex-
tend the line.^ The company, having constructed the road, has
a vested property in the franchise, of which it cannot be de-
prived, either by repeal of the grant or by a grant to another
covering the same streets, unless the power to do this was re-
served;* except, of course, in the exercise of the right of emi-
nent domain, and upon payment of compensation for the partial
confiscation of the franchise.^
Horse railroads have a private property, subject to ordinary
use by the public, in the rails upon which their cars are run, so
that a rival company cannot use or intersect them without the
owners' consent.^ A passenger car is entitled to the unob-
iNash V. Lowry, 37 Minn. 261;
Harrison v. New Orleans etc. Co., 34
La. An. 462; Burlington etc. Co. v.
Eeinhackle, 15 Neb. 279.
^Hovelmanv. Kans. C. H. E. Co.,
79 Mo. 632; People v. Chicago etc.
Co., 18 111. App. 125; People v.
O'Brien, 111 N. T. 1; State v. Noyes,
47 Me. 189; Com. v. Proprietors, 2
Gray, 339.
8 Buriington v. Burl. Ry. Co., 49
Iowa, 144.
*New Orleans etc. Co. v. Dela-
more, 114 W. S. 501.
' Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hamp-
shire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35 ; Tuckahoe
Canal Co. v. R. R. Co., 11 Leigh, 42
(36 Am. Dec. 374); Boston Water
Power Co. v. Boston & W. E. R. Co.,
23 Pick. 360; Central Bridge Corp. v.
Lowell, 4 Gray, 474; West River
Bridge V. Dix, 6 How. 507; Rich-
mond R. R. Co. V. Louisa. R. R. Co.,
13 How. 71 ; White River Turnpike
Co. V. Vermont Central R. R. Co.,
21 Vt. 590; Commonwealth v. Pitts-
burgh etc. R. E. Co., 58 Pa. St. 26;
Ee Towanda Bridge Co., 91 Pa. St.
216; N. C. R. R. Co. v. Carolina
Ceht. R. R. Co., 83 N. C. 489. But
see Central City Horse R'y Co. v.
Fort Clarke Horse R'y Co., 87 111.
523, where it was held that a com-
peting street railway cannot acquire
by compulsion the joint use of the
tracks of another previously created
railway, although the track and the
franchise of the latter railway may
be completely appropriated under
the power of eminent domain. See,
also, Lake Shore etc. R. R. Co. v.
Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 97 111. 506;
lie Rochester Water Commissioners,
66 N. Y. 413; Little Miami etc. R.
E. Co. V. Dayton, 23 Ohio St. 510.
6 Brooklyn etc. Co. v. B. City E.
R. Co., 32 Barb. 358; Jersey City- etc.
Co. V. J. C. & H. H. R. R. Co., 20 N.
585
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
structed use of the track over private vehicles,^ and a muni-
cipal ordinance confirming such right would be sustained.^
The franchise, which a horse or other railroad possessed to
operate its lines upon a city street, is property which may be
mortgaged^ or sold,* and a purchaser may operate the road up-
on the same terms as its predecessor had enjoyed the franchise.^
The grants of such franchises are, however, not necessarily ex-
clusive ; and their character in that regard depends upon the
scope of the power of the municipality, as well as upon the
language of the grant.® Thus, the municipality may grant
the franchise to lay a track to one corporation, upon condition
that another company may have the joint use of it with the
grantee.'^
In accordance with the rule that grants made by the sover-
eign are to be strictly construed against the grantee, his right
must be clearly defined, in order that it may be claimed against
the public and abutting owners.^ But the grant of power, to
construct a railroad, will include the power to construct the
necessary appurtenances thereto;^ aud it has been held that
the power to construct railroads in streets included the right
to lay sidings to wharves,^" and elevators.^i The road must be
constructed substantially upon the line prescribed,-*^ and must
be conducted as the statute requires ; ^^ but the power to con-
N. Y. 160; Sixth etc. Co. v. Kerr, 45
Barb. 138; Louisville etc. Co. v. L.
City Ey. Co., 2 Duvall, 175.
' Jersey City etc. Co. v. J. C. Ber-
gen etc. Co., 21 N. J. Eq. 550.
8 Chicago etc. Co. v. Chicago, 121
111. 176; Heath v. Des Moines etc., 61
Iowa, 11; Wyandotte V. Carrigan, 35
Kan. 21; Chamberlain v. Eliz. S.
Cordage Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 43.
' New Orleans etc. Co. v. Second
Mun., 1 La. An. 128; Knight v. Car-
rollton E. E. Co., 9 lb. 284.
i°Black V. Phila. etc. Co., 58 Pa.
St. 249.
" Clarke v. Blackraar, 47 N. Y. 150.
12 Jn re Metro, etc. Co., 19 N. E. R.
645; Concord v. Concord etc. Co.,
18 Atl. E. 87.
w Atty. Gen. v. Toronto, 14 Grant's
Ch. (Can.) 673.
J. Eq. 61; Market etc. Co. v. Cen.
etc. Co., 51 Cal. 583; Coach Co. v.
Camden H. E. E. Co., 33 N. J. Eq.
267; Cottom v. Griest, 1 Am. &Eng.
E. E. Cas. 474 re.
iWilbrand v. Eighth Ave. E. E.
Co., 3 Bosw. 314; Adolph v. Central
etc. Co., 65 N. Y. 554; Shea v. Po-
trero etc. Co., 44 Cal. 414; Mahady
V. Bushwick etc. Co., 91 N. Y. 148.
2 State V. Foley, 31 Iowa, 527; Com.
V. Temple, 14 Gray, 69.
8 Sixth Av. etc. Co., v. Kerr, 72 N.
Y. 330; People v. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y.
263.
*New Orleans etc. Co. v. Dela-
raore, 114 U. S. 501; Memphis etc.
Co. V. Cora'rs, 112 lb. 619.
s People V. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 75.
^ Brooklyn City etc. Co. v. Coney
Isl. etc. Co., 35 Barb. 364; s. c, 18
686
CH. XVI.] STEEETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 302
struct a horse car line along a certain street involves the power
to cross the intersecting streets, notwithstanding a law or ordi-
nance which excepted these streets from use by railways.^
When permission is given by ordinance to use the city
streets for a railroad, and to employ a certain specified motive
power, the railroad company possesses no right whatever to oper-
ate the road by any other motive power than the one prescribed
to them by the municipal corporation..^ Where the charter of the
railroad company, and the city ordinance, by which permission
to use the streets is conferred, are silent as to the motive power
to be used, it seems most reasonable to hold that the intention
of the Legislature, and of the municipality, is that the railway
may employ any motive power, which is ordinarily used, and
which is not inimical to the public safety.^ But when a rail-
road company had obtained a grant to operate a road upon ex-
press condition that no steam power should be employed ; and
had constructed and operated a horse railroad, it was held that
the permission did not embrace the right to make excavations,
in order to use the streets for a cable road.*
While it is true that an ordinance, conferring the right to
operate a railway in a city street, either absolutely or upon con-
ditions, when accepted by the grantee, and followed b}"- the ac-
tual construction of the road, constitutes an irrevocable contract ;
it is equally true that a municipality cannot baiter away its
police power, the power to regulate highways and supervise
the use made of them.^ So, if permission has been given orig-
inally to use steam as a motive power, it is. safe to assume that
the city could, by virtue of its iuhei'cnt power to provide for
the public safety, prohibit the use of steam in streets, where its
use has become, by reason of the growth of the municipality.
1 State V. Newport etc. Co., 18 Atl.
E. 161.
2 People 7. Newton, 112 N. Y. 396;
19 N. E. Rep. 664; Denver etc. Co.
V. Denver etc. Co., 2 Col. 681; Citi-
zens etc. Co. V. Jones, 34 Fed. Rep.
579; see Mayor v. Ohio etc. Co., 26
Pa. St. 355 ; Birmingham etc. Co. v.
birm. etc. Co., Y9 Ala. 463.
"North Chi. C. R. Co. v. Lake View,
105 m. 20Y; see post, §306 a, Electric
and cable cars on street railways.
« People V. Newton, 112 N. Y. 396;
see post, § 306 a.
"Thorpe v. Rutland etc. Co., 27
Vt. 140; Ind. etc. Co. v. Kercheval,
16 Ind. 84; Brick P. Ch. v. Mayor, .5
Cowen, 538; Brimmer v. Boston, 102
Mass. 19; Horn v. Atl. etc. Co., 35
N. H. 169; Bulckley V. N. Y. etc. Co.,
27 Conn. 479; Penn. etc. Co. v. Riblet,
66 Pa. St. 164; State v. Herod, 29
Iowa, 123.
587
302
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
a menace to the lives and health of the public, who have a right
to the safe and convenient use of the streets.^
General municipal power over streets and roads will not au-
thorize the city, in the absence of statutory authorization, to
■ grant permission to a steam railroad, running between places
outside of its limits, to use its streets as a part of their line.^
But the Legislature may authorize such a use of the street; and
legislative, as distinct frora municipal, authority to a railroad,
to occupy and use streets for railroad purposes, need not be al-
ways conferred expressly, but may arise from necessary impli-
cation ; ^ although, where the railroad company seeks to lay a
track along a whole street, requiring embankments and exca-
vations, the implication must be very clear and necessary.*
And so, also, in order that a municipality may grant to a
street railway companj^ the franchise of constructing and main-
taining its line along a certain street, the Legislature must dele-
gate the authority to it, expressly or by necessary implication;
and it has been held that this authority cannot be implied from
the charter power to " open, alter, repair and regulate streets."^
A general legislative grant to a corporation, authorizing it to
construct a steam railroad between certain places, but not spec-
ifying the exact route, will authorize the crossing of streets or
highwaj's, but not their occupation longitudinally.^ Where,
' Detroit v. Port Wayne etc. Co.,
(Mich. 92) 51 N. W. R. 688; Fitoh-
bui'g etc. Co. V. Grand etc. Co., 1
Allen, 552 ; Eodemacher v. Milw. etc.
Co., 41 Iowa, 297; Stroudsburg v.
Wllkes-Barre E. E. Co., 12 Pa. Co. Ct.
395 ; People v. Boston etc. Co., 70 N.
T. 569; Portland etc. Co. v. Boston
etc. Co., 65 Me. 122.
2Dalyv. E. R. Co., 7 S. E.E. 146; 80
Ga. 793 ; Savannah etc. Co. v. Shields,
33 Ga. 601 ; see People v. Carpenter, 1
Mich. 273 ; Areata v. E. E. Co., 28 Pac.
E. 676; 92 Cal. 639; Perry v. N. O. etc.
Co., 55 Ala. 413; Lawrence etc. Co.
'v. Williams, 35 Ohio St. 168; Dooly
Block V. S. L. T. Co., 33 Pac. E. 229;
Davis V. E. E. Co., 87 Ga. 605.
^ Trustees v. Milwaukee etc. Co.,
(Wis. 89) 45 N. W. E. 1086; Coving-
ton etc. Co. v. Covington, 9 Bush,
588
127; Atty. Gen. v. Morris etc. Co.,
20 N. J. Eq. 530; State v. Jackson-
ville etc. Co., (Fla. 90) 10 So. E. 590;
State V. Hoboken, 35 N. J. L. 205 ;
Allegheny v. Ohio etc. Co., 26 Pa. St.
355 ; Com. v. Erie etc. Co.,,27 Ih. 339.
« Com. V. Frankfort, (Ky. 92) 17 S.
W. E. 287; Sav. etc. Co. v. Shiels, 33
Ga. 601; Dooley Block v. S. L. T.
Co., supra.
6 Strasser v. N. Y. L. & W. E. R.,
128 N. Y. 157, 623; People E. E. v.
Memphis R. E., 10 Wall. 38, 52; Cit-
izens etc. Co. V. Jones, 34 Fed. Rep.
579; Gleck v. B. & O. E. E. Co., 19
D. C. 412; Coleman V. Sec. Ave. R.
R., 38 N. T. 201; Louisville etc. Co.
V. Louisville, 8 Bush, 415, 421 ; Brook-
lyn V. Brooklyn etc. Co., 47 K. T.
475.
^ Burt V. Lima etc. Co., 21 N. T.
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
303
however, the charter authorizes a railroad company to construct
a line of road to or from a city, the power to enter the limits of
the municipal corporation is implied, and the company is not
compelled to erect its depot outside the city line.i But when
a power was conferred to run a line to a city, where it was to
connect with another road, it does not give by implication the
power to run the road through the city.^
When a municipal corporation has the power to refuse its
assent to the construction of a horse or steam railroad in its
streets, it is not confined to a simple grant or denial of a right
of way ; but conditions may be imposed, as, for example, tliat
the company shall erect a depot, and grade and repair the streets
used by it. The company cannot then enjoy the franchise, un-
less it complies with these conditions.^
§ 303. Rights of abutting owners, how affected by con-
straction of a steam railroad along the street. — In a preced-
ing chapter,* the general subject of what constitutes a taking of
private property in the exercise of the right of eminent domain,
has been fully presented, with the announcement, that in a sub-
sequent connection this matter would be discussed in its rela-
tion to the appropriation of streets to other than the ordinary
purposes of a highway ; and the fundamental principle was there
recognized and accepted, that incidental injuries did not con-
stitute a taking under eminent domain, and nothing short of a
confiscation of some established and legally recognized right
of property, either corporeal or incorpoaeal, would constitute
such a taking of property for a public use, for which compensa-
S. 482; Chicago etc. Co. v. Dunbar,
100 111. 110; Ingraham v. Chic. etc.
Co., 34 lb.. 249; Chicago etc. Co. v.
Newton, 36 Iowa, 299; Com. v. Erie
etc. Co., 27 Pa. St. 339; Northeastern
etc. Co. V. Payne, 8 Kich. L. 177.
'Hazlehurst v. Freeman, 52 Ga.
245; Western etc. Co.'s Appeal, 99
Pa. St. 155; Houston etc. Co. v.
Odam, 53 Tex. 343.
2 St. Louis etc. Co. v. Haller, 82
m. 208; Richmond etc. Co. v. Elch-
mond, 96 U. S. 521.
^ Long Island E. E. Co. v. Brook-
lyn, 8 N. T. S. 805; Ind. etc. Co. v.
Lawrenoeburg, 34 Ind. 304; Wood-
ruff V. E. E. Co., (Conn. 90) 20 Atl.
E. 17; Detroit v. Det. Ey. Co., 43 N.
W. Eep. 447; Hovel den v. Kansas,
etc. Co., 79 Mo. 632; Mey v. Mis-
souri Pac. Ey. Co., 1 S. "W. E. 382;
Pac. etc. Co. v. Leavenworth, 1 Dil-
lon C. C. 393; Northern etc. Co. v.
Baltimore, 21 Md. 93; Eastern Ey.
Co. V. Portsmouth, 62 N. H. 344;
Kyne v. Wilmington etc. Co., (Del.)
14 Atl. E. 922; Newport v. So. Cov.
etc. Co., 11 S. W. Eep. 954; see §305,
Horse railroads.
4 Chapter XVI. § 239. '
589
§ 303 jru>riciPAL coepoeations. [ch. xvi.
tion can be claimed. In referring to this general principle, Mr.
Justice Miller has said ^ that the decisions, which have denied
the right of compensation "for the consequential injury to the
property of an individual from the prosecution of improvement
of roads, streets, rivers and other highways," " have gone
to the extreme and limit of sound judicial construction in
favor of this principle, and in some cases beyond it ; and it re-
mains true that where real estate is actually invaded by super-
induced additions of water, earth, sand or o^her material, or by
having any artificial structure placed upon it, so as effectually
to destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking within the
meaning of the constitution." The greatest difficulty has been
experienced in applying these principles to the police regula-
tions of the highways or public streets, in consequence of the
variety of uses, to which the demands of modern life require
them to be put. Elsewhere in the present chapter, it has been
explained how far there is any new taking, when the street is
employed for the laying of pipes,^ the construction of sewers,
drains and cisterns * and the erection of poles for hanging of
telegraph, and other electrical wires.* But the greatest diffi-
culty is probably found in determining how far there has been
a new taking of the property of the abutting owner, where the
Legislature or municipal council authorizes the construction
and maintenance of a railroad along the street of a city. The
decisions on the subject are at variance, and the grounds upon
which the judgments are placed are not always the same, and
sometimes very confusing. In some of the cases, great stress
is laid upon the fact that the fee is or is not in the public ; '
while in others, no importance seems to be attached to this
distinction.^ The authorities and facts will only justify this
8 The Supreme Court of the United
States has said in Barney v. Keokuk,
94 U. S. 324, 440 : " On the general
question as to the rights of the pub-
lic in a city street, -we cannot see any
material difference in principle with
regard to the extent of those rights,
whether the fee is in the public or in
the adjacent landowner or in some
third person;" and Judge Cooley
calls this distinction more technical
1 Pompelly v. Green Bay, etc. Co.,
13 Wall. 106, 180.
2 § 295.
s § 294.
* § 297.
* See Moses v. Pittsburgh, etc. K.
R. Co., 21 111. 516, 522; People v. Kerr,
37 Barb. 357; s. c, 27 N. T. 188; Mill-
burn V. Cedar Rapids etc. R. R. Co.,
12 Iowa, 246; Franz v. Railroad Co.,
55 Iowa, 107.
690
CH. XVI.J STKEETS, BRIDGES A:srD TURNPIKES.
§ 303
distinction ; if the new use of the highwny is inconsistent with
its character as a highway, where the fee is in the abutting land-
owner, it is a taking of property for which compensation may
be made, whatever incidental benefits or injuries the landowner
may or may not sustain from the new uses ; for incidental inju-
ries never constitute a taking of property in the law of eminent
domain.^ But if the fee is in the public, no use of the highway
will operate as a taking of the property of the abutting land-
owner, which does not interfere with his ordinary and customary
use of the street.^ Probably, this distinction might assist in
explaining away many of the differences of opinion, which now
make the cases on this subject confusing and perplexing. Whei'e
the fee is not in the public, it seems to be the opinion of an
overwhelming majority of the cases, that the construction of
an ordinary steam railway along a public street was a taking of
the property of the owners of the fee for a different use, for
which compensation had to be made. The common ground,
upon which these decisions rest their judgment, is that the con-
struction of such a railroad was the appropriation of the land,
over which the highway or street was laid out, to a new and
different use, not contemplated or included in the acquisition of
the public easement for the purposes of a highway. As was
said in one of these cases : " It is true that the actual use of the
street by the railroad may not be so absolute and constant as to
exclude the public also from its use. With its single track, and
particularly, if the cars upon it were propelled by horse power,
the interruption of the public easement in the street might be
very trifling and of no practical consequence to the public at
large. But this question cannot affect the question of the right
of property, or of the increase of the burden upon the soil. It
would present simply a question of degree in respect to the en-
than real. CooleyConst. Lim. 687 )i.
Theobald v. Louisville, 40 Alb. L.
J. 335 ; Bloomfleld etc. Co. v. Calkins,
62 N. Y. 386; compare Kucheman v.
Chicago, 46 Iowa, 366; MulhoUand
V. Des Moines, etc., 60 lb. 740; Mor-
gan V. Des Moines, 64 lb. 589; Scioto
etc. V. Lawrence, 38 Ohio St. 41;
Crowley v. Davis, 63 Cal. 460; Story's
Case, 70 N. T. 327; Lahr's Case, 90
N. T. 122; Gilbert E. Ry. Case, 70
N. Y. 361; N. Y. Dis. Ry. Cas., 107 N.
Y. 42.
1 See ante, § 239.
2 Protzman v. Indianapolis, 9 Ind.
467; New Albany, etc. v. O'Daily, 12
lb. 551; 13 lb. 353; Street Railway v.
Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 523; Grand
Rap., etc., Co., 38 Mich. 62; s. c, 47
lb. 393.
591
§ 303
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
largement of the easement, and would not affect the principle,
that the use of a street for the purposes of a railroad imposed
upon it a new burden."-'
I Wager v. Troy Union R. R. Co.,
25 N. T. 526, 532; see, also, to same
effect, Ford v. Chicago, etc., Co., 14
Wis. 609; Pomeroy v. Milwaukee, etc.,
Co., 10 lb. 646; Perry v. New Orleans,
etc., Co., 55 Ala. 41.3; Carli v. Still-
water, etc., Co., 28 Minn. 373; So.
Pac, etc., Co. v. Reed, 41 Cal. 256;
Ford V. Santa Cruz, etc., 59 lb. 290;
Harrington t. St. Paul, etc., Co., 17
Minn. 215, 224; Gray v. St. Paul,
etc., Co., 13 lb. 315; Williams v. N.
y. Cen., etc., Co., 16 N. T. 97; Wager
V. Troy, etc., Co., 25 lb. 526; Malion
V. N. Y. Cen., etc., Co., 24 lb. 658;
Fletcher v. Auburn, etc., Co., 25
Wend. 462; Bissell v. N. T. Cen., etc.,
Co., 23 lb. 61; Davis v. New York,
14 lb. 526; Carpenter v. Oswego, etc.,
24 lb. 655; Inhabitants of Spring-
field V. Conn. River R. R. Co., 4
Cush. 71 ; Imlay v. Union Branch R.
R. Co., 26 Conn. 249; Presbyterian
Society, etc., v. Auburn, etc., R. R.
Co., 3 Hill, 567; Carpenter v. Oswego,
etc., R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 655; Starr v.
Camden & Atlantic R. R. Co., 24 N.
Y. 592; Central R. R. Co. v. Hetfield,
29 N. Y. 206; So. Car. R. R. Co. v.
Steiner, 44 Ga. 546; Bonnaher's Case,
16 Miss. 649; Cox v. Louisville, etc.,
R. R. Co., 48 Ind. 178; Sohurraeier
V. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 10 Minn.
82; Cosby V. Railroad Co., 10 Bush,
288; Railroad Co. v. Combs, 10 Bush,
382 (19 Am. Rep. 67). See, contra,
Mifflin V. Railroad Co., 16 Pa. St. 182;
Cases of Pliila. & Trenton R. R.,
6 Whart. 25 (36 Am. Dec. 202);
Struthers v. Railroad Co., 87 Pa. St.
282; Lexington, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Applegate, 8 Dana, 289 (33 Am. Dec.
497); see, also. West Jersey R. R. Co.
V. Cape May, etc., Co., 34 N. J. Eq.
164; Com. v. Erie, etc., R. R. Co., 27
592
Pa. St. 339 ; Snyder y. Pennsylvania
R. R. Co., 55 Pa. St. 340; Peddicord
v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 34 Md.
463; Wolfe v. Covington, etc., R. R.
Co., 15 B. Hon. 404; Houston, etc.,
R. R. Co. V. Odum, 53 Tex. 343. In
Nicholson V. N. Y., etc., R. R. Co., 22
Conn. 74, 85, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut, per Hinman, J., pre-
sented a very strong argument, in
favor of the proposition of the text.
The court said: " Wlien land is con-
demned for a special purpose on the
score of public utility, the seques-
tration is limited to the use, the spe-
cific use, for which the proprietor
has been divested of a complete do-
minion over his own estate. These
are propositions which are no longer
open to discussion. But it is con-
tended that land once taken and still
held for highway purposes may be
used for a railway without exceed-
ing the limits of the easement al-
ready acquired by the public. If
this is true, if the new use of the
land is within the scope of the orig-
inal sequestration or dedication, it
would follow that the railway privi-
leges are not an encroachment on
the estate remaining in the owner of
the soil, and that the new mode of
enjoying the public easement will
not enable him rightfully to assert
a claim to damages therefor. On the
contrary, if the time, intent and ef-
ficacy of the original condemnation
was not to subject the land to such
a burden as will be imposed upon it
when it is confiscated to the uses
and control of a corporation, it can-
not be denied that in the latter case
the estate of the owner of the soil is
injuriously affected by the super-
vening servitude; th.at his rights are
OH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 303
The dissimilarity of highways and railways cannot be mora
strikingly presented than by a consideration of the numerous
abridged, and that In a legal sense
his land is again taken for public
uses. Thus, it appears that the court
have simply to decide whether there
is such an identity between a high-
way and a railway, that statutes con-
ferring a right to establish the for-
mer include an authority to construct
the latter. . . Such a construction
is possibly only when it is made to
appear that there is a substantial,
practical or technical identity be-
tween the uses of land for highway
and for railway purposes. No one
can fail to see that the terms ' rail-
way ' and ' highway ' are not con-
vertible, or that the two uses, prac-
tically considered, althougli anala-
gous, are not identical. Land, as
ordinarily appropriated by a railroad
company, is inconvenient and even
impassable to those who would use
it as a common highway. Such a
corporation does not hold itself
bound to make or keep its embank-
ments and bridges in a condition
wTiich will facilitate the transitus
of such vehicles as ply over an ordi-
nary road.
" A practical dissimilarity obvi-
lously exists between a railway and
a common highway, and is recognized
as the basis of a legal distinction be-
tween them. It is so recognized on
a large scale, when railway privileges
are sought from legislative bodies,
and granted by them. If the terms
' liighway ' and ' railway ' are synony-
mous, or if one of them includes the
other by legal implication, no act
would be more superfluous than to
require or to grant authority to con-
struct railways over localities already
occupied as highways. If a legal
identity does not subsist between a
highway and a railway, it is illogical
38
to argue that, because a railway may
be so constructed as not to interfere
with the ordinary uses of a highway,
and so as to be consistent wich the
highway right already existing,
therefore such a new use is included
within the old use. It might as well
be urged that if a common or a canal,
laid out over the route of a public
road, could be so arranged as to leave
an ample roadway for vehicles and
passengers on foot, the laud should
be held to be originally condemned
for a canal or a common, as properly
incident to the highway use."
The two uses " are by no means
the same thing to the proprietor
whose land is taken; on the contra-
ry, they suggest widely different
standards of compensation. One
can readily conceive of cases, where
the value of real estate would be di-
rectly enhanced by the opening of a
highway through it; while its confis-
cation for a railway at tlie same or
a subsequent time would be a gross
injury to the estate, and a total sub-
version of the mode of enjoyment
expected by the owner, when he
yielded his private rights to the
public exigeucj'. . . . No one ever
thought of regarding highway acts
as conferring railway privileges, in-
volving a right in every individual,
not only to break up ordinary travel,
but also to exact tolls from the pub-
lic for the privilege of using the
peculiar conveyances adapted to a
railroad. If a right of this descrip-
tion is not conferred when a high-
way is authorized by law, it is idle
to pretend that any proprietor is di-
vested of such a right. It would
seem that, under such circumstances,
the true construction of highway
laws could hardly be debatable, and
693
§ 303
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XVT.
safeguards which are thought necessary to be thrown around
the public, when a railroad crosses a highway. The bells
must be rung, the whistle must be blown, the speed must be
slackened, and very often bars are laid across the highway, so
that vehicles and foot passengers cannot attempt to cross the
track while the train is passing.. How much greater would be
the inconvenience to the public, if a railroad track was laid
along the highway, instead of across it.
But where the fee of the highway is in the public, the cases
very generally hold that the establishment of a steam railroad
along a highway is not such a taking of property of the adjoin-
ing landowner, as will requiie the payment of compensation.^
that the absence of legal identity
between the two uses of which we
speak was patent and entire."
' Milburn v. Cedar Eapids etc. E.
K. Co., 12 Iowa, 246; Clinton v. Ce-
dar Kapids etc. K. R. Co., 24 lb.
455; Ingraham v. Chicago etc. Co., 34
lb. 176; Euch^man v. Chicago etc.
Co., 46 lb. 366; Franz v. Railroad
Co., 55 lb. 101; Grand Eapids etc.
R. E. Co. V. Heisel, 38 Mich. 62 ; 31
Am. Eep. 306; Grand Rapids etc. R.
R. Co. V. Heisel, 47 Mich. 393; Har-
rison V. New Orleans etc. E. R. Co.,
34 La, An. 462; 44 Am. Rep. 438;
Protzman v. Indianapolis etc. E. R.
Co., 9 Ind, 467; New Albany etc. E.
E. Co. y, O'Haily, 13 Ind. 353; Chi-
cago etc. E. E. Co. V. Joliet, 79 111.
25; Siraplot v. Chicago etc. Ey., 5
McCrary, 158; Davenport v. Steven-
son, 34 lowaj 235 ; Elizabethtown etc.
Co. V. Thompson, 79 Ky. 52; Hinch-
man v. Patej-soji fitc, Co., 17 N. J. Eq.
75; Jersey City etc. Co. v. J. C. &
H. H. E. E. Co., 20 lb, 61; Dwenger
V. Chicago etc. Ey. Co., 98 Ind. 153;
Wager v. Troy etc. Ey., 25 N. Y. 527;
People V. Kerr, 27 lb, 188; Phila.
etc. Co. V. Philadelphia, 47 Pa. St.
325 ; Struthers v. Dunkirk etc. , 87 lb.
282; Carson v. Central etc. Co., 35
Cal. 325. See § 302 : Power of Legis-
lature over railroads. In Moses v.
594
Pittsburgh etc. E. E. Co., 22 111. 522,
Caton, Ch. J., said: "By the city
charter, the common council is vest-
ed with the exclusive control and
regulation of the streets of the city,
the fee simple title to which we have
already decided is vested in the mu-
nicipal corporation. The city char-
ter also empowers the common coun-
cil to direct and control the location
of railroad tracks within the city. In
granting this permission to locate
the ti-ack in Beach street, the com-
mon council acted under an express
power granted by the Legislature,
so that the defendant has all the
right, which both the Legislature
and the common council could give,
to occupy the street with its track.
But the complainant assumes higher
ground, and claims that any use of
the street, even under the authority
of the Legislature and the common
council, which tends to deteriorate
the value of his property on the
street is a violation of that funda-
mental law which forbids private
property to be taken for public use
without just compensation. This
is manifestly an erroneous view of
the constitutional guaranty thus in-
voked. It must necessarily happen
that streets will be used for various
legitimate purposes, which will, to
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§ 303
It cannot be doubted, that in no case does the consequential
depreciation in value of adjoining propertj'^, as a result of the
construction of a steam railway along the street, constitute a
taking of property which requires a payment of compensation,
any more than the ordinaiy and reasonable exercise of any right
gives rise to liability for incidental injuries to others. The ap-
propriation of a highway to other purposes must interfere with
some positive right of property, in order that it may be consid-
ered a taking of property. Where the public does not own the
fee, any other and different use of the highway would be a tak-
ing, whatever effect it may have upon the adjoining property,
as has been alreadj^ explained, for there would be a fresh appro-
priation of the property of the owners of the fee. But when
the fee is in the State, the adjoining landowner has only an
easement in the street, which entitles him to a reasonable en-
joyment of it as a street, and an appropriation of it to other
a greater or less extent, discommode
persons residing or doing business
upon them, and just to that extent
damage their property; and yet such
damage is incident to all city proper-
ty, and for it a party can claim no
remedy. . . The street is made for the
passage of persons and property; and
the law cannot define what exclusive
means of transportation and passage
shall be used. Universal experience
shows that this can best be left to
the determination of the municipal
authorities, who are supposed to be
the best acquainted with the wants
and necessities of the citizens gen-
erally. To say that a new mode of
passage shall be banished from the
streets, no matter how much the
general good may require it, sim-
ply because streets were not so used
in the days of Blackstone, would
hardly comport with the advance-
ment and enlightenment of the pres-
ent age. Steam has but lately taken
tlie place, to any extent, of animal
power for land transportation, and
for that reason alone shall it be ex-
pelled the streets? . . . Cars upon
street railroads are generally, if not
universally, propelled by horses [in
1893 this is not quite accurate], but
who can say how long it will be be-
fore it will be found safe and profit-
able to propel them with steam, or
some other power besides horses ?
Should we say that this road should
be enjoined, we could advance no
reason for it which would not apply
with equal force to street railroads;
so that consistency would require
that we should stop all. Nor would
the evil which would result from the
rule we must lay down, stop here.
We must prohibit every use of a
street which discommodes those who
reside or do business upon it, be-
cause their property will else be
damaged. The question has been
presented in other States, and ia
some instances, where the public
have only an easement of the street,
and the owner of adjoining property
still holds the fee in the street, it
has been sustained; but the weight
of authority, and certainly in our
apprehension, all sound reasoning is
the other way."
695
304
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
purposes, for example, for the construction of a steam railway,
will constitute a taking of the property of the abutting pro-
prietor, only when his reasonable enjoyment of the street is de-
nied to him. The noise, smoke, etc., do not involve any taking
of property, however much it may depreciate the value and the
desirability of the adjoining property .^
§ 804. Abutting owners how affected Iby surface street
railways. — The ordinary steam railway serves the purpose of
transporting passengers and goods from one city, town or vil-
lage to another, and not from one part to another of the same
city, town or village. On the other hand, a street railway, it
matters not by what motive power the cars may be propelled,
is designed to carry passengers and goods from one part of the
same local community to another part. For this reason, it is
not doing violence to the meaning of words to recognize a vital
distinction between the two kinds of railways, and to hold that,
■while the appropriation of a street to the use of the ordinary
railroad was a new taking of property, where the title to the
soil of the street is in the abutting owner, the construction of
a surface street railway on a street, was not a diversion of the
street from its use as a highway or street, but only a new pro-
vision for the more expeditious and convenient use of the street
as such. And this would be a correct view of the effect of the
grant of a franchise to a surface street railway, whether the mo-
tive power be animal, steam, cable or electrical. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, to find that the courts are almost unanimously
of the opinion that the use of a street, for the purpose of con-
structing and operating a surface street railroad, is not a taking
of property for which compensation must be made ; and this is
true whether the fee is in the State or in the abutter.^
' Protzman v. Indianapolis etc. K.
E. Co., 9 Ind. 467; New Albany etc.
R. R. Co. V. O'Daily, 12 Ind. 551;
S. c, 13 Ind. 353; Street Railway v.
Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 523; Grand
Rapids etc. R. R. Co., 38 Mich. 62 (31
Am. Rep. 306); s. c, 47 Mich. 393,
and the cases cited in the two pre-
ceding notes.
2 For cases, in which the fee was
in the adjoining owner, see Atty.
Gen. V. Metro. R. R. Co., 125 Mass.
59S
515; Com. v. Temple, 14 Gray, 75;
Elliott V. Fair Haven etc. Co., 32
Conn. 579; Hinchman v. R. R. Co.,
17 N. J. Eq. 75; s. c, 20 lb. 360;
City R. R. Co. v. City R. E. Co., 20
lb. 61; Street R'y Co. v. Cummins-
ville, 14 Ohio St. 523; Hobart v. Mil-
waukee etc. Co., 27 Wis. 194; 9 Am.
R. 461. For eases, in which the fee
was in the public, see People v. Kerr,
27 N. Y. 188; Kellinger v. Sti-eet K.
R. Co., 50 lb. 206; Metro, etc. Co. v,,
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§ 304
The ordinary street railway interferes very slightly, if at all,
with the use of the highway as such by the public, or by the
abutter.^ And if a slight inconvenience is inflicted on an abut-
ter by a street railroad running its line past his property, it can-
not constitute a taking of private property for public use ; and
such use of a street, where no material alteration is made in its
surface or grade, should, upon the principles already pointed out,
be considered as falling within the purpose for which the streets
were dedicated.^ But the abutting owner is entitled to a reason-
able use of the street as such, and if it is materially interfered
with by the construction of a street railway, it will constitute
a taking of the property of the abutting owner, for which com-
pensation must be made to him. Thus, if the street railroad
be located in such a portion of the highway as not to leave
space for the standing of vehicles in front of the abutter's prop-
erty,^ or if by storing cars upon its track it causes special dam-
age,* the abutting owner is clearly entitled to compensation.
No rule can be laid down which would be universally appli-
cable, but it is safe to say that while the owner of adjacent
property may be incommoded to some extent without entitling
him to compensation his complete exclusion from the ordinary
use of the street, or an extraordinary and unreasonable interfer-
ence with such use, would be a taking of property and entitle
him to compensation.^ And while the running of a street sur-
face railway does not ordinarily interfere with the reasonable
enjoyment of the street by the adjoining landowners, still, it
might, under peculiar circumstances, interfere very seriously
Quinoy etc. Co., 12 Allen, 262; Chi-
cago V. Evans, 24 HI. 52; Hess v.
Baltimore etc. Co., 52 Md. 242; 36
Am. Eep. 371. See, generally, Citi-
zens etc. Co. V. Camden H. R. R. Co.,
33 N. J. Eq. 267; West Jer. etc. Co.
V. Cape May etc. Co., 34 lb. 164; Sa-
vannah etc. Co. V. Savannah, 45 Ga.
602; Floyd Co. v. Rome St. R. R. Co.,
77 lb. 614; Stanley v. Davenport, 54
Iowa, 463; Peddicord v. Baltimore,
34 Md. 466; Brown v. Duplessis, 14
La. An. 842; Texas etc. Co. v. Rose-
dale, 64 Tex. 80.
1 Eichels v. Evansville etc. Co., 78
Ind. 261; Briggsv. Lewistoneto. Co.,
79 Me. 363.
2 Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 124;
Mills Em. Dom. § 205; Sears v. Mar-
shalltown etc. Co., 65 Iowa, 742.
8 Kellinger v. Street etc. Co., 50 N".
Y. 206; People v. Kerr, 27 lb. 188;
Hobart v. M. C. R. R. Co., 27 Wis.
194.
* Mahady v. Bushwick etc. Co., 91
ISr. Y. 148.
'See Craig v. Rochester, etoi, Co.,
39 Isr. Y. 404; Cf. Story v. N. Y. E.
R. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122; Lahr's Case,
104 lb. 268.
597
§305
MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
with the ordinary use of the street, as where the street is very-
narrow, and at the same time a great business thoroughfare ;
and whenever that happens, the construction oi the railway
would seem to constitute a taking of property, for which com-
pensation could be demanded. But Mr. Cooley holds that, un-
der such circumstances, the property owners would, in the light
of the authorities, be without a remedy. -"^
§ 305. Elevated street railways in relation to abntting
owners. — As has already been explained, in connection with
ordinary railroads ^ and street surface railways,^ whether the
fee was in the public or in the abutting owner, it has been gen-
erally held that the proprietors of adjoining property have, as
an easement over the land used as a highway, the right to the
free and unobstructed use of the street, and any interference
with such use was a taking of property, for which compensa-
tion had to be made.* In New York, however, whenever the
fee of the streets is in the public, the earlier cases seemed to
deny to the abutting owner, anj^ right of property in tlie street,
as a highway, which would be invaded by a different appropria-
tion of the land.* And even those cases, which recognized that
the abutting owner did have a peculiar easement in the street,
as a highway, conceded to the abutter only the right to a rea-
sonablj'- convenient ingress and egress to and from his property.
If the construction of a street or ordinary steam railroad did
not materially obstruct his access to his property, he had no
cause of action. But in a late case in New York,® it has been
1 Cooley Const. Lim. 683.
2 § 303.
8 §304
*Haynes v. Thomas, 7 lud. 38;
Protzman v. Indianapolis, etc. , K. R.
Co., 9 Ind. 467; New Albany, etc.,
E. E. Co. V. O'Daily, 13 Ind. 453;
Indianapolis E. E. Co. v. Smith, 52
Ind. 428; Crawford v. Delaware, 7
Ohio St. 459 ; Street Eailway v. Cum-
mingsville, 14 Ohio St. 523; State v.
Cincinnati Gas, etc., Co., 18 Ohio
St. 262; Grand Eapids, etc., E. E.
Co. V. Heisel, 38 Mich. 62 (31 Am.
Rep. 306) ; Pekin v. Winkel, 77 111.
66; Lackland v. Xo. Mo. E. E. Co.,
598
31 Mo. 180; Green v. Portland, 32
Me. 431; Brown v. Duplessis, 14 La.
An. 842. But see contra, Millburu
V. Cedar Rapids, etc., R. E. Co., 12
Iowa, 246; Franz v. Eailroad Co., 55
Iowa, 107.
6 People V. Kerr, 37 Barb. 357; s.
c, 27 N. Y. 188; Ferring v. Irwin, 55
N. T. 486; Kellinger v. Forty-Second
St., etc., E. E. Co., 50 If. Y. 206;
Brooklyn Park Commissioners v.
Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234 (6 Am.
Eep. 70) ; Coster v. Mayor, etc., 43
N. Y. 399.
6 Story V. ISr. Y. Elevated E. R. Co.,
90 X. Y. 122, 145, 146.
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 30.5
held, that the abutting owner has, as appurtenant to his land,
not only an incorporeal right of property in the free and unob-
structed use of the street or highway for purposes of locomo-
tion, but also a right to the free passage of light and air over
the land used as a street, and any interference with either right
would constitute a taking of property, for which compensation
must be made. In delivering the opinion of the court. Judge
Danforth said : " Besides the right of passage, which the grantee
as one of the public acquired, he gained certain other rights as
purchaser of the lot, and became entitled to all the advantages
which attached to it. . . . The value of the lot was enhanced
thereby, and it is to be presumed that the grantee paid, and
the grantor received an enlarged price by reason of this added
value. There was thus secured to the plaintiff the right and
privilege of having the street forever kept open as such. For
that purpose, no special or express grant was necessarj- ; the
dedication, the sale in reference to it, the conveyance of the
abutting lot with its appurtenances, and the consideration paid
were of themselves sufficient.^ . . Nor does it matter that the
acts constituting such dedication are those of a municipality.
The State even, under similar circumstances, would be bound.^
.... Lesser corporations can claim no other immunity, and
all are bound upon the principle, that to retract the promise im-
plied by such conduct, and upon which the purchaser acted,
would disappoint his just expectation.
"But what is the extent of this easement? What rights
or privileges are secured thereby ? Generally, it may be said,
it is to have the street kept -open, so that from it access may be
had to the lot, and light and air furnished across the open way.
The street occupies the surface, and to its uses the rights of
the adjacent lots are subordinate, but above the surface there
can be no lawful obstruction to the access of light and air, to
tiie detriment of the abutting owner. To hold otherwise would
enable the city to derogate from its own grant, and violate the
arrangement on the faith of which the lot was purchased.
This, in effect, was an agreement, that if the grantee would buy
the lot abutting on the street, he might have the use of light
■ Citing Wyman v. Mayor of N. Y.,
11 Wend. 487; Trustees of Water-
town V. Cowen, 4 Paige, 510.
2 City of Oswego v. Orwego Canal
Co., 6 N. T. 2.57.
599
§ 305
MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
and air over the open space designated as a street. In this
case, it is found by the trial court, in substance, that the struc-
ture proposed bj'' the defendant, [a railroad elevated fifteen feet
above the surface,] and intended for the street opposite to the
plaintiff's premises, would cause an actual diminution of light,
depreciate the value of the plaintiff's warehouse and thus work
to his injury. In doing this thing, the defendant will take his
property as much as if it took the tenement itself; without air
and light, it would be of little value. Its profitable manage-
ment is secui'ed by adjusting it in reference to the right obtained
by his grantor over the adjoining property. The elements of
light and air are both to be derived from the space over the
land, on the surface of which the sti'eet is constructed, and
which is made servient for that purpose. He therefore has an
interest in that land, and when it is sought to close it, or any
part of it, above the surface of the street, so that light is in any
measure to his injury prevented, that interest is to be taken,
and one whose lot, acquired as this was, is directly dependent
upon it for a supply, becomes a party interested and entitled,
not only to be heard, but to compensation." In a strong dis-
senting opinion in the same case Judge Earl denies the prop-
osition that the abutting owner " has an unqualified private
easement " for light and air appurtenant to his lot, and holds
that " whatever right an abutter, as such, has in the street, is
subject to the paramount authoiity of the State to regulate and
control the street, for all the purposes of a street, and to make
it more suitable for the wants and convenience of the public." ^
This case has been confirmed by numerous subsequent cases,
and may now be considered to be the settled law of New York.
And the management and control of the elevated railroads of
New York city have been provided for by a number of statutes.^
1 Story V. K. T. Elevated E. R. Co.,
90 N. T. 122, 186-188.
2 Statutes of IS'ew York State relat-
ing to this subject. Act of June 17,
1872, ch. 885, p. 2179; Act of June
26, 1873, ch. 837, p. 1253; Act of June
•^8, 1874, ch. 275, p. 331; Act of June
18, 1875, ch. 606, p. 740. Laws of
1881, p. 540, ch. 399, regulates man-
agement of trains. See upon con-
600
struction of these acts, In re N. Y. El.
R. R., 70 N. Y. 327; Gilbert E. E. R.
Co., lb. 361 ; In re Kings Co. E. E. R.
Co., 105 lb. 97; In re's. Y. Cable Ey.
Co. , 109 lb. 32 ; Zn re East Ei verBridge
etc., 26 Hun, 490; In re 'S. Y. El. E.
E. Co., 41 lb. 502; In re So. Bklyn. E.
R. & T. Co., 50 lb. 405; see, also, 3
Abbott New Cases, 301, and note.
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§ 306
In estimating the damages caused by the operation of an
elevated railroad the general character and extent of the injury-
must be considered. Does the structure injuriously affect the
general character of the thoroughfare or decrease the current
of business there. "Smoke, and gas, ashes and cinders affect
and impair the easement of air. The structure itself and the
passage of cars lessen the easement of light. These are ele-
ments of damalges even though the necessary concomitants of
the construction and operation of the road, and not the product
of negligence, for they abridge the landowner's easement, and
to that extent, at least, are subjects for redress in an action for
damages." ^ Although noise and bustle are not such an injury
to property as will require compensation,^ the pollution of
the air with noxious smells, rendering the enjoyment of abut-
ting premises uncomfortable, is a taking of propertj'.^
§ 306. Municipal control over the construction and op-
eration of railroads in streets. — From the control, which a
municipal corporation has over its streets, results the power to
regulate the running of steam and other railways in city limits.
The municipal authorities may prohibit the use of dangerous
motors and regulate the rate of speed ; * compel tlie company
to send a horseman in front of its trains ; ^ to report quarterly
the number of passengers carried ; ^ and to fence in its track. ^
Although a railroad, when operated in a street under legisla-
tive permission, is not a nuisance, per se, it may become such
if it is operated so as to become dangerous to life and property ;
and such a nuisance may be abated by the municipal authori-
iDruckerv. Manhattan Ey Co., 106
K. Y. 157: s. c, 16 J. & S. 429, fol-
lowed in Pond V. Metro. El. E. E. Co.,
42 Hun, 567; In re N. Y. El. E. E., 36
Hun, 427; Peyser v. Metro. El. E. E.,
13 Daly, 122.
2 Meyer v. Metro. El. E. E. Co.,
Gen. Term Com. Pleas, N. Y. Daily
Eeg., April 1, 1886; contra, Taylor v.
Metro. E. Ry. Co., 55 Super. Ct. 555.
"Care y. Metro. Ey. Co., 46 N. Y.
Super. Ct. 138.
* Meyers v. Chicago, etc. Co., 57
555; Knoblock V. Chicago, etc.
Co., 31 Minn. 402; Eobertson v. "Wa-
bash, etc. Co., 84 Mo. 119; Merz v.
Miss. etc. Co., 88 lb. 672; Chicago,
etc. Co. V. Eeidy, 66 111. 43; Chicago,
etc. Co. V. Haggerty, 67 lb. 113;
Whitson V. Pranklyn, 34 Ind. 392;
Eichraond, etc. Co. v. Eichmoud, 90
U. S. 521; Dounaher v. State, 16
Miss. 649.
s Baltimore, etc. Co. v. Mali, 66 Md.
53.
« St. Louis V. E. E. Co., 89 Mo. 44.
' Hayes v. Mich. etc. Co., Ill U. S,
228.
601
§ 306
MtmrCIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
ties, under the ordinary police power.^ So, cars may be prohib-
ited by ordinance from unnecessarily obstructing the streets or
blockading the crossings,^ as a street cannot be used for depot
or terminal facilities.^ And an ordinance, forbidding all kinds
of obstructions, has been held to include the obstruction of a
street by railroad cars.* Flagmen may be required to be placed,
not perhaps at every crossing, but at crossings and places wheie,
in the judgment of prudent persons, danger to the public might
be apprehended.^ Under the very comprehensive grant of
power, contained in most municipal charters, in the so-called
" general welfare clause," a city may compel a street railroad
to sprinkle its tracks for the purpose of keeping down the dust ;''
and it has been held that this power will authorize the city to
remove the tracks temporarily or permanently, for the puipose
of constructing a culvert or for any similar purpose connected
with the health, or for the convenience of the community.^
The company may be compelled to number its cars and pay
a license for each of them.^
In general, it may be said that the special privilege, which a
street railroad possesses, must be exercised by it in such a manner
as not to intrude upon the rights or privileges of others using the
street.^ As the company operating a horse railroad is not en-
titled to anj"- further use or occupation of the highway than
what is essential for the reasonable enjoyment of its franchise,
it will be liable for negligently removing the snow from its
track, and throwing it into the highway not occupied by its
tracks.!" The common law rule is clear that, when a railroad
iHentz V. L. I. etc. Co., 13 Barb.
646; Eedfield on Railways (Qth ed.)
§226; Memphis, etc. Co. v. State, 11
S. W. R. 946.
2 111. etc. Co. V. Galena, 40 111. 344;
St. Louis, etc. Co. v. Belleville, 122
lb. 376.
3 Maliady v. Busbwick, etc. Co., 91
X. Y. 148.
* G. W. etc. Co. V. Decatur, 33 111.
381; GaUagau v. Boston, etc. Co., 1
Allen, 187.
5 Toledo, etc. Co. v. Jacksonville,
67111. 37; compare Burritt v. New
Haven, 42 Conn. 172, as to require-
602
ment of viaducts at crossings; see
State V. Miss. P. Ry. Co., 33 Kan.
176.
^ City, etc. Co. v. Savannah, 77 6a.
731.
' No. Penn. Ry. v. Stone, 3 Phila.
421; West Phila. etc. Co. v. City of
Philadelphia, 10 lb. 70.
^Frankford, etc. Co. v. City, 58
Pa. St. 119.
0 Prime v. 23d St. etc. Co., 1 Abb.
N. Cases, 63; Hussner v. Bklyn. ete,
Co., 114 N. T. 4.33.
» Bo wen v. Detroit Ry., 54 Mich.
490; 52 Am. Rep. 822; Wallace v.
CH. XVI.] STEEETS, BEIDaBS AND TITEKPIKES.
§ 306
company or other corporation lays out a railway or canal across
a public street or highway, it must restore and afterwards keep
the highway in the same condition, in which it was originally
used by the public. This duty is imposed upon such a com-
pany, by implication of law, where there is no express statutory
requirement.
The duty of both horse and steam roads to repair is a con-
tinuous one ; and is not discharged by a restoration of the street
to the condition, in which it was originally, but includes a main-
tenance of the repairs.^ This duty is imperative and perform-
ance may be compelled by mandamus, on application of any
one who is aggrieved.^ And the railroad is liable to an action
for damages by the city, when a j)arty injured by the company's
failure to repair has recovered damages in a suit against the
city ;^ or, if the city makes the necessary repairs, it may recover
the expense thereby incurred, from the company by whose neg-
lect it was made necessary.* When by ordinance, granting per-
mission to use the street, it was provided that the company
should pave the space between its tracks, it was held that with
the acceptance and performance of the condition by the com-
pany a contract was created, which could not be impaired by a
subsequent municipal requirement that additional space be
Same, 58 Mich. 231; Short v. Balti-
more, 50 Md. 73; Prime v. 23d St.
Ry. Co., 1 Abb. N. C. 63, 71; Broad-
way, etc. Co. V. Kew York, 49 Hun,
126; People v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y.
520; see Burger v. Mo. Pac. Ry., (Mo.
93) 20 S. W. E. 439.
' State V. Jacksonville, (Fla. 92) 10
So. 590; Burrett v. New Haven, 42
Conn. 174; State v. Minn. etc. Co., 39
N. W. E. 153; Philadelphia v. Eidge
Ave. E. Co., 143 Pa. St. 144; Atlanta
v. Gate City Ey. Co., (Ga.) 4 S. E. R.
269; Western Pav. & Sup. Co. v.
Citizens Ey. Co., 26 N. E. E. 188;
State V. N. 0. C. & L. E. Co., 42 La.
An. 550; 7 So. E. 606; Borough v.
Norristown Ey. Co., (Pa. 91) 23 Atl.
E. 1060; Sioux City St. E. Co. v.
Sioux City, 78 Iowa, 742; 39 N. W.
E. 498.
^No. Cen. E. E. v. Baltimore, 46
Md. 425; Paducah etc. Co. v. Com.,
80 Ky. 147; State v. St. Paul etc. Co.,
(Minn.) 28 N. W. E. 3; Hamden v.
New Haven etc. Co., 27 Conn. 158.
8 Brooklyn v. B. City etc. Co., 47 N.
Y. 475; People v. Brooklyn, 65 lb.
349; Bloomfield etc. Gas Co. v. Cal-
kins, 62 lb. 886; Cf. Memphis etc.
Co. v. State, 87 Tenn. 746; s. c, 11
S. W. E. 946.
4 Gulf City S. R. Co. v. Galveston,
69 Tex. 660; 7 S. W. E. 520; Gulf etc.
Co. V. Galveston, 32 Am. & Eng. E.
E. Cas. 300; Eutland v. Dayton, 60
111. 58; Cf. Leake v. Philadelphia, 24
Atl E. 351 (Pa. 92) ; Binghamton v.
Ey. Co., 61 Hun, 479; Philada. etc.
Co. V. Philadelphia, 11 Phila. 358;
New York v. Broadway etc. Co., 17
Hun, 242; Columbus v. Col. etc. Co.,
45 Ohio, 98; Oconto v. Chicago etc.
Co., 44 Wis. 231.
603
306 a.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
paved by tlie company .^ But when the requirement is that the
horse railroad shall keep the streets used by it in good repair, the
companj' cannot be compelled to pave it or repave it in a certain
way which is specified subsequently by the city council.^
The city is the owner of the streets as trustee for the public ;
and, as such it has the same right to question the corporate
existence and the franchise rights of a railroad company, whiuli
desires to use its streets, as would a private trustee or owner.^
A general legislative grant of authority to construct a road,
does not, unless so stated in express terms, confer the right to
use the streets without municipal license.* So, also, the muni-
cipality may raise the question of the legal existence of the
company ; the rule being very general, that a corporation,
seeking to exercise such a franchise, must have an existence
de jure, as well as de facto. The grant of a railroad franchise
to an illegally incorporated company is void for the want of a
legal grantee.^
§ 306 a. Electric and calble cars on street railways.^— In
the past decade, the horse or mule, as a motor power in the
hauling of street cars, is fast being superseded by the use of
electrical and cable apparatus. Not only do the new methods
of moving street cars reduce the cost of operating them, but
likewise increase the speed at which the cars can be propelled
or hauled. But the increased speed is also the occasion of an
alarming increase in the danger of accidents to pedestrians in
the lawful use of the street ; and, on this account, this new de-
parture, in matters relating to street railways, has met with
1 Coast etc. Co. v. Savannah, 30
Fed. Rep. 646: Cf. People v. Fort
Street etc. Co., 41 Mich. 413; Reg. v.
Toronto etc. Co., 24 Q. B. (Can.) 454.
2 Kansas City v. Carrigan, 85 Mo.
268 ; and 86 Mo. 67.
' Brooklyn S. T. Co. v. Brooklyn,
.78 N. Y. 524.
, ^Hine v. Keokuk, 42 Iowa, 636;
Chicago etc. v. Chicago, 121 111. 176;
Penn. R. R. Co. v. Schuylkill Co., 116
Pa. St. 55, 8 Atl. R. 914; Clinton v.
R. R. Co., 24 Iowa, 455; Ruttle v.
Covington, 10 S. W. Rep. 644.
« Vason V. So. Car. R. R., 42 Ga. 631 ;
604
Chicago V. Robbins, 2 Black, 424;
Jas. River etc. v. Anderson, 12 Leigh,
276; Porter V. No. Mo. etc., 33 Mo.
128; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. New-
ton, 36 Iowa, 299; Clinton v. Cedar
Rap. etc. R. R. Co., 24 Iowa, 455;
People v. Kerr, 27 N. T. 188; New
Albany etc. R. R. Co. v. O'Daily, 13
Ind. 353 ; Savannah etc. v. Savannah,
45 Ga. 602; Tate v. Ohio etc. K. R.
Co., 7 Ind. 479; Cable Co.' s Case, 104
N. Y. 43.
« See §§ 301, 302, for a general dis-
cussion of the principles underlying
the present subject.
CH. XVI.J STREETS, BRIDGES AKD TXJR:XPIKES. § 306 a.
very serious popular opposition, with the consequent litigation
over the right of the railway companies to make use of these
motive powers, particularly that of the trolley system of elec-
tricity.
It does not seem at all possible for the abutting owners to
claim successfully that the adoption of either of these motive
powers would operate as an increase of the public servitude,
which had been imposed upon their land by the opening of the
street or road, even though they still owned the fee in the road-
bed, and such has been the ruling of at least two courts.^ But
it has been held in New Jersey that a provision of the statute,
which empowers a street railway " to use electrical or chemical
motors or grip cable " does not authorize the erection of poles
or wire in the public streets as an electrical system of propel-
ling street cars.^ It will be remembered that, in another con-
nection,^ tlie claim has been made that the erection of poles for
the wires of the telegraph, the telephone and the electric light-
ing, should be considered an additional servitude on the abutter,
for which additional compensation should be given. But this
is not yet positive law.
Apart from this question of thereby imposing an additional
servitude upon the abutting land, there is no limitation, in the
absence of an express constitutional provision, of the legislative
power to grant to a street railway the riglit to use the electric
or cable motor in the propulsion or hauling of their cars. And
the only question of practical importance, which can arise in
the present connection, is whether the existing charter rights of
a street railway company authorized the use of some other than
horse power. Thus, where a railway was authorized by charter
or statute to employ " any other than animal power," * " me-
chanical or other power," ' " any power other than locomo-
tives," ^ " steam, horse or other power," ^ it was held that such
'Williams v. City Electric St. E.
Co., 41 Fed. Eep. 556; Koch v. Korth
Ave. R'y Co., (Md. '92) 23 Atl. Kep.463.
estate V. Trenton, (92 K. J.) 23 Atl.
R. 281; Same v. Newark, lb. 284.
» § 297.
* Detroit City E'y v. Mills, (Mich.
'92) 48 N. W. 100.
^HudsonK. T. Co. v. Watervliet
Tr. E. Co., 9 iSr. T. S. 177; s. c, 56
Hun, 67.
6 Com'rs V. West Chester, 9 Pa. Co.
Ct. E. 542; Lockhardt v. Craig St.
E'y Co., 21 Atl. Eep. 26; s. c, 139
Pa. St. 419; Williams v. City E'y Co.,
(Ind. '92) 29 N. E. Eep. 408.
'Taggart v. Newport St. E. Co.,
(E. I. '91) 19 Atl. Eep. 326.
605
§ 306 a. MUiSflCIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVI.
railways could use the electric power without any further grant
of autliority from the State or municipal authorities. It has,
however, been held in New York, that, although a street rail-
way may have by statute and charter the right to use "steam,
animal or mechanical power," it is not thereby authorized to
employ the cable as the motive power, without the consent of
the city.^ But where by the laws of '89, ch. 531, street rail-
ways, are authorized to employ cable or other power, other than
steam, under approval of the State Board of Railroad Commis-
sioners, the consent of the city would not be required to make
the change from horse to cable power.^
In one case, it has been held that, although a street railway
was authorized to use " any improved motive power," it did not
authorize the use of the overhead wires, in the trolley electric
system.^ And so, likewise, it has been held in Texas that an
ordinance, which permitted the use of " electricity or such other
motive power as will not necessarily obstruct the street," does
not authorize the employment of steam power.*
Where a railway company had an exclusive monopoly of
" horse railroads " along certain streets, such an exclusive mo-
nopoly must be strictly construed against its owner, and it did
not prevent the grant to a rival companj' the right to construct
and maintain a cable road along the same route.^
But even where the street railways are fully authorized to
employ electric or cable power, in the moving of cars, they are
not beyond the reach of the police regulations of the State or
city govei-nment, and they are obliged to conform to all reason-
able regulations either in respect to the erection of poles and
wires, construction of cable, or in the speed of the cars, which
the State Legislature or municipal council ma}' see fit to impose.''
1 People V. Newton, 112 N. Y. 396.
2/n re Third Ave. R'y Co., (N. Y.
'91) 24 N. E. Rep. 651.
8 Farrell v. Winchester Ave, 61
Conn. 127 ; s. c. , 23 Atl. 757. But see,
contra, Com'rs v. 'Westehester, 9 Pa,
Co. Ct. Rep. 542; Lockhart v. Craig
St. Ry. Co., 139 Pa. St. 419; s. c, 21
Atl. Rep. 26, and other cases cited
supra in preceding notes.
* Houston V. H. B. & M. Ry. Co.,
(Tex. '92) 19 S. W. Rep. 786.
606
6 Omaha H. R. Co. v. Cahle Tram-
way Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 324.
« W. U. Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia,
(Pa. '88) 12 Atl. Rep. 144"; Lamb v.
St. Louis & W. Ry. Co., 33 Mo. App.
489; Hudson R. T. Co. v. Watervliet
T. & R. Co., 61 Hun, 140; Cent. Pa.
Tel. & Supply Co. v. "Wilkes-Barre &
W. S. R. Co., 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 417; Cin-
cinnati Inc. Plane Ry. Co. v. City &
S. Tel. Ass'n, (Ohio '92) 27 N. E. 89a
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURKPIKES.
§ 307
And the electric and cable street railways will come under ex-
isting regulations as to construction and management, which
had been expressly intended to apply to horse railways, so far
as these regulations are applicable to them.^
It has been held that, where there was a grant to a railway
of the right to use electric motive power, it was not authorized
to use a system by which electricity may pass from its own
wires to those of the telephone and telegraph wires, and thus
interfere with the use of the latter, where this could be avoided
by the use of some other system of electrical power, even though
the latter system was more expensive.^ But, on the contrary,
it has been held in Ohio that the use of the street by the tele-
graph and telephone companies must always be subordinate to
its use by the general public for travel and locomotion ; and
that if the construction of the electric railway affects injuriously
the use of the wires of the telegraph and telephone companies,
the latter must prqvide for the insulation of its own wires.^
' § 307. Remedies of abutters — Measure of damages.— If
a railroad does not maJie compensation to abutting owners for
their property which is taken or damaged in the exercise of the
right of eminent domain, the company is a trespasser, and is lia-
ble in damages to the owners of such property ; but the owner,
who seeks his remedy in an action for damages of a common law
nature, can only recover the damages which were sustained by
him up to the date, when the action was instituted. He may
bring successive actions of this character at such times as he
may elect ; or, if the land itself has been appropriated, he may
bring an action of ejectment.* But such a proceeding is inef-
fectual to recover complete damages for the permanent depre-
ciation or destruction of an easement which is invaded by the
iLamb v. St. Louis & W. Ky. Co.,
33 Mo. App. 489; Wolfe v. Erie E. T.
Co., 33 Fed. Eep. 320; Criveaud v.
St. Louis Cable & W. Ry. Co., 33 Mo.
App. 458.
'^ Hudson E. T. Co. v. Watervliet
T. & R. Co., Gl Hun, 140.
" Cincinnati Inc. Plane Ey. Co. v.
City & S. Tel. Ass'n, (Ohio '92) 27
N. E. 890.
*Uline V. N. Y. Cen. R. E. Co., 101
ISr. T. 98; s. c, 4 N. E. Eep. 536; Ma-
hon V. E. E. Co., 24 lb. 658; Wheel-
ock v. Noonan, 198 K. Y. 179; N. Y.
Nat. Ex. Bk. v. Metro. El. Ey. Co.,
108 lb. 660; Eeed v. State, 108 lb.
407; Pond v. Metro. E. E. E. Co.,
112 lb. 186; see ante, §247, as to the
time when payment of corapensa^
tion must be made in cases of emi-
nent domain.
607
§308
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
company. It has accordingly been found that, to avoid the ne-
cessity of successive actions, an equitable suit, in which an in-
junction is demanded, restraining the company from running its
trains, is best adapted to tlie purpose ; for the court of equity
can mould the relief granted to suit the exigences of the case.^
It has been held that the proper measure of damages in the tak-
ing of property by street railways is the diminution in rental
value ; and that damages for loss of business cannot be consid-
ered, they being merely remote and consequential.^
§ 308. Yacation of streets by the Legislature — Delega-
tion of power to corporation. — The power to vacate highways,
which is possessed by the Legislature in the absence of consti-
tutional resti'iction, can, like other powers, be delegated to the
municipal authorities.^ But the municipal corporation cannot
claim the power to vacate streets and thereby destroy the pub-
lic easement in them by implication ; at least, in ordinary cases.*
The power can only be derived from an express declaration or,
in unusual cases from necessary implication ; all ambiguous'
language being construed favorably to the continuance of the
highway.^ But it has been held that an illegal or invalid vaca-
tion of a public street by a municipality can be validated by
subsequent State Legislation.* But even the legislative power
in the present case is not unlimited. Thus, the legislative pow-
R 756; Excelsior Brick Co. v. Hav-
erstraw, 62 Hun, 620; Lindsay v.
Omaha, (N"eb. 90) 46 N. W. E. 627;
Parker v. Catholic Bishop, (111. 93)
34 N. E. R. 473 ; Glasgow v. St. Louis,
17 S. W. K. 743 ; see also cases col-
lected in 33 Am. & Eng, Corp. Cases,
453; Trenton R. E. Case, 6 Whart.
(Pa.) 25; Spiegel v. Gansberg, 44 Ind.
418; Fearing v. Irwin, 55 lb. 486;
State V. Huggins, 47 Ind. 586; Mc-
Gee V. Penn. R. K., 114 Pa. St. 470.
« Gants' Ap., 21 Pitts. Leg. J. 219;
Eohmeiser v. Bannon, (Ky. 93) 22 S.
W. R. 27; Hobo. Ld. Co. v. Hoboken,
36 N. J. L. 540.
6 Campen v. Board, (Mich. 91) 49
N. W. R. 39; Newark v. Del., etc.,
42 N. J. Eq. 106; Jersey City v. N.
J. Cent., etc., 40 lb. 217.
>^ Kettle V. Tremont, 1 Neb. 329.
1 Pond V. Met. R. R. Co., 112 N. Y.
186; see Henderson's Case, 78 lb.
423; Story's Case, 90 lb. 133.
2 N. T. Exch. Bk. v. Metro. El. Ry.
Co., 53 Super. Ct. 511 ; s. c, 108 N. Y.
660; Taylor v. Metro. El. Ry. Co., 50
Super. 311; s. c, 55 lb. 555.
SMcGee's Appeal, 140 Pa. St. 570;
Piatt V. E. E. Co., (Iowa; 87) 31 N. W.
R. 883; Wenicke v. N. Y. Cen. & H.
R. R. Co., 61 Hun, 619; State v.
Elizabeth, (N. J. 92) 24 Atl. 495;
Whitsett V. Union Depot, etc., 10
Colo. 243; North Liberties Comrs. v.
Gas Co., 12 Pa. St. 318; Stuber's
Road, 28 lb. 223; Marshalltown
V. Forney, 61 Iowa, 578; Barr v. Os-
caloosa, 45 lb. 475 ; Reed v. Camden,
(N. J. 92) 24 Atl. R. 549; Glasgow v.
St. Louis, (Mo. 92) 17 S. W. R. 743;
Cliicago etc. Co. v. Chicago, 28 N. E.
608
CH. XVI.J STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§ 309
er does not extend to the discontinuance of public highways
for the purpose of applying them to private uses.^ The public
interests must alone be considered in all such propositions to
vacate a highway.
§ 309. Proceedings to vacate — These proceedings differ
in different jurisdictions ; and since they are usually statutory,
any detailed explanation of them is impossible here. Since
the discontinuance of highways is in derogation of public right,
any proceedings, having such an object, must conform substan-
tially, and in England strictly ,2 to the statute ; and failure to
give abutting owners an opportunity to be heard, may invali-
date the proceedings.^ So, although a town was authorized to
discontinue " at a meeting called for the purpose," any town
or private way ; it was held that such action could only be
taken by a tribunal acting judicially, after notice to adjoining
owners, and not by a mere vote at a town meeting.* And so,
likewise, county commissioners have usually no power to vacate
city streets.^ A city cannot vacate a street, unless it is author-
ized by the Legislature ; *■ and an injunction will lie to restrain
the enforcement of an illegal order to that effect.'^
The applicant for an injunction must show that his property
will sustain special injury by the illegal vacation.^ And an
owner of land which does not abut directly on the street, is a
stranger, and has no standing in court.^
It has been held, however, that an alteration by competent
authority of an existing way is not equivalent to a discontin-
' Winchester v. Capron, 63 N. H.
605 ; Le Clerq v. Gallipolis, 17 Ohio
St., pt. 1, 217; In re John and Cher-
ry Streets, 19 Wend. 659 ; Glasgow v.
St Louis, 87 Mo. 678; Dubaoh v. Han-
nibal, etc., 89 lb. 483; Warren v. Ly-
ons, 22 la. 351; Indianapolis, etc. v.
State, 37Ind. 489; Portland, etc. E.
E. V. Portland, 14 Oreg. 188; see also
Stevenson v. Mayor, etc., 20 Fed.
Eep. 586; Atty. Gen. v. Goodrich, 5
Grant (Can.) 402, Patten v. Cress-
well, (Ind.) 21 N. E. Rep. 663; Baird
V. Rice, 63 Pa. St. 489; Hinchman v.
V. Detroit, 9 Mich. 103.
39
2 Eex V. Justices, 23 L. M. J. 113.
8 James v. Darlington, (Wis.) 36 N.
W. Rep. 835; Price v. Stagsay, (Mich.)
35 lb. 815; Rex v. Jones, 12 Ad. &
E. 684; Rex v. Milverton, 5 lb. 841;
De Ponthieu v. Pennyfather, .5
Taunt. 634.
^ Lincoln v. Warren, (Mass.) 23 N.
Pac. E. Rep. 45.
5 Ottawa V. Rohrburgh, (Kan.) 21
Pac, R. 1061.
« Polack V. Orph. Asyl., 48 Cal. 490.
■? Spiegel V. Gansberg, 44 Ind. 418.
8 Bering v. Scott, 107 111. 600.
s House V. Greensburg, 93 Ind. 533.
609
§ 310 MCTNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. SVI.
uance of the portion rejected; and that no special order of
discontinuance is required.^
In proceedings to vacate, the opinions of witnesses, as to the
public utility of the existing street, — although this is often the
only issue, — -cannot be given in evidence.^
§ 310. Burden and means of proving vacation and aban-
donment.— In considering the vacation or abandonment of
highways, two maxims are of use. The first is " once a high-
way always a highway ; " the other is the rule of evidence, that
"a thing known to exist is presumed to continue until the con-
trary is shown." The former maxim is applicable and useful
when the rights of abutters, who have made improvements in
the expectation of the continuance of the street, are involved.
But where no such rights are involved ; or when they are un-
claimed ; or when compensation is made for injury to them, a
highway may cease to exist, either b}' abandonment or by legal
vacation. The latter maxim applies in conjunction with the
former, when it is sought to prove affirmatively, that the public
and the abutters have abandoned their respective rights to the
street. The burden of proof is on him who seeks to establish
these propositions ; and the continuance of the street will he
presumed, until satisfactory evidence is produced to rebut it.^
In some instances, the nonuser of a way, coupled with the
acquisition of another in its place, has been held to be an aban-
donment.* But to lay this down as the general rule, would be
erroneous. In one case it was held, that nonuser for eleven
years, although the highway had been fenced in ; and a total
neglect to repair for fifteen years, was not conclusive evidence
of abandonment.^ Nor is a compulsory nonuser of a road, in
the absence of the acquisition of a new one,^ nonuser for ten
years and inclosure,^ sowing grain and pasturing cattle,* nor tlie
1 Brook V. Horton, 68 Cal. 554;
Com. V. Westborough, 3 Mass. 406;
Com. V. Cambridge, 7 lb. 158; Bow-
ley V. Walker, 8 Allen, 21.
2Fairohild v. Bascom, 35 Vt. 398;
White V. Baily, 10 Mich. 155 ; Hughes
v. Beggs, (lud.) 16 N". E. Rep. 817.
' Elliott on Roads & Streets, p. 658.
* Peoria v. Johnston, 56 111. 45;
Oalbraith v. Littiech, 73 lb. 210; War-
ner V. Holyoke, 112 Mass. 862; Jef- i Rose v. Bostyer, 22 Pac. Rep. 393,
610
fersonville v. C Conner, 37 Ind. 9.");
Hamilton v. State, 106 lb. 361; Davie
V. Huebner, 45 Iowa, 575.
5 Kelly, etc., v. Lawrence F. Co.,
22 N. E. Rep. 639.
eCriggs v. Philips, 103 N. T. 77;
Freeholders v. Towns, 20 N. Y. State
Rep. 394.
' State V. Culver, 65 Mo. 607.
^Watkins v. Lynch, 71 Cal. 21;
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§311
drawing of a line across an of3ficial map,^ satisfactory and con-
clusive evidence of abandonment. When no public need ex-
isted for the use of a street, abandonment cannot be presumed
from nonuser."
Parol evidence of abandonment is not admissible to show that
a street has been legally vacated } as vacation can only be ef-
fected by a jMasi-judicial proceeding, of which the record is the
best evidence.^
§ 311. Compensation to abutters on vacation. — The expe-
diency or necessity of vacating highways is wholly discretion-
ary with the Legislature ; * but when vacating a street or highway
will cause special, as distinct from consequential, damages to the
abutter, his consent must be obtained, or adequate compensation
must be made him.^ As has already been explained,^ the abut-
ter has a right in the highway, separate and distinct from that
which he enjoys in the public easement; and as this private
right to a convenient access to his property makes the property
more valuable, it is itself real property, and comes within the
protection of the constitutional inhibition against taking pri-
vate property without compensation.'^ But the law cannot by
any means be said to be settled upon this question, and there
are many decisions which assert or countenance a contrary
doctrine, or modify the operation of the principle just explained.*
In New York it has been held that the Legislature may au-
1 Eureka v. Armstrong, 22 Pac. 828.
2 Wolfe V. Sullivan, (Ind. 93) 32 N.
E. R. 1017; RelUy v. Racine, 51 Wis.
526; Crocker v. Collins, (S. C. 93) 15
S. E. R. 951.
' Latlirop V. Cent. la., 69 Iowa, 105 ;
Sanborn v. Sch. Dist., 12 Minn. 17;
Wlietton V. Clayton, 111 Ind. 360;
Monaghan v. Sch. Dist, 38 Wis. 101.
* Hayes v. Taylor, (Iowa, 92) 52 N.
W. R. 116; Bradbury v. Walton, (Ky.
93) 21 S. W. R. 869; Elliott, Roads
and Streets, p. 664.
^ Miller v. Sohenck, ( Iowa, 89) 43
N. W. R. 225 ; Rohmeiser v. Bannon,
(Ky. 93)22 S.W. R. 27; Parker v.
Bishop, (111. 93) 34 N. E. R. 473;
Haynes v. Thomas, 7 Ind. 38; Gil-
bert's Case, 70 N. T. 361; Story's
Case, 90 lb. 122; Kimball v. Homan,
(Mich. 89) 42 N. W. R. 167; Onset St.
R. Co. V. Com'rs, 154 Mass. 395.
« §§ 301-305.
'Indianapolis v. Hartley, 67 111.
439; Gargan v. Railroad, (Ky. 89) 12
S. W. R. 259; Cinoin. v. White, 6
Peters, 431 ; Petition of Concord, 50
N. H. 530; Butterworth v. Bartlett,
50 Ind. 537; Pearsall v. Eaton, (Mich.)
42 N. W. Rep. 77.
8 Glasgow V. St. Louis, 17 S. W. R.
743; 107 Mo. 198; Gerhard v. See-
konk Com'rs, (R. I.) 5 Atl. Rep. 199,
201 ; Barr v. Oscaloosa, 45 Iowa, 275 ;
Polack V. Trustees, 48 Cal. 490; Hiel-
scher v. Minneapolis, ( Minn. 91 ) 49
N. W. R. 287; Perry v. Sherbourne,
11 Cush. 888.
611
§312
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
thorize the closing of one public way without compensating
adjoining owners, provided another way to their property re-
mains open.^ And in Pennsylvania, where the constitution pro-
vided that private property should not be taken for public use
without just compensation, and contains a special clause which
makes this principle applicable to the taking of property by
municipal corporations for the construction of highways; it
was held that the abutter's interests, except when his tangible
property is taken, were not to be considered or compensated
for.2
§ 312. Statute of Limitations as applicable to public ease-
ment in streets— Equitable estoppel. — In the absence of ex-
press statutory provisions, it is generally held that the remedial
rights of the United States, and of the several States, are not af-
fected by Statutes of Limitation.^ It would seem logical to ap-
ply the same rule to municipal corporations, since they are but
agents of the general sovereigntj', exercising the powers of local
government. At any rate, this should be recognized as the
controlling principle, wliere the rights or privileges, which they
possess, are held by them in a representative public capacity,
representative either of the State and Nation, or of the local
community.* When a city is interested in, what may be termed,
its private capacity, as distinguished from its governmental ; as,
for example, when as defendant or plaintiff, it is a party to an
ordinary action ; and, particularly, when the suit does not in-
volve any propertj', which is held by it solely upon trust for
public use and convenience, there seems to be no good ground
for exempting it from the operation of the statute.^ If a city,
laying aside its sovereignty, enters upon terms of equality into
contractual relations with individuals ; there is no unfairness
in the rule which permits it to enjoy the benefits of such a con-
• Coster V. Kew Tork, 43 N. Y.
399; Fearing v. Irwin, 65 lb. 486.
2 McGliee's Appeal, 114 Pa. St. 470.
^ Angell on Limitations, § 36; Dick-
inson V. New Tork, 92 N. Y. 584; U.
S. V. Kirkpatriok, 9 Wheat. 735; Peo-
ple V. Gilbert, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 227;
U. S. V. Hoar, 2 Mason, 134.
^Dil. Mun. Corp. 668; Elliott on
612
Roads, p. 667, note 4.
5 Elliott on Roads, p. 665 ; Wood on
Limitations, § 53; Evans v. Erie Co.,
66 Pa. St. 222; Koshkoning v. Bur-
ton, 104 U. S. 668; May v. Sch. Dist.,
22 Neb. 205; Gaines v. Hot Spr. Co.,
39 Ark. 262; Simplot v. Chicago eto.,
16 Fed. Rep. 350; Mowry v. Provi-
dence, 10 R. I. 52.
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§312
dition only subject to the obligations and limitations which are
binding on natural persons.^
Upon the question, whether the city's title to a street, owned
by it in trust for public use, may be lost by adverse possession,
and its action for recovery barred by the Statute of Limita-
tions, the cases are at variance. In some of the States, it is
held that when the public title to the street is concerned, the
lules of the Statute of Limitations will bar the right of action
of the municipality .'■' In other States, the directly contrary doc-
trine is upheld, and the public right to a highway is held not
to be barred by adverse possession under the statute.^ The
true theory, at the basis of the law relating to streets, is un-
doubtedly that they are acquired or dedicated primarily, if not
solely, for the use of the whole public, as distinct from the in-
habitants of the municipality, within the limits of which they
are located. The corporation possesses an interest in them as
trustee for the real owners. Every erection or obstruction upon
a street, by which its use is in danger of impairment, is, unless
authorized by the Legislature, a public nuisance ; and no mere
lapse of time will, in the absence of a limit expressly imposed
' Burlington v. R. E. Co., 41 Iowa,
134.
2 Chicago V. Middlebrook, 32 N. E.
E. 457 (111. 93); Wheeling v. Camp-
bell, 12 W. Va. 36; Bo wen v. Team,
6 Rich. 398; Fort Smith v. McKibben,
41 Ark. 45 ; Litchfield v. Wilmot, 2
Root (Conn.) 288; Terrill v. Bloom-
field, (Ky. 93) 21 S. W. R. 1041;
Cincin. v. Evans, 5 Ohio St. 594; Le-
vasser V. Washburn, 11 Gratt. 572;
Richmond v. Poe, 24 lb. 149; Gregoi-y
V. Knight, 50 Mich. 61 ; Coleman v.
Flint etc., 64 lb. 160; Black v. O'Hara,
5 Atl. Rep. 598; Meyer v. Graham,
(Neb. 92) 51 N. W. R. 17.
^Dewitt V. Elmira Transfer Co.,
134 N. T. 495; Driggs v. Phillips, 103
lb. 77; Vicksburg v. Marshall, 59
Miss. 563; Simplot v. Chicago etc.,
16 Fed. Rep. 350; Webb v. Demopolis,
(Ala. 91) 18 So. R. 289; St. Vincents
etc. V. Troy, 76 N. Y. 108; Durham
V. Hussman, (Iowa, 93) 55 N. W. R.
11; Ellis V. State, (Tex. 93) 21 S. W.
E. 66; Sumner v. Peebles, 22 Pac. R.
221; 5 Wash. St. 471; Flynn v. De-
troit, 93 Mich. 590; Devoe v. Smelt-
zer, (Iowa, 93) 53 N. W. E. 287; Pal-
lers V. SoUers, (Md. 93) 26 Atl. E.
188; Kofe v. Utler, 101 Pa. St. 27;
Com. V. Moorhead, (Pa.) 12 Atl. R.
424; Philadelphia v. Phila. etc. E.
Co., 58 Pa. St. 263; Mayor v. Cornell,
6 Coldw. 412; Almy v. Church, (E. I.
93) 26 Atl. R. 58; People v. Pope, 53
Cal. 437; Visalia v. Jacob, 65 lb. 434;
Wolfe V. Sullivan, (Ind. 93) 32 N. E.
E. 1017; Logan Co. v. Lincoln, 81
111. 156; Jersey City v. State, 30 N.
J. L. 521; Crocker v. Collins, (S. C.
93) 15 S. E. E. 951; People v. Pope,
53 Cal. 437; Sims v. Frankfort, 79
Ind. 446; Coleman v. Thurmond, 56
Tex. 514; McTarnahan v. Pike, 91
Cal. 540; Board v. Martin, 92 lb. 209;
San Francisco v. Bradbury, lb.
414; Taylor v. Phillippi, 14 S. E. R.
130; 35 W. Va. 554.
613
312
MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
by the sovereignty, make such obstruction other than a nui-
sance, subject to the public right of abatement.^
Every repetition of a nuisance is indictable ; and upon gen-
eral principles, it is clear that no one ought to be allowed to
take such an advantage of his own wrong, as will enable him
to acquire for private and individual purposes public lands,
which by the policy of tlie law are taken out of the market
and made inalienable for such purposes.^ A distinction, how-
ever, has been made by some courts between the claims of the
State and of the municipality, based upon the assumed fact,
that the exemption from the statute is a prerogative of sov-
ereignty alone ; in other words, of the State.
The difference also is pointed out between the condition of
the lands and highways in the State, outside of the city limits
— frequently sparsely populated, subject to the intrusion of
squatters, and distant from the central government ; and the
condition of the town or city — thickly inhabited and with the
proper officials close at hand, and ready to prevent encroach-
ments.^
• Dil. Miin. Corp. § 669.
- Elliott on Eoads and Streets, p.
669; Sims v. Chattanooga, 1 Lea,
694; Com. v. McDonald, 16 R. & S.
(Pa.) 390; Barter v. Com., 3 Pa. 253;
Penny Pot Landing Cas., 16 Pa. St.
79; Phila. v. Pliila. etc., 58 Pa. St.
2.o3.' In Com. v. Alburger, 1 Whart.
469, it was said: "These principles
pervade the laws of the most en-
lightened nations as well as our own
code, and are essential to the protec-
tion of public rights, which would
be gradually frittered away, if the
want of complaint or prosecution
gave the party a right. Individuals
may reasonably be held to a limited
period to enforce their rights against
adverse occupants, because they have
an interest sufficient to make them
vigilant. But in public rights of
property, each individual feels but
a slight interest, and rather tolerates
even a manifest encroachment than
seeks a dispute to set it right." See,
614
also, Indianapolis etc. v. Eoss, 47
Ind. 25; New Orleans v. Maggioli,
4 La. An. 73 ; Ingram v. Pol. Jury,
20 lb. 226; Delabigarre v. Sec. Mu-
nic, 3 lb. 237; Shreveport v. Wal-
pole, 22 lb. 526; Staffordshire v.
Prop'rs etc. Law Hep., 1 E. & I.
Appeals, 254; Rochdale Can. Co. v.
RadclifEe, 18 Q. B. 287; Elwell v.
Prop'rs etc., 3 H. of L. Cases, 812;
Grand Surrey Can. Co. v. Hall, 1 M.
& Gr. 392; see, also, as bearing upon
adverse possession against a munici-
pal corporation, Dil. Mun. Corp.
§§667-675; Henshaw v. Hunting,
1 Gray, 203 ; Fox v. Hart, 11 Ohio,
414; Com'rs v. Taylor, 2 Bay (S. C.)
282; Oustott v. Murray, 22 Iowa,
457; McFarlane v. Kerr, 10 Bosw.
(ISr. Y.) 249; Kellogg v. Thompson,
66 N. Y. 88; State v. Pettis, 7 Rich.
(S. C.) Law, 390.
3 Wheeling v. Campbell, 12 W. Va.
36; Dil. Mun. Corp., 473.
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§313
There are some extraordinary and exceptional cases, in which
the courts have applied the doctrines of equitable estoppel to
prevent the municipality from asserting its title to lands, once
a part of the highway, whicli had been encroached upon by the
abutting owner ; where, through the criminal or culpable negli-
gence of the municipal authorities, the abutting owner has been
induced to rely upon his apparently good title, and where he
would suffer irreparable damage, if the municipality were now
allowed to assert its title.^ But this cannot be safely taken as
a definitely settled rule.^
§ 313. Deflnition, character and construction of public
bridges. — A public bridge is a structure, erected across a nat-
ural or artificial water course and employed by the public in
traversing the stream.^ The erection of a public bridge is the
"laying out of a highway,"* and "the principal circumstance
necessary to constitute a public bridge is that the people at
large may have a free and uninterrupted use of it, not upon
sufferance, but as a matter of right." ^
Such a bridge may be erected by the municipal authorities
1 Meyer v. Graham, (Neb. 92) 50 N.
W. R. 763; Simplot v. Dubuque, 49
Iowa, 630; Quincy v. C. B. & Q. E.
K.,92 111. 21; Ramsay V. Clinton Co.,
lb. 226; Flynn v. Detroit, 93 Mich.
590; 53 N. W. R. 815; Check v. Au-
rora, 92 Ind. 107; Com'rs v. Huff, 91
lb. 333; Waterloo v. Union Mill, 72
Iowa, 437 ; Orr v. O'Brien, 77 lb. 258 ;
Brooks V. Riding, 40 Ind. 15 ; Devaux
'/. Detroit, Harring. Oh. (Mich.) 98;
Big Rapids v. Comstock, 65 Mich. 78;
s. c, 31 N. W. Rep. 811; Elliott v.
Williamson, 11 Lea, 38; Lane v. Ken-
nedy, 13 Ohio St. 42, 49.
2 See Tiedeman's Equity Jurispru-
dence, §§ 106-115, on explanation and
scope of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel.
5 Elliott on Roads and Streets, 21;
see, also. Com. v. Pittston F. B. Co.,
(Pa. 92) 24 Atl. R. 87; Enfield Bridge
Co. V. Hartford, 17 Conn. 40; Tolland
V. Wilmington, 26 lb. 578; Board
etc. V. Strader, 18 jST. J. L. 108; Mc-
Kinleyv. Freeh., 29 N. J. Eq. 164;
Whitall V. Freeholders, 40 N. J. L.
302; State v. Gloucester, lb. 302;
Board of Com'rs v. Beirly, 23 N. E.
R. 672; 122 Ind. 46; Duncan v. State,
(Fla. 92) 10 So. R. 815 (bridge de-
fined); State V. Demarce, 80 Ind.
520; State v. Gorham, 37 Me. 451;
White V. Quincy, 97 Mass. 430; Board
V. Brown, 89 Ind. 48, 52.
* Washer v. Bullet Co., 110 U. S.
558; San Luis Obispo v. White, (Cal.
91) 24 Pao. 864; People v. Com'rs, 4
Neb. 150; Goshen v. Myers, 119 Ind.
196; People v. President, 23 Wend.
254; Mandershld v. Dubuque, 29
Iowa, 73; Jones v. Keith, 37 Tex.
394; Beaiver v. Manchester, L. J. 26
Q. B. 311; Parker v. Bos. & M. R. R.,
4 Cush. 107; Com. v. Cent. Bridge
Corp., 12 lb. 244; Chicago v. Pow-
ers, 42 111. 169; Rush v. Davenport,
6 Iowa, 443.
5 Woolrych on Ways, 196, cited in
Elliott on Roads and Streets, 22.
615
§313
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
at public expense, by a turnpike or bridge^ corporation, or by-
individuals and dedicated to public use.^ On the principle that
acceptance will be inferred from the beneficial nature of a grant,
a bridge, built by an individual, but of which the public has
the use, is deemed a public bridge.* A bridge may be open to
the public ; yet, if erected or maintained for private gain, the
builder and not the public will be responsible for its repair.*
The municipal authorities may either by express acceptance,
or by laying out a road, so that the private bridge becomes a
part of the highway or street, adopt a bridge which has been
constructed by individuals ; and the city thereby assumes charge
of the bridge, and the duty to keep it safe and fit for use.*
Although highways and bridges are similar, in that both are
used for the passage of the public, it is by no means true that
the rules of law applicable to the former have equal application
to the latter ; and, in order to charge a person with failure to
maintain a bridge, it will not be sufficient to use the word
" highway," in imposing such a burden. " Highway " does not
include a " bridge." ^
The word " bridge " signifies the whole structure, including
the approaches, abutments, anchorages, piers and all parts nec-
essary to make it safe and convenient for public use.'^ Although
1 Rex V. West Elding etc., 2 East,
342; Callendar v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 432.
- Pisoa. B. Co. V. New Hampshire,
7 N. H. 59.
3 State V. Compton, 2 N. H. 513;
Heacook v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58.
«Dygert v. Schenk, 23 Wend. 446;
Heacook v. Sherman, 14 lb. 58;
Phoenixville v. Phoenix Iron Co., 45
Pa. St. 135. A good illustration of
this principle is found in the erection
of a bridge carrying the highway
over a canal or railway cutting, and
which is required to be kept in re-
pair by the canal or railway com-
pany, the burden being imposed
upon such company as the condition
of authorizing this intersection of
the highway: Lowell v. Prop'rs, 104
Mass. 18.
6 Mayor v. Sheffield, 4 Wall. 180;
Houfe V. Town, 34 Wis. U08; State v.
616
Supervisors, 41 lb. 28; Bislier v.
Eichard, 9 Ohio St. 495; Dayton v.
Euthland, 84 111. 2*79; Batty v. Dux-
berry, 24 Vt. 155; State v. Board,
80 lud. 4Y8.
^ State V. Canterbury, 8 Foster,
(N. H.) 195.
'Tinkham v. Town of Stookbridge,
24 Atl. Eep. 761; 64 Vt. 480; Bard-
well V. Jamaica, 15 lb. 442; Com. v.
Deerfleld, 6 Allen, 449; Whicher v.
Somerville, 138 Mass. 454; CMnton
Bridge, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 454, 462;
Duncan v. State, (Fla. 92) 10 So. Rep.
815; Penn. Towns, v. Perry Co., 78
Pa. St. 457; Everett v. Beisly, 24 Atl.
Rep. 700; 150 Pa. St. 152; Watson v.
Proprietors, 14 Me. 201; Com'rs v.
Pittston, (Pa. 92) 24 All. Eep. 87;
Tolland v. Willington, 26 Conn. 578;
Board of Com'rs v. Beirly, 23 N. E.
It. 672; 122 Ind. 46; Proprietors, etc.
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§314
the question, whether a structure is or is not a bridge, is usuall}'
one of law, it may under peculiar circumstances be one of fact
for the jury. So, also, what are parts of a bridge.^
§ 314. Legislative and municipal powers •ver bridges
When the power is possessed by a municipal corporation to
build or maintain bridges, it is always conferred upon it by
statute, expressly or by necessary or reasonable implication.^
And, in America, any one who claims the right to bridge over
a navigable stream, must show statutory authority.^ A general
authorization, " to lay out and open " highways or streets, does
not empower a municipality to build bridges across navigable
streams, however it might be with respect to those not navigable.*
Although there has been some conflict of the cases, it is now
well settled that a State may authorize a municipal or other
corporation to place a bridge across a navigable stream, al-
though navigation may thereby be interfered with ; ^ and the
V. Hoboken, etc., 13 N. J. Eq. 504;
Board v. K. & V. Grav. Road Co.,
87 Ind. 502; contra, Carter v. Bos. &
Prov. R. R. Co., 139 Mass. 525; Swan-
zey v. Somerset, 132 lb. 312; More-
land V. Mitchell Co., 40 Iowa, 394;
Nims V. Boone Co., 66 lb. 272.
iPolland V. Willington, 26 Conn.
578; Moreland v. Mitchell Co., 40
Iowa, 394; Reg. v. Southampton, 14
Eng. L. Eq. 116; Bard well v. Jamai-
ca, 15 Vt. 442; Reg. v. Gloucester-
shire, 1 Car. & M. 506.
2 Freeholders v. State, 42 jST. J. 263;
Conn. V. Breed, 4 Pick. 460 ; Balti-
more V. StoU, 52 Md. 435 ; Humphrey
T. Armstrong Co., 56 Pa. St. 204;
Com. V. Taunton, 7 Allen, 309; Sa^
vannah v. State, 4 Ga. 26 ; Penn. Tp.
V. Perry Co., 78 Pa. St. 457; Queen
V. Inh., 6 Mod. 307; Beatty v. Titus,
47 N. J. L. 89; Springfield v. Conn.
E. R., 4 Cush. 637; Fall Riv. I. W. v.
Old Colony E. R., 5 Allen, 221.
8 Whitehead v. Jessup, (93) 53 Fed.
707; People v. Sara. R. R. Co., 15
Wend. 130; Mohawk B. Co. v. Utica
E. E., 6 Paige, 554; Pall Riv. etc. v.
Old Col. R. R., 5 Allen, 221; State v.
Oldtown B. Co., 85 Me. 17; Miller v.
Prairie du Chien R. R., 34 Wis. 533;
Costello V. Landwehr, 28 lb. 533;
Union Pac. E. R. v. Hall, 91 U. S.
343; Saugatuck B. Co. v. Westport,
39 Conn. 337; Boston, etc. v. Boston
R. R., 23 Pick. 360.
* Snyder v. Poster, 77 Iowa, 638;
Snyder v. Foster, supra ; Com. v.
Charlestown, 1 Pick. 130; Arundel
V. McCuUoch, 10 Mass. 70; Maxwell
V. Bay Bridge Co., 41 Mich. 453; see
Elliott, Roads and Streets, p. 35.
5 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 ;
Williams v. Beardsley, 2 Ind. 59;
Gilman v. Phila., 3 Wall. 713; Bridge
Co. V. U. S., 105 U. S. 470; Escauaba
V. Chicago, 107 lb. 678; Cardwell
V. Bridge Co., 113 lb. 205 ; Wheeling
Bridge Case, 13 How 518; Com. v.
Breed, '4 Pick. 460; Carter v. Pro-
prietors, 104 Mass. 236; People v.
Kelly, 76 N. Y. 475; Packet Co. v.
Peoria, etc., 38 111. 467; People v.
Rensselaer, etc., 15 Wend. 113;
Wilson V. Blackb. C. Cr. etc., 2
Peters, 245; Cox. v. State, 3 Blackf.
193; Palmer v. Cuyahoga Co., 3 Mc-
Lean. 226; Chicago V. McGinn, 51 111.
617
§ 314 a. MUNICIPAL COBPOBATIONS. [CH. XVI.
corporation, upon which has been conferred this privilege, can-
not be held liable for damages from such interference, as long
as there is no negligence on its part, and proper skill and dili-
gence are employed.^
The right to navigate a stream is one which should be jeal-
ously guarded ; and although in a great public emergency or
necessity it may possibly be destroyed or taken away, in the ex-
ercise of the police power ; ^ yet, statutes, conferring the power
to erect bridges, should be strictly construed in protection of
the right of navigation of the streams.^ Under the common
law, the right of exacting toll imposed upon a municipal corpo^
ration the duty of keeping its bridges safe for public use, on the
theory that the corporation thereby derives a private benefit.*
§ 314 a. National control over the construction and
maintenance of bridges. — As a general proposition, the pow-
er to regulate the use of navigable rivers resides in the States,
through which the rivers flow. And the only constitutional
limitation upon the State's power of control, as against the
United States government, is that which arises by implication
from the express grant to Congress of the power to regulate
foreign and interstate commerce. Inasmuch as a large part of
this commerce is carried on by the use of the navigable streams
of the country, it has been uniformly held by the courts, both
Federal and State, that the Federal power to regulate com-
merce includes the power to institute regulations for the use
and control of those streams which are used in the prosecution
of foreign and interstate commerce.^ But inasmuch as all
266; Bailey v. Phila. etc., 4 Harr.
389; Pumphrey v. Baltimore, 47 Md.
145; Hamilton v. Vicksburg, etc.,
34 La. An. 970; Wisconsin, etc. v.
Manson, 43 Wis. 255.
1 Hamilton v. Viclcsburg, etc., 119
U. S. 281; Carolina S. B. Co. v. Kail-
road, .30 S. C. 539; Alabama S. K.
Co. V. Railroad, 87 Ala. 154. See
Shawnee Co. v. Topeka, 39 Kan. 197;
18 Pac. R. 161 ; Delta Lumber Co. v.
Board, (Mich.) 40 N. W. E. 1.
2 Passaic Bridge Cases, 3 Wall. 782;
Pound V. Turck, 95 U. S. 459; State
V. Eau Claire, 40 Wis. 533.
3 Stevens Pt. Boom Co. v. Reilly,
618
46 Wis 237; Boston v. Crowley, 38
Fed. Rep. 202; Dugan v. Bridge Co.,
27 Pa. St. 303; Hickok v. Hine, 23
Ohio St. 523; State v. Freeport, 43
Me. 198.
* Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass.
489; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H.
289; Biglow v. Randolph, 14 Gray,
543; Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511;
Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. St. 54; Al-
drich V. Tripp, 11 R. I. 141.
5 United States v. E. & H. B. Co.,
45 Fed. Rep. 414; Rhea v. Newport,
etc. Co., 50 Fed. Rep. 16; State v.
Leighton, 22 Atl. Rep. 380; 83 Me.
419.
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 314 a.
streams may be used in the canyiiig on of the domestic com-
merce, and serve other local interests, the congressional power
of control does not exclude State regulation altogether. The
power of the State to regulate the streams, which may be used
in interstate commerce, is unaffected, as long as Congress does
not exercise its power; and in any case the State regulations
are void only so far as they conflict with the regulations of
Congress.^ In applying this general rule of constitutional lim-
itation to the construction of bridges over navigable streams,
it has been held that if the stream, over which it is proposed
to construct a bridge, is one which is subject to congressional
regulations, because it is used in the conduct of interstate com-
merce, the authority to construct the bridge may be granted
by Congress or by the State Legislature. If Congress grants
the franchise, the interference of the bridge with interstate
commerce will constitute no objection to the legality of the
structure — the determination of Congress, that it causes only
a reasonable interference with tlie navigation of the stream,
being conclusive, in the same manner as a like determination
of the State Legislature is, in i-espect to bridges constructed
over streams not adapted for use in interstate commerce. But
if the State Legislature autliorize the construction of a bridge
over a stream used in interstate commerce, — inasmuch as the
interference with interstate commerce by the State is only per-
missive, and secondary to the primary control of Congress, —
the judgment of the Legislature, that the bridge causes only a
reasonable interference with navigation, which is justiflable by
the increased facilities for rapid transportation which the bridge
affords, is not conclusive ; and the ultimate decision, in the ab-
sence of congressional action, rests with the Federal Courts,
who are deemed to have the power to pass upon the reason-
ableness of the interference with navigation, and to cause the
bridge to be removed, if it is found to interfere materially with
the use of the stream in foreign or interstate commerce.^ But
1 Cooley's Const. Llm. 730; Tied-
eman's Lira, of Police Power, § 203;
Wilson V. Black Bird Creek Marsh
Co., 2 Pet. 245; Wheeling Bridge
Case, 13 How. 518; 18 How. 421;
Oilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. VIS;
Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84;
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 ; Es-
canaba Company v. Chicago, 107 U.
S. 678.
2 Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How.
518; Columbus Ins. Co. v. Peoria
Bridge Co., 6 McLean, 70, 209; Jolly
V. Terre Haute Drawbridge Co., 6
619
§315
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
even after a bridge has been condemned by a Federal court,
because of its unreasonable interference with interstate com-
merce, Congress may interpose, in the exercise of its power to
regulate commerce, and declare the bridge to be a lawful
structure.^
In consequence of these rulings, the consent of Congress, or
the national authorities, to the construction of a bridge, is now
always obtained in advance, whenever it is constructed over a
stream, which is more or less adapted to use in interstate com-
merce.^
§ 315. County liability for maintenance and repair of
public bridges. — At common law the duty of repairing public
bridges was incumbent upon the county in which they were
located ; ^ and while this rule has been applied in some cases in
America,* it may be said that this responsibility of counties to
repair bridges has never prevailed generally in this country.^
It seems to be the general rule that a county is liable onlj-
for the repair of such bridges, which it is by statute authorized
or commanded to build and maintain ; ^ and it has been held that
county funds cannot be used, without statutory authority, to
aid in the construction of toll bridges, or even of free bridges.'
But in Iowa, counties are permitted to aid in the construction
of free bridges, within municipal limits, with the consent of the
city.8
borough, 85 Ala. 590; Huffman v.
San Joaquin Co., 21 Gal. 426.
^ Taylor v. Davis Co., 40 Iowa, 295 ;
State V. Wood Co., (Wis.) 40 N. W. E.
381; Pandeman v. St. Charles Co.,
(Mo. 92) 19 S. W. E. 733; Helgel v.
Wichita Co., (Tex. 92) 19 Ibl 562;
Arnold v. Henry Co., 81 Ga. 730;
Wabash v. Pearson, (Ind.) 22 K. E.
E. 134; Dougherty V. Supervisors, 12
Pa. Co. Ct. 304; In re Kansas City B.
& I. Co., 35 Kans. 557; GrayviUe v.
Whitaker, 85 111. 439; Moreland v.
Mitchell, 40 lb. 394; Board v. Mitcli-
elltown, (Ind. 92) 30 N. E. Eep. 937;
Skinner v. Henderson, (Fla. 90) 7 So.
Rep. 464.
' Colton V. Hanchet, 13 111. 615.
8 Bell V. Foutch, 21 Iowa, 119; Bar
rett V. Brooks, lb. 144.
McLean, 237; Com'rs of St. Joseph
Co. V. Pidge, 5 Ind. 13.
'Wheeling Bridge Case, 18 How.
421.
2 Eex V. W. Riding, 5 Burr. 2594;
Com'rs V. Martin, 4 Mich. 557; State
V. Campton, 2 N. H. 513; Board v.
Washington Tp., (Ind.) 23 N. E. Eep.
257.
3 Hill V. Boston, 122 Mass. 344;
Washer v. BuUett Co., 110 U. S. 558;
* In re Waverly Borough, 12 Pa. Co.
Ct. 669; Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn.
375 ; Gilman v. Laconia, 55 N". H. 130;
Weightraan v. Washington, 1 Black,
39; Mackinnon v. Pei-son, 25 Eng. L.
& Eq. 457.
5 1/1 re Spier, 115 N. Y. 389; Hill
V. Supervisors, 12 lb. 52; Myers v.
Com., 110 Pa. St. 217; Lee v. Yar-
620
CH. XVI.J STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§316
§ 316. Rights and duties of municipal corporations in
building, rebuilding and maintaining bridges If the ex-
pediency or necessity of buildirig,i or rebuilding bridges,^ be left
to the discretion of the local authorities, the courts will not inter-
fere in the exercise of what under the circumstances is a dis-
cretionary power.3 But if the duty to repair or rebuild be
imperative, mandamus will lie.* When, in locating or building
bridges, the rights of private property are impaired or invaded,
an injunction will be granted against the municipal corporation,
when acting illegally ; ^ but as a rule the courts will not interfere
except upon clear proof of fraud or bad faith, or when the mu-
nicipal or local authorities are exceeding their powers.
Municipal corporations have a qualified ownership in the
bridges they build, as trustees for the public ; and may maintain
all actions which are necessary to protect such ownership and
the public use of the structure. This ownership continues,
even after the bridge may have been damaged to such an ex-
tent as to render it unfit for public use.^
The Legislature may provide that the expense attendant upon
the construction, maintenance or repair of a bridge connecting
two cities, be divided between them ; "^ and if one of them under
such a statute pays all the expenses, it is entitled to reimburse-
ment by the other.^ It has been held, however, in such a case
that, where one pays more than its share because of an erro-
1 Macon Co. v. People, 121 111. 616;
Kankakee v. People, 24 III. App. 410;
Com. T. Charleston, 1 Pick. 180;
Hamilton v. State, 113 Ind. 179; 15
N. E. Rep. 258; Travis v. Skinner, 40
K W. Rep. 234.
estate V. Board, 113 Ind. 179.
8 State V. Mt. Pleasant, 16 Wis. 613;
Jefeerson v. St. Louis Co., (Mo. 93)
21 S. W. Rep. 217.
* Richards v. County, 120 Mass.
401; State v. Bramwell, (Kan.) 18
Pac. R. 9o2; State v. Board, 80 Ind.
478; Walker v. Kansas City, 99 Mo.
647; State v. Winterberg, 80 lb. 519;
Howe V. Com'rs, 47 Pa. St. 361; see
chapter on Mandamus, §§362, 377;
Augusta etc, In re, 12 Up. Can. Q.
B. 522; State v. County Co., 11 S. E.
R. 72; 33 W. Va. 589; Ottawa ,. Peo-
ple, 48 111. 233; People v. Dutchess
Co., 58 N. Y. 152.
5 Kyle V. Board, 94 Ind. 115; Quin-
ton V. Burton, 61 Iowa, 471.
6 City V. Shirk, 88 Ind. 563; Shirk
V. Board, 106 lb. 573; St. Louis B.
Co. V. Curtis, 103 111. 410.
' Kendall v. County, 12 111. App.
210; MoHardy v. Corporation etc., 1
App. C. 629; 39 Q. B. (Canada) 546;
State V. Canterbury, 58 N. H. 195.
8 Pittsburgh v. Clarksville, 58 N.
H. 291; see as to requisites to sup-
port the claim, Browning v. Board,
44 Ind. 11; Board v. Thompson, 106
lb. 534; Browning V. Board, 44 lb. 11.
621
§317
MUNICIPAT. COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
neous construction of the statute, it cannot recover from the
other.^
§ 317. Private bridges on or intersecting highways. —
When a corporation in constructing a canal or railroad, inter-
sects a street or other highway in such a manner, that a bridge
on the highway becomes necessarj'^ for its continued use, the duty
of constructing and maintaining such a bridge is incumbent upon
the private corporation.^ This duty is imperative and will be
enforced by mandamus,^ and, although usually imposed by stat-
ute, is equally binding in the absence of statute.*
Although owners of private bridges, which are used by the
public, are not obliged to build or maintain structures that will
support a very unusual weight, such as a railroad car,^ or a wagon
oveiloaded, or loaded in an unsafe or extraordinary way,^ they
must use ordinary care to keep their bridges reasonably safe for
travel and traffic.'^ Where corporations operate canals or rail-
roads for their own use, and erect bridges which intersect streets
or high ways, they must do so in such a way as not to interfere
with the public use of the street, or render its use unnecessarily
dangerous.^ The bridge should be constructed and maintained,
with a degree of care proportionate to the known or indicated
dangers, although unusual.^
If a private corporation build a toll bridge upon a public
highway, the corporation may, if it so elect, take such bridge
1 JeTerson Co. v. St. Loiiis Co.,
(Mo. 93) 21 S. AV. R. 217; Flynn v.
Com'rs, (N. T.) 22 N. E. R. 1109; In-
hiibitants v. Charlestown etc., 7 Met.
70; Rex v. Inhabitants, 14 East, 319;
Rex V. Inhabitants, 13 lb. 220.
2 Wayne Co. etc. v. Berry, .5 lud.
286; Board v. White Water etc. Co.,
2 lb. 162.
3 Cambridge v. Charlestown etc., 7
Met. 70; State v. Gorhain, 37 Me. 451;
Reg. V. Wycomber, L. R. 2 Q. B. 310.
* People V. Chicago etc., 67 111. 118.
* Yordy v. Marshall Co., (Iowa, 93)
53 N. W. R. 298; Monongahela B. Co.
V. Pittsburgh etc., 114 Pa. St. 478;
Clulow V. McClelland, 151 lb. 583.
6 Dexter v. Canton, 79 Me. 463 ;
Clapp V. Town, 3 N. Y. State Rep.
622
516; McCormick v. Washington, 112
Pa. St. 185.
' Board v. Cruiston, 32 N. E. R.
735; Stokes v. Tift, 64 Ga. 312; State
V. Zauesville etc., 16 Ohio St. 308.
8 State V. Minn. etc. Co., 38 Minn.
246; 39 N. W. R. 153; Rexford ^.
State, 105 N. Y. 229; Town of Rox-
bury V. B. R. Co., (Vt. 92) 14 Atl. K.
92; Appeal of Philadelphia etc. Co.,
15 Atl. R. 476; B. & O. R. Co. v. Wal-
ker, 45 Ohio St. 577; 16 N. E. R. 475.
3 N. Y. etc. Co. V. State, (N. J. 91)
13 Atl. R. 1 ; Penn. Ry. Co. v. Brad-
dock, 31 W. N. C. 311; Ohio etc. Co.
V. Bridgeport, 43 HI. Ap. 89; Boston
etc. Co. V. Cambridge, (Mass. 93) 34
lif. E. R. 382; Parker v. Truesdale,
(Minn. 93) 55 N. Y. S. 901; Humphrey
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§318
upon the dissolution of the company or the expiration of its
franchise ; upon the ground that such bridge has become a part
of a regular system of highways for public use, and hence can-
not be diverted to private purposes.^
§ 318. Turnpikes. — A road or highviray, which is constructed
and maintained by a private corporation, possessing the legal
right to gather toll from travelers, is a turnpike ; ^ the theory
of the law being, that the tolls paid are the equivalent of taxes
and assessments,^ and that no additional burden is thereby im-
posed with the change in the mode of collection.* It is within
the legislative power to grant franchises to turnpike corpora-
tions to construct turnpikes and collect toll on existing public
roads.^ And a turnpike may even be established on a city
street.^
Although turnpikes are operated for private gain and are
private property, they become the property of the municipal,
or other local authorities, upon abandonment by their owners
or forfeiture of their franchise.^ And this should be the uni-
versal rule ; although it has been held that, where the fee of the
turnpike is in the corporation operating it, the land does not
pass to the public on abandonment of the turnpike.^ The
maxim " once a highway always a highway " is as applicable
to a turnpike as to a street ; and the company to which the
V. Armstrong, 3 Brewster, 49; Gray
V. Harris, 107 Mass. 492 ; Louisville
etc. V. Thompson, 107 Ind. 442; Fort
Dodge V. Minn. B. R. Co., (Iowa, 93)
54 N. W. E. 243.
1 Elliott Roads and Streets, p. 34;
compare SMrk v. Board, 106 Ind.
573; see §318, where the same i-ule
is adopted in relation to abandon-
ment of a turnpike.
2 State V. Haight, 30 N. J. Law,
448; Nefe V. Mooresville, 66 Ind. 279.
» Craig V. People, 47 111. 487; Ed-
ward V. Payne, 17 Barb. 567; Regina
V. E. & W. Dock, 22 Eng. L. & E.
113; see Buncombe T. Co. v. Baxter,
10 Ired. 222; Seneca E. Co. v. Au-
burn etc., 5 Hill, 170; Northern B.
etc. V. London, etc., 6 M. & W. 428.
'Walker V. Caywood, 31 N. Y. 51;
Com. V. Wilkinson, 16 Pick. 175;
"Willis V. Farley, 24 Cal. 490; Turn.
Co. V. Atkinson, 1 Sneed, 426; Bene-
dict V. Groit, 3 Barb. 459; Plank Rd.
Co. V. Thomas, 8 Harris, 91.
5 People V. Com'rs, 37 N. T. 360;
State V. Hampton, 2 N. H. 22; Paw-
ton T. Co. V. Bishop, 11 Vt. 198; Mc-
Kay V. D. & E. R. R., 2 Mich. 139;
Chagrin F. Co. v. Cane, 2 Ohio St.
419; Noblesville T. Co. v. Baker, 4
Humph. 315.
^ Stormfeltz v. Manor Turn. Co.,
13 Pa. St. 555; Milakers v. Foster, 6
Oregon, 378.
'St. Clair Co. etc. v. Illinois, 96 U.
S. 63; Craig v. People, 47 111. 487;
State V. Dayton etc., 10 Nev. 155;
State V. Duff, (Ky. 91) 49 N. W. E. 23;
State V. Lawrence Bdg. Co., 22 Kan.
438; State v. Flanagan, 67 Ind. 140.
8 People V. N. & S. etc., 86 N. T. 1
623
§ 319 MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIOSS. [CH. XVI.
fiiinchise had been granted, lias received in the tolls paid to
them all the benefit, which was contemplated by the Legislature.
A turnpike is a public highway and should not be diverted
to private use any more than a street dedicated by the owner ;
particularly, when, as is frequently the case, the local authori-
ties have made it a part of its own system of streets or roads.^
In granting the franchise, there is nothing from which it may
be inferred, that the road so established shall ever be anything
but a public highway. On the other hand, there is a strong
implication that its use as a public highway shall only cease, in
strict conformity to law, b}' abandonment by the public.^
§ 319. Extent of municipal power over turnpikes. —It is
clear that when, upon the surrender or forfeiture of its franchise
by the turnpike company, the municipality adopts the turnpike
as a public road or street, it becomes vested with the power and
duty of maintaining and keeping it in repair, as fully as though
it had laid out the way originally.
But a more difficult problem arises when a turnpike exists
and is used by the public as a part of the existing system of
city streets.^ Inasmuch as the franchise of the turnpike cor-
poration is beyond impairment, it follows that the municipality
cannot exercise that extensive power of supervision and regu-
lation over turnpikes, which it usually possesses over streets ;
and hence, it cannot be held to the same degree of responsibil-
ity for their condition.* But under the police power delegated
to them, the city authorities can undoubtedly make such ordi-
nances, and take such action, as will compel private coipora-
tions, operating turnpikes within the city limits, to keep them
in a reasonable condition of repair, and to adopt such precau-
tions that the public safety, health and convenience will not be
J. L. 395; state v. Hoboken, 30 lb.
225; Quinn v. Paterson, 2'7 lb. 35;
State V. Passaic Tump., 27 lb. 217.
As to plank roads, see State v. Jer-
sey City, 26 N. J. L. 445; McKay v.
Detroit etc., 2 Mich. 138; Detroit v.
Plank Ed., 12 Mich. 333; Keg. v. Cot-
tle, 3 Eng. L. Eq. 474.
* Indianapolis v. McCluer, 2 Ind.
147; Joliet v. Verley, 35 111. 58; Mc-
Cain V. State, 62 Ala. 138.
1 Cooley on Const. Limit. 660, 661.
2 state V. Western etc., 95 X. C. 602 ;
Craig v. People, 47 111. 487; People
V. Davidson, (Cal.) 21 Pac. R. 538;
.state V. Lake, 8 IS'ev. 270; Bridge
Corp. V. Lowell, 15 Gray, 106; Thomp-
son V. Mathews, 2 Edw. (X. Y.) Ch.
202; State v. Maine, 27 Conn. 641;
Dawes v. Hawkins, 8 C. B. (X. S.)
857.
" See as to extent of municipal con-
trol. State V. New Brunswick, 30 X.
624
CH. XVI.J STREETS, BRIDGES AKD TITENPIKES.
§319
endangered. In the absence of special statutory authorization,
there exists no authority on the part of a municipal corporation
to maintain or repair turnpikes, which are operated for gain by
a private corporation, upon the fundamental principle that money
raised by taxation can only be used for public purposes. The
fact that existing turnpikes are by the march of municipal im-
provement, or by legislative action, brought within city or town
limits, does not destroy the franchise.^ But turnpilse companies,
like owners of land, over which municipal jurisdiction has been
extended, are subject to all the municipal regulations, which
are at all applicable to them, or to their property.
Changes in the character of the country will require corre-
sponding changes in the character of the roads ; and when we
consider that the franchise is granted subject, as is private prop-
erty everywhere, to the burden of taxation which may become
necessary by the growth of population, we see no reason for
exempting such a company from its share of the expense or in-
convenience, attendant upon a transition from rural to muni-
cipal conditions and jurisdiction. ^ Thus, it is held that a turn-
pike company must change the grade of its road, to correspond
with the grade of streets intersecting it.^ If there is a statu-
tory obligation upon the turnpike corporation to repair its road,
and it neglects to do so, the municipality may repair it and col-
lect the cost from the company ; * and it would seem to be fi-ee
from reasonable doubt that the municipal corporation might
do the same in the absence of statutorj'' authority.
Adjoining landowners cannot be assessed for the expense
which is necessary to improve or repair a turnpike,^ as in the
case of a street; but they may be estopped from denying that
the way is a city street, by silent acquiescence in the repairs or
improvement.'' The fact, that the public use a turnpike as a
street, has been held to justify the municipality in treating it as
^ St. Catherines v. Gardner, 20 U.
Canada C. P. 107; Quinn v. Pater-
son, 27 N. J. L. 35; Detroit v. Plank
Rd. Co., 12 Mich. 333; People v. De-
troit, 37 lb. 195.
-See §§292, 329: grading streets;
Elliott Roads and Streets, p. 58; In-
dianapolis V. State, 37 Ind. 489.
8 People V. Squire, 107 N. Y. 593;
10
compare Erie v. Erie Canal Co., 59
Pa. St. 174.
4 Versailles V. Versailles Co., (Ky.)
10 S. W. Kep. 280.
6 Wilson V. Allegheny, 79 Pa. St.
272.
e Palmer v. Strumph, 29 Ind. 329;
State V. Fuller, 5 Vroom, 227.
625
§ 320
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS.
[CH. XVI.
a street ; and no one can successfully object, except the turn-
pike corporation.^
§ 320. Incidents of toll. — The right to take toll, although
arising sometimes at common law by prescription, ^ is usually
in America, like all other franchises, conferred by statute.^
And the provisions of the statute must be strictly observed and
followed, whenever they are at all material, as a condition pre-
cedent to the enjoyment of the franchise.* When an ambiguity
exists in the construction of a statute, which confers this fran-
chise, it will be resolved in favor of the public and against the
claimant.^ Toll as a rule can only be collected at the turnpike
gates,^ the location of which cannot be altered, after being
regularly established, unless it is authorized by statute, or
compelled by some overpowering necessity.'^ The turnpike cor-
poration must lay out its line within the territorial limit pre-
scribed by its charter ; and its gates must be located only at
such places as are legally provided for,* unless a discretionary
power in regard to their location is conferred, when the company
may, if it uses its discretion in a fair and reasonable manner,
so as not to harass or annoy the traveling public, establish the
toll gates at such places, and in such numbers, as it may see fit.'
The company can legally close its gates against any one re-
iConestoga, etc. Co. v. Lancaster
Co., 151 Pa. St. 543; State v. Passaic,
42 N. J. L. 524; Jersey City v. State,
I Vroom, 521 ; State v. Atlantic City,
5 lb. 99.
'Panton Turnpike Co. v. Bishop,
II Vt. 198; Yarmouth v. Eaton, 3
Burr, 1402; Harpurt v. Wils, 1 Mod.
47; Warren v. Pridaux, 1 lb. 104.
3 Boyle V. Phila. etc., 54 Pa. St.
314; Pa. E. E. Co. v. Sly, 65 lb. 210;
Covington etc. Co. v. Sandford, (Ky.
93) 20 S. W. Eep. 1031; Truman V.
Walgam, 2 Wils. 296.
* Charles Eiver Bridge v. Warren,
etc., 11 Pet. 422; Barti-am v. Cen. C.
Co., 25 Cal. 283; Eives v. Wood, 15
S. W. Rep. 131; Justices v. G. & W.
Co., 9 Ga. 475; Kemper v. Cinoin.
etc., 11 Ohio, 392.
^ Lees v. Manchester, 11 East, 645;
626
Hall V. Grantham, etc., 13 M. & W.
114.
*• Lincoln Ave. Co. v. Daum, 79 111.
299; Eussell v. Muldraugh, 13 Bush,
(Ky.) 307; Turnp. Co. v. Vandusen,
10 Vt. 199; comp. New Albany, etc.
V.Lewis, 49 Ind. 161 ; Patterson v.
Ind. etc. Co., 56 lb. 20.
'Hartford Co. v. Baker, 17 Pick.
432; State v. Norwalk Co., 10 Conn.
157; Turnp. Co. v. Hosmer, 12 lb.
361; Griffin v. House, 18 Johns. 397;
estate V. Douglas, 10 Oreg. 185;
Detroit, etc. Co. v. Mahoney, (Mich.)
36 N. W. Eep. 69.
8 The Cheshire Co. etc. v. Stevens,
10 N. H. 133: People v. Kingston,
etc., 23 Wend. 193; Mallory v. Aus-
tin, 7 Barb. 626; Stewart v. Eioh, 1
Caines, 182; Farmers, etc. v. Coven-
try, 10 Johns. 389.
CH. XVI.J STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§321
fusing to pay toll ; ^ and cutting or breaking down a toll gate,
thus lawfully closed, is in Indiana, and perhaps elsewhere, a
misdemeanor, beside being a civil injury .^ The Legislature may
exempt certain persons from paying toll by inserting in the
charter of the turnpike company a provision to that effect ; *
and the right of exacting tolls may also be waived by contract.
But while a turnpike companj' may by contract exempt certain
persons from the obligation to pay toll, it would seem that its
power, so to contract, was limited, as in tlie case of railroads
and other common carriers, by the rule that the same privileges
and rights must be impartially extended to all, and that the
tm-npike company cannot enter into contracts, which will un-
justly discriminate in favor of one class of the community, and
aid it in securing an unfair advantage over others.* Not only
may a turnpike company maintain an action to recover tolls
due,* but in some cases penalties are imposed by statutes for non-
payment,^ but no such penalty can be imposed by a corporate
by-law.^
§ 321. Law of the road. — In order that a proper and con-
venient use may be made of the highways by the public, cer-
tain rules have grown up as the result of a long continued and
uniform practice, which in some of the States have been ratified
and aiBrmed by statute.^
A traveler, generally, may legally occupy any portion of a
highway, not occupied by some one else.* In England the cus-
tomary rules for drivers are : First. Two parties meeting, each
must keep to the left. Second, in passing, the first person keep-
ing to the left, the other must pass on the off side. Third, in
crossing, the person coming transverse shall turn to the left, so
as to pass behind the other vehicle.^"
' Bock V. State, 50 Ind. 281.
2 State V. Walters, 64 Ind. 226.
' Tump. Co. V. Freeman, 14 Conn.
85; Harrison v. James, 2 Chltty, 347;
Hearsay v. Pruyn, 1 Johnson, 179;
Angell on Highways, (3d ed.) §359;
Stratton v. Herrick, 9 Johns. 356;
Stratton v. Hubel, 9 lb. 357; Pass.
Turn. Co. v. Langdon, 6 Vt. 546.
*Munn V. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113.
"Ayers v. Turnp. Co., 4 Halst. 33;
Peacock v. Harris, 10 East, 104;
Proprs. V. Taylor, 6 N. H. 499.
8 Morton, etc. v. Wysong, 51 Ind.
4; W. U. T. Co. V. Scircle, 103 lb. 227.
' Wayne v. Bosworth, 91 Ind. 210.
8 Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32, 44.
3 Poster V. Goddard, 40 Me. 64;
Johnson v. Small, 5 B. Mon. 25.
1" Elliott Roads ai;d Streets, p. 618,
ch. 31; Wayde v. Carr, 2 Dow. &
Ry. 255 ; Turley v. Thomas, 8 Carr.
& P. 103.
627
§321
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIOjSTS.
[CH. XVI.
In America the first of the above rules is reversed. In meet-
ing, each person must bear to the right.-"^ When it is provided
by statute that travelers shall go to the right of the " center
of the road," the center of the traveled part is meant.^ If the
usually traveled path is covered by snow, and another beaten
path parallel to it is used, persons who meet upon the latter
must turn to the right of its center.^ The above rule is not an
inflexible one, and one may under certain circumstances deviate
from it.*
The rule does not apply to a building which is being moved
along the road,^ nor to persons crossing the road.* Street rail-
roads are exempt from this rule, for their cars cannot be hauled
elsewhere than in the tracks, to the use of which they are en-
titled. But the cars must not be permitted to obstruct trav-
el^ at crossings, or elsewhere. Other vehicles are permitted
to use the tracks in a reasonable manner, and all persons have a
right to drive or walk on them, or to cross them, provided they
do not interrupt or impede the use of the tracks by the cai-s.^
A person violating the law of the road does so at his own risk,
and must in such a case use greater care.® If a collision takes
place, particularly in the dark,!" a presumption will exist against
the person violating this rule.^^
In this country on passing, the leading driver must turn to
1 Kennard v. Burton, 25 Me. 39;
Mahogany v. Ward, (R. I.) 17 Atl.
Eep. 860; Com. v. Allen, 11 Met. 403;
Wrinn V. Jones, 111 Mass. 350; O'Mal-
ley V. Dorn, 7 Wis. 236 ; McLane v.
Sharp, 2 HaiT. 481. The court will
take judicial notice of this custom.
Leame v. Bray, 3 East, 593.
2 Clark V. Com., 4 Pick. 125; Ear-
ing V. Lansing, 17 Wend. 185; Dan-
iels V. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32.
s Jacquith v. Richardson, 8 Met.
213; Smith v. Dygert, 12 Barb. 613.
* Kennard v. Burton, 25 Me. 39;
Strouse v. Whittlesy, 41 Conn. 559;
Dudley v. Bolles, 24 Wend. 465;
Beach v. Parmeuter, 23 Pa. St. 196;
Johnson v. Small, 5 B. Mon. 25.
s Graves v. Shattuck, 35 N. H. 257.
^ Lovejoy v. Dolan, 10 Cush. 495;
628
Morse v. S weenie, 15 Bradw. 486;
Lloyd V. Ogleby, 5 C. B. 667.
' Com. V. Temple, 14 Gray, 69; Be-
gan V. Eighth Av. etc. Co., 15 N. T.
380; Adolph V. Cen. Park etc. Co., 65
lb. 554; Same v. Same, 76 lb. 530.
» Adolph V. Cen. P. etc. Co., 76 N.
T. 530; Buhrens v. D. D. E. etc. Co.,
53 Hun, 571 ; Gov. St. Ry. Co. v. Han-
Ion, 53 Ala. 70; Shea v. Potrero, 44
Cal. 414; contra, Johnson v. Canal
St. Ry. Co., 27 La. An. 53.
9 Holland v. Bartch, (Ind.) 22 N.
E. B. 83; Pluckwell v. Wilson, 5 C.
& P. 375 ; Brooks v. Hart, 14 N. H.
307; Wilson v. Rockland etc. Co., 2
Harr. 67.
w Cruden v. Fentham, 2 Esp. 685.
11 Burdick v. Worrall, 4 Barb. 596;
Spofford V. Harlow, 3 Allen, 176.
CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES.
§321
either side of the road which will allow enough room on the
other side for the rear driver to pass,^ either to the right or to
the left as may be most convenient.'^ But the neglect or re-
fusal of the leading traveler to turn to one side does not justi-
fy the other in attempting to pass him at all hazards, or in
running 'him down. Persons using a highway owe to each
other the duty of ordinary care, and each may assume that the
other will employ that care.*
1 Bolton V. Colder, 1 Watts, 360.
2 Clifford V. Tyman, 61 N. H. 508.
8 Harpell v. Curtis, 1 E. D. Smith,
78; Baker v. Tehr, 97 Pa. St. 70; Pig-
gott V. Lilly, 27 N. W. Kep. 3; Aveg-
no V. Hart, 20 La. An. 235; Center
V. Finney, 17 Barb. 94; Burnham v.
Butler, 31 N. T. 480; Knowles v.
Crampton, 11 Atl. Eep. 593.
629
CHAPTER XVII.
LIABILITY or MXTNICIPAL CORPORATIONS FOR TORTS.
Section.
324 — Implied liability of munici-
pal corporations.
325 — Quasi-municipal corporations
not liable for breach of of-
ficial duty.
326 — Liability of municipal corpo-
rations for illegal taxes,
fines and licenses.
326o — Payment must be compul-
sory.
327 — Municipal corporations not
liable for nonperformance
of discretionary duties.
327a — Failure to abate nuisances.
B2n — Liability for negligent sup-
ply of water.
328 — Liability for manner in which
discretionary powers are
exercised.
329 — Consequential damage s —
Changes in the grade of
streets — Improvements.
330 — Constitutional and statutory
provisions, guaranteeing
compensation for property
damaged — Remedy.
331 — ^Municipal corporations not
liable for failure to enforce
ordinances.
;la — Liability for mistake as to
corporate powers.
332 — Municipality not liable for
neglect or misconduct of
health officers.
383 — Municipality not liable for
torts of police officials.
333a — Liability for torts of fire-
men.
334 — Liability for property des-
troyed by mobs and rioters.
630
Section
335 — ^Destruction of buildings to
prevent a conflagration.
335a — Destruction of property
under military and sanitary
regulations.
336 — Receipt of consideration, as
a ground of liability for
negligence.
836o — Liability as an owner of
property.
337 — How may negligence be
proven.
338 — Negligence of municipal sei-
vants — What must be
proven — Torts ultra vires.
338a — Who is a, municipal officer
or agent.
339 — Liability for the condition of
highways and streets —
Municipal ftnd quasi-rau-
nicipal corporations distin-
guished.
340 — Statutory liability for neglect
in maintenance and repair
of highways — Construc-
tion.
341 — Q uas 4-munioipal corpora-
tion, when liable for speci-
fic duties.
342 — Municipal liability for injury
from defective streets —
Horses taking fright.
343 — Railings or barriers, signs
and lights, to guard exca-
vations, areas, and base-
ments.
344 — ^Accidents caused by ice and
snow.
S44o — ^Negligence in lighting
streets.
CH. XVII.] LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL COEPORATIOlSrS. § 324
345 — Falling of weighty things in
highways.
346 — Right to go outside the trav-
eled path — Estoppel to
deny existence of highway
— Sidewalks.
347 — Liability for work given out
on contract — Liability for
torts of contractors.
348 — Liability for torts of abutters
— Liability of abutters for
the same.
349 — ^Liability for neglect in per-
formance of ministerial
duties.
350 — ^Defects and obstructions
created by municipal cor-
porations.
850a — Necessity for, and evidence
admissible, to show notice,
in order to charge corpora-
tion with negligence.
351 — Proximate cause.
352 — Contributory negligence.
352a — Damages in suits for negli-
gence.
353— Bridges.
354 — Water courses.
354a — Surface water.
355 — Drains and sewers.
§ 324. Implied liability of municipal corporations. — Mu-
nicipal corporations are the creatures of statute, and the powers
which they possess, and the duties which they perform, are in
the majority of eases wholly imposed and defined by the statute
law. It is therefoi'e a cardinal rule, that in every case the lia-
bility of a body created by statute must be determined upon
a true interpretation of the statute, by which it is created.^
When express statutory provisions declare the corporation to
be liable for a tortious act, or for failure to act, the question is
simply one of degree ; and, upon the facts being proven, little
remains to be done but to ascertain the extent to which the
corporation has been derelict, and the amount of the damages
sustained bj' the complainant. But when there is no express or
implied statutory municipal liability for tort, and a plain munic-
ipal duty has been violated with a consequent damage to some
one's person, or property, there is no general rule by which it
can be decided in every case whether a civil action will lie.^
As will be seen fartlier on, a great deal depends upon the na-
ture of the duty,^ which is incumbent upon the municipal corpo-
1 Mersey Docks v. Gibbs; Same v.
Penhallow, L. R. 1 H. L. Cases, 93;
1 H. & N. 439; Richmond v. Long's
Adm., 17 Gratt. 375; Southampton,
etc., Co. v. Local Board, 8 El. &
Bl. 812; Winch v. Conservators of
Thames, L. R. 9 C. P. C. 378. It
should be borne in mind in this con-
nection that in many States a liberal
statutory construction is expressly
commanded and the common lav/'
rule, that statutes in derogation
thereof are to be strictly construed,
is abolished. Stimpson's Statutes,
art. 102.
2Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R. I. 456;
Flynp V. Canton, 40 Md. 312; 2
Thomps. Neg., ch. 16.
8 Hill V. Boston, 122 Mass. 344.
631
§324
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. xvn.
ration ; and this is to so large an extent based upon the peculiar
facts and circumstances of each case, that it is best to refrain
from laying down any universal rule, and endeavor justly to
determine each case upon its own merits.^
Municipal duties may be divided into two classes : Fii-st,
governmental duties, which have been delegated to the city or
town by the people acting through the Legislature ; and which,
though performed within circumscribed territorial limits, serve
to benefit the people of the State ; and in the carrying out of
which the municipal corporation is only an agent of the State.^
Secondly, quasi-private duties, to be exercised for the peculiar
advantage of the municipal locality and its inhabitants ; and ex-
clusive of any benefit to be conferred upon any person outside
of the corporate jurisdiction. The first class of duties are the
duties of sovereignty, delegated though they be ; and for their
violation the municipality is no more liable, unless made so by
express statute, than is the State, whence they are derived.^
The second class of duties are not imposed as a burden, but con-
ferred on the municipal corporation and its inhabitants as a
benefit, to be accepted and exercised to the advantage of the
municipality alone, which the city receives somewhat as a pri-
vate proprietor. There is, therefore, no injustice in the rule of
law that these duties shall be carefully performed ; and that the
corporation shall be civilly liable in damages in all cases, where
a person is injured by reason of their negligent performance.*
1 Lloyd V. New York, 5 N. T. 369,
375; Cobb v. Dalton, 53 Ga. 426;
Conway v. Beaumont, 61 Tex. 10.
^Sebert v. Alpena, (Micb. 91) 43
N. W. E. 1098; Pettengillv. Tonkers,
22 N. E. E. 1095 ; 116 N. Y. 558; King
V. Osbkosb, 44 N. W. E. "745; 75 "Wis.
517; Michigan v. Boekling, 23 N. E.
E. 518; 122 Ind. 39; Snyder v. St.
Paul, (Minn. 93) 53 N. W. E. 763.
3 O'Eourkev. Sioux Falls, (S. D. 93)
54 N. W. E. 1044; Lawson v. Seattle,
(Wash. 93) 33 Pao. E. 347; Eabway
V. Carter, (y. J. 93) 26 Atl. E. 96;
Columbus etc. Co. v. Columbus,
(Ohio 93) 33 N. E. E. 292; Brum-
baugh V. Philadelphia, 154 Pa. St.
632
109; Howland v. Maynard, (Mass. 93)
34 N. E. E. 515; Eeed v. Madison, 83
Wis. 171; O'Eourke v. Sioux City,
(ISTeb. 93) 54 N. W. E. 1044; Snider
V. St. Paul, (Minn. 93) 53 ST. W. K.
763; Ulrich V. St. LouLs, 112 Mo. 138;
Peters v. Lindsborg, 40 Kan. 654; Le
Clef V. Concordia, 21 Pao. Eep. 272;
Hardy v. Keane, 52 N. H. 570; New
York etc. Co. v. Brooklyn, 71 K. T.
580; Summers v. Daviess Co., 103
Ind. 262; Deti-oit v. Blakely, 21 Mich.
84; McCarthy v. Boston, 135 Mass-.
197; Sullivan v. Holyoke, 135 lb. 273.
* Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex'.
118; Hewison v. New Haven, 37
Conn. 475. In these two cases the
CH. XVn.] LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. § 325
§ 325. Quasi-mnnicipal corporations not liable for
breacll of official duty. — Following the principle that there isj
in the absence of statute expressly creating it, no liability for
the nonperformance or negligent performance of the purely
public duties, which are imposed upon municipal corporations
as a part of the sovereign power of the State, the courts have
generally held that those g'wasi-municipal corporations, known
as townships, counties, school districts and New England towns,
are not liable in damages for injuries received by any person,
through the misconduct or negligence of any oificer of such
quasi corporation in the performance of such public duties.^
distinction is clearly brought out.
Rhodes v. Cleveland, 11 Ohio, 159;
Lan. Can. Co. v. Tamably, 11 Ad. &
E. 223; MoKinnon v. Penson, 25 Eng.
L. & E. 457; Scott v. Mayor, 37 lb.
495; Eequa v. Rochester, 45 N. Y.
129; Bear v. Allentown, (Pa. 90) 23
Atl. E. 1062; Eooh. W. Lead Co. v.
Eochester, 3 lb. 463; Aldrich v.
Tripp, 11 E. I. 141; McCorraiok v.
City, ION. Y. S. 272; 63 Hun, 632;
Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158; Bar-
ton V. Syracuse, 36 lb. 54 ; Vandalia v.
Eopp, 39 m. App. 344; Bayly v. May-
or, 3 Hill, 538; West v. Brockport, 16
N. Y. 161; Eingv. Cohoes, 77 lb. 83;
Noonan v. Albany, 79 lb. 470; Olney
V. Eiley, 39 111. App. 401; Blooming-
ton V. Bay, 42 111. 503; Stirling v.
Thomas, 60 lb. 265; White v. Bond,
58 lb. 298; Town v. Kemper, 55 lb.
346; Barron v. Detroit, 54 N. W. E.
273; 94 Mich. 601; Jones v. New
Haven, 34 Conn. 1; Allbrittin v.
Huntsville, 60 Ala. 465; Augusta v.
Hudson, 88 Ga. 599; 15 S. E. E. 678;
Meares v. Wilmington, 9 Ired. L. (N.
C.) 73; Barthold v. Philadelphia, 154
Pa. St. 109; Wheeler v. Troy, 20 K.
H. 77; Ball v. Winchester, 32 lb. 435;
Hillsboro v. Ivey, 20 S. W. E. 1012;
1 Tex. Civ. Ap. 653 ; Anne Arundel
Co. v. Duckett, 20 Md. 469; Com'rs
etc. V. Gibson, 36 lb. 229; Jackson-
ville V. Doan, (111. 93) 33 N. E. E. 878;
Boyd V. Insurance Patrol, 113 Pa. St.
169; Mayor of Memphis v. Lessor of
Humph. 757; Munk v. Watertown,
67 Hun, 261 ; Simmer v. St. Paul, 23
Minn. 408; Logansport v. Wright, 25
Ind. 513; Bohan v. Avoca, 154 Pa.
St. 404; McConnell v., Dewey, 5 Neb.
385; Gould v. Topeka, 32 Kan. 485;
Milnes v. Huddersfield, L. E. Q. B.
Div. 124; McDonnell v. Philadelphia,
12 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 672; Marion v. New
Bedford, (Mass. 93) 33 N. E. E. 605;
Vandalia V. Huss, 41 111. Ap. 517; Mc-
Inerney v. Eeading, 150 Pa. St. 611;
Greenwood v. Westport, 53 Fed. 824;
Barron v. Detroit, 94 Mich. 601 ; Free-
holders v. Strader, 18 N. J. L. 108;
Young v. Comm'rs, 2 N. & McC. (S.
C.) 537.
1 HoUensworth v. County Com'rs,
(Neb. 93) 54 N. W. E. 70; Huffman
V. San Joaquin, 21 Cal. 426; Crowell
V. Sonoma Co., 25 lb. 313; Board v.
Bish, (Colo. 93) 33 Pac. 184; Fulton
Co. V. Eickel, 106 Ind. 501; Abbett
V. Johnson Co., 114 lb. 61; Bibb Co.
V. Dorsey, (Ga. 93) 15 S. E. E. 687;
White V. City of Charleston, 2 Hill
L. (S. C.) 571; White V. Chowan Co.,
90 N. C. 437; Turner v. Woodbury,
57 Iowa, 440; McGuinness v. West-
chester, 66 Hun, 256; Detroit v.
Blakely, 21 Mich. 84; Larkin v. Sag-
inaw Co., 11 lb. 88; Allen Co. v.
Creirston, (Ind. 93) 32 N. E. E. 735;.
633
§325
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
And this is true of these territorial divisions, even though
they may be vested by statute with corporate capacity, and
with the power of taxation.^ Thus, it has been held that a
board of education, whose function is to administer the law of
the State, by which a system of common schools is provided, is
not liable to a pupil in one of its schools for an injury which
resulted from the negligence of the board, unless the board or
the school district is made liable by statute.^
It is the duty of a town or county to provide suitable build-
ings for schoolhouses, for holding town meetings, for courts of
justice and similar purposes. But these and similar territorial
divisions are generally considered to be simply the agencies cre-
ated by the State more effectuall}'^ to carry out the objects for
which such buildings are used. And the fact, that they are
declared by statute to be corporations, does not alter the rela-
tion they hold to their inhabitants, who would have to meet the
charges of liability to persons injured by such misfeasances.*
Governor v. Justice of Clark Co., 19
Ga. 97; Smith v. Board of Carltoa
Co., 40 Fed. 340; Clark v. Lincoln
Co., 25 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 211;
Com'rs etc. v. Martin, 4 Mich. 557;
Frio V. Earnest, (Tex. 90) 16 S. W.
K. 1036; Hickockv. Trustees, 16 N.
Y. 161; Garllnghouse v. Jacob,
4 lb. 161; Gould v. Booth, 66 lb. 62;
Hill V. Laurens Co., (S. C. 92) 13 S.
E. R. 318; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. T.
158; Farniim v. Concord, 2 lb. 392;
Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black,
39 ; Whitney v. Town of Ticonderoga,
27 N. E. R.403; Baxter v. Winooski,
22 Vt. 123; Beardsleyv. Smith, 16
Conn. 375 ; Chidsey v. Canton, 17 lb.
475; Fritz V. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 6.32;
Spicer v. County Com'rs, 126 Ii^d. 369 ;
Granger V. Pulaski Co., 26 Ark. 37;
Mitchell V. Rockland, 52 Me. 118;
Jernee v. Chosen Freeholders, 52 K.
J. L. 553; Askew v. Hale Co., 54Ala.
639; Barbour Co. v. Horn, 48 lb. 566;
Van Eppes v. Mobile, 25 lb. 460;
Morin v. Multonah Co., (Or. 90) 22
Pac. 490; Marion Co. v. Riggs, 24
Kan. 255 ; Eikenberry v. Township,
634
22 lb. 556; Fry v. Albermarle Co.,
(Va. 90) 9 S. E. E. 1004; Woods v.
Colfax Co., 10 Neb. 552; Lehigh Co.
V. Hoffart, 19 W. N. C. (Pa.) 363;
RatlifE V. County Co., (W. Va. 90) 10
S. E. R. 28; Young v. Edgefield, 2
Nott & McC. (S. C.) 537; Sulton v.
Board, 41 Miss. 236; Navasota v.
Pearce, 46 Tex. 525 ; Dashman v. Mills
Co., (Iowa, 93) 55 N. W. R. 468.
1 In California the rules of non-
liability, applicable to counties, are
applied to incorporated cities, upon
the ground that they are govern-
mental instruments, created for the
purposes of administering the laws
of tlie State. Winbiger v. Los Angeles,
45 Cal. 36; Tranter v. Sacramento,
61 lb. 271.
2 Finch v. Toledo Bd. of Ed., 30
Ohio St. 37; Kincaid v. Hardin Co.,
53 Iowa, 430; Flori v. St. Louis, 69
Mo. 341; Brabham v. Hindo Co., 54
Miss. 363.
8 Cooley V. Freeholders, 27 N. J.
L. 415; White v. Chowan, 90 N. C.
437; Crowell v. Sonoma, 25 Cal. 313;
Clark V. Adair, 79 Mo. 526; Marion
CH. xvilJ
LIABILITY FOR TORTS.
326
So, a town in New England is not responsible — unless made so
by statute — to one who is injured by the defective condition of
a school or meeting-house,^ or to a scholar attending its school,
who is injured by a dangerous excavation in the schoolhouse
yard, where the exposure is due to the negligence of its offi-
cials.^ It has been repeatedly held that counties are not liable
for the defective condition of their public buildings, even when
it was conclusively shown or admitted, that the condition of the
building was to be attributed to the negligent conduct of the
county officials ; ^ nor are they liable for nuisances.* County
courts have been held to be a part of the State judiciary, and
the county is not liable for their action, or refusal to act.^
§ 326. Liability of municipal corporations for illegal
taxes, fines and licenses — Compulsory payment necessary. —
In the absence of any statutory remedy, actions to recover
money, which has been illegally collected for taxes or assess-
ments, are usually maintainable, only when the folio wing prere-
quisites exist : First, the authority to levy the tax must have been
wholly wanting, making the tax absolutely invalid, and not
merely irregular.® Secondly, the money must have been re-
ceived by tlie municipality for its own use, in carrying out cor-
Co. V. Kiggs, 26 Kan. 255; Wliite v.
Bond, 58 111. 297; Barbour Co. v.
Brinson, 36 Ala. .362; Greene v. Eu-
banks, 80 Ala. 204.
1 Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H.
284; see Solomon v. Osceola, 43 N.
W. E. 990; 77 Mich. 365; Mecbanics'
Bk. V. Granger, (K. I.) 20 Atl. Rep.
202.
^Blgelow V. Randolph, 14 Gray,
541.
8 Governor v. Clark Co., 19 Ga. 97;
Seales v. Cbattaliooche Co., 41 lb.
225; Hamilton Co. v. Migliels, 7 Ohio
St. 109; Ward v. Hartford Co., 12
Conn. 404; Kincaid v. Hardin Co.,
53 Iowa, 430; Sherbourne v. Tuba
Co., 21 Cal. 113; Mitchell v. Rock-
land, 52 Me. 118.
* Board v. Bish, (93) 55 N. W. 408;
Crowell V. Sonoma Co., 25 Cal. 313;
Threadgill v. Anson Co., 99 N. C. 352.
6 Miller V. Iron Co., 29 Mo. -122;
State V. St. Louis Co. Court, 34 lb.
546.
^ Biggs V. Board of Com'rs, (Ind.
93) 34 ]Sr. E. 500; Wiesman v. Brig-
ham, 83 Wis. 550; 53 N. W. Rep. 911 ;
Ratterman v. Exp. Co., 49 Ohio St.
698; 32 N. E. Rep. 754; Rushton v.
Burke, (Dak.) 43 N. W. Rep. 815;
Tarbitt v. Louisville, (Ky.) 4 S. W.
Rep. 345 ; Fremont etc. Co. v. Holt
Co., 45 N. W. Rep. 163; Boston M'f'g
Co. V. Cora., 144 Mass. 508; 32 N. E.
R. 362; Hennelv. Board, 132 Ind. .32;
31 N. E. R. 462; Douoh v. Board
Com'rs of Lake Co., (Ind. 92) 30
lb. 204; Michigan Ld. etc. Co. v.
Republic, (Mich.) 32 N. W. 1!. 832;
Indianapolis v. Vagen, 111 Ind. 240;
Powers v. Sandford, 39 Me. 1S3; Em-
ery v. Lowell, 127 Mass. 138 ; Peyser
V. New York, 70 jST. Y. 49; Hay-
ford V. Belfast, 69 JIo. 03; Gil-
man V. Waterville, 59 lb. 491;
635
§ 326 MtTNICIPAIi COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XVn.
porate purposes as distinct from those public purposes, in the
execution of which it acts as an agent of the State. Thirdly,
the taxpayer must have paid the tax under compulsion. The
same conditions determine the liability for return of an illegal
license-tax or fine, which may be imposed by a municipal court.^
These actions are, in form, usually common law actions of
assumpsit, for money had and received ; but their character is
equitable. And when the payment is founded on mistake or
fraud, a court of equity will take and retain jurisdiction, in or-
der that justice may be done upon all the facts of the case.
No action will lie to recover back taxes which are justly due,
but upon which doubt has been cast, by reason of irregularities in
the details of the levy or collection. But care should however
be observed in the application of this rule to local assessments,
which are always the subject of statutory provisions which are
strictly construed,^ and with which there must be a substantial
if not literal compliance, in the details of the inception and
execution of the work, in order that the municipality may ac-
quire jurisdiction and levy a legal and valid assessment.^ In
seeking to recover illegal assessments, a material distinction
should be recognized between proceedings which are void be-
cause of lack of jurisdiction, and proceedings which are irreg-
ular because of departure from statutory requirements. In the
former case, the assessment is absolutely void ; in the latter, its
voidability depends upon the extent to which the requirements
are mandatory.* For these reasons, it is not just to require the
^See, generally, The Collector v.
Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1, 12; Grimley v.
Santa Clara Co., 68 Cal. 575; Foley
V. HaverhiU, 144 Mass. 352; First
Kat. Bank of H. v. Amerious, 68
Ga. 119; Winter v. Montgomery, 65
Ala. 403; O'Brien v. Colusa Co., 67
Cal. 503; Stephenson Co. Sup. v.
Manny, 56111. 160; McKee v. Ander-
son Council, Rice L. 24; Taylor v.
People, 66 111. 322 ; Bennett v. Buf-
falo, 17 N. T. 383; Howell v. Buffalo,
15 N. T. 512; Dewey v. Niagara Co.
Sup., 62 y. Y. 294, where the defend-
ant was held not to be liable, where
the money was received for the use
of others, and not for its own use.
636
2 Walker v. District, 12 Cent. Eep.
408; City v. Murphy, 3 S. E. Kep.
326; Hewes v. Rice, 40 Cal. 255; Tay-
lor V. Palmer, 31 lb. 241; Smith v.
Toledo, 24 Ohio St. 126.
' See ch. xv on Taxation; Merritt
V. Portchester, 71 N. T. 309; White
V. Stevens, 34 N. W. R. 255; Ranch
V. City, 22 Pa. Eep. 22; SewaU v. St.
Paul, 22 Minn. 511 ; Chicago v. Wright,
32IU.192; Butler v. Nevin, 88 lb. 575.
* Sumner v. Dorchester First Par-
ish, 4 Pick. 361 ; Osborn v. Danvers,
6 Pick. 98; Preston v. Boston, 12
Pick. 7; Howe v. Boston, 7 Cush.
273; Wright v. Boston, 9 Cush. 233;
Emery v. Lowell, 127 Mass. 138; Hay-
CH. XVII.J
LIABILITY FOE TORTS.
§ 326
same strictness in cases of assessments which are special charges
of an exceptional nature, as is properly acquired in general taxa-
tion, which is a burden borne by all for the benefit of all ; and
which every landowner expects to pay in exchange for the pro-
tection his property receives.^
The principles, which are outlined above as employed in the
recovery of illegal taxes, rflay be applied to illegal licenses or
fines, keeping in view their special character which distinguish-
es them like assessments, from general taxation.^ If the prop-
erty taxed is exempt from taxation by federal law ; as, for
example, United States bonds,^ an illegal tax levied thereon can
be recovered from the city ; * and so likewise, may a local as-
sessment, which is originally invalid, but collected under color
of authority for corporate purposes, be recovered with interest,
even when the amount had been paid over to third persons.^
In actions to recover taxes or licenses illegally collected, the
burden of proof of the illegality is upon the plaintiff.^ The
ford V. Belfast, 69 Me. 63; Oilman v.
Waterville, 59 lb. 491; First Eccl.
Soc of H. V. Hartford, 38 Conn. 274;
In re Aiken Ave., 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 228;
Eogers v. Greenbush, 58 Me. 390;
Peyser v. New York, 70 N. Y. 497.
1 Cleveland v. Tripp, 13 R. I. 50;
Manistee L. Co. v. Springfield, 52 N.
W. Eep. 468; 92 Mich. 277; Donch v.
Board Com'rs of Lake Co., (Ind. 92)
30 N. E. Eep. 204; R. & A. etc. Co. v.
City, 81 Va. 473; Willard v. Presbu-
ry, 14 Wall. 676.
2 People v. Mayor, 4 N. Y. 419;
Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329; Sat-
urn V. Trenton, 85 Ga. 468; 11 S. E.
R. 705; Garland v. Gaines, (Ark.) 2 S.
W. E. 460; Collector v. Hubbard, 12
Wall. 1, 12; Stephenson Co. v. Man-
ny, 56 111. 160; Grimley v. Santa
Clara Co., 68 Cal. 575; Foley v. Hav-
erhill, 144 Mass. 352; Winter v. Mont-
gomery, 65 Ala. 403.
' Union Nat. Bank v. New York,
51 N. Y. 638.
* Nat. Bk. of Chemung v. Elmira,
53 N. Y. 49; Indianapolis v. McAvoy,
86 Ind. 587.
*Bank of Commonwealth v. New
York, 43 N. Y. 189; Moss v. Cum-
mirigs, 44 Mich. 359; 22 Alb. L. J.
376; Calloway v. Milledgeville, 48
Ga. 309; Wattles v. Lapeer, 40 Mich.
624; Tallant v. Betmingham, 39 Iowa,
543; Tuttle v. Everett, 15 Miss. 27;
Grand Eapids v. Blakely, 40 Mich.
367. In this last case, the court
said, "The further point that as the
fund is not for city use, the city is
not liable, is untenable. If the mon-
ey was illegally exacted by the mar-
shal under color of city authority,
and was by him paid to and received
by the city, the latter cannot escape
liability by reason of the special ob-
ject of the tax. Where the party
entitled demands restoration, it is
no answer for the city to say it holds
the fund for somebody else." Comp.
Dewey v. Niagara Co., 62 N. Y. 294.
0 Tripler v. New York, 63 Hun, 630;
Wiesman v. Brigham, 83 Wis. 550;
53 N. W. Eep. 911; Ligonier v. Acker-
man, 46 Ind. 552; Douglasville v.
Jones, 62 Ga. 423; Grim v. Weisen-
berg, 57 Pa. St. 433.
637
326 a.
MUKICIPAI, CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. xvn.
Statute of Limitations has been held to apply to actions of this
sort.^
§ 326 a. Payment must Ibe compulsory. — It has been said
that the payment must have been made under compulsion ; ^ but
what shall constitute compulsion is not easy of decision, and
depends to a great extent upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. A threat that legal prodeedings will be employed \^
or the fact that a fine or imprisonment will be imposed for
nonpayment, is not sufficient to make the payment involuntary.*
And, as a general rule, compulsion may be said to exist, only
when money is paid to prevent the seizure of one's person or
property, or to secure their liberation from detention, following
a seizure. A mere protest, in the presence of these facts, is not
sufBcient ; * and so, also, the payment of money to an official, as
a consideration for the performance of an act, which it was his
duty to perform." The payment of illegal taxes to avoid a cloud
on the title to land is a compulsory payment.'^ And certainly,
where the effect of a sale for delinquent taxes would be to confer
an indefeasible title ^ upon the purchaser, the threatened dives-
1 Brown v. Painter, 44 Iowa, 368;
Hamilton v. Dubuque, 50 lb. 213;
Com. V. Philadelphia, 27 Pa. St. 497.
2 Lamborn v. Dickinson, 97 U. S.
181 ; Union Pac. K. R. Co. v. Dodge
Co., 98 lb. 541; Manistee L. Co. v.
Springfield, 92 Mich. 277; 52 N. W.
Rep. 468; McCrickart v. Pittsburgh,
88 Pa. St. 133; Lester v. Baltimore,
29 Md. 415; Rushton v. Burke, (Dak.)
43 N. W. R. 815; Tupelo v. Beard,
56 Miss. 532; Dunnell v. Newell, 15
R. I. 233; 2 Atl. R. 766; Cahaba v.
Bennett, 84 Ala. 400; Raisler v. Ath-
ens, 66 lb. 194.
3 Taylor v. Board, 31 Pa. St. 73.
* Cahaba T. Coun. v. Burnett, 34
Ala. 400; Louisville etc. Co. v. Com .,
(Ky.) 12 S. W. 1064; Llgonier v.
Ackerman, 46 Ind. 552.
5 Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Dodge Co.
Com'rs, 98 U. S. 541; Phelps v. New
York, 112 N. T. 216; Rushton v.
Burke, (Dak.) 43 N. W. R. 815; Bab-
cock V. Fond du Lac, 58 Wis. 230;
McGehee v. Columbus, 69 Ga. 581;
638
Sowles V. Soule, 59 Vt. 131; 7 Atl.
R. 715; Haines v. Readfield, 41 Me.
256; AUentown Bor. v. Saeger, 20
Pa. St. 421; Baker v. Big Rapids, 31
N. W. R. 810; Fellows v. Fayette
Sch. Dis., 29Me. 559; Allen v. Bur-
lington, 45 Vt. 202; Elliott v. Swart-
wout, 10 Pet. 137; Silliman v. Wing,
7 Hill (N. T.) 159; Princeton v. Vier-
ling, 40 Md. 340; Wliitbeck v. Minch,
88 Ohio St. 210; 31 N. E. R. 743;
Ratterman v. Express Co., 49 Ohio
St. 698; 32 N. E. R. 754; Harvey v.
Olney, 42 111. 336; Falls v. Cairo, 58
lb. 403; Kan. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Wyan-
dotte Co., 16 Kan. 587; Bradford v.
Chicago, 25 111. 411; Conkling v.
Springfield, 24 N. E. R. 67; 124IU. 420;
Ripley v. Gelston, 9 Johns. 201;
Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick. 7; Jersey
City v. Riker, 38 X. J. L. 225; Boston
& S. Glass Co. V. Boston, 4 Met. 181.
6 Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St.
534; La Salle v. Simmons, 10 111. 516.
' Stephan v. Daniels, 27 Ohio St. 527.
' In Illinois, Nebraska, Texas, and
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOE TORTS.
326 a.
titure of ownership is a distress or compulsion, which is equiv-
alent to the detention of the owner's person.^ But a payment
to an officer, who is only empowered to levy on the lands of the
delinquent and dispose of them by a sale, which would not dis-
turb the owner's possession, is not compulsory, if an adequate
remedy be available to avoid the illegal assessment and sale.^
"The coercion or duress, which will render a payment of taxes
involuntary, must in general consist of some actual or threat-
ened exercise of power, possessed or believed to be possessed
by the party exacting or receiving the payment, over the person
or property of another, from which the latter has no other means
of immediate relief except by making paym^t." This is the
definition given by Judge Dillon in his learned work on mu-
nicipal corporations,^ and it is no doubt a correct general state-
ment of the principles involved, which, if intelligently applied
to the varying circumstances of the cases in which money has
been illegally exacted, will furnish to the practitioner a reliable
rule for determining in each case, whether the complainant has
a right to recover back what he has paid without authority of
law.*
Although voluntary payment of taxes does not confer a right
Louisiana the right to redeem lands
sold for taxes is secured to the owner
by constitutional enactment. Stim-
son's Statutes, art. 35.
' See Lamborn v. Dickinson Co.
Com'rs, 97 IT. S. 181; Bradford v.
Chicago, 25 111. 412.
2 Falls V.' Cairo, 58 111. 403; Kan.
Pac. E. E. Co. V. Wyandotte Co., 16
Kan. 587.
' § 943.
* Fii'st Nat. Bank v. Americus, 68
Ga. 119; Maxwell v. San Luis Obespo,
71 Cal. 466; 12 Pac. Rep. 484; Whit-
beck V. Minch, 48 Ohio St. 210; 31
N. E. Rep. 743; Meylert's Executor
V. Sullivan Co., 19 Pa. St. 181; Mus-
catine V. Keokuk N. L. etc. Co., 45
Iowa, 185; Harrison v. Milwaukee,
49 Wis. 247; Lyon v. Receiver of
Taxes, 52 Mich. 271; Detroit v. Mar-
tin, 34 lb. 170; Michigan Ld. etc.
Co. V. Republic, (Mich.) 32 N. W.
Eep. 882; Whitney v. Port Huron,
88 Mich. 268; 50 N. W. Rep. 316;
Tarbitt v. Louisville, (Ky.) 4 S. W.
Rep. 345; Coulson v. Portland,
Deady, 481; La Salle Co. v. Simons,
10 111. 513; Elliott v. Swartwout, 10
Pet. 137, 150; Radick v. Hutchins,
95 U. S. 210; Leonard v. Canton, 35
Miss. 189; Harvey v. Olney, 42 111.
336; Babcook v. Beaver Creek, 31
N..W.Rep.423; s.c.,32Ib.653; Shaw
v. Allegheny, 115 Pa. St. 46; 7 Atl.
Rep. 770; Hennel v. Board, 132
Ind. 32; 31 N. E. Eep. 462; Shoe-
maker v. Grant Co., 36 Ind. 175;
Princeton v. Vierling, 40 lb. 340;
Bellinger v. Gray, 51 N. T. 610; Bank
v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 421;
Howell V. Buffalo, 15 N. Y. 512; Ben-
nett V. Buffalo, 17 lb. 383; Bowns
V. May, 120 N. Y. 357; 24 N. E. Eep,
947; Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18
Cal. 265.
639
§ 326 a.
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIOKS.
[CH. XVII.
to recover them back, it raises a moral obligation, and is a suffi-
cient consideration to support a subsequent promise to repay.'
Generally, the payment of taxes or assessments, coupled only
with the declaration that the payment is under protest, will
not deprive the act of the taxpayer of its voluntary character : ^
but if the protest be made in a case, where the collecting offi-
cer threatens a levy and sale, the payment will be compulsory.^
But if payment is made under protest, to avoid a sale under a
statute levying an assessment, and the statute is subsequently
declared unconstitutional, it has been held that the sale, being
absolutely invalid, would not constitute a cloud upon the title,
and hence the payment was voluntary.* Monej% voluntarily
paid to a municipal corporation for taxes, licenses or fines, under
a mistake of law, — as where an ordinance directing a local im-
provement is illegal ; ^ — or whe're the act under which the pay-
ment is enacted is unconstitutional,® — in the absence of fraud .or
ignorance of the facts involved, cannot be recovered by the
party paying, either at law or in equitj'-, unless some statutory
remedy be provided.^ But the general rule, that equity will
1 State V. Butler, 11 Lea, 418.
2 Union Pac. R. E. Co. v. Dodge
Co., 98 U. S. 541; Galveston City Co.
V. Galveston, 56 Tex. 486; AUentov^n
Bor. V. Saeger, 20 Pa. St. 421; Taylor
V. Board, 31 lb. 73; Parker v. Gt.
West. Ky. Co., T M. & G. 253; Baker
V. Cincinnati, 11 Oliio St. 534; Boston
& S. Glass Co. V. Boston, 4 Met. 181.
3 Euggles V. Fond du Lao, 53 Wis.
436 ; Whitney v. Port Huron, 88 Mich.
268; 50 N. W. Eep. 316; Eattevmanv.
Express Company, 49 Ohio St. 698;
32 N. E. Eep. 754.
^ Detroit v. Martin, 34 Mich. 170;
Ligonier v. Ackerraan, 46 Ind. 552;
Grim v. Weissenberg Sch. Dis., 57
Pa. St. 433.
5 Phelps V. New York, 112 U. S. 216.
" Baltimore v. Lefferman, 4 Gill,
425; MoxTis v. Baltimore, 5 lb. 244;
Detroit v. Martin, 34 Mich. 170; Tay-
lor V. Board, 31 Pa. St. 73.
' Union Pac. E. E. Co. v. Dodge
Co., 98 U. S. 541; Boyd v. Selma, 93
640
Ala. 567; 11 So. Eep. 393; Welch v.
Marion, 48 Ala. 291 ; Gachet v. Mc-
Call, 50 lb. 307; Robinson v. Charles-
ton Council, 2 Eich. (S. C.) Law Eep.
317; Elston v. Chicago, 40 111. 514;
Churchman v. Indianapolis, 110 Ind.
259; People V. Wemple, 133 N. Y. 617;
30 IST. E. Eep. 1002; Bailey v. Paulina,
69 Iowa, 463; Muscatine v. Packet
Co., 45 lb. 185; Savannah v. Fee-
ley, 66 Ga. 31; Bucknell v. Story, 40
Cal. 589; Cahaba v. Burnett, 34 Ala.
400; Barber v. Jackson Co., 40111.
App. 42; Christy's Adm. v. St Louis,
20 Mo. 143; Smith v. Eeadfield, 27
Me. 145 ; Emery v. Lowell, 127 Mass.
138; Eichmond etc. Co. v. Eeidsville,
109 N. C. 494; 13 S. E. Eep. 869;
Stephenson v. Manny, 56 111. 160;
Sullivan v. McCammon, 51 Ind. 264;
Moss V. Cummings, 44 Mich. 359;
Manistee L. Co. v. Springfield, 92
Mich. 277; 52 N. W. Eep. 468; Bank
of Commonwealth v. N. Y., 43 N.Y
184; Camden v. Green, 25 Atl. E. 357;
CH. XVII.J
LIABILITY FOR TORTS.
§ 826 a.
relieve against a mistake of a material fact, is applied to pay-
ment of taxes or similar dues to a municipal corporation ; ^ and
mistake of fact is no less a ground for relief, because the payor
had adequate means of knowledge,^ provided he was not negli-
gent.^
The rule, that a mistake of law will not be relieved against,
has in modern equity been so modified, that it is no longer ap-
plicable in its original severity.* The usual cases, in which
relief is asked against a mistake of law, are controversies aris-
ing out of the distribution of estates and of conveyances of
land. In such cases, all parties ordinarily use deliberation and
employ and act under the advice of counsel; and to disturb ar-
rangements which are thus made would involve limitless litiga-
tion and impair rights of property, which have become vested
in those who are not parties to the original settlement.^ This
reasoning is not applicable to the payment of money to munici-
pal officers, whose supposed legal duty is to receive it ; and, ac-
cordingly, we find courts of equity giving relief, where money
had by mistake of law been paid to their own officers." So,
equity will distinguish between mistakes arising out of igno-
lance of the general law, and those due to ignorance of private
right ; a distinction peculiarly applicable to claims against mu-
nicipal corporations for money illegally collected, where the
question frequently is one of the individual right in a particu-
lar case of the party paying the money .^
Ege V. Koontz, 3 Pa. St. 109; Benson
V. Monroe, 7 Cush. 125; Mllnes v.
Duncan, 6 B. & C. 671; Stuart v.
Stuart, 6 CI. & Fin. 968.
'Hunt V. Rousmaniere, 1 Pet. 15;
Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East, 469; Lam-
born V. Dickinson Co., 97 U. S. 181;
Mayer v. New York, 63 N. Y. 455;
Cooper V. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 149;
Brett's Lead. Cas. 68; Colonial Bank
V. Exch. Bank of Yarmouth, 11 App.
Cas. 84; Daniell v. Sinclair, 6 lb. 181,
190; Davis v. Krum, 12 Mo. 279;
Grimes v. Blake, 16 Ind. 160; Good-
speed V. Fuller, 46 Me. 141 ; Glenn v.
Shannon, 12 P. C. 570; Newell v.
Smith, 53 Conn. 72; Wolf v. Beard,
1:^3 111. 585; Buffalo v. O'Malley, 61
il
Wis. 255 ; Manzy v. Hardy, 13 Neb.
36; Baldwin v. Foss, 71 Iowa, 389;
Wlieadon v. Olds, 20 Wend. 174.
2 Wilmot V. Barber, 15 Ch. D. 96.
s Smith V. Wheeler, 58 Iowa, 659.
* See Tiedeman's Equity Jurispru-
dence, §§ 185-191.
6 Davis V. Morier, 2 Call. 303.
'' Ex parte James, In re Condon,
L. R. 9Cli. 609; Ex parte Simmonds,
16 Q. B. Div. 308; In re Brown, Dixon
V. Brown, 32 Oh. D. 597.
'Tiedeman on Equity Jur. §189;
Matlock V. Glover, 63 Tex. 231 ; Coo-
per V. Phibbs, L. B. 2 H. L. 149; Earl
Beauchamp v. Winn, L. R. 6 H. L.
223; Stone v. Godfrey, 5 De G. M. &
G. 76; In re Condon, L. R. 6 Ch.
641
§327
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
The benefit conferred by local improvements is the only true
basis, upon which their cost can be assessed upon adjacent prop-
erty, and the general public be released from paying a share
therein.! If, therefore, after the assessment for an improvement
shall have been levied and collected, the improvement is aban-
doned altogether ; or if there is an unreasonable delay in carry-
ing out the plan devised, the abutting owners may recover the
amounts paid into the city treasury, upon the ground that there
has been a total failure of consideration.^ The facts, that the
payment was voluntary,^ or that the plaintiff did not protest
when he saw the improvement being made,* will not in such a
case deprive him of his remedy.^
§ 327. Municipal corporations not liable for nonperform-
ance of discretionary duties — Failure to abate nuisances
and supply water. — When a duty has been expressly, or by
necessary implication, imposed upon a municipal corporation by
statute ; and the exercise of the duty will result in some pecu-
liar advantage to the corporation itself ; it is liable by implica-
tion, under ordinary circumstances, for a neglect of that dutj',
provided the duty be absolute and imperative, and not one
which may be performed or not, according to the discretion of
the municipal authorities. It is a well settled rule that for the
nonperformance of a discretionary duty, particularl}' if the duty
be of a public nature, no private action for damages can be
maintained against the corporation, for the reason that discre-
tionary powers are intended to be exercised only when the in-
terests of the public demand their exercise ; and the question.
App. 609; Snell v. Insurance Co., 98
U. S. 85 ; Mut. Sav. Inst. v. Eustin,
46 Mo. 200, 203 ; Underwood v. Brock-
man, 4 Dana, 309 ; Northrop v. Graves,
19 Conn. 548; Louisville v. Henning,
1 Bush, 381 ; Noble v. Bullis, 23 lovf a,
559; Ripon v. Joint Sob. Dis., 17 Wis.
83; King v. Doolittle, 1 Head, 77;
Jones V. Clifeord, 3 Ch. Div. 779;
Bunnell Mfg. Co. v. Pavrtucket, 7
Gray, 277. In Charlestown v. Mid-
dlesex Co. Com'rs, 109 Mass. 270,
the court said: " One, who by a mis-
take of his rights returns to the as-
sessors as liable to taxation a list of
612
property which by law is exempt, is
not thereby estopped to claim an
abatement of the tax."
1 See ante, § 259.
2 Bradford v. Chicago, 25 111. 412;
Godfrey v. Claflin, 21 Pick. 1, 9, 13,
14; Valentine v. St. Paul, 34 Minn.
446.
3 Bradford v. Chicago, 25 111. 412.
* Robinson v. Burlington, 50 Iowa,
240.
6 Jersey City v. O'Callaghin, 41 N.
J. L. 849; Peyser v. New York, 70 N.
T. 497 ; Weber v. San Francisco, 1 Cal.
455; Kellogg v. Ely, 15 Ohio St. 64.
OH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOE TORTS.
§ 327 a.
whether the public interests do or do not demand it, is one for
the municipality to determine.^ Thus, the power to construct
sidewalks,^ to remove obstructions in the harbor,^ and to con-
struct sewers * does not create an imperative duty, for the non-
performance of which a civil action can be maintained.
§ 317 a. Failure to abate nuisances. — As a part of its po-
lice power, a municipality can abate nuisances, whether delete-
rious to the health, property or morals of the community ; and
this power is one which is repeatedly exercised by all munici-
pal corporations. But it is a delegated power, and discretion-
ary and judicial in its nature ; and unless the nuisance be one,
which will render the municipal highways within the corporate
control dangerous and unsafe, there is no liability to a private
person, if the city should fail to exert the power, with a result-
ant injury to the complainant.*
1 Aaron v. Broiles, 64 Tex. 316;
Easton V. Nefe, 102 Pa. St. 474; Whit
ney V. New Haven, (Conn. 91) 20 Atl.
Eep. 666; Collins v. Savannah, 77
Ga. 745; McDonough v. Virginia
City, 6 Nev. 90; Lindholm v. St.
Paul, 19 Minn. 245 ; Williams v. Grand
Rapids, 59 Mich. 51 ; Amperse v. Kal-
amazoo, 75 lb. 228; 42 N. W. Rep.
821; Bauman v. Campan, 58 Mich.
444; MoArthur v. Saginaw, 58 lb.
357; Petz v. Detroit, (Mich. 93) 54 N.
W. Rep. 644; Urquhart v. Ogdens-
burg, 91 N. Y. 67; City of Anderson
V. East, 117 Ind. 126; Keating v. Kan-
sas City, 84 Mo. 415; Fritz v. Same,
84 lb. 632; Ten-ill v. Bloomfisld, (Ky.
93)21 S. W. Rep. 1041; McDade v.
Chester City, 117 Pa. St. 414; Tres-
cott V. Waterloo, 26 Fed. Rep. 592;
Hillsboro v. Ivey, 1 Tex. Civ. Ap.
653; 20 S. W. Rep. 1012; Trammell
V. Russellville, 34 Ark. 105; Rivers
V. Augusta Council, 65 Ga. 376 ; Wil-
kin V. Houston, (Kan. 90) 30 Pac.
Rep. 23; Horton v. Bristol, 4 Lea, 39;
Lehigh Co. v. Haffort, 116 Pa. St.
119; Alton v. Hope, 68 111. 167; Tan-
ish V. St. Paul, (Minn. 92) 52 N. W.
Rep. 925; Clemence v. Auburn, 66
N. Y. 334; Hyatt v. Rondout, 41 lb.
619; Hoey V. Gilroy, 129 lb. 1.32; Au-
rora V. Puffer, 56 Ga. 270; Freeport
V. Isbell, 83 lb. 440; Piatt v. Chicago
etc. Co., 31 N. W. Rep. 883; White
V. Yazoo, 27 Miss. 357; James Adm'r
V. Harrodsburg, (Ky.) 3 S. W. Rep.
135; Peru v. Gleason, 91 Ind. 566;
Lafayette v. Timberlake, 88 lb. 330;
Walker v. Hallock, 33 lb. 239; Hub-
bell V. Viroqua, 67 Wis. 343; 30 X.
W. 847; Kelly v. Milwaukee, 18 Wis.
83; Schattner v. Sauderfur, 53 Mo.
162; Steines v. Franklin Co., 48 lb.
167.
^Saulsburg v. Ithaca, 94 N. Y. 27;
Vogel V. New York, 92 lb. 10; Irving
V. Ford, (Mich.) 32 N. E. Rep. 601.
s Goodrich v. Chicago, 20 111. 445.
*Anne Arundel Co. v. Buckett, 20
Md. 468; Bennett v. New Orleans, 14
La. An. 120; Monticello v. Fox, 3
Ind. App. 481; 28 N. E. Rep. 1025.
sBaker v. State, 27 Ind. 485;
Walker v. Hallock, 32 lb. 239;
Worth V. Crawford, 64 Tex. 202;
McCutcheon v. Homer, 43 Md. 483;
O'Rourke v. Sioux Falls, (S. D. 93)
54 N. W. Rep. 1044; Detroit v. Beck-
man, 34 Mich. 125; Ball v. Wood-
bine, 61 Iowa, 83; Tainter v. Wor-
cester, 123 Mass. 311; Austin \ Lam-
643
§ 327 h.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XVII
So, also, a city will not be liable for damages by fire, caused
by sparks from an engine, which had been pronounced a nui-
sance by an ordinance ; ^ for injury by a bullet from a shooting
gallery ; ^ by a stone thrown in the air by blasting ; ' for injury
caused b)' fireworks, while the operation of an ordinance for-
bidding their use is suspended ; * for injury caused by animals
running at large ; ^ or for failure to provide a pest house.^
By reason of the dangerous character of fireworks, fuU pow-
er had been intrusted to a city to prohibit their manufacture ;
but even then the city was not liable to a person, who was in-
jured at a fire in a building, where these articles were made."
It has been held that, although a city has power to remove
obstructions in its harbor, it is not liable for a failure to do so ;
although it was said it would be liable for removing them in
such a careless manner, that injury was done to any one right-
fully using the harbor."
§ 327 b. liability for negligent supply of water. — When,
in pursuance of an express power, a municipal corporation de-
parts from the purposes for which such corporations are created ;
and engages in business enterprises by which it becomes as-
similated to private corporations, it is held strictly to the same
liability as are private corporations and individuals. Thus a
municipal corporation, selling water to all persons, upon pay-
betli, 27 L. J. Ch. 677; Hargreaves v.
Taylor, 3 Best & S. 613; Levy v. May-
or, 1 Sandf. 405; Bennett v. New Or-
leans, 14 La. An. 120; Howe v. New
Orleans, 12 lb. 481 ; Kelly v. Milwau-
kee, 18 Wis. 83 ; Goodrich v. Chicago,
20 111. 445; Fair v. Philadelphia, 88
Pa. St. 309 ; Ogg v. Lansing, 35 Iowa,
495; Hafford v. New Bedford, 16
Gray, 297; Forsyth v. Atlanta, 45 Ga.
152; Parker v. Mayor etc., 39 lb. 725;
Campbell v. Montgomery, 53 lb. 327;
Stevenson v. Phoenixville, 1 Ches.
Co. Eep. 113; Norristown v. Fitzpat-
rick, 94 Pa. St. 121; Kiley v. Kansas
City, 87 Mo. 103; Armstrong v.
Brunswick, 79 lb. 319; Kistner v. In-
dianapolis, 100 Ind. 210; Faulkner v.
Aurora, 85 lb. 130; Cain v. Syracuse,
95 N. T. 83; People v. Albany, 11
644
"Wend. 539; Connors v. Mayor etc., 11
Hun, 439; Wilson v. Mayor etc., 1
Den. 595 ; Cole v. Medina, 27 Barb.
218; Fowle v. Alexandria, 3 Pet. (U.
S.)398; Hill v. Charlotte, 72 N. C.
55 ; Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa.
St. 324; Grant v. Erie, 69 lb. 420.
1 Davis V. Montgomery Council, 51
Ala. 139; Kent v. Cheyenne, 2 Wy-
om. 6.
2 Hubbell V. Viroqua, 67 Wis. 343.
* James v. Harrodsburgh, 85 Ky.
191.
4 Hill V. Charlotte, 72 N. C. 55.
= Kelly V. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 83.
6 Aaron v. Broiles, 64 Tex. 316.
' McDade v. Chester, 117 Pa. St.
414.
8 Goodrich v. Chicago, 20 111. 445;
Seaman v. New York, 80 N. T. 239
CH. XVII.J
LIABILITY FOE TOUTS.
328
ment of the proper price, is liable for the negligence of its
agents, to the same extent as a private corporation.^
§ 328. Corporation when liable for manner in which dis-
cretionary powers are exercised. — Not only are municipal
corporations exempt from liability for the nonperformance of
public, or discretionary duties; but they are likewise exempt
from liability for consequences, when they in good faith exer-
cise such powers. Corporations are impliedly liable for the
negligent or unskillful manner, in which purely ministerial and
corporate, as distinct from public, powers are executed ; but
the liability will not attach in the case of public or judicial du-
ties, until they have ceased to be such, and have become cor-
porate and ministerial.^
The selection of the proper means, and the adoption of plans,
by which these judicial and discretionary powers are to be ex-
ecuted, involve the employment of deliberation and discretion ;
and an honest and faithful exercise of these attributes is not
subject to review by courts of law in a piivate action, brought
by one alleging an injury to have been caused thereby.^ Thus,
iBaily v. New York, 3 Hill (N. Y.)
531; MeiTimack Bk. v. Lowell, 26
N. E. 97; 152 Mass. 556; Western
Sav. F. Soc. V. Philadelphia, 31 Pa.
St. 175.
2 " Wliere a judicial duty ends and
ministerial duty begins, there immu-
nity ceases and liability attaches."
Jones V. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1;
Denver v. Ehodes, 13 Pac. 729.
3 Barron v. Detroit, 94 Mich. 601 ;
Barthold v. Philadelphia, 26 Atl.
304; 154 Pa. St. 109; Benson v. Wau-
kesha, 41 N. W. E. 1017; Diamond
Match Co. V. New Haven, 55 Conn.
510; Wessinan v. Brooklyn, 16 N. Y.
St. 97; Thompson v. Polk Co., 38
Minn. 130; Denver v. Capelll, 4 Col.
25; Wicks v. DeWitt, 54 Iowa, 130;
Beai- V. Allentown, 23 Atl. 1062; 148
Pa. St. 80: Smith v. Gould, 61 Wis.
31; Horton v. Nashville, 4 Lea, 47;
Gibbs V. Beaufort, 20 S. C. 213;
Buckley v. New Bedford, 155 Mass.
64; 29 N. E. 201; Weis v. Madison,
75 Ind. 241; Cummins v. Seymour,
79 lb. 491; Evansville v. Decker, 84
lb. 325; Garratt v. Canandaigua, 64
Hun, 623; Imler v. Springfield, 55
Mo. 119; Foster v. St. Louis, 71 lb.
157; Flori v. St. Louis, 69 lb. 341;
Fairlawn Coal Co. v. Scranton, 23
Atl. 1009; 148 Pa. St. 231; Welsh v.
Eutland, 56 Vt. 228; McCaughey v.
Tripp, 12 E. I. 449; Johnson v. Dis-
trict, 118 U. S. 19; Fair v. Philadel-
phia, 88 Pa. St. 309; Lynch v. Mayor
of N. Y., 76 N. Y. 60; Monk v. New
Utrecht, 104 lb. 552; Hubbell v.
Yonkers, 104 lb. 434; Arms v. Knox-
ville, 32 111. Ap. 604; Madison v.
Harbor Board, 25 Atl. 337; Dewey
T. Detroit, 15 Mich. 307; Flagg v.
Worcester, 13 Gray, 601; Merrifleld
V. Worcester, 110 Mass. 216; Collins
V. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. St. 272; Pep-
per V. City, 114 lb. 96; Eoanoke Gas
Co. V. Eoanoke, (Va. 90) 14 S. E. E.
665 ; Howard v. Worcester, (Mass. 91)
27 N. E. 11; Hennessy v. New Bed-
ford, (JIass. 91) 26 lb. 999; O'Eeillj
V. Kingston, 114 N. Y. 439.
645
§ 328
MUXICIPAL COEPORATIONS.
[CH. xvn.
a city is not liable for extending a street, so as to bring an ex-
isting nuisance within its limits.^
The question of municipal liability in this connection arises
most frequentlj"^ out of the prosecution of local improvements
by a municipal corporation, where the expediency or necessity
of the improvement has been left to the discretion of the mu-
nicipal authorities. Whether or no there shall be any local
improvement, is a judicial question for the municipalitj'- to de-
cide ; but it is coupled very often with a statutory plan and
method for carrying out the improvement, which is obligatory
upon the city, when it shall have decided that the comtemplated
work is desirable. In all such cases, the municipal corporation
is liable to any one who is injured by a deviation from the statu-
tory plan and method, or by its failure to comply therewith in
anj' material respect.^
So, also, when the plan and method are left to the discretion
of the municipality, the principle of non-liability should be ap-
plied with care ; and each case be decided more or less upon its
own merits. It is doubtless the law that a municipal corporation
is not liable for defects and errors in the plan of a public work ;
but this can be true, only when due care is used by the corpora-
tion in the adoption of plans and instrumentalities. Not that a
corporation is compelled to use the highest degree of care in
planning and executing public works. Ordinary care as it is
termed, is usually sufficient. But, in any event, if there is such
a lack of skill, care and attention on the part of the city, or its
officials, in devising or executing a plan for a public work, as
will constitute negligence, it will be liable therefor in dam-
If the municipal officials, in planning or executing a
. 3
1 McCutelieou v.' Horner, 5 K. W.
Eep. 668; Larkin v. Saginaw Co., 11
Mich. 88; Detroit v. Blakeby, 21 lb.
84.
2 Hardy v. Brooklyn, 90 N. Y. 435;
Pekin v. Newell, 26 111. 320; Kanka-
kee V. Linden, 38 111. App. 675 ; Har-
low V. Humiston, 6 Cow. 189; Dygert
V. Schenck, 23 Wend. 446.
3 Jordan v. Hannibal, 87 Mo. 673;
Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black,
39; Chalkley v. Richmond, 88 Va.
402; 14 S. E. Rep. 339; llilwaukee
646
V. Davis, 6 Wis. 377; Ashley v. Pt.
Huron, 35 Mich. 296; Jenney v.
Brooklyn, 120 IST. Y. 164; 24 JST. E.
Rep. 274; Olney v. Eiley, 39 111. App.
401; Vandalia v. Eopp, 39 lb. 344;
Cumraings v. Seymour, 79 Ind. 491 ;
Crawfordsville v. Bond, 96 Ind. 230;
North Vernon v. Vogeler, 103 lb.
314; Rice v. Evansville, lb. 314;
Benton v. Hamilton, 110 lb. 294; 11
N. E. R. 238; Terre Haute v. Hudnut,
112 Ind. 542; New Albany v. Ray, 3
Ind. App. 481; 29 N. E. Rep. 611.
CH. XYII.]
LIABILITY FOB TOETS.
§ 329
work requiring professional skill and knowledge, consult per-
sons who possess the requisite information and experience, and
use reasonable care and prudence in selecting skilled persons
to control and effectuate the plan, neither the officials nor the
corporation they represent will be liable, if the plans turn out
to be unsuitable and injudicious, or the structure be defective.^
Of the municipal officials themselves, it is only required " that
they shall bring to the service reasonable care and judgment,
and that the professional men, employed by them in planning
and superintending the work, shall have all the knowledge and
skill that experience in such work would naturally give them." ^
If aboard of commissioners undertake to execute a public work
themselves, requiring skill and experience which they do not
possess, instead of employing a competent person, they will ren-
der themselves liable for injury resulting from a defective, in-
sufficient or faulty plan.** But if it becomes apparent during the
prosecution of the work, that the plan decided on by the city,
even if selected and executed with proper care, will work a
direct injurj"- to property, which is likely to be repeated and
continuous, the city is liable in damages after notice thereof,
unless it shall adopt such a change of plan, or such precaution-
ary measures, as will obviate the difficulty.*
§ 329. Damnum absque injuria — Consequential damages
—Changes in the grade of streets — Improvements. — When
a municipal corporation, acting within the limits of its authority
and jurisdiction, does an act by virtue of power conferred by
a valid statute ; and there is a reasonable degree of care and
skill employed by it, there is no liability for injury caused to
Same v. Lawyer, 38 lb. 348; Lehn v.
San Francisco, 66 Cal. 76; Barnes v.
District, 91 U. S. 540; Gould v. To-
peka, 32 Kan. 485 ; Lacour v. Mayor,
3 Duer, 406; People v. Waterford,
etc. Co., 2 Keyes, 327; Townsend V.
Susquehanna T. Co., 6 Johns. 90;
Watson V. Kingston, 43 Hun, 367; He-
lena V. Thompson, 29 Ark. 569; Chi-
cago V. Gallagher, 44 111. 295 ; Nevlns
V. Peoria, 41 lb. 502; Wilson v. At-
lanta, 60 Ga. 473.
'Sutton V. Clark, 1 Marsh. 429;
Van Pelt v. Davenport, 42 Iowa, 308.
2 Diamond M. Co. v. New Haven,
55 Conn. 510.
sEobinson v. Roha, 73 Wis. 436;
Wallace V. Menasha, 48 lb. 79; Wren
V. Walsh, 57 lb. 98; Peck v. Cooper,
112 111. 192.
^Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y.
136; Lynch v. Mayor, 76 IST. Y. 60;
Wilson v. Mayor, 1 Den. 595; Flem-
ing V. Manchester, 44 L. J. IST. S. 517;
Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black,
39; Hardy v. Brooklyn, 90 N. Y. 435;
Shearman & Redf. on Negligence
(4th ed.)§§ 269-279.
647
§329
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. xvn.
third persons, although the same act, if done without legislative
premission, would be actionable.
He, who does what the Legislature expressly commands or
permits, cannot be a wrongdoer ; but he cannot act without
that reasonable care which men are supposed to employ in their
affairs.^
Injuries caused by the careful and skillful performance of a
lawful act are called consequential, and for such the law gives
no redress ; for, although there is a loss, there is no legal wrong.
It is a case of damnum absque injuria.^ The question of con-
sequential injuries arises oftenest in the prosecution of public
improvements. It is seldom that an improvement, though ex-
ecuted in the most careful manner, does not cause injury to some
one ; and it is extremely difficult at times to separate injuries
1 Northern Transp. Co. v. Chicago,
99 U. S. 635; Smith v. Washington,
20 How. 135; Elster v. Springfield,
(Ohio, 93) SON. E.E. 274; Hohman
V. Chicago, (111. 92) 29 lb. 671;
Hovey v. Mayo, 43 Me. 322; Rus-
sell V. Burlington, 30 Iowa, 262;
Hicks V. Dorn, 42 N. Y. 47; Siefert
V. Brooklyn, 101 lb. 136; Radcliff's
Ex. V. Brooklyn, 4 lb. 195; Bel-
linger V. ST. T. Cen. R. R. Co., 23 lb.
42; In re Furman St., 17 Wend. 667;
Wakefield v. Newell, 12 R. I. 75;
Clark V. Saybrook, 21 Conn. 313;
Fellowes v. New Haven, 44 Conn.
240; West Orange v. Field, 37 N. J.
Eq. 600; Quinn v. Paterson, 27 N. J.
L. 35 ; AUeutown v. Kramer, 73 Pa.
St. 406; Reading v. Keppleman, 61
Pa. St. 233 ; Magarity v. Wilmington,
5 Bel. 530; Detroit v. Beckman, 34
Mich. 125 ; Cumberland v. Willison,
50 Md. 138; Perry v. Worcester, 6
Gray, 544; Flagg v. Worcester, 13 lb.
601, 605; Sprague v. Worcester, 13
Gray, 19o; Americus v. Eldridge, 64
Ga. 524; Pratt v. Stratford, 14 Out.
260; Dixon v. Board of Works, L. R.
7 Q. B. D. 418; comp. Deringey v.
Ottawa, 15 Ont. 712 ; Herring v. Dis-
trict, 3 Mackey, 572; Imler v. Spring-
field, 55 Mo. 119; Weyman v.
648
Jefferson, 61 lb. 553; Swenson v.
Lexington, 69 lb. 157; Stewart v.
Lexington, 79 lb. 503; Aid en v.
Minneapolis, 24 Minn. 254; Lee v.
Minneapolis, 22 lb. 13 ; Dore v. Mil-
waukee, 42 Wis. 108; Hume v.
Knoxville, 1 Humph. 403; Rigney v.
Chicago, 102 111. 64; Snyder v. Rock-
port, 6 Ind. 237; Cummins v. Sey-
mour, 79 lb. 491 ; Princeton v. Yieske,
93 lb. 102; Kokonio v. Maham, 100
Ind. 242; Freburg v. Davenport, 63
Iowa, 119; Morris v. Council Bluffs,
67 lb. 343; Simons v. Camden, 26
Ark. 276; Chicago v. McGraw, 75
111. 566; Nebraska City v. Lampkin,
6 Neb. 27; Lawler v. Boom Co., 56
Me. 443; Roll v. Augusta, 34
Ga. 326; Shaw v. Crocker, 42 Gal.
435; British C. R. Co. v. Mere-
dith, 4 D. & E. T. R. 794; Docks
Cases, 11 H. L. 713, 714; Brine v. G.
& Western Ry. Co., 110 Eng. C. L.
402, 411.
2 Eaton v. R. R. Co., 51 N. H. 504;
Elliott on Roads and Streets, p. 204;
Smith V. Thackerath, L. R. 1 C. P.
564; Cooke v. Waring, 1 H. & C.
332; Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend. 309;
Parker v. Foot, 19 lb. 309; Hill v
Balls, 2 H. & N. 299.
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOE TORTS.
329
which are consequential, from those for which, upon the grounds
of negligence, an action will be permitted.^
The rule as to consequential injury has been applied to dam-
ages caused by a system of drainage, by which a large amount
of water was allowed to flow over private property ; ^ to the dis-
charge of fireworks by the city's servants under autl:ority of
statute ; * to the straightening of a river ; * to interruption to
travel by the building of a railroad across a highway ; ^ and to
loss from business competition." But its principal application
in connection with municipal corporations is to the execution
of the power to grade new streets, and to alter the grade of
those already established. It has been a well settled rule of law
that a municipal corporation, acting under the powers, conferred
upon it by the Legislature, to make, repair, grade and improve
streets, may grade, or alter the grade of streets already estab-
lished, without being liable in the absence of statute for any
damages whatever, provided there is no actual entry on private
land and the work is confined to the limits of the street ; and
provided reasonable care is employed by the corporation.^
iRakowsky v. Duluth, 44 Minn.
188; 46 N. W. Bep. 338; Marion v.
Skillman,26K. E. Eep. 676; Kemper
V. Campbell, (Kan. 91) 26 Pac. Kep.
55;McVerry v. Boyd, (Gal. 91) 885;
Broadwell v. Kansas City, 75 Mo.
213; Smith v. Alexandria, 33 Gratt.
208.
2 Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wis.
247.
' Tindley v. Salem, 137 Mass. 171.
« Green v. Swift, 47 Cal. 536.
'Ham T. Wisconsin E. Co., 61
Iowa, 716.
«Whittier v. Portland etc. Co., 38
Me. 26.
' Goszler v. Georgetown, 6 Wheat.
593; Smith v. Washington, 20 How.
135, 149; Pumpelly v. Green Bay, 13
Wall. 166; North Tp. Co. v. Chicago,
99 U. S. 635 ; Mason v. Kennebec etc.
Co., 31 Me. 215 ; Hovey v. Mayo, 43
lb. 322; Eaton v. B. C. & M. R. R.
Co,, 51 K H. 504, 509; Callendar v.
Marsh, 1 Pick. 418; (leading case.)
Griggs V. Foote, 4 Allen, 195; Brown
V. Lowell, 8 Met. 172; Benjamin v.
Wheeler, 8 Gray, 409; Rounds v.
Mumford, 2 E. 1. 154; Inman v. Tripp,
11 lb. 520; Smith v. Same, 13 lb. 152;
Wakefield v. Pawtucket, 15 lb. 75;
Hollisterv. Union Co., 9 Conn. 436;
Hooker v. N. H. & N. Co., 14 lb.
146; Skinner V. Hartf. Br. Co., 29 lb.
523; Burritt v. New Haven, 42 lb.
174; Healey v. Same, 49 lb. 394;
Graves v. Otis, 2 Hill, 466; Benedict
V. Goit, 3 Barb. 459; In re Fifth St.,
17 Wend. 667; Waddell v. New York,
8 Barb. 95 ; Radclifi's Ex. v. Brook-
lyn, 4 N. Y. 195 ; Mills v. Brooklyn,
32 lb. 489; St. Peter v. Denison,
58 lb. 416; People v. Green, 64 lb.
606; Coggswell v. N. Y., N. H. <fe H.
R. R. Co., 103 lb. 10; Plum v. Morris
Can Co., 10 N. J. Eq. 256; Quinn v.
Paterson, 27 N. J. L. 35; Trenton W.
P. Co. V. Raff, 36 lb. 335, 340; Mer-
sey Dock Cases, 11 H. L. Cas. 713;
Sutton V. Clarke, 6 Taunton, 28;
649
329
MUNICIPAL COBPOEATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
A landowner is generally entitled to lateral support for his
land in its natural unimproved state from the adjoining soil ;
but a city, it has been held, will not be liable to an abutting
owner, who has erected buildings on his land, for injury caused
by grading, where his building falls into the highway,^ or where
his shade trees are destroyed for lack of lateral support.^ The
power to grade is a continuous one, and may be exerted from
time to time, whenever it is necessary to accomplish either of
the two objects, for which it is granted, viz. : drainage, and tlie
Boulton V. Crowther, 2 B. & C. 703;
Green v. Reading, 9 Watts (Pa.)
382; Henry v. Pittsburgh etc. Co., 8
Watts & S. 85 ; Charlton v. Allegheny,
1 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 208; Kensington
Commissioners v. Woods, 10 Pa. St.
93;0'Conuerv.Pittsburgh, 18 lb. 187;
Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. St.
324; 7nj-eRidgeSt.,29Ib. 391; Read-
ing V. Keppleman, 61 lb. 233;
Rome V. Omberg, 28 Ga. 46; Mark-
ham V. Atlanta, 23 lb. 402; Roll v.
Augusta, 34 lb. 326 ; Mitchell v. Rome,
49 lb. 29; Macon v. Hill, 58 lb. 597;
Fuller V. Atlanta, 66 lb. 80; Castle-
berry v. Atlanta, 74 lb. 164;Dorman
V. Jacksonville, 13 Pla. 538; Selden
V. Jacksonville, 28 lb. 558; 10 So.
Rep. 457; Whitehouse v. Fellowes,
IOC. B. 779; Cheever v. Shedd, 13
Blatchf. 258; Snyder v. Rockport, 6
Ind. 237 ; Lafayette v. Spencer, 14 lb.
399; Macy v. Indianapolis, 17 lb.
267: Lafayette v. Bush, 19 lb. 326;
Vincennes v. Richards, 23 lb. 381 ;
Terre Haute v. Turner, 36 lb. 522;
Weis V. Madison, 75 lb. 241; St.
Louis v. Gurno, 12 Mo. 414; Taylor
V. St. Louis, 14 lb. 20; Hoffman v.
St. Louis, 15 lb. 651; Schattner v.
Kansas City, 53 lb. 162; Imler v.
Springfield, 55 lb. 110; Wegman v.
Jefferson, 61 lb. 55, 56; Thompson
V. Booneville, 61 lb. 282; Tate v. Mis-
souri, 64 lb. 149; Pontiac v. Carter,
32 Mich. 164; Detroit v. Beckman,
34 lb. 125; Keasy v. Louisville, 4
Dana, 154; Newport etc. Co. v.
650
Foote, 9Bush, 264; Kemper v. Louis-
ville, 14 lb. 87; Pearson v. Zable, 78
Ky. 170; Lee v. Minneapolis, 22 Minn.
13; Karst v. St. Paul etc. Co., 22 lb.
118; Alden v. Minneapolis, 24 lb. 254;
Geuois v. St. Paul, 35 lb. 330; Ne-
braska City v. Lampkin, 6 Neb. 27;
Creal v. Keokuk, 4 G. Greene, 87;
Cotes V. Davenport, 9 Iowa, 227;
Cole V. Muscatine, 14 lb. 296; Ellis
V. Iowa City, 29 lb. 229; Russell v.
Burlington, 30 lb. 262; Warren v.
Henley, 31 lb. 31; Burlington v. Gil-
bert, 31 lb. 356; Moses v. Pittsburgh
etc. Co., 21 111. 516; Roberts v. Chi-
cago, 26 lb. 249 ; Murphy v. Chicago,
29 lb. 279; Nevius v. Peoria, 41 lb.
502; Quincy v. Jones, 76 lb. 231;
White v. Yazoo City, 27 Miss. 357;
Simmons v. Camden, 26 Ark. 276;
Reynolds v. Shreveport, 13 La. An.
426; Humes v. Knoxville, 1 Hump.
403; Shawv. Crocker, 42 Cal. 435;
1 Northern Trans. Co. v. Chicago, 99
U. S. 635; Moore v. Albany, 98 N. T.
396; Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass.
220; Gilmore v. DriscoU, 122 lb.
199; Wyatt v. Harrison, 3 B. &. A.
871; Bonomi v. Backhouse, 9 H. L.
513; Taylor v. St. Louis, 14 Mo. 20;
Rome v. Omberg, 28 Ga. 46; Boll v.
Augusta, 34 lb. 326; Meth. E. Church
V.Wyandotte, 31 Kans. 721; Quincy
V. Jones, 76 111. 231; Pontiac v. Car-
ter, 32 Mich. 164; Hall v. Bristol, L.
R. 2 C. P. 322; comp. contra, Meares
V. Com'rs, 9 Ired. L. (N. C.) 73.
2 Castleberry v. Atlanta, 74 Ga. 164.
CH. XVII.J LIABILITY FOR TORTS. S 329
furnishing of a level surface for drafting purposes.^ Nor will
the courts inquire into the motives for such an act when done
under legal authority ; 2 or ascertain whether the grade adopted
is the best, or will cause the least injury .3 So, also, a change in
grade is not illegal, because unnecessary.* The arbitrary and un-
just character of this rule, when applied to the constant changes
and improvements, which are taking place in the rapidly growing
municipalities of this country, was perceived by the courts ; and
they have been astute to raise distinctions which would, under
certain circumstances, remove cases from its operation .^ Thus,
where grading was necessary to be done before the street could
be improved, the corporation was held responsible for proceed-
ing with the improvement prior to grading.^ It is also the rule
that, when the grade of a street is altered otherwise than in con-
formity with statutory provisions ; as, for example, if the consent
of the abutters is not secured, or some other condition precedent
is not complied with, the city will be held liable for injuries caused
in grading.' The signer of a petition for a change of grade is not
estopped from claiming damages, when the city's action was il-
legal, because the preliminary petition had not been signed by
a sufficient number.^
An exemption from liability for injuries, caused by a change
in grade, will not absolve the municipality from an action for
damages which are caused by the erection of a bridge upon a
public street, which resulted in the abutting owner's loss of ac-
cess to his property.^
'Lamed v. Briscoe, 62 Mich. 393;
Fuller V. Atlanta, 66 Ga. 80.
2 Benjamin v. Wheeler, 8 Gray, 409 ;
Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49.
sKoberts v. Chicago, 26 111. 249;
Snyder v. Rockport, 6 Ind. 237.
* May V. Indianapolis, 17 Ind. 267.
5 0' Conner v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. St.
187.
■^Schneider v. City, 40 N. W. R.
329; Meinzer v. Racine, 70 Wis. 561.
'Crossett v. Janesville, 28 Wis.
420; P. E. Church v. Anaraosa, 76
Iowa, 538; Dare v. Milwaukee, 42
lb. 108; Hill v. St. Louis, 59 Mo. 412;
Karst V. Stillwater etc. Co., 22 Minn.
118; Lafayette v. Wortmau, 107 Ind.
404 ; Meinzer v. Racine, 68 Wis. 241 ;
70 lb. 561.
8 Cross V. Kansas City, 90 Mo. 18.
9 Stack V. E. St. Louis, 85 111. 377;
Pekin v. Brereton, 67 lb. 477; Pekin
V. Winkel, 77 lb. 56. In Illinois, the
court said, in a case adjudicated
prior to the adoption of the consti-
tutional provision, which requires
compensation to be made to owners
of property damaged : "While a city
has the right to grade its streets by
raising or lowering them, the prop-
erty holder adjacent to the street
thus graded cannot call the city to
651
§ 329
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
In Ohio alone has the common law non-liability of munici-
palities for consequential damages been repudiated. The courts
of that State have repeatedly held municipal corporations lia-
ble for consequential damages occurring in the exercise of ju-
dicial powers, when the exercise was in good faith and authorized
by statute.^ The grounds upon which this doctrine is founded
are, that the benefit conferred upon all, to the injury of some
individual, will justify a corresponding burden shared by all, to
reimburse the injured party .^ The doctrine of exemption from
liability for consequential damages has no application to an in-
tentional or negligent invasion of private property ; and the
city will be liable for a trespass on private property, as by neg-
ligently casting stones or soil upon it,^ as well as for an entry
account for error lu judgment in es-
tablishing the grade, nor can he re-
cover damages for inconveniences or
expense in adjusting the approach
to his premises for the purposes of
ingress or egress. Although the city
may be the owner of the streets, it
has no more power over them than
a private owner over his own land,
audit cannot, under the claim of
public convenience, be permitted to
exercise that dominion to the injury
of another's property in a mode that
would render a private individual re-
sponsible in dSanages, without itself
becoming responsible. If it becomes
necessary for the interest of the pub-
lic, in grading or draining streets,
that the lot of an individual should
be rendered unfit for occupancy,
either wholly or in part, the public
should pay for it to the extent to
which the owner is deprived of its
legitimate use. Private property
shall not be taken for public use
without due compensation, applies
as well to secure the payment for
property partially taken for the use
or convenience of a street, as where
wholly taken or converted into a
street. The question as to the ex-
652
tent to which the property is taken
makes no difference in the applica--
tion of the rule; private rights are
never to be sacrificed to public con-
venience or necessity without full
compensation, and for such an in-
jury inflicted an action may be main-
tained and damage recovered as a
compensation." Nevins v. Peoria,
41 111. 502. See ante, §§ 301-308.
1 Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio, 159;
McCombs V. Akron Council, 15 lb.
4Y4.
'■' Goodloe V. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio,
500, 514; Crawford v. Delaware, 7
Ohio St. 459; Scovill v. Geddings, 7
Ohio, part 2, 211; Hickox v. Cleve-
land, 8 Ohio, 543 ; Cincinnati v. Pen-
ny, 21 Ohio St. 499; Youngstown v.
Moore, 30 lb. 133; Dodson v. Cin-
cinnati, 34 lb. 276; Keating v. Cin-
cinnati, 38 lb. 141 ; see late afiSrmance
of the rule in Cohen v. Cleveland, 43
lb. 190 (1885).
^ Hendershatt v. Ottumwa, 46 Iowa,
658; Waldrou V. Haverhill, 143 Mass.
582; Martinsville v. Shirley, 84 Ind.
546; Platter v. Seymour, 86 lb. 323;
Vanderlip v. Grand Rapids, 41 N. W.
R. 677; Cf. Fellows v. New Haven,
44 Conn. 240.
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOE TOETS.
§ 330
theieon.i So, also, will the city be liable for injuries which
are caused by official acts of wantonness or malice.^
§ 330. Constitutional and statutory provisions, guaran-
teeing compensation for property damaged— Remedy. It
is a well recognized fact that the provisions in most of the
constitutions of the States, forbidding a taking of private jjrop-
erty for public use without compensation,^ were wholly inade-
quate to protect private property from impairment by acts
which could not be included in the meaning which the courts
attached to the word taking,* and many of the constitutions
have within recent years been amended.^ In a majority of the
States the clause, in the constitution as amended, which is to
render private property inviolate, is to the effect that no man's
property shall be taken, DAMAGED OE dbstkoybd for public
purposes, without just compensation being made or secured to
the party injured.^
Such a provision in a constitution has been held by the Su-
preme Court of the United States "^ to impose upon a munici-
pality a liability for damages to private property caused bj-
changing the grades of streets ; and this construction has been
followed bj' those State courts, which have been called upon to
construe clauses of this character.^ These constitutional pro-
iWard T. Peck, 6 Atl. Rep. 805;
Broadwell v. City, 75 Mo. 213 ; Mayo
V. Springfield, 136 Mass. 10.
2 Bounds V. Mumford, 2 R. I. 154;
Reynolds v. Shreveport, 13 La. An.
426; Mayor v. Randolph, 4 W. & S.
514; Chicago v. Roberts, 26 111. 249;
Philadelphia v. Randolph, 4 W. & S.
(Pa.) 514; Northern T. Co. v. Chica-
go, 99 U. S. 635.
^Northern Transp. Co. of O. v.
Chicago, 99 U. S.'665; Platter v. Sey-
mour, 86 Ind. 324; Henderschott V.
Ottumwa, 46 Iowa, 658.
*Ante,, §§239, 301-305.
' Callendar v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 418,
430 (1823); Thurston v. Hancock, 12
Mass. 220; Radcliff's Ex. v. Brooklyn,
4 N. Y. 195, 205 ; Tiedeman Police
Power, pages, 397-420.
"See Constitutions of Massachu-
setts, Maine, Vermont, Connecticut,
Rhode Island, New York, New Jer-
sey, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Wis-
consin, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Virginia, West Virginia, Missouri,
Arkansas, California, Oregon, Ne-
vada, Colorado, Georgia, Alabama,
Mississippi, Louisiana and Arizona.
Stimpson's Statutes, art. 9, §§ 90 to
92.
' Chicago V. Taylor, 125 U. S. 161.
SRigney v. Chicago, 102 111. 64;
Shawneetown v. Mason, 82 lb. 337;
Elgin V. Eaton, 83, 111. 535 ; Pekin v.
Brereton, 67 lb. 477; Bloomington v.
Brokaw, 77 lb. 194; Pekin v. Winkel,
lb. 50; Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. Reich,
101 lb. 157; Chicago v. Union B.
Ass'n, 102 lb. 379; Atlanta v. Green,
69 Ga. 386; Harmon v. Omaha, 17
Neb. 548; Goodrich v. Omaha, 10 lb.
98; Gottschalk v. C. B. & Q. R. R.
Co., 14 lb. 530; Omaha, etc. Co. v.
653
§ 330
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS.
[CH. xvn,
visions are general in their application, and give a remedy when-
ever substantial damage is inflicted on the abutting property,
sufficient to constitute a taking of property or a new use which
is not contemplated in the original dedication or condemnation.
Thus, damages have been awarded, where the grade was raised
by a railroad company four feet,^ fifteen feet,^ and ten feet;^
and where the street was lowered twenty feet.* So, also, have
damages been awarded for other injuries, caused by laying a
railroad track,^ by erecting telegraph poles," by excavations in
sidewalks," and by raising an embankment in front of plaintiff's
premises.^ In several of the States, statutes have been passed
which require that compensation be made, irrespective of negli-
gence, for damages caused b}'- the change ® of street grades.^"
If the statute provides for a special remedy, that remedy is
Struden, 22 lb. 34.'? ; Lowe v. Omaha,
.50 N. W. Rep. 760; Sheehy v. Jersey
City, 78 Mo. 107 ; Sheehy v. Kansas
City etc. Co., 94 lb. .574; Household-
er V. Kansas City, 83 lb. 488; Whit-
more V. Tarry town, 62 Hun, 619; 16
N. T. S. 740; Blanchard v. Kansas
City, 16 Fed. Rep. 444; 5 McCrary
C. C. R. 217; McElroy v. Kansas City,
21 Fed. Rep. 2,57; Denver Circle R.
Co. V. Nestor, 10 Col. 403; Stearns
V. Richmond, (Va. 93) 14 S. E. Rep.
847; Page v. Belvin, 88 Va. 985;
Galveston etc. Co. v. Fuller, 63 Tex.
467; Cooper v. Dallas, (Tex.) 18 S.
W. Rep. 565; Hot Springs, etc. Co.
V. Williamson, 45 Ark. 429; Mont-
gomery Council V. Townsend, 80 Ala.
489; New Brighton v. U. Pres.
Church, 90 Pa. St. 331 ; New Brighton
V. Peirsol, 107 lb. 280; Hendrick's
App., 103 lb. 358; Pa. R.' R. v. Lip-
pincott, 116 Pa. St. 472; Pa. R. R.
Co. V. Merchant, 119 lb. 541 ; Bloom-
ington V. Pollock, (111. 92) 31 N. E.
Rep. 146.
1 Hot Springs v. Williamson, 45
Ark. 429.
2 Atlanta v. Green, 67 Ga. 386.
8 Shawneetown v. Mason, 82 111.
337.
« Montgomery Council v. Town-
654
send, 80 Ala. 489.
"Mollandin v. Union Pac. Co., 14
Fed. Rep. 394.
8 Board of Trade I. C. v. Barnett,
107 III. 507.
'Stone v. Fairbury etc. Co., 68 lb.
394; Shelton v. Birmingham, 62 Conn.
456; 26 Atl. Rep. 156.
* Harmon v. Omaha, 17 Neb. 548.
^ Whether there has been such a
change of grade as will entitle an
owner to damages, is a question for
the jury: Conklin v. Keokuk, 73
Iowa, 343.
10 Phillips V. Council Bluffs, 63
Iowa, 576; Hampstead v. Des Moines,
63 lb. 36; Pratt v. Des Moines etc.
Co., 72 lb. 249; Hovey v. Mays, 43
Me. 322; Shelton v. Birmingham, 62
Conn. 456; 26 Atl. Rep. 156; McCar-
thy V. St. Paul, 22. Minn. 527; Cros-
sett V. Janesville, 28 Wis. 434; Lsr
fayette v. Wartman, 107 Ind. 404;
Reook V. Newark, 33 N. J. L. 129;
White V. McKeesport, 101 Pa. St.
394; Jones v. Borough of Bangor,
144 lb. 638; 29 W. N. C. 245; Fer-
nald V. Boston, 12 Gush. 574; Flagg
V. Worcester, 13 Gray, 601; Colum-
bus V. Hydr. Woollen Mills Co.,
33 Ind. 435; Fortworth v. How-
ard, (Tex. 93) 22 S. W. Rep. 1059.
CH. xvn.]
LIABILITy FOE TOETS.
330
generally exclusive.^ So, where it was provided by the charter
that the common council should compensate owners for injuries
caused by change of grade, out of funds raised by an assessment
which was levied upon all property benefited, it was held that
tlie plaintiff could not recover in an ordinary civil action for
damages, as the effect of such a recovery would be to impose a
burden on all, which should be borne by a class only.^
When it was provided by charter that no change shall be
made in grades, until damages shall be assessed and tendered,
it was held that an abutter might enjoin the work until this
provision of the charter had been complied with.^
Pecuniary loss furnishes a standard for the measurement of
damages ; and if the property has been benefited by the change
of grade, as much as it has been damaged, no action will lie ; *
or, at least, only nominal damages may be recovered. All re-
sulting damages for change of grade must be ascertained and
recovered in one action, the property owner not being entitled
to maintain successive actions for each fresh annoj^ance.®
Widening a street and grading a street are independent
processes. Hence, although the abutting owners have received
compensation for property taken in widening the street they
will still be entitled to compensation, where a statutory pro-
vision authorizes the recovery of damages caused by a subse-
quent change in grade.®
The repeal of a statute, by which a city was made liable for
Queen v. Wallesey etc., L. R. 4 Q. B.
351; Queen v. Vestry etc., 6 lb. 572;
Caledonian Ey. Co. v. Ogilvie, 2
Macq. 229; Bigg v. London, L. E. 15
Eq. 376; Eicket v. Metro. Ey. Co., L.
R. 2 H. L. 175 ; Duke of Buccleuch v.
Metro. Board, L. E. 5 H. L. C. 418;
McCarthy v. Same, L. E. 7 C. P. 508;
Anderson v. Bain, 22 K. E. E. 323;
Burham v. Ohio etc. Co., 23 lb. 799.
' Andover v. Gould, 6 Mass. 40;
Boston V. Shaw, 1 Met. 130; Cole v.
Muscatine, 14 Iowa, 296 ; Dorman v.
Jacksonville, 13 Fla. 50, 538; Heiser
V. New Tork, 104 N. Y. 68; Hovey
V. Mayo, 43 Me. 322.
2 Keock V. Newark, 33 JST. J. L. 129.
But the contrary has been held, in
Elgin V. Eaton, 83 111. 537; Lafayette
V. Wortman, 107 Ind. 404.
" Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Keb. 336.
4 Chicago V. Taylor, 125 U. S. 161 ;
Lehigh C. Co. v. Chicago, 26 Fed.
Eep. 415 ; Elgin v. Eaton, 83 111. 535 ;
Stone V. Fairbury etc. Co., 68 lb.
394; Chicago etc. Co. v. Francis, 70
lb. 238; Shawneetown V. Mason, 82
lb. 337.
6 Lafayette v. Nagle, 113 lud. 425 ;
North Vernon v. Voegeler, 103 lb.
314; Terre Haute v. Hudnut, 112 lb.
542; Central Branch etc. Co. v. An-
drews, 26 Kan. 702.
^ Lane v. Boston, 125 Mass. 519;
Cambridge v. Middlesex, 125 lb. 519;
Snow V. Provincetown, 109 lb. 123.
655
§331
MU^'ICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. xvir.
consequential damages, will not take away the right to damages
for a change of grade, which was ordered while it was in force.^
§ 331. Municipal corporation not liaMe for failure to en-
force ordinances. — The enactment of ordinances is accom-
plished by the exercise of legislative power, which is conferred
expressly, or by necessary implication, upon all municipal cor-
porations ; and, as the power is wholly discretionar}', as to the
time or manner of its exercise, there is generally no liability,
either for a failure to enact an ordinance, or for failure to en-
force it, after it shall have been enacted. The functions of the
legislator are not, so far as they constitute him the judge of the
expediency of legislative action, subject to judicial review;
and, in the case of municipal ordinance, there is no civil liability
in damages to a person, who is injured by the neglect of the
city's officers to enforce them, unless this liability is imposed by
statute, or the effect of enacting the ordinance has been to
create a contract between the city and an individual or corpo-
ration.^
The violation of an ordinance, particularly one regulating
the use of streets, makes the violator a wrongdoer, and gives
the injured party a good cause of action against him,^ for in-
juries caused by the violation ; * but, generall j' the municipality
is not liable for the violation of its ordinances, unless it has
assumed to grant the permission to violate them to a private
citizen for private purposes ; and has taken compensation for
this license to do an illegal act.^ It has thus been held, that
' Healey v. New Haven, 49 Conn.
394.
2 Levy V. New York, 1 Sandf. 465;
Peck V. Austin, 2 Tex. 162; Fowle v.
Alexander, 3 Pet. 398, 409; Lorillard
V. Monroe, 11 N. T. 292, 396; 12
Barb. 161; Chandler v. Bay St. Louis,
5T MlBs. 327; Sutton v. Carroll Co.,
41 lb. 236; Sherman v. Grenada, 51
lb. 186; McCrowell V. Bristol, 5 Lea,
085; Kiley v. Kansas, 87 Mo. 103;
Howe V. New Orleans, 12 La. An.
481 ; Boyland v. Mayor of New York,
1 Sandf. 27; Kehberg v. Mayor, 91
N. Y. 137; Hill v. Charlotte, 72 N.
C. 55; Odell v. Schroeder, 58 111. 353 ;
Howe v. New Orleans, 12 La. An.
656
481; Cole v. Nashville, 4Sneed, 162;
Schultze V. Milwaukee, 49_Wis. 254;
Davis V. Montgomery, 51 Ala. 139;
Norristown v. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. St.
121; Eobinson V. Greenville, 42 Ohio
St. 625; Wheeler v. Plymouth, IIG
Ind. 158; Pierce v. New Bedfoid,
129 Mass. 534; Steele v. Boston, 128
Mass. 583.
3 Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St.
96 ; State v. Lee, 4 Grim. Law Mag. 79.
* Whelan v. N. Y. etc. R. E. Co., 38
Fed. Kep. 15; Penna. Co. v. Stage-
meier, 118 Ind. 305; Wanless v. N.
E. K. W., L. E. 6Q. B. 481.
' Cohen v. New York, 113 N. Y.
582.
CH. xvn.]
LIABILITY FOK TORTS.
§ 331 a.
a city is not liable for injuries received by a person using its
streets, which are caused by persons coasting thereon by permis-
sion of the municipal authorities.^ The suppression of a nui-
sance, is a police, and not a distinctly corporative duty ; and
for the nonperformance of such a duty, or for the nonenforce-
ment of an ordinance, forbidding such a use of its streets, a city
cannot be held liable.^
Municipal corporations are not liable in damages for viola-
tions of their by-laws by their own officials in performing dis-
cretionary duties, where no contractual relation exists between
the party injured and the corporation.^ So, it has been held
that a city is not responsible for loss caused by fire, originating
in a wooden building which was erected with full notice and
knowledge of the city's officials, inside of the fire limits, within
which the erection of frame structures had been forbidden by
ordinance ; * or for damages caused by the falling of the walls
of a building, which had been burned, upon a house on the op-
posite side of the street, although the city marshal had volun-
teered to have them torn down.^ No action can be maintained
against the city by a person, who is injured by the act of another,
though the act is by ordinance illegal, if at the time the opera-
tion of the ordinance had been temporaril}'' suspended by the
municipal governing body.^
§ 331 a. Liability for mistake as to corporate powers — A
municipal corporation is not liable for an injury which is wholly
caused by a mistaken exercise of powers not granted it by the
State, or by having misconceived their extent and limitations.
Thus, a city will not be liable to individuals, who are injured
'Schultz V. Milwaukee, 49 Wis.
254; Lafayette v. Timberlake, 88
Ind. 330; Burford v. Grand Rapids,
58 Mich. 98; Frankner v. Aurora, 85
Ind. 130; Calwell v. Boone, 51 Iowa,
687;Piercev. New Bedford, 129 Mass.
534; Steele v. Boston, 128 lb. 583.
2 Hayes v. Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314;
Wallace v. Menosha, 48 lb. 79; 4 K.
W. Rep. 101, contra, Taylor v. Cum-
berland, 64 Md. 68.
^Odell V. Schroeder, 58 lU. 353;
Ball T. Woodbine, 61 Iowa, 85 ; but
see contra, where a city was held li-
43
able for injury caused by rapid driv-
ing of a steam engine by a member
of its fire department. Morse v.
Sweenie, 15 Bradw. 486.
iHines v. Charlotte, 12 Mich. 278;
see Forsythe v. Mayor, etc., Atlanta,
45 Ga. 152, where the erection was
expressly authorized in contraven-
tion of existing ordinance.
s City of Anderson v. East, 117
Ind. 126.
» Rivers v. Augusta, 67 Ga. 376;
23 Alb. L. J. 17; Hill v. Charlotte,
72 N. C. 55.-
657
§ 332
MtTKICIPAL COKPOKATrONS.
[CH. xvri.
by the fraudulent or negligent conduct of those whom it licenses
in good faith to carry on business within its limits,^ because it
had not the power to grant the license. But, as a general rule,
where a city, acting within its corporate power, licenses a per-
son to do an act which is dangerous per se,^ or which will be
dangerous, if done bj' this particular person,^ and continues the
license after it received actual or constructive notice that its li-
censee is acting under the license negligently, and to the great
danger of the safety of others, it will be held responsible for
any injur)'' caused thereby.* And as a municipal corporation
cannot, by the grant of a license, part with its powers of con-
trol, it is always under the obligation of exercising a supervision
over' its licensee. But, ordinarily, the city will not be liable
for the negligence of the licensee, unless there is gross negli-
gence on its part. So, when it is sought to fix a liability upon
the city for the act of its licensee, municipal, as well as individ-
ual, negligence must be shown.^
The granting of a license being substantially a judicial act,
a municipal corporation will not be liable to one to whom the
license has been refused.®
882. Municipal corporation not liable for neglect or mis-
conduct of its health officers The right of the State to
enact laws for the protection of the public health, by which per-
sons afflicted with contagious or infectious disorders may be
confined, where they will not cause the disease to spread, is
fully recognized.' So, too, the State may provide for the care
of indigent, insane, sick and decrepit persons by general laws,
and devolve their administration upon one or the other of the
territorial governmental subdivisions, of which the State is com-
iFowle V. Alexandria, 3 Pet. 398;
3 Cranch C. C. 70; Masterson v. Mt.
Vernon, 58 IST. T. 391 ; Susquehanna
V. Simmons, 112 Pa. St. 384; Warsaw
V. Dunlap, 112 Ind. 576; Hunt v. New
Tork, 109 N. y. 134; Macomber v.
Taunton, 100 Mass. 255.
2 Little V. Madison, 42 Wis. 043.
«Cole V. Nashville, 4 Sneed, 102.
<Ilussellv. Columbia, 74 Mo. 480;
Stephens v. Macon, 83 lb. 343 ; Indi-
anapolis V. Dougherty, 71 Ind. 5;
Savannah v. Donnelly, 71 Ga. 258;
658
Estelle V. Lake Crystal, 27 Minn. 243;
Cohen v. New York, 113 N. Y. 532;
contra, Robinson v. Greenville, 42
Ohio St. 625; Norristown v. Fitz-
patrick, 94 Pa. St. 621; Lincoln v.
Boston, 148 Mass. 578.
6 Cleveland v. King, 28 Fed. Eep.
835.
«Duke v. Rome, 20 Ga. 635; Wliite
V. Yazoo City, 27 Miss. 357.
' Com. V. Parker, 9 Mete. 263 ; State
V. Cooper, 22 N. J. L. 52; Tiedeman's
Limitations of Police Power, § 43.
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOR TORTS.
§ 333
posed. A city, in enforcing such laws, is performing duties of
a purely public character, and is not responsible for the neglect
or misconduct of its agents or officials,^ resulting in injury to
a nonpaying patient ; ^ or for damages to any inmate of one of
its institutions, by reason of the unskillful treatment of the
resident physicians.^ So, too, the corporation will not be liable
for failure to prevent the spread of an infectious disease ; * for
removing a healthy person to a pest house where he contracted
the disease, when he was believed to be suffering from the con-
tagious disease ; ^ for ordering an infected ship to leave the har-
bor ; ^ or for taking possession of and detaining it.^
The same rule of non-liability is applicable to a city corpora-
tion, when it is required by statute to care for paupers and or-
phan children ; and to maintain hospitals and institutions of a
public and .charitable nature, where the treatment is gratuitous,
even though they may be partly supported by private contribu-
tions.^
§ 333. Municipal corporations not liable for the torts of
their police oiKcers or firemen. — The police officers of a city,
although appointed by it, are not its private agents. For the
duties, which thej' perform in protecting life and property, and
preserving the peace, are not strictly corporate ; nor are they
performed for the exclusive benefit of the city in its corporate
capacity.^ So, although a police officer may himself be liable
I Richmond v. Long's Adm., 17
Gratt. 375; Dargan v. Mobile, 31 Ala.
469.
^Murtagh V. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 479.
"Summers v. Daviess Co., 103 Ind.
262; Ogg V. Lansing, 3.5 Iowa, 495.
* Brown v. Vinalhaven, 65 Me. 402.
''Barbour v. Ellsworth, 67 Me. 294.
" Eudolphe v. New Orleans, 11 La.
An. 242.
'Mitchell V. Rockland, 41 Me. 363;
Harrison v. Baltimore, 1 Gill, (Md.)
264.
'Bryant v. St. Paul, 33 Minn. 289;
liiberty v. Hurd, 74 Me. 101 ; Ogg v.
Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495 ; McDonald v.
Mass. Gen. Hos., 120 Mass. 432;
Spring V. Hyde, 137 lb. 554; Ben-
ton V. City Hos., 140 lb. 13; CaiTing-
tonv. St. Louis, 89 Mo. 208; Maxi-
milian V. New York, 62 N. Y. 160;
Ham V. Mayor of N. Y., 10 lb. 459;
Haight V. New York, 24 Fed. Rep.
98; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H.
284.
'McKay v. Buffalo, 74 N. Y. 619;
Elliott V. Philadelphia, 75 Pa. St. 347;
Brown's Adm'r v. Guyandotte, 34
W. Va. 290; Caldwell v. Boone, 51
Iowa, 687; Odell v. Schroeder, 58 111.
353 ; Prather v. Lexington, 13 B. Mon.
559; Odell v. Schroeder, 58111. 353;
see Forbush v, Norwich, 38 Conn.
368; Campbell v. Montgomery, 53
Ala. 527; Cook v. Macon, 54 Ga. 468;
Heller v. Mayor etc. of Sedalia, 53
Mo. 159: see ante, § 9.
659
§ 333 a.
MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
in damages for an unlawful arrest, the city will not be respon-
sible to a person who has been arrested illegally,^ or to one who
has been assaulted by a policeman, in an attempt to enforce a
city ordinance ; ^ for a horse negligently killed under such cir-
cumstances ; ^ for the taking and detention of property by the
police officer ; * for selling the chattels of one person for the
delinquent taxes of another ; ^ or for any unlawful or tortious
acts, by which property or life is injured in the performance
of police duty.^
A city is not liable for the act of its recorder in refusing
bail wrongfully ; '' nor to a person who suffers a bodily injury,
while aiding peace officers, at their request, in making an arrest.*
Although constables are appointed by the authorities of the
town, the town is not liable for their default unless the statute
has so provided.^
A city is also under no legal duty to furnish an adequate
police force ; and will not, unless an action is given by statute;
be responsible for injur}' which is caused by insufficient police
protection.^"
§ 333 a. Liability for torts of the firemen. — Although a
city may be expressly empowered and required to furnish water,
and to maintain apparatus, adapted to the extinguishing of
fires, it will not be impliedly liable to one, whose property has
' Grumbine v. "Washington, 2 Mc-
Arthur, 578; Corsicaua v. White, 57
Tex. 382; Little v. Madison, 49 Wis.
605 ; Hart v. Bridgeport, 13 Blatchf .
(U. S.) 289; Odell v. Schroeder, 58
HI. 353; Kew York Lumber Co. v.
Brooklyn, 71 K. T. 580; Greenwood
V. Louisville, 13 Bush, 226; Pol-
lock's Adm. V. Louisville, , lb. 221;
Cook V. Macon, 64 Ga. 460; McElroy
V. Albany, 65 lb. 387; Dargan v. Mo-
bile, 31 Ala. 469.
^ Bowditch V. Boston, 101 U. S. 16;
Buttrick v. Lovrell, 1 Allen, 172;
Biirch V. Hardwicke, 30 Gratt. 24;
Worley v. Columbia, 88 Mo. 106;
Caldwell v. Boone, 51 Iowa, 687;
Culver V. Streator, 22 N. E. Kep. 810;
Little V, Madison, 49 Wis. 605 ; La-
fayette V. Timberlake, 88 Ind. 330;
GGO
Norristown v. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. St.
121.
3 Elliott v. Philadelphia, 75 Pa. St
347.
* Stedman V. San Francisco, 63 Gal.
193.
6 Wallace v. Menasha, 48 Wis. 79.
^ Stewart v. New Orleans, 6 La.
An. 461 ; Dargan v. Mobile, 31 Ala.
469, 477.
■ Pesterfield v. Tickers, 3 Coldw.
205; Keady v. Tuskaloosa, 6 Ala. 327.
8 Cobb V. Portland, 55 Me. 381 ; Sut-
ton v. Carroll Co. Pol. Bd., 41 Miss.
236.
^Hurlbut V. Litchfield, 1 Root,
(Conn.) 520.
'» Hannon v. Agnew, 96 N. T. 439;
Dewey v. Detroit, 15 Mich. 307; Jones
V. Richmond, 18 Gratt. 517. '
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOR TORTS.
§833a.
been damaged, either by its failure to provide an adequate
water supply ; ^ or by reason of negligence on the part of the
officials, having chai'ge thereof, in the use or care of the fire
engines, or other similar apparatus owned by the city.^
A city is not liable for a failure to supply enough water to
extinguish fires, even when the water company supplying it
has agreed to indemnify the city for damages, caused by its
misfeasance or nonfeasance.^ And the fact, that the city en-
tered into a contract to furnish the plaintiff with an adequate
water supply to extinguish fires, is invalid, if such a contract
when made is ultra viresJ"
Municipal corporations are not liable for the negligence of
their firemen, — although they may be appointed and removed
by the city, and the performance of the duties are wholly sub-
ject to its contirol, — where a person is run over b}' a hose car-
riage on its way to a fire ;^ for injuries caused by the bursting
of a hose ; ^ for damage by fire caused by the negligence of the
city's firemen ; ^ for neglect in cutting off water by which the
fire might have been sooner extinguished ; ^ by the bursting
of the mains;' because a horse is frightened by steam from
an engine left in the street ; ^^ or for any similar lack of care or
skill."
1 Van Horn v. Des Moines, 63 Iowa,
447; Black v. Columbia, 19 S. C. 412;
Wheeler V. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio St. 19;
Tainter v. Worcester, 123 Mass. 311 ;
Brinkraeyer v. Evansville, 29 Ind.
187; Wright v. City Council, 78 Ga.
241 ; Patch v. Covington, 17 B. Mon.
722.
-McKennav. St. Louis, 6 Mo. App.
320; Foster v. Lookout W. Co., 3
Lea, 42; Davis v. Montgomery, 51
Ala. 139; Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. St.
420; Heller v. Sedalia, 53 Mo. 159;
Gi-eenwood v. Louisville, 13 Bush.
226; Howard V. San Francisco, 51 Cal.
52; Omeara v. Mayor, 1 Daly, 425;
Jewett V. New Haven, 38 lb. 368;
Mendel v. Wheeling, 28 W. Va. 233;
Wheller V. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio St. 19;
Smith V. Rochester, 76 N. T. 506;
Wilcox V. Chicago, 107 111. 334; Wild
V. Paterson, 47 N. J. L. 406.
3 Van Horn v. Des Moines, 63 Iowa,
447.
4 Black V. Columbia, 19 S. C. 412.
This should be read in connection
with § 336, on Negligence and the
receipt of a consideration as elements
in the implied liability of municipal
corporations.
5 Hafeord v. New Bedford, IG Gray,
297.
8 Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87.
' Hayes v. Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314 ;
New Orleans v. Cresc. M. I. Co., 25
La. An. 390.
* Tainter v. Worcester, 123 Mass.
311; Davis v. Montgomery Council,
51 Ala. 139.
9 Tainter v. Worc'r, 123 Mass. 311.
10 Burrill v. Augusta, 78 Me. 118.
" Grube v. St. Paul, 34 Minn. 402;
McCrowell v. Bristol, 5 Lea, 685;
Welsh V. Rutland, 56 Vt. 228.
661
CH. xvn.]
LIABILITY POK TOETS.
334
The city is not liable for failure to supply cisterns,^ or to
repair the reservoir.^ And the fact, that the waterworks are
owned by the city, will not alone, in the absence of statute,
make it liable for an insufficient supply.^
§ 834. Liability for property destroyed by mobs or riot-
ers.— The suppression of mob violence, and the prevention of
injury to life and property, is a public duty, delegated to the
muncipalit}' by the State, and is to be distinguished from corpo-
rate duties to be performed for the special beneiit of the munic-
ipality, ia that there is no common law liability upon a municipal
corporation, to reimburse those whose property has been dam-
aged or destroyed by mobs.*
So, it has been held, when the charter makes it the manda-
tory duty of the city council to regulate the police, preserve
1 Wheeler v. Cincinnati, 19 OMo
St. 19.
2 Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. St. 420.
. ■' Mendel v. Wheeling, 28 W. Va.
233.
* Baltimore v. Poultney, 25 Md.
107; Fauira v. New Orleans, 20 La.
An. 410; Howe v. Same, 12 lb. 481;
Street V. Same, 32 lb. 577; Campbell
V. Montgomery, 53 Ala. 527; Dale
Co. V. Gunter, 46 lb. 118; Hart v.
Bridgeport, 13 Blatchf. 289; Robin-
son V. Greenville, 42 Ohio St. 625;
Louisiana v. Mayor of New Orleans,
109 U. S. 285 ; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9
B. Mon. 330; Williams v. New Or-
leans, 23 La. An. 507; Hagerstown
v. Dechert, 32 Md. 369; Martin v.
Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 545, 551; Chad-
bourne V. Newcastle, 48 N. H. 196;
Buttrick v. Lowell, 1 Allen, 172;
Ely V. Niagara Co., 36 N. T. 297;
Clear- Lake W. W. Co. v. Lake Co.,
45 Cal. 90. In Louisiana ex rel.
Folsora V. New Orleans, 109 U. S.
285, the court said: " Tlie right to
reimbursement for damages caused
by a mob or riotous assemblage of
people is not founded upon any con-
tract between the city and the suf-
ferers. Its liability for damage is
662
created by a law of the Legislature,
and can be withdrawn or limited at
pleasure. It is their duty [the cities']
to exercise their authority so as to
prevent violence from any cause,
and particularly from mobs and riot
ous assemblages. It has, therefore,
been generally considered as a just
burden, cast upon them, to require
them to make good any loss sus-
tained from the acts of such assem-
blages, wliich they should have re-
pressed. The imposition has been
supposed to create, in the holders of
property liable to taxation within
their limits, an interest to discourage
and prevent any movements tending
to such violent proceedings. But,
however considered, the imposition
is simply a measure of legislative
policy, in no respect resting upon
contract, and subject like all other
measures of policy to any change the
Legislature may see fit to make, ei-
ther in the extent of the liability or
in the means of its enforcement.
And its character is not at all chang-
ed by the fact, that the amount of
the loss, in pecuniary estimation,
has been ascertained and establish-
ed by the judgments rendered.
CH. xvn.]
LIABILITY FOK TOUTS.
§334
the peace and prevent riots and disorderly assemblages, that
this duty was properly and fully performed by the enactment
of ^he proper ordinances ; and that the neglect of the ofBcers,
who were appointed by the city to enforce the ordinances, and
to perform this duty, did not impose any liability on the city.^
In many States, statutes have been enacted which give the per-
son, whose property is destroyed, an action in damages against
the city or county ; and such statutes are constitutional.^ Thus,
it lias been held that such an act does not conflict with a clause
in a State constitution, that " a county shall never be made re-
sponsible for the acts of the sheriff." ^ This remedy is purely
a matter of legislative policy and statutory creation. The ac-
tion for damages is founded, not on contract, but on the tor-
tious conduct of the municipality ; and the remedy may be
limited, modified or withdrawn at the pleasure of the lawmak-
ing power ; irrespective of the fact, that the damage has been
ascertained and fixed by a judgment* of a court of competent
jurisdiction. The municipal liability under such acts is gene-
ral, arising in all cases where property ^ or life ^ is destroyed by
a mob, irrespective of the size or character of the gathering,^
and regardless of the fact, that many of the rioters were not
residents of the municipality .^ The inability of the munici-
pality to quell the disturbance, even though the sheriff called
the State militia to his aid, is no defence ; ^ and the city is lia-
ble, whether the property destroyed is in transit through it,^''
and whether the owner is a resident of the city or not.^^
The basis, upon which the statutory remedy is founded, be-
1 Western Col. v. Cleveland, 12
Ohio St. 375 ; Hart v. Bridgeport, 13
Blatclif . 289 ; Prather v. Lexington,
13 B. Mon. 559; "Ward v. Louisville,
16 lb. 184.
- Orr V. Brooklyn, 36 N. T. 661 ;
Darlington v. New York, 31 lb. 164;
Eastman v. Mayor etc., 5 Rob. 389;
In re Penn. Hall, 5 Pa. St. 204; Chad-
bourne v. Newcastle, 48 N. H. 196;
Davidson v. Mayor, 27 How. Pr. 343 ;
Folsom V. New Orleans, 28 La. An.
936; Williams v. New Orleans, 23 lb.
507; Russell v. New York, 2 Denio,
461; Lowell v. Wyman, 12 Cush. 273,
276; Gray v. B'klyn, 10 Abb. Pr. 186.
3 Moody v. Niagara, 36 N. Y. 297.
* Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U.
S. 285.
6 Moody V. Niagara, 36 N. Y. 297.
6 Atchison v. Twine, 9 Kan. 350.
'Pittsburgh Riot, Allegheny v.
Gibson, 90 Pa. St. 397.
8 Chadbourne v. Newcastle, 48 N.
H. 196.
3 Allegheny Co. v. Gibson, 90 Pa.
St. 397.
1" Allegheny v. Gibson, supra.
1' Williams v. New Orleans, 23 La,
An. 507.
663
§ 334 MXJXICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVn.
ing the negligence of the municipal corporation in securing a
proper enforcement of the laws for the protection of life and
property, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is an ele-
ment to be considered. If threats of violence have been made
prior to the disturbance, the party threatened should give no-
tice to the sheriff or mayor, that precautionary measures may
be takeni. But such notice is not required, if the interval be-
tween the threat and the overt act is so short as to render no-
tice impracticable ; '^ or if the authorities had received warning
of the apprehended violence from others ; ^ or where the in-
jured party had no previous warning.*
The property of tliose who break the law is entitled to its
protection as well as that of the law abiding. For this reason,
it is no defence that the house destroj^ed was frequented by
thieves and murdereis ; ® that a policeman had been murdered
in it,^ or, that the house at the time was used for unlawful pur-
poses.'^ But it is a good defence, that the riot arose out of the
previous conduct of the plaintiff, e. g. where he had freely sup-
plied the rioters with liquor, which made them quarrelsome ; ^
or, where a disturbance arose out of a gambling transaction,
which took place in the plaintiff's house, although he was not
implicated.^ If the plaintiff participated in or instigated the
riot, he will, of course, not be entitled to recover.^'' The city
may show in mitigation of damages that the property destroyed
was exposed in a market, in violation of ordinance.^^
The measure of damages, in such actions, is the actual value
of the propertj- when destroyed or carried away by the mob,^^
1 Newberry v. Mayor etc., 1 Sweeny,
369.
2 Moody V. Niagara Co., 36 N. Y.
297; Allegheny v. Gibson, supra;
Scliiellein v. Kings Co., 43 Barb. 490;
Solomon v. Kingston, 24 Hun, 462.
^ Newberry v. Mayor etc., 1 Sweeny,
309; Allegheny Co. v. Gibson, 90 Pa.
St. 397.
*Ely V. Niagara, 36 N. Y. 297;
Donoghue v. Philada. Co., 2 Pa. St.
230; St. Michaels Ch. v. Philada.
Co., Bright. (Pa.) 121.
^Ely V. Niagara Co., 36 N. Y. 297;
Blodgett V. Syracuse, 36 Barb. 526;
Brightman v. Bristol, 65 Me. 426.
664
6 Moody V. Niagara, 46 Barb. 669,
s. c, 36 N. Y. 297.
' Moody V. Niagara, supra.
* Hill V. Rensselaer Co., 53 Hun,
194; Paladino v. Westchester, 47 lb,
337.
' tJnderhill v. Manchester, 45 N. H.
214.
10 Wing Chung v. Los Angeles, 47
Cal. 531.
" Portunich v. New Orleans, 14 La.
An. 115.
12 Solomon v. Kingston, 24 Hun, 562 ;
Hermits of St. Augustine v. Phila.
Co., Bright, 116; St. Michael's Ch. v.
Same, Bright, 121.
CH. xvn.]
LIABILITY FOR TORTS.
§ 335
and the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff ^ to show its value.
Interest should ordinarily l)e allowed.^
§ 335. Destruction of buildings to prevent the spread of
fire. — As has already been explained in other connections, in
the constitutions of most of the States it is provided that pri-
vate property shall not be taken, damaged or destroyed for pub-
lic use or benefit, unless compensation is made to the owner.
But this constitutional prohibition is held to be inapplicable to
the razing or demolishing of houses to prevent the spread of a
conflagration. Such a destruction is not a taking of property
in the constitutional meaning of the words.''
In such emergencies the public necessity is paramount, and
any person may then destroy private propert}' without making
himself, the State or municipality, responsible to the owner for
its value.* The further consideration is to be held in mind,
that while the destruction of the building does result in benefit
to those whose buildings have thus been saved, there has really
been no taking of property for a public use, inasmuch as the
building destroyed would have fallen a prey to the cpnflagia-
tion. This building was already doomed to destruction. But
in order that the destruction of a building under such circum-
stances may not entail a liability for its destruction, the neces-
sity must be urgent and the danger imminent. He who destroj's
a building to prevent the spread of fire, when it is not I'eason-
ably necessary, will render himself, or the corporation he repre-
sents, liable in damages.^
In the absence of statute, making the corporation liable, the
fact, that municipal officials are empowered by ordinance to de-
stroy private property, to prevent the spread of a fire, will give
the owner of the property no claim against the municipality ;
338; New York v. Lord, 18 Wend.
126; Smith v. Kochester, 76 N. Y.
285 ; Conwell v. Emeric, 2 Ind. i'l ;
Keller v. Corpus Christi, 50 Tex. 614;
Bowditch V. Boston, 101 U. S. 16;
Fields V. Stockley, 99 Pa. St. 306;
comp. Bishop v. Macon, 7 Ga. 200.
"> As to necessity, see White v.
Charleston, 2 Hill (S.C.) 571 ; Mouse's
Case, 12 Coke, 63 ; lb. 13 ; 15 Vin. Abr.
Necessity.
' Street v. New Orleans, 32 La. An.
577.
2 Greer v. New York, 3 Bob. 406.
' Field V. Des Moines, 39 Iowa,
575; Amer. Print Wks. v. Lawrence,
23 N. J. I,. 595; McDonald v. Ked-
wing, 13 Minn. 38 ; Surrocco v. Geary,
3 Cal. 69.
* Maleverer v. Spink, 1 Dyer, 36 6 ;
Eespuhlica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dallas,
237; Taylor v. Plymouth, 8 Met.
462, 465; Neuert v. Boston, 120 Mass.
665
§335
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
not even when the destruction of the building was not necessary
to the extinguishment of the fife.'' But, in many cases, munic-
ipal corporations are made liable, by their charters or by general
statutes, for property thus destroyed by the proper municipal
officials. But in such a case the liability is purely statutory,
and it attaches only when the circumstances of the case bring
it within the statute.^
It has been held that the statutory remedy is not available,
when the house is burned so that it is impossible to save it ; ^
or if it would liave inevitably been destroyed by fire, had it not
been destroyed by the municipal officials.* The action is given
to the owner, and it cannot be prosecuted by one not having an
interest in the building ; ^ as, for example, by a person who has
bought the house, but in whom the title is not yet vested.*
But this ruling can only be accepted as sound, as long as the
vendor waives his right to enforce specific performance of the
contract against the vendee. The vendee acquires under an
executory contract of sale of land an insurable interest in the
buildings ; and if the vendor enforces specific performance, it
is not a good defence to such action, in whole or in part, that
the buildings have been destroyed or damaged by fire subse-
quent to the execution of the contract.'' Certainly, under those
circumstances, the loss by the destruction of the building, to
prevent the spread of the fire, would fall on the vendee, and he
alone would be entitled to the statutorjr compensation.
While the owner of a house can claim damages for the de-
struction of chattels in the house, to the extent of his interest
I Field V. Des Moines, 39 Iowa, 575;
Araer. Print Works v. Lawrence, 23
N. J. L. 590; lb. 9; 21 lb. 248; lb.
714.
■■^ Dunbar v. San Francisco, 1 lb.
355; Howard v. Same, 51 lb. 52; Tay-
lor V. Plymouth, 8 Met. 462, 465;
Euggles V. Nantucket, 11 Gush. 433;
Hafford v. New Bedford, 16 Gray,
297; Wheeler v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio
St. 19; Western Col. v. Cleveland, 12
lb. 375; Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass.
87; Nevert v. Boston, 120 Mass. 338;
Hayes v. Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314; Cof-
fin V. Nantucket, 5 Gush. 269; Stone
666
V. New York, 25 Wend. 157; New
York V. Lord, 18 lb. 12G; 17 lb. 285.
8 Taylor v. Plymouth, 8 Meto. 462.
* Mayor v. Lord, 17 Wend. 285.
The opinions of bystanders that the
house would or would not have been
inevitably destroyed is not admissi-
ble, although the opinions of expert
firemen may be. New York v. Pentz,
24 Wend. 668.
^ Mayor v. Lord, supra.
" Kuggles V. Nantucket, 11 Cush.
433.
' Tiedeman's Eq. Jur. § 501.
CH. xvn.]
LIABILITY FOE TOUTS.
§ 335 a.
in them, a person having goods stored in the building, of which
he is neither owner nor occupant, is held to have no claim for
damages.^
The fact, that the property destroyed was insured, is imma-
terial, so far as the city is concerned ; but the insurance compa-
ny will be subrogated to the rights of the insured, and may set
up an equitable assignment of his claim against the municipal-
ity, or may claim the allowance on the policy of the amount
received by the insured from the city.^
Statutes of this sort are remedial, and are designed to carry
out tlie just and equitable principles of constitutional provis-
ions, that private property shall not be damaged or taken with-
out compensation. They should therefore receive a liberal
construction in order to attain the results desired, the equitable
distribution of an inevitable loss.^
§ 335 a. Destruction of property under military and
sanitary regulations. — The principles, upon which is founded
the non-liability of municipal corporations for property, which
has been destroyed to prevent the spread of a fire, sliould ap-
ply, where private property is damaged or destroyed by city
officials, in the maintenance of military or police rule, or in the
enforcement of sanitary regulations. Thus, it is well settled
that the Federal government is not liable in damages for injury
to, or destruction of, private property during the operation of
its armies ; * and the same rule will doubtless obtain, when, by
municipal command, property is destroyed or injured in order
to resist foreign invasion, suppress domestic violence or to pre-
vent anticipated riotous proceedings.^
Since the confinement of pei'sons suffering from infectious
or contagious disorders, is fully justified as a protection to the
health of the community,^ and creates no liability on the part
of a State or municipality, there is no doubt that the destruc-
tion of the infected clothing or property of such persons, as
1 Mayor v. Stone, 20 "Wend. 139.
2 New York v. Pentz, 24 Wend.
668; Pentz v. JEtnalns. Co., 9 Paige,
568; City P. I. Co. v. Corliss, 21
Wend. 367.
' Lowell V. Wyman, 12 Cush. 273,
276; Russell v. New York, 2 Denio,
461; Auckland V. West. Loo. Board,
L. K. 7 Ch. 597; Kerr v. Preston, L.
R. 6 Cli. Div. 403; Dawson v. Hutt-
ner, 43 Ga. 133.
* United States v. Pacific Railroad,
120 U. S. 227.
5 Harmon v. Lynchberg, 33 G-ratt.
37; Jones v. Richmond, 18 lb. 517.
s Harrison v. Baltimore, 1 Gill, 264
66.7
§336
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
far as it is essential to the public health, will not at common
law rendei" a municipal corporation liable in damages.^
§ 336. Eeceipt of consideration as ground of liability for
negligence. — Municipal liability for negligence is particularly
clear and enforceable, when the city has received a considera-
tion for the duty to be peiforined ; or if, having received per-
mission or authority from the Legislature, it begins and carries
on a work, from which it receives a toll, or other profit.''^ Al-
though, as a rule, a municipal corporation is not liable for a
failure to supply water, or for damages caused by defects in the
appliances, by which water is furnished ; if it lay and maintain
mains for supplying the inhabitants with water, for which it
receives water rates, it will be liable for injuries, which have
been caused in any way by the negligent construction of its
system of waterworks, and the consequent undermining of the
roadbed by the escape of water, and which are sustained by
one who is lawfully using the highway.^ Here the liability is
based upon the facts, that the municipality, by voluntarily ac-
cepting the power to engage in the business of supplying water,
for which it derives a direct pecuniary benefit, has placed itself
on a parity with private corporations, and should be responsible
to the same extent as they.* And this rule has been applied in
States, where there existed no implied liability for the non-
repair of highways.
Where a stream of water was thrown across a street from a
hydrant, the cit}' was held liable for the injury thus caused to
the plaintiff's horse, which was frightened and ran away. It is
not material in such a case, that the water was being used for
extinguishing a fire.^ A city, owning and conducting its own
gas works, will under similar circumstances, be liable for neg-
1 Stedman v. San Francisco, 63 Cal.
103. See § 332. Municipality not
liable for health officials.
2 Scott V. Manchester, 2 H. & jST.
204; (Rowley v. Sunderland, 6 lb. 565;
Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. St. 54;
Mersey Dock Cases, U H. Lds. Cases,
687; Milnes v. Huddersaeld, L. R. 10
Q. B. Div. 124.
3 Stock V. Boston, 149 Mass. 410;
Hand v. Brookline, 126 lb. 324; Wil-
son V. New Bedford, 108 lb. 261 ; Mc-
668
Avoyo V. New York, 54 How. Pr.
Kep. 245.
* Murphy v. Lowell, 124 Mass. 564;
Hand v. Brookline, 126 lb. 324; Wil-
son V. New Bedford, 108 lb. 361; Aid-
rich V. Tripp, 11 K. I. 141; Levy v.
Salt Lake City, 3 Utah, 63; Grimes v.
Keene, 52 N. H. 335.
" Aldrich v. Tripp Treas., 11 B. I.
141. Distinguishing Butrick v. Low-
ell, 1 Allen, 172, and similar cases
where it had been held that firemen
OH. XYII.]
LIABILITY FOK TORTS.
§ 336
ligence in the conduct and management of such works, or in
the service to the private consumer.^
§ 336 a. liability as an owner of property. — There are,
however, many cases of liability of municipal corporations for
torts, in> which the element of profit or consideration does not
enter, and some other ground of liability must be discovered for
such cases. Since municij)al charters were in England, orig-
inally, royal grants, they were regarded as creating an implied
contract between the corporators and the State, and as implied-
ly imposing duties, which under the earlier cases furnished the
proper legal basis for the liability in tort of the municipal cor-
poration to private individuals.^ In this country, municipal
corporations are wholly the creatures of statute, and are erected
without the consent of those who are the incorporators.^ The
English view, therefore, which regards the charter as a contract,
is properly denied.* And hence the doctrine of implied contract,
which furnished in England a satisfactory foundation for the
municipal liability for injuries sustained by private individuals,
would not answer in American law. In the place of this theory-
is substituted the semi-private character of the municipal cor-
poration as the owner of property. Upon the ground, that
owners of property are liable for its improper use and condition,
municipal corporations have been held liable for damages caused
by the defective condition of property, which is held by tkem in
the private character of owner or lessee, to the same extent, and
in the same manner, as private corporations and individuals.^
were public and not corporate offi-
cers.
' Western Sav. Soc. v. Philadelphia,
31 Pa. St. 175; Kibele v. Same, 105
lb. 41; Scott V. Manchester, 1 H. &
N.59;Coe& Wise, 5 B. & S. 440, 475.
Henley v. Lyme Regis, 5 Bing. 91 ;
3 Mo. & P. 298; 3 B. & Ad. 77; 2 CI.
& Fin. 331 ; 8 Bligh N. R. 690 ; 1 Bing.
N. C. 222; 1 Scott, 29.
' " The erection of such a corpora-
tion is in truth simply the creation
of a new instrumentality of govern-
ment." Elliott on Roads and Streets,
p. 313; Cf. West v. Brockport, 16 K.
Y. 161, 173; Cooley, Const. Limit.
247,248; see anJe, §24.
* Dil. Mun. Cor. § 967.
^ Where a city holds and deals with
property as its own, not in the dis-
charge of a public duty, nor for the
direct and immediate use of the pub-
lic, but for its own benefit, by re-
ceiving rents or otherwise in the
same manner as a private owner
might, it is liable, to the same extent
as he would be for neglisence in the
management or use of such property
to the injury of others." Hill v. Bos-
ton, 122 Mass. 344, 359; see also
Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill, 531, 539;
Western S. F. Soc. v. Philadelphia,
31 Pa. St. 185, 189; Thayer v. Boston,
19 Pick. 511 ; Oliver v. Worcester, 102
669
§ 336 a.
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XVII,
So it was held that a city, owning a wharf, and receiving
wharfage for its use, must employ the same degree of care to
provide proper appliances, as would an individual owner under
similar circumstances.^ The city of New York, as the owner
of a dam upon lands owned by it, and which had been negli-
gently and un skillfull J-- built, was held liable for injuries sus-
tained by reason of the dam being carried awaj% although it
was constructed by water commissioners who were appointed by
the State ; ^ and a village, owning and operating an aqueduct
through its streets, will be responsible as owners for permit-
ting a water box to project above the surface of the highway ;
even though it might not be its duty to remove it, in the exer-
cise of its control of highways.^
Under tlie same rule, a municipal corporation will be held
liable, if it erect a building for corporate purposes, the foundation
of which is so negligently laid as to cause water to flow back
upon the land of private owners ; * or if it establishes a reservoir,
Mass. 489 ; McCaiigliey v. Providence,
12 K. I. 449; Sherman V. Laugham,
13 S. W. R. 1042; Moulton v. Scarbor-
ough, Yl Me. 267; Hannon v. St. Louis
Co., 62 Mo. 313; Hillsboro v. Ivey, 1
Tex. C. C. App. 653; 20 S. W. R. 1012;
Brown v. Atlanta, 66 Ga. 71; Millers
V. Augusta, 63 lb. 772; Worden v.
New Bedford, 131 Mass. 23; Perkins
V. Lawrence, 136 lb. 305; Barthold v.
Philadelphia, 154 Pa. St. 109; 26 Atl.
Rep. 3'04; "Waldron v. Haverhill, 10
N. E. R. 481; Mackey v. Vicksburg,
64 Miss. 777; Rowland v. Kalamazoo,
49 Mich. 553 ; Seaman v. Mayor, 80
N. Y. 2.39; Radway v. Briggs, 37 lb.
256; Kennedy v. Mayor, 73 lb.
365 ; McAvoy v. Mayor, 54 How. Pr.
245 ; Grimes v. Keane, 52 K. H. 335 ;
Savannah v. Culleus, 38 Ga. 334; City
Council V. Hudson, 88 lb. 599; 15 S.
E. Rep. 678; Wilkius v. Rutland, 25
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 49 ; Aldrich
V. Tripp, 11 R. L 141; 23 Am. Rep.
434; Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. St.
54; Erie v. Schwingle, 22 Pa. St. 338;
Greenwood v. Westport, (D. C. 93)
53 Fed. Rep. 824; Memphis v. Kim-
670
borough, 12 Heisk. 133; Fennimore
V. New Orleans, 20 La. An. 124;
Hand v. Brookline, 126 Mass. 324;
Wilson V. New Bedford, 108 lb. 261;
Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284;
72 Am. Deo. 302; Cumberland v.
Willison, 50 Md. 138; Rhodes v.
Cleveland, 10 Ohio, 159; Jeffei'son-
ville V. Louisville, etc. Ferry Co., 27
Ind. 100; 89 Am. Dec. 495; Carring-
ton V. St. Louis, 89 Mo. 208; Harper
V. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365.
1 Willey V. Allegheny, 118 Pa. St.
490; Allegheny v. Campbell, 107 lb.
530.
2 New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio,
433 ; see Darlington v. New York, 31
N. Y. 200; Fleming v. Susp. Bridge,
92 lb. 368; Barnes v. District, 91 U.
S. 540, 552; Wright v. Holbrook, 52
N. H. 120.
sWilkifts V. Rutland, (Vt.) 25 Am.
& Eng. Corp. Cas. 49.
* Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio, 159 ;
Roch. W. L. Co. V. Rochester, 3 N.
Y. 463; Harper v. Milwaukee, 30
Wis. 865.
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOE TOETS.
§ 326 a.
from which the water percolated to the injury of adjoining lands .^
So a municipal corporation is liable for the negligent plumbing
and drainage in a school building, by which water was permitted
to overflow neighboring cellars.^ When a town, under author-
ity from .its charter, establishes a market, it must construct and
maintain it and its appurtenances, in such a manner that they
will not become a nuisance to the vicinage,^ or dangerous to indi-
viduals, who use it.* So, also, municipal corporations have been
repeatedly held liable for damages, caused by unguarded exca-
vations, when made by the corporation upon its own grounds.^
But it should be noted in this connection that municipJilities
are not insurers of the safe condition of their public buildings,®
apparatus for water supply, sewers or other municipal instru-
mentalities. A city is not liable for the improper condition of
its property to a greater extent than are private corporations
or individuals,^ and the fact that a defect existed in any of them,
is not enough to make the city liable ; it must be affirmatively
shown that the cause of the defect, or the cause of its contin-
uance, was the negligence of the municipality, or of its officials.^
Though the municipality has paid for, and holds the title to
1 Wilson V. New Bedford, 108 Mass.
26.
2 Briegel v. Philadelphia, (Pa. 1890)
19 Atl. Rep. 10, 38.
8 Suffolk V. Parker, 79 Va. 660.
* Savannah v. CuUens, 38 Ga. 334.
^Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass.
489; Hannon V. St. Louis Co., 62 Mo.
313.
8 Chicago V. O'Brennan, 65 111. 560.
Worden v. N'ew Bedford, 181
Mass. 23; Perkins v. Lawrence, 136
lb. 305; Levy V. St. Lake, 3 Utah, 63;
Hofeston v. Eads, 32 III. App. 75;
Onne v. Richmond, 79 Va. 86 ; Wald-
ron v. Haverhill, 143 Mass. 582; 10
N. E. R. 481; Mackey v. Vicksburg,
64 Miss. 777; Fox v. Lansingburgh,
59 Hun, 617; 13 N. Y. S. 174; Bar-
ton v. S.yracuse, 36 N. Y. 54; Lloyd
v.KewYork, 5 lb. 369; McCullough
v. B'klyn, 23 Wend. 458; Clayburg
v. Chicago, 25 111. 535; Tice v. Bay
City, 47 N. W. Eep. 1062; 84 Mich.*
461; Saxton v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo.
153; Sterrett v. Houston, 14 Tex.
153; Richmond v. Long's Adm., 17
Gratt. 375 ; Helena v. Thompson, 29
Ark. 569, 574; Markee v. Borough,
(Pa. 91) 21 Afcl. Eep. 794; Denver v.
Dean, 7 Col. 328.
8 Beach v. Elmira, 58 Hun, 606;
Dannaher v. Brooklyn, 51 lb., 563;
Smith V. Mayor, 66 N. Y. 295 ; Jen-
ney v. Brooklyn, 120 lb. 164; Ring
V. Cohoes, 77 lb. 83; Todd v. Troy,
61 lb. 506; Goodfellow v. Mayor, 100
lb. 15 ; Dubois v. Kingston, 102 lb.
219; Hunt v. New York, 109 lb. 234;
Bi.shop v. Schuylkill, 8 Atl. Rep. 449;
Scranton v. Catterson, 94 Pa. St. 202;
Moore v. Platteville, 47 N. W. Rep.
1055; Gay v. Cambridge, 128 Mass.
387; Flanders v. Norwood, 141
lb. 17; Chicago v. McGiven, 78 111.
347; Rockford v. Hildebrand, 61
lb. 155; Lee v. Barkhampstead, 46
Conn. 213; Bill v. Norwich, 39 lb.
671
S 337
MUNICIPAL COBPOEATIOXS.
[CH. XVII.
the property ; ^ yet if it does not possess the usual rights and
privileges of ownership, and cannot control or dispose of it, so
as to rid itself of liability, it will not be within the principle
above laid down.^ Thus, even when a city is responsible for
the condition of its aqueduct, it is not liable for injuries caused
by defective lateral service pipes, which are inserted by con-
sumers into the street mains.^
§ 337. How may negligence be proven. — Negligence may
be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case, with-
out the introduction of positive and direct evidence pointing
thereto.* But this does not mean that negligence will be found
without evidence ; * or that there is in any case a legal pre-
sumption, that officials of a corporation, private or municipal,
have been negligent.^ In extreme and exceptional cases, the
dangerous character ^ or insufficiency of the streets ^ may be
so manifest, that as a matter of law the court may be justified
in holding them unsafe ; but, usually, these are questions for
222; Mayor V. Perdue, 53 Ga. 607;
Bi-owii V. Atlanta, 66 lb. 71 ; Cook v.
Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 270; Smith v.
Leavenworth, 15 Kan. 81; Atchison
V. King, 9 lb. 550; Wellington v.
Gregson, 31 lb. 99; Galveston v. Bar-
bour, 62 Tex. 172 ; Noble v. Richmond,
31 Gratt. 271; Aurora v. Bitner, 100
Ind. 396; Cook v. Anamosa, 66 Iowa,
427; Holmes v. Hamburg, 47 lb. 348;
Stafford v. Oskaloosa, 57 lb. 748.
1 As to what evidence is admissible
or sufficient to prove ownership by
the city, see Terry v. Mayor etc. of
New York, 8 Bosw. 504; Palmer v.
St. Albans, 60 Vt. 427; El Paso v.
Causey, 1 111. Ap. 531.
-Terry v. Mayor, supra; Curran v.
Boston, 151 Mass. 505; New York v.
B. S. & L. Co. V. B'k'lyn, 71 N. Y.
580; Palmer v. St. Albans, supra;
Flori V. St. Louis, 69 Mo. 341.
^Bigelow V. Randolph, 14 Gray,
541; Treadwell v. Mayor, 1 Daly
(N. Y.) 123; Smith v. Philadelphia,
81 Pa. St. 38.
* Briggs V. Oliver, 4 H. & N. 403 ;
672
Feltham v. England, L. R. 2 Q. B.
33; Cleveland V. Spier, 16 Q. B. N.
S. 399; Sherwood v. Hamilton, 37 U.
C. Q. B. 410; Sterling v. Thomas, 60
111. 264; Stratton v. Staples, 59 Me.
94; Chicago v. Major, 18 111. 349;
Lehman v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. 234;
Costello V. Landwehr, 28 Wis. 522;
Cassidy v. Angell, 12 R. I. 447; Hart
V. Hudson Riv. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y.
622; Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y.
567.
5 Philadelphia etc. Co. v. Hum-
mell, 44 Pa. St. 375.
6 Jackson v. Hyde, 28 TJ. C. Q. B.
294; Harris v. Perry, 89 N. Y. 308;
Singleton v. East. Counties R. E., 7
C. B. N. S. 287; Hammaok v. White,
11 lb. 588; Duffy V. Upton, 113 Mass.
544; Ward v. Andrews, 3 Mo. App.
275 ; Strouse v. Whittlesy, 41 Conn.
559; Kendall v. Boston, 118 Mass.
234; Goshorn v. Smith, 92 Pa. St.
435.
'Prideaux v. Mineral Pt., 43 Wis.
513.
• 8 Maugh V. Milwaukee, 32 Wis. 200.
CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOB, TORTS. § 338
the jury ^ to decide or infer f lom the facts, as shown by the tes-
timony. The opinions of witnesses, as, to the sufficiency of the
road, are not admissible.^
§ 388. Negligence of municipal servants— Wliat must be
shown— Torts ultra vires — The rule that a principal or em-
ployer is responsible civilly for injury caused by the negligence
or lack of skill of an agent or servant, when he is acting in
tlie line of his employment, is applicable to municipal corpora-
tions. To create such a liability in the case of a municipal
agent, it is essential, not only that the act, by which the injury
is caused, should be within the powers conferred on him by the
Qorporation ; but it must also be within the corporate power ;
tliat is, the act must not be ultra vires to the corporation itself.^
The corporation cannot make itself liable for torts ultra vires,
not even by express commands to its officers to do the tortious
acts;* or by subsequent ratification.^ But if the wrongful act
be, when committed, within the powers which are expressly or
impliedly conferred upon the corporation, it will be liable when
it expressly authorized or commanded the wrongful act ; or when
not having commanded it, the agent is implied by law to have
had the authorit}'' to act in the name of the corporation ; or, when
it has subsequently ratified or adopted it. And such ratifica-
tion may be express, or may be inferred from circumstances ; as
when the corporation receives the benefit of the tortious action
of its official.^ The corporation is also liable for the negligent
performance by its officials of corporate duties of a ministerial
nature. Finally, it may be stated, in general explanation of
this liability of the muiricipal corporation, that " A municipal
corporation is liable for the acts of its agents, injurious to others,
when the act is in its nature lawful and authorized but done in
an unlawful manner or in an unauthorized place, but it is not
' Draper v. Ironton, 42 Wis. 696.
-Montgomery v. Scott, .34 Wis.
338; Olesonv. Tolford, 37 lb. 327;
Griffin v. Willow, 43 lb. 509; Bene-
dict V. Fond du Lac, 44 lb. 495.
' Haag V. Vanderburgh Co., 60 Ind.
611; Smith v. Rochester, 76 N. Y.
506; Baltimore v. Eschback, 18 Md.
276; State v. Kirkley, 29 Md. 85, 111;
Horn V. Baltimore, 30 lb. 218; Haw-
ell v. Bufealo, 15 ISr. Y. 512; Cole v.
43 673
Nashville, 4 Sneed, 162; Trammell v.
Eussellville, 34 Ark. 105.
' Browning v. Owen Co., 44 Ind.
11, 13.
5 Hodges V. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110;
Mitchell V. Rockland, 52 Me. 118.
« Wade V. Brantford, 19 Up. Can.
Q. B. 207; Morse v. New York, 73 N.
Y. 238; Trescott v. Waterloo, 26 Fed.
Rep. 592.
338
MtrXICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVII,
liable for injuries or tortious acts, which are in their nature
unlawful and prohibited." ^ A corporation is, however, not
liable for an illegal act of its official intra vires, if the corpora-
tion has not authorized or ratified it.^ But when in its answer
a city ratifies and adopts the illegal official act, it will be liable
if it fails to justify it.^ And it has been held that, where an
act is lawful when done, as where property is lawfully seized,
yet if the officials of the municipality fail to pursue the proper
legal methods in disposing of it, the city will be liable for what
has become a trespass.*
The distinction above made between acts beyond the author-
ity of the municipal corporation, and acts within its authority,
but not within the authority of the particular ofiicer, is very im-
portant. So, it may be well to note the general rule, that a cor-
poration will be liable without ratification for official acts done
bona fide, in pursuance of a general authority, which is granted
by the city to act for it.^ It is a general rule that the person,
bringing an action for the breach of a legal duty against a
municipality, or against one of its officials, must show the
existence of the duty,® and his interest in its performance.^
Not that he must show an express statute or rule of law, creat-
iWoiiey V. Columbia, 88 Mo. 106;
see also, generally, Brown v. Cape
Girardeau, 90 lb. 37; New Decatur
V. Berry, 90 Ala. 432; 7 So. Eep. 838;
"Wakefield v. Newport, 60 N. H. 374;
Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511 ; Per-
ley V. Georgetown, 7 Gray, 464;
Deane v. Randolph, 132 Mass. 475;
State V. Kirly, 29 Md. 85; Cooper v.
Atlanta, 53 Ga. 638; Loyd v. Colum-
bus, (Ga. 93) 15 S. E. 818; Chicago
V. Megraw, 75 111. 566, 570; Sewall v.
St. Paul, 20 Minn. 511, 524; Aldrich
V. Tripp, 11 B. I. 141; Goddard v.
Harpswell, 84 Me. 499; 24 Atl. 958;
Haag V. Vanderburgh, 60 Ind. 511;
Rowland v. Maynard, (Mass. 93) 34
N. E. 515; Smith v. Rochester, 76
N. T. 506; McDonald v. New York,
68 lb. 23; 23 Am. Rep. 144; Collins
V. Macon, 69 Ga. 542; Marsh v. Ful-
ton Co., 10 Wall. 676; Thomas v.
674
Richmond, 12 lb. 349; Salt Lake
City V. Hollister, 118 U. S. 256, 262.
2 Fox V. Northern Liberties, 3 W.
& S. 103; Everson v. Syracuse, 100
N. Y. 577; Corsicana v. White, 57
Tex. 382.
8 Wilde V. New Orleans, 12 La. An.
15.
*Baumgard v. New Orleans, 9 La.
An. 119; Hunt v. Boone ville, 65 Mo.
620; Donnelly v. Tripp, 12 R. I. 97.
5 Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511,
516; Lee v. Sandy Hill, 40 N. Y. 44a,
449; Buffalo T. Co. v. Buffalo, 58 lb.
639; Perley v. Georgetown, 7 Gray,
464.
"Mich. Cen. R. R. v. Coleman, 28
Mich. 440; Freeh v. Philadelphia, 39
Md. 574; Button v. Frink, 51 Conn.
342.
'Skate V. Harris, 89 Ind. 363; Fish
V. Kelly, 17 C. B. N. S. 194.
CH. XVn.] LIABILITY FOR TOUTS. § 338
ing the duty for his benefit ; but he must show facts sufficient
to enable the court to infer that the duty existed.^
The rule as to the non-liability of municipal corporations for
torts ultra vires, is one which in numerous instances works
great hardship and loss to the injured person ; but it is firmly
established, and the courts seldom if ever depart from it. So,
when a city had the authority to construct an embankment and
plank road, instead of which a bridge was built, it was held, in
overruling a defence of ultra vires to an action by a person in-
jured thereon, that, as the city had the authority to construct a
road, its failure to do so, in the manner prescribed by law, made
its negligence more evident-^ On account of the control which
municipalities exercise over highways, and the impossibility of
knowing, whether in any case the municipality is acting within
its powers, a few exceptions have been made to the rule of non-
liability for acts ultra vires, in cases arising out of permission
being unlawfully given for uses of the highway which result
in injury to travelers.^
A distinction has been made in a recent case by the Supreme
Court of the United States between acts ex contractu, which are
ultra vires, and those ex delicto. It arose in a case, where a mu-
nicipal corporation, having no statutory ^authonity to do so, en-
gaged in the business of distilling spirits ; and having been
taxed by the United States upon spirits, in excess of the amount
reported by it, sought unsuccessfully to recover the amount paid,
and to avoid a seizure of its property, by claiming that its ac-
tion as distiller was ultra vires.^ In this case, Mr. Justice Mil-
ler said : " We do not agree that they (municipal corporations)
are wholly exempt from liability for wrongful acts done, with
all the evidences of their being acts of the corporation, to the
injury of others, or in invasion of legal obligations to the State
or the public. The question of the liability of corporations on
contracts, which the law does not authorize them to make, and
which are wholly beyond the scope of their powers, is governed
1 Basset v. Fish, 73 N. Y. 310; State
V. Haworth, 23 N. E. E. 946; Eslava
V. Jones, 83 Ala. 139; State v. Har-
ris, 89 Ind. 363; Murphy v. Brook-
lyn, 23 N. E. K. 887; Beck v. Carter,
68 N. T. 283; Murphy, Jr., v. Brook-
lyn, 98 N. Y. 642.
spekin v. Newell, 26 111. 320; Chi-
cago V. Turner, 80 lb. 419.
8 Cohen v. New York, 113 N. Y.
532 ; Stanley v. Davenport, 54 Iowa,
463; Howell v. Buffalo, 15 N. Y. 512.
* Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118
U. S. 256.
675
§ 338
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. xvn.
by a different principle (from liability ex delicto). In such a
case the party dealing with the corporation is under no obliga-
tion to enter into the contract. No force or restraint or fraud
is placed upon him. The powers of the corporation are mat-
ters of public law open to his inspection, and he may and must
judge for himself as to the power of the corporation to bind it-
self by the proposed agreement."
The charter of a town did not confer power to erect a dam.
Nevertheless, the selectmen proceeded to construct one, by
which the plaintiff's land was flooded. The town was held to
be not liable, because of the lack of corporate power to con-
struct a work of such a character ; ^ a ruling, which would seem
to be applicable to injuries caused by works of local improve-
ments, unauthorized by statute,^ or authorized by a statute
which is unconstitutional.^ A city has no power to call a meet-
ing for political purposes. But a person present at such a
meeting, who is injured by the discharge of a cannon, has no
claim against the city, although the meeting may have been
called, and held under the management of, the citj"- councils.*
And it may be stated as a general rule, that a municipality will
not be liable for wrongs done by its officials, under ordinances
and by-laws whose enactment is wholly outside of the corporate
authority.*
A municipal corporation is liable for the wi'ongful acts of its
servants, although it may be apparent from the malicious and
illegal ^ character of their acts, that the servants are exceeding
the power which their principal possesses. Of course, a mu-
1 Anthony v. Adams, 1 Met. 284.
2 Walling V. Shreveport, 5 La. An.
669; Seele v. Deering, 79 Me. 343;
Idaho Springs v. Woodward, 10 Col.
104; Cavanagh v. Boston, 139 Mass.
426; Leeds v. Eichmond, 102 Ind.
372; Denver v. Bayer, 7 Col. 113;
Cummins v. City, 79 Ind. 491; Haag
V. Board, 60 lb. 511; Morrison v.
Lawrence, 98 Mass. 219; Anthony v.
Adams, 1 Meto. (Mass.) 284; Mitchell
V. Eockland, 52 Me. 118; Cuyler v.
Eochester, 12 Wend. 165; Mayor etc.
V. Cunlif, 2 N. Y. 165; Smith v.
Eochester, 76 N. T. 506; Schipper v.
676
Aurora, 22 N. E. E. 878; Campbell v.
Montgomery, 53 Ala. 573.
8 Albany v. CunlifE, 2 K. Y. 165;
Browning v. Owen Co., 44 Ind. 11,
13; Shelby v. Deprez, 87 lb. 509.
* Boyland v. New York, 1 Sandf.
27; Boom V. Utica, 2 Barb. 104; Swift
V. Williamsburg, 24 Barb. 427; Mor-
rison V. Lawrence, 98 Mass. 219.
5 Field V. Des Moines, 39 Iowa, 575.
6 McGary v. Lafayette, 15 Eob.(La.)
668; 4 La. An. 440; Wilde v. New
Orleans, 12 La. An. 15 ; Gould v. At-
lanta, 00 Ga. 164; Hunt v. Booneville,
65 Mo. 620.
CH. xvn.]
LIABILITY rOE, TORTS.
§ 338 a.
nicipal corporation has no right to commit a trespass or appro-
priate property belonging to another ; and if it does so, it must
act through agents. If its agents, therefore, in exercising the
powers conferred upon it as, for example, in carrying on local
improvements trespass on, appropriate or destroy^ private prop-
erty, it will be liable in the same manner as would an individ-
ual principal.^ But the city is not liable, unless the wrongful
act is done in carrying out the improvement, or is proximately
connected with it.^
Municipal corporations, and counties,* are impliedly liable to
a patentee, whose invention they infringe in the execution and
performance of corporate powers and duties.^ But a municipal
or quasi municipal corporation will not be liable, when the in-
fringement is committed by a contractor.,^ on the general prin-
ciple, that the employer of an independent contractor is not
liable for the torts of the latter, committed in the course of the
business to which the contract relates.
§ 338 a. Who is a municipal officer or agent. — In consid-
ering the liability of a municipal corporation for the torts of its
officials, the primary questions are : Was the person a servant
of the corporation ; and if so, was the act for which responsi-
1 Walling V. Shreveport, 5 La. Ad.
660.
2 Allen V. Decatur, 24 111. 332; Lee
T. Sandy Hill, 40 N. Y. 442; Sheldon
V. Kalamazoo, 24 Mich. 383; Crossett
V. Janesville, 28 Wis. 420; Buffalo
Tump. Co. V. Buffalo, 58 N. Y. 639;
Hunt V. Booneville, 65 Mo. 620; Of.
Rowland v. Gallatin, 75 Mo. 134;
Manners v. Haverhill, 135 Mass. 165;
Hickerson v. Mexico, 58 Mo. 61 ; Hunt
V. Booneville, 65 lb. 620; Soulavd v.
St. Louis, 36 Mo. 546; Walling v.
Shreveport, 5 La. An. 6G0; Platter v.
Seymour, 86 lud. 323 ; Conniff v. San
Francisco, 67 Cal. 45; Waldron v.
Haverhill, 143 Mass. 582; Dooley v.
Kansas City, 82 Mo. 444; Anthony v.
Adams, 1 Met. 287; Hawks v. Charle-
mont, 107 Mass. 414; Gordon v.
Taunton, 126 lb. 349; Ipswich Mills
V.Essex Co., 108 lb. 363; Bailey v.
Woburn, 126 lb. 416; ^tna Mills v.
Waltham, 126 lb. 122; Hildreth v.
Lowell, 11 Gray, 345 ; Leeds v. Rich-
mond, 102 Ind. 372.
3 White V. Phillipston, 10 Metcf.
108; Bigelow v. Randolph, 17 Gray,
541; Barney v. Lowell, 98 Mass. 571.
^May V. Mercer Co., 30 Fed. Rep.
247; May v. Logan, 30 lb. 250; see
contra, Jacobs v. Hamilton Co., 4
Fisher Pat. Cas. 81.
SRausen v. New York, 1 Fisher
Pat. Cases, 254, 274; Bliss v. Brook-
lyn, 4 lb. 596; Munson v. New York,
3 Fed. Rep. 338; Am. Nic. Pav. Co.
V. Elizabeth City, 4 Fisher Pat. Cases,
189, 197; Allen v. Brooklyn, lb. 598.
6 Bigelow V. Louisville, 3 Fisher
Pat. Cases, 602; May v. Juneau Co.j
30 Fed. Kep. 241.
677
§ 338 a.
MUNICIPAL COBPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
bility is sought to be fixed upon the corporation, a corporate, as
distinct from a public act.^
If it can be shown that the appointment or election, the
control and the removal of the official, are in the power of the
corporation, then the official is its official or agent, either gen-
erally, or as to the wrong complained of ; and for the nonper-
formance or negligent performance of a strictly coi"porate duty
which devolved upon him by law, or which was commanded or
ratified by the corporation, the municipality will be liable.^
And, so, likewise, will a municipal corporation be liable for
the tortious actions of its officers de facto? If the duties per-
formed by an official are not corporate or not performed for
the peculiar benefit of the corporation, as distinct from the pub-
lic at large ; if they are State and public duties, which for public
convenience have been imposed upon municipal officials, the
municipal corporation is not liable for misfeasance or nonfea-
sance in the performance of them.*
So, there may be officials who, although appointed by the
corporation, are otherwise wholly independent of it, but whose
jurisdiction territorially is coterminous with the municipality,
and whose duties are wholly such as public or State officials
perform. For the acts of this class of officials the municipality
is not responsible.^ So a city will not be liable for the negli-
' Alcorn v. Philadelphia, 44 Pa. St.
348; Barnes v. District, 45 Mo. 94;
Lynam v. White, 2 Aiken, 2.15; Ben-
nett v. Same, 14 La. An. 120; Hilsdorf
V. St. Louis, 45 Mo. 94; Small v. Dan-
ville, 51 Me. 359; Fisher v. Boston,
104 Mass. 87; Morrison v. Lawrence,
98 lb. 219; Hinde v. Wabash, 98 lb.
219; Pollock v. Louisville, 13 Bush,
321 ; Brown v. Vinalhaven, 65 Me. 402 ;
Grumbine v. Washington, 2 McAr-
thur, 578.
^Saylor V. Harrisburg, 87 Pa. St.
216; Powers v. Council Bluffs, 50
Iowa, 197; Kobs v. Minneapolis, 22
Minn. 159; Eowell v. Williams, 29
Iowa, 210; Van Pelt v. Davenport,
42 lb. 308; Damour v. Lyons, 44 lb.
276; Sheldon V. Kalamazoo, 24 Mich.
083; Heuson V. New Haven, 37 Conn.
475; Osborne v. Detroit, 0:i Fed. 36;
678
Cowley V. Sunderland, 6 H. & W. 565.
8 Clark V. Easton, 146 Mass. 43.
4Boehm v. Baltimore, 61 Md. 259;
McCarthy V. Boston, 135 Mass. 197;
Hannen v. St. Louis, 62 Mo. 313;
Maximilian v. New York, 62 N. Y.
160; Sullivan v. Holyoke, 135 Mass.
273; Aldrich v. Tripp, 11 R. I. 141;
Brinkmeyer v. Evans, 29 Ind. 187.
5 Pratt v. Weymouth, 147 Mass.
245; Edgerly v. Concord, 59 N. 11.
78; Dooiey v. Sullivan, 112 Ind. 451;
Walcott V. Swampscott, 1 Allen, 101 ;
Wliite V. Phillipston, 10 Met. 108;
Hamilton v. Garrett, 62 Tex. 602;
Greggs V. Foote, 4 Allen, 195 ; Haf-
ford V. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297;
Fishe V. Boston, 104 Mass. 87; Ogg
V. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495 ; Brinkmeyer
V. Evansville, 29 Ind. 187; Bryant v.
St. Paul, 33 Minn. 289; Black v. Co-
CH. xvn.J
LIABILITY FOR TOBTS.
§ 338 a.
gence of a board of health,^ a surveyor of highways,^ or for an
assault by a policeman ; ^ for the actions of the board of equal-
ization of assessments ; * or for those of the board of education,
although the mayor appoints the members ; * or of the com-
missioners of charities and correction ; ^ for the actions of the
city council, when erecting docks for the benefit of individuals ; ^
for the negligence of a boiler inspector ; ^ or of the driver of an
ambulance ; ^ or for the negligence of a city surveyor or engineer
doing work for private persons ; ^^ or for the unlawful action of
the mayor, in ordering a building to be destroyed.i^
But the city of New York has been held liable for the neg-
ligence of the water commissioners, on the ground that the city
had an interest in the grant of power to them ; ^ and for the ac-
tion of the park commissioners when, by statute, certain streets
were put under their control.^^ The suspension bridge connect-
ing the cities of New York and Brooklyn belongs to those
cities ; and the bridge trustees, and persons employed by them,
are the servants of the cities, for whose negligence they will
be responsible.^*
On the other hand, it has been held that a tribunal, which
is authorized by law to act in condemnation proceedings, is not
the agent of the municipality, although it may represent it, for
the reason that its functions are public, discretionary and judi-
cially
In New England, the towns are not, in the absence of statute
lumbia, 10 S. C. 412 ; Coleman v. Ches-
ter, 14 lb. 286; Johnston v. Charles-
ton, 3 lb. 232; Aldrich v. Tripp, 11
E. I. 141; Baltimore v. O'Neill, 63
Md. 336; Newert v. Boston, 120
Mass. 338.
1 Bryant V. St. Paul, 33 Minn. 289;
see § 332.
2 Walcott V. Swampscott, 1 Allen,
101.
SButtrick v. Lowell, 1 Allen, 172;
see § 333.
* Tone V. New York, 70 N. Y. 157.
6 Ham V. New York, 70 N. Y. 459;
Swift V. New York, 83 lb. 528.
6 Maximilian v. New York, 62 N.
Y. 160; Haight v. New York, 24 Fed.
Rep. 93.
' N. Y. & B. Lumber Co. v. Brook-
lyn, 71 N. Y. 580.
8 Mead v. New Haven, 40 Conn. 72.
5 Maximilian v. New York, 62 N.
Y. 160.
w Alcorn v. Philadelphia, 44 Pa. St.
348. '
Ji Eussell V. New York, 2 Denio,
401.
12 Bailey v. New York, 2 Denio, 443.
13 Ehrgott V. New York, 96 N. Y.
264.
14 Walsh V. New York, 107 N. Y.
220; Walsh V. Bridge Trs., 96 lb. 429.
16 Board v. Puller, 111 Ind. 410;
Osborn V.Sutton, 108 lb. 443; Black
V. Thomson, 107 lb. 162; Hays v.
Parish, 52 lb. 132.
679
§ 339 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. XVH.
responsible for the acts of a surveyor of highways or of a per-
son emploj^ed by him ; ^ and this is also the case in regard to
town assessors and collectors of taxes in New York.^ But in
Vermont, towns have been made liable by statute for the de-
fault and neglect of the clerks.^
§ 339. liability for the condition of highways and streets
— Municipal andqnasi-municipal corporations distingnished.
— In England and Canada the parishes are charged with the
maintenance and repair of highways, unless these duties are
imposed by prescription on particular persons. But in neither
country, are they liable civilh'' in damages.* In America a dif-
ference is made, as to liability to a person injured by failure to
repair streets and highways, between municipal corporations
proper and those of a g'wasi-municipal character, as counties and
townships.
Highways and streets are to so large an extent the subject of
legislation in all the States, that the only safe method to pur-
sue, in endeavoring to fix a liability for defects therein, is to
make a close inspection of the statute law.^ It is an almost
universal rule that giwasi-municipal corporations are not in the
absence of an express statutory declaration to that effect, lia-
ble to a civil action for damages by one who is injured bj- de-
fective roads or bridges under their control. In the absence
of a statute creating such a liability, there is no obligation on
these quasi corporations to repair highways ; and even when
this statutory obligation to repair is imposed, and the power to
levy taxes to provide for its execution is conferred, the court
will regard such duties as public, and the county or town as
the State's agent, and therefoi'e, not impliedly liable for the omis-
sion or neglect to perform this duty.® But under precisely sim-
ilar circumstances, it is generally held that there is an implied
1 Barney, V. Lowell, 98 Mass. 570;
Judge v. Meriden, 38 Conn. 90.
2 Lorillard v. Monroe, 11 jST. Y. 392.
8 Hunter v. "Windsor, 24 Vt. 327;
Lyman v. Edgerton, 29 lb. 305; Jar-
vis V. Barnard, 30 lb. 492.
«Rex V. St. George, 3 Campb. 222;
Wellington v. Wilson, 14 TJp. Can.
C. P. 304; Rex v. Great Brougliton,
5 Burr, 2700; Grassick v. Toronto,
30 U. C. Q. B. 306; Queen v. Harley,
680
8 L. T. (N. S.) 382; Harrold v. Sim-
coe, 16 U. C. C. K. 43.
"North Pac. etc. Co. v. East Poi-t-
land, 14 Ore. 3; Barter v. Com., 3
Pa. 253; Com. v. E. R. Co., 27 Pa.
St. 349.
6 Chick V. Kewberry Co., 27 S. C.
419; Manuel v. Cumberland, 98 K.
C. 9; Threadgill v. Ansen, 99 lb. 352;
Pfefferlee v. Lyon, 39 Kan. 432; Peo.
V. Auditors, 75 N. Y. 317; Swinefo'rd
CH. xvn.]
LIABIIilTY FOE TORTS.
§339
liability upon cities to answer in damages, based upon the ex-
tensive statutory or charter powers of taxation and control and
repair of the streets, which they possess and exercise as a dis-
tinct and separate legal entity.^
The courts and the writers of text books ^ have often adverted
to the lack of any substantial reason for this distinction, which
gives an injured person a remedy by implication of law against
a municipal corporation, and denies it under precisely similar
circumstances, when a county or g'wasi-municipal corporation is
the defendant.^ It has been sought to find a basis for the dis-
tinction in the peculiar and frequent use made of city streets,
the supreme and special control exerted over them by the mu-
nicipal authorities, and the ample means generally possessed by
them for their proper maintenance and repair ; yet, whatever
may be the reasons of the distinction, and although the doc-
V. Franklin Co., 73 Mo. 279; Crowell
V. Sonoma Co., 25 Cal. 313; Carpen-
ter V. echoes, 21 Alb. L. J. 374;
Clark V. Lincoln Co., 20 Pac. E. 576;
Watkins v. County Co., 30 W. Va.
657; Tindleyv. Salera, 137 Mass. 171;
Wliite V. Bond Co., 58 111. 297; Rus-
sell V. Steuben, 57 lb. 35; Button
V. Board, 41 Miss. 236; Cooley v.
Essex Co., 27 N. J. L. 415; Eipley v.
Essex, 40 lb. 45; Granger v. Pulaski,
26 Ark. 37; Huffman v. San Joaquin,
21 Cal. 426; Atchison v. Jansen, 21
Kan. 560; Soper v. Henry Co., 26
Iowa, 264; Askew v. Hale, 54 Ala.
639; Barbour v. Horn, 48 lb. 566;
Wyandotte v. Seitz, 21 Kan. 649;
Sims V. Butler Co., 49 Ala. 110; Ham-
ilton v.Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109.
'Albritten v. Huntsville, 60 Ala.
486; Kellogg v. Janesville, 34 Minn.
132; Diveney v. Elmira, 51 N. Y. 506;
Delger ». St. Paul, 14 Fed. R. 567;
Riddle v. Merrimac Riv. Co., 7 Mass.
169; Noble v. Richmond, 31 Gratt.
271; Cliidsey v. Canton, 17 Conn.
475 ; Larson v. Grand Forks, 3 Dak.
307; Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645;
Boulder v. Niles, 9 Col. 415; Barnes
V. District, 91 U. S. 540; Young v.
Waterville, 39 N. W. R. 97; Moore
V. Richmond, (Va.) 8 S. E. E. 387;
Nelson v. Canisteo, 100 N. Y. 89; 2
N. E. R. 473; Hiner v. Fond du Lac,
71 Wis. 74; Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 94
N. Y. 27; Weller v. St. Paul, 42 N.
W. R. 392 ; Munger v. Marshalltown,
13 lb. 642; Klein v. Dallas, 71 Tex.
280; Selma v. Perkins, 68 Ala. 145;
Clark V. Richmond, 83 Va. 355.
2 See Dillon Mun. Corp. 1022, et
seq., for a full discussion of the rea-
sons, difficulties and limitations of
this distinction. " The rule which ex-
empts one class of governmental
corporations from liability, and fas-
tens it upon another, where the stat-
utes are the same as to the charac-
ter of the duty, and the means of
performing it, must be an arbitrary
one, since it is quite impossible to
find any difference sufficient to cre-
ate a distinction." Elliott Roads
and Streets, p. 327. See Thompson
on Negligence, 614.
!i Young V. Charleston, 20 S. C. 116;
Chick V. Newberry Co., 27 lb. 419;
Eastman v. Clackamas Co., 34 Fed.
Eep. 139; Arkadelphia v. Windham
49 Ark. 139.
681
§340
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[cH. xvn.
trine may be anomalous, the rule is generally, though not uni-
versally, settled.^ The only satisfactory explanation of this
dLstinction is to be found in the statement that the municipal
corporation is a legal personality, distinct and separate from
the State government, which has independent rights and duties,
while the county or township is only a subdivision of the State,
without a separate legal existence, and therefore, cannot be
held liable for the tortious acts of its officials, without violating
the technical, but nevertheless well established doctrine, that
the State cannot be sued, on account of its sovereign character.
The State is also protected from such suits bj' the Eleventh Ar-
ticle of the Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The application of this principle to •g'Masi-municipal corpora-
tions has not been uniform, and in many cases statutes have sub-
jected them to liability to actions ex contractu and ex delicto ; but
I am satisfied that it was the original cause of this distinction.
In many States this distinction has been disregarded, and it
has been held that, in the absence of statute, there is no im-
plied liability, even upon municipal corporations, for failure to
keep streets in repair, to any one who is injured thereby. And
although this is not in accordance with the current of decisions,
it has received the indorsement of courts, whose decisions are
worthy of cai'cful consideration.^
§ 340. Statutory liability for neglect in maintenance and
repair of highways. — In Canada, in the New England States
and elsewhere, statutes have been enacted which provide that
the streets shall be kept in repair and safe for public use ; and
that the town, city or other territorial division, on which this
duty is cast, shall be liable to travelers injured by any defect,
insufficiency or want of repair.^ Construing the expression
1 Barnes v. District, 91 U. S. 540,
551.
2 Merrill v. Portland, 4 Cliff. C. C.
R. 138; Detroit v. Blakeby, 21 Mich.
84; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1;
Pray v. Jersey City, 32 N. J. L. 394;
Morgan v. Hallowell, 5Y Me. 375;
Albnow V. Sibley, 30 Minn. 186; Hix-
on V. Lowell, 13 Gray, 59; McArthur
V. Saginaw, 58 Mich. 357 ; Young v.
Charleston, 20 S. C. 110; Chick v.
Newberry, 27 lb. 419; Harwood v.
682
Lowell, 4 Cush. 310; Winbigler v.
Los Angeles, 45 Cal. 36; Brady v.
Lowell, 3 Cush. 121; Arkadelphia
V. Windham, 49 Ai-k. 139; Vorrath
V. Hoboken, 49 N. J. L. 285; Weis-
senberg v. Winnecoune, 56 Wis. 667;
Wild V. Paterson, 47 N. J. L* 406.
8 Leslie v. Lewiston, 62 Me. 488;
Hamilton v. Boston, 4 Allen, 475;
Bliss V. So. Hadley, 145 Mass. 91;
Barker v. Worcester, 139 lb. 74; 'V ar-
ney v. Manchester, 58 N. H. 430.
CH. xvn.J
LIABILITY FOK TORTS.
§ 340
"kept in repair," it has been held in Canada not to refer to
construction.! The words should also be given a reasonable
interpretation. It will not be expected that a new road, opened
in a thinly settled township, shall be found in as good a condi-
tion, as a highway in a thickly settled neighborhood.^ The
adjudications in which the statutes, passed in the New England
States for fixing such a liability upon the town, have been con-
strued, are abundant and voluminous. The reported cases
point out and defi.ne what is required of the town to exempt it
from liability, how large a part of the highway or street must
be made safe or convenient, what constStutes an actionable
defect or want of repair, when the plaintiff is guilty of contribu-
tory negligence, and what is in any particular case the proxi-
mate cause of injury to him.^
In some of the New England States, the right to maintain
actions under these statutes is confined to travelers ; and it is
held that children playing in the street,* or persons stopping by
the wayside,^ are not entitled to recovery for injuries caused by
defective roads. Elsewhere, it is held that a city owes a duty,
to keep its streets in repair, to all using them for any lawful
purpose.®
Many of the questions, which are discussed in construing
these statutes, are general in their nature ; and while the duty
' Queen v. Epsom Union Guard, 8
L. T. E. N. S. 383.
2 Colbeck V. Brantf ord, 21 Up. Can.
Q.B. 276; Castor v. Uxbridge, 39 lb.
113.
'Loan V. Boston, 106 Mass. 450;
Post V. Boston, 141 lb. 189; Hansoom
V. Boston, 142 lb. 242; Hixon v. Low-
ell, 13 Gray, 59; Barber v. Koxbury,
11 Allen, 318; Sanford v. Augusta,
32 Me. 536; Peck v. Ellsworth, 86 lb.
393; Brackenridge v. Fitohburg, 145
Mass. 160; Gulline v. Lowell, 1441b.
491; Ward v. Jefferson, 24 Wis. 342;
Clark V. Corinth, 41 Vt. 449; Prindle
V. Fletcher, 39 lb. 255; Hyde v. Ja-
maica, 27 lb. 443; Bacon v. Boston,
3 Gush. 174; Bailey v. Southborough,
6 lb. 141; Packard v. New Bedford,
9 Allen, 200; Ray v. Manchester, 46
N. H. 59; Howe v. Plainfleld, 41 lb.
135; Clark v. Barrington, 41Ib. 44;
Hall V. Manchester, 40 lb. 410; Hardy
V. Keene, 25 lb. 370; Church v.
Chen-yfield, 33 Me. 460; Raymond v.
Lowell, 6 Cush. 524; Smith v. Ded-
ham, 8 lb. 522; Vinal v. Dorchester,
7 Gray, 421; Gregory v. Adams, 14
lb. 242; Farnura v. Concord, 2 N. H.
392; Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247;
Reed v. Belfast, 20 Me. 248.
*Stinson v. Gardner, 42 Me. 248;
Tighe V. Lowell, 119 Mass. 472.
sBlodgett V. Boston, 8 Allen, 287;
Stiokney v. Salem, 3 lb. 874.
6 Indianapolis v. Emmelman, 108
Ind. 530; Murray v. McShane, 52 Md,
517; Chicago v. Keefe, 114 111. 222
Babson v. Rockport, 101 Mass. 93
Gregory v. Adams, 14 Gray, 242 ; Var-
ney v. Manchester, 58 N. H. 430.
683
§ 341 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVII.
and liability they impose are not of course coincident with the
duty and liability which are impliedly imposed by the law else-
where, the opinions and decisions of the courts upon these stat-
utes may be consulted with advantage, in determining questions,
involving the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, his con-
tributory negligence if any, and the measure of damages.
As in the case of all statutes creating a liability, these stat-
utes have received a strict construction at the hands of the
courts.^
§ 341. Quasi-municipal corporations liable for breach of
specific duty. — The weight of the authorities is to the effect
that g'Masi-municipal corporations are not responsible in dam-
ages for the neglect of duty imposed on them, when the duty
is common to all corporations of the class in question, even
though they are empowered to raise money for corporate pur-
poses, unless the liability is created by statute.^ But there are
exceptions to the above rule, at least so far as the New England
towns are concerned, and for an actual wrongful trespass upon
property rights they would be liable.^
The exemption of g'wasi-municipal corporations from liability
for the performance of public duties, as explained in the pre-
ceding section,* is applicable only to such duties as are im-
posed upon all towns in general and which subserve public
purposes exclusively. On the other hand, for a negligent per-
formance of specific duties, or the execution of a special power,
which was conferred on the town at its request, or with its
consent, it will be subject to the same liability ; as will any
corporation, upon which such duties have been imposed, or such
powers conferred.^ And this distinction, based as it is upon
the just principle, which renders municipalities impliedly liable
for the nonperformance or neglect of corporate, as distinct from
public, duties, has been followed and approved by the courts
outside of New England,^ in application to counties and other
1 Arline v. Laurens Co., 77 6a. 249.
2 See last section.
8 Grilmau v. Laconia, 55 N. H. 130;
Weed V. Greenwich, 45 Conn. 170.
* § 339.
^Bigelow V. Randolph, 14 Gray,
541; comp. Weisenberg, v. Winne-
conne, 56 Wis. 667; Oliver v. Wor-
684
cester, 102 Mass. 489; Reed v. Belfast,
20 Me. 246; Blodgett v. Boston, 8
Allen, 237; CMdsey v. Canton, 17
Conn. 475 ; Stiokney v. Salem, 8 Al-
len, 374.
6 Conrad v. Ithaca Trs., 16 N. T.
158; Hannon v. St. Louis Co., 62 Mo.
313, 316.
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOK TORTS.
§342
quasi corporations, wherever they are chai-ged with a specific
duty, and are provided with the means of enforcing it.^
§ 342. Extent of municipal liability for injury from de-
fective streets— Horses taking fright — The question, whether
a street shall be repaired or improved, as a general rule, is sole-
ly for the municipality to answer ; ^ but the city is bound to re-
pair, when the failure to do so will menace the safety of the
traveling public.^ No public corporation is liable to a private
action by an abutter* or other person, for a general failure to re-
pair, or for making injudicious improvements if they are au-
thorized,^ if no one has received a special injury therefrom ; ^
and it may be laid down, as a general rule of the law, that towns
and cities are only required to keep their streets in a reasonably
safe condition for travelers, and according to the practice and
usage of those communities which may be said to exercise ordi-
nary care in their attention to the highways.'^ Where the lia-
bility is for non-repair, it may arise from any defect, which
renders a road unsafe for ordinary travel ; ^ and the dangerous
character of the defect is a question for the jury.® It lias been
held, however, in several instances, that the defect must be suf-
ficient to render the corporation indictable for maintaining a
nuisance.^" And this rule has been applied to objects in the
1 Mahaney v. Scholley, 84 Pa. St.
136; County v. Wise, 18 Atl. R. 31;
Cooper V. Mills Co., 09 Iowa, 350;
Gary v. Tama Co., 37 N. W. K. 38;
Mayor v. Marriott, 9 Md. 160; Mayor
T. Pendleton, 15 lb. 12; County v.
Baker, 44 lb. 1 ; Harris v. Board, 32
N. E. E. 92; Pritchett v. Board, 61
Ind.210; Board v. Arnett, 116 lb. 438.
2 Benson V. Waukesha, (Wis.) 41
N. W. R. 1017.
STreise v. St. Paul, 36 Minn. 526.
4 Gold V. Philadelphia, 115 Pa. St.
184.
sPepperv. City, 114 Pa. St. 96;
O'Reilly v. Kingston, 114 N. Y. 439.
^Slackhouse v. Lafayette, 26 Ind.
17; Lynch v. Mayor, 76 N. T. 60;
Williams v. Grand Rapids, 33 Alb.
L. J. 237; Lyon v. Cambridge, 136
Mass. 419; Henderson v. Sandefur,
111 Bush. 530.
' Turner v. Newburgh, 109 K. Y.
301; Emporia V. Schmidling, 7 Am.
Eng. Cor. Cas. 86; Hunt v. Mayor,
109 jSr. Y. 134; Indianapolis v. Cook,
99 Ind. 10; Ring v. Cohoes, 77 N". Y.
83; Aurora v. Pulfer, 56 111. 270;
Raymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. 524;
Furuell v. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 117;
Macomberv. Taimson, 100 Mass. 255.
8 Davis V. Bangor, 42 Me. 522; Bar-
ber v. Roxbury, 11 Allen, 318; Cas-
tor V. Uxbridge, 39 Up. Can. Q. B.
113; Harrison v. New Haven, 34
Conn. 136.
s Caswell V. St. Mary's PI. R. Co.,
28 Up. Can. Q. B. 247, 254; Curry v.
Mannington, 23 W. Va. 14; Wilson v.
Wheeling, 19 lb. 323; Denver v. Dean,
10 Col. 375.
'"Men-ill v. Hampden, 26 Me. 234;
Goldthwaite v. East Bridgewater, 5
Gray, 61; Howard v. Bridgewater,
685
§342
MTJNIOIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[cH. xvn.
road which are not strictly defects, but which were calculated
to frighten horses.^
The duty to repair is comprehensive and includes the re-
moval of obstructions," such as an inequality between a pave-
ment and a crosswalk ; ^ a water box, which extends an inch
and a half above a sidewalk ; * a pile of stones,® or of lumber ; ^
sticks of timber, logs, etc.; '' a rock,^ a tent,^ a portable furnace,^'
a steam roUer,^^ thresher,^" or motor j^^ machinery left by the
roadside,^* posts ; ^® an ash pile,^" and loose planks, projections and
other inequalities in the surface-'^ of the driveway or sidewalk,^*
as well as the filling up or guarding of dangerous holes and
excavations ^^ in the surface, or near the line, of the road.^
16 Pick. 189; Ringland v. Toronto,
23 Up. Can. C. P. 93; Kay v. Petrolia,
24 lb. 73 ; Boyle v. Dundas, 25 lb. 420.
I Bushville v. Adams, 107 Ind. 475 ;
Fritsch v. Allegheny, 91 Pa. St. 226;
Chicago V. Hoy, 75 111. 530.
^ Michigan City v. Boeckling, (Ind.)
23 ST. E. K. 518; Goodfellow v. New
York, 100 K. T. 15.
8 Glantz V. So. Bend, 106 Ind. 305.
* Indianapolis v. Cook, 99 Ind. 10.
5 Bigelow v.Weston,3 Pick. 267; Kel-
logg V. Northampton, 4 Gray, 65; Fore-
man V. Canterbury, L. R. 6 Q. B. 214.
^ North Manlieim v. Arnold, 119
Pa. St. 380.
' Gorham v. Cooperstown, 59 N.
Y. 660; Springer v. Bowdoinham, 7
Me. 442; Davis v. Bangor, 42 lb. 522;
Johnson v. Whiteiield, 18 lb. 286;
Carter v. Uxbridge, 39 Up. Can. Q.
B. 113; Snow v. Adams, 1 Cush. 443.
8 Card v. Ellsworth, 65 Me. -547.
9 Ayer v. Norwich, 39 Conn. 376.
1^ Rushville v. Adams, 107 Ind. 475.
II Young V. New Haven, 39 Conn.
435.
12 Burrell v. Uncapher, 117 Pa. St.
353.
13 Stanley v. Davenport, 54 la. 463.
" Bennett v. Lovell, 12 R. I. 166.
i=Soulev'. Gr. Trunk Ry. Co., 21
Up. Can. C. P. 308; Coggswell v.
Lexington, 4 Cush. 307.
686
18 Ring V. Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83.
17 Hall V. Manchester, 40 N. H. 410;
Irwin V. Bradford, 22 Up. Can. C. P.
421 ; Hubbard v. Concord, 35 N. H.
52; Winn v. Lowell, 1 Allen, 177.
'8 As to removing such obstructions
when seen by a traveler, it has been
said that when to remove them would
materially delay him or entail consid-
erable labor upon him, he is under no
obligation to do so; but he may use
the road employing proper care in
view of the obstruction; or he may,
if the road be impassable, travel tem-
porarily on the laud adjoining. Morey
V. Fitzgerald, 56 Vt. 487.
19 Sherwood v. District, 3 Mackey
276; "Walsh v. Mayor, 107 N. Y. 222;
Murphy v. Gloucester, 105 Mass. 470;
Pettingill v. Yonkers, 39 Hun, 449;
Cromarty v. Boston, 127 Mass. 329;
Chicago V. Robbins, 2 Black, 418;
Reed v. Northfield, 13 Pick. 94; Con-
greve v. Morgan, 5 Duer, 495 ; Barnes
V. District, 91 U. S. 540; Doherty v.
Waltham, 4 Gray, 596 ; Brusso v. Buf-
falo, 90 N. Y. 679; Willard v. New-
bury, 22 Vt. 458; O'Neill v. New Or-
leans, 30 La. An. 220; Batty v. Dux-
bury, 24 Vt. 155.
2» Fritsch v. Allegheny, 91 Pa. St.
226; No. Manheim v. Arnold, 1191b.
380; Hinckley v. Somerset, 145 Mass.
326.
CH. xvn.J
LIABILITY POK TORTS.
§342
The place of the accident, the hour of the day, and the sea-
son of the year must all be considered, in determining the
question of what constitutes negligence in municipal control
of streets.^ As municipalities are only bound to beep their
streets in repair for ordinary modes of traveling, they need not
keep them safe for furious and reckless driving and racing.^
If an ordinarily gentle horse shies to one side, and the driver
does not lose control over him, but injury is caused by an ob-
stacle or defect in the highway, the municipality will be liable.^
But if the horse shies at something, for which the municipality
is not responsible, and running away, comes in contact with an
obstruction or defect in the street, the corporation will not be
liable.* But there are many cases, which hold that the city
would be liable, if it had been negligent in removing the ob-
stacle or defect, and the injury would not have been sustained
but for such obstacle or defect.* If a horse of average gentle-
ness become frightened at an object which, being calculated to
frighten horses, has been negligently placed or permitted to re-
1 Castor V. Uxbridge, 39 Tip. Can.
Q. B. 113; Eingland v. Toronto, 23
lb. 98; Hart v. Cedar Kapids, 63 Wis.
634; Schrotli v. Prescott, 68 lb. 678;
Kelseyv. Glover, 15 Vt. 708; Cassedy
V. Stockbrldge, 21 lb. 391; Kioe v.
Montpelier, 19 lb. 470; Fritsch v. Al-
legheny, 91 Pa. St. 226; Dubois v.
Kingston, 102 N. Y. 219; Teaw v.
Williams, 15 R. I. 20; Talbott v. Taun-
ton, 140 Mass. 552; Merrill v. Hamp-
den, 26 Me. 234; Pratt v. Amherst,
140 Mass. 167; Mayor v. Sheffield, 4
Wall. 189; Johnson v. Enfleld, 42 >r.
H. 197; Johnson v. Haverhill, 35 lb.
74; Young Twp. v. Sutter, 18 Atl.
R. 610; Fitz V. Boston, 4 Gush. 365;
Ponca V. Crawford, 23 Neb. 662;
Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161;
Hill V. Fond du Lao, 56 Wis. 342;
Cook V. Milwaukee, 27 lb. 191.
2McCarthyv. Portland, 67 Me. 167;
King V. Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83.
"Aldrloh V. Gorham, 77 Me. 287;
Baltimore etc. Co. v. Bateman, 68
Md. 389; Stone v. Hubbardstown,
100 Mass. 49; Gushing v. Bedford,
125 lb. 526.
4Houfe V. Fulton, 29 Wis. 296;
Moulton V. Sanford, 51 Me. 127; Per-
kins V. Fayette, 68 lb. 152; Davis v.
Dudley, 4 Allen, 557; Titus v. North-
bridge, 97 Mass. 258; Drelier v. Fitch-
burg, 22 Wis. 675 ; Brown v. Mayor,
57 Mo. 156.
6 Plymouth v. Graver, 125 Pa. St.
24; 17 Atl. E. 249; Campbell v. Still-
water, 32 Minn. 308 ; Hunt v. Pownal,
9 Vt. 411; Sherwood v. Hamilton, 37
Up. Can. Q. B. 410; Winship v. En-
field, 42 N. H. 197; Hey v. Philadel-
phia, 81 Pa. St. 44; Ward v. North
Haven, 43 Conn. 148 ; Crawf ordsville
v. Smith, 79 Ind. 308; Howard v.
North Bridgewater, 16 Pick. 189;
Hull V. Kansas City, 54 Mo. 601;
Fogg V. Nahant, 98 Mass. 578; Rock-
ford V. Russell, 9 111. App. 229; Jack-
son V. Belle view, 30 Wis. 250; Man-
derscliiel v. Dubuque, 25 Iowa, 108;
Soule V. Gr. Tr. Ry. Co., 21 Up. Can.
C. P. 308; Vars v. Same, 23 lb. 308;
687
§343
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
main in the highway by the municipality, the city will be liable.^
But the obstacles must also be of a nature to frighten horses of
ordinary gentleness ; ^ and the city will not be liable for dam-
ages sustained by the affright of a very nervous horse, where
the obstacle which frightened the horse, would not have dis-
turbed the ordinary horse, which is accustomed to travel in the
crowded streets of a city. And although they must ordinarily
be within the limits of the highway or street, it has been some-
times held that they need not be within the traveled path.* There
are many cases which hold, however, that objects, outside the
part of a highway most used, but inside the highway limit, will
not render the city liable for injuiy to horses frightened there-
by.* Whether an obstacle is in any given case naturally calcu-
lated to frighten horses of average gentleness, is usually for the
jury to say.^ And evidence, that other horses took fright at the
object, is admissible.® But a defect is never to be inferred merely
from the fact that an injury was sustained.^
§ 343. Railings or Carriers, signs and Kghts to guard
excaYations, areas and basements. —Where the highway is
defective through the existence over the roadbed, either of ex-
cavations or a dangerous caving in or depression below the sur-
face, it is the duty of the municipality to exercise a high degree
Moore v. Abbott, 32 Me. 46; Pick-
hard V. Smith, 10 C. B. N. S. 470;
Corley v. Hill, 4 C. B. N. S. 556.
' Bennett v. Fifield, 13 E. I. 139;
Morse v. Richmond, 41 Vt. 435 ; Stan-
ley V. Davenport, 54 Iowa, 468 ; Card
V. Ellsworth, 65 Me. 547; Kingsburg
V. Dedham, 13 lb. 186; Eushvill v.
Adams, 107 Ind. 124; Cook v. Charles-
town, 98 Mass. 80; Keith v. Easton,
2 Allen, 552; Ayer v. Norwich, 39
Conn. 376; Foshay v. Glen Haven,
25 Wis. 288; Chicago v. Hoy, 75 111.
530; Bartlett v. Hooksett, 48 N. H. 18.
'^ PioUet v. Simmers, 106 Pa. St. 95;
Davis V. Bangor, 42 Me. 522.
3 Foshay v. Glen Haven, 25 Wis.
288; Morse v. Eichmond, 41Vt.435;
Eushville v. Adams, 107 Ind. 475;
comp. Nichols v. Athens, 66 Me.
402.
lEockford v. Tripp, 83 111. 247;
688
Nichols V. Athens, 68 Me. 413; Per-
kins v. Fayette, 68 lb. 152; Farrell
v. Oldtown, 69 lb. 72; Bartlett v.'
Kittery, 68 lb. 358; Marble v. Wor-
cester, 4 Gray, 395 ; Bounds v. Strat-
ford, 26 Up. Can. C. B. 11.
6 Lawrence v. Mt. Vernon, 35 Me.
100; Winship v. Enfield, 42 N. H.
197; Ayer v. Norwich, 39 Conn. 376;
Cleveland etc. Co. v. Wynant, 114
Ind. 525.
'> Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N.
H. 401.
7 Church V. Cherryfield, 33 Me. 460;
Sherman v. Kortright, 52 Barb. 567;
Collins V. Dorchester, 6 Cush. 396;
Packard v. New Bedford, 9 Allen,
200; Calkins v. Hartford, 33 Conn.
57; see Kearney v. London B. & S.
C. Ey. Co., L. E. 5 Q. B. 411; Mullen
v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567.
OH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOR TOETS.
§343
of care, in protecting travelers from injury therefrom, by the
use of the necessary railings, barriers, signs and lights.^ Nor
will the city be excused from the observance of these precau-
tions, because the street was newly opened, and for that reason
there was no regular travel thereon.^
A city is not liable, if it fail to erect barriers, to prevent trav-
elers from going outside of the road or street.^ And where
the defect or excavation is so far from the highway, that it can
cause injury only to one leaving the highway, no barriers are
necessary,* so far as the city is concerned. A city is bound to
erect barriers around an excavation, which is in close proximity
to the street^ but not around a dangerous place, twenty-eight,^
twenty-five,^ or thirty-four feet distant.*
A city is called upon to employ ordinary care only ; and when
an accident is such as has never occurred before, prudent men
would not be expected to guard against it.® Nor is the city
1 0'Leary v. Mankato, 21 Minn. 65;
Newlin v. Davis, 77 Pa. St. 317; At-
lanta V. Wilson, 60 Ga. 473; Keys v.
Maroellus, 50 Mich. 439; Kennedy v.
Mayor, 73 N. Y. 365; Chicago v. His-
lop, 61 111. 86; Carlisle v. Brisbane,
113 Pa. St. 544; Blaisdell v. Portland,
39 Me. 113;'' Drew v. Sutton, 55 Vt.
586; Toms v. Whitby, 35 Up. Can. Q.
B. 195; Zetther v. Atlanta, 66 Ga.
195; Delphi v. Lowery, 74 Ind. 520;
Houfe V. Fulton, 29 Wis. 296; Wil-
liams V. Clinton, 28 Conn. 264; Ward
V. North Haven, 23 lb. 148 ; Jones v.
Waltham, 4 Cush. 499 ; Scott v. Mont>
fjomery, 95 Pa. St. 444; Pittsburgh v.
Hart, 89 Pa. St. 389; Britton v. Cum-
mington, 107 Mass. 347; Halpin v.
Kansas City, 76 Mo. 335; Stark v.
Portsmouth, 52 N. H. 221; Freeport
V. Isbell, 83 111. 440; Babson v. Eock-
port, 101 Mass. 93 ; Murphy v. Glou-
cester, 105 Mass. 470; Com. v. Wil-
mington, 105 lb. 599; Barnes v.
Chicopee, 138 lb. 67; Davis v. Hill,
41 N. H. 329; Stimson v. Gardiner,
42 Me. 248; Blake v. Newfield, 68 lb.
36."); Stevens v. Boxford, 10 Allen,
93; Alger v. Lowell, 3 lb. 402; Burn-
14
ham V. Boston, 10 lb. 290; Orme v.
Richmond, 79 Va. 86; Clark v. Rich-
mond, 83 lb. 355 ; Koester v. Ottum-
wa, 34 Iowa, 41 ; Han-is v. Newbury,
128 Mass. 321.
2 Crystal v. Des Moines, 65 Iowa,
502.
3 Murphy v. Gloucester, 105 Mass.
470; Puffer v. Orange, 122 lb. 389
Barnes v. Chicopee, 138 lb. 67
Chicago V. Gallagher, 44 111. 295
Adams V. Natick, 13 Allen, 429; Spar-
hawk V. Salem, 1 lb. 30.
< Lansing v. Toolan, 37 Mich. 152
Goodin v. Des Moines, 55 Iowa, 67
Warren v. Holyoke, 112 Mass. 362
Darly v. Worcester, 131 lb. 452 ; Duf-
fy V. Dubuque, 63 Iowa, 171; Mon-
mouth V. Sullivan, 8 111. App. 50.
5 Harris v. Inh's, 138 Mass. 67;
Chicago V. Hesing, 83 111. 204; Em-
melmann v. Indianapolis, 108 Ind.
530.
6 Daily v. Worcester, 131 Mass. 452.
7 Murphy v. Gloucester, 105 Mass.
470.
8 Barnes v. Inh's, 138 Mass. 67.
9 Hubbells v. Yonkers, 104 N. Y.
434.
689
§344
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
liable, when, after having placed the proper barriers around a
dangerous place in the highway, they have been removed by
third persons without the knowledge of the city.^
It is no excuse for the absence of barriers, that the horse
driven by the traveler was not quiet and gentle.^
A city is not bound to maintain railings in front of basements
and shops ^ or around cellar doors, which open from the side-
walk,* or areas or hatchways,^ not in the sidewalk but on private
property contiguous to it ; or to provide hitching posts, or, if it
does, to use extraordinary care in their selection and erection.^
But where an open area or hatchway, whether in private prop-
erty or not, is notoriously dangerous, a municipality should be
liable for failure to properly guard it, or for failure to oblige
the property owner to do so.^ A railing along the side of a
stairway, parallel with the sidewalk, is sufficient although no
gate is maintained at the entrance.^
Whether, it is negligence to leave a highway unguarded by
barriers in a particular place, is a question of fact for the jury,^
to be decided upon a consideration of all the circumstances of
each case.
§ 344. Accidents caused by ice and snovr In determining
whether the city is liable for the consequences of negligence in
the removal of snow and ice from the streets, the amount of
the snow fall, the temperature and state of the weather, and
the length of time the ice or snow has been allowed to remain,
are all to be considered,^'' as well as the expense of clearing it
away.^^ Cities are not compelled by law to compensate every
' Klatt V. Milwaukee, 53 Wis. 196;
Mullen V. Rutland, 55 Vt. 77.
2 Lower Macungiev.Merkhoffer, 71
Pa. St. 276; Kennedy v. Mayor, 73
N. T. 365; Hey v. Philadelphia, 81
Pa. St. 44 ; Newlin v. Davis, 77 lb. 317.
3 Beardsley v. Hartford, 50 Conn.
529.
* Day V. Mt. Pleasant, 70 Iowa, 193.
6 Withan v. Portland, 72 Me. 539;
Temperance Hall Ass'n v. Giles, 33
N. J. L. 260.
"Eockford v. Tripp, 83 111. 247;
Marble v. Worcester, 4 Gray, 395.
' Augusta V. Hafers, 59 Ga. 151 ;
690
Eowell V. Williams, 29 Iowa, 210;
Grove v. Kansas City, 75 Mo. 672;
Niblett V. Nashville, 12 Heisk. 68.
8 Fitzgerald v. Berlin, 51 Wis. 81.
" Burrell Tp. v. Uncapher, 117 Pa.
St. 353.
'"Burr V. Plymouth, 48 Conn. 460;
Taylor v. Yonkers, 105 N. Y. 202; 11
N. E. R. 642; Congdon v. Norwich,
37 Conn. 414; Hayes v. Cambridge,
136 Mass. 402; Siebert v. Boston, 31
N. E. 734; 139 Mass. 313; Richards v.
Oshkosh, (Wis. 90) 51 N. W. 256.
" Rooney v. Randolph, 128 Mass.
580.
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOR TOUTS.
§34-i
individual, who is injured by the presence of ice or snow on a
thoroughfare ; it has been held that a person, who walks upon
a part of the street where ice has accumulated, and sustains an
injury which he could have avoided by passing on either side
of it, cannot recover from the city.^
The slippery condition of the sidewalk is not enough alone
to render th.e city liable, where there is nothing to show that
the city has been negligent, in allowing ice or snow to accum-
ulate, and thus become a dangerous obstruction.^ But if the
municipality permits an unreasonable accumulation of snow
and ice upon its pavements,^ when it forms hills and ridges ; *
or it allows a road or street to be blocked up for from four to
iQuincy v. Barker, 81 111. 300;
Coates V. Canaan, 51 Vt. 131; Chi-
cago V. Bixby, 84 111. 82 ; Aurora v.
Pulfer, 56 lb. 270; Schaeffler v. San-
dusky, 33 Ohio St. 246; Dunkin v.
Troy, 61 Barb. 437; Evans v. Utica,
69 T^. Y. 166; Belton v. Baxter, 54 lb.
245; Wilson v. Charlestown, 8 Allen,
137; Penna. Co. v. Kathget, 32 Ohio
St. 66; Chicago v. McGiven, 78 111.
347; Higirt v. Greenoastle, 53 Ind.
574; Alline v. LaMars, 71 Iowa, 654.
2 Stilling V. Thorpe, 54 Wis. 538;
Eingland v. Toronto, 23 Up. Can. C.
P. 93; Lawless v. Troy, 68 Hun, 632;
Sohroth V. Prescott, 63 Wis. 652;
Harrington v. BufCalo, 24 N. E. R.
186; Evans v. Utica, 69 N. Y. 166;
Dickinson v. N. York, 92 lb. 584;
Hill V. Fond du Lac, 56 Wis. 242;
Grossenbach v. Milwaukee, 65 lb. 31 ;
Stewart v. Woodstock, 15 Up. Can.
Q. B. 427; Heuks v. Minneapolis, 42
Minn. 530; Nason v. Boston, 14 Al-
len, 508; Stanton v. Springfield, 12
lb. 566; Keith V. Brockton, 136 Mass.
119; Stone v. Hubbardston, 100 lb.
50; Seeley V. Litchfield, 49 Conn. 134;
Landolt v. Norwich, 37 lb. 615 ; Smyth
V. Bangor, 72 Me. 249; Kinney v.
Troy, 108 N. T. 567; O' Conner v.
New York, 9 N. Y. S. 492; Mauch
Chunk V. Kline, 100 Pa. St. 119; Bro-
burg V. Des Moines, 63 Iowa, 523;
Chase v. Cleveland, 44 Ohio St. 505;
Ayres v. Hammondsport, &9 N. E. R.
265 ; 130 N. T. 065 ; Levasseur v. Ha-
vestraw, 63 Hun, 627.
8 Collins V. Council Bluffs, 32 Iowa,
324; Whitman v. Groveland,131 Mass.
553; Morse v. Boston, 109 Mass. 446;
Todd V. Troy, 61 N. Y. 506; Barton
V. Montpelier, 30 Vt. 650; Loker v.
Brookline, 13 Pick. 343; Luther v.
Worcester, 97 Mass. 268 ; Hall v. Man-
chester, 39 N. H. 295; Hortonv. Ip-
swich, 12 Cush. 488; Hall v. LoweU,
10 lb. 260; Savage v. Bangor, 40 Me.
176; Providence v. Clapp, 17 How.
161; Stanton v. Springfield, 12 Allen,
560; Shea v. Lowell, 8 lb. 136; Street
V. Holyoke, 105 Mass. 82; Gilbert v.
Eoxbury, 100 lb. 185 ; McLaughlin v.
Corry, 77 Pa. St. 109; Smyth v. Ban-
gor, 72 Me. 249; Green v. Danby, 12
Vt. 338; Keane v. Waterford, 29 N.
E. R'. 130; 130 N. Y. 188; see gener-
ally, Johnson v. Glens Falls, (N. Y.
92) 63 Hun, 618; Winne v. Albany,
(N. Y. 91) 61 Hun, 620; Bell v. City
of York, 31 Neb. 842; Woolsey v.
Trustees, 61 Hun, 136; O'Connor v.
New York, 16 Daly, 88; Lincoln v.
Smith, (Neb. 91) 45 N. W. R. 41.
4 Mauch Chunk v. Kline, 100 Pa.
St. 119; Grossenback v. Milwaukee,
65 lb. 31.
691
§ 344 a.
MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS.
[CH. xvn.
six weeks,^ or a street to remain covered with ice and snow for
nine days,^ or for two weeks,^ it will be liable for injuries oc-
casioned thereby. A city is not bound, in the removal of snow
and ice,* to do for the driveway of its streets what it must do
for its sidewalks ; and if it is impossible to clear the whole
street, it is bound to clear a passageway at the customary cross-
ings.^ When a municipality exercises due diligence in the re-
moval of the accumulated ice or snow, it is of course not liable.^
And when, in consequence of a sudden thaw, followed by ex-
treme cold, a sidewalk becomes covered with ice, the munici-
pality may, without being negligent, await a thaw to remove
the ice ; but should in the meantime require householders or
its own agents to sprinkle ashes or sand thereon.^
A city, is, also, not liable for injuries, which result from ex-
traordinary snow falls, before it has had a reasonable time to
clear its streets.^
§ 344 a. Negligence in lighting streets. — In the absence
of statute, a city is not liable for not lighting its streets.^ If,
however, the duty is imposed by statute, failure to light the
streets will render the city liable for injuries caused thereby.^"
So, the fact, that a street was not lighted, may be material as
1 Green v. Danby, 13 Vt. 338,
'^ Fortin v. East Hampton, 145 Mass.
196.
' Pomfrey v. Saratoga Springs, 104
N. T. 459; see Burr v. Plymouth, 48
Conn. 460, where the fact, that a
highway .was jinpassable three
mouths, was held not to constitute
negligence.
* Cloughessy v, Waterbury, 51
Conn. 405,
5 Savage v. Bangor, 40 Me. 176,
* Battersby v. New Tork, 7 Daly,
16; Hayes v, Cambridge, 136 Mass.
402; Cunniugham v, St. Louis, 96
Mo. 53; Blakeley v. Troy, 18 Hun,
167.
' Taylor v. Yonkers, 105 K. Y. 203.
S Clark V. District, 3 Mackey, 79;
Hayes v. Cambridge, 136 Mass. 402.
" Several authorities treat the class
of cases in question as involving want
of repair and defects. But in the ab-
692
sence of statutes, which provide for
them as such, it is not a natural con-
struction, and the cases are more
consistent which deal with those
things as acts of negligence at com-
mon law. A great deal, however,
must depend on local usage in de-
termining duties concerning high-
ways in winter. Where it is custom-
ary to treat the removal of snow and
ice, as a part of highway manage-
ment, the failure to look after it may
properly be regarded as wrongful
and neglectful." McKellar v. De-
troit, 57 Mich. 158; Nebraska City v.
Kathbone, 20 Neb. 288.
9 Gaskins v. Allen, 73 Ga. 746; Ran-
dall V. R. R. Co., 106 Mass. 276;
Macomber v. Taunton, 100 lb. 255;
Freeport v. Isbell, 83 111. 440; Lyon
V, Cambridge, 136 Mass. 409.
i» Davenport v. Hannibal, (Mo. 92)
18 S. W. R. 1122; Hayes v. West Bay
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOE TORTS.
§345
sliowing care or lack of care, during the time that the sti-eet
was obstructed or was in process of repair.^
§ 345. Falling substances in highways Municipal cor-
porations are often held liable upon the ground of negligence
for personal injuries, caused by the falling into the streets and
squares of dangerous substances, such as ice and snow from
the roofs of abutting houses, awnings, cornices and the like ; or
trees and poles, which have become weakened or decayed by
time and exposure to the weather.^ The fact, that a dangerous
awning or other obstruction is unauthorized,* or that the city
has failed to pass an ordinance for the removal and abatement
of such nuisances,* will not absolve the municipality from lia-
bility.^ The duty of a city towards the public, in the use of
its streets, is undefined and unlimited. And its conti-ol over
streets and highways is usually so extensive, that it is not un-
just to hold the municipality to a strict performance of its duty
in this respect, especially when we consider that the public
must to a great extent use the streets upon faith in, and in re-
liance upon, the care which the municipality is presumed to ex-
ercise over them.*
But the authorities are by no means in harmony. It has thus
been held that, although a city may be impliedly liable for de-
fects in its highways, it will not be liable in the absence of
statute for injuries caused by objects, such as unsafe walls fall-
ing into the streets from abutting propertj'.'^ So, also, a city
has been exempted from liability, where the injury was caused
by the fall of a mass of snow from a roof into the street ; ^ of a
sign suspended over a sidewalk ; ^ of an iron weight attached
City, (Mich. 92) 51 N. W. R.1067; But-
ler V. Bangor, 67 Me. 385 ; Noble v.
Richmond, 31 Gratt. 271 ; Barnes v.
District, 91 U. S. 540.
1 Indianapolis v. Scott, 72 Ind. 196;
Miller v. St. Paul, 38 Minn. 134;
IiBwis V. Atlanta, 77 Ga. 756.
2 Grove v. Fort Wayne, 45 Ind. 429;
House V. Montgomery Co., 60 lb.
580; Hutson v. New York, 9 IST, Y.
163; Davenport v. Rochester, 45 lb.
129; Morristown v. Mayor, 67 Pa. St.
355; Drake v. Lowell, 13 Mete. 292;
Day V. Milford, 5 Allen, 98; Merrill
V. Portland, 4 Cliff. 438; Bieling v.
Brooklyn, 24 N. E. R. 389; 120 N. Y.
98; Vioksburg v. McLean, (Miss. 90)
6 So. R. 774; Gray v. Emporia, 23
Pac. R. 944; 43 Kan. 704.
3 Hume V. Mayor, 74 N. Y. 639.
4 Bohen v. Waseca, 32 Minn. 176.
6 Larsen v. Grand Forks, 3 Dak. 307.
^ Grove v. Foi-t Wayne, 45 Ind. 429.
" Anderson v. East, 117 Ind. 126,
129.
8 Hixon V. Lowell, 13 Gray, 59.
9 Jones V. Boston, 104 Mass. 75;
contra, West v. Luin, 110 lb. 514.
693
§346
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. xvn.
to a flag, which was suspended across the street ; ^ and of an
unsafe wall, situated on private property.^
Upon the other hand, municipal corporations have been held
impliedly liable for injury caused by the fall of a signboard
which had been erected on private abutting land ; ^ by the fall
of a deca3'ed limb from a tree, where the duty was imposed by
charter of keeping the park, where the tree was situated, in good
repair ; * by the falling of the walls of a house which was left
standing after its partial destruction by fire ;^ for injury caused
by the falling into the street of part of an old roof which was
leaning against a tree ; *> of a rotten pole standing in the street ; ^
of a derrick ; ^ of a tree in a street ; ® and of a banner which was
allowed to remain suspended across a street.^"
§ 346. Right to go outside the traveled path — Estoppel
to deny existence of highway — ^Liability for sidewalks. — Al-
though the public is entitled to the use of all of the road or
street,^^ it is generally the duty of the municipality to keep in
repair only that portion which is customarily used by travelers,
provided that part is wide enough, and reasonably safe for those
who use due care.-'^ The duty of the municipality, in regard tp
the repair and maintenance of streets in thickly settled portions
1 Hewison v. New Haven, 34 Conn.
136.
2 Howe V. New Orleans, 12 La. An.
481 ; but in Parker v. Macon, 39 Ga.
725; and Savannah v. Waldner, 49
lb. 324, an entirely opposite conclu-
sion was reached.
" Langam v. Atchison, 3-5 Kan. 318.
* Jones V. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1;
Salisbury v. Herclienroder, 106 Mass.
4.58; Chase v. Lowell, (Mass. 89) 24
N. E. E. 212.
5 Grogan v. Broadway F. Co., 87
Mo. 321.
" DufEy V. Dubuque, 63 Iowa, 171.
' Gilmartin v. Mayor, 55 Barb. 239 ;
Norristown v. Mayor, 67 Pa. St. 355.
" Hardy v. Keene, 52 N. H. 57?.
^ Chase v. Lowell (supra) : Vosper
V. New York, 49 N. Y. Superior, 296;
Gilchrist v. Garden, 26 Up. Can. C.
P. 1.
^^ Champlin v. Penn Yan, 34 Hun,
694
33; French v. Brunswick, 21 Me. 29.
11 Queen v. U. K. Tel. Co., 3 F. &
F. 74; Tutill v. West Ham L. Bd., L.
E. 8 C. P. 447; Queen v. Fitzgerald,
39 Up. Can. Q. B. 297.
1^ Sykes v. Pawlet, 43 Vt. 446 ; Kling
V. City, 27 Mo. App. 231; Kellogg v.
Northampton, 4 Gray, 65 ; Hayden v.
Attleborough, 7 lb. 338; Fritz v.
Kansas City, 84 Mo. 632; Perkins v.
Inhabitants, 68 Me. 152 ; Shepardson
V. Colerain, 13 Met. 55; Smith v.
Wendell, 7 Cush. 498; Packard v.
Packard, 16 Pick. 191; Tinsdale v.
Norton, 8 Mete. 388; Fitzgerald v.
Berlin, 64 Wis. 203; Ireland v. Os-
wego Co., 13 N. Y. 526; Kelly v. Co-
lumbus, 41 Ohio St. 263; Stone v.
Attleborough, 140 Mass. 328; Morse
V. Belfast, 77 Me. 44; Keith v. Eas-
ton, 2 Allen. 552; Baltimore v. Bran-
mara, 14 Md. 227; Buck v. Biddeford,
84 Me. 433.
CH. XVII.J
LIABILITY FOE TORTS.
§346
of the city, is more onerous than in the case of outlying or
suburban roads.^ A town need not keep the whole surface
of a suburban road in repair,^ or free from snow,^ for ordinarily
only a part of it is used for travel hj the public. And whether
in any case the city has performed its duty, so as to be exempt
from the charge of negligence, is a question for the jury.* The
duty to repair and the liability for nonrepair extends to the side-
walks,^ and crosswalks or crossings.^ Even though the side-
walk has been constructed by a private person, without the
authority, and not under the direction, of the city, the munici-
pality will be liable for defects therein, if it has assumed juris-
diction by permitting it to be used as a part of the thoroughfare.''
And this assumption of jurisdiction may be inferred from the
silence of the corporation.^ Inequalities in the surface of the
sidewalks, causing injury to foot passengers, will render the
city liable.^ The abutting owner is not bound to keep his
VWhitfield v. Meridian, 6 So. R.
244; Monongahela V. Fischer, 111 Pa.
St. 9; Wellington v. Gregson, 31 Kan.
90; O'Connor v. Otenabee, 35 Up.
Can. Q. B. 73; Colbeck v. Brantford,
21 lb. 276; Queen v. Epsom Union,
8 L. T. N. O. 883.
2 Keyes v. Marcellus, 50 Mich. 539.
' Seeley v. Litchaeld, 49 Conn. 134.
« Bassett v. St. Joseph, 53 Mo. 290;
Wellington V. Gregson, 31 Kan. 99;
Fiilliam v. Muscatine, 70 Iowa, 436.
6Eoe V. City, 100 Mo. 190; 13 S.
W. E. 404; O'Keill v. West Branch,
(Mich. 90) 45 N. W. E. 1023; Sher-
man V. Williams, 14 S. W. E. 130; 77
Tex. 310; Banguss v. Atlanta, 12
S.W. E. 750; 74 Tex. 629; Lincoln v.
Smith, (N^eb. 90) 45 N. W. E. 41; Val-
paraiso V. Donovan, 44 N. W. E. 449;
Knowlton V, Pittsfleld, 62 X. H. 535 ;
Carters ville v. Cook, 22 N. E. E. 14;
129 111. 152; Moon v. Ionia, (Mich.
90) 46 N. W. E. 25; Michigan v. Ball-
ance, (Ind. 90) 24 IST. E. E. 117; Year-
ance v. S. L. City, (Utah 90) 24 Pao.
E. 254; Bly v. Whitehall, 24 N. E. E.
943; 120 N. Y. 506; Furnell v. St.
Paul, 20 Minn. 117; Studley v. Osh-
kosh, 45 Wis. 380; Atlanta v. Perdue,
53 Ga. 607; Chicago v. McCarthy, 75
111. 602; Eockford v. Hilderbrand,
61 111. 155; Chicago v. Langlass, 66
lb. 371; Kirby v. Boylston Ass'n,
14 Gray, 249 ; Manchester v. Hartford,
30 Conn. 118; Hubbard v. Concord,
35 N. H. 54; Market v. St. Louis, 56
Mo. 189; Burns v. Toronto, 42 Up.
Can. Q. B. 560; Hutten v. Windsor,
34 lb. 487 ; Eay v. Petrolia, 24 Id. 73 ;
Barnes v. Newton, 46 Iowa, 567;
Higert v. Greeucastle, 43 Ind. 574;
O'Neil V. New Orleans, 35 La. An. 202.
" Coombs V. Purrington, 42 Me. 332 ;
Whitney v. Milwaukee, 57 Wis. 639;
Eaymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. 524;
Stilling V. Thorp, 54 Wis. 538; Bar-
ker V. Savage, 45 N. Y. 19; Pequinot
V. Detroit, 16 Fed. E. 211; Grossen-
bach V. Milwaukee, 65 Wis. 31 ; Hill v.
Fond du Lac, 56 lb. 242.
' Plattsmouth v. Mitchell, 20 Neb.
228; Eussell v. Canastota, 98 N. Y.
496; Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 94 lb. 27.
8 Urquhart v. Ogdensburg, 98 N.
Y. 238.
3 Loan V. Boston, 156 Mass. 4.50;
Eaymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. 524;
695
346
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
sidewalk in repair, unless lie is required to do so by statute ;
and he is, therefore,not liable in damages for defects not caused
by his own fault,i to one who is injured thereby ; nor is he lia-
ble to the city for the failure to make repairs, which he was
under no obligation to make, in a case where the municipality
has been compelled to answer in damages for a defect or ob-
struction of the sidewalk.'*
When a highway is out of repair, the public have a tempo-
rary right to go on the adjoining land ; * keeping as near the
road as possible. And, although sidewalks and crossings are
intended for the use of foot passengers, if they be obstructed
or in a dangerous condition, the public may, with ordinarj-- care,
walk elsewhere.* In Vermont, it has been held that, if a defect
be in such close proximity to the road as to render it dangerous,
the town will be liable.^
If the public are induced by any acts of the corporation to
use any part of the liighwaj-, not actually dedicated,^ or where
any portion of a street is graded, with the result of inviting and
inducing travel thereon ; "' or where land is held out or opened
as a public thoroughfare, even though not improved or graded,*
the city will be estopped to claim that it is not a street, and
will be liable for its negligence in respect to its repair.^
Lacou V. Page, 48 111. 499; Hubbard
V. Concord, 35 N. H. 52; Winn v.
Lowell, 1 Allen, 177.
1 Moore v. Gadsden, 87 K Y. 84;
93 lb. 12; Knupfle V. Knick. Ice Co.,
84 lb. 488; Weller v. McCorraick, 47
N. J. L. 397.
2 Kirby v. Boylston M. Ass'n, 14
Gray, 249; Keokuk v. Keokuk I. S.
Dis., 53 Iowa, 352; Hartford v. Tal-
cott, 48 Conn. 525 ; Flynn v. Canton,
40 Md. 312; Russell v. Canastota, 98
N. T. 496; Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R.
I. 456; Jansen v. Atchison, 16 Kan.
358; Eustace v. Johns, 38 Cal. 3.
^ Taylor v. Douglas, 2 Douglas
(Eng.) 744^748; Morey v. Fitzgerald,
56 Vt. 487; Carrick v. Johnston, 26
Up. Can. Q. B. 65 ; Ballard v. Harri-
son, 4 M. & W. 392; Holmes v. Seeley,
19 Wend. 507; Williams v. Safford, 7
Barb. 309; Newkirk v. Sabler, 9 lb.
696
655 ; Pomf ret v. Sioroft, 1 Saunders,
323; Carey v. Rae, 58 Cal. 168.
*See §352, Contributory negli-
gence; O'Laughlin v. Dubuque, 42
Iowa, 589.
'> Drew V. Sutton, 55 Vt. 58; Patter
V. Castleton, 53 Vt. 435.
«Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 94 IS. T. 27;
Jewshurst v. Syracuse, 108 lb. 303;
Barton v. Montpelier, 30 Vt. 650.
'Lindholm v. St. Paul, 19 Minn.
245; Triese v. St. Paul, 36 Minn. 526.
8 Murphy v. Indianapolis, 83 Ind.
76; Mansfield v. Moore, 21 111. App.
326.
9 Craig V. Sedalia, 63 Mo. 417; Au-
rora V. Colshire, 55 Ind. 584; Coates
V. Canaan, 51 Vt. 131 ; Ivory v. Deer-
park, 116 N. T. 476; Sewall v. Co-
hoes, 75 lb. 45; Harper v. Milwau-
kee, 30 Wis. 365 ; Veale v. Boston,
135 Mass. 187; Stark v. Lancaster,
CH. XVIl.J LIABILITY FOR TORTS. § 347
But this principle does not appl}- to a bridge and its ap-
proaches, which belong to the State ; for here the city has no
right to enter and repair, even though the bridge is used as a
highway.^
§ 347. Liability for work given out on contract— Liabil-
ity for torts of the contractor. —The obligation to discharge
the duties incumbent upon municipal corporations in the proper
care of their streets, cannot by contract or ordinance be shifted,
evaded or imposed by the corporation upon others.^ Thus the
granting of a permit, to deposit building material in the street,
will not exempt the city from liability for damages caused
thereby.^ On the other hand, no person is responsible in dam-
ages to a person injured by the negligence of another, unless
the relation of principal and agent, or of master and servant, ex-
isted at the time between the wrongdoer and the person, whom
it is desired to make responsible. And in the presfent connec-
tion, as elsewhere, the distinction between the ordinary agent
and the independent contractor, is fully recognized in the limi-
tation of the city's liability. Thus, it is well settled that no
umnicipal liability exists, if the work be lawful and not intrin-
sically dangerous,* for the acts of independent contractors,
where the city does not control the doer of the tortious act as
it would the ordinary agent ; and has no choice in the selection
of the instrumentalities and means by which the work is to be
accomplished.
If, however, the contracts calls for the execution of a work
which is dangerous, no matter how skillfully it ma}'^ be per-
57 N. H. 88; Bishop v. Centralia, 49
Wis. 669; Estelle v. Lake Crystal, 2*7
Minn. 243; Phelps v. Mankato, 23
Minn. 276; Manderscheid v. Dubu-
que, 25 Iowa, 108; Johnson v. Mil-
waukee, 46 Wis. 568; Mathews v.
Baraboo, 39 lb. 674; Kelly v. Fond
du Lac, 31Ib. 179; James v. Portage
City, 5 N. W. E. 31; Gallegher v. St.
Paul, 28 Fed. Rep. 305 ; Cartwright
V. Belmont, 58 Wis. 370; Davis v.
Fulton, 52 lb. 657; Croninv. Delavan,
50 Wis. 375.
' Carpenter v. Cohoes, 81 N. T. 21 ;
Brusso V. BufCalo, 90 lb. 679.
2 Watson V. Tripp, 11 R. 1. 98; Troy
V. Tr. Lans. K. E. Co., 49 N. T. 657;
Pearson v. Zable, 78 Ey. 170; Omaha
V. Jensen, (Neb. 92), 52 N. W. E. 833.
8 Cleveland v. King, 132 U. S. 295.
« Hale V. Johnson, 80 111. 185; Davy
V. Levy, 39 La. 551; Eyan v. Curran,
04 Ind. 345 ; McGuire v. Grant, 25 N.
J. L. 356; Dooley V. Sullivan, 112 Ind.
451; Leeds V. Eichraond, 102 lb. 372;
Fink V. Missouri etc. Co., 82 Mo. 283;
Kelly V. New York, 1 1 N. Y. 432 ; Pack
V. New York, 8 lb. 222; Erie v. Caul-
kins, 85 Pa. St. 247; Callahan v. Bur-
lington, 23 Iowa, 562; Brown v. Wer-
ner, 40 Md. 15.
697
§347
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[cH. xvn.
formed, the city, which authorizes it, will be liable to persons
who are actually injured in its performance by the contractor.'^
Thus, the weight of the decisions tends to substantiate the rule,
that where a dangerous excavation is made and left in an un-
safe condition by a contractor, without the employment of the
proper and necessary safeguards, upon a street or highway, the
municipal corporation will be liable to a person injured, even
when it had no control over the contractor's employees ; and
when it had expressly stipulated in the contract^ that the eon-
tractor should hold himself liable for accidents caused by his
neglect.^ And this is the law, even where the municipality is
compelled by statute to let the contract out to the lowest bid-
der.* And, so, also, where a city charter contained a provision
that, when an injury resulted from a defect in the street, for
which under ordinary circumstances the city would be liable,
it would not be primarily liable where the defect was caused
by the fault of some third person, it is ineffectual to protect the
1 Hayes v. West Bay City, (Mich.
92) 51 N. W. E. 1067; Omaha v. Jen-
sen, 52 N. W. E. 833 ; St. Paul v. Seitz,
3 Minn. 397; Storrs v. Utica, 17 N. T.
104; Biusso v. Buffalo, 90 lb. 679;
Kunzv. Troy, 104 lb. 344; Lock wood
V. New York, 2 Hilton, 66; LeClaire
V. Springfield, 49 111. 476; Waldner v.
Savannah, 49 Ga. 316; Welsh v. St.
Louis, 72 Mo. 71; Wright v. Hol-
brook, 52 N. H. 120; Wilson v. Wlieel-
ing, 19 W. Va. 324; Logansport v.
Beck, 70 Ind. 65; Tiffin v. McCor-
mack, 34 Ohio St. 638; Fay v. David-
son, 13 Minn. 523; Dooley v. Sulli-
van, 112 Ind. 451 ; Houston v. Izaaks,
68 Tex. 116; Murpliy v. Lowell, 124
Mass. 564; Stone v. Cheshire etc.
Corp., 19 N. H. 427; Harrisburg v.
Sayler, 87 Pa. St. 216; Butler v.
Hunter, 7 H. & N. 826; Eeedie v.
London etc. Co., 4 Exch. 244; Whit-
ney v. Clifford, 46 Wis. 138; Allen v.
Willard, 57 Pa. St. 374; Carman v.
Steub etc. Co., 4 Ohio St. 939; St.
Paul W. Co. v. Ware, 16 Wall. 566;
J.oliet V. Harwood, 86 111. 110; Blake
698
V. St. Louis, 40 Mo. 569; Circleville
V. Neuding, 41 Ohio St. 465.
2 Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y.48; Kelly
V. Mayor, 11 lb. 432.
8 Ironton v. Kelly, 38 Ohio St. 50;
Nashville v. Brown, 9 Heisk. 1; Tur-
ner V. Newbergh, 109 N. Y. 301; Sar
vaunali v. Waldner, 49 Ga. 316; King
V. Cleveland, 28 Fed. Kep. 835; Knox-
ville V. Bell, 12 Lea, 157; Seattle v.
Buzby, 2 Wash. Ter. 25 ; Jacksonville
V. Drew, 19 Fla. 106; Butler v. Ban-
gor, 67 Me. 385; Eyler v. County
Com'rs, 49 Md. 257; Baltimore v. Pen-
nington, 15 Md. 12; St. Paul v. Seitz,
3 Minn. 297 ; Campbell v. Stillwater,
32 Minn. 308; Vogel v. New York,
92 N. Y. 10; Broadwell v. City, 75 Mo.
213; Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165;
Chicago V. Eobbins, 2 Black. 418;
contra, Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46 Pa.
St. 221; Westchester v. Appee, 35 lb.
284.
« Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165 ; but
compare O'Hale v. Sacramento, 48
Cal. 212; Pratt v. Lick, 33 lb. 691;
Boswell V. Laird, 8 lb. 469.
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOE TORTS.
§347
city, when the person creating the obstacle or defect is a con-
tractor doin^ work for the municipality.^
But a municipality, which does not direct, or is not author-
ized to direct, the manner in which a contract is to be performed,
is not liable for the contractor's negligence, if the agreement
called for an act to be done, which is lawful in itself, which does
constitute a nuisance, and which is not essentially dangerous.^
If a city contract for a work of local improvement ; and, in
accordance with the law and the conditions of the contract, the
work is done under the immediate supervision, direction or con-
trol of municipal officials, whose duty it is to supervise the work,
and damages result, not from the negligence of the contractors,
but from the performance of the work according to contract,
the city will be liable for such damages. Under such circum-
stances, the party doing woik for the city is its agent, and not
an independent contractor.* The same rule governs when, in
the prosecution of the work which is being done by a contractor
for a round sum but wholly under municipal control, injury is
caused by the negligence of the contractor's workmen.* But
a right to cancel the contract, and an obligation on the part of
the contractor to discharge any of his workmen, who are dis-
obedient to the municipal supervising officer, or the fact that
the work must be done to the satisfaction of a certain specified
municipal official,^ is not enough to create the relation of princi-
1 Hinoks v. Milwaukee, 46 Wis.
569; Durkee v. Janesville, 28 lb.
464; Noonan v. Stillwater, 33 Minn.
198.
2 Palmer v. Lincoln, 5 Neb. 136;
Gray v. PuUen, 32 L. J. Hep. Q. 169;
Clark V. Fry, 8 Ohio St. 358; Hilliard
V. Richardson, 3 Gray, 349; Gondier
V. Cormack, 2 E. D. Smith, 204; Blake
V. Ferris, 5 N. T. 48; Edmundston
V. Pittsburgh, etc., Co., Ill Pa. St.
316; Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46 lb. 213 ;
Erie V. Calkjns, 85 lb. 287; Nashville
V. Brown, 9 Heisk. 1 ; Cincinnati v.
Stone, 5 Ohio St. 38; Susquehanna
De Bor. v. Simmons, 79 Ind. 491;
Scammon V. Chicago, 25111. 424; Har-
rington V. Lansingburgh, 110 N. Y.
145; Barry V. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 121;
Cuff V. Newark, 35 N. J. L. 17; King
V. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. E. E. Co., 66
N. Y. 181 ; Harper v. Milwaukee, 30
Wis. 365; McCafferty v. Spuyten
Duyvil etc. Co., 61 N. Y. 178; Cincin-
nati V. Stone, 5 Ohio St. 38.
2 Hilliard v. Eiohardson, 3 Gray,
349; Eeilly v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St.
467 ; Chicago v. Eobbins, 2 Black, 418,
428; Sewall v. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 511.
4 Lowell V. Boston,' 23 Pick. 24;
Dressell v. Kingston, 32 Hun, 533;
Linnehan v. Eollins, 137 Mass. 123.
6 Erie V. Caulkins, 85 Pa. St. 247;
Pack V. Mayor, 8 N. Y. 222; Sammel-
son V. Cleveland etc. Co., 49 Mich,
164.
699
§348
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
pal and agent between the city and the contractor.^ Nor does
the fact, that a person is paid by the day, negative the inde-
pendent character of his employment.^ So, generally, when the
result of the work is the object considered by the employer,
]-ather than the means by which the employed is to accomplish
it, it is an independent employment.^
Although the city cannot evade responsibility by an agree-
ment with the contractor that he will be responsible for injuries
to third persons ; yet, if an express stipulation exists to this
effect, the city may recover from him the amount it has been
compelled to pay, in a case where the accident was occasioned,
wholly or in part, by his default or negligence.*
§ 348. Liability for torts of abutters — Liability of abut-
ters for the same. — No one has a right to do anything, which
leaves the streets in a dangerous condition, or less secure than
they are kept by the municipality. Whoever does so in any man-
ner, is guilty of creating a nuisance, which makes him a wrong-
doer, and renders him liable to any one suffering special injury
thereby, independent of negligence on the part of the person
creating the nuisance.^ This liability for the creation of the
nuisance on the highway is not affected by the liability of the
city to the party injured, or of the abutting owner. It is gen-
erally the duty of both the city and the owner to keep a side-
walk in repair, and both will be liable jointly or severally to
1 Blumb V. City of Kansas, 84 Mo.
112.
2 Forsythe v. Hooper, 11 Allen, 419 ;
Corbin v. America Mills, 27 Conn.
274.
3 Harrison v. Collins, 86 Pa. St. 153;
East St. Louis v. Klug, 3 111. App. 90;
Wood V. Mitchell, 44 Iowa, 27 ; Pack
V. New Tork, 3 N. Y. 222; East St.
Louis V. Giblin, 3 111. App. 219; Mer-
cer V. Jackson, 54 111. 397.
* Herringtou v. Lansingburgh, 110
N. Y. 545 ; Buffalo v. Hallaway, 7 lb.
493; Storrs v. Utica, 17 lb. 104;
Brooklyn v. B. City R. E. Co., 47 lb.
475; Myers v. Snyder, Bright. (Pa.)
489; Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 Pa. St. 463.
. 6 Bush V. Johnston, 23 Pa. St. 109;
Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 lb. 463;
700
Sexton V. Zett, 44N. Y. 430; Garland
V. Towne, 55 N. H. 55; Durant v. Pal-
mer, 29 N. J. L. 544; Congreve v.
Smith, 18 N. Y. 79; Congreve v.
Morgan, 18 N. Y. 84; Jochem v. Rob-
inson, 66 Wis. 638 ; Ottumwa V. Parks,
43 Iowa, 119; Jessenv. Sweigert, 66
Cal. 182 ; Rowell v. Williams, 29 Iowa,
210; Ryan v. Reynolds, 53 111. 212;
Parker v. Macon, 39 Ga. 725 ; Howe v.
New Orleans, 12 La. An. 481 ; Severin
V. Eddy, 52 111. 189; Ball v. Arm-
strong, 10 Ind. 181 ; Wood v. Mears,
12 lb. 515; Harlow v. Humiston, 6
Cow. 189: Hardcastle v. So. York.
Ry. Co., 4 H. & N. 67; Temp. Hall
Assn. V. Giles, 33 N. J. L. 260;Dygert
V. Schenck, 23 Wenrt. 446; Cornwall
V. Com'rs, 10 Ex. 771; Gridley v.
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOR TORTS.
§ 348
one injured by lack of repair.^ And the same is true of the
city and a railroad company, in respect to keeping the roadway
in repair.2 ^u^ when a nuisance, in or near the streets, has
been created by the owner, the tenant or lessee, who maintains
and continues it, partakes of the original liability of his land-
lord or lessor.3 Abutting owners are, however, not liable at
common law for injuries sustained by travelers, unless the de-
fect or obstruction in the highway causing the injury was placed
there by the abutter.* And this is particularly clear, when the
city is expressly or impliedly under the legal duty of repairing.^
As the municipality is responsible for the repair of streets, and
has a property in them, as representative and trustee for the
people, it has been held that it ma}-, when compelled to repair
a street which is rendered unsafe by some act of a wrongdoer,
recover the amount it was under the necessity of expending
ill making the street safe, in an action against the person caus-
ing the damage.^
If an abutter has notice of an action pending against the mu-
nicipality, and founded on his wrongful interference with the
street; and he neglects to defend it, he will be concluded, in
an action against himself, as to ftie existence of the defect, the
lii»bility of the corporation therefor, and the amount of the dam-
ages.^ But he is not estopped from showing, that he was not
Bloomington, 68 111. 47; Hadley v.
Taylor, L.E. 1 C. P. 53; Ccalder v.
Sraalley,66 Iowa, 219 ; Barnes v. Ward,
0 C. B. 392.
' Bowen v. Huntington, 14 S. E. R.
217; 35 W. Va. 682; Peoria v. Simp-
son, 110 111. 294.
■^Philadelphia v. Weller, 4 Brews-
ter, 24.
" Jennings v. Van Schaick, 108 N.
Y. 530; Irvine v. Wood, 51 jST. Y. 224;
Clieetliam v. Hampson, 4 D. & E. T.
R. 318; Eakin v. Brown, 1 E. D.
Smith, 44; Durantv. Palmer, 5 Dutch.
544; Chicago v. O'Brennan, 65 111. 160;
Stephani v. Brown, 40 111. 428; Sliip-
man v. Fifty Asso., 106 Mass. 194;
Milford V. Holbrook, 9 Allen, 17;
Lowell V. Spalding, 4 Cush. 277;
* Moore v. Gadsden, 87 N. Y. 84;
Weuzlick v. McCotter, 87 lb. 122;
Eustace v. Johns, 38 Cal. 3 ; Elkhart
\-. Wickwire, 87 Ind. 77; Morton v.
Smith, 48 Wis. 265 ; Robbins v. Johns,
15 C. B. N. S. 221, 243; Weller v.
McCormick, 47 N. J. L. 397; Janseu
V. Atchison, 16 Kan. 358; comp. St.
Louis V. Life Ins. Co , (Mo. 90) 17 S.
W. R. 637; Ryan v. Wilson, 87 JST. Y.
471.
SFlynn v. Canton, 40 Md. 312;
Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R. I. 456.
"Elliott Roads and Streets, 547;
Centerville v. Woods, 57 Ind. 192;
Bishop Non-contract Law, § 1005.
' Portland v. Richardson, 54 Me.
46; Brookville v. Arthurs, 18 Atl.
R. 1076; Seneca Falls v. Zalinski,
8 Hun, 571; Lowell v. Boston & L.
Co., 23 Pick. 24; Rochester v. Mont-
701
348
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. xvn.
bound to keep the street in repair, or that the accident was not
occasioned by any fault of his.^
The omission to give such notice does not however affect the
city's right of action ; its object being merely to save unnec-
essary litigation .2 Unless required by statute, written notice
to an abutter is not necessary ; ^ and notice may be implied
from the party's actual knowledge of the pendency of the ac-
tion.* It has been held that the abutter is not liable for inju-
ries occasioned by an accidental fall, which was caused by ice
or snow upon the sidewalk, even though the city had enacted
an ordinance, requiring him to remove it ; * and such an ordi-
nance, as an attempt to evade municipal responsibility, was
held to be unconstitutional.® The general rule, however, in re-
spect to the liability of the abutting landowner, is that, in a case
where a verdict is recovered against the municipality for injuiy
caused by a defect, due solely to his act or fault, the city can
recover over in an action against him.''
A charter provision, exempting a city from liability for defects
in streets, whicli have been caused by third persons, until all
legal remedies shall have been exhausted against the primary
gomery, 72 K. T. 65; Westfield T.
Mayo, 122 Mass. 100; Morgan v. Mul-
doon, 82 Ind. 347 ; Troy v. Troy R. K.
Co., 49 X. Y. 657; Bever v. Nortli, 107
lud. 544; Veazie v. Penob. R. R. Co.,
49 Me. 119; Boston v. Worthington,
10 Gray, 496; Milford v. Holbrook, 9
Allen, 17.
' Chicago V. Robbins, 2 Black, 418 ;
Littleton v. Ricliai-dson, 34 N. H.
179, 187; Brooklyn v. B. R. Co., 47
N. T. 475.
2 Port Jervis v. First Nat. Bk., 96
N. T. 550; Aberdeen v. Blackmar, 6
Hill, 324; Binssee v. Wood, 37 N.
Y. 530.
8 Robbins v. Chicago, 4 Wall. 657;
Barney v. Dewey, 12 Johns. 225;
Beers v. Piuney, 12 Wend. 309.
■* Port Jerris v. First Nat. Bank,
96 N. Y. 550; Morgan v. Muldoon,
82 Ind. 347.
5 Moore v. Gadsden, 93 N. Y. 12;
Hartford v. Talcott, 48 Conn. 525;
702
Kirby v. Boyl. M., 14 Gray, 249 ; Flynn
V. Canton Co., 40 Md. 312.
^ Gridley v. Blooraington, 88 111.
554.
' Wickwire v. Angola, (Ind. 90) 30
N. E. B. 917; Chicago v. Robbins, 4
Wall. 657; Severin v. Eddy, 52 111.
189; Boylston v. Mason, 102 Mass.
541; Westfield v. Mayo, 122 lb. 100;
Milford V. Holbrook, 9 Allen, 17;
Rochester v. Montgomery, 72 N. Y.
65; Brooklyn v. B. City R. K. Co.,
47 N. Y. 475; Littleton v. Richard-
son, 34 N. H. 179; Norwich v. Breed,
30 Conn. 535 ; Brookville v. Arthurs,
18 Atl. R. 1076; Rockford v. Hilde-
brand, 61 111. 155; District v. Ealt.
& P. R. R. R. Co., 1 Mackey, 314;
Portland v. Richardson, 54 Me. 46;
Taylor v. Lake Shore etc. Co., 45
Mich. 74; MacNaughton v. Elkhart,
85 Ind. 384; Elkhart v. Wickwire, 87
lb. 77; Catterlin v. Frankfort, 79 lb.
547.
CH. xvn.J
LIABILITY FOE TOETS.
§348
wrongdoers, is to be strictly construeiii and does not of course
apply, when the city is in fanlt.2 There is no municipal liabil-
ity for the proper maintenance of a private way, although it is
used by the public.^
An abutter will be held liable for an accident caused by an
unguarded excavation, as a coal hole, where it was made with-
out authority, even though it was at first protected so as not
to be a source of danger to the public, irrespective of any charge
of negligence on his part; and regardless of the fact, that the
covering thereto, provided by him, had been removed or broken
by the act of others.* But if, on the other hand, the owner
had permission to make such an excavation, he is only liable
for the absence of ordinary care and diligence in constructing
and guarding it.^ Not only will an abutting owner be liable for
damages resulting from an unauthorized excavation, which con-
stitutes a nuisance when created in the highway ; but he will
also be liable to traveler for accidents occurring from excava-
tions, such as areas ® or cellar openings,'' which are made by him
near the highwaj'^, and left in a dangerously unguarded condition.**
1 Raymond v. Sheboygan, 70 Wis.
318; Hines v. Fond du Lac, 71 lb. 74.
2 Papworth v. Milwaukee, 64 Wis.
389.
' Goodwin v. Des Moines, 55 Iowa,
617; distinguishing Bumham v. Ros-
ton, 10 Allen, 290; see also Coving-
ton V. Bryant, 7 Bush, 248; Oliver v.
AVorcester, J.02 Mass. 489; Young v.
Harvey, 16 Ind. 314.
'Smith V. Eyan, 8 ST. Y. S. 853;
Hughes V. Orange Co. Assn., 56 Hun,
396; contra, Kirkpatiick v. Knapp,
28 Mo. App. 427; Portland v. Eich-
ardson, 54 Me. 46; Congreve v. Mor-
gan, 18 N. Y. 84; Gwinnell v. Earner,
10 L. R. C. P. 658; Nelson v. God-
frey, 12 111. 22.
* Dickson v. Hollister, 123 Pa. St.
421; Norwich v. Breed, 30 Conn. 535 ;
Clifford V. Dam, 81 N. Y. 52; How-
land V. Vincent, 10 Met. 371; Wolf
V. Kilpatrick, 101 N. Y. 146; Hard-
castle V. So. Yorks. etc. Co., 4 H. &
X. 67; Larrabee 7.Peabody, 128 Mass.
561; Hormsel v. Smyth, 7 C. B. 729;
Beacli V. Frankenberger, 4 W. Va.
712; Victory v. Baker, 67 N. Y. 366;
Fisher v. Prowse, 110 Eng. Com. L.
770 ; Beck v. Carter, 68 N. Y. 283 ; Par-
ker V. Macon, 39 Ga. 725 ; Bunch v.
Edenton, 90 N. C. 431; Haughey v.
Hart, 62 Iowa, 96; Halpin v. Kansas
City, 76 Mo. 335 ; Scrantou v. Hills,
102 Pa. St. 378; Hawes v. Fox Lake,
33 Wis. 438; Kelly v. Columbus, 41
Ohio, 263; Drew v. Sutton, 55 Vt. 586.
6 Hotel Ass'n v. Walter, 23 Neb. 280.
' McGill v. District, 4 Mackey, 70;
Landou v. Lund, 38 N. W. Eep. 699.
^Mallory v. Hibernia etc. Co., 21
Pac. E. 525 ; Beck v. Carter, 68 N. Y.
283; Crogan v. Schieles, 53 Conn. 186;
Jones V. Nichols, 46 Ark. 207; Strat-
ton V. Staples, 59 Me. 94 ; comp. Graves
V. Thomas, 95 Ind. 364; Haughey v.
Hart, 62 Iowa, 96; Norwich v. Breed,
30 Conn. 535 ; Homan v. Stanley, 66
Pa. St. 464; Sanders v. Eeiske, IDak.
151.
703
§ 34:8 MT7S1CIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVH.
Of course, an owner who makes an excavation on his own land,
is not liable for injuries received b}' any trespassers who fall in
it, or to travelers using the street, if the excavation be distant
from the highway ; or, being near the road, if the abutter em-
ploy due care in erecting barriers around it ;^ and whether the
excavation is near enough to render travel unsafe, is a question
for the jury.^
If an owner of land, contiguous to the street, erects a build-
ing, or stacks lumber,^ or allows a ruinous wall to stand on his
land,* near the street line, ordinary and reasonable care must
be exercised by him to prevent it from falling and injuring
travelers.® And he is liable for any such negligence, even if
the work is done by an independent contractor.^ So, an owner
of abutting land must use ordinary care in the process of con-
structing a building, in order to protect passers-by from injury
from falling objects.'^ If, having constructed a building care-
fully, it is thrown down and into the highway by some accident
beyond his control, and which he could not reasonably antici-
pate, he will not be liable.^
It is customary to permit owners of land, abutting on a street
to place building material on the street or sidewalk ; but a rea-
tonable diligence should be observed by them in the completion
of the work of erection or repair ; ^ and they must use ordinary
care to warn and protect the traveling public. ^^ So, too, while
the adjoining landowner may use the street temporarily for
loading and unloading his goods, he, and not the city, will be
primarily responsible for injury resulting from any unreasoua-
^ Jennings v. Van Schaick, 20 Abb.
N. C. 324; Beck v. Carter, 68 N. Y.
283; Binks V. Yorkshire etc. Co., 3 B.
& S. 244; Gramlisli v. Wurst, 86 Pa.
St. 74; Campbell v. Lunsford, 83 Ala.
512; 3 S. E. 522; Hardcastle v. So.
Yorkshire Ry. Co., 6 H. & N. 12.
2 Murphy v. Brooklyn, 118 N. Y.
575; Drew v. Lutton, 55 Vt. 586;
"Warner v. Holyoke, 112 Mass. 362;
Taylor v. Mt. Vernon, 58 Hun, 384.
8 Weller v. McCormick, 19 Atl. R.
1101 ; Pastine v. Adams, 49 Cal. 87.
*Kappes V. Appel, 14 Bradw. 179;
Church V. Burkhardt, 3 Hill, 193;
704
Grogan v. Broadway etc. Co., 87 Mo.
321.
^Mullen V. St. John, 57 N. Y.569;
Murphy v. McShane, 52 Md. 217 ; Low-
ell V. Spalding, 4 Gush. 277.
sNoeling v. Allee, 10 N. Y. S. 97;
Wilkinson v. Detroit etc. Co., 41 N.
W. R. 490.
' Jager v. Adams, 123 Mass. 2i.
8 Couts V. Neer, 70 Tex. 468.
s Stuart V. Havens, 17 Neb. 211.
i» Lewis V. Atlanta, 77 Ga. 756; Mc-
Donald V. Troy, 59 Hun, 618; Nolan
V. King, 97 N. Y. 565; Vanderpool v.
Husson, 28 Barb. 196; Jackson v.
Schmidt, 14 La. An. 818.
OH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOE TOUTS.
§349
ble interference with the highway, as constituting a nuisance,
aside from any question of negligence.^
§ 349. Liability for neglect in performance of ministerial
duties. — It is a general rule that officials who are charged with
the performance of ministerial and corporate duties, and are act-
ing within the scope of their authority, will make the corporation
which they represent liable to one, to whom the performance
of the duty is owing, and who receives special injury by a non-
performance, or by a negligent performance. Tliis liability, so
far as municipal corporations are concerned, has been sometimes
based upon the implication that, by their acceptance of tlie powers
and duties imposed upon them by their charter, they promise
to exercise their powers and perform their corporate duties in a
proper manner.^ Nor is it necessary, when the performance
of a ministerial and absolute duty is concerned, that the mu-
nicipality should have expressly imposed upon it, by statute, a
liability to answer in damages to one, who may suffer by its
breach of duty. If the duty clearly appears, expressly or by
necessary implication, to be imposed upon the corporation for
its own private or corporate advantage ; and if the power, from
which the duty arises, is not discretionary as to its exercise, the
pecuniar}^ liability for a breach of the duty will be implied and
enforced.^
iKing V, Oshkosh, 44 N. "W. K.
745; 75 Wis. 517; Dubach v. Hanni-
bal, Sq. Mo. 483 ; Queen v. Davis, 24
N. C. C. P. 575; Denby v. Wilier, 59
Wis. 240; People v. Cunningham, 1
Denio, 524; Callanan v. Oilman, 107
N. Y. 360.
" Davenport v. Kuokman, 37 K. T.
568; Nelson V. Canisteo, 100 lb. 89;
Eequav. Rochester, 45 lb. 129; Ehr-
gott V. Mayor of N. Y., 96 lb. 264;
Kunz V. Troy, 104 lb. 344; Barton v.
Syracuse, 36 lb. 54; Hutson v. Mayor,
9 lb. 163; Maximilian v. Mayor, etc.,
62 lb. 160; Robinson v. Chamberlain,
34 lb. 389; Cain v. Syracuse, 95 lb.
83; Conrad V. Ithaca, 16 lb. 158; Far-
quar V. Eoseburg, (Oreg.) 21 Pac. Rep.
1103; Winn v. Rutland, 52 Vt. 481;
Eiclimond v. Long, 17 Gratt. 375;
Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118 ;
45
Denver v. Dunsmore, 7 Colo. 328.
' Hevpison v. New Haven, 37 Conn.
475 ; Jones v. Nevf Haven, 34 lb. 1 ;
Kiley v. Kansas City, 87 Mo. 103; Hal-
pin V. Kansas City, 76 Mo. 335 ; Welsh
V. St. Louis, 73 lb. 71 ; Russell v. Co-
lumbia, 74 lb. 490; Bassett v. St. Jo-
seph, 53 lb. 290; Gilluly v. Madison,
63 Wis. 518; Montgomery v. Gilmer,
33 Ala. 130; Hamilton v. Columbus,
52 Ga. 435; Little Rock v. Willis, 27
Ark. 572; Hitchins v. Frostburgh, 68
Md. 100; Albrittin v. Huntsville, 60
Ala. 486; McDonough v. Virginia
City, 6 Nev. 90; Centerville v. Woods,
57 Ind. 192; Omaha v. Olmstead, 5
Neb. 446; Anne Arundel Co. v. Duck-
ett, 20 Md. 469; Bell v. West Point,
51 Miss. 262; Dewey v. Detroit, 15
Mich. 311; Vicksburgv. Hennessy,54
Miss. 392; Bohen v. Waseca, 32 Minn.
705
§349
MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
While the principle is settled beyond cavil that a municipality-
is liable for negligent nonfeasance or misfeasance of its officials,
while performing ministerial duties, it is not so well settled,
whether in any particular case duties are ministerial or judicial,
corporate or public. It has been said, that tlie nature of the
duty is to be determined from the statute creating it,^ and, on
the whole, the question resolves itself into one of statutory con-
struction, depending in each particular instance upon the lan-
guage employed. It is not necessary that the duty should be
declared by the statute to be mandatory or ministerial ; for the
courts may infer its character, not only from the language used,
but from the evil designed to be remedied, and from the pur-
poses intended to be accomplished.^ Ministerial duties are such
as are absolute, certain and imperative.^ The act itself, which
117 ; Simmer v. St. Paul, 2.3 Minn. 408 ;
Tallahassee v. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19;
Niblett V. Nashville, 12 Heisk. 684;
Wilson V. Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 324;
Mayor of Memphis v. Lasser, 9
Humph. 757; O'Neil v. New Orleans,
30 La. An. 220; Gilman v. Laconia, 55
N. H. 130; Mayor of Rome v. Dodd,
58 Ga. 239; Mayor etc. Milledgeville
V. Cooley, 55 Ga. 17; Burns v. Elba,
32 Wis. 605 ; Ward v. Jefterson, 24
lb. 342; Jausen v. Atchison, 16 Kan.
358; Pittsburgh v. Crier, 22 Pa. 54;
Fritsch v. Allegheny, 91 lb. St. 226;
Meares v. Wilmington, 9 Ired. L. (N.
C.) 73 ; Western College v. Cleveland,
12 Ohio St. 377; Noble v. Richmond,
31 Grat. 271 ; McCombs v. Akron, 15
Ohio, 476; Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10
lb. 159; Gordon V. Richmond, 83 Va.
436; Soper v. Henry Co., 26 Iowa,
264; White v. Bond Co., 58 HI. 298;
Wallace v. Muscatine, 4 Greene
(Iowa), 264; Sterling v. Thomas, 60
111. 265 ; Waltham v. Kemper, 55 lb.
346; Bloomington v. Bay, 42 lb. 503;
Champaign v. Patterson, 50 lb. 62;
Clayburgh v. Chicago, 25 lb. 535 ; La-
con V. Page, 48 lb. 499; Lan. Can.
Co. v. Parnably, 11 A. & E. 223; Har-
per V. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365 ; Mer-
sey Docks v. Penhallow, 1 H. L. Gas.
706
N. S. 93; Delger v. St. Paul, 14 Fed.
Rep. 567; Mayor v. Sheffield, 4 Wall.
189 ; Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, Cow-
per, 86; Barnes v. District, 91 U. S.
541 ; Mersey Docks v. Gill, 11 H. L.
Cas. 686; Rock Co. v. United States,
4 Wall. 435; Henley v. Lyme Regis.,
3 B. & Ad. 77; Evanston v. Gunn, 99
U. S. 660; Scott v. Mayor, 37 Eng.
L. & Eq. 495; Boulder v. Niles, 9
Colo. 415 ; Nelson v. Canisteo, 100 N.
T. 89; Weet v. Brockport, 16 lb. 161;
Denver v. Rhodes, 9 Colo. 554; Bai-
ley v. Mayor, 3 Hill, 538; Kavanagh
V. Brooklyn, 38 Barb. 232; Saulsburg
V. Ithaca, 94 N. Y. 27; McCarthy v.
Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 194; Cole v. Me-
dina, 27 Barb. 218; Peck v. Batavia,
32 lb. 634; Clark v. Lockport, 49 lb.
580; Wendell V. Mayor of Troy, 39 lb.
329; Storrs V. Utica, 17 lb. 104; Ring
V. Colioes, 77 lb. 83 ; Noonan v. Al-
bany, 79 lb. 470; and cases cited in
last note.
1 State V. Haworth, 23 N.,E. R. 946.
2 Perry V. Barnett, 65 Ind. 522, 525;
Newman v. Sylvestre, 42 lb. 106;
Austin V. Carter, 1 Mass. 231; State
V. Halifax, 4 Dev. 345.
s Lewenthal v. New York, 5 Lans.
532; Mills v. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489.
OH. XVII.J
LIABILITY FOR TORTS.
§350
is to be performed, will frequently determine the character of
the duty. But the fact, that the municipal or official action
requires skill and judgment, or involves an exercise of discre-
tion, will not always make it judicial.^
Authority or power implies a duty to be performed by its
possessor ; and unless the power is expressly discretionary, the
grant of power creates a peremptory public duty.^ And it is
not absolutely necessary that words of command should be used
by the lawmaker ; for, where power is conferred and the occa-
sion for its exercise is not expressly left to the discretion of the
municipal corporation, the interest, which the public or third
persons have in its performance, is generally sufficient to cause
the statute to be regarded as mandatory .^ All acts, which are
done in the performance of a duty prescribed by ordinance, are
usually ministerial.*
§ 350. Defects and obstructions created hj municipal
corporations. — When a street has been made dangerous by the
direct command or permission^ of the city, as in the case of
local improvements, carried on by the city officials, the city will
be liable for injuries thereby sustained by travelers, who exer-
cise proper care in the use of the highway.® Thus, it is no de-
fence that the defect arose when necessary repairs were being
made to the highwaj- ; for proper precautions to protect travel-
ers, should then be employed.'^ This is true, even in those
1 Wilson V. Marsh, 34 Vt. 352; Mc-
Cord V. Hugh, 24 Iowa, 336.
^ People V. Supervisors, 11 Abb.
Pr. E. 114.
' Southwell V. Detroit, 42 N. W.
118; Madison v. Smith, 83 Ind. 502;
Corbett v. Bradley, 7 Nev. lOfi; Peo-
ple T. Supervisors, 51 N. Y. 442;
Koch V. Bridges, 45 Miss. 247; Super-
visors V. United States, 4 Wall. 485 ;
Mason v. Fearson, 9 How. 248.
»Amy V. Des Moines, 11 Wall. 136;
Danbury & N. E. E. Co. v. Norwalk,
37 Conn. 109.
^Haniford v. City, 103 Mo. 172;
Savannah v. Donnelly, 71 Ga. 258.
« City v. Cunningham, 47 N. W. E.
930; McAlister v. Albany, 18 Greg.
426; Horey v. Haverstraw, 47 Hun,
356; Chicago etc. Co. v. Quincy, 27
K. E. E. 232; Blessingtou v. Boston,
26 N. E. R. 1113; Covington v. Bry-
ant, 7 Bush, 248; Glantz v. So. Bend,
106 Ind. 305; Detroit v. Carey, 9
Mich. 165 ; Lloyd v. New York, 5 N.
Y. 369; Weet v. Brockport, 16 N. Y.
161 ; Brooks v. Somerville, 106 Mass.
271; Chicago v. Mayor, 18 111. 349;
Pfanv. Eeynolds, 53 111.212; Dayton
V. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80; Baltimore v.
Pennington, 15 Md. 12; Grant v.
Brooklyn, 41 Barb. 381 ; Cincinnati v.
Stone, 5 Ohio St. 38; New York v.
Sheffield, 4 Wall. 189; Conrad v.
Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158; Wendell v.
Troy, 39 Barb. 329.
' Crowther v. Yonkers, 15 N. Y.
S. 588; Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25
707
§ 350
MUNICIPAIi COKPOEATIONS.
[CH. xvir.
States where there exists no implied liability on the part of
cities for non-repair, or for defects and obstructions created by-
others .^
The rule of law, that the city will not be responsible in an
action for damages, where by statute it is vested with the dis-
cretionary power to arrange a plan for the prosecution of the
projected work, and in doing which it acts under the advice of
skilled and experienced persons, has been carried verj' far, par-
ticularly in those States, where in the absence of statute there
is no implied liability for negligence in the care of streets.^
But it should not be construed to exempt the city from liabil-
ity, when the plan devised, if put in operation, leaves the city's
streets in a dangerous condition for public use. The principle
seems to be, that for a mere error of judgment, the municipali-
ty will not be liable ; but for such a lack of care and skill, as
will amount to negligence, it will be liable when there is an im-
plied or statutory liability for defects or obstructions in the
streets, which are caused by others.
In both these classes of cases, the liability is not imposed
upon the corporation, because it is a corporation ; or because
of the very comprehensive powers it possesses over the subject-
matter. The basis of the claim which the injured individual
has against a city for damages, which were occasioned by a
defect or obstruction in a public street, is in every instance the
negligence of the corporation, acting through its ofiicials.^
Such being the basis of the plaintiff's claim, the necessity and
importance of notice, or proof of circumstances which will be
sufBcient to dispense with actual notice,* in all cases where the
defect is not due to some direct act or course of action by the
municipality, is apparent.
Wis. 223; Milwaukee v. Davis, 6 lb.
377; Smith v. Milwaukee, 18 lb. 63;
Storrs V. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104.
' Blessington v. Boston, 26 N. E.
R. 1113; Hill V. Boston, 122 Mass.
344, 364.
2 Detroit v. Blakeby, 21 Mich. 184;
Lansing v. Toolau, 37 Mich. 152.
' Foreman v. Canterbury, L. R. 6 Q.
B. 214; Taylor v. Greenhalgh, L. R.
n,Q. B. 487; Pendlebury v. Same, 1
708
Q. B. D. 36; Palmer v. St. Albans,
56 Vt. 522; when the municipal au-
thorities in repairiag streets are com-
pelled to obstruct tliem, it is their
duty to give travelers due warning
of the obstruction. Carlisle v. Bris-
bane, 113 Pa. St. 544.
*Spiceland v. AUier, 98 Ind. 467;
Turner v. Indianapolis, 96 Ind. 51;
York V. Spellraan, 19 Xeb. 357; Rus-
sell V. Columbia, 74 Mo. 480.
CK. xvri.]
LIABILITY rOK TORTS.
§ 350 a.
§ 350 a. Necessity for, and evidence admissible to show
notice, in order to cliarge corporation witli negligence.
A municipal corporation cannot be charged with negligence,
unless sufficient time has elapsed, after the authorities had had
notice of the defect, for them to repair it ; or after they ought
by reasonable diligence to have acquired knowledge of the de-
fect.i When the defect in the street is occasioned by a third
party, notice of its existence is absolutely essential, in order to
render the city liable.^
This notice may be either express or implied. Actual or
express notice may be given, by serving a writing upon the
proper officer,* or by knowledge of the defect coming to him
through some other channel, and it may be proven by an entry
in the books of the city,* by the repoi't of the street commis-
1 Squires v. Cliillecothe, 89 Mo. 226;
Whitney v. Lowell, 24 N. E. E. 47;
Cairncross v. Pewaukee, (Mo. 91) 47
N. W. E. 13 ; Manning v. Woodstock,
22 Atl. E. 47; 59 Conn. 224; MoNally
V. Cohoes, (N. Y. 91)29 N. E. E. 1043;
Stoddard v. Winchester, (Mass. 91)
27 N. E. E. 1014; Burns v. Bradford,
187 Pa. St. 861 ; Prindle v. Fletcher,
39 Vt. 257; Goodsen v. Des Moines,
66 Iowa, 255; Carter v. Monticello,
68 lb. 178; Yale v. Hampden, 18 Pick.
357; Aurora v. Bitner, 100 Ind. 396;
Johnson v. Milwaukee, 46 Wis. 568;
Larmon v. District, 5 Mackey, 330;
Kibele v. Philadelphia, 105 Pa. St,
41; Cusick v. Korwioh, 40 Conn. 370;
Bellamy V. Atlanta, 75 Ga. 167; Town-
send V. Des Moines, 42 Iowa, 657;
Eice V. Des Moines, 40 lb. 638;
Sheel V. Appleton, 49 Wis. 125 ; Mo-
Siraons v. Lancaster, 63 lb. 596;
Howe V. Plainfield, 41 N. H. 135;
Madison v. Brown, 89 Ind. 48 ; Evans-
ville V. Wilter, 86 lb. 414; Logans-
port V. Justice, 74 lb. 378; Hume v.
New York, 47 N. Y. 639; McCarthy
V. Syracuse, 46 lb. 194; Turner v.
Newburgh, 1091b. 301; Smith v. New
York, 66 lb. 295; Chicago v. Murphy,
84111. 224; Chicago v. Stearns, 105
lb. 554; Jolietv. Seward, 99 lb. 267;
Todd V. Troy, 61 N. Y. 506; Camp-
bell V. Fairhaven, 54 Vt. 336; Eapho
V. Moore, 68 Pa. St. 404; Bonine v.
Eichmond, 75 Mo. 437; Centralia v.
Krouse, 64 111. 19; Datton v. Albion,
50 Mich. 129; Dooly v. Sullivan, 112
Ind. 451; Salina v. Prosper, 27 Kan.
544; Ironton v. Kelley, 38 Ohio St.
50; Indianapolis v. Scott, 72 Ind. 196;
New York V. Sheffield, 4 Wall. 189;
Eequa v. Eochester, 45 N. Y. 129;
Vandyke v. Cincinnati, 1 Disney,
532; Serrot v. Omaha, 1 Dil. C. C. E.
312; Bartlett v. Kittery, 68 Me. 357;
Dorlon v. Brooklyn, 46 Barb. 604;
Hart V. Brooklyn, 36 lb. 226; Donlson
V. Clinton, 33 Iowa, 397; Cleveland
V. St. Paul, 18 Minn. 279; Smith V.
New York, 66 N. Y. 295 ; Ward v.
Jefferson City, 24 Wis. 342; Hubbard
V. Concord, 35 N. H. 52; Worcester
V. Canal Props., 16 Pick. 541; Howe
V. Lowell, 101 Mass. 99.
2 Hume V. New York, 47 N. Y. 639;
Port Wayne v. DeWitt, 47 Ind. 396.
397; Huntington v. Breen, 77 lb. 29.
s Monies v. Lynn, 119 Mass. 273 ;
Foster v. Boston, 127 Mass. 290 ; Eog-
ers V. Shirley, 74 Me. 144 ; Eisson v.
Bettel, 30 Wis. 614.
* Blake v. Lowell, 148 Mass. 290.
709
§ 350 a.
MUNICIPAL COBPOKATIONS.
[cH. xvn.
sioner,^ by a resolution directing repairs ; ^ or by the report of
a committee.^
A city, it has been held, is not charged with notice of a de-
fect, which is not apparent to ordinary observers.* Nor is no-
tice to a citizen to be considered as sufficient notice to the
corporation.*
But the lack of such a notice is no defence, when the defect
was caused, or the obstruction placed in the highway, b)'' ser-
vants or employees of the municipal corporation ; ® or where
the city has given permission to an individual to make an ex-
cavation in the highway.^
Proper officers, to whom notice may come or be given, are
policemen,® or ^ street commissioners or road ovei-seers ; ^^ and
notice to one supervisor ^^ or councilman, is notice to all and
to the town.12
But actual notice of an existing defect is not always neces-
sary ^^ as municipal corporations, which have exclusive control
of streets and public ways, and possess a power to provide for
'Bond V. Biddeford, TS Me. 538.
2 Erd V. St. Paul, 22 Minn. 443.
3 Delphi T. Lowery, 74 Ind. 520,
526, and cases there cited.
* Cook V. Anamosa, 66 Iowa, 427.
" The defect must be one, which the
proper officers either had knowledge
of, or, by the exercise of reasonable
care and diligence, might have had
knowledge of it in time to remedy
it, or preventthe injury." The court,
inHanscom v. Boston, 141 Mass. 242;
see, also, Joliet v. Walker, 7 111. Ap.
267; Soanlon v. New York, 12 Daly,
81 ; Lyman v. Hampshire, 140 Mass.
311; Rooney v. Randolph, 128 lb.
580; Harrimau V. Boston, 1141b. 241.
^ Squires v. Chilliootlie, supra ;
Donaldson v. Boston, 16 Gray, 508 ;
contra, Springer v. Bowdoinham, 7
Greenl. 442 ; Masen v. Ellsworth, 32
Me. 271.
* Hines v. Fond du Lac, 71 Wis. 74.
' Stephens v. Macon, 83 Mo. 345 ;
Cleveland v. King, 132 U. S. 295.
* Denver v. Deane, 10 Cal. 375.
710
s Goldsworthy v. Linden, 43 N. W.
R. 656 ; Buck v. Biddeford, 82 Me.
433; Chase v. Lowell, 24 N". E. R.
212; Rehberg v. New Tork, 91 N. Y.
137; Goodfellow v. New Tork, 100
lb. 15; Hume v. Mayor, 47 lb. 639;
Reinhard v. New Tork, 2 Daly, 243;
Weed V. Ballston Spa, 76 N. T. 329;
Todd V. Troy, 61 lb. 329; Donaldson
V. Boston, 16 Gray, 508.
"ScTanton v. Patterson, 94 Pa. St.
202; Parish v. Eden, 62 Wis. 372;
Rogers v. Shirley, 74 Me. 144.
" Bailey v. Spring Lake, 5 Am. &
Eng. Cor. Cas. 651.
12 Logansport v. Justice, 74 Ind.
378; Carter v. Monticello, 68 Iowa,
378 ; Dundas v. Lansing, 42 N. W. R.
10, 11.
"Smith V. St. Joseph, 42 Mo. App.
392; Murphy's Boro. v. Baker, 34111.
App. 659; Lincoln v. Smith, 45 N.
W. 41; District v. Woodbury, 136
U. S. 450; Pomfrey v.- Village of Sar-
atoga Springs, 104 N. T. 459 ; Cook
V. Anamosa, 66 Iowa, 427.
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOR TORTS.
§ 350 a.
their maintenance and repair by taxation, are required to exer-
cise positive and active vigilance over them. Upon this prin-
ciple, a municipality will not be exempt from liability for latent
defects, if by ordinary care such defects could have been dis-
covered and guarded against.? So, too, the corporation must
use care and diligence to guard against the decay and weaken-
ing of timber, caused by time and exposure.^ When a city is
clearly at fault, or when a sufficient period of time has elapsed
since the occurrence of the defect, in which the city officials
might or should have observed it, if they had exercised ordinary
care and attention, notice will be implied.^
It is sometimes said that notice will be presumed under such
circumstances from the character and notoriety of the defect,
its location and surroundings, and from its continuance for such
a time, as to create the presumption that the municipality did
in fact know of it.* And the length of time, which must elapse,
viiiies with the circumstances of each case. Thus, where a de-
1 McGaffagan v. Boston, 149 Mass.
289; Weed v. Balston, 78 jST. T. 329;
Gubaske v. New York, 12 Daly, 182;
Cusick V. Norwich, 40 Conn. 375;
Kunz V. Troy, 104 N. Y. 344; Market
V. St. Louis, 5(3, Mo. 189; Boucher
v. New Haven, 40 Conn. 456; Denver
V. Dean, 10 Col. 375; Aurora v. Hill-
man, 90 III. 61.
2 McDonald v. Ashland, 47 N. W. B.
4.S4; Indianapolis v. Scott, 72 Ind.
196; Furnellv.St. Paul, 20 Minn. 117;
Sherwood v. District, 3 Mackey, 276.
'Masters v. Troy, 50 Hun, 485;
Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11 H. L.
Cas. 087, 701 ; Weisenberg v. Apple-
ton, 26 Wis. 56; Springfield v. Le
Claire, 49 111. 476; Shipley v. Bolivar,
42 Mo. App. 401; Barton v. Syra-
cuse, 86 N. Y. 54, 58; Chicago v.
Johnson, 53 111. 91 ; Troxall v. Vin-
ton, 77 Iowa, 90; Furnell v. St. Paul,
20 Minn. 117; Moore v. Minneapolis,
19 lb. 800; Fort Wayne v. Coombs,
107 Ind. 75; Holmes v. Paris, 75 Me.
559; Eochefort v. Attleboro, 27 N. E.
R. 1013; Gude v. Mankato, 30 Minn.
256; Medina v. Perkins, 48 Mich. 67;
Albertine v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. 486;
Houston v. Izaaks, 68 Tex. 116;
Goodnough v. Oshkosh, 24 Wis. 549;
comp. Submarine Tel. Co. v. Dick-
son, 15 C. B. N. S. 759; Eapho Tp. v.
Moore, 8 Am. Rep. 202 ; comp. Joliet
V. Walker, 7 HI. App. 267; Gilman
V. Haley, 7 lb. 849; Chatsworth v.
Ward, 10 lb. 75; Chicago v. McCul-
lough, 10 lb. 459 ; Powers v. Council
Bluffs, 50 Iowa, 197; Eowell v. Wil-
liams, 29 lb. 210; Van Pelt v. Daven-
port, 42 lb. 308; Colbeck v. Beaut-
ford, 21 Up. Can. Q. B. 276.
4Tice V. Bay, 84 Mich. 461; Fuller
V. Jackson, 82 lb. 480; Albrittin v.
Huntsville, 60 Ala. 486; Board v.
Dombke, 94 Ind. 72; Enright v. At-
lanta, 78 Ga. 288; Reed v. Northfield,
13 Pick. 94; Doveuy v. Elmira, 51 N.
Y. 506; Todd v. Troy, 61 lb. 506;
Squires v. Chillicothe, 89 Mo. 226;
Daltonv. Com. Council, 50 Mich. 129;
Chicago V. Dalle, 115 111. 386; Chi-
cago V. Fowler, 00 lb. 322; Smally
V. Appleton, 43 N. W. R. 826.
711
§ 350 a.
MTJNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. xvn.
feet had existed three weeks,^ and in other cases several months,
notice was presumed to have been received by the city.^ On
the other hand, when an injury was sustained by a fall upon a
sidewalk, which had been improperly constructed seven days
prior thereto, actual notice of the defect was required.*
It has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States,
that evidence of the occurrence of similar accidents at the same
place is admissible, as tending to show notice to the municipal
corporation.* So, also, where an accident was caused by a loose
board, evidence, that the city knew of the general lack of re-
pair and decay of the walk, was admitted as tending to prove
notice,^ even where it did not appear that the municipal au-
thorities had special notice of this loose board. For, in seek-
ing to recover for injury sustained from a defect at one point
in a sidewalk, evidence is admissible of its defective condition
elsewhere.^ But in modification of this statement of the law,
it has been held that evidence, of a walk being out of repair
in a "locality near" where the accident occurred, is not ad-
missible.'^ The same rules of evidence have been applied to
suits for damages suffered from defects in a bridge.**
1 Griffin v. Johnson, 10 S. E. R.
"719; 84Ga.279; Studleyv. Oshkosh,
45 Wis. 380; Pomfrey v. Saratoga,
104 N. T. 459; Grand Eapids v. Wy-
raan, 46 Mich. 516.
2 Philadelphia v. Smith, 23 W. N.
C. 242; Wheaton v. Hadley, 23 IST. E.
E. 422;. Chicago v. Crocker, 2 111.
App. 279; Evansville v. Wilter, 86
Ind. 414; Board v. Brown, 89 lb. 48;
Purple V. Greenfield, 138 Mass. 1;
Smith V. Leavenworth, 15 Kan. 81.
8 Chicago V. McCarthy, 75 111. 602;
Cf. Barr v. Kansas City, 16 S. W. K.
483.
* Thompson v. Quincy, 83 Mich.
173; Abilene v. Hendricks, 36 Kan.
196; Augusta v. Hafers, 61 Ga. 48;
Lombard v. East Towas, 48 K W. E.
947; Smith v. Sherwood, 62 Mich.
159; Nave v. Flack, 90 Ind. 203, 214;
District v. Armes, 107 U. S. 519; Del-
phi V. Lowery, 74 Ind. 520; Gilmer
V. Atlanta, 77 Ga. 688; Quinlan v.
712
Utica, 71 N. T. 603; Osborne v. De-
troit, 32 Fed. E. 36; Kent v. Lincoln,
32 Vt. 591 ; Darling v. Westmoreland,
52 N. H. 401; contra, Philips v.
Willow, 70 Wis. 6; Moor v. Delafield,
69 lb. 273 ; Blair v. Pelham, 118 Mass.
420.
^Fox V. Lansingburgh, 59 Hun,
617; Aurora v. Hillman, 90 111. 61;
Bloomiugton v. Chamberlain, 104 lb.
268; contra, Shelby v. Daggett, 22
N. B. E. 497.
« Village V. Brooks, 31 HI. App. 62;
Tice V. Bay City, 84 Mich. 461; Arm-
strong V. Ackley, 71 Iowa, 76.
''Euggles V. Nevada, 63 Iowa, 185;
Barr v. City, 16 S. W. E. 483 (Kan. 91) ;
contra, Shaw v. Sun Prairie, 74 Wis.
105.
8 Hiues V. Fond duLac, 71 Wis. 74;
Spearbacker v. Larrabee, 64 lb. 573;
Aurora v. Hillman, 90 111. 61 ; Platts-
mouth v. Mitchell, 20 Neb. 228; Cf.
Dundas v. Lansing, 42 N.W.B. 1011.
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOR TOUTS.
§ S50 I.
In an action to recover for an injury, caused by falling into
an open cesspool, the court admitted evidence showing, that the
cover of the cesspool had been off several times before ; i and,
generally, where repairs have been made in a structure under
municipal control, this fact should be taken into account, in
connection with the age and appearance of the structure.^
§ 350 b. Notice of claim prior to suit.— In many municipal
charters, and in the statutes of some of the States, provisions
exist, which require the plaintiff to give notice to the city of
the injury received by him, before he can begin an action to
recover damages therefor. Such requirements are sometimes
constitutional,^ and compliance with them must generallj"- be
alleged and proved.* When it is required by statute that the
notice be served upon a specified municipal official, it need not,
it has been held, be handed to him directly by the person in-
jured ; but it will be sufficient if it reach liim in time through
the hands of some third person.^ In a case, where notice re-
quired, the fact that the plaintiff was ill and under the influence
iPost V. Boston, 141 Mass. 189.
2 Cooley V. Westbrook, 57 Me. 181 ;
Grimes v. Keane, 52 N. H. 330; Me-
dina V. Perkins, 48 Mich. 67; Klein v.
Dallas, 8 S. W. Rep. 90, per curiam:
" The question of notice must be left
to the jury in all cases whether it be
actual or constructive. What facts
■would be sufiBcient to put the cor-
poration upon inquiry would depend
upon a variety of circumstances, the
length of time the defect had exist-
ed, its notoriety, the frequency of
travel over it, and the character of
the defect itself. Such facts would
be admissible in evidence to be con-
sidered and weighed by the jury.
The existence of a dangerous side-
walk or street would not in any case
of itself justify a legal presumption,
that it was known to the city author-
ities, except whei'e it is visible, and
where the city had itself constructed
the sidewalk and made the excavar
tion or obstruction. The act of a
wi'ongdoer, rendering usual travel
dangerous, without knowledge, ac-
tual or constructive, on the part of
corporate officers, would not create
a liability on the part of the city."
Erd V. Paul, 22 Minn. 440; Hall v.
Lowell, 10 Gush. 260; AUetson v.
Chichester, L. E. C. P. 319; Mosey
V. Troy, 61 Barb. 580; Stanton v.
Springfield, 12 Allen, 566; Kellogg
V. Janesville, 34 Minn. 132; Howe v.
Lowell, 101 Mass. 99; Corcoran v.
Peekskill, 108 N. T. 151; Bailey v.
Spring Lake, 61 Wis. 227.
3 Reining v. Buffalo, 102 IT. Y. 308;
Nichols V. Minneapolis, 2 Am. &
Eng. Cor. Cas. 562.
* Reining v. Buffalo, supra ; Dor-
sey V. Racine, 60 Wis. 281 ; Benware
V. Pine Valley, 53 Wis. 527; Minick
V. Troy, 83 N". Y. 514, 516 ; Jones v.
Minneapolis, 31 Minn. 230 ; Marshall
Co. V. Jackson Co., 36 Ala. 613.
5 Wormwood v. Waltham, 144
Mass. 184 ; McCabe v. Cambridge,
134 lb. 484.
713
351
MTrfflCIPAI/ CORPORATIONS.
[cH. xvn.
of opiates, was held to be insufficient to excuse the omission to
give the notice.^ If tlie charter prescribes the notice to be given,
it should be complied with, although there may be general statu-
tory provisions upon the subject.^
The notice should identify the locality where the accident
occurred;* but a minute and specific description is never re-
quired.* The notice should also state that damages are claimed
for the injury ; ^ but a variance between the amount claimed in
the complaint and that in the notice is not material.^ Any ma-
terial variance, particularly as to the manner or time of the in-
jury will invalidate the notice.^
Whether this notice, when it is regarded as a condition pre-
cedent, can be waived by the defendant corporation, is not de-
finitely settled, except in Massachusetts where it cannot be
waived.^
§ 351. Proximate cause. — The law looks to the proximate,
and not to the remote, cause of an injury ; and from this fol-
lows the rule, that unless the defendant's negligence was the
proximate or direct cause of this plaintiff's injurj"-, no recovery
can be had. So, unless the defect in the highway, whether it
be ice or snow, a dangerous excavation or general lack of re-
pair, is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, the munici-
pal corporation will not be liable in damages.® The injury for
which a municipal corporation will be liable must be the natural
1 May V. Boston, (Mass.) 23 TST. E.
Eep. 220.
2 Hines v. Fond du Lao, 71 Wis. 74.
8 Rogers v. Shirly, 74 Me. 144.
* Cloughessey v. Waterbury, 51
Conn. 405 ; Sargent v. Lynn, 138
Mass. 599 ; McCabe v. Cambridge,
134 lb. 484 ; Pendergast v. Clinton,
147 lb. 40i ; Liffin v. Beverly, 145 lb.
549 ; Wall v. Highland, 72 Wis. 435.
5 Kenaday v. Lawrence, 128 Mass.
318.
6 Reed v. New York, 97 N. Y. 620 ;
Wyandotte v. White, 13 Kan. 191.
' Shaw V. Waterbury, 46 Conn. 263 ;
MoBougall V. Boston, 134 Mass. 149;
Spooner v. Freetown, 139 lb. 235.
8 Gay V. Cambridge, 128 Mass. 387 ;
Maddox v. Randolph, 65 Ga. 216 ;
714
Dorsey v. Racine, 60 Wis. 292 ; Bab-
cook V. Guilford, 47 Vt. 519.
« Judd V. Claremont, (N. H. 92) 23
Atl. R. 427; White v. Conley, 52 Am.
Rep. 154, 157; Forney v. Geldmacher,
42 lb. 388, 390; Crafter v. Metro. Ry.
Co., L. E. 1. C. P. 300; Thomas v.
Winchester, 57 Am. Dec. 455; Mc-
Donald V. Snelling, 92 lb. 768; Hen-
derson V. Barnes, 32 Up. Can. Q. B.
176; Weiok v. Lander, 75 111. 93; Ag-
new V. Corunna, 55 Mich. 428; Bill-
man v. Ind., etc., Co., 76 Ind. 166;
BlufEton V. Mathews, 92 Ind. 213;
Cornman v. Eastern Counties R. Co.,
4 H. & N. 781; Deverill v. Grand Tr.
Ry. Co., 25 Up. Can. Q. B. 517; Too-
mey v. London, etc., Co., 3 C. B. N.
S. 146; Cotton v. Wood, 8 lb. 568.
CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOR TORTS. § 351
and probable consequence of the lack of repair, defect or obsta-
cle in the street or highway.^
It is also necessary, in order to sustain a separate action
against the city, that the negligence of its agents should be the
sole cause of the injury .^ But care should be observed in dis-
tinguishing between the efficient cause of the injury, which is
the city's negligence, and the conditions which contributed to
the injury. Thus, where plaintiff's injury was caused partly by
a fall on the ice with which the road was covered, and partly
by a defect in the road itself, the city was liable for its negli-
gence in not repairing the defect, which was the cause of the
injury, even though the ice as a condition contributed to it.^
So, too, where there was a defective gutter, which in conjunc-
tion with a heavy rainfall caused damage to the foundation of
a building on adjacent land, the city was held liable.* Where
there is a combination of causes, all of which are g'wasi-proximate
in character ; but one of them is a defect or obstacle caused by
the city's negligence, while the others are occurrences for which
neither party is responsible, the municipality is liable, provided
the injury would not have been sustained, had not the obstacle
or defect existed.^ The concurrent negligence of a thiid person
will not relieve a wrongdoer.® Thus, where a person, whose
clothes were entangled in a defective sidewalk, was run over bj'
a railroad train ; '' or where a child, falling into a ditch, which
was negligently left unguarded, was hurt by broken glass at the
bottom ; * or where a traveler was injured by a horse, which had
been frightened at a defect in the road and had run away ;S or
1 Elirgott V. New York, 96 N. Y.
264; Hoag v. Lake Shore & Mich. S.
E. Co., 85 Pa. St. 293; Ring v. Cohoes,
77 N. Y. 83.
2Flagg V. Hudson, 142 Mass. 280;
Aldrich v. Gorham, 77 Me. 287.
* Wharton on Negligence, §86; At-
chison V. King, 9 Kan. 550.
' Hanney v. Kansas City, 94 Mo.
334.
^MoXamara V. Clintonville, 62 Wis.
207; Ehrgott v. New York, 96 N. Y.
264 ; Palmer v. Ando ver, 56 Mass. 600 :
Hunt V. Pownal, 9 Vt. 411; Perkins
V. Fayette, 08 Me. 152; Shearman &
Red. on Neg. § 346; Moulton v. San-
ford, 51 Me. 127; Castor v. Uxbridge,
39 Up. Can. Q. B. 113; Toms v. Wliit-
by, 37 lb. 100; Sherwood v. Hamilton,
37 lb. 410; Merrill v. Portland, 4
Cliff. C. C. 138; Hampsou v. Taylor,
15 R. I. 83.
« Franklin v. Winona, etc., Co., 37
Minn. 409.
T Chicago V. Schmidt, 107 111. 186.
' Galveston v. Posnainsky, 02 Tex.
118.
9 Baldwin v. Turnpike, 40 Conn.
238; Fulsome V. Concord, 46 Vt. 135;
Centerville v. Woods, 57 Ind. 192,
197; Merrill v. Claremont, 58 N. H.
468.
715
§352
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
where plaintiff was injured, while he was trying to free his horse
from a defect in the road ; ^ in all of these cases, the negligence
of the municipality was held to be the proximate cause without
which the injury would not have been sustained, and the city
was held liable for the damages.
§ 352. Contributory negligence. — On the other hand, there
can be no recovery, where an injury was caused or proximately
contributed to by the negligence or unskillfulness of the plain-
tiff in driving,^ or by defects in his wagon, harness, etc.; ^ or by
any other want of due care, which under the circumstances
amounts to contributory negligence.* To deliberately venture
to walk or drive upon a part of the street, which plaintiff
knows is dangerous, would under ordinary circumstances be
contributory negligence on his part.^ It would, however, de-
pend upon the circumstances of each case, whether the negli-
gence of the plaintiff constituted, along with the negligence of
the defendant municipality, the jointly co-operating cause of
the injury complained of, so that it would be treated as con-
tributory negligence, and preclude a recovery against the de-
'Page V. Bucksport, 64 Me. 51;
Atlanta v. Wilson, 59 Ga. 544; Lund
V. Ty.ngsborough, 11 Cush. 563;
Brooksville v. Pumplirey, 59 Ind. "78'.
2 Bryant v. Randolph, 6 N. Y. S.
438; Clark v. Richmond, 5 S. E. R.
369; Marriott v. Stanley, 1 M. & G.
568; Cobb v. Standish, 14 Me. 477;
Flower v. Adams, 2 Taunt. 314;
Stuart V. Maohiasport, 48 Me. 477;
Peoria Br. Assoc, v. Loomis, 20 111.
402; Cassidy V. Stockbridge, 21 Vt.
391 ; Murphy v. Dean, 101 Mass. 455 ;
Beatty v. Gilmore, 10 Pa. St. 463;
District V. MoElligott, 117 U. S. 621 ;
Centralia v. Krouse, 64 111. 19; Craig
V. Sedelia, 63 Mo. 417; Damon v.
Scituate, 119 Mass. 66; Evans v.
Utica, 69 N". Y. 166; Gilman v. Deer-
field, 15 Gray, 577; Pettingillv. Yon-
kers, 116 lb. 558.
s Winship v. Enfield, 42 N. H. 197;
Clark V. Barrington, 41 lb. 44; Tucker
V. Heinecker, lb. 317; Palmer v.
Audover, 2 Cush. 600; Jenks v. Wil-
716
braham, 11 Gray, 142; Moore v. Al-
bert, 32 Me. 46; Noyes v. Morris-
town, 1 Vt. 357; Allen v. Hancock,
16 Vt. 230.
*Hutchius V. Priestly, 61 Mich.
252; Kelly v. Doody, 22 K. B. R.
1084; 116 N. Y. 575; Schonhohf v.
Jackson, 97 Mo. 151; 10 S. W. R. 618;
Smith V. Smith, 2 Pick. 621; Park-
hill V. Brighton, 61 Iowa, 103; Man-
gan V. Atterbury, 1 Ex. 239; Bridge
V. Grand June. E'y Co., 3 M. & W.
244; Wltherley v. Regents Canal Co.,
12 C.^B. N. S. 2 ; Tuff v. Warman, 2 lb.
573; Waite v. N. E. R'y Co., E. B. &
E. 719; Bradley v. Brown, 32 Up.
Can. Q. B. 463; Baker v. Portland,
58 Me. 199.
i" Evans v. Adams, 122 Ind. 362;
Erie v. Jlaoill, 101 Pa. St. 616; Mc-
Kee V. Bidwell, 74 Pa. St. 218; Coatea
V. Canaan, 51 Vt. 131; and cases cited
in §344. Ice and snow; Dunkin v.
Troy, 61 Barb. 437; Baker v. Fehr, 97
Pa. St. 70.
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOE TOKTS.
§352
fendant.^ So, also, a reasonable choice between known dangers
is not negligence ; and the fact, that plaintiff, knowing the de-
fect, voluntarily attempted to pass over it is not conclusive of
liis negligence ; but it is a question for the jury to settle in the
light of the facts in the case.^ The traveler's familiarity with
the condition of the road is only a circumstance to be considered
as bearing upon the question of his contributory negligence.^
1 Johnson v. Wilcox, (Pa. 90) 19
Atl. R. 939; GafEney v. Brown, 150
Mass. 479; Ellis v. Peru, 23 111. App.
35; Lynch v. New York, 47 Hun,
524; McCracken v. Markesan, 45 N.
W. E. 323; Ely v. Whitehall, 24 N.
E. E. 943; 120 K. T. 506; McGlnty
V. Keokuk, 66 Iowa, 725 ; Gribble v.
Sioux City, 38 Iowa, 390; President
v. Dusouchett, 2 Ind. 587; McKenzle
V. Jforthfield, 30 Minn. 456; Farnum
V. Concord, 2 N. H. 392; Carlett v.
Leavenworth, 27 Kan. 673; Maultby
V. Leavenwoi-th, 28 lb. 745 ; Eeed v.
Northfleld, 13 Pick. 94; G-osport v.
Evans, 112 Ind. 133; Bruker v. Cov-
ington, 69 lb. 33; Wheeler v. West-
port, 30 Wis. 392; Hunger v. Mar-
shalltown, 56 Iowa, 216; Bullock v.
Kew York, 99 N. Y. 654; Dubois v.
Kingston, 102 N. Y. 219; Mahoney v.
Metro. Ey. Co., 104 Mass. 73; Cres-
cent v. Anderson, 114 Pa. St. 643; Al-
toonav. Latz, 1141b. 238; Humphrey
V. Armstrong Co., 56 Pa. St. 204;
Strong V. Steven's Point, 62 Wis. 255 ;
McKeigue v. Janes ville, 68 lb. 50;
Estelle V. Lake Crystal, 27 Minn.
243; Loewer v. Sedalia, 77 Mo. 431;
Lowell V. Watertown, 58 Mich. 568.
2 Sandwich v. Dolan, (Mass. 90) 24
N. E. E. 526; Byerly v. Anamosa,
(Iowa, 90) 44 N. W. 359; Allegheny
County V. Broadwaters, 69 Md. 533;
Fort Wayne v. Breeze, 23 N. E. R.
1038; Chicago v. McLean, 24 N. E.
527; Boland v. City, 32 Mo. App. 8;
Weed V. Ballston, 76 jS". Y. 329; At-
Water v. Veteran, 6 K. Y. S. 607;
Lyman v. Amherst, 107 Mass. 339;
Kenworthy v. Ironton, 41 Wis. 647;
Divney v. Elmira, 51 N. Y. 506 ; Bul-
lock V. New York, 99 lb. 654; Shook
V. Cohoes, 108 lb. 648; Whitaker v.
West Boylston, 97 Mass. 273 ; Gilbert
V. Boston, 139 lb. 313; Pollard v.
Woburn, 104 lb. 84; Eindge v. Col-
rain, 11 Gray, 157; Frost v. Waltham,
12 Allen, 85; Harris v. Clinton, 64
Mich. 447; Maltby v. Leavenworth,
28 Kan. 745; Maw v. Township, 8
Ont. App. 248; Montgomery v.
Wright, 72 Ala. 411 ; Jeffrey v. Keo-
kuk, 56 Iowa, 546; Bronson v. South-
bury, 37 Conn. 199 ; Aurora v. Dale,
90 111. 46.
« Ellis V. Peru, 23 111. Ap. 35 ; Fort
Wayne v. Breeze, 23 N. E. 1038; Lan-
gan V. Atchison, 35 Kan. 318; By-
erly V. Anamosa, (Cal.) 44 N. W. E.
459; Foster v. Swope, 41 Mo. App.
137; Hayes v. Hyde Park, (Mass. 91)
27 N". E. 522; Cornish v. Toronto St.
R'y Co., 23 Up. Can. C. P. 355;
Blackwell v. Same, 38 Up. Can. Q.
B. 172; Clayardsv. Dethick, 12Q. B.
439; Gee v. Metro. R'y Co., L. R. 8
Q. B. 177; Snow v. Housatonic R. E.
Co., 8 Allen, 441; Adams v. Lanca-
shire & Y. R'y Co., L. R. 4 C. P. 739;
Frost V. Waltham, 12 Allen, 85;
Belief ontaine R'y Co. v. Hunter, 33
Ind. 335 ; Clark v. Lockport, 49 Bai-b.
580; Bi-idges v. No. London R'y Co.,
L. R. 6 Q. B. 377; Whittakerv. W.
Boylston, 97 Mass. 273; Nicholls v.
Gt. Western R'y Co., 27 Up. Can. Q.
B. 382; Fox v. Sackett, 10 Allen, 535;
Rastrick v. Gt. Western Ry. Co.,
27 Up. Can. Q. B. 396; Hutton v.
717
§352
MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS.
[CH. xvn.
His knowledge of a defect or obstruction is not decisive proof of
contributory negligence ; it is, however, an important element,
and one from which contributory negligence is frequently and
not unreasonably inferred.^ But a corporation has no right, by
keeping its streets in a notoriously unsafe condition, to debar
the public from using them, upon the penalty of being guilty
of contributory negligence if they do and are injured thereby .^
A person may walk or drive carefully, relying upon the be-
lief, that the corporation has done its duty ; and even a near
sighted person, or one vi^hose sight is dimmed by age,^ may act
on the assumption, that the streets are reasonably safe.* All,
however, while using the highways, are bound to exercise the
prudence and care, which is reasonable and proper under the
varying circumstances and conditions of such use, for which
no general rule can be given.^ " Each case," it has been said,^
" depends upon its own circumstances and each is a law unto
itself." ^
Those using highways are not bound to anticipate danger,
where there is nothing to indicate it.** Nor are they expected
Windsor, 34 lb. 487; Winckler v.
Gt. Western Ey. Co., 18 Up. Can. C.
P. 250, 262; Fox v. Glastenbury, 29
Conn. 204; James v. San Francisco,
6 Cal. 528; Folsom v. Underbill, 36
Vt. 580 ; Horton v. Ipswich, 12 Cush.
488; Jacobs v. Bangor, 16 Me. 187;
Wilson V. Charlestown, 8 Allen, 177;
Hanlon v. Keokuk, 7 Iowa, 477;
Brown v. Jefferson, 16 lb. 339.
iHesser v. Grafton, 11 S. E. E.
211; 33 W. Va. 548; Skjeggerud v.
Minn. etc. Co., 38 Minn. 56; FuUiam
V. Muscatine, 30 N. W. E. 861 ; Evans-
ville etc. Co. v. Crist, 116 Ind. 453;
Gulf etc. Co. V. Gascamp, 69 Tex.
545; Gosport v. Evans, 112 Ind. 133;
Penna. Co. v. Varnan, 15 Atl. E. 624;
Eicbmond v. Mulholland, 116 Ind.
173.
2 Bloomsburg, S. & E. L. Co. v.
Gardner, 17 Atl. E. 521; 126 Pa. St.
80; Langan v. Atchison, 35 Kan. 318;
Maultby V. Leavenworth, 28 Kan.
745 ; Frost v. Waltham, 12 Allen, 85 ;
Eioe V. Des Moines, 40 Iowa, 638;
. 718
Elndge v. Colrain, 11 Gray, 157;
Wheeler v. Westport, 30 Wis. 392;
Whitaker v. W. Boylston, 97 Mass.
273; Humphreys v. County, 56 Pa.
St. 204; Pollard V. Woburn, 104
Mass. 84.
■■> Nefe v. Wellesley, 148 Mass. 487;
20 N. E. Ill; Frost v. Waltham, 12
Allen, 85 ; Coates v. Canaan, 51 Vt.
131; Requa v. Rochester, 45 N. Y.
129; Harris V. Uebelhofer, 75 lb. 169.
* Gordon v. Richmond, 18 Am. &
Eng. Corp. Cases, 251.
6 Parvls V. Philada. etc. Co., (Del.
89) 17 Atl. 702; Massey v. Columbus
75 Ga. 658; Minick v. Troy, 83 N. Y.
514; Farrar v. Greene, 32 Me. 574;
Morrell v. Peck, 88 lb. 398.
6 Dillon Mun. Corp. § 1007.
' Chamberlain v. Wheatland, 7 N.
Y. S. 190; Weedv. Ballston, 76N. Y.
329; Davenport v. Euckman, 37 lb.
568, 573.
8 Com'rs of Howard v. Legg, 110
Ind. 479; Turner v. Newburgh, 109
^^ Y. 301.
CH. xvn.]
LIABILITY FOE TORTS.
§352
to haA'e perfect vision,^ or to see defects not obvious to those
of ordinary faculties, traveling at an ordinary pace.^ But it is
just to require from those, who have defective sight^ or who
drive horses which are blind * or have imperfect vision,^ a greater
degree of care, than what is required of others.
It is not contributory negligence for a woman to drive a
horse,^ nor for any one to drive over a smooth road at the rate
of ten miles an hour,^ or to drive in a violent storm through
city streets, with which the driver is unacquainted,^ or on a
street, when its defects are covered by the snow.' Nor is it
contributory negligence, in an action against the city for neg-
ligence in the repair of the roads, for one to drive on the wrong
side of the road;!" to travel by night,!^ or to go on a dark
night without a lantern.^
The fact, that the harness or carriage breaks, is not conclu-
sive proof of negligence, as it might be an accident caused by
a defect, of which the owner had no knowledge and which he
could not have discovered by the use of ordinary care. He is
not an insurer of the condition of his tackle, and is liable only
upon the principle, that he has not used ordinary care in the
maintenance of it in good repair. ^^
■ When a foot passenger at night, without necessity therefor,
steps from the sidewalk and is injured by falling into a hole ; ^*
or where a driver receives an injury, while he is on the edge of
the highway, by his own fault ; ^^ as, when driving a horse and
' Neff v. Wellesley, supra; Thomp-
son V. Bridgewater, 7 Pick. 188.
2 Sheldon v. W. U. T. Co., 51 Hun,
591; Cox V. Westchester Tp. Co., 33
Barb. 414; Frost v. Waltham, 12 Al-
len, 85.
s Hutton V. Windsor, 34 Up. Can. Q.
B. 487; Winn v. Lowell, 1 Allen, 177;
Sleeper V. Sandown, 52 N. H. 244;
Smith V. Wildes, 14:5 Mass. 556.
* Salem v. Goller, 76 Ind. 291;
Breckenridge v. Fitchburg, 145 Mass.
160; Sleeper V. Sandown, 52 N. H. 244.
5 Wright V. Templeton, 132 Mass.
49.
' Snow T. Provincetown, 120 Mass.
580; Cobb v. Standish, 14 Me. 198.
' Keed v. Deerfleld, 8 Allen, 522.
8 Brackenridge v. Fitchburg, 145
Mass. 160; Milwaukee v. Davis, 6
Wis. 377; Hart v. Bed Cedar, 63 Wis.
634; Williams v. Clinton, 28 Conn.
264; Clark v. Lockport, 49 Barb. 580.
9 Clark V. Lockport, 49 Barb. 580.
'" Damon v. Scituate, 20 An. Kep.
315.
1' Stier V. Osoaloosa, 41 Iowa, 353.
12 Allegheny Co. v. Broadwaters,
69 Md. 538.
13 Thompson on Neg. § 381 ; Doyle
V. Wragg, 1 F. & F. 7.
n Alline v. Le Mars, 18 Am. & Eng.
Cor.Cases, 262; Zettlerv. Atlanta, 66
Ga. 195.
15 Potter V. Castleton, 53 Vt. 435.
719
§ 352
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
tileigh, he leaves the portion of the road which is bare, for that
upon which the snow lies ; ^ he is guilty of contributory negli-
gence, and cannot recover, even though he thought the side of
the road was safer than the part he left, provided the regular
track was reasonably safe and open.^ But every departure
from the highway or beaten path does not constitute negligence,^
and whether any deviation is negligence, is usually a question
for the jurj'.* When a traveler leaves the traveled path know-
ingly, he is bound to show a sufficient excuse or reason therefor.
And if he does not, contributor}'' negligence may be inferred.^
But it is not negligence for a person to leave a street to obtain
a drink of water from a hydrant, situated on an adjacent lot ;
in stopping, he exercises a lawful privilege.^
It is not .enough alone to show that plaintiff was in fault.
His negligence to defeat his recovery, must have proximately
contributed to his injury ; "< and while contributory negligence
will not be presumed, its existence may be inferred from cir-
cumstances, showing a want of care.^
On the other hand, it has been held by many authorities that
the strong instinct of self preservation will raise a presumption,'
but not a proof, ^^ of the use of due care. Although contribu-
tory negligence cannot be inferred from the single fact that
plaintiff was intoxicated," that is one of the circumstances
which may be given in evidence,^^ and may, together with
other circumstances, exert a controlling influence.-'^^ While a
drunken man is not beyond the protection of the law of
negligence,^* his intoxication is no excuse ; ^^ and if his injury is
' Kice V. Montpelier, 19 Vt. 470.
2 Burr V. Plymouth, 48 Conn. 460.
3 Briggs V. Guilford, 8 Vt. 264; Erie
V. Sohwingle, 22 Pa. St. 384.
" Ramsey v. Ttushville, 81 Ind. 394.
5 McLaury v. McGregor, 54 Iowa,
717 ; Carohis v. Xew York, 6 Bosw. 15 ;
Vlcksburg v. Henessy, 54 Miss. 391 ;
Parkhill v. Brighton, 01 la. 103; Lov-
engarth v. Bloomington, 71 111. 238;
Momenoe v. Kendall, 14 111. App. 229.
6 Duffy V. Dubuque, 63 Iowa, 171.
■? Nave V. Mack, 90 Ind. 205.
8 Moore v. Richmond, 8 S. E. R.
387; Kingv. Thompson, 87 Pa. St. 365.
720
9 Cassidy v. Angell, 12 R. 1. 447 ; Cen-
tral Br. etc. Co. v. Pate, 21 Kan. 539;
Allen V. Willard, 57 Pa. St. 374; North-
ern Gen. R. R. v. State, 31 Ind. 357.
1" Warner v. New York etc. Co., 44
N. Y. 465; Cordell v. New York etc.
Co., 75 N. Y. 330.
n Healy v. New York, 3 Hun, 708.
12 Alger V. Lowell, 3 Allen, 402.
w Wood V. Andes, 11 Hun, 543.
" Cincinnati etc. Co. v. Cooper, 22
N. E. R. 340.
w Illinois Cen. R. R. Co. v. Hutch-
inson, 47 111. 408; Woods v. Tipton,
27 N. E. E. 611.
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOR TORTS.
§ 352
attributable to his drunkenness as a proximate cause, he cannot
recover.^
In some of the Eastern States, it is held that a person trav-
eling on Sunday, except upon an errand of mercy or charity,
cannot recover for injuries caused by a defective highway.^
This ruling of the New England courts is the outcome of their
strict enforcement of their Sunday laws, which makes travel on
Sunday, except on an errand of rnercy or charity, illegal. The
Sunday traveler cannot recover in the New England States for
injuries he sustains from a defective roadbed, because he was
violating the law when he sustained the injury. This applica-
tion of the general rule is not recognized elsewhere.^
Unless the facts are undisputed, the question of contributory
negligence is for the jury.* Even if the facts are not contro-
verted, if different conclusions may be drawn from them, the
question is still for the jury to decide as a question of fact.^
In respect to the burden of showing contributory negligence
there is a hopeless contrariety of opinion ; and for a full discus-
sion of the subject, the reader is referred to any of the works,
which treat specially of the subject of negligence. It suffices to
say in the present connection, that where the contributory neg-
ligence of the plaintiff does not so clearly appear upon his own
testimony, as to convince the jury that he was at fault, the
burden of proof rests on the defendant ;® and he may show the
iFitzgeraldv. Weston, 52 Wis. 354;
Seymer v. Lake, 66 lb. 651; Cramer
V. Burlington, 42 Iowa, 315 ; Monk v.
New Utrecht, 104 N. Y. 561 ; Hub-
bard V. Mason City, 60 Iowa, 400;
Cassidy v. Stockbridge, 21 Vt. 391.
2 Hinckley V. Penobscot, 42 Me. 89;
Baker v. Portland, 58 lb. 199; David-
son v. Portland, 69 lb. 116; Bosworth
V. Swansey, 10 Metcf . 363 ; Norris v.
Litchfield, 35 N. H. 918; Johnson v.
Irasburgh, 47 Vt. 28; Steele v. Burk-
hardt, 104 Mass. 59; Lyons v. Deso-
telle, 124 Mass. 387; Com. v. Adams,
114 lb. 323.
'Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat.
258; Platz v. Cohoes, 89 N. Y. 219;
Sutton V. Wauwatosa, 29 Wis. 21, 28;
White V. Lang, 128 Mass. 598; Wood-
46
ward V. Hubbard, 25 N. H. 67; Piol-
let V. Simmers, 106 Pa,. St. 95.
*Ponca V. Crawford, 23 Neb. 662;
Daniels v. Lebanon, 58 N. H. 284;
Albian v. Hedrick, 90 lb. 545 ; Ramsey
V. R. & M. Grar. Rd. Co., 81 lb. 394;
Dwenyv.Elmira, 51 N. Y. 506; Balti-
more V. Holmes, 39 Md. 243; Niven
V. Rochester, 76 lb. 619; Kelsey v.
Glover, 15 Vt. 708; Hart v. Red Cedar,
63 Wis. 634.
' Montgomery v. Wright, 72 Ala.
411 ; Sioux C. & R. R. R. Co. v. Stout,
17 Wall. 657.
6 Georgia P. Ry. v. Davis, (Ala. 91)
9 So. 252; Hai-mon v. W. & G. R. Co.,
7 Mackey, 235 ; Sanders v. Reister, 1
Dak. 131; Brad well v. Pittsburgh &
W. E. R. Co., 139 Pa. St. 404; Inland
721
§ 352 a.
MTTNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH.
XVII.
plaintiff's negligence by direct testimony, or inferentially from
the testimony of the plaintiff.
§ 352 a. Damages in suits for negligence. — The question of
damages in actions for negligence, is involved in great diffi-
culty .^ And an extended discussion of the subject is impossi-
ble in a treatise of this character. In England the rule has
been laid down ^ that, in measuring the compensation, which
an injured person ought to receive, in an action founded upon
the negligence of a municipal corporation, the jury should con-
sider, firsU the pecuniary loss he sustains by the accident, and
secondly, the injury he sustains in his person, or his physical
capacity for enjoying life. In considering the pecuniary loss,
his partial or total incapacity to earn a future income is jast as
much an element as his present loss. If the plaintiff's health
be shattered or impaired, compensation therefor in damages
should undoubtedly be made.^
It has generally been held in America, that pain and suffer-
ing are not elements to be considered in actions to recover dam-
ages for the death of a person by the negligence of a municipal
corporation ; and the doctrine of exemplary damages in this
connection meets with very little recognition or favor.* No
fixed rule can be laid down that will be of very much assist-
& Seaboard Co. v. Folson, 139 TJ. S.
551; MuUer v. District, 5 Mackey,
286 ; Washington & G. Ky. Co. v. Glad-
mon, 15 Wall. 401.
'Rowley v. London etc. Co., L. R.
8 Ex. 221; Gee v. Lancashire etc. Co.,
6 H. & N. 211.
2By Cockburn, C. J., in Fair v.
London & N. W. Ry. Co., 21 L. T. N'.
S. 327.
8 Terre Haute R. R. Co. v. Buck, 96
Ind. 346 ; Indiana Car Co. v. Parker,
100 lb. 181; Curtis v. Rochester etc.
Co., 18 N. Y. 534; Sunney v. Holt,
15 lb. 880; Totten v. Penn. R. R. Co.,
11 lb. 564; Holyoke v. Grand Trunk
etc. Co., 48 N. H. 541; Spicer v. Chi-
cago etc. Co., 29 Wis. 580; Kendall
V. Albia, 73 Iowa, 241 : Weissenburg
V. Appleton, 26 lb. 56; Kennon v.
Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22; Scott Tp.. y.
Montgomery, 95 Pa. St. 444; Wjber
722
V. Creston, 75 Iowa, 16; 39 IST. W. R.
126; Elkhart v. Bitter, 66 Ind. 136
Malloy V. Bennett, 15 Fed. Rep. 371
Stafford v. Oscaloosa, 64 Iowa, 251
Canning v. Williamstown, 1 Cush
451; Gibliu v. Mclntire, 2 Utah, 384
Masters v. Warren, 27 Conn. 294
Sheehan v. Edgar, 58 N. T. 631; Oli
ver v. No. Pac. Ry. Co., 3 Ore. 84
Peoria B. Ass'n v. Loomis, 20 111. 235
Wade V. Leroy, 20 How. (U. S.) 34
Varnham v. Council Bluffs, 52 Iowa,
698.
* Raymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. 524;
Wilson V. Granby, 47 Conn. 59 ; Atchi-
son V. King, 9 Kan. 550; Chicago v.
Langlass, 52 111. 256; McGary v. La-
fayette, 12 Rob. (La.) 668; Wilson v.
Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 323; Decatur v.
Fisher, 53 111. 407; Louisville etc.
Co. V. Shanks, 94 Ind. 598.
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOE TORTS.
§352a
ance. The amount, which will be a reasonable compensation
in any given case, depends altogether upon the extent and na-
ture of the pl£»ntiff's injuries, considered in the light of the
collateral facts and circumstances of the particular case. The
reader is referred to the cases cited.^
'-Decatur v. Fisher, 53 111. 407;
Chicago V. Langlass, 52 lb. 256;
Whelan v. N. Y. etc. Co., 38 Fed.
Kep. 15; Eipon v. Bittel, 30 Wis. 614;
McKamara v. Clintonville, 62 lb.
207; Luck v. Eipon, 52 lb. 196; Page
V. Sumpter, 53 lb. 652; Abbott v.
ToUiver, 71 Wis. 64; Crete v. Childs,
11 Neb. 252; Dickson v. HoUister,
123 Pa. St. 421; 16 Atl. E. 484; Gal-
veston V. Barbour, 62 Tex. 172 ; Louis-
ville etc. Co. V. Snider, (Ind. 90) 20
N. W. K. 284; Fleming v. Shenan-
doah, 71 lovra, 456; Driess v. Fred-
erick, (Tex. 90) 11 S. W. E. 493; Col-
hns V. Council Bluffs, 82 Iowa, 324;
Lapleine v. Morgan etc. Co., 40 La.
An. 661 ; Nebraska City v. Campbell,
2 Black. 590; Louisville etc. Co. v.
Wood, 113 Ind. 544; Eead v. Belfast,
20 Me. 246; Tice v. Munn, 94 ST. Y.
621; Wilson v.- Wheeling, 19 W. Va.
324; Louisville etc. Co. v. Falvey, 104
Ind. 409; Lewis v. Atlas etc. Ins. Co.,
61 Mo. 534; Baltimore etc. Co. v.
Kemp, 61 Md. 74; ^tna L. I. Co. v.
Nexson, 84 Ind. 347; Chicago v. Ma-
jor, 18 111. 349; Schell v. Plumb, 55
N. Y. 592; Lehman v. Brooklyn, 29
Barb. 234; Sauter v. N. Y. Cent. etc.
Co., 66 N. Y. 50; Etherington v. P.
P. etc. E. E. Co., 88 N. Y. 641;
Scheffler v. Minn. etc. Ey. Co., 32
Minn. 518; Owen v. Brockschmidt,
54 Mo. 285 ; Chicago v. Martin, 49 111.
241; McKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis.
50; Chicago v. Kelly, 69 111. 475 ; Pros-
ser v. Ottumwa, 47 Iowa, 509 ; Ehrgott
V. ISTew York, 96 N. Y. 264; Ottawa
V. Seely, 65 111. 434; Hunt v. Boone-
ville, 65 Mo. 620; Barbour Co. v.
Horn, 48 Ala. 566; Eichmond v.
Courtney, 32 Gratt. 792; Parsons v.
Lindsay, 26 Kan. 426; Ccntreville v.
Woods, 57 Ind. 192; Elizabeth L. etc.
Co. V. Combs, 10 Bush. 382; Weeks
V. Shirley, 33 Me. 271; Shartle v.
Minneapolis, 17 Minn. 308; Verrill v.
Minot, 31 lb. 299; Masters v. Warren,
27 Conn. 293; Mason v. Ellsworth, 32
Me. 271 ; Eaymoud v. Lowell, 6 Cush.
524, 537; Brown v. Watson, 47 Me.
161; Atchison v. King, 9 Kan. 550;
State V. Hewett, 31 lb. 396, 400; Sto-
ver V. Bluehill, 51 lb. 439; Sandford
V. Augusta, 32 lb. 536; Chicago v.
Martin, 49 111. 241; Chidsey v. Can-
ton, 17 Conn. 475 ; McGary v. Lafay-
ette, 12 Eob. 668; Beeoher v. Derby
etc. Co. , 24 lb. 491 ; Decatur v. Fisher,
53 111. 407; Chicago v. Langlass, 52
lb. 256; Canning v. Williamstown, 1
Cush. 451; Wylie v. Wausin, 48 Wis.
506; Sheel v. Appleton, 49 lb. 125;
Harwood v. Lowell, 4 Cush. 310; Peru
V. French, 55 111. 318; Baily v. Fair-
field, Brayt. (Vt.) 126; Farrelly v.
Cincinnati, 2 Disney, 516; Weissen-
berg V. Appleton, 26 Wis. 56; John-
son V. Hud. E. E. Co., 6 Duer, 634;
Armsworth v. S. E. Ey. Co., 11 Jur.
758; Eowley v. London & N. W. Ey.
Co., L. E. 8 Ex. 221; Franklin v. S.
E. Ey. Co., 3 H. & N. 211; Soule v.
N". Y. & N. H. E. E. Co., 24 Conn.
575 ; Ducksworth v. Johnson, 4 H. &
N. 653; Safford v. Drew, 3 Duer, 627;
Blake v. Midland Ey. Co., 18 Q. B.
93; Lucas v. New York, 21 Barb.
245; Dalton v. S. E. Ey. Co., 4 C. B.
N. O. 296; Quin v. Moore, 15 N. Y.
432; Pym v. Gt. Northern Ey. Co.,
15 Up. Can. Q. B. 631; Penn. E. E.
Co. V. McCloskey, 23 Pa. St. 526;
Marley v. Gt. Western Ey. Co., 16
Up. Can. Q. B. 504; Secord v. Gt.
Western Ey. Co., 15 lb. 631.
723
§ 353
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
§ 353. Bridges. — The duty of repairing bridges was imposed
at common law upon the county, in which thej- were located ;
but while the duty was deemed an imperative qne, no civil ac-
tion could be maintained by one suffering injury on account of
its breach, unless the county possessed the franchise of taking
toll.i
In the United States, the common law obligation just men-
tioned is generally regulated by statute ; and the same distinc-
tion is made as to liability for injuries sustained through
negligence in the care of bridges between cities, towns and un-
incorporated villages on the one hand and townships and coun-
ties on the other, as in the cases of the repair and maintenance
of highways.^ When by statute or otherwise, a county is under
a legal duty to keep a bridge in repair, it will be required to em-
ploy ordinary care to that end. Such care will require the coun-
ty or municipal officials to exercise active diligence, in keeping
themselves informed as to its condition, and to take notice of the
natural tendency of the materials composing the bridge to de-
cay.^ When a statute requires a county to build and maintain
bridges of a certain class, it has been held that the county will
not be liable for injuries received from a defect in a bridge,
which is not of the class mentioned in the statute.* When a
township or county is charged with the statutory duty of caring
for bridges within its limits, and provided with the means for
performing this duty, it is held in some States to be liable for
negligence.^
' Purdeman v. St. Charles, 19 G.
W. K. 733; Heegel v. Wichita, 19 lb.
562; Askew v. Hale Co., 54 Ala. 639;
Hallenbeck v. Winnebago Co., 95
HI. 148; Abbett v. Johnson Co., 114
Ind. 61; White v. Chowan Co., 90 N.
C. 437.
2 See §§324, 325.
sRaples v. Moore, 68 Pa. St. 404;
Spaulding v. Sherman, 34 N. W. 558;
O'Neill V. Deerfleld, 86 Mich. 610;
Abernethy v. Van Buren, 52 Mich.
353; Board v. Legg, 110 Ind. 479;
Fort Wayne v. Combs, 107 lb. 75.
^ Granger v. Pulaski Co., 26 Ark. 37.
Howard v. Pritchett, 85 Ind. 68;
724
Hou«e V. Montgomery Co., 60 Ind.
580; Abbett v. Johnson Co., 114 lb.
61 ; Knox Co. v. Montgomery, 109 lb.
69 ; Moreland v. Mitchell Co. , 40 Iowa,
394; Long v. Boone Co., 33 lb. 181;
Taylor v. Davis Co., 40 lb. 295; Ke-
gina V. Inhabitants, 14 Eng. L. & E.
116.
5 Arnold v. Henry Co., 81 Ga. 730;
Yeager v. Tippecanoe, 81 Ind. 46;
McCalla v. Multnomah Co., 3 Oreg.
424; Stebbins v. Keene, 55 Mich. 552;
Zimmerman v. Conemaugh Tp., 2
Cent. Rep. 361; 5 Atl.Rep. 45; Moore
V. Kenockee Tp., (Mich.) 42 N. W,
R. 944.
OH. XVII. J
LIABILITY FOK TOKTS.
§ 353
In respect to the liability of municipal corporations for the
care of bridges, it need only be said that bridges are highways,
and the municipal corporation is called upon to exercise the
same degree of care over bridges under its control, and upon
which corporate funds may be expended, as it is over streets.
That is to say, it is the duty of the municipality to keep
bridges reasonably safe for ordinary travel.^ But no munici-
pal corporation will be answerable in damages to a person, who
is injured by a defect in a bridge which is not under its con-
trol as a public bridge ; as, for example, a bridge within the
city limits, but erected and controlled by the county, township
or State in which the city is located. ^ If, however, the bridge,
though owned by the county, in severalty or jointly with the
city,3 forms a part of the general system of public highways, it
becomes the duty of the corporation to keep it safe for public use ;
and the city will be liable to a person injured by any negligence
in that respect.* This liability is founded on the principle,
that a municipal corporation may by adoption so far make a
private bridge its own, as to be estopped from denying its lia-
bility for a failure to keep it in a safe and convenient condi-
tion for travel.^ And when two municipal corporations or
counties are jointly bound to repair a bridge, and damages
have been recovered against either for a neglect to do so, con-
tribution may be enforced against the other.^
1 Boston V. Crowley, 38 Fed. 202;
Zimmerman v. Conemaugh, 2 Cent.
E. 361; Jordan v. Hannibal, 87 Mo.
673; Board v. Deprez, 87 Ind. 509;
Moreland v. Mitchell, 40 Iowa, 394;
McDonald v. Corporation etc., 29 Up.
Can. C. P. 249; Dale v. Webster Co.,
(Iowa) 41 N. W. Kep. 1; Hyatt v.
Eondout, 44 Barb. 385; Medina v.
Perkins, 48 Micb. 67; Tift v. Towns,
53 Ga. 47; Joliet v. Verley, 35 111.
58; Lowery v. Delpbi, 55 Ind. 250.
2 Board v. Washington, (Ind.) 23
N. E. Eep. 257; Indianapolis v. Mc-
Clure, 2 Ind. 147; Titler v. Iowa Co.,
48 Iowa, 90; Carpenter v. Cohoes,
81 N. Y. 21; Brusso v. Buffalo, 90
K. T. 679; Veeder v. Little Falls,
100 lb. 343; Hord v. Village, 26 111.
Ap. 41 ; Sewall v. Cohoes, 75 N. Y.
45 ; Bishop v. Centralia, 49 Wis. 669.
8 Hawkhurst v. New York, 43 Hun,
588; Shawnee Co. v. Topeka, 39 Kan.
197; Goshen v. Myers, 119 Ind. 196.
4 Hyatt V. Eondout, 44 Barb. 385 ;
Schomer v. Eochester, 15 Abb. N. C.
57; Eudora v. Miller, 30 Kan. 494;
Bioard v. Deprez, 87 Ind. 508.
* Atlanta v. Buchanan, 76 Ga. 585 ;
State V. Demaree, 80 Ind. 519; State
V. Campton, 2 N. H. 513; Eudora v.
Miller, 30 Kan. 494; Watson v. Pro-
prietors, 14 Me. 201; Eex v. West
Eiding, 2 East, 342.
8 Armstrong Co. v. Clarion Co., 66
Pa. St. 218; comp. Village v. How-
land, 124 111. 547.
725
353
MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
A municipal corporation will also be liable in damages to
any one who is injured through its want of care and skill in
constructing a bridge ; as, for example, by an unnecessary ob-
struction of the current,^ or for injuries to the rights of riparian
owners.^
A bridge must be so constructed, that it shall possess suffi-
cient strength ^ to stand against freshets which, from the char-
acter of the stream, and from the knowledge the municipal
authorities have of its former history, may reasonably be ex-
pected to occur, although they may not be of frequent occur-
rence.* But it is not required to construct bridges which will
withstand the force of floods or storms of an extraordinary and
unexpected character,^ such as are considered to come within
the definition of the act of God or inevitable accident, for the
result of which there is no legal liability.^
When no particular mode is prescribed by statute, in which
the bridge should be constructed, the implication is that it shall
be constructed in the usual manner; the municipality using due
care and a just discretion.'^ And it has been held in Missouri
that the rule, that a city acts judicially in selecting a plan for
1 Scott V. Chicago, 1 Biss. 510;
Thompson v. Inhabitants, 5 Gray, 110.
2 Perry v. Worcester, 6 Gray, 544 ;
Spencer v. Hartford etc. Co., 10 K.I.
14.
3 Richardson v. Koyalton & W. T.
Co., 6 Vt. 496.
* Koenig v. Arcadia, (Wis. 91) 43 N.
W. 734; Blythe v. Birmingham, 11
Exch. 781; Allen v. Chippewa Falls,
52 Wis. 530; Smith v. Margrave, 2
App. Cases, 781; 43 L. J. Ex. 70;
Evans ville v. Decker, 84 Ind. 325, 328 ;
Louisville etc. Co. v. Thompson, 107
lb. 442; Koss v. Madison, 1 Ind. 281.
^ Dorman v. Ames, 12 Minn. 451 ;
Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. Gilleland, 56
Pa. St. 445 ; Gray v. Harris, 107 Mass.
492 ; Livezey v. Philadelphia, 64 Pa.
St. 106; Kansas etc. Co. v. Miller, 2
Col. 442; Ellet v. St. Louis etc. Co.,
76 Mo. 518; Morris Canal Co. v. Eyer-
son, 27 N. J. L. 457; Nashville etc.
726
Co. V. David, 6 Heisk. 261; Campbell
V. Bear River Co., 35 Cal. 679; Rich-
ardson V. Kier, 34 lb. 64; Lehigh
Bridge Co. v. Lehigh, 4 Rawle, 24;
Bellv. McClintock,9Watts, 119; Fos-
ter V. Juniata B. Co., 4 Har. (Pa.) 393 ;
China v. South wick, 12 Me. 238; Chi-
cago, etc. Co. v. Sawyer, 69 111. 285;
Lapham v. Curtis, 5 Vt. 371 ; Oakham
V. Holbrook, 11 Cush. 299; Gillespie
etc. Co. V. St. Louis etc., 6 Mo. App.
554; Shrewsbury v. Smith, 12 Cush.
177; International etc. Co. v. Hallo-
ran, 53 Tex. 46; Withers v. North
Kent, 3 H. & N. 969 ; Wendell v. Pratt,
12 Allen, 464.
« Evans v. North Side etc. Co., 26
Fed. Rep. 718; The Modoc, 26 lb.
718; Clarke v. Birmingham etc. Co.,
41 Pa. St. 147.
' Wabash v. Pearson, 22 N. E. K.
134; Ferguson v. Davis Co., 57 Iowa,
601.
CH. xvn.]
LIABILITY FOR TORTS.
§353
public improvements, is not applicable to bridges.^ If the stat-
ute, which authorizes the municipality to construct the edifice,
at the same time expressly points out the manner in which it
shaU be constructed, any material and substantial deviation
from the statute will make the city a wrongdoer, and create
"municipal liability to any one injured thereby.^
In the work of constructing a public bridge, the municipal
corporation is responsible for the same degree of care and must
employ the same or similar precautions, which are generally re-
quired, when other improvements are carried on under its con-
trol or supervision. Thus, the city will be liable for damages,
which result from a failure on its part to provide signals or
guards, to the persons or property of those using the stream,
across which the bridge is placed, or the highway, of which it
is to form a part.*
The obligation of a city, to keep a bridge in a reasonably safe
condition for ordinary public travel,* does not involve a liability,
where injury is caused by the plaintiff's wagon being overload-
ed, or loaded in an unsafe manner.^ But if a bridge is origi-
nally built to support a specific weight, the municipality will
be liable if it be subsequently weakened in that respect by
changes in the structure, or by repairs.^ And, likewise, upon
the principle, that a municipal corporation is not bound to pro-
vide against extraordinary accidents, it has been held that a city
is under no obligation to provide a railing to protect passengers,
upon the footway of a bridge, from injury by runaway horses.'^
The doctrine, that notice of a defect, obstacle or lack of repair
must be brought home to the municipal corporation, before it
can be held liable for negligence in respect to it, is applicable
to the same extent, and its application is controlled by the same
1 Jordan v. Hannibal, 87 Mo. 673.
2 Ward V. Great West etc. Co.,
(Prov. Ort.) 13 Q. B. 315; Eeg. v.
Great West. etc. Co., (Prov. Ont.)
12 Q. B. 25q; Attorney General v.
Bridge Co., 20 Grant (U. C.) 34;
Attorney General v. Mid. Kent etc.,
L. E. 3 Ch. 100.
' Dolierty v. Braintree, 20 N. E. E.
106: 148 Mass. 495; The Modoc, 26
Fed. Eep. 718; Mullen v. Eutland,
55 Vt. 77.
4 Wabash v. Carver, 129 Ind. 552;
Gregory v.' Adams, 14 Gray, 242.
5 Board v. Chipps, (Ind. 92) 29 N.
E. E. 1092; McCormick v. Washing-
ton Tp., 112 Pa. St. 185.
6 O'Neill V. Deerfield, 49 N. W. E.
590; 86 Mich. 610; Board of Com'rs
V. Brod., 29 N. E. E. 430; Stebbins v.
Keene, 60 Mich. 214.
' Lehigh v. HofCart, 116 Pa. St. 119.
727
§354
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XYII.
rules, as in the case of streets and highways.^ Notice is essen-
tial, only when the defect occurs subsequently to, the erection
of the bridge. For, if there has been negligence in its con-
struction, a liability as a wrongdoer, it is held, has become fixed
upon the corporation, for which it must answer in damages to
any one injured afterwai'ds.^ When the municipal liability is
statutory, the injured individual is required to bring his case
within the statute. Thus, where the existence of a liability
was dependent upon a failure to repair, it was held that there
could be no recovery for an injury which was caused by being
caught in the draw, although plaintiff was using the bridge
upon the assuiance of its keeper, that it was safe for him to do
so.^ And the same rule of non-liability has been invoked in the
case of accidents, caused by runaway horses.* The general rule,
exempting the defendant from liability for negligence when the
plaintiff's negligence proximately contributed to his own injury,
is applied in the present connection.^
§ 354. Watercourses "A water course is a stream of
water, ordinarily flowing in a defined channel, having beds and
banks, and flowing into some stream or other body of water;""
and for an unauthorized or illegal obstruction of such a water
1 Bullock V. Durham, 19 N. T. S.
635; Board v. Sisson, 2 Ind. App.
311; Board v. Dombke, 94 Ind. 72;
Ford V. Umatilla Co., (Oregon) 16
Pac. Eep. 33; Board v. Bacon, 96
Ind. 31.
2 Board v. Dombke, supra ; see
§§ 338, 338 a, on Negligence of Mun.
Servants; § 351. Proximate cause.
Board v. Pearson, 120 Ind. 426; Har-
ris V. Board, (Ind.) 23 N. E. Eep. 92;
Board v. Bacon, 96 Ind. 31.
3]Srouell V. Wright, 3 Allen, 166;
Butterfield v. Boston, (Mass.) 20 N.
E.Eep. 113; McDougall v. Salem, 110
Mass. 21; French v. Boston, 129 Mass.
592.
* Fulton Co, V. Eickel, 106 Ind. 501 ;
Acker v. Anderson, 20 S. C. 495.
6 Taylor v. Constable, 13 N. Y. 597;
Vance v. Franklin, 30 N. E. E. 149;
Gulf etc. Co. V. Gascamp, 7S. W. Eep.
227; Dale v. "Webster Co., 41 N. W.
728
Eep. 1; Monongahela B. Co. v. Be-
vard, 11 Atl. Eep. 575; Morrison v.
Board, 116 Ind. 431; Fisher v. Cam-
bridge, 133 N. T. 527.
6 Eobinson v. Shanks, 20 N. E. E.
713; 118 Ind. 125; Geddis v. Parrish,
(Wash. 91) 21 Pac. E. 314; Palmer v.
Waddell, 22 Kan. 352; Gibbs v. Wil-
liams, 25 lb. 214; Chicago etc. Co. v.
Morrow, 22 Pac. E. 214; Simmons v.
Winters, (Or. 91) 26 Pac. E. 7; Macom-
ber V. Godfrey, 108 Mass. 219; Ell-
iott Eoads and Streets, p. 361; Chi-
cago etc. Co. V. Morrow, (Kan.) 22
Pac. E. 413 ; Luther v. Winnisimmet
Co.,9Cush. 171; Gibbs v. Williams,
25 Kan. 214; Palmer v. Waddell, 23
Kan. 852; Stanchfield v. Newton, 142
Mass. 110; Howard v. Ingersoll, 13
How. (U. S.) 427; Jeffers v. Jeffers,
107 N. Y. 650; Eicev. Evansville, 108
Ind. 7; Weis v. Madison, 75 Ind. 253;
Fryer v. Warne, 29 Wis. 511.
CH. xvn.]
LIABILITY FOR TORTS.
§354
course, damages may be recovered by any one who has sustained
actual injury.i But not every channel, or strip of land, through
or over which water flows or makes its way, is a water course ; ^
and the uniform and well recognized distinction, between sur-
face water and a natural water course, flowing through a regu-
lar and permanent channel, becomes very important, when it is
considered that the powers of a municipal corporation are very
much more extensive in regard to the control and disposition
of the former, than of the latter.^ A municipality cannot
merely by virtue of its power to grade streets, or to construct
a system of drainage, lawfully cause injury to the property of
riparian owners by obstructing or unnecessarily diverting the
flow of a stream of water, which is properly denominated a water
course, whether this be done by badly constructed culverts, or
otherwise.* The comprehensive rights which are possessed by
riparian owners in the stream, and the use which they are able
to make of it, cons.titute private property, for the taking or dam-
1 Schnltzins v. Bailey, 22 Atl. R. (48
N. J. E.) 409; Sherwood v. Judge, 41
?r. W. 234 ; 40 Minn. 22. In Bellinger
V. Railroad, 23 N. Y., the covirt said:
"If one chooses of his own authority
to interfere with a water course even
upon his own land, he as a general rule,
does it at his peril, as respects other
riparian owners, above or below:
Eulrich V. Richter, 37 Wis. 226; Con-
hocton etc. Co. v. Buffalo etc. Co., 3
Hun, 523; Barnes v. Sabron, 10 Nev.
217; Earl v. De Hart, 1 Beasley Ch.
280.
2 Byrnes v. Minn. etc. Co., 38 Minn.
212; Bangor v. Lansil, 51 Me. 521;
Hawley v. Sheldon, (Vt. 91) 24 Atl.
R. 717; Parks v. Newburyport, 10
Gray, 28; 39 N. W. R. 390; Hoyt v.
Hudson, 27 Wis. 656; Moore v. Chi-
cago etc. Co., 75 Iowa, 263; Robinson
V. Shanks, 118 Ind. 125; West v. Tay-
lor, 16 Ore. 165.
'Hoehl V. Muscatine, 57 Iowa, 444;
Vanpelt v. Davenport, 42 lb. 308;
Rose V. St. Charles, 49 Mo. 509; Hoyt
V. Hudson, 27 Wis. 656; Imler v.
Springfield, 55 Mo. 119, 127; Barns v.
Hannibal, 71 lb. 449; Vanderweile v.
Taylor, 65 N. Y. 341; Goodale v.
Tuttle, 29 lb. 459 ; Kellogg v. Thomp-
son, 66 lb. 88; Gould v. Booth, 66 lb.
62, 65; Wood v. Ward, 3 Exch. 748;
Helena v. Thompson, 29 Ark. 569,
574; Little Rock V. Willis, 27 lb. 572;
Briscoe v. Drought, 11 Ir. C. L. R. 250.
* Butler T. Edgewater, 6 N. Y. S.
174; Schenectady V. Furman, 15 N.
Y. S. 724; 61 Hun, 171 ; East St. Louis
etc. Ry. Co. v. Eisentrant, 24 N. E. R.
760; Sherwood V. Judge, 40 Minn. 22;
Stanchfleld v. N^ton, 142 Mass. 110;
Morse v. Worcester, 139 lb. 389; Bar-
row v. Baltimore, 2 Am. Jur. 203;Pye
V. Mankato, 36 Minn. 373 ; Stetson v.
Faxon, 19 Pick. 147, 158; Kemper v.
Louisville, 14 Bush, 87; Thayer v.
Boston, 19 Pick. 510; Crawfordsville
V. Bond, 96 Ind. 236 ; Indianapolis v.
Lawyer, 38 Ind. 348; Rice v. Evans-
ville, 108 lb. 7; Gardner v. Newburgh,
2 Johns, 162; Phinizy v. Augusta, 47
Ga. 260;. Kellogg v. Thompson, 66 N.
Y. 88.
729
§354
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. xvn.
aging of which compensation must be made.^ The municipality
has no right, either to take the water itself for public use,^ or
to divert the stream to the material injury of the riparian pro-
prietor, without making compensation for the actual damages
thus caused.^ In either case, the act is an exercise of the right
of eminent domain.
Where the embankment, dam or other obstruction to the nat-
ural flow of the stream, which was ordered or authorized by the
municipal authorities, did not ordinarily retard or divert the
flow of the stream to the injury of the riparian owners ; but
such injury was experienced only with the occurrence of extra-
ordinary freshets, which could not be reasonably anticipated,
and was occasioned by the insufficient capacity of the culverts,
the city is not liable for such injuries. It is a case of damnum
absque injuria.^
In all cases, where lands are submerged, the true measure of
1 Miller v. Windham, 23 Atl. R.
1132; 30 W. N. C. 85; Ames v. Dorset,
23 Atl. R. 857; Kay v. Kerk, 24 Atl.
R. 326; WabasL etc. Co. v. Spears, 16
Ind. 441 ; Evansville, etc. Co. v. Dick,
9 lb. 433 ; Harding v. Stanford W. Co.,
41 Conn. 87; Lee v. Pembroke etc.
Co., 57 Me. 481; Proprietors etc. v.
Nash. & Low. R. R. Co., lOCush. 388;
Ten Eyck v. Canal Co., 18 N. .r. L.
200; March v. Portsmouth etc. Co.,
19 N. H. 372; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10
Wall. 497; Rome v. Addison, 34 N.
H. 306 ; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige, 143 ;
.Johnson v. Atlantic etc. Co. , 35 N. H.
569; Smith v. Rocliester, 92 N. Y.
463; Bongliton v. Carter, 18 Johns.
405 ; Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis.
223; Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130;
Baltimore etc. Co. v. Magender, 34
Md. 79.
2 Bass v. Ft. Wayne, 28 N. E. R. 249;
Woodrufe v. Neal, 28 Conn. 167; Suf-
field v. Hathaway, 15 Johns. 447.
8 Culver V. Garbe, 43 N. W. R. 237;
hi re Tracy, 16 N. Y. S. 606; 62 Hun,
619; In re L-win, 16 N. Y. S. 606; 62
Hun, 619; Para Rub. Shoe Co. v. Bos-
ton, 139 Mass. 155 ; Haynes v.' Bur-
730
lington, 38 Vt. 350; CoUins v. Phila-
delphia, 93 Pa. St. 272; Groton v.
Haines, 36 N. H. 388; Philada. v.
Randolph, 4W. & S. Pa. 514; Gilman
V. Laconia, 55 N. H. 130; Dayton v.
Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80; Aurora v. Love,
93 m. 521 ; Ross v. Madison, 1 Ind.
281; Stack V. East St. Louis, 85 111.
377; Powers v. Council, 50 Iowa, 197;
Mootry v. Danbury, 45 Conn. 550;
Kobs V. Minneapolis, 22 Minn. 159,
164; Parker V. Lowell, 11 Gray, 358;
Smith V. New York, 66 N. Y. 295;
Perry v. Worcester, 6 Gray, 544;
Lawrence v. Fair Haven, 5 lb. 110;
Talbot V. Whipple, 7 lb. 122; Sprague
v. Worcester, 13 lb. 193; Seifert v.
Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 136; Rochester
W. L. Co. V. Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463;
Mills V. Brooklyn, 32 lb. 489; see
cases cited in last note.
* Velte V. U. S., 45 N. W. R. 119;
Miller v. Manstow, 20 Atl. 6; Johns-
ton v.District, 118 U. S. 19 ; New York
V. Bailey, 2 Denio, 433 ; Cumberland
V. Willison, 50 Ind. 138; Madison v.
Ross, 3 lb. 236; Lynch v. New York,
76 lb. 60; Smith v. New York, 66
lb. 295.
CH. xvn.J
LIABILITY FOE TOETS.
§ 354a
damages is the fair rental value of the ground, and not the pos-
sible or probable profits, which might have been made, if the
land had not been overflowed.^
§ 354 a. Surface water. — An important distinction is made
in the law of real property between water courses, which flow
in fixed or definite channels, and the percolations of the subsoil
and surface water. In the latter cases, there is no property in
the water, except when it has been collected in a well, or some
other convenient receptacle.^ This is true of both percolations
aud surface water. There is here no conflict of authority, ex-
,cept in respect to the question of liability of the proprietor of the
lower land who, by means of dams or other effective obstructions,
keeps on the surface water from flowing on his own land from the
higher laud of his neighbor, whereby the higher land becomes
.fiooded to the damage of its owner. According to one set of
cases, the proprietor of the low land has the right to employ
all the available means, in order to prevent surface drainage
upon his own land, even though it results in damage to his
neighbor of the higher land.^ And while this is without doubt
a sound rule in the case of urban servitudes, — on account of the
fact that municipal governments usually provide for a proper
disposition of the surface water by public drains, and there is,
therefore, no need of imposing such a burden upon the pro-
prietor of adjoining low lands, — the better opinion is, at least
in respect to drainage of surface water on farms and woodlands,
1 Omaha & E. V. E. Co. v. Brown,
46 N. W. E. 39; Velte v. U. S., 45
lb. 119; Montgomery v. Locke, 11
Pack. 874; Mize v. Glenn, 38 Mo. App.
98; Anderson v. Boone Co., 61 Mich.
489; Boston v. Middlesex, etc., Co.,
1 Allen, 324; Chicago v. Huenesbein,
85 111. 594; Watterson v. Allegheny,
etc., Co., 74 Ta. St. 208; Loughran
v.Des Moines, 72 Iowa, 772; DuUea v.
Taylor, 35 Up. Can. Q. B. 395; Sey-
mour v. Cummins, 119 Ind. 148; Minn.
Vail. Co. V. Doran, 17 Minn. 188;
Minn. Cent. Co. v. McNamara, 13 lb.
508; Brown V. Pro v. E. E. Co., 5 Gray,
35; Shaw v. Charlestown, 2 lb. 107.
'^ Tiedeman Eeal Prop. §§ 614, 615.
^ Tiedeman, Eeal Prop. § 615 ; Green
V. Taylor, 79 Tex. 604; Burke v.
Miss. E. Ey. Co., 29 Mo. App. 370;
Illinois Cent. E. Co. v. Miller, 10 So.
E. 61; 68 Miss. 760; Johnson v. Chi.,
St. P., M.&Q. Ey.Co., 50,N.W.771;
80 Wis. 641 ; Schneider v. Miss. Pac.
Ey. Co., 29 Mo. App. 68; Goodale v.
Tuttle, 29 N. Y. 459; Swett v. Cutts,
50 N. H. 439; Greeley v. Maine Cent. '
E. E. Co., 53 Me. 200; Parks v. New-
buryport, 16 Gray, 29; Gannon v.
Hagadon, 10 Allen, 106; Wilson ^.
Duncan, 38 K. W. 371; Eowlsby v.
Speer, 31 N. J. L. 351; Ogburn ,-.
Connor, 46 Cal. 346; Hoyt v. Hudson,
27 Wis. 650; contra, if it does injury;
Gerrish v. Clough, 48 N. H. 9.
731
354a
MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS.
[CH. xvir.
that the upper land has a natural right to natura,! drainage over
the lower land.^ In many of the States the proprietors of lands,
needing drainage, are authorized, by compulsory process, to se-
cure the right to cut drains through lands adjoining, upon pay-
ment of damages therefor.^ When the authority is vested in
the municipal corporation, by charter or statute, to improve
streets and establish street grades, and, in the exercise of that
power, changes are made in the surface of the city's highways,
by which surface water is caused to collect on, or flow over, the
adjacent land of private owners, there is no implied liability on
the part of the municipal corporation for such indirect and con-
sequential injuries, provided the city does not exceed its lawful
power.^
So, also, it has been held that, ordinarily, there is no obliga-
tion upon the city to provide drainage for the surface water
upon its unimproved or unguarded streets ; * and when a city
has begun the process of grading, it is under no implied liability
to keep open former existing drains,^ or to construct new drains
in their place, in order to prevent the surface water from over-
flowing land which may be situated below the level of the high-
1 Jenkinsv. Wilm. & W. K. Co., 110
K. C. 438; Statoo v. Norfolk & C. K.
Co., 19 S. E. R. 933; 109 N. C. 337;
Mexill V. Morgan, (Pa. 92) 24 Atl.
216; Schneider v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co.,
29 Mo. App. 681 ; Farrls v. Dudley,
78 Ala. 124; Burke v. Mo. Pac. R. R.
Co., 29 Mo. App. 370; Boyd v. Conk-
lin, 64 Mich. 583; C. & A. R. R. Co.
V. Smith, 17 111. App. 58; Abbott v.
K. C, etc., R. R. Co., 83 Mo. 271;
Ribordy v. Pellachond, 28 111. App.
303.
2 Stimpson's Statutes, § 2253.
3 Glass V. Fritz, 23 Atl. R. 1050;
Gouldeu V. Scrauton, (Pa. 88) 15 lb.
R. 483; Alden v. Minneapolis, 24
Minn. 243 ; Wakefield v. Pawtucket,
12 R. I. 75; Lee v. Minneapolis, 24
Minn. 13; Inman v. Tripp, 11 R. I.
520; O'Brien v. St. Paul, 25 Minn.
331; Bloomington v. Brokaw, 77 111.
194; Davis V. Crawfordsville, 119 Ind.
1 ; Cairo, etc., Co. v. Stevens, 73 lb.
732
278; "Weis v. Madison, 75 lb. 241;
Clark V. Wilmington, 5 Harring. 243;
Stanohfield V. Newton, 142 Mass. 110;
Magarity v. Wilmington, 5 Hous.
530; Foster v. St. Louis, 71 Mo. 157;
Gilfeather v. Council Bluffs, 69
Iowa, 310; Field v. West Orange, 36
N. J. Eq. 118; Morris v. Council
Bluffs, 67 Iowa, 343; Lynch v. New
York, 76 N. T. 00; Hoard v. Des
Moines, 62 Iowa, 326; Wilson v. New
York, 1 Denio, 595, 598; Hoyt v.
Hudson, 27 111. 656; Smith v. Mil-
waukee, 18 Wis. 63 ; Nevins V. Peo-
ria, 41 111. 503.
* Crower v. Ewers, 39 111. App. 34;
Mclnerney v. St. Joseph, 45 Mo. 291;
Lynch v. New York, 76 N. Y. 60.
6 Bush V. Portland, (Or. 90) 23 Pac.
R. 667; Wilson v. New York, 1 De-
nio, 595; Imler v. Springfield, 55
Mo. 119; St. Louis v. Gurno, 12 lb.
414.
CH. xvn.]
LIABILITY FOE TORTS.
355
way.^ Upon this point, the decisions are far from harmonious,
many cases holding that the city, when practicable, should pro-
vide drains and culverts.^ Many cases go further, and deny any
implied liability, where, in making local improvements, which
are legally authorized, surface water is made or permitted to
flow from the street directly upon the adjoining property.*
§355. Drains and sewers In the preceding section *
the liability of the municipality was explained and stated,
in cases where, through grading and other improvements in
the roadbed of the streets, the surface water was inadvertently
made to flow upon the adjoining land. In the present section
will be discussed the liability of the city, where such an over-
flow of surface water upon abutting private property was oc-
casioned by the city's construction of artificial means for the
removal of surface water, such as drains and sewers. Wheth-
er the power to construct sewers, aside from the question of
grading, shall be exercised or not in any particular case, is for
the corporation, and not for the courts, to decide. Hence, —
except, perhaps, in a case where tlie necessity for a sewer arises
1 Mills V. Brooklyn, 32 IST. Y. 489;
Gould V. Booth, 66 lb. 65 ; Wilson v.
New York, 1 Denio, 595.
2 Eufaula v. Simmons, 86 Ala. 515 ;
Patoka V. Hopkins, (Ind. 92) 30 N. E.
E.896; Ryclilicke v. St. Louis, 98 Mo.
497; Butler v. Edgewater, 6 N. Y. S.
174; Allen v. Chippewa Falls, 52 Wis.
430; Templin v. Iowa City, 14 Iowa,
59; Waters v. Bay View, 61 Wis. 642;
Heth V. Fond du Lac, 63 lb. 228;
Mears v. Wilmington, 9 Ired. L. 73,
82; Kehrer v. Richmond, 81 Va. 745;
Bloomington v. Brokaw, 77 111. 194;
Aurora v. Reed, 57111. 29; Moran v.
McLeans, 63 Barb. 185; Stewart v.
Clinton, 79 Mo. 603; Smith v. New
York, 66 N. Y. 295; Baxter v. Provi-
dence, 12 R. I. 310; Fair v. Philadel-
phia, 88 Pa. St. 309; Henderson v.
Minneapolis, 32 Minn. 219; Spring-
field V. Spence, 40 Ohio St. 665.
' Dickinson v. Worcester, 7 Allen,
18; Lambar v. St. Louis, 15 Mo. 610;
Flagg V. Worcester, 13 Gray, 601;
Adams v. Walker, 34 Conn. 466; Ken-
sington Com'rs V. Wood, 10 Pa. St.
93; Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis.
223; Ellis v. Iowa City, 29 Iowa, 229;
Bloomington v. Brokaw, 77 111. 194;
Nevins v. Peoria, 41 lb. 502; Stack
V. East St. Louis, 85 lb. 377; Aurora
V. Gillett, 56 lb. 132; Young v. Lee-
dom, 67 Pa. St. 351; Turner v. Dart-
mouth, 13 Allen, 291; Mootry v.
Danbury, 45 Conn. 550; Franklin v.
Fisk, 13 Allen, 211; O'Brien v. St.
Paul, 25 Minn. 331 ; Greeley v. Maine
Cent. R. R. Co., 53 Mo. 200; Alton
V. Hope, 68 111. 167; Gannon v. Hag-
adom, 10 Allen, 106; Hoyt v. Hud-
son, 27 Wis. 656; Pennoyer v. Sagi-
naw, 8 Mich. 534; Barry v. Lowell, 8
Allen, 127; Brine v. Gt. West. Ry.,
110 Eng. Com. L. 402; Parks v. New-
buryport, 10 Gray, 28; Bangor v.
Lansil, 51 Me. 521.
* § 354 a.
783
355
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
out of the negligent acts of the corporation,^ — the city is not
liable to a. civil action for a total failure to provide any system
of sewerage,^ or for a defective or insufficient system of sewer-
age, which is adopted by it in good faith, provided due care was
used in the selection of the plan, and the advice of those having
experience and skill vv^as employed ; * certainly, where the er-
ror or want of judgment is not so gross, as to support the charge
that, if the city's engineers had been possessed of the average
skill of sanitary engineers of the present day, they would not
have committed the error. So, likewise, when a city has de-
vised and constructed a system of sewerage which is sufficient
for all purposes at the time, it will not be liable when, by in-
crease of population and the consequent extension of graded
territory, the sj'stem has become inadequate and injurious.*
But these rules are qualified by the principle, which is held
in some of the cases, that a municipality has no right, by a de-
fective system of sewerage, to create a nuisance on or near pri-
vate property. Some courts have gone very far in this direction
and have held that if the sewer, however planned in good faith
and with ordinarj"- care, resulted in creating a nuisance, or caus-
ed a positive and clear invasion of private property by collect-
ing water or sewage upon or near it, in such a way a-s to impair
1 Aurora v. liOve, 93 111. 521 ; Byrnes
V. Cohoes, ei N. Y. 204; Ellis v. Iowa
City, 29 Iowa, 229.
2 Frostburg v. Hitchins, (Ind. 89)
16 Atl. R. 380; Elkhart v. Weckwire,
(Ind. 91) 22 N. B. E. 342; Collins v.
Philadelphia, 93 Pa. St. 272; Mills v.
Brooklyn, 32 N". Y. 489; "Wright v.
Wilmington, 52 N. C. 156; Wilson v.
New York, 1 Denio, 595; Rozell v.
Anderson, 91 Ind. 591 ; Cliild v. Bos-
ton, 4 Allen, 41, 52; McCarthy v.
Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 194; Montgomery
Council V. Gilmei', 33 Ala. 116 ; Judge
V. Meriden, 38 Conn. 90; Atchison v.
Challis, 9 "Kan.605 ; Dermont v. De-
troit, 4 Mich. 435 ; Barry v. Lowell,
8 Allen, 127; TJrquhart v. Ogdens-
burg, 91 N. Y. 67; Watson v. Kings-
ton, 114 N. Y. 88.
" Costello V. Conshohocken, 8 Pa.
734
Co. Ct. E. 639; Chaplin v. Wheatland,
126 111. 264; Drexel v. Lake, 127 111.
54; Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y.
136; Johnson v. District, 118 U. S.
19; Mills V. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489;
Merrifield v. Worcester, 110 Mass.
216 ; Smith v. Gould, 61 Wis. 31 ; Dan-
iels V. Denver, 2 Col. 669; Brewster
V. Davenport, 51 Iowa, 427; Horton
V. Nashville, 4 Lea, 47; Wicks v.
Dewitt, 54 Iowa, 130; Herring v.
District, 2 Mackey, 87; Savannah v.
Spears, 66 Ga. 304; cases in last note.
4 Steirsmyer v. St. Louis, 3 Mo.
App. 256 ; Carr v. Northern Liberties,
35 Pa. St. 324; Raulett v. Lowell, 126
Mass. 431; Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. St.
420; Bannagan v. District, 2 Mackey,
285; Fair v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. St.
309; Denver v. Capelli, 4 Col. 25.
CH. xvn.]
LIABILITY FOR TORTS.
§355
its enjoyment, the city will be liable for the damages occasion-
ed.' So where deposits of sewage caused a peculiar and special
injury to, and impaired the use of, a wharf, the city was held
liable in damages.^
Whatever difference of opinion may exist as to the liability
of the corporation, so far as the plan of sewerage itself is con-
cerned, there is a universal agreement that the city will be im-
pliedly liable for the negligent execution of the plan^ to one
injured,* and for the negligent discharge or omission to dis-
charge ministerial duties, in carrying on the work of construc-
tion,^ or in keeping municipal sewers, drains and culverts in a
1 Ashberry v. W. Seneca, 58 Hun,
602; Markle v. Berwick, 21 Atl. 794;
Seymour V. Cummins, 119 Ind. 148;
Young V. Kansas, 27 Mo. App. 101 ;
Whipple V. Fair Haven, (Am. 90) 21
Atl. 533 ; Columbus v. Woolen Mills,
33 Ind. 435; Ashley v. Port Huron,
35 Mich. 296; Jacksonville v. Lam-
bert, 62 111. 519; Seifert v. Brooklyn,
101 N. Y. 136; Haskell v. New Bed-
ford, 108 Mass. 208; Rowe v. Ports-
mouth, 56 N. H. 291 ; Taylor v. Aus-
tin, 32 Minn. 247; Lehr v. San Fran-
cisco, 66 Cal. 76.
^ Merrimac Eiv. Can. Prop. v. Low-
ell, 7 Gray, 223; Franklin Whf. Co.
V. Portland, 67 Me. 46; Emery v. Low-
ell, 104 Mass. 13 ; Richardson v. Bos-
ton, 19 How. 270; Haskell v. New
Bedford, 108 Mass. 208; Kranz v. Bal-
timore, 64 Md. 491 ; Brayton v. Fall
River, 113 Mass. 218; Barron v. Bal-
timore, 2 Am. Jour. 103; Morse v.
Worcester, 139 Mass. 389; Gillery v.
Madison, 53 Wis. 510.
^Frostburg v. Hutchins, (Md. 89)
16 Alt. E. 380; Gross v. Lampasas,
(Tex. 90) 11 S. W. 1086; Child v. Bos-
ton, 4 Allen, 41 ; Gilluly v. Madison,
63 Wis. 518; Ball v. Winchester, 34
N. H. 435; Gilman v. Laconia, 55
lb. 130; Reeves v. Toronto, 21 Up.
Can. Q. B. 160; Niras v. Troy, 59 N.
Y. 500; Stainton v. Metro. Board of
Works, 23 Beav. 225 ; Barton v. Syra-
cuse, 36 N. Y. 54; Cator v. Lenisham
r)ist.,5 B. & S. 115; Perdue v. Ching-
nacousy, 25 Up. Can. Q. B. 61 ; Darby
V. Crowland, 38 lb. 338; Farrell v.
London, 12 lb. 347; Coghlan v. Otta-
wa, 1 App. (Can.) R. 54.
* Indianapolis v. Huffer, 30 Ind. 235 ;
Rice V. Evansville, 107 lb. 7; Cum-
mins v. Seymour, 79 lb. 491; North
Vernon v. Voegeler, 103 lb. 314;
Evansville v. Decker, 84 lb. 825;
Weis V. Madison, 75 lb. 241; Craw-
fordsville v. Bond, 96 lb. 236; Terre
Haute V. Hudnut, 112 lb. 542.
5 Stoddard v. Saratoga, (N. Y. 91)
27 N. E. R. 1030; Young v. City, 27
Mo. App. 201 ; Seymour v. Cummins,
119 Ind. 148; Rochester W. Lead Co.
v. Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463; Thurston
V. St. Joseph, 51 Mo. 510; Barton v.
Syi-acuse, 36 N. Y. 54; Seifert v.
Brooklyn, 101 lb. 36; Lloyd v. New
York, 5 lb. 369; Nims v. Troy, 59
lb. 500; Mills v. Brooklyn, 32 lb. 489;
Smith V. New York, 66 lb. 295; Mc-
Carthy V. Syracuse, 46 lb. 194; La-
cour V. New York, 3 Duer, 406; Par-
sons V. Bethnal Green, 17 L. T. 211;
Parker v. Lowell, 11 Gray, 353; Hol-
liday v. St. Leonardo Par., 11 C. B.
192; Wilson v. New York, 1 Denio,
595; Grant v. Brooklyn, 41 Barb. 381;
Logansport v. Wright, 25 Ind. 512;
Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165; Mar-
tin v. Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 545; Mem-
735
§355
MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVII.
proper condition of repair, and free from obstructions. Since
the abutting owners have been assessed for the expense of its
construction, they have a right to use the sewer, and may re-
cover damages for the failure to keep the sewer in such a con-
dition of repair that it may be of use to them.^ If the city
permit a sewer to become obstructed, so that the water flows
back through the private drains connected with it, and into cel-
lars or basements, it will be liable for such negligence for creat-
ing a nuisance to others.^
The courts will also protect property owners against any acts
of wanton or malicious injury to their property, on the part of
municipal officials, in the construction or management of its
sewers.^ And it is a well settled rule in many of the States
that, if the municipality, in constructing drains and sewers,
collects the surface water of a large territory, which does not
naturally flow in the direction of the adjoining land, and will-
fully causes it to be precipitated upon the premises of an indi-
vidual, by which damage is done him, the city will undoubtedly
be liable.* So, also, a city was held liable for injury, caused by
phis V. Lasser, 9 Humph. "757; Melleu
V. West. R. R. Co., 4 Gray, .501 ; Munn
V. Pittsburgh, 40 Pa. St. 364; Child
V. Boston, 4 Allen, 41; Delmonico v.
New York, 1 Sandf. 222; Wheeler v.
Worcester, 10 Allen, 591; Mears v.
Wilmington, 9 Ired. L. To; Eastman
V. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; see cases
cited, § 349.
1 Buchanan v. Duluth, 40 Minn.
402; Frostburg v. Duffy, 70 Md. 47;
Buchanan v. Duluth, 42 N. W. R. 204;
Kranz v. Baltimore, 64 Md. 491;
Wendell v. Mayor, 4 Keyes, 261; Tay-
lor V. Austin, 32 Minn. 247; Master-
ton V. Mt. Vernon, 58 N. T. 391;
Stock V. Boston, 2 N. E. R. 871;
Semple v. Vicksburg, 62 Miss. 63.
2 Boston Belting Co. v. Boston,
149 Mass. 44; Elliott v. Oil City, 18
Atl. E. 553; Denver v. Capelli, 4 Col.
25 ; Smith v. New York, 66 N. Y. 295 ;
Thurston V. St. Joseph, 51 Mo. 510;
Hines v. Lookport, 50 X. Y. 236;
Seifert V. Brooklyn, 101 lb. 136; New
736
York V. Furze, 3 Uill, 612; Nims v.
Troy, 59 N. Y. 500.
' Whipple V. Fair Haven, 21 Atl.' E.
533; Mayor v. Randolph, 4 W. & S.
514; Reynolds v. Shreveport, 13 La.
An. 426; Rounds v. Mumford,2 R. I.
145.
* Young V. Com'rs, 25 N. E. R. 689;
Follman v. Mankato, 45 Minn. 457;
Torrey v. Scranton, (Pa. 90) 19 Atl.
R. 351 ; Bates v. Westborough, (Mass.
90) 23 N. E. R. 1070; Slack v. Law-
rence, (N. J. 90) 19 Atl. R. 663. In
Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296,
Mr. Chief Justice Cooley uses this
vigorous language : "It is very mani-
fest from this reference to the au-
thorities, that they recognize in mu-
nicipal corporations no exemption
from responsibility where the injury
an individual has received is a direct
injury accomplished by a corporate
act which is in the nature of a trespass
upon him. The right of an individual
to the occupation and enjoyment of
CH. XVII.]
LIABILITY FOR TOKTS.
§355
discharging a public sewer upon private laud, and into a mill
pond.i A city has no right to pour its sewage into an artificial
body of water owned by others.^ But it may connect its system
of drainage with any natural stream of water, such as a river or
brook provided it use due care, so that the privileges of the
his premises is exclusive, and the pub-
lic authorities have no m ore liberty to
trespass upon it than has a private
individual. If the corporation send
people with picks and spades to cut
a street through it without first ac-
quiring the right of way, it is liable
for a tort; but it is no more liable
under such circumstances than it is
when it pours upon his land a flood
of water by a public sewer, so con-
structed that the flood must be a
necessary result. Each is a trespass
and in each instance the city exceeds
its lawful authority. A municipal
charter never gives and never could
give authority to appropriate the
freehold of a citizen without compen-
sation, whether it be done through
an actual taking of it for streets or
buildings, or by flooding it so as to
interfere with the owner's posses-
sion." See, also, Nevins v. Peoria,
41 111. 502; Smith v. Tripp, 13 R. I.
152; Aurora V. Gillett, 56 111. 122;
Inman v. Tripp, 11 R. I. 520; Shaw-
neetown v. Mason, 82 111. 337 ; Elgin y.
Kimball, 90 111. 356; Bloomington v.
Urokan, 11 lb. 194; Lynch v. New
York, 76 K Y. 60; Noonan v. Albany,
79 lb. 470; Ellis v. Iowa City, 29 Iowa,
229; Brown V. Sarnia, 11 Up. Can. Q.
B. 87; Eowe v. Portsmouth, 56 N. H.
291 ; Eaton v. Boston C. & M. E. E., 51
lb. 504; Perdue v. Chinquaconsy, 25
Up. Can. Q. B. 61; Arimond v. Green-
bay & Miss. Can. Co., 31 Wis. 316;
Eowe V. Rochester, 29 Up. Can. Q. B.
590; Huddleston v. West Bellevlew,
111 Pa. St. 110; Pumpelly v. Green
Bay & Miss. Can. Co., 13 Wall. 166;
47
Attorney Genl. v. Hackney Local Bd.
L. E., 20 Eq. 626; Davis v. Crawiords-
ville, 119 Ind. 1; Byi-nes v. Cohoes,
67 N. Y. 204; Eychlicke v. St. Louis,
lis. W. E. 1001; Burton V. Chatta-
nooga, 7 Lea, 739 ; McClure v. Redwig,
28 Minn. 186; Attorney General v.
Leeds, L. R. 5 Ch: App. 583; Noble
V. St. Albans, 56 Vt. 522; Hitchins
V. Frostburg, 68 Md. 100; Rutherford
v. Halley, 105 N. Y. 632 ; West Orange
V. Field, 37 N. J. E. 600 ; Peters v.
Fergus Falls, 35 Minn. 549; Blakely
V. Devine, 36 lb. 53; Pye v. Man-
kato, 36 lb. 373; Manning v. Lowell,
130 Mass. 21; Herring v. District, 3
Mackey, 572; Arn v. Kansas City,
15 Fed. Rep. 336; Gillison v. Charles-
town, 16 W. Va. 282; Addy v. Janes-
ville, 70 Wis. 401 ; Pennoyer v. Sagi-
naw, 8 Mich. 534; Crabtree v. Baker,
75 Ala. 91; Flagg v. Worcester, 13
Gray, 601; Winn v. Rutland, 52 Vt.
481 ; Livingston v.McDonald, 21 Iowa,
160; Bastable v. Syracuse, 72 N. Y.
64; Bentz v. Armstrong, 8 Watts &
S. 40; Foot V. Bronson, 4 Lansing, 47;
O'Brien v. St. Paul, 25 Minn. 331;
Fremont v. Marley, 25 Neb. 138 ; Sulli-
van V. Phillips, 110 Ind. 320; Seifert
V. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 136, 143; Olson
V. St. Paul, 38 Minn. 419.
1 Bloomington v. Murnin, 36 HI.
App. 647; Beach v. Elmira, 58 Hun,
606; Bacon v. Boston, 28 N. E. R. 9;
Smith V. Atlanta, 75 Ga. 110; Vale
Mills V. Nashua, 63 N. H. 136; Reid
V. Atlanta, 73 Ga. 523.
2 Columbus V. Hydr. Woolen MiUs
Co., 33 Ind. 435.
737
§355
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. xvn.
riparian owners are not thereby impaired, or their property in-
jured.i
1 Waffle V. N. T. Cen. E. R. Co.,
58 Barb. 413; O'Brien v. St. Paul, 18
Minn. 176; Gould v. Booth, 66 N. T.
738
62, 65 ; Kol>s v. Minneapolis, 22 Minn.
159.
CHAPTER XVIII.
MANDAMUS AND QUO WAEKANTO.
Section.
359— Nature of mandamus and
wherein it differs fro.m in-
junction.
360 — Mandamus against municipal
corporations.
361 — Mandamus and quo warranto
distinguished.
362 — ^Distinction between discre-
tionary and mandatory
powers, as limiting the
right to mandamus.
363— "Who may apply for the writ.
364 — ^Prior judgment, when not
necessary.
365 — Practice— Effect of laches.
366 — Framing the writ and order
to show cause.
367 — Importance of a correct di-
rection and proper service
of the alternative writ.
368 — Return to the alternative writ.
369 — Peremptory writ, when al-
lowed— Means of enforcing
obedience.
370— Final judgment— Effect of
resignation or death of of-
ficials.
371 — Mandamus, as applicable to
municipal elections and to
elective officers.
372 — Mandamus, as applicable to
removal and suspension of
officials.
373 — Mandamus, as applicable to
custodians of public rec-
ords and of public funds.
Section.
374 — Mandamus against school
officers.
Slo—Mandamus in aid of the
rights of municipal credi-
tors.
376 — Mandamus to compel levy of
a special tax for specific
object.
377 — Mandamus, as applicable to
municipal improvements.
378 — Nature of quo warranto.
379 — By whom proceedings are in-
stituted.
380 — Practice and procedure —
Power discretionary.
381 — How far remedy by quo war-
ranto is superseded by spe-
cial statutory proceedings
for the control of contested
elections.
382 — User on part of usurper nec-
essary.
383— The burden of proof.
384 — Quo warranto proceedings
to secure the forfeiture of
a municipal charter.
385 — Quo warranto to test the legal
existence of municipal cor-
porations.
386 — Effect of judgment in quo
warranto.
387 — Effect of judgment, when not
rendered during official
term.
§ 359. Nature of mandamus and wherein it differs from
injunction. — An application for a writ of mandamus has for
its object the coercion of a corporation through its agents or
739
§359
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. xvin.
officers, a public board or official or ah inferior court, to perform
some lawful act or duty imposed upon him or it.
The original theory upon which the writ of mandamus was
issued was that its issuance was an exercise of the royal preroga-
tive, and a means by which the king through the judges of the
king's bench could effectuate that control and supervision which
he possessed over public bodies and officials, municipal and other
corporations included ; ^ but as the royal vigilance had usually
to be stimulated and invoked by the individual aggrieved, the
early theory of a spontaneous exercise of the roj'^al power gradu-
ally disappeared, until in America the remedy by mandamus has
become in practice a species of civil action at law.^
Its usefulness is limited in that it is applicable in most in-
stances to those only who have a public or corporate duty^
to perform ; and it cannot be used even then when, as is now fre-
quently the case, other and more appropriate remedies exist.*
Upon the theorj'-, that the arbitrary supervision and direction
lAtt. Gen. v. Boston, 123 Mass.
460; People v. Collins, 19 Wend. 65;
3 Blackstone Com. 110; Am. & Eng.
Enc. of Law, vol. 10, p. 92; Com. v.
Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. St. 510.
2 Kendall V. Stokes, 3 How. 100;
Porter v. State, 78 Tex. 591 ; State v.
Eddy, (Mont. 91) 25 Pac. K. 1032;
Wood V. Lenawee Arc. Judge, 84
Mich. 521 ; State v. Mayo, 8 So. E.
52; 42 La. An. 637; U. S. v. Hall, 7
Maokey, 14; Tennant v. Crocker,
(Mich. 91) 48 N. W. E. 577; State v.
Heege, 40 Mo. App. 650; Woffenden
V. Board, 1 Ariz. 237; 25 Pac. E. 647;
State V. Association, (La. 91) 9 So. E.
564; Brown v. Crego, 29 Iowa, 321;
Eosenbaum v. Bauer, 120 U. S. 461;
Davis V. Corbiu, 112 lb. 36; State v.
Williams, 69 Ala. 311; In re Fleming,
4 Hill, 581; McBane v. People, 50 111.
503; Com. v. Allegheny Co., 32 Pa.
St. 218; Chamberlain V. Warburton,
1 Utah, 267; State v. Kirkwood, 29
Md. 85 ; State v. Jennings, 56 Wis.
113; Kentucky v. Denison, 24 How.
66, 97, 98; Wilkinson v. Prov. Bk., 3
E. I. 22.
740
8 Trinity & S. Ey. Co. v. Lane, 79
Tex. 643; 16 S. W. E. 18; State v.
Engle, (Ind. 91) 26 N. E. E. 1077; Cope
V. State, 126 Ind. 51; State v. Eaine,
47 Ohio St. 447; 25 N. E. E. 54; Board
V. Gantt, (Md. 9) 21 Atl. E. 548; Peo-
ple V. Blackhurst, 25 Abb. N. C. 230;
State V. Manitowoc, 52 Wis. 432;
Crandall v. Amador, 20 Cal. 72; King
Williams Co. v. Munday, 2 Leigh
165; Louisville & N. A., etc., v. State,
25 Ind. 177; Cleveland v. Jersey City,
39 N. J. L. 629; State v. McCrillus, 4
Kan. 250; People v. Edmonds, 15
Barb. 529 ; Baker v. Johnson, 41 Me.
15.
4 United States v. Windom, 137 U.
S.636; Haines V. Saginaw Co., (Midi.
91) 49 N. W. 310; People v. Board oi
Education, 15 N". Y. S. 308; McGee
V. State, (Neb. 92) 49 N. W. E. 220;
State v. Board, (Mont. 92) 25 Pac. E.
440; McLeod v. Scott, (Or. 92) 26
Pac. E. 1061; Delgado v. Chavez, 11
S. Ct. 874; 140 U. S. 586; People v.
Gilmore, 5 Gilm. (111.) 242; Com. v.
Allegheny Co. Com'rs, 37 Pa. St. 277.
CH. XVin.] MANDAMUS AND QTTO WARRANTO.
§359
of public officials, and of corporations, formerly vested in the
king, have under our system been delegated by the people to the
lawmaking power subject to constitutional regulation and re-
straint, the Legislatures in nearly every State of the Union have
by statute improved the remedy and extended its force and
scope.^ Although the writs of mandamus and injunction are
similar in that both are commands to do or refrain from doing a
particular act,^ they differ in very material respects and are not
concurrent ; nor will either be granted when the facts of the
case show that the other is the proper remedy.*
What a court of equity can do through the far-reaching pre-
ventive powers of an injunction, which by its pliability can be
shaped to the infinite variety of human affairs, it were useless
to attempt through a process so narrow and limited in effect as
the writ of mandamus.'^ But when the duties to be performed,
or the public services to be rendered, are imperative and minis-
terial, and the object souglit is rather to compel the performance
of a legal, than to restrain or prevent the commission of an
illegal, act, a mandamus is the most effective if not the only
remed}^^
But if there exist concurrent remedies, as a suit for damages
or a proceeding by writ of quo warranto or indictment, yet if
the rights of the applicant will not receive adequate protection
or redress thereby, he is entitled to a mandamus.^
1 Sikes V. Kansom, 6 Johnson (N.
Y.) 279; Eex v. Barker, 3 Burr. 1265;
Inre Turner, u Ohio, 542; N. Y. Code
Civ. Pro. §§206T-2990.
2 Com. V. Boone Co., 82 Ky. 632;
Legg V. Annapolis, 42 Md. 203.
"Proper remedy of bondholders
against defaulting municipality is by
mandamus and not in equity. 2 Dil.
Mun. Corp., sees. 854, 855; Gay v.
Gilmore, 76 Ga. 725; Thompson v.
Allen Co., 115 U. S. 550; Rees v.
Watertown, 19 Wall. 481 ; Walkley v.
Muscatine, 6 lb. 481.
1 Butterworth V. U. S., 112 U. S.
50; Smith v. Bourbon Co., 127 U. S.
105 (1887).
= Gormley v. Day, 28 N. E. R. 693;
114 111. 195; State v. Shakespeare, 41
La. An. 156; McCullough v. Brook-
lyn, 23 Wend. 459; People v. New
York, 10 lb. 393; People v. Chenango
Co., 11 N. Y. 563; Atty. General v.
Boston, 123 Mass. 460; State v.
Graves, 19 Md. 351; Presoott v. Du-
quesne Bor., 48 Pa. St. 118; Bedford
etc. V. Anderson, 45 lb. 388; People
V. Board, 20 N". Y. S. 1 (1892); People
v. Salomon, 46 111. 415 ; Pond v. Par-
rott, 42 Conn. 13 ; In re Parker, 120 U. .
S. 746; Craig v. Leitensdorfer, 123
U. S. 209; Washington Univ. v.
Green, 1 Md. Ch. 97; Sherman v.
Clark, 4 Nev. 138; People v. Insps.,
4 Mich. 187 ; Crawford v. Carson, 35
Ark. 565.
sPeo. v. Alb. R. R., 24 N. Y. 261,
269; Peo. v. Troy etc., 37 How. Pr.
437; Union Pao. R. R. v. Hall, 91 U.
S. 343, 355; Smith v. Bourbon Co.,
127 U. S. 105.
741
§ 360
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[cH. xvin.
§ 360. Mandamus against mnnicipal corporations. — From
the above it maybe deduced as a general rule that the writ will
lie when it is shown that the injured party or community has
no prompt, clear and adequate means of compelling the perform-
ance of a non-discretionary or imperative duty.^ If the ag-
grieved party has the right to bring an action to recover damages
for the municipal neglect of duty, this extraordinary remedy
will not lie.^ But if such a corporation or its ofi&cials refuse, or
unreasonably neglect, to perform a duty obligatory upon it or
them, either by its charter or by the general law, and there is no
adequate remedy by which a prompt and satisfactory perform-
ance can be enforced, the law is clear that a mandamus will
be granted.^ But when in general the writ would be of no
1 State V. McGowan, 89 Mo. 1.56;
In re Bradstreet, 1*7 Pet. 634; In re
Manny, 14 How. 24; In re Cutting,
94 U. S. 14;Tennantv. Arcker, (Mich.
92) 48 N. W. E. 577; Manus v. Givens,
7 Leigh, 689; King Williams Co. v.
Munday, 2 lb. 168; Page v. Clop-
ton, 30 Gratt.415; Cope v. State, 126
Ind. 51; Randolph v. Stahlnalcer, 13
lb. 523 ; Kent v. Dickinson, 25 lb. 817 ;
L. & F. Ins. Co. V. Wilson, 8 Pet.
291; L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Addams, 9 lb.
571; Daw-son v. Fred'k Co., 2 H. &
M. (Va.) 132; Brown V. Crippen, 4 lb.
173; United States v. Lawrence, 3
Dall. 42; People v. Crotty, 93 111. 180;
Zanone v. Md. City, 103 lb. 552; St.
Clair V. Keller, 85 lb. 396; People v.
Trustees, 86 lb. 613 ; Smalley v. Yates,
36 Kan. 519; State v. Hill, 32 Minn.
275; State v. Newman, 91 Mo. 445;
Douglas V. Com. , 108 Pa. St, 559 ; State
V. Omaha, 14 Neb. 265; State v. Wil-
son, 21 lb. 572; Ferry Co. v. Bos-
ton, 101 Mass. 359 ; Cairo v. Campbell,
116 111. 305.
2 State V. Cape Girardeau Co., (Mo.
Sup. 92) 19 S. W. E. 23; Sessions v.
Boyken, 78 Ala. 328; Needham v.
Thresher, 49 Cal. 393; McAi-thur v.
Duncan, 34 Mich. 27; Lexington v-
MuUiken, 7 Gray, 280 ; State v. Union
742
Twp., 8 Vroora, 343; State v. Mount,
21 La. An. 755; State v. Titus, 47 N.
J. L. 89; People v. Wood, 35 Barb.
653; People v. Booth, 49 lb. 31;
People V. Thompson, 25 lb. 73; State
V. County Jud., 5 Iowa, 380; State v.
Supervisors, 29 Wis. 79 ; Burnet v.
Auditor, 12 Ohio, 54; Com. v. Eodes,
5 Mon. (Ky.) 318; Mansfield v. Fuller,
50 Mo. 338; State v. Mayor, 4 Neb.
260 ; People v. Chenango, 11 N. T. 563 ;
Brown v. Euse, 69 Tex. 589; Com'rs
V. Hicks, 2 Ind. 527; People v. Clarke,
50 111. 213; Mich. Pav. Co. v. Detroit,
Mich. 201 ; Portwood v. Montgomery,
52 Miss. 523.
' State V. Sliakespeare, 43 La. An.
92; People v. Com. Council, 85 Cal.
369; 24 Pac. K. 727; Smith v. Law-
rence, (S. D. 92) 49 N. W. 7; Coll v.
Board, 47 N. W. E. 227; 83 Mich. 367;
Cope V. State, 126 Ind. 51; State v.
Heege, 40 Mo. App. 650; Thomason
V. Euggles, 69 Cal. 465; Smalley v.
Yates, 36 Kan. 519; Silverthorne v.
Warren E. E., 33 N. J. L. 372; Hall
V. Somerswarth, 39 N. H. 511; Treat
V. Middletown, 8 Conn. 243 ; Com. v.
Allegheny, 32 Pa. St. 218; State v.
Eaine, 47 Ohio St. 447; Atty. General
V. Myers, 58 Hun, 218; People v.
Fitzgerald, 59 lb. 625; Labette
CH. XVni.] MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO.
§360
avail,^ as when the performance of the act demanded has be-
come unlawful,^ or when the occasion for it has passed and a
mandamus would thus be futile, the court will not grant it.*
But the right of the relator must be clear, and the facts ad-
duced by him must show prima facie a case for the relief de-
manded.* This does not mean that his case must exclude any
and every possible doubt as to its legal sufBciency, or that he
must show conclusively that he is without any other legal rem-
edy ; but only that he should present fair and reasonable grounds
for his demand,^ and on such grounds the writ will ordinarily
be granted. But the municipal board or official affected will
be allowed to disprove in the return the jurisdictional facts,
which are stated by the plaintiff or relator.®
On the other hand, if the authority of the municipality to do
the act be uncertain, a mandamus will not be granted ; ^ nor gen-
erally for the control of rights of a purely private nature. For
in such cases the party has an adequate remedy, by which he may
recover damages or obtain a decree for specific performance in
equity.^ Accordingly, it has been repeatedly decided that no
mandamus will lie to compel the payment of salary by a munic-
ipality, provided the official to whom it is owing can sue for it
V. Moulton, 112 U. S. 217; U. S. v.
Oswego, 28 Fed. R. 55 ; Williamsport
V. Com., 90 Pa. St. 498; Hawkins v.
Hawke Co. Com'rs, 14 Ind. 521; Mc-
Bride v. Grand Rapids, 47 Mich. 236;
People V. N. Y. Pol. Board, 107 N. T.
235; Martin v. Tripp, 51 Me. 184;
State V. Kirkland, 29 Md. 85.
'Williams V. Com'rs, 35 Me. 345;
Spirit Aph. v. Randolph, 58 Vt. 192;
People V. Dulany, 96 111. 203; Fisher
V. Charleston, 17 W. Va. 595 ; Roberts
V. Smith, 63 Ga. 213; Wells v. Mason,
23 W. Va. 456; Cook v. Candee, 52
Ala. 109; Lamar v. Wilkins, 28 Ark.
34; Clark V. Crane, 57 Cal. 629; Ex
parte Hum, (Ala. 91) 9 So. R. 615;
Grigsby V. Bowles, 79 Tex. 13; Mills
V. Brevoort, 77 Mich. 210.
2Peo.v. Hyde Pk., 117 111. 462;
Boss V. Lane, 3 S. & M. (Miss.) 695.
sjji re Bristol, 3 Q. B. Div. 10;
Gormley v. Day, 28 N. E. R. 693; 14
111. 185.
* People V. Board of Canvassers,
129 N. T. 360; Smith v. Railroad, 67
111. 191; People v. Newton, 112 N.
T. 396; Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N. T.
145; Morthorst v. K. Y. Cen. R. R.,
66 lb. 609; U. S. v. Bank, 1 Cranch. 7.
^ See cases cited under sec. 359,
ante.
6 People V. Stevens, 5 Hill, 616
State V. Warren, 32 N. J. L. 439; Peo,
V. Ransom, 2 N. Y. 490; see post, sec,
365, Practice and Procedure.
' People V. Bloomington, 38 111
App. 125 ; State v. Guttenberg Coun
cil, 39 N. J. L. 660.
8 Parrott v. Bridgeport, 44 Conn
180; Peo. v. East Saginaw, 40 Mich
336.
743
§361
MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS.
[CH.
XVIII.
in an ordinary common law action.^ If he cannot sue at com-
mon law or in equity, mandamus will lie, unless the office be
occupied by another, and the title to it is disputed, when a quo
warranto is the proper remedy.^
§ 361. Mandamns and quo warranto distinguished. — Al-
though in some jurisdictions these two remedies are concurrent
when the title to official employment is involved,' this is very
far from being a universal rule. In proper cases mandamus will
lie to compel the admission of one legally elected to a municipal
office * if the office be vacant, and the claimant's title to the
office is undisputed. If it is sought to try the title to the office
between the rightful claimant and a usurper, mandamus would
not lie, there being already an adequate remedy in quo warranto?
A certificate, showing the election of a municipal official or
his commission, is prima fade evidence of his right to the office,
and is so far conclusive that it cannot be questioned in any col-
lateral proceedings whatever, and only in a proceeding to which
the official is made defendant, in an information in the nature
of quo warranto ; when the court will inquire into the validity
of his election or appointment.® In all cases where a person
is in actual if not legal possession of an office, and is exercis-
ing the duties of such office under color of right, conferred by
election or appointment, the validity or legality of such election
1 Baker v. Johnson, 41 Me. 15 ; Com-
monwealth V. Johnson, 2 Binn. (Pa.)
275; Peo. v. Edmonds, 15 Barb. 529;
Peo. V. N. Y. Sup., 32 N. Y. 473;
State V. Jones, 1 Ired. L. 134.
^ Fleming v. Guthrie, 3 Law Rep.
An. 53, and oases there cited, sec.
368, on quo warranto.
estate V. Falconer, 44 Ala. 696;
State V. Palmer, 10 Keb. 203; In re
Eeid, 50 Ala. 439.
^ Eaton V. Burke, (N. H. 92) 22 Atl.
K. 452; State v. Shakespeare, 43 La.
An. 92; State v. Smith, (Mo. 91) 15
S. W. R. 614; Schelir v. Board, 83
Mich. 367; Cross v. R. R. Co., 12 S.
E. E. 765; 34 W. Va. 742; Smith v.
Rahway, 33 N. J. L. Ill; McDermott
V. Miller, 45 lb. 251; Ellison v. Ra-
leigh, 89 K. C. 125, but may beref used
744
pending quo warranto proceedings,
Hannon v. Halifax, 89 N. C. 123.
5 Kelly V. Edwards, 69 Cal. 460;
Cochran v. Cleary, 22 Iowa, 75 ; Peo-
ple V. Goetling, 133 N. Y. 569; In re
Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200; Biggs v. Mc-
Bride, 17 Or. 640; People v. Matte-
son, 17 111. 167; Brennan v. Brad-
shaw, 53 Tex. 330; Hullman v. Hon-
comp, 5 Ohio St. 237; Worthley v.
Steen, 43 N. J. L. 542.
« People V. Riordan, 41 K W. 482;
People V. Thacher, 55 N. Y. 525;
People V. Van Flyck, 4 Cow. 297;
People V. Vail, 20 Wend. 12; State
V. Frazier, 98 Mo. 426; Hunnecutt v.
State, 12 S. W. R. 106; Ex parte
Scarborough, (S. C. 91 ) 12 S. E. E.
666.
CH. XVin.] MANDAMUS AND QTJO WARRANTO.
§361
or appointment will not be adjudicated upon an application for
a mandamus, but only upon an information in the nature of a quo
warranto. Indeed it may be laid down as a principle of uni-
versal application, that where the applicant has a remedy by
quo warranto, mandamus will not lie.^ But there are authori-
ties which hold that, in the case of a groundless claim to, or
intrusion into, an oiBce by an interloper, or an utterly illegal
retention of an office, after the expiration of the incumbent's
term of office, and the election of his successor, the rightful
claimant will not be compelled to resort to a quo warranto ; but
he may have at once a mandamus to compel a delivery to him
of the possession of the office, and of the books and papers be-
longing thereto.^
In consequence of the short periods for which officials are
elected in American municipalities, regret has been expressed
that a claimant to an office, which it is alleged has been usurped,
is put to the dilatory process of an information in the nature of
a quo warranto, and the opinion has been expressed that a court
would be justified in granting a mandamus so far as to see that
the incumbent is " a bona fide possessor of the place, and that
there is a real dispute and fair doubt as to which party has the
legal title." ^ It has been held in one State that mandamus was
the only complete remedy, " as under the quo warranto informa-
tion the judgment might remove the occupant but would not
install the claimant." *
In New York by Code Civ. Pro. 1948, et seq., the attorney-
general may, on the relation of a private individual, bring " an
action against the usurper of an office or franchise," triable by
jury, and may obtain an order of arrest against defendant. If
the defendant when ousted refuses to deliver on demand the
books and papers of the office, he is guilty of a misdemeanor,
and the successful party can recover costs and damages against
him. And the court may in its discretion impose on the unsuc-
' Com. V. Philada. Co., 5 Rawle,
73; State v. Gaslight Co., 25 Mo.
App. 44; State v. Thompson, 36 Mo.
70; Underwood v. White, 27 Ark.
382; Warner v. Myers, 3 Oreg. 218;
State V. Rodman, 43 Mo. 256; Bon-
ner V. State, 7 Ga. 473; Anderson v.
Colson, 1 Neb. 172; State v. Bryce,
7 Ohio, pt. 2, 82.
2 People T. KildufE, 55 111. 492 ; Lind-
say V. Saokett, 20 Tex. 516.
8 2 Dil. Mun. Corp. § 846.
«Luoe V. Board, 153 Mass. 108;
Keoughv, Board, 31 N. E. R. 587;
Harwood v. Marshall, 9 Md. 83.
745
§ 362
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIOKS.
[CH. xvni.
cessful defendant in this action, as part of the final judgment,
a fine not to exceed f 2,000.i
§ 362. Distinction between discretionary and mandatory
powers as limiting the right to mandamus. — This distinc-
tion is of great importance in its bearing upon the granting of
the writ. As discretionary duties are, except in circumstances
of gross abuse and injustice, beyond judicial control, it is well
settled in modern times that a mandamus will not be granted to '
compel their performance.^
If, therefore, the law confers upon the municipal officers a
clear and unmistakable power to decide upon the expediency
or necessity of measures; or if the municipality is invested
with the capacity of exercising a deliberative choice between
several courses, either of which is legal and within the scope of
the municipal powers, no mandamus will be granted.^ Thus,
when a statute calls for the acceptance of the bid of the lowest
responsible bidder, a discretionary power is therewith granted ;
and if the municipality acts in good faith, in determining the
responsibility of the bidders, mandamus will not lie.* But if, as
is sometimes the case, a mandamus is asked for to compel the
performance of a duty clearly discretionary, the court wiU grant
it when the discretion is abused, or the officer is acting in bad
faith, and great injustice will otherwise be done.^
Inasmuch as any gross, fraudulent or unlawful abuse of dis-
1 § 1956.
2 People V. Martin, 131 N. Y. 196;
Grant v. Detroit, 51 N. W. 997; State
V. Tippecanoe Co., (Ind. 92) 30 N. E.
K. 892; Wintz v. Board, 28 W. Va.
227; State v. Mt. Pleasant, 16 Wis.
613; Ho-we v. Crawford, 47 Pa. St.
361; People v. Martin, 131 N. T. 196;
Mich. City v. Roberts, 34 Ind. 471;
State V. Essex Co., 23 N. J. L. 214;
Howe V. Crawl Co., 47 Pa. St. 361;
Grant V. Detroit, 51 N. W. R. 997;
State V. .Jefferson, 22 La. An. 611;
Dechert v. Com'rs, 113 Pa. St. 229;
People V. McLean, 16 N. T. S. (1891)
401; State v. Tippecanoe Co., (Ind.
92) 30 N. E. R. 892; People v. Com.
Council, 78 N. T. 39; People v. Fair-
cliild, 67 lb. 336; Ferry Co, v. Bos-
746
ton, 101 Mass. 488; State v. Francis,
95 Mo. 44; Mageev. Sup., lOCal.376;
Gardenier V. Sup., 17 St. Rep. (N. Y.)
983; Supervisors V. People, 110 lU.
511; State v. Demaree, 80 Ind. 519;
In re Town Board, 7 N. Y. Supp.
165; Pfister v. State, 82 Ind. 382.
sSansom v. Mercer, 68 Tex. 488;
Peo. V. Com. Counc, 78 N. Y. 39.
« Grand v. Detroit, (92 Mich.) 51
K. W. R. 999; People v. Board, 5 N.
Y. S. 392; Douglas v. Com'rs, 108
Pa. St. 559.
5 Keogli T. Wilmington, 4 Del. Ch.
491; Glencoe v. Peo., 78") HI. 382;
Amperse v. Kal. Counc, 59 Mich. 78;
Barrett v. New Orleans, 33 La. An.
542.
CH. XVIII. j MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO.
§ 362
cretionary powers would as a misfeasance very likely render
the municipal officer indictable, it seems, upon grounds already
discussed, viz : the adequacy of other remedies, that the use of
the writ in this connection must be very rare. Where the offi-
cial is deprived of all discretion as to performance or nonper-
formance of the act ; and the only discretion which he may
exercise is as to the details of its execution, a mandamus will
be granted to compel him to exercise his power for the accom-
plishment of the substantial result, which is required of him by
law.^
But when the power, though discretionary and conferred in
language of a permissive character, is one whose exercise is re-
quired for the furtherance of individual rights or public inter-
ests, and their protection from irreparable injury, a mandamus
will issue. So where the levy of a tax was dependent upon the
belief in the public benefit to be derived from it, or upon the
advisableness of employing a statutory power for the public
good, a mandamus will lie.^
V. Louisville, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 9 ; State
V. Shaw, 23 La. An. 790; State v.
Pol. Jury, 29 lb. 146; In re State
Board, 23 lb. 388; Kennedy v. Wash-
ington, 3 Cranch C. C. 593 ; Magee v.
Calavei-as Co., 10 Cal. 376; Mayor v.
Morgan, 7 Mart. N". S. (La.) 1; State
V. Wilm. Coun., 3 Barring. (Del.)
294; Poultney v. Lafayette, 12 Pe-
ters, 472; Mich. City v. Roberts, 34
Ind. 471; U. S. v. Lawrence, 3 Dall.
(U. S.) 42; Dechert v. Com., 113 Pa.
St. 229; Deeham v. Johnson, 141
Mass. 23; Braconier v. Packard, 13(1
Mass. 50; Alirens v. Fiedler, 43 N. J.
L. 400; Mau v. Liddle, 15 Nev. 271;
Elkins V. Athearn, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 50;
People V. Albany Co. Suprs., 12
Johns. (N. y.) 414; Hull v. Oneida
Co., 19 lb. 259; Kice B. & F. Co. v.
Worcester, 130 Mass. 575; Madison v.
Smith, 83 Ind. 502; Hudman v.
Slaugliter, 70 Ala. 546.
2 When keeping streets in repair
being mandatory is enforceable by
mandamus. State v. Brown, 38 Ohio
747
iRay V. Wilson, (Fla. 92) 10 So. E.
673; Ex parte Alabama State Bar
Assn., (Ala. 91) 18 So. R. 768; Trinity
& S. R. Co. V. Lane, 79 Tex. 643;
Porter v. State, 78 lb. 591; United
States V. Hall, 7 Mackey, 14; Atty.
Gen, V. Boston, 123 Mass. 469 ; Bran-
der V. Chesterfield, 5 Call. (Va.)
.548; Memphis V. Brown, 97 U. S. 203,
300; United States v. Memphis, 97
lb. 284; United States v. Spurz, 102
lb, 407; Queen v. Haldimond, etc,, 7
Up. Can. L. J. 266; In re Augusta
etc., 12 Up. Can. Q. B. 522; Coy v.
Lyons, 17 Iowa, 1 ; Com. v. Parks, 9
Phila. (Pa.) 481; Treat v. Middle-
town, 8 Conn. 243 ; Howe v. Craw-
ford Co., 47 Pa. St. 361; People v.
Cass Co. Com'rs, 77 111. 488; Parker
V. Portland, 54 Mich. 308; Ex parte
Black, 1 Ohio St. 30; People v. Board
of Police, 19 N. Y. 188; In re Turner,
5 Ohio, 542; Martin v. Ingham, 36
Kan. 641; Com. v. Henry, 49 Pa. St.
530; Burns v. Bender, 36 Mich. 139;
Buchoz V. Pray, 37 lb. 512; McKean
§ 362
MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS.
[CH. xvin.
If municipal officials, who are vested with discretionary pow-
ers, refuse to exercise those powers when it becomes lawful and
necessary for them to do so, a mandamus will issue, not to con-
trol their discretion, but to compel them to exercise a power
when public interests demand it.^ In the following cases of
discretionary power mandamus has been refused: To compel
approval of official bonds,^ or other bonds of sureties,^ granting
a license ^ and to audit illegal claim. ^
§ 363. Who may apply for the writ. — Upon the ancient
theory, that the writ was an exercise of the royal prerogative, it
has been argued that the State by its attorney-general is the
proper agency to put in motion this remedy against a munici-
pality. This is undoubtedly true, when the object sought for
is a public one, viz., to enforce a legislative act or a municipal
charter, and in such cases the State is entitled to the writ as a
matter of right.^ In some States the performance of a public
duty can only be compelled on mandamus procured by the
attornej'-general.'^ But there has been of late years a wide diver-
St. 344; State v. Staley, 38 lb. 259;
Hammar v. Covington, 3 Met. (Ky.)
494; People V. Thaoher, 42 Hun, 319;
Appleby v, N. York, 41 lb. 481 ; Louis-
ville V. Kean, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 9;
State V. Baton Rouge, 34 La. An.
1197; Uniontown v. Commonwealth,
34 Pa. St. 293; Meyer v. Carolan, 9
Tex. 250; Napa V. R. Co. v. Napa
Co., 30 Cal. 435; State v. Orange, 31
N. J. L. 131 ; People v. Bloomington,
63 m. 207; Mich. City v. Roberts, 34
Ind. 471; Ind. v. Cine. R. R. Co., 37
lb. 489; Hull v. Siip'rs, 19 Johns. (N.
Y.)259; Goodrich V. Chicago, 20111.
445; Ottawa v. People, 48 lb. 233;
People V. Cass Co., 77 lb. 438; People
V. La Salle, 84 lb. 303; People v.
Dutchess, 58 N. T. 154; Com. v. Pitts-
burgh, 34 Pa. St. 49B; Sup'rs v. U. S.,
4 Wall. 435. Memphis v. Brown, 97
TT. S. 300; Rock Island etc. v. U. S.,
4 Wall. 435 ; Robinson v. Butte Co.
Sup., 43 Cal. 353; State v. New
Orleans, 30 La. An. 129; Memphis
v. United States, 97 U. S. 293; 97 lb.
284.
748
estate V. Lewis, 10 Ohio St. 46;
Nelson v. Edwards, 55 Tex. 389; Ar-
apahoe Co. v. Crotty, 9 Colo. 138;
Lewis v. Marion, 14 Ohio St. 515;
Beebe v. Robinson, 52 Ala. 67.
2McDuffie V. Cook, 65 Ala. 430;
Mobile M. I. Co. v. Cleveland, 76
Ala. 321.
5 McHenry v. Township, 31 N. W.
Rep. 602.
« Heblich v. Judge, 10 S. W. R.
465; Devine v. Belt, 70 Md. 352; In
re Knarr, 127 Pa. St. 554; 18 Atl. E.
639; State v. Kramer, 96 Mo. 75;
Schlandeker v. Marshall, 72 Pa. St.
200; Dunbar v. Frazer, 78 Ala. 538;
Walsford v. Weidein, 23 Kan. 601.
5 People V. Case, 19 N. Y. S. 625;
People V. Greene Co., 39 Hun, 299.
6 State V. Hartford & N. H. R. K.
Co., 29 Conn. 538; Peo. v. Attorney
General, 22 Barb. 114; Peo. v. Tracy,
1 Deuio, 617; Mosesv. Kearney, 31
Ark. 261.
' Smith V. Saginaw, 45 N. W. E.
964; No. Pac. R. Co. v. Territory,
142 U. S. 49; Boblett v. Dresher, 10
OH. XVIII.] MANDAMDS AND QUO "WARRANTO.
§364
geuce in the decisions of the American courts from the ancient
theory.^ And it may now be considered as an established rule
that the writ against a municipality will issue upon the applica-
tion or relation of any private person ; provided he be interested
as a citizen, and show facts which, in the discretion of the court,
will warrant the issuance of the writ.^
The nature of the act, whose performance may be compelled,
does not seem to make any difference, it being now the custom
in most States for private persons to use the facilities afforded
by the writ for the enforcement of rights of a purely private
character, as well as those in which all the citizens residing in
a municipality may have an interest.^
§ 364. Prior judgment when not necessary. — When in
the law, under which a municipality has entered into contract-
ual relations, there exists a provision for the levy of a special
tax, or for as much as may be necessary /or the purpose of meet-
ing the obligation when it matures, mandamus is of right and
there exists no necessity usually for the return of an execution
Kan. 9 (1872) ; Wyandotte & K. C. Co.
y. "Wyan Co. Comm'rs, 10 Kan. 331 ;
Graves v. Cole, 3 Dak. 301; State y.
Ware, 13 Greg. 380.
1 Union Pac. E. E. Co. y. Hall, 91
U. S. 843.
2 Eaton V. Burke, 22 Atl. E. 452;
State V. Archibald, 43 Minn. 328; In
re Whitney, 3 N.Y. S. 838; Pura-
phrey y. Balto., 47 Md. 145; Peo. v.
Brooklyn, 22 Barb. 404; Peo. v. Hal-
sey, 53 lb. 547; Pike Co. Com'rs v.
State, 11 111. 202; Hamilton v. State,
3 Ind. 452; Attorney General v. Bos-
ton, 123 Mass. 460; State v. Eahyeay,
33 N. J. L. 110; People v. Collins, 19
Wend. 56; In re Fuller, 25 Ark. 261;
Chambers v. Green, L. E. 20 Eq. 552;
Kingv. Sev. & Wye. E. E., 2B. & Aid.
646; People v. San Francisco, 36 Cal.
504; Cannon v. Janirer, 3 Houst. 27;
Bryan y. Cattell, 15 Iowa, 538 ; Peo.
V. Mich. Uniy. Eeg., 4 Mich. 98; Peo.
V. Inspectors, 4 lb. 187; Sanger y.
Kennebec Co., 25 Me. 291; Bates v.
Plymouth, 14 Gray, 163.
' Peo. V. Brooklyn Council, 77 N.
T. 503; State y.Marshall Co., 7 Iowa,
186; State v. Eahway,33 N. J. L. 110;
(to compel council to fill vacancy by
holding an election;) State v. Baily,
7 Iowa, 390. As to private persons
employing the writto enforce private
rights, see Mt. Moriah Cera., 81 Pa.
St. 235 ; State v. Eddy, (Mont. 91) 25
Pac. E. 1032; State v. Engle, (Ind.
91) 26 N. E. E. 1077; Wood v. Lena-
wee, 84 Mich. 521; 47 N. W. R. 1103;
United States v. Hall, 7 Mackey, 14;
Cope V. State, 126 Ind. 51; Kendall
v. Stokes, 5 How. (U. S.) 87; Peo.
V. Man. Gas Co., 45 Barb. 136; Otta-
wa V. People, 48 111. 233 ; Insurance
Co. V. Baltimore, 23 Md. 296; Price '
y. Eiverside Co., 56 Cal. 431; Bryan
V. Cattell, 15 Iowa, 538; Peo. v. State,
19 Mich. 392; Peo. v. Cummings, 72
N. T. 433 ; State v. Trustees, 4 Nev.
400; State v. Wright, 10 lb. 167; In
re Wliitney, 3 N. T. S. 838; Cf. State
v. Kearney, 25 Neb. 262.
749
§ 365
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XVIII.
niilla bona, before it may be issued ; and it is no defence that
the corporation may have property which may be levied on by
the creditor.! In such a case, too, it has been held that no pre-
vious judgment is necessary,^ and this is particularly true, if, as
in the case of municipal bonds or coupons, there exists no doubt
as to their genuineness or validity, and the relator is himself
their holder.
On the same principles, mandamus will lie to collect official
salaries, without recovering a prior judgment against the mu-
nicipality for the same.^
§ 365. Practice — ^Effect of laches. — The statutory rules
which exist in our States, governing this extraordinary remedy,
have received a strict construction ; * and the alternative writ or
order to show cause, although usually founded upon an ex parte
application or petition,^ is not of right and is never granted, ex-
cept upon proper affidavits or pleading, verified by the oath of the
application. A prima facie case must always be made out, and
all facts showing non-performance clearly and precisely stated,
1 State V. Cutes, (Ohio 91) 26 N. E.
R. 1052; State V. Davenport, 12 Iowa,
335; State v. Board, (N. J. 90) 20
Atl. R. 755 ; Ell. Co. v. Kitchen, 14
Bush. (Ky.)289; Knox Co. Comm'rs
V. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376; Com. v.
Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. St. 496; Louisiana
V. St. Martin's Par., Ill U. S. 716;
Limestone Co. v. Rather, 48 Ala. 433 ;
Greenfield v. Moore, 113 Ind. 597;
Walkley v. Muscatine, 6 Wall. 481;
Hoffman v. Quinoy, 4 lb. 535 ; Ben-
bow V. Iowa City, 7 lb. 313; Rock Is-
land Co. Sup. V. U. S., 4 lb. 435;
Brown v. Gates, 15 W. Va. 131 ; State
Com'rs, 6 Ohio St. 280; Washn. Co.
Sup. V. Durant, 9 Wall. 415 ; Daven-
port V. Lord, 9 lb. 409.
2 Ray V. Wilson, (Fla. 92) 10 S. O.
R. 673 ; Rah way Comrs. v. Rah way,
49 N. J. L. 384; Columbia Co. Comrs.
V. King, 13 Fla. 451; Clark Co. v.
Paris, 11 B. Mon. 143, 154; Com. v.
Allegheny Co. Comrs., 37 Pa. St. 277;
Maddox v. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56;
750
State V. Anderson, 8 Baxt. 249; State
V. Clinton Comrs., 6 Oliio St. 280, 287;
Com. V. Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. St. 496;
Winslow V. Perquimas Co., 64 N. C.
218; Flagg v. Palmyi-a, 33 Mo. 440;
Pegram v. Cleveland Co. , 64 N. C. 557 ;
State V. Milw., 20 Wis. 87; People v.
Brown, 55 K. T. 180; Newman v. Jus-
tices, 5 Sneed (Tenn.); Stevenson v.
Sum. Towns., 35 Iowa, 462; Brown
V. Crego, 32 lb. 498.
' State V. Starling, 13 S.Car. 262;
Honea v. Monroe, 63 Miss. 171; Just
V. Township, 42 Mich. 573; Peo. v.
Smith, 77 N. T. 347; State v. Ocean,
48 N. J. L. 70; Morley v. Power, 5
Lea, 691; Ray v. Wilson, (Fla. 92) 10
So. R. 678; State v. Hannon, 38 Kan.
593.
^Peo. V. Newton, 112 N. Y. 396;
Langdon v. Mayor, 93 lb. 145.
5 Fisher v. Charleston, 17 W. "Va.
595; Haight v. Turner, 2 Johns. 371;
Barnett v. Meredith, 10 Gratt. 651.
CH. XVni.] MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO.
§365
in order to warrant the issuance of the writ.^ Thus, a man-
damus will be refused when facts are stated sufficient only to
raise a presumption, that respondents intend to refuse to per-
form their duty when called upon.^ Public policy is against
granting the writ, if the applicant be not free from laches.^
And it seems to be a question for the court to determine what
shaU be deemed a sufficient delay to induce a refusal of the
writ.*
Although, in most respects, the issuance of the writ is wholly
discretionary ; yet it is not generally considered laches, if ap-
plication be made for it within the statutory period of limita-
tion for bringing an ordinary action, provided there is no special
statutory regulation to the contrary.^
The applicant for the writ must as a rule show a previous
demand, coupled with a refusal to act on the part of the corpo-
ration or official, on whom the duty was imposed.® But demand
and refusal is unnecessary if clearly useless ; ^ and in the case
of a public official or board, where no one is privately inter-
ested sufficiently to induce him to make the demand, it is gen-
erally only necessary that circumstances exist, which show
iStatev. Gayhart, (Neb. 92) 51 N. W.
E. 746; Schrever v. Livingston, 9 Mo.
196; Zeasey v. Bricker, 60 Pa. St. 9;
Swan V. Gray, 44 Miss. 393; Speed v.
Cocke, 57 Ala. 209; Cooke v. Tanner,
40 Conn. 378; Mason v. Minturn, 4
W. Va. 802; Ohio etc. v. Moundsville,
11 lb. 8.
estate V. Tork Co., 8 Neb. 92;
State v. Ramsey, lb. 286.
8 People V. Harper, 18 N. T. S. 896;
Smith V. Eaton Co., 56 lb. 217; Chinn
V. Trustees, 82 111. 236; State v. Jen-
nings, 48 Wis. 549; People v. French,
12 Abb. (N". T.) N. Cas. 156; True v.
MelTin, 43 N. H. 503; Mitchell v.
Boardman, 10 Atl. Rep. 452.
* Territory V. Potts, 3 Mont. 354;
People V. Harper, 18 N. Y. S. 896;
State V. Appleby, 25 S. C. 100; State
T. Cardoza, 5 S. C. 297; People v. Sen.
Com. Pleas, 2 Wend. 264; Walcott
V. Mayor, 5 Mich. 249; Savannah v.
State, 4 Ga. 26; True v. Melvin, 43
N. H. 503.
speo. V. Super's, 12 Barb. 446;
Prescott V. Gonser, 34 Iowa, 175;
Klein v. Warren Co., 51 Miss. 578;
Carroll v. Tishamingo, 28 lb. 38;
Klein v. Smith Co., 54 lb. 254; State
V. Hull, 17 Minn. 429; Bryson v.
Spaulding, 20 Kan. 427.
estate v. Adams, 19 Nev. 370;
Crandall v. Amador Co., 20 Cal. 72;
Jefferson Co. v. Arrighi, 51 Miss. 68;
State V. Schaack, 28 Minn. 358 ; State
V. Slick, 86 Ind. 501; Coit v. Elliott,
28 Ark. 204; Leroux v. Bay Circ. J.,
45 Mich. 416; In re Whitney, 8 N. Y.
Supp. 838; Peo. v. Hyde Pk., 117
111. 462; Kemmerer v. State, 7 Neb.
133; Peo. v. Whittemore, 4 Mich. 27;
Dobbs V. Stauffer, 24 Kan. 12.
' U. S. V. Brooklyn, 8 Fed. Rep. 473 ;
Chi. K. & W. R. Co. V. Harris, (Kan.
92) 30 Pac. R. 456.
751
§367
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATtONS.
[cH. xvin.
positive neglect or evasion of a legal duty,^ or a plain public
manifestation of a disinclination to perform the desired official
or corporate act. The demand need neither be made nor alleged.
It is sufficient to prove the circumstances, which show such con-
tinued and settled intention to evade the performance of a
duty which is clearly required to be done by law.^
§ 366. Framing the writ and order to show canse. — It is
sometimes the practice upon an application for a writ, for the
court to grant upon motion an order to show cause why a man-
damus should not issue; but this is often dispensed with and
an alternative writ of mandamus is granted, which as well as
the order, may be demurred to or traversed by the municipal
official on whom it is served.^ If, upon the service of the order
to show cause, the defendant is unable to disprove the applicant's
statement of facts by counter affidavits ; or if his demurrer be
not well taken, an absolute mandamus will issue.
This alternative writ must conform substantially to the affi-
davits or pleadings on which it is founded, although in the ab-
sence of statutory requirements no particular form or language
is necessary, provided the command to do the required act or
duty be certain and specific in its nature.*
§ 367. Importance of a correct direction and proper ser-
vice of the alternative writ. — Although in strictness of lan-
1 state v. Bailey, 7 Iowa, 390; Chum-
asero v. Potts, 2 Mont. 242; Palmer
V. Stacy, 44 Iowa, 44; Alexander v.
McDowell, 67 N. C. 330 (1872); Mad-
dox V. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56, 70;
Peo. V. Whittemore, 4 Micb. 27;
Commonwealth v. Allegheny Co.
Com'r's, 37 Pa. St. 277, 291; State
V. Lehre, 7 Kich. (S. C.) 234, 322;
Chi. K. & W. R. Co. V. Harris, (Kan.
92) 80 Pac. R. 456; State v. Kahway,
33 N. J. L. 110; Columbia Co. Comrs.
V. King, 13 Fla. 451; Oroville, etc.,
V. Plumas Co. Sups., 37 Cal. 354.
2 Attorney General v. Boston, 123
Mass. 460 (1877) ; Maddox v. Graham,
2 Met. (Ky.) 56; Commonwealth v.
Allegheny Co. Comm'rs, 37 Pa. St.
237; State v. Rahway Council, 33 N.
J. L. 110.
752
8 State V. Cities, (Ohio 91) 26 N. E.
R. 1052; Cape v. State, 126 Ind. 51;
In re Shay, 15 N. T. 488.
* As a discussion of the minute
technicalities to be employed in fram-
ing the writ would be out of place
in a work of this character, the read-
er is referred to Stephens' Nisi Prius,
2321; In reLoftus, 61 Hun, 627; Par-
rish V. Reed, 2 Wash. St. 491; People
V. Board, 62 Hun, 632; Peck v. Board,
90 Cal. 384; Chance v. Temple, 1 Iowa,
179; Hates v. Jones, 1 Ired. L. (N. C.)
129. As to the nature of the command
and of the duty or act to be perform-
ed, Tapping on Mandamus, p. 327;
State V. Milw., 22 Wis. 397; Kexv.
Kingston, 8 Mod. 210; State v. Pac.
T. Trs., 61 Mo. 155 (1875).
CH. XVin.] JIANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO.
§ 367
guage the direction of the writ is only a formal part of the paper,
yet it is very material ; for if the writ be erroneously diiected, in
the absence of a statute allowing amendment, the writ is liable
to be quashed. Statutes oi jeofails having been almost univer-
sally enacted, it is believed that a clerical error in the direction,
as, for example, a mistake in naming the wrong official, would
afford no valid ground for abating the writ.^
Upon the plain principle, which runs through all the deci-
sions on this subject, that the writ be directed to that body, or
to the person whose duty it is to do the thing commanded, it is
evident that in seeking to enforce any charter obligation, which
is incumbent upon a municipalit}', the writ should be directed
to it under its corporate name, and should be served upon its
chief official, as well as upon the subordinates in whose sphere
the performance of the act lies.^ But it has been held that
a writ, directed to the " Mayor and City Council," is good and
need not be directed to the corporation.^ And under a liberal
construction of the various statutes of jeofails, the courts are
always ready to allow a reasonable amendment in cases of this
character.*
If, however, the act commanded is to be performed by a se-
lect body as commissioners, or by a single official acting under
an authority conferred by the municipal charter, it is proper to
direct the mandamus to them or him. But even here the writ
will not be abated because it is directed to the corporation ; for
at least, according to the English law, the select body or of-
iN. T. Code C. P. 721; Knight v.
Ferris, 6 Houst. (Del.) 293; People
V. Yates Co., 40111. 126; Davenportv.
Lord, 9 Wall. 409 ; U. S. v. Union Pac.
E. R. Co., 4 Dillon, 479; s. c, 91 U. S.
343; State v. Jones, 1 Ired. L. (N. C.)
129; State v. Board of Canvassers, 18
Fla. 55; People v. Billiard, 29 111. 413;
Johnes v. State, 4 pliio St. 493; State
V. Johnson Co., 12 Iowa, 237; Pow-
sheik V. Durant, 9 Wall. 736; State
v'. Milwaukee, 22 Wis. 397; Chance
V. Temple, 1 Iowa, 179; Lyons Higli-
way Comm'rs v. People, 38 111. 347;
State V. Ellwood, 11 Wis. 17; State
V. Hastings, 10 lb. 518; State v. Bai-
48
ly, 7 Iowa, 390; Springfield v. Hamp-
den, 10 Pick. 59.
2 Hitchcock V. Galveston. 48 Fed.
E. 640; United States v. Boiitwell,
17 Wall. 604; Labette Co. Com'rs v.
Moulton, 112 U. S. 217; Wren v. In-
dianapolis, 96 Ind. 206; Cherolcee Co.
V. Wilson, 109 IT. S. 621 ; Farnsworth
V. Boston, 121 Mass. 173; Glencoe v.
People, 78 111. 382 ; Louisville v. Kean,
18 B. Mon. 9; Davenport v. Lord, 9
Wall. 409.
8 Peo. V. Bloomington, 63 111. 207;
Glencoe v. Peo., 78 111. 382.
» Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, 34
Pa. St. 496.
753
368
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS.
[CH. xvin.
ficial is a constitutional part of the municipality.^ And, ac-
cording to the American law, such a board or official would be
treated in a representative capacity, as the agent of the corpo-
ration, which was in fact the real principal in the suit.
It is however very important to direct the writ to the munic-
ipal officials by their official titles, rather than by their personal
appellations ; as the former method avoids the danger of abate-
ment, which may arise from the death, removal or resignation
of such officials.^ If, pending proceedings upon a writ, the of-
ficial concerned goes out of office, it will not issue against him,
as he cannot legally perform an official act after the close of his
term of office ; * but if the writ is directed to the officer by his
title, and not to him individually; or if, as is the case generally
with municipal officials, the duty is impersonal and devolves
upon his successors, the writ is still operative.*
The service of the alternative writ is usually regulated by
statute and does not differ materially from the service of a
summons,® or other judicial process. The original should in-
variably be shown and a copy left with the official or officials
who are to make the return thereto.^
§ 368. Return to the alternative writ. — The rules, gov-
erning the return to a writ served upon a municipal corpora-
tion, in no wise differ from those which control in other circum-
stances. The return must be direct and positive in its terms,"
1 Willcock Corporations, 389, pis.
135, 137; Kex v. Abingdon, 1 Lord
Raymond, 560.
2 State V. New Orleans, 35 La. 68;
Kex V. West Love, 3 B. & C. 685 ; State
ex rel. Soutter v. Madison Council,
15 Wis. 30; Peo. v. Breen, 18 Mich.
247; State v. Gates, 22 Wis. 210; State
V. Elkington, 30 N. J. L. 335; Beachy
V. Lamkin, 1 Idaho, 48; Louisville v.
Kean, 18 B. Mon. 9, 13 ; Peo. v. Ma-
her, 19 N. T. Sup. 759 (1892.)
" Peo. V. Greene Co., 12 Barb. 222;
Peo. V. Hayt, 66 N. Y. 607.
4 Thompson v. U. S., 103 V. S. 480;
Peo. V. Collins Co., 19 Wend. 56;
Peo. V. Champion, 16 Johns. 61.
' State V. Sups., 67 Wis. 274.
« New York Code Civ. Pro. §2071;
754
Clarke Co. Comm'rs v. State, 61 Ind.
75 ; see contra, State v. King, 29 Kan.
607; State ex rel. Havemeyer v. Min.
Pt. Sup., 22 Wise. 396; State v. Elk-
ington, 30 N. J. L. 335; Hampstead
V. TJnderliill, 20 Ark. 337; State v.
Super., 39 Wis. 264; St. Louis v.
Sparks, 10 Mo. 118; Peo. v. Pearson,
3 Scam. (111.) 274; Peo. v. Judges, 4
Cow. (N. Y.) 73; Ladue v. Spaulding,
17 Mo. 159 ; Havemeyer v. Min. Point,
22 Wis. 396.
' Pierce v. Bleckweun, 30 N. E. R.
67; 131 N. Y. 570; State v. Tram-
mell, 106 Mo. 510; People v. Board,
46 Hun, 296; People v. Cromwell
102 N. Y. 477; People v. Super's, 53
Hun, 254.
CH. XVin.] MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO.
§369
either denying facts as stated by petitioner, or stating new facts
sufficient to defeat his riglit.^ Or the issue may be made by
filing a demurrer to the alternative writ.^
In practice, a distinction is made between a return and a de-
murrer to an alternative writ for insufficiency of law. The man-
damus may be considered to serve as a declaration or complaint ;
and if in the opinion of the respondent it does not state facts
sufficient to impose the legal duty, he may demur.^ But the re-
turn is in no case conclusive ; and any issue, either of fact or
law arising thereon, will be disposed of according to the prac-
tice of the jurisdiction, in which the action for mandam,us has
been instituted. If respondent declines to obey the command,
of the writ, he may select any one of four courses open to him :
(1) he may object because of defects apparent upon the face of
the writ ; (2) he may demur ; (3) deny the facts upon which
the writ has been granted ; (4) or allege other facts by way of
confession and avoidance.*
§ 369. Peremptory writ ; when allowed means of enforc-
ing obedience. — If in his return to the alternative writ, or to a
preliminai-y order to show cause, the defendant shall fail to dis-
prove the facts stated by the relator ; or if in an argument upon
Co. Bd. , 10 Iowa, 157 ; People v. Baker,
35 Barb. (N. T.) 105; State v. Haben,
22 Wis. 660; People v. Hilliard, 29111.
413 ; as to defence of officer de facto,
see Kelly v. Wimberly, 61 Miss. 548 ;
St. Louis V. Green, 7 Mo. App. 468 ;
People V. Logan Co., 63 111. 374; Fow-
ler V. Pierce, 2 Cal. 165; State v.
Jones, 10 Iowa, 65 ; People v. Metro.
Pol. Bd., 26 N. Y. 216; Maddox v.
Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56.
* 2 Dillon's Mun. Corp., § 877, citing :
Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong
V. Allegheny Co. Com'rs, 37 Pa. St.
277 ; Same ex rel. Middleton v.
Same, 37 lb. 237; Tarver v. Talla-
poosa Com'rs Ct., 17 Ala. 527; Com-
monwealth V. Lyndall, 2 Brew. (Pa.)
425; Dane v. Derby, 54 Me. 95; Ben-
bow V. Iowa City, 7 Wall. 313; U. S.
V. Ft. Scott, 99 U. S. 152; Elliott v.
Oliver, (Or. 92) 29 Pac. R. 1.
755
1 Canova V. State, 18 Fla. 512; Levy
V. Inglish, 4 Ark. 65; Goss v. Ver-
montville etc., 44 Mich. 319; Wood-
ruff V. N. Y. & N. E. R. R., 20 Atl. R.
17 ; Society etc. v. Com. , 52 Pa. St. 125 ;
People V. Com'rs, 11 How. Pr. 89;
Ray V. "Wilson, 10 So. R. 613; Peo-
ple V. Com'rs, 6 Colo. 202; Spring-
field V. Com'rs, 10 Pick. 59.
■■' Com. V. Alleg. Co., 37 Pa. St. 279;
Legg V. Mayor, 42 Md. 203; Neuse v.
Com'rs, 6 Jones L. (N. C.) 204; State
V. Griscom, 3 Halst. (N. J.) ; Sout-
ter V. Madison, 15 Wis. 30; Tallapoosa
V. Tarver, 21 Ala. 661 ; Pollock v. Law-
rence, P. L. J. 373; Loute V. All. Co.,
10 lb. 241; People v. Baker, 35 Barb.
105.
speoplev. Ransom, 2 N. Y. 490;
People V. Hayt, 66 lb. 606; Canal
Trs. V. People, 12 111. 254; State v.
Baily, 7 Iowa, 390; State v. Johnson
§ 369
MT7NICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XVIII.
a demurrer, either to the writ or to the return, the legal insuf-
ficiency of defendant's position be evident, a peremptory man-
damus will issue.^ If in the first instance the facts are un-
questionable, and the rights of the relator clear ; and especially
if the matter is one of public interest and requiring immediate
attention,^ the peremptory mandamus may be issued at once.*
So far as form is concerned, the rules generally applicable to
framing and amending pleadings and process, so as to secure
substantial justice, are permitted to operate within reasonable
and appropriate limits.*
This remedy being peculiarly within the discretion of the
court, it may be annulled, even after the issue of the peremptory
and final writ, if it be proven that unfair or improper means
have been used in procuring it, or that the duty commanded
is not required by law.^ If the validity of the writ be admitted
or if the defendant fails in his attempt to impugn it, he must
obey its command ; and such obedience is usually enforced, in
the case of a municipal corporation, as the corporation cannot
itself be adjudged guilty of contempt,^ by attaching the persons
of those officials who are actually in contempt by their refusal
or neglect to observe the commands of the writ.'^
Equity will not usually interfere by injunction to stay the
proceedings attendant upon a peremptory mandamus, upon the
ground that equity follows the law,^ and it is no excuse for a
municipality to show that it has been enjoined by a State court
1 State V. Field, 37 Mo. App. 83;
Com. V. Pittsbui-gh, 34 Pa. St. 496;
Morgauthaler v. Cities, 4 Ohio Cir.
Ct. 495; Dow v. Hembert, 91 U. S.
294; People v. Seymour, 6 Cow. 579;
Comm'rs v. Asplnwall, 24 How. (U.
S.) 376; Weber v. Zimmerman, 23
Md. 45; Harkins v. Tencerbox, 2
Minn. 344; People v. Rich. Co. Svip.,
28 N. Y. 112; In re Rogers, 7 Cow.
526; Attala Co. B'rd v. Grant, 17
Miss. 77; State v. Elkinton, 30 N. J.
L. 3.35.
2 People V. St. Louis & S. F. Ry.,
47 Hun, 543; Knox Co. v. Aspinwall,
24 How. 376.
^ Lutterloli v. Cumberland Co.
-Comm'rs, 65 N. C. 403; People v.
756
Greene Co. Sup., 64 N. T. 600; Eugg
V. Camden, 39 X. J. L. 620; Cleve-
land V. Jer. City, 39 lb. 629; State v.
Hud. Co. Freeh., 35 lb. 269; State v.
Jones, 1 Ired. (K. C.) 129.
* Peo. V. Dutchess Co. etc., 58 N. T.
152 and cases cited.
s State V. Johnson Co. J., 12 Iowa,
237; Weber V. Zimmerman, 23 Md.
45; Peo. v. Everett, 1 Cai. (N. T.) 8.
^ Bass V. Shakopee, 27 Minn. 25D;
Davis V. New York, 1 Duer, 451;
London v. Lynn, 1 H. Bl. 206.
' Commonwealth v. Taylor, 36 Pa.
St. 263 ; Regina v. Heathcote, 10 Mod.
56; State ex rel. Havemeyer v. Miu
Pt., 22 Wis. 396.
8 Col. Co. V. Bryson, 13 Fla. 281.
CH. XVIII.J MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO.
§370
from performing a duty, the enforcement of whioh is commanded
by a Federal mandamus.^ Under exceptional circumstances,
wiien a municipality has been enjoined or otherwise prevented
from obeying a Federal process, a U. S. marshal will be ap-
pointed a commissioner to carry such process into effect.^
§ 370. Final judgment— Effect of resignation or death
of officials. — If, according to the general practice, the mandor
mus proceedings be instituted and carried on against the munici-
pality in its corporate capacity, it is no ground for abating the
judgment, granting a peremptory mandamus, that the officials
who are to execute its commands have resigned, or that the
membership of any board on whom it is obligatory has been
changed.^ But when judgment is rendered against an official,
Ids resignation before it is entered will render it ineffectual as
against his successor, unless such successor be made a party to
the proceeding.*
This distinction, as to the effect of a resignation of an officer,
whose duty is to obey the commands of a peremptory writ of
mandamus, where the writ is directed against the municipality,
and where it is directed against the individual official, is ex-
ceedingly important where, in pursuance of the effort of a mu-
nicipal corporation to escape its liability to its creditors, the
officials who would have to obey the mandamus resign their
offices before the peremptoiy writ can be served upon them.
Their resignation does not have any effect, if the writ is directed
' Eiggs V. Johnson City, 6 Wall.
166; Selbei-t v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284;
Hill V. Scott, 32 Fed. Rep. 716;
Wasli'n Co. Suprs. v. Durant, 9 Wall.
415; Davenpoi-t v. Lord, 9 lb. 409;
State V. Rainey, 74 Mo. 229; Lansing
V. County Tr., 1 Dillon, C. C. 522;
United States v. Silverman, 4 lb. 224;
Weber v. Lee Co., 6 Wall. 210; United
States V. Keokuk, 6 lb. 214, 518; Amy
V. Des Moines, 11 lb. 136; Dillon
Mun. Corp. § 861.
^Lans. V. County Treas., 1 Dillon C.
C. 522; Lee Co. Sup. v. Rogers, 7
Wall. 175; Eees v. Watertown, 19
Wall. 107; Heine v. Levee Com'rs,
19 lb. 655.
' Leavenworth Co. Comm'rs v. Sel-
lew, 99 U. S. 624; Stat ex rel. Sout-
ter V. Madison Coun., 15 Wis. 30;
Louisville v. Keen, 18 B. Mon. 9, 13;
People v. Collins, 19 Wend. 68; Mad-
dox v. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56, 63,
71 ; Pegram v. Cleve. Co. Comm'rs,
65 N. C. 114; Columbia Co. Com. v.
King, 18 Fla. 451; Leavenworth v.
Kinney, 99 U. S. 623; see 2 Dillon
Mun. Corp. § 861 a to § 861 d, inc.
4 Secretary of the Int. v. MoGarra-
ham, 9 Wall. 298, 313; Beachy v.
Lamkin, 1 Idaho, 48; State ex rel.
Soutter V. Mad. Cora., 15 Wis. 30;
State V. Elkinton, 30 N. J. L. 335;
Rees V. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107;
United States v. Boutwell, 17 Wall.
604.
757
§371
MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. XVin.
against the corporation ; but if it is directed against the official,
his prior resignation will render it nugatory, as, in his character
as a private citizen, he is under no obligation to obey the writ
of mandamus for the performance of an official duty. But it is
held, where an official is declared bj' statute to continue in office,
until his successor has been appointed or elected, and has quali-
fied, that a resignation does not release such officer from the
duty of obeying a peremptory writ issued against him as the
incumbent of the office, unless his resignation has been accepted
and his successor has been appointed.^ But where the statute
expressly declares that a resignation shall take effect, as soon
as it is filed with a certain officer, the officer need not obey a
writ of mandamus, which is served upon him after such filing
of the resignation, although his successor has not been appointed
or elected.^
§ 371. Mandamns as applicable to municipal elections and
to elective officers. — In the constantly recurring litigation, aris-
ing out of our American system of selecting municipal officials
by popular suffrage, the writ of mandamus has been of frequent
use. If, in consequence of the refusal or delay of the officials
to act, on whom the duty of calling an election is incumbent,
the day appointed has passed and no election has-been held, the
municipality, or their officials, may be compelled by mandamus
to perform their duty in this respect,^ and the necessary prelimi-
nary steps in providing for the calling of such an election may
also be required.* When, also, a vacancy occurs, and by 'law a
special election is necessary for the purpose of filling it, manda-
mus in the name of. the State will furnish the most appropriate
and effective remedy for compelling the holding of the election.^
1 Badger v. United States, 93 U. S.
599; s. c, 6 Blss. 308; Jones v. Jef-
ferson, 66 Tex. 576; Edwards v.
United States, 103 U. S. 471; Sala-
manca T. Wilson, 109 U. S. 671.
2 Amy V. Watertown, 130 U. S. 302;
City of Watertown v. Kobinson, 69
Wis. 230.
^Demarest v. Wickham, 63 N. Y.
334; Lewis v. Marshall, 16 Kan. 102;
Glencove v. Peo., 78 111. 382; Peo. v.
Fairbury, 51 111. 149; State v. Smith,
'1-Z Minn. 218; State v. Tolan, 33 N.
758
J. L. 195; McConike v. State, 17
Fla. 238; Atty. Gen. v. Lawrence, 11
Mass. 90; State v. Holden, 19 Neb.
249.
* Gibbs V. Hampden, 19 Pick. 298;
Irkre Morse, 18 lb. 443; In re Strong,
20 lb. 484; Lamb v. Lynd, 44 Pa. St.
336; State v. Boden, (IST. J.) 16 Atl.
Kep. 58.
^Fish V. Weatherwax, 2 Johns.
Cas. 217; State v. Rahway, 33 N. J.
L. 110; People v. Brooklyn Council,
77 N. Y. 503; People v. Carrique, 2
CH. XVIII.] MANDAMUS AND QUO "WARRANTO.
§371
And if in place of being elected directly by popular vote, the
municipal ofiScer is appointed by one or more select bodies or
councils, acting under rules laid down in the charter, by which
the time for such appointment is determined, a mandatory duty
is imposed and its performance may be compelled by mandamus }■
The control and supervision of elections, at which municipal.
State and national officers are elected, are often vested in mu-
nicipal officials and boards ; and they may be compelled by
mandamus to perform all such duties thus imposed upon them,
which are not purely judicial,'-^ such as canvassing election re-
turns,* or announcing the result.*
The duty, which the returning officer or canvassing body
owes to the person elected, of giving him a proper certificate of
his election, may also be compelled by a mandamus,^ unless
the person so elected fails to show that he possesses the neces-
siiry and legal qualifications for the office, whenever that ques-
tion has been raised before the canvassing board.^
Hill (N. T.) 93; Lamb v. Lynd, 44
Pa. St. 336 ; Rex v. Cambridge, 4 Burr.
2011.
1 Lamb v. Lynd, 44 Pa. St. 336 ; Kerr
V. Trego, 44 Pa. St. 292; Brightley's
Elect. Cases, 270, 455, 466, 656.
2Kimere v. State, 129 Ind. 589;
Rice V. Smith, 9 Iowa, 570; McDiar-
mid V. Fitch, 27 Ark. 106: State v.
Marston, 6 Kan. 524; State v. Shakes-
peare, 6 So. Rep. 592; State v. Batl,
4 lb. 495 ; State v. Parish, 2 lb. 305 ;
State V. Meadows, 1 Kan. 90; State
V. Magill, 4 lb. 415 ; People v. Taylor,
45 Barb. 129; Roberts v. Davidson,
83 Ky. 279; Parker v. Hubbard, 64
Ala. 203; People v. French, 24 Hun,
:63; State v. Palmer, 18 Neb. 644;
Monroe v. State, 63 Miss. 135 ; Dick-
son V. Hill, 75 Ga. 369; State v. Cum-
mings, 17 Neb. 311 ; People v. Regis-
.trar, 20 N. E. R. 611 ; State v. Mayor,
43 N. J. L. 542; People v. Purviance,
12 111. Ap. 216; Ridley V. Dougherty,
(Iowa) 42 N. W. R. 78; State v. Wil-
son, (Neb.) 38 N. W. R. 31; Ramsey
V. Clerk, 52 Mich. 344.
» State V. Howe, (Neb. 92) 44 N. "W.
R. 874; Peo. v. Super's, 47 Cal. 205;
Peo. V. Hilliard, 29 111. 419; Kisler v.
Cameron, 39 Ind. 488; State v. Car-
ney, 3 Kan. 88; Territory v. B. Co.,
(New Mex.) 20 Am. & Eng. Cor.
Cases, 44; Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan.
(Tenn.) 68; O'Ferrall v. Colby, 2
Minn. 180; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 lb.
107; Bacon v. York, 26 Me. 491;
State V. Steers, 44 Mo. 228; State v.
Rodman, 43 lb. 256; Mayo v. Free-
land, 10 lb. 629; Peo. v. Van Cleve,
1 Mich. 362; Atty. Gen. v. Barstow,
4 Wis. 749.
* Peo. V. Saloman, 46 HI. 415.
^Putman v. Langley, 133 Mass.
204; In re Strong, 20 Pick. (Mass.)
484; State v. Judge Cir. Ct., 13 Ala.
805; Clark v. McKenzie, 7 Bush.
523; Kisler v. Cameron, 39 Ind. 488;
State V. Co. Jud. , 7 Iowa, 186 ; Barnes
V. Gottschalk, 3 Mo. App. Ill; Rob-
erts V. Rivers, 27 111. 242; Thompson
V. Judge, 9 Ala. 338; State v. Baily,
7 Iowa, 390; Roberts v. Rivers, 27
111. 242; Ingerson v. Berry, 14 Ohio,
315; Territory v. Bern. Co., supra.
6 O'Farrall v. Colby, 2 Minn. 180;
759
§372
MTJNICIPAIi COKPORATIONS.
[CH. xvin.
If, on receiving such a certificate he meets with a refusal of
the proper officer to administer the oath of office to him, matv-
damns will lie, provided the office be vacant.^ But where an
office is filled by one, who holds it de facto and under color of
right, and who is exercising the functions of the office, manda-
mus is not the proper remedy for determining between the two
claimants the question of title to the office. Quo warranto is
the proper remedy for this case, and the question of right to
the office must first be determined by quo warranto, before man-
damns will lie to compel parties in possession of the office to
turn it over to the rightful claimants.^
§ 372. Maudamns as applicable to removal and suspen-
sion of officials. — In some cases, where a municipal official is
I'emovable by the municipality for malfeasance or nonfeasance,
a mandamus will lie to compel the exercise of this power,^ and
the power to remove being inclusive of power to suspend for a
reasonable time,* it may be inferred that a mandamus will be
granted to compel the suspension of a municipal official pending
investigation. On the other hand, if the powers of suspension
or removal be illegall}' exercised, a mandamus will generally is-
yue to reinstate the injured official.® But although the act of
State V. Moffatt, 5 Ohio, 358, 362;
State V. Newman, 91 Mo. 445.
iJn re Heath, 3 Hill (N. T.)42;
Ex parte Diggs, 52 Ala. 381 ; Ex parte
Wiley, 54 lb. 226; State v. McCul-
lough, 3 Nev. 202 ; Clayton v. Carey,
4 Md. 26; State v. Andr, 36 Mo. 70;
Lindsley v. Trickett, 20 Tex. 516;
Morley v. Power, 5 Lea, (Tenn.) 691;
Putnam v. Langley, 133 Mass. 204;
Peo. V. Matteson, 17 HI. 167; Peo. v.
Head, 25 lb. 287; Peo. v. Hilliard, 29
lb. 413; Peo. v. Langham, 20 Barb.
(N. T.) 302; Peo. v. Trustees, 7 N.
Y. Sup. 125; Atty. Gen. v. Mayor,
128 Mass. 312; State v. Harlam, 25
Neb. 33; McDermott v. Miller, 45 N.
J. L. 253 ; State v. Rahway, 33 lb. 111.
2 Ellison V. Aldermen of Raleigh,
89 N. C. 125; Kelley v. Edwards, 69
Cal. 460; St. Louis Co. v. Sparks, 10
Mo. 118; People v. Matterson, 17 111.
167 ; Meredith v. Supervisors of Sac-
760
ramento, 50 Cal. 433; Denver v. Ho-
bart, 10 Nev. 28; Brown v. Turner,
70 N. C. 93; Warner v. Myers, 4
Oreg. 72; People v. Hilliard, 29 HI.
413; Bonner v. State, 7 Ga. 473;
State V. Deliesseline, 1 McCord, 52;
People V. Head, 25 HI. 287; State v.
Auditor, 36 Mo. 70; People v. New
York, 3 Johns. Cas. 79; see State v.
Falconer, 44 Ala. 696; Strong's
Case, 20 Pick. 497; Lindsey v. Luck-
ett, 20 Tex. 516; State v. Pilot, 21
La. An. 336; State v. John, 81 Mo. 13;
Underwood v. White, 27 Ark. 382;
Banton v. Wilson, 4 Tex. 400; Conlin
V. Aldrich, 98 Mass. 557; Putnam
v. Langley, 133 Mass. 204.
8 Delahauty v. Warner, 75 111. 185.
* Shannon v. Portsmouth, 54 N. H.
183; 1 Dillon Mun. Cor., sec. 247,
note 1, and cases cited.
» Angell & Ames, sees. 702, 706;
Dew V. Judges, 3 Hen. & M. (Va.) 1;
CH. XVIU.] MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO.
§ 373
removal has been done irregularly ; if the court inquires into,
and establishes the fact that good grounds for the removal
existed,^ or if the justice of the removal is admitted by the
official applying for the mandamus^ it will be denied.^
§ 373. Mandamus, as applicable to custodians of public
records and of public funds. — This writ is the appropriate
process for a legally elected or appointed official, to obtain pos-
session of the records, seal of office and other property of which
he is to be the custodian,^ as against his predecessor or a usurp-
er,* or against a committee acting illegally to compel delivery of
documents belonging to the city.^ Mandamus will lie against
a custodian of public records ; as, for example, a clerk having
charge of registration lists, poll books or election returns,® to
compel him to permit an inspection of them for any proper pui--
pose ; and, under reasonable precautionary regulations, to allow
copies to be made thereof, on the application of any citizen hav-
ing an interest therein.'''
When, in order to give the right of appeal, officials must make
a record of their action, they may be compelled to do so by man-
damus ; ^ and an official may be compelled to record a deed or
file a paper,^ or to correct his records.^" Commissioners may
State V. Watertown Council, 9 "Wis.
254; Delahanty v. Warner, 75 111. 185;
State V. Patterson, 38 N". J. L. 190;
State V. Jer. City, 25 lb. 536; State
V. Gall. Co. Commissioners, 1 111. 25 ;
Delacy v. N. River N. Co., 1 Hawks
(N. C.) 274.
1 Rex V. London, 2 D. & E. T. R.
181; Rex v. Bristol, 1 D. & R. 389;
s. c, 5 B. & A. 731; In re Paine, 1
Hill (N. T.) 665, 667; Shaw v. Mayor
etc., 21 Ga. 280; s. c, 25 Ga. 590.
2 Rex V. Axbridge, Cowper, 523.
» State V. Bacon, 6 Neb. 286; Stone
V. Small, 54 Vt. 498; Keokuk v. Mer-
riam, 44 Iowa, 432 ; Conlin v. Aldrich,
98 Mass. 357; Anier. R. F. Co. v. Ha-
Ten, 101 lb. 398.
* Bates V. Plymouth, 14 Gray, 163;
Perkins v. Weston, 3 Cush. 549; Par-
ish V. Stearns, 21 Pick. 156; Ex parte
Strong, 20 lb. 484; Taylor v. Henry,
2 lb. 397; Kimball v. Lamprey, 19 X.
H. 215 ; Com. v. Athearn, 3 Mass. 285 ;
Prop'rs V. Slack, 7 Cush. 226; People
V. KildufE, 15 111. 492.
' State V. Kirkley, 20 Md. 85.
6 State V. Hoblitzelle, 85 Me. 620.
' Hayes v. White, 66 Me. 305 ; Stock-
man V. Brooks, 27 Pac. R. 746;
O'Hara v. King, 52 HI. 303; Diamond
M. Co. V. Powers, 51 Mich. 145; Cor-
mack V. Wolcott, 17 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cases, 309; State v. Raohao, 37
Minn. 372.
8 State V. Field, 37 Mo. App. 83;
Bennett v. McCaffrey, 28 lb. 220;
Warren Co. v. State, 15 Ind. 250.
9 Trinity v. Lane, 79 Tex. 643; U.
S. V. Hall, 7 Mackey, 14; Willflange
V. McCollom, 83 Ky. 361; People v.
Collins, 7 Johns. 549; In re Goodell,
14 lb. 325; Strong's Case, Kirby
(Conn.) 345.
10 People V. Brooklyn, 7 N. T. S. 327 ;
State V. Clayton, 34 Mo. App. 563;
761
§ 375 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XVm.
also be compelled by mandamus to receive and file a petition,^
or to affix a seal to a document requiring it.'-* So, also, a man-
damus will lie to compel the treasurer of a municipality to re-
ceive coupons for taxes, if this is required by statute,^ or to
issue a duplicate tax bill, with the legal rate stated thereon.*
§ 374. Mandamns against school officers. — Mandamus will
lie against a school board,^ to compel a mandatory duty, such
as the admission of a child to the public schools,® but not if
the school is full ; "^ and when it is the absolute duty of the trus-
tees to introduce certain text books, mandamus will lie to com-
pel them to perform that duty.^
When the act to be done is ministerial, mandamus will lie,
even though it is to be performed upon the occurrence of a cer-
tain condition of facts ; and it is discretionary with the school
officers to decide according to their best judgment, whether such
a condition exists.^
As it is the duty of school trustees controlling the school
funds of a township to apply such funds to indebtedness for
tuition, mandamus will lie to compel the performance of this
duty.io
§ 375. Mandamus in aid of the rights of municipal cred-
itors.— When, in pursuance of the almost unlimited powers
which are possessed by the legislative authority over the disposi-
tion of the funds, revenues and general financial resources of
municipal corporations, statutes have been passed making it
mandatory upon them to levy taxes to meet tlieir contractual
Ellis V. Bristol, 2 Gray, 370; Bower
V. O'Brien, 2 Ind. 423; People v. Ma1>
teson, 17 111. 167.
1 Hawkins v. Com'rs, 14 Ind. 521.
^Tapping on Mandamus, p. 96; 3
Black Cora. 110; 2 Dillon's Mun.
Corp. § 831, n. ; Prescott v. Ganser,
34 Iowa, 175 (seal to a county war-
rant).
3 Sands v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 585.
« Hamilton v. State, 8 Ind. 452.
5 Case V. Blood, 71 Iowa, 632.
0 Peo. V. Board, 18 Mich. 400; State
V. Osborne, 24 Mo. App. 309; State
V. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342; Clark v. Board,
24 Iowa, 366; Peo. v. Board etc., 127
111. 613.
762
' Be Nicoll, 44 Hun (N. T.) 340.
' State V. School Directors, 74 Mo.
21; Cf. Effingham v. Hamilton, 68
Miss. 523.
9 People V. Coffey, 131 N. Y. 569;
Trustees v. People, 121 111. 552;
Newby v. Free, 72 Iowa, 379; State
V. Duffy, 7 NCT. 342; Morley v. Pow-
er, 5 Lea, 691 ; Clark v. Board, 24
Iowa, 266; State v. Ha worth, 23 N.
E. E. 946.
10 Gardner v. Haney, 86 Ind. 17;
Smith V. Johnson, 69 lb. 55 ; Jessup
V. Carey, 61 lb. 584; Board v. State,
61 Ind. 379; State v. Cooprider, 96
lb. 279.
CH. XVIII.J MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO.
§375
obligations, obedience to such statutes will be enforced by man-
damus} The power to contract connotes the obligation and
power to meet financial liabilities incurred thereby,^ in the mode
prescribed by special law, or by the municipal charter or other
legislative enactment. Such cases fall within the rules already
laid down, governing the right to a mandamus, when the injured
party to the contract has no other adequate redress ; and for
this reason, the writ will generally be granted.^
Neglect to exert the power of levying taxes, at the time le-
gally appointed, does not prevent the issue of a mandamus at
some future period, provided the indebtedness is still unpaid.*
Not only will mandamus lie to compel the levy of assessments
or the appropriation of funds by a municipality ; but it will
usually be granted, if invoked to compel the performance of
any preliminary acts which may be necessary and usual in the
1 Bloorafield t. Char. Oak Bk., 121
U. S. 121; Lilly v. Taylor, 88 N". C.
489; Howers App., 127 Pa. St. 134;
17 Atl. E. 862; Meyer v. Brown, 65
Cal. 583; Shelly v. St. Charles Co.,
30 Fed. Rep. 603; Commonwealth v.
Pittsb.. 34 Pa. St. 496; Chero. Co. v.
Wilson, 109 U. S. 621; Wakely v.
Muscatine, 6 Wall. 481 ; State v. Board,
etc., 27 Ohio St. 96; Cincinnati etc.
V. Clinton Co., 1 lb. 77; Atchison v.
Jefferson Co., 12 Kan. 127; Com. v.
Pittsburgh, 88 Pa. St. 66.
2 Com. V. Alle. Co. Comm'rs, 37
Pa. St. 277, 290; U. S. v. New Or-
leans, 98 U. S. 381; U. S. v. New Or-
leans, 17 Fed. Rep. 483 ; Knox v. Ba-
ton Rouge, 36 La. An. 427; Ralls. Co.
V. U. S., 105 U. S. 733; Loan Ass'n
V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 680; Par-
kersb. v. Brown, 106 IT. S. 582.
3 State V. Anderson, 18 Atl. R. 584;
Brown v. Gates, 15 W. Va. 131 ; Crane
v.Fond duLac, 16 Wis. 196; State v.
Beloit, 20 lb. 79; Hasbrouck v. Milw.,
25 lb. 122; State v. Jacksonville,
22Fla. 21; State v. Guttenberg, 30 N.
J. L. 660; Lexington v. MuUiken, 7
Gray, 280; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4
Wall. 535; Alden v. Alameda Co., 43
Cal. 279; Young v. Clarendon, 132
U. S. 340; Vance V. Lit. Rock, 30 Ark.
435; Com. v. Perkins, 43 Pa. St. 400;
Newman v. Scott etc., 1 Heisk. 787;
Davenport v. Lord, 9 Wall. 409;
Heine v. Comm'rs, 19 lb. 6.55;
Rees V. Watertown, 19 lb. 107; Klein
V. Smith Co., 54 Miss. 254; Flagg v.
Palmyra, 33 Mo. 440; Klein v. Warren
Co., 54 Miss. 254; Col. Co. Comm'rs
V. King, 13 Fla. 451 ; State v. Burbank,
22 La. An. 318; State v. Buff. Co., 6
Neb. 455 ; Kelly v. Wimbei-ly, 61 Miss.
548; Hawley V. Fayetteville, 82 N. C.
22; Brown v. Crego, 32 la. 408; Ken-
nedy v. Sacramento, 19 Fed. 580; see
contra, Coy v. Lyons, 17 la. 1 ; State
V. Davenport, 12 Iowa, 335; Eyerly
V. Jasper Co., 72 Iowa, 149; Barnes v.
Marshall Co., 58 lb. 20; Miller v. Mc-
Williams, 50 Ala. 427; Elmore Co. v. '
Long, 52 lb. 277; Covington Co. v.
Dunklin, 52 lb. 28; Shinbone v. Ran-
dolph Co., 56 lb. 183; Monaghan v.
Phila., 28 Pa. St. 207; Commonwealth
v. Pitts., 88 Pa. 66; Commonwealth
V. Lancaster, 5 Watts (Pa.) 132.
4 Limestone Co. v. Rather, 48 Ala.
433.
763
§375
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. xvni.
settlement by ministerial officials of the claims of municipal
creditors ; as, for example, to compel a council to order an esti-
mate to be made of the amount of tax necessary,^ or to compel
the auditing board or auditor to perform his duty in the prem-
ises,^ such as to audit the claim, or to issue a warrant or other
certificate of indebtedness, when directed to do so by superior
authority.^
But if the amount be uncertain, mandamus will not lie against
an auditor, and the claimant will be relegated to a civil action
whereby the extent of his right can be ascertained.* Hence, it
has been the general, although by no means a uniform rule, that
a creditor must, by a judgment obtained in a civil action, estab-
lish with certainty the amount of the municipal indebtedness
to him, before a mandamus will be granted to compel the levy
of the taxes which will be necessary to liquidate the indebted-
ness. A court will not anticipate in a controverted case a
judicial determination of the validity of a claim, by issuing a
mandamus to compel its payment.^ In the Federal courts, man-
1 Greeufleld v. Moore, 33 Ind. 597.
2 People V. FuHon, 53 Hun, 254;
Attala V. Grant, 17 Miss. 77; Klein
V. Warren, 51 lb. 878 ; Klein v.
Smith Co., 54 lb. 254; Putnam Co.
V. Allen, 1 Ohio St. 322; Peo. v. Com.
Ooun., 34 Mich. 201; State v. Earl, 42
JiT. J. L. 94; Crandall v. Amadar, 20
Cal. 72; Gerrard v. McKee, 11 Bush,
234.
3 Babcock v. Goodrich, 47 Cal. 488;
Com. V. Lancaster, 5 Watts, 152; U.
S. V. Ottawa, 28 Fed. Eep.; State v.
Fiedler, 43 N. J. L. 400; State v.
Anderson, 18 Atl. E. 584; People v.
Abbott, 45 Hun, 293; State v. Mount,
21 La. An. 352; Jack v. Moore, 66
Ala. 184.
*Eaisoh v. Board, 22 Pac. E. 890;
People V. Barnes, 114 N. Y. 317;
Crawley v. Mershor, 61 Ga. 284; Bur-
nett V. Portage Co. etc., 12 Ohio St.
57; People v. Supervisors, 38 Mich.
421; People v. Flagg, 17 N. T. 584;
Cal. Bank v. Shabe, 55 Cal. 322;
764
State V. Trustees, 61 Mo. 155 ; State
V. Scott, 15 Neb. 147; Peo. v. Green,
1 Hun, 1 ; People v. Johnson, 100 111.
537; People v. Connolly, 2 Abb. Pr.
N. S. 315; State v. Earle, 42 N. J. L.
94; People v. Harris, 23 How. Pr. 107;
Tenn. etc. Co. v. Moore, 36 Ala. 371;
Peo. V. Vantassel, (Mich.) 40 N. W.
E. 847.
^ Territory v. Woodbury, 44 N. W.
R. 1077; State v. Snodgrass, 98 Ind,
546; Alden v. Alameda, 43 Cal. 270
Jerome v. Kio Grande, 18 Fed. E,
873; Greene v. Datoiel, 102 IT. S. 187
Crane v. Fond du Lac, 16 Wis. 196
Marsh v. Little Valley, 64 N. T. 112
People V. Clark Co., 50 111. 213; State
V. New Orleans, 30 La. An. 82; 30 lb.
129; Buck v. Lockport, '6 Lans. 251;
Brown v. Gates, 15 W. Va. 131 ; State
V. Clay Co., 46 Mo. 231; Mansfield v.
Fuller, 50 lb. 338; State v. Trustees,
61 lb. 155; Knapp v. Hoboken, 38 N.
J. L. 371; State V. Floyd, 5 Iowa, 380;
Lexington v. MuUiken, 7 Gray, 280.
CH. XVIII.] MANDAMUS AND QUO "WAEKANTO.
§375
damns is granted onl}!- after judgments, and in suits against
municipalities it takes the place of an execution. i
In the New England States, there is no necessity for the use
of the writ, to compel the payment of indebtedness incurred by
counties, towns and similar political divisions ; the property of
the individual members of the corporation may by common law
and immemorial usage be taken in execution against the mu-
nicipality .^ But, in the absence of express statutory provisions,
there is outside of these States, no individual liability on the
part of the inhabitants of a municipality, nor can private prop-
erty be taken in execution to pay municipal debts. ^
Municipal corporations are created for public, governmental
and political purposes and it is a corollary of this proposition,
that all property, of whatever nature, held by them in trust for
carrying out such purposes, should be exempted from seizure
and sale under execution.* Under any other theory, the para-
mount importance of the proper execution of its public func-
tions would be lost sight of, and its usefulness in subserving the
interests of the community curtailed or destroyed.^
But when a judgment has been recovered, and either under
the general principle above stated,^ or under some local statute,
execution is refused ; '' or when issued is returned unsatisfied ;
1 Greene Co. v. Daniel, 102 TT. S. 187;
Heine v. Levee Com'rs, 19 Wall. 655;
McClung V. Silliman, 6 Wheat. 601 ;
Bath Co. V. Amy, 13 Wall. 244; Ken-
dall V. U. S., 12 Pet. 584; Mclntire v.
Wood, 7 Cranch, 504; Davenport v.
Dodge, 105 TJ. S. 237; Smith v. Bour-
bon, 127 lb. 105 ; Labette v. Moulton,
112 U. S. 217; 2 Dil. Mun. Corp. 856,
860, et seq.
2 Bloomfield v. Charter O. Bk., 12
U. S. 129; Eames v. Savage, 77 Me.
212; Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn.
368; Hawkes v. New. Co., 7 Mass.
461, 463; Hill v. Boston, 122 lb. 344;
Chase v. Mor. Bk., 19 Pick. 564; Gas-
kill V. Dudley, 6 Met. (Mass.) 546.
3 Eeese v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107,
122; Mill V. McWilliams,50 Ala. 427;
see also, ante, §212; Horner v. Cof-
fey, 25 Miss. 434; Merri wether v.
Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; Crowell v.
Sonoma Co., 25 Cal. 313; Symonds v.
Clay Co. Sup., 71 111. 355 ; Sherbourne
V. Yuba Co., 21 Cal. 113; Kincaid v.
Hardin Co., 53 Iowa, 430; Flori v. St.
Louis, 69 Mo. 341.
* Edgerton v. Municipality, 1 La.
An. 435 ; Municipality v. Hart, 6 lb.
570; U. S. V. B. & O. R. Co., 17 Wall.
322 ; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S.
472; ante §§196, 212.
6 2 Dillon Mun. Corp. §§ 576, 577,
and cases cited. See ante, sec. 196.
6 Morrison V. Hankson, 87 111. 587;
Elrod V. Bernadotte, 53 lb. 368; Chi-
cago V. Hasley, 25 lb. 598; Bloom-
ington V. Brokaw, 77 111. 194.
"Monaghan v. Pbila., 28 Pa. St.
207; Loute v. AUeglieny Co., 10 Pitts.
L. J. 24; Pollock V. Lawrence Co., 7
lb. 373.
765
§ 376
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH. XVIII.
a mandamus will issue to compel the levy of a tax to be applied
to satisfaction of the judgment creditor.-^
§ 376. Mandamns to compel levy of a special tax for
specific object. — The power of a municipal corporation to
levy taxes is limited hj the terms of the statutory enactment
conferring the power, and must generally be expressly grantr
ed, although it may arise by necessary implication.^
If the power to create a debt is authorized by statute, but the
power to levy taxes to provide for its payment is by the same or
by any other statute limited and abridged, either as to amount
or objects, then it is very evident that no mandamus will issue
at the suit of any creditor to compel the exercise of the power
of taxation beyond these limits.^ For in such a case, the ob-
ject aimed at would be illegal and beyond the power of the mu-
nicipality.* In the absence of express statutory authority for
the creation of municipal obligations, it is even more evident
that the municipality is not bound, and that in all such cases of
implied obligation no mandamus will lie.^ A distinction is to
1 Peoria Co. v. Grarrison, 82 111.
435; United States v. Oswego Twp.,
28 Fed. E. 5.5; King, etc., v. Otoe
Co., 27 lb. 800; IGein v. Vy^arreu Co.,
51 Miss. 278; Klein v. Smith Co., 54
lb. 254; Corpus Cliristi v. Waessner,
54 Tex. 462; Com. v. Pittsburgh, 88
Pa. St. 66; Fry v. Comrs., 82 N. C.
304; State v. Jackson Co., 19 Fla. 17;
State V. Elizabeth, Treas., 42 N. J.
L. 79; 42 lb. 94; Fisher v. Charles-
town, 17 W. Va. 595; 17 lb. 682;
United States v. Ottawa, 28 Fed. R.
407; State v. New Oris., 30 La. An.,
pt. 1, 705; Coy v. Lyons, 17 Iowa, 1;
Louisiana ex rel. v. St. Martins, etc..
Ill U. S. 716; Britton v. Platte City,
2 Dillon C. C. 1; Frank v. San Fran.,
21 Cal. 668; Schafeer v. Cadwallader,
36 Pa. St. 126; Galena v. Amy, 5
Wall. 705; State v. King, 44 Mo. 116;
Rogers v. People, 68 111. 154; State v.
Milw. Council, 20 Wis. 87; State v.
Beloit, 20 lb. 79; 20 lb. 501.
2 See as to taxation ante, chap. xv.
8 Clay Co. V. McAleer, 115 U. S.
766
616; East St. Louis v. U. S. ex rel,
110 U. S. 321.
'People T. Hyde Pk., 117 111. 462;
In re M. E. Church, 66 N. T. 395;
Vance v. Lit. Rock, 30 Ark. 435; U.
S. V. Miller Co., 4 Dill. 233; U. S. v.
Mayor etc., 2 Woods, 230; U. S. v.
Carroll Co., 18 Wall. 71; U. S. v.
Clark Co., 95 U. S. 769; State v.
Board, 18 Atl. Rep. 571.
5U. S. V. Clark Co., 96 U. S. 212;
U. S. V. Macon Co., 99 U. S. 582; (Cf.
with this base Harshman v. Knox
Co., 122 U. S. 306; and Brownsville
V. Loague, 129 U. S. 493;) Knox Co.
V. U. S., 109 U. S. 229; Williamson v.
Keokuk, 44 Iowa, 88; People v. Jack-,
son, 92 111. 444; Chicot Co. v. Kruse,
47 Ark. 80; Sykes v. Columbus, 55
Miss. 115; McPherson v. Foster, 43
Iowa, 48; State v. Macon Co., 68 Mo.
29; as to powers by implication,
U. S. V. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 391;
U. S. V. Lincoln, 5 Dill. C. C. 184,
194, and cases cited.
CH. XVni.J MANDAMUS AlfD QUO WARRANTO.
§ 377
be recognized in this connection between the right to the levy
of a special tax to pay municipal debts, where the debt is a ne-
gotiable bond, and where it is a non-negotiable instrument, such
as a warrant. The power to levy a tax may be implied as an
intended means of paying the former, but it would never be
implied in favor of the latter.^ And if mandamus to levy a
tax would be issuable at all, at the instance of the holders of
warrants and other non-negotiable debt, it must be in pursu-
ance of an express authority, and is limited to the amount or
I'ate of taxation authorized.^
The municipal creditor is not entitled to a mandamus to en-
force the liquidation of a bonded indebtedness when, although
the original statute authorizing the issue was valid, it had been
abrogated prior to the issue of the bonds.* But the rule is other-
wise, where a constitutional restriction is imposed subsequent to
the contraction of the debt, but prior to the levy of the tax for
its payment.*
§ 377. Mandamus as applicable to municipal improve-
ments.— Where a mandatory duty is imposed by charter or
other statute upon municipal corporations, to make improve-
ments, such as the laying out of streets and highways and keep-
ing them in repair, mandamus will lie to compel its performance,^
but the duty must be clear.®
. The erection of certain buildings, provided for by statute, may
be compelled by mandamus.'' But here, as in other similar cases,
if the municipal authorities are invested with a discretion as to
1 2 Dillon Mun. Corp. § 862.
2 Carroll Co. Sup. v. United States,
18 "Wall. 71; United States v. Vernon
Co. Court, 3 Dillon, 281.
^ Brownsville v. Loague, 129 U. S.
49.3.
* Fisk V. Jefferson Par. etc., 116 U.
S. 131; Ex parte Selma etc., 45 Ala.
606; see ante, § 14.
sPerrine v. Twp., 48 Mich. 041;
Peo. V. San Luis, etc., 56 Cal. 561;
Peo. V. Bloomington, 63 111. 207; State
V. Super's, 41 Wis. 28; Trus. v. Kin-
ner, 13 Busli. 834; Pumplirey v.
Mayor, 47 Md. 145 ; State v. Demarce,
80 Ind. 519; State v. Board, 80 lb.
478; Uniontown V. Com., 34 Pa. St.
293, 296; Com'rs v. Com., 72 lb. 24;
Ottawa V. Peo., 48 111. 233; Richards
V. Com'rs, 120 Mass. 401; Peo. v. San
Francisco, 36 Cal. 595; Hammar v.
Covington, 3 Met. (Ky.) 494; Peo. v.
Collins, 19 Wend. 86; Peo. v. Brook-
lyn, 28 Barb. 404; Reading v. Cora.,
11 Pa. St. 196; Peo. v. Champion, IS
Johns. 61; Bloomington v. Bay, 42
111. 503; Chicago V. Robbins, 2 Black,
418.
6 Com. V. Peo., 99 HI. 587; 'State v.
Wood Co., 72 Mo. 629.
' Peo. V. Com., 45 Barb. 473; Manor
V. McCall, 5 Ga. 522.
767
§ 378
MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS.
[CH. XVIII.
the expediency or advisability of the proposed improvements,
no mandamus v^ill issue to control such discretion.^ But after
the improvements have been consummated, mandamus will lie
to compel the paj'^ment of damages to the property owners af-
fected thereby^ by a levy of taxes, or by issue of bonds for the
purpose of raising the necessary funds.^ So, also, will manda-
mus be granted to compel the taking of any of the usual prelimi-
nary steps which may be necessary to reimburse any owner,
whose property has been taken or injured by the exercise of
the power of eminent domain.*
§ 378. Nature of quo warranto. — In the case of an usurpa-
tion of a municipal office, or of the illegal exercise of a public
franchise, an information in the nature of a quo warranto will lie.^
The principles, underlying the ancient common law writ of
quo warranto, as regulated by the statute of Anne, have be-
come part of the common law of our States, either by implica-
tion or by express declaration of the Legislatures.®
' Trans, v. Skinner, (Mich.) 40 W.
W. Rep. 234; Com. v. Henry, 49 Pa.
St. 530; People V. Manhattan Ey. Co.,
22 Abb. N. C. 393; State v. Henry Co.,
?,1 Ohio St. 211; State v. Morris, 43
Iowa, 192; Kice, etc., v. Worcester,
130 Mass. 57.5; Hitchcock v. Cora'rs,
131 lb. 519; Haskins v. Super's, 51
Miss. 506; Co. of St. Clair v. Peo.,85
111. 396; Mayor v. Roberts, 34 Ind.
471; Hill V. Worcester, 4 Grav, 414;
State V. Essex, 3 Zab. N. J. 214; Peo.
V. Croton Aq. Bod., 26 Barb. 240.
2 Wilson V. Berkstresser, 45 Mo.
283; Minhinnah v. Haines, 29 N. J.
L. 388; Peo. v. Supervisors, 4 Barb.
64; Trustees, etc., v. Johnson, 2
Cart. (Ind.) 219; State v. Keokuk, 9
Iowa, 438; Peo. v. Lowell, 9 Met.
144; Treat v. Middletown, 8 Conn.
243; Justices, etc., v. Jefferson, 1
Coldw. (Tenu.) 419.
s Miller v. Bridgewater, 29 JT. J. L.
54; Jonnston v. Super's, 19 Jolins.
272; State v. Keokuk, 9 Iowa, 438;
Brock V. Hisben, 40 Wis. 674; Hig-
ginsv. Chicago, 48 111. 276; Duncan
V. Louisville, 8 Bush, 98.
768
« Ryan v. HoflEman, 26 Ohio St.
109; Eudisill v. State, 40 Ind. 485;
State V. Wilson, 17 Wis. 687; Dodge
V. Essex, 3 Met. (Mass.) 380; Carpen-
ter V. Bristol, 21 Pick. 258; see, ante,
§ 249.
6 People V. Riordan, 41 ST. W. R.
482; State v. Anderson, 45 Ohio St.
196; State v. Camden, 35 N. J. L. 217;
Com. V. Allen, 128 Mass. 308; State
v. Deliesseline, 1 McCord (S. C.) 52;
Bartlet v. State, 13 Kan. 99; Demarest
V. Wickham, 63 N. Y. 320; People v.
Hall, 80 lb. 117; Cochran v. Mc-
Cleary, 22 Iowa, 75; Worthley v.
Steen, 43 N. J. L. 542 ; 1 Dil. Mun.
Corp. §§ 272, 275.
15 2 Dil. Mun. Corp. 888-9 ; Reynolds
V. Bacowin, 1 La. An. 162; People v.
Waite, 70 111. 25 ; Com. v. Cen. Pass,
etc., Co., 52 Wend. 503; State v. Mil-
waukee, 45 Wis. 579; Peo. v. Thomp-
son, 16 Wend. 655; State v. Cine, 18
Ohio St. 262; Com. v. Cluley, 56 Pa.
St. 270; State v. Tolan, 33 IV. J. L. 195 ;
State V. Pat. &, H. Turn, etc., 21 lb. 9;
People V. Richardson, 4 Cow. N. Y.
101, 122, 133; Goddard v. Smithett,
OH. XVm.] MANDAMUS AMD QUO WARRANTO.
§371)
In another section, the distinction between this remedy and
mandamus is explained ^ and it need only be added that an
information in the nature of a quo warranto should be granted,
when the effect of final judgment will be to establish a contro-
verted right, as, for example, to an oflQce ; while mandamus will
lie to enforce a duty, arising out of a right already established
or admitted, but not enforceable by ordinary process.^
So, if the right to hold an election be in dispute a quo war-
ranto will lie ; ^ whereas, if it be clearly the duty of the munici-
pality to hold such election, mandamus is the appropriate
remedy ; * quo warranto will also lie to determine the title of a
member to a seat in a city council ^ or his right to vote in or
preside over a municipal body.^
§379. By whom proceedings are instituted Inasmuch
as the creation of a municipal corporation, and the grant of a
municipal franchise, is wholly discretionary with the State Leg-
islature, and a matter over which it has exclusive control, no in-
formation in the nature of a quo warranto can be set in motion
by a private citizen to prevent or inquire into the usurpation of
such a franchise.'' But when a municipal corporation has long
existed and exercised its functions, with the acquiescence of the
State ; and its officials have been recognized by the State, the
attorney general will be precluded from an information, which is
intended to deprive the municipality of its franchise.^ At
common law, the attorney general alone has power to inquire
3 Gray (Mass.) 116. By the N. Y.
Code, 1983, et seq., the writ is abol-
ished. An action must be brought
in the name of the people on the re-
lation of an interested pei-son, who
must give security and compensate
the attorney general. Costs may be
granted for or against the defendant.
But execution will not issue against
the people, nor is a municipal cor-
poration or official required to give
security for costs. See Code, §§ 1947-
1956.
1 See §361.
2 Commonwealth v. Meeser, 44 Pa.
St. 341; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200,
21i; Hullman v. Honcomp, 5 Ohio,
237;Markle v. Wright, 13 Ind. 548;
49
Peabody v. Flint, 6 Allen (Mass.) 52;
Peo. V. Carpenter, 24 N. Y. 86; Peo.
v. Draper, 15 lb. 532; Com. v. Bank,
28 Pa. St. 389.
sWaltonv. Beveling, 61 111. 201;
Dickey v. Reed, 78 lb. 261; Peo. v.
Galesburg, 48 lb. 485.
* § 000, ante.
'" Com. V. Meeser, 44 Pa. 341; State
V. Frazier, 98 Mo. 426.
li Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. An.
162 ; Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa,
75 ; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200.
'2Dil. Mun. Cor. §-898; Robinson
v. Jones, 14Fla. 256; State v. Viokers,
51 N. J. L. 180.
' Peo. v. Maynard,, 15- Mich. 463.
769
§380
MtTNIGIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XVIII.
into the usurpation of an office,^ and in theory he is made the
sole judge of the expediency of employing this remedy. This
rule is so far modified that it has become usual as a matter of
course for the State to begin such proceedings upon the rela-
tion of any person who is sufficiently interested to institute
the suit ; and such interest need be neither important nor en-
grossing.'^
§ 380. Practice and procedare— Power discretionary.—
Any lengthy discussion regarding the practice in quo warranto
proceedings, regulated as it is by statutes in the various States,
must be omitted here, and the reader is referred to the notes,
and to an inspection of the authorities there cited.^
The granting of an information, in the nature of a quo war-
ranto, is discretionary with the court, but the judicial discretion
must be exercised in accordance with sound legal principles, and
in the manner best calculated to advance the interests of justice.*
If the matter be one which concerns the public interests alone,
such as the abuse of a franchise, it is the duty of the State of-
ficials to seek a remedy, and to procure redress for the public
wrong committed ; and although in a case of this character the
attorney general can, and often does, initiate the quo warranto
proceedings on the relation of a private person, he should act
in his official capacity. If the purpose of the proceedings be
1 Commonwealth v. Allen, 128
Mass. 308; State v. Anderson, 45
Ohio St. 196.
2 Com. V. Cluley, 56 Pa. St. 270;
Com. V. Shepp, 10 Phila. 518; Eaton
V. State, TBlackf. 65; Com. v. Bumm,
10 Phila. 162 ; (citizen claiming seat
in municipal council.) State v. To-
lan,3.3]Sr. J.L. 195; (voter.) Church-
ill V. Walker, 68 Ga. 681; (every citi-
zen.) Com. V. Jones, 12 Pa. St. 365;
(defeated candidate.) Com. v. Mee-
ser, 14 lb. 341.
2 Order to show cause : Com. v.
Jones, 12 Pa. St. 365; Process on fil-
ing : Com. V. Smead, 11 Mass. 264;
E. D&llas V. State, 73 Tex. 370; State
V. (Jummersall, 24 N. J. L. 529. Re-
moval to Federal Court : Ames v.
Kansas, 111 U. S. 449. Forms : State
770
V. Parsons, 40 N. J. L. 1; Bank v.
Niagara, 6 Cow. 196; People v. Van
Slyke, 4 lb. 297; Lavalle v. People, 68
111. 252; Eaton v. State, 7 Blackf. 65.
Verdict: Thompson v. People, 23
Wend. 537. Judgment: State v.
Herndon, 23 Fla. 287; Com. v. Fowler,
10 Mass. 290; Utica v. Scott, 8 Cow.
(N. T.) 721; Miners Bank v. U. S., 5
How. (U. S.) 213. Costs : Peter v.
Blue, 40 Kan. 727; Peo. v. Loomis, 8
Wend. 396; State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio,
143; State v. Jenkins, 46 Wis. 616.
Appeal : Inter. & G. N. Ey. v. State,
73 Tex. 356; State v. Burnett, 2 Ala."
140.
* Commonwealth v. McCarter, 68
Pa. St. 607; Peo. v. No. Ch. Ey. Co.,
88 111. 537; Peo. v. Callaghan, 83 D).
128; Peo. v. Waite, 70 lb. 25.
CH. XVni.] MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO.
§381
merely to permit some disinterested person or meddler to inter-
fere in a matter, which concerns the public welfare alone, the
information should be refused.^
The court is bound to look into the motives actuating the re-
lator ; and if upon all the circumstances, as detailed in the affi-
davits, it seems clear to the court that he is impelled by wrong
motives, and that the public necessity does not call for any ac-
tion in his favor, his motion for a quo warranto will be denied.^
So, likewise, if there be no adverse claimant,^ or if respondent
has acted in good faith.*
§ 381. How far remedy by quo warranto is superseded
by special statutory proceedings for the control of contested
elections. — It is sometimes difficult to determine to what ex-
tent the force and efficiency of the remedy under consideration
is impaired by the legislative provision of special proceedings
before judges of election or other g'Masi-judicial officers, for the
purpose of settling all questions involved in municipal electiong.
It is a general and salutary rule that the supervisory juris-
diction, exerted by the courts over elections and similar pro-
ceedings by means of the writs of quo warranto, mandamus and
certiorari, should not be curtailed without sound reasons there-
for; nor should the final* decision of legal questions arising
therein be relegated to tribunals, which may be incompetent to
deal with them, and which are often swayed by partisan preju-
dice.*
The decisions conflict somewhat as to what special provisions
for the trial of contested elections will operate as a repeal of
the remedy by quo warranto.^ The answer to the question,
1 Peo. V. No. Ch. Ey. Co., 88 111.
537; Dorsey v. Ansley, 72 Ga. 460.
liPeo. V. Waite, 70111. 25; Common-
wealth V. Cluley, 56 Pa. St. 270.
8 State v. Sclmierle, 5 Rich. L. (S.
C.) 299.
*Peo. V. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508;
Peo. V. Witherell, 12 lb. 48. In State
V. Tolan, 33 N. J. L. 195, the follow-
ing rules have been laid down for the
guidance of the discretionary pow-
ers of the court: "(1) The relator
must not be a stranger or inter-
meddler. (2) He must not have
concun-ed in the illegal act. (3) In
the absence of fraud or intentional
violation of law it must appear that
public or private interests will not
be seriously affected thereby." 2
Dil. Mun. Cor. § 901.
6 Dil. Mun. Corp. § 891.
6 Peo.v. Holden, 28 Cal. 123; Steele
V. Martin, 6 Kan. 430; State v. Mar-
low, 15 Ohio St. 114; Com. v. Meeser,
44 Pa. St. 341; Com. v. Baxter, 35 lb.
263. In New Tork, it has been held
that the general jurisdiction of the
coui'ts over the municipal officers, is
771
382
MUNICrPAIi COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XVni.
whether such a special legislative provision abolishes the judi-
cial supervision, always depends upon the phraseology con-
tained in the provision itself, and upon the local laws regulating
the subjects of quo warranto and elections.^ For this reason,
it can only be laid down as a general rule that the Superior
Courts can only be considered to have lost the jurisdiction over
cases arising out of contested election, where the legislative in-
tent to bring about that result is manifest and certain.^ It is,
however, no violation of the constitutional provision, that the
judicial power shall he vested in a Supreme Court and in inferior
courts, for the Legislature to enact that a municipal council shall
be the judge of the elections of its mayor, members and other
officials, and that the ordinary courts of justice shall possess no
jurisdiction therein.^
But when, as is usually the ease, the wording of the statute
is not so manifestly exclusive of judicial supervision, the statu-
tory procedure will be considered as initiate and cumulative
only, and the right of the party, who is unsuccessful before the
special tribunal, to a quo warranto will not be denied.* But if
the intent to supersede the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts
is clear, the court will not inquire even into election frauds,^ or
into the eligibility of an elected official.''
§ 382. User on part of usurper necessary — It is in all
cases necessary to show a user on the part of the usurper ; and
not ousted by a statute which makes
an official board the judges of the
election, and qualifications of its
members. Peo. v. Hall, 80 N. Y.
117; In re Heath, 3 Hill (IS". Y.) 42,
57 ; but it is otherwise, if they are the
final or sole judges; Sellick v. Com.
Council, 40 Conn. 359; Linega v. Eit-
tenhouse, 94 HI. 208; Peo. v. Metz-
ker, 47 Cal. 524.
1 1 Dil. Mun. Corp., sec. 202; Ken-
dall V. Camden, 47 N. J. L. 64; Peo.
V. North, 72 N. Y. 124; Peo. v. Cris-
sey, 91 lb. 616; McVeany v. Mayor,
80 K Y. 185; Peo. v. Detroit, 18
Mich. 338.
2 1 DU. Mun. Corp. 202.
' Mayoj V. Morgan, 7 Martin, La.
l;9Ib. (K. S.)381.
772
* state V. Gates, 35 Minn. 385 ; State
V. Governor, 1 Dutch. 331 ; Veauy v.
Mayor, 80 IST. Y. 185; People v. Hull,
80 lb. 117; People v. Kilduff, 15 111.
492; State v. Wilmington, 3 Har.
(Del.) 294; State v. Clerk, 1 Dutch.
354; Hadley v. Mayor, 33 N. Y. 603;
Gass V. State, 34 Ind. 424; Com. v.
Allen, 70 Pa. St. 465 ; Macklot v. Dav-
enport, 17 Iowa, 379; State v. Fitz-
gerald, 44 Mo. 425 ; Hummer v. Hum-
mer, 3 G. Greene (Iowa) 42; Com. v.
McClosky, 2 Eawle (Pa.) 369; In re
Strahl, 16 Iowa, 369; Wammacks v.
Hallaway, 2 Ala. 31; Kane v. People,
4 Neb. 509.
6 Common, v. Leach, 44 Pa. St. 332;
Com. V. Meeser, 44 lb. 341.
6 Seay v. Hunt, 55 Tex. 545.
CH. XVIII.] MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO. § 38-1
it will not suffice to allege merely a claim against the defendant,
that he holds or possesses and uses the office or franchise ; but
some overt act of user must be shown.^
§ 383. The burden of proof — The burden of proof is in
such an action wholly upon the defendant, and the State is not
under the necessity of showing that he is a usurper ; while he
must substantiate his title to the office or franchise, and show
by what authority he possesses it. And it is not enough to
state generally, that he was legally or duly elected ; but he
must allege facts, from which the court may draw the proper
inferences as to the legality and validity of his title.^
§ 384. Quo warranto proceeding to secure the forfeiture
of municipal charter. — Inasmuch as the franchise of a munici-
pal corporation is considered in the United States to exist solely
for the benefit of the whole community, and not as a privilege
of a few incorporators, as was the case under the early English
Law, it is not likely that in this country an information in the
nature of a quo warranto would be granted for the purpose of
working a forfeiture of a municipal charter. At any rate, no
American case can be cited, in which the court employed that
remedy for that purpose. Such a proceeding would not har-
monize with the spirit of American institutions. If municipal
officials usurp powers which belong exclusively to the State,
tJiere exist ample remedies, both in law and equity, by which
their acts can be nullified aud their usurpation corrected.^
The constitutionality of an act which is pei'formed_ by a mu-
nicipal official* will not be determined in quo warranto ; n9r will
the action lie against a city for taking property without compen-
sation ; ^ nor for the purpose of annulling irregular and improper
city ordinances.^ But in one State it has been held that the
1 Eex V. Ponsonby, 1 Vesey (Eng.)
l;Peo. V. Thompson, 16 Wendell, 655;
2 Dil. Mun. Cor. § 903.
2 People V. Clayton, 4 Utah, 421;
People V. Jack, 4 lb. 438; Com. v.
Gill, 3 Whart. 228; Clark v. People,
15 111. 213; Crook v. People, 106 111.
237; People v. Fletcher, 55 N. Y. 525;
Atty. Gen. v. Foote, 11 Wis. 14; State
V. Gleason, 12 Pla. 190.
' See post, chapter xrx. on Reme-
dies against Corporations. Com. v.
Pittsb., 14 Pa. St. 177; Harris v. Nes-
bit, 24 Ala. 398; State v. Cahaba Co.,
30 Ala. 66; Attorney Gen. v. Salem,
103 Mass. 138; Atty. Gen. v. Boston,
123 lb. 460.
4 Peo. V. Whitcomb, 55 111. 172.
5 Peo. V. Hillsdale, 2 Johns. (N. Y.)
190; see, also, to the same general
effect, People v. Mut. Gaslight Co.,
38 Mich. 154.
6 State V. Lyons, 31 Iowa, 432.
773
§ 386
MUKICIPAL CORPOKATIONS.
[CH. xvin.
right of a municipality to exercise a certain power, as, for ex-
ample, to tax certain property, may be determined upon an in-
formation in the nature of quo warranto, filed by the attorney
general.^
§ 885. Quo warranto to test the legal existence of mu-
nicipal corporations. — Municipal corporations in America are
always the creatures of statute, and hence the occasion would
seldom arise when there can be any doubts as to their legal
existence. But when they do occur, the question is generally
raised in collateral proceedings brought against them or their
officials. But such a question may arise when by statutory en-
actment a municipal corporation has been legislated out of ex-
istence, or extinguished by annexation or consolidation.^ And
probably, they are more common where the town and cities are
chartered under general statutes, by compliance with the provis-
ions of the same, instead of by a special or private act of incor-
poration. But, whether the cases are rare or common, it is
reasonably well settled by the current of judicial decisions in this
country, that the corporate existence of a municipality may be
put in issue and determined by the court in an information in
the nature of a quo warranto, brought against an official who
claims to act under the municipal authority.^ And if in such a
case it be found that no corporation exists, de jure or de facto,
the relator is entitled to judgment.*
§ 386. Effect of judgment in quo warranto. — Judgment
in a proceeding in quo warranto is conclusive, until reversed,
upon all persons whomsoever; and may be given in evidence
in any subsequent case, on an issue involving the rights, which
have been settled thereby.^ It has been held, however, that a
« 1 State V. Charleston Com., 1 Mill.
Const. E. (S. C.) 36; People v. Oak-
land, 92 Cal. 611.
2 Dillon's Muu. Cor. §184, et seq.;
Taylor v. Toi-t Wayne, 47 luu. 281.
" People V. Spring Valley, 129 Bl.
169; People v. Carpenter, 24 ST. Y. 86;
People V. Draper, 15 lb. 532 ; People
V. Clark, 70 N. T. 518; People v.
Bennett, 29 lb. 471 ; State v. Carbon-
dale, 29 Iowa, 254; State v. Brown, 31
N. J. L. 350; People v. Gartland,
(Mich. 90) 42 W. W. K. 687 ; People v.
774
Albertson, 55 N. T. 50; People v.
Clute, 22 lb. 576; State v. Tracy, 51
N. W. K. 613; State v. Parker, 25
Minn. 215.
* State V. Weatherby, 45 Mo. 17;
Cf. Territory v. Armstrong, 6 Dak.
226; State v. McReynolds, 61 Mo. 203;
State V. Coffee, 59 lb. 59; Renwick
V. Hall, 84 111. 162.
s Utica Ins. Co. v. Scott, 8 Cow
(K. T.) 709, 721, and authorities cited.
Hunter v. Chandler, 45 Mo. 452.
CH. XVIII.] MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO.
§387
prior judgment, obtained on the relation of a district attorney,
is not a bar to a subsequent proceeding by the State. ^ Nor will
a judgment of ouster against an official bind one who does not
hold under him.^
§ 387. Effect of judgment when not rendered during offi-
cial term. — Since the terms of office in America are almost al-
wa^'S of short duration, it becomes exceedingly important to
ascertain whether a judgment can be rendered in a quo warranto
proceeding, after the expiration of the term. In England it is
held, where satisfactory reasons can be given for the delay, that
the information will be granted, even though the application
be filed after the close of the term of office.** The reason for
this ruling is that the rightful claimant is entitled to a judicial
determination of his right to the office. In the United States,
the authorities are somewhat conflicting. The English rule is
followed without qualification in North Carolina,* while in other
States, the information has been refused, because the limited
duration of the term of office made it impossible for ajudgment
to be rendered before its expiration.^ But the better opinion
seems to be that the judgment on an information in the nature
of quo warranto will be granted, notwithstanding the resignation
of the respondent, or the expiration of his term of office, pro-
vided the proceedings were begun prior to such termination of
the opposition to the lawful claims of the relator.®
1 State V. Cin. G. & C. Co., IS Ohio
St. 285.
2 Wood V. State, 30 N". E. E. 309;
State V. Kearn, 20 Atl. R. 1018; State
V. Smith, 22 lb. 1020; People v. Mur-
ray, 73 N. Y. 535; Dodge v. People,
113 111. 491.
3 Rex V. Williams, 1 W. Black. 95 ;
Rex V. Harris, 6 Ad. & El. 475 ; Rex
V. Mario w, 2 M. & S. 76; Rex v.
Payne, 2 Chitty, 367. In Eegina v.
Blizaid, L. E. 2 Q. B. ,634, the infor-
mation was granted and judgment of
ouster rendered, although the unlaw-
ful claimant had prior to judgment
disclaimed the office.
« Burton v. Patton, 2 Jones (N. C.)
L. 124.
6 Morris v. Underwood, 19 Ga. 559 ;
Howard v. Gage, 6 lb. 462; State v.
Jacobs, 17 Ohio, 143; Peo. v. Loomis,
8 Wend. (N. Y.) 396.
6 Hunter v. Chandler, 35 Mo. 452 ;
Com. V. Swasey, 133 Mass. 538; Com.
V. Smith, 45 Pa. St. 59; People \r.
Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508.
775
CHAPTER XIX.
KEMEDIES AGAINST MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS IN GENERAL.
Section.
391 — Equitable remedies.
392 — ^Necessity for equitable rem-
edies— Codes of proced-
ure— Preliminary injunc-
tion.
398 — Equitable jurisdiction over
municipal officials.
394 — Municipal corporations as
trustees.
395 — Taxpayers' suits in equity.
Section.
396 — ^Injunction to restrain dam-
ages to private property —
Multiplicity of suits.
397 — Injunction to restrain the
collection of taxes.
898 — Scope of certiorari.
399— Wliat may be examined un-
der vrrit of certiorari.
400 — Indictment.
401 — Writ of prohibition.
§ 391. Equitable remedies. — Questions, concerning the ex-
tent of the authority and powers of municipal corporations un-
der the charter or general law of the State, generally involve a
consideration of legal principles rather than of equitable ; and
as a rule a court of equity has very little control or super-
vision over corporations of this character.^ Equity of course
will not interfere in cases, where there is a plain, adequate and
complete remedy at law,^ but if a case should arise to which a
municipal corporation is a party, equity will assume jurisdiction ;
and equitable relief will be given, if the subjec1>matter of the
suit ranges itself under some one of the distinct heads of equity
V. St. Louis, 5 Wall. 413; Hannew-
rukle V. Georgetown, 15 lb. 547;
Dows V. Chicago, 11 lb. 108; Com. v.
Wellsboro etc. Co., 35 Pa. St. 152;
Hyatt V. Bates, 35 Barb. 308; Albany
etc. Co. V. Brownell, 24 N. T. 345;
Dodd V. Hartford, 25 Conn. 232;
Milwauliee Iron Co. v. Hubbard, 29
Wis. 51; Lewis v. Franlcfort, 79 Ind.
446; Mayor v. Markham, 23 Ga. 402.
The remedy at law must be shown
to be inadequate. Nichols v. Salem,
14 Gray, 490; Frevert v. Finrock, 31
Oliio St. 621; Watson v. Sutherland,
5 Wall. 74: English v. Smock, 34 Ind.
115; Bisliop v. Moorman, 98 Ind. 1.
I Boyle V. Brooklyn, 71 N. T. 1;
Brooklyn v. Meserole, 26 Wend. 132_;
Guest V. Brooklyn, 69 N. T. 506;
Moars v. Smedley, 6 Johns. Ch. 28;
Jex V. New York, 103 N. T. 536;
Susquehanna Bk. v. Broome Co., 25
N. T. 312; Brehm v. New York, 104
lb. 586; Heywood v. Buffalo, 14 lb.
534; Minnesota L. O. Co. v. Palmer,
20 Minn. 468, 474; Smith v. Oconomo-
woc, 49 Wis. 694; Douglas v. Har-
rison, 9 W. Ya. 162.
sPaine v. Delhi, 116 N. Y. 224;
Myall v. St. Paul, 30 Minn. 294; Mil-
ler V. Mobile, 47 Ala. 166; Hansmeis-
ter V. Porter, 21 Fed. Rep. 335 ; Ewing
776
CH. XIX.]
EEMEDIES IN GENEEAL.
§392
jurisdictiou.! ^g jj^s been seen,^ a municipal corporation has
no right to create or maintain a nuisance, and a court of equity
will enjoin a municipality from building a sewer through pri-
vate property, which endangered the health of the community.^
The jurisdiction of equity to enjoin nuisances is of ancient ori-
gin and generally acknowledged.* So, too, equity will enjoin
municipal usurpation of jurisdiction under an unconstitutional
act of the Legislature, upon the ground that an irreparable
injury will be done thereby, for which damages, which may be
recoYered in an action at law, would afford no adequate com-
pensation.^
§ 392. Necessity for equitable remedies against cities and
towns — Code of procedure— Preliminary injunction. — The
notorious fact, that the powers committed to municipal corpora-
tions are extremely liable to abuse and in fact frequently are
abused and illegally exceeded to the serious detriment of the
inhabitants, has brought about a quasi limitation of the rule,
that equity will not act as long as there is a remedy at law.
Many apparent exceptions to this rule are acknowledged, par-
ticularly in those systems of procedure which are employed in
what are known as the Code States. In these States, the an-
cient line of demarkation between law and equity has become
indistinct and the remedies afforded by both are blended iu one
cause of an action.
The '■'■preliminary injunction" of the codes or injunction pen-
dente lite, granted usually ez parte or a prima facie ease, and
employed with the utmost liberality and improvidence by the
courts, is very extensively employed over municipal corpora-
tions, and their officers.
The whole matter is to so large an extent regulated by stat-
utes and codes of procedure that no universal or general rules
can be laid down ; and the only safe method, as in all questions
1 State V. Newark, 25 N. J. L. 399;
Railroad Co. v. Jersey City, 26 N. J.
Eq. 247 ; Foley v. Paterson, 26 lb. 216 ;
Can-on v. Martin, 26 ST. J. L. 594;
Jersey City v. Lembeok, 31 N. J. Eq.
255; State v. Jersey City, 30 lb. 521.
2 §§340, 342.
8 Butler V. Thomasville, 74 Ga. 570.
< Atty. Gen. v. Johnson, 2 Wils. Ch.
87; Columbus v. Jaques, 30 Ga. 506;
Silliman v. Hudson Eiv. B. Co., 4
Blatchf. (U. S.) 74; DemopoUs v.
Webb, 6 So. Kep. 408.
''Peoria v. Johnson, 56 HI. 52;
Smith V. Bangs, 15 lb. 399; Hyde
Park V. Chicago, 124 111. 156; Mc-
Cord V. Pike, 121 111. 288; People v.
Whitcomb, 55 lb. 172.
777
§392
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XIX.
of procedure, is an attentive examination of these local statutes
or codes.
As a rule, it may be said that equity will interfere to aid or
coerce municipal corporations upon the same principle, that
they will assume jurisdiction over individuals. Thus, equity
will not interfere at the instance of a private person, as against a
municipal corporation, for an act perpetrated by the latter with-
in its legal powers or for the exercise of its judgment or discre-
tion, unless some irreparable or at least some substantial injury
to private propertj'^ rights is caused thereby ; ^ or where the dis-
cretion is manifestly abused.^ So, an injunction was refused
an abutter, to restrain the closing of a street at a point three
blocks distant from his land, upon the ground that he had no
property rights which would be injured by the act of the city.'
The issue of municipal bonds having been authorized, to
supply gas for public and private use, it was provided that the
interest and principal were -to be met by the money received
for its use. Any deficiency was to be provided for by taxation.
An injunction to restrain their issue was refused, upon the
ground that it could not be shown that the anticipated income
would be insufficient to meet the principal and interest.*
1 SufSeld V. Hathaway, 44 Conn.
521; Gartsede v. East St. Louis, 43
111. 47; Baltimore v. B. & O. K. E.
Co., 21 Md. 50.
2 Moore v. Atlanta, "70 Ga. 611;
Variok v. New York, 4 Johns. Ch. 5.3,
ch. XVI., Streets; Atty. Gen. v. Bos-
ton, 123 Mass. 460, 479; Hamerick v.
House, 17 Ga. 56; State v. "Woody, lb.
612; Alpero v. San Francisco, 32
Fed. Eep. 503; Torpedo Co. v. Clar-
endon, 19 lb. 231 ; Brodnax v. Groom,
64 N. C. 244; Jenkins v. Andover, 103
Mass. 94, 104; Cape May etc. Co. v.
Cape May, 419 ; Waterbury v. Laredo,
60 Tex. 510. In Erie v. Eeed, 113
Pa. St. 468, it was said " if the discre-
tion was abused no doubt the power
of a court of equity would be ade-
quate to restrain the perpetration
of a palpable wrong." Spring Val-
ley etc. Co. V. Schottler, 110 U. S.
347.
778
3 Chicago V. Union Building Assn.,
102 111. 379, 399, comp. Whiting v.
Boston, 106 Mass. 89; Jones v. Bos-
ton, 104 lb. 461; Sullivan v. Phillips,
110 Ind. 320.
* Fellows V. "Walker, 39 Fed. Eep.
651. In this case the court said:
"Injunctions are not granted in
cases like the present, except when
complainant's rights are clear, and
where an injury more or less irre-
parable is likely to result to com-
plainant, unless defendants are en-
joined. In this case, complainant's
rights are not clear and the injury
likely to happen to them is not
shown to be irreparable or even se-
rious. On the other hand, the allow-
ance of an injunction would be at-
tended with irreparable loss and
damage to the city of Toledo. See,
also. Lane v. Schamp, 20 N. J. Eq.
82, Galoway v. London, 1 H. L. 34.
CH. XlX.j
EEMEDIES IN GENERAL.
391
§ 393. Equitable jurisdiction over municipal ofHcials
It is a well settled rule, that courts of equity have no jurisdic-
tion over public ofBcers, either to determine the validity of their
appointment, or the legality or justice of their removal. These
subjects are exclusively for the consideration of courts of law,
and the form of remedy properly employed is mandamus, cer-
tiorari, quo warranto, or some similar proceeding, according to
the local rules of procedure.^
The jurisdiction of courts of equity, unless it is extended by
statute, is confined to the protection of property rights, for the
infringement of which there is no adequate, plain and com-
plete remedy at law.^
§ 394. Municipal corporations as trustees. — By virtue of
the control and supervision which is exercised over trusts and
trustees by courts of equity, bills to restrain or prevent breaches
of trust or misapplication of trust property by municipal au-
thorities, or to enforce and obtain the performance of the im-
portant trusts, which are committed to cities and towns as
trustees for their inhabitants, and for the public generally, have
been frequently entertained favorably, both in England and in
this country.^
The bill maj- in such cases be filed more properly by the at-
torney general on his own motion, as the advocate of the legal
lights and interests of the public, or on the relation of the cor-
porators or individual parties interested.*
1 See oil. YI. Ofacers; ch. XVIII.
Mandamus; see also In re Sawyer,
124 U. S. 200; Cobb v. Hague, 13 S.
E. R. 633; 87 Ga. 430; Updegraff v.
C'lans, 47 Pa. St. 103; MoCord v. Oak-
land, 27 Pac. 863; 64 Cal. 134; Dela-
hanty V. Warner, 75 Ex. 185; Mont-
gomery Gas Light Co. v. City Coun-
cil, 6 So. 113; 87 Ala. 245; Stahl v.
Brown, 1 S. W. R. 540; 85 Ky. 325;
United States Ex. Co. v. Hess, 3 N.
Y. S. 777; Payne v. English, 79 Cal.
540; Sperry v. AUina, 17 Or. 481; Mc-
Donald V. Rehrer, 22 Fla. 198.
2 In re Sawyer, supra, § 391, Equi-
table remedies.
8 Trevin v. Lewis, 4 M. & C. 249;
Baltimore v. E. B. Co., 21 Md. 275;
Barnum v. Baltimore, 62 lb. 275;
Atty. General v. Heelis, 2 Sim. &
Stu. 67; Atty. Gen. v. Boston, 123
Mass. 460; People v. Canal Board, 55
N. Y. 390; Black v. Ross, 37 Mo. App.
250; Brockman V. Cresten, 44 Mo. R.
882 (Iowa, 90) ; Murphy v. East Port-
land, 42 Fed. 308; Russell v. Tate,
13 S. W. E. 130; 52 Ark. 541; Balti-
more V. Horn, 26 Md. 194; High on
Injunction, 783-795; see ch. XII.
on Corporate Property.
* It is customary, though not nec-
essary, to make the relators parties
to the suit so that the defendant, if
the bill is dismissed, may recover
costs for which the crown is not lia-
ble. Atty. Gen. v. Dublin, Bligh N.
779
394
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XIX.
Under certain circumstances in this country, if not in Eng-
land, equity will entertain bills, which are filed by private per-
sons in suits of this nature against municipal corporations. And
in Canada, it has been held that the attorney general is by no
means a necessary party.-'
In consequence of the greater power, which is possessed by
the attorney general in England, and conferred upon him by the
common law, in comparison with similar officials in the States,
the principles regulating the governmental supervision of mu-
nicipal and other corporations as enunciated by the English de-
cisions are not wholly applicable to municipal corporations in
the United States.
The English court of chancery wiU, upon the bill filed by the
attorney general, relieve against fraud in the disposition of mu-
nicipal property even though by statute there is another remedy.
So, if property belonging to a municipal corporation isfraudu-
lently or collusivel)'' alienated,^ or if the municipal council con-
template making an unauthorized payment of compensation to
officers of the borough,^ equity will interpose.
A nmnieipal corporation has been enjoined, on an informa-
tion by the attorney general, from paying a note which was
given for borrowed money, when the city had no power to
give a note,* and from using corporate funds to pay the ex-
penses of procuring an act of Parliament, beneficial to the
corporation.^ The property in the possession of municipal
corporations is universally regarded by the English courts as
trust property ; ^ and over them and their officials as trustees,
the State has the right to exercise the most rigid supervision, not
only in equitable proceedings, but by criminal process as well.''
R. 312; Same v. Birmingham, 3 L. K.
Eq. 552 ; Same v. Exeter, 29 Beav.
44.
1 Paterson v. Bowes, 4 Grant, 170.
2 Parr v. Attorney Gen'l, 8 01. &
F.409; Evans v. Avon, 29 Bear. 144;
Attorney General v. Aspiuwall, 2
My. & C. 613; Roper v. MoWliorter,
77 Va. 214; Clapp v. City of Spokane,
53 Fed. 515; Russell v. Tate, 13 S. W.
R. 130 ; 52 Ark. 541 ; Payne v. English,
79 Cal. 540; McDonald v. Eehrer, 22
Fla. 198.
780
" Attorney Gen'l v. Poole, 4 Mylne
& C. 613.
« Attorney Gen'l v. Litchfield, 13
Simons, 547.
6 Sherman v. Winnetka, 59111. 389;
Attorney General v. Norwich, 13
Simons, 225 ; Cf . Underwood v.
Wood, (Ky. 92) 19 S. W. R. 405.
^ Attorney Gen. v. Aspinwall, 2 M.
& C. 613, 618, 623.
'Blakie v. Staples, 13 Grant, 67;
Daniels v. Burford, 10 Up. Can. Q.
B. 481.
CH. XIX.] EEMBDIES IN GENERAL. § 395
In the United States, there is much difference of opinion
upon some points, involved in the equitable control of the
powei's of municipal corporations, which is due to the fact,
that with us the powers of the municipalities, and the duties
of the attorney general or law officer of the State, are commonly
such onlj' as are prescribed by express statute. In consequence
of the limited power of the attorney general of a State as com-
pared with his English prototype, the question has been raised
several times as to his power to invoke the aid of a court of
equity to restrain the illegal action of a municipal corporation,
in the absence of an)'' statute authorizing him to do so. The
weight of authority is decidedly to the effect, that he has such
a right by virtue of his office, and by reason of the interest
which the State has in a proper execution of the powers, dele-
gated to or conferred upon municipal corporations.^ But the
facts upon which the law official of the State tiles a bill to pre.
vent municipal corporations from making an illegal use of their
powers, or to set aside their illegal acts, must bring the case
within one of the universally recognized subdivisions or heads
of equity jurisdiction,^ although tlie courts are not very strin-
gent in this regard ; and have applied the Englisli rule, that
every abuse of corporate power is a breach of trust, with the
object of giving the attorney general power over corporations,
even when no jurisdiction is conferred on him by statute.^
§ 395. Taxpayers' suits in equity. — Following out the
theory which regards the municipal corporation as a trustee for
the inhabitants, it is almost, if not quite universally, conceded
by the courts in the United States that, in the event of the
failure of the State law officer to intervene by virtue of his
statutory or implied power to protect the interest of the State
and of the corporators, any property holder or municipal tax-
payer may resort to equity, to prevent municipal corporations
or officials from exceeding their lawful powers, or neglecting
or violating their legal duties, under any circumstances where
the taxpayer's interest will be injuriously affected.* And this
1 State V. Saline Co., 51 Mo. 350.
^Dailey v. New Haven, 60 Conn.
314; Stalil v. Brown, 84 Ky. 324; Peo-
ple V. Lowber, 7 Abb. Pr. 158; Peo-
ple V. New York, 9 lb. 253; 10 lb. 144.
2 Attorney General v. Detroit, 26
Mich. 263.
* See § 396. Damage to personal
property.
781
§395
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XIX.
is the privilege of the taxpayer, though it is not expressly con-
ferred upon him by statute.^ In private corporations, the bene-
ficiaries of the trust reposed in the body corporate are the
stockholders ; and they, it is well settled, have the power to
invoke the aid of eq^uity to protect their rights and enforce the
trust existing for their benefit in cases where the officials of the
corporation refuse to act or act fraudulently. If the directors
will not protect the rights of the creditors and stockholders
then the latter may and should attend to their own interests.^
There is no reason whatever why a different rule should be
applied to municipal corporations, in which the taxpayers are
the beneficiaries upon whose shoulders will ultimately fall the
loss and expense which is caused by illegal, fraudulent or
tortious acts, or by the inertness and general malfeasances of
the municipal authorities.
1 Crompton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S.
601. In this case the court said:
" Of the riglit of resident taxpayers
to invoke the interposition of a court
of equity to prevent an illegal dis-
position of the moneys of the county,
or the illegal creation of a debt,
which they in common with other
property holders of the county may
otherwise be compelled to pay, there
is at this day no serious question.
The right has been recognized by
the State courts in numerous cases,
and from the nature of the powers
exercised by municipal corporations
the great danger of their abuse, and
the necessity of prompt action to
prevent irremediable injuries, it
would seem eminently proper for
courts of equity to interfere upon
the application of the taxpayers of a
county, to prevent the consumma-
tion of a wrong, when the officers of
these corporations assume, in excess
of their powers, to create burdens
upon property holders. Certainly,
in the absence of legislation, resti-ict-
ing the right to interfere in such
cases to public officers of the State
or county, there would seem to be
no substantial reason why a bill, by
782
or in behalf of individual taxpayers,
should not be entertained to prevent
the misuse of corporate power.
The courts may safely be trusted to
prevent the abuse of their process
in such cases." Colburn v. Chatta-
nooga, 17 Am. L. E. N. S. 191; Solo-
mon V. Fleming, (Neb. 92) 51 N. W.
E. 304; Harrington v. Plainview, 27
Minn. 224; Grant v. Davenport, 36
Iowa, 396; Webster v. Harwinton, 32
Conn. 131; Brockman v. Creston,
(Iowa, 90) 44 N. W. E. 822; Stevens
V. Eutland etc. Co., 29 Vt. 546; Nor-
mand v. Comm'rs, 8 Neb. 18; Smith
V. Magourich, 44 Ga. 163; Valparaiso
V. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1; Merrill v.
Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126 ; Hooper v.
Ely, 46 Mo. 505; McCord v. Pike, 12
N. E. E. 259; Murphy v. East Port-
land, 42 Fed. E. 308; Terrett v. Shar-
on, 34 Conn. 105 ; The Liberty Bell,
23 Fed. E. 843; Winkler v. Halsted, 36
Mo. App. 25 ; Harrison v. Electric
Co., 48N. W. E. 1005; Baltimore v.
Gill, 31 Md. 575; Hodgman v. Chi-
cago etc. Co., 20 Minn. 48; contra,
Pierce v. Smith, (Kan. 92) 29 Pac.
565.
2 Tiedeman on Equity Jur. § 329^
CH. XIX.]
EEMEDIES IN GENERAL.
395
A municipal corporation will, it is well settled, be enjoined
at the suit of a taxpaj^er from appropriating corporate funds
for purposes unauthorized by the general laws, or by its char-
ter,^ from making illegal contracts,^ or from issuing their own
bonds,^ or delivering railroad aid bonds,* or indorsing the ob-
ligations of the railroad company,* when such acts are unau-
thorized. So a taxpayer and citizen may enjoin the issue or
the sale after issue of void bonds,** or of scrip intended to cir-
culate as money.'' Not only will equity interfere to prevent an
illegal appropriation of municipal funds or credit ; but it has
been held that when a city, in exercising a legal power to lease
its wharves, disregards the charter forms prescribed, and, by
failure to invite competition, attempts to make a lease upon
terms extremely disadvantageous to the taxpayers, they have
a standing in court to prevent the execution of the lease, and
procure the amendment of the ordinance authorizing it.^
As a general rule, taxpayers have no right to contest, in an
equity suit, the validity of a grant of an exclusive privilege or
1 City of Rook Island v. Huesing,
25 m. App. 600; 21 N. E. R. 558; 128
111. 565; Bayle v. New Orleans, 28
Fed. R. 843; Willard v. Anisteck, 58
Wis. 565; Tarnell v. Los Angeles, 87
Cal. 603; 25 Pac. 767; Mazet v. Pitts-
burgh, 137 Pa. St. 548; 27 W. N. C.
73; Knorr v. Miller, 25 W'klyL. Bui.
128; Simmons v. Toledo, 5 Ohio Cir.
Ct. E. 124; Sackett v. New Albany,
88 Ind. 473; Scott v. Alexander, 23 S.
C. 120; Harney v. Indianapolis, 32
Ind. 244; Jacksonpoi-t v. Watson, 33
Ark. 704; Richmond v. Davis, 103
Ind. 449; Sherlock v. Winnetka, 59
111. 389 ; Wade v. Richmond, 18 Gratt.
583; Newmeyer v. M. & M. Co., 52
Mo. 81 ; Russell v. Tate, 52 Ark. 541 ;
13 S. W. R. 130; New London v.
Brainard, 22 Conn. 552; Webster v.
Harvinton, 32 lb. 131; Winkler v.
Halstead, 36 Mo. App. 25 ; Falmer v.
Nuckolls Co., 6 Neb. 204.
2 Mazet V. Pittsburgh, 137 Pa. St.
548; Knorr v. Miller, 25 W'kly L.
Bui. 128; and cases in last note.
8 Robertson v. Breedlove, 61 Tex.
316.
« Lynch v. R. E. Co., 57 Wis. 430.
5 Blake v. Macon, 53 Ga. 172.
6 Jackson v. Brush, 77 111. 59.
''Colburn v. Chattanooga, 17 Am.
L. R. 191. Issue of bonds enjoined,
see WuUenwater v. Duunigan, (Neb.
91) 47 N. W. R. 420; Winn v. Shaw,
(Cal. 91) 25 Pac. R. 244; 25 lb. 968;
87 Cal. 631; Wood v. Bangs, 46 N. W.
R. 586; 1 Dak. 179; Livingston Co. v.
Welder, 64 III. 427; Allison v. Louis-
ville etc. Co., 9 Bush, 247; Bound v.
Wis. Cen. R, R., 45 Wis. 543; McCord
V. Pike, (111. 87) 12 N. E. R. 2.59;
Davenport v. Kleinschmidt, (6 Mont.
502) 13 Pac. 249; Marshall v. Silliman,
61111. 218; Chestnutwood v. Hood,
68 lb. 132; Carruthers v. Harnett,
(Tex. 91) 2 S. W. R. 523; Wright v.
Bishop, 88 111. 302; Springfield v. Ed-
wards, 84 lb. 626.
8 Handy v. New Orleans, 39 La. An.
107; Conery v. New Orleans W. W.
Co., 39 lb. 770.
783
5 396
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XIX.
franchise,^ or to enjoin a city from entering into a contract,
unless they can show in both instances that they sustain spe-
cial injury by the municipal action.^ But taxpayers may enjoin
the city from contracting debts, which will cause the municipal
limit of taxation to be exceeded ; ^ or which for any other rea-
son are in violation of constitutional or statutory prohibitions.*
And if such debts have been contracted, their payment may be
likewise enjoined.^ It is agreed by all that taxpayers have a
right, founded on their property interests which are at stake,
to interfere to prevent an unauthorized municipal act, by which
the burden of taxation will be increased ; the main difference
of opinion being as to the proper party to institute the action.
As above indicated, the majority of the decisions hold that such
suits may, in the absence of statute, be instituted directly by
the taxpayers who are affected. But there are many decisions
which hold that since the illegal action of a municipal corpora-
tion affects the whole public, any measure to restrain or redress
such acts must be instituted by a public officer, although, of
course, he may do so upon the i'el9.tion of the individual tax-
payers.^
§ 396. Injunction to restrain damages to private prop-
erty—Multiplicity of suits. — Ithas been held that an injunction
will not lie at the suit of a private citizen, to abate a nuisance
erected in the public streets,^ upon the ground that the proper
• Grant V. Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396;
Grand Kap. E. etc. Co. v. Grand Rap.
Ed. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 659; N. O. Gas
Co. V. Louisiana L. Co., 115 U. S. 650.
^ Searles v. Abraham, 73 Iowa,
507; Bolton V. San Antonio, (Tex. 93)
•M S. W. E. 64.
^ Howell V. Peoria, 90 111. 104; Dav-
enport V. Kleiuschmidt, 6 Mont. 502.
* Merrill v. Plaiufield, 45 N. H. 126;
Frederick v. Goshen, 20 Md. 436; Bal-
timore v. Gill, 31 lb. 375; Kelly v.
Baltimore, 53 lb. 134.
^ Strohme v. Iowa City, 47 Iowa, 42.
6 Bagg V. Detroit, 5 Mich. 336, 346;
Kelly V. Chicago, 62 111. 279 ; compare
Brown v. Manning, 6 Ohio, 298 ; State
V. Perry Co., 5 Ohio St. 497, 502;
Cornell College v. Iowa County, 32
784
Iowa, 520; State v. Carey, (N. D. 91)
49 N. W. R. 164; Doolittle v. Select-
men, 59 Conn. 402; Kilbourne v. St.
John. 51 N. Y. 21 ; Merriam v. Yuba
Co., 72 Cal. 517; State v. Grace, (Or.
91) 25 Pac. 382; Atty. Genl. v. Bos-
ton, 123 Mass. 460; Johnson v. Thorn-
dike, 56 Me. 52; Spencer V. Menasha,
15 Kan. 259; Anderson v. State, 23
Miss. 459.
■^ Mowry v. Providence, (R. I. 91)
16 Atl. E. 433; Morris eto. Co. v.
Prudden, 20 jST. J. Eq. 530; Fay v.
Weber, (Wis. 91) 48 K. W. R. 859;
Bechtel v. Carslake, 11 N. J. Eq. 50;
Higbee v. Camden etc. Co., 20 N. J. Eq.
435 ; Cf. Pennsylvania v. Bridge Co., 13
How. 518; Atty. Gen. v. Cohoes Co.,
6 Paige, 133; People v. Third Ave.
CH. XIX.]
BEMEDIES IN GENERAL.
396
part}' to procure the abatement of a public nuisance is the of-
ficial acting for the state or municipal corporation. Though
the cases are not harmonious the majority of the decisions sus-
tain the opposite doctrine, i. e., that a private person is enti-
tled to an injunction in such case, at least when the street is so
used as to constitute a special and irreparable damage to his
property'. 1
E. E. Co., 45 Barb. 63; Craig v. Peo-
ple, 47 111. 487; Atty. Gen. v. Eau
Claire, 37 Wis. 400; Rochester v.
Eriokson, 46 Barb. 92; Coast Line
etc. Co. V. Cohen, 50 Ga. 451; Wil-
liams V. Smith, 22 Wis. 600; Wau-
kesha H. M. S. Co. V. Waukesha, 83
lb. 475; Webb v. Demopolis, (Ala.
93) 13 So. 289; Neshkoro v. West, 55
N. W. E. 476.
1 Barton v. Union Cattle Co., 44 K.
W. E. 454; McCowan v. Whiteside,
31 Ind. 235 ; Dubach v. Hannibal etc.
Co., 89 Mo. 483; Harvard Col. v.
Stearns, 15 Gray, 1; Crowley v. Da-
vis, 63 Cal. 460; Billard v. Erhard,
35 Kan. 611 ; Board v. N. T. H. M. Co.,
19 Atl. E. 1098; Cumberland etc. E.
E. App., 62 Pa. St. 218; Truesdale v.
Peoria C. S. Co., 101 111. 561; Glaes-
ner v. Auheuser etc. Co., 13 S. W.
E. 707; Gray v. Bay ward, 5 Del.
Ch. 499 ; Vick v. Rochester, 46 Hun,
607; Morgan's Ap., 25 W. N. C. 532;
Sullivan v. Phillips, (Ind.) 11 N.
E. R. 310; Czarniecki's App., (Pa.
88) 11 Atl. E. 660; Smith v. Bangs,
15 HI. 399; Pettibone v. Hamilton,
40 Wis. 402; Central B. Co. v. Low-
ell, 4 Gray, 474; Milhau v. Sharp, 27
N. T. 611; Knox v. New York, 55
Barb. 404; Columbus v. Jaques, 30
Ga. 506; Shed v. Hawthorne, 3 Neb.
179. The word irreparable as used
ia this connection does not neces-
sarily mean that there is no possi-
bility of compensation in damages,
or even that the damage is very great.
Wood V. Sutcliffe, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 165;
Cassebeer v. Mowrey, 55 Pa. St. 419;
Dudley v. Hurst, 1 Am. St. Eep. 368,
50
374. The very fact that no actual
damages could be shown while in-
jury was caused furnished a good
reason for the interference of a court
of equity. Clowes v. Staffordshh'e,
L. E. 8 Chapp. 125; Jerome v. Eoss,
7 Johns. Ch. 315 ; Hunkerline's App.,
70 Pa. St. 102; Coe v. Lake Co., 37
N. H. 254; see as to the necessity
for irreparable damage and its ele-
ments: Bond V. Wool, 107 N. C. 139;
Winter v. Montgomery, (Ala. 91) 9
So. 366; Ferris v. Wellborn, 64 Miss.
29; Watson v. Farrell, 34 W. Va.
406 ; Loeser v. Leebman, 14 N. T. S.
569; Ohio Eiv. E. Co. v. Gibbons,
(W. Va. 91) 12 S. E. E. 1093; Strin v.
Nash, 12 N. Y. S. 431; 19 Civ. Pro.
E. 184; Empire L. & B. Ass'n v.
City of Atlanta, 77 Ga. 496; El well
v. Greenwood, 26 Iowa, 377; People
V. Vanderbilt, 26 N. Y. 287; Bechtel
V. Carslake, 3 Stockton Ch. 500; Con-
rad V. Smith, 32 Mich. 429; Pratt v.
Lewis, 39 lb. 7 ; Pettibone v. Hamil-
ton, 40 Wis. 402 ; Payne v. McKinley,
54 Cal. 532 ; Keizer v. Lovett, 85 Ind.
240; White v. Williamson, 17 S. E.
E. 604 (Ga. 93); Parsons v. Atlanta,
44 Ga. 529; Pratt v. Eoseland, (N. J.
93) 24 Atl. E. 1037; Toledo A. A. etc.
Co. V. Pennsyl. Co., 54 Fed. 730
Brooklyn S. T. Co. v. Brooklyn, 78
N. Y. 524; Cushman v. Highland
Ditch Co., 33 Pac. 344; Hannibal v.
Winchell, 57 Mo. 172 ; Graves v. Gas
Co., 83 Iowa, 74; Columbus etc. Co.
V. Witherow, 82 Ala. 190; Bell v.
Edwards, 37 La. An. 475; earning
V. Lowerse, 6 Johns. Ch. 439; Scran-
ton V. Steele Co., 154 Pa. St. 1717.
785
S 396
MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XIX.
An injunction will lie to restrain the municipal authorities
from the commission of acts which will illegally encroach or
trespass upon the property of private persons ; ^ as for example,
to restrain a city from proceeding to open a street through land,
without condemnation proceedings or the owner's consent;'*
or to prevent a seizure of land, when compensation has not
been paid or tendered ; ^ or for arbitrarily removing merchan-
dise which is not a nuisance from the owner's yard ; * or from
selling land which has been dedicated as a common or park.^
The rights of abutters to a convenient use of the streets will
be protected by injunction against the encroachment of the mu-
nicipal coi-poration or railroad companies or others using the
streets. Thus, an injunction will lie to prevent him from being
deprived of his right of access.^ So an abutting owner may
enjoin the illegal removal of shade trees and fences by the city
or others.'^
Where abutters are entitled to compensation for the use of
the street, on which they front, by a railroad company, the ap-
propriation of the street will be enjoined until compensation is
1 Ambrose v. Buffalo, 20 IST. T. S.
129; 29 Abb. N. C. 140; Kerr v. Jos-
lin, 66 Hun, 629; Rafter v. Tagliabue,
29 Abb. N. C. 1 ; Payne v. English,
21Pac. 952; 79 Cal. 540; McDonald
V. Newark, 42 N. J. E. 136; Broome
V. K. J. etc. Tel. Co., Y Atl. E. 457;
Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588; Kyle
V. Board, 94 lud. 115; Clark v. Syra-
cuse, 1.3 Barb. 32; North Pac. Ry. Co.
V. Spokane, 52 Fed. 428; Wright v.
Chanahan, 51 Hun, 262; Taintor v.
Mbrristown, 19 N. J. Eq. 46; Quiuten
V. Burton, 61 Iowa, 471; Holmes v.
Jersey City, 12 N. J. Eq. 299; Dud-
ley V. Frankfort, 12 B. Mon. 610;
Carter v. Chicago, 57 111. 283; Bough-
man V. Clarksburgh, 10 W. Va. 394;
Kern v. Isgrigg, (Ind. 92) 31 N. E. R.
455.
2 Hudson V. Vareis, (Ind. 93) 34 N.
W. K. 503; Cf. Smith v. Navasota, 72
Tex. 422; Kern v. Isgrigg, (Ind. 92)
31 N. E. R. 455; Mason City etc. Co.
V. Mason, 23 W. Va. 211.
786
3 Evans v. Miss. etc. Co., 64 Mo.
453; Gardner v. Kewburg, 2 Johns.
Ch. 162; Sidener v. Norristown etc.
Co., 23 Ind. 623; Western Ry. y. Ala.
G. T. R. Co., (Ala. 93) 11 So. 483.
4 Pieri v. Shieldsboro, 42 Miss. 493.
^ Cummings v. St. Louis, 90 Mo.
259; Mowry v. Providence, (R. I. 91)
16 Atl. 511.
s Carter v. Chicago, 57 HI. 283; Le-
Clerq v. Gallipolis, 7 Ohio, pt. 1, 218;
Schaidt v. Bland, 66 Md. 141; Atch-
ison etc. Co. V. Nare, 17 Pac. R. 587;
Flynn v. Taylor, 28 N. E. R. 418; 127
N. T. 596, afi'ge N. Y. S. 96; Prime v.
Twenty- third etc. Co., 1 Abb. N. C.
1. The abutter is not bound to wait
until actually damaged: Ross v.
Thompson, 78 lud. 90, 96.
' Winslow V. Mason, 113 Mass. 411 ;
Crismon v. Deck, (Iowa 90) 51 N. W.
55 ; DeWitt v. Van Seheyk, 110 N. Y.
7; Chicago v. Union, 102 111. 379;
Wilder v. De Core, 26 Minn. 10; Taint-
or V. Mayor, 19 N. J. Eq. 46.
CH. XIX.]
BEMEDIES IN GENERAL.
§ 397
made.^ In all such cases, however, the right to an injunction
maj' be lost by laches.^
A court of equity will restrain by injunction the prosecution
of a multiplicity of suits by or against a municipal corporation,
when the court in which they have been brought has no power
to order them to be consolidated.^ But the courts of equity
will not entertain a bill for relief upon the ground of avoiding
a multiplicity of suits or because irreparable damage will ac-
crue, when the orator has been legally tried and convicted of
violating an ordinance, the validity of which is not disputed,
though there were seven suits for the offence pending against
him. It is not the province of equity to decide upon the va-
lidity or legality of an ordinance, where there is an adequate
remedy at law for the purpose.* If, however, a defendant
claim a propertj' right, as a justification or defence when a num-
ber of warrants have been issued agaiust him for violating an
ordinance, an injunction will issue to restrain their enforce-
ment until his right can be decided upon by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.^
§ 397. Injunction to restrain the collection of taxes. —
The collection of taxes will be enjoined upon application of one
or more taxpayers, when the tax is tainted with fraud, or
when the levy or assessment is unauthorized by law.® Illegal
1 Atty. Genl. v. Walworth L. & P.
Co., (Mass. 90) 31 N. E. R. 482; Lake
Erie etc. Co. v. Michener, lit Ind.
46.5; Vanderlip v. Grand Rapids,
(Mich. 90) 41 N. W. R. 677; Nette v.
N. Y.El.R.Co.,20]Sr.Y.S.844; Potts
V. Quaker City El. Ry. Co., 12 Pa. Co.
Ct. R. 593 ; 2 Pa. Dis. Ct. R. 200; Syra-
cuse etc. Co. V. Rome etc. Co. , 22 N. Y.
S. 321 ; Kavanagh v. Mobile etc. R. R.
Co., (Ga.) 4 S. E. Rep. 113 ; Colstrum v.
Minn. etc. R. R. Co., 33 Minn. 516;
Scioto Val. R. R. Co. v. Lawrence, 38
Ohio St. 41; Western Ry. Co. v. Ala-
bama G. T. R. Co., (Ala. 93) 11 So.
483; Stroub v. Railway Co., 59 N. Y.
Super. Ct. 505; American Bk. Note
V. Railway Co., 59 lb. 175; Palmer
V. Waddell, 22 Kan. 352; City of
Gloversville v. Johnston G. & K. R.
Co., 21 N. Y. S. 146; 66 Hun, 627;
Hartv. Buckner, 54 Fed. Rep. 925;
2 Sunderland v. Martin, 112 Ind.
411; Indianapolis etc. Co. v. Calvert
110 Ind. 555.
3 Third Ave. etc. Co. v. New York,
54 N. Y. 159, prosecution for viola-
tions of an ordinance.
* Des Plaines v. Poyer, 123 111. 348;
Davis V. American Soc, 76 N. Y. 362.
6 Shinkle v. Covington, 83 Ky. 420.
"Lebanon v. O. & M. R. R. Co., 77
HI. 539; Dupage Co. v. Jenks, 65 111.
275; BrandrifE v. Harrison Co., 55
Iowa, 164; Warden v. Fond du Lac,
14 Wis. 618; Trowbridge v. Haran,
78 N. Y. 439; Kean v. Asch, 27 N. J.
Eq. 57; Oliver V. Memphis etc. Co., 30
Ark. 128; Deming v. James, 72 111.
78; Trowbridge v. Horan, 78 N. Y.
439; First Nat. Bank v. Cook, 77 111.
622.
787
§397
MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS.
[CH. XIX.
taxation will not be restrained by an injunction unless some
special reason is shown for the employment of the equitable
remedy ; that is, unless it shall afBrmatively appear that the
levy of the tax was tainted with fraud, that irreparable injury
will be done to the applicant or that he is without a plain, ade-
quate and prompt legal remedy. ^
If, however, a tax is so tainted with fraud that its invalidity
is undoubted, its collection will be enjoined at the suit of a tax-
payer.2
In any event, if the aggrieved taxpayer has an adequate rem-
edy at law, either by certiorari or appeal, or by an action to re-
cover the taxes paid, it is extremely doubtful if a court of equity
will interfere with the exercise of the power of taxation by a
municipal corporation.^ The collection of a legal tax will not
1 Dawson v. Croisan, 23 Pac. K.
257; 18 Ore. 431; KemblesApp., (Pa.)
19 Atl. E. 946; Augusta Factory v.
Counsel, 83 Ga. 734; 10 S. B. E. 359;
Delaware Co. v. Atkins, 24 K. E. R.
319; Davis v. Lake Sliore etc. Co.,
114 Ind. 364; 16 N. E. E. 639; Dud-
ley V. Gilmore, 35 Kan. 555 ; Glee v.
Sanders, 74 Mich. 692; Puck v. Peel-
er, 74 Tex. 268; Lenawee Co. Bk. v.
Adrian, (Mich.) 33 K. W. E. 304; Mer-
riam V. Tuba Co., 72 Cal. 577; 14 Pac.
E. 137; Philadelphia W. etc. Co. v.
Meary, 8 Atl. E. 363; Oregon & W.
M. S. Bk. V. Jordan, (Oregon) 17 Pac.
E. 621; Coulsen v. Harris, 43 Miss.
728; Page v. St. J^ouis, 20 Mo. 138;
Bank v. Meredith, 44 Mo. 500; Eock-
ingham Sav. Bk. v. Portsmouth, 52
N. H. 17 ; Hoagland v. Delaware, 17
N. J. Eq. 107; Ely ton Ld. Co. v.
Ayres, 62 Ala. 413; Clayton v. Lar
f argue,23 Ark. 137 ; Hobart v. Detroit,
7 Mich. 246; Eubey v. Shain, 54 Mo.
207; Eanney v. Bader, 67 lb. 476;
Paulser v. Portland, 16 Ore. 450;
HoUister v. Sherman, 63 Cal. 38; Van
Daren v. New Tork, 9 Paige, 388;
Van Eensselaer v. Kidd, 4 Barb. 17;
Waterbury Sav. Bfc. v. Lawler, 46
Conn. 243; Frost v. Flick, 1 Dakota,
131 ; Georgia Loan Assn. v. McGow-
788
an, 59 Ga. 811; Brewer v. Spring-
field, 97 Mass. 152; HunneweU v.
Charleston, 106 lb. 350; Carrothei'S
v. Board, 16 W. Va. 527; Christie v.
Maiden, 23 lb. 667; Louisen v. Hauee,
1 Wyo. 570; Hauscome v. Omaha, 11
Neb. 37; Merrill v. Humphrey, 24
Mich. 170; Mace v. Com'rs, 99 N. C.
65; 5 S. E. E. 740; Baldwin v. Shine,
84 Ky. 502; 2 S. W. E. 164; Breeze
V. Haley, 10 Colo. 5; 13 Pac. E. 913;
Duncan v. Cen. P. Ey. Co., (87 Ky.)
4 S. W. E. 228; Com'rs v. Bryson, 13
Pla. 281 ; Burnes v. Atchison, 2 Kan.
454; Mobile v. Baldwin, 57 Ala. 61;
Porter v. Eockford etc. Co., 76 111.
561; Williams v. Pinney, 25 Iowa,
436; tr. P. E. E. v. Lincoln Co., 2
Dill. C. C. 297; Dows v. Chicago, 11
Wall. 108; Hunnewinkle v. George-
town, 15 lb. 547.
2Litch V. Weutworth, 71 111. 146;
First N. Bk. v. Cook, 77 lb. 622.
8 Boyd V. Selma, (Ala. 93) 11 So.
393; Odlin v. Woodrufe, 12 So. Eep.
227; Arnold v. Cambridge, 106 Mass.
352; Whitney v. Boston, 108 lb. 89;
Hummill v. Boston, 106 lb. 350; see
also Murphy v. Harrison, 29 Ark.
340; Dusenbury v. Mayor, 25 N. J.
Eq. 295; Vanover v. Terrell etc. Co.,
27 Ga. 354; Harward v. St. Clair etc.
CH. XIX.]
REMEDIES IN GENERAL.
§397
be enjoined in order to prevent the collection of one that is
illegal ; ^ and if an assessment has been made, so as to place
an undue burden upon the property of some, the collection of
the excess will be enjoined.^ In such cases the court of equity
may require the payment of that portion of the tax, which is
admitted to be legal, as a condition precedent to relief against
the illegal tax.^
An injunction will lie, where property has been illegally ex-
empted from assessment or taxation, at the instance of one whose
burden has been thus increased.* But an injunction will not
lie, where there is no fraud (even though there be an over es-
timate of benefit received) where the error is simply one of
judgment.^
When the municipal authorities assert a jurisdiction to assess
property not subject to assessment, or lying outside of their ter-
ritorial jurisdiction, they will be enjoined.*"
An owner of land subject to assessment for local improve-
ments may obtain an injunction to prevent an assessment being
made without a petition ; ^ or the awarding of a contract with-
out advertisement, or to any except the lowest bidder,^ where
these are statutory requirements.
The question, whether the contract has been strictly per-
Co., 51 111. 531 ; Fleming v. Mersliom,
37 Iowa, 413 ; Barr v. Denisten, 19 N.
H. 170, 180; Mechanics' Bank v. Kan-
sas City, 73 Mo. 555.
1 Covington v. Rockingham, 93 N.
C. 134; Sheperdson v. Gillett, (Ind.
93) 31 N. E. R. 788; Goodnough v.
Powell, (Or. 93) 32 Pac. R. 396; Stilz
V. Indianapolis, 81 Ind. 582.
^Cummings v. National Bk. 101
U. S. 153 ; Pelton v. National Bank,
101 lb. 143.
3 Morrison v. Jacoby, 14 N. E. R.
546; 114 Ind. 84; Deeflir v. Bowen,
61 Ind. 29; Cook v. Racine, 49 Wis.
244; Morrison v. Hershire, 32 Iowa,
271; Merrill v. Humphrey, 24 Mich.
170; Albuquerque v. Beres, 13 S. Ct.
143; 147 U. S. 87.
4 Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242;
Hersey v. Suprs., 16 lb. 198; Hassen
V. Rochester, 65 N. T. 256.
5 Cleveland v. Board, 55 Barb. 288;
Brevoort v. Detroit, 24 Mich. 322;
Black V. Boyd, 155 Pa. St. 163; Kan-
sas M. L. Ins. Co. V. Hill, (Kan. 93)
33 Pac. 300; Smith v. Kelly, (Oreg.
93) lb. 642; Gage v. Evans, 90 111.
569; Hoke v. Perdue, 62 Cal. 545.
6 Ft. Wayne v. Shaaf, 106 Ind. 66;
Hawk v. Bonn, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 452;
Pullman P. Car Co. v. Board, 55 Fed.
206; Balfe v. Lammers, 109 Ind. 347;
Curry V. Jones, 4 Del. Ch. 559; Fre-
mont V. Boling, 11 Cal. 380; Bouldin
V. Mayor, 15 Md. 18.
.' Covington v. Nelson, 35 Ind. 582;
Makemson v. Kaufman, 35 Ohio St.
444.
" Mayor v. Johnson, 62 Md. 225 ;
Schumm v. Seymour, 9 C. E. Green,
143; Board of Comrs. v. Templeton,
51 Ind. 266.
789
§ 397
MTJNICIPAIi COEPOEATIONS.
[CH. XIX.
formed,^ or whether the ordinance, directing the improvement,
was legally enacted, cannot be tried in the injunction proceed-
ings, but must be referred to an action at law.^
If the power to tax exists, and the only question for consid-
eration is its irregular or erroneous exercise, injunction will
not lie unless it is applied for in a reasonable time after the
work has been begun ; when the iri'egularities are substantial,*
and the matter falls clearly and unmistakably under one of the
heads into which equity jurisdiction is divided. In conformity
with these principles, it is a general rule that a court of equity
will not enjoin the enforcement of a personal tax, or a tax levied
upon personal property by a municipality, merely because of
its illegality or invalidity.* If, however, there is no adequate
remedy at law, equity will enjoin the sale of personal property ;
as for example, in a case where a State, levying taxation on the
rolling stock of a railroad, refused to receive payment in its own
coupons in violation of its agreement to that effect.^
When the likeliliood of a sale for nonpayment of illegal
taxes would create a cloud on the title, the owner of the prop-
erty is not compelled to allow the illegal transaction to be con-
summated, and resist the purchaser by a legal defence ; but he
may apply for an injunction at once upon the ground of re-
moving a cloud upon his title.^
1 Kicketts v. Spraker, 77 Ind. 371;
McCafferty v. McCabe, 4 Abb. B. E.
87.
2 Balfe v. Lammers, 109 Ind. 347;
St. Louis V. Eanken, 9 S. W. E. 910;
96 Mo. 497; St. Louis v. Brewing Co.,
9 S. W. E. 910; 96 Mo. 497; Micliael
V. St. Louis, 20 S. "W. E, 666; 112 Mo.
610.
8 Kennedy v. Troy, 77 N. Y. 493;
Wright V. Tacoma, 3 Wash. Ter. 410;
Tingue v. Eochester, 101 N. T. 294;
Brush V. Carbondale, 78 111. 74; Mo-
Donald T. Payne, 114 Ind. 359.
* Lockwood V. St. Louis, 24 Mo.
20; Milwaukee v. Kaefler, 116 U. S.
219; Dodd v. Hartford, 25 Conn. 232;
Dows V. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108; Union
Pao. E. E. V. Cheyenne, 113 V. S.
516, 525; Sheldon v. Centre L. D.,
790
25 Conn. 224; Milwaukee Iron Co. v.
Hubbard, 27 Wis. 51.
5 Allen V. B. & O. E. E. Co., 114
U. S. 311.
6 Jersey City v. Canal Co., 12 N. J.
Eq. 227; Powell v. Parkersburg, 28
W. Va. 698; Huntington v. Union
Pac. Ey. Co., 2 Sawy. (U. S.)503;
Mitchell V. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 92;
Wiley V. Flournoy, 30 Ark. 609; Mo-
bile etc. Co. V. Peebles, 47 Ala. 317;
Bend v. Kenosha, 17 Wis. 284; Mc-
Pike V. Pen, 51 Mo. App. 63; Gilmore
V. Fox, 10 Kan. 509; McCormick v.
District, 4 Mackey, 396; Mutual Ins.
Co. V. Supervisors, 32 Barb. 322 ; Stone
V. Mobile, 57 Ala. 61; Ewing v. St.
Louis, 5 Wall. 413, 419; Holland v.
Baltimore, 11 Md. 186; Heywood v.
Buffalo, 14 N. T. 534; Baltimore v.
CH. XIX.J
BEMEDIES IN GENERAL.
§ 398
A suit will be entertained by equity to restrain tlie collec-
tion of taxes to pay fraudulent judgments, whicK have been
coUusively obtained against the corporation,^ or the expenses of
an unauthorized railroad survey ,2 to refund money voluntarily
contributed by citizens to avoid a conscription in the town.^
In cases, where the taxpayer has a right to seek the assist-
ance of courts of equity, they will be debarred from receiving
its aid by injunction, or otherwise, when they have been guilty
of laches, and have knowingly permitted third persons, acting
in good faith, to rely upon the objectionable action of the mu-
nicipality.* So, upon an application for an injunction, to pre-
vent the collection of an alleged illegal assessment, the silence
of the plaintiff during the progress of the improvement will be
a sound reason for refusing the injunction.^
§ 398. Scope of certiorari. — By the common law, courts
of superior and general jurisdiction have power to examine on
certiorari the proceedings of inferior jurisdictions, and the ac-
tions of ministerial officials.® So, in this coijntrj'', if there be
no appeal or remedy, in the nature of a writ of error, as when
a new jurisdiction or tribunal is created, whose procedure is
summary in character or contrary to the rules of the common
law, the superior or general courts of the State, having common
law powers, have inherent power to review and correct or va-
cate the proceedings and findings of the inferior court, board or
officers, exercising judicial authority.^
Porter, 18 Md. 284; Delphi v. Brown,
61 Ind. 29, 37.
1 Barr v. Deniston, 19 N. H. 170,
180; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 lb. 126.
2 Douglas V. Placerville, 18 Cal.
643.
8 Drake v. Phillips, 40 111. 388.
* Elliott, Koads and Streets, p. 440;
Claflin V. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 502;
Tash V. Adams, 10 Gush. 252; Stew-
art V. Kalamazoo, 30 Mich. 69 ; Peo-
ple V. Maynard, 15 lb. 463; Hodges
V. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110.
5 Lafayette v. Fowler, 34 Ind. 140;
Ritchie v. So. Topeka, 38 lb. 368;
Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. Eq.
143; Hyde Park v. Borden, 94111. 26;
Motz V. Detroit, 18 Mich. 495 ; Byram
V. Detroit, 50 lb. 56; Evansville v.
Phistere, 34 Ind. 36; Lundborn v.
Manistee, 93 Mich. 170; Weber v.
San Francisco, 1 Cal. 455 ; Collins v.
Camden, 27 K J. Eq. 293; Dusen-
bury V. Newark, 25 lb. 295; Storerv.
Cincinnati, 4 Ohio Cir. Ct. 279;
Bloomington v. Blodgett, 24 111. App.
650; Sleeper v. Bullen, 6 Kans. 300;
Topeka v. Gage, (Kan. 90) 24 Pac.
82; Martin v. Town, 56 Hun, 510.
•> Grovenvelt v. Burwell, 1 Ld.
Eaym. 454,469; Rex v. Inh. Glamor-
ganshire, 1 lb. 580.
7 Harris v. Barber, 129 U. S. 360;
Marion v. Chandler, 6 Ala. 899; Sav-
age V. (iulliver, 4 Mass. 178; Seattle
etc. Co. V. State, 5 "Wash. St. 807;
791
398
MTJNICrPAL CORPORATIONS.
[CH.
XIX.
Under this rule, it is well settled that the courts of common
law will ill the United States examine on certiorari the acts or
proceedings of municipal corporations or of their officials. If
it is found, upon such examination, that such acts or proceed-
ings are in excess of the municipal powers, or that they do not
conform substantially to the requirements of the cliarter or tlie
general law, they will be reversed or vacated by the court.^
In the absence of any statutory extension of its scope, a com-
mon law certiorari could be used only to review acts by courts
of law or officials of a distinctly judicial character, and not acts
of a ministerial nature.^ In recent times, however, exceptions
to this rule have been made, the scope of the writ greatly ex-
tended, and the writ employed to test the validitj'^ of municipal
acts and ordinances, both judicial and ministerial.^
Certiorari will not be granted to review the determination of
the local authorities, that the public interests demand the exer-
People V. Trustees, 42 111. Ap. 650;
McDonald v. Williams, 41 lb. 378;
Mathias v. Mason, (Mich.) 33 K W.
B. 312; Com. v. Ellis, 11 Mass^ 465;
Miller v. Sell. Trustees, 88 111. 26;
Welch V. Wetzel Co., (W. Va.) 1 S. E.
K. 337; State v. District. Court, 41
Minn. 42; Peterson v. Fowler, 76
Mich. 258.
1 State V. Robbins, 54 N. J. L. 566;
Lexington V. Sargent, 64 Miss. 621;
Swift V. Wayne Co., 64 Mich. 479;
31 N. W. E. 434; Old Colony R. Co.
V. Fall River, 147 Mass. 455 ; State v.
Elizabeth, 50 N. J. L. 347; State v.
Stewart, 5 Strob. L. 29 ; In re Schmidt,
24 S. C. 363; State v. Orange, 50 N.
J. L. 347; Dwight v. Springfield, 4
Gray, 107; Cunningham v. Squires,
2W. Va. 422; Champion v. Board,
5 Dak. 416; Taylor v. Americus, 39
Ga. 59; Macon v. Shaw, 16 lb. 172;
Wilson V. Seattle, 2 Wash. St. 543;
27 Pac. 474; Burns v. Lagrange, 17
Tex. 415; Carroll v. Tuscaloosa, 12
Ala. 173; Miller v. Jones, 80 lb. 89;
Great Falls Ice Co. v. District, 19 D.
C. 327; Jackson v. People, 9 Mich.
Ill; Gager v. Chippewa, 47 lb.
792
167; Can-on v. Martin, 26 K. J. L.
594; State v. Trenton, (N. J. 92) 23
Atl. R. 281 ; State v. Kewark, 25 N.
J. L. 399; State v. Hudson, 32 lb.
365; Dorchester v. Wentworth, 31
N. H. 451; State v. Dowling, 50 Mo.
134; Swan v. Cumberland, 8 Gill,
(Md.) 150; Ewing v. St. Louis, 5 Wall.
413; Holberg v. Macon, 55 Miss. 112;
Lonora v. Carthage, 27 111. 140; Gen-
esee V. Harper, 38 lb. 103; Collins
V. Davis, 59 Iowa, 256; Oshkosh v.
State, 59 Wis. 425 ; Board of Aid. of
Denver v. Darrow, 22 Pao. Rep. 784;
see ch. VII. Municipal Courts, § 105.
-Bacon's Abridgment, Certiora-
ri, P; People v. New York, 2 Hill, 9,
11, 14, 21; People V. Com'rs, 97 N.
Y. 37; Stone v. New York, 25 Wend.
157, 167; North & S. S. R. Co. v.
Spullock, 88 Ga. 283; State v. Moni-
teau Co. Ct., 45 Mo. App. 387.
8 Camden v. Mulf ord, 26 N. J, L.
49; State v. Hudson, 32 lb. 365; State
V. Donahay, 30 lb. 404; Mowery v.
Camden, 49 lb. 106; State v. Newark
Pol. Com'rs, 49 lb. 170; Iske v. New-
ton, 54 Iowa, 586.
OH. XIX.J
EBJIEDIES IN GENERAL.
§399
cise of the discretionary legislative powers which are possessed
by the municipality ; but proceedings, instituted in carrying
into execution such determination, are reviewable by the proper
court, with the object of correcting errors of law which have
been committed therein.^
In the absence of statute, a writ of certiorari is not a matter
of course and of right,^ and a party seeking the remedy ought
to show that substantial justice requires the issue of the writ.^
If their error is merely one of policj' or expediency,^ or if
there has been unreasonable delay in applying for it, the writ
should be denied.^
Certiorari will be granted to review proceedings which are
taken in condemnation of lands for highwa5rs and other public
purposes ; ® sometimes, even when an appeal is provided for.'
A writ of certiorari will also lie to review a contested elec-
tion case, where a writ of quo warranto is not called for.^ So,
likewise, the person aggrieved may by this writ obtain a revi-
sion of an assessment or tax, which has been wrongfully levied
upon his property,® or procure the removal of his non-taxable
property from the assessment roU.^"
§ 399. What may be examined under writ of certorari.
— A writ of certiorari is neither a substitute for an appeal, nor
is it designed to correct errors of fact ; " although it will be
112 Mass. 206; People v. Betts, 55 K.
Y. 600; People V. Dodge, 45 Hun, 310.
' People V. Brighton, 20 Mich. 57;
1 People V. Board, 62 Hun, 619; 16
N. Y. S. 705; People v. Queens Co.,
131 N. Y. 468 ;D wight v. Springfield,
4 Gray, 107; Monterey v. Berkshire,
7 Gush. 394; Read v. Camden, (N. J.
L.) 24 Atl. E. 549; Macon v. Shaw, 16
Ga. 172; Stone v. Boston, 2 Met. 220.
■^Ex parte Hitz, 111 U. S. 766;
Welch V.Wetzel Co., (W. Va.) 1 S. E.
Bep. 337; Lees v. Drainage Com'rs,
24 111. App. 487; Weaver v. Deven-
dorf, 3 Denio, 117; 15 Wend. 198.
^Charlestown v. Com'rs, 109 Mass.
270.
* People v. Board, 131 N. Y. 468;
Tiedt V. Carstevsen, 61 Iowa, 334.
5 State v. Ten Eyck, 18 N. J. L.
373;Elmendorf V. Covert, 1 Hill, 674;
Noyes v. City, 116 Mass. 87; Keys v.
Marion Co., 42 Cal. 252.
«Farmington etc. Co. v. Com'rs,
Comrs. V. Town, 19 111. App. 259;
Phillips v. Franklin Co., 22 Atl. K.
385 ; 83 Me. 541 ; Roberts v. Williams,
13 Ark. 555; Sailer v. Brown, 67
Mich. 422; State v. Poland, 50 N. J.
Law,367; Bixbyv. Gass,54Micli.551.
8 Cunningham v. Squires, 2 W. Va.
422; Gibbons v. Sheppard, 65 Pa.
St. 20. .
9 Swann v. Cumberland, 8 Gill, 150;
Milwaukee I. Co. v. Schubel, 29 Wis.
444.
10 Peo. V. Ogdensburg, 48 N. Y. 390.
11 State V. Bill, 13 Ired. L. 373 ; State
V. Swift, 1 Hill (S. C.) 29; State v.
Cockrell, 2 Eich..(S. C.) 6; State v.
Moniteau Co. Ct., 45 Mo. Ap. 387;
North & S. S. E. Co. v. Sprillock, 88
793
§399
MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS.
[CH. XIX.
granted, only when a final determination of the case has been
had by an inferior tribunal.^ But the revisory court can in-
quire, not only into the jurisdiction of the inferior court or of-
ficer, but into all alleged errors of law ^ in the proceedings which
bear upon the merits of the matter under consideration. So,
it has been held that it is the duty of the court to examine the
evidence, upon which the action of the inferior tribunal is
founded, and to determine if it was sufficient to justify the ad-
judication or decision of the court.* There is, however, much
contrariety of opinion upon this point ; and it has been held
that the jurisdiction of the superior court is limited to an ex-
amination of the legalitj' aud regularity of the proceedings in
point of form ; and can only determine the question of proper
observance of the requirments of the law.* The general rule
is, that certiorari does not lie to review the evidence given in
the inferior court,^ is subject to the exception that the court
may inquire, whether any evidence of a fact was presented to
the inferior tribunal.^ But the weight of the decisions seems
to sustain the view, that the case cannot be retried upon its
merits in a proceeding by certiorari, unless the scope of that
writ has been enlarged by statute.^
Ga. 283; Com. v. Gillespie, 23 Atl.
E. 393.
'Western Uu. Co. v. Locke, 107
Ind. 9; Freshour v. Logansport, 104
lb. 463.
^McAUiley V. Horton, 75 Ala. 491;
Donahue v. "Will Co., 100 HI. 94;
Hyslop V. Pinch, 99 lb. 571; State v.
Dodge Co., 56 Wis. 79; Bea v. See-
man, (W. Va. 92) 15 S. E. R. 173;
State V. St. Johns, 47 Minn. 315;
Kane v. State, 17 Atl. E. 557; 70 Md.
546.
" People V. Metro. Pol. Board, 39
N. T. 506; People v. Smith, 45 lb.
772; Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. 111.
* Parks V. Boston, 8 Pick. 218;
Dwight V. Springfield, 4 Gray, 107;
State V. Perranet, 41 La. An. 179;
People V. Parker, 45 Hun, 452 ; Far-
mingtonE. W. P. Co. v. Comrs., 112
Mass. 206; State v. Eightor, (La.) 2
So. E. 385; Herbert v. Curtis, (N. J.
794
93) 25 Atl. E. 386; Wilmington S. S.
Co. V. Haas, 25 lb. 85; 151 Pa.
St. 131; 31 W. N. C. 79; Garvin v.
Gorman, 63 Mich. 221.
5 Com. V. Gillespie, 23 Atl. E. 393;
DeEochburne v. Com., 12 Minn. 78;
Betts V. Warren, 5 Harr. 4; In re
Eoad in Bethlehem Tp., 10 Atl. E.
122; Barclay v. Brabston, 49 N. J. L.
629; Carrie v. Carrie, 42 Mich. 509;
Eayuer v. State, 52 Md. 568; State v.
Davis, 48 N. J. L. 112; Hewitt v.
Judge, 34 N. W. E. 248; Wilmington
S. S. Co. V. Haas, 25 Atl. E. 85; 151
Pa. St. 131; 31 W. N. C. 79; People
V. Assessors, 39 K. T. 81.
8 Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. Ill;
Ez parte Turnpike Co., 62 Ala. 93;
Camden v. Bloch, 65 lb. 236; People
V. Police Board, 72 N. Y. 415 ; More-
land V. Whitford, 54 Wis. 150.
' In re Mount Morris Sq., 2 Hill,
14; In re Albany St., 23 Wend. 277;
CH. XIX.J
REMEDIES IN GENERAL.
400
The uncertainty of the law as to the extent of the power of
the revisory court, where its power in a certiorari proceeding
has not been expressly and distinctly enlarged by statute, is due
wholly to the disposition manifest in some courts in recent times
to extend this remedy, in order to make it cover particular cases,
to whicb in its original character it was never intended to be
applied.
A common law writ of certiorari will not lie to review the
final determination of a court or officer, where an appeal or
writ of error is allowed.^ But if an appeal is improperly de-
nied, or if the party is fraudulently, or by accident, deprived
of it, he may have his whole case reviewed on certiorari, both
as to law auc^ fact.^
§ 400. Indictment. — In accordance with the present dispo-
sition to assimilate corporate duties and responsibilities to those
of individuals, it is well settled that municipal and private cor-
porations can be indicted for malfeasance or nonfeasance, in
performing those mandatory public duties, which are imposed
upon them by statute, or in England by prescription. Munic-
ipal corporations cannot be indicted for felonies, but they may
be indicted for acts injurious to the public, which constitute a
nuisance.^ So, it has been held that the municipality is indict-
able at common law for a failure to keep its highways in re-
Stone V. New York, 25 lb. 157,
167; People v. Kochester, 21 Barb.
656; 2 Hill, 27; People v. Com'rs, 106
N. T. 64; People v. Fire Com'rs, 106
lb. 257; Oslikosh v. State, 59 Wis.
425. But see State v. Kansas City,
89 Mo. 34, where it is held that cer-
tiorari will call for review of only
those facts which appear upon the
face of the record.
1 State V. District, 41 Minn. 42;
Harris v. Barber, 9 S. Ct. 314; 129 U.
S. 366; Petty v. Ducker, 11 S. W. R.
2; 51 Ark. 281; In re Mt. Morris Sq.,
2 Hill, 14; Bogart v. Kew York, 7
Cow. 158; Bundle v. Baltimore, 28
Md. 356; Beasley v. Beckley, 28 W.
Va. 81 ; Wilson v. Burks, 71 Ga. 862 ;
Galloway v. Corbett, 52 Mich. 460;
Eeynolds v. Los Angeles, 64 Cal. 372.
2 State V. Bill, 13 Ired. L. 373; ch.
VIII. Municipal Courts, § 100.
3 Kegina v. Great etc. Ey. Co., 9 Q.
B. 315; Kegina v. Bermingham etc.
Co., 9 Car. & P. 469; Reginav. Nott,
4 Q. B. 773; Rex v. Oxfordshire, 16
East, 223; Com. v. New Bedford, 2
Gray, 229; McCrowell v. Bristol, 5
Lea, 685 ; Com. v. Kinperts, 12 Pa.
Co. Ct. R. 463; State v. Raymond, 27
N. H. 388; Sussex v. Strader, 18 N.
J. L. 108; Com. v. Vt. & Mass. R. R.
Co., 4 Gray, 22; State v. Hudson Co.,
27 N. J. L. 415 ; State v. E. R. Co., 27
Tt. 103; State v. Society, 54 N. J.
Law, 260; People v. Equitable G. L.
Co., 5 N. Y. S. 19; Phillips v. Com.,
44 Pa. St. 197; State v. Portland, 74
Me. 268.
795
§401
MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS.
[CH. XIX.
pair.i In such an indictment it is sufficient to allege generally
that it is a public highway ; ^ and it is not essential to name the
owners of the land over which it runs.^ Immaterial misdescrip-
tions will not vitiate the indictment.* A town, having by
charter the power to preserve health and remove nuisances,
has been indicted for a neglect of its public duty, in permitting
a slaughter house to remain on private property, to the annoy-
ance of a citizen, and in danger of the public health.^
In one instance, it was held that a town was indictable at
common law for failure to erect a bridge.^ The liability of mu-
nicipal corporations including towns and counties for the re-
pair of bridges depends largely upon statute. But at common
law they were indictable for failure to keep a bridge in repair,
even though no damages could be recovered against them in a
civil suit.'^ '
The indictment of municipal corporations at common law
without doubt rested upon the strictly private and possessory "
character of such corporations under the earlier English law.^
In the United States, where the municipal franchise is given
to the community in general, and not to a few citizens of the
place, the indictment of a municipal corporation would appear
to be a very anomalous proceeding, if it were not altogether
impossible.
§ 401. Writ of prohibition. — In the United States, the
writ of prohibition is employed to restrain the attempted ille-
gal exercise of municipal powers, or the imposition of munic-
1 State V. Murfreesboro, 11 Humph.
217; State V. Gorliam, 37 Me. 451;
Com. V. Hopklnsville, 7 B. Mon. 38;
State V. Barksdale, 5 Humph. 154;
Com. T. Newburyport, 103 Mass. 129;
Louisville etc. Co. v. State, 3 Head,
523; JSTowlin v. State, 49 Ala. 41;
Phillips V. Com., 44 Pa. St. 197;
Howard v. Bridgewater, 16 Pick.
189; Davis v. Bangor, 42 Me. 522.
2 State V. Harsh, 6 Black. 346;
Eeg. V. Turvpesten, 1 Eng. L. & Eq.
317; Nichols v. State, 89 Ind. 298.
8 State V. Dover, 10 N. H. 394.
« Alexander v. State, 16 Ala. 661 ;
State V. Lemay, 13 Ark. 405; State v.
796
Fletcher, 13 Vt. 124.
^McCrovrell v. Bristol, 5 Lea, 585;
State V. Shelbyville, 4 Sneed, 176;
contra, State v. Burlington, 36 Vt.
521.
6 State V. Whitingham, 7 Vt. 390.
' Eegina v. Bermingham, 9 Car. &
P. 469; Rex v. Staffordshire, 16 East,
223; State v. Gorham, 37 Me. 451;
Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. Com., 101 Pa.
St. 192; Sawyer V. Northfield,7Cush.
490; contra, State v. Hudson, 30 N.
J. L. 137; Eyman v. People, 6 111. 8;
State V. Portland, 74 Me. 268.
" See ante, § 21, and, generally,
ch. III. on Ihcorporation.
CH. XIX.]
KEMEDIES IN GENERAL.
§401
ipal fines and penalties which are unauthorized by law.^ A
writ of prohibition is directed bj'^ a superior to an inferior court,
forbidding it to act, while an injunction is directed to a party
and not to the court. So, a prohibition has been refused, when
it was asked for, in order to control the action of a municipal
council, acting not as a court, but as a legislative body.^
If a suit is pending, and injury is imminent to either of the
parties, for which he can have no other remedy, a writ of pro-
hibition will issue ; but such a writ will not be granted, merely
because a suit is threatened.^ If however there is a plain rem-
edy in the ordinary course of law, as by putting in a defence
•in the inferior or municipal court, and the defendant upon con-
viction has the right of an appeal or to ask for a certiorari to
review the trial, a writ of prohibition will not be granted.*
1 Clayton v. Heidelberg, VJ Miss.
623 ; Warwick v. Mayo, 15 Gratt. 528 ;
State V. Christ Ch. P. R. Com'rs, 1
Mill Const. 55.
2 Mealing v. Augusta, Dud. (Ga.)
221.
sBluffton V. Silver, 63 Ind. 262;
Arnold v. Shields, 5 Dana, 18; State
V. Columbia, 16 S. C. 412; In re Elly-
son, 20 Gratt. 10; Culpeper v. Gar-
rell, 20 lb. 484; Gould v. Gapper, 5
East, 345. In Smith v. Whitney, 116
U. S. 167, Mr. Justice Gray says:
" Where the inferior court has clearly
no jurisdiction of the suit or prose-
cution instituted before it, and the
defendant therein has objected to its
jurisdiction at the outset, and has no
other remedy, he is entitled to a writ
of prohibition as matter of right, and
a refusal to grant it, where all the
proceedings appear of record, may
be reversed on error."
■i Ducheneau v. Ireland, (Utah, 87)
13 Pac. 87; Turner v. Forsyth, 3 S.
E. E. 649; 78 Ga. 683; State v. Four-
net, 13 So. K. 185; State v. Kightor,
44 La. An. 298; State v. Withrow,
108 Mo. 1.
797
INDEX.
References are to Sections.
A.
ABAiroONMENT,
of condemnation proceedings, 242.
of dedicated lands, 228.
of streets, 308-312, inc.
of turnpikes, 319.
ABUTTERS,
torts of, 348.
their rights and remedies as against railroads as streets, 301-307, inc.
their riglits on the vacation of streets, 308-312, inc., 297.
rights of, in local assessments, 259 a, 277-282, inc.
ACCEPTANCE OF CHARTER,
when necessary, 24.
ACCEPTANCE OF DAMAGE,
in condemnation of lands, 250.
ACCEPTANCE OF DEDICATION,
when implied and effect, 222-224.
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFICE, 78.
ACCRETIONS,
public rights to, 225.
ACTIONS,
on bonds, 193.
on coupons, 193.
ACTIONS EX DELICTO AND EX CONTRACTU,
distinguished, 164.
on warrants, 179, 180.
ACTS,
unauthorized not compellable by mandamus, 361.
ADJOURNMENT OF TOWN MEETING, 95.
ADJOURNED MEETINGS, 97.
ADMISSIONS IN MUNICIPAL RECORDS, 107.
ADVERSE POSSESSION,
of city streets, 312.
ADVERTISING CONTRACTS, 172, 173.
AGENT,
may dedicate, 218.
of municipal corporation defined, 338 a.
of municipality contracts with city, 166.
municipal contracts made by, 166, 167.
(799)
800 XNDBX.
References are to Sections.
AGEICULTUKAX, LAKDS,
when taxable, 276.
AID TO EAILROAD, 184^188.
ALIENATION,
power of, 208.
of dedicated lands, 229.
ALLEYS, 221, 287.
ALLUVIUM,
right to, 200, 225.
ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF MANDAMUS, 367, 368.
AMENDMENT,
of record, 106.
AMUSEMENTS,
regulation of, 121.
ANIMALS, 129, 180.
exhibitors of, 300.
ANNEXATION. See Boxjitdaeles.
ANNULMENT OF CONTRACTS, 174.
APPARATUS,
to extinguish fires, 130.
APPLICATION,
for mandamus by attorney-general, 363.
APPOINTMENTS TO OFFICE, 75, 76, 77.
APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES, 248.
APPROPRIATION,
for public works, 171.
ARBITRATIONS, 142.
AREAS,
railings around, 343.
for violation of, ordinances, 156.
ASSENT,
of abutters to assessments, 278.
ASSESSMENTS, 253-284, inc.
for improvements and taxation distinguished, 259 a,
for repairing turnpikes, 379.
for improvements, 259 a, 272-282, inc.
of damages for lands taken, 244r-250, inc.
ASSETS, 89.
ASSIGNMENT,
of contracts, 171.
of salaries, 80.
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
may apply for mandamus, 363.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW,
municipal contracts with, 176.
AUCTIONS,
municipal control of, 291.
AWARDING,
contracts, 172.
INDEX. 3(,J^
Beferences are to Sections.
AUTHORITY,
of ofRcers to contract, 169.
AWNINGS, 300, 346.
AYES AND NOES, 98.
B.
BALLOT LAW, OT.
BANKS,
when taxable, 273.
BAERIEES,
around excavations, 343.
BASEMENTS, 343.
BAY WINDOWS, 131, 300.
BENEFITS,
resulting from public acts, 246.
BICYCLES,
use of, in streets, 299.
BIDS,
by contractors, 172, 173.]
BLASTING,
injury by, 327 a.
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
liability of, for negligence, 325.
BONA FIDE HOLDERS,
of bonds, 195 c-195 e, inc., 196.
BONDS,
of contractors, 171.
of municipal corporations, 177-199.
ofScial, 72.
BOUNDARIES,
how defined, 54.
corporate boundaries by reference to streams and highways, 54.
enlargement of boundaries — annexation of territory, 55.
what territory may be annexed — ^farm lands, 56.
effect of extension of city boundaries, 57.
effect of annexation of one town to another, 58.
effect of division of one town into two, 59.
legislative power to apportion property and debts in cases of annexa-
tion and division, 60.
procedure in cases of annexation. When annexation legal, 61.
exercise of power beyond city limits, only one corporation over same
area, 62.
division of municipal territory into wards, 63.
BOUNTIES, 138.
BREACH OF OFFICIAL DUTY,
when cause for removal, 81.
BRIDGES,
definition, character and construction of public bridges, 313.
legislative and municipal powers over, 314.
51
802 INDEX.
Beterences are to Sections.
BRIDGES— cojiiinaed.
national control over construction and maintenance of, 314 a.
county liability for maintenance and repair of public bridges, 315.
rights and duties of municipal corporations in building, rebuilding
and maintaining bridges, 316.
private bridges on or intersecting highways, 317.
when taxable, 272.
negligence in care of, 353.
BROOKLTIT,
boundary line of, 54.
BROOKLYN BRIDGE, 15, 338 a.
BUILDING,
moving, through streets, 300.
in fire limits, 331.
destruction of, to prevent conflagration, 335.
BUILDINGS,
regulation of, 131.
BUILDING MATERIALS,
in streets, 300, 348.
BURDEN OF PROOF,
to establish abandonment of streets, 310.
to show negligence, 352.
quo warranto proceedings, 383.
to establish contributory negligence, 350.
BUSINESS OF CITY,
must be transacted at meeting of council, 100.
BY-LAWS. See Oedinances.
c.
CABLE ROADS, 306 a.
CANCELLATION,
of contracts, 174.
CANCELED BONDS, 197.
CARS,
storage of, on streets, 300.
CATTLE AT LARGE, 153.
CAUSE,
removals for, 83.
CELEBRATIONS, 139.
CEMETERIES, 118.
CENTER OF ROAD,
defined, 321.
CERTIFICATION OF ELECTION,
officer may obtain by mandamus, 371.
CERTIORARI,
in condemnation of lands, 249.
in illegal local assessments, 279.
scope, 378.
what examinable, 399.
INDEX. 803
Eelerences are to Sections.
CHLOTGE,
of corporate name, 48.
of motor power, 306, 306 a.
CHARITABLE DEVISES,
to cities, 202-212.
CHAKITABLE INSTITUTIONS,
exempt from taxation, 270.
CHARTER,
of city, its nature, 146.
acceptance of, 24.
power to amend or repeal, 32.
forfeiture of, 384.
CHARTER POWERS, ^
classiflcation and construction of, 110. ^
imperative and discretionary, distinguished. 111.
discretionary powers, 112.
delegated powers cannot be delegated, 113.
usage in construing powers — prescription, 114.
the indemnity for officials acting in good faitli, 115.
the police power of municipal corporations — its scope and limitations,
116.
territorial limits of police regulations, 116 a.
the municipal power to legislate upon subjects covered by State stat-
utes, 117.
sanitary regulations — slaughter houses — cemeteries — unwholesome
provisions, 118 — contagious diseases — removal of refuse — water
supply, 119.
the regulation and abatement of nuisances in general, 120.
regulation of harbor and navigable waters, 121.
regulation of occupations and amusements, 122.
licenses, when a police regulation, and when a tax, 123.
license power of municipal corporation construed, 124.
licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors, 125.
supervision and care of paupers, vagrants, indigent, insane and sick
persons, 126.
inspection of goods and other commodities, 127. mm
establishment and regulation of public markets, 128.
impounding animals — ordinances respecting dogs, 129.
prevention of flres — fire limits — purchase of fire apparatus, 130.
regulation of buildings and their construction, 131.
regulation of private wharves, 132.
public wharves, 183.
ferries and ferriage, 134.
regulations providing for the public welfare, peace and safety, 135.
regulations of railroads within city limits, 135 a. .
power to appropriate funds for lobbying purposes, 136.
power to borrow money, 137.
payment of bounties, 138.
804 INDEX.
Beferences are to Sectionii.
CHAETEE FOW^nS— continued.
celebrations and entertainments, 139.
rewards, 140.
erecting, furnishing and repairing public buildings, 141.
compromises and arbitrations, 142.
power of municipality to sue and be sued, 143.
power to create private monopolies, 144.
power to create and operate municipal monopolies — municipal owner-
ship of gas, electric light and water works, 144 o.
CHOSES IN ACTIONS,
when taxable, 275.
CHURCHES,
aisles of, 131.
CHURCH PEOPEETT,
when exempt from taxation, 270.
CITY LIMITS,
powers beyond, 62.
CITY ATTOENEYS, 176.
CISTEENS,
in streets, 294.
CIVIL SEEVICE,
examinations, 70.
CLAIMS,
non legal, satisfaction of, 16.
by city against contractors, 171.
CLASSIPICATIO]Sr,
of charter powers, 110.
CLEEK OP coinsrciL,
his duties, 106.
COAL CELLAES,
under sidewalks, 298.
COASTING,
in streets, 331.
COEECION,
what constitutes, 326 a.
COLLECTION,
of taxes and local assessments, 253-284, inc.
restrained by injunction, 897.
COMMISSIONEES,
to assess local assessments, 265.
COMMITTEES, 98.
COMMON LAW,
dedications, 214, et seq.
COMMONS, 226.
COMMUNITIES,
gifts to, 205.
COMPENSATION,
for land taken by right of eminent domain, 243-248, inc.
INDEX. 805
Keferences arc to Sections.
COMPENSATION— continued.
to abutters on vacating streets, 311.
for property destroyed or damaged in grading, 330.
office, 79, 80.
COMPROMISES, 142.
COMPULSION,
what constitutes, 326 a.
COMPULSORY CONTRACTS, 15.
COMPULSORY LABOR ON ROAD, 260.
COMPULSORY PAYMENT
of taxation, 326, 326 a.
CONDEMNATION,
of lands by right of eminent domain, 230-250, inc.
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT,
to railroad aid, 186.
to exercise of power of eminent domain, 241.
CONFLAGRATION,
destruction of building to prevent, 335.
CONGRESS,
its power to create corporations, 22.
CONSENT,
of community to incorporation, 24.
of taxpayers to issue of bonds, 189.
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, 239, 329, 354, 354 a.
CONSIDERATION,
for invalid bonds, 193 a.
when ground for liability, 336.
CONSOLIDATION,
of corporations. See Anstexatign.
CONSTABLES,
powers of, 89, 333.
CONSTITUTIONS,
tlieir requirements as to uniformity of taxation, 259, 259 a,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS,
on the riglit of eminent domain, 231.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
relating to change of grades, 330.
relative to incorporation, 27.
CONSTRUCTION,
of bridges, 313.
of cliarter powers, 110-144 a.
of powers over streets and bridges, 286-321, inc.
of ordinances, 159, 160.
CONTAGIOUS DISEASE, 119.
CONTIGUOUS TERRITORY,
annexation of, 56.
CONTRACTS,
when compulsoiy, 15.
legislative power over, 14.
806 INDEX.
Beferences are to Sections.
CO'STB.A.CTS— continued.
inJierent or implied power to contract, 163.
implied contracts, 164.
mode of contracting, writing or seal when necessary — statute of
frauds, 165.
municipal contracts with its agents, 166.
form of contracts made by municipal agents, 167.
non-liability of public official acting within his authority, 168.
authority of municipal officials to contract — ultra vires, 169.
ratification, what constitutes, 170.
contracts for public works — contractor's bond — payment, 171.
advertising and letting to lowest bidders — ^patented articles, 172.
bids — sealed proposals — taxpayer's remedy — ^fraud in bidding, 173.
annulment of contracts — corporate control of work, 174.
contracts for water supply, 175.
contracts with attorneys at law, 176.
CONTEACT WOKK,
liability for, 347.
CONTKACTOK,
who is, 67.
and servant distinguished, 347.
torts of, 847.
CONTEMPT OF COUKT,
in failing to obey mandamus, 369.
CONTKIBUTORT NEGLIGENCE, 352.
CONTROL OP STREETS,
of cities by legislature, 289, 302, 303, 308.
by city, 286, 306 o.
CORNER LOTS,
how assessable, 259 a.
CORPORATE NAME. See Name.
CORPORATE EXISTENCE,
forfeiture of, 39.
not open to collateral attack, 29,
judicial notice, 30.
proof of, 31.
CORPORATIONS,
defined, 1.
public and private corporations distinguished, 2.
public and municipal corporations distinguished, 3.
the New England town, 4.
the State and Federal government as a quasi corporation, 5.
COUNCILS, 96.
notice of corporate meetings — ^New England town meetings — adjourn-
ment, 95.
town councils — presiding officers, 96.
regular, special and adjourned meetings, 97.
methods of proceeding — ayes and noes, 98.
INDEX. 807
References are to Sections.
COXmCILS— continued.
quorum of the council— joint bodies— action of the majority bind-
ing, 99.
municipal business must be transacted by the council as a body-
meetings, 100.
COUNTY,
when liable for bridges, 315, 325.
COUPON BONDS, 190 to 194 a, inc.
COURTS,
municipal, 101, et seq.
COURTS OF EQUITY,
their power to enforce trusts, 206.
jurisdiction over Municipal Corporations, 391-397.
See Equitable Remedies and Remedies in genekal.
CONVEYANCE,
by city, 211-214.
CREATION OF MUNICIPALITIES,
in England, 21.
in America, 22.
by special act, 26.
by general act, 27.
by implication, 25.
CREDITORS,
lights of, 41, 42.
of municipal aided by mandamus, 375, 376.
CROSSINGS AND INTERSECTIONS,
power to pave, 292.
CURATIVE STATUTES, 187.
CUSTODY OF RECORDS, 106.
D.
DAMAGES,
caused by exercise of right of eminent domain, 244-250, inc.
consequential, 239, 329, 354, 354 a.
for change of grade, 330.
for negligence, 352 a.
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA, 329.
DEAD ANIMALS, 150.
DEBTS,
apportionment of, 60.
of corporation, 45.
DEDICATION OF PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE,
general statement, 214.
general requisites of statutory dedications, 215.
extent of statutoiy dedication, 216.
general requisites of common law dedication, 217.
who may dedicate, 218.
intention to dedicate, how established, 219.
presumption of intention from long user, 220.
808 INDEX.
References are to Sections.
DEDICATION OP PROPERTY TO PUBLIC VS'E— continued.
platting and sale of lots as evidence of intention, 221.
a dedication irrevocable, when accepted, 222.
effect of acceptance, 223.
extent of common law dedication, as respects donor's title, 224,
public right to alluvium and accretions, 225.
dedication to use as public square, 226.
dedication to other public uses, 227.
effect of misuser or abandonment of dedicated lands, 228.
alienation of dedicated lands, 229.
DE FACTO OFFICERS, 79, 85, 188.
DE FACTO COUNCILS, 96.
DEFECTIVE BRIDGES, 353.
DEFECTIVE STREETS, 340-346, 342, 348, 350.
DEFENCES,
to warrants, 179, 180.
to bonds, 195 a.
not appearing on face, 195 6.
DEFINITION,
of agent, 338 a.
of center of the road, 321.
of bridge, 313.
of nuisance, 120.
of ordinances and resolutions, 145.
of payment, 291.
DE JURE OFFICERS, 85, 88.
DELAY,
when an estoppel, 196.
DELEGATION,
of legislative power, 113, 147, 238.
of power of Legislature over streets to cities, 289, 301, 302.
of municipal power of taxation forbidden, 263.
DEMAND IN MANDAMUS
proceedings must be shown, 364.
DEMURRER,
to mandamus, 368.
DESTRUCTION,
of property by mobs, 334.
of houses to prevent spread of conflagration, 239, 335, 335 a.
of property by board of health, 335 a.
of property under sanitary or military regulations, 335 a.
DEPUTIES, 67.
DEVISE,
to municipal corporation, 49, 202, 207.
DIRECTION,
of writ of mandamus, 367-370.
DISCONTINUANCE,
of proceedings in condemning land, 242.
DISCRETIONARY AND MINISTERIAL DUTIES DISTINGUISHED,
349, 362.
INDEX. 809
Beferences are to Sections.
DISCRETIONARY POWERS, 112, 328, 335.
when liable for negligence in exercise of, 328.
DISEASE,
spread of, 119.
DISPOSAL OF BONDS, 198.
DISQUALIFICATIONS,
for office, "74.
DISSOLUTION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 10.
in England, 37.
in the United States, 38.
forfeiture of corporate existence, 39.
efCect of, 40.
rights of creditors on a dissolution of a municipal corporation, 41.
the rights of creditors where a second corporation has been established
in its place, 42.
effect of dissolution-of corporation in general, where no other corjjora-
tion has been substituted therefor, 43.
revival by a new charter, 44.
DIVERGENCE,
from path when negligence, 352.
DIVISION OF TOWNS,
DOCKS, 182.
DOGS, 129.
DOMESTIC ANIMALS, 155.
DOMICILE,
of voters, 66.
DONATIONS,
to municipal corporations, 202-207.
to railroads, 184-188.
DUTIES,
of officers, 87.
of mayor, 90.
of municipal corporations, 324.
of guasj-munioipal corporations, 341.
to guard excavations, 343.
DURESS,
defined, 326 a.
DRAINING LANDS, 237.
DRAINING,
power to take lands by eminent domain for, 236.
DRAINAGE, 354 a, 355.
DRAINS AND SEWERS, 855.
EARTH,
of city streets, 293.
EASEMENT,
when acquired by, 216.
dedication, 217.
810 INDEX.
Beferences are to Sections.
'EASEMENT— continued.
taking of, by right of eminent domain, 238.
of abutters, 300-306.
EFFECT OF RECITALS,
in bonds, 196.
ELECTIONS,
time and place of holding elections, 65.
qualifications of voters — residence, 66.
contests, 381.
mandamus to compel, 371.
ELECTRIC LIGHT, 144 a.
ELECTRIC RAILROAD, 306 a.
ELEVATED RAILROADS, 301, 304, 305.
EMINENT DOMAIN,
defined, 230.
constitutional limitations, 231.
exercise of power regulated by Legislature, 232.
delegation of power to municipal corporations, 233.
what is a public purpose, 234.
power to take lands for a private road, 234 a.
power to take land for ornamental purposes, 235.
power to take lands for purpose of draining them, 236.
power to take land beyond city limits, 237.
what property may be taken, 238.
what constitutes a taking, 239.
exercise of eminent domain by municipal corporations, 240.
conditions precedent to the exercise of the power, 241.
effect of discontinuance of proceedings, 242.
compensation required, 243.
who entitled to receive compensation, 244.
who assesses the damages, 245.
the measure of value or damages, 246.
when payment should be made, 247.
apportionment of damages among lots benefited, 248.
revisory proceedings — certiorari, 249.
effect of accepting damages, 250.
distinguished from taxation, 253.
EMPLOYEE OF CITT,
distinguished from officer, 67.
ENACTMENT OP BY-LAWS, See Obdinancbs.
ENFORCEMENT,
of ordinances, 331.
of ministerial duties, 349.
of mandatory duties by mandamus, 362.
ENGLISH MUNICIPALITIES,
how incorporated, 21.
ENLARGEMENT OF BOUNDARIES, 55.
ENTERTAINMENTS, 139.
ERECTION OF BUILDINGS,
compellable by mandamus, 377.
INBEX. 811
References are to Sections.
ESTOPPEL,
of city as to public easement in streets, 196, 312.
to deny existence of street, 346.
EQUALITY OF TAXATION,
and assessment, 259, 259 a.
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL, 196, 312, 346.
EQUITABLE JURISDICTION,
over mistakes, 326 a.
over municipal corporations, 391-397, inc.
EQUITABLE REMEDIES,
in condemnation proceedings, 249.
against cities, 391-397, inc.
EQUITY,
power to enforce trusts, 206.
EXAMESTATIONS,
for civil service, 70.
EXCAVATIONS, 325, 330, 348, 348.
EXCHANGE,
on bonds, 192 6.
EXCLUSIVE FRANCHISE,
to lay pipes, 296.
EX CONTRACTU,
actions, 164.
EXECUTION,
of bonds, 190-190 a.
EXECUTIONS AGAINST CITY, 212.
EXEMPTIONS,
from taxation, 270.
of farm lands from taxation, 276.
from poll tax, 260 a.
from toll, 320.
of public property from judgment, 375.
EXISTENCE OF CORPORATION,
proof of, 29, 31.
EXPENSE OF REPAIRING BRIDGES, 315, 316.
EXPRESS COMPANIES,
power to tax, 261.
EXTENT OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR STREETS, 342-346.
EVIDENCE, 160.
to show negligence, 337, 338.
of contributory negligence, 352.
in proceedings to vacate streets, 309, 310.
F.
FAILURE OF MUNICIPALITY,
to appoint, 76.
to abate nuisances, 327, 327 a.
to enforce ordinances, corpoi'ation not liable for, 331.
to supply water, 327, 327 6.
812 INDEX.
Befcrences are to Sections.
FALLING SUBSTANCES,
in streets, 345, 348.
PALLING WALLS,
damage by, 331 a.
FARM LANDS, 56.
annexation of,
when taxable, 276.
. FAST DRIVING, 299.
FEDERAL CONTROL OVER BRIDGES, 314 a.
FEDERAL LIMITATIONS,
on taxing powers of States and municipal corporations, 258.
FEE LICENSE, 123.
FENCES AND BARRIERS, 343.
■when they pass in dedication, 224.
FERRIES AND FERRIAGE, 134.
FERRY BOATS.
■when taxable, 272.
finaIj judgment,
in mandamns, 370.
FINES,
must be reasonable, 154.
form of, 156.
action to recover, 156, 157.
FIREMEN,
city not liable for their torts, 333, 333 a, 334.
FIRE LIMITS,
power to establish, 130.
city not liable for fire therein, 331.
FIRE APPARATUS, 130.
FIREWORKS,
damage by, 327 a.
FIXING BOUNDARIES, 53.
FLAGGING, 292.
FLOUR,
sale of, 154. •
FOODS,
inspection of, 127.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS,
their rights, 272.
FORFEITURE,
of municipal charter, 37, 384.
for violation of ordinance, 155.
FORMS,
of official oaths and bonds, 72, 73.
FRAME STRUCTURES,
inside fire limits, 130.
FRANCHISE, 144.
legislative power over, 11.
FRAUD,
in building, 173.
INDEX. 813
References are to Sections.
FRIGHTENING HORSES,
in streets, 242.
FRONTAGE,
as a basis for apportioning local assessment, 259 a 277
FUNDING BONDS, 197.
FURNITURE,
for public buildings, 141.
a.
GAMBLING, 117.
GAS,
supplied by city, 336 a.
GAS-PIPES,
in streets, 295, 296.
GAS-WORKS, ,
ownership of municipal, 144 a.
GATES,
to turnpike, 320.
GENERAL LAWS,
regulating taxation, 267.
GENERAL WELFARE,
clause, 135.
contracts for, 163.
GOOD FAITH,
ordinances must be enacted in, 149.
GOODS,
inspection of, 127.
GRADE,
power to fix and change, 329.
GRADING AND IMPROVING STREETS, 291-294, inc.
H.
HARBORS, 121.
HEALTH OFFICIAL,
no liability of city for acts of, 332, 335 a.
HIGHWAYS. See Stebets.
and bridges distinguished, 313.
and railroads distinguished, 303.
as boundaries, 54.
and streets. Liability for their condition, 329, 330, 339-350a, inc.
maintenance of, 339.
repairs to, 340, 346.
HIGHWAY COMMISSIONERS, 288.
HOLDERS BONA FIDE, 195 c-19o e, inc.
of municipal securities, their rights, 177 to 199.
HOLDING OVER, 81.
HOISTWATS, 131.
HOMESTEAD,
in cities, 57.
814 INDEX.
Keferences are to Sections.
HORSE RAILWAYS, 302, 304, 306, 321.
HORSES,
taking fright, 342.
I.
ICE AjSTD snow in STREETS,
accidents caused by, 299, 344, 348.
ILLEGAL EXEMPTION,
its effect, 270.
ILLEGAL OBLIGATIONS, 181.
ILLEGAL REMOVALS, 85.
ILLEGAL TAXES,
liability of corporation for, 326.
ILLEGAL TAXATION,
•estrained, 897.
IMPLICATION,
municipality created by, 25.
repeal of charter by, 34.
IMPLIED CONTRACTS, 163, 164.
IMPLIED DEDICATION, 221.
IMPLIED LIABILITY,
of municipal corporations, 324, 336 a.
IMPLIED POWER,
to contract, 163, 164.
IMPOUNDING ANIMALS, 129.
IMPRISONMENT,
for violating ordinance, 154.
IMPROVEMENTS, 329.
assessments for, 259 a, 277-282.
mandamus as applicable to, 377.
IMPERATIVE DUTIES AND POWERS,
enforceable by mandamus, 111, 360.
INCIDENTS OP TOLL, 819.
INCLOSURE OF PARKS, 226.
INCOME,
■when taxable, 268.
INCOMPATIBLE OFFICES, 86.
INCORPORATION,
acceptance of, 24.
by special act, 26.
by general act, 27.
mode of, 25.
by implication, 25.
INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS,
where taxable, 274.
INDEBTEDNESS,
limitations on, 189 a.
INDEMNITY,
for officials, 115.
f
INDEX. 815
References are to Sections.
INDICTMENT,
of municipal corporation, 400.
INDORSEMENT,
of bonds, 191 a.
of warrants, 179.
INFECTIOUS DISEASE,
city not liable for spread of, 332.
INJUNCTION,
and quo warranto distinguished, 359.
against municipal corporations, 391-397, inc.
INJUNCTION,
in condemnation proceedings, 249.
INFORMATION,
in nature of quo warranto, 379-387, inc.
INSANE.
care of, 126.
INSPECTION LAWS, 127.
INSPECTION OF RECORDS, 106.
INSURANCE COMPANIES,
where taxable, 273.
INTENTION TO DEDICATE, 219-221.
INTEREST ON BONDS, 192 6.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE,
cannot be taxed by state, 258.
INTOXICATION,
as contributory negligence, 352.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS,
power to license sale, 125.
INVALID GRANTS, 207.
INVALID ORDINANCES,
ratification of, 162.
IRREGULARITY OF SECURITIES,
how cured, 187 a.
IRREVOCABLE DEDICATION, 222.
J.
JANITOR,
of public buildings, 92.
JOINT BODIES, 98.
JUDGMENT,
in quo warranto, 386, 387.
JUDGES,
in municipal courts, 103.
JURISDICTION,
over streets, 288-302.
of equity over officers, 393.
of municipal courts, 502.
of courts over elections, 93.
816 INDEX.
Eeferences are to Sections.
JURORS,
in municipal courts, 103, 104, 105.
JURIES,
in municipal courts, 103, 104, 105.
JURY TRIAL,
in condemnation proceedings, 245.
L.
LACHES,
in mandamus proceedings, 365.
LANDS,
power to take, by right of eminent domain, 230-250.
power to regulate use of, 118.
purchased for public use, 208.
used for agricultural purposes, when taxable, 275.
LATERAL SUPPORT, 329.
LAW OF THE ROAD, 321.
LAWYERS,
license tax on, 268.
LEASE,
by municipal corporation, 210.
LEGALITY,
of appointment of ofiBoers, 77.
LEGALITY, OF CORPORATE CHARTER,
triable by quo warranto, 385.
LEGISLATIVE POWER,
over corporations, 7.
general statement as to legislative power, 8.
legislative power not unlimited, public and private character of mu-
nicipal corporations distinguished, 9.
effect of repeal or dissolution, 10.
legislative power over property of municipal corporations, 11.
legislative power over revenues, including penalties and franchises, 12.
legislative power over property held in trust, 13.
legislative power over municipal contracts, 14.
compulsory contracts, 15.
compulsory satisfaction of non-legal claims against cities, 16.
ratifying void local assessments, 17.
legislative control of offices and officers in municipal coi'poi-ations, 18.
to repeal charter, 32.
over bridges, 314.
over streets, 289, 301, 302, 308.
to apportion debts, 60.
LEGISLATURE,
exercise of right of eminent domain by, 231.
LETTING CONTRACTS, 172.
LEVY OF SPECIAL TAX,
compellable by mandamus, 376.
INDEX. ■ 817
Keferences are to Sections.
LIABILITY,
of abutter on contract in case of local improvements, 281.
of mtinicipal officers, 92.
of public officials, 168.
for exercise of discretionary powers, 328.
of city for debts, 212.
of city for highways, 339-346.
of city for property destroyed by mobs, 334.
of municipal corporation for changing grade, 329, 330.
of city for mistakes of officials, 331 a.
of municipal corporation for torts, 324, et seq.
of city for negligence, 324-355, inc.
of guasi-raunicipal corporations, 341.
LICENSES, 261 a.
for vehicles, 299.
granting, not compellable by mandamus, 362.
when a tax, 123.
no liability for refusal to grant, 331 a.
LICENSING POWER,
construed, 123-126.
LICENSEE,
liability of city for negligence of, 331 a.
LIEN OF TAXES, 283.
LIGHT AND AIK,
damage to, 301.
LIGHTING STEEETS, 295, 344 a.
LIMITATIONS,
on charter powers, 110-144 a.
of taxation, 266.
on municipal indebtedness, 189 a.
LOCAL ASSESSMENTS, 253-284, inc.
void, ratified by Legislature, 17.
LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS,
liability for negligence in prosecuting, 328.
LOCATION,
of gates on turnpike, 330.
of property for purposes of taxation, 272.
LOG ROLLING, 28.
LOTS,
sale of, as evidence of dedication, 221.
LOW-WATER MARK,
as boundary, 54.
MACADAMIZING, 291.
MAINTENANCE,
of bridge, 315-317, inc.
MAJORITY,
action by, 99.
52
M.
818 ■ INDEX.
Beferences are to Sections.
MALFEASANCE,
in office, 81.
MANDAMUS,
nature of, and wherein it differs from injunction, 360.
against municipal corporations, 360.
and quo warranto distinguished, 361.
distinction between discretionary and mandatory powers, as limiting
the right to, 362.
who may apply for the writ, 363.
prior judgment, when not necessary, 364.
practice — effect of laches, 365.
framing the writ and order to show cause, 366.
importance of a correct direction and proper service of the alternative
writ, 867.
return to the alternative writ, 368.
peremptory writ, when allowed — means of enforcing obedience, 369.
final judgment — effect of resignation or death of officials, 370.
as applicable to municipal elections and to elective officers, 371.
as applicable to removal and suspension of officials, 372.
as applicable to custodians of public records and of public funds, 373.
against school officers, 374.
in aid of the rights of municipal creditors, 375.
to compel levy of a special tax for specific object, 266, 376.
as applicable to municipal improvements, 377.
to compel repair of bridges, 316, 317.
MANDATOKT DUTIES,
enforced by mandamus, 362, 368.
MANDATORY AND DISCRETIOSTART POWERS,
distinguished. 111, 362.
MANDATORY POWERS, 111.
to levy taxes, 265.
MARKETS, 128.
MARRIED WOMAN,
may dedicate land, 218.
MAYOR,
his approval of ordinances, 148.
MEANS OF PROVING
abandonment, 310.
MECHANIC'S LIEN,
against corporations, 212.
MEDICAL TREATMENT,
no liability of city for unskillful, 332 a.
MEETINGS,
of council, 100.
of town, 95.
MERCHANDISE,
state taxes on sales of, 258.
METHODS OF PROCEEDING,
in municipal councils, 98.
INDEX. 819
References are to Sections.
METROPOLITAN POLICE, 18.
MILITARY REGULATION,
property discharged under, 335 a.
MINISTERIAL DUTIES, 348.
MISFEASANCE,
of municipal duty, 349.
MISNOMER,
effect of, 49, 50.
MISTAKE OF LAWS, 326 a.
as to corporate powers, 331 a.
in payment, 326 a.
MISUSER,
effect of, on dedication, 228.
MOBS,
liability for property destroyed by, 334.
MODE,
of levying taxes must be followed, 265.
of authorizing local assessments, 278-282, inc.
of contracting debts, 165, 170.
of common law dedication, 217.
MONOPOLIES, 144.
by municipality, 144 a.
power to create, 296.
MONET,
power to borrow, 137.
MORTGAGE,
power to, 209.
MORTGAGES,
when taxable, 275.
MORTMAIN, 200.
MOTIVE POWER,
change of, by street railways, 306, 306 a.
MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS, 396.
MUNICIPAL AND QUASI-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
their liability distinguished, 339.
MUNICIPAL CHARTER,
existence of, 385.
MUNICIPAL CREDITORS,
aided by mandamus, 375, 376.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
right of, to acquire property, 200.
real estate beyond corporate limits, 201.
donations of land to, 202.
power of, to serve as trustee of a charitable use, 203,
devises and grants for objects foreign to corporate purposes, 204.
gifts or grants to unincorporated communities, 205.
interference by State courts in performance of trusts by, 206.
invalid grants to, how invalidated, 207.
power of alienation, 208.
820 INDEX.
References are to Sections.
MUKICIPAL CORPOEATIOIirS— con«ijiue(Z.
power to mortgage, 209.
power to lease corporate property, 210.
requisites of conveyances by, 211.
sale of corporate property on execution — liability for debts, 212.
exercise of eminent domain by, 240.
dissolution, 37, et seq.
remedies against, 391-401, inc.
as owner of property, 336 a.
mandamus against, 360-371.
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL. See Councils.
MUNICIPAL COURTS,
power to establisb, 102.
competency of corporators as jurors, judges and witnesses, 103.
summary proceedings — ^jury trials, 104.
review by Superior Court — jury trials, 105.
MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. See Contracts.
MUNICIPAL OFFICERS. See Officeks.
MUNICIPAL POWERS,
over bridges, streets, etc., 286-321.
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. See Sbcubities, 177-199.
MUNICIPAL WARRANTS, 177-180.
N.
NAME,
corporate name, how obtained, 47.
change of corporate name — name acquired by reputation, 48.
effect of misnomer in general, 49.
use of corporate name in suits, 50.
NAVIGABLE WATERS, 121, 131, 314, 314 a.
their diversion, 239.
NEGLIGENCE,
in lighting streets, 344 a.
of cities, 324t-355, inc.
of firemen, 333 a.
how proven, 337.
contributory, 352.
NEGOTIABILITY,
of bonds, 191.
of warrants, 177, 179.
NEW ENGLAND TOWN, 4.
meetings, 95.
NEW CHARTER, 44.
NON ASSENT,
a defence in action to collect local assessments, 278.
NON LIABILITY,
of cities in certain cases, 324r-355, inc.
of city for contractor's lots, 347.
for performance of discretionary duties, 328.
INDEX. 821
References are to Sections.
XON LIABILITY— continued.
of public officials, 168.
of corporations for failing to abate nuisance, 327.
NON LEGAL CLAIMS, 16.
NONPERFORMANCE,
of conditions, 195 a.
of disci-etionary duties, 327.
NONRESIDENTS,
power to tax, 261.
NONUSER,
forfeiture of charter by, 39.
NONUSER OF HIGHWAY,
what constitutes, 310.
NOTES, when taxable, 275.
payable to corporation, power to enforce, 142.
NOTICE, JUDICIAL,
of charter, 30.
of coi'porate meeting, 95.
of ordinances, 153.
of seals, 52.
to abutters of assessments, 278, 279.
to bondholders, 195 d.
to municipality of defects, accidents, etc., 350a, 3506.
NUISANCES, 120.
caused by sewage, 355.
on streets, 309.
failure to abate, 327 a.
o.
OATH, official, 73.
OBJECT OF BILL, 28.
OBLIGATION,
of municipal corporations, enforceable by mandamus, 367.
OBSTRUCTION,
to harbor, 121.
in highways and streets, 340-346, inc., 350.
when not nuisances, 300, 301.
OCCUPATIONS,
licensing of, 123.
regulations of, 121.
OFFICE,
usurpation of, 378, 382.
OFFICES AND OFFICERS,
who are municipal officers ? 67.
legislative control over officers, 18, 68.
qualification for municipal office— women when eligible, 69.
civil service examinations, 70.
preference for veterans, 71.
official bonds, 72.
822 INDEX.
References are to Sections.
OFFICES Am) OFFIC^SS—continuea.
of&cial oaths, 73.
disqualifications on account o£ prior official position, 74.
appointments to office, 75.
exercise of the appointing power, 76.
legality of appointment presumed, 77.
acceptance of office, 78.
compensation, 79.
assignment of salary, 80.
holding over after expiration of term of office, 81.
vacancies, 82.
removals when for cause, 83.
proceedings to remove for cause, 84.
illegal removals — right to salary, 85.
resignations — ^incompatihle officers, 86.
general powers and duties of officers, 87.
de facto officers, 88.
police officials — power to arrest, 89.
the mayor — nature of his duties and powers, 90.
liability of the officer to the corporation, 91.
municipal liability for official acts, 92.
OFFICERS,
equity jurisdiction of, 393.
OFFICERS, MTHSnCIPAIi,
mandamus when applicable to, 270, 371.
authority to contract, 166, 169.
defined, 338 a.
OFFICIAL BONDS,
approval of, 362.
OFFICIALS,
cannot contract with city, 166.
mandamus as applicable to removal of, 372.
usurpation of office by, 378, 382.
OMNIBUS ROUTES, 299.
OMISSION,
of property from assessor's lists, 270.
OPENINGS IN SIDEWALKS, 298.
ORDER,
to show cause on mandamus, 366.
ORDISTANCES,
definition — ordinances and resolutions distinguished, 145.
power to pass ordinances, 146.
delegation of power of legislation — official non-liability, 147.
method of enactment — mode, time and proof of publication — mayor's
approval, 148.
must be enacted in good faith, 149.
must beJavrful and i-easonable, 150.
must not be oppressive, 151.
must be impartial and general, 152.
INDEX. 823
Beferences are to Sections.
ORDINANCES— contmued.
binding on whom — notice — evidence, 153.
power to enforce, by fines or imprisonment, 154.
forfeitures, 155.
procedure to enforce — arrest, 156.
action in name of corporation, 157.
pleading of, 158.
validity of, a question of law, 159.
evidence — defence — construction of, 160.
repealing, 161.
ratification of invalid, by Legislature, 162.
corporation not liable for failure to enforce, 331.
respecting dues, 129.
violations of, 104.
ineffectual to enlarge power to tax, 265.
OIIDINART CAltE DEFINED, 328.
ORNAMENTAL USE,
taking lands for, 236.
OWNERSHIP,
of monopolies by city, 144 o.
P.
PACKING HOUSES, 62.
PAR VALUE,
of bonds, 198.
PARK COMMISSIONERS, 338 a.
PARKS,
dedication and use of, 226.
PAROL ACTS,
of corporation, 51.
PAROL CONTRACTS,
of municipalities, 165.
PAROL EVIDENCE,
when admissible, 108.
when admissible to show dedication, 21!>.
PARTICULAR FUND,
warrants payable out of, 178.
PART PAYMENT,
not a ratification, 170.
PARTY WALLS, 131.
PATENT,
liability of city for infringement of, 338.
PATENTED ARTICLES,
contracts for, 172.
PASSENGERS,
right to carry, 302.
PAUPERS,
care of, 126.
824 INDEX.
Beferences are to Sections.
PAVEMENT,
power to construct, 291.
PAVING,
a local improvement, 259 a, 264.
PAYMENT,
by mistake, 326 a.
in cases of taking of property under right of eminent domain, 247.
of contractor, 171.
of coupon bonds, 191 a to 192 b.
of warrants, 177, 178.
of taxes under protest, 326 a.
when compulsory, 326 a.
PENALTIES,
legislative power over, 12.
for noncompletion of contracts, 174.
PENSIONS,
taxation for, 254.
PEECOLATIONS, 354 a.
PEREMPTORY WRIT,
of mandamus, 369.
PERFORMANCE,
of unlawful act not compellable by mandamus, 360.
PERMITS FOR BUILDING-, 131.
PERSONAL LIABILITY,
of public oflScials, 168.
PERSONAL PROPERTY,
taxation on, 268-276.
PEST HOUSE,
failure to provide, 327 a.
PETITION,
for local improvements, 278.
PHILADELPHIA,
boundary of, 54.
PIERS, 132.
PIPES IN STREETS, 295, 290.
PLACE OF HOLDING,
elections, 65, 95.
PLATTING,
as evidence of dedication, 221.
PLEADING ORDINANCES, 158.
POLES IN STREETS, 297, 306 a, 330.
POLICEMEN,
city not liable for the acts of, 333.
POLICE OFFICERS, 89, 333.
POLICE POWER, 116, 116 a.
and taxation distinguished, 253.
POLICE PROTECTION,
city not liable for insufficiency of, 333.
INDEX. 825
References are to Sections.
POLICE REGULATIONS,
of cities, 116-136.
POLL TAX, 260 a.
PORT OF MOBILE, 42.
POUNDS, 129.
POWER OF LEGISLATURE,
over corporations, 7-18.
See Legislative Powbe.
to change or enlarge taxing power of municipal corporation, 25*7.
to amend charter, 32.
of officers to arrest, 89.
POWER OF CITY. See Poweks, Chaetbk Powbbs.
to appoint officers, 76.
to establish municipal courts, 102.
to pass ordinances, 146.
to institute legislation, 117.
to exercise light of eminent domain, 230-250.
over property owned by it, 200-212.
to mortgage real property, 209.
to serve as trustee, 203.
to alienate real property, 208.
to lease real property, 210.
to tax, 253-284.
to levy taxes whence derived by municipal corporation, 255.
to tax cannot be delegated, 263.
of taxing is continuous, 264.
to tax, when and when not implied, 256.
over streets and bridges, 286-321.
to borrow money, 182. .
to issue warrants, 177 et seq.
to issue negotiable securities, 183.
POWERS,
exercise of, beyond city limits, 62.
of mayor, 90.
of officers in general, 87.
when mandatory, 362.
charter, 110-144 a.
See Chabtbb Powbes.
PRACTICE,
in mandamus proceedings, 365-370.
in quo warranto, 379-381, inc.
PREFERENCE TO VETERANS,
in appointment of officers, 71.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS, 392.
PRESCRIPTION, 114.
PRESENTMENT,
of coupons, 192.
of warrants, 178, 179.
PRESIDING OFFICERS, 96.
826 INDEX.
Beferences are to Sections.
PRESUMPTION,
of dedication, 219, et seq.
of notice of defect in highway, 350 o, 3505.
PREVENTION OF FIRES, 130.
PRIOR JUDGMENT,
when necessary in mandamus, 375.
PRIVATE ALLEYS, 287.
PRIVATE BRIDGES, 317.
PRIVATE CHARACTER,
of municipal corporations, 336 a.
PRIVATE PURPOSES,
bonds in aid of, 188.
taxes cannot be levied for a, 254.
PRIVATE ROADS,
lands for, 234 a.
PRIVATE WHARVES, 132.
PROCEEDINGS,
in quo warranto, 379-381, inc.
to vacate streets, 309.
to annex municipality, 61.
to remove for cause, 84.
PROFESSIONS,
taxes upon, 259, 261.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES.
contracts for, 172.
PROHIBITION,
remedy of, in condemnation proceedings, 249.
to courts, 401.
PROOF,
of corporate existence, 31.
of negligence, 337.
of records, 107.
PROPERTY,
when taxable, 268-276.
See Taxation,
which may be taken under the right of eminent domain, 234-239.
PROPERTY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 200-212.
apportionment of, in subdivision of cities, 60.
legislative power over, 10.
PROPERTY OWNERS,
municipal corporations as, 336 a.
PROPOSALS, SEALED, 173.
PROVING NEGLIGENCE, 337. .
PROVISIONS,
unwholesome, sale of, 118.
PROXIMATE CAUSE, 351.
PUBLICATION,
of ordinances, 148.
INDEX. 827
References are to Sections.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOK,
municipal liability for, 92.
PUBLIC BENEFIT,
what is, 246.
PUBLIC BRIDGES,
control of, etc., 313-316, inc.
PUBLIC BUILDINGS,
power to erect, 141.
dedication of, 227.
PUBLIC DUTIES,
no liability for their nonperformance, 325.
PUBLIC OFFICIALS,
not liable, 168.
PUBLIC PROPERTY,
not taxable, 271.
PUBLIC PURPOSE,
what is, 184, 234, 235.
taxes must be levied for, 254.
PUBLIC RECORDS,
' mandamus to obtain delivery or inspection, 373.
PUBLIC SQUARES, 226.
PUBLIC USE,
dedication to, 214^229.
PUBLIC WELFARE,
clause, 135.
PUBLIC WHARF,
not- taxable, 271 — control of, by city, 133.
PUBLIC WORKS,
contracts for, 171.
PUPIL m SCHOOL,
mandamus to compel admission of, 374.
PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE,
given by city, 209.
I
Q.
QUALIFICATION,
of voters, 66.
QUARANTINE,
ordinary, 118.
QUASI-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
liability of, 325, 341.
QUO WARRANTO,
when granted, 361.
and mandamus distinguished, 361.
nature of, 378.
by whom proceedings are instituted, 379.
practice and procedure— power discretionary, 380.
how far remedy by quo warranto is superseded by special statutory
proceedings for the control of contested elections, 381.
828 INDEX.
Beferences are to Sections.
QUO WAREANTO— continued.
user on part of usurper necessary, 382.
the burden of proof, 383.
quo warranto proceedings to secure the forfeiture of a municipal char-
ter, 384.
quo warranto to test the legal existence of municipal corporations, 385.
effect of judgment in quo warranto, 386.
effect of judgment when not rendered during of&cial term, 387.
QUORUM,
of municipal council, 99.
B.
RAILINGS AROUND EXCAVATIONS, 343.
RAILROAD AID,
by cities, 184-188.
RAILROAD TRAINS,
speed of, 291, 306.
LAILEOADS,
and highways distinguished, 305.
in streets, 144, 302-307, inc.
within city limits, 135 a.
taxation of, 273.
RATIFICATION,
of contracts, 170.
of void assessments, 280.
unauthorized taxation, 262.
READING ORDINANCES, 148.
REAL ESTATE,
taxation on, 268-276, inc.
power of city to own, 200-212.
REASSESSMENT, 280.
REBUILDING BRIDGES, 316.
RECITALS,
in bonds, their effect, 196. •
RECONSIDERATION,
by council, 98.
RECORD OP DEED,
mandamus to compel, 373.
RECORDS, MUNICIPAL,
custody of, power to amend, 106.
as evidence — admissions, 107.
admissibility of parol evidence to explain, 108.
REFUSE,
removal of, 119.
REGISTRATION OF BONDS, 191 b.
REGULAR MEETINGS, 97.
REGULATION,
of street travel, 299.
INDEX. 829
Keferences are to Sections.
REINSTATEMENT,
of officer, mandamus to compel, 372.
RELATOR,
ia mandamus proceedings, 363, et seq.
REMAINDERMAN,
must pay share of assessments, 259 a.
REMEDIES AGAINST MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
equitable remedies, 391.
necessity for equitable remedies — codes of procedure — preliminary in-
junction, 392.
equitable jurisdiction over municipal officials, 393.
municipal corporations as trustees, 394.
taxpayers' suits in equity, 395.
injunction to restrain damages to private property — multiplicity of
suits, 390.
injunction to restrain the collection of taxes, 397.
scope of certiorari, 398.
what may be examined under writ of certiorari, 399.
indictment, 400.
writ of prohibition, 401.
by mandamus, 359-377, inc.
See Mandamus.
for contested elections, 381.
by quo warranto, 378-387, inc.
See Quo ■Wabbanto.
to enforce payments of municipal bonds, 194.
REMOVAL OF BONDS, 197.
REMOVAL OF OFFICERS, 83, 84, 85.
mandamus to compel, 372.
REPAIRS,
to bridges, 314, 316. •
to streets, 290, et seq.
to turnpikes, 319.
to highways, 340-346, 355.
REPAIRING, 264.
REPEAL,
of municipal corporation, 10.
of ordinances, 161.
of cliarter, 32.
REPUTATION,
name acquired by, 48.
RES GEST^, 107.
RESIDENCE,
of voters, 66.
of officers, 86.
RESIGNATION,
of officers, 82, 86.
of official to avoid mandamus, 367, 368, 370.
830 INDEX.
References are to Sections.
RESOLUTIONS,
and ordinances distinguished, 145.
RESTRAINT,
on tiade, 122.
RETROSPECTIVE TAXES,
power to levy, 262.
RETURN,
to writ of mandamus, 368.
REVENUES, OP CORPORATIONS,
legislative power over, 11.
REVISORY PROCEEDING,
in condemnation of lands, 249.
REWARDS, 140.
RIGHT TO JURT TRIAL, 154.
RIGHTS,
of abutting owners, 301-307, inc.
of municipalities over building and maintaining bridges, 314, 316.
RIOTERS,
liability of city for property destroyed by, 334.
RIPARIAN OWNERS,
their rights, 225, 354.
ROAD,
the law of, 321.
ROAD TAX, 260.
ROLLING STOCK,
of road, when taxable, 273.
ROOFS, 131.
RURAL PROPERTY,
when taxable, 276.
S.
SALARY,
of officer, 79, 80.
right of de facto officer to, 85.
payment not comoellable by mandamus, 360.
SALE,
of bonds, 198.
of corporate property on execution, 212.
of land by municipal corporation, 211.
of lots as evidence of dedication, 221.
of public land, 229.
SALESMEN,
when taxable by State, 258.
SANITARY REGULATIONS, 118.
SCHOOL OFFICERS,
mandamus against, 374.
SCRIP,
of cities, 181.
INDEX. 831
References are to Sections.
SEAL,
requirement of a corporate, 51.
how proved, 52.
use of, in contracts, 165.
SEALED PROPOSALS, 173.
SEALING INSTRUMENT,
mandamus to compel, 373.
SECRET BALLOT, 66.
SECURITIES OF MUNICIPALITY,
municipal warrants — negotiability — form and effect — pi-esentment —
payment, 177.
warrants payable out of a particular fund, 178.
presentment of warrants — indorsement — actions by and against
whom, 179.
when actions may be brought — defences — Statute of Limitations, 180.
municipal scrip — illegal obligations as circulating medium, 181.
implied power to borrow money and to emit negotiable paper, 182.
power to issue negotiable securities, 183.
public purposes — aid to railroad, 184.
construction, completion and location of road as affecting the validity
of bonds issued in its aid, 185.
subscriptions for stock— conditions precedent, 186.
legislative power to compel the issue of bonds for public purposes, 187.
curative statutes validating irregular subscriptions and invalid securi-
ties, 187 a.
bonds issued in aid of private purposes — constitutional prohibitions,
188.
consent of taxpayers or voters as a condition precedent to issue of
municipal bonds, 189.
limitations upon municipal indebtedness, 189 a.
the municipal coupon bond — its nature and definition, 190.
execution of the municipal bond— by what officials must it be signed,
190 a.
negotiability of coupon bonds— rights of holder of the same, 191.
to whom payable— transfer by indorsement or delivery, 191 a.
registration of municipal securities by State officials, 191 6.
presentment of coupons for payment, 192.
the time of payment, 192 a.
interest and exchange on bond and coupon, 192 6.
actions on bonds and coupons, 193.
when consideration paid to corporation for invalid bond may be re-
covered, 193 a.
legislative control of remedies to enforce payment of municipal debts,
194.
remedies for enforcement of municipal indebtedness, 194 a
defences to bonds— conflict of decisions, 195.
burden of proof, 195 a.
doctrine of estoppel, as applicable to bona fide holders-effect of re-
citals in the bonds, 190.
832 INDEX.
Keferences are to Sections.
SECURITIES OF MUNICIPALITY— confmued.
renewal and funding, 197.
disposal and sale of bonds, 198.
Statute of Limitations, 199.
of State not taxable, 271.
SEMI-PRIVATE USE OF STREETS, 296.
SERVANTS OF CITY,
defined, 338 a.
negligence of, 338.
SERVICE OF WRIT,
mandamus, 367-370.
services of officer, 79.
SEWAGE,
may be discharge beyond city limits, 294.
SEWERS,
negligence in care of, 354 a, 355.
local assessments for, 277, 294.
SHOWBOARDS,
on streets, 300.
SICK PERSONS,
care of, 126.
SIDEWALKS,
vaults under, 298.
power of city over, 290, 291, 298, 327 a, 330, 346, 348.
SIGNATURE TO BONDS, 190 a.
SIGNS,
falling in streets, 344, 348.
SLAUGHTER HOUSES, 118.
SNOW ON SIDEWALKS, 299.
SOIL OF STREETS,
right of city to, 293, 294.
SPECIFICATIONS AND PLANS, 173.
SPEED OF TRAVEL, 299.
STATE AND MUNICIPAL OFFICIAL DISTINGUISHED, 338 a.
STATE COURTS,
their power to enforce trusts, 206.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 165.
STATUTE LAWS,
municipal power to legislate upon subjects covered by, 117.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 284.
on warrants, 180.
applied to bonds, 199.
applicable to public easement in streets, 312.
STATUTORY DEDICATIONS, 214, et seq.
STATUTORY LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 824.
of municipal and gMasi-raunicipal corporations, 324r-355, inc.
for repairs of highways, 340, 341.
STATUTORY LIENS, 284.
INDEX. 833
References are to Sections.
STEAM RAILWAY,
in highways not a taking, 303.
STREAMS,
as houndaries, 54.
STREETS,
definition of, 286.
alleys, 287.
conflict of jurisdiction ovei- streets, 288.
delegation of legislative power over, 289.
construction of charter powers over, 290.
power to pave construed, 291.
power to improve, pave and grade continuous, 292.
rights of the municipality in soil of the streets, in general, 293.
right of municipality in soil of the streets for construction of sewers
and cisterns, 294.
pipes in streets, for gas and other purposes, 295.
power to grant an exclusive franchise to lay pipes and to use streets
for other semi-private purposes, 296.
poles for the hanging of telegraph and other wires. Abutter' s right
to compensation, 291.
openings in and vaults under sidewalks, 298.
municipal regulation of street travel and ti-affic, 299.
obstructions, 300.
legislative control of — rights of abutting owners therein, 301.
legislative power over the construction of railroads. Its delegation to
cities; construction of grant, 302.
rights of abutting owners, how affected by construction of steam rail-
roads along the, 303.
abutting owners, how affected by surface street railways, 304.
elevated street railways in relation to abutting owners, 305.
municipal control over the construction and operation of railroads in
streets, 306.
electric and cable cars on street railways, 306 a.
remedies of abutters — ^measure of damages, 307.
vacation of streets by Legislature — delegation of power to municipal
corporations, 308.
procer dings to vacate, 309.
burden and means of proving vacation and abandonment, 810.
compensation to abutters on vacation, 311.
statute of limitations, as applicable to the public easement in street —
equitable estoppel, 312.
the law o. the road, 321.
paving of, etc., 264.
in parks, i iO.
snow and ice in, 344.
lighting of, 344 a.
liability for their condition, 329, 330, 339, 340, 342-350 a, inc.
SQUARES,
dedication and use of, 226.
53
834 INDEX.
Keferences are to Sections.
SUBSCKIPTION,
for stook by the city, 186.
SUBSOIL,
of sidewalk, its use by abutter, 298.
SUITS,
use of corporate name in, 50.
by taxpayers, 395.
by municipalties, 143.
multiplicity of, 396.
SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS, 104.
SUNDAY TRAVELING, 352.
SURETIES,
for officers, 91.
See Bonds.
SURFACE WATER,
damage from, 354 a.
SUPERVISION,
of contractor by, officer, 174.
SUSPENSION,
of officer, mandamus to compel, 372.
T.
TAKING OP PROPERTY,
for public use, 294, 295', 302, 308, 304, 306, 306 a.
TAXATION,
legislative power over, 14.
defined and distinguished from eminent domain and police power, 253.
authorized only for public purposes, 254.
municipal authority to levy taxes whence derived, 255.
municipal power to tax, when implied, 256.
legislature may change the taxing power of municipalities at will, 257.
federal limitations in the exercise of the power of, 258.
constitutional provisions as to requirements of uniformity and equal-
ity, 259.
uniformity and equality in local assessments, 259 a.
road tax and compulsory labor on the same, 260.
poll tax, constitutional, 260 a.
power to tax professions, trades and callings, 261.
power to levy retrospective taxes, 262.
municipality cannot delegate its authority, 263.
power of taxation a continuing one, 264.
power of taxation cannot be varied or enlarged by city ordinances, 265.
limitation of tax rate cannot be exceeded, 266.
construction and reconcilement of general laws with special charter
provisions, 267.
what can be taxed, 268.
discrimination between real and personal property when permissi-
ble, 269.
exemption from taxes, when permitted, 270.
INDEX. 835
References are to Sections.
TAXATION— coniinited.
public property not taxable, 271.
what property is within municipality for purposes of taxation, 272.
taxation of banks, railways and other corporations, 273.
taxation of incorporeal hereditaments, 274.
choses in action when taxable, 275.
taxation of agricultural land, 276.
local assessments for sewers, 277.
notice to and assent of abutters to assessments, 278.
power of legislature to dispense with notice, 279.
re-assessments, 280.
adjoining owner's relation to contract — his liability, 281.
methods of collection, 282.
lien of taxes, 283.
Statute of Limitations, 284.
TAXING DISTRICT, 42.
establishment of, 259.
TAXES,
levy compellable by mandamus, 375.
TAXES ILLEGAL, 326.
restrained, 397.
TAXPAYERS' REMEDY, 173.
in equity, 395.
TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONES,
wires and poles in streets, 297.
TERRITORY,
division into wards, 63.
TERMS OF OFFICE, 79, 81.
THEATERS, 131.
TIME OF PAYMENT,
of bonds, 192 a.
ot holding elections, 65.
TITLE TO OFFICE,
triable by quo warranto, 371.
TOLL, 318-320.
TONNAGE, 133.
TORTS,
of abutters, 348.
of contractor, 347.
TORTS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
implied liability of municipal corporations, 324.
2«asi- municipal corporations not liable for breach of official duty, 325.
liability of municipal corporations for illegal taxes, fines and licenses,
326.
payment must be compulsory, 326 a.
municipal corporations not liable for non-performance of discretionary
duties, 327.
failure to abate nuisances, 327 a.
liability for negligent supply of water, 327 6.
836 INDEX.
References are to Sections.
TOKTS OF MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS— conimMed.
liability for manner in which discretionary powers are exercised, 328.
consequential damages — changes in the grade of sti'eets — improve-
ments, 329.
constitutional and statutory provisions, guaranteeing compensation
for property damaged — remedy, 330.
municipal corporations not liable for failure to enforce ordinances, 331.
liability for mistake as to corporate powers, 331 a.
municipality not liable for neglect or misconduct of health officers, 332.
municipality not liable for torts of police officials, 333.
liability for torts of firemen, 333 a.
liability for property destroyed by mobs and rioters, 334.
destruction of buildings to prevent a conflagration, 335.
destruction of property under military and sanitary regulations, 335 a.
receipt of consideration, as a ground of liability for negligence, 336.
liability as an owner of property, 336 a.
how may negligence be proven, 337.
negligence of municipal servants — what must be px'oven— torts ultra
vires, 338.
who is a municipal officer or agent, 338 a.
liability for the condition of highways and streets — municipal and
gwosi-municipal corporations distinguished, 339.
statutory liability for neglect in maintenance and repair of highways
— construction, 340.
guast-municipal corporation, when liable for specific duties, 341.
municipal liability for injury from defective streets — horses taking
fright, 342.
railings or barriers, signs and lights, to guard excavations, areas, and
basements, 343.
accidents caused by ice and snow, 344.
negligence in lighting streets, 344 a.
falling of weighty things in highways, 345.
right to go outside the traveled path — estoppel to deny existence of
highway — sidewalks, 346.
liability for work given out on contract— liability for torts of contract-
ors, 34Y.
liability for torts of abutters — liability of abutters for the same, 348.
liability for neglect in performance of ministerial duties, 349.
defects and obstructions created by municipal corporations, 350.
necessity for, and evidence admissible, to show notice, in order to
charge corporation with negligence, 350 a.
proximate cause, 351.
contributory negligence, 352.
damages in suits for negligence, 352 a.
bridges, 353.
water courses, 354.
surface water, 354 a.
drains and sewers, 355.
INDEX. 837
References are to Sections.
TOWN COUNCILS, 96.
powers of, 155. '
TOWN MEETINGS, 95.
TOWN,
in New England, 3.
TOWN HALL,
power to rent, 210.
TRACKS OF HORSE CAli COMPANY,
may be used, 321.
TRADES,
power to tax, 261.
TRANSFER OF BONDS,
by indorsement, 191 a.
TRAVEL ON STREETS, 299, 300, 303-306 o, 340-346
TRAVELED PATH,
what is, 346, 352.
TRAVELERS,
defined, 340.
TREES,
cutting down, 154.
TRIAL BY JURY, 104.
See Municipal Courts,
TROLLEY CARS,
in streets, 306 a.
TRUSTEE,
municipal corporations as, 13, 203, 207.
TRUSTEES OF SCHOOLS,
mandamus against, 374.
TURNPIKES, 318.
extent of municipal power over turnpike, 319.
incidents of toll, 320.
u.
ULTRA VIRES,
acquiescence by citizens, 169.
illegal contracts distinguished from, 170.
as a defence to contracts and torts, 169.
in cases of tort, 338.
UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS, 259, 259 a.
UNINCORPORATED COMMUNITY,
gifts to, 205.
UNION SOLDIERS,
preference to, 71.
UNLAWFUL ARRESTS,
by policemen, city not liable for, 333.
USAGE,
in construing powers, 114.
USER,
as evidence of dedication, 220.
838 INDEX,
References are to Sections.
USURPATION,
of officers, STS, 382.
USUEPER OF OFFICE,
action against, 361.
UNWHOLESOME
provisions, 118.
V-
VACANCIES,
in office, 82.
VACATION,
of turnpikes, 318.
of streets, 228, 308-312, inc.
VAGRANTS,
care of, 126.
V^AGUENESS IN BOUNDARIES, .53.
VALIDITY,
of local assessment, 277-281, inc.
of ordinances, 159.
VALUE OF PROPERTY,
taken by exercise of eminent domain, 246.
VARIATIONS OF CONTRACTS, 155.
VAULTS UNDER SIDEWALKS, 298.
VEHICLES,
power to regulate, 299, 306.
VESSELS,
where taxable, 272.
VETERANS, 71.
VIOLATION OP ORDINANCES, 351.
VOID TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS, 326.
w.
WAGONS,
license to nonresidents, 153.
on street, 299.
WAIVER,
by municipality, 197.
WANTON INJURY,
by officials, 355.
WARDS, 63.
WARNING TOWN MEETINGS, 95.
WARRANTS,
municipal, 177-180.
WATER,
failure to supply, 327, 327 6, 333 a, 336 a.
refusal to furnish, 151.
WATERCOURSES, 354.
WATER COMMISSIONERS, 338 a.
INDEX. 839
References are to Sections.
WATEEPIPES,
in streets, 295.
WATER RENTS,
not taxes, 284.
WATER SUPPLY, 175.
contract fox-, 119.
WATER WORKS, 144 a.
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES, 127,
WHARF A&E, 132, 133.
WHARVES, 132, 133.
WIDENING AND GRADING,
distinguished, 330.
WIRES IN STREETS, 297.
WOMEN,
when eligible to office, 69.
WOODEN BUILDINGS, 130.
WRIT,
of mandamus, 359-377, inc.
of quo warranto, 379-387, inc.
injunction, 391-397, inc.
WRITING,
use of in contracts, 165.
KF 5305 T55
Aulhot ~ Vol.
Tiedeman, Christopher G-ustavus
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Tjlj, ±i. CTeaTUXse Cfir one j-aw Co_
,pt municipal corporations in
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